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{{Adams
#REDIRECT [[IR 05000423/1997082]]
| number = ML20216G059
| issue date = 04/14/1998
| title = Provides Preliminary Results of Insp Conducted 980209-20. Detailed Findings of Team Insp Will Be Documented in Insp Rept 50-423/97-82.Insp Team Leader Provided Results of Insp at 980226 Public Meeting
| author name = Lanning W
| author affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
| addressee name = Bowling M
| addressee affiliation = NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY CO.
| docket = 05000423
| license number =
| contact person =
| document report number = 50-423-97-82, NUDOCS 9804170322
| document type = CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS, OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE
| page count = 7
}}
See also: [[see also::IR 05000423/1997082]]
 
=Text=
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                                                                                                                                                                          %D
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                                                  April 14,1998
      Mr. Martin L. Bowling, Recovery Officer - Millstone Unit 2
      c/o Ms. Patricia Loftus, Director - Regulatory Affairs
      Northeast Nuclear Energy Company
      P.O. Box 128
      Waterford, CT 06385-0128
      Dear Mr. Bowling:
      SUBJECT: PRELIMINARY INSPECTION RESULTS
      This letter provides the preliminary results of the NRC Region I team inspection of
      Northeast Utilities (NU) controls in identifying, resolving and preventing issues that degrade
      the quality of plant operations or safety at Millstone Unit 3. This team inspection was
      performed onsite from February 9 through February 20,1998, using NRC inspection
      procedure 40500, " Effectiveness of Licensee Controls in Identifying, Resolving and
      Preventing Problems." The detailed findings of the team inspection will be documented in
'
      inspection report 50-423/97-82. The inspection team leader provided you with the rer.ults
      of the inspection at a public meeting on February 26,1998.
      Inspection Scope
      Our inspection examined the management processes used to provide direction to the plant
      staff in order to facilitate effective and safe plant operations. This was accomplished by
      reviewing your goals and expectations, communications and teamwork, receptiveness to
      problems brought forward, performance monitoring, and your commitment to resolve safety
    committee recommendations and audit / assessment findings.
    Our inspection also assessed the adequacy of your corrective actions program including
    processes for identification, analysis and resolution of plant deficiencies. The inspectors
    evaluated your organization's responsiveness in dealing with issues brought forward by
    employees through various channels including your employee concerns program. The team
    examined the backlog of open problem reports to verify that safety significant issues are
    being tracked to completion, reviewed the process to prioritize corrective actions based on
    risk, and evaluated your process for assessing the effectiveness of corrective actions.
    The inspectors evaluated your process for site and departmental self-assessments. The
    team reviewed the corrective actions that were implemented for several significant self-
    assessments and third party audits including actions applicable to Unit 3 from the ACR-
    7007 Event Response Team Report, and the actions to improve the Nuclear Oversight
    Department taken in response to the 1996 Joint Utilities Management Assessment. In
    addition, the inspectors examined the effectiveness of your Performance and Evaluations
    Group in their audit, surveillance and quality control function.                                                                                                            ( ,
                                                                                                                                                                              b
                                                                                                                                                                            J
        9004170322 900414                      ?
        PDR    ADOCK 05000423
        0                      PDR              {
 
