IR 07200059/2020401: Difference between revisions

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Sincerely, X /RA/
Sincerely, X /RA/
Signed by: Fred L. Bower Fred L. Bower, III, Chief Plant Support Branch Division of Reactor Safety
Signed by: Fred L. Bower
 
Fred L. Bower, III, Chief Plant Support Branch Division of Reactor Safety  


===Enclosure:===
===Enclosure:===
Inspection Report No. 07200059/2020401
Inspection Report No. 07200059/2020401  


REGION I==
REGION I==
INSPECTION REPORT Docket No. 07200059 License No. DPR-28 Report No. 07200059/2020401 Licensee: Northstar Nuclear Decommissioning Company, LLC (Northstar NDC)
INSPECTION REPORT  
Address: 320 Governor Hunt Rd.
 
Docket No.
 
07200059  
 
License No.
 
DPR-28  
 
Report No.
 
07200059/2020401  
 
Licensee:
Northstar Nuclear Decommissioning Company, LLC (Northstar NDC)  
 
Address:
320 Governor Hunt Rd.
 
Vernon, VT 05354
 
Location Inspected:
Vermont Yankee, Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI)
 
Inspection Dates:
September 15 - 23, 2020
 
Inspectors:
Jeremiah Rey, Physical Security Inspector
 
Kenneth Hussar, Physical Security Inspector
 
Approved by:
Fred L. Bower, III, Chief
 
Plant Support Branch
 
Division of Reactor Safety
 
REPORT DETAILS


Vernon, VT 05354 Location Inspected: Vermont Yankee, Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI)
a. Inspection Scope
Inspection Dates: September 15 - 23, 2020 Inspectors: Jeremiah Rey, Physical Security Inspector Kenneth Hussar, Physical Security Inspector Approved by: Fred L. Bower, III, Chief Plant Support Branch Division of Reactor Safety Enclosure


REPORT DETAILS a. Inspection Scope Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2690, Inspection Program for Dry Storage of Spent Reactor Fuel at Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards. Starting on March 20, 2020, in response to the National Emergency declared by the President of the United States on the public health risks of the coronavirus (COVID-19), inspectors were directed to begin telework. In addition, regional baseline inspections were evaluated to determine if all or portion of the objectives and requirements stated in the IP could be performed remotely. If the inspections could be performed remotely, they were conducted per the applicable IP. In some cases, portions of an IP were completed remotely and on site. The inspections documented below met the objectives and requirements for completion of the IP.
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2690, Inspection Program for Dry Storage of Spent Reactor Fuel at Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards. Starting on March 20, 2020, in response to the National Emergency declared by the President of the United States on the public health risks of the coronavirus (COVID-19), inspectors were directed to begin telework. In addition, regional baseline inspections were evaluated to determine if all or portion of the objectives and requirements stated in the IP could be performed remotely. If the inspections could be performed remotely, they were conducted per the applicable IP. In some cases, portions of an IP were completed remotely and on site. The inspections documented below met the objectives and requirements for completion of the IP.


The inspectors evaluated this area by reviewing the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) security plan, implementing procedures, and records; conducting interviews with responsible security personnel and plant employees; and performing walk-downs of the ISFSI.
The inspectors evaluated this area by reviewing the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) security plan, implementing procedures, and records; conducting interviews with responsible security personnel and plant employees; and performing walk-downs of the ISFSI.
Line 56: Line 96:


The inspectors conducted the following specific inspection activities and evaluated the program to determine if: (a) the access authorization program provided reasonable assurance that individuals granted unescorted access to the ISFSI Protected Area (PA)
The inspectors conducted the following specific inspection activities and evaluated the program to determine if: (a) the access authorization program provided reasonable assurance that individuals granted unescorted access to the ISFSI Protected Area (PA)
were trustworthy and reliable and did not constitute an unreasonable risk to public health and safety; (b) procedures were in place to ensure that vehicles accessing the ISFSI had proper authorization and were properly searched; (c) keys, locks, combinations, and associated hardware used in the ISFSI PA were properly controlled; (d) the intrusion detection system (IDS) had the ability to detect and assess unauthorized penetration of the ISFSI PA and adequate response capability existed; (e) alarms for the ISFSI IDS annunciated at an alarm station which was continually staffed; (f) the ISFSI PA was illuminated to facilitate adequate assessment of PA penetration or unauthorized activity; (g) a program was in place for testing and maintenance of the physical protection systems associated with the ISFSI; (h) the spent fuel storage was within a PA and was protected by two barriers; (i) the vehicle barrier system satisfied the design vehicle bomb attack requirements; (j) communications had been established between onsite security forces and a designated response force or local law enforcement agency (LLEA); (k) a
were trustworthy and reliable and did not constitute an unreasonable risk to public health and safety; (b) procedures were in place to ensure that vehicles accessing the ISFSI had proper authorization and were properly searched; (c) keys, locks, combinations, and associated hardware used in the ISFSI PA were properly controlled; (d) the intrusion detection system (IDS) had the ability to detect and assess unauthorized penetration of the ISFSI PA and adequate response capability existed; (e) alarms for the ISFSI IDS annunciated at an alarm station which was continually staffed; (f) the ISFSI PA was illuminated to facilitate adequate assessment of PA penetration or unauthorized activity; (g) a program was in place for testing and maintenance of the physical protection systems associated with the ISFSI; (h) the spent fuel storage was within a PA and was protected by two barriers; (i) the vehicle barrier system satisfied the design vehicle bomb attack requirements; (j) communications had been established between onsite security forces and a designated response force or local law enforcement agency (LLEA); (k) a  


