ML22024A064

Transcript of Rulemaking: Alternative Physical Security Requirements for Advanced Reactors Public Meeting, January 20, 2022, Pages 1-72

ML22024A064
Person / Time
Issue date:	01/20/2022
From:	Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards
To:
Andrukat, Dennis
References
NRC-1807, NRC-2017-0227, RIN 3150-AK19
Download: ML22024A064 (74)

Text

Official Transcript of Proceedings

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Title:

Rulemaking: Alternative Physical Security Requirements for Advanced Reactors Public Meeting

Docket Number: (n/a)

Location: teleconference

Date: Thursday, January 20, 2022

Work Order No.: NRC-1807 Pages 1-72

NEAL R. GROSS AND CO., INC.

Court Reporters and Transcribers 1716 14th Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20009 (202) 234 -4433 1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

+ + + + +

PUBLIC MEETING TO DISCUSS RULEMAKING: ALTERNATIVE

PHYSICAL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR ADVANCED

REACTORS

+ + + + +

THURSDAY

JANUARY 20, 2022

+ + + + +

The Meeting convened via Videoconference,

at 11:00 a.m. EST, Dennis Andrukat, Facilitator,

presiding.

PRESENT:

DENNIS ANDRUKAT

LOUIS CUBELLIS

STACY PRASAD

BETH REED

MICHELE SAMPSON

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ALSO PRESENT:

CHRISTOPHER CHWASZ, Idaho National Laboratory

KEVIN DEYETTE, NuScale

SCOTT FERRARA, Idaho National Laboratory

RANI FRANOVICH, The Breakthrough Institute

DYRK GREENHALGH, Kairos Power

EDWIN LYMAN, Union of Concerned Scientists

DAVID YOUNG, Nuclear Energy Institute

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P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S

11:02 a.m.

MR. ANDRUKAT: Okay, good morning.

Hopefully everyone can see the slides and can hear me

very well.

MR. YOUNG: We can year you, Dennis.

MR. ANDRUKAT: Fantastic. Thanks, David.

I want to welcome everyone, and thank you for

participating in today's public meeting to discuss the

Alternative Physical Security Requirements for Advance

Reactors, also known as the Advance Reactor Security

Rulemaking.

My name is Dennis Andrukat. I'm from the

NRC's Office of Nuclear Material Safeguards and

Rulemaking -- excuse me, and Security -- and I will be

serving as the facilitator for today's meeting on this

rulemaking.

This is an information meeting with a

question-and-answer session. The purpose of this

meeting is for the NRC staff to meet directly with the

individuals to discuss the regulatory and technical

issues.

Attendees will have an opportunity to ask

the questions to the NRC staff, or make comments about

the issues discussed, but we do ask that the attendees

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wait until the end of the staff's presentation.

The NRC is not actively soliciting

comments towards the regulatory decision at this

meeting.

The purpose of today's meeting is to

present the recently released, revised, preliminary

proposed rule language, as part of the Alternative

Physical Security Requirements for non-light water

reactors and small modular reactors. The proposed

rule is currently in development with the staff.

The staff will also present key elements

of the latest draft implementation guidance documents,

and there are currently two that are in development.

We are using Microsoft Teams. So, the

agenda today is broken into two main presentations.

We're going to discuss and present the preliminary

proposed rule language, the current version.

This is also the handout that we see in

the public meeting notice. And we will also discuss

the key elements of the associated implementation

guidance.

We do plan to have a break at about the

halfway mark, depending on how everyone feels and the

progress being made.

We are using Microsoft Teams for this

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public meeting, and so this will require all of us to

continuously assure that our phones and laptops are

muted when we are not speaking, and to do our best not

to speak over each other.

To help facilitate discussion during the

meeting, we request that you utilize the raised-hand

feature in Teams, so that we can identify who would

like to speak next. The staff will then call on the

individual to ask the question or make their comment.

The raised-hand button, which is shaped

like a small hand, is along the top row in the Teams

display area.

You can also use the chat window to alert

us that you had a question or comment. Please do not

use the chat window to actually ask the comment or to

address or ask your questions, as the window, the chat

window, is not part of the official meeting record.

It is reserved to identify when someone has a

question, or to handle logistical issues.

If you joined the meeting using the

Microsoft Teams bridge line, i.e., the phone, and you

would like to ask a question or provide a comment, you

may do so by pressing star-six to unmute your phone,

to identify that you have a comment or a question.

When you are done speaking, please go back on to mute

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by pressing star-six again.

The ADAMS Accession number for today's

presentation is ML22019A075. And the ADAMS Accession

number for the referenced preliminary proposed rule

language is ML21336A004.

And I placed a link to the ADAMS

presentation in the chat window. The ADAMS number for

the preliminary proposed rule language is in the

presentation. You'll see that here shortly.

This meeting is being transcribed. So, in

order to get a clean transcription and to minimize

distraction, again please be courteous. Please use

the mute function, as well as please be sure to

identify yourself before you speak and the affiliation

for which you're speaking.

A summary of the transcript will be made

available on or before February21, 2022.

Again, the format for today's public

meeting is an informational presentation, but I would

like to highlight a few items.

As you can see on this slide, you see the

name of the rulemaking. You can see the docket ID

number, NRC2017-0227, that you can find under

regulations.gov.

I would also like to point out a slight

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change. The supporting guidance, as I mentioned

earlier, there are two. DG1365 is now DG5022. And

those familiar with the NRC's regulatory guide

division structure will note that this is now a

Division-5 guidance document, which fits under the

Division for Physical Security.

The other associated draft guidance

document is DG 50.71, which focuses on the target set

identification process.

Ad now, we'd like to go through the

presentation slides, starting off with the preliminary

proposed rule language presentation.

As I mentioned earlier, here is the ADAMS

Accession number for the handout. This is the full

preliminary proposed rule language, the current draft.

It is in redline/strikeout format. And that is a

comparison of the proposed changes to the current

existing language in the regulation.

There is a disclaimer here. Please note

the NRC is making this preliminary proposed rule

language available to the public solely for the

purpose of providing information to the public.

The release of this proposed rule language

will facilitate today's discussion, but does not

represent the final staff position, nor has it been

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reviewed by the Commission. Therefore, the rule

language may undergo additional revisions throughout

the remainder of the rulemaking process.

I will highlight that the previous

released preliminary proposed rule language is ADAMS

Accession number ML20182A157, and that was released

September of 2020.

The next few presenters represent staff

from the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation,

Ms. Beth Reed, and the Office of Nuclear Security and

Incident Response, Mr.Lou Cubellis and Ms.Stacy

Prasad.

And with that, I'll turn the meeting over

to Beth Reed of the Office of Nuclear Reactor

Regulation, to continue to present the preliminary

proposed rule language. Beth?

MS. REED: Thank you, Dennis, and good

morning everyone.

Today, we will discuss both the

preliminary proposed rule language and draft guidance

in 73.55(b) and 73.55(s). 73.55(b) addresses

performance requirements, and 73.55(s) addresses

applicability of the proposed rule and the specific

alternative security measures. Next slide, please.

MS. SAMPSON: Beth?

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MS. REED: Yes.

MS. VALLIERE: I apologize. Dennis, I

believe we had some opening remarks from Michele

Sampson that we inadvertently skipped over.

MS. REED: Sorry, you are correct.

Thanks, Nan.

MR. ANDRUKAT: Thanks, Nan. Go ahead,

Michele.

MS. SAMPSON: Thanks, Dennis. Thanks,

Nan. And I guess I won't hold us up. But, Michele

Sampson. I'm Acting Director in the Division of

Physical and Cybersecurity Policy in the Office of

Nuclear Security and Incident Response.

And I did want to thank everyone for

participating in today's public meeting on the

Preliminary Proposed Rule text for the Alternative

Physical Security Requirements for Advanced Reactors.

The rule is intended to provide security

alternatives, recognizing that advanced reactors

encompass a broad spectrum of potential designs, such

as micro reactors, modular reactors, and on light

water reactors, with production potentially from the

tens of megawatts up to the power levels of today's

light water reactor designs.

While not every alternative may work for

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every reactor size and design, the rulemaking is

intended to adapt the physical security framework that

was designed for large light water reactors, to

provide risk-informed, technology-inclusive options

for advanced reactors.

