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{{#Wiki_filter:ADAMS Template: SECY-067 DOCUMENT DATE:        04/23/1998 TITLE:      PR-050 - 63FR20136 - CODES AND STANDARDS: IEEE NATIONAL CONSENSUS STANDARD CASE
{{#Wiki_filter:}}
 
==REFERENCE:==
PR-050 63FR20136 KEYWORD:          RULEMAKING COMMENTS Document Sensitivity: Non-sensitive - SUNS! Review Complete
 
DOCKET NO. PR-050 (63FR20136)
In the Matter of CODES AND STANDARDS: IEEE NATIONAL CONSENSUS STANDARD DATE        DATE OF      TITLE OR DOCKETED    DOCUMENT      DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT
.04/20/98      04/17 /98    FEDERAL REGISTER NOTICE - PROPOSED RULE 05/26/98    05/22/98      COMMENT OF EDWARD (TED) L. QUINN (    1) 05/26/98    05/26/98      COMMENT OF MAINE YANKEE (GEORGE A. ZINKE)  (      2) 05/26/98    05/26/98      COMMENT OF NUCLEAR UTILITY BACKFITTING AND REFORM GROUP (D.F. STENGER & G.D. RICHMOND, ATTYS) (      3) 05/26/98    05/20/98      COMMENT OF NUCLEAR ENERGY INSTITUTE (ALEXANDER MARION) (    4) 05/27_/98  05/26/98      COMMENT OF NUCLEAR UTILITY GROUP ON EQUIPMENT QUALIFICATION (M.H. PHILIPS, JR., & W.A. HORIN) (    5) 05/28/98    05/22/98      COMMENT OF IES UTILITIES (KENNETH E. PEVELER) (      6) 05/28/98    05/28/98      COMMENT OF PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS (PSE&G) (    7) 05/28/98    05/20/98      COMMENT OF TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY (MARK J. BURZYNSKI) (    8) 05/29/98    05/26/98      COMMENT OF PECO ENERGY COMPANY (GARRETT D. EDWARDS) (    9) 05/29/98    05/22/98      COMMENT OF FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY (JOHN GIANFRANCESCO) ( 10) 05/29/98    05/22/98      COMMENT OF PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY (LAWRENCE F. WOMACK, VICE PRESIDENT) ( 11) 05/29/98    05/26/98      COMMENT OF ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC.
(JERROLD G. DEWEASE, VICE PRESIDENT) (    12) 06/01/98    05/27/98      COMMENT OF COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY (R. M. KRICH) (    13) 06/01/98    05/26/98      COMMENT OF CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY (D. B. ALEXANDER) ( 14)
 
DOCKET NO. PR-050 (63FR20136}
DATE        DATE OF    TITLE OR DOCKETED    DOCUMENT    DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT 06/02/98    05/25/98    COMMENT OF DUKE ENERGY CORPORATION (M. S. TUCKMAN, EXECUTIVE VP} ( 15}
06/03/98    05/26/98    COMMENT OF NEW YORK POWER AUTHORITY (J. KNUBEL, SR. VP AND CNO} (  16}
06/18/98    06/12/98    LTR FM D. R. POWELL, PSE&G, ENCLOSING COMMENTS WHICH WERE E-MAILED TO SATISH AGGARWAL ON 5/27/98 (COMMENT NO. 7}
04/07/99    04/06/99    FEDERAL REGISTER NOTICE - FINAL RULE 04/29/99    04/28/99    FEDERAL REGISTER NOTICE - FINAL RULE:  CORRECTION 05/03/99    04/27/99    COMMENT OF NUCLEAR ENERGY INSTITUTE (ALEXANDER MARION} ( 17}
 
DOCKET USf>1~ 9 P]
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 10 CFR Part 50                    *99 APR 29 Pl2 :12 RIN 3150-AF96                  OFPI ,
RlJL,_'            )
Codes and Standards: IEEE National        ADJUIJ,l            /-F F Consensus Standard; Correction DOCKET NUMBER AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.                              PROPOSED RULE.PR        5o (fo3FR~ot 3'.)
ACTION: Final rule: Correction.
 
