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| l TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY' '
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| NUCLEAR POWER ,
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| l 9 BROWNS FERRYNUCLEAR PLANT ANWAL OPERATING REPORT '
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| TO THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION January 1,1988 - December 31, 1988
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| DOCKET NUMBER 50-259, 50-260, and 50-296 '
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| LICENSE NUMBER DPR-33, DPR 52,'and DPR-68 O
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| V 8sa88is, I[swx BTF 1883 )
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| R ' PDC 1
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| TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE Summary of Plant Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Summary of 10CFR50.59 Safety Evaluations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Condition Adverse to Quality Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Core Component Design Change Requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 FSAR Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 New Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Procedure Revisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 Special Operating Condi tions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
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| ~
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| Special Tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 Temporary Alterations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~. . 45 Temporary Shieldina . . . . . . . . . .............. 51 Plant Modifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 ,
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| 1 Partial Plant Modifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199 Transmission Line Corridor Herbicide Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219 Challenges to or Failures of Hain Steam Relief Valves . . . . . . . . . 220 Reactor Vessel Fatigue Usage Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221 1988 Occupational Exposure Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222 1988 Release Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227 w__________ _
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| ==SUMMARY==
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| OF PLANT CONDITIONS JANUARY 1, 1988 - DECEMBER 31, 1988 Unit 1 Unit I was placed on administrative hold in March 1985 to resolve TVA and NRC concerns. The unit began its sixth refueling outage on June 1, 1985, with a scheduled restart date to be determined. The sixth refueling will involve loading 8x8R (retrofit) fuel assemblies into the core. The prior-to-startup unit 1 modifications are environmental qualification of electrical equipment (10CFR50.49), torus modification (Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regulation
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| [NUREG) 0661), containment instrumentation modifications (NUREG 0737), fire protection changes (10CFR50 Appendix R), main steam isolation valve (MSIV) leak rate reduction modifications, modification of masonry walls (IEB 80-11),
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| evaluation of the vent, drain and test connections (Licensee Event Report
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| [LER] 82020), valve local leak rata testing (LLRT) modifications (10CFR50 Appendix J), high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) improvements, modification of primary containment isolation system (PCIS) logic (LER 85009), replacement of plant process computers, seismic; qualifications of piping (IEB 79-02/14),
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| postaccident sampling modifications (NUREG 0737), reactor protection system (RPS) voltage monitoring modificati_ons, H,0 2 sample line modification (LER 81050), and emergency equipment cooling water (EECH) carbon to stainless steel pipe changeout.
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| l At the end of calendar year 1988, there were zero assemblies in the reactor vessel. The spent fuel storage pool contained 284 new assemblies, 512 end-of-cycle (E0C)-6, 267 E0C-5, 245 EOC-4, 362 E0C-3, 26 EOC-2, and 168 EOC-1 assemblies. The 252 EOC-6 assemblies were transferred to unit 2 spent fuel storage pool (SFSP). The remaining available capacity of the fuel pool was 1607 locations.
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| Unit 2 Unit 2 was shutdown on September 15, 1984, for its fifth refueling outage with a scheduled restart date to be determined. On September 3, 1985, the unit was placed on administrative hold to resolve TVA and NRC safety concerns. The fifth refueling involves loading 8x8R (retrofit) fuel assemblies into the core. The prior-to-startup unit 2 modifications are control rod drive (CRD) scram discharge instrument volume (SDIV) piping modifications (IEB 80-17),
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| environmental qualification of electrical equipment (10CFR50.49), torus structural modifications (NUREG 0661), containment instrumentation modification (NUREG 0737), fire protection changes (10CFR50 Appendix R), MSIV leak rate reduction modifications, modification of masonry walls (IEB 80-11),
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| addition of feedwater nozzle temperature monitoring (NUREG 0619), evaluation of the vent, drain and test connections (LER 82020), valve LLRT modifications (10CFR50 Appendix J), diesel generator (DG) speed sensor installation (LER 81004), HPCI and reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) testable check valve changeout, modification of PCIS logic (LER 85009), HPCI improvements, various seismic program reviews, and EECW carbon to stainless steel pipe changeout.
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| 1 i
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| i 1
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| 1
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| Unit 2 (Continued)
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| At the end of calendar year 1988, there were zero assemblies in the reactor vessel. The spent fuel storage pool contained 304 new assemblies, 252 unit 1 E0C-6, 764 EOC-5, 248 EOC-4, 352 E0C-3, 156 E0C-2, and 132 E0C-1 assemblies.
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| The 252 E0C-6 assemblies were transferred from unit 1 SFSP. The remaining
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| =available capacity of the fuel pool was 1,229' locations.
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| Unit 3 Unit 3 was shutdown on March 9, 1985, and placed on administrative hold to resolve various TVA and NRC concerns with a scheduled restart date to be determined. The sixth refueling outage involves loading 8x8R (retrofit) assemblies into the core and anticipated transient without scram (ATHS) modifications. The prior-to-startup unit 3 modifications are environmental qualification of electrical equipment (10CFR50.49),-containment modifications (NUREG 0737), fire protection changes (10CFR50 Appendix R), MSIV leak rate reduction modifications, modification of masonry walls (IEB 80-11), evaluation of the vent, drain and test connections (LER 82020), valve LLRT modifications (10CFR50 Appendix J), HPCI concerns, replacement of plant process computer, seismic qualifications of piping (IEB 79-02/14), postaccident sampling modification (NUREG 0737), addition of redundant drywell control air supply, RPS voltage monitoring modification, H2 02 sample line modification (LER 81050), replacement of jet pump holddown beam assemblies (IEB 80-07), EECW carbon to stainless steel pipe changeout, and plant design upgrade to seismic qualification.
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| At the end of calendar year 1988, there were zero assemblies in the reactor vessel. The spent fuel storage pool contained 764 assemblies to finish cycle 6, 248 EOC-5, 280 EOC-4, 376 EOC-3, 97 EOC-2, and 3 EOC-1 assemblies. The remaining available capacity of the fuel pool was 585 locations.
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| 4 2
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| OPERATING DATA REPORT DOCKET NO. 50-259 DATE I-1-39' COMPLETED BY S.A.Ratliff ,
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| TELEPHONE (205)729-2937 l OPERATING STATUS
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| ( Notes g
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| : 1. Unit Name: Browns Ferry Unit One g
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| : 2. Reporting Period: December 1988 g
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| : 3. Licensed Thermal Power (MWt): 3293
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| : 4. Nameplate Rating (Gross MWe): 1152 g
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| : 5. Design Electrical Rating (Net HWe): 1065 g
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| : 6. Maximum Dependable Capacity (Gross MWe): 1098.4 g g
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| : 7. Maximum Dependable Capacity (Net MWe): 1065 g
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| : 8. If Changes Occur in Capacity Ratings (Items Number 3 Through 7) Since Last Report, Give Reasons: N/A
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| : 9. Power Level To Which Restricted, If Any (Net MWe): N/A
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| : 10. Reasons For Restrictions, If Any: N/A This Month Year-to-Date Cumulative
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| : 11. Hours in Reporting Period 744 8784 126,464
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| : 12. Number of Hours Reactor Was Critical 0 0 59,521.38
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| : 13. Reactor Reserve Shutdown Hours 0 0 6,997.44
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| : 14. Hours Generator On-Line 0 0 58,267.26
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| : 15. Unit Reserve Shutdown Hours 0 0 0
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| : 16. Gross Thermal Energy Generated IMWH) 0 0 168,066,787
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| : 17. Gross Electrical Energy Generated (MWH) 0 0 55,398,130
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| : 18. Net Electrical Energy Generated (MWH) -5046 -53603 53,627,870
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| : 19. Unit Service Factor 0 0 46.1
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| : 20. Unit Availability Factor ___0 0 46.1
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| : 21. Unit Capacity Factor (Using MDC Net) 7 0 39.8
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| : 22. Unit Capacity Factor (Using DER Net) 0 0 39.8
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| : 23. Unit Forced Outage Rate 100 100 45.9
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| : 24. Shutdowns Scheduled Over Next 6 Months (Type, Date, and Duration of Each):
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| N/A
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| : 25. If Shutdown at end of report period, estimated date of startup:
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| To be determined
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| : 26. Units In Test Status (Prior to Commercial Operation): Forecast Achieved ;
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| INITIAL CRITICALITY INITIAL ELECTRICITY COMMERCIAL OPERATION 3
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| OPERATING DATA REPORT DOCKET NO. 50-260 l
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| i DATE: 1-1-89 COMPLETED BY S.A.Ratliff TELEPHONE (205)729-2937 OPERATING STATUS Notes (
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| : l. Unit Name: Browns Ferry Unit Two
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| : 2. Reporting Period: December 1988 (
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| : 3. Licensed Thermal Power (MHt): 3293 (. (
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| : 4. Nameplate Rating (Gross MWe): 1152 g l 5. Design Electrical Rating (Net MWe):_ 1065 (
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| : 6. Maximum Dependable Capacity (Gross MWe): 1098.4
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| : 7. Maximum Dependable Capacity (Net MHe): (
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| 8.
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| 1065 (
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| If Changes Occur in Capacity Ratings (Items Number 3 Through 7) Since Last Report, Give Reasons: N/A
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| : 9. Power Level To Which Restricted, If Any (Net MHe): N/A -
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| : 10. Reasons For Restrictions, If Any: N/A This Month Year-to-Date Cumulative
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| : 11. Hours in Reporting Period 744 8784 121,251.00
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| : 12. Number of Hours Reactor Has Critical 0 0 55,860.03
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| : 13. Reactor Reserve Shutdown Hours 0 0 14,200.44
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| : 14. Hours Generator On-Line 0 0 54,338.36
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| : 15. Unit Reserve Shutdown Hours 0 0 0
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| : 16. Gross Thermal Energy Generated (MHH) 0 0 _153,245,167
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| : 17. Gross Electrical Energy Generated (NHH) 0- 0 50,771,798
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| : 18. Net Electrical Energy Generated (MHH) -2482
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| -25285 49,158,548
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| : 19. Unit Service Factor 0 0 4 4 . 8__
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| : 20. Unit Availability Factor 0 0 44.8
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| : 21. Unit Capacity Factor (Using MDC Net) 0 0 38.0
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| : 22. Unit Capacity Factor (Using DER Net) 0 0 38.0
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| : 23. Unit Forced Outage Rate 100 100 45.5
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| : 24. Shutdowns Scheduled Over Next 6 Months (Type, Date, and Duration of Each):
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| : 25. If Shutdown At End of Report Period, Estimated Date of Startup:
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| To Be Determined
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| : 26. Units In Test Status (Prior to Commercial Operation): forecast Achieved INITIAL CRITICALITY INITIAL ELECTRICTIY COMMERCIAL OPERATION i
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| l l
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| i y
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| 4 o
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| 7 ,
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| OPERATING DATA REPORT DOCKET NO. 50-296 DATE: 1-1-89 COMPLETED BY:S.A.Ratliff
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| (
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| TELEPHONE: _205)729-2937 OPERATING STATUS
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| ( Notes g
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| : 1. Unit Name: Browns Ferry Unit Three g g
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| : 2. Reporting Period: December 1988 (
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| : 3. (
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| Licensed Thermal Power (MWt): 3293 ( g
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| : 4. Nameplate P.ating (Gross MWe): 1152 g
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| : 5. Design Electrical Rating (Net MWe): 1065 (
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| (
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| : 6. Maximum Dependable Capacity (Gross MWe) 1098.4 g
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| : 7. Maximum Dependable Capacity (Net MWe) 1065 g
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| : 8. If Changes Occur in Capacity Ratings (Items Number 3 Through 7) Since Last Report, Give Reasons: N/A
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| : 9. Power Level To Which Restricted, If Any (Net MWe): N/ A .-
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| : 10. Reasons For Restrictions, If Any: N/A This Month Year-to-Date Cumulative
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| : 11. Hours in Reporting Period 744 8784 103,776.00
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| : 12. Number of Hours Reactor Was Critical 0 0 45,306.08
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| : 13. Reactor Reserve Shutdown Hours 0 0 5,149.55
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| : 14. Hours Generator On-Line 0 0 44,194.76
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| : 15. Unit Reserve Shutdown Hours 0 0 0
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| : 16. Gross Thermal Energy Generated (MWH) 0 0 _131,868,267
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| : 17. Gross Electrical Energy Generated (MWH) 0 0 43,473,760
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| : 18. Het Electrical Energy Generated (MWH) -1758 -24218 _ 42,016,930
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| : 19. Unit Service Factor 0 0 42.6
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| : 20. Unit Availability Factor 0 0 42.6
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| : 21. Unit Capacity Factor (Using MDC Net) 0 0 38.0
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| : 22. Unit Capacity Factor (Using DER Net) 0 0 38.0
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| : 23. Unit Forced Outage Rate 100 100 49.2
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| : 24. Shutdowns Scheduled Over Next 6 Months, (Type, Date, and Duration of each):
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| i
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| : 25. If Shutdown At End of Report Period, Estimated Date of Startup:
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| To Be Determined
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| : 26. Units In Test Status (Prior to Commercial Operation): Forecast Achieved INITIAL CRITICALITY INITIAL ELECTRICITY COMMERCIAL OPERATION 5
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| 1
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| __ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ - -__ - --- Q l
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| 1 SAFETY EVALUATIONS FOR CONDITION ADVERSE TO QUALITY REPORTS (CAQRs) l CAQR BFT 870918 Containment Spray Cooling / Backup Control Description CAQR BFT 870918 states that there is no transfer switch on the unit 2 containment spray cooling (CSC) flow control valve (FCV) 74-75 to provide drywell spray from the Backup Control Panel to enable its operation from outside the main control room in the event the control room becomes inhabitable. This safety evaluation addresses removing the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) requirement for CSC while the plant is in the backup control mode.
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| Safety Evaluation Neither the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction nor the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR is increased or created, and the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any technical specification (TS) is not reduced because the CSC system does not support any of the systems required during normal shutdown conditions. The Backup Control system provides capability to shutdown the reactor from a normal operating state without consideration of any other accidents, such as a loss of coolant accident (LOCA), before or after the event that damages the control room. The CSC system is used only in postaccident situations to alleviate high temperature in the drywell. Under Backup Control conditions, drywell cooling is attained normally through the reactor building closed cooling water (RBCCH) drywell coolers, fans and dampers. Suppression pool cooling is provided by the residual heat removal (RHR) system. Therefore, the CSC system is not required while the plant is in the backup control mode.
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| CAQR BFT 8709G3 D01 CSC/ Backup Control Description CAQR BFT 870963 001 states that there is no transfer switch on the unit 1 CSC valve FCV 74-75 to provide drywell spray from the Backup Control Panel to enable its operation from outside the main control room in the event the control room becomes inhabitable. This safety evaluation addresses removing the FSAR requirement for CSC while the plant is in the backup control mode.
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| 6
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| CAQR BFT 870963 001 (Continued)
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| Safety Evaluation Neither the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction nor the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR is increased or created, and the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any TS is not reduced because the CSC system does not support any of the l
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| systems required during normal shutdown conditions. The Backup Control system provides capability to shutdown the reactor from a normal operating state without consideration of any other accidents, such as a i
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| LOCA, before or after the event that damages the control room. The CSC system is used only in postaccident situations to alleviate high i
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| temperature in the drywell. Under Backup Control conditions, drywell cooling is attained normally through the RBCCW drywell coolers, fans and dampers. Suppression pool cooling is provided by the RHR system.
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| Therefore, the CSC system is not required while the plant is in the backup control mode.
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| CAQR BFT 870963 D02 CSC/ Backup Control Description CAQR BFT 870963 D02 states that there is no transfer switch on the unit 3 CSC valve FCV 74-61 to provide drywell spray from the Backup Control Panel to enable its operation from outside the main control room in the event the control room becomes inhabitable. This safety evaluation addresses removing the FSAR requirement for CSC while the plant is in the backup control mode.
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| Safety Evaluation Neither the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction nor the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR is increased or created, and the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any TS is not reduced because the CSC system does not support any of the systems required during normal shutdown conditions. The Backup Control system provides capability to shutdown the reactor from a normal operating state without consideration of any other accidents, such as a LOCA, before or after the event that damages the control room. The CSC system is used only in postaccident situations to alleviate high temperature in the drywell. Under Backup Control cr iltions, drywell cooling is attained normally through the RBCCW dryws coolers, fans and dampers. Suppression pool cooling is provided by the RHR system.
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| Therefore, the CSC system is not required while the plant is in the backup control mode. (
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| l 7
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| r - - - - - ---- --------- ----- - -- - - -
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| CAQR BFP 880304 Ground Level Release of Radioactive Gases Description CAQR BFP 880304 states that the effluent from the standby gas treatment system (SGTS) may release radioactive gases at ground level at the base of the plant stack because Restart Test 2-BFN-RTP-065 R1 concluded that the off-gas dilution fans were required to obtain design flow through the plant stack. However, the off-gas dilution fans are not seismically qualified and have not been identified as safety-related. Therefore, operation of these fans cannot be relied upon following a design basis accident (DBA) or seismic event. The Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS) is assumed inoperable because unfiltered inleakage into the main control room may occur as described in CAQR BFP 870591. This safety evaluation evaluates the effects on the main control room (MCR) radiation doses after a DBA or seismic event without CREVS and with unqualified off-gas dilution fans.
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| Safety Evaluation Neither the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction _nor the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR is increased or created, and the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any TS is not reduced because during this postulated plant configuration and possible accident scenarios, the radiation doses in the MCR would be .
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| well below the requirements of 10CFR50 Appendix A. Thus, the occupants '
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| of the MCR would not receive an excessive amount of radiation and would be able to perform their required duties. The postulated ground level radioactive release will not affect any equipment important to safety.
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| The plant will still respond as specified in the FSAR.
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| CAQR BFP 880455 Blowout Panels Description CAQR BFP 880455 states that the blowout panels in the unit 3 main steam vault do not have 360 ft of unobstructed available area as required by the FSAR section 5.3.3.4 and Design Criteria BFN-50.7064C. A 2" diameter HPCI drain 11ne penetrates one of the number four blowout panels. The penetration details required the panel be welded to the supporting steel which resulted in a total net unobstructed area for the blowout panels of only 356.67 ft". This safety evaluation addresses the described I condition.
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| 8
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| CAQR BfP 880455 (Continued)
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| Safety Evaluation
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| .1 Neither the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction nor the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR is increased or created, and the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any TS is not reduced because the failure of this single blowout panel to perform as designed would not result in structural damage to the reactor building superstructure or cause design limits to be exceeded since the remaining panels would still yleid at the design pressure. The resulting increase in reactor building internal pressure and temperature due to this less than one percent reduction in blowout panel overall area would be negligible and would have no adverse effect on operability or safety.
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| 9
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| f SAFETY EVALUATIONS FOR CORE COMPONENT DESIGN CHANGE REQUESTS (DCR)
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| DCR Core Component No. 31 Startup Neutron Sources and Neutron Source Holders
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| ~
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| Description The proposed activity involves the use of Californium (CF)-252 startup neutron sources and neutron source holders originally from Hartsville i Nuclear Plant which were modified to the current General Electric (GE) source holder design. These sources are necessary,to assure that the {
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| count rates observed by the source. range monitors (SRMs) meet the minimum three counts per second required by the technical specifications for startup.
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| Safety Evaluation Neither the probability of the occurrence or.the consequences of an accident or malfunction nor the possibility for an accident'or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR is increased or. created, and the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any TS is not reduced because the modified source holders are equivalent in form, fit, and function to the original Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant-(BFN) source holders and the CF-252 neutron sources are encapsulated under the same stringent requirements as the original neutron sources.
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| The installation-of the neutron sources and modified source holders will not effect the function of the core plate or top guide, nor the performance of.the fuel assemblies.or SRMs. The safety of the plant should be increased since the source holders utilize an improved design over the original BFN source holders such as increased wall thickness, improved materials, and a modified weld sequence to eliminate the tensile stress in the weld region where cracks were observed in earlier designs.
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| DCR Core Component No. 32 Reconstituted Fuel Assemblies Description The proposed activity involves the use of reconstituted assemblies in BFN Unit 2, Cycle 6. In order to mitigate the consequences of crud-induced localized corrosion (CILC), BFN completed an inspection and reconstitution program. Twice and thrice-burned fuel rods were replaced with fuel rods from donor fuel assemblies. Out of 290 reload twice and thrice-burned assemblies, 204 were reconstituted, 60 were used as donor assemblies, and 10 were accepted without any reconstitution. Two hundred two of the reconstituted assemblies are planned for use.
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| 10
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| DCR Core Component No. 32 (Continued)
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| Safety Evaluation Neither the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an l accident or malfunction nor the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR is increased or created, and the margin of safety as defined in the basis of l
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| any TS is not reduced because the reconstituted assemblias have equivalent thermal, mechanical, and hydraulic characteristics as the original unrecoastituted assemblies and similar neutronics characteristics. Extensive core analyses were performed verifying that all safety functions required of the nuclear fuel design were satisfied and all design criteria for the reload core design were met. Further, additional conservatism in monitoring reconstituted fuel assemblies to be incorporated into the process computer will ensure these assemblies operate within core operating limits specified by the technical specifications.
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| e a
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| 11
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| SAFETY EVALUATIONS FOR FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT CHANGES j l
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| 1 FSAR Section 3.4.5.3.1 Accumulator Charging Pressure Reason This evaluation allows the FSAR to be revised to correct documentation discrepancies between the FSAR and other plant procedures and drawings.
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| FSAR Section 3.4.5.3.1 concerning CRD accumulator charging pressure states that "the pressure in the charging header is monitored in the control room with a pressure indicator and low pressure alarm". This l section of the FSAR will be revised to read " the pressure in the '
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| charging header is monitored in the control room with a pressure indicator and high pressure alarm." The high pressure alarm was installed in the initial cor. figuration of the plant. The low pressure alarm was never installed.
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| Safety Evaluation -
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| Neither the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction nor the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR is increased or created, and the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any TS is not reduced because the high pressure alarm is more desirable than the low pressure alarm for a number of reasons. First, a high pressure alarm will warn against inadvertent high pressure damage to the hydraulic control unit (HCU) accumulators and associated piping due to flow control valve failure. Secondly, each of the HCOs incorporates a low pressure switch that alarms at the corresponding control rod location in the control room. Thirdly, the pressure indicator is located on panel 9-5 in the MCR which can be monitored routinely to ensure charging header pressure remains within operating limits.
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| FSAR Sections 4 and 7 Reference Point Change for Water Level Setpoints Reason One figure and several tables in sections 4 and 7 of the FSAR are being revised to reflect a new reference point for the water level setpoints.
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| Only the reference point is being changed. The actual water level setpoints will remain the same. Browns Ferry presently uses 8x8 fuel bundles instead of 7x7. These new bundles have an active fuel length of 150 inches as opposed to 144 inches for the old bundles, so the distance from the top of active fuel to the water level setpoints is no longer valid. A corresponding change to the TS Section 3.2 is being made to reference the setpoints from vessel zero (i.e. interior bottom invert of the vessel).
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| 12
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| FSAR Sections 4 and 7 (Continued)
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| Safety Evaluation Neither the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction nor the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR is increased or created, and the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any TS is not reduced because referencing the water level setpoints in relation to vessel zero instead of top of active fuel does not change the function or operation of the water level instruments or any other system, component, or structure. The water level setpoints are not being changed i and are therefore not affected in any way. l FSAR Section 4 Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Piping Design Specifications Reason FSAR Sections 4.2.4.1, 4.3.4.1, 4.4.3, 4.4.6, 4.5.3, 4.6.3, 4i7.5, 4.8.5, 4.9.3, 4.11.1, and 4.11.6 pertaining to power piping design specification requirements for the reactor coolant system are being revised. to include usage of applicable GE design and procurement specifications in lieu of outdated American National Standards Institute (ANSI) 831.1, " Power Piping", code cases.
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| Safety Evaluation Neither the probability of the occc .ence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction nor the possibility for an accident or maifonction of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR was increased or created, and the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any TS was not reduced because this change does not inhibit the RCS's piping or valves from performing their primary function of carrying cooling water to the reactor during normal or emergency operation, nor does the change adversely affect any seismic loading requirement.
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| Performance and reliability of the piping are increased because the testing requirements performed on the piping are more stringent and accurate than that required by ANSI B31.1.
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| FSAR Section 4.9.3 Clarification of Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) System Configuration Reason This section of the FSAR has been revised to acknowledge that In addition to stainless steel and carbon steel (in unit 1), reactor water is also in direct physical contact with precoat medium while in the RWCU fil ter-demineral izers . This change is simply a clarification.
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| 13
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| _ _ - - - - _ _ _ _ _ l
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| 4 FSAR Section 4.9.3 (Continued)
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| Safety Evaluation Neither the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction nor the possibility for an accident or i malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR is increased or created, and the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any TS is not reduced because the direct reactor water-lon exchange resin contact was also present in the original licensed design. The FSAR j failed to explicitly state this fact. This change acknowledges the j existence of this interface. Contact with the ion exchange resin by the. J reactor water is intrinsic to the operation of the filter-demineralizers and does not affect the RWCU safety function.
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| FSAR Section 5.2.3.5 Isolation Valving on Instrumentation Lines Reason The FSAR is being revised to include an exception to the requirement for isolation valving on instrumentation lines in the Primary Containment system.. Currently, the FSAR, based on Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) criterion 53, requires all piping penetrating Primary Containment and open to the drywell free air to contain two isolation valves in series. 1 The'FSAR does not specify different requirements for instrument lines. '
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| Safety Evaluation Neither the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction nor the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR is increased-or created, and the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any TS is not reduced because this change will bring the plant in-line with industry standards (ANSI /American National Standard (ANS) 56.2) and because no physical changes have been implemented. The original instrument lines were installed based on criteria in GE design specifications which reflect industry requirements for protection of instrument lines. The installed valves and instrument piping are designed to withstand maximum Primary Containment temperatures and pressures which could impair the function of the equipment; therefore, isolation valves were not required. In adition, an installed block valve cai, manually isolate the system in case of a pipe break.
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| FSAR Section 5.2.6 Containment Atmosphere Dilution (CAD) System Reason This revision to the FSAR corrects a discrepancy which consists of an implication that the entire venting function as well as the dilution and isolation functions of the CAD system are seismic Class I and engineered
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| ! safety features (ESFs). The revision clarifles exactly which portions of the CAD system are classified as seismic ESFs. The revision also includes a pressure switch in the description of the CAD vent paths and corrects typographical errors.
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| 14
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| h FSAR Section 5.2.6 (Continued)
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| Safety Evaluation Neither the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction nor the possibility for an accident or l-malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR is l increased or created, and the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any_TS is not reduced because the design of the CAD system does not require its vent function to be an ESF. However, the CAD vent lines are required to be seismic Class I from primary containment up to and l
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| Including FCV-84-19 and 20, as they are required to provide primary containment isolation. Including pressure switches in the description of the CAD vent paths accurately describes these paths as they appear on configuration control drawings and is not the result of a plant change or discrepancy. These changes have no affect on the safety function of the CAD system (i.e., dilution and isolation).
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| FSAR Section 5.2.6.3 SGTS Flow Rate -
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| Reason This revision changes the SGTS flow rate given in section 5.2.6.3 from 9,000 cfm, which is the flow rate of one SGTS train, to its correct value of 15,000 cfm which is the design flow rate of the system. This is a FSAR wording change to accurately describe the design of SGTS.
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| Safety Evaluation Neither the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction nor the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR is increased or created, and the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any TS is not reduced because the revision does not alter the function or operation of the SGTS and does not result in any physical modification of the SGTS. The change simply provides the correct design flow rate of the system. At a flow rate of 15,000 cfm the dose rate at the exclusion zone boundary will be less than 10% of the allowable dose rates specified in 10CFR100 for a design basis event. The change in no way affects the operation of the SGTS as defined in the technical specifications.
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| FSAR Section 6.4.1 Manual Control of HPCI Turbine Governor Reason This revision deletes the discussion concerning manual operation of the HPCI turbine governor. The FSAR states that manual operation of the HPCI turbine governor is possible in the test mode, but the governor is automatically repositioned by the demand signal from the flow controller if system initiation is required. Although this manual operation is described in GE system descriptions GEK 779, GE removed the manual control of the governor from the HPCI design in 1973 because of repeated turbine trips due to turbine overspeed and excessive transients.
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| 15
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| FSAR Section 6.4.1 (Continued)
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| Safety Evaluation Neither the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction nor the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR.is increased or created, and the margin of safety as. defined in the basis of any TS is not reduced because manual control was not required for normal operation and an alternate means of manua)-turbine control using the flow controller remains in the present plant configuration. Removal of the turbine governor manual control will not prevent HPCI from performing its intended safety function.
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| FSAR Section 6.4.1 HPCI Turbine Exhaust Line Vacuum Breakers Reason This section is being revised to delete the following sentences:
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| A. "In order to limit the leakage from containment following.a LOCA, the existing stop check valve and the swing check valve will be exposed to water rather than air to provide a water seal."
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| : 8. "After the HPCI and RCIC systems are secured following a LOCA, the Motor Operated Valves (MOVs) will be closed by remote manual means, thereby defeating the vacuum breakers."
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| C. "As a result, any long term leakage through the turbine exhaust line check valves will consist of water rather than air."
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| These three sentences are interrelated. Sentence B is being deleted because the MOVs are not required for primary containment, are not single failure proof, and are not environmentally o'Jalified. As a result of sentence B deletion, sentence A must also be deleted because credit cannot be taken for the stop check valve and swing check valve being exposed to water only. Therefore, sentence C must also be deleted because the valve could be exposed to air.
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| Safety Evaluation Neither the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction nor the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR is increased or created, and the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any T5 is not reduced because the deletion of sentences A, B, and C does not affect the one-out-of-two taken twice configuration of the four vacuum breaker check valves which prevent steam from bypassing the suppression pool due to one of the check valves sticking open and because the deletion of the sentences does not change the fact that there are two valves in the HPCI turbine exhaust line that are responsible for primary containment isolation. Although the primary containment isolation check valves are no longer water sealed, they have been tested for containment leakage in accordance with 10CFR50 Appendix J requirements for valves exposed directly to the primary containment airspace. This type of leakage has been previously evaluated in the FSAR. l 16 l
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| 1- - ---_ --__----- 9
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| FSAR Table 7.3-1 Primary Containment Isolation Valves Reason f
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| This revision adds the drywell control air compressor suction valves FCV-32-62 and -63 to FSAR table 7.3-1. These valves are physically installed in the plant, appear on issued as-constructed and as-designed drawings sad appear in TS table 3.7.A. {
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| Safety Evaluation Neither the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction nor the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR is increased or created, and the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any TS is not reduced because this revision does not modify these valves, their operating requirements, the drywell control air system or any other system or equipment. This revision merely adds these ex.3 ting primary containment isolation valves to the.FSAR table. As noted above, these e valves are presently listed in the TS.
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| FS'AR Table 7.3-1 and -2 HPCI and RCIC Isolation Signal Reason Table 7.3-2 lists information for Isolation Signal E that is for both HPCI and RCIC. Since the instrumentation for the HPCI system and RCIC system is not identical, this revision will provide separate entries for each system in order to accurately detail the information. This change will also require corresponding changes to table 7.3-1 in order to maintain consistency. This FSAR revision is for unit 2 only.
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| Safety Evaluation Neither the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction nor the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR is increased or created, and the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any TS is not reduced because the affected instrumentation will perform its requited function for the range added to the FSAR. This revision reflects the present plant configuration. No physical modification will be required. The change will not prevent the instruments from functioning as intended.
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| 17
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| _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - . - - - - - - )
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| FSAR Section 7.4.5.1 Use of Clip Leads on Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS)
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| Reason The proposed revision is to change section 7.4.5.1 to allow the use of clip leads during testing of ECCS, under certain administrative restrictions and controls. The FSAR currently prohibits the use of clip leads for ECCS because of BFN's commitment to NRC which applied strict testing guidelines based on Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE) 279. However, IEEE 279 did not specifically disallow i
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| the use of clip leads.
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| Safety Evaluation Neither the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction nor the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR is increased or created, and the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any TS is not reduced because strict administrative controls will ensure proper usage'-of the clip leads. These administrative controls allow the use of clip h ads only when specified in approved procedures which define where the leads are to be used, specify any prerequisites needed prior to installation of the leads, and require independent verification of clip lead removal. These controls will prevent any malfunction or inadvertent modification to equipment or circuitry. In the unlikely event of a system failure caused by a clip lead, alternate systems would fulfill the safety objectives of ECCS.
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| FSAR Sections 7.12.4.5, 9.2. 4.2, and 9.2. 5 Release of Radioactive L1 quid Effluents Reason This revision addresses the limits and conditions for the release of radioactive effluents to the environment. This revision changes the FSAR in regard to the basis for determining maximum permissible concentration limits to reflect current plant practices in the areas of liquid radioactive effluents, radwaste pumoout rate, and minimum dilution flow rate.
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| Safety Evaluation Neither the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction nor the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR is increased or created, and the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any TS is not reduced because these changes bring the FSAR into complete agreement with the technical specifications and 10CFR20 in regard to 11guld radioactive effluent releases, radwaste pumpout rates, and minimum dilution flow rate. The components affected by this revision do not interface with any equipment important to safety nor are the components required to mitigate any transients or accidents.
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| 18
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| 'FSAR Section 7.1.4.1 Site' Environmental Radiation Monitors
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| : Reason This FSAR change pertains to the transmittal of radiation monitor Information. The change removes the perimeter monitors from the .
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| l description in section 7.1.4.1 since these monitors are located offsite-and corrects the measurement of radioactivity from concentration to count rate.
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| Safety Evaluation Neither the probability of the occurrence or'the consequences of an accident or malfunction nor the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR is increased or created, and the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any TS is not reduced _because the function of the perimeter monitors remains the same and the description of the-perimeter monitors will
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| . . remain in FSAR, Section 2.6.1. No equipment changes are involved. The monitors will continue to transmit radio;ogical information to the -
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| control room.
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| FSAR Section 7.1.5.3 Portable Health Physics Instruments Reason The following statement was added to Section 7.1.5.3 "All portable health physics instruments used exclusively for training are calibrated at least annually."
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| This change was made to align the FSAR with the Radiation Protection Plan.
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| Safety Evaluation Neither the probability of the occurren,e or the consequences of an accident or malfunction nor the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR is increased or created and the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any TS is not reduced because these instruments do not perform any safety-related function nor interface with any safety-related equipment.
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| These instruments are used exclusively for tral"ing purposes and are so labelled. This change does not alter the previously specified calibration interval given in Section 7.1.5.2 of the FSAR.
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| 19
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| FSAR Section 8.5.3.2 DG Backup Control Transfer Switches Reason In section_8.5.3.2 of.the FSAR, the' backup control transfer. switches for DG control at the 4KV shutdown boards are described as being
| |
| .." wire-sealed" into the NORMAL position. The proposed change is to revise the FSAR to delete this description.
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| Safety Evaluation Neither the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction nor the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR is increased or created, and the margin of' safety as defined in the basis of any TS is not reduced because the functional operability of the DG is not affected by the position of these switches. In addition, annunciators will alarm in the MCR if the switches are moved from their NORMAL
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| -positions,..thereby negating the requirement to have these wire seals installed. . In any event, accidental or intentional. repositioning of these switches does not prevent the diesel generators from performing their intended function.
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| FSAR Section 8.9.2.1 Maximum Cable Fill Reason This change is proposed to align the FSAR with TVA Ded e Standard DS-E13.1.4 regarding maximum cable fill for conduits. This design standard allows a maximum cable fill of 53 percent for one (1) cable, 31 percent for two (2) cables, and 40 percent for three (3) or more cables.
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| The change also states that TVA Electrical Standards Drawings were used prior to the use of the design standard.
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| Safety Evaluation Neither the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction nor the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR is increased or created, and the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any TS is not reduced because the revision to allow 53 percent cable fill for one (1) cable meets TVA Design Standard DS-E13.1.4 and the industry standard established by the National Electrical Code. The electrical cables of safety related equipment with conduit sized to the 53 percent TVA Design Standard will perform their required function. It should be noted that cable fill is determined such that jams and tangles should not occur. Multiple cables are considered more likely to tangle or jam.
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| Unlike multiple cables, the single cable, being cylindrical in shape like the conduit, can align its center-line with the center-line of the conduit which provides for better freedom of movement. This accounts for the larger cable fill limit in the case of the single cable.
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| 20
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| -j j
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| W R Section 9.2.5 Changing Valve Designations Reason I In this revision, valve d' designations "AO-231" and "A0-315" are being replaced by "77-58B" and "77-58A", and the reference to " Figure 9.2-3d" is being changed to " Figure 9.2-3c". This revision changes the original i GE valve designations to the TVA Unique Identifier (UNID) format. I Another change being made to this FSAR section is the result of a l modification which was previously analyzed under Unreviewed Safety l Question Determination (USQD) P-5523,RI. !
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| : 1. '
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| Safety Evaluation Neither the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction nor the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR is increased or created, and the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any TS is not. reduced because changing the valve designations makes the FSAR text agree with Figure 9.2-3c (erroneously called 9.2-3d in the Amendment 5 FSAR), TVA design drawings, and other documents, and el.iminates possible confusion. This change is not the result of any new modification, test, or experiment, and does not change the intent of the FSAR.
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| 1 FSAR Sections 9.3.4.1, 9.3.4.2, and 9.3.6 Radwaste Disposal System Reason This revision makes the FSAR description of radwaste disposal consistent with the current methods of dewatering wet solid wastes and compar 'ng dry solid wastes. The change concerning the dewatering of spent ion exchange resin and filter aid sludge is a NRC commitment (NRC report 86-26).
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| Safety Evaluation Neither the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction nor the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a alfferent type than previously evaluated in the FSAR is increased or created, and the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any TS is not reduced because the dewatering and compaction equipment is not safety-related nor does it affect any safety-related equipment.
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| Failure of any of the resin dewatering components will not provide a pathway for radioactive materials to escape into the environment since the dewatering system is located inside the radwaste packaging room. Any leaks or spills will be contained inside this room by exterior doors which are closed during liner filling and dewatering oparations. Any spillage will be collected in the radwaste building floor drains.
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| 21
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| FSAR Section 10.6.4- Reactor Building Floor Drainage
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| -Reason The following changes to the FSAR were made for clarification only. -In section 10.6.4.i, "This system. is shared"_ will be changed to "The Reactor -
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| Building Floor Drainage System (Radioactive Drainage) is shared". "Two pumps" will be changed to "Two Reactor Building' Floor Drainage Pumps".
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| In Section 10.6.4.2, the last sentence of the second paragraph will be-changed from " equipment drain collector tank" to " waste collector tank". l Safety Evaluation Neither the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction nor the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR is increased or created, and'the margin of safety as defined in,the basis of any TS is not reduced because the changes improve readability and more precisely describe the equipment and floor drainage systems of the reactor building. . The changes are not the result of any new modification, test, or experiment. The changes are editorial in nature and do not alter the intent of the FSAR. These changes will prevent 4
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| f misinterpretation and eliminate confusion.
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| I FSAR Sections 10.16.4.1 and F.7.1' Reactor Building Floor Drainage Pumps Reason j
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| The following sentence on pages 10.16-1 and F.0-24 "Each pump has a capacity of 50 gpm at 75 ft of head, and both pumps may-operate concurrently" is being changed to:
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| "Each pump has a capacity of 160 gpm at 90 ft of head, and both pumps may operate concurrently."
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| The Reactor Building floor drain pumps were changed to provide increased pumping pressure in response to design changes in safety features. This increased pump duty is shown on Flow Diagram 47W852-1,R17. However, Amendment 5 still erroneously lists the original specification.
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| Safety Evaluation Neither the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction nor the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR is increased or created, and the marg'in of safety as defined in the basis of any TS is not reduced because the resulting increased pumpout rate does 1 not affect the safety function of the Reactor Building floor drainage '
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| system or any other safety feature. Since the effluent from the sumps is routed to the radwaste floor drain collector tank, the possibility for an uncontrolled release of radioactive material does not exist. The increased capacity is a change in the conservative direction.
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| 22 l
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| _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ - - ____-Q
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| l r
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| FSAR Section 11.9.4' HPCI Pump Suction Transfer Reason This section currently states that transfer of the HPCI system pump suction from the condensate storage tank (CST) to the pressure z suppression chamber is initiated by pressure switches in the line leading from the supply return headers to the header in the reactor building basement. This is incorrect. HPCI pump suction is transferred on low level in the line leading from the supply headers to the. header in the reactor building basement. This revision corrects this discrepancy.
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| Safety Evaluation Neither the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction nor the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR is increased or. created, and the margin of safety as defined in the basis of i any TS is not reduced because this change does not alter the level '
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| setpoint at which HPCI pump suction is transferred from the CST to the pressure suppression pool, nor does the change affect any of the safety functions of the CST, pressure suppression pool., or HPCI system. This change is not the result of any modification to the plant. It is only a wording correction to accurately reflect the design of BFN.
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| FSAR Table 12.3-1 Plant Radiation Zone Classifications Reason The following changes are being made to bring the FSAR into agreement with 10CFR20. Under the heading " Access Dose Rate Range" for Zone 1, change "<5 mrem /hr" to "<2 mrem /hr, and for Zone 2a, change "seven day" to "five day". These changes are related to plant shielding which provides for personnel access to the plant to perform maintenance and carry out operational duties with personnel exposures limited to the dose criteria set forth in 10CFR20.
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| Safety Evaluation Neither the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction nor the possibility for an accident or j malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR is )
| |
| increased or creaced, and the margin of safety as defineti in the basis of j any TS is not reduced because even with these revised numbers for the Access Dose Rate Range, the Shielding Design Dose Rate values are still well below the new range. Thus, plant design will still prevent operational personnel from being exposed to radiation doses exceeding I 10CFR20. The radiation protection function of the plant is not altered )
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| by this revision nor are any safety functions affected.
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| -)
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| l l
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| i i
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| I l
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| 23
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| ______________a
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| 'FSAR Section 12.3.2. Radwaste Facility Shielding-Reason The following revision'is being made to clarify ambiguous wording regarding radwaste shielding. The sentences:
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| "All areas for preparing, handling, or storing the radwaste for removal offsite are shleided. The principal sources and their zones are listed f in the following table." '
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| Will be. replaced by the following:
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| " Shielding is provided around the following Radioactive Waste Building areas, and the interior zones are classified as shown."
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| Safety Evaluation Neither the probability of the occurrence or- the consequences of an accident or malfunction nor the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR is increased or created, and the margin of safety as defined in the basis of-any TS is not reduced because revising the description of the radwaste facilities shielding makes the FSAR consistent with FSAR Section 9.2, the GE Design Specification for the Radwaste System, and the actual physical configuration of the plant. This change eliminates the possibility of misinterpreting the extent of the shielding which could result from.the previously vague wording.
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| I L
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| 24
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| I SAFETY EVALUATIONS FOR NEW PROCEDURES b rgency Operating Instruction (E0I)-3 Secondary Containment and Radioactivity Release Control
| |
| - Unit 2 Reason This procedure provides for symptom based operations which will protect equipment inside secondary containment, limit radioactive release to secondary containment, and either maintain secondary containment integrity or limit radioactive release from secondary containment. A set of entry conditions (i.e. symptoms) is defined which characterize events which could degrade into emergencies. Proper operator actions are specified to mitigate these symptoms and the event.
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| Safety Evaluation -
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| Neithertheprobabilityoftheoccurrhnteortheconsequencesofan accident or malfunction nor the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR was increased or created, and the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any TS was not reduced because the procedure was written in accordance with NRC approved, Boiling Water Reactor Owners Group Emergeacy Procedure i Guidelines and will only be utilized to mitigate the consequences of equipment inalrunctions.
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| 4 Maintenance Request (MR) A-821014 Replacement of Reactor Building Crane Shoulder Bolts Reason This maintenance request was written to provide instructions for the replacement of failed shoulder bolts on the reactor building crane. Two of the four 1 1/2 inch shoulder bolts that connected the wide flange NF 33 to the reactor building crane column failed as a result of fatigue. One inch bolts of the same length were fabricated and were used to replace the existing shoulder bolts.
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| Safety Evaluation Neither the probability of the occerrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction nor the pobibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR was increased or created, and the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any TS was not reduced because the substitution of two (or even all) shoulder bolts with 1 inch diameter bolts did not affect the structural integrity or seismic qualification of the reactor building crane or reactor building structure. This was assured through the use of special administrative controls which prohibited the lifting of fuel or fuel '
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| casks and limited the crane's operating speeds. The crane, therefore, performed its lifting function as designed.
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| 25
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| Special Operating Instruction (SOI) 2-S0I-25 Lowering Fuel Storage Pool Water l
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| Level For Check Valve Maintenance 1
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| Reason-l This procedure was written to lower the fuel pool level by three feet in order to provide ample clearance for personnel performing maintenance on fuel storage. pool diffuser line A and B check valves. The procedure provided the necessary steps and documentation for stopping the fuel storage pool cooling system, lowering fuel storage pool water level, monitoring fuel storage pool temperature ar.d water level, and restoring water level upon maintenance completion.