The Commission's direction to the staff

for this rule was to develop these alternatives within

the existing security framework.

Power reactors licensed under 10C.F.R.

Parts50 or 52 must defend against the design basis

threat of radiological sabotage at all times, and

would be subject to the NRC's force-on-force

inspection program.

In keeping with the Commission's advanced

reactor policy statement, these security alternatives

provide a regulatory framework to allow credit, in the

form of operational flexibilities, when a reactor

design can show increased margins of safety, including

cellular transient times and relatively small and slow

release efficient products, when considering the

effects of the design-basis threat of radiological

sabotage.

The proposal includes novel approaches not

previously included in the regulatory framework for

power reactors, and addresses certain specific

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prescriptive security requirements.

The framework enables a licensee or

applicant to include one or more of these alternatives

in its protective strategy design.

We will discuss the preliminary rule

language for each of these alternatives today, and

then cover some of the key guidance on it that will

accompany the proposed rule.

While this rulemaking provides

alternatives within the existing security framework of

10C.F.R.73.55, there is a concurrent rulemaking

effort, known as Part53, which provides additional

security options for advanced reactors.

These are two separate activities, and we

will be focused only on the limited scope rulemaking

in today's meeting.

So, again, thank you for joining us for

this meeting, and I'll turn it back over to Beth so

that she can begin talking about the rule language.

MS. REED: Thank you, Michele. Sorry

about that. Didn't mean to skip over you.

So, we should be on Slide7. And I'll

just start again. The preliminary proposed rule

language was updated to ensure that the alternative

security measures would be applicable to a variety of

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power reactors, even those who don't have reactor

cores similar to those of the existing fleet of large

light water reactors.

Staff determined that using the existence

performance objective and requirements of significant

core damage found in 73.55(b), may not be a

technology-inclusive measure in determining which

systems need to be protected in order to prevent an

unreasonable risk to the public health and safety.

The preliminary proposed rule language now

includes, prevent a significant release of radio

nuclides from any source, to the performance

requirements under73.55(b)3.

This approach is in alignment with the

current framework for large light water power reactors

that must protect against significant core damage or

spent fuel sabotage. Both events have the potential

to cause a significant release of radio nuclides.

Next slide, please.

The previously proposed three-eligibility

criteria, or change, that are now one applicability

requirement found in 73.55(s)(1)(i), under

applicability.

The alternative security measures are

applicable to an applicant or licensee of a small

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modular reactor, or a non-light water reactor,

provided they meet the requirements in 73.55(s)(1)(ii)

and (iii). Next slide, please.

Another update to the preliminary proposed

rule language was to clarify what elements needed to

be included in the analysis that is done to justify

using the alternative security measures.

As part of the analysis, an applicant or

licensee must identify the site-specific alternative

security measures they intend to implement.

As part of the analysis required by

73.55(s)(1)(iii), a licensee or applicant should

develop scenarios that examine the capability to

maintain the site's physical security plan, protect

target-set equipment from the DBT, or prevent an

offsite release from exceeding referenced doses.

While employing the alternative security

measures, using any or all of the former eligibility

criteria are examples of some scenarios that could be

considered. Next slide, please.

This analysis starts after the target-set

identification process, which will be discussed later

in this presentation.

This analysis focuses in on achievable

target sets identified in the target-set

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identification process, and assesses if they could

defend against the DBT or not.

If a target set is compromised with the

alternative measures in place and offsite dose above

the referenced values occurs as a result, the

alternative measures cannot be used.

The analysis should discuss the inherent

features, engineered features or operator actions,

employed at the facility, that would allow the

radiological release to be delayed, minimized, or

prevented.

For example, if following the left side of

the flowchart you end up at the red box that says,

cannot implement additional physical security

requirements, the analysis can be expanded to include

mitigative measures that could mitigate and prevent an

offsite release, as shown on the right side of the

flowchart, the blue box that says mitigative measures

prevent release.

And if it's yes, then you could implement

the alternative security measures. If no, then you

can't use the alternative security measures.

Before turning the presentation over to

Lou, I'd like to remind everyone that these proposed

alternatives do not represent a final NRC staff

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position, nor have they been reviewed by the

Commission. Therefore, the preliminary proposed

ruling, which may undergo significant revision during

the rulemaking process, and the Commission may not

approve any or all of the alternatives.

Now, I will hand the presentation over to

Lou Cubellis from NSIR.

MR. CUBELLIS: Thank you, Beth. Good

morning everybody. I'm Lou Cubellis, I'm a Senior

Security Specialist in the Office of Nuclear Security

and NSIR response, and today I'll be taking you

through the five alternative security measures that we

have currently in the proposed rule language.

Dennis, if you go ahead and hit next to

get the five on the screen. As we look at these five

proposed alternative physical security requirements,

it may be helpful if we keep a couple of thoughts in

mind.

One of these Michele mentioned during her

opening remarks, which is that by Commission

direction, this rule would have a limited scope, which

means that licensees would still have to exist with

the physical security requirements inside the existing

security framework.

Therefore, they would be subject to the

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requirement to protect against the design-basis threat

of radiological sabotage, which is what we and I might

today refer to as the DBT.

The Commission has generally described the

attributes of the design-basis threat in

10C.F.R.73.1, including the type, composition and

capabilities of an adversary that power reactor

licensees must defend against.

The second thought to keep in mind is that

except for the specific relief contained within this

proposed rule, which I'll be covering in more detail

here in the next several slides, small modular reactor

and non-light water reactor applicants and licensees

would need to comply with all of the other

requirements in the existing 10 C.F.R. 73.55. Can we

move to Slide12, please, Dennis? Thank you.

This and the other predetermined relief

contained in the proposed rule language would

eliminate the need for advanced reactor applicants or

licensees to request exemptions from the NRC prior to

implementing these alternative security requirements.

With respect to the proposed S2I

requirement, power light reactor licensees are

currently required to have at least ten armed

responders.

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The proposed alternative security

requirement you see here would provide flexibility for

an applicant or licensee to consider design of its

reactor facility, as well as other site-specific

conditions, and then determine the appropriate minimum

number of armed responders, including zero armed

responders, that would be needed to defend against the

design-basis threat.

Would you please move to the next slide,

Dennis? Thirteen? Oh, sorry. I'm sorry, Dennis.

One thing I want to say here is, I'm not sure if

everybody's seeing that, but my slides are kind of

moving around. So, I'm not sure if it's my

connection. If it is, I apologize. I see we're on

Slide12 still--

MR. YOUNG: Hey Lou, this is David Young.

It looks fine to us. Just so you know.

MR. CUBELLIS: Okay. It's kind of doing

some pixelations and it's making some weird animations

on my screen. So--

MR. YOUNG: Okay. Well, it looks good

here.

MR. CUBELLIS: All right. So, we should

be on Slide13. I hope that the slides that gets on

is Slide 13. If it is, you should see S2 and an Alpha

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under S2.

For these two alternative security

requirements, before we talk about the specifics in

Alpha, I want to point out that the proposed security

requirement here in S2, subparagraph ii, the point I

want to make is that an applicant or licensee would be

able to choose to meet this alternative security

requirement only if it has zero onsite armed

responders. That's the way it's currently written.

And so, the applicant or licensee has to have zero and

meet the requirements in an S1I.

And as we look at the proposed requirement

for Alpha, licensees would at all times retain the

responsibility for interdicting and neutralizing

threats, up to and including the design-basis threat.

However, licensees wouldbe able to rely

on law enforcement or other offsite responders to

perform the interdiction and neutralization functions.

And when I say interdicting and

neutralizing a threat, it means to interrupt whatever

the adversary is doing, and in preventing the

adversary from continuing any actions that would

threaten the safe operation of a site.

Law enforcement responders could be from

any level of government agencies-- for example,

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local, state or federal -- as long as they would have

the authority and capabilities to interdict and

neutralize the design-basis threat.

For example, local police or sheriff's

department may have the authority to respond to a

licensee's call for assistance, but a state patrol

agency may not have that authority, because they may

have authority only on state property, like a state

highway.

