IR 07200059/2020401: Difference between revisions
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Sincerely, X /RA/ | Sincerely, X /RA/ | ||
Signed by: Fred L. Bower Fred L. Bower, III, Chief Plant Support Branch Division of Reactor Safety | Signed by: Fred L. Bower | ||
Fred L. Bower, III, Chief Plant Support Branch Division of Reactor Safety | |||
===Enclosure:=== | ===Enclosure:=== | ||
Inspection Report No. 07200059/2020401 | Inspection Report No. 07200059/2020401 | ||
REGION I== | REGION I== | ||
INSPECTION REPORT Docket No. 07200059 License No. DPR-28 Report No. 07200059/2020401 Licensee: | INSPECTION REPORT | ||
Address: | |||
Docket No. | |||
07200059 | |||
License No. | |||
DPR-28 | |||
Report No. | |||
07200059/2020401 | |||
Licensee: | |||
Northstar Nuclear Decommissioning Company, LLC (Northstar NDC) | |||
Address: | |||
320 Governor Hunt Rd. | |||
Vernon, VT 05354 | |||
Location Inspected: | |||
Vermont Yankee, Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) | |||
Inspection Dates: | |||
September 15 - 23, 2020 | |||
Inspectors: | |||
Jeremiah Rey, Physical Security Inspector | |||
Kenneth Hussar, Physical Security Inspector | |||
Approved by: | |||
Fred L. Bower, III, Chief | |||
Plant Support Branch | |||
Division of Reactor Safety | |||
REPORT DETAILS | |||
a. Inspection Scope | |||
Inspection | |||
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2690, Inspection Program for Dry Storage of Spent Reactor Fuel at Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards. Starting on March 20, 2020, in response to the National Emergency declared by the President of the United States on the public health risks of the coronavirus (COVID-19), inspectors were directed to begin telework. In addition, regional baseline inspections were evaluated to determine if all or portion of the objectives and requirements stated in the IP could be performed remotely. If the inspections could be performed remotely, they were conducted per the applicable IP. In some cases, portions of an IP were completed remotely and on site. The inspections documented below met the objectives and requirements for completion of the IP. | |||
The inspectors evaluated this area by reviewing the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) security plan, implementing procedures, and records; conducting interviews with responsible security personnel and plant employees; and performing walk-downs of the ISFSI. | The inspectors evaluated this area by reviewing the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) security plan, implementing procedures, and records; conducting interviews with responsible security personnel and plant employees; and performing walk-downs of the ISFSI. | ||
| Line 56: | Line 96: | ||
The inspectors conducted the following specific inspection activities and evaluated the program to determine if: (a) the access authorization program provided reasonable assurance that individuals granted unescorted access to the ISFSI Protected Area (PA) | The inspectors conducted the following specific inspection activities and evaluated the program to determine if: (a) the access authorization program provided reasonable assurance that individuals granted unescorted access to the ISFSI Protected Area (PA) | ||
were trustworthy and reliable and did not constitute an unreasonable risk to public health and safety; (b) procedures were in place to ensure that vehicles accessing the ISFSI had proper authorization and were properly searched; (c) keys, locks, combinations, and associated hardware used in the ISFSI PA were properly controlled; (d) the intrusion detection system (IDS) had the ability to detect and assess unauthorized penetration of the ISFSI PA and adequate response capability existed; (e) alarms for the ISFSI IDS annunciated at an alarm station which was continually staffed; (f) the ISFSI PA was illuminated to facilitate adequate assessment of PA penetration or unauthorized activity; (g) a program was in place for testing and maintenance of the physical protection systems associated with the ISFSI; (h) the spent fuel storage was within a PA and was protected by two barriers; (i) the vehicle barrier system satisfied the design vehicle bomb attack requirements; (j) communications had been established between onsite security forces and a designated response force or local law enforcement agency (LLEA); (k) a | were trustworthy and reliable and did not constitute an unreasonable risk to public health and safety; (b) procedures were in place to ensure that vehicles accessing the ISFSI had proper authorization and were properly searched; (c) keys, locks, combinations, and associated hardware used in the ISFSI PA were properly controlled; (d) the intrusion detection system (IDS) had the ability to detect and assess unauthorized penetration of the ISFSI PA and adequate response capability existed; (e) alarms for the ISFSI IDS annunciated at an alarm station which was continually staffed; (f) the ISFSI PA was illuminated to facilitate adequate assessment of PA penetration or unauthorized activity; (g) a program was in place for testing and maintenance of the physical protection systems associated with the ISFSI; (h) the spent fuel storage was within a PA and was protected by two barriers; (i) the vehicle barrier system satisfied the design vehicle bomb attack requirements; (j) communications had been established between onsite security forces and a designated response force or local law enforcement agency (LLEA); (k) a | ||