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                                                    2
    M. L. Bowling
    The team observed activities involving the Nuclear Safety Advisory Board (NSAB), the Site
    Operations Review Committee (SORC) and the Unit 3 Plant Operations Review Committee
    (PORC). The inspectors reviewed your operating experience program, including the
    programs for evaluation of industry data and site experience.
    Preliminary Assessment of the Management Process
    The team found that management communications methods with the plant staff were a
    strength. There was a common understanding of management's expectations by plant
    personnel. However,it was noted that a strategic plan and vision statement on where the
    plant is headed were stillin draft. This is considered a weakness in view of the fact that
    the current management has been in place since late 1996. Overall, the Nuclear Group
    policies and standards were considered good. Teamwork initiatives at the first line
    supervisor and above were developed, but have not been fully extended to the worker
    level.
    Observations and interviews show that managers and supervisors encourage employees to
    identify problems. The plant staff feels that management is receptive to problems brought
    forward and individuals generally characterized the environment as improved and currently
    receptive to problem identification. There is no reluctance or reservation expressed by
    individuals to identify problems, either through the Corrective Actions Condition Report
    process, the Employee Concems Program (ECP), or to the NRC.
    The handling of individual HIRD cases by the Employee Concerns Program and the Safety
    Conscious Work Environment (SCWE) program is adequately responsive to specific case
    needs. Both technical and human-side problems are generally well addressed. The ECP
    case intakes and the Employee Concerns Oversight Panel (ECOP) oversight activities and
    surveys are used to identify potential or actual HIRD problems or organizational units which
    exhibit barriers to free identification and reporting of problems. These are positive
    contributions to the overall process. These mechanisms are effective, especially for the
    more significant issues identified as problem areas. However, NU management has not
    been fully effective in addressing trends and common causes for HIRD allegations
    genersted organization-wide to ECP. A significant backlog of HIRD allegations was
    pending investigation and the backlog and emergent HIRD allegations had not been
    analyzed by NU for broad trends or patterns, and common causes. As a result, the actions
    taken to date had not effectively assessed the nature and substance of the continuing high
    incidence rate of HIRD allegations at the time of the inspection. Further, the SCWE
    processes have not yet been formalized. That is, the program lacks structure in the form
    of procedures, formal processes and documentation requirements.
    Preliminary Assessment of the Corrective Actions Process
    Overall, the team saw evidence that the corrective actions program is functioning, but it is )
    clear that the program will continue to require careful monitoring by NU management to      i
    ensure sustained performance. For example, the team found a notable number of                I
    additionalissues in a relatively small sample size of Condition Reports, after NU had
    completed their own extensive self-assessment preparing for this team inspection. In
L
 
  .
i
'.
!                                                      3
!
      M. L. Bowling
      general, the current findings represent minor process problems with the exception of the
;    boric acid tank level finding discussed below.
      The team found a structurud framework in place that 'provided a strong' definition for the
      corrective actions program. There is evidence of a good deal of management attention
      applied to infuse quality into the program implementation process. The team observed a
      general improving trend in quality over the last year for most program aspects, including
      issue identification, classification, analysis and actions to prevent recurrence. However,
      deficient conditions were found to exist in some specific root cause analyses and
      corrective actions.
      The team found that the Corrective Actions Program lacked controls when it combined
      Condition Reports such that they did not preserve issues and that they did not maintain
      their appropriate significance level. This weakness was evident in the handling of multiple
      condition reports concerning deficiencies in the Nonconformance Report process. The
      team considers this activity to be a program weakness.
      The team noted that the licensee had established a generally low threshold for recording
      issues but that there was a tendency to assign a lowur Significance Level classification      l
      than appropriate and to waive root cau.se analysis to similar issues. The team is concerned  i
      that this practice has the potential to cause trends to be missed and possibly result in      ;
      ineffective corrective actions.
                                                                                                    <
    ' incomplete corrective actions and root cause analysis were identified during the team's        I
      review of several Condition Reports including the repetitive air binding of the Boric Acid
      Transfer pumps. The team noted that NU engineering failed to recognize the potential
      unreviewed safety questir. (USO) which resulted from their initial conclusion of a more      {
                                                                                                    )
      restrictive Boric Acid 'Iank level requirement relative to the Technical Specification. The
      team also observed that the reportability evaluation of the event was incomplete and that
      NU failed to consider industry operating experience in their evaluation of the problem.
      The team found that long term compensatory measures are in effect for fire protection
      systems because surveillance testing which verifies operability of these systems has been
      suspended. Compensatory measures are being taken to allow restoration of a fire
      protection system, but in this case, are being used inappropriately to substitute for long
      term system inoperability.
      Preliminary Assessment of Site and Departmental Self-Assessment Process
      The team found that self-assessments were typically of high quality. It noted that the
      quality assurance and quality control functions of the Nuclear Oversight organization have    4
      improved as a direct result of improved staffing, qualifications, and knowledge level. Of      l
;    note is the Nuclear Oversight Restart Verification Assessment, which the team considered      !
      to be a strong initiative. That Nuclear Oversight now has the opportunity to concur on        l
l    corrective actions taken as a result of its audit findings and nonconformance reports is also  i
I
      considered to be a substantive improvement.
                                                                                                    .
 