We included in this proposed language

other offsite responders. Those three words mean that

a licensee or applicant could rely on armed security

personnel who are employed by a licensee -- what we on

staff sometimes refer to as a proprietary guard

force-- or armed security contractors hired by the

licensee, all of whom would be routinely positioned at

an offsite location.

Relying on armed security personnel, their

stationed offsite as a method that the Departments of

Defense and Energy have employed for decades, to

secure some of their sensitive facilities. Dennis,

could you hit the forward button one time to go to the

next requirement, please?

The staff is proposing five, what I'll

call conditions, that would apply when a licensee

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relies on offsite responders to interdict and

neutralize threats up to and including the design-

basis threat.

The proposed rule language you see here in

Alpha-1 reinforces the fact that licensees would

continue to be responsible for detecting and assessing

threats.

If the licensee is relying on law

enforcement for interdiction and neutralization, the

licensee would communicate threat information to law

enforcement so law enforcement could respond.

If the licensee was relying on other

offsite responders -- for example, licensee-controlled

proprietary or contract security force-- licensee

would initiate response actions in accordance with

existing requirements. Dennis, would you forward to

Alpha-2, please?

The proposed rule language in Alpha-2

captures another key element for facilitating an

effective offsite response, either from law

enforcement or other offsite responders.

Sufficient the way they would prevent the

design-basis threat adversary from completing tasks,

and provide the opportunity for offsite responders to

interdict and neutralize the adversary before it could

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cause significant release of radio nuclides. Our next

slide, please, Dennis, should be Slide14.

The proposed requirement in Alpha-3 that

you see here, would ensure that licensees give

information to law enforcement or other offsite

responders prior to an actual incident.

Site information may include things like

sketches or drawings of the facility layout, including

structures and avenues of approach and the owner-

controlled protected areas, floor or elevation

drawings for site structures, particularly those that

are important from a safety or response tactical

movement perspective, barrier information and defeat

methods, which could include the use of standard

access control items like access cards or mechanical

keys, and then communication systems information.

The proposed requirement in Alpha-3 would

also ensure that a licensee that relies on law

enforcement or other offsite responders to interdict

and neutralize the design-basis threat, provides those

responders with recurring training opportunities so

the responders can apply their knowledge and skills in

the environments in which they would be expected to

operate during real-world safeguards events.

Slide15, please, Dennis?

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The proposed rule language in Alpha-4 that

you see here would ensure that a licensee performs

adequate contingency response planning, and should be

able to satisfactorily implement its protective

strategy when relying on law enforcement or other

offsite responders, in lieu of, say, onsite licensee-

on responders, to interdict and neutralize the design-

basis threat.

The purpose of this requirement is to

ensure that licensee documents in sufficient detail

the specific role or roles that law enforcement or

other offsite responders have in its physical

protection program.

Staff understands here that a licensee may

be able to document fewer details than it would for

onsite responders, but a licensee should be able to

document the roles, responsibilities, and expected

actions, by offsite response personnel, that describe

how the offsite response personnel intend to fulfill

the interdiction and neutralization capabilities.

For example, when licensees are relying on

law enforcement, a licensee obviously may not know

where the law enforcement responders may be starting

from when they get the call for assistance, because

those officers will likely be performing routine

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duties in the community.

However, if a licensee is relying on an

offsite proprietary and contract security force, the

licensee will likely know that force's starting

location and state of readiness. Slide16, please,

Dennis.

All right, licensees would still be

responsible for ensuring that the capabilities to

interdict and neutralize threats, up to and including

the design-basis threat, are maintained at all times.

Licensees would need to consider the

possibility that unlike when relying on onsite-on

responders, also responders may be impeded or

prevented from interdicting and neutralizing the

design-basis threat by circumstances that are

independent from the safeguards of that at a site.

For example, simultaneous events in the

community may compete for the same law enforcement

resources. Or weather may preclude any offsite

responders from reaching a site before the design-

basis threat can complete radiological sabotage

actions.

Therefore, the proposed requirement in

Alpha-5 would require licensees that rely on law

enforcement or other offsite responders for

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interdiction and neutralization, to identify criteria

and measures to compensate for the degradation or

absence of that support, and to describe suitable

compensatory measures within its security plan.

I think it's important to note here that

the proposed requirement would also ensure that the

compensatory measures that licensees identify for the

degradation or loss of interdiction and neutralization

capabilities, will provide an equivalent level of

protection, and can be implemented in a timely manner,

which are the same two principles that the NRC

currently require for compensatory measures associated

with equipment, systems and components that perform

required security functions. Slide17, please,

Dennis?

When relying on law enforcement to

interdict and neutralize the design-basis threat,

licensees would not be required to meet the response

requirements in the current 73.55 Kilo-3 through7

paragraphs, or the response initiation requirement in

Kilo-8, subparagraphII.

For example, a licensee would be relying

on law enforcement personnel to initiate the response

actions to interdict and neutralize threats, rather

than an armed licensee personnel force.

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Other offsite responders would be under a

licensee's control, so the proposed relief in Bravo-1

would not apply, and the licensee would need to meet

all the response requirements in 73.55 Kilo. Would

you hit forward once, please, Dennis, to go to

Bravo-2?

For Bravo-2, staff accepts the fact that

law enforcement personnel qualifications and skills

are equivalent to those required by Appendix Bravo to

Part73.

Therefore, licensees that rely on law

enforcement for interdiction and neutralization, would

not be responsible for ensuring that law enforcement

responders meet most of the security and training

qualification requirements in Appendix Bravo.

Examples would be things like employment

suitability or qualifications, or duty and reference

training qualifications or requalifications. The

licensee would not be responsible for any of those

things.

As we saw earlier in this presentation,

the proposed requirement in S2III Alpha-3 would

require licensees to still provide periodic onsite

training opportunities, so that law enforcement could

apply its skills and test its equipment in the actual

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environment that it would operate in during a real-

world safeguards event.

It's important to mention that a licensee

relying on offsite proprietary contract security force

would still need to train that force in accordance

with Section6 in Appendix Bravo to Part73.

And regardless of whether licensees rely

on law enforcement or other offsite responders to

perform the interdiction and neutralization functions,

the licensees would be required to establish,

implement and maintain a performance evaluation

program consistent with the requirements in Section 6

Charlie-3 in Appendix Bravo to Part73.

The reason for this is that a performance

evaluation program is a critical tool that licensees

use to demonstrate and assess the effectiveness of

their physical protection programs and protective

strategies, including the capabilities of an armed

response team, or in this case law enforcement or

offsite responders, to carry out assigned duties and

responsibilities during safeguards contingency events.

Would you highlight Bravo-3 please, Dennis?

When we look at the proposed relief in

Bravo-3-- I'm sorry, my slide--there we go. My

slides are still doing funny things for me and I

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apologize.

When we look at the proposed relief in

Bravo-3, the phrase, law enforcement or other offsite

responders, means that an applicant or licensee that

chooses to implement the proposed alternative

requirement in 73.55CR(2)(ii), would be relying solely

on an armed response force that originates outside a

protected area, to interdict and neutralize the

design-basis threat.

This particular proposal in Bravo-3

provides relief from three existing requirements that

restrict armed responder movement or duties.

The requirements from which licensees

would be relieved would be, first, be required to

designate areas inside a protected area that would

house the armed responders.

Second, that the armed responders remain

inside the protected area at all times. And the third

requirement from which licensees would be relieved

would be to ensure that armed responders are not

assigned any other duties or responsibilities that

could interfere with their assigned armed response

team duties and responsibilities. Would you move to

Slide18, please, Dennis.

The proposed rule language that you see

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here would provide advance reactor applicants and

licensees with the flexibility to consider and

implement methods other than physical barriers that

are currently defined in 73.2, to achieve the delays

needed for the physical protection program.

As you see, we say that acceptable means

are really any method. You're not limited to just the

couple that are defined within the 73.2. Slide 19,

please, Dennis.

The proposed rule language in S2IV would

allow an applicant or licensee to establish a

secondary alarm station at an offsite location. Okay,

Dennis, I think we need to go forward one more. There

we go. Thank you.