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| Safety Evaluation Neither the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction nor the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a-different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR was increased or created, and the margin of safety as defined.In the basis of-any TS was not reduced because the procedure required the-fuel pool cooling pumps to start (135'F) well before the TS temperature limit (150*F) would be exceeded, and because lowering the water. level three feet would still leave 21 feet of water above the irradiated fuel assemblies which is well above the TS minimum depth limit (8 1/2 feet above the top of the spent fuel). Additional special administrative controls (such as temperature, chemistry, and level checks, depth limit for pump), and prevention of fuel assembly movement were established to ensura TS limits would not be exceeded.
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| Safe Shutdown Instruction (SSI) 2-SSI-001 Reason This procedure provides the necessary manual operator actions, both inside and outside the MCR, to safely shutdown BFN Unit 2 following a 10CFR50 Appendix R fire event. The procedure also provides the necessary conditions which must be satisfied prior to use.
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| {
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| Safety Evaluation Neither the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction nor the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR is increased or created, and the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any TS is not reduced because this procedure is only for the new design basis event of an Appendix R fire and is in accordance with 10CFR50 Appendix R requirements. The procedure does not cause equipment to be operated in any manner for which the equipment was not designed, nor does the procedure subject any equipment to conditions which are different from those currently existing.
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| 1 26 l
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| Corporate Radiological Control Programs Reason This safety evaluation was performed to provide a one time analysis of the Dose Assessment, Environmental Radiological Monitoring, and Meteorological Monitoring Programs to preclude the necessity of providing individual evaluations for each procedure within these programs.
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| Safety Evaluation Neither the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an ;
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| accident or malfunction nor the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR is increased or created, and the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any TS is not reduced because these programs do not affect system ability regarding the indication of gaseous radioactive release rates to the environs or the determination whether radioactive release rate limits are exceeded. These systems are not necessary for the prevention or mitigation of accidents and do not affect FSAR safety objectivos.
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| Therefore, no unreviewed safety question can exist for the Dose
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| * Assessment, Environmental Radiological Monitoring, or , Meteorological Monitoring Programs, the implementing documents, procedures, or instructions for these programs, or revisions to these documents.
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| l l
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| 27
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| SAFETY EVALUATIONS FOR PROCEDURE REVISIONS I Mechanical Maintenance Instruction (MMI) - 119 Lifting Instruction for the Control of Heavy Loads Rea:on This revision to MMI-119 redefines the safe load path for the fuel storage pool gates, spent fuel cask, and miscellaneous _ equipment in the fuel storage pool critical zone. The change was necessary because the installation of high density fuel storage racks decreased the bad path area in the fuel storage pool.
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| Safety Evaluation Neither the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of'an accident or malfunction nor the possibility for an accident'or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR 1s !
| |
| increased or created, and the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any TS.is not reduced because the revision continues to disallow the transport of loads greater than 1000 pounds over spent fuel assemblies which is consistent with the technical specifications and does not modify the manner in which any equipment functions.
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| Operating Instruction (0I) 0-0I-77E Solid Radwaste Operating Instruction Reason This procedure was revised to coordinate the operation of the Chem Nuclear Rapid Dewatering System (RDS-1000) with existing radwaste dewatering equipment in order to provide for accelerated dewatering of particulate radioactive waste slurries.
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| Safety Evaluation Neither the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction nor the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR is increased or created, and the nargin of safety as defined in the basis of any TS is not reduced because system configuration and operation remain as described in the FSAR and technical specifications. The RDS-1000 and the system with which it interfaces are not safety related.
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| 28
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| Post Modification Test (PMT)-110 Scram Discharge System Test Reason This postmodification test will verify the design and implementation of Engineering Change Notice (ECN) P0392 which modified the scram discharge volume (SDV) and the SDIV. The test will verify proper operation of the SDIV output signals and the free volume after receipt of a SDIV high water level scram signal.
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| Safety Evaluation Neither the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction nor the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a f.fferent type than previously evaluated in the FSAR is increased or created, and the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any TS is not reduced because the first part of the test is performed with no fuel in the vessel and the last part of the test is performed with all control rods fully inserted and electrically disarmed which
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| - actually decreases the probability of malfunction or inadvertent rod withdrawal.
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| Restart Test 2-BFN-RTP-99, Change Notice (CN) 3, RPS Reason 2-BFN-RTP-99 is the restart test for the RPS which verified the system was capable of meeting safe shutdown requirements. CN-3 installed jumpers around the inputs to the scram circuits to clear Temporary '
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| Alteration Control Forms (TACFs) 2-85-021-99 and 2-85-022-99.
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| Safety Evaluation Neither the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction nor the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR was increased or created, and the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any TS was not reduced because RPS initiation was not required with unit 2 defueled. No permanent alterations were performed since these alterations were removed after testing and prior to fuel load.
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| Surveillance Instruction (SI) 0-SI-4.7.C Secondary Containment Integrity Test Reason This revision was a temporary change to reduce the acceptance criteria for flow out of secondary containment (through SGTS) from 12,000 cfm to 10,500 cfm when testing all zones of secondary containment. This was to account for two 750 cfm air compressors installed on TACF 2-88-005-64 to provide additional service air from outside the power block into the unit 2 reactor building for use in the drywell.
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| 29 L __ _ _ _ _ _____--__ _ _ _ _ _
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| l l
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| 0-SI-4.7.C (Continued)
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| Safety Evaluation 1 1
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| Neither the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an '
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| accident or malfunction nor the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR was increased or created, and the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any TS was not reduced because the change assured that SBGT and secondary containment would still perform their safety functions even with 1500 cfm ,
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| of additional air being pumped into secondary containment. Reducing the :
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| allowable limit to 10,500 cfm had no physical affect on any plant equipment.
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| 0-SI-4.8.A.1-1 Release Procedure - Liquid Effluents Reason The revision to 0-SI-4.8.A.1-1 allowed the bypassing of the isolation logic of monitor RM-90-130 to allow liquid radwaste discharge to the river. This was necessary since RM-90-130 isolates discharge to the river whenever it is inoperable. A temporary jumper was installed in panel 9-10 to override the isolation logic and removed after each release.
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| Safety Evaluation Neither the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction nor the possiblitty for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR was increased or created, and the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any TS was not reduced because the revision established compensatory measures in accordance with the TS (3.2.D.2) which allowed releases of radioactive wastes when the radiation monitor was inoperable. These compensatc y measures (two grab samples with second party verification) provided the assurance that the limits of 10CFR20 Appendix 8 would not be exceeded.
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| 2-SSI-001 Safe Shutdown Instruction Reason This procedure was revised to reflect additional Appendix R analyses performed by the design organization which supported a reduction in the number of manual operator actions.
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| l l
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| 1 30
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| _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ A
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| 2-SSI-001 (Continued)
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| Safety Evaluation Neither'the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction nor the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR was increased or created, and the margin of safety as defined in the. basis of any TS was not reduced because the basis of the original safety-evaluation was not changed. The procedure does not cause equipment to be operated in.any manner for which the equipment was not designed, nor does the procedure subject equipment-to conditions which are different from those currently existing. The procedure is in accordance with 10CFR50, Appendix.R.
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| e 31 m
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| i SAFETY EVALUATIONS FOR SPECIAL OPERATING CONDITIONS Safety Evaluation (SE) 64-C-88004 Secondary Containment Operability Purpose This document' evaluated the effects of seismically unqualified secondary containment penetrations on fuel handling and other operational
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| -activities over the unit 1, 2, and 3 spent fuel storage pools and the- ;
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| open reactor well containing fuel. This evaluation allows modification i work to support resolution of the seismic issue to continue during fuel )
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| handling activities. Temporary seals are used to keep secondary containment functional.
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| Safety Evaluation Neither the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction nor the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR is increased or created, and the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any TS is not reduced because even if the highly improbable fuel handling accident in' conjunction with a seismic event were to occur, the dose release levels would be below allowable limits established by NUREG 0800 and the FSAR. This means that secondary containment is not required in order to maintain release dose levels within allowable limits for the prescribed plant conditions (i.e., shutdown, refueling mode, or defueled). This activity does not affect the methods of fuel handling.
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| SE 31-C-88006 Fuel Reconstitution Effect on CREVS Purpose This evaluation addresses fuel reconstitution work with unanticipated, unfiltered inleakage into the MCR. The evaluation addresses the effects of this condition (i.e., unfiltered inleakage) on the CREV system as it relates to a fuel handling. accident during the fuel reconstitution effort. Nuclear fuel reconstitution work will be performed at BFN to improve fuel performance for the next fuel cycle.
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| l 32
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| SE 31-C-88006 (Continued)
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| Safety Evaluation Neither the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an accident or-malfunction nor the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR was increased or created, and the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any TS was not reduced because the radiological consequences to the MCR operators would be far below what is allowed by 10CFR50 Appendix A guidelines if a fuel handling accident were to occur, even if the CREVS did not operate. The previously irradiated fuel has decayed to a point where the assumed inability of the CREVS to pressurize and provide filtered air to the MCR would have no detrimental affect on MCR personnel in the event of an accident. The activity involves no abnormal use of fuel handling equipment. In addition, simultaneous movement of fuel in all three units is acceptable since no single probable event could result in multiple fuel handling accidents.
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| SE 65-C-88007 Aligning 480 Volt (V) DG Auxiliary Board to Alternate Supply Purpose This document evaluates activities necessary for fuel reconstitution in unit 2 with either, but not both, 480V DG auxiliary boards powered from the alternate supply. Unit 1 and 2 480V DG auxiliary boards are normally powered from 4KV shutdown board (SDBD) A and 4KV SDBD D, respectively.
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| The 4KV SDBD 8 is the common alternate supply to both unit 1 and 2 480V DG auxiliary boards. Transfer of the power supply to the 480V DG auxiliary boards is a manual operation.
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| Safety Evaluation Neither the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction nor the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR was increased or created, and the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any TS was not reduced because the alignment to alternate supply did not introduce any conditions that could have lessened the ability of the plant to respond to design basis events and because the alignment I
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| provided sufficient separation, protection, and redundancy to maintain the diesel auxiliary boards and associated loads operable. The activity presented no changes to system interfaces or operating characteristics which would have invalidated the assumptions of equipment failures in the FSAR. Administrative controls were established to rack out the breaker ,
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| to the alternate power supply on the 480V DG BD which was not aligned to l the alternate power supply when the other DG BD was aligned to the alternate source. This control assured that a single failure would not affect both DG BDs. 1 l
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| l l
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| 33
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| l-SE 31-C-88006 (Continued)
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| Safety Evaluation Neither the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction nor the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR was increased or created, and the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any TS was not reduced because the radiological consequences to the MCR operators would be far below what is allowed by 10CFR50 Appendix A
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| ' guidelines if a fuel handling accident were to occur, even if the CREVS
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| -did not operate. The previously irradiated fuel has decayed to'a point where the assumed inability of the CREVS to pressurize and provide filtered air to the MCR would have no detrimental affect on MCR personnel :
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| in the event of an accident. The activity involves no abnormal use of ;
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| fuel handling equipment. In addition, simultaneous movement of fuel in r all three units is acceptable since no single probable event could result in multiple fuel handling accidents.
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| SE 65-C-88007 Aligning 480 Volt (V) DG Auxiliary Board to Alternate Supply Purpose This document evaluates activities necessary for fuel reconstitution in unit 2 with either, but not both, 480V DG auxiliary boards powered from e the alternate supply. Unit I and 2 480V DG auxiliary boards are normally j powered from 4KV shutdown board (SDBD) A and 4KV SDBD D, respectively. l The 4KV SDBD B is the common alternate supply to both unit 1 and 2 480V DG auxiliary boards. Transfer of the power supply to the 480V DG auxiliary boards is a manual operation.
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| Safety Evaluation Neither the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction nor the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR was increased or created, and the margin of safety as defined in the basis of I any TS was not reduced because the alignment to alternate supply did not 2 introduce any conditions that could have lessened the ability of the ,
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| plant to respond to design basis events and because the alignment provided sufficient separation, protection, and redundancy to maintain the diesel auxiliary boards and associated loads operable. The activity presented no changes to system interfaces or operating characteristics which would have invalidated the assumptions of equipment failures in the FSAR. Administrative controls were established to rack out the breaker to the alternate power supply on the 480V DG BD which was not aligned to the alternate power supply when the other DG BD was aligned to the alternate source. This control assured that a single failure would not affect both DG BDs.
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| f i
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| }
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| 33 j
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| l l
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| SE 31-C-88008 Aligning 480V SDBD 38 to Alternate Power Purpose This evaluation addressed the alignment of the 480V SDBD 3B to its alternate power supply, 4KV SDBD 3EB. On unit 3 the normal emergency supply, DG 3C, to the CREV train IB was not available to the 480V .
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| distribution system. Therefore, this evaluation addressed tne use of DG 3B to supply the emergency power to the 480V SDBD 3B through 4KV SDBD 3EB.
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| J Safety Evaluation Neither the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction nor the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR was
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| , increased or created, and the margin of safety as defined in the basis of l any TS was not reduced because the alignment to alternate supply met the I
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| design requirements for single failure, physical independence, and
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| -loading. This was assured through the.use of special requirements which hequired the three units to remain defueled, the alternate supply breaker to the 480V SDBD 3A to be racked out, the RHR pump associated with 4KV
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| .SDBD 3EB to be tagged out, and adequate EECW supply flow to the DGs to be maintained. The activity had no affect on fuel handling methods. The alignment did not introduce a condition that could have prevented systems required to mitigate a fuel handling accident from initiating and performing as designed.
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| SE 57-C-88009 DG Operability Purpose This evaluation addressed administrative controls which assured that two or more DGs were not lost due to a single failure of a battery board.
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| This failure could occur because the 480V SDBD's loads failed to shed when the control power was lost. This could, in turn, overload the associated DG. These administrative controls required the breakers for the unit 1 and unit 2 RHR pumps to be disabled in the open position.
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| Safety Evaluation Neither the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction nor the possibility for an actident or malfunction nor the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR was increased or created, and the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any TS was not reduced because the administrative controls assured that the DGs would meet single failure criteria and because the RHR pumps were not required while the unit 1 and 2 reactors were defueled. Disabling the RHR pumps assured that the additional load on the 480V SDBD caused by a single failure would not overload the DGs. With the exception of the RHR pumps, the power requirements for the other safety systems were satisfied.
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| 34
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| | |
| SE 57-C-88011 250V SDBD Charger Return-to-Service Purpose This evaluation addressed returning 250V SDBD. charger B to service with the filter circuit removed. Until the parts were attained to return the charger to-its original configuration, administrative controls were set in place to allow the charger to be returned to service. This was needed because certain AC electrical line-ups required the 250V SDBD charger B to be in service to support secondary containment operability. ,
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| i Safety Evaluation Neither the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction nor the possibility for an accident or '
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| malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR was !
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| increased or created, and the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any TS was not reduced because the loads fed by the shutdown board batteries were not< sensitive to " ripple" generated by typical battery chargers and were therefore capable of performing their intended fur-tions. With the battery connected to the charger, th'e " ripple"
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| " age was acceptable for operation (.38 percent). Administrative ct .rols were established to prevent the charger from being energized unless it was connected to the associated battery.
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| SE 31-P-88028 Restriction on Control Bay Ventilation Configuration !
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| Purpose This evaluation addressed the establishment of one configuration for the control bay ventilation system, and set the flows through each CREV unit for this configuration. The selected configuration is the initial lineup after an isolation signal is received. The configuration was needed because all possible lineups had not been tested to prove the design flow rate was available under all possible conditions. The required configuration removed the 1A SDBD room exhaust fan from service.
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| Safety Evaluation Neither the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction nor the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the foAR was increased or created, and the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any TS was not reduced because all equipment related to the activity performed its normal function except the 1A SDBD room exhaust fan which has a function inconsequential to the safe operation of CREVs. In addition, there are two other backup methods to provide cooling to the SDBD rooms. The flow through each CREV unit has since been established for each of the various control bay ventilation configurations through the use of Special Test (ST) 8726 and returned to normal TS requirements.
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| 35
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| l SE 204-C-88035 Aligning 480V SDBD 1A to Alternate Power l
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| Purpose This evaluation addressed the alignment of the 480V SDBD 1A to its alternate povar supply, 4KV SDBD B. In order to take credit for the use of the albrnate feed to the 480V SDBD 1A, the effect the alignment had on the single failure criteria for the required systems and loading configuration changes had to be evaluated.
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| Safety Evaluation i Neither the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction nor the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR was increased or created, and the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any TS was not reduced because the alignment to alternate supply met the design requirements for single failures, physical independence, and loading. This was assured through the use of special administrative controls which required all- three units to remain defueled, the alternate supply breaker to the 480V SDBD 1B to be racked out, and adequate EECW supply flow to the DGs to be mi.intained. This alignment did not introduce a condition which could have prevented systems required to mitigate a fuel handling accident from initiating and performing as designed.
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| SE 111-C-88038 and 111-C-88074 Reactor Building Crane Operability Purpose This evalua. a addressed the use of the reactor building crane to move the unit 2 steam separator, dryer separator shield plugs, refueling slot plugs, refueling canal shield, and any 5 ton load. The evaluation was needed because the configuration of the reactor building crane runway was not the same as the configuration specified by design. These loads were required to be moved to facilitate in-vessel inspection, fuel reconstitution, and other refueling floor activities.
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| Safety Evaluation Neither the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an iccident or malfunction nor the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR was increased or created, and the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any TS was not reduced because, as analyzed by the design organization, the structural integrity and seismic qualification of the reactor building structure, reactor building crane runway, and reactor building crane were not adversely affected under the given loading conditions and configuration. This analysis also considered the effects of a seismic event during a lifting activity. Fuel and fuel casks were not handled during the duration of this evaluation, nor was the reactor building crane bridge operated at a speed greater than 50 percent of its maximum speed.
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| 36
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| I SE 204-C-88039 Aligning 480V SDBD 18 to Alternate Power j Purpop This evaluation addressed the alignment of the 480V SDBD 18 to its alternate power supply, 4KV SDBD B. In order to take credit for the use of the alternate feed to the 480V SDBD 1B, the effect the alignment had on the single failure criteria for the required systems and loading configuration changes had to be evaluated.
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| Safety Evaluation Neither the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction nor the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR was increased or created, and the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any TS was not reduced because the alignment to alternate supply met the design requirements for single failure, physical independence, and loading. This was assured through the use of special administrative contrels which required all three units to remain defueled, the alternate supply breaker to the 480V SDBD 1A to be racked out, adequate EECW supply flow to the DGs to be maintained, and the RHR pump associated with 4KV SDBD 18 to be tagged out. The alignment did not introduce a condition that could have prevented systems required to mitigate 2. fuel handling accident from initiating and performing as designed.
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| SE 231-C-88040 Aligning 480V SDBD 3A or 3B to Alternate Power Purpose T W evaluation addressed the alignment of the 480V SDBDs 3A or 3B to their alternate power supply, 4KV SDBD 3EB. In order to take credit for the use of the alternate feed to the 480V SDBDs 3A and 3B, the effect the alignment had on the single failure criteria for the required systems aad loading configuration changes had to be evaluated.
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| Safety Eval _uation Neither the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction nor the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR was increased or created, and the margin of safety as defined in tr.o basis of any TS was not reduced because the alignment to alternate supply met the design requirements for single failure, physical independence, and loading. This was assured through the use of special administrative controls which required all three units to remain defueled, the alternate supply breaker to the 480V SDBD 3A or 3B to be racked out, and adequate EECW supply to the DGs to be maintained. The alignment did not introduce a condition that could have prevented systems required to mitigate a fuel handling accident from initiating and performing as designed.
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| 37
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| SE 66-C-88046 Off Gas System Air Leakage Purpose.
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| This evaluation addressed air inleakage into the off-gas system that exceeded the FSAR design flow. The highest recorded value for air inleakage was'330 standard cubic feet per minute (scfm). The average air inleakage for unit 2 (which is the unit with a hist 7ry of most air inleakage) in 1984 was 165 scfm.
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| . Safety Evaluation Neither the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an
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| -accident or malfunction nor the possibility for an accident or malfunction of'a different type than previously. evaluated in the FSAR was increased or created, and the margin of safety as defined in the basis of-any TS was not reduced because the presence of large. amounts of air inleakage into the off-gas system did not result in releases which exceeded exposure limits given in 10CFR20, nor was the operability of the l radiation monitoring systems affected. The off-gas system is not safety - 1 related. The main stack'and air ejector off-gas radiation monitoring systems are not essential during any transients or accidents.
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| SE 00-C-88061 Operation With One Carbon Steel Bearing in the Reactor Coolant System-Purpose This evaluation addresses the ope ation of BFN unit 2 with one carbon steel ball bearing in the reactor coolant system (core component-operational safety evaluation [CCOSE] 88-02). The reason for this activity is that one carbon steel ball bearing was discovered missing from an ultrasonic inspection device after it was used in the vessel annulus region. The dimension of the ball bearing is 0.10 inch diameter.
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| Safety Evaluation Neither the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction nor the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR is increased or created, and the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any TS is not reduced because the lost ball bearing will not impair the function or tallability of any equipment important to safety. In addition, operation of unit 2 with the lost ball bearing is bounded by existing events analyzed in the FSAR. The small size of the ball bearing ;
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| will allow it to flow through the recirculation pump without adversely affecting its functior.. There is no change in the confidence level of the cladding as a fission product barrier due to long-term fretting.
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| 38 1
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| SE 00-C-88065 Operation With an Eye Hook in the Reactor Vessel Purpose This evaluation addresses the operation of BFN unit 2 with an aluminum eye-hook in the primary system (CCOSE 88-03). The hook broke off the rail of the operator's console on the refueling platform. The hook is approximately 3/16 inches thick in the shape of a semicircle 3/4 inches in diameter.
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| Safety Evaluation Neither the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction nor the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different typ. i.han previously evaluated in the FSAP, is increased or created, and thn ma gin of safety as defined in the basis of any TS is not reduced because '.here is no degradation in the performance of any safety related system or in the integrity of any process barrier designed to guard agu nst the uncontrolled release of radioactivity, nor is there any change in the confidence level of physical barriers. This -
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| conclusion was drawn while considering the worst possible migration paths for the hook, and the impact it might have on the continued safe ,
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| operation of unit 2. Operation with the lost part is bounded by previously analyzed events in the FSAR.
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| SE 31-P-88068 Effect of Control Bay Heating, Cooling and Ventilation on Secondary Containment Purpose This evaluation addressed the effect of having the control bay heating, ventilating, and air conditioning (HVAC) system inoperable while taking credit for secondary containment operability. With the HVAC system out-of-service, the SDBD rooms would not be provided with a method to handle the heat load associated with normal operation. The concern with this situation was that room temperatures might have increased beyond the 104*F limit for which the electrical components were analyzed. This evaluation was valid only when all three reactor vessels were defueled.
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| Safety Evaluation Neither the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an ,
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| accident or malfunction nor the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR was increased or created, and the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any TS was not reduced because the major contributors to the heat load of the shutdown board rooms, such as core spray pumps, RHR pumps, and some RHRSW pumps, were not required and therefore, exceeding the temperature limit was remote. In addition, during the time of this condition (lat.;
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| autumn and winter), the outside ambient temperature was significantly lower than the 97'F assumed during design which made it even less likely that the temperature limit would be exceeded. An administrative procedure (MMI-153) was also established to monitor the room temperature as a final precaution.
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| 39
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| l SAFETY EVALUATIONS FOR SPECIAL TESTS ST 87-28 Hays-Republic H2 0: ' Analyzer Hostile Environment Test Test Objective e
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| The purpose of.this test was to obtain data to be used to supplement the
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| ' environmental qualification (10CFR50.49) of the H202 analyzer and to prove the analyzer's operability. The test subjected the H20s analyzer panel to simulated design basis event conditions for seven days' and demonstrated the analyzers ability to accurately perform its function.
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| Safety Evaluation Neither the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction nor.the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR was increased or created, and the margin of safety as defined in the basis of
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| &ny TS was not reduced because the test status of unit 3 (i.e., defueled) -
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| did not require the operability of the H 0, 2 analyzer, containment air monitors, or primary containment. The.H20 panel and analyzer was used in the same manner as the normal procedure and was restored to the pretest configuration Ster completion of the test. Failure of the H02 system would have had no effect on the ability to monitor containment atmosphere.
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| ST 87-31 Control Bay Emergency Pressurization and Leak Rate Test Test Objective The purpose of this test was to demonstrate the ability of the CREVS to pressurize the MCR habitability envelope in the event of control room isolation. The test operated each CREVS pressurization unit, verified pressurization boundary integrity, and verified that design differential pressure could be established and maintained by each CREVS unit while operating at design flow.
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| Safety Evaluation Neither the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction nor the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR was increased or created, and the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any TS was not reduced because the test did not place the system in an alignment or operational mode that was not described in the FSAR or TS.
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| No plant alterations or abnormal alignment of equipment was performed.
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| +
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| i 40
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| . _ - - _ _ . _A
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| ST 88 SGT5 Maximum Flow. Test Test Objective This test was performed to determine the maximum capacity of the SGTS fans. The information derived from this test was used to supplement design evaluations concerning the seismic qualifications of secondary containment penetrations.
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| Safety Evaluation Neither the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction nor the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR was increased or created, and the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any TS was not reduced because secondary containment and SGTS were operated in their normal operating condition and no activities were
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| ' allowed during testing which could have damaged spent fuel. In addition,
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| - since all three units were defueled and since no fuel handling or other
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| > activities over the fuel pool were allowed during the test, no credible accident could have occurred.
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| ST 88-14 BFN Unit 2 Cycle 5 Fuel Inspection / Reconstitution Test Objective This test established the fuel inspection / reconstitution program. The program was established to assess the condition of the fuel scheduled for reinsertion for cycle 6, and, to the extent required, to perform fuel reconstitution in an effort to reduce the probability of CILC failures, thereby improving fuel reliability.
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| Safety Evaluation Neither the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction nor the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR was increased or created, and the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any TS was not reduced because the test did not change the function or use of the fuel handling / storage equipment or affect the performance of the fuel pool cooling system. The only possible accidents which could have occurred would have been bounded by the design basis fuel handling accident per FSAR, Section 14.6.4. This activity will reduce the number of fuel failures next cycle which will reduce plant radiation levels, and thus, increase plant safety. No TS limits were exceeded.
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| l 41
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| Ey i'
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| i:
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| ST 88-15 CHEMTEC Ventilation System Flow Measurement Test Objective The purpose of this test was to establish and verify ventilation system flow rates. ihe data collected was used to document actual plant release rates for use in radiation monitoring.
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| Safety Evaluation Neither the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction nor the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR was increased or created, and the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any TS was not reduced because the test did not degrade the capability to.
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| monitor effluent through these ducts, change the operating l characteristics of the system, require the system to operate outside its design specifications, nor affect the ability of the ventilation ducts to isolate. In addition, no continuous air monitors were taken out Lf service or modified. -
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| ST 88-18 BFN Unit 1 and 3 fuel Inspection Test Objective This test involved the disassembly of fuel bundles and the inspection of selected fuel rods to determine their acceptability for-use in unit 2 cycle 6. The test was performed in the unit 1 and unit 3 spent fuel storage pools.
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| Safety Evaluation Neither the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction nor the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR was increased or created, and the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any TS was not reduced because the test did not change the function or use of the fuel handling / storage equipment or affect the performance of the fuel pool cooling system. The only possible accidents which could have occurred would have been bounded by the design basis fuel handling accident per FSAR, Section 14.6.4. This activity will reduce the number of fuel failures next cycle which will reduce plant radiattor levels, and thus, increase plant safety. No TS limits were exceeded.
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| 42
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| ST 88-25 Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) Flush and Pressure Drop Verification i Test Objective The purpose of this test was to determine where possible flow -
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| restrictions may exist in the RHRSW system that prevaated design flow from being achieved through several of the RHR heat exchangers.
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| Safety Evaluation Neither the probability of the' occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction nor the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR was increased or created, and the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any TS was not reduced because total flows through the RHR heat exchangers did not exceed design or FSAR specifications. In addition, safety functions of the RHRSW system were not required for the plant mode (defueled) during performance of the test.
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| ST 88-31, Valve Leak Rate and Maximum Pressure Differential Test Test Objective The purpose of this test was to prove that the leak rate across two' 16-inch valves internal pressure boundary (flapper) was minimal at design pressure and that the flapper could withstand the maximum. differential pressure-to which it would be exposed during a system hydrostatic test.
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| The results of the test were to be used to upgrade the valves to allow installation in the RHRSW system.
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| Safety Evaluation Neither the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction nor the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR was increased or created, and the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any TS was not reduced because the valves were tested prior to l Installation and therefore, had no affect on any safety system function.
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| The valves were tested in accordance with applicable codes and requirements.
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| 43 I
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| ST 88-37. 250V DC Reactor Motor-Operated Valve (RMOV) Board Supply Breaker Interlock Functional Test Objective Tia purpose of this test was to verify that the electrical interlock-between the normal and emergency supply breakers on the 250V DC RMOV boards was_ functioning properly. Each board was transferred to emergency supply to verify the normal breaker did not close, then returned to normal supply.
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| Safety Evaluation
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| < Neither the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction nor the possibility for an accident or malfunction'of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR was increased or created, and the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any TS was not reduced because the transfer of a 250V DC RMOV board is a design feature of the boards and.is described in the FSAR and TS. In addition, since the test was performed while the reactors were defueled, the 250V DC RMOV boards were not required for any accident mitigation.
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| 44 L:
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| SAFETY EVALUATIONS FOR TEMPORARY ALTERATIONS TACF 0-87-004-025 Raw Service Water (RSH) Tank Level Sensing Piping Purpose This alteration was made to move the containment barrier from the seal weld to the bottom of the sleeve, to provide enhanced freeze protection, and to remove an unnecessary support; Safety Evaluation Neither the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an i accident or malfunction nor the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR was !
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| increased or created, and the margin of safety as defined in the_ basis of any TS was not reduced because these alterations meet applicable design criteria and do not degrade system configuration. These changes will be made permanent on ECN P5529. 3 TACF 1-88-001-90 RBCCH and RHRSH Radiation Monitors Purpose i
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| This alteration will render inoperable the associated annunciation for RBCCH and RHRSH radiation monitors. This will prevent inoperable monitors from masking annunciator 1-RA-90-1318 shared with the Raw Cooling Water (RCH) radiation monitor.
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| Safety Evaluation Neither the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction nor the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR was increased or created, and the margin of safety as defined in the basis of )
| |
| any TS was not reduced because this alteration ensured the proper annunciation of an operable RCH monitor. These monitors were inoperable i before initiation of this alteration and compensatory sampling per the TS
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| ! had already been implemented.
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| l 45 l
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| l u - - - - -
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| TACF 1-88-002-69 Jumper Installation for Temperature Indicating Switch ,
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| 1-TIS-69-11 Purpose This alteration provided a jumper around instrument 1-TIS-69-11 in the PCIS' logic. This.was required because the instrument cr:ated spurious actuation of the unit 1 PCIS. The function of 1-TIS-69-il was to provide i a signal to close the inboard and outboard RNCU primary' containment !
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| isolation valves when an abnormally high temperature of the influent to
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| .the RWCU demineralizers was sensed.
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| Safety Evaluation Neither the probability of che occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction nor the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR was increased or created, and the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any TS was not reduced because the function of 1-TIS-69-11 is not a-required. safety function nor will the reactor coolaat reach temperatures high enough to initiate isolation since the unit I reactor is defueled.
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| TACF 2-88-001-085 -CR0 Scram Discharge Shielding Purpose This alteration installed temporary supports at the north end of the scram discharge volume header contacting at the . eld of the elbow and tee on each side of the. header. These supports provided additional stability for the installation of lead shielding (weighing approximately 80 lbs/ft) elbow to elbow and 12 feet south on each. leg. The shleiding was install >d to reduce radiation levels on elevation 565' of the reactor buildt.g during unit.2 cycle 5 refueling outage.
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| Safety Evaluation Neither the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction nor the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR was increased or created, and the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any TS was not reduced because the shielding was installed when there was no fuel in the reactor vessel. In this configuration, there was no requirement for the CRD piping to maintain its pressure boundary r.or for the CRD system to be operable. Calculations proved that the piping was not overstressed. The shielding was removed prior to fuel load.
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| 45
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| (.
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| L h
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| -TACF 2-88-002-90 ~RBCCW and RHRSW Radiation Monitors
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| : l. Purpose
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| -This alteration will ren" - inoperable.the associated annunciation.for RBCCW and RHRSW radiatic onitors.= This will prevent inoperable monitors from masking an, aciator 2-RA-90-131B shared with the RCW radiation monitor.
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| Safety Evaluation Neither the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction nor the possibility.for'an accident or L malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR was increased or created, and the margin of safety as defined in the basis'of l any TS was not reduced because this alteration ensured the proper i annunciation of an operable RCH conttor. .These monitors were inoperable before initiation of this alteration and compensatory sampling per the TS had already been implemented.
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| TACF 2-88-003-075 Installation of Minimum Flow Switches Purpose This alteratioa disabled the existing minimum bypass flow switches (2-FS-75-80/81) and installed indicating flow switches (2-FIS-75-21/49) to control the operation of the minimum bypass flow valves (2-FCV-75-9/37).. The flow indicating switches were taken from t.11t 3, retagged, and installed in unit 2. These switches were not qualified for harsh environment.
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| Safety Evaluation Neither the probability of the occurrence or'the consequences'of an ;
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| accident or-malfunction nor the possibility for an accident or l malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR is increased or created, and the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any TS is not reduced because these temporary flow indicating switches increase system reliability, perform the same function as the' original switches, and are qualified for the current plant mode (shutdown and
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| 'depressurized). These switches will be replaced by ECN E-2-P7151 prict to restart.
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| 47
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| TACF 2-88-004-68 Sensing Line Relocation Purpose This alteration changed the location of the sensing line for Level Transmitter (LT)-3-62 and -62A from the lower tap of jet pump 11 to the lower tap of jet pump 16. This alteration was required to make LT-3-62
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| , and -62A operable. These level transmitters were inoperable due to their i sensfag line being clogged.
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| Safety Evaluation Neither the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction nor the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR is i increased or created, and the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any TS is not reduced because the r.ew sensing line meets the same specifications and functions in the same manner as the original sensing line. Making these instruments operable helps assure the plant will respond as it was designed by preventing water needed for core flooding .-
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| from being diverted to containment cooling and by making postaccident reactor water level information available. .
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| TACF 2-88-005-64 Installation of Two (2) 750 SCFM Air Compressors Purpose This alteration installed two 750 SCFM air compressors outside the southside of the reactor building. The supplemental air supply added by this alteratLn provides additional service air for operating power tools and equipment during the unit 2, cycle 5 outage. The air is supplied through a 4" gate valve connected to the: Integrated Leak Rate Test pipe penetration.
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| Safety Evaluation Neither the probability of the occurrente or the consequences of an accident or malfunction nor the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR is increased or created, and the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any TS is not reduced because the equipment will not interact with any i safety-related components during any postulated accident nor does it '
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| perform a safety-related function. Administrative controls were established which reduced the allowed leakage of secondarv containment, depending on the number of compressors in service, to a M unt for tne possibility of a pipe break of the air supply inside set;: dary containment.
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| I 48
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| 'TACF 3-88-001-111 Damaged Bolt on the Reactor Building Crane Purpose This evaluation addressed the temporary use of a damaged bolt at the column R3 crane bracket on the reactor building crane structure. One of the two bolts supporting the crane bracket was bent and its accompanying nut was missing.
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| Safety Evaluation Neither the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction nor the possibility foi an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR was increased or created, and the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any TS was not reduced because the damaged bolt did not adversely affect the structural integrity or seismic qualification of the reactor building crane or reactor building structure. This was assured through the use of special controls which bounded the loading conditions of the c - The crane was not allowed to lift fuel, fuel casks, or any load grv 5 than - -
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| 10 kips.
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| TACF 3-88-003-90 RBCCW and RHRSW Radiation Monitors Purpose This alteration will render inoperable the associated annunciation for RBCCW and RHRSW radiat';on monitors. This will prevent inoperable monitors from masking annunciator 3-RA-90-131B shared with the RCH radiation monitor.
| |
| Safety Evaluation i Neither the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction nor the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR was increased or created, and the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any TS was not reduced because this alteration ensured the proper annunciation of an cperable RCH monitor. These monitors were inoperable before initiation of this alteration and compensatory sampling per the TS had already been implemented.
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| 49
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| TACF 3-88-004-75 Removal of Minimum Bypass Flow Switches Purpose This alteration removed the minimum bypass " low switches (3-FIS-75-21/49) from unit 3 for installation in unit 2 under TACF-2-88-003-75. These switches will be restored in unit 3 upon implementation of ECN E-2-P7151.
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| Safety Evaluation Neither the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction nor the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR is increased or created, and the margin of safety as defined in the basis of ;
| |
| , any TS is not reduced because the CS system is not required to be '
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| operable, nor is there a possibility of a DBA under the current plant condit!ons for unit 3 (i.e., shutdown, depressurized, and defueled).
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| I i
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| 50
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| SAFETY EVALUATIONS FOR TEMPORARY SHIELDING (TSRF)
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| ]
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| TSRF 88-0002- Shielding for fuel Storage Pool Cooling Heat Exchangers 1
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| Purpose This evaluation addressed the application of temporary lead shielding to the fuel storage pool cooling (FPC) heat exchangers located in the unit 2 reactor building, elevation 621'. The shielding was needed to reduce the radiation doses to employees working in and passing through this area.
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| The shielding was wrapped around the circumference of both heat-exchangers.
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| Safety Evaluation Neither the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction nor the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated An the FSAR was increased or created, and the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any TS was not reduced because the addition of the shieldt.ng did not adversely affect the seismic qualification of the heat exchangers, associated FPC or RBCCH piping, or the elevation 621' floor, nor did the shielding affect the function or operability of FPC, RBCCH, or any other system. The shielding was installed in a positively _ secure manner to prevent damage to surrounding equipment during a seisml; event. The addition of the shielding was consistent with ALARA principles and ,
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| increased'the safety of the evaluated work area.
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| TSRF 88-0006 Shielding for Fuel Storage Pool Cooling Heat Exchangers Purpose This evaluation addressed the application of temporary lead shielding to the FPC heat exchangers located in the unit i reactor building, elevation 621'. The shielding was needed to reduce the radiation doses to employees working in and passing through this area. The shielding was wrapped around the circumference of both heat exchangers.
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| Safety Evaluation Neither the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction nor the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR was increased or created, and the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any TS was not reduced because the addition of the shielding did not adversely affect the seismic qualification of the heat exchangers, associated FPC or RBCCW piping, or the elevation 621' floor, nor did the shielding affect the function or operability of FPC, RBCCW, or any other system. The shielding was installed in a positively secure manner to prevent damage to surrounding equipment during a seismic event. The addition of the shielding was consistent with ALARA principles and increased the safety of the evaluated work area.
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| 51
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| t.
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| TSRF 88-0008 Shielding for Fuel Storage Pool Cooling Piping
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| . Purpose This evaluation addressed the application of approximately 30 feet of temporary lead shielding to the unit 2 fuel pool cooling (FPC) piping'on f
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| elevation 617'-9". The piping was 6" carbon stet:1 pipe which delivered j FPC water from the outlet of the FPC heat exchangers to the FPC 1 demineralizers.
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| Safety Evaluation 1
| |
| ~Neither the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction nor the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR was Increased or created, and the margin of safety as defined in the basis of .
| |
| any TS was not reduced because the addition of the shielding did not adversely affect the ability of the existing pipe restraints to support the added dead load during a seismic event. This portion of. piping was not required to be seismic Class I because it was not required for cooling the spent fuel storage pool. The shielding was installed in a positively secure manner to prevent damage to surrounding equipment during a seismic event.
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| TSRF 88-0010 Shielding for Fuel Storage Pool Cooling Piping Purpose This evaluation addressed the application of temporary lead shielding to three areas of piping for the unit 2 FPC system. Area 1 consisted of the 6" horizontal run of FPC pump 28 discharge piping between supports R-l' and R-34. Area 2 consisted of the 12" fuel pool and cleanup pump suction from the point where the 12" line exited the "S" line wall up to support R-5. Area 3 consisted of the 8" piping to the RHR system from the 4-way.
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| pioing connection to valve 2-78-534. Lead wool blankets were wrapped around the' piping.
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| Safety Evaluation Neither the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction nor the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR was increased or created, and the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any TS was not reduced because the shielding did not affect the function, operability, or seismic qualification of the FPC system or any other equipment. The shielding was installed in a positively secure manner to prevent damage to surrounding equipment during a seismic event.
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| 52
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| SAFETY EVALUATIONS FOR PLANT MODIFICATIONS Design Change Notice (DCN) B0002C Replace RHRSW Supply Isolation Valves
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| - Unit 1 Description This DCN replaces the current RHRSW supply isolation valves (HCV-23-31,
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| -37, -43 and -49) with new Henry Pratt Nuclear Mark II butterfly valves.
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| The current valves have no qualification documentation and have been l shown to have a tendency to develop leaks. 1 Safety Evaluation An analysis has been performed to demonstrate the seismic integrity of the valves and the piping system with the new installation. In addition, the function and operation of the RHRSW system and the replacement valves is the same as the previous installation. Therefore, there is no impact on plant safety.
| |
| DCN B0003C Replace RHRSW Supply Isolation Valves - Unit 2 Description This DCN replaces the current RHRSW supply isolation valves (HCV-23-31,
| |
| -37. -43 and -49) with new Henry Pratt Nuclear Mark II butterfly valves.
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| The current valves have no qualification documentation and have been shown tc have a tendency to develop leaks.
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| Safety Evaluation An analysis has been performed to demonstrate the seismic integrity of the valves and the piping system with the new installation. In addition, the function and operation of the RHRSW system and the replacement valves is the same as the previous installation. Therefore, there is no impact '.
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| on plant safety.
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| DCN B0005D Replace EECW Supply Isolation Valves - Unit 0 Description This DCN replaces the current EECW supply isolation valves (FCV-67-13,
| |
| -14, -17, ~18, -21, -22, -25, and -26) with Henry Pratt Nuclear Mark II butterfly valves. The existing valves have no qualification ,
| |
| documentation and have been shown to have a tendency to develop leaks. '
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| i t
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| c 53
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| DCN B0005D (Continued)
| |
| Safety Evaluation
| |
| 'Ananalysis'hasbeenperformedtodemonstratetheseismicintegrityof ;
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| the valves and the piping system with this new installation. In l addition, the function and operation of the EECW system and the j replacement valves is the same as the previous installation. Therefore, there is no impact on plant safety.
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| DCN B0006C Replace Cable for Valve FCV-74 Unit 2 Description This DCN replaces the power cable for.FCV-74-7 which was stuck in' conduit 2ES 1150-I, by replacing a portion of the conduit and splicing the cable t
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| in the nearest pull box.
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| Safety Evaluation - 1 The replacement cable and conduit meet the same Class 1E requirements as the original cable and conduit and will not affect the function or operation of the RHR system or any other system. Therefore, plant safety is not affected by this modification.
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| DCN B0007A Replace Explosive Detectors - Unit 0 Description This DCN replaces the existing Ion Track Model 75 explosive detectors from the three lanes of the west gatehouse with three Ion Track Model 85 detectors.
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| Safety Evaluation This modification is not associated with any plant operating system or equipment, and therefore, will have no impact on plant safety.
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| DCN B0008D Modification of Fuel Storage Pool Cooling System Equipment - Unit 2 Description This DCN changes out three meletron level switches. The instrument numbers are LS-78-1A,18, and IC. The meletron switches are of poor quality and there is a lack of spare parts.
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| i Safety Evaluation This DCN replaces level switches (meletron) with switches of batter quality and reliability. This DCN does not have any adverse affect on the operation and function of the system. Therefore, the margin of safety has not been reduced.
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| l 54
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| I l
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| l DCN B0010C Replace Section of Cable 3ES1590-I - Unit 0 Description The scope of this DCN is to replace cable 3ES1590-I from junction box JB4852 to RHRSW pump C3 motor using Class IE #2/0AWG copper cable 8KV EPST, Mark Number WNB-1.
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| Safety Evaluation l
| |
| This DCN will increase the reliability of the cable and the equipment serviced by replacing the existing non-Class IE cable with a Class IE cable. The function and operation of the system has not been adversely affected by this modification. Therefore, the margin of safety has not been reduced.
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| DCN B00llB Replace ESTR Relay With Potter & Brum Field Relay - Unit 3
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| - Descri ption
| |
| . The scope of this DCN is to replace existing square D relays (class 700 ESTR) and others with same type. The replacement is a Potter & Brum field series MDR 173-1, 16PDT, 125VDC rotary relay. Square D no longer manufactures these relays.