security organization with written procedures had been established; (l) members of the security organization were trained, equipped, qualified, and requalified to perform assigned duties; (m) the committed responders provided for an adequate armed response; (n) written response procedures were established and maintained; (o) training included ISFSI activities; (p) safeguards events were being properly reported; (q) audits of the physical protection system were conducted; (r) signs were posted in accordance with requirements; (s) the licensee established an emergency plan; (t) the response force or LLEA had unimpeded access to the ISFSI PA during contingency events; and (u) staffing, procedures, and resources were adequate to protect against radiological sabotage.
security organization with written procedures had been established; (l) members of the security organization were trained, equipped, qualified, and requalified to perform assigned duties; (m) the committed responders provided for an adequate armed response; (n) written response procedures were established and maintained; (o) training included ISFSI activities; (p) safeguards events were being properly reported; (q) audits of the physical protection system were conducted; (r) signs were posted in accordance with requirements; (s) the licensee established an emergency plan; (t) the response force or LLEA had unimpeded access to the ISFSI PA during contingency events; and (u) staffing, procedures, and resources were adequate to protect against radiological sabotage.


b. Findings No findings were identified.
b. Findings  
 
No findings were identified.
 
Exit Meeting Summary


Exit Meeting Summary On September 23, 2020, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Billy Reid Jr.,
On September 23, 2020, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Billy Reid Jr.,
Site Vice President, and other members of the licensees staff. The inspectors verified that no proprietary information was retained by the inspectors or documented in this report.
Site Vice President, and other members of the licensees staff. The inspectors verified that no proprietary information was retained by the inspectors or documented in this report.


A-2 ATTACHMENT SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION KEY POINTS OF CONTACT Licensee Personnel P. Ryan, Security Manager LIST OF ITEMS OPEN, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Opened None Opened and Closed None Closed None INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 81311, Physical Security Requirements for Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED Procedures Vermont Yankee ISFSI PSP, Revision 0 Vermont Yankee ISFSI Defensive Strategy, Revision 0 VY-SP-17, FFD Program, Revision 2 Condition Reports 2019000043 2019000072 2019000109 2019000015 2019000207 2020000067 2020000049 Condition Reports Generated 202000204 202000205 202000206 202000207
A-2  
 
ATTACHMENT SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION KEY POINTS OF CONTACT  
 
Licensee Personnel P. Ryan, Security Manager  
 
LIST OF ITEMS OPEN, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED  
 
Opened None  
 
Opened and Closed None  
 
Closed None  
 
INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED  
 
IP 81311, Physical Security Requirements for Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations  
 
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED  
 
Procedures Vermont Yankee ISFSI PSP, Revision 0 Vermont Yankee ISFSI Defensive Strategy, Revision 0 VY-SP-17, FFD Program, Revision 2  
 
Condition Reports 2019000043 2019000072 2019000109 2019000015 2019000207 2020000067 2020000049  
 
Condition Reports Generated 202000204 202000205 202000206 202000207
}}
}}

Latest revision as of 15:12, 29 November 2024

Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Security Report 07200059/2020401 (Public)
ML20294A307
Person / Time
Site: Vermont Yankee File:NorthStar Vermont Yankee icon.png
Issue date: 10/21/2020
From: Fred Bower
Plant Support Branch 1
To: Reid B
Vermont Yankee
Bower F
References
IR 2020401
Download: ML20294A307 (7)


Text

October 21, 2020

SUBJECT:

VERMONT YANKEE - INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATION SECURITY INSPECTION REPORT 07200059/2020401

Dear Mr. Reid:

On September 23, 2020, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) security inspection at the Vermont Yankee, Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation in Brattleboro, VT. The inspection covered the licensees physical security plan and the October 16, 2002, Interim Compensatory Measures for Dry Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations Order and was conducted using NRC Inspection Procedure 81311, Physical Security Requirements for Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations.

