ML20311A324: Difference between revisions

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
(StriderTol Bot insert)
 
(StriderTol Bot change)
 
Line 15: Line 15:


=Text=
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:1Q/2000 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                                              Page 1 of 5 Wolf Creek 1 Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance:          Nov 02, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Lack of monitoring a small radius elbow The team identified that licensee's lack of monitoring a small radius elbow, in Train A of the essential service water system in the Train B switchgear room, with a tee-connection approximately two pipe lengths downstream, did not allow the licensee to demonstrate that the piping stresses remained within design allowable to exclude the possibility of a pipe rupture that could defeat safety-function redundancy. This finding was of very low safety significance because there was no actual leakage in the area of concern and the system remained operable. There is no regulatory requirement for monitoring for erosion/corrosion, therefore, there was no violation of regulatory requirements. The licensee initiated Performance Improvement Request 20012794 to evaluate the condition of the piping in the Train B switchgear room. In addition, the licensee was considering to risk-inform the erosion/corrosion program Inspection Report# : 2001007(pdf)
{{#Wiki_filter:}}
Significance:          Mar 31, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Three hour rated fire door partially open between vital switchgear rooms The inspectors identified that a 3-hour rated fire door between the safety-related switchgear rooms was partially open. License Condition 2.C(5)(a) of the Wolf Creek Generating Station Facility Operating License requires, in part, that the licensee implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire program. The fire protection program required that 3-hour rated fire doors remain closed if compensatory measures were not in place. The license condition was not met since the 3-hour fire barrier between the switchgear rooms was not intact and the licensee did not have compensatory measures in place. The licensee's failure to maintain in effect the provisions of the fire protection program was a violation of Operating License Condition 2.C(5)(a). This violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VI.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy. The inspectors entered the significance determination process since the partially open door affected a fire separation barrier for multiple safety systems. This had a credible impact on safety and was an impairment to a fire protection feature. The door was partially open for less than 3 hours, the ignition frequency was relatively low, the automatic fire detection and suppression systems were minimally affected, and manual firefighting effectiveness was unaffected. Using the plant specific significance determination process "Transients with Power Conversion System" worksheet, this violation was evaluated as having had very low safety significance. The secondary heat removal and power conversion system mitigation capabilities were available for decay heat removal.
Inspection Report# : 2000011(pdf)
Significance:          Dec 30, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Satisfactorily Perform Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.8.1.3 Emergency Diesel Generator A The licensee failed to satisfactorily perform Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.8.1.3 on Emergency Diesel Generator A on two occasions. The licensee determined that the diesel would have performed satisfactorily in the event of a loss of offsite power. The licensee initiated corrective action document Performance Improvement Request 2000-3385 as a result of this issue.
Inspection Report# : 2000010(pdf)
Barrier Integrity
 
1Q/2000 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                                              Page 2 of 5 Significance:        Nov 02, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Ineffective controls to minimize macro-biological growth and accumulation of foreign material in the essential service water system The team identified that the licensee's controls to minimize macro-biological growth and accumulation of foreign material in the essential service water system were not effective. This finding was of very low safety significance because the essential service water system and containment isolation functions remained operable. The licensee's biological control and system flushing programs were not adequate to prevent the growth and accumulation of clams and their debris (i.e., shells and shell pieces) at the essential service water containment isolation valves for the containment coolers. The clams and their debris were contributing causes of these valves' failure to fully close. There are no regulatory requirements for a biological control program, therefore, there was no violation of regulatory requirements. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 20012802 to reassess the effectiveness of the biological control and system flushing programs Inspection Report# : 2001007(pdf)
Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Significance:        Jul 19, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure To Use NIOSH Certified Respiratory Protection Equipment During a review of self-contained breathing apparatus maintenance and surveillance records, the inspector identified that 36 self-contained breathing apparatus air bottles were past the 3-year hydrostatic test dates. Hydrostatic testing had expired in April 2001 for 31 of the self-contained breathing apparatus air bottles that were in service. According to the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, self-contained breathing apparatus units with expired hydrostatic testing are no longer certified. The use of non-National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health certified respiratory protection equipment was a violation of 10 CFR 20.1703(a). This violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2001-1835. The safety significance of this violation was determined to be more than minor, because it had a credible impact on safety due to previously identified air bottle failures and questionable availability for emergency response. This violation was processed through the Emergency Preparedness Significance Determination Process and determined to be of very low safety significance, because there was no failure to meet an emergency planning standard or risk significant planning standard Inspection Report# : 2001003(pdf)
Significance:        Jul 10, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure To Follow Procedural Requirements For Out-of-Calibration Instruments On July 18, 2001, the inspectors identified a continuous air monitor in the radwaste truck bay with an expired calibration. The calibration due date was May 31, 2001. The licensee identified on June 4, 2001, in Performance Improvement Request 2001-1452, a survey instrument which was out of calibration. The calibration due date was also May 31, 2001. The licensee had not properly marked the instruments out of calibration or removed them to the designated holding area. Radiation Protection Procedure RPP-01-405, Revision 12, requires that instruments be properly marked out of calibration and/or placed in a proper holding area. The licensee's failures to follow procedural requirements involving out-of-calibration instruments were two examples of a violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a. This violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2001-1833. The safety significance of this violation was determined to be more than minor, because it had a credible impact on safety and it involved conditions contrary to licensee procedures which impact instrumentation related to measuring worker dose. This violation was processed through the Occupational Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process and determined to be of very low safety significance, because there was no overexposure, no substantial potential for overexposure because the instruments were not used, and the ability to assess dose was not compromised because the whole body counter was operable.
Inspection Report# : 2001003(pdf)
 
1Q/2000 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                                                  Page 3 of 5 Significance:        Dec 30, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Follow Radiological Work Permit Requirement Technical Specification 5.4.1 requires procedures for the radiation work permit system. Section 6.2.2 of Procedure AP 25B-300, "Radiation Work Permit Program," Revision 10, states that all workers shall read, understand, and follow the provisions set forth on their radiation work permit. On October 30, 2000, a radiation worker did not follow the radiological requirement listed on Radiation Work Permit 00-3220, as described in the licensee's corrective action program, reference Performance Improvement Request 2000-3290.
Inspection Report# : 2000010(pdf)
Significance:        Oct 27, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform a Dose Rate Survey 10 CFR 20.1501 requires that each licensee shall make, or cause to be made, surveys that are reasonable under the circumstances to evaluate the potential radiological hazards. On October 25, 2000, after Spent Fuel Pool Cleanup Filter FEC01B was transferred into a waste liner at approximately 4 a.m., the licensee failed to conduct a dose rate survey of the area surrounding the waste liner. the licensee performed a followup radiation survey at approximately 8:30 a.m., after identifying that a survey had not been conducted. The survey identified two high radiation areas which were subsequently properly posted as described in the licensee's correction action program Performance Improvement Request 2000-3225.
Inspection Report# : 2000009(pdf)
Significance:        Oct 27, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Follow Radiation Work Permit Special Instructions Technical Specification 5.4.1 requires that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, February 1978. Radiation Work Permit 005000, Revision 0, special instruction (7) stated that proper contamination and airborne controls were to be established in accordance with radiation work permit briefing material prior to commencing work. On October 6, 2000, a deconner received an uptake while performing deconning activities inside the containment bioshield. The deconner failed to follow the radiation work permit special instructions to establish respiratory protection or high efficiency particulate airborne ventilation prior to initiating deconning activities. The details are described in corrective action program Performance Improvement Request 2000-2909.
Inspection Report# : 2000009(pdf)
Significance:        Sep 01, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure To Perform a Contamination Survey On August 28, 2000, the inspectors identified that radiation protection personnel failed to perform a contamination survey of an area containing scaffolding located in the residual heat exchanger Room A prior to workers entering the area on August 9, 2000. 10 CFR Part 20, Section 1501(a),
states, in part, each licensee shall make or cause to be made surveys that are reasonable under the circumstances to evaluate concentrations or quantities of radioactive material and the potential radiological hazards. The failure to perform a contamination survey of the above area was a violation of 10 CFR Part 20, Section 1501(a). This violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This issue is in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2000-2403. This violation was determined to have very low safety significance, because there was no overexposure or substantial potential for an overexposure to occur.
Inspection Report# : 2000008(pdf)
Significance:        Sep 01, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Poor Radiological Work Planning During the review of the licensee's Refueling Outage 10 exposure estimates and exposure performance data, the inspectors identified that Radiation Work Permit 99-4200 (secondary side steam generator work) total person-rem exceeded budgeted person-rem by greater than 50 percent (11.9 rem verses 6.6 rem). The inspectors noted that approximately 2 person-rem of this additional exposure was due to foreign object retrieval work, which was not planned during Refueling Outage 10. Although retrieval work was not necessary during Refueling Outage 9, it had
 
1Q/2000 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                                            Page 4 of 5 been performed during previous refueling outages. The failure to plan/budget for the retrieval operation caused the licensee to exceed its budgeted estimate by greater than 50 percent. This issue is in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2000-2430.
This issue was determined to have very low-safety significance, because actual job dose was less than 25 person-rem and there was only one occurrence.
Inspection Report# : 2000008(pdf)
Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Significance:          Aug 27, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure To Properly Access Vital Areas A noncited violation of 10 CFR 73.55(d)(7)(i)(B) occurred when two licensee employees failed to follow proper procedures when entering vital areas. On August 27- and September 28, 2001, licensee employees did not properly enter vital areas but followed another person through the open door. The finding is more than minor because it had a credible impact on safety. One person entered a vital area without properly badging in. The second person did not have the appropriate access level to enter a vital area. The finding was found to be of very low safety significance using the Safeguards Significance Determination Process. There were no vulnerabilities in the access control program or the safeguards systems or plans, and a safeguard contingency response was not required. This finding of very low safety significance, which is documented in the licensee's corrective action program, is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
Inspection Report# : 2001003(pdf)
Significance:          Jun 15, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Metal Detectors Through a series of tests, the inspector demonstrated that the metal detectors did not detect the test weapon at an 85 percent rate. Paragraph 3.10.1.5 a(1) of the Physical Security Plan, Revision 32, requires that personnel are searched to detect firearms, explosives, and incendiary devices. The plan also requires that the metal detector units conform to Regulatory Guide 5.7, Revision 1, "Entry/Exit Control for Protected Areas, Vital Areas, and Material Access Areas," Paragraph C.1.e, which requires that the metal detectors detect a test weapon with an 85 percent success rate. The failure to adequately detect a test weapon 85 percent of the time is a violation of Paragraph 3.10.1.5 a(1) of the Physical Security Plan, Revision 32. Prior to the end of the inspection, the licensee implemented adequate corrective actions to ensure that the metal detectors would meet the 85 percent criteria. This violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2001-1551. The safety significance of this finding was determined to be very low by the physical protection significance determination process because there were less than two similar findings in the last 4 quarters. The issue was more than minor because the potential failure to detect firearms represents a credible impact on safety and impacts a key performance attribute of the physical protection cornerstone to meet its intended function.
Inspection Report# : 2001002(pdf)
Significance:          Aug 12, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Package Search The inspector identified that security officers manning the x-ray search equipment were not visually searching hand-carried packages which contained material that could not be identified. The licensee's failure to adequately search packages being processed through the x-ray machine was a violation of paragraphs 1.6.1 and 1.6.8 of the Physical Security Plan, Revision 31, and paragraph 6.3.3.2 of Security Procedure SEC 01-202, Revision 37. This violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2000-1939 The issue was of very low safety significance because no similar findings had occurred during the previous four quarters.
Inspection Report# : 2000007(pdf)
 
1Q/2000 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                                            Page 5 of 5 Miscellaneous Significance: N/A Mar 28, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Licensee's problem identification and resolution program was effective The licensee adequately identified problems and put them into the corrective action program. The licensee appropriately used risk in determing the extent to which individual problems would be evaluated and in establishing schedules for implementation of corrective actions. Licensee audits and assessments were effective in identifying problems. Based on the interviews conducted during this inspection, workers at the site were comfortable placing safety issues into the problem identification and resolution program. Corrective actions, when specified, were generally implemented in a timely manner. With a few exceptions identified by the licensee, corrective actions to prevent recurrence of conditions adverse to quality were generally effective.
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Last modified : April 01, 2002
 
2Q/2000 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                                              Page 1 of 5 Wolf Creek 1 Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance:          Nov 02, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Lack of monitoring a small radius elbow The team identified that licensee's lack of monitoring a small radius elbow, in Train A of the essential service water system in the Train B switchgear room, with a tee-connection approximately two pipe lengths downstream, did not allow the licensee to demonstrate that the piping stresses remained within design allowable to exclude the possibility of a pipe rupture that could defeat safety-function redundancy. This finding was of very low safety significance because there was no actual leakage in the area of concern and the system remained operable. There is no regulatory requirement for monitoring for erosion/corrosion, therefore, there was no violation of regulatory requirements. The licensee initiated Performance Improvement Request 20012794 to evaluate the condition of the piping in the Train B switchgear room. In addition, the licensee was considering to risk-inform the erosion/corrosion program Inspection Report# : 2001007(pdf)
Significance:          Mar 31, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Three hour rated fire door partially open between vital switchgear rooms The inspectors identified that a 3-hour rated fire door between the safety-related switchgear rooms was partially open. License Condition 2.C(5)(a) of the Wolf Creek Generating Station Facility Operating License requires, in part, that the licensee implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire program. The fire protection program required that 3-hour rated fire doors remain closed if compensatory measures were not in place. The license condition was not met since the 3-hour fire barrier between the switchgear rooms was not intact and the licensee did not have compensatory measures in place. The licensee's failure to maintain in effect the provisions of the fire protection program was a violation of Operating License Condition 2.C(5)(a). This violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VI.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy. The inspectors entered the significance determination process since the partially open door affected a fire separation barrier for multiple safety systems. This had a credible impact on safety and was an impairment to a fire protection feature. The door was partially open for less than 3 hours, the ignition frequency was relatively low, the automatic fire detection and suppression systems were minimally affected, and manual firefighting effectiveness was unaffected. Using the plant specific significance determination process "Transients with Power Conversion System" worksheet, this violation was evaluated as having had very low safety significance. The secondary heat removal and power conversion system mitigation capabilities were available for decay heat removal.
Inspection Report# : 2000011(pdf)
Significance:          Dec 30, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Satisfactorily Perform Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.8.1.3 Emergency Diesel Generator A The licensee failed to satisfactorily perform Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.8.1.3 on Emergency Diesel Generator A on two occasions. The licensee determined that the diesel would have performed satisfactorily in the event of a loss of offsite power. The licensee initiated corrective action document Performance Improvement Request 2000-3385 as a result of this issue.
Inspection Report# : 2000010(pdf)
Barrier Integrity
 
2Q/2000 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                                              Page 2 of 5 Significance:        Nov 02, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Ineffective controls to minimize macro-biological growth and accumulation of foreign material in the essential service water system The team identified that the licensee's controls to minimize macro-biological growth and accumulation of foreign material in the essential service water system were not effective. This finding was of very low safety significance because the essential service water system and containment isolation functions remained operable. The licensee's biological control and system flushing programs were not adequate to prevent the growth and accumulation of clams and their debris (i.e., shells and shell pieces) at the essential service water containment isolation valves for the containment coolers. The clams and their debris were contributing causes of these valves' failure to fully close. There are no regulatory requirements for a biological control program, therefore, there was no violation of regulatory requirements. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 20012802 to reassess the effectiveness of the biological control and system flushing programs Inspection Report# : 2001007(pdf)
Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Significance:        Jul 19, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure To Use NIOSH Certified Respiratory Protection Equipment During a review of self-contained breathing apparatus maintenance and surveillance records, the inspector identified that 36 self-contained breathing apparatus air bottles were past the 3-year hydrostatic test dates. Hydrostatic testing had expired in April 2001 for 31 of the self-contained breathing apparatus air bottles that were in service. According to the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, self-contained breathing apparatus units with expired hydrostatic testing are no longer certified. The use of non-National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health certified respiratory protection equipment was a violation of 10 CFR 20.1703(a). This violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2001-1835. The safety significance of this violation was determined to be more than minor, because it had a credible impact on safety due to previously identified air bottle failures and questionable availability for emergency response. This violation was processed through the Emergency Preparedness Significance Determination Process and determined to be of very low safety significance, because there was no failure to meet an emergency planning standard or risk significant planning standard Inspection Report# : 2001003(pdf)
Significance:        Jul 10, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure To Follow Procedural Requirements For Out-of-Calibration Instruments On July 18, 2001, the inspectors identified a continuous air monitor in the radwaste truck bay with an expired calibration. The calibration due date was May 31, 2001. The licensee identified on June 4, 2001, in Performance Improvement Request 2001-1452, a survey instrument which was out of calibration. The calibration due date was also May 31, 2001. The licensee had not properly marked the instruments out of calibration or removed them to the designated holding area. Radiation Protection Procedure RPP-01-405, Revision 12, requires that instruments be properly marked out of calibration and/or placed in a proper holding area. The licensee's failures to follow procedural requirements involving out-of-calibration instruments were two examples of a violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a. This violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2001-1833. The safety significance of this violation was determined to be more than minor, because it had a credible impact on safety and it involved conditions contrary to licensee procedures which impact instrumentation related to measuring worker dose. This violation was processed through the Occupational Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process and determined to be of very low safety significance, because there was no overexposure, no substantial potential for overexposure because the instruments were not used, and the ability to assess dose was not compromised because the whole body counter was operable.
Inspection Report# : 2001003(pdf)
 
2Q/2000 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                                                  Page 3 of 5 Significance:        Dec 30, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Follow Radiological Work Permit Requirement Technical Specification 5.4.1 requires procedures for the radiation work permit system. Section 6.2.2 of Procedure AP 25B-300, "Radiation Work Permit Program," Revision 10, states that all workers shall read, understand, and follow the provisions set forth on their radiation work permit. On October 30, 2000, a radiation worker did not follow the radiological requirement listed on Radiation Work Permit 00-3220, as described in the licensee's corrective action program, reference Performance Improvement Request 2000-3290.
Inspection Report# : 2000010(pdf)
Significance:        Oct 27, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform a Dose Rate Survey 10 CFR 20.1501 requires that each licensee shall make, or cause to be made, surveys that are reasonable under the circumstances to evaluate the potential radiological hazards. On October 25, 2000, after Spent Fuel Pool Cleanup Filter FEC01B was transferred into a waste liner at approximately 4 a.m., the licensee failed to conduct a dose rate survey of the area surrounding the waste liner. the licensee performed a followup radiation survey at approximately 8:30 a.m., after identifying that a survey had not been conducted. The survey identified two high radiation areas which were subsequently properly posted as described in the licensee's correction action program Performance Improvement Request 2000-3225.
Inspection Report# : 2000009(pdf)
Significance:        Oct 27, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Follow Radiation Work Permit Special Instructions Technical Specification 5.4.1 requires that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, February 1978. Radiation Work Permit 005000, Revision 0, special instruction (7) stated that proper contamination and airborne controls were to be established in accordance with radiation work permit briefing material prior to commencing work. On October 6, 2000, a deconner received an uptake while performing deconning activities inside the containment bioshield. The deconner failed to follow the radiation work permit special instructions to establish respiratory protection or high efficiency particulate airborne ventilation prior to initiating deconning activities. The details are described in corrective action program Performance Improvement Request 2000-2909.
Inspection Report# : 2000009(pdf)
Significance:        Sep 01, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure To Perform a Contamination Survey On August 28, 2000, the inspectors identified that radiation protection personnel failed to perform a contamination survey of an area containing scaffolding located in the residual heat exchanger Room A prior to workers entering the area on August 9, 2000. 10 CFR Part 20, Section 1501(a),
states, in part, each licensee shall make or cause to be made surveys that are reasonable under the circumstances to evaluate concentrations or quantities of radioactive material and the potential radiological hazards. The failure to perform a contamination survey of the above area was a violation of 10 CFR Part 20, Section 1501(a). This violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This issue is in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2000-2403. This violation was determined to have very low safety significance, because there was no overexposure or substantial potential for an overexposure to occur.
Inspection Report# : 2000008(pdf)
Significance:        Sep 01, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Poor Radiological Work Planning During the review of the licensee's Refueling Outage 10 exposure estimates and exposure performance data, the inspectors identified that Radiation Work Permit 99-4200 (secondary side steam generator work) total person-rem exceeded budgeted person-rem by greater than 50 percent (11.9 rem verses 6.6 rem). The inspectors noted that approximately 2 person-rem of this additional exposure was due to foreign object retrieval work, which was not planned during Refueling Outage 10. Although retrieval work was not necessary during Refueling Outage 9, it had
 
2Q/2000 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                                            Page 4 of 5 been performed during previous refueling outages. The failure to plan/budget for the retrieval operation caused the licensee to exceed its budgeted estimate by greater than 50 percent. This issue is in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2000-2430.
This issue was determined to have very low-safety significance, because actual job dose was less than 25 person-rem and there was only one occurrence.
Inspection Report# : 2000008(pdf)
Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Significance:          Aug 27, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure To Properly Access Vital Areas A noncited violation of 10 CFR 73.55(d)(7)(i)(B) occurred when two licensee employees failed to follow proper procedures when entering vital areas. On August 27- and September 28, 2001, licensee employees did not properly enter vital areas but followed another person through the open door. The finding is more than minor because it had a credible impact on safety. One person entered a vital area without properly badging in. The second person did not have the appropriate access level to enter a vital area. The finding was found to be of very low safety significance using the Safeguards Significance Determination Process. There were no vulnerabilities in the access control program or the safeguards systems or plans, and a safeguard contingency response was not required. This finding of very low safety significance, which is documented in the licensee's corrective action program, is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
Inspection Report# : 2001003(pdf)
Significance:          Jun 15, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Metal Detectors Through a series of tests, the inspector demonstrated that the metal detectors did not detect the test weapon at an 85 percent rate. Paragraph 3.10.1.5 a(1) of the Physical Security Plan, Revision 32, requires that personnel are searched to detect firearms, explosives, and incendiary devices. The plan also requires that the metal detector units conform to Regulatory Guide 5.7, Revision 1, "Entry/Exit Control for Protected Areas, Vital Areas, and Material Access Areas," Paragraph C.1.e, which requires that the metal detectors detect a test weapon with an 85 percent success rate. The failure to adequately detect a test weapon 85 percent of the time is a violation of Paragraph 3.10.1.5 a(1) of the Physical Security Plan, Revision 32. Prior to the end of the inspection, the licensee implemented adequate corrective actions to ensure that the metal detectors would meet the 85 percent criteria. This violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2001-1551. The safety significance of this finding was determined to be very low by the physical protection significance determination process because there were less than two similar findings in the last 4 quarters. The issue was more than minor because the potential failure to detect firearms represents a credible impact on safety and impacts a key performance attribute of the physical protection cornerstone to meet its intended function.
Inspection Report# : 2001002(pdf)
Significance:          Aug 12, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Package Search The inspector identified that security officers manning the x-ray search equipment were not visually searching hand-carried packages which contained material that could not be identified. The licensee's failure to adequately search packages being processed through the x-ray machine was a violation of paragraphs 1.6.1 and 1.6.8 of the Physical Security Plan, Revision 31, and paragraph 6.3.3.2 of Security Procedure SEC 01-202, Revision 37. This violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2000-1939 The issue was of very low safety significance because no similar findings had occurred during the previous four quarters.
Inspection Report# : 2000007(pdf)
 
2Q/2000 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                                            Page 5 of 5 Miscellaneous Significance: N/A Mar 28, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Licensee's problem identification and resolution program was effective The licensee adequately identified problems and put them into the corrective action program. The licensee appropriately used risk in determing the extent to which individual problems would be evaluated and in establishing schedules for implementation of corrective actions. Licensee audits and assessments were effective in identifying problems. Based on the interviews conducted during this inspection, workers at the site were comfortable placing safety issues into the problem identification and resolution program. Corrective actions, when specified, were generally implemented in a timely manner. With a few exceptions identified by the licensee, corrective actions to prevent recurrence of conditions adverse to quality were generally effective.
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Last modified : April 01, 2002
 
3Q/2000 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                                              Page 1 of 5 Wolf Creek 1 Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance:          Nov 02, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Lack of monitoring a small radius elbow The team identified that licensee's lack of monitoring a small radius elbow, in Train A of the essential service water system in the Train B switchgear room, with a tee-connection approximately two pipe lengths downstream, did not allow the licensee to demonstrate that the piping stresses remained within design allowable to exclude the possibility of a pipe rupture that could defeat safety-function redundancy. This finding was of very low safety significance because there was no actual leakage in the area of concern and the system remained operable. There is no regulatory requirement for monitoring for erosion/corrosion, therefore, there was no violation of regulatory requirements. The licensee initiated Performance Improvement Request 20012794 to evaluate the condition of the piping in the Train B switchgear room. In addition, the licensee was considering to risk-inform the erosion/corrosion program Inspection Report# : 2001007(pdf)
Significance:          Mar 31, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Three hour rated fire door partially open between vital switchgear rooms The inspectors identified that a 3-hour rated fire door between the safety-related switchgear rooms was partially open. License Condition 2.C(5)(a) of the Wolf Creek Generating Station Facility Operating License requires, in part, that the licensee implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire program. The fire protection program required that 3-hour rated fire doors remain closed if compensatory measures were not in place. The license condition was not met since the 3-hour fire barrier between the switchgear rooms was not intact and the licensee did not have compensatory measures in place. The licensee's failure to maintain in effect the provisions of the fire protection program was a violation of Operating License Condition 2.C(5)(a). This violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VI.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy. The inspectors entered the significance determination process since the partially open door affected a fire separation barrier for multiple safety systems. This had a credible impact on safety and was an impairment to a fire protection feature. The door was partially open for less than 3 hours, the ignition frequency was relatively low, the automatic fire detection and suppression systems were minimally affected, and manual firefighting effectiveness was unaffected. Using the plant specific significance determination process "Transients with Power Conversion System" worksheet, this violation was evaluated as having had very low safety significance. The secondary heat removal and power conversion system mitigation capabilities were available for decay heat removal.
Inspection Report# : 2000011(pdf)
Significance:          Dec 30, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Satisfactorily Perform Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.8.1.3 Emergency Diesel Generator A The licensee failed to satisfactorily perform Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.8.1.3 on Emergency Diesel Generator A on two occasions. The licensee determined that the diesel would have performed satisfactorily in the event of a loss of offsite power. The licensee initiated corrective action document Performance Improvement Request 2000-3385 as a result of this issue.
Inspection Report# : 2000010(pdf)
Barrier Integrity
 
3Q/2000 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                                              Page 2 of 5 Significance:        Nov 02, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Ineffective controls to minimize macro-biological growth and accumulation of foreign material in the essential service water system The team identified that the licensee's controls to minimize macro-biological growth and accumulation of foreign material in the essential service water system were not effective. This finding was of very low safety significance because the essential service water system and containment isolation functions remained operable. The licensee's biological control and system flushing programs were not adequate to prevent the growth and accumulation of clams and their debris (i.e., shells and shell pieces) at the essential service water containment isolation valves for the containment coolers. The clams and their debris were contributing causes of these valves' failure to fully close. There are no regulatory requirements for a biological control program, therefore, there was no violation of regulatory requirements. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 20012802 to reassess the effectiveness of the biological control and system flushing programs Inspection Report# : 2001007(pdf)
Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Significance:        Sep 01, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure To Perform a Contamination Survey On August 28, 2000, the inspectors identified that radiation protection personnel failed to perform a contamination survey of an area containing scaffolding located in the residual heat exchanger Room A prior to workers entering the area on August 9, 2000. 10 CFR Part 20, Section 1501(a),
states, in part, each licensee shall make or cause to be made surveys that are reasonable under the circumstances to evaluate concentrations or quantities of radioactive material and the potential radiological hazards. The failure to perform a contamination survey of the above area was a violation of 10 CFR Part 20, Section 1501(a). This violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This issue is in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2000-2403. This violation was determined to have very low safety significance, because there was no overexposure or substantial potential for an overexposure to occur.
Inspection Report# : 2000008(pdf)
Significance:        Sep 01, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Poor Radiological Work Planning During the review of the licensee's Refueling Outage 10 exposure estimates and exposure performance data, the inspectors identified that Radiation Work Permit 99-4200 (secondary side steam generator work) total person-rem exceeded budgeted person-rem by greater than 50 percent (11.9 rem verses 6.6 rem). The inspectors noted that approximately 2 person-rem of this additional exposure was due to foreign object retrieval work, which was not planned during Refueling Outage 10. Although retrieval work was not necessary during Refueling Outage 9, it had been performed during previous refueling outages. The failure to plan/budget for the retrieval operation caused the licensee to exceed its budgeted estimate by greater than 50 percent. This issue is in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2000-2430.
This issue was determined to have very low-safety significance, because actual job dose was less than 25 person-rem and there was only one occurrence.
Inspection Report# : 2000008(pdf)
Significance:        Jul 19, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure To Use NIOSH Certified Respiratory Protection Equipment During a review of self-contained breathing apparatus maintenance and surveillance records, the inspector identified that 36 self-contained breathing apparatus air bottles were past the 3-year hydrostatic test dates. Hydrostatic testing had expired in April 2001 for 31 of the self-contained breathing apparatus air bottles that were in service. According to the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, self-contained breathing
 
3Q/2000 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                                              Page 3 of 5 apparatus units with expired hydrostatic testing are no longer certified. The use of non-National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health certified respiratory protection equipment was a violation of 10 CFR 20.1703(a). This violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2001-1835. The safety significance of this violation was determined to be more than minor, because it had a credible impact on safety due to previously identified air bottle failures and questionable availability for emergency response. This violation was processed through the Emergency Preparedness Significance Determination Process and determined to be of very low safety significance, because there was no failure to meet an emergency planning standard or risk significant planning standard Inspection Report# : 2001003(pdf)
Significance:        Jul 10, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure To Follow Procedural Requirements For Out-of-Calibration Instruments On July 18, 2001, the inspectors identified a continuous air monitor in the radwaste truck bay with an expired calibration. The calibration due date was May 31, 2001. The licensee identified on June 4, 2001, in Performance Improvement Request 2001-1452, a survey instrument which was out of calibration. The calibration due date was also May 31, 2001. The licensee had not properly marked the instruments out of calibration or removed them to the designated holding area. Radiation Protection Procedure RPP-01-405, Revision 12, requires that instruments be properly marked out of calibration and/or placed in a proper holding area. The licensee's failures to follow procedural requirements involving out-of-calibration instruments were two examples of a violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a. This violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2001-1833. The safety significance of this violation was determined to be more than minor, because it had a credible impact on safety and it involved conditions contrary to licensee procedures which impact instrumentation related to measuring worker dose. This violation was processed through the Occupational Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process and determined to be of very low safety significance, because there was no overexposure, no substantial potential for overexposure because the instruments were not used, and the ability to assess dose was not compromised because the whole body counter was operable.
Inspection Report# : 2001003(pdf)
Significance:        Dec 30, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Follow Radiological Work Permit Requirement Technical Specification 5.4.1 requires procedures for the radiation work permit system. Section 6.2.2 of Procedure AP 25B-300, "Radiation Work Permit Program," Revision 10, states that all workers shall read, understand, and follow the provisions set forth on their radiation work permit. On October 30, 2000, a radiation worker did not follow the radiological requirement listed on Radiation Work Permit 00-3220, as described in the licensee's corrective action program, reference Performance Improvement Request 2000-3290.
Inspection Report# : 2000010(pdf)
Significance:        Oct 27, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform a Dose Rate Survey 10 CFR 20.1501 requires that each licensee shall make, or cause to be made, surveys that are reasonable under the circumstances to evaluate the potential radiological hazards. On October 25, 2000, after Spent Fuel Pool Cleanup Filter FEC01B was transferred into a waste liner at approximately 4 a.m., the licensee failed to conduct a dose rate survey of the area surrounding the waste liner. the licensee performed a followup radiation survey at approximately 8:30 a.m., after identifying that a survey had not been conducted. The survey identified two high radiation areas which were subsequently properly posted as described in the licensee's correction action program Performance Improvement Request 2000-3225.
Inspection Report# : 2000009(pdf)
Significance:        Oct 27, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Follow Radiation Work Permit Special Instructions Technical Specification 5.4.1 requires that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, February 1978. Radiation Work Permit 005000, Revision 0, special instruction (7) stated that proper contamination and airborne controls were to be established in accordance with radiation work permit briefing material prior to commencing work. On October 6, 2000, a deconner received an uptake while performing deconning activities inside the containment bioshield. The deconner failed to follow the radiation work permit special instructions to establish respiratory protection or high
 
3Q/2000 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                                                  Page 4 of 5 efficiency particulate airborne ventilation prior to initiating deconning activities. The details are described in corrective action program Performance Improvement Request 2000-2909.
Inspection Report# : 2000009(pdf)
Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Significance:          Aug 12, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Package Search The inspector identified that security officers manning the x-ray search equipment were not visually searching hand-carried packages which contained material that could not be identified. The licensee's failure to adequately search packages being processed through the x-ray machine was a violation of paragraphs 1.6.1 and 1.6.8 of the Physical Security Plan, Revision 31, and paragraph 6.3.3.2 of Security Procedure SEC 01-202, Revision 37. This violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2000-1939 The issue was of very low safety significance because no similar findings had occurred during the previous four quarters.
Inspection Report# : 2000007(pdf)
Significance:          Aug 27, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure To Properly Access Vital Areas A noncited violation of 10 CFR 73.55(d)(7)(i)(B) occurred when two licensee employees failed to follow proper procedures when entering vital areas. On August 27- and September 28, 2001, licensee employees did not properly enter vital areas but followed another person through the open door. The finding is more than minor because it had a credible impact on safety. One person entered a vital area without properly badging in. The second person did not have the appropriate access level to enter a vital area. The finding was found to be of very low safety significance using the Safeguards Significance Determination Process. There were no vulnerabilities in the access control program or the safeguards systems or plans, and a safeguard contingency response was not required. This finding of very low safety significance, which is documented in the licensee's corrective action program, is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
Inspection Report# : 2001003(pdf)
Significance:          Jun 15, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Metal Detectors Through a series of tests, the inspector demonstrated that the metal detectors did not detect the test weapon at an 85 percent rate. Paragraph 3.10.1.5 a(1) of the Physical Security Plan, Revision 32, requires that personnel are searched to detect firearms, explosives, and incendiary devices. The plan also requires that the metal detector units conform to Regulatory Guide 5.7, Revision 1, "Entry/Exit Control for Protected Areas, Vital Areas, and Material Access Areas," Paragraph C.1.e, which requires that the metal detectors detect a test weapon with an 85 percent success rate. The failure to adequately detect a test weapon 85 percent of the time is a violation of Paragraph 3.10.1.5 a(1) of the Physical Security Plan, Revision 32. Prior to the end of the inspection, the licensee implemented adequate corrective actions to ensure that the metal detectors would meet the 85 percent criteria. This violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2001-1551. The safety significance of this finding was determined to be very low by the physical protection significance determination process because there were less than two similar findings in the last 4 quarters. The issue was more than minor because the potential failure to detect firearms represents a credible impact on safety and impacts a key performance attribute of the physical protection cornerstone to meet its intended function.
Inspection Report# : 2001002(pdf)
 
3Q/2000 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                                            Page 5 of 5 Miscellaneous Significance: N/A Mar 28, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Licensee's problem identification and resolution program was effective The licensee adequately identified problems and put them into the corrective action program. The licensee appropriately used risk in determing the extent to which individual problems would be evaluated and in establishing schedules for implementation of corrective actions. Licensee audits and assessments were effective in identifying problems. Based on the interviews conducted during this inspection, workers at the site were comfortable placing safety issues into the problem identification and resolution program. Corrective actions, when specified, were generally implemented in a timely manner. With a few exceptions identified by the licensee, corrective actions to prevent recurrence of conditions adverse to quality were generally effective.
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Last modified : March 29, 2002
 
4Q/2000 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                                              Page 1 of 5 Wolf Creek 1 Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance:          Dec 30, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Satisfactorily Perform Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.8.1.3 Emergency Diesel Generator A The licensee failed to satisfactorily perform Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.8.1.3 on Emergency Diesel Generator A on two occasions. The licensee determined that the diesel would have performed satisfactorily in the event of a loss of offsite power. The licensee initiated corrective action document Performance Improvement Request 2000-3385 as a result of this issue.
Inspection Report# : 2000010(pdf)
Significance:          Nov 02, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Lack of monitoring a small radius elbow The team identified that licensee's lack of monitoring a small radius elbow, in Train A of the essential service water system in the Train B switchgear room, with a tee-connection approximately two pipe lengths downstream, did not allow the licensee to demonstrate that the piping stresses remained within design allowable to exclude the possibility of a pipe rupture that could defeat safety-function redundancy. This finding was of very low safety significance because there was no actual leakage in the area of concern and the system remained operable. There is no regulatory requirement for monitoring for erosion/corrosion, therefore, there was no violation of regulatory requirements. The licensee initiated Performance Improvement Request 20012794 to evaluate the condition of the piping in the Train B switchgear room. In addition, the licensee was considering to risk-inform the erosion/corrosion program Inspection Report# : 2001007(pdf)
Significance:          Mar 31, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Three hour rated fire door partially open between vital switchgear rooms The inspectors identified that a 3-hour rated fire door between the safety-related switchgear rooms was partially open. License Condition 2.C(5)(a) of the Wolf Creek Generating Station Facility Operating License requires, in part, that the licensee implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire program. The fire protection program required that 3-hour rated fire doors remain closed if compensatory measures were not in place. The license condition was not met since the 3-hour fire barrier between the switchgear rooms was not intact and the licensee did not have compensatory measures in place. The licensee's failure to maintain in effect the provisions of the fire protection program was a violation of Operating License Condition 2.C(5)(a). This violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VI.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy. The inspectors entered the significance determination process since the partially open door affected a fire separation barrier for multiple safety systems. This had a credible impact on safety and was an impairment to a fire protection feature. The door was partially open for less than 3 hours, the ignition frequency was relatively low, the automatic fire detection and suppression systems were minimally affected, and manual firefighting effectiveness was unaffected. Using the plant specific significance determination process "Transients with Power Conversion System" worksheet, this violation was evaluated as having had very low safety significance. The secondary heat removal and power conversion system mitigation capabilities were available for decay heat removal.
Inspection Report# : 2000011(pdf)
Barrier Integrity
 
4Q/2000 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                                                  Page 2 of 5 Significance:        Nov 02, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Ineffective controls to minimize macro-biological growth and accumulation of foreign material in the essential service water system The team identified that the licensee's controls to minimize macro-biological growth and accumulation of foreign material in the essential service water system were not effective. This finding was of very low safety significance because the essential service water system and containment isolation functions remained operable. The licensee's biological control and system flushing programs were not adequate to prevent the growth and accumulation of clams and their debris (i.e., shells and shell pieces) at the essential service water containment isolation valves for the containment coolers. The clams and their debris were contributing causes of these valves' failure to fully close. There are no regulatory requirements for a biological control program, therefore, there was no violation of regulatory requirements. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 20012802 to reassess the effectiveness of the biological control and system flushing programs Inspection Report# : 2001007(pdf)
Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Significance:        Dec 30, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Follow Radiological Work Permit Requirement Technical Specification 5.4.1 requires procedures for the radiation work permit system. Section 6.2.2 of Procedure AP 25B-300, "Radiation Work Permit Program," Revision 10, states that all workers shall read, understand, and follow the provisions set forth on their radiation work permit. On October 30, 2000, a radiation worker did not follow the radiological requirement listed on Radiation Work Permit 00-3220, as described in the licensee's corrective action program, reference Performance Improvement Request 2000-3290.
Inspection Report# : 2000010(pdf)
Significance:        Oct 27, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform a Dose Rate Survey 10 CFR 20.1501 requires that each licensee shall make, or cause to be made, surveys that are reasonable under the circumstances to evaluate the potential radiological hazards. On October 25, 2000, after Spent Fuel Pool Cleanup Filter FEC01B was transferred into a waste liner at approximately 4 a.m., the licensee failed to conduct a dose rate survey of the area surrounding the waste liner. the licensee performed a followup radiation survey at approximately 8:30 a.m., after identifying that a survey had not been conducted. The survey identified two high radiation areas which were subsequently properly posted as described in the licensee's correction action program Performance Improvement Request 2000-3225.
Inspection Report# : 2000009(pdf)
Significance:        Oct 27, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Follow Radiation Work Permit Special Instructions Technical Specification 5.4.1 requires that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, February 1978. Radiation Work Permit 005000, Revision 0, special instruction (7) stated that proper contamination and airborne controls were to be established in accordance with radiation work permit briefing material prior to commencing work. On October 6, 2000, a deconner received an uptake while performing deconning activities inside the containment bioshield. The deconner failed to follow the radiation work permit special instructions to establish respiratory protection or high efficiency particulate airborne ventilation prior to initiating deconning activities. The details are described in corrective action program Performance Improvement Request 2000-2909.
Inspection Report# : 2000009(pdf)
 
4Q/2000 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                                              Page 3 of 5 Significance:        Sep 01, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure To Perform a Contamination Survey On August 28, 2000, the inspectors identified that radiation protection personnel failed to perform a contamination survey of an area containing scaffolding located in the residual heat exchanger Room A prior to workers entering the area on August 9, 2000. 10 CFR Part 20, Section 1501(a),
states, in part, each licensee shall make or cause to be made surveys that are reasonable under the circumstances to evaluate concentrations or quantities of radioactive material and the potential radiological hazards. The failure to perform a contamination survey of the above area was a violation of 10 CFR Part 20, Section 1501(a). This violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This issue is in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2000-2403. This violation was determined to have very low safety significance, because there was no overexposure or substantial potential for an overexposure to occur.
Inspection Report# : 2000008(pdf)
Significance:        Sep 01, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Poor Radiological Work Planning During the review of the licensee's Refueling Outage 10 exposure estimates and exposure performance data, the inspectors identified that Radiation Work Permit 99-4200 (secondary side steam generator work) total person-rem exceeded budgeted person-rem by greater than 50 percent (11.9 rem verses 6.6 rem). The inspectors noted that approximately 2 person-rem of this additional exposure was due to foreign object retrieval work, which was not planned during Refueling Outage 10. Although retrieval work was not necessary during Refueling Outage 9, it had been performed during previous refueling outages. The failure to plan/budget for the retrieval operation caused the licensee to exceed its budgeted estimate by greater than 50 percent. This issue is in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2000-2430.
This issue was determined to have very low-safety significance, because actual job dose was less than 25 person-rem and there was only one occurrence.
Inspection Report# : 2000008(pdf)
Significance:        Jul 19, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure To Use NIOSH Certified Respiratory Protection Equipment During a review of self-contained breathing apparatus maintenance and surveillance records, the inspector identified that 36 self-contained breathing apparatus air bottles were past the 3-year hydrostatic test dates. Hydrostatic testing had expired in April 2001 for 31 of the self-contained breathing apparatus air bottles that were in service. According to the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, self-contained breathing apparatus units with expired hydrostatic testing are no longer certified. The use of non-National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health certified respiratory protection equipment was a violation of 10 CFR 20.1703(a). This violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2001-1835. The safety significance of this violation was determined to be more than minor, because it had a credible impact on safety due to previously identified air bottle failures and questionable availability for emergency response. This violation was processed through the Emergency Preparedness Significance Determination Process and determined to be of very low safety significance, because there was no failure to meet an emergency planning standard or risk significant planning standard Inspection Report# : 2001003(pdf)
Significance:        Jul 10, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure To Follow Procedural Requirements For Out-of-Calibration Instruments On July 18, 2001, the inspectors identified a continuous air monitor in the radwaste truck bay with an expired calibration. The calibration due date was May 31, 2001. The licensee identified on June 4, 2001, in Performance Improvement Request 2001-1452, a survey instrument which was out of calibration. The calibration due date was also May 31, 2001. The licensee had not properly marked the instruments out of calibration or removed them to the designated holding area. Radiation Protection Procedure RPP-01-405, Revision 12, requires that instruments be properly marked out of calibration and/or placed in a proper holding area. The licensee's failures to follow procedural requirements involving out-of-calibration instruments were two examples of a violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a. This violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2001-1833. The safety significance of this violation was determined to be more than minor, because it had a credible impact on safety and it involved conditions contrary to licensee procedures which impact instrumentation related to measuring worker dose. This violation was processed through the Occupational Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process and determined to be of very low safety significance, because there was no overexposure, no substantial potential for overexposure because the instruments were not used, and the ability to assess dose was not
 
4Q/2000 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                                            Page 4 of 5 compromised because the whole body counter was operable.
Inspection Report# : 2001003(pdf)
Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Significance:          Aug 12, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Package Search The inspector identified that security officers manning the x-ray search equipment were not visually searching hand-carried packages which contained material that could not be identified. The licensee's failure to adequately search packages being processed through the x-ray machine was a violation of paragraphs 1.6.1 and 1.6.8 of the Physical Security Plan, Revision 31, and paragraph 6.3.3.2 of Security Procedure SEC 01-202, Revision 37. This violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2000-1939 The issue was of very low safety significance because no similar findings had occurred during the previous four quarters.
Inspection Report# : 2000007(pdf)
Significance:          Aug 27, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure To Properly Access Vital Areas A noncited violation of 10 CFR 73.55(d)(7)(i)(B) occurred when two licensee employees failed to follow proper procedures when entering vital areas. On August 27- and September 28, 2001, licensee employees did not properly enter vital areas but followed another person through the open door. The finding is more than minor because it had a credible impact on safety. One person entered a vital area without properly badging in. The second person did not have the appropriate access level to enter a vital area. The finding was found to be of very low safety significance using the Safeguards Significance Determination Process. There were no vulnerabilities in the access control program or the safeguards systems or plans, and a safeguard contingency response was not required. This finding of very low safety significance, which is documented in the licensee's corrective action program, is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
Inspection Report# : 2001003(pdf)
Significance:          Jun 15, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Metal Detectors Through a series of tests, the inspector demonstrated that the metal detectors did not detect the test weapon at an 85 percent rate. Paragraph 3.10.1.5 a(1) of the Physical Security Plan, Revision 32, requires that personnel are searched to detect firearms, explosives, and incendiary devices. The plan also requires that the metal detector units conform to Regulatory Guide 5.7, Revision 1, "Entry/Exit Control for Protected Areas, Vital Areas, and Material Access Areas," Paragraph C.1.e, which requires that the metal detectors detect a test weapon with an 85 percent success rate. The failure to adequately detect a test weapon 85 percent of the time is a violation of Paragraph 3.10.1.5 a(1) of the Physical Security Plan, Revision 32. Prior to the end of the inspection, the licensee implemented adequate corrective actions to ensure that the metal detectors would meet the 85 percent criteria. This violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2001-1551. The safety significance of this finding was determined to be very low by the physical protection significance determination process because there were less than two similar findings in the last 4 quarters. The issue was more than minor because the potential failure to detect firearms represents a credible impact on safety and impacts a key performance attribute of the physical protection cornerstone to meet its intended function.
Inspection Report# : 2001002(pdf)
Miscellaneous
 
4Q/2000 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                                            Page 5 of 5 Significance: N/A Mar 28, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Licensee's problem identification and resolution program was effective The licensee adequately identified problems and put them into the corrective action program. The licensee appropriately used risk in determing the extent to which individual problems would be evaluated and in establishing schedules for implementation of corrective actions. Licensee audits and assessments were effective in identifying problems. Based on the interviews conducted during this inspection, workers at the site were comfortable placing safety issues into the problem identification and resolution program. Corrective actions, when specified, were generally implemented in a timely manner. With a few exceptions identified by the licensee, corrective actions to prevent recurrence of conditions adverse to quality were generally effective.
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Last modified : March 28, 2002
 
1Q/2001 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                                              Page 1 of 5 Wolf Creek 1 Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance:          Mar 31, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Three hour rated fire door partially open between vital switchgear rooms The inspectors identified that a 3-hour rated fire door between the safety-related switchgear rooms was partially open. License Condition 2.C(5)(a) of the Wolf Creek Generating Station Facility Operating License requires, in part, that the licensee implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire program. The fire protection program required that 3-hour rated fire doors remain closed if compensatory measures were not in place. The license condition was not met since the 3-hour fire barrier between the switchgear rooms was not intact and the licensee did not have compensatory measures in place. The licensee's failure to maintain in effect the provisions of the fire protection program was a violation of Operating License Condition 2.C(5)(a). This violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VI.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy. The inspectors entered the significance determination process since the partially open door affected a fire separation barrier for multiple safety systems. This had a credible impact on safety and was an impairment to a fire protection feature. The door was partially open for less than 3 hours, the ignition frequency was relatively low, the automatic fire detection and suppression systems were minimally affected, and manual firefighting effectiveness was unaffected. Using the plant specific significance determination process "Transients with Power Conversion System" worksheet, this violation was evaluated as having had very low safety significance. The secondary heat removal and power conversion system mitigation capabilities were available for decay heat removal.
Inspection Report# : 2000011(pdf)
Significance:          Dec 30, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Satisfactorily Perform Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.8.1.3 Emergency Diesel Generator A The licensee failed to satisfactorily perform Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.8.1.3 on Emergency Diesel Generator A on two occasions. The licensee determined that the diesel would have performed satisfactorily in the event of a loss of offsite power. The licensee initiated corrective action document Performance Improvement Request 2000-3385 as a result of this issue.
Inspection Report# : 2000010(pdf)
Significance:          Nov 02, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Lack of monitoring a small radius elbow The team identified that licensee's lack of monitoring a small radius elbow, in Train A of the essential service water system in the Train B switchgear room, with a tee-connection approximately two pipe lengths downstream, did not allow the licensee to demonstrate that the piping stresses remained within design allowable to exclude the possibility of a pipe rupture that could defeat safety-function redundancy. This finding was of very low safety significance because there was no actual leakage in the area of concern and the system remained operable. There is no regulatory requirement for monitoring for erosion/corrosion, therefore, there was no violation of regulatory requirements. The licensee initiated Performance Improvement Request 20012794 to evaluate the condition of the piping in the Train B switchgear room. In addition, the licensee was considering to risk-inform the erosion/corrosion program Inspection Report# : 2001007(pdf)
Barrier Integrity
 
1Q/2001 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                                                  Page 2 of 5 Significance:        Nov 02, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Ineffective controls to minimize macro-biological growth and accumulation of foreign material in the essential service water system The team identified that the licensee's controls to minimize macro-biological growth and accumulation of foreign material in the essential service water system were not effective. This finding was of very low safety significance because the essential service water system and containment isolation functions remained operable. The licensee's biological control and system flushing programs were not adequate to prevent the growth and accumulation of clams and their debris (i.e., shells and shell pieces) at the essential service water containment isolation valves for the containment coolers. The clams and their debris were contributing causes of these valves' failure to fully close. There are no regulatory requirements for a biological control program, therefore, there was no violation of regulatory requirements. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 20012802 to reassess the effectiveness of the biological control and system flushing programs Inspection Report# : 2001007(pdf)
Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Significance:        Dec 30, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Follow Radiological Work Permit Requirement Technical Specification 5.4.1 requires procedures for the radiation work permit system. Section 6.2.2 of Procedure AP 25B-300, "Radiation Work Permit Program," Revision 10, states that all workers shall read, understand, and follow the provisions set forth on their radiation work permit. On October 30, 2000, a radiation worker did not follow the radiological requirement listed on Radiation Work Permit 00-3220, as described in the licensee's corrective action program, reference Performance Improvement Request 2000-3290.
Inspection Report# : 2000010(pdf)
Significance:        Oct 27, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform a Dose Rate Survey 10 CFR 20.1501 requires that each licensee shall make, or cause to be made, surveys that are reasonable under the circumstances to evaluate the potential radiological hazards. On October 25, 2000, after Spent Fuel Pool Cleanup Filter FEC01B was transferred into a waste liner at approximately 4 a.m., the licensee failed to conduct a dose rate survey of the area surrounding the waste liner. the licensee performed a followup radiation survey at approximately 8:30 a.m., after identifying that a survey had not been conducted. The survey identified two high radiation areas which were subsequently properly posted as described in the licensee's correction action program Performance Improvement Request 2000-3225.
Inspection Report# : 2000009(pdf)
Significance:        Oct 27, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Follow Radiation Work Permit Special Instructions Technical Specification 5.4.1 requires that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, February 1978. Radiation Work Permit 005000, Revision 0, special instruction (7) stated that proper contamination and airborne controls were to be established in accordance with radiation work permit briefing material prior to commencing work. On October 6, 2000, a deconner received an uptake while performing deconning activities inside the containment bioshield. The deconner failed to follow the radiation work permit special instructions to establish respiratory protection or high efficiency particulate airborne ventilation prior to initiating deconning activities. The details are described in corrective action program Performance Improvement Request 2000-2909.
Inspection Report# : 2000009(pdf)
 
1Q/2001 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                                              Page 3 of 5 Significance:        Sep 01, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure To Perform a Contamination Survey On August 28, 2000, the inspectors identified that radiation protection personnel failed to perform a contamination survey of an area containing scaffolding located in the residual heat exchanger Room A prior to workers entering the area on August 9, 2000. 10 CFR Part 20, Section 1501(a),
states, in part, each licensee shall make or cause to be made surveys that are reasonable under the circumstances to evaluate concentrations or quantities of radioactive material and the potential radiological hazards. The failure to perform a contamination survey of the above area was a violation of 10 CFR Part 20, Section 1501(a). This violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This issue is in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2000-2403. This violation was determined to have very low safety significance, because there was no overexposure or substantial potential for an overexposure to occur.
Inspection Report# : 2000008(pdf)
Significance:        Sep 01, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Poor Radiological Work Planning During the review of the licensee's Refueling Outage 10 exposure estimates and exposure performance data, the inspectors identified that Radiation Work Permit 99-4200 (secondary side steam generator work) total person-rem exceeded budgeted person-rem by greater than 50 percent (11.9 rem verses 6.6 rem). The inspectors noted that approximately 2 person-rem of this additional exposure was due to foreign object retrieval work, which was not planned during Refueling Outage 10. Although retrieval work was not necessary during Refueling Outage 9, it had been performed during previous refueling outages. The failure to plan/budget for the retrieval operation caused the licensee to exceed its budgeted estimate by greater than 50 percent. This issue is in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2000-2430.
This issue was determined to have very low-safety significance, because actual job dose was less than 25 person-rem and there was only one occurrence.
Inspection Report# : 2000008(pdf)
Significance:        Jul 19, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure To Use NIOSH Certified Respiratory Protection Equipment During a review of self-contained breathing apparatus maintenance and surveillance records, the inspector identified that 36 self-contained breathing apparatus air bottles were past the 3-year hydrostatic test dates. Hydrostatic testing had expired in April 2001 for 31 of the self-contained breathing apparatus air bottles that were in service. According to the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, self-contained breathing apparatus units with expired hydrostatic testing are no longer certified. The use of non-National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health certified respiratory protection equipment was a violation of 10 CFR 20.1703(a). This violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2001-1835. The safety significance of this violation was determined to be more than minor, because it had a credible impact on safety due to previously identified air bottle failures and questionable availability for emergency response. This violation was processed through the Emergency Preparedness Significance Determination Process and determined to be of very low safety significance, because there was no failure to meet an emergency planning standard or risk significant planning standard Inspection Report# : 2001003(pdf)
Significance:        Jul 10, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure To Follow Procedural Requirements For Out-of-Calibration Instruments On July 18, 2001, the inspectors identified a continuous air monitor in the radwaste truck bay with an expired calibration. The calibration due date was May 31, 2001. The licensee identified on June 4, 2001, in Performance Improvement Request 2001-1452, a survey instrument which was out of calibration. The calibration due date was also May 31, 2001. The licensee had not properly marked the instruments out of calibration or removed them to the designated holding area. Radiation Protection Procedure RPP-01-405, Revision 12, requires that instruments be properly marked out of calibration and/or placed in a proper holding area. The licensee's failures to follow procedural requirements involving out-of-calibration instruments were two examples of a violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a. This violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2001-1833. The safety significance of this violation was determined to be more than minor, because it had a credible impact on safety and it involved conditions contrary to licensee procedures which impact instrumentation related to measuring worker dose. This violation was processed through the Occupational Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process and determined to be of very low safety significance, because there was no overexposure, no substantial potential for overexposure because the instruments were not used, and the ability to assess dose was not
 
1Q/2001 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                                            Page 4 of 5 compromised because the whole body counter was operable.
Inspection Report# : 2001003(pdf)
Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Significance:          Aug 12, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Package Search The inspector identified that security officers manning the x-ray search equipment were not visually searching hand-carried packages which contained material that could not be identified. The licensee's failure to adequately search packages being processed through the x-ray machine was a violation of paragraphs 1.6.1 and 1.6.8 of the Physical Security Plan, Revision 31, and paragraph 6.3.3.2 of Security Procedure SEC 01-202, Revision 37. This violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2000-1939 The issue was of very low safety significance because no similar findings had occurred during the previous four quarters.
Inspection Report# : 2000007(pdf)
Significance:          Aug 27, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure To Properly Access Vital Areas A noncited violation of 10 CFR 73.55(d)(7)(i)(B) occurred when two licensee employees failed to follow proper procedures when entering vital areas. On August 27- and September 28, 2001, licensee employees did not properly enter vital areas but followed another person through the open door. The finding is more than minor because it had a credible impact on safety. One person entered a vital area without properly badging in. The second person did not have the appropriate access level to enter a vital area. The finding was found to be of very low safety significance using the Safeguards Significance Determination Process. There were no vulnerabilities in the access control program or the safeguards systems or plans, and a safeguard contingency response was not required. This finding of very low safety significance, which is documented in the licensee's corrective action program, is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
Inspection Report# : 2001003(pdf)
Significance:          Jun 15, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Metal Detectors Through a series of tests, the inspector demonstrated that the metal detectors did not detect the test weapon at an 85 percent rate. Paragraph 3.10.1.5 a(1) of the Physical Security Plan, Revision 32, requires that personnel are searched to detect firearms, explosives, and incendiary devices. The plan also requires that the metal detector units conform to Regulatory Guide 5.7, Revision 1, "Entry/Exit Control for Protected Areas, Vital Areas, and Material Access Areas," Paragraph C.1.e, which requires that the metal detectors detect a test weapon with an 85 percent success rate. The failure to adequately detect a test weapon 85 percent of the time is a violation of Paragraph 3.10.1.5 a(1) of the Physical Security Plan, Revision 32. Prior to the end of the inspection, the licensee implemented adequate corrective actions to ensure that the metal detectors would meet the 85 percent criteria. This violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2001-1551. The safety significance of this finding was determined to be very low by the physical protection significance determination process because there were less than two similar findings in the last 4 quarters. The issue was more than minor because the potential failure to detect firearms represents a credible impact on safety and impacts a key performance attribute of the physical protection cornerstone to meet its intended function.
Inspection Report# : 2001002(pdf)
Miscellaneous
 
1Q/2001 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                                            Page 5 of 5 Significance: N/A Mar 28, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Licensee's problem identification and resolution program was effective The licensee adequately identified problems and put them into the corrective action program. The licensee appropriately used risk in determing the extent to which individual problems would be evaluated and in establishing schedules for implementation of corrective actions. Licensee audits and assessments were effective in identifying problems. Based on the interviews conducted during this inspection, workers at the site were comfortable placing safety issues into the problem identification and resolution program. Corrective actions, when specified, were generally implemented in a timely manner. With a few exceptions identified by the licensee, corrective actions to prevent recurrence of conditions adverse to quality were generally effective.
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Last modified : March 28, 2002
 
2Q/2001 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                                              Page 1 of 5 Wolf Creek 1 Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance:          Mar 31, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Three hour rated fire door partially open between vital switchgear rooms The inspectors identified that a 3-hour rated fire door between the safety-related switchgear rooms was partially open. License Condition 2.C(5)(a) of the Wolf Creek Generating Station Facility Operating License requires, in part, that the licensee implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire program. The fire protection program required that 3-hour rated fire doors remain closed if compensatory measures were not in place. The license condition was not met since the 3-hour fire barrier between the switchgear rooms was not intact and the licensee did not have compensatory measures in place. The licensee's failure to maintain in effect the provisions of the fire protection program was a violation of Operating License Condition 2.C(5)(a). This violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VI.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy. The inspectors entered the significance determination process since the partially open door affected a fire separation barrier for multiple safety systems. This had a credible impact on safety and was an impairment to a fire protection feature. The door was partially open for less than 3 hours, the ignition frequency was relatively low, the automatic fire detection and suppression systems were minimally affected, and manual firefighting effectiveness was unaffected. Using the plant specific significance determination process "Transients with Power Conversion System" worksheet, this violation was evaluated as having had very low safety significance. The secondary heat removal and power conversion system mitigation capabilities were available for decay heat removal.
Inspection Report# : 2000011(pdf)
Significance:          Dec 30, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Satisfactorily Perform Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.8.1.3 Emergency Diesel Generator A The licensee failed to satisfactorily perform Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.8.1.3 on Emergency Diesel Generator A on two occasions. The licensee determined that the diesel would have performed satisfactorily in the event of a loss of offsite power. The licensee initiated corrective action document Performance Improvement Request 2000-3385 as a result of this issue.
Inspection Report# : 2000010(pdf)
Significance:          Nov 02, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Lack of monitoring a small radius elbow The team identified that licensee's lack of monitoring a small radius elbow, in Train A of the essential service water system in the Train B switchgear room, with a tee-connection approximately two pipe lengths downstream, did not allow the licensee to demonstrate that the piping stresses remained within design allowable to exclude the possibility of a pipe rupture that could defeat safety-function redundancy. This finding was of very low safety significance because there was no actual leakage in the area of concern and the system remained operable. There is no regulatory requirement for monitoring for erosion/corrosion, therefore, there was no violation of regulatory requirements. The licensee initiated Performance Improvement Request 20012794 to evaluate the condition of the piping in the Train B switchgear room. In addition, the licensee was considering to risk-inform the erosion/corrosion program Inspection Report# : 2001007(pdf)
Barrier Integrity
 
2Q/2001 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                                                  Page 2 of 5 Significance:        Nov 02, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Ineffective controls to minimize macro-biological growth and accumulation of foreign material in the essential service water system The team identified that the licensee's controls to minimize macro-biological growth and accumulation of foreign material in the essential service water system were not effective. This finding was of very low safety significance because the essential service water system and containment isolation functions remained operable. The licensee's biological control and system flushing programs were not adequate to prevent the growth and accumulation of clams and their debris (i.e., shells and shell pieces) at the essential service water containment isolation valves for the containment coolers. The clams and their debris were contributing causes of these valves' failure to fully close. There are no regulatory requirements for a biological control program, therefore, there was no violation of regulatory requirements. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 20012802 to reassess the effectiveness of the biological control and system flushing programs Inspection Report# : 2001007(pdf)
Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Significance:        Dec 30, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Follow Radiological Work Permit Requirement Technical Specification 5.4.1 requires procedures for the radiation work permit system. Section 6.2.2 of Procedure AP 25B-300, "Radiation Work Permit Program," Revision 10, states that all workers shall read, understand, and follow the provisions set forth on their radiation work permit. On October 30, 2000, a radiation worker did not follow the radiological requirement listed on Radiation Work Permit 00-3220, as described in the licensee's corrective action program, reference Performance Improvement Request 2000-3290.
Inspection Report# : 2000010(pdf)
Significance:        Oct 27, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform a Dose Rate Survey 10 CFR 20.1501 requires that each licensee shall make, or cause to be made, surveys that are reasonable under the circumstances to evaluate the potential radiological hazards. On October 25, 2000, after Spent Fuel Pool Cleanup Filter FEC01B was transferred into a waste liner at approximately 4 a.m., the licensee failed to conduct a dose rate survey of the area surrounding the waste liner. the licensee performed a followup radiation survey at approximately 8:30 a.m., after identifying that a survey had not been conducted. The survey identified two high radiation areas which were subsequently properly posted as described in the licensee's correction action program Performance Improvement Request 2000-3225.
Inspection Report# : 2000009(pdf)
Significance:        Oct 27, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Follow Radiation Work Permit Special Instructions Technical Specification 5.4.1 requires that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, February 1978. Radiation Work Permit 005000, Revision 0, special instruction (7) stated that proper contamination and airborne controls were to be established in accordance with radiation work permit briefing material prior to commencing work. On October 6, 2000, a deconner received an uptake while performing deconning activities inside the containment bioshield. The deconner failed to follow the radiation work permit special instructions to establish respiratory protection or high efficiency particulate airborne ventilation prior to initiating deconning activities. The details are described in corrective action program Performance Improvement Request 2000-2909.
Inspection Report# : 2000009(pdf)
 
2Q/2001 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                                              Page 3 of 5 Significance:        Sep 01, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure To Perform a Contamination Survey On August 28, 2000, the inspectors identified that radiation protection personnel failed to perform a contamination survey of an area containing scaffolding located in the residual heat exchanger Room A prior to workers entering the area on August 9, 2000. 10 CFR Part 20, Section 1501(a),
states, in part, each licensee shall make or cause to be made surveys that are reasonable under the circumstances to evaluate concentrations or quantities of radioactive material and the potential radiological hazards. The failure to perform a contamination survey of the above area was a violation of 10 CFR Part 20, Section 1501(a). This violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This issue is in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2000-2403. This violation was determined to have very low safety significance, because there was no overexposure or substantial potential for an overexposure to occur.
Inspection Report# : 2000008(pdf)
Significance:        Sep 01, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Poor Radiological Work Planning During the review of the licensee's Refueling Outage 10 exposure estimates and exposure performance data, the inspectors identified that Radiation Work Permit 99-4200 (secondary side steam generator work) total person-rem exceeded budgeted person-rem by greater than 50 percent (11.9 rem verses 6.6 rem). The inspectors noted that approximately 2 person-rem of this additional exposure was due to foreign object retrieval work, which was not planned during Refueling Outage 10. Although retrieval work was not necessary during Refueling Outage 9, it had been performed during previous refueling outages. The failure to plan/budget for the retrieval operation caused the licensee to exceed its budgeted estimate by greater than 50 percent. This issue is in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2000-2430.
This issue was determined to have very low-safety significance, because actual job dose was less than 25 person-rem and there was only one occurrence.
Inspection Report# : 2000008(pdf)
Significance:        Jul 19, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure To Use NIOSH Certified Respiratory Protection Equipment During a review of self-contained breathing apparatus maintenance and surveillance records, the inspector identified that 36 self-contained breathing apparatus air bottles were past the 3-year hydrostatic test dates. Hydrostatic testing had expired in April 2001 for 31 of the self-contained breathing apparatus air bottles that were in service. According to the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, self-contained breathing apparatus units with expired hydrostatic testing are no longer certified. The use of non-National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health certified respiratory protection equipment was a violation of 10 CFR 20.1703(a). This violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2001-1835. The safety significance of this violation was determined to be more than minor, because it had a credible impact on safety due to previously identified air bottle failures and questionable availability for emergency response. This violation was processed through the Emergency Preparedness Significance Determination Process and determined to be of very low safety significance, because there was no failure to meet an emergency planning standard or risk significant planning standard Inspection Report# : 2001003(pdf)
Significance:        Jul 10, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure To Follow Procedural Requirements For Out-of-Calibration Instruments On July 18, 2001, the inspectors identified a continuous air monitor in the radwaste truck bay with an expired calibration. The calibration due date was May 31, 2001. The licensee identified on June 4, 2001, in Performance Improvement Request 2001-1452, a survey instrument which was out of calibration. The calibration due date was also May 31, 2001. The licensee had not properly marked the instruments out of calibration or removed them to the designated holding area. Radiation Protection Procedure RPP-01-405, Revision 12, requires that instruments be properly marked out of calibration and/or placed in a proper holding area. The licensee's failures to follow procedural requirements involving out-of-calibration instruments were two examples of a violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a. This violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2001-1833. The safety significance of this violation was determined to be more than minor, because it had a credible impact on safety and it involved conditions contrary to licensee procedures which impact instrumentation related to measuring worker dose. This violation was processed through the Occupational Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process and determined to be of very low safety significance, because there was no overexposure, no substantial potential for overexposure because the instruments were not used, and the ability to assess dose was not
 
2Q/2001 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                                            Page 4 of 5 compromised because the whole body counter was operable.
Inspection Report# : 2001003(pdf)
Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Significance:          Jun 15, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Metal Detectors Through a series of tests, the inspector demonstrated that the metal detectors did not detect the test weapon at an 85 percent rate. Paragraph 3.10.1.5 a(1) of the Physical Security Plan, Revision 32, requires that personnel are searched to detect firearms, explosives, and incendiary devices. The plan also requires that the metal detector units conform to Regulatory Guide 5.7, Revision 1, "Entry/Exit Control for Protected Areas, Vital Areas, and Material Access Areas," Paragraph C.1.e, which requires that the metal detectors detect a test weapon with an 85 percent success rate. The failure to adequately detect a test weapon 85 percent of the time is a violation of Paragraph 3.10.1.5 a(1) of the Physical Security Plan, Revision 32. Prior to the end of the inspection, the licensee implemented adequate corrective actions to ensure that the metal detectors would meet the 85 percent criteria. This violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2001-1551. The safety significance of this finding was determined to be very low by the physical protection significance determination process because there were less than two similar findings in the last 4 quarters. The issue was more than minor because the potential failure to detect firearms represents a credible impact on safety and impacts a key performance attribute of the physical protection cornerstone to meet its intended function.
Inspection Report# : 2001002(pdf)
Significance:          Aug 12, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Package Search The inspector identified that security officers manning the x-ray search equipment were not visually searching hand-carried packages which contained material that could not be identified. The licensee's failure to adequately search packages being processed through the x-ray machine was a violation of paragraphs 1.6.1 and 1.6.8 of the Physical Security Plan, Revision 31, and paragraph 6.3.3.2 of Security Procedure SEC 01-202, Revision 37. This violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2000-1939 The issue was of very low safety significance because no similar findings had occurred during the previous four quarters.
Inspection Report# : 2000007(pdf)
Significance:          Aug 27, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure To Properly Access Vital Areas A noncited violation of 10 CFR 73.55(d)(7)(i)(B) occurred when two licensee employees failed to follow proper procedures when entering vital areas. On August 27- and September 28, 2001, licensee employees did not properly enter vital areas but followed another person through the open door. The finding is more than minor because it had a credible impact on safety. One person entered a vital area without properly badging in. The second person did not have the appropriate access level to enter a vital area. The finding was found to be of very low safety significance using the Safeguards Significance Determination Process. There were no vulnerabilities in the access control program or the safeguards systems or plans, and a safeguard contingency response was not required. This finding of very low safety significance, which is documented in the licensee's corrective action program, is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
Inspection Report# : 2001003(pdf)
Miscellaneous
 
2Q/2001 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                                            Page 5 of 5 Significance: N/A Mar 28, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Licensee's problem identification and resolution program was effective The licensee adequately identified problems and put them into the corrective action program. The licensee appropriately used risk in determing the extent to which individual problems would be evaluated and in establishing schedules for implementation of corrective actions. Licensee audits and assessments were effective in identifying problems. Based on the interviews conducted during this inspection, workers at the site were comfortable placing safety issues into the problem identification and resolution program. Corrective actions, when specified, were generally implemented in a timely manner. With a few exceptions identified by the licensee, corrective actions to prevent recurrence of conditions adverse to quality were generally effective.
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Last modified : March 27, 2002
 
3Q/2001 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                                              Page 1 of 5 Wolf Creek 1 Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance:          Mar 31, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Three hour rated fire door partially open between vital switchgear rooms The inspectors identified that a 3-hour rated fire door between the safety-related switchgear rooms was partially open. License Condition 2.C(5)(a) of the Wolf Creek Generating Station Facility Operating License requires, in part, that the licensee implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire program. The fire protection program required that 3-hour rated fire doors remain closed if compensatory measures were not in place. The license condition was not met since the 3-hour fire barrier between the switchgear rooms was not intact and the licensee did not have compensatory measures in place. The licensee's failure to maintain in effect the provisions of the fire protection program was a violation of Operating License Condition 2.C(5)(a). This violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VI.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy. The inspectors entered the significance determination process since the partially open door affected a fire separation barrier for multiple safety systems. This had a credible impact on safety and was an impairment to a fire protection feature. The door was partially open for less than 3 hours, the ignition frequency was relatively low, the automatic fire detection and suppression systems were minimally affected, and manual firefighting effectiveness was unaffected. Using the plant specific significance determination process "Transients with Power Conversion System" worksheet, this violation was evaluated as having had very low safety significance. The secondary heat removal and power conversion system mitigation capabilities were available for decay heat removal.
Inspection Report# : 2000011(pdf)
Significance:          Dec 30, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Satisfactorily Perform Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.8.1.3 Emergency Diesel Generator A The licensee failed to satisfactorily perform Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.8.1.3 on Emergency Diesel Generator A on two occasions. The licensee determined that the diesel would have performed satisfactorily in the event of a loss of offsite power. The licensee initiated corrective action document Performance Improvement Request 2000-3385 as a result of this issue.
Inspection Report# : 2000010(pdf)
Significance:          Nov 02, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Lack of monitoring a small radius elbow The team identified that licensee's lack of monitoring a small radius elbow, in Train A of the essential service water system in the Train B switchgear room, with a tee-connection approximately two pipe lengths downstream, did not allow the licensee to demonstrate that the piping stresses remained within design allowable to exclude the possibility of a pipe rupture that could defeat safety-function redundancy. This finding was of very low safety significance because there was no actual leakage in the area of concern and the system remained operable. There is no regulatory requirement for monitoring for erosion/corrosion, therefore, there was no violation of regulatory requirements. The licensee initiated Performance Improvement Request 20012794 to evaluate the condition of the piping in the Train B switchgear room. In addition, the licensee was considering to risk-inform the erosion/corrosion program Inspection Report# : 2001007(pdf)
Barrier Integrity
 
3Q/2001 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                                              Page 2 of 5 Significance:        Nov 02, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Ineffective controls to minimize macro-biological growth and accumulation of foreign material in the essential service water system The team identified that the licensee's controls to minimize macro-biological growth and accumulation of foreign material in the essential service water system were not effective. This finding was of very low safety significance because the essential service water system and containment isolation functions remained operable. The licensee's biological control and system flushing programs were not adequate to prevent the growth and accumulation of clams and their debris (i.e., shells and shell pieces) at the essential service water containment isolation valves for the containment coolers. The clams and their debris were contributing causes of these valves' failure to fully close. There are no regulatory requirements for a biological control program, therefore, there was no violation of regulatory requirements. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 20012802 to reassess the effectiveness of the biological control and system flushing programs Inspection Report# : 2001007(pdf)
Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Significance:        Jul 19, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure To Use NIOSH Certified Respiratory Protection Equipment During a review of self-contained breathing apparatus maintenance and surveillance records, the inspector identified that 36 self-contained breathing apparatus air bottles were past the 3-year hydrostatic test dates. Hydrostatic testing had expired in April 2001 for 31 of the self-contained breathing apparatus air bottles that were in service. According to the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, self-contained breathing apparatus units with expired hydrostatic testing are no longer certified. The use of non-National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health certified respiratory protection equipment was a violation of 10 CFR 20.1703(a). This violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2001-1835. The safety significance of this violation was determined to be more than minor, because it had a credible impact on safety due to previously identified air bottle failures and questionable availability for emergency response. This violation was processed through the Emergency Preparedness Significance Determination Process and determined to be of very low safety significance, because there was no failure to meet an emergency planning standard or risk significant planning standard Inspection Report# : 2001003(pdf)
Significance:        Jul 10, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure To Follow Procedural Requirements For Out-of-Calibration Instruments On July 18, 2001, the inspectors identified a continuous air monitor in the radwaste truck bay with an expired calibration. The calibration due date was May 31, 2001. The licensee identified on June 4, 2001, in Performance Improvement Request 2001-1452, a survey instrument which was out of calibration. The calibration due date was also May 31, 2001. The licensee had not properly marked the instruments out of calibration or removed them to the designated holding area. Radiation Protection Procedure RPP-01-405, Revision 12, requires that instruments be properly marked out of calibration and/or placed in a proper holding area. The licensee's failures to follow procedural requirements involving out-of-calibration instruments were two examples of a violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a. This violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2001-1833. The safety significance of this violation was determined to be more than minor, because it had a credible impact on safety and it involved conditions contrary to licensee procedures which impact instrumentation related to measuring worker dose. This violation was processed through the Occupational Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process and determined to be of very low safety significance, because there was no overexposure, no substantial potential for overexposure because the instruments were not used, and the ability to assess dose was not compromised because the whole body counter was operable.
Inspection Report# : 2001003(pdf)
 
3Q/2001 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                                                  Page 3 of 5 Significance:        Dec 30, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Follow Radiological Work Permit Requirement Technical Specification 5.4.1 requires procedures for the radiation work permit system. Section 6.2.2 of Procedure AP 25B-300, "Radiation Work Permit Program," Revision 10, states that all workers shall read, understand, and follow the provisions set forth on their radiation work permit. On October 30, 2000, a radiation worker did not follow the radiological requirement listed on Radiation Work Permit 00-3220, as described in the licensee's corrective action program, reference Performance Improvement Request 2000-3290.
Inspection Report# : 2000010(pdf)
Significance:        Oct 27, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform a Dose Rate Survey 10 CFR 20.1501 requires that each licensee shall make, or cause to be made, surveys that are reasonable under the circumstances to evaluate the potential radiological hazards. On October 25, 2000, after Spent Fuel Pool Cleanup Filter FEC01B was transferred into a waste liner at approximately 4 a.m., the licensee failed to conduct a dose rate survey of the area surrounding the waste liner. the licensee performed a followup radiation survey at approximately 8:30 a.m., after identifying that a survey had not been conducted. The survey identified two high radiation areas which were subsequently properly posted as described in the licensee's correction action program Performance Improvement Request 2000-3225.
Inspection Report# : 2000009(pdf)
Significance:        Oct 27, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Follow Radiation Work Permit Special Instructions Technical Specification 5.4.1 requires that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, February 1978. Radiation Work Permit 005000, Revision 0, special instruction (7) stated that proper contamination and airborne controls were to be established in accordance with radiation work permit briefing material prior to commencing work. On October 6, 2000, a deconner received an uptake while performing deconning activities inside the containment bioshield. The deconner failed to follow the radiation work permit special instructions to establish respiratory protection or high efficiency particulate airborne ventilation prior to initiating deconning activities. The details are described in corrective action program Performance Improvement Request 2000-2909.
Inspection Report# : 2000009(pdf)
Significance:        Sep 01, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure To Perform a Contamination Survey On August 28, 2000, the inspectors identified that radiation protection personnel failed to perform a contamination survey of an area containing scaffolding located in the residual heat exchanger Room A prior to workers entering the area on August 9, 2000. 10 CFR Part 20, Section 1501(a),
states, in part, each licensee shall make or cause to be made surveys that are reasonable under the circumstances to evaluate concentrations or quantities of radioactive material and the potential radiological hazards. The failure to perform a contamination survey of the above area was a violation of 10 CFR Part 20, Section 1501(a). This violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This issue is in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2000-2403. This violation was determined to have very low safety significance, because there was no overexposure or substantial potential for an overexposure to occur.
Inspection Report# : 2000008(pdf)
Significance:        Sep 01, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Poor Radiological Work Planning During the review of the licensee's Refueling Outage 10 exposure estimates and exposure performance data, the inspectors identified that Radiation Work Permit 99-4200 (secondary side steam generator work) total person-rem exceeded budgeted person-rem by greater than 50 percent (11.9 rem verses 6.6 rem). The inspectors noted that approximately 2 person-rem of this additional exposure was due to foreign object retrieval work, which was not planned during Refueling Outage 10. Although retrieval work was not necessary during Refueling Outage 9, it had
 
3Q/2001 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                                            Page 4 of 5 been performed during previous refueling outages. The failure to plan/budget for the retrieval operation caused the licensee to exceed its budgeted estimate by greater than 50 percent. This issue is in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2000-2430.
This issue was determined to have very low-safety significance, because actual job dose was less than 25 person-rem and there was only one occurrence.
Inspection Report# : 2000008(pdf)
Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Significance:          Aug 27, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure To Properly Access Vital Areas A noncited violation of 10 CFR 73.55(d)(7)(i)(B) occurred when two licensee employees failed to follow proper procedures when entering vital areas. On August 27- and September 28, 2001, licensee employees did not properly enter vital areas but followed another person through the open door. The finding is more than minor because it had a credible impact on safety. One person entered a vital area without properly badging in. The second person did not have the appropriate access level to enter a vital area. The finding was found to be of very low safety significance using the Safeguards Significance Determination Process. There were no vulnerabilities in the access control program or the safeguards systems or plans, and a safeguard contingency response was not required. This finding of very low safety significance, which is documented in the licensee's corrective action program, is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
Inspection Report# : 2001003(pdf)
Significance:          Jun 15, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Metal Detectors Through a series of tests, the inspector demonstrated that the metal detectors did not detect the test weapon at an 85 percent rate. Paragraph 3.10.1.5 a(1) of the Physical Security Plan, Revision 32, requires that personnel are searched to detect firearms, explosives, and incendiary devices. The plan also requires that the metal detector units conform to Regulatory Guide 5.7, Revision 1, "Entry/Exit Control for Protected Areas, Vital Areas, and Material Access Areas," Paragraph C.1.e, which requires that the metal detectors detect a test weapon with an 85 percent success rate. The failure to adequately detect a test weapon 85 percent of the time is a violation of Paragraph 3.10.1.5 a(1) of the Physical Security Plan, Revision 32. Prior to the end of the inspection, the licensee implemented adequate corrective actions to ensure that the metal detectors would meet the 85 percent criteria. This violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2001-1551. The safety significance of this finding was determined to be very low by the physical protection significance determination process because there were less than two similar findings in the last 4 quarters. The issue was more than minor because the potential failure to detect firearms represents a credible impact on safety and impacts a key performance attribute of the physical protection cornerstone to meet its intended function.
Inspection Report# : 2001002(pdf)
Significance:          Aug 12, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Package Search The inspector identified that security officers manning the x-ray search equipment were not visually searching hand-carried packages which contained material that could not be identified. The licensee's failure to adequately search packages being processed through the x-ray machine was a violation of paragraphs 1.6.1 and 1.6.8 of the Physical Security Plan, Revision 31, and paragraph 6.3.3.2 of Security Procedure SEC 01-202, Revision 37. This violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2000-1939 The issue was of very low safety significance because no similar findings had occurred during the previous four quarters.
Inspection Report# : 2000007(pdf)
 
3Q/2001 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                                            Page 5 of 5 Miscellaneous Significance: N/A Mar 28, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Licensee's problem identification and resolution program was effective The licensee adequately identified problems and put them into the corrective action program. The licensee appropriately used risk in determing the extent to which individual problems would be evaluated and in establishing schedules for implementation of corrective actions. Licensee audits and assessments were effective in identifying problems. Based on the interviews conducted during this inspection, workers at the site were comfortable placing safety issues into the problem identification and resolution program. Corrective actions, when specified, were generally implemented in a timely manner. With a few exceptions identified by the licensee, corrective actions to prevent recurrence of conditions adverse to quality were generally effective.
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Last modified : March 26, 2002
 
4Q/2001 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                                              Page 1 of 4 Wolf Creek 1 Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance:          Nov 02, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Lack of monitoring a small radius elbow The team identified that licensee's lack of monitoring a small radius elbow, in Train A of the essential service water system in the Train B switchgear room, with a tee-connection approximately two pipe lengths downstream, did not allow the licensee to demonstrate that the piping stresses remained within design allowable to exclude the possibility of a pipe rupture that could defeat safety-function redundancy. This finding was of very low safety significance because there was no actual leakage in the area of concern and the system remained operable. There is no regulatory requirement for monitoring for erosion/corrosion, therefore, there was no violation of regulatory requirements. The licensee initiated Performance Improvement Request 20012794 to evaluate the condition of the piping in the Train B switchgear room. In addition, the licensee was considering to risk-inform the erosion/corrosion program Inspection Report# : 2001007(pdf)
Significance:          Mar 31, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Three hour rated fire door partially open between vital switchgear rooms The inspectors identified that a 3-hour rated fire door between the safety-related switchgear rooms was partially open. License Condition 2.C(5)(a) of the Wolf Creek Generating Station Facility Operating License requires, in part, that the licensee implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire program. The fire protection program required that 3-hour rated fire doors remain closed if compensatory measures were not in place. The license condition was not met since the 3-hour fire barrier between the switchgear rooms was not intact and the licensee did not have compensatory measures in place. The licensee's failure to maintain in effect the provisions of the fire protection program was a violation of Operating License Condition 2.C(5)(a). This violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VI.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy. The inspectors entered the significance determination process since the partially open door affected a fire separation barrier for multiple safety systems. This had a credible impact on safety and was an impairment to a fire protection feature. The door was partially open for less than 3 hours, the ignition frequency was relatively low, the automatic fire detection and suppression systems were minimally affected, and manual firefighting effectiveness was unaffected. Using the plant specific significance determination process "Transients with Power Conversion System" worksheet, this violation was evaluated as having had very low safety significance. The secondary heat removal and power conversion system mitigation capabilities were available for decay heat removal.
Inspection Report# : 2000011(pdf)
Significance:          Dec 30, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Satisfactorily Perform Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.8.1.3 Emergency Diesel Generator A The licensee failed to satisfactorily perform Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.8.1.3 on Emergency Diesel Generator A on two occasions. The licensee determined that the diesel would have performed satisfactorily in the event of a loss of offsite power. The licensee initiated corrective action document Performance Improvement Request 2000-3385 as a result of this issue.
Inspection Report# : 2000010(pdf)
Barrier Integrity Significance:          Nov 02, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Ineffective controls to minimize macro-biological growth and accumulation of foreign material in the essential service water system The team identified that the licensee's controls to minimize macro-biological growth and accumulation of foreign material in the essential service water system were not effective. This finding was of very low safety significance because the essential service water system and containment isolation functions remained operable. The licensee's biological control and system flushing programs were not adequate to prevent the growth and
 
4Q/2001 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                                              Page 2 of 4 accumulation of clams and their debris (i.e., shells and shell pieces) at the essential service water containment isolation valves for the containment coolers. The clams and their debris were contributing causes of these valves' failure to fully close. There are no regulatory requirements for a biological control program, therefore, there was no violation of regulatory requirements. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 20012802 to reassess the effectiveness of the biological control and system flushing programs Inspection Report# : 2001007(pdf)
Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Significance:        Jul 19, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure To Use NIOSH Certified Respiratory Protection Equipment During a review of self-contained breathing apparatus maintenance and surveillance records, the inspector identified that 36 self-contained breathing apparatus air bottles were past the 3-year hydrostatic test dates. Hydrostatic testing had expired in April 2001 for 31 of the self-contained breathing apparatus air bottles that were in service. According to the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, self-contained breathing apparatus units with expired hydrostatic testing are no longer certified. The use of non-National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health certified respiratory protection equipment was a violation of 10 CFR 20.1703(a). This violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2001-1835. The safety significance of this violation was determined to be more than minor, because it had a credible impact on safety due to previously identified air bottle failures and questionable availability for emergency response. This violation was processed through the Emergency Preparedness Significance Determination Process and determined to be of very low safety significance, because there was no failure to meet an emergency planning standard or risk significant planning standard Inspection Report# : 2001003(pdf)
Significance:        Jul 10, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure To Follow Procedural Requirements For Out-of-Calibration Instruments On July 18, 2001, the inspectors identified a continuous air monitor in the radwaste truck bay with an expired calibration. The calibration due date was May 31, 2001. The licensee identified on June 4, 2001, in Performance Improvement Request 2001-1452, a survey instrument which was out of calibration. The calibration due date was also May 31, 2001. The licensee had not properly marked the instruments out of calibration or removed them to the designated holding area. Radiation Protection Procedure RPP-01-405, Revision 12, requires that instruments be properly marked out of calibration and/or placed in a proper holding area. The licensee's failures to follow procedural requirements involving out-of-calibration instruments were two examples of a violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a. This violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2001-1833. The safety significance of this violation was determined to be more than minor, because it had a credible impact on safety and it involved conditions contrary to licensee procedures which impact instrumentation related to measuring worker dose. This violation was processed through the Occupational Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process and determined to be of very low safety significance, because there was no overexposure, no substantial potential for overexposure because the instruments were not used, and the ability to assess dose was not compromised because the whole body counter was operable.
Inspection Report# : 2001003(pdf)
Significance:        Dec 30, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Follow Radiological Work Permit Requirement Technical Specification 5.4.1 requires procedures for the radiation work permit system. Section 6.2.2 of Procedure AP 25B-300, "Radiation Work Permit Program," Revision 10, states that all workers shall read, understand, and follow the provisions set forth on their radiation work permit. On October 30, 2000, a radiation worker did not follow the radiological requirement listed on Radiation Work Permit 00-3220, as described in the licensee's corrective action program, reference Performance Improvement Request 2000-3290.
Inspection Report# : 2000010(pdf)
Significance:        Oct 27, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform a Dose Rate Survey
 
4Q/2001 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                                                  Page 3 of 4 10 CFR 20.1501 requires that each licensee shall make, or cause to be made, surveys that are reasonable under the circumstances to evaluate the potential radiological hazards. On October 25, 2000, after Spent Fuel Pool Cleanup Filter FEC01B was transferred into a waste liner at approximately 4 a.m., the licensee failed to conduct a dose rate survey of the area surrounding the waste liner. the licensee performed a followup radiation survey at approximately 8:30 a.m., after identifying that a survey had not been conducted. The survey identified two high radiation areas which were subsequently properly posted as described in the licensee's correction action program Performance Improvement Request 2000-3225.
Inspection Report# : 2000009(pdf)
Significance:        Oct 27, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Follow Radiation Work Permit Special Instructions Technical Specification 5.4.1 requires that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, February 1978. Radiation Work Permit 005000, Revision 0, special instruction (7) stated that proper contamination and airborne controls were to be established in accordance with radiation work permit briefing material prior to commencing work. On October 6, 2000, a deconner received an uptake while performing deconning activities inside the containment bioshield. The deconner failed to follow the radiation work permit special instructions to establish respiratory protection or high efficiency particulate airborne ventilation prior to initiating deconning activities. The details are described in corrective action program Performance Improvement Request 2000-2909.
Inspection Report# : 2000009(pdf)
Significance:        Sep 01, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure To Perform a Contamination Survey On August 28, 2000, the inspectors identified that radiation protection personnel failed to perform a contamination survey of an area containing scaffolding located in the residual heat exchanger Room A prior to workers entering the area on August 9, 2000. 10 CFR Part 20, Section 1501(a),
states, in part, each licensee shall make or cause to be made surveys that are reasonable under the circumstances to evaluate concentrations or quantities of radioactive material and the potential radiological hazards. The failure to perform a contamination survey of the above area was a violation of 10 CFR Part 20, Section 1501(a). This violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This issue is in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2000-2403. This violation was determined to have very low safety significance, because there was no overexposure or substantial potential for an overexposure to occur.
Inspection Report# : 2000008(pdf)
Significance:        Sep 01, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Poor Radiological Work Planning During the review of the licensee's Refueling Outage 10 exposure estimates and exposure performance data, the inspectors identified that Radiation Work Permit 99-4200 (secondary side steam generator work) total person-rem exceeded budgeted person-rem by greater than 50 percent (11.9 rem verses 6.6 rem). The inspectors noted that approximately 2 person-rem of this additional exposure was due to foreign object retrieval work, which was not planned during Refueling Outage 10. Although retrieval work was not necessary during Refueling Outage 9, it had been performed during previous refueling outages. The failure to plan/budget for the retrieval operation caused the licensee to exceed its budgeted estimate by greater than 50 percent. This issue is in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2000-2430.
This issue was determined to have very low-safety significance, because actual job dose was less than 25 person-rem and there was only one occurrence.
Inspection Report# : 2000008(pdf)
Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Significance:        Aug 27, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure To Properly Access Vital Areas A noncited violation of 10 CFR 73.55(d)(7)(i)(B) occurred when two licensee employees failed to follow proper procedures when entering vital areas. On August 27- and September 28, 2001, licensee employees did not properly enter vital areas but followed another person through the open door. The finding is more than minor because it had a credible impact on safety. One person entered a vital area without properly badging in. The
 
4Q/2001 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                                            Page 4 of 4 second person did not have the appropriate access level to enter a vital area. The finding was found to be of very low safety significance using the Safeguards Significance Determination Process. There were no vulnerabilities in the access control program or the safeguards systems or plans, and a safeguard contingency response was not required. This finding of very low safety significance, which is documented in the licensee's corrective action program, is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
Inspection Report# : 2001003(pdf)
Significance:          Jun 15, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Metal Detectors Through a series of tests, the inspector demonstrated that the metal detectors did not detect the test weapon at an 85 percent rate. Paragraph 3.10.1.5 a(1) of the Physical Security Plan, Revision 32, requires that personnel are searched to detect firearms, explosives, and incendiary devices. The plan also requires that the metal detector units conform to Regulatory Guide 5.7, Revision 1, "Entry/Exit Control for Protected Areas, Vital Areas, and Material Access Areas," Paragraph C.1.e, which requires that the metal detectors detect a test weapon with an 85 percent success rate. The failure to adequately detect a test weapon 85 percent of the time is a violation of Paragraph 3.10.1.5 a(1) of the Physical Security Plan, Revision 32. Prior to the end of the inspection, the licensee implemented adequate corrective actions to ensure that the metal detectors would meet the 85 percent criteria. This violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2001-1551. The safety significance of this finding was determined to be very low by the physical protection significance determination process because there were less than two similar findings in the last 4 quarters. The issue was more than minor because the potential failure to detect firearms represents a credible impact on safety and impacts a key performance attribute of the physical protection cornerstone to meet its intended function.
Inspection Report# : 2001002(pdf)
Significance:          Aug 12, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Package Search The inspector identified that security officers manning the x-ray search equipment were not visually searching hand-carried packages which contained material that could not be identified. The licensee's failure to adequately search packages being processed through the x-ray machine was a violation of paragraphs 1.6.1 and 1.6.8 of the Physical Security Plan, Revision 31, and paragraph 6.3.3.2 of Security Procedure SEC 01-202, Revision 37. This violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2000-1939 The issue was of very low safety significance because no similar findings had occurred during the previous four quarters.
Inspection Report# : 2000007(pdf)
Miscellaneous Significance: N/A Mar 28, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Licensee's problem identification and resolution program was effective The licensee adequately identified problems and put them into the corrective action program. The licensee appropriately used risk in determing the extent to which individual problems would be evaluated and in establishing schedules for implementation of corrective actions. Licensee audits and assessments were effective in identifying problems. Based on the interviews conducted during this inspection, workers at the site were comfortable placing safety issues into the problem identification and resolution program. Corrective actions, when specified, were generally implemented in a timely manner. With a few exceptions identified by the licensee, corrective actions to prevent recurrence of conditions adverse to quality were generally effective.
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Last modified : March 01, 2002
 
1Q/2002 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                                  Page 1 of 6 Wolf Creek 1 Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: N/A Mar 23, 2002 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Fire Protection A noncited violation of Technical Specifications Section 5.4.1 when the licensee failed to follow Procedure AP 10-102, "Control of Combustible Materials," Revision 6. The inspectors identified that the licensee placed transient combustibles weighing approximately 530 pounds inside the turbine building within 20 feet of the auxiliary building without the required permit. A permit was required in this area if the transient combustibles weight is greater than 100 pounds. This finding was greater than minor because it had a credible impact on safety. This finding did not involve an impairment or degradation of a fire protection feature. The finding was of No Color because the issue was determined to be a violation greater than minor. The placement of the transient combustible material did not affect any installed fire protection features and it would not have impeded access to the area by the licensee's fire brigade Inspection Report# : 2001006(pdf)
Significance: TBD Feb 15, 2002 Identified By: NRC Item Type: URI Unresolved item Failure to Implement Corrective Action for Past Indications of Emergency Diesel Generator Heat Exchanger Tube Degradation The inspectors identified a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, for failure to implement corrective action to prevent recurrence for a significant condition adverse to quality. In 1990 and 1991, the licensee identified that the emergency diesel generator heat exchangers exhibited severe wall thinning and pitting because of de-alloying of the base metals and flow accelerated corrosion. As corrective action, the licensee planned to perform periodic eddy current examination of the heat exchanger tubes to provide early indication of tube degradation. However, this corrective action was not implemented until December 13, 2001, despite several missed opportunities to implement this action. This item is in the corrective action system as Performance Improvement Request 2002-0048. This item is being treated as an unresolved item pending licensee metallurgical and structural analysis of several degraded tubes following which the risk significance of this finding will be determined.
Inspection Report# : 2002006(pdf)
Significance: TBD Feb 15, 2002 Identified By: NRC Item Type: URI Unresolved item Failure To Provide Acceptance Criteria For Eddy Current Testing The inspectors identified a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, for failure to include appropriate acceptance criteria in an activity affecting quality. As of December 13, 2001, Work Order WO 01-229167-001, which directed the licensee to perform eddy current testing on Emergency Diesel Generator A heat exchanger tubes, did not initially include acceptance criteria for maximum allowable heat exchanger tube wall thinning. As a result, the licensee did not document the significant tube degradation identified or take corrective action to plug the degraded tubes until January 4, 2002. This item is in the corrective action system as Performance Improvement Request 2002-0048. This item is being treated as an unresolved item pending licensee metallurgical and structural analysis of several degraded tubes following which the risk significance of this finding will be determined. (Section 4OA3.4).
Inspection Report# : 2002006(pdf)
Significance: TBD Feb 15, 2002 Identified By: NRC Item Type: URI Unresolved item Failure to Prompt;y Identify Significantly Degraded Emergency Diesel Generator Heat Exchanger Tubes The inspectors identified a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, for failure to promptly identify a significant condition adverse to quality. Specifically, on December 13, 2001, the licensee performed eddy current examination of the Emergency Diesel Generator A heat exchanger tubes, and identified significant tube degradation, but failed to document the condition or report it to management until January 4, 2002. The licensee had no acceptance criteria for performance of the testing, and personnel believed that the condition could be corrected during a future outage. This item is in the corrective action system as Performance Improvement Request 2002-0048. This item is being treated as an unresolved item pending licensee metallurgical and
 
1Q/2002 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                                  Page 2 of 6 structural analysis of several degraded tubes following which the risk significance of this finding will be determined.
Inspection Report# : 2002006(pdf)
Significance: TBD Feb 15, 2002 Identified By: NRC Item Type: URI Unresolved item Evaluate Post Operability of Emergency Diesel Generator B Following Analysis of Heat Exchanger Tubes Emergency Diesel Generator B may have been inoperable for a significant period of time. During eddy current testing, the licensee identified nine intercooler heat exchanger tubes that exhibited suspected de-alloying, indicating that the structural integrity of the tubes was indeterminate. The licensee bounding calculation determined that the intercooler heat exchanger would be operable with up to three intercooler heat exchanger tubes failing. The licensee subsequently plugged these heat exchanger tubes on January 7, 2002. This item is in the corrective action system as Performance Improvement Request 2002-0048. This item is being treated as an unresolved item pending licensee metallurgical and structural analysis of several degraded tubes following which the risk significance of this finding will be determined.
Inspection Report# : 2002006(pdf)
Significance:        Nov 02, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Lack of monitoring a small radius elbow The team identified that licensee's lack of monitoring a small radius elbow, in Train A of the essential service water system in the Train B switchgear room, with a tee-connection approximately two pipe lengths downstream, did not allow the licensee to demonstrate that the piping stresses remained within design allowable to exclude the possibility of a pipe rupture that could defeat safety-function redundancy. This finding was of very low safety significance because there was no actual leakage in the area of concern and the system remained operable. There is no regulatory requirement for monitoring for erosion/corrosion, therefore, there was no violation of regulatory requirements. The licensee initiated Performance Improvement Request 20012794 to evaluate the condition of the piping in the Train B switchgear room. In addition, the licensee was considering to risk-inform the erosion/corrosion program Inspection Report# : 2001007(pdf)
Significance:        Mar 31, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Three hour rated fire door partially open between vital switchgear rooms The inspectors identified that a 3-hour rated fire door between the safety-related switchgear rooms was partially open. License Condition 2.C(5)(a) of the Wolf Creek Generating Station Facility Operating License requires, in part, that the licensee implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire program. The fire protection program required that 3-hour rated fire doors remain closed if compensatory measures were not in place. The license condition was not met since the 3-hour fire barrier between the switchgear rooms was not intact and the licensee did not have compensatory measures in place. The licensee's failure to maintain in effect the provisions of the fire protection program was a violation of Operating License Condition 2.C(5)(a). This violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VI.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy. The inspectors entered the significance determination process since the partially open door affected a fire separation barrier for multiple safety systems.
This had a credible impact on safety and was an impairment to a fire protection feature. The door was partially open for less than 3 hours, the ignition frequency was relatively low, the automatic fire detection and suppression systems were minimally affected, and manual firefighting effectiveness was unaffected. Using the plant specific significance determination process "Transients with Power Conversion System" worksheet, this violation was evaluated as having had very low safety significance. The secondary heat removal and power conversion system mitigation capabilities were available for decay heat removal.
Inspection Report# : 2000011(pdf)
Significance:        Dec 30, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Satisfactorily Perform Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.8.1.3 Emergency Diesel Generator A The licensee failed to satisfactorily perform Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.8.1.3 on Emergency Diesel Generator A on two occasions. The licensee determined that the diesel would have performed satisfactorily in the event of a loss of offsite power. The licensee initiated corrective action document Performance Improvement Request 2000-3385 as a result of this issue.
Inspection Report# : 2000010(pdf)
 
1Q/2002 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                                  Page 3 of 6 Barrier Integrity Significance:          Nov 02, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Ineffective controls to minimize macro-biological growth and accumulation of foreign material in the essential service water system The team identified that the licensee's controls to minimize macro-biological growth and accumulation of foreign material in the essential service water system were not effective. This finding was of very low safety significance because the essential service water system and containment isolation functions remained operable. The licensee's biological control and system flushing programs were not adequate to prevent the growth and accumulation of clams and their debris (i.e., shells and shell pieces) at the essential service water containment isolation valves for the containment coolers. The clams and their debris were contributing causes of these valves' failure to fully close. There are no regulatory requirements for a biological control program, therefore, there was no violation of regulatory requirements. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 20012802 to reassess the effectiveness of the biological control and system flushing programs Inspection Report# : 2001007(pdf)
Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Significance:          Jul 19, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure To Use NIOSH Certified Respiratory Protection Equipment During a review of self-contained breathing apparatus maintenance and surveillance records, the inspector identified that 36 self-contained breathing apparatus air bottles were past the 3-year hydrostatic test dates. Hydrostatic testing had expired in April 2001 for 31 of the self-contained breathing apparatus air bottles that were in service. According to the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, self-contained breathing apparatus units with expired hydrostatic testing are no longer certified. The use of non-National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health certified respiratory protection equipment was a violation of 10 CFR 20.1703 (a). This violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2001-1835. The safety significance of this violation was determined to be more than minor, because it had a credible impact on safety due to previously identified air bottle failures and questionable availability for emergency response. This violation was processed through the Emergency Preparedness Significance Determination Process and determined to be of very low safety significance, because there was no failure to meet an emergency planning standard or risk significant planning standard Inspection Report# : 2001003(pdf)
Significance:          Jul 10, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure To Follow Procedural Requirements For Out-of-Calibration Instruments On July 18, 2001, the inspectors identified a continuous air monitor in the radwaste truck bay with an expired calibration. The calibration due date was May 31, 2001. The licensee identified on June 4, 2001, in Performance Improvement Request 2001-1452, a survey instrument which was out of calibration. The calibration due date was also May 31, 2001. The licensee had not properly marked the instruments out of calibration or removed them to the designated holding area. Radiation Protection Procedure RPP 405, Revision 12, requires that instruments be properly marked out of calibration and/or placed in a proper holding area. The licensee's failures to follow procedural requirements involving out-of-calibration instruments were two examples of a violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a. This violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2001-1833.
The safety significance of this violation was determined to be more than minor, because it had a credible impact on safety and it involved conditions contrary to licensee procedures which impact instrumentation related to measuring worker dose. This violation was processed through the Occupational Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process and determined to be of very low safety significance, because there was no overexposure, no substantial potential for overexposure because the instruments were
 
1Q/2002 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                                      Page 4 of 6 not used, and the ability to assess dose was not compromised because the whole body counter was operable.
Inspection Report# : 2001003(pdf)
Significance:        Dec 30, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Follow Radiological Work Permit Requirement Technical Specification 5.4.1 requires procedures for the radiation work permit system. Section 6.2.2 of Procedure AP 25B-300, "Radiation Work Permit Program," Revision 10, states that all workers shall read, understand, and follow the provisions set forth on their radiation work permit. On October 30, 2000, a radiation worker did not follow the radiological requirement listed on Radiation Work Permit 00-3220, as described in the licensee's corrective action program, reference Performance Improvement Request 2000-3290.
Inspection Report# : 2000010(pdf)
Significance:        Oct 27, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform a Dose Rate Survey 10 CFR 20.1501 requires that each licensee shall make, or cause to be made, surveys that are reasonable under the circumstances to evaluate the potential radiological hazards. On October 25, 2000, after Spent Fuel Pool Cleanup Filter FEC01B was transferred into a waste liner at approximately 4 a.m., the licensee failed to conduct a dose rate survey of the area surrounding the waste liner.
the licensee performed a followup radiation survey at approximately 8:30 a.m., after identifying that a survey had not been conducted. The survey identified two high radiation areas which were subsequently properly posted as described in the licensee's correction action program Performance Improvement Request 2000-3225.
Inspection Report# : 2000009(pdf)
Significance:        Oct 27, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Follow Radiation Work Permit Special Instructions Technical Specification 5.4.1 requires that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, February 1978. Radiation Work Permit 005000, Revision 0, special instruction (7) stated that proper contamination and airborne controls were to be established in accordance with radiation work permit briefing material prior to commencing work. On October 6, 2000, a deconner received an uptake while performing deconning activities inside the containment bioshield. The deconner failed to follow the radiation work permit special instructions to establish respiratory protection or high efficiency particulate airborne ventilation prior to initiating deconning activities. The details are described in corrective action program Performance Improvement Request 2000-2909.
Inspection Report# : 2000009(pdf)
Significance:        Sep 01, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure To Perform a Contamination Survey On August 28, 2000, the inspectors identified that radiation protection personnel failed to perform a contamination survey of an area containing scaffolding located in the residual heat exchanger Room A prior to workers entering the area on August 9, 2000. 10 CFR Part 20, Section 1501(a), states, in part, each licensee shall make or cause to be made surveys that are reasonable under the circumstances to evaluate concentrations or quantities of radioactive material and the potential radiological hazards. The failure to perform a contamination survey of the above area was a violation of 10 CFR Part 20, Section 1501(a). This violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This issue is in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2000-2403. This violation was determined to have very low safety significance, because there was no overexposure or substantial potential for an overexposure to occur.
Inspection Report# : 2000008(pdf)
Significance:        Sep 01, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Poor Radiological Work Planning
 
1Q/2002 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                                Page 5 of 6 During the review of the licensee's Refueling Outage 10 exposure estimates and exposure performance data, the inspectors identified that Radiation Work Permit 99-4200 (secondary side steam generator work) total person-rem exceeded budgeted person-rem by greater than 50 percent (11.9 rem verses 6.6 rem). The inspectors noted that approximately 2 person-rem of this additional exposure was due to foreign object retrieval work, which was not planned during Refueling Outage 10. Although retrieval work was not necessary during Refueling Outage 9, it had been performed during previous refueling outages. The failure to plan/budget for the retrieval operation caused the licensee to exceed its budgeted estimate by greater than 50 percent. This issue is in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2000-2430. This issue was determined to have very low-safety significance, because actual job dose was less than 25 person-rem and there was only one occurrence.
Inspection Report# : 2000008(pdf)
Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Significance:        Aug 27, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure To Properly Access Vital Areas A noncited violation of 10 CFR 73.55(d)(7)(i)(B) occurred when two licensee employees failed to follow proper procedures when entering vital areas. On August 27- and September 28, 2001, licensee employees did not properly enter vital areas but followed another person through the open door. The finding is more than minor because it had a credible impact on safety. One person entered a vital area without properly badging in. The second person did not have the appropriate access level to enter a vital area.
The finding was found to be of very low safety significance using the Safeguards Significance Determination Process. There were no vulnerabilities in the access control program or the safeguards systems or plans, and a safeguard contingency response was not required. This finding of very low safety significance, which is documented in the licensee's corrective action program, is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
Inspection Report# : 2001003(pdf)
Significance:        Jun 15, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Metal Detectors Through a series of tests, the inspector demonstrated that the metal detectors did not detect the test weapon at an 85 percent rate.
Paragraph 3.10.1.5 a(1) of the Physical Security Plan, Revision 32, requires that personnel are searched to detect firearms, explosives, and incendiary devices. The plan also requires that the metal detector units conform to Regulatory Guide 5.7, Revision 1, "Entry/Exit Control for Protected Areas, Vital Areas, and Material Access Areas," Paragraph C.1.e, which requires that the metal detectors detect a test weapon with an 85 percent success rate. The failure to adequately detect a test weapon 85 percent of the time is a violation of Paragraph 3.10.1.5 a(1) of the Physical Security Plan, Revision 32. Prior to the end of the inspection, the licensee implemented adequate corrective actions to ensure that the metal detectors would meet the 85 percent criteria. This violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2001-1551. The safety significance of this finding was determined to be very low by the physical protection significance determination process because there were less than two similar findings in the last 4 quarters. The issue was more than minor because the potential failure to detect firearms represents a credible impact on safety and impacts a key performance attribute of the physical protection cornerstone to meet its intended function.
Inspection Report# : 2001002(pdf)
Significance:        Aug 12, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Package Search The inspector identified that security officers manning the x-ray search equipment were not visually searching hand-carried packages which contained material that could not be identified. The licensee's failure to adequately search packages being processed through the x-ray machine was a violation of paragraphs 1.6.1 and 1.6.8 of the Physical Security Plan, Revision 31, and paragraph 6.3.3.2 of Security Procedure SEC 01-202, Revision 37. This violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent
 
1Q/2002 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                                    Page 6 of 6 with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2000-1939 The issue was of very low safety significance because no similar findings had occurred during the previous four quarters.
Inspection Report# : 2000007(pdf)
Miscellaneous Significance: N/A May 17, 2002 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Identification and Resolution of Problems The licensee was effective at identifying problems and placing them into the corrective action program. Observations and findings identified by the NRC during the evaluation period (March 1, 2001 to April 1, 2002) were similar those identified in licensee audits and assessments. The licensee effectively prioritized reviews and evaluated issues with few exceptions. The licensee was effective in determining the extent of conditions, and implementation of corrective actions. The depth of the condition evaluations and the rigor applied to cover the actions was appropriate to the significance of the safety issue involved. Based on interviews conducted during this inspection, workers at the site felt free to input safety issues into the problem identification and resolution program.
Inspection Report# : 2002003(pdf)
Significance: N/A Mar 28, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Licensee's problem identification and resolution program was effective The licensee adequately identified problems and put them into the corrective action program. The licensee appropriately used risk in determing the extent to which individual problems would be evaluated and in establishing schedules for implementation of corrective actions. Licensee audits and assessments were effective in identifying problems. Based on the interviews conducted during this inspection, workers at the site were comfortable placing safety issues into the problem identification and resolution program.
Corrective actions, when specified, were generally implemented in a timely manner. With a few exceptions identified by the licensee, corrective actions to prevent recurrence of conditions adverse to quality were generally effective.
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Last modified : July 22, 2002
 
2Q/2002 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                    Page 1 of 8 Wolf Creek 1 Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: N/A Mar 23, 2002 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Fire Protection A noncited violation of Technical Specifications Section 5.4.1 when the licensee failed to follow Procedure AP 10-102, "Control of Combustible Materials," Revision 6. The inspectors identified that the licensee placed transient combustibles weighing approximately 530 pounds inside the turbine building within 20 feet of the auxiliary building without the required permit. A permit was required in this area if the transient combustibles weight is greater than 100 pounds. This finding was greater than minor because it had a credible impact on safety. This finding did not involve an impairment or degradation of a fire protection feature. The finding was of No Color because the issue was determined to be a violation greater than minor. The placement of the transient combustible material did not affect any installed fire protection features and it would not have impeded access to the area by the licensee's fire brigade Inspection Report# : 2001006(pdf)
Significance: TBD Feb 15, 2002 Identified By: NRC Item Type: URI Unresolved item Failure to Implement Corrective Action for Past Indications of Emergency Diesel Generator Heat Exchanger Tube Degradation The inspectors identified a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, for failure to implement corrective action to prevent recurrence for a significant condition adverse to quality. In 1990 and 1991, the licensee identified that the emergency diesel generator heat exchangers exhibited severe wall thinning and pitting because of de-alloying of the base metals and flow accelerated corrosion. As corrective action, the licensee planned to perform periodic eddy current examination of the heat exchanger tubes to provide early indication of tube degradation. However, this corrective action was not implemented until December 13, 2001, despite several missed opportunities to implement this action.
This item is in the corrective action system as Performance Improvement Request 2002-0048. This item is being treated as an unresolved item pending licensee metallurgical and structural analysis of several degraded tubes following which the risk significance of this finding will be determined.
Inspection Report# : 2002006(pdf)
Significance: TBD Feb 15, 2002 Identified By: NRC Item Type: URI Unresolved item Failure To Provide Acceptance Criteria For Eddy Current Testing The inspectors identified a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, for failure to include appropriate acceptance criteria in an activity affecting quality. As of December 13, 2001, Work Order WO 01-229167-001, which directed the licensee to perform eddy current testing on Emergency Diesel Generator A heat exchanger tubes, did not initially include acceptance criteria for maximum allowable heat exchanger tube wall thinning. As a result, the licensee did not document the significant tube degradation identified or take corrective action to plug the degraded tubes until file://C:\RROP\NRR\OVERSIGHT\ASSESS\WC\wc_pim.html                                                            07/03/2003
 
2Q/2002 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                      Page 2 of 8 January 4, 2002. This item is in the corrective action system as Performance Improvement Request 2002-0048. This item is being treated as an unresolved item pending licensee metallurgical and structural analysis of several degraded tubes following which the risk significance of this finding will be determined. (Section 4OA3.4).
Inspection Report# : 2002006(pdf)
Significance: TBD Feb 15, 2002 Identified By: NRC Item Type: URI Unresolved item Failure to Prompt;y Identify Significantly Degraded Emergency Diesel Generator Heat Exchanger Tubes The inspectors identified a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, for failure to promptly identify a significant condition adverse to quality. Specifically, on December 13, 2001, the licensee performed eddy current examination of the Emergency Diesel Generator A heat exchanger tubes, and identified significant tube degradation, but failed to document the condition or report it to management until January 4, 2002. The licensee had no acceptance criteria for performance of the testing, and personnel believed that the condition could be corrected during a future outage. This item is in the corrective action system as Performance Improvement Request 2002-0048. This item is being treated as an unresolved item pending licensee metallurgical and structural analysis of several degraded tubes following which the risk significance of this finding will be determined.
Inspection Report# : 2002006(pdf)
Significance: TBD Feb 15, 2002 Identified By: NRC Item Type: URI Unresolved item Evaluate Post Operability of Emergency Diesel Generator B Following Analysis of Heat Exchanger Tubes Emergency Diesel Generator B may have been inoperable for a significant period of time. During eddy current testing, the licensee identified nine intercooler heat exchanger tubes that exhibited suspected de-alloying, indicating that the structural integrity of the tubes was indeterminate. The licensee bounding calculation determined that the intercooler heat exchanger would be operable with up to three intercooler heat exchanger tubes failing. The licensee subsequently plugged these heat exchanger tubes on January 7, 2002. This item is in the corrective action system as Performance Improvement Request 2002-0048. This item is being treated as an unresolved item pending licensee metallurgical and structural analysis of several degraded tubes following which the risk significance of this finding will be determined.
Inspection Report# : 2002006(pdf)
Significance:        Nov 02, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Lack of monitoring a small radius elbow The team identified that licensee's lack of monitoring a small radius elbow, in Train A of the essential service water system in the Train B switchgear room, with a tee-connection approximately two pipe lengths downstream, did not allow the licensee to demonstrate that the piping stresses remained within design allowable to exclude the possibility of a pipe rupture that could defeat safety-function redundancy. This finding was of very low safety significance because there was no actual leakage in the area of concern and the system remained operable. There is no regulatory requirement for monitoring for erosion/corrosion, therefore, there was no violation of regulatory requirements. The licensee initiated Performance Improvement Request 20012794 to evaluate the condition of the piping in the Train B switchgear room. In addition, the licensee was considering to risk-inform the erosion/corrosion program Inspection Report# : 2001007(pdf)
Significance:        Jul 10, 2002 Identified By: Self Disclosing file://C:\RROP\NRR\OVERSIGHT\ASSESS\WC\wc_pim.html                                                            07/03/2003
 
2Q/2002 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                      Page 3 of 8 Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Follow Procedure While Drawing a Vacuum on the Reactor Coolant system The inspectors documented a failure to follow procedure while drawing a vacuum on the reactor coolant system.
Although Item 4.6 of Operations Procedure SYS BB-112, "Vacuum Fill of the RCS," Revision 17, stated that residual heat removal pump flow rate during vacuum venting shall be less than 2000 gallons per minute to prevent pump cavitation, operators allowed the flow rate to exceed 2000 gallons per minute. The failure to follow procedure while drawing a vacuum on the reactor coolant system was identified as a violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1, for a Regulatory Guide 1.33 referenced procedure. This violation is being treated as a noncited violation and is in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2002-1247. A risk analyst in the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation determined that this issue was of very low safety significance because all other emergency core cooling components were available and inventory remained in the secondary side of the steam generators which would provide for reflux cooling of the reactor.
Inspection Report# : 2002002(pdf)
Significance:      Mar 31, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Three hour rated fire door partially open between vital switchgear rooms The inspectors identified that a 3-hour rated fire door between the safety-related switchgear rooms was partially open.
License Condition 2.C(5)(a) of the Wolf Creek Generating Station Facility Operating License requires, in part, that the licensee implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire program. The fire protection program required that 3-hour rated fire doors remain closed if compensatory measures were not in place. The license condition was not met since the 3-hour fire barrier between the switchgear rooms was not intact and the licensee did not have compensatory measures in place. The licensee's failure to maintain in effect the provisions of the fire protection program was a violation of Operating License Condition 2.C(5)(a). This violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VI.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy. The inspectors entered the significance determination process since the partially open door affected a fire separation barrier for multiple safety systems. This had a credible impact on safety and was an impairment to a fire protection feature. The door was partially open for less than 3 hours, the ignition frequency was relatively low, the automatic fire detection and suppression systems were minimally affected, and manual firefighting effectiveness was unaffected. Using the plant specific significance determination process "Transients with Power Conversion System" worksheet, this violation was evaluated as having had very low safety significance. The secondary heat removal and power conversion system mitigation capabilities were available for decay heat removal.
Inspection Report# : 2000011(pdf)
Significance:      Dec 30, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Satisfactorily Perform Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.8.1.3 Emergency Diesel Generator A The licensee failed to satisfactorily perform Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.8.1.3 on Emergency Diesel Generator A on two occasions. The licensee determined that the diesel would have performed satisfactorily in the event of a loss of offsite power. The licensee initiated corrective action document Performance Improvement Request 2000-3385 as a result of this issue.
Inspection Report# : 2000010(pdf) file://C:\RROP\NRR\OVERSIGHT\ASSESS\WC\wc_pim.html                                                              07/03/2003
 
2Q/2002 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                        Page 4 of 8 Barrier Integrity Significance:        Nov 02, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Ineffective controls to minimize macro-biological growth and accumulation of foreign material in the essential service water system The team identified that the licensee's controls to minimize macro-biological growth and accumulation of foreign material in the essential service water system were not effective. This finding was of very low safety significance because the essential service water system and containment isolation functions remained operable. The licensee's biological control and system flushing programs were not adequate to prevent the growth and accumulation of clams and their debris (i.e., shells and shell pieces) at the essential service water containment isolation valves for the containment coolers. The clams and their debris were contributing causes of these valves' failure to fully close. There are no regulatory requirements for a biological control program, therefore, there was no violation of regulatory requirements. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 20012802 to reassess the effectiveness of the biological control and system flushing programs Inspection Report# : 2001007(pdf)
Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Significance:        Jul 19, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure To Use NIOSH Certified Respiratory Protection Equipment During a review of self-contained breathing apparatus maintenance and surveillance records, the inspector identified that 36 self-contained breathing apparatus air bottles were past the 3-year hydrostatic test dates. Hydrostatic testing had expired in April 2001 for 31 of the self-contained breathing apparatus air bottles that were in service. According to the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, self-contained breathing apparatus units with expired hydrostatic testing are no longer certified. The use of non-National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health certified respiratory protection equipment was a violation of 10 CFR 20.1703(a). This violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2001-1835. The safety significance of this violation was determined to be more than minor, because it had a credible impact on safety due to previously identified air bottle failures and questionable availability for emergency response. This violation was processed through the Emergency Preparedness Significance Determination Process and determined to be of very low safety significance, because there was no failure to meet an emergency planning standard or risk significant planning standard Inspection Report# : 2001003(pdf)
Significance:        Jul 10, 2001 file://C:\RROP\NRR\OVERSIGHT\ASSESS\WC\wc_pim.html                                                                07/03/2003
 
2Q/2002 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                    Page 5 of 8 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure To Follow Procedural Requirements For Out-of-Calibration Instruments On July 18, 2001, the inspectors identified a continuous air monitor in the radwaste truck bay with an expired calibration. The calibration due date was May 31, 2001. The licensee identified on June 4, 2001, in Performance Improvement Request 2001-1452, a survey instrument which was out of calibration. The calibration due date was also May 31, 2001. The licensee had not properly marked the instruments out of calibration or removed them to the designated holding area. Radiation Protection Procedure RPP-01-405, Revision 12, requires that instruments be properly marked out of calibration and/or placed in a proper holding area. The licensee's failures to follow procedural requirements involving out-of-calibration instruments were two examples of a violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a. This violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2001-1833.
The safety significance of this violation was determined to be more than minor, because it had a credible impact on safety and it involved conditions contrary to licensee procedures which impact instrumentation related to measuring worker dose. This violation was processed through the Occupational Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process and determined to be of very low safety significance, because there was no overexposure, no substantial potential for overexposure because the instruments were not used, and the ability to assess dose was not compromised because the whole body counter was operable.
Inspection Report# : 2001003(pdf)
Significance:      Dec 30, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Follow Radiological Work Permit Requirement Technical Specification 5.4.1 requires procedures for the radiation work permit system. Section 6.2.2 of Procedure AP 25B-300, "Radiation Work Permit Program," Revision 10, states that all workers shall read, understand, and follow the provisions set forth on their radiation work permit. On October 30, 2000, a radiation worker did not follow the radiological requirement listed on Radiation Work Permit 00-3220, as described in the licensee's corrective action program, reference Performance Improvement Request 2000-3290.
Inspection Report# : 2000010(pdf)
Significance:      Oct 27, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform a Dose Rate Survey 10 CFR 20.1501 requires that each licensee shall make, or cause to be made, surveys that are reasonable under the circumstances to evaluate the potential radiological hazards. On October 25, 2000, after Spent Fuel Pool Cleanup Filter FEC01B was transferred into a waste liner at approximately 4 a.m., the licensee failed to conduct a dose rate survey of the area surrounding the waste liner. the licensee performed a followup radiation survey at approximately 8:30 a.m.,
after identifying that a survey had not been conducted. The survey identified two high radiation areas which were subsequently properly posted as described in the licensee's correction action program Performance Improvement Request 2000-3225.
Inspection Report# : 2000009(pdf)
Significance:      Oct 27, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation file://C:\RROP\NRR\OVERSIGHT\ASSESS\WC\wc_pim.html                                                            07/03/2003
 
2Q/2002 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                        Page 6 of 8 Failure to Follow Radiation Work Permit Special Instructions Technical Specification 5.4.1 requires that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, February 1978.
Radiation Work Permit 005000, Revision 0, special instruction (7) stated that proper contamination and airborne controls were to be established in accordance with radiation work permit briefing material prior to commencing work.
On October 6, 2000, a deconner received an uptake while performing deconning activities inside the containment bioshield. The deconner failed to follow the radiation work permit special instructions to establish respiratory protection or high efficiency particulate airborne ventilation prior to initiating deconning activities. The details are described in corrective action program Performance Improvement Request 2000-2909.
Inspection Report# : 2000009(pdf)
Significance:      Sep 01, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure To Perform a Contamination Survey On August 28, 2000, the inspectors identified that radiation protection personnel failed to perform a contamination survey of an area containing scaffolding located in the residual heat exchanger Room A prior to workers entering the area on August 9, 2000. 10 CFR Part 20, Section 1501(a), states, in part, each licensee shall make or cause to be made surveys that are reasonable under the circumstances to evaluate concentrations or quantities of radioactive material and the potential radiological hazards. The failure to perform a contamination survey of the above area was a violation of 10 CFR Part 20, Section 1501(a). This violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This issue is in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2000-2403. This violation was determined to have very low safety significance, because there was no overexposure or substantial potential for an overexposure to occur.
Inspection Report# : 2000008(pdf)
Significance:      Sep 01, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Poor Radiological Work Planning During the review of the licensee's Refueling Outage 10 exposure estimates and exposure performance data, the inspectors identified that Radiation Work Permit 99-4200 (secondary side steam generator work) total person-rem exceeded budgeted person-rem by greater than 50 percent (11.9 rem verses 6.6 rem). The inspectors noted that approximately 2 person-rem of this additional exposure was due to foreign object retrieval work, which was not planned during Refueling Outage 10. Although retrieval work was not necessary during Refueling Outage 9, it had been performed during previous refueling outages. The failure to plan/budget for the retrieval operation caused the licensee to exceed its budgeted estimate by greater than 50 percent. This issue is in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2000-2430. This issue was determined to have very low-safety significance, because actual job dose was less than 25 person-rem and there was only one occurrence.
Inspection Report# : 2000008(pdf)
Public Radiation Safety file://C:\RROP\NRR\OVERSIGHT\ASSESS\WC\wc_pim.html                                                              07/03/2003
 
2Q/2002 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                      Page 7 of 8 Physical Protection Significance:        Aug 27, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure To Properly Access Vital Areas A noncited violation of 10 CFR 73.55(d)(7)(i)(B) occurred when two licensee employees failed to follow proper procedures when entering vital areas. On August 27- and September 28, 2001, licensee employees did not properly enter vital areas but followed another person through the open door. The finding is more than minor because it had a credible impact on safety. One person entered a vital area without properly badging in. The second person did not have the appropriate access level to enter a vital area. The finding was found to be of very low safety significance using the Safeguards Significance Determination Process. There were no vulnerabilities in the access control program or the safeguards systems or plans, and a safeguard contingency response was not required. This finding of very low safety significance, which is documented in the licensee's corrective action program, is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
Inspection Report# : 2001003(pdf)
Significance:        Jun 15, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Metal Detectors Through a series of tests, the inspector demonstrated that the metal detectors did not detect the test weapon at an 85 percent rate. Paragraph 3.10.1.5 a(1) of the Physical Security Plan, Revision 32, requires that personnel are searched to detect firearms, explosives, and incendiary devices. The plan also requires that the metal detector units conform to Regulatory Guide 5.7, Revision 1, "Entry/Exit Control for Protected Areas, Vital Areas, and Material Access Areas,"
Paragraph C.1.e, which requires that the metal detectors detect a test weapon with an 85 percent success rate. The failure to adequately detect a test weapon 85 percent of the time is a violation of Paragraph 3.10.1.5 a(1) of the Physical Security Plan, Revision 32. Prior to the end of the inspection, the licensee implemented adequate corrective actions to ensure that the metal detectors would meet the 85 percent criteria. This violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2001-1551. The safety significance of this finding was determined to be very low by the physical protection significance determination process because there were less than two similar findings in the last 4 quarters. The issue was more than minor because the potential failure to detect firearms represents a credible impact on safety and impacts a key performance attribute of the physical protection cornerstone to meet its intended function.
Inspection Report# : 2001002(pdf)
Significance:        Aug 12, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Package Search The inspector identified that security officers manning the x-ray search equipment were not visually searching hand-carried packages which contained material that could not be identified. The licensee's failure to adequately search packages being processed through the x-ray machine was a violation of paragraphs 1.6.1 and 1.6.8 of the Physical Security Plan, Revision 31, and paragraph 6.3.3.2 of Security Procedure SEC 01-202, Revision 37. This violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation file://C:\RROP\NRR\OVERSIGHT\ASSESS\WC\wc_pim.html                                                              07/03/2003
 
2Q/2002 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                    Page 8 of 8 was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2000-1939 The issue was of very low safety significance because no similar findings had occurred during the previous four quarters.
Inspection Report# : 2000007(pdf)
Miscellaneous Significance: N/A May 17, 2002 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Identification and Resolution of Problems The licensee was effective at identifying problems and placing them into the corrective action program. Observations and findings identified by the NRC during the evaluation period (March 1, 2001 to April 1, 2002) were similar those identified in licensee audits and assessments. The licensee effectively prioritized reviews and evaluated issues with few exceptions. The licensee was effective in determining the extent of conditions, and implementation of corrective actions. The depth of the condition evaluations and the rigor applied to cover the actions was appropriate to the significance of the safety issue involved. Based on interviews conducted during this inspection, workers at the site felt free to input safety issues into the problem identification and resolution program.
Inspection Report# : 2002003(pdf)
Significance: N/A Mar 28, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Licensee's problem identification and resolution program was effective The licensee adequately identified problems and put them into the corrective action program. The licensee appropriately used risk in determing the extent to which individual problems would be evaluated and in establishing schedules for implementation of corrective actions. Licensee audits and assessments were effective in identifying problems. Based on the interviews conducted during this inspection, workers at the site were comfortable placing safety issues into the problem identification and resolution program. Corrective actions, when specified, were generally implemented in a timely manner. With a few exceptions identified by the licensee, corrective actions to prevent recurrence of conditions adverse to quality were generally effective.
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Last modified : August 29, 2002 file://C:\RROP\NRR\OVERSIGHT\ASSESS\WC\wc_pim.html                                                            07/03/2003
 
3Q/2002 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                        Page 1 of 7 Wolf Creek 1 Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance:        Sep 25, 2002 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Implement Appropriate Corrective Actions for Degraded Emergency Diesel Generator Heat Exchanger ubes The inspectors identified a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, for failure to: (a) implement corrective action for past indications of emergency diesel generator heat exchanger tube degradation; (b) provide acceptance criteria for eddy current testing of emergency diesel generator heat exchanger tubes; and (c) promptly identify significantly degraded emergency diesel generator heat exchanger tubes. These failures were identified as a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI. This violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy and is in the licensee's corrective action system as Performance Improvement Request 2002-0048. This issue was considered more than minor because, if left uncorrected, the finding would result in a more significant safety concern. Additionally, the issue affected the operability, availability, reliability, and function of accident mitigation equipment. This issue was determined to be of very low safety significance because it did not result in the loss of the safety function of a Technical Specification train or system.
Inspection Report# : 2002004(pdf)
Significance:        Jul 10, 2002 Identified By: Self Disclosing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Follow Procedure While Drawing a Vacuum on the Reactor Coolant system The inspectors documented a failure to follow procedure while drawing a vacuum on the reactor coolant system.
Although Item 4.6 of Operations Procedure SYS BB-112, "Vacuum Fill of the RCS," Revision 17, stated that residual heat removal pump flow rate during vacuum venting shall be less than 2000 gallons per minute to prevent pump cavitation, operators allowed the flow rate to exceed 2000 gallons per minute. The failure to follow procedure while drawing a vacuum on the reactor coolant system was identified as a violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1, for a Regulatory Guide 1.33 referenced procedure. This violation is being treated as a noncited violation and is in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2002-1247. A risk analyst in the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation determined that this issue was of very low safety significance because all other emergency core cooling components were available and inventory remained in the secondary side of the steam generators which would provide for reflux cooling of the reactor.
Inspection Report# : 2002002(pdf)
Significance: N/A Mar 23, 2002 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Fire Protection A noncited violation of Technical Specifications Section 5.4.1 when the licensee failed to follow Procedure AP 10-102, "Control of Combustible Materials," Revision 6. The inspectors identified that the licensee placed transient combustibles weighing approximately 530 pounds inside the turbine building within 20 feet of the auxiliary building
 
3Q/2002 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                      Page 2 of 7 without the required permit. A permit was required in this area if the transient combustibles weight is greater than 100 pounds. This finding was greater than minor because it had a credible impact on safety. This finding did not involve an impairment or degradation of a fire protection feature. The finding was of No Color because the issue was determined to be a violation greater than minor. The placement of the transient combustible material did not affect any installed fire protection features and it would not have impeded access to the area by the licensee's fire brigade Inspection Report# : 2001006(pdf)
Significance:      Nov 02, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Lack of monitoring a small radius elbow The team identified that licensee's lack of monitoring a small radius elbow, in Train A of the essential service water system in the Train B switchgear room, with a tee-connection approximately two pipe lengths downstream, did not allow the licensee to demonstrate that the piping stresses remained within design allowable to exclude the possibility of a pipe rupture that could defeat safety-function redundancy. This finding was of very low safety significance because there was no actual leakage in the area of concern and the system remained operable. There is no regulatory requirement for monitoring for erosion/corrosion, therefore, there was no violation of regulatory requirements. The licensee initiated Performance Improvement Request 20012794 to evaluate the condition of the piping in the Train B switchgear room. In addition, the licensee was considering to risk-inform the erosion/corrosion program Inspection Report# : 2001007(pdf)
Significance:      Nov 04, 2002 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Altenative Shutdown Procedure The team identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1 for the failure to provide an adequate procedure for ensuring the safe shutdown of the reactor in the event of a fire in the control room that requires control room evacuation. Procedure OFN RP-17, "Control Room Evacuation," Revision 17, was inadequate because certain operator actions specified in Attachment C to the procedure could not be performed within the required time. The licensee entered this finding into their corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2002-2393.
This finding was of greater than minor significance because it impacted the mitigating systems cornerstone. This resulted from the issue's potential to affect the licensee's capability to safely shutdown the reactor in response to a fire in the control room requiring control room evacuation and remote shutdown. For fire protection findings, the Phase 1 screening worksheet in Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, refers fire protection findings to Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, for significance evaluation. Using the significance determination process described in Appendix F, this finding was determined to be of very low safety significance, due to the licensee's demonstration that operators would have performed the most time-critical step (to isolate the power-operated relief valves) in time to prevent core damage.
Inspection Report# : 2002008(pdf)
Significance:      Mar 31, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Three hour rated fire door partially open between vital switchgear rooms The inspectors identified that a 3-hour rated fire door between the safety-related switchgear rooms was partially open.
License Condition 2.C(5)(a) of the Wolf Creek Generating Station Facility Operating License requires, in part, that the licensee implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire program. The fire protection program required that 3-hour rated fire doors remain closed if compensatory measures were not in place. The license condition was not met since the 3-hour fire barrier between the switchgear rooms was not intact and the licensee did not have compensatory measures in place. The licensee's failure to maintain in effect the provisions of the fire protection program was a violation of Operating License Condition 2.C(5)(a). This violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VI.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy. The inspectors entered the significance
 
3Q/2002 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                        Page 3 of 7 determination process since the partially open door affected a fire separation barrier for multiple safety systems. This had a credible impact on safety and was an impairment to a fire protection feature. The door was partially open for less than 3 hours, the ignition frequency was relatively low, the automatic fire detection and suppression systems were minimally affected, and manual firefighting effectiveness was unaffected. Using the plant specific significance determination process "Transients with Power Conversion System" worksheet, this violation was evaluated as having had very low safety significance. The secondary heat removal and power conversion system mitigation capabilities were available for decay heat removal.
Inspection Report# : 2000011(pdf)
Significance:        Dec 30, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Satisfactorily Perform Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.8.1.3 Emergency Diesel Generator A The licensee failed to satisfactorily perform Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.8.1.3 on Emergency Diesel Generator A on two occasions. The licensee determined that the diesel would have performed satisfactorily in the event of a loss of offsite power. The licensee initiated corrective action document Performance Improvement Request 2000-3385 as a result of this issue.
Inspection Report# : 2000010(pdf)
Barrier Integrity Significance:        Nov 02, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Ineffective controls to minimize macro-biological growth and accumulation of foreign material in the essential service water system The team identified that the licensee's controls to minimize macro-biological growth and accumulation of foreign material in the essential service water system were not effective. This finding was of very low safety significance because the essential service water system and containment isolation functions remained operable. The licensee's biological control and system flushing programs were not adequate to prevent the growth and accumulation of clams and their debris (i.e., shells and shell pieces) at the essential service water containment isolation valves for the containment coolers. The clams and their debris were contributing causes of these valves' failure to fully close. There are no regulatory requirements for a biological control program, therefore, there was no violation of regulatory requirements. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 20012802 to reassess the effectiveness of the biological control and system flushing programs Inspection Report# : 2001007(pdf)
Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Significance:        Jul 19, 2001
 
3Q/2002 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                      Page 4 of 7 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure To Use NIOSH Certified Respiratory Protection Equipment During a review of self-contained breathing apparatus maintenance and surveillance records, the inspector identified that 36 self-contained breathing apparatus air bottles were past the 3-year hydrostatic test dates. Hydrostatic testing had expired in April 2001 for 31 of the self-contained breathing apparatus air bottles that were in service. According to the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, self-contained breathing apparatus units with expired hydrostatic testing are no longer certified. The use of non-National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health certified respiratory protection equipment was a violation of 10 CFR 20.1703(a). This violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2001-1835. The safety significance of this violation was determined to be more than minor, because it had a credible impact on safety due to previously identified air bottle failures and questionable availability for emergency response. This violation was processed through the Emergency Preparedness Significance Determination Process and determined to be of very low safety significance, because there was no failure to meet an emergency planning standard or risk significant planning standard Inspection Report# : 2001003(pdf)
Significance:      Jul 10, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure To Follow Procedural Requirements For Out-of-Calibration Instruments On July 18, 2001, the inspectors identified a continuous air monitor in the radwaste truck bay with an expired calibration. The calibration due date was May 31, 2001. The licensee identified on June 4, 2001, in Performance Improvement Request 2001-1452, a survey instrument which was out of calibration. The calibration due date was also May 31, 2001. The licensee had not properly marked the instruments out of calibration or removed them to the designated holding area. Radiation Protection Procedure RPP-01-405, Revision 12, requires that instruments be properly marked out of calibration and/or placed in a proper holding area. The licensee's failures to follow procedural requirements involving out-of-calibration instruments were two examples of a violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a. This violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2001-1833.
The safety significance of this violation was determined to be more than minor, because it had a credible impact on safety and it involved conditions contrary to licensee procedures which impact instrumentation related to measuring worker dose. This violation was processed through the Occupational Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process and determined to be of very low safety significance, because there was no overexposure, no substantial potential for overexposure because the instruments were not used, and the ability to assess dose was not compromised because the whole body counter was operable.
Inspection Report# : 2001003(pdf)
Significance:      Dec 30, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Follow Radiological Work Permit Requirement Technical Specification 5.4.1 requires procedures for the radiation work permit system. Section 6.2.2 of Procedure AP 25B-300, "Radiation Work Permit Program," Revision 10, states that all workers shall read, understand, and follow the provisions set forth on their radiation work permit. On October 30, 2000, a radiation worker did not follow the radiological requirement listed on Radiation Work Permit 00-3220, as described in the licensee's corrective action program, reference Performance Improvement Request 2000-3290.
Inspection Report# : 2000010(pdf)
Significance:      Oct 27, 2000 Identified By: Licensee
 
3Q/2002 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                        Page 5 of 7 Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform a Dose Rate Survey 10 CFR 20.1501 requires that each licensee shall make, or cause to be made, surveys that are reasonable under the circumstances to evaluate the potential radiological hazards. On October 25, 2000, after Spent Fuel Pool Cleanup Filter FEC01B was transferred into a waste liner at approximately 4 a.m., the licensee failed to conduct a dose rate survey of the area surrounding the waste liner. the licensee performed a followup radiation survey at approximately 8:30 a.m.,
after identifying that a survey had not been conducted. The survey identified two high radiation areas which were subsequently properly posted as described in the licensee's correction action program Performance Improvement Request 2000-3225.
Inspection Report# : 2000009(pdf)
Significance:      Oct 27, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Follow Radiation Work Permit Special Instructions Technical Specification 5.4.1 requires that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, February 1978.
Radiation Work Permit 005000, Revision 0, special instruction (7) stated that proper contamination and airborne controls were to be established in accordance with radiation work permit briefing material prior to commencing work.
On October 6, 2000, a deconner received an uptake while performing deconning activities inside the containment bioshield. The deconner failed to follow the radiation work permit special instructions to establish respiratory protection or high efficiency particulate airborne ventilation prior to initiating deconning activities. The details are described in corrective action program Performance Improvement Request 2000-2909.
Inspection Report# : 2000009(pdf)
Significance:      Sep 01, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure To Perform a Contamination Survey On August 28, 2000, the inspectors identified that radiation protection personnel failed to perform a contamination survey of an area containing scaffolding located in the residual heat exchanger Room A prior to workers entering the area on August 9, 2000. 10 CFR Part 20, Section 1501(a), states, in part, each licensee shall make or cause to be made surveys that are reasonable under the circumstances to evaluate concentrations or quantities of radioactive material and the potential radiological hazards. The failure to perform a contamination survey of the above area was a violation of 10 CFR Part 20, Section 1501(a). This violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This issue is in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2000-2403. This violation was determined to have very low safety significance, because there was no overexposure or substantial potential for an overexposure to occur.
Inspection Report# : 2000008(pdf)
Significance:      Sep 01, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Poor Radiological Work Planning During the review of the licensee's Refueling Outage 10 exposure estimates and exposure performance data, the inspectors identified that Radiation Work Permit 99-4200 (secondary side steam generator work) total person-rem exceeded budgeted person-rem by greater than 50 percent (11.9 rem verses 6.6 rem). The inspectors noted that approximately 2 person-rem of this additional exposure was due to foreign object retrieval work, which was not planned during Refueling Outage 10. Although retrieval work was not necessary during Refueling Outage 9, it had been performed during previous refueling outages. The failure to plan/budget for the retrieval operation caused the licensee to exceed its budgeted estimate by greater than 50 percent. This issue is in the licensee's corrective action
 
3Q/2002 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                      Page 6 of 7 program as Performance Improvement Request 2000-2430. This issue was determined to have very low-safety significance, because actual job dose was less than 25 person-rem and there was only one occurrence.
Inspection Report# : 2000008(pdf)
Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Significance:        Aug 27, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure To Properly Access Vital Areas A noncited violation of 10 CFR 73.55(d)(7)(i)(B) occurred when two licensee employees failed to follow proper procedures when entering vital areas. On August 27- and September 28, 2001, licensee employees did not properly enter vital areas but followed another person through the open door. The finding is more than minor because it had a credible impact on safety. One person entered a vital area without properly badging in. The second person did not have the appropriate access level to enter a vital area. The finding was found to be of very low safety significance using the Safeguards Significance Determination Process. There were no vulnerabilities in the access control program or the safeguards systems or plans, and a safeguard contingency response was not required. This finding of very low safety significance, which is documented in the licensee's corrective action program, is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
Inspection Report# : 2001003(pdf)
Significance:        Jun 15, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Metal Detectors Through a series of tests, the inspector demonstrated that the metal detectors did not detect the test weapon at an 85 percent rate. Paragraph 3.10.1.5 a(1) of the Physical Security Plan, Revision 32, requires that personnel are searched to detect firearms, explosives, and incendiary devices. The plan also requires that the metal detector units conform to Regulatory Guide 5.7, Revision 1, "Entry/Exit Control for Protected Areas, Vital Areas, and Material Access Areas,"
Paragraph C.1.e, which requires that the metal detectors detect a test weapon with an 85 percent success rate. The failure to adequately detect a test weapon 85 percent of the time is a violation of Paragraph 3.10.1.5 a(1) of the Physical Security Plan, Revision 32. Prior to the end of the inspection, the licensee implemented adequate corrective actions to ensure that the metal detectors would meet the 85 percent criteria. This violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2001-1551. The safety significance of this finding was determined to be very low by the physical protection significance determination process because there were less than two similar findings in the last 4 quarters. The issue was more than minor because the potential failure to detect firearms represents a credible impact on safety and impacts a key performance attribute of the physical protection cornerstone to meet its intended function.
Inspection Report# : 2001002(pdf)
Significance:        Aug 12, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation
 
3Q/2002 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                    Page 7 of 7 Inadequate Package Search The inspector identified that security officers manning the x-ray search equipment were not visually searching hand-carried packages which contained material that could not be identified. The licensee's failure to adequately search packages being processed through the x-ray machine was a violation of paragraphs 1.6.1 and 1.6.8 of the Physical Security Plan, Revision 31, and paragraph 6.3.3.2 of Security Procedure SEC 01-202, Revision 37. This violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2000-1939 The issue was of very low safety significance because no similar findings had occurred during the previous four quarters.
Inspection Report# : 2000007(pdf)
Miscellaneous Significance: N/A May 17, 2002 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Identification and Resolution of Problems The licensee was effective at identifying problems and placing them into the corrective action program. Observations and findings identified by the NRC during the evaluation period (March 1, 2001 to April 1, 2002) were similar those identified in licensee audits and assessments. The licensee effectively prioritized reviews and evaluated issues with few exceptions. The licensee was effective in determining the extent of conditions, and implementation of corrective actions. The depth of the condition evaluations and the rigor applied to cover the actions was appropriate to the significance of the safety issue involved. Based on interviews conducted during this inspection, workers at the site felt free to input safety issues into the problem identification and resolution program.
Inspection Report# : 2002003(pdf)
Significance: N/A Mar 28, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Licensee's problem identification and resolution program was effective The licensee adequately identified problems and put them into the corrective action program. The licensee appropriately used risk in determing the extent to which individual problems would be evaluated and in establishing schedules for implementation of corrective actions. Licensee audits and assessments were effective in identifying problems. Based on the interviews conducted during this inspection, workers at the site were comfortable placing safety issues into the problem identification and resolution program. Corrective actions, when specified, were generally implemented in a timely manner. With a few exceptions identified by the licensee, corrective actions to prevent recurrence of conditions adverse to quality were generally effective.
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Last modified : December 02, 2002
 
4Q/2002 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                                              Page 1 of 2 Wolf Creek 1 Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance:        Oct 11, 2002 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Altenative Shutdown Procedure The team identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1 for the failure to provide an adequate procedure for ensuring the safe shutdown of the reactor in the event of a fire in the control room that requires control room evacuation. Procedure OFN RP-17, "Control Room Evacuation," Revision 17, was inadequate because certain operator actions specified in Attachment C to the procedure could not be performed within the required time. The licensee entered this finding into their corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2002-2393. This finding was of greater than minor significance because it impacted the mitigating systems cornerstone. This resulted from the issue's potential to affect the licensee's capability to safely shutdown the reactor in response to a fire in the control room requiring control room evacuation and remote shutdown. For fire protection findings, the Phase 1 screening worksheet in Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, refers fire protection findings to Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, for significance evaluation. Using the significance determination process described in Appendix F, this finding was determined to be of very low safety significance, due to the licensee's demonstration that operators would have performed the most time-critical step (to isolate the power-operated relief valves) in time to prevent core damage.
Inspection Report# : 2002008(pdf)
Significance:        Sep 25, 2002 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Implement Appropriate Corrective Actions for Degraded Emergency Diesel Generator Heat Exchanger Tubes The inspectors identified a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, for failure to: (a) implement corrective action for past indications of emergency diesel generator heat exchanger tube degradation; (b) provide acceptance criteria for eddy current testing of emergency diesel generator heat exchanger tubes; and (c) promptly identify significantly degraded emergency diesel generator heat exchanger tubes. These failures were identified as a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI. This violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy and is in the licensee's corrective action system as Performance Improvement Request 2002-0048. This noncited violation closes three unresolved items identified in NRC Inspection Report 50-482/2002-06.
This issue was considered more than minor because, if left uncorrected, the finding would result in a more significant safety concern.
Additionally, the issue affected the operability, availability, reliability, and function of accident mitigation equipment. This issue was determined to be of very low safety significance because it did not result in the loss of the safety function of a Technical Specification train or system.
Inspection Report# : 2002004(pdf)
Significance:        Jul 10, 2002 Identified By: Self Disclosing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Follow Procedure While Drawing a Vacuum on the Reactor Coolant system The inspectors documented a failure to follow procedure while drawing a vacuum on the reactor coolant system. Although Item 4.6 of Operations Procedure SYS BB-112, "Vacuum Fill of the RCS," Revision 17, stated that residual heat removal pump flow rate during vacuum venting shall be less than 2000 gallons per minute to prevent pump cavitation, operators allowed the flow rate to exceed 2000 gallons per minute. The failure to follow procedure while drawing a vacuum on the reactor coolant system was identified as a violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1, for a Regulatory Guide 1.33 referenced procedure. This violation is being treated as a noncited violation and is in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2002-1247. A risk analyst in the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation determined that this issue was of very low safety significance because all other emergency core cooling components were available and inventory remained in the secondary side of the steam generators which would provide for reflux cooling of the reactor.
Inspection Report# : 2002002(pdf)
Significance: N/A Mar 23, 2002
 
4Q/2002 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                                          Page 2 of 2 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Fire Protection A noncited violation of Technical Specifications Section 5.4.1 when the licensee failed to follow Procedure AP 10-102, "Control of Combustible Materials," Revision 6. The inspectors identified that the licensee placed transient combustibles weighing approximately 530 pounds inside the turbine building within 20 feet of the auxiliary building without the required permit. A permit was required in this area if the transient combustibles weight is greater than 100 pounds. This finding was greater than minor because it had a credible impact on safety. This finding did not involve an impairment or degradation of a fire protection feature. The finding was of No Color because the issue was determined to be a violation greater than minor. The placement of the transient combustible material did not affect any installed fire protection features and it would not have impeded access to the area by the licensee's fire brigade Inspection Report# : 2001006(pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Miscellaneous Significance: N/A May 17, 2002 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Identification and Resolution of Problems The licensee was effective at identifying problems and placing them into the corrective action program. Observations and findings identified by the NRC during the evaluation period (March 1, 2001 to April 1, 2002) were similar those identified in licensee audits and assessments. The licensee effectively prioritized reviews and evaluated issues with few exceptions. The licensee was effective in determining the extent of conditions, and implementation of corrective actions. The depth of the condition evaluations and the rigor applied to cover the actions was appropriate to the significance of the safety issue involved. Based on interviews conducted during this inspection, workers at the site felt free to input safety issues into the problem identification and resolution program.
Inspection Report# : 2002003(pdf)
Last modified : March 25, 2003
 
1Q/2003 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                      Page 1 of 3 Wolf Creek 1 1Q/2003 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance:      Jan 03, 2003 Identified By: Self Disclosing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Manipulation of component outside of procedural guidance causes reactor trip.
The inspectors documented a failure to follow Procedure AP 21D-005, "Component Manipulation Control." Step 6.1.2 of Procedure AP 21D-005, requires shift manager or designee authorization to operate all systems or components.
While restoring a rod-drive motor generator to service, an operator did not receive authorization prior to operating the motor-generator output breaker handle. The manipulation of the handle was an action not directed by procedure and resulted in a reactor trip. The failure to follow Procedure AP 21D-005 was identified as a violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1, for a Regulatory Guide 1.33 referenced procedure. This violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy and is in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2003-0010. This issue was considered more than minor because the failure to follow procedure resulted in an unplanned reactor trip and the inherent challenges to plant safety systems and equipment associated with a reactor trip. This issue was determined to be of very low safety significance because the finding did not contribute to the likelihood of: (1) a primary or secondary system loss of coolant accident, (2) mitigation equipment or function unavailability; and (3) a plant fire or internal/external flooding affecting plant response.
Inspection Report# : 2003003(pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance:      Oct 11, 2002 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Altenative Shutdown Procedure The team identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1 for the failure to provide an adequate procedure for ensuring the safe shutdown of the reactor in the event of a fire in the control room that requires control room evacuation. Procedure OFN RP-17, "Control Room Evacuation," Revision 17, was inadequate because certain operator actions specified in Attachment C to the procedure could not be performed within the required time. The licensee entered this finding into their corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2002-2393.
This finding was of greater than minor significance because it impacted the mitigating systems cornerstone. This resulted from the issue's potential to affect the licensee's capability to safely shutdown the reactor in response to a fire in the control room requiring control room evacuation and remote shutdown. For fire protection findings, the Phase 1 screening worksheet in Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, refers fire protection findings to Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, for significance evaluation. Using the significance determination process described in Appendix F, this finding was determined to be of very low safety significance, due to the licensee's demonstration that operators would have performed the most time-critical step (to isolate the power-operated relief valves) in time to prevent core damage.
file://C:\RROP\NRR\OVERSIGHT\ASSESS\WC\wc_pim.html                                                              07/22/2003
 
1Q/2003 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                        Page 2 of 3 Inspection Report# : 2002008(pdf)
Significance:      Sep 25, 2002 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Implement Appropriate Corrective Actions for Degraded Emergency Diesel Generator Heat Exchanger Tubes The inspectors identified a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, for failure to: (a) implement corrective action for past indications of emergency diesel generator heat exchanger tube degradation; (b) provide acceptance criteria for eddy current testing of emergency diesel generator heat exchanger tubes; and (c) promptly identify significantly degraded emergency diesel generator heat exchanger tubes. These failures were identified as a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI. This violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy and is in the licensee's corrective action system as Performance Improvement Request 2002-0048. This noncited violation closes three unresolved items identified in NRC Inspection Report 50-482/2002-06. This issue was considered more than minor because, if left uncorrected, the finding would result in a more significant safety concern. Additionally, the issue affected the operability, availability, reliability, and function of accident mitigation equipment. This issue was determined to be of very low safety significance because it did not result in the loss of the safety function of a Technical Specification train or system.
Inspection Report# : 2002004(pdf)
Significance:      Jul 10, 2002 Identified By: Self Disclosing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Follow Procedure While Drawing a Vacuum on the Reactor Coolant system The inspectors documented a failure to follow procedure while drawing a vacuum on the reactor coolant system.
Although Item 4.6 of Operations Procedure SYS BB-112, "Vacuum Fill of the RCS," Revision 17, stated that residual heat removal pump flow rate during vacuum venting shall be less than 2000 gallons per minute to prevent pump cavitation, operators allowed the flow rate to exceed 2000 gallons per minute. The failure to follow procedure while drawing a vacuum on the reactor coolant system was identified as a violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1, for a Regulatory Guide 1.33 referenced procedure. This violation is being treated as a noncited violation and is in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2002-1247. A risk analyst in the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation determined that this issue was of very low safety significance because all other emergency core cooling components were available and inventory remained in the secondary side of the steam generators which would provide for reflux cooling of the reactor.
Inspection Report# : 2002002(pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness file://C:\RROP\NRR\OVERSIGHT\ASSESS\WC\wc_pim.html                                                                07/22/2003
 
1Q/2003 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                    Page 3 of 3 Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Miscellaneous Significance: N/A May 17, 2002 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Identification and Resolution of Problems The licensee was effective at identifying problems and placing them into the corrective action program. Observations and findings identified by the NRC during the evaluation period (March 1, 2001 to April 1, 2002) were similar those identified in licensee audits and assessments. The licensee effectively prioritized reviews and evaluated issues with few exceptions. The licensee was effective in determining the extent of conditions, and implementation of corrective actions. The depth of the condition evaluations and the rigor applied to cover the actions was appropriate to the significance of the safety issue involved. Based on interviews conducted during this inspection, workers at the site felt free to input safety issues into the problem identification and resolution program.
Inspection Report# : 2002003(pdf)
Last modified : May 30, 2003 file://C:\RROP\NRR\OVERSIGHT\ASSESS\WC\wc_pim.html                                                            07/22/2003
 
2Q/2003 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                      Page 1 of 4 Wolf Creek 1 2Q/2003 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance:      Jan 03, 2003 Identified By: Self Disclosing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Manipulation of component outside of procedural guidance causes reactor trip.
The inspectors documented a failure to follow Procedure AP 21D-005, "Component Manipulation Control." Step 6.1.2 of Procedure AP 21D-005, requires shift manager or designee authorization to operate all systems or components.
While restoring a rod-drive motor generator to service, an operator did not receive authorization prior to operating the motor-generator output breaker handle. The manipulation of the handle was an action not directed by procedure and resulted in a reactor trip. The failure to follow Procedure AP 21D-005 was identified as a violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1, for a Regulatory Guide 1.33 referenced procedure. This violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy and is in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2003-0010. This issue was considered more than minor because the failure to follow procedure resulted in an unplanned reactor trip and the inherent challenges to plant safety systems and equipment associated with a reactor trip. This issue was determined to be of very low safety significance because the finding did not contribute to the likelihood of: (1) a primary or secondary system loss of coolant accident, (2) mitigation equipment or function unavailability; and (3) a plant fire or internal/external flooding affecting plant response.
Inspection Report# : 2003003(pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance:      Jun 24, 2003 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Correctly Translate a Design Basis into the Applicable Flooding Calculation The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control,"
regarding internal flooding Calculation FL-08, Revision 0. The calculation improperly credits nonexistent 0.25 inch gaps under four doors for drainage of Room 3302 which contains vital Train "B" switchgear equipment. The finding is greater than minor because it affects the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure reliability and capability of systems that respond to flood hazards. Additionally, this finding is similar to Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix E, Example 3i. The licensee's engineering staff had to recalculate the maximum flood level in Room 3302 because Calculation FL-08, Revision 0, improperly credited drainage under doors. The team considered this finding to be of very low safety significance because it did not represent an actual loss of safety function since the new analysis demonstrated that the maximum flood level in Room 3302 (approximately 5 inches) would not damage the vital electrical equipment located in that room. The capability to safely shut down the plant, therefore, would not be compromised.
Inspection Report# : 2003007(pdf) file://C:\RROP\NRR\OVERSIGHT\ASSESS\WC\wc_pim.html                                                              10/08/2003
 
2Q/2003 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                        Page 2 of 4 Significance:      Oct 11, 2002 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Altenative Shutdown Procedure The team identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1 for the failure to provide an adequate procedure for ensuring the safe shutdown of the reactor in the event of a fire in the control room that requires control room evacuation. Procedure OFN RP-17, "Control Room Evacuation," Revision 17, was inadequate because certain operator actions specified in Attachment C to the procedure could not be performed within the required time. The licensee entered this finding into their corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2002-2393.
This finding was of greater than minor significance because it impacted the mitigating systems cornerstone. This resulted from the issue's potential to affect the licensee's capability to safely shutdown the reactor in response to a fire in the control room requiring control room evacuation and remote shutdown. For fire protection findings, the Phase 1 screening worksheet in Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, refers fire protection findings to Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, for significance evaluation. Using the significance determination process described in Appendix F, this finding was determined to be of very low safety significance, due to the licensee's demonstration that operators would have performed the most time-critical step (to isolate the power-operated relief valves) in time to prevent core damage.
Inspection Report# : 2002008(pdf)
Significance:      Sep 25, 2002 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Implement Appropriate Corrective Actions for Degraded Emergency Diesel Generator Heat Exchanger Tubes The inspectors identified a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, for failure to: (a) implement corrective action for past indications of emergency diesel generator heat exchanger tube degradation; (b) provide acceptance criteria for eddy current testing of emergency diesel generator heat exchanger tubes; and (c) promptly identify significantly degraded emergency diesel generator heat exchanger tubes. These failures were identified as a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI. This violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy and is in the licensee's corrective action system as Performance Improvement Request 2002-0048. This noncited violation closes three unresolved items identified in NRC Inspection Report 50-482/2002-06. This issue was considered more than minor because, if left uncorrected, the finding would result in a more significant safety concern. Additionally, the issue affected the operability, availability, reliability, and function of accident mitigation equipment. This issue was determined to be of very low safety significance because it did not result in the loss of the safety function of a Technical Specification train or system.
Inspection Report# : 2002004(pdf)
Significance:      Jul 10, 2002 Identified By: Self Disclosing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Follow Procedure While Drawing a Vacuum on the Reactor Coolant system The inspectors documented a failure to follow procedure while drawing a vacuum on the reactor coolant system.
Although Item 4.6 of Operations Procedure SYS BB-112, "Vacuum Fill of the RCS," Revision 17, stated that residual heat removal pump flow rate during vacuum venting shall be less than 2000 gallons per minute to prevent pump cavitation, operators allowed the flow rate to exceed 2000 gallons per minute. The failure to follow procedure while drawing a vacuum on the reactor coolant system was identified as a violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1, for a Regulatory Guide 1.33 referenced procedure. This violation is being treated as a noncited violation and is in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2002-1247. A risk analyst in the Office of file://C:\RROP\NRR\OVERSIGHT\ASSESS\WC\wc_pim.html                                                                10/08/2003
 