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| Safety Evaluation This DCN provides for the replacement relay to be qualified Class IE and seismic Class I. The replacement relay is equal to or better than the quality, reliability, endurance rating, response time, and performance characteristics as the old relay. There is no adverse affect on the function or operation of the system. Therefore, the margin of safety has not been reduced.
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| DCN S0012B Add Required Stiffeners to Drywell Floor - Unit 2 Description The scope of this DCN is to add drywell floor framing structural steel at elevation 584'11" and 563'2" to resolve NCR BFN CEB 8402 RI.
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| Safety Evaluation This DCN ensures that drywell access platforms meet design criteria and FSAR requirements. This DCN is supported by analysis and engineering evaluations. This DCN ensures that the platforms will perform as intended during a DBE. There are no adverse affects on the system.
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| Therefore, the margin of safety has not been reduced.
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| 55
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| 4 DCN B0013C Modify Existing Thermowell Installations on RBCCW Piping - Unit 2 Description
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| ~
| |
| This DCN scope is to' rework thermowells identified as not.being installed in accordance with currently aoproved installation details.
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| Safety Evaluation This DCN has. reinstalled / replaced subject thermowells per new design details and calculations that are of t.etter quality than original installation. This modification-has no adverse affect to the (<eration and function of'the system. -Therefore, the margin of safety has not been reduced.
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| DCN B0014A Seal Material Replacement - Unit 0 Description This DCN scope'is to substitute existing Huntington GID-160 seals used on the reactor building equipment access locks with seals made by Prespray Corporation using a EPDM E603 seal material. These seals are identical in configuration.
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| Safety Evaluation This change is due to the original supplier (Huntington) not being in business. Replacement of seals will restore the equipment access doors to as-designed operating status. The replacement material is acceptable-for harsh environments. The replacement seals will not adversely affect the function of.the access. doors. Therefore the margin of safety will not be reduced.
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| l DCN B0016A Provide Metal Support From Top of the Main Body of Air Release t
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| Valve - Unit 0 Description This change added two steel braces between the top of the main body.of the 4" diameter air release valve and the top of its associated cantilevered valve extension. The valves are 0-23-587, -501, -590, -521
| |
| -525, -541, -545, -593, -560, -564, -505, and -596 located at the RHRSK pumps (A1, A2, A3, B1, B2, B3, C1, C2, C3, Dl, D2, and D3) discharge.
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| Safety Evaluation This DCN scope is to minimize vibration induced fatigue on valve materials. This will increase the reliability of the valves without affecting the seismic adequacy. This change does not have any adverse affect on the system. Therefore, the margin of safety has not been reduced.
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| 56 i
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| DCN B0017A Provide CCTV Camera Mounting on Refueling Platform - Unit 2 Description '
| |
| This modification installed a CCTV camera mounting on unit 2 refueling platform to be used during performance of ASME Section XI visual reactor vessel examinations and MMI-182 inspections. This modification does not introduce any unanalyzed loadings or movement of heavy equipment.
| |
| Safety Evaluation The bridge frame weldment is designed as seismic Class II supporting the CCTV camera assembly. They are not safety-related components. The total CCTV camera assembly is less in weight than a fuel bundle; hence, the consequences of the camera assembly being dropped are enveloped by a fuel handling accident evaluated in FSAR Section 14.6. Therefore, the probability of occurrence of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR ;
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| is not increased and the margin of safety defined in the TS is not i reduced.
| |
| DCN B0018A Allow Rep 1acement of Steel Square-Head Bolts aad Hex Nuts with ASME/ ASTM Studs and Nuts - Units 1, 2, 3 Description This DCN documents the substitution of ASME/ ASTM studs and nuts used on flanged joints. ASME/ ASTM SA/A 193 GR B7 studs and ASME/ ASTM SA/A 194 GR 2H nuts will repl. ace rusty and corroded studs and nuts on RHRSW and EECW flanged joints.
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| Safety Evaluation The replacement of the existing bolts with higher quality ASME/ ASTM materials does not alter the operation of the EECW and RHRSW systems in any way. The replacement studs and nuts are made of materials that satisfy the strength requirements for the flanged joints. Based on the above, the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any of the previously evaluated in the FSAR is not created. The margin of safety as defined in the technical specifications is not reduced.
| |
| DCN B0022A Provide Appropriate Splicing Design for Gamewell 29969 Smoke Detector Leads and Wiring - Unit 1 Description This DCN is for documentation purposes only. This change is made to allow the use of non-Class IE waterproof splices in connections to Gamewell 29969 smoke detectors located in harsh environment.
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| 57
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| | |
| DCN B0022A (Continued)
| |
| Safety Evaluation This change will not.-impact the smoke detector function. The waterproof
| |
| -splices will provide a more reliable connection that is more suited to a harsh environment than'the original terminal board. This change does not create any possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated condition in the FSAR. Likewise, the margin of safety defined in the TS is not reduced.
| |
| DCN B0023A Provide Appropriate Spilcing Design for Gamewell 29969 Smoke Detector leads and Wiring - Unit 2 Description This DCN is for documentation purposes only. This change is made to-allow the use of non-Class IE waterproof splices in connections to Gamewell 29969 smoke detectors located in harsh environment. -
| |
| Safety Evaluation This change'will not impact the smoke detector function. The waterproof
| |
| . splices will provide a more reliable connection that is more suited to a harsh environment than the original terminal board. This change does not create any possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated condition in the FSAR. Likewise, the margin of safety defined in the TS is not reduced.
| |
| DCN B0024A Provide Appropriate Splicing Design for Gamewell 29969 Smoke Detector' Leads and Wiring - Unit 3 Description This DCN is for documentation purposes only. This change is made to allow the use of non-Class IE waterproof splices in connections to Gamewell 29969 smoke detectors located in harsh environment.
| |
| Safety Evaluation This change will not impact on the smoke detector function. The waterproof splices will provide a more reliable connection that is more suited to a harsh environment than the original terminal board. This change does not create any possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated condition in the FSAR.
| |
| Likewise the margin of safety defined in the TS is not reduced.
| |
| 1 l
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| 58 i
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| l DCN B0031A Replace Existing HVAC Flexible Connections - Unit 1, 2, 3 1
| |
| Description This DCN provides an' alternate design for the fabrication of flexible connections on air handling equipment and ducts. Several of the existing flexible connections have been damaged or have aged to the point that replacement will soon be necessary. This change provides design details-which will facilitate their replacement.
| |
| Safety Evaluation These details will allow the replacement of existing flexible connections-with new'ones having the same functional capability.' There will not be any imp?.ct on seismic analyses since the weight and configuration of the-new flexible connections is similar to the existing ones. Therefore, there is no impact on plant safety.
| |
| DCN B0035C Move the RHRSW Pump L-ocal Control Switch Boxes - Unit 0 Description .
| |
| This DCN provides an alternate detail for mounting the RHRSH pump local control switches.directly on the wall rather than the pumps. This allows scheduled maintenance to be performed without requiring switch removal.
| |
| Safety Evaluation This new mounting configuration is seismically qualified and will not affect the function or operation of the RHRSW system. Therefore, this modification will not affect plant safety.
| |
| DCN B0040A Standby DG Control Cabinets - Unit 1 Description Louvers were added to the front and back of the DG electrical control cabinets to provide additional-ventilation to lower internal cabinet temperature. Also, deflectors were added to the back of the cabinet to divert air flow into the cabinet.
| |
| Safety Evaluation This change will increase ventilation, reduce internal temperatures which will reduce the potential for component failure, and improve availability and operability of the diesels. Therefore, the margin of safety has not been reduced.
| |
| 59
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| DCN B0041A Standby DG Control Cabinets - Unit 3 Description Louvers were added to the front and back of the DG electrical control cabinets to provide additional ventilation to lower internal cabinet ,
| |
| temperatures. Also, deflectors were added to the back of the cabinet to divert air flow into the cabinet.
| |
| Safety Evaluation This change will increase ventilation, reduce internal temperatures which will reduce the potential for component failure, and improve availability and operability of the diesels. Therefore, the margin of safety has not l been reduced. l DCN B0046A Drywell Cable Trays - Unit 2 Description .-
| |
| This DCN reinstalled cable trays GV-ESI, RY-ESI, and RR-ESI which were damaged by the drywell fire to their original as-built location. The replacement of damaged cable and cable tray supports will be done by additional DCNs.
| |
| Safety Evaluation This DCN restores the damaged cable trays to their original as-built configuration and they will perform the same function. The margin of safety has not been reduced.
| |
| DCN B0049A Condensate and Fuel Storage Pool Cooling - Unit 2 Description This change added an isolation valve to the 10" automatic makeup from the CST line and a 4" cross connect line from the automatic makeup CST line to the reactor well drain to condenser hotwell line. The piping added was qualified to seismic Class II and included the installation of new supports.
| |
| Safety Evaluation The new pipe was installed for the purpose of circulating water through the CRD system when the normal reactor water reject path is not available. This circulation of water will reduce corrosion of the CRD's nitrided surfaces and prolong seal life. This change does not affect the function of other systems. The margin of safety has not been reduced.
| |
| 60 t - -- --_---.------______ _ _ J
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| | |
| DCN H0145A Control Room HVAC Isolation Dampers - Unit 0 Description This modification covered the upgrading of the four isolation dampers 31-FCO-150B, -150D, -150E, and -150F in the MCR habitability zone.
| |
| Refurbishment of these dampers will reduce the amount of leakage during an isolation mode.
| |
| Safety Evaluation The dampers refurbishment will not affect the perfo mance or function of the dampers and will reduce the amount of leakage during an isolation mode. Therefore, the probability or consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety, previnc.,1y evaluated in the FSAR, is not increased.
| |
| DCN H0587A Replacement of Damaged Cables - Jnit 2 Description This modification covers the rep'lacement of damaged sections of Class IE cables 2RP133-G2, 2RP-357G2 and 2RP-358-G2 which feed Class IE, group 2 scram pilot soleroid valves.
| |
| Safety Evaluation <
| |
| The operation of the group 2 scram pilot solenoid valves will not be affected by this change and the safety function of the RPS as it relates to the group 2 scram pilot solenoid valves is not affected. Therefore, no effects on safety are created by this change.
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| DCN H1094A Switchgear/MCC's - Unit 2 Description This modifiestu provided double isolation for nondivisional cables powered from one divisional source which are routed in portions of the other divisional raceway. This is to ensure that the single failure criteria of IEEE STD 279-1968 and BFN-50-729 is maintained. l Safety Evaluation The use of two circuit breakers or a breaker / fuse combination in series provides protection from postulated failures such as hot shorts, shorts to ground, and provides instantaneous protection for those scenarios where the postulated single failure is the failure of a breaker to open.
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| Therefore, any potential failure of non-safety power cabling will not I preclude safe shutdown or accident mitigation following DBEs. therefore, {
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| this modification does not increase the probability or consequer.ces of a l malfunct (* equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the '
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| FSAR.
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| 61 l
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| 1 k
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| l DCN H1413B Standby DG - Unit 3 Description
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| )
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| This modification was issuad to provide new setpoints for the DG speed control settings. These setpoints are needed to support a special DG !
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| test. Problems were encountered during emergency RHR pump starts where ,
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| the DG voltage and engine speed rapidly decreased.
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| Saf!ty Evaluation Thts modification will reduce the transient response time and improve the stability of the DG unit's operation. It will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any TS, nor will it create the possibility for an accident of a different type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR. The test results of each DG tested shall be reviewed by Engineering before the DG can be declared operational. If the test results do not indicate improved DG performance, all setpoints shall be returned to their pretest conditions. I DCN H1414B Stcndby DG - Units 1 & 2 Description This modification was issued to provide new setpoints for the DG speed control settings. These setpoints are needed to support a special DG test. Problems were encountered during emergency RHR pump starts where the standby DG voltage and engine speed rapidly decreased.
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| Safety Evaluation This modification will reduce the transient response time and improve the stability of the DG enit's operation. It will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any TS, nor will it create the possibility for an accident of a different type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR. The test results of each DG tested shall be reviewed by Engineering before the DG can be declared operational. If the test results do not indicate improved DG performance, all setpoints shall be returned to their pretest conditions.
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| 62
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| I DCN H2242A MCCs - Various Systems - Units 1, 2, 3 Description This modification provided double isolation for nondivisional cables powered from one divisional source which are routed in portions of the other divisional raceway. This is to ensure that the single failure criteria of IEEE STD 279-1968 and BFN-50-729 is maintained.
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| Safety Evaluation The use of two circuit breakers or a breaker / fuse combination in series provides protection from postulated failures such as hot shorts, shorts to ground, and provides instantaneous protection for those ccenarios where the postulated single failure is the failure of a breaker to open.
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| Therefore, any potential failure of non-safety power cabling will not preclude safe shutdown or accident mitigation following design basis events. Therefore, this modification does not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment importan' to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR. -
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| DCN H2544 Provide Separation of Non 1E/IE Cables - Unit 2 Description This modification installs additional fuses in series with a previously installed breaker to allow mixing of non-safety circuit between redundant divisions of safety divisions. The physical work for this period consisted of installing 200 amp fuse /fuseblocks in 480V SD BD 2A and IB.
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| Safety Evaluation Although the failure of a breaker can always be assumed single failure, the use of two breakers in series prevents the loss of associated safety function. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any TS is not reduced.
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| DCN H2735A Disable Common Accident Signals - Units 1 & 3 Description This modification is to prevent a spurious unit 1 or 3 accident signal from unnecessarily starting the CS and RHR pumps and the DG and also to prevent a spurious unit 1 accident signal from blocking the startup of unit 2 equipment responding to a real accident. The physical work for this period consisted of lifting wires inside unit I and unit 3 panels 9-32 and 9-33.
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| 63
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| DCN H2735A (Continued)
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| Safety Evaluation The systems affected by this change are strictly standby systems and the effects of the changes are to block the unneeded operation of this equipment for the defueled units and to prevent a spurious accident signal from the defueled units from tripping or preventing operation of vital equipment of the operating unit. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any TS is not reduced.
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| DCN H4277B Modify Thermal Overload (TOL) Relays in RHRSW Valves and RHR Valves - Unit 2 Description This modification bypasses the TOL relays in 480V RMOV boards for RHRSW valves 2-FCV-23-34, -40, -46, -52 and RHR valves 2-FCV-74-59 and -73 and removes TOL heater elements for these valves.
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| Safety Evaluation The TOL relays provide overload protection for MOV motors. Removal o' this function puts all motor protection under the trip characteristics of the branch circuit breaker. Making this change trades the safety of one component, the motor, for improving the safety of the plant as a whole.
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| If a situation develops which causes the motor to draw current of such value that the TOL relay would have tripped the motor, the motor will suffer damage, but it will be able to complete more of its safety-related function (providing adequate core cooling) before becoming inoperable.
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| The possible effect from this change is burnout of a MOV mctor and hence loss of a single MOV valve. This is not a new event and has been previously evaluated. Therefore, the probability of a new accident has not been created.
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| ECN Ll776 Modification to Reactor Feed Pump Turbine Supervisory Instruments (RFPT/TSI) - Units 1, 2, 3 Description This modification provided separate logic boards to perform the alarm and trip functions on (1) loss or interruption of AC power to the monitors, (2) removal of the trip board or (3) by testing the vibration or eccentricity systems. GE had originally supplied a dual alarm / trip logic board to perform this function. The physical work was previously completed. This effort resulted in "as-constructing" outstanding drawings for ECN closure.
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| 64
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| ECN Ll776 (Continued) l Safety Evaluation The modification reduces the potential for spurious RFPT trips and subsequent reactor transients. The RFPT/TSI system is not safety-related and not addressed in the TS. The documentation change will not provide additional modes of failure. No physical work was done which would reduce the margin of safety for plant equipment.
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| i ECN L1845 Low Pressure Cooiant Injection (LPCI) Mode of the RHR System !
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| - Units 1, 2, 3 Description This modification was for performance improvement of the LPCI mode of the RHR system and is an ongoing activity. The modifications were completed ,
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| on unit 2 and documentation was processed to close the ECN on unit 2. i Safety Evaluation The affected drawings for unit 2 have been revited to incorporate this modification. Documentation is now complete ano is within the scope of the Unreviewed Safety Question Determination (USQD).
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| ECN L1854 Modifications to High Pressure Fire Protection System - Units 1,2,3 Description This modification installed manual alarm stations in the cable tunnel from the turbine building to the intake pumping station, installed smoke '
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| detection for the mechanical equipment room in the control building (elevation 606.0') and installed automatic preaction sprinklers, curbs and drains at elevation 617.0' of the control building in areas adjacent to the MCR and in the mechanical equipment rooms. This modification is part of the fire protection program commitments made to the NRC.
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| Safety Evaluation The modifications improve the fire protection systems capabilities for various plant areas and do not impact any safety related equipment. The change:: will reduce the consequences of a fire in the affected areas and will not increase the consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the FSAR.
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| i 65
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| 1-L L -ECN L1856 Modifications to Fire Protection and HVAC Systems - Units 1,.2, 3 Description This modification installed 1 1/2-hour fire rated dampers in the ventilation supply and return ducts for various equipment rooms, installed 3-hour fire rated door assemblies in the ventilation ducts that !
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| penetrate the walls between the reactor building and control bay, and replaced the fixed louvers in control bay doors with 1 1/2-hour fire rated dampers. Doors for rooms protected by carbon dioxide fire protection equipment will ''e handled by a separate ECN.
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| Safety Evaluation The performance of the HVAC systems will not be affected by the installation of the fire dampers and the barriers will not inhibit the required air flow needed to maintain the various critical rooms at their design conditions. The fire. dampers will provide additional protection in the case of a fire. Therefore, this modification will not create the possibility for an accident of a different type than any previously -
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| evaluated in the FSAR nor will it reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any TS.
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| ECN L1937 Modifications to EECH System - Unit 2 Description This modification installed 1-inch flushing connections along with associated isolation valves for the RHR room coolers, CS room coolers and the CS motor bearing coolers. This modification will facilitate, from a maintenance perspective, the connection of the backwash lines and the isolation and flushing of the coolers.
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| Safety Evaluation This modification will not degrade the EECH system or prevent it from performing'its intended safety function. Therefore, the probability of occurrence of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR has not been increased. The seismic qualification of the as-built configuration of the new flushing connections will be vertfled by the IEB 79-14 program, l
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| ECN L1970 Modifications to EECH System - Unit 2 Description This modification replaced all safety-related carbon steel piping, valves (except header isolation valves) and fittings four inches and smaller with components made of type 316 or 316L stainless steel. Accumulated rust and silt had reduced the flow rate to the CS motor bearing coolers below design requirements. The change to stainless steel will minimize the buildup of corrosion products.
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| I 66
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| q l
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| ECN L1970 (Continued)-
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| Safety Evaluation The EECW system will not be degraded or prevented from performing its safety function of providing the required amount of cooling water to certain safety-related components. These modifications will provide assurance that corrosion will not reduce cooling water flow below required levels. Based on this, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any TS will not be reduced.
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| ECN L2003 CS Piping Replacement - Jnits 1, 2, 3-5 Description This modification covered'the replacement of stainless steel CS system j piping with carbon steel piping to avoid stress corrosion cracking of the stainless steel piping.
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| Safety Evaluation IGSCC does not represent a safety problem and this modification will reduce, if not eliminate, the susceptibility of the CS system piping to IGSCC, thereby improving reliability and availability. On these bases, this modification will not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accide it or malfunction of equipment important to safety that is or is not evaluated in the FSAR.
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| ECN L2053 Cooling Tower Lift Pumps Circuit Modification - Units 1, 2, 3 Description This modification provided a local handswitch for each cooling tower lift pump to override the 94.75'F temperature trip and allow flushing the hot water'away from the temperature probe to enable restarting the towers.
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| Safety Evaluation Since the cooling tower lift pump trip circuitry is redundant by design, with both a primary slift pump trip) and secondary (switchgear trip) trip circuitry, no single failure of the pushbutton bypass circuit can prevent the lift pump trip circuitry from performing its intended function.
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| Additionally, the bypass trip circuitry is Class IE with appropriate seismic and separation criterie adhered to. Thus, given the above, the proposed modification will not degrade overall system reliability nor affect the safe operation of the plant.
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| 67
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| ECN L2057 Cooling Towar Lift Pumps Circuit Modification - Units 1, 2, 3 Description u This modification provided two out of three trip logic on the cooling tower lift pumps and.switchgear. r Safety Evaluation This modification will improve system reliability and eliminate the possibility of a faulty detector causing a trip of the cooling tower lift pumps or switchgear. This modification will not remove the required redundancy and no credible single failure of the modified logic can defeat the function of:the redundant trip function. ,
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| ECN L2079 Containment Atmosphere Monitoring - Units 1, 2, 3 Description 1 .
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| This modification replaces the existing electro-chemical H and 0, sensors (inside primary containment) and associated equipment with new monitoring systems to be located outside containment. Although this modification has not beei fully implemented, additional work was done on units 1 and 2 which included removal of pressure transmitters, changeout of valves and installation of tubing supports.
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| Safety Evaluation The modifications completed to date are within the scope of the USQD.
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| ECN L2107 RHR System Valve Modification - Units 1, 2, 3 description This modification replaced the disc in 24-inch pressure seal angle valves FCV-74-52 and FCV-74-66 with a "v-notched" disc. The new discs will eliminate excessive vibrations experienced at low flow and high pressure drop conditions. The modification will assist in controlling the reactor cool down rate.
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| Safety Evaluation This modification does not have any affect on the operation of the RHR system and will enhance the safety of the system. The new disc material will increase the strength of the valve disc thereby enhancing the valves reliability. Due to the improvement in material and disc design, the probability of occurrence of a malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR will not increa;;.
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| 68
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| _ _ - - - _ _ _ _ _ _____._____________j
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| ECN L2115 MS Line Safety Valves - Units 1, 2, 3 Description This modification removed the MS safety valves.from MS lines B & C and installed blind flanges on the connections vacated by the valves. Two new MS safety valves, one on MS line A and one on MS line D were installed.
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| Safety Evaluation This modification provides greater conservatism to-the safety' relief system and related systems and any resultant transients due to an inadvertent opening of a relief valve are acceptable'for the MS safety valves added by this modification. Consequently, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any TS is'not reduced.
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| ECN L9061 Fire Protection System - Units 1, 2, 3 Description This modification converted the spreading room CO system from manual to automatic action, provided automatic actuation of expanded fixed water spray systems in the reactor building and turbine building, and provided automatic preaction, fusible-link fixed sprinkler systems in the reactor building and DG building.
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| Safety Evaluation Since essential electrical equipment in the reactor building and spreading room is protected from spray and flooding from the fixed water spray and sprinkler systems, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any TS is not reduced.
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| ECN L9065 Fire Protection System - Unit 0 Description i This modification added a diesel engine driven fire pump on the west side of gate structure No. 2 and tie in to the existing RSW system. The work was completed by the installation of a telephone in the diesel driven fire pump house.
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| Safety Evaluation The operation of the Fire Protection system is not affected by the installation of a telephone in the diesel driven fire pump house.
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| Therefore, the change did not reduce the margin of safety.
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| 69
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| ECN M0070A Control' Rod Drive Mechanisms (CRDMS) - Unit 2 Description This modification replaced existing control rod drives with converted BWR-6 CRDMs originally purchased for the Hartsville Nuclear Plant. A total of 92 rods are to be modified to cover marginal CRDMs and 10 spares.
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| Safety Evaluation I -
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| The function of the BWR-6 CRDMs is identical to the existing drives because the same principal of operation is maintained. By utilizing l
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| higher strength materials and latest design improvements,- the operating reliability increases and maintenance will decrease. Hence, the probability of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR does not increase. The basis for the control rod drive system is given in Section
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| ; 3.3/4.3 of the TS. The margin of safety for this basis is not reduced when BWR-6 CRDMs replace BWR-4 CRDMs because the safety functions'for the BWR-6 control rod drives are identical to the existing BHR-4 CRDMs. -
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| ECN P0001 Recirculation Pump Trip (RPT) Modifications - Units 1, 2, 3 .
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| Description This modification was designed to fully implement the RPT and remove all design changes associated with the prompt relief trip.
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| Safety Evaluation All affected drawings.havE been revised to incorporate this modification. Documentation is now complete and determined to be within the scope of the USQD.
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| ECN P0008 Plant Security System - Units 1, 2, 3 Description This modification was to provide an active intrusion detection system for all vital area doors, fence gates, and plant exterior doors. This modification has been fully implemented with the additional work being done in conjunction with the modifications for ECN-P0007.
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| Safety Evaluation I This modification is compatible with the existing and proposed card reader system, door frames, and doors, and is for monitoring only.
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| Therefore, the probability or consequences of an accident or safety equipment malfunction will not be increased by this mod'fication.
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| 4 70
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| ECN P0032 Off-Gas ~ System - Units 1, 2, 3 Description This modification replaced the 1 inch pipe and 1 inch valve in the drain line from the Steam Packing Exhauster (GPE) holdup line drain to the off-gas conc'ensate drain sump with 4 inch pipe and a 4 inch valve for each unit. The reason for the change was that the existing 1 inch line clogged easily which caused liquid to accumulate in the hoidup line creating back pressure. The back pressure forced a gas / steam mixture to backflow through a condensate drain tank vent line into the Turbine Building drain sumps.
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| Safety Evaluation This modification ensures that the drain line does not clog thereby increasing the reliability of the system. This change has no affect on the volume of radioactive contamination in the condensate from the SPE nuclear steam. Therefore, the margin of safety defined in the basis for any TS is not reduced.
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| ECN P0061 Condenser Circulating Water System - Units 1, 2, 3 Description This modification replaced Industrial Instrument Company Model Number 200LS Pressure Differential Indicating Switches (PDISS) which were no longer available with Meriam Instrument Company, Model Number 1226 PDI Switches. The affected instruments are: PDIS-27-34, PDIS-27-50, PDIS-27-58, PDIS-27-66 and PDIS-27-74. These instruments monitor circulating water pressure drop across each half of the non-safety-related turbine exhaust steam condensers. The switches provide an alarm in the MCR if the pressure drop exceeds 264 inches of water. The modification was completed by a drawing update for work previously implemented and was a documentation only change.
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| Safetv Evaluation All affected drawings have been revised to incorporate the modification and the design changes were determined to be within the scope of the Field Complete Phase II USQD.
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| ECN P0083 RHR Pump Seal Heat Exchanger Replac'ement - Units 1, 2, 3 Description This modification replaced the original RHR pump seal heat exchanger (cast iron case and cover) with model NXW-0750-ER. Older model was j leaking due to casting fracture. New model is made of steel and is not prone to cracking.
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| 71
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| 1
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| )
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| ECN P0083 (Continued) I
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| ; Safety Evaluation Replacement of the seal heat exchanger with a new exchangar having equal performance properties does not alter the pump performance.or system function. Thus, this change has no impact on the safety function of,any plant system and no revision to the TS is required.
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| EON P0093 Prime.ry Containment - Unit 2 )
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| I Description This modification was initiated for the Torus Integrity Long-Term program and is an ongoir:g activity. The modifications were, however, complated i on unit 2 with the installation of shims on-the end arm supports, various '
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| weld repairs, and installation of 1/4 inch seal plates.
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| - Safety Evaluation
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| . The latest modifications completed on unit 2 are within the scope of the USQD issued for work to be completed during the Cycle 5 outage.
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| ECN P0096A 480V Shutdown Boards - Unit 3 Description This modification replaced tr nsformer TS3B with the one in use as TS2A.
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| The replacement transformer has the same form, fit, and function except.
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| for the changes resulting for the %Z difference.
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| Safety Evaluation i
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| The replacement transformer, presently TS2A, has a different impedance compared to the existing TS38. An engineering evaluation is required to ensure that the %Z of the transformer now in use as TS2A will not-l adversely affect any safety-related systems associated with 480V SDBD 3B. This evaluation has been documented in calculation ED-Q3231-88346 which justified this transformer replacement as essentially a maintenance replacement.
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| ECN P0112 Neutron Monitoring System - Unit 2 Description This modification installed the Average Power Range Monitor (APRM) l Simulated Thermal Power Trip (STPT) logic, which changed the APRM flow biased scram system, but not the fixed setpoint scram setting of the APRMs.
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| l 72 1
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| ECN P0112 (Continued)
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| Safety Evaluation This modification is only changing the APRM flow biased scram system and not the fixed setpoint scram setting of the APRMs. The fixed setpoint is at 120 percent of rated power. All analyses in the FSAR take credit for the fixed setpoint and not the flow biased setpoint. Since the flow biased setpoint is always less than or equal to the fixed setpoint, the flow biased setpoint is more conservative. Based on the above considerations and the safety evaluaticn, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfur.ction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR is not increaseo.
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| ECN P0126 Modifications of Various Systems - Unit 1, 2, 3 Description The ECN provides for the replacement of the currently installed pressure, level, and the temperature switches with analog transmitter / trip unit combinations (which provide continual monitoring of critical parameters in addition to performbig basic logic trip operations) with the proposed analog transmitter / trip unit system for engineered safeguard sensor trip inputs.
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| Safety Evaluation The instrument functions will not be changed by the modification. The modification package was reviewed and approved by NRC prior to implementation. The likelihood of failure will be reduced by implementing the ECN.
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| ECN P0157 Modify CS System - Pump Bearing Lube Oil Coolers - Units 1 & 2 Description This modification consisted of inlet and outlet pipes and valves to the Lube Oil Coolers and installing pipe caps on the remaining lines at the pump.
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| Safety Evaluation This modification will improve core spray pump reliability by ensuring proper lubrication of the motor bearing by uncontaminated oil. A test j
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| was performed with the coolers valved out using a Mobile SHC 629 oil which concluded that EECW was not required. Removal of the inlet and outlet lines will not change previous evaluations nor introduce a {
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| possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any j previously evaluated in the FSAR.
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| 73 l
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| l
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| )
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| _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ . l
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| l ECN P0220 Modify Off-Line Process Radiation Monitors - Units 1, 2, 3 Description This modification consisted of interlocking the low-flow annunciator with a sample pump running status to eliminate nuisance alarms. Also a punip status light was added to a control room panel.
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| Safety Evaluation l l This modification improves the off-line radiation alarm system in that an !
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| alarm from a nonoperating unit could blanket a second alarm. The pump l status light enhances the control room operators information of this (
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| system. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of equipment of a j differret type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR is not created.
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| Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any TS is not reduced.
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| ECN P0226 Modify Off-Line Liquid Effluent Radiation Monitors - Uni-ts 1 & 2 Descriptica This modification added automatic start /stop circuits for the sample pumps associated with off-line radiation monitors such that a RHRSW flow of 500 gpm initiates an off-line system sample.
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| Safety Evaluation This modification brings the off-line radiation monitoring system for the RHRSW system up to operating standards as defined in the Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications (RETS). RETS required continuous monitoring of the RHRSW effluent to ensure that radioactive releases are kept below defined limits. The modification will not affect the parameters within which the system operates. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the TS is not reduced.
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| ECN P0244 Replace Differential Pressure Transmitters PDT-68-62 & Unit 2 Description This ECN replaced Foxboro differential pressure transmitters PDT-68-62 and -65 in the Reactor Water Recirculation System with a Rosemount model of the same range. The original units were susceptible to shock and vibration not just differential pressure. Following the replacement a postmodification test was performed to verify performance, 74
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| ECN P0244 (Continue'd)
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| Safety Evaluation This modification does not'make any changes'in the functional design of the system. Failure modes are the same~as for the original transmitter.
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| Therefore, the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR is not created. The transmitters are not safety related and are not required for the )
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| prevention or mitigation of consequences of a design basis accident. j Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the basis. for any technical specification is not reduced.
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| ECN P0245 Replace MS Flow Transmitters (FTs) - Unit 2 Description This modification consisted of replacing Fisher Porter FT-1-13, -25, -36, and -50 with Rosemount FTs of the same range. In addition, new power supplies were installed and underwent post modification testing to verify performance.
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| Safety Evaluation The replacement was necessary to improve transmitter dampening and reduce noise in the feedwater controls. The upgrade will enhance system control while performing the same functions. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR is not created. Therefore, the margin of safety is not reduced.
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| ECN P0268 Modify Baseplate Concrete Anchors on Pipe Supports - Unit 2 Description This change consisted of analyses and design for bolt anchors set in hardened concrete modified or otherwise improperly installed and discovered during the inspection pursuant to NRC IE Bulletin 79-02. The modification includes extension of the anchor plate, redrilling the anchor plate within a prescribed area, and adding a strap across the corner of the anchor plate. i l
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| 1 l
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| Safety Evaluation '
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| The modifications performed in accordance with the design criteria specified will ensure that any seismic Class I pipe support or anchor baseplate for which the anchor bolts were installed improperly or were improperly modified will perform in accordance with its original design requirements. The baseplates perform no active function and are only brought into conformance with the original seismic Class I design for the systems. The probability of occurrence of a malfunction of equipment important to safety is not increased. Consequently, the margin of safety as defined in the TS is not reduced.
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| 75 {
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| l l
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| _ - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - ~ ~ ~
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| ECN P0271 Removal cf Packing Bleed-0ff Valves inside Drywell.- Unit 2 Description.
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| This modification consisted of removing bleed-off valves and capping their lines because the valves were inaccessible and not useab!? for their intended function. They had to be manually opened to detect packing leakage. Valve manufacturers were notified and their approval obtained to make the modification.
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| Safety Evaluation Removal of the lantern ring and addition of stem packing improves the pressure retaining capabilities of the modified valves stem packing. The valves function is not altered. The possibility for an accident or malfunction different from any evaluated in the FSAR is not created.
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| Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the technical specification is not reduced.
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| ECN P0275 Add New Unit Station Service Transformers to Operate in Conjunction with Existing Unit Station Service Transformers - Units 1 & 2 Description The physical changes for this modification were previously completed and I the chrnges made to close out this ECN consisted of removing cable ES4085-IID from terminal strip 2A, Safety Evaluation 1
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| The addition and deletion of the equipment specified in this modification will provide a more reliable offsite power source. It also detraases the probability of a loss of rifsite power due te additional sources. Also it would not increase the consequences of an accident. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in.the technical specification is not reduced.
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| ECN P0289 . Modification of Pipes and Pipe Supports for IEB 79-02 and 79-14
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| - Units 0, 1, 2, 3 Description This modification was made to comply with NRC IE Bulletin 79-02 and 79-14. It includes seismic and stress analyses which resulted in deletion of some existing supports, addition of new supports, and relocation of some supports where required to meet the requirements of .
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| these bulletins. The as-built piping was changed, where necessary, to I conform to the seismic and stress analyses.
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| 76
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| ECN P0289 (Continued)
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| Safety Evaluation ;
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| The modifications during this period upgraded RHRSW,.EECW System, and RCH small bore piping. Tais will ensure that a piping failure will not prevent the correct functioning of any equipment essential to safe
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| -shutdown or degrade the habitability of the control bay environment.
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| Therefore, the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR is not created.
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| I ECN P0291 Modify the Control Systems of Containment Isolation Valves
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| - Units 1, 2, 3 Description This modification was made to comply with NRC IE Bulletin 79-08, question j 7, and physical changes to the control circuits have been previously done. This was a documentation only change that closes out the ECN.
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| Safety Evaluation ,
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| The documentation change upgrades the document to accurately reflect as-built conditions. The changes will not increase either the probability of occurrence or consequences of any accident previously evaluated in the FSt.R. Thus, the margin of safety as dafined in the technical specification is not reduced. i
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| )
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| ECN P0311 Seal Expansion Joints for Conaenser Circulating Water (CCW)
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| Conduits Under the Turbine Building - Units 2 & 3 Description This change consists of pressure grouting the expansion /cc,ntraction joints of the CCW system intake conduits under the turbir.3 building.
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| Safety Evaluation This change was necessary to stop outer leakage at these expansion joints. The CCW system is not used to mitigate design basis events. The use of pressure grouting will have no affect on any safety-related features of the plant. The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR is not increased.
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| 1 77
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| ECN P0323 Install Wide Range Torus Water Level Instrumentation - Units 2 & 3 Description l j
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| This modification included adding instrument taps, differential pressure transmitters, cables, conduit, junction boxes, panel indicators and l recorders to measure torus water level two feet from the bottom of the j torus to five feet above the normal water level. This change was required to comply with the requirements of Section 2.1.9 of NUREG-0578.
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| The transmitters are fully qualified units, seismically installed, and supplied from lE power sources.
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| Safety Evaluation These instruments do not initiate any automatic safety related function.
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| They are monitors to supply information to the control room operator for use in determining the nature of an accident and for better understanding of post accident conditions. This upgrade will enhance the operators' capabilities to assess plant conditions in the event of an accident.
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| They will not adversely affect any accident mitigation function.
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| Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any technical specifications is.not reduced.
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| ECN P0361 Modify Torus Piping and Conduit Supports - Unit 2 Description 1
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| These changes were part of the long-term torus modification program. The physical work includes reviewing numerous systems branch line supports, analyzing supports, removing and installing new supports, both piping and electrical conduit supports, tensioning many seismic support bolts and as-configuring design drawings.
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| Safety Evaluation This effort consisted of an extensive verification of many of the long-term torus modifications. The upgrades enhance the ability of system piping and electrical supports to withstand seismic and thermal loads. The function and operation of any system described in the technical specification is not degraded and the margin of safety as defined in the technical specifications is not reduced. '
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| ECN P0392 Modify CRD Hydraulic System - Unit 2 Description This modification is part of the long-term modifications to the CRD hydraulic system and clean radioactive waste (CRW) drain system.
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| Physical work included installation of new piping and pipe supports on the CRD SDIV, instrument changes in panels, installing new conduit and cables, pipe support analyses and replacement, and a platform design and installation.
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| 78
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| f ECN P0392 (Continued)
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| . Safety Evaluation i
| |
| This modification provides increased scram discharge volume capabilities i and diverse level instrumentation to ensure scram capabilities are not degraded by accumulation of excessive water in the SDV. This. change does .
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| not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different I type than any evaluated previously in the safety. analysis report nor is the margin of safety as defined for technical specifications reduced.
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| ECN P0400 Seal Expansion Joints in CCH Conduits - Units 2 & 3 Description This modification used pressure grouting to seal the expansion / contraction joints in the round portion of the CCN intake conduits. This was necessary to prevent leakage at these joints from causing a ground water problem. This includer a post modification inspection to ensure that no obstructions.were made that would impede RCH )
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| suction off the CCW pump discharges.
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| Safety Evaluation The sealing of these joints ensures that there will be no ground water problems associated with leaking conduit joints. This will have no affect on any safety-related features of the plant. Therefore, the use of pressure grouting does not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any TS.
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| i ECN P0407 As-Constructed Drawings - Interim Gatehouse Facility - Unit 0 Description This modification completed the construction of the entrance portal building at the western entrance to the plant which per 10CFR55 is zoned for limited access. This building does not interface with any safety ,
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| related equipment.
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| Safety Evaluation This modification provides a building to control access to the plant as a part of the security system. Since there is no Interface with any safety related system, it has no impact on nuclear safety for the plant.
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| 79
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| ECN P0411 Modification to Rusco Card Reader System - Unit 0 Description This modification provided search and access control equipment for the western gatehouse to comply with the requirements of 10CFR55. This included equipment for x-ray search, explosive detectors, metal detectors, bullet resistant access control booth, card readers, intrusion alarms for external doors and communication equipment.
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| Safety Evaluation This change has no affect on any safety related structure or component.
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| The security system is not discussed in the technical specifications.
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| This change has no impact on nuclear safety.
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| ECN P0418 Install Class IE Pressure Switches in CRD Hydraulic Control Air System - Unit 2 Description This charige added Class IE pressure switches PS-85-35Al, A2, Bi 02 to monitor the control air system for the CRD hydraulic system circuitry associated with these p; essure switches. These switches will initiate reactor scram when the air pressure drops to the pressure switch setpoint. This change was initiated to comply with NRC IE Bulletin 80-17 (supplement 3).
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| Safety Evaluation The components that were added are Class IE and seismic Category I and provide two trains of detection and actuation.
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| The scram logic being !
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| used is the same as the existing reactor protection system logic.
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| Consequently, this modification will enhance the safety of the plant without degrading the existing safety related systems.
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| ECN P0422 Modify RPS Relaying - Unit 2 Description This modification included installing redundant Class IE overvoltage relays, undervoltage relays, and underfrequency relays. This included making calculations. installing cables and conduits, and making internal panel wiring changes.
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| Safety Evaluation This modification provides fully redundant Class IE protection between the non-Class IE 120V AC control power supplies and the Class IE battery board RPS 120V AC power distribution cabinets. This upgrade will ensure that the RPS operates properly during any event requiring an automatic scram. Therefore, the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR is not created.
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| 80
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| ECN P0479 -Install' Emergency' Lighting Units - Units 1_& 3 Description-This modification installed emergency lighting units with an eight-hour battery. power supply in all areas needed.for operation of safe shutdown equipment and along/across' egress routes. Much of this physical work had been previously completed but final units were installed with associated-
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| ' conduits and cables so that this ECN could be closed.
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| Safety Evaluation This modification brings the plant into compliance with 10CFR50 Appendix R requirements for emergency lighting. A seismic evaluation was performed to show that the additional emergency lighting units will not fail in a way which would induce failure of any safety related equipment. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical' specification is not reduced.
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| ECN P0487 Modify Security System - Unit 0 l
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| ~
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| Description This modification added door monitors and associated electronics and replaced relays in the plant security system.
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| Safety Evaluation This modification enhances the overall plant security system. It does not impact any safety-related equipment. Therefore, the margin of saf9 ty as defined in the TS is not reduced.
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| 1 ECN P0511 Replacement of Reactor Building Emergency Lighting Transformers
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| - Units 1, 2, 3 Description This modification replaces the reactor building emergency lighting transformer with a newer model due to the discontinuance of the original !
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| model. The new transformer is relocated from reactor building elevation '
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| 608'4" to elevation 593'0" to provide better access to the transformer for maintenance.
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| Safety Evaluation The new transformer has the same capability and performs the same function as the old transformer. The new transformer is seismically
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| , qualified IL which will prevent damage to safety-related equipment.
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| t Since the new transformer is functionally equivalent and is seismically qualified at its new location, the margin of safety was not reduced.
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| 81 i
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| l ECN P0513 Vital Area Access Control System (VAACS) - Unit 0 '
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| Desc-iption The modification provides interconnecting cables and power feeds for the VAACS. The purpose of the VAACS is to interface with the card entry system to provide second party verification of all data base changes of .
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| the card entry system. T.iis verification is required by NRC plant security regulations. The VAACS is installed on ECN P0514.
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| Safety Evaluation The VAACS system is not safety-related and does not interface with any f safety-related system. The VAACS will improve plant security and achieve compliance with NRC plant security regulations. This change does not reduce the margin of safety. .
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| I i
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| ECN P0514 Install a VAACS - Unit 0 Description This modification adds a VAACS to interface with the Rusco Mac 500 card entry system and provides second party verification of all data base changes of the card entry system. This verification is required by NRC plant security regulations.
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| Safety Evaluation The VAACS is not safety-related and does not interface with any safety-related system. The VAACS will improve plant security and achieve compliance with NRC plant security regulations. This change does not reduce the margin of safety.
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| ECN P0533 Add Torus Temperature Monitoring System - Unit 2 Description The modification includes adding 16 temperature sensors (two trains of 8 sensors), one at each torus quenchv. Physical work included installing two Barley panels 9-87 and 9-88 in the unit 2 auxiliary panel rooms and connecting cables and conduit. This system was installed to comply with NUREG 0661.
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| Safety Evaluation The torus temperature monitoring system is required to monitor bulk torus temperature following a design basis accident. This modification provides assurance that the torus temperature is within prescribed design limits. Analyses were performed to verify that the seismic qualification of the torus was not adversely affected. The margin of safety as defined in the TS is not reduced.
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| 82
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| ECN P0555 Coating of the Torus with " Mobile 78" - Units 1, 2, 5 '
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| D_escription This modification provides for coating of the torus using Mobile 78 coating using a room temperature cure. During the development of this work several unit specific problems were evaluated and resolved. These included touch-up painting, removal of baffle support stubs, heat curing and corrosion inspection of uncoated components.
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| Safety Evaluation The principal concern with torus coating is that it not flake off and block strainers or other small openings in systems required to mitigate events for which credit has been taken in the present design. Evaluation of Mobile 78 coating was done by actual tests done on sample panels. The conclusion from these tests were that Mobile 78 is a satisfactory coating for the torus environment and that it conforms to the appropriate construction specifications. The margin of safety was not reduced.
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| ECN P0567 RPS Diode Replacement - Units 1, 2, 3 Description This modification replaced diodes in the RPS/RPT circuits. The new diodes have a higher voltage rating and will not be susceptible to breakdown while subject to 250V DC system voltages, thus, making the RPT circuits more reliable.