security organization with written procedures had been established; (l) members of the security organization were trained, equipped, qualified, and requalified to perform assigned duties; (m) the committed responders provided for an adequate armed response; (n) written response procedures were established and maintained; (o) training included ISFSI activities; (p) safeguards events were being properly reported; (q) audits of the physical protection system were conducted; (r) signs were posted in accordance with requirements; (s) the licensee established an emergency plan; (t) the response force or LLEA had unimpeded access to the ISFSI PA during contingency events; and (u) staffing, procedures, and resources were adequate to protect against radiological sabotage. | security organization with written procedures had been established; (l) members of the security organization were trained, equipped, qualified, and requalified to perform assigned duties; (m) the committed responders provided for an adequate armed response; (n) written response procedures were established and maintained; (o) training included ISFSI activities; (p) safeguards events were being properly reported; (q) audits of the physical protection system were conducted; (r) signs were posted in accordance with requirements; (s) the licensee established an emergency plan; (t) the response force or LLEA had unimpeded access to the ISFSI PA during contingency events; and (u) staffing, procedures, and resources were adequate to protect against radiological sabotage. | ||
b. Findings No findings were identified. | b. Findings | ||
No findings were identified. | |||
Exit Meeting Summary | |||
On September 23, 2020, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Billy Reid Jr., | |||
Site Vice President, and other members of the licensees staff. The inspectors verified that no proprietary information was retained by the inspectors or documented in this report. | Site Vice President, and other members of the licensees staff. The inspectors verified that no proprietary information was retained by the inspectors or documented in this report. | ||
A-2 ATTACHMENT SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION KEY POINTS OF CONTACT Licensee Personnel P. Ryan, Security Manager LIST OF ITEMS OPEN, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Opened None Opened and Closed None Closed None INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 81311, Physical Security Requirements for Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED Procedures Vermont Yankee ISFSI PSP, Revision 0 Vermont Yankee ISFSI Defensive Strategy, Revision 0 VY-SP-17, FFD Program, Revision 2 Condition Reports 2019000043 2019000072 2019000109 2019000015 2019000207 2020000067 2020000049 Condition Reports Generated 202000204 202000205 202000206 202000207 | A-2 | ||
ATTACHMENT SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION KEY POINTS OF CONTACT | |||
Licensee Personnel P. Ryan, Security Manager | |||
LIST OF ITEMS OPEN, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED | |||
Opened None | |||
Opened and Closed None | |||
Closed None | |||
INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED | |||
IP 81311, Physical Security Requirements for Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations | |||
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED | |||
Procedures Vermont Yankee ISFSI PSP, Revision 0 Vermont Yankee ISFSI Defensive Strategy, Revision 0 VY-SP-17, FFD Program, Revision 2 | |||
Condition Reports 2019000043 2019000072 2019000109 2019000015 2019000207 2020000067 2020000049 | |||
Condition Reports Generated 202000204 202000205 202000206 202000207 | |||
}} | }} | ||
Latest revision as of 15:12, 29 November 2024
| ML20294A307 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vermont Yankee File:NorthStar Vermont Yankee icon.png |
| Issue date: | 10/21/2020 |
| From: | Fred Bower Plant Support Branch 1 |
| To: | Reid B Vermont Yankee |
| Bower F | |
| References | |
| IR 2020401 | |
| Download: ML20294A307 (7) | |
Text
October 21, 2020
SUBJECT:
VERMONT YANKEE - INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATION SECURITY INSPECTION REPORT 07200059/2020401
Dear Mr. Reid:
On September 23, 2020, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) security inspection at the Vermont Yankee, Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation in Brattleboro, VT. The inspection covered the licensees physical security plan and the October 16, 2002, Interim Compensatory Measures for Dry Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations Order and was conducted using NRC Inspection Procedure 81311, Physical Security Requirements for Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations.
The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed with you and other members of your staff, on September 23, 2020.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to security and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.
Based on the results of this inspection, no findings were identified.