For example, when a slight footprint is

small enough that an onsite secondary alarm station

would be impractical, or potentially able to be

disabled by a single act, an offsite secondary alarm

station may enable a licensee to better ensure that

that facility maintains the redundant functions of the

central alarm station.

This provision also would provide

licensees with flexibility to possibly improve

efficiency by consolidating required secondary alarm

station functions for multiple sites at a single

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offsite location, potentially reducing construction,

operation and maintenance costs. Would you please

show B, Dennis?

The proposed language in essentially what

is 4-Bravo, would require that an offsite secondary

alarm station be able to perform the same functions as

the onsite central alarm station, but a licensee would

be relieved from the requirements to construct, locate

and protect the offsite secondary alarm station to the

same standards as the central alarm station.

For example, a licensee would not need to

do things like locate the secondary alarm station

inside a protected area, ensure the interior of the

secondary alarm station is not visible from the

perimeter of the protected area, or construct the

secondary alarm station to be bullet-resistant.

A licensee would also be permitted to

install equipment in the secondary alarm station that

is different than that in the central alarm station,

as long as the secondary alarm station can perform the

equivalent and redundant functions of the central

alarm station. Slide 20, please, Dennis. Very good,

thank you.

The proposed rule language in Alpha would

relieve advanced reactor applicants and licensees from

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the requirements to designate the secondary alarm

station as a vital area, and to locate the power

systems supplies for the offsite secondary alarm

station in a vital area.

For those of you that may not be familiar,

a vital area is one where the licensee can limit

access to protected equipment or operations that are

important to safety or security. Would you go to

Bravo please, Dennis?

The secondary alarm station and its power

supply provide backup to a site's primary alarm

station, which is the central alarm station.

Plus, the secondary alarm station does not

contain any material that would pose a risk of

radiological sabotage. Therefore, locating secondary

power supplies offsite, as well as the secondary alarm

station offsite, means they'd be in a different

location than where our safeguards of that would be

occurring.

It's important to know that the proposed

rule would not prevent an applicant or licensee from

implementing measures to protect an offsite secondary

alarm station or its power supplies, or its functions.

But those measures would not be a regulatory

requirement.

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At this point, I'll turn the discussion

back over to Beth to start the presentation on the

draft guidance.

MS. REED: Thanks, Lou. Next slide

please, Dennis, unless you have anything to interject

on for Slide21. I take that as a no.

Okay, so we are now on Slide22. Draft

Guide5072, which was formerly Draft Guide1365, is

new guidance that is applicable to small modular

reactors and non-light water reactors wanting to use

the alternative measures foundin 73.55(s)(2).

This regulatory guide describes methods

and approaches the staff of the NRC consider

acceptable for advanced reactor applicants or

licensees to comply with requirements in

10C.F.R.73.55(s)(1).

Further, the guidance discusses each

alternative found in 73.55(s)(2), that may be applied

if the requirements in 73.55(s)(1) are met. Next

slide, please.

The draft guidance explains one approach

for conducting a site-specific analysis required by

73.55(s)(1)(iii) that demonstrates that the

performance requirement set forth in 73.55(b)(3) are

met when selected alternative to use.

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This analysis should identify each

alternative that will be used, demonstrate the ability

of the physical protection system while using the

alternative measures in defending against the DBT, and

if a target-set is compromised, perform a site-

specific radiological consequence analysis to

demonstrate that a significant release of radio

nuclides does not occur. Next slide, please.

So, what is meant by significant release?

As stated in the proposed rule, the term, significant

release of radio nuclides, covers those security-

initiated events that could impact the safety systems

of the reactor, potentially resulting in a release of

offsite doses that approach or exceed referenced

values defined in 10 C.F.R. 50.34A.1.III.d(1) and (2),

and 10C.F.R.52.79A.1.VI.a and b.

The 25-rim criteria has been used in

Parts50, 52 and 100, as a reference value that is

used to evaluate plants' assigned features with

respect to postulated reactor accidents, including

design-based accidents, or DBAs.

DBAs are postulated accidents that a

nuclear facility must be designed and built to

withstand without loss to the systems, structures and

components necessary to ensure public health and

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safety.

By identifying and assessing the DBA, the

NRC has been able to provide a useful perspective with

regard to doses that ought not to be exceeded. It was

for this reason that the requirements exist that the

dose consequences be evaluated at the outer boundary

of the low population zone over the course of the

postulated accident.

As stated in the footnote in

10 C.F.R. 50.34A1, the use of 25 rim, and I quote, is

not intended to imply that this number constitutes an

acceptable limit for an emergency dose to the public

under accident conditions. Unquote.

Likewise, the performance requirements in

the proposed security regulations do not mean that

this is an acceptable consequence.

Conservatism built into these assessments,

a person standing in the plume for its full passage,

and multiple layers of defense in-depth found, provide

additional assurance that approved designs for

reactors provide assurance of low-risk of public

exposure to radiation in the event of an accident.

Next slide, please.

As a follow-up to the last public meeting,

NEI submitted a letter to the NRC requesting staff to

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stop reviewing NEI-2005. Staff incorporated some of

the concepts from 2005 into DG50.71 and DG50.72,

such as target-set identification and radiological

dose consequence analysis.

The discussions on the eligibility

criterion are being issued as examples of scenarios

that could be included in the analysis required by

73.55(s)(1)(iii). Next slide, please. Thanks.

Guidance, both for target-set

identification and to determine the ability to use the

alternative measures, will discuss an acceptable

method to perform a radiological consequence analysis.

For the purpose of this proposed rule, the

required analysis for 73.55(s)(1)(iii) will be

performed by the applicant or licensee to determine

radiation doses at the exclusion area boundary and the

outer boundary of the low population zone from a

postulated radiological release.

The consequence analysis will be based on

achievable target sets, which will be further

discussed by Stacy Prasad shortly.

The consequence analysis should determine

the type and amount of radioactivity potentially

released to the environment and offsite consequences.

The guidance will describe elements that

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should be included in the radiological consequence

analysis, such as, but not limited to, physical and

chemical processes affecting the timing, composition

and magnitude of release, facility-specific

radiological source terms and atmospheric release and

transport.

Now, I'll turn the presentation back over

to Lou to discuss the guidance for the alternative

measures.

MR. CUBELLIS: Thanks, Beth. Staff

anticipates that the guidance for the specific

alternative security requirements portion of the

proposed rule will cover three primary areas, and you

see those areas here on the slide.

Methods and approaches the staff will find

acceptable for satisfying the alternative security

requirements themselves, a methodology for calculating

security delay time that would be required as a

condition of relying on offsite response for the

indiction and neutralization functions, and

explanatory information and clarifications related to

the relief provided within the alternatives proposed

in 73.55CR(2).

Stacy, I think I turn it over you now for

5071.

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MS. PRASAD: Thanks, Lou. You can go to

the next slide, Dennis.

5071. This is just a revision of the

current breakout 581, and that's targets of

identification and development for nuclear power

plants. Currently, it only addresses light water

reactors.

So, what's happening with this revision?

Two things. We're going to identify target sets for

SMRs and non-light water reactors. And that's

consistent with the changes that Beth previously spoke

about with 73.55 Bravo-3.

The other thing this guidance is going to

do is, it's going to have some pointers back to

DG 50.72 that's going to establish how the target that

process can be utilized to support implementation of

the alternative physical security controls.Next

slide, Dennis.

Here, the definition that you've been

seeing in the past few meetings, this definition

aligns with the B3 brew language, again, that we

discussed earlier.

In addition, the definition provides an

example of a significant release and it defines that

as exceeding the radio nuclide release fraction

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analyzed for the DBA, and it also includes creation of

a released pathway.

As Beth just discussed in the slide-basis

accident analysis, important structures, systems and

components are identified to ensure public health and

safety.

So, the reason we have this EG is to

ensure the target sets are appropriately identified in

analyzing the systems and the design of the physical

protection program. Next slide.

This is the flow chart we've seen a bunch

of times, is consistent to what we presented

previously, but the exception is the example that we

just talked about with exceeding the DBA release

fraction.

The actual guidance, actually there's a

paragraph describing how you'd work through the

process.