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| Safety Evaluation The RPT will function with a higher degree of reliability with no increase in the probable occurrence or consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety. The margin of safety is not reduced.
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| ECN P0583 Remove Test Connection Intertie for Testable Check Valve FCV-71-40
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| - Unit 2 Description The testable check valve (FCV 71-40) on the injection line to the RPV originally had two test connection points tied to a common test point.
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| This modification removes the intertie piping to valves 74-536 and 71-534 and provides separate lines with individual test points. This modification also corrects the valve number prefixes for 74-536 and 74-535 to 71-536 and 71-535 respectively.
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| I i
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| 83
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| _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - _ - - - - - - _ - - - - - _ _ - - _ _ - - -- - - - - - - - - - - .- - -a
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| ECN P0583 (Continued)
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| Safety Evaluation This modification to the valve test piping has no adverse affect on the valve and hence no adverse affect on'the safe operation of the plant.
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| The modification does allow the "B" feedwater primary containment isolation valves to be tested quicker with more useful information for repairs. The test lines have been seismically qualified in the new configuration. These modifications do not reduce the inargin of safety.
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| ECN P0587 Documentation Change Only. No Field Work (Show As-Built Configuration of the Piping to Control and Station Service Air Compressors E&F) - Unit 0 Description The modification was for documentation only to "as-constructed" drawings
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| .- to reflect the actual plant configuration of piping to control and station service air compressors E&F.
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| Safety Evaluation The control and station service air compressors are not safety-related.
| |
| No work was performed on the hardware. This modification documents as-built piping information. The as-built configuration does not degrade the function of the air compressors. The technical specifications do not address these compressed air systems and no margin of safety is reduced.
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| ECN P0596 Replace Valves FCV-85-11A and 118 and Associated Cables, Conduits, and Supports Description This modification replaces valves FCV-85-11A and FCV-85-11B with new valves that can have their seats repaired or replaced with the valves installed in the line. The old valves required the valves to be removed from the line to do seat service. Since the valves were of the welded type it was difficult to perform this service.
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| Safety Evaluation The new flow control valves have superior performance characteristics relative to the old valves and will meet the functional requirements of the system. The valves and piping configurations have been seismically qualified. This enhancement will increase overall system reliability and not affect the safe operation of the plant. The safety margin is not reduced.
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| 84
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| ECN P0507 Increase the-Flow Range of Reactor Feed Pump Flow Instrumentation
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| - Unit _2 i
| |
| Description j
| |
| This modification of the reactor feed pump flow instrumentation increases the flow range enough to allow the operator to monitor the actual feedwater_ flow when one pump is out of service and the other two are providing maximum flow.
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| Safety Evaluation The reactor feedwater system is not safety-related and is not required for the safe shutdown of the reactor. Operation with.two feedwater pumps will provide approximately 90 percent of normal _ flow and thus is enveloped by normal operating conditions. The new flow transmit +ers being used weigh less than the old ones and will have no adverse impact on the seismic qualification of the control panel. These changes do not increase the probability of-occurrence or the consequences of an accident-or equipment malfunction of equipment important to safety. The margin of.
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| safety _is not reduced.
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| ECN P0598 Modify Control _ Room Doors - Unit 2 Description This modification provides physical barriers in the louvers above the control room doors. The doors themselves were modified by the addition of bullet stop thresholds, bullet resistant plates with security fasteners over the locking mechanisms and other security hardware improvements. The doors and the barriers have been seismically qualified.
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| Safety Evaluation These doors are for security purposes only. They are not safety-related and are not fire barriers. The modifications do not adversely affect the HVAC system. Since the doors are seismically qualified they have no.
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| impact on the function of any safety-related equipment. There is no TS that address security. This change does not affect the margin of safety for any other TS.
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| ECN P0600 Modify Clips From Motor-Generator (MG) Set Brush Access Covers
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| - Unit 2 Description This change to the recirculation MG set drive motor provides easier access to the brush r'gging. The modification permits the recirculation MG set brushes to be changed out with the unit in service instead of a requirement that the unit be at half load for at least four hours to facilitate the brush replacement.
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| 85
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| ECN P0600 (Continued)i Safety Evaluation The recirculation MG sets are not a safety-related portion of the reactor recirculation system. This modification does not affect the function of the MG sets, nor does it affect the operability and availability of the recirculation pumps. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any TS is not reduced.
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| ECN P0611 Modify Target Rock Model 7567F Safety Relief Valves - Unit 2 Description This modification was a vendor recommended design change.to machine the.
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| safety relief valves surfaces between the valve operator base and body to allow installation of a larger gasket. This change will provide more seating surface to reduce valve leakage.
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| Safety Evaluation
| |
| ~
| |
| Implementation of this modification did not affect the safety functions of the MS safety relief valves. This change does provide a greater seating surface for the base-to-body flange seal. This does not change the valves operation, setpoint, response time or characteristics specified in FSAR section 4.4.5. Consequently, the margin of safety as defined in the TS bases is not reduced.
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| EC9 P0612 Modify Control Air Lines to MS Safety Relief Valves - Unit 2 Descripti_on Replaced the rigid control air lines to the 13 MS safety relief valves pilot solenoid valves with flexible lines and new tubing supports. These supports were fabricated and installed in accordance with ASME Section III, Class 2 requirements.
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| Safety Evaluation This new replacement operates in a manner functionally the same as the rigid air lines and will not introduce any new failure mechanisms not previously anticipated. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the TS is not reduced.
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| l 86 l
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| | |
| ECN P0617 As-Construct Drawings for Barge Docking Facility - Unit 0 Description Revised drawings to reflect as-constructed locations of temporary barge docking facility, haul road, and fencing. The physical work for this work was previously completed.
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| Safety Evaluation Documenting the "as is" status of the facility will provide an accurate base of technical knowledge to base future design or operations. The physical work would not impact existing margin of safety for the plant.
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| ECN P0625 Modification of Vibration Restraints on Vent, Drain, or Test Connections on RHR/HPCI Systems - Unit 2 Description -
| |
| This modification consisted of analyzing and installing pipe supports on vent, drain, and test connection lines in the RHR and the HPCI systems.
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| Safety Evaluation The addition of seismic supports will assure that the vent, drain and test connections will not fail during a seismic event. Thus, the probability of occurrence or consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR is not increased nor is the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any TS reduced.
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| ECN P0631 Modify the Radiation Monitoring System - Unit 3 Description In-line radiation monitoring detectors RE-90-132, -133 and -134 and associated cables, and preamplifiers were relocated to the south end of the service water discharge tunnel. This change was determined necessary because the original location had a high humidity environment and occasional elevated background radiation levels causing spurious alarms.
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| Safety Evaluation The in-line detectors are not required to perform any safety function.
| |
| The equipment was designed not to fail in a manner which would degrade safety-related equipment. Off line radiation detectors have been installed to satisfy the monitoring requirements specified in the RETS.
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| The in-line detectors no longer provide a safety-related function.
| |
| Therefore, this change will not reduce the margin of safety for the facility.
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| I 87
| |
| | |
| ECN P0632 Modify 4KV Common Boards A and B - Units 1 & 2 Description This modification swapped the normal and alternate breaker functions for -
| |
| the 4KV common boards A and B. Their normal feeds are from the unit station service transformers and their alternate feeds are from the START j buses. Also included is the addition of a fast manual transfer scheme similar to the transfer scheme of the 4KV unit boards. The common boards should normally be supplied from the primary offsite power source (now the 500KV system). This source is more reliable and stronger than the 161KV system. The fast transfer reduces the transient which occurs during switching of the common board feeds.
| |
| Safety Evaluation This change will provide a more reliable source of offsite power. There are no safety-related loads associated with these electrical boards. The i margin of safety is not reduced by this modification.
| |
| l ECN P0646 As-Built Drawings for DG Air Start System - Unit 3 Description This modification consists of revising the plant drawings to show that l
| |
| there are no isolation valves for the DG air start. These valves were installed on other units locked open and used for valve maintenance only.
| |
| , Safety Evaluation 1
| |
| 1 These valves if installed would have been locked open and used for motor maintenance only. This change to drawings reflects the plant condition accurately for future design considerations. This will not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for the TS.
| |
| ECN P0651 Modify / Replace HPCI Testable Check Valve 73 Unit 2 Description This chance consisted of installation of a new replacement Atwood Morril l 14 inch testable check valve for HPCI containment isolation and new electrical cables to the test switch on valve FCV 73-45. This completes the work associated with the installation of this replacement valve l allowing closure of the ECN.
| |
| l l Safety Evaluation This new replacement valve is manufactured to the appropriate seismic and piping codes for containment isolation valves. The valve is designed to be tested by physically moving the actuator rod and has position switches I to verify operability. Plant margin of safety is not reduced by replacement of this valve with a fully qualified replacement to perform the same isolation function.
| |
| 88
| |
| _ _ _ _ . _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ D
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| ECN P0652 Modify / Replace RCIC Testable Caeck Valve (71-40) - Unit 2 Description This change consisted of installation of a new replacement Atwood Morril 6 inch testable check valve for RCIC containment isolation and new electrical cables, conduit, and junction boxes on valve FCV 71-40. This completes the physical work associated with the installation of the replacement valve allowing closure of this ECN.
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| Safety Evaluation The replacement Atwood Morril valve is manufactured to the same stringent seismic and piping codes associated with containment isolation valves.
| |
| The check valve is designed to be tested by physically moving the actuator rod with control air and has position switches to verify operability. Plant margin of safety is not reduced by replacement of this valve with a fully qualified replacement to perform the same containment isolation function.
| |
| ECN P0653 Modify Main Steam Relief Valve (MSRV) Vacuum Breaker Valves
| |
| - Unit 2 Description This modification consisted of physical changes to the MSRV tallpipe and changes to the bumper springs and bushings. These modifications were necessary to ensure full closure of the valve pallet after MSRVs cause the vacuum breaker to open. The consequence of this failure could include introduction of steam into tne drywell.
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| Safety Evaluation The modified vacuum valves are more structurally sound than they were prior to the modification. Thus, their probability of failure is less.
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| Based on this, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for TS is not reduced.
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| ECN P0661 Repair Standby DG - Unit 3 Description A crack in the end bonnet of the DG 30 jacket water cooling heat exchanger was identified. A replacement end bonnet was designed, fabricated, and installed. Design evaluations were performed insuring that the replacement bonnet meets ASME Code, Section VIII, Division 1 requirements, including external loads.
| |
| 89
| |
| | |
| ECN P0661 (Continued)
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| Safety Evaluation-4
| |
| 'The replacement of.the cracked end bonnet with a new fabricated end bonnet does not prevent either the standby DG 3D or the EECW system from performing its intended safety function. The possibility for an accident of a different type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR is not increaseo. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the TS is not reduced, i
| |
| ECN P0671 Modify Fire Protection System in the Control Building 1
| |
| - Units 1, 2, 3 Description This modification was to the existing fire suppression and detection systems to comply with 10CFR50, Appendix R, Section III.G in auxiliary instrument rooms .1, 2 & 3 and in battery board rooms 1, 2 and 3 on elevation 593' in the control building. Physical work involved relocating er adding fire detectors, add ug heat collector above sprinkler heads, and eliminating obstructions to sprinklers.
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| Calculations were performed and additional pipe supports / restraints were installed as needed to ensure pressure boundary integrity.
| |
| Safety Evaluation This modification reduces the probability of a fire occurring undetected and lessens the consequences of a fire. The effects of flooding in the battery rooms had been previously analyzed. This upgrade enhances the capabilities of the control building fire protection system to mitigate a fire event. The possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR is not created.
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| ECN P0684 Modify Drywell Torus Vacuum Breakers - Unit 2 Description This modification included fabrication and installation of hinge arms, pins, a , bushings for the drywell torus vacuum breaker valves 64028A through 64028M. This completes the physical work associated with this change and allows closure of this ECN.
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| Safety Evaluation This change was necessary to improve the strength and reliability of the valves. The modifications have been seismically qualified. Neither the function nor the qualifications of the vacuum breakers will be adversely affected by the changes. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for the TS is not reduced.
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| l 90
| |
| | |
| ECN P0688, P0690 and P0695 Modify Containment Inerting System Valves - Unit 2 Description Valves FCV 76-18, -19, FCV 84-8A, -88, -8C and -8D were modified by drilling and tapping test connections in the valve flanges to perform 10CFR50, Appendix J containment leakage tests. Following the modification, the valves were tested functionally to ensure that they would close and isolate as required.
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| Safety Evaluation This modification was necessary because these ;ontainment isolation valve; could not be isolated inside containment to perform the required leakage tests. The installation of pressure taps and concentric gaskets allows testing to limit leakage past the flange connection to within limits assumed in the accident analyses. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any TS is not reduced by this change.
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| ECN P0689 and P0691 Modify Containment Purge and Vacuum Relief Valves - Unit 2 Description This change consisted of machining the cast steel disc of containment isolation valves FCV 64-17 thru -21 and FCV 64-29 thru -34 and applying a weld bead of stainless steel to stop disc corrosion of the valve seat.
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| Also, flange test connections were drilled and tapped and concentric gaskets installed to allow performance of a 10CFR50, Appendix J containment leakage test on each valve. Each valve was functionally tested to ensure operability.
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| Safety Evaluation This modification improves the valve seat sealing capability and assures that containment boundary integrity is improved on containment isolation. The change will assure that isolation and leakage-requirements of TS 3.7/4.7 are achieved. The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any TS is not reduced.
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| ECN P0706 Replacement of Power Supplies in ECCS Trip Calibration Panels
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| - Unit 2 Description This n. modification replaces the power supplies in the trip calibration panels 9-81 and 9-82. The present Elma power supplies have had excessive maintenance problems and have been subject to high failure rates.
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| 91
| |
| | |
| 1 ECN P0706 (Continued)'
| |
| Safety' Evaluation The replacement of Elma power supplies with more reliable units increases the reliability of.the system with no increase in'the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident'or malfunction of equipment important to safety. The TS valves for the ECCS are unaffected by this modification.
| |
| ECN P0709 -Fabricate Spare Steel Head for DG Engine Coolers and Add Throttling Valves in'the EECW Supply - Unit l' Description This modification adds a throttling valve (globe) in the EECW supply to the DG engine coolers and locks open.the existing downstream balancing valves. This change is needed to reduce the operating pressure in.the heat exchanger to the design level. This modification also'provides for the fabrication of a steel head for the DG engine coolers to replace the vendor's cast iron head.
| |
| Safety Evaluation This modification reduces the operating pressure in the DG engine coolers while maintaining the design flow rate. This modification has been seismically qualified and has been designed and fabricated to a code that-exceeds the code requirements of the original design. Locking open the balancing valves assures the design flow rate is maintained. The pare head was fabricated in accordance with Section VIII of the ASME code.
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| Neither of these changes decrease the reliability of the plant nor reduce the margin of safety.
| |
| ECN P0710 Replace 3 Channel Containment Atmosphere Monitoring (CAM) Recorders With an Equivalent Modern Design Recorde - Unit 0 Description This modification replaces three channel CAM recorders with an equivalent modern design recorder that uses heat sensitive paper and a thermal print head. The present recorders require high maintenance and spare parts are not available because the recorders are obsolete.
| |
| Safety Evaluation The replacement recorders are equivalent to the existing recorders in terms of range and scale and should be more reliable and maintainable than the old recorders. The new recorders should also improve the overall accuracy of the instrument loops. A seismic analysis has concluded that the seismic qualification of control room panels 9-2 and 9-44 will not be degraded by the installation of the new recorders. The data inputs and power supply for the new recorders are unchanged from the original design.
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| 92
| |
| | |
| ECN P0712 Replace Existing Unit Preferred Transformer with Regulating ;
| |
| Transformer and Add Class IE Isolation Device - Unit 2 Description This modification replaces the 37.5KVA three phase unit preferred transformer which is the alternate power source for the RPS buses A or 8 with a 40KVA single phase voltage regulating transformer to prevent overvoltage on the RPS bus. The voltage regulating transformer will be supplied from the 480V RMOV board B. The existing transformer is fed directly from 480V shutdown board B. The breaker feeding the voltage regulating transformer will also serve as an isolation device since the voltage regulating transformer is non-IE.
| |
| Safety Evaluation There is no safety function served by the unit preferred transformer; however, the transformer is seismic Class II to prevent degradation to IE equipment to which it is connected and for which it provides power as an alternate power source. Its Class IE feeder breaker will ensure that the -
| |
| failure of the new transformer, electrically, will not adversely affect the RMOV board. The Class IE devices installed between the transformer and its Class IE loads protect the Class IE loads from degraded voltage.
| |
| The probability of equipment malfunction is not increased and the margin of safety is not reduced. !
| |
| ECN P0716 Install Silver Plated, Solid S.S. Ring Gasket For Floating Head Sealing Surface RHR Heat Exchangers 2B and 20 - Unit 2 Description This modification replaces asbestos gaskets in the floating head of RHR heat exchangers 28 and 20 with silver plated, solid stainless steel ring gaskets. Periodic occurrences of leaks from these heat exchangers have been attributed to relaxation of the asbestos gaskets after fit-up.
| |
| Installation of these ring gaskets is anticipated to significantly reduce leakage from the RHR heat exchangers.
| |
| Safety Evaluation Since the modification will significantly reduce the possibility of leakage at the floating head, the RHR heat exchangers should become more reliable and less susceptible to leakage failure. Therefore, the probability of an accident or malfunction is not increased and the margin of safety is not reduced.
| |
| 93
| |
| | |
| ECN P0720 Replacement of Sections of Jet Pump Instrument Lines L and M t
| |
| - Unit 2 Description This modification replaces and modifies existing piping susceptible to Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking (IGSCC) with an improved stainless steel material that has increased resistance to IGSCC. This is to provide a long-term mitigation of IGSCC problems and to reduce the radiation exposure time for Inservice Inspections (ISI). This modification was done when all the fuel was loaded into the feel pool.
| |
| Safety Evaluation Since the new material is less susceptible to IGSCC, the possibility of a pipe failure is significantly reduced. Therefore, the probability of an accident or malfunction is not increased and the margin of safety is not reduced. An evaluation was also done to determine if a safety concern exists while the modification is being performed and the primary system is breached. Since all the fuel is out of the vessel, a failure at this time would not b- detrimental to plant safety..
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| ECN P0724 Modify Reactor Vessel Head Spray Through X17 Penetration - Unit 2 Description This modification will remove or abandon the RHR Reactor Head Spray line from the reactor head through the X17 penetration. There was a partial implementation of this modification during this period.
| |
| Safety Evaluation The removal of the head spray line is part of the IGSCC study being done for Browns Ferry. The containment isolation valves FCV 74-77 will be removed and the penetration capped. Based on the safety evaluation, the margin of saft y will not be reduced by the removal of the reactor vessel head spray.
| |
| ECN P0739 Replace Pump Discharge Air Pressure Valves With Cast Steel Body Valves - Unit 2 Description The existing RHRSW/EECW pump discharge air release valve ulth cast iron bodies have a pressure rating less than the 185 psig system design pressure. This modification replaces these valves with seismically qualified cast steel body valves rated for the 185 psig design pressure.
| |
| . 94
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| | |
| ECN P0739 (Continued)
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| Safety Evaluation Replacement of existing valves with seismically qualified cast steel body valves rated for 185 psig will upgrade these valves to the system design pressure rating. The new valves will perform the same function as the existing valves with no adverse affects on system operations. The probability of an accident or malfunction is not increased and the margin of safety is not reduced.
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| ECN P0750 Install Additional Potable Water Lines - Unit 0 l
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| Description This modification provides an additional potable water plant supply line and branch supplies to new buildings, replaces. level controls and adjusts system setpoints for use of existing storage tanks. These storage tanks are located on top of the reactor building. -
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| Safety Evaluation The potable water system is not safety-re!ated and is not required for any design basis events. The additional plant supply line end subsequent branch supply lines do not go through any safety-related structures so no equipment important to safety will be affected. The probability of an accident or malfunction of safety-related equipment is not increased and the margin of safety is not reduced.
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| ECN P0753 Provide HPCI and Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) Cable Separation - Unit 2 Description This change included a review of the HPCI Division I and the ADS Division I cables to assess adequate cable separation to meet the design basis for these systems. Physical work included rerouting cable as necessary, moving relays in panels and relabeling cables to preclude future separation problems. The requirements for cable separation are stated in FSAR Section 8.9.4.1.
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| Safety Evaluation The identification and separation of HPCI and ADS cables will not alter the function or operation of the HPCI or ADS equipment. It will ensure that a single fire could not render both HPCI and ADS inoperable. A functional test will be performed prior to unit startup to ensure that the HPCI and ADS valves affected by this modification operate properly.
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| Therefore, the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the SAR is not created.
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| l 95
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| ECN P0758 Replace Single' Transfer Trip Circuit 2491 with Dual Circuit 2938-1 and 2938 Unit 0 Description This modification replaces the existing single transfer trip receiver on circuit 2941 with 2 transfer trip receivers on circuits 2938-1 and 2938-2 to the Union, Mississippi 500KV substation to provide adequate transfer trip protection for the Browns Ferry-Union 500 KV line. The dual transfer trip receivers will be installed in the communications room. A transfer trip alarm panel will also be added to connect the receivers to a spare alarm in the communications room. All the physical work for this change is limited to the communications room. This room does not contain any safety-related equipment.
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| Safety Evaluation This modification does not directly or indirectly involve any safety-related aspects of the plant. Therefore, no new accident or failure possibilities are foreseen. The margin of safety is not reduced.
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| ECN P0766 Modify HPCI Turbine Controls - Unit 2 Description This modification will lower the idle voltage setting on the controls ramp generator to maintain technical specification requirements for full HPCI flow at 25 seconds or less. The change also adds a 3/8 inch instrument line with a check valve between oil pump discharge and the remote' servo for limiting governor valve opening during startup.
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| Physical work consisted of installing this 3/8 inch line and servo valve during this period.
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| Safety Evaluation This modification will reduce HPCI turbine controls startup transients.
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| The test to verify performance of this modification will be performed after startup of the unit since nuclear steam is required to run the turbine. The modified HPCI controls will meet all the design basis requirements. Therefore, the possibility for ar accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated ir. the FSAR is not created.
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| ECN P0789 Replace DG No Voltage Relays (Documentation Only) - Unit 3 Description This change documents the replacement of failed no voltage relays with vendor recommended replacement relays on the annunciator panels of the DG control panels. The replacement relays have previously been installed on a TACF. This design change provides the engineering documentation for this change.
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| 96
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| ECN P0789 (Continued)
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| J Safety Evaluation The relays that were replaced provide an annunciation signal only and do not perform any safety function. The replacement relays are seismically qualified so as to not provide a potential to damage safety-related components within the panels. The probability of an accident or malfunction is not increased and the margin of safety is not reduced.
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| ECN P0792 10CFR50 Appendix J Testing For RHR Valves - Unit 2 Description This modification installs the necessary block, vent and drain valves to allow leak testing of four RHR valves in accordance with 10CFR50, Appendix J. A seismic analysis was done to assure that the new configuration is qualified to seismic Class I requirements.
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| Safety Evaluation The modification was designed and fabricated for the necessary requirements of safety-related piping. A seismic analysis was performed and the piping and valves used met all material, code, and environmental requirements. The probability of an accident or malfunction was not increased and the margin of safety was not reduced by this modification.
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| ECN P0795 10CFR50 Appendix J Testing For CS Valves - Unit 2 Description This modification installs the necessary block, vent and drain valves to allow leak testing of four CS valves in accordance with 10CFR50, Appendix J. A seismic analysis was done to assure that the new configuration is qualified to seismic Class I requirements.
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| Safety Evaluation The modification was designed and fabricated for the necessary requirements of safety-related piping. A seismic analysis was performed and the piping and valves used met all material, code, and environmental requirements. The probability of an accident or malfunction was not increased and the margin of safety was not reduced by this modification.
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| 1 97
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| ECN P0807 Reroute Normal Power Feed to Panel 25 Unit 2 Description This modification is a 10CfR50 Appendix R change. The normal.120V AC feed for backup u. '.rol panel 25-32 traversed the control building fire area. This change rerouted this cable so that a fire in the control building necessitating abandonment of the MCR could not disable both the MCR and the backup control panel. The change' included seismic analyses of the rerouted cable, conduit, and their supports. Electrical loads were analyzed to verify adequacy of replacement cables.
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| Safety Evaluation The replacement cable is a qualified IE replacement. The backup control system of which panel 25-32 is a part, is not an ESF. No functional or operational change to any loads fed by this unit are affected by this change. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any TS is not reduced.
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| ECN P0820 Modify Electrical Hiring for Reactor Recirculation Valve - Unit'3 Description The modification required changing the MCC internal wiring for valve 2-FCV-68-79 to provide isolated backup control. This change was necessary to bring the valve into compliance with requirements of FSAR Section 7.18.f.
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| Safety Evaluation This modification provides for more reliable backup control of reactor recirculation system valve FCV-68-79 and does not adversely affect the safety functions of other systems essential for safe operation or-shutdown of the plant. The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any TS is not reduced.
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| ECN P0823 Modify RHR Valves - Unit 2 Description This change installed switches to disable valves FCV 74-1, -12, -24. -35 and -48 during normal power operation. This switch will prevent the spurious opening or closing of these valves due to electrical shorts during 10CFR50 Appendix R related fire event. During shutdown, the switch will be used to allow the opening and closing circuits to be operable.
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| l 98
| |
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| ECN P0823 (Continued) o Safety Evaluation The current scope of this modification will not increase the probability or consequences of previously evaluated accidents or malfunctions, create the possibility of a different accident or malfunction than those analyzed in.the FSAR, nor reduce the margin of safety as defined in any basis in the TS because these switches prevent spurious actuations due to electrical shorts.
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| ECN P0827 Modify MG Sets 1A & 18 - Unit 1 Description This modification consisted of adding fuses in the negative polarity of the protective relaying circuits downstream of the main c?rcuit fuse of the 4KV reactor recirculation pumps lA and 18 MG sets.
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| These coordinating fuses are necessary to bring the unit into compliance with I 10CFR50, Appendix R, Section III G.
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| Safety Evaluation This modification increases the reliability of the circuitry in that a fire-induced fault in the control circuit would cause the coordinating fuse to open and cause a trip of protective relays. The addition of tio G fuse circuit does not create a possibility for an accident or malfunction that has not been previously analyzed in the FSAR. Therefore, the margin of safety is not reduced.
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| ECN P0829 Modify Reactor Recirculation Pumps 3A & 3B - Unit 3 Description This modification consisted of adding coordinating fuses downstream of the main circuit fuse in the negative polarity of the protective relaying circuits of the 4KV reactor recirculation pumps 3A & 3B MG sets. These coordinating fuses are necessary to bring the unit into compliance witn 10CFR50, Appendix R, Section III G.
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| Safety Evaluation This modification increases the reliability of the MG set circuitry in that a fire-induced fault in the circuit would cause the coordinating fuse to open and cause a trip of protective relays. Calculations show that the fuses are properly sized to not spuriously open for normal operation and startup loading transients. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type is not created. Therefore, the margin of safety is not reduced.
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| 99
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| ECN P0830 Replace 480V RMOV R.eaker - thit 3 Description This modification replaced the 480V AC RMOV BD 3A compartment R981 breaker with a smaller ampere rated breaker to protect associated cables under faulted conditions. The replacement breaker meets or exceeds all-the original design requirements. Calculations were made to verify the replacement breaker will allow its loads to start and operate without spuriously tripping.
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| Fafety Evaluation The replacement breaker is sized such that it will open before the cable-reaches its auto ignition temperature due to a fire-induced fault.
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| Failure of the breaker would not create a possibility for an accident or malfunction different from those previously analyzed in the FSAR.
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| Therefore, the margin of safety is not reduced.
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| ECN P0832 Circuit Protection Required By'10CFR50 Appendix R - Unit 3 Description This is a documentation only change that designates the emergency fused disconnect from the unit preferred MG set 3 as normally open. This will prevent fire-induced failures in the emergency tie cables from disabling the MG set. The newly designated normally open disconnects are the feeds from the MG set to.the unit 2 battery board.
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| Safety Evaluation Implementation of this ECN will pravent a fire related accident from disabling unit preferred MG set 3 and ensure compliance with the requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix R. The design does not change the normal operation of any equipment but it offers additional protection for the MG set during a fire.
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| ECN P0834 Modify Circuit Protection Required by 10CFR50 Appendix R - Unit 2 Description This modification consisted of adjusting load breaker settings on 250V DC RMOV BD 2A, compartment 7A to a lower setting and replacing breakers 1B1, 881, 3D, 7B and 4B with a smaller amperage rated breaker. The replacement breakers are sized to protect cables in case of a 10CFR50, Appendix R fire-induced fault.
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| 100
| |
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| ECN P0834 (continued)
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| Safety Evaluation This change is needed in order to bring the plant in compliance with the requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix R, Section III. G. This modification reduces the probability of a cable fault on the listed circuits affecting other minimum safe shutdown systems for an Appendix R event.
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| Calculations verify the changes will not affect the operation or qualification of any system needed for accident mitigation. Therefore, the margin of safety will not be reauced.
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| ECN P0836 Replace 480V AC RMOV Board 1A Circuit Breakers - Unit 1 Description This modification included replacement of circuit breakers in 480V AC RMOV Board-lA compartment 6E and 10A with GE type."THED" molded case circuit breakers with a lower amperage rating to protect cables IV2235 and IPL20ll. This will clear a fault prior to reaching auto-ignition temperatures of cable insulation. This modification is required to bring ,
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| the unit into compliance with 10CFR50, Appendix R, Section III G.
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| Safety Evaluation This change has not affected the function or operation of the 480V RMOV Board 1A. The upgrade enhances the ability of the unit to prevent electrical fires. Failure of the replacement breaker to trip when needed, or to trip spuriously, would be no different thar a similar fault j to the existing breaker. Therefore, the possibility for an accident or 1 malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the SAR is not created. The margin of safety as defined in the TS is not-reduced.
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| ECN P0837 Replace RMOV Circuit Breakers - Unit 2 Description This modification consists of replacement of breakers in RMOV BD 2A, compartment 6E and 8E with smaller amperage rated breakers to prevent cables from reaching auto-ignition tereratures before a fault is cleared.
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| Safety Evaluation i
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| This modification was needed to bring the plant in compliance with the requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix R, Section III G. Failure of the j replacement breaker to trip when needed or to trip spuriously would be no l different than a similar fault to the existing breaker. Therefore, the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR is not created. The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical specification is not reduced.
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| 101 )
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| ECN P0838 Replace Breakers in RMOV Board 3A & 38 - Unit 3 Description This modification consists of replacing breakers in the 480V AC RMOV Board 3A, compartment 6E and 10A with smaller amperage rated breakers to prevent cables from reaching auto-ignition temperatures before a fault is cleared. Calculations have been made to verify proper sizing of the replacement breakers to handle normal operational loads and startup loads to preclude spurious tripping.
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| Safety Evaluation l
| |
| This modification was needed to bring the plant into compliance with the requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix R, Section III G. The probability of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously i evaluated in the SAR is not increased by this change. The margin of safety as defined in the basis of any TS is not reduced.
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| ECN P0852 Modify Off-Gas System Moisture Instruments - Unit 2 Description This change replaced the original moisture sensor and recorder identified as loop number 110 in the off-gas system. The original equipment was obsolete and no replacement parts were available. Replacement equipment meets or exceeds qualifications for the original equipment.
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| Safety Evaluation The replacement equipment performs the same function as the original equipment and will not adversely affect the off-gas systems ability to meet its TS requirements. Based on this, the margin of safety in the basis for any TS is not reduced.
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| ECN P0859 Modify CRD - Unit 2 Description This change modifies the CRD insert and withdrawal pipe supports to meet the seismic and thermal requirements of the system in accordance with the requirements of the FSAR section 3.5 and Appendix C. Calculations were made to verify the qualification of the modified supports to meet these requirements.
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| 102 l
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| t -
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| ECN P0859 (Continued) ,
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| Safety Evaluation These modifications ensure the structural integrity during operating l
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| basis earthquakes and safe shutdown earthquakes as well as thermal loads associated with a scram. These changes upgrade the plant's ability to perform the scram function for which the system was designed by improving its structural integrity. The modification does not involve any change to the function of the system, thus, the possibility for an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than any evaluated previously in the SAR is not created.
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| ECN P0862 Modify 1E Conduit Supports in Control Bay - Units 1 & 2 Description This ECN provided inspections, engineering evaluations, analyses, calculations, and drawings to seismically qualify conduits located in Class I structures. Some supports were removed for addition of qualified supports in some locations. The physical work was performed so that this ECN could be closed.
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| Safety Evaluation This modification qualified various safety-related conduit supports on numerous drawings and modified those that did not qualify. This uograde in seismic qualification verified that the conduit supports meet tne design requirements in approved design criteria for seismic qualification. Based on this, no new accident possibilities are crected l and the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any TS is not I reduced. '
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| ECN P0864 Modify 1E Conduit Supports in Auxiliary Electrical System - Unit 3 Description This ECN provided inspections, engineering evaluations, analyses, calculations, and drawings to seismically qualify conduits located in Class I structures. Support modifications were made where required when existing supports could not be qualified by the analyses.
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| Safety Evaluation This modification qualified various safety-related conduit supports on numerous drawings and modified those that did not qualify. This upgrade verified that the conduit supports meet the design requirements in approved design criteria for seismic qualification. Based on this, no new accident possibilities are created and the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any TS is not reduced.
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| 103 j
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| 1
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| _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ - - _ - - - - - - - - - - - - J
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| ECN P0865 -Fabricate and Install IE Conduit in Class I Structures - Unit 0:
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| Description This ECN provided inspections, engineering evaluations, analyses, calculations, and drawings to seismically qualify conduits located in common Class I structures. Support modifications were made where required when existing supports could not be qualified by the analyses.
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| Safety Evaluation This modification qualified various safety-related lE conduit supports on numerous systems and modified those that did not qualify. This upgrade verified seismic design requirements. Based on this effort, no new accident possibilities are created and the margin of safety as defined for any TS is not reduced.
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| ECN P0870, P0871, and P0872 Modify Reactor Building HVAC - Units 1 & 2 Description This change added three hour fire-rated dampers. They are designed as seismic Class I and have double fusible links to preclude inadvertent closure. This change is implemented to meet the separation requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix k, Section III.G.2. (P0870 added 11 dampers, P0871 added 4 dampers, P0872 added 27 dampers) This modification also included modifying duct supports and penetration sleeves in the vicinity of the dampers.
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| Safety Evaluation This change minimizes the spread of a fire through the ventilation ducts between various fire zones, thus improving the fire protection capabilities of the plant. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the SAR is not created.
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| ECN P0873 Modify Reactor Building HVAC Duct Work - Unit 3 Description This modification added three hour fire-rated damners, intruder barriers, duct supports, and modified penetration sleeves 1,. 'he vicinity of the additions. This change is implemented to meet the separation requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2.
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| 104 l
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| -_--_____-_ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _- l
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| ECN P0873 (Continued)
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| Safety Evaluation This modification minimizes the. spread of a fire through the ventilation ;
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| ducts between various fire zones, thus improving the fire protection j capabilities of the plant. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the SAR is not created. '
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| ECN P0874 Modify DG Building HVAC Duct Work - Unit 3 Description This change replaced six existing fire dampers with units that are 3-hour fire-rated dampers and added two new dampers with this same rating. In addition, the duct sleeves at the penetration and duct supports were modified to meet seismic Class I qualification.
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| Safety Evaluation This change ensures compartmentation of fire zones and minimizes the spread of.a fire through the ventilation ducts within the DG Building, thus improving the fire protection ca] abilities. Since this change w111' improve the fire protection in the unit 3 DG building, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for TS is not reduced.
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| ECN P0875 Modify Cable Spreading Rooms HVAC Ducts - Unit 2 Description This change consisted of replacing four 1.5 hour fire dampers with 3.0 l hour fire-rated dampers in the cable spreading room ducts. In addition, duct supports were modified where necessary to guarantee the addition did not change the seismic qualification for the system duct work. This change was implemented to meet separation requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2.
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| Safety Evaluation i
| |
| {
| |
| This change minimizes the spread of a fire through the ventilation ducts -l within the cable spreading room ducts, thus improving the fire protection l capabilities. Since this change will improve fire protection, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any TS is not reduced.
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| I l
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| 105 I
| |
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| ECN P0883 Replacement Fuses for Trip Circuits - Unit 2 Description This change was implemented to meet requirement of 10CFR50, Appendix R, Section III.G. This consisted of replacing 30 amp and 35 amp breaker trip fuses with 15 amp fuses. The lower amperage fuses ensure that the associated cable fault conditions on an exposure fire would not prevent operation of breaker control circuit protective devices.
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| Safety Evaluation The replacement fuses were designed to lE requirements. Calculations were made to verify that the 15 amp fuses would be of an adequate size to preclude inadvertent opening on normal startup loads or transient conditions. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the SAR is not created.
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| Therefore, the margin of safety as defined by the basis of any TS is not reduced.
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| ECN P0884 Replace 480V AC RMOV Boards 2A & 28 - Unit 2 Description This modification consisted of replacing a "THEF" type molded case circuit breakers with "THED" type in Board 2A compartments llE, 13C, R10F and Board 28 compartments 8A1, 14C2, and R10F. This modification is required to bring these units into compliance with 10CFR50, Appendix R, Section III.G.
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| Safety Evaluation This modification upgrades the breakers to prevent the conductors from insulation damage due to reaching auto-ignition temperature before a fault is cleared. The function and operation of the breaker is not being changed. Tha possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the SAR is not created.
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| ECN P0886 Install and Inspect Smoke and Gas Fire Seals in Electrical Conduits
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| - Unit 2 Description The smoke and gas fire seals installed by this modification provide a fire resistr.ce rating equivalent to that of the barrier in which they are installed. In addition, this modification does not affect the secondary containment pressure boundary integrity, the seismic qualification, nor the external flooding analysis.
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| 106
| |
| | |
| ECN P0886 (Continued)
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| Safety Evaluation This modification ensures that the electrical penetrations through fire barriers are sealed properly and meet the requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix R. These seals were designed to maintain SGTS negative pressure or a flood condition of 60 feet of water (26 psig). Based on the design to meet special requirements (* secondary containment pressure boundary, environmental conditions, externas flooding, and interunit flooding, the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the SAR is not created.-
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| ECN P0887 Wrap Conduits with One-Hour Rated Fire Barrier Material - Unit 2 Description This modification consisted of wrapping conduits with a one-hour rated i
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| fire barrier material for a minimum of five feet after it leaves the room from which the cables originate. The cables and conduits affected by
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| , this change are associated with the 250V DC RMOV board 28 and 38.
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| Safety Evaluation The modification will increase the reliability of the systems by reducing potential failure points by an additional five feet outside the fire barrier walls. The derated ampere capacity of the cables have been addressed by a calculation which shows the cables are still properly sized to allow proper operability of the circuits. Seismic calculations have shown that the seismic Class I supports are adequate for the additional insulation. This modification does not change the functions or operations of any equipment. Thus, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any TS will not be reduced.
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| ECN P0889 Modify Control Circuits, Reroute Cables, and Wrap Conduits - Unit 2 Description i
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| Modifications included adding backup control switches for RHR containment isolation valves, rerouting a number of control cables to attain Appendix R separation, and wrapping electrical conduits with a one-hour rated fire wrap. These modifications are described in the BFN 10CFR50, Appendix R submittal.
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| Safety Evaluation The rerouting, wrapping, and adding control switches ensure the availability of the minimum equipment required for mitigating the consequences of an Appendix R event. The addition of backup control hand switches does not change the function of the valves being controlled nor l does it create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a l 3
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| different type than any previously evaluater in the SAR. By protecting conduit cables during a fire or rerouting t.., cables out of a fire zone, the margin of safety is increased.
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| 107 l
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| ECN P0889 Provide Fire-Rated Seals for Pipe Penetrations - Units 1, 2, 3 and C , mon Descrip'; j Pipe penetrations in reactor building, control bay, and DG buildings were analyzed and fire seals designed and installed to prevent a fire from propagating from one Appendix R fire compartment to another fire compartment through pipe penetrations.
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| Safety Evaluation The pipe penetration seals do not degrade or change the operation of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the SAR. The seal modifications will improve the fire protection system design without changing or adversely affecting the operation of the secondary containment system or any other feature discussed in the TS. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any TS is not reduced.
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| FCN P0900 Installation of Penetration Seals Description This modification adds fire-rated seals for pipe penetrations through fire compartment zone boundaries. These seals are required because the existing pipe penetrations do not provide the fire barrier ratings required to meet 10CFR50, Appendix R requirements.
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| Safety Evaluation The pipe penetrations affected by this modification are Appendix R fire compartment area zones in the reactor building. This modification will upgrade the pipe penetration fire ratings to a level that meets the requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix R. The probability of an accident or malfunction is not increased and the margin of safety is not reduced by this modification.
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| ECN P0901 CAO System Pipe Supports - Unit 2 Description This modification adds a connection between the CAD system and the control air system to provide MSRY control if the drywell control air compressors are lost due to fire. This fulfills a requirement of the BFN 10CFR50 Appendix R submittal to be able to assure control air for the MSRVs for 72 hours. 1 i
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| i 108
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| ECN P0901 (Continued)
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| Safety Evaluation An analysis has been made of the effect of this modification which addresses the seismic requirements, single failure criteria, the possible release of radioactivity, the possibility of mechanical failure, the fire protection concerns, the environmental qualifications, separation criteria, and the design basis accident mitigation issue. By verifying that a calculation has been written for each pertinent safety issue and that the design package is complete, this ensures that the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the SAR is not created.
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| 1 ECN P0911 Replace Four Breakers - 480V RMOV Boards - Unit 1 Description Some of the power circuit cables from the 480V RMOV boards have enough fire-related fault current to raise the conductors to the cable insulation auto-ignition temperature before a fault could be cleared.
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| This modification replaces these breakers with ones sized such that they.
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| will open before the cable insulation reaches its auto-ignition point due to a fire-induced fault. This will protect the load and the 480V RMOV 3 boards. This modification is required for compliance with 10CFR50, Appendix R, Section III.G.
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| Safety Evaluation This modification does not change the function or operation of the 480V RMOV boards or the affected loads. Failure of the replacement breaker to trip when needed, or to trip spuriously, would be no different than a similar fault in the existing circuit breakers. Thus, the probability of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety is not increased and the margin of safety is not reduced.
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| ECN P0912 Replace Five Breakers - 480V RMOV Boards - Unit 3 Description Some of the power circuit cables from the 480V RMOV boards have enough fire related fault current to raise the conductors to the cable insulation auto-ignition temperature before a fault could be cleared.
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| This modification replaces these breakers with ones sized such that they will open before the cable insulation reaches its auto-Ignition point due to a fire-induced fault. This will protect the load and the 480V RMOV boards. This modification is required for compliance with 10CFR50, Appendix R, Section III.G.
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| {
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| 109
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| ECN P0912 (Continued)
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| Safety Evaluation This modification does not change the function or operation of the 480V RMOV boards or the affected loads. Failure of the replacement breaker to l trip when needed, or to trip spuriously, would be no different than a similar fault in the existing circuit breakers.. Thus, the probability of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety is not increased and the margin of safety is not reduced.
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| ECN P0913 Install Fuses in 10CFR50 Appendix R Circuits - Unit 1 Description During 10CFR50 Appendix R reviews it was found that some 30A and 35A fuses were not adequate to provide overturrent protection for control cabling during the postulated exposure. fire. This modification replaces these 30A and 35A fuses with 15A fuses,.or adds 15A coordinating fuses where needed, in selected 4KV and 480V SDBDs with electrically operated
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| . breakers to provide circuit protection required by 10CFR50, Appendix R.
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| Safety Evaluation This modification does not change the function or operation of the 4KV and 480V shutdown distribution boards or the respective leads. Failure of the added or substituted 15A fuses to function when needed, or to open spuriously, would be no worse than a similar fault in the existing control circuit. Thus, the probability of an accident or malfunction of safety-related equipment is not increased and the margin of safety is not reduced.
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| ECN P0914 Install Fuses in 10CFR50 Appendix R Circuit - Unit 3 Description During 10C" 50, Appendix R reviews it was found that some 30A and 35A fuses were not adequate to provide overcurrent protection for control cabling during the postulated exposure fire. This modification replaces these 30A and 35A with 15A fuses, or adds 15A coordinating fuses where needed, in selected 4KV and 480V shutdown boards with electrically operated breakers, to provide circuit protection required by 10CFR50, Appendix R.
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| Safety Evaluation This modification does not change the function or operation of the 4KV and 480V shutdown distribution boards or the respective loads. Failure of the added or substituted 15A fuses to function when needed, or to open spuriously, would be no worse than a similar fault in the existing control circuit. Thus, the probability of an accident or malfunction of safety-related equipment is not increased and the margin of safety is not reduced.
| |
| 110
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| ECN P0920 Addition of Conduit Smoke and Gas Seals - Unit I l
| |
| i Description This modification provides fire stops for electrical conduits which u penetrate fire barriers in unit 1. These fire stops are an assembly consisting of external and internal seals and provide a fire resistance rating of at least the rating of the barrier that it penetrates.
