ML19319B812: Difference between revisions

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| document report number = NUDOCS 8001270277
| document report number = NUDOCS 8001270277
| package number = ML19319B708
| package number = ML19319B708
| document type = REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE REPORT (SEE ALSO AO,LER), TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
| document type = REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE REPORT (SEE ALSO AO LER), TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
| page count = 2
| page count = 2
}}
}}
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=Text=
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:_
{{#Wiki_filter:_
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Channel 3 of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) was inoperable. The                                                                                               1 g[ 89 3
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t vtNT DE SCRePYeoM g: Channel 3 of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) was inoperable. The 1
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i                                                        TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY DAVIS-BESSE U'i1T ONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION SUPPLEME' ITAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-33-77-67 4
U TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY i
l l         DATE OF EVENT: August 19, 1977 FACILITY: Davis-Besse Unit 1 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE: Channel 3 of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) was inoperable.                                           .[ *
DAVIS-BESSE U'i1T ONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION SUPPLEME' ITAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-33-77-67 4
                                                                        , _        o
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DATE OF EVENT: August 19, 1977 FACILITY: Davis-Besse Unit 1 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE: Channel 3 of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) was inoperable.
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Conditions Prior to Occurrence: The placticeu in Mode 2, with Power (MWT) = 0, and Load (MWE) = 0.
Conditions Prior to Occurrence: The placticeu in Mode 2, with Power (MWT) = 0, and Load (MWE) = 0.
Description of Occurrence: On August 19, 1977, at 0830 hours, under normal operat-
Description of Occurrence: On August 19, 1977, at 0830 hours, under normal operat-ing conditions, the Control Room Operator observed that the reactor flow indication was decreasing. Upon checking in the RPS cabinet, it was found that the reactor coolant flow meter of Loop B, Channel 3 was at zero. The flow test module was then placed in the zero position thus tripping RPS Channel 3 at 0832 hours. This was done in compliance with Action Statement 2 of Technical Specification 3.3.1.1, specifically pertaining to Iten 4 of Table 3.3-L Functional Unit Flux - d Flux -
,          ing conditions, the Control Room Operator observed that the reactor flow indication was decreasing. Upon checking in the RPS cabinet, it was found that the reactor coolant flow meter of Loop B, Channel 3 was at zero. The flow test module was then placed in the zero position thus tripping RPS Channel 3 at 0832 hours. This
: Flow, a
;          was done in compliance with Action Statement 2 of Technical Specification 3.3.1.1, specifically pertaining to Iten 4 of Table 3.3-L Functional Unit Flux - d Flux -
4 Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence: Upon investigation, it was found that the fuse which supplies power to the flow transmitter FT RC01B3 was not making proper contact with the fuse holder. This prohibited FT RC01B3 from operating, causing the zero flow reading in the RPS cabinet.
Flow, a
This cecurrence can be attributed to a component failure due to the fact that the fuse holder had to be cleaned and the fuse realigned.
4         Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence: Upon investigation, it was found that the fuse which supplies power to the flow transmitter FT RC01B3 was not making proper contact with the fuse holder. This prohibited FT RC01B3 from operating, causing the zero flow reading in the RPS cabinet.
Analysis of Occurrence: There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or station personnel since the redundant RPir;Chacnels 1, 2 and 4 were operable at the time Channel 3 was tripped,in complianc;:cchh Action Statement 2 of Technical Specification 3.3.1.1.
>        This cecurrence can be attributed to a component failure due to the fact that the fuse holder had to be cleaned and the fuse realigned.                                                             _
Corrective Action: The fuse which supplies power to FT RC0133 was removed, the fuse i
Analysis of Occurrence: There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or station personnel since the redundant RPir;Chacnels 1, 2 and 4 were operable at                                 -
holder cleaned, and the fuse was realigned in the fuse holder which returned flow j
the time Channel 3 was tripped,in complianc;:cchh Action Statement 2 of Technical Specification 3.3.1.1.                                           ,
transmitter FT RC0133 to service. At 1345 hours on August 19, 1977, Surveillance l
Corrective Action: The fuse which supplies power to FT RC0133 was removed, the fuse i           holder cleaned, and the fuse was realigned in the fuse holder which returned flow j           transmitter FT RC0133 to service. At 1345 hours on August 19, 1977, Surveillance l
Test ST 5099.01, " Miscellaneous Instrument Shift Check" was performed for RPS Chan-nel 3 and was declared operable removing the station from Action Statement 2 of 1
Test ST 5099.01, " Miscellaneous Instrument Shift Check" was performed for RPS Chan-                                 l nel 3 and was declared operable removing the station from Action Statement 2 of                                       l 1           Technical Specification 3.3.1.1.
Technical Specification 3.3.1.1.
4
4 To prevent recurrence, Maintenance Work Order IC-571-77 has been issued to check i
;          To prevent recurrence, Maintenance Work Order IC-571-77 has been issued to check i           all eight flow transmitter fuses for proper alignment and cleanliness. This work                                     l I
all eight flow transmitter fuses for proper alignment and cleanliness. This work l
was completed on August 9. 1977.
was completed on August 9. 1977.
    ''      Failure Data: No previous similar events have occurred.
Failure Data: No previous similar events have occurred.
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Latest revision as of 19:49, 1 January 2025