If nothing would scream out saying that

you can implement alternative physical security

requirements, get to that bottom red box, and that red

box will knock you back over to the flowchart that

Beth provided earlier. So, there's a line between

this reg guide and the other reg guide that was just

discussed. All right, back to you, Dennis.

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MR. ANDRUKAT: Okay, thank you guys very

much. Before I get to the next slide on the next

steps here, I guess what we'll do is we can go ahead

and open this up to the attendees. We want to make

sure everyone's had a chance to speak.

So, again, if you have any questions or

comments, please use the raised-hand feature. And we

will kick it off to the first attendee here. Let me

see. Okay, I see Kevin Deyette from NuScale. Go

ahead.

MR. DEYETTE: Yes, thank you. I want to

first thank the NRC staff for taking the effort to go

through what we're doing here for the rulemaking for

advanced reactors for physical security. I think it's

very important, so I do appreciate your efforts.

I have two questions. The first one deals

with, I guess you could look at Slide7, where it

talks about the sources, where we're looking at the

release from any source.

And it states on that slide that it is

retaining the significant core damage and spent fuel

sabotage for the light water reactors. And we did

want to go to a performance-based rule.

But the question I have with this is the

NRC has an SGI document which provides a definition

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for spent fuel sabotage and a scenario.

If we change it to the wording that you

have now, release of radio nuclides from any source,

does that mean that additional scenarios for spent

fuel need to be analyzed?

MS. REED: So, I guess this is my slide,

so I can take that.

Thank you for the question. And that

third bullet talk about retaining for the large light

water reactors, so the significant core damage and

spent fuel sabotage will be only applicable for the

existing fleet of the large light water reactors.

The intent here is that the small modular

reactors and non-light water reactors will have the

requirement to prevent a significant release of radio

nuclides from any source.

So, if you have a spent fuel pool, you

should analyze it to see if a DBT could defend against

the DBT if there was an attack. Would that spent fuel

pool release any -- lower the threshold of -- not the

threshold, but over the DBA.

And that's how, under Stacy's process, the

target-set be determined to see if that needs to be

protected.

So, I don't know if any small modular

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reactors or non-light water reactors will have a spent

fuel pool. That language is retained in B3 just for

the large lights.

MR. DEYETTE: Okay, thank you. I

appreciate that response. I still have somewhat of a

concern. I know that folks that have been working on

their design for a while incorporated security-by-

design and the spent fuel is one area. And this may

cause a change in direction or philosophy that we may

need to look at. So,on that comment there.

MS. REED: Okay. Well, thank you. And

this is trying to take into account the MSRs that have

may have sources outside the reactor.

So, that's why I say that this is

technology-inclusive, because you may not have the

highest source in the core. It may be somewhere else.

So, any place that could potentially have a release

should be examined and analyzed, and see if it needs

to be protected.

MR. DEYETTE: Okay, thank you. My second

question dealt with the secondaryalarm station, and

would the language that's being put in, I think

Slide19 would be the best one to look at for that,

it's talking about the fact that the secondary alarm

station offsite would need to have the same

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capabilities and functions as the existing central

alarm station.

The fact that it doesn't have to be in a

vital area and doesn't have to be bulletproof

obviously would present some cost savings. But having

the same function of capabilities may be problematic.

And the other concern I have with that is,

with this offsite secondary alarm station, now you're

looking at the cybersecurity implications, or

security-related components, digital components, that

are offsite and how is that going to impact the

licensee's cybersecurity plan? So, that's just some

food for thought.

MS. REED: Thank you. We appreciate that

input.

MR. ANDRUKAT: Okay, let me switch back

here. Ed Lyman, I think you're next.

MR. LYMAN: Hi. Good morning. I'm from

the Union of Concerned Scientists. Can you hear me?

MR. ANDRUKAT: Yes, sir.

MR. LYMAN: Okay, great. I just have a

few questions. There's a lot here. So, on Slide--

let's see, slide 14, about the provision of necessary

information about the facility.

So, I presume that this will be safeguards

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information, I guess. And so, where are the

provisions for how that information is going to be

protected and how the recipients are going to be

properly vetted for receipt, and as well as, right,

not only approved protection for the recipient, but

also electronic potential for electronic transmission?

What are the requirements for protecting that

information?

MS. SAMPSON: Thank you for that question.

So, these alternatives are within our existing

security framework. So, the regulatory requirements

that apply to power reactors for protection of

safeguards information will still apply to these

applicants.

MR. LYMAN: Okay. The second question.

So, the local law enforcement would not be exempt from

the performance evaluation program. So, that includes

whatever drills manual. Is that correct?

MS. SAMPSON: So, to be clear, the NRC

does not have jurisdiction over law enforcement. The

licensee--

(Audio interference.)

MS. SAMPSON: So, the licensee will be

subject to a performance evaluation program

requirement and the licensee must ensure that they are

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meeting the regulatory requirements to assess, detect,

interdict and neutralize at all times.

MR. LYMAN: Right, but that means to stay

on the line in local law enforcement to satisfy the

functions, if they're going to have to be drafted into

these drills and exercises. Right?

MS. SAMPSON: So, the licensee is required

to identify the role that law enforcement will

perform, and to provide law enforcement with site-

specific information.

The licensee must also make periodic

training specific to the interdiction and

neutralization functions available to law enforcement.

MR. LYMAN: All right. I mean, I think,

don't get me wrong, I think that's actually critical

if they're going to have this expanded role if they

have to be captured by this program. But if they,

practically speaking, maybe unless it's too heavy for

the licensee.

So, my third is, well, if I could comment.

So, you've written this rule to be extremely general.

And a lot of details are being put in the guidance,

including -- doesn't mention significant, even though

that's the same design as this release that's already

in the regulations.

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So, I guess I have a general concern about

in the bag, making the rule too general, that it might

have milestones or goalposts that some of those have

to be incorporated into the regulation as

requirements, rather than leaving so much in the

guidance. And that's so that the public at least

knows that there are certain minimum requirements that

are being met in these evaluations. Those are my

initial thoughts on this. Thank you.

MR. ANDRUKAT: Thanks, Ed. I'm sorry.

And Ed, I didn't know if you had any specific examples

for that last comment, that you wanted to share, or if

that was more of a general comment.

MR. LYMAN: Well, one comment is the

definition of the significant release. Because if you

put in the guidance, you're going to get arguments

about what is useful.

MR. ANDRUKAT: Okay.

MR. LYMAN: Also, things like the target-

set. Well, again, I've looked at this rule and seen

what particular aspects are already a regulatory

requirement and should be -- an analogous requirement

should be retained for this alternative. I haven't

done that yet, but that's what I was thinking of.

MR. ANDRUKAT: I think this is helpful.

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Okay, let's see. I'm going to move on to the next

one. Rani Franovich?

MS. FRANOVICH: Good morning, Dennis. And

it's good to have this opportunity to engage with you,

Beth and Lou. And Happy New Year to all of you.

I have a question, Dennis, on Slide 14, if

you could pull that up.

MR. ANDRUKAT: Okay.

MS. FRANOVICH: Hold on. I thought it was

Slide 14. It may be -- oh, apologies. It's Slide 15,

Dennis.

MR. ANDRUKAT: Sure. There you go.

MS. FRANOVICH: Great. So, I see on this

slide a reference to high assurance. And my question

is--well, first an observation. High assurance is

not typically used in the regulatory lexicon. It's

typically reasonable assurance.

And I am aware that a high assurance

standard found its way into the inspection and

oversight documents used for security inspections,

primarily the force-on-force inspection, and it led to

a lot of confusion about the level of assurance sought

under the NRC's oversight process.

And the Commission and its SRM2 SECY

160073, back on October5, 2016, made it very clear

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that high assurance is equivalent to reasonable

assurance.

And as a result of that Commission

clarification, the term high assurance was stricken

from oversight manual chapters, inspection manual

chapters, in the security cornerstone.

And I'm wondering how the NRC staff is

reconciling that Commission direction that the

assurance standard for security is no different than

it is for any other aspect of our regulatory mandate.

How does the staff reconcile the use of

the term high assurance with that Commission

clarification that it's reasonable assurance, even in

security?

MS. SAMPSON: Thank you, Rani. We

appreciate that question. And as you've correctly

noted, the Commission has addressed this issue and the

staff fully appreciates the Commission's clarification

that high assurance is equal to reasonable assurance.