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| Internal seals for conduits four inches and less in diameter are smoke i
| |
| and gas seals only.
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| , Safety Evaluation The fire stops being installed provide the equivalent fire resistance rating as the barriers in which they are being installed. This modification will not degrade the ability of the SGTS to maintain the required negative 0-25 inch water pressure within the secondary containment. The margin of safety for the secondary containment is not reduced by this modification. -
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| ECN P0921 Addition of Conduit Smoke and Gas Seals - Unit 3 Description This modification provides fire stops for electrical conduits which penetrate fire barriers in unit 1. These fire stops are an assembly consisting of external and internal seals and provide a fire resistance rating of at least the rating of the barrier that it penetrates.
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| Internal seals for conduits four inches and less in diameter are smoke and gas seals only.
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| Safety Evaluation The fire stops being installed provide the equipment with the same fire resistance rating as the barriers in which they are being installed.
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| This modification will not degrade the ability of the SGTS to maintain the required negative 0-25 inch water pressure within the secondary containment. The mai gin of safety for the secondary containment is not reduced by this modification.
| |
| ECN P0922 Change Transmission Relaying Line Terminals to Agree with State of the Art Cross-Blocking Scheme - Unit 0 Description This modification replaces the protective relaying system on the Davidson 500KV transmission line with a new Westinghouse Carrier protective relaying system which utilizes the new Cross-Blocking scheme. Since the Maury, Tennessee 500KV substation is looped into the Davidson 500KV transmission line, the name of the line has been changed from Davidson to Maury.
| |
| In addition, the single channel transfer trip now operating from Davidson to Browns Ferry will be changed to dual channel for operation from Maury to Browns Ferry.
| |
| 111
| |
| | |
| l l
| |
| ECN P0922 (Continued)
| |
| Safety Evaluation This modification increases reliability, improves performance, and provides better sensitivity of the new Maury 500KV transmission line.
| |
| The cross blocking scheme utilized in the new carrier protective relay system increases reliability and improves performance by preventing false operation of fault protection equipment. This modification does not increase the probability or consequences of an accident or equipment malfunction and does not reduce the margin of safety.
| |
| l ECN P0931 Modify / Install Conduit Supports in Reactor Building - Unit 2 Description This modification provides engineering evaluation or, where necessary, physical modification to seismically support conduit systems in the unit 2 reactor building at elevations 621' and 639'. This modification is only for conduits installed prior to May 1984. This change is for interim operation of unit 2 for cycle.5.
| |
| Safety Evaluation These modifications are required to satisfy the seismic support requirements for Class IE conduit in Class I structures. Since this modification enhances the reliability of the system without changing the system operation, the probability of an accident or malfunction are not increased and the margin of safety is not reduced.
| |
| ECN P0934 Modify / Install Conduit Supports in DG Building - Unit 2 Description This modification provides engineering evaluation or, where necessary, physical modification to seismically support conduit systems in the unit 1/2 DG building. This modification is only for conduits installed prior to May 1984. This change is for interim operation of unit 2 for cycle 5.
| |
| Safety Evaluation These modifications are required to satisfy the seismic support requirements for Class IE conduit in Class I structures. Since this modification enhances the reliability of the system without changing the system operation, the probability of an accident or malfunction are not increased and the margin of safety is not reduced.
| |
| l 112 '
| |
| l
| |
| | |
| ECN P0935 Modify / Install Condult Supports in Control Bay - Unit 2 Description This modification provides engineering evaluation or, where necessary, physical modification to seismically support conduit systems in the unit 2 control bay with the exception of the unit 2 spreading room. This modification is only for conduits installed prior to May 1984. This change is for interim operation of unit 2 for cycle 5.
| |
| Safety Evaluation These modifications are required to satisfy the seismic support requirements for Class IE conduit in Class I structures. Since this modification enhances the reliability of the system without changing the system operation, the probability of an accident or malfunction are not increased and the margin of safety is not reduced.
| |
| ECN P0936 Modify / Install Conduit Supports - Unit 2 Description .
| |
| This modification provides engineering evaluation or, where necessary, physical modification to seismically support conduit systems in the unit 3 DG building. This modification is only for conduits installed prior to May 1984. This change is for interim operation of unit 2 for cycle S.
| |
| Safety Evaluation These modifications are required to satisfy the seismic support requirements for Class IE conduit in Class I structures. Since this modification enhances the reliability of the system without changing the system operation, the probability of an accident or malfunction are not increased and the margin of safety is not reduced.
| |
| ECN P0937 Qualify Seismic Conduit in the Control Bay - Unit 1 Description This modification provided inspections, evaluations, analyses, calculations, and drawing updates to seismically qualify conduit located in the unit 1 control bay with the exception of the unit I spreading room and chiller room. This modification is only for conduits installed prior to May 1984. Physical work consisted of replacing the conduit supports not found in compliance. Completion of this change allowed closure of this ECN.
| |
| 113
| |
| | |
| 1 ECN P0937 (Continued)
| |
| Safety Evaluation l
| |
| This modification verifies that the Class IE electrical conduits meet the seismic requirements of Design Criteria BFN-50-723 for Class I structures. This enhances the plant's capability to withstand'a seismic event. Seismically supporting conduit will not affect any. systems operation and will provide added assurance that the affected systems will operate as required to maintain an adequate margin of safety'.
| |
| ECN P0938 Modify / Instal 1 Conduit Supports in the SGTS - Unit 0 Description This modification provides engineering evaluation or, where necessary, physical modification to seismically support conduit systems in the SGTS. This modification is only for conduits installed prior to May 1984. This change is:for interim operation of unit 2 for cycle 5.
| |
| Safety Evaluation These modifications are required to satisfy the seismic support requirements for Class IE conduit in Class I structures. Since this modification enhances the reliability of the system without changing the system operation, the probability of an accident or malfunction are not increased and the margin of safety is not reduced.
| |
| ECN P0939 Modify / Install Conduit Supports in the Intake Pumping Structure
| |
| - Unit 0 Description This modification provides engineering evaluation or, where necessary, physical modification to seismically support conduit systems in the intake pumping structure. This modification is only for conduits installed prior to May 1984. This change is for interim operation of unit 2 for cycle 5.
| |
| Safety Evaluation These modifications are required to satisfy the seismic support requirements for Class IE conduit in Class I structures. Since this modification enhances the reliability of the system without changing the system operation, the probability of an accident or malfunction are not increased and the margin of safety is not reduced.
| |
| 114
| |
| | |
| 1 ECN P0940 Review of the Reactor Building Conduit Seismic Qualifications Elevation 519' to 565' - Unit 1 Description This modification documents the inspection, evaluations, analyses, calculations, and drawings for the seismic qualification of conduit located in the unit I reactor building elevation 519' to 565' which were installed in Class I structures prior to May 1984. The seismic l Qualification is required for interim operation of unit 2 for cycle 5.
| |
| l The physical work completed this period consisted of installing and modifying conduit supports in the reactor building elevation 519' Safety Evaluation The conduit will continue to function in the same manner as before and will not affect any safety-related system already existing in the plant.
| |
| In fact, this modification enhances safety by eliminating the possibility of conduit failure during a seismic event.- Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any TS is not reduced.
| |
| ECN P0941 Review of Control Bay Conduit Seismic Qualifications - Unit 3 Description This modification documents the inspection, evaluations, analyses, calculations, and drawings for the seismic qualification of conduit located in the unit 3 control bay, except the spreading room, which was installed in Class I structures prior to May 1984. The seismic qualification is required for interim operation of unit 2 for cycle 5.
| |
| The physical work completed this period consisted of fixing Class IE conduit supports in unit 3 control bay.
| |
| Safety Evaluation The conduit will continue to function in the same manner as before and will not affect any safety-related system already existing in the plant.
| |
| In fact, this modification enhances safety by eliminating the possibility of conduit failure during a seismic event. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any TS is not reduced.
| |
| 1 115
| |
| | |
| ECN P0942 Modify / Install Conduit Supports in Reactor Building - Unit.3 Description This modification provides engineering evaluation or, where necessary, physical modification to seismically support conduit systems in the unit 3 reactor building at elevation 519' to 565'. This modification is only for conduits installed prior to May 1984. This change is for interim operation of unit 2 for cycle 5.
| |
| Safety Evaluation These modifications are required to satisfy the seismic support requirements for Class IE conduit in Class I structures. Since this modification enhances the reliability of the system without changing the system operation, the probability of an accident or malfunction are not increased and the margin of safety is not reduced.
| |
| ECN P0943 Modify / Install Conduit Supports in Reactor Building - Unit 1 Description This modification provides engineering evaluation or, where necessary, physical modification to seismically support conduit systems in unit I reactor building elevations 565' - 593'. This modification is only for conduits installed prior to May 1984. This change is for interim operation of unit 2 for cycle 5.
| |
| Safety Evaluation These modifications are required to satisfy the seismic support requirements for Class IE conduit in Class I structures. Since this modification enhances the reliability of the system without changing the system operation, the probability of an accident or malfunction are not increased and the margin of safety is not reduced.
| |
| ECN P0944 Modify / Install Conduit Supports in Reactor Building - Unit 3 Description This modification provides engineering evaluation or, where necessary, physical modification to seismically support conduit systems in unit 3 reactor building on elevations 565' - 593'. This modification is only for conduits installed prior to May 1984. This change is for interim operation of unit 2 for cycle 5.
| |
| 116
| |
| | |
| ECN P0944 (Continued)
| |
| Safety Evaluation
| |
| .These modifications are required to satisfy the seismic. support.
| |
| requirements for Class IE conduit in Class I-structures. Since this modification enhances the reliability of the system without changing the system operation, the probability of an accident or malfunction are not increased and the margin of safety is not reduced.
| |
| [
| |
| ECN P0945 Modify / Install Conduit Supports in Reactor Building - Unit 1
| |
| . Description This modification provides engineering evaluation or, where necessary, physical modification to seismically support conduit systems in unit I reactor building elevations 593' - 621'. This modification is only for conduits installed prior to May 1984. This change is for interim operation of unit 2 for cycle 5. -
| |
| Safety Evaluation These modifications.are required to satisfy the seismic support requirements for Class IE conduit in Class I structures. Since this modification enhances the reliability of the system without changing the system operation, the probability of an accident or malfunction are not increased and the margin of safety is not reduced.
| |
| ECN P0946 Modify / Install Conduit Supports in Reactor Building - Unit 3 Description This modification provides engineering evaluation or, where necessary, physical modification to seismically support conduit systems in unit 3 reactor building' elevations 593' - 621'. This modification is only for conduits installed prior to May 1984. This change is for interim operation of unit 2 for cycle 5.
| |
| Safety Evaluation These modifications are required to satisfy the seismic support requirements for Class IE conduit in Class I structures. Since this
| |
| ; modification enhances the reliability of the system without changing the system operation, the probability of an accident or malfunction are not increased and the margin of safety is not reduced.
| |
| 117 L - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ . _ - _-
| |
| | |
| ECN P0947 Modify / Install Conduit Supports in Reactor Building - Unit 1 Description T;ils modification provides engineering evaluation or, where necessary, physical' modification.to seismically support conduit systems in unit i reactor building elevations 621' - 639'. This modification is only for conduits installed prior to May 1984. This change is for interim.
| |
| operation of unit 2 for cycle 5.
| |
| Safety Evaluation These modifications are required to satisfy the seismic support requirements for Class IE conduit in Class I structures. Since this modification enhances the reliability of the system without changing the''
| |
| system operation, the probability of an accident or malfunction are not increased and the margin of safety is not reduced.
| |
| ECN P0948 Modify / Install Conduit Supports.In Reactor Building - Unit 3
| |
| , Description This modification provides engineering evaluation or, where necessary, physical modification to seismically support conduit systems in unit 3 reactor building elevations 621' - 639'. This modification is only for conduits installed prior to May 1984. This change is for interim operation of unit 2 for cycle 5.
| |
| Safety Evaluation '
| |
| These modifications are required to satisfy the seismic support requirements for Class IE conduit in Class I structures. Since this modification enhances the reliability of the system without changing the system operation, the probability of an accident or malfunction are not increased and the margin of safety is not reduced.
| |
| ECN P0949 Modify / Install Conduit Supports in Reactor Building - Unit 1 Description This modification provides engineering evaluation or, where necessary, physical modification to seismically support conduit systems in unit I reactor building elevations 639' - 664'. This mollification is only for conduits installed prior to May 1984. This change is for interim operation of unit 2 for cycle 5.
| |
| I18 l
| |
| t L _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - - - - - . - - _ - - _ _ _
| |
| | |
| ECN P0949 (Continued)
| |
| Safety Evaluation These modifications are required to satisfy the seismic support )
| |
| requirements for Class IE conduit in Class I structures. Since this modification enhances the reliability of the system without changing the (
| |
| system operation, the probability of an. accident or malfunction'are not increased and the margin of a Taty is not reduced.
| |
| ECN P0950 Modify / Install Conduit Supports in Reactor Building - Unit 3 q
| |
| Description This modification provides enginet-ing evaluation or, where necessary, physical modification to seismically support conduit systems in unit 3 reactor building elevations 639' - 664'. This mc'dification is only for conduits instailed prior to May 1984. This change is for interim operation of unit 2 for-cycle 5.
| |
| Safety Evaluation .
| |
| These modifications are required to satisfy the seismic support requirerrants for Class IE conduit in Class I structures. Since this modification enhances.the reliability of the system without changing the system operation, the probability of an accident or malfunction are not increased and the margin of safety is not reduced.
| |
| ECN P0956 Electrical Board Rooms and HVAC - Unit 2 Description This modification provides new seismically and environmentally quallfled HVAC equipment for unit 2 SOBD C and D.at elevations 621.25' and 593.0' respectively. This modification will provide adequate cooling capacity to handle the increased heat loads which will result from the -
| |
| installation of new equipment described in ECN P0399. This modification will assure a quallfled, redundant HVAC system for SDBD rooms C and D that will be implemented in accordance with the applicable seismic, environmental, and 10CFR50, Appendix R fire protection requirements.
| |
| Safety Evaluation All new equipment, ductwork, conduit, piping, supports, and other components have been designed and implemented in accordance with the appropriate criteria for seismic Class I systems. Proper circuit protection devices have been used to ensure that the power supply to other systems from the 480V RMOV boards will not be compromised by the addition of new circuits for this modification. The additional cooling water requirements for the new HVAC units will not measurably affect the systems which supply the water (RCH and EECW). All new penetrations will be properly sealed to maintain the integrity of the 10CFR50, Appendix R fire barriers. Each HVAC unit will be equipped with a trouble alarm to notify the MCR in the event of a unit failure.
| |
| 119
| |
| | |
| ECN P0956 (Continued)
| |
| This modification includes two new HVAC units whitn will provide a redundant system and minimize the probability of a loss of environmental control in the SDBD rooms. Based upon these considerations, the final-configuration for ECN P0956 will be seismically and environmentally qualified and will not adversely affect the safety of tae plant. The margin of safety is not reduced.
| |
| ECN P0959 Modification to Provide for LLRT of FCV 70-47 and -506 - Unit 2 Description This modification adds valves, piping, an( srpports needed to do LLRT of FCV 70-47.and -506 in accordance with 10CFR50, Appendix J, " Primary Reactor Containment Leakage Testing for Water Cooled Reactors."
| |
| Safety Evaluation The installation of test, block, and vent valves increases the probability of essential loop flow failure, but only very slightly, and .
| |
| is considered a highly unlikely event. A safety evaluation performed for this modification concluded that there is not an increase in the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident, and that failure of the new valve does not create the possibility of a malfunction of equipment important to safety. The RBCCW system is not safety-related. The margin of safety is not reduced.
| |
| ECN P0962 Remove and Cap Pipe at Penetration X-216 - Unit 2 Description This modification removes a section of piping and installs pipe caps at primary containment penetration X-216. This negates 10CFR50, Appendix J requirements for FCV 74-102, -103, -119, and -120 by isolating the RHR vent system from the primary containment.
| |
| Safety Evaluation During RHR system operation, the valves isolated by the pipe caps are normally closed. Therefore, the modification does not change the functional operational configuration of the system. Based on this, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type is not created and the probability of occurrence is not increased. The margin of safety is not reduced.
| |
| I 120
| |
| __ __________-__-_-__a
| |
| | |
| ECN P0965 Modifications to Provide for LLRT of FCVs - Unit 2 i
| |
| Description
| |
| . This modification adds valves, piping, and supports needed to do LLRT of R L
| |
| FCV 73-30 in the HPCI system minimum flow bypass line in accordance with
| |
| :10CFR50, Appendix J.
| |
| Safety Evaluation A safety evaluation performed for this modification concluded that the
| |
| )- addition of these piping components does not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident, and that the failure of the new valve does not create the possibility of a malfunction of equipment-important to safety. LLRT will only be done when the reactor is shutdown and the HPCI system is not required. This modification does not reduce the margin of safety.
| |
| ECN P0968 Modification to Provide for LLRT of FCVs - Unit 2 Description This modification adds valves, piping, and supports needed to do LLRT of valves FCV 84-8A, -88, -8C and -8D in the CAD system in accordance with 10CFR50, Appendix J.
| |
| Safety Evaluation A safety evaluation performed for this modification concluded that the addition of these piping components does not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident, and that the failure of the new valve does not create the possibility of a malfunction of equipment important to safety. The CAD system is unaffected by this modification during normal operation as the block valve is open and the test connections closed. This modification does not reduce the margin of safety.
| |
| ECN P0971 Modification to Provide for LLRT of FCVs - Unit 2 Description This modification adds valves, piping, and supports needed to do LLRT af FCV 73-30 in the RCIC system in accordance with 10CFR50, Appendix J.
| |
| l 121
| |
| | |
| ECN P0971 (Continued)
| |
| Safety Evaluation A safety evaluation performed for this modification concluded that the addition of these piping components does not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident, and that the failure of the new valves does not create the possibility of a malfunction of equipment important to safety. LLRT will only be done when the reactor is shutdown and the RCIC system is not required. This modification does not reduce the margin of safety.
| |
| ECN P0975 Document As-Constructed Drawings for TOL Heater Values and Settings Established by Environmental Qualification Walkdowns for 480V and 250V DC MCCs - Unit 2 Description This.ECN provides documentation for as-constructed TOL heater values and settings for the 480V AC and 250V DC MCCs reautred for support of unit 2 operation. This ECN is strictly for the docuuntation of the as-constructed configuration and does not reflect the design. ECN E-2-P7010 will provide engineering verification to ensure that the documented TOL heater values conform with the overload element sizing criteria.
| |
| Safety Evaluation This ECN is for documentation only to correct a condition of inadequate documentation as reported in a CAQR. No physical modification is being performed at this time. Therefore, there is no impact to plant safety due to this ECN. The margin of safety is not reduced.
| |
| ECN P0976 Off-Line Liquid Effluent Radiation Monitor Modifications - Unit 1 Description This modification upgrades the radiation monitoring systems for the RHRSW system and the RCW system to the operating standards defined in the RETS. These changes pertain mostly to annunciation and status signals.
| |
| Safety Evaluation These changes improve the performance of the monitors without adversely affecting their function. A safety evaluation has determined that none of the modifications made will increase the probability or consequences of an accident or malfunction and that the margin of safety is not reduced.
| |
| 122
| |
| | |
| ECN P0977 Modify Radiation Monitoring System - Unit 2 Description This. modification is tci bring the radiation. monitoring systems for the RHRSW system and the RvH system up to the operating standards defined in the RETS. The physical work completed this period consisted of installing panels, supports, conduits, and cables to modify off-line process radiation monitoring system.
| |
| l l
| |
| Safety Evaluation The overall function and operation of the radiation monitoring system are I
| |
| not changed. The modifications do not invalidate any assumptions used in any safety analysis. The effectiveness of the system is increased by providing the operator with more reliable information about system statt.s Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the TS is not reduceu ECN P0978 Modify Radiation Monitoring System - Unit 3 Description This modification is to bring the radiation monitoring systems for RHRSW, RBCCW, and RCW up to the operating standards defined in the RETS. The physical work completed this period consisted of installing panels, supports, conduits, and cables to modify off-line process radiation monitoring system.
| |
| . Safety Evaluation Implementation will not adversely affect the design function or the operation limits of the equipment as discussed in the TS. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any TS will not be reduced.
| |
| ECN P0985 Repair Leaking Expansion Joints in CCW Tunnels - Units 1, 2 & 3 Description This modification addresses the repair of leaking expansion joints in the CCW discharge tunnels. The physical work completed this period consisted of pressure grouting in the CCW discharge tunnels.
| |
| 123
| |
| | |
| l ECN P0985 (Continued)
| |
| Safety Evaluation The CCW system is not used to mitigate DBEs, per FSAR Section 11.6. The safety systems which interact with the CCW system are not affected by the proposed modification. Therefore, the repair of these joints does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any TS.
| |
| ECN P0987 Document TOL Heater Ratings - Unit 1 Description This modification will provide documentation for as-constructed TOL heaters. This modification is required to implement the corrective action for Significant Condition Report SCRBFNEEB8536RI. The work.
| |
| completed this period consisted of documenting as-constructed drawings for TOL heater values and settings established 'by environmental qualification walkdowns for 480V AC and 250V DC MCCs.
| |
| Safety Evaluation l
| |
| This change is necessary to correct the condition of inadequate documentation of TOL heater values and settings for the 480V AC and 250V DC MCCs. The documentation will not physically affect any safety-related system in the plant. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any TS is not reduced.
| |
| l ECN P0988 Document TOL Heater Ratings - Unit 3 Description This modification will provide. documentation for as-constructed TOL heaters. This modification is required to implement the corrective action for Significant Condition Report SCRBFNEEB8536RI. The work completed this period consisted of documenting as-constructed drawings for TOL heater values and settings established by environmental qualification walkdowns for 480V AC and 250V DC MCCs.
| |
| Safety Evaluation This change is necessary to correct the condition of inadequate documentation of TOL heater values and settings for the 480V AC and 250V DC MCCs. The documentation will not physically affec+ any safety-related system in the plant. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any TS is not reduced.
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| 124
| |
| | |
| ECN P0994 Install Cafety Improvements on the Machine Shop Overhead Traveling Crane - Unit 0 Description J
| |
| This modification is to '.mtall safety improvements on the overhead traveling crane located in tN machine shop. The modifications add the following safety features; 1) c'erspeed protection, 2) red mushroom style emergency stop pushbutton, 3) ht ist drum overspooling and overlapping protection, and 4) phase loss protection. The physical work completed this period consisted of modification of the service building five ton underhung machine shop crane.
| |
| Safety Evaluation These modifications are to improve the industrial safety aspect of the machine shop crane. The structural integrity of the crane is not changed. Therefore, the margin of safety is not reduced.
| |
| ECN P0996 Modify Supports for Bypass Lines for Reactor Pumps 2A, 28, and 2C
| |
| - Unit 2 Description This modification included doing an analysis of the low load bypass to the condenser lines for reactor feedwater pumps 2A, 2B and 2C and their supports which have been damaged due to overloading and excessive movement. To limit stress on the piping and prevent further support damage, existing pipe supports will be modified to provide proper support and redirect thermal growth. Completion of this modification allowed closure of this ECN.
| |
| Safety Evaluation These modifications and repairs on piping supports for the reactor feed pumps low load fb rass lines are necessary for proper support and thermal growth allowance. The implementation of this change provides assurance that the integrity of minimum flow lines will be maintained. These lines do not perform any safety-related functions nor are they addressed in any TS. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any TS is not reduced.
| |
| I ECN P0997 Modify RNCU Weld RNC-2 Unit 2 i Description i
| |
| This modification required a design, evaluation, and inspection of the l full structural overlay of the weld DSRHC-2-5 to be performed in accordance with ASME Boller and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XIm, 1980 Edition with addendas through winter 1981., The modification consisted of a full weld structural overlay of the weld.
| |
| I 125
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| _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - . _ _ - - _ - _ _ - - - - - I
| |
| | |
| ECN P0997 (Continued)
| |
| Safety Evaluation This modification will reduce further IGSCC effects on this particular portioq of the PHCU piping and is requirtd to maintain the reactor pressure boundary'for interim operation. Continued operation with this
| |
| . Modification in olace will depend upon the results of the Nondestructive i Examindilon (NDE). The piping will be .eturned to the original '
| |
| configuration or equivalent based on des 19 .T calculations. Thus, the margin of safety as defined in the TS is not reduced.
| |
| ECN P0998 Modify Drywell Platforms on Elevations 604' 616' and 628' - Unit 2 Description This modification when complete will have analyzed and made_ drawings for drywell access platforms on elevations 604', 616' and 628'. This modification became necessary when walkdowns showed the "as-built" configuration of the platforms differed significantly from the "as-designed". The platforms serve as structured attachment points for various system components including H"AC ducts, electrical conduits, junction boxes, lamp posts, and smal7 bore pipes / valves. The structures must be sound in order to provide que.ified supports. Nork completed during this period consisted of completion of structural step installations on elevations 604' and 616'.
| |
| Safety Evaluation Implementation of this modification ensures that the access platforms and their attachments meet the requirements for strength and stiffness responses included in design criteria for the plant and the SAR.
| |
| Drawings, analyses, And calculations verify this structural integrity and form a technical base of knowledge required for future e.dditions/ modifications in this area of the drywell. The structural modifications do not change the operation of any safety-related system.
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| Based on this, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any TS is not reduced.
| |
| 4 l
| |
| 126
| |
| | |
| L l
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| ECN P1000 Modification to Seismic Instrumentation - Unit 0 Description The scope of the modification performed by this ECN is to replace the current Terra Technology (PRA-1035) seismic instruments which have been declared inoperative with Engdahl (PAR 400-2) seismic instruments.
| |
| Safety Evaluation.
| |
| The replacement seismic instruments are more reliable than the old instruments and will improve the plant's ability to r'onitor peak acceleration during a seismic event. Replacement of the old seismic-instruments will not have an adverse affect on the safe operation of the plant. The replacement instruments will perform the'same function as the old instruments. Tt4refore, the margin of safety has not been reduced.
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| I ECN P1001 Modification of Recirculating System Equipment - Unit 2 Description The scope of this ECN is the modificativi or addition of supports for ,
| |
| piping that was modified by ECN P0957 to restore the piping to its '
| |
| original design basis as a seismic Class I system. These seismically qualified pipe supports are for recirculation, RHR, and RWCU system piping.
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| Safety Evaluation This modification will improve the structural integrity of the systems affected by this ECN by having seismically qualified pipe supports.
| |
| However, this modification will not alter the function c operation of the affected systems. Therefore, the margin of safety has not been reduced.
| |
| ECN P2036 Modification to CRD System Equipment - Unit i Description The scope of the modifications performed by t.'s ECN is to modify supports and piping as required to comply with NRC IE Bulletins 79-02 and 79-14. The scope of the ECN addressed here is the modification / rework of the piping.
| |
| Safety Evaluation This modification is to conform to NRC IE Bulletins 70-02 and 79-14 to ensure seismic integrity of the system. However, the system function and operability is not adversely affected by this ECN. Therefore, the margin of safety has not been reduced.
| |
| 127 l
| |
| | |
| ECN P2042 Modification to RHRSW Equipment - Unit 1 Description The scope of the modifications performed'under the. scope of this ECN is to modify RHRSW piping supports to comply with NRC IE Bulletins 79-02 and 79-14 which will meet the se'?mic and other design stresses for the systems. This ECN applies to Class I piping (RHRSW System) supports in the reactor building.
| |
| Safety Evaluation This modification ensures that the RHRSW ploing supports in the reactor building conform to the requirements of ~ IE Bulletins 79-02 and 79-14 and that the system piping will perform .r the original design requirements. The operation and function of the system has not been adversely affected by this modification. Therefore, the margin of safety
| |
| .has not been reduced.
| |
| ECN P2044 Modification to Reactor Building Floor Drainage and Sump Pump (RBFD&SP) Equipment - Unit 1 '
| |
| Description The scope of the modifications performed e der this ECN is to modify RBFD&SP piping supports to comply with NRC IE Bulletins 79-02 and 79-14 which will meet the seismic and other design stresses for the systems.
| |
| Safety Evaluation This modification ensures that the RBFD&SP piping supports conform to the requirements of NRC Bulletins 79-02 and 79-14 and that the system piping will perform per the original design requirements. The operation and function of the system has not been adversely affected by this modification. Therefore, tha margin of safety has not been reduced. l ECN P2054 Modification to RBCCW Equipment - Unit 1 Description The scope of the modifications performed under this ECN is to modify RBCCW piping supports to comply with NRC IE Bulletins 79-02 and 79-14 which will meet the seismic and other design stresses for the systems.
| |
| Safety Evaluatt'on l
| |
| This modification ensures that the RBCCW piping supports conform to the requirements of NRC IE Bulletins 79-02 and 79-14 and that the system piping will perform per the original design requirements. The operation and function of the system has not been adversely affected by this modification. Therefore, the margin of safety has not been reduced.
| |
| t 128 1
| |
| | |
| FCN P2064_ Modify P.6F0&SP Equipment - Unit 3 Description l The scope.of the rnodification performed under this ECN is to change l RBFD&SP pipe support 50061 from a single acting Y-support to a double acting Y-support to comply with NRC IE Bulletin 79-14.
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| Safety Evaluation This modification assures that the actual. pipe stresses are reduced to an acceptable level during a DBE. Furthermore, this modification does not alter or adversely affect the function or operation of the system.
| |
| Therefore, the margin of safety has not been reduced.
| |
| ECN P2079 Modification to CRD Equipment - Unit 2 Description.
| |
| This ECN as-constructs portions of the CRD scram discharge header system based on IE Bulletin 79-14 walkdown data.
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| Safety Evaluation This ECN is supported by pipe stress analyses showing that the as-built configuration meets all design loads. This ECN does not have any adverse affect on the operation or function of the system. Therefore, the margin of safety has not been reduced.
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| ECN P2088 Modification to FPC Equipment - Unit 2 Description The scope of this ECN is the replacement of two pipe restraints at nodes "R13 and R18" in response tc NRC IE Bulletin 79-14.
| |
| Safety Evaluation This modification assures that the actual pipe stresses are reduced to an acceptable level during a DBE. Thus, the reliability of the piping has been increased. Furthermore, this modification has not altered or adversely affected the function or operation of the system. Therefore, the margin of safety has not been reduced.
| |
| l 129 l
| |
| | |
| I ECN P2090 Modification to Radwaste System Equipment - Unit 2 4
| |
| L Description The scope of the modification performed by this ECN is to modify supports and piping as required to comply with NRC Bulletins 79-02 and 79-14. The i'
| |
| . scope of the ECN addressed here is the removal, modification, and installation of supports 50061, 50075.through 50079, and 50081 through ;
| |
| 50083. !
| |
| Safety Evaluation This modification is to conform to NRC Bulletins 79-02 and 79-14 to ensure seismic integrity of the system. The system function and operation have not been Iitered or adversely affected by this modification. Thereferv the margin of safety has not been reduced.
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| ECN P2092 Modification to SGTS Equipment - Unit 3 Description
| |
| ~
| |
| The scope of the ECN is the removal of one pipe support (H-33) in response to NRC IE Bulletin 79-14.
| |
| Safety Evaluation This modification assures that the actual pipe stresses are reduced to an acceptable level during a DBE. Thus, the reliability of the piping has been increased. Furthermore, this modification has not altered or adversely affected the operation or function of the system. Therefore, the margin of safety has not been reduced.
| |
| ECN P2095 Modification to CS Equipment - Unit 2 Description The scope of this ECN applies to those portions of the CS that are determined to comply with NRC IE Bulletins 79-02 and' 79-14 without performing any field modification to the system supports or hangers.
| |
| However, the scope identified here addresses fabrication, installation, modification, removal, and springlead settings of these hangers and supports.
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| Safety Evaluation This ECN does not affect the safety function of this system. Also, compliance with NRC IE Bulletins 79-02 and 79-14 does not affect the operation and reliability of the system. Therefore, the margin of safety has not been reduced.
| |
| 130
| |
| | |
| ECN P2103 Modification to RCIC System Equipment - Unit 2 Description The scope of_this ECN applies to those portions of the RCIC system that-are determined to comply with NRC IE Bulletins 79-02 and 79-14 without performing any field modification to the system supports or hangers.
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| However, the scope identified here addresses fabrication, installation, modification, and removal of these hangers and supports.
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| Safety Evaluation This ECN does not affect the safety function of this system. Also, compliance with NRC IE Bulletins 79-02 and 79-14 does not affect the operation or reliability of the system. Therefore, the margin of safety has not been reduced.
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| ECN P2111 Modification to RHR Equipment - Unit 2 Description The scope of this ECN applies to those portions of the RHR that are determined to comply with NRC IE Bulletins 79-02 and 79-14 without performing any field modification to the system supports or hangers.
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| However, the scope identified here addresses fabrication, installation, modification, and removal of these hangers and supports.
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| Safety Evaluation This ECN does not affect the safety function of this system. Also, compliance with NRC IE Bulletins 79-02 and 79-14 does not affect the operation or reliability of the system. Therefors, the margin of safety has not been reduced.
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| ECN P2146 Remove Support H-87 on Drywell and Torus Purge Piping - Unit 2 Description l
| |
| ' The stress analysis done in response to NRC IE Bulletin 79-14 indicated removal of existing support H-87 reduces the pipe stresses to an acceptable level. This modification implements this support removal.
| |
| Safety Evaluation This modification assures the actual pipe stress levels during a DBE are within acceptable levels. Therefore, this change has enhanced the reliability of the torus purge system and would not increase the probability of occurrence of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR. The margin of safety as defined in the TS is not reduced.
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| i 131 c:.
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| - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ - _ s
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| ECN P2154 Modify RHRSW and EECW Pipe Supports - Unit 0 Description This ECN modified RHRSW and EECH piping supports in the intake structures as required by the stress analyses performed in response to NRC IE Bulletins 79-02 and 79-14.
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| Safety Evaluation o
| |
| .This modification brings the RHRSW and EECW system piping and their supports in conformance with the design requirements and the as-constructed configuration. This ensures the functional capabilities of the supports following a seismic event. Since this modification will restore.the piping systems to at least their original design capability, the modifications will not increase the probability of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR, nor will they reduce the margin of safety defined la the TS.
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| ECNP30b3 Replace Flow Solenoid Valves (FSV) 84-19 and FSV 84 Unit 2 l
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| De'scription This modification replaces FSV 84-19 and FSV 84-20 with equivalent valves that are environmentally qualified.
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| Safety Evaluation The new valves which replace the non-qualified valves improve the reliability of the system and thus, will not increase the probability of occurrence of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR nor reduce the !
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| margin of safety defined in the TS.
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| ECN P3006 Replace Non-Qualified Pressure Switches (PS) - Unit 2 Description I I
| |
| This modification replaced the following switches to meet NRC IE Bulletin 79-018 requirements; PS-73-1C, 10, 20A, 20B, 20C, and 200. I Safety Evaluation l i
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| The new qualified equipment meets the same requirements and performs the j ame function as the original equipment. The new equipment has l
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| documentation that will environmentally qualify them for their respective i
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| environment. Therefore, with increased reliability and same function as the original equipment, the new qualified equipment does not create or i
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| increase the possibility of occurrence of an accident previously l
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| described in the FSAR. Likewise, the margin of safety defined in the TS is not reduced.
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| 132 L____________________-- _ - _ _ _ _ . -
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| l
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| ECN P3023 Replace RHR Non-Quallfled PSs - Unit 2 Description This modification replaced PS-74-8A, 19A, 31A, 42A, 88, 198, 318, and 428 with qualified PSs to meet NRC IE Bulletin 79-01B requirements.
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| Safety Evaluation The new qualified equipment meets the same requirements and performs the >
| |
| same functions as the original equipment. Therefore, with increased f reliability and same function as the original equipment, the new qualified equipment does not create nor increase the possibility of occurrence of an accident previously described in the FSAR. Likewise, the margin of safety defined in the TS is not reduced.
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| ECN P3025 Replace HPCI Non-Qualified PSs - Unit 2
| |
| ? Description
| |
| . This modification replaced PS-73-22A and B with qualified pressure switches to meet NRC IE Bulletin 79-OlB requirements.
| |
| Safety Evaluation The new qualified equipment meets the same requirements and performs the same functions as the original equipment. Therefore, with increased reliability and same function as the original equipment, the new qualified equipment does not create or increase the possibility of occurrence of an accident previously described in the FSAR. Likewise, the margin of safety defined in the TS is not reduced.
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| ECN P3026 Replace Non-Qualified CS PSs - Unit 2 Description This modification replaced PS-75-7, 16, 35, and 44 with qualified PSs to meet NRC IE Bulletin 79-018 requirements.
| |
| Safety Evaluation
| |
| ' The new qualified equipment meets the same requirements and performs the same function as the original equipment. Therefore, with increased reliability and same function as the original equipment, the new qualified equipment does not create or increase the possibility of occurrence of an accident previously described in the FSAR. Likewi ,
| |
| the margin of safety defined in the TS is not reduced.
| |
| 133 f
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| r -- - -_ _
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| ECN P3043 Replace Primary Containment Non-Qualified FSVs - Unit 2 Description This modification replaces FSV 64-9, 10, 40, 41, 42, and 43 with FSVs that comply with NRC IE Bulletin 79-018 requirements. Supports for these FSVs were also modified to meet seismic Class I qualification requirements.
| |
| Safety Evaluation The new quallfled equipment meets the same requirements and performs the same functions as the original equipment. Therefore, with increased reliability and same function as the original equipment, the new quallfled equipment does not create or increase the possibility of l occurrence of an accident previously described in the FSAR. Likewise, the margin of safety defined in the TS is not reduced.
| |
| ECN P3046 Replace Non-Qualified Primary Containment FSVs - Unit 2 Description This modification replaced FSV 64-139, 140, and 141 with qualified FSVs that meet NRC IE Bulletin 79-01B requirements.
| |
| Safety Evaluation The new qualified equipment meets the same requirements and performs the same function as the original equipment. Therefore, with increased reliability and same function as the original equipment, the new quallfled equipment does not create or increase the possibility of occurrence of an accident previously described in the FSAR. Likewise, the margin of safety defined in the TS is not reduced.
| |
| ECN P3053 Replace Non-Qualified Feedwater Level Indicating Switches (LIS)
| |
| - Unit 2 Description This modification replaced LIS-3-208 A, B, C and D with qualified level transmitters and analog trip units to meet NRC IE Bulletin 79-01B requirements. The change also revised the high reactor water level trip of the HPCI turbine and the standby mode signal of the RCIC system turbine. The revised HPCI high water level trip and the modified RCIC turbine standby mode signal meet all the requirements of the TS and the design criteria for the HPCI and RCIC systems.
| |
| 134 {
| |
| i
| |
| | |
| i ECN P3053 (Continued)-
| |
| Safety Evaluation The nrw qualified equipment meets the same requirements and performs the same functions as'the original equipment. Therefore, with increased reliability and same function as the original equipment, the new qualified equipment does not create or increase the possibility of-occurrence of an accident previously described "in the FSAR. Likewise, the margin of safety defined in the TS is not reduced.
| |
| ECN P3058 Replace Primary Containment Pressure Transmitters (pts) - Unit 2 Description This modification replaced PT-64-50, 51 and 67 including changes to their circuitry to make the current instrument loop compatible with the new transmitters. The ECN is field complete.
| |
| Safety Evaluation.
| |
| ~
| |
| Changes have been evaluated in USQD Revision 2 as not affecting the occurrence of an accident previously analyzed in the FSAR, but there arc special requirements on the USQD that have not yet been addressed since the ECN has not been closed.
| |
| ECN P3061 Replace HPCI Non-Qualified LISs - Unit 2 Description This modification replaces LIS 73-56A and B with qualified switches that meet NRC IE Bulletin 79-01B requirements.
| |
| Safety Evaluation The new qualified equipment meets the same requirements and performs the same functions as the original equipment. Therefore, with increased reliability and same function as the original equipment, the new qualified equipment does not create nor increase the possibility of occurrence of an accident previously described in the FSAR. Likewise, the margin of safety defined in the TS is not reduced.
| |
| ECN P3064 Instrument Panel Relocation - Unit 2 Description This modification relocated several HPCI instruments from panel 25-31 to 25-32 to comply with NRC IE Bulletin 79-01B requirements. These instruments must be relochted to a mild environment to make modification on ECN P3058 possible.
| |
| 135
| |
| | |
| ECN P3064 (Continued)
| |
| Safety Evaluation 3
| |
| The subject instruments are being relocated in order to meet the i requirements of IEEE-323-1974. Their intended function does not change !
| |
| with the relocation. Therefore, the probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR is not increased. Likewise, the margin of safety as defined in the TS is not reduced.
| |
| .c ECN P3069 Modification to CS Instrumentation - Unit 2 1 Description This modification replaced non-environmentally qualified FSV-75-57 and FSV-75-58 with environmentally qualified equipment. This is to comply with NRC IE Bulletin 79-018.
| |
| Safety Evaluation This modification increases t'he reliability of the FSVs by replacing the non-environmentally qualified valves with qualified valves. Furthermore' ,
| |
| no functional changes have been made by this modification as the replacement valves are equivalent to the replaced valves. Therefore, the margin of safety has not been reduced.
| |
| ECN P3085 Modification to HPCI Instrumentation - Unit 2 Description l This modification replaced non-environmentally qualified PS-73-1A and PS-73-1B with environmentally qualified equipment. This is to comply with NRC IE Bulletin 79-018.
| |
| Safety Evaluation This modification increases the reliability of the PSs by replacing the non-environmentally qualified PSs with qualified PSs. Furthermore, no '
| |
| functional changes have been made by this modification and all other qualifications of the new switches will meet or exceed the qualifications of the old switches. Therefore, the margin of safety has not been reduced.
| |
| l ECN P3087 Modification to HPCI Level Switches (LS) - Unit 2 l
| |
| Description This modification replaced non-environmentally qualified LS-73-57A and LS-73-578 with environmentally qualified equipmont. This is to comply with NRC IE Bulletin 79-018.
| |
| 1 l
| |
| 136
| |
| )
| |
| i
| |
| | |
| ECN P3087 (Continued)
| |
| Safety Evaluation This modification increases the reliability of the LSs by replacing the non-environmentally qualified LSs with qualified LSs. Furthermore, no functional-changes have been made by this modification and all other qualifications of the new switches will meet or exceed the qualifications of the old switches. Therefore, the margin of safety has not been reduced.
| |
| ECN P3092 Modification to RHR Flow Indicating Switches (FISs) - Unit 2 Description This modification replaced non-environmentally qualified FIS-74-50 and FIS-74-64 with environmentally qualified equipment. This is to comply with NRC IE-Bulletin 79-018.
| |
| Safcty Evaluation This modification increases the reliability of the FISs by replacing the non-environmentally qualified FISs with qualified FISs. Furthermore, no functional changes have been made by this modification and all other.
| |
| qualifications of the new switches will meet or exceed the qualifications of the old switches. Therefore, the margin of safety has not been reduced.
| |
| ECN P3098 Modification to CS Instrumentation - Unit 2 Description This modification replaced non-environmentally qualified instrumentation with environmentally qualified instrumentation. This is to comply with NRC IE Bulletin 79-018.
| |
| Safety Evaluation This modification increases the reliability of the instrumentation by replacing non-environmentally qualified FISs with quallfled flow elements and flow switches. Furthermore, no functional changes have been made by this modification and the replacement instrument's qualifications meet or exceed those of the old instruments. Therefore, the margin of safety has not been reduced.
| |
| ECN P3106 Modification to CAD Flow Transmitters (FTs) - Unit 2 Description This modification replaces non-environmentally qualified FT-84-19 and FT-84-20 with environmentally qualified equipment. This is to comply with NRC IE Bulletin 79-018.
| |
| 137
| |
| | |
| ECN P3106 (Continued)
| |
| Safety Evaluation This modification increases the reliability of the FTs by replacing non-environmentally qualified FTs with qualified FTs. Furthermore, no functional changes have been made by this modification and all other qualifications of the new transmitters will meet or exceed the qualifications of the old transmitters. Therefore, the margin of safety has not been reduced.
| |
| ECN P3112 Modification to MS Equipment - Unit 2 Description This modification replaced the non-environmentally qualified DC motors of FCV-1-55 and FCV-1-56 with environmentally qualified DC motors. This is to comply with NRC IE Bulletin 79-01B.
| |
| Safety Evaluation This modification increases the reliability of the DC motors and thus, the FCVs, by replacing non-environmentally qualified DC motors with qualified DC motors. Furthermore, no functional changes have been made by this modification and all other qualifications of the new DC motors will meet or exceed the qualifications of the old DC motors. Therefore, the margin of safety has not been reduced.