==SUMMARY==
: This document corrects a final rule appearing in the Federal Register on April 13, 1999 (64 FR 17944), that incorporates by reference IEEE Std. 603-1991, a national consensus standard for power, instrumentation, and control portions of safety systems in nuclear power plants. This action is necessary to correct an erroneous reference.
EFFECTIVE DATE: The final rule is effective on May 13, 1999.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Michael T. Lesar, Federal Register Liaison Officer, telephone (301) 415-7163.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
On page 17946, in the third column, in the codified text at §50.55a(h)(1 ), on the fourteenth and twenty-first lines from the top, and at §50.55a(h)(2) on the twenty-eighth line from the top "Std. 279-1971" should be corrected by removing "-1971" to read "Std. 279."
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this  J,,f3t& 1day of April, 1999.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Q,,;m--- L. !l*-~
nnette L. Vietti-Cook, Secretary of the Commission.
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DOC FTED I \~~ IC NUCLEAR        ENERGY      IN S TITUTE
                                                                        *qq
                                                                          #.,    MAY - 3 P 4 :O 1 Alexander Marlon DIRECTOR, PROGRAMS Of ; ,                  NUCLEAR GENERATION D IVISION p,,__,
ADJ-..
April 27, 1999 Mrs. Annette L. Vietti-Cook                                                    DOCKET NUMBER Secretary, Office of the Secretary of the Commission                          PROPOSED RULE.PR                        50 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission                                                                            (_t,3FR :io/ 3i,)
Washington, D.C. 20555
 
==SUBJECT:==
Final Rule 10 CFR 50.55a, Codes and Standards: IEEE National Consensus Standard, 64 Fed. Reg. 17944, April 13, 1999 The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), on behalf of the nuclear energy industry, submits this letter on the final rule that incorporates by reference IEEE Standard 603-1991, "IEEE Standard Criteria for Safety Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations."
We are pleased that a number of industry comments and concerns with the previous direct final rules have been addressed, especially in the following areas:
* applicability to current operating plants
* clarification and consistency in terminology
* applicability of referenced standards In reviewing the statement of considerations and associated SECY-98-294, we noted a lack of discussion about how the rule would be implemented after a licensee decides to voluntarily apply this IEEE standard, in whole or in part. Because of the voluntary nature of this rule, we believe it important for the Commission to clearly state its
* intention that such a decision by a licensee would be a commitment and handled within the context of the licensee's commitment management program. This would ensure consistent implementation by NRC inspection personnel as well as utility licensees who may choose to voluntarily apply IEEE 603 in accordance with this final rule.
We look forward to your response and would be pleased to further discuss with NRC industry views on this matter. Should you have any questions, please call me at (202) 739-8080 or e-mail am@nei.org.
Sincerely, Alexander Marion cc:      Dr. William D. Travers                                                                            A - 6 1999 Mr. Samuel J. Collins                                    ~edbycard                        1811111    II JI.,.,._~
I 776 I ~TREET, NW  SUIT E 400 WASH I NGTON . D<  '.20006 3708        PHONE  20'.2 . /:!9 8000        fAX  202 785 /4 0 J <;
 
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY          ON AULEMAKINGS&,_.,::::,n:JNS_ 8l'AFF OFRCEOF              'MN OFTHECOWIMISSION DomnantSlatlsllcs
              &#xa2; 9/99 I    I
 
DOCKET MBER          PR PROPOSED RULE*            SO 03FR~o/31,)              D NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 10 CFR Part 50                "99  AP -7 P2 :49 RIN 3150-AF96 or+
RL_c Codes and Standards: IEEE          ADJU,                    F National Consensus Standard AGENCY:        Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION:        Final rule .
 
==SUMMARY==
:        The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is amending its regulations to incorporate by reference IEEE Std. 603-1991, a national consensus standard for power, instrumentation, and control portions of safety systems in nuclear power plants. Use of IEEE Std. 603-1991 is mandatory for new nuclear power plants and design approvals or certifications and is voluntary for existing nuclear power plants and design approvals. This action is necessary to endorse the latest version of this national consensus standard in NRC's regulations because IEEE has withdrawn IEEE Std. 279-1971.
EFFECTIVE DATE:        The final rule is effective on ~O d:!~~~6a:o~~~he        Federal Aegiste,,. The incorporation by reference of IEEE Std. 603-1991 is approved by the Director of the Federal Register as of (30 days after publication).
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Satish K. Aggarwal, Senior Program Manager, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, Telephone: 301-415-6005, Fax: 301-415-5074, E-mail: SKA@NRC.GOV.
PttJ,      ,,Cn  L//t3/1 7 a.:f" Ci:,  '/FR I 7q t./4
 