2Q/2003 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                    Page 3 of 4 Nuclear Reactor Regulation determined that this issue was of very low safety significance because all other emergency core cooling components were available and inventory remained in the secondary side of the steam generators which would provide for reflux cooling of the reactor.
Inspection Report# : 2002002(pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Significance:        Jun 27, 2003 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Critique an Exercise Performance Deficiency relating to Protecting Nonessential Workers The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10CFR50.47(b)(14) for failure to critique an exercise performance deficiency associated with implementation of a planning standard. The licensee did not identify failures to completely implement [simulated] station assembly and site evacuation during an exercise as a performance deficiency. This finding is greater than minor because had the performance deficiency occurred during an actual event the health and safety of non-essential workers would not have been adequately protected. The finding is of very low safety significance because it occurred during an exercise simulation, did not involve the risk-significant aspects of planning standard 10CFR 50.47(b)(10), and was not a failure of the planning standard function. This finding is a non-cited violation of 10CFR50.47(b)(14). The licensee has entered this issue into their corrective action system as Problem Identification Request 2003-1553.
Inspection Report# : 2003004(pdf)
Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Significance: N/A Feb 04, 2003 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Verification of compliance with interim compensatory measures order On February 25, 2002, the NRC imposed by Order, Interim Compensatory Measures to enhance physical security. The inspectors determined that, overall, the licensee appropriately incorporated the Interim Compensatory Measures into the site protective strategy and access authorization program; developed and implemented relevant procedures; ensured file://C:\RROP\NRR\OVERSIGHT\ASSESS\WC\wc_pim.html                                                            10/08/2003
 
2Q/2003 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                Page 4 of 4 that the emergency plan could be implemented; and established and effectively coordinated interface agreements with offsite organizations.
Inspection Report# : 2003002(pdf)
Miscellaneous Last modified : September 04, 2003 file://C:\RROP\NRR\OVERSIGHT\ASSESS\WC\wc_pim.html                                                        10/08/2003
 
3Q/2003 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                      Page 1 of 4 Wolf Creek 1 3Q/2003 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance:        Jan 03, 2003 Identified By: Self Disclosing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Manipulation of component outside of procedural guidance causes reactor trip.
The inspectors documented a failure to follow Procedure AP 21D-005, "Component Manipulation Control." Step 6.1.2 of Procedure AP 21D-005, requires shift manager or designee authorization to operate all systems or components.
While restoring a rod-drive motor generator to service, an operator did not receive authorization prior to operating the motor-generator output breaker handle. The manipulation of the handle was an action not directed by procedure and resulted in a reactor trip. The failure to follow Procedure AP 21D-005 was identified as a violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1, for a Regulatory Guide 1.33 referenced procedure. This violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy and is in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2003-0010.
This issue was considered more than minor because the failure to follow procedure resulted in an unplanned reactor trip and the inherent challenges to plant safety systems and equipment associated with a reactor trip. This issue was determined to be of very low safety significance because the finding did not contribute to the likelihood of: (1) a primary or secondary system loss of coolant accident, (2) mitigation equipment or function unavailability; and (3) a plant fire or internal/external flooding affecting plant response.
Inspection Report# : 2003003(pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance:        Jul 05, 2003 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Ensure That Emergency Operating Procedures Could Have Been Successfully Performed The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, for failure to ensure that instructions, procedures, or drawings shall include appropriate quantitative or qualitative criteria for determining that important activities have been satisfactorily accomplished. The licensee failed to ensure that the emergency operating Procedure EMG C-11, "Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation," Revision 14, could have been successfully performed with the loss of the postaccident dynamic reactor vessel level instrumentation.
This finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the Reactor Safety Strategic Performance Area Mitigating System Cornerstone. Specifically, the quality of emergency operating Procedure EMG C-11 was affected by the inoperable postaccident reactor vessel level instrument. The failure is of very low safety significance because it did not:
Represent a design or qualification deficiency that resulted in a loss of function Represent an actual loss of a safety function of a system file://C:\RROP\NRR\OVERSIGHT\ASSESS\WC\wc_pim.html                                                              01/12/2004
 
3Q/2003 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                      Page 2 of 4 Represent an actual loss of a single function of a train for greater than the Technical Specification allowed outage time Represent an actual loss of safety function of one or more non-Technical Specification trains of equipment designated as risk significant Screen as potentially risk significant due to seismic, fire, flooding, or severe weather This finding is a noncited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V. The licensee entered into the corrective action program as Performance Improvement Requests 2003-0805 and 1731.
Inspection Report# : 2003004(pdf)
Significance:        Jul 05, 2003 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Ensure That Changes to an Off-Normal Procedure Were Appropriate The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, for failure to identify and correct a procedure deficiency while performing corrective actions due to an NRC identified finding documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-482/2002-08. The licensee failed to ensure that the off-normal Procedure OFN RP-017, "Control Room Evacuation", Revision 18, could have been successfully performed following the procedure change resulting from the corrective actions.
. This finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the Reactor Safety Strategic Performance Area Mitigating System Cornerstone. Specifically, off-normal Procedure OFN RP-017, "Control Room Evacuation" did not verify a volume control tank outlet valve closed in a timely manner. The failure is of very low safety significance because it did not:
. Represent a design or qualification deficiency that resulted in a loss of function
. Represent an actual loss of a safety function of a system
. Represent an actual loss of a single function of a train for greater than the Technical Specification allowed outage time
. Represent an actual loss of safety function of one or more non-Technical Specification trains of equipment designated as risk significant
. Screen as potentially risk significant due to seismic, fire, flooding, or severe weather This finding is a noncited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI. The licensee entered into the corrective action program as Performance Improvement Requests 2003-0333 and 0338.
Inspection Report# : 2003004(pdf)
Significance:        Jun 24, 2003 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Correctly Translate a Design Basis into the Applicable Flooding Calculation The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control,"
regarding internal flooding Calculation FL-08, Revision 0. The calculation improperly credits nonexistent 0.25 inch gaps under four doors for drainage of Room 3302 which contains vital Train "B" switchgear equipment.
The finding is greater than minor because it affects the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure reliability and capability of systems that respond to flood hazards. Additionally, this finding is similar to Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix E, Example 3i. The licensee's engineering staff had to recalculate the maximum flood level in Room 3302 because Calculation FL-08, Revision 0, improperly credited drainage under doors. The team considered this finding to be of very low safety significance because it did not represent an actual loss of safety function since the new analysis demonstrated that the maximum flood level in Room 3302 (approximately 5 inches) would not damage the vital electrical equipment located in that room. The capability to safely shut down the plant, therefore, would not be compromised.
file://C:\RROP\NRR\OVERSIGHT\ASSESS\WC\wc_pim.html                                                              01/12/2004
 
3Q/2003 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                      Page 3 of 4 Inspection Report# : 2003007(pdf)
Significance:      Oct 11, 2002 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Altenative Shutdown Procedure The team identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1 for the failure to provide an adequate procedure for ensuring the safe shutdown of the reactor in the event of a fire in the control room that requires control room evacuation. Procedure OFN RP-17, "Control Room Evacuation," Revision 17, was inadequate because certain operator actions specified in Attachment C to the procedure could not be performed within the required time. The licensee entered this finding into their corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2002-2393.
This finding was of greater than minor significance because it impacted the mitigating systems cornerstone. This resulted from the issue's potential to affect the licensee's capability to safely shutdown the reactor in response to a fire in the control room requiring control room evacuation and remote shutdown. For fire protection findings, the Phase 1 screening worksheet in Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, refers fire protection findings to Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, for significance evaluation. Using the significance determination process described in Appendix F, this finding was determined to be of very low safety significance, due to the licensee's demonstration that operators would have performed the most time-critical step (to isolate the power-operated relief valves) in time to prevent core damage.
Inspection Report# : 2002008(pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Significance:      Jun 27, 2003 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Critique an Exercise Performance Deficiency relating to Protecting Nonessential Workers The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10CFR50.47(b)(14) for failure to critique an exercise performance deficiency associated with implementation of a planning standard. The licensee did not identify failures to completely implement [simulated] station assembly and site evacuation during an exercise as a performance deficiency.
This finding is greater than minor because had the performance deficiency occurred during an actual event the health and safety of non-essential workers would not have been adequately protected. The finding is of very low safety significance because it occurred during an exercise simulation, did not involve the risk-significant aspects of planning standard 10CFR 50.47(b)(10), and was not a failure of the planning standard function. This finding is a non-cited violation of 10CFR50.47(b)(14). The licensee has entered this issue into their corrective action system as Problem Identification Request 2003-1553.
Inspection Report# : 2003004(pdf) file://C:\RROP\NRR\OVERSIGHT\ASSESS\WC\wc_pim.html                                                              01/12/2004
 
3Q/2003 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                Page 4 of 4 Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Significance: N/A Feb 04, 2003 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Verification of compliance with interim compensatory measures order On February 25, 2002, the NRC imposed by Order, Interim Compensatory Measures to enhance physical security. The inspectors determined that, overall, the licensee appropriately incorporated the Interim Compensatory Measures into the site protective strategy and access authorization program; developed and implemented relevant procedures; ensured that the emergency plan could be implemented; and established and effectively coordinated interface agreements with offsite organizations.
Inspection Report# : 2003002(pdf)
Miscellaneous Last modified : December 01, 2003 file://C:\RROP\NRR\OVERSIGHT\ASSESS\WC\wc_pim.html                                                        01/12/2004
 
4Q/2003 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                      Page 1 of 5 Wolf Creek 1 4Q/2003 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance:        Jan 03, 2003 Identified By: Self Disclosing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Manipulation of component outside of procedural guidance causes reactor trip.
The inspectors documented a failure to follow Procedure AP 21D-005, "Component Manipulation Control." Step 6.1.2 of Procedure AP 21D-005, requires shift manager or designee authorization to operate all systems or components.
While restoring a rod-drive motor generator to service, an operator did not receive authorization prior to operating the motor-generator output breaker handle. The manipulation of the handle was an action not directed by procedure and resulted in a reactor trip. The failure to follow Procedure AP 21D-005 was identified as a violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1, for a Regulatory Guide 1.33 referenced procedure. This violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy and is in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2003-0010.
This issue was considered more than minor because the failure to follow procedure resulted in an unplanned reactor trip and the inherent challenges to plant safety systems and equipment associated with a reactor trip. This issue was determined to be of very low safety significance because the finding did not contribute to the likelihood of: (1) a primary or secondary system loss of coolant accident, (2) mitigation equipment or function unavailability; and (3) a plant fire or internal/external flooding affecting plant response.
Inspection Report# : 2003003(pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance:        Jul 05, 2003 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Ensure That Emergency Operating Procedures Could Have Been Successfully Performed The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, for failure to ensure that instructions, procedures, or drawings shall include appropriate quantitative or qualitative criteria for determining that important activities have been satisfactorily accomplished. The licensee failed to ensure that the emergency operating Procedure EMG C-11, "Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation," Revision 14, could have been successfully performed with the loss of the postaccident dynamic reactor vessel level instrumentation.
This finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the Reactor Safety Strategic Performance Area Mitigating System Cornerstone. Specifically, the quality of emergency operating Procedure EMG C-11 was affected by the inoperable postaccident reactor vessel level instrument. The failure is of very low safety significance because it did not:
Represent a design or qualification deficiency that resulted in a loss of function Represent an actual loss of a safety function of a system file://C:\RROP\NRR\OVERSIGHT\ASSESS\WC\wc_pim.html                                                              04/22/2004
 
4Q/2003 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                      Page 2 of 5 Represent an actual loss of a single function of a train for greater than the Technical Specification allowed outage time Represent an actual loss of safety function of one or more non-Technical Specification trains of equipment designated as risk significant Screen as potentially risk significant due to seismic, fire, flooding, or severe weather This finding is a noncited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V. The licensee entered into the corrective action program as Performance Improvement Requests 2003-0805 and 1731.
Inspection Report# : 2003004(pdf)
Significance:        Jul 05, 2003 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Ensure That Changes to an Off-Normal Procedure Were Appropriate The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, for failure to identify and correct a procedure deficiency while performing corrective actions due to an NRC identified finding documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-482/2002-08. The licensee failed to ensure that the off-normal Procedure OFN RP-017, "Control Room Evacuation", Revision 18, could have been successfully performed following the procedure change resulting from the corrective actions.
. This finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the Reactor Safety Strategic Performance Area Mitigating System Cornerstone. Specifically, off-normal Procedure OFN RP-017, "Control Room Evacuation" did not verify a volume control tank outlet valve closed in a timely manner. The failure is of very low safety significance because it did not:
. Represent a design or qualification deficiency that resulted in a loss of function
. Represent an actual loss of a safety function of a system
. Represent an actual loss of a single function of a train for greater than the Technical Specification allowed outage time
. Represent an actual loss of safety function of one or more non-Technical Specification trains of equipment designated as risk significant
. Screen as potentially risk significant due to seismic, fire, flooding, or severe weather This finding is a noncited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI. The licensee entered into the corrective action program as Performance Improvement Requests 2003-0333 and 0338.
Inspection Report# : 2003004(pdf)
Significance:        Jun 24, 2003 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Correctly Translate a Design Basis into the Applicable Flooding Calculation The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control,"
regarding internal flooding Calculation FL-08, Revision 0. The calculation improperly credits nonexistent 0.25 inch gaps under four doors for drainage of Room 3302 which contains vital Train "B" switchgear equipment.
The finding is greater than minor because it affects the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure reliability and capability of systems that respond to flood hazards. Additionally, this finding is similar to Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix E, Example 3i. The licensee's engineering staff had to recalculate the maximum flood level in Room 3302 because Calculation FL-08, Revision 0, improperly credited drainage under doors. The team considered this finding to be of very low safety significance because it did not represent an actual loss of safety function since the new analysis demonstrated that the maximum flood level in Room 3302 (approximately 5 inches) would not damage the vital electrical equipment located in that room. The capability to safely shut down the plant, therefore, would not be compromised.
file://C:\RROP\NRR\OVERSIGHT\ASSESS\WC\wc_pim.html                                                              04/22/2004
 
4Q/2003 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                      Page 3 of 5 Inspection Report# : 2003007(pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Significance:      Jun 27, 2003 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Critique an Exercise Performance Deficiency relating to Protecting Nonessential Workers The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10CFR50.47(b)(14) for failure to critique an exercise performance deficiency associated with implementation of a planning standard. The licensee did not identify failures to completely implement [simulated] station assembly and site evacuation during an exercise as a performance deficiency.
This finding is greater than minor because had the performance deficiency occurred during an actual event the health and safety of non-essential workers would not have been adequately protected. The finding is of very low safety significance because it occurred during an exercise simulation, did not involve the risk-significant aspects of planning standard 10CFR 50.47(b)(10), and was not a failure of the planning standard function. This finding is a non-cited violation of 10CFR50.47(b)(14). The licensee has entered this issue into their corrective action system as Problem Identification Request 2003-1553.
Inspection Report# : 2003004(pdf)
Occupational Radiation Safety Significance:      Dec 31, 2003 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Adequately Control Access to a Very High Radiation Area The inspector identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR 20.1602 because the licensee failed to institute measures to ensure that an individual is not able to gain unauthorized access to a very high radiation area. Specifically, on October 28, 2003, the inspector observed that the area surrounding a locked ladder leading down to the reactor under-vessel area, a very high radiation area, was not provided with a physical barrier that completely enclosed the area. Radiation levels at the bottom of the ladder, one meter away from the withdrawn in-core instrument thimbles, were approximately 640 Rads per hour. An individual could have climbed over the handrail and climbed down the outside of the ladder using the fall protection cage. The finding is in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2003-3220.
The finding was greater than minor because it affected the Occupational Radiation Safety cornerstone objective to ensure adequate protection of worker health and safety from exposure to radiation and the finding was associated with the cornerstone attribute (program & process). The finding involved an individual's potential for unplanned or unintended dose. When processed through the Occupational Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process the file://C:\RROP\NRR\OVERSIGHT\ASSESS\WC\wc_pim.html                                                              04/22/2004
 
4Q/2003 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                    Page 4 of 5 finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the finding was not associated with as low as reasonably achievable planning or work controls, there was no overexposure nor a substantial potential for overexposure, and the ability to assess dose was not compromised.
Inspection Report# : 2003006(pdf)
Significance:        Dec 31, 2003 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Four Examples of the Failure to Perform Radiological Surveys The inspectors identified four examples of a noncited violation of 10 CFR 20.1501(a), because the licensee failed to perform required radiological surveys to ensure compliance with 10 CFR 20.1204(a) and 10 CFR 20.1902(b). On October 19, 2003, the licensee did not perform adequate surveys to assess changes in radiological conditions during chemical cleaning of the reactor coolant system. On October 22, 2003, the licensee did not perform an adequate survey of the workers breathing zone while decontaminating of the reactor cavity seal ring. These findings are in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Requests 2003-3069 and -3136 respectively.
The finding is greater than minor because it affected the Occupational Radiation Safety cornerstone objective to ensure adequate protection of worker health and safety from exposure to radiation and the finding is associated with the cornerstone attribute (program & process). The finding involved an individual's potential for unplanned or unintended dose. When processed through the Occupational Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the finding was not associated with as low as reasonably achievable planning or work controls, there was no overexposure or a substantial potential for overexposure, and the ability to assess dose was not compromised.
Inspection Report# : 2003006(pdf)
Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Significance: N/A Feb 04, 2003 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Verification of compliance with interim compensatory measures order On February 25, 2002, the NRC imposed by Order, Interim Compensatory Measures to enhance physical security. The inspectors determined that, overall, the licensee appropriately incorporated the Interim Compensatory Measures into the site protective strategy and access authorization program; developed and implemented relevant procedures; ensured that the emergency plan could be implemented; and established and effectively coordinated interface agreements with offsite organizations.
Inspection Report# : 2003002(pdf)
Miscellaneous file://C:\RROP\NRR\OVERSIGHT\ASSESS\WC\wc_pim.html                                                          04/22/2004
 
4Q/2003 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1        Page 5 of 5 Last modified : March 02, 2004 file://C:\RROP\NRR\OVERSIGHT\ASSESS\WC\wc_pim.html 04/22/2004
 
1Q/2004 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                                            Page 1 of 3 Wolf Creek 1 1Q/2004 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance:        Jul 05, 2003 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Ensure That Emergency Operating Procedures Could Have Been Successfully Performed The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, for failure to ensure that instructions, procedures, or drawings shall include appropriate quantitative or qualitative criteria for determining that important activities have been satisfactorily accomplished. The licensee failed to ensure that the emergency operating Procedure EMG C-11, "Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation,"
Revision 14, could have been successfully performed with the loss of the postaccident dynamic reactor vessel level instrumentation.
This finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the Reactor Safety Strategic Performance Area Mitigating System Cornerstone.
Specifically, the quality of emergency operating Procedure EMG C-11 was affected by the inoperable postaccident reactor vessel level instrument. The failure is of very low safety significance because it did not:
Represent a design or qualification deficiency that resulted in a loss of function Represent an actual loss of a safety function of a system Represent an actual loss of a single function of a train for greater than the Technical Specification allowed outage time Represent an actual loss of safety function of one or more non-Technical Specification trains of equipment designated as risk significant Screen as potentially risk significant due to seismic, fire, flooding, or severe weather This finding is a noncited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V. The licensee entered into the corrective action program as Performance Improvement Requests 2003-0805 and 1731.
Inspection Report# : 2003004(pdf)
Significance:        Jul 05, 2003 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Ensure That Changes to an Off-Normal Procedure Were Appropriate The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, for failure to identify and correct a procedure deficiency while performing corrective actions due to an NRC identified finding documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-482/2002-08. The licensee failed to ensure that the off-normal Procedure OFN RP-017, "Control Room Evacuation", Revision 18, could have been successfully performed following the procedure change resulting from the corrective actions.
. This finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the Reactor Safety Strategic Performance Area Mitigating System Cornerstone.
Specifically, off-normal Procedure OFN RP-017, "Control Room Evacuation" did not verify a volume control tank outlet valve closed in a timely manner. The failure is of very low safety significance because it did not:
. Represent a design or qualification deficiency that resulted in a loss of function
. Represent an actual loss of a safety function of a system
. Represent an actual loss of a single function of a train for greater than the Technical Specification allowed outage time
. Represent an actual loss of safety function of one or more non-Technical Specification trains of equipment designated as risk significant
. Screen as potentially risk significant due to seismic, fire, flooding, or severe weather This finding is a noncited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI. The licensee entered into the corrective action program as Performance Improvement Requests 2003-0333 and 0338.
Inspection Report# : 2003004(pdf)
Significance:        Jun 24, 2003 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Correctly Translate a Design Basis into the Applicable Flooding Calculation The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," regarding internal flooding Calculation FL-08, Revision 0. The calculation improperly credits nonexistent 0.25 inch gaps under four doors for drainage of Room 3302 07/14/2004
 
1Q/2004 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                                            Page 2 of 3 which contains vital Train "B" switchgear equipment.
The finding is greater than minor because it affects the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure reliability and capability of systems that respond to flood hazards. Additionally, this finding is similar to Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix E, Example 3i. The licensee's engineering staff had to recalculate the maximum flood level in Room 3302 because Calculation FL-08, Revision 0, improperly credited drainage under doors. The team considered this finding to be of very low safety significance because it did not represent an actual loss of safety function since the new analysis demonstrated that the maximum flood level in Room 3302 (approximately 5 inches) would not damage the vital electrical equipment located in that room. The capability to safely shut down the plant, therefore, would not be compromised.
Inspection Report# : 2003007(pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Significance:        Jun 27, 2003 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Critique an Exercise Performance Deficiency relating to Protecting Nonessential Workers The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10CFR50.47(b)(14) for failure to critique an exercise performance deficiency associated with implementation of a planning standard. The licensee did not identify failures to completely implement [simulated] station assembly and site evacuation during an exercise as a performance deficiency.
This finding is greater than minor because had the performance deficiency occurred during an actual event the health and safety of non-essential workers would not have been adequately protected. The finding is of very low safety significance because it occurred during an exercise simulation, did not involve the risk-significant aspects of planning standard 10CFR 50.47(b)(10), and was not a failure of the planning standard function. This finding is a non-cited violation of 10CFR50.47(b)(14). The licensee has entered this issue into their corrective action system as Problem Identification Request 2003-1553.
Inspection Report# : 2003004(pdf)
Occupational Radiation Safety Significance:        Dec 31, 2003 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Adequately Control Access to a Very High Radiation Area The inspector identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR 20.1602 because the licensee failed to institute measures to ensure that an individual is not able to gain unauthorized access to a very high radiation area. Specifically, on October 28, 2003, the inspector observed that the area surrounding a locked ladder leading down to the reactor under-vessel area, a very high radiation area, was not provided with a physical barrier that completely enclosed the area. Radiation levels at the bottom of the ladder, one meter away from the withdrawn in-core instrument thimbles, were approximately 640 Rads per hour. An individual could have climbed over the handrail and climbed down the outside of the ladder using the fall protection cage. The finding is in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2003-3220.
The finding was greater than minor because it affected the Occupational Radiation Safety cornerstone objective to ensure adequate protection of worker health and safety from exposure to radiation and the finding was associated with the cornerstone attribute (program & process). The finding involved an individual's potential for unplanned or unintended dose. When processed through the Occupational Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the finding was not associated with as low as reasonably achievable planning or work controls, there was no overexposure nor a substantial potential for overexposure, and the ability to assess dose was not compromised.
Inspection Report# : 2003006(pdf)
Significance:        Dec 31, 2003 07/14/2004
 
1Q/2004 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                                        Page 3 of 3 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Four Examples of the Failure to Perform Radiological Surveys The inspectors identified four examples of a noncited violation of 10 CFR 20.1501(a), because the licensee failed to perform required radiological surveys to ensure compliance with 10 CFR 20.1204(a) and 10 CFR 20.1902(b). On October 19, 2003, the licensee did not perform adequate surveys to assess changes in radiological conditions during chemical cleaning of the reactor coolant system. On October 22, 2003, the licensee did not perform an adequate survey of the workers breathing zone while decontaminating of the reactor cavity seal ring. These findings are in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Requests 2003-3069 and -3136 respectively.
The finding is greater than minor because it affected the Occupational Radiation Safety cornerstone objective to ensure adequate protection of worker health and safety from exposure to radiation and the finding is associated with the cornerstone attribute (program & process). The finding involved an individual's potential for unplanned or unintended dose. When processed through the Occupational Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the finding was not associated with as low as reasonably achievable planning or work controls, there was no overexposure or a substantial potential for overexposure, and the ability to assess dose was not compromised.
Inspection Report# : 2003006(pdf)
Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Miscellaneous Last modified : May 05, 2004 07/14/2004
 
2Q/2004 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                                                          Page 1 of 3 Wolf Creek 1 2Q/2004 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance:        Apr 07, 2004 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Inadequate Work Instructions and Acceptance Criteria for Maintenance Activities on the Feedwater Regulating Values The inspectors documented a self-revealing finding for inadequate work instructions and acceptance criteria for maintenance activities on the feedwater regulating valves which resulted in a reactor trip. This finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the reactor safety strategic performance area Initiating Events cornerstone. Specifically, the failure to provide adequate work instructions and acceptance criteria for feedwater regulating valve maintenance resulted in a plant trip. The finding is of very low safety significance because, although it resulted in a reactor trip, it did not: increase the likelihood of a primary or secondary system loss of coolant accident initiator, contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions would not be available, or increase the likelihood of a fire or internal/external flood.
Inspection Report# : 2004002(pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance:        Apr 07, 2004 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Fire Barriers at Seismic Gaps The inspectors identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification License Condition 2.C(5)(a) because the licensee failed to provide adequate 3-hour rated fire barriers between fire areas containing redundant safe shutdown equipment in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2, requirements. The inspectors identified that approximately 20 inches of fire barrier material between the main steam enclosure and the auxiliary feedwater system flow control valve rooms was missing. The fire barrier material was missing from the approximately 4-inch wide seismic gap between the reactor and auxiliary buildings. The licensee immediately placed fire barrier material in the seismic gap and wrote Performance Improvement Request 2003-3704 to document the condition. The licensee determined that an inadequate design for fire barriers at seismic gaps had also resulted in slightly degraded fire barriers at 14 other locations. After identification, the licensee installed the required fire barrier seal material to restore the 3-hour rating of these 14 additional fire barriers.
This finding is greater than minor because it is similar to the example in Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix E, Section 2.e. In the as-found condition, the fire penetration seals at the seismic gaps were not rated to perform their function to prevent the spread of fire for 3 hours. However, this finding is of very low safety significance because, overall, the fire barriers would have provided the protection needed. There was not a credible fire scenario that would affect the defense-in-depth design requirements. Fourteen other fire barrier installations were in accordance with an inadequate design, but there were no significant gaps between fire areas and, in some cases, the fire seal material was butted up against each other at a right angle.
Inspection Report# : 2004002(pdf)
Significance:        Jul 05, 2003 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Ensure That Emergency Operating Procedures Could Have Been Successfully Performed The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, for failure to ensure that instructions, procedures, or drawings shall include appropriate quantitative or qualitative criteria for determining that important activities have been satisfactorily accomplished. The licensee failed to ensure that the emergency operating Procedure EMG C-11, "Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation," Revision 14, could have been successfully performed with the loss of the postaccident dynamic reactor vessel level instrumentation.
This finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the Reactor Safety Strategic Performance Area Mitigating System Cornerstone.
Specifically, the quality of emergency operating Procedure EMG C-11 was affected by the inoperable postaccident reactor vessel level instrument. The failure is of very low safety significance because it did not:
Represent a design or qualification deficiency that resulted in a loss of function Represent an actual loss of a safety function of a system Represent an actual loss of a single function of a train for greater than the Technical Specification allowed outage time Represent an actual loss of safety function of one or more non-Technical Specification trains of equipment designated as risk significant Screen as potentially risk significant due to seismic, fire, flooding, or severe weather This finding is a noncited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V. The licensee entered into the corrective action program as Performance Improvement Requests 2003-0805 and 1731.
 
2Q/2004 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                                                      Page 2 of 3 Inspection Report# : 2003004(pdf)
Significance:        Jul 05, 2003 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Ensure That Changes to an Off-Normal Procedure Were Appropriate The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, for failure to identify and correct a procedure deficiency while performing corrective actions due to an NRC identified finding documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-482/2002-08. The licensee failed to ensure that the off-normal Procedure OFN RP-017, "Control Room Evacuation", Revision 18, could have been successfully performed following the procedure change resulting from the corrective actions.
. This finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the Reactor Safety Strategic Performance Area Mitigating System Cornerstone.
Specifically, off-normal Procedure OFN RP-017, "Control Room Evacuation" did not verify a volume control tank outlet valve closed in a timely manner. The failure is of very low safety significance because it did not:
. Represent a design or qualification deficiency that resulted in a loss of function
. Represent an actual loss of a safety function of a system
. Represent an actual loss of a single function of a train for greater than the Technical Specification allowed outage time
. Represent an actual loss of safety function of one or more non-Technical Specification trains of equipment designated as risk significant
. Screen as potentially risk significant due to seismic, fire, flooding, or severe weather This finding is a noncited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI. The licensee entered into the corrective action program as Performance Improvement Requests 2003-0333 and 0338.
Inspection Report# : 2003004(pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Significance:        Jun 26, 2004 Identified By: Self Disclosing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to obtain a radiological survey prior to moving materials from a contaminated area.
Green. A self-revealing noncited violation of a Technical Specification 5.4.1(a) required procedure was reviewed because workers failed to obtain a radiological survey before removing materials from a contaminated area. On December 1, 2003, three workers alarmed the personnel contamination monitors upon exiting the radiologically controlled area because they had become contaminated. A followup survey of the work area identified contamination levels up to 100,000 disintegrations per minute per 100 cm2. The licensee determined that the personnel became contaminated when they improperly moved a drip catch from a posted contaminated area.
The failure to obtain a radiological survey before removing materials from a contaminated area is a performance deficiency. This finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the occupational radiation safety program and process attribute and affected the cornerstone objective, which is to ensure adequate protection of the worker health and safety from exposure to radiation. Using the occupational radiation safety significance determination process, the inspector determined that the finding was of very low safety significance because it did not involve (1) ALARA planning and controls, (2) an overexposure, (3) a substantial potential for overexposure, or (4) an impaired ability to assess dose. In addition, this finding had a cross-cutting aspect associated with problem identification and resolution. The immediate corrective actions were narrowly focused.
Inspection Report# : 2004003(pdf)
Significance:        Jun 26, 2004 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to provide adequate contaminated area controls.
Green. A self-revealing noncited violation of a Technical Specification 5.4.1(a) required procedure was reviewed because a health physics technician failed to provide adequate contaminated area controls. On October 31, 2003, after working on a refueling water storage tank line flange, three personnel alarmed the personnel contamination monitors as they exited the radiologically controlled area because they had become contaminated. The licensee determined that the health physics technician covering the above work activity did not properly establish contamination controls, area posting and protective clothing instructions in accordance with procedural requirements.
 
2Q/2004 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                                                    Page 3 of 3 The failure to provide adequate contaminated area controls is a performance deficiency. This finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the occupational radiation safety program and process attribute and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure adequate protection of the worker health and safety from exposure to radiation. Using the occupational radiation safety significance determination process, the inspector determined that the finding was of very low safety significance because it did not involve (1) ALARA planning and controls, (2) an overexposure, (3) a substantial potential for overexposure, or (4) an impaired ability to assess dose. In addition, this finding had a cross-cutting aspect associated with problem identification and resolution. The immediate corrective actions were narrowly focused.
Inspection Report# : 2004003(pdf)
Significance:        Dec 31, 2003 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Adequately Control Access to a Very High Radiation Area The inspector identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR 20.1602 because the licensee failed to institute measures to ensure that an individual is not able to gain unauthorized access to a very high radiation area. Specifically, on October 28, 2003, the inspector observed that the area surrounding a locked ladder leading down to the reactor under-vessel area, a very high radiation area, was not provided with a physical barrier that completely enclosed the area. Radiation levels at the bottom of the ladder, one meter away from the withdrawn in-core instrument thimbles, were approximately 640 Rads per hour. An individual could have climbed over the handrail and climbed down the outside of the ladder using the fall protection cage. The finding is in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2003-3220.
The finding was greater than minor because it affected the Occupational Radiation Safety cornerstone objective to ensure adequate protection of worker health and safety from exposure to radiation and the finding was associated with the cornerstone attribute (program & process). The finding involved an individual's potential for unplanned or unintended dose. When processed through the Occupational Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the finding was not associated with as low as reasonably achievable planning or work controls, there was no overexposure nor a substantial potential for overexposure, and the ability to assess dose was not compromised.
Inspection Report# : 2003006(pdf)
Significance:        Dec 31, 2003 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Four Examples of the Failure to Perform Radiological Surveys The inspectors identified four examples of a noncited violation of 10 CFR 20.1501(a), because the licensee failed to perform required radiological surveys to ensure compliance with 10 CFR 20.1204(a) and 10 CFR 20.1902(b). On October 19, 2003, the licensee did not perform adequate surveys to assess changes in radiological conditions during chemical cleaning of the reactor coolant system. On October 22, 2003, the licensee did not perform an adequate survey of the workers breathing zone while decontaminating of the reactor cavity seal ring. These findings are in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Requests 2003-3069 and -3136 respectively.
The finding is greater than minor because it affected the Occupational Radiation Safety cornerstone objective to ensure adequate protection of worker health and safety from exposure to radiation and the finding is associated with the cornerstone attribute (program & process). The finding involved an individual's potential for unplanned or unintended dose. When processed through the Occupational Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the finding was not associated with as low as reasonably achievable planning or work controls, there was no overexposure or a substantial potential for overexposure, and the ability to assess dose was not compromised.
Inspection Report# : 2003006(pdf)
Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Physical Protection information not publicly available.
Miscellaneous Last modified : September 08, 2004
 
3Q/2004 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                                              Page 1 of 4 Wolf Creek 1 3Q/2004 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance:          Sep 26, 2004 Identified By: Self Disclosing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Identify and Correct a Significant Condition Adverse to Quality The inspectors documented a self-revealing noncited violation for failure to follow a surveillance procedure in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, which resulted in a reactor trip. On August 22, 2004, the reactor tripped during restoration from partially completed surveillance Procedure STS IC-211B, "Actuation Logic Test Train B Solid State Protection System." The operators appropriately responded to the event using Procedures EMG E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection;" and EMG ES-02, "Reactor Trip Response." This finding had human performance crosscutting aspects in that an operator failed to follow a procedure.
The failure to follow the procedure was a performance deficiency. The finding was greater than minor because it was similar to Example 4.b of Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix E, and caused a reactor trip. The finding is of very low safety significance because, even though it resulted in a reactor trip, it did not: contribute to the likelihood of a primary or secondary system loss of coolant accident initiator, contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions would not be available, nor increase the likelihood of a fire or internal/external flood Inspection Report# : 2004004(pdf)
Significance:          Apr 07, 2004 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Inadequate Work Instructions and Acceptance Criteria for Maintenance Activities on the Feedwater Regulating Values The inspectors documented a self-revealing finding for inadequate work instructions and acceptance criteria for maintenance activities on the feedwater regulating valves which resulted in a reactor trip. This finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the reactor safety strategic performance area Initiating Events cornerstone. Specifically, the failure to provide adequate work instructions and acceptance criteria for feedwater regulating valve maintenance resulted in a plant trip. The finding is of very low safety significance because, although it resulted in a reactor trip, it did not: increase the likelihood of a primary or secondary system loss of coolant accident initiator, contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions would not be available, or increase the likelihood of a fire or internal/external flood.
Inspection Report# : 2004002(pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance:          Sep 29, 2004 Identified By: Self Disclosing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Adequately Model Plant Response in the Simulator A self-revealing, noncited violation of CFR 55.46 (1) was identified regarding simulator response to a transient condition. While completing immediate actions following a reactor trip that occurred on February 13, 2004, the Balance of Plant Operator (BOP) observed what he understood to be a malfunction of the steam dump valves. Subsequent investigation revealed that the plant systems operated properly but that the Balance of Plant Operator did not expect the Steam Generator Atmospheric Relief Valves (ARV) to be open while the steam dumps were closed shortly following a plant trip. The licensee identified that the simulator had not accurately modeled steam generator atmospheric relief valves post-trip operation since initial licensing.
Based on the results of a Significance Determination Process (SDP) using Manual Chapter (MC) 0609, Appendix I, this finding was determined to have very low safety significance, since it involved a simulator fidelity issue which impacted operator actions. The failure to adequately model plant response in the simulator, discovered on February 19, 2004, is a violation of 10 CFR 55.46©). This violation is being treated as a noncited violation 05000482/2004006-01 consistent with Section VI.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
Inspection Report# : 2004006(pdf)
Significance:          Sep 29, 2004 Identified By: NRC
 
3Q/2004 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                                                Page 2 of 4 Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Design Control for Overcurrent Settomgs fpr Emergency Diesel Generator Supply Fan Breakers A self-revealing noncited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, for the failure to assure that design criteria had adequately been translated into specifications and procedures associated with the Emergency Diesel Generators. Specifically, in December 2002, and February 2003, the licensee failed to correctly adjust the overcurrent trip setpoints on the newly installed, different manufacture, Emergency Diesel Generator supply fan breakers. On March 12, 2003, Emergency Diesel Generator "A" supply fan Breaker NG03DBF6 was found tripped, but no problem was identified. On April 12 and April 15, 2003, additional failures of NG03DBF6 were identified. Evaluation determined that new breakers had been installed with overcurrent trips set too low to allow for the starting inrush current. The Emergency Diesel Generators were determined not to be affected because the outside temperature had not exceeded 79 degrees Fahrenheit (F), which is the temperature at which the fans are required to be operable.
The finding is greater than minor because it affected that Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective of equipment reliability, in that the failure of the Emergency Diesel Generator supply fans could have made the Emergency Diesel Generator inoperable if the outside temperatures had exceeded 79 degrees F. The finding is of very low safety significance because at the time of the breaker failures the outside air temperature had not exceeded 79 degrees F; therefore there was no loss of safety function. This violation is being treated as a noncited violation 05000482/2004006-02 consistent with Section VI.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
Inspection Report# : 2004006(pdf)
Significance:        Apr 07, 2004 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Fire Barriers at Seismic Gaps The inspectors identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification License Condition 2.C(5)(a) because the licensee failed to provide adequate 3-hour rated fire barriers between fire areas containing redundant safe shutdown equipment in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2, requirements. The inspectors identified that approximately 20 inches of fire barrier material between the main steam enclosure and the auxiliary feedwater system flow control valve rooms was missing. The fire barrier material was missing from the approximately 4-inch wide seismic gap between the reactor and auxiliary buildings. The licensee immediately placed fire barrier material in the seismic gap and wrote Performance Improvement Request 2003-3704 to document the condition. The licensee determined that an inadequate design for fire barriers at seismic gaps had also resulted in slightly degraded fire barriers at 14 other locations. After identification, the licensee installed the required fire barrier seal material to restore the 3-hour rating of these 14 additional fire barriers.
This finding is greater than minor because it is similar to the example in Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix E, Section 2.e. In the as-found condition, the fire penetration seals at the seismic gaps were not rated to perform their function to prevent the spread of fire for 3 hours. However, this finding is of very low safety significance because, overall, the fire barriers would have provided the protection needed. There was not a credible fire scenario that would affect the defense-in-depth design requirements.
Fourteen other fire barrier installations were in accordance with an inadequate design, but there were no significant gaps between fire areas and, in some cases, the fire seal material was butted up against each other at a right angle.
Inspection Report# : 2004002(pdf)
Barrier Integrity Significance:        Sep 26, 2004 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Follow Procedure, Which Resulted in a Ractor Trip The inspectors identified a noncited violation of Criteria XVI of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Corrective Action, for failure to identify and correct a significant condition adverse to quality. Specifically, the licensee failed to recognize that the containment atmosphere radiation gaseous monitors were inoperable. The monitors were not able to meet the operability requirement of detecting a reactor coolant leakage rate of 1 gallon per minute in less than 1 hour.
This finding was greater than minor because the containment gas channel radiation monitors were not capable of performing the design bases function for an extended period of time. The inoperability of the containment radiation monitor resulted in potential impact on reactor safety and adversely affected the reactor coolant leakage performance attribute of the barrier integrity cornerstone. The finding was of very low safety significance because other methods of reactor coolant system leak detection were available to the licensee and no actual leak had occurred. The unavailability of the gaseous channel leak detection function did not contribute to an increase in core damage sequences when evaluated using the significance determination process Phase 2 worksheets Inspection Report# : 2004004(pdf)
Emergency Preparedness
 
3Q/2004 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                                              Page 3 of 4 Occupational Radiation Safety Significance:        Jun 26, 2004 Identified By: Self Disclosing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to obtain a radiological survey prior to moving materials from a contaminated area.
Green. A self-revealing noncited violation of a Technical Specification 5.4.1(a) required procedure was reviewed because workers failed to obtain a radiological survey before removing materials from a contaminated area. On December 1, 2003, three workers alarmed the personnel contamination monitors upon exiting the radiologically controlled area because they had become contaminated. A followup survey of the work area identified contamination levels up to 100,000 disintegrations per minute per 100 cm2. The licensee determined that the personnel became contaminated when they improperly moved a drip catch from a posted contaminated area.
The failure to obtain a radiological survey before removing materials from a contaminated area is a performance deficiency. This finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the occupational radiation safety program and process attribute and affected the cornerstone objective, which is to ensure adequate protection of the worker health and safety from exposure to radiation. Using the occupational radiation safety significance determination process, the inspector determined that the finding was of very low safety significance because it did not involve (1) ALARA planning and controls, (2) an overexposure, (3) a substantial potential for overexposure, or (4) an impaired ability to assess dose. In addition, this finding had a cross-cutting aspect associated with problem identification and resolution. The immediate corrective actions were narrowly focused.
Inspection Report# : 2004003(pdf)
Significance:        Jun 26, 2004 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to provide adequate contaminated area controls.
Green. A self-revealing noncited violation of a Technical Specification 5.4.1(a) required procedure was reviewed because a health physics technician failed to provide adequate contaminated area controls. On October 31, 2003, after working on a refueling water storage tank line flange, three personnel alarmed the personnel contamination monitors as they exited the radiologically controlled area because they had become contaminated. The licensee determined that the health physics technician covering the above work activity did not properly establish contamination controls, area posting and protective clothing instructions in accordance with procedural requirements.
The failure to provide adequate contaminated area controls is a performance deficiency. This finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the occupational radiation safety program and process attribute and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure adequate protection of the worker health and safety from exposure to radiation. Using the occupational radiation safety significance determination process, the inspector determined that the finding was of very low safety significance because it did not involve (1) ALARA planning and controls, (2) an overexposure, (3) a substantial potential for overexposure, or (4) an impaired ability to assess dose. In addition, this finding had a cross-cutting aspect associated with problem identification and resolution. The immediate corrective actions were narrowly focused.
Inspection Report# : 2004003(pdf)
Significance:        Dec 31, 2003 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Adequately Control Access to a Very High Radiation Area The inspector identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR 20.1602 because the licensee failed to institute measures to ensure that an individual is not able to gain unauthorized access to a very high radiation area. Specifically, on October 28, 2003, the inspector observed that the area surrounding a locked ladder leading down to the reactor under-vessel area, a very high radiation area, was not provided with a physical barrier that completely enclosed the area. Radiation levels at the bottom of the ladder, one meter away from the withdrawn in-core instrument thimbles, were approximately 640 Rads per hour. An individual could have climbed over the handrail and climbed down the outside of the ladder using the fall protection cage. The finding is in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2003-3220.
The finding was greater than minor because it affected the Occupational Radiation Safety cornerstone objective to ensure adequate protection of worker health and safety from exposure to radiation and the finding was associated with the cornerstone attribute (program & process). The finding involved an individual's potential for unplanned or unintended dose. When processed through the Occupational Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the finding was not associated with as low as reasonably achievable planning or work controls, there was no overexposure nor a substantial potential for overexposure, and the ability to assess dose was not compromised.
Inspection Report# : 2003006(pdf)
Significance:        Dec 31, 2003 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation
 
3Q/2004 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                                          Page 4 of 4 Four Examples of the Failure to Perform Radiological Surveys The inspectors identified four examples of a noncited violation of 10 CFR 20.1501(a), because the licensee failed to perform required radiological surveys to ensure compliance with 10 CFR 20.1204(a) and 10 CFR 20.1902(b). On October 19, 2003, the licensee did not perform adequate surveys to assess changes in radiological conditions during chemical cleaning of the reactor coolant system. On October 22, 2003, the licensee did not perform an adequate survey of the workers breathing zone while decontaminating of the reactor cavity seal ring. These findings are in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Requests 2003-3069 and -3136 respectively.
The finding is greater than minor because it affected the Occupational Radiation Safety cornerstone objective to ensure adequate protection of worker health and safety from exposure to radiation and the finding is associated with the cornerstone attribute (program & process). The finding involved an individual's potential for unplanned or unintended dose. When processed through the Occupational Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the finding was not associated with as low as reasonably achievable planning or work controls, there was no overexposure or a substantial potential for overexposure, and the ability to assess dose was not compromised.
Inspection Report# : 2003006(pdf)
Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Physical Protection information not publicly available.
Miscellaneous Significance: N/A Sep 29, 2004 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Identification and Resolution of Problems The team reviewed approximately 200 Performance Improvement Requests program documents, apparent and root cause analyses and plant procedures for the identification and resolution of problems. Based on this review, the team found that the processes to identify, prioritize, evaluate, and correct problems were generally effective; thresholds for identifying issues remained appropriately low and, in most cases, corrective actions were adequate to address conditions adverse to quality.
Cross-cutting aspects, associated with identification, prioritization and evaluation and correction of degraded conditions in the plant were identified. The team found that these cross-cutting aspects were the exception and not the rule and most issues were minor. However, in a few cases, licensee personnel did not initiate corrective action documents for known equipment degradations. In other cases, planned corrective actions were not managed to a satisfactory completion. Either the issue was not corrected by the planned actions, or the planned actions were cancelled.
Based on the interviews, the team concluded that a positive safety-conscious work environment exists at Wolf Creek. The team determined that employees and contractors feel free to raise safety concerns to their supervision or bring concerns to the employees concern program.
Inspection Report# : 2004006(pdf)
Last modified : December 29, 2004
 
4Q/2004 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                                              Page 1 of 4 Wolf Creek 1 4Q/2004 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance:          Sep 26, 2004 Identified By: Self Disclosing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Follow Procedure, Which Resulted in a Reactor Trip The inspectors documented a self-revealing noncited violation for failure to follow a surveillance procedure in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appexnic B, Criterion V, which resulted in a reactor trip. On August 22, 2004, the reactor tripped during a restoration from partially completed surveillance Procedure STS IC-211B, "Actuation Logic Test Train B Solid State Protection System." The operators appropriately responded to the event using Procedures EMG E-O, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection;" and EMG ES-02, "Reactor Trip Response." This finding had human performance cross-cutting aspects in that an operator failed to follow a procedure.
The failure to follow the procedure was a performance deficiency. The finding was greater than minor because it was similar to Example 4.b of Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix E, and caused a reactor trip. The finding is of very low safety significance because, even though it resulted in a reactor trip, it did not: contribute to the likelihood of a primary or secondary system loss of coolant accident initiator, contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions would not be available, nor increase the likelihood of a fire or internal/external flood.
Inspection Report# : 2004004(pdf)
Significance:          Apr 07, 2004 Identified By: Self Disclosing Item Type: FIN Finding Inadequate Work Instructions and Acceptance Criteria for Maintenance Activities on the Feedwater Regulating Values The inspectors documented a self-revealing finding for inadequate work instructions and acceptance criteria for maintenance activities on the feedwater regulating valves which resulted in a reactor trip. This finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the reactor safety strategic performance area Initiating Events cornerstone. Specifically, the failure to provide adequate work instructions and acceptance criteria for feedwater regulating valve maintenance resulted in a plant trip. The finding is of very low safety significance because, although it resulted in a reactor trip, it did not: increase the likelihood of a primary or secondary system loss of coolant accident initiator, contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions would not be available, or increase the likelihood of a fire or internal/external flood.
Inspection Report# : 2004002(pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance:          Sep 29, 2004 Identified By: Self Disclosing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Adequately Model Plant Response in the Simulator A self-revealing, noncited violation of CFR 55.46 (1) was identified regarding simulator response to a transient condition. While completing immediate actions following a reactor trip that occurred on February 13, 2004, the Balance of Plant Operator (BOP) observed what he understood to be a malfunction of the steam dump valves. Subsequent investigation revealed that the plant systems operated properly but that the Balance of Plant Operator did not expect the Steam Generator Atmospheric Relief Valves (ARV) to be open while the steam dumps were closed shortly following a plant trip. The licensee identified that the simulator had not accurately modeled steam generator atmospheric relief valves post-trip operation since initial licensing.
Based on the results of a Significance Determination Process (SDP) using Manual Chapter (MC) 0609, Appendix I, this finding was determined to have very low safety significance, since it involved a simulator fidelity issue which impacted operator actions. The failure to adequately model plant response in the simulator, discovered on February 19, 2004, is a violation of 10 CFR 55.46(c). This violation is being treated as a noncited violation 05000482/2004006-01 consistent with Section VI.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
Inspection Report# : 2004006(pdf)
Significance:          Sep 29, 2004 Identified By: Self Disclosing
 
4Q/2004 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                                                Page 2 of 4 Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Design Control for Overcurrent Settings for Emergency Diesel Generator Supply Fan Breakers A self-revealing noncited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, for the failure to assure that design criteria had adequately been translated into specifications and procedures associated with the Emergency Diesel Generators. Specifically, in December 2002, and February 2003, the licensee failed to correctly adjust the overcurrent trip setpoints on the newly installed, different manufacture, Emergency Diesel Generator supply fan breakers. On March 12, 2003, Emergency Diesel Generator "A" supply fan Breaker NG03DBF6 was found tripped, but no problem was identified. On April 12 and April 15, 2003, additional failures of NG03DBF6 were identified. Evaluation determined that new breakers had been installed with overcurrent trips set too low to allow for the starting inrush current. The Emergency Diesel Generators were determined not to be affected because the outside temperature had not exceeded 79 degrees Fahrenheit (F), which is the temperature at which the fans are required to be operable.
The finding is greater than minor because it affected the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective of equipment reliability, in that the failure of the Emergency Diesel Generator supply fans could have made the Emergency Diesel Generator inoperable if the outside temperatures had exceeded 79 degrees F. The finding is of very low safety significance because at the time of the breaker failures the outside air temperature had not exceeded 79 degrees F; therefore there was no loss of safety function. This violation is being treated as a noncited violation 05000482/2004006-02 consistent with Section VI.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
Inspection Report# : 2004006(pdf)
Significance:        Apr 07, 2004 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Fire Barriers at Seismic Gaps The inspectors identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification License Condition 2.C(5)(a) because the licensee failed to provide adequate 3-hour rated fire barriers between fire areas containing redundant safe shutdown equipment in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2, requirements. The inspectors identified that approximately 20 inches of fire barrier material between the main steam enclosure and the auxiliary feedwater system flow control valve rooms was missing. The fire barrier material was missing from the approximately 4-inch wide seismic gap between the reactor and auxiliary buildings. The licensee immediately placed fire barrier material in the seismic gap and wrote Performance Improvement Request 2003-3704 to document the condition. The licensee determined that an inadequate design for fire barriers at seismic gaps had also resulted in slightly degraded fire barriers at 14 other locations. After identification, the licensee installed the required fire barrier seal material to restore the 3-hour rating of these 14 additional fire barriers.
This finding is greater than minor because it is similar to the example in Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix E, Section 2.e. In the as-found condition, the fire penetration seals at the seismic gaps were not rated to perform their function to prevent the spread of fire for 3 hours. However, this finding is of very low safety significance because, overall, the fire barriers would have provided the protection needed. There was not a credible fire scenario that would affect the defense-in-depth design requirements.
Fourteen other fire barrier installations were in accordance with an inadequate design, but there were no significant gaps between fire areas and, in some cases, the fire seal material was butted up against each other at a right angle.
Inspection Report# : 2004002(pdf)
Barrier Integrity Significance:        Sep 26, 2004 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Identify and Correct a Significant Condition Adverse to Quality The inspectors identified a noncited violation of Criteria XVI of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Corrective Action, for failure to identify and correct a significant condition adverse to quality. Specifically, the licensee failed to recognize that the containment atmosphere radiation gaseous monitors were inoperable. The monitors were not able to meet the operability requirement of detecting a reactor coolant leakage rate of 1 gallon per minute in less than 1 hour. This finding contains problem identification and resolution cross-cutting aspects.
This finding was greater than minor because the containment gas channel radiation monitors were not capable of performing the design bases function for an extended period of time. The inoperability of the containment radiation monitor resulted in potential impact on reactor safety and adversely affected the reactor coolant leakage performance attribute of the barrier integrity cornerstone. The finding was of very low safety significance because other methods of reactor coolant system leak detection were available to the licensee and no actual leak had occurred. The unavailability of the gaseous channel leak detection function did not contribute to an increase in core damage sequences when evaluated using the significance determination process Phase 2 worksheets.
Inspection Report# : 2004004(pdf)
Emergency Preparedness
 
4Q/2004 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                                              Page 3 of 4 Occupational Radiation Safety Significance:        Jun 26, 2004 Identified By: Self Disclosing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to obtain a radiological survey prior to moving materials from a contaminated area.
Green. A self-revealing noncited violation of a Technical Specification 5.4.1(a) required procedure was reviewed because workers failed to obtain a radiological survey before removing materials from a contaminated area. On December 1, 2003, three workers alarmed the personnel contamination monitors upon exiting the radiologically controlled area because they had become contaminated. A followup survey of the work area identified contamination levels up to 100,000 disintegrations per minute per 100 cm2. The licensee determined that the personnel became contaminated when they improperly moved a drip catch from a posted contaminated area.
The failure to obtain a radiological survey before removing materials from a contaminated area is a performance deficiency. This finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the occupational radiation safety program and process attribute and affected the cornerstone objective, which is to ensure adequate protection of the worker health and safety from exposure to radiation. Using the occupational radiation safety significance determination process, the inspector determined that the finding was of very low safety significance because it did not involve (1) ALARA planning and controls, (2) an overexposure, (3) a substantial potential for overexposure, or (4) an impaired ability to assess dose. In addition, this finding had a cross-cutting aspect associated with problem identification and resolution. The immediate corrective actions were narrowly focused.
Inspection Report# : 2004003(pdf)
Significance:        Jun 26, 2004 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to provide adequate contaminated area controls.
Green. A self-revealing noncited violation of a Technical Specification 5.4.1(a) required procedure was reviewed because a health physics technician failed to provide adequate contaminated area controls. On October 31, 2003, after working on a refueling water storage tank line flange, three personnel alarmed the personnel contamination monitors as they exited the radiologically controlled area because they had become contaminated. The licensee determined that the health physics technician covering the above work activity did not properly establish contamination controls, area posting and protective clothing instructions in accordance with procedural requirements.
The failure to provide adequate contaminated area controls is a performance deficiency. This finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the occupational radiation safety program and process attribute and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure adequate protection of the worker health and safety from exposure to radiation. Using the occupational radiation safety significance determination process, the inspector determined that the finding was of very low safety significance because it did not involve (1) ALARA planning and controls, (2) an overexposure, (3) a substantial potential for overexposure, or (4) an impaired ability to assess dose. In addition, this finding had a cross-cutting aspect associated with problem identification and resolution. The immediate corrective actions were narrowly focused.
Inspection Report# : 2004003(pdf)
Public Radiation Safety Significance:        Aug 20, 2004 Identified By: Self Disclosing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to control radioactive material The team reviewed a self-revealing, non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1 that resulted from the licensee's failure to properly control items contaminated with radioactive material. Three snubbers with fixed contamination levels ranging from approximately 1500 to 3000 disintegrations per minute were released from the radiological controlled area, but remained in the protected area. The licensee was alerted to the situation when a personnel radiation monitor in the secondary access area alarmed because of the presence of one of the snubbers.
The finding was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2003-2438.
The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the cornerstone attribute material release and it affected the associated cornerstone objective to ensure adequate protection of public health and safety from exposure to radioactive materials released into the public domain. Using the Public Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process, the team determined the finding is of very low safety significance because (1) the finding was a radioactive material control issue (2) it was not a transportation issue, and (3) it did not result in a dose to the public greater than 0.005 rem. This finding also had crosscutting aspects associated with human perormance.
Inspection Report# : 2004008(pdf)
 
4Q/2004 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                                          Page 4 of 4 Physical Protection Physical Protection information not publicly available.
Miscellaneous Significance: N/A Sep 29, 2004 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Identification and Resolution of Problems The team reviewed approximately 200 Performance Improvement Requests program documents, apparent and root cause analyses and plant procedures for the identification and resolution of problems. Based on this review, the team found that the processes to identify, prioritize, evaluate, and correct problems were generally effective; thresholds for identifying issues remained appropriately low and, in most cases, corrective actions were adequate to address conditions adverse to quality.
Cross-cutting aspects, associated with identification, prioritization and evaluation and correction of degraded conditions in the plant were identified. The team found that these cross-cutting aspects were the exception and not the rule and most issues were minor. However, in a few cases, licensee personnel did not initiate corrective action documents for known equipment degradations. In other cases, planned corrective actions were not managed to a satisfactory completion. Either the issue was not corrected by the planned actions, or the planned actions were cancelled.
Based on the interviews, the team concluded that a positive safety-conscious work environment exists at Wolf Creek. The team determined that employees and contractors feel free to raise safety concerns to their supervision or bring concerns to the employees concern program.
Inspection Report# : 2004006(pdf)
Last modified : March 09, 2005
 
1Q/2005 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                                              Page 1 of 4 Wolf Creek 1 1Q/2005 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance:          Sep 26, 2004 Identified By: Self Disclosing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Follow Procedure, Which Resulted in a Reactor Trip The inspectors documented a self-revealing noncited violation for failure to follow a surveillance procedure in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appexnic B, Criterion V, which resulted in a reactor trip. On August 22, 2004, the reactor tripped during a restoration from partially completed surveillance Procedure STS IC-211B, "Actuation Logic Test Train B Solid State Protection System." The operators appropriately responded to the event using Procedures EMG E-O, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection;" and EMG ES-02, "Reactor Trip Response." This finding had human performance cross-cutting aspects in that an operator failed to follow a procedure.
The failure to follow the procedure was a performance deficiency. The finding was greater than minor because it was similar to Example 4.b of Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix E, and caused a reactor trip. The finding is of very low safety significance because, even though it resulted in a reactor trip, it did not: contribute to the likelihood of a primary or secondary system loss of coolant accident initiator, contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions would not be available, nor increase the likelihood of a fire or internal/external flood.
Inspection Report# : 2004004(pdf)
Significance:          Apr 07, 2004 Identified By: Self Disclosing Item Type: FIN Finding Inadequate Work Instructions and Acceptance Criteria for Maintenance Activities on the Feedwater Regulating Values The inspectors documented a self-revealing finding for inadequate work instructions and acceptance criteria for maintenance activities on the feedwater regulating valves which resulted in a reactor trip. This finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the reactor safety strategic performance area Initiating Events cornerstone. Specifically, the failure to provide adequate work instructions and acceptance criteria for feedwater regulating valve maintenance resulted in a plant trip. The finding is of very low safety significance because, although it resulted in a reactor trip, it did not: increase the likelihood of a primary or secondary system loss of coolant accident initiator, contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions would not be available, or increase the likelihood of a fire or internal/external flood.
Inspection Report# : 2004002(pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance:          Sep 29, 2004 Identified By: Self Disclosing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Adequately Model Plant Response in the Simulator A self-revealing, noncited violation of CFR 55.46 (1) was identified regarding simulator response to a transient condition. While completing immediate actions following a reactor trip that occurred on February 13, 2004, the Balance of Plant Operator (BOP) observed what he understood to be a malfunction of the steam dump valves. Subsequent investigation revealed that the plant systems operated properly but that the Balance of Plant Operator did not expect the Steam Generator Atmospheric Relief Valves (ARV) to be open while the steam dumps were closed shortly following a plant trip. The licensee identified that the simulator had not accurately modeled steam generator atmospheric relief valves post-trip operation since initial licensing.
Based on the results of a Significance Determination Process (SDP) using Manual Chapter (MC) 0609, Appendix I, this finding was determined to have very low safety significance, since it involved a simulator fidelity issue which impacted operator actions. The failure to adequately model plant response in the simulator, discovered on February 19, 2004, is a violation of 10 CFR 55.46(c). This violation is being treated as a noncited violation 05000482/2004006-01 consistent with Section VI.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
Inspection Report# : 2004006(pdf)
Significance:          Sep 29, 2004 Identified By: Self Disclosing
 
1Q/2005 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                                                Page 2 of 4 Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Design Control for Overcurrent Settings for Emergency Diesel Generator Supply Fan Breakers A self-revealing noncited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, for the failure to assure that design criteria had adequately been translated into specifications and procedures associated with the Emergency Diesel Generators. Specifically, in December 2002, and February 2003, the licensee failed to correctly adjust the overcurrent trip setpoints on the newly installed, different manufacture, Emergency Diesel Generator supply fan breakers. On March 12, 2003, Emergency Diesel Generator "A" supply fan Breaker NG03DBF6 was found tripped, but no problem was identified. On April 12 and April 15, 2003, additional failures of NG03DBF6 were identified. Evaluation determined that new breakers had been installed with overcurrent trips set too low to allow for the starting inrush current. The Emergency Diesel Generators were determined not to be affected because the outside temperature had not exceeded 79 degrees Fahrenheit (F), which is the temperature at which the fans are required to be operable.
The finding is greater than minor because it affected the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective of equipment reliability, in that the failure of the Emergency Diesel Generator supply fans could have made the Emergency Diesel Generator inoperable if the outside temperatures had exceeded 79 degrees F. The finding is of very low safety significance because at the time of the breaker failures the outside air temperature had not exceeded 79 degrees F; therefore there was no loss of safety function. This violation is being treated as a noncited violation 05000482/2004006-02 consistent with Section VI.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
Inspection Report# : 2004006(pdf)
Significance:        Apr 07, 2004 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Fire Barriers at Seismic Gaps The inspectors identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification License Condition 2.C(5)(a) because the licensee failed to provide adequate 3-hour rated fire barriers between fire areas containing redundant safe shutdown equipment in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2, requirements. The inspectors identified that approximately 20 inches of fire barrier material between the main steam enclosure and the auxiliary feedwater system flow control valve rooms was missing. The fire barrier material was missing from the approximately 4-inch wide seismic gap between the reactor and auxiliary buildings. The licensee immediately placed fire barrier material in the seismic gap and wrote Performance Improvement Request 2003-3704 to document the condition. The licensee determined that an inadequate design for fire barriers at seismic gaps had also resulted in slightly degraded fire barriers at 14 other locations. After identification, the licensee installed the required fire barrier seal material to restore the 3-hour rating of these 14 additional fire barriers.
This finding is greater than minor because it is similar to the example in Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix E, Section 2.e. In the as-found condition, the fire penetration seals at the seismic gaps were not rated to perform their function to prevent the spread of fire for 3 hours. However, this finding is of very low safety significance because, overall, the fire barriers would have provided the protection needed. There was not a credible fire scenario that would affect the defense-in-depth design requirements.
Fourteen other fire barrier installations were in accordance with an inadequate design, but there were no significant gaps between fire areas and, in some cases, the fire seal material was butted up against each other at a right angle.
Inspection Report# : 2004002(pdf)
Barrier Integrity Significance:        Sep 26, 2004 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Identify and Correct a Significant Condition Adverse to Quality The inspectors identified a noncited violation of Criteria XVI of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Corrective Action, for failure to identify and correct a significant condition adverse to quality. Specifically, the licensee failed to recognize that the containment atmosphere radiation gaseous monitors were inoperable. The monitors were not able to meet the operability requirement of detecting a reactor coolant leakage rate of 1 gallon per minute in less than 1 hour. This finding contains problem identification and resolution cross-cutting aspects.
This finding was greater than minor because the containment gas channel radiation monitors were not capable of performing the design bases function for an extended period of time. The inoperability of the containment radiation monitor resulted in potential impact on reactor safety and adversely affected the reactor coolant leakage performance attribute of the barrier integrity cornerstone. The finding was of very low safety significance because other methods of reactor coolant system leak detection were available to the licensee and no actual leak had occurred. The unavailability of the gaseous channel leak detection function did not contribute to an increase in core damage sequences when evaluated using the significance determination process Phase 2 worksheets.
Inspection Report# : 2004004(pdf)
Emergency Preparedness
 
1Q/2005 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                                              Page 3 of 4 Occupational Radiation Safety Significance:        Jun 26, 2004 Identified By: Self Disclosing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to obtain a radiological survey prior to moving materials from a contaminated area.
Green. A self-revealing noncited violation of a Technical Specification 5.4.1(a) required procedure was reviewed because workers failed to obtain a radiological survey before removing materials from a contaminated area. On December 1, 2003, three workers alarmed the personnel contamination monitors upon exiting the radiologically controlled area because they had become contaminated. A followup survey of the work area identified contamination levels up to 100,000 disintegrations per minute per 100 cm2. The licensee determined that the personnel became contaminated when they improperly moved a drip catch from a posted contaminated area.
The failure to obtain a radiological survey before removing materials from a contaminated area is a performance deficiency. This finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the occupational radiation safety program and process attribute and affected the cornerstone objective, which is to ensure adequate protection of the worker health and safety from exposure to radiation. Using the occupational radiation safety significance determination process, the inspector determined that the finding was of very low safety significance because it did not involve (1) ALARA planning and controls, (2) an overexposure, (3) a substantial potential for overexposure, or (4) an impaired ability to assess dose. In addition, this finding had a cross-cutting aspect associated with problem identification and resolution. The immediate corrective actions were narrowly focused.
Inspection Report# : 2004003(pdf)
Significance:        Jun 26, 2004 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to provide adequate contaminated area controls.
Green. A self-revealing noncited violation of a Technical Specification 5.4.1(a) required procedure was reviewed because a health physics technician failed to provide adequate contaminated area controls. On October 31, 2003, after working on a refueling water storage tank line flange, three personnel alarmed the personnel contamination monitors as they exited the radiologically controlled area because they had become contaminated. The licensee determined that the health physics technician covering the above work activity did not properly establish contamination controls, area posting and protective clothing instructions in accordance with procedural requirements.
The failure to provide adequate contaminated area controls is a performance deficiency. This finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the occupational radiation safety program and process attribute and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure adequate protection of the worker health and safety from exposure to radiation. Using the occupational radiation safety significance determination process, the inspector determined that the finding was of very low safety significance because it did not involve (1) ALARA planning and controls, (2) an overexposure, (3) a substantial potential for overexposure, or (4) an impaired ability to assess dose. In addition, this finding had a cross-cutting aspect associated with problem identification and resolution. The immediate corrective actions were narrowly focused.
Inspection Report# : 2004003(pdf)
Public Radiation Safety Significance:        Aug 20, 2004 Identified By: Self Disclosing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to control radioactive material The team reviewed a self-revealing, non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1 that resulted from the licensee's failure to properly control items contaminated with radioactive material. Three snubbers with fixed contamination levels ranging from approximately 1500 to 3000 disintegrations per minute were released from the radiological controlled area, but remained in the protected area. The licensee was alerted to the situation when a personnel radiation monitor in the secondary access area alarmed because of the presence of one of the snubbers.
The finding was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2003-2438.
The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the cornerstone attribute material release and it affected the associated cornerstone objective to ensure adequate protection of public health and safety from exposure to radioactive materials released into the public domain. Using the Public Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process, the team determined the finding is of very low safety significance because (1) the finding was a radioactive material control issue (2) it was not a transportation issue, and (3) it did not result in a dose to the public greater than 0.005 rem. This finding also had crosscutting aspects associated with human perormance.
Inspection Report# : 2004008(pdf)
 
1Q/2005 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                                          Page 4 of 4 Physical Protection Physical Protection information not publicly available.
Miscellaneous Significance: N/A Sep 29, 2004 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Identification and Resolution of Problems The team reviewed approximately 200 Performance Improvement Requests program documents, apparent and root cause analyses and plant procedures for the identification and resolution of problems. Based on this review, the team found that the processes to identify, prioritize, evaluate, and correct problems were generally effective; thresholds for identifying issues remained appropriately low and, in most cases, corrective actions were adequate to address conditions adverse to quality.
Cross-cutting aspects, associated with identification, prioritization and evaluation and correction of degraded conditions in the plant were identified. The team found that these cross-cutting aspects were the exception and not the rule and most issues were minor. However, in a few cases, licensee personnel did not initiate corrective action documents for known equipment degradations. In other cases, planned corrective actions were not managed to a satisfactory completion. Either the issue was not corrected by the planned actions, or the planned actions were cancelled.
Based on the interviews, the team concluded that a positive safety-conscious work environment exists at Wolf Creek. The team determined that employees and contractors feel free to raise safety concerns to their supervision or bring concerns to the employees concern program.
Inspection Report# : 2004006(pdf)
Last modified : June 17, 2005
 
2Q/2005 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                                              Page 1 of 3 Wolf Creek 1 2Q/2005 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance:          Sep 26, 2004 Identified By: Self Disclosing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Follow Procedure, Which Resulted in a Reactor Trip The inspectors documented a self-revealing noncited violation for failure to follow a surveillance procedure in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appexnic B, Criterion V, which resulted in a reactor trip. On August 22, 2004, the reactor tripped during a restoration from partially completed surveillance Procedure STS IC-211B, "Actuation Logic Test Train B Solid State Protection System." The operators appropriately responded to the event using Procedures EMG E-O, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection;" and EMG ES-02, "Reactor Trip Response." This finding had human performance cross-cutting aspects in that an operator failed to follow a procedure.
The failure to follow the procedure was a performance deficiency. The finding was greater than minor because it was similar to Example 4.b of Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix E, and caused a reactor trip. The finding is of very low safety significance because, even though it resulted in a reactor trip, it did not: contribute to the likelihood of a primary or secondary system loss of coolant accident initiator, contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions would not be available, nor increase the likelihood of a fire or internal/external flood.
Inspection Report# : 2004004(pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance:          Sep 29, 2004 Identified By: Self Disclosing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Adequately Model Plant Response in the Simulator A self-revealing, noncited violation of CFR 55.46 (1) was identified regarding simulator response to a transient condition. While completing immediate actions following a reactor trip that occurred on February 13, 2004, the Balance of Plant Operator (BOP) observed what he understood to be a malfunction of the steam dump valves. Subsequent investigation revealed that the plant systems operated properly but that the Balance of Plant Operator did not expect the Steam Generator Atmospheric Relief Valves (ARV) to be open while the steam dumps were closed shortly following a plant trip. The licensee identified that the simulator had not accurately modeled steam generator atmospheric relief valves post-trip operation since initial licensing.
Based on the results of a Significance Determination Process (SDP) using Manual Chapter (MC) 0609, Appendix I, this finding was determined to have very low safety significance, since it involved a simulator fidelity issue which impacted operator actions. The failure to adequately model plant response in the simulator, discovered on February 19, 2004, is a violation of 10 CFR 55.46(c). This violation is being treated as a noncited violation 05000482/2004006-01 consistent with Section VI.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
Inspection Report# : 2004006(pdf)
Significance:          Sep 29, 2004 Identified By: Self Disclosing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Design Control for Overcurrent Settings for Emergency Diesel Generator Supply Fan Breakers A self-revealing noncited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, for the failure to assure that design criteria had adequately been translated into specifications and procedures associated with the Emergency Diesel Generators. Specifically, in December 2002, and February 2003, the licensee failed to correctly adjust the overcurrent trip setpoints on the newly installed, different manufacture, Emergency Diesel Generator supply fan breakers. On March 12, 2003, Emergency Diesel Generator "A" supply fan Breaker NG03DBF6 was found tripped, but no problem was identified. On April 12 and April 15, 2003, additional failures of NG03DBF6 were identified. Evaluation determined that new breakers had been installed with overcurrent trips set too low to allow for the starting inrush current. The Emergency Diesel Generators were determined not to be affected because the outside temperature had not exceeded 79 degrees Fahrenheit (F), which is the temperature at which the fans are required to be operable.
The finding is greater than minor because it affected the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective of equipment reliability, in that the failure of the Emergency Diesel Generator supply fans could have made the Emergency Diesel Generator inoperable if the outside temperatures had exceeded 79 degrees F. The finding is of very low safety significance because at the time of the breaker failures the outside air temperature had not exceeded 79 degrees F; therefore there was no loss of safety function. This violation is being treated as a noncited violation
 
2Q/2005 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                                            Page 2 of 3 05000482/2004006-02 consistent with Section VI.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
Inspection Report# : 2004006(pdf)
Barrier Integrity Significance:        Sep 26, 2004 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Identify and Correct a Significant Condition Adverse to Quality The inspectors identified a noncited violation of Criteria XVI of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Corrective Action, for failure to identify and correct a significant condition adverse to quality. Specifically, the licensee failed to recognize that the containment atmosphere radiation gaseous monitors were inoperable. The monitors were not able to meet the operability requirement of detecting a reactor coolant leakage rate of 1 gallon per minute in less than 1 hour. This finding contains problem identification and resolution cross-cutting aspects.
This finding was greater than minor because the containment gas channel radiation monitors were not capable of performing the design bases function for an extended period of time. The inoperability of the containment radiation monitor resulted in potential impact on reactor safety and adversely affected the reactor coolant leakage performance attribute of the barrier integrity cornerstone. The finding was of very low safety significance because other methods of reactor coolant system leak detection were available to the licensee and no actual leak had occurred. The unavailability of the gaseous channel leak detection function did not contribute to an increase in core damage sequences when evaluated using the significance determination process Phase 2 worksheets.
Inspection Report# : 2004004(pdf)
Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Significance:        Apr 15, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform an Adequate Survey to Identify a Radiation Area The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 20.1501(a) for failure to perform a survey to identify a radiation area. Specifically, on April 14, 2005, the inspectors identified, by direct survey, an unposted radiation area directly above the resin loading flange of the "A" Recycle Evaporator Feed Demineralizer on the 2051-foot elevation of the radioactive waste building. The licensee performed a confirmatory survey that indicated a contact dose rate of 20 millirem per hour and 10 millirem per hour at 30 centimeters.
The finding is greater than minor because it was associated with a cornerstone attribute (Human Performance) and affected the associated cornerstone objective because the failure to perform an adequate radiation survey effects the adequate protection of worker health and safety from exposure to radiation. Using the Occupational Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process, the inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance because it did not involve (1) ALARA planning and controls, (2) an overexposure, (3) a substantial potential for overexposure, or (4) an impaired ability to assess dose. This finding also had a crosscutting aspect associated with human performance because radiation protection personnel directly contributed to the finding by not performing an adequate survey. The finding was placed in the licensee's corrective action program as performance improvement request PIR 2005-1046.
Inspection Report# : 2005003(pdf)
Public Radiation Safety Significance:        Aug 20, 2004 Identified By: Self Disclosing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to control radioactive material The team reviewed a self-revealing, non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1 that resulted from the licensee's failure to properly
 
2Q/2005 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                                              Page 3 of 3 control items contaminated with radioactive material. Three snubbers with fixed contamination levels ranging from approximately 1500 to 3000 disintegrations per minute were released from the radiological controlled area, but remained in the protected area. The licensee was alerted to the situation when a personnel radiation monitor in the secondary access area alarmed because of the presence of one of the snubbers.
The finding was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2003-2438.
The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the cornerstone attribute material release and it affected the associated cornerstone objective to ensure adequate protection of public health and safety from exposure to radioactive materials released into the public domain. Using the Public Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process, the team determined the finding is of very low safety significance because (1) the finding was a radioactive material control issue (2) it was not a transportation issue, and (3) it did not result in a dose to the public greater than 0.005 rem. This finding also had crosscutting aspects associated with human perormance.
Inspection Report# : 2004008(pdf)
Physical Protection Physical Protection information not publicly available.
Miscellaneous Significance: N/A Sep 29, 2004 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Identification and Resolution of Problems The team reviewed approximately 200 Performance Improvement Requests program documents, apparent and root cause analyses and plant procedures for the identification and resolution of problems. Based on this review, the team found that the processes to identify, prioritize, evaluate, and correct problems were generally effective; thresholds for identifying issues remained appropriately low and, in most cases, corrective actions were adequate to address conditions adverse to quality.
Cross-cutting aspects, associated with identification, prioritization and evaluation and correction of degraded conditions in the plant were identified. The team found that these cross-cutting aspects were the exception and not the rule and most issues were minor. However, in a few cases, licensee personnel did not initiate corrective action documents for known equipment degradations. In other cases, planned corrective actions were not managed to a satisfactory completion. Either the issue was not corrected by the planned actions, or the planned actions were cancelled.
Based on the interviews, the team concluded that a positive safety-conscious work environment exists at Wolf Creek. The team determined that employees and contractors feel free to raise safety concerns to their supervision or bring concerns to the employees concern program.
Inspection Report# : 2004006(pdf)
Last modified : August 24, 2005
 
3Q/2005 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                                              Page 1 of 3 Wolf Creek 1 3Q/2005 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance:        Jul 12, 2005 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: AV Apparent Violation Manipulation of Plant Component Without Proper Aucthorization Results in Inoperable A self-revealing noncited violation of a Technical Specification 5.4.1a occurred when station personnel failed to follow Procedure AP 21E-001, "Clearance Orders," and manipulated a component inside the clearance boundary without instructions and authorization. Specifically, station personnel started a temporary fire pump physically attached to the station's fire protection system causing water to spray from a tagged open vent valve. The water spray resulted in the only remaining station fire pump becoming inoperable due to wetting of the pump's controller. This issue involved human performance crosscutting aspects associated with station personnel not following a station procedure.
The failure to follow station procedures is a performance deficiency. The finding was determined to be more than minor because if affected the mitigating systems cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using the Phase 1 worksheets in Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process," the finding was determined to have very low safety significance because the finding did not represent a complete loss of a safety function or a train of safety function and is not potentially risk significant due to external events. The licensee entered this finding into their corrective action program as PIR 2005-2142.
Inspection Report# : 2005004(pdf)
Significance:        Jul 11, 2005 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Corrective Actions Fail to Prevent Subsequent Failure of Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Transmitters The inspectors documented a self-revealing, noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, because the licensee failed to assure corrective actions taken in response to a significant condition adverse to quality preclude repetition of the condition. On May 5, 2005, auxiliary feedwater flow Transmitter ALFT-0011 indicated flow without existing flow in the auxiliary feedwater system due to the buildup of debris from steam generator chemical cleaning. Following the May 5, 2005, event, the licensee flushed all auxiliary feedwater flow transmitters and the level transmitters for the steam generators. On July 11, 2005, another auxiliary feedwater flow Transmitter ALFT-0003 indicated flow without existing flow in the auxiliary feedwater system. This transmitter was flushed and the conditions found on May 5, 2005, existed in this transmitter. This issue involved problem identification and resolution crosscutting aspects, in that, station personnel did not properly evaluate a condition adverse to quality regarding debris in the auxiliary feedwater flow transmitters.
The failure to take appropriate corrective measures to address a significant condition adverse to quality is a performance deficiency. This finding was determined to be more than minor because it affected the mitigating systems cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). Using the Phase 1 worksheets in Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process," the finding was determined to have very low safety significance because the finding did not represent a complete loss of a safety function or a train of safety function and is not potentially risk significant due to external events. The licensee entered this finding into their corrective action program as PIR 2005-2149.
Inspection Report# : 2005004(pdf)
Significance:        Jun 28, 2005 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Follow Station Procedures Results in Transfer of Water From VCT to RWST The inspectors documented a self-revealing, noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, because the licensee failed to assure corrective actions taken in response to a significant condition adverse to quality preclude repetition of the condition. On June 28, 2005, planned motor-operated valve actuator work on an isolation valve in the safety injection system lead to the unplanned transfer of water from the
 
3Q/2005 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                                              Page 2 of 3 volume control tank (VCT) to the refueling water storage tank (RWST). The same event occurred in 1995. This issue involved human performance crosscutting aspects associated with station personnel not following a station procedure.
The failure to take appropriate corrective measures to address a significant condition adverse to quality is a performance deficiency. This finding was determined to be more than minor because it affected the mitigating systems cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). Using the Phase 1 worksheets in Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process," the finding was determined to have very low safety significance because the finding did not represent a complete loss of a safety function or a train of safety function and is not potentially risk significant due to external events. The licensee entered this finding into their corrective action program as PIR 2005-2004.
Inspection Report# : 2005004(pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Significance:        Jul 01, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform an Exit Whole Body Count The inspector identified a noncited violation of a Technical Specification 5.4.1a which requires procedures for radiation protection and personnel monitoring. Specifically, on September 22, 2003, the licensee failed to perform an exit whole body count for a radiation worker that had entered the radiologically controlled area and terminated their employment with the licensee.
The failure to perform an exit whole body count was a performance deficiency. The finding was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Occupational Radiation Safety cornerstone attribute of Programs and Process and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the adequate protection of worker health and safety from exposure to radiation and radioactive materials. Because the occurrence involved conditions that were contrary to licensee procedures related to measuring worker dose, this finding was processed through the Occupational Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not involve: (1) as low as is reasonably achievable planning and work controls, (2) an overexposure, (3) a substantial potential for an overexposure, or (4) an impaired ability to assess dose. The finding was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as PIR 2005-1653.
Inspection Report# : 2005004(pdf)
Significance:        Apr 15, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform an Adequate Survey to Identify a Radiation Area The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 20.1501(a) for failure to perform a survey to identify a radiation area. Specifically, on April 14, 2005, the inspectors identified, by direct survey, an unposted radiation area directly above the resin loading flange of the "A" Recycle Evaporator Feed Demineralizer on the 2051-foot elevation of the radioactive waste building. The licensee performed a confirmatory survey that indicated a contact dose rate of 20 millirem per hour and 10 millirem per hour at 30 centimeters.
The finding is greater than minor because it was associated with a cornerstone attribute (Human Performance) and affected the associated cornerstone objective because the failure to perform an adequate radiation survey effects the adequate protection of worker health and safety from exposure to radiation. Using the Occupational Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process, the inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance because it did not involve (1) ALARA planning and controls, (2) an overexposure, (3) a substantial potential for overexposure, or (4) an impaired ability to assess dose. This finding also had a crosscutting aspect associated with human performance because radiation protection personnel directly contributed to the finding by not performing an adequate survey. The finding was placed in the licensee's corrective action program as performance improvement request PIR 2005-1046.
Inspection Report# : 2005003(pdf)
 
3Q/2005 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1              Page 3 of 3 Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Physical Protection information not publicly available.
Miscellaneous Last modified : November 30, 2005
 
4Q/2005 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                                            Page 1 of 3 Wolf Creek 1 4Q/2005 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance:        Dec 31, 2005 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Manipulation of Plant Component Without Proper Aucthorization Results in Inoperable A self-revealing noncited violation of a Technical Specification 5.4.1a occurred when station personnel failed to follow Procedure AP 21E-001, "Clearance Orders," and operated a temporary component that had been established within a fire protection suppression water system clearance boundary without instructions and authorization. Specifically, personnel started a temporary fire pump which had been connected to the station's fire protection system causing water to spray from a tagged open vent valve. The water spray wetted the control panel for the diesel driven fire pump which resulted in the pump becoming inoperable for approximately 4 hours. This issue involved human performance crosscutting aspects associated with station personnel not following a station procedure.
The failure to follow station procedures is a performance deficiency. The finding was determined to be more than minor because if affected the mitigating systems cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using the Phase 1 worksheets in Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process," the finding was determined to degrade the fire protection system suppression and was evaluated using Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process and screened to a Phase 3. The Phase 3 evaluation determined the finding was of very low safety significance. The licensee entered this finding into their corrective action program as PIR 2005-2142.
Inspection Report# : 2005004(pdf)
Significance:        Dec 08, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to Adequately Implement Station Procedures for Cold Weather Operations.
The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance for the licensee's failure to adequately prepare for cold weather prior to the onset of frazil ice conditions on December 8, 2005. Specifically, the licensee failed to ensure essential service water air compressors were ready for use prior to lake temperature reaching 35 degrees in accordance with established procedures. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2006-006.
The inspectors determined that the failure to have the air compressors ready at the time the procedure provided for their being placed into service was a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because, if left uncorrected, it would become a more significant safety concern. The finding also affected the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems to respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Utilizing the Phase 1 Screening Worksheet in Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process," this finding was determined to have very low safety significance because it did not represent a loss of a safety function and is not potentially risk significant because of the plant conditions that would be impacted by external events with warming flow established. The cause of this finding is related to the crosscutting element of human performance for the failure to ensure the air compressors were in place and available at the time conditions existed when they should be placed into service.
Inspection Report# : 2005005(pdf)
Significance:        Jul 11, 2005 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Corrective Actions Fail to Prevent Subsequent Failure of Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Transmitters The inspectors documented a self-revealing, noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, because the licensee failed to assure corrective actions taken in response to a significant condition adverse to quality preclude repetition of the condition. On May 5, 2005, auxiliary feedwater flow Transmitter ALFT-0011 indicated flow without existing flow in the auxiliary feedwater system due to the buildup of debris from steam generator chemical cleaning. Following the May 5, 2005, event, the licensee flushed all auxiliary feedwater flow transmitters and the level transmitters for the steam generators. On July 11, 2005, another auxiliary feedwater flow Transmitter ALFT-0003 indicated flow
 
4Q/2005 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                                              Page 2 of 3 without existing flow in the auxiliary feedwater system. This transmitter was flushed and the conditions found on May 5, 2005, existed in this transmitter. This issue involved problem identification and resolution crosscutting aspects, in that, station personnel did not properly evaluate a condition adverse to quality regarding debris in the auxiliary feedwater flow transmitters.
The failure to take appropriate corrective measures to address a significant condition adverse to quality is a performance deficiency. This finding was determined to be more than minor because it affected the mitigating systems cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). Using the Phase 1 worksheets in Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process," the finding was determined to have very low safety significance because the finding did not represent a complete loss of a safety function or a train of safety function and is not potentially risk significant due to external events. The licensee entered this finding into their corrective action program as PIR 2005-2149.
Inspection Report# : 2005004(pdf)
Significance:        Jun 28, 2005 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Follow Station Procedures Results in Transfer of Water From VCT to RWST A self-revealing noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1a, occurred when station personnel failed to adequately evaluate a maintenance activity on safety-related equipment for potential energy/fluid transfer paths as required by Station Procedure AP 21D-002, "Evaluation For Potential Energy/Fluid Transfer Paths." On June 28, 2005, planned motor-operated valve actuator work on an isolation valve in the safety injection system lead to the unplanned transfer of water from the volume control tank to the refueling water storage tank. This issue involved human performance crosscutting aspects associated with station personnel not following a station procedure.
The failure to correctly perform a required step of a station procedure for evalauting emergency core cooling system interfaces is a performance deficiency. This finding was determined to be more than minor because it affected the mitigating systems cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage).
Using the Phase 1 worksheets in Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process," the finding was determined to have very low safety significance because the finding did not represent a loss of a safety function or a train of safety function and is not potentially risk significant due to external events. Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation entered this finding into their corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2005-2004.
Inspection Report# : 2005004(pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Significance:        Jul 01, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform an Exit Whole Body Count The inspector identified a noncited violation of a Technical Specification 5.4.1a which requires procedures for radiation protection and personnel monitoring. Specifically, on September 22, 2003, the licensee failed to perform an exit whole body count for a radiation worker that had entered the radiologically controlled area and terminated their employment with the licensee.
The failure to perform an exit whole body count was a performance deficiency. The finding was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Occupational Radiation Safety cornerstone attribute of Programs and Process and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the adequate protection of worker health and safety from exposure to radiation and radioactive materials. Because the occurrence involved conditions that were contrary to licensee procedures related to measuring worker dose, this finding was processed through the Occupational Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not involve: (1) as low as is reasonably achievable planning and work controls, (2) an overexposure, (3) a substantial potential for an overexposure, or (4) an impaired ability to assess dose. The finding was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as PIR 2005-1653.
Inspection Report# : 2005004(pdf)
 
4Q/2005 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                                            Page 3 of 3 Significance:        Apr 15, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform an Adequate Survey to Identify a Radiation Area The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 20.1501(a) for failure to perform a survey to identify a radiation area. Specifically, on April 14, 2005, the inspectors identified, by direct survey, an unposted radiation area directly above the resin loading flange of the "A" Recycle Evaporator Feed Demineralizer on the 2051-foot elevation of the radioactive waste building. The licensee performed a confirmatory survey that indicated a contact dose rate of 20 millirem per hour and 10 millirem per hour at 30 centimeters.
The finding is greater than minor because it was associated with a cornerstone attribute (Human Performance) and affected the associated cornerstone objective because the failure to perform an adequate radiation survey effects the adequate protection of worker health and safety from exposure to radiation. Using the Occupational Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process, the inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance because it did not involve (1) ALARA planning and controls, (2) an overexposure, (3) a substantial potential for overexposure, or (4) an impaired ability to assess dose. This finding also had a crosscutting aspect associated with human performance because radiation protection personnel directly contributed to the finding by not performing an adequate survey. The finding was placed in the licensee's corrective action program as performance improvement request PIR 2005-1046.
Inspection Report# : 2005003(pdf)
Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Physical Protection information not publicly available.
Miscellaneous Last modified : March 03, 2006
 
1Q/2006 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                                            Page 1 of 3 Wolf Creek 1 1Q/2006 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance:        Dec 31, 2005 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Manipulation of Plant Component Without Proper Aucthorization Results in Inoperable A self-revealing noncited violation of a Technical Specification 5.4.1a occurred when station personnel failed to follow Procedure AP 21E-001, "Clearance Orders," and operated a temporary component that had been established within a fire protection suppression water system clearance boundary without instructions and authorization. Specifically, personnel started a temporary fire pump which had been connected to the station's fire protection system causing water to spray from a tagged open vent valve. The water spray wetted the control panel for the diesel driven fire pump which resulted in the pump becoming inoperable for approximately 4 hours. This issue involved human performance crosscutting aspects associated with station personnel not following a station procedure.
The failure to follow station procedures is a performance deficiency. The finding was determined to be more than minor because if affected the mitigating systems cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using the Phase 1 worksheets in Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process," the finding was determined to degrade the fire protection system suppression and was evaluated using Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process and screened to a Phase 3. The Phase 3 evaluation determined the finding was of very low safety significance. The licensee entered this finding into their corrective action program as PIR 2005-2142.
Inspection Report# : 2005004(pdf)
Significance:        Dec 08, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to Adequately Implement Station Procedures for Cold Weather Operations.
The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance for the licensee's failure to adequately prepare for cold weather prior to the onset of frazil ice conditions on December 8, 2005. Specifically, the licensee failed to ensure essential service water air compressors were ready for use prior to lake temperature reaching 35 degrees in accordance with established procedures. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2006-006.
The inspectors determined that the failure to have the air compressors ready at the time the procedure provided for their being placed into service was a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because, if left uncorrected, it would become a more significant safety concern. The finding also affected the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems to respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Utilizing the Phase 1 Screening Worksheet in Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process," this finding was determined to have very low safety significance because it did not represent a loss of a safety function and is not potentially risk significant because of the plant conditions that would be impacted by external events with warming flow established. The cause of this finding is related to the crosscutting element of human performance for the failure to ensure the air compressors were in place and available at the time conditions existed when they should be placed into service.
Inspection Report# : 2005005(pdf)
Significance:        Jul 11, 2005 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Corrective Actions Fail to Prevent Subsequent Failure of Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Transmitters The inspectors documented a self-revealing, noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, because the licensee failed to assure corrective actions taken in response to a significant condition adverse to quality preclude repetition of the condition. On May 5, 2005, auxiliary feedwater flow Transmitter ALFT-0011 indicated flow without existing flow in the auxiliary feedwater system due to the buildup of debris from steam generator chemical cleaning. Following the May 5, 2005, event, the licensee flushed all auxiliary feedwater flow transmitters and the level transmitters for the steam generators. On July 11, 2005, another auxiliary feedwater flow Transmitter ALFT-0003 indicated flow
 
1Q/2006 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                                              Page 2 of 3 without existing flow in the auxiliary feedwater system. This transmitter was flushed and the conditions found on May 5, 2005, existed in this transmitter. This issue involved problem identification and resolution crosscutting aspects, in that, station personnel did not properly evaluate a condition adverse to quality regarding debris in the auxiliary feedwater flow transmitters.
The failure to take appropriate corrective measures to address a significant condition adverse to quality is a performance deficiency. This finding was determined to be more than minor because it affected the mitigating systems cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). Using the Phase 1 worksheets in Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process," the finding was determined to have very low safety significance because the finding did not represent a complete loss of a safety function or a train of safety function and is not potentially risk significant due to external events. The licensee entered this finding into their corrective action program as PIR 2005-2149.
Inspection Report# : 2005004(pdf)
Significance:        Jun 28, 2005 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Follow Station Procedures Results in Transfer of Water From VCT to RWST A self-revealing noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1a, occurred when station personnel failed to adequately evaluate a maintenance activity on safety-related equipment for potential energy/fluid transfer paths as required by Station Procedure AP 21D-002, "Evaluation For Potential Energy/Fluid Transfer Paths." On June 28, 2005, planned motor-operated valve actuator work on an isolation valve in the safety injection system lead to the unplanned transfer of water from the volume control tank to the refueling water storage tank. This issue involved human performance crosscutting aspects associated with station personnel not following a station procedure.
The failure to correctly perform a required step of a station procedure for evalauting emergency core cooling system interfaces is a performance deficiency. This finding was determined to be more than minor because it affected the mitigating systems cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage).
Using the Phase 1 worksheets in Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process," the finding was determined to have very low safety significance because the finding did not represent a loss of a safety function or a train of safety function and is not potentially risk significant due to external events. Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation entered this finding into their corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2005-2004.
Inspection Report# : 2005004(pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Significance:        Jul 01, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform an Exit Whole Body Count The inspector identified a noncited violation of a Technical Specification 5.4.1a which requires procedures for radiation protection and personnel monitoring. Specifically, on September 22, 2003, the licensee failed to perform an exit whole body count for a radiation worker that had entered the radiologically controlled area and terminated their employment with the licensee.
The failure to perform an exit whole body count was a performance deficiency. The finding was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Occupational Radiation Safety cornerstone attribute of Programs and Process and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the adequate protection of worker health and safety from exposure to radiation and radioactive materials. Because the occurrence involved conditions that were contrary to licensee procedures related to measuring worker dose, this finding was processed through the Occupational Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not involve: (1) as low as is reasonably achievable planning and work controls, (2) an overexposure, (3) a substantial potential for an overexposure, or (4) an impaired ability to assess dose. The finding was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as PIR 2005-1653.
Inspection Report# : 2005004(pdf)
 
1Q/2006 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                                            Page 3 of 3 Significance:        Apr 15, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform an Adequate Survey to Identify a Radiation Area The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 20.1501(a) for failure to perform a survey to identify a radiation area. Specifically, on April 14, 2005, the inspectors identified, by direct survey, an unposted radiation area directly above the resin loading flange of the "A" Recycle Evaporator Feed Demineralizer on the 2051-foot elevation of the radioactive waste building. The licensee performed a confirmatory survey that indicated a contact dose rate of 20 millirem per hour and 10 millirem per hour at 30 centimeters.
The finding is greater than minor because it was associated with a cornerstone attribute (Human Performance) and affected the associated cornerstone objective because the failure to perform an adequate radiation survey effects the adequate protection of worker health and safety from exposure to radiation. Using the Occupational Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process, the inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance because it did not involve (1) ALARA planning and controls, (2) an overexposure, (3) a substantial potential for overexposure, or (4) an impaired ability to assess dose. This finding also had a crosscutting aspect associated with human performance because radiation protection personnel directly contributed to the finding by not performing an adequate survey. The finding was placed in the licensee's corrective action program as performance improvement request PIR 2005-1046.
Inspection Report# : 2005003(pdf)
Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Physical Protection information not publicly available.
Miscellaneous Last modified : May 25, 2006
 
2Q/2006 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                                                    Page 1 of 7 Wolf Creek 1 2Q/2006 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance:        Apr 07, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to provide adequate fire detection in the diesel generator rooms An NRC identified Green noncited violation of Facility Operating License Condition 2.C.5, Fire Protection, was identified for inadequate fire detection in the emergency diesel generator rooms. The infrared detectors view of some combustibles in the rooms was blocked by temporary scaffolding and permanent plant equipment, which could delay the detection of fires and the fire brigade response. Wolf Creek Fire Hazard Analysis E-19905 Sections D.1.7.1 and D.2.7.1 state that the diesel generator rooms early warning fire detection is by infrared detectors, which will readily detect the type of fire caused by the burning of fuel and lube oils. Wolf Creek Updated Safety Analysis Report Section 9.5.1.2.3 states that these detectors respond directly to infrared radiation emanating from a flickering flame. However, with solid objects in between the detectors and the combustibles, the infrared light from the flame would not be sensed by the infrared detectors. The control room would still be alerted to the fire, but only if the fire spread to a part of the room visible to the infrared detectors or the heat from the fire reached thermal fire detectors also installed in the room.
The failure to provide adequate fire detection in the emergency diesel generator rooms was a performance deficiency. The inspectors determined that the inadequate fire detection in the diesel generator rooms was more than minor because it potentially affected diesel generator availability due to fire under the mitigating systems cornerstone. The inspectors used Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process, to determine the significance of the finding. The finding is of very low safety significance because a postulated fire in a diesel room would still be detected and extinguished before it affected any other safe shutdown equipment. The inspectors assigned a low degradation rating to the finding in the significance determination process because the fire detection would have nearly the same level of effectiveness and reliability with the degradation. Therefore, the significance determination process screens the finding as very low safety significance.
Inspection Report# : 2006002(pdf)
Significance:        Apr 07, 2006 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: FIN Finding INADEQUATE PROCEDURE FOR THE OPERATION OF LIMITORQUE MOTOR-OPERATED VALVES A self-revealing Green finding was identified for the failure to provide adequate instructions for the operation of Limitorque motor-operated valves.
The instructions were inadequate because they failed to provide guidance on declutching Limitorque motor-operated valves, such that the valve operators are not damaged. The inadequate guidance resulted in the degraded operation of a Limitorque motor-operated valve in the circulating water system. During maintenance activities on November 30, 2005, a Limitorque motor-operated valve would not stay declutched without an operator hanging onto the declutch lever. The declutch mechanism had become misaligned from previous improper manual operation of the Limitorque operator. The inability of the operators to promptly close the valve resulted in lowering the condenser vacuum which approached the turbine trip/reactor trip setpoint before the valve was closed. This finding had crosscutting aspects of human performance. The licensee had not provided adequate instructions for manual operation of the Limitorque motor-operated valve, which subsequently resulted in damage to the declutch mechanism.
The failure to provide adequate instructions for the operation of Limitorque motor-operated valves was a performance deficiency. This finding is more than minor because it affected the initiating events cornerstone objective of limiting the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions and affected the cornerstone attribute of procedural quality because an inadequate procedure increased the probability of an initiating event. Using the Phase 1 worksheets in Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, the issue was determined to have very low safety significance because the finding did not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and loss of mitigation equipment (power conversion system would have remained available), nor increase the likelihood of fire or flooding.
Inspection Report# : 2006002(pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance:        Jun 23, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation
 
2Q/2006 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                                                  Page 2 of 7 Failure to Follow System Operating Procedure A self-revealing noncited violation of TS 5.4.1 was identified for failing to follow system operating procedures Class 1E electrical equipment air conditioning units. On May 4, 2006, a planned maintenance evolution was scheduled to be performed that required the shutdown of the safety-related Class 1E electrical equipment air conditioning Unit A (SGK05A); however, the operator incorrectly secured the Class 1E electrical equipment air conditioning Unit B (SGK05B) and used steps that had been previously marked N/A. While later performing additional steps, the operator returned to the same incorrect SGK05B unit and secured the unit a second time. However, the planned work had previously tripped the correct unit (SGK05A). This resulted in both trains being inoperable. The control room was notified, immediately declared both trains inoperable and entered TS 3.0.3 which requires the plant to be in Mode 3 in 7 hours. The control room instructed operators to return SGK05B to service and approximately 2 minutes later exited TS 3.0.3.
The inspectors determined that the failure to follow station procedures was a performance deficiency. The finding was greater than minor because it affected the mitigating systems cornerstone attribute equipment availability and if left uncorrected, the failure to adhere procedure requirements could become a more significant safety concern. The inspectors determined that this finding is of very low safety significance because the finding did not result in a loss of safety function per Generic Letter (GL) 91-18 or screen as potentially risk significant due to external events. This finding had crosscutting aspects of human performance because personnel did not follow established procedures and did not use appropriate human error prevention techniques, such as self and peer-checking.
Inspection Report# : 2006003(pdf)
Significance:        May 10, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Inadequate Procedure to Address a 10 CFR Part 21 Notification of a Potential Safety-Related Component Defect The team identified a finding for the licensees failure to establish appropriate testing procedures for the operation of the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump following notification (10 CFR Part 21 report issued April 12, 2005) of a component defect, which could substantially and adversely affect turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump operation. Specifically, the licensee did not adequately address appropriate testing, acceptance criteria, and test frequency to assure that the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater governor operability remained unaffected by a potential null voltage shift that could prevent the fail safe mode of operation of the governor, as described in the 10 CFR Part 21 report. Since there were no indications of drifting of the null voltage for the past two surveillances, the licensee concluded that no additional actions were required to address the 10 CFR Part 21 report. Contrary to the vendor recommended actions, the licensee did not establish a monitoring frequency in accordance with recommended actions. This finding had crosscutting aspects associated with problem evaluation.
The failure to establish appropriate testing, acceptance criteria, and test frequency for the operation of the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump was considered a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because if left uncorrected, the finding could become a more significant safety concern and affected the mitigating system cornerstone objectives of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to events to prevent undesirable consequences. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because it did not result in a loss of function in accordance with Generic Letter 91-18, Information to Licensees Regarding NRC Inspection Manual Section on Resolution of Degraded and Nonconforming Conditions, Revision 1.
Inspection Report# : 2006010(pdf)
Significance:        May 10, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Inadequate procedure for long-standing component cooling water pump problems The team identified a finding for the failure to establish appropriate procedures for the operation of the component cooling water pump.
Specifically, the licensee did not establish procedures to include appropriate acceptance criteria for component cooling water pump axial shaft movement that has existed for approximately 18 years. The licensees procedure did not contain any vendor acceptance criteria to ensure axial shaft movement did not result in a failure of the pump during a postulated accident. The licensee did not evaluate the long-term impact from wear to the bearing fit surfaces, wear particles in oil samples, or long-term cyclic fatigue to adjacent piping and other components. This issue had crosscutting aspects associated with problem evaluation.
The failure to establish a procedure with appropriate acceptance criteria was considered a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because it affected the mitigating systems cornerstone attribute of procedure quality and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring availability, reliability and capability of systems to respond to events. The finding was of very low safety significance because, despite the fact that the condition was not properly evaluated, the affected equipment remained operable consistent with Generic Letter 91-18, Revision 1.
Inspection Report# : 2006010(pdf)
Significance:        May 10, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Inadequate procedure to address industry operating experience regarding submerged cables The team identified a finding for the failure to establish appropriate procedures for the inspection of buried safety-related electrical cables.
Specifically, the licensee did not establish procedures to include acceptance criteria to determine if buried safety-related electrical cables were subject to the degradation described in NRC Information Notice 2002-12, Submerged Safety-Related Electrical Cables. The licensee did not
 
2Q/2006 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                                                  Page 3 of 7 develop a maintenance activity to inspect the underground cables for degraded or damaged jacketing, contrary to industry operating experience, which provided examples of visual inspections that discovered degraded cable jacketing. This issue had crosscutting aspects associated with problem evaluation.
The failure to establish a maintenance activity with appropriate acceptance criteria was considered a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because if left uncorrected the finding could become a more significant safety concern and it affected the mitigating system cornerstone objectives of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to events to prevent undesirable consequences. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because it did not result in a loss of function in accordance with Generic Letter 91-18, Revision 1.
Inspection Report# : 2006010(pdf)
Significance:        Dec 31, 2005 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Manipulation of Plant Component Without Proper Authorization Results in Inoperable A self-revealing noncited violation of a Technical Specification 5.4.1a occurred when station personnel failed to follow Procedure AP 21E-001, "Clearance Orders," and operated a temporary component that had been established within a fire protection suppression water system clearance boundary without instructions and authorization. Specifically, personnel started a temporary fire pump which had been connected to the station's fire protection system causing water to spray from a tagged open vent valve. The water spray wetted the control panel for the diesel driven fire pump which resulted in the pump becoming inoperable for approximately 4 hours. This issue involved human performance crosscutting aspects associated with station personnel not following a station procedure.
The failure to follow station procedures is a performance deficiency. The finding was determined to be more than minor because if affected the mitigating systems cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using the Phase 1 worksheets in Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process," the finding was determined to degrade the fire protection system suppression and was evaluated using Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process and screened to a Phase 3. The Phase 3 evaluation determined the finding was of very low safety significance. The licensee entered this finding into their corrective action program as PIR 2005-2142.
Inspection Report# : 2005004(pdf)
Significance:        Dec 29, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Provide Adequate Post-Fire Shutdown Procedures The team identified a noncited violation (NCV) for failure to comply with Technical Specification 5.4, Procedures, in that a procedure required for post-fire safe shutdown was found to be inadequate. Procedure OFN RP-014, Hot Standby to Cold Shutdown from Outside the Control Room, was inadequate because it did not provide a method to provide sufficiently borated water to the reactor coolant system so that cold shutdown could be achieved and maintained within 72 hours after a control room fire. Procedure OFN RP-014 requires monitoring of the boron concentration in the reactor and, if necessary, starting the acid transfer pumps to draw borated water from the boric acid tanks. However, this procedure did not include sufficient instructions for refilling and borating the Refueling Water Storage Tank for a potential loss of offsite power or fire induced damage to circuits related to the pumps.
This finding is greater than minor because it impacted the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to external events (such as fire) to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). The inspectors evaluated the finding using MC 0609, Appendix F, and determined that it screens as very low safety significance (Green) because it is related to the ability to achieve and maintain cold shutdown.
Inspection Report# : 2005008(pdf)
Significance: TBD Dec 29, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: AV Apparent Violation Failure to Maintain Reactor Coolant System Subcooling During the Alternative Shutodwn The team identified an Apparent Violation of Wolf Creek License Condition 2.C.(5)(a) concerning an inadequate alternative shutdown analysis. The licensees alternative shutdown analysis was inadequate in that it used an acceptance criteria which was inconsistent with and less conservative than that required by the approved Fire Protection Program. The licensee developed Calculation Number AN-02-021, Revision 0, OFN RP-017, Control Room Evacuation, Consequence Evaluation, to demonstrate alternative shutdown capability for Wolf Creek in response to NRC-identified Noncited Violation 2002008-01, Inadequate alternative shutdown procedure. The calculation predicted that during an alternative shutdown, the reactor coolant system subcooling margin would not be maintained, significant voiding would occur in the core, and a steam void would form in the reactor vessel head. The licensee found the results of the calculation to be acceptable since it demonstrated that the void formation would be limited, natural circulation in the reactor coolant system would be maintained, sufficient decay heat removal would be maintained, and no fuel damage would occur. This is not consistent with the license condition to meet the technical requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R. Section III.L of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Alternative and dedicated shutdown capability, that states in part, During the postfire shutdown, the reactor process variables shall be maintained within those predicted for a loss of normal a.c. power.
This finding is greater than minor because it impacted the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and
 
2Q/2006 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                                                Page 4 of 7 capability of systems that respond to external events (such as fire) to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). It is the NRCs understanding that the licensee does not consider these circuit vulnerabilities to be violations of NRC requirements. The licensee considers the spurious operation of multiple components to be outside of the plant licensing basis for the Fire Protection Program. Specifically, in this case, both pressurizer power-operated relief valves are assumed to spuriously open because of fire induced circuit damage. The NRC staff and the industry are currently working on developing a resolution methodology to address these types of potential fire induced circuit failures. The team concluded that this violation meets the criteria of the NRC Enforcement Manual Section 8.1.7.1 for deferring enforcement actions for postulated fire induced circuit failures.
Inspection Report# : 2005008(pdf)
Significance: TBD Dec 29, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: AV Apparent Violation Failure to Ensure Redundant Safe Shutdown Systems Located in the Same Fire Area Are Free of Fire Damage The team identified an Apparent Violation of License Condition 2.C.(5), Fire Protection (Section 9.5.1, Safety Evaluation Report (SER); Section 9.5.1.8, SSER 5), concerning failure to assure safe shutdown systems are protected in accordance with the provisions of the approved fire protection program. The licensee credited manual actions to mitigate the effects of fire damage in lieu of providing the physical separation, physical protection, or an appropriate diverse means of accomplishing the safe shutdown function, which adversely affected the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire. Standardized Nuclear Unit Power Plant System Final Safety Analysis Report, Appendix 9.5E, provided the design comparison between the plants fire protection program and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R. The comparison to Section III.G, "Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Capability," states, "Redundant trains of systems required to achieve and maintain hot standby are separated by 3-hour rated fire barriers, or the equivalent provided by III.G.2, or else a diverse means of providing the safe shutdown capability exists that is unaffected by the fire."
This finding is of greater than minor safety significance because it impacted the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to external events (such as fire) to prevent undesirable consequences. The team reviewed Procedure OFN KC-016, "Fire Response," and stepped through the manual actions directed in the procedure with licensee operations personnel for the sample fire areas selected for inspection. The team found that the manual operator actions were reasonable (as defined in Enclosure 2 of Inspection Procedure 71111.05T), could be performed within the analyzed time limits assuming prompt recognition of the condition by control room operators and could be credited as part of or in whole as a compensatory measure. Since the manual operator actions were considered reasonable as interim compensatory measures, the significance determination process was not entered.
Inspection Report# : 2005008(pdf)
Significance: TBD Dec 29, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: AV Apparent Violation Inadequate Alternataive Shutdown Procedure The team identified an Apparent Violation of Technical Specification 5.4, Procedures, due to an inadequate alternative shutdown procedure that is required for implementation of the Fire Protection Program. The team found that some time critical actions required to safely shutdown the plant following a control room fire could not be accomplished within the required time periods. Specifically, the team found that the recommendations by Westinghouse Owners Group for assuring reactor coolant pump seal reliability and avoiding component cooling water thermal barrier water hammer concerns would not be met if the operators had to respond to multiple spurious operations. The procedure was developed and verified based on a time line assuming operators only have to respond to one spurious operation from the fire induced damage during the scenario. The team disagrees with this limitation of potential spurious operations.
This finding is greater than minor because it impacted the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to external events (such as fire) to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). It is the NRCs understanding that the licensee does not consider these circuit vulnerabilities to be violations of NRC requirements. The licensee considers the spurious operation of multiple components to be outside of the plant licensing basis for the Fire Protection Program. The NRC staff and the industry are currently working on developing a resolution methodology to address these types of potential fire induced circuit failures. The team concluded that this violation meets the criteria of the NRC Enforcement Manual Section 8.1.7.1 for deferring enforcement actions for postulated fire induced circuit failures.
Inspection Report# : 2005008(pdf)
Significance:        Dec 08, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to Adequately Implement Station Procedures for Cold Weather Operations.
The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance for the licensee's failure to adequately prepare for cold weather prior to the onset of frazil ice conditions on December 8, 2005. Specifically, the licensee failed to ensure essential service water air compressors were ready for use prior to lake temperature reaching 35 degrees in accordance with established procedures. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2006-006.
The inspectors determined that the failure to have the air compressors ready at the time the procedure provided for their being placed into service was a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because, if left uncorrected, it would become a more significant safety concern.
The finding also affected the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems to respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Utilizing the Phase 1 Screening Worksheet in Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process," this finding was determined to have very low safety significance because it did not represent a loss of a
 
2Q/2006 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                                                    Page 5 of 7 safety function and is not potentially risk significant because of the plant conditions that would be impacted by external events with warming flow established. The cause of this finding is related to the crosscutting element of human performance for the failure to ensure the air compressors were in place and available at the time conditions existed when they should be placed into service.
Inspection Report# : 2005005(pdf)
Significance:        Jul 11, 2005 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Corrective Actions Fail to Prevent Subsequent Failure of Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Transmitters The inspectors documented a self-revealing, noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, because the licensee failed to assure corrective actions taken in response to a significant condition adverse to quality preclude repetition of the condition. On May 5, 2005, auxiliary feedwater flow Transmitter ALFT-0011 indicated flow without existing flow in the auxiliary feedwater system due to the buildup of debris from steam generator chemical cleaning. Following the May 5, 2005, event, the licensee flushed all auxiliary feedwater flow transmitters and the level transmitters for the steam generators. On July 11, 2005, another auxiliary feedwater flow Transmitter ALFT-0003 indicated flow without existing flow in the auxiliary feedwater system. This transmitter was flushed and the conditions found on May 5, 2005, existed in this transmitter. This issue involved problem identification and resolution crosscutting aspects, in that, station personnel did not properly evaluate a condition adverse to quality regarding debris in the auxiliary feedwater flow transmitters.
The failure to take appropriate corrective measures to address a significant condition adverse to quality is a performance deficiency. This finding was determined to be more than minor because it affected the mitigating systems cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). Using the Phase 1 worksheets in Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process," the finding was determined to have very low safety significance because the finding did not represent a complete loss of a safety function or a train of safety function and is not potentially risk significant due to external events. The licensee entered this finding into their corrective action program as PIR 2005-2149.
Inspection Report# : 2005004(pdf)
Barrier Integrity Significance:        May 10, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate corrective actions to address spent fuel pool foreign material.
The team identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, for the failure to take adequate corrective actions to address spent fuel pool foreign material issues. Specifically, the licensee did not determine the source of the foreign material and prevent it from entering the spent fuel pool on multiple occasions. The spent fuel pool is considered a foreign material exclusion zone in which no foreign material is allowed. Although it was considered a low probability event, foreign material in the spent fuel pool could cause problems with spent fuel pool cooling equipment or could be carried into the core during refueling and result in degradation of the fuel assembly cladding. As such, the introduction of foreign material into the spent fuel pool was considered a significant condition adverse to quality. This issue had crosscutting aspects associated with problem evaluation and resolution.
The failure to take effective corrective actions to determine and correct the source of spent fuel pool foreign material was considered a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because it affected the barrier integrity cornerstone attribute of cladding performance and human performance (foreign material exclusion). This finding was of very low safety significance because it is associated with a fuel barrier concern and did not affect reactor coolant system barrier performance.
Inspection Report# : 2006010(pdf)
Significance:        Apr 07, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to follow administrative procedure for operability determination The inspectors identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1 for failure to follow Administrative Procedure AP28-011, Resolving Deficiencies Impacting SSCs [structures, systems and components], Revision 1. The inspectors identified a faulty evaluation of a containment spray system degraded condition. The degraded condition was caused by the potential for a 5 cubic foot void in both trains of the containment spray system. The licensee identified the condition and performed their evaluation in response to industry operating experience regarding voiding in safety-related fluid systems. The evaluation was faulty in its interpretation of the information provided in NUREG/CR-2792. Once aware of the faulty evaluation, the licensee failed to adhere to Procedure AP 28-011 in the following ways: (1) they failed to document the deficiency as soon as possible; (2) they failed to inform the shift manager immediately; (3) they failed to provide reasonable assurance of operability in a time frame commensurate with safety; and (4) they failed to provide a valid reasonable assurance of operability prior to completion of a prompt operability evaluation. This finding had crosscutting aspects associated with problem identification and resolution based on the fact that both the original evaluation of the industry operating experience and the engineering judgement used to provide reasonable assurance of operability were inadequate.
 
2Q/2006 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                                              Page 6 of 7 The failure to implement Procedure AP 28-011 following identification of a degraded condition was a performance deficiency. This finding is more than minor because, if left uncorrected, the failure to follow Procedure AP 28A-011 would become a more significant safety concern. Based on the results of a significance determination process Phase 1 evaluation, this finding was determined to have very low safety significance since the licensee was ultimately able to demonstrate operability of the affected equipment.
Inspection Report# : 2006002(pdf)
Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Significance:        Apr 07, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to follow a station procedure for the operation of the incore detector drive system The inspectors identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1(a) for the failure to follow licensee Procedure SYS SR-200, Movable Incore Detector Operation, Revision 18. Contrary to this procedure, during troubleshooting activities on the incore detector drive system, an incore detector was moved with personnel in the area. This issue was determined to have crosscutting aspects regarding human performance.
The failure to follow the procedure for incore detector system operation was a performance deficiency. The finding is more than minor because it is associated with the occupational radiation safety cornerstone attribute regarding programs and processes and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the adequate protection of worker health and safety from exposure to radiation in that not following station procedure could increase personnel exposure. Using the occupational radiation safety determination process to analyze the significance of the finding, the inspectors concluded the issue was of very low safety significance because the inspection finding was not related to ALARA, did not involve an overexposure, and there was no substantial potential for overexposure.
Inspection Report# : 2006002(pdf)
Significance:        Jul 01, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform an Exit Whole Body Count The inspector identified a noncited violation of a Technical Specification 5.4.1a which requires procedures for radiation protection and personnel monitoring. Specifically, on September 22, 2003, the licensee failed to perform an exit whole body count for a radiation worker that had entered the radiologically controlled area and terminated their employment with the licensee.
The failure to perform an exit whole body count was a performance deficiency. The finding was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Occupational Radiation Safety cornerstone attribute of Programs and Process and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the adequate protection of worker health and safety from exposure to radiation and radioactive materials. Because the occurrence involved conditions that were contrary to licensee procedures related to measuring worker dose, this finding was processed through the Occupational Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not involve: (1) as low as is reasonably achievable planning and work controls, (2) an overexposure, (3) a substantial potential for an overexposure, or (4) an impaired ability to assess dose. The finding was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as PIR 2005-1653.
Inspection Report# : 2005004(pdf)
Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Physical Protection information not publicly available.
 
2Q/2006 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                                              Page 7 of 7 Miscellaneous Significance:        Jun 23, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Follow Station Procedures for Clearance Orders An NRC-identified noncited violation of Technical Specifications (TS) 5.4.1. for failing to follow procedures was identified when electricians removed terminal leads that were still energized with 500 volt AC. During work under Clearance Orders C15-D-LF-005 and C15-D-LF-006 to replace two sump pump motors located in the radwaste tunnel, the electricians discovered that the terminals on the sump motors were still energized with 500 volt AC. The licensees investigation discovered that the clearance orders written to isolate the sump motors did not include 120 volt AC breakers for moisture sensors located in the motor.
The inspectors determined that the failure to follow station procedures to establish appropriate administrative controls and verify components de-energized prior to work was a performance deficiency. The inspectors concluded that the finding was greater than minor because, if left uncorrected, the failure to adhere to clearance order procedure requirements and the failure to be aware of plant equipment status prior to work could become a more significant safety concern. This finding does not affect any of the reactor safety cornerstones; therefore, the finding is not suitable for the significance determination process (SDP). Although not suited for SDP evaluation, the finding has been reviewed by NRC management and determined to be of very low safety significance because there were no personnel injuries or no safety-related equipment rendered inoperable. This finding had crosscutting aspects of problem identification and resolution (PI&R) as well as human performance because the licensee failed to thoroughly evaluate a similar concern such that the cause was resolved and personnel did not follow established procedures.
Inspection Report# : 2006003(pdf)
Last modified : August 25, 2006
 
3Q/2006 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                              Page 1 of 8 Wolf Creek 1 3Q/2006 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance:        Apr 07, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to provide adequate fire detection in the diesel generator rooms An NRC identified Green noncited violation of Facility Operating License Condition 2.C.5, Fire Protection, was identified for inadequate fire detection in the emergency diesel generator rooms. The infrared detectors view of some combustibles in the rooms was blocked by temporary scaffolding and permanent plant equipment, which could delay the detection of fires and the fire brigade response. Wolf Creek Fire Hazard Analysis E-19905 Sections D.1.7.1 and D.2.7.1 state that the diesel generator rooms early warning fire detection is by infrared detectors, which will readily detect the type of fire caused by the burning of fuel and lube oils. Wolf Creek Updated Safety Analysis Report Section 9.5.1.2.3 states that these detectors respond directly to infrared radiation emanating from a flickering flame. However, with solid objects in between the detectors and the combustibles, the infrared light from the flame would not be sensed by the infrared detectors. The control room would still be alerted to the fire, but only if the fire spread to a part of the room visible to the infrared detectors or the heat from the fire reached thermal fire detectors also installed in the room.
The failure to provide adequate fire detection in the emergency diesel generator rooms was a performance deficiency. The inspectors determined that the inadequate fire detection in the diesel generator rooms was more than minor because it potentially affected diesel generator availability due to fire under the mitigating systems cornerstone. The inspectors used Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process, to determine the significance of the finding. The finding is of very low safety significance because a postulated fire in a diesel room would still be detected and extinguished before it affected any other safe shutdown equipment. The inspectors assigned a low degradation rating to the finding in the significance determination process because the fire detection would have nearly the same level of effectiveness and reliability with the degradation. Therefore, the significance determination process screens the finding as very low safety significance.
Inspection Report# : 2006002(pdf)
Significance:        Apr 07, 2006 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: FIN Finding INADEQUATE PROCEDURE FOR THE OPERATION OF LIMITORQUE MOTOR-OPERATED VALVES A self-revealing Green finding was identified for the failure to provide adequate instructions for the operation of Limitorque motor-operated valves. The instructions were inadequate because they failed to provide guidance on declutching Limitorque motor-operated valves, such that the valve operators are not damaged. The inadequate guidance resulted in the degraded operation of a Limitorque motor-operated valve in the circulating water system. During maintenance activities on November 30, 2005, a Limitorque motor-operated valve would not stay declutched without an operator hanging onto the declutch lever. The declutch mechanism had become misaligned from previous improper manual operation of the Limitorque operator. The inability of the operators to promptly close the valve resulted in lowering the condenser vacuum which approached the turbine trip/reactor trip setpoint before the valve was closed. This finding had crosscutting aspects of human performance. The licensee had not provided adequate instructions for manual operation of the Limitorque motor-operated valve, which subsequently resulted in damage to the declutch mechanism.
The failure to provide adequate instructions for the operation of Limitorque motor-operated valves was a performance deficiency. This finding is more than minor because it affected the initiating events cornerstone objective of limiting the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions and affected the cornerstone attribute of procedural quality because an inadequate procedure increased the probability of an initiating event. Using the Phase 1 worksheets in Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, the issue was determined to have very
 
3Q/2006 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                            Page 2 of 8 low safety significance because the finding did not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and loss of mitigation equipment (power conversion system would have remained available), nor increase the likelihood of fire or flooding.
Inspection Report# : 2006002(pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance:        Jun 23, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Follow System Operating Procedure An NRC-identified noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1 was identified for failing to follow system operating procedures for the Class 1E electrical equipment air conditioning units. On May 4, 2006, a planned maintenance evolution was scheduled to be performed that required shut down of safety-related Class 1E electrical equipment air conditioning Unit A (SGK05A); however, the operator incorrectly secured Class 1E electrical equipment air conditioning Unit B (SGK05B) and used steps that had been previously marked N/A. While later performing additional steps, the operator returned to the same incorrect Unit SGK05B and secured the unit a second time. However, the planned work had previously tripped the correct unit (SGK05A). This resulted in both trains being inoperable. The control room was notified, immediately declared both trains inoperable, and entered Technical Specification 3.0.3, which requires the plant to be in Mode 3 in 7 hours. The control room instructed operators to return Unit SGK05B to service and approximately 2 minutes later exited Technical Specification 3.0.3.
The inspectors determined that the failure to follow station procedures was a performance deficiency. The finding was greater than minor because it affected the mitigating systems cornerstone attribute of support equipment that ensures the availability of equipment that responds to initiating events. Using the Significance Determination Process Phase 1 Worksheet in Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, the inspectors determined that this finding is of very low safety significance because the finding did not result in a loss of safety function per Generic Letter 91-18. This finding had crosscutting aspects of human performance because personnel did not follow established procedures and did not use appropriate human error prevention techniques, such as self- and peer-checking.
Inspection Report# : 2006003(pdf)
Significance:        May 10, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Inadequate Procedure to Address a 10 CFR Part 21 Notification of a Potential Safety-Related Component Defect The team identified a finding for the licensees failure to establish appropriate testing procedures for the operation of the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump following notification (10 CFR Part 21 report issued April 12, 2005) of a component defect, which could substantially and adversely affect turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump operation.
Specifically, the licensee did not adequately address appropriate testing, acceptance criteria, and test frequency to assure that the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater governor operability remained unaffected by a potential null voltage shift that could prevent the fail safe mode of operation of the governor, as described in the 10 CFR Part 21 report. Since there were no indications of drifting of the null voltage for the past two surveillances, the licensee concluded that no additional actions were required to address the 10 CFR Part 21 report. Contrary to the vendor recommended actions, the licensee did not establish a monitoring frequency in accordance with recommended actions. This finding had crosscutting aspects associated with problem evaluation.
The failure to establish appropriate testing, acceptance criteria, and test frequency for the operation of the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump was considered a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because if left uncorrected, the finding could become a more significant safety concern and affected the mitigating system cornerstone objectives of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to events to prevent undesirable consequences. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because it did not result in a loss of function in accordance with Generic Letter 91-18, Information to Licensees Regarding NRC Inspection Manual Section on Resolution of Degraded and Nonconforming Conditions, Revision 1.
 
3Q/2006 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                          Page 3 of 8 Inspection Report# : 2006010(pdf)
Significance:      May 10, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Inadequate procedure for long-standing component cooling water pump problems The team identified a finding for the failure to establish appropriate procedures for the operation of the component cooling water pump. Specifically, the licensee did not establish procedures to include appropriate acceptance criteria for component cooling water pump axial shaft movement that has existed for approximately 18 years. The licensees procedure did not contain any vendor acceptance criteria to ensure axial shaft movement did not result in a failure of the pump during a postulated accident. The licensee did not evaluate the long-term impact from wear to the bearing fit surfaces, wear particles in oil samples, or long-term cyclic fatigue to adjacent piping and other components. This issue had crosscutting aspects associated with problem evaluation.
The failure to establish a procedure with appropriate acceptance criteria was considered a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because it affected the mitigating systems cornerstone attribute of procedure quality and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring availability, reliability and capability of systems to respond to events. The finding was of very low safety significance because, despite the fact that the condition was not properly evaluated, the affected equipment remained operable consistent with Generic Letter 91-18, Revision 1.
Inspection Report# : 2006010(pdf)
Significance:      May 10, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Inadequate procedure to address industry operating experience regarding submerged cables The team identified a finding for the failure to establish appropriate procedures for the inspection of buried safety-related electrical cables. Specifically, the licensee did not establish procedures to include acceptance criteria to determine if buried safety-related electrical cables were subject to the degradation described in NRC Information Notice 2002-12, Submerged Safety-Related Electrical Cables. The licensee did not develop a maintenance activity to inspect the underground cables for degraded or damaged jacketing, contrary to industry operating experience, which provided examples of visual inspections that discovered degraded cable jacketing. This issue had crosscutting aspects associated with problem evaluation.
The failure to establish a maintenance activity with appropriate acceptance criteria was considered a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because if left uncorrected the finding could become a more significant safety concern and it affected the mitigating system cornerstone objectives of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to events to prevent undesirable consequences. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because it did not result in a loss of function in accordance with Generic Letter 91-18, Revision 1.
Inspection Report# : 2006010(pdf)
Significance:      Dec 31, 2005 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Manipulation of Plant Component Without Proper Authorization Results in Inoperable A self-revealing noncited violation of a Technical Specification 5.4.1a occurred when station personnel failed to follow Procedure AP 21E-001, "Clearance Orders," and operated a temporary component that had been established within a fire protection suppression water system clearance boundary without instructions and authorization. Specifically, personnel started a temporary fire pump which had been connected to the station's fire protection system causing water to spray from a tagged open vent valve. The water spray wetted the control panel for the diesel driven fire pump which resulted in the pump becoming inoperable for approximately 4 hours. This issue involved human performance crosscutting aspects associated with station personnel not following a station procedure.
 
3Q/2006 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                            Page 4 of 8 The failure to follow station procedures is a performance deficiency. The finding was determined to be more than minor because if affected the mitigating systems cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using the Phase 1 worksheets in Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process," the finding was determined to degrade the fire protection system suppression and was evaluated using Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process and screened to a Phase 3. The Phase 3 evaluation determined the finding was of very low safety significance. The licensee entered this finding into their corrective action program as PIR 2005-2142.
Inspection Report# : 2005004(pdf)
Significance:        Dec 29, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Provide Adequate Post-Fire Shutdown Procedures The team identified a noncited violation (NCV) for failure to comply with Technical Specification 5.4, Procedures, in that a procedure required for post-fire safe shutdown was found to be inadequate. Procedure OFN RP-014, Hot Standby to Cold Shutdown from Outside the Control Room, was inadequate because it did not provide a method to provide sufficiently borated water to the reactor coolant system so that cold shutdown could be achieved and maintained within 72 hours after a control room fire. Procedure OFN RP-014 requires monitoring of the boron concentration in the reactor and, if necessary, starting the acid transfer pumps to draw borated water from the boric acid tanks. However, this procedure did not include sufficient instructions for refilling and borating the Refueling Water Storage Tank for a potential loss of offsite power or fire induced damage to circuits related to the pumps.
This finding is greater than minor because it impacted the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to external events (such as fire) to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). The inspectors evaluated the finding using MC 0609, Appendix F, and determined that it screens as very low safety significance (Green) because it is related to the ability to achieve and maintain cold shutdown.
Inspection Report# : 2005008(pdf)
Significance: TBD Dec 29, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: AV Apparent Violation Failure to Maintain Reactor Coolant System Subcooling During the Alternative Shutodwn The team identified an Apparent Violation of Wolf Creek License Condition 2.C.(5)(a) concerning an inadequate alternative shutdown analysis. The licensees alternative shutdown analysis was inadequate in that it used an acceptance criteria which was inconsistent with and less conservative than that required by the approved Fire Protection Program. The licensee developed Calculation Number AN-02-021, Revision 0, OFN RP-017, Control Room Evacuation, Consequence Evaluation, to demonstrate alternative shutdown capability for Wolf Creek in response to NRC-identified Noncited Violation 2002008-01, Inadequate alternative shutdown procedure. The calculation predicted that during an alternative shutdown, the reactor coolant system subcooling margin would not be maintained, significant voiding would occur in the core, and a steam void would form in the reactor vessel head. The licensee found the results of the calculation to be acceptable since it demonstrated that the void formation would be limited, natural circulation in the reactor coolant system would be maintained, sufficient decay heat removal would be maintained, and no fuel damage would occur. This is not consistent with the license condition to meet the technical requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R. Section III.L of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Alternative and dedicated shutdown capability, that states in part, During the postfire shutdown, the reactor process variables shall be maintained within those predicted for a loss of normal a.c. power.
This finding is greater than minor because it impacted the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to external events (such as fire) to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). It is the NRCs understanding that the licensee does not consider these circuit vulnerabilities to be violations of NRC requirements. The licensee considers the spurious operation of multiple components to be outside of the plant licensing basis for the Fire Protection Program. Specifically, in this case, both pressurizer power-operated relief valves are assumed to spuriously open because of fire induced circuit damage. The NRC staff and the industry are currently working on developing a resolution methodology to address these types of potential fire induced circuit failures. The team concluded that this violation meets the criteria of the NRC Enforcement Manual Section 8.1.7.1 for deferring enforcement actions for postulated fire induced circuit failures.
Inspection Report# : 2005008(pdf)
 
3Q/2006 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                            Page 5 of 8 Significance: TBD Dec 29, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: AV Apparent Violation Failure to Ensure Redundant Safe Shutdown Systems Located in the Same Fire Area Are Free of Fire Damage The team identified an Apparent Violation of License Condition 2.C.(5), Fire Protection (Section 9.5.1, Safety Evaluation Report (SER); Section 9.5.1.8, SSER 5), concerning failure to assure safe shutdown systems are protected in accordance with the provisions of the approved fire protection program. The licensee credited manual actions to mitigate the effects of fire damage in lieu of providing the physical separation, physical protection, or an appropriate diverse means of accomplishing the safe shutdown function, which adversely affected the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire. Standardized Nuclear Unit Power Plant System Final Safety Analysis Report, Appendix 9.5E, provided the design comparison between the plants fire protection program and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R. The comparison to Section III.G, "Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Capability," states, "Redundant trains of systems required to achieve and maintain hot standby are separated by 3-hour rated fire barriers, or the equivalent provided by III.G.2, or else a diverse means of providing the safe shutdown capability exists that is unaffected by the fire."
This finding is of greater than minor safety significance because it impacted the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to external events (such as fire) to prevent undesirable consequences. The team reviewed Procedure OFN KC-016, "Fire Response," and stepped through the manual actions directed in the procedure with licensee operations personnel for the sample fire areas selected for inspection. The team found that the manual operator actions were reasonable (as defined in Enclosure 2 of Inspection Procedure 71111.05T), could be performed within the analyzed time limits assuming prompt recognition of the condition by control room operators and could be credited as part of or in whole as a compensatory measure. Since the manual operator actions were considered reasonable as interim compensatory measures, the significance determination process was not entered.
Inspection Report# : 2005008(pdf)
Significance: TBD Dec 29, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: AV Apparent Violation Inadequate Alternataive Shutdown Procedure The team identified an Apparent Violation of Technical Specification 5.4, Procedures, due to an inadequate alternative shutdown procedure that is required for implementation of the Fire Protection Program. The team found that some time critical actions required to safely shutdown the plant following a control room fire could not be accomplished within the required time periods. Specifically, the team found that the recommendations by Westinghouse Owners Group for assuring reactor coolant pump seal reliability and avoiding component cooling water thermal barrier water hammer concerns would not be met if the operators had to respond to multiple spurious operations. The procedure was developed and verified based on a time line assuming operators only have to respond to one spurious operation from the fire induced damage during the scenario. The team disagrees with this limitation of potential spurious operations.
This finding is greater than minor because it impacted the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to external events (such as fire) to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). It is the NRCs understanding that the licensee does not consider these circuit vulnerabilities to be violations of NRC requirements. The licensee considers the spurious operation of multiple components to be outside of the plant licensing basis for the Fire Protection Program. The NRC staff and the industry are currently working on developing a resolution methodology to address these types of potential fire induced circuit failures. The team concluded that this violation meets the criteria of the NRC Enforcement Manual Section 8.1.7.1 for deferring enforcement actions for postulated fire induced circuit failures.
Inspection Report# : 2005008(pdf)
Significance:        Dec 08, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to Adequately Implement Station Procedures for Cold Weather Operations.
The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance for the licensee's failure to adequately prepare for cold weather prior to the onset of frazil ice conditions on December 8, 2005. Specifically, the licensee failed to ensure essential service water air compressors were ready for use prior to lake temperature reaching 35 degrees in accordance with established procedures. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2006-006.
 
3Q/2006 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                            Page 6 of 8 The inspectors determined that the failure to have the air compressors ready at the time the procedure provided for their being placed into service was a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because, if left uncorrected, it would become a more significant safety concern. The finding also affected the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems to respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Utilizing the Phase 1 Screening Worksheet in Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process," this finding was determined to have very low safety significance because it did not represent a loss of a safety function and is not potentially risk significant because of the plant conditions that would be impacted by external events with warming flow established. The cause of this finding is related to the crosscutting element of human performance for the failure to ensure the air compressors were in place and available at the time conditions existed when they should be placed into service.
Inspection Report# : 2005005(pdf)
Barrier Integrity Significance:      May 10, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate corrective actions to address spent fuel pool foreign material.
The team identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, for the failure to take adequate corrective actions to address spent fuel pool foreign material issues. Specifically, the licensee did not determine the source of the foreign material and prevent it from entering the spent fuel pool on multiple occasions. The spent fuel pool is considered a foreign material exclusion zone in which no foreign material is allowed. Although it was considered a low probability event, foreign material in the spent fuel pool could cause problems with spent fuel pool cooling equipment or could be carried into the core during refueling and result in degradation of the fuel assembly cladding. As such, the introduction of foreign material into the spent fuel pool was considered a significant condition adverse to quality. This issue had crosscutting aspects associated with problem evaluation and resolution.
The failure to take effective corrective actions to determine and correct the source of spent fuel pool foreign material was considered a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because it affected the barrier integrity cornerstone attribute of cladding performance and human performance (foreign material exclusion). This finding was of very low safety significance because it is associated with a fuel barrier concern and did not affect reactor coolant system barrier performance.
Inspection Report# : 2006010(pdf)
Significance:      Apr 07, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to follow administrative procedure for operability determination The inspectors identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1 for failure to follow Administrative Procedure AP28-011, Resolving Deficiencies Impacting SSCs [structures, systems and components], Revision 1. The inspectors identified a faulty evaluation of a containment spray system degraded condition. The degraded condition was caused by the potential for a 5 cubic foot void in both trains of the containment spray system. The licensee identified the condition and performed their evaluation in response to industry operating experience regarding voiding in safety-related fluid systems. The evaluation was faulty in its interpretation of the information provided in NUREG/CR-2792. Once aware of the faulty evaluation, the licensee failed to adhere to Procedure AP 28-011 in the following ways: (1) they failed to document the deficiency as soon as possible; (2) they failed to inform the shift manager immediately; (3) they failed to provide reasonable assurance of operability in a time frame commensurate with safety; and (4) they failed to provide a valid reasonable assurance of operability prior to completion of a prompt operability evaluation. This finding had crosscutting aspects associated with problem identification and resolution based on the fact that both the original evaluation of the industry operating experience and the engineering judgement used to provide reasonable assurance of operability were inadequate.
 
3Q/2006 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                          Page 7 of 8 The failure to implement Procedure AP 28-011 following identification of a degraded condition was a performance deficiency. This finding is more than minor because, if left uncorrected, the failure to follow Procedure AP 28A-011 would become a more significant safety concern. Based on the results of a significance determination process Phase 1 evaluation, this finding was determined to have very low safety significance since the licensee was ultimately able to demonstrate operability of the affected equipment.
Inspection Report# : 2006002(pdf)
Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Significance:      Apr 07, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to follow a station procedure for the operation of the incore detector drive system The inspectors identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1(a) for the failure to follow licensee Procedure SYS SR-200, Movable Incore Detector Operation, Revision 18. Contrary to this procedure, during troubleshooting activities on the incore detector drive system, an incore detector was moved with personnel in the area.
This issue was determined to have crosscutting aspects regarding human performance.
The failure to follow the procedure for incore detector system operation was a performance deficiency. The finding is more than minor because it is associated with the occupational radiation safety cornerstone attribute regarding programs and processes and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the adequate protection of worker health and safety from exposure to radiation in that not following station procedure could increase personnel exposure. Using the occupational radiation safety determination process to analyze the significance of the finding, the inspectors concluded the issue was of very low safety significance because the inspection finding was not related to ALARA, did not involve an overexposure, and there was no substantial potential for overexposure.
Inspection Report# : 2006002(pdf)
Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Physical Protection information not publicly available.
Miscellaneous Significance:        Jun 23, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Follow Station Procedures for Clearance Orders
 
3Q/2006 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                        Page 8 of 8 An NRC-identified noncited violation of Technical Specifications 5.4.1 for failing to follow procedures was identified when electricians removed terminal leads that were still energized with 500 volt ac. During work under Clearance Orders C15-D-LF-005 and C15-D-LF-006 to replace two sump pump motors located in the radwaste tunnel, the electricians discovered that the terminals on the sump motors were still energized with 500 volt ac. The licensees investigation discovered that the clearance orders written to isolate the sump motors did not include 120 volt ac breakers for moisture sensors located in the motor.
The inspectors determined that the failure to follow station procedures to establish appropriate administrative controls and verify components were de-energized prior to work was a performance deficiency. The inspectors concluded that the finding was greater than minor because, if left uncorrected, the failure to adhere to clearance order procedure requirements that are applicable to work on safety-related and mitigating equipment and the failure to ensure equipment is in a configuration where an unexpected response will not occur prior to work could result in a plant transient or effect mitigating equipment and become a more significant safety concern. This issue was reviewed using Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, and determined that NRC management review for safety significance was appropriate.
The safety significance was determined to be very low based on the fact that there was no impact on safety-related equipment and failure of the sump pumps would not initiate a plant transient. This finding had crosscutting aspects of problem identification and resolution for the failure to adequately address previous occurrences, specifically involving the sump pump motors, as well as human performance because the licensee failed to thoroughly evaluate a similar concern such that the cause was resolved and personnel did not follow established procedures.
Inspection Report# : 2006003(pdf)
Last modified : December 21, 2006
 
4Q/2006 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                              Page 1 of 8 Wolf Creek 1 4Q/2006 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance:        Oct 07, 2006 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to follow procedure results in loss of coolant charging flow The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a involving the licensee's failure to follow a procedure that resulted in a loss of coolant charging flow during a planned surveillance. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as Condition Report 2006-0002030.
The failure to follow station procedures was considered a performance deficiency. This finding was more than minor because it affected the human performance attribute of the initiating events cornerstone and the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions. Using Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 worksheets, this finding screened to a Phase 2 analysis because it affected both the initiating events and mitigating system cornerstones. The inspectors performed a Phase 2 analysis using Appendix A, "Technical Basis For At Power Significance Determination Process," of Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process," and the Phase 2 worksheets for the Wolf Creek Generating Station. Based on the results of the Phase 2 analysis, the finding is determined to have very low safety significance. The inspectors also determined that the finding has crosscutting aspects in the area of human performance associated with work practices because the operators failed to use appropriate human error prevention techniques, such as self-checking, peer-checking, and not proceeding in the face of uncertainty.
Inspection Report# : 2006004 (pdf)
Significance:        Apr 07, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to provide adequate fire detection in the diesel generator rooms An NRC identified Green noncited violation of Facility Operating License Condition 2.C.5, Fire Protection, was identified for inadequate fire detection in the emergency diesel generator rooms. The infrared detectors view of some combustibles in the rooms was blocked by temporary scaffolding and permanent plant equipment, which could delay the detection of fires and the fire brigade response. Wolf Creek Fire Hazard Analysis E-19905 Sections D.1.7.1 and D.2.7.1 state that the diesel generator rooms early warning fire detection is by infrared detectors, which will readily detect the type of fire caused by the burning of fuel and lube oils. Wolf Creek Updated Safety Analysis Report Section 9.5.1.2.3 states that these detectors respond directly to infrared radiation emanating from a flickering flame. However, with solid objects in between the detectors and the combustibles, the infrared light from the flame would not be sensed by the infrared detectors. The control room would still be alerted to the fire, but only if the fire spread to a part of the room visible to the infrared detectors or the heat from the fire reached thermal fire detectors also installed in the room.
The failure to provide adequate fire detection in the emergency diesel generator rooms was a performance deficiency. The inspectors determined that the inadequate fire detection in the diesel generator rooms was more than minor because it potentially affected diesel generator availability due to fire under the mitigating systems cornerstone. The inspectors used Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process, to determine the significance of the finding. The finding is of very low safety significance because a postulated fire in a diesel room would still be detected and extinguished before it affected any other safe shutdown equipment. The inspectors assigned a low degradation rating to the finding in the significance determination process because the fire detection would have nearly the same level of effectiveness and reliability with the degradation. Therefore, the significance determination process screens the finding as very low safety significance.
Inspection Report# : 2006002 (pdf)
 
4Q/2006 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                          Page 2 of 8 Significance:      Apr 07, 2006 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: FIN Finding INADEQUATE PROCEDURE FOR THE OPERATION OF LIMITORQUE MOTOR-OPERATED VALVES A self-revealing Green finding was identified for the failure to provide adequate instructions for the operation of Limitorque motor-operated valves. The instructions were inadequate because they failed to provide guidance on declutching Limitorque motor-operated valves, such that the valve operators are not damaged. The inadequate guidance resulted in the degraded operation of a Limitorque motor-operated valve in the circulating water system. During maintenance activities on November 30, 2005, a Limitorque motor-operated valve would not stay declutched without an operator hanging onto the declutch lever. The declutch mechanism had become misaligned from previous improper manual operation of the Limitorque operator. The inability of the operators to promptly close the valve resulted in lowering the condenser vacuum which approached the turbine trip/reactor trip setpoint before the valve was closed. This finding had crosscutting aspects of human performance. The licensee had not provided adequate instructions for manual operation of the Limitorque motor-operated valve, which subsequently resulted in damage to the declutch mechanism.
The failure to provide adequate instructions for the operation of Limitorque motor-operated valves was a performance deficiency. This finding is more than minor because it affected the initiating events cornerstone objective of limiting the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions and affected the cornerstone attribute of procedural quality because an inadequate procedure increased the probability of an initiating event. Using the Phase 1 worksheets in Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, the issue was determined to have very low safety significance because the finding did not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and loss of mitigation equipment (power conversion system would have remained available), nor increase the likelihood of fire or flooding.
Inspection Report# : 2006002 (pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance:      Oct 07, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate inspections of potentially defective pressure transmitter The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, regarding the failure to implement Administrative Procedure AP 28-011, Resolving Deficiencies Impacting SSCs, Revision 1. Procedure AP 28-011 requires that, during the operability determination process, a reasonable expectation must exist that the structure, system, or component is operable and that the prompt determination process will support that expectation. Contrary to this requirement, reasonable expectation was not established for a deficiency affecting safety-related Barton pressure transmitters. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as Condition Report 2006-000895.
The failure to implement Procedure AP 28-011 following identification of a potential degraded condition was a performance deficiency. This finding was more than minor because it affected the equipment performance attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone and the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events. Using Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 worksheets, the inspectors determined that the finding is of very low significance because it did not represent a loss of a safety function or operability and was not potentially risk significant due to external events. The inspectors also determined that this finding has crosscutting aspects in the human performance area associated with decision making in that the licensee failed to use conservative assumptions in decision making and verify the validity of underlying assumptions for operability of the pressure transmitters.
Inspection Report# : 2006004 (pdf)
Significance:      Jun 23, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation
 
4Q/2006 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                            Page 3 of 8 Failure to Follow System Operating Procedure An NRC-identified noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1 was identified for failing to follow system operating procedures for the Class 1E electrical equipment air conditioning units. On May 4, 2006, a planned maintenance evolution was scheduled to be performed that required shut down of safety-related Class 1E electrical equipment air conditioning Unit A (SGK05A); however, the operator incorrectly secured Class 1E electrical equipment air conditioning Unit B (SGK05B) and used steps that had been previously marked N/A. While later performing additional steps, the operator returned to the same incorrect Unit SGK05B and secured the unit a second time. However, the planned work had previously tripped the correct unit (SGK05A). This resulted in both trains being inoperable. The control room was notified, immediately declared both trains inoperable, and entered Technical Specification 3.0.3, which requires the plant to be in Mode 3 in 7 hours. The control room instructed operators to return Unit SGK05B to service and approximately 2 minutes later exited Technical Specification 3.0.3.
The inspectors determined that the failure to follow station procedures was a performance deficiency. The finding was greater than minor because it affected the mitigating systems cornerstone attribute of support equipment that ensures the availability of equipment that responds to initiating events. Using the Significance Determination Process Phase 1 Worksheet in Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, the inspectors determined that this finding is of very low safety significance because the finding did not result in a loss of safety function per Generic Letter 91-18. This finding had crosscutting aspects of human performance because personnel did not follow established procedures and did not use appropriate human error prevention techniques, such as self- and peer-checking.
Inspection Report# : 2006003 (pdf)
Significance:        May 10, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Inadequate Procedure to Address a 10 CFR Part 21 Notification of a Potential Safety-Related Component Defect The team identified a finding for the licensees failure to establish appropriate testing procedures for the operation of the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump following notification (10 CFR Part 21 report issued April 12, 2005) of a component defect, which could substantially and adversely affect turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump operation.
Specifically, the licensee did not adequately address appropriate testing, acceptance criteria, and test frequency to assure that the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater governor operability remained unaffected by a potential null voltage shift that could prevent the fail safe mode of operation of the governor, as described in the 10 CFR Part 21 report. Since there were no indications of drifting of the null voltage for the past two surveillances, the licensee concluded that no additional actions were required to address the 10 CFR Part 21 report. Contrary to the vendor recommended actions, the licensee did not establish a monitoring frequency in accordance with recommended actions. This finding had crosscutting aspects associated with problem evaluation.
The failure to establish appropriate testing, acceptance criteria, and test frequency for the operation of the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump was considered a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because if left uncorrected, the finding could become a more significant safety concern and affected the mitigating system cornerstone objectives of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to events to prevent undesirable consequences. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because it did not result in a loss of function in accordance with Generic Letter 91-18, Information to Licensees Regarding NRC Inspection Manual Section on Resolution of Degraded and Nonconforming Conditions, Revision 1.
Inspection Report# : 2006010 (pdf)
Significance:        May 10, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Inadequate procedure for long-standing component cooling water pump problems The team identified a finding for the failure to establish appropriate procedures for the operation of the component cooling water pump. Specifically, the licensee did not establish procedures to include appropriate acceptance criteria for component cooling water pump axial shaft movement that has existed for approximately 18 years. The licensees procedure did not contain any vendor acceptance criteria to ensure axial shaft movement did not result in a failure of the pump during a postulated accident. The licensee did not evaluate the long-term impact from wear to the bearing fit surfaces, wear particles
 
4Q/2006 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                            Page 4 of 8 in oil samples, or long-term cyclic fatigue to adjacent piping and other components. This issue had crosscutting aspects associated with problem evaluation.
The failure to establish a procedure with appropriate acceptance criteria was considered a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because it affected the mitigating systems cornerstone attribute of procedure quality and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring availability, reliability and capability of systems to respond to events. The finding was of very low safety significance because, despite the fact that the condition was not properly evaluated, the affected equipment remained operable consistent with Generic Letter 91-18, Revision 1.
Inspection Report# : 2006010 (pdf)
Significance:        May 10, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Inadequate procedure to address industry operating experience regarding submerged cables The team identified a finding for the failure to establish appropriate procedures for the inspection of buried safety-related electrical cables. Specifically, the licensee did not establish procedures to include acceptance criteria to determine if buried safety-related electrical cables were subject to the degradation described in NRC Information Notice 2002-12, Submerged Safety-Related Electrical Cables. The licensee did not develop a maintenance activity to inspect the underground cables for degraded or damaged jacketing, contrary to industry operating experience, which provided examples of visual inspections that discovered degraded cable jacketing. This issue had crosscutting aspects associated with problem evaluation.
The failure to establish a maintenance activity with appropriate acceptance criteria was considered a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because if left uncorrected the finding could become a more significant safety concern and it affected the mitigating system cornerstone objectives of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to events to prevent undesirable consequences. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because it did not result in a loss of function in accordance with Generic Letter 91-18, Revision 1.
Inspection Report# : 2006010 (pdf)
Significance: TBD Dec 29, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: AV Apparent Violation Failure to Maintain Reactor Coolant System Subcooling During the Alternative Shutodwn The team identified an Apparent Violation of Wolf Creek License Condition 2.C.(5)(a) concerning an inadequate alternative shutdown analysis. The licensees alternative shutdown analysis was inadequate in that it used an acceptance criteria which was inconsistent with and less conservative than that required by the approved Fire Protection Program. The licensee developed Calculation Number AN-02-021, Revision 0, OFN RP-017, Control Room Evacuation, Consequence Evaluation, to demonstrate alternative shutdown capability for Wolf Creek in response to NRC-identified Noncited Violation 2002008-01, Inadequate alternative shutdown procedure. The calculation predicted that during an alternative shutdown, the reactor coolant system subcooling margin would not be maintained, significant voiding would occur in the core, and a steam void would form in the reactor vessel head. The licensee found the results of the calculation to be acceptable since it demonstrated that the void formation would be limited, natural circulation in the reactor coolant system would be maintained, sufficient decay heat removal would be maintained, and no fuel damage would occur. This is not consistent with the license condition to meet the technical requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R. Section III.L of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Alternative and dedicated shutdown capability, that states in part, During the postfire shutdown, the reactor process variables shall be maintained within those predicted for a loss of normal a.c. power.
This finding is greater than minor because it impacted the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to external events (such as fire) to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). It is the NRCs understanding that the licensee does not consider these circuit vulnerabilities to be violations of NRC requirements. The licensee considers the spurious operation of multiple components to be outside of the plant licensing basis for the Fire Protection Program. Specifically, in this case, both pressurizer power-operated relief valves are assumed to spuriously open because of fire induced circuit damage. The NRC staff and the industry are currently working on developing a resolution methodology to address these types of potential fire induced circuit failures. The team concluded that this violation meets the criteria of the NRC Enforcement Manual Section 8.1.7.1 for deferring enforcement actions for postulated fire induced circuit failures.
 
4Q/2006 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                            Page 5 of 8 Inspection Report# : 2005008 (pdf)
Significance: TBD Dec 29, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: AV Apparent Violation Inadequate Alternataive Shutdown Procedure The team identified an Apparent Violation of Technical Specification 5.4, Procedures, due to an inadequate alternative shutdown procedure that is required for implementation of the Fire Protection Program. The team found that some time critical actions required to safely shutdown the plant following a control room fire could not be accomplished within the required time periods. Specifically, the team found that the recommendations by Westinghouse Owners Group for assuring reactor coolant pump seal reliability and avoiding component cooling water thermal barrier water hammer concerns would not be met if the operators had to respond to multiple spurious operations. The procedure was developed and verified based on a time line assuming operators only have to respond to one spurious operation from the fire induced damage during the scenario. The team disagrees with this limitation of potential spurious operations.
This finding is greater than minor because it impacted the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to external events (such as fire) to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). It is the NRCs understanding that the licensee does not consider these circuit vulnerabilities to be violations of NRC requirements. The licensee considers the spurious operation of multiple components to be outside of the plant licensing basis for the Fire Protection Program. The NRC staff and the industry are currently working on developing a resolution methodology to address these types of potential fire induced circuit failures. The team concluded that this violation meets the criteria of the NRC Enforcement Manual Section 8.1.7.1 for deferring enforcement actions for postulated fire induced circuit failures.
Inspection Report# : 2005008 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Significance:        Oct 07, 2006 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to completely close SFP valves resulted in a loss of SFP water inventory A self-revealing noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a was identified for the failure to close Valves EC-V025 and -V033 during a lineup to recirculate the refueling water storage tank through the spent fuel pool cleanup system.
These two systems were cross- connected for approximately 26 hours, which resulted in approximately 1200 gallons of SFP water being inadvertently transferred to the refueling water storage tank. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as Condition Report 2006-000589.
The failure to completely close Valves EC-V025 and -V033 was a performance deficiency. This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the barrier integrity cornerstone attribute of configuration control and affected the cornerstone objective to maintain functionality of the spent fuel pool system. Using Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 worksheets, the inspectors determined that the finding is only of very low significance because the finding only affected the barrier function of the spent fuel pool. The inspectors also determined that the finding has crosscutting aspects in the area of human performance associated with work practices because the operators failed to use appropriate human error prevention techniques, such as peer-checking and not proceeding in the face of uncertainty.
Inspection Report# : 2006004 (pdf)
Significance:        May 10, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate corrective actions to address spent fuel pool foreign material.
The team identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, for the failure to take adequate corrective actions to address spent fuel pool foreign material issues. Specifically, the licensee did not determine the source of the foreign material and prevent it from entering the spent fuel pool on multiple occasions. The spent fuel pool is
 
4Q/2006 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                          Page 6 of 8 considered a foreign material exclusion zone in which no foreign material is allowed. Although it was considered a low probability event, foreign material in the spent fuel pool could cause problems with spent fuel pool cooling equipment or could be carried into the core during refueling and result in degradation of the fuel assembly cladding. As such, the introduction of foreign material into the spent fuel pool was considered a significant condition adverse to quality. This issue had crosscutting aspects associated with problem evaluation and resolution.
The failure to take effective corrective actions to determine and correct the source of spent fuel pool foreign material was considered a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because it affected the barrier integrity cornerstone attribute of cladding performance and human performance (foreign material exclusion). This finding was of very low safety significance because it is associated with a fuel barrier concern and did not affect reactor coolant system barrier performance.
Inspection Report# : 2006010 (pdf)
Significance:      Apr 07, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to follow administrative procedure for operability determination The inspectors identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1 for failure to follow Administrative Procedure AP28-011, Resolving Deficiencies Impacting SSCs [structures, systems and components], Revision 1. The inspectors identified a faulty evaluation of a containment spray system degraded condition. The degraded condition was caused by the potential for a 5 cubic foot void in both trains of the containment spray system. The licensee identified the condition and performed their evaluation in response to industry operating experience regarding voiding in safety-related fluid systems. The evaluation was faulty in its interpretation of the information provided in NUREG/CR-2792. Once aware of the faulty evaluation, the licensee failed to adhere to Procedure AP 28-011 in the following ways: (1) they failed to document the deficiency as soon as possible; (2) they failed to inform the shift manager immediately; (3) they failed to provide reasonable assurance of operability in a time frame commensurate with safety; and (4) they failed to provide a valid reasonable assurance of operability prior to completion of a prompt operability evaluation. This finding had crosscutting aspects associated with problem identification and resolution based on the fact that both the original evaluation of the industry operating experience and the engineering judgement used to provide reasonable assurance of operability were inadequate.
The failure to implement Procedure AP 28-011 following identification of a degraded condition was a performance deficiency. This finding is more than minor because, if left uncorrected, the failure to follow Procedure AP 28A-011 would become a more significant safety concern. Based on the results of a significance determination process Phase 1 evaluation, this finding was determined to have very low safety significance since the licensee was ultimately able to demonstrate operability of the affected equipment.
Inspection Report# : 2006002 (pdf)
Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Significance:      Apr 07, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to follow a station procedure for the operation of the incore detector drive system The inspectors identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1(a) for the failure to follow licensee Procedure SYS SR-200, Movable Incore Detector Operation, Revision 18. Contrary to this procedure, during troubleshooting activities on the incore detector drive system, an incore detector was moved with personnel in the area.
This issue was determined to have crosscutting aspects regarding human performance.
 