| |
| ECN P3113 Modification to Reactor Recirculation Equipment - Unit 2 Description This modification replaced the existing non-environmentally qualified actuators on FCV-68-3 and FCV-68-79 with new environmentally qualified actuators. This is to comply with NRC IE Bulletin 79-018.
| |
| Safety Evaluation This modification increases the reliability of the actuators and thus, the FCVs, by replacing non-environmentally qualified actuators with qualified actuators. Furthermore, no functional changes have been made by this modification and all other qualifications of the new actuators will meet or exceed the qualifications of the old actuators. Therefore, the margin of safety has not been reduced.
| |
| 138
| |
| | |
| ECN P3114 Modification to RWCU Components - Unit 2 Description This modification replaced certain non-environmentally qualified components including motors, limit switches, torque switches, and grease
| |
| -fittings in the valve operators for FCV-69-1 and FCV-69-2 with environmentally quallfled components. This is to comply with NRC IE Bulletin 79-018.
| |
| Safety Evaluation This modification increases the reliability of the valve _ operators because the non-environmentally qualified components have been replaced by environmentally quallfled components. Furtheranore, no functional changes have been made by this modification and all other qualifications of the'new' components will meet or exceed the qualifications of the old components. Therefore, the margin of safety has not been reduced.
| |
| P3117' Modification of RHR Equipment - Unit 2 D'escription The modifications performed under this ECN were performed to comply with NRC IE Bulletin 79-01B by replacing components of FCV limitorque
| |
| -operators as required. The modification replaced electric motor brakes on various valves and replaced the limit switch on FCV 74-48 to meet environmental qualifications.
| |
| Safety Evaluation This modification increases the reliability of the equipment by making the equipment environmentally qualified for its environment.
| |
| Furthermore, the new equipment will meet the same requirements and perform the same function as the old equipment. Therefore,.the margin of safety has not been reduced.
| |
| ECN P3118 Modification to CS Equipment - Unit 2 Description The modifications performed under this ECN were performed to comply with NRC IE Bulletin 79-018 by replacing components of FCV limitorque operators as required. The modification replaced limitorque motor brakes on various valves to meet environmental qualifications.
| |
| 139
| |
| | |
| ECN P3118 (Continued)
| |
| Safety Evaluation This modification increases the reliability of the equipment by replacing
| |
| 'non-environmentally qualified equipment with environmentally qualified equipment. Furthermore, this modification does not alter the function or performance requirements of the equipment. Therefore, the margin of safety has not been reduced.
| |
| ECN P3135 Replace Isolation. Valves in H20 Panels 25-340 and 25-341
| |
| - Unit 2 Description This modification replaces the non-environmentally qualified isolation valves on panels 25-340 and 25-341 with environmentally quallfled isolation valves. This is to comply with NRC IE Bulletin 79-01B.
| |
| Safety Evaluation This modification increases the reliability of'the isolation valves because the replacement valves are environmentally qualified whereas the old isolation valves are not qualified. Furthermore, no functional changes to the isolation valves have been made by this modification.
| |
| Therefore, the margin of safety has not been reduced.
| |
| ECN P3138 Modification to RHR Components - Unit 2 Description This modification replaced the non-qualified RHR pump room cooler fan motors with motors that meet the environmental and seismic qualifications for the reactor building. This is to comply with NRC IE Bulletin 79-018.
| |
| Safety Evaluation This modification increases the reliability of the motors because the new motors are environmentally and seismically qualified. Furthermore, this modification does not change the function or capabilities of the RHR room coolers. Therefore, the margin of safety has not been reduced.
| |
| ECN P3139 Modification to CS Components - Unit 2 Description This modification replaced the non-qualified CS pump room cooler fan motors with motors that meet the environmental and seismic qualifications for the reactor building. This is to comply with NRC IE Bulletin 79-018.
| |
| i 140
| |
| | |
| I I
| |
| ECN P3139 (Continued) j 1
| |
| Safety Evaluation l
| |
| l This modification increases the reliability of the motors because the new I
| |
| motors are environmentally and seismically qualified. Furthermore, this t modification does not change the function or capabilities of the CS room coolers. Therefore, the margin of safety has not been reduced.
| |
| l ECN P3140 Modification to Primary Containment Components - Unit 2 I
| |
| l Description This modification replaced non-environmentally qualified FSV 64-31 and FSV 64-34 with environmentally qualified FSVs. Also, the interconnecting cables from the power supply to the FSVs was replaced with qualified cable and the required Raychem splices. This is to comply with NRC IE Bulletin 79-018.
| |
| Safety Evaluation This modification increased the reliability of FSV-64-31 and FSV-64-34 because the non-environmentally qualified valves were replaced with environmentally qualified valves. Furthermore, no functional changes have been made by this modification and all other qualifications of the new FSVs will meet or exceed the qualifications of the old FSVs.
| |
| Therefore, the margin of safety has not been reduced.
| |
| ECN P3142 Addition of Reactor Feedwater System Instruments - Unit 2 Description This modification adds pressure indicators PI-3-74A and PI-3-748, and their associated cables (3ES19I and 2ES2522II), conduits, and supports to the feedwater system. This is to comply with NRC IE Bulletin 79-01B.
| |
| Safety Evaluation The instrurrents were procured seismic Class I. The instruments and conduit supports were mounted to meet seismic Class I requirements. The instruments and cables are environmentally qualified. Therefore, the new instrumentation will not degrade the performance of pressure loops P-3-74A and P-3-74B under conditions of a DBA. Thus, the margin of safety has not been reduced.
| |
| 141
| |
| | |
| ECN P3145 Plant Wide Modification to Prevent Motsture Intrusion - Unit 2 Description The_ modifications performed under this ECN were performed to comply with NRC IE Bulletin 79-01B for equipment and/or devices susceptible to moisture intrusion through the conduit entrances, by providing conduit seals or disabling cable where practical. In' addition, to support the conduit seal installation, rework of conduit and support brackets and the addition of junction boxes was required.
| |
| Safety Evaluation This modification increases the reliability of the equipment being served by the conduit by preventing moisture intrusion into the equipment.
| |
| Also, the modification performed under this ECN will not change the function or operability of the equipment being served. Therefore, the margin of safety has not been reduced.
| |
| ECN P3154 Modification to Primary Containment System Equipment - Unit 2 Description The scope of this ECN is to replace FSV 64-20 and FSV 64-21 with valves that are environmentally qualified per the requirements of 10CFR50.49.
| |
| Safety Evaluation The replacement valves will function the same as the old valves. The new valves will be environmentally quallfled and meet or exceed all other qualification requirements of the old valves. This'ECN will not adversely affect the operation of the system. Therefore, the margin of safety will not be reduced.
| |
| 142
| |
| | |
| ECN P3157 Modification to 480V Shutdown Transformers TS2A and TS2B - Unit 2 Description This modification installed cover plates on the 480V shutdown transformer's (TS2A and TS28) bus connection boxes. This is to comply with NRC IE Bulletin 79-018.
| |
| Safety Evaluation This modification sealed the bus boxes to ensure that the 480V shutdown transformers are environmentally qualified which increases the reliability of the equipment. The installed cover panels do not affect any venting requirements of the transformer and the functionality of the transformer has not been altered by this modification. Therefore, the margin of safety has not been reduced.
| |
| ECN P3163 NRC IE Bulletin 79-01B Drywell Cable Replacement - Unit 2 Description This modification replaced cables in Unit 2 drywell to comply with NRC IE Bulletin 79-01B requirements. The replacement cables meet the seismic loadings, cable ratings, fire loadings, etc. required by design.
| |
| Safety Evaluation The margin of safety has not been reduced since the replacement cables meet all design requirements.
| |
| ECN P3164 Replacement of Non-Qualified Wiring (Unit Wide) - Unit 2 ,
| |
| Description The total scope of this ECN is to replace the internal wires on limitorque IE motor valve operators identified as having internal wiring which cannot be shown to be qualified. This replacement is being performed to comply with NRC IE Bulletin 79-018. The scope of work performed in calendar year 1988 was the replacement of existing internal wiring on various system valves with #14 ANG wire.
| |
| 143
| |
| | |
| ECN P3164 (Continued)
| |
| Safety Evaluation The replacement cable is qualified for harsh environments. .Also, the function.of the replacement cable is the same as the old cable. All other qualifications of the old cable are being met by the replacement cable. Furthermore, the operation and function of the equipment serviced by.the replacement cable has not been altered by this modification.
| |
| Therefore, the margin of safety has not been reduceo.
| |
| ECN P3165 Plant Wide Cable Sampling Program - Unit 0 Description This modification replaces and/or splices cables where cables have been removed for use in an environmental qualification sampling program. This program is to comply with NRC IE Bulletin 79-01B.
| |
| Safety Evaluation The replacem'ent cables and splices are Class IE and qualified to the requirements of 10CFR50.49. . Analyses have been performed to ensure that the replacement cables and splices do not adversely affect the safety of the plant. 1he function and operation of the equipment serviced by these replacements have not been altered by this modification. Therefore, the margin of safety has not been reduced.
| |
| ECN P3170 Modification to Move Cables to Mild Environment - Unit 2 Description The scope of the modifications performed in accordance with this ECN is to remove Class IE cables from terminal blocks located in harsh environments and to reconnect the terminal ends of the cables together using environmentally qualified cable splices. The scope of work also included the addition of two junction boxes and the installation and painting of supports.
| |
| Safety Evaluation The ECN work eliminates potential current leakage problems in low voltage Class 1E circuits terminated in harsh environments. The affected cables perform the same function after tLe change as before. The function and operation of the equipment serviced by the affected cables are not altered by this modification. All supports are seismically supported.
| |
| Therefore, the margin of safety has not been reduced.
| |
| 144
| |
| | |
| ECN P3180 Modification to Primary Containment Electrical Penetrations - Unit 2 Description The modifications performed by this ECN are the replacement of existing primary containment electrical penetrations EB, EC, and EE with qualified penetrations, the relocation of safety-related circuits from penetration EB to penetration nozzle X-105A, and the relocation of radiation detactor RE-90-272 A2 from nozzle X-105A to nozzle XO43A.
| |
| Safety Evaluation This modification installs envirorrentally qualified equipment. The function and operation of the equipment serviced by the modified items will not be altered by this modification. The radiation detector is for monitoring only and serves no safety function. This ECN has no affect on i the TS. Therefore, the margin of safety has not been reduced. j 1
| |
| ECN P3187 Modification to Primary Containment Instrumentation - Unit 2 .-
| |
| Description This modification replaces pressure transmitters PT-64-160A and PT-64-160B, Rosemount Model 1153 Series A with Rosemount 1154GP (or engineering approved equals). This is an upgrade to comply with NUREG 0578, 0588, and Regulatory Guide 1.97.
| |
| Safety Evaluation This modification provides upgraded pts that meet IEEE standards that have more stringent testing requirements than previously required. The function of these instruments has not been altered by this modification.
| |
| Therefore the margin of safety has not been reduced.
| |
| ECN P3202 Modification to RCIC Equipment - Unit 2 Description This modification replaces non-environmentally aualified FSV-71-6A, FSV-71-68, FSV-71-7A, and FSV-71-78 with environmentally qualified FSVs.
| |
| This is to comply with the requirements of 10CFR50.49.
| |
| Safety Evaluation This modification increases the reliability of the FSVs because the nev valves are environmentally qualified whereas the old valves are not.
| |
| However, the function of the FSVs has not been altered by this modification. Therefore, the margin of safety has not been reduced.
| |
| 14E
| |
| | |
| ECN P3204 Modification to CAD Instruments - Unit 2 Description The modifications performed under the scope of this ECN are the replacement of the internal position switches for the target rock solenoid valves 2-FSV-84-8A, 2-FSV-84-88, 2-FSV-84-8C, and 2-FSV-84-8D, with switches environmentally qualified to the requirements of 10CFR50.49. Also, the repair of cable insulation on cable going to position switches on 2-FSV-84-8A was perfornied. )
| |
| )
| |
| 1 Safsty Evaluation
| |
| {
| |
| This modification increases the reliability of the position switches because the new position switches are environmentally qualified whereas the old switches were not. Also, this modification did not alter the L function of the equipment affected by this change. Therefore, the margin of safety has not been reduced.
| |
| ECNF[205 Modification to Containment Inerting System (CIS) Equipment - Unit 2 Description The scope of the modifications performed under this ECN is to provide drawings and calculations that qualify H 20 sample lines from panels 2-25-340 and 2-25-341. This includes installation, modification, and/or removal of supports, replacement of sample lines, installation of piping, removal and capping of the oxygen line, removal of conduit and cables,_
| |
| and testing.
| |
| Safety Evaluation This modification does not affect the ability to monitor hydrogen and oxygen simultaneously and redundantly, nor is the operation of the CAM system degraded by this modification. Therefore, the margin of safety has not been reduced.
| |
| ECN P3219 Modification to Delete / Abandon ECN P3148 - Unit 2 Description The scope of the modification performed under this ECN is to remove or abandon in place portions of ECN P3148.
| |
| I Safety Evaluation All abandoned portions do not affect the operation or function of the Unit 2 SDBD room HVAC system. The miscellaneous changes (deletion of loadshed cables and junction boxes, add hangers, etc.) do not affect plant operation. The removal of equipment per this ECN does not adversely affect plant operation. Therefore, the margin of safety has not been reduced.
| |
| 146
| |
| | |
| l ECN P3204 Modification to CAD Instruments - Unit 2 Description The modifications performed under the scope of this ECN are the replacement of the internal position switches for the target rock solenoid valves 2-FSV-84-8A, 2-FSV-84-88, 2-FSV-84-8C, and 2-FSV-84-8D, with switches environmentally qualified to the requirements of l 10CFR50.49. Also, the repair of cable insulation on cable going to ,
| |
| position switches on 2-FSV-84-8A was performed.
| |
| Safety Evaluation This modification increases the reliability of the position switches because the new position switches are environmentally qualified whereas the old switches were not. Also, this modification did not alter the function of the equipment affected by this change. Therefore, the margin of safety has not been reduced.
| |
| ECN P3205 Modification to Containment Inerting System (CIS) Equipment - Unit 2 description The scope of the modifications performed under this ECN is to provide drawings and calculations that qualify H 02 2 sample lines from panels 2-25-340 and 2-25-341. This includes installation, modification, and/or removal of supports, replacement of sample lines, installation of piping, removal and capping of the oxygen line, removal of conduit and cables, and testing.
| |
| Safety Evaluatig This modification does not affect the ability to monitor hydrogen and oxygen simultaneously and redundantly, nor is the operation of the CAM system degraded bi this modification. Therefore, the margin of safety has not been reduced.
| |
| ECN P3219 Modification to Delete / Abandon ECN P3148 - Unit 2 Description The scope of the modification performed under this ECN is to remove or abandon in place portions of ECN P3148.
| |
| Safety Evaluation All abandoned portions do not affect the operation or function of the Unit 2 SDBD room HVAC system. The miscellaneous changes (deletion of loadshed cables and junction boxes, add hangers, etc.) do not affect plant operation. The removal of equipment per this ECN does not adversely affect plant operation. Therefore, the margin of safety has not been reduced.
| |
| 146
| |
| | |
| ECN P5016 (Continued)
| |
| Safety Evaluation The modification which removed the snubber support bracket from the recirculation pump discharge line is supported by calculations for seismic integrity. The changes identified for documentation were evaluated in the USQD for ECN Ll633. The function of this system and its ability to perform.its function has not changed. Therefore, the margin of, safety has not been reduced.
| |
| ECN P5040 Modification to Access Doors - Unit 3 Description This modification changes the door swing direction for doors 186 and 190. This modification was performed in the interest of personnel safety. The doors originally opened into stairwells but after reversing the door swing, now open into rooms.
| |
| Safety Evaluation .
| |
| This modification,1 eliminates a personnel hazard. However, no TS is affected. Therefore, the margin of safe ~cy has not been reduced.
| |
| ECN P5049 Modification to RBCCW Equipment - Unit 2 Description This modification upgrades the structural integrity of the RBCCW on-line radiation shielding box and supports, and provides clearance between the vertical support for the radiation monitor shield and the exterior drywell wall.
| |
| Safety Evaluation
| |
| [ This modification is an upgrade in that the radiation shielding box and l
| |
| l Its supports are now designed to ensure that the seismic qualification of
| |
| .the RBCCW system can be maintained and that no other safety-related equipment will be damaged by an earthquake. However, no TS is affected by this change. Therefore, the margin of safety is not reduced.
| |
| ECN P5077 Modification to Control Air System Equipment - Unit 0 Description This modification replaces FCV-32-37A and FCV-32-37B with two 2* valves (for each replaced valve) placed in parallel. This :nfiguration will ensure that the required air flow is supplied.
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| 148
| |
| | |
| ~
| |
| ECN P3221 Modification to RWCU Equipment - Unit 2 Description This modification replaced the non-verifiable amphenol mounting connectors.in Fenwal temperature switches TS-69-29J through TS-69-29M with qualified componcots including grommets (or rubber bushing's). This is to comply with the requirement of 10CFR50.49.
| |
| Safety Evaluation This modification incre'ases the reliability of the switches because the replacement components will ensure the environmental qualification of the temperature switches. The function of these switches has not been altered by this modification. Therefore the margin of safe:y has'not been reduced.
| |
| ECN~P3225 Modification to RWCU Equipment.- Unit 2 Description
| |
| ~ This modification replaced the existing internal wiring, terminal blocks, and Raychem tubing-in Fenwal temperature switches TS-69-29J through TS-69-29M and TS-69-30A through TS-69-30H with environmentally qua11 fled-replacements. This is to comply with the requirements of 10CFR50.49.
| |
| Safety Evaluation This modification increases the reliability of the switches because the use of environmentally qualified components will eliminate potential current problems in low voltage Class 1E circuits which are terminated in harsh environments. Furthermore, this modification has not changed the function of these switches. Therefore, the margin of safety has not been reduced.
| |
| ECN P5016 Documentation of and Modification to Recirculation System Equipment - Unit 2 Description This modification documents and as-constructs the changes made by ECN 1.1633 which removed the four inch pipe and valves that bypass valves FCV-68-3 and FCV-68-79, removed the snubber support assembly, and installed caps on the four inch weldolets. This modification also removed the snubber support brackets from the recirculation pump discharge line.
| |
| 147
| |
| | |
| ECN P5077 (Continued)
| |
| Safety Evaluation This modification changed the. piping configuration to allow installation of the parallel valves. However, since the control air system is not safety-related and not required to mitigate the effects of a DBA, no adverse affect on the system operation has been caused by this modification. The TS is not affected. The margin of safety.has not been reduced.
| |
| I ECN P5079 Revise Drawings to Show As-Constructed Configuration of EECH System
| |
| - Unit 1 Description This.ECN revises design drawings to reflect the as-constructed status of the " keep-full" line from the RCW at the point of connection with the EECW system. Drawings 47H451-5 and 47H859-1 are revised to reverse the -
| |
| positions of check valve 0-67-679 and globe valve 0-67-680 and to show the as-constructed routing of the one. inch " keep-full" line. .
| |
| Safety Evaluation The design document changes provided for by this ECN will have no effects on the safety of the plant. The " keep-full" function is not safety-related and the change does not involve any physical change to either system. The reversal of the valve positions and the as-constructed pipe routing shall be evaluated as part of the IEB 79-14 program.
| |
| ECN P5122 Modify High Pressure Fire Protection (HPFP) System - Unit 0 Description This modification "as-constructed" the drawing series 47H836 and 47H850 to reflect deluge valve trim piping rearrangements, pressure sensor relocations, elimination of local flow elements and local pressure indications, and elimination or relocation of fire hydrants. In addition, valve marker tags were fabricated and installed. This allowed closure of this ECN.
| |
| Safety Evaluation i The documentation changes and valve tagging will not provide additional modes of failure. Documenting the "as-constructed" status of the equipment will provide an accurate base of technical knowledge on which to base future design or operations. The physical work done will not impact the existing margin of safety as defined in any TS.
| |
| l 149
| |
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| ECN P5138 Change Power Feed to Radiation Monitor 1-RE-90-251 - Unit 1 Description The turbine building roof exhaust vent particulate monitors 1-RE-90-250 and 1-RE-90-251 were both fed from breaker 208 on unit I circuit breaker board 9-9. Due to the increased horsepower ratings of the suction pump motors in the radiation monitors, monitor 1-RE-90-251 is being removed from breaker 208 and being connected to previously spare breaker 235 which has been increased from 15 amps to 20 amps on the same circuit breaker board.
| |
| Safety Evaluation The change will not affect the ability of the radiation monitors to operate as-designed, but will decrease the likelihood of an unnecessary breaker trip. Both monitors remain powered from the same Class IE power sources and no new or different loads are being added. Therefore, the margin of safety has not been reduced.
| |
| ECN P5167 As-Construct Turbine and Reactor Building Control Air System flow Drawings - Unit 2 ;
| |
| Description Unit 2 turbine and reactor building control air system flow diagrams were revised to reflect as-constructed configuration. All changes are minor additions, deletions, or distribution rearrangements. No changes were made to safety-related portions of the control air system.
| |
| Safety Evaluation No changes were made to safety-related portions of the control air system except clarifying one valve tag marker which will have no adverse effect on any safety-related system. Thus, the margins of stfety are unchanged.
| |
| ECN P5170 Revise Drawings to Show Rod Position Information System (RPIS)
| |
| Storage Racks - Unit 3 D_escription i Revised drawings to locate RPIS storage racks on elevation 565' in the unit 3 reactor building. The rack is used to hold spare RPIS probes.
| |
| Calculations were performed to seismically qualify the RPIS storage rack.
| |
| 150
| |
| | |
| ECN P5170 (Continued)
| |
| Safety Evaluation The RPIS probe storage rack has no safety-related function. The storage rack is used to hold spare RPIS probes. The rack meets seismic qualifications. The probability of occurrence or the consequence of an accident of malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated is not created, nor is the margin of safety reduced.
| |
| ECN P5190 Radwaste System Highpoint Vent Valve - Units 1, 2, 3 Description Design drawings were revised to add the radwaste system highpoint vent valve to the as-constructed configuration. This change is complete for units 1, 2, and 3.
| |
| Safety Evaluation This modification improves the performance of the radwaste system. No safety-related systems are affected by this change. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the TS is not reduced.
| |
| ECN P5198 Containment Purge and Vacuum Relief Bushing and Seal Design
| |
| - Unit 2 Description The bushing and seal design was changed for unit 2 valves FCV 64-17, -18,
| |
| -19, -20, -21, -29, -30, -31, -32, -33, and -34. As-constructed valve dimensions and valve part numbers were incorporated on valve drawings.
| |
| This change is due to the vendor no longer supplying replacement parts.
| |
| Safety Evaluation I
| |
| The valves will perform the same safety-related function. The modified valves meet the same requirements (i.e. leak rate, closure time, seismic, etc.) as the replaced valves. Based v.i this, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any TS is not reduced.
| |
| ECN PS210 Radiation Monitoring Drawing Discrepancies - Unit 3 Description ECN P5210 rectifies drawing discrepancies by correcting the annunciator legends for unit 3 radiation alarms RA-90-131B and RA-90-132. These changes provide the correct description of the intended function of these radiation alarms.
| |
| 151 l
| |
| | |
| 1 ECN P5210 (Continued)
| |
| Safety Evaluation These changes do not affect the function or operation of any system or component. This change does not reduce the margin of safety.
| |
| ECN PS213 HPCI and RCIC Containment Isolation Valves - Units 1, 2, 3 Description This change modifies the bonnet flange on stop check valves HCV-71-32 and HCV-73-24 to provide a means to test the bonnet to valve body flange joints which are a part of the LLRT program. This ECN was completed for unit 3. The modification had been previously implemented on unit 2 and is unimplemented for unit 1.
| |
| Safety Evaluation Because the valves perform a containment isolation function, they must be tested as a part of the LLRT program. Performing this modification enables LLRT of the valves which ensures that the valves safety function will be satisfied. Pressure boundary, structural integrity, and seismic qualification were verified. Based on this, the margin of safety has not been reduced.
| |
| ECN P5215 Reactor Water Recirculation Repair Weld - Unit 2 Description A full structu;al overlay repair weld was dasigned and implemented to repair a throughwall crack (IGSCC) at weld joint GR-2-15 in the recirculation system Loop A. The final repaired condition was evaluated to ensure integrity of the repaired joint.
| |
| Safety Evaluation The as-constructed configuration of the structural overlay weld was evaluated to ensure that it met NRC and ASME requirements for seismic Class 1 requirements, pressure boundary, temperature, dead weight, thermal and dynataic movements ar.d stresses, and induced loads. Based on the actual physical axial shrinkage caused by the weld Overlay, these requirements have been met and the margin of safety has not been reduced.
| |
| 152
| |
| | |
| i
| |
| ~ECN P5227 Control Room Emergency Pressurization - Unit 0 Description l
| |
| l Design drawings were revised to reflect existinq manual flow-control dampers between the charcoal filter and the fan on the emergency pressurization units A & B. Identification numtvrs were.usigned to the dampers and identification tags were fabricated and 1,: stalled on them.
| |
| Safety Evaluation Design drawings were revised to reflect as-built configuration of the plant. .It has been verified that the dampers are seismic Class 1. Since the system has not been degraded, the margin of safety has not been reduced.
| |
| ECN P5232 Recirculation System Bushing Replacement - Unit 2 Description Some of the double fracture self aligning log ball bearing bushing's were !
| |
| replaced with single fracture type bushing's. The components involved are'the. recirculation snubber lug bushing's for snubbers 55-5, 55-7, and 55-8. The vendor no longer manufactures double fracture bushing's.
| |
| Safety Evaluation The replacement bushing's have structural qualities that are equal to or better than the existing bushing's. The difference in fracture type has no adverse affect on the lug bushing's ability to perform its intended function. The margin of safety is not reduced.
| |
| ECN PS244 4160-480V Transformer Liquid Containment Barrier Enlargement
| |
| - Unit 0 Description This ECN provides for enlarging the liquid containment barriers for three nonsafety 4160-480V transformers located at elevation 550' of the intake pumping station. This modification was required to comply with Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulations which require 11guld ,
| |
| containment barriers to hold 110 percent of the transfumer 11guld {
| |
| volume.
| |
| l Safety Evaluation The modification was done to comply with EPA regulation and does not affect nuclear safety. Calculations performed conclude that the component parts used to enlarge the liquid containment barriers are structurally adequate.
| |
| 153 I
| |
| | |
| ECN 95250 HPCI and Reactor Feedwater Inverters - Unit 2
| |
| ' Description The low input voltage trip setpoint of HPCI and reactor feedwater inverters were reduced from 200 VDC to 185 VDC to eliminate the possibility of worst case voltage transients shutting down the inverters. i Safety Evaluation This . modification does not change any circuits, equipment, or methods of performing design functions. Tests were performed to verify that the inverter's output voltage satisfied system requirements when input voltage was at the minimum low input voltage trip setpoint. The margin of safety was not reduced.
| |
| ECN PS251 Revise the HPCI and RCIC Turbine Speed Controls - Unit 1, 2, 3 Description TVA and vendor drawings were revised to show the correct wiring configuration for HPCI and RCIC turbine speed controls. Vendor supplied cable. that have cracked insulation were replaced with TVA cables.
| |
| Safety Evaluation Revising design drawings to show the correct wiring configuration resulted in no subsequent physical changes in the plant. The replat.ement cables meet the necessary design requirements. Based on this, the margin of safety was not reduced.
| |
| ECN PS257 Replace LS in Radwaste System - Unit 2 Description Previous flood level switch LS-77-25B, Robert Shaw Model 351, was replaced with a Robert Shaw Model 352. Hiring diagram drawings were revised and issued to show correct electrical connections for the new switch. Seismic calculations were performed which established that the components seismic qualifications were satisfied.
| |
| Safety Evaluation The new switch performs the si.me functions as the previous switch and meets the same qualifications. The margin of safety has not been reduced.
| |
| 154 i
| |
| I
| |
| [
| |
| _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ J
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| | |
| ECN P5266 'SGTS Transmitter Replacement - Units 1, 2, 3 Description Obsolete Fisher Porter transmitters were replaced with Rosemount transmitters. The seismic requirements for these transmitters were changed per this ECN to Class II.
| |
| Safety Evaluation The new Rosemount transmitters perform the same functions as the obsolete transmitters and are qualified to seismic Class II requirements. The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any TS is not reduced.
| |
| ECN P5269 Demineralized Water Supply Line Replacement - Unit 2 Description This ECN removci the. existing carbon steel demineralized water supply line to the narrow range torus water level transmitters LT-64-54 and LT-64-66, and install.ed a new uninterruptible source stainless steel supply line. The ECN also installed the associated pipe supports.
| |
| Safety Evaluation This modification replaced existing piping with piping less susceptible to degradation, thus improving the reliability and availability of demineralized water to the torus water level transmitters. The level transmitters affected by this change still function and operate in the same manner. The margin of safety has not been reduced.
| |
| ECN P5281 Flamemastic Documentation Only Change - Unit 0 Description This documentation only change removes the design requirement to apply flamemastic fire resistant coatings on IEEE 383 cables installed in open cable trays.
| |
| Safety Evaluation f
| |
| i This documentation change will not provide additional modes of failure.
| |
| Documenting the reduction of this design requirement will provide an accurate base of technical knowledge on which to base future design work. No physical work was done to any system which could impact any actual margin of safety already built into plant equipment. {
| |
| 3
| |
| )
| |
| i 155
| |
| | |
| L I
| |
| l l ECN P5291 Modify Reactor Water Level Instrument Sensing Lines - Unit 2 Description l
| |
| This change includes providing isometric drawings of the reactor vessel ,
| |
| level sensing lines from nozzles N11A, N118, N12A, and N12B to. l penetrations X-28A, X-28B, X-29A, and X-298, performing seismic analyses 1 of existing line supports, and redesigning / installing new supports.
| |
| Safety Evaluation This modification is to document an "as-constructed" condition. The "as-constructed" configuration has been evaluated to determine that it meets seismic Class I requirements. Changes have been made, where necessary, to ensure seismic qualification of the instrument sensing lines. All changes have been made using approved standards and methods.
| |
| Therefore, the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the SAR is not created.
| |
| ECN P5301 Replace CS FSV-75-26 & FSV-75 Unit 2 Description This modification replaces the existing ASCO test solenoid valves which are used to test CS's testable check valve by lifting the disc off its seat to demonstrate free movement of the valve disc. The original valve model is obsolete and no longer available. The intent of the replacement is only to provide a substitute of an equal or better design.
| |
| Safety Evaluation The substituted ASCO solenoid valves perform the same function as the i original valves. This is a surveillance function that is not required to remain operational for mitigation of accident conditions. However, they are designed not to fail in a manner that would result in the check valve disc closing when it is required to be open, or that would result in the disc opening against reverse flow. Based on this, the replacement valves perform the same functions as the original valves and do not affect plant safety.
| |
| ECN P5315 Modify PCIS Electrical Circuit - Unit 2 Description This modifica~ c ion eliminates a " sneak' circuit that prevents resetting the PCIS trip signal and allows a defeat of the isolation systems. The change revises the power supply wiring t,the Run Mode Bypass Switches (RMBS) 2-HS-64-24 and -25.
| |
| 4 156
| |
| | |
| ECN P5315 (Continued)
| |
| ]
| |
| Safety Evaluation )
| |
| )
| |
| Changing the RMBS power supply wiring to be in series with the PCIS logic i causes the RMBS to be tripped and disabled (stopping tne purge or inerting process) whenever a PCIS signal is present. This will ensure that the switches will no longer reset the PCIS trip signal and prevent the initiation of PCIS. This will eliminate the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the SAR.
| |
| ECN P5317 Modify Instrument Line Supports Inside Drywell - Unit 2 Description This modification replaces original supports with seismically qualified supports inside drywell penetrations X-27, X-30, X-31, X-32, X-33, X-34, X-40A,- X-408, X-40C, X-400, X-49, X-50, X-51 and X-52. These instrument lines affected 8 systems.
| |
| Safety Evaluation l This seismic upgrade of these instrument sensing lines will ensure their instruments can perform their safety function under seismic conditions. i The probability of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the SAR is not increased. j ECN P5322 Modify Control Room Emergency Pressurization System Dampers - Unit 0 Description This modification takes both of the connecting rods to the actuators on dampers FCO-31-151 and 31-152 and threads them so that lock nuts can be placed on occh side of the damper control swivels. The lock nuts prevent the rM s connecting the dampers to the actuators from detaching.
| |
| Safety Evaluation This change enhances the operation of these seismic units in that the lock nuts do not affect the functioa of the dampers and distribute the loading better than the original set screw design Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipmer;t important to safety is not increased.
| |
| ECN P5329 Reinstall RHR Supports - Unit 2 Description i This modification included providing design drawings with sufficient detail to permit the reinstallation of supports DRHR-H9, RHR 67, and RHR 69 that were removed for IGSCC pipe replacement.
| |
| 157
| |
| | |
| ~
| |
| i i
| |
| ECN P5329 (Continued)
| |
| Safety Evaluation Engineering calculations were made to verify the structural integrity of the supports. These supports remain qualified to meet seismic criteria for Class 1 structures. Therefore, they do not degrade the RHR system.
| |
| Consequently, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated la the SAR is not increased.
| |
| ECN P5331 Evaluate As-Constructed Battery Rack - Unit 0 Description This modification reviewed the as-installed battery. racks shown on drawing 45N958, made engineering calculations to verify acceptable seismic requirements, and made modifications to anchorages, as required.
| |
| Safety Evaluation This modification upgrades and verifles the battery racks and panels meet the design requirements for seismic criteria in a Class 1 structure.
| |
| Qualifying the battery racks will not affect the function or operation of any equipment described in any TS. The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any TS is not reduced.
| |
| ECN PST. Modify High Pressure Auxiliary Steam Line Hanger - Unit 2 Description This modification redesigned high pressure auxiliary steam line hanger number HPAS-H-4 to eliminate interferences between the hanger and piping installed in the area. Reinstalling the pipe hanger allowed closure of this ECN.
| |
| Safety Evaluation The high pressure auxiliary steam line to the reactor feed pump turbines is not safety-related. The pipe to be supported is located iri the turbine building which is not a Class 1 structure. The piping in the vicinity of the support is not safety-related. The redesigned support will perform the same function as the old support. Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety is r.ot increased.
| |
| I 158
| |
| | |
| I ECN P5346 CAD Root Valves - Unit 0 Description This ECN was for documentation change only to as-construct TVA design drawings to agree with vendor drawings and the as-built configuration in the plant. The change deleted root valves 0-84-103 and 0-84-109 from TVA design documents. The as-built configuration was analyzed to ensure that it still met seismic Class 1 requirements. All work has been completed.
| |
| Safety Evaluation Removal of the valves from TVA design documents will not affect seismic qualification of the CAD system piping or the nitrogen storage and supply unit packages. The changes to TVA design documents will not degrade system reliability nor affect safe operation of the plant.
| |
| ECN P5361 HVAC Conduit Drawings - Unit 2 Description Conduits PLil15 an'd E51288-I which were previously embedded were rerouted exposed. The original cable types for PL1115 and E51288-I are now obsolete and have been replaced with qualified cable. Design drawings were updated to reflect new conduit routing and cable replacement.
| |
| Safety Evaluation i
| |
| The new cables perform the same function as the replaced cables and are routed in seismically qualified raceways. No TS is affected by this ,
| |
| change and the margin of safety has not been reduced.
| |
| ECN P5366 HPCI Piping Analysis - Unit 2 Description
| |
| 'he HPCI piping system was analyzed for the current seismic and pump estraint loadings. Pipe stress and support load evaluations were also l performed. As a result, support R-23 had two additional lugs installed and existing lugs modified to achieve symmetry for even load distribution !
| |
| to reduce f atigue and transient dainage. I 1
| |
| Safety Evaluation These analyses and modification: should ensure that the HPCI discharge piping and supports are suitable for the remaining life of the plant. l This will improve the safety function of the HPCI system by reducing fatigue and transient damage. The margin of safety has not been reduced.
| |
| I l
| |
| l l
| |
| l 159
| |
| | |
| ECN P5367 Provide' Mounting Details for the Installation of Temperature Element TE-80 Unit 2 Description This modification was to document a support detail for a TE located in the drywell area of the reactor building. The physical work for this period consisted of installing the drywell temperature support and relocating temperature probe TE-80-16.
| |
| Safety Evaluation Since the support detail was seismically analyzed and approved, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction is not increased. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any TS is not reduced.
| |
| ECN.P5379 Replace Cables Between Circuit Breakers and Panels.9-15 and 9-17
| |
| - Unit 0 -
| |
| Description This modification replaces a #6 AWG cable between the power supply circuit breaker and power busses to panels 9-15 and 9-17 with a #2 AWG cable. Physical work consisted of as-constructing the documentation package.
| |
| Safety Evaluation This documentation only change brings the design documents up-to-date and enhances the plant's operating abilities. The replacement of the existing cable with a larger size IE qualified cable reduces the possibility for an overcurrent condition between the panels and their power source. The replacement cable does not adversely affect the operation of the systems controlled by these panels. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any TS is not reduced.
| |
| ECN P5380 Replace Cables From Circuit Breakers to Panels 9-15 and 9-17
| |
| - Unit 0 Description This modification replaces a #6 AWG cable between circuit breaker SA-CBlA and 5A-CBIB and panels 9-15 and 9-17 with a #2 AWG cable. Physical work consisted of as-constructing the documentation.
| |
| Safety Evaluation This documentation upgrade enhances the plant's operating abilities. The replacement of the existing cable with a larger size IE qualified cable reduces the potential for an overcurrent condition between the panels and their power sources. The replacement cable does not adversely affect the operation of the systems controlled by these panels. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any TS is not reduced.
| |
| 160
| |
| | |
| i I
| |
| l
| |
| -ECN P5381 Modification to RPS Equipment - Unit 3 '
| |
| Description l The scope of this ECN is to provide the design for the replacement of #6 !
| |
| l AWG power cable routed with #2 AWG power cable in order to remove the potential for cable failure due to inadequate circuit protection.
| |
| Safety Evaluation l This ECN removes the potential problem of cable failure due to the calculated maximum circuit current being greater than the cable ampacity of the #6 AWG cable, by replacing it with #2 AWG cable. This ECN does not have &ay adverse affect on the function or operation of the equipment or system being serviced by this cable. Therefore, the margin of safety has not been reduced.
| |
| ECN P5388 and P5389 Modification to Reactor Building Battery Racks - Unit 0.
| |
| Description The ECN as-constructs anchorage details for the reactor building battery racks.
| |
| Safety Evaluation The as-constructed anchorage configuration does not affect the seismic qualification of the battery racks. The function and operation of the battery racks have not been adversely affected by this modification.
| |
| Therefore, the margin of safety has not been reduced.
| |
| ECN P5395 Modification of Supports for Chillers A and B Piping - Unit 0 Description This ECN modifies pipe supports for water chiller-A (CH-1) and chiller-B (CH-7) to allow chiller water outlet flange gasket replacement without cutting pipe supports.
| |
| Safety Evaluation This modification does not alter or adversely affect the function or operation of the system. The funr. tion of the modified pipe supports remain the same. The structural integrity of the pipe supports and piping system is supported by analysis. Therefore, the margin of safety .
| |
| has not been reduced.
| |
| 161 J
| |
| | |
| 1 ECN P5402 RHR and CS Cable Replacement - Unit 2 Description k
| |
| This ECN replaces' electrical cables (2ES 853-1, 2V2214, 2V2216, and l 2V2218) associated with the actuators and/or indicators used to verify ;
| |
| free movement of the valve discs for testable check valves FCV-75-26 and FCV-74-68. .This is required due to reorientation of the rod actuators.
| |
| Safety Evaluation The replacement cables are of equal or better qualification than the original cables. This replacement,will not affect the function or operation of RHR, CS, or any other system. Therefore, this modification will have no impact on safety.
| |
| ECN P5410 Reactor Building Overhead Crane Ladder Modification - Unit 3 Description This ECN modifies the horizontal support on the ladder used to access the cab of the reactor building overhead crane. The portion that interferes with personnel foot placement on the rungs has been removed.
| |
| Safety Evaluation An analysis has been performed to demonstrate the seismic integrity of the reactor building overhead crane with this modification. The ladder provides no nuclear safety function. This modification is for personnel safety only. Therefore, there is no impact on nuclear safety.
| |
| ECN P5411 Contract Engineering Office Modifications - Unit 0 Description This ECN provides potable water, fire protection, and sewage services to the contract engineering offices outside the plant boundary.
| |
| Safety Evaluation The potable water, fire protection, and sewage systems affected by this modification are not safety-ralated or inportant to scfety. This g modification has no impact on the f' unction or operation of any safety-related system. Thereiore, this mcdifichtlon has no impact on f plant safety.
| |
| 162
| |
| | |
| ECN P5431 Crack Repair on the RHR Motor Housing - Unit 2 Description s This ECN. repairs cracks on RHR pump 2B motor housing by bolting 3/8" plates to the motor housing and adding epoxy to the plates to provide uniform loading.
| |
| Safety Evaluation The incorporation of this ECN will enhance the structural integrity of the RHR pump motor housing and will not affect operation of the RHP pump. With this modification and the increased surveillance by maintenance to inspect for further crack propagation, there is no impact on safety.
| |
| ECN P5434 Suppression Chamber Narrow Range Water Level Instrument Modification
| |
| - Unit 2 Descr ption This'ECN includes modifications to suppression chamber narrow range level instrumentation LS-73-57A, LS-73-57B, LT-64-54 and LT-64-66 to meet the requirements of FSAR Appendix A and to enhance operation of this system.
| |
| Safety Evaluation This modification will not affect the function or operation of the suppression chamber water level instrumentation, the HPCI system suppression chamber high water level switches, or the primary containment system. Therefore, this modification does not affect safety.
| |
| ECN P5435 Drywell Floor Framing Steel Modification - Unit 2 Description This ECN modifies drywell floor framing structural steel connections and 4 connection details in order to provide sufficient load carrying capacity ]
| |
| such that the integrity of the drywell platform structural steel is maintained during a seismic event. This is required to accommodate loads that were added to the steel drywell platforms since the original structures were installed.
| |
| S_afety Evaluation l A seismic analysis has been performed to ensure that this modification will maintain the structural integrity of the drywell steel framing during a DBE as required by the bases of TS 5.6. Therefore, the margin of safety in the basis of the TS is not reduced.
| |
| 1 164
| |
| | |
| ECN P5412 Move Cables 2NM440-IIA and 2NM441-IIA - Unit 2 Description This ECN moves cables 2NH440-IIA and 2NM441-IIA from penetration BE connector 88/813 (identified as failed) to spare connector 24B/B24 on the same penetration.
| |
| Safety Evaluation This cable reconnection does not change cable routing or affect the function or operation of the neutron monitoring system or the local power-range monitor, or any other system. Therefore, this change has no affect on plant safety.
| |
| ECN P5413 RPS Control Switch Covers - Unit 2 Description This ECN adds covers to the RPS A&B MG set stop switches, the RPS A&B MG set voltage adjustment control, and the RPS A&B bus transfer switches to help prevent inadvertent bumping of the control switches by workmen.
| |
| Safety Evaluation The addition of these covers will not affect the function or operation of the RPS or the 250VDC power supply and distribution system. In addition, the seismic qualification of panel 9 of the 250VDC battery bcard 2 is not affected by this addition. Therefore, there is no impact on plant safety.
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| ECN P5429 Replace RHCU Pump Pullout Unit and Associated Equipment - Unit 2 Description This ECN replaces the R4CU pump pullout units and associated equipment l consisting of impeller, shaft, bearings, mechanical seal, housing, and' coupling. This will reduce the probability of failure of the pumps and thereby reduce the personnel exposure received during repair and maintenance.
| |
| Safety Evaluation The implementation of this ECN does not alter the original pressure boundary design of the RHCU system or the performance of the pump. In addition, all original calculations including seismic calculations remain valid. Therefore, the implementation of this ECN does not affect safety.