The reason that we have used the term high

assurance in this regulatory requirement is to mirror

the existing regulatory language in 10C.F.R.73.55.

But as you've noted, the Commission has weighed in on

this issue in the past and this is preliminary

proposed rule text which has not been through

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management review or the Commission.

So, should the Commission choose to use

two different terms within 73.55, the staff would

certainly appreciate that guidance when the proposed

rule is with them for review. Thank you.

MS. FRANOVICH: Great. Thank you for that

explanation. Appreciate that.

MR. ANDRUKAT: Okay. All right, let's

see. And Rani, can you just remind us your

affiliation real quick?

MS. FRANOVICH: Apologies, Dennis. Of

course. I'm with the Breakthrough Institute.

MR. ANDRUKAT: Fantastic. Okay, I'll go

ahead and move on to David Young of NEI.

MR. YOUNG: Yeah. Hi guys. Good morning.

David Young, NEI. I've got two questions. The first

is, on Slide10 on the flowchart, it talks about an

analysis demonstrates. And so, it goes to that on a

couple of blocks, but analysis demonstrates. That

talks about that on Slide10.

And then, when you go down to Slide 30 for

the target set portion of it, it talks about screening

for achievable target sets. I just want to say to the

Committee, just discuss what they see are the key

differences between assessments that might be done at

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the target-set stage, or on screening for achievable

target sets, and the analysis or assessment that would

be done at the later stages, where I'm looking at

analysis demonstrates.

Given that some of the features I'm

looking at are the same kinds of features-- things

being within DBT capabilities, or certain dose limits

be exceeded offsite-- just want to understand what

the differences are between the screening and the

analysis.

MS. REED: Stacy, do you want to start

from the beginning with the target set, and then I'll

pick up with the analysis for the achievable target

sets?

MS. PRASAD: Sure. So, the analysis

that's going to be done in DG 50.71 is supposed to be

a simpler analysis. So, this analysis is kind of

consistent to the programs and the systems-- every

time I have to talk I feel like I can't--

(Simultaneous speaking.)

MR. ANDRUKAT: You okay?

MS. PRASAD: I apologize for that. So,

this is supposed to be a simpler analysis using the

same kind of programs that you use for your DBA

analysis. It's not supposed to be intended to be this

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huge expanse of an analysis that we're looking at in

the consequence analysis.

So, when you bounce it over to Beth's

slide and she's looking at the consequence analysis,

in that space you can lose the complete target set and

you can still demonstrate that you're below the

reference values. So, this is kind of a more

encompassing analysis.

I know initially we toyed with the fact of

having the same analysis for both, but then we

separated the two to make the line of targets a little

simpler, and then you only have to do the consequence

analysis and kind of the bigger analysis if you go

through a certain staff and DG50.71.

Beth, you want to add anything to that?

Or I misspoke about your guidance?

MS. REED: No, you were spot on, Stacy.

Thanks. And just to reiterate, the analysis is only

on the achievable target sets. And you go through it

and you see what's achievable. Then, you apply the

alternative measures and you have to demonstrate that

they can defend against the DBT.

If they can't, then you do the

radiological consequence analysis. And if it comes to

the point where that analysis shows that there would

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be offset release above the reference values, you then

have to discuss mitigation measures. That's that on

the bottom line, that blue box.

You can throw into your analysis what

steps you do to mitigate and prevent or stop an

offsite release. If it's then able to be mitigated

and there's not a release above the 25-rim reference

value, then you can use the alternative measures.

If it's not, if it is above the reference

values, then you can't use the alternative measures,

or you need to think of a different alternative

measure, maybe a more robust one that can withstand

the DBT, or different mitigative measures.

And whatever you come up with, that's what

we need to see for 73.55(s)(2)(i). We need that

description.

MR. YOUNG: Okay. Okay. All right.

MS. REED: So, the right consequence

analysis for the 25-rim is only done if you can't

defend against the DBT with the alternatives in place.

MR. YOUNG: All right. Okay. All right,

I guess I'll just have to wait and see the guidance

document when it comes out. And I appreciate the

explanation. I got a little bit clearer picture, I

think, of what you're looking for.

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I still just maybe have some detail

questions, but perhaps they'd just be better addressed

when we see the proposed documents.

The second question I had was, is on

Slide29 and Slide30. You talk about release

fractions exceeding DBA analysis. And I guess, again,

not solving it here, but just going to remind staff

that there's different DBAs that get analyzed. It

could be many DBAs.

So, having guidance on what particular DBA

provides the threshold, or provides the criteria for

which it's being exceeded, which DBA is that?

MS. PRASAD: Yeah, I appreciate that

question. And I also appreciate you asking all these

questions on my three slides.

We're having the same discussions to make

sure we accurately reflect the DBA that we're talking

about, whether it's going to be the most restrictive,

or maybe specific to a target set, and the DBA that

was analyzed consistent with those systems and

equipment.

So, that hasn't been decided. Right now

it's a more flexible determinate. As you said, it can

be many different things, so we're going to make sure

we get the right wording in there in the reg guide.

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MR. YOUNG: Okay. Great Stacy. I'm glad

you guys are thinking about that. And the other thing

then, kind of related to that same thought, is as you

start thinking about which DBAs you're going to look

at and specify in the guidance, if you would, just

make sure that the wording is pretty crystal clear on

that, that you are talking about the design-basis

accidents, you're not talking about like Chapter19,

severe accidents and beyond design-basis events and

things like that.

MS. PRASAD: Yeah, because we are thinking

about the Chapter15--

MR. YOUNG: Yeah, yeah.

MS. PRASAD: --access.

MR. YOUNG: Right.

MS. PRASAD: Good point. I'll make sure

that's clear in there as well.

MR. YOUNG: Okay, cool. All right,

Dennis. That's all I had. Thank you.

MR. ANDRUKAT: Fantastic. Okay, let's

see, Mr.Chris. Okay, let's move on to--

MR. CHWASZ: Oh, I'm sorry, I had trouble

unmuting.

MR. ANDRUKAT: Oh, sure.

MR. CHWASZ: Hi, this is Chris Chwasz from

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INL. So, I had a couple of questions starting back on

Slide 9. And this is kind of echoing Ed's concern for

not defining significant release in the regulation.

So, I guess I'm curious as to the staff's

thought process for not directly referencing in the

regulation 50.34, and theassociated Part52 values.

MS. REED: So, this is Beth. I appreciate

your question, and that is something that, a

conversation we've had internally about should it be

in the rule language. It should be in guidance.

And we decided to clarify it in guidance.

Leave it higher level, just like in Bravo-3, what

significant core damage. That's not defined in the

regulations either. It's more into the guidance.

So, that's the way we have chosen to go.

Like we've said before, this is just preliminary

proposed rule language. And once this draft is

released for comment, that's a very appropriate

comment to submit to the NRC once it's been released.

I don't know if anybody else has any

further comments to add to mine. Feel free. I mean,

anybody else from the NRC. Sorry.

MS. SAMPSON: Nothing further from me,

Beth. I think you've captured it. Our intent was to

align with a similar framework that we had for the

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large light water reactors, where we used significant

core damage.

MR. CHWASZ: That's understandable.

Significant core damage isn't a value. So, not having

value codified, like Dr.Lyman said, opens it up to

interpretation.

In addition, that value or similar values

being codified under Part 53. So, I don't understand

why it wouldn't be codified here if it's the same

expectation across the board. So, food for thought.

Moving on, Slide 15. All right, so I feel

like there needs to be an observation or maintenance

requirement with this, in that the offsite response

needs to notify the site when they are in a degraded

condition. I don't see that here. And I question the

timeliness of compensatory measures without it.

MS. SAMPSON: We appreciate that comment.

I would note that the NRC does not have regulatory

jurisdiction over law enforcement. So, we are not

proposing specific requirements for law enforcement to

make notifications within this regulation.

The licensees are expected to have routine

communications with law enforcement that would be

providing this type of support, and the requirement

for compensatory measures is a requirement that the

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licensee identify and document compensatory measures

within their security plans. So, it would not be

something that they're identifying on the fly. It's

an advance requirement.