4Q/2006 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                        Page 7 of 8 The failure to follow the procedure for incore detector system operation was a performance deficiency. The finding is more than minor because it is associated with the occupational radiation safety cornerstone attribute regarding programs and processes and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the adequate protection of worker health and safety from exposure to radiation in that not following station procedure could increase personnel exposure. Using the occupational radiation safety determination process to analyze the significance of the finding, the inspectors concluded the issue was of very low safety significance because the inspection finding was not related to ALARA, did not involve an overexposure, and there was no substantial potential for overexposure.
Inspection Report# : 2006002 (pdf)
Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Physical Protection information not publicly available.
Miscellaneous Significance:        Jun 23, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Follow Station Procedures for Clearance Orders An NRC-identified noncited violation of Technical Specifications 5.4.1 for failing to follow procedures was identified when electricians removed terminal leads that were still energized with 500 volt ac. During work under Clearance Orders C15-D-LF-005 and C15-D-LF-006 to replace two sump pump motors located in the radwaste tunnel, the electricians discovered that the terminals on the sump motors were still energized with 500 volt ac. The licensees investigation discovered that the clearance orders written to isolate the sump motors did not include 120 volt ac breakers for moisture sensors located in the motor.
The inspectors determined that the failure to follow station procedures to establish appropriate administrative controls and verify components were de-energized prior to work was a performance deficiency. The inspectors concluded that the finding was greater than minor because, if left uncorrected, the failure to adhere to clearance order procedure requirements that are applicable to work on safety-related and mitigating equipment and the failure to ensure equipment is in a configuration where an unexpected response will not occur prior to work could result in a plant transient or effect mitigating equipment and become a more significant safety concern. This issue was reviewed using Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, and determined that NRC management review for safety significance was appropriate.
The safety significance was determined to be very low based on the fact that there was no impact on safety-related equipment and failure of the sump pumps would not initiate a plant transient. This finding had crosscutting aspects of problem identification and resolution for the failure to adequately address previous occurrences, specifically involving the sump pump motors, as well as human performance because the licensee failed to thoroughly evaluate a similar concern such that the cause was resolved and personnel did not follow established procedures.
Inspection Report# : 2006003 (pdf)
Significance: N/A May 10, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Identification and Resolution of Problems The team reviewed approximately 270 performance improvement requests, corrective work requests, work orders,
 
4Q/2006 Inspection Findings - Wolf Creek 1                                                                          Page 8 of 8 associated apparent and root cause analyses, as well as supporting documents and corrective actions to assess problem identification and resolution activities. Overall, corrective action procedures and processes were generally effective; thresholds for identifying issues were low and, in most cases, corrective actions were adequate to address conditions adverse to quality. However, inconsistent problem evaluations and corrective actions resulted in some self-disclosing and NRC identified violations and findings. The licensee had identified corrective actions to address these performance problems.
Based on the interviews conducted, the team concluded that a safety conscience work environment existed at Wolf Creek Generating Station. The team determined that employees felt free to raise safety concerns to their supervision, the employee concerns program, and the NRC. The team received a few isolated comments regarding the lack of knowledge of the corrective action program, an increased workload caused by the corrective action process and a concern about the effectiveness of knowledge transfer because of an aging workforce. However, the interviewees all believed that potential safety issues were being addressed and there were no instances identified where individuals had experienced adverse actions for bringing safety issues to the NRC. The team determined that licensee management was aware of the perceptions and was taking action to address them.
Inspection Report# : 2006010 (pdf)
Last modified : March 01, 2007
 
Wolf Creek 1 1Q/2007 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance:        Oct 07, 2006 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to follow procedure results in loss of coolant charging flow The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a involving the licensee's failure to follow a procedure that resulted in a loss of coolant charging flow during a planned surveillance. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as Condition Report 2006-0002030.
The failure to follow station procedures was considered a performance deficiency. This finding was more than minor because it affected the human performance attribute of the initiating events cornerstone and the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions. Using Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 worksheets, this finding screened to a Phase 2 analysis because it affected both the initiating events and mitigating system cornerstones. The inspectors performed a Phase 2 analysis using Appendix A, "Technical Basis For At Power Significance Determination Process," of Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process," and the Phase 2 worksheets for the Wolf Creek Generating Station. Based on the results of the Phase 2 analysis, the finding is determined to have very low safety significance. The inspectors also determined that the finding has crosscutting aspects in the area of human performance associated with work practices because the operators failed to use appropriate human error prevention techniques, such as self-checking, peer-checking, and not proceeding in the face of uncertainty.
Inspection Report# : 2006004 (pdf)
Significance:        Apr 07, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to provide adequate fire detection in the diesel generator rooms An NRC identified Green noncited violation of Facility Operating License Condition 2.C.5, Fire Protection, was identified for inadequate fire detection in the emergency diesel generator rooms. The infrared detectors view of some combustibles in the rooms was blocked by temporary scaffolding and permanent plant equipment, which could delay the detection of fires and the fire brigade response. Wolf Creek Fire Hazard Analysis E-19905 Sections D.1.7.1 and D.2.7.1 state that the diesel generator rooms early warning fire detection is by infrared detectors, which will readily detect the type of fire caused by the burning of fuel and lube oils. Wolf Creek Updated Safety Analysis Report Section 9.5.1.2.3 states that these detectors respond directly to infrared radiation emanating from a flickering flame. However, with solid objects in between the detectors and the combustibles, the infrared light from the flame would not be sensed by the infrared detectors. The control room would still be alerted to the fire, but only if the fire spread to a part of the room visible to the infrared detectors or the heat from the fire reached thermal fire detectors also installed in the room.
The failure to provide adequate fire detection in the emergency diesel generator rooms was a performance deficiency. The inspectors determined that the inadequate fire detection in the diesel generator rooms was more than minor because it potentially affected diesel generator availability due to fire under the mitigating systems cornerstone. The inspectors used Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process, to determine the significance of the finding. The finding is of very low safety significance because a postulated fire in a diesel room would still be detected and extinguished before it affected any other safe shutdown equipment. The inspectors assigned a low degradation rating to the finding in the significance determination process because the fire detection would have nearly the same level of effectiveness and reliability with the degradation. Therefore, the significance determination process screens the finding as very low safety significance.
Inspection Report# : 2006002 (pdf)
 
Significance:      Apr 07, 2006 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: FIN Finding INADEQUATE PROCEDURE FOR THE OPERATION OF LIMITORQUE MOTOR-OPERATED VALVES A self-revealing Green finding was identified for the failure to provide adequate instructions for the operation of Limitorque motor-operated valves. The instructions were inadequate because they failed to provide guidance on declutching Limitorque motor-operated valves, such that the valve operators are not damaged. The inadequate guidance resulted in the degraded operation of a Limitorque motor-operated valve in the circulating water system. During maintenance activities on November 30, 2005, a Limitorque motor-operated valve would not stay declutched without an operator hanging onto the declutch lever. The declutch mechanism had become misaligned from previous improper manual operation of the Limitorque operator. The inability of the operators to promptly close the valve resulted in lowering the condenser vacuum which approached the turbine trip/reactor trip setpoint before the valve was closed. This finding had crosscutting aspects of human performance. The licensee had not provided adequate instructions for manual operation of the Limitorque motor-operated valve, which subsequently resulted in damage to the declutch mechanism.
The failure to provide adequate instructions for the operation of Limitorque motor-operated valves was a performance deficiency. This finding is more than minor because it affected the initiating events cornerstone objective of limiting the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions and affected the cornerstone attribute of procedural quality because an inadequate procedure increased the probability of an initiating event. Using the Phase 1 worksheets in Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, the issue was determined to have very low safety significance because the finding did not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and loss of mitigation equipment (power conversion system would have remained available), nor increase the likelihood of fire or flooding.
Inspection Report# : 2006002 (pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance:      Dec 31, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to implement the reactor vessel closure head installation procedure The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, involving the licensee's failure to properly implement the reactor vessel closure head installation procedure during Refuel 15. Specifically, on October 30, 2006, the licensee performed Procedure FHP-02-007B, Reactor Vessel Closure Head Installation," Revision 5. During the performance of Procedure FHP-02-007B, the licensee encountered problems with the polar crane that prevented the crane hoist from being lowered. The problems with the polar crane were encountered while the reactor vessel head was being transported along the North-South axis of the refueling cavity towards the reactor vessel. Consequently, the licensee transported the reactor vessel closure head approximately 3 feet over the reactor vessel flange while suspended approximately 4 feet above the operating deck. This condition was not allowed by procedure and exceeded the maximum analyzed height in the head drop analysis.
The failure to properly implement the reactor vessel closure head installation procedure was considered a performance deficiency. The finding was greater than minor because it affected the human performance attribute of mitigating systems cornerstone and the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events. Using Manual Chapter 0609 Appendix G, Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process Phase 1 worksheets, the finding was found to be of very low safety significance because it did not affect decay heat removal or reactor coolant system inventory. The inspectors determined that the finding has crosscutting aspects in the area of human performance associated with work practices because the licensee failed to use appropriate human error prevention techniques, such as self, peer-checking and not proceeding in the face of uncertainty. The inspectors also determined that the finding has crosscutting aspects in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with operating experience because the licensee failed to effectively communicate internally generated lessons learned following the procedural noncompliance during the Refuel 13 reactor vessel head installation.
Inspection Report# : 2006005 (pdf)
 
Significance:        Oct 07, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate inspections of potentially defective pressure transmitter The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, regarding the failure to implement Administrative Procedure AP 28-011, Resolving Deficiencies Impacting SSCs, Revision 1. Procedure AP 28-011 requires that, during the operability determination process, a reasonable expectation must exist that the structure, system, or component is operable and that the prompt determination process will support that expectation. Contrary to this requirement, reasonable expectation was not established for a deficiency affecting safety-related Barton pressure transmitters. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as Condition Report 2006-000895.
The failure to implement Procedure AP 28-011 following identification of a potential degraded condition was a performance deficiency. This finding was more than minor because it affected the equipment performance attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone and the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events. Using Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 worksheets, the inspectors determined that the finding is of very low significance because it did not represent a loss of a safety function or operability and was not potentially risk significant due to external events. The inspectors also determined that this finding has crosscutting aspects in the human performance area associated with decision making in that the licensee failed to use conservative assumptions in decision making and verify the validity of underlying assumptions for operability of the pressure transmitters.
Inspection Report# : 2006004 (pdf)
Significance:        Jun 23, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Follow System Operating Procedure An NRC-identified noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1 was identified for failing to follow system operating procedures for the Class 1E electrical equipment air conditioning units. On May 4, 2006, a planned maintenance evolution was scheduled to be performed that required shut down of safety-related Class 1E electrical equipment air conditioning Unit A (SGK05A); however, the operator incorrectly secured Class 1E electrical equipment air conditioning Unit B (SGK05B) and used steps that had been previously marked N/A. While later performing additional steps, the operator returned to the same incorrect Unit SGK05B and secured the unit a second time. However, the planned work had previously tripped the correct unit (SGK05A). This resulted in both trains being inoperable. The control room was notified, immediately declared both trains inoperable, and entered Technical Specification 3.0.3, which requires the plant to be in Mode 3 in 7 hours. The control room instructed operators to return Unit SGK05B to service and approximately 2 minutes later exited Technical Specification 3.0.3.
The inspectors determined that the failure to follow station procedures was a performance deficiency. The finding was greater than minor because it affected the mitigating systems cornerstone attribute of support equipment that ensures the availability of equipment that responds to initiating events. Using the Significance Determination Process Phase 1 Worksheet in Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, the inspectors determined that this finding is of very low safety significance because the finding did not result in a loss of safety function per Generic Letter 91-18. This finding had crosscutting aspects of human performance because personnel did not follow established procedures and did not use appropriate human error prevention techniques, such as self- and peer-checking.
Inspection Report# : 2006003 (pdf)
Significance:        May 10, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Inadequate Procedure to Address a 10 CFR Part 21 Notification of a Potential Safety-Related Component Defect The team identified a finding for the licensees failure to establish appropriate testing procedures for the operation of the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump following notification (10 CFR Part 21 report issued April 12, 2005) of a component defect, which could substantially and adversely affect turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump operation.
Specifically, the licensee did not adequately address appropriate testing, acceptance criteria, and test frequency to assure that the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater governor operability remained unaffected by a potential null voltage shift that
 
could prevent the fail safe mode of operation of the governor, as described in the 10 CFR Part 21 report. Since there were no indications of drifting of the null voltage for the past two surveillances, the licensee concluded that no additional actions were required to address the 10 CFR Part 21 report. Contrary to the vendor recommended actions, the licensee did not establish a monitoring frequency in accordance with recommended actions. This finding had crosscutting aspects associated with problem evaluation.
The failure to establish appropriate testing, acceptance criteria, and test frequency for the operation of the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump was considered a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because if left uncorrected, the finding could become a more significant safety concern and affected the mitigating system cornerstone objectives of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to events to prevent undesirable consequences. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because it did not result in a loss of function in accordance with Generic Letter 91-18, Information to Licensees Regarding NRC Inspection Manual Section on Resolution of Degraded and Nonconforming Conditions, Revision 1.
Inspection Report# : 2006010 (pdf)
Significance:      May 10, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Inadequate procedure for long-standing component cooling water pump problems The team identified a finding for the failure to establish appropriate procedures for the operation of the component cooling water pump. Specifically, the licensee did not establish procedures to include appropriate acceptance criteria for component cooling water pump axial shaft movement that has existed for approximately 18 years. The licensees procedure did not contain any vendor acceptance criteria to ensure axial shaft movement did not result in a failure of the pump during a postulated accident. The licensee did not evaluate the long-term impact from wear to the bearing fit surfaces, wear particles in oil samples, or long-term cyclic fatigue to adjacent piping and other components. This issue had crosscutting aspects associated with problem evaluation.
The failure to establish a procedure with appropriate acceptance criteria was considered a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because it affected the mitigating systems cornerstone attribute of procedure quality and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring availability, reliability and capability of systems to respond to events. The finding was of very low safety significance because, despite the fact that the condition was not properly evaluated, the affected equipment remained operable consistent with Generic Letter 91-18, Revision 1.
Inspection Report# : 2006010 (pdf)
Significance:      May 10, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Inadequate procedure to address industry operating experience regarding submerged cables The team identified a finding for the failure to establish appropriate procedures for the inspection of buried safety-related electrical cables. Specifically, the licensee did not establish procedures to include acceptance criteria to determine if buried safety-related electrical cables were subject to the degradation described in NRC Information Notice 2002-12, Submerged Safety-Related Electrical Cables. The licensee did not develop a maintenance activity to inspect the underground cables for degraded or damaged jacketing, contrary to industry operating experience, which provided examples of visual inspections that discovered degraded cable jacketing. This issue had crosscutting aspects associated with problem evaluation.
The failure to establish a maintenance activity with appropriate acceptance criteria was considered a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because if left uncorrected the finding could become a more significant safety concern and it affected the mitigating system cornerstone objectives of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to events to prevent undesirable consequences. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because it did not result in a loss of function in accordance with Generic Letter 91-18, Revision 1.
Inspection Report# : 2006010 (pdf)
Significance: TBD Dec 29, 2005
 
Identified By: NRC Item Type: AV Apparent Violation Failure to Maintain Reactor Coolant System Subcooling During the Alternative Shutodwn The team identified an Apparent Violation of Wolf Creek License Condition 2.C.(5)(a) concerning an inadequate alternative shutdown analysis. The licensees alternative shutdown analysis was inadequate in that it used an acceptance criteria which was inconsistent with and less conservative than that required by the approved Fire Protection Program. The licensee developed Calculation Number AN-02-021, Revision 0, OFN RP-017, Control Room Evacuation, Consequence Evaluation, to demonstrate alternative shutdown capability for Wolf Creek in response to NRC-identified Noncited Violation 2002008-01, Inadequate alternative shutdown procedure. The calculation predicted that during an alternative shutdown, the reactor coolant system subcooling margin would not be maintained, significant voiding would occur in the core, and a steam void would form in the reactor vessel head. The licensee found the results of the calculation to be acceptable since it demonstrated that the void formation would be limited, natural circulation in the reactor coolant system would be maintained, sufficient decay heat removal would be maintained, and no fuel damage would occur. This is not consistent with the license condition to meet the technical requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R. Section III.L of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Alternative and dedicated shutdown capability, that states in part, During the postfire shutdown, the reactor process variables shall be maintained within those predicted for a loss of normal a.c. power.
This finding is greater than minor because it impacted the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to external events (such as fire) to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). It is the NRCs understanding that the licensee does not consider these circuit vulnerabilities to be violations of NRC requirements. The licensee considers the spurious operation of multiple components to be outside of the plant licensing basis for the Fire Protection Program. Specifically, in this case, both pressurizer power-operated relief valves are assumed to spuriously open because of fire induced circuit damage. The NRC staff and the industry are currently working on developing a resolution methodology to address these types of potential fire induced circuit failures. The team concluded that this violation meets the criteria of the NRC Enforcement Manual Section 8.1.7.1 for deferring enforcement actions for postulated fire induced circuit failures.
Inspection Report# : 2005008 (pdf)
Significance: TBD Dec 29, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: AV Apparent Violation Inadequate Alternataive Shutdown Procedure The team identified an Apparent Violation of Technical Specification 5.4, Procedures, due to an inadequate alternative shutdown procedure that is required for implementation of the Fire Protection Program. The team found that some time critical actions required to safely shutdown the plant following a control room fire could not be accomplished within the required time periods. Specifically, the team found that the recommendations by Westinghouse Owners Group for assuring reactor coolant pump seal reliability and avoiding component cooling water thermal barrier water hammer concerns would not be met if the operators had to respond to multiple spurious operations. The procedure was developed and verified based on a time line assuming operators only have to respond to one spurious operation from the fire induced damage during the scenario. The team disagrees with this limitation of potential spurious operations.
This finding is greater than minor because it impacted the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to external events (such as fire) to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). It is the NRCs understanding that the licensee does not consider these circuit vulnerabilities to be violations of NRC requirements. The licensee considers the spurious operation of multiple components to be outside of the plant licensing basis for the Fire Protection Program. The NRC staff and the industry are currently working on developing a resolution methodology to address these types of potential fire induced circuit failures. The team concluded that this violation meets the criteria of the NRC Enforcement Manual Section 8.1.7.1 for deferring enforcement actions for postulated fire induced circuit failures.
Inspection Report# : 2005008 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Significance:        Oct 07, 2006 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation
 
Failure to completely close SFP valves resulted in a loss of SFP water inventory A self-revealing noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a was identified for the failure to close Valves EC-V025 and -V033 during a lineup to recirculate the refueling water storage tank through the spent fuel pool cleanup system.
These two systems were cross- connected for approximately 26 hours, which resulted in approximately 1200 gallons of SFP water being inadvertently transferred to the refueling water storage tank. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as Condition Report 2006-000589.
The failure to completely close Valves EC-V025 and -V033 was a performance deficiency. This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the barrier integrity cornerstone attribute of configuration control and affected the cornerstone objective to maintain functionality of the spent fuel pool system. Using Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 worksheets, the inspectors determined that the finding is only of very low significance because the finding only affected the barrier function of the spent fuel pool. The inspectors also determined that the finding has crosscutting aspects in the area of human performance associated with work practices because the operators failed to use appropriate human error prevention techniques, such as peer-checking and not proceeding in the face of uncertainty.
Inspection Report# : 2006004 (pdf)
Significance:      May 10, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate corrective actions to address spent fuel pool foreign material.
The team identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, for the failure to take adequate corrective actions to address spent fuel pool foreign material issues. Specifically, the licensee did not determine the source of the foreign material and prevent it from entering the spent fuel pool on multiple occasions. The spent fuel pool is considered a foreign material exclusion zone in which no foreign material is allowed. Although it was considered a low probability event, foreign material in the spent fuel pool could cause problems with spent fuel pool cooling equipment or could be carried into the core during refueling and result in degradation of the fuel assembly cladding. As such, the introduction of foreign material into the spent fuel pool was considered a significant condition adverse to quality. This issue had crosscutting aspects associated with problem evaluation and resolution.
The failure to take effective corrective actions to determine and correct the source of spent fuel pool foreign material was considered a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because it affected the barrier integrity cornerstone attribute of cladding performance and human performance (foreign material exclusion). This finding was of very low safety significance because it is associated with a fuel barrier concern and did not affect reactor coolant system barrier performance.
Inspection Report# : 2006010 (pdf)
Significance:      Apr 07, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to follow administrative procedure for operability determination The inspectors identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1 for failure to follow Administrative Procedure AP28-011, Resolving Deficiencies Impacting SSCs [structures, systems and components], Revision 1. The inspectors identified a faulty evaluation of a containment spray system degraded condition. The degraded condition was caused by the potential for a 5 cubic foot void in both trains of the containment spray system. The licensee identified the condition and performed their evaluation in response to industry operating experience regarding voiding in safety-related fluid systems. The evaluation was faulty in its interpretation of the information provided in NUREG/CR-2792. Once aware of the faulty evaluation, the licensee failed to adhere to Procedure AP 28-011 in the following ways: (1) they failed to document the deficiency as soon as possible; (2) they failed to inform the shift manager immediately; (3) they failed to provide reasonable assurance of operability in a time frame commensurate with safety; and (4) they failed to provide a valid reasonable assurance of operability prior to completion of a prompt operability evaluation. This finding had crosscutting aspects associated with problem identification and resolution based on the fact that both the original evaluation of the industry operating experience and the engineering judgement used to provide reasonable assurance of operability were inadequate.
The failure to implement Procedure AP 28-011 following identification of a degraded condition was a performance deficiency. This finding is more than minor because, if left uncorrected, the failure to follow Procedure AP 28A-011 would
 
become a more significant safety concern. Based on the results of a significance determination process Phase 1 evaluation, this finding was determined to have very low safety significance since the licensee was ultimately able to demonstrate operability of the affected equipment.
Inspection Report# : 2006002 (pdf)
Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Significance:      Dec 31, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to provide instructions to workers The inspector identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 19.12(a)(2) because the licensee failed to provide instructions to a worker on how to minimize exposure while working with radioactive material and contaminated equipment. Specifically, on October 18, 2006, a worker on the "A" steam generator platform received an intake of cobalt-58 while removing contaminated conduit from the primary side of the steam generator and placing it in a radioactive material bag for storage.
The worker was wearing a face shield, however, the inspector identified that the licensee failed to provide the worker with instructions on how to minimize exposure to radioactive material while performing this task. The licensees corrective actions included providing workers with powered face shields that blow air away from the face. This finding was entered into the licensees corrective action program.
The finding was greater than minor because it was associated with the Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone attribute of Exposure Control, and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the adequate protection of a workers health and safety from exposure to radioactive materials because a worker received an unintended internal dose. The finding was processed through the Occupational Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process and determined to be of very low safety significance because it was not an ALARA finding, there was no overexposure or substantial potential for an overexposure, and the ability to assess dose was not compromised. Additionally, this finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance related to work practices because the licensee did not ensure supervisory oversight of work activities such that exposure to radioactive material was minimized and properly controlled.
Inspection Report# : 2006005 (pdf)
Significance:      Apr 07, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to follow a station procedure for the operation of the incore detector drive system The inspectors identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1(a) for the failure to follow licensee Procedure SYS SR-200, Movable Incore Detector Operation, Revision 18. Contrary to this procedure, during troubleshooting activities on the incore detector drive system, an incore detector was moved with personnel in the area.
This issue was determined to have crosscutting aspects regarding human performance.
The failure to follow the procedure for incore detector system operation was a performance deficiency. The finding is more than minor because it is associated with the occupational radiation safety cornerstone attribute regarding programs and processes and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the adequate protection of worker health and safety from exposure to radiation in that not following station procedure could increase personnel exposure. Using the occupational radiation safety determination process to analyze the significance of the finding, the inspectors concluded the issue was of very low safety significance because the inspection finding was not related to ALARA, did not involve an overexposure, and there was no substantial potential for overexposure.
Inspection Report# : 2006002 (pdf)
 
Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Physical Protection information not publicly available.
Miscellaneous Significance:        Jun 23, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Follow Station Procedures for Clearance Orders An NRC-identified noncited violation of Technical Specifications 5.4.1 for failing to follow procedures was identified when electricians removed terminal leads that were still energized with 500 volt ac. During work under Clearance Orders C15-D-LF-005 and C15-D-LF-006 to replace two sump pump motors located in the radwaste tunnel, the electricians discovered that the terminals on the sump motors were still energized with 500 volt ac. The licensees investigation discovered that the clearance orders written to isolate the sump motors did not include 120 volt ac breakers for moisture sensors located in the motor.
The inspectors determined that the failure to follow station procedures to establish appropriate administrative controls and verify components were de-energized prior to work was a performance deficiency. The inspectors concluded that the finding was greater than minor because, if left uncorrected, the failure to adhere to clearance order procedure requirements that are applicable to work on safety-related and mitigating equipment and the failure to ensure equipment is in a configuration where an unexpected response will not occur prior to work could result in a plant transient or effect mitigating equipment and become a more significant safety concern. This issue was reviewed using Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, and determined that NRC management review for safety significance was appropriate.
The safety significance was determined to be very low based on the fact that there was no impact on safety-related equipment and failure of the sump pumps would not initiate a plant transient. This finding had crosscutting aspects of problem identification and resolution for the failure to adequately address previous occurrences, specifically involving the sump pump motors, as well as human performance because the licensee failed to thoroughly evaluate a similar concern such that the cause was resolved and personnel did not follow established procedures.
Inspection Report# : 2006003 (pdf)
Significance: N/A May 10, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Identification and Resolution of Problems The team reviewed approximately 270 performance improvement requests, corrective work requests, work orders, associated apparent and root cause analyses, as well as supporting documents and corrective actions to assess problem identification and resolution activities. Overall, corrective action procedures and processes were generally effective; thresholds for identifying issues were low and, in most cases, corrective actions were adequate to address conditions adverse to quality. However, inconsistent problem evaluations and corrective actions resulted in some self-disclosing and NRC identified violations and findings. The licensee had identified corrective actions to address these performance problems.
Based on the interviews conducted, the team concluded that a safety conscience work environment existed at Wolf Creek Generating Station. The team determined that employees felt free to raise safety concerns to their supervision, the employee concerns program, and the NRC. The team received a few isolated comments regarding the lack of knowledge of the corrective action program, an increased workload caused by the corrective action process and a concern about the effectiveness of knowledge transfer because of an aging workforce. However, the interviewees all believed that potential safety issues were being addressed and there were no instances identified where individuals had experienced adverse
 
actions for bringing safety issues to the NRC. The team determined that licensee management was aware of the perceptions and was taking action to address them.
Inspection Report# : 2006010 (pdf)
Last modified : June 01, 2007
 
Wolf Creek 1 2Q/2007 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance:        Oct 07, 2006 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to follow procedure results in loss of coolant charging flow The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a involving the licensee's failure to follow a procedure that resulted in a loss of coolant charging flow during a planned surveillance. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as Condition Report 2006-0002030.
The failure to follow station procedures was considered a performance deficiency. This finding was more than minor because it affected the human performance attribute of the initiating events cornerstone and the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions. Using Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 worksheets, this finding screened to a Phase 2 analysis because it affected both the initiating events and mitigating system cornerstones. The inspectors performed a Phase 2 analysis using Appendix A, "Technical Basis For At Power Significance Determination Process," of Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process," and the Phase 2 worksheets for the Wolf Creek Generating Station.
Based on the results of the Phase 2 analysis, the finding is determined to have very low safety significance. The inspectors also determined that the finding has crosscutting aspects in the area of human performance associated with work practices because the operator' failure to use appropriate human error prevention techniques, such as self-checking, peer-checking, and the operator's choice to proceed in the face of uncertainty, resulted in a loss of coolant charging flow.
Inspection Report# : 2006004 (pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance:        Apr 07, 2007 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to implement fire protection impairment control permit requirements and compensatory measures A self-revealing noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.d was identified for failure to implement fire protection impairment control permit requirements and compensatory measures when operators incorrectly disabled three fire detectors in the auxiliary building. The detectors in the auxiliary building were disabled without a proper fire impairment control permit and the required compensatory roving hourly fire watch for a period of approximately 5 hours as required by Administrative Procedure AP 10 103, "Fire Protection Impairment Control," Revision 21. This issue is captured in the licensee's corrective action program.
The failure to implement fire protection impairment control permit requirements and establish compensatory measures for the auxiliary building 1974' level was considered a performance deficiency. The inspectors determined that the finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of protection against external factors and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The finding was of very low safety significance because it involved compensatory measures for the fixed fire protection system and was assigned a low degradation rating since less than 10 percent of the fire detectors in the area were disabled. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the work practices component because the licensee failed to apply appropriate human error prevention techniques such as self and peer-checking prior to removing the fire detectors from service.
 
Inspection Report# : 2007002 (pdf)
Significance:        Dec 31, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to implement the reactor vessel closure head installation procedure The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, involving the licensee's failure to properly implement the reactor vessel closure head installation procedure during Refueling Outage 15. Specifically, on October 30, 2006, the licensee performed Procedure FHP 007B, Reactor Vessel Closure Head Installation," Revision 5. During the performance of Procedure FHP-02-007B, the licensee encountered problems with the polar crane that prevented the crane hoist from being lowered. The problems with the polar crane were encountered while the reactor vessel head was being transported along the North-South axis of the refueling cavity towards the reactor vessel. Consequently, the licensee transported the reactor vessel closure head approximately 3 feet over the reactor vessel flange while suspended approximately 4 feet above the operating deck. This condition was not allowed by procedure and exceeded the maximum analyzed height in the head drop analysis.
The failure to properly implement the reactor vessel closure head installation procedure was considered a performance deficiency. The finding was greater than minor because it affected the human performance attribute of mitigating systems cornerstone and the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events. Using Manual Chapter 0609 Appendix G, Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process Phase 1 worksheets, the finding was found to be of very low safety significance because it did not affect decay heat removal or reactor coolant system inventory. The inspectors determined that the finding has crosscutting aspects in the area of human performance associated with work practices because the licensee failed to use appropriate human error prevention techniques, such as self, peer-checking and not proceeding in the face of uncertainty. The inspectors also determined that the finding has crosscutting aspects in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with operating experience because the licensee failed to effectively communicate internally generated lessons learned following the procedural noncompliance during the Refueling Outage 13 reactor vessel head installation.
Inspection Report# : 2006005 (pdf)
Significance:        Oct 07, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate inspections of potentially defective pressure transmitter The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, regarding the failure to implement Administrative Procedure AP 28-011, Resolving Deficiencies Impacting SSCs, Revision 1. Procedure AP 28-011 requires that, during the operability determination process, a reasonable expectation must exist that the structure, system, or component is operable and that the prompt determination process will support that expectation.
Contrary to this requirement, reasonable expectation was not established for a deficiency affecting safety-related Barton pressure transmitters. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as Condition Report 2006-000895.
The failure to implement Procedure AP 28-011 following identification of a potential degraded condition was a performance deficiency. This finding was more than minor because it affected the equipment performance attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone and the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events. Using Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 worksheets, the inspectors determined that the finding is of very low significance because it did not represent a loss of a safety function or operability and was not potentially risk significant due to external events. The inspectors also determined that this finding has crosscutting aspects in the human performance area associated with decision making in that the licensee failed to use conservative assumptions in decision making and verify the validity of underlying assumptions for operability of the pressure transmitters, which resulted in indeterminate pressure transmitters remaining in service.
Inspection Report# : 2006004 (pdf)
Significance: TBD Dec 29, 2005 Identified By: NRC
 
Item Type: AV Apparent Violation Failure to Maintain Reactor Coolant System Subcooling During the Alternative Shutodwn The team identified an Apparent Violation of Wolf Creek License Condition 2.C.(5)(a) concerning an inadequate alternative shutdown analysis. The licensees alternative shutdown analysis was inadequate in that it used an acceptance criteria which was inconsistent with and less conservative than that required by the approved Fire Protection Program. The licensee developed Calculation Number AN-02-021, Revision 0, OFN RP-017, Control Room Evacuation, Consequence Evaluation, to demonstrate alternative shutdown capability for Wolf Creek in response to NRC-identified Noncited Violation 2002008-01, Inadequate alternative shutdown procedure. The calculation predicted that during an alternative shutdown, the reactor coolant system subcooling margin would not be maintained, significant voiding would occur in the core, and a steam void would form in the reactor vessel head. The licensee found the results of the calculation to be acceptable since it demonstrated that the void formation would be limited, natural circulation in the reactor coolant system would be maintained, sufficient decay heat removal would be maintained, and no fuel damage would occur. This is not consistent with the license condition to meet the technical requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R. Section III.L of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Alternative and dedicated shutdown capability, that states in part, During the postfire shutdown, the reactor process variables shall be maintained within those predicted for a loss of normal a.c. power.
This finding is greater than minor because it impacted the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to external events (such as fire) to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). It is the NRCs understanding that the licensee does not consider these circuit vulnerabilities to be violations of NRC requirements. The licensee considers the spurious operation of multiple components to be outside of the plant licensing basis for the Fire Protection Program. Specifically, in this case, both pressurizer power-operated relief valves are assumed to spuriously open because of fire induced circuit damage. The NRC staff and the industry are currently working on developing a resolution methodology to address these types of potential fire induced circuit failures. The team concluded that this violation meets the criteria of the NRC Enforcement Manual Section 8.1.7.1 for deferring enforcement actions for postulated fire induced circuit failures.
Inspection Report# : 2005008 (pdf)
Significance: TBD Dec 29, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: AV Apparent Violation Inadequate Alternataive Shutdown Procedure The team identified an Apparent Violation of Technical Specification 5.4, Procedures, due to an inadequate alternative shutdown procedure that is required for implementation of the Fire Protection Program. The team found that some time critical actions required to safely shutdown the plant following a control room fire could not be accomplished within the required time periods. Specifically, the team found that the recommendations by Westinghouse Owners Group for assuring reactor coolant pump seal reliability and avoiding component cooling water thermal barrier water hammer concerns would not be met if the operators had to respond to multiple spurious operations. The procedure was developed and verified based on a time line assuming operators only have to respond to one spurious operation from the fire induced damage during the scenario. The team disagrees with this limitation of potential spurious operations.
This finding is greater than minor because it impacted the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to external events (such as fire) to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). It is the NRCs understanding that the licensee does not consider these circuit vulnerabilities to be violations of NRC requirements. The licensee considers the spurious operation of multiple components to be outside of the plant licensing basis for the Fire Protection Program. The NRC staff and the industry are currently working on developing a resolution methodology to address these types of potential fire induced circuit failures. The team concluded that this violation meets the criteria of the NRC Enforcement Manual Section 8.1.7.1 for deferring enforcement actions for postulated fire induced circuit failures.
Inspection Report# : 2005008 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Significance:        Apr 07, 2007 Identified By: NRC
 
Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to maintain steady state reactor power at or below the licensed thermal power limit A noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a occurred when operators did not take timely action to lower power below the licensed thermal limit of 3565 MWt. During an incore to excore neutron detector calibration, the power level exceeded the limit and the operating crew did not insert negative reactivity until after the neutron detector calibration was complete. During this evolution, the reactor exceeded licensed thermal power of 3565 MWt for approximately 58 minutes, peaking at 3566.5 MWt according to the plant computer's 10 minute calorimetric. After the neutron detector calibration was completed, operators added boron to the reactor coolant system to reduce power below 100 percent. Procedure GEN 00-004, "Power Operation," Attachment B, Step B.1.1 states, in part, that exceeding 3565 MWt is permitted only as a result of transients or computer point fluctuations. The inspectors judged that allowing reactor power to ascend above 100 percent for nearly an hour was not a transient. However, operators did not initiate action in accordance with Step B.1.1 when the 10 minute average exceeded 3565 MWt until approximately 40 minutes elapsed. This issue is entered into the corrective action program.
The failure to maintain steady state reactor power at or below the licensed thermal power limit is a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because it is associated with the configuration control attribute for the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone; and, it affected the cornerstone objective of providing reasonable assurance that physical design barriers (fuel cladding, reactor coolant system, and containment) protect the public from radio nuclide releases caused by accidents or events. The finding was of very low safety significance because the fuel cladding barrier was affected but did not affect the reactor coolant system or containment barriers. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the decision making component because the licensee did not ensure that licensed operators used conservative assumptions in their decision making when reactor power increased above the licensed limit for an extended period.
Inspection Report# : 2007002 (pdf)
Significance:        Apr 07, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to remove the correct containment radiation monitor from service A self-revealing noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1 occurred on February 20, 2007, when a chemistry technician inadvertently removed both containment purge radiation Monitors GTRE22 and GTRE33 from service at the same time. During planned maintenance on the safety-related GTRE33 containment purge radiation monitor, a chemistry technician inadvertently removed the incorrect containment purge radiation monitor from service. After contacting the control room, the shift chemist went to GTRE22 and incorrectly removed the radiation monitor from service. Instrumentation and controls personnel working at GTRE33 informed the shift chemist that the incorrect radiation monitor was removed from service. The shift chemist subsequently returned GTRE22 to service. Technical Specification 3.3.6, Condition A, was entered for having more than one train inoperable. The containment purge and supply dampers were immediately verified to be closed and remained closed with no containment purge in progress.
This issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action program.
The inspectors determined that the failure to remove the correct containment radiation monitor from service was a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because it is associated with the configuration control attribute for the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone; and it affected the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers (fuel cladding, reactor coolant system, and containment) protect the public from radio nuclide releases caused by accidents for events. The finding was of very low safety significance because both trains of the radiation monitor protective functions (i.e., to stop a containment purge on a high radiation signal) were affected but did not result in an actual open pathway in the containment barrier. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the work practices component because the shift chemist failed to apply appropriate human error prevention techniques such as self and peer-checks.
Inspection Report# : 2007002 (pdf)
Significance:        Oct 07, 2006 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to completely close SFP valves resulted in a loss of SFP water inventory A self-revealing noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a was identified for the failure to close Valves
 
EC-V025 and -V033 during a lineup to recirculate the refueling water storage tank through the spent fuel pool cleanup system. These two systems were cross- connected for approximately 26 hours, which resulted in approximately 1200 gallons of spent fuel pool water being inadvertently transferred to the refueling water storage tank. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as Condition Report 2006-000589.
The failure to completely close Valves EC-V025 and -V033 was a performance deficiency. This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the barrier integrity cornerstone attribute of configuration control and affected the cornerstone objective to maintain functionality of the spent fuel pool system. Using Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 worksheets, the inspectors determined that the finding is only of very low significance because the finding only affected the barrier function of the spent fuel pool. The inspectors also determined that the finding has crosscutting aspects in the area of human performance associated with work practices because the operators failed to use appropriate human error prevention techniques, such as peer-checking and not proceeding in the face of uncertainty. This led to 1200 gallons of spent fuel pool water being inadvertently transferred to the refueling water storage tank.
Inspection Report# : 2006004 (pdf)
Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Significance:      Apr 07, 2007 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to perform an adequate survey in a high radiation area The inspector reviewed a self-revealing noncited violation of 10 CFR 20.1501(a) because the licensee failed to perform an adequate survey in a high radiation area. On March 7, 2007, a health physics technician performed a survey of Floor Drain Tank Room 7126 in the radwaste building to support a task performed by two radwaste operators. The health physics technician surveyed the immediate work area and informed the operators that general work area dose rates were 10 millirem per hour. Based on this information, operators entered the posted high radiation area on a radiation work permit that had an electronic dosimeter dose rate set point of 50 millirem per hour. One of the operators received a dose rate alarm while performing the task, the operators exited the area, and contacted health physics personnel. Subsequent investigation identified that a comprehensive survey of the entire room was not performed. Follow-up surveys indicated that dose rates in the room were as high as 150 millirem per hour at 30 centimeters from the floor drain tank. This issue has been entered into the licensee's corrective action program.
The finding was greater than minor because it was associated with the Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone attribute of Exposure Control, and affected the cornerstone objective because workers could have received additional radiation dose. The finding was processed through the Occupational Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process and determined to be of very low safety significance because it was not an as low as is reasonably achievable finding, there was no overexposure or substantial potential for an overexposure, and the ability to assess dose was not compromised. Additionally, this finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance related to work controls because the failure to incorporate job site conditions impacted the margin of radiological safety provided by an adequate survey.
Inspection Report# : 2007002 (pdf)
Significance:      Dec 31, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to provide instructions to workers The inspector identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR 19.12(a)(2) because the licensee failed to provide instructions to a worker on how to minimize exposure while working with radioactive material and contaminated equipment.
 
Specifically, on October 18, 2006, a worker on the Steam Generator A platform received an intake of Cobalt-58 while removing contaminated conduit from the primary side of the steam generator and placing it in a radioactive material bag for storage. The worker was wearing a face shield; however, the inspector identified that the licensee failed to provide the worker with instructions on how to minimize exposure to radioactive material while performing this task.
The licensees corrective actions included providing workers with powered face shields that blow air away from the face. This finding was entered into the licensees corrective action program.
The finding was greater than minor because it was associated with the Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone attribute of Exposure Control, and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the adequate protection of a workers health and safety from exposure to radioactive materials because a worker received an unintended internal dose. The finding was processed through the Occupational Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process and determined to be of very low safety significance because it was not an as low as is reasonably achievable finding, there was no overexposure or substantial potential for an overexposure, and the ability to assess dose was not compromised.
Additionally, this finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance related to work practices because the licensee did not ensure supervisory oversight of work activities such that exposure to radioactive material was minimized and properly controlled.
Inspection Report# : 2006005 (pdf)
Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Significance:        Apr 07, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to maintaini sufficient records to furnish evidence of events significant to plant safety A noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a was identified for failure to maintain sufficient records (logs) to furnish evidence of events significant to plant safety. On January 26, 2007, electrical maintenance commenced a scheduled replacement of main control board Annunciator Power Supply E1PS5. During the power supply replacement, a loss of 8.7 percent of the annunciators was expected. However, during de-termination of the power supply leads, an unexpected loss of a significant number of the main control board annunciators occurred.
Subsequently, due to the large number of annunciator inputs that were lost, the plant computer became overloaded and stopped updating. Based on these indications, the control room operators would need to evaluate emergency action level and Technical Specification requirements. The inspectors discovered during interviews with the operations crew that was on watch during the event, that no information was recorded or kept during the event. Administrative Procedure AP 21-001, "Conduct of Operations," Revision 36A, requires operators to make plant log entries of potentially reportable occurrences, entries that could be useful in reconstructing events, and events significant to plant safety. However, the logs were not updated until several hours later based on verbal accounts provided to the oncoming crew. The inspectors noted that the 'after the fact' log entries still provided insufficient data to reconstruct the activities related to the loss of annunciators. This issue is captured in the licensee's corrective action program.
The failure to adequately document times and information for the loss of annunciators was considered to be a performance deficiency. This finding was more than minor because it could impact the operator's ability to accurately implement emergency action levels and Technical Specification action statements and if left uncorrected, this type of insufficient documentation could become a more significant safety concern. The finding required NRC management
 
review and was determined to be of very low safety significance because the loss of annunciators challenged the emergency action level time requirements but was restored prior to exceeding any emergency action level or Technical Specification action time requirement. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the work practices component because the licensee failed to effectively communicate expectations regarding plant operating log entries in accordance with procedural requirements.
Inspection Report# : 2007002 (pdf)
Significance:        Apr 07, 2007 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to maintain drawings technically accurate A self-revealing finding was identified regarding inadequate engineering drawings used as guidance to replace main control board annunciator power supplies resulting in a loss of all main control board annunciators. During de-termination of the power supply leads, an unexpected loss of a significant number of the annunciators occurred.
During the planning review of Work Order 06 280217 003, "Replace Power Supply RK045E1PS5," the electricians brought forth a concern about the daisy chaining of the leads associated with the main control board power supplies and not knowing what effect removing a power supply would have on additional annunciators. System engineering reviewed vendor drawings and determined that only the expected annunciators would be lost. The vendor drawings only consisted of discrete wire connections from the power supply to the logic bus and did not show interconnections with any other power supplies. Although, it was acknowledged by system engineering that there were numerous daisy chained connections not shown on the vendor drawings, no further reviews or research was conducted. The licensee's root cause analysis determined that the vendor drawings did not show the interconnecting wiring identifying point to point connections associated with the main control board power supplies. This issue is captured in the licensee's corrective action program.
The failure to maintain drawings technically accurate and reflect the as-built condition of the plant was considered to be a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because it impacted the maintenance technicians ability to accurately plan and implement work, resulting in the annunciator system being adversely affected and could be reasonably viewed as a precursor to a significant event. The finding required NRC management review and was determined to be of very low safety significance because the finding did not result in a loss of a system safety function or a loss of risk significant equipment for greater than 24 hours. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the human performance area associated with the resources component because the licensee failed to maintain complete, accurate and up-to-date design documentation.
Inspection Report# : 2007002 (pdf)
Last modified : August 24, 2007
 
Wolf Creek 1 3Q/2007 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance:      Jul 07, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Identify Cause of Component Cooling Water Valve Closures The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Conditions Adverse to Quality, involving Wolf Creeks failure to identify and correct the cause of the reactor coolant pump (RCP) thermal barrier component cooling water heat exchanger outlet valves stroking closed on high flow. Specifically, between 2001 and 2007, Wolf Creek experienced repeated cases of the RCP thermal barrier component cooling water heat exchanger outlet valves stroking closed when two component cooling water pumps are started during train swaps.
Wolf Creek evaluated the issue after inspector questioning but did not review the impact of the valves stroking closed during design basis events or accidents and the operators ability to open them given the valves circuit breakers opening. Wolf Creek has further condition reports open on this finding.
The failure to identify and correct the condition adverse to quality of ensuring RCP seal cooling as described in the Updated Safety Analysis Report is a performance deficiency. The finding is more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute for the Initiating Events Cornerstone; and, it affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. The finding is determined to be of very low safety significance because the finding would not result in exceeding the Technical Specification limit for identified reactor coolant system leakage and would not have affected other mitigation systems resulting in a total loss of their safety function. The cause of the finding has problem identification and resolution crosscutting aspects in the area of corrective action because Wolf Creek did not thoroughly evaluate the issue such that the resolution addressed the extent of conditions given multiple opportunities documented in the corrective action program (P.1(c)).
Inspection Report# : 2007003 (pdf)
Significance:      Jul 07, 2007 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: FIN Finding Inadequate Inspections of Circulating Water Pump Auto Transformers A self-revealing finding for failing to identify degraded circulating water pump auto transformers during inspections in April 2007. Specifically, Wolf Creek failed to adequately inspect and identify signs of overheating and degradation during inspection of the excitation auto transformers for the circulating water pumps. Consequently, the unidentified degraded condition resulted in the circulating water Pump A tripping and an automatic turbine load reduction on May 25, 2007. Wolf Creek has replaced the failed auto transformer and is planning a modification to increase the size of the transformers to reduce overheating.
The failure to perform adequate inspections of the circulating water Pump A excitation auto transformer was considered a performance deficiency. The finding is more than minor because it is associated with the Initiating Events Cornerstone because the deficiency affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the issue did not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions would not be available. The cause of the finding has human performance crosscutting aspects in the area of work practices because Wolf Creek did not follow maintenance procedures and did not ensure oversight of work activities such that nuclear safety was supported (H.4(b)).
Inspection Report# : 2007003 (pdf)
Significance:      Oct 07, 2006
 
Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to follow procedure results in loss of coolant charging flow The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a involving the licensee's failure to follow a procedure that resulted in a loss of coolant charging flow during a planned surveillance. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as Condition Report 2006-0002030.
The failure to follow station procedures was considered a performance deficiency. This finding was more than minor because it affected the human performance attribute of the initiating events cornerstone and the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions. Using Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 worksheets, this finding screened to a Phase 2 analysis because it affected both the initiating events and mitigating system cornerstones. The inspectors performed a Phase 2 analysis using Appendix A, "Technical Basis For At Power Significance Determination Process," of Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process," and the Phase 2 worksheets for the Wolf Creek Generating Station.
Based on the results of the Phase 2 analysis, the finding is determined to have very low safety significance. The inspectors also determined that the finding has crosscutting aspects in the area of human performance associated with work practices because the operator' failure to use appropriate human error prevention techniques, such as self-checking, peer-checking, and the operator's choice to proceed in the face of uncertainty, resulted in a loss of coolant charging flow.
Inspection Report# : 2006004 (pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance:        Jul 20, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Procedure for Restoration of the Emergency Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Transfer Pump Control Circuit Following a Fire Requiring Control Room Evacuation The team identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, for the licensees inadequate procedure for remotely starting the emergency diesel generator fuel oil transfer pump following a fire in the control room.
Specifically, the governing procedure failed to include the necessary actions to replace the control power fuse in the associated motor control center, which would likely be blown as a result of the fire-induced circuit failures assumed in the licensees analysis for the control room fire. In addition, the licensee had failed to specify and stage the control power fuse and fuse puller that could be required for timely restoration of the emergency diesel generator fuel oil transfer pump to service following the control room fire. This issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report 2007-02790.
The finding was more than minor because it is associated with the mitigating systems cornerstone attribute of procedural quality and affected the associated cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The Phase 1 worksheets in Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process," were used to conclude that analysis with Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection Findings Significance Determination Process, was required because the issue involved a degradation in fire protection defense-in-depth strategies. A Phase 3 review was then performed by a senior reactor analyst who determined the finding to be of very low safety significance because of the low probability of a fire in relevant cabinets that would result in a control room evacuation.
Inspection Report# : 2007006 (pdf)
Significance:        Jul 20, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Design Control Associated with Vortexing Calculation The team identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, in that, the licensee did not ensure adequate suction submergence for the containment spray pumps by not properly translating
 
vortex design parameters into calculations relative to the refueling water storage tank. Specifically, the licensee used a non-conservative method to calculate the level required to prevent pump vortexing in the refueling water storage tank.
The licensee entered the issue into their corrective action program as Condition Report 2007-02597 and revised the affected calculations.
The finding was more than minor because it is associated with the mitigating systems cornerstone attribute of design control and affected the associated cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using the Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 Worksheet, the finding is determined to have very low safety significance because it was a design deficiency that did not result in a loss of operability. The finding had crosscutting aspects in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program (P.1(a))
because the licensee did not identify an issue in a timely manner, commensurate with its safety significance.
Inspection Report# : 2007006 (pdf)
Significance:        Jul 20, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Identify and Correct Discolored Boric Acid Deposits The team identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for the failure to identify and take timely corrective action to correct indications of material wastage at the base of the Refueling Water Storage Tank. Specifically, the licensee did not recognize and take actions to prevent recurring discolored boric acid deposits for approximately 9 years. This issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report 2007-02742.
The finding was more than minor because if left uncorrected it would become a more significant safety concern in that continued wastage could impact component operability. Using the Phase 1 worksheets in Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process," the finding was determined to have very low safety significance because it did not result in a system or component being inoperabe and it did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The finding had crosscutting aspects in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program (P.1(c) because the licensee failed to thoroughly evaluate the problem such that the resolution addressed the cause and extent of condition.
Inspection Report# : 2007006 (pdf)
Significance:        Jul 20, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Nonconservative Battery Intercell Connection Resistance Value Specified in Design Calculation The team identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for the failure of the licensee to ensure that the 125 Vdc safety-related batteries would remain operable if all the intercell and terminal connections were at the resistance value of 150 micro-ohms as allowed by Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.8.4.5. The licensees design calculation used a non-conservative value. This issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report 2007-02492.
The finding was more than minor because it is associated with the mitigating systems cornerstone attribute of design control and affected the associated cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 Worksheet, the finding was determined to have very low safety significance because it was a design deficiency confirmed not to result in a loss of operability. The finding had crosscutting aspects in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program (P.1(a)) because the licensee did not implement a program with a low threshold for identifying this issue and the licensee did not identify the issue completely, accurately, and in a timely manner.
Inspection Report# : 2007006 (pdf)
Significance:        Jul 20, 2007 Identified By: NRC
 
Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Battery Surfaces Not Cleaned as Required by Procedure The team identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, for the licensees failure to clean electrolyte from the outside surfaces of the 125 Vdc safety-related batteries in accordance with procedures.
Specifically, surveillance procedures for the 125 Vdc batteries required appropriate cleaning of electrolyte on battery cell covers following specific gravity checks, however, maintenance personnel did not perform this cleaning. The licensee has entered this issue into their corrective action program as Condition Report 2007-02580.
The finding was more than minor because if left uncorrected the finding would become a more significant safety concern due to the corrosive effects of electrolyte on battery posts and terminal connections. Using the Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process," Phase 1 Worksheet, the finding was determined to have very low safety significance because it did not result in a design qualification deficiency or loss of function and it did not screen as risk significant due to external events. The finding had crosscutting aspects in the area of human performance associated with work practices (H.4(a)) because of insufficient communication of human error prevention techniques to maintenance personnel, specifically with respect to self and peer checking.
Inspection Report# : 2007006 (pdf)
Significance:      Jul 20, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Normal Charging Pump Balance Line Crack The team reviewed a self-revealing finding associated with the licensees failure to correct normal charging pump balance line vibrations in a timely manner. Because the licensee did not address the extended time and periodically increased magnitude of the vibrations, the balance line cracked, rendering the pump inoperable. This issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report 2007-02339.
The finding was more than minor because it is associated with the mitigating systems cornerstone attribute of equipment performance and affected the associated cornerstone objective ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using the Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process," Phase 1 Worksheet, the finding was determined to have very low safety significance because the finding did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The finding had crosscutting aspects in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program (P.1(d)) in that licensee personnel did not take corrective actions to address a safety issue in a timely manner, commensurate with its safety significance.
Inspection Report# : 2007006 (pdf)
Significance:      Jul 20, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Inadequate Procedure for Maintaining Drains Capable of Functioning The team identified a finding associated with the licensees failure to maintain a procedure which ensured that control building room drains remained available to pass their design flows for postulated flooding events. As a result of the licensees procedure and practices, debris and items were found in control building room drains. This issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report 2007-02753.
The finding was more than minor because if left uncorrected it would become a more significant safety concern. This finding affected the mitigating systems cornerstone. Using the Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process," Phase 1 Worksheet, the finding is determined to have very low safety significance because the finding did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The finding had crosscutting aspects in the area of human performance associated with work practices (H.4(b)) because the licensee did not define and effectively communicate expectations regarding procedural compliance and personnel following procedures.
Inspection Report# : 2007006 (pdf)
Significance:      Jul 20, 2007
 
Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Diesel Generator Frequency Variation Not Considered in Loading Calculations The team identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, having very low safety significance for the licensees failure to account for the effect of emergency diesel generator frequency variation in the diesel loading calculations. Specifically, emergency diesel generator loading was based on nominal 60 hertz operation of pumps and fans and did not account for the 2 percent variation allowed by Technical Specifications.
The licensee has entered this issue into their corrective action program as Condition Report 2007-02683.
The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the mitigating systems cornerstone attribute of design control and affected the associated cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, based on preliminary calculations, the failure to account for frequency variations had more than a minimal effect on the outcome of the analysis in that the continuous load rating for the emergency diesel generators would have been exceeded in the recirculation phase of a loss-of-coolant accident with the assumed loads. The team determined that the finding screened as very low safety significance (Green) because it was a design or qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in loss of operability.
Inspection Report# : 2007006 (pdf)
Significance:        Jul 07, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Implement Manual Actions A noncited violation of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) was identified for failure to adequately assess and manage the increase in risk during observation of a scheduled emergency diesel generator surveillance. On January 4, 2007, inspectors observed the emergency diesel Generator A hot start surveillance test and questioned plant operators regarding operability in Modes 1 or 2 of the emergency diesel generator while paralleled with the grid based on operating experience. The inspectors noted that operations personnel did not have a written set of steps or procedures identified for restoration of the emergency diesel generator, and would have to diagnose what restoration activities would have to be taken at the time of an emergency start demand based upon the step of the surveillance procedure in effect at the time the emergency start demand occurred. The inspectors also identified that operations personnel were unaware of the limiting response time for operator manual actions specified in Amendment 154 that approved testing in Modes 1 or 2. Wolf Creek has developed manual actions for restoration of the emergency diesel generator during testing.
The failure to adequately assess and manage the increase in risk for the use of operator manual actions to ensure emergency diesel generator availability during surveillance testing was a performance deficiency. The finding is similar to the minor example 7(g) and is more than minor because it is associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of protection against external factors, and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The finding was of very low safety significance because the magnitude of the calculated risk deficit was less than 1 x 10-6 and other risk management actions were in place.
Inspection Report# : 2007003 (pdf)
Significance:        Apr 07, 2007 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to implement fire protection impairment control permit requirements and compensatory measures A self-revealing noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.d was identified for failure to implement fire protection impairment control permit requirements and compensatory measures when operators incorrectly disabled three fire detectors in the auxiliary building. The detectors in the auxiliary building were disabled without a proper fire impairment control permit and the required compensatory roving hourly fire watch for a period of approximately 5 hours as required by Administrative Procedure AP 10 103, "Fire Protection Impairment Control," Revision 21. This issue is captured in the licensee's corrective action program.
The failure to implement fire protection impairment control permit requirements and establish compensatory measures for the auxiliary building 1974' level was considered a performance deficiency. The inspectors determined that the finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of protection against external factors and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability of systems that respond to
 
initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The finding was of very low safety significance because it involved compensatory measures for the fixed fire protection system and was assigned a low degradation rating since less than 10 percent of the fire detectors in the area were disabled. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the work practices component because the licensee failed to apply appropriate human error prevention techniques such as self and peer-checking prior to removing the fire detectors from service.
Inspection Report# : 2007002 (pdf)
Significance:        Dec 31, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to implement the reactor vessel closure head installation procedure The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, involving the licensee's failure to properly implement the reactor vessel closure head installation procedure during Refueling Outage 15. Specifically, on October 30, 2006, the licensee performed Procedure FHP 007B, Reactor Vessel Closure Head Installation," Revision 5. During the performance of Procedure FHP-02-007B, the licensee encountered problems with the polar crane that prevented the crane hoist from being lowered. The problems with the polar crane were encountered while the reactor vessel head was being transported along the North-South axis of the refueling cavity towards the reactor vessel. Consequently, the licensee transported the reactor vessel closure head approximately 3 feet over the reactor vessel flange while suspended approximately 4 feet above the operating deck. This condition was not allowed by procedure and exceeded the maximum analyzed height in the head drop analysis.
The failure to properly implement the reactor vessel closure head installation procedure was considered a performance deficiency. The finding was greater than minor because it affected the human performance attribute of mitigating systems cornerstone and the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events. Using Manual Chapter 0609 Appendix G, Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process Phase 1 worksheets, the finding was found to be of very low safety significance because it did not affect decay heat removal or reactor coolant system inventory. The inspectors determined that the finding has crosscutting aspects in the area of human performance associated with work practices because the licensee failed to use appropriate human error prevention techniques, such as self, peer-checking and not proceeding in the face of uncertainty. The inspectors also determined that the finding has crosscutting aspects in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with operating experience because the licensee failed to effectively communicate internally generated lessons learned following the procedural noncompliance during the Refueling Outage 13 reactor vessel head installation.
Inspection Report# : 2006005 (pdf)
Significance:        Oct 07, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate inspections of potentially defective pressure transmitter The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, regarding the failure to implement Administrative Procedure AP 28-011, Resolving Deficiencies Impacting SSCs, Revision 1. Procedure AP 28-011 requires that, during the operability determination process, a reasonable expectation must exist that the structure, system, or component is operable and that the prompt determination process will support that expectation.
Contrary to this requirement, reasonable expectation was not established for a deficiency affecting safety-related Barton pressure transmitters. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as Condition Report 2006-000895.
The failure to implement Procedure AP 28-011 following identification of a potential degraded condition was a performance deficiency. This finding was more than minor because it affected the equipment performance attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone and the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events. Using Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 worksheets, the inspectors determined that the finding is of very low significance because it did not represent a loss of a safety function or operability and was not potentially risk significant due to external events. The inspectors also determined that this finding has crosscutting aspects in the human performance area associated with decision
 
making in that the licensee failed to use conservative assumptions in decision making and verify the validity of underlying assumptions for operability of the pressure transmitters, which resulted in indeterminate pressure transmitters remaining in service.
Inspection Report# : 2006004 (pdf)
Significance: TBD Dec 29, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: AV Apparent Violation Failure to Maintain Reactor Coolant System Subcooling During the Alternative Shutodwn The team identified an Apparent Violation of Wolf Creek License Condition 2.C.(5)(a) concerning an inadequate alternative shutdown analysis. The licensees alternative shutdown analysis was inadequate in that it used an acceptance criteria which was inconsistent with and less conservative than that required by the approved Fire Protection Program. The licensee developed Calculation Number AN-02-021, Revision 0, OFN RP-017, Control Room Evacuation, Consequence Evaluation, to demonstrate alternative shutdown capability for Wolf Creek in response to NRC-identified Noncited Violation 2002008-01, Inadequate alternative shutdown procedure. The calculation predicted that during an alternative shutdown, the reactor coolant system subcooling margin would not be maintained, significant voiding would occur in the core, and a steam void would form in the reactor vessel head. The licensee found the results of the calculation to be acceptable since it demonstrated that the void formation would be limited, natural circulation in the reactor coolant system would be maintained, sufficient decay heat removal would be maintained, and no fuel damage would occur. This is not consistent with the license condition to meet the technical requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R. Section III.L of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Alternative and dedicated shutdown capability, that states in part, During the postfire shutdown, the reactor process variables shall be maintained within those predicted for a loss of normal a.c. power.
This finding is greater than minor because it impacted the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to external events (such as fire) to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). It is the NRCs understanding that the licensee does not consider these circuit vulnerabilities to be violations of NRC requirements. The licensee considers the spurious operation of multiple components to be outside of the plant licensing basis for the Fire Protection Program. Specifically, in this case, both pressurizer power-operated relief valves are assumed to spuriously open because of fire induced circuit damage. The NRC staff and the industry are currently working on developing a resolution methodology to address these types of potential fire induced circuit failures. The team concluded that this violation meets the criteria of the NRC Enforcement Manual Section 8.1.7.1 for deferring enforcement actions for postulated fire induced circuit failures.
Inspection Report# : 2005008 (pdf)
Significance: TBD Dec 29, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: AV Apparent Violation Inadequate Alternataive Shutdown Procedure The team identified an Apparent Violation of Technical Specification 5.4, Procedures, due to an inadequate alternative shutdown procedure that is required for implementation of the Fire Protection Program. The team found that some time critical actions required to safely shutdown the plant following a control room fire could not be accomplished within the required time periods. Specifically, the team found that the recommendations by Westinghouse Owners Group for assuring reactor coolant pump seal reliability and avoiding component cooling water thermal barrier water hammer concerns would not be met if the operators had to respond to multiple spurious operations. The procedure was developed and verified based on a time line assuming operators only have to respond to one spurious operation from the fire induced damage during the scenario. The team disagrees with this limitation of potential spurious operations.
This finding is greater than minor because it impacted the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to external events (such as fire) to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). It is the NRCs understanding that the licensee does not consider these circuit vulnerabilities to be violations of NRC requirements. The licensee considers the spurious operation of multiple components to be outside of the plant licensing basis for the Fire Protection Program. The NRC staff and the industry are currently working on developing a resolution methodology to address these types of potential fire induced circuit failures. The team concluded that this violation meets the criteria of the NRC Enforcement Manual Section 8.1.7.1 for deferring enforcement actions for postulated fire induced circuit failures.
Inspection Report# : 2005008 (pdf)
 
Barrier Integrity Significance:      Jul 07, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Establish an Adequate Preventive Maintenance Program The inspectors identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a in which Wolf Creek did not implement a preventive maintenance procedure to mitigate Train B emergency exhaust system fan bearing vibrations which resulted in a degraded condition. Specifically, the vendor manual directs lubrication every 3 to 12 months (3 to 6 months for average conditions being room temperature and clean conditions) to prevent oxidation and breakdown of the grease; however, the Wolf Creek recurring preventive maintenance was set to lubricate the bearings every three years. This recurring preventive maintenance was not sufficient to ensure the bearings remained adequately lubricated.
It was not until NRC questioning that Wolf Creek generated a condition report to review the past condition of the bearings and the appropriateness of the recurring lubrication interval for the bearings.
The licensees failure to implement preventive maintenance to ensure the fan bearings were adequately lubricated is a performance deficiency. The finding is more than minor because it is associated with the barrier performance attribute of the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone; and, it affected the cornerstone objective to maintain radiological barrier functionality of the auxiliary and fuel building. The finding is of very low safety significance because the issue only represents a degradation of the radiological barrier function provided for the auxiliary or fuel building barriers to mitigate airborne radionuclides from emergency core cooling system pump cubicles or a fuel handling accident, respectively. The cause of the finding has problem identification and resolution crosscutting aspects in the area of corrective action because Wolf Creek did not evaluate or resolve the causes of repeated bearing degradation by thoroughly evaluating problems such that the resolutions address causes and extent of the conditions (P.1(c)).
Inspection Report# : 2007003 (pdf)
Significance:      Jul 07, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Follow Test Control Procedures to Demonstrate Operability The inspectors identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a in which Wolf Creek did not implement a preventive maintenance procedure to mitigate Train B emergency exhaust system fan bearing vibrations which resulted in a degraded condition. Specifically, the vendor manual directs lubrication every 3 to 12 months (3 to 6 months for average conditions being room temperature and clean conditions) to prevent oxidation and breakdown of the grease; however, the Wolf Creek recurring preventive maintenance was set to lubricate the bearings every three years. This recurring preventive maintenance was not sufficient to ensure the bearings remained adequately lubricated.
It was not until NRC questioning that Wolf Creek generated a condition report to review the past condition of the bearings and the appropriateness of the recurring lubrication interval for the bearings.
The licensees failure to implement preventive maintenance to ensure the fan bearings were adequately lubricated is a performance deficiency. The finding is more than minor because it is associated with the barrier performance attribute of the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone; and, it affected the cornerstone objective to maintain radiological barrier functionality of the auxiliary and fuel building. The finding is of very low safety significance because the issue only represents a degradation of the radiological barrier function provided for the auxiliary or fuel building barriers to mitigate airborne radionuclides from emergency core cooling system pump cubicles or a fuel handling accident, respectively. The cause of the finding has problem identification and resolution crosscutting aspects in the area of corrective action because Wolf Creek did not evaluate or resolve the causes of repeated bearing degradation by thoroughly evaluating problems such that the resolutions address causes and extent of the conditions (P.1(c)).
Inspection Report# : 2007003 (pdf)
Significance:      Apr 07, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to maintain steady state reactor power at or below the licensed thermal power limit A noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a occurred when operators did not take timely action to lower power below the licensed thermal limit of 3565 MWt. During an incore to excore neutron detector calibration, the
 
power level exceeded the limit and the operating crew did not insert negative reactivity until after the neutron detector calibration was complete. During this evolution, the reactor exceeded licensed thermal power of 3565 MWt for approximately 58 minutes, peaking at 3566.5 MWt according to the plant computer's 10 minute calorimetric. After the neutron detector calibration was completed, operators added boron to the reactor coolant system to reduce power below 100 percent. Procedure GEN 00-004, "Power Operation," Attachment B, Step B.1.1 states, in part, that exceeding 3565 MWt is permitted only as a result of transients or computer point fluctuations. The inspectors judged that allowing reactor power to ascend above 100 percent for nearly an hour was not a transient. However, operators did not initiate action in accordance with Step B.1.1 when the 10 minute average exceeded 3565 MWt until approximately 40 minutes elapsed. This issue is entered into the corrective action program.
The failure to maintain steady state reactor power at or below the licensed thermal power limit is a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because it is associated with the configuration control attribute for the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone; and, it affected the cornerstone objective of providing reasonable assurance that physical design barriers (fuel cladding, reactor coolant system, and containment) protect the public from radio nuclide releases caused by accidents or events. The finding was of very low safety significance because the fuel cladding barrier was affected but did not affect the reactor coolant system or containment barriers. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the decision making component because the licensee did not ensure that licensed operators used conservative assumptions in their decision making when reactor power increased above the licensed limit for an extended period.
Inspection Report# : 2007002 (pdf)
Significance:        Apr 07, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to remove the correct containment radiation monitor from service A self-revealing noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1 occurred on February 20, 2007, when a chemistry technician inadvertently removed both containment purge radiation Monitors GTRE22 and GTRE33 from service at the same time. During planned maintenance on the safety-related GTRE33 containment purge radiation monitor, a chemistry technician inadvertently removed the incorrect containment purge radiation monitor from service. After contacting the control room, the shift chemist went to GTRE22 and incorrectly removed the radiation monitor from service. Instrumentation and controls personnel working at GTRE33 informed the shift chemist that the incorrect radiation monitor was removed from service. The shift chemist subsequently returned GTRE22 to service. Technical Specification 3.3.6, Condition A, was entered for having more than one train inoperable. The containment purge and supply dampers were immediately verified to be closed and remained closed with no containment purge in progress.
This issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action program.
The inspectors determined that the failure to remove the correct containment radiation monitor from service was a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because it is associated with the configuration control attribute for the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone; and it affected the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers (fuel cladding, reactor coolant system, and containment) protect the public from radio nuclide releases caused by accidents for events. The finding was of very low safety significance because both trains of the radiation monitor protective functions (i.e., to stop a containment purge on a high radiation signal) were affected but did not result in an actual open pathway in the containment barrier. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the work practices component because the shift chemist failed to apply appropriate human error prevention techniques such as self and peer-checks.
Inspection Report# : 2007002 (pdf)
Significance:        Oct 07, 2006 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to completely close SFP valves resulted in a loss of SFP water inventory A self-revealing noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a was identified for the failure to close Valves EC-V025 and -V033 during a lineup to recirculate the refueling water storage tank through the spent fuel pool cleanup system. These two systems were cross- connected for approximately 26 hours, which resulted in approximately 1200 gallons of spent fuel pool water being inadvertently transferred to the refueling water storage tank. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as Condition Report 2006-000589.
 
The failure to completely close Valves EC-V025 and -V033 was a performance deficiency. This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the barrier integrity cornerstone attribute of configuration control and affected the cornerstone objective to maintain functionality of the spent fuel pool system. Using Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 worksheets, the inspectors determined that the finding is only of very low significance because the finding only affected the barrier function of the spent fuel pool. The inspectors also determined that the finding has crosscutting aspects in the area of human performance associated with work practices because the operators failed to use appropriate human error prevention techniques, such as peer-checking and not proceeding in the face of uncertainty. This led to 1200 gallons of spent fuel pool water being inadvertently transferred to the refueling water storage tank.
Inspection Report# : 2006004 (pdf)
Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Significance:      Apr 07, 2007 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to perform an adequate survey in a high radiation area The inspector reviewed a self-revealing noncited violation of 10 CFR 20.1501(a) because the licensee failed to perform an adequate survey in a high radiation area. On March 7, 2007, a health physics technician performed a survey of Floor Drain Tank Room 7126 in the radwaste building to support a task performed by two radwaste operators. The health physics technician surveyed the immediate work area and informed the operators that general work area dose rates were 10 millirem per hour. Based on this information, operators entered the posted high radiation area on a radiation work permit that had an electronic dosimeter dose rate set point of 50 millirem per hour. One of the operators received a dose rate alarm while performing the task, the operators exited the area, and contacted health physics personnel. Subsequent investigation identified that a comprehensive survey of the entire room was not performed. Follow-up surveys indicated that dose rates in the room were as high as 150 millirem per hour at 30 centimeters from the floor drain tank. This issue has been entered into the licensee's corrective action program.
The finding was greater than minor because it was associated with the Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone attribute of Exposure Control, and affected the cornerstone objective because workers could have received additional radiation dose. The finding was processed through the Occupational Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process and determined to be of very low safety significance because it was not an as low as is reasonably achievable finding, there was no overexposure or substantial potential for an overexposure, and the ability to assess dose was not compromised. Additionally, this finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance related to work controls because the failure to incorporate job site conditions impacted the margin of radiological safety provided by an adequate survey.
Inspection Report# : 2007002 (pdf)
Significance:      Dec 31, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to provide instructions to workers The inspector identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR 19.12(a)(2) because the licensee failed to provide instructions to a worker on how to minimize exposure while working with radioactive material and contaminated equipment.
Specifically, on October 18, 2006, a worker on the Steam Generator A platform received an intake of Cobalt-58 while removing contaminated conduit from the primary side of the steam generator and placing it in a radioactive material bag for storage. The worker was wearing a face shield; however, the inspector identified that the licensee failed to provide the worker with instructions on how to minimize exposure to radioactive material while performing this task.
 
The licensees corrective actions included providing workers with powered face shields that blow air away from the face. This finding was entered into the licensees corrective action program.
The finding was greater than minor because it was associated with the Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone attribute of Exposure Control, and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the adequate protection of a workers health and safety from exposure to radioactive materials because a worker received an unintended internal dose. The finding was processed through the Occupational Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process and determined to be of very low safety significance because it was not an as low as is reasonably achievable finding, there was no overexposure or substantial potential for an overexposure, and the ability to assess dose was not compromised.
Additionally, this finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance related to work practices because the licensee did not ensure supervisory oversight of work activities such that exposure to radioactive material was minimized and properly controlled.
Inspection Report# : 2006005 (pdf)
Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Significance:        Apr 07, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to maintain sufficient records to furnish evidence of events significant to plant safety A noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a was identified for failure to maintain sufficient records (logs) to furnish evidence of events significant to plant safety. On January 26, 2007, electrical maintenance commenced a scheduled replacement of main control board Annunciator Power Supply E1PS5. During the power supply replacement, a loss of 8.7 percent of the annunciators was expected. However, during de-termination of the power supply leads, an unexpected loss of a significant number of the main control board annunciators occurred.
Subsequently, due to the large number of annunciator inputs that were lost, the plant computer became overloaded and stopped updating. Based on these indications, the control room operators would need to evaluate emergency action level and Technical Specification requirements. The inspectors discovered during interviews with the operations crew that was on watch during the event, that no information was recorded or kept during the event. Administrative Procedure AP 21-001, "Conduct of Operations," Revision 36A, requires operators to make plant log entries of potentially reportable occurrences, entries that could be useful in reconstructing events, and events significant to plant safety. However, the logs were not updated until several hours later based on verbal accounts provided to the oncoming crew. The inspectors noted that the 'after the fact' log entries still provided insufficient data to reconstruct the activities related to the loss of annunciators. This issue is captured in the licensee's corrective action program.
The failure to adequately document times and information for the loss of annunciators was considered to be a performance deficiency. This finding was more than minor because it could impact the operator's ability to accurately implement emergency action levels and Technical Specification action statements and if left uncorrected, this type of insufficient documentation could become a more significant safety concern. The finding required NRC management review and was determined to be of very low safety significance because the loss of annunciators challenged the emergency action level time requirements but was restored prior to exceeding any emergency action level or Technical Specification action time requirement. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the work practices component because the licensee failed to effectively communicate
 
expectations regarding plant operating log entries in accordance with procedural requirements.
Inspection Report# : 2007002 (pdf)
Significance:        Apr 07, 2007 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to maintain drawings technically accurate A self-revealing finding was identified regarding inadequate engineering drawings used as guidance to replace main control board annunciator power supplies resulting in a loss of all main control board annunciators. During de-termination of the power supply leads, an unexpected loss of a significant number of the annunciators occurred.
During the planning review of Work Order 06 280217 003, "Replace Power Supply RK045E1PS5," the electricians brought forth a concern about the daisy chaining of the leads associated with the main control board power supplies and not knowing what effect removing a power supply would have on additional annunciators. System engineering reviewed vendor drawings and determined that only the expected annunciators would be lost. The vendor drawings only consisted of discrete wire connections from the power supply to the logic bus and did not show interconnections with any other power supplies. Although, it was acknowledged by system engineering that there were numerous daisy chained connections not shown on the vendor drawings, no further reviews or research was conducted. The licensee's root cause analysis determined that the vendor drawings did not show the interconnecting wiring identifying point to point connections associated with the main control board power supplies. This issue is captured in the licensee's corrective action program.
The failure to maintain drawings technically accurate and reflect the as-built condition of the plant was considered to be a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because it impacted the maintenance technicians ability to accurately plan and implement work, resulting in the annunciator system being adversely affected and could be reasonably viewed as a precursor to a significant event. The finding required NRC management review and was determined to be of very low safety significance because the finding did not result in a loss of a system safety function or a loss of risk significant equipment for greater than 24 hours. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the human performance area associated with the resources component because the licensee failed to maintain complete, accurate and up-to-date design documentation.
Inspection Report# : 2007002 (pdf)
Last modified : December 07, 2007
 
Wolf Creek 1 4Q/2007 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance:      Jul 07, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Identify Cause of Component Cooling Water Valve Closures The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Conditions Adverse to Quality, involving Wolf Creeks failure to identify and correct the cause of the reactor coolant pump (RCP) thermal barrier component cooling water heat exchanger outlet valves stroking closed on high flow. Specifically, between 2001 and 2007, Wolf Creek experienced repeated cases of the RCP thermal barrier component cooling water heat exchanger outlet valves stroking closed when two component cooling water pumps are started during train swaps.
Wolf Creek evaluated the issue after inspector questioning but did not review the impact of the valves stroking closed during design basis events or accidents and the operators ability to open them given the valves circuit breakers opening. Wolf Creek has further condition reports open on this finding.
The failure to identify and correct the condition adverse to quality of ensuring RCP seal cooling as described in the Updated Safety Analysis Report is a performance deficiency. The finding is more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute for the Initiating Events Cornerstone; and, it affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. The finding is determined to be of very low safety significance because the finding would not result in exceeding the Technical Specification limit for identified reactor coolant system leakage and would not have affected other mitigation systems resulting in a total loss of their safety function. The cause of the finding has problem identification and resolution crosscutting aspects in the area of corrective action because Wolf Creek did not thoroughly evaluate the issue such that the resolution addressed the extent of conditions given multiple opportunities documented in the corrective action program (P.1(c)).
Inspection Report# : 2007003 (pdf)
Significance:      Jul 07, 2007 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: FIN Finding Inadequate Inspections of Circulating Water Pump Auto Transformers A self-revealing finding for failing to identify degraded circulating water pump auto transformers during inspections in April 2007. Specifically, Wolf Creek failed to adequately inspect and identify signs of overheating and degradation during inspection of the excitation auto transformers for the circulating water pumps. Consequently, the unidentified degraded condition resulted in the circulating water Pump A tripping and an automatic turbine load reduction on May 25, 2007. Wolf Creek has replaced the failed auto transformer and is planning a modification to increase the size of the transformers to reduce overheating.
The failure to perform adequate inspections of the circulating water Pump A excitation auto transformer was considered a performance deficiency. The finding is more than minor because it is associated with the Initiating Events Cornerstone because the deficiency affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the issue did not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions would not be available. The cause of the finding has human performance crosscutting aspects in the area of work practices because Wolf Creek did not follow maintenance procedures and did not ensure oversight of work activities such that nuclear safety was supported (H.4(b)).
Inspection Report# : 2007003 (pdf)
 
Mitigating Systems Significance:      Oct 06, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to implement transient combustible material control permit requirements The inspectors identified a Green noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.d for failing to control combustible materials in an area of the plant that contained safety-related equipment. During a walkdown, inspectors noted that temporary scaffolding constructed of flame retardant treated wood installed in the emergency diesel generator rooms did not have a transient combustible materials permit. Following review of the procedure for control of combustibles, it was noted that the licensee inappropriately considered fire retardant treated wood as noncombustible material and exempted it from permit control. This could lead to the uncontrolled use of fire treated wood throughout the facility, even in excess of fire hazard analysis limits for fire loads.
The inspectors determined that the inadequate control of transient combustibles in the emergency diesel generator rooms was more than minor because, if left uncorrected, it would become a more significant safety concern and could potentially affect emergency diesel generator availability due to fire under the mitigating systems cornerstone. The finding was of very low safety significance because it involved the combustible controls program and was assigned a low degradation rating since the flame retardant treated wood is considered a high flashpoint material.
Inspection Report# : 2007004 (pdf)
Significance:      Oct 06, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to collor EDG assembly procedure resulting in NOED A self-revealing noncited violation was identified regarding failure to follow a procedure used to reassemble the intercooler and jacketwater pumps to the Train A emergency diesel generator resulting in the Emergency Diesel Generator A being inoperable. During reassembly of the Emergency Diesel Generator A on June 6, 2007, the stationary seals for the intercooler and jacketwater pumps were not correctly installed in their housings. On July 5, 2007, the Emergency Diesel Generator A failed its surveillance test because the intercooler pump leaked at a rate of 23.4 ml/min with an acceptability limit of 9.1 ml/min. Even with the leakage, Emergency Diesel Generator A was later determined to be capable of running for greater than 24 hours.
The failure to install the stationary seals in accordance with the approved work orders is a performance deficiency.
The finding is more than minor because it is associated with the human performance attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone; and, it affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). The finding is of very low safety significance because the issue does not represent a qualification or design deficiency, it did not represent a loss of safety function for a train or system as defined in the plant specific risk-informed inspection notebook, and was not related to external events such as fires and floods. The inspectors also determined that the finding has a human performance crosscutting aspect in the area associated with resources because the licensee failed to ensure that mechanics had adequate emergency diesel generator training to assure correct reassembly of the diesel auxiliaries as stated in Wolf Creeks root cause evaluation [H.2(b)].
Inspection Report# : 2007004 (pdf)
Significance:      Oct 06, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to use appropriate guidance for valve operation A self-revealing finding was identified when a nonlicensed plant operator failed to utilize appropriate guidance and used excessive torque on service water Valves 1WS0002A and 1WS0004 resulting in damage to the valves and unavailability of service water Pump 1WS01PA and the low-flow service water Pump 1WS002P. Valve 1WS0002A was repaired as emergent work and returned to service after approximately 42 hours of being unavailable and Valve 1WS0004 was repaired as corrective maintenance and returned to service after approximately 65 days of
 
unavailability. This issue is captured in the licensee's corrective action program.
The finding was more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute for the mitigating systems cornerstone; and, it affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The inspectors also determined that this finding was more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute for the initiating events cornerstone, and it affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. A Phase 3 evaluation was necessary since the finding involved concurrent multiple equipment degradations from a common cause. The Phase 3 evaluation concluded that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green). The inspectors also determined that the finding had a human performance crosscutting aspect in the area of work practices because the licensee failed to effectively communicate expectations regarding valve operations in accordance with procedural requirements [H.4(b)].
Inspection Report# : 2007004 (pdf)
Significance:        Jul 20, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Procedure for Restoration of the Emergency Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Transfer Pump Control Circuit Following a Fire Requiring Control Room Evacuation The team identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, for the licensees inadequate procedure for remotely starting the emergency diesel generator fuel oil transfer pump following a fire in the control room.
Specifically, the governing procedure failed to include the necessary actions to replace the control power fuse in the associated motor control center, which would likely be blown as a result of the fire-induced circuit failures assumed in the licensees analysis for the control room fire. In addition, the licensee had failed to specify and stage the control power fuse and fuse puller that could be required for timely restoration of the emergency diesel generator fuel oil transfer pump to service following the control room fire. This issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report 2007-02790.
The finding was more than minor because it is associated with the mitigating systems cornerstone attribute of procedural quality and affected the associated cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The Phase 1 worksheets in Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process," were used to conclude that analysis with Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection Findings Significance Determination Process, was required because the issue involved a degradation in fire protection defense-in-depth strategies. A Phase 3 review was then performed by a senior reactor analyst who determined the finding to be of very low safety significance because of the low probability of a fire in relevant cabinets that would result in a control room evacuation.
Inspection Report# : 2007006 (pdf)
Significance:        Jul 20, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Design Control Associated with Vortexing Calculation The team identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, in that, the licensee did not ensure adequate suction submergence for the containment spray pumps by not properly translating vortex design parameters into calculations relative to the refueling water storage tank. Specifically, the licensee used a non-conservative method to calculate the level required to prevent pump vortexing in the refueling water storage tank.
The licensee entered the issue into their corrective action program as Condition Report 2007-02597 and revised the affected calculations.
The finding was more than minor because it is associated with the mitigating systems cornerstone attribute of design control and affected the associated cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using the Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 Worksheet, the finding is determined to have very low safety significance because it was a design deficiency that did not result in a loss of operability. The finding had crosscutting aspects in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program (P.1(a))
because the licensee did not identify an issue in a timely manner, commensurate with its safety significance.
 
Inspection Report# : 2007006 (pdf)
Significance:        Jul 20, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Identify and Correct Discolored Boric Acid Deposits The team identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for the failure to identify and take timely corrective action to correct indications of material wastage at the base of the Refueling Water Storage Tank. Specifically, the licensee did not recognize and take actions to prevent recurring discolored boric acid deposits for approximately 9 years. This issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report 2007-02742.
The finding was more than minor because if left uncorrected it would become a more significant safety concern in that continued wastage could impact component operability. Using the Phase 1 worksheets in Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process," the finding was determined to have very low safety significance because it did not result in a system or component being inoperabe and it did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The finding had crosscutting aspects in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program (P.1(c) because the licensee failed to thoroughly evaluate the problem such that the resolution addressed the cause and extent of condition.
Inspection Report# : 2007006 (pdf)
Significance:        Jul 20, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Nonconservative Battery Intercell Connection Resistance Value Specified in Design Calculation The team identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for the failure of the licensee to ensure that the 125 Vdc safety-related batteries would remain operable if all the intercell and terminal connections were at the resistance value of 150 micro-ohms as allowed by Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.8.4.5. The licensees design calculation used a non-conservative value. This issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report 2007-02492.
The finding was more than minor because it is associated with the mitigating systems cornerstone attribute of design control and affected the associated cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 Worksheet, the finding was determined to have very low safety significance because it was a design deficiency confirmed not to result in a loss of operability. The finding had crosscutting aspects in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program (P.1(a)) because the licensee did not implement a program with a low threshold for identifying this issue and the licensee did not identify the issue completely, accurately, and in a timely manner.
Inspection Report# : 2007006 (pdf)
Significance:        Jul 20, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Battery Surfaces Not Cleaned as Required by Procedure The team identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, for the licensees failure to clean electrolyte from the outside surfaces of the 125 Vdc safety-related batteries in accordance with procedures.
Specifically, surveillance procedures for the 125 Vdc batteries required appropriate cleaning of electrolyte on battery cell covers following specific gravity checks, however, maintenance personnel did not perform this cleaning. The licensee has entered this issue into their corrective action program as Condition Report 2007-02580.
The finding was more than minor because if left uncorrected the finding would become a more significant safety concern due to the corrosive effects of electrolyte on battery posts and terminal connections. Using the Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process," Phase 1 Worksheet, the finding was determined to have very low safety significance because it did not result in a design qualification deficiency or loss of function and it did not
 
screen as risk significant due to external events. The finding had crosscutting aspects in the area of human performance associated with work practices (H.4(a)) because of insufficient communication of human error prevention techniques to maintenance personnel, specifically with respect to self and peer checking.
Inspection Report# : 2007006 (pdf)
Significance:      Jul 20, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Normal Charging Pump Balance Line Crack The team reviewed a self-revealing finding associated with the licensees failure to correct normal charging pump balance line vibrations in a timely manner. Because the licensee did not address the extended time and periodically increased magnitude of the vibrations, the balance line cracked, rendering the pump inoperable. This issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report 2007-02339.
The finding was more than minor because it is associated with the mitigating systems cornerstone attribute of equipment performance and affected the associated cornerstone objective ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using the Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process," Phase 1 Worksheet, the finding was determined to have very low safety significance because the finding did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The finding had crosscutting aspects in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program (P.1(d)) in that licensee personnel did not take corrective actions to address a safety issue in a timely manner, commensurate with its safety significance.
Inspection Report# : 2007006 (pdf)
Significance:      Jul 20, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Inadequate Procedure for Maintaining Drains Capable of Functioning The team identified a finding associated with the licensees failure to maintain a procedure which ensured that control building room drains remained available to pass their design flows for postulated flooding events. As a result of the licensees procedure and practices, debris and items were found in control building room drains. This issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report 2007-02753.
The finding was more than minor because if left uncorrected it would become a more significant safety concern. This finding affected the mitigating systems cornerstone. Using the Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process," Phase 1 Worksheet, the finding is determined to have very low safety significance because the finding did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The finding had crosscutting aspects in the area of human performance associated with work practices (H.4(b)) because the licensee did not define and effectively communicate expectations regarding procedural compliance and personnel following procedures.
Inspection Report# : 2007006 (pdf)
Significance:      Jul 20, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Diesel Generator Frequency Variation Not Considered in Loading Calculations The team identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, having very low safety significance for the licensees failure to account for the effect of emergency diesel generator frequency variation in the diesel loading calculations. Specifically, emergency diesel generator loading was based on nominal 60 hertz operation of pumps and fans and did not account for the 2 percent variation allowed by Technical Specifications.
The licensee has entered this issue into their corrective action program as Condition Report 2007-02683.
The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the mitigating systems cornerstone attribute of design control and affected the associated cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, based on preliminary
 
calculations, the failure to account for frequency variations had more than a minimal effect on the outcome of the analysis in that the continuous load rating for the emergency diesel generators would have been exceeded in the recirculation phase of a loss-of-coolant accident with the assumed loads. The team determined that the finding screened as very low safety significance (Green) because it was a design or qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in loss of operability.
Inspection Report# : 2007006 (pdf)
Significance:        Jul 07, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Implement Manual Actions A noncited violation of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) was identified for failure to adequately assess and manage the increase in risk during observation of a scheduled emergency diesel generator surveillance. On January 4, 2007, inspectors observed the emergency diesel Generator A hot start surveillance test and questioned plant operators regarding operability in Modes 1 or 2 of the emergency diesel generator while paralleled with the grid based on operating experience. The inspectors noted that operations personnel did not have a written set of steps or procedures identified for restoration of the emergency diesel generator, and would have to diagnose what restoration activities would have to be taken at the time of an emergency start demand based upon the step of the surveillance procedure in effect at the time the emergency start demand occurred. The inspectors also identified that operations personnel were unaware of the limiting response time for operator manual actions specified in Amendment 154 that approved testing in Modes 1 or 2. Wolf Creek has developed manual actions for restoration of the emergency diesel generator during testing.
The failure to adequately assess and manage the increase in risk for the use of operator manual actions to ensure emergency diesel generator availability during surveillance testing was a performance deficiency. The finding is similar to the minor example 7(g) and is more than minor because it is associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of protection against external factors, and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The finding was of very low safety significance because the magnitude of the calculated risk deficit was less than 1 x 10-6 and other risk management actions were in place.
Inspection Report# : 2007003 (pdf)
Significance:        Apr 07, 2007 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to implement fire protection impairment control permit requirements and compensatory measures A self-revealing noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.d was identified for failure to implement fire protection impairment control permit requirements and compensatory measures when operators incorrectly disabled three fire detectors in the auxiliary building. The detectors in the auxiliary building were disabled without a proper fire impairment control permit and the required compensatory roving hourly fire watch for a period of approximately 5 hours as required by Administrative Procedure AP 10 103, "Fire Protection Impairment Control," Revision 21. This issue is captured in the licensee's corrective action program.
The failure to implement fire protection impairment control permit requirements and establish compensatory measures for the auxiliary building 1974' level was considered a performance deficiency. The inspectors determined that the finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of protection against external factors and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The finding was of very low safety significance because it involved compensatory measures for the fixed fire protection system and was assigned a low degradation rating since less than 10 percent of the fire detectors in the area were disabled. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the work practices component because the licensee failed to apply appropriate human error prevention techniques such as self and peer-checking prior to removing the fire detectors from service (H.4(a)).
Inspection Report# : 2007002 (pdf)
Significance: TBD Dec 29, 2005 Identified By: NRC
 
Item Type: AV Apparent Violation Failure to Maintain Reactor Coolant System Subcooling During the Alternative Shutodwn The team identified an Apparent Violation of Wolf Creek License Condition 2.C.(5)(a) concerning an inadequate alternative shutdown analysis. The licensees alternative shutdown analysis was inadequate in that it used an acceptance criteria which was inconsistent with and less conservative than that required by the approved Fire Protection Program. The licensee developed Calculation Number AN-02-021, Revision 0, OFN RP-017, Control Room Evacuation, Consequence Evaluation, to demonstrate alternative shutdown capability for Wolf Creek in response to NRC-identified Noncited Violation 2002008-01, Inadequate alternative shutdown procedure. The calculation predicted that during an alternative shutdown, the reactor coolant system subcooling margin would not be maintained, significant voiding would occur in the core, and a steam void would form in the reactor vessel head. The licensee found the results of the calculation to be acceptable since it demonstrated that the void formation would be limited, natural circulation in the reactor coolant system would be maintained, sufficient decay heat removal would be maintained, and no fuel damage would occur. This is not consistent with the license condition to meet the technical requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R. Section III.L of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Alternative and dedicated shutdown capability, that states in part, During the postfire shutdown, the reactor process variables shall be maintained within those predicted for a loss of normal a.c. power.
This finding is greater than minor because it impacted the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to external events (such as fire) to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). It is the NRCs understanding that the licensee does not consider these circuit vulnerabilities to be violations of NRC requirements. The licensee considers the spurious operation of multiple components to be outside of the plant licensing basis for the Fire Protection Program. Specifically, in this case, both pressurizer power-operated relief valves are assumed to spuriously open because of fire induced circuit damage. The NRC staff and the industry are currently working on developing a resolution methodology to address these types of potential fire induced circuit failures. The team concluded that this violation meets the criteria of the NRC Enforcement Manual Section 8.1.7.1 for deferring enforcement actions for postulated fire induced circuit failures.
Inspection Report# : 2005008 (pdf)
Significance: TBD Dec 29, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: AV Apparent Violation Inadequate Alternataive Shutdown Procedure The team identified an Apparent Violation of Technical Specification 5.4, Procedures, due to an inadequate alternative shutdown procedure that is required for implementation of the Fire Protection Program. The team found that some time critical actions required to safely shutdown the plant following a control room fire could not be accomplished within the required time periods. Specifically, the team found that the recommendations by Westinghouse Owners Group for assuring reactor coolant pump seal reliability and avoiding component cooling water thermal barrier water hammer concerns would not be met if the operators had to respond to multiple spurious operations. The procedure was developed and verified based on a time line assuming operators only have to respond to one spurious operation from the fire induced damage during the scenario. The team disagrees with this limitation of potential spurious operations.
This finding is greater than minor because it impacted the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to external events (such as fire) to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). It is the NRCs understanding that the licensee does not consider these circuit vulnerabilities to be violations of NRC requirements. The licensee considers the spurious operation of multiple components to be outside of the plant licensing basis for the Fire Protection Program. The NRC staff and the industry are currently working on developing a resolution methodology to address these types of potential fire induced circuit failures. The team concluded that this violation meets the criteria of the NRC Enforcement Manual Section 8.1.7.1 for deferring enforcement actions for postulated fire induced circuit failures.
Inspection Report# : 2005008 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Significance:        Jul 07, 2007 Identified By: NRC
 
Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Establish an Adequate Preventive Maintenance Program The inspectors identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a in which Wolf Creek did not implement a preventive maintenance procedure to mitigate Train B emergency exhaust system fan bearing vibrations which resulted in a degraded condition. Specifically, the vendor manual directs lubrication every 3 to 12 months (3 to 6 months for average conditions being room temperature and clean conditions) to prevent oxidation and breakdown of the grease; however, the Wolf Creek recurring preventive maintenance was set to lubricate the bearings every three years. This recurring preventive maintenance was not sufficient to ensure the bearings remained adequately lubricated.
It was not until NRC questioning that Wolf Creek generated a condition report to review the past condition of the bearings and the appropriateness of the recurring lubrication interval for the bearings.
The licensees failure to implement preventive maintenance to ensure the fan bearings were adequately lubricated is a performance deficiency. The finding is more than minor because it is associated with the barrier performance attribute of the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone; and, it affected the cornerstone objective to maintain radiological barrier functionality of the auxiliary and fuel building. The finding is of very low safety significance because the issue only represents a degradation of the radiological barrier function provided for the auxiliary or fuel building barriers to mitigate airborne radionuclides from emergency core cooling system pump cubicles or a fuel handling accident, respectively. The cause of the finding has problem identification and resolution crosscutting aspects in the area of corrective action because Wolf Creek did not evaluate or resolve the causes of repeated bearing degradation by thoroughly evaluating problems such that the resolutions address causes and extent of the conditions (P.1(c)).
Inspection Report# : 2007003 (pdf)
Significance:        Jul 07, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Follow Test Control Procedures to Demonstrate Operability The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR, Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control, in which Wolf Creek did not implement controlled testing of the Train B emergency exhaust system fan to demonstrate operability prior to returning the fan to service after bearing replacement. Specifically, on June 12, 2007, Wolf Creek restored the B emergency exhaust system fan to service without implementing the postmaintenance testing described in Procedure AP 16E-002, Postmaintenance Testing Development, Revision 6A. Upon review of the postmaintenance testing, the fan failed the vibration portion of the testing and Wolf Creek did not perform an operability evaluation in accordance with Procedure AP 28-001, Operability Evaluations. Based on inspector questioning, Wolf Creek performed the correct postmaintenance testing and an operability evaluation. These issues are under evaluation in the Wolf Creek corrective action program.
The failure to follow test control procedures for the safety-related B emergency exhaust system fan prior to declaring it operable is a performance deficiency. The finding is more than minor because it is associated with the Barrier performance attribute of the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone; and, it affected the cornerstone objective to maintain radiological barrier functionality of the auxiliary and fuel building. The finding is of very low safety significance because the issue represents a degradation of only the radiological barrier function provided for the auxiliary or fuel building barriers to mitigate airborne radionuclides from emergency core cooling system pump cubicles or a fuel handling accident. The cause of the finding has human performance crosscutting aspects in the area of decision making because Wolf Creek did not initially conduct an adequate test and then failed to question the failed postmaintenance test by making a safety-significant or risk-significant decision using proceduralized systematic processes, especially when faced with uncertain or unexpected plant conditions, to ensure safety is maintained (H.1 (a))
Inspection Report# : 2007003 (pdf)
Significance:        Apr 07, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to maintain steady state reactor power at or below the licensed thermal power limit A noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a occurred when operators did not take timely action to lower power below the licensed thermal limit of 3565 MWt. During an incore to excore neutron detector calibration, the power level exceeded the limit and the operating crew did not insert negative reactivity until after the neutron detector calibration was complete. During this evolution, the reactor exceeded licensed thermal power of 3565 MWt for
 
approximately 58 minutes, peaking at 3566.5 MWt according to the plant computer's 10 minute calorimetric. After the neutron detector calibration was completed, operators added boron to the reactor coolant system to reduce power below 100 percent. Procedure GEN 00-004, "Power Operation," Attachment B, Step B.1.1 states, in part, that exceeding 3565 MWt is permitted only as a result of transients or computer point fluctuations. The inspectors judged that allowing reactor power to ascend above 100 percent for nearly an hour was not a transient. However, operators did not initiate action in accordance with Step B.1.1 when the 10 minute average exceeded 3565 MWt until approximately 40 minutes elapsed. This issue is entered into the corrective action program.
The failure to maintain steady state reactor power at or below the licensed thermal power limit is a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because it is associated with the configuration control attribute for the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone; and, it affected the cornerstone objective of providing reasonable assurance that physical design barriers (fuel cladding, reactor coolant system, and containment) protect the public from radio nuclide releases caused by accidents or events. The finding was of very low safety significance because the fuel cladding barrier was affected but did not affect the reactor coolant system or containment barriers. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the decision making component because the licensee did not ensure that licensed operators used conservative assumptions in their decision making when reactor power increased above the licensed limit for an extended period (H.1(b)).
Inspection Report# : 2007002 (pdf)
Significance:        Apr 07, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to remove the correct containment radiation monitor from service A self-revealing noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1 occurred on February 20, 2007, when a chemistry technician inadvertently removed both containment purge radiation Monitors GTRE22 and GTRE33 from service at the same time. During planned maintenance on the safety-related GTRE33 containment purge radiation monitor, a chemistry technician inadvertently removed the incorrect containment purge radiation monitor from service. After contacting the control room, the shift chemist went to GTRE22 and incorrectly removed the radiation monitor from service. Instrumentation and controls personnel working at GTRE33 informed the shift chemist that the incorrect radiation monitor was removed from service. The shift chemist subsequently returned GTRE22 to service. Technical Specification 3.3.6, Condition A, was entered for having more than one train inoperable. The containment purge and supply dampers were immediately verified to be closed and remained closed with no containment purge in progress.
This issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action program.
The inspectors determined that the failure to remove the correct containment radiation monitor from service was a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because it is associated with the configuration control attribute for the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone; and it affected the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers (fuel cladding, reactor coolant system, and containment) protect the public from radio nuclide releases caused by accidents for events. The finding was of very low safety significance because both trains of the radiation monitor protective functions (i.e., to stop a containment purge on a high radiation signal) were affected but did not result in an actual open pathway in the containment barrier. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the work practices component because the shift chemist failed to apply appropriate human error prevention techniques such as self and peer-checks (H.4(a)).
Inspection Report# : 2007002 (pdf)
Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Significance:        Apr 07, 2007 Identified By: Self-Revealing
 
Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to perform an adequate survey in a high radiation area The inspector reviewed a self-revealing noncited violation of 10 CFR 20.1501(a) because the licensee failed to perform an adequate survey in a high radiation area. On March 7, 2007, a health physics technician performed a survey of Floor Drain Tank Room 7126 in the radwaste building to support a task performed by two radwaste operators. The health physics technician surveyed the immediate work area and informed the operators that general work area dose rates were 10 millirem per hour. Based on this information, operators entered the posted high radiation area on a radiation work permit that had an electronic dosimeter dose rate set point of 50 millirem per hour. One of the operators received a dose rate alarm while performing the task, the operators exited the area, and contacted health physics personnel. Subsequent investigation identified that a comprehensive survey of the entire room was not performed. Follow-up surveys indicated that dose rates in the room were as high as 150 millirem per hour at 30 centimeters from the floor drain tank. This issue has been entered into the licensee's corrective action program.
The finding was greater than minor because it was associated with the Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone attribute of Exposure Control, and affected the cornerstone objective because workers could have received additional radiation dose. The finding was processed through the Occupational Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process and determined to be of very low safety significance because it was not an as low as is reasonably achievable finding, there was no overexposure or substantial potential for an overexposure, and the ability to assess dose was not compromised. Additionally, this finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance related to work controls because the failure to incorporate job site conditions impacted the margin of radiological safety provided by an adequate survey (H.3(a)).
Inspection Report# : 2007002 (pdf)
Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Significance:      Apr 07, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to maintain sufficient records to furnish evidence of events significant to plant safety A noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a was identified for failure to maintain sufficient records (logs) to furnish evidence of events significant to plant safety. On January 26, 2007, electrical maintenance commenced a scheduled replacement of main control board Annunciator Power Supply E1PS5. During the power supply replacement, a loss of 8.7 percent of the annunciators was expected. However, during de-termination of the power supply leads, an unexpected loss of a significant number of the main control board annunciators occurred.
Subsequently, due to the large number of annunciator inputs that were lost, the plant computer became overloaded and stopped updating. Based on these indications, the control room operators would need to evaluate emergency action level and Technical Specification requirements. The inspectors discovered during interviews with the operations crew that was on watch during the event, that no information was recorded or kept during the event. Administrative Procedure AP 21-001, "Conduct of Operations," Revision 36A, requires operators to make plant log entries of potentially reportable occurrences, entries that could be useful in reconstructing events, and events significant to plant safety. However, the logs were not updated until several hours later based on verbal accounts provided to the
 
oncoming crew. The inspectors noted that the 'after the fact' log entries still provided insufficient data to reconstruct the activities related to the loss of annunciators. This issue is captured in the licensee's corrective action program.
The failure to adequately document times and information for the loss of annunciators was considered to be a performance deficiency. This finding was more than minor because it could impact the operator's ability to accurately implement emergency action levels and Technical Specification action statements and if left uncorrected, this type of insufficient documentation could become a more significant safety concern. The finding required NRC management review and was determined to be of very low safety significance because the loss of annunciators challenged the emergency action level time requirements but was restored prior to exceeding any emergency action level or Technical Specification action time requirement. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the work practices component because the licensee failed to effectively communicate expectations regarding plant operating log entries in accordance with procedural requirements (H.4(b)).
Inspection Report# : 2007002 (pdf)
Significance:        Apr 07, 2007 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to maintain drawings technically accurate A self-revealing finding was identified regarding inadequate engineering drawings used as guidance to replace main control board annunciator power supplies resulting in a loss of all main control board annunciators. During de-termination of the power supply leads, an unexpected loss of a significant number of the annunciators occurred.
During the planning review of Work Order 06 280217 003, "Replace Power Supply RK045E1PS5," the electricians brought forth a concern about the daisy chaining of the leads associated with the main control board power supplies and not knowing what effect removing a power supply would have on additional annunciators. System engineering reviewed vendor drawings and determined that only the expected annunciators would be lost. The vendor drawings only consisted of discrete wire connections from the power supply to the logic bus and did not show interconnections with any other power supplies. Although, it was acknowledged by system engineering that there were numerous daisy chained connections not shown on the vendor drawings, no further reviews or research was conducted. The licensee's root cause analysis determined that the vendor drawings did not show the interconnecting wiring identifying point to point connections associated with the main control board power supplies. This issue is captured in the licensee's corrective action program.
The failure to maintain drawings technically accurate and reflect the as-built condition of the plant was considered to be a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because it impacted the maintenance technicians ability to accurately plan and implement work, resulting in the annunciator system being adversely affected and could be reasonably viewed as a precursor to a significant event. The finding required NRC management review and was determined to be of very low safety significance because the finding did not result in a loss of a system safety function or a loss of risk significant equipment for greater than 24 hours. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the human performance area associated with the resources component because the licensee failed to maintain complete, accurate and up-to-date design documentation (H.2(c)).
Inspection Report# : 2007002 (pdf)
Last modified : February 04, 2008
 
Wolf Creek 1 1Q/2008 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance:        Dec 31, 2007 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: FIN Finding Inadequate work instructions resulted in condensate pump trip A self-revealing finding was identified for inadequate work instructions and poor work practices associated with trip circuit verification on the Central Chiller B resulted in the Condensate Pump B trip and steam generator level transient. Procedure RNM C-1301, Miscellaneous Relay and Meter equipment, Revision 6, step 8.3.2.8.h of RNM C-1301 required in part that a jumper be installed from Terminals 3 to 4 on Relay 194 at Breaker PB00402 for the Central Chiller B (wire C280 and C281) which resulted in Condensate Pump B trip. However, this step was copied from a previous work order and not verified as appropriate for the testing being conducted. Step 8.3.2.8.h should have read in part to install jumpers from Terminals 7 to 8 (wire C284 and C285). Licensee reviews and walkdowns were inadequate to identify the incorrect instructions due to workload, interruptions and distractions during the review process. The evaluation also identified Performance Improvement Request 2002-1664 which discussed a similar event where copied information in a work order was incorrect and not identified in reviews. Corrective actions for this event included adding sign-off sections in RNM C-1301 for walkdowns/reviews to ensure work instructions were reviewed before work was performed.
The failure to provide adequate work instructions is a performance deficiency. This finding was more than minor because it is associated with the procedure quality attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone and it affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability. This finding also affected the procedure quality attribute for the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and it affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). Because two cornerstones were affected a Phase 2 analysis was required. The consequences were assessed using the Phase 2 pre-solved tables with the assistance of a Region IV Senior Reactor Analyst. Although the likelihood of a trip was increased and the capability of the normal heat sink was reduced, the exposure time for this condition was less than 3 days and all other mitigation capabilities were maintained.
Consequently, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance. The cause of the finding has human performance crosscutting aspects in the area associated with work practices because the licensee failed to ensure that human error prevention techniques such as self/peer-checking and proper documentation of activities were used in the review of work activities such that they are performed safely (H.4(a)).
Inspection Report# : 2007005 (pdf)
Significance:        Jul 07, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Identify Cause of Component Cooling Water Valve Closures The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Conditions Adverse to Quality, involving Wolf Creeks failure to identify and correct the cause of the reactor coolant pump (RCP) thermal barrier component cooling water heat exchanger outlet valves stroking closed on high flow. Specifically, between 2001 and 2007, Wolf Creek experienced repeated cases of the RCP thermal barrier component cooling water heat exchanger outlet valves stroking closed when two component cooling water pumps are started during train swaps.
Wolf Creek evaluated the issue after inspector questioning but did not review the impact of the valves stroking closed during design basis events or accidents and the operators ability to open them given the valves circuit breakers opening. Wolf Creek has further condition reports open on this finding.
The failure to identify and correct the condition adverse to quality of ensuring RCP seal cooling as described in the Updated Safety Analysis Report is a performance deficiency. The finding is more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute for the Initiating Events Cornerstone; and, it affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during
 
shutdown as well as power operations. The finding is determined to be of very low safety significance because the finding would not result in exceeding the Technical Specification limit for identified reactor coolant system leakage and would not have affected other mitigation systems resulting in a total loss of their safety function. The cause of the finding has problem identification and resolution crosscutting aspects in the area of corrective action because Wolf Creek did not thoroughly evaluate the issue such that the resolution addressed the extent of conditions given multiple opportunities documented in the corrective action program (P.1(c)).
Inspection Report# : 2007003 (pdf)
Significance:        Jul 07, 2007 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: FIN Finding Inadequate Inspections of Circulating Water Pump Auto Transformers A self-revealing finding for failing to identify degraded circulating water pump auto transformers during inspections in April 2007. Specifically, Wolf Creek failed to adequately inspect and identify signs of overheating and degradation during inspection of the excitation auto transformers for the circulating water pumps. Consequently, the unidentified degraded condition resulted in the circulating water Pump A tripping and an automatic turbine load reduction on May 25, 2007. Wolf Creek has replaced the failed auto transformer and is planning a modification to increase the size of the transformers to reduce overheating.
The failure to perform adequate inspections of the circulating water Pump A excitation auto transformer was considered a performance deficiency. The finding is more than minor because it is associated with the Initiating Events Cornerstone because the deficiency affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the issue did not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions would not be available. The cause of the finding has human performance crosscutting aspects in the area of work practices because Wolf Creek did not follow maintenance procedures and did not ensure oversight of work activities such that nuclear safety was supported (H.4(b)).
Inspection Report# : 2007003 (pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance:        Mar 13, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Vent ECCS Piping Every 31 days The team identified two examples of a noncited violation of Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements 3.5.3.4 for the failure to vent emergency core cooling system discharge piping. In the first example, the licensee had inappropriately concluded that inaccessible vents included all those vents located in posted high radiation areas, but either no high radiation field existed in the area or personnel would not be exposed to high radiation dose. The second example involved the failure to perform the surveillance in accordance with the 31 days required frequency. When the surveillance was conducted, gas was observed coming from a SI system hot leg injection line vent.
Both violation examples were more than minor because they were similar to non-minor examples 4.m from NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix E. Examples of Minor Issues, in that, when the surveillances were completed, unexpected amounts of gas were found the piping systems. Some sections were totally voided. Using the Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 Screening Worksheet, the issue screened as having very low safety significance because it was a qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in loss-of-operability in accordance with NRC Manual Chapter Part 9900, Technical Guidance, Operability Determination Process for Operability and Functional Assessment. The finding had a crosscutting aspect in the Human Performance, Resources component, because the licensee failed to have an adequate surveillance procedure that included all necessary ECCS vent values. These findings were indicative of current performance because operators, who are familiar with the TS requirements and Bases commitments, could have questioned, at any time, the practice of eliminating accessible values from the venting program.
 
Inspection Report# : 2008007 (pdf)
Significance:      Mar 13, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Promptly Identify and Correct Voiding in the Safety Injection System The team identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI (Corrective Actions), with five examples, for the failure to promptly identify and correct voids in safety injection system. In some cases, significant changes in the safety injection tank leakage rates went unnoticed. Safety injection tank leakage can be a key indicator that voids are forming in lower pressure systems. In other examples, unexpected amounts of gas came from safety injection piping vents but operators and engineers failed to take meaningful actions to investigate or to address the occurrences. Contributors to the violation included: (1) the failure to properly address two pieces of related operating experience, (2) management's failure to follow site procedures and ensure that operating experience reviews were adequate, (3) the emergency core cooling system monthly venting procedure contained inadequate acceptance criteria, and (4) engineers were not adequately monitoring safety injection tank leakage.
This finding was more than minor because it was similar to non-minor example 3.j from NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues, in that there was a reasonable doubt on the operability of the Train A safety injection system and the steam generators. Using the Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 Screening Worksheet, the issue screened as having very low safety significance because it was a qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in loss-of-operability in accordance with NRC Manual Chapter Part 9900, Technical Guidance, Operability Determination Process for Operability and Functional Assessments. The finding had a crosscutting aspect in the Problem Identification and Resolution area, Operating Experience component, because the site had not institutionalized operating experience. This finding was indicative of current plant performance because the weaknesses in the operating experience program that permitted the inadequate review of operating experience were still in place at the time of this inspection.
Inspection Report# : 2008007 (pdf)
Significance:      Mar 13, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Promptly Identify and Correct Voids in ECCS Suction Piping The team identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI (Corrective Actions), with five examples, for the failure to promptly identify and correct voids in safety injection system. In some cases, significant changes in the safety injection tank leakage rates went unnoticed. Safety injection tank leakage can be a key indicator that voids are forming in lower pressure systems. In other examples, unexpected amounts of gas came from safety injection piping vents but operators and engineers failed to take meaningful actions to investigate or to address the occurrences. Contributors to the violation included: (1) the failure to properly address two pieces of related operating experience, (2) management's failure to follow site procedures and ensure that operating experience reviews were adequate, (3) the emergency core cooling system monthly venting procedure contained inadequate acceptance criteria, and (4) engineers were not adequately monitoring safety injection tank leakage.
This finding was more than minor because it was similar to non-minor example 3.j from NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues, in that there was a reasonable doubt on the operability of the Train A safety injection system and the steam generators. Using the Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 Screening Worksheet, the issue screened as having very low safety significance because it was a qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in loss-of-operability in accordance with NRC Manual Chapter Part 9900, Technical Guidance, Operability Determination Process for Operability and Functional Assessments. The finding had a crosscutting aspect in the Problem Identification and Resolution area, Operating Experience component, because the site had not institutionalized operating experience. This finding was indicative of current plant performance because the weaknesses in the operating experience program that permitted the inadequate review of operating experience were still in place at the time of this inspection.
Inspection Report# : 2008007 (pdf)
 
Significance:      Mar 13, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate RHR and CS Void Calculations The team identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III (Design Control), for an inadequate calculation involving previously identified voids in the residual heat removal and containment spray containment suction piping. A contract engineer relied solely on engineering judgment to determine that the void stream, up to 11 percent, would have no affect on pump performance. Test data from an NRC NUREG, that the licensee had also used, contradicted the contractor's assessment. A contributor to this violation was the licensee's poor understanding of information contained in the NUREG.
This finding was more than minor because it was similar to non-minor example 3.j from NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues, in that there was a reasonable doubt on the operability of the residual heat removal and containment spray pumps. Using the Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 Screening Worksheet, the issue screened as having very low safety significance because it was a qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in loss of operability in accordance with NRC Manual Chapter Part 9900, Technical Guidance, Operability Determination Process for Operability and Functional Assessments. The finding had a crosscutting aspect in the Problem Identification and Resolution area, Corrective Action Program component, because the site failed to perform an adequate engineering evaluation for a nonconforming condition [P.1 (c)].
Inspection Report# : 2008007 (pdf)
Significance:      Mar 13, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Adequately Correct Voiding Design Control Violation The team identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI (Corrective Actions), because the licensee took inadequate corrective measures to address NRC identified deficiencies involving the calculation for voids in the residual heat removal and containment spray sump piping. The licensee's assessment failed to address the expected change in net-positive-suction-head required for the pumps. NRC issued guidance informed the licensee that this term would need adjustment.
This finding was more than minor because, if left uncorrected, could become a more significant safety concern. For example, the net positive suction head calculations for residual heat removal pumps shows that the pumps have very little design margin. The failure to properly address the voids may lead engineers to believe that there is margin available for plant modifications (such as the containment sump modification), when there is not. Using the Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 Screening Worksheet, the issue screened as having very low safety significance because it was a qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in loss of operability in accordance with NRC Manual Chapter Part 9900, Technical Guidance, Operability Determination Process for Operability and Functional Assessments. The finding had a crosscutting aspect in the Problem Identification and Resolution area, Corrective Action Program component, because the site failed to perform an adequate engineering evaluation for a performance deficiency [P.1(c)].
Inspection Report# : 2008007 (pdf)
Significance:      Mar 13, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Approve Engineering Calculations Prior to Use at Wolf Creek and Inadequate Work Instructions The team identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III (Design Control), with two examples for: (1) the failure to implement engineering procedures and approve a third party calculation prior to use at Wolf Creek, and (2) the failure to properly translate licensing and design basis information into instructions.
Following identification of the first example, the licensee approved the subject calculation for use at Wolf Creek.
 
However, the calculation had an inadequate basis for the acceptance of a 5 percent void fraction in suction piping and a 20 percent void fraction in discharge piping. Specifically, the calculation failed to consider the impact of voids on natural circulation operations and was inconsistent with Technical Specifications, the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, and net positive suction head calculations. All had assumed that Wolf Creek piping was water solid.
The finding was more than minor because, if left uncorrected, could result in a more significant safety concern.
Specifically, the existence of 5 percent void fraction on the suction side of the pumps and 20 percent on the discharge side are still unanalyzed conditions and could adversely impact design basis accident analysis results. The licensee's operability assessment provided a reasonable expectation that design limits would not be exceeded. Using the Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 Screening Worksheet, the issue screened as having very low safety significance because it was a qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in loss-of-operability in accordance with NRC Manual Chapter Part 9900, Technical Guidance, Operability Determination Process for Operability and Functional Assessments. The finding had a crosscutting aspect in the Problem Identification and Resolution area, Corrective Action Program component, because the site failed to perform an adequate engineering evaluation [P.1(c)].
Inspection Report# : 2008007 (pdf)
Significance:      Mar 13, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Implement Piping Design Procedure and ASME Code Requirements The team identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V (Procedures), for the failure to implement piping design procedure requirements. The procedure required that piping systems be designed for normal component service (filling and venting) as well as routine operational surveillance (monthly emergency core cooling system venting). The piping systems were actually designed with some sections that could not be totally filled. The licensee also failed to design the piping in accordance with the ASME Code, which required vents at all piping high points.
The finding was more than minor because, if left uncorrected, it could result in a more significant safety concern.
Specifically, the performance of emergency core cooling system systems with voids is not totally understood and could result in adverse systems response such as degraded pump performance or adversely impact natural circulation operations. Using the Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 Screening Worksheet, the issue screened as having very low safety significance because it was a qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in loss of operability in accordance with NRC Manual Chapter Part 9900, Technical Guidance, Operability Determination Process for Operability and Functional Assessments."
Inspection Report# : 2008007 (pdf)
Significance:      Mar 13, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Root Cause Assessment The team identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, because the licensee failed to follow the site procedure when performing a root cause assessment for the emergency core cooling system voiding issues and, subsequently, completed an inadequate root cause assessment. The licensee came to the erroneous conclusion that operating experience evaluations were thorough, but actually drew broad conclusions based on unverified and incorrect information, and had failed to identify significant contributors to the events.
The finding was more than minor because, if left uncorrected, it could result in a more significant safety concern.
Specifically, the NRC relies heavily on the licensee's ability to find and correct their own safety issues. The licensee's reliance on unvalidated (and incorrect) information and the crafting of corrective measures to fit erroneous conclusions provides an unacceptable level of confidence that the licensee can consistently correct its own problems without NRC involvement. Using the Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 Screening Worksheet, the issue screened as having very low safety significance because it was a qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in loss-of-operability in accordance with NRC Manual Chapter Part 9900, Technical Guidance, Operability Determination Process for Operability and Functional Assessments. The finding had a
 
crosscutting aspect in the Problem Identification and Resolution area, Corrective Action Program component, because the site failed to perform an adequate engineering evaluation.
Inspection Report# : 2008007 (pdf)
Significance:        Feb 29, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Twenty one examples of failure to follow seismic requirements of scaffolding procedure The team identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V, in which 21 scaffolds in 10 plant areas that were in contact with or closer to plant equipment than procedure allowed. The procedure required engineering evaluations which did not contain any technical bases as to the acceptability of as built scaffolds.
Subsequent engineering evaluation of each of the incorrect scaffolding installations confirmed that the configurations did not challenge operability. The NRC identified previous concerns with the erection of scaffolds, yet the licensee failed to take action to correct this issue.
The team evaluated the significance of this finding using Phase 1 of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, Significance Determination of Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations, and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance because the issue resulted in 21 unevaluated scaffolds which are likely not to challenge the ability of the plant to safely shutdown after an earthquake. As such, under Phase 1 screening, the deficiency is not related to a qualification or design deficiency, it did not represent a loss of safety function for a train or system as defined in the plant specific risk-informed inspection notebook, and did not screen as risk significant for seismic external events, because the affected systtems were considered degraded, but operable. Using these inputs, the performance deficiency screened to Green. The team determined that the finding had a human performance crosscutting aspect in the area associated with decision making because the licensee failed to adopt a requirement to demonstrate that the proposed action is safe in order to proceed rather than a requirement to demonstrate that the proposed action is safe in order to disapprove the action. Specifically, Wolf Creek Generating Station did not conduct any review of engineering decisions to verify the validity of the underlying assumption that equipment and scaffolding could be in contact or closer than the established limit (H.1(b)).
Inspection Report# : 2008006 (pdf)
Significance:        Feb 29, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to take Corrective Action For Missed Compensatory Measures The team identified a finding because the licensee failed to take timely corrective actions to address a previously identified NRC finding. FIN 2007002-04 was issued because the licensee had failed to establish compensatory actions in response to the failure of all Main Annunciator Board alarms. Failure to have compensatory measures inhibited the licensee in their efforts to determine the cause of the alarm failures. Corrective actions repaired the equipment that caused of the annunciator failure, but were unrelated to the failure to follow procedures and take compensatory measures.
The team determined that this was a performance deficiency because the licensee had committed to take corrective actions in response to the previous NCV but failed to do so in a timely manner. The inspectors determined that this violation was greater than minor because it met the intent of MC 0612 Appendix E Example 4.a. in that there were several examples of the licensee failing to take corrective actions in response to NRC identified NCVs and findings, indicating that The licensee routinely failed to perform engineering evaluations on similar issues. The inspectors performed a Phase I SDP evaluation and determined that the violation was screened as being very low safety significance, Green, because all of the answers to the Phase I Worksheet Mitigating Systems Column were no. The team also determined that this finding has crosscutting aspects in the problem identification and resolution area associated with the corrective action program in that the licensee failed to implement timely or effective corrective actions. (P.1(d)).
Inspection Report# : 2008006 (pdf)
 
Significance:        Feb 29, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to take corrective action for missed operability evaluation compensatory measures The team identified a violation of 10CFR50 Appendix B Criterion XVI because the licensee failed to take timely corrective actions to address a previously identified NCV. NCV 2007003-05 was issued because the licensee had failed to perform an operability evaluation following bearing replacement on the Train B emergency exhaust system fan. Corrective actions were not related to the missed performance of the operability evaluation, but the equipment failure.
The team determined that this was a performance deficiency because the licensee had committed to take corrective actions in response to the previous NCV but failed to do so in a timely manner. The inspectors determined that this violation was greater than minor because it met the intent of MC 0612 Appendix E Example 4.a. in that there were several examples of the licensee failing to take corrective actions in response to NRC identified NCVs and findings, indicating that The licensee routinely failed to perform engineering evaluations on similar issues. The inspectors performed a Phase I SDP evaluation and determined that the violation was screened as being very low safety significance, Green, because all of the answers to the Phase I Worksheet Mitigating Systems Column were no. The team also determined that this finding has crosscutting aspects in the problem identification and resolution area associated with the corrective action program in that the licensee failed to implement timely or effective corrective actions. (P.1(d)).
Inspection Report# : 2008006 (pdf)
Significance:        Feb 29, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to take timely corrective action to establish monitoring frequency of AFW pump governor null drift The team identified a violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion XVI because the licensee failed to take timely corrective actions to address a previously identified finding. Finding 2006010 was issued because the licensee had failed to establish an acceptable monitoring frequency on their Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump speed governor null-drift as recommended by a Part 21 report from Engine Systems, Inc. The corrective actions to establish the monitoring for the null-drift were not implemented.
The team determined that this was a performance deficiency because the licensee had committed to take corrective actions in response to the previous NCV but failed to do so in a timely manner. The team determined that this violation was greater than minor because it met the intent of MC 0612 Appendix E Example 4.a. in that there were several examples of the licensee failing to take corrective actions in response to NRC identified NCVs and findings, indicating that The licensee routinely failed to perform engineering evaluations on similar issues. The team performed a Phase I SDP evaluation and determined that the violation was screened as being very low safety significance, Green, because all of the answers to the Phase I Worksheet Mitigating Systems Column were no. The team also determined that this finding has crosscutting aspects in the problem identification and resolution area associated with the corrective action program in that the licensee failed to implement timely or effective corrective actions (P.1(d)).
Inspection Report# : 2008006 (pdf)
Significance:        Feb 29, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to take timely corrective action to correct Barton transmitter defects The team identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, regarding the failure to identify and correct conditions adverse quality associated with NRC NCV 2006-004-02 documented in Inspection Report 2006-004. Specifically, the licensee did not address in the apparent cause evaluation and corrective actions the failure to follow procedures resulting in an inadequate inspection of installed Barton pressure transmitters for known potential manufacturing defects which resulted in a previous violation of Administrative Procedure AP 28-011, Resolving Deficiencies Impacting SSCs, Revision 1. The licensee inappropriately credited transmitter inspections
 
that occurred several years prior to receipt of the vendor recommendation as sufficient to resolve this issue.
This finding was more than minor because it could reasonably be viewed a precursor to a significant event and affected the equipment performance attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone and the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events. Using Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 worksheets, the inspectors determined that the finding is of very low significance because it did not represent an actual loss of a safety function or operability and was not potentially risk significant due to external events. The inspectors also determined that this finding has crosscutting aspects in the problem identification and resolution area associated with the corrective action program in that the licensee failed to identify the issue completely and thoroughly evaluate the problem such that the problem was resolved (P.1(a), P.1(c)).
Inspection Report# : 2008006 (pdf)
Significance:        Feb 29, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to take timely corrective action to correct annunciator feed configuration deficiencies.
The team identified a green finding for failure to implement corrective action for abandoned in place annunciator feed wiring deficiencies. CR 2005-003275 was initiated because Cables ST-009 and ST-019 were field-spliced together to prevent electrical shocks such that the system configuration did not match the system drawing. Work Order (WO) 07-292004-000 was initiated to correct this condition but was closed as unworkable. CR 2005-003275 was closed to this closed work order even though the condition was not corrected, leaving the system in a condition not reflected in drawings or design documents. This configuration could result in further shocks, and further configuration control issues. The main annunciator system and its feeds are not safety-¬related, and therefore this performance deficiency is not a violation of NRC requirements.
The failure to implement corrective actions for an identified configuration control issue is a performance deficiency.
This item affects the mitigating systems cornerstone. The team determined that this violation was greater than minor because it met the intent of MC 0612 Appendix E Example 4.a. in that there were several examples of the licensee failing to take corrective actions in response to findings, indicating that The licensee routinely failed to perform engineering evaluations on similar issues. The team performed a Phase I SDP evaluation and determined that the violation was screened as being very low safety significance, Green, because all of the answers to the Phase I Worksheet Mitigating Systems Column were no. The team also determined that this finding has crosscutting aspects in the problem identification and resolution area associated with the corrective action program in that the licensee failed to implement timely or effective corrective actions. (P.1(d)).
Inspection Report# : 2008006 (pdf)
Significance:        Dec 31, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to evaluate ESW valve corrosion The inspectors identified a noncited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," for failure to follow a procedure which required an evaluation of the Train B of ESW traveling screen wash valve and identical valves in the system after the Train A ESW screen wash valve had failed. Wolf Creek declined to enter its operability process but did tag Valve EF HV-92 open on September 13, 2007. An operability evaluation was produced on September 27, after EF HV-92 was disassembled and found to have unacceptable disc material loss due to corrosion. Corrective actions from the September 27 evaluation include a disassembly of an identical valve in the essential service water system that shows degrading but operable performance.
The failure to follow Procedure AP 26C-004, Technical Specification Operability, which required an evaluation of Valve EF HV-92, is a performance deficiency. The finding is more than minor because if left uncorrected the valve discs corrosion would become a more significant safety concern. The finding was of very low safety significance because the issue resulted in Valve EF HV 92 being degraded, but did open even with significant material and is not related to a qualification or design deficiency, did not result in the loss of safety function for greater than 24 hours, and was not related to external events such as fires and floods. The cause of the finding had problem identification and
 
resolution crosscutting aspects in the area associated with the corrective action program because the licensee failed to evaluate the failure mechanism completely, accurately, and in a timely manner commensurate with its safety significance (P.1(a)).
Inspection Report# : 2007005 (pdf)
Significance:        Dec 31, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate evaluation of EDG for common cause failure The inspectors identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 3.8.1 for failure to perform an adequate common cause evaluation within 24 hours to demonstrate no common cause failure mechanism existed between the emergency diesel generators. Wolf Creeks common cause evaluation stated that the Hypothesis was that the EDG A digital reference unit (DRU) had not been refurbished as recommended in a April 21, 2004, 10 CFR Part 21 notification from Fairbanks Morse which stated that Wolf Creeks DRUs were affected by an integrated circuit contamination problem. Inspectors reviewed the April 21 notification and found that the slow start rpm ramp function was affected, however, The inspectors reviewed operating experience and other generic correspondence and found a 10 CFR Part 21 notification dated January 23, 2006, from Engine Systems, Inc. (ESI), who is a vendor for DRUs. The ESI notification describes a DRU deficiency in which an integrated circuit manufacturing defect can cause failure of the engine load raise and lower signals to the electronic governor controller. The inspectors noted this failure mechanism was similar to Wolf Creeks observed failure on November 1, 2007. Both EDGs were found to be affected by the ESI notification.
The inspectors determined that the failure to demonstrate, per TS 3.8.1 required actions B.3.1 or B.3.2, that no common cause failure existed for the EDGs is a performance deficiency. The finding is more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute for the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone; and, it affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). The finding was of very low safety significance because the issue resulted in the EDG being degraded, but likely to start even with an intermittent failure and did not result in the loss of safety function for greater than 24 hours, and was not related to external events such as fires and floods. The cause of the finding had problem identification and resolution crosscutting aspects in the area associated with the corrective action program because the licensee failed to evaluate the failure mechanism completely, accurately, and in a timely manner commensurate with its safety significance (P.1(a)).
Inspection Report# : 2007005 (pdf)
Significance:        Dec 31, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to enter and evaluate EDG operating experience in CAP The inspectors identified a finding for failure to enter into corrective action program evaluate relevant emergency diesel generator operating experience which allowed a manufacturing defect to exist resulting in a testing failure.
Procedure AP 20E-001, Step 4.1.1, in part, directs the screening and review of operating experience from sources such as vendors, the NRC, other utilities, and INPO. Although, the inspectors found that Wolf Creek was not specifically listed as affected in the ESI Part 21, they had procured DRUs that were listed by serial number on the ESI notification.
The inspectors also found a Woodward service bulletin dated January 2006 that Wolf Creek had not reviewed addressing the same issue that listed DRU serial numbers affected which included Wolf Creeks DRUs.
The failure to enter into corrective action program evaluate publicly available operating experience directly applicable to Wolf Creeks emergency diesel generators is a performance deficiency. This finding was more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute for the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone; and, it affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). The finding is of very low safety significance because the issue resulted in the EDG being degraded, but likely to start even with an intermittent failure and is not related to a qualification or design deficiency, did not result in the loss of safety function for greater than 24 hours, and was not related to external events such as fires and floods. The cause of the finding has a problem identification and resolution crosscutting aspect in the area associated with the operating experience program because the licensees operating experience process did not use operating experience information, including vendor recommendations, to support plant safety. Specifically, the licensee did not systematically collect, evaluate, and communicate relevant external operating
 
experience to affected internal stakeholders in a timely manner (P.2(a)).
Inspection Report# : 2007005 (pdf)
Significance:      Dec 31, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Clogged drains cause circulating water roof loads to exceed design The inspectors identified a Green finding for exceeding the calculated roof loading for the circulating water screen house. In May 2007, Wolf Creek received heavy rains and water leaks from the circulating water screen house roof were observed. On May 8, 2007, it was observed that the roof of the circulating water screen house had accumulated approximately eight inches of standing water and that the drains were blocked by debris. Subsequently on May 8, the drains were cleared and the roof was drained. A roof yield or collapse was assumed to result in the loss of both circulating water and normal service water.
Exceeding the calculated allowable roof loading due to clogged drains is a performance deficiency. The finding is more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute for the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone; and, it affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Additionally, this finding was more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute for the Initiating Events Cornerstone; and, it affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. This finding screened to a Phase 3 analysis because two or more cornerstones (Initiating Events and Mitigating Systems) were affected. The Senior Reactor Analyst performed the Phase 3 analysis and determined it to be of very low safety significance.
Inspection Report# : 2007005 (pdf)
Significance:      Oct 06, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to implement transient combustible material control permit requirements The inspectors identified a Green noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.d for failing to control combustible materials in an area of the plant that contained safety-related equipment. During a walkdown, inspectors noted that temporary scaffolding constructed of flame retardant treated wood installed in the emergency diesel generator rooms did not have a transient combustible materials permit. Following review of the procedure for control of combustibles, it was noted that the licensee inappropriately considered fire retardant treated wood as noncombustible material and exempted it from permit control. This could lead to the uncontrolled use of fire treated wood throughout the facility, even in excess of fire hazard analysis limits for fire loads.
The inspectors determined that the inadequate control of transient combustibles in the emergency diesel generator rooms was more than minor because, if left uncorrected, it would become a more significant safety concern and could potentially affect emergency diesel generator availability due to fire under the mitigating systems cornerstone. The finding was of very low safety significance because it involved the combustible controls program and was assigned a low degradation rating since the flame retardant treated wood is considered a high flashpoint material.
Inspection Report# : 2007004 (pdf)
Significance:      Oct 06, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to collor EDG assembly procedure resulting in NOED A self-revealing noncited violation was identified regarding failure to follow a procedure used to reassemble the intercooler and jacketwater pumps to the Train A emergency diesel generator resulting in the Emergency Diesel Generator A being inoperable. During reassembly of the Emergency Diesel Generator A on June 6, 2007, the stationary seals for the intercooler and jacketwater pumps were not correctly installed in their housings. On July 5, 2007, the Emergency Diesel Generator A failed its surveillance test because the intercooler pump leaked at a rate of 23.4 ml/min with an acceptability limit of 9.1 ml/min. Even with the leakage, Emergency Diesel Generator A was later determined to be capable of running for greater than 24 hours.
 
The failure to install the stationary seals in accordance with the approved work orders is a performance deficiency.
The finding is more than minor because it is associated with the human performance attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone; and, it affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). The finding is of very low safety significance because the issue does not represent a qualification or design deficiency, it did not represent a loss of safety function for a train or system as defined in the plant specific risk-informed inspection notebook, and was not related to external events such as fires and floods. The inspectors also determined that the finding has a human performance crosscutting aspect in the area associated with resources because the licensee failed to ensure that mechanics had adequate emergency diesel generator training to assure correct reassembly of the diesel auxiliaries as stated in Wolf Creeks root cause evaluation [H.2(b)].
Inspection Report# : 2007004 (pdf)
Significance:        Oct 06, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to use appropriate guidance for valve operation A self-revealing finding was identified when a nonlicensed plant operator failed to utilize appropriate guidance and used excessive torque on service water Valves 1WS0002A and 1WS0004 resulting in damage to the valves and unavailability of service water Pump 1WS01PA and the low-flow service water Pump 1WS002P. Valve 1WS0002A was repaired as emergent work and returned to service after approximately 42 hours of being unavailable and Valve 1WS0004 was repaired as corrective maintenance and returned to service after approximately 65 days of unavailability. This issue is captured in the licensee's corrective action program.
The finding was more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute for the mitigating systems cornerstone; and, it affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The inspectors also determined that this finding was more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute for the initiating events cornerstone, and it affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. A Phase 3 evaluation was necessary since the finding involved concurrent multiple equipment degradations from a common cause. The Phase 3 evaluation concluded that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green). The inspectors also determined that the finding had a human performance crosscutting aspect in the area of work practices because the licensee failed to effectively communicate expectations regarding valve operations in accordance with procedural requirements [H.4(b)].
Inspection Report# : 2007004 (pdf)
Significance:        Jul 20, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Procedure for Restoration of the Emergency Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Transfer Pump Control Circuit Following a Fire Requiring Control Room Evacuation The team identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, for the licensees inadequate procedure for remotely starting the emergency diesel generator fuel oil transfer pump following a fire in the control room.
Specifically, the governing procedure failed to include the necessary actions to replace the control power fuse in the associated motor control center, which would likely be blown as a result of the fire-induced circuit failures assumed in the licensees analysis for the control room fire. In addition, the licensee had failed to specify and stage the control power fuse and fuse puller that could be required for timely restoration of the emergency diesel generator fuel oil transfer pump to service following the control room fire. This issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report 2007-02790.
The finding was more than minor because it is associated with the mitigating systems cornerstone attribute of procedural quality and affected the associated cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The Phase 1 worksheets in Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process," were used to conclude that analysis with Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection Findings Significance Determination Process, was required because the issue involved a degradation in fire protection defense-in-depth strategies. A Phase 3 review was then performed by a senior reactor analyst who determined the finding to be of very low safety significance because of the low probability of a fire in relevant cabinets that would result in a control room evacuation.
 
Inspection Report# : 2007006 (pdf)
Significance:        Jul 20, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Design Control Associated with Vortexing Calculation The team identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, in that, the licensee did not ensure adequate suction submergence for the containment spray pumps by not properly translating vortex design parameters into calculations relative to the refueling water storage tank. Specifically, the licensee used a non-conservative method to calculate the level required to prevent pump vortexing in the refueling water storage tank.
The licensee entered the issue into their corrective action program as Condition Report 2007-02597 and revised the affected calculations.
The finding was more than minor because it is associated with the mitigating systems cornerstone attribute of design control and affected the associated cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using the Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 Worksheet, the finding is determined to have very low safety significance because it was a design deficiency that did not result in a loss of operability. The finding had crosscutting aspects in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program (P.1(a))
because the licensee did not identify an issue in a timely manner, commensurate with its safety significance.
Inspection Report# : 2007006 (pdf)
Significance:        Jul 20, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Identify and Correct Discolored Boric Acid Deposits The team identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for the failure to identify and take timely corrective action to correct indications of material wastage at the base of the Refueling Water Storage Tank. Specifically, the licensee did not recognize and take actions to prevent recurring discolored boric acid deposits for approximately 9 years. This issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report 2007-02742.
The finding was more than minor because if left uncorrected it would become a more significant safety concern in that continued wastage could impact component operability. Using the Phase 1 worksheets in Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process," the finding was determined to have very low safety significance because it did not result in a system or component being inoperabe and it did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The finding had crosscutting aspects in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program (P.1(c) because the licensee failed to thoroughly evaluate the problem such that the resolution addressed the cause and extent of condition.
Inspection Report# : 2007006 (pdf)
Significance:        Jul 20, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Nonconservative Battery Intercell Connection Resistance Value Specified in Design Calculation The team identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for the failure of the licensee to ensure that the 125 Vdc safety-related batteries would remain operable if all the intercell and terminal connections were at the resistance value of 150 micro-ohms as allowed by Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.8.4.5. The licensees design calculation used a non-conservative value. This issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report 2007-02492.
The finding was more than minor because it is associated with the mitigating systems cornerstone attribute of design control and affected the associated cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 Worksheet, the finding was determined to have very low safety significance because it was a design deficiency confirmed not to result in a loss of operability. The finding had
 
crosscutting aspects in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program (P.1(a)) because the licensee did not implement a program with a low threshold for identifying this issue and the licensee did not identify the issue completely, accurately, and in a timely manner.
Inspection Report# : 2007006 (pdf)
Significance:      Jul 20, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Battery Surfaces Not Cleaned as Required by Procedure The team identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, for the licensees failure to clean electrolyte from the outside surfaces of the 125 Vdc safety-related batteries in accordance with procedures.
Specifically, surveillance procedures for the 125 Vdc batteries required appropriate cleaning of electrolyte on battery cell covers following specific gravity checks, however, maintenance personnel did not perform this cleaning. The licensee has entered this issue into their corrective action program as Condition Report 2007-02580.
The finding was more than minor because if left uncorrected the finding would become a more significant safety concern due to the corrosive effects of electrolyte on battery posts and terminal connections. Using the Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process," Phase 1 Worksheet, the finding was determined to have very low safety significance because it did not result in a design qualification deficiency or loss of function and it did not screen as risk significant due to external events. The finding had crosscutting aspects in the area of human performance associated with work practices (H.4(a)) because of insufficient communication of human error prevention techniques to maintenance personnel, specifically with respect to self and peer checking.
Inspection Report# : 2007006 (pdf)
Significance:      Jul 20, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Normal Charging Pump Balance Line Crack The team reviewed a self-revealing finding associated with the licensees failure to correct normal charging pump balance line vibrations in a timely manner. Because the licensee did not address the extended time and periodically increased magnitude of the vibrations, the balance line cracked, rendering the pump inoperable. This issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report 2007-02339.
The finding was more than minor because it is associated with the mitigating systems cornerstone attribute of equipment performance and affected the associated cornerstone objective ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using the Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process," Phase 1 Worksheet, the finding was determined to have very low safety significance because the finding did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The finding had crosscutting aspects in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program (P.1(d)) in that licensee personnel did not take corrective actions to address a safety issue in a timely manner, commensurate with its safety significance.
Inspection Report# : 2007006 (pdf)
Significance:      Jul 20, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Inadequate Procedure for Maintaining Drains Capable of Functioning The team identified a finding associated with the licensees failure to maintain a procedure which ensured that control building room drains remained available to pass their design flows for postulated flooding events. As a result of the licensees procedure and practices, debris and items were found in control building room drains. This issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report 2007-02753.
The finding was more than minor because if left uncorrected it would become a more significant safety concern. This finding affected the mitigating systems cornerstone. Using the Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process," Phase 1 Worksheet, the finding is determined to have very low safety significance because the finding did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The finding had
 
crosscutting aspects in the area of human performance associated with work practices (H.4(b)) because the licensee did not define and effectively communicate expectations regarding procedural compliance and personnel following procedures.
Inspection Report# : 2007006 (pdf)
Significance:        Jul 20, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Diesel Generator Frequency Variation Not Considered in Loading Calculations The team identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, having very low safety significance for the licensees failure to account for the effect of emergency diesel generator frequency variation in the diesel loading calculations. Specifically, emergency diesel generator loading was based on nominal 60 hertz operation of pumps and fans and did not account for the 2 percent variation allowed by Technical Specifications.
The licensee has entered this issue into their corrective action program as Condition Report 2007-02683.
The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the mitigating systems cornerstone attribute of design control and affected the associated cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, based on preliminary calculations, the failure to account for frequency variations had more than a minimal effect on the outcome of the analysis in that the continuous load rating for the emergency diesel generators would have been exceeded in the recirculation phase of a loss-of-coolant accident with the assumed loads. The team determined that the finding screened as very low safety significance (Green) because it was a design or qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in loss of operability.
Inspection Report# : 2007006 (pdf)
Significance:        Jul 07, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Implement Manual Actions A noncited violation of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) was identified for failure to adequately assess and manage the increase in risk during observation of a scheduled emergency diesel generator surveillance. On January 4, 2007, inspectors observed the emergency diesel Generator A hot start surveillance test and questioned plant operators regarding operability in Modes 1 or 2 of the emergency diesel generator while paralleled with the grid based on operating experience. The inspectors noted that operations personnel did not have a written set of steps or procedures identified for restoration of the emergency diesel generator, and would have to diagnose what restoration activities would have to be taken at the time of an emergency start demand based upon the step of the surveillance procedure in effect at the time the emergency start demand occurred. The inspectors also identified that operations personnel were unaware of the limiting response time for operator manual actions specified in Amendment 154 that approved testing in Modes 1 or 2. Wolf Creek has developed manual actions for restoration of the emergency diesel generator during testing.
The failure to adequately assess and manage the increase in risk for the use of operator manual actions to ensure emergency diesel generator availability during surveillance testing was a performance deficiency. The finding is similar to the minor example 7(g) and is more than minor because it is associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of protection against external factors, and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The finding was of very low safety significance because the magnitude of the calculated risk deficit was less than 1 x 10-6 and other risk management actions were in place.
Inspection Report# : 2007003 (pdf)
Significance:        Apr 07, 2007 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to implement fire protection impairment control permit requirements and compensatory measures A self-revealing noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.d was identified for failure to implement fire protection impairment control permit requirements and compensatory measures when operators incorrectly disabled three fire detectors in the auxiliary building. The detectors in the auxiliary building were disabled without a proper fire impairment control permit and the required compensatory roving hourly fire watch for a period of approximately 5
 
hours as required by Administrative Procedure AP 10 103, "Fire Protection Impairment Control," Revision 21. This issue is captured in the licensee's corrective action program.
The failure to implement fire protection impairment control permit requirements and establish compensatory measures for the auxiliary building 1974' level was considered a performance deficiency. The inspectors determined that the finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of protection against external factors and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The finding was of very low safety significance because it involved compensatory measures for the fixed fire protection system and was assigned a low degradation rating since less than 10 percent of the fire detectors in the area were disabled. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the work practices component because the licensee failed to apply appropriate human error prevention techniques such as self and peer-checking prior to removing the fire detectors from service (H.4(a)).
Inspection Report# : 2007002 (pdf)
Significance: TBD Dec 29, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: AV Apparent Violation Failure to Maintain Reactor Coolant System Subcooling During the Alternative Shutodwn The team identified an Apparent Violation of Wolf Creek License Condition 2.C.(5)(a) concerning an inadequate alternative shutdown analysis. The licensees alternative shutdown analysis was inadequate in that it used an acceptance criteria which was inconsistent with and less conservative than that required by the approved Fire Protection Program. The licensee developed Calculation Number AN-02-021, Revision 0, OFN RP-017, Control Room Evacuation, Consequence Evaluation, to demonstrate alternative shutdown capability for Wolf Creek in response to NRC-identified Noncited Violation 2002008-01, Inadequate alternative shutdown procedure. The calculation predicted that during an alternative shutdown, the reactor coolant system subcooling margin would not be maintained, significant voiding would occur in the core, and a steam void would form in the reactor vessel head. The licensee found the results of the calculation to be acceptable since it demonstrated that the void formation would be limited, natural circulation in the reactor coolant system would be maintained, sufficient decay heat removal would be maintained, and no fuel damage would occur. This is not consistent with the license condition to meet the technical requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R. Section III.L of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Alternative and dedicated shutdown capability, that states in part, During the postfire shutdown, the reactor process variables shall be maintained within those predicted for a loss of normal a.c. power.
This finding is greater than minor because it impacted the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to external events (such as fire) to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). It is the NRCs understanding that the licensee does not consider these circuit vulnerabilities to be violations of NRC requirements. The licensee considers the spurious operation of multiple components to be outside of the plant licensing basis for the Fire Protection Program. Specifically, in this case, both pressurizer power-operated relief valves are assumed to spuriously open because of fire induced circuit damage. The NRC staff and the industry are currently working on developing a resolution methodology to address these types of potential fire induced circuit failures. The team concluded that this violation meets the criteria of the NRC Enforcement Manual Section 8.1.7.1 for deferring enforcement actions for postulated fire induced circuit failures.
Inspection Report# : 2005008 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Significance:        Jul 07, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Establish an Adequate Preventive Maintenance Program The inspectors identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a in which Wolf Creek did not implement a preventive maintenance procedure to mitigate Train B emergency exhaust system fan bearing vibrations which resulted in a degraded condition. Specifically, the vendor manual directs lubrication every 3 to 12 months (3 to 6 months for average conditions being room temperature and clean conditions) to prevent oxidation and breakdown of
 
the grease; however, the Wolf Creek recurring preventive maintenance was set to lubricate the bearings every three years. This recurring preventive maintenance was not sufficient to ensure the bearings remained adequately lubricated.
It was not until NRC questioning that Wolf Creek generated a condition report to review the past condition of the bearings and the appropriateness of the recurring lubrication interval for the bearings.
The licensees failure to implement preventive maintenance to ensure the fan bearings were adequately lubricated is a performance deficiency. The finding is more than minor because it is associated with the barrier performance attribute of the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone; and, it affected the cornerstone objective to maintain radiological barrier functionality of the auxiliary and fuel building. The finding is of very low safety significance because the issue only represents a degradation of the radiological barrier function provided for the auxiliary or fuel building barriers to mitigate airborne radionuclides from emergency core cooling system pump cubicles or a fuel handling accident, respectively. The cause of the finding has problem identification and resolution crosscutting aspects in the area of corrective action because Wolf Creek did not evaluate or resolve the causes of repeated bearing degradation by thoroughly evaluating problems such that the resolutions address causes and extent of the conditions (P.1(c)).
Inspection Report# : 2007003 (pdf)
Significance:        Jul 07, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Follow Test Control Procedures to Demonstrate Operability The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR, Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control, in which Wolf Creek did not implement controlled testing of the Train B emergency exhaust system fan to demonstrate operability prior to returning the fan to service after bearing replacement. Specifically, on June 12, 2007, Wolf Creek restored the B emergency exhaust system fan to service without implementing the postmaintenance testing described in Procedure AP 16E-002, Postmaintenance Testing Development, Revision 6A. Upon review of the postmaintenance testing, the fan failed the vibration portion of the testing and Wolf Creek did not perform an operability evaluation in accordance with Procedure AP 28-001, Operability Evaluations. Based on inspector questioning, Wolf Creek performed the correct postmaintenance testing and an operability evaluation. These issues are under evaluation in the Wolf Creek corrective action program.
The failure to follow test control procedures for the safety-related B emergency exhaust system fan prior to declaring it operable is a performance deficiency. The finding is more than minor because it is associated with the Barrier performance attribute of the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone; and, it affected the cornerstone objective to maintain radiological barrier functionality of the auxiliary and fuel building. The finding is of very low safety significance because the issue represents a degradation of only the radiological barrier function provided for the auxiliary or fuel building barriers to mitigate airborne radionuclides from emergency core cooling system pump cubicles or a fuel handling accident. The cause of the finding has human performance crosscutting aspects in the area of decision making because Wolf Creek did not initially conduct an adequate test and then failed to question the failed postmaintenance test by making a safety-significant or risk-significant decision using proceduralized systematic processes, especially when faced with uncertain or unexpected plant conditions, to ensure safety is maintained (H.1 (a))
Inspection Report# : 2007003 (pdf)
Significance:        Apr 07, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to maintain steady state reactor power at or below the licensed thermal power limit A noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a occurred when operators did not take timely action to lower power below the licensed thermal limit of 3565 MWt. During an incore to excore neutron detector calibration, the power level exceeded the limit and the operating crew did not insert negative reactivity until after the neutron detector calibration was complete. During this evolution, the reactor exceeded licensed thermal power of 3565 MWt for approximately 58 minutes, peaking at 3566.5 MWt according to the plant computer's 10 minute calorimetric. After the neutron detector calibration was completed, operators added boron to the reactor coolant system to reduce power below 100 percent. Procedure GEN 00-004, "Power Operation," Attachment B, Step B.1.1 states, in part, that exceeding 3565 MWt is permitted only as a result of transients or computer point fluctuations. The inspectors judged that allowing reactor power to ascend above 100 percent for nearly an hour was not a transient. However, operators did not initiate action in accordance with Step B.1.1 when the 10 minute average exceeded 3565 MWt until approximately 40 minutes elapsed. This issue is entered into the corrective action program.
 