In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding, of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRCs Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely, X /RA/
Signed by: Fred L. Bower
Fred L. Bower, III, Chief Plant Support Branch Division of Reactor Safety
Enclosure:
Inspection Report No. 07200059/2020401
REGION I==
INSPECTION REPORT
Docket No.
07200059
License No.
Report No.
07200059/2020401
Licensee:
Northstar Nuclear Decommissioning Company, LLC (Northstar NDC)
Address:
320 Governor Hunt Rd.
Vernon, VT 05354
Location Inspected:
Vermont Yankee, Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI)
Inspection Dates:
September 15 - 23, 2020
Inspectors:
Jeremiah Rey, Physical Security Inspector
Kenneth Hussar, Physical Security Inspector
Approved by:
Fred L. Bower, III, Chief
Plant Support Branch
Division of Reactor Safety
REPORT DETAILS
a. Inspection Scope
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2690, Inspection Program for Dry Storage of Spent Reactor Fuel at Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards. Starting on March 20, 2020, in response to the National Emergency declared by the President of the United States on the public health risks of the coronavirus (COVID-19), inspectors were directed to begin telework. In addition, regional baseline inspections were evaluated to determine if all or portion of the objectives and requirements stated in the IP could be performed remotely. If the inspections could be performed remotely, they were conducted per the applicable IP. In some cases, portions of an IP were completed remotely and on site. The inspections documented below met the objectives and requirements for completion of the IP.
The inspectors evaluated this area by reviewing the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) security plan, implementing procedures, and records; conducting interviews with responsible security personnel and plant employees; and performing walk-downs of the ISFSI.
The inspectors: (1) reviewed the access authorization program for the ISFSI; (2) verified and assessed the licensees testing and maintenance program to assure the functionality and reliability of security equipment; and (3) verified that a rapid, capable response to safeguards contingency events had been appropriately developed and effectively implemented.
The inspectors conducted the following specific inspection activities and evaluated the program to determine if: (a) the access authorization program provided reasonable assurance that individuals granted unescorted access to the ISFSI Protected Area (PA)
were trustworthy and reliable and did not constitute an unreasonable risk to public health and safety; (b) procedures were in place to ensure that vehicles accessing the ISFSI had proper authorization and were properly searched; (c) keys, locks, combinations, and associated hardware used in the ISFSI PA were properly controlled; (d) the intrusion detection system (IDS) had the ability to detect and assess unauthorized penetration of the ISFSI PA and adequate response capability existed; (e) alarms for the ISFSI IDS annunciated at an alarm station which was continually staffed; (f) the ISFSI PA was illuminated to facilitate adequate assessment of PA penetration or unauthorized activity; (g) a program was in place for testing and maintenance of the physical protection systems associated with the ISFSI; (h) the spent fuel storage was within a PA and was protected by two barriers; (i) the vehicle barrier system satisfied the design vehicle bomb attack requirements; (j) communications had been established between onsite security forces and a designated response force or local law enforcement agency (LLEA); (k) a
security organization with written procedures had been established; (l) members of the security organization were trained, equipped, qualified, and requalified to perform assigned duties; (m) the committed responders provided for an adequate armed response; (n) written response procedures were established and maintained; (o) training included ISFSI activities; (p) safeguards events were being properly reported; (q) audits of the physical protection system were conducted; (r) signs were posted in accordance with requirements; (s) the licensee established an emergency plan; (t) the response force or LLEA had unimpeded access to the ISFSI PA during contingency events; and (u) staffing, procedures, and resources were adequate to protect against radiological sabotage.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
Exit Meeting Summary
On September 23, 2020, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Billy Reid Jr.,
Site Vice President, and other members of the licensees staff. The inspectors verified that no proprietary information was retained by the inspectors or documented in this report.
A-2
ATTACHMENT SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee Personnel P. Ryan, Security Manager
LIST OF ITEMS OPEN, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Opened None
Opened and Closed None
Closed None
INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED
IP 81311, Physical Security Requirements for Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Procedures Vermont Yankee ISFSI PSP, Revision 0 Vermont Yankee ISFSI Defensive Strategy, Revision 0 VY-SP-17, FFD Program, Revision 2
Condition Reports 2019000043 2019000072 2019000109 2019000015 2019000207 2020000067 2020000049
Condition Reports Generated 202000204 202000205 202000206 202000207