MR. CHWASZ: I understand that, but I'm

talking about the timeliness of enacting those

compensatory measures.

And I'm not saying you would regulate the

local law enforcement agencies, but you can certainly

regulate the licensee and require that they have a

program that considers that, and include it either in

guidance or here in the rule.

MS. SAMPSON: Thank you for that comment.

Thank you.

MR. CHWASZ: All right. Okay.

Additionally on Slide15, I just wanted to make a

comment that licensees are taking on a large risk

using the local law enforcement for offsite response,

when ultimately the local law enforcement is not under

the jurisdiction of the NRC, like you've said.

And so, if the LLEA doesn't meet the

performance requirements, then the licensee is on the

hook for that.

So, Slide18. I think a little further

clarification here on the physical barriers could be

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needed. The 73.55(e) is a fairly large section and it

covers PA, VA and vehicle barriers.

And the language described here makes it

sound like none of those are required necessarily.

And it brings up questions about access control. So,

food for thought.

MS. SAMPSON: Thank you.

MR. CHWASZ: And then, Slide 19. And this

goes back to a comment that was made earlier on the

expense of having a SAS still. I mean, it's a fixed

cost. A SAS is required whether it's onsite or

offsite. I was curious as to the NRC's response to

the possibility of a SAS serving multiple sites. Like

a fleet-wide SAS.

MS. SAMPSON: There is nothing in the rule

that would prohibit that, as long as the licensee can

meet regulatory requirements.

MR. CHWASZ: Okay.

MR. CUBELLIS: Yeah. And Chris, this is

Lou. I actually, if I didn't say it, I certainly had

it in my notes to present on that exact point. That's

one of the cost savings we envision, is a single SAS

serving multiple sites.

MR. CHWASZ: Great. Thanks, Lou.

MR. CUBELLIS: Yep.

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MR. CHWASZ: Okay. All right, next slide,

28/29. And this relates to Draft Guide 50.72. I know

we don't have the text yet, so maybe this is a little

bit premature. But are we going to see further

guidance on security assessments and the consequence

analysis required for advanced reactors to really

address their unique technologies and materials on

sites?

MR. ANDRUKAT: Sorry. Which slide did you

want again?

MR. CHWASZ: Oh, it's like 28/29. I guess

it can be 29.

MS. PRASAD: Yeah, I think that would be

more applicable to the guidelines-- sorry, this is

getting a little crazy-- in DG 50.72. So, for the

draft guide for target sets does not assume success of

the physical protection program.

So, when you're looking at if things can

be defended beyond, if it's within the DBT's ability,

that's going to be looked at in DG50.72. So, with

the ability to neutralize and stuff like that, of

security systems.

The security system is not looked at for

the success in target-set identification. Did I

answer the question, or am I not understanding the

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question?

MR. CHWASZ: No, sorry. I probably picked

the wrong flight. So, relating to 50.72, I want to

speak to that, and the kind of guidance it's going to

provide specifically for our advanced reactors.

Reg Guide 5.81 does a good job of

addressing target sets that's generally applicable.

It looks like you're going to update it for advanced

reactors. But I'm curious more about the expectations

for the consequence analysis for like sodium being

onside, or molten salt, or other like unique

technologies and materials that are intrinsic to

advanced reactors, and how will those be paired with a

necessary like security assessment?

MS. PRASAD: Understood. I'm going to

hand it over to Lou or Beth.

MS. REED: So, I'm not sure about the

security assessment, but for the radiological

consequence analysis, that's one that the guidance

discusses exactly what elements we would find

acceptable to be included.

And one of them is definitely the chemical

compensation and how the chemical form affects the

release and the engineered systems and all that stuff

for the reactor, that we are in guidance discussing

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how those are some of the elements that should be or

could be included in the analysis.

And that one box on the flowchart I shared

in Slide 10 gets into also mitigative strategies. And

you could also include in that if it's a molten salt,

obviously it's a lot slower release, definitely that

different chemical properties. And so, those are the

sort of things we're looking for and discuss in the

guidance for the analysis.

MR. CHWASZ: Okay. I very much look

forward to looking at that. Consequence analysis can

be very, very tricky. And like in the example with

molten salt, there are many different sources of

radioactivity and release pathways.

And then, when you add in deliberate

sabotage acts, those multiply.

MS. REED: Mm-hmm.

MR. CHWASZ: And so, I'm curious to see

your methodology to determine a bounding analysis for

some of these technologies. So, all right.

MS. REED: Okay. Thanks for your comment.

MR. CHWASZ: Thanks all for your work.

MS. REED: Thank you.

MR. CHWASZ: I'm done.

MR. ANDRUKAT: Okay, fantastic. Okay,

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let's go back to Ed Lyman.

MR. LYMAN: Yeah, thanks. Just a couple

of follow-up. So, these guidance documents, are you

envisioning they're going to be SOI? Are going to be

publicly available, or partially? What's your

thinking?

MS. REED: In the 50.72, as it stands

right now, it is publicly available. The 50.71 is

basically an update on Reg Guide 5.81, which is OUO

SRI. Is that correct, Stacy?

MS. PRASAD: Yes, that's correct.

MR. LYMAN: And just one more question on

these slides. Could you go to Slide33? So that is

confusing me, is there a stray arrow here, or between

screens for achievable target sets, and within DBT

capabilities you have this little arrow?

MS. PRASAD: Yeah, there's a little arrow

that's in there. It should be the little arrow, and

not the no. It should just to right to the block

within DBT capabilities.

MR. LYMAN: That makes a lot more sense.

Thanks.

MR. ANDRUKAT: Okay, let's go on to Scott

Ferrara. And don't forget to highlight your

affiliation.

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MR. FERRARA: Yeah, Scott Ferrara, Idaho

National Laboratory. Had a question regarding the

implementation of the local law enforcement

interdiction. Personal experience from previous NRC

and LLEA management of a facility, it seems like we're

placing a lot of onus on LLEA and their response. Is

it the NRC's expectation that a licensee would have to

provide an MOU that is audible and inspectible by the

NRC to ensure that LLEA will perform those duties?

MS. SAMPSON: So, the NRC's regulatory

requirement for an MOU is unchanged by this

rulemaking. We do recognize that allowing licensees

to rely on offsite support to fulfill the interdiction

and neutralization function is a novel approach and

has not previously been included in the regulatory

framework for power reactors.

So, we are developing guidance to assist

licensees with how to implement these requirements and

that guidance will be available with the draft rule

once it's approved for publication by the Commission.

MR. FERRARA: Okay, thank you very much.

I'd be very interested in looking at that guidance,

having firsthand experience with this exact topic and

requirement.

It can be very onerous and probably should

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be something developers and licensees are looking at

during their siting process. Thank you.

MR. ANDRUKAT: Okay, looks like we have

one more. Hopefully, I'm saying this right. Is that

Dyrk? Is that right?

MR. GREENHALGH: You are correct, thank

you.

MR. ANDRUKAT: Fantastic.

MR. GREENHALGH: My name is Dyrk

Greenhalgh. I'm affiliated with Kairos Power. I

appreciate the hard work that the staff has done to

make this presentation available, and also the

background analyses that support it.

One of the questions that I have, I

believe it's back on Slide14, relating to the

73.55(s)(2)(ii)(a), Condition 3, the licensing

providing necessary information.

What type of information is the Commission

looking for that the licensee must provide to local

law enforcement? And then the second corollary to

that is, what's the imagined periodicity of the

training to law enforcement, and what types of

training would meet that requirement, since it is a

must? Lou, you might be a good person to answer this

one.

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MR. CUBELLIS: Yeah, this is Lou Cubellis.

First off, good afternoon, Dyrk. I think I have met

you on multiple occasions, so it's good to hear you're

in the audience.

I would say the short answer to the first

part of your question, is what information do we

envision being provided, required being provided. Is

there really any information that law enforcement or

the other offsite responders need to perform their

functions?

So, whatever that looks like, it will

largely be determined by whatever roles the licensee

is relying on those offsite forces to perform, and the

familiarization with the facility and the different

methods for defeating delay features and systems of

the facility to carry out the functions that they're

required to carry out for the licensee's protected

strategies.