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| 163 ll s
| |
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| . i ECN P5438 Install Qualified Test. Boxes on Panels 9-42 and 9 Unit 2..
| |
| Description This modification installed permanent qualified test boxes at the rear of j panels 9-42 and 9-43. This modification facilitates- testing of the reactor building ventilation radiation monitoring system without -
| |
| interrupting the operability and availability of the system. Each test l box consists of three standard dual banana jacks with fuse blocks that electrically separate Class IE components from the test jacks.
| |
| Safety Evaluation 1
| |
| j j This modification did not make any functional changes to the reactor '
| |
| building ventilation radiation monitoring system. The test jacks are electrically isolated from the system. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in.the FSAR is not created. The change improves the safety and reliability of the !
| |
| system. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the TS is not reduced. -
| |
| ECN P5443 Revise Design Drawings to Reflect As-Built Configuration - Unit 2 Description This ECN revised design drawings to show the as-built conduit and cable configuration at junction boxes JB2756, JB2759, JB4872, and power supply 0-PX-90-271 on. elevation 599'-5" of the plant stack. There were no actual physical changes made. The revisions are related to the radiation monitoring system. No safety functions or safety systems have been i affected by these drawing revisions.
| |
| Safety Evaluation The affected portions of the radiation monitoring system do not provide any safety-related functions. Therefore, the possibility for an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different typt than any previously evaluated in the FSAR is not increased. No margin of safety as defined in the TS is reduced by these drawing revisions.
| |
| ECN P5444 Revise Architectural Drawings to Specify Acceptable Plant Coatings
| |
| - Unlic 0 Description This ECN is for documentation only. Architectural drawings were updated to specify the acceptable types of coatings that can be applied to the ,
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| various plant areas. This change ensures that only approved coating systems are installed in the appropriate areas of the plant. ;
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| l 165
| |
| | |
| ECN P5444 (Continued)
| |
| Safety Evaluation This change enhances plant design documentation on plant approved coatings. The use of approved coating systems in the plant will ensure that no plant feature is adversely affected. Therefore, the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR is not created. Likewise, the margin of safety defined in the TS is not reduced.
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| ECN P5451 Provide Pressure-Temperature Compensation for Mainstack Flow Instrumentation - Unit 0 Description This modification installed a new annubar flow element with temperature and pressure compensating devices to provide accurate flow readings at e the actual operating conditions of the radiation monitoring system. This instrumentation only provides indication of main stack flow.
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| ~
| |
| Safety Evaluation The installed instrumentation does not perform any safety-related function, nor is it required to prevent or mitigate any DBE. Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment previously evaluated in the FSAR is not increased. Likewise, the margin of safety defined in the TS is not reduced.
| |
| ECN P5461 Replace RHR Heat Exchanger 2B Tube Side Drain Expansion Bellows
| |
| - Unit 2 Description This modification installed the tube side drain expansion bellows of RHR heat exchanger 2B per the modified fillet weld and alternate installation detail described in this ECN. The vendor-supplied installation and fillet weld details were not constructible.
| |
| Safety Evaluation This modification does not change the reliability of the RHR system. The j reduction in fillet weld size did not structurally affect the operation j of the RHR system. The alternate installation detail for the tube side j drain expansion bellows does not affect the pressure boundary or function !
| |
| of the tube side drain line. Based on the above, this modification will j not increase the consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the i FSAR, nor will it reduce the margin of safety defined in the TS.
| |
| I 166
| |
| | |
| ECN P5474 Install Jumper Jacks in Panels 9-15 and 9 Unit 2 Description This modification installed jumper jacks with additional fuse protection in panels 9-15 and 9-17. These connectors will be used during Average Power Range Monitor (APRM) testing per SI 4.2.C-la to prevent accidental initiation of a half scram signal.
| |
| Safety Evaluation The reactor auto-scram logic channels are electrically isolated from the jumper jacks by fuses. Also, the jumpers will only be used during the APRM functional test, so the function of the APRMs is not altered by the change. Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR is not created.
| |
| Likewise, the margin of safety defined in the TS is not reduced.
| |
| ECN P5475 Replace Primary Containment Instrumentation - Unit 2 Description This modification removed the existing flow modifiers FM-64-37 and -38 and replaced the existing flow transmitters FT-64-37 and -38 with new ones that do not need flow modifiers.
| |
| Safety Evaluation The replacement transmitters meet the design functional and operational requirements of the existing transmitters. The new transmitters are qualified seismic Class II. Based on the above, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR is not increased. Likewise, the margin of safety defined in the TS is not reduced.
| |
| ECN P5485 Replace Source Range Monitor (SRM) and Intermediate Range Monitor (IRM) Signal Cables - Unit 2 {
| |
| Description This modification replaces Division I IRM and SRM cables with qualified !
| |
| triple shielded coaxial cables and connectort to minimize electromagnetic '
| |
| interference that can cause erroneous SRM and IRM readings. This modification will make the SRMs and IRMs comply with FSAR provisions that specify use of triple shielded coaxial cables.
| |
| I l
| |
| 1 l
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| 167 l
| |
| | |
| ECN P5485 (Continued)
| |
| Safety Evaluation Since this modification will make the SRMs and IRMs comply with provisions of the FSAR, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an. accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR is not increased, nor is the margin of safety defined in the TS reduced.
| |
| ECN P5498 Remove Vacuum Priming Valve of the EECH System - Units 2 and 3 Description This modification recoved vacuum priming valves 3-34-551 and -552 and ;
| |
| related piping from EECH isolation valve 3-67-669 to a suitable point inside the turbine building and upstream of valve 2-34-550. EECW isolation valve 3-67-669 was converted to a normally closed position with a cap downstream of the valve. The line to the vacuum priming system was capped. The secondary containment penetration was sealed after piping i removal.
| |
| Safety Evaluation The removal of the vacuum priming valve improves the EECH pressure boundary integrity since the valve is not qualified for EECH design pressure. The operability of the EECH is not adversely affected because the system now runs continuously. The secondary containment penetration was sealed, so that the integrity of the secondary pressure boundary was not affected. Based on the above, the possibility of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR is not increased, nor is the margin of safety defined in the TS reduced.
| |
| ECN P5499 HPFP and CO2 Storage - Units 1, 2, 3 Description This modification allowed the use of ASTM A106 Grade B pipe in place of ASTM A53 pipe, because of the unavailability of ASTM A53 pipe.
| |
| Safety Evaluation Revision 1 of the USQD Phase II documents the review of this modification which is now design complete. All design output documents were reviewed and the design changes were determined to be within the scope of the USQD.
| |
| I 168
| |
| | |
| ECN P5508 Neutron Monitoring System - Unit 2 Description This modification allowed for the installation of Local Power Range Monitor (LPRM) cable extension adapters to allow termination of nine cables to their respective LPRM detector connections.
| |
| Safety Evaluation This modification meets the existing cable requirements for the LPRM system and will not change the system's design intent or function.
| |
| Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any TS is not reduced. USQD Phase II, Revision 1, documents the design complete review.
| |
| ECN P5523 Radwaste System and Radiation Monitoring - Units 1, 2, 3 Description This modification added two automatic isolation signals, "downscale" and
| |
| " inoperative", to radiation monitor RE-90-130 to isolate liquid radwaste discharge valves FCV-77-58A and FCV-77-58B. These valves are used to isolate the effluent flow in the three inch and one inch radwaste discharge lines. Also, the one inch radwaste discharge line is to be reactivated to enable it to be used concurrently with the three inch radwaste discharge line.
| |
| Safety Evaluation The purpose of this modification is to fulfill an NRC commitment for RETS implementation, and to increase the release flow rate of radwaste discharge which in turn improves radwaste system operations. USQD Phase II, Revision i documents the review of this modification which is now design complete. All design output documents were reviewed and were determined to be within the scope of the USQD.
| |
| ECN P5534 Neutron Monitoring System - Unit 2 Description This modification replaced four IRM and two SRM cables with Class IE qualified triple shielded cables and connectors. The triple shielded cables are to eliminate electromagnetic interference of the signal.
| |
| , Safety Evaluation Although the modification has not been fully implemented, the electrical portion was completed on unit 2. USQD Phase II, Revision 1 documents the '
| |
| review of the modification which is now design complete. All of the design output documents have been reviewed and the design changes were determined to be within the scope of the USQD.
| |
| i 4
| |
| 169 l l
| |
| i
| |
| | |
| ECN P5539 RPS Cable Replacement - Unit 2 Description This modification was to replace a damaged section of cable 2RP132-G2 between junction boxes 2563 and 1220 and install the necessary splices in the junction boxes. This cable was damaged during the replacement of a conduit seal.
| |
| Safety Evaluation i The modification will assure the RPS will function as designed. The new cable will be qualified per 10CFR50.49 and will not affect the function
| |
| -or design of the RPS. USQD Phase II, Revision 1, evaluates _the design complete package for this modification.
| |
| ECN P5540 Standby DG System - Units 1 & 2 Description This modification is to eliminate the standby DG exciter potential transformer primary fuses for generators A, B, C, and D. The spring finger contacts associated with these fuses were damaged and apparently made little or no contact. Arcing across these contacts damaged them and the connecting cable's insulation. The potential transformer wiring will be connected directly to the bus to prevent any potential electrical arcing from worn or damaged contacts.
| |
| Safety Evaluation This modification should increase the reliability of the standby DG system without changing its intended function. The elimination of the primary fuses for the exciter potential transformer circuit will prevent electrical arcing faults and minimize electrical contact maintenance.
| |
| The only effect will be the possible loss of overcurrent protection for circuit wiring between the 4KV bus and the potential transformers. The remaining circuitry overcurrent protection, however, is stil.1 provided by the field circuit breakers and the fuel transfer pump motor breakers.
| |
| USQD Phase II, Revision 2, was revised to document the review of the modification which is design complete. The design output documents were reviewed and all of the design changes are within the scope of the USQD.
| |
| ECN P5541 Standby DG System - Unit 3 Description This modification is to eliminate the standby DG exciter potential transformer primary fuses for generators A, B, C, and D. The spring finger contacts associated with these fuses were damaged and apparently made little or no contact. Arcing across these contacts damaged them and the connecting cable's insulation. The potential transformer wiring will be connected directly to the bus to prevent any potential electrical arcing from worn or damaged contacts.
| |
| 170
| |
| | |
| f i
| |
| ECN P5541 (continued)
| |
| Safety Evaluation This modification should increhse the reliability of the standby DG system without changing its intended function. The elimination of the primary fuses for the exciter potential transformer circuit will prevent electrical arcing faults and minimize electrical contact maintenance.
| |
| The only effect will be the possible loss of overcurrent protection for circuit wiring between the 4KV bus and the potential transformers. The remaining circuitry overcurrent protection, however, is still provided by the field circuit breakers and the fuel transfer pump motcr breakers.
| |
| l USQD Phase II, Revision 2 was revised to document the review of the modification which is design complete. The' design output documents were reviewed and all of the design changes are within the scope of the USQD.
| |
| ECN P5542 Control Bay HVAC System - Units 1 and 2 Description This modification provides a seismically qualified motor mounting bracket and detailed linkage configuration for the motor operator replacement at each of unit I and 2 control room outlet dampers FCO-31-81 and FCO-31-82. Previously, no mounting details existed for these damper motor operators, and the manufacturer's recommended linkage did not allow proper operation (normal or failure). Control bay HVAC components may not operate as necessary if the dampers will not function correctly or if they fall in the wrong position.
| |
| Safety Evaluation The new mounting and linkage design improves damper operation and reliability. Also, this motor bracket anchors a conduit support.
| |
| Additional loadings from this conduit support have been considered in the seismic analysis, calculations, and design. USQD Phase II, Revision 1, was issued to document the review of this modification which is design complete. The design output documents were reviewed and all the design changes are within the scope of the USQ3.
| |
| ECN P5543 Standby DG - Unit 3 Description This modification was to replace damaged cable 3ES4140IID for the DG 3D feeder cable. This design change is needed to repair the DG 30 and return it to an operable status to support 10CFR50, Appendix J l modifications, restart testing, and unit 2 startup activities. The reason for the cable change is to provide a replacement type which is qualified for T.E use.
| |
| 171 A _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _._
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| | |
| l L '
| |
| ECN P5543 (Continued)
| |
| Safety Evaluation Because the new cable is an accepted, scalified replacement type..and because no changes will be made to any equipment functions, no adverse effects to any safety-related equipment or function will result from the cable replacement. Therefore, the possibility for an accident or L malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR
| |
| , is not created. USQD Phasa II, Revision 1, documents the design complete
| |
| [ review for this modification.
| |
| ECN P7000 Replace Namco Limit Switches for 2-FCV-64-141 - Unit 2 1 Description The modification will replace existing Namco limit switches 2-ZS-064-141A and 2-ZS-064-141B. The field replacement will be performed to meet the environmental requirements of 10CFR50.49 and the seismic requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix A.
| |
| Safety Evaluation The environmental and seismic qualification of the Namco replacement will not aitor the operational characteristics of these switches or the associated valve. Therefore. the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any TS is'not reduced.
| |
| ECN P7002 Installation of Connections for Addition of a Hydrogen Water Chemistry (HWC) System - Unit 2 Description This modification will provide interfacing H 02 2 injection and sample connections ir, the piping of the main condensate, RNCU, reactor water recirculation, sampling, and off-gas systems for the future installation o' a HNC system.
| |
| Safety Evaluation New connections will be capped until sucl. time as the full HNC systein is installed. The installation of these capped connections will not affect the oargin of safety as these connections will have no affect on the oper.tlon of the system on which they are installed.
| |
| I 172
| |
| | |
| l ECN P7006. Replacement of fnverter Power: Supplies for ECCS Analog Trip Units (ATUs) - Unit 2 Description The modification addresses the replacement of the inverter power supplies for the ECCS ATUs. The ECN added a #6 AWG cable between the 250V DC RMOV board and the inverter, a #8 AWG cable between the inverter and the panels in the auxiliary equipment room, and associated conduit and seismic supports.
| |
| l
| |
| _ Safety Evaluation The replacement of the inverters and associated cables, conduit, and seismic supports for the ECCS ATUs does not alter the operational
| |
| , requirements or safety function performed by these inverters. Therefore, I the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any TS is not reduced.
| |
| l l
| |
| ECN P7007 Replace 876 Type CFD Differential Relays with Type IJD Relays
| |
| - Unit 1 Description This modification replaces the relays used to protect the DG against electrical faults.
| |
| Safety Evaluation The replacement relays meet the same design requirements and will operate in the same manner as the existing relays. Therefore, the function of the relays has not changed and the safety margin is not reduced, ECN P7015 Installation of Bypass Switches for Neutron Monitoring System
| |
| - Unit 2 Description .
| |
| This modification installs 16 bypass switches in the SRM, IRM, Rod Block Monitor (RBM) and APRM converters. The bypass switches are to be wired across the selector switch contact so that when the selector switch is moved into a position other than operate, the inoperative trip signal is bypassed such that a trip signal is not initiated and system calibration can be performed.
| |
| Safety Evaluation The seismic qualification of the control panels is not affected by the installation of these bypass switches. The pushbutton bypass switches are only utilized during testing of the neutron monitoring system and do not affect the normal operation of this system.
| |
| 173
| |
| | |
| ECN P7018 Drywell HVAC Supports - Unit 2 Description This modification evaluated and modified HVAC supports to assure acceptable stress levels and functional integrity of support members and connections attached to drywell platforms at elevations 604', 616', and 628'. This ECN will also revise drawings to reflect the as-constructed configuration.
| |
| Safety Evaluation This modification will document the as-constructed condition of the duct supports and repair deficient items. No adverse affects on any TS will occur. The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any TS in not reduced.
| |
| ECN P7024 RHRSW Heat Exchanger Discharge Valve Seat Ring Replacement - Unit 2 Description
| |
| ~
| |
| This modification documents the replacement seat ring material for four RHRSW heat exchanger discharge valves (valve numbers FCV 23-34, -40, -46 and -52). The vendor who supplied the valves no longer prrvides ASTM A216 seats for this type of valve and recommends a replacement of ASTM A105 carbon steel with stellite trim.
| |
| Safety Evaluation The niargi.n of safety as defined in TS or any other document is not reduced since this modification improves the function of the RHRSN heat exchanger discharge control valve. This improves availability of RHRSW system.
| |
| ECN P7026 Redesign of CRD System, RBCCW System, and Miscellaneous Vent / Drain Piping for the RHCU Pump A and B - Unit 2 Description This modification redesigns pipe routing from RBCCW and CR0 to the RWCU pumps 2A and 2B. In addition, a relief valve is installed on the seal t injection piping in order to prevent overpressurization of the RWCU pumps.
| |
| Safety Evaluation Since the installation of relief valves and the rerouting of piping does not affect the operation or function of the pumps, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any TS is not reduced.
| |
| 174 l
| |
| l l
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| _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .1
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| | |
| ECN P7029 Modify Crywell Floor Framing Structural and Miscellaneous Steel
| |
| - Unit 2 1:
| |
| Description This modification is to revise'drywell floor framing structural and miscellaneous steel details at elevation 584'-9 1/2". This reanalysis and redesign is necessary to provide the corrective action for NCR BFNCEB 8402 RI.
| |
| Safety Evaluation These design modifications' ensure that the platforms will not fall during a seismic event. The structural modifications to the platforms do not change the operation of any safety-related system as described in the
| |
| -TS. Based on these comments, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any TS is not reduced.
| |
| i ECN P7030 RHCU Pump Modification - Unit 2 Description .
| |
| This modification provides for a warm-up line for each of the RHCU pumps, thermocouple mounting details, pump discharge side flanges, and replacement of the flush connections, and drain, check and gate valves.
| |
| Safety Evaluation This modification is being performed to improve the maintainability, reliability, and availability of the RNCU system. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any TS is not reduced..
| |
| ECN P7032 Replacement of Class IE Cables - Unit 2 Description This modification requires the replacement of cables in the RNCU heat exchanger room which were determined to be unqualified for the environmental conditions in that area.
| |
| Safety Evaluation The replacement of unqualified cables with qualified cables returns the system to the same point for which it was evaluated in the FSAR.
| |
| Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any TS is.not reduced.
| |
| 175
| |
| | |
| ECN P7033 Add Shims to Disc Hinge Arm for RHR Testable Check Valves (2-FCV-74-54 and -68) - Unit 2 Description This modification a,igns the valve disc to the seat by the addition of a shim ring between the inboard bushing and the disc arm at the end of bearing.
| |
| Safety Evaluation Since this modification will reduce the leakage rate through the valves without affecting any other equipment or systems, it will not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR. Therefore, the margin of safety will not be reduced.
| |
| ECN P7037 Isolate the Control Air Line of Six Testable Check Valves - Unit 2 Description This ECN isolates the control air supply line of six testable check valves by installing quick connect couplings. Metal flexible hoses are to be attached for testing purposes. This modification will affect check valves 2-FCV-71-40, 45, 54. 68, 26 and 54 for RCIC, HPCI, RHR and CS systems.
| |
| Safety Evaluation Since this modification alters only the air supply to the actuators, which are used only for test purposes during reactor cold shutdown, no other equipment or systems are affected by this modification. Based on these considerations, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any TS will not be reduced.
| |
| ECN P7038 Document Clutch Tripper Fingers Removed on Limitorque Actuators for 2-FCV-68-1, -33, -35, -77 and 2-FCV-74 Unit 2 Description This modification removes from the valve motor operators for the clutch tripper fingers, which are utilized to hold the motor operator clutch in the manual (declutched) mode after handwheel operation.
| |
| Safety Evaluation The margin of safety as defined in the basis for cny TS is not reduced by this modification since the operation and integrity of the recirculation and RHR systems are unaffected by the modification.
| |
| 176
| |
| | |
| ECN'P7039 Replace'SDBD Transformers (TS2A and TS28) Hith Environmentally Qualified Transformers - Unit 2 Description This modification replaces the existing SDBD transformers (TS2A and TS2B) with environmentally qualified transformers. The new transformers are installed on a new foundation and connected to the existing raceway from the previous installation.
| |
| Safety Evaluation The replacement of the unqualified transformers will ensure that the SDBD transformers remain operational. Therefore, the margin of safety was not reduced.
| |
| ECN P7043 Install New RNCU Temperature Switches for Line Break Detectors
| |
| - Unit 2 Description This modification installs four temperature switches in the RHCU system pipe trench in the reactor building. The temperature switches will provide leak detection and RHCU isolation for an RNCU pipe break in the pipe trench.
| |
| Safety Evaluation The addition of another set of qualified temperature sensing switches increases the likelihood of detecting an RHCU system pipe break.
| |
| Therefore,_the margin of safety was not reduced.
| |
| ECN P7044 Addition of Fuses to Isolate Switch Contact Nos. 2-ZIS-067-050A,
| |
| -050B, -051A, and -051B - Unit 2 Description ,
| |
| This modification mounts fuses in panel 25-32 for limit switch contacts on flow control valves, to isolate their non-IE function from IE power devices on the remainder of the control circuit. This change is necessary to satisfy general separation requirements for Class IE electrical equipment.
| |
| Safety Evaluation The installation of these isolation devices eliminates the potential for the failure of devices required to be operable during a DBA. Therefore, the margin of rafety will not be reduced.
| |
| 177
| |
| | |
| i ECN P7045 Modify CRD Control Air Piping and Valves - Unit 2 Description This modification addresses the mechanical modifications to be made to the CRD hydraulic system to satisfy the requirements of 10CFR50.62. The ECN includes only the piping, valves, and support portion of the modification.
| |
| Safety Evaluation 1he work to be performed under this ECN does not affect any tection of the TS since the system is not fenctional and does not have any control power. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in.the basis for any TS is not reduced by the proposed activity.
| |
| ECN P7047 Replace Existing Splices With Oualified Raychem Splices - Unit 2
| |
| .- Description
| |
| , This modification replaces Class IE cable splices and terminations which do not meet environmental qualification requirements. The physical work for this period consisted of replacing existing splices / terminations with qualified Raychem splices, electrical conduit, boxes, and associated seismic supports.
| |
| Safety Evaluation Each system which is affected by the replacement of these splices and terminations will remain functionally identical to that which was previously evaluated. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the l basis for any TS is not reduced.
| |
| ECN P7048 Provide Isometric Drawing of Sensing Lines and Evaluate Supports
| |
| - Unit 2 Descri ptic ?.
| |
| This modification provides isometric drawings of sensing lines from the reactor vessel to all reactor water level instruments for those lines outside the drywell. This ECN also evaluates existing supports to determine if they are adequate. The physical work for this period consisted of modifying supports and installing new supports.
| |
| Safety Evaluation The function or configuration of these instrument lines has not been changed by this ECN. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any TS is not reduced.
| |
| 178
| |
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| )
| |
| ECN P7049 Install Protective Covers Over Control Switches - Unit 1 Description This ECN installed protective covers over.the control switches on RPS battery board 1. -The protective covers will prevent inadvertent actuation. The work for this period consisted of documenting-the cover installation to lift TACFs. i Safety Evaluation The protective covers to be added will not change the function or .
| |
| operation of any equipment discussed in the TS. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any TS is not reduced.
| |
| )
| |
| ECN P7050 Install Protective Covers Over Control Switches - Unit 1 l Description This ECN installed protective covers over the control switches on RPS j battery board 3. The protective covers will prevent inadvertent '
| |
| actuation. The work for this-period consisted of documenting the cover installation to close out TACFs.
| |
| {
| |
| Safety Evaluation The protective covers to be added will not change the function or operation of any equipment discussed in the TS. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any TS is not reduced. {
| |
| l ECN P7051 Provide Locking Devices for the Holddown Bolts of the RHRSW i Pumps - Units 1, 2, 3 Description l
| |
| This modification provides a method for preventing the holddown nuts of the RHRSW pumps from comtrq loose due to vibration. The physical work ,
| |
| l for this period consisted of providing locking devices for all 12 RHRSW l pumps. '
| |
| i Safets Evaluation This modification will enhance the integrity of the mounting of the RHRSW l pumps by preventing the holddown bolts from working loose due to l vibration. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any TS will not be reduced.
| |
| l !
| |
| I 179
| |
| | |
| l l
| |
| ECN P7052 Add Microswitches to the Control Circuits of the Containment-Airlock Doors - Unit 1 Description
| |
| .This modification is required to improve the reliability of the secondary containment door interlocking system. The work for this period consisted of documenting the addition of microswitches to close out TACFs.
| |
| Safety' Evaluation The doors are not modified by this ECN. The addition of th'e microswitch enhances the capability of maintaining secondary containment by ensuring the plunger is locked in place. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any TS is not reduced.
| |
| ECN P7053 Add Microswitches to the Control Circuits of the Containment Airlock Doors - Unit 3 Description
| |
| ~
| |
| This modification is required to improve the reliability of the secondary containment door interlocking system. The work for this period consisted of documenting the addition of microswitches to close out TACFs.
| |
| Safety Evaluation The doors are not modified by this ECN. The addition of the microswitch enhances the capability of maintaining secondary containment by ensuring the plunger is locked in place. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any TS is not reduced.
| |
| ECN P7054 Regear Limitorque to Allow Seating of Valve - Unit 2 Description This modification to the electric motor operator for 2-FCV-73-2 will provide the torque and thrust needed for proper valve seating.
| |
| Safety Evaluation Only the electric motor operator for 2-FCV-73-2 on the HPCI turbine steam supply line will be modified. No other system in the plant will be affected by this modification. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any TS is not reduced.
| |
| 180
| |
| | |
| ECN P7059 Rework Existing Light Fixtures to Upgrade Standby Lighting-
| |
| - Units 1 and 2 Description This' modification will improve the design of lamp and ballast fixtures by movement to more optimum locations. The physical work for this period consisted of reworking existing light fixtures.
| |
| Safety Evaluation This change improves the iiiun;iration of previously identified deficient areas without increasing the maxin a design load. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for sny TS is not reduced.
| |
| ECN P7063 RHRSW Heat Exchanger Discharge Valve Seat Ring Replacement - Unit 1 Description This modification documents the replacement of seat ring material for four RHRSW heat exchanger discharge valves (valve nambers FCV-23-34, -40,
| |
| -46, and -52). The vendor who supplied the valves no longer provides ASTM A216 seats for this type of valve and recommends a replacement of ASTM A105 carbon steel with stellite trim. The physical work for this period consisted of. valve seat ring replacement.
| |
| Safety Evaluation The margin of safety as defined in the TS or any other document is not reduced since this modification improves the function of the RHRSW heat exchanger discharge control valve.
| |
| l ECN P7064 Document the Addition of an Access Panel - Unit 1 Description l This modification documents a 12" x 12" access panel at the exhaust of the 50B0 room emergency cooling unit. This access is required in order to measure the temperature of the exhaust air from the cooling unit. The work allowed TACF 1-84-98-31 to be closed.
| |
| Safety Evaluation The installation of the access panel at the exhaust from the c wling unit does not affect the operation of the SDBD room emergency coc'.ing system.
| |
| The panel will be rigidly installed in the existing duct work.
| |
| Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any TS is not reduced.
| |
| 181 l
| |
| i
| |
| | |
| ECN P7065 Replacement of Temperature Switches TS-63-3 and 63-4 on the Standby Liquid Control (SLC) Storage Tank - Unit 2 Description This modification addresses a concentration change in conjunction with the use of enriched boric acid. The change requires level and temperature setpoint changes on the SLC storage tank. The only modification to equipment is the replacement of the temperature switches on the SLC storage tank with switches that have a wider range. The physical work for this period consisted of replacing existing temperature switches, changing level and temperature setpoints, and disconnecting heat tracing for the SLC system.
| |
| Safety Evaluation These modifications will require a revision to the TS. However, the revised TS will provide the limiting conditions for operations and surveillance requirements necessary to ensure that the SLC will perform its objective with the same level of reliability. This modification does not change any function or in any way interfere with the safe operation of the SLC. The margin of safety as defined in any TS is not reduced.
| |
| ECN P7066 RHRSW Heat Exchanger Discharge Valve Seat Replacement - Unit 3 Description This modification documents the replacement of seat ring material for four RHRSW heat exchanger discharge valves (valve numbers FCV 23-34, -40,
| |
| -46, and -52). The vendor who suppliM the valve no longer provides ASTM A216 seats for this type of valve and recommends a replacement of ASTM A105 carbon steel with stellite trim. The physical work for this period consisted of valve seat ring replacement.
| |
| Safety Evaluation The margin of safety as defined in TS or any other document is not reduced since this modification improves the function of RHRSW heat exchanger discharge control valve.
| |
| ECN P7080 Install Jib Crane Mechanical Stop - Unit 2 Description This modification adds a mechanical stop to the 3-ton capacity CRD jib crane to preclude swinging a load into or over panel 25-57.
| |
| 182
| |
| | |
| l l
| |
| ECN P7080 (Continued) i Safety Evaluation The operation and function of the jib crane are unaffected by the installation of the mechanical stop. Therefore, the margin of safety as.
| |
| defined in the basis for any TS is not reduced.
| |
| ECN P7081 Replace Motor Pinion Keys with Stronger Keys to Prevent Failure of Operator - Unit 2 Description This modification replaced AISI 1018 motor pinion gear keys with stronger AISI 4140 keys to prevent failure of the actuator. The work for this period consisted of'as-constructing drawings to reflect replacement of the motor pinion gear keys.
| |
| Safety Evaluation -
| |
| The function of these valves is not changed as a result of the replacement of the pinion gear keys. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any TS is not reduced.
| |
| ECN P7083 Tubing Support and Tube Routing Modifications - Unit 0 Description This ECN includes additions, deletions, and modification of existing tubing supports and rerouting of tubing needed as corrective action to SCRBFNEEB 8535 and 8543. The physical work for this period consisted of installation of capillary-tubing supports in the off-gas stack, reactor building, and control building.
| |
| Safety Evaluation The function of the tubing is not changed. The proposed modifications meet required thermal and seismic design criteria. Therefore, the margin of safety is not reduced.
| |
| ECN P7085 Revise Instrument Tubing and Capillary Tubing Supports for Seismic Qualification - Unit 2 Description 1
| |
| This ECN includes additions, deletions, and modifications of existing I
| |
| tubing supports and rerouting of tubing needed as corrective action to SCRBFNEEB 8535 and 8543. The physical work for this period consisted of installation or modification of capillary tubing supports in the off-gas i stack, tip room, reactor building, drywell, and steam tunnel. '
| |
| 183
| |
| _. . _ _ _ - _ _ _ - A
| |
| | |
| ECN P708S (continued)
| |
| Safety Evaluation The function of the tubing is not changed. The proposed modifications meet required thermal and seismic design requirements. Therefore, the margin of safety is not reduced.
| |
| ECN P7089 and P7090 Alternate Rod Insertion Portion of ATWS Modification
| |
| - Unit 2 Description This modification changes the existing reactor vessel level and pressure l circuitry to mitigate ATHS events, The modification shall be such that both alternate rod insertion and recirculation pump trip functions can be l separate from the RPS. The physical work for this period consisted of deleting existing ATHS circuits, installing the ATHS ATU cards and associated wiring in the ECCS cabinet in the auxiliary instrument room, pulling and terminating cables, and removing ATHS components from RPS cabinets.
| |
| Safety Evaluation The changes do not alter the function or method of operation of any safe shutdown system. The change is an independent and separate enhancement to the present safety equipment. Incorporation of this change will decrease the probability of several of the most severe accident sequences currently reflected in the Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA). These changes do not reduce the margin of safety for the TS since all creponents are independent and separate.
| |
| ECN P7091 Secondary Containment Piping Penetrations on Elevation 565' - Unit 3 Description This modification provides for the evaluation of the unit 3 north wall on elevation 565' for piping penetrating through the secondary containment membrane. The physical work for this period consisted of performing necessary seal modifications.
| |
| Safety Evaluation The new seals will be qualified to ensure that secondary containment remains operable following a DBE. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any TS is not reduced.
| |
| 1 i
| |
| 184 i
| |
| | |
| -ECN P7092 Secondary Containment Piping Penetrations on Elevation 639' - Unit 3 Description This modification provides for the evaluation of the unit 3 north wall on elevation 639' for. piping penetrating through the secondary containment membrane. The physical work for this period consisted of performing necessary seal modifications, i Safety Evaluation The new seals will be qualified to ensure that secondary containment remains operable following a DBE. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for.any TS is not reduced.
| |
| ECN P7093 Secondary Containment Piping Penetrations on Elevation 541' - Unit 3 Description This modification provides for the evaluation of the unit 3 north wall on elevation 541' for piping penetrating through the secondary containment membrane. The physical work for this period consisted of performing necessary seal modifications.
| |
| Safety Evaluation 1 The new seals will be qualified to ensure that secondary containment remains operable following a DBE. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any TS is not reduced.
| |
| ECN P7094 Secondary Containment Piping Penetrations on Elevation 565' - Unit 3 Description This modification provides for the evaluation of the unit 3 south wall on l elevation 565' for piping penetrating through the secondary containment membrane. The physical work for this period consisted of performing necessary seal modifications.
| |
| Safety Evaluation 1 l
| |
| The new seals will be qualified to ensure that secondary containment l remains operable following a DBE. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any TS is not reduced.
| |
| 185 1
| |
| t >
| |
| | |
| ECN P7095 Secondary Containment Piping Penetrations on Elevation 664_' - Unit 3 Description This modification provides for the evaluation of the unit 3 north wall on elevation 664' for piping penetrating through the secondary containment membrane. The physical work for this period consisted of performing necessary seal modifications.
| |
| Safety Evaluation The new seals will be qualified to ensure that secondary containment remains operable following a DBE. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any TS is not reduced.
| |
| ECN P7096 Secondary Containment Piping Penetrations on Elevation 716' - Unit 3 Description This modification provides for the evaluation of the unit 3 reactor building roof, elevation 716' for piping penetrating through the secondary containment membrane. The physical work for this period consisted of performing seal modifications.
| |
| Safety Evaluation The new seals will be qualified to ensure that secondary containment remains operable following a DBE. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any TS is not reduced.
| |
| ECN P7097 Secondary Containment Piping Penetrations on Elevation 639' - Unit 1 Description This modification provides for the evaluation of the unit i north wall on elevation 639' for piping penetrating through the secondary containment membrane. The physical work for this period consisted of performing necessary seal modifications.
| |
| Safety Evaluation The new seals will be qualified to ensure that secondary containment remains operable following a DBE. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any TS is not reduced.
| |
| 186
| |
| | |
| \
| |
| ECN P7098 Secondary Containment Piping Penetrations on Elevation 541' - Unit 1 Description j This modification provides for the evaluation of the unit 1 north wall on elevation 541' for piping penetrating through the secondary containment 4 membrane. The physical work for this period consisted of performing i '
| |
| necessary seal modifications.
| |
| Safety Evaluation ,
| |
| 1 The new seals will be qualified to ensure that secondary containment remains operable following a DBE. Therefore, the margin of safety as f defined in the basis for any TS is not reduced.
| |
| ECN P7099 Secondary Containment Piping Penetrations on Elevation 565' - Unit 1 Description This modification provides for the evaluation of the unit 1 south wall on elevation 565' for piping penetrating through the secondary containment membrane. The physical work for this period consisted of performing seal modifications.
| |
| Safety Evaluation The new seals will be qualified to ensure that secondary containment remains operable following a DBE. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any TS is not reduced.
| |
| ECN P7100 Secondary Containment Piping Penetrations on Elevation 565' - Unit 1 Description This modification provides for the evaluation of the unit i north wall on elevation 565' for piping penetrating through the secondary containment membrane. The physical work for this period consisted of performing necessary seal modifications.
| |
| Safety Evaluation The new seals will be qualified to ensure that secondary containment remains operable following a DBE. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any TS is not reduced.
| |
| 187
| |
| | |
| ECN P7101 Secondary Containment Piping Penetrations on Elevation 565' - Unit 1 Description This modification provides for the elevation of the unit I southeast corner airlock wall adjacent to equipment access elevation 565' for piping penetrating through the secondary containment membrane. The physical work for this period consisted of performing necessary seal modifications.
| |
| Safety Evaluation The new seals will be qualified to ensure that secondary containment remains operable following a DBE. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any TS is not reduced.
| |
| ECN P7102 Secondary Containment Piping Penetrations on Elevation 664' - Unit 1 Description -
| |
| This modification provides for the evaluation of the unit I north wall on elevation 664' for piping penetrating through the secondary containment membrane. The physical work for this period consisted of performing necessary seal modifications.
| |
| Safety Evaluation 1 The new seals will be qualified to ensure that secondary containment remains operable following a DBE. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any TS is not reduced.
| |
| ECN P7103 Secondary Containment Piping Penetrations on Elevation 716' - Unit 1 Description This modification provides for the evaluation of the unit 1 reactor building roof, elevation 716' for piping penetrating through the secondary containment membrane. The physical work for this period consisted of performing necessary seal modifications.
| |
| Safety Evaluation The new seals will be qualified to ensure that secondary containmei remains operable following a DBE. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any TS is not reduced.
| |
| 188
| |
| | |
| t ECN P7104 Secondary Containment Piping Penetrations on Elevation 565' - Unit 2 s Description This modification provides for the evaluation of the unit 2 south wall on elevation 565' for piping penetrating through the secondary containment membrane. The physical work for this period consisted of performing necessary seal modifications.
| |
| ' Safety Evaluation The new seals will be qualified to ensure that secondary containment remains operable following a DBE. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any TS is not reduced.
| |
| ECN P7105 Secondary Containment Piping Penetrations on Elevation 664' - Unit 2 Description -
| |
| 'Thismodificationprovidesfo[theevaluationoftheunit2northwallon elevation 664' for piping penetrating through the secondary containment membrane. The physical work for this period consisted of performing necessary seal modifications.
| |
| Safety Evaluation The new seals will be qualified to ensure that secondary containment remains operable following a DBE. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any TS is not reduced.
| |
| ECN P7106 Secondary Containment Piping Penetrations on Elevation 716' - Unit 2 l Description i This modification provides for the evaluation of the unit 2 reactor l building roof, elevation 716' for piping penetrating through the secondary containment membrane. The physical work for this period consisted of performing necessary seal modifications.
| |
| Safety Evaluation The new seals will be qualified to ensure that secondary containment remains operable following a DBE. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any TS is not reduced.
| |
| 189
| |
| | |
| ECN P7107 Secondary Containment Piping Penetrations on Elevation 593' - Unit 2 )
| |
| I Description y This modification provides.for-the evaluation of the unit 2 south wall-on L elevation 593' for piping penetrating through the secondary containment i membrane. The physical-work for-this period consisted of performing j necessary seal modifications.
| |
| Safety Evaluation-The new seals will be qualified to ensure that secondary containment remains operable following a-DBE. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any TS is'not reduced.
| |
| ECN P7108 Secondary Containment Piping. Penetrations on Elevation 541' - Unit 2 Description This modification provides for'the evaluation of the unit 2 north wall on elevation 541' for piping penetrating through the secondary containment membrane. The physical work.for this period consisted of performing necessary seal modifications.
| |
| Safety Evaluation The new seals will be qualified to ensure that secondary containment remains operable following a DBE. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any TS is not reduced.
| |
| ECN P7109 Secondary Containment Piping Penetrations on Elevation 639' - Unit 2 Description This modification provides for the evaluation of the unit 2 north wall on '
| |
| elevation 639' for piping penetrating through the secondary containment membrane. The physical work for this period consisted of performing necessary seal modifications.
| |
| Safety Evaluation The new seals will be qualified to ensure that secondary containmer.4 l remains operable following a DBE. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any TS is not reduced.
| |
| 1 190
| |
| | |
| i ECN P7110 Secondary Containment Piping Penetrations on Elevation 564' - Unit 2 i
| |
| description This modification provides for the evaluation of the unit 2 north wall on elevation 564' for piping penetrating through the secondary containment membrane. The physical work for this period consisted of performing necessary seal modifications.
| |
| Safety Evaluation The new seals will be qualified to ensure that secondary containment remains operable following a DBE. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any TS is not reduced.
| |
| ECN P7115 Tubing Support and Tube Routing Modifications - Unit 0 Description This ECN includes additions, deletions, and modifications of_ existing tubing supports and rerouting of tubing needed as corrective action to .
| |
| SCRBFNEEB 8535 and 8543. The physical-work for this period consisted of the addition, deletion, and modification of the existing tubing supports.
| |
| Safety Evaluation The function of the tubing is not changed. The proposed modifications meet the required thermal and seismic design criteria. Therefore, the margin of safety is not reduced.
| |
| ECN P7117 Reassignment of Control Power Feed to 480V AC SDBDs - Unit 2 Description This modification covers the reassignment of 480V SDBD 28. The physical work for this period consisted of reassigning normal control power feed of the 480V AC SDBD 2B from battery 2 to 4160V AC SDBD battery SB-D.
| |
| f 191
| |
| | |
| ECN P7117 (Continued)
| |
| Safety Evaluation The modification will result in the system being functionally the same as the present system. The equipment being installed will be Class IE equipment and will be seismically installed. In addition, the battery is properly sized to handle the additional load. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any TS is not reduced.
| |
| ECN P7124 Reassignment of Normal 480V SDBD Control Power Feeds - Unit 2 Description This modification covers the permanent reassignment of the normal 250V DC control power supplies of 480V AC SDBD 1A, 2A, and 18 from the plant unit batteries to the 4160V AC SDBD batteries SB-A, SB-B, and SB-C respectively.
| |
| Safety Evaluation The modification will result in the system being functionally the same as the present system. The equipment being installed will be Class IE equipment and will be seismically installed. In addition, the battery is properly sized to handle the additional load. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any TS is not reduced.
| |
| ECN P7130 Change Power Control Feeds to CREVS Pressurization Fan A to RMOV Board 1A - Unit 2 Description This modification changes the power and control feeds to CREVS fan A from control bay vent BD A to RMOV BD 1A. This change is necessary to correct l the condition identified in CAQR BFP 870802. The physical work for this !
| |
| period consisted of installing new conduit, reworking existing conduits, and pulling, relabeling, and terminating cables.
| |
| Safety Evaluation !
| |
| This modification changes the power and control feeds to the CREVS fan A. The increased load on DG A does not affect the capability of the diesel. The cables being added are Class IE and seismically qualified.
| |
| Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any TS is not reduced.
| |
| i l
| |
| 192
| |
| | |
| ECN P7131 RHR, Primary Containment, Reactor Feedwater, and CAD Modification
| |
| - Unit 2 i Description
| |
| }
| |
| This modification was issued to reroute the reactor vessel level sensor's :
| |
| reference legs to minimize the possibility of post-accident boiling in the reference legs due to high temperature and low pressure in the drywell. j Safety Evaluation This modification will not affect the function or operation of the ,
| |
| reactor vessel water level instrumentation. Therefore, this modification does not affect safety.
| |
| ECN P7146 SGTS Duct Work - Units 1, 2, 3 Description This modification was required to replace missing hardware and existing defective hardware for the SGTS ducts and duct supports.
| |
| Safety Evaluation This modification was required in order to qualify the ducts and duct supports to seismic Class I requirements. Based upon this, it was concluded that.the modification did not affect safety.
| |
| ECN P7149 HVAC Duct Work - Unit 0 Description This modification was required to replace missing hardware and existing defective hardware for HVAC.
| |
| Safety Evaluation This modification was required to meet the requirements of the existing design. The probability or consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR is not increased.
| |
| 193
| |
| | |
| ECN P7150 4KV SDBDs - DG Breakers - Units 1, 2, 3 Description This modification provided a 2.5 second time delay to the closure circuit of the DG 4KV breakers to handle a common accident signal. The time delay is.necessary to allow the breaker closing spring time to recharge after a trip caused by a Common Accident Signal. If.a closure signal occurs before the closing spring recharges, then the anti-pump circuit of the breaker prevents breaker closure.
| |
| Safety Evaluation An accuracy and setpoint calculation was prepared to assure that the time delay was as small as possible, but would still ensure breaker closure.
| |
| The anti-pump feature of the breaker will still be functional. Since the equipment that is being added is within the DG breaker control circuit and qualified to the same requirements as the ariginal equipment, the probability or consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety, previously evaluated-in the SAR, is not increased.
| |
| ECN P7155 Battery Room HVAC Duct - Units 1, 2, 3 Description This modification was required to replace missing hardware and repair damaged concrete around the anchor bolts for HVAC duct supports.
| |
| Safety Evaluation This modification will result in seismic Class I supports.for the HVAC ,
| |
| duct. Therefore, the probability or consequences of an accident or '
| |
| malfunction of equipment important to safety, previously evaluated in the SAR, is not increased.
| |
| ECN P7199 Modification to Transformer Tap Settings - Units 1 and 2 Description The scope of this ECN is to change the transformer tap settings to avoid overvoltage or undervoltage to the safety-related SDBDs and to control i bay vent boards A and B. ? l t
| |
| l 0
| |
| 194 1
| |
| 1
| |
| | |
| l ECN P7199 (Continued)
| |
| Safety Evaluation.
| |
| This modification is in accordance with the electrical baseline program for fuel load which covers all possible operating modes of the plant when power is supplied from offsite sources. Calculations demonstrate that no adverse affect on safety is created by this modification. Therefore, the margin of safety has not been reduced.
| |
| ECN P7200 Modification to FPC - Unit 2 Description The ECN installed siphon breaking vents in the bottom of anti-siphon check valves 78-526 and 78-527. This will prevent draining the fuel pool by breaking the siphon that would form following a line break upstream of the check valves.
| |
| Safety Evaluation This modification limits siphoning of the fuel pool water after-a line break upstream of the check valves. Calculations support this modification. Furthermore, this modification does not adversely affect I
| |
| the operation or function of the system. Therefore, the margin of safety has not been redur.ed.
| |
| DCN H0119A Replace Secondary Power Feed for Radio System Combiners - Unit 0 Description The proposed activity will disconnect the existing power feed for the combiner and determinate on the repeater in parallel'with the feed from battery board 2, panel 8, located in the vital area.
| |
| Safety Evaluation This activity involves nonsafety-related equipment in the turbine building which is not related to any accident evaluated in the FSAR.
| |
| This activity only adds an insignificant nonsafety-related load to the '
| |
| emergency backed power source. The modification has been evaluated to determine all possible electrical or physical effects on the safety-related systems in the circuit and was shown not to increase the probability of any accident previously evaluated in the FSAR. This activity could not reduce the margin of safety defined In the basis for any TS.
| |
| 195
| |
| | |
| DCN H0143A Install Isolation Damper in Control Room Relief Vent and Associated Control Air Tubing - Unit 0 Description CAQR BFP870591 and CAQR BFP870956 identified possible leakage paths into the control bay 3C level that could introduce an unanalyzed source of unfiltered outside air into the control bay habitability zone. The review of these CAQRs found that the existing modulating damper associated with the 3C elevation vent could fail to open. To provide positive isolation during accident conditions, this modification-installed an isolation damper utilizing the existing isolation logic and control air for actuation.
| |
| Safety Evaluation The proposed modification will upgrade the existing HVAC system to ensure that the emergency pressurization system will function as described in Section 10.12.5.3 of the FSARt The design of the new damper installation will be identical to the existing isolation dampers (FC0 31-150B, D, E &
| |
| F) described in the FSAR. The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR is not increased, nor is the margin of safety defined in the TS reduced.
| |
| DCh H0157A Replace Cables to Motor Heaters on CS Pumps 2B/20 - Unit 2 Description This modification includes replacement of cables 2ES2556-II, 2ES2519-II, and 2E3308-II which had suffered water damage. The change includes replacement of cables and adding junction boxes to allow splicing and pulling new cables. These cables supplied power to motor heaters and thermostat control circuits for CS pumps 2B and 20.
| |
| Safety Evaluation This modification has no adverse effects on safety. There is no change in the function of any system. Cables are being replaced with same sized cables. The new cables are Class IE and environmentally qualified. The existing conduits carrying these cables are seismically qualified.
| |
| Additional supports are supplied for the added junction box. Condui,ts were sealed and drains were added to junction boxes and fittings to' l prevent future water damage. The replacement does not create a I possibility for a malfunction of equipment of a different type than any previously evaluated in the SAR.
| |
| 196 1
| |
| | |
| DCN N0269A Modify Existing SGTS Duct Support - Unit 3 J
| |
| Description 1he existing duct support at the suction of the unit 3 SGTS was modified to resolve SCRBFNCEB8603 and to ensure operability of the SGTS during a seism!c event. 4 I
| |
| 1 lafety Evaluation The modification ensures the SGTS seismic Class I support design requirements are satisfied as described in the FSAR. The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR is not increased.
| |
| The change will not affect the function or operation of any equipment described in the TS. Based on this, the margin of safety as defined in TS is not reduced.
| |
| DCN H271B Install SGTS Duct Support - Unit 3 Description The additional duct support at the suction of the unit 3 SGTS was installed to resolve SCRBFNCEB8603 and to ensure operability of the SGTS during a seismic event.
| |
| Safety Evaluation The modification ensures the SGTS seismic Class I support design requirements are satisfied as described in the FSAR. The probability of
| |
| )
| |
| occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment '
| |
| important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR is not increased.
| |
| The change will not affect the function or operation of any equipment described in the TS. Based on this, the margin of safety as defined in TS is not reduced.
| |
| DCN H02728 SGTS HVAC Modification - Unit 0 Description This DCN modifies existing HVAC supports and adds new HVAC supports to the SGTS in order to qualify the SGTS to seismic Class I requirements.
| |
| Safety Evaluation This modification is seismically qualified and will not affect the l function or operation of the SGTS or any other system. Therefore, plant safety is not affected by thi; modification.
| |
| 1 l
| |
| l 197 1
| |
| l . _ _ _ _ . ______________A
| |
| | |
| DCN WO429A Modify Existing SGTS Duct Support - Unit 1 Description The existing duct support at the suction of the unit 1 SGTS was modified to resolve SCRBFNCEB8603 and to ensure operability of the SGTS during a seismic event.
| |
| Safety Evaluation The modification ensures the SGTS seismic Class I support design requirements are satisfied as described in the FSAR. The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR is not increased.
| |
| The change will not affect the function or operation of any equipment described in the TS. Based on this, the margin of safety as defined in TS is not reduced.
| |
| DCN N0430A Install SGTS Duct- Supports - Unit 1 Description .
| |
| The additional duct support at the unit 1 SGTS was installed to resolve SCRBFNCEB8603 and to ensure operability of the SGTS during a seismic event.
| |
| Safety Evaluation l The modification ensures the SGTS seismic Class I support design requirements are satisfied as described in the FSAR. The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR is not increased.
| |
| The change will not affect the function or operation of any equipment l described in the TS. Based on this, the margin of safety as defined in.
| |
| i TS is not reduced.
| |
| DCN H0849A Install Demineralized Hater Lines - Unit 0 Description Demineralized water lines and a waste line were installed under the protected area fence to the southeast side of the intake structure. This i
| |
| will establish a permanent connection for the portable demineralized water trailer outside of the protected area. ;
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| Safety Evaluation The system involved is not required to serve any safety functions directly related to safe shutdown of the reactor. The proposed change is not applicable to any accident evaluated in the FSAR. )
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| 198 I
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| l SAFETY EVALUATIONS FOR PARTIAL PLANT MODIFICATIONS ECN Ll656 Provide CCW to the Experimental Greenhouse - Units 1, 2, 3 Description This modification installed warm 5:ater supply coming from the CCW system to the waste heat demonstration greenhouse. All work has been completed except HS97-2 which has not yet been installed per workplan 6509.
