ML23052A148: Difference between revisions

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{{#Wiki_filter:Date: February 21, 2023
{{#Wiki_filter:1 of 2 Date:
February 21, 2023  


==Subject:==
==Subject:==
Response to Information Request: The Nuclear Regulatory Authori ty - Japan
Response to Information Request: The Nuclear Regulatory Authority - Japan Basis for U.S. 40-year Reactor License Term Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Section 103 Each such license shall be issued for a specified periodbut not exceeding forty yearsand may be renewed upon the expiration of such a period Key Messages The 40-year license term was a political decision based on a desire to set a limit to address antitrust concerns, while also maintaining consistency with the typical amortization schedule used by electrical utility companies for capital investments.
 
In the development of Atomic Energy Act of 1954, antitrust concerns were a significant topic of debate. There was a fear that the government transfer of nuclear technology to private entities would put them in a position to monopolize nuclear power.
Basis for U.S. 40-year Reactor License Term
The limited term was not based on technical considerations. Nevertheless, the 40-year license term is acknowledged to have influenced engineering analyses and component selection. As a result, the license renewal framework specifically considers aging implications beyond 40 years of operation.
 
Background / References NUREG/BR-0518, No Undue Risk: Regulating the Safety of Operating Nuclear Power Plants (2014) [Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS)
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Section 103 Each such license shall be issued for a specified periodbut n ot exceeding forty yearsand may be renewed upon the expiration of such a period
 
Key Messages The 40-year license term was a political decision based on a d esire to set a limit to address antitrust concerns, while also maintaining consistency with the typical amortization schedule used by electrical utility companies for capital investments.
In the development of Atomic Energy Act of 1954, antitrust con cerns were a significant topic of debate. There was a fear that the government transfer of nuclea r technology to private entities would put them in a position to monopolize nuclear power.
The limited term was not based on technical considerations. Ne vertheless, the 40-year license term is acknowledged to have influenced engineering analyses an d component selection. As a result, the license renewal framework specifically considers ag ing implications beyond 40 years of operation.
 
Background / References
* NUREG/BR-0518, No Undue Risk: Regulating the Safety of Operat ing Nuclear Power Plants (2014) [Agencywide Documents Access and Management Syst em (ADAMS)
Accession No. ML14181A493]
Accession No. ML14181A493]
The selection of a 40-year term for licenses originally had nothing to do with technical considerations of plant aging. Forty years was a compromise between the Justice Departments desire for a short license period to keep utilities from monopolizing power sources and utility officials who favored a longer period to amortize the capital costs of a plant.
The 40-year license might not have had a technical basis but it had technical implications. Engineering analysis and component selection as part of the original design of a plant were often made on the assumption of 40-years of operation.
NUREG-1610, Controlling the Atom: The Beginnings of Nuclear Regulation 1946-1962 (1984) [ML20149F702]
Congress finally passed the new Atomic Energy Act in August 1954, despite the objections of some legislators who complained that it would lead to private monopoly of atomic power and preclude public-power initiatives. (p. 31)


The selection of a 40-year term for licenses originally had not hing to do with technical considerations of plant aging. Forty years wa s a compromise between the Justice Departments desire for a short license period to keep utilities from monopolizing power source s and utility officials who favored a longer period to amortize the c apital costs of a plant.
2 of 2 Antitrust Provisions of the Atomic Energy Act, Richard Cosway, Vanderbilt Law Review, Volume 12, Issue 1, (1958) [at https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu]
 
The antitrust provisions developed from a sincere fear that nuclear power lends itself to monopolization and restriction, a fear founded on the circumstances that: (1) to date, vast amounts of capital are required for entrance into the field, (2) great risks deter entry, and (3) those companies which are in the field, since the days of the Manhattan Project, have a head start over outsiders.
The 40-year license might not have had a technical basis but it had technical implications. Engineering analysis and component sele ction as part of the original design of a plant were often made on th e assumption of 40-years of operation.
Legislative History of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (1955)
* NUREG-1610, Controlling the Atom: The Beginnings of Nuclear R egulation 1946-1962 (1984) [ML20149F702]
[at https://www.google.com/books]
 
Congress finally passed the new Atomic Energy Act in August 195 4, despite the objections of some legislators who complained that it would lead to private monopoly of atomic power and preclude public-po wer initiatives. (p. 31)
 
1 of 2
* Antitrust Provisions of the Atomic Energy Act, Richard Coswa y, Vanderbilt Law Review, Volume 12, Issue 1, (1958) [at https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu ]
 
The antitrust provisions developed from a sincere fear that nuc lear power lends itself to monopolization and restriction, a fear fo unded on the circumstances that: (1) to date, vast amounts of capital ar e required for entrance into the field, (2) great risks deter ent ry, and (3) those companies which are in the field, since the days of the Manhattan Project, have a head start over outsiders.
* Legislative History of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (1955)
[at https://www.google.com/books ]
 
Testimony of Senator Humpfrey:
Testimony of Senator Humpfrey:
 