2 SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
10 CFR Part 50, "Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities," &sect;50.SSa(h) requires that the protection systems in nuclear power plants meet the requirements stated in IEEE Std. 279, "Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations," in effect on the formal docket date of the application. However, IEEE has withdrawn IEEE Std.
279-1971 and has superseded it with IEEE Std. 603-1991, "Criteria for Safety Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations." On April 23, 1998 (63 FR 20136), the NRC published a
* proposed rule in the Federal Register that would amend its regulations to incorporate IEEE Std.
603-1991 for power, instrumentation, and control portions of safety systems. This action is consistent with the provisions of the National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104-113, which encourages Federal regulatory agencies to consider adopting industry consensus standards as an alternative to de novo agency development of standards affecting an industry. This action is also consistent with the NRC policy of evaluating the latest versions of national consensus standards in terms of their suitability for endorsement by regulations or regulatory guides.
Currently, 10 CFR 50.55a(h) specifies that "protection systems" for plants with construction permits issued after January 1, 1971, must meet the requirements in IEEE Std.
279 in effect on the formal docket date of the application for a construction permit. IEEE Std.
279-1971 states that a "protection system" encompasses all electric and mechanical devices and circuitry (from sensors to actuation device input terminals) involved in generating those signals associated with the protective function. These signals include those that actuate reactor trip and that, in the event of a serious reactor accident, actuate engineered safety features (ESFs), such as containment isolation, core spray, safety injection, pressure reduction, and air
 
3 cleaning. "Protective function" is defined in IEEE Std. 279-1971 as ''the sensing of one or more variables associated with a particular generating station condition, signal processing, and the initiation and completion of the protective action at values of the variables established in the design bases."
IEEE Std. 603-1991 uses the term "safety systems" rather than "protection systems" to define its scope. A "safety system" is defined in IEEE Std. 603-1991 as "a system that is relied upon to remain functional during and following design basis events to ensure: (i) The integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, (ii) the capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, or (iii) the capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents that could result in potential offsite exposures comparable to the 10 CFR Part 100 guidelines." A "safety function" is defined in IEEE Std. 603-1991 as "one of the processes or conditions (for example, emergency negative reactivity insertion, post-accident heat removal, emergency core cooling, post-accident radioactivity removal, and containment isolation) essential to maintain plant parameters within acceptable limits established for a design basis event."
The NRC recognizes that "protection systems" are a subset of "safety systems." Safety system is a broad-based and all-encompassing term, embracing the protection system in addition to other electrical systems. Thus, the term "protection system" is not synonymous with the term "safety system." The final rule is not intended to change the scope of the systems covered in the final safety analysis report (FSAR) for currently operating nuclear power plants.
This final rule sets forth the standards for the design of safety systems for future power plants. The final rule mandates the use of IEEE Std. 603-1991 (including the correction sheet dated January 30, 1995) for applications for design approvals pursuant to 10 CFR Part 52, Appendix O and design certifications pursuant to 10 CFR Part 52, Subpart B which are filed
 
4 after the effective date of this rule. Although the Westinghouse AP-600 design certification was filed prior to the effective date of this rule, it has been reviewed to IEEE Std. 603-1991. In addition, the final rule mandates the use of IEEE Std. 603-1991 (including the correction sheet dated January 30, 1995) for all applications for a construction permit, operating license or combined license filed on or after the effective date of the rule that do not reference a certified design. Any application for a construction permit, operating license or combined license that references a certified design is required to comply with the IEEE standards approved in the referenced design certification rule. Current holders of operating licenses may continue to meet the requirements for protection systems in their licensing basis, or may voluntarily comply with IEEE Std. 603-1991 (including the correction sheet dated January 30, 1995).
Significant Comments on the Proposed Rule The NRC received 16 public comment letters. Copies of these letters are available for public inspection, and copying for a fee, at the NRC's Public Document Room. The major issues raised by the commenters and the NRC staff responses to these issues are as follows:
(1) Ambiguity in the definition of "System-Level Replacements."
Issue: The term "system-level replacement'' is not clearly defined. The rule would create a dual licensing basis for plant protection systems.
Response: "System-level replacement'' for a protection system must involve complete replacement from the process sensors to the actuation signals used for the initiation of execute features (e.g., reactor trip system trip breaker, scram solenoid-operated valves, and ESF motive equipment operation). A licensee's current licensing basis applies when defining protection system boundaries. A licensee's protection systems are typically defined and
 