The failure to maintain steady state reactor power at or below the licensed thermal power limit is a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because it is associated with the configuration control attribute for the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone; and, it affected the cornerstone objective of providing reasonable assurance that physical design barriers (fuel cladding, reactor coolant system, and containment) protect the public from radio nuclide releases caused by accidents or events. The finding was of very low safety significance because the fuel cladding barrier was affected but did not affect the reactor coolant system or containment barriers. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the decision making component because the licensee did not ensure that licensed operators used conservative assumptions in their decision making when reactor power increased above the licensed limit for an extended period (H.1(b)).
Inspection Report# : 2007002 (pdf)
Significance:      Apr 07, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to remove the correct containment radiation monitor from service A self-revealing noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1 occurred on February 20, 2007, when a chemistry technician inadvertently removed both containment purge radiation Monitors GTRE22 and GTRE33 from service at the same time. During planned maintenance on the safety-related GTRE33 containment purge radiation monitor, a chemistry technician inadvertently removed the incorrect containment purge radiation monitor from service. After contacting the control room, the shift chemist went to GTRE22 and incorrectly removed the radiation monitor from service. Instrumentation and controls personnel working at GTRE33 informed the shift chemist that the incorrect radiation monitor was removed from service. The shift chemist subsequently returned GTRE22 to service. Technical Specification 3.3.6, Condition A, was entered for having more than one train inoperable. The containment purge and supply dampers were immediately verified to be closed and remained closed with no containment purge in progress.
This issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action program.
The inspectors determined that the failure to remove the correct containment radiation monitor from service was a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because it is associated with the configuration control attribute for the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone; and it affected the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers (fuel cladding, reactor coolant system, and containment) protect the public from radio nuclide releases caused by accidents for events. The finding was of very low safety significance because both trains of the radiation monitor protective functions (i.e., to stop a containment purge on a high radiation signal) were affected but did not result in an actual open pathway in the containment barrier. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the work practices component because the shift chemist failed to apply appropriate human error prevention techniques such as self and peer-checks (H.4(a)).
Inspection Report# : 2007002 (pdf)
Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Significance:      Apr 07, 2007 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to perform an adequate survey in a high radiation area The inspector reviewed a self-revealing noncited violation of 10 CFR 20.1501(a) because the licensee failed to perform an adequate survey in a high radiation area. On March 7, 2007, a health physics technician performed a survey of Floor Drain Tank Room 7126 in the radwaste building to support a task performed by two radwaste operators. The health physics technician surveyed the immediate work area and informed the operators that general work area dose rates were 10 millirem per hour. Based on this information, operators entered the posted high radiation area on a radiation work permit that had an electronic dosimeter dose rate set point of 50 millirem per hour. One of the
 
operators received a dose rate alarm while performing the task, the operators exited the area, and contacted health physics personnel. Subsequent investigation identified that a comprehensive survey of the entire room was not performed. Follow-up surveys indicated that dose rates in the room were as high as 150 millirem per hour at 30 centimeters from the floor drain tank. This issue has been entered into the licensee's corrective action program.
The finding was greater than minor because it was associated with the Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone attribute of Exposure Control, and affected the cornerstone objective because workers could have received additional radiation dose. The finding was processed through the Occupational Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process and determined to be of very low safety significance because it was not an as low as is reasonably achievable finding, there was no overexposure or substantial potential for an overexposure, and the ability to assess dose was not compromised. Additionally, this finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance related to work controls because the failure to incorporate job site conditions impacted the margin of radiological safety provided by an adequate survey (H.3(a)).
Inspection Report# : 2007002 (pdf)
Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Significance:        Apr 07, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to maintain sufficient records to furnish evidence of events significant to plant safety A noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a was identified for failure to maintain sufficient records (logs) to furnish evidence of events significant to plant safety. On January 26, 2007, electrical maintenance commenced a scheduled replacement of main control board Annunciator Power Supply E1PS5. During the power supply replacement, a loss of 8.7 percent of the annunciators was expected. However, during de-termination of the power supply leads, an unexpected loss of a significant number of the main control board annunciators occurred.
Subsequently, due to the large number of annunciator inputs that were lost, the plant computer became overloaded and stopped updating. Based on these indications, the control room operators would need to evaluate emergency action level and Technical Specification requirements. The inspectors discovered during interviews with the operations crew that was on watch during the event, that no information was recorded or kept during the event. Administrative Procedure AP 21-001, "Conduct of Operations," Revision 36A, requires operators to make plant log entries of potentially reportable occurrences, entries that could be useful in reconstructing events, and events significant to plant safety. However, the logs were not updated until several hours later based on verbal accounts provided to the oncoming crew. The inspectors noted that the 'after the fact' log entries still provided insufficient data to reconstruct the activities related to the loss of annunciators. This issue is captured in the licensee's corrective action program.
The failure to adequately document times and information for the loss of annunciators was considered to be a performance deficiency. This finding was more than minor because it could impact the operator's ability to accurately implement emergency action levels and Technical Specification action statements and if left uncorrected, this type of insufficient documentation could become a more significant safety concern. The finding required NRC management review and was determined to be of very low safety significance because the loss of annunciators challenged the emergency action level time requirements but was restored prior to exceeding any emergency action level or Technical Specification action time requirement. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human
 
performance associated with the work practices component because the licensee failed to effectively communicate expectations regarding plant operating log entries in accordance with procedural requirements (H.4(b)).
Inspection Report# : 2007002 (pdf)
Significance:        Apr 07, 2007 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to maintain drawings technically accurate A self-revealing finding was identified regarding inadequate engineering drawings used as guidance to replace main control board annunciator power supplies resulting in a loss of all main control board annunciators. During de-termination of the power supply leads, an unexpected loss of a significant number of the annunciators occurred.
During the planning review of Work Order 06 280217 003, "Replace Power Supply RK045E1PS5," the electricians brought forth a concern about the daisy chaining of the leads associated with the main control board power supplies and not knowing what effect removing a power supply would have on additional annunciators. System engineering reviewed vendor drawings and determined that only the expected annunciators would be lost. The vendor drawings only consisted of discrete wire connections from the power supply to the logic bus and did not show interconnections with any other power supplies. Although, it was acknowledged by system engineering that there were numerous daisy chained connections not shown on the vendor drawings, no further reviews or research was conducted. The licensee's root cause analysis determined that the vendor drawings did not show the interconnecting wiring identifying point to point connections associated with the main control board power supplies. This issue is captured in the licensee's corrective action program.
The failure to maintain drawings technically accurate and reflect the as-built condition of the plant was considered to be a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because it impacted the maintenance technicians ability to accurately plan and implement work, resulting in the annunciator system being adversely affected and could be reasonably viewed as a precursor to a significant event. The finding required NRC management review and was determined to be of very low safety significance because the finding did not result in a loss of a system safety function or a loss of risk significant equipment for greater than 24 hours. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the human performance area associated with the resources component because the licensee failed to maintain complete, accurate and up-to-date design documentation (H.2(c)).
Inspection Report# : 2007002 (pdf)
Last modified : June 05, 2008
 
Wolf Creek 1 2Q/2008 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance:        Dec 31, 2007 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: FIN Finding Inadequate work instructions resulted in condensate pump trip A self-revealing finding was identified for inadequate work instructions and poor work practices associated with trip circuit verification on the Central Chiller B resulted in the Condensate Pump B trip and steam generator level transient. Procedure RNM C-1301, Miscellaneous Relay and Meter equipment, Revision 6, step 8.3.2.8.h of RNM C-1301 required in part that a jumper be installed from Terminals 3 to 4 on Relay 194 at Breaker PB00402 for the Central Chiller B (wire C280 and C281) which resulted in Condensate Pump B trip. However, this step was copied from a previous work order and not verified as appropriate for the testing being conducted. Step 8.3.2.8.h should have read in part to install jumpers from Terminals 7 to 8 (wire C284 and C285). Licensee reviews and walkdowns were inadequate to identify the incorrect instructions due to workload, interruptions and distractions during the review process. The evaluation also identified Performance Improvement Request 2002-1664 which discussed a similar event where copied information in a work order was incorrect and not identified in reviews. Corrective actions for this event included adding sign-off sections in RNM C-1301 for walkdowns/reviews to ensure work instructions were reviewed before work was performed.
The failure to provide adequate work instructions is a performance deficiency. This finding was more than minor because it is associated with the procedure quality attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone and it affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability. This finding also affected the procedure quality attribute for the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and it affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). Because two cornerstones were affected a Phase 2 analysis was required. The consequences were assessed using the Phase 2 pre-solved tables with the assistance of a Region IV Senior Reactor Analyst. Although the likelihood of a trip was increased and the capability of the normal heat sink was reduced, the exposure time for this condition was less than 3 days and all other mitigation capabilities were maintained.
Consequently, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance. The cause of the finding has human performance crosscutting aspects in the area associated with work practices because the licensee failed to ensure that human error prevention techniques such as self/peer-checking and proper documentation of activities were used in the review of work activities such that they are performed safely (H.4(a)).
Inspection Report# : 2007005 (pdf)
Significance:        Jul 07, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Identify Cause of Component Cooling Water Valve Closures The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Conditions Adverse to Quality, involving Wolf Creeks failure to identify and correct the cause of the reactor coolant pump (RCP) thermal barrier component cooling water heat exchanger outlet valves stroking closed on high flow. Specifically, between 2001 and 2007, Wolf Creek experienced repeated cases of the RCP thermal barrier component cooling water heat exchanger outlet valves stroking closed when two component cooling water pumps are started during train swaps.
Wolf Creek evaluated the issue after inspector questioning but did not review the impact of the valves stroking closed during design basis events or accidents and the operators ability to open them given the valves circuit breakers opening. Wolf Creek has further condition reports open on this finding.
The failure to identify and correct the condition adverse to quality of ensuring RCP seal cooling as described in the Updated Safety Analysis Report is a performance deficiency. The finding is more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute for the Initiating Events Cornerstone; and, it affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during
 
shutdown as well as power operations. The finding is determined to be of very low safety significance because the finding would not result in exceeding the Technical Specification limit for identified reactor coolant system leakage and would not have affected other mitigation systems resulting in a total loss of their safety function. The cause of the finding has problem identification and resolution crosscutting aspects in the area of corrective action because Wolf Creek did not thoroughly evaluate the issue such that the resolution addressed the extent of conditions given multiple opportunities documented in the corrective action program (P.1(c)).
Inspection Report# : 2007003 (pdf)
Significance:      Jul 07, 2007 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: FIN Finding Inadequate Inspections of Circulating Water Pump Auto Transformers A self-revealing finding for failing to identify degraded circulating water pump auto transformers during inspections in April 2007. Specifically, Wolf Creek failed to adequately inspect and identify signs of overheating and degradation during inspection of the excitation auto transformers for the circulating water pumps. Consequently, the unidentified degraded condition resulted in the circulating water Pump A tripping and an automatic turbine load reduction on May 25, 2007. Wolf Creek has replaced the failed auto transformer and is planning a modification to increase the size of the transformers to reduce overheating.
The failure to perform adequate inspections of the circulating water Pump A excitation auto transformer was considered a performance deficiency. The finding is more than minor because it is associated with the Initiating Events Cornerstone because the deficiency affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the issue did not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions would not be available. The cause of the finding has human performance crosscutting aspects in the area of work practices because Wolf Creek did not follow maintenance procedures and did not ensure oversight of work activities such that nuclear safety was supported (H.4(b)).
Inspection Report# : 2007003 (pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance:      Apr 07, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to implement fire protection impairment control permit requirements and compensatory measures The inspectors identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.d for failure to implement fire protection impairment control permit requirements and compensatory measures when operators received a trouble alarm on a fire detector in the auxiliary building. On January 26, 2008, operators discovered that Detector KC-104-XCH-ID-006 did not have a fire protection impairment control permit. This detector was adjacent to Detector KC-104-XSH-ID-007 which was already inoperable in Impairment 2008-020. The licensees administrative procedure required fire detection in the area to be declared inoperable if two adjacent detectors are inoperable. This condition existed for approximately 24 hours and would have required a compensatory continuous fire watch for the period that both detectors were inoperable. The residents identified that the control room turnover checklist contains a section for listing the KC008 alarms; however, the two turnover checklists for the two shifts following the initial alarm did not identify Detector KC 104 XCH ID 006 as a Detector KC 008 alarm.
The failure to implement fire protection impairment control permit requirements and establish compensatory measures for the auxiliary building 2026-foot level was considered a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of protection against external factors and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, this issue relates to the protection against fire example of protection against external factors attribute because the detectors were inoperable without ensuring compensatory measures were in place. The finding was of very low safety significance because it involved compensatory measures for the fixed fire protection system and was assigned a low degradation rating since less than 10 percent of the fire detectors in the area were disabled. The finding has crosscutting aspects in the area of human performance associated with work practices
 
because the licensee failed to apply appropriate human error techniques such as self and peer checking techniques to avoid committing errors [H.4(a)].
Inspection Report# : 2008002 (pdf)
Significance:      Apr 07, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Performing prohibited elective maintenance on offsite power during EDG maintenance
* An NRC identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 3.8.1.B.4 resulted from Wolf Creek removing equipment from service that was prohibited by the TS. Inspectors reviewed Technical Specification Bases 3.8.1.B.4 which prohibits elective maintenance within the switchyard that would challenge offsite power. Inspectors also reviewed the NRC Safety Evaluation Report for the 7 day emergency diesel generator allowed outage time (Technical Specification 3.8.1.B.4.2.2) and found that Section 4.6.c, states: The offsite power supply and switchyard conditions are conducive to an extend[ed] DG [completion time], which includes ensuring that switchyard access is restricted and no elective maintenance within the switchyard is performed that would challenge the offsite power availability. The inspectors determined that challenges to offsite power can originate with elective maintenance inside the protected area.
The inspectors determined that the failure to implement requirements of the NRC Safety Evaluation Report and Technical Specification Bases for Technical Specification 3.8.1.B.4 was a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute for the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone; and, it affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the issue resulted in the Train B offsite power being inoperable, but capable of supplying the safety bus for greater than 24 hours. Additionally, the cause of the finding has a human performance crosscutting aspects in the area associated with work control. Specifically, Wolf Creek did not ensure STS IC-805B was appropriately coordinated within organizations to assure plant and human performance during the extended emergency diesel generator allowed outage time. [H.3(b)]
Inspection Report# : 2008002 (pdf)
Significance:      Apr 07, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to establish reasonable expectation of operability
* An NRC identified NCV of Technical Specification 5.4.1 for failure to follow the operability process on discovery of the CCP A room cooler leak. Wolf Creek made no log entries at 2:20 p.m. stating its basis for immediate operability. At 3:50 p.m., Wolf Creek control room logs state that centrifugal charging Pump A had a room cooler leak and structural integrity cannot be verified. Subsequent entry into Technical Specification 3.7.8 for the essential service water Pump A caused emergency diesel Generator A to be inoperable. Technical Specification 3.8.1, Condition I states that with three alternating current sources inoperable (both emergency diesel generators and on offsite source), Technical Specification 3.0.3 shall be entered. Wolf Creek exited Technical Specification 3.0.3 at 4:13 p.m. when the inlet and outlet valves to centrifugal charging Pump As room cooler were closed. The inspectors could not locate any justification produced by Wolf Creek for the room coolers operability after 2:20 p.m.
The inspectors determined that the failure to follow the operability process is a performance deficiency. The inspectors determined that this finding was more than minor because if left uncorrected, it could become a more serious problem if the Technical Specification is not correctly applied. The finding screened to Phase 2 because the finding represents an actual loss of safety function of a single train of high head injection. A bounding risk of Green results from the Phase 2 presolved worksheets using an exposure time of less than 3 days for the centrifugal charging pump (CCP) A [Fails to Run]. The inspectors also determined that the finding had a human performance crosscutting aspects in the area associated with decision making because the licensee failed to use conservative assumptions in its operability decision and apply a requirement to demonstrate that the room cooler is operable is in order to proceed rather than a requirement to demonstrate that it is inoperable [H.1(b)].
Inspection Report# : 2008002 (pdf)
 
Significance:      Apr 07, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Untimely corrective actions for CCP room cooler leads to NOED The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix B Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, because Wolf Creek failed to take timely corrective actions to prevent failure of the centrifugal charging pump A room cooler which resulted in a Notice of Enforcement Discretion (EA 08 052). The inspectors found that room Cooler SGL12A experienced leaks in October 1999, May 2003, October 2003, August 2004, October 2006, and again in February 2008. On March 14, 2007, Wolf Creek chose to delay SGL12As replacement until Refueling Outage 16 due to the required length of time to replace the cooler. On February 13, 2008, a circumferential flaw on an H bend was discovered in SGL12A preventing it from performing its safety function. Inspectors reviewed corrective action Procedure AP 28A-100, Condition Reports, Revision 3 and found that a loss of a train to perform its safety function was considered a significant deficiency requiring corrective action to prevent recurrence. The inspectors reviewed this issue under Performance Improvement Requests 2005-2507 and 2004-0688, and Condition Report 2008-0467 and found that Wolf Creek designated prior failures nonsignificant.
The failure to take timely corrective actions within 9 years was a performance deficiency. The inspectors determined that this finding was more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute for the mitigating systems cornerstone; and, it affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e. core damage). The finding screened to Phase 2 because the finding represents an actual loss of safety function of a single train of high head injection for greater than its Technical Specification 3.8.1.B.2 allowed outage time of 4 hours. Using an exposure time of less than 3 days for the scenario Centrifugal Charging Pump PBG05A [Fails to Run], a bounding risk of Green results from the Phase 2 presolved worksheets. Additionally, the cause of the finding has a human performance crosscutting aspect in the area associated with resources. Specifically, Wolf Creek did not ensure adequate resources to maintain long-term plant safety by minimizing the room coolers long-standing issues and preventive maintenance deferrals [H.2(a)].
Inspection Report# : 2008002 (pdf)
Significance:      Apr 07, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to reestablish timely seal cooling for the reactor coolant pumps
* An NRC identified violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.d resulted because Procedure OFN RP 017, "Control Room Evacuation," Revision 21, failed to account for the needed actions to reestablish reactor coolant pump seal cooling. Failure to reestablish seal cooling in a timely manner could have resulted in a small break loss of coolant accident.
This performance deficiency resulted from an inadequate postfire safe shutdown procedure. The inspectors determined the finding is greater than minor in that it affected the ability to achieve and maintain hot shutdown following a control room fire. This finding is associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of protection against external factors (e.g., fire). This finding affected the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to external events (such as fire) to prevent undesirable consequences. In addition to the control room fire requiring operators to evacuate the control room, the fire would have had to affect components located in two physically separated panels. The licensee has IEEE 383 qualified cables and conductors throughout the plant. The Phase 3 risk evaluation performed by the NRC senior reactor analyst determined this deficiency had very low risk significance.
Inspection Report# : 2008002 (pdf)
Significance:      Apr 07, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to analyze motor operated valuve circuits
* The inspectors identified a noncited violation of License Condition 2.c(5) because the licensee failed to evaluate the impact of a motor operated valve failure mechanism on their ability to implement postfire safe shutdown following a control room evacuation. The licensee determined that the failure mechanism affected 38 motor operated valves and
 
upon valve failure could affect their ability to implement their postfire safe shutdown procedure. A short circuit that bypassed the torque and/or limit switches could damage the valves and prevent repositioning of the valve in the postfire safe shutdown position.
The inspectors determined this was a performance deficiency because the licensee failed to ensure that components necessary to safely shutdown the reactor would remain operable following a fire. This deficiency was more than minor, in that, it had the potential to impact the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to external events (such as fire) to prevent undesirable consequences. In addition to the control room fire requiring operators to evacuate the control room, the fire would have had to affect components located in five different control panels. The Phase 3 risk evaluation performed by the NRC senior reactor analyst determined this deficiency had very low risk significance.
Inspection Report# : 2008002 (pdf)
Significance:        Mar 13, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Vent ECCS Piping Every 31 days The team identified two examples of a noncited violation of Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements 3.5.2.3 for the failure to vent emergency core cooling system discharge piping. In the first example, the licensee had inappropriately concluded that inaccessible vents included all those vents located in posted high radiation areas, but either no high radiation field existed in the area or personnel would not be exposed to high radiation dose. The second example involved the failure to perform the surveillance in accordance with the 31 days required frequency. When the surveillance was conducted, gas was observed coming from a SI system hot leg injection line vent.
Both violation examples were more than minor because they were similar to non-minor examples 4.m from NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix E. Examples of Minor Issues, in that, when the surveillances were completed, unexpected amounts of gas were found the piping systems. Some sections were totally voided. Using the Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 Screening Worksheet, the issue screened as having very low safety significance because it was a qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in loss-of-operability in accordance with NRC Manual Chapter Part 9900, Technical Guidance, Operability Determination Process for Operability and Functional Assessment. The finding had a crosscutting aspect in the Human Performance, Resources component, because the licensee failed to have an adequate surveillance procedure that included all necessary ECCS vent values. These findings were indicative of current performance because operators, who are familiar with the TS requirements and Bases commitments, could have questioned, at any time, the practice of eliminating accessible values from the venting program. [H.2(c)]
Inspection Report# : 2008007 (pdf)
Significance:        Mar 13, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Promptly Identify and Correct Voiding in the Safety Injection System The team identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI (Corrective Actions), with five examples, for the failure to promptly identify and correct voids in safety injection system. In some cases, significant changes in the safety injection tank leakage rates went unnoticed. Safety injection tank leakage can be a key indicator that voids are forming in lower pressure systems. In other examples, unexpected amounts of gas came from safety injection piping vents but operators and engineers failed to take meaningful actions to investigate or to address the occurrences. Contributors to the violation included: (1) the failure to properly address two pieces of related operating experience, (2) management's failure to follow site procedures and ensure that operating experience reviews were adequate, (3) the emergency core cooling system monthly venting procedure contained inadequate acceptance criteria, and (4) engineers were not adequately monitoring safety injection tank leakage.
This finding was more than minor because it was similar to non-minor example 3.j from NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues, in that there was a reasonable doubt on the operability of the Train A safety injection system and the steam generators. Using the Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 Screening Worksheet, the issue screened as having very low safety significance because it was a qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in loss-of-operability in accordance with NRC
 
Manual Chapter Part 9900, Technical Guidance, Operability Determination Process for Operability and Functional Assessments. The finding had a crosscutting aspect in the Problem Identification and Resolution area, Operating Experience component, because the site had not institutionalized operating experience. This finding was indicative of current plant performance because the weaknesses in the operating experience program that permitted the inadequate review of operating experience were still in place at the time of this inspection. [P.2(b)]
Inspection Report# : 2008007 (pdf)
Significance:      Mar 13, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Promptly Identify and Correct Voids in ECCS Suction Piping The team identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI (Corrective Actions), because the licensee failed to promptly identify and correct voids in emergency core cooling systme suction piping. After NRC concerns were raised, the licensee checked the suction piping and found voids in the piggyback lines (between residual heat removal discharge piping and charging and safety injection suction headers) and in shutdown cooling suction piping. Contributors to the violation included: (1) the failure to properly address two pieces of related operating experience, (2) management's failure to follow site procedures and ensure that operating experience reviews were adequate.
This finding was more than minor because it was similar to non-minor example 3.j from NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues, in that there was a reasonable doubt on the operability of the Train A safety injection system and the steam generators. Using the Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 Screening Worksheet, the issue screened as having very low safety significance because it was a qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in loss-of-operability in accordance with NRC Manual Chapter Part 9900, Technical Guidance, Operability Determination Process for Operability and Functional Assessments. The finding had a crosscutting aspect in the Problem Identification and Resolution area, Operating Experience component, because the site had not institutionalized operating experience. This finding was indicative of current plant performance because the weaknesses in the operating experience program that permitted the inadequate review of operating experience were still in place at the time of this inspection.[P.2(b)]
Inspection Report# : 2008007 (pdf)
Significance:      Mar 13, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate RHR and CS Void Calculations The team identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III (Design Control), for an inadequate calculation involving previously identified voids in the residual heat removal and containment spray containment suction piping. A contract engineer relied solely on engineering judgment to determine that the void stream, up to 11 percent, would have no affect on pump performance. Test data from an NRC NUREG, that the licensee had also used, contradicted the contractor's assessment. A contributor to this violation was the licensee's poor understanding of information contained in the NUREG.
This finding was more than minor because it was similar to non-minor example 3.j from NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues, in that there was a reasonable doubt on the operability of the residual heat removal and containment spray pumps. Using the Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 Screening Worksheet, the issue screened as having very low safety significance because it was a qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in loss of operability in accordance with NRC Manual Chapter Part 9900, Technical Guidance, Operability Determination Process for Operability and Functional Assessments. The finding had a crosscutting aspect in the Problem Identification and Resolution area, Corrective Action Program component, because the site failed to perform an adequate engineering evaluation for a nonconforming condition [P.1 (c)].
Inspection Report# : 2008007 (pdf)
 
Significance:      Mar 13, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Adequately Correct Voiding Design Control Violation The team identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI (Corrective Actions), because the licensee took inadequate corrective measures to address NRC identified deficiencies involving the calculation for voids in the residual heat removal and containment spray sump piping. The licensee's assessment failed to address the expected change in net-positive-suction-head required for the pumps. NRC issued guidance informed the licensee that this term would need adjustment.
This finding was more than minor because, if left uncorrected, could become a more significant safety concern. For example, the net positive suction head calculations for residual heat removal pumps shows that the pumps have very little design margin. The failure to properly address the voids may lead engineers to believe that there is margin available for plant modifications (such as the containment sump modification), when there is not. Using the Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 Screening Worksheet, the issue screened as having very low safety significance because it was a qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in loss of operability in accordance with NRC Manual Chapter Part 9900, Technical Guidance, Operability Determination Process for Operability and Functional Assessments. The finding had a crosscutting aspect in the Problem Identification and Resolution area, Corrective Action Program component, because the site failed to perform an adequate engineering evaluation for a performance deficiency [P.1(c)].
Inspection Report# : 2008007 (pdf)
Significance:      Mar 13, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Approve Engineering Calculations Prior to Use at Wolf Creek and Inadequate Work Instructions The team identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III (Design Control), with two examples for: (1) the failure to implement engineering procedures and approve a third party calculation prior to use at Wolf Creek, and (2) the failure to properly translate licensing and design basis information into instructions.
Following identification of the first example, the licensee approved the subject calculation for use at Wolf Creek.
However, the calculation had an inadequate basis for the acceptance of a 5 percent void fraction in suction piping and a 20 percent void fraction in discharge piping. Specifically, the calculation failed to consider the impact of voids on natural circulation operations and was inconsistent with Technical Specifications, the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, and net positive suction head calculations. All had assumed that Wolf Creek piping was water solid.
The finding was more than minor because, if left uncorrected, could result in a more significant safety concern.
Specifically, the existence of 5 percent void fraction on the suction side of the pumps and 20 percent on the discharge side are still unanalyzed conditions and could adversely impact design basis accident analysis results. The licensee's operability assessment provided a reasonable expectation that design limits would not be exceeded. Using the Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 Screening Worksheet, the issue screened as having very low safety significance because it was a qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in loss-of-operability in accordance with NRC Manual Chapter Part 9900, Technical Guidance, Operability Determination Process for Operability and Functional Assessments. The finding had a crosscutting aspect in the Problem Identification and Resolution area, Corrective Action Program component, because the site failed to perform an adequate engineering evaluation [P.1(c)].
Inspection Report# : 2008007 (pdf)
Significance:      Mar 13, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Implement Piping Design Procedure and ASME Code Requirements The team identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V (Procedures), for the failure to implement piping design procedure requirements. The procedure required that piping systems be designed for normal
 
component service (filling and venting) as well as routine operational surveillance (monthly emergency core cooling system venting). The piping systems were actually designed with some sections that could not be totally filled. The licensee also failed to design the piping in accordance with the ASME Code, which required vents at all piping high points.
The finding was more than minor because, if left uncorrected, it could result in a more significant safety concern.
Specifically, the performance of emergency core cooling system systems with voids is not totally understood and could result in adverse systems response such as degraded pump performance or adversely impact natural circulation operations. Using the Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 Screening Worksheet, the issue screened as having very low safety significance because it was a qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in loss of operability in accordance with NRC Manual Chapter Part 9900, Technical Guidance, Operability Determination Process for Operability and Functional Assessments."
Inspection Report# : 2008007 (pdf)
Significance:        Mar 13, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Root Cause Assessment The team identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, because the licensee failed to follow the site procedure when performing a root cause assessment for the emergency core cooling system voiding issues and, subsequently, completed an inadequate root cause assessment. The licensee came to the erroneous conclusion that operating experience evaluations were thorough, but actually drew broad conclusions based on unverified and incorrect information, and had failed to identify significant contributors to the events.
The finding was more than minor because, if left uncorrected, it could result in a more significant safety concern.
Specifically, the NRC relies heavily on the licensee's ability to find and correct their own safety issues. The licensee's reliance on unvalidated (and incorrect) information and the crafting of corrective measures to fit erroneous conclusions provides an unacceptable level of confidence that the licensee can consistently correct its own problems without NRC involvement. Using the Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 Screening Worksheet, the issue screened as having very low safety significance because it was a qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in loss-of-operability in accordance with NRC Manual Chapter Part 9900, Technical Guidance, Operability Determination Process for Operability and Functional Assessments. The finding had a crosscutting aspect in the Problem Identification and Resolution area, Corrective Action Program component, because the site failed to perform an adequate engineering evaluation.[P.1(c)]
Inspection Report# : 2008007 (pdf)
Significance:        Feb 29, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Twenty one examples of failure to follow seismic requirements of scaffolding procedure The team identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V, in which 21 scaffolds in 10 plant areas that were in contact with or closer to plant equipment than procedure allowed. The procedure required engineering evaluations which did not contain any technical bases as to the acceptability of as built scaffolds.
Subsequent engineering evaluation of each of the incorrect scaffolding installations confirmed that the configurations did not challenge operability. The NRC identified previous concerns with the erection of scaffolds, yet the licensee failed to take action to correct this issue.
The team evaluated the significance of this finding using Phase 1 of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, Significance Determination of Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations, and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance because the issue resulted in 21 unevaluated scaffolds which are likely not to challenge the ability of the plant to safely shutdown after an earthquake. As such, under Phase 1 screening, the deficiency is not related to a qualification or design deficiency, it did not represent a loss of safety function for a train or system as defined in the plant specific risk-informed inspection notebook, and did not screen as risk significant for seismic external events, because the affected systtems were considered degraded, but operable. Using these inputs, the performance deficiency screened to Green. The team determined that the finding had a human performance
 
crosscutting aspect in the area associated with decision making because the licensee failed to adopt a requirement to demonstrate that the proposed action is safe in order to proceed rather than a requirement to demonstrate that the proposed action is safe in order to disapprove the action. Specifically, Wolf Creek Generating Station did not conduct any review of engineering decisions to verify the validity of the underlying assumption that equipment and scaffolding could be in contact or closer than the established limit (H.1(b)).
Inspection Report# : 2008006 (pdf)
Significance:        Feb 29, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to take Corrective Action For Missed Compensatory Measures The team identified a finding because the licensee failed to take timely corrective actions to address a previously identified NRC finding. FIN 2007002-04 was issued because the licensee had failed to establish compensatory actions in response to the failure of all Main Annunciator Board alarms. Failure to have compensatory measures inhibited the licensee in their efforts to determine the cause of the alarm failures. Corrective actions repaired the equipment that caused of the annunciator failure, but were unrelated to the failure to follow procedures and take compensatory measures.
The team determined that this was a performance deficiency because the licensee had committed to take corrective actions in response to the previous NCV but failed to do so in a timely manner. The inspectors determined that this violation was greater than minor because it met the intent of MC 0612 Appendix E Example 4.a. in that there were several examples of the licensee failing to take corrective actions in response to NRC identified NCVs and findings, indicating that The licensee routinely failed to perform engineering evaluations on similar issues. The inspectors performed a Phase I SDP evaluation and determined that the violation was screened as being very low safety significance, Green, because all of the answers to the Phase I Worksheet Mitigating Systems Column were no. The team also determined that this finding has crosscutting aspects in the problem identification and resolution area associated with the corrective action program in that the licensee failed to implement timely or effective corrective actions. (P.1(d)).
Inspection Report# : 2008006 (pdf)
Significance:        Feb 29, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to take corrective action for missed operability evaluation compensatory measures The team identified a violation of 10CFR50 Appendix B Criterion XVI because the licensee failed to take timely corrective actions to address a previously identified NCV. NCV 2007003-05 was issued because the licensee had failed to perform an operability evaluation following bearing replacement on the Train B emergency exhaust system fan. Corrective actions were not related to the missed performance of the operability evaluation, but the equipment failure.
The team determined that this was a performance deficiency because the licensee had committed to take corrective actions in response to the previous NCV but failed to do so in a timely manner. The inspectors determined that this violation was greater than minor because it met the intent of MC 0612 Appendix E Example 4.a. in that there were several examples of the licensee failing to take corrective actions in response to NRC identified NCVs and findings, indicating that The licensee routinely failed to perform engineering evaluations on similar issues. The inspectors performed a Phase I SDP evaluation and determined that the violation was screened as being very low safety significance, Green, because all of the answers to the Phase I Worksheet Mitigating Systems Column were no. The team also determined that this finding has crosscutting aspects in the problem identification and resolution area associated with the corrective action program in that the licensee failed to implement timely or effective corrective actions. (P.1(d)).
Inspection Report# : 2008006 (pdf)
Significance:        Feb 29, 2008
 
Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to take timely corrective action to establish monitoring frequency of AFW pump governor null drift The team identified a violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion XVI because the licensee failed to take timely corrective actions to address a previously identified finding. Finding 2006010 was issued because the licensee had failed to establish an acceptable monitoring frequency on their Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump speed governor null-drift as recommended by a Part 21 report from Engine Systems, Inc. The corrective actions to establish the monitoring for the null-drift were not implemented.
The team determined that this was a performance deficiency because the licensee had committed to take corrective actions in response to the previous NCV but failed to do so in a timely manner. The team determined that this violation was greater than minor because it met the intent of MC 0612 Appendix E Example 4.a. in that there were several examples of the licensee failing to take corrective actions in response to NRC identified NCVs and findings, indicating that The licensee routinely failed to perform engineering evaluations on similar issues. The team performed a Phase I SDP evaluation and determined that the violation was screened as being very low safety significance, Green, because all of the answers to the Phase I Worksheet Mitigating Systems Column were no. The team also determined that this finding has crosscutting aspects in the problem identification and resolution area associated with the corrective action program in that the licensee failed to implement timely or effective corrective actions (P.1(d)).
Inspection Report# : 2008006 (pdf)
Significance:        Feb 29, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to take timely corrective action to correct Barton transmitter defects The team identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, regarding the failure to identify and correct conditions adverse quality associated with NRC NCV 2006-004-02 documented in Inspection Report 2006-004. Specifically, the licensee did not address in the apparent cause evaluation and corrective actions the failure to follow procedures resulting in an inadequate inspection of installed Barton pressure transmitters for known potential manufacturing defects which resulted in a previous violation of Administrative Procedure AP 28-011, Resolving Deficiencies Impacting SSCs, Revision 1. The licensee inappropriately credited transmitter inspections that occurred several years prior to receipt of the vendor recommendation as sufficient to resolve this issue.
This finding was more than minor because it could reasonably be viewed a precursor to a significant event and affected the equipment performance attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone and the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events. Using Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 worksheets, the inspectors determined that the finding is of very low significance because it did not represent an actual loss of a safety function or operability and was not potentially risk significant due to external events. The inspectors also determined that this finding has crosscutting aspects in the problem identification and resolution area associated with the corrective action program in that the licensee failed to identify the issue completely and thoroughly evaluate the problem such that the problem was resolved (P.1(a), P.1(c)).
Inspection Report# : 2008006 (pdf)
Significance:        Feb 29, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to take timely corrective action to correct annunciator feed configuration deficiencies.
The team identified a green finding for failure to implement corrective action for abandoned in place annunciator feed wiring deficiencies. CR 2005-003275 was initiated because Cables ST-009 and ST-019 were field-spliced together to prevent electrical shocks such that the system configuration did not match the system drawing. Work Order (WO) 07-292004-000 was initiated to correct this condition but was closed as unworkable. CR 2005-003275 was closed to this closed work order even though the condition was not corrected, leaving the system in a condition not reflected in drawings or design documents. This configuration could result in further shocks, and further configuration control issues. The main annunciator system and its feeds are not safety-¬related, and therefore this performance deficiency is
 
not a violation of NRC requirements.
The failure to implement corrective actions for an identified configuration control issue is a performance deficiency.
This item affects the mitigating systems cornerstone. The team determined that this violation was greater than minor because it met the intent of MC 0612 Appendix E Example 4.a. in that there were several examples of the licensee failing to take corrective actions in response to findings, indicating that The licensee routinely failed to perform engineering evaluations on similar issues. The team performed a Phase I SDP evaluation and determined that the violation was screened as being very low safety significance, Green, because all of the answers to the Phase I Worksheet Mitigating Systems Column were no. The team also determined that this finding has crosscutting aspects in the problem identification and resolution area associated with the corrective action program in that the licensee failed to implement timely or effective corrective actions. (P.1(d)).
Inspection Report# : 2008006 (pdf)
Significance:        Dec 31, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to evaluate ESW valve corrosion The inspectors identified a noncited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," for failure to follow a procedure which required an evaluation of the Train B of ESW traveling screen wash valve and identical valves in the system after the Train A ESW screen wash valve had failed. Wolf Creek declined to enter its operability process but did tag Valve EF HV-92 open on September 13, 2007. An operability evaluation was produced on September 27, after EF HV-92 was disassembled and found to have unacceptable disc material loss due to corrosion. Corrective actions from the September 27 evaluation include a disassembly of an identical valve in the essential service water system that shows degrading but operable performance.
The failure to follow Procedure AP 26C-004, Technical Specification Operability, which required an evaluation of Valve EF HV-92, is a performance deficiency. The finding is more than minor because if left uncorrected the valve discs corrosion would become a more significant safety concern. The finding was of very low safety significance because the issue resulted in Valve EF HV 92 being degraded, but did open even with significant material and is not related to a qualification or design deficiency, did not result in the loss of safety function for greater than 24 hours, and was not related to external events such as fires and floods. The cause of the finding had problem identification and resolution crosscutting aspects in the area associated with the corrective action program because the licensee failed to evaluate the failure mechanism completely, accurately, and in a timely manner commensurate with its safety significance (P.1(a)).
Inspection Report# : 2007005 (pdf)
Significance:        Dec 31, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate evaluation of EDG for common cause failure The inspectors identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 3.8.1 for failure to perform an adequate common cause evaluation within 24 hours to demonstrate no common cause failure mechanism existed between the emergency diesel generators. Wolf Creeks common cause evaluation stated that the Hypothesis was that the EDG A digital reference unit (DRU) had not been refurbished as recommended in a April 21, 2004, 10 CFR Part 21 notification from Fairbanks Morse which stated that Wolf Creeks DRUs were affected by an integrated circuit contamination problem. Inspectors reviewed the April 21 notification and found that the slow start rpm ramp function was affected, however, The inspectors reviewed operating experience and other generic correspondence and found a 10 CFR Part 21 notification dated January 23, 2006, from Engine Systems, Inc. (ESI), who is a vendor for DRUs. The ESI notification describes a DRU deficiency in which an integrated circuit manufacturing defect can cause failure of the engine load raise and lower signals to the electronic governor controller. The inspectors noted this failure mechanism was similar to Wolf Creeks observed failure on November 1, 2007. Both EDGs were found to be affected by the ESI notification.
The inspectors determined that the failure to demonstrate, per TS 3.8.1 required actions B.3.1 or B.3.2, that no common cause failure existed for the EDGs is a performance deficiency. The finding is more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute for the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone; and, it affected the
 
cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). The finding was of very low safety significance because the issue resulted in the EDG being degraded, but likely to start even with an intermittent failure and did not result in the loss of safety function for greater than 24 hours, and was not related to external events such as fires and floods. The cause of the finding had problem identification and resolution crosscutting aspects in the area associated with the corrective action program because the licensee failed to evaluate the failure mechanism completely, accurately, and in a timely manner commensurate with its safety significance (P.1(a)).
Inspection Report# : 2007005 (pdf)
Significance:      Dec 31, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to enter and evaluate EDG operating experience in CAP The inspectors identified a finding for failure to enter into corrective action program evaluate relevant emergency diesel generator operating experience which allowed a manufacturing defect to exist resulting in a testing failure.
Procedure AP 20E-001, Step 4.1.1, in part, directs the screening and review of operating experience from sources such as vendors, the NRC, and other utilities. Although, the inspectors found that Wolf Creek was not specifically listed as affected in the ESI Part 21, they had procured DRUs that were listed by serial number on the ESI notification. The inspectors also found a Woodward service bulletin dated January 2006 that Wolf Creek had not reviewed addressing the same issue that listed DRU serial numbers affected which included Wolf Creeks DRUs.
The failure to enter into corrective action program evaluate publicly available operating experience directly applicable to Wolf Creeks emergency diesel generators is a performance deficiency. This finding was more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute for the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone; and, it affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). The finding is of very low safety significance because the issue resulted in the EDG being degraded, but likely to start even with an intermittent failure and is not related to a qualification or design deficiency, did not result in the loss of safety function for greater than 24 hours, and was not related to external events such as fires and floods. The cause of the finding has a problem identification and resolution crosscutting aspect in the area associated with the operating experience program because the licensees operating experience process did not use operating experience information, including vendor recommendations, to support plant safety. Specifically, the licensee did not systematically collect, evaluate, and communicate relevant external operating experience to affected internal stakeholders in a timely manner (P.2(a)).
Inspection Report# : 2007005 (pdf)
Significance:      Dec 31, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Clogged drains cause circulating water roof loads to exceed design The inspectors identified a Green finding for exceeding the calculated roof loading for the circulating water screen house. In May 2007, Wolf Creek received heavy rains and water leaks from the circulating water screen house roof were observed. On May 8, 2007, it was observed that the roof of the circulating water screen house had accumulated approximately eight inches of standing water and that the drains were blocked by debris. Subsequently on May 8, the drains were cleared and the roof was drained. A roof yield or collapse was assumed to result in the loss of both circulating water and normal service water.
Exceeding the calculated allowable roof loading due to clogged drains is a performance deficiency. The finding is more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute for the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone; and, it affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Additionally, this finding was more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute for the Initiating Events Cornerstone; and, it affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. This finding screened to a Phase 3 analysis because two or more cornerstones (Initiating Events and Mitigating Systems) were affected. The Senior Reactor Analyst performed the Phase 3 analysis and determined it to be of very low safety significance.
Inspection Report# : 2007005 (pdf)
 
Significance:      Oct 06, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to implement transient combustible material control permit requirements The inspectors identified a Green noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.d for failing to control combustible materials in an area of the plant that contained safety-related equipment. During a walkdown, inspectors noted that temporary scaffolding constructed of flame retardant treated wood installed in the emergency diesel generator rooms did not have a transient combustible materials permit. Following review of the procedure for control of combustibles, it was noted that the licensee inappropriately considered fire retardant treated wood as noncombustible material and exempted it from permit control. This could lead to the uncontrolled use of fire treated wood throughout the facility, even in excess of fire hazard analysis limits for fire loads.
The inspectors determined that the inadequate control of transient combustibles in the emergency diesel generator rooms was more than minor because, if left uncorrected, it would become a more significant safety concern and could potentially affect emergency diesel generator availability due to fire under the mitigating systems cornerstone. The finding was of very low safety significance because it involved the combustible controls program and was assigned a low degradation rating since the flame retardant treated wood is considered a high flashpoint material.
Inspection Report# : 2007004 (pdf)
Significance:      Oct 06, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to collor EDG assembly procedure resulting in NOED A self-revealing noncited violation was identified regarding failure to follow a procedure used to reassemble the intercooler and jacketwater pumps to the Train A emergency diesel generator resulting in the Emergency Diesel Generator A being inoperable. During reassembly of the Emergency Diesel Generator A on June 6, 2007, the stationary seals for the intercooler and jacketwater pumps were not correctly installed in their housings. On July 5, 2007, the Emergency Diesel Generator A failed its surveillance test because the intercooler pump leaked at a rate of 23.4 ml/min with an acceptability limit of 9.1 ml/min. Even with the leakage, Emergency Diesel Generator A was later determined to be capable of running for greater than 24 hours.
The failure to install the stationary seals in accordance with the approved work orders is a performance deficiency.
The finding is more than minor because it is associated with the human performance attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone; and, it affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). The finding is of very low safety significance because the issue does not represent a qualification or design deficiency, it did not represent a loss of safety function for a train or system as defined in the plant specific risk-informed inspection notebook, and was not related to external events such as fires and floods. The inspectors also determined that the finding has a human performance crosscutting aspect in the area associated with resources because the licensee failed to ensure that mechanics had adequate emergency diesel generator training to assure correct reassembly of the diesel auxiliaries as stated in Wolf Creeks root cause evaluation [H.2(b)].
Inspection Report# : 2007004 (pdf)
Significance:      Oct 06, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to use appropriate guidance for valve operation A self-revealing finding was identified when a nonlicensed plant operator failed to utilize appropriate guidance and used excessive torque on service water Valves 1WS0002A and 1WS0004 resulting in damage to the valves and unavailability of service water Pump 1WS01PA and the low-flow service water Pump 1WS002P. Valve 1WS0002A was repaired as emergent work and returned to service after approximately 42 hours of being unavailable and Valve 1WS0004 was repaired as corrective maintenance and returned to service after approximately 65 days of unavailability. This issue is captured in the licensee's corrective action program.
The finding was more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute for the mitigating systems cornerstone; and, it affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The inspectors also determined that this
 
finding was more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute for the initiating events cornerstone, and it affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. A Phase 3 evaluation was necessary since the finding involved concurrent multiple equipment degradations from a common cause. The Phase 3 evaluation concluded that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green). The inspectors also determined that the finding had a human performance crosscutting aspect in the area of work practices because the licensee failed to effectively communicate expectations regarding valve operations in accordance with procedural requirements [H.4(b)].
Inspection Report# : 2007004 (pdf)
Significance:        Jul 20, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Procedure for Restoration of the Emergency Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Transfer Pump Control Circuit Following a Fire Requiring Control Room Evacuation The team identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, for the licensees inadequate procedure for remotely starting the emergency diesel generator fuel oil transfer pump following a fire in the control room.
Specifically, the governing procedure failed to include the necessary actions to replace the control power fuse in the associated motor control center, which would likely be blown as a result of the fire-induced circuit failures assumed in the licensees analysis for the control room fire. In addition, the licensee had failed to specify and stage the control power fuse and fuse puller that could be required for timely restoration of the emergency diesel generator fuel oil transfer pump to service following the control room fire. This issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report 2007-02790.
The finding was more than minor because it is associated with the mitigating systems cornerstone attribute of procedural quality and affected the associated cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The Phase 1 worksheets in Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process," were used to conclude that analysis with Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection Findings Significance Determination Process, was required because the issue involved a degradation in fire protection defense-in-depth strategies. A Phase 3 review was then performed by a senior reactor analyst who determined the finding to be of very low safety significance because of the low probability of a fire in relevant cabinets that would result in a control room evacuation.
Inspection Report# : 2007006 (pdf)
Significance:        Jul 20, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Design Control Associated with Vortexing Calculation The team identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, in that, the licensee did not ensure adequate suction submergence for the containment spray pumps by not properly translating vortex design parameters into calculations relative to the refueling water storage tank. Specifically, the licensee used a non-conservative method to calculate the level required to prevent pump vortexing in the refueling water storage tank.
The licensee entered the issue into their corrective action program as Condition Report 2007-02597 and revised the affected calculations.
The finding was more than minor because it is associated with the mitigating systems cornerstone attribute of design control and affected the associated cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using the Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 Worksheet, the finding is determined to have very low safety significance because it was a design deficiency that did not result in a loss of operability. The finding had crosscutting aspects in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program (P.1(a))
because the licensee did not identify an issue in a timely manner, commensurate with its safety significance.
Inspection Report# : 2007006 (pdf)
Significance:        Jul 20, 2007 Identified By: NRC
 
Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Identify and Correct Discolored Boric Acid Deposits The team identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for the failure to identify and take timely corrective action to correct indications of material wastage at the base of the Refueling Water Storage Tank. Specifically, the licensee did not recognize and take actions to prevent recurring discolored boric acid deposits for approximately 9 years. This issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report 2007-02742.
The finding was more than minor because if left uncorrected it would become a more significant safety concern in that continued wastage could impact component operability. Using the Phase 1 worksheets in Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process," the finding was determined to have very low safety significance because it did not result in a system or component being inoperabe and it did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The finding had crosscutting aspects in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program (P.1(c) because the licensee failed to thoroughly evaluate the problem such that the resolution addressed the cause and extent of condition.
Inspection Report# : 2007006 (pdf)
Significance:        Jul 20, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Nonconservative Battery Intercell Connection Resistance Value Specified in Design Calculation The team identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for the failure of the licensee to ensure that the 125 Vdc safety-related batteries would remain operable if all the intercell and terminal connections were at the resistance value of 150 micro-ohms as allowed by Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.8.4.5. The licensees design calculation used a non-conservative value. This issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report 2007-02492.
The finding was more than minor because it is associated with the mitigating systems cornerstone attribute of design control and affected the associated cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 Worksheet, the finding was determined to have very low safety significance because it was a design deficiency confirmed not to result in a loss of operability. The finding had crosscutting aspects in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program (P.1(a)) because the licensee did not implement a program with a low threshold for identifying this issue and the licensee did not identify the issue completely, accurately, and in a timely manner.
Inspection Report# : 2007006 (pdf)
Significance:        Jul 20, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Battery Surfaces Not Cleaned as Required by Procedure The team identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, for the licensees failure to clean electrolyte from the outside surfaces of the 125 Vdc safety-related batteries in accordance with procedures.
Specifically, surveillance procedures for the 125 Vdc batteries required appropriate cleaning of electrolyte on battery cell covers following specific gravity checks, however, maintenance personnel did not perform this cleaning. The licensee has entered this issue into their corrective action program as Condition Report 2007-02580.
The finding was more than minor because if left uncorrected the finding would become a more significant safety concern due to the corrosive effects of electrolyte on battery posts and terminal connections. Using the Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process," Phase 1 Worksheet, the finding was determined to have very low safety significance because it did not result in a design qualification deficiency or loss of function and it did not screen as risk significant due to external events. The finding had crosscutting aspects in the area of human performance associated with work practices (H.4(a)) because of insufficient communication of human error prevention techniques to maintenance personnel, specifically with respect to self and peer checking.
Inspection Report# : 2007006 (pdf)
 
Significance:      Jul 20, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Normal Charging Pump Balance Line Crack The team reviewed a self-revealing finding associated with the licensees failure to correct normal charging pump balance line vibrations in a timely manner. Because the licensee did not address the extended time and periodically increased magnitude of the vibrations, the balance line cracked, rendering the pump inoperable. This issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report 2007-02339.
The finding was more than minor because it is associated with the mitigating systems cornerstone attribute of equipment performance and affected the associated cornerstone objective ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using the Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process," Phase 1 Worksheet, the finding was determined to have very low safety significance because the finding did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The finding had crosscutting aspects in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program (P.1(d)) in that licensee personnel did not take corrective actions to address a safety issue in a timely manner, commensurate with its safety significance.
Inspection Report# : 2007006 (pdf)
Significance:      Jul 20, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Inadequate Procedure for Maintaining Drains Capable of Functioning The team identified a finding associated with the licensees failure to maintain a procedure which ensured that control building room drains remained available to pass their design flows for postulated flooding events. As a result of the licensees procedure and practices, debris and items were found in control building room drains. This issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report 2007-02753.
The finding was more than minor because if left uncorrected it would become a more significant safety concern. This finding affected the mitigating systems cornerstone. Using the Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process," Phase 1 Worksheet, the finding is determined to have very low safety significance because the finding did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The finding had crosscutting aspects in the area of human performance associated with work practices (H.4(b)) because the licensee did not define and effectively communicate expectations regarding procedural compliance and personnel following procedures.
Inspection Report# : 2007006 (pdf)
Significance:      Jul 20, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Diesel Generator Frequency Variation Not Considered in Loading Calculations The team identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, having very low safety significance for the licensees failure to account for the effect of emergency diesel generator frequency variation in the diesel loading calculations. Specifically, emergency diesel generator loading was based on nominal 60 hertz operation of pumps and fans and did not account for the 2 percent variation allowed by Technical Specifications.
The licensee has entered this issue into their corrective action program as Condition Report 2007-02683.
The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the mitigating systems cornerstone attribute of design control and affected the associated cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, based on preliminary calculations, the failure to account for frequency variations had more than a minimal effect on the outcome of the analysis in that the continuous load rating for the emergency diesel generators would have been exceeded in the recirculation phase of a loss-of-coolant accident with the assumed loads. The team determined that the finding screened as very low safety significance (Green) because it was a design or qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in loss of operability.
Inspection Report# : 2007006 (pdf)
 
Significance:        Jul 07, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Implement Manual Actions A noncited violation of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) was identified for failure to adequately assess and manage the increase in risk during observation of a scheduled emergency diesel generator surveillance. On January 4, 2007, inspectors observed the emergency diesel Generator A hot start surveillance test and questioned plant operators regarding operability in Modes 1 or 2 of the emergency diesel generator while paralleled with the grid based on operating experience. The inspectors noted that operations personnel did not have a written set of steps or procedures identified for restoration of the emergency diesel generator, and would have to diagnose what restoration activities would have to be taken at the time of an emergency start demand based upon the step of the surveillance procedure in effect at the time the emergency start demand occurred. The inspectors also identified that operations personnel were unaware of the limiting response time for operator manual actions specified in Amendment 154 that approved testing in Modes 1 or 2. Wolf Creek has developed manual actions for restoration of the emergency diesel generator during testing.
The failure to adequately assess and manage the increase in risk for the use of operator manual actions to ensure emergency diesel generator availability during surveillance testing was a performance deficiency. The finding is similar to the minor example 7(g) and is more than minor because it is associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of protection against external factors, and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The finding was of very low safety significance because the magnitude of the calculated risk deficit was less than 1 x 10-6 and other risk management actions were in place.
Inspection Report# : 2007003 (pdf)
Significance: TBD Dec 29, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: AV Apparent Violation Failure to Maintain Reactor Coolant System Subcooling During the Alternative Shutodwn The team identified an Apparent Violation of Wolf Creek License Condition 2.C.(5)(a) concerning an inadequate alternative shutdown analysis. The licensees alternative shutdown analysis was inadequate in that it used an acceptance criteria which was inconsistent with and less conservative than that required by the approved Fire Protection Program. The licensee developed Calculation Number AN-02-021, Revision 0, OFN RP-017, Control Room Evacuation, Consequence Evaluation, to demonstrate alternative shutdown capability for Wolf Creek in response to NRC-identified Noncited Violation 2002008-01, Inadequate alternative shutdown procedure. The calculation predicted that during an alternative shutdown, the reactor coolant system subcooling margin would not be maintained, significant voiding would occur in the core, and a steam void would form in the reactor vessel head. The licensee found the results of the calculation to be acceptable since it demonstrated that the void formation would be limited, natural circulation in the reactor coolant system would be maintained, sufficient decay heat removal would be maintained, and no fuel damage would occur. This is not consistent with the license condition to meet the technical requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R. Section III.L of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Alternative and dedicated shutdown capability, that states in part, During the postfire shutdown, the reactor process variables shall be maintained within those predicted for a loss of normal a.c. power.
This finding is greater than minor because it impacted the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to external events (such as fire) to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). It is the NRCs understanding that the licensee does not consider these circuit vulnerabilities to be violations of NRC requirements. The licensee considers the spurious operation of multiple components to be outside of the plant licensing basis for the Fire Protection Program. Specifically, in this case, both pressurizer power-operated relief valves are assumed to spuriously open because of fire induced circuit damage. The NRC staff and the industry are currently working on developing a resolution methodology to address these types of potential fire induced circuit failures. The team concluded that this violation meets the criteria of the NRC Enforcement Manual Section 8.1.7.1 for deferring enforcement actions for postulated fire induced circuit failures.
Inspection Report# : 2005008 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity
 
Significance:        Jul 07, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Establish an Adequate Preventive Maintenance Program The inspectors identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a in which Wolf Creek did not implement a preventive maintenance procedure to mitigate Train B emergency exhaust system fan bearing vibrations which resulted in a degraded condition. Specifically, the vendor manual directs lubrication every 3 to 12 months (3 to 6 months for average conditions being room temperature and clean conditions) to prevent oxidation and breakdown of the grease; however, the Wolf Creek recurring preventive maintenance was set to lubricate the bearings every three years. This recurring preventive maintenance was not sufficient to ensure the bearings remained adequately lubricated.
It was not until NRC questioning that Wolf Creek generated a condition report to review the past condition of the bearings and the appropriateness of the recurring lubrication interval for the bearings.
The licensees failure to implement preventive maintenance to ensure the fan bearings were adequately lubricated is a performance deficiency. The finding is more than minor because it is associated with the barrier performance attribute of the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone; and, it affected the cornerstone objective to maintain radiological barrier functionality of the auxiliary and fuel building. The finding is of very low safety significance because the issue only represents a degradation of the radiological barrier function provided for the auxiliary or fuel building barriers to mitigate airborne radionuclides from emergency core cooling system pump cubicles or a fuel handling accident, respectively. The cause of the finding has problem identification and resolution crosscutting aspects in the area of corrective action because Wolf Creek did not evaluate or resolve the causes of repeated bearing degradation by thoroughly evaluating problems such that the resolutions address causes and extent of the conditions (P.1(c)).
Inspection Report# : 2007003 (pdf)
Significance:        Jul 07, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Follow Test Control Procedures to Demonstrate Operability The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR, Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control, in which Wolf Creek did not implement controlled testing of the Train B emergency exhaust system fan to demonstrate operability prior to returning the fan to service after bearing replacement. Specifically, on June 12, 2007, Wolf Creek restored the B emergency exhaust system fan to service without implementing the postmaintenance testing described in Procedure AP 16E-002, Postmaintenance Testing Development, Revision 6A. Upon review of the postmaintenance testing, the fan failed the vibration portion of the testing and Wolf Creek did not perform an operability evaluation in accordance with Procedure AP 28-001, Operability Evaluations. Based on inspector questioning, Wolf Creek performed the correct postmaintenance testing and an operability evaluation. These issues are under evaluation in the Wolf Creek corrective action program.
The failure to follow test control procedures for the safety-related B emergency exhaust system fan prior to declaring it operable is a performance deficiency. The finding is more than minor because it is associated with the Barrier performance attribute of the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone; and, it affected the cornerstone objective to maintain radiological barrier functionality of the auxiliary and fuel building. The finding is of very low safety significance because the issue represents a degradation of only the radiological barrier function provided for the auxiliary or fuel building barriers to mitigate airborne radionuclides from emergency core cooling system pump cubicles or a fuel handling accident. The cause of the finding has human performance crosscutting aspects in the area of decision making because Wolf Creek did not initially conduct an adequate test and then failed to question the failed postmaintenance test by making a safety-significant or risk-significant decision using proceduralized systematic processes, especially when faced with uncertain or unexpected plant conditions, to ensure safety is maintained (H.1 (a))
Inspection Report# : 2007003 (pdf)
Emergency Preparedness
 
Occupational Radiation Safety Significance:      Apr 07, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to control area as a locked high radiation area
* The inspector reviewed a self-revealing noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.7.2.a for failure to evaluate changing radiological conditions and control an area as a locked high radiation area. Specifically, on October 17, 2007, dose rates in Room 7604 increased to levels requiring posting as a Locked High Radiation Area as a result of a vent and drain evolution. Dose rates reached a level of 1500 mRem/hour prior to the area being properly posted and controlled. This issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Report 2007-003934.
Immediate corrective actions included posting and controlling the area as a locked high radiation area. Other corrective actions included changing the vent and drain process to change the vent path.
This finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the occupational radiation safety program and process attribute and affected the cornerstone objective, in that, the failure to properly post and control access to a locked high radiation area has the potential to increase personnel dose. This occurrence involves the potential for unplanned, unintended dose. Utilizing Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix C, Occupational Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process, the inspector determined that the finding was of very low safety significance because it did not involve; (1) as low as is reasonably achievable planning and controls, (2) an overexposure, (3) a substantial potential for overexposure, or (4) an impaired ability to assess dose. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of work control, work planning, in that the licensee failed to appropriately plan work activities by incorporating job site conditions that may impact radiological safety [H.3(a)].
Inspection Report# : 2008002 (pdf)
Significance:      Apr 07, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to follow procedure
* The inspector reviewed a self-revealing noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1 for failure to follow a licensee procedure. Specifically, on March 29, 2008, one of two radiographers conducting radiography operations in the quality control vault received a dose rate alarm on their electronic dosimeter. The two radiographers evaluated the dose received and decided to continue with radiography without notifying health physics personnel to evaluate the conditions. This issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Report 2008-001181.
Immediate corrective actions included restriction of the radiographers to log onto the radiation work permit and discussions with the radiographers and the contractors radiation safety officer. Long term corrective action is still being evaluated.
This finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the occupational radiation safety program and process attribute and affected the cornerstone objective, in that, the failure to stop work and notify health physics personnel for assistance had the potential to increase personnel dose. This occurrence involves the potential for unplanned, unintended dose. Utilizing Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix C, Occupational Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process, the inspector determined that the finding was of very low safety significance because it did not involve: (1) as low as is reasonably achievable planning and controls, (2) an overexposure, (3) a substantial potential for overexposure, or (4) an impaired ability to assess dose. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of decision making, risk significant decisions, because the radiographer and assistant failed to contact health physics personnel to discuss the circumstances surrounding the unexpected dose rate alarm [H.1(a)].
Inspection Report# : 2008002 (pdf)
Public Radiation Safety
 
Physical Protection Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Last modified : August 29, 2008
 
Wolf Creek 1 3Q/2008 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance:        Jun 28, 2008 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: FIN Finding Inadequate transformer procedure resulted in an unplanned reactor trip and forced outage A self-revealing finding was identified for an inadequate maintenance procedure that resulted in a reactor trip due a loss of all condensate pumps. On March 17, 2008, plant operators observed that steam generator water level was lowering and main feed pump speed was decreasing. Based on these indications, Wolf Creek operators manually tripped the plant. Approximately 12 hours prior to the transformer trip, Wolf Creek had removed from service XPB04 transformer for planned maintenance and cross connected XPB04 transformer PB004 bus loads to the XPB03 transformer PB003 bus. This arrangement powered all three condensate pumps from PB003 4.16kv bus. The licensees investigation of the cause of the transformer trip determined that two phases of the XPB03 transformer 4.16kv output cables had overheated and failed because two multi-directional conductor connectors used to terminate two phases of the 1000 MCM 4.16kv bus cables were installed using the incorrect configuration. The resident inspectors reviewed Work Order 06-291275-000, Revision 0, in which the licensee had performed maintenance on the XPB03 transformer on March 4, 2008, that required removal of the XPB03 transformer 4.16kv output cables. The work order provided general guidance to disconnect the high/low side. The inspectors noted that neither the work order nor Procedure MTE TL-001 contained any guidance or specified the conductor connector configuration and only provided general guidance to disconnect and re-term the cables. It was also noted that this work was performed by first time performers who had no experience with this type of connector. The inspectors reviewed electrical maintenance training and did not identify any training that would have provided knowledge or skills on multi-directional conductor connectors.
The finding was more than minor because it is associated with the procedure quality attribute of the initiating events cornerstone and it affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability. This finding also affected the procedure quality attribute for the mitigating systems cornerstone and it affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). The inspectors evaluated the significance of this finding and because two cornerstones were affected, a Phase 2 analysis was required. The consequences were assessed using a Phase 3 analysis by the Region IV senior reactor analyst. The consequence of the performance deficiency was a reactor trip with a loss of normal feedwater. This event occurred 13 days following maintenance using the flawed procedure. Consequently, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance. This finding has human performance crosscutting aspects in the area associated with resources component because the licensee failed to provide an adequate maintenance procedure to assure nuclear safety [H.2(c)].
Inspection Report# : 2008003 (pdf)
Significance:        Dec 31, 2007 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: FIN Finding Inadequate work instructions resulted in condensate pump trip A self-revealing finding was identified for inadequate work instructions and poor work practices associated with trip circuit verification on the Central Chiller B resulted in the Condensate Pump B trip and steam generator level transient. Procedure RNM C-1301, Miscellaneous Relay and Meter equipment, Revision 6, step 8.3.2.8.h of RNM C-1301 required in part that a jumper be installed from Terminals 3 to 4 on Relay 194 at Breaker PB00402 for the Central Chiller B (wire C280 and C281) which resulted in Condensate Pump B trip. However, this step was copied from a previous work order and not verified as appropriate for the testing being conducted. Step 8.3.2.8.h should have read in part to install jumpers from Terminals 7 to 8 (wire C284 and C285). Licensee reviews and walkdowns were inadequate to identify the incorrect instructions due to workload, interruptions and distractions during the review process. The evaluation also identified Performance Improvement Request 2002-1664 which discussed a similar event where copied information in a work order was incorrect and not identified in reviews. Corrective actions for this event included adding sign-off sections in RNM C-1301 for walkdowns/reviews to ensure work instructions were reviewed before work was performed.
The failure to provide adequate work instructions is a performance deficiency. This finding was more than minor because it is associated with the procedure quality attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone and it affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability. This finding also affected the procedure quality attribute for the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and it affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). Because two cornerstones were affected a Phase 2 analysis was required. The consequences were assessed using the Phase 2 pre-solved tables with the assistance of a Region IV Senior Reactor Analyst. Although the likelihood of a trip was increased and the capability of the normal heat sink was reduced, the exposure time for this condition was less than 3 days and all other mitigation capabilities were maintained. Consequently, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance. The cause of the finding has human performance crosscutting aspects in the area associated with work practices because the licensee failed to ensure that human error prevention techniques such as self/peer-checking and proper documentation of activities were used in the review of work
 
activities such that they are performed safely (H.4(a)).
Inspection Report# : 2007005 (pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance:        Jun 28, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to implement transient combustible control permit requirements for a propane tank A noncited violation (NCV) TS 5.4.1.d was identified for failing to control combustible materials in an area of the plant that contained safety related equipment. During a walkdown on May 1, 2008, inspectors noted that a temporary propane cylinder for a generator contained 33.5 pounds of propane. The inspectors identified that the propane cylinder did not have a transient combustible materials permit. Operators informed the inspectors that there were no active permits or impairments for this propane cylinder. The operators further stated that no such actions would be necessary because the generator and its propane cylinder are exempted from permit controls. The inspectors reviewed Procedure AP 10-102, Control of Combustible Materials, Revision 13. Section 7.10 of this procedure stated that the, propane cylinder is exempt from the transient combustible permit requirements of this procedure. Section 6.2.1 also states, in part, that a transient combustible materials permit is required if two gallons of flammable liquid or 14 pounds of flammable gas (not connected with hot work) are used. The inspectors spoke with Wolf Creek fire protection and licensing personnel and expressed that there seemed to be an inadequacy in their fire protection program. These personnel stated that their exemption of the propane was a long standing policy of the station and fire protection plan. The inspectors contacted NRC regional fire protection specialists. The specialists informed the inspectors that Wolf Creeks position was contrary to industry standards and practice. The specialists stated that industry standards also consider heat of combustion or fire load, and a potential fire hazard and combustible characteristics of a material, i.e., an explosion. The inspectors determined that the licensees interpretation that the propane cylinder should be exempted from permit requirements was inappropriate.
The inadequate control of transient combustibles in containment was more than minor because, if left uncorrected, it would become a more significant-safety concern and could potentially affect residual heat removal availability due to fire under the mitigating systems cornerstone.
The finding was of very low safety significance because the finding was assigned a moderate degradation factor and the issue only affected the ability to achieve and maintain cold shutdown. The finding also had crosscutting aspects in the problem identification and resolution area associated with corrective actions because the licensee failed to take appropriate corrective actions for a previous NRC identified deficiency in the exempted use of Class A transient combustibles [P.1(d)].
Inspection Report# : 2008003 (pdf)
Significance:        Jun 28, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to establish goals and monitor for a(1) ECCS room An NCV of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) was identified by the inspectors for failure to establish a(1) goals for the safety-related room coolers and monitor room cooler performance against those goals. On May 5, 2005, the Train A residual heat removal pump accumulated enough unavailability time to exceed the 10 CFR 50.65 a(2) goal due to a 0.5 gpm through wall leak on Room Cooler SGL10A. The licensee wrote Performance Improvement Request (PIR) 2005-2507 on August 31, 2005, to document that the maintenance rule expert panel had a majority vote to move the room cooler function to a(1) status. In the coming years, the replacement schedule defined prior to PIR 2005 2507 was delayed several times. PIR 2005-2507, Action Item 4, required the expert panel to establish a(1) monitoring goals with a monitoring duration by June 30, 2006. Wolf Creek performed a 10 CFR 50.65 a(3) review on April 27, 2007, to determine if the room cooler performance was disproportionate to its established a(2) goals. The April 27, 2007, expert panel meeting minutes, in part, states that a(1) goals had not been established because all of the room coolers had not been replaced and after all room coolers are replaced, that a(1) goals and monitoring will be implemented in the future. Inspectors questioned this practice of only monitoring for performance after corrective action rather than before and after corrective action. Thus, no technically justified goals were established. The inspectors questioned the process of considering the Function a(1) for 3 years of corrective actions with no a(1) monitoring goals in the intervening time. After inspector questioning in February 2008, Wolf Creek has expedited room cooler procurement and replacement. The inspectors also determined that the replacement plan did not implement maintenance activities, which would improve the availability of the systems. This was contrary to the guidance in NUMARC 93-01, Industry Guideline for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants, Revision 3, which states that while waiting to implement modifications, increased preventive maintenance may be necessary to ensure the affected function will remain reliable.
This finding is more than minor because it is consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter 612, Appendix E, Example 7.a. Specifically, Wolf Creek failed to establish a(1) goals and monitor performance against those goals for the a(1) GL-5 function for 3 years. The inspectors evaluated the significance of this finding and determined that the finding is of very low safety significance because the support function (GL-
: 5) to cool pump rooms does not result in a total loss of any safety function as identified by the licensee probability risk assessment that contributes to external event initiated core damage accident sequences (i.e., initiated by a seismic, flooding, or severe weather event). The finding has a crosscutting aspects in the problem identification and resolution area associated with corrective action program because Wolf Creek failed to take appropriate corrective actions to address this safety issue and the adverse room cooler trends in a timely manner,
 
commensurate with safety significance and complexity [P.1(d)].
Inspection Report# : 2008003 (pdf)
Significance:        Jun 28, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate containment sump inspection procedure The inspectors identified an NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Procedures, Instructions, and Drawings, for Wolf Creeks failure to specify acceptance criteria in its containment sump inspection procedure which led to unidentified gaps in containment Sump A.
During a Mode 4 containment walkdown on May 9, 2008, the inspector identified a gap in containment Sump A not previously identified by Wolf Creek. Based on previous Engineering Disposition 12684, the gap acceptance criterion was 0.045 inch. The gap that the inspector identified was 1/8-inch wide by 1/2-inch tall on one of the upper sump strainers. After raising the issue to the control room, Wolf Creek declared containment Sump A inoperable and entered TS 3.5.3. Train B residual heat removal was already inoperable for maintenance. Wolf Creek subsequently entered Technical Specification 3.0.3, and repaired the sump. Wolf Creek Procedure STS EJ 003, Containment Sump Inspection Revision 14, Step 8.1, contains no guidance on filter screen gap acceptance criteria, other than verify no evidence of structural distress. Wolf Creek last implemented STS EJ-003 during their May 7, 2008, walkdown prior to ascending from Mode 5 to Mode 4. The inspectors considered this a missed opportunity as Wolf Creek should have identified these deficiencies prior to Mode 4. Although the inspectors could not determine with complete certainty that the sump screen gap existed at the time of Wolf Creeks walkdown on May 7, Wolf Creek was not able to identify any work activity performed in the recirculation sump area since that time.
The finding was more than minor because it affected the procedure quality and human performance attributes of the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that to responds to initiating events and prevent undesirable consequences. The inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance because the deficiency did not result in the complete loss of operability or functionality and did not represent a risk significant external event such as flooding. The finding has human performance crosscutting aspects in the area associated with resources. Specifically, Wolf Creek did not ensure that Procedure STS EJ-002 was adequate to assure nuclear safety including complete, accurate and up-to-date specifications or acceptance criteria for the sump [H.2(c)].
Inspection Report# : 2008003 (pdf)
Significance:        Jun 28, 2008 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: FIN Finding Inadequate switchyard work procedure resulted in a loss of offsite power A self-revealing finding was identified for an inadequate Wolf Creek switchyard maintenance work instruction which resulted in the loss of offsite power. On April 7, 2008, offsite power was lost to the NB02 4 kV safety-related bus when switchyard workers tripped the incorrect breaker failure trip relay while testing the Rose Hill 345kV offsite switchyard breakers. The incorrect closed trip relay made up the logic for the startup transformer protection circuit and extended the trip signal to all 345kV offsite breakers, resulting in the loss of power. The loss of the switchyard bus de-energized the protected train, 4 kV Bus B. The emergency diesel generator automatically started and supplied power to the Train B bus. Offsite power was restored to Train B bus approximately 8 hours later. The plant was defueled for a refueling outage and NB01 bus was secured for maintenance. The inspectors noted that the work orders only provided generic instructions and did not contain any detailed information or any specific step-by-step instructions on how the work was to be conducted. It was also noted that the switchyard workers did not have a copy of the maintenance procedure in hand and was on the phone with another switchyard worker who coordinated/directed the work. Administrative Procedure AP 21C-001, WCGS/WESTAR Substation, Revision 8, in part, contains steps for the Wolf Creek switchyard coordinator to review and monitor switchyard activities; and prepare a substation work authorization which describes the type of work to be performed and oversight of work needed. This review process is to ensure control of maintenance which could affect the availability of offsite power. AP 21C-001 also contains guidance that if either NB bus is de-energized, then work should not be performed that could jeopardize power to the inservice NB bus. However, this review did not catch the inadequate instructions provided to the workers nor prevented work that jeopardized power to the inservice NB bus.
This finding is greater than minor because the availability and reliability of a safety-related 4 kV bus was challenged when offsite power was lost. This finding was also associated with the equipment performance attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone and affected the objective to ensure availability and reliability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the finding did not increase the likelihood of a loss of reactor coolant system inventory, degrade the ability to terminate a leak path or add reactor coolant system inventory when needed during shutdown operations. This finding had human performance crosscutting aspects in the area of resources because personnel did not have adequate procedures and work instructions for switchyard maintenance to ensure that the trip relay testing would not create an inadvertent loss of offsite power [H.2(c)].
Inspection Report# : 2008003 (pdf)
Significance:        Jun 28, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to verify engineering design calculation prior to use
 
The inspectors identified an NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III (Design Control) for failure to implement engineering procedures and approve a third party calculation prior to use at Wolf Creek. Specifically, the calculation review failed to identify the incorrect design inputs to the net positive suction head calculations on two occasions for residual heat removal and containment spray. On October 5, 2006, Wolf Creek engineering approved Design Change Package 011295 which accepted the associated vendor calculation, TDI 6002 05, Revision 0, for clean strainer head loss as a design analysis calculation for the new containment sump. On January 22, 2008, an operability evaluation documented design errors that created unacceptable reductions in margin-to-net positive suction head requirements for core cooling components associated with the already installed containment recirculation sump strainer modification. Revision 0 of the calculation had omitted the head loss component associated with the as built orifices located in the strainer support plate. The size of the orifice beneath each strainer was not large enough to prevent head loss in excess of the net positive suction head required per the design conditions defined in the purchase specification supplied to the strainer vendor. This resulted in required net positive suction head being less than available. On three separate reviews, Wolf Creek engineering accepted the vendor calculation without completely evaluating the calculation as acceptable in accordance with Wolf Creek plant procedures. Administrative Procedure AP 05D 001, "Calculations," Revision 11, Step 6.11.3, states, in part, that design analysis calculations shall be reviewed and accepted by engineering prior to being used to support plant design or operability.
This review shall compare calculations to design inputs, verify assumptions, verify analytical methods, verify accuracy and ensure compliance with design criteria. Contrary to the above, the licensee acceptance review of Revision 0 of the calculation failed to identity incorrect design inputs to the as built orifice size and Revisions 1 and 2 failed to identity the nonconservative temperature correction prior to being accepted.
This finding was more than minor because they were similar to non-minor Example 3.j from NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix E, "Examples of Minor Issues," in that, there was a reasonable doubt on the operability of the residual heat removal and containment spray pumps; and if left uncorrected, could result in a more significant safety concern. The finding is of very low safety significance because it was a qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in loss-of-operability in accordance with NRC Manual Chapter Part 9900, Technical Guidance, "Operability Determination Process for Operability and Functional Assessments." The finding had a problem identification and resolution area crosscutting aspects in the corrective action program component, because the site failed to perform a thorough evaluation of vendor calculations to ensure conditions adverse to quality are identified and resolved [P.1(c)].
Inspection Report# : 2008003 (pdf)
Significance:        Apr 07, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to implement fire protection impairment control permit requirements and compensatory measures The inspectors identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.d for failure to implement fire protection impairment control permit requirements and compensatory measures when operators received a trouble alarm on a fire detector in the auxiliary building. On January 26, 2008, operators discovered that Detector KC-104-XCH-ID-006 did not have a fire protection impairment control permit. This detector was adjacent to Detector KC-104-XSH-ID-007 which was already inoperable in Impairment 2008-020. The licensees administrative procedure required fire detection in the area to be declared inoperable if two adjacent detectors are inoperable. This condition existed for approximately 24 hours and would have required a compensatory continuous fire watch for the period that both detectors were inoperable.
The residents identified that the control room turnover checklist contains a section for listing the KC008 alarms; however, the two turnover checklists for the two shifts following the initial alarm did not identify Detector KC 104 XCH ID 006 as a Detector KC 008 alarm.
The failure to implement fire protection impairment control permit requirements and establish compensatory measures for the auxiliary building 2026-foot level was considered a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of protection against external factors and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, this issue relates to the protection against fire example of protection against external factors attribute because the detectors were inoperable without ensuring compensatory measures were in place. The finding was of very low safety significance because it involved compensatory measures for the fixed fire protection system and was assigned a low degradation rating since less than 10 percent of the fire detectors in the area were disabled. The finding has crosscutting aspects in the area of human performance associated with work practices because the licensee failed to apply appropriate human error techniques such as self and peer checking techniques to avoid committing errors [H.4(a)].
Inspection Report# : 2008002 (pdf)
Significance:        Apr 07, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Performing prohibited elective maintenance on offsite power during EDG maintenance
* An NRC identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 3.8.1.B.4 resulted from Wolf Creek removing equipment from service that was prohibited by the TS. Inspectors reviewed Technical Specification Bases 3.8.1.B.4 which prohibits elective maintenance within the switchyard that would challenge offsite power. Inspectors also reviewed the NRC Safety Evaluation Report for the 7 day emergency diesel generator allowed outage time (Technical Specification 3.8.1.B.4.2.2) and found that Section 4.6.c, states: The offsite power supply and switchyard conditions are conducive to an extend[ed] DG [completion time], which includes ensuring that switchyard access is restricted and no elective maintenance within the switchyard is performed that would challenge the offsite power availability. The inspectors determined that challenges to offsite power can originate with elective maintenance inside the protected area.
The inspectors determined that the failure to implement requirements of the NRC Safety Evaluation Report and Technical Specification Bases for Technical Specification 3.8.1.B.4 was a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because it is associated with the
 
equipment performance attribute for the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone; and, it affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the issue resulted in the Train B offsite power being inoperable, but capable of supplying the safety bus for greater than 24 hours. Additionally, the cause of the finding has a human performance crosscutting aspects in the area associated with work control. Specifically, Wolf Creek did not ensure STS IC-805B was appropriately coordinated within organizations to assure plant and human performance during the extended emergency diesel generator allowed outage time. [H.3(b)]
Inspection Report# : 2008002 (pdf)
Significance:        Apr 07, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to establish reasonable expectation of operability
* An NRC identified NCV of Technical Specification 5.4.1 for failure to follow the operability process on discovery of the CCP A room cooler leak. Wolf Creek made no log entries at 2:20 p.m. stating its basis for immediate operability. At 3:50 p.m., Wolf Creek control room logs state that centrifugal charging Pump A had a room cooler leak and structural integrity cannot be verified. Subsequent entry into Technical Specification 3.7.8 for the essential service water Pump A caused emergency diesel Generator A to be inoperable. Technical Specification 3.8.1, Condition I states that with three alternating current sources inoperable (both emergency diesel generators and on offsite source), Technical Specification 3.0.3 shall be entered. Wolf Creek exited Technical Specification 3.0.3 at 4:13 p.m. when the inlet and outlet valves to centrifugal charging Pump As room cooler were closed. The inspectors could not locate any justification produced by Wolf Creek for the room coolers operability after 2:20 p.m.
The inspectors determined that the failure to follow the operability process is a performance deficiency. The inspectors determined that this finding was more than minor because if left uncorrected, it could become a more serious problem if the Technical Specification is not correctly applied. The finding screened to Phase 2 because the finding represents an actual loss of safety function of a single train of high head injection. A bounding risk of Green results from the Phase 2 presolved worksheets using an exposure time of less than 3 days for the centrifugal charging pump (CCP) A [Fails to Run]. The inspectors also determined that the finding had a human performance crosscutting aspects in the area associated with decision making because the licensee failed to use conservative assumptions in its operability decision and apply a requirement to demonstrate that the room cooler is operable is in order to proceed rather than a requirement to demonstrate that it is inoperable [H.1(b)].
Inspection Report# : 2008002 (pdf)
Significance:        Apr 07, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Untimely corrective actions for CCP room cooler leads to NOED The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix B Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, because Wolf Creek failed to take timely corrective actions to prevent failure of the centrifugal charging pump A room cooler which resulted in a Notice of Enforcement Discretion (EA 08 052). The inspectors found that room Cooler SGL12A experienced leaks in October 1999, May 2003, October 2003, August 2004, October 2006, and again in February 2008. On March 14, 2007, Wolf Creek chose to delay SGL12As replacement until Refueling Outage 16 due to the required length of time to replace the cooler. On February 13, 2008, a circumferential flaw on an H bend was discovered in SGL12A preventing it from performing its safety function. Inspectors reviewed corrective action Procedure AP 28A-100, Condition Reports, Revision 3 and found that a loss of a train to perform its safety function was considered a significant deficiency requiring corrective action to prevent recurrence. The inspectors reviewed this issue under Performance Improvement Requests 2005-2507 and 2004-0688, and Condition Report 2008-0467 and found that Wolf Creek designated prior failures nonsignificant.
The failure to take timely corrective actions within 9 years was a performance deficiency. The inspectors determined that this finding was more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute for the mitigating systems cornerstone; and, it affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e. core damage). The finding screened to Phase 2 because the finding represents an actual loss of safety function of a single train of high head injection for greater than its Technical Specification 3.8.1.B.2 allowed outage time of 4 hours. Using an exposure time of less than 3 days for the scenario Centrifugal Charging Pump PBG05A [Fails to Run], a bounding risk of Green results from the Phase 2 presolved worksheets. Additionally, the cause of the finding has a human performance crosscutting aspect in the area associated with resources. Specifically, Wolf Creek did not ensure adequate resources to maintain long-term plant safety by minimizing the room coolers long-standing issues and preventive maintenance deferrals [H.2(a)].
Inspection Report# : 2008002 (pdf)
Significance:        Apr 07, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to reestablish timely seal cooling for the reactor coolant pumps
* An NRC identified violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.d resulted because Procedure OFN RP 017, "Control Room Evacuation,"
 
Revision 21, failed to account for the needed actions to reestablish reactor coolant pump seal cooling. Failure to reestablish seal cooling in a timely manner could have resulted in a small break loss of coolant accident.
This performance deficiency resulted from an inadequate postfire safe shutdown procedure. The inspectors determined the finding is greater than minor in that it affected the ability to achieve and maintain hot shutdown following a control room fire. This finding is associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of protection against external factors (e.g., fire). This finding affected the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to external events (such as fire) to prevent undesirable consequences. In addition to the control room fire requiring operators to evacuate the control room, the fire would have had to affect components located in two physically separated panels. The licensee has IEEE 383 qualified cables and conductors throughout the plant. The Phase 3 risk evaluation performed by the NRC senior reactor analyst determined this deficiency had very low risk significance.
Inspection Report# : 2008002 (pdf)
Significance:        Apr 07, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to analyze motor operated valuve circuits
* The inspectors identified a noncited violation of License Condition 2.c(5) because the licensee failed to evaluate the impact of a motor operated valve failure mechanism on their ability to implement postfire safe shutdown following a control room evacuation. The licensee determined that the failure mechanism affected 38 motor operated valves and upon valve failure could affect their ability to implement their postfire safe shutdown procedure. A short circuit that bypassed the torque and/or limit switches could damage the valves and prevent repositioning of the valve in the postfire safe shutdown position.
The inspectors determined this was a performance deficiency because the licensee failed to ensure that components necessary to safely shutdown the reactor would remain operable following a fire. This deficiency was more than minor, in that, it had the potential to impact the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to external events (such as fire) to prevent undesirable consequences. In addition to the control room fire requiring operators to evacuate the control room, the fire would have had to affect components located in five different control panels. The Phase 3 risk evaluation performed by the NRC senior reactor analyst determined this deficiency had very low risk significance.
Inspection Report# : 2008002 (pdf)
Significance:        Mar 13, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Vent ECCS Piping Every 31 days The team identified two examples of a noncited violation of Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements 3.5.2.3 for the failure to vent emergency core cooling system discharge piping. In the first example, the licensee had inappropriately concluded that inaccessible vents included all those vents located in posted high radiation areas, but either no high radiation field existed in the area or personnel would not be exposed to high radiation dose. The second example involved the failure to perform the surveillance in accordance with the 31 days required frequency. When the surveillance was conducted, gas was observed coming from a SI system hot leg injection line vent.
Both violation examples were more than minor because they were similar to non-minor examples 4.m from NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix E. Examples of Minor Issues, in that, when the surveillances were completed, unexpected amounts of gas were found the piping systems. Some sections were totally voided. Using the Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 Screening Worksheet, the issue screened as having very low safety significance because it was a qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in loss-of-operability in accordance with NRC Manual Chapter Part 9900, Technical Guidance, Operability Determination Process for Operability and Functional Assessment. The finding had a crosscutting aspect in the Human Performance, Resources component, because the licensee failed to have an adequate surveillance procedure that included all necessary ECCS vent values. These findings were indicative of current performance because operators, who are familiar with the TS requirements and Bases commitments, could have questioned, at any time, the practice of eliminating accessible values from the venting program. [H.2(c)]
Inspection Report# : 2008007 (pdf)
Significance:        Mar 13, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Promptly Identify and Correct Voiding in the Safety Injection System The team identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI (Corrective Actions), with five examples, for the failure to promptly identify and correct voids in safety injection system. In some cases, significant changes in the safety injection tank leakage rates went unnoticed. Safety injection tank leakage can be a key indicator that voids are forming in lower pressure systems. In other examples, unexpected amounts of gas came from safety injection piping vents but operators and engineers failed to take meaningful actions to investigate or to address the occurrences. Contributors to the violation included: (1) the failure to properly address two pieces of related operating experience, (2) management's failure to follow site procedures and ensure that operating experience reviews were adequate, (3) the emergency core cooling system monthly venting procedure contained inadequate acceptance criteria, and (4) engineers were not adequately
 
monitoring safety injection tank leakage.
This finding was more than minor because it was similar to non-minor example 3.j from NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues, in that there was a reasonable doubt on the operability of the Train A safety injection system and the steam generators. Using the Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 Screening Worksheet, the issue screened as having very low safety significance because it was a qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in loss-of-operability in accordance with NRC Manual Chapter Part 9900, Technical Guidance, Operability Determination Process for Operability and Functional Assessments. The finding had a crosscutting aspect in the Problem Identification and Resolution area, Operating Experience component, because the site had not institutionalized operating experience. This finding was indicative of current plant performance because the weaknesses in the operating experience program that permitted the inadequate review of operating experience were still in place at the time of this inspection. [P.2(b)]
Inspection Report# : 2008007 (pdf)
Significance:        Mar 13, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Promptly Identify and Correct Voids in ECCS Suction Piping The team identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI (Corrective Actions), because the licensee failed to promptly identify and correct voids in emergency core cooling systme suction piping. After NRC concerns were raised, the licensee checked the suction piping and found voids in the piggyback lines (between residual heat removal discharge piping and charging and safety injection suction headers) and in shutdown cooling suction piping. Contributors to the violation included: (1) the failure to properly address two pieces of related operating experience, (2) management's failure to follow site procedures and ensure that operating experience reviews were adequate.
This finding was more than minor because it was similar to non-minor example 3.j from NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues, in that there was a reasonable doubt on the operability of the Train A safety injection system and the steam generators. Using the Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 Screening Worksheet, the issue screened as having very low safety significance because it was a qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in loss-of-operability in accordance with NRC Manual Chapter Part 9900, Technical Guidance, Operability Determination Process for Operability and Functional Assessments. The finding had a crosscutting aspect in the Problem Identification and Resolution area, Operating Experience component, because the site had not institutionalized operating experience. This finding was indicative of current plant performance because the weaknesses in the operating experience program that permitted the inadequate review of operating experience were still in place at the time of this inspection.[P.2(b)]
Inspection Report# : 2008007 (pdf)
Significance:        Mar 13, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate RHR and CS Void Calculations The team identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III (Design Control), for an inadequate calculation involving previously identified voids in the residual heat removal and containment spray containment suction piping. A contract engineer relied solely on engineering judgment to determine that the void stream, up to 11 percent, would have no affect on pump performance. Test data from an NRC NUREG, that the licensee had also used, contradicted the contractor's assessment. A contributor to this violation was the licensee's poor understanding of information contained in the NUREG.
This finding was more than minor because it was similar to non-minor example 3.j from NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues, in that there was a reasonable doubt on the operability of the residual heat removal and containment spray pumps. Using the Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 Screening Worksheet, the issue screened as having very low safety significance because it was a qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in loss of operability in accordance with NRC Manual Chapter Part 9900, Technical Guidance, Operability Determination Process for Operability and Functional Assessments. The finding had a crosscutting aspect in the Problem Identification and Resolution area, Corrective Action Program component, because the site failed to perform an adequate engineering evaluation for a nonconforming condition [P.1(c)].
Inspection Report# : 2008007 (pdf)
Significance:        Mar 13, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Adequately Correct Voiding Design Control Violation The team identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI (Corrective Actions), because the licensee took inadequate corrective measures to address NRC identified deficiencies involving the calculation for voids in the residual heat removal and containment spray sump piping. The licensee's assessment failed to address the expected change in net-positive-suction-head required for the
 
pumps. NRC issued guidance informed the licensee that this term would need adjustment.
This finding was more than minor because, if left uncorrected, could become a more significant safety concern. For example, the net positive suction head calculations for residual heat removal pumps shows that the pumps have very little design margin. The failure to properly address the voids may lead engineers to believe that there is margin available for plant modifications (such as the containment sump modification), when there is not. Using the Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 Screening Worksheet, the issue screened as having very low safety significance because it was a qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in loss of operability in accordance with NRC Manual Chapter Part 9900, Technical Guidance, Operability Determination Process for Operability and Functional Assessments. The finding had a crosscutting aspect in the Problem Identification and Resolution area, Corrective Action Program component, because the site failed to perform an adequate engineering evaluation for a performance deficiency [P.1(c)].
Inspection Report# : 2008007 (pdf)
Significance:        Mar 13, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Approve Engineering Calculations Prior to Use at Wolf Creek and Inadequate Work Instructions The team identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III (Design Control), with two examples for: (1) the failure to implement engineering procedures and approve a third party calculation prior to use at Wolf Creek, and (2) the failure to properly translate licensing and design basis information into instructions. Following identification of the first example, the licensee approved the subject calculation for use at Wolf Creek. However, the calculation had an inadequate basis for the acceptance of a 5 percent void fraction in suction piping and a 20 percent void fraction in discharge piping. Specifically, the calculation failed to consider the impact of voids on natural circulation operations and was inconsistent with Technical Specifications, the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, and net positive suction head calculations. All had assumed that Wolf Creek piping was water solid.
The finding was more than minor because, if left uncorrected, could result in a more significant safety concern. Specifically, the existence of 5 percent void fraction on the suction side of the pumps and 20 percent on the discharge side are still unanalyzed conditions and could adversely impact design basis accident analysis results. The licensee's operability assessment provided a reasonable expectation that design limits would not be exceeded. Using the Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 Screening Worksheet, the issue screened as having very low safety significance because it was a qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in loss-of-operability in accordance with NRC Manual Chapter Part 9900, Technical Guidance, Operability Determination Process for Operability and Functional Assessments. The finding had a crosscutting aspect in the Problem Identification and Resolution area, Corrective Action Program component, because the site failed to perform an adequate engineering evaluation [P.1(c)].
Inspection Report# : 2008007 (pdf)
Significance:        Mar 13, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Implement Piping Design Procedure and ASME Code Requirements The team identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V (Procedures), for the failure to implement piping design procedure requirements. The procedure required that piping systems be designed for normal component service (filling and venting) as well as routine operational surveillance (monthly emergency core cooling system venting). The piping systems were actually designed with some sections that could not be totally filled. The licensee also failed to design the piping in accordance with the ASME Code, which required vents at all piping high points.
The finding was more than minor because, if left uncorrected, it could result in a more significant safety concern. Specifically, the performance of emergency core cooling system systems with voids is not totally understood and could result in adverse systems response such as degraded pump performance or adversely impact natural circulation operations. Using the Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 Screening Worksheet, the issue screened as having very low safety significance because it was a qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in loss of operability in accordance with NRC Manual Chapter Part 9900, Technical Guidance, Operability Determination Process for Operability and Functional Assessments."
Inspection Report# : 2008007 (pdf)
Significance:        Mar 13, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Root Cause Assessment The team identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, because the licensee failed to follow the site procedure when performing a root cause assessment for the emergency core cooling system voiding issues and, subsequently, completed an inadequate root cause assessment. The licensee came to the erroneous conclusion that operating experience evaluations were thorough, but actually drew
 
broad conclusions based on unverified and incorrect information, and had failed to identify significant contributors to the events.
The finding was more than minor because, if left uncorrected, it could result in a more significant safety concern. Specifically, the NRC relies heavily on the licensee's ability to find and correct their own safety issues. The licensee's reliance on unvalidated (and incorrect) information and the crafting of corrective measures to fit erroneous conclusions provides an unacceptable level of confidence that the licensee can consistently correct its own problems without NRC involvement. Using the Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 Screening Worksheet, the issue screened as having very low safety significance because it was a qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in loss-of-operability in accordance with NRC Manual Chapter Part 9900, Technical Guidance, Operability Determination Process for Operability and Functional Assessments. The finding had a crosscutting aspect in the Problem Identification and Resolution area, Corrective Action Program component, because the site failed to perform an adequate engineering evaluation.[P.1(c)]
Inspection Report# : 2008007 (pdf)
Significance:        Feb 29, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Twenty one examples of failure to follow seismic requirements of scaffolding procedure The team identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V, in which 21 scaffolds in 10 plant areas that were in contact with or closer to plant equipment than procedure allowed. The procedure required engineering evaluations which did not contain any technical bases as to the acceptability of as built scaffolds. Subsequent engineering evaluation of each of the incorrect scaffolding installations confirmed that the configurations did not challenge operability. The NRC identified previous concerns with the erection of scaffolds, yet the licensee failed to take action to correct this issue.
The team evaluated the significance of this finding using Phase 1 of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, Significance Determination of Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations, and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance because the issue resulted in 21 unevaluated scaffolds which are likely not to challenge the ability of the plant to safely shutdown after an earthquake. As such, under Phase 1 screening, the deficiency is not related to a qualification or design deficiency, it did not represent a loss of safety function for a train or system as defined in the plant specific risk-informed inspection notebook, and did not screen as risk significant for seismic external events, because the affected systtems were considered degraded, but operable. Using these inputs, the performance deficiency screened to Green. The team determined that the finding had a human performance crosscutting aspect in the area associated with decision making because the licensee failed to adopt a requirement to demonstrate that the proposed action is safe in order to proceed rather than a requirement to demonstrate that the proposed action is safe in order to disapprove the action. Specifically, Wolf Creek Generating Station did not conduct any review of engineering decisions to verify the validity of the underlying assumption that equipment and scaffolding could be in contact or closer than the established limit (H.1(b)).
Inspection Report# : 2008006 (pdf)
Significance:        Feb 29, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to take Corrective Action For Missed Compensatory Measures The team identified a finding because the licensee failed to take timely corrective actions to address a previously identified NRC finding. FIN 2007002-04 was issued because the licensee had failed to establish compensatory actions in response to the failure of all Main Annunciator Board alarms. Failure to have compensatory measures inhibited the licensee in their efforts to determine the cause of the alarm failures.
Corrective actions repaired the equipment that caused of the annunciator failure, but were unrelated to the failure to follow procedures and take compensatory measures.
The team determined that this was a performance deficiency because the licensee had committed to take corrective actions in response to the previous NCV but failed to do so in a timely manner. The inspectors determined that this violation was greater than minor because it met the intent of MC 0612 Appendix E Example 4.a. in that there were several examples of the licensee failing to take corrective actions in response to NRC identified NCVs and findings, indicating that The licensee routinely failed to perform engineering evaluations on similar issues.
The inspectors performed a Phase I SDP evaluation and determined that the violation was screened as being very low safety significance, Green, because all of the answers to the Phase I Worksheet Mitigating Systems Column were no. The team also determined that this finding has crosscutting aspects in the problem identification and resolution area associated with the corrective action program in that the licensee failed to implement timely or effective corrective actions. (P.1(d)).
Inspection Report# : 2008006 (pdf)
Significance:        Feb 29, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to take corrective action for missed operability evaluation compensatory measures The team identified a violation of 10CFR50 Appendix B Criterion XVI because the licensee failed to take timely corrective actions to address
 
a previously identified NCV. NCV 2007003-05 was issued because the licensee had failed to perform an operability evaluation following bearing replacement on the Train B emergency exhaust system fan. Corrective actions were not related to the missed performance of the operability evaluation, but the equipment failure.
The team determined that this was a performance deficiency because the licensee had committed to take corrective actions in response to the previous NCV but failed to do so in a timely manner. The inspectors determined that this violation was greater than minor because it met the intent of MC 0612 Appendix E Example 4.a. in that there were several examples of the licensee failing to take corrective actions in response to NRC identified NCVs and findings, indicating that The licensee routinely failed to perform engineering evaluations on similar issues.
The inspectors performed a Phase I SDP evaluation and determined that the violation was screened as being very low safety significance, Green, because all of the answers to the Phase I Worksheet Mitigating Systems Column were no. The team also determined that this finding has crosscutting aspects in the problem identification and resolution area associated with the corrective action program in that the licensee failed to implement timely or effective corrective actions. (P.1(d)).
Inspection Report# : 2008006 (pdf)
Significance:        Feb 29, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to take timely corrective action to establish monitoring frequency of AFW pump governor null drift The team identified a violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion XVI because the licensee failed to take timely corrective actions to address a previously identified finding. Finding 2006010 was issued because the licensee had failed to establish an acceptable monitoring frequency on their Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump speed governor null-drift as recommended by a Part 21 report from Engine Systems, Inc. The corrective actions to establish the monitoring for the null-drift were not implemented.
The team determined that this was a performance deficiency because the licensee had committed to take corrective actions in response to the previous NCV but failed to do so in a timely manner. The team determined that this violation was greater than minor because it met the intent of MC 0612 Appendix E Example 4.a. in that there were several examples of the licensee failing to take corrective actions in response to NRC identified NCVs and findings, indicating that The licensee routinely failed to perform engineering evaluations on similar issues. The team performed a Phase I SDP evaluation and determined that the violation was screened as being very low safety significance, Green, because all of the answers to the Phase I Worksheet Mitigating Systems Column were no. The team also determined that this finding has crosscutting aspects in the problem identification and resolution area associated with the corrective action program in that the licensee failed to implement timely or effective corrective actions (P.1(d)).
Inspection Report# : 2008006 (pdf)
Significance:        Feb 29, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to take timely corrective action to correct Barton transmitter defects The team identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, regarding the failure to identify and correct conditions adverse quality associated with NRC NCV 2006-004-02 documented in Inspection Report 2006-004. Specifically, the licensee did not address in the apparent cause evaluation and corrective actions the failure to follow procedures resulting in an inadequate inspection of installed Barton pressure transmitters for known potential manufacturing defects which resulted in a previous violation of Administrative Procedure AP 28-011, Resolving Deficiencies Impacting SSCs, Revision 1. The licensee inappropriately credited transmitter inspections that occurred several years prior to receipt of the vendor recommendation as sufficient to resolve this issue.
This finding was more than minor because it could reasonably be viewed a precursor to a significant event and affected the equipment performance attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone and the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events. Using Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 worksheets, the inspectors determined that the finding is of very low significance because it did not represent an actual loss of a safety function or operability and was not potentially risk significant due to external events. The inspectors also determined that this finding has crosscutting aspects in the problem identification and resolution area associated with the corrective action program in that the licensee failed to identify the issue completely and thoroughly evaluate the problem such that the problem was resolved (P.1(a), P.1(c)).
Inspection Report# : 2008006 (pdf)
Significance:        Feb 29, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to take timely corrective action to correct annunciator feed configuration deficiencies.
The team identified a green finding for failure to implement corrective action for abandoned in place annunciator feed wiring deficiencies. CR 2005-003275 was initiated because Cables ST-009 and ST-019 were field-spliced together to prevent electrical shocks such that the system configuration did not match the system drawing. Work Order (WO) 07-292004-000 was initiated to correct this condition but was closed as
 
unworkable. CR 2005-003275 was closed to this closed work order even though the condition was not corrected, leaving the system in a condition not reflected in drawings or design documents. This configuration could result in further shocks, and further configuration control issues. The main annunciator system and its feeds are not safety-¬related, and therefore this performance deficiency is not a violation of NRC requirements.
The failure to implement corrective actions for an identified configuration control issue is a performance deficiency. This item affects the mitigating systems cornerstone. The team determined that this violation was greater than minor because it met the intent of MC 0612 Appendix E Example 4.a. in that there were several examples of the licensee failing to take corrective actions in response to findings, indicating that The licensee routinely failed to perform engineering evaluations on similar issues. The team performed a Phase I SDP evaluation and determined that the violation was screened as being very low safety significance, Green, because all of the answers to the Phase I Worksheet Mitigating Systems Column were no. The team also determined that this finding has crosscutting aspects in the problem identification and resolution area associated with the corrective action program in that the licensee failed to implement timely or effective corrective actions. (P.1(d)).
Inspection Report# : 2008006 (pdf)
Significance:        Dec 31, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to evaluate ESW valve corrosion The inspectors identified a noncited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," for failure to follow a procedure which required an evaluation of the Train B of ESW traveling screen wash valve and identical valves in the system after the Train A ESW screen wash valve had failed. Wolf Creek declined to enter its operability process but did tag Valve EF HV-92 open on September 13, 2007. An operability evaluation was produced on September 27, after EF HV-92 was disassembled and found to have unacceptable disc material loss due to corrosion. Corrective actions from the September 27 evaluation include a disassembly of an identical valve in the essential service water system that shows degrading but operable performance.
The failure to follow Procedure AP 26C-004, Technical Specification Operability, which required an evaluation of Valve EF HV-92, is a performance deficiency. The finding is more than minor because if left uncorrected the valve discs corrosion would become a more significant safety concern. The finding was of very low safety significance because the issue resulted in Valve EF HV 92 being degraded, but did open even with significant material and is not related to a qualification or design deficiency, did not result in the loss of safety function for greater than 24 hours, and was not related to external events such as fires and floods. The cause of the finding had problem identification and resolution crosscutting aspects in the area associated with the corrective action program because the licensee failed to evaluate the failure mechanism completely, accurately, and in a timely manner commensurate with its safety significance (P.1(a)).
Inspection Report# : 2007005 (pdf)
Significance:        Dec 31, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate evaluation of EDG for common cause failure The inspectors identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 3.8.1 for failure to perform an adequate common cause evaluation within 24 hours to demonstrate no common cause failure mechanism existed between the emergency diesel generators. Wolf Creeks common cause evaluation stated that the Hypothesis was that the EDG A digital reference unit (DRU) had not been refurbished as recommended in a April 21, 2004, 10 CFR Part 21 notification from Fairbanks Morse which stated that Wolf Creeks DRUs were affected by an integrated circuit contamination problem. Inspectors reviewed the April 21 notification and found that the slow start rpm ramp function was affected, however, The inspectors reviewed operating experience and other generic correspondence and found a 10 CFR Part 21 notification dated January 23, 2006, from Engine Systems, Inc. (ESI), who is a vendor for DRUs. The ESI notification describes a DRU deficiency in which an integrated circuit manufacturing defect can cause failure of the engine load raise and lower signals to the electronic governor controller. The inspectors noted this failure mechanism was similar to Wolf Creeks observed failure on November 1, 2007. Both EDGs were found to be affected by the ESI notification.
The inspectors determined that the failure to demonstrate, per TS 3.8.1 required actions B.3.1 or B.3.2, that no common cause failure existed for the EDGs is a performance deficiency. The finding is more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute for the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone; and, it affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). The finding was of very low safety significance because the issue resulted in the EDG being degraded, but likely to start even with an intermittent failure and did not result in the loss of safety function for greater than 24 hours, and was not related to external events such as fires and floods. The cause of the finding had problem identification and resolution crosscutting aspects in the area associated with the corrective action program because the licensee failed to evaluate the failure mechanism completely, accurately, and in a timely manner commensurate with its safety significance (P.1(a)).
Inspection Report# : 2007005 (pdf)
Significance:        Dec 31, 2007 Identified By: NRC
 
Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to enter and evaluate EDG operating experience in CAP The inspectors identified a finding for failure to enter into corrective action program evaluate relevant emergency diesel generator operating experience which allowed a manufacturing defect to exist resulting in a testing failure. Procedure AP 20E-001, Step 4.1.1, in part, directs the screening and review of operating experience from sources such as vendors, the NRC, and other utilities. Although, the inspectors found that Wolf Creek was not specifically listed as affected in the ESI Part 21, they had procured DRUs that were listed by serial number on the ESI notification. The inspectors also found a Woodward service bulletin dated January 2006 that Wolf Creek had not reviewed addressing the same issue that listed DRU serial numbers affected which included Wolf Creeks DRUs.
The failure to enter into corrective action program evaluate publicly available operating experience directly applicable to Wolf Creeks emergency diesel generators is a performance deficiency. This finding was more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute for the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone; and, it affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). The finding is of very low safety significance because the issue resulted in the EDG being degraded, but likely to start even with an intermittent failure and is not related to a qualification or design deficiency, did not result in the loss of safety function for greater than 24 hours, and was not related to external events such as fires and floods. The cause of the finding has a problem identification and resolution crosscutting aspect in the area associated with the operating experience program because the licensees operating experience process did not use operating experience information, including vendor recommendations, to support plant safety. Specifically, the licensee did not systematically collect, evaluate, and communicate relevant external operating experience to affected internal stakeholders in a timely manner (P.2(a)).
Inspection Report# : 2007005 (pdf)
Significance:        Dec 31, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Clogged drains cause circulating water roof loads to exceed design The inspectors identified a Green finding for exceeding the calculated roof loading for the circulating water screen house. In May 2007, Wolf Creek received heavy rains and water leaks from the circulating water screen house roof were observed. On May 8, 2007, it was observed that the roof of the circulating water screen house had accumulated approximately eight inches of standing water and that the drains were blocked by debris. Subsequently on May 8, the drains were cleared and the roof was drained. A roof yield or collapse was assumed to result in the loss of both circulating water and normal service water.
Exceeding the calculated allowable roof loading due to clogged drains is a performance deficiency. The finding is more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute for the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone; and, it affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences.
Additionally, this finding was more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute for the Initiating Events Cornerstone; and, it affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. This finding screened to a Phase 3 analysis because two or more cornerstones (Initiating Events and Mitigating Systems) were affected. The Senior Reactor Analyst performed the Phase 3 analysis and determined it to be of very low safety significance.
Inspection Report# : 2007005 (pdf)
Significance:        Oct 06, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to implement transient combustible material control permit requirements The inspectors identified a Green noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.d for failing to control combustible materials in an area of the plant that contained safety-related equipment. During a walkdown, inspectors noted that temporary scaffolding constructed of flame retardant treated wood installed in the emergency diesel generator rooms did not have a transient combustible materials permit. Following review of the procedure for control of combustibles, it was noted that the licensee inappropriately considered fire retardant treated wood as noncombustible material and exempted it from permit control. This could lead to the uncontrolled use of fire treated wood throughout the facility, even in excess of fire hazard analysis limits for fire loads.
The inspectors determined that the inadequate control of transient combustibles in the emergency diesel generator rooms was more than minor because, if left uncorrected, it would become a more significant safety concern and could potentially affect emergency diesel generator availability due to fire under the mitigating systems cornerstone. The finding was of very low safety significance because it involved the combustible controls program and was assigned a low degradation rating since the flame retardant treated wood is considered a high flashpoint material.
Inspection Report# : 2007004 (pdf)
Significance:        Oct 06, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to collor EDG assembly procedure resulting in NOED
 
A self-revealing noncited violation was identified regarding failure to follow a procedure used to reassemble the intercooler and jacketwater pumps to the Train A emergency diesel generator resulting in the Emergency Diesel Generator A being inoperable. During reassembly of the Emergency Diesel Generator A on June 6, 2007, the stationary seals for the intercooler and jacketwater pumps were not correctly installed in their housings. On July 5, 2007, the Emergency Diesel Generator A failed its surveillance test because the intercooler pump leaked at a rate of 23.4 ml/min with an acceptability limit of 9.1 ml/min. Even with the leakage, Emergency Diesel Generator A was later determined to be capable of running for greater than 24 hours.
The failure to install the stationary seals in accordance with the approved work orders is a performance deficiency. The finding is more than minor because it is associated with the human performance attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone; and, it affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). The finding is of very low safety significance because the issue does not represent a qualification or design deficiency, it did not represent a loss of safety function for a train or system as defined in the plant specific risk-informed inspection notebook, and was not related to external events such as fires and floods. The inspectors also determined that the finding has a human performance crosscutting aspect in the area associated with resources because the licensee failed to ensure that mechanics had adequate emergency diesel generator training to assure correct reassembly of the diesel auxiliaries as stated in Wolf Creeks root cause evaluation [H.2(b)].
Inspection Report# : 2007004 (pdf)
Significance:        Oct 06, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to use appropriate guidance for valve operation A self-revealing finding was identified when a nonlicensed plant operator failed to utilize appropriate guidance and used excessive torque on service water Valves 1WS0002A and 1WS0004 resulting in damage to the valves and unavailability of service water Pump 1WS01PA and the low-flow service water Pump 1WS002P. Valve 1WS0002A was repaired as emergent work and returned to service after approximately 42 hours of being unavailable and Valve 1WS0004 was repaired as corrective maintenance and returned to service after approximately 65 days of unavailability. This issue is captured in the licensee's corrective action program.
The finding was more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute for the mitigating systems cornerstone; and, it affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The inspectors also determined that this finding was more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute for the initiating events cornerstone, and it affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. A Phase 3 evaluation was necessary since the finding involved concurrent multiple equipment degradations from a common cause. The Phase 3 evaluation concluded that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green). The inspectors also determined that the finding had a human performance crosscutting aspect in the area of work practices because the licensee failed to effectively communicate expectations regarding valve operations in accordance with procedural requirements [H.4(b)].
Inspection Report# : 2007004 (pdf)
Significance: TBD Dec 29, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: AV Apparent Violation Failure to Maintain Reactor Coolant System Subcooling During the Alternative Shutodwn The team identified an Apparent Violation of Wolf Creek License Condition 2.C.(5)(a) concerning an inadequate alternative shutdown analysis. The licensees alternative shutdown analysis was inadequate in that it used an acceptance criteria which was inconsistent with and less conservative than that required by the approved Fire Protection Program. The licensee developed Calculation Number AN-02-021, Revision 0, OFN RP-017, Control Room Evacuation, Consequence Evaluation, to demonstrate alternative shutdown capability for Wolf Creek in response to NRC-identified Noncited Violation 2002008-01, Inadequate alternative shutdown procedure. The calculation predicted that during an alternative shutdown, the reactor coolant system subcooling margin would not be maintained, significant voiding would occur in the core, and a steam void would form in the reactor vessel head. The licensee found the results of the calculation to be acceptable since it demonstrated that the void formation would be limited, natural circulation in the reactor coolant system would be maintained, sufficient decay heat removal would be maintained, and no fuel damage would occur. This is not consistent with the license condition to meet the technical requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R. Section III.L of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Alternative and dedicated shutdown capability, that states in part, During the postfire shutdown, the reactor process variables shall be maintained within those predicted for a loss of normal a.c. power.
This finding is greater than minor because it impacted the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to external events (such as fire) to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). It is the NRCs understanding that the licensee does not consider these circuit vulnerabilities to be violations of NRC requirements. The licensee considers the spurious operation of multiple components to be outside of the plant licensing basis for the Fire Protection Program. Specifically, in this case, both pressurizer power-operated relief valves are assumed to spuriously open because of fire induced circuit damage. The NRC staff and the industry are currently working on developing a resolution methodology to address these types of potential fire induced circuit failures. The team concluded that this violation meets the criteria of the NRC Enforcement Manual Section 8.1.7.1 for deferring enforcement actions for postulated fire induced circuit failures.
Inspection Report# : 2005008 (pdf)
 
Barrier Integrity Significance:        Jun 28, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Troubleshooting activities bypass design control for the fuel transfer system The inspectors identified a violation of TS 5.4.1.a in which Wolf Creek raised the winch load setpoint for its fuel transfer system to avoid trips without knowing the cause. During core reload, Wolf Creek experienced repeated trips of the fuel handling system winch. It was not until after NRC involvement that it was identified that the winch load setpoints were inappropriately altered. The inspectors found that on April 17, 2008, under Work Order 08 305599-000, the load setpoints and slow speed zones were inappropriately changed from 250 pounds for 1 second and 590 inches, to 300 pounds for 2 seconds and 585 inches, respectively. The inspectors found that under M 716 00787, Section G, Software Change Log, no changes to the winch load limits or slow speed zones were referenced. The fuel transfer system is also explicitly controlled under Procedure AP 05-005, Design, Implementation, & Configuration Control of Modifications. It was subsequently discovered that the setpoints were controlled by a vendor technical document that Wolf Creek accepted as the fuel transfer cart design.
Inspectors were unable to locate, and Wolf Creek was unable to produce, modification documentation that justified these software changes.
After the discovery that the setpoints were inappropriately changed, the 250 pounds for 1 second and 590 inches were loaded into the EEPROM (nonvolatile memory for the PLC). Power to the fuel transfer system was cycled and the speed change for the cart was observed at 590 inches. On this basis, Wolf Creek believed that the settings had been correctly re established, and fuel moves continued. Wolf Creek has had difficulty determining with certainty that the original setpoints were correctly re-established.
The finding was more than minor because it is associated with the human performance attribute for the barrier integrity cornerstone; and, it affected the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers (fuel cladding) protect the public from radio nuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, this issue relates to the procedure adherence example of the human performance attribute because the design process was bypassed to mask fuel cart problems. The finding was of very low safety significance because the issue did not result in fuel handling errors that caused damage to fuel clad integrity or a dropped fuel assembly. The cause of the finding has human performance crosscutting aspects in the area associated with decision making. Specifically, Wolf Creek did not ensure safety by making safety or risk significant decisions by using any procedural or systematic process when faced with the unexpected and repeated fuel transfer cart winch trips.
Inspection Report# : 2008003 (pdf)
Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Significance:        Apr 07, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to control area as a locked high radiation area
* The inspector reviewed a self-revealing noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.7.2.a for failure to evaluate changing radiological conditions and control an area as a locked high radiation area. Specifically, on October 17, 2007, dose rates in Room 7604 increased to levels requiring posting as a Locked High Radiation Area as a result of a vent and drain evolution. Dose rates reached a level of 1500 mRem/hour prior to the area being properly posted and controlled. This issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Report 2007-003934. Immediate corrective actions included posting and controlling the area as a locked high radiation area. Other corrective actions included changing the vent and drain process to change the vent path.
This finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the occupational radiation safety program and process attribute and affected the cornerstone objective, in that, the failure to properly post and control access to a locked high radiation area has the potential to increase personnel dose. This occurrence involves the potential for unplanned, unintended dose. Utilizing Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix C, Occupational Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process, the inspector determined that the finding was of very low safety significance because it did not involve; (1) as low as is reasonably achievable planning and controls, (2) an overexposure, (3) a substantial potential for overexposure, or (4) an impaired ability to assess dose. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of work control, work planning, in that the licensee failed to appropriately plan work activities by incorporating job site conditions that may impact radiological safety [H.3(a)].
Inspection Report# : 2008002 (pdf)
Significance:        Apr 07, 2008
 
Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to follow procedure
* The inspector reviewed a self-revealing noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1 for failure to follow a licensee procedure.
Specifically, on March 29, 2008, one of two radiographers conducting radiography operations in the quality control vault received a dose rate alarm on their electronic dosimeter. The two radiographers evaluated the dose received and decided to continue with radiography without notifying health physics personnel to evaluate the conditions. This issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Report 2008-001181. Immediate corrective actions included restriction of the radiographers to log onto the radiation work permit and discussions with the radiographers and the contractors radiation safety officer. Long term corrective action is still being evaluated.
This finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the occupational radiation safety program and process attribute and affected the cornerstone objective, in that, the failure to stop work and notify health physics personnel for assistance had the potential to increase personnel dose. This occurrence involves the potential for unplanned, unintended dose. Utilizing Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix C, Occupational Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process, the inspector determined that the finding was of very low safety significance because it did not involve: (1) as low as is reasonably achievable planning and controls, (2) an overexposure, (3) a substantial potential for overexposure, or (4) an impaired ability to assess dose. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of decision making, risk significant decisions, because the radiographer and assistant failed to contact health physics personnel to discuss the circumstances surrounding the unexpected dose rate alarm [H.1(a)].
Inspection Report# : 2008002 (pdf)
Public Radiation Safety Significance:        Sep 12, 2008 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Provide an Accuratge Shipping Manifest The team reviewed a self-revealing, noncited violation of 10 CFR 20.2006(b) resulting from the licensees failure to provide an accurate shipping manifest. On May 16, 2008, the licensee shipped used radioactive resin to a waste processor. The shipment contained 65 cubic feet of resin and a total activity of 177 Curies. However, the manifest papers accompanying the shipment only indicated 35 cubic feet of resin and a total activity of 83.8 Curies. The licensee was notified of the problem by the shipment recipient. The licensees corrective actions were to fax a corrected shipment manifest to the processor, suspend resin shipments, and conduct an apparent cause investigation. The problem involving the incorrect manifest was documented in the corrective action program as Condition Report 2008-2357.
The finding is greater than minor because it was associated with the Public Radiation Safety cornerstone attribute, transportation program, and affected the cornerstone objective in that it provided incorrect information as part of hazard communication which could increase public dose. Using the public radiation safety significance determination process, the team determined the finding had very low safety significance because (1) radiation limits were not exceeded; (2) there was no breach of a package during transit; (3) it did not involve a certificate of compliance issue; (4) it was not a low level burial ground nonconformance; and (5) it did not involve a failure to make notifications or provide emergency information. Additionally, this finding had a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance, resources component, in that, the licensee did not establish adequate procedures and documentation necessary to ensure that information entered on the manifest was correct before shipping the package.
Inspection Report# : 2008009 (pdf)
Physical Protection Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Last modified : November 26, 2008
 
Wolf Creek 1 4Q/2008 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance:      Sep 27, 2008 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate reactor vessel vent path A self-revealing green noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, was identified due to an inadequate vent path for the reactor vessel head. The inadequate vent path resulted in the formation of a maximum void size of 2600 gallons in the reactor vessel head on March 23, 2008, while the plant was shutdown and depressurized. Wolf Creek found indirect evidence of a loop seal due to water that came out of the hard pipe at the end of the outage during vacuum filling of the reactor coolant system. However, the root cause team could not exclude blockage in the piping. This issue was entered into the corrective action program and the licensee plans to conduct a more thorough inspection of the hard pipe during the next refueling outage.
The inspectors determined that the failure to provide adequate vessel head vent path to prevent gas accumulation in the reactor vessel during depressurized plant operations was a performance deficiency. The inspectors determined that this finding, which was associated with the Initiating Events cornerstone, was more than minor because if it was left uncorrected, it would have become a more significant safety concern. Specifically, the reactor vessel does not have an effective means of relieving noncondensable gases to prevent a loss of reactor coolant system inventory. The inspectors evaluated this finding using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix G, Attachment 1, and determined it be of very low safety significance based upon the demonstrated availability of mitigation systems and the flooded reactor cavity inventory. Because Wolf Creek did not inspect the portions of the piping or identify why the vent was blocked, no cause of the finding related to the crosscutting aspects could be identified.
Inspection Report# : 2008004 (pdf)
Significance:      Jun 28, 2008 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: FIN Finding Inadequate transformer procedure resulted in an unplanned reactor trip and forced outage A self-revealing finding was identified for an inadequate maintenance procedure that resulted in a reactor trip due a loss of all condensate pumps. On March 17, 2008, plant operators observed that steam generator water level was lowering and main feed pump speed was decreasing. Based on these indications, Wolf Creek operators manually tripped the plant. Approximately 12 hours prior to the transformer trip, Wolf Creek had removed from service XPB04 transformer for planned maintenance and cross connected XPB04 transformer PB004 bus loads to the XPB03 transformer PB003 bus. This arrangement powered all three condensate pumps from PB003 4.16kv bus. The licensees investigation of the cause of the transformer trip determined that two phases of the XPB03 transformer 4.16kv output cables had overheated and failed because two multi-directional conductor connectors used to terminate two phases of the 1000 MCM 4.16kv bus cables were installed using the incorrect configuration. The resident inspectors reviewed Work Order 06-291275-000, Revision 0, in which the licensee had performed maintenance on the XPB03 transformer on March 4, 2008, that required removal of the XPB03 transformer 4.16kv output cables. The work order provided general guidance to disconnect the high/low side. The inspectors noted that neither the work order nor Procedure MTE TL-001 contained any guidance or specified the conductor connector configuration and only provided general guidance to disconnect and re-term the cables. It was also noted that this work was performed by first time performers who had no experience with this type of connector. The inspectors reviewed electrical maintenance training and did not identify any training that would have provided knowledge or skills on multi-directional conductor connectors.
 
The finding was more than minor because it is associated with the procedure quality attribute of the initiating events cornerstone and it affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability.
This finding also affected the procedure quality attribute for the mitigating systems cornerstone and it affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). The inspectors evaluated the significance of this finding and because two cornerstones were affected, a Phase 2 analysis was required. The consequences were assessed using a Phase 3 analysis by the Region IV senior reactor analyst. The consequence of the performance deficiency was a reactor trip with a loss of normal feedwater. This event occurred 13 days following maintenance using the flawed procedure. Consequently, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance. This finding has human performance crosscutting aspects in the area associated with resources component because the licensee failed to provide an adequate maintenance procedure to assure nuclear safety [H.2(c)].
Inspection Report# : 2008003 (pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance:        Nov 25, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Equipment out of service log definitions redefined outside of procedure change process The inspectors identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, procedures, for changing the equipment out of service log outside of the procedure change process. On November 25, 2008, the inspectors questioned the status of excess letdown Valve 8153B because its equipment out of service log entry changed from available to unavavailable. The inspectors were informed that the meaning of unavailable was verbally changed to mean that the valve was inoperable but considered available. This contradicted the words of the electronic log and Procedure AP 21F-001, Equipment Out of Service Control. Operations management was aware of the change to the terminology. Inspectors reviewed Procedures AP 21F-001 and found it required a senior operator to make and maintain the equipment out of service log. Procedure AP 15C-004, Preparation, Review and Approval of Procedures, Instructions and Forms, defines AP class procedures as those that, in part, implement activities that can significantly affect nuclear safety. Inspectors did not identify any other formal change processes that led to the log changes. Inspectors found no formal training or communication to all licensed and nonlicensed operations staff on this change.
The failure to implement AP 21F-001was considered a performance deficiency. The finding was determined to be more than minor because it could become a more significant safety concern if procedures and configuration controls are changed outside the required process. The inspectors evaluated the significance of this finding under the mitigating systems cornerstone using Phase 1 of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because no systems, structures, or components were inappropriately out of service for greater than 24 hours due to errors in the log. Specifically, no equipment status was lost such that it was returned to service inappropriately. Further, none of the affected equipment was risk significant for the mitigation of external events such as flooding. The inspectors determined that this finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of Human Performance associated with the Decision Making component because Wolf Creek did not use its procedure change process to demonstrate that changing the equipment out service log the change was a safe course of action. Although roles and authority are defined in Procedure AP 15C-004, these roles and authorities were not implemented for a safety significant decision.
Inspection Report# : 2008005 (pdf)
Significance:        Oct 24, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Ensure a Fire Pump Would Automatically Start for One Fire Area The team identified a non-cited violation of License Condition 2.C.(5), Fire Protection, for the failure to ensure that
 
a water supply for the manual fire suppression system credited by the fire protection program would be promptly available in the event of a fire in the communications corridor. The team determined that cables for both fire pumps were routed in cable trays in the communications corridor. As a result, a single fire could result in the failure of any fire pump to start automatically or manually from the control room. A fire pump could be started locally to restore the water supply, but the delay would reduce the effectiveness of the fire suppression systems in limiting the growth of a fire and minimizing damage to safety-related equipment. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program as Condition Report 2008-005190.
Failure to ensure that a fire pump would be promptly available for manual fire suppression in the event of a fire in the communications corridor is a performance deficiency. This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the Protection Against External Factors attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and could affect the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to fire events to prevent undesirable consequences. The team judged the delay in starting a fire pump to be approximately five minutes. Using guidance in Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, Table 2.7.1 and Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, Attachment 2, the team determined this issue to be categorized as a fixed fire protection finding with a low degradation. This finding is of very low safety significance because the finding was assigned a low degradation rating. This finding was not assigned a cross-cutting aspect because it has existed since original construction and does not represent current performance.
Inspection Report# : 2008010 (pdf)
Significance:        Oct 24, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Operator Actions Affect the Ability to Operate Post Fire Safe Shutdown Equipment The team identified a non-cited violation of License Condition 2.C.(5), Fire Protection, for operator actions taken in response to a fire in Fire Area A-27 (Reactor Trip Switchgear Room 1403) that remove the ability to remotely operate equipment required for post-fire safe shutdown. Specifically, Procedure OFN KC 016, Fire Response, directs operators to remove the Train B 125V dc control power supply if a fire in Fire Area A-27 causes the Train B power-operated relief valve to spuriously open and its associated block valve fails to close. Removing the Train B 125V dc control power supply affects several of the functions credited for post-fire safe shutdown in Fire Area A-27. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program as Condition Report 2008-005210.
Removing the ability to remotely operate equipment required for post-fire safe shutdown, as specified in Procedure OFN KC-016, is a performance deficiency. This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the Protection Against External Factors attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and could affect the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to fire events to prevent undesirable consequences. The team determined the risk significance using Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process. This finding is of very low safety significance since all fire ignition sources screened out and a hot gas layer would not form in this area. This finding was not assigned a cross-cutting aspect because the cause was not representative of current performance.
Inspection Report# : 2008010 (pdf)
Significance: TBD Oct 24, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Evaluate Changes to the Approved Fire Protection Program The team identified a Severity Level IV non-cited violation for making changes to the approved fire protection program in a manner contrary to the requirements of License Condition 2.C.(5).(b). Prior to 2005, the licensee made multiple revisions to Procedure OFN RP 017, Control Room Evacuation, without demonstrating the changes would not adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire. Specifically, the licensee had revised the alternative shutdown procedure to allow some manual actions to be completed in times longer than the approved time commitments. When revising the alternative shutdown procedure, the licensee did not evaluate the changes to ensure they would not adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2005-
 
3317.
Failure to demonstrate that changes to the approved fire protection program would not adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire prior to changing the alternative shutdown procedure is a performance deficiency. This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the Protection Against External Factors attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and could affect the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to fire events to prevent undesirable consequences. This finding was assessed using traditional enforcement since it had the potential for impacting the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function. Using the guidance in Section D.3 of Supplement I of the NRC Enforcement Policy, this violation was determined to be a Severity Level IV violation since the licensee implemented corrective actions, provided a technical evaluation for the new alternative shutdown procedure, and performed an evaluation of the changes made in the alternative shutdown procedure. This finding was not assigned a cross-cutting aspect because the procedure changes were made in the 2005 timeframe and do not represent current performance.
Inspection Report# : 2008010 (pdf)
Significance:      Sep 27, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Use of hammer to reduce accumulator check valve leakage Inspectors identified a green noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, when Wolf Creek hammered the side of check Valve EP8818D such that the body of the valve was dented numerous times. This activity was performed under a troubleshooting work order to reduce valve seat leakage. The subsequent evaluation stated that this was an acceptable practice and that it would strengthen the surface metal of the valve body. Wolf Creek subsequently initiated Condition Report 2008-2284 to evaluate the practice.
The inspectors determined that the failure to utilize work instructions appropriate to the circumstances and properly evaluate the effects was a performance deficiency. The inspectors determined that this issue is more than minor because it could become a more safety-significant concern if the cold working or peening practice is not discontinued.
Inspectors determined that the finding was not appropriate for evaluation under Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, . The inspectors applied Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix M, Significance Determination Process Using Qualitative Criteria. The inspectors used a bounding qualitative case, and in consultation with NRC management, determined that the operability of the valve was not impacted. Therefore, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance, or Green. The inspectors determined that the cause of the finding has a problem identification and resolution crosscutting aspect in the area associated with the corrective action program because the licensee failed to evaluate the problem of seat leakage such that the resolution (a hammer) appropriately addressed the possible causes of valve seat leakage.
Inspection Report# : 2008004 (pdf)
Significance:      Sep 27, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to adequately evaluate submerged safety-related cables The inspectors identified a green noncited violation of 10 CFR, Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, because Wolf Creek failed to adequately demonstrate that 4160v cables that are under water are qualified for such service, and that they will remain operable, although the cables are presently operable. Since NRC Information Notice 2002-12 was issued, Wolf Creek had several opportunities to implement a preventive maintenance program and/or thoroughly evaluate the submerged cables. These cables include those of residual heat removal, containment spray, and essential service water. Wolf Creek has subsequently written Condition Report 2008-5073 and work orders to inspect cables and dewater cable vaults.
The failure to perform an engineering evaluation that demonstrated continued operability was considered a
 
performance deficiency. The inspectors determined that this finding was more than minor using Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix E, example 3.j, because the NRC was able to show that Wolf Creeks operability evaluation needed significant change to demonstrate continued operability. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance, Green, using the Significance Determination Process Phase 1. Specifically, the deficiency did not result in the present loss of operability or functionality and did not represent a risk significant external event such as flooding. The inspectors determined that the cause of the finding has a problem identification and resolution crosscutting aspect in the area associated with the corrective action program. Despite several opportunities since 2002, Wolf Creek failed to perform a thorough evaluation for continued operability of submerged safety-related cables to assure continued nuclear safety.
Inspection Report# : 2008004 (pdf)
Significance:        Sep 27, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation EDG lube oil heat exchanger leak due water hammer On April 7, 2008, the inspectors identified a green noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, due to an approximately 10 to 15 gpm leak on the Emergency Diesel Generator B lubricating oil heat exchanger cover plate. The water hammer caused part of the cover plate gasket to be ejected from the heat exchanger and created the leak. The inspectors found that the work order to assemble the heat exchanger were inadequate. Wolf Creek evaluations did not identify that vendor manual steps were not incorporated into the installation work order which led to loose cover plate nuts which caused the leak. Wolf Creek subsequently wrote Condition Report 2008-004982.
Wolf Creeks failure to ensure that the configuration of both emergency diesel generator lube oil heat exchangers was per plant design was considered a performance deficiency. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance, Green, by using the Significance Determination Process Phase 1 screening worksheet for mitigating systems. Specifically, the deficiency did not result in the loss of operability or functionality and did not represent a risk significant external event such as flooding. The inspectors determined that the cause of the finding has a human performance crosscutting aspect in the area associated with resources. Specifically, Wolf Creek did not ensure that Work Order 08-305289-000 was adequate to assure nuclear safety by including vendor instructions or acceptance criteria for both emergency diesel generator lube oil heat exchanger cover plates.
Inspection Report# : 2008004 (pdf)
Significance:        Sep 27, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Waterhammer caused by loss of offsite power exceeds heat exchanger bolt yield strength A self-revealing noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, occurred on April 7, 2008, when a loss of offsite power caused the service water pumps to shutdown and the essential service water pump to start. As a result, a water hammer occurred and the control room air conditioning unit Condenser B developed an approximately 60 gpm essential service water leak. This issue was entered into the corrective action program as condition report 2008-001450.
Wolf Creeks operation of the control room air conditioning and essential service water systems outside the design limits of the heat exchanger studs was determined to be a performance deficiency. The finding was determined to be more than minor because it impacted the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and operability of systems that respond to initiating events. The finding screened Green in Phase 1 of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609 because it did not cause the loss of safety function and did not impact risk for external events. The inspectors determined that the cause of the finding was related to the problem identification and resolution crosscutting aspect in the area associated with the corrective action program. Specifically, Wolf Creek previously identified that the heat exchanger joint might be inadequate, but it failed to perform any subsequent corrective action.
 
Inspection Report# : 2008004 (pdf)
Significance:        Sep 27, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Diesel generator low frequency and voltage variation not considered in calculations The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, having very low safety significance for the licensees failure to account for the effect of emergency diesel generator frequency variation at the lower limit of the allowable range. Specifically, emergency diesel generator voltage and frequency deviations for load sequencing was based on nominal 60 hertz operation of pumps and fans and did not account for the two percent variation allowed by Technical Specification 3.8.1. Wolf Creek could not demonstrate compliance with USAR section 8.1.4.3.b. The licensee has entered this issue into their corrective action program as Condition Report 2008-004312.
The inspectors determined that the failure to properly account for the effect of frequency variation on diesel generator was a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of design control and affected the associated cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the failure to account for the frequency variations at the lower limit had more than a minimal effect on the outcome of the analysis, in that, the bus frequency will decrease below the Updated Safety Analysis Report limit of 57.0 hertz for loss of coolant accident and loss of offsite power scenarios. The inspector determined that the finding screened as very low safety significance (Green) because it was a design or qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in loss of operability Inspection Report# : 2008004 (pdf)
Significance:        Jun 28, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to implement transient combustible control permit requirements for a propane tank A noncited violation (NCV) TS 5.4.1.d was identified for failing to control combustible materials in an area of the plant that contained safety related equipment. During a walkdown on May 1, 2008, inspectors noted that a temporary propane cylinder for a generator contained 33.5 pounds of propane. The inspectors identified that the propane cylinder did not have a transient combustible materials permit. Operators informed the inspectors that there were no active permits or impairments for this propane cylinder. The operators further stated that no such actions would be necessary because the generator and its propane cylinder are exempted from permit controls. The inspectors reviewed Procedure AP 10-102, Control of Combustible Materials, Revision 13. Section 7.10 of this procedure stated that the, propane cylinder is exempt from the transient combustible permit requirements of this procedure. Section 6.2.1 also states, in part, that a transient combustible materials permit is required if two gallons of flammable liquid or 14 pounds of flammable gas (not connected with hot work) are used. The inspectors spoke with Wolf Creek fire protection and licensing personnel and expressed that there seemed to be an inadequacy in their fire protection program. These personnel stated that their exemption of the propane was a long standing policy of the station and fire protection plan.
The inspectors contacted NRC regional fire protection specialists. The specialists informed the inspectors that Wolf Creeks position was contrary to industry standards and practice. The specialists stated that industry standards also consider heat of combustion or fire load, and a potential fire hazard and combustible characteristics of a material, i.e.,
an explosion. The inspectors determined that the licensees interpretation that the propane cylinder should be exempted from permit requirements was inappropriate.
The inadequate control of transient combustibles in containment was more than minor because, if left uncorrected, it would become a more significant-safety concern and could potentially affect residual heat removal availability due to fire under the mitigating systems cornerstone. The finding was of very low safety significance because the finding was assigned a moderate degradation factor and the issue only affected the ability to achieve and maintain cold shutdown.
The finding also had crosscutting aspects in the problem identification and resolution area associated with corrective
 
actions because the licensee failed to take appropriate corrective actions for a previous NRC identified deficiency in the exempted use of Class A transient combustibles [P.1(d)].
Inspection Report# : 2008003 (pdf)
Significance:      Jun 28, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to establish goals and monitor for a(1) ECCS room An NCV of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) was identified by the inspectors for failure to establish a(1) goals for the safety-related room coolers and monitor room cooler performance against those goals. On May 5, 2005, the Train A residual heat removal pump accumulated enough unavailability time to exceed the 10 CFR 50.65 a(2) goal due to a 0.5 gpm through wall leak on Room Cooler SGL10A. The licensee wrote Performance Improvement Request (PIR) 2005-2507 on August 31, 2005, to document that the maintenance rule expert panel had a majority vote to move the room cooler function to a(1) status. In the coming years, the replacement schedule defined prior to PIR 2005 2507 was delayed several times. PIR 2005-2507, Action Item 4, required the expert panel to establish a(1) monitoring goals with a monitoring duration by June 30, 2006. Wolf Creek performed a 10 CFR 50.65 a(3) review on April 27, 2007, to determine if the room cooler performance was disproportionate to its established a(2) goals. The April 27, 2007, expert panel meeting minutes, in part, states that a(1) goals had not been established because all of the room coolers had not been replaced and after all room coolers are replaced, that a(1) goals and monitoring will be implemented in the future. Inspectors questioned this practice of only monitoring for performance after corrective action rather than before and after corrective action. Thus, no technically justified goals were established. The inspectors questioned the process of considering the Function a(1) for 3 years of corrective actions with no a(1) monitoring goals in the intervening time. After inspector questioning in February 2008, Wolf Creek has expedited room cooler procurement and replacement. The inspectors also determined that the replacement plan did not implement maintenance activities, which would improve the availability of the systems. This was contrary to the guidance in NUMARC 93-01, Industry Guideline for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants, Revision 3, which states that while waiting to implement modifications, increased preventive maintenance may be necessary to ensure the affected function will remain reliable.
This finding is more than minor because it is consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter 612, Appendix E, Example 7.a. Specifically, Wolf Creek failed to establish a(1) goals and monitor performance against those goals for the a(1)
GL-5 function for 3 years. The inspectors evaluated the significance of this finding and determined that the finding is of very low safety significance because the support function (GL-5) to cool pump rooms does not result in a total loss of any safety function as identified by the licensee probability risk assessment that contributes to external event initiated core damage accident sequences (i.e., initiated by a seismic, flooding, or severe weather event). The finding has a crosscutting aspects in the problem identification and resolution area associated with corrective action program because Wolf Creek failed to take appropriate corrective actions to address this safety issue and the adverse room cooler trends in a timely manner, commensurate with safety significance and complexity [P.1(d)].
Inspection Report# : 2008003 (pdf)
Significance:      Jun 28, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate containment sump inspection procedure The inspectors identified an NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Procedures, Instructions, and Drawings, for Wolf Creeks failure to specify acceptance criteria in its containment sump inspection procedure which led to unidentified gaps in containment Sump A. During a Mode 4 containment walkdown on May 9, 2008, the inspector identified a gap in containment Sump A not previously identified by Wolf Creek. Based on previous Engineering Disposition 12684, the gap acceptance criterion was 0.045 inch. The gap that the inspector identified was 1/8-inch wide by 1/2-inch tall on one of the upper sump strainers. After raising the issue to the control room, Wolf Creek declared containment Sump A inoperable and entered TS 3.5.3. Train B residual heat removal was already inoperable for maintenance. Wolf Creek subsequently entered Technical Specification 3.0.3, and repaired the sump.
 
Wolf Creek Procedure STS EJ 003, Containment Sump Inspection Revision 14, Step 8.1, contains no guidance on filter screen gap acceptance criteria, other than verify no evidence of structural distress. Wolf Creek last implemented STS EJ-003 during their May 7, 2008, walkdown prior to ascending from Mode 5 to Mode 4. The inspectors considered this a missed opportunity as Wolf Creek should have identified these deficiencies prior to Mode
: 4. Although the inspectors could not determine with complete certainty that the sump screen gap existed at the time of Wolf Creeks walkdown on May 7, Wolf Creek was not able to identify any work activity performed in the recirculation sump area since that time.
The finding was more than minor because it affected the procedure quality and human performance attributes of the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that to responds to initiating events and prevent undesirable consequences. The inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance because the deficiency did not result in the complete loss of operability or functionality and did not represent a risk significant external event such as flooding. The finding has human performance crosscutting aspects in the area associated with resources. Specifically, Wolf Creek did not ensure that Procedure STS EJ-002 was adequate to assure nuclear safety including complete, accurate and up-to-date specifications or acceptance criteria for the sump [H.2(c)].
Inspection Report# : 2008003 (pdf)
Significance:      Jun 28, 2008 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: FIN Finding Inadequate switchyard work procedure resulted in a loss of offsite power A self-revealing finding was identified for an inadequate Wolf Creek switchyard maintenance work instruction which resulted in the loss of offsite power. On April 7, 2008, offsite power was lost to the NB02 4 kV safety-related bus when switchyard workers tripped the incorrect breaker failure trip relay while testing the Rose Hill 345kV offsite switchyard breakers. The incorrect closed trip relay made up the logic for the startup transformer protection circuit and extended the trip signal to all 345kV offsite breakers, resulting in the loss of power. The loss of the switchyard bus de-energized the protected train, 4 kV Bus B. The emergency diesel generator automatically started and supplied power to the Train B bus. Offsite power was restored to Train B bus approximately 8 hours later. The plant was defueled for a refueling outage and NB01 bus was secured for maintenance. The inspectors noted that the work orders only provided generic instructions and did not contain any detailed information or any specific step-by-step instructions on how the work was to be conducted. It was also noted that the switchyard workers did not have a copy of the maintenance procedure in hand and was on the phone with another switchyard worker who coordinated/directed the work. Administrative Procedure AP 21C-001, WCGS/WESTAR Substation, Revision 8, in part, contains steps for the Wolf Creek switchyard coordinator to review and monitor switchyard activities; and prepare a substation work authorization which describes the type of work to be performed and oversight of work needed. This review process is to ensure control of maintenance which could affect the availability of offsite power. AP 21C-001 also contains guidance that if either NB bus is de-energized, then work should not be performed that could jeopardize power to the inservice NB bus. However, this review did not catch the inadequate instructions provided to the workers nor prevented work that jeopardized power to the inservice NB bus.
This finding is greater than minor because the availability and reliability of a safety-related 4 kV bus was challenged when offsite power was lost. This finding was also associated with the equipment performance attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone and affected the objective to ensure availability and reliability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the finding did not increase the likelihood of a loss of reactor coolant system inventory, degrade the ability to terminate a leak path or add reactor coolant system inventory when needed during shutdown operations.
This finding had human performance crosscutting aspects in the area of resources because personnel did not have adequate procedures and work instructions for switchyard maintenance to ensure that the trip relay testing would not create an inadvertent loss of offsite power [H.2(c)].
Inspection Report# : 2008003 (pdf)
Significance:      Jun 28, 2008 Identified By: NRC
 
Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to verify engineering design calculation prior to use The inspectors identified an NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III (Design Control) for failure to implement engineering procedures and approve a third party calculation prior to use at Wolf Creek. Specifically, the calculation review failed to identify the incorrect design inputs to the net positive suction head calculations on two occasions for residual heat removal and containment spray. On October 5, 2006, Wolf Creek engineering approved Design Change Package 011295 which accepted the associated vendor calculation, TDI 6002 05, Revision 0, for clean strainer head loss as a design analysis calculation for the new containment sump. On January 22, 2008, an operability evaluation documented design errors that created unacceptable reductions in margin-to-net positive suction head requirements for core cooling components associated with the already installed containment recirculation sump strainer modification. Revision 0 of the calculation had omitted the head loss component associated with the as built orifices located in the strainer support plate. The size of the orifice beneath each strainer was not large enough to prevent head loss in excess of the net positive suction head required per the design conditions defined in the purchase specification supplied to the strainer vendor. This resulted in required net positive suction head being less than available. On three separate reviews, Wolf Creek engineering accepted the vendor calculation without completely evaluating the calculation as acceptable in accordance with Wolf Creek plant procedures. Administrative Procedure AP 05D 001, "Calculations," Revision 11, Step 6.11.3, states, in part, that design analysis calculations shall be reviewed and accepted by engineering prior to being used to support plant design or operability. This review shall compare calculations to design inputs, verify assumptions, verify analytical methods, verify accuracy and ensure compliance with design criteria. Contrary to the above, the licensee acceptance review of Revision 0 of the calculation failed to identity incorrect design inputs to the as built orifice size and Revisions 1 and 2 failed to identity the nonconservative temperature correction prior to being accepted.
This finding was more than minor because they were similar to non-minor Example 3.j from NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix E, "Examples of Minor Issues," in that, there was a reasonable doubt on the operability of the residual heat removal and containment spray pumps; and if left uncorrected, could result in a more significant safety concern. The finding is of very low safety significance because it was a qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in loss-of-operability in accordance with NRC Manual Chapter Part 9900, Technical Guidance, "Operability Determination Process for Operability and Functional Assessments." The finding had a problem identification and resolution area crosscutting aspects in the corrective action program component, because the site failed to perform a thorough evaluation of vendor calculations to ensure conditions adverse to quality are identified and resolved [P.1(c)].
Inspection Report# : 2008003 (pdf)
Significance:        Apr 07, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to implement fire protection impairment control permit requirements and compensatory measures The inspectors identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.d for failure to implement fire protection impairment control permit requirements and compensatory measures when operators received a trouble alarm on a fire detector in the auxiliary building. On January 26, 2008, operators discovered that Detector KC-104-XCH-ID-006 did not have a fire protection impairment control permit. This detector was adjacent to Detector KC-104-XSH-ID-007 which was already inoperable in Impairment 2008-020. The licensees administrative procedure required fire detection in the area to be declared inoperable if two adjacent detectors are inoperable. This condition existed for approximately 24 hours and would have required a compensatory continuous fire watch for the period that both detectors were inoperable. The residents identified that the control room turnover checklist contains a section for listing the KC008 alarms; however, the two turnover checklists for the two shifts following the initial alarm did not identify Detector KC 104 XCH ID 006 as a Detector KC 008 alarm.
The failure to implement fire protection impairment control permit requirements and establish compensatory measures for the auxiliary building 2026-foot level was considered a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of protection against external factors and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, this issue relates to the protection against fire example of protection against external factors attribute because the detectors were inoperable without ensuring compensatory measures were in
 
place. The finding was of very low safety significance because it involved compensatory measures for the fixed fire protection system and was assigned a low degradation rating since less than 10 percent of the fire detectors in the area were disabled. The finding has crosscutting aspects in the area of human performance associated with work practices because the licensee failed to apply appropriate human error techniques such as self and peer checking techniques to avoid committing errors [H.4(a)].
Inspection Report# : 2008002 (pdf)
Significance:      Apr 07, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Performing prohibited elective maintenance on offsite power during EDG maintenance
* An NRC identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 3.8.1.B.4 resulted from Wolf Creek removing equipment from service that was prohibited by the TS. Inspectors reviewed Technical Specification Bases 3.8.1.B.4 which prohibits elective maintenance within the switchyard that would challenge offsite power. Inspectors also reviewed the NRC Safety Evaluation Report for the 7 day emergency diesel generator allowed outage time (Technical Specification 3.8.1.B.4.2.2) and found that Section 4.6.c, states: The offsite power supply and switchyard conditions are conducive to an extend[ed] DG [completion time], which includes ensuring that switchyard access is restricted and no elective maintenance within the switchyard is performed that would challenge the offsite power availability. The inspectors determined that challenges to offsite power can originate with elective maintenance inside the protected area.
The inspectors determined that the failure to implement requirements of the NRC Safety Evaluation Report and Technical Specification Bases for Technical Specification 3.8.1.B.4 was a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute for the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone; and, it affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the issue resulted in the Train B offsite power being inoperable, but capable of supplying the safety bus for greater than 24 hours. Additionally, the cause of the finding has a human performance crosscutting aspects in the area associated with work control. Specifically, Wolf Creek did not ensure STS IC-805B was appropriately coordinated within organizations to assure plant and human performance during the extended emergency diesel generator allowed outage time. [H.3(b)]
Inspection Report# : 2008002 (pdf)
Significance:      Apr 07, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to establish reasonable expectation of operability
* An NRC identified NCV of Technical Specification 5.4.1 for failure to follow the operability process on discovery of the CCP A room cooler leak. Wolf Creek made no log entries at 2:20 p.m. stating its basis for immediate operability. At 3:50 p.m., Wolf Creek control room logs state that centrifugal charging Pump A had a room cooler leak and structural integrity cannot be verified. Subsequent entry into Technical Specification 3.7.8 for the essential service water Pump A caused emergency diesel Generator A to be inoperable. Technical Specification 3.8.1, Condition I states that with three alternating current sources inoperable (both emergency diesel generators and on offsite source), Technical Specification 3.0.3 shall be entered. Wolf Creek exited Technical Specification 3.0.3 at 4:13 p.m. when the inlet and outlet valves to centrifugal charging Pump As room cooler were closed. The inspectors could not locate any justification produced by Wolf Creek for the room coolers operability after 2:20 p.m.
The inspectors determined that the failure to follow the operability process is a performance deficiency. The inspectors determined that this finding was more than minor because if left uncorrected, it could become a more serious problem if the Technical Specification is not correctly applied. The finding screened to Phase 2 because the finding represents an actual loss of safety function of a single train of high head injection. A bounding risk of Green results from the Phase 2 presolved worksheets using an exposure time of less than 3 days for the centrifugal charging pump (CCP) A [Fails to Run]. The inspectors also determined that the finding had a human performance crosscutting
 
aspects in the area associated with decision making because the licensee failed to use conservative assumptions in its operability decision and apply a requirement to demonstrate that the room cooler is operable is in order to proceed rather than a requirement to demonstrate that it is inoperable [H.1(b)].
Inspection Report# : 2008002 (pdf)
Significance:      Apr 07, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Untimely corrective actions for CCP room cooler leads to NOED The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix B Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, because Wolf Creek failed to take timely corrective actions to prevent failure of the centrifugal charging pump A room cooler which resulted in a Notice of Enforcement Discretion (EA 08 052). The inspectors found that room Cooler SGL12A experienced leaks in October 1999, May 2003, October 2003, August 2004, October 2006, and again in February 2008. On March 14, 2007, Wolf Creek chose to delay SGL12As replacement until Refueling Outage 16 due to the required length of time to replace the cooler. On February 13, 2008, a circumferential flaw on an H bend was discovered in SGL12A preventing it from performing its safety function. Inspectors reviewed corrective action Procedure AP 28A-100, Condition Reports, Revision 3 and found that a loss of a train to perform its safety function was considered a significant deficiency requiring corrective action to prevent recurrence. The inspectors reviewed this issue under Performance Improvement Requests 2005-2507 and 2004-0688, and Condition Report 2008-0467 and found that Wolf Creek designated prior failures nonsignificant.
The failure to take timely corrective actions within 9 years was a performance deficiency. The inspectors determined that this finding was more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute for the mitigating systems cornerstone; and, it affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e. core damage). The finding screened to Phase 2 because the finding represents an actual loss of safety function of a single train of high head injection for greater than its Technical Specification 3.8.1.B.2 allowed outage time of 4 hours. Using an exposure time of less than 3 days for the scenario Centrifugal Charging Pump PBG05A [Fails to Run], a bounding risk of Green results from the Phase 2 presolved worksheets. Additionally, the cause of the finding has a human performance crosscutting aspect in the area associated with resources. Specifically, Wolf Creek did not ensure adequate resources to maintain long-term plant safety by minimizing the room coolers long-standing issues and preventive maintenance deferrals [H.2(a)].
Inspection Report# : 2008002 (pdf)
Significance:      Apr 07, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to reestablish timely seal cooling for the reactor coolant pumps
* An NRC identified violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.d resulted because Procedure OFN RP 017, "Control Room Evacuation," Revision 21, failed to account for the needed actions to reestablish reactor coolant pump seal cooling. Failure to reestablish seal cooling in a timely manner could have resulted in a small break loss of coolant accident.
This performance deficiency resulted from an inadequate postfire safe shutdown procedure. The inspectors determined the finding is greater than minor in that it affected the ability to achieve and maintain hot shutdown following a control room fire. This finding is associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of protection against external factors (e.g., fire). This finding affected the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to external events (such as fire) to prevent undesirable consequences. In addition to the control room fire requiring operators to evacuate the control room, the fire would have had to affect components located in two physically separated panels. The licensee has IEEE 383 qualified cables and conductors throughout the plant. The Phase 3 risk evaluation performed by the NRC senior reactor analyst determined this deficiency had very low risk significance.
Inspection Report# : 2008002 (pdf)
 
Significance:        Apr 07, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to analyze motor operated valuve circuits
* The inspectors identified a noncited violation of License Condition 2.c(5) because the licensee failed to evaluate the impact of a motor operated valve failure mechanism on their ability to implement postfire safe shutdown following a control room evacuation. The licensee determined that the failure mechanism affected 38 motor operated valves and upon valve failure could affect their ability to implement their postfire safe shutdown procedure. A short circuit that bypassed the torque and/or limit switches could damage the valves and prevent repositioning of the valve in the postfire safe shutdown position.
The inspectors determined this was a performance deficiency because the licensee failed to ensure that components necessary to safely shutdown the reactor would remain operable following a fire. This deficiency was more than minor, in that, it had the potential to impact the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to external events (such as fire) to prevent undesirable consequences. In addition to the control room fire requiring operators to evacuate the control room, the fire would have had to affect components located in five different control panels. The Phase 3 risk evaluation performed by the NRC senior reactor analyst determined this deficiency had very low risk significance.
Inspection Report# : 2008002 (pdf)
Significance:        Mar 13, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Vent ECCS Piping Every 31 days The team identified two examples of a noncited violation of Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements 3.5.2.3 for the failure to vent emergency core cooling system discharge piping. In the first example, the licensee had inappropriately concluded that inaccessible vents included all those vents located in posted high radiation areas, but either no high radiation field existed in the area or personnel would not be exposed to high radiation dose. The second example involved the failure to perform the surveillance in accordance with the 31 days required frequency. When the surveillance was conducted, gas was observed coming from a SI system hot leg injection line vent.
Both violation examples were more than minor because they were similar to non-minor examples 4.m from NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix E. Examples of Minor Issues, in that, when the surveillances were completed, unexpected amounts of gas were found the piping systems. Some sections were totally voided. Using the Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 Screening Worksheet, the issue screened as having very low safety significance because it was a qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in loss-of-operability in accordance with NRC Manual Chapter Part 9900, Technical Guidance, Operability Determination Process for Operability and Functional Assessment. The finding had a crosscutting aspect in the Human Performance, Resources component, because the licensee failed to have an adequate surveillance procedure that included all necessary ECCS vent values. These findings were indicative of current performance because operators, who are familiar with the TS requirements and Bases commitments, could have questioned, at any time, the practice of eliminating accessible values from the venting program. [H.2(c)]
Inspection Report# : 2008007 (pdf)
Significance:        Mar 13, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Promptly Identify and Correct Voiding in the Safety Injection System The team identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI (Corrective Actions), with five examples, for the failure to promptly identify and correct voids in safety injection system. In some cases, significant changes in the safety injection tank leakage rates went unnoticed. Safety injection tank leakage can be a key indicator that voids are forming in lower pressure systems. In other examples, unexpected amounts of gas came
 
from safety injection piping vents but operators and engineers failed to take meaningful actions to investigate or to address the occurrences. Contributors to the violation included: (1) the failure to properly address two pieces of related operating experience, (2) management's failure to follow site procedures and ensure that operating experience reviews were adequate, (3) the emergency core cooling system monthly venting procedure contained inadequate acceptance criteria, and (4) engineers were not adequately monitoring safety injection tank leakage.
This finding was more than minor because it was similar to non-minor example 3.j from NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues, in that there was a reasonable doubt on the operability of the Train A safety injection system and the steam generators. Using the Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 Screening Worksheet, the issue screened as having very low safety significance because it was a qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in loss-of-operability in accordance with NRC Manual Chapter Part 9900, Technical Guidance, Operability Determination Process for Operability and Functional Assessments. The finding had a crosscutting aspect in the Problem Identification and Resolution area, Operating Experience component, because the site had not institutionalized operating experience. This finding was indicative of current plant performance because the weaknesses in the operating experience program that permitted the inadequate review of operating experience were still in place at the time of this inspection. [P.2(b)]
Inspection Report# : 2008007 (pdf)
Significance:      Mar 13, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Promptly Identify and Correct Voids in ECCS Suction Piping The team identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI (Corrective Actions), because the licensee failed to promptly identify and correct voids in emergency core cooling systme suction piping. After NRC concerns were raised, the licensee checked the suction piping and found voids in the piggyback lines (between residual heat removal discharge piping and charging and safety injection suction headers) and in shutdown cooling suction piping. Contributors to the violation included: (1) the failure to properly address two pieces of related operating experience, (2) management's failure to follow site procedures and ensure that operating experience reviews were adequate.
This finding was more than minor because it was similar to non-minor example 3.j from NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues, in that there was a reasonable doubt on the operability of the Train A safety injection system and the steam generators. Using the Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 Screening Worksheet, the issue screened as having very low safety significance because it was a qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in loss-of-operability in accordance with NRC Manual Chapter Part 9900, Technical Guidance, Operability Determination Process for Operability and Functional Assessments. The finding had a crosscutting aspect in the Problem Identification and Resolution area, Operating Experience component, because the site had not institutionalized operating experience. This finding was indicative of current plant performance because the weaknesses in the operating experience program that permitted the inadequate review of operating experience were still in place at the time of this inspection.[P.2(b)]
Inspection Report# : 2008007 (pdf)
Significance:      Mar 13, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate RHR and CS Void Calculations The team identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III (Design Control), for an inadequate calculation involving previously identified voids in the residual heat removal and containment spray containment suction piping. A contract engineer relied solely on engineering judgment to determine that the void stream, up to 11 percent, would have no affect on pump performance. Test data from an NRC NUREG, that the licensee had also used, contradicted the contractor's assessment. A contributor to this violation was the licensee's poor understanding of information contained in the NUREG.
 
