ML20009C116: Difference between revisions

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{{Adams
#REDIRECT [[05000270/LER-1981-001, Forwards LER 81-001/03X-1.Detailed Event Analysis Encl]]
| number = ML20009C116
| issue date = 06/19/1981
| title = Forwards LER 81-001/03X-1.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
| author name = Parker W
| author affiliation = DUKE POWER CO.
| addressee name = Oreilly J
| addressee affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
| docket = 05000270
| license number =
| contact person =
| document report number = NUDOCS 8107200299
| package number = ML20009C117
| document type = CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS, INCOMING CORRESPONDENCE, UTILITY TO NRC
| page count = 2
}}
 
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:.
s DUKE POWER COMPANY                                            ' col' '
Powra Bun.o NG 42 2 Sourn Cituacii STREET, CHAnwTTE, N. C. aaa4a w w 4u o. e4 a n c a, s a.                    June 19, 1981                              .  .
Vice PmC*1 DENT                                                                    AICL CPheON C; AB C A 704 St Cau AmODuCTiON                                                                                373-4083 ff. cc5- t 34 '
Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II                                                                                -
c9
                                                                                            ~
101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 f
                                                                                  . . JUL 171981
* d Re: Oconee Nuclear Station                                              "
p,s. m uauuuon        -4 Docket No. 50-270                                        \_4.  /
oo*'5" "
 
==Dear Mr. O'Reilly:==
 
Please find attached Reportable Occurrence Report R0-270/81-1, Revision 1.
This report is submitted pursuaat to'Oconee Nuclear Station Technical j          Specification 6.6.2.1.b(2), which concerns operntion in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operatioc, sud describes an incident
,        which is considered to be of no significance with respect to its effect on l        the health and safety of the public.
Investigation of the incident, " Nonexistent Flow cf LPSW to 2A HPI Pump Motor Bearing Coolers," has been cou.pleted. The additional information resulting from this investigation is included in the attached. The original report was submitted to your office by my letter of February 19, 1981.
Very truly yours, A                                                ,
                                                                /
William O. Parker, Jr.
JLJ:ses Attachment cc: Director                                                    Mr. Bill Lavallee Office of Management & Program Analysis              Nuclear Safety Analysis Center U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission                  P. O. Box 10412 Washington, D. C.      20555                        Palo Alto, California 94303 fI      i 8107200299 810619 -
PDR ADOCK 05000270 D                          PDR                                                                                          .
J
 
DUKE POWER COMPANY OCONEE UNIT 2 Report Number: R0-270/81-1, Revision 1 Report Date: June 19, 1981 Occurrence Date: January 20, 1981 Facility: Oconee Unit 2, Seneca, South Carolina Identification of Occurrence: Non-Existent Flou of LPSW to "2A" HPI Pump Motor Bearing Coolers Conditions Prior to Occurrence:            100% FP Description of Occurrence:
At approximately 0230 on January 20, 1981, it was discovered that there was no flow of Low Pressure Service Water (LPSW) to the "2A" High Pressure Injection (HPI) pu.'p. This lack of flow was found during the pre-start check for the "2A" HPI pump. This constitutes operation in c degraded mode per Technical l          Specification 3.3.1.c.'2(b) and is thus reportable pursuant to Technical Speci-fication 6.6.2.1.b(2).
Apparent Cause of Occurrence _:
The reaton for the loss of flow appears to be " crud" buildup within the carbon steel line.
Analysis of Occurrence:
The line in which LPSW flow was stopped is the discharge from-HPI pump "A" motor bearing cooling jacket. Flow must be maintained in order to keep a_ safe 1
opernting temperature for the HPI pump motor bearings. In case of failure of the temperature controller valve in this line there is a bypass line te main-tain flow. The bypass was used, and the use of "2A" HPI pump was not J ost.
At the time it was found that there was no flow in the "2A" bearing cooler, pumps "2B" and "2C" were available for use.                  Therefore, the HPI system was not impaired. Also the use of "2A" was quickly regained when flow was restored.
Thus, this incident was of no significance with respect to safe operation and the health and safety of the public were not affected.
Corrective Action:
,          When lack of flow was encountered, valve 2/TCV/p was bypassed, and flow was restored. A modification to replace portions of the carbon steel piping with stainless steel will be implemented.
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