I cannot imagine a licensing system under which anyone in government would grant a license in perpetuity. There is not a franchise that is not limited, in term of years at least. Yet here, with these fabulous resources in which the people have invested billions of dollars, resources which may change the face of America, the pending bill literally permits the Government to give a license extending into infinity, with no recapture clause whatsoever even if it should be deemed necessary in the public interest
I cannot imagine a licensing system under which anyone in government would grant a license in perpetuity. There is not a franchise that is not limited, in term of years at least. Yet here, with these fabulous resources in which the people have invested bill ions of dollars, resources which may change the face of America, the pe nding bill literally permits the Government to give a license extendi ng into infinity, with no recapture clause whatsoever even if it should be deemed necessary in the public interest
 
[the Congressional record doesnt appear to go into great detail regarding the amortization schedule, except in the specific discussions of Tennessee Valley Authority projects]
[the Congressional record doesnt appear to go into great detail regarding the amortization schedule, except in the specific discussions of Tennessee Valley Authority projects]
Testimony of Senator Gore:
Testimony of Senator Gore:
 
Under the law, TVA is required to amortize each and every one of its power projects in 40 years. The law requires the TVA to repay actually and physically into the United States Treasury a sufficient amount each year to amortize the investment in power projects within 40 years.
Under the law, TVA is required to amortize each and every one o f its power projects in 40 years. The law requires the TVA to repay a ctually and physically into the United States Treasury a sufficient amo unt each year to amortize the investment in power projects within 4 0 years.
Division of New and Renewed Licenses Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission}}
 
Division of New and Renewed Licenses Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
 
2 of 2}}

Latest revision as of 10:15, 27 November 2024

Response to Nuclear Regulatory Authority (Japan) - Basis for 40 Year Reactor License
ML23052A148
Person / Time
Issue date: 02/21/2023
From: John Wise
NRC/NRR/DNRL
To:
References
Download: ML23052A148 (2)


Text

1 of 2 Date:

February 21, 2023

Subject:

Response to Information Request: The Nuclear Regulatory Authority - Japan Basis for U.S. 40-year Reactor License Term Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Section 103 Each such license shall be issued for a specified periodbut not exceeding forty yearsand may be renewed upon the expiration of such a period Key Messages The 40-year license term was a political decision based on a desire to set a limit to address antitrust concerns, while also maintaining consistency with the typical amortization schedule used by electrical utility companies for capital investments.

In the development of Atomic Energy Act of 1954, antitrust concerns were a significant topic of debate. There was a fear that the government transfer of nuclear technology to private entities would put them in a position to monopolize nuclear power.

The limited term was not based on technical considerations. Nevertheless, the 40-year license term is acknowledged to have influenced engineering analyses and component selection. As a result, the license renewal framework specifically considers aging implications beyond 40 years of operation.

Background / References NUREG/BR-0518, No Undue Risk: Regulating the Safety of Operating Nuclear Power Plants (2014) [Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS)

Accession No. ML14181A493]

The selection of a 40-year term for licenses originally had nothing to do with technical considerations of plant aging. Forty years was a compromise between the Justice Departments desire for a short license period to keep utilities from monopolizing power sources and utility officials who favored a longer period to amortize the capital costs of a plant.

The 40-year license might not have had a technical basis but it had technical implications. Engineering analysis and component selection as part of the original design of a plant were often made on the assumption of 40-years of operation.

NUREG-1610, Controlling the Atom: The Beginnings of Nuclear Regulation 1946-1962 (1984) [ML20149F702]

Congress finally passed the new Atomic Energy Act in August 1954, despite the objections of some legislators who complained that it would lead to private monopoly of atomic power and preclude public-power initiatives. (p. 31)

2 of 2 Antitrust Provisions of the Atomic Energy Act, Richard Cosway, Vanderbilt Law Review, Volume 12, Issue 1, (1958) [at https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu]

The antitrust provisions developed from a sincere fear that nuclear power lends itself to monopolization and restriction, a fear founded on the circumstances that: (1) to date, vast amounts of capital are required for entrance into the field, (2) great risks deter entry, and (3) those companies which are in the field, since the days of the Manhattan Project, have a head start over outsiders.

Legislative History of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (1955)

[at https://www.google.com/books]

Testimony of Senator Humpfrey:

I cannot imagine a licensing system under which anyone in government would grant a license in perpetuity. There is not a franchise that is not limited, in term of years at least. Yet here, with these fabulous resources in which the people have invested billions of dollars, resources which may change the face of America, the pending bill literally permits the Government to give a license extending into infinity, with no recapture clause whatsoever even if it should be deemed necessary in the public interest

[the Congressional record doesnt appear to go into great detail regarding the amortization schedule, except in the specific discussions of Tennessee Valley Authority projects]

Testimony of Senator Gore:

Under the law, TVA is required to amortize each and every one of its power projects in 40 years. The law requires the TVA to repay actually and physically into the United States Treasury a sufficient amount each year to amortize the investment in power projects within 40 years.

Division of New and Renewed Licenses Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission