ENS 52004: Difference between revisions
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| event date = 06/13/2016 17:33 CDT | | event date = 06/13/2016 17:33 CDT | ||
| last update date = 07/08/2016 | | last update date = 07/08/2016 | ||
| title = Alert Sirens Failed | | title = Alert Sirens Failed to Rotate | ||
| event text = At 1845 CDT on June 13, 2016, TVA Corporate Emergency Preparedness notified the Shift Manager at Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant that eight of the BFN [Browns Ferry Nuclear] Alert & Notification Sirens (19, 39, 55, 59, 60, 61, 69, 95) failed to rotate. The sirens were activated at 0915 CDT. Post sounding siren feedback indicated thirteen sirens that failed to rotate. BFN EP [Emergency Preparedness] Senior Instrument Mechanics were dispatched to inspect the thirteen sirens and determined, through field inspections that only eight sirens would not rotate. The field inspection was completed and communicated to Corporate Emergency Preparedness at 1733 CDT. | | event text = At 1845 CDT on June 13, 2016, TVA Corporate Emergency Preparedness notified the Shift Manager at Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant that eight of the BFN [Browns Ferry Nuclear] Alert & Notification Sirens (19, 39, 55, 59, 60, 61, 69, 95) failed to rotate. The sirens were activated at 0915 CDT. Post sounding siren feedback indicated thirteen sirens that failed to rotate. BFN EP [Emergency Preparedness] Senior Instrument Mechanics were dispatched to inspect the thirteen sirens and determined, through field inspections that only eight sirens would not rotate. The field inspection was completed and communicated to Corporate Emergency Preparedness at 1733 CDT. | ||
Per NPG-SPP-03.5.1, the affected sirens which were lost affect 25.1 percent of the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) population and the sirens are not expected to be returned to service within 24 hours. Per NPG-SPP-03.5.1, a Loss of Alert and Notification System Capability exists when there is an unplanned or planned loss of primary Alert and Notification System (ANS) equipment for greater than one hour resulting in a loss of capability to alert 25 percent or more of the total Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) population and either the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) approved backup alerting method cannot be implemented for the area affected by the lost primary ANS equipment OR the primary ANS equipment is not expected to be returned to service within 24 hours. | Per NPG-SPP-03.5.1, the affected sirens which were lost affect 25.1 percent of the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) population and the sirens are not expected to be returned to service within 24 hours. Per NPG-SPP-03.5.1, a Loss of Alert and Notification System Capability exists when there is an unplanned or planned loss of primary Alert and Notification System (ANS) equipment for greater than one hour resulting in a loss of capability to alert 25 percent or more of the total Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) population and either the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) approved backup alerting method cannot be implemented for the area affected by the lost primary ANS equipment OR the primary ANS equipment is not expected to be returned to service within 24 hours. | ||
Latest revision as of 21:44, 1 March 2018
| Where | |
|---|---|
Browns Ferry  Alabama (NRC Region 2) | |
| Reporting | |
| 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | |
| Time - Person (Reporting Time:+-0.33 h-0.0138 days <br />-0.00196 weeks <br />-4.52034e-4 months <br />) | |
| Opened: | Andrew D. Mitchell 22:13 Jun 13, 2016 |
| NRC Officer: | Daniel Mills |
| Last Updated: | Jul 8, 2016 |
| 52004 - NRC Website
| |