This finding was more than minor because it was similar to non-minor example 3.j from NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues, in that there was a reasonable doubt on the operability of the residual heat removal and containment spray pumps. Using the Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 Screening Worksheet, the issue screened as having very low safety significance because it was a qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in loss of operability in accordance with NRC Manual Chapter Part 9900, Technical Guidance, Operability Determination Process for Operability and Functional Assessments. The finding had a crosscutting aspect in the Problem Identification and Resolution area, Corrective Action Program component, because the site failed to perform an adequate engineering evaluation for a nonconforming condition [P.1 (c)].
Inspection Report# : 2008007 (pdf)
Significance:      Mar 13, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Adequately Correct Voiding Design Control Violation The team identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI (Corrective Actions), because the licensee took inadequate corrective measures to address NRC identified deficiencies involving the calculation for voids in the residual heat removal and containment spray sump piping. The licensee's assessment failed to address the expected change in net-positive-suction-head required for the pumps. NRC issued guidance informed the licensee that this term would need adjustment.
This finding was more than minor because, if left uncorrected, could become a more significant safety concern. For example, the net positive suction head calculations for residual heat removal pumps shows that the pumps have very little design margin. The failure to properly address the voids may lead engineers to believe that there is margin available for plant modifications (such as the containment sump modification), when there is not. Using the Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 Screening Worksheet, the issue screened as having very low safety significance because it was a qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in loss of operability in accordance with NRC Manual Chapter Part 9900, Technical Guidance, Operability Determination Process for Operability and Functional Assessments. The finding had a crosscutting aspect in the Problem Identification and Resolution area, Corrective Action Program component, because the site failed to perform an adequate engineering evaluation for a performance deficiency [P.1(c)].
Inspection Report# : 2008007 (pdf)
Significance:      Mar 13, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Approve Engineering Calculations Prior to Use at Wolf Creek and Inadequate Work Instructions The team identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III (Design Control), with two examples for: (1) the failure to implement engineering procedures and approve a third party calculation prior to use at Wolf Creek, and (2) the failure to properly translate licensing and design basis information into instructions.
Following identification of the first example, the licensee approved the subject calculation for use at Wolf Creek.
However, the calculation had an inadequate basis for the acceptance of a 5 percent void fraction in suction piping and a 20 percent void fraction in discharge piping. Specifically, the calculation failed to consider the impact of voids on natural circulation operations and was inconsistent with Technical Specifications, the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, and net positive suction head calculations. All had assumed that Wolf Creek piping was water solid.
The finding was more than minor because, if left uncorrected, could result in a more significant safety concern.
Specifically, the existence of 5 percent void fraction on the suction side of the pumps and 20 percent on the discharge side are still unanalyzed conditions and could adversely impact design basis accident analysis results. The licensee's
 
operability assessment provided a reasonable expectation that design limits would not be exceeded. Using the Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 Screening Worksheet, the issue screened as having very low safety significance because it was a qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in loss-of-operability in accordance with NRC Manual Chapter Part 9900, Technical Guidance, Operability Determination Process for Operability and Functional Assessments. The finding had a crosscutting aspect in the Problem Identification and Resolution area, Corrective Action Program component, because the site failed to perform an adequate engineering evaluation [P.1(c)].
Inspection Report# : 2008007 (pdf)
Significance:        Mar 13, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Implement Piping Design Procedure and ASME Code Requirements The team identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V (Procedures), for the failure to implement piping design procedure requirements. The procedure required that piping systems be designed for normal component service (filling and venting) as well as routine operational surveillance (monthly emergency core cooling system venting). The piping systems were actually designed with some sections that could not be totally filled. The licensee also failed to design the piping in accordance with the ASME Code, which required vents at all piping high points.
The finding was more than minor because, if left uncorrected, it could result in a more significant safety concern.
Specifically, the performance of emergency core cooling system systems with voids is not totally understood and could result in adverse systems response such as degraded pump performance or adversely impact natural circulation operations. Using the Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 Screening Worksheet, the issue screened as having very low safety significance because it was a qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in loss of operability in accordance with NRC Manual Chapter Part 9900, Technical Guidance, Operability Determination Process for Operability and Functional Assessments."
Inspection Report# : 2008007 (pdf)
Significance:        Mar 13, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Root Cause Assessment The team identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, because the licensee failed to follow the site procedure when performing a root cause assessment for the emergency core cooling system voiding issues and, subsequently, completed an inadequate root cause assessment. The licensee came to the erroneous conclusion that operating experience evaluations were thorough, but actually drew broad conclusions based on unverified and incorrect information, and had failed to identify significant contributors to the events.
The finding was more than minor because, if left uncorrected, it could result in a more significant safety concern.
Specifically, the NRC relies heavily on the licensee's ability to find and correct their own safety issues. The licensee's reliance on unvalidated (and incorrect) information and the crafting of corrective measures to fit erroneous conclusions provides an unacceptable level of confidence that the licensee can consistently correct its own problems without NRC involvement. Using the Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 Screening Worksheet, the issue screened as having very low safety significance because it was a qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in loss-of-operability in accordance with NRC Manual Chapter Part 9900, Technical Guidance, Operability Determination Process for Operability and Functional Assessments. The finding had a crosscutting aspect in the Problem Identification and Resolution area, Corrective Action Program component, because the site failed to perform an adequate engineering evaluation.[P.1(c)]
Inspection Report# : 2008007 (pdf)
 
Significance:        Feb 29, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Twenty one examples of failure to follow seismic requirements of scaffolding procedure The team identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V, in which 21 scaffolds in 10 plant areas that were in contact with or closer to plant equipment than procedure allowed. The procedure required engineering evaluations which did not contain any technical bases as to the acceptability of as built scaffolds.
Subsequent engineering evaluation of each of the incorrect scaffolding installations confirmed that the configurations did not challenge operability. The NRC identified previous concerns with the erection of scaffolds, yet the licensee failed to take action to correct this issue.
The team evaluated the significance of this finding using Phase 1 of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, Significance Determination of Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations, and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance because the issue resulted in 21 unevaluated scaffolds which are likely not to challenge the ability of the plant to safely shutdown after an earthquake. As such, under Phase 1 screening, the deficiency is not related to a qualification or design deficiency, it did not represent a loss of safety function for a train or system as defined in the plant specific risk-informed inspection notebook, and did not screen as risk significant for seismic external events, because the affected systtems were considered degraded, but operable. Using these inputs, the performance deficiency screened to Green. The team determined that the finding had a human performance crosscutting aspect in the area associated with decision making because the licensee failed to adopt a requirement to demonstrate that the proposed action is safe in order to proceed rather than a requirement to demonstrate that the proposed action is safe in order to disapprove the action. Specifically, Wolf Creek Generating Station did not conduct any review of engineering decisions to verify the validity of the underlying assumption that equipment and scaffolding could be in contact or closer than the established limit (H.1(b)).
Inspection Report# : 2008006 (pdf)
Significance:        Feb 29, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to take Corrective Action For Missed Compensatory Measures The team identified a finding because the licensee failed to take timely corrective actions to address a previously identified NRC finding. FIN 2007002-04 was issued because the licensee had failed to establish compensatory actions in response to the failure of all Main Annunciator Board alarms. Failure to have compensatory measures inhibited the licensee in their efforts to determine the cause of the alarm failures. Corrective actions repaired the equipment that caused of the annunciator failure, but were unrelated to the failure to follow procedures and take compensatory measures.
The team determined that this was a performance deficiency because the licensee had committed to take corrective actions in response to the previous NCV but failed to do so in a timely manner. The inspectors determined that this violation was greater than minor because it met the intent of MC 0612 Appendix E Example 4.a. in that there were several examples of the licensee failing to take corrective actions in response to NRC identified NCVs and findings, indicating that The licensee routinely failed to perform engineering evaluations on similar issues. The inspectors performed a Phase I SDP evaluation and determined that the violation was screened as being very low safety significance, Green, because all of the answers to the Phase I Worksheet Mitigating Systems Column were no. The team also determined that this finding has crosscutting aspects in the problem identification and resolution area associated with the corrective action program in that the licensee failed to implement timely or effective corrective actions. (P.1(d)).
Inspection Report# : 2008006 (pdf)
Significance:        Feb 29, 2008 Identified By: NRC
 
Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to take corrective action for missed operability evaluation compensatory measures The team identified a violation of 10CFR50 Appendix B Criterion XVI because the licensee failed to take timely corrective actions to address a previously identified NCV. NCV 2007003-05 was issued because the licensee had failed to perform an operability evaluation following bearing replacement on the Train B emergency exhaust system fan. Corrective actions were not related to the missed performance of the operability evaluation, but the equipment failure.
The team determined that this was a performance deficiency because the licensee had committed to take corrective actions in response to the previous NCV but failed to do so in a timely manner. The inspectors determined that this violation was greater than minor because it met the intent of MC 0612 Appendix E Example 4.a. in that there were several examples of the licensee failing to take corrective actions in response to NRC identified NCVs and findings, indicating that The licensee routinely failed to perform engineering evaluations on similar issues. The inspectors performed a Phase I SDP evaluation and determined that the violation was screened as being very low safety significance, Green, because all of the answers to the Phase I Worksheet Mitigating Systems Column were no. The team also determined that this finding has crosscutting aspects in the problem identification and resolution area associated with the corrective action program in that the licensee failed to implement timely or effective corrective actions. (P.1(d)).
Inspection Report# : 2008006 (pdf)
Significance:        Feb 29, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to take timely corrective action to establish monitoring frequency of AFW pump governor null drift The team identified a violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion XVI because the licensee failed to take timely corrective actions to address a previously identified finding. Finding 2006010 was issued because the licensee had failed to establish an acceptable monitoring frequency on their Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump speed governor null-drift as recommended by a Part 21 report from Engine Systems, Inc. The corrective actions to establish the monitoring for the null-drift were not implemented.
The team determined that this was a performance deficiency because the licensee had committed to take corrective actions in response to the previous NCV but failed to do so in a timely manner. The team determined that this violation was greater than minor because it met the intent of MC 0612 Appendix E Example 4.a. in that there were several examples of the licensee failing to take corrective actions in response to NRC identified NCVs and findings, indicating that The licensee routinely failed to perform engineering evaluations on similar issues. The team performed a Phase I SDP evaluation and determined that the violation was screened as being very low safety significance, Green, because all of the answers to the Phase I Worksheet Mitigating Systems Column were no. The team also determined that this finding has crosscutting aspects in the problem identification and resolution area associated with the corrective action program in that the licensee failed to implement timely or effective corrective actions (P.1(d)).
Inspection Report# : 2008006 (pdf)
Significance:        Feb 29, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to take timely corrective action to correct Barton transmitter defects The team identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, regarding the failure to identify and correct conditions adverse quality associated with NRC NCV 2006-004-02 documented in Inspection Report 2006-004. Specifically, the licensee did not address in the apparent cause evaluation and corrective actions the failure to follow procedures resulting in an inadequate inspection of installed Barton pressure transmitters for known potential manufacturing defects which resulted in a previous violation of Administrative Procedure AP 28-011, Resolving Deficiencies Impacting SSCs, Revision 1. The licensee inappropriately credited transmitter inspections
 
that occurred several years prior to receipt of the vendor recommendation as sufficient to resolve this issue.
This finding was more than minor because it could reasonably be viewed a precursor to a significant event and affected the equipment performance attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone and the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events. Using Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 worksheets, the inspectors determined that the finding is of very low significance because it did not represent an actual loss of a safety function or operability and was not potentially risk significant due to external events. The inspectors also determined that this finding has crosscutting aspects in the problem identification and resolution area associated with the corrective action program in that the licensee failed to identify the issue completely and thoroughly evaluate the problem such that the problem was resolved (P.1(a), P.1(c)).
Inspection Report# : 2008006 (pdf)
Significance:      Feb 29, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to take timely corrective action to correct annunciator feed configuration deficiencies.
The team identified a green finding for failure to implement corrective action for abandoned in place annunciator feed wiring deficiencies. CR 2005-003275 was initiated because Cables ST-009 and ST-019 were field-spliced together to prevent electrical shocks such that the system configuration did not match the system drawing. Work Order (WO) 07-292004-000 was initiated to correct this condition but was closed as unworkable. CR 2005-003275 was closed to this closed work order even though the condition was not corrected, leaving the system in a condition not reflected in drawings or design documents. This configuration could result in further shocks, and further configuration control issues. The main annunciator system and its feeds are not safety-¬related, and therefore this performance deficiency is not a violation of NRC requirements.
The failure to implement corrective actions for an identified configuration control issue is a performance deficiency.
This item affects the mitigating systems cornerstone. The team determined that this violation was greater than minor because it met the intent of MC 0612 Appendix E Example 4.a. in that there were several examples of the licensee failing to take corrective actions in response to findings, indicating that The licensee routinely failed to perform engineering evaluations on similar issues. The team performed a Phase I SDP evaluation and determined that the violation was screened as being very low safety significance, Green, because all of the answers to the Phase I Worksheet Mitigating Systems Column were no. The team also determined that this finding has crosscutting aspects in the problem identification and resolution area associated with the corrective action program in that the licensee failed to implement timely or effective corrective actions. (P.1(d)).
Inspection Report# : 2008006 (pdf)
Significance: TBD Dec 29, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: AV Apparent Violation Failure to Maintain Reactor Coolant System Subcooling During the Alternative Shutodwn The team identified an Apparent Violation of Wolf Creek License Condition 2.C.(5)(a) concerning an inadequate alternative shutdown analysis. The licensees alternative shutdown analysis was inadequate in that it used an acceptance criteria which was inconsistent with and less conservative than that required by the approved Fire Protection Program. The licensee developed Calculation Number AN-02-021, Revision 0, OFN RP-017, Control Room Evacuation, Consequence Evaluation, to demonstrate alternative shutdown capability for Wolf Creek in response to NRC-identified Noncited Violation 2002008-01, Inadequate alternative shutdown procedure. The calculation predicted that during an alternative shutdown, the reactor coolant system subcooling margin would not be maintained, significant voiding would occur in the core, and a steam void would form in the reactor vessel head. The licensee found the results of the calculation to be acceptable since it demonstrated that the void formation would be limited, natural circulation in the reactor coolant system would be maintained, sufficient decay heat removal would be maintained, and no fuel damage would occur. This is not consistent with the license condition to meet the technical requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R. Section III.L of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Alternative and
 
dedicated shutdown capability, that states in part, During the postfire shutdown, the reactor process variables shall be maintained within those predicted for a loss of normal a.c. power.
This finding is greater than minor because it impacted the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to external events (such as fire) to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). It is the NRCs understanding that the licensee does not consider these circuit vulnerabilities to be violations of NRC requirements. The licensee considers the spurious operation of multiple components to be outside of the plant licensing basis for the Fire Protection Program. Specifically, in this case, both pressurizer power-operated relief valves are assumed to spuriously open because of fire induced circuit damage. The NRC staff and the industry are currently working on developing a resolution methodology to address these types of potential fire induced circuit failures. The team concluded that this violation meets the criteria of the NRC Enforcement Manual Section 8.1.7.1 for deferring enforcement actions for postulated fire induced circuit failures.
Inspection Report# : 2005008 (pdf)
Inspection Report# : 2008010 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Significance:        Sep 27, 2008 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Incompatible Procedures Result in 6400 gallon Drain of SFP A self-revealing noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was identified after the licensee followed two incompatible procedures simultaneously resulting in the inadvertent partial draining of the spent fuel pool. Consequently, approximately 6400 gallons of water was pumped from the spent fuel pool to the refueling water storage tank. Wolf Creek subsequently initiated Condition Report 2008-002035.
The failure to prevent spent fuel pool draining due to simultaneous performance of incompatible Procedures SYS EC-200 and SYS EC-320 is considered a performance deficiency. This finding is more than minor because it impacted the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone attribute of configuration control and affected the cornerstone objective to maintain functionality of the spent fuel pool system. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 worksheets, the inspectors determined that the finding is of very low significance because the finding only affected the barrier function of the spent fuel pool. The inspectors also determined that this finding has crosscutting aspects in the human performance area associated with work control, because Wolf Creek did not coordinate work activities among separate groups, assess the impact of these concurrent evolutions or track the alignment of the fuel pool clean-up system.
Inspection Report# : 2008004 (pdf)
Significance:        Sep 27, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to completely close the SFP valve resulted in a loss of SFP water inventory A self-revealing green noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a was identified for the failure to close Valve EC-V025 during a lineup to recirculate the refueling water storage tank through the spent fuel pool cleanup system. These two systems were cross-connected for approximately 5 minutes on July 26, 2008, which resulted in approximately 1500 gallons of spent fuel pool water being inadvertently transferred to the refueling water storage tank. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as Condition Report 2008-003663.
The failure to completely close Valve EC-V025 was a performance deficiency. This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone attribute of configuration control and affected the cornerstone objective to maintain functionality of the spent fuel pool system. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609,
 
Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 worksheets, the inspectors determined that the finding is of very low significance because the finding affected only the barrier function of the spent fuel pool. The inspectors also determined that the cause of the finding has a crosscutting aspect in the problem identification and resolution area associated with the corrective action program because Wolf Creek did not take appropriate corrective actions to address the adverse trend in manual valve stem friction in a timely manner, commensurate with its safety significance and complexity Inspection Report# : 2008004 (pdf)
Significance:      Sep 24, 2008 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Maintenance causes unplanned increase in reactor power On September 24, 2008, inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR 50.54(j) in which the fix it now team manipulated limit switches for Valve ACPV186C that caused the reactor to exceed the licensed thermal power limit of 3565 MWt for 27 minutes until reactor operators reduced power. The fix it now superintendent designated this work as tool pouch maintenance which required no prior planning. When the instrumentation and controls technician recoupled the limit switch to the stem linkage, position indication of Valve ACPV186C changed from open to closed.
Unknown to the control room or the fix it now team, Valve ACPV186C is interlocked with Valve ACHV256D which is a dump valve from Moisture Separator Reheater C to the condenser. When Valve ACHV256D opened, it caused a positive reactivity addition which exceeded the licensed thermal power limit.
The failure to adequately plan a work activity that resulted in an unexpected positive reactivity addition is a performance deficiency. The inspectors determined that the finding was more than minor because it is associated with the configuration control attribute for the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone; and it affected the cornerstone objective of providing reasonable assurance that physical design barriers, such as fuel cladding, protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, this issue relates to the reactor manipulation example of the configuration control attribute. The inspectors evaluated the significance of this finding using Phase 1 of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance or Green because the fuel cladding barrier was affected but did not affect the reactor coolant system or containment barriers. The inspectors determined that this finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of Human Performance associated with the Decision Making component because Wolf Creek used flawed assumptions in the work planning process for Valve ACPV186C to demonstrate that the Tool Pouch course of action was safe.
Inspection Report# : 2008005 (pdf)
Significance:      Jun 28, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Troubleshooting activities bypass design control for the fuel transfer system The inspectors identified a violation of TS 5.4.1.a in which Wolf Creek raised the winch load setpoint for its fuel transfer system to avoid trips without knowing the cause. During core reload, Wolf Creek experienced repeated trips of the fuel handling system winch. It was not until after NRC involvement that it was identified that the winch load setpoints were inappropriately altered. The inspectors found that on April 17, 2008, under Work Order 08 305599-000, the load setpoints and slow speed zones were inappropriately changed from 250 pounds for 1 second and 590 inches, to 300 pounds for 2 seconds and 585 inches, respectively. The inspectors found that under M 716 00787, Section G, Software Change Log, no changes to the winch load limits or slow speed zones were referenced. The fuel transfer system is also explicitly controlled under Procedure AP 05-005, Design, Implementation, &
Configuration Control of Modifications. It was subsequently discovered that the setpoints were controlled by a vendor technical document that Wolf Creek accepted as the fuel transfer cart design. Inspectors were unable to locate, and Wolf Creek was unable to produce, modification documentation that justified these software changes. After the discovery that the setpoints were inappropriately changed, the 250 pounds for 1 second and 590 inches were loaded into the EEPROM (nonvolatile memory for the PLC). Power to the fuel transfer system was cycled and the speed change for the cart was observed at 590 inches. On this basis, Wolf Creek believed that the settings had been correctly
 
re established, and fuel moves continued. Wolf Creek has had difficulty determining with certainty that the original setpoints were correctly re-established.
The finding was more than minor because it is associated with the human performance attribute for the barrier integrity cornerstone; and, it affected the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers (fuel cladding) protect the public from radio nuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, this issue relates to the procedure adherence example of the human performance attribute because the design process was bypassed to mask fuel cart problems. The finding was of very low safety significance because the issue did not result in fuel handling errors that caused damage to fuel clad integrity or a dropped fuel assembly. The cause of the finding has human performance crosscutting aspects in the area associated with decision making. Specifically, Wolf Creek did not ensure safety by making safety or risk significant decisions by using any procedural or systematic process when faced with the unexpected and repeated fuel transfer cart winch trips.
Inspection Report# : 2008003 (pdf)
Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Significance:        Apr 07, 2008 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to control area as a locked high radiation area The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.7.2.a for failure to evaluate changing radiological conditions and control an area as a locked high radiation area. Specifically, on October 17, 2007, dose rates in Room 7604 increased to levels requiring posting as a Locked High Radiation Area, as a result of a vent and drain evolution. Dose rates reached a level of 1500 mRem/hour prior to the area being properly posted and controlled. This issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Report 2007-003934.
Immediate corrective actions included posting and controlling the area as a locked high radiation area. Other corrective actions included changing the vent and drain process to change the vent path.
This finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the occupational radiation safety program and process attribute and affected the cornerstone objective, in that, the failure to properly post and control access to a locked high radiation area has the potential to increase personnel dose. This occurrence involves the potential for unplanned, unintended dose. Utilizing Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix C, Occupational Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process, the inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance because it did not involve; (1) as low as is reasonably achievable planning and controls, (2) an overexposure, (3) a substantial potential for overexposure, or (4) an impaired ability to assess dose. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the work control component because licensee failed to appropriately plan work activities by incorporating job site conditions that may impact radiological safety.
Inspection Report# : 2008002 (pdf)
Significance:        Apr 07, 2008 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to follow procedure The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1 for failure to follow a licensee procedure. Specifically, on March 29, 2008, one of two radiographers conducting radiography operations in the quality control vault received a dose rate alarm on their electronic dosimeter. The two radiographers evaluated the dose received and decided to continue with radiography without notifying health physics personnel to evaluate the conditions. This issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Report 2008-001181.
 
Immediate corrective actions included restriction of the radiographers to log onto the radiation work permit and discussions with the radiographers and the contractors radiation safety officer. Long term corrective action is still being evaluated.
This finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the occupational radiation safety program and process attribute and affected the cornerstone objective, in that, the failure to stop work and notify health physics personnel for assistance had the potential to increase personnel dose. This occurrence involves the potential for unplanned, unintended dose. Utilizing Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix C, Occupational Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process, the inspector determined that the finding was of very low safety significance because it did not involve: (1) as low as is reasonably achievable planning and controls, (2) an overexposure, (3) a substantial potential for overexposure, or (4) an impaired ability to assess dose. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the decision making component because the radiographer and assistant failed to contact health physics personnel to discuss the circumstances surrounding the unexpected dose rate alarm.
Inspection Report# : 2008002 (pdf)
Public Radiation Safety Significance:        Sep 12, 2008 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Provide an Accuratge Shipping Manifest The team reviewed a self-revealing, noncited violation of 10 CFR 20.2006(b) resulting from the licensees failure to provide an accurate shipping manifest. On May 16, 2008, the licensee shipped used radioactive resin to a waste processor. The shipment contained 65 cubic feet of resin and a total activity of 177 Curies. However, the manifest papers accompanying the shipment only indicated 35 cubic feet of resin and a total activity of 83.8 Curies. The licensee was notified of the problem by the shipment recipient. The licensees corrective actions were to fax a corrected shipment manifest to the processor, suspend resin shipments, and conduct an apparent cause investigation.
The problem involving the incorrect manifest was documented in the corrective action program as Condition Report 2008-2357.
The finding is greater than minor because it was associated with the Public Radiation Safety cornerstone attribute, transportation program, and affected the cornerstone objective in that it provided incorrect information as part of hazard communication which could increase public dose. Using the public radiation safety significance determination process, the team determined the finding had very low safety significance because (1) radiation limits were not exceeded; (2) there was no breach of a package during transit; (3) it did not involve a certificate of compliance issue; (4) it was not a low level burial ground nonconformance; and (5) it did not involve a failure to make notifications or provide emergency information. Additionally, this finding had a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance, resources component, in that, the licensee did not establish adequate procedures and documentation necessary to ensure that information entered on the manifest was correct before shipping the package.
Inspection Report# : 2008009 (pdf)
Physical Protection Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
 
Miscellaneous Last modified : April 07, 2009
 
Wolf Creek 1 1Q/2009 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance:      Sep 27, 2008 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate reactor vessel vent path A self-revealing green noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, was identified due to an inadequate vent path for the reactor vessel head. The inadequate vent path resulted in the formation of a maximum void size of 2600 gallons in the reactor vessel head on March 23, 2008, while the plant was shutdown and depressurized. Wolf Creek found indirect evidence of a loop seal due to water that came out of the hard pipe at the end of the outage during vacuum filling of the reactor coolant system. However, the root cause team could not exclude blockage in the piping. This issue was entered into the corrective action program and the licensee plans to conduct a more thorough inspection of the hard pipe during the next refueling outage.
The inspectors determined that the failure to provide adequate vessel head vent path to prevent gas accumulation in the reactor vessel during depressurized plant operations was a performance deficiency. The inspectors determined that this finding, which was associated with the Initiating Events cornerstone, was more than minor because if it was left uncorrected, it would have become a more significant safety concern. Specifically, the reactor vessel does not have an effective means of relieving noncondensable gases to prevent a loss of reactor coolant system inventory. The inspectors evaluated this finding using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix G, Attachment 1, and determined it be of very low safety significance based upon the demonstrated availability of mitigation systems and the flooded reactor cavity inventory. Because Wolf Creek did not inspect the portions of the piping or identify why the vent was blocked, no cause of the finding related to the crosscutting aspects could be identified.
Inspection Report# : 2008004 (pdf)
Significance:      Jun 28, 2008 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: FIN Finding Inadequate transformer procedure resulted in an unplanned reactor trip and forced outage A self-revealing finding was identified for an inadequate maintenance procedure that resulted in a reactor trip due a loss of all condensate pumps. On March 17, 2008, plant operators observed that steam generator water level was lowering and main feed pump speed was decreasing. Based on these indications, Wolf Creek operators manually tripped the plant. Approximately 12 hours prior to the transformer trip, Wolf Creek had removed from service XPB04 transformer for planned maintenance and cross connected XPB04 transformer PB004 bus loads to the XPB03 transformer PB003 bus. This arrangement powered all three condensate pumps from PB003 4.16kv bus. The licensees investigation of the cause of the transformer trip determined that two phases of the XPB03 transformer 4.16kv output cables had overheated and failed because two multi-directional conductor connectors used to terminate two phases of the 1000 MCM 4.16kv bus cables were installed using the incorrect configuration. The resident inspectors reviewed Work Order 06-291275-000, Revision 0, in which the licensee had performed maintenance on the XPB03 transformer on March 4, 2008, that required removal of the XPB03 transformer 4.16kv output cables. The work order provided general guidance to disconnect the high/low side. The inspectors noted that neither the work order nor Procedure MTE TL-001 contained any guidance or specified the conductor connector configuration and only provided general guidance to disconnect and re-term the cables. It was also noted that this work was performed by first time performers who had no experience with this type of connector. The inspectors reviewed electrical maintenance training and did not identify any training that would have provided knowledge or skills on multi-directional conductor connectors.
 
The finding was more than minor because it is associated with the procedure quality attribute of the initiating events cornerstone and it affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability.
This finding also affected the procedure quality attribute for the mitigating systems cornerstone and it affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). The inspectors evaluated the significance of this finding and because two cornerstones were affected, a Phase 2 analysis was required. The consequences were assessed using a Phase 3 analysis by the Region IV senior reactor analyst. The consequence of the performance deficiency was a reactor trip with a loss of normal feedwater. This event occurred 13 days following maintenance using the flawed procedure. Consequently, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance. This finding has human performance crosscutting aspects in the area associated with resources component because the licensee failed to provide an adequate maintenance procedure to assure nuclear safety [H.2(c)].
Inspection Report# : 2008003 (pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance:        Nov 25, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Equipment out of service log definitions redefined outside of procedure change process The inspectors identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, procedures, for changing the equipment out of service log outside of the procedure change process. On November 25, 2008, the inspectors questioned the status of excess letdown Valve 8153B because its equipment out of service log entry changed from available to unavavailable. The inspectors were informed that the meaning of unavailable was verbally changed to mean that the valve was inoperable but considered available. This contradicted the words of the electronic log and Procedure AP 21F-001, Equipment Out of Service Control. Operations management was aware of the change to the terminology. Inspectors reviewed Procedures AP 21F-001 and found it required a senior operator to make and maintain the equipment out of service log. Procedure AP 15C-004, Preparation, Review and Approval of Procedures, Instructions and Forms, defines AP class procedures as those that, in part, implement activities that can significantly affect nuclear safety. Inspectors did not identify any other formal change processes that led to the log changes. Inspectors found no formal training or communication to all licensed and nonlicensed operations staff on this change.
The failure to implement AP 21F-001was considered a performance deficiency. The finding was determined to be more than minor because it could become a more significant safety concern if procedures and configuration controls are changed outside the required process. The inspectors evaluated the significance of this finding under the mitigating systems cornerstone using Phase 1 of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because no systems, structures, or components were inappropriately out of service for greater than 24 hours due to errors in the log. Specifically, no equipment status was lost such that it was returned to service inappropriately. Further, none of the affected equipment was risk significant for the mitigation of external events such as flooding. The inspectors determined that this finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of Human Performance associated with the Decision Making component because Wolf Creek did not use its procedure change process to demonstrate that changing the equipment out service log the change was a safe course of action. Although roles and authority are defined in Procedure AP 15C-004, these roles and authorities were not implemented for a safety significant decision.
Inspection Report# : 2008005 (pdf)
Significance:        Oct 24, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Ensure a Fire Pump Would Automatically Start for One Fire Area The team identified a non-cited violation of License Condition 2.C.(5), Fire Protection, for the failure to ensure that
 
a water supply for the manual fire suppression system credited by the fire protection program would be promptly available in the event of a fire in the communications corridor. The team determined that cables for both fire pumps were routed in cable trays in the communications corridor. As a result, a single fire could result in the failure of any fire pump to start automatically or manually from the control room. A fire pump could be started locally to restore the water supply, but the delay would reduce the effectiveness of the fire suppression systems in limiting the growth of a fire and minimizing damage to safety-related equipment. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program as Condition Report 2008-005190.
Failure to ensure that a fire pump would be promptly available for manual fire suppression in the event of a fire in the communications corridor is a performance deficiency. This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the Protection Against External Factors attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and could affect the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to fire events to prevent undesirable consequences. The team judged the delay in starting a fire pump to be approximately five minutes. Using guidance in Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, Table 2.7.1 and Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, Attachment 2, the team determined this issue to be categorized as a fixed fire protection finding with a low degradation. This finding is of very low safety significance because the finding was assigned a low degradation rating. This finding was not assigned a cross-cutting aspect because it has existed since original construction and does not represent current performance.
Inspection Report# : 2008010 (pdf)
Significance:        Oct 24, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Operator Actions Affect the Ability to Operate Post Fire Safe Shutdown Equipment The team identified a non-cited violation of License Condition 2.C.(5), Fire Protection, for operator actions taken in response to a fire in Fire Area A-27 (Reactor Trip Switchgear Room 1403) that remove the ability to remotely operate equipment required for post-fire safe shutdown. Specifically, Procedure OFN KC 016, Fire Response, directs operators to remove the Train B 125V dc control power supply if a fire in Fire Area A-27 causes the Train B power-operated relief valve to spuriously open and its associated block valve fails to close. Removing the Train B 125V dc control power supply affects several of the functions credited for post-fire safe shutdown in Fire Area A-27. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program as Condition Report 2008-005210.
Removing the ability to remotely operate equipment required for post-fire safe shutdown, as specified in Procedure OFN KC-016, is a performance deficiency. This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the Protection Against External Factors attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and could affect the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to fire events to prevent undesirable consequences. The team determined the risk significance using Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process. This finding is of very low safety significance since all fire ignition sources screened out and a hot gas layer would not form in this area. This finding was not assigned a cross-cutting aspect because the cause was not representative of current performance.
Inspection Report# : 2008010 (pdf)
Significance: TBD Oct 24, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Evaluate Changes to the Approved Fire Protection Program The team identified a Severity Level IV non-cited violation for making changes to the approved fire protection program in a manner contrary to the requirements of License Condition 2.C.(5).(b). Prior to 2005, the licensee made multiple revisions to Procedure OFN RP 017, Control Room Evacuation, without demonstrating the changes would not adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire. Specifically, the licensee had revised the alternative shutdown procedure to allow some manual actions to be completed in times longer than the approved time commitments. When revising the alternative shutdown procedure, the licensee did not evaluate the changes to ensure they would not adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2005-
 
3317.
Failure to demonstrate that changes to the approved fire protection program would not adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire prior to changing the alternative shutdown procedure is a performance deficiency. This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the Protection Against External Factors attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and could affect the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to fire events to prevent undesirable consequences. This finding was assessed using traditional enforcement since it had the potential for impacting the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function. Using the guidance in Section D.3 of Supplement I of the NRC Enforcement Policy, this violation was determined to be a Severity Level IV violation since the licensee implemented corrective actions, provided a technical evaluation for the new alternative shutdown procedure, and performed an evaluation of the changes made in the alternative shutdown procedure. This finding was not assigned a cross-cutting aspect because the procedure changes were made in the 2005 timeframe and do not represent current performance.
Inspection Report# : 2008010 (pdf)
Significance:      Sep 27, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Use of hammer to reduce accumulator check valve leakage Inspectors identified a green noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, when Wolf Creek hammered the side of check Valve EP8818D such that the body of the valve was dented numerous times. This activity was performed under a troubleshooting work order to reduce valve seat leakage. The subsequent evaluation stated that this was an acceptable practice and that it would strengthen the surface metal of the valve body. Wolf Creek subsequently initiated Condition Report 2008-2284 to evaluate the practice.
The inspectors determined that the failure to utilize work instructions appropriate to the circumstances and properly evaluate the effects was a performance deficiency. The inspectors determined that this issue is more than minor because it could become a more safety-significant concern if the cold working or peening practice is not discontinued.
Inspectors determined that the finding was not appropriate for evaluation under Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, . The inspectors applied Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix M, Significance Determination Process Using Qualitative Criteria. The inspectors used a bounding qualitative case, and in consultation with NRC management, determined that the operability of the valve was not impacted. Therefore, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance, or Green. The inspectors determined that the cause of the finding has a problem identification and resolution crosscutting aspect in the area associated with the corrective action program because the licensee failed to evaluate the problem of seat leakage such that the resolution (a hammer) appropriately addressed the possible causes of valve seat leakage.
Inspection Report# : 2008004 (pdf)
Significance:      Sep 27, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to adequately evaluate submerged safety-related cables The inspectors identified a green noncited violation of 10 CFR, Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, because Wolf Creek failed to adequately demonstrate that 4160v cables that are under water are qualified for such service, and that they will remain operable, although the cables are presently operable. Since NRC Information Notice 2002-12 was issued, Wolf Creek had several opportunities to implement a preventive maintenance program and/or thoroughly evaluate the submerged cables. These cables include those of residual heat removal, containment spray, and essential service water. Wolf Creek has subsequently written Condition Report 2008-5073 and work orders to inspect cables and dewater cable vaults.
The failure to perform an engineering evaluation that demonstrated continued operability was considered a
 
performance deficiency. The inspectors determined that this finding was more than minor using Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix E, example 3.j, because the NRC was able to show that Wolf Creeks operability evaluation needed significant change to demonstrate continued operability. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance, Green, using the Significance Determination Process Phase 1. Specifically, the deficiency did not result in the present loss of operability or functionality and did not represent a risk significant external event such as flooding. The inspectors determined that the cause of the finding has a problem identification and resolution crosscutting aspect in the area associated with the corrective action program. Despite several opportunities since 2002, Wolf Creek failed to perform a thorough evaluation for continued operability of submerged safety-related cables to assure continued nuclear safety.
Inspection Report# : 2008004 (pdf)
Significance:        Sep 27, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation EDG lube oil heat exchanger leak due water hammer On April 7, 2008, the inspectors identified a green noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, due to an approximately 10 to 15 gpm leak on the Emergency Diesel Generator B lubricating oil heat exchanger cover plate. The water hammer caused part of the cover plate gasket to be ejected from the heat exchanger and created the leak. The inspectors found that the work order to assemble the heat exchanger were inadequate. Wolf Creek evaluations did not identify that vendor manual steps were not incorporated into the installation work order which led to loose cover plate nuts which caused the leak. Wolf Creek subsequently wrote Condition Report 2008-004982.
Wolf Creeks failure to ensure that the configuration of both emergency diesel generator lube oil heat exchangers was per plant design was considered a performance deficiency. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance, Green, by using the Significance Determination Process Phase 1 screening worksheet for mitigating systems. Specifically, the deficiency did not result in the loss of operability or functionality and did not represent a risk significant external event such as flooding. The inspectors determined that the cause of the finding has a human performance crosscutting aspect in the area associated with resources. Specifically, Wolf Creek did not ensure that Work Order 08-305289-000 was adequate to assure nuclear safety by including vendor instructions or acceptance criteria for both emergency diesel generator lube oil heat exchanger cover plates.
Inspection Report# : 2008004 (pdf)
Significance:        Sep 27, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Waterhammer caused by loss of offsite power exceeds heat exchanger bolt yield strength A self-revealing noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, occurred on April 7, 2008, when a loss of offsite power caused the service water pumps to shutdown and the essential service water pump to start. As a result, a water hammer occurred and the control room air conditioning unit Condenser B developed an approximately 60 gpm essential service water leak. This issue was entered into the corrective action program as condition report 2008-001450.
Wolf Creeks operation of the control room air conditioning and essential service water systems outside the design limits of the heat exchanger studs was determined to be a performance deficiency. The finding was determined to be more than minor because it impacted the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and operability of systems that respond to initiating events. The finding screened Green in Phase 1 of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609 because it did not cause the loss of safety function and did not impact risk for external events. The inspectors determined that the cause of the finding was related to the problem identification and resolution crosscutting aspect in the area associated with the corrective action program. Specifically, Wolf Creek previously identified that the heat exchanger joint might be inadequate, but it failed to perform any subsequent corrective action.
 
Inspection Report# : 2008004 (pdf)
Significance:        Sep 27, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Diesel generator low frequency and voltage variation not considered in calculations The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, having very low safety significance for the licensees failure to account for the effect of emergency diesel generator frequency variation at the lower limit of the allowable range. Specifically, emergency diesel generator voltage and frequency deviations for load sequencing was based on nominal 60 hertz operation of pumps and fans and did not account for the two percent variation allowed by Technical Specification 3.8.1. Wolf Creek could not demonstrate compliance with USAR section 8.1.4.3.b. The licensee has entered this issue into their corrective action program as Condition Report 2008-004312.
The inspectors determined that the failure to properly account for the effect of frequency variation on diesel generator was a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of design control and affected the associated cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the failure to account for the frequency variations at the lower limit had more than a minimal effect on the outcome of the analysis, in that, the bus frequency will decrease below the Updated Safety Analysis Report limit of 57.0 hertz for loss of coolant accident and loss of offsite power scenarios. The inspector determined that the finding screened as very low safety significance (Green) because it was a design or qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in loss of operability Inspection Report# : 2008004 (pdf)
Significance:        Jun 28, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to implement transient combustible control permit requirements for a propane tank A noncited violation (NCV) TS 5.4.1.d was identified for failing to control combustible materials in an area of the plant that contained safety related equipment. During a walkdown on May 1, 2008, inspectors noted that a temporary propane cylinder for a generator contained 33.5 pounds of propane. The inspectors identified that the propane cylinder did not have a transient combustible materials permit. Operators informed the inspectors that there were no active permits or impairments for this propane cylinder. The operators further stated that no such actions would be necessary because the generator and its propane cylinder are exempted from permit controls. The inspectors reviewed Procedure AP 10-102, Control of Combustible Materials, Revision 13. Section 7.10 of this procedure stated that the, propane cylinder is exempt from the transient combustible permit requirements of this procedure. Section 6.2.1 also states, in part, that a transient combustible materials permit is required if two gallons of flammable liquid or 14 pounds of flammable gas (not connected with hot work) are used. The inspectors spoke with Wolf Creek fire protection and licensing personnel and expressed that there seemed to be an inadequacy in their fire protection program. These personnel stated that their exemption of the propane was a long standing policy of the station and fire protection plan.
The inspectors contacted NRC regional fire protection specialists. The specialists informed the inspectors that Wolf Creeks position was contrary to industry standards and practice. The specialists stated that industry standards also consider heat of combustion or fire load, and a potential fire hazard and combustible characteristics of a material, i.e.,
an explosion. The inspectors determined that the licensees interpretation that the propane cylinder should be exempted from permit requirements was inappropriate.
The inadequate control of transient combustibles in containment was more than minor because, if left uncorrected, it would become a more significant-safety concern and could potentially affect residual heat removal availability due to fire under the mitigating systems cornerstone. The finding was of very low safety significance because the finding was assigned a moderate degradation factor and the issue only affected the ability to achieve and maintain cold shutdown.
The finding also had crosscutting aspects in the problem identification and resolution area associated with corrective
 
actions because the licensee failed to take appropriate corrective actions for a previous NRC identified deficiency in the exempted use of Class A transient combustibles [P.1(d)].
Inspection Report# : 2008003 (pdf)
Significance:      Jun 28, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to establish goals and monitor for a(1) ECCS room An NCV of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) was identified by the inspectors for failure to establish a(1) goals for the safety-related room coolers and monitor room cooler performance against those goals. On May 5, 2005, the Train A residual heat removal pump accumulated enough unavailability time to exceed the 10 CFR 50.65 a(2) goal due to a 0.5 gpm through wall leak on Room Cooler SGL10A. The licensee wrote Performance Improvement Request (PIR) 2005-2507 on August 31, 2005, to document that the maintenance rule expert panel had a majority vote to move the room cooler function to a(1) status. In the coming years, the replacement schedule defined prior to PIR 2005 2507 was delayed several times. PIR 2005-2507, Action Item 4, required the expert panel to establish a(1) monitoring goals with a monitoring duration by June 30, 2006. Wolf Creek performed a 10 CFR 50.65 a(3) review on April 27, 2007, to determine if the room cooler performance was disproportionate to its established a(2) goals. The April 27, 2007, expert panel meeting minutes, in part, states that a(1) goals had not been established because all of the room coolers had not been replaced and after all room coolers are replaced, that a(1) goals and monitoring will be implemented in the future. Inspectors questioned this practice of only monitoring for performance after corrective action rather than before and after corrective action. Thus, no technically justified goals were established. The inspectors questioned the process of considering the Function a(1) for 3 years of corrective actions with no a(1) monitoring goals in the intervening time. After inspector questioning in February 2008, Wolf Creek has expedited room cooler procurement and replacement. The inspectors also determined that the replacement plan did not implement maintenance activities, which would improve the availability of the systems. This was contrary to the guidance in NUMARC 93-01, Industry Guideline for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants, Revision 3, which states that while waiting to implement modifications, increased preventive maintenance may be necessary to ensure the affected function will remain reliable.
This finding is more than minor because it is consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter 612, Appendix E, Example 7.a. Specifically, Wolf Creek failed to establish a(1) goals and monitor performance against those goals for the a(1)
GL-5 function for 3 years. The inspectors evaluated the significance of this finding and determined that the finding is of very low safety significance because the support function (GL-5) to cool pump rooms does not result in a total loss of any safety function as identified by the licensee probability risk assessment that contributes to external event initiated core damage accident sequences (i.e., initiated by a seismic, flooding, or severe weather event). The finding has a crosscutting aspects in the problem identification and resolution area associated with corrective action program because Wolf Creek failed to take appropriate corrective actions to address this safety issue and the adverse room cooler trends in a timely manner, commensurate with safety significance and complexity [P.1(d)].
Inspection Report# : 2008003 (pdf)
Significance:      Jun 28, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate containment sump inspection procedure The inspectors identified an NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Procedures, Instructions, and Drawings, for Wolf Creeks failure to specify acceptance criteria in its containment sump inspection procedure which led to unidentified gaps in containment Sump A. During a Mode 4 containment walkdown on May 9, 2008, the inspector identified a gap in containment Sump A not previously identified by Wolf Creek. Based on previous Engineering Disposition 12684, the gap acceptance criterion was 0.045 inch. The gap that the inspector identified was 1/8-inch wide by 1/2-inch tall on one of the upper sump strainers. After raising the issue to the control room, Wolf Creek declared containment Sump A inoperable and entered TS 3.5.3. Train B residual heat removal was already inoperable for maintenance. Wolf Creek subsequently entered Technical Specification 3.0.3, and repaired the sump.
 
Wolf Creek Procedure STS EJ 003, Containment Sump Inspection Revision 14, Step 8.1, contains no guidance on filter screen gap acceptance criteria, other than verify no evidence of structural distress. Wolf Creek last implemented STS EJ-003 during their May 7, 2008, walkdown prior to ascending from Mode 5 to Mode 4. The inspectors considered this a missed opportunity as Wolf Creek should have identified these deficiencies prior to Mode
: 4. Although the inspectors could not determine with complete certainty that the sump screen gap existed at the time of Wolf Creeks walkdown on May 7, Wolf Creek was not able to identify any work activity performed in the recirculation sump area since that time.
The finding was more than minor because it affected the procedure quality and human performance attributes of the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that to responds to initiating events and prevent undesirable consequences. The inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance because the deficiency did not result in the complete loss of operability or functionality and did not represent a risk significant external event such as flooding. The finding has human performance crosscutting aspects in the area associated with resources. Specifically, Wolf Creek did not ensure that Procedure STS EJ-002 was adequate to assure nuclear safety including complete, accurate and up-to-date specifications or acceptance criteria for the sump [H.2(c)].
Inspection Report# : 2008003 (pdf)
Significance:      Jun 28, 2008 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: FIN Finding Inadequate switchyard work procedure resulted in a loss of offsite power A self-revealing finding was identified for an inadequate Wolf Creek switchyard maintenance work instruction which resulted in the loss of offsite power. On April 7, 2008, offsite power was lost to the NB02 4 kV safety-related bus when switchyard workers tripped the incorrect breaker failure trip relay while testing the Rose Hill 345kV offsite switchyard breakers. The incorrect closed trip relay made up the logic for the startup transformer protection circuit and extended the trip signal to all 345kV offsite breakers, resulting in the loss of power. The loss of the switchyard bus de-energized the protected train, 4 kV Bus B. The emergency diesel generator automatically started and supplied power to the Train B bus. Offsite power was restored to Train B bus approximately 8 hours later. The plant was defueled for a refueling outage and NB01 bus was secured for maintenance. The inspectors noted that the work orders only provided generic instructions and did not contain any detailed information or any specific step-by-step instructions on how the work was to be conducted. It was also noted that the switchyard workers did not have a copy of the maintenance procedure in hand and was on the phone with another switchyard worker who coordinated/directed the work. Administrative Procedure AP 21C-001, WCGS/WESTAR Substation, Revision 8, in part, contains steps for the Wolf Creek switchyard coordinator to review and monitor switchyard activities; and prepare a substation work authorization which describes the type of work to be performed and oversight of work needed. This review process is to ensure control of maintenance which could affect the availability of offsite power. AP 21C-001 also contains guidance that if either NB bus is de-energized, then work should not be performed that could jeopardize power to the inservice NB bus. However, this review did not catch the inadequate instructions provided to the workers nor prevented work that jeopardized power to the inservice NB bus.
This finding is greater than minor because the availability and reliability of a safety-related 4 kV bus was challenged when offsite power was lost. This finding was also associated with the equipment performance attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone and affected the objective to ensure availability and reliability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the finding did not increase the likelihood of a loss of reactor coolant system inventory, degrade the ability to terminate a leak path or add reactor coolant system inventory when needed during shutdown operations.
This finding had human performance crosscutting aspects in the area of resources because personnel did not have adequate procedures and work instructions for switchyard maintenance to ensure that the trip relay testing would not create an inadvertent loss of offsite power [H.2(c)].
Inspection Report# : 2008003 (pdf)
Significance:      Jun 28, 2008 Identified By: NRC
 
Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to verify engineering design calculation prior to use The inspectors identified an NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III (Design Control) for failure to implement engineering procedures and approve a third party calculation prior to use at Wolf Creek. Specifically, the calculation review failed to identify the incorrect design inputs to the net positive suction head calculations on two occasions for residual heat removal and containment spray. On October 5, 2006, Wolf Creek engineering approved Design Change Package 011295 which accepted the associated vendor calculation, TDI 6002 05, Revision 0, for clean strainer head loss as a design analysis calculation for the new containment sump. On January 22, 2008, an operability evaluation documented design errors that created unacceptable reductions in margin-to-net positive suction head requirements for core cooling components associated with the already installed containment recirculation sump strainer modification. Revision 0 of the calculation had omitted the head loss component associated with the as built orifices located in the strainer support plate. The size of the orifice beneath each strainer was not large enough to prevent head loss in excess of the net positive suction head required per the design conditions defined in the purchase specification supplied to the strainer vendor. This resulted in required net positive suction head being less than available. On three separate reviews, Wolf Creek engineering accepted the vendor calculation without completely evaluating the calculation as acceptable in accordance with Wolf Creek plant procedures. Administrative Procedure AP 05D 001, "Calculations," Revision 11, Step 6.11.3, states, in part, that design analysis calculations shall be reviewed and accepted by engineering prior to being used to support plant design or operability. This review shall compare calculations to design inputs, verify assumptions, verify analytical methods, verify accuracy and ensure compliance with design criteria. Contrary to the above, the licensee acceptance review of Revision 0 of the calculation failed to identity incorrect design inputs to the as built orifice size and Revisions 1 and 2 failed to identity the nonconservative temperature correction prior to being accepted.
This finding was more than minor because they were similar to non-minor Example 3.j from NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix E, "Examples of Minor Issues," in that, there was a reasonable doubt on the operability of the residual heat removal and containment spray pumps; and if left uncorrected, could result in a more significant safety concern. The finding is of very low safety significance because it was a qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in loss-of-operability in accordance with NRC Manual Chapter Part 9900, Technical Guidance, "Operability Determination Process for Operability and Functional Assessments." The finding had a problem identification and resolution area crosscutting aspects in the corrective action program component, because the site failed to perform a thorough evaluation of vendor calculations to ensure conditions adverse to quality are identified and resolved [P.1(c)].
Inspection Report# : 2008003 (pdf)
Significance:        Apr 07, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to implement fire protection impairment control permit requirements and compensatory measures The inspectors identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.d for failure to implement fire protection impairment control permit requirements and compensatory measures when operators received a trouble alarm on a fire detector in the auxiliary building. On January 26, 2008, operators discovered that Detector KC-104-XCH-ID-006 did not have a fire protection impairment control permit. This detector was adjacent to Detector KC-104-XSH-ID-007 which was already inoperable in Impairment 2008-020. The licensees administrative procedure required fire detection in the area to be declared inoperable if two adjacent detectors are inoperable. This condition existed for approximately 24 hours and would have required a compensatory continuous fire watch for the period that both detectors were inoperable. The residents identified that the control room turnover checklist contains a section for listing the KC008 alarms; however, the two turnover checklists for the two shifts following the initial alarm did not identify Detector KC 104 XCH ID 006 as a Detector KC 008 alarm.
The failure to implement fire protection impairment control permit requirements and establish compensatory measures for the auxiliary building 2026-foot level was considered a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of protection against external factors and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, this issue relates to the protection against fire example of protection against external factors attribute because the detectors were inoperable without ensuring compensatory measures were in
 
place. The finding was of very low safety significance because it involved compensatory measures for the fixed fire protection system and was assigned a low degradation rating since less than 10 percent of the fire detectors in the area were disabled. The finding has crosscutting aspects in the area of human performance associated with work practices because the licensee failed to apply appropriate human error techniques such as self and peer checking techniques to avoid committing errors [H.4(a)].
Inspection Report# : 2008002 (pdf)
Significance:      Apr 07, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Performing prohibited elective maintenance on offsite power during EDG maintenance
* An NRC identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 3.8.1.B.4 resulted from Wolf Creek removing equipment from service that was prohibited by the TS. Inspectors reviewed Technical Specification Bases 3.8.1.B.4 which prohibits elective maintenance within the switchyard that would challenge offsite power. Inspectors also reviewed the NRC Safety Evaluation Report for the 7 day emergency diesel generator allowed outage time (Technical Specification 3.8.1.B.4.2.2) and found that Section 4.6.c, states: The offsite power supply and switchyard conditions are conducive to an extend[ed] DG [completion time], which includes ensuring that switchyard access is restricted and no elective maintenance within the switchyard is performed that would challenge the offsite power availability. The inspectors determined that challenges to offsite power can originate with elective maintenance inside the protected area.
The inspectors determined that the failure to implement requirements of the NRC Safety Evaluation Report and Technical Specification Bases for Technical Specification 3.8.1.B.4 was a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute for the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone; and, it affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the issue resulted in the Train B offsite power being inoperable, but capable of supplying the safety bus for greater than 24 hours. Additionally, the cause of the finding has a human performance crosscutting aspects in the area associated with work control. Specifically, Wolf Creek did not ensure STS IC-805B was appropriately coordinated within organizations to assure plant and human performance during the extended emergency diesel generator allowed outage time. [H.3(b)]
Inspection Report# : 2008002 (pdf)
Significance:      Apr 07, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to establish reasonable expectation of operability
* An NRC identified NCV of Technical Specification 5.4.1 for failure to follow the operability process on discovery of the CCP A room cooler leak. Wolf Creek made no log entries at 2:20 p.m. stating its basis for immediate operability. At 3:50 p.m., Wolf Creek control room logs state that centrifugal charging Pump A had a room cooler leak and structural integrity cannot be verified. Subsequent entry into Technical Specification 3.7.8 for the essential service water Pump A caused emergency diesel Generator A to be inoperable. Technical Specification 3.8.1, Condition I states that with three alternating current sources inoperable (both emergency diesel generators and on offsite source), Technical Specification 3.0.3 shall be entered. Wolf Creek exited Technical Specification 3.0.3 at 4:13 p.m. when the inlet and outlet valves to centrifugal charging Pump As room cooler were closed. The inspectors could not locate any justification produced by Wolf Creek for the room coolers operability after 2:20 p.m.
The inspectors determined that the failure to follow the operability process is a performance deficiency. The inspectors determined that this finding was more than minor because if left uncorrected, it could become a more serious problem if the Technical Specification is not correctly applied. The finding screened to Phase 2 because the finding represents an actual loss of safety function of a single train of high head injection. A bounding risk of Green results from the Phase 2 presolved worksheets using an exposure time of less than 3 days for the centrifugal charging pump (CCP) A [Fails to Run]. The inspectors also determined that the finding had a human performance crosscutting
 
aspects in the area associated with decision making because the licensee failed to use conservative assumptions in its operability decision and apply a requirement to demonstrate that the room cooler is operable is in order to proceed rather than a requirement to demonstrate that it is inoperable [H.1(b)].
Inspection Report# : 2008002 (pdf)
Significance:      Apr 07, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Untimely corrective actions for CCP room cooler leads to NOED The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix B Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, because Wolf Creek failed to take timely corrective actions to prevent failure of the centrifugal charging pump A room cooler which resulted in a Notice of Enforcement Discretion (EA 08 052). The inspectors found that room Cooler SGL12A experienced leaks in October 1999, May 2003, October 2003, August 2004, October 2006, and again in February 2008. On March 14, 2007, Wolf Creek chose to delay SGL12As replacement until Refueling Outage 16 due to the required length of time to replace the cooler. On February 13, 2008, a circumferential flaw on an H bend was discovered in SGL12A preventing it from performing its safety function. Inspectors reviewed corrective action Procedure AP 28A-100, Condition Reports, Revision 3 and found that a loss of a train to perform its safety function was considered a significant deficiency requiring corrective action to prevent recurrence. The inspectors reviewed this issue under Performance Improvement Requests 2005-2507 and 2004-0688, and Condition Report 2008-0467 and found that Wolf Creek designated prior failures nonsignificant.
The failure to take timely corrective actions within 9 years was a performance deficiency. The inspectors determined that this finding was more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute for the mitigating systems cornerstone; and, it affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e. core damage). The finding screened to Phase 2 because the finding represents an actual loss of safety function of a single train of high head injection for greater than its Technical Specification 3.8.1.B.2 allowed outage time of 4 hours. Using an exposure time of less than 3 days for the scenario Centrifugal Charging Pump PBG05A [Fails to Run], a bounding risk of Green results from the Phase 2 presolved worksheets. Additionally, the cause of the finding has a human performance crosscutting aspect in the area associated with resources. Specifically, Wolf Creek did not ensure adequate resources to maintain long-term plant safety by minimizing the room coolers long-standing issues and preventive maintenance deferrals [H.2(a)].
Inspection Report# : 2008002 (pdf)
Significance:      Apr 07, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to reestablish timely seal cooling for the reactor coolant pumps
* An NRC identified violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.d resulted because Procedure OFN RP 017, "Control Room Evacuation," Revision 21, failed to account for the needed actions to reestablish reactor coolant pump seal cooling. Failure to reestablish seal cooling in a timely manner could have resulted in a small break loss of coolant accident.
This performance deficiency resulted from an inadequate postfire safe shutdown procedure. The inspectors determined the finding is greater than minor in that it affected the ability to achieve and maintain hot shutdown following a control room fire. This finding is associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of protection against external factors (e.g., fire). This finding affected the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to external events (such as fire) to prevent undesirable consequences. In addition to the control room fire requiring operators to evacuate the control room, the fire would have had to affect components located in two physically separated panels. The licensee has IEEE 383 qualified cables and conductors throughout the plant. The Phase 3 risk evaluation performed by the NRC senior reactor analyst determined this deficiency had very low risk significance.
Inspection Report# : 2008002 (pdf)
 
Significance:        Apr 07, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to analyze motor operated valuve circuits
* The inspectors identified a noncited violation of License Condition 2.c(5) because the licensee failed to evaluate the impact of a motor operated valve failure mechanism on their ability to implement postfire safe shutdown following a control room evacuation. The licensee determined that the failure mechanism affected 38 motor operated valves and upon valve failure could affect their ability to implement their postfire safe shutdown procedure. A short circuit that bypassed the torque and/or limit switches could damage the valves and prevent repositioning of the valve in the postfire safe shutdown position.
The inspectors determined this was a performance deficiency because the licensee failed to ensure that components necessary to safely shutdown the reactor would remain operable following a fire. This deficiency was more than minor, in that, it had the potential to impact the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to external events (such as fire) to prevent undesirable consequences. In addition to the control room fire requiring operators to evacuate the control room, the fire would have had to affect components located in five different control panels. The Phase 3 risk evaluation performed by the NRC senior reactor analyst determined this deficiency had very low risk significance.
Inspection Report# : 2008002 (pdf)
Significance: TBD Dec 29, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: AV Apparent Violation Failure to Maintain Reactor Coolant System Subcooling During the Alternative Shutodwn The team identified an Apparent Violation of Wolf Creek License Condition 2.C.(5)(a) concerning an inadequate alternative shutdown analysis. The licensees alternative shutdown analysis was inadequate in that it used an acceptance criteria which was inconsistent with and less conservative than that required by the approved Fire Protection Program. The licensee developed Calculation Number AN-02-021, Revision 0, OFN RP-017, Control Room Evacuation, Consequence Evaluation, to demonstrate alternative shutdown capability for Wolf Creek in response to NRC-identified Noncited Violation 2002008-01, Inadequate alternative shutdown procedure. The calculation predicted that during an alternative shutdown, the reactor coolant system subcooling margin would not be maintained, significant voiding would occur in the core, and a steam void would form in the reactor vessel head. The licensee found the results of the calculation to be acceptable since it demonstrated that the void formation would be limited, natural circulation in the reactor coolant system would be maintained, sufficient decay heat removal would be maintained, and no fuel damage would occur. This is not consistent with the license condition to meet the technical requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R. Section III.L of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Alternative and dedicated shutdown capability, that states in part, During the postfire shutdown, the reactor process variables shall be maintained within those predicted for a loss of normal a.c. power.
This finding is greater than minor because it impacted the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to external events (such as fire) to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). It is the NRCs understanding that the licensee does not consider these circuit vulnerabilities to be violations of NRC requirements. The licensee considers the spurious operation of multiple components to be outside of the plant licensing basis for the Fire Protection Program. Specifically, in this case, both pressurizer power-operated relief valves are assumed to spuriously open because of fire induced circuit damage. The NRC staff and the industry are currently working on developing a resolution methodology to address these types of potential fire induced circuit failures. The team concluded that this violation meets the criteria of the NRC Enforcement Manual Section 8.1.7.1 for deferring enforcement actions for postulated fire induced circuit failures.
Inspection Report# : 2005008 (pdf)
Inspection Report# : 2008010 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity
 
Significance:      Sep 27, 2008 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Incompatible Procedures Result in 6400 gallon Drain of SFP A self-revealing noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was identified after the licensee followed two incompatible procedures simultaneously resulting in the inadvertent partial draining of the spent fuel pool. Consequently, approximately 6400 gallons of water was pumped from the spent fuel pool to the refueling water storage tank. Wolf Creek subsequently initiated Condition Report 2008-002035.
The failure to prevent spent fuel pool draining due to simultaneous performance of incompatible Procedures SYS EC-200 and SYS EC-320 is considered a performance deficiency. This finding is more than minor because it impacted the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone attribute of configuration control and affected the cornerstone objective to maintain functionality of the spent fuel pool system. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 worksheets, the inspectors determined that the finding is of very low significance because the finding only affected the barrier function of the spent fuel pool. The inspectors also determined that this finding has crosscutting aspects in the human performance area associated with work control, because Wolf Creek did not coordinate work activities among separate groups, assess the impact of these concurrent evolutions or track the alignment of the fuel pool clean-up system.
Inspection Report# : 2008004 (pdf)
Significance:      Sep 27, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to completely close the SFP valve resulted in a loss of SFP water inventory A self-revealing green noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a was identified for the failure to close Valve EC-V025 during a lineup to recirculate the refueling water storage tank through the spent fuel pool cleanup system. These two systems were cross-connected for approximately 5 minutes on July 26, 2008, which resulted in approximately 1500 gallons of spent fuel pool water being inadvertently transferred to the refueling water storage tank. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as Condition Report 2008-003663.
The failure to completely close Valve EC-V025 was a performance deficiency. This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone attribute of configuration control and affected the cornerstone objective to maintain functionality of the spent fuel pool system. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 worksheets, the inspectors determined that the finding is of very low significance because the finding affected only the barrier function of the spent fuel pool. The inspectors also determined that the cause of the finding has a crosscutting aspect in the problem identification and resolution area associated with the corrective action program because Wolf Creek did not take appropriate corrective actions to address the adverse trend in manual valve stem friction in a timely manner, commensurate with its safety significance and complexity Inspection Report# : 2008004 (pdf)
Significance:      Sep 24, 2008 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Maintenance causes unplanned increase in reactor power On September 24, 2008, inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR 50.54(j) in which the fix it now team manipulated limit switches for Valve ACPV186C that caused the reactor to exceed the licensed thermal power limit of 3565 MWt for 27 minutes until reactor operators reduced power. The fix it now superintendent designated this work as tool pouch maintenance which required no prior planning. When the instrumentation and controls technician
 
recoupled the limit switch to the stem linkage, position indication of Valve ACPV186C changed from open to closed.
Unknown to the control room or the fix it now team, Valve ACPV186C is interlocked with Valve ACHV256D which is a dump valve from Moisture Separator Reheater C to the condenser. When Valve ACHV256D opened, it caused a positive reactivity addition which exceeded the licensed thermal power limit.
The failure to adequately plan a work activity that resulted in an unexpected positive reactivity addition is a performance deficiency. The inspectors determined that the finding was more than minor because it is associated with the configuration control attribute for the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone; and it affected the cornerstone objective of providing reasonable assurance that physical design barriers, such as fuel cladding, protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, this issue relates to the reactor manipulation example of the configuration control attribute. The inspectors evaluated the significance of this finding using Phase 1 of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance or Green because the fuel cladding barrier was affected but did not affect the reactor coolant system or containment barriers. The inspectors determined that this finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of Human Performance associated with the Decision Making component because Wolf Creek used flawed assumptions in the work planning process for Valve ACPV186C to demonstrate that the Tool Pouch course of action was safe.
Inspection Report# : 2008005 (pdf)
Significance:        Jun 28, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Troubleshooting activities bypass design control for the fuel transfer system The inspectors identified a violation of TS 5.4.1.a in which Wolf Creek raised the winch load setpoint for its fuel transfer system to avoid trips without knowing the cause. During core reload, Wolf Creek experienced repeated trips of the fuel handling system winch. It was not until after NRC involvement that it was identified that the winch load setpoints were inappropriately altered. The inspectors found that on April 17, 2008, under Work Order 08 305599-000, the load setpoints and slow speed zones were inappropriately changed from 250 pounds for 1 second and 590 inches, to 300 pounds for 2 seconds and 585 inches, respectively. The inspectors found that under M 716 00787, Section G, Software Change Log, no changes to the winch load limits or slow speed zones were referenced. The fuel transfer system is also explicitly controlled under Procedure AP 05-005, Design, Implementation, &
Configuration Control of Modifications. It was subsequently discovered that the setpoints were controlled by a vendor technical document that Wolf Creek accepted as the fuel transfer cart design. Inspectors were unable to locate, and Wolf Creek was unable to produce, modification documentation that justified these software changes. After the discovery that the setpoints were inappropriately changed, the 250 pounds for 1 second and 590 inches were loaded into the EEPROM (nonvolatile memory for the PLC). Power to the fuel transfer system was cycled and the speed change for the cart was observed at 590 inches. On this basis, Wolf Creek believed that the settings had been correctly re established, and fuel moves continued. Wolf Creek has had difficulty determining with certainty that the original setpoints were correctly re-established.
The finding was more than minor because it is associated with the human performance attribute for the barrier integrity cornerstone; and, it affected the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers (fuel cladding) protect the public from radio nuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, this issue relates to the procedure adherence example of the human performance attribute because the design process was bypassed to mask fuel cart problems. The finding was of very low safety significance because the issue did not result in fuel handling errors that caused damage to fuel clad integrity or a dropped fuel assembly. The cause of the finding has human performance crosscutting aspects in the area associated with decision making. Specifically, Wolf Creek did not ensure safety by making safety or risk significant decisions by using any procedural or systematic process when faced with the unexpected and repeated fuel transfer cart winch trips.
Inspection Report# : 2008003 (pdf)
Emergency Preparedness
 
Occupational Radiation Safety Significance:        Apr 07, 2008 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to control area as a locked high radiation area The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.7.2.a for failure to evaluate changing radiological conditions and control an area as a locked high radiation area. Specifically, on October 17, 2007, dose rates in Room 7604 increased to levels requiring posting as a Locked High Radiation Area, as a result of a vent and drain evolution. Dose rates reached a level of 1500 mRem/hour prior to the area being properly posted and controlled. This issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Report 2007-003934.
Immediate corrective actions included posting and controlling the area as a locked high radiation area. Other corrective actions included changing the vent and drain process to change the vent path.
This finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the occupational radiation safety program and process attribute and affected the cornerstone objective, in that, the failure to properly post and control access to a locked high radiation area has the potential to increase personnel dose. This occurrence involves the potential for unplanned, unintended dose. Utilizing Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix C, Occupational Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process, the inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance because it did not involve; (1) as low as is reasonably achievable planning and controls, (2) an overexposure, (3) a substantial potential for overexposure, or (4) an impaired ability to assess dose. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the work control component because licensee failed to appropriately plan work activities by incorporating job site conditions that may impact radiological safety.
Inspection Report# : 2008002 (pdf)
Significance:        Apr 07, 2008 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to follow procedure The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1 for failure to follow a licensee procedure. Specifically, on March 29, 2008, one of two radiographers conducting radiography operations in the quality control vault received a dose rate alarm on their electronic dosimeter. The two radiographers evaluated the dose received and decided to continue with radiography without notifying health physics personnel to evaluate the conditions. This issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Report 2008-001181.
Immediate corrective actions included restriction of the radiographers to log onto the radiation work permit and discussions with the radiographers and the contractors radiation safety officer. Long term corrective action is still being evaluated.
This finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the occupational radiation safety program and process attribute and affected the cornerstone objective, in that, the failure to stop work and notify health physics personnel for assistance had the potential to increase personnel dose. This occurrence involves the potential for unplanned, unintended dose. Utilizing Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix C, Occupational Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process, the inspector determined that the finding was of very low safety significance because it did not involve: (1) as low as is reasonably achievable planning and controls, (2) an overexposure, (3) a substantial potential for overexposure, or (4) an impaired ability to assess dose. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the decision making component because the radiographer and assistant failed to contact health physics personnel to discuss the circumstances surrounding the unexpected dose rate alarm.
Inspection Report# : 2008002 (pdf)
 
Public Radiation Safety Significance:      Sep 12, 2008 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Provide an Accuratge Shipping Manifest The team reviewed a self-revealing, noncited violation of 10 CFR 20.2006(b) resulting from the licensees failure to provide an accurate shipping manifest. On May 16, 2008, the licensee shipped used radioactive resin to a waste processor. The shipment contained 65 cubic feet of resin and a total activity of 177 Curies. However, the manifest papers accompanying the shipment only indicated 35 cubic feet of resin and a total activity of 83.8 Curies. The licensee was notified of the problem by the shipment recipient. The licensees corrective actions were to fax a corrected shipment manifest to the processor, suspend resin shipments, and conduct an apparent cause investigation.
The problem involving the incorrect manifest was documented in the corrective action program as Condition Report 2008-2357.
The finding is greater than minor because it was associated with the Public Radiation Safety cornerstone attribute, transportation program, and affected the cornerstone objective in that it provided incorrect information as part of hazard communication which could increase public dose. Using the public radiation safety significance determination process, the team determined the finding had very low safety significance because (1) radiation limits were not exceeded; (2) there was no breach of a package during transit; (3) it did not involve a certificate of compliance issue; (4) it was not a low level burial ground nonconformance; and (5) it did not involve a failure to make notifications or provide emergency information. Additionally, this finding had a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance, resources component, in that, the licensee did not establish adequate procedures and documentation necessary to ensure that information entered on the manifest was correct before shipping the package.
Inspection Report# : 2008009 (pdf)
Physical Protection Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Significance: TBD Apr 22, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Problem Identification and Resolution Team Inspection Results The team reviewed approximately 224 documents, which included condition reports, work orders, apparent and root cause analyses, and other related documents, to assess the effectiveness of the licensees problem identification and resolution processes and systems over a 2-year assessment period. The team concluded that problems were consistently identified and entered into the corrective action program and evaluated, but challenges to the corrective action program were identified.
The team identified four findings and noted four additional examples of findings that occurred during the assessment period that resulted from failure to implement appropriate or timely corrective actions.
Four examples were noted where ineffective use of operating experience contributed to NRC¬-identified findings during the assessment period. The licensee was not employing a formal electronic tracking system (as required by procedure) for the review of operating experience.
 
The licensee performed effective and critical self-assessments and audits, with the exception that no formal trending of equipment issues was performed for items tracked by work orders. The procedure for equipment trending was only applicable to condition reports.
The team concluded that the licensee established a safety-conscious work environment. All the interviewees believed that potential safety issues were being addressed and there were no instances identified where individuals had experienced adverse actions for bringing safety issues to licensee management or the NRC. However, 15 of 28 interviewees were not aware of the employee concerns programs ability to take nuclear safety issues.
Inspection Report# : 2008006 (pdf)
Last modified : June 05, 2009
 
Wolf Creek 1 2Q/2009 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance:        Jun 30, 2009 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: FIN Finding Inadequate Fuse Thermography Procedure Resulted in Blown Fuses and Unplanned Reactor Trip A self-revealing finding was identified for an inadequate thermography maintenance procedure. Inadequate procedural guidance resulted in thermography failing to identify an overheated fues which resulted in a reactor trip due a loss of power to a main feed regulating valve controller. On April 28, 2009, the main feedwater regulating valve controller power supply fuses blew, isolating flow to steam Generator B. The fuses blew due to overheating of the fuse holder. Wolf Creeks root cause found that vendor information was previously used in 1995 to detect a process cabinet main power fuse holder that was hot. However, this guidance was not incorporated into the preventive maintenance thermography procedure. This issue was entered into the corrective action program as Condition Report 00016455.
Failure to develop an adequate maintenance procedure for the 7300 process rack fuses was a performance deficiency.
The inspectors determined that this finding was more than minor because it is associated with the procedure quality attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone and it affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability. The inspectors evaluated the significance of this finding using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, and determined the finding to be Green because it did not result in both a reactor trip and loss of accident mitigation equipment. Consequently, this finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green). The inspectors also determined that the cause of the finding has a crosscutting aspect in the problem identification and resolution area associated with operating experience because Wolf Creek failed to use vendor information to assure plant safety. Specifically Wolf Creek utilized but failed to subsequently institutionalize operating experience in 1995 and 2009 by updating the thermography maintenance procedure.
Inspection Report# : 2009003 (pdf)
Significance:        Mar 31, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: VIO Violation Failure to correct component cooling water valve closures The inspectors identified a cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, involving Wolf Creeks failure to correct the cause of the reactor coolant pump thermal barrier component cooling water heat exchanger outlet valves stroking closed on high flow. Specifically, between 2001 and 2009, Wolf Creek experienced repeated cases of the reactor coolant pump thermal barrier component cooling water heat exchanger outlet valves stroking closed during component cooling water pump swaps and during isolations of the radioactive waste evaporators. Wolf Creek reinitiated evaluation of the issue after the inspectors questions but did not review the impact on the operators ability to open the valves given the valves circuit breakers opening. Repeated throttle valve adjustments have not been successful in stopping the valve closures. This issue and the corrective actions are being tracked by the licensee in Condition Report 2007 002074 and has corrective action pending to modify valve circuitry but it has not been implemented.
The failure to correct a condition adverse to quality of ensuring reactor coolant pump seal cooling as described in the Updated Safety Analysis Report is a performance deficiency. The finding is more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute for the Initiating Events Cornerstone; and, it affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the finding would not result in exceeding the Technical Specification limit for identified reactor coolant system leakage and would not have affected other mitigation systems resulting in a total loss of the seal cooling safety function. This finding is being cited because the licensee failed to establish measures to assure this condition adverse to quality was
 
promptly identified and corrected. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the decision making component because, even though numerous instances of valve closures occurred since the first noncited violation, Wolf Creek downgraded the condition report. Using nonconservative assumptions, the licensee consistently viewed this issue as not having a risk impact because seal injection was not simultaneously lost.
[H.1.b]
Inspection Report# : 2009002 (pdf)
Significance:      Sep 27, 2008 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate reactor vessel vent path A self-revealing green noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, was identified due to an inadequate vent path for the reactor vessel head. The inadequate vent path resulted in the formation of a maximum void size of 2600 gallons in the reactor vessel head on March 23, 2008, while the plant was shutdown and depressurized. Wolf Creek found indirect evidence of a loop seal due to water that came out of the hard pipe at the end of the outage during vacuum filling of the reactor coolant system. However, the root cause team could not exclude blockage in the piping. This issue was entered into the corrective action program and the licensee plans to conduct a more thorough inspection of the hard pipe during the next refueling outage.
The inspectors determined that the failure to provide adequate vessel head vent path to prevent gas accumulation in the reactor vessel during depressurized plant operations was a performance deficiency. The inspectors determined that this finding, which was associated with the Initiating Events cornerstone, was more than minor because if it was left uncorrected, it would have become a more significant safety concern. Specifically, the reactor vessel does not have an effective means of relieving noncondensable gases to prevent a loss of reactor coolant system inventory. The inspectors evaluated this finding using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix G, Attachment 1, and determined it be of very low safety significance based upon the demonstrated availability of mitigation systems and the flooded reactor cavity inventory. Because Wolf Creek did not inspect the portions of the piping or identify why the vent was blocked, no cause of the finding related to the crosscutting aspects could be identified.
Inspection Report# : 2008004 (pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance:      Jun 30, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Testing Equipment Used for Alignment Verification of Emergency Diesel Lube Oil Piping The inspectors identified a noncited violation for an inadequate control of measuring and test equipment used to verify the design basis of a safety related system. On June 2, 2009, Wolf Creek measured pipe gaps and angles of deflection associated with Smith-Blair couplings on the emergency diesel generator lube oil and jacket water systems. Wolf Creek used commercial grade tape measures and protractors to determine whether the piping met vendor and design requirements or if the piping had to be refitted. Some of the measurements indicated little or no margin from the maximum pipe gap tolerances. Instrument degradation and human error were not factored into the assessment of design margin when using commercial grade tools. The design specification called for a measurement to one-hundredth of one inch, whereas the tape measure was only graduated to one-sixteenth of one inch. This issue was entered into the corrective action program as Condition Report 00017781.
Failure to use appropriately qualified measuring and test equipment when verifying the design specifications of a safety related system was a performance deficiency. The inspectors determined that this finding was more than minor because it is associated with the design control attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and it affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of mitigating systems. The inspectors evaluated the significance of this finding using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, and determined the finding to be
 
Green because it did not result in the loss of operability or functionality and was not affected by external events such as earthquakes or floods. Consequently, this finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green).
The inspectors also determined that the cause of the finding has a crosscutting aspect in the human performance area associated with work controls because Wolf Creek failed to place adequate instructions into the work order to assure that the use of the proper measuring and test equipment requirements were specified.
Inspection Report# : 2009003 (pdf)
Significance:      Mar 31, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Unacceptable preconditioning of control rods prior to surveillance testing On February 6, 2009, the inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control for a procedure that allowed unacceptable preconditioning of the control rods prior to Technical Specification Surveillance 3.1.4.2. Wolf Creek did not perform any preconditioning acceptability review when adopting operating experience and revising Procedure STS SF-001. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program as Condition Report 2009-000598.
Unacceptable preconditioning of the control rods is a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone, and it affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The inspectors evaluated the significance of this finding under the mitigating systems cornerstone using Phase 1 of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because, it did not represent an actual loss of safety function and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. This finding was determined to have a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program because the condition report that adopted the operating experience failed to evaluate NRC guidance regarding preconditioning during surveillance testing which should have disallowed the procedure change. Therefore, the applicable procedures were not complete and accurate.
Inspection Report# : 2009002 (pdf)
Significance:      Mar 31, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Untimely corrective actions result in room temperature below boric acid solubility limit The inspectors identified a finding for allowing low room temperature to cause a boric acid flow path to be inoperable.
The inspectors reviewed a performance improvement request from 2005, which identified that boric acid could decrease below its limits if the room cooler was started while lake temperature was low which would render the system inoperable. The inspectors reviewed operator logs of safety injection Room A temperature data and found an instance where room temperature had decreased below the solubility limit for boric acid which had not been noted by operators. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program as Condition Reports 2009 000516 and 2009 001495.
The failure to implement the heat tracing corrective action within 3 years to maintain the boric acid injection piping operable during the winter is a performance deficiency. The inspectors determined that this finding was more than minor because this issue aligned with Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix E, example 2.f because the heat tracing was required by Condition Reports 2005-3461 and 2007-2472 but was not installed and the room temperature dropped below the boron solubility limit. The inspectors evaluated the significance of this finding using Phase 1 of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix G, Attachment 1, Checklist 3, and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance because Wolf Creek maintained shutdown margin in compliance with its Technical Specifications. No violation of regulatory requirements occurred. The inspectors determined that this finding has a cross cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the resources component because Wolf Creek did not maintain long term plant safety by not correcting this long term (3 years) equipment issue and its compensatory measure with the boric acid system.
 
Inspection Report# : 2009002 (pdf)
Significance:      Mar 31, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Degraded fire barrier for auxiliary feedwater The inspectors identified a noncited violation of License Condition 2.C(5)(a) for a degraded fire seal that separated redundant safe shutdown equipment. Specifically, a silicone foam seal and ceramic fiber board separating redundant motor driven auxiliary feedwater trains was degraded so that it no longer provided a 3 hour rated fire barrier. The licensee entered the finding into their corrective action program as Condition Report 2009-001087.
The finding was more than minor because it was similar to example 2.e. of NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues, in that, the performance deficiency impacted the ability of the seal to perform its function. In addition, the performance deficiency was associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of Protection Against External Events, and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the reliability of systems that respond to Initiating Events to prevent undesirable consequences. Under NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, Attachment 2, Degradation Rating Guidance Specific to Various Fire Protection Program Elements the finding was associated with a Moderate B degradation due to the seal not being in a tested or evaluated condition. Using Appendix F, Supplemental Screening for Fire Confinement Findings, the finding screens as Green due to exposing fire Area A33 featuring an automatic full area water-based suppression system. The inspectors determined that this finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program component because Wolf Creek failed to identify the degraded seal and missing ceramic board during previous post waterhammer walkdowns.
Inspection Report# : 2009002 (pdf)
Significance:      Mar 31, 2009 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inattentive on-duty senior reactor operator A self-revealing noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1(a) was identified when an on-duty operations shift manager was observed to be inattentive on multiple occasions in 2004 and 2005. This limited his ability to monitor the safe operation of the plant, assist the control room supervisor with the control room command function, and respond in the event of an accident. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program as Condition Report 2008 000572.
The failure of the shift manager to remain attentive is considered a performance deficiency. This finding is more than minor because it adversely impacts the Human Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone, and if left uncorrected this performance deficiency has the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern because the shift manager plays an important role in the oversight of post-accident response by all licensed operators on shift. This issue was reviewed by NRC management using Inspection Manual Chapter 609, Appendix M, Significance Determination Process Using Qualitative Criteria. NRC management reviewed the qualitative factors involved with this finding and determined that this finding is Green. No crosscutting aspect was identified because the shift manager has not stood watch for several years, and therefore this issue was not considered current performance.
Inspection Report# : 2009002 (pdf)
Significance:      Nov 25, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Equipment out of service log definitions redefined outside of procedure change process The inspectors identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, procedures, for changing the equipment out of service log outside of the procedure change process. On November 25, 2008, the inspectors questioned the status of excess letdown Valve 8153B because its equipment out of service log entry changed from available to unavavailable. The inspectors were informed that the meaning of unavailable was verbally changed to
 
mean that the valve was inoperable but considered available. This contradicted the words of the electronic log and Procedure AP 21F-001, Equipment Out of Service Control. Operations management was aware of the change to the terminology. Inspectors reviewed Procedures AP 21F-001 and found it required a senior operator to make and maintain the equipment out of service log. Procedure AP 15C-004, Preparation, Review and Approval of Procedures, Instructions and Forms, defines AP class procedures as those that, in part, implement activities that can significantly affect nuclear safety. Inspectors did not identify any other formal change processes that led to the log changes. Inspectors found no formal training or communication to all licensed and nonlicensed operations staff on this change.
The failure to implement AP 21F-001was considered a performance deficiency. The finding was determined to be more than minor because it could become a more significant safety concern if procedures and configuration controls are changed outside the required process. The inspectors evaluated the significance of this finding under the mitigating systems cornerstone using Phase 1 of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because no systems, structures, or components were inappropriately out of service for greater than 24 hours due to errors in the log. Specifically, no equipment status was lost such that it was returned to service inappropriately. Further, none of the affected equipment was risk significant for the mitigation of external events such as flooding. The inspectors determined that this finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of Human Performance associated with the Decision Making component because Wolf Creek did not use its procedure change process to demonstrate that changing the equipment out service log the change was a safe course of action. Although roles and authority are defined in Procedure AP 15C-004, these roles and authorities were not implemented for a safety significant decision.
Inspection Report# : 2008005 (pdf)
Significance:        Oct 24, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Ensure a Fire Pump Would Automatically Start for One Fire Area The team identified a non-cited violation of License Condition 2.C.(5), Fire Protection, for the failure to ensure that a water supply for the manual fire suppression system credited by the fire protection program would be promptly available in the event of a fire in the communications corridor. The team determined that cables for both fire pumps were routed in cable trays in the communications corridor. As a result, a single fire could result in the failure of any fire pump to start automatically or manually from the control room. A fire pump could be started locally to restore the water supply, but the delay would reduce the effectiveness of the fire suppression systems in limiting the growth of a fire and minimizing damage to safety-related equipment. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program as Condition Report 2008-005190.
Failure to ensure that a fire pump would be promptly available for manual fire suppression in the event of a fire in the communications corridor is a performance deficiency. This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the Protection Against External Factors attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and could affect the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to fire events to prevent undesirable consequences. The team judged the delay in starting a fire pump to be approximately five minutes. Using guidance in Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, Table 2.7.1 and Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, Attachment 2, the team determined this issue to be categorized as a fixed fire protection finding with a low degradation. This finding is of very low safety significance because the finding was assigned a low degradation rating. This finding was not assigned a cross-cutting aspect because it has existed since original construction and does not represent current performance.
Inspection Report# : 2008010 (pdf)
Significance:        Oct 24, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Operator Actions Affect the Ability to Operate Post Fire Safe Shutdown Equipment The team identified a non-cited violation of License Condition 2.C.(5), Fire Protection, for operator actions taken in
 
response to a fire in Fire Area A-27 (Reactor Trip Switchgear Room 1403) that remove the ability to remotely operate equipment required for post-fire safe shutdown. Specifically, Procedure OFN KC 016, Fire Response, directs operators to remove the Train B 125V dc control power supply if a fire in Fire Area A-27 causes the Train B power-operated relief valve to spuriously open and its associated block valve fails to close. Removing the Train B 125V dc control power supply affects several of the functions credited for post-fire safe shutdown in Fire Area A-27. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program as Condition Report 2008-005210.
Removing the ability to remotely operate equipment required for post-fire safe shutdown, as specified in Procedure OFN KC-016, is a performance deficiency. This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the Protection Against External Factors attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and could affect the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to fire events to prevent undesirable consequences. The team determined the risk significance using Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process. This finding is of very low safety significance since all fire ignition sources screened out and a hot gas layer would not form in this area. This finding was not assigned a cross-cutting aspect because the cause was not representative of current performance.
Inspection Report# : 2008010 (pdf)
Significance:      Oct 24, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Evaluate Changes to the Approved Fire Protection Program The team identified a Severity Level IV non-cited violation for making changes to the approved fire protection program in a manner contrary to the requirements of License Condition 2.C.(5).(b). Prior to 2005, the licensee made multiple revisions to Procedure OFN RP 017, Control Room Evacuation, without demonstrating the changes would not adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire. Specifically, the licensee had revised the alternative shutdown procedure to allow some manual actions to be completed in times longer than the approved time commitments. When revising the alternative shutdown procedure, the licensee did not evaluate the changes to ensure they would not adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2005-3317.
Failure to demonstrate that changes to the approved fire protection program would not adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire prior to changing the alternative shutdown procedure is a performance deficiency. This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the Protection Against External Factors attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and could affect the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to fire events to prevent undesirable consequences. This finding was assessed using traditional enforcement since it had the potential for impacting the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function. Using the guidance in Section D.3 of Supplement I of the NRC Enforcement Policy, this violation was determined to be a Severity Level IV violation since the licensee implemented corrective actions, provided a technical evaluation for the new alternative shutdown procedure, and performed an evaluation of the changes made in the alternative shutdown procedure. This finding was not assigned a cross-cutting aspect because the procedure changes were made in the 2005 timeframe and do not represent current performance.
Inspection Report# : 2008010 (pdf)
Significance:      Sep 27, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Use of hammer to reduce accumulator check valve leakage Inspectors identified a green noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, when Wolf Creek hammered the side of check Valve EP8818D such that the body of the valve was dented numerous times. This activity was performed under a troubleshooting work order to reduce valve seat leakage. The subsequent evaluation stated that this was an acceptable practice and that it would strengthen the
 
surface metal of the valve body. Wolf Creek subsequently initiated Condition Report 2008-2284 to evaluate the practice.
The inspectors determined that the failure to utilize work instructions appropriate to the circumstances and properly evaluate the effects was a performance deficiency. The inspectors determined that this issue is more than minor because it could become a more safety-significant concern if the cold working or peening practice is not discontinued.
Inspectors determined that the finding was not appropriate for evaluation under Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, . The inspectors applied Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix M, Significance Determination Process Using Qualitative Criteria. The inspectors used a bounding qualitative case, and in consultation with NRC management, determined that the operability of the valve was not impacted. Therefore, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance, or Green. The inspectors determined that the cause of the finding has a problem identification and resolution crosscutting aspect in the area associated with the corrective action program because the licensee failed to evaluate the problem of seat leakage such that the resolution (a hammer) appropriately addressed the possible causes of valve seat leakage.
Inspection Report# : 2008004 (pdf)
Significance:        Sep 27, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to adequately evaluate submerged safety-related cables The inspectors identified a green noncited violation of 10 CFR, Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, because Wolf Creek failed to adequately demonstrate that 4160v cables that are under water are qualified for such service, and that they will remain operable, although the cables are presently operable. Since NRC Information Notice 2002-12 was issued, Wolf Creek had several opportunities to implement a preventive maintenance program and/or thoroughly evaluate the submerged cables. These cables include those of residual heat removal, containment spray, and essential service water. Wolf Creek has subsequently written Condition Report 2008-5073 and work orders to inspect cables and dewater cable vaults.
The failure to perform an engineering evaluation that demonstrated continued operability was considered a performance deficiency. The inspectors determined that this finding was more than minor using Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix E, example 3.j, because the NRC was able to show that Wolf Creeks operability evaluation needed significant change to demonstrate continued operability. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance, Green, using the Significance Determination Process Phase 1. Specifically, the deficiency did not result in the present loss of operability or functionality and did not represent a risk significant external event such as flooding. The inspectors determined that the cause of the finding has a problem identification and resolution crosscutting aspect in the area associated with the corrective action program. Despite several opportunities since 2002, Wolf Creek failed to perform a thorough evaluation for continued operability of submerged safety-related cables to assure continued nuclear safety.
Inspection Report# : 2008004 (pdf)
Significance:        Sep 27, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation EDG lube oil heat exchanger leak due water hammer On April 7, 2008, the inspectors identified a green noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, due to an approximately 10 to 15 gpm leak on the Emergency Diesel Generator B lubricating oil heat exchanger cover plate. The water hammer caused part of the cover plate gasket to be ejected from the heat exchanger and created the leak. The inspectors found that the work order to assemble the heat exchanger were inadequate. Wolf Creek evaluations did not identify that vendor manual steps were not incorporated into the installation work order which led to loose cover plate nuts which caused the leak. Wolf Creek subsequently wrote Condition Report 2008-004982.
 
Wolf Creeks failure to ensure that the configuration of both emergency diesel generator lube oil heat exchangers was per plant design was considered a performance deficiency. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance, Green, by using the Significance Determination Process Phase 1 screening worksheet for mitigating systems. Specifically, the deficiency did not result in the loss of operability or functionality and did not represent a risk significant external event such as flooding. The inspectors determined that the cause of the finding has a human performance crosscutting aspect in the area associated with resources. Specifically, Wolf Creek did not ensure that Work Order 08-305289-000 was adequate to assure nuclear safety by including vendor instructions or acceptance criteria for both emergency diesel generator lube oil heat exchanger cover plates.
Inspection Report# : 2008004 (pdf)
Significance:        Sep 27, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Waterhammer caused by loss of offsite power exceeds heat exchanger bolt yield strength A self-revealing noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, occurred on April 7, 2008, when a loss of offsite power caused the service water pumps to shutdown and the essential service water pump to start. As a result, a water hammer occurred and the control room air conditioning unit Condenser B developed an approximately 60 gpm essential service water leak. This issue was entered into the corrective action program as condition report 2008-001450.
Wolf Creeks operation of the control room air conditioning and essential service water systems outside the design limits of the heat exchanger studs was determined to be a performance deficiency. The finding was determined to be more than minor because it impacted the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and operability of systems that respond to initiating events. The finding screened Green in Phase 1 of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609 because it did not cause the loss of safety function and did not impact risk for external events. The inspectors determined that the cause of the finding was related to the problem identification and resolution crosscutting aspect in the area associated with the corrective action program. Specifically, Wolf Creek previously identified that the heat exchanger joint might be inadequate, but it failed to perform any subsequent corrective action.
Inspection Report# : 2008004 (pdf)
Significance:        Sep 27, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Diesel generator low frequency and voltage variation not considered in calculations The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, having very low safety significance for the licensees failure to account for the effect of emergency diesel generator frequency variation at the lower limit of the allowable range. Specifically, emergency diesel generator voltage and frequency deviations for load sequencing was based on nominal 60 hertz operation of pumps and fans and did not account for the two percent variation allowed by Technical Specification 3.8.1. Wolf Creek could not demonstrate compliance with USAR section 8.1.4.3.b. The licensee has entered this issue into their corrective action program as Condition Report 2008-004312.
The inspectors determined that the failure to properly account for the effect of frequency variation on diesel generator was a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of design control and affected the associated cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the failure to account for the frequency variations at the lower limit had more than a minimal effect on the outcome of the analysis, in that, the bus frequency will decrease below the Updated Safety Analysis Report limit of 57.0 hertz for loss of coolant accident and loss of offsite power scenarios. The inspector determined that the finding screened as very low safety significance (Green) because it was a design or qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in loss of operability
 
Inspection Report# : 2008004 (pdf)
Significance: TBD Dec 29, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: AV Apparent Violation Failure to Maintain Reactor Coolant System Subcooling During the Alternative Shutodwn The team identified an Apparent Violation of Wolf Creek License Condition 2.C.(5)(a) concerning an inadequate alternative shutdown analysis. The licensees alternative shutdown analysis was inadequate in that it used an acceptance criteria which was inconsistent with and less conservative than that required by the approved Fire Protection Program. The licensee developed Calculation Number AN-02-021, Revision 0, OFN RP-017, Control Room Evacuation, Consequence Evaluation, to demonstrate alternative shutdown capability for Wolf Creek in response to NRC-identified Noncited Violation 2002008-01, Inadequate alternative shutdown procedure. The calculation predicted that during an alternative shutdown, the reactor coolant system subcooling margin would not be maintained, significant voiding would occur in the core, and a steam void would form in the reactor vessel head. The licensee found the results of the calculation to be acceptable since it demonstrated that the void formation would be limited, natural circulation in the reactor coolant system would be maintained, sufficient decay heat removal would be maintained, and no fuel damage would occur. This is not consistent with the license condition to meet the technical requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R. Section III.L of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Alternative and dedicated shutdown capability, that states in part, During the postfire shutdown, the reactor process variables shall be maintained within those predicted for a loss of normal a.c. power.
This finding is greater than minor because it impacted the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to external events (such as fire) to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). It is the NRCs understanding that the licensee does not consider these circuit vulnerabilities to be violations of NRC requirements. The licensee considers the spurious operation of multiple components to be outside of the plant licensing basis for the Fire Protection Program. Specifically, in this case, both pressurizer power-operated relief valves are assumed to spuriously open because of fire induced circuit damage. The NRC staff and the industry are currently working on developing a resolution methodology to address these types of potential fire induced circuit failures. The team concluded that this violation meets the criteria of the NRC Enforcement Manual Section 8.1.7.1 for deferring enforcement actions for postulated fire induced circuit failures.
Inspection Report# : 2005008 (pdf)
Inspection Report# : 2008010 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Significance:        Jun 30, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Testing Results in P-6 Interlock Failure to Energize Source Range on Reactor Trip On April 28, 2009, the inspectors identified a Green noncited violation of Technical Specification, Table 3.3.1-1, Function 18.a, when Wolf Creek tripped from 100 percent reactor power. During the trip, intermediate range neutron Detector NI-36 did not decrease below 10 E -10 amps and energize source range Detector NI-32. The inspectors determined that post maintenance testing of the new detector during the previous refueling outage was insufficient and caused the detector to be under compensated. A postmaintenance testing deficiency was not evaluated. After reactor trip, this issue was entered into the corrective action program but was closed to pending recalibration of the detector.
The deficiency for Function 18.a was entered into the corrective action program after the inspectors questioning.
The inspectors determined that the failure to ensure that the P-6 interlock was operable per the technical specification as defined in the bases was a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the configuration control attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone, and it affected the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers (fuel cladding, reactor coolant system, and containment) protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, it affected the reactivity control area (reactor control systems) of the cornerstones attribute. The inspectors evaluated the significance of this finding under the Mitigating Systems cornerstone using Phase 1 of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, and
 
determined that the finding screened to Green because the P-6 interlock only affected the fuel barrier. This issue has been entered into the corrective action program as Condition Report 00017814. The cause of this finding was determined to have a crosscutting aspect in the problem identification and resolution area associated with the corrective action program because post maintenance testing of Procedure STN IC-236 identified deficiencies as well as the post trip review; however, this did not result in initiation of condition reports and subsequent evaluation.
Inspection Report# : 2009003 (pdf)
Significance:        Mar 31, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to follow 10 CFR 50.65a(2) for containment isolation valve failures On February 25, 2009, the inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR 50.65 a(2), the Maintenance Rule, for failure to demonstrate that the performance of a containment isolation valve was effectively controlled through the performance of preventive maintenance such that the valve remained capable of performing its intended function. An inadequate Maintenance Rule evaluation was performed after a containment isolation valve (SJHV0005) exceeded its Maintenance Rule a(2) performance criteria, and as a result goal setting and monitoring were not performed as required by paragraph a(1) of the Maintenance Rule. This issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Report 2009 001667.
The failure to follow 10 CFR 50.65 a(2) and properly evaluate the failed valve, establish performance goals, and monitor its performance is considered a performance deficiency. Per Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix E, Section 7, this finding is more than minor because failure to demonstrate effective control of performance or condition and not putting the affected structures, systems, and components in (a)(1) necessarily involves degraded structures, systems, or components performance or condition. Under NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, the Phase I Significance Screening Process, it was found that the finding is of very low safety significance because it does not represent an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of the reactor containment. This finding was determined to have a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program because the licensee failed to properly classify, prioritize, and evaluate a condition adverse to quality.
Inspection Report# : 2009002 (pdf)
Significance:        Mar 31, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to implement foreign material exclusion control procedure for spent fuel pool The inspectors identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Procedures, for failure to follow Procedure AP 12-003, Foreign Material Exclusion. On January 17, 2009, inspectors conducted a walkdown of the spent fuel pool area and found numerous untracked tools and other equipment inside the fuel pool area. Inspectors also found duct tape attached to various fueling and control rod tools such that duct tape was above and below the water. Condition Report 2009-001388 was initiated identifying a loss of spent fuel pool foreign material control.
Subsequently, Wolf Creek began re-inventorying all materials in the spent fuel pool area.
The inspectors determined that the failure to implement multiple steps of Procedure AP 12 003 was a performance deficiency. This finding is more than minor because it impacted the Barrier Integrity cornerstone attribute of configuration control and affected the cornerstone objective to maintain functionality of the spent fuel pool system.
Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, this finding was determined be of very low safety significance because the finding only affected the barrier function of the spent fuel pool. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the work practices component because even though personnel had been made aware of Wolf Creeks policy on procedure use and adherence through site-wide communications, personnel still failed to follow numerous parts of the procedure, such that Wolf Creek was not using the procedure.
Inspection Report# : 2009002 (pdf)
 
Significance:      Sep 27, 2008 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Incompatible Procedures Result in 6400 gallon Drain of SFP A self-revealing noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was identified after the licensee followed two incompatible procedures simultaneously resulting in the inadvertent partial draining of the spent fuel pool. Consequently, approximately 6400 gallons of water was pumped from the spent fuel pool to the refueling water storage tank. Wolf Creek subsequently initiated Condition Report 2008-002035.
The failure to prevent spent fuel pool draining due to simultaneous performance of incompatible Procedures SYS EC-200 and SYS EC-320 is considered a performance deficiency. This finding is more than minor because it impacted the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone attribute of configuration control and affected the cornerstone objective to maintain functionality of the spent fuel pool system. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 worksheets, the inspectors determined that the finding is of very low significance because the finding only affected the barrier function of the spent fuel pool. The inspectors also determined that this finding has crosscutting aspects in the human performance area associated with work control, because Wolf Creek did not coordinate work activities among separate groups, assess the impact of these concurrent evolutions or track the alignment of the fuel pool clean-up system.
Inspection Report# : 2008004 (pdf)
Significance:      Sep 27, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to completely close the SFP valve resulted in a loss of SFP water inventory A self-revealing green noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a was identified for the failure to close Valve EC-V025 during a lineup to recirculate the refueling water storage tank through the spent fuel pool cleanup system. These two systems were cross-connected for approximately 5 minutes on July 26, 2008, which resulted in approximately 1500 gallons of spent fuel pool water being inadvertently transferred to the refueling water storage tank. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as Condition Report 2008-003663.
The failure to completely close Valve EC-V025 was a performance deficiency. This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone attribute of configuration control and affected the cornerstone objective to maintain functionality of the spent fuel pool system. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 worksheets, the inspectors determined that the finding is of very low significance because the finding affected only the barrier function of the spent fuel pool. The inspectors also determined that the cause of the finding has a crosscutting aspect in the problem identification and resolution area associated with the corrective action program because Wolf Creek did not take appropriate corrective actions to address the adverse trend in manual valve stem friction in a timely manner, commensurate with its safety significance and complexity Inspection Report# : 2008004 (pdf)
Significance:      Sep 24, 2008 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Maintenance causes unplanned increase in reactor power On September 24, 2008, inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR 50.54(j) in which the fix it now team manipulated limit switches for Valve ACPV186C that caused the reactor to exceed the licensed thermal power limit of 3565 MWt for 27 minutes until reactor operators reduced power. The fix it now superintendent designated this work as tool pouch maintenance which required no prior planning. When the instrumentation and controls technician
 
recoupled the limit switch to the stem linkage, position indication of Valve ACPV186C changed from open to closed.
Unknown to the control room or the fix it now team, Valve ACPV186C is interlocked with Valve ACHV256D which is a dump valve from Moisture Separator Reheater C to the condenser. When Valve ACHV256D opened, it caused a positive reactivity addition which exceeded the licensed thermal power limit.
The failure to adequately plan a work activity that resulted in an unexpected positive reactivity addition is a performance deficiency. The inspectors determined that the finding was more than minor because it is associated with the configuration control attribute for the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone; and it affected the cornerstone objective of providing reasonable assurance that physical design barriers, such as fuel cladding, protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, this issue relates to the reactor manipulation example of the configuration control attribute. The inspectors evaluated the significance of this finding using Phase 1 of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance or Green because the fuel cladding barrier was affected but did not affect the reactor coolant system or containment barriers. The inspectors determined that this finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of Human Performance associated with the Decision Making component because Wolf Creek used flawed assumptions in the work planning process for Valve ACPV186C to demonstrate that the Tool Pouch course of action was safe.
Inspection Report# : 2008005 (pdf)
Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Significance:      Sep 12, 2008 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Provide an Accuratge Shipping Manifest The team reviewed a self-revealing, noncited violation of 10 CFR 20.2006(b) resulting from the licensees failure to provide an accurate shipping manifest. On May 16, 2008, the licensee shipped used radioactive resin to a waste processor. The shipment contained 65 cubic feet of resin and a total activity of 177 Curies. However, the manifest papers accompanying the shipment only indicated 35 cubic feet of resin and a total activity of 83.8 Curies. The licensee was notified of the problem by the shipment recipient. The licensees corrective actions were to fax a corrected shipment manifest to the processor, suspend resin shipments, and conduct an apparent cause investigation.
The problem involving the incorrect manifest was documented in the corrective action program as Condition Report 2008-2357.
The finding is greater than minor because it was associated with the Public Radiation Safety cornerstone attribute, transportation program, and affected the cornerstone objective in that it provided incorrect information as part of hazard communication which could increase public dose. Using the public radiation safety significance determination process, the team determined the finding had very low safety significance because (1) radiation limits were not exceeded; (2) there was no breach of a package during transit; (3) it did not involve a certificate of compliance issue; (4) it was not a low level burial ground nonconformance; and (5) it did not involve a failure to make notifications or provide emergency information. Additionally, this finding had a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance, resources component, in that, the licensee did not establish adequate procedures and documentation necessary to ensure that information entered on the manifest was correct before shipping the package.
Inspection Report# : 2008009 (pdf)
 
Physical Protection Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Last modified : August 31, 2009
 
Wolf Creek 1 3Q/2009 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance:        Jun 30, 2009 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: FIN Finding Inadequate Fuse Thermography Procedure Resulted in Blown Fuses and Unplanned Reactor Trip A self-revealing finding was identified for an inadequate thermography maintenance procedure. Inadequate procedural guidance resulted in thermography failing to identify an overheated fues which resulted in a reactor trip due a loss of power to a main feed regulating valve controller. On April 28, 2009, the main feedwater regulating valve controller power supply fuses blew, isolating flow to steam Generator B. The fuses blew due to overheating of the fuse holder. Wolf Creeks root cause found that vendor information was previously used in 1995 to detect a process cabinet main power fuse holder that was hot. However, this guidance was not incorporated into the preventive maintenance thermography procedure. This issue was entered into the corrective action program as Condition Report 00016455.
Failure to develop an adequate maintenance procedure for the 7300 process rack fuses was a performance deficiency.
The inspectors determined that this finding was more than minor because it is associated with the procedure quality attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone and it affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability. The inspectors evaluated the significance of this finding using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, and determined the finding to be Green because it did not result in both a reactor trip and loss of accident mitigation equipment. Consequently, this finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green). The inspectors also determined that the cause of the finding has a crosscutting aspect in the problem identification and resolution area associated with operating experience because Wolf Creek failed to use vendor information to assure plant safety. Specifically Wolf Creek utilized but failed to subsequently institutionalize operating experience in 1995 and 2009 by updating the thermography maintenance procedure.
Inspection Report# : 2009003 (pdf)
Significance:        Mar 31, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: VIO Violation Failure to correct component cooling water valve closures The inspectors identified a cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, involving Wolf Creeks failure to correct the cause of the reactor coolant pump thermal barrier component cooling water heat exchanger outlet valves stroking closed on high flow. Specifically, between 2001 and 2009, Wolf Creek experienced repeated cases of the reactor coolant pump thermal barrier component cooling water heat exchanger outlet valves stroking closed during component cooling water pump swaps and during isolations of the radioactive waste evaporators. Wolf Creek reinitiated evaluation of the issue after the inspectors questions but did not review the impact on the operators ability to open the valves given the valves circuit breakers opening. Repeated throttle valve adjustments have not been successful in stopping the valve closures. This issue and the corrective actions are being tracked by the licensee in Condition Report 2007 002074 and has corrective action pending to modify valve circuitry but it has not been implemented.
The failure to correct a condition adverse to quality of ensuring reactor coolant pump seal cooling as described in the Updated Safety Analysis Report is a performance deficiency. The finding is more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute for the Initiating Events Cornerstone; and, it affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the finding would not result in exceeding the Technical Specification limit for identified reactor coolant system leakage and would not have affected other mitigation systems resulting in a total loss of the seal cooling safety function. This finding is being cited because the licensee failed to establish measures to assure this condition adverse to quality was promptly identified and corrected. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated
 
with the decision making component because, even though numerous instances of valve closures occurred since the first noncited violation, Wolf Creek downgraded the condition report. Using nonconservative assumptions, the licensee consistently viewed this issue as not having a risk impact because seal injection was not simultaneously lost.
[H.1.b]
Inspection Report# : 2009002 (pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance:      Jun 30, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Testing Equipment Used for Alignment Verification of Emergency Diesel Lube Oil Piping The inspectors identified a noncited violation for an inadequate control of measuring and test equipment used to verify the design basis of a safety related system. On June 2, 2009, Wolf Creek measured pipe gaps and angles of deflection associated with Smith-Blair couplings on the emergency diesel generator lube oil and jacket water systems. Wolf Creek used commercial grade tape measures and protractors to determine whether the piping met vendor and design requirements or if the piping had to be refitted. Some of the measurements indicated little or no margin from the maximum pipe gap tolerances. Instrument degradation and human error were not factored into the assessment of design margin when using commercial grade tools. The design specification called for a measurement to one-hundredth of one inch, whereas the tape measure was only graduated to one-sixteenth of one inch. This issue was entered into the corrective action program as Condition Report 00017781.
Failure to use appropriately qualified measuring and test equipment when verifying the design specifications of a safety related system was a performance deficiency. The inspectors determined that this finding was more than minor because it is associated with the design control attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and it affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of mitigating systems. The inspectors evaluated the significance of this finding using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, and determined the finding to be Green because it did not result in the loss of operability or functionality and was not affected by external events such as earthquakes or floods. Consequently, this finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green).
The inspectors also determined that the cause of the finding has a crosscutting aspect in the human performance area associated with work controls because Wolf Creek failed to place adequate instructions into the work order to assure that the use of the proper measuring and test equipment requirements were specified.
Inspection Report# : 2009003 (pdf)
Significance:      Mar 31, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Unacceptable preconditioning of control rods prior to surveillance testing On February 6, 2009, the inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control for a procedure that allowed unacceptable preconditioning of the control rods prior to Technical Specification Surveillance 3.1.4.2. Wolf Creek did not perform any preconditioning acceptability review when adopting operating experience and revising Procedure STS SF-001. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program as Condition Report 2009-000598.
Unacceptable preconditioning of the control rods is a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone, and it affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The inspectors evaluated the significance of this finding under the mitigating systems cornerstone using Phase 1 of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because, it did not represent an actual loss of safety function and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. This finding was determined to have a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program because the condition
 
report that adopted the operating experience failed to evaluate NRC guidance regarding preconditioning during surveillance testing which should have disallowed the procedure change. Therefore, the applicable procedures were not complete and accurate.
Inspection Report# : 2009002 (pdf)
Significance:      Mar 31, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Untimely corrective actions result in room temperature below boric acid solubility limit The inspectors identified a finding for allowing low room temperature to cause a boric acid flow path to be inoperable.
The inspectors reviewed a performance improvement request from 2005, which identified that boric acid could decrease below its limits if the room cooler was started while lake temperature was low which would render the system inoperable. The inspectors reviewed operator logs of safety injection Room A temperature data and found an instance where room temperature had decreased below the solubility limit for boric acid which had not been noted by operators. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program as Condition Reports 2009 000516 and 2009 001495.
The failure to implement the heat tracing corrective action within 3 years to maintain the boric acid injection piping operable during the winter is a performance deficiency. The inspectors determined that this finding was more than minor because this issue aligned with Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix E, example 2.f because the heat tracing was required by Condition Reports 2005-3461 and 2007-2472 but was not installed and the room temperature dropped below the boron solubility limit. The inspectors evaluated the significance of this finding using Phase 1 of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix G, Attachment 1, Checklist 3, and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance because Wolf Creek maintained shutdown margin in compliance with its Technical Specifications. No violation of regulatory requirements occurred. The inspectors determined that this finding has a cross cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the resources component because Wolf Creek did not maintain long term plant safety by not correcting this long term (3 years) equipment issue and its compensatory measure with the boric acid system.
Inspection Report# : 2009002 (pdf)
Significance:      Mar 31, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Degraded fire barrier for auxiliary feedwater The inspectors identified a noncited violation of License Condition 2.C(5)(a) for a degraded fire seal that separated redundant safe shutdown equipment. Specifically, a silicone foam seal and ceramic fiber board separating redundant motor driven auxiliary feedwater trains was degraded so that it no longer provided a 3 hour rated fire barrier. The licensee entered the finding into their corrective action program as Condition Report 2009-001087.
The finding was more than minor because it was similar to example 2.e. of NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues, in that, the performance deficiency impacted the ability of the seal to perform its function. In addition, the performance deficiency was associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of Protection Against External Events, and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the reliability of systems that respond to Initiating Events to prevent undesirable consequences. Under NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, Attachment 2, Degradation Rating Guidance Specific to Various Fire Protection Program Elements the finding was associated with a Moderate B degradation due to the seal not being in a tested or evaluated condition. Using Appendix F, Supplemental Screening for Fire Confinement Findings, the finding screens as Green due to exposing fire Area A33 featuring an automatic full area water-based suppression system. The inspectors determined that this finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program component because Wolf Creek failed to identify the degraded seal and missing ceramic board during previous post waterhammer walkdowns.
Inspection Report# : 2009002 (pdf)
Significance:      Mar 31, 2009
 
Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inattentive on-duty senior reactor operator A self-revealing noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1(a) was identified when an on-duty operations shift manager was observed to be inattentive on multiple occasions in 2004 and 2005. This limited his ability to monitor the safe operation of the plant, assist the control room supervisor with the control room command function, and respond in the event of an accident. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program as Condition Report 2008 000572.
The failure of the shift manager to remain attentive is considered a performance deficiency. This finding is more than minor because it adversely impacts the Human Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone, and if left uncorrected this performance deficiency has the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern because the shift manager plays an important role in the oversight of post-accident response by all licensed operators on shift. This issue was reviewed by NRC management using Inspection Manual Chapter 609, Appendix M, Significance Determination Process Using Qualitative Criteria. NRC management reviewed the qualitative factors involved with this finding and determined that this finding is Green. No crosscutting aspect was identified because the shift manager has not stood watch for several years, and therefore this issue was not considered current performance.
Inspection Report# : 2009002 (pdf)
Significance:      Nov 25, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Equipment out of service log definitions redefined outside of procedure change process The inspectors identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, procedures, for changing the equipment out of service log outside of the procedure change process. On November 25, 2008, the inspectors questioned the status of excess letdown Valve 8153B because its equipment out of service log entry changed from available to unavavailable. The inspectors were informed that the meaning of unavailable was verbally changed to mean that the valve was inoperable but considered available. This contradicted the words of the electronic log and Procedure AP 21F-001, Equipment Out of Service Control. Operations management was aware of the change to the terminology. Inspectors reviewed Procedures AP 21F-001 and found it required a senior operator to make and maintain the equipment out of service log. Procedure AP 15C-004, Preparation, Review and Approval of Procedures, Instructions and Forms, defines AP class procedures as those that, in part, implement activities that can significantly affect nuclear safety. Inspectors did not identify any other formal change processes that led to the log changes. Inspectors found no formal training or communication to all licensed and nonlicensed operations staff on this change.
The failure to implement AP 21F-001was considered a performance deficiency. The finding was determined to be more than minor because it could become a more significant safety concern if procedures and configuration controls are changed outside the required process. The inspectors evaluated the significance of this finding under the mitigating systems cornerstone using Phase 1 of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because no systems, structures, or components were inappropriately out of service for greater than 24 hours due to errors in the log. Specifically, no equipment status was lost such that it was returned to service inappropriately. Further, none of the affected equipment was risk significant for the mitigation of external events such as flooding. The inspectors determined that this finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of Human Performance associated with the Decision Making component because Wolf Creek did not use its procedure change process to demonstrate that changing the equipment out service log the change was a safe course of action. Although roles and authority are defined in Procedure AP 15C-004, these roles and authorities were not implemented for a safety significant decision.
Inspection Report# : 2008005 (pdf)
Significance:      Oct 24, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Ensure a Fire Pump Would Automatically Start for One Fire Area
 
The team identified a non-cited violation of License Condition 2.C.(5), Fire Protection, for the failure to ensure that a water supply for the manual fire suppression system credited by the fire protection program would be promptly available in the event of a fire in the communications corridor. The team determined that cables for both fire pumps were routed in cable trays in the communications corridor. As a result, a single fire could result in the failure of any fire pump to start automatically or manually from the control room. A fire pump could be started locally to restore the water supply, but the delay would reduce the effectiveness of the fire suppression systems in limiting the growth of a fire and minimizing damage to safety-related equipment. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program as Condition Report 2008-005190.
Failure to ensure that a fire pump would be promptly available for manual fire suppression in the event of a fire in the communications corridor is a performance deficiency. This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the Protection Against External Factors attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and could affect the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to fire events to prevent undesirable consequences. The team judged the delay in starting a fire pump to be approximately five minutes. Using guidance in Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, Table 2.7.1 and Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, Attachment 2, the team determined this issue to be categorized as a fixed fire protection finding with a low degradation. This finding is of very low safety significance because the finding was assigned a low degradation rating. This finding was not assigned a cross-cutting aspect because it has existed since original construction and does not represent current performance.
Inspection Report# : 2008010 (pdf)
Significance:        Oct 24, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Operator Actions Affect the Ability to Operate Post Fire Safe Shutdown Equipment The team identified a non-cited violation of License Condition 2.C.(5), Fire Protection, for operator actions taken in response to a fire in Fire Area A-27 (Reactor Trip Switchgear Room 1403) that remove the ability to remotely operate equipment required for post-fire safe shutdown. Specifically, Procedure OFN KC 016, Fire Response, directs operators to remove the Train B 125V dc control power supply if a fire in Fire Area A-27 causes the Train B power-operated relief valve to spuriously open and its associated block valve fails to close. Removing the Train B 125V dc control power supply affects several of the functions credited for post-fire safe shutdown in Fire Area A-27. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program as Condition Report 2008-005210.
Removing the ability to remotely operate equipment required for post-fire safe shutdown, as specified in Procedure OFN KC-016, is a performance deficiency. This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the Protection Against External Factors attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and could affect the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to fire events to prevent undesirable consequences. The team determined the risk significance using Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process. This finding is of very low safety significance since all fire ignition sources screened out and a hot gas layer would not form in this area. This finding was not assigned a cross-cutting aspect because the cause was not representative of current performance.
Inspection Report# : 2008010 (pdf)
Significance:        Oct 24, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Evaluate Changes to the Approved Fire Protection Program The team identified a Severity Level IV non-cited violation for making changes to the approved fire protection program in a manner contrary to the requirements of License Condition 2.C.(5).(b). Prior to 2005, the licensee made multiple revisions to Procedure OFN RP 017, Control Room Evacuation, without demonstrating the changes would not adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire. Specifically, the licensee had revised the alternative shutdown procedure to allow some manual actions to be completed in times longer than the approved time commitments. When revising the alternative shutdown procedure, the licensee did not evaluate the changes to ensure they would not adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a
 
fire. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2005-3317.
Failure to demonstrate that changes to the approved fire protection program would not adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire prior to changing the alternative shutdown procedure is a performance deficiency. This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the Protection Against External Factors attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and could affect the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to fire events to prevent undesirable consequences. This finding was assessed using traditional enforcement since it had the potential for impacting the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function. Using the guidance in Section D.3 of Supplement I of the NRC Enforcement Policy, this violation was determined to be a Severity Level IV violation since the licensee implemented corrective actions, provided a technical evaluation for the new alternative shutdown procedure, and performed an evaluation of the changes made in the alternative shutdown procedure. This finding was not assigned a cross-cutting aspect because the procedure changes were made in the 2005 timeframe and do not represent current performance.
Inspection Report# : 2008010 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Significance:        Jun 30, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Testing Results in P-6 Interlock Failure to Energize Source Range on Reactor Trip On April 28, 2009, the inspectors identified a Green noncited violation of Technical Specification, Table 3.3.1-1, Function 18.a, when Wolf Creek tripped from 100 percent reactor power. During the trip, intermediate range neutron Detector NI-36 did not decrease below 10 E -10 amps and energize source range Detector NI-32. The inspectors determined that post maintenance testing of the new detector during the previous refueling outage was insufficient and caused the detector to be under compensated. A postmaintenance testing deficiency was not evaluated. After reactor trip, this issue was entered into the corrective action program but was closed to pending recalibration of the detector.
The deficiency for Function 18.a was entered into the corrective action program after the inspectors questioning.
The inspectors determined that the failure to ensure that the P-6 interlock was operable per the technical specification as defined in the bases was a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the configuration control attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone, and it affected the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers (fuel cladding, reactor coolant system, and containment) protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, it affected the reactivity control area (reactor control systems) of the cornerstones attribute. The inspectors evaluated the significance of this finding under the Mitigating Systems cornerstone using Phase 1 of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, and determined that the finding screened to Green because the P-6 interlock only affected the fuel barrier. This issue has been entered into the corrective action program as Condition Report 00017814. The cause of this finding was determined to have a crosscutting aspect in the problem identification and resolution area associated with the corrective action program because post maintenance testing of Procedure STN IC-236 identified deficiencies as well as the post trip review; however, this did not result in initiation of condition reports and subsequent evaluation.
Inspection Report# : 2009003 (pdf)
Significance:        Mar 31, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to follow 10 CFR 50.65a(2) for containment isolation valve failures On February 25, 2009, the inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR 50.65 a(2), the Maintenance Rule, for failure to demonstrate that the performance of a containment isolation valve was effectively controlled through the performance of preventive maintenance such that the valve remained capable of performing its intended function. An inadequate Maintenance Rule evaluation was performed after a containment isolation valve (SJHV0005) exceeded its
 
Maintenance Rule a(2) performance criteria, and as a result goal setting and monitoring were not performed as required by paragraph a(1) of the Maintenance Rule. This issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Report 2009 001667.
The failure to follow 10 CFR 50.65 a(2) and properly evaluate the failed valve, establish performance goals, and monitor its performance is considered a performance deficiency. Per Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix E, Section 7, this finding is more than minor because failure to demonstrate effective control of performance or condition and not putting the affected structures, systems, and components in (a)(1) necessarily involves degraded structures, systems, or components performance or condition. Under NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, the Phase I Significance Screening Process, it was found that the finding is of very low safety significance because it does not represent an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of the reactor containment. This finding was determined to have a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program because the licensee failed to properly classify, prioritize, and evaluate a condition adverse to quality.
Inspection Report# : 2009002 (pdf)
Significance:      Mar 31, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to implement foreign material exclusion control procedure for spent fuel pool The inspectors identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Procedures, for failure to follow Procedure AP 12-003, Foreign Material Exclusion. On January 17, 2009, inspectors conducted a walkdown of the spent fuel pool area and found numerous untracked tools and other equipment inside the fuel pool area. Inspectors also found duct tape attached to various fueling and control rod tools such that duct tape was above and below the water. Condition Report 2009-001388 was initiated identifying a loss of spent fuel pool foreign material control.
Subsequently, Wolf Creek began re-inventorying all materials in the spent fuel pool area.
The inspectors determined that the failure to implement multiple steps of Procedure AP 12 003 was a performance deficiency. This finding is more than minor because it impacted the Barrier Integrity cornerstone attribute of configuration control and affected the cornerstone objective to maintain functionality of the spent fuel pool system.
Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, this finding was determined be of very low safety significance because the finding only affected the barrier function of the spent fuel pool. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the work practices component because even though personnel had been made aware of Wolf Creeks policy on procedure use and adherence through site-wide communications, personnel still failed to follow numerous parts of the procedure, such that Wolf Creek was not using the procedure.
Inspection Report# : 2009002 (pdf)
Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection
 
Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Last modified : December 10, 2009
 
Wolf Creek 1 4Q/2009 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance:        Jun 30, 2009 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: FIN Finding Inadequate Fuse Thermography Procedure Resulted in Blown Fuses and Unplanned Reactor Trip A self-revealing finding was identified for an inadequate thermography maintenance procedure. Inadequate procedural guidance resulted in thermography failing to identify an overheated fues which resulted in a reactor trip due a loss of power to a main feed regulating valve controller. On April 28, 2009, the main feedwater regulating valve controller power supply fuses blew, isolating flow to steam Generator B. The fuses blew due to overheating of the fuse holder.
Wolf Creeks root cause found that vendor information was previously used in 1995 to detect a process cabinet main power fuse holder that was hot. However, this guidance was not incorporated into the preventive maintenance thermography procedure. This issue was entered into the corrective action program as Condition Report 00016455.
Failure to develop an adequate maintenance procedure for the 7300 process rack fuses was a performance deficiency.
The inspectors determined that this finding was more than minor because it is associated with the procedure quality attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone and it affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability. The inspectors evaluated the significance of this finding using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, and determined the finding to be Green because it did not result in both a reactor trip and loss of accident mitigation equipment. Consequently, this finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green). The inspectors also determined that the cause of the finding has a crosscutting aspect in the problem identification and resolution area associated with operating experience because Wolf Creek failed to use vendor information to assure plant safety. Specifically Wolf Creek utilized but failed to subsequently institutionalize operating experience in 1995 and 2009 by updating the thermography maintenance procedure.
Inspection Report# : 2009003 (pdf)
Significance:        Mar 31, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: VIO Violation Failure to correct component cooling water valve closures The inspectors identified a cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, involving Wolf Creeks failure to correct the cause of the reactor coolant pump thermal barrier component cooling water heat exchanger outlet valves stroking closed on high flow. Specifically, between 2001 and 2009, Wolf Creek experienced repeated cases of the reactor coolant pump thermal barrier component cooling water heat exchanger outlet valves stroking closed during component cooling water pump swaps and during isolations of the radioactive waste evaporators. Wolf Creek reinitiated evaluation of the issue after the inspectors questions but did not review the impact on the operators ability to open the valves given the valves circuit breakers opening. Repeated throttle valve adjustments have not been successful in stopping the valve closures. This issue and the corrective actions are being tracked by the licensee in Condition Report 2007 002074 and has corrective action pending to modify valve circuitry but it has not been implemented.
The failure to correct a condition adverse to quality of ensuring reactor coolant pump seal cooling as described in the Updated Safety Analysis Report is a performance deficiency. The finding is more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute for the Initiating Events Cornerstone; and, it affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the finding would not result in exceeding the Technical Specification limit for identified reactor coolant system leakage and would not have affected other mitigation systems resulting in a total loss of the seal cooling safety function. This finding is being cited because the licensee failed to establish measures to assure this condition adverse to quality was promptly identified and corrected. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the decision making component because, even though numerous instances of valve closures occurred since the
 
first noncited violation, Wolf Creek downgraded the condition report. Using nonconservative assumptions, the licensee consistently viewed this issue as not having a risk impact because seal injection was not simultaneously lost.
[H.1.b]
Inspection Report# : 2009002 (pdf)
Inspection Report# : 2009005 (pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance:        Sep 30, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inability to perform manual actions for risk assessment The inspector identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) for failure to adequately assess and manage the increase in risk during fuse inspection of component cooling water valves supplying cooling loads inside containment.
On March 18, 2009, component cooling water Valves EG HV 16 and EG HV-54 were out of service for fuse inspections to verify wiring for fire protection analyses. The inspectors observed that the evolution was not included in the weekly risk assessment and that operations and maintenance personnel did not have guidance or briefings for restoration of the valves. Review of the risk assessment revealed that the impact of de-energizing the valves in the closed position was neglected and that restoration actions credited by the risk analyst were unknown to the control room and craft workers. The issue was entered into the corrective action program as Condition Report 15318.
The failure to adequately assess and manage risk in accordance with AP 22C 003 and the preplanned risk assessment for the use of local actions to ensure component cooling water cooling to loads inside containment was a performance deficiency. The finding is more than minor because the licensee failed to effectively manage prescribed significant compensatory measures for maintenance activities that could increase the likelihood of initiating events. The finding was of very low safety significance because the magnitude of the calculated risk deficit was less than IE-6 even though risk management actions were not in place. The inspectors also determined that the finding has a human performance crosscutting aspect in the area associated with work control because the risk assessment procedure and clearance order procedure assumed local actions could be accomplished but there was no communication regarding this during the work planning stages [H.3(b)]
Inspection Report# : 2009004 (pdf)
Significance:        Sep 30, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Use of Nonsafety Related Power to Ensure Operability of Safety Related Boric Acid System The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for failing to translate the boric acid design basis into procedures that ensure time sensitive operator actions are completed to achieve the core shutdown margin specified in the core operating limits report. Performance Improvement Request 2005-3461 identified that if the room coolers were started while lake temperature was low, the boric acid solution temperature may decrease below the solubility limit. Corrective actions for heat tracing and room temperature logging took approximately 3 years to implement and stopped short of addressing boric acid system operation when nonsafety power is lost to the heat tracing and the plant must be taken to cold shutdown in accordance with technical specifications. The licensee entered this issue in their corrective action program as Condition Report 20717.
The failure to translate the design bases into procedures that ensure the function of the safety related boric acid system upon loss of nonsafety related heat tracing is a performance deficiency. The inspectors determined that this finding was more than minor because this issue aligned with Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix E, example 2.f, because the pipe temperature was required to stay above the boric acid solubility limit and the loss of the heat tracing and or room temperature decrease will block the boric acid system. This issue was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events. The inspectors evaluated the significance of this finding using Phase 1 of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, "Significance
 
Determination of Reactor Inspection Findings for At Power Situations," and determined that the finding screened to phase 2 because the issue was a design or qualification deficiency confirmed to result in loss of operability or functionality The inspectors evaluated the significance of this finding using Phase 2 of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Risk Informed Inspection Notebook for Wolf Creek Generating Station, and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance because loss of the boric acid system in Table 3.9 for one year resulted in a 1E-7 CDF when giving recovery credit for the refueling water storage tank. The inspectors determined that this finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program component because Wolf Creek did not take appropriate corrective actions to resolve known deficiencies in the design and operation of the boric acid system for approximately 4 years. The issue was re-evaluated in 2009, and the licensee failed to correct the deficiencies identified in 2005. [P.1.d]
Inspection Report# : 2009004 (pdf)
Significance: SL-IV Sep 30, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Changes to the Approved Fire Protection Program Without Prior Staff Approval The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV noncited violation of License Condition 2.C.(5), Fire Protection, for making changes to the approved fire protection program without the required prior Commission approval.
Specifically, the licensee made a change to the Updated Safety Analysis Report that allowed the licensee to violate the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.L. Specifically, when the licensee recognized that fire damage could cause a pressurizer power operated relief valve to open long enough to create a void in the reactor vessel, this was documented as acceptable when it was not in compliance with this regulatory requirement. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2008 004869.
This finding was assessed using traditional enforcement since it had the potential for impacting the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function. This finding is more than minor since the change required prior staff review and approval prior to implementation and it did not receive the required approval. A senior reactor analyst performed a Phase 3 evaluation and determined this performance deficiency was of very low risk significance. In accordance with the guidance in Supplement I of the Enforcement Policy, this issue is considered a Severity Level IV noncited violation because it is of very low risk significance. This finding had a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with resources because the licensee failed to maintain long term plant safety by maintaining design margins. Specifically, the licensees choice to allow reactor vessel head voiding during an alternative shutdown in lieu of restoring the plant to compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.L constituted a reduction in safety margin [H.2(a)]
Inspection Report# : 2009004 (pdf)
Significance:        Jun 30, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Testing Equipment Used for Alignment Verification of Emergency Diesel Lube Oil Piping The inspectors identified a noncited violation for an inadequate control of measuring and test equipment used to verify the design basis of a safety related system. On June 2, 2009, Wolf Creek measured pipe gaps and angles of deflection associated with Smith-Blair couplings on the emergency diesel generator lube oil and jacket water systems. Wolf Creek used commercial grade tape measures and protractors to determine whether the piping met vendor and design requirements or if the piping had to be refitted. Some of the measurements indicated little or no margin from the maximum pipe gap tolerances. Instrument degradation and human error were not factored into the assessment of design margin when using commercial grade tools. The design specification called for a measurement to one-hundredth of one inch, whereas the tape measure was only graduated to one-sixteenth of one inch. This issue was entered into the corrective action program as Condition Report 00017781.
Failure to use appropriately qualified measuring and test equipment when verifying the design specifications of a safety related system was a performance deficiency. The inspectors determined that this finding was more than minor because it is associated with the design control attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and it affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of mitigating systems. The inspectors evaluated the significance of this finding using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, and determined the finding to be Green because it did not result in the loss of operability or functionality and was not affected by external events such as earthquakes or floods. Consequently, this finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green).
 
The inspectors also determined that the cause of the finding has a crosscutting aspect in the human performance area associated with work controls because Wolf Creek failed to place adequate instructions into the work order to assure that the use of the proper measuring and test equipment requirements were specified.
Inspection Report# : 2009003 (pdf)
Significance:        Jun 30, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Evaluation of Emergency Diesel Generator for Common Cause Failure in the Supporting Essential Service Water System On June 30, 2009, the inspectors identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 3.8.1 for failure to perform an adequate common cause evaluation within 24 hours to demonstrate no common cause failure mechanism existed between the emergency diesel generators after a through-wall leak was discovered on the essential service water piping. Wolf Creek did not start the opposite train emergency diesel generator and declared that the through-wall flaw was not a common cause failure without any evaluation or supporting statements. Nondestructive testing had not been started at this time. Subsequent evaluation of the flaw per American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code Case N513.2 restored operability to the essential service water piping. The licensee entered this issue in their corrective action program as Condition Report 18347.
The inspectors determined that the failure to demonstrate, per Technical Specifications 3.8.1 Required Actions B.3.1 or B.3.2, that no common cause failure existed for the emergency diesel generators was a performance deficiency. The inspectors determined that this finding was more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute for the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The inspectors evaluated the significance of this finding using Phase 1 of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, "Significance Determination of Reactor Inspection Findings for At Power Situations," and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the issue was not a design or qualification deficiency confirmed to result in loss of operability or functionality, did not represent a loss of system safety function, an actual loss of safety function of a single train for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time, an actual loss of safety function of a nontechnical specification risk-significant equipment train, and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The cause of the finding has a problem identification and resolution crosscutting aspect in the area associated with the corrective action program because Wolf Creek failed to thoroughly evaluate the failure mechanism such that the resolutions address the causes and extent of conditions, as necessary. Specifically Wolf Creek did not properly consider the possibility of common-cause pitting failures which could have impacted the essential service water piping Train A structural integrity thereby affecting its cooling loads, including the Emergency Diesel Generator A [P.1(c)]
Inspection Report# : 2009004 (pdf)
Significance:        Jun 30, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate instructions for changing modes of operation of the residual heat removal system The inspectors identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1, Procedures, associated with the licensees failure to ensure that adequate procedures were available for changing modes of operation of the residual heat removal system from shutdown cooling to emergency core cooling system operation. Specifically, station procedures allowed the residual heat removal system to be realigned to the emergency core cooling system mode of operation following operation in the shutdown cooling mode with suction temperatures as high as 350°F without properly cooling the entire suction header. This resulted in both trains of the residual heat removal system being inoperable during periods of operation in Modes 3 and 4. This issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Reports 2008-3810 and 2008 4997.
The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and it directly affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 Worksheet, the inspectors concluded
 
that a Phase 2 evaluation was required because this finding represented a loss of safety function of the residual heat removal system.
The inspectors performed a Phase 2 analysis using Appendix A, Determining the Safety Significance of Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations, of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, and the plant specific Phase 2 presolved tables and worksheets for Wolf Creek. The inspectors determined that the Phase 2 presolved tables and worksheets did not contain appropriate target sets to accurately estimate the risk input of the finding. Therefore, it was determined that a Phase 3 analysis was required. Senior risk analysts performed a Phase 3 analysis of this issue. The estimated Conditional Core Damage Probability was determined to be 2.84E-7, and the estimated Conditional Large Early Release Probability was determined to be 2.72E-9. Based on these results, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance. This finding was determined to have a crosscutting aspect in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution associated with the corrective action program [P.1(c)], in that the licensee failed to appropriately and thoroughly evaluate problems such that the resolutions address the causes Inspection Report# : 2009006 (pdf)
Significance:      Mar 31, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Unacceptable preconditioning of control rods prior to surveillance testing On February 6, 2009, the inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control for a procedure that allowed unacceptable preconditioning of the control rods prior to Technical Specification Surveillance 3.1.4.2. Wolf Creek did not perform any preconditioning acceptability review when adopting operating experience and revising Procedure STS SF-001. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program as Condition Report 2009-000598.
Unacceptable preconditioning of the control rods is a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone, and it affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The inspectors evaluated the significance of this finding under the mitigating systems cornerstone using Phase 1 of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because, it did not represent an actual loss of safety function and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. This finding was determined to have a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program because the condition report that adopted the operating experience failed to evaluate NRC guidance regarding preconditioning during surveillance testing which should have disallowed the procedure change. Therefore, the applicable procedures were not complete and accurate.
Inspection Report# : 2009002 (pdf)
Significance:      Mar 31, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Untimely corrective actions result in room temperature below boric acid solubility limit The inspectors identified a finding for allowing low room temperature to cause a boric acid flow path to be inoperable.
The inspectors reviewed a performance improvement request from 2005, which identified that boric acid could decrease below its limits if the room cooler was started while lake temperature was low which would render the system inoperable. The inspectors reviewed operator logs of safety injection Room A temperature data and found an instance where room temperature had decreased below the solubility limit for boric acid which had not been noted by operators. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program as Condition Reports 2009 000516 and 2009 001495.
The failure to implement the heat tracing corrective action within 3 years to maintain the boric acid injection piping operable during the winter is a performance deficiency. The inspectors determined that this finding was more than minor because this issue aligned with Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix E, example 2.f because the heat tracing was required by Condition Reports 2005-3461 and 2007-2472 but was not installed and the room temperature dropped below the boron solubility limit. The inspectors evaluated the significance of this finding using Phase 1 of
 
Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix G, Attachment 1, Checklist 3, and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance because Wolf Creek maintained shutdown margin in compliance with its Technical Specifications. No violation of regulatory requirements occurred. The inspectors determined that this finding has a cross cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the resources component because Wolf Creek did not maintain long term plant safety by not correcting this long term (3 years) equipment issue and its compensatory measure with the boric acid system.
Inspection Report# : 2009002 (pdf)
Significance:      Mar 31, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Degraded fire barrier for auxiliary feedwater The inspectors identified a noncited violation of License Condition 2.C(5)(a) for a degraded fire seal that separated redundant safe shutdown equipment. Specifically, a silicone foam seal and ceramic fiber board separating redundant motor driven auxiliary feedwater trains was degraded so that it no longer provided a 3 hour rated fire barrier. The licensee entered the finding into their corrective action program as Condition Report 2009-001087.
The finding was more than minor because it was similar to example 2.e. of NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues, in that, the performance deficiency impacted the ability of the seal to perform its function. In addition, the performance deficiency was associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of Protection Against External Events, and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the reliability of systems that respond to Initiating Events to prevent undesirable consequences. Under NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, Attachment 2, Degradation Rating Guidance Specific to Various Fire Protection Program Elements the finding was associated with a Moderate B degradation due to the seal not being in a tested or evaluated condition. Using Appendix F, Supplemental Screening for Fire Confinement Findings, the finding screens as Green due to exposing fire Area A33 featuring an automatic full area water-based suppression system. The inspectors determined that this finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program component because Wolf Creek failed to identify the degraded seal and missing ceramic board during previous post waterhammer walkdowns.
Inspection Report# : 2009002 (pdf)
Significance:      Mar 31, 2009 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inattentive on-duty senior reactor operator A self-revealing noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1(a) was identified when an on-duty operations shift manager was observed to be inattentive on multiple occasions in 2004 and 2005. This limited his ability to monitor the safe operation of the plant, assist the control room supervisor with the control room command function, and respond in the event of an accident. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program as Condition Report 2008 000572.
The failure of the shift manager to remain attentive is considered a performance deficiency. This finding is more than minor because it adversely impacts the Human Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone, and if left uncorrected this performance deficiency has the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern because the shift manager plays an important role in the oversight of post-accident response by all licensed operators on shift. This issue was reviewed by NRC management using Inspection Manual Chapter 609, Appendix M, Significance Determination Process Using Qualitative Criteria. NRC management reviewed the qualitative factors involved with this finding and determined that this finding is Green. No crosscutting aspect was identified because the shift manager has not stood watch for several years, and therefore this issue was not considered current performance.
Inspection Report# : 2009002 (pdf)
Significance:      Mar 24, 2009 Identified By: NRC
 
Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Performing Prohibited Elective Maintenance on Safety Bus NB02 Channel 4 During Emergency Diesel Generator Maintenance On August 22, 2009, the inspectors identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 3.0.3 in which both trains of Technical Specification 3.3.2 engineered safety features actuation system interlock function 8.a were bypassed with jumper wires in accordance with a plant procedure. Function 8.a is the interlock for reactor trip signal coincident with lo Tave signal. Wolf Creek blocked the signal from the feedwater valves with jumper wires during control rod drive motor-generator testing in Mode 3. The inspectors and the NRR technical specification branch found this to be contrary to the Updated Safety Analysis Report, the technical specifications, the technical specification bases, and the NRC safety evaluations supporting the technical specifications. The licensee entered this issue in their corrective action program as Condition Report 19318.
The inspectors found that the failure to implement Technical Specification 3.3.2 interlock, function 8.a was a performance deficiency. The inspectors determined that this finding was more than minor because it is associated with the design control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and it affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of mitigating systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). The inspectors evaluated the significance of this finding using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, and screened the finding to Phase 2 because the finding represents a loss of a systems function. The inspectors used Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A and screened the finding to the NRC senior reactor analyst for review because there was not an acceptable equipment deficiency in the pre-solved worksheet. The senior reactor analyst determined that the finding is Green because he solved Table 3.10 of the Risk Informed Inspection Notebook for Wolf Creek Generating Station, Revision 2.1a and found that the loss of feedwater isolation signal for less than 3 days resulted in a 1E 7 (Green) outcome. The inspectors also determined that the cause of the finding has a crosscutting aspect in the human performance area associated with decision making because Wolf Creek failed to make a risk significant decision using a systematic process. This issue was evaluated more than once and those evaluations sought to justify bypassing the interlock rather than seek the full regulatory basis for the interlock [H.1.a]
Inspection Report# : 2009004 (pdf)
Significance:        Mar 24, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Performing Prohibited Elective Maintenance on Safety Bus NB02 Channel 4 During Emergency Diesel Generator Maintenance The inspectors identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 3.8.1, Required Action B.4.2.2 on March 24, 2009 when the licensee performed elective maintenance on safety bus relays and removed equipment from service that was required by the technical specification and the NRC Safety Evaluation Report (SER) while in an extended diesel generator outage. The maintenance had the potential to open the normal offsite feeder breaker. This issue has been entered into the corrective action program as Condition Report 15727.
The inspectors determined that the failure to implement requirements of Technical Specification 3.8.1 and the associated NRC safety evaluation was a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute for the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the issue did not result in the Train B offsite power being inoperable for greater than 24 hours and did not involve external events such as flooding. Additionally, the cause of the finding has a problem identification and resolution crosscutting aspect in the area associated with the corrective action program. Specifically, Wolf Creek did an extent of condition review in response to a previous violation which included Procedure STS IC 208B, but still failed to prohibit performance of STS IC-208B during the 7 day diesel outages [P.1(c)]
Inspection Report# : 2009004 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity
 
Significance:        Aug 12, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Log Foreign Material in Spent Fuel Pool After Extent of Condition Evaluation The inspectors identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Procedures, for failure to follow Procedure AP 12-003, Foreign Material Exclusion. On August 12, 2009, the inspectors conducted a walkdown of the spent fuel pool area and found duct tape attached to various fueling and control rod tools such that duct tape was below the water. This duct tape was not in the foreign material exclusion logs. Spent fuel pool foreign material control is required under Procedure AP 12-003. The licensee entered this issue in their corrective action program as Condition Report 20338.
The inspectors determined that the failure to log material in accordance with Procedure AP 12 003 was a performance deficiency. This finding is more than minor because it impacted the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone attribute of configuration control and affected the cornerstone objective to maintain functionality of the spent fuel pool system.
Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, this finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the finding only affected the barrier function of the spent fuel pool. The inspectors determined that this finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program component because although Wolf Creek performed a root cause and extent of condition evaluation for untracked foreign material, the evaluation still failed to find the duct tape in the pool itself. This allowed the tape to continue to be untracked [P.1.c]
Inspection Report# : 2009004 (pdf)
Significance:        Jun 30, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Testing Results in P-6 Interlock Failure to Energize Source Range on Reactor Trip On April 28, 2009, the inspectors identified a Green noncited violation of Technical Specification, Table 3.3.1-1, Function 18.a, when Wolf Creek tripped from 100 percent reactor power. During the trip, intermediate range neutron Detector NI-36 did not decrease below 10 E -10 amps and energize source range Detector NI-32. The inspectors determined that post maintenance testing of the new detector during the previous refueling outage was insufficient and caused the detector to be under compensated. A postmaintenance testing deficiency was not evaluated. After reactor trip, this issue was entered into the corrective action program but was closed to pending recalibration of the detector.
The deficiency for Function 18.a was entered into the corrective action program after the inspectors questioning.
The inspectors determined that the failure to ensure that the P-6 interlock was operable per the technical specification as defined in the bases was a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the configuration control attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone, and it affected the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers (fuel cladding, reactor coolant system, and containment) protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, it affected the reactivity control area (reactor control systems) of the cornerstones attribute. The inspectors evaluated the significance of this finding under the Mitigating Systems cornerstone using Phase 1 of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, and determined that the finding screened to Green because the P-6 interlock only affected the fuel barrier. This issue has been entered into the corrective action program as Condition Report 00017814. The cause of this finding was determined to have a crosscutting aspect in the problem identification and resolution area associated with the corrective action program because post maintenance testing of Procedure STN IC-236 identified deficiencies as well as the post trip review; however, this did not result in initiation of condition reports and subsequent evaluation.
Inspection Report# : 2009003 (pdf)
Significance:        Mar 31, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to follow 10 CFR 50.65a(2) for containment isolation valve failures On February 25, 2009, the inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR 50.65 a(2), the Maintenance Rule, for failure to demonstrate that the performance of a containment isolation valve was effectively controlled through the performance of preventive maintenance such that the valve remained capable of performing its intended function. An
 
inadequate Maintenance Rule evaluation was performed after a containment isolation valve (SJHV0005) exceeded its Maintenance Rule a(2) performance criteria, and as a result goal setting and monitoring were not performed as required by paragraph a(1) of the Maintenance Rule. This issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Report 2009 001667.
The failure to follow 10 CFR 50.65 a(2) and properly evaluate the failed valve, establish performance goals, and monitor its performance is considered a performance deficiency. Per Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix E, Section 7, this finding is more than minor because failure to demonstrate effective control of performance or condition and not putting the affected structures, systems, and components in (a)(1) necessarily involves degraded structures, systems, or components performance or condition. Under NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, the Phase I Significance Screening Process, it was found that the finding is of very low safety significance because it does not represent an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of the reactor containment. This finding was determined to have a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program because the licensee failed to properly classify, prioritize, and evaluate a condition adverse to quality.
Inspection Report# : 2009002 (pdf)
Significance:      Mar 31, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to implement foreign material exclusion control procedure for spent fuel pool The inspectors identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Procedures, for failure to follow Procedure AP 12-003, Foreign Material Exclusion. On January 17, 2009, inspectors conducted a walkdown of the spent fuel pool area and found numerous untracked tools and other equipment inside the fuel pool area. Inspectors also found duct tape attached to various fueling and control rod tools such that duct tape was above and below the water. Condition Report 2009-001388 was initiated identifying a loss of spent fuel pool foreign material control.
Subsequently, Wolf Creek began re-inventorying all materials in the spent fuel pool area.
The inspectors determined that the failure to implement multiple steps of Procedure AP 12 003 was a performance deficiency. This finding is more than minor because it impacted the Barrier Integrity cornerstone attribute of configuration control and affected the cornerstone objective to maintain functionality of the spent fuel pool system.
Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, this finding was determined be of very low safety significance because the finding only affected the barrier function of the spent fuel pool. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the work practices component because even though personnel had been made aware of Wolf Creeks policy on procedure use and adherence through site-wide communications, personnel still failed to follow numerous parts of the procedure, such that Wolf Creek was not using the procedure.
Inspection Report# : 2009002 (pdf)
Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection
 
Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Significance: SL-IV Sep 30, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Report Conditions that Could have Presented Fulfillment of a Safety Function The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV noncited violation of 10 CFR 50.73, Licensee Event Report System, with three examples in which the licensee failed to submit licensee event reports within 60 days following discovery of an event meeting the reportability criteria. First, on April 10, 2008, Wolf Creek submitted Licensee Event Report 2008 002 00 under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) which is operation prohibited by technical specifications but failed to make a report for a loss of safety function per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v) for the same event in which both trains of the emergency core cooling system were inoperable on February 13-14, 2008. Second, Wolf Creek filed Licensee Event Report 2008-004 00 on June 6, 2008 under 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) for an event that caused automatic start of an emergency diesel during a loss of offsite power on April 16, 2008. No report was made under 50.73(a)(2)(v) for an event or condition that could have prevented a safety function due to the loss of offsite power. Third, on April 10, 2008, Wolf Creek filed Event Notification Report 44131 under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) based on a possible trip of all four containment coolers. The notification was later retracted. The inspectors found insufficient evidence to show that the containment coolers would not trip and concluded the event should have been reported under 10 CFR 50.73(a)
(2)(v). All three issues are collectively captured in Condition Report 15318.
The inspectors reviewed this issue in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0612 and the NRC Enforcement Manual. Through this review, the inspectors determined that traditional enforcement was applicable to this issue because the NRC's regulatory ability was affected. Specifically, the NRC relies on the licensee to identify and report conditions or events meeting the criteria specified in regulations in order to perform its regulatory function, and when this is not done, the regulatory function is impacted. The inspectors determined that this finding was not suitable for evaluation using the significance determination process, and as such, was evaluated in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy. The finding was reviewed by NRC management, and because the violation was determined to be of very low safety significance, was not repetitive or willful, and was entered into the corrective action program, this violation is being treated as a Severity Level IV noncited violation consistent with the NRC Enforcement Policy. This finding was determined to have a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program in that the licensee failed to appropriately and thoroughly evaluate for reportability aspects all factors and time frames associated with the inoperability of the emergency core cooling system, the offsite power system, and the containment heat removal system [P.1(c)]
Inspection Report# : 2009004 (pdf)
Significance: SL-IV Jun 30, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Report Conditons Prohibited by Technical Specifications and Safety System Functional Failures The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV noncited violation of 10 CFR 50.73, Licensee Event Report System, associated with the licensees failure to submit a licensee event report within 60 days following discovery of an event meeting the reportability criteria as specified. Specifically, on December 8, 2008, the licensee completed analysis of an issue associated with the residual heat removal system which determined that both trains of the system were inoperable when suction side temperature exceeded 249°F. Based on the results of this analysis as well as plant operating history, it was determined that the licensee failed to report instances where the system was operated in a condition prohibited by technical specifications, and a loss of safety function of the system existed between March 20, 2008, and December 8, 2008. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as Condition Reports 2009 1261 and 2009-1326 and Action Requests 15244, 17776, and 15306.
The inspectors reviewed this issue in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0612 and the NRC Enforcement Manual. Through this review, the inspectors determined that traditional enforcement was applicable to this issue because the NRC's regulatory ability was affected. Specifically, the NRC relies on licensee to identify and report
 
conditions or events meeting the criteria specified in regulations in order to perform its regulatory function, and when this is not done, the regulatory function is impacted. The inspectors determined that this finding was not suitable for evaluation using the significance determination process, and as such, was evaluated in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy. The finding was reviewed by NRC management and, because the violation was determined to be of very low safety significance, was not repetitive or willful, and was entered into the corrective action program, this violation is being treated as a Severity Level IV noncited violation consistent with the NRC Enforcement Policy. This finding was determined to have a crosscutting aspect in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution associated with the corrective action program in that the licensee failed to appropriately and thoroughly evaluate for reportability aspects all factors and time frames associated with the inoperability of residual heat removal system when suction temperatures were above 249°F [P.1(c)]
Inspection Report# : 2009006 (pdf)
Last modified : March 01, 2010
 
Wolf Creek 1 1Q/2010 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance:      Dec 31, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: VIO Violation Failure to Correct Vessel Head Vent Path The inspectors identified a cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, due to an inadequate vent path for the reactor vessel head. The inadequate vent path resulted in the formation of voids in the reactor vessel head during Refueling Outage 17. Failure to ensure an adequate vent path in the reactor vessel head was the subject of a noncited violation in NRC Inspection Report 05000482/2008004. During and after Refueling Outage 16, Wolf Creek initiated a root cause evaluation and corrective actions to prevent occurrence. When one of the possible root causes was disproven in Refueling Outage 17, no additional action was taken to determine the cause of the vessel head vent blockage. However, the licensee could not exclude blockage in the piping. This issue was entered into the corrective action program and the licensee plans to conduct a more thorough inspection of the piping during the next refueling outage. This issue is being tracked by the licensee as Condition Report 22501.
The inspectors determined that the failure to provide adequate vessel head vent path to prevent gas accumulation in the reactor vessel during depressurized plant operations was a performance deficiency. The inspectors determined that this finding, which was associated with the Initiating Events Cornerstone, was more than minor because if left uncorrected, it would have become a more significant safety concern. Specifically, without an adequate vent path the reactor vessel does not have an effective means of relieving noncondensable gases to prevent a loss of reactor coolant system inventory. The inspectors evaluated this finding using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix G, , and determined it be of very low safety significance based upon the demonstrated availability of mitigating systems and the flooded reactor cavity inventory. The inspectors determined the cause of the finding had a problem identification and resolution aspect in the corrective action program. Specifically, Wolf Creeks corrective actions were not successful to address the vent path blockage in a timely manner.
Inspection Report# : 2009005 (pdf)
Significance:      Dec 22, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to Enter Adverse Conditions into the Corrrective Action Program The team identified a finding associated with the licensees failure to recognize the adverse conditions related to their offsite power system as prescribed by Procedure AP 28A 100, Condition Reports. Specifically, the licensee failed to enter pertinent switchyard operating experience and six occurrences of offsite power line losses as adverse conditions in their corrective action program as of August 2009. The licensee entered these deficiencies in their corrective action program as Wolf Creek Condition Reports 00022242 and 00022241.
This finding is greater than minor because, if left uncorrected, the failure to fully utilize the corrective action program could become a more significant safety concern. The inspectors determined that this finding impacted the Initiating Events Cornerstone equipment maintenance attribute and affected the cornerstone objective to limit events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during power operations. Using Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the issue screened as having very low safety significance because it did not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions would not be available.
Inspection Report# : 2009007 (pdf)
 
Significance:      Dec 22, 2009 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Adequately Control Steam Generator Water Levels The team identified a self-revealing noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Procedures, after operators failure to monitor and maintain steam generator water levels resulted in an unanticipated turbine trip signal and feedwater isolation. On August 21, 2009, while in Mode 3, Wolf Creek operators, using an intermittent method of feeding steam generators over shift turnover, lost control of the level in steam generator A. This resulted in increased levels above the P 14 feedwater isolation actuation setpoint. Contributing to the loss of level control was the disabling of a previously established operator selectable alarm for the steam generator level. The licensee entered this deficiency in their corrective action program as Wolf Creek Condition Report 00019295.
This finding is greater than minor because it impacted the Initiating Events Cornerstone human performance attribute and affected the cornerstone objective to limit events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during power operations. Using Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the issue screened as having very low safety significance because it did not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions would not be available and it did not increase the likelihood of a fire or internal/external flooding. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the decision making component because licensee personnel failed to make safety-significant or risk-significant decisions using a systematic process especially when faced with uncertain or unexpected plant conditions to ensure that safety is maintained [H.1(a)]
Inspection Report# : 2009007 (pdf)
Significance:      Dec 22, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Operator Actions Disable Circuit Breaker Coordination and Could Initiate Secondary Fires The inspectors identified a noncited violation of License Condition 2.C.(5), Fire Protection, for the failure to implement and maintain the approved fire protection program. Specifically, the licensee prescribed mitigating actions in response to certain fire scenarios that would result in a loss of circuit breaker coordination and could initiate secondary fires in plant locations outside of the initial fire area. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as Condition Report 2008 005210.
This finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Protection Against External Factors attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations.
The risk significance of this finding was determined using Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance using a Phase 2 evaluation. This finding was not assigned a crosscutting aspect because the cause was not representative of current performance.
Inspection Report# : 2009005 (pdf)
Significance:      Dec 16, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Obtain Vendor Data Necessary for Plant Modification On December 16, 2009, inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, involving failure to obtain vendor design data for a modification. In August 2009, a component cooling water modification was made to the reactor coolant pump thermal barrier heat exchangers flow rates as a corrective action to VIO 05000482/2009002 07 (EA-09-110). A flow rate above the previous design value was justified by an internal memo of a vendor opinion from a telephone conversation in 1992. The inspectors found this to be contrary to Procedure AP 05-005, for obtaining data from vendors. The notice of violation will remain open until
 
full compliance has been restored. Wolf Creek consulted with Westinghouse, confirmed the acceptability of the increased flow rate, and requested a formal calculation. This issue is captured in Condition Report 22824.
The inspectors determined that this finding was more than minor because this issue aligned with Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix E, example 2.f, in that the modification relied on verbal statements to raise the allowable flow through the heat exchanger. This is a significant deficiency in the modification package. The inspectors determined this finding was associated with the design control attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions. The inspectors evaluated the significance of this finding using Phase 1 of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04 and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance because assuming worst case degradation, the finding would not result in exceeding the technical specification limit for identified reactor coolant system leakage and would not have likely affected other mitigation systems resulting in a total loss of their safety function because seal injection was available. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with work practices in that management was unsuccessful in communicating expectations on procedure use and adherence in engineering Inspection Report# : 2009005 (pdf)
Significance:        Oct 23, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Identify Sources of Boron Leakage The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, involving the licensees failure to identify sources of boron leakage and document them in a corrective action document. Specifically, prior to October 23, 2009, the licensee failed to accomplish the requirements of Procedure AP 16F-001, Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program, Revision 5, step 6.4.1, which states, in part, Sources of boron seepage/leakage shall be identified/verified and documented in the applicable corrective action document. During a boric acid walkdown, the inspectors identified 11 sources of boron leakage which had not been previously identified and documented by the licensee. The licensee entered this finding into their corrective action system as Condition Report 00021274.
The finding was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Initiating Events Cornerstone attribute of human performance and affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. The inspectors used Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Attachment 4, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, and determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the issue would not result in exceeding the technical specification limit for identified reactor coolant system leakage or affect other mitigating systems resulting in a total loss of their safety function. The inspectors also determined that the finding had a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution, operating experience, where the licensee did not institutionalize operating experience through changes to station processes, procedures, equipment, and training programs.
Inspection Report# : 2009005 (pdf)
Significance:        Jun 30, 2009 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: FIN Finding Inadequate Fuse Thermography Procedure Resulted in Blown Fuses and Unplanned Reactor Trip A self-revealing finding was identified for an inadequate thermography maintenance procedure. Inadequate procedural guidance resulted in thermography failing to identify an overheated fues which resulted in a reactor trip due a loss of power to a main feed regulating valve controller. On April 28, 2009, the main feedwater regulating valve controller power supply fuses blew, isolating flow to steam Generator B. The fuses blew due to overheating of the fuse holder.
Wolf Creeks root cause found that vendor information was previously used in 1995 to detect a process cabinet main power fuse holder that was hot. However, this guidance was not incorporated into the preventive maintenance thermography procedure. This issue was entered into the corrective action program as Condition Report 00016455.
Failure to develop an adequate maintenance procedure for the 7300 process rack fuses was a performance deficiency.
The inspectors determined that this finding was more than minor because it is associated with the procedure quality attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone and it affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those
 
events that upset plant stability. The inspectors evaluated the significance of this finding using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, and determined the finding to be Green because it did not result in both a reactor trip and loss of accident mitigation equipment. Consequently, this finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green). The inspectors also determined that the cause of the finding has a crosscutting aspect in the problem identification and resolution area associated with operating experience because Wolf Creek failed to use vendor information to assure plant safety. Specifically Wolf Creek utilized but failed to subsequently institutionalize operating experience in 1995 and 2009 by updating the thermography maintenance procedure.
Inspection Report# : 2009003 (pdf)
Significance:      Mar 31, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: VIO Violation Failure to correct component cooling water valve closures The inspectors identified a cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, involving Wolf Creeks failure to correct the cause of the reactor coolant pump thermal barrier component cooling water heat exchanger outlet valves stroking closed on high flow. Specifically, between 2001 and 2009, Wolf Creek experienced repeated cases of the reactor coolant pump thermal barrier component cooling water heat exchanger outlet valves stroking closed during component cooling water pump swaps and during isolations of the radioactive waste evaporators. Wolf Creek reinitiated evaluation of the issue after the inspectors questions but did not review the impact on the operators ability to open the valves given the valves circuit breakers opening. Repeated throttle valve adjustments have not been successful in stopping the valve closures. This issue and the corrective actions are being tracked by the licensee in Condition Report 2007 002074 and has corrective action pending to modify valve circuitry but it has not been implemented.
The failure to correct a condition adverse to quality of ensuring reactor coolant pump seal cooling as described in the Updated Safety Analysis Report is a performance deficiency. The finding is more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute for the Initiating Events Cornerstone; and, it affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the finding would not result in exceeding the Technical Specification limit for identified reactor coolant system leakage and would not have affected other mitigation systems resulting in a total loss of the seal cooling safety function. This finding is being cited because the licensee failed to establish measures to assure this condition adverse to quality was promptly identified and corrected. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the decision making component because, even though numerous instances of valve closures occurred since the first noncited violation, Wolf Creek downgraded the condition report. Using nonconservative assumptions, the licensee consistently viewed this issue as not having a risk impact because seal injection was not simultaneously lost.
[H.1.b]
Inspection Report# : 2009002 (pdf)
Inspection Report# : 2009005 (pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance:      Mar 31, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Follow Procedure for a Main Feed Pump Trip The inspectors identified a Green noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Procedures, for the failure of Wolf Creek control room personnel to follow procedures for a main feedwater pump trip. During a review of the posttrip data and operator statements, the inspectors noted that control room operators took manual control and reset main feedwater Pump A, which was not in accordance with station procedures. This issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report 24011.
This finding was greater than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of human performance and it affected the objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that
 
respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). The inspectors evaluated the significance of this finding using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, and screened the finding to Phase 2 because the finding represents a loss of auxiliary feedwater actuation system safety Function g. The finding screened to Phase 3 because of the failure to start of both motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps. The senior reactor analyst performed a Phase 3 analysis and concluded that the finding was Green because the probability of an initiator occurring within any 10-second exposure time is approximately 3E-7. Additionally, auxiliary feedwater pumps would have been automatically started on lo-lo steam generator level if required. The inspectors also determined that the cause of the finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with operating experience because Wolf Creek failed to communicate relevant operating experience to affected internal stakeholders.
Inspection Report# : 2010002 (pdf)
Significance:      Mar 10, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Establish goals and Monitor for a(1) Offgas Radiation Monitor GERE0092 The inspectors identified a Green noncited violation of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) for failure establish goals per paragraph (a)(1) to monitor the performance of the main condenser offgas radiation Monitor GERE0092. Multiple failures occurred which exceeded the monitoring goals and the function was not moved to 50.65(a)(1) status for corrective action and goal setting. Wolf Creek engineering subsequently evaluated the issues and determined that the function should have been moved to a(1) for goal setting. This is captured in Condition Report 24423.
This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affects the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events. The inspectors evaluated the significance of this finding using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, "Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings," and determined that this finding is of very low safety significance, Green. Specifically, the associated function (SP-04) to detect primary to secondary leakage and then isolate the steam generator blowdown flow path does not result in a loss of any safety function. The inspectors determined that this finding has a crosscutting aspect in the problem identification and resolution area associated with corrective action program because Wolf Creek failed to take appropriate corrective actions to address the system reliability issue and adverse radiation monitor performance trends in a timely manner, commensurate with safety significance and complexity.
Inspection Report# : 2010002 (pdf)
Significance:      Mar 03, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Degraded Fire Barriers for Auxiliary Feedwater The inspectors identified a noncited violation of License Condition 2.C(5)(a) for degraded fire seals that separated redundant safe shutdown equipment. Specifically, silicone foam and ceramic fiber board seals separating the auxiliary feedwater trains from the turbine building and the condensate storage tank valve house were degraded so that they no longer provided a 3-hour rated fire barrier. The licensee entered the finding into the corrective action program as Condition Report 23828.
The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of protection against external events and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the reliability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, Attachment 2, Degradation Rating Guidance Specific to Various Fire Protection Program Elements, under Fire Barrier Degradation, Table A2.2, the finding was associated with Moderate B degradation due to the seal not being in a tested or evaluated condition. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process, in supplemental screening for fire confinement findings, the finding screens as Green due to exposing Fire Area A33 featuring an automatic full area water-based suppression system. No crosscutting aspect was assigned as this condition was not reflective of current licensee performance.
Inspection Report# : 2010002 (pdf)
 
Significance:        Mar 03, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to Perform Adequate Posttrip Review The inspectors identified a Green finding for the failure to adequately implement the posttrip review procedure following a reactor trip caused by low steam generator water levels on March 2, 2010. Specifically, Wolf Creek's posttrip evaluation was not adequate because it failed to identify or evaluate anomalous equipment performance associated with the main feedwater pump that caused the trip. Additionally, the inspectors determined that the Wolf Creeks posttrip review failed to identify that some aspects of operator response to the trip of the main feedwater pump were not in accordance with station procedures. Wolf Creek evaluated the individual issues and deficiencies listed above and entered them into the corrective action program as Condition Reports 23932, 23966, 24043, 23982, and 23981.
This finding was greater than minor because the information omitted from the posttrip review was associated with the human performance attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events. Using Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, this finding was determined to be of very low safety significance since the finding does not represent a loss of system safety function, nor does the finding represent actual loss of safety function for single train for a greater time than permitted by technical specifications. This finding had a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program component because Wolf Creek failed to fully evaluate plant computer data and operator statements associated with the March 2, 2010, reactor trip.
Inspection Report# : 2010002 (pdf)
Significance:        Dec 31, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Follow Procedure Results in Draining of Emergency Core Cooling System Pump Oil On November 23, 2009, a self-revealing violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a was identified when a technician failed to follow procedure and emptied 45 gallons of oil from centrifugal charging Pump A. The technician was supposed to remove the temperature indicator for calibration but instead removed the thermowell which breached the lube oil subsystem of centrifugal charging Pump A. An unplanned entry into Technical Specification 3.5.2, Condition A, was made for approximately 10 hours. The licensee entered this issue in their corrective action program as Condition Report 21993.
The failure to follow station procedures and correctly remove the detector was a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The inspectors evaluated the significance of this finding using Phase 1 of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the pump was inoperable for less than 24 hours. Also, the finding did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The inspectors identified a human performance crosscutting in the area of work practices because self-checking and communication with the supervisor failed to prevent the event.
Inspection Report# : 2009005 (pdf)
Significance:        Dec 22, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform an Operability Evaluation The team identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, regarding the licensees failure to follow the requirements of Procedure AP 26C-004, Technical Specification Operability. Specifically, licensee personnel failed to perform an operability evaluation for the impact of the 2009 water hammer and internal corrosion on the entire essential service water system. The Wolf Creek
 
essential service water system was degraded by a significant water hammer on August 19, 2009. Also in 2009 widespread internal corrosion resulted in at least three through wall leaks. Discovery of these conditions had been documented in the corrective action program but had not resulted in performance of an operability evaluation of the current and potentially future impact on the system as a whole. The licensee entered this deficiency in their corrective action program as Wolf Creek Condition Report 00022240.
This finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of equipment performance and adversely affected the objective to ensure equipment availability and reliability. Using Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the issue screened as having very low safety significance because it was not a design or qualification deficiency that resulted in a loss of operability or functionality, did not create a loss of system safety function of a single train for greater than the technical specification allowed outage times, and did not affect seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating events.
This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program because licensee personnel failed to thoroughly evaluate problems such that the resolutions address causes and extent of conditions [P.1(c)]
Inspection Report# : 2009007 (pdf)
Significance:        Dec 22, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Correctly Screen Essential Service Water Piping Leaks for Significance The team identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, regarding the licensees failure to follow the requirements of Procedure AI 28A-010, Screening Condition Reports. Specifically, licensee personnel failed to properly screen condition reports for the essential service water system adverse conditions of internal corrosion and loss of offsite power induced water hammer since April 2008. The adverse conditions met the procedures marginal consequence and probable frequency definitions which should have, but did not, result in a requirement to perform a root cause analysis prior to September 2009. The licensee entered this deficiency in their corrective action program as Wolf Creek Condition Report 00022239.
This finding is greater than minor because, if left uncorrected, the failure to fully utilize the corrective action program could become a more significant safety concern. The inspectors determined that this finding impacted the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone. Using Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the issue screened as having very low safety significance because it was not a design or qualification deficiency that resulted in a loss of operability or functionality, did not create a loss of system safety function of a single train for greater than the technical specification allowed outage times, and did not affect seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating events. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program because licensee personnel failed to thoroughly evaluate problems such that the resolutions address causes and extent of conditions [P.1(c)]
Inspection Report# : 2009007 (pdf)
Significance:        Dec 22, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Ensure Adequate Acceptance Criteria and Extent of Condition Guidance in Lake Water and Corrective Action Program Procedures The team identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, regarding the licensees failure to provide adequate guidance to identify and address pitting, corrosion, and surface indications in the essential service water system. A 2007 licensee self-assessment on lake water corrosion issues recommended improvements in lake water chemistry control procedures to establish a pit monitoring program.
In September 2009 NRC inspectors noted that the lake water monitoring and chemistry control procedures did not contain quality standards or acceptance criteria for newly discovered flaws or abnormal gross degradation due to erosion, pitting, or corrosion. Not having such procedural quality standards resulted in allowing repairs to not be performed until such degradations (pitting) had become through-wall leaks. Several instances of internally identified
 
corrosion were not entered into the corrective action program until essential service water piping had thinned to below the minimum ASME code allowed wall thickness. The licensee entered this deficiency in their corrective action program as Wolf Creek Condition Report 00022243.
This finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of procedure quality and adversely affected the objective to ensure equipment availability and reliability. Using Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the issue screened as having very low safety significance because it was not a design or qualification deficiency that resulted in a loss of operability or functionality, did not create a loss of system safety function of a single train for greater than the technical specification allowed outage times, and did not affect seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating events. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program because licensee personnel failed to take appropriate corrective actions to address safety issues and adverse trends in a timely manner [P.1(d)]
Inspection Report# : 2009007 (pdf)
Significance:      Dec 22, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Procedure Resulted in Failure to Discover Essential Service Water System Leakage Following a Water Hammer Event The team identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, regarding the licensees failure to provide adequate guidance to address the impact of a loss of offsite power event on the essential service water system. On August 19, 2009, seven hours following a loss of offsite power induced water hammer of the essential service water system, the NRC senior resident identified that the licensee was unaware of significant leakage from the piping on the 1988 elevation of the auxiliary building. Wolf Creek Procedure STN PE 040G, Transient Event Walkdown, required that systems subject to expected transient dynamic forces following a reactor trip to have a post-trip walkdown to identify any structural damage. This procedure did not include the essential service water system as a vulnerable system. The procedure only specifically identified portions of systems inside containment. As a result, no walkdown was performed for the essential service water system on August 19, 2009. The licensee entered this deficiency in their corrective action program as Wolf Creek Condition Report 00022265.
This finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of procedure quality and adversely affected the objective to ensure equipment availability and reliability. Using Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the issue screened as having very low safety significance because it was not a design or qualification deficiency that resulted in a loss of operability or functionality, did not create a loss of system safety function of a single train for greater than the technical specification allowed outage times, and did not affect seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating events. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the operating experience component because the licensee failed to institutionalize lessons learned through changes to station walkdown procedures [P.2(b)]
Inspection Report# : 2009007 (pdf)
Significance:      Dec 22, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Initiate Timely Fire Protection Impairment Control Permit and Implement Compensatory Measures The team identified a noncited violation of License Condition 2.C.(5), Fire Protection, for the failure to establish a compensatory fire watch in a timely manner per the station fire protection program. On August 19, 2009, a complete loss of offsite power resulted in fire protection trouble alarms on fire protection panel KC 008. The control room supervisor acknowledged the alarms. Procedure ALR KC 888, Fire Protection Panel KC 008 Alarm Response, required an impairment and compensatory measures for the affected smoke detectors. The following day it was
 
noticed that impairments and fire watches for the 13 affected fire zones on KC 008 had not been initiated. The licensee entered this deficiency in their corrective action program as Wolf Creek Condition Report 00019320.
This finding was more than minor since it was associated with the protection against external factors attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process, the inspectors determined that the finding had an adverse affect on the fixed fire protection systems element of fixed fire detection systems. This finding was ultimately determined, by a senior reactor analyst, to be of very low safety significance because of a low exposure time of the uncompensated deficiency. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the work practices component because the licensee failed to ensure supervisory oversight of work activities such that nuclear safety is supported [H.4(c)]
Inspection Report# : 2009007 (pdf)
Significance:        Nov 12, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: VIO Violation Failure to Correct Discolored Boric Acid Deposits The inspectors identified a cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for failure to take action to stop leakage from the base of the refueling water storage tank or evaluate the leakage and wastage for acceptability. Specifically, the licensee did not take actions to prevent recurring discolored boric acid deposits for approximately 11 years. Failure to correct leakage from the refueling water storage tank base was the subject of a noncited violation in NRC Inspection Report 05000482/2007006. This issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report 22866.
The failure to implement corrective actions for the refueling water storage tank leakage was a performance deficiency.
The inspectors determined this issue impacted the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and was greater than minor because if left uncorrected, the failure to correct the presence of boric acid leakage could become a more significant safety concern in that continued wastage could impact tank operability. Using the Phase 1 worksheets in Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, "Significance Determination Process," the finding was determined to have very low safety significance because it did not result in a system or component being inoperable and it did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The inspectors identified a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with resources. Specifically, Wolf Creek did not maintain long term plant safety minimizing corrective maintenance deferrals and this long standing equipment issue.
Inspection Report# : 2009005 (pdf)
Significance:        Nov 05, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Operability Evaluation of Essential Service Water Pumps On November 5, 2009, inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for the failure to perform an adequate operability evaluation required by procedure. The inspectors identified that Operability Evaluation EF 09 010, Revisions 0 and 1, did not demonstrate that the essential service water pumps could withstand a safe shutdown earthquake. Revision 2 of the operability evaluation included calculations to demonstrate acceptable stresses and included pump impeller clearances. This issue is captured in the corrective action program as condition reports 22798 and 21572.
The failure to perform an adequate operability evaluation per Procedures AP 28 001 and AP 26C 004 was a performance deficiency. The inspectors determined that this finding was more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, and it affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). Specifically, this issue relates to the availability and reliability examples of the equipment performance attribute because a latent common mode failure mechanism was not correctly evaluated. The inspectors evaluated the significance of this finding using Phase 1 of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the issue was not a design or
 
qualification deficiency confirmed to result in loss of operability or functionality, did not represent a loss of system safety function, an actual loss of safety function of a single train for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time, an actual loss of safety function of a nontechnical specification risk-significant equipment train, and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The cause of the finding has a problem identification and resolution crosscutting aspect associated with the corrective action program because Wolf Creek failed to thoroughly evaluate the failure mechanism such that the resolutions address the causes and extent of conditions, as necessary.
Inspection Report# : 2009005 (pdf)
Significance:        Oct 21, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Control of Transient Ignition Sources.
The inspectors identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, for an inadequate Procedure AP 101, Control of Transient Ignition Sources. On October 21, 2009, the inspectors observed maintenance personnel performing weld preparation work on essential service water piping to containment cooler B using a flapper wheel.
The inspectors observed that the ignition control barriers for the hot work were insufficient in that the sparks from the preparation work extended four to five feet from the job site and there was no fire watch posted. On December 4, 2003, a procedure revision inappropriately incorporated a change to the procedure where a fire watch did not have to be posted when using wire brushes, flapper wheels, polishing devices, or Rol-Lok type buffing pads mounted on power grinder motor drives or air tools. The maintenance supervisor stopped the work until a fire watch was posted.
The licensee entered this into their corrective action system as Condition Report 20993.
This finding is more than minor because it affected the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of Protection Against External Factors - Fires, and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The lack of a posted fire watch could adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a severe fire in the affected area. Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process, could not be used to effectively evaluate the finding and defense-in-depth strategies because the 2003 changes to the fire watch program affected multiple fire areas and conditions. Therefore, in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix M, the safety significance was determined by regional management review who concluded that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green). This finding was reviewed for crosscutting aspects and none were identified. The original change occurred in 2003 and was not indicative of current performance.
Inspection Report# : 2009005 (pdf)
Significance:        Oct 21, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Incorporate Requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.182 into Shutdown Risk The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) involving the failure to adequately perform shutdown risk assessments during Refueling Outage 17. Between October 10 and November 17, 2009, Wolf Creek did not appropriately consider electrical power, decay heat removal, and containment when assessing shutdown risk.
This changed the outcome or color of the qualitative calculation on several occasions. The licensee entered this issue in their corrective action program as Condition Reports 22295 and 22296.
The failure to meet shutdown risk assessment requirements in the daily shutdown risk assessment process is a performance deficiency. The inspectors determined this finding was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and was more than minor because it involved incorrect risk assessment assumptions by omitting requirements specified in committed guidance without providing justification for that omission. Such errors of omission have the potential to change the outcome of the licensees maintenance risk assessment as described above.
Per Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix K, Maintenance Risk Assessment and Risk Management Significance Determination Process, licensees who only perform qualitative analyses of plant configuration risk due to maintenance activities, the significance of the deficiencies must be determined by an internal NRC management
 
review using risk insights where possible in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 612, Power Reactor Inspection Reports. The NRC management review concluded that this finding was of Green safety significance because missing risk management actions did not result in loss of key shutdown risk functions. Additionally, the cause of the finding has a human performance crosscutting aspect in the area associated with the resources. Specifically, Wolf Creek did not ensure that Procedure APF 22B-001-02 was complete, accurate, and up-to-date Inspection Report# : 2009005 (pdf)
Significance:      Oct 15, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Follow Corrective Action Procedure On October 15, 2009, the inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for failure to follow Procedure AP 28A-100, Condition Reports. Wolf Creek failed to initiate a condition report for evaluation of corrosion on containment cooler A piping. After inspector challenging, Wolf Creek initiated condition reports, performed nondestructive testing, replaced corroded studs, and evaluated the cause of the corrosion.
The inspectors determined that the failure to follow AP 28A-100, Appendix C, was a performance deficiency. This issue was more than minor because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, the issue screened to Green because there was not a loss of operability and the finding did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. A crosscutting aspect was identified in the problem identification and resolution area of the corrective action program. Specifically, Wolf Creek failed to implement a corrective action program with a low threshold for identifying issues.
Inspection Report# : 2009005 (pdf)
Significance:      Oct 15, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Unevaluated Scaffold Against Component Cooling Water Piping The inspectors identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a for failure to properly implement Procedure AP 14A-003, Scaffold Construction and Use, when scaffolding was erected against operable safety-related equipment. On October 15, 2009, the inspectors walked down containment and identified scaffolding in contact with component cooling water piping. The tag on the scaffold explicitly stated that it was not seismically qualified. At the time, both steam generators were inoperable and both trains of residual heat removal were required to be operable. The inspectors reviewed the bases for Technical Specification 3.4.7, RCS Loops - Mode 5, Loops Filled, which required an operable heat sink path from residual heat removal to component cooling water to essential service water. This issue was entered into the corrective action program as Condition Report 22464.
The construction of an unqualified scaffold against operable component cooling water piping was a performance deficiency. The inspectors determined that this finding was more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute for the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). Specifically, this issue relates to the availability and reliability examples of the equipment performance attribute because a latent failure mechanism was not evaluated. The inspectors evaluated the significance of this finding using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix G, Attachment 1, Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process Phase 1 Operational Checklists for Both PWRs and BWRs. The inspectors determined that Checklist 3 was applicable because the unit was in cold shutdown with the refueling cavity level less than 23 feet. Using Appendix G, Attachment 1, Checklist 3, Phase 2 analysis was not needed and the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the licensee was able to demonstrate that the seismically unqualified scaffolding would not have resulted in a loss of safety function. The inspectors determined the cause of the finding had a human performance aspect in the area of resources. Specifically, Procedure AP 14A-003 was inadequate because it had conflicting guidance that allowed seismically unqualified scaffolds in Modes 5 and 6.
 