RO NP-33-77-67:on 770819,reactor Protection Sys Channel 3 Coolant Flow Meter Found at Zero.Caused by Improper Contact Between Flow Transmitter Ft RC01B3 Power Supply Fuse & Fuse Holder.Holder Cleaned & Fuse Realigned in Fuse Holder
ML19319B812
Person / Time
Site: Davis Besse 
Issue date: 09/15/1977
From: Borsyiak M, Lingenfelter J
TOLEDO EDISON CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML19319B708 List:
References
NUDOCS 8001270277
Download: ML19319B812 (2)
v • d • e


Text

_

O LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

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t vtNT DE SCRePYeoM g: Channel 3 of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) was inoperable. The 1

7 89 g[ flow test module was placed in the zero position, tripping RPS Channel 1 3

89 g;

3.

This is not a repetitive occurrence.

(NF-30-77-67)

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DAVIS-BESSE U'i1T ONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION SUPPLEME' ITAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-33-77-67 4

l l

DATE OF EVENT: August 19, 1977 FACILITY: Davis-Besse Unit 1 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE: Channel 3 of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) was inoperable.

.[

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Conditions Prior to Occurrence: The placticeu in Mode 2, with Power (MWT) = 0, and Load (MWE) = 0.

Description of Occurrence: On August 19, 1977, at 0830 hours0.00961 days <br />0.231 hours <br />0.00137 weeks <br />3.15815e-4 months <br />, under normal operat-ing conditions, the Control Room Operator observed that the reactor flow indication was decreasing. Upon checking in the RPS cabinet, it was found that the reactor coolant flow meter of Loop B, Channel 3 was at zero. The flow test module was then placed in the zero position thus tripping RPS Channel 3 at 0832 hours0.00963 days <br />0.231 hours <br />0.00138 weeks <br />3.16576e-4 months <br />. This was done in compliance with Action Statement 2 of Technical Specification 3.3.1.1, specifically pertaining to Iten 4 of Table 3.3-L Functional Unit Flux - d Flux -

Flow, a

4 Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence: Upon investigation, it was found that the fuse which supplies power to the flow transmitter FT RC01B3 was not making proper contact with the fuse holder. This prohibited FT RC01B3 from operating, causing the zero flow reading in the RPS cabinet.

This cecurrence can be attributed to a component failure due to the fact that the fuse holder had to be cleaned and the fuse realigned.

Analysis of Occurrence: There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or station personnel since the redundant RPir;Chacnels 1, 2 and 4 were operable at the time Channel 3 was tripped,in complianc;:cchh Action Statement 2 of Technical Specification 3.3.1.1.

Corrective Action: The fuse which supplies power to FT RC0133 was removed, the fuse i

holder cleaned, and the fuse was realigned in the fuse holder which returned flow j

transmitter FT RC0133 to service. At 1345 hours0.0156 days <br />0.374 hours <br />0.00222 weeks <br />5.117725e-4 months <br /> on August 19, 1977, Surveillance l

Test ST 5099.01, " Miscellaneous Instrument Shift Check" was performed for RPS Chan-nel 3 and was declared operable removing the station from Action Statement 2 of 1

Technical Specification 3.3.1.1.

4 To prevent recurrence, Maintenance Work Order IC-571-77 has been issued to check i

all eight flow transmitter fuses for proper alignment and cleanliness. This work l

was completed on August 9. 1977.

Failure Data: No previous similar events have occurred.

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