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| Safety Evaluation The greenhouse water supply system under this modification does not have any safety function. Also, both mechanical and electrical tie-ins will be on systems that are in no way safety related (CCH and electrical distribution).
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| ECN Ll791 Modify Steam Jet Air Ejection (SJAE) System - Unit 2 Description ~
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| The modification consisted of adding a new set of controls to assure adequate hydrogen-oxygen dilution in the off-gas system at 100 percent reactor power. The change included new conduits and supports in the control bay area and turbine building.
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| Safety Evaluation The off-gas system is not safety-related. This modification provides automatic protective circuitry to reduce the potential for hydrogen accumulation sufficient to cause a burn. This modification does not impact the analysis performed in the FSAR and does not reduce the margin of safety for the plant.
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| ECN L1965 Modifications to the CRD Scram Air Pilot Solenoid Valves
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| - Units 1 and 3 Description This modification replaced the existing 0-rings in the solenoid head assembly of CRD HCU solenoid valves 117 and 118 with Parker Seal 0-rings of a different material and compound number. The heat generated in the head assembly caused the existing 0-rings to harden and crack. This allowed air leakage out of the head assembly.
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| 199
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| ECN L1965 (Continued) .
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| ' Safety Evaluation i All foreseen consequences and possibilities of malfunction due to this modification have been evaluated. No possibility for a different type of accident or safety equipment malfunction is envisioned. The probability or consequences of an accident or safety equipment malfunction will not be increased.
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| ~~4 P0007 Plant Security System - Units 1, 2, 3 Description i This modification was initiated to relocate equipment from the unit I control room to the unit 3 control room, to modify the equipment layout of the Central Alarm Station (CAS), and '. extend the CCTV control and
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| . communications to the Secondary Alarm Station (SAS). Although this ,
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| 1 modification has not been fully implemented, additional work was completed for the communications position in the CAS and SAS.
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| Safety Evaluation 4
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| The modifications completed to date are determined to be within the scope of the USQD and the probability or consequences of an accident or safety '
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| equipment malfunction will not be increased.
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| ECN P0009 Plant Security System - Units 1, 2, 3 i
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| Description !
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| i This modification provided additional card readers and alarms and '
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| replaced existing card readers. Although this modification has not been fully implemented, the additional work consisted of a drawing update and was a documentation only change.
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| Safety Evaluation This modification replaced the existing card reader system with a higherThe quality system of greater capacity to allow improved access control.
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| new system will be compatible with the vital area alarm system and will meet the requirements of 10CFR73.55. The probability or consequences of an accident or safety equipment malfunction will not be increased by this modification.
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| 200
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| . i 9
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| ECN P0027 Spent Fuel Storage - Units 1, 2, 3 Description This modification installed high density spent fuel storage racks to increase storage capacity. Six additional racks were installed for unit
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| * 2.
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| Safety Evaluation
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| ~
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| Seismic qualification of the racks and their arrangements were evaluated and approved. NRC approval was obtained prior to implementation of the ECN. :The margin of safety will be enhanced with the complete implementation of this ECN.
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| ECN P0085 Containment Spray System Upgrade - Units 1, 2, 3 Description This modification was.to upgrade the existing drywell temperature and pressure instrumentation and annunciators used for.the manual. initiation of containment spray by the unit operator. When this ECN is fully implemented, the instrumentation and annunciators for this function will be redundant and fully divisionalized. Although this modification has not been fully implemented, additional work was completed on unit 2 with the installation of cable and conduit.
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| Safety Evaluation The modifications completed to date are within the scope of the USQD which documents the final design configuration for the drywell pressure and temperature instrumentation.
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| ECN P0238 Add Two 550,000 Gallon CSTs - Unit 0 Description This modification will add two CSTs to temporarily store torus and l-reactor vessel cavity water during outages. This modification was partially completed by installing foundations for storage tanks 4 and 5.
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| Safety Evaluation The addition of the tank foundations will not affect any of the l
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| safety-related structures of the plant. Even when the tank and its l Instrumentation are installed, there will be no possibility of an l accident or equipment malfunction of a different type than any previously l
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| evaluated in the FSAR. The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any TS will not be reduced.
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| l l
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| i 201
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| ECN P0284 Modify.MSRV Acoustic Monitors - Onit'2
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| ' Description This modification provided the addition of an acoustic valve position for the MSRVs. The physical. work performed in this period consisted of installing transient shields. The installation of the monitors is in response to NUREG 0578.
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| Safety Evaluation The addition of the MSRV acoustic monitors provides additional monitoring capability of the MSRV. This change adds redundancy to an existing function and provides a positive indication of the valve status to the control room. No new function is performed by the additional monitoring. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a
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| 'different type than any.previously evaluated in the SAR is not created.
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| The margin of safety as defined in the basis for this or any TS is not reduced.
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| ECN P0305 Remove / Replace Propane Ignitor System o.n Auxiliary Boilers A, B, and C - Unit 0 Description This change consisted of removing and isolating the present propane
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| ~
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| ignitors on auxiliary boilers A, B, and C, and replacing them with high intensity spark ignitors.
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| Safety Evaluation The auxiliary boiler is not safety-related and is physically separated from safety-related buildings and equipment such that no interaction is ensured. This change does not create a possibility for an accident or-malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the SAR. Thus, the margin of safety as defined in the TS is not reduced.
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| ECN P0320 Provide Onsite Storage Facility for Low Level Radwaste - Unit O.
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| Description This modification consists of partial construction of a storage facility for permanent onsite low level radwaste to provide at least one year of interim onsite storage in a secured area. Tbc physical work for this period consisted of installation of general area security lights and electrical supply for a crane.
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| l l
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| 202
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| l l q ECN P0320 (Continued)
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| Safety Evaluation i
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| This modification when completed will provide a secured area facility for onsite storage of low level radwaste. Storage of radwaste will not be permitted without NRC approval. Until storage is permitted, the facility will not create a possibility for an ~ accident or malfunction different than'any previously analyzed. When radwaste is allowed to be stored i there, its discharge will be the subject of future analysis.
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| Ii ECN P0322 Install Hide Range Containment Pressure Instrumentation - Unit 2 !
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| Description l-This modification installed PT-64-160 A and B to measure' containment i pressure over the range of 0 to 300 psig. This change is required to comply with the. requirements of NUREG 0578. The pressure transmitters are fully qualified units, seismically installed with IE power sources.
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| Safety Evaluation These containment pressure monitors will not mitigate any safety-related automatic function. They are used by control room operators to. assess the type of accident when alarms are initiated. This upgrade ensures that a sufficient number of surveillance instruments are operable to provide the operator with a clear understanding of plant conditions.
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| These redundant instruments, in conjunction with existing low-level pressure instruments, allow an operator to differentiate between small and large pipe breaks. This change will not adversely affect any safety-related function or indication. Thus, no margin of safety as defined in TS has been reduced.
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| ECN P0324 Install High Range Containment Radiation Monitors - Unit 2 Description This modification ins'.alled two divisionally separated, seismically and environmentally qualified radiation monitors (RE-90-272C, -273C, RM-90-272C and -273C), including conduits and cables, inside the drywell. This change is required to comply with NUREG 0737 and Regulatory Guide 1.97. The physical work completed during this period included installation of the' detector mounting brackets, addition of conduit and junction boxes, and installation of control room panels.
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| 203 1
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| i
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| - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ - - _ _ _ - _ _ I
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| l ECN P03241 Continued)
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| Safety Evaluation The high range containment radiation monitors are required to provide an indication and record of the radiation levels of the containment atmosphere after an accident. The information helps the operator understand the post-accident conditions inside the containment. The monitors will not initiate any automatic function required to mitigate an' accident. No possibility for an accident or malfunction is created by installing these units.
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| ECN P0354 Install Plant Stack Effluent Radiation Monitoring System - Unit 2 Description This modification added a permanent radiation monitoring system at the plant stack to meet NRC extended range effluent monitoring requirements of NUREG 0737. This included adding a- probe in the stack, installing condult and cables, installing sample lines to the local panel, and installing. indicating and recording equipment in the control room.
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| Safety Evaluation This modification upgrades the monitoring equipment at the plant vent stack. The system performs no automatic safety-related functions. It enhances the operator's ability to assess accident conditions. The probability of occurrence or consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety is not increased. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any TS is not reduced.
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| ECN P0360 Modify Torus Tie-Downs and Supports - Unit 2 Description These modifications are part of the long term torus integrity modification which have been ongoing since 1981. Physical work during this period consisted of modifying the chamber on the torus tie-down bracket assembly and installing new ring girder stiffener plates.
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| Safety Evaluation The torus integrity modifications have significantly increased the capability of the torus to withstand loadings postulated during operational and accident conditions. Therefore, the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the SAR is not created, j
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| l 204
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| ECN P0362 ModifyMSRVSupporlts-Unit 2 Description This change-is part of the long term torus integrity program and involved evaluating and modifying MSRV pipe supports. The physical work included modifying MSRV struts and clamps inside the torus, installing. jet deflector rings on MSRV lines, adjusting spring cams and wonder box ring gaps, as-constructing drawings, and reinspecting numerous hangers and supports.
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| Safety Evaluation These modifications enhance the ability of MSRV supports and piping hangers to withstand normal, seismic, and thermal loadings. The upgrade.
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| enhances system performance. The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the SAR is not increased. Thus, the margin of safety as defined in TS is not reduced.
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| ECN P0370 Evaluated and Modified Masonry Walls - Units 1, 2, 3 Description
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| : i. This change consisted of identifying, evaluating by calculation for i seismic responses, and modifying, as necessary, masonry walls throughout the plant. This effort is in response to NRC IE Bulletin 80-11. The calculations made either qualified existing installations or qualified the modifications as required.
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| Safety Evaluation The qualification and/6r upgrading of masonry walls will ensure compliance with the design of these walls analyzed in the SAR. This will ensure that equipment important to safety remains available to perform its intended safety function (s) during or following a seismic / tornado event. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any TS will not be reduced.
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| ECN P0570 Replace Vibration Damper with Gear-Type on DG C - Units 1, 2, 3 Description This modification will install a gear-type vibration damper in place of the damper that is currently installed to limit vibrations in the crankshaft of the DG engine. The gear-type damper is externally lubricated and has a longer design-life than the sealed lubrication viscous dampers. The gear-type damper is a direct from the manufacturer replacement for the viscous type that is no longer made.
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| 205
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| ECN P0570 (Continued) .
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| " Safety Evaluation The gear-type damper performs the same function as the viscous type damper a'nd does not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety. Installation of a gear-type damper increases the reliability of the DG. The margin of safety as defined in the TS is not reduced.
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| ECN P0634 Modify Operator's Front Console 9 Units 1 and 2 Description This modification consisted of drilling holes in the MCR operator console in preparation for installation of the new plant process computer control room consoles. This change is a small portion of the physical work of installing the computer which is called for by this ECN.
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| Safety Evaluation The plant process computer system is not safety-related and this modification does not reduce the margin of safety for existing plant equipment.
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| ECN P0641 and P0645 Addition of Buildings - Unit 0 Descr50 tion This ECN idds three buildings (field services, plant administration, and plant shop) to facilitate and enhance routine plant operation.
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| Interfacing systems (fluid and electrical) will be addressed under a separate ECN.
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| Safety Evaluation The addition of these buildings will not affect the function or operation of any safety system. Therefore, plant safety is not affected. i i
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| ECN P0697 Add a Non-Safety Grade Air Conditioning System - Unit 2 Description This change includes provisions for a redundant, nonsafety grade air conditioning system to serve the process computer room, existing ccmputer rooms, communication room, and communication battery board room. The modification will include a P distribution of safety-grade air provided i
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| by the existing system to other control bay rooms on elevation 593.0', as )
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| required. There was a partial completion of this ECN during this period.
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| 206 f
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| ECN P0697 (Continued)
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| Safety Evaluation Upon completion of this modification there will be adequate cooling for several new systems being added to the facility. These include the -
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| process computer from ECN P0634, the torus temperature monitoring system from ECN P0533, and numerous other additional equipment in the control building. Calculations were made to verify that adequate cooling is supplied to rooms containing safety-related equipment. Therefore, the probability of an accident previously evaluated in the SAR is not increased.
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| ECN P0704 Removal of Cab l$s to Disable Circuit Breakers in RMOV BD 1A and IB - Un?t '
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| Description The circuit breakers being disabled are for the RHR head spray system.
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| that has been partially removed and abandoned in place. Since the subject valves are no longer f.ur.ctional, there is no longer a need for the valve logic circuitry.
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| Safety Evaluation The removal of the RHR head spray system was previously evaluated and proven not to be a safety concern. Since the system is no longer functional, there is no need for the valve logic circuitry. This modification does not reduce the margin of safety.
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| l ECN P0732 Replace Existing Sewage Treatment System with a Sewage Treatment Lagoon System - Unit 0 Description A three stage type lagoon system will be located north of the 500-KV switchyard area. A new sewage lift station and associated piping is also added. No piping modifications were made inside any buildings.
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| Safety Evaluation The plant sewage system is not safety-related and does not interrelate with any safety-related system other than structures. However, this ECN is not modifying any of the sewage system piping inside any structures.
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| Therefore, the probability of an accident or malfunction is not increased and the margin of safety is not reduced.
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| i 1
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| I 207 i
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| ECN P0738 Security System Modifications - Security Access Enclosures and Door Controls - Unit 0 Description This modification installed access enclosures (cages) in the turbine building elevation 565' and electric door control devices in accordance with the Physical Security Plan (PSP). These changes affect the control of access into and within the reactor building and primary containment.
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| Safety Evaluation l
| |
| This modification will not adversely affect any safety-related function or equipment. It will enhance security and reduce the possibility for personnel induced failure. The probability of an accident or. malfunction of equipment important to safety is not increased and the margin of safety is not reduced.
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| ECN P0746 Install Fire Protection For Design Ser-vices Modular Building
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| - Unit 0
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| ^
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| Description This modification adds fire protection water lines for the design services modular lease space. The source of water is from the low-level radwaste facility fire protection potable water loop.
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| Safety Evaluation The low-level radwaste area fire protection lines are not essential to safe operation. No safety-related structures have been affected by this modification. Therefore, the probability of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety has not increased and the margin of safety has not been reduced.
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| ECN P0755 Raw Water for Plant Services Engineering Building - Unit 0 Description This modification provides architectural details such as lighting, grading, landscaping, drainage, as well as fire protection for new office space.
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| Safety Evaluation The features of this modification are not safety-related. The new office space will be sufficiently anchored so that the possibility of these structures becoming tornado missiles is minimized. The fire protection water is taken from a nonsafety source. This modification does not increase the probability of an accident or malfunction of safety-related equipment or reduce the safety margin.
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| 208
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| ~
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| ECN P0808 Replace 250V DC' Feeder Cable - Unit 2 Description This is a change to comply with 10CFR50, Appendix R. It consisted of modifying conduit and cable runs for cables 3B18 and 876, and replacing -
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| cable 2B281 with a bigger size cable. Seismic and load calculations were performed to verify acceptability of these changes.
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| Safety Evaluation l
| |
| The new cables / raceways serve the same function as the former cables / raceways and meet material and construction standards applicable to the 250V DC system. In addition, the changes meet separation criteria and enhance the operating characteristics of the protective device for the system involved. Overall circuit reliability has not been degraded, nor has the probability of occurrence of an accident previously evaluated in tne FSAR been increased.
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| ECN P0851 Installation of Evacuation Alarm Interfaces - Unit 0 Description The scope of this ECN is to add a permanent training facility at BFN.
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| The scope addressed here is the installation of an evacuation alarm interface between the training facility and MCR.
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| Safety Evaluation The training facilitv and its interfacing systems do not have any adverse affect on safety-related equipment or systems, and are not required for any DBE. Therefore, the margin of safety has not been reduced.
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| ECN P0863 Fabricate and Install Seismic Conduit Supports - Unit 2 Description This ECN provided inspections, engineering evaluations, analyses, calculations, and drawings to seismically qualify conduits located in Class I structures. Supports were added or moved to new locations to qualify all the supports on numerous systems.
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| Safety Evaluation This upgraded the seismic qualification of numerous conduit runs on various systems. Based on the results of this ECN, no new accident possibilities are created and the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any TS is not reduced.
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| 209
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| | |
| ECN P0905 Power Stores and Flammable Liquids Storage Facilities - Unit 0 Description This modification _ adds a power stores facility and flammable liquids storage facility outside the security area. The scope of work included buildings and interfaces for storage activities including shipping, receiving, flammable liquids storage, and yard storage.
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| Safety Evaluation These facilities serve no safety function and do not adversely affect any l safety-related equipment in the plant. The probability of an accident or l
| |
| malfunction.of equipment is not increased and the margin of safety is not reduced.
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| ECN P0923 Construct East-West Service Road - Unit 0 Description -
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| This modification provides a permanent paved east-west service road connecting the design services building and the site eas* entrance road including a right turn lane.
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| Safety Evaluation This modification is outside the security area of the plant and is not associated with any plant operating system or equipment. This modification will not increase the probability or the consequences of an accident or equipment malfunction, nor will it reduce the margin of shfety.
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| ECN P0930 Modify / Install Conduit Supports in Reactor Building - Unit 2 Description This modification provides engineering design and physical modification to seismically support conduit systems in the unit 2 reactor building at elevations 565' and 593'. This modification is only for conduits installed prior to May 1984. This change is for interim operation of unit 2 for cycle 5. l l
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| Safety Evaluation These modifications are required to satisfy the seismic support requirements for Class IE conduit in Class I structures. Since this modification enhances the reliability of the system without changing the system operation, the probability of an accident or malfunction are not increased and the margin of safety is not reduced.
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| 210
| |
| | |
| t ECN P0933 Modify / Install'Coriduit Supports in Reactor Building - Unit 2' Description This modification provides engineering design and physical _ modification.
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| to seismically support conduit systems in the unit 2 reactor building at elevations 565' and 593'.. This modification is only for. condu'its '
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| installed prior to May 1984. This change is for interim operation of-unit 2 for cycle 5.
| |
| Safety Evaluation These modifications are required to satisfy the seismic support requirements for Class IE conduit in Class I structures. -Since this-modification enhances the reliability of the system without changing the system operation, the probability of an accident or malfunction are not 1 increased and the margin of safety is not reduced.
| |
| ECN P0957 Modifications of Recirculation System - Unit 2 Description Replaced and/or modified part of the existing recirculation system piping susceptible to IGSCC with an improved stainless steel material.that has increased resistance to 'IGSCC. The major portion of the field work covered by the ECN has been completed. Some minor work remains to complete the ECN.
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| Safety Evaluation All structures and components affected by this modification were replaced / repaired with equivalent or better materials which meet or exceed current design requirements. The modification does not adversely affect the system operation. Therefore, the margin of safety will not be reduced.
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| ECN P0984 Installation of Digital Microwave System - Unit 0 Description This modification implements the installation of a new digital microwave system :nd associated equipment for microwave circuit 8610. The physical work completed this period consisted of replacing existing microwave equipment.
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| Safety Evaluation Since there is no safety-related equipment in the communications room, in the turbine building, or in the training center yard and since the 48V DC power system does not have a nuclear safety-related function, the replacement of the microwave system does not create a safety concern.
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| Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any TS is not reduced.
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| 211 j
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| ECN P0999 Replace Upper und Lower RHR Pump Impeller Wear Rings - Unit 2
| |
| " Description This modification is required as a result of NRC IE Bulletin 86-39. The reason for the replacement of the wear rings is to provide alternate materials to alleviate RHR pump impeller wear ring cracking. The replacement wear rings have a lower hardness value'to reduce problems with cracking.
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| Safety Evaluation These modifications will reduce the cracking problem for the upper and I lower RHR pump impeller wear rings. Only the material type and its hardness value were changed. The change will improve the safety furction of the RHR system by reducing pump susceptibility to failures from There will be no change in the operation of the pump. Any IGSCC.
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| failures that occur would be similar to those already evaluated in the SAR. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined'in TS is not reduced.
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| ECN P2085 Documentation of As-Built HPCI Configuration - Unit 2 Description The scope of-this ECN is to document the as-built configuration and seismic acceptability of hangers in the HPCI system.
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| Safety Evaluation This is a documentation change which will eflect the as-built configuration of HPCI hangers. Analysis snows that the as-built system is equal to or better than the original system design. This modification does not alter or adversely affect the function or operation of the system. Therefore, the margin of safety has not been reduced.
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| ECN P2147 Modifications of Pipe Supports - Unit 2 Description This ECN was written for documentation only to accept as-built configurations of the drywell and torus purge piping where no support modifications were required.
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| 212
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| ~
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| ECN P2147-(Continued)
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| Safety Evaluation Engineering analyses were performed to confirm that the as-built piping configuration met all design. loads. Since no physical modifications were -
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| made and pipe stress analyses have demonstrated acceptability, this ECN 4 will not increase the probability of occurrence of an accident previously 'l evaluated in the SAR, nor reduce the margin of safety defined in-the TS.
| |
| ECN P3019 Replace Non-Qualified Pressure Switches - Unit 2 Description This modification replaced PS-71-lC, -10, -11A, -118, -llc, -110 and -21 with qualified switches to meet NRC IE Bulletin 79-018 requirements.
| |
| Safety Evaluation Thenewqualified.equipmentmeets[hesamerequirementsandperformsthe same function as the original equipment. Therefore, with increased reliability and same function as the original equipment, the new qualified equipment does not create or increase the probability of occurrence of an accident previously described in the FSAR. Likewise, the margin of safety defined in the TS is not reduced.
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| ECN P3022 Replace Non-Qualified PS-73-29 Unit 2 Description This modification replaced PS-73-29-1 with a qualified switch to meet NRC IE Bulletin 79-018.
| |
| Safety Evaluation I The new qualified equipment meets the same requirements and performs the same function as the original equipment. Therefore, with increased reliability and same function as the original equipment, the new quallfled equipment does not create or increase the possibility of occurrence of an accident previously described in the FSAR. Likewise, the margin of safety defined in the TS is not reduced.
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| 213
| |
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| ~
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| ECN P3051 Replace Non-Qualified Pressure Dif.ferential Switches - Unit 2
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| * Description This modification replaced pressure differential switches (PDIS)-64-20 and -21 to meet NRC IE Bulletin 79-018. This modification also involved changing contacts 63-64-20 and -21 to normally open to permit the vacuum breakers to open in the event of loss of power to the inverter. This I
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| change returned the operability of the vacuum breakers to full automatic, j fail open operation as originally described in the FSAR.
| |
| Safety Evaluation The new qualified equipment meets the same requirements and performs the same function as the original equipment. Therefore, with increased reliability and same function as the o 'ginal equipment, the new qualified equipment does not create or increase the possibility of occurrence of an accident previously described in.the FSAR. Likewise, the margin of safety defined in the TS is not reduced.
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| ECN P3116 Modification to HPCI Components - Unit 2 Description This modification replaced motors in and regeared various HPCI FCVs.
| |
| This change was made to comply with NRC IE. Bulletin 79-018.
| |
| Safety Evaluation This modification increases the reliability of the valves because the valves are upgraded to environmentally qualified. In addition, the new equipment meets or exceeds all the same qualifications as the old equipment with the addition of environmental qualification. Furthermore, the function of these valves has not been altered by this modification.
| |
| Therefore, the margin of safety has not been reduced.
| |
| ECN P3184 Modification to HPCI Equipment - Unit 2 Description The modifications performed under the scope of this ECN are the replacement / relocation of HPCI turbine control and electrical components, and the replacement and calibration of PS-73-47A and PS-73-47B Safety Evaluation These modifications do not change the design, function, or capability of any system component. Replacement equipment will be qualified electrically and environmentally to requirements equal to or greater than that of the originally installed equipment. Therefore, the margin of safety has not been reduced.
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| 214
| |
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| ?
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| ECN P5041 As-Construction of Outstanding Drawing for Primary Containment System - Unit 0 -
| |
| Description The description of the ECN is to remove instruments ME-64-111 -ME-64-112, ME-64-113, ME-64-il4, and PT-64-115 and store them for occasional use.
| |
| during drywell: leak rate tests. However, the applicable portion of the work to be described here is the as-construction of outstanding drawings for ECN closure.
| |
| Safety Evaluation This ECN removed instruments that are not required for normal plant operation r,or provide -any safety-related function during plant operation. These instruments are used for testing during the drywell leak rate test. This portion of work as-constructed applicable plant drawings. -Therefore, the margin of safety has not been reduced.
| |
| ECN P5069 As-Construct Drawings for DG Fuel Oil Transfer System - Unit 0 Description This ECN involves a documentation change to delete fuel oil transfer pump . s.
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| strainer blowdown valves 18-580A, 18-5808, 18-580C, 18-5800, 18-581A, 18-581B, 18-581C, and 18-5810 from the flow diagram and valve lists, because these valves were never installed. The presently installed drain plugs perform the same function as these valves.
| |
| Safety Evaluation This ECN documents the actual plant configuration. The use of the drain plugs instead of the valves does not alter the function of the system or introduce any new failure modes which could adversely affect safety-related functions of equipment. Therefore, the margin of safety has not been reduced.
| |
| ECN P5235 Master Facilities Plan 4KV Electrical Loop Line - Unit 0 Description This ECN provided the design for a new 4KV loop line to provide permanent power to existing and future site facilities outside of the powerhouse (BFN training center, contract engineers trailer complex, etc.). Work performed this year included the modification of the 4KV cooling tower switchgear 70 which powers the 4KV loop line. Changes to switchgear 7D included wiring, relays, current transformer, and cable terminations.
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| 215 i l
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| 1
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| ~
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| ECN P5235 (Continued) -
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| )
| |
| Safety Evaluation This line does not provide power to any equipment that has a nuclear safety function. An evaluation was performed which concludes that a {
| |
| falling pole or line will not damage or degrade any of.the plant's safety features. The loop line interface with the cooling tower switchgear is 1 of a design that will prevent the new 4KV loop line from jeopardi:ing other equipment powered from the cooling tower switchgear. Based on this, the new 4KV loop line will not adversely affect any of the plant systems or features required for safe shutdown.
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| ECN P5256 Communications System Modification - Units 1, 2, 3 Description The existing ground fault protection system is to be replaced with a fiber optic cable (underground) which provides greater capacity and meets South Central. Bell's criteria for high voltage protection. A new fiber l optic cable from the Elk River office to BFN and a new telephone are .
| |
| included in this ECN. Work perfor.med this year included the termination of new telephone entrance cables in the telephone hut.
| |
| Safety Evaluation The installation of the new ground fault protection equipment has no adverse affect on any safety-related function, system, or component.
| |
| This modification upgrades the phone system to South Central Bell's requirements. The margin of safety has not been reduced.
| |
| ECN P5327 Documentation Only Change to Control Building Chilled Water Recirculation Pumps - Unit 0 Description This modification addresses a revision to drawing 47W935-2 to provide inspection criteria to ensure the work performed under TACF 0-85-028-031 meets the requirements of permanent plant design. A note on the drawing added minimum thitiness dimensions. In addition, the drawing revision picks up a spacer that was installed under the TACF.
| |
| Safety Evaluation This documentation only char.ge will not provide additional modes of failure. Documenting the "as-constructed" status of the equipment will provide an accurate base of knowledge on which to base future design or operations. No physical work was done as a result of this ECN which would impact any actual existing margin of safety already built into plant equipment.
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| 216
| |
| | |
| l 1
| |
| ECN P5385 Modification to Cable Tray Supports - Unit 2 Description The scope of this ECN is to modify existing cable tray supports that are inadequate for the loads on them for interim seismic qualification based on a cable tray / support evaluation.
| |
| Safety Evaluation This ECN makes-modifications to cable tray supports so that the cable tray designs will be seismically qualified for interim operation of unit 2. This modification does not have any adverse affect on the function or operation of plant systems. Therefore, the margin of safety has not been reduced.
| |
| ECN P5409 Voice and Data Cables - Units 1, 2, 3 Description
| |
| .This ECN provides cables for voice and data communication to the contract engineering office modules north of the plant site. The cable is routed from the plant communications room, through the cable spreading room, the turbine building cable gallery and the plant yard, to the contract engineering office modules. This ECN does not include connection of this-cable with the plant communications system.
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| Safety Evaluation New supports have been analyzed to determine seismic integrity.
| |
| Evaluations have been performed to show that the existing support's seismic integrity will not be adversely affected. In addition, all fire barriers penetrated are resealed in accordance with plant procedures.
| |
| Further, these new cables perform no safety-related function and are not connected to any safety-related system. Therefore, there is no impact on safety.
| |
| ECN P5432 Addition of a Local Area Network - Unit 0 Description This ECN provides a new plant data switch and a local area network to support additional onsite engineering services.
| |
| Safety Evaluation This equipment is for site support services only and will not affect plant safety systems or plant operation. Therefore, there is no impact on safety.
| |
| l 217
| |
| | |
| ~
| |
| ECN P5480 Remove Reactor Pressure Vessel Dra.in Lines - Unit 2
| |
| " Description This modification removed the reactor pressure vessel drain valves HCV-10-503 and -504. Piping supports were modified to adapt to the new piping configuration. .These valves provide a sludge trap and made the surroundings a high radiation source. Materials for this modification are compatible with existing lines and were fabricated to maintain the integrity of reactor pressure boundary.
| |
| Safety Evaluation Implementation of this modification per the ECN requirements ensures the integrity of reactor pressure boundary is maintained. The deleted valves were used only for maintenance purposes and served no safety-related functions other than described above. This modification will not degrade the integrity of the reactor pressure boundary nor will it adversely affect any other safety-related system. Therefore, probability of an-accident or malfunction previously evaluated in the FSAR is not increased and the margin of safety defined in the TS is not reduced. Work on this ECN is field complete and is. ready for closure.
| |
| ECN P5528 Buildings and Structures - Yard Fencing'- Units 1, 2, 3 Description This modification is being implemented to allow the installation of a fenced enclosure south of the 500KV transformer yard fence. This enclosure will be used by power stores as a satellite storage area and issue point.for construction and maintenance materials. This will facilitate the issue of materials without having to go outside the security perimeter. This ECN will also include drawing revisions to reflect the current configuration of the 500KV transformer yard fence.
| |
| Safety Evaluation The. transformer yard fence being modified as part of this ECN is outside the plant and is not associated with any plant operating system or equipment. Therefore, the affected components do not serve a safety function. Based upon these considerations, ECN P5528 will not adversely affect plant safety. USQD Phase II, Revision 1 evaluated the design complete package for this modification.
| |
| 218
| |
| ___ _____ _____ _____ _ _ - _ O
| |
| | |
| TRANSMISSI N LINE CORR! DOR HERBICIDE USAGE JANUARY l. 1988 - DECEMBER 31, 1988 For calendar year 1988, no herbicides were used in maintaining rights-of-way for the transmission lines associated with 8FN.
| |
| 9 219 I
| |
| | |
| ~
| |
| I CHALLENGES TO OR FA! LURES OF MAIN STEAM RELIEF VALVES JANUARY 1, 1988 - DECEMBER 31, 1988 .
| |
| Unit 1 None Unit 2 None Unit 3 None All three units were in cold shutdown during the entire reporting period.
| |
| l 220
| |
| | |
| ~
| |
| I l REACTORYESSELFATIGUEUSAGEEVALUATION
| |
| ( .
| |
| The cumulative usage factors for the reattor vessel are as follows:
| |
| 1 Location Unit 1 Unit 2 Unit 3 j Shell at water line 0.00620 0.00492 0.00431 i
| |
| Feedwater nozzle 0.29782 0.21329 0.16139 i Closure studs 0.24204 0.17629 0.14360 l l
| |
| 221
| |
| | |
| e
| |
| ~
| |
| 1988 OCCUPAT10NAL EXPOSURE DATA i
| |
| l l
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| 222 i i
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| ~
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| ~
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| 59 - - -
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| 2 - - -
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| 9 - - -
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| - S -
| |
| 1 57?R0 _ 9 - -
| |
| 94 327 . 5 - - S e -
| |
| tM sE 7 99 56 . 3 -
| |
| - LF S S3616 7 - S 67503 . 1 - lF 692S2 C 7 2C7 . . r o e - T R 5 0. (. 0 C. E. - A E E. 5 1 21 3 - LP E3C25 . 0 - i E 4 4 . C l - O - 9 67 0 2 . 1 -
| |
| - A E 62907 _ 6 - T R 0. C. E. . .
| |
| T D F* 0?7 0 - T P . - 0 - ?
| |
| - T P 5101 E _ C - O- 41 3 3 _. 4 1 0 '. C 2 Y - - O - 7 CC 02 1 - 1 P 9 1 C R -
| |
| _ 2 -
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| T M 5 - 5 - T M _. 1 - . 1 A - -
| |
| U - - -
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| N - -
| |
| A - -
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| - S - S - S J - R - S
| |
| - R - R
| |
| - TE 1 9205 . 7 - R
| |
| - TE 59006 _ 0 - T E - TE
| |
| - CH 5090 0 _ 5 - CH 59607 . 9 CH 1 0503 . 9 _
| |
| Y - A T . 7 - AT
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| - - CH 50S09 . 9 A 2 9 9 0. E. 80706 _ 3 - A T 607 03 . 6 - A T 60?C0 .3 -
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| - R O . . - RO . _ - RO 1 0005 . 7 - RO 20 D - t 00201 6 - T 70102 _ 2 - T .
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| 1 0 4 9 -
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| S - T
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| - MD 5 5 - ND - 1 - ND 00000 . 0 - ND 00004 . 4 E - ON - ON N - CA
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| 1 G207 . 2 3 1 3 51 TY I 3 60003 _ 9 - T Y F 0005.3 0 005 N
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| A LL I P 0 0 0. C 1 2 LL _.
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| 1
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| [ 3 LL 3 3 33 2 1
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| M - T M I P 91004 -- 4. 1 - I P 00000 . 0 - I P 00001 _ 2
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| - S - S 787 87 . 7 - E 66921 9 - E -
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| N - NE E 697 88 . 8 3 - NE 22712 5 - NE -
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| L - CY 97 8 11006 5 8 __ 4 - OY 27008 _ 7 - NE 47 205 1 F
| |
| 8 I O . . - IO C. 3323 8 -
| |
| CY IO 6332e_1 32806
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| _ 3 -
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| OY I O 20 261 5 -
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| 88 TL 35309 2 - TL 1 4 890 - 3 - TL . . . . . - -
| |
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| 41 - SE -
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| S N S S CN N N E N O N -
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| 84 289 3 N AS 47286 - 9 T AS 54 7 4 1 N AS WP i
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| * L I
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| TR OE 011 1
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| 2 7 1 N A T R OE 211 1
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| 2 - 8
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| T R 7 71 734 _ 4 1 _ 0 -
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| E M R S T N N N ML E U I I I %
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| EC R S A RU - S M S E S 3
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| - N M S R b S 2 N . R C R R P TE E TE i I TE 2 A Y 0 O CI N C! V CH L TE MR A CH -
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| A F - LL 3 2 12106 _ 0 - I O 40006_ 0 - I O 00307 . 7 FL 6 - LL 4 2 . 7 - LL _ 1 -
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| - I O 1 4 7 30 . 5 - OY 5674 1 . 3 - 0Y 90 6e1 _ C - OY 36258 _ 4 4 31 P4 1 - I O 861 80 - 0 - 1 O -
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| T L A P 01 1 1
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| T T - S - S C - E - E 25107 5=9 N - NE 93326- 3 - NE 92904 5=4 U - OY 21162- 4 - CT 94200 F
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| |
| 7 1 T 4 C - C 39;M==9
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| !7 0 E Y T M 7 I = 9 R
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| A U
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| A S J R T E 292 0 1 = 4 CH 5290 2 = 9 Y AT 5 620 9 = 3 A RO . = '
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| D T e1 E07 = 4 S N0 7 = 9 ,
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| E Ot4 CA D'I E %
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| W 7 S 3 M E 9
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| YE T Y 7030 P
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| |
| = T.
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| |
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| |
| N A O T I O T T S C E 28207 = 9 W NE 564 62 = 4 L OY 50 = 6 F I O E. ?. 4 =
| |
| 0 T L 631 C0 = 2 08 A 3925 = 8 09 A fP1 T 6 = 8 J1 SE D
| |
| M A _
| |
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| |
| R A LO 664 83 = 7 OL A S 0790 1 = 9 WP T R 4 4 4 28 = 3 OE 3 = 5 Y R TP OA )
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| |
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| |
| A Y 0 CH MR 0 A T 5G1 00 = 2 R 1 RO 4 I 3 9 = 8 OE > T '
| |
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| |
| R: E YE ET P T Y 0 2307 = 2 PM I O 9 7 = 7 -
| |
| A F LL = 1 -
| |
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| |
| R E .
| |
| E B B M M U U N S N E NE OY 1 p 3 R . = 3r I O 7 560 4 = 4 T L 2 4 4 24 = 8 A P 3 = +
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| |
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| |
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| |
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| |
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| |
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| |
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| |
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| |
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| |
| MR E A 1 11 1 = 6 R B T 1 = 1 OEM S 6
| |
| N fFU S N
| |
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| TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY -
| |
| CH ATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401 SN 157B Lookout Place MAR 301989 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 Gentlemen:
| |
| In the Matter of ) Docket Nos. 50-259 Tennessee Valley Authority ) 260
| |
| )- 50-296 BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (BFN) UNITS 1, 2, AND 3 - ANNUAL OPERATING REPORT FOR JANUARY 1, 1988 - DECEMBER 31, 1988 Enclosed is the annual operating report for BFN for the period of January 1, '
| |
| to December 31, 1988. This report is being submitted to satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59, BFN Technical Specifications Appendix A,
| |
| ^
| |
| Sections 6.9.1.2 and 6.9.2, and BFN Technical Specifications Appendix B, Section 3.2.2. It conD ins a summary of plant conditions, occupational exposure data, reacto: vessel fatigue usage, herbicide usage, liquid and I gaseous releases, challenges to or failures of main steam relief valves, and j safety evaluations for conditions adverse to quality, core component design .
| |
| change requests, Final Safety Analysis Report revisions, new procedures, !
| |
| procedure revisions, special operating conditions, special tests, temporary ;
| |
| alterations, temporary shielding, and plant modifications.. j If you have any questions, please telephone Patrick P. Carter at (205) l 729-3570.
| |
| Very truly yours, t TENNE S VA E AUTHORITY D '
| |
| R. Gr diey, Ma ger Nuclear Licen9m and Regulator' Aft irs Enclosure cc: See page 2
| |
| ' i i
| |
| An Equal opportunity Employer
| |
| | |
| 1-1 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission MAR 301989 l
| |
| l cc (Enclosures):
| |
| Ms. S. C. Black, Assistant Director for Projects TVA Projects Division U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint, North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852
| |
| (
| |
| l Ms. L. J. Watson, Acting Assistant Director l' for Inspection Programs TVA Projects Division l U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission -
| |
| Region II -
| |
| 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323 _
| |
| Director,' Nuclear Engineering and Operations Department
| |
| ! Electric Power Research Institute I
| |
| P. O. Lox 10412
| |
| .Palo Alto, California 94303 INP0 Records Center Institute of Nuclear Power Operations Suite 1500 1100 Circle 75 Parkway Atlanta, Georgia 30389 Browns Ferry Resident Inspector Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Route 12, Box 637 Athens, Alabama 35609-2000 i
| |
| I i
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| 1
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| --}}
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