Inspection Report# : 2009005 (pdf)
Significance:        Sep 30, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inability to perform manual actions for risk assessment The inspector identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) for failure to adequately assess and manage the increase in risk during fuse inspection of component cooling water valves supplying cooling loads inside containment.
On March 18, 2009, component cooling water Valves EG HV 16 and EG HV-54 were out of service for fuse inspections to verify wiring for fire protection analyses. The inspectors observed that the evolution was not included in the weekly risk assessment and that operations and maintenance personnel did not have guidance or briefings for restoration of the valves. Review of the risk assessment revealed that the impact of de-energizing the valves in the closed position was neglected and that restoration actions credited by the risk analyst were unknown to the control room and craft workers. The issue was entered into the corrective action program as Condition Report 15318.
The failure to adequately assess and manage risk in accordance with AP 22C 003 and the preplanned risk assessment for the use of local actions to ensure component cooling water cooling to loads inside containment was a performance deficiency. The finding is more than minor because the licensee failed to effectively manage prescribed significant compensatory measures for maintenance activities that could increase the likelihood of initiating events. The finding was of very low safety significance because the magnitude of the calculated risk deficit was less than IE-6 even though risk management actions were not in place. The inspectors also determined that the finding has a human performance crosscutting aspect in the area associated with work control because the risk assessment procedure and clearance order procedure assumed local actions could be accomplished but there was no communication regarding this during the work planning stages [H.3(b)]
Inspection Report# : 2009004 (pdf)
Significance:        Sep 30, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Use of Nonsafety Related Power to Ensure Operability of Safety Related Boric Acid System The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for failing to translate the boric acid design basis into procedures that ensure time sensitive operator actions are completed to achieve the core shutdown margin specified in the core operating limits report. Performance Improvement Request 2005-3461 identified that if the room coolers were started while lake temperature was low, the boric acid solution temperature may decrease below the solubility limit. Corrective actions for heat tracing and room temperature logging took approximately 3 years to implement and stopped short of addressing boric acid system operation when nonsafety power is lost to the heat tracing and the plant must be taken to cold shutdown in accordance with technical specifications. The licensee entered this issue in their corrective action program as Condition Report 20717.
The failure to translate the design bases into procedures that ensure the function of the safety related boric acid system upon loss of nonsafety related heat tracing is a performance deficiency. The inspectors determined that this finding was more than minor because this issue aligned with Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix E, example 2.f, because the pipe temperature was required to stay above the boric acid solubility limit and the loss of the heat tracing and or room temperature decrease will block the boric acid system. This issue was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events. The inspectors evaluated the significance of this finding using Phase 1 of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, "Significance Determination of Reactor Inspection Findings for At Power Situations," and determined that the finding screened to phase 2 because the issue was a design or qualification deficiency confirmed to result in loss of operability or functionality The inspectors evaluated the significance of this finding using Phase 2 of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Risk Informed Inspection Notebook for Wolf Creek Generating Station, and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance because loss of the boric acid system in Table 3.9 for one year resulted in a 1E-7 CDF when giving recovery credit for the refueling water storage tank. The inspectors determined that this finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program component because Wolf Creek did not take appropriate corrective actions to resolve known deficiencies in the design and operation of the boric acid system for approximately 4 years. The issue was re-evaluated in 2009, and the licensee
 
failed to correct the deficiencies identified in 2005. [P.1.d]
Inspection Report# : 2009004 (pdf)
Significance: SL-IV Sep 30, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Changes to the Approved Fire Protection Program Without Prior Staff Approval The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV noncited violation of License Condition 2.C.(5), Fire Protection, for making changes to the approved fire protection program without the required prior Commission approval.
Specifically, the licensee made a change to the Updated Safety Analysis Report that allowed the licensee to violate the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.L. Specifically, when the licensee recognized that fire damage could cause a pressurizer power operated relief valve to open long enough to create a void in the reactor vessel, this was documented as acceptable when it was not in compliance with this regulatory requirement. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2008 004869.
This finding was assessed using traditional enforcement since it had the potential for impacting the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function. This finding is more than minor since the change required prior staff review and approval prior to implementation and it did not receive the required approval. A senior reactor analyst performed a Phase 3 evaluation and determined this performance deficiency was of very low risk significance. In accordance with the guidance in Supplement I of the Enforcement Policy, this issue is considered a Severity Level IV noncited violation because it is of very low risk significance. This finding had a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with resources because the licensee failed to maintain long term plant safety by maintaining design margins. Specifically, the licensees choice to allow reactor vessel head voiding during an alternative shutdown in lieu of restoring the plant to compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.L constituted a reduction in safety margin [H.2(a)]
Inspection Report# : 2009004 (pdf)
Significance:        Aug 31, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Mode Change Under Technical Specification 3.0.4.b without Required Risk Management Actions On November 18, 2009, the inspectors identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 3.0.4.b for ascension from Mode 4 to Mode 3 without establishing required risk management actions. Wolf Creek used technical specification Limiting Condition for Operation 3.0.4.b to permit mode ascension after performance of a risk assessment and identification of risk management actions to maintain safety in the next mode. The turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump was inoperable per Technical Specification 3.7.5. As a risk management action, protected train signs would be placed on the doors to the motor driven auxiliary feedwater Pump A and B room doors. A walkdown conducted by the inspector on the morning of November 18, 2009, found that the protected train signs on the motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump rooms were not in place. Also, a maintenance crew was performing radiography in the motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump Room B. The motor driven auxiliary feedwater Pumps A and B were also made inoperable (at separate times) later on the morning of November 18, 2009. The licensee entered this issue in their corrective action program as Condition Report 21926.
Mode ascension under Technical Specification LCO 3.0.4.b without establishing required risk management actions is a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the configuration control and alignment attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The configuration control issues not only included the work being completed on the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump, but also included containment isolation valve testing and radiography that was performed on the motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps which was not included in the risk assessment. The inspector used Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, to determine that the finding was of very-low safety significance (Green) because it did not result in a loss of system safety function; did not exceed allowable technical specification outage time; and was not a seismic, flooding, or severe weather concern. Additionally, the cause of the finding has a human performance crosscutting aspect in the area associated with decision making. Specifically, Wolf Creek used a risk assessment form and an informal mode change form to communicate between departments the requirement for risk management actions. The two forms were in conflict and the personnel who implemented the risk management actions were not informed.
 
Inspection Report# : 2009005 (pdf)
Significance:        Jun 30, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Testing Equipment Used for Alignment Verification of Emergency Diesel Lube Oil Piping The inspectors identified a noncited violation for an inadequate control of measuring and test equipment used to verify the design basis of a safety related system. On June 2, 2009, Wolf Creek measured pipe gaps and angles of deflection associated with Smith-Blair couplings on the emergency diesel generator lube oil and jacket water systems. Wolf Creek used commercial grade tape measures and protractors to determine whether the piping met vendor and design requirements or if the piping had to be refitted. Some of the measurements indicated little or no margin from the maximum pipe gap tolerances. Instrument degradation and human error were not factored into the assessment of design margin when using commercial grade tools. The design specification called for a measurement to one-hundredth of one inch, whereas the tape measure was only graduated to one-sixteenth of one inch. This issue was entered into the corrective action program as Condition Report 00017781.
Failure to use appropriately qualified measuring and test equipment when verifying the design specifications of a safety related system was a performance deficiency. The inspectors determined that this finding was more than minor because it is associated with the design control attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and it affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of mitigating systems. The inspectors evaluated the significance of this finding using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, and determined the finding to be Green because it did not result in the loss of operability or functionality and was not affected by external events such as earthquakes or floods. Consequently, this finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green).
The inspectors also determined that the cause of the finding has a crosscutting aspect in the human performance area associated with work controls because Wolf Creek failed to place adequate instructions into the work order to assure that the use of the proper measuring and test equipment requirements were specified.
Inspection Report# : 2009003 (pdf)
Significance:        Jun 30, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Evaluation of Emergency Diesel Generator for Common Cause Failure in the Supporting Essential Service Water System On June 30, 2009, the inspectors identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 3.8.1 for failure to perform an adequate common cause evaluation within 24 hours to demonstrate no common cause failure mechanism existed between the emergency diesel generators after a through-wall leak was discovered on the essential service water piping. Wolf Creek did not start the opposite train emergency diesel generator and declared that the through-wall flaw was not a common cause failure without any evaluation or supporting statements. Nondestructive testing had not been started at this time. Subsequent evaluation of the flaw per American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code Case N513.2 restored operability to the essential service water piping. The licensee entered this issue in their corrective action program as Condition Report 18347.
The inspectors determined that the failure to demonstrate, per Technical Specifications 3.8.1 Required Actions B.3.1 or B.3.2, that no common cause failure existed for the emergency diesel generators was a performance deficiency. The inspectors determined that this finding was more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute for the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The inspectors evaluated the significance of this finding using Phase 1 of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, "Significance Determination of Reactor Inspection Findings for At Power Situations," and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the issue was not a design or qualification deficiency confirmed to result in loss of operability or functionality, did not represent a loss of system safety function, an actual loss of safety function of a single train for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time, an actual loss of safety function of a nontechnical specification risk-significant equipment train, and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The cause of the finding has a problem identification and resolution crosscutting aspect in the area associated with the corrective action program because
 
Wolf Creek failed to thoroughly evaluate the failure mechanism such that the resolutions address the causes and extent of conditions, as necessary. Specifically Wolf Creek did not properly consider the possibility of common-cause pitting failures which could have impacted the essential service water piping Train A structural integrity thereby affecting its cooling loads, including the Emergency Diesel Generator A [P.1(c)]
Inspection Report# : 2009004 (pdf)
Significance:        Jun 30, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate instructions for changing modes of operation of the residual heat removal system The inspectors identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1, Procedures, associated with the licensees failure to ensure that adequate procedures were available for changing modes of operation of the residual heat removal system from shutdown cooling to emergency core cooling system operation. Specifically, station procedures allowed the residual heat removal system to be realigned to the emergency core cooling system mode of operation following operation in the shutdown cooling mode with suction temperatures as high as 350°F without properly cooling the entire suction header. This resulted in both trains of the residual heat removal system being inoperable during periods of operation in Modes 3 and 4. This issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Reports 2008-3810 and 2008 4997.
The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and it directly affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 Worksheet, the inspectors concluded that a Phase 2 evaluation was required because this finding represented a loss of safety function of the residual heat removal system.
The inspectors performed a Phase 2 analysis using Appendix A, Determining the Safety Significance of Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations, of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, and the plant specific Phase 2 presolved tables and worksheets for Wolf Creek. The inspectors determined that the Phase 2 presolved tables and worksheets did not contain appropriate target sets to accurately estimate the risk input of the finding. Therefore, it was determined that a Phase 3 analysis was required. Senior risk analysts performed a Phase 3 analysis of this issue. The estimated Conditional Core Damage Probability was determined to be 2.84E-7, and the estimated Conditional Large Early Release Probability was determined to be 2.72E-9. Based on these results, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance. This finding was determined to have a crosscutting aspect in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution associated with the corrective action program [P.1(c)], in that the licensee failed to appropriately and thoroughly evaluate problems such that the resolutions address the causes Inspection Report# : 2009006 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Significance:        Mar 03, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inoperable Containment Cooler Condensate Monitoring System The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, due to all containment cooler drip pans being degraded such that the containment cooler condensate monitoring system could not perform its design basis safety function to quantify reactor coolant system leakage into the containment atmosphere. Wolf Creek initiated Condition Report 24005 and Work Order 10-325741-000 to clean and repair the drip pans.
This issue is more than minor because it was associated with the equipment performance aspect of the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone and impacted the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, it affected the licensees ability to detect a reactor coolant system leak. The inspectors used Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04,
 
Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, to analyze the significance of this finding. The inspectors concluded the finding is of very low safety significance because the condition was not related to pressurized thermal shock. The inspectors also determined that the cause of the finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program because Wolf Creek failed to identify adverse postwork conditions after the coolers received maintenance in the 2009 refueling outage Inspection Report# : 2010002 (pdf)
Significance:        Dec 30, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Identify Inoperable P-6 Interlock and Intermediate Range Detector On December 30, 2009, the inspectors identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification Table 3.3.1-1, Function 18.a, when Wolf Creek restarted on May 18, 2005. During a reactor shutdown on October 7, 2006, intermediate range neutron detector Nuclear Instrument 36 did not decrease below 6E -11 amps and energize source range detector Nuclear Instrument 32. The detector was not replaced until Refueling Outage 16 in March 2008. The licensee entered this issue in their corrective action program as Condition Report 22450 The inspectors determined that the failure to ensure that the P-6 interlock was operable per the technical specification as defined in the bases was a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the configuration control (reactivity control) attribute of the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone, and it affected the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers (fuel cladding, reactor coolant system, and containment) protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. The inspectors evaluated the significance of this finding using Phase 1 of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, and determined that the finding screened to Green because the P-6 interlock only affected the fuel barrier. This finding was not assigned a crosscutting aspect because the cause was not representative of current performance.
Inspection Report# : 2009005 (pdf)
Significance:        Dec 15, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequately Analyzed Emergency Operating Procedure Change The NRC examiners identified a Green noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.b for failure to validate changes made to Emergency Operating Procedures. Specifically, the licensee failed to validate a change made to Emergency Operating Procedure E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. This unvalidated change to E-0 had the unintended consequence of changing the Emergency Operating Procedure mitigation strategy in the steam generator tube rupture procedure, E-3, in that it resulted in premature direction to close the main steam isolation valves which increases the likelihood and duration of a radioactive release during a tube rupture event. This was an undesirable effect that the licensee had not considered when it made the change to E-0. This was entered into the licensees Corrective Action Program under AR22391, and the licensee removed the change that was made to E-0.
The finding was more than minor because it adversely affected the barrier integrity cornerstone attribute of Procedure Quality in that the change to the emergency operating procedure increased the likelihood of an offsite release during a steam generator tube rupture casualty. Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 4, Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, was used to evaluate the finding. The finding is of very low safety significance because it did not represent a degradation of the radiological barrier function provided for the control room, auxiliary building, or spent fuel pool; it did not represent a degradation of the barrier function of the control room against smoke or a toxic atmosphere; it did not represent an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of reactor containment; and it did not involve an actual reduction in function of hydrogen ignitors in the reactor containment. The finding had a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with decision making because the licensee failed to conduct effectiveness reviews of safety-significant decisions to verify the validity of underlying assumptions and identify possible unintended consequences.
Inspection Report# : 2009302 (pdf)
Significance:        Aug 22, 2009
 
Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Positive Reactivity Addition Prohibited by Technical Specifications while in Mode 2 The inspectors identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 3.3.1, Condition I, for making positive reactivity addition prohibited by technical specifications in Mode 2 because one source range nuclear instrument channel was inoperable. Following a reactor transient, one of the source range nuclear instrument channels experienced an unanticipated increased count rate and was declared inoperable. Wolf Creek restored the channel in an operability evaluation which cited the cause as a problem in a component which was later determined not to exist in the installed configuration; however, the improperly restored equipment had already been used for to support plant startup on August 22, 2009. Wolf Creek replaced the detector during Refueling Outage 17. This issue was entered into the correction action program as Condition Report 20208.
Reactivity addition with source range channel Nuclear Instrument-31 inoperable is a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the configuration control (reactivity control) attribute of the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone, and it affected the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers (fuel cladding, reactor coolant system, and containment) protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. The inspectors evaluated the significance of this finding using Phase 1 of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, and determined that the finding screened to Green because the finding only affected the fuel barrier. Additionally, the cause of the finding has a human performance crosscutting aspect in the area associated with the decision making. Specifically, Wolf Creek did not use conservative assumptions in decision making and adopt requirements to demonstrate that the proposed action is safe in order to proceed rather than a requirement to demonstrate that it is unsafe in order to disapprove the action, when performing an operability evaluation for the source range Nuclear Instrument 31 detector prior to restarting from a forced outage Inspection Report# : 2009005 (pdf)
Significance:      Aug 12, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Log Foreign Material in Spent Fuel Pool After Extent of Condition Evaluation The inspectors identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Procedures, for failure to follow Procedure AP 12-003, Foreign Material Exclusion. On August 12, 2009, the inspectors conducted a walkdown of the spent fuel pool area and found duct tape attached to various fueling and control rod tools such that duct tape was below the water. This duct tape was not in the foreign material exclusion logs. Spent fuel pool foreign material control is required under Procedure AP 12-003. The licensee entered this issue in their corrective action program as Condition Report 20338.
The inspectors determined that the failure to log material in accordance with Procedure AP 12 003 was a performance deficiency. This finding is more than minor because it impacted the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone attribute of configuration control and affected the cornerstone objective to maintain functionality of the spent fuel pool system.
Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, this finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the finding only affected the barrier function of the spent fuel pool. The inspectors determined that this finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program component because although Wolf Creek performed a root cause and extent of condition evaluation for untracked foreign material, the evaluation still failed to find the duct tape in the pool itself. This allowed the tape to continue to be untracked [P.1.c]
Inspection Report# : 2009004 (pdf)
Significance:      Jun 30, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Testing Results in P-6 Interlock Failure to Energize Source Range on Reactor Trip On April 28, 2009, the inspectors identified a Green noncited violation of Technical Specification, Table 3.3.1-1, Function 18.a, when Wolf Creek tripped from 100 percent reactor power. During the trip, intermediate range neutron Detector NI-36 did not decrease below 10 E -10 amps and energize source range Detector NI-32. The inspectors determined that post maintenance testing of the new detector during the previous refueling outage was insufficient and caused the detector to be under compensated. A postmaintenance testing deficiency was not evaluated. After reactor
 
trip, this issue was entered into the corrective action program but was closed to pending recalibration of the detector.
The deficiency for Function 18.a was entered into the corrective action program after the inspectors questioning.
The inspectors determined that the failure to ensure that the P-6 interlock was operable per the technical specification as defined in the bases was a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the configuration control attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone, and it affected the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers (fuel cladding, reactor coolant system, and containment) protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, it affected the reactivity control area (reactor control systems) of the cornerstones attribute. The inspectors evaluated the significance of this finding under the Mitigating Systems cornerstone using Phase 1 of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, and determined that the finding screened to Green because the P-6 interlock only affected the fuel barrier. This issue has been entered into the corrective action program as Condition Report 00017814. The cause of this finding was determined to have a crosscutting aspect in the problem identification and resolution area associated with the corrective action program because post maintenance testing of Procedure STN IC-236 identified deficiencies as well as the post trip review; however, this did not result in initiation of condition reports and subsequent evaluation.
Inspection Report# : 2009003 (pdf)
Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Significance:        Nov 23, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Maintain Administrative Control of Keys to Locked High Radiation Areas The inspector identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.7.2.a.1 for failure to maintain administrative control of door and gate keys to high radiation areas with dose rates greater than 1 rem per hour but less than 500 rads per hour (referred to as locked high radiation areas). Specifically, as of October 21, 2009, the licensee did not have administrative controls over a single master key to locked high radiation areas. This issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Report 20973.
Failure to maintain administrative control of the master key to locked high radiation areas was a performance deficiency. This finding is greater than minor because if left uncorrected the finding has the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern in that an individual could receive unanticipated radiation dose by gaining access a locked high radiation area without the proper controls and briefing. This finding was evaluated using the occupational radiation safety significance determination process and determined to be of very low safety significance because it did not involve: (1) as low as is reasonably achievable planning or work control issue, (2) an overexposure, (3) a substantial potential for overexposure, or (4) an impaired ability to assess dose. Additionally, the violation has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the work practices component because the lack of peer and self-checking resulted in inadequate control of keys to locked high radiation areas Inspection Report# : 2009005 (pdf)
Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection
 
Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Significance: SL-IV Dec 31, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Report a Condition That Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV noncited violation of 10 CFR 50.73 in which the licensee failed to submit a licensee event report within 60 days following discovery of events or conditions meeting the reportability criteria. On December 31, 2009, the inspectors identified a licensee event report that was not timely. Licensee Event Report 2009-009-00 was not issued within 60 days for a condition prohibited by technical specifications, and the event report did not identify that the disabling of both trains of the P 4 interlock on August 22, 2009 was also reportable per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v). The P 4 interlock was required by Technical Specification 3.3.2, function 8.a, and is discussed in USAR, Section 7.3.8, NSSS Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System. Wolf Creek licensee event report 2009-009 was correct in that the interlock is not credited in accident analysis. However, NUREG 1022, Section 3.2.6, specifies that inoperable systems required by the technical specifications be reported, even if there are other diverse operable means of accomplishing the safety function.
The inspectors reviewed this issue in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0612 and the NRC Enforcement Manual. Through this review, the inspectors determined that traditional enforcement was applicable to this issue because the NRC's regulatory ability was affected. Specifically, the NRC relies on the licensee to identify and report conditions or events meeting the criteria specified in regulations in order to perform its regulatory function, and when this is not done, the regulatory function is impacted. The inspectors determined that this finding was not suitable for evaluation using the significance determination process, and as such, was evaluated in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy. The finding was reviewed by NRC management, and because the violation was determined to be of very low safety significance, was not repetitive or willful, and was entered into the corrective action program, this violation is being treated as a Severity Level IV noncited violation consistent with the NRC Enforcement Policy. This finding was determined to have a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program in that the licensee failed to appropriately and thoroughly evaluate for reportability aspects all factors and time frames associated with the inoperability of the engineered safety features actuation system .
Inspection Report# : 2009005 (pdf)
Significance: SL-IV Sep 30, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Report Conditions that Could have Presented Fulfillment of a Safety Function The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV noncited violation of 10 CFR 50.73, Licensee Event Report System, with three examples in which the licensee failed to submit licensee event reports within 60 days following discovery of an event meeting the reportability criteria. First, on April 10, 2008, Wolf Creek submitted Licensee Event Report 2008 002 00 under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) which is operation prohibited by technical specifications but failed to make a report for a loss of safety function per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v) for the same event in which both trains of the emergency core cooling system were inoperable on February 13-14, 2008. Second, Wolf Creek filed Licensee Event Report 2008-004 00 on June 6, 2008 under 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) for an event that caused automatic start of an emergency diesel during a loss of offsite power on April 16, 2008. No report was made under 50.73(a)(2)(v) for an event or condition that could have prevented a safety function due to the loss of offsite power. Third, on April 10, 2008, Wolf Creek filed Event Notification Report 44131 under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) based on a possible trip of all four containment coolers. The notification was later retracted. The inspectors found insufficient evidence to show that the containment coolers would not trip and concluded the event should have been reported under 10 CFR 50.73(a)
(2)(v). All three issues are collectively captured in Condition Report 15318.
The inspectors reviewed this issue in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0612 and the NRC Enforcement
 
Manual. Through this review, the inspectors determined that traditional enforcement was applicable to this issue because the NRC's regulatory ability was affected. Specifically, the NRC relies on the licensee to identify and report conditions or events meeting the criteria specified in regulations in order to perform its regulatory function, and when this is not done, the regulatory function is impacted. The inspectors determined that this finding was not suitable for evaluation using the significance determination process, and as such, was evaluated in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy. The finding was reviewed by NRC management, and because the violation was determined to be of very low safety significance, was not repetitive or willful, and was entered into the corrective action program, this violation is being treated as a Severity Level IV noncited violation consistent with the NRC Enforcement Policy. This finding was determined to have a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program in that the licensee failed to appropriately and thoroughly evaluate for reportability aspects all factors and time frames associated with the inoperability of the emergency core cooling system, the offsite power system, and the containment heat removal system [P.1(c)]
Inspection Report# : 2009004 (pdf)
Significance: SL-IV Jun 30, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Report Conditons Prohibited by Technical Specifications and Safety System Functional Failures The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV noncited violation of 10 CFR 50.73, Licensee Event Report System, associated with the licensees failure to submit a licensee event report within 60 days following discovery of an event meeting the reportability criteria as specified. Specifically, on December 8, 2008, the licensee completed analysis of an issue associated with the residual heat removal system which determined that both trains of the system were inoperable when suction side temperature exceeded 249°F. Based on the results of this analysis as well as plant operating history, it was determined that the licensee failed to report instances where the system was operated in a condition prohibited by technical specifications, and a loss of safety function of the system existed between March 20, 2008, and December 8, 2008. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as Condition Reports 2009 1261 and 2009-1326 and Action Requests 15244, 17776, and 15306.
The inspectors reviewed this issue in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0612 and the NRC Enforcement Manual. Through this review, the inspectors determined that traditional enforcement was applicable to this issue because the NRC's regulatory ability was affected. Specifically, the NRC relies on licensee to identify and report conditions or events meeting the criteria specified in regulations in order to perform its regulatory function, and when this is not done, the regulatory function is impacted. The inspectors determined that this finding was not suitable for evaluation using the significance determination process, and as such, was evaluated in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy. The finding was reviewed by NRC management and, because the violation was determined to be of very low safety significance, was not repetitive or willful, and was entered into the corrective action program, this violation is being treated as a Severity Level IV noncited violation consistent with the NRC Enforcement Policy. This finding was determined to have a crosscutting aspect in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution associated with the corrective action program in that the licensee failed to appropriately and thoroughly evaluate for reportability aspects all factors and time frames associated with the inoperability of residual heat removal system when suction temperatures were above 249°F [P.1(c)]
Inspection Report# : 2009006 (pdf)
Last modified : June 02, 2010
 
Wolf Creek 1 2Q/2010 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance:      Dec 31, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: VIO Violation Failure to Correct Vessel Head Vent Path The inspectors identified a cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, due to an inadequate vent path for the reactor vessel head. The inadequate vent path resulted in the formation of voids in the reactor vessel head during Refueling Outage 17. Failure to ensure an adequate vent path in the reactor vessel head was the subject of a noncited violation in NRC Inspection Report 05000482/2008004. During and after Refueling Outage 16, Wolf Creek initiated a root cause evaluation and corrective actions to prevent occurrence. When one of the possible root causes was disproven in Refueling Outage 17, no additional action was taken to determine the cause of the vessel head vent blockage. However, the licensee could not exclude blockage in the piping. This issue was entered into the corrective action program and the licensee plans to conduct a more thorough inspection of the piping during the next refueling outage. This issue is being tracked by the licensee as Condition Report 22501.
The inspectors determined that the failure to provide adequate vessel head vent path to prevent gas accumulation in the reactor vessel during depressurized plant operations was a performance deficiency. The inspectors determined that this finding, which was associated with the Initiating Events Cornerstone, was more than minor because if left uncorrected, it would have become a more significant safety concern. Specifically, without an adequate vent path the reactor vessel does not have an effective means of relieving noncondensable gases to prevent a loss of reactor coolant system inventory. The inspectors evaluated this finding using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix G, , and determined it be of very low safety significance based upon the demonstrated availability of mitigating systems and the flooded reactor cavity inventory. The inspectors determined the cause of the finding had a problem identification and resolution aspect in the corrective action program. Specifically, Wolf Creeks corrective actions were not successful to address the vent path blockage in a timely manner [P.1(d)].
Inspection Report# : 2009005 (pdf)
Significance:      Dec 22, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to Enter Adverse Conditions into the Corrrective Action Program The team identified a finding associated with the licensees failure to recognize the adverse conditions related to their offsite power system as prescribed by Procedure AP 28A-100, Condition Reports. Specifically, the licensee failed to enter pertinent switchyard operating experience and six occurrences of offsite power line losses as adverse conditions in their corrective action program as of August 2009. The licensee entered these deficiencies in their corrective action program as Wolf Creek Condition Reports 00022242 and 00022241.
This finding is greater than minor because, if left uncorrected, the failure to fully utilize the corrective action program could become a more significant safety concern. The inspectors determined that this finding impacted the Initiating Events Cornerstone equipment maintenance attribute and affected the cornerstone objective to limit events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during power operations. Using Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the issue screened as having very low safety significance because it did not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions would not be available.
Inspection Report# : 2009007 (pdf)
 
Significance:      Dec 22, 2009 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Adequately Control Steam Generator Water Levels The team identified a self-revealing noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Procedures, after operators failure to monitor and maintain steam generator water levels resulted in an unanticipated turbine trip signal and feedwater isolation. On August 21, 2009, while in Mode 3, Wolf Creek operators, using an intermittent method of feeding steam generators over shift turnover, lost control of the level in steam generator A. This resulted in increased levels above the P-14 feedwater isolation actuation setpoint. Contributing to the loss of level control was the disabling of a previously established operator selectable alarm for the steam generator level. The licensee entered this deficiency in their corrective action program as Wolf Creek Condition Report 00019295.
This finding is greater than minor because it impacted the Initiating Events Cornerstone human performance attribute and affected the cornerstone objective to limit events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during power operations. Using Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the issue screened as having very low safety significance because it did not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions would not be available and it did not increase the likelihood of a fire or internal/external flooding. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the decision making component because licensee personnel failed to make safety-significant or risk-significant decisions using a systematic process especially when faced with uncertain or unexpected plant conditions to ensure that safety is maintained [H.1(a)].
Inspection Report# : 2009007 (pdf)
Significance:      Dec 22, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Operator Actions Disable Circuit Breaker Coordination and Could Initiate Secondary Fires The inspectors identified a noncited violation of License Condition 2.C.(5), Fire Protection, for the failure to implement and maintain the approved fire protection program. Specifically, the licensee prescribed mitigating actions in response to certain fire scenarios that would result in a loss of circuit breaker coordination and could initiate secondary fires in plant locations outside of the initial fire area. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as Condition Report 2008-005210.
This finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Protection Against External Factors attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations.
The risk significance of this finding was determined using Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance using a Phase 2 evaluation. This finding was not assigned a crosscutting aspect because the cause was not representative of current performance.
Inspection Report# : 2009005 (pdf)
Significance:      Dec 16, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Obtain Vendor Data Necessary for Plant Modification On December 16, 2009, inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, involving failure to obtain vendor design data for a modification. In August 2009, a component cooling water modification was made to the reactor coolant pump thermal barrier heat exchangers flow rates as a corrective action to VIO 05000482/2009002 07 (EA-09-110). A flow rate above the previous design value was justified by an internal memo of a vendor opinion from a telephone conversation in 1992. The inspectors found this to be contrary to Procedure AP 05-005, for obtaining data from vendors. The notice of violation will remain open until
 
full compliance has been restored. Wolf Creek consulted with Westinghouse, confirmed the acceptability of the increased flow rate, and requested a formal calculation. This issue is captured in Condition Report 22824.
The inspectors determined that this finding was more than minor because this issue aligned with Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix E, example 2.f, in that the modification relied on verbal statements to raise the allowable flow through the heat exchanger. This is a significant deficiency in the modification package. The inspectors determined this finding was associated with the design control attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions. The inspectors evaluated the significance of this finding using Phase 1 of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04 and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance because assuming worst case degradation, the finding would not result in exceeding the technical specification limit for identified reactor coolant system leakage and would not have likely affected other mitigation systems resulting in a total loss of their safety function because seal injection was available. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with work practices in that management was unsuccessful in communicating expectations on procedure use and adherence in engineering [H.4(b)].
Inspection Report# : 2009005 (pdf)
Significance:      Oct 23, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Identify Sources of Boron Leakage The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, involving the licensees failure to identify sources of boron leakage and document them in a corrective action document. Specifically, prior to October 23, 2009, the licensee failed to accomplish the requirements of Procedure AP 16F-001, Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program, Revision 5, step 6.4.1, which states, in part, Sources of boron seepage/leakage shall be identified/verified and documented in the applicable corrective action document. During a boric acid walkdown, the inspectors identified 11 sources of boron leakage which had not been previously identified and documented by the licensee. The licensee entered this finding into their corrective action system as Condition Report 00021274.
The finding was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Initiating Events Cornerstone attribute of human performance and affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. The inspectors used Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Attachment 4, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, and determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the issue would not result in exceeding the technical specification limit for identified reactor coolant system leakage or affect other mitigating systems resulting in a total loss of their safety function. The inspectors also determined that the finding had a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution, operating experience, where the licensee did not institutionalize operating experience through changes to station processes, procedures, equipment, and training programs [P.2(b)].
Inspection Report# : 2009005 (pdf)
Significance:      Mar 31, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: VIO Violation Failure to correct component cooling water valve closures The inspectors identified a cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, involving Wolf Creeks failure to correct the cause of the reactor coolant pump thermal barrier component cooling water heat exchanger outlet valves stroking closed on high flow. Specifically, between 2001 and 2009, Wolf Creek experienced repeated cases of the reactor coolant pump thermal barrier component cooling water heat exchanger outlet valves stroking closed during component cooling water pump swaps and during isolations of the radioactive waste evaporators. Wolf Creek reinitiated evaluation of the issue after the inspectors questions but did not review the impact on the operators ability to open the valves given the valves circuit breakers opening. Repeated throttle valve adjustments have not been successful in stopping the valve closures. This issue and the corrective actions are being
 
tracked by the licensee in Condition Report 2007 002074 and has corrective action pending to modify valve circuitry but it has not been implemented.
The failure to correct a condition adverse to quality of ensuring reactor coolant pump seal cooling as described in the Updated Safety Analysis Report is a performance deficiency. The finding is more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute for the Initiating Events Cornerstone; and, it affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the finding would not result in exceeding the Technical Specification limit for identified reactor coolant system leakage and would not have affected other mitigation systems resulting in a total loss of the seal cooling safety function. This finding is being cited because the licensee failed to establish measures to assure this condition adverse to quality was promptly identified and corrected. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the decision making component because, even though numerous instances of valve closures occurred since the first noncited violation, Wolf Creek downgraded the condition report. Using nonconservative assumptions, the licensee consistently viewed this issue as not having a risk impact because seal injection was not simultaneously lost.
[H.1.b]
Inspection Report# : 2009002 (pdf)
Inspection Report# : 2009005 (pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance:      Mar 31, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Follow Procedure for a Main Feed Pump Trip The inspectors identified a Green noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Procedures, for the failure of Wolf Creek control room personnel to follow procedures for a main feedwater pump trip. During a review of the posttrip data and operator statements, the inspectors noted that control room operators took manual control and reset main feedwater Pump A, which was not in accordance with station procedures. This issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report 24011.
This finding was greater than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of human performance and it affected the objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). The inspectors evaluated the significance of this finding using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, and screened the finding to Phase 2 because the finding represents a loss of auxiliary feedwater actuation system safety Function g. The finding screened to Phase 3 because of the failure to start of both motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps. The senior reactor analyst performed a Phase 3 analysis and concluded that the finding was Green because the probability of an initiator occurring within any 10-second exposure time is approximately 3E-7. Additionally, auxiliary feedwater pumps would have been automatically started on lo-lo steam generator level if required. The inspectors also determined that the cause of the finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with operating experience because Wolf Creek failed to communicate relevant operating experience to affected internal stakeholders [P.2(a)].
Inspection Report# : 2010002 (pdf)
Significance:      Mar 10, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Establish goals and Monitor for a(1) Offgas Radiation Monitor GERE0092 The inspectors identified a Green noncited violation of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) for failure establish goals per paragraph (a)(1) to monitor the performance of the main condenser offgas radiation Monitor GERE0092. Multiple failures occurred which exceeded the monitoring goals and the function was not moved to 50.65(a)(1) status for corrective action and goal setting. Wolf Creek engineering subsequently evaluated the issues and determined that the function
 
should have been moved to a(1) for goal setting. This is captured in Condition Report 24423.
This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affects the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events. The inspectors evaluated the significance of this finding using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, "Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings," and determined that this finding is of very low safety significance, Green. Specifically, the associated function (SP-04) to detect primary to secondary leakage and then isolate the steam generator blowdown flow path does not result in a loss of any safety function. The inspectors determined that this finding has a crosscutting aspect in the problem identification and resolution area associated with corrective action program because Wolf Creek failed to take appropriate corrective actions to address the system reliability issue and adverse radiation monitor performance trends in a timely manner, commensurate with safety significance and complexity [P.1(d)].
Inspection Report# : 2010002 (pdf)
Significance:        Mar 03, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Degraded Fire Barriers for Auxiliary Feedwater The inspectors identified a noncited violation of License Condition 2.C(5)(a) for degraded fire seals that separated redundant safe shutdown equipment. Specifically, silicone foam and ceramic fiber board seals separating the auxiliary feedwater trains from the turbine building and the condensate storage tank valve house were degraded so that they no longer provided a 3-hour rated fire barrier. The licensee entered the finding into the corrective action program as Condition Report 23828.
The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of protection against external events and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the reliability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, Attachment 2, Degradation Rating Guidance Specific to Various Fire Protection Program Elements, under Fire Barrier Degradation, Table A2.2, the finding was associated with Moderate B degradation due to the seal not being in a tested or evaluated condition. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process, in supplemental screening for fire confinement findings, the finding screens as Green due to exposing Fire Area A33 featuring an automatic full area water-based suppression system. No crosscutting aspect was assigned as this condition was not reflective of current licensee performance.
Inspection Report# : 2010002 (pdf)
Significance:        Mar 03, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to Perform Adequate Posttrip Review The inspectors identified a Green finding for the failure to adequately implement the posttrip review procedure following a reactor trip caused by low steam generator water levels on March 2, 2010. Specifically, Wolf Creek's posttrip evaluation was not adequate because it failed to identify or evaluate anomalous equipment performance associated with the main feedwater pump that caused the trip. Additionally, the inspectors determined that the Wolf Creeks posttrip review failed to identify that some aspects of operator response to the trip of the main feedwater pump were not in accordance with station procedures. Wolf Creek evaluated the individual issues and deficiencies listed above and entered them into the corrective action program as Condition Reports 23932, 23966, 24043, 23982, and 23981.
This finding was greater than minor because the information omitted from the posttrip review was associated with the human performance attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events. Using Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, this finding was determined to be of very low safety significance since the finding does not represent a loss of system safety function, nor does the finding represent actual loss of safety function for single train for a greater time than permitted by technical specifications. This finding had a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program
 
component because Wolf Creek failed to fully evaluate plant computer data and operator statements associated with the March 2, 2010, reactor trip [P.1(c)].
Inspection Report# : 2010002 (pdf)
Significance:      Dec 31, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Follow Procedure Results in Draining of Emergency Core Cooling System Pump Oil On November 23, 2009, a self-revealing violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a was identified when a technician failed to follow procedure and emptied 45 gallons of oil from centrifugal charging Pump A. The technician was supposed to remove the temperature indicator for calibration but instead removed the thermowell which breached the lube oil subsystem of centrifugal charging Pump A. An unplanned entry into Technical Specification 3.5.2, Condition A, was made for approximately 10 hours. The licensee entered this issue in their corrective action program as Condition Report 21993.
The failure to follow station procedures and correctly remove the detector was a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The inspectors evaluated the significance of this finding using Phase 1 of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the pump was inoperable for less than 24 hours. Also, the finding did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The inspectors identified a human performance crosscutting in the area of work practices because self-checking and communication with the supervisor failed to prevent the event [H.4(a)].
Inspection Report# : 2009005 (pdf)
Significance:      Dec 22, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform an Operability Evaluation The team identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, regarding the licensees failure to follow the requirements of Procedure AP 26C-004, Technical Specification Operability. Specifically, licensee personnel failed to perform an operability evaluation for the impact of the 2009 water hammer and internal corrosion on the entire essential service water system. The Wolf Creek essential service water system was degraded by a significant water hammer on August 19, 2009. Also in 2009 widespread internal corrosion resulted in at least three through wall leaks. Discovery of these conditions had been documented in the corrective action program but had not resulted in performance of an operability evaluation of the current and potentially future impact on the system as a whole. The licensee entered this deficiency in their corrective action program as Wolf Creek Condition Report 00022240.
This finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of equipment performance and adversely affected the objective to ensure equipment availability and reliability. Using Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the issue screened as having very low safety significance because it was not a design or qualification deficiency that resulted in a loss of operability or functionality, did not create a loss of system safety function of a single train for greater than the technical specification allowed outage times, and did not affect seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating events.
This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program because licensee personnel failed to thoroughly evaluate problems such that the resolutions address causes and extent of conditions [P.1(c)].
Inspection Report# : 2009007 (pdf)
Significance:      Dec 22, 2009
 
Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Correctly Screen Essential Service Water Piping Leaks for Significance The team identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, regarding the licensees failure to follow the requirements of Procedure AI 28A-010, Screening Condition Reports. Specifically, licensee personnel failed to properly screen condition reports for the essential service water system adverse conditions of internal corrosion and loss of offsite power induced water hammer since April 2008. The adverse conditions met the procedures marginal consequence and probable frequency definitions which should have, but did not, result in a requirement to perform a root cause analysis prior to September 2009. The licensee entered this deficiency in their corrective action program as Wolf Creek Condition Report 00022239.
This finding is greater than minor because, if left uncorrected, the failure to fully utilize the corrective action program could become a more significant safety concern. The inspectors determined that this finding impacted the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone. Using Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the issue screened as having very low safety significance because it was not a design or qualification deficiency that resulted in a loss of operability or functionality, did not create a loss of system safety function of a single train for greater than the technical specification allowed outage times, and did not affect seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating events. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program because licensee personnel failed to thoroughly evaluate problems such that the resolutions address causes and extent of conditions [P.1(c)].
Inspection Report# : 2009007 (pdf)
Significance:        Dec 22, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Ensure Adequate Acceptance Criteria and Extent of Condition Guidance in Lake Water and Corrective Action Program Procedures The team identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, regarding the licensees failure to provide adequate guidance to identify and address pitting, corrosion, and surface indications in the essential service water system. A 2007 licensee self-assessment on lake water corrosion issues recommended improvements in lake water chemistry control procedures to establish a pit monitoring program.
In September 2009 NRC inspectors noted that the lake water monitoring and chemistry control procedures did not contain quality standards or acceptance criteria for newly discovered flaws or abnormal gross degradation due to erosion, pitting, or corrosion. Not having such procedural quality standards resulted in allowing repairs to not be performed until such degradations (pitting) had become through-wall leaks. Several instances of internally identified corrosion were not entered into the corrective action program until essential service water piping had thinned to below the minimum ASME code allowed wall thickness. The licensee entered this deficiency in their corrective action program as Wolf Creek Condition Report 00022243.
This finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of procedure quality and adversely affected the objective to ensure equipment availability and reliability. Using Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the issue screened as having very low safety significance because it was not a design or qualification deficiency that resulted in a loss of operability or functionality, did not create a loss of system safety function of a single train for greater than the technical specification allowed outage times, and did not affect seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating events. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program because licensee personnel failed to take appropriate corrective actions to address safety issues and adverse trends in a timely manner [P.1(d)].
Inspection Report# : 2009007 (pdf)
Significance:        Dec 22, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation
 
Inadequate Procedure Resulted in Failure to Discover Essential Service Water System Leakage Following a Water Hammer Event The team identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, regarding the licensees failure to provide adequate guidance to address the impact of a loss of offsite power event on the essential service water system. On August 19, 2009, seven hours following a loss of offsite power induced water hammer of the essential service water system, the NRC senior resident identified that the licensee was unaware of significant leakage from the piping on the 1988 elevation of the auxiliary building. Wolf Creek Procedure STN PE-040G, Transient Event Walkdown, required that systems subject to expected transient dynamic forces following a reactor trip to have a post-trip walkdown to identify any structural damage. This procedure did not include the essential service water system as a vulnerable system. The procedure only specifically identified portions of systems inside containment. As a result, no walkdown was performed for the essential service water system on August 19, 2009. The licensee entered this deficiency in their corrective action program as Wolf Creek Condition Report 00022265.
This finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of procedure quality and adversely affected the objective to ensure equipment availability and reliability. Using Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the issue screened as having very low safety significance because it was not a design or qualification deficiency that resulted in a loss of operability or functionality, did not create a loss of system safety function of a single train for greater than the technical specification allowed outage times, and did not affect seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating events. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the operating experience component because the licensee failed to institutionalize lessons learned through changes to station walkdown procedures [P.2(b)].
Inspection Report# : 2009007 (pdf)
Significance:      Dec 22, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Initiate Timely Fire Protection Impairment Control Permit and Implement Compensatory Measures The team identified a noncited violation of License Condition 2.C.(5), Fire Protection, for the failure to establish a compensatory fire watch in a timely manner per the station fire protection program. On August 19, 2009, a complete loss of offsite power resulted in fire protection trouble alarms on fire protection panel KC-008. The control room supervisor acknowledged the alarms. Procedure ALR KC-888, Fire Protection Panel KC-008 Alarm Response, required an impairment and compensatory measures for the affected smoke detectors. The following day it was noticed that impairments and fire watches for the 13 affected fire zones on KC-008 had not been initiated. The licensee entered this deficiency in their corrective action program as Wolf Creek Condition Report 00019320.
This finding was more than minor since it was associated with the protection against external factors attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process, the inspectors determined that the finding had an adverse affect on the fixed fire protection systems element of fixed fire detection systems. This finding was ultimately determined, by a senior reactor analyst, to be of very low safety significance because of a low exposure time of the uncompensated deficiency. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the work practices component because the licensee failed to ensure supervisory oversight of work activities such that nuclear safety is supported [H.4(c)].
Inspection Report# : 2009007 (pdf)
Significance:      Nov 12, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: VIO Violation Failure to Correct Discolored Boric Acid Deposits
 
The inspectors identified a cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for failure to take action to stop leakage from the base of the refueling water storage tank or evaluate the leakage and wastage for acceptability. Specifically, the licensee did not take actions to prevent recurring discolored boric acid deposits for approximately 11 years. Failure to correct leakage from the refueling water storage tank base was the subject of a noncited violation in NRC Inspection Report 05000482/2007006. This issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report 22866.
The failure to implement corrective actions for the refueling water storage tank leakage was a performance deficiency.
The inspectors determined this issue impacted the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and was greater than minor because if left uncorrected, the failure to correct the presence of boric acid leakage could become a more significant safety concern in that continued wastage could impact tank operability. Using the Phase 1 worksheets in Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, "Significance Determination Process," the finding was determined to have very low safety significance because it did not result in a system or component being inoperable and it did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The inspectors identified a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with resources. Specifically, Wolf Creek did not maintain long term plant safety minimizing corrective maintenance deferrals and this long standing equipment issue [H.2(c)].
Inspection Report# : 2009005 (pdf)
Significance:        Nov 05, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Operability Evaluation of Essential Service Water Pumps On November 5, 2009, inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for the failure to perform an adequate operability evaluation required by procedure. The inspectors identified that Operability Evaluation EF 09-010, Revisions 0 and 1, did not demonstrate that the essential service water pumps could withstand a safe shutdown earthquake. Revision 2 of the operability evaluation included calculations to demonstrate acceptable stresses and included pump impeller clearances. This issue is captured in the corrective action program as condition reports 22798 and 21572.
The failure to perform an adequate operability evaluation per Procedures AP 28-001 and AP 26C-004 was a performance deficiency. The inspectors determined that this finding was more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, and it affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). Specifically, this issue relates to the availability and reliability examples of the equipment performance attribute because a latent common mode failure mechanism was not correctly evaluated. The inspectors evaluated the significance of this finding using Phase 1 of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the issue was not a design or qualification deficiency confirmed to result in loss of operability or functionality, did not represent a loss of system safety function, an actual loss of safety function of a single train for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time, an actual loss of safety function of a nontechnical specification risk-significant equipment train, and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The cause of the finding has a problem identification and resolution crosscutting aspect associated with the corrective action program because Wolf Creek failed to thoroughly evaluate the failure mechanism such that the resolutions address the causes and extent of conditions, as necessary [P.1(c)].
Inspection Report# : 2009005 (pdf)
Significance:        Oct 21, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Control of Transient Ignition Sources The inspectors identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, for an inadequate Procedure AP 101, Control of Transient Ignition Sources. On October 21, 2009, the inspectors observed maintenance personnel performing weld preparation work on essential service water piping to containment cooler B using a flapper wheel.
 
The inspectors observed that the ignition control barriers for the hot work were insufficient in that the sparks from the preparation work extended four to five feet from the job site and there was no fire watch posted. On December 4, 2003, a procedure revision inappropriately incorporated a change to the procedure where a fire watch did not have to be posted when using wire brushes, flapper wheels, polishing devices, or Rol-Lok type buffing pads mounted on power grinder motor drives or air tools. The maintenance supervisor stopped the work until a fire watch was posted.
The licensee entered this into their corrective action system as Condition Report 20993.
This finding is more than minor because it affected the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of Protection Against External Factors - Fires, and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The lack of a posted fire watch could adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a severe fire in the affected area. Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process, could not be used to effectively evaluate the finding and defense-in-depth strategies because the 2003 changes to the fire watch program affected multiple fire areas and conditions. Therefore, in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix M, the safety significance was determined by regional management review who concluded that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green). This finding was reviewed for crosscutting aspects and none were identified. The original change occurred in 2003 and was not indicative of current performance.
Inspection Report# : 2009005 (pdf)
Significance:        Oct 21, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Incorporate Requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.182 into Shutdown Risk The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) involving the failure to adequately perform shutdown risk assessments during Refueling Outage 17. Between October 10 and November 17, 2009, Wolf Creek did not appropriately consider electrical power, decay heat removal, and containment when assessing shutdown risk.
This changed the outcome or color of the qualitative calculation on several occasions. The licensee entered this issue in their corrective action program as Condition Reports 22295 and 22296.
The failure to meet shutdown risk assessment requirements in the daily shutdown risk assessment process is a performance deficiency. The inspectors determined this finding was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and was more than minor because it involved incorrect risk assessment assumptions by omitting requirements specified in committed guidance without providing justification for that omission. Such errors of omission have the potential to change the outcome of the licensees maintenance risk assessment as described above.
Per Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix K, Maintenance Risk Assessment and Risk Management Significance Determination Process, licensees who only perform qualitative analyses of plant configuration risk due to maintenance activities, the significance of the deficiencies must be determined by an internal NRC management review using risk insights where possible in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 612, Power Reactor Inspection Reports. The NRC management review concluded that this finding was of Green safety significance because missing risk management actions did not result in loss of key shutdown risk functions. Additionally, the cause of the finding has a human performance crosscutting aspect in the area associated with the resources. Specifically, Wolf Creek did not ensure that Procedure APF 22B-001-02 was complete, accurate, and up-to-date [H.2(c)].
Inspection Report# : 2009005 (pdf)
Significance:        Oct 15, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Follow Corrective Action Procedure On October 15, 2009, the inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for failure to follow Procedure AP 28A-100, Condition Reports. Wolf Creek failed to initiate a condition report for evaluation of corrosion on containment cooler A piping. After inspector challenging, Wolf Creek initiated condition reports, performed nondestructive testing, replaced corroded studs, and
 
evaluated the cause of the corrosion.
The inspectors determined that the failure to follow AP 28A-100, Appendix C, was a performance deficiency. This issue was more than minor because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, the issue screened to Green because there was not a loss of operability and the finding did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. A crosscutting aspect was identified in the problem identification and resolution area of the corrective action program. Specifically, Wolf Creek failed to implement a corrective action program with a low threshold for identifying issues [P.1(a)].
Inspection Report# : 2009005 (pdf)
Significance:      Oct 15, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Unevaluated Scaffold Against Component Cooling Water Piping The inspectors identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a for failure to properly implement Procedure AP 14A-003, Scaffold Construction and Use, when scaffolding was erected against operable safety-related equipment. On October 15, 2009, the inspectors walked down containment and identified scaffolding in contact with component cooling water piping. The tag on the scaffold explicitly stated that it was not seismically qualified. At the time, both steam generators were inoperable and both trains of residual heat removal were required to be operable. The inspectors reviewed the bases for Technical Specification 3.4.7, RCS Loops - Mode 5, Loops Filled, which required an operable heat sink path from residual heat removal to component cooling water to essential service water. This issue was entered into the corrective action program as Condition Report 22464.
The construction of an unqualified scaffold against operable component cooling water piping was a performance deficiency. The inspectors determined that this finding was more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute for the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). Specifically, this issue relates to the availability and reliability examples of the equipment performance attribute because a latent failure mechanism was not evaluated. The inspectors evaluated the significance of this finding using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix G, Attachment 1, Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process Phase 1 Operational Checklists for Both PWRs and BWRs. The inspectors determined that Checklist 3 was applicable because the unit was in cold shutdown with the refueling cavity level less than 23 feet. Using Appendix G, Attachment 1, Checklist 3, Phase 2 analysis was not needed and the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the licensee was able to demonstrate that the seismically unqualified scaffolding would not have resulted in a loss of safety function. The inspectors determined the cause of the finding had a human performance aspect in the area of resources. Specifically, Procedure AP 14A-003 was inadequate because it had conflicting guidance that allowed seismically unqualified scaffolds in Modes 5 and 6 [H.2 (c)].
Inspection Report# : 2009005 (pdf)
Significance:      Sep 30, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inability to perform manual actions for risk assessment The inspector identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) for failure to adequately assess and manage the increase in risk during fuse inspection of component cooling water valves supplying cooling loads inside containment.
On March 18, 2009, component cooling water Valves EG HV-16 and EG HV-54 were out of service for fuse inspections to verify wiring for fire protection analyses. The inspectors observed that the evolution was not included in the weekly risk assessment and that operations and maintenance personnel did not have guidance or briefings for restoration of the valves. Review of the risk assessment revealed that the impact of de-energizing the valves in the closed position was neglected and that restoration actions credited by the risk analyst were unknown to the control
 
room and craft workers. The issue was entered into the corrective action program as Condition Report 15318.
The failure to adequately assess and manage risk in accordance with AP 22C-003 and the preplanned risk assessment for the use of local actions to ensure component cooling water cooling to loads inside containment was a performance deficiency. The finding is more than minor because the licensee failed to effectively manage prescribed significant compensatory measures for maintenance activities that could increase the likelihood of initiating events. The finding was of very low safety significance because the magnitude of the calculated risk deficit was less than IE-6 even though risk management actions were not in place. The inspectors also determined that the finding has a human performance crosscutting aspect in the area associated with work control because the risk assessment procedure and clearance order procedure assumed local actions could be accomplished but there was no communication regarding this during the work planning stages [H.3(b)].
Inspection Report# : 2009004 (pdf)
Significance:        Sep 30, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Use of Nonsafety Related Power to Ensure Operability of Safety Related Boric Acid System The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for failing to translate the boric acid design basis into procedures that ensure time sensitive operator actions are completed to achieve the core shutdown margin specified in the core operating limits report. Performance Improvement Request 2005-3461 identified that if the room coolers were started while lake temperature was low, the boric acid solution temperature may decrease below the solubility limit. Corrective actions for heat tracing and room temperature logging took approximately 3 years to implement and stopped short of addressing boric acid system operation when nonsafety power is lost to the heat tracing and the plant must be taken to cold shutdown in accordance with technical specifications. The licensee entered this issue in their corrective action program as Condition Report 20717.
The failure to translate the design bases into procedures that ensure the function of the safety-related boric acid system upon loss of nonsafety-related heat tracing is a performance deficiency. The inspectors determined that this finding was more than minor because this issue aligned with Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix E, example 2.f, because the pipe temperature was required to stay above the boric acid solubility limit and the loss of the heat tracing and or room temperature decrease will block the boric acid system. This issue was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events. The inspectors evaluated the significance of this finding using Phase 1 of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, "Significance Determination of Reactor Inspection Findings for At Power Situations," and determined that the finding screened to phase 2 because the issue was a design or qualification deficiency confirmed to result in loss of operability or functionality The inspectors evaluated the significance of this finding using Phase 2 of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Risk Informed Inspection Notebook for Wolf Creek Generating Station, and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance because loss of the boric acid system in Table 3.9 for one year resulted in a 1E-7 CDF when giving recovery credit for the refueling water storage tank. The inspectors determined that this finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program component because Wolf Creek did not take appropriate corrective actions to resolve known deficiencies in the design and operation of the boric acid system for approximately 4 years. The issue was re-evaluated in 2009, and the licensee failed to correct the deficiencies identified in 2005 [P.1(d)].
Inspection Report# : 2009004 (pdf)
Significance: SL-IV Sep 30, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Changes to the Approved Fire Protection Program Without Prior Staff Approval The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV noncited violation of License Condition 2.C.(5), Fire Protection, for making changes to the approved fire protection program without the required prior Commission approval.
Specifically, the licensee made a change to the Updated Safety Analysis Report that allowed the licensee to violate the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.L. Specifically, when the licensee recognized that fire
 
damage could cause a pressurizer power operated relief valve to open long enough to create a void in the reactor vessel, this was documented as acceptable when it was not in compliance with this regulatory requirement. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2008-004869.
This finding was assessed using traditional enforcement since it had the potential for impacting the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function. This finding is more than minor since the change required prior staff review and approval prior to implementation and it did not receive the required approval. A senior reactor analyst performed a Phase 3 evaluation and determined this performance deficiency was of very low risk significance. In accordance with the guidance in Supplement I of the Enforcement Policy, this issue is considered a Severity Level IV noncited violation because it is of very low risk significance. This finding had a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with resources because the licensee failed to maintain long term plant safety by maintaining design margins. Specifically, the licensees choice to allow reactor vessel head voiding during an alternative shutdown in lieu of restoring the plant to compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.L constituted a reduction in safety margin [H.2(a)].
Inspection Report# : 2009004 (pdf)
Significance:        Aug 31, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Mode Change Under Technical Specification 3.0.4.b without Required Risk Management Actions On November 18, 2009, the inspectors identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 3.0.4.b for ascension from Mode 4 to Mode 3 without establishing required risk management actions. Wolf Creek used technical specification Limiting Condition for Operation 3.0.4.b to permit mode ascension after performance of a risk assessment and identification of risk management actions to maintain safety in the next mode. The turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump was inoperable per Technical Specification 3.7.5. As a risk management action, protected train signs would be placed on the doors to the motor driven auxiliary feedwater Pump A and B room doors. A walkdown conducted by the inspector on the morning of November 18, 2009, found that the protected train signs on the motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump rooms were not in place. Also, a maintenance crew was performing radiography in the motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump Room B. The motor driven auxiliary feedwater Pumps A and B were also made inoperable (at separate times) later on the morning of November 18, 2009. The licensee entered this issue in their corrective action program as Condition Report 21926.
Mode ascension under Technical Specification LCO 3.0.4.b without establishing required risk management actions is a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the configuration control and alignment attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The configuration control issues not only included the work being completed on the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump, but also included containment isolation valve testing and radiography that was performed on the motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps which was not included in the risk assessment. The inspector used Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, to determine that the finding was of very-low safety significance (Green) because it did not result in a loss of system safety function; did not exceed allowable technical specification outage time; and was not a seismic, flooding, or severe weather concern. Additionally, the cause of the finding has a human performance crosscutting aspect in the area associated with decision making. Specifically, Wolf Creek used a risk assessment form and an informal mode change form to communicate between departments the requirement for risk management actions. The two forms were in conflict and the personnel who implemented the risk management actions were not informed [H.1(c)].
Inspection Report# : 2009005 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Significance:        Mar 03, 2010 Identified By: NRC
 
Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inoperable Containment Cooler Condensate Monitoring System The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, due to all containment cooler drip pans being degraded such that the containment cooler condensate monitoring system could not perform its design basis safety function to quantify reactor coolant system leakage into the containment atmosphere. Wolf Creek initiated Condition Report 24005 and Work Order 10-325741-000 to clean and repair the drip pans.
This issue is more than minor because it was associated with the equipment performance aspect of the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone and impacted the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, it affected the licensees ability to detect a reactor coolant system leak. The inspectors used Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, to analyze the significance of this finding. The inspectors concluded the finding is of very low safety significance because the condition was not related to pressurized thermal shock. The inspectors also determined that the cause of the finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program because Wolf Creek failed to identify adverse postwork conditions after the coolers received maintenance in the 2009 refueling outage [P.1(a)].
Inspection Report# : 2010002 (pdf)
Significance:        Dec 30, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Identify Inoperable P-6 Interlock and Intermediate Range Detector On December 30, 2009, the inspectors identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification Table 3.3.1-1, Function 18.a, when Wolf Creek restarted on May 18, 2005. During a reactor shutdown on October 7, 2006, intermediate range neutron detector Nuclear Instrument 36 did not decrease below 6E -11 amps and energize source range detector Nuclear Instrument 32. The detector was not replaced until Refueling Outage 16 in March 2008. The licensee entered this issue in their corrective action program as Condition Report 22450.
The inspectors determined that the failure to ensure that the P-6 interlock was operable per the technical specification as defined in the bases was a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the configuration control (reactivity control) attribute of the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone, and it affected the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers (fuel cladding, reactor coolant system, and containment) protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. The inspectors evaluated the significance of this finding using Phase 1 of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, and determined that the finding screened to Green because the P-6 interlock only affected the fuel barrier. This finding was not assigned a crosscutting aspect because the cause was not representative of current performance.
Inspection Report# : 2009005 (pdf)
Significance:        Dec 15, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequately Analyzed Emergency Operating Procedure Change The NRC examiners identified a Green noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.b for failure to validate changes made to Emergency Operating Procedures. Specifically, the licensee failed to validate a change made to Emergency Operating Procedure E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. This unvalidated change to E-0 had the unintended consequence of changing the Emergency Operating Procedure mitigation strategy in the steam generator tube rupture procedure, E-3, in that it resulted in premature direction to close the main steam isolation valves which increases the likelihood and duration of a radioactive release during a tube rupture event. This was an undesirable effect that the licensee had not considered when it made the change to E-0. This was entered into the licensees Corrective Action Program under AR22391, and the licensee removed the change that was made to E-0.
The finding was more than minor because it adversely affected the barrier integrity cornerstone attribute of Procedure Quality in that the change to the emergency operating procedure increased the likelihood of an offsite release during a steam generator tube rupture casualty. Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 4, Initial Screening and
 
Characterization of Findings, was used to evaluate the finding. The finding is of very low safety significance because it did not represent a degradation of the radiological barrier function provided for the control room, auxiliary building, or spent fuel pool; it did not represent a degradation of the barrier function of the control room against smoke or a toxic atmosphere; it did not represent an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of reactor containment; and it did not involve an actual reduction in function of hydrogen ignitors in the reactor containment. The finding had a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with decision making because the licensee failed to conduct effectiveness reviews of safety-significant decisions to verify the validity of underlying assumptions and identify possible unintended consequences.
Inspection Report# : 2009302 (pdf)
Significance:      Aug 22, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Positive Reactivity Addition Prohibited by Technical Specifications while in Mode 2 The inspectors identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 3.3.1, Condition I, for making positive reactivity addition prohibited by technical specifications in Mode 2 because one source range nuclear instrument channel was inoperable. Following a reactor transient, one of the source range nuclear instrument channels experienced an unanticipated increased count rate and was declared inoperable. Wolf Creek restored the channel in an operability evaluation which cited the cause as a problem in a component which was later determined not to exist in the installed configuration; however, the improperly restored equipment had already been used for to support plant startup on August 22, 2009. Wolf Creek replaced the detector during Refueling Outage 17. This issue was entered into the correction action program as Condition Report 20208.
Reactivity addition with source range channel Nuclear Instrument-31 inoperable is a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the configuration control (reactivity control) attribute of the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone, and it affected the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers (fuel cladding, reactor coolant system, and containment) protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. The inspectors evaluated the significance of this finding using Phase 1 of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, and determined that the finding screened to Green because the finding only affected the fuel barrier. Additionally, the cause of the finding has a human performance crosscutting aspect in the area associated with the decision making. Specifically, Wolf Creek did not use conservative assumptions in decision making and adopt requirements to demonstrate that the proposed action is safe in order to proceed rather than a requirement to demonstrate that it is unsafe in order to disapprove the action, when performing an operability evaluation for the source range Nuclear Instrument 31 detector prior to restarting from a forced outage [H.1(b)].
Inspection Report# : 2009005 (pdf)
Significance:      Aug 12, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Log Foreign Material in Spent Fuel Pool After Extent of Condition Evaluation The inspectors identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Procedures, for failure to follow Procedure AP 12-003, Foreign Material Exclusion. On August 12, 2009, the inspectors conducted a walkdown of the spent fuel pool area and found duct tape attached to various fueling and control rod tools such that duct tape was below the water. This duct tape was not in the foreign material exclusion logs. Spent fuel pool foreign material control is required under Procedure AP 12-003. The licensee entered this issue in their corrective action program as Condition Report 20338.
The inspectors determined that the failure to log material in accordance with Procedure AP 12-003 was a performance deficiency. This finding is more than minor because it impacted the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone attribute of configuration control and affected the cornerstone objective to maintain functionality of the spent fuel pool system.
Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, this finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the finding only affected the barrier function of the spent fuel pool. The inspectors determined that this finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program component because although Wolf Creek performed a
 
root cause and extent of condition evaluation for untracked foreign material, the evaluation still failed to find the duct tape in the pool itself. This allowed the tape to continue to be untracked [P.1(c)].
Inspection Report# : 2009004 (pdf)
Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Significance:      Nov 23, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Maintain Administrative Control of Keys to Locked High Radiation Areas The inspector identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.7.2.a.1 for failure to maintain administrative control of door and gate keys to high radiation areas with dose rates greater than 1 rem per hour but less than 500 rads per hour (referred to as locked high radiation areas). Specifically, as of October 21, 2009, the licensee did not have administrative controls over a single master key to locked high radiation areas. This issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Report 20973.
Failure to maintain administrative control of the master key to locked high radiation areas was a performance deficiency. This finding is greater than minor because if left uncorrected the finding has the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern in that an individual could receive unanticipated radiation dose by gaining access a locked high radiation area without the proper controls and briefing. This finding was evaluated using the occupational radiation safety significance determination process and determined to be of very low safety significance because it did not involve: (1) as low as is reasonably achievable planning or work control issue, (2) an overexposure, (3) a substantial potential for overexposure, or (4) an impaired ability to assess dose. Additionally, the violation has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the work practices component because the lack of peer and self-checking resulted in inadequate control of keys to locked high radiation areas [H.4(a)].
Inspection Report# : 2009005 (pdf)
Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Significance: SL-IV Dec 31, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Report a Condition That Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function
 
The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV noncited violation of 10 CFR 50.73 in which the licensee failed to submit a licensee event report within 60 days following discovery of events or conditions meeting the reportability criteria. On December 31, 2009, the inspectors identified a licensee event report that was not timely. Licensee Event Report 2009-009-00 was not issued within 60 days for a condition prohibited by technical specifications, and the event report did not identify that the disabling of both trains of the P-4 interlock on August 22, 2009 was also reportable per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v). The P-4 interlock was required by Technical Specification 3.3.2, function 8.a, and is discussed in USAR, Section 7.3.8, NSSS Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System. Wolf Creek licensee event report 2009-009 was correct in that the interlock is not credited in accident analysis. However, NUREG 1022, Section 3.2.6, specifies that inoperable systems required by the technical specifications be reported, even if there are other diverse operable means of accomplishing the safety function.
The inspectors reviewed this issue in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0612 and the NRC Enforcement Manual. Through this review, the inspectors determined that traditional enforcement was applicable to this issue because the NRC's regulatory ability was affected. Specifically, the NRC relies on the licensee to identify and report conditions or events meeting the criteria specified in regulations in order to perform its regulatory function, and when this is not done, the regulatory function is impacted. The inspectors determined that this finding was not suitable for evaluation using the significance determination process, and as such, was evaluated in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy. The finding was reviewed by NRC management, and because the violation was determined to be of very low safety significance, was not repetitive or willful, and was entered into the corrective action program, this violation is being treated as a Severity Level IV noncited violation consistent with the NRC Enforcement Policy. This finding was determined to have a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program in that the licensee failed to appropriately and thoroughly evaluate for reportability aspects all factors and time frames associated with the inoperability of the engineered safety features actuation system
[P.1(c)].
Inspection Report# : 2009005 (pdf)
Significance: SL-IV Sep 30, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Report Conditions that Could have Presented Fulfillment of a Safety Function The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV noncited violation of 10 CFR 50.73, Licensee Event Report System, with three examples in which the licensee failed to submit licensee event reports within 60 days following discovery of an event meeting the reportability criteria. First, on April 10, 2008, Wolf Creek submitted Licensee Event Report 2008-002-00 under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) which is operation prohibited by technical specifications but failed to make a report for a loss of safety function per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v) for the same event in which both trains of the emergency core cooling system were inoperable on February 13-14, 2008. Second, Wolf Creek filed Licensee Event Report 2008-004-00 on June 6, 2008 under 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) for an event that caused automatic start of an emergency diesel during a loss of offsite power on April 16, 2008. No report was made under 50.73(a)(2)(v) for an event or condition that could have prevented a safety function due to the loss of offsite power. Third, on April 10, 2008, Wolf Creek filed Event Notification Report 44131 under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) based on a possible trip of all four containment coolers. The notification was later retracted. The inspectors found insufficient evidence to show that the containment coolers would not trip and concluded the event should have been reported under 10 CFR 50.73(a)
(2)(v). All three issues are collectively captured in Condition Report 15318.
The inspectors reviewed this issue in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0612 and the NRC Enforcement Manual. Through this review, the inspectors determined that traditional enforcement was applicable to this issue because the NRC's regulatory ability was affected. Specifically, the NRC relies on the licensee to identify and report conditions or events meeting the criteria specified in regulations in order to perform its regulatory function, and when this is not done, the regulatory function is impacted. The inspectors determined that this finding was not suitable for evaluation using the significance determination process, and as such, was evaluated in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy. The finding was reviewed by NRC management, and because the violation was determined to be of very low safety significance, was not repetitive or willful, and was entered into the corrective action program, this violation is being treated as a Severity Level IV noncited violation consistent with the NRC Enforcement Policy. This finding was determined to have a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program in that the licensee failed to appropriately and thoroughly evaluate for reportability aspects all factors and time frames associated with the inoperability of the emergency core cooling system, the offsite
 
power system, and the containment heat removal system [P.1(c)].
Inspection Report# : 2009004 (pdf)
Last modified : September 02, 2010
 
Wolf Creek 1 3Q/2010 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance:      Dec 31, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: VIO Violation Failure to Correct Vessel Head Vent Path The inspectors identified a cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, due to an inadequate vent path for the reactor vessel head. The inadequate vent path resulted in the formation of voids in the reactor vessel head during Refueling Outage 17. Failure to ensure an adequate vent path in the reactor vessel head was the subject of a noncited violation in NRC Inspection Report 05000482/2008004. During and after Refueling Outage 16, Wolf Creek initiated a root cause evaluation and corrective actions to prevent occurrence. When one of the possible root causes was disproven in Refueling Outage 17, no additional action was taken to determine the cause of the vessel head vent blockage. However, the licensee could not exclude blockage in the piping. This issue was entered into the corrective action program and the licensee plans to conduct a more thorough inspection of the piping during the next refueling outage. This issue is being tracked by the licensee as Condition Report 22501.
The inspectors determined that the failure to provide adequate vessel head vent path to prevent gas accumulation in the reactor vessel during depressurized plant operations was a performance deficiency. The inspectors determined that this finding, which was associated with the Initiating Events Cornerstone, was more than minor because if left uncorrected, it would have become a more significant safety concern. Specifically, without an adequate vent path the reactor vessel does not have an effective means of relieving noncondensable gases to prevent a loss of reactor coolant system inventory. The inspectors evaluated this finding using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix G, , and determined it be of very low safety significance based upon the demonstrated availability of mitigating systems and the flooded reactor cavity inventory. The inspectors determined the cause of the finding had a problem identification and resolution aspect in the corrective action program. Specifically, Wolf Creeks corrective actions were not successful to address the vent path blockage in a timely manner [P.1(d)].
Inspection Report# : 2009005 (pdf)
Significance:      Dec 22, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to Enter Adverse Conditions into the Corrrective Action Program The team identified a finding associated with the licensees failure to recognize the adverse conditions related to their offsite power system as prescribed by Procedure AP 28A-100, Condition Reports. Specifically, the licensee failed to enter pertinent switchyard operating experience and six occurrences of offsite power line losses as adverse conditions in their corrective action program as of August 2009. The licensee entered these deficiencies in their corrective action program as Wolf Creek Condition Reports 00022242 and 00022241.
This finding is greater than minor because, if left uncorrected, the failure to fully utilize the corrective action program could become a more significant safety concern. The inspectors determined that this finding impacted the Initiating Events Cornerstone equipment maintenance attribute and affected the cornerstone objective to limit events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during power operations. Using Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the issue screened as having very low safety significance because it did not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions would not be available.
Inspection Report# : 2009007 (pdf)
 
Significance:      Dec 22, 2009 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Adequately Control Steam Generator Water Levels The team identified a self-revealing noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Procedures, after operators failure to monitor and maintain steam generator water levels resulted in an unanticipated turbine trip signal and feedwater isolation. On August 21, 2009, while in Mode 3, Wolf Creek operators, using an intermittent method of feeding steam generators over shift turnover, lost control of the level in steam generator A. This resulted in increased levels above the P-14 feedwater isolation actuation setpoint. Contributing to the loss of level control was the disabling of a previously established operator selectable alarm for the steam generator level. The licensee entered this deficiency in their corrective action program as Wolf Creek Condition Report 00019295.
This finding is greater than minor because it impacted the Initiating Events Cornerstone human performance attribute and affected the cornerstone objective to limit events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during power operations. Using Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the issue screened as having very low safety significance because it did not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions would not be available and it did not increase the likelihood of a fire or internal/external flooding. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the decision making component because licensee personnel failed to make safety-significant or risk-significant decisions using a systematic process especially when faced with uncertain or unexpected plant conditions to ensure that safety is maintained [H.1(a)].
Inspection Report# : 2009007 (pdf)
Significance:      Dec 22, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Operator Actions Disable Circuit Breaker Coordination and Could Initiate Secondary Fires The inspectors identified a noncited violation of License Condition 2.C.(5), Fire Protection, for the failure to implement and maintain the approved fire protection program. Specifically, the licensee prescribed mitigating actions in response to certain fire scenarios that would result in a loss of circuit breaker coordination and could initiate secondary fires in plant locations outside of the initial fire area. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as Condition Report 2008-005210.
This finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Protection Against External Factors attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations.
The risk significance of this finding was determined using Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance using a Phase 2 evaluation. This finding was not assigned a crosscutting aspect because the cause was not representative of current performance.
Inspection Report# : 2009005 (pdf)
Significance:      Dec 16, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Obtain Vendor Data Necessary for Plant Modification On December 16, 2009, inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, involving failure to obtain vendor design data for a modification. In August 2009, a component cooling water modification was made to the reactor coolant pump thermal barrier heat exchangers flow rates as a corrective action to VIO 05000482/2009002 07 (EA-09-110). A flow rate above the previous design value was justified by an internal memo of a vendor opinion from a telephone conversation in 1992. The inspectors found this to be contrary to Procedure AP 05-005, for obtaining data from vendors. The notice of violation will remain open until
 
full compliance has been restored. Wolf Creek consulted with Westinghouse, confirmed the acceptability of the increased flow rate, and requested a formal calculation. This issue is captured in Condition Report 22824.
The inspectors determined that this finding was more than minor because this issue aligned with Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix E, example 2.f, in that the modification relied on verbal statements to raise the allowable flow through the heat exchanger. This is a significant deficiency in the modification package. The inspectors determined this finding was associated with the design control attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions. The inspectors evaluated the significance of this finding using Phase 1 of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04 and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance because assuming worst case degradation, the finding would not result in exceeding the technical specification limit for identified reactor coolant system leakage and would not have likely affected other mitigation systems resulting in a total loss of their safety function because seal injection was available. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with work practices in that management was unsuccessful in communicating expectations on procedure use and adherence in engineering [H.4(b)].
Inspection Report# : 2009005 (pdf)
Significance:      Oct 23, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Identify Sources of Boron Leakage The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, involving the licensees failure to identify sources of boron leakage and document them in a corrective action document. Specifically, prior to October 23, 2009, the licensee failed to accomplish the requirements of Procedure AP 16F-001, Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program, Revision 5, step 6.4.1, which states, in part, Sources of boron seepage/leakage shall be identified/verified and documented in the applicable corrective action document. During a boric acid walkdown, the inspectors identified 11 sources of boron leakage which had not been previously identified and documented by the licensee. The licensee entered this finding into their corrective action system as Condition Report 00021274.
The finding was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Initiating Events Cornerstone attribute of human performance and affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. The inspectors used Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Attachment 4, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, and determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the issue would not result in exceeding the technical specification limit for identified reactor coolant system leakage or affect other mitigating systems resulting in a total loss of their safety function. The inspectors also determined that the finding had a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution, operating experience, where the licensee did not institutionalize operating experience through changes to station processes, procedures, equipment, and training programs [P.2(b)].
Inspection Report# : 2009005 (pdf)
Significance:      Mar 31, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: VIO Violation Failure to correct component cooling water valve closures The inspectors identified a cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, involving Wolf Creeks failure to correct the cause of the reactor coolant pump thermal barrier component cooling water heat exchanger outlet valves stroking closed on high flow. Specifically, between 2001 and 2009, Wolf Creek experienced repeated cases of the reactor coolant pump thermal barrier component cooling water heat exchanger outlet valves stroking closed during component cooling water pump swaps and during isolations of the radioactive waste evaporators. Wolf Creek reinitiated evaluation of the issue after the inspectors questions but did not review the impact on the operators ability to open the valves given the valves circuit breakers opening. Repeated throttle valve adjustments have not been successful in stopping the valve closures. This issue and the corrective actions are being
 
tracked by the licensee in Condition Report 2007 002074 and has corrective action pending to modify valve circuitry but it has not been implemented.
The failure to correct a condition adverse to quality of ensuring reactor coolant pump seal cooling as described in the Updated Safety Analysis Report is a performance deficiency. The finding is more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute for the Initiating Events Cornerstone; and, it affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the finding would not result in exceeding the Technical Specification limit for identified reactor coolant system leakage and would not have affected other mitigation systems resulting in a total loss of the seal cooling safety function. This finding is being cited because the licensee failed to establish measures to assure this condition adverse to quality was promptly identified and corrected. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the decision making component because, even though numerous instances of valve closures occurred since the first noncited violation, Wolf Creek downgraded the condition report. Using nonconservative assumptions, the licensee consistently viewed this issue as not having a risk impact because seal injection was not simultaneously lost.
[H.1.b]
Inspection Report# : 2009002 (pdf)
Inspection Report# : 2009005 (pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance:      Jun 30, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Maintain an Adequate Flooding Analysis for Auxiliary Feedwater Trains The inspectors identified a green noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, after Wolf Creek failed to provide adequate design control measures for verifying the adequacy of the flooding analysis for the auxiliary feedwater pipe rooms 1206 and 1207. Wolf Creek failed to identify piping that was seismically unqualified and that if ruptured could potentially overwhelm the floor drains. Wolf Creek re-analyzed the piping and determined it would not rupture during an earthquake. Flooding of the room could have caused all three of the auxiliary feedwater pump suction pressure transmitters to fail and inhibit automatic swap to essential service water. The licensee placed this issue in their corrective action program as Condition Report 26050.
The inspectors determined that the incorrect calculation assumption in the flooding analysis of record was the performance deficiency. This finding was determined to be more than minor because it impacted the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of the design control and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the finding was determined to have very low safety significance because the deficiency was confirmed not to result in loss of operability or functionality. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program because the licensees evaluation focused on the probability of equipment failure leading to a flooding event rather than the stated design basis of the facility [P.1(c)].
Inspection Report# : 2010003 (pdf)
Significance:      Jun 30, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Lack of Acceptance Criteria Allows Degraded EDG Power Supply to Remain in Service The inspectors identified a violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Procedures, for the failure of maintenance personnel to provide an adequate work order that included critical acceptance criteria for the emergency diesel generator B. On October 22, 2010, emergency diesel generator A failed because excessive power supply voltage ripple caused its speed switch to actuate while in standby. Emergency diesel generator B also failed voltage ripple
 
tests on October 27, 2009. On October 27, 2009, voltage ripple was at 2,015 mV, but no acceptance criteria were specified in Work Order 09-321599-000. Corrective action was not taken until March 2010 and subsequent evaluation of the issue did not identify the lack of acceptance criteria in the work order. The licensee placed this issue into the corrective action program as Condition Report 26651.
The inspectors determined that the failure to replace a power supply that was degraded below its acceptance criteria was the performance deficiency. This finding is more than minor because it affected the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of availability and reliability and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the finding was determined to have very low safety significance because the deficiency was confirmed not to result in loss of operability or functionality. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program because several work groups failed to question the March 17, 2010, results and initiate a condition report [P.1(a)].
Inspection Report# : 2010003 (pdf)
Significance:        Jun 30, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Nonsafety Power Supply Causes Failure of Emergency Diesel Generator A The inspectors identified a Green noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for the failure of the licensee to ensure the design of the emergency diesel local annunciator power supply circuit such that its failure would not cause failure of the associated emergency diesel generator. On October 22, 2009, Wolf Creek was defueled when the control room received annunciators for emergency diesel generator A. The power supply for the local annunciators had input enough noise or voltage spikes on to the safety related power wires to cause the speed switch to actuate while the engine was in standby. This inhibited engine start. The power supply was replaced and emergency diesel generator A was returned to service on October 23, 2009. Condition Report 21039 examined this failure but failed to identify that the vendors circuit analysis did not consider voltage ripple as a failure mode and that the requirements of IEEE 384-1974 were not met. The nonsafety related power supply was not supposed to be able to cause the failure of the safety related emergency diesel generator. The licensee placed this issue into the corrective action program as Condition Reports 25663, 24867, and 25479.
The inspectors determined the failure to ensure that the licensing basis for the emergency diesel generators was being met to be the performance deficiency. This finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of human performance and it affected the objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage).
Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the finding was determined to have very low safety significance because emergency diesel generator A was out of service for less than 24 hours. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program because the licensee failed to evaluate this failure mode against the vendors circuit analysis [P.1(c)].
Inspection Report# : 2010003 (pdf)
Significance:        Mar 31, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Follow Procedure for a Main Feed Pump Trip The inspectors identified a Green noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Procedures, for the failure of Wolf Creek control room personnel to follow procedures for a main feedwater pump trip. During a review of the posttrip data and operator statements, the inspectors noted that control room operators took manual control and reset main feedwater Pump A, which was not in accordance with station procedures. This issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report 24011.
This finding was greater than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of
 
human performance and it affected the objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). The inspectors evaluated the significance of this finding using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, and screened the finding to Phase 2 because the finding represents a loss of auxiliary feedwater actuation system safety Function g. The finding screened to Phase 3 because of the failure to start of both motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps. The senior reactor analyst performed a Phase 3 analysis and concluded that the finding was Green because the probability of an initiator occurring within any 10-second exposure time is approximately 3E-7. Additionally, auxiliary feedwater pumps would have been automatically started on lo-lo steam generator level if required. The inspectors also determined that the cause of the finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with operating experience because Wolf Creek failed to communicate relevant operating experience to affected internal stakeholders [P.2(a)].
Inspection Report# : 2010002 (pdf)
Significance:      Mar 10, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Establish goals and Monitor for a(1) Offgas Radiation Monitor GERE0092 The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR 50.65 for failure to establish goals per paragraph (a)(1) to monitor the performance of the main condenser offgas radiation Monitor GERE0092. Multiple failures occurred which exceeded the monitoring goals and the function was not moved to 50.65(a)(1) status for corrective action and goal setting. Wolf Creek engineering subsequently evaluated the issues and determined that the function should have been moved to a(1) for goal setting. The licensee entered this issue in their corrective action program as Condition Report 24423.
This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affects the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events. The inspectors evaluated the significance of this finding using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, "Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings," and determined that this finding is of very low safety significance, Green. Specifically, the associated function (SP-04) to detect primary to secondary leakage and then isolate the steam generator blowdown flow path does not result in a loss of any safety function. The inspectors determined that this finding has a crosscutting aspect in the problem identification and resolution area associated with corrective action program because Wolf Creek failed to take appropriate corrective actions to address the system reliability issue and adverse radiation monitor performance trends in a timely manner, commensurate with safety significance and complexity [P.1(d)].
Inspection Report# : 2010002 (pdf)
Significance:      Mar 03, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Degraded Fire Barriers for Auxiliary Feedwater The inspectors identified a noncited violation of License Condition 2.C(5)(a) for degraded fire seals that separated redundant safe shutdown equipment. Specifically, silicone foam and ceramic fiber board seals separating the auxiliary feedwater trains from the turbine building and the condensate storage tank valve house were degraded so that they no longer provided a 3-hour rated fire barrier. The licensee entered the finding into the corrective action program as Condition Report 23828.
The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of protection against external events and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the reliability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, Attachment 2, Degradation Rating Guidance Specific to Various Fire Protection Program Elements, under Fire Barrier Degradation, Table A2.2, the finding was associated with Moderate B degradation due to the seal not being in a tested or evaluated condition. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process, in supplemental screening for fire confinement findings, the finding screens as Green due to exposing Fire Area A33 featuring an automatic full area water-based suppression system. No crosscutting aspect was assigned as this condition was not reflective of current licensee performance.
 
Inspection Report# : 2010002 (pdf)
Significance:        Mar 03, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to Perform Adequate Posttrip Review The inspectors identified a Green finding for the failure to adequately implement the posttrip review procedure following a reactor trip caused by low steam generator water levels on March 2, 2010. Specifically, Wolf Creek's posttrip evaluation was not adequate because it failed to identify or evaluate anomalous equipment performance associated with the main feedwater pump that caused the trip. Additionally, the inspectors determined that the Wolf Creeks posttrip review failed to identify that some aspects of operator response to the trip of the main feedwater pump were not in accordance with station procedures. Wolf Creek evaluated the individual issues and deficiencies listed above and entered them into the corrective action program as Condition Reports 23932, 23966, 24043, 23982, and 23981.
This finding was greater than minor because the information omitted from the posttrip review was associated with the human performance attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events. Using Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, this finding was determined to be of very low safety significance since the finding does not represent a loss of system safety function, nor does the finding represent actual loss of safety function for single train for a greater time than permitted by technical specifications. This finding had a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program component because Wolf Creek failed to fully evaluate plant computer data and operator statements associated with the March 2, 2010, reactor trip [P.1(c)].
Inspection Report# : 2010002 (pdf)
Significance:        Dec 31, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Follow Procedure Results in Draining of Emergency Core Cooling System Pump Oil On November 23, 2009, a self-revealing violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a was identified when a technician failed to follow procedure and emptied 45 gallons of oil from centrifugal charging Pump A. The technician was supposed to remove the temperature indicator for calibration but instead removed the thermowell which breached the lube oil subsystem of centrifugal charging Pump A. An unplanned entry into Technical Specification 3.5.2, Condition A, was made for approximately 10 hours. The licensee entered this issue in their corrective action program as Condition Report 21993.
The failure to follow station procedures and correctly remove the detector was a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The inspectors evaluated the significance of this finding using Phase 1 of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the pump was inoperable for less than 24 hours. Also, the finding did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The inspectors identified a human performance crosscutting in the area of work practices because self-checking and communication with the supervisor failed to prevent the event [H.4(a)].
Inspection Report# : 2009005 (pdf)
Significance:        Dec 22, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform an Operability Evaluation The team identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and
 
Drawings, regarding the licensees failure to follow the requirements of Procedure AP 26C-004, Technical Specification Operability. Specifically, licensee personnel failed to perform an operability evaluation for the impact of the 2009 water hammer and internal corrosion on the entire essential service water system. The Wolf Creek essential service water system was degraded by a significant water hammer on August 19, 2009. Also in 2009 widespread internal corrosion resulted in at least three through wall leaks. Discovery of these conditions had been documented in the corrective action program but had not resulted in performance of an operability evaluation of the current and potentially future impact on the system as a whole. The licensee entered this deficiency in their corrective action program as Wolf Creek Condition Report 00022240.
This finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of equipment performance and adversely affected the objective to ensure equipment availability and reliability. Using Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the issue screened as having very low safety significance because it was not a design or qualification deficiency that resulted in a loss of operability or functionality, did not create a loss of system safety function of a single train for greater than the technical specification allowed outage times, and did not affect seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating events.
This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program because licensee personnel failed to thoroughly evaluate problems such that the resolutions address causes and extent of conditions [P.1(c)].
Inspection Report# : 2009007 (pdf)
Significance:      Dec 22, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Correctly Screen Essential Service Water Piping Leaks for Significance The team identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, regarding the licensees failure to follow the requirements of Procedure AI 28A-010, Screening Condition Reports. Specifically, licensee personnel failed to properly screen condition reports for the essential service water system adverse conditions of internal corrosion and loss of offsite power induced water hammer since April 2008. The adverse conditions met the procedures marginal consequence and probable frequency definitions which should have, but did not, result in a requirement to perform a root cause analysis prior to September 2009. The licensee entered this deficiency in their corrective action program as Wolf Creek Condition Report 00022239.
This finding is greater than minor because, if left uncorrected, the failure to fully utilize the corrective action program could become a more significant safety concern. The inspectors determined that this finding impacted the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone. Using Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the issue screened as having very low safety significance because it was not a design or qualification deficiency that resulted in a loss of operability or functionality, did not create a loss of system safety function of a single train for greater than the technical specification allowed outage times, and did not affect seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating events. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program because licensee personnel failed to thoroughly evaluate problems such that the resolutions address causes and extent of conditions [P.1(c)].
Inspection Report# : 2009007 (pdf)
Significance:      Dec 22, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Ensure Adequate Acceptance Criteria and Extent of Condition Guidance in Lake Water and Corrective Action Program Procedures The team identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, regarding the licensees failure to provide adequate guidance to identify and address pitting, corrosion, and surface indications in the essential service water system. A 2007 licensee self-assessment on lake water corrosion issues recommended improvements in lake water chemistry control procedures to establish a pit monitoring program.
In September 2009 NRC inspectors noted that the lake water monitoring and chemistry control procedures did not
 
contain quality standards or acceptance criteria for newly discovered flaws or abnormal gross degradation due to erosion, pitting, or corrosion. Not having such procedural quality standards resulted in allowing repairs to not be performed until such degradations (pitting) had become through-wall leaks. Several instances of internally identified corrosion were not entered into the corrective action program until essential service water piping had thinned to below the minimum ASME code allowed wall thickness. The licensee entered this deficiency in their corrective action program as Wolf Creek Condition Report 00022243.
This finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of procedure quality and adversely affected the objective to ensure equipment availability and reliability. Using Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the issue screened as having very low safety significance because it was not a design or qualification deficiency that resulted in a loss of operability or functionality, did not create a loss of system safety function of a single train for greater than the technical specification allowed outage times, and did not affect seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating events. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program because licensee personnel failed to take appropriate corrective actions to address safety issues and adverse trends in a timely manner [P.1(d)].
Inspection Report# : 2009007 (pdf)
Significance:        Dec 22, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Procedure Resulted in Failure to Discover Essential Service Water System Leakage Following a Water Hammer Event The team identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, regarding the licensees failure to provide adequate guidance to address the impact of a loss of offsite power event on the essential service water system. On August 19, 2009, seven hours following a loss of offsite power induced water hammer of the essential service water system, the NRC senior resident identified that the licensee was unaware of significant leakage from the piping on the 1988 elevation of the auxiliary building. Wolf Creek Procedure STN PE-040G, Transient Event Walkdown, required that systems subject to expected transient dynamic forces following a reactor trip to have a post-trip walkdown to identify any structural damage. This procedure did not include the essential service water system as a vulnerable system. The procedure only specifically identified portions of systems inside containment. As a result, no walkdown was performed for the essential service water system on August 19, 2009. The licensee entered this deficiency in their corrective action program as Wolf Creek Condition Report 00022265.
This finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of procedure quality and adversely affected the objective to ensure equipment availability and reliability. Using Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the issue screened as having very low safety significance because it was not a design or qualification deficiency that resulted in a loss of operability or functionality, did not create a loss of system safety function of a single train for greater than the technical specification allowed outage times, and did not affect seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating events. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the operating experience component because the licensee failed to institutionalize lessons learned through changes to station walkdown procedures [P.2(b)].
Inspection Report# : 2009007 (pdf)
Significance:        Dec 22, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Initiate Timely Fire Protection Impairment Control Permit and Implement Compensatory Measures The team identified a noncited violation of License Condition 2.C.(5), Fire Protection, for the failure to establish a compensatory fire watch in a timely manner per the station fire protection program. On August 19, 2009, a complete
 
loss of offsite power resulted in fire protection trouble alarms on fire protection panel KC-008. The control room supervisor acknowledged the alarms. Procedure ALR KC-888, Fire Protection Panel KC-008 Alarm Response, required an impairment and compensatory measures for the affected smoke detectors. The following day it was noticed that impairments and fire watches for the 13 affected fire zones on KC-008 had not been initiated. The licensee entered this deficiency in their corrective action program as Wolf Creek Condition Report 00019320.
This finding was more than minor since it was associated with the protection against external factors attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process, the inspectors determined that the finding had an adverse affect on the fixed fire protection systems element of fixed fire detection systems. This finding was ultimately determined, by a senior reactor analyst, to be of very low safety significance because of a low exposure time of the uncompensated deficiency. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the work practices component because the licensee failed to ensure supervisory oversight of work activities such that nuclear safety is supported [H.4(c)].
Inspection Report# : 2009007 (pdf)
Significance:        Nov 12, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: VIO Violation Failure to Correct Discolored Boric Acid Deposits The inspectors identified a cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for failure to take action to stop leakage from the base of the refueling water storage tank or evaluate the leakage and wastage for acceptability. Specifically, the licensee did not take actions to prevent recurring discolored boric acid deposits for approximately 11 years. Failure to correct leakage from the refueling water storage tank base was the subject of a noncited violation in NRC Inspection Report 05000482/2007006. This issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report 22866.
The failure to implement corrective actions for the refueling water storage tank leakage was a performance deficiency.
The inspectors determined this issue impacted the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and was greater than minor because if left uncorrected, the failure to correct the presence of boric acid leakage could become a more significant safety concern in that continued wastage could impact tank operability. Using the Phase 1 worksheets in Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, "Significance Determination Process," the finding was determined to have very low safety significance because it did not result in a system or component being inoperable and it did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The inspectors identified a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with resources. Specifically, Wolf Creek did not maintain long term plant safety minimizing corrective maintenance deferrals and this long standing equipment issue [H.2(c)].
Inspection Report# : 2009005 (pdf)
Significance:        Nov 05, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Operability Evaluation of Essential Service Water Pumps On November 5, 2009, inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for the failure to perform an adequate operability evaluation required by procedure. The inspectors identified that Operability Evaluation EF 09-010, Revisions 0 and 1, did not demonstrate that the essential service water pumps could withstand a safe shutdown earthquake. Revision 2 of the operability evaluation included calculations to demonstrate acceptable stresses and included pump impeller clearances. This issue is captured in the corrective action program as condition reports 22798 and 21572.
The failure to perform an adequate operability evaluation per Procedures AP 28-001 and AP 26C-004 was a performance deficiency. The inspectors determined that this finding was more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, and it affected the cornerstone objective
 
to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). Specifically, this issue relates to the availability and reliability examples of the equipment performance attribute because a latent common mode failure mechanism was not correctly evaluated. The inspectors evaluated the significance of this finding using Phase 1 of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the issue was not a design or qualification deficiency confirmed to result in loss of operability or functionality, did not represent a loss of system safety function, an actual loss of safety function of a single train for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time, an actual loss of safety function of a nontechnical specification risk-significant equipment train, and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The cause of the finding has a problem identification and resolution crosscutting aspect associated with the corrective action program because Wolf Creek failed to thoroughly evaluate the failure mechanism such that the resolutions address the causes and extent of conditions, as necessary [P.1(c)].
Inspection Report# : 2009005 (pdf)
Significance:        Oct 21, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Control of Transient Ignition Sources The inspectors identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, for an inadequate Procedure AP 101, Control of Transient Ignition Sources. On October 21, 2009, the inspectors observed maintenance personnel performing weld preparation work on essential service water piping to containment cooler B using a flapper wheel.
The inspectors observed that the ignition control barriers for the hot work were insufficient in that the sparks from the preparation work extended four to five feet from the job site and there was no fire watch posted. On December 4, 2003, a procedure revision inappropriately incorporated a change to the procedure where a fire watch did not have to be posted when using wire brushes, flapper wheels, polishing devices, or Rol-Lok type buffing pads mounted on power grinder motor drives or air tools. The maintenance supervisor stopped the work until a fire watch was posted.
The licensee entered this into their corrective action system as Condition Report 20993.
This finding is more than minor because it affected the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of Protection Against External Factors - Fires, and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The lack of a posted fire watch could adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a severe fire in the affected area. Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process, could not be used to effectively evaluate the finding and defense-in-depth strategies because the 2003 changes to the fire watch program affected multiple fire areas and conditions. Therefore, in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix M, the safety significance was determined by regional management review who concluded that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green). This finding was reviewed for crosscutting aspects and none were identified. The original change occurred in 2003 and was not indicative of current performance.
Inspection Report# : 2009005 (pdf)
Significance:        Oct 21, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Incorporate Requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.182 into Shutdown Risk The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) involving the failure to adequately perform shutdown risk assessments during Refueling Outage 17. Between October 10 and November 17, 2009, Wolf Creek did not appropriately consider electrical power, decay heat removal, and containment when assessing shutdown risk.
This changed the outcome or color of the qualitative calculation on several occasions. The licensee entered this issue in their corrective action program as Condition Reports 22295 and 22296.
The failure to meet shutdown risk assessment requirements in the daily shutdown risk assessment process is a performance deficiency. The inspectors determined this finding was associated with the Mitigating Systems
 
Cornerstone and was more than minor because it involved incorrect risk assessment assumptions by omitting requirements specified in committed guidance without providing justification for that omission. Such errors of omission have the potential to change the outcome of the licensees maintenance risk assessment as described above.
Per Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix K, Maintenance Risk Assessment and Risk Management Significance Determination Process, licensees who only perform qualitative analyses of plant configuration risk due to maintenance activities, the significance of the deficiencies must be determined by an internal NRC management review using risk insights where possible in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 612, Power Reactor Inspection Reports. The NRC management review concluded that this finding was of Green safety significance because missing risk management actions did not result in loss of key shutdown risk functions. Additionally, the cause of the finding has a human performance crosscutting aspect in the area associated with the resources. Specifically, Wolf Creek did not ensure that Procedure APF 22B-001-02 was complete, accurate, and up-to-date [H.2(c)].
Inspection Report# : 2009005 (pdf)
Significance:      Oct 15, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Follow Corrective Action Procedure On October 15, 2009, the inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for failure to follow Procedure AP 28A-100, Condition Reports. Wolf Creek failed to initiate a condition report for evaluation of corrosion on containment cooler A piping. After inspector challenging, Wolf Creek initiated condition reports, performed nondestructive testing, replaced corroded studs, and evaluated the cause of the corrosion.
The inspectors determined that the failure to follow AP 28A-100, Appendix C, was a performance deficiency. This issue was more than minor because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, the issue screened to Green because there was not a loss of operability and the finding did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. A crosscutting aspect was identified in the problem identification and resolution area of the corrective action program. Specifically, Wolf Creek failed to implement a corrective action program with a low threshold for identifying issues [P.1(a)].
Inspection Report# : 2009005 (pdf)
Significance:      Oct 15, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Unevaluated Scaffold Against Component Cooling Water Piping The inspectors identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a for failure to properly implement Procedure AP 14A-003, Scaffold Construction and Use, when scaffolding was erected against operable safety-related equipment. On October 15, 2009, the inspectors walked down containment and identified scaffolding in contact with component cooling water piping. The tag on the scaffold explicitly stated that it was not seismically qualified. At the time, both steam generators were inoperable and both trains of residual heat removal were required to be operable. The inspectors reviewed the bases for Technical Specification 3.4.7, RCS Loops - Mode 5, Loops Filled, which required an operable heat sink path from residual heat removal to component cooling water to essential service water. This issue was entered into the corrective action program as Condition Report 22464.
The construction of an unqualified scaffold against operable component cooling water piping was a performance deficiency. The inspectors determined that this finding was more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute for the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). Specifically, this issue relates to the availability and reliability examples of the equipment performance attribute because a latent failure mechanism was not evaluated. The inspectors evaluated the significance of this finding using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix G, Attachment 1, Shutdown
 
Operations Significance Determination Process Phase 1 Operational Checklists for Both PWRs and BWRs. The inspectors determined that Checklist 3 was applicable because the unit was in cold shutdown with the refueling cavity level less than 23 feet. Using Appendix G, Attachment 1, Checklist 3, Phase 2 analysis was not needed and the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the licensee was able to demonstrate that the seismically unqualified scaffolding would not have resulted in a loss of safety function. The inspectors determined the cause of the finding had a human performance aspect in the area of resources. Specifically, Procedure AP 14A-003 was inadequate because it had conflicting guidance that allowed seismically unqualified scaffolds in Modes 5 and 6 [H.2 (c)].
Inspection Report# : 2009005 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Significance:        Mar 03, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inoperable Containment Cooler Condensate Monitoring System The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, due to all containment cooler drip pans being degraded such that the containment cooler condensate monitoring system could not perform its design basis safety function to quantify reactor coolant system leakage into the containment atmosphere. Wolf Creek initiated Condition Report 24005 and Work Order 10-325741-000 to clean and repair the drip pans.
This issue is more than minor because it was associated with the equipment performance aspect of the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone and impacted the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, it affected the licensees ability to detect a reactor coolant system leak. The inspectors used Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, to analyze the significance of this finding. The inspectors concluded the finding is of very low safety significance because the condition was not related to pressurized thermal shock. The inspectors also determined that the cause of the finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program because Wolf Creek failed to identify adverse postwork conditions after the coolers received maintenance in the 2009 refueling outage [P.1(a)].
Inspection Report# : 2010002 (pdf)
Significance:        Dec 30, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Identify Inoperable P-6 Interlock and Intermediate Range Detector On December 30, 2009, the inspectors identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification Table 3.3.1-1, Function 18.a, when Wolf Creek restarted on May 18, 2005. During a reactor shutdown on October 7, 2006, intermediate range neutron detector Nuclear Instrument 36 did not decrease below 6E -11 amps and energize source range detector Nuclear Instrument 32. The detector was not replaced until Refueling Outage 16 in March 2008. The licensee entered this issue in their corrective action program as Condition Report 22450.
The inspectors determined that the failure to ensure that the P-6 interlock was operable per the technical specification as defined in the bases was a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the configuration control (reactivity control) attribute of the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone, and it affected the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers (fuel cladding, reactor coolant system, and containment) protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. The inspectors evaluated the significance of this finding using Phase 1 of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, and determined that the finding screened to Green because the P-6 interlock only affected the fuel barrier. This finding was not assigned a crosscutting aspect because the cause was not representative of current performance.
Inspection Report# : 2009005 (pdf)
 
Significance:        Dec 15, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequately Analyzed Emergency Operating Procedure Change The NRC examiners identified a Green noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.b for failure to validate changes made to Emergency Operating Procedures. Specifically, the licensee failed to validate a change made to Emergency Operating Procedure E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. This unvalidated change to E-0 had the unintended consequence of changing the Emergency Operating Procedure mitigation strategy in the steam generator tube rupture procedure, E-3, in that it resulted in premature direction to close the main steam isolation valves which increases the likelihood and duration of a radioactive release during a tube rupture event. This was an undesirable effect that the licensee had not considered when it made the change to E-0. This was entered into the licensees Corrective Action Program under AR22391, and the licensee removed the change that was made to E-0.
The finding was more than minor because it adversely affected the barrier integrity cornerstone attribute of Procedure Quality in that the change to the emergency operating procedure increased the likelihood of an offsite release during a steam generator tube rupture casualty. Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 4, Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, was used to evaluate the finding. The finding is of very low safety significance because it did not represent a degradation of the radiological barrier function provided for the control room, auxiliary building, or spent fuel pool; it did not represent a degradation of the barrier function of the control room against smoke or a toxic atmosphere; it did not represent an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of reactor containment; and it did not involve an actual reduction in function of hydrogen ignitors in the reactor containment. The finding had a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with decision making because the licensee failed to conduct effectiveness reviews of safety-significant decisions to verify the validity of underlying assumptions and identify possible unintended consequences.
Inspection Report# : 2009302 (pdf)
Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Significance:        Nov 23, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Maintain Administrative Control of Keys to Locked High Radiation Areas The inspector identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.7.2.a.1 for failure to maintain administrative control of door and gate keys to high radiation areas with dose rates greater than 1 rem per hour but less than 500 rads per hour (referred to as locked high radiation areas). Specifically, as of October 21, 2009, the licensee did not have administrative controls over a single master key to locked high radiation areas. This issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Report 20973.
Failure to maintain administrative control of the master key to locked high radiation areas was a performance deficiency. This finding is greater than minor because if left uncorrected the finding has the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern in that an individual could receive unanticipated radiation dose by gaining access a locked high radiation area without the proper controls and briefing. This finding was evaluated using the occupational radiation safety significance determination process and determined to be of very low safety significance because it did not involve: (1) as low as is reasonably achievable planning or work control issue, (2) an overexposure, (3) a substantial potential for overexposure, or (4) an impaired ability to assess dose. Additionally, the violation has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the work practices component because the lack of peer and self-checking resulted in inadequate control of keys to locked high radiation areas [H.4(a)].
 
Inspection Report# : 2009005 (pdf)
Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Significance: SL-IV Dec 31, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Report a Condition That Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV noncited violation of 10 CFR 50.73 in which the licensee failed to submit a licensee event report within 60 days following discovery of events or conditions meeting the reportability criteria. On December 31, 2009, the inspectors identified a licensee event report that was not timely. Licensee Event Report 2009-009-00 was not issued within 60 days for a condition prohibited by technical specifications, and the event report did not identify that the disabling of both trains of the P-4 interlock on August 22, 2009 was also reportable per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v). The P-4 interlock was required by Technical Specification 3.3.2, function 8.a, and is discussed in USAR, Section 7.3.8, NSSS Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System. Wolf Creek licensee event report 2009-009 was correct in that the interlock is not credited in accident analysis. However, NUREG 1022, Section 3.2.6, specifies that inoperable systems required by the technical specifications be reported, even if there are other diverse operable means of accomplishing the safety function.
The inspectors reviewed this issue in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0612 and the NRC Enforcement Manual. Through this review, the inspectors determined that traditional enforcement was applicable to this issue because the NRC's regulatory ability was affected. Specifically, the NRC relies on the licensee to identify and report conditions or events meeting the criteria specified in regulations in order to perform its regulatory function, and when this is not done, the regulatory function is impacted. The inspectors determined that this finding was not suitable for evaluation using the significance determination process, and as such, was evaluated in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy. The finding was reviewed by NRC management, and because the violation was determined to be of very low safety significance, was not repetitive or willful, and was entered into the corrective action program, this violation is being treated as a Severity Level IV noncited violation consistent with the NRC Enforcement Policy. This finding was determined to have a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program in that the licensee failed to appropriately and thoroughly evaluate for reportability aspects all factors and time frames associated with the inoperability of the engineered safety features actuation system
[P.1(c)].
Inspection Report# : 2009005 (pdf)
Last modified : November 29, 2010
 
Wolf Creek 1 4Q/2010 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance:      Dec 07, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Identify Boric Acid Leak on Instrument Lines to Reactor Coolant System The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, involving the licensees failure to identify, document, and evaluate sources of boric acid leakage.
During a boric acid walkdown and containment closeout tour on December 7, 2010, the inspectors identified a boric acid leak in an instrument line to the reactor coolant system loop 2 flow transmitters which had not been previously identified and documented by the licensee. As such, the licensee failed to accomplish the requirements of procedure AP 16F-001, Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program, Revision 6A, step 6.1, which stated, in part, that sources of boron leakage shall be identified and documented in the applicable corrective action document. The licensee entered this finding into their corrective action system as Condition Report 31003 and replaced the leaking union.
The finding was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Initiating Events Cornerstone attribute of human performance and affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. The inspectors used Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, and determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the issue would not result in exceeding the technical specification limit for identified reactor coolant system leakage or affect other mitigating systems resulting in a total loss of their safety function. The inspectors also determined that the finding had a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program component because the licensee did not have a sufficiently low threshold in order to identify boric acid leaks during walkdowns [P.1.(a)] .
Inspection Report# : 2010005 (pdf)
Significance:      Nov 04, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Procedures for Establishing Feedwater Preheat The inspectors identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Procedures, for Wolf Creek Procedures GEN 00-003, Hot Standby to Minimum Load, and SYS AE-200, Feedwater Preheating During Plant Startup and Shutdown, being inadequate by failing to require maximum feedwater preheating. This could lead to a reactor trip caused by steam generator level oscillations attributable to low feedwater temperature. This was a contributing factor in the October 17, 2010, reactor trip. A temporary change was made to the procedures that cautioned operating crews to maintain maximum feedwater preheating. This issue was entered in the licensees corrective action program as Condition Reports 29845 and 29846.
The inadequate procedural direction to establish maximum feedwater preheating is a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency is more than minor, therefore a finding, because it is associated with the Initiating Events Cornerstone attribute of procedure quality and it affects the objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. The inspectors evaluated the significance of this finding using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance since the finding contributed to the likelihood of a reactor trip; however, it did not contribute to the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions would not be available. This finding had a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the operating experience component because Wolf Creek failed to institutionalize internal and external operating experience by changing plant procedures [P.2(b)].
Inspection Report# : 2010005 (pdf)
 
Significance:      Nov 04, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Procedures to Ensure Proper Main Feed Pump Speed During Startup The inspectors identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Procedures, for Wolf Creek Procedures GEN 00-003, Hot Standby to Minimum Load, and SYS AE-121, Turbine Driven Main Feedwater Pump Startup, being inadequate by failing to direct control room operators to establish a main feedwater pump speed that will allow the feed bypass regulating valves to control in the 60 to 80 percent open range, prior to raising power from 8 to 16 percent. Feed bypass regulating valve throttle characteristics are highly non-linear below this range which complicates manual and automatic control. This was a contributing factor in the October 17, 2010, reactor trip.
A temporary change was made to the procedures that cautioned operating crews to ensure earlier establishment of optimal feedwater bypass control valve position. This issue was entered in the licensees corrective action program as Condition Reports 29845 and 29846.
The inadequate procedural direction to establish optimal bypass valve position at the correct time during the startup is a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency is more than minor, therefore a finding, because it is associated with the Initiating Events Cornerstone attribute of procedure quality and it affects objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. The inspectors evaluated the significance of this finding using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance since the finding contributed to the likelihood of a reactor trip; however, it did not contribute to the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions would not be available. This finding had a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the operating experience component because Wolf Creek failed to institutionalize internal operating experience by changing plant procedures [P.2(b)].
Inspection Report# : 2010005 (pdf)
Significance:      Sep 30, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Establish Conditons to Open a Main Steam Isolation Valve that Resulted in a Feedwater Isolation A self-revealing noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Procedures, was identified for the failure to provide a procedure to establish appropriate conditions to open a main steam isolation valve in Mode 4 which resulted in an excessive steam generator level swell and feedwater isolation. On March 5, 2010, Wolf Creek commenced a plant heatup following a shutdown to Mode 4 for a nuclear instrument repair. Main steam isolation valve A was opened at approximately 12:07 a.m. and steam generator A level rapidly increased 28 percent and tripped the P-14 setpoint which caused a feedwater isolation. The cause was attributed to an inadequate procedure for determining valve differential pressure or steam demand prior to opening a main steam isolation valve. This issue is captured in Condition Report 23938. For corrective action, Wolf Creek plans to install high accuracy local gauges to measure valve differential pressure.
The inspectors determined that the failure to provide a procedure that established the conditions necessary to open a main steam isolation valve without causing an excessive steam generator swell was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor, and therefore a finding, because it was associated with the Initiating Events Cornerstone attribute of procedure adequacy and affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operation. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the inspectors concluded the finding screened to Green because the finding did not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigating equipment or functions would not be available. No crosscutting aspect was identified because there was no aspect that significantly contributed to the event.
Inspection Report# : 2010004 (pdf)
Significance:      Dec 31, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: VIO Violation
 
Failure to Correct Vessel Head Vent Path The inspectors identified a cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, due to an inadequate vent path for the reactor vessel head. The inadequate vent path resulted in the formation of voids in the reactor vessel head during Refueling Outage 17. Failure to ensure an adequate vent path in the reactor vessel head was the subject of a noncited violation in NRC Inspection Report 05000482/2008004. During and after Refueling Outage 16, Wolf Creek initiated a root cause evaluation and corrective actions to prevent occurrence. When one of the possible root causes was disproven in Refueling Outage 17, no additional action was taken to determine the cause of the vessel head vent blockage. However, the licensee could not exclude blockage in the piping. This issue was entered into the corrective action program and the licensee plans to conduct a more thorough inspection of the piping during the next refueling outage. This issue is being tracked by the licensee as Condition Report 22501.
The inspectors determined that the failure to provide adequate vessel head vent path to prevent gas accumulation in the reactor vessel during depressurized plant operations was a performance deficiency. The inspectors determined that this finding, which was associated with the Initiating Events Cornerstone, was more than minor because if left uncorrected, it would have become a more significant safety concern. Specifically, without an adequate vent path the reactor vessel does not have an effective means of relieving noncondensable gases to prevent a loss of reactor coolant system inventory. The inspectors evaluated this finding using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix G, , and determined it be of very low safety significance based upon the demonstrated availability of mitigating systems and the flooded reactor cavity inventory. The inspectors determined the cause of the finding had a problem identification and resolution aspect in the corrective action program. Specifically, Wolf Creeks corrective actions were not successful to address the vent path blockage in a timely manner [P.1(d)].
Inspection Report# : 2009005 (pdf)
Significance:      Mar 31, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: VIO Violation Failure to correct component cooling water valve closures The inspectors identified a cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, involving Wolf Creeks failure to correct the cause of the reactor coolant pump thermal barrier component cooling water heat exchanger outlet valves stroking closed on high flow. Specifically, between 2001 and 2009, Wolf Creek experienced repeated cases of the reactor coolant pump thermal barrier component cooling water heat exchanger outlet valves stroking closed during component cooling water pump swaps and during isolations of the radioactive waste evaporators. Wolf Creek reinitiated evaluation of the issue after the inspectors questions but did not review the impact on the operators ability to open the valves given the valves circuit breakers opening. Repeated throttle valve adjustments have not been successful in stopping the valve closures. This issue and the corrective actions are being tracked by the licensee in Condition Report 2007 002074 and has corrective action pending to modify valve circuitry but it has not been implemented.
The failure to correct a condition adverse to quality of ensuring reactor coolant pump seal cooling as described in the Updated Safety Analysis Report is a performance deficiency. The finding is more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute for the Initiating Events Cornerstone; and, it affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the finding would not result in exceeding the Technical Specification limit for identified reactor coolant system leakage and would not have affected other mitigation systems resulting in a total loss of the seal cooling safety function. This finding is being cited because the licensee failed to establish measures to assure this condition adverse to quality was promptly identified and corrected. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the decision making component because, even though numerous instances of valve closures occurred since the first noncited violation, Wolf Creek downgraded the condition report. Using nonconservative assumptions, the licensee consistently viewed this issue as not having a risk impact because seal injection was not simultaneously lost.
[H.1.b]
Inspection Report# : 2009002 (pdf)
Inspection Report# : 2009005 (pdf)
 
Mitigating Systems Significance:        Dec 16, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Maintain Licensed Operator Examination Integrity The inspectors identified a Green noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 55.49, Integrity of Examinations and Tests, for the failure of the licensee to ensure that the integrity of the written examinations and the operating tests administered to licensed operators was maintained. Seven licensed operators received two dynamic scenarios for their operating tests that had been previously administered to other licensed operators in previous weeks for the 2009 operating tests.
Also, six licensed operators for week 4 and 12 licensed operators for week 5 received written examinations during the 2010 examinations that contained more than 50 percent repeat questions from the previous week examinations. These failures resulted in a compromise of examination integrity because they exceeded the 50 percent overlap defined by ACAD 07-01, Guidelines for the Continuing Training of Licensed Personnel, for this portion of the examination and operating tests, but did not lead to an actual effect on the equitable and consistent administration of the examination. This issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Report 00028854.
The failure of the licensees training staff to maintain the integrity of examinations administered to licensed operations personnel was a performance deficiency. Enclosure The performance deficiency is more than minor, and therefore a finding, because it adversely impacted the human performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Additionally, if left uncorrected, the finding could have become more significant in that allowing licensed operators to return to the control room without valid demonstration of appropriate knowledge on the biennial examinations and operating tests could be a precursor to a significant event if undetected performance deficiencies develop. Using Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 worksheets, and the corresponding Appendix I, Licensed Operator Requalification Significance Determination Process, the finding was determined to have very low safety significance (Green) because the finding resulted in a compromise of the integrity of operating test dynamic scenarios and written examinations and compensatory actions were not immediately taken in 2009 (for the operating tests) and 2010 (for the written examinations) when the compromise should have been discovered. Because the equitable and consistent administration of the exam was not actually impacted by this compromise, it is being characterized as a Green noncited violation. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the resources component because the licensee did not ensure that the associated procedure used to create the examinations and operating tests was complete, accurate, and up to date to ensure that the 50 percent maximum overlap standard was not exceeded [H.2(c)].
Inspection Report# : 2010005 (pdf)
Significance:        Dec 09, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Account for Water Hammer Stresses in Essential Service Water System Calculations The inspector identified a Green noncited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, having very low safety significance for the licensees failure to ensure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis were correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures and instructions. Wolf Creek failed to properly account for essential service water piping membrane stress and impact loads as required by the 1974 ASME Code, Section III, paragraphs ND-3112.4 and ND-3111. Specifically, the licensees design calculations for the essential service water system did not account for the pressure fluctuations caused by a known column closure water hammer phenomena which occurs during a loss of offsite power or load sequencer testing. Wolf Creek has written Condition Report 33253 and plans to address the issue.
The licensees failure to account for the pressure fluctuations caused by a known column closure water hammer phenomena in the design calculations for the essential service water system was a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency was more than minor and therefore a finding because it was associated with the human performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the
 
availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The inspector determined the significance of the finding using IMC 0609.04, "Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings," and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not represent an actual loss of safety function of a single train for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the human performance cross-cutting area, associated with the decision making component, because the licensee used non-conservative values without adequate engineering justification to conclude that essential service water system piping met minimum wall thickness criteria for operability [H.1 (b)].
Inspection Report# : 2010005 (pdf)
Significance:        Nov 24, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Promptly Identify and Correct a Condition Adverse to Quality The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for the failure to promptly identify voiding conditions in the component cooling water and residual heat removal system piping. The licensee failed to promptly identify the presence of voids in both the component cooling water and residual heat removal systems despite unexpected component cooling water pump auto starts and unexpected audible water hammer and minimum flow valve (EJ FCV-610) cycling during component cooling water and residual heat removal pump surveillances.
This finding was more than minor because the failure to promptly identify conditions adverse to quality associated with the component cooling water and residual heat removal systems is associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affects the associated cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the issue screened as having very low safety significance because it was a qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in a loss of operability. The finding had a crosscutting aspect in the human performance, decision making component, because the licensee failed to use conservative assumptions during the evaluation of the pressure oscillations exhibited during the component cooling water pump starts.
Inspection Report# : 2010008 (pdf)
Significance:        Nov 24, 2010 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Procedure for Fill and Vent of the Component Cooling Water System The inspectors identified a self-revealing noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1, Procedures, for failure to maintain procedures required for filling and venting of the component cooling water system. The licensee failed to ensure that the procedures for filling and venting the component cooling water system were adequately written to prevent gas accumulation and voids to form in the system.
This finding was more than minor because the failure to maintain an adequate procedure for filling and venting the component cooling water system is associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affects the associated cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the issue screened as having very low safety significance because it was a qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in a loss of operability. No crosscutting aspect was assigned, as this condition was not reflective of current licensee performance.
Inspection Report# : 2010008 (pdf)
Significance:        Nov 24, 2010
 
Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform an Adequate Operability Evaluation The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, regarding the failure to follow the requirements of Procedures AP 28-001, Operability Evaluations, and AP 26C-004, Technical Specification Operability, associated with deficiencies resulting from the presence of voiding in the train A residual heat removal heat exchanger. This condition resulted in the failure to adequately address the impact of the voided condition for the high head pumps and the heat removal capacity of the heat exchanger.
This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of equipment performance and adversely affects the objective to ensure equipment availability and reliability. Using Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the issue screened as very low risk significant since the finding did not represent a loss of system safety function. The inspectors determined that this finding had a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program component because the licensee failed to thoroughly evaluate a similar problem such that extent of condition of the voiding was considered and the cause was resolved.
Inspection Report# : 2010008 (pdf)
Significance:      Nov 23, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Identify and Correct Inadequate RHR Fill and Vent The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action," for the failure to promptly identify and take corrective actions to address inadequacies in the residual heat removal system fill and vent procedure. The licensee failed to perform corrective actions to incorporate minimum flow rates required to sweep air out of the residual heat removal heat exchangers into the system fill and vent procedure during performance of revisions incorporating previous operating experience and corrective actions associated with NRC inspections.
This finding is more than minor because it affected the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of design control for ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of safety systems. Using Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 -
Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, this finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the voided heat exchanger was a design or qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in loss of operability. The inspectors determined that the finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action component because the licensee staff evaluation of previous Performance Improvement Request 2002-2765 was not thorough enough to result in inclusion of minimum flows necessary to sweep voids out of the residual heat removal heat exchanger.
Inspection Report# : 2010008 (pdf)
Significance:      Nov 04, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Procedure for Steam Generator Hi-Hi Turbine Trip The inspectors identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Procedures, for Wolf Creek Procedure ALR 00-112A, Steam Generator Level Hi-Hi Turbine Trip, being inadequate when reactor power exceeds the capabilities for the auxiliary feedwater system to maintain adequate steam generator inventory after P-14 actuation. This contributed to the operators attempt to perform a controlled shutdown instead of a reactor trip, thereby causing an automatic reactor trip. The licensee incorporated guidance in their startup training to trip the reactor when inadequate feedwater flow exists after P-14 actuation. This issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report 29540.
The inadequate procedural direction after P-14 actuation is a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency is
 
more than minor, and therefore a finding, because it is associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of human performance and it affected the objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). The inspectors evaluated the significance of this finding using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance since the finding does not represent a loss of system safety function, nor does the finding represent actual loss of safety function for single train for a greater time than permitted by technical specifications. This finding had a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the resources component because Wolf Creek failed to validate that the procedure would be successful in stabilizing the plant [H.2(c)].
Inspection Report# : 2010005 (pdf)
Significance:        Nov 04, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Simulation Facility Fidelity The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR 55.46(c)(1)(i), Simulator Fidelity, in that the licensees simulation facility did not have adequate fidelity to simulate steam generator level oscillations that occur during startup and shutdown after a loss of feedwater preheat, thereby creating the possibility for negative training.
Specifically, two constants that are used in the model for the Westinghouse 7300 steam generator level control cards were improperly programmed in the simulator. The licensee changed the constants in the simulator model and initiated actions to ensure accurate low-power steam generator oscillation modeling. This issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report 29541.
The failure to have a properly modeled simulation facility is a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency is more than minor, therefore a finding, because it is associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of human performance and it affected the objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). The inspectors evaluated the significance of this finding using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the finding neither represents a loss of system safety function, nor does it represent actual loss of safety function for single train for a greater time than permitted by technical specifications. This finding had a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the resources component because Wolf Creek did not ensure the simulation facility was accurately modeling plant behavior [H.2(d)].
Inspection Report# : 2010005 (pdf)
Significance:        Oct 01, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Design of Component Cooling Water Safety/Nonsafety Isolation The team identified a Green noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, which states, in part, that measures shall be established to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis are correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions. Specifically, as of October 8, 2010, the licensee failed to incorporate design seismic requirements into the design calculations and actual system operation. This finding was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Report 00028237.
The team determined that the failure to adequately analyze the isolation between the safety related and nonsafety-related portions of the component cooling water system was a performance deficiency. This finding was more than minor because it was associated with the design control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the design basis analysis did not ensure that the affected train of component cooling water would perform its required functions after the failure of nonsafety-related component cooling water piping. The inspectors evaluated the issue using Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings. This finding affected the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone because
 
seismic protection was degraded. The inspectors determined that this finding represented the degradation of equipment and functions specifically designed to mitigate a seismic event and that during an earthquake the deficiency would degrade one train of component cooling water, a system that supports a safety system or function. Therefore, this finding was potentially risk significant to seismic initiators and a Phase 3 analysis was required. A Region IV senior reactor analyst performed the Phase 3 significance determination. The change in core damage frequency was calculated to be 7.0 x 10 8 indicating that this finding was of very low safety significance (Green). The dominant risk sequence included a seismic initiating event, loss of offsite power, loss of reactor coolant pump seal cooling, and a failure of high pressure recirculation. This finding did not have a crosscutting aspect because the most significant contributor did not reflect current licensee performance.
Inspection Report# : 2010007 (pdf)
Significance:        Oct 01, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform Tornado Damper Testing The team identified a Green noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, which states, in part, that measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, and nonconformances are promptly identified and corrected. Specifically, as of October 8, 2010, the licensee failed to assure that the identified emergency diesel generator room and the service water pump room tornado damper testing deficiency was effectively corrected. This finding was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Report 00028185.
The inspectors determined that the failure to implement this corrective action was a performance deficiency. This finding was more than minor because, if left uncorrected, the performance deficiency would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, failure to implement this corrective action would have resulted in a failure to periodically test tornado dampers required to protect both the emergency diesel generator room and the essential service water pump room ventilation system. In accordance with Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, a significance determination screening was performed and determined this finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because it was not a design or qualification deficiency, did not represent a loss of system safety function, and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The team determined that there was a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance resources because the licensee failed to provide complete, accurate, and up-to-date work packages [H.2(c)].
Inspection Report# : 2010007 (pdf)
Significance:        Oct 01, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Suction Line Break Analysis and Design The team identified a Green noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, which states, in part, that measures shall be established to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis are correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions. Specifically, as of October 8, 2010, the design calculations associated with the auxiliary feedwater system line break analysis was not consistent with the actual system operation. This finding was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Report 00006250.
The team determined that the failure to adequately analyze a postulated failure of the piping from the condensate storage tank to the auxiliary feedwater pumps was a performance deficiency. This finding was more than minor because it was associated with the design control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the design basis analysis did not ensure that the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump would perform its required functions after the failure of nonsafety-related piping from the condensate storage tank. In accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, "Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings," a significance determination screening was performed and determined this finding
 
was of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not represent a loss of system safety function and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The licensee's operability evaluation demonstrated that the auxiliary feedwater system was operable. This finding did not have a crosscutting aspect because the most significant contributor did not reflect current licensee performance.
Inspection Report# : 2010007 (pdf)
Significance:        Oct 01, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Emergency Diesel Generator Specified Rating did not Address Engine Operation at Design Basis Extreme Meteorological Temperature Conditions The team identified a Green noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, which states, in part, that measures shall be established to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis are correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures and instructions. Specifically, prior to September 29, 2010, the licensee failed to ensure that the design bases inputs in the emergency diesel generator equipment specification were bounded by expected operational values. The licensee failed to evaluate the effects of the identified design basis maximum local meteorological conditions on the rating for the emergency diesel generators which could have affected the capability of safety-related equipment to respond to initiating events. This finding was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Report 00028695.
The team determined that failure to properly incorporate the licensing design basis for extreme local meteorological temperature conditions as a design input in the emergency diesel generator equipment specification was a performance deficiency. This finding was more than minor because it was associated with the design control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the design basis analysis did not ensure that the diesel generators could perform their design safety function at the maximum design temperature. In accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, "Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings," a significance determination screening was performed and determined this finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because it was a design or qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in loss of operability or functionality. This finding did not have a crosscutting aspect because the most significant contributor did not reflect current licensee performance.
Inspection Report# : 2010007 (pdf)
Significance:        Oct 01, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Translate Design Requirements to Operating Procedures for the Transfer of Residual Heat Removal and Containment Spray Suction to the Containment Recirculation Sumps The team identified a Green noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, which states in part, that measures shall be established to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design bases are correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions. Specifically, on September 22, 2010, two out of two operating crews failed to satisfy the minimum time requirement for the transfer of suction of the residual heat removal pumps and the containment spray pumps to the containment recirculation sumps following a large break loss of coolant accident with the worst single active failure as described in Table 6.3 12 of the Updated Safety Analysis Report. This finding was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Report 00028276.
The team determined that the failure to translate design requirements into operating procedures was a performance deficiency. This finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of design control and affected the associated cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the licensee failed to translate design requirements into Procedure EMG ES 12, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation. In accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of
 
Findings, a significance determination screening was performed and determined that this finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because it was a design or qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in loss of operability or functionality. This finding had a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance resources because the operating personnel were not trained to complete the transfer to cold leg recirculation within the minimum time to ensure the equipment was available to assure nuclear safety [H.2(b)].
Inspection Report# : 2010007 (pdf)
Significance:        Sep 30, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Correct Degraded Vital Switchgear Cooler Wiring The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Conditions Adverse to Quality, involving Wolf Creeks failure to identify and correct degraded wiring in the train A vital switchgear air conditioning unit. On August 5, 2010, the SGK05A unit tripped when it blew a fuse. The cause of the blown fuse was found to be a wire that shorted to its terminal box, which is mounted to the compressor. A limited number of wires were replaced and the unit was returned to service. A work order to troubleshoot stated that all wires were inspected and the repair work order stated to inspect for additional damage. The inspectors questioned degraded cables in the terminal box that were not replaced. On August 26, 2010, Wolf Creek re-inspected the wiring and found 15 wires that exceeded the 10 percent insulation loss acceptance criterion and 1 wire that exceeded 50 percent. Vibration of flex conduit was also found to be causing wire degradation. This issue is captured in Condition Reports 27564, 27209, 27218, 27231, and 27237. Wolf Creek has planned more thorough and frequent wiring inspections.
The failure to identify and correct the condition adverse to quality of ensuring wiring insulation meets its acceptance criteria is a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency is more than minor, and therefore a finding, because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and it affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events.
The finding is determined to be of very low safety significance because it did not represent an actual loss of safety function, did not result in exceeding a Technical Specification allowed outage time, and did not affect external event initiators. The finding has a crosscutting aspect in the human performance area associated with the resources component. Specifically, the August 6 troubleshooting and repair work orders did not include instructions to inspect all potentially affected wiring with a specific method to assess insulation loss in order to repair all the damaged wires.
Inspection Report# : 2010004 (pdf)
Significance:        Sep 15, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Properly Identify and Evaluate Degraded Piping in the Train A Essential Service Water System The inspector identified a Green noncited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for the licensee's failure to properly evaluate a condition adverse to quality involving train A of the essential service water system. The cause and extent of condition of the pitting corrosion of the essential service water piping was not fully addressed by the licensee due to inadequate analysis and lack of engineering justification for the assumptions used to evaluate the degradation. As a result, the licensee was unable to ensure the pitting degradation did not reduce essential service water pipe wall thickness below the minimum allowed ASME code specifications. This resulted in train A of the essential service water system being declared inoperable from 2:20 p.m. until 10:21 p.m. on December 9, 2010, while measurements of the piping wall thickness were obtained. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program as Condition Report 18785.
The failure to properly evaluate the degraded condition of the essential service water piping was a performance deficiency. The inspector determined this finding was more than minor because it was associated with the human performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone , and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to events to prevent undesirable consequences. The inspector determined the significance of the finding using IMC 0609.04, "Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings," and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not represent an actual loss of safety function of a single train for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time. This finding had a crosscutting aspect in the human performance cross-cutting area, decision making
 
component, because the licensee did not use conservative assumptions in its decision making when they initially used non-conservative values without adequate engineering justification to conclude that the train A essential service water piping met minimum wall thickness criteria for operability [H.1 (b)].
Inspection Report# : 2010005 (pdf)
Significance:        Sep 15, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Evaluate Corrosion Mechanism in Accordance with Code Case N513 On September 15, 2010, the inspectors identified a Green noncited violation of 10 CFR 50.55a(b)(5) for failing to implement the requirements of Code Case N513-2, Section 2.0(e). On June 29, 2010, Wolf Creek discovered a through-wall leak of a 30 inch essential service water pipe. The flaw was evaluated using ASME Code Case N513-2.
Code Case N513, Section 2.0(e) required the flaw be re-examined every 30 days unless a flaw growth evaluation is prepared to justify re-examination every 90 days. The evaluation is required to include corrosion rate and corrosion mechanism. The inspectors reviewed the engineering disposition for the flaw and did not find a discussion of the corrosion mechanism or a justification of the corrosion rate. The inspectors reviewed independent laboratory analyses of removed Wolf Creek piping samples that stated that microbiologically influenced corrosion was likely and that the corrosion likely progressed through-wall at a high rate. On September 30, 2010, an engineering disposition was created in response to Condition Report 28077 which included a corrosion evaluation and established a much higher corrosion rate. Key in that corrosion evaluation was the use of empirical data from testing of known flaws which showed a corrosion rate between -4 mils per year to 29 mils per year. The flaw was reexamined after 90 days and minimal growth was found.
The failure to comply with the requirements of ASME Code Case N513-2, Section 2.0(e) was considered a performance deficiency. The finding is greater than minor because the failure to perform timely and adequate evaluations of degraded, nonconforming, and unanalyzed conditions for operability, if left uncorrected, would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. The finding is associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affects the associated cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The inspectors evaluated the significance of this finding using Phase 1 of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the issue did not result in a loss of operability or functionality, and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with corrective action program component because operations and engineering personnel failed to thoroughly evaluate problems such that the resolutions addressed the cause and extent of condition [P.1(c)]
Inspection Report# : 2010005 (pdf)
Significance:        Jul 30, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Resolve Degraded Conditions in a Timely Manner The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for the licensees failure to promptly correct degraded or nonconforming conditions in that the conditions were not corrected at the first available opportunity or appropriately justify a longer completion schedule. Some examples of affected degraded or nonconforming conditions included degraded atmospheric relief valve discharge line silencer, essential service water system water hammer events and internal corrosion, and 23 items on the Operability Evaluation Database that had not been corrected prior to the start of the last refuel outage. As corrective actions for this issue, the licensee implemented interim procedural guidance and initiated Condition Report 27071 to evaluate the adequacy of tracking methods used for degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed conditions. In addition, the licensee initiated a review of work requests, condition reports, and other items for degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed conditions and is assessing the justification for delayed implementation of these corrective actions.
This issue was more than minor because it affected the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems
 
Cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, the issue is determined to have very low safety significance because the finding is not a design or qualification issue confirmed not to result in a loss of operability or functionality; did not represent an actual loss of safety function of the system or train; did not result in the loss of one or more trains of nontechnical specification equipment; and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The inspectors determined that the finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the component of resources because the licensee failed to provide adequate procedures to assure timely resolution of degraded or nonconforming conditions
[H.2(c)].
Inspection Report# : 2010006 (pdf)
Significance:        Jul 30, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Unqualified Scaffolding Erected Near Safety-Related Equipment The inspectors identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a for failure to properly implement Procedure AP 14A-003, Scaffold Construction and Use, Revision 17, when scaffolding was erected near operable safety-related equipment. On July 14, 15, and 28, the inspectors identified a total of four instances where the minimum separation distance between scaffolding and safety-related components was less than the minimum allowed by procedure and an approved engineering evaluation to justify the deviation was not performed. The licensee entered the issue into its corrective action program as Condition Reports 26752 and 27010, corrected each scaffolding deficiency, and performed comprehensive walkdowns of all scaffolding around safety-related structures, systems, and components.
The deficiency was more than minor because if left uncorrected, it would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. The finding was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, the issue is determined to have very low safety significance because the finding is not a design or qualification issue confirmed not to result in a loss of operability or functionality; did not represent an actual loss of safety function of the system or train; did not result in the loss of one or more trains of nontechnical specification equipment; and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The inspectors determined the finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with corrective action program because the licensee did not take appropriate corrective actions to address previously identified scaffolding construction issues in a timely manner [P.1(d)].
Inspection Report# : 2010006 (pdf)
Significance:        Jul 30, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to Adequately Monitor Control Room Deficiencies The inspectors identified a finding for the failure to follow Procedure AI 22A-001, Operator Work Arounds/Burdens/Control Room Deficiencies, Revision 8, to adequately identify, document, and track control room deficiencies associated with instruments and controls to ensure proper prioritization and timely corrective actions.
Specifically, inspectors observed that the licensee had approximately 52 WR (work request) buttons on the control boards indicating that work requests had been initiated to correct problems on instruments and controls. However, not all deficiencies were logged, and some of the deficiencies had existed for years without correction or justification. The licensee initiated Condition Report 27034 to document and evaluate this concern.
The deficiency was more than minor because if left uncorrected, it would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern, in that, the deficient condition could cause an operator to take an inappropriate action based on expected plant response or conversely cause an operator not to take action when action is required. The finding is associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone. The senior reactor analyst determined that this finding was not appropriate to be evaluated using the significance determination process since this finding was associated with numerous equipment issues and associated human performance aspects that might impact equipment operation. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix M, Significance Determination Process Using Qualitative Criteria, the
 
finding is determined to have very low safety significance because there was no adverse impact to plant equipment.
The inspectors determined that the cause of the finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the component of corrective action program because the licensee did not identify issues completely, accurately, and in a timely manner commensurate with their safety significance [P.1(a)].
Inspection Report# : 2010006 (pdf)
Significance:        Jul 30, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Update an Operability Evaluation The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures and Drawings, for the failure to implement Procedure AP 26C-004, Technical Specification Operability, Revision 20, to adequately evaluate the operability of a degraded essential service water system. Specifically, operations and engineering personnel failed to adequately evaluate the operability of the essential service water system when relevant new information was identified that challenged a previously performed operability determination and which challenged the reasonable expectation for operability. Condition Report 27288 was initiated to evaluate the failure to perform adequate operability determinations.
The issue was more than minor because if left uncorrected, it would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. The finding is associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, the issue is determined to have very low safety significance because the finding is not a design or qualification issue confirmed not to result in a loss of operability or functionality; did not represent an actual loss of safety function of the system or train; did not result in the loss of one or more trains of nontechnical specification equipment; and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The inspectors determined that the cause of the finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with resources because the licensee failed to provide complete, accurate, and up-to-date procedures for performing operability evaluations [H.2(c)].
Inspection Report# : 2010006 (pdf)
Significance:        Jul 30, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: VIO Violation Failure to Perform Adequate Evaluation for Significant Conditions The inspectors identified a cited violation 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, because the licensee failed to perform an adequate evaluation to determine the cause of loss of offsite power induced water hammers and internal corrosion in the essential service water system and did not take corrective actions to preclude repetition of additional water hammer events and system leaks. Specifically, the licensee performed an apparent cause evaluation instead of a root cause evaluation as required, and the licensees evaluation did not consider metallurgical evaluations that were performed outside the corrective action program. The inspectors found that the licensee had not corrected a previous NCV 05000482/2009007-03, Failure to Correctly Screen ESW Piping Leaks for Significance, which resulted in the licensee failing to perform a root cause evaluation. Because the licensee failed to restore compliance within a reasonable time after NCV 05000482/2009007-03 was identified, this violation is being cited in a Notice of Violation in accordance with Section VI.A.1 of the NRCs Enforcement Policy. The licensees corrective action to this cited violation was to initiate Condition Reports 27212, 26466, and 27075, to evaluate and correct the identified conditions, to start a root cause evaluation and, separately, to evaluate the licensees failure to properly respond to NCV 05000482/2009007-03.
The issue was more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affects the associated cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences, and is therefore a finding.
Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, the issue is determined to have very low safety significance because the finding is not a design or qualification issue confirmed not to result in a loss of operability or functionality; did not represent an actual loss of safety function of the system or train; did not result in the loss of one or more trains of
 
nontechnical specification equipment; and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The inspectors determined that the cause of the finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the component of corrective action program because the licensee failed to thoroughly evaluate problems such that the resolutions address causes and extent of conditions [P.1 (c)]
Inspection Report# : 2010006 (pdf)
Significance:        Jul 30, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Determine if a Deficiency Existed in the Ultimate Heat Sink The team identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for the failure to follow the requirements of Procedure AP 26C-004, Technical Specification Operability, Revision 20. Specifically, Wolf Creek Generating Station failed to confirm if a deficiency existed with the ability of the ultimate heat sink to perform its safety function after delaying the 5 year scheduled dredging of the channel. The licensee initiated Condition Report 27080 and performed an operability determination to evaluate the deficiency.
The issue was more than minor because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, and it affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, the issue is determined to have very low safety significance because the finding is not a design or qualification issue confirmed not to result in a loss of operability or functionality; did not represent an actual loss of safety function of the system or train; did not result in the loss of one or more trains of nontechnical specification equipment; and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program component because licensee personnel failed to identify a potential deficiency in the ultimate heat sink in a timely manner [P.1(a)].
Inspection Report# : 2010006 (pdf)
Significance:        Jul 30, 2010 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Notice of Unusual Event Due to Loss of Both Emergency Diesel Generators The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for failure to identify a degraded equipment condition in December 2006. As a result, the emergency diesel generator system experienced a failure on October 22, 2009, which caused the plant to make a notice of unusual event emergency declaration. Licensee personnel missed an opportunity to identify the condition because they did not thoroughly evaluate a surveillance failure and post-mortem testing data available in December 2006.
The finding is more than minor because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, and it affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, the issue is determined to have very low safety significance because the finding is not a design or qualification issue confirmed not to result in a loss of operability or functionality; did not represent an actual loss of safety function of the system or train; did not result in the loss of one or more trains of nontechnical specification equipment; and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. A crosscutting aspect was identified in the problem identification and resolution in that the licensee did not thoroughly evaluate problems such that the resolution addressed causes [P.1(c)].
Inspection Report# : 2010006 (pdf)
 
Significance:        Jul 30, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Translate Design Information into a Procedure The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for the failure to translate criteria from the atmospheric relief valve accumulator leakage calculation into proceduralized leakage criteria. Specifically, engineering personnel did not translate the calculated design basis leakage criteria and the required minimum pressure to start the test into the procedure. The licensee entered this in to the corrective action program as Condition Report 26771, and the licensee was developing plans to revise the leakage criteria in the procedure.
This issue was more than minor because it affected the design control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affected the objective to ensure the reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, the issue is determined to have very low safety significance because the finding is not a design or qualification issue confirmed not to result in a loss of operability or functionality; did not represent an actual loss of safety function of the system or train; did not result in the loss of one or more trains of nontechnical specification equipment; and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program component because licensee personnel failed to take appropriate corrective actions to previously identified problems [P.1(d)].
Inspection Report# : 2010006 (pdf)
Significance:        Jun 30, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Maintain an Adequate Flooding Analysis for Auxiliary Feedwater Trains The inspectors identified a green noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, after Wolf Creek failed to provide adequate design control measures for verifying the adequacy of the flooding analysis for the auxiliary feedwater pipe rooms 1206 and 1207. Wolf Creek failed to identify piping that was seismically unqualified and that if ruptured could potentially overwhelm the floor drains. Wolf Creek re-analyzed the piping and determined it would not rupture during an earthquake. Flooding of the room could have caused all three of the auxiliary feedwater pump suction pressure transmitters to fail and inhibit automatic swap to essential service water. The licensee placed this issue in their corrective action program as Condition Report 26050.
The inspectors determined that the incorrect calculation assumption in the flooding analysis of record was the performance deficiency. This finding was determined to be more than minor because it impacted the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of the design control and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the finding was determined to have very low safety significance because the deficiency was confirmed not to result in loss of operability or functionality. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program because the licensees evaluation focused on the probability of equipment failure leading to a flooding event rather than the stated design basis of the facility [P.1(c)].
Inspection Report# : 2010003 (pdf)
Significance:        Jun 30, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Lack of Acceptance Criteria Allows Degraded EDG Power Supply to Remain in Service The inspectors identified a violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Procedures, for the failure of maintenance personnel to provide an adequate work order that included critical acceptance criteria for the emergency diesel generator B. On October 22, 2010, emergency diesel generator A failed because excessive power supply voltage
 
ripple caused its speed switch to actuate while in standby. Emergency diesel generator B also failed voltage ripple tests on October 27, 2009. On October 27, 2009, voltage ripple was at 2,015 mV, but no acceptance criteria were specified in Work Order 09-321599-000. Corrective action was not taken until March 2010 and subsequent evaluation of the issue did not identify the lack of acceptance criteria in the work order. The licensee placed this issue into the corrective action program as Condition Report 26651.
The inspectors determined that the failure to replace a power supply that was degraded below its acceptance criteria was the performance deficiency. This finding is more than minor because it affected the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of availability and reliability and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the finding was determined to have very low safety significance because the deficiency was confirmed not to result in loss of operability or functionality. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program because several work groups failed to question the March 17, 2010, results and initiate a condition report [P.1(a)].
Inspection Report# : 2010003 (pdf)
Significance:        Jun 30, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Nonsafety Power Supply Causes Failure of Emergency Diesel Generator A The inspectors identified a Green noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for the failure of the licensee to ensure the design of the emergency diesel local annunciator power supply circuit such that its failure would not cause failure of the associated emergency diesel generator. On October 22, 2009, Wolf Creek was defueled when the control room received annunciators for emergency diesel generator A. The power supply for the local annunciators had input enough noise or voltage spikes on to the safety related power wires to cause the speed switch to actuate while the engine was in standby. This inhibited engine start. The power supply was replaced and emergency diesel generator A was returned to service on October 23, 2009. Condition Report 21039 examined this failure but failed to identify that the vendors circuit analysis did not consider voltage ripple as a failure mode and that the requirements of IEEE 384-1974 were not met. The nonsafety related power supply was not supposed to be able to cause the failure of the safety related emergency diesel generator. The licensee placed this issue into the corrective action program as Condition Reports 25663, 24867, and 25479.
The inspectors determined the failure to ensure that the licensing basis for the emergency diesel generators was being met to be the performance deficiency. This finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of human performance and it affected the objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage).
Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the finding was determined to have very low safety significance because emergency diesel generator A was out of service for less than 24 hours. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program because the licensee failed to evaluate this failure mode against the vendors circuit analysis [P.1(c)].
Inspection Report# : 2010003 (pdf)
Significance:        Mar 31, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Follow Procedure for a Main Feed Pump Trip The inspectors identified a Green noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Procedures, for the failure of Wolf Creek control room personnel to follow procedures for a main feedwater pump trip. During a review of the posttrip data and operator statements, the inspectors noted that control room operators took manual control and reset main feedwater Pump A, which was not in accordance with station procedures. This issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report 24011.
 