5 discussed in Final Safety Analysis Report Sections 7.1, 7.2, and 7.3. The decision to establish and manage a dual licensing basis is voluntary, not mandatory. Reference to system-level replacements has been removed in this final rule because the compliance with the requirements of IEEE Std. 603-1991 is voluntary for changes to protection systems.
(2) Referenced Standards.
Issue: The NRC staff states that the other IEEE standards referenced in IEEE Std.
603-1991 will not by themselves become mandatory. However, this position was not restated in the rule itself.
Response: As a matter of law, the other IEEE standards referenced in IEEE Std. 603-1991 are not rulemaking requirements, inasmuch as (i) Section 50.55a does not contain lanquage explicitly requiring the use of the other IEEE standards referenced in IEEE Std. 603-1991, and (ii) the other IEEE standards referenced in IEEE Std. 603-1991 have not been approved for incorporation by reference by the Office of Federal Register.
(3) Backfit Analysis.
Issue: Incorporating the additional requirements of IEEE Std. 603-1991 as a binding regulation would impose a change to the current licensing basis and constitutes a backfit.
Response: The NRC has revised the rule to make compliance with the requirements of IEEE Std. 603-1991 voluntary. Current licensees may continue to satisfy NRC regulations by meeting the requirements stated in the edition or revision of IEEE Std. 279 in effect on the formal date of their application for a construction permit. Therefore, any further discussion of backfit is unnecessary.
 
6 Consensus Standards The National Technology Transfer Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104-113, requires that Federal agencies use technical standards that are developed or adopted by voluntary consensus standards bodies unless the use of these standards is inconsistent with applicable law or otherwise impractical. In this final rule, the NRC is using the following voluntary consensus standards, IEEE Std. 603-1991, including the correction sheet dated January 30, 1995. No alternative voluntary consensus standard(s) were identified for use in this final rule.
Finding of No Environmental Impact: Availability of Environmental Assessment The NRC has determined under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, as amended, and the NRC's regulations in subpart A of 10 CFR Part 51, that because this final rule would not be a major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, an environmental impact statement is not required. The NRC has prepared an environmental assessment supporting this finding of no significant environmental impact.
The NRC had sent a copy of the environmental assessment and a copy of the Federal Register notice to every State liaison officer and requested their comments on the environmental assessment. No comments were received. The environmental assessment is available for inspection, and copying for a fee, at the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, D.C. Also, the NRC has committed itself to complying in all its actions with Presidential Executive Order 12898, "Federal Actions To Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations" (February 11, 1994). Therefore, the NRC also has determined that there are no disproportionate, high, and adverse impacts on
 
7 minority and low-income populations. The NRC uses the following working definition of environmental justice: Environmental justice means the fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all people- regardless of race, ethnicity, culture, income, or educational level-with respect to the development, implementation, and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations, and policies.
Paperwork Reduction Act Statement This final rule does not contain a new or amended information collection requirement subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501, et seq.). Existing requirements were approved by the Office of Management and Budget, Approval No. 3150-0011.
Public Protection Notification If an information collection does not display a currently valid 0MB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
Regulatory Analysis The NRC has prepared a regulatory analysis that shows this amendment does not impose any new requirements or costs on current licensees because compliance with the requirements of IEEE Std. 603-1991 is voluntary. The regulatory analysis is available for
 
8 inspection, and copying for a fee, in the NRG Public Document Room , 2120 L Street NW.,
Washington, DC.
Regulatory Flexibility Certification As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (5 U.S.C. 605(b)), the NRG certifies that this rule does not have a significant economic impact on small entities. This rule affects only the operation of nuclear power plants. The companies that own these plants do not fall within the scope of the definition of "small entities" stated in the Regulatory Flexibility Act or the small business size standards adopted by the NRC (10 CFR 2.810). Because these companies are dominant in their service areas, this rule does not fall within the purview of the act.
Backfit Analysis The final rule requires applicants for new design approvals and new design certifications to comply with IEEE Std. 603-1991 (including the correction sheet dated January 30, 1995).
The final rule also requires applicants for new construction permits, new operating licenses, and combined licenses that do not reference a certified design to comply with IEEE Std. 603-1991 (including the correction sheet dated January 30, 1995). Current holders of operating licenses may continue to meet the requirements for protection systems in their licensing basis, or may voluntarily comply with IEEE Std. 603-1991 (including the correction sheet dated January 30, 1995).
 