So, I then gave some examples of basic

sketches of the facility layout, structures that are

important from either a tactical perspective or a

safety perspective, avenues of approach, certainly

structure elevation drawings, barrier information,

defeat methods, key blocks locations, all that kind of

stuff.

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If that's something that law enforcement

or other offsite responders would need to carry out

their functions, then we would expect the licensee to

provide that information. Obviously, communications

is part of that.

MR. GREENHALGH: Yeah, excellent. Would

that include, in your opinion, the need to provide

them target sets?

MR. CUBELLIS: So, I'm only going to speak

from my personal experience. I have, with the large

light water reactor training that we do with law

enforcement, I've been doing it for more than

15 years, we don't ever provide target set information

to law enforcement because, in my experience, it has

not been necessary to do that.

Providing general locations of equipment

is generally sufficient and we don't provide

combinations. The way we do it in the large light

water world is, here is a list of all the equipment or

potential actions in a given elevation and structure,

and we made law enforcement aware of all of those

different locations.

But they don't really know the

relativeness of one location to another.

MR. GREENHALGH: Excellent. Thank you.

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And then, the periodicity. What do you think would

meet that requirement for training?

MR. CUBELLIS: So, right now-- and I'm

sorry, I thought I had enough information to be

dangerous. I didn't mean to cut you off.

The periodicity is, right now, spelled out

in Section 6 Charlie 3, in Appendix Bravo to Part 73.

The tactical response drills are clearly the

exercises are annual. And then, as you know, every

third year is a force-on-force inspection.

MR. GREENHALGH: Okay.

MR. CUBELLIS: And we do not envision that

period as changing. At least we haven't at this

point.

MR. GREENHALGH: Okay, I appreciate it.

No more questions.

MR. CUBELLIS: Yes, sir.

MR. ANDRUKAT: Fantastic. Let's go back

to Ed Lyman. I think have your hand up again.

MR. LYMAN: You know, I just want to

express my reservations once more about what's going

on here.

I don't think it's the right time for the

NRC to contemplate allowing licensees to transfer more

of their responsibilities to local law enforcement,

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especially with the lack of clarity about the vetting

process for local law enforcement, given the political

climate, the potential infiltration of extremist

groups in local law enforcement, and recruitment from

those ranks.

And I think this is a dangerous path we're

going down. In fact, there's so little guidance about

how the licensee's going to maintain their controls

over information, whether they have target-set

information or not.

And I'd say that what happened in the past

is not necessarily what would be needed for the

future, given the increased, the greater authority of

local law enforcement that may be needed to fulfill

these duties.

So, I am very concerned about this. I

don't think it's the right time. And that's all I

have. Thanks.

MR. ANDRUKAT: Okay, thank you very much.

And Rani, I think you have your hand up again.

MS. FRANOVICH: Thanks, Dennis. And

again--

MR. ANDRUKAT: Did we lose you?

MS. FRANOVICH: I'm sorry. Can you hear

me?

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MR. ANDRUKAT: I can hear you now.

MS. FRANOVICH: Okay, my apologies.

Again, this is Rani Franovich from the Breakthrough

Institute. And I have a question that's kind of a

follow-on to one Ed Lyman had asked earlier in the Q&A

session.

And so, I'm just going to ask it directly.

Is the NRC's expectation that LLEA will participate

in force-on-force exercises as a component of an SMR

licensee's protective strategy?

MS. SAMPSON: Hi Rani. This is Michele

Sampson with the NRC. So, the regulatory requirement

that we're putting in place is for the licensee to

maintain the requirement to assess, detect, interdict

and neutralize at all times.

Licensee may rely on law enforcement or

other offsite responders to fulfill the interdiction

and neutralization functions for threats up to and

including the design-basis threat of radiological

sabotage.

The question of what role will law

enforcement have, we expect to be very dependent upon

the reactor design. And it will be incumbent upon the

licensee to do the radiological consequence assessment

and the target-set analysis that have been discussed,

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and to identify the protective strategy for the

facility and what role law enforcement plays in that

protective strategy.

At the end of the day, the licensee's

compliance with security requirements, with the

security regulations, will be subject to NRC's

oversight included in the NRC's force-on-force

inspection program.

So, that's the way is currently

structured. And of course we look forward to comments

during the public comment phase.

MS. FRANOVICH: Thanks, Michele. I think

that answers the question. But just to confirm, I'm

going to repeat back what I think I heard you say.

It really depends on the role local law

enforcement agencies are assigned by a licensee, and

if that role is one of having a protective function,

then it would be subject to those oversight activities

that the NRC implements at nuclear facilities. Did I

understand that correctly?

MS. SAMPSON: Yes, I think that's a good

summary.

MS. FRANOVICH: Okay, great. Thank you.

That answers my question, Michele. Thanks.

MR. ANDRUKAT: Okay. I'm not seeing any

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other hands raised. And for the folks that have

dialed in and can't raise their hand, if you have any

comments or question, you just hit star-six, and then

you can be unmuted and you can let us know if you have

anything.

In the meantime, I will go ahead and go on

to the next slide here. And apologies to Stacy. I

inadvertently put an extra arrow in there.

Okay, so the next steps here, so we had

some good comments, good discussions and good

questions. The next steps, of course, are to finalize

this draft proposed rule packet, in addition with the

draft implementation guidance, these two draft

regulatory guides here, and then of course begin the

concurrence process. And with that, several

challenges, of course, along the way. This is a long

time coming.

I will state that the plan, as far as

future public meetings, for the most part we are not

planning to have additional public meetings before the

publication of the proposed rule.

So, the focus is now, we've had several

public meetings, we've received a lot of good

feedback, we've tried to consider that feedback, and

we wanted to share kind of our latest development with

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the rule text and some of the key elements of the

guidance, especially since NEI2005, right now we're

ceasing the review of that, and thus incorporated such

guidance into these two DGs here.

So, the focus now is to put together this

rule package and get it into concurrence, and kind of

get it out onto the streets out to the public during

the official public comment period.

And to give you an idea of the dates for

that, same dates as the last public meeting if you

attended. The public schedule here is, we are due to

give the proposed rule package to the Commission by

June28th, and then of course the final rule package

to the Commission for their review and approval by

October19, 2023.

Okay, I'd like to switch gears for a quick

second here. So, this is a transformation survey.

So, this is unrelated to the rulemaking. This is just

an opportunity that the agency has been recently

developing and putting out to share with the public at

our various public meetings.

The agency is currently undergoing a kind

of a transformation environment and there's a group of

staff members that put together this public survey.

It's not required, and again, it's not related to this

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rulemaking. It only takes about ten minutes, but

please feel free to click on it and provide your

thoughts on that survey.

And going back to this rulemaking, a huge

thank you to not only the staff on our side, but the

attendees and those that provided their interest,

their comments, and their questions.

Again, the docket ID for this rulemaking

is NRC-2017- 0227. That's on www.regulations.gov. And

the last link on the slide there is the public meeting

feedback form/survey.

Please feel free to click on that to

provide feedback on this particular public meeting,

and we would love to hear from you.

Now once again, if you have any questions

or comments, feel free to email myself-- that's

dennis.andrukat, so D-E-N-N-I-S-.-A-N-D-R-U-K-A-T

@nrc.gov (dennis.andrukat@nrc.gov), and I'm going to

switch back over just to make sure -- we have one more

raised hand. Mr.Tony. There you go.

MR. UNKNOWN: Tony Qualenca.

MR. ANDRUKAT: Yes, go ahead.

MR. UNKNOWN: I'm sorry. I just wanted to

clarify. You said the timeline, October '23. That's

calendar year, not fiscal year?

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com 73

MR. ANDRUKAT: Correct. Correct. So, it

will be the very beginning of the fiscal year 2024.

Right?

MR. UNKNOWN: Yes.

MR. ANDRUKAT: Yeah.

MR. UNKNOWN: Thank you.

MR. ANDRUKAT: Of course. Okay, seeing no

other hands raised, I will go ahead and conclude

today's meeting. We ended early, which is good. You

guys have some time back. And thank you very much.

(Whereupon the above-entitled matter

went off the record at 12:43 p.m.)

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com