  .
  .
                                                    4
    M. L. Bowling
    Preliminary Assessment of Safety Review Committse/ Operating Experience Programs
    The team found that all three safety review committees (Nudear Safety Advisory Board,
    Site Operations Review Committee, and Plant Operations Review Committee) operated
    effectively, were well prepared for their meetings, and provided quality input in addressing
    the issues before them. The team also noted that the independent Safety Engineering
    Group has made considerable progress, albeit at the expense of performing safety reviews,
    in reducing the backlog of operating experience (OE) reviews. The backlog of OE reviews
    on Unit 3 has been reduced from several hundred to approximately 40. However, the
    number of ISEG reviews done in 1997 was only 12, down from 24 the previous year.
    Preliminary Findings identified by the NRC Team
    The NRC inspection nm identified regulatory issues. Based on our preliminary evaluation,
    the following finding m.e being considered as potential violations:
    * In the area of design control, the team found problems in the Master Setpoint List
        (MSL), in that it was inconsistent and did not contain all of the setpoints and the
        calculatiun references as required by NGP 5.23. Also, a potential deficiency with the    I
        sub-cooling margin setpoints was found. In addition, the findings callinto question the
        adequacy of setpoint control.
    * There were two procedural problems identified with maintaining accurate design basis
        documents. The Safety Functional Requirements Manual and the Design Basis
        Summaries were not maintained as required by NGP 5.28 and PI-29, respectively.
    * The team found problems with meeting the organizationalindependence required by
        Section 6 of the Millstone Unit 3 Technical Specifications because of the reporting
        relationship between the Radiation Protection Manager and the Maintenance Manager.
        These requirements are established in TS 6.2.1.d, the Updated Final Safety Analysis
        Report and Regulatory Guide 8.8. Also, the independence required for persons
        cerforming the independent Safety Engineering Group (ISEG) reviews for human
!
        performance issues did not meet the intent of TS 6.2.3.3.                                ;
l
l    * The inspection identified several individual problems within the Millstone Corrective
        Action Program. _ These problems include: (1) incomplete corrective actions and root
!      cause analyses, as illustrated by the repetitive air binding of the boric acid transfer
l      pumps, and (2) issue closure without completion of all corrective actions, as was the
l
        case with Design Change Notice (DCN) review required by CR M3-97-0506and the
        closure of an Automated Work Order (AWO) to correct service water flow instrument
        anomalies that was associated with Operator Work Around 96-03. The team noted that
(      completion of the DCN review was an Adverse Condition Report (ACR) 7007 and
l      Configuration Management Program restart commitment.
    * The team identified some procedural problems with assigning inappropriate significance
        levels for Condition Reports. These included the following: incomplete action on
        Generic Letter (GL; 89-13, Service Water Fouling, and GL 90-03, Vendor Technical
l
.
 
                                                                                              1
  ,
  .
                                                      5
    M. L. Bowling
        Information Program. These are commitments to the NRC and should have been
        classified as at least Level 2. The team also observed that some actions on the        l
        Condition Reports for the incompleto Generic Letter issues had been inappropriately
        coded as ' Deferred' until after plant restart.
    The team reviewed NU actions c7 four issues related to two NRC Significant items List
    -(SIL) items (SIL ltems 41 and 73), and has recommended that all four be closed. These
    four issues include: ACR-7007 issues relevant to Unit 3; trending of NCRs; the Technical
    Specification audit program; and the adequacy of the Nuclear Oversight Program. The      J
    closure of these issues also results in the final closure of SIL items 41 and 73.
                                                                                              >
    The NRC's overall assessment of the effectiveness of your corrective action program will
    be based on the results of this inspection, as well as additional evaluations such as the
    ongoing inspection of ICAVP corrective actions, the NRC's review of the Employee          4
    Concerns Program, and the upcoming Operational Safety Team Inspection (OSTI).
    The SPO staff willinclude these findings within NRC Inspection Report 50-245/97-82,
    which will provide the final observations, findings, and any enforcement actions to which
    you will be required to respond based on the results of the subject inspection. No
    response to the issues discussed in this letter are required at this time; however, any    i
    potential enforcement items which warrant prompt corrective actions should be addressed
    in a timely manner rather than waiting for the final report.
    Should you have any questions or comments regarding the issues discussed in this letter,
    please contact me at (610) 337-5126.
                                          Sincerely,
                                                                                                !
                                            ORIGINAL SIG ED BY
                                          Wayne D. Lanning
                                          Deputy Director of Inspections
                                          Special Projects Office
                                          Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
    Docket No. 50-423
                                                                                                :
                                                                                                  l
r                                                                                              -
L            -                                        - - . - - - - -
 