The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed with you and other members of your staff, on September 23, 2020.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to security and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.

The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

Based on the results of this inspection, no findings were identified.

In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding, of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRCs Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely, X /RA/

Signed by: Fred L. Bower

Fred L. Bower, III, Chief Plant Support Branch Division of Reactor Safety

Enclosure:

Inspection Report No. 07200059/2020401

REGION I==

INSPECTION REPORT

Docket No.

07200059

License No.

DPR-28

Report No.

07200059/2020401

Licensee:

Northstar Nuclear Decommissioning Company, LLC (Northstar NDC)

Address:

320 Governor Hunt Rd.

Vernon, VT 05354

Location Inspected:

Vermont Yankee, Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI)

Inspection Dates:

September 15 - 23, 2020

Inspectors:

Jeremiah Rey, Physical Security Inspector

Kenneth Hussar, Physical Security Inspector

Approved by:

Fred L. Bower, III, Chief

Plant Support Branch

Division of Reactor Safety

REPORT DETAILS

a. Inspection Scope

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2690, Inspection Program for Dry Storage of Spent Reactor Fuel at Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards. Starting on March 20, 2020, in response to the National Emergency declared by the President of the United States on the public health risks of the coronavirus (COVID-19), inspectors were directed to begin telework. In addition, regional baseline inspections were evaluated to determine if all or portion of the objectives and requirements stated in the IP could be performed remotely. If the inspections could be performed remotely, they were conducted per the applicable IP. In some cases, portions of an IP were completed remotely and on site. The inspections documented below met the objectives and requirements for completion of the IP.

The inspectors evaluated this area by reviewing the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) security plan, implementing procedures, and records; conducting interviews with responsible security personnel and plant employees; and performing walk-downs of the ISFSI.

The inspectors: (1) reviewed the access authorization program for the ISFSI; (2) verified and assessed the licensees testing and maintenance program to assure the functionality and reliability of security equipment; and (3) verified that a rapid, capable response to safeguards contingency events had been appropriately developed and effectively implemented.

The inspectors conducted the following specific inspection activities and evaluated the program to determine if: (a) the access authorization program provided reasonable assurance that individuals granted unescorted access to the ISFSI Protected Area (PA)

were trustworthy and reliable and did not constitute an unreasonable risk to public health and safety; (b) procedures were in place to ensure that vehicles accessing the ISFSI had proper authorization and were properly searched; (c) keys, locks, combinations, and associated hardware used in the ISFSI PA were properly controlled; (d) the intrusion detection system (IDS) had the ability to detect and assess unauthorized penetration of the ISFSI PA and adequate response capability existed; (e) alarms for the ISFSI IDS annunciated at an alarm station which was continually staffed; (f) the ISFSI PA was illuminated to facilitate adequate assessment of PA penetration or unauthorized activity; (g) a program was in place for testing and maintenance of the physical protection systems associated with the ISFSI; (h) the spent fuel storage was within a PA and was protected by two barriers; (i) the vehicle barrier system satisfied the design vehicle bomb attack requirements; (j) communications had been established between onsite security forces and a designated response force or local law enforcement agency (LLEA); (k) a

security organization with written procedures had been established; (l) members of the security organization were trained, equipped, qualified, and requalified to perform assigned duties; (m) the committed responders provided for an adequate armed response; (n) written response procedures were established and maintained; (o) training included ISFSI activities; (p) safeguards events were being properly reported; (q) audits of the physical protection system were conducted; (r) signs were posted in accordance with requirements; (s) the licensee established an emergency plan; (t) the response force or LLEA had unimpeded access to the ISFSI PA during contingency events; and (u) staffing, procedures, and resources were adequate to protect against radiological sabotage.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

Exit Meeting Summary

On September 23, 2020, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Billy Reid Jr.,

Site Vice President, and other members of the licensees staff. The inspectors verified that no proprietary information was retained by the inspectors or documented in this report.

A-2

ATTACHMENT SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee Personnel P. Ryan, Security Manager

LIST OF ITEMS OPEN, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened None

Opened and Closed None

Closed None

INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED

IP 81311, Physical Security Requirements for Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Procedures Vermont Yankee ISFSI PSP, Revision 0 Vermont Yankee ISFSI Defensive Strategy, Revision 0 VY-SP-17, FFD Program, Revision 2

Condition Reports 2019000043 2019000072 2019000109 2019000015 2019000207 2020000067 2020000049

Condition Reports Generated 202000204 202000205 202000206 202000207