ENS 52872: Difference between revisions
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| event date = 07/25/2017 04:28 EDT | | event date = 07/25/2017 04:28 EDT | ||
| last update date = 07/25/2017 | | last update date = 07/25/2017 | ||
| title = Manual Reactor Trip Due | | title = Manual Reactor Trip Due to Rod Position Indication System Being Inoperable | ||
| event text = On July 25, 2017, at 0428 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT) Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 2 was in Mode 3, beginning a Reactor Startup. While in the initial phase of withdrawing the first of four Control Rod banks, the two associated group demand position indicators deviated greater than 2 steps from each other. In accordance with Technical Requirement 3.1.7, Position Indication System, Shutdown, with one or more group demand position indicators inoperable, the reactor trip breakers are to be opened immediately. Operations personnel opened the reactor trip breakers immediately by initiating a manual trip of the Reactor Protection System (RPS). The Auxiliary Feedwater system was in service and controlling Steam Generator water levels at the time of the event and did not receive any valid actuation signals. No other system actuations occurred as a result of this reactor trip and all systems operated as designed. | | event text = On July 25, 2017, at 0428 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT) Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 2 was in Mode 3, beginning a Reactor Startup. While in the initial phase of withdrawing the first of four Control Rod banks, the two associated group demand position indicators deviated greater than 2 steps from each other. In accordance with Technical Requirement 3.1.7, Position Indication System, Shutdown, with one or more group demand position indicators inoperable, the reactor trip breakers are to be opened immediately. Operations personnel opened the reactor trip breakers immediately by initiating a manual trip of the Reactor Protection System (RPS). The Auxiliary Feedwater system was in service and controlling Steam Generator water levels at the time of the event and did not receive any valid actuation signals. No other system actuations occurred as a result of this reactor trip and all systems operated as designed. | ||
The cause of the position indication system inoperability is currently under investigation. | The cause of the position indication system inoperability is currently under investigation. | ||
Latest revision as of 20:42, 1 March 2018
| Where | |
|---|---|
| Watts Bar Tennessee (NRC Region 2) | |
| Reporting | |
| 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation | |
| Time - Person (Reporting Time:+2.65 h0.11 days <br />0.0158 weeks <br />0.00363 months <br />) | |
| Opened: | Brian Mclinay 11:07 Jul 25, 2017 |
| NRC Officer: | Vince Klco |
| Last Updated: | Jul 25, 2017 |
| 52872 - NRC Website
| |