9 The backfit rule was not intended to apply to regulatory actions that change expectations of prospective applicants and, therefore, the backfit rule does not apply to the portion of the rule applicable to new construction permits, new operating licenses, new design approvals, new design certifications, and combined licenses that do not reference a certified design. Because the IEEE Std. 603-1991 is voluntary for licensees of currently operating plants, this rule does not constitute a backfit with respect to those plants.
The NRC staff believes that newer consensus standards reflect progress and the current "state of the practice" of the technology. Specifically, IEEE Std. 603-1991 is a major
* improvement over IEEE Std. 279-1971 . IEEE Std. 279-1971 provides basic criteria for protection systems, which remain unchanged in IEEE Std. 603-1991. If a licensee proposes to replace an existing analog protection system with a digital system, IEEE Std. 279-1971 provides no specific guidance. Therefore, licensees are likely to consider the guidance in IEEE Std. 603-1991 and other standards that address digital system design. The NRC staff encourages the use of digital technology and encourages the use of new standards such as IEEE Std. 603-1991. Thus, the final rule provides an option for complying with the new
* standard for changes to existing power and instrumentation and control portions of protection systems. This is not considered a backfit because the adoption of IEEE Std. 603-1991 would be voluntary.
In summary, the NRC has determined that the backfit rule, 10 CFR 50.109, does not apply to this rule because it does not impose any backfits as defined in 10 CFR 50.109(a)(1 ).
Therefore, a backfit analysis has not been prepared for this final rule.
 
10 Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act In accordance with the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 the NRC has determined that this action is not a major rule and has verified this determination with the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs of 0MB.
List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 50 Antitrust, Classified information, Criminal penalties, Fire protection; Incorporation by reference, lntergovernmentalrelations, Nuclear power plants and reactors, Radiation protection, Reactor siting criteria, and Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.
For the reasons stated in the preamble and under the authority of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, and 5 U.S.C. 552 and 553, the NRC is adopting the following amendment to 10 CFR Part 50.
 
11 PART SO-DOMESTIC LICENSING OF PRODUCTION AND UTILIZATION FACILITIES
: 1. The authority citation for Part 50 continues to read as follows:
AUTHORITY: Secs. 102, 103, 104, 105, 161, 182, 183, 186, 189, 68 Stat. 936, 937, 938, 948, 953, 954, 955, 956, as amended, sec. 234, 83 Stat. 1244, as amended (42 U.S.C.
2132, 2133, 2134, 2135, 2201, 2232, 2233, 2236, 2239, 2282); secs. 201, as amended, 202, 206, 88 Stat. 1242, as amended, 1244, 1246 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5842, 5846).
Section 50.7 also issued under Pub. L. 95-601, sec. 10, 92 Stat. 2951 (42 U.S.C.
5851). Section 50.10 also issued under secs. 101, 185, 68 Stat. 955 as amended (42 U.S.C.
2131, 2235), sec. 102, Pub. L. 91-190, 83 Stat. 853 (42 U.S.C. 4332). Sections 50.13, and 50.54(dd), and 50.103 also issued under sec. 108, 68 Stat. 939, as amended (42 U.S.C.
2138), Sections 50.23, 50.35, 50.55, and 50.56 also issued under sec. 185, 68 Stat. 955 (42 U.S.C. 2235), Sections 50.33a, 50.55a and Appendix Q also issued under sec. 102, Pub. L.
91-190, 83 Stat. 853 (42 U.S.C. 4332). Sections 50.34 and 50.54 also issued under sec. 204, 88 Stat. 1245 (42 U.S.C. 5844). Sections 50.58, 50.91, and 50.92 also issued under Pub. L.
97-415, 96 Stat. 2073 (42 U.S.C. 2239). Section 50.78 also issued under sec. 122, 68 Stat.
939 (42 U.S.C. 2152). Sections 50.80-50.81 also issued under sec. 184, 68 Stat. 954, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2234). Appendix Falso issued under sec. 187, 68 Stat. 955 (42 U.S.C. 2237).
: 2. In&sect; 50.55a, paragraph (h) is revised to read as follows:
&sect; 50.55a Codes and standards.
 