This finding was greater than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of human performance and it affected the objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). The inspectors evaluated the significance of this finding using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, and screened the finding to Phase 2 because the finding represents a loss of auxiliary feedwater actuation system safety Function g. The finding screened to Phase 3 because of the failure to start of both motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps. The senior reactor analyst performed a Phase 3 analysis and concluded that the finding was Green because the probability of an initiator occurring within any 10-second exposure time is approximately 3E-7. Additionally, auxiliary feedwater pumps would have been automatically started on lo-lo steam generator level if required. The inspectors also determined that the cause of the finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with operating experience because Wolf Creek failed to communicate relevant operating experience to affected internal stakeholders [P.2(a)].
Inspection Report# : 2010002 (pdf)
Significance:      Mar 10, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Establish Goals and Monitor for a(1) Offgas Radiation Monitor GERE0092 The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR 50.65 for failure to establish goals per paragraph (a)(1) to monitor the performance of the main condenser offgas radiation Monitor GERE0092. Multiple failures occurred which exceeded the monitoring goals and the function was not moved to 50.65(a)(1) status for corrective action and goal setting. Wolf Creek engineering subsequently evaluated the issues and determined that the function should have been moved to a(1) for goal setting. The licensee entered this issue in their corrective action program as Condition Report 24423.
This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affects the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events. The inspectors evaluated the significance of this finding using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, "Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings," and determined that this finding is of very low safety significance, Green. Specifically, the associated function (SP-04) to detect primary to secondary leakage and then isolate the steam generator blowdown flow path does not result in a loss of any safety function. The inspectors determined that this finding has a crosscutting aspect in the problem identification and resolution area associated with corrective action program because Wolf Creek failed to take appropriate corrective actions to address the system reliability issue and adverse radiation monitor performance trends in a timely manner, commensurate with safety significance and complexity [P.1(d)].
Inspection Report# : 2010002 (pdf)
Significance:      Mar 03, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Degraded Fire Barriers for Auxiliary Feedwater The inspectors identified a noncited violation of License Condition 2.C(5)(a) for degraded fire seals that separated redundant safe shutdown equipment. Specifically, silicone foam and ceramic fiber board seals separating the auxiliary feedwater trains from the turbine building and the condensate storage tank valve house were degraded so that they no longer provided a 3-hour rated fire barrier. The licensee entered the finding into the corrective action program as Condition Report 23828.
The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of protection against external events and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the reliability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, Attachment 2, Degradation Rating Guidance Specific to Various Fire Protection Program Elements, under Fire Barrier Degradation, Table A2.2, the finding was associated with Moderate B degradation due to the seal not being in a tested or evaluated condition. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process, in supplemental screening for fire confinement findings, the finding screens as Green due to exposing Fire Area A33 featuring an automatic full area water-based suppression system. No crosscutting aspect was
 
assigned as this condition was not reflective of current licensee performance.
Inspection Report# : 2010002 (pdf)
Significance:        Mar 03, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to Perform Adequate Posttrip Review The inspectors identified a Green finding for the failure to adequately implement the posttrip review procedure following a reactor trip caused by low steam generator water levels on March 2, 2010. Specifically, Wolf Creek's posttrip evaluation was not adequate because it failed to identify or evaluate anomalous equipment performance associated with the main feedwater pump that caused the trip. Additionally, the inspectors determined that the Wolf Creeks posttrip review failed to identify that some aspects of operator response to the trip of the main feedwater pump were not in accordance with station procedures. Wolf Creek evaluated the individual issues and deficiencies listed above and entered them into the corrective action program as Condition Reports 23932, 23966, 24043, 23982, and 23981.
This finding was greater than minor because the information omitted from the posttrip review was associated with the human performance attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events. Using Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, this finding was determined to be of very low safety significance since the finding does not represent a loss of system safety function, nor does the finding represent actual loss of safety function for single train for a greater time than permitted by technical specifications. This finding had a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program component because Wolf Creek failed to fully evaluate plant computer data and operator statements associated with the March 2, 2010, reactor trip [P.1(c)].
Inspection Report# : 2010002 (pdf)
Significance:        Nov 12, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: VIO Violation Failure to Correct Discolored Boric Acid Deposits The inspectors identified a cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for failure to take action to stop leakage from the base of the refueling water storage tank or evaluate the leakage and wastage for acceptability. Specifically, the licensee did not take actions to prevent recurring discolored boric acid deposits for approximately 11 years. Failure to correct leakage from the refueling water storage tank base was the subject of a noncited violation in NRC Inspection Report 05000482/2007006. This issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report 22866.
The failure to implement corrective actions for the refueling water storage tank leakage was a performance deficiency.
The inspectors determined this issue impacted the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and was greater than minor because if left uncorrected, the failure to correct the presence of boric acid leakage could become a more significant safety concern in that continued wastage could impact tank operability. Using the Phase 1 worksheets in Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, "Significance Determination Process," the finding was determined to have very low safety significance because it did not result in a system or component being inoperable and it did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The inspectors identified a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with resources. Specifically, Wolf Creek did not maintain long term plant safety minimizing corrective maintenance deferrals and this long standing equipment issue [H.2(c)].
Inspection Report# : 2009005 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity
 
Significance:        Mar 03, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inoperable Containment Cooler Condensate Monitoring System The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, due to all containment cooler drip pans being degraded such that the containment cooler condensate monitoring system could not perform its design basis safety function to quantify reactor coolant system leakage into the containment atmosphere. Wolf Creek initiated Condition Report 24005 and Work Order 10-325741-000 to clean and repair the drip pans.
This issue is more than minor because it was associated with the equipment performance aspect of the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone and impacted the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, it affected the licensees ability to detect a reactor coolant system leak. The inspectors used Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, to analyze the significance of this finding. The inspectors concluded the finding is of very low safety significance because the condition was not related to pressurized thermal shock. The inspectors also determined that the cause of the finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program because Wolf Creek failed to identify adverse postwork conditions after the coolers received maintenance in the 2009 refueling outage [P.1(a)].
Inspection Report# : 2010002 (pdf)
Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Significance:        Oct 21, 2009 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Have Procedures to Prevent Draining Radioactive Systems into Nonradioactive Systems The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a for failure to implement written procedures to prevent draining and venting radioactive systems into nonradioactive systems and prevent unplanned releases of radioactivity into the environment. On October 21, 2009, an auxiliary building operator inadvertently connected a hose carrying radioactive water to a hose that was routed into the auxiliary building nonradioactive sump. Consequently, the operator drained an estimated 800 to 1,000 gallons of reactor coolant into the nonradioactive auxiliary building sump which transferred its radioactive contents to the turbine building sump. When the contaminated turbine building sump attempted to transfer liquid radioactive waste to the non-radioactive wastewater retention basin, radiation monitor RE95 alarmed and terminated the discharge due to the Hi-Hi radioactivity setting of 7.25E-5 uCi/ml. The licensee immediately implemented a decontamination recovery plan. This event was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Reports 20995, 20999, and 29295.
The inspectors determined that failure to have procedures to prevent draining and venting radioactive systems to nonradioactive systems was a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because it impacted the program and process attribute of the Public Radiation Safety Cornerstone, and it adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring adequate protection of public health and safety from exposure to radioactive material released into the public domain. Using the Public Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process, the inspectors determined this finding to be of very low safety significance because this was not a failure to implement the effluent program, and it had no impact on public dose. In addition, this finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of Human
 
Performance related to the personnel work practices component. Specifically, the licensee failed to use self- and peer-checking human error prevention techniques and then proceeded in the face of uncertainty when unexpected plant conditions were known [H.4(a)].
Inspection Report# : 2010005 (pdf)
Significance:      Oct 21, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Have Adequate Procedures for Meteorological Monitoring The inspectors identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a for failure to have adequate procedures for maintaining meteorological monitoring systems functional. The inspectors determined that procedures did not exist for maintaining the functionality or to declare one or more channels of wind instrumentation out of service pursuant to Technical Requirement 3.3.12. Consequently, both channels of the 10 meter wind direction instrumentation were not functional between April and October 2009. The licensee developed additional guidance for determining functionality of the instruments and immediately required the meteorological data to be reviewed on a more frequent basis to ensure validity. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program as Condition Report 00029337.
The failure to have procedures to maintain meteorological monitoring functional is a performance deficiency. This finding is more than minor because it was associated with the Public Radiation Safety Cornerstone attribute of program and process and affected the cornerstone objective, in that, the failure to have adequate procedures to maintain meteorological monitoring instrumentation functional has the potential to impair public dose assessments of routine and accidental radioactive effluent releases. Using the Public Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process, the inspectors determined this finding to be of very low safety significance because this was not a failure to implement the effluent program, and it had no impact on public dose. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in problem identification and resolution area associated with the corrective action component because the licensee failed to implement a low threshold for completely and accurately identifying issues with the meteorological monitoring instrumentation in a timely manner [P.1(a)].
Inspection Report# : 2010005 (pdf)
Physical Protection Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Significance: N/A Nov 24, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Evaluations and Operability Assessments The inspectors reviewed the licensee evaluations associated with the component cooling water and residual heat removal systems following the identification of the voiding condition. During the review of the licensee evaluations, the inspectors identified inadequate assumptions within the calculations and operability determinations. The assumptions included; the failure to include the effects of the voided condition in the residual heat removal system on the high head safety pumps; the use of nonconservative assumptions during the determination of the size of the initial void contained in the residual heat removal heat exchanger; and the initial troubleshooting following the start of the standby component cooling water pump during a low discharge pressure condition focused on the potential failure of
 
the pressure switch, when the licensee had sufficient information that the pressure switch operated as expected.
In addition, during the inspection the inspectors observed challenges in the licensees ability to understand abnormal operating conditions, in that, the licensee had multiple opportunities to identify the presence of voids in the residual heat removal and component cooling water systems prior to the actual discovery of the adverse conditions. These included missed opportunities during review of licensee and industry operating experience, indications of flow oscillations during start of system components, and abnormal cycling of flow control valves.
Inspection Report# : 2010008 (pdf)
Significance: N/A Jul 30, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Wolf Creek Generating Station Biennial PI&R Inspection Summary The team concluded that the corrective action program at Wolf Creek Generating Station was generally performing in a satisfactory manner to ensure safe plant operations. However, as previously discussed in the past four NRC assessment letters, Wolf Creeks ability to thoroughly evaluate and prioritize problems such that the resolutions effectively address the causes and extent of conditions is of concern. Wolf Creek Generating Stations efforts to reverse the trend of substantive crosscutting issues in problem identification and resolution areas have not shown to be effective.
The team identified a number of issues that the licensees staff had previous opportunities to identify. The team also identified instances in which the licensee takes actions outside of the corrective action program in order to evaluate or correct issues of concern. The inspectors noted several examples where degraded or nonconforming conditions were not corrected in a timely manner and no evaluation had been performed that justified delayed correction of the issue.
In addition, the team identified examples where the licensee has taken ineffective corrective actions, including one example of a cited violation based on the licensees failure to take corrective actions to restore compliance within a reasonable time after a violation had been identified.
The team determined that the licensee adequately evaluated industry operating experience for relevance to the facility, and entered applicable items in the corrective action program. And, based on focus group interviews, the team concluded that the licensee had a strong safety conscious work environment. Workers stated they felt they could raise safety concerns without fear of retaliation.
Inspection Report# : 2010006 (pdf)
Last modified : March 03, 2011
 
Wolf Creek 1 1Q/2011 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance:      Mar 31, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Clearance Order Disables Power Operated Relief Valve Low temperature Overpressure Function The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Procedures, involving the failure to follow the requirements of Procedure AP 21E-001, Clearance Orders. This procedure violation resulted in an inadequate tagout for the Train A solid state protection system resulting in an unplanned swap of the volume control tank charging pump suction to the reactor water storage tank and an unplanned entry into Technical Specification 3.4.12 due to the de-energization of power operated relief valve A low temperature overpressure protection relays. Operators took manual actions to restore the pump suction, and power was restored after approximately four hours. This finding has been entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Reports 35288 and 35318.
The failure to follow procedures to complete clearance orders with adequate boundaries is a performance deficiency.
The performance deficiency was more than minor because it impacted the Initiating Events Cornerstone objective of configuration control to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. The significance of the finding was determined using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Appendix G, Checklist 2, and determined to be of very low safety significance, because it did not cause the loss of mitigating capability of core heat removal, inventory control, power availability, containment control, or reactivity control. Additionally, the cause of the finding is related to the human performance crosscutting component of work control. Specifically, the licensee did not appropriately plan for the maintenance work scope by ensuring work groups and an offsite organization communicate the necessary electrical boundaries to assure plant and human performance [H.3(b)] (Section 1R20).
Inspection Report# : 2011002 (pdf)
Significance:      Dec 31, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Identify Boric Acid Leak on Instrument Lines to Reactor Coolant System The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, involving the licensees failure to identify, document, and evaluate sources of boric acid leakage.
During a boric acid walkdown and containment closeout tour on December 7, 2010, the inspectors identified a boric acid leak in an instrument line to the reactor coolant system loop 2 flow transmitters which had not been previously identified and documented by the licensee. As such, the licensee failed to accomplish the requirements of procedure AP 16F-001, Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program, Revision 6A, step 6.1, which stated, in part, that sources of boron leakage shall be identified and documented in the applicable corrective action document. The licensee entered this finding into their corrective action system as Condition Report 31003 and replaced the leaking union.
The finding was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Initiating Events Cornerstone attribute of human performance and affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. The inspectors used Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, and determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the issue would not result in exceeding the technical specification limit for identified reactor coolant system leakage or affect other mitigating systems resulting in a total loss of their safety function. The inspectors also determined that the finding had a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program component because the licensee did not have a sufficiently low threshold in order to identify boric acid leaks during walkdowns [P.1.(a)] .
 
Inspection Report# : 2010005 (pdf)
Significance:      Dec 31, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Procedures for Establishing Feedwater Preheat The inspectors identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Procedures, for Wolf Creek Procedures GEN 00-003, Hot Standby to Minimum Load, and SYS AE-200, Feedwater Preheating During Plant Startup and Shutdown, being inadequate by failing to require maximum feedwater preheating. This could lead to a reactor trip caused by steam generator level oscillations attributable to low feedwater temperature. This was a contributing factor in the October 17, 2010, reactor trip. A temporary change was made to the procedures that cautioned operating crews to maintain maximum feedwater preheating. This issue was entered in the licensees corrective action program as Condition Reports 29845 and 29846.
The inadequate procedural direction to establish maximum feedwater preheating is a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency is more than minor, therefore a finding, because it is associated with the Initiating Events Cornerstone attribute of procedure quality and it affects the objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. The inspectors evaluated the significance of this finding using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance since the finding contributed to the likelihood of a reactor trip; however, it did not contribute to the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions would not be available. This finding had a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the operating experience component because Wolf Creek failed to institutionalize internal and external operating experience by changing plant procedures [P.2(b)].
Inspection Report# : 2010005 (pdf)
Significance:      Dec 31, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Procedures to Ensure Proper Main Feed Pump Speed During Startup The inspectors identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Procedures, for Wolf Creek Procedures GEN 00-003, Hot Standby to Minimum Load, and SYS AE-121, Turbine Driven Main Feedwater Pump Startup, being inadequate by failing to direct control room operators to establish a main feedwater pump speed that will allow the feed bypass regulating valves to control in the 60 to 80 percent open range, prior to raising power from 8 to 16 percent. Feed bypass regulating valve throttle characteristics are highly non-linear below this range which complicates manual and automatic control. This was a contributing factor in the October 17, 2010, reactor trip.
A temporary change was made to the procedures that cautioned operating crews to ensure earlier establishment of optimal feedwater bypass control valve position. This issue was entered in the licensees corrective action program as Condition Reports 29845 and 29846.
The inadequate procedural direction to establish optimal bypass valve position at the correct time during the startup is a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency is more than minor, therefore a finding, because it is associated with the Initiating Events Cornerstone attribute of procedure quality and it affects objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. The inspectors evaluated the significance of this finding using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance since the finding contributed to the likelihood of a reactor trip; however, it did not contribute to the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions would not be available. This finding had a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the operating experience component because Wolf Creek failed to institutionalize internal operating experience by changing plant procedures [P.2(b)].
Inspection Report# : 2010005 (pdf)
Significance:      Sep 30, 2010
 
Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Establish Conditons to Open a Main Steam Isolation Valve that Resulted in a Feedwater Isolation A self-revealing noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Procedures, was identified for the failure to provide a procedure to establish appropriate conditions to open a main steam isolation valve in Mode 4 which resulted in an excessive steam generator level swell and feedwater isolation. On March 5, 2010, Wolf Creek commenced a plant heatup following a shutdown to Mode 4 for a nuclear instrument repair. Main steam isolation valve A was opened at approximately 12:07 a.m. and steam generator A level rapidly increased 28 percent and tripped the P-14 setpoint which caused a feedwater isolation. The cause was attributed to an inadequate procedure for determining valve differential pressure or steam demand prior to opening a main steam isolation valve. This issue is captured in Condition Report 23938. For corrective action, Wolf Creek plans to install high accuracy local gauges to measure valve differential pressure.
The inspectors determined that the failure to provide a procedure that established the conditions necessary to open a main steam isolation valve without causing an excessive steam generator swell was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor, and therefore a finding, because it was associated with the Initiating Events Cornerstone attribute of procedure adequacy and affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operation. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the inspectors concluded the finding screened to Green because the finding did not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigating equipment or functions would not be available. No crosscutting aspect was identified because there was no aspect that significantly contributed to the event.
Inspection Report# : 2010004 (pdf)
Significance:      Dec 31, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: VIO Violation Failure to Correct Vessel Head Vent Path The inspectors identified a cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, due to an inadequate vent path for the reactor vessel head. The inadequate vent path resulted in the formation of voids in the reactor vessel head during Refueling Outage 17. Failure to ensure an adequate vent path in the reactor vessel head was the subject of a noncited violation in NRC Inspection Report 05000482/2008004. During and after Refueling Outage 16, Wolf Creek initiated a root cause evaluation and corrective actions to prevent occurrence. When one of the possible root causes was disproven in Refueling Outage 17, no additional action was taken to determine the cause of the vessel head vent blockage. However, the licensee could not exclude blockage in the piping. This issue was entered into the corrective action program and the licensee plans to conduct a more thorough inspection of the piping during the next refueling outage. This issue is being tracked by the licensee as Condition Report 22501.
The inspectors determined that the failure to provide adequate vessel head vent path to prevent gas accumulation in the reactor vessel during depressurized plant operations was a performance deficiency. The inspectors determined that this finding, which was associated with the Initiating Events Cornerstone, was more than minor because if left uncorrected, it would have become a more significant safety concern. Specifically, without an adequate vent path the reactor vessel does not have an effective means of relieving noncondensable gases to prevent a loss of reactor coolant system inventory. The inspectors evaluated this finding using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix G, , and determined it be of very low safety significance based upon the demonstrated availability of mitigating systems and the flooded reactor cavity inventory. The inspectors determined the cause of the finding had a problem identification and resolution aspect in the corrective action program. Specifically, Wolf Creeks corrective actions were not successful to address the vent path blockage in a timely manner [P.1(d)].
Inspection Report# : 2009005 (pdf)
Significance:      Mar 31, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: VIO Violation Failure to correct component cooling water valve closures The inspectors identified a cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action,
 
involving Wolf Creeks failure to correct the cause of the reactor coolant pump thermal barrier component cooling water heat exchanger outlet valves stroking closed on high flow. Specifically, between 2001 and 2009, Wolf Creek experienced repeated cases of the reactor coolant pump thermal barrier component cooling water heat exchanger outlet valves stroking closed during component cooling water pump swaps and during isolations of the radioactive waste evaporators. Wolf Creek reinitiated evaluation of the issue after the inspectors questions but did not review the impact on the operators ability to open the valves given the valves circuit breakers opening. Repeated throttle valve adjustments have not been successful in stopping the valve closures. This issue and the corrective actions are being tracked by the licensee in Condition Report 2007 002074 and has corrective action pending to modify valve circuitry but it has not been implemented.
The failure to correct a condition adverse to quality of ensuring reactor coolant pump seal cooling as described in the Updated Safety Analysis Report is a performance deficiency. The finding is more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute for the Initiating Events Cornerstone; and, it affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the finding would not result in exceeding the Technical Specification limit for identified reactor coolant system leakage and would not have affected other mitigation systems resulting in a total loss of the seal cooling safety function. This finding is being cited because the licensee failed to establish measures to assure this condition adverse to quality was promptly identified and corrected. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the decision making component because, even though numerous instances of valve closures occurred since the first noncited violation, Wolf Creek downgraded the condition report. Using nonconservative assumptions, the licensee consistently viewed this issue as not having a risk impact because seal injection was not simultaneously lost.
[H.1.b]
Inspection Report# : 2009002 (pdf)
Inspection Report# : 2009005 (pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance:        Mar 31, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Design Control of the Fuel Oil Storage Tank Fill System The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, for the failure to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis were met. Specifically, the licensee failed to ensure that the fuel oil storage tank fill system minimized turbulence, as required by the Updated Safety Analysis Report, such that the emergency diesel generators can be refueled while running uninterrupted. The licensee entered this issue in the corrective action program and will develop corrective actions as part of Condition Report 34730.
The failure to establish measures to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis are met was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it impacted the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of design control and affects the associated cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, "Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings," the inspectors determined that the finding had very low safety significance because it did not result in a loss of system safety function, an actual loss of safety function of a single train for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time, or screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the decision making component because the licensee failed to use conservative assumptions in decision making and adopt a requirement to demonstrate the proposed action is safe in order to proceed rather than a requirement to demonstrate that it is unsafe in order to disapprove the action [H.1(b)] (Section 1R04).
Inspection Report# : 2011002 (pdf)
Significance:        Mar 31, 2011 Identified By: NRC
 
Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Isolated Cooling to Inservice Safety-Related Equipment The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a involving the failure to properly implement the clearance order procedure resulting in a failure to provide adequate cooling to inservice safety-related equipment. Operators restored cooling water flow after approximately one hour. The licensee entered the finding into their corrective action program as Condition Report 33357.
The inspectors determined that the failure to ensure that plant conditions could support establishing the clearance order boundaries, which resulted in a component cooling water heatup and trip of the inservice control room air conditioner, was a performance deficiency. The inspectors determined that this finding was more than minor because it is associated with the configuration control attribute for the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and it affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the finding was determined to have very low safety significance because it was confirmed not to result in loss of operability of control room air conditioning Train B for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time and it did not result in the loss of the normal service water function for greater than 24 hours. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with work control because the licensee failed to plan the work activity by incorporating the impact on the plant [H.3(a)] (Section 1R04).
Inspection Report# : 2011002 (pdf)
Significance:      Mar 31, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Monitor the Performance of Nonsafety Related Systems and Components Used in the Plant Emergency Operating Procedures under 10 CFR 50.65 Programs The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) with three examples involving the failure to monitor the performance of stand by nonsafety-related systems and components that exceeded performance criteria against goals. First, the inspectors identified that the licensee failed to monitor the turbine-driven main feedwater pumps against their standby restart function to fill the steam generators in emergency operating procedures. Failures of the two turbine-driven main feedwater pumps occurred which could have prevented fulfillment of this function.
Second, the inspectors identified that the licensee failed to evaluate reactor trips caused by the main feedwater system against the systems plant level monitoring criteria. Third, the inspectors identified that the licensee failed to monitor the instrument air compressor system against its emergency operating procedure function to restart and provide compressed air. Several instrument air compressor trips have occurred in the last 18 months which could have prevented fulfillment of this function. The licensee entered this issue in the corrective action program and will develop corrective actions as part of Condition Report 36600.
The failure to establish performance monitoring goals commensurate with the mitigating safety function specified in the emergency operating procedures and the plant level criteria is a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency is more than minor, and therefore a finding, because it impacts equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). Using the NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the finding screened to a Phase 2 significance determination because it involved a potential loss of safety function of the main feedwater system and failure of the instrument air system. A Region IV senior reactor analyst performed a Phase 2 significance determination and using the pre-solved worksheet from the Risk Informed Inspection Notebook for the Wolf Creek, Revision 2.01a; however, the presolved worksheet did not include the simultaneous failure of multiple components in different systems. Therefore, the senior reactor analyst performed a bounding Phase 3 significance determination using Appendix M of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process Using Qualitative Criteria, Section 4.1.2. The analyst determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green). The bounding change to the core damage frequency was approximately 8 E-7/year. The relatively low risk worth of the instrument air system at Wolf Creek helped to mitigate the significance. To evaluate the change to the large early release frequency (LERF), the analyst used Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix H, Containment Integrity Significance Determination Process. The finding screened as having very low safety significance for LERF because it did not affect the intersystem loss of coolant accident or steam generator tube rupture categories. The inspectors determined that the finding had a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem Enclosure identification and resolution. Specifically, when Wolf Creek evaluated exceeding the plant level monitoring criteria for reactor trips, their analysis did not identify that failures within the main feedwater system were the cause of four of the six reactor trips, and did not place the affected system function in a(1) monitoring [P.1(c)] (Section 1R12).
Inspection Report# : 2011002 (pdf)
Significance:        Mar 31, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Follow 10 CFR 50.65 a(2) for Main Control Board Annunciator Power Supply Failures The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR 50.65 a(2), involving the failure to demonstrate that the performance of main control board annunciator power supplies was effectively controlled through preventive maintenance such that the annunciators remained capable of performing their intended function. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program and will develop corrective actions as part of Condition Report 34681.
The failure to properly evaluate the failed main control board annunciator power supplies, establish performance goals, and monitor their performance is considered a performance deficiency. This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of equipment performance and it adversely affects the cornerstone objective ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using the Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 Worksheets, the finding is determined to have very low safety significance since it did not result in a loss of system safety function, an actual loss of safety function of a single train for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time, or screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. This finding was determined to have a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program because the licensee failed to properly classify, prioritize, and evaluate a condition adverse to quality [P.1(c)] (Section 1R12).
Inspection Report# : 2011002 (pdf)
Significance:        Mar 31, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Calculation for Vital Switchgear Cooling The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, involving an inadequate calculation supporting vital switchgear room temperatures with only one vital switchgear cooler operable. The licensee entered this issue in the corrective action program and will develop corrective actions as part of Condition Reports 27276, 28252, and 31452.
The inspectors considered the inadequate heat loads and assumptions used in calculation GK-06-W to be a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency is more than minor, and therefore a finding, because it impacted with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and it affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the inspectors screened the finding to Green because the additional temperatures would not have caused the loss of functionality of vital switchgear or batteries, and it did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. No crosscutting aspects were identified because the supporting documentation was prepared in the late 1990s and was not representative of current licensee performance (Section 1R15).
Inspection Report# : 2011002 (pdf)
Significance:        Mar 31, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform an Operability Determination for Degradation of the Fuel Oil Storage Tank The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, involving the failure to follow plant procedures. Specifically, the licensee failed to follow procedure and perform an operability determination when a nonconforming or degraded condition was identified in the Train B emergency diesel generator fuel oil storage tank, as required by Procedure AP 26C-004, Operability Determination and Functionality Assessment,
 
Revision 21. The licensee subsequently performed an operability determination and concluded the fuel oil storage tank was operable but degraded. The licensee entered this issue in the corrective action program as Condition Reports 33355 and 34068.
The failure to follow Procedure AP 26C-004, Operability Determination and Functionality Assessment, Revision 21, when a nonconforming or degraded condition was identified was a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency was more than minor because it could become a more significant safety concern if left uncorrected. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, "Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings," the inspectors determined that the finding had very low safety significance (Green) because it did not result in a loss of system safety function, an actual loss of safety function of a single train for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time, or screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program component because the licensee failed to thoroughly evaluate problems, including evaluating Inspection Report# : 2011002 (pdf)
Significance:        Mar 31, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Verify Ultimate Heat Sink Sedimentation Levels within Design Bases The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix B, Criterion III, involving a failure to perform periodic testing to verify that ultimate heat sink sedimentation remained within design basis limits. The licensee subsequently verified the ultimate heat sink depth remained acceptable using SONAR. The licensee entered this issue in the corrective action program as Condition Report 27144.
Wolf Creeks failure to perform periodic testing to verify that ultimate heat sink sedimentation remained within design basis limits is a performance deficiency. The issue is more than minor, and therefore a finding, because if left uncorrected the issue has the potential to become a more significant safety concern. The inspectors concluded that the issue screened to Green under the significance determination process using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1-Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, because the finding was a design deficiency that was later confirmed not to result in the loss of operability or functionality of the ultimate heat sink. The inspectors concluded that this findings cause has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the work control component because Wolf Creek did not appropriately coordinate work activities by incorporating actions to address the impact of changes to the work scope or activity on the plant and human performance. Specifically, when Wolf Creek performed and planned dredging preventive maintenance on the ultimate heat sink, they did not consider the need to confirm as-found and as-left sediment depth to verify that their design basis was met [H.3(b)]
(Section 1R19).
Inspection Report# : 2011002 (pdf)
Significance:        Mar 31, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Fill and Vent of Component Cooling Water The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Procedures, involving the failure to perform an adequate fill and vent of the component cooling water system which resulted in voiding of the system. The licensee entered the finding into their corrective action program and will develop corrective actions as part of Condition Report 33925.
The inspectors determined that the failure to perform an adequate fill and vent of component cooling water that resulted in system voiding was a performance deficiency. The inspectors determined that this finding was more than minor because it is associated with the human performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and it affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the finding was determined to have very low safety significance (Green) because it did not result in a loss of system safety function, an actual loss of safety function of a single train for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time, or screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program because the licensee failed to take appropriate corrective actions from previous voiding events [P.1(d)] (Section 1R19).
 
Inspection Report# : 2011002 (pdf)
Significance:        Mar 31, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Repetitive Failure to Enter and Log Technical Specifications for Auxiliary Feedwater Suction Valve Testing The inspectors identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Procedures, involving the failure to follow Procedure AP 21-001, Conduct of Operations. Specifically, the licensee failed to enter into technical specification limiting condition of operation 3.7.5.B.1 for one auxiliary feedwater pump inoperable during performance of 92-day check valve surveillance tests. Wolf Creek took prompt corrective action to amend the procedures to include instructions for maintaining the pumps operable with manual actions. This occurred prior to the next check valve test. This issue is captured in Condition Report 34469.
The failure to enter technical specification action statements in accordance with Procedure AP 21-001 was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor, and therefore a finding, because it impacted with the human performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and its objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the issue did not result in a loss of operability for a time period greater than the action statement, and did it not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The inspectors determined that the finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with decision making. Specifically, informally maintained pre-job briefing sheets were being relied upon to determine technical specification applicability instead of the licensees decision making process of operator review on a case by case basis [H.1.a.] (Section 1R22).
Inspection Report# : 2011002 (pdf)
Significance:        Feb 25, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Trend Emergency Diesel Generator Chemistry Paameters Results in an Unplanned Technical Specification Entry The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," for the failure to follow Procedure AP 28A-0100, "Condition Reports," Revision 13. On February 17, 2011, the licensee received laboratory test results on the emergency diesel generator B fuel oil storage tank and determined that the cloud point parameter was out of specification at -8° Celsius. However, Procedure AP 28A-0100, step 5.13.3, required the licensee to evaluate condition report data to identify and evaluate potential trends. The emergency diesel fuel oil storage tank cloud point parameter had been trending closer to the acceptance criteria over the last several fuel oil additions. The licensee had allowed the original fuel oil vendor to continue to deliver fuel that was out of specification which resulted in a gradual trend toward the limits of the chemistry parameters. This trend was not appropriately evaluated because the licensee had not performed training to ensure that consistent and appropriate evaluations would be performed.
This finding was more than minor because it affected the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of equipment performance by impacting the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. This deficiency directly resulted in emergency diesel generator B being declared inoperable due to its fuel oil storage tank being out of specification. The inspectors performed the significance determination using NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, "Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings," because it affected the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone while the plant was at power. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it was not a design or qualification deficiency; it did not result in the loss of a system safety function; it did not represent the loss of a single train for greater than technical specification allowed time; it did not represent a loss of one or more non-technical specification risk-significant equipment for greater than 24 hours; and it did not screen as potentially risk significant due to seismic, flooding, or severe weather. In addition, this finding had a human performance crosscutting aspect associated with resources in that the licensee did not ensure that the corrective action program coordinators were effectively train Inspection Report# : 2011006 (pdf)
 
Significance:        Dec 31, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Account for Water Hammer Stresses in Essential Service Water System Calculations The inspector identified a Green noncited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, having very low safety significance for the licensees failure to ensure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis were correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures and instructions. Wolf Creek failed to properly account for essential service water piping membrane stress and impact loads as required by the 1974 ASME Code, Section III, paragraphs ND-3112.4 and ND-3111. Specifically, the licensees design calculations for the essential service water system did not account for the pressure fluctuations caused by a known column closure water hammer phenomena which occurs during a loss of offsite power or load sequencer testing. Wolf Creek has written Condition Report 33253 and plans to address the issue.
The licensees failure to account for the pressure fluctuations caused by a known column closure water hammer phenomena in the design calculations for the essential service water system was a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency was more than minor and therefore a finding because it was associated with the human performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The inspector determined the significance of the finding using IMC 0609.04, "Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings," and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not represent an actual loss of safety function of a single train for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the human performance cross-cutting area, associated with the decision making component, because the licensee used non-conservative values without adequate engineering justification to conclude that essential service water system piping met minimum wall thickness criteria for operability [H.1 (b)].
Inspection Report# : 2010005 (pdf)
Significance:        Dec 31, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Maintain Licensed Operator Examination Integrity The inspectors identified a Green noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 55.49, Integrity of Examinations and Tests, for the failure of the licensee to ensure that the integrity of the written examinations and the operating tests administered to licensed operators was maintained. Seven licensed operators received two dynamic scenarios for their operating tests that had been previously administered to other licensed operators in previous weeks for the 2009 operating tests.
Also, six licensed operators for week 4 and 12 licensed operators for week 5 received written examinations during the 2010 examinations that contained more than 50 percent repeat questions from the previous week examinations. These failures resulted in a compromise of examination integrity because they exceeded the 50 percent overlap defined by ACAD 07-01, Guidelines for the Continuing Training of Licensed Personnel, for this portion of the examination and operating tests, but did not lead to an actual effect on the equitable and consistent administration of the examination. This issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Report 00028854.
The failure of the licensees training staff to maintain the integrity of examinations administered to licensed operations personnel was a performance deficiency. Enclosure The performance deficiency is more than minor, and therefore a finding, because it adversely impacted the human performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Additionally, if left uncorrected, the finding could have become more significant in that allowing licensed operators to return to the control room without valid demonstration of appropriate knowledge on the biennial examinations and operating tests could be a precursor to a significant event if undetected performance deficiencies develop. Using Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 worksheets, and the corresponding Appendix I, Licensed Operator Requalification Significance Determination Process, the finding was determined to have very low safety significance (Green) because the finding resulted in a compromise of the integrity of operating test dynamic scenarios and written examinations and compensatory actions were not immediately taken in 2009 (for the operating tests) and
 
2010 (for the written examinations) when the compromise should have been discovered. Because the equitable and consistent administration of the exam was not actually impacted by this compromise, it is being characterized as a Green noncited violation. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the resources component because the licensee did not ensure that the associated procedure used to create the examinations and operating tests was complete, accurate, and up to date to ensure that the 50 percent maximum overlap standard was not exceeded [H.2(c)].
Inspection Report# : 2010005 (pdf)
Significance:        Dec 31, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Properly Identify and Evaluate Degraded Piping in the Train A Essential Service Water System The inspector identified a Green noncited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for the licensee's failure to properly evaluate a condition adverse to quality involving train A of the essential service water system. The cause and extent of condition of the pitting corrosion of the essential service water piping was not fully addressed by the licensee due to inadequate analysis and lack of engineering justification for the assumptions used to evaluate the degradation. As a result, the licensee was unable to ensure the pitting degradation did not reduce essential service water pipe wall thickness below the minimum allowed ASME code specifications. This resulted in train A of the essential service water system being declared inoperable from 2:20 p.m. until 10:21 p.m. on December 9, 2010, while measurements of the piping wall thickness were obtained. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program as Condition Report 18785.
The failure to properly evaluate the degraded condition of the essential service water piping was a performance deficiency. The inspector determined this finding was more than minor because it was associated with the human performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone , and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to events to prevent undesirable consequences. The inspector determined the significance of the finding using IMC 0609.04, "Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings," and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not represent an actual loss of safety function of a single train for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time. This finding had a crosscutting aspect in the human performance cross-cutting area, decision making component, because the licensee did not use conservative assumptions in its decision making when they initially used non-conservative values without adequate engineering justification to conclude that the train A essential service water piping met minimum wall thickness criteria for operability [H.1 (b)].
Inspection Report# : 2010005 (pdf)
Significance:        Dec 31, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Evaluate Corrosion Mechanism in Accordance with Code Case N513 On September 15, 2010, the inspectors identified a Green noncited violation of 10 CFR 50.55a(b)(5) for failing to implement the requirements of Code Case N513-2, Section 2.0(e). On June 29, 2010, Wolf Creek discovered a through-wall leak of a 30 inch essential service water pipe. The flaw was evaluated using ASME Code Case N513-2.
Code Case N513, Section 2.0(e) required the flaw be re-examined every 30 days unless a flaw growth evaluation is prepared to justify re-examination every 90 days. The evaluation is required to include corrosion rate and corrosion mechanism. The inspectors reviewed the engineering disposition for the flaw and did not find a discussion of the corrosion mechanism or a justification of the corrosion rate. The inspectors reviewed independent laboratory analyses of removed Wolf Creek piping samples that stated that microbiologically influenced corrosion was likely and that the corrosion likely progressed through-wall at a high rate. On September 30, 2010, an engineering disposition was created in response to Condition Report 28077 which included a corrosion evaluation and established a much higher corrosion rate. Key in that corrosion evaluation was the use of empirical data from testing of known flaws which showed a corrosion rate between -4 mils per year to 29 mils per year. The flaw was reexamined after 90 days and minimal growth was found.
 
The failure to comply with the requirements of ASME Code Case N513-2, Section 2.0(e) was considered a performance deficiency. The finding is greater than minor because the failure to perform timely and adequate evaluations of degraded, nonconforming, and unanalyzed conditions for operability, if left uncorrected, would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. The finding is associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affects the associated cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The inspectors evaluated the significance of this finding using Phase 1 of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the issue did not result in a loss of operability or functionality, and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with corrective action program component because operations and engineering personnel failed to thoroughly evaluate problems such that the resolutions addressed the cause and extent of condition [P.1(c)]
Inspection Report# : 2010005 (pdf)
Significance:        Dec 31, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Procedure for Steam Generator Hi-Hi Turbine Trip The inspectors identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Procedures, for Wolf Creek Procedure ALR 00-112A, Steam Generator Level Hi-Hi Turbine Trip, being inadequate when reactor power exceeds the capabilities for the auxiliary feedwater system to maintain adequate steam generator inventory after P-14 actuation. This contributed to the operators attempt to perform a controlled shutdown instead of a reactor trip, thereby causing an automatic reactor trip. The licensee incorporated guidance in their startup training to trip the reactor when inadequate feedwater flow exists after P-14 actuation. This issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report 29540.
The inadequate procedural direction after P-14 actuation is a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency is more than minor, and therefore a finding, because it is associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of human performance and it affected the objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). The inspectors evaluated the significance of this finding using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance since the finding does not represent a loss of system safety function, nor does the finding represent actual loss of safety function for single train for a greater time than permitted by technical specifications. This finding had a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the resources component because Wolf Creek failed to validate that the procedure would be successful in stabilizing the plant [H.2(c)].
Inspection Report# : 2010005 (pdf)
Significance:        Dec 31, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Simulation Facility Fidelity The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR 55.46(c)(1)(i), Simulator Fidelity, in that the licensees simulation facility did not have adequate fidelity to simulate steam generator level oscillations that occur during startup and shutdown after a loss of feedwater preheat, thereby creating the possibility for negative training.
Specifically, two constants that are used in the model for the Westinghouse 7300 steam generator level control cards were improperly programmed in the simulator. The licensee changed the constants in the simulator model and initiated actions to ensure accurate low-power steam generator oscillation modeling. This issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report 29541.
The failure to have a properly modeled simulation facility is a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency is more than minor, therefore a finding, because it is associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of human performance and it affected the objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that
 
respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). The inspectors evaluated the significance of this finding using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the finding neither represents a loss of system safety function, nor does it represent actual loss of safety function for single train for a greater time than permitted by technical specifications. This finding had a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the resources component because Wolf Creek did not ensure the simulation facility was accurately modeling plant behavior [H.2(d)].
Inspection Report# : 2010005 (pdf)
Significance:        Nov 24, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Promptly Identify and Correct a Condition Adverse to Quality The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for the failure to promptly identify voiding conditions in the component cooling water and residual heat removal system piping. The licensee failed to promptly identify the presence of voids in both the component cooling water and residual heat removal systems despite unexpected component cooling water pump auto starts and unexpected audible water hammer and minimum flow valve (EJ FCV-610) cycling during component cooling water and residual heat removal pump surveillances.
This finding was more than minor because the failure to promptly identify conditions adverse to quality associated with the component cooling water and residual heat removal systems is associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affects the associated cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the issue screened as having very low safety significance because it was a qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in a loss of operability. The finding had a crosscutting aspect in the human performance, decision making component, because the licensee failed to use conservative assumptions during the evaluation of the pressure oscillations exhibited during the component cooling water pump starts.
Inspection Report# : 2010008 (pdf)
Significance:        Nov 24, 2010 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Procedure for Fill and Vent of the Component Cooling Water System The inspectors identified a self-revealing noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1, Procedures, for failure to maintain procedures required for filling and venting of the component cooling water system. The licensee failed to ensure that the procedures for filling and venting the component cooling water system were adequately written to prevent gas accumulation and voids to form in the system.
This finding was more than minor because the failure to maintain an adequate procedure for filling and venting the component cooling water system is associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affects the associated cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the issue screened as having very low safety significance because it was a qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in a loss of operability. No crosscutting aspect was assigned, as this condition was not reflective of current licensee performance.
Inspection Report# : 2010008 (pdf)
Significance:        Nov 24, 2010 Identified By: NRC
 
Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform an Adequate Operability Evaluation The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, regarding the failure to follow the requirements of Procedures AP 28-001, Operability Evaluations, and AP 26C-004, Technical Specification Operability, associated with deficiencies resulting from the presence of voiding in the train A residual heat removal heat exchanger. This condition resulted in the failure to adequately address the impact of the voided condition for the high head pumps and the heat removal capacity of the heat exchanger.
This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of equipment performance and adversely affects the objective to ensure equipment availability and reliability. Using Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the issue screened as very low risk significant since the finding did not represent a loss of system safety function. The inspectors determined that this finding had a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program component because the licensee failed to thoroughly evaluate a similar problem such that extent of condition of the voiding was considered and the cause was resolved.
Inspection Report# : 2010008 (pdf)
Significance:        Nov 24, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Identify and Correct Inadequate RHR Fill and Vent The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action," for the failure to promptly identify and take corrective actions to address inadequacies in the residual heat removal system fill and vent procedure. The licensee failed to perform corrective actions to incorporate minimum flow rates required to sweep air out of the residual heat removal heat exchangers into the system fill and vent procedure during performance of revisions incorporating previous operating experience and corrective actions associated with NRC inspections.
This finding is more than minor because it affected the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of design control for ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of safety systems. Using Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 -
Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, this finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the voided heat exchanger was a design or qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in loss of operability. The inspectors determined that the finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action component because the licensee staff evaluation of previous Performance Improvement Request 2002-2765 was not thorough enough to result in inclusion of minimum flows necessary to sweep voids out of the residual heat removal heat exchanger.
Inspection Report# : 2010008 (pdf)
Significance:        Oct 01, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Design of Component Cooling Water Safety/Nonsafety Isolation The team identified a Green noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, which states, in part, that measures shall be established to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis are correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions. Specifically, as of October 8, 2010, the licensee failed to incorporate design seismic requirements into the design calculations and actual system operation. This finding was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Report 00028237.
The team determined that the failure to adequately analyze the isolation between the safety related and nonsafety-related portions of the component cooling water system was a performance deficiency. This finding was more than minor because it was associated with the design control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating
 
events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the design basis analysis did not ensure that the affected train of component cooling water would perform its required functions after the failure of nonsafety-related component cooling water piping. The inspectors evaluated the issue using Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings. This finding affected the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone because seismic protection was degraded. The inspectors determined that this finding represented the degradation of equipment and functions specifically designed to mitigate a seismic event and that during an earthquake the deficiency would degrade one train of component cooling water, a system that supports a safety system or function. Therefore, this finding was potentially risk significant to seismic initiators and a Phase 3 analysis was required. A Region IV senior reactor analyst performed the Phase 3 significance determination. The change in core damage frequency was calculated to be 7.0 x 10 8 indicating that this finding was of very low safety significance (Green). The dominant risk sequence included a seismic initiating event, loss of offsite power, loss of reactor coolant pump seal cooling, and a failure of high pressure recirculation. This finding did not have a crosscutting aspect because the most significant contributor did not reflect current licensee performance.
Inspection Report# : 2010007 (pdf)
Significance:        Oct 01, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform Tornado Damper Testing The team identified a Green noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, which states, in part, that measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, and nonconformances are promptly identified and corrected. Specifically, as of October 8, 2010, the licensee failed to assure that the identified emergency diesel generator room and the service water pump room tornado damper testing deficiency was effectively corrected. This finding was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Report 00028185.
The inspectors determined that the failure to implement this corrective action was a performance deficiency. This finding was more than minor because, if left uncorrected, the performance deficiency would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, failure to implement this corrective action would have resulted in a failure to periodically test tornado dampers required to protect both the emergency diesel generator room and the essential service water pump room ventilation system. In accordance with Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, a significance determination screening was performed and determined this finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because it was not a design or qualification deficiency, did not represent a loss of system safety function, and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The team determined that there was a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance resources because the licensee failed to provide complete, accurate, and up-to-date work packages [H.2(c)].
Inspection Report# : 2010007 (pdf)
Significance:        Oct 01, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Suction Line Break Analysis and Design The team identified a Green noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, which states, in part, that measures shall be established to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis are correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions. Specifically, as of October 8, 2010, the design calculations associated with the auxiliary feedwater system line break analysis was not consistent with the actual system operation. This finding was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Report 00006250.
The team determined that the failure to adequately analyze a postulated failure of the piping from the condensate storage tank to the auxiliary feedwater pumps was a performance deficiency. This finding was more than minor because it was associated with the design control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events
 
to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the design basis analysis did not ensure that the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump would perform its required functions after the failure of nonsafety-related piping from the condensate storage tank. In accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, "Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings," a significance determination screening was performed and determined this finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not represent a loss of system safety function and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The licensee's operability evaluation demonstrated that the auxiliary feedwater system was operable. This finding did not have a crosscutting aspect because the most significant contributor did not reflect current licensee performance.
Inspection Report# : 2010007 (pdf)
Significance:        Oct 01, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Emergency Diesel Generator Specified Rating did not Address Engine Operation at Design Basis Extreme Meteorological Temperature Conditions The team identified a Green noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, which states, in part, that measures shall be established to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis are correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures and instructions. Specifically, prior to September 29, 2010, the licensee failed to ensure that the design bases inputs in the emergency diesel generator equipment specification were bounded by expected operational values. The licensee failed to evaluate the effects of the identified design basis maximum local meteorological conditions on the rating for the emergency diesel generators which could have affected the capability of safety-related equipment to respond to initiating events. This finding was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Report 00028695.
The team determined that failure to properly incorporate the licensing design basis for extreme local meteorological temperature conditions as a design input in the emergency diesel generator equipment specification was a performance deficiency. This finding was more than minor because it was associated with the design control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the design basis analysis did not ensure that the diesel generators could perform their design safety function at the maximum design temperature. In accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, "Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings," a significance determination screening was performed and determined this finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because it was a design or qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in loss of operability or functionality. This finding did not have a crosscutting aspect because the most significant contributor did not reflect current licensee performance.
Inspection Report# : 2010007 (pdf)
Significance:        Oct 01, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Translate Design Requirements to Operating Procedures for the Transfer of Residual Heat Removal and Containment Spray Suction to the Containment Recirculation Sumps The team identified a Green noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, which states in part, that measures shall be established to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design bases are correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions. Specifically, on September 22, 2010, two out of two operating crews failed to satisfy the minimum time requirement for the transfer of suction of the residual heat removal pumps and the containment spray pumps to the containment recirculation sumps following a large break loss of coolant accident with the worst single active failure as described in Table 6.3 12 of the Updated Safety Analysis Report. This finding was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Report 00028276.
The team determined that the failure to translate design requirements into operating procedures was a performance deficiency. This finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone
 
attribute of design control and affected the associated cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the licensee failed to translate design requirements into Procedure EMG ES 12, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation. In accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, a significance determination screening was performed and determined that this finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because it was a design or qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in loss of operability or functionality. This finding had a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance resources because the operating personnel were not trained to complete the transfer to cold leg recirculation within the minimum time to ensure the equipment was available to assure nuclear safety [H.2(b)].
Inspection Report# : 2010007 (pdf)
Significance:        Sep 30, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Correct Degraded Vital Switchgear Cooler Wiring The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Conditions Adverse to Quality, involving Wolf Creeks failure to identify and correct degraded wiring in the train A vital switchgear air conditioning unit. On August 5, 2010, the SGK05A unit tripped when it blew a fuse. The cause of the blown fuse was found to be a wire that shorted to its terminal box, which is mounted to the compressor. A limited number of wires were replaced and the unit was returned to service. A work order to troubleshoot stated that all wires were inspected and the repair work order stated to inspect for additional damage. The inspectors questioned degraded cables in the terminal box that were not replaced. On August 26, 2010, Wolf Creek re-inspected the wiring and found 15 wires that exceeded the 10 percent insulation loss acceptance criterion and 1 wire that exceeded 50 percent. Vibration of flex conduit was also found to be causing wire degradation. This issue is captured in Condition Reports 27564, 27209, 27218, 27231, and 27237. Wolf Creek has planned more thorough and frequent wiring inspections.
The failure to identify and correct the condition adverse to quality of ensuring wiring insulation meets its acceptance criteria is a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency is more than minor, and therefore a finding, because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and it affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events.
The finding is determined to be of very low safety significance because it did not represent an actual loss of safety function, did not result in exceeding a Technical Specification allowed outage time, and did not affect external event initiators. The finding has a crosscutting aspect in the human performance area associated with the resources component. Specifically, the August 6 troubleshooting and repair work orders did not include instructions to inspect all potentially affected wiring with a specific method to assess insulation loss in order to repair all the damaged wires.
Inspection Report# : 2010004 (pdf)
Significance:        Jul 30, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Resolve Degraded Conditions in a Timely Manner The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for the licensees failure to promptly correct degraded or nonconforming conditions in that the conditions were not corrected at the first available opportunity or appropriately justify a longer completion schedule. Some examples of affected degraded or nonconforming conditions included degraded atmospheric relief valve discharge line silencer, essential service water system water hammer events and internal corrosion, and 23 items on the Operability Evaluation Database that had not been corrected prior to the start of the last refuel outage. As corrective actions for this issue, the licensee implemented interim procedural guidance and initiated Condition Report 27071 to evaluate the adequacy of tracking methods used for degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed conditions. In addition, the licensee initiated a review of work requests, condition reports, and other items for degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed conditions and is assessing the justification for delayed implementation of these corrective actions.
This issue was more than minor because it affected the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, the issue is determined to have very low
 
safety significance because the finding is not a design or qualification issue confirmed not to result in a loss of operability or functionality; did not represent an actual loss of safety function of the system or train; did not result in the loss of one or more trains of nontechnical specification equipment; and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The inspectors determined that the finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the component of resources because the licensee failed to provide adequate procedures to assure timely resolution of degraded or nonconforming conditions
[H.2(c)].
Inspection Report# : 2010006 (pdf)
Significance:        Jul 30, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Unqualified Scaffolding Erected Near Safety-Related Equipment The inspectors identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a for failure to properly implement Procedure AP 14A-003, Scaffold Construction and Use, Revision 17, when scaffolding was erected near operable safety-related equipment. On July 14, 15, and 28, the inspectors identified a total of four instances where the minimum separation distance between scaffolding and safety-related components was less than the minimum allowed by procedure and an approved engineering evaluation to justify the deviation was not performed. The licensee entered the issue into its corrective action program as Condition Reports 26752 and 27010, corrected each scaffolding deficiency, and performed comprehensive walkdowns of all scaffolding around safety-related structures, systems, and components.
The deficiency was more than minor because if left uncorrected, it would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. The finding was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, the issue is determined to have very low safety significance because the finding is not a design or qualification issue confirmed not to result in a loss of operability or functionality; did not represent an actual loss of safety function of the system or train; did not result in the loss of one or more trains of nontechnical specification equipment; and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The inspectors determined the finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with corrective action program because the licensee did not take appropriate corrective actions to address previously identified scaffolding construction issues in a timely manner [P.1(d)].
Inspection Report# : 2010006 (pdf)
Significance:        Jul 30, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to Adequately Monitor Control Room Deficiencies The inspectors identified a finding for the failure to follow Procedure AI 22A-001, Operator Work Arounds/Burdens/Control Room Deficiencies, Revision 8, to adequately identify, document, and track control room deficiencies associated with instruments and controls to ensure proper prioritization and timely corrective actions.
Specifically, inspectors observed that the licensee had approximately 52 WR (work request) buttons on the control boards indicating that work requests had been initiated to correct problems on instruments and controls. However, not all deficiencies were logged, and some of the deficiencies had existed for years without correction or justification. The licensee initiated Condition Report 27034 to document and evaluate this concern.
The deficiency was more than minor because if left uncorrected, it would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern, in that, the deficient condition could cause an operator to take an inappropriate action based on expected plant response or conversely cause an operator not to take action when action is required. The finding is associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone. The senior reactor analyst determined that this finding was not appropriate to be evaluated using the significance determination process since this finding was associated with numerous equipment issues and associated human performance aspects that might impact equipment operation. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix M, Significance Determination Process Using Qualitative Criteria, the finding is determined to have very low safety significance because there was no adverse impact to plant equipment.
The inspectors determined that the cause of the finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification
 
and resolution associated with the component of corrective action program because the licensee did not identify issues completely, accurately, and in a timely manner commensurate with their safety significance [P.1(a)].
Inspection Report# : 2010006 (pdf)
Significance:        Jul 30, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Update an Operability Evaluation The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures and Drawings, for the failure to implement Procedure AP 26C-004, Technical Specification Operability, Revision 20, to adequately evaluate the operability of a degraded essential service water system. Specifically, operations and engineering personnel failed to adequately evaluate the operability of the essential service water system when relevant new information was identified that challenged a previously performed operability determination and which challenged the reasonable expectation for operability. Condition Report 27288 was initiated to evaluate the failure to perform adequate operability determinations.
The issue was more than minor because if left uncorrected, it would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. The finding is associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, the issue is determined to have very low safety significance because the finding is not a design or qualification issue confirmed not to result in a loss of operability or functionality; did not represent an actual loss of safety function of the system or train; did not result in the loss of one or more trains of nontechnical specification equipment; and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The inspectors determined that the cause of the finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with resources because the licensee failed to provide complete, accurate, and up-to-date procedures for performing operability evaluations [H.2(c)].
Inspection Report# : 2010006 (pdf)
Significance:        Jul 30, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: VIO Violation Failure to Perform Adequate Evaluation for Significant Conditions The inspectors identified a cited violation 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, because the licensee failed to perform an adequate evaluation to determine the cause of loss of offsite power induced water hammers and internal corrosion in the essential service water system and did not take corrective actions to preclude repetition of additional water hammer events and system leaks. Specifically, the licensee performed an apparent cause evaluation instead of a root cause evaluation as required, and the licensees evaluation did not consider metallurgical evaluations that were performed outside the corrective action program. The inspectors found that the licensee had not corrected a previous NCV 05000482/2009007-03, Failure to Correctly Screen ESW Piping Leaks for Significance, which resulted in the licensee failing to perform a root cause evaluation. Because the licensee failed to restore compliance within a reasonable time after NCV 05000482/2009007-03 was identified, this violation is being cited in a Notice of Violation in accordance with Section VI.A.1 of the NRCs Enforcement Policy. The licensees corrective action to this cited violation was to initiate Condition Reports 27212, 26466, and 27075, to evaluate and correct the identified conditions, to start a root cause evaluation and, separately, to evaluate the licensees failure to properly respond to NCV 05000482/2009007-03.
The issue was more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affects the associated cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences, and is therefore a finding.
Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, the issue is determined to have very low safety significance because the finding is not a design or qualification issue confirmed not to result in a loss of operability or functionality; did not represent an actual loss of safety function of the system or train; did not result in the loss of one or more trains of nontechnical specification equipment; and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The inspectors determined that the cause of the finding has a crosscutting aspect in the
 
area of problem identification and resolution associated with the component of corrective action program because the licensee failed to thoroughly evaluate problems such that the resolutions address causes and extent of conditions [P.1 (c)]
Inspection Report# : 2010006 (pdf)
Significance:        Jul 30, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Determine if a Deficiency Existed in the Ultimate Heat Sink The team identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for the failure to follow the requirements of Procedure AP 26C-004, Technical Specification Operability, Revision 20. Specifically, Wolf Creek Generating Station failed to confirm if a deficiency existed with the ability of the ultimate heat sink to perform its safety function after delaying the 5 year scheduled dredging of the channel. The licensee initiated Condition Report 27080 and performed an operability determination to evaluate the deficiency.
The issue was more than minor because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, and it affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, the issue is determined to have very low safety significance because the finding is not a design or qualification issue confirmed not to result in a loss of operability or functionality; did not represent an actual loss of safety function of the system or train; did not result in the loss of one or more trains of nontechnical specification equipment; and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program component because licensee personnel failed to identify a potential deficiency in the ultimate heat sink in a timely manner [P.1(a)].
Inspection Report# : 2010006 (pdf)
Significance:        Jul 30, 2010 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Notice of Unusual Event Due to Loss of Both Emergency Diesel Generators The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for failure to identify a degraded equipment condition in December 2006. As a result, the emergency diesel generator system experienced a failure on October 22, 2009, which caused the plant to make a notice of unusual event emergency declaration. Licensee personnel missed an opportunity to identify the condition because they did not thoroughly evaluate a surveillance failure and post-mortem testing data available in December 2006.
The finding is more than minor because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, and it affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, the issue is determined to have very low safety significance because the finding is not a design or qualification issue confirmed not to result in a loss of operability or functionality; did not represent an actual loss of safety function of the system or train; did not result in the loss of one or more trains of nontechnical specification equipment; and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. A crosscutting aspect was identified in the problem identification and resolution in that the licensee did not thoroughly evaluate problems such that the resolution addressed causes [P.1(c)].
Inspection Report# : 2010006 (pdf)
Significance:        Jul 30, 2010
 
Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Translate Design Information into a Procedure The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for the failure to translate criteria from the atmospheric relief valve accumulator leakage calculation into proceduralized leakage criteria. Specifically, engineering personnel did not translate the calculated design basis leakage criteria and the required minimum pressure to start the test into the procedure. The licensee entered this in to the corrective action program as Condition Report 26771, and the licensee was developing plans to revise the leakage criteria in the procedure.
This issue was more than minor because it affected the design control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affected the objective to ensure the reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, the issue is determined to have very low safety significance because the finding is not a design or qualification issue confirmed not to result in a loss of operability or functionality; did not represent an actual loss of safety function of the system or train; did not result in the loss of one or more trains of nontechnical specification equipment; and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program component because licensee personnel failed to take appropriate corrective actions to previously identified problems [P.1(d)].
Inspection Report# : 2010006 (pdf)
Significance:        Jun 30, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Maintain an Adequate Flooding Analysis for Auxiliary Feedwater Trains The inspectors identified a green noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, after Wolf Creek failed to provide adequate design control measures for verifying the adequacy of the flooding analysis for the auxiliary feedwater pipe rooms 1206 and 1207. Wolf Creek failed to identify piping that was seismically unqualified and that if ruptured could potentially overwhelm the floor drains. Wolf Creek re-analyzed the piping and determined it would not rupture during an earthquake. Flooding of the room could have caused all three of the auxiliary feedwater pump suction pressure transmitters to fail and inhibit automatic swap to essential service water. The licensee placed this issue in their corrective action program as Condition Report 26050.
The inspectors determined that the incorrect calculation assumption in the flooding analysis of record was the performance deficiency. This finding was determined to be more than minor because it impacted the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of the design control and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the finding was determined to have very low safety significance because the deficiency was confirmed not to result in loss of operability or functionality. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program because the licensees evaluation focused on the probability of equipment failure leading to a flooding event rather than the stated design basis of the facility [P.1(c)].
Inspection Report# : 2010003 (pdf)
Significance:        Jun 30, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Lack of Acceptance Criteria Allows Degraded EDG Power Supply to Remain in Service The inspectors identified a violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Procedures, for the failure of maintenance personnel to provide an adequate work order that included critical acceptance criteria for the emergency diesel generator B. On October 22, 2010, emergency diesel generator A failed because excessive power supply voltage ripple caused its speed switch to actuate while in standby. Emergency diesel generator B also failed voltage ripple tests on October 27, 2009. On October 27, 2009, voltage ripple was at 2,015 mV, but no acceptance criteria were
 
specified in Work Order 09-321599-000. Corrective action was not taken until March 2010 and subsequent evaluation of the issue did not identify the lack of acceptance criteria in the work order. The licensee placed this issue into the corrective action program as Condition Report 26651.
The inspectors determined that the failure to replace a power supply that was degraded below its acceptance criteria was the performance deficiency. This finding is more than minor because it affected the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of availability and reliability and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the finding was determined to have very low safety significance because the deficiency was confirmed not to result in loss of operability or functionality. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program because several work groups failed to question the March 17, 2010, results and initiate a condition report [P.1(a)].
Inspection Report# : 2010003 (pdf)
Significance:        Jun 30, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Nonsafety Power Supply Causes Failure of Emergency Diesel Generator A The inspectors identified a Green noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for the failure of the licensee to ensure the design of the emergency diesel local annunciator power supply circuit such that its failure would not cause failure of the associated emergency diesel generator. On October 22, 2009, Wolf Creek was defueled when the control room received annunciators for emergency diesel generator A. The power supply for the local annunciators had input enough noise or voltage spikes on to the safety related power wires to cause the speed switch to actuate while the engine was in standby. This inhibited engine start. The power supply was replaced and emergency diesel generator A was returned to service on October 23, 2009. Condition Report 21039 examined this failure but failed to identify that the vendors circuit analysis did not consider voltage ripple as a failure mode and that the requirements of IEEE 384-1974 were not met. The nonsafety related power supply was not supposed to be able to cause the failure of the safety related emergency diesel generator. The licensee placed this issue into the corrective action program as Condition Reports 25663, 24867, and 25479.
The inspectors determined the failure to ensure that the licensing basis for the emergency diesel generators was being met to be the performance deficiency. This finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of human performance and it affected the objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage).
Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the finding was determined to have very low safety significance because emergency diesel generator A was out of service for less than 24 hours. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program because the licensee failed to evaluate this failure mode against the vendors circuit analysis [P.1(c)].
Inspection Report# : 2010003 (pdf)
Significance:        Dec 31, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: VIO Violation Failure to Correct Discolored Boric Acid Deposits The inspectors identified a cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for failure to take action to stop leakage from the base of the refueling water storage tank or evaluate the leakage and wastage for acceptability. Specifically, the licensee did not take actions to prevent recurring discolored boric acid deposits for approximately 11 years. Failure to correct leakage from the refueling water storage tank base was the subject of a noncited violation in NRC Inspection Report 05000482/2007006. This issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report 22866.
The failure to implement corrective actions for the refueling water storage tank leakage was a performance deficiency.
 
The inspectors determined this issue impacted the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and was greater than minor because if left uncorrected, the failure to correct the presence of boric acid leakage could become a more significant safety concern in that continued wastage could impact tank operability. Using the Phase 1 worksheets in Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, "Significance Determination Process," the finding was determined to have very low safety significance because it did not result in a system or component being inoperable and it did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The inspectors identified a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with resources. Specifically, Wolf Creek did not maintain long term plant safety minimizing corrective maintenance deferrals and this long standing equipment issue [H.2(c)].
Inspection Report# : 2009005 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Significance:      Mar 31, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Follow Radiation Work Permit Instructions The inspectors identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a for the failure to follow procedure requirements related to adding work to existing radiation work permits. On January 4, 2011, welding was performed in a locked high radiation area on radiation work permit 110039, which did not cover that type of activity. The ALARA review associated with radiation work permit 110039 stated that this permit was not intended to be used for major contamination breaches. However, welders cut into and welded a contaminated pipe. The licensee placed the finding into the corrective action program as Condition Report 35522 and acknowledged that the radiation work permit used was inappropriate for the work completed.
The failure to follow a procedure was a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because it negatively impacted the Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstones attribute of program and process, in that the inappropriate use of a radiation work permit led to workers unplanned and unintended dose. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix C, Occupational Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because: (1) it was not associated with ALARA planning or work controls, (2) there was no overexposure, (3) there was no substantial potential for an overexposure, and (4) the ability to assess dose was not compromised. This deficiency had a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance related to work controls. Specifically, there was inappropriate coordination and communication of work activities between work groups [H.3.b]
Inspection Report# : 2011002 (pdf)
Public Radiation Safety Significance:      Dec 31, 2010 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation
 
Failure to Have Procedures to Prevent Draining Radioactive Systems into Nonradioactive Systems The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a for failure to implement written procedures to prevent draining and venting radioactive systems into nonradioactive systems and prevent unplanned releases of radioactivity into the environment. On October 21, 2009, an auxiliary building operator inadvertently connected a hose carrying radioactive water to a hose that was routed into the auxiliary building nonradioactive sump. Consequently, the operator drained an estimated 800 to 1,000 gallons of reactor coolant into the nonradioactive auxiliary building sump which transferred its radioactive contents to the turbine building sump. When the contaminated turbine building sump attempted to transfer liquid radioactive waste to the non-radioactive wastewater retention basin, radiation monitor RE95 alarmed and terminated the discharge due to the Hi-Hi radioactivity setting of 7.25E-5 uCi/ml. The licensee immediately implemented a decontamination recovery plan. This event was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Reports 20995, 20999, and 29295.
The inspectors determined that failure to have procedures to prevent draining and venting radioactive systems to nonradioactive systems was a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because it impacted the program and process attribute of the Public Radiation Safety Cornerstone, and it adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring adequate protection of public health and safety from exposure to radioactive material released into the public domain. Using the Public Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process, the inspectors determined this finding to be of very low safety significance because this was not a failure to implement the effluent program, and it had no impact on public dose. In addition, this finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of Human Performance related to the personnel work practices component. Specifically, the licensee failed to use self- and peer-checking human error prevention techniques and then proceeded in the face of uncertainty when unexpected plant conditions were known [H.4(a)].
Inspection Report# : 2010005 (pdf)
Significance:      Dec 31, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Have Adequate Procedures for Meteorological Monitoring The inspectors identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a for failure to have adequate procedures for maintaining meteorological monitoring systems functional. The inspectors determined that procedures did not exist for maintaining the functionality or to declare one or more channels of wind instrumentation out of service pursuant to Technical Requirement 3.3.12. Consequently, both channels of the 10 meter wind direction instrumentation were not functional between April and October 2009. The licensee developed additional guidance for determining functionality of the instruments and immediately required the meteorological data to be reviewed on a more frequent basis to ensure validity. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program as Condition Report 00029337.
The failure to have procedures to maintain meteorological monitoring functional is a performance deficiency. This finding is more than minor because it was associated with the Public Radiation Safety Cornerstone attribute of program and process and affected the cornerstone objective, in that, the failure to have adequate procedures to maintain meteorological monitoring instrumentation functional has the potential to impair public dose assessments of routine and accidental radioactive effluent releases. Using the Public Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process, the inspectors determined this finding to be of very low safety significance because this was not a failure to implement the effluent program, and it had no impact on public dose. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in problem identification and resolution area associated with the corrective action component because the licensee failed to implement a low threshold for completely and accurately identifying issues with the meteorological monitoring instrumentation in a timely manner [P.1(a)].
Inspection Report# : 2010005 (pdf)
Physical Protection Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings
 
pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Significance: N/A Nov 24, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Evaluations and Operability Assessments The inspectors reviewed the licensee evaluations associated with the component cooling water and residual heat removal systems following the identification of the voiding condition. During the review of the licensee evaluations, the inspectors identified inadequate assumptions within the calculations and operability determinations. The assumptions included; the failure to include the effects of the voided condition in the residual heat removal system on the high head safety pumps; the use of nonconservative assumptions during the determination of the size of the initial void contained in the residual heat removal heat exchanger; and the initial troubleshooting following the start of the standby component cooling water pump during a low discharge pressure condition focused on the potential failure of the pressure switch, when the licensee had sufficient information that the pressure switch operated as expected.
In addition, during the inspection the inspectors observed challenges in the licensees ability to understand abnormal operating conditions, in that, the licensee had multiple opportunities to identify the presence of voids in the residual heat removal and component cooling water systems prior to the actual discovery of the adverse conditions. These included missed opportunities during review of licensee and industry operating experience, indications of flow oscillations during start of system components, and abnormal cycling of flow control valves.
Inspection Report# : 2010008 (pdf)
Significance: N/A Jul 30, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Wolf Creek Generating Station Biennial PI&R Inspection Summary The team concluded that the corrective action program at Wolf Creek Generating Station was generally performing in a satisfactory manner to ensure safe plant operations. However, as previously discussed in the past four NRC assessment letters, Wolf Creeks ability to thoroughly evaluate and prioritize problems such that the resolutions effectively address the causes and extent of conditions is of concern. Wolf Creek Generating Stations efforts to reverse the trend of substantive crosscutting issues in problem identification and resolution areas have not shown to be effective.
The team identified a number of issues that the licensees staff had previous opportunities to identify. The team also identified instances in which the licensee takes actions outside of the corrective action program in order to evaluate or correct issues of concern. The inspectors noted several examples where degraded or nonconforming conditions were not corrected in a timely manner and no evaluation had been performed that justified delayed correction of the issue.
In addition, the team identified examples where the licensee has taken ineffective corrective actions, including one example of a cited violation based on the licensees failure to take corrective actions to restore compliance within a reasonable time after a violation had been identified.
The team determined that the licensee adequately evaluated industry operating experience for relevance to the facility, and entered applicable items in the corrective action program. And, based on focus group interviews, the team concluded that the licensee had a strong safety conscious work environment. Workers stated they felt they could raise safety concerns without fear of retaliation.
Inspection Report# : 2010006 (pdf)
Last modified : June 07, 2011
 
Wolf Creek 1 2Q/2011 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance:        Jun 16, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation No Procedure for Debris in Transformer an Tank Yards Propr to Severe Weather The inspectors identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Administrative Procedures, for having no procedure to address onsite debris impacting plant equipment during severe weather. The inspectors walked down external areas of the plant on June 1 and June 9, 2011, prior to the onset of predicted severe thunderstorms and tornadoes. The inspectors found loose debris each time and brought it to the attention of the licensee who secured the materials. The inspectors walked down the transformer yard and tank yard during a thunderstorm on June 16 and found loose debris such as plywood, trash, wood planks, and fiberglass planks. The inspectors brought this to the attention of Wolf Creek and the materials were removed or secured. Wolf Creek initiated several condition reports but they only addressed immediate cleanup. Wolf Creek procedures had no steps for securing potential wind-driven projectiles prior to severe weather. After June 16, Wolf Creek wrote Condition Report 40573 which started a weekly maintenance activity to remove loose materials and added procedure steps to have operations walk down external areas prior to severe weather.
This finding was more than minor because it impacted the protection against external factors attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone, and it affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. The inspectors evaluated this finding using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, and determined that it was of very low safety significance (Green) for June 16, 2011, because it did not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigation equipment would be unavailable since the reactor was shutdown. Inspectors used Manual Chapter 0609 Appendix G, Checklist 4 for the other occurrences because Wolf Creek was in Modes 4 or 5. The finding again screened to Green because it did not increase the likelihood of a loss of inventory, did not cause the loss of reactor coolant system instrumentation, did not degrade the ability of the licensee to terminate a leak path or add inventory when needed, or degrade the ability to recover residual heat removal if it was lost. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution, specifically the corrective action program attribute because licensees short-term corrective actions failed to ensure debris was secured or removed prior to severe weather [P.1 (d)](Section 1R01).
Inspection Report# : 2011003 (pdf)
Significance:        Jun 16, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Undersized Weld Failure on Charging Header The inspectors documented a self-revealing noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion IX, Control of Special Processes. Specifically, in October 2009, welders failed to ensure the fillet weld between the train B charging header and the half coupling used to attach two vent valves met the specified weld requirements. This weld failed in January 2011, rendering the train B charging system inoperable. The licensees extent of condition review identified 12 vent line welds which did not meet ASME code weld size requirements and/or procedural requirements for 2:1 weld taper configuration. Additionally, quality assurance inspectors failed to identify that the 2:1 taper weld requirements specified by procedure, and ASME minimum weld size requirements, were not met in multiple vent line welds. The weld was repaired and built up to the correct 2:1 aspect ratio. This issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Reports 32648, 33686, 33689, and 36438.
The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during power operations. The inspectors performed a Phase 1 screening in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of
 
Findings, and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the issue did not result in exceeding the technical specification limit for identified reactor coolant system leakage or affect other mitigating systems resulting in a total loss of their safety function. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, resources, because the licensee failed to ensure that personnel, specifically welders and quality assurance inspectors, were adequately trained in the procedural requirements and methods for measuring weld dimensions to assure nuclear safety [H.2(b)](Section 1R08).
Inspection Report# : 2011003 (pdf)
Significance:        Jun 16, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Ensure Separation of Stainless Steel and Carbon Steel Grinding and Cutting Tools The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50 involving the failure of the licensee to ensure that weld preparation was protected from deleterious contamination in that drawers (located in the hot tool room) containing files, grinding wheels, flapper wheels, and cutting wheels, used for the purpose of weld preparation, contained a mixture of both stainless steel tools and carbon steel tools. The failure to separate tools used for stainless steel weld preparation from tools used for carbon steel preparation could result in the contamination of stainless steel welds by carbon steel and affect the material integrity and corrosion resistance. The licensee immediately removed the tools and replaced them with new tools stored separately for use on specific types of metal. This issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Report 36444.
The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during power operations, and if left uncorrected the finding would become a more significant safety concern. The inspectors performed a Phase 1 screening in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the issue did not result in exceeding the technical specification limit for identified reactor coolant system leakage or affect other mitigating systems resulting in a total loss of their safety function. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, resources, because the licensee did not provide complete, accurate, and up-to-date procedures for the preparation of stainless steel and carbon steel welds [H.2(c)](Section 1R08).
Inspection Report# : 2011003 (pdf)
Significance:        Jun 16, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Ensure Configuration Control of Safety-Related Systems The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, involving the failure of the licensee to review the suitability of installing brass fittings and leaving test fittings on pressure, differential pressure, and flow transmitter equalizing block valve drain ports instead of the design specified stainless steel manifold plugs. During a boric acid walkdown, the inspectors identified that drain ports on the equalizing block of two separate reactor coolant system flow transmitters had brass fittings installed instead of the design specified stainless steel fittings. In response to inspector concerns about the brass fittings, the licensee subsequently discovered that a design configuration nonconformance existed by leaving the test fittings on the drain port during plant operation. Licensee Drawing J-17D22 specifies that manifold plugs be installed in the drain ports during plant operation. The licensee immediately replaced the brass caps with stainless steel fittings. This issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Report 36439.
The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the design control attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during power operations. The inspectors performed a Phase 1 screening in accordance with Inspection Manual 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the issue would not result in exceeding the technical specification limit for identified reactor coolant system leakage or affect other mitigating systems resulting in a total loss of their safety function. The inspectors also determined that the finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, resources, because the licensee did not provide adequate training of personnel so that the inappropriately installed fittings
 
Inspection Report# : 2011003 (pdf)
Significance:      Apr 05, 2011 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Fire Watch Defeats Halon Fire Suppression in Vital Switchgear Rooms During Fire The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing noncited violation of License Condition 2.C.5 for failure to implement adequate fire watches which affected both trains of vital ac and dc switchgear. The inadequate fire watches occurred during an actual fire which negated the Halon system discharge because internal fire doors were not shut, as required, by the fire watch. The inspectors found problems with fire impairments and watches from 2008 that had not been corrected. Subsequent to the fire, Wolf Creek again briefed and trained its personnel on the requirements for fire watches. This issue is captured in the corrective action program as Condition Report 36719.
Failure to implement adequate fire impairments such that the fire watches ensured the success of the Halon system was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it impacted the Initiating Events Cornerstone and its objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, the protection against external factors attribute was impacted by the fire impairment. To determine significance, the inspectors used Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04 to screen the finding to Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, because the fire protection defense-in-depth strategies involving automatic suppression, fire barriers, and administrative controls were degraded. The senior reactor analyst conducted a Phase 3 review of this finding and concluded that the incremental core damage frequency was 1.6E-8 per year, or very low safety significance (Green). The inspectors found that the cause of the finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution. Specifically, corrective actions from ineffective fire watches in 2008 did not prevent recurrence of the inadequate fire watch on April 5, 2011 [P.1.d](Section 4OA3.3).
Inspection Report# : 2011003 (pdf)
Significance:      Mar 31, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Clearance Order Disables Power Operated Relief Valve Low Temperature Overpressure Function The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Procedures, involving the failure to follow the requirements of Procedure AP 21E-001, Clearance Orders. This procedure violation resulted in an inadequate tagout for the Train A solid state protection system resulting in an unplanned swap of the volume control tank charging pump suction to the reactor water storage tank and an unplanned entry into Technical Specification 3.4.12 due to the de-energization of power operated relief valve A low temperature overpressure protection relays. Operators took manual actions to restore the pump suction, and power was restored after approximately four hours. This finding has been entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Reports 35288 and 35318.
The failure to follow procedures to complete clearance orders with adequate boundaries is a performance deficiency.
The performance deficiency was more than minor because it impacted the Initiating Events Cornerstone objective of configuration control to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. The significance of the finding was determined using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Appendix G, Checklist 2, and determined to be of very low safety significance, because it did not cause the loss of mitigating capability of core heat removal, inventory control, power availability, containment control, or reactivity control. Additionally, the cause of the finding is related to the human performance crosscutting component of work control. Specifically, the licensee did not appropriately plan for the maintenance work scope by ensuring work groups and an offsite organization communicate the necessary electrical boundaries to assure plant and human performance [H.3(b)] (Section 1R20).
Inspection Report# : 2011002 (pdf)
Significance:      Mar 21, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation
 
Failure to Maintain RCS Pressure Below Relief Valve Setpoint The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Administrative Procedures, for failure to follow procedural requirements to maintain reactor coolant system pressure below 350 psig. Control room operators increased charging flow at too great a rate with the reactor coolant system water-solid which caused the pressurizer power-operated relief valve to cycle three times over several minutes until adjustments to letdown could be made to reduce reactor coolant system pressure. Also, the letdown pressure controller was left in manual when automatic control would have lessened the pressure increase. Wolf Creek wrote Condition Report 35244 to Enclosure correct the deficiency by changing several procedures for water-solid plant operations.
The failure to maintain pressure below the power-operated relief valve setpoint was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it impacted the Initiating Events Cornerstone objective of configuration control to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. The significance of the finding was determined using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Appendix G, Checklist 2, and determined to be of very low safety significance (Green), because it did not cause the loss of mitigating capability of core heat removal, inventory control, power availability, containment control, or reactivity control. Additionally, the finding also did not cause any low temperature overpressure technical specifications to be exceeded. The inspectors found that the cause of the finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance. Specifically, operators had to rely on skill of the craft when procedures should have supplied more instruction for manipulating charging and letdown with a water-solid plant [H.2.c](Section 4OA3.2).
Inspection Report# : 2011003 (pdf)
Significance:        Mar 19, 2011 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: VIO Violation Failure to Correct Procedure for Opening Main Steam Isolation Valves (EA-11-149)
The inspectors identified a cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Administrative Procedures, involving Wolf Creeks failure to correct Procedure SYS AB-120 for main steam isolation valve operation. Specifically, between March 3, 2010, and March 19, 2011, Wolf Creek experienced repeat cases of safety-system actuations due to Procedure SYS AB-120 containing inadequate steps to establish conditions necessary to open a main steam isolation valve. Corrective actions were previously limited to steam header pressures below 300 psi. Wolf Creek commenced a root cause evaluation of the March 19, 2011, safety injection under Condition Report 34964. Due to Wolf Creeks failure to restore compliance from previous NCV 05000482/2010004-01 within a reasonable time after the violation was identified, this violation is being cited as a Notice of Violation consistent with the Enforcement Policy.
Failure to correct deficiencies in Procedure SYS AB-120 for steam pressures above 300 psi was a performance deficiency. The inspectors determined that this finding was more than minor because it impacted the equipment performance attribute for the Initiating Events Cornerstone, and it affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, this issue relates to the configuration control attribute for shut down equipment alignment. The inspectors evaluated the significance of this finding using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04.
Assuming worst case degradation, the finding resulted in exceeding the technical specification limit for reactor coolant system leakage due to the pressurizer power-operated relief valve cycling. Therefore, the inspectors screened the finding to a Phase 2 review by the senior reactor analyst. The senior reactor analyst used the Wolf Creek SPAR model and concluded that the incremental core damage probability was 3.7E-7 (Green). The inspectors found that the cause of the finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program. Specifically, several evaluations failed to have an adequate extent of condition review and did not find that procedures were inadequate for opening a main steam isolation valve above 300 psi [P.1(c)](Section 4OA3.1).
Inspection Report# : 2011003 (pdf)
Significance:        Dec 31, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Identify Boric Acid Leak on Instrument Lines to Reactor Coolant System
 
The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, involving the licensees failure to identify, document, and evaluate sources of boric acid leakage.
During a boric acid walkdown and containment closeout tour on December 7, 2010, the inspectors identified a boric acid leak in an instrument line to the reactor coolant system loop 2 flow transmitters which had not been previously identified and documented by the licensee. As such, the licensee failed to accomplish the requirements of procedure AP 16F-001, Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program, Revision 6A, step 6.1, which stated, in part, that sources of boron leakage shall be identified and documented in the applicable corrective action document. The licensee entered this finding into their corrective action system as Condition Report 31003 and replaced the leaking union.
The finding was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Initiating Events Cornerstone attribute of human performance and affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. The inspectors used Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, and determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the issue would not result in exceeding the technical specification limit for identified reactor coolant system leakage or affect other mitigating systems resulting in a total loss of their safety function. The inspectors also determined that the finding had a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program component because the licensee did not have a sufficiently low threshold in order to identify boric acid leaks during walkdowns [P.1.(a)] .
Inspection Report# : 2010005 (pdf)
Significance:      Dec 31, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Procedures for Establishing Feedwater Preheat The inspectors identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Procedures, for Wolf Creek Procedures GEN 00-003, Hot Standby to Minimum Load, and SYS AE-200, Feedwater Preheating During Plant Startup and Shutdown, being inadequate by failing to require maximum feedwater preheating. This could lead to a reactor trip caused by steam generator level oscillations attributable to low feedwater temperature. This was a contributing factor in the October 17, 2010, reactor trip. A temporary change was made to the procedures that cautioned operating crews to maintain maximum feedwater preheating. This issue was entered in the licensees corrective action program as Condition Reports 29845 and 29846.
The inadequate procedural direction to establish maximum feedwater preheating is a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency is more than minor, therefore a finding, because it is associated with the Initiating Events Cornerstone attribute of procedure quality and it affects the objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. The inspectors evaluated the significance of this finding using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance since the finding contributed to the likelihood of a reactor trip; however, it did not contribute to the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions would not be available. This finding had a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the operating experience component because Wolf Creek failed to institutionalize internal and external operating experience by changing plant procedures [P.2(b)].
Inspection Report# : 2010005 (pdf)
Significance:      Dec 31, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Procedures to Ensure Proper Main Feed Pump Speed During Startup The inspectors identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Procedures, for Wolf Creek Procedures GEN 00-003, Hot Standby to Minimum Load, and SYS AE-121, Turbine Driven Main Feedwater Pump Startup, being inadequate by failing to direct control room operators to establish a main feedwater pump speed that will allow the feed bypass regulating valves to control in the 60 to 80 percent open range, prior to raising power from 8 to 16 percent. Feed bypass regulating valve throttle characteristics are highly non-linear below this range which complicates manual and automatic control. This was a contributing factor in the October 17, 2010, reactor trip.
A temporary change was made to the procedures that cautioned operating crews to ensure earlier establishment of
 
optimal feedwater bypass control valve position. This issue was entered in the licensees corrective action program as Condition Reports 29845 and 29846.
The inadequate procedural direction to establish optimal bypass valve position at the correct time during the startup is a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency is more than minor, therefore a finding, because it is associated with the Initiating Events Cornerstone attribute of procedure quality and it affects objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. The inspectors evaluated the significance of this finding using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance since the finding contributed to the likelihood of a reactor trip; however, it did not contribute to the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions would not be available. This finding had a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the operating experience component because Wolf Creek failed to institutionalize internal operating experience by changing plant procedures [P.2(b)].
Inspection Report# : 2010005 (pdf)
Significance:      Sep 30, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Establish Conditons to Open a Main Steam Isolation Valve that Resulted in a Feedwater Isolation A self-revealing noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Procedures, was identified for the failure to provide a procedure to establish appropriate conditions to open a main steam isolation valve in Mode 4 which resulted in an excessive steam generator level swell and feedwater isolation. On March 5, 2010, Wolf Creek commenced a plant heatup following a shutdown to Mode 4 for a nuclear instrument repair. Main steam isolation valve A was opened at approximately 12:07 a.m. and steam generator A level rapidly increased 28 percent and tripped the P-14 setpoint which caused a feedwater isolation. The cause was attributed to an inadequate procedure for determining valve differential pressure or steam demand prior to opening a main steam isolation valve. This issue is captured in Condition Report 23938. For corrective action, Wolf Creek plans to install high accuracy local gauges to measure valve differential pressure.
The inspectors determined that the failure to provide a procedure that established the conditions necessary to open a main steam isolation valve without causing an excessive steam generator swell was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor, and therefore a finding, because it was associated with the Initiating Events Cornerstone attribute of procedure adequacy and affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operation. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the inspectors concluded the finding screened to Green because the finding did not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigating equipment or functions would not be available. No crosscutting aspect was identified because there was no aspect that significantly contributed to the event.
Inspection Report# : 2010004 (pdf)
Significance:      Dec 31, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: VIO Violation Failure to Correct Vessel Head Vent Path The inspectors identified a cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, due to an inadequate vent path for the reactor vessel head. The inadequate vent path resulted in the formation of voids in the reactor vessel head during Refueling Outage 17. Failure to ensure an adequate vent path in the reactor vessel head was the subject of a noncited violation in NRC Inspection Report 05000482/2008004. During and after Refueling Outage 16, Wolf Creek initiated a root cause evaluation and corrective actions to prevent occurrence. When one of the possible root causes was disproven in Refueling Outage 17, no additional action was taken to determine the cause of the vessel head vent blockage. However, the licensee could not exclude blockage in the piping. This issue was entered into the corrective action program and the licensee plans to conduct a more thorough inspection of the piping during the next refueling outage. This issue is being tracked by the licensee as Condition Report 22501.
The inspectors determined that the failure to provide adequate vessel head vent path to prevent gas accumulation in
 
the reactor vessel during depressurized plant operations was a performance deficiency. The inspectors determined that this finding, which was associated with the Initiating Events Cornerstone, was more than minor because if left uncorrected, it would have become a more significant safety concern. Specifically, without an adequate vent path the reactor vessel does not have an effective means of relieving noncondensable gases to prevent a loss of reactor coolant system inventory. The inspectors evaluated this finding using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix G, , and determined it be of very low safety significance based upon the demonstrated availability of mitigating systems and the flooded reactor cavity inventory. The inspectors determined the cause of the finding had a problem identification and resolution aspect in the corrective action program. Specifically, Wolf Creeks corrective actions were not successful to address the vent path blockage in a timely manner [P.1(d)].
Inspection Report# : 2009005 (pdf)
Significance:        Mar 31, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: VIO Violation Failure to correct component cooling water valve closures The inspectors identified a cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, involving Wolf Creeks failure to correct the cause of the reactor coolant pump thermal barrier component cooling water heat exchanger outlet valves stroking closed on high flow. Specifically, between 2001 and 2009, Wolf Creek experienced repeated cases of the reactor coolant pump thermal barrier component cooling water heat exchanger outlet valves stroking closed during component cooling water pump swaps and during isolations of the radioactive waste evaporators. Wolf Creek reinitiated evaluation of the issue after the inspectors questions but did not review the impact on the operators ability to open the valves given the valves circuit breakers opening. Repeated throttle valve adjustments have not been successful in stopping the valve closures. This issue and the corrective actions are being tracked by the licensee in Condition Report 2007 002074 and has corrective action pending to modify valve circuitry but it has not been implemented.
The failure to correct a condition adverse to quality of ensuring reactor coolant pump seal cooling as described in the Updated Safety Analysis Report is a performance deficiency. The finding is more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute for the Initiating Events Cornerstone; and, it affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the finding would not result in exceeding the Technical Specification limit for identified reactor coolant system leakage and would not have affected other mitigation systems resulting in a total loss of the seal cooling safety function. This finding is being cited because the licensee failed to establish measures to assure this condition adverse to quality was promptly identified and corrected. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the decision making component because, even though numerous instances of valve closures occurred since the first noncited violation, Wolf Creek downgraded the condition report. Using nonconservative assumptions, the licensee consistently viewed this issue as not having a risk impact because seal injection was not simultaneously lost.
[H.1.b]
Inspection Report# : 2009002 (pdf)
Inspection Report# : 2009005 (pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance:        May 06, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Analyze for Vortexing in Containment Spray Additive Tank The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for the failure to translate the design basis into instructions, procedures, and drawings. The inspectors found that the licensee failed to assess whether vortexing occurred in the containment spray additive tank in the event of a design-basis accident. Wolf Creek entered this issue in the corrective action program as Condition Report 38715.
 
Failure to implement design control measures to analyze whether containment spray piping remained full of water was a performance deficiency. This finding was more than minor because it affected the design control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of the containment spray system to respond to initiating events and prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the inspectors had reasonable doubt on the capability of the containment spray system to properly inject because of vortexing in the containment spray additive tank. The inspectors performed the significance determination using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it was a design or qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in loss of operability or functionality. Although the failure to have this calculation had existed since original construction, the inspectors determined this finding reflected current performance since the licensee was required to evaluate likelihood of tanks allowing gas intrusion into the emergency core cooling systems in response to Generic Letter 2008-01, Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling, Decay Heat Removal, and Containment Spray Systems. Consequently, this finding had problem identification and resolution cross-cutting aspects associated with the corrective action program in that the licensee did not thoroughly evaluate the potential for gas intrusion from all possible tanks [P.1(c)](Section 4OA5).
Inspection Report# : 2011003 (pdf)
Significance:        Mar 31, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Design Control of the Fuel Oil Storage Tank Fill System The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, for the failure to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis were met. Specifically, the licensee failed to ensure that the fuel oil storage tank fill system minimized turbulence, as required by the Updated Safety Analysis Report, such that the emergency diesel generators can be refueled while running uninterrupted. The licensee entered this issue in the corrective action program and will develop corrective actions as part of Condition Report 34730.
The failure to establish measures to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis are met was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it impacted the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of design control and affects the associated cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, "Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings," the inspectors determined that the finding had very low safety significance because it did not result in a loss of system safety function, an actual loss of safety function of a single train for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time, or screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the decision making component because the licensee failed to use conservative assumptions in decision making and adopt a requirement to demonstrate the proposed action is safe in order to proceed rather than a requirement to demonstrate that it is unsafe in order to disapprove the action [H.1(b)] (Section 1R04).
Inspection Report# : 2011002 (pdf)
Significance:        Mar 31, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Isolated Cooling to Inservice Safety-Related Equipment The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a involving the failure to properly implement the clearance order procedure resulting in a failure to provide adequate cooling to inservice safety-related equipment. Operators restored cooling water flow after approximately one hour. The licensee entered the finding into their corrective action program as Condition Report 33357.
The inspectors determined that the failure to ensure that plant conditions could support establishing the clearance order boundaries, which resulted in a component cooling water heatup and trip of the inservice control room air conditioner, was a performance deficiency. The inspectors determined that this finding was more than minor because it is associated with the configuration control attribute for the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and it affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the finding was determined to have very low safety significance because it was
 
confirmed not to result in loss of operability of control room air conditioning Train B for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time and it did not result in the loss of the normal service water function for greater than 24 hours. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with work control because the licensee failed to plan the work activity by incorporating the impact on the plant [H.3(a)] (Section 1R04).
Inspection Report# : 2011002 (pdf)
Significance:      Mar 31, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Monitor the Performance of Nonsafety Related Systems and Components Used in the Plant Emergency Operating Procedures under 10 CFR 50.65 Programs The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) with three examples involving the failure to monitor the performance of stand by nonsafety-related systems and components that exceeded performance criteria against goals. First, the inspectors identified that the licensee failed to monitor the turbine-driven main feedwater pumps against their standby restart function to fill the steam generators in emergency operating procedures. Failures of the two turbine-driven main feedwater pumps occurred which could have prevented fulfillment of this function.
Second, the inspectors identified that the licensee failed to evaluate reactor trips caused by the main feedwater system against the systems plant level monitoring criteria. Third, the inspectors identified that the licensee failed to monitor the instrument air compressor system against its emergency operating procedure function to restart and provide compressed air. Several instrument air compressor trips have occurred in the last 18 months which could have prevented fulfillment of this function. The licensee entered this issue in the corrective action program and will develop corrective actions as part of Condition Report 36600.
The failure to establish performance monitoring goals commensurate with the mitigating safety function specified in the emergency operating procedures and the plant level criteria is a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency is more than minor, and therefore a finding, because it impacts equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). Using the NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the finding screened to a Phase 2 significance determination because it involved a potential loss of safety function of the main feedwater system and failure of the instrument air system. A Region IV senior reactor analyst performed a Phase 2 significance determination and using the pre-solved worksheet from the Risk Informed Inspection Notebook for the Wolf Creek, Revision 2.01a; however, the presolved worksheet did not include the simultaneous failure of multiple components in different systems. Therefore, the senior reactor analyst performed a bounding Phase 3 significance determination using Appendix M of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process Using Qualitative Criteria, Section 4.1.2. The analyst determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green). The bounding change to the core damage frequency was approximately 8 E-7/year. The relatively low risk worth of the instrument air system at Wolf Creek helped to mitigate the significance. To evaluate the change to the large early release frequency (LERF), the analyst used Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix H, Containment Integrity Significance Determination Process. The finding screened as having very low safety significance for LERF because it did not affect the intersystem loss of coolant accident or steam generator tube rupture categories. The inspectors determined that the finding had a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution.
Specifically, when Wolf Creek evaluated exceeding the plant level monitoring criteria for reactor trips, their analysis did not identify that failures within the main feedwater system were the cause of four of the six reactor trips, and did not place the affected system function in a(1) monitoring [P.1(c)] (Section 1R12).
Inspection Report# : 2011002 (pdf)
Significance:      Mar 31, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Follow 10 CFR 50.65 a(2) for Main Control Board Annunciator Power Supply Failures The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR 50.65 a(2), involving the failure to demonstrate that the performance of main control board annunciator power supplies was effectively controlled through preventive maintenance such that the annunciators remained capable of performing their intended function. The licensee entered
 
this issue into the corrective action program and will develop corrective actions as part of Condition Report 34681.
The failure to properly evaluate the failed main control board annunciator power supplies, establish performance goals, and monitor their performance is considered a performance deficiency. This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of equipment performance and it adversely affects the cornerstone objective ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using the Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 Worksheets, the finding is determined to have very low safety significance since it did not result in a loss of system safety function, an actual loss of safety function of a single train for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time, or screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. This finding was determined to have a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program because the licensee failed to properly classify, prioritize, and evaluate a condition adverse to quality [P.1(c)] (Section 1R12).
Inspection Report# : 2011002 (pdf)
Significance:        Mar 31, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Calculation for Vital Switchgear Cooling The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, involving an inadequate calculation supporting vital switchgear room temperatures with only one vital switchgear cooler operable. The licensee entered this issue in the corrective action program and will develop corrective actions as part of Condition Reports 27276, 28252, and 31452.
The inspectors considered the inadequate heat loads and assumptions used in calculation GK-06-W to be a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency is more than minor, and therefore a finding, because it impacted with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and it affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the inspectors screened the finding to Green because the additional temperatures would not have caused the loss of functionality of vital switchgear or batteries, and it did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. No crosscutting aspects were identified because the supporting documentation was prepared in the late 1990s and was not representative of current licensee performance (Section 1R15).
Inspection Report# : 2011002 (pdf)
Significance:        Mar 31, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform an Operability Determination for Degradation of the Fuel Oil Storage Tank The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, involving the failure to follow plant procedures. Specifically, the licensee failed to follow procedure and perform an operability determination when a nonconforming or degraded condition was identified in the Train B emergency diesel generator fuel oil storage tank, as required by Procedure AP 26C-004, Operability Determination and Functionality Assessment, Revision 21. The licensee subsequently performed an operability determination and concluded the fuel oil storage tank was operable but degraded. The licensee entered this issue in the corrective action program as Condition Reports 33355 and 34068.
The failure to follow Procedure AP 26C-004, Operability Determination and Functionality Assessment, Revision 21, when a nonconforming or degraded condition was identified was a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency was more than minor because it could become a more significant safety concern if left uncorrected. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, "Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings," the inspectors determined that the finding had very low safety significance (Green) because it did not result in a loss of system safety function, an actual loss of safety function of a single train for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time, or screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective
 
action program component because the licensee failed to thoroughly evaluate problems, including evaluatingoperability, such that the resolution addressed the cause [P.1(c)] (Section 1R15).
Inspection Report# : 2011002 (pdf)
Significance:        Mar 31, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Verify Ultimate Heat Sink Sedimentation Levels within Design Bases The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix B, Criterion III, involving a failure to perform periodic testing to verify that ultimate heat sink sedimentation remained within design basis limits. The licensee subsequently verified the ultimate heat sink depth remained acceptable using SONAR. The licensee entered this issue in the corrective action program as Condition Report 27144.
Wolf Creeks failure to perform periodic testing to verify that ultimate heat sink sedimentation remained within design basis limits is a performance deficiency. The issue is more than minor, and therefore a finding, because if left uncorrected the issue has the potential to become a more significant safety concern. The inspectors concluded that the issue screened to Green under the significance determination process using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1-Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, because the finding was a design deficiency that was later confirmed not to result in the loss of operability or functionality of the ultimate heat sink. The inspectors concluded that this findings cause has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the work control component because Wolf Creek did not appropriately coordinate work activities by incorporating actions to address the impact of changes to the work scope or activity on the plant and human performance. Specifically, when Wolf Creek performed and planned dredging preventive maintenance on the ultimate heat sink, they did not consider the need to confirm as-found and as-left sediment depth to verify that their design basis was met [H.3(b)]
(Section 1R19).
Inspection Report# : 2011002 (pdf)
Significance:        Mar 31, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Fill and Vent of Component Cooling Water The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Procedures, involving the failure to perform an adequate fill and vent of the component cooling water system which resulted in voiding of the system. The licensee entered the finding into their corrective action program and will develop corrective actions as part of Condition Report 33925.
The inspectors determined that the failure to perform an adequate fill and vent of component cooling water that resulted in system voiding was a performance deficiency. The inspectors determined that this finding was more than minor because it is associated with the human performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and it affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the finding was determined to have very low safety significance (Green) because it did not result in a loss of system safety function, an actual loss of safety function of a single train for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time, or screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program because the licensee failed to take appropriate corrective actions from previous voiding events [P.1(d)] (Section 1R19).
Inspection Report# : 2011002 (pdf)
Significance:        Mar 31, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Repetitive Failure to Enter Technical Specifications for Auxiliary Feedwater Suction Valve Testing The inspectors identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Procedures, involving the failure to
 
follow Procedure AP 21-001, Conduct of Operations. Specifically, the licensee failed to enter into technical specification limiting condition of operation 3.7.5.B.1 for one auxiliary feedwater pump inoperable during performance of 92-day check valve surveillance tests. Wolf Creek took prompt corrective action to amend the procedures to include instructions for maintaining the pumps operable with manual actions. This occurred prior to the next check valve test. This issue is captured in Condition Report 34469.
The failure to enter technical specification action statements in accordance with Procedure AP 21-001 was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor, and therefore a finding, because it impacted with the human performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and its objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the issue did not result in a loss of operability for a time period greater than the action statement, and did it not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The inspectors determined that the finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with decision making. Specifically, informally maintained pre-job briefing sheets were being relied upon to determine technical specification applicability instead of the licensees decision making process of operator review on a case by case basis [H.1(a)] (Section 1R22).
Inspection Report# : 2011002 (pdf)
Significance:        Mar 08, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Properly Establish Clearance Order Boundary Isolation Resulting in Loss of Component Cooling Water Inventory The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1a, Administrative Procedures, for a loss of component cooling water train B inventory caused by inadequate clearance order verification. Valve HBV110 was stuck in position and was partially open. When the clearance order was implemented, the operators concluded the valve was already closed. Subsequently, the valve created a leakage path which exceeded the surge tank makeup flow capacity and required manual isolation by the control room operators to protect safety-related components. Wolf Creek has taken corrective actions to include communication of expected as-found equipment positions in pre-job briefings and the clearance order template. This issue is captured in the corrective action program as Condition Reports 34505 and 40219.
Failure to properly establish clearance order boundary isolation was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency is more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance and human performance attributes of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and impacted the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the finding did not result in the loss of operability or functionality of the component cooling water train or screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event or screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The inspectors found that the finding had a cross-cutting aspect of work practices in the area of human performance associated with the communication of human error prevention techniques, such as holding pre-job briefings, self- and peer-checking, and proper documentation of activities [H.4(a)](Section 1R04).
Inspection Report# : 2011003 (pdf)
Significance:        Mar 08, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Inadequate Acceptance Criteria for Postmaintenance Testing of the Startup Feedwater Pump The inspectors identified a finding involving the failure to follow the requirements of Procedure AP 16E-002, Post Maintenance Testing Development, for the startup feedwater pump. On November 4-6, 2010, Wolf Creek workers disassembled the startup feedwater pump for numerous preventive and corrective activities including removing the rotating element. On November 17, 2010, Wolf Creek conducted surveillance Procedure STN AE-007, Startup Main Feedwater Pump Operational Test, following reassembly. The only acceptance criteria listed in this procedure is that the motor-driven feedwater pump starts from the control room with no local operator action. The inspectors found this
 
contrary to Procedure AP 16E-002, which requires acceptance criteria for a pump flow capacity test, vibration, bearing and lubrication temperatures, motor current, external leakage, and lubrication level be found satisfactory. This issue is captured in the corrective action program as Condition Report 39494. Wolf Creek issued a new work package to conduct a single-point pump capacity test and complete the required postmaintenance testing. Wolf Creek found, pending final review, that initial calculations show that the pump design is capable of enough flow to provide a heat sink in emergency operating procedures.
Failure to follow Procedure AP 16E-002 for developing test criteria for plant equipment after the completion of maintenance activities is a performance deficiency. The finding is more than minor because it is associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of equipment performance and it adversely affects the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, the inspectors determined that the finding had very low safety significance (Green) because it did not result in a loss of system safety function, an actual loss of safety function of a single train for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time, or screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The inspectors determined that the finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution. Specifically, Wolf Creek created a testing procedure in response to a root cause evaluation, but did not consider acceptance criteria Inspection Report# : 2011003 (pdf)
Significance:        Feb 25, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Trend Emergency Diesel Generator Chemistry Paameters Results in an Unplanned Technical Specification Entry The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," for the failure to follow Procedure AP 28A-0100, "Condition Reports," Revision 13. On February 17, 2011, the licensee received laboratory test results on the emergency diesel generator B fuel oil storage tank and determined that the cloud point parameter was out of specification at -8° Celsius. However, Procedure AP 28A-0100, step 5.13.3, required the licensee to evaluate condition report data to identify and evaluate potential trends. The emergency diesel fuel oil storage tank cloud point parameter had been trending closer to the acceptance criteria over the last several fuel oil additions. The licensee had allowed the original fuel oil vendor to continue to deliver fuel that was out of specification which resulted in a gradual trend toward the limits of the chemistry parameters. This trend was not appropriately evaluated because the licensee had not performed training to ensure that consistent and appropriate evaluations would be performed.
This finding was more than minor because it affected the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of equipment performance by impacting the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. This deficiency directly resulted in emergency diesel generator B being declared inoperable due to its fuel oil storage tank being out of specification. The inspectors performed the significance determination using NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, "Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings," because it affected the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone while the plant was at power. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it was not a design or qualification deficiency; it did not result in the loss of a system safety function; it did not represent the loss of a single train for greater than technical specification allowed time; it did not represent a loss of one or more non-technical specification risk-significant equipment for greater than 24 hours; and it did not screen as potentially risk significant due to seismic, flooding, or severe weather. In addition, this finding had a human performance crosscutting aspect associated with resources in that the licensee did not ensure that the corrective action program coordinators were effectively train Inspection Report# : 2011006 (pdf)
Significance:        Dec 31, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Account for Water Hammer Stresses in Essential Service Water System Calculations The inspector identified a Green noncited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, having very low safety significance for the licensees failure to ensure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis were
 
correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures and instructions. Wolf Creek failed to properly account for essential service water piping membrane stress and impact loads as required by the 1974 ASME Code, Section III, paragraphs ND-3112.4 and ND-3111. Specifically, the licensees design calculations for the essential service water system did not account for the pressure fluctuations caused by a known column closure water hammer phenomena which occurs during a loss of offsite power or load sequencer testing. Wolf Creek has written Condition Report 33253 and plans to address the issue.
The licensees failure to account for the pressure fluctuations caused by a known column closure water hammer phenomena in the design calculations for the essential service water system was a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency was more than minor and therefore a finding because it was associated with the human performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The inspector determined the significance of the finding using IMC 0609.04, "Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings," and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not represent an actual loss of safety function of a single train for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the human performance cross-cutting area, associated with the decision making component, because the licensee used non-conservative values without adequate engineering justification to conclude that essential service water system piping met minimum wall thickness criteria for operability [H.1(b)].
Inspection Report# : 2010005 (pdf)
Significance:        Dec 31, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Maintain Licensed Operator Examination Integrity The inspectors identified a Green noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 55.49, Integrity of Examinations and Tests, for the failure of the licensee to ensure that the integrity of the written examinations and the operating tests administered to licensed operators was maintained. Seven licensed operators received two dynamic scenarios for their operating tests that had been previously administered to other licensed operators in previous weeks for the 2009 operating tests.
Also, six licensed operators for week 4 and 12 licensed operators for week 5 received written examinations during the 2010 examinations that contained more than 50 percent repeat questions from the previous week examinations. These failures resulted in a compromise of examination integrity because they exceeded the 50 percent overlap defined by ACAD 07-01, Guidelines for the Continuing Training of Licensed Personnel, for this portion of the examination and operating tests, but did not lead to an actual effect on the equitable and consistent administration of the examination. This issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Report 28854.
The failure of the licensees training staff to maintain the integrity of examinations administered to licensed operations personnel was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency is more than minor, and therefore a finding, because it adversely impacted the human performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Additionally, if left uncorrected, the finding could have become more significant in that allowing licensed operators to return to the control room without valid demonstration of appropriate knowledge on the biennial examinations and operating tests could be a precursor to a significant event if undetected performance deficiencies develop. Using Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 worksheets, and the corresponding Appendix I, Licensed Operator Requalification Significance Determination Process, the finding was determined to have very low safety significance (Green) because the finding resulted in a compromise of the integrity of operating test dynamic scenarios and written examinations and compensatory actions were not immediately taken in 2009 (for the operating tests) and 2010 (for the written examinations) when the compromise should have been discovered. Because the equitable and consistent administration of the exam was not actually impacted by this compromise, it is being characterized as a Green noncited violation. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the resources component because the licensee did not ensure that the associated procedure used to create the examinations and operating tests was complete, accurate, and up to date to ensure that the 50 percent maximum overlap standard was not exceeded [H.2(c)].
Inspection Report# : 2010005 (pdf)
 
Significance:        Dec 31, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Properly Identify and Evaluate Degraded Piping in the Train A Essential Service Water System The inspector identified a Green noncited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for the licensee's failure to properly evaluate a condition adverse to quality involving train A of the essential service water system. The cause and extent of condition of the pitting corrosion of the essential service water piping was not fully addressed by the licensee due to inadequate analysis and lack of engineering justification for the assumptions used to evaluate the degradation. As a result, the licensee was unable to ensure the pitting degradation did not reduce essential service water pipe wall thickness below the minimum allowed ASME code specifications. This resulted in train A of the essential service water system being declared inoperable from 2:20 p.m. until 10:21 p.m. on December 9, 2010, while measurements of the piping wall thickness were obtained. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program as Condition Report 18785.
The failure to properly evaluate the degraded condition of the essential service water piping was a performance deficiency. The inspector determined this finding was more than minor because it was associated with the human performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone , and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to events to prevent undesirable consequences. The inspector determined the significance of the finding using IMC 0609.04, "Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings," and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not represent an actual loss of safety function of a single train for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time. This finding had a crosscutting aspect in the human performance cross-cutting area, decision making component, because the licensee did not use conservative assumptions in its decision making when they initially used non-conservative values without adequate engineering justification to conclude that the train A essential service water piping met minimum wall thickness criteria for operability [H.1(b)].
Inspection Report# : 2010005 (pdf)
Significance:        Dec 31, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Evaluate Corrosion Mechanism in Accordance with Code Case N513 On September 15, 2010, the inspectors identified a Green noncited violation of 10 CFR 50.55a(b)(5) for failing to implement the requirements of Code Case N513-2, Section 2.0(e). On June 29, 2010, Wolf Creek discovered a through-wall leak of a 30 inch essential service water pipe. The flaw was evaluated using ASME Code Case N513-2.
Code Case N513, Section 2.0(e) required the flaw be re-examined every 30 days unless a flaw growth evaluation is prepared to justify re-examination every 90 days. The evaluation is required to include corrosion rate and corrosion mechanism. The inspectors reviewed the engineering disposition for the flaw and did not find a discussion of the corrosion mechanism or a justification of the corrosion rate. The inspectors reviewed independent laboratory analyses of removed Wolf Creek piping samples that stated that microbiologically influenced corrosion was likely and that the corrosion likely progressed through-wall at a high rate. On September 30, 2010, an engineering disposition was created in response to Condition Report 28077 which included a corrosion evaluation and established a much higher corrosion rate. Key in that corrosion evaluation was the use of empirical data from testing of known flaws which showed a corrosion rate between -4 mils per year to 29 mils per year. The flaw was reexamined after 90 days and minimal growth was found.
The failure to comply with the requirements of ASME Code Case N513-2, Section 2.0(e) was considered a performance deficiency. The finding is greater than minor because the failure to perform timely and adequate evaluations of degraded, nonconforming, and unanalyzed conditions for operability, if left uncorrected, would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. The finding is associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affects the associated cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The inspectors evaluated the significance of this finding using Phase 1 of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the issue did not result in a loss of operability or functionality, and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or
 
severe weather initiating event. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with corrective action program component because operations and engineering personnel failed to thoroughly evaluate problems such that the resolutions addressed the cause and extent of condition [P.1(c)].
Inspection Report# : 2010005 (pdf)
Significance:        Dec 31, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Procedure for Steam Generator Hi-Hi Turbine Trip The inspectors identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Procedures, for Wolf Creek Procedure ALR 00-112A, Steam Generator Level Hi-Hi Turbine Trip, being inadequate when reactor power exceeds the capabilities for the auxiliary feedwater system to maintain adequate steam generator inventory after P-14 actuation. This contributed to the operators attempt to perform a controlled shutdown instead of a reactor trip, thereby causing an automatic reactor trip. The licensee incorporated guidance in their startup training to trip the reactor when inadequate feedwater flow exists after P-14 actuation. This issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report 29540.
The inadequate procedural direction after P-14 actuation is a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency is more than minor, and therefore a finding, because it is associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of human performance and it affected the objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). The inspectors evaluated the significance of this finding using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance since the finding does not represent a loss of system safety function, nor does the finding represent actual loss of safety function for single train for a greater time than permitted by technical specifications. This finding had a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the resources component because Wolf Creek failed to validate that the procedure would be successful in stabilizing the plant [H.2(c)].
Inspection Report# : 2010005 (pdf)
Significance:        Dec 31, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Simulation Facility Fidelity The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR 55.46(c)(1)(i), Simulator Fidelity, in that the licensees simulation facility did not have adequate fidelity to simulate steam generator level oscillations that occur during startup and shutdown after a loss of feedwater preheat, thereby creating the possibility for negative training.
Specifically, two constants that are used in the model for the Westinghouse 7300 steam generator level control cards were improperly programmed in the simulator. The licensee changed the constants in the simulator model and initiated actions to ensure accurate low-power steam generator oscillation modeling. This issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report 29541.
The failure to have a properly modeled simulation facility is a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency is more than minor, therefore a finding, because it is associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of human performance and it affected the objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). The inspectors evaluated the significance of this finding using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the finding neither represents a loss of system safety function, nor does it represent actual loss of safety function for single train for a greater time than permitted by technical specifications. This finding had a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the resources component because Wolf Creek did not ensure the simulation facility was accurately modeling plant behavior [H.2(d)].
Inspection Report# : 2010005 (pdf)
 
Significance:        Nov 24, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Promptly Identify and Correct a Condition Adverse to Quality The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for the failure to promptly identify voiding conditions in the component cooling water and residual heat removal system piping. The licensee failed to promptly identify the presence of voids in both the component cooling water and residual heat removal systems despite unexpected component cooling water pump auto starts and unexpected audible water hammer and minimum flow valve (EJ FCV-610) cycling during component cooling water and residual heat removal pump surveillances.
This finding was more than minor because the failure to promptly identify conditions adverse to quality associated with the component cooling water and residual heat removal systems is associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affects the associated cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the issue screened as having very low safety significance because it was a qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in a loss of operability. The finding had a crosscutting aspect in the human performance, decision making component, because the licensee failed to use conservative assumptions during the evaluation of the pressure oscillations exhibited during the component cooling water pump starts.
Inspection Report# : 2010008 (pdf)
Significance:        Nov 24, 2010 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Procedure for Fill and Vent of the Component Cooling Water System The inspectors identified a self-revealing noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1, Procedures, for failure to maintain procedures required for filling and venting of the component cooling water system. The licensee failed to ensure that the procedures for filling and venting the component cooling water system were adequately written to prevent gas accumulation and voids to form in the system.
This finding was more than minor because the failure to maintain an adequate procedure for filling and venting the component cooling water system is associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affects the associated cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the issue screened as having very low safety significance because it was a qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in a loss of operability. No crosscutting aspect was assigned, as this condition was not reflective of current licensee performance.
Inspection Report# : 2010008 (pdf)
Significance:        Nov 24, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform an Adequate Operability Evaluation The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, regarding the failure to follow the requirements of Procedures AP 28-001, Operability Evaluations, and AP 26C-004, Technical Specification Operability, associated with deficiencies resulting from the presence of voiding in the train A residual heat removal heat exchanger. This condition resulted in the failure to adequately address the impact of the voided condition for the high head pumps and the heat removal capacity of the heat exchanger.
This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of
 
equipment performance and adversely affects the objective to ensure equipment availability and reliability. Using Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the issue screened as very low risk significant since the finding did not represent a loss of system safety function. The inspectors determined that this finding had a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program component because the licensee failed to thoroughly evaluate a similar problem such that extent of condition of the voiding was considered and the cause was resolved.
Inspection Report# : 2010008 (pdf)
Significance:        Nov 24, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Identify and Correct Inadequate RHR Fill and Vent The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action," for the failure to promptly identify and take corrective actions to address inadequacies in the residual heat removal system fill and vent procedure. The licensee failed to perform corrective actions to incorporate minimum flow rates required to sweep air out of the residual heat removal heat exchangers into the system fill and vent procedure during performance of revisions incorporating previous operating experience and corrective actions associated with NRC inspections.
This finding is more than minor because it affected the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of design control for ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of safety systems. Using Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 -
Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, this finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the voided heat exchanger was a design or qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in loss of operability. The inspectors determined that the finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action component because the licensee staff evaluation of previous Performance Improvement Request 2002-2765 was not thorough enough to result in inclusion of minimum flows necessary to sweep voids out of the residual heat removal heat exchanger.
Inspection Report# : 2010008 (pdf)
Significance:        Oct 01, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Design of Component Cooling Water Safety/Nonsafety Isolation The team identified a Green noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, which states, in part, that measures shall be established to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis are correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions. Specifically, as of October 8, 2010, the licensee failed to incorporate design seismic requirements into the design calculations and actual system operation. This finding was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Report 00028237.
The team determined that the failure to adequately analyze the isolation between the safety related and nonsafety-related portions of the component cooling water system was a performance deficiency. This finding was more than minor because it was associated with the design control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the design basis analysis did not ensure that the affected train of component cooling water would perform its required functions after the failure of nonsafety-related component cooling water piping. The inspectors evaluated the issue using Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings. This finding affected the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone because seismic protection was degraded. The inspectors determined that this finding represented the degradation of equipment and functions specifically designed to mitigate a seismic event and that during an earthquake the deficiency would degrade one train of component cooling water, a system that supports a safety system or function. Therefore, this finding was potentially risk significant to seismic initiators and a Phase 3 analysis was required. A Region IV senior reactor analyst performed the Phase 3 significance determination. The change in core damage frequency was calculated to be 7.0 x 10 8 indicating that this finding was of very low safety significance (Green). The dominant risk
 
sequence included a seismic initiating event, loss of offsite power, loss of reactor coolant pump seal cooling, and a failure of high pressure recirculation. This finding did not have a crosscutting aspect because the most significant contributor did not reflect current licensee performance.
Inspection Report# : 2010007 (pdf)
Significance:        Oct 01, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform Tornado Damper Testing The team identified a Green noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, which states, in part, that measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, and nonconformances are promptly identified and corrected. Specifically, as of October 8, 2010, the licensee failed to assure that the identified emergency diesel generator room and the service water pump room tornado damper testing deficiency was effectively corrected. This finding was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Report 00028185.
The inspectors determined that the failure to implement this corrective action was a performance deficiency. This finding was more than minor because, if left uncorrected, the performance deficiency would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, failure to implement this corrective action would have resulted in a failure to periodically test tornado dampers required to protect both the emergency diesel generator room and the essential service water pump room ventilation system. In accordance with Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, a significance determination screening was performed and determined this finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because it was not a design or qualification deficiency, did not represent a loss of system safety function, and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The team determined that there was a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance resources because the licensee failed to provide complete, accurate, and up-to-date work packages [H.2(c)].
Inspection Report# : 2010007 (pdf)
Significance:        Oct 01, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Suction Line Break Analysis and Design The team identified a Green noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, which states, in part, that measures shall be established to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis are correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions. Specifically, as of October 8, 2010, the design calculations associated with the auxiliary feedwater system line break analysis was not consistent with the actual system operation. This finding was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Report 00006250.
The team determined that the failure to adequately analyze a postulated failure of the piping from the condensate storage tank to the auxiliary feedwater pumps was a performance deficiency. This finding was more than minor because it was associated with the design control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the design basis analysis did not ensure that the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump would perform its required functions after the failure of nonsafety-related piping from the condensate storage tank. In accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, "Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings," a significance determination screening was performed and determined this finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not represent a loss of system safety function and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The licensee's operability evaluation demonstrated that the auxiliary feedwater system was operable. This finding did not have a crosscutting aspect because the most significant contributor did not reflect current licensee performance.
Inspection Report# : 2010007 (pdf)
 
Significance:        Oct 01, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Emergency Diesel Generator Specified Rating did not Address Engine Operation at Design Basis Extreme Meteorological Temperature Conditions The team identified a Green noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, which states, in part, that measures shall be established to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis are correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures and instructions. Specifically, prior to September 29, 2010, the licensee failed to ensure that the design bases inputs in the emergency diesel generator equipment specification were bounded by expected operational values. The licensee failed to evaluate the effects of the identified design basis maximum local meteorological conditions on the rating for the emergency diesel generators which could have affected the capability of safety-related equipment to respond to initiating events. This finding was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Report 00028695.
The team determined that failure to properly incorporate the licensing design basis for extreme local meteorological temperature conditions as a design input in the emergency diesel generator equipment specification was a performance deficiency. This finding was more than minor because it was associated with the design control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the design basis analysis did not ensure that the diesel generators could perform their design safety function at the maximum design temperature. In accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, "Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings," a significance determination screening was performed and determined this finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because it was a design or qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in loss of operability or functionality. This finding did not have a crosscutting aspect because the most significant contributor did not reflect current licensee performance.
Inspection Report# : 2010007 (pdf)
Significance:        Oct 01, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Translate Design Requirements to Operating Procedures for the Transfer of Residual Heat Removal and Containment Spray Suction to the Containment Recirculation Sumps The team identified a Green noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, which states in part, that measures shall be established to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design bases are correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions. Specifically, on September 22, 2010, two out of two operating crews failed to satisfy the minimum time requirement for the transfer of suction of the residual heat removal pumps and the containment spray pumps to the containment recirculation sumps following a large break loss of coolant accident with the worst single active failure as described in Table 6.3 12 of the Updated Safety Analysis Report. This finding was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Report 00028276.
The team determined that the failure to translate design requirements into operating procedures was a performance deficiency. This finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of design control and affected the associated cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the licensee failed to translate design requirements into Procedure EMG ES 12, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation. In accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, a significance determination screening was performed and determined that this finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because it was a design or qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in loss of operability or functionality. This finding had a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance resources because the operating personnel were not trained to complete the transfer to cold leg recirculation within the minimum time to ensure the equipment was available to assure nuclear safety [H.2(b)].
Inspection Report# : 2010007 (pdf)
 
Significance:        Sep 30, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Correct Degraded Vital Switchgear Cooler Wiring The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Conditions Adverse to Quality, involving Wolf Creeks failure to identify and correct degraded wiring in the train A vital switchgear air conditioning unit. On August 5, 2010, the SGK05A unit tripped when it blew a fuse. The cause of the blown fuse was found to be a wire that shorted to its terminal box, which is mounted to the compressor. A limited number of wires were replaced and the unit was returned to service. A work order to troubleshoot stated that all wires were inspected and the repair work order stated to inspect for additional damage. The inspectors questioned degraded cables in the terminal box that were not replaced. On August 26, 2010, Wolf Creek re-inspected the wiring and found 15 wires that exceeded the 10 percent insulation loss acceptance criterion and 1 wire that exceeded 50 percent. Vibration of flex conduit was also found to be causing wire degradation. This issue is captured in Condition Reports 27564, 27209, 27218, 27231, and 27237. Wolf Creek has planned more thorough and frequent wiring inspections.
The failure to identify and correct the condition adverse to quality of ensuring wiring insulation meets its acceptance criteria is a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency is more than minor, and therefore a finding, because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and it affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events.
The finding is determined to be of very low safety significance because it did not represent an actual loss of safety function, did not result in exceeding a Technical Specification allowed outage time, and did not affect external event initiators. The finding has a crosscutting aspect in the human performance area associated with the resources component. Specifically, the August 6 troubleshooting and repair work orders did not include instructions to inspect all potentially affected wiring with a specific method to assess insulation loss in order to repair all the damaged wires.
Inspection Report# : 2010004 (pdf)
Significance:        Jul 30, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Resolve Degraded Conditions in a Timely Manner The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for the licensees failure to promptly correct degraded or nonconforming conditions in that the conditions were not corrected at the first available opportunity or appropriately justify a longer completion schedule. Some examples of affected degraded or nonconforming conditions included degraded atmospheric relief valve discharge line silencer, essential service water system water hammer events and internal corrosion, and 23 items on the Operability Evaluation Database that had not been corrected prior to the start of the last refuel outage. As corrective actions for this issue, the licensee implemented interim procedural guidance and initiated Condition Report 27071 to evaluate the adequacy of tracking methods used for degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed conditions. In addition, the licensee initiated a review of work requests, condition reports, and other items for degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed conditions and is assessing the justification for delayed implementation of these corrective actions.
This issue was more than minor because it affected the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, the issue is determined to have very low safety significance because the finding is not a design or qualification issue confirmed not to result in a loss of operability or functionality; did not represent an actual loss of safety function of the system or train; did not result in the loss of one or more trains of nontechnical specification equipment; and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The inspectors determined that the finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the component of resources because the licensee failed to provide adequate procedures to assure timely resolution of degraded or nonconforming conditions
[H.2(c)].
Inspection Report# : 2010006 (pdf)
Significance:        Jul 30, 2010 Identified By: NRC
 
Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Unqualified Scaffolding Erected Near Safety-Related Equipment The inspectors identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a for failure to properly implement Procedure AP 14A-003, Scaffold Construction and Use, Revision 17, when scaffolding was erected near operable safety-related equipment. On July 14, 15, and 28, the inspectors identified a total of four instances where the minimum separation distance between scaffolding and safety-related components was less than the minimum allowed by procedure and an approved engineering evaluation to justify the deviation was not performed. The licensee entered the issue into its corrective action program as Condition Reports 26752 and 27010, corrected each scaffolding deficiency, and performed comprehensive walkdowns of all scaffolding around safety-related structures, systems, and components.
The deficiency was more than minor because if left uncorrected, it would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. The finding was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, the issue is determined to have very low safety significance because the finding is not a design or qualification issue confirmed not to result in a loss of operability or functionality; did not represent an actual loss of safety function of the system or train; did not result in the loss of one or more trains of nontechnical specification equipment; and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The inspectors determined the finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with corrective action program because the licensee did not take appropriate corrective actions to address previously identified scaffolding construction issues in a timely manner [P.1(d)].
Inspection Report# : 2010006 (pdf)
Significance:        Jul 30, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to Adequately Monitor Control Room Deficiencies The inspectors identified a finding for the failure to follow Procedure AI 22A-001, Operator Work Arounds/Burdens/Control Room Deficiencies, Revision 8, to adequately identify, document, and track control room deficiencies associated with instruments and controls to ensure proper prioritization and timely corrective actions.
Specifically, inspectors observed that the licensee had approximately 52 WR (work request) buttons on the control boards indicating that work requests had been initiated to correct problems on instruments and controls. However, not all deficiencies were logged, and some of the deficiencies had existed for years without correction or justification. The licensee initiated Condition Report 27034 to document and evaluate this concern.
The deficiency was more than minor because if left uncorrected, it would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern, in that, the deficient condition could cause an operator to take an inappropriate action based on expected plant response or conversely cause an operator not to take action when action is required. The finding is associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone. The senior reactor analyst determined that this finding was not appropriate to be evaluated using the significance determination process since this finding was associated with numerous equipment issues and associated human performance aspects that might impact equipment operation. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix M, Significance Determination Process Using Qualitative Criteria, the finding is determined to have very low safety significance because there was no adverse impact to plant equipment.
The inspectors determined that the cause of the finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the component of corrective action program because the licensee did not identify issues completely, accurately, and in a timely manner commensurate with their safety significance [P.1(a)].
Inspection Report# : 2010006 (pdf)
Significance:        Jul 30, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Update an Operability Evaluation The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures and Drawings, for the failure to implement Procedure AP 26C-004, Technical Specification Operability, Revision
 
20, to adequately evaluate the operability of a degraded essential service water system. Specifically, operations and engineering personnel failed to adequately evaluate the operability of the essential service water system when relevant new information was identified that challenged a previously performed operability determination and which challenged the reasonable expectation for operability. Condition Report 27288 was initiated to evaluate the failure to perform adequate operability determinations.
The issue was more than minor because if left uncorrected, it would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. The finding is associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, the issue is determined to have very low safety significance because the finding is not a design or qualification issue confirmed not to result in a loss of operability or functionality; did not represent an actual loss of safety function of the system or train; did not result in the loss of one or more trains of nontechnical specification equipment; and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The inspectors determined that the cause of the finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with resources because the licensee failed to provide complete, accurate, and up-to-date procedures for performing operability evaluations [H.2(c)].
Inspection Report# : 2010006 (pdf)
Significance:        Jul 30, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: VIO Violation Failure to Perform Adequate Evaluation for Significant Conditions The inspectors identified a cited violation 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, because the licensee failed to perform an adequate evaluation to determine the cause of loss of offsite power induced water hammers and internal corrosion in the essential service water system and did not take corrective actions to preclude repetition of additional water hammer events and system leaks. Specifically, the licensee performed an apparent cause evaluation instead of a root cause evaluation as required, and the licensees evaluation did not consider metallurgical evaluations that were performed outside the corrective action program. The inspectors found that the licensee had not corrected a previous NCV 05000482/2009007-03, Failure to Correctly Screen ESW Piping Leaks for Significance, which resulted in the licensee failing to perform a root cause evaluation. Because the licensee failed to restore compliance within a reasonable time after NCV 05000482/2009007-03 was identified, this violation is being cited in a Notice of Violation in accordance with Section VI.A.1 of the NRCs Enforcement Policy. The licensees corrective action to this cited violation was to initiate Condition Reports 27212, 26466, and 27075, to evaluate and correct the identified conditions, to start a root cause evaluation and, separately, to evaluate the licensees failure to properly respond to NCV 05000482/2009007-03.
The issue was more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affects the associated cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences, and is therefore a finding.
Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, the issue is determined to have very low safety significance because the finding is not a design or qualification issue confirmed not to result in a loss of operability or functionality; did not represent an actual loss of safety function of the system or train; did not result in the loss of one or more trains of nontechnical specification equipment; and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The inspectors determined that the cause of the finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the component of corrective action program because the licensee failed to thoroughly evaluate problems such that the resolutions address causes and extent of conditions [P.1 (c)]
Inspection Report# : 2010006 (pdf)
Inspection Report# : 2011003 (pdf)
Significance:        Jul 30, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Determine if a Deficiency Existed in the Ultimate Heat Sink
 
The team identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for the failure to follow the requirements of Procedure AP 26C-004, Technical Specification Operability, Revision 20. Specifically, Wolf Creek Generating Station failed to confirm if a deficiency existed with the ability of the ultimate heat sink to perform its safety function after delaying the 5 year scheduled dredging of the channel. The licensee initiated Condition Report 27080 and performed an operability determination to evaluate the deficiency.
The issue was more than minor because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, and it affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, the issue is determined to have very low safety significance because the finding is not a design or qualification issue confirmed not to result in a loss of operability or functionality; did not represent an actual loss of safety function of the system or train; did not result in the loss of one or more trains of nontechnical specification equipment; and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program component because licensee personnel failed to identify a potential deficiency in the ultimate heat sink in a timely manner [P.1(a)].
Inspection Report# : 2010006 (pdf)
Significance:        Jul 30, 2010 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Notice of Unusual Event Due to Loss of Both Emergency Diesel Generators The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for failure to identify a degraded equipment condition in December 2006. As a result, the emergency diesel generator system experienced a failure on October 22, 2009, which caused the plant to make a notice of unusual event emergency declaration. Licensee personnel missed an opportunity to identify the condition because they did not thoroughly evaluate a surveillance failure and post-mortem testing data available in December 2006.
The finding is more than minor because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, and it affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, the issue is determined to have very low safety significance because the finding is not a design or qualification issue confirmed not to result in a loss of operability or functionality; did not represent an actual loss of safety function of the system or train; did not result in the loss of one or more trains of nontechnical specification equipment; and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. A crosscutting aspect was identified in the problem identification and resolution in that the licensee did not thoroughly evaluate problems such that the resolution addressed causes [P.1(c)].
Inspection Report# : 2010006 (pdf)
Significance:        Jul 30, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Translate Design Information into a Procedure The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for the failure to translate criteria from the atmospheric relief valve accumulator leakage calculation into proceduralized leakage criteria. Specifically, engineering personnel did not translate the calculated design basis leakage criteria and the required minimum pressure to start the test into the procedure. The licensee entered this in to the corrective action program as Condition Report 26771, and the licensee was developing plans to revise the leakage criteria in the procedure.
This issue was more than minor because it affected the design control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone
 
and affected the objective to ensure the reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, the issue is determined to have very low safety significance because the finding is not a design or qualification issue confirmed not to result in a loss of operability or functionality; did not represent an actual loss of safety function of the system or train; did not result in the loss of one or more trains of nontechnical specification equipment; and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program component because licensee personnel failed to take appropriate corrective actions to previously identified problems [P.1(d)].
Inspection Report# : 2010006 (pdf)
Significance:        Dec 31, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: VIO Violation Failure to Correct Discolored Boric Acid Deposits The inspectors identified a cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for failure to take action to stop leakage from the base of the refueling water storage tank or evaluate the leakage and wastage for acceptability. Specifically, the licensee did not take actions to prevent recurring discolored boric acid deposits for approximately 11 years. Failure to correct leakage from the refueling water storage tank base was the subject of a noncited violation in NRC Inspection Report 05000482/2007006. This issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report 22866.
The failure to implement corrective actions for the refueling water storage tank leakage was a performance deficiency.
The inspectors determined this issue impacted the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and was greater than minor because if left uncorrected, the failure to correct the presence of boric acid leakage could become a more significant safety concern in that continued wastage could impact tank operability. Using the Phase 1 worksheets in Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, "Significance Determination Process," the finding was determined to have very low safety significance because it did not result in a system or component being inoperable and it did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The inspectors identified a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with resources. Specifically, Wolf Creek did not maintain long term plant safety minimizing corrective maintenance deferrals and this long standing equipment issue [H.2(c)].
Inspection Report# : 2009005 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Significance:        Mar 31, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Follow Radiation Work Permit Instructions The inspectors identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a for the failure to follow procedure requirements related to adding work to existing radiation work permits. On January 4, 2011, welding was performed in a locked high radiation area on radiation work permit 110039, which did not cover that type of activity. The ALARA review associated with radiation work permit 110039 stated that this permit was not intended to be used for
 
major contamination breaches. However, welders cut into and welded a contaminated pipe. The licensee placed the finding into the corrective action program as Condition Report 35522 and acknowledged that the radiation work permit used was inappropriate for the work completed.
The failure to follow a procedure was a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because it negatively impacted the Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstones attribute of program and process, in that the inappropriate use of a radiation work permit led to workers unplanned and unintended dose. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix C, Occupational Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because: (1) it was not associated with ALARA planning or work controls, (2) there was no overexposure, (3) there was no substantial potential for an overexposure, and (4) the ability to assess dose was not compromised. This deficiency had a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance related to work controls. Specifically, there was inappropriate coordination and communication of work activities between work groups [H.3(b)].
Inspection Report# : 2011002 (pdf)
Public Radiation Safety Significance:      Dec 31, 2010 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Have Procedures to Prevent Draining Radioactive Systems into Nonradioactive Systems The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a for failure to implement written procedures to prevent draining and venting radioactive systems into nonradioactive systems and prevent unplanned releases of radioactivity into the environment. On October 21, 2009, an auxiliary building operator inadvertently connected a hose carrying radioactive water to a hose that was routed into the auxiliary building nonradioactive sump. Consequently, the operator drained an estimated 800 to 1,000 gallons of reactor coolant into the nonradioactive auxiliary building sump which transferred its radioactive contents to the turbine building sump. When the contaminated turbine building sump attempted to transfer liquid radioactive waste to the non-radioactive wastewater retention basin, radiation monitor RE95 alarmed and terminated the discharge due to the Hi-Hi radioactivity setting of 7.25E-5 uCi/ml. The licensee immediately implemented a decontamination recovery plan. This event was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Reports 20995, 20999, and 29295.
The inspectors determined that failure to have procedures to prevent draining and venting radioactive systems to nonradioactive systems was a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because it impacted the program and process attribute of the Public Radiation Safety Cornerstone, and it adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring adequate protection of public health and safety from exposure to radioactive material released into the public domain. Using the Public Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process, the inspectors determined this finding to be of very low safety significance because this was not a failure to implement the effluent program, and it had no impact on public dose. In addition, this finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of Human Performance related to the personnel work practices component. Specifically, the licensee failed to use self- and peer-checking human error prevention techniques and then proceeded in the face of uncertainty when unexpected plant conditions were known [H.4(a)].
Inspection Report# : 2010005 (pdf)
Significance:      Dec 31, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Have Adequate Procedures for Meteorological Monitoring The inspectors identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a for failure to have adequate procedures for maintaining meteorological monitoring systems functional. The inspectors determined that procedures did not exist for maintaining the functionality or to declare one or more channels of wind instrumentation out of
 
service pursuant to Technical Requirement 3.3.12. Consequently, both channels of the 10 meter wind direction instrumentation were not functional between April and October 2009. The licensee developed additional guidance for determining functionality of the instruments and immediately required the meteorological data to be reviewed on a more frequent basis to ensure validity. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program as Condition Report 29337.
The failure to have procedures to maintain meteorological monitoring functional is a performance deficiency. This finding is more than minor because it was associated with the Public Radiation Safety Cornerstone attribute of program and process and affected the cornerstone objective, in that, the failure to have adequate procedures to maintain meteorological monitoring instrumentation functional has the potential to impair public dose assessments of routine and accidental radioactive effluent releases. Using the Public Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process, the inspectors determined this finding to be of very low safety significance because this was not a failure to implement the effluent program, and it had no impact on public dose. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in problem identification and resolution area associated with the corrective action component because the licensee failed to implement a low threshold for completely and accurately identifying issues with the meteorological monitoring instrumentation in a timely manner [P.1(a)].
Inspection Report# : 2010005 (pdf)
Physical Protection Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Significance: N/A Mar 31, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding 95002 Inspection Inspection Report# : 2011006 (pdf)
Significance: N/A Nov 24, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Evaluations and Operability Assessments The inspectors reviewed the licensee evaluations associated with the component cooling water and residual heat removal systems following the identification of the voiding condition. During the review of the licensee evaluations, the inspectors identified inadequate assumptions within the calculations and operability determinations. The assumptions included; the failure to include the effects of the voided condition in the residual heat removal system on the high head safety pumps; the use of nonconservative assumptions during the determination of the size of the initial void contained in the residual heat removal heat exchanger; and the initial troubleshooting following the start of the standby component cooling water pump during a low discharge pressure condition focused on the potential failure of the pressure switch, when the licensee had sufficient information that the pressure switch operated as expected.
In addition, during the inspection the inspectors observed challenges in the licensees ability to understand abnormal operating conditions, in that, the licensee had multiple opportunities to identify the presence of voids in the residual heat removal and component cooling water systems prior to the actual discovery of the adverse conditions. These included missed opportunities during review of licensee and industry operating experience, indications of flow oscillations during start of system components, and abnormal cycling of flow control valves.
 
Inspection Report# : 2010008 (pdf)
Significance: N/A Jul 30, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Wolf Creek Generating Station Biennial PI&R Inspection Summary The team concluded that the corrective action program at Wolf Creek Generating Station was generally performing in a satisfactory manner to ensure safe plant operations. However, as previously discussed in the past four NRC assessment letters, Wolf Creeks ability to thoroughly evaluate and prioritize problems such that the resolutions effectively address the causes and extent of conditions is of concern. Wolf Creek Generating Stations efforts to reverse the trend of substantive crosscutting issues in problem identification and resolution areas have not shown to be effective.
The team identified a number of issues that the licensees staff had previous opportunities to identify. The team also identified instances in which the licensee takes actions outside of the corrective action program in order to evaluate or correct issues of concern. The inspectors noted several examples where degraded or nonconforming conditions were not corrected in a timely manner and no evaluation had been performed that justified delayed correction of the issue.
In addition, the team identified examples where the licensee has taken ineffective corrective actions, including one example of a cited violation based on the licensees failure to take corrective actions to restore compliance within a reasonable time after a violation had been identified.
The team determined that the licensee adequately evaluated industry operating experience for relevance to the facility, and entered applicable items in the corrective action program. And, based on focus group interviews, the team concluded that the licensee had a strong safety conscious work environment. Workers stated they felt they could raise safety concerns without fear of retaliation.
Inspection Report# : 2010006 (pdf)
Last modified : October 14, 2011
 
Wolf Creek 1 3Q/2011 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance:        Sep 30, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Maintain Steam Generator Level Above Lo Lo Level Setpoint The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR 50.55a, Codes and Standards, when the licensee failed to correctly test a series of butterfly valves. The licensee installed seven Crane butterfly valves in the essential service water system in 2000 and 2002 but did not perform a preservice test under conditions as close as possible to the inservice test conditions or develop and perform an inservice stroke test under conditions as close to design basis conditions as required by their applicable code case. This issue is captured in the corrective action program as Condition Report 44218.
The issue is more than minor because it impacted the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective to ensure that to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding is not a design or qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in loss of operability or functionality; the finding does not represent a loss of system safety function; the finding does not represent actual loss of safety function of a single train for more than its technical specification allowed outage time; the finding does not represent an actual loss of safety function of one or more nontechnical specification trains of equipment designated as risk significant per 10 CFR 50.65 for more than 24 hours; and the finding does not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The inspectors did not assign a crosscutting aspect because the finding was not indicative of current performance (Section 1R22).
Inspection Report# : 2011004 (pdf)
Significance:        Jul 21, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Switchyard component Failures Cause Loss of Ring Bus and Loss of Offsite Power On July 21, 2011, the inspectors identified a finding for degraded switchyard equipment that caused a loss of offsite power. Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR), Section 8.2.1.3.g.1, states that: Any transmission line can be cleared under normal or fault conditions without affecting any other transmission line. On August 19, 2009, the damaged carrier system signal failures that allowed a lightning strike to cause a loss of all three 345 kV lines was inconsistent with the Updated Safety Analysis Report. Wolf Creeks root cause and hardware failure analysis of the capacitive coupled voltage transformer found that it was degraded for a significant period of time. There was no causal analysis of the out of tune wave trap that contributed to the event. The inspectors concluded that the deficiency could have been prevented if Wolf Creek adopted significant external operating experience from 2004. This included inspection and/or replacement of aging capacitive coupled voltage transformers. Corrective actions from the 2004 operating experience were not implemented in a 2007 self assessment and were finally implemented in December 2009. This issue is captured in the corrective action program as Condition Report 19245. Wolf Creek and its owner companies have since upgraded all capacitive coupled voltage transformers (finishing in spring 2011), added fault data recorders, added enhanced line checking procedures with the grid operator, regrounded all three 345 kV lines, and plans to add an offsite power technical requirements manual limiting condition of operation per Condition Report 43244.
The failure to maintain 345 kV equipment such that a single line fault could be cleared without affecting the other lines, as described in the Updated Safety Analysis Report, is a performance deficiency. The issue is more than minor because it impacted the protection against external factors attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, inspectors
 
screened the finding to Phase 3 because it caused both a reactor trip and loss of mitigation equipment or functions to not be available. The Senior Reactor Analyst calculated that the increase in core damage frequency was 2.6 x 10-7 or green. The inspectors determined that no crosscutting aspects applied because this finding is not indicative of current licensee performance.
Inspection Report# : 2011004 (pdf)
Significance:        Jun 16, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation No Procedure for Debris in Transformer an Tank Yards Propr to Severe Weather The inspectors identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Administrative Procedures, for having no procedure to address onsite debris impacting plant equipment during severe weather. The inspectors walked down external areas of the plant on June 1 and June 9, 2011, prior to the onset of predicted severe thunderstorms and tornadoes. The inspectors found loose debris each time and brought it to the attention of the licensee who secured the materials. The inspectors walked down the transformer yard and tank yard during a thunderstorm on June 16 and found loose debris such as plywood, trash, wood planks, and fiberglass planks. The inspectors brought this to the attention of Wolf Creek and the materials were removed or secured. Wolf Creek initiated several condition reports but they only addressed immediate cleanup. Wolf Creek procedures had no steps for securing potential wind-driven projectiles prior to severe weather. After June 16, Wolf Creek wrote Condition Report 40573 which started a weekly maintenance activity to remove loose materials and added procedure steps to have operations walk down external areas prior to severe weather.
This finding was more than minor because it impacted the protection against external factors attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone, and it affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. The inspectors evaluated this finding using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, and determined that it was of very low safety significance (Green) for June 16, 2011, because it did not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigation equipment would be unavailable since the reactor was shutdown. Inspectors used Manual Chapter 0609 Appendix G, Checklist 4 for the other occurrences because Wolf Creek was in Modes 4 or 5. The finding again screened to Green because it did not increase the likelihood of a loss of inventory, did not cause the loss of reactor coolant system instrumentation, did not degrade the ability of the licensee to terminate a leak path or add inventory when needed, or degrade the ability to recover residual heat removal if it was lost. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution, specifically the corrective action program attribute because licensees short-term corrective actions failed to ensure debris was secured or removed prior to severe weather [P.1 (d)](Section 1R01).
Inspection Report# : 2011003 (pdf)
Significance:        Jun 16, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Undersized Weld Failure on Charging Header The inspectors documented a self-revealing noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion IX, Control of Special Processes. Specifically, in October 2009, welders failed to ensure the fillet weld between the train B charging header and the half coupling used to attach two vent valves met the specified weld requirements. This weld failed in January 2011, rendering the train B charging system inoperable. The licensees extent of condition review identified 12 vent line welds which did not meet ASME code weld size requirements and/or procedural requirements for 2:1 weld taper configuration. Additionally, quality assurance inspectors failed to identify that the 2:1 taper weld requirements specified by procedure, and ASME minimum weld size requirements, were not met in multiple vent line welds. The weld was repaired and built up to the correct 2:1 aspect ratio. This issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Reports 32648, 33686, 33689, and 36438.
The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during power operations. The inspectors performed a Phase 1 screening in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the issue did not result
 
in exceeding the technical specification limit for identified reactor coolant system leakage or affect other mitigating systems resulting in a total loss of their safety function. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, resources, because the licensee failed to ensure that personnel, specifically welders and quality assurance inspectors, were adequately trained in the procedural requirements and methods for measuring weld dimensions to assure nuclear safety [H.2(b)](Section 1R08).
Inspection Report# : 2011003 (pdf)
Significance:        Jun 16, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Ensure Separation of Stainless Steel and Carbon Steel Grinding and Cutting Tools The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50 involving the failure of the licensee to ensure that weld preparation was protected from deleterious contamination in that drawers (located in the hot tool room) containing files, grinding wheels, flapper wheels, and cutting wheels, used for the purpose of weld preparation, contained a mixture of both stainless steel tools and carbon steel tools. The failure to separate tools used for stainless steel weld preparation from tools used for carbon steel preparation could result in the contamination of stainless steel welds by carbon steel and affect the material integrity and corrosion resistance. The licensee immediately removed the tools and replaced them with new tools stored separately for use on specific types of metal. This issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Report 36444.
The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during power operations, and if left uncorrected the finding would become a more significant safety concern. The inspectors performed a Phase 1 screening in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the issue did not result in exceeding the technical specification limit for identified reactor coolant system leakage or affect other mitigating systems resulting in a total loss of their safety function. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, resources, because the licensee did not provide complete, accurate, and up-to-date procedures for the preparation of stainless steel and carbon steel welds [H.2(c)](Section 1R08).
Inspection Report# : 2011003 (pdf)
Significance:        Jun 16, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Ensure Configuration Control of Safety-Related Systems The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, involving the failure of the licensee to review the suitability of installing brass fittings and leaving test fittings on pressure, differential pressure, and flow transmitter equalizing block valve drain ports instead of the design specified stainless steel manifold plugs. During a boric acid walkdown, the inspectors identified that drain ports on the equalizing block of two separate reactor coolant system flow transmitters had brass fittings installed instead of the design specified stainless steel fittings. In response to inspector concerns about the brass fittings, the licensee subsequently discovered that a design configuration nonconformance existed by leaving the test fittings on the drain port during plant operation. Licensee Drawing J-17D22 specifies that manifold plugs be installed in the drain ports during plant operation. The licensee immediately replaced the brass caps with stainless steel fittings. This issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Report 36439.
The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the design control attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during power operations. The inspectors performed a Phase 1 screening in accordance with Inspection Manual 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the issue would not result in exceeding the technical specification limit for identified reactor coolant system leakage or affect other mitigating systems resulting in a total loss of their safety function. The inspectors also determined that the finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, resources, because the licensee did not provide adequate training of personnel so that the inappropriately installed fittings Inspection Report# : 2011003 (pdf)
 
Significance:      Apr 05, 2011 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Fire Watch Defeats Halon Fire Suppression in Vital Switchgear Rooms During Fire The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing noncited violation of License Condition 2.C.5 for failure to implement adequate fire watches which affected both trains of vital ac and dc switchgear. The inadequate fire watches occurred during an actual fire which negated the Halon system discharge because internal fire doors were not shut, as required, by the fire watch. The inspectors found problems with fire impairments and watches from 2008 that had not been corrected. Subsequent to the fire, Wolf Creek again briefed and trained its personnel on the requirements for fire watches. This issue is captured in the corrective action program as Condition Report 36719.
Failure to implement adequate fire impairments such that the fire watches ensured the success of the Halon system was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it impacted the Initiating Events Cornerstone and its objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, the protection against external factors attribute was impacted by the fire impairment. To determine significance, the inspectors used Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04 to screen the finding to Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, because the fire protection defense-in-depth strategies involving automatic suppression, fire barriers, and administrative controls were degraded. The senior reactor analyst conducted a Phase 3 review of this finding and concluded that the incremental core damage frequency was 1.6E-8 per year, or very low safety significance (Green). The inspectors found that the cause of the finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution. Specifically, corrective actions from ineffective fire watches in 2008 did not prevent recurrence of the inadequate fire watch on April 5, 2011 [P.1.d](Section 4OA3.3).
Inspection Report# : 2011003 (pdf)
Significance:      Mar 31, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Clearance Order Disables Power Operated Relief Valve Low Temperature Overpressure Function The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Procedures, involving the failure to follow the requirements of Procedure AP 21E-001, Clearance Orders. This procedure violation resulted in an inadequate tagout for the Train A solid state protection system resulting in an unplanned swap of the volume control tank charging pump suction to the reactor water storage tank and an unplanned entry into Technical Specification 3.4.12 due to the de-energization of power operated relief valve A low temperature overpressure protection relays. Operators took manual actions to restore the pump suction, and power was restored after approximately four hours. This finding has been entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Reports 35288 and 35318.
The failure to follow procedures to complete clearance orders with adequate boundaries is a performance deficiency.
The performance deficiency was more than minor because it impacted the Initiating Events Cornerstone objective of configuration control to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. The significance of the finding was determined using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Appendix G, Checklist 2, and determined to be of very low safety significance, because it did not cause the loss of mitigating capability of core heat removal, inventory control, power availability, containment control, or reactivity control. Additionally, the cause of the finding is related to the human performance crosscutting component of work control. Specifically, the licensee did not appropriately plan for the maintenance work scope by ensuring work groups and an offsite organization communicate the necessary electrical boundaries to assure plant and human performance [H.3(b)] (Section 1R20).
Inspection Report# : 2011002 (pdf)
Significance:      Mar 21, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Maintain RCS Pressure Below Relief Valve Setpoint The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Administrative
 
Procedures, for failure to follow procedural requirements to maintain reactor coolant system pressure below 350 psig. Control room operators increased charging flow at too great a rate with the reactor coolant system water-solid which caused the pressurizer power-operated relief valve to cycle three times over several minutes until adjustments to letdown could be made to reduce reactor coolant system pressure. Also, the letdown pressure controller was left in manual when automatic control would have lessened the pressure increase. Wolf Creek wrote Condition Report 35244 to Enclosure correct the deficiency by changing several procedures for water-solid plant operations.
The failure to maintain pressure below the power-operated relief valve setpoint was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it impacted the Initiating Events Cornerstone objective of configuration control to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. The significance of the finding was determined using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Appendix G, Checklist 2, and determined to be of very low safety significance (Green), because it did not cause the loss of mitigating capability of core heat removal, inventory control, power availability, containment control, or reactivity control. Additionally, the finding also did not cause any low temperature overpressure technical specifications to be exceeded. The inspectors found that the cause of the finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance. Specifically, operators had to rely on skill of the craft when procedures should have supplied more instruction for manipulating charging and letdown with a water-solid plant [H.2.c](Section 4OA3.2).
Inspection Report# : 2011003 (pdf)
Significance:        Mar 19, 2011 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: VIO Violation Failure to Correct Procedure for Opening Main Steam Isolation Valves (EA-11-149)
The inspectors identified a cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Administrative Procedures, involving Wolf Creeks failure to correct Procedure SYS AB-120 for main steam isolation valve operation. Specifically, between March 3, 2010, and March 19, 2011, Wolf Creek experienced repeat cases of safety-system actuations due to Procedure SYS AB-120 containing inadequate steps to establish conditions necessary to open a main steam isolation valve. Corrective actions were previously limited to steam header pressures below 300 psi. Wolf Creek commenced a root cause evaluation of the March 19, 2011, safety injection under Condition Report 34964. Due to Wolf Creeks failure to restore compliance from previous NCV 05000482/2010004-01 within a reasonable time after the violation was identified, this violation is being cited as a Notice of Violation consistent with the Enforcement Policy.
Failure to correct deficiencies in Procedure SYS AB-120 for steam pressures above 300 psi was a performance deficiency. The inspectors determined that this finding was more than minor because it impacted the equipment performance attribute for the Initiating Events Cornerstone, and it affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, this issue relates to the configuration control attribute for shut down equipment alignment. The inspectors evaluated the significance of this finding using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04.
Assuming worst case degradation, the finding resulted in exceeding the technical specification limit for reactor coolant system leakage due to the pressurizer power-operated relief valve cycling. Therefore, the inspectors screened the finding to a Phase 2 review by the senior reactor analyst. The senior reactor analyst used the Wolf Creek SPAR model and concluded that the incremental core damage probability was 3.7E-7 (Green). The inspectors found that the cause of the finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program. Specifically, several evaluations failed to have an adequate extent of condition review and did not find that procedures were inadequate for opening a main steam isolation valve above 300 psi [P.1(c)](Section 4OA3.1).
Inspection Report# : 2011003 (pdf)
Inspection Report# : 2011004 (pdf)
Significance:        Dec 31, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Identify Boric Acid Leak on Instrument Lines to Reactor Coolant System The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures,
 
and Drawings, involving the licensees failure to identify, document, and evaluate sources of boric acid leakage.
During a boric acid walkdown and containment closeout tour on December 7, 2010, the inspectors identified a boric acid leak in an instrument line to the reactor coolant system loop 2 flow transmitters which had not been previously identified and documented by the licensee. As such, the licensee failed to accomplish the requirements of procedure AP 16F-001, Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program, Revision 6A, step 6.1, which stated, in part, that sources of boron leakage shall be identified and documented in the applicable corrective action document. The licensee entered this finding into their corrective action system as Condition Report 31003 and replaced the leaking union.
The finding was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Initiating Events Cornerstone attribute of human performance and affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. The inspectors used Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, and determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the issue would not result in exceeding the technical specification limit for identified reactor coolant system leakage or affect other mitigating systems resulting in a total loss of their safety function. The inspectors also determined that the finding had a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program component because the licensee did not have a sufficiently low threshold in order to identify boric acid leaks during walkdowns [P.1.(a)] .
Inspection Report# : 2010005 (pdf)
Significance:      Dec 31, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Procedures for Establishing Feedwater Preheat The inspectors identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Procedures, for Wolf Creek Procedures GEN 00-003, Hot Standby to Minimum Load, and SYS AE-200, Feedwater Preheating During Plant Startup and Shutdown, being inadequate by failing to require maximum feedwater preheating. This could lead to a reactor trip caused by steam generator level oscillations attributable to low feedwater temperature. This was a contributing factor in the October 17, 2010, reactor trip. A temporary change was made to the procedures that cautioned operating crews to maintain maximum feedwater preheating. This issue was entered in the licensees corrective action program as Condition Reports 29845 and 29846.
The inadequate procedural direction to establish maximum feedwater preheating is a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency is more than minor, therefore a finding, because it is associated with the Initiating Events Cornerstone attribute of procedure quality and it affects the objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. The inspectors evaluated the significance of this finding using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance since the finding contributed to the likelihood of a reactor trip; however, it did not contribute to the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions would not be available. This finding had a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the operating experience component because Wolf Creek failed to institutionalize internal and external operating experience by changing plant procedures [P.2(b)].
Inspection Report# : 2010005 (pdf)
Significance:      Dec 31, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Procedures to Ensure Proper Main Feed Pump Speed During Startup The inspectors identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Procedures, for Wolf Creek Procedures GEN 00-003, Hot Standby to Minimum Load, and SYS AE-121, Turbine Driven Main Feedwater Pump Startup, being inadequate by failing to direct control room operators to establish a main feedwater pump speed that will allow the feed bypass regulating valves to control in the 60 to 80 percent open range, prior to raising power from 8 to 16 percent. Feed bypass regulating valve throttle characteristics are highly non-linear below this range which complicates manual and automatic control. This was a contributing factor in the October 17, 2010, reactor trip.
A temporary change was made to the procedures that cautioned operating crews to ensure earlier establishment of optimal feedwater bypass control valve position. This issue was entered in the licensees corrective action program as
 
Condition Reports 29845 and 29846.
The inadequate procedural direction to establish optimal bypass valve position at the correct time during the startup is a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency is more than minor, therefore a finding, because it is associated with the Initiating Events Cornerstone attribute of procedure quality and it affects objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. The inspectors evaluated the significance of this finding using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance since the finding contributed to the likelihood of a reactor trip; however, it did not contribute to the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions would not be available. This finding had a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the operating experience component because Wolf Creek failed to institutionalize internal operating experience by changing plant procedures [P.2(b)].
Inspection Report# : 2010005 (pdf)
Significance:      Dec 31, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: VIO Violation Failure to Correct Vessel Head Vent Path The inspectors identified a cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, due to an inadequate vent path for the reactor vessel head. The inadequate vent path resulted in the formation of voids in the reactor vessel head during Refueling Outage 17. Failure to ensure an adequate vent path in the reactor vessel head was the subject of a noncited violation in NRC Inspection Report 05000482/2008004. During and after Refueling Outage 16, Wolf Creek initiated a root cause evaluation and corrective actions to prevent occurrence. When one of the possible root causes was disproven in Refueling Outage 17, no additional action was taken to determine the cause of the vessel head vent blockage. However, the licensee could not exclude blockage in the piping. This issue was entered into the corrective action program and the licensee plans to conduct a more thorough inspection of the piping during the next refueling outage. This issue is being tracked by the licensee as Condition Report 22501.
The inspectors determined that the failure to provide adequate vessel head vent path to prevent gas accumulation in the reactor vessel during depressurized plant operations was a performance deficiency. The inspectors determined that this finding, which was associated with the Initiating Events Cornerstone, was more than minor because if left uncorrected, it would have become a more significant safety concern. Specifically, without an adequate vent path the reactor vessel does not have an effective means of relieving noncondensable gases to prevent a loss of reactor coolant system inventory. The inspectors evaluated this finding using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix G, , and determined it be of very low safety significance based upon the demonstrated availability of mitigating systems and the flooded reactor cavity inventory. The inspectors determined the cause of the finding had a problem identification and resolution aspect in the corrective action program. Specifically, Wolf Creeks corrective actions were not successful to address the vent path blockage in a timely manner [P.1(d)].
Inspection Report# : 2009005 (pdf)
Significance:      Mar 31, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: VIO Violation Failure to correct component cooling water valve closures The inspectors identified a cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, involving Wolf Creeks failure to correct the cause of the reactor coolant pump thermal barrier component cooling water heat exchanger outlet valves stroking closed on high flow. Specifically, between 2001 and 2009, Wolf Creek experienced repeated cases of the reactor coolant pump thermal barrier component cooling water heat exchanger outlet valves stroking closed during component cooling water pump swaps and during isolations of the radioactive waste evaporators. Wolf Creek reinitiated evaluation of the issue after the inspectors questions but did not review the impact on the operators ability to open the valves given the valves circuit breakers opening. Repeated throttle valve adjustments have not been successful in stopping the valve closures. This issue and the corrective actions are being tracked by the licensee in Condition Report 2007 002074 and has corrective action pending to modify valve circuitry
 
but it has not been implemented.
The failure to correct a condition adverse to quality of ensuring reactor coolant pump seal cooling as described in the Updated Safety Analysis Report is a performance deficiency. The finding is more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute for the Initiating Events Cornerstone; and, it affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the finding would not result in exceeding the Technical Specification limit for identified reactor coolant system leakage and would not have affected other mitigation systems resulting in a total loss of the seal cooling safety function. This finding is being cited because the licensee failed to establish measures to assure this condition adverse to quality was promptly identified and corrected. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the decision making component because, even though numerous instances of valve closures occurred since the first noncited violation, Wolf Creek downgraded the condition report. Using nonconservative assumptions, the licensee consistently viewed this issue as not having a risk impact because seal injection was not simultaneously lost.
[H.1.b]
Inspection Report# : 2009002 (pdf)
Inspection Report# : 2009005 (pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance:        Sep 30, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Follow ASME Code Cas OMN-1 for Butterfly Valves The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR 50.55a, Codes and Standards, when the licensee failed to correctly test a series of butterfly valves. The licensee installed seven Crane butterfly valves in the essential service water system in 2000 and 2002 but did not perform a preservice test under conditions as close as possible to the inservice test conditions or develop and perform an inservice stroke test under conditions as close to design basis conditions as required by their applicable code case. This issue is captured in the corrective action program as Condition Report 44218.
The issue is more than minor because it impacted the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective to ensure that to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding is not a design or qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in loss of operability or functionality; the finding does not represent a loss of system safety function; the finding does not represent actual loss of safety function of a single train for more than its technical specification allowed outage time; the finding does not represent an actual loss of safety function of one or more nontechnical specification trains of equipment designated as risk significant per 10 CFR 50.65 for more than 24 hours; and the finding does not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The inspectors did not assign a crosscutting aspect because the finding was not indicative of current performance (Section 1R22).
Inspection Report# : 2011004 (pdf)
Significance:        May 06, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Analyze for Vortexing in Containment Spray Additive Tank The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for the failure to translate the design basis into instructions, procedures, and drawings. The inspectors found that the licensee failed to assess whether vortexing occurred in the containment spray additive tank in the event of a design-basis accident. Wolf Creek entered this issue in the corrective action program as Condition Report 38715.
Failure to implement design control measures to analyze whether containment spray piping remained full of water was a performance deficiency. This finding was more than minor because it affected the design control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of the containment
 
spray system to respond to initiating events and prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the inspectors had reasonable doubt on the capability of the containment spray system to properly inject because of vortexing in the containment spray additive tank. The inspectors performed the significance determination using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it was a design or qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in loss of operability or functionality. Although the failure to have this calculation had existed since original construction, the inspectors determined this finding reflected current performance since the licensee was required to evaluate likelihood of tanks allowing gas intrusion into the emergency core cooling systems in response to Generic Letter 2008-01, Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling, Decay Heat Removal, and Containment Spray Systems. Consequently, this finding had problem identification and resolution cross-cutting aspects associated with the corrective action program in that the licensee did not thoroughly evaluate the potential for gas intrusion from all possible tanks [P.1(c)](Section 4OA5).
Inspection Report# : 2011003 (pdf)
Significance:        Mar 31, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Design Control of the Fuel Oil Storage Tank Fill System The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, for the failure to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis were met. Specifically, the licensee failed to ensure that the fuel oil storage tank fill system minimized turbulence, as required by the Updated Safety Analysis Report, such that the emergency diesel generators can be refueled while running uninterrupted. The licensee entered this issue in the corrective action program and will develop corrective actions as part of Condition Report 34730.
The failure to establish measures to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis are met was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it impacted the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of design control and affects the associated cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, "Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings," the inspectors determined that the finding had very low safety significance because it did not result in a loss of system safety function, an actual loss of safety function of a single train for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time, or screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the decision making component because the licensee failed to use conservative assumptions in decision making and adopt a requirement to demonstrate the proposed action is safe in order to proceed rather than a requirement to demonstrate that it is unsafe in order to disapprove the action [H.1(b)] (Section 1R04).
Inspection Report# : 2011002 (pdf)
Significance:        Mar 31, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Isolated Cooling to Inservice Safety-Related Equipment The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a involving the failure to properly implement the clearance order procedure resulting in a failure to provide adequate cooling to inservice safety-related equipment. Operators restored cooling water flow after approximately one hour. The licensee entered the finding into their corrective action program as Condition Report 33357.
The inspectors determined that the failure to ensure that plant conditions could support establishing the clearance order boundaries, which resulted in a component cooling water heatup and trip of the inservice control room air conditioner, was a performance deficiency. The inspectors determined that this finding was more than minor because it is associated with the configuration control attribute for the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and it affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the finding was determined to have very low safety significance because it was confirmed not to result in loss of operability of control room air conditioning Train B for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time and it did not result in the loss of the normal service water function for greater than 24 hours. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of
 
human performance associated with work control because the licensee failed to plan the work activity by incorporating the impact on the plant [H.3(a)] (Section 1R04).
Inspection Report# : 2011002 (pdf)
Significance:        Mar 31, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Monitor the Performance of Nonsafety Related Systems and Components Used in the Plant Emergency Operating Procedures under 10 CFR 50.65 Programs The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) with three examples involving the failure to monitor the performance of stand by nonsafety-related systems and components that exceeded performance criteria against goals. First, the inspectors identified that the licensee failed to monitor the turbine-driven main feedwater pumps against their standby restart function to fill the steam generators in emergency operating procedures. Failures of the two turbine-driven main feedwater pumps occurred which could have prevented fulfillment of this function.
Second, the inspectors identified that the licensee failed to evaluate reactor trips caused by the main feedwater system against the systems plant level monitoring criteria. Third, the inspectors identified that the licensee failed to monitor the instrument air compressor system against its emergency operating procedure function to restart and provide compressed air. Several instrument air compressor trips have occurred in the last 18 months which could have prevented fulfillment of this function. The licensee entered this issue in the corrective action program and will develop corrective actions as part of Condition Report 36600.
The failure to establish performance monitoring goals commensurate with the mitigating safety function specified in the emergency operating procedures and the plant level criteria is a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency is more than minor, and therefore a finding, because it impacts equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). Using the NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the finding screened to a Phase 2 significance determination because it involved a potential loss of safety function of the main feedwater system and failure of the instrument air system. A Region IV senior reactor analyst performed a Phase 2 significance determination and using the pre-solved worksheet from the Risk Informed Inspection Notebook for the Wolf Creek, Revision 2.01a; however, the presolved worksheet did not include the simultaneous failure of multiple components in different systems. Therefore, the senior reactor analyst performed a bounding Phase 3 significance determination using Appendix M of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process Using Qualitative Criteria, Section 4.1.2. The analyst determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green). The bounding change to the core damage frequency was approximately 8 E-7/year. The relatively low risk worth of the instrument air system at Wolf Creek helped to mitigate the significance. To evaluate the change to the large early release frequency (LERF), the analyst used Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix H, Containment Integrity Significance Determination Process. The finding screened as having very low safety significance for LERF because it did not affect the intersystem loss of coolant accident or steam generator tube rupture categories. The inspectors determined that the finding had a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution.
Specifically, when Wolf Creek evaluated exceeding the plant level monitoring criteria for reactor trips, their analysis did not identify that failures within the main feedwater system were the cause of four of the six reactor trips, and did not place the affected system function in a(1) monitoring [P.1(c)] (Section 1R12).
Inspection Report# : 2011002 (pdf)
Significance:        Mar 31, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Follow 10 CFR 50.65 a(2) for Main Control Board Annunciator Power Supply Failures The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR 50.65 a(2), involving the failure to demonstrate that the performance of main control board annunciator power supplies was effectively controlled through preventive maintenance such that the annunciators remained capable of performing their intended function. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program and will develop corrective actions as part of Condition Report 34681.
The failure to properly evaluate the failed main control board annunciator power supplies, establish performance
 
goals, and monitor their performance is considered a performance deficiency. This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of equipment performance and it adversely affects the cornerstone objective ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using the Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 Worksheets, the finding is determined to have very low safety significance since it did not result in a loss of system safety function, an actual loss of safety function of a single train for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time, or screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. This finding was determined to have a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program because the licensee failed to properly classify, prioritize, and evaluate a condition adverse to quality [P.1(c)] (Section 1R12).
Inspection Report# : 2011002 (pdf)
Significance:        Mar 31, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Calculation for Vital Switchgear Cooling The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, involving an inadequate calculation supporting vital switchgear room temperatures with only one vital switchgear cooler operable. The licensee entered this issue in the corrective action program and will develop corrective actions as part of Condition Reports 27276, 28252, and 31452.
The inspectors considered the inadequate heat loads and assumptions used in calculation GK-06-W to be a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency is more than minor, and therefore a finding, because it impacted with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and it affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the inspectors screened the finding to Green because the additional temperatures would not have caused the loss of functionality of vital switchgear or batteries, and it did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. No crosscutting aspects were identified because the supporting documentation was prepared in the late 1990s and was not representative of current licensee performance (Section 1R15).
Inspection Report# : 2011002 (pdf)
Significance:        Mar 31, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform an Operability Determination for Degradation of the Fuel Oil Storage Tank The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, involving the failure to follow plant procedures. Specifically, the licensee failed to follow procedure and perform an operability determination when a nonconforming or degraded condition was identified in the Train B emergency diesel generator fuel oil storage tank, as required by Procedure AP 26C-004, Operability Determination and Functionality Assessment, Revision 21. The licensee subsequently performed an operability determination and concluded the fuel oil storage tank was operable but degraded. The licensee entered this issue in the corrective action program as Condition Reports 33355 and 34068.
The failure to follow Procedure AP 26C-004, Operability Determination and Functionality Assessment, Revision 21, when a nonconforming or degraded condition was identified was a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency was more than minor because it could become a more significant safety concern if left uncorrected. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, "Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings," the inspectors determined that the finding had very low safety significance (Green) because it did not result in a loss of system safety function, an actual loss of safety function of a single train for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time, or screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program component because the licensee failed to thoroughly evaluate problems, including evaluatingoperability, such that the resolution addressed the cause [P.1(c)] (Section 1R15).
Inspection Report# : 2011002 (pdf)
 
Significance:        Mar 31, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Verify Ultimate Heat Sink Sedimentation Levels within Design Bases The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix B, Criterion III, involving a failure to perform periodic testing to verify that ultimate heat sink sedimentation remained within design basis limits. The licensee subsequently verified the ultimate heat sink depth remained acceptable using SONAR. The licensee entered this issue in the corrective action program as Condition Report 27144.
Wolf Creeks failure to perform periodic testing to verify that ultimate heat sink sedimentation remained within design basis limits is a performance deficiency. The issue is more than minor, and therefore a finding, because if left uncorrected the issue has the potential to become a more significant safety concern. The inspectors concluded that the issue screened to Green under the significance determination process using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1-Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, because the finding was a design deficiency that was later confirmed not to result in the loss of operability or functionality of the ultimate heat sink. The inspectors concluded that this findings cause has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the work control component because Wolf Creek did not appropriately coordinate work activities by incorporating actions to address the impact of changes to the work scope or activity on the plant and human performance. Specifically, when Wolf Creek performed and planned dredging preventive maintenance on the ultimate heat sink, they did not consider the need to confirm as-found and as-left sediment depth to verify that their design basis was met [H.3(b)]
(Section 1R19).
Inspection Report# : 2011002 (pdf)
Significance:        Mar 31, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Fill and Vent of Component Cooling Water The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Procedures, involving the failure to perform an adequate fill and vent of the component cooling water system which resulted in voiding of the system. The licensee entered the finding into their corrective action program and will develop corrective actions as part of Condition Report 33925.
The inspectors determined that the failure to perform an adequate fill and vent of component cooling water that resulted in system voiding was a performance deficiency. The inspectors determined that this finding was more than minor because it is associated with the human performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and it affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the finding was determined to have very low safety significance (Green) because it did not result in a loss of system safety function, an actual loss of safety function of a single train for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time, or screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program because the licensee failed to take appropriate corrective actions from previous voiding events [P.1(d)] (Section 1R19).
Inspection Report# : 2011002 (pdf)
Significance:        Mar 31, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Repetitive Failure to Enter Technical Specifications for Auxiliary Feedwater Suction Valve Testing The inspectors identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Procedures, involving the failure to follow Procedure AP 21-001, Conduct of Operations. Specifically, the licensee failed to enter into technical specification limiting condition of operation 3.7.5.B.1 for one auxiliary feedwater pump inoperable during performance of 92-day check valve surveillance tests. Wolf Creek took prompt corrective action to amend the procedures to include instructions for maintaining the pumps operable with manual actions. This occurred prior to the
 
next check valve test. This issue is captured in Condition Report 34469.
The failure to enter technical specification action statements in accordance with Procedure AP 21-001 was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor, and therefore a finding, because it impacted with the human performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and its objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the issue did not result in a loss of operability for a time period greater than the action statement, and did it not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The inspectors determined that the finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with decision making. Specifically, informally maintained pre-job briefing sheets were being relied upon to determine technical specification applicability instead of the licensees decision making process of operator review on a case by case basis [H.1(a)] (Section 1R22).
Inspection Report# : 2011002 (pdf)
Significance:        Mar 08, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Properly Establish Clearance Order Boundary Isolation Resulting in Loss of Component Cooling Water Inventory The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1a, Administrative Procedures, for a loss of component cooling water train B inventory caused by inadequate clearance order verification. Valve HBV110 was stuck in position and was partially open. When the clearance order was implemented, the operators concluded the valve was already closed. Subsequently, the valve created a leakage path which exceeded the surge tank makeup flow capacity and required manual isolation by the control room operators to protect safety-related components. Wolf Creek has taken corrective actions to include communication of expected as-found equipment positions in pre-job briefings and the clearance order template. This issue is captured in the corrective action program as Condition Reports 34505 and 40219.
Failure to properly establish clearance order boundary isolation was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency is more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance and human performance attributes of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and impacted the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the finding did not result in the loss of operability or functionality of the component cooling water train or screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event or screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The inspectors found that the finding had a cross-cutting aspect of work practices in the area of human performance associated with the communication of human error prevention techniques, such as holding pre-job briefings, self- and peer-checking, and proper documentation of activities [H.4(a)](Section 1R04).
Inspection Report# : 2011003 (pdf)
Significance:        Mar 08, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Inadequate Acceptance Criteria for Postmaintenance Testing of the Startup Feedwater Pump The inspectors identified a finding involving the failure to follow the requirements of Procedure AP 16E-002, Post Maintenance Testing Development, for the startup feedwater pump. On November 4-6, 2010, Wolf Creek workers disassembled the startup feedwater pump for numerous preventive and corrective activities including removing the rotating element. On November 17, 2010, Wolf Creek conducted surveillance Procedure STN AE-007, Startup Main Feedwater Pump Operational Test, following reassembly. The only acceptance criteria listed in this procedure is that the motor-driven feedwater pump starts from the control room with no local operator action. The inspectors found this contrary to Procedure AP 16E-002, which requires acceptance criteria for a pump flow capacity test, vibration, bearing and lubrication temperatures, motor current, external leakage, and lubrication level be found satisfactory. This issue is captured in the corrective action program as Condition Report 39494. Wolf Creek issued a new work package to conduct a single-point pump capacity test and complete the required postmaintenance testing. Wolf Creek found,
 
pending final review, that initial calculations show that the pump design is capable of enough flow to provide a heat sink in emergency operating procedures.
Failure to follow Procedure AP 16E-002 for developing test criteria for plant equipment after the completion of maintenance activities is a performance deficiency. The finding is more than minor because it is associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of equipment performance and it adversely affects the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, the inspectors determined that the finding had very low safety significance (Green) because it did not result in a loss of system safety function, an actual loss of safety function of a single train for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time, or screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The inspectors determined that the finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution. Specifically, Wolf Creek created a testing procedure in response to a root cause evaluation, but did not consider acceptance criteria Inspection Report# : 2011003 (pdf)
Significance:        Feb 25, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Trend Emergency Diesel Generator Chemistry Paameters Results in an Unplanned Technical Specification Entry The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," for the failure to follow Procedure AP 28A-0100, "Condition Reports," Revision 13. On February 17, 2011, the licensee received laboratory test results on the emergency diesel generator B fuel oil storage tank and determined that the cloud point parameter was out of specification at -8° Celsius. However, Procedure AP 28A-0100, step 5.13.3, required the licensee to evaluate condition report data to identify and evaluate potential trends. The emergency diesel fuel oil storage tank cloud point parameter had been trending closer to the acceptance criteria over the last several fuel oil additions. The licensee had allowed the original fuel oil vendor to continue to deliver fuel that was out of specification which resulted in a gradual trend toward the limits of the chemistry parameters. This trend was not appropriately evaluated because the licensee had not performed training to ensure that consistent and appropriate evaluations would be performed.
This finding was more than minor because it affected the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of equipment performance by impacting the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. This deficiency directly resulted in emergency diesel generator B being declared inoperable due to its fuel oil storage tank being out of specification. The inspectors performed the significance determination using NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, "Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings," because it affected the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone while the plant was at power. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it was not a design or qualification deficiency; it did not result in the loss of a system safety function; it did not represent the loss of a single train for greater than technical specification allowed time; it did not represent a loss of one or more non-technical specification risk-significant equipment for greater than 24 hours; and it did not screen as potentially risk significant due to seismic, flooding, or severe weather. In addition, this finding had a human performance crosscutting aspect associated with resources in that the licensee did not ensure that the corrective action program coordinators were effectively train Inspection Report# : 2011006 (pdf)
Significance:        Dec 31, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Account for Water Hammer Stresses in Essential Service Water System Calculations The inspector identified a Green noncited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, having very low safety significance for the licensees failure to ensure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis were correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures and instructions. Wolf Creek failed to properly account for essential service water piping membrane stress and impact loads as required by the 1974 ASME Code, Section III, paragraphs ND-3112.4 and ND-3111. Specifically, the licensees design calculations for the essential service water system did not account for the pressure fluctuations caused by a known column closure water hammer phenomena
 
which occurs during a loss of offsite power or load sequencer testing. Wolf Creek has written Condition Report 33253 and plans to address the issue.
The licensees failure to account for the pressure fluctuations caused by a known column closure water hammer phenomena in the design calculations for the essential service water system was a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency was more than minor and therefore a finding because it was associated with the human performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The inspector determined the significance of the finding using IMC 0609.04, "Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings," and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not represent an actual loss of safety function of a single train for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the human performance cross-cutting area, associated with the decision making component, because the licensee used non-conservative values without adequate engineering justification to conclude that essential service water system piping met minimum wall thickness criteria for operability [H.1(b)].
Inspection Report# : 2010005 (pdf)
Significance:        Dec 31, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Maintain Licensed Operator Examination Integrity The inspectors identified a Green noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 55.49, Integrity of Examinations and Tests, for the failure of the licensee to ensure that the integrity of the written examinations and the operating tests administered to licensed operators was maintained. Seven licensed operators received two dynamic scenarios for their operating tests that had been previously administered to other licensed operators in previous weeks for the 2009 operating tests.
Also, six licensed operators for week 4 and 12 licensed operators for week 5 received written examinations during the 2010 examinations that contained more than 50 percent repeat questions from the previous week examinations. These failures resulted in a compromise of examination integrity because they exceeded the 50 percent overlap defined by ACAD 07-01, Guidelines for the Continuing Training of Licensed Personnel, for this portion of the examination and operating tests, but did not lead to an actual effect on the equitable and consistent administration of the examination. This issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Report 28854.
The failure of the licensees training staff to maintain the integrity of examinations administered to licensed operations personnel was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency is more than minor, and therefore a finding, because it adversely impacted the human performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Additionally, if left uncorrected, the finding could have become more significant in that allowing licensed operators to return to the control room without valid demonstration of appropriate knowledge on the biennial examinations and operating tests could be a precursor to a significant event if undetected performance deficiencies develop. Using Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 worksheets, and the corresponding Appendix I, Licensed Operator Requalification Significance Determination Process, the finding was determined to have very low safety significance (Green) because the finding resulted in a compromise of the integrity of operating test dynamic scenarios and written examinations and compensatory actions were not immediately taken in 2009 (for the operating tests) and 2010 (for the written examinations) when the compromise should have been discovered. Because the equitable and consistent administration of the exam was not actually impacted by this compromise, it is being characterized as a Green noncited violation. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the resources component because the licensee did not ensure that the associated procedure used to create the examinations and operating tests was complete, accurate, and up to date to ensure that the 50 percent maximum overlap standard was not exceeded [H.2(c)].
Inspection Report# : 2010005 (pdf)
Significance:        Dec 31, 2010 Identified By: NRC
 
Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Properly Identify and Evaluate Degraded Piping in the Train A Essential Service Water System The inspector identified a Green noncited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for the licensee's failure to properly evaluate a condition adverse to quality involving train A of the essential service water system. The cause and extent of condition of the pitting corrosion of the essential service water piping was not fully addressed by the licensee due to inadequate analysis and lack of engineering justification for the assumptions used to evaluate the degradation. As a result, the licensee was unable to ensure the pitting degradation did not reduce essential service water pipe wall thickness below the minimum allowed ASME code specifications. This resulted in train A of the essential service water system being declared inoperable from 2:20 p.m. until 10:21 p.m. on December 9, 2010, while measurements of the piping wall thickness were obtained. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program as Condition Report 18785.
The failure to properly evaluate the degraded condition of the essential service water piping was a performance deficiency. The inspector determined this finding was more than minor because it was associated with the human performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone , and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to events to prevent undesirable consequences. The inspector determined the significance of the finding using IMC 0609.04, "Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings," and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not represent an actual loss of safety function of a single train for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time. This finding had a crosscutting aspect in the human performance cross-cutting area, decision making component, because the licensee did not use conservative assumptions in its decision making when they initially used non-conservative values without adequate engineering justification to conclude that the train A essential service water piping met minimum wall thickness criteria for operability [H.1(b)].
Inspection Report# : 2010005 (pdf)
Significance:        Dec 31, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Evaluate Corrosion Mechanism in Accordance with Code Case N513 On September 15, 2010, the inspectors identified a Green noncited violation of 10 CFR 50.55a(b)(5) for failing to implement the requirements of Code Case N513-2, Section 2.0(e). On June 29, 2010, Wolf Creek discovered a through-wall leak of a 30 inch essential service water pipe. The flaw was evaluated using ASME Code Case N513-2.
Code Case N513, Section 2.0(e) required the flaw be re-examined every 30 days unless a flaw growth evaluation is prepared to justify re-examination every 90 days. The evaluation is required to include corrosion rate and corrosion mechanism. The inspectors reviewed the engineering disposition for the flaw and did not find a discussion of the corrosion mechanism or a justification of the corrosion rate. The inspectors reviewed independent laboratory analyses of removed Wolf Creek piping samples that stated that microbiologically influenced corrosion was likely and that the corrosion likely progressed through-wall at a high rate. On September 30, 2010, an engineering disposition was created in response to Condition Report 28077 which included a corrosion evaluation and established a much higher corrosion rate. Key in that corrosion evaluation was the use of empirical data from testing of known flaws which showed a corrosion rate between -4 mils per year to 29 mils per year. The flaw was reexamined after 90 days and minimal growth was found.
The failure to comply with the requirements of ASME Code Case N513-2, Section 2.0(e) was considered a performance deficiency. The finding is greater than minor because the failure to perform timely and adequate evaluations of degraded, nonconforming, and unanalyzed conditions for operability, if left uncorrected, would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. The finding is associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affects the associated cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The inspectors evaluated the significance of this finding using Phase 1 of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the issue did not result in a loss of operability or functionality, and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with corrective action program component because operations and engineering personnel failed to thoroughly evaluate problems such that the resolutions addressed the cause and extent of condition [P.1(c)].
 