--
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    e
                                                                        i
                                                      6
        M. L. Bowling
        cc:
        B. Kenyon, President and Chief Executive Officer
        M. H. Brothers, Vice President - Operations
        J. McElwain, Unit 1 Recovery Officer
        J. Streeter, Recovery Officer Nuclear Oversight
        G. D. Hicks, Unit Director - Millstone Unit 3
        J. A. Price, Unit Director - Millstone Unit 2
        D. Amerine, Vice President for Engineering and Support Services
        P. D. Hinnenkamp, Director, Unit 1 Operations                  .
        F. C. Rothen, Vice President, Work Services                      I
        J. Cantrell, Director - Nuclear Training
        S.-J. Sherman, Audits and Evaluation
        L. M. Cuoco, Esquire
        J. R. Egan, Esquire
        V. Juliano, Waterford Library
        J. Buckingham, Department of Public Utility Control
        S. B. Comley, We The People
        State of Connecticut SLO Designee
        D. Katz, Citizens Awareness Network (CAN)
        R. Bassilakis, CAN
      ' J. M. Block, Attorney, CAN
        S. P. Luxton, Citizens Regulatory Commission (CRC)
        Representative T. Concannon
        E. Woollacott, Co-Chairman, NEAC
                                                                        )
l
l-
  s
l
                                                                          l
                                                                          !
                                                                          l
                                                                          1
                                  i
  w_ _
 
    ..                                                                                                                                                  l
                                                                                                                                                          l
    .
    e
                                                                              7                                                                          i
                    M. L. Bowling
                    Distribution w/ encl:
                    Region i Docket Room (with .c_gny of concurrences)                                                                                    i
                    Nuclear Safety Information Center (NSIC)
                    PUBLIC
                    FILE CENTER, NRR (with Oriainal concurrences)
                    SPO Secretarial File, Region i
                    NRC Resident inspector
                                                                                                                                                          l
                    B. Jones, PIMB/ DISP
                    W. Lanning, Deputy Director of Inspections, SPO, RI
                    D. Screncl, PAO
                    W. Travers, Director, SPO, NRR
                    Distribution w/enci (VIA E-MAIL):
                    J. Andersen, PM, SPO, NRR                                                                                                            i
                    M. Callahan, OCA
                    R. Correia, NRR
                    B. McCabe, OEDO
                    S. Dembek, PM, SPO, NRR
                    G. Imbro, Deputy Director of ICAVP Oversight, SPO, NRR
                    D. Mcdonald, PM, SPO, NRR
                    P. McKee, Deputy Director of Licensing, SPO, NRR
                    S. Reynolds, Chief, ICAVP Oversight, SPO, NRR
                    D. Screnci, PAO                                                                                                                      l
                    Inspection Program Branch (IPAS)
      DOCUMENT NAME: G:tempfile\405quc2.410
.
      To receive a copy of this document. Indicate in the box: *C' = Copy without attachrnent/enct re  "E" = Copy with attachment / enclosure  *N"s No  l
                                                                                                                                                          '
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        NAME          Shedlosky.W                Durr , M                  LarWfirig
        DATE          04/04/98 ''                  04/d /98                04/ # /98                  04/      /98              04/        /98
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