12 (h) Protection and Safety Systems. (1) IEEE Std. 603-1991, including the correction sheet dated January 30, 1995, which is referenced in paragraphs (h)(2) and (h){3} of this section, is approved for incorporation by reference by the Director of the Office of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies of IEEE Std. 603-1991 may be purchased from the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Service Center, 445 Hoes Lane, Piscataway, NJ 08855. The standard is also available for inspection at the NRC Library, 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Md; and at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., Suite 700, Washington, D.C. IEEE Std. 279, which is referenced in paragraph (h)(2) of this section, was approved for incorporation by reference by the Director of the Office of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies of IEEE Std. 279 are also available as indicated for IEEE Std. 603-1991.
(2) Protection systems. For nuclear power plants with construction permits issued after January 1, 1971, but before (insert the effective date of this document), protection systems must meet the requirements stated in either IEEE Std. 279, "Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations," or in IEEE Std. 603-1991, "Criteria for Safety Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations," and the correction sheet dated January 30, 1995. For nuclear power plants with construction permits issued before January 1, 1971, protection systems must be consistent with their licensing basis or may meet the requirements of IEEE Std. 603-1991 and the correction sheet dated January 30, 1995.
(3) Safety systems. Applications filed on or after [INSERT EFFECTIVE DATE OF RULE] for preliminary and final design approvals (1 0 CFR Part 52, Appendix 0), design certifications, and construction permits, operating licenses and combined licenses that do not reference a final design approval or design certification, must meet the requirements for safety
 
13 systems in IEEE Std. 603-1991 and the correction sheet dated January 30, 1995.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this  lQ *ti-:    day of April, 1999.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Annette L. Vietti-Cook, Secretary of the Commission.
 
O PS~G                                                                                DOCKETED Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey      080~b~'i8t Nuclear Business Unit "98 JUN 18 All :14 JUN 1 2 1998 OF/=1 l,...
1
                                                                                              ;:.: SF LR-N980284              RUl.,_,
ADJU -:(
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Secretary Washington, DC 20555 Attn: Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff
 
==Dear Sir:==
 
COMMENTS ON NRC PROPOSED RULE ON IEEE STANDARD 603-1991
* SALEM AND HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATIONS DOCKET NOS. 50-272, 50-311 AND 50-354 Enclosed are the Public Service Electric & Gas (PSE&G) comments on the proposed rule revising 10CFR50.55a(h) as published in the Federal Register on April 23, 1998, 63FR20136 submitting a direct rule to amend the Commissions rules in 10 CFR Part 50.55a(h). The enclosed comments were provided to Mr. S. Aggarwal of the NRC via E-Mail on May 27, 1998.
If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact Mr. Vic Fregonese at (609) 339-1607 .
* Sincerely, D.R. Powell ,
Director -
Licensing/Regulation and Fuels Attachment Tre~is in~ harm 95-2168 REV. 6/94
 
itJ.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION RULEMAKINGS & ADJUDICATIONS STAR=
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE COMMISSION Doctlr1ant Statistics Pomlark 0a1e        ro/45/qg Cq)lasAecat.ted _____          , _  _ _
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Document Control Desk                    2 LR-N980284 C    Mr. H. J. Miller, Administrator - Region I U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406 Mr. P. Milano, Licensing Project Manager - Salem U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
* One White Flint North Mail Stop 14E21 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852 Mr. R. Ennis, Licensing Project Manager - Hope Creek U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint North Mail Stop 14E21 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852 Mr. S. Morris        (X24)
USNRC Senior Resident Inspector - Salem Mr. S. Pindale      (X24)
USNRC Senior Resident Inspector - Hope Creek Mr. K. Tosch, Manager IV, Bureau of Nuclear Engineering PO Box415 Trenton, NJ 08625
 
LR-N980284 ATTACHMENT 1 PSE&G COMMENTS ON PROPOSED RULE ON IEEE STANDARD 603-1991
: 1. Endorsement of other referenced IEEE standards Within the proposed rules published in the Federal Register as noted above, the NRC in its response to significant comment #1, PSE&G does not believe the NRC has fully addressed the outright endorsement of other IEEE standards. The statement that IEEE 603 - 1991 does not imply endorsement of later versions of IEEE Standards is not technically substantiated within the proposed rule by the NRC if IEEE 603 - 1991 is to be endorsed by rule and not regulatory guidance. The NRC states that it did not seek for any other standards referenced in IEEE 603 - 1991 to be approved for incorporation by reference