Inspection Report# : 2010005 (pdf)
Significance:        Dec 31, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Procedure for Steam Generator Hi-Hi Turbine Trip The inspectors identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Procedures, for Wolf Creek Procedure ALR 00-112A, Steam Generator Level Hi-Hi Turbine Trip, being inadequate when reactor power exceeds the capabilities for the auxiliary feedwater system to maintain adequate steam generator inventory after P-14 actuation. This contributed to the operators attempt to perform a controlled shutdown instead of a reactor trip, thereby causing an automatic reactor trip. The licensee incorporated guidance in their startup training to trip the reactor when inadequate feedwater flow exists after P-14 actuation. This issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report 29540.
The inadequate procedural direction after P-14 actuation is a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency is more than minor, and therefore a finding, because it is associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of human performance and it affected the objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). The inspectors evaluated the significance of this finding using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance since the finding does not represent a loss of system safety function, nor does the finding represent actual loss of safety function for single train for a greater time than permitted by technical specifications. This finding had a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the resources component because Wolf Creek failed to validate that the procedure would be successful in stabilizing the plant [H.2(c)].
Inspection Report# : 2010005 (pdf)
Significance:        Dec 31, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Simulation Facility Fidelity The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR 55.46(c)(1)(i), Simulator Fidelity, in that the licensees simulation facility did not have adequate fidelity to simulate steam generator level oscillations that occur during startup and shutdown after a loss of feedwater preheat, thereby creating the possibility for negative training.
Specifically, two constants that are used in the model for the Westinghouse 7300 steam generator level control cards were improperly programmed in the simulator. The licensee changed the constants in the simulator model and initiated actions to ensure accurate low-power steam generator oscillation modeling. This issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report 29541.
The failure to have a properly modeled simulation facility is a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency is more than minor, therefore a finding, because it is associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of human performance and it affected the objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). The inspectors evaluated the significance of this finding using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the finding neither represents a loss of system safety function, nor does it represent actual loss of safety function for single train for a greater time than permitted by technical specifications. This finding had a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the resources component because Wolf Creek did not ensure the simulation facility was accurately modeling plant behavior [H.2(d)].
Inspection Report# : 2010005 (pdf)
Significance:        Nov 24, 2010
 
Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Promptly Identify and Correct a Condition Adverse to Quality The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for the failure to promptly identify voiding conditions in the component cooling water and residual heat removal system piping. The licensee failed to promptly identify the presence of voids in both the component cooling water and residual heat removal systems despite unexpected component cooling water pump auto starts and unexpected audible water hammer and minimum flow valve (EJ FCV-610) cycling during component cooling water and residual heat removal pump surveillances.
This finding was more than minor because the failure to promptly identify conditions adverse to quality associated with the component cooling water and residual heat removal systems is associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affects the associated cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the issue screened as having very low safety significance because it was a qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in a loss of operability. The finding had a crosscutting aspect in the human performance, decision making component, because the licensee failed to use conservative assumptions during the evaluation of the pressure oscillations exhibited during the component cooling water pump starts.
Inspection Report# : 2010008 (pdf)
Significance:        Nov 24, 2010 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Procedure for Fill and Vent of the Component Cooling Water System The inspectors identified a self-revealing noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1, Procedures, for failure to maintain procedures required for filling and venting of the component cooling water system. The licensee failed to ensure that the procedures for filling and venting the component cooling water system were adequately written to prevent gas accumulation and voids to form in the system.
This finding was more than minor because the failure to maintain an adequate procedure for filling and venting the component cooling water system is associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affects the associated cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the issue screened as having very low safety significance because it was a qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in a loss of operability. No crosscutting aspect was assigned, as this condition was not reflective of current licensee performance.
Inspection Report# : 2010008 (pdf)
Significance:        Nov 24, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform an Adequate Operability Evaluation The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, regarding the failure to follow the requirements of Procedures AP 28-001, Operability Evaluations, and AP 26C-004, Technical Specification Operability, associated with deficiencies resulting from the presence of voiding in the train A residual heat removal heat exchanger. This condition resulted in the failure to adequately address the impact of the voided condition for the high head pumps and the heat removal capacity of the heat exchanger.
This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of equipment performance and adversely affects the objective to ensure equipment availability and reliability. Using Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the issue screened as very
 
low risk significant since the finding did not represent a loss of system safety function. The inspectors determined that this finding had a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program component because the licensee failed to thoroughly evaluate a similar problem such that extent of condition of the voiding was considered and the cause was resolved.
Inspection Report# : 2010008 (pdf)
Significance:        Nov 24, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Identify and Correct Inadequate RHR Fill and Vent The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action," for the failure to promptly identify and take corrective actions to address inadequacies in the residual heat removal system fill and vent procedure. The licensee failed to perform corrective actions to incorporate minimum flow rates required to sweep air out of the residual heat removal heat exchangers into the system fill and vent procedure during performance of revisions incorporating previous operating experience and corrective actions associated with NRC inspections.
This finding is more than minor because it affected the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of design control for ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of safety systems. Using Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 -
Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, this finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the voided heat exchanger was a design or qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in loss of operability. The inspectors determined that the finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action component because the licensee staff evaluation of previous Performance Improvement Request 2002-2765 was not thorough enough to result in inclusion of minimum flows necessary to sweep voids out of the residual heat removal heat exchanger.
Inspection Report# : 2010008 (pdf)
Significance:        Oct 01, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Design of Component Cooling Water Safety/Nonsafety Isolation The team identified a Green noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, which states, in part, that measures shall be established to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis are correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions. Specifically, as of October 8, 2010, the licensee failed to incorporate design seismic requirements into the design calculations and actual system operation. This finding was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Report 00028237.
The team determined that the failure to adequately analyze the isolation between the safety related and nonsafety-related portions of the component cooling water system was a performance deficiency. This finding was more than minor because it was associated with the design control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the design basis analysis did not ensure that the affected train of component cooling water would perform its required functions after the failure of nonsafety-related component cooling water piping. The inspectors evaluated the issue using Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings. This finding affected the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone because seismic protection was degraded. The inspectors determined that this finding represented the degradation of equipment and functions specifically designed to mitigate a seismic event and that during an earthquake the deficiency would degrade one train of component cooling water, a system that supports a safety system or function. Therefore, this finding was potentially risk significant to seismic initiators and a Phase 3 analysis was required. A Region IV senior reactor analyst performed the Phase 3 significance determination. The change in core damage frequency was calculated to be 7.0 x 10 8 indicating that this finding was of very low safety significance (Green). The dominant risk sequence included a seismic initiating event, loss of offsite power, loss of reactor coolant pump seal cooling, and a failure of high pressure recirculation. This finding did not have a crosscutting aspect because the most significant
 
contributor did not reflect current licensee performance.
Inspection Report# : 2010007 (pdf)
Significance:        Oct 01, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform Tornado Damper Testing The team identified a Green noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, which states, in part, that measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, and nonconformances are promptly identified and corrected. Specifically, as of October 8, 2010, the licensee failed to assure that the identified emergency diesel generator room and the service water pump room tornado damper testing deficiency was effectively corrected. This finding was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Report 00028185.
The inspectors determined that the failure to implement this corrective action was a performance deficiency. This finding was more than minor because, if left uncorrected, the performance deficiency would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, failure to implement this corrective action would have resulted in a failure to periodically test tornado dampers required to protect both the emergency diesel generator room and the essential service water pump room ventilation system. In accordance with Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, a significance determination screening was performed and determined this finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because it was not a design or qualification deficiency, did not represent a loss of system safety function, and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The team determined that there was a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance resources because the licensee failed to provide complete, accurate, and up-to-date work packages [H.2(c)].
Inspection Report# : 2010007 (pdf)
Significance:        Oct 01, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Suction Line Break Analysis and Design The team identified a Green noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, which states, in part, that measures shall be established to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis are correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions. Specifically, as of October 8, 2010, the design calculations associated with the auxiliary feedwater system line break analysis was not consistent with the actual system operation. This finding was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Report 00006250.
The team determined that the failure to adequately analyze a postulated failure of the piping from the condensate storage tank to the auxiliary feedwater pumps was a performance deficiency. This finding was more than minor because it was associated with the design control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the design basis analysis did not ensure that the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump would perform its required functions after the failure of nonsafety-related piping from the condensate storage tank. In accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, "Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings," a significance determination screening was performed and determined this finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not represent a loss of system safety function and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The licensee's operability evaluation demonstrated that the auxiliary feedwater system was operable. This finding did not have a crosscutting aspect because the most significant contributor did not reflect current licensee performance.
Inspection Report# : 2010007 (pdf)
 
Significance:        Oct 01, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Emergency Diesel Generator Specified Rating did not Address Engine Operation at Design Basis Extreme Meteorological Temperature Conditions The team identified a Green noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, which states, in part, that measures shall be established to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis are correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures and instructions. Specifically, prior to September 29, 2010, the licensee failed to ensure that the design bases inputs in the emergency diesel generator equipment specification were bounded by expected operational values. The licensee failed to evaluate the effects of the identified design basis maximum local meteorological conditions on the rating for the emergency diesel generators which could have affected the capability of safety-related equipment to respond to initiating events. This finding was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Report 00028695.
The team determined that failure to properly incorporate the licensing design basis for extreme local meteorological temperature conditions as a design input in the emergency diesel generator equipment specification was a performance deficiency. This finding was more than minor because it was associated with the design control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the design basis analysis did not ensure that the diesel generators could perform their design safety function at the maximum design temperature. In accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, "Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings," a significance determination screening was performed and determined this finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because it was a design or qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in loss of operability or functionality. This finding did not have a crosscutting aspect because the most significant contributor did not reflect current licensee performance.
Inspection Report# : 2010007 (pdf)
Significance:        Oct 01, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Translate Design Requirements to Operating Procedures for the Transfer of Residual Heat Removal and Containment Spray Suction to the Containment Recirculation Sumps The team identified a Green noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, which states in part, that measures shall be established to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design bases are correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions. Specifically, on September 22, 2010, two out of two operating crews failed to satisfy the minimum time requirement for the transfer of suction of the residual heat removal pumps and the containment spray pumps to the containment recirculation sumps following a large break loss of coolant accident with the worst single active failure as described in Table 6.3 12 of the Updated Safety Analysis Report. This finding was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Report 00028276.
The team determined that the failure to translate design requirements into operating procedures was a performance deficiency. This finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of design control and affected the associated cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the licensee failed to translate design requirements into Procedure EMG ES 12, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation. In accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, a significance determination screening was performed and determined that this finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because it was a design or qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in loss of operability or functionality. This finding had a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance resources because the operating personnel were not trained to complete the transfer to cold leg recirculation within the minimum time to ensure the equipment was available to assure nuclear safety [H.2(b)].
Inspection Report# : 2010007 (pdf)
 
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Significance:      Aug 10, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Technical Support Center External Door Propped Open without Impairment On August 10, 2011, the inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8) when the technical support center doors were propped open without a breach permit. On June 1, 2011, technical support center diesel generator had a fuel oil to coolant leak. On June 3, 2011, work order 11 341781 003 was used to install a temporary technical support center diesel generator. The door was propped open to allow temporary diesel electrical cables to tie into the permanent diesels generator output lugs. The door was tied open with rope and the entry was taped with sheet plastic to keep the interior air conditioned. On August 24, 2011, the permanent diesel was repaired and doors were shut. The inspectors found that step 6.4.2 of Procedure AP 06-002, Radiological Emergency Response Plan, states that the technical support center was rated to withstand the 100 year recurrence winds. Procedure AP 10 104 Breach Authorization, states that door Z015009 does not require a breach permit. Off Normal Procedure OFN SG-003, Natural Events, would cause operations to review breaches and shut the doors for a tornado. The inspectors did not find any other procedure that would remove the cables and shut the door due to any lesser severe weather. This issue is captured in the corrective action program as Condition Report 42495.
The failure to ensure that the technical support center met step 6.4.2 of the emergency response plan was a performance deficiency. The issue was more than minor because it impacted Emergency Preparedness Cornerstone objective to ensure that the licensee is capable of implementing adequate measures to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency. Specifically, it impacted the facilities and equipment attribute.
The inspectors used Section 4.8 of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix B, and found that the finding was Green. Specifically, changes were made to the technical support center that did not comply with the plan and did not have compensatory actions, but the facility remained functional. The inspectors found that the cause of the finding had a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance. Specifically, the breach procedure was not consistent with the design of the technical support center and resulted in missed compensatory action [H.2.c] (Section 1R05).
Inspection Report# : 2011004 (pdf)
Occupational Radiation Safety Significance:      Mar 31, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Follow Radiation Work Permit Instructions The inspectors identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a for the failure to follow procedure requirements related to adding work to existing radiation work permits. On January 4, 2011, welding was performed in a locked high radiation area on radiation work permit 110039, which did not cover that type of activity. The ALARA review associated with radiation work permit 110039 stated that this permit was not intended to be used for major contamination breaches. However, welders cut into and welded a contaminated pipe. The licensee placed the finding into the corrective action program as Condition Report 35522 and acknowledged that the radiation work permit used was inappropriate for the work completed.
The failure to follow a procedure was a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because it
 
negatively impacted the Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstones attribute of program and process, in that the inappropriate use of a radiation work permit led to workers unplanned and unintended dose. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix C, Occupational Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because: (1) it was not associated with ALARA planning or work controls, (2) there was no overexposure, (3) there was no substantial potential for an overexposure, and (4) the ability to assess dose was not compromised. This deficiency had a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance related to work controls. Specifically, there was inappropriate coordination and communication of work activities between work groups [H.3(b)].
Inspection Report# : 2011002 (pdf)
Public Radiation Safety Significance:      Dec 31, 2010 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Have Procedures to Prevent Draining Radioactive Systems into Nonradioactive Systems The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a for failure to implement written procedures to prevent draining and venting radioactive systems into nonradioactive systems and prevent unplanned releases of radioactivity into the environment. On October 21, 2009, an auxiliary building operator inadvertently connected a hose carrying radioactive water to a hose that was routed into the auxiliary building nonradioactive sump. Consequently, the operator drained an estimated 800 to 1,000 gallons of reactor coolant into the nonradioactive auxiliary building sump which transferred its radioactive contents to the turbine building sump. When the contaminated turbine building sump attempted to transfer liquid radioactive waste to the non-radioactive wastewater retention basin, radiation monitor RE95 alarmed and terminated the discharge due to the Hi-Hi radioactivity setting of 7.25E-5 uCi/ml. The licensee immediately implemented a decontamination recovery plan. This event was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Reports 20995, 20999, and 29295.
The inspectors determined that failure to have procedures to prevent draining and venting radioactive systems to nonradioactive systems was a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because it impacted the program and process attribute of the Public Radiation Safety Cornerstone, and it adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring adequate protection of public health and safety from exposure to radioactive material released into the public domain. Using the Public Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process, the inspectors determined this finding to be of very low safety significance because this was not a failure to implement the effluent program, and it had no impact on public dose. In addition, this finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of Human Performance related to the personnel work practices component. Specifically, the licensee failed to use self- and peer-checking human error prevention techniques and then proceeded in the face of uncertainty when unexpected plant conditions were known [H.4(a)].
Inspection Report# : 2010005 (pdf)
Significance:      Dec 31, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Have Adequate Procedures for Meteorological Monitoring The inspectors identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a for failure to have adequate procedures for maintaining meteorological monitoring systems functional. The inspectors determined that procedures did not exist for maintaining the functionality or to declare one or more channels of wind instrumentation out of service pursuant to Technical Requirement 3.3.12. Consequently, both channels of the 10 meter wind direction instrumentation were not functional between April and October 2009. The licensee developed additional guidance for determining functionality of the instruments and immediately required the meteorological data to be reviewed on a more frequent basis to ensure validity. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program as Condition Report 29337.
 
The failure to have procedures to maintain meteorological monitoring functional is a performance deficiency. This finding is more than minor because it was associated with the Public Radiation Safety Cornerstone attribute of program and process and affected the cornerstone objective, in that, the failure to have adequate procedures to maintain meteorological monitoring instrumentation functional has the potential to impair public dose assessments of routine and accidental radioactive effluent releases. Using the Public Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process, the inspectors determined this finding to be of very low safety significance because this was not a failure to implement the effluent program, and it had no impact on public dose. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in problem identification and resolution area associated with the corrective action component because the licensee failed to implement a low threshold for completely and accurately identifying issues with the meteorological monitoring instrumentation in a timely manner [P.1(a)].
Inspection Report# : 2010005 (pdf)
Physical Protection Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Significance: N/A Mar 31, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding 95002 Inspection Inspection Report# : 2011006 (pdf)
Significance: N/A Nov 24, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Evaluations and Operability Assessments The inspectors reviewed the licensee evaluations associated with the component cooling water and residual heat removal systems following the identification of the voiding condition. During the review of the licensee evaluations, the inspectors identified inadequate assumptions within the calculations and operability determinations. The assumptions included; the failure to include the effects of the voided condition in the residual heat removal system on the high head safety pumps; the use of nonconservative assumptions during the determination of the size of the initial void contained in the residual heat removal heat exchanger; and the initial troubleshooting following the start of the standby component cooling water pump during a low discharge pressure condition focused on the potential failure of the pressure switch, when the licensee had sufficient information that the pressure switch operated as expected.
In addition, during the inspection the inspectors observed challenges in the licensees ability to understand abnormal operating conditions, in that, the licensee had multiple opportunities to identify the presence of voids in the residual heat removal and component cooling water systems prior to the actual discovery of the adverse conditions. These included missed opportunities during review of licensee and industry operating experience, indications of flow oscillations during start of system components, and abnormal cycling of flow control valves.
Inspection Report# : 2010008 (pdf)
Last modified : January 04, 2012
 
Wolf Creek 1 4Q/2011 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance:      Sep 30, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Maintain Steam Generator Level Above Lo Lo Level Setpoint The inspectors reviewed a noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Procedures, for failure of operators to follow procedure to maintain steam generator water level. This failure resulted in level in steam generator B level lowering such that a Lo Lo level actuation was initiated, which isolated normal feedwater and initiated auxiliary feedwater. A reactor trip signal was also Enclosure received, but the control rods were already tripped. The licensee captured this issue in their corrective action program as Condition Report 39732 and subsequently changed its operating procedures and conducted remediation training of licensed operators.
The issue was considered more than minor because it impacted the human performance attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone and its objective to limit the events that upset plant stability and challenge safety systems during power and shutdown operations. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, the inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the loss of mitigation equipment. The inspectors determined that the finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the decision making component because the decision by the crew to maintain steam generator level in a difficult to maintain band proved to have unintended consequences Inspection Report# : 2011004 (pdf)
Significance:      Jul 21, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Switchyard component Failures Cause Loss of Ring Bus and Loss of Offsite Power On July 21, 2011, the inspectors identified a finding for degraded switchyard equipment that caused a loss of offsite power. Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR), Section 8.2.1.3.g.1, states that: Any transmission line can be cleared under normal or fault conditions without affecting any other transmission line. On August 19, 2009, the damaged carrier system signal failures that allowed a lightning strike to cause a loss of all three 345 kV lines was inconsistent with the Updated Safety Analysis Report. Wolf Creeks root cause and hardware failure analysis of the capacitive coupled voltage transformer found that it was degraded for a significant period of time. There was no causal analysis of the out of tune wave trap that contributed to the event. The inspectors concluded that the deficiency could have been prevented if Wolf Creek adopted significant external operating experience from 2004. This included inspection and/or replacement of aging capacitive coupled voltage transformers. Corrective actions from the 2004 operating experience were not implemented in a 2007 self assessment and were finally implemented in December 2009. This issue is captured in the corrective action program as Condition Report 19245. Wolf Creek and its owner companies have since upgraded all capacitive coupled voltage transformers (finishing in spring 2011), added fault data recorders, added enhanced line checking procedures with the grid operator, regrounded all three 345 kV lines, and plans to add an offsite power technical requirements manual limiting condition of operation per Condition Report 43244.
The failure to maintain 345 kV equipment such that a single line fault could be cleared without affecting the other lines, as described in the Updated Safety Analysis Report, is a performance deficiency. The issue is more than minor because it impacted the protection against external factors attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, inspectors screened the finding to Phase 3 because it caused both a reactor trip and loss of mitigation equipment or functions to
 
not be available. The Senior Reactor Analyst calculated that the increase in core damage frequency was 2.6 x 10-7 or green. The inspectors determined that no crosscutting aspects applied because this finding is not indicative of current licensee performance.
Inspection Report# : 2011004 (pdf)
Significance:        Jun 16, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation No Procedure for Debris in Transformer an Tank Yards Propr to Severe Weather The inspectors identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Administrative Procedures, for having no procedure to address onsite debris impacting plant equipment during severe weather. The inspectors walked down external areas of the plant on June 1 and June 9, 2011, prior to the onset of predicted severe thunderstorms and tornadoes. The inspectors found loose debris each time and brought it to the attention of the licensee who secured the materials. The inspectors walked down the transformer yard and tank yard during a thunderstorm on June 16 and found loose debris such as plywood, trash, wood planks, and fiberglass planks. The inspectors brought this to the attention of Wolf Creek and the materials were removed or secured. Wolf Creek initiated several condition reports but they only addressed immediate cleanup. Wolf Creek procedures had no steps for securing potential wind-driven projectiles prior to severe weather. After June 16, Wolf Creek wrote Condition Report 40573 which started a weekly maintenance activity to remove loose materials and added procedure steps to have operations walk down external areas prior to severe weather.
This finding was more than minor because it impacted the protection against external factors attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone, and it affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. The inspectors evaluated this finding using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, and determined that it was of very low safety significance (Green) for June 16, 2011, because it did not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigation equipment would be unavailable since the reactor was shutdown. Inspectors used Manual Chapter 0609 Appendix G, Checklist 4 for the other occurrences because Wolf Creek was in Modes 4 or 5. The finding again screened to Green because it did not increase the likelihood of a loss of inventory, did not cause the loss of reactor coolant system instrumentation, did not degrade the ability of the licensee to terminate a leak path or add inventory when needed, or degrade the ability to recover residual heat removal if it was lost. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution, specifically the corrective action program attribute because licensees short-term corrective actions failed to ensure debris was secured or removed prior to severe weather [P.1 (d)](Section 1R01).
Inspection Report# : 2011003 (pdf)
Significance:        Jun 16, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Undersized Weld Failure on Charging Header The inspectors documented a self-revealing noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion IX, Control of Special Processes. Specifically, in October 2009, welders failed to ensure the fillet weld between the train B charging header and the half coupling used to attach two vent valves met the specified weld requirements. This weld failed in January 2011, rendering the train B charging system inoperable. The licensees extent of condition review identified 12 vent line welds which did not meet ASME code weld size requirements and/or procedural requirements for 2:1 weld taper configuration. Additionally, quality assurance inspectors failed to identify that the 2:1 taper weld requirements specified by procedure, and ASME minimum weld size requirements, were not met in multiple vent line welds. The weld was repaired and built up to the correct 2:1 aspect ratio. This issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Reports 32648, 33686, 33689, and 36438.
The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during power operations. The inspectors performed a Phase 1 screening in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the issue did not result in exceeding the technical specification limit for identified reactor coolant system leakage or affect other mitigating
 
systems resulting in a total loss of their safety function. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, resources, because the licensee failed to ensure that personnel, specifically welders and quality assurance inspectors, were adequately trained in the procedural requirements and methods for measuring weld dimensions to assure nuclear safety [H.2(b)](Section 1R08).
Inspection Report# : 2011003 (pdf)
Significance:        Jun 16, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Ensure Separation of Stainless Steel and Carbon Steel Grinding and Cutting Tools The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50 involving the failure of the licensee to ensure that weld preparation was protected from deleterious contamination in that drawers (located in the hot tool room) containing files, grinding wheels, flapper wheels, and cutting wheels, used for the purpose of weld preparation, contained a mixture of both stainless steel tools and carbon steel tools. The failure to separate tools used for stainless steel weld preparation from tools used for carbon steel preparation could result in the contamination of stainless steel welds by carbon steel and affect the material integrity and corrosion resistance. The licensee immediately removed the tools and replaced them with new tools stored separately for use on specific types of metal. This issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Report 36444.
The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during power operations, and if left uncorrected the finding would become a more significant safety concern. The inspectors performed a Phase 1 screening in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the issue did not result in exceeding the technical specification limit for identified reactor coolant system leakage or affect other mitigating systems resulting in a total loss of their safety function. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, resources, because the licensee did not provide complete, accurate, and up-to-date procedures for the preparation of stainless steel and carbon steel welds [H.2(c)](Section 1R08).
Inspection Report# : 2011003 (pdf)
Significance:        Jun 16, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Ensure Configuration Control of Safety-Related Systems The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, involving the failure of the licensee to review the suitability of installing brass fittings and leaving test fittings on pressure, differential pressure, and flow transmitter equalizing block valve drain ports instead of the design specified stainless steel manifold plugs. During a boric acid walkdown, the inspectors identified that drain ports on the equalizing block of two separate reactor coolant system flow transmitters had brass fittings installed instead of the design specified stainless steel fittings. In response to inspector concerns about the brass fittings, the licensee subsequently discovered that a design configuration nonconformance existed by leaving the test fittings on the drain port during plant operation. Licensee Drawing J-17D22 specifies that manifold plugs be installed in the drain ports during plant operation. The licensee immediately replaced the brass caps with stainless steel fittings. This issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Report 36439.
The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the design control attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during power operations. The inspectors performed a Phase 1 screening in accordance with Inspection Manual 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the issue would not result in exceeding the technical specification limit for identified reactor coolant system leakage or affect other mitigating systems resulting in a total loss of their safety function. The inspectors also determined that the finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, resources, because the licensee did not provide adequate training of personnel so that the inappropriately installed fittings could be identified during system walkdowns.
Inspection Report# : 2011003 (pdf)
 
Significance:      Apr 05, 2011 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Fire Watch Defeats Halon Fire Suppression in Vital Switchgear Rooms During Fire The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing noncited violation of License Condition 2.C.5 for failure to implement adequate fire watches which affected both trains of vital ac and dc switchgear. The inadequate fire watches occurred during an actual fire which negated the Halon system discharge because internal fire doors were not shut, as required, by the fire watch. The inspectors found problems with fire impairments and watches from 2008 that had not been corrected. Subsequent to the fire, Wolf Creek again briefed and trained its personnel on the requirements for fire watches. This issue is captured in the corrective action program as Condition Report 36719.
Failure to implement adequate fire impairments such that the fire watches ensured the success of the Halon system was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it impacted the Initiating Events Cornerstone and its objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, the protection against external factors attribute was impacted by the fire impairment. To determine significance, the inspectors used Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04 to screen the finding to Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, because the fire protection defense-in-depth strategies involving automatic suppression, fire barriers, and administrative controls were degraded. The senior reactor analyst conducted a Phase 3 review of this finding and concluded that the incremental core damage frequency was 1.6E-8 per year, or very low safety significance (Green). The inspectors found that the cause of the finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution. Specifically, corrective actions from ineffective fire watches in 2008 did not prevent recurrence of the inadequate fire watch on April 5, 2011 [P.1.d](Section 4OA3.3).
Inspection Report# : 2011003 (pdf)
Significance:      Mar 31, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Clearance Order Disables Power Operated Relief Valve Low Temperature Overpressure Function The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Procedures, involving the failure to follow the requirements of Procedure AP 21E-001, Clearance Orders. This procedure violation resulted in an inadequate tagout for the Train A solid state protection system resulting in an unplanned swap of the volume control tank charging pump suction to the reactor water storage tank and an unplanned entry into Technical Specification 3.4.12 due to the de-energization of power operated relief valve A low temperature overpressure protection relays. Operators took manual actions to restore the pump suction, and power was restored after approximately four hours. This finding has been entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Reports 35288 and 35318.
The failure to follow procedures to complete clearance orders with adequate boundaries is a performance deficiency.
The performance deficiency was more than minor because it impacted the Initiating Events Cornerstone objective of configuration control to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. The significance of the finding was determined using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Appendix G, Checklist 2, and determined to be of very low safety significance, because it did not cause the loss of mitigating capability of core heat removal, inventory control, power availability, containment control, or reactivity control. Additionally, the cause of the finding is related to the human performance crosscutting component of work control. Specifically, the licensee did not appropriately plan for the maintenance work scope by ensuring work groups and an offsite organization communicate the necessary electrical boundaries to assure plant and human performance [H.3(b)] (Section 1R20).
Inspection Report# : 2011002 (pdf)
Significance:      Mar 21, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Maintain RCS Pressure Below Relief Valve Setpoint The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Administrative
 
Procedures, for failure to follow procedural requirements to maintain reactor coolant system pressure below 350 psig. Control room operators increased charging flow at too great a rate with the reactor coolant system water-solid which caused the pressurizer power-operated relief valve to cycle three times over several minutes until adjustments to letdown could be made to reduce reactor coolant system pressure. Also, the letdown pressure controller was left in manual when automatic control would have lessened the pressure increase. Wolf Creek wrote Condition Report 35244 to Enclosure correct the deficiency by changing several procedures for water-solid plant operations.
The failure to maintain pressure below the power-operated relief valve setpoint was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it impacted the Initiating Events Cornerstone objective of configuration control to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. The significance of the finding was determined using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Appendix G, Checklist 2, and determined to be of very low safety significance (Green), because it did not cause the loss of mitigating capability of core heat removal, inventory control, power availability, containment control, or reactivity control. Additionally, the finding also did not cause any low temperature overpressure technical specifications to be exceeded. The inspectors found that the cause of the finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance. Specifically, operators had to rely on skill of the craft when procedures should have supplied more instruction for manipulating charging and letdown with a water-solid plant [H.2.c](Section 4OA3.2).
Inspection Report# : 2011003 (pdf)
Significance:        Mar 19, 2011 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: VIO Violation Failure to Correct Procedure for Opening Main Steam Isolation Valves (EA-11-149)
The inspectors identified a cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Administrative Procedures, involving Wolf Creeks failure to correct Procedure SYS AB-120 for main steam isolation valve operation. Specifically, between March 3, 2010, and March 19, 2011, Wolf Creek experienced repeat cases of safety-system actuations due to Procedure SYS AB-120 containing inadequate steps to establish conditions necessary to open a main steam isolation valve. Corrective actions were previously limited to steam header pressures below 300 psi. Wolf Creek commenced a root cause evaluation of the March 19, 2011, safety injection under Condition Report 34964. Due to Wolf Creeks failure to restore compliance from previous NCV 05000482/2010004-01 within a reasonable time after the violation was identified, this violation is being cited as a Notice of Violation consistent with the Enforcement Policy.
Failure to correct deficiencies in Procedure SYS AB-120 for steam pressures above 300 psi was a performance deficiency. The inspectors determined that this finding was more than minor because it impacted the equipment performance attribute for the Initiating Events Cornerstone, and it affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, this issue relates to the configuration control attribute for shut down equipment alignment. The inspectors evaluated the significance of this finding using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04.
Assuming worst case degradation, the finding resulted in exceeding the technical specification limit for reactor coolant system leakage due to the pressurizer power-operated relief valve cycling. Therefore, the inspectors screened the finding to a Phase 2 review by the senior reactor analyst. The senior reactor analyst used the Wolf Creek SPAR model and concluded that the incremental core damage probability was 3.7E-7 (Green). The inspectors found that the cause of the finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program. Specifically, several evaluations failed to have an adequate extent of condition review and did not find that procedures were inadequate for opening a main steam isolation valve above 300 psi [P.1(c)](Section 4OA3.1).
Inspection Report# : 2011003 (pdf)
Inspection Report# : 2011004 (pdf)
Significance:        Dec 31, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: VIO Violation Failure to Correct Vessel Head Vent Path The inspectors identified a cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, due to an
 
inadequate vent path for the reactor vessel head. The inadequate vent path resulted in the formation of voids in the reactor vessel head during Refueling Outage 17. Failure to ensure an adequate vent path in the reactor vessel head was the subject of a noncited violation in NRC Inspection Report 05000482/2008004. During and after Refueling Outage 16, Wolf Creek initiated a root cause evaluation and corrective actions to prevent occurrence. When one of the possible root causes was disproven in Refueling Outage 17, no additional action was taken to determine the cause of the vessel head vent blockage. However, the licensee could not exclude blockage in the piping. This issue was entered into the corrective action program and the licensee plans to conduct a more thorough inspection of the piping during the next refueling outage. This issue is being tracked by the licensee as Condition Report 22501.
The inspectors determined that the failure to provide adequate vessel head vent path to prevent gas accumulation in the reactor vessel during depressurized plant operations was a performance deficiency. The inspectors determined that this finding, which was associated with the Initiating Events Cornerstone, was more than minor because if left uncorrected, it would have become a more significant safety concern. Specifically, without an adequate vent path the reactor vessel does not have an effective means of relieving noncondensable gases to prevent a loss of reactor coolant system inventory. The inspectors evaluated this finding using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix G, , and determined it be of very low safety significance based upon the demonstrated availability of mitigating systems and the flooded reactor cavity inventory. The inspectors determined the cause of the finding had a problem identification and resolution aspect in the corrective action program. Specifically, Wolf Creeks corrective actions were not successful to address the vent path blockage in a timely manner [P.1(d)].
Inspection Report# : 2009005 (pdf)
Significance:      Mar 31, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: VIO Violation Failure to correct component cooling water valve closures The inspectors identified a cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, involving Wolf Creeks failure to correct the cause of the reactor coolant pump thermal barrier component cooling water heat exchanger outlet valves stroking closed on high flow. Specifically, between 2001 and 2009, Wolf Creek experienced repeated cases of the reactor coolant pump thermal barrier component cooling water heat exchanger outlet valves stroking closed during component cooling water pump swaps and during isolations of the radioactive waste evaporators. Wolf Creek reinitiated evaluation of the issue after the inspectors questions but did not review the impact on the operators ability to open the valves given the valves circuit breakers opening. Repeated throttle valve adjustments have not been successful in stopping the valve closures. This issue and the corrective actions are being tracked by the licensee in Condition Report 2007 002074 and has corrective action pending to modify valve circuitry but it has not been implemented.
The failure to correct a condition adverse to quality of ensuring reactor coolant pump seal cooling as described in the Updated Safety Analysis Report is a performance deficiency. The finding is more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute for the Initiating Events Cornerstone; and, it affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the finding would not result in exceeding the Technical Specification limit for identified reactor coolant system leakage and would not have affected other mitigation systems resulting in a total loss of the seal cooling safety function. This finding is being cited because the licensee failed to establish measures to assure this condition adverse to quality was promptly identified and corrected. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the decision making component because, even though numerous instances of valve closures occurred since the first noncited violation, Wolf Creek downgraded the condition report. Using nonconservative assumptions, the licensee consistently viewed this issue as not having a risk impact because seal injection was not simultaneously lost.
[H.1.b]
Inspection Report# : 2009002 (pdf)
Inspection Report# : 2009005 (pdf)
Mitigating Systems
 
Significance:      Dec 12, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Alternative Shutdown Procedure The team identified a Green non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.d for the failure to implement and maintain adequate written procedures covering fire protection program implementation. Specifically, the team identified two examples where the licensee failed to maintain an alternative shutdown procedure that ensured operators would prevent overfilling the pressurizer and steam generators, respectively. The licensee documented this deficiency in Condition Report 045442.
The failure to maintain adequate written procedures covering fire protection program implementation was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the protection against external events (fire) attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and it adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The team evaluated the significance of this finding using Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process, because the performance deficiency affected fire protection defense-in-depth strategies involving post-fire safe shutdown systems. A senior reactor analyst performed a Phase 3 evaluation and determined this finding had very low risk significance based upon a bounding analysis (Green). This finding did not reflect current licensee performance (Section 1R05.05.2).
Inspection Report# : 2011007 (pdf)
Significance:      Dec 12, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Ensure Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Components Remain Free of Fire Damage The team identified a Green non-cited violation of License Condition 2.C(5) because the licensee failed to implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program. Specifically, the licensee failed to properly analyze for fire damage in the form of shorts-to-ground related to the residual heat removal Train B refueling water storage tank suction valve and the pressurizer power-operated relief valves. Certain postulated shorts-to-ground could spuriously actuate these valves such that safe shutdown would be impacted. The licensee documented these deficiencies in Condition Reports 044912 and 045452, respectively.
The failure to protect the residual heat removal Train B suction cables and the pressurizer power operated relief valve cables against all modes of cable failure during post-fire safe shutdown circuit analysis was a performance deficiency.
The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the design control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences.
The team used Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process, because the performance deficiency affected fire protection defense-in-depth strategies involving post-fire safe shutdown. The team categorized the finding as having a high degradation rating because the post fire safe shutdown analysis was not complete. Because the Phase 1 screening criteria were not met, the team performed a Phase 2 analysis. The team walked down the affected fire area for each example as part of the Phase 2 quantitative screening. The team identified fire ignition sources and targets, and specific fire growth and damage scenario combinations for each example. The sum of the conditional core damage frequencies for the fire scenarios was 5.15E 7/year, which bounded the total change in core damage frequency associated with this performance deficiency.
This performance deficiency had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with decision making because the licensee did not use conservative assumptions during their design review process. Specifically, the licensee did not follow industry guidance related to performing a circuit analysis [H.1(b)] (Section 1R05.06).
Inspection Report# : 2011007 (pdf)
 
Significance:      Nov 04, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to Verify Isolation of Associated Circuits on Isolation Switches The team identified a finding because the licensee was not fully testing the isolation function of local transfer switches located at motor control center breakers for individual components. As a result, the licensee was not performing periodic verifications to confirm that local control circuits would be isolated from the effects of fire damage caused by a control room fire. The licensee documented this deficiency in Condition Report 045434.
The failure to maintain adequate written procedures covering fire protection program implementation was a performance deficiency. Specifically, the licensee failed to ensure that component specific transfer switch testing procedures verified proper circuit isolation from the control room in the event of a control room fire. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the procedure quality attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The team evaluated the finding using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process, because it affected fire protection defense-in-depth strategies involving post fire safe shutdown. Using Appendix F, , Degradation Rating Guidance Specific to Various Fire Protection Program Elements, the team determined that the finding constituted a low degradation of the safe shutdown area since the control room isolation feature is expected to display nearly the same level of effectiveness and reliability as it would had the degradation not been present. This finding screened as having very low safety significance (Green). Since the failure to test the isolation function had not been verified since initial installation, the team determined that this failure did not reflect current performance (Section 1R05.05.1).
Inspection Report# : 2011007 (pdf)
Significance:      Nov 04, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Procedure Inadequacies Related to Cold Shutdown Repairs The team identified a Green non-cited violation of License Condition 2.C(5) because the licensee failed to implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program. Specifically, the licensee failed to provide an adequate procedure for performing cold shutdown repairs required for post-fire safe shutdown. The licensee documented the deficiencies in Condition Reports 045397 and 045417.
The failure to ensure that Procedure OFN RP-017A, Hot Standby to Cold Shutdown from Outside the Control Room Due To Fire, Revision 0, could be implemented as written was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the procedure quality attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and it adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events (fire) to prevent undesirable consequences. The finding was evaluated for safety significance using NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process. Since the finding was related to the ability to achieve and maintain cold shutdown, the finding screened to Green in Phase 1.
This performance deficiency had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with resources because the licensee did not prepare an accurate and up-to-date procedure that assured nuclear safety. Specifically, personnel did not verify that the steps in the revised procedure could be performed as written and that the components had proper labeling [H.2(c)] (Section 1R05.10).
Inspection Report# : 2011007 (pdf)
Significance:      Sep 30, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation
 
Failure to Follow ASME Code Cas OMN-1 for Butterfly Valves The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR 50.55a, Codes and Standards, when the licensee failed to correctly test a series of butterfly valves. The licensee installed seven Crane butterfly valves in the essential service water system in 2000 and 2002 but did not perform a preservice test under conditions as close as possible to the inservice test conditions or develop and perform an inservice stroke test under conditions as close to design basis conditions as required by their applicable code case. This issue is captured in the corrective action program as Condition Report 44218.
The issue is more than minor because it impacted the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective to ensure that to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding is not a design or qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in loss of operability or functionality; the finding does not represent a loss of system safety function; the finding does not represent actual loss of safety function of a single train for more than its technical specification allowed outage time; the finding does not represent an actual loss of safety function of one or more nontechnical specification trains of equipment designated as risk significant per 10 CFR 50.65 for more than 24 hours; and the finding does not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The inspectors did not assign a crosscutting aspect because the finding was not indicative of current performance (Section 1R22).
Inspection Report# : 2011004 (pdf)
Significance:        Sep 22, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Emergency Operating Procedure for Steam Generator Tube Rupture The inspectors identified a Green noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Procedures, due to insufficient procedural direction to operations personnel to perform a subcooled recovery of a steam generator tube rupture if the ruptured steam generator cannot be isolated from any of the intact steam generators. On August 2, 2011, inspectors identified during simulator scenario validation that step 9 of Emergency Mitigation Guideline 3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, did not give adequate direction to operations personnel to mitigate a steam generator tube rupture event that required a subcooled recovery. The licensee entered the issue into their corrective action program as condition report 43515.
The finding is more than minor because the performance deficiency is associated with the procedure quality attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone, and adversely affected the cornerstones attribute to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using the Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 Worksheets, the finding was determined to have very low safety significance because the finding is a deficiency confirmed not to result in a loss of operability or functionality of the overall ability to mitigate an unisolable steam generator tube rupture, if Emergency Mitigation Guideline 3 is used correctly as written. The finding does not have a crosscutting aspect because the deficiency was incorporated into the procedure in May 2000 and was not considered indicative of current licensee performance (Section 4OA5.2).
Inspection Report# : 2011301 (pdf)
Significance:        May 06, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Analyze for Vortexing in Containment Spray Additive Tank The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for the failure to translate the design basis into instructions, procedures, and drawings. The inspectors found that the licensee failed to assess whether vortexing occurred in the containment spray additive tank in the event of a design-basis accident. Wolf Creek entered this issue in the corrective action program as Condition Report 38715.
Failure to implement design control measures to analyze whether containment spray piping remained full of water was a performance deficiency. This finding was more than minor because it affected the design control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of the containment spray system to respond to initiating events and prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the inspectors had
 
reasonable doubt on the capability of the containment spray system to properly inject because of vortexing in the containment spray additive tank. The inspectors performed the significance determination using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it was a design or qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in loss of operability or functionality. Although the failure to have this calculation had existed since original construction, the inspectors determined this finding reflected current performance since the licensee was required to evaluate likelihood of tanks allowing gas intrusion into the emergency core cooling systems in response to Generic Letter 2008-01, Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling, Decay Heat Removal, and Containment Spray Systems. Consequently, this finding had problem identification and resolution cross-cutting aspects associated with the corrective action program in that the licensee did not thoroughly evaluate the potential for gas intrusion from all possible tanks [P.1(c)](Section 4OA5).
Inspection Report# : 2011003 (pdf)
Significance:        Mar 31, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Design Control of the Fuel Oil Storage Tank Fill System The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, for the failure to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis were met. Specifically, the licensee failed to ensure that the fuel oil storage tank fill system minimized turbulence, as required by the Updated Safety Analysis Report, such that the emergency diesel generators can be refueled while running uninterrupted. The licensee entered this issue in the corrective action program and will develop corrective actions as part of Condition Report 34730.
The failure to establish measures to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis are met was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it impacted the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of design control and affects the associated cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, "Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings," the inspectors determined that the finding had very low safety significance because it did not result in a loss of system safety function, an actual loss of safety function of a single train for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time, or screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the decision making component because the licensee failed to use conservative assumptions in decision making and adopt a requirement to demonstrate the proposed action is safe in order to proceed rather than a requirement to demonstrate that it is unsafe in order to disapprove the action [H.1(b)] (Section 1R04).
Inspection Report# : 2011002 (pdf)
Significance:        Mar 31, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Isolated Cooling to Inservice Safety-Related Equipment The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a involving the failure to properly implement the clearance order procedure resulting in a failure to provide adequate cooling to inservice safety-related equipment. Operators restored cooling water flow after approximately one hour. The licensee entered the finding into their corrective action program as Condition Report 33357.
The inspectors determined that the failure to ensure that plant conditions could support establishing the clearance order boundaries, which resulted in a component cooling water heatup and trip of the inservice control room air conditioner, was a performance deficiency. The inspectors determined that this finding was more than minor because it is associated with the configuration control attribute for the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and it affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the finding was determined to have very low safety significance because it was confirmed not to result in loss of operability of control room air conditioning Train B for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time and it did not result in the loss of the normal service water function for greater than 24 hours. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with work control because the licensee failed to plan the work activity by
 
incorporating the impact on the plant [H.3(a)] (Section 1R04).
Inspection Report# : 2011002 (pdf)
Significance:        Mar 31, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Monitor the Performance of Nonsafety Related Systems and Components Used in the Plant Emergency Operating Procedures under 10 CFR 50.65 Programs The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) with three examples involving the failure to monitor the performance of stand by nonsafety-related systems and components that exceeded performance criteria against goals. First, the inspectors identified that the licensee failed to monitor the turbine-driven main feedwater pumps against their standby restart function to fill the steam generators in emergency operating procedures. Failures of the two turbine-driven main feedwater pumps occurred which could have prevented fulfillment of this function.
Second, the inspectors identified that the licensee failed to evaluate reactor trips caused by the main feedwater system against the systems plant level monitoring criteria. Third, the inspectors identified that the licensee failed to monitor the instrument air compressor system against its emergency operating procedure function to restart and provide compressed air. Several instrument air compressor trips have occurred in the last 18 months which could have prevented fulfillment of this function. The licensee entered this issue in the corrective action program and will develop corrective actions as part of Condition Report 36600.
The failure to establish performance monitoring goals commensurate with the mitigating safety function specified in the emergency operating procedures and the plant level criteria is a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency is more than minor, and therefore a finding, because it impacts equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). Using the NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the finding screened to a Phase 2 significance determination because it involved a potential loss of safety function of the main feedwater system and failure of the instrument air system. A Region IV senior reactor analyst performed a Phase 2 significance determination and using the pre-solved worksheet from the Risk Informed Inspection Notebook for the Wolf Creek, Revision 2.01a; however, the presolved worksheet did not include the simultaneous failure of multiple components in different systems. Therefore, the senior reactor analyst performed a bounding Phase 3 significance determination using Appendix M of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process Using Qualitative Criteria, Section 4.1.2. The analyst determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green). The bounding change to the core damage frequency was approximately 8 E-7/year. The relatively low risk worth of the instrument air system at Wolf Creek helped to mitigate the significance. To evaluate the change to the large early release frequency (LERF), the analyst used Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix H, Containment Integrity Significance Determination Process. The finding screened as having very low safety significance for LERF because it did not affect the intersystem loss of coolant accident or steam generator tube rupture categories. The inspectors determined that the finding had a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution.
Specifically, when Wolf Creek evaluated exceeding the plant level monitoring criteria for reactor trips, their analysis did not identify that failures within the main feedwater system were the cause of four of the six reactor trips, and did not place the affected system function in a(1) monitoring [P.1(c)] (Section 1R12).
Inspection Report# : 2011002 (pdf)
Significance:        Mar 31, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Follow 10 CFR 50.65 a(2) for Main Control Board Annunciator Power Supply Failures The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR 50.65 a(2), involving the failure to demonstrate that the performance of main control board annunciator power supplies was effectively controlled through preventive maintenance such that the annunciators remained capable of performing their intended function. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program and will develop corrective actions as part of Condition Report 34681.
The failure to properly evaluate the failed main control board annunciator power supplies, establish performance goals, and monitor their performance is considered a performance deficiency. This finding is more than minor because
 
it is associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of equipment performance and it adversely affects the cornerstone objective ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using the Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 Worksheets, the finding is determined to have very low safety significance since it did not result in a loss of system safety function, an actual loss of safety function of a single train for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time, or screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. This finding was determined to have a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program because the licensee failed to properly classify, prioritize, and evaluate a condition adverse to quality [P.1(c)] (Section 1R12).
Inspection Report# : 2011002 (pdf)
Significance:        Mar 31, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Calculation for Vital Switchgear Cooling The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, involving an inadequate calculation supporting vital switchgear room temperatures with only one vital switchgear cooler operable. The licensee entered this issue in the corrective action program and will develop corrective actions as part of Condition Reports 27276, 28252, and 31452.
The inspectors considered the inadequate heat loads and assumptions used in calculation GK-06-W to be a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency is more than minor, and therefore a finding, because it impacted with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and it affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the inspectors screened the finding to Green because the additional temperatures would not have caused the loss of functionality of vital switchgear or batteries, and it did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. No crosscutting aspects were identified because the supporting documentation was prepared in the late 1990s and was not representative of current licensee performance (Section 1R15).
Inspection Report# : 2011002 (pdf)
Significance:        Mar 31, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform an Operability Determination for Degradation of the Fuel Oil Storage Tank The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, involving the failure to follow plant procedures. Specifically, the licensee failed to follow procedure and perform an operability determination when a nonconforming or degraded condition was identified in the Train B emergency diesel generator fuel oil storage tank, as required by Procedure AP 26C-004, Operability Determination and Functionality Assessment, Revision 21. The licensee subsequently performed an operability determination and concluded the fuel oil storage tank was operable but degraded. The licensee entered this issue in the corrective action program as Condition Reports 33355 and 34068.
The failure to follow Procedure AP 26C-004, Operability Determination and Functionality Assessment, Revision 21, when a nonconforming or degraded condition was identified was a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency was more than minor because it could become a more significant safety concern if left uncorrected. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, "Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings," the inspectors determined that the finding had very low safety significance (Green) because it did not result in a loss of system safety function, an actual loss of safety function of a single train for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time, or screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program component because the licensee failed to thoroughly evaluate problems, including evaluatingoperability, such that the resolution addressed the cause [P.1(c)] (Section 1R15).
Inspection Report# : 2011002 (pdf)
 
Significance:        Mar 31, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Verify Ultimate Heat Sink Sedimentation Levels within Design Bases The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix B, Criterion III, involving a failure to perform periodic testing to verify that ultimate heat sink sedimentation remained within design basis limits. The licensee subsequently verified the ultimate heat sink depth remained acceptable using SONAR. The licensee entered this issue in the corrective action program as Condition Report 27144.
Wolf Creeks failure to perform periodic testing to verify that ultimate heat sink sedimentation remained within design basis limits is a performance deficiency. The issue is more than minor, and therefore a finding, because if left uncorrected the issue has the potential to become a more significant safety concern. The inspectors concluded that the issue screened to Green under the significance determination process using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1-Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, because the finding was a design deficiency that was later confirmed not to result in the loss of operability or functionality of the ultimate heat sink. The inspectors concluded that this findings cause has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the work control component because Wolf Creek did not appropriately coordinate work activities by incorporating actions to address the impact of changes to the work scope or activity on the plant and human performance. Specifically, when Wolf Creek performed and planned dredging preventive maintenance on the ultimate heat sink, they did not consider the need to confirm as-found and as-left sediment depth to verify that their design basis was met [H.3(b)]
(Section 1R19).
Inspection Report# : 2011002 (pdf)
Significance:        Mar 31, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Fill and Vent of Component Cooling Water The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Procedures, involving the failure to perform an adequate fill and vent of the component cooling water system which resulted in voiding of the system. The licensee entered the finding into their corrective action program and will develop corrective actions as part of Condition Report 33925.
The inspectors determined that the failure to perform an adequate fill and vent of component cooling water that resulted in system voiding was a performance deficiency. The inspectors determined that this finding was more than minor because it is associated with the human performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and it affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the finding was determined to have very low safety significance (Green) because it did not result in a loss of system safety function, an actual loss of safety function of a single train for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time, or screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program because the licensee failed to take appropriate corrective actions from previous voiding events [P.1(d)] (Section 1R19).
Inspection Report# : 2011002 (pdf)
Significance:        Mar 31, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Repetitive Failure to Enter Technical Specifications for Auxiliary Feedwater Suction Valve Testing The inspectors identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Procedures, involving the failure to follow Procedure AP 21-001, Conduct of Operations. Specifically, the licensee failed to enter into technical specification limiting condition of operation 3.7.5.B.1 for one auxiliary feedwater pump inoperable during performance of 92-day check valve surveillance tests. Wolf Creek took prompt corrective action to amend the procedures to include instructions for maintaining the pumps operable with manual actions. This occurred prior to the
 
next check valve test. This issue is captured in Condition Report 34469.
The failure to enter technical specification action statements in accordance with Procedure AP 21-001 was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor, and therefore a finding, because it impacted with the human performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and its objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the issue did not result in a loss of operability for a time period greater than the action statement, and did it not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The inspectors determined that the finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with decision making. Specifically, informally maintained pre-job briefing sheets were being relied upon to determine technical specification applicability instead of the licensees decision making process of operator review on a case by case basis [H.1(a)] (Section 1R22).
Inspection Report# : 2011002 (pdf)
Significance:        Mar 08, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Properly Establish Clearance Order Boundary Isolation Resulting in Loss of Component Cooling Water Inventory The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1a, Administrative Procedures, for a loss of component cooling water train B inventory caused by inadequate clearance order verification. Valve HBV110 was stuck in position and was partially open. When the clearance order was implemented, the operators concluded the valve was already closed. Subsequently, the valve created a leakage path which exceeded the surge tank makeup flow capacity and required manual isolation by the control room operators to protect safety-related components. Wolf Creek has taken corrective actions to include communication of expected as-found equipment positions in pre-job briefings and the clearance order template. This issue is captured in the corrective action program as Condition Reports 34505 and 40219.
Failure to properly establish clearance order boundary isolation was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency is more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance and human performance attributes of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and impacted the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the finding did not result in the loss of operability or functionality of the component cooling water train or screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event or screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The inspectors found that the finding had a cross-cutting aspect of work practices in the area of human performance associated with the communication of human error prevention techniques, such as holding pre-job briefings, self- and peer-checking, and proper documentation of activities [H.4(a)](Section 1R04).
Inspection Report# : 2011003 (pdf)
Significance:        Mar 08, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Inadequate Acceptance Criteria for Postmaintenance Testing of the Startup Feedwater Pump The inspectors identified a finding involving the failure to follow the requirements of Procedure AP 16E-002, Post Maintenance Testing Development, for the startup feedwater pump. On November 4-6, 2010, Wolf Creek workers disassembled the startup feedwater pump for numerous preventive and corrective activities including removing the rotating element. On November 17, 2010, Wolf Creek conducted surveillance Procedure STN AE-007, Startup Main Feedwater Pump Operational Test, following reassembly. The only acceptance criteria listed in this procedure is that the motor-driven feedwater pump starts from the control room with no local operator action. The inspectors found this contrary to Procedure AP 16E-002, which requires acceptance criteria for a pump flow capacity test, vibration, bearing and lubrication temperatures, motor current, external leakage, and lubrication level be found satisfactory. This issue is captured in the corrective action program as Condition Report 39494. Wolf Creek issued a new work package to conduct a single-point pump capacity test and complete the required postmaintenance testing. Wolf Creek found,
 
pending final review, that initial calculations show that the pump design is capable of enough flow to provide a heat sink in emergency operating procedures.
Failure to follow Procedure AP 16E-002 for developing test criteria for plant equipment after the completion of maintenance activities is a performance deficiency. The finding is more than minor because it is associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of equipment performance and it adversely affects the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, the inspectors determined that the finding had very low safety significance (Green) because it did not result in a loss of system safety function, an actual loss of safety function of a single train for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time, or screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The inspectors determined that the finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution. Specifically, Wolf Creek created a testing procedure in response to a root cause evaluation, but did not consider acceptance criteria to ensure that the pump performs acceptably [P.1(d)](Section 1R19).
Inspection Report# : 2011003 (pdf)
Significance:        Feb 25, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Trend Emergency Diesel Generator Chemistry Paameters Results in an Unplanned Technical Specification Entry The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," for the failure to follow Procedure AP 28A-0100, "Condition Reports," Revision 13. On February 17, 2011, the licensee received laboratory test results on the emergency diesel generator B fuel oil storage tank and determined that the cloud point parameter was out of specification at -8° Celsius. However, Procedure AP 28A-0100, step 5.13.3, required the licensee to evaluate condition report data to identify and evaluate potential trends. The emergency diesel fuel oil storage tank cloud point parameter had been trending closer to the acceptance criteria over the last several fuel oil additions. The licensee had allowed the original fuel oil vendor to continue to deliver fuel that was out of specification which resulted in a gradual trend toward the limits of the chemistry parameters. This trend was not appropriately evaluated because the licensee had not performed training to ensure that consistent and appropriate evaluations would be performed.
This finding was more than minor because it affected the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of equipment performance by impacting the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. This deficiency directly resulted in emergency diesel generator B being declared inoperable due to its fuel oil storage tank being out of specification. The inspectors performed the significance determination using NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, "Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings," because it affected the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone while the plant was at power. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it was not a design or qualification deficiency; it did not result in the loss of a system safety function; it did not represent the loss of a single train for greater than technical specification allowed time; it did not represent a loss of one or more non-technical specification risk-significant equipment for greater than 24 hours; and it did not screen as potentially risk significant due to seismic, flooding, or severe weather. In addition, this finding had a human performance crosscutting aspect associated with resources in that the licensee did not ensure that the corrective action program coordinators were effectively train Inspection Report# : 2011006 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness
 
Significance:      Aug 10, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Technical Support Center External Door Propped Open without Impairment The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR 50.47, Emergency Plans, for the failure to maintain an adequate emergency facility. The technical support center doors were propped open during maintenance for 82 days without a breach permit, leaving the licensee with no procedural controls to maintain the ability of the technical support center to withstand the 100-year recurrence winds as designed. The licensees procedures would have caused operations personnel to review breaches and shut doors for a tornado event. This issue is captured in the corrective action program as Condition Report 42495.
The issue was more than minor because it impacted the facilities and equipment attribute of Emergency Preparedness Cornerstone objective to ensure that the licensee is capable of implementing adequate measures to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency. The inspectors used the emergency preparedness significance determination process and determined that the finding was Green because changes were made to the technical support center that did not comply with the plan and did not have compensatory actions, but the facility remained functional. The inspectors found that the cause of the finding had a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the resources component, in that the breach procedure was not consistent with the design of the technical support center and resulted in missed compensatory action [H.2.c]
Inspection Report# : 2011004 (pdf)
Occupational Radiation Safety Significance:      Mar 31, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Follow Radiation Work Permit Instructions The inspectors identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a for the failure to follow procedure requirements related to adding work to existing radiation work permits. On January 4, 2011, welding was performed in a locked high radiation area on radiation work permit 110039, which did not cover that type of activity. The ALARA review associated with radiation work permit 110039 stated that this permit was not intended to be used for major contamination breaches. However, welders cut into and welded a contaminated pipe. The licensee placed the finding into the corrective action program as Condition Report 35522 and acknowledged that the radiation work permit used was inappropriate for the work completed.
The failure to follow a procedure was a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because it negatively impacted the Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstones attribute of program and process, in that the inappropriate use of a radiation work permit led to workers unplanned and unintended dose. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix C, Occupational Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because: (1) it was not associated with ALARA planning or work controls, (2) there was no overexposure, (3) there was no substantial potential for an overexposure, and (4) the ability to assess dose was not compromised. This deficiency had a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance related to work controls. Specifically, there was inappropriate coordination and communication of work activities between work groups [H.3(b)].
Inspection Report# : 2011002 (pdf)
Public Radiation Safety
 
Physical Protection Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Significance: N/A Mar 31, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding 95002 Inspection Inspection Report# : 2011006 (pdf)
Last modified : March 02, 2012
 
Wolf Creek 1 1Q/2012 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance:        Feb 12, 2012 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Procedure Causes Lift of Relief Valve and Reactor Coolant Leak During Shutdown The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for a procedure that failed to restore the reactor coolant pump seal return flow path prior to raising reactor coolant system pressure, which caused the seal return relief valve to lift. During shutdown, reactor coolant pump seal return valve BGHV8100 was shut. On February 12, 2012, Wolf Creek was in Mode 5 with a water-filled (solid) pressurizer at 94 psig. After pressurizer power operated relief valve maintenance, Wolf Creek raised reactor coolant system pressure to 250 psig. With no return path, the relief valve lifted at 150 psig for 15 hours before operators noted an unexplained steady increase in pressurizer relief tank level and re-established the return flow path.
Wolf Creek procedures were written to transition straight to refueling, and did not include consideration for maneuvering the plant in Mode 5. This led to shutting valve BGHV8100 without instructions to reopen it before exceeding 150 psig. Wolf Creek subsequently added procedure steps and precautions to reopen the seal return path in Mode 5. The inspectors calculated that approximately 760 gallons of reactor coolant were lost to the relief tank. This issue was placed in the corrective action program as condition report 49021.
Failure to align the reactor coolant pump seal return flow path prior to raising reactor coolant system pressure above the relief valve setpoint, creating a leak path, was a performance deficiency. The inspectors determined that this finding impacted the Initiating Events Cornerstone and its objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge safety functions during shutdown. Specifically, it impacted the configuration control attribute of shutdown equipment lineup which created an unmonitored intersystem leak. The inspectors used Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix G, Attachment 1, checklist 4 (cold shutdown, level in the pressurizer, time to boil >2 hours) to evaluate the significance of this finding. A Phase 2 analysis was not needed because the level of inventory was terminated when the normal path was opened and the relief valve reseated. The leak would have terminated itself if the reactor coolant system drained itself to below the pump seal. The finding did not affect reactor coolant system level indication, affect the ability to terminate the leak path, affect the ability to add inventory, or affect the ability to recover residual heat removal if it was lost. Therefore, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance. The inspectors identified the cause of the finding had a human performance cross-cutting aspect in the area of resources. Specifically, complete and accurate procedures were not provided because Procedure GEN 00-006 did not contain guidance to establish the seal return flow path prior to raising reactor coolant system pressure above 150 psig [H.2.c].
Inspection Report# : 2012002 (pdf)
Significance:        Dec 31, 2011 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Evaluate Gasket Compatibility The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing, non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, associated with an improperly selected essential service water gasket that sprayed safety-related electrical equipment. On August 31, 2011, essential service water pump A was started and a 1 gpm leak from a bolted flange on the strainer was observed spraying a Class 1E supply transformer. The gasket was found to be broken due to excessive torque, and was replaced. Wolf Creeks apparent cause evaluation concluded that the cause of the gasket failure was not evaluating the suitability of existing gasket material to be used in conjunction with the new, hard Ceramalloy coating applied to the strainers as part of a design change in 2003. The strainer joints had been previously re-tightened to stop leakage without evaluating the cause. Selecting inappropriate gasket material, which led to repeated leaks and tightening until the gasket broke, was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency is more than minor
 
because it could be a precursor to a loss of essential service water event. Specifically, the water spray was wetting a transformer that could have cause the loss of the train A traveling screen, strainer, and ventilation. The inspectors used Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, and determined the issue was Green, or very low safety significance, because assuming worst case degradation, the finding did not affect train B. Also, train A essential service water was inoperable for less than its allowed outage time of 72 hours because it was successfully run the previous day. The finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution because Wolf Creek did not thoroughly evaluate the problem such that the resolutions address causes and extent of conditions, as necessary.
Specifically the bolted flanges of the essential service water strainer A had leaked multiple times over the past 2 years, but did not get evaluated because they were classified as find and fix. [P.1(c)] (Section 1R12).
Inspection Report# : 2011005 (pdf)
Significance:      Dec 31, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Account for RCP Seal Injection in Safety Analysis for Inadvertent Safety Injection On June 13, 2011, the inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR, Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, for an inadequate safety analysis of inadvertent operation of the emergency core cooling system. The inspectors identified that Updated Safety Analysis Report, Chapter 15.5.1, Inadvertent Operation of the ECCS, was inadequate because it did not account for the effects of reactor coolant pump seal injection flow. Since the pressurizer would be nearly full when operators terminate safety injection flow, the added volume would eventually overfill the pressurizer. Relief of liquid by the pressurizer safety valves is not permissible by the Updated Safety Analysis Report and the Standard Review Plan because the event could then propagate to a loss of coolant accident. The inspectors also identified that Wolf Creek needed an additional time critical operator action to re-establish letdown to reduce pressurizer level. The inspectors identified that operators were not tested on these actions in the simulator. Wolf Creek evaluations in 2011 did not find the error in the safety analysis or operator training. Wolf Creek planned to re-perform this safety analysis and has changed its simulator training to include timing of safety injection termination and establishing letdown. This issue was entered in the corrective action program as condition report 40410.
Failure to identify an inadequate safety analysis for inadvertent safety injection while comparing the plant response during an actual inadvertent safety injection to the safety analysis was a performance deficiency. This finding was more than minor because it impacted the design control attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. The inspectors used Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, "Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings," and determined that the issue required a Phase 3 analysis because it involved a primary system loss of coolant accident initiator that could exceed the technical specification limit for allowable leakage. The senior reactor analyst calculated a bounding incremental core damage probability of 9.0E-7 per year or very low safety significance. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with problem evaluation. Specifically, condition reports 34964 and 35700 did not identify the issue although they were tasked with evaluating the March 19 event against the safety analysis. [P.1(c)] (Section 1R18)
Inspection Report# : 2011005 (pdf)
Significance:      Dec 31, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Evaluation of Effects of Emergency Diesel Generator Frequency Variation on Supplied Equipment The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for the licensees failure to adequately evaluate the effects of allowed technical specification frequency variations on plant equipment in design calculations. Specifically, significant affects on the Class 1E electrical equipment air conditioning units were observed which required licensee action. The reduced cooling capacity raised temperatures above the allowable limits for equipment in those rooms. This finding was entered into the licensees corrective action program as condition report 2007-002734, for which the licensee performed a comprehensive analysis of the effects of frequency variation on safety-related equipment.
Failure to adequately analyze the effects of allowable frequency variations on equipment performance was a performance deficiency. This finding is more than minor because it was associated with the design control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and it affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability,
 
and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. In accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, this finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not create a loss of safety system function of a single train for greater than the technical specification allowed outage times, and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. This finding did not have a cross-cutting aspect because the most significant contributing cause did not reflect current licensee performance (Section 4OA2).
Inspection Report# : 2011005 (pdf)
Significance:        Sep 30, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Maintain Steam Generator Level Above Lo Lo Level Setpoint The inspectors reviewed a noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Procedures, for failure of operators to follow procedure to maintain steam generator water level. This failure resulted in level in steam generator B level lowering such that a Lo Lo level actuation was initiated, which isolated normal feedwater and initiated auxiliary feedwater. A reactor trip signal was also Enclosure received, but the control rods were already tripped. The licensee captured this issue in their corrective action program as Condition Report 39732 and subsequently changed its operating procedures and conducted remediation training of licensed operators.
The issue was considered more than minor because it impacted the human performance attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone and its objective to limit the events that upset plant stability and challenge safety systems during power and shutdown operations. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, the inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the loss of mitigation equipment. The inspectors determined that the finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the decision making component because the decision by the crew to maintain steam generator level in a difficult to maintain band proved to have unintended consequences Inspection Report# : 2011004 (pdf)
Significance:        Jul 21, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Switchyard component Failures Cause Loss of Ring Bus and Loss of Offsite Power On July 21, 2011, the inspectors identified a finding for degraded switchyard equipment that caused a loss of offsite power. Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR), Section 8.2.1.3.g.1, states that: Any transmission line can be cleared under normal or fault conditions without affecting any other transmission line. On August 19, 2009, the damaged carrier system signal failures that allowed a lightning strike to cause a loss of all three 345 kV lines was inconsistent with the Updated Safety Analysis Report. Wolf Creeks root cause and hardware failure analysis of the capacitive coupled voltage transformer found that it was degraded for a significant period of time. There was no causal analysis of the out of tune wave trap that contributed to the event. The inspectors concluded that the deficiency could have been prevented if Wolf Creek adopted significant external operating experience from 2004. This included inspection and/or replacement of aging capacitive coupled voltage transformers. Corrective actions from the 2004 operating experience were not implemented in a 2007 self assessment and were finally implemented in December 2009. This issue is captured in the corrective action program as Condition Report 19245. Wolf Creek and its owner companies have since upgraded all capacitive coupled voltage transformers (finishing in spring 2011), added fault data recorders, added enhanced line checking procedures with the grid operator, regrounded all three 345 kV lines, and plans to add an offsite power technical requirements manual limiting condition of operation per Condition Report 43244.
The failure to maintain 345 kV equipment such that a single line fault could be cleared without affecting the other lines, as described in the Updated Safety Analysis Report, is a performance deficiency. The issue is more than minor because it impacted the protection against external factors attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, inspectors screened the finding to Phase 3 because it caused both a reactor trip and loss of mitigation equipment or functions to
 
not be available. The Senior Reactor Analyst calculated that the increase in core damage frequency was 2.6 x 10-7 or green. The inspectors determined that no crosscutting aspects applied because this finding is not indicative of current licensee performance.
Inspection Report# : 2011004 (pdf)
Significance:        Jun 16, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation No Procedure for Debris in Transformer an Tank Yards Propr to Severe Weather The inspectors identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Administrative Procedures, for having no procedure to address onsite debris impacting plant equipment during severe weather. The inspectors walked down external areas of the plant on June 1 and June 9, 2011, prior to the onset of predicted severe thunderstorms and tornadoes. The inspectors found loose debris each time and brought it to the attention of the licensee who secured the materials. The inspectors walked down the transformer yard and tank yard during a thunderstorm on June 16 and found loose debris such as plywood, trash, wood planks, and fiberglass planks. The inspectors brought this to the attention of Wolf Creek and the materials were removed or secured. Wolf Creek initiated several condition reports but they only addressed immediate cleanup. Wolf Creek procedures had no steps for securing potential wind-driven projectiles prior to severe weather. After June 16, Wolf Creek wrote Condition Report 40573 which started a weekly maintenance activity to remove loose materials and added procedure steps to have operations walk down external areas prior to severe weather.
This finding was more than minor because it impacted the protection against external factors attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone, and it affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. The inspectors evaluated this finding using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, and determined that it was of very low safety significance (Green) for June 16, 2011, because it did not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigation equipment would be unavailable since the reactor was shutdown. Inspectors used Manual Chapter 0609 Appendix G, Checklist 4 for the other occurrences because Wolf Creek was in Modes 4 or 5. The finding again screened to Green because it did not increase the likelihood of a loss of inventory, did not cause the loss of reactor coolant system instrumentation, did not degrade the ability of the licensee to terminate a leak path or add inventory when needed, or degrade the ability to recover residual heat removal if it was lost. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution, specifically the corrective action program attribute because licensees short-term corrective actions failed to ensure debris was secured or removed prior to severe weather [P.1 (d)](Section 1R01).
Inspection Report# : 2011003 (pdf)
Significance:        Jun 16, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Undersized Weld Failure on Charging Header The inspectors documented a self-revealing noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion IX, Control of Special Processes. Specifically, in October 2009, welders failed to ensure the fillet weld between the train B charging header and the half coupling used to attach two vent valves met the specified weld requirements. This weld failed in January 2011, rendering the train B charging system inoperable. The licensees extent of condition review identified 12 vent line welds which did not meet ASME code weld size requirements and/or procedural requirements for 2:1 weld taper configuration. Additionally, quality assurance inspectors failed to identify that the 2:1 taper weld requirements specified by procedure, and ASME minimum weld size requirements, were not met in multiple vent line welds. The weld was repaired and built up to the correct 2:1 aspect ratio. This issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Reports 32648, 33686, 33689, and 36438.
The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during power operations. The inspectors performed a Phase 1 screening in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the issue did not result in exceeding the technical specification limit for identified reactor coolant system leakage or affect other mitigating
 
systems resulting in a total loss of their safety function. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, resources, because the licensee failed to ensure that personnel, specifically welders and quality assurance inspectors, were adequately trained in the procedural requirements and methods for measuring weld dimensions to assure nuclear safety [H.2(b)](Section 1R08).
Inspection Report# : 2011003 (pdf)
Significance:        Jun 16, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Ensure Separation of Stainless Steel and Carbon Steel Grinding and Cutting Tools The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50 involving the failure of the licensee to ensure that weld preparation was protected from deleterious contamination in that drawers (located in the hot tool room) containing files, grinding wheels, flapper wheels, and cutting wheels, used for the purpose of weld preparation, contained a mixture of both stainless steel tools and carbon steel tools. The failure to separate tools used for stainless steel weld preparation from tools used for carbon steel preparation could result in the contamination of stainless steel welds by carbon steel and affect the material integrity and corrosion resistance. The licensee immediately removed the tools and replaced them with new tools stored separately for use on specific types of metal. This issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Report 36444.
The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during power operations, and if left uncorrected the finding would become a more significant safety concern. The inspectors performed a Phase 1 screening in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the issue did not result in exceeding the technical specification limit for identified reactor coolant system leakage or affect other mitigating systems resulting in a total loss of their safety function. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, resources, because the licensee did not provide complete, accurate, and up-to-date procedures for the preparation of stainless steel and carbon steel welds [H.2(c)](Section 1R08).
Inspection Report# : 2011003 (pdf)
Significance:        Jun 16, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Ensure Configuration Control of Safety-Related Systems The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, involving the failure of the licensee to review the suitability of installing brass fittings and leaving test fittings on pressure, differential pressure, and flow transmitter equalizing block valve drain ports instead of the design specified stainless steel manifold plugs. During a boric acid walkdown, the inspectors identified that drain ports on the equalizing block of two separate reactor coolant system flow transmitters had brass fittings installed instead of the design specified stainless steel fittings. In response to inspector concerns about the brass fittings, the licensee subsequently discovered that a design configuration nonconformance existed by leaving the test fittings on the drain port during plant operation. Licensee Drawing J-17D22 specifies that manifold plugs be installed in the drain ports during plant operation. The licensee immediately replaced the brass caps with stainless steel fittings. This issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Report 36439.
The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the design control attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during power operations. The inspectors performed a Phase 1 screening in accordance with Inspection Manual 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the issue would not result in exceeding the technical specification limit for identified reactor coolant system leakage or affect other mitigating systems resulting in a total loss of their safety function. The inspectors also determined that the finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, resources, because the licensee did not provide adequate training of personnel so that the inappropriately installed fittings could be identified during system walkdowns.
Inspection Report# : 2011003 (pdf)
 
Significance:      Apr 05, 2011 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Fire Watch Defeats Halon Fire Suppression in Vital Switchgear Rooms During Fire The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing noncited violation of License Condition 2.C.5 for failure to implement adequate fire watches which affected both trains of vital ac and dc switchgear. The inadequate fire watches occurred during an actual fire which negated the Halon system discharge because internal fire doors were not shut, as required, by the fire watch. The inspectors found problems with fire impairments and watches from 2008 that had not been corrected. Subsequent to the fire, Wolf Creek again briefed and trained its personnel on the requirements for fire watches. This issue is captured in the corrective action program as Condition Report 36719.
Failure to implement adequate fire impairments such that the fire watches ensured the success of the Halon system was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it impacted the Initiating Events Cornerstone and its objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, the protection against external factors attribute was impacted by the fire impairment. To determine significance, the inspectors used Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04 to screen the finding to Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, because the fire protection defense-in-depth strategies involving automatic suppression, fire barriers, and administrative controls were degraded. The senior reactor analyst conducted a Phase 3 review of this finding and concluded that the incremental core damage frequency was 1.6E-8 per year, or very low safety significance (Green). The inspectors found that the cause of the finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution. Specifically, corrective actions from ineffective fire watches in 2008 did not prevent recurrence of the inadequate fire watch on April 5, 2011 [P.1.d](Section 4OA3.3).
Inspection Report# : 2011003 (pdf)
Significance:      Dec 31, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: VIO Violation Failure to Correct Vessel Head Vent Path The inspectors identified a cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, due to an inadequate vent path for the reactor vessel head. The inadequate vent path resulted in the formation of voids in the reactor vessel head during Refueling Outage 17. Failure to ensure an adequate vent path in the reactor vessel head was the subject of a noncited violation in NRC Inspection Report 05000482/2008004. During and after Refueling Outage 16, Wolf Creek initiated a root cause evaluation and corrective actions to prevent occurrence. When one of the possible root causes was disproven in Refueling Outage 17, no additional action was taken to determine the cause of the vessel head vent blockage. However, the licensee could not exclude blockage in the piping. This issue was entered into the corrective action program and the licensee plans to conduct a more thorough inspection of the piping during the next refueling outage. This issue is being tracked by the licensee as Condition Report 22501.
The inspectors determined that the failure to provide adequate vessel head vent path to prevent gas accumulation in the reactor vessel during depressurized plant operations was a performance deficiency. The inspectors determined that this finding, which was associated with the Initiating Events Cornerstone, was more than minor because if left uncorrected, it would have become a more significant safety concern. Specifically, without an adequate vent path the reactor vessel does not have an effective means of relieving noncondensable gases to prevent a loss of reactor coolant system inventory. The inspectors evaluated this finding using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix G, , and determined it be of very low safety significance based upon the demonstrated availability of mitigating systems and the flooded reactor cavity inventory. The inspectors determined the cause of the finding had a problem identification and resolution aspect in the corrective action program. Specifically, Wolf Creeks corrective actions were not successful to address the vent path blockage in a timely manner [P.1(d)].
Inspection Report# : 2009005 (pdf)
Significance:      Mar 31, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: VIO Violation
 
Failure to correct component cooling water valve closures The inspectors identified a cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, involving Wolf Creeks failure to correct the cause of the reactor coolant pump thermal barrier component cooling water heat exchanger outlet valves stroking closed on high flow. Specifically, between 2001 and 2009, Wolf Creek experienced repeated cases of the reactor coolant pump thermal barrier component cooling water heat exchanger outlet valves stroking closed during component cooling water pump swaps and during isolations of the radioactive waste evaporators. Wolf Creek reinitiated evaluation of the issue after the inspectors questions but did not review the impact on the operators ability to open the valves given the valves circuit breakers opening. Repeated throttle valve adjustments have not been successful in stopping the valve closures. This issue and the corrective actions are being tracked by the licensee in Condition Report 2007 002074 and has corrective action pending to modify valve circuitry but it has not been implemented.
The failure to correct a condition adverse to quality of ensuring reactor coolant pump seal cooling as described in the Updated Safety Analysis Report is a performance deficiency. The finding is more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute for the Initiating Events Cornerstone; and, it affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the finding would not result in exceeding the Technical Specification limit for identified reactor coolant system leakage and would not have affected other mitigation systems resulting in a total loss of the seal cooling safety function. This finding is being cited because the licensee failed to establish measures to assure this condition adverse to quality was promptly identified and corrected. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the decision making component because, even though numerous instances of valve closures occurred since the first noncited violation, Wolf Creek downgraded the condition report. Using nonconservative assumptions, the licensee consistently viewed this issue as not having a risk impact because seal injection was not simultaneously lost.
[H.1.b]
Inspection Report# : 2009002 (pdf)
Inspection Report# : 2009005 (pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance:      Jan 24, 2012 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Loss of Configuration Control Causes Loss of All Non-Vital Power Inspectors identified a non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Procedures, for implementation of an unauthorized modification by using a clearance order and a temporary procedure. This left the power source to a temporary protective relay unprotected. When another clearance order was being placed for main generator work, the temporary relay power source was lost when fuses were removed which supplied power to the temporary relay. This tripped the offsite power breaker to 13.8kV bus PA01 and tripped PA01 distribution breakers on January 24, 2012. Safety busses were unaffected because they were cross tied and being supplied by the No. 7 transformer. All non-vital systems lost power including normal service water which was removing core decay heat until operators could manually start and align essential service water pumps. Power to all systems was restored within approximately 24 hours. The inspectors found that the installation of temporary equipment was an unevaluated long standing practice. The temporary procedure was consistent with a system operating procedure when it was approved on January 17, 2012. This conclusion differed from Wolf Creeks apparent cause determination which did not identify the issue as an unevaluated modification. The inspectors concluded that they added value and considered the issue NRC identified. Initially, corrective actions included changing the clearance order to prevent removing of fuses to the temporary relay. After inspector questions, Wolf Creek blocked the use of the temporary procedure and procedure SYS MA-120 until further evaluation was completed. This has been entered into the corrective action program as condition reports 48182, 48642, and 51408.
Failure to control system configuration such that unplanned loss of power would not occur is a performance deficiency. The inspectors determined that this finding was more than minor because it impacted the mitigating systems cornerstone and its objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). Specifically, it impacted the configuration
 
control attribute of shutdown equipment lineup which created a loss of offsite power to 13.8kV bus PA01. The inspectors screened the loss of service water pumps B and C, A and B circulating water pumps, vital air conditioning units, emergency diesel generator starting air compressors, transformer XNB01 cooling fans, heat tracing, auxiliary boiler steam heating, the condensate storage tank makeup pump, and the refueling water storage tank makeup pump to Manual Chapter 0609, attachment G, checklist 4. Wolf Creek had inventory in the pressurizer with a time to boil greater than 2 hours. The inspectors screened the finding to Green or very low safety significance because it did not involve a loss of reactor coolant system inventory, did not affect reactor coolant system level instrumentation, did not affect the licensees ability to terminate a leak path, did not affect the licensees ability to add reactor coolant system inventory when needed, or degrade the licensees ability to recover decay heat removal once it was lost. Additionally, the inspectors screened the loss of the electric fire pump and jockey (keep full) fire pump to Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04. Specifically, these pumps were out of service for less than 24 hours, and therefore, screened to Green or very low safety significance. The inspectors identified that the cause of the finding had a human performance cross-cutting aspect in the area of resources because the loss of power was caused by a lack of complete, accurate and up-to-date design documentation, procedures, drawings, fuse labeling, and work orders necessary to support the temporary configuration established through TMP 12-001 [H.2.c].
Inspection Report# : 2012002 (pdf)
Significance:        Dec 31, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Incorrect Retraction of an Event that Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV noncited violation of 10 CFR 50.73 because the licensee inappropriately retracted a licensee event report. On September 29, 2011, Wolf Creek issued Licensee Event Report 2011-004-01 which retracted the 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) portion of the report for loss of both trains of automatic safety injection on March 19, 2011. The automatic functioning of safety injection is required by Technical Specification 3.3.2, function 1.b. Wolf Creek licensee event report 2011-004-00 was correct in its reporting the loss of safety function. In retracting this aspect, Wolf Creek credited manual action to restart safety injection and the long standing logic design.
However, NUREG 1022, Section 3.2.7, specifies that inoperable systems required by the technical specifications be reported. This issue is entered into the licensees corrective action program as condition report 46110.
The inspectors reviewed this issue in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0612 and the NRC Enforcement Manual and determined that traditional enforcement was applicable to this issue because the NRC's regulatory ability was affected. Specifically, the NRC relies on the licensee to identify and report conditions or events meeting the criteria specified in regulations in order to perform its regulatory function, and when this is not done, the regulatory function is impacted. The inspectors used the Enforcement Policy and the available risk information to conclude that this violation is appropriately characterized as Severity Level IV.
Inspection Report# : 2011005 (pdf)
Significance:        Dec 12, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Alternative Shutdown Procedure The team identified a Green non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.d for the failure to implement and maintain adequate written procedures covering fire protection program implementation. Specifically, the team identified two examples where the licensee failed to maintain an alternative shutdown procedure that ensured operators would prevent overfilling the pressurizer and steam generators, respectively. The licensee documented this deficiency in Condition Report 045442.
The failure to maintain adequate written procedures covering fire protection program implementation was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the protection against external events (fire) attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and it adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The team evaluated the significance of this finding using Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process, because the performance deficiency affected fire protection defense-in-depth strategies involving post-fire safe shutdown systems. A senior reactor analyst performed a Phase 3 evaluation and determined this finding had very low risk significance based upon a bounding analysis
 
(Green). This finding did not reflect current licensee performance (Section 1R05.05.2).
Inspection Report# : 2011007 (pdf)
Significance:      Dec 12, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Ensure Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Components Remain Free of Fire Damage The team identified a Green non-cited violation of License Condition 2.C(5) because the licensee failed to implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program. Specifically, the licensee failed to properly analyze for fire damage in the form of shorts-to-ground related to the residual heat removal Train B refueling water storage tank suction valve and the pressurizer power-operated relief valves. Certain postulated shorts-to-ground could spuriously actuate these valves such that safe shutdown would be impacted. The licensee documented these deficiencies in Condition Reports 044912 and 045452, respectively.
The failure to protect the residual heat removal Train B suction cables and the pressurizer power operated relief valve cables against all modes of cable failure during post-fire safe shutdown circuit analysis was a performance deficiency.
The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the design control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences.
The team used Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process, because the performance deficiency affected fire protection defense-in-depth strategies involving post-fire safe shutdown. The team categorized the finding as having a high degradation rating because the post fire safe shutdown analysis was not complete. Because the Phase 1 screening criteria were not met, the team performed a Phase 2 analysis. The team walked down the affected fire area for each example as part of the Phase 2 quantitative screening. The team identified fire ignition sources and targets, and specific fire growth and damage scenario combinations for each example. The sum of the conditional core damage frequencies for the fire scenarios was 5.15E 7/year, which bounded the total change in core damage frequency associated with this performance deficiency.
This performance deficiency had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with decision making because the licensee did not use conservative assumptions during their design review process. Specifically, the licensee did not follow industry guidance related to performing a circuit analysis [H.1(b)] (Section 1R05.06).
Inspection Report# : 2011007 (pdf)
Significance:      Nov 04, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to Verify Isolation of Associated Circuits on Isolation Switches The team identified a finding because the licensee was not fully testing the isolation function of local transfer switches located at motor control center breakers for individual components. As a result, the licensee was not performing periodic verifications to confirm that local control circuits would be isolated from the effects of fire damage caused by a control room fire. The licensee documented this deficiency in Condition Report 045434.
The failure to maintain adequate written procedures covering fire protection program implementation was a performance deficiency. Specifically, the licensee failed to ensure that component specific transfer switch testing procedures verified proper circuit isolation from the control room in the event of a control room fire. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the procedure quality attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The team evaluated the finding using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process, because it affected fire protection defense-in-depth strategies involving post fire safe shutdown. Using Appendix F, , Degradation Rating Guidance Specific to Various Fire Protection Program Elements, the team determined that the finding constituted a low degradation of the safe shutdown area since the control room isolation
 
feature is expected to display nearly the same level of effectiveness and reliability as it would had the degradation not been present. This finding screened as having very low safety significance (Green). Since the failure to test the isolation function had not been verified since initial installation, the team determined that this failure did not reflect current performance (Section 1R05.05.1).
Inspection Report# : 2011007 (pdf)
Significance:        Nov 04, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Procedure Inadequacies Related to Cold Shutdown Repairs The team identified a Green non-cited violation of License Condition 2.C(5) because the licensee failed to implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program. Specifically, the licensee failed to provide an adequate procedure for performing cold shutdown repairs required for post-fire safe shutdown. The licensee documented the deficiencies in Condition Reports 045397 and 045417.
The failure to ensure that Procedure OFN RP-017A, Hot Standby to Cold Shutdown from Outside the Control Room Due To Fire, Revision 0, could be implemented as written was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the procedure quality attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and it adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events (fire) to prevent undesirable consequences. The finding was evaluated for safety significance using NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process. Since the finding was related to the ability to achieve and maintain cold shutdown, the finding screened to Green in Phase 1.
This performance deficiency had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with resources because the licensee did not prepare an accurate and up-to-date procedure that assured nuclear safety. Specifically, personnel did not verify that the steps in the revised procedure could be performed as written and that the components had proper labeling [H.2(c)] (Section 1R05.10).
Inspection Report# : 2011007 (pdf)
Significance:        Sep 30, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Follow ASME Code Cas OMN-1 for Butterfly Valves The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR 50.55a, Codes and Standards, when the licensee failed to correctly test a series of butterfly valves. The licensee installed seven Crane butterfly valves in the essential service water system in 2000 and 2002 but did not perform a preservice test under conditions as close as possible to the inservice test conditions or develop and perform an inservice stroke test under conditions as close to design basis conditions as required by their applicable code case. This issue is captured in the corrective action program as Condition Report 44218.
The issue is more than minor because it impacted the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective to ensure that to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding is not a design or qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in loss of operability or functionality; the finding does not represent a loss of system safety function; the finding does not represent actual loss of safety function of a single train for more than its technical specification allowed outage time; the finding does not represent an actual loss of safety function of one or more nontechnical specification trains of equipment designated as risk significant per 10 CFR 50.65 for more than 24 hours; and the finding does not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The inspectors did not assign a crosscutting aspect because the finding was not indicative of current performance (Section 1R22).
Inspection Report# : 2011004 (pdf)
 
Significance:      Sep 22, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Emergency Operating Procedure for Steam Generator Tube Rupture The inspectors identified a Green noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Procedures, due to insufficient procedural direction to operations personnel to perform a subcooled recovery of a steam generator tube rupture if the ruptured steam generator cannot be isolated from any of the intact steam generators. On August 2, 2011, inspectors identified during simulator scenario validation that step 9 of Emergency Mitigation Guideline 3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, did not give adequate direction to operations personnel to mitigate a steam generator tube rupture event that required a subcooled recovery. The licensee entered the issue into their corrective action program as condition report 43515.
The finding is more than minor because the performance deficiency is associated with the procedure quality attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone, and adversely affected the cornerstones attribute to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using the Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 Worksheets, the finding was determined to have very low safety significance because the finding is a deficiency confirmed not to result in a loss of operability or functionality of the overall ability to mitigate an unisolable steam generator tube rupture, if Emergency Mitigation Guideline 3 is used correctly as written. The finding does not have a crosscutting aspect because the deficiency was incorporated into the procedure in May 2000 and was not considered indicative of current licensee performance (Section 4OA5.2).
Inspection Report# : 2011301 (pdf)
Significance:      Sep 01, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Testing Of Emergency Diesel Generator A The inspector identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control, with two examples, because the licensee failed to ensure that all testing required to demonstrate that the emergency diesel generators would perform satisfactorily in service was identified and performed. In the first example, the licensee failed to change the loading requirements in Surveillance Test Procedure STS KJ-005A, Manual/Auto Start, Sync &
Loading Of EDG (emergency diesel generator) NE01, when the design basis accident loading of the emergency diesel generators was increased. In the second example, the licensee failed to perform testing required by Regulatory Guide 1.9 and IEEE Standard 387 to recertify the system following replacement of the mechanical governor.
The finding is more than minor because it was associated with the procedure quality attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using the significance determination process, the inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because it was a design or qualification issue that was confirmed not to represent an actual loss of safety function of the emergency diesel generator, since the unit was still able to operate properly in the isochronous mode. This finding was determined to have a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the decision making component because the licensee did not use conservative assumptions in decision making and adopt a requirement to demonstrate that the proposed action was safe in order to proceed rather than a requirement to demonstrate that it was unsafe in order to disapprove the action. Specifically, the licensee decided not to perform all required certification testing per Regulatory Guide 1.9 Revision 3 prior to declaring Emergency Diesel Generator A operable following replacement of the mechanical governor [H.1(b)]. (Section 3.2)
Inspection Report# : 2011009 (pdf)
Significance:      May 23, 2011 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation
 
Inadequate Procedure to Adjust the Compensation in Emergency Diesel Generator Governor A self-revealing noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Procedures, was identified for the failure to include essential information needed to correctly adjust the emergency diesel generator governor actuator compensation potentiometer in Work Order 10-327976-000. Specifically, on May 23, 2011, maintenance personnel adjusted the actuator compensation potentiometer by following instructions from the system engineer per Work Order 10-327976-000. Work Order 10-327976-000 did not contain the cautionary note from Procedure MPE NE-003, Governor Adjustments for Emergency Diesel Generator NE01, which stated, DO NOT set actuator compensation adjustor below 1.5. The maintenance personnel set the potentiometer to 1.0. This improper adjustment resulted in Emergency Diesel Generator A being declared inoperable due to excessive load swings on September 1, 2011.
The finding is more than minor because it was associated with the procedure quality attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using the Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 Worksheets, the finding was determined to have very low safety significance (Green) because it was a design or qualification issue that was confirmed not to represent an actual loss of safety function of the emergency diesel generator, because the unit was still able to operate properly in the isochronous mode. This finding was determined to have a crosscutting aspect in the Resources component of human performance because the licensee did not provide complete, accurate and up-to-date procedures/work orders to plant personnel because the licensee had not developed procedure guidance sufficiently detailed to ensure maintenance personnel properly adjusted the compensating actuator potentiometer for the electronic governor [H.2(c)]. (Section 3.1)
Inspection Report# : 2011009 (pdf)
Significance:        May 06, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Analyze for Vortexing in Containment Spray Additive Tank The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for the failure to translate the design basis into instructions, procedures, and drawings. The inspectors found that the licensee failed to assess whether vortexing occurred in the containment spray additive tank in the event of a design-basis accident. Wolf Creek entered this issue in the corrective action program as Condition Report 38715.
Failure to implement design control measures to analyze whether containment spray piping remained full of water was a performance deficiency. This finding was more than minor because it affected the design control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of the containment spray system to respond to initiating events and prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the inspectors had reasonable doubt on the capability of the containment spray system to properly inject because of vortexing in the containment spray additive tank. The inspectors performed the significance determination using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it was a design or qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in loss of operability or functionality. Although the failure to have this calculation had existed since original construction, the inspectors determined this finding reflected current performance since the licensee was required to evaluate likelihood of tanks allowing gas intrusion into the emergency core cooling systems in response to Generic Letter 2008-01, Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling, Decay Heat Removal, and Containment Spray Systems. Consequently, this finding had problem identification and resolution cross-cutting aspects associated with the corrective action program in that the licensee did not thoroughly evaluate the potential for gas intrusion from all possible tanks [P.1(c)](Section 4OA5).
Inspection Report# : 2011003 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Significance:        Mar 26, 2012 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation
 
Failure to Test ASME O&M Code Category A Valves in Post-LOCA Flow Path The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50.55a(f)(4), Codes and Standards, for failure to adequately demonstrate that the seat leakage for 12 emergency core cooling system and containment spray valves remained within acceptable limits. These valves have a combined allowable leakage rate of 3.8 gpm to ensure that control room operator radiation doses remain within regulatory limits during an accident. Since the flowpaths have valves for which seat leakage is limited to a specific maximum amount, the inspectors identified that they should be considered Category A valves as specified in ASME OM (American Society of Mechanical Engineers Operations &
Maintenance) Code. Wolf Creek subsequently took corrective action to perform valve seat leakage testing on March 10, 2012, which demonstrated that leakage was within acceptable limits. Additionally, Wolf Creek plans to change Chapter 15 of the USAR and correct its ASME OM Code basis document. This issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as condition report 46927.
Failure to correctly identify and perform testing needed to assure plant design for control room habitability is a performance deficiency. This finding is greater than minor because it was associated with the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone attribute of configuration control and affects the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers (fuel cladding, reactor coolant system, and containment) protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, it affects the design control objective by failing to ensure that design limits were met on a periodic basis. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, the issue was determined to not impact public and control room dose (above regulatory limits), it did not impact the control room due to toxic gas, it did not represent an actual open containment bypass path (above of regulatory limits), and did not impact hydrogen igniters. Therefore, this finding was found to be of very low safety significance. Also, public dose was not impacted with a potential radiation dose above a 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix I criteria. This finding did not have a cross-cutting aspect since the error associated with the inservice testing program was not reflective of current licensee performance because the failure to identify and include these valves occurred more than 3 years ago.
Inspection Report# : 2012002 (pdf)
Significance:        Dec 31, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Preconditioning of 480 Vac Breakers Prior to Required Surveillance Testing On November 14, 2011, the inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control, for pre-conditioning of the 480 Vac breaker for the containment cooling fan D prior to performance of the periodic functional test to satisfy Technical Requirements Manual Surveillance 3.8.11.3. Testing consisted of injecting a current in excess of the breakers setpoint and measuring the response time. The licensee was observed to perform preventive maintenance activities consisted of cleaning, lubricating, inspecting, and calibrating the circuit breakers, then performed as-left surveillance testing. The inspectors concluded that the preventive maintenance activities were likely to positively impact the surveillance test results. The inspectors identified that the practice had occurred with other 480 Vac breakers because Wolf Creek personnel believed that the performance of as-left testing after preventive maintenance constituted a surveillance test.
The inspectors determined that mixing preventive maintenance and surveillance testing such that the containment cooling fan breaker was preconditioned was a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because it could become a more safety significant concern if left uncorrected. Specifically, the programmatic practices could mask safety-related circuit breaker degradation. The inspectors evaluated the significance of this finding under the barrier integrity cornerstone using Phase 1 of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, and determined that the finding had very low safety significance. Specifically, the finding does not represent a degradation of the radiological barrier function provided for the control room, auxiliary building, or spent fuel pool; or represent a degradation of the barrier function of the control room against smoke or a toxic atmosphere; and does not represent an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of the reactor containment; or a heat removal component. The inspectors determined that the finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with work control. Specifically, the work order and procedures were performed with competing requirements such that workers had to choose the correct sequence of activities [H.3(b)] (Section 1R22).
Inspection Report# : 2011005 (pdf)
Emergency Preparedness
 
Significance:      Aug 10, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Technical Support Center External Door Propped Open without Impairment The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR 50.47, Emergency Plans, for the failure to maintain an adequate emergency facility. The technical support center doors were propped open during maintenance for 82 days without a breach permit, leaving the licensee with no procedural controls to maintain the ability of the technical support center to withstand the 100-year recurrence winds as designed. The licensees procedures would have caused operations personnel to review breaches and shut doors for a tornado event. This issue is captured in the corrective action program as Condition Report 42495.
The issue was more than minor because it impacted the facilities and equipment attribute of Emergency Preparedness Cornerstone objective to ensure that the licensee is capable of implementing adequate measures to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency. The inspectors used the emergency preparedness significance determination process and determined that the finding was Green because changes were made to the technical support center that did not comply with the plan and did not have compensatory actions, but the facility remained functional. The inspectors found that the cause of the finding had a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the resources component, in that the breach procedure was not consistent with the design of the technical support center and resulted in missed compensatory action [H.2.c]
Inspection Report# : 2011004 (pdf)
Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Last modified : May 29, 2012
 
Wolf Creek 1 2Q/2012 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance:        Jun 29, 2012 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Incorrect Leak Seal Injection Port Installation A self-revealing non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Inspections, Procedures, and Drawings, was identified as a result of a leaking watertight door that was observed on January 13, 2012. Station procedure MPM XX-002, Watertight Door Preventive Maintenance Activities, failed to ensure the proper position of the alignment screws, which resulted in leakage through a misalignment between the door and its threshold. During the January 13, 2012, loss of offsite power, the auxiliary building general area sump pumps did not operate for approximately 36 hours. Condensed steam and other effluents slowly accrued in the stairwell area outside the containment spray pump rooms to a depth of 24 to 36 inches. The train B containment spray pump room watertight door leaked approximately 10 gallons per minute and pooled in both the containment spray pump room and the residual heat removal pump room to a depth of three inches. This issue was entered into the corrective action program under condition report 51622. The licensee corrected the procedure and realigned the affected watertight doors.
Failure to properly adjust safety-related watertight door alignment screws during testing activities is a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency is more than minor and therefore a finding because, if left uncorrected it could lead to a more significant safety concern. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, the finding was characterized using Exhibit 4, Seismic, Flooding, and Severe Weather Screening Criteria. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the degraded flood protection equipment would not have caused a plant trip or other initiating event, would not degrade two or more trains of a multi-train safety system, would not degrade one or more trains of a supporting system, and the finding does not involve the total loss of any safety function. The inspectors determined the cause of this finding was not indicative of current performance.
(Section 1R06).
Inspection Report# : 2012003 (pdf)
Significance:        Feb 12, 2012 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Procedure Causes Lift of Relief Valve and Reactor Coolant Leak During Shutdown The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for a procedure that failed to restore the reactor coolant pump seal return flow path prior to raising reactor coolant system pressure, which caused the seal return relief valve to lift. During shutdown, reactor coolant pump seal return valve BGHV8100 was shut. On February 12, 2012, Wolf Creek was in Mode 5 with a water-filled (solid) pressurizer at 94 psig. After pressurizer power operated relief valve maintenance, Wolf Creek raised reactor coolant system pressure to 250 psig. With no return path, the relief valve lifted at 150 psig for 15 hours before operators noted an unexplained steady increase in pressurizer relief tank level and re-established the return flow path.
Wolf Creek procedures were written to transition straight to refueling, and did not include consideration for maneuvering the plant in Mode 5. This led to shutting valve BGHV8100 without instructions to reopen it before exceeding 150 psig. Wolf Creek subsequently added procedure steps and precautions to reopen the seal return path in Mode 5. The inspectors calculated that approximately 760 gallons of reactor coolant were lost to the relief tank. This issue was placed in the corrective action program as condition report 49021.
Failure to align the reactor coolant pump seal return flow path prior to raising reactor coolant system pressure above the relief valve setpoint, creating a leak path, was a performance deficiency. The inspectors determined that this finding impacted the Initiating Events Cornerstone and its objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge safety functions during shutdown. Specifically, it impacted the configuration control attribute
 
of shutdown equipment lineup which created an unmonitored intersystem leak. The inspectors used Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix G, Attachment 1, checklist 4 (cold shutdown, level in the pressurizer, time to boil >2 hours) to evaluate the significance of this finding. A Phase 2 analysis was not needed because the level of inventory was terminated when the normal path was opened and the relief valve reseated. The leak would have terminated itself if the reactor coolant system drained itself to below the pump seal. The finding did not affect reactor coolant system level indication, affect the ability to terminate the leak path, affect the ability to add inventory, or affect the ability to recover residual heat removal if it was lost. Therefore, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance. The inspectors identified the cause of the finding had a human performance cross-cutting aspect in the area of resources. Specifically, complete and accurate procedures were not provided because Procedure GEN 00-006 did not contain guidance to establish the seal return flow path prior to raising reactor coolant system pressure above 150 psig [H.2.c].
Inspection Report# : 2012002 (pdf)
Significance:        Jan 13, 2012 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: AV Apparent Violation Failure to provide adequate oversight of contractors during maintenance on the Startup Transformer The team reviewed a self-revealing apparent violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a and Regulatory Guide 1.33 for the failure to follow procedures. Specifically, the electrical penetration seal and wiring assembly associated with the H1/CT4 and H2/CT5 current transformers installed in the startup transformer (XMR01) were replaced without insulating two of the splices, as required by Work Order 11-240360-006, Revision 3. This affected safety-related equipment on January 13, 2012, when the startup transformer experienced a spurious trip and lockout during a plant trip because the two uninsulated wires touched and provided a false high phase differential signal to the protective relaying circuit. The protective lockout caused a prolonged loss of offsite power to Train B equipment. The licensees root cause analysis concluded that the Startup Transformer failure on January 13, 2012, was caused by the failure to provide adequate oversight of contractors. As a result, the licensee failed to identify that electrical maintenance contractors had failed to install insulating sleeves on wires that affected the differential current protection circuit. This issue was entered into the corrective action program as Condition Report 47653. The licensees corrective actions included reworking the current transformer junction block to correct the missing insulation sleeves and updating station procedures to require oversight of contractors performing work on risk significant components.
This finding was more than minor because it affected the human performance attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of limiting the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions. This deficiency resulted in the failure of the fast bus transfer and the failure to maintain offsite power to safety-related loads during a reactor/turbine trip. The team performed the significance determination using NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, dated January 10, 2008, because it affected the Initiating Events Cornerstone while the plant was at power. The Phase 1 screened to a Phase 3 because the finding contributed to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigation equipment would not be available; it was also potentially risk significant due to seismic external initiating event core damage sequences. A Senior Reactor Analyst performed a Phase 3 analysis using the Wolf Creek SPAR model, Revision 8.20. The performance deficiency was determined to impact all transient sequences, particularly those involving losses of essential service water and/or component cooling water that led to a reactor coolant pump seal loss of coolant accident. The loss of cooling water prevented successful room cooling for mitigation equipment as well as loss of containment recirculation phase cooling. The analyst used half (98.5 days) of the period since the last successful load transfer, since the actual time of failure could not be determined from the available information. Credit for recovery of limited non-vital loads on the startup transformer was given based on licensee troubleshooting results, however no recovery credit was available for room cooling, since the licensee had no preplanned alternate room cooling measures. The evaluation of external events showed a small contribution due to fires. The increase in the core damage probability (ICCDP) was determined to be 2.59E-5. This was a YELLOW significance.
The evaluation of large early release failures resulted in an ICLERP of 1.62E-7. This was a WHITE significance, which is superseded by the YELLOW significance of the ICCDP.
This finding had a human performance cross-cutting aspect associated with the work control component in that licensee personnel associated with the oversight of the work did not appropriately coordinate work activities, and address the impact of changes to the work scope consistent with nuclear safety [H.3(b)] (Section 4OA5.2).
 
Inspection Report# : 2012009 (pdf)
Significance:      Dec 31, 2011 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Evaluate Gasket Compatibility The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing, non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, associated with an improperly selected essential service water gasket that sprayed safety-related electrical equipment. On August 31, 2011, essential service water pump A was started and a 1 gpm leak from a bolted flange on the strainer was observed spraying a Class 1E supply transformer. The gasket was found to be broken due to excessive torque, and was replaced. Wolf Creeks apparent cause evaluation concluded that the cause of the gasket failure was not evaluating the suitability of existing gasket material to be used in conjunction with the new, hard Ceramalloy coating applied to the strainers as part of a design change in 2003. The strainer joints had been previously re-tightened to stop leakage without evaluating the cause. Selecting inappropriate gasket material, which led to repeated leaks and tightening until the gasket broke, was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency is more than minor because it could be a precursor to a loss of essential service water event. Specifically, the water spray was wetting a transformer that could have cause the loss of the train A traveling screen, strainer, and ventilation. The inspectors used Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, and determined the issue was Green, or very low safety significance, because assuming worst case degradation, the finding did not affect train B. Also, train A essential service water was inoperable for less than its allowed outage time of 72 hours because it was successfully run the previous day. The finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution because Wolf Creek did not thoroughly evaluate the problem such that the resolutions address causes and extent of conditions, as necessary.
Specifically the bolted flanges of the essential service water strainer A had leaked multiple times over the past 2 years, but did not get evaluated because they were classified as find and fix. [P.1(c)] (Section 1R12).
Inspection Report# : 2011005 (pdf)
Significance:      Dec 31, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Account for RCP Seal Injection in Safety Analysis for Inadvertent Safety Injection On June 13, 2011, the inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR, Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, for an inadequate safety analysis of inadvertent operation of the emergency core cooling system. The inspectors identified that Updated Safety Analysis Report, Chapter 15.5.1, Inadvertent Operation of the ECCS, was inadequate because it did not account for the effects of reactor coolant pump seal injection flow. Since the pressurizer would be nearly full when operators terminate safety injection flow, the added volume would eventually overfill the pressurizer. Relief of liquid by the pressurizer safety valves is not permissible by the Updated Safety Analysis Report and the Standard Review Plan because the event could then propagate to a loss of coolant accident. The inspectors also identified that Wolf Creek needed an additional time critical operator action to re-establish letdown to reduce pressurizer level. The inspectors identified that operators were not tested on these actions in the simulator. Wolf Creek evaluations in 2011 did not find the error in the safety analysis or operator training. Wolf Creek planned to re-perform this safety analysis and has changed its simulator training to include timing of safety injection termination and establishing letdown. This issue was entered in the corrective action program as condition report 40410.
Failure to identify an inadequate safety analysis for inadvertent safety injection while comparing the plant response during an actual inadvertent safety injection to the safety analysis was a performance deficiency. This finding was more than minor because it impacted the design control attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. The inspectors used Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, "Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings," and determined that the issue required a Phase 3 analysis because it involved a primary system loss of coolant accident initiator that could exceed the technical specification limit for allowable leakage. The senior reactor analyst calculated a bounding incremental core damage probability of 9.0E-7 per year or very low safety significance. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with problem evaluation. Specifically, condition reports 34964 and 35700 did not identify the issue although they were tasked with evaluating the March 19 event against the safety analysis. [P.1(c)] (Section 1R18)
 
Inspection Report# : 2011005 (pdf)
Significance:        Dec 31, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Evaluation of Effects of Emergency Diesel Generator Frequency Variation on Supplied Equipment The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for the licensees failure to adequately evaluate the effects of allowed technical specification frequency variations on plant equipment in design calculations. Specifically, significant affects on the Class 1E electrical equipment air conditioning units were observed which required licensee action. The reduced cooling capacity raised temperatures above the allowable limits for equipment in those rooms. This finding was entered into the licensees corrective action program as condition report 2007-002734, for which the licensee performed a comprehensive analysis of the effects of frequency variation on safety-related equipment.
Failure to adequately analyze the effects of allowable frequency variations on equipment performance was a performance deficiency. This finding is more than minor because it was associated with the design control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and it affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. In accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, this finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not create a loss of safety system function of a single train for greater than the technical specification allowed outage times, and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. This finding did not have a cross-cutting aspect because the most significant contributing cause did not reflect current licensee performance (Section 4OA2).
Inspection Report# : 2011005 (pdf)
Significance:        Sep 30, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Maintain Steam Generator Level Above Lo Lo Level Setpoint The inspectors reviewed a noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Procedures, for failure of operators to follow procedure to maintain steam generator water level. This failure resulted in level in steam generator B level lowering such that a Lo Lo level actuation was initiated, which isolated normal feedwater and initiated auxiliary feedwater. A reactor trip signal was also Enclosure received, but the control rods were already tripped. The licensee captured this issue in their corrective action program as Condition Report 39732 and subsequently changed its operating procedures and conducted remediation training of licensed operators.
The issue was considered more than minor because it impacted the human performance attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone and its objective to limit the events that upset plant stability and challenge safety systems during power and shutdown operations. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, the inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the loss of mitigation equipment. The inspectors determined that the finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the decision making component because the decision by the crew to maintain steam generator level in a difficult to maintain band proved to have unintended consequences Inspection Report# : 2011004 (pdf)
Significance:        Jul 21, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Switchyard component Failures Cause Loss of Ring Bus and Loss of Offsite Power On July 21, 2011, the inspectors identified a finding for degraded switchyard equipment that caused a loss of offsite power. Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR), Section 8.2.1.3.g.1, states that: Any transmission line can be cleared under normal or fault conditions without affecting any other transmission line. On August 19, 2009, the damaged carrier system signal failures that allowed a lightning strike to cause a loss of all three 345 kV lines was
 
inconsistent with the Updated Safety Analysis Report. Wolf Creeks root cause and hardware failure analysis of the capacitive coupled voltage transformer found that it was degraded for a significant period of time. There was no causal analysis of the out of tune wave trap that contributed to the event. The inspectors concluded that the deficiency could have been prevented if Wolf Creek adopted significant external operating experience from 2004. This included inspection and/or replacement of aging capacitive coupled voltage transformers. Corrective actions from the 2004 operating experience were not implemented in a 2007 self assessment and were finally implemented in December 2009. This issue is captured in the corrective action program as Condition Report 19245. Wolf Creek and its owner companies have since upgraded all capacitive coupled voltage transformers (finishing in spring 2011), added fault data recorders, added enhanced line checking procedures with the grid operator, regrounded all three 345 kV lines, and plans to add an offsite power technical requirements manual limiting condition of operation per Condition Report 43244.
The failure to maintain 345 kV equipment such that a single line fault could be cleared without affecting the other lines, as described in the Updated Safety Analysis Report, is a performance deficiency. The issue is more than minor because it impacted the protection against external factors attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, inspectors screened the finding to Phase 3 because it caused both a reactor trip and loss of mitigation equipment or functions to not be available. The Senior Reactor Analyst calculated that the increase in core damage frequency was 2.6 x 10-7 or green. The inspectors determined that no crosscutting aspects applied because this finding is not indicative of current licensee performance.
Inspection Report# : 2011004 (pdf)
Significance:      Dec 31, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: VIO Violation Failure to Correct Vessel Head Vent Path The inspectors identified a cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, due to an inadequate vent path for the reactor vessel head. The inadequate vent path resulted in the formation of voids in the reactor vessel head during Refueling Outage 17. Failure to ensure an adequate vent path in the reactor vessel head was the subject of a noncited violation in NRC Inspection Report 05000482/2008004. During and after Refueling Outage 16, Wolf Creek initiated a root cause evaluation and corrective actions to prevent occurrence. When one of the possible root causes was disproven in Refueling Outage 17, no additional action was taken to determine the cause of the vessel head vent blockage. However, the licensee could not exclude blockage in the piping. This issue was entered into the corrective action program and the licensee plans to conduct a more thorough inspection of the piping during the next refueling outage. This issue is being tracked by the licensee as Condition Report 22501.
The inspectors determined that the failure to provide adequate vessel head vent path to prevent gas accumulation in the reactor vessel during depressurized plant operations was a performance deficiency. The inspectors determined that this finding, which was associated with the Initiating Events Cornerstone, was more than minor because if left uncorrected, it would have become a more significant safety concern. Specifically, without an adequate vent path the reactor vessel does not have an effective means of relieving noncondensable gases to prevent a loss of reactor coolant system inventory. The inspectors evaluated this finding using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix G, , and determined it be of very low safety significance based upon the demonstrated availability of mitigating systems and the flooded reactor cavity inventory. The inspectors determined the cause of the finding had a problem identification and resolution aspect in the corrective action program. Specifically, Wolf Creeks corrective actions were not successful to address the vent path blockage in a timely manner [P.1(d)].
Inspection Report# : 2009005 (pdf)
Significance:      Mar 31, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: VIO Violation
 
Failure to correct component cooling water valve closures The inspectors identified a cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, involving Wolf Creeks failure to correct the cause of the reactor coolant pump thermal barrier component cooling water heat exchanger outlet valves stroking closed on high flow. Specifically, between 2001 and 2009, Wolf Creek experienced repeated cases of the reactor coolant pump thermal barrier component cooling water heat exchanger outlet valves stroking closed during component cooling water pump swaps and during isolations of the radioactive waste evaporators. Wolf Creek reinitiated evaluation of the issue after the inspectors questions but did not review the impact on the operators ability to open the valves given the valves circuit breakers opening. Repeated throttle valve adjustments have not been successful in stopping the valve closures. This issue and the corrective actions are being tracked by the licensee in Condition Report 2007 002074 and has corrective action pending to modify valve circuitry but it has not been implemented.
The failure to correct a condition adverse to quality of ensuring reactor coolant pump seal cooling as described in the Updated Safety Analysis Report is a performance deficiency. The finding is more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute for the Initiating Events Cornerstone; and, it affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the finding would not result in exceeding the Technical Specification limit for identified reactor coolant system leakage and would not have affected other mitigation systems resulting in a total loss of the seal cooling safety function. This finding is being cited because the licensee failed to establish measures to assure this condition adverse to quality was promptly identified and corrected. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the decision making component because, even though numerous instances of valve closures occurred since the first noncited violation, Wolf Creek downgraded the condition report. Using nonconservative assumptions, the licensee consistently viewed this issue as not having a risk impact because seal injection was not simultaneously lost.
[H.1.b]
Inspection Report# : 2009002 (pdf)
Inspection Report# : 2009005 (pdf)
Inspection Report# : 2012009 (pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance:      Jun 29, 2012 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Unacceptable Leakage through Safety-Related Watertight Door during Loss of Offsite Power The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for a work order that did not accomplish a leak seal repair in accordance with its engineering evaluation. Valve BMV0037 is a safety related ASME Code Class 2 steam generator blowdown valve that had a body-to-bonnet steam leak. Wolf Creek and its vendor produced modification documents to perform a leak-seal repair. The inspectors identified that on December 10, 2011, Wolf Creek installed an injection port in the valve body in close proximity of another injection port. Work orders allowed the location of the injection ports to be determined by the work. The pair was not installed in accordance with change package 9385. After inspector questioning, Wolf Creek performed an evaluation that demonstrated that the valve body retained structural integrity. This issue was entered into the corrective action program under condition report 52992.
The failure to ensure that the configuration of a safety-related steam generator blowdown was controlled in accordance with the approved engineering change package during leak seal activities is a performance deficiency.
This finding was more than minor because it impacted the procedure quality attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone and affected the objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, this finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because an evaluation after the modification was able to demonstrate structural integrity. Therefore, the finding does not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigation equipment will not be available. The inspectors identified the cause of the finding had a human performance crosscutting aspect in the area of resources. Specifically, the
 
licensee did not ensure that the work order instructions were complete, accurate, and reflected up-to-date design documentation sufficiently to control plant configuration in accordance with design [H.2.c] (Section 1R18).
Inspection Report# : 2012003 (pdf)
Significance:      Jun 01, 2012 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Identify and Correct a Condition Adverse to Fire Protection The team identified a non-cited violation of License Condition 2.C.5.a for the failure of the licensee to identify and correct a condition adverse to fire protection. Specifically, the licensee failed to identify an adverse trend in the diesel driven fire water pump oil samples and take appropriate corrective actions. The licensees corrective actions included installing a new diesel driven fire water pump, revising the oil sample procedure to increase the sensitivity to the presence of water, and evaluating further corrective actions. This issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Report 43710.
This performance deficiency was more than minor because it affected the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of protection against external factors (fire) and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Corrective actions to address the adverse condition were not taken, which led to the catastrophic failure of the right-angle drive for the diesel driven fire water pump. The team performed the significance determination using NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, dated January 10, 2008, because it affected the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone while the plant was at power, and concluded the finding needed additional screening under Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process, dated February 28, 2005. The team determined that the condition represented a low degradation of the fire protection program element of fixed fire protection systems due to a loss of the diesel driven fire water pump, and using Figure F.1 the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance based on Task 1.3.1. In addition, this finding had a problem identification and resolution cross cutting aspect associated with the corrective action program component in that the licensee failed to thoroughly evaluate problems such that resolutions address causes and extent of condition
[P.1(c)] (Section 4OA5.10).
Inspection Report# : 2012009 (pdf)
Significance:      Jun 01, 2012 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Procedure for Temporary Fire Pump The team reviewed a self-revealing non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.d for the failure to have procedures appropriate for the implementation of fire protection compensatory measures. Specifically, Procedure SYS FP-290, Temporary Fire Pump Operations, Revision 10, did not have appropriate guidance for the installation and operation of a temporary diesel driven fire water pump. This pump was a compensatory action for the nonfunctional normally installed diesel driven fire water pump. The licensees corrective actions included revising Procedure SYS FP-290 to provide adequate instructions to operate the temporary diesel driven fire water pump continuously to preclude another loss of fire water suppression capability; completing a temporary modification for the installation of the temporary diesel driven fire water pump; and replacing the permanently installed diesel driven fire water pump.
This issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Reports 43710 and 51821.
This performance deficiency was more than minor because it affected the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of protection against external factors and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The inadequate procedure contributed to the delayed recovery of the fire water system for approximately 9 hours. A Phase 1 screening indentified that the issue should be evaluated under NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process. A Region IV Senior Reactor Analyst, who determined that NRC Inspection Manual 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process, was not a good tool to evaluate this issue because the firewater system was credited in both the fire suppression and the internal events probabilistic risk assessment models. Therefore the analyst performed a bounding detailed risk evaluation for this performance deficiency. The exposure period of 68 days was used for the time when the pump was placed in a cold-
 
weather alignment. The senior reactor analyst determined that bounding change to the core damage frequency was 5.9E-7 per year. The dominant core damage sequences included loss of offsite power initiating events (including fire induced loss of offsite power events), the failure of component cooling water, and the failure to establish alternate lube oil cooling to the charging and high pressure safety injection pumps. The availability of the motor-driven pump, the limited frequency of risk significant fire induced loss of offsite power events, and the availability of front line lube oil cooling systems, such as component cooling water, helped to mitigate the findings significance. This finding had a human performance cross-cutting aspect associated with the decision making component in that the licensee failed to make safety-significant decisions using a systematic process to ensure safety was maintained while reviewing changes to the plant and procedures necessary to implement required compensatory measures [H.1(a)] (Section 4OA5.8).
Inspection Report# : 2012009 (pdf)
Significance:        Jun 01, 2012 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequte Preventative Maintenance Procedure on Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump The team reviewed a self-revealing non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for the failure to have an adequate preventative maintenance procedure, PM 28129, Refueling Inspection of the Trip Tappet. Specifically, the dimensional criterion for the head lever to tappet nut engagement was not verified to be in accordance with vendor recommended criteria. The licensees corrective actions included replacement of the trip tappet nut, trip lever, and trip linkage spring, as well as, inspecting all contact points on the trip linkage for damage or wear and specifying a more precise method of measuring the head lever to tappet nut engagement. This issue was documented in the licensees corrective action program as Condition Report 47658.
This finding was more than minor because it affected the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attributes of Human Performance and Procedure Quality and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. This deficiency resulted in the potential of the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump to trip during a seismic, or other jarring events. The team performed the significance determination using NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 0609.04, Phase 1
- Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, dated January 10, 2008, because it affected the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone while the plant was at power. The Phase 1 screened to a Phase 3 because the finding was potentially risk significant due to seismic external initiating event core damage sequences. A Senior Reactor Analyst performed a Phase 3 analysis. The performance deficiency was determined to impact seismic events, since a seismic event could jar the mechanism enough to trip the turbine. Assuming all seismic events would trip the turbine, the analyst used SPAR-H to evaluate operator action to reset the trip mechanism. Considering the recovery, and conservatively assuming a zero baseline, the Delta-CDF of the finding was 7.9E-9/yr, or very low safety significance (Green). This finding did not have any cross-cutting aspects because the preventative maintenance procedure was changed in 1999 and no other procedure changes since then would have caused the licensee to review this change, therefore, it is not representative of current licensee performance (Section 4OA5.3).
Inspection Report# : 2012009 (pdf)
Significance:        May 26, 2012 Identified By: NRC Item Type: VIO Violation Failure to Take Timely corrective Action to Preclude Repetition The inspectors identified a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for the licensees failure to take corrective action to preclude repetition of system leaks due to water hammer events in the essential service water system. Extensive inadequately evaluated corrosion in the system has led to multiple water-hammer-induced leaks of essential service water piping. These leaks were the subject of two previous violations issued by the NRC. The licensee failed to take timely corrective action to restore compliance. The licensee entered this finding in its corrective action program as condition report 53443.
The failure to preclude recurrence of water hammer in the essential service water system and the failure to take adequate corrective action to control internal pitting corrosion in essential service water system piping was a performance deficiency. The deficiency was more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance
 
attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. It is therefore a finding. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the team determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding was a design or qualification deficiency that was confirmed not to result in loss of system operability or functionality. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the corrective action program component of the problem identification and resolution cross-cutting area because the licensee failed to take appropriate corrective actions to address safety issues and adverse trends in a timely manner, commensurate with their safety significance (P.1(d)). (Section 4OA2.5.c)
Inspection Report# : 2012007 (pdf)
Significance:        May 26, 2012 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequte Procedure to Implement Compensatory Measures The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for the licensees failure to adequately translate design information into procedures and requirements.
Specifically, the licensee had information that its calculation for vital switchgear cooling included nonconservative assumptions. These assumptions called into question the ability of air conditioning systems to adequately cool Class 1E switchgear under all design conditions. The licensee failed to revise procedures to include compensatory actions necessary to ensure the vital switchgear remained operable. The licensee entered this finding in its corrective action program as condition report 53393.
The inspectors determined that the licensees failure to adequately translate design information into procedures was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency is more than minor because it affected the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening an Characterization of Findings, the team determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not represent a loss of system safety function, did not represent the actual loss of safety function of a single train for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time, and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the corrective action component of the problem identification and resolution cross-cutting area because the licensee failed to thoroughly evaluate the problem such that its resolution addressed its causes and extent of conditions (P.1(c)). (Section 4OA2.5.a)
Inspection Report# : 2012007 (pdf)
Significance:        May 26, 2012 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Untimely Corrective Action The team identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for the licensees failure to effectively correct deficient procedures regarding the use of clearance orders. A number of clearance-related problems revealed several deficiences in procedures to ensure that safe tag-out of equipment occurred prior to the start of work, that independent reviews of qualified individuals were being completed during clearance order preparation, and that effective training was being conducted where performance gaps were identified.
The licensee failed to correct these deficiencies in a timely manner. The licensee entered this finding in its corrective action program as condition report 53451.
The team determined that the failure to correct an adverse trend in the use of clearance orders was a performance deficiency. This finding was more than minor because if left uncorrected, it could lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, continued failure to establish the correct clearance order boundaries could result in the loss of configuration control for systems required to maintain nuclear safety. Using Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 -
Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the team determined that this finding was of very low safety
 
significance (Green) because it was not a design or qualification deficiency, did not represent a loss of system safety function, and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The team determined that this finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the resources component of the human performance cross-cutting area because the licensee failed to ensure complete, accurate and up-to-date design documentation, procedures, and work packages were available and adequate to support nuclear safety (H.2(c)).
(Section 4OA2.5.d)
Inspection Report# : 2012007 (pdf)
Significance:        May 26, 2012 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Complete Corrective Actions The team identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for the licensees failure to establish adequate procedures for resolution of corrective actions. Specifically, the licensee failed to establish procedures to ensure that planned corrective actions were effectively implemented. The licensee entered this finding in its corrective action program as condition report 53432.
The failure to establish adequate procedures for resolution of corrective actions was a performance deficiency. This finding was more than minor because if left uncorrected, it would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, failure to establish adequate procedures for resolution of corrective actions could result in important actions not being accomplished. Using Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, this finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it was not a design or qualification deficiency, did not represent a loss of system safety function, and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the decision making component of the human performance cross-cutting area because the licensee failed to demonstrate that nuclear safety is an overriding priority by making safety-significant or risk-significant decisions using a systematic process (H.1(a)). (Section 4OA2.5.e)
Inspection Report# : 2012007 (pdf)
Significance:        May 26, 2012 Identified By: NRC Item Type: VIO Violation Failure to Implement Procedures to Test Safety-Related Equipment The team identified a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for the licensees failure to perform testing of safety-related spring-loaded tornado dampers in the emergency diesel generator and essential service water rooms. In 2008, the licensee identified that because the updated safety analysis report (USAR) incorrectly classified these active components as passive, they had not been included in a periodic testing or surveillance program. Since 2010, action items to test the dampers have received four due date extensions.
Additonally, required training for this testing was completed and closed. However, no testing or surveillance was accomplished. This failure was the subject of a previous violation issued by the NRC. The licensee failed to take timely corrective actions to restore compliance. The licensee entered this finding in its corrective action program as condition report 53363.
The team determined that the licensees failure to implement corrective action was a performance deficiency. This finding was more than minor because it affected the equipment reliability attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, failure to implement this corrective action could result in reduced reliability of safety-related equipment during an event initiated by a tornado. Using Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 -
Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the team determined that this finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because it was not a design or qualification deficiency, did not represent a loss of system safety function, and during a tornado, would not cause a plant trip if failed, would not degrade two or more trains of a multi-train safety system, and would not degrade one or more trains of a system that supports a safety system or function.
This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the resources component of the human performance cross-cutting area because the licensee failed to provide complete, accurate, and up-to-date design documentation, procedures, and work
 
packages were available and adequate to support nuclear safety (H.2(c)). (Section 4OA2.5.f)
Inspection Report# : 2012007 (pdf)
Significance:        May 26, 2012 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Prevent Recurrent of Component Cooling Water System Voiding On February 23, 2011, a non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, was revealed when an anomalous start of component cooling water pump B indicated gas voiding in the component cooling water piping. This violation was due to the licensees inadequate root cause evaluation and failure to prevent recurrence of the voiding that had previously occurred in May 2010. The licensee entered this finding in its corrective action program as condition report 33925.
The failure to properly identify design issues as a root cause and to take action to prevent the recurrence of a component cooling water system voiding was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency is more than minor because it impacted the equipment performance attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, excessive voiding of the component cooling water system could lead to lack of cooling to important safety-related components. Using Manual Chapter 0609.04, "Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings," the team determined that the issue was of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not represent a loss of system safety function or loss of a single train longer than its technical specification allowed outage time. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the corrective action program component of the problem identification and resolution cross-cutting area because the licensee failed to thoroughly evaluate a problem such that its resolution addressed its cause and extent of condition. Specifically, condition report 25918 did not properly identify design issues as a root cause requiring immediate system modifications to preclude recurrence (P.1 (c)). (Section 4OA2.5.g)
Inspection Report# : 2012007 (pdf)
Significance:        May 26, 2012 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Adequately Evaluate the Suitability of Nonsafety-related Gaskets, O-Rings, and Seals Installed in Safety-Related Equipment and to Identify Extent of the Condition The team identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for the licensees failure to evaluate the suitability of nonsafety-related gaskets, o-rings, and seals installed in safety-related components. These nonsafety-related parts were originally installed due to erroneous Safety Classification Assessments. After determining that the parts were inappropriate in safety-related joints, the licensee failed to promptly correct the condition and failed to fully identify which components were affected. The licensee entered this finding in its corrective action program as condition report 53456.
The failure of the licensee to evaluate the suitability of the specific nonsafety-related material installed in safety-related equipment and to determine the extent to which this condition existed was a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency was more than minor because it affected the design control attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the inadequate evaluation of nonsafety-related gaskets, o-rings, and seals installed in safety-related equipment adversely affected the reliability of the affected systems. Using Manual Chapter 0609.04, "Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings," the team determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding was a design or qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in loss of operability or functionality. This performance deficiency had a cross-cutting aspect in the corrective action program component of the problem identification and resolution cross-cutting area because the licensee did not take appropriate corrective actions to address safety issues and adverse trends in a timely manner, commensurate with their safety significance and complexity (P.1(d)). (Section 4OA2.5.h)
Inspection Report# : 2012007 (pdf)
 
Significance:      May 26, 2012 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Inappropriately High Threshold for Condition Report Initiation The team identified a finding for the licensees failure to ensure that condition reports were initiated as required by procedure. The licensees implementing procedure for its corrective action program did not contain clear guidance as to what conditions were required to be entered into the corrective action program, or how soon after discovery the condition report was required to be generated. The team identified several examples where condition reports were not generated, though it appeared from the guidance that they were required. The licensee entered this finding in its corrective action program as condition report 53445.
The failure of licensee personnel to promply initiate condition reports for identified issues, contrary to procedural requirements, is a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency is more than minor because if left uncorrected, it could lead to a more significant safety concern. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 -
Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the team determined that this finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not involve a design or qualification deficiency, did not represent a loss of system safety function, and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the resources component of the human performance cross-cutting area because the licensee failed to ensure procedures necessary for complete, accurate, and up-to-date procedures were available and adequate to support nuclear safety. Specifically, the corrective action program procedure was vague in its guidance as to when a condition report was required (H.2(c)). (Section 4OA2.5.i)
Inspection Report# : 2012007 (pdf)
Significance:      Jan 24, 2012 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Loss of Configuration Control Causes Loss of All Non-Vital Power Inspectors identified a non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Procedures, for implementation of an unauthorized modification by using a clearance order and a temporary procedure. This left the power source to a temporary protective relay unprotected. When another clearance order was being placed for main generator work, the temporary relay power source was lost when fuses were removed which supplied power to the temporary relay. This tripped the offsite power breaker to 13.8kV bus PA01 and tripped PA01 distribution breakers on January 24, 2012. Safety busses were unaffected because they were cross tied and being supplied by the No. 7 transformer. All non-vital systems lost power including normal service water which was removing core decay heat until operators could manually start and align essential service water pumps. Power to all systems was restored within approximately 24 hours. The inspectors found that the installation of temporary equipment was an unevaluated long standing practice. The temporary procedure was consistent with a system operating procedure when it was approved on January 17, 2012. This conclusion differed from Wolf Creeks apparent cause determination which did not identify the issue as an unevaluated modification. The inspectors concluded that they added value and considered the issue NRC identified. Initially, corrective actions included changing the clearance order to prevent removing of fuses to the temporary relay. After inspector questions, Wolf Creek blocked the use of the temporary procedure and procedure SYS MA-120 until further evaluation was completed. This has been entered into the corrective action program as condition reports 48182, 48642, and 51408.
Failure to control system configuration such that unplanned loss of power would not occur is a performance deficiency. The inspectors determined that this finding was more than minor because it impacted the mitigating systems cornerstone and its objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). Specifically, it impacted the configuration control attribute of shutdown equipment lineup which created a loss of offsite power to 13.8kV bus PA01. The inspectors screened the loss of service water pumps B and C, A and B circulating water pumps, vital air conditioning units, emergency diesel generator starting air compressors, transformer XNB01 cooling fans, heat tracing, auxiliary boiler steam heating, the condensate storage tank makeup pump, and the refueling water storage tank makeup pump to Manual Chapter 0609, attachment G, checklist 4. Wolf Creek had inventory in the pressurizer with a time to boil greater than 2 hours. The inspectors screened the finding to Green or very low safety significance because it did not
 
involve a loss of reactor coolant system inventory, did not affect reactor coolant system level instrumentation, did not affect the licensees ability to terminate a leak path, did not affect the licensees ability to add reactor coolant system inventory when needed, or degrade the licensees ability to recover decay heat removal once it was lost. Additionally, the inspectors screened the loss of the electric fire pump and jockey (keep full) fire pump to Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04. Specifically, these pumps were out of service for less than 24 hours, and therefore, screened to Green or very low safety significance. The inspectors identified that the cause of the finding had a human performance cross-cutting aspect in the area of resources because the loss of power was caused by a lack of complete, accurate and up-to-date design documentation, procedures, drawings, fuse labeling, and work orders necessary to support the temporary configuration established through TMP 12-001 [H.2.c].
Inspection Report# : 2012002 (pdf)
Significance:        Dec 31, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Incorrect Retraction of an Event that Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV noncited violation of 10 CFR 50.73 because the licensee inappropriately retracted a licensee event report. On September 29, 2011, Wolf Creek issued Licensee Event Report 2011-004-01 which retracted the 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) portion of the report for loss of both trains of automatic safety injection on March 19, 2011. The automatic functioning of safety injection is required by Technical Specification 3.3.2, function 1.b. Wolf Creek licensee event report 2011-004-00 was correct in its reporting the loss of safety function. In retracting this aspect, Wolf Creek credited manual action to restart safety injection and the long standing logic design.
However, NUREG 1022, Section 3.2.7, specifies that inoperable systems required by the technical specifications be reported. This issue is entered into the licensees corrective action program as condition report 46110.
The inspectors reviewed this issue in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0612 and the NRC Enforcement Manual and determined that traditional enforcement was applicable to this issue because the NRC's regulatory ability was affected. Specifically, the NRC relies on the licensee to identify and report conditions or events meeting the criteria specified in regulations in order to perform its regulatory function, and when this is not done, the regulatory function is impacted. The inspectors used the Enforcement Policy and the available risk information to conclude that this violation is appropriately characterized as Severity Level IV.
Inspection Report# : 2011005 (pdf)
Significance:        Dec 12, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Alternative Shutdown Procedure The team identified a Green non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.d for the failure to implement and maintain adequate written procedures covering fire protection program implementation. Specifically, the team identified two examples where the licensee failed to maintain an alternative shutdown procedure that ensured operators would prevent overfilling the pressurizer and steam generators, respectively. The licensee documented this deficiency in Condition Report 045442.
The failure to maintain adequate written procedures covering fire protection program implementation was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the protection against external events (fire) attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and it adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The team evaluated the significance of this finding using Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process, because the performance deficiency affected fire protection defense-in-depth strategies involving post-fire safe shutdown systems. A senior reactor analyst performed a Phase 3 evaluation and determined this finding had very low risk significance based upon a bounding analysis (Green). This finding did not reflect current licensee performance (Section 1R05.05.2).
Inspection Report# : 2011007 (pdf)
 
Significance:      Dec 12, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Ensure Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Components Remain Free of Fire Damage The team identified a Green non-cited violation of License Condition 2.C(5) because the licensee failed to implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program. Specifically, the licensee failed to properly analyze for fire damage in the form of shorts-to-ground related to the residual heat removal Train B refueling water storage tank suction valve and the pressurizer power-operated relief valves. Certain postulated shorts-to-ground could spuriously actuate these valves such that safe shutdown would be impacted. The licensee documented these deficiencies in Condition Reports 044912 and 045452, respectively.
The failure to protect the residual heat removal Train B suction cables and the pressurizer power operated relief valve cables against all modes of cable failure during post-fire safe shutdown circuit analysis was a performance deficiency.
The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the design control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences.
The team used Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process, because the performance deficiency affected fire protection defense-in-depth strategies involving post-fire safe shutdown. The team categorized the finding as having a high degradation rating because the post fire safe shutdown analysis was not complete. Because the Phase 1 screening criteria were not met, the team performed a Phase 2 analysis. The team walked down the affected fire area for each example as part of the Phase 2 quantitative screening. The team identified fire ignition sources and targets, and specific fire growth and damage scenario combinations for each example. The sum of the conditional core damage frequencies for the fire scenarios was 5.15E 7/year, which bounded the total change in core damage frequency associated with this performance deficiency.
This performance deficiency had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with decision making because the licensee did not use conservative assumptions during their design review process. Specifically, the licensee did not follow industry guidance related to performing a circuit analysis [H.1(b)] (Section 1R05.06).
Inspection Report# : 2011007 (pdf)
Significance:      Nov 04, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to Verify Isolation of Associated Circuits on Isolation Switches The team identified a finding because the licensee was not fully testing the isolation function of local transfer switches located at motor control center breakers for individual components. As a result, the licensee was not performing periodic verifications to confirm that local control circuits would be isolated from the effects of fire damage caused by a control room fire. The licensee documented this deficiency in Condition Report 045434.
The failure to maintain adequate written procedures covering fire protection program implementation was a performance deficiency. Specifically, the licensee failed to ensure that component specific transfer switch testing procedures verified proper circuit isolation from the control room in the event of a control room fire. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the procedure quality attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The team evaluated the findin}}

Latest revision as of 13:54, 29 November 2024

2017 Q1-Q4 ROP Inspection Findings
ML20311A324
Person / Time
Site: Wolf Creek Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation icon.png
Issue date: 04/20/2018
From:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
References
Download: ML20311A324 (738)
v • d • e


Text

Retrieved from "https://kanterella.com/w/index.php?title=ML20311A324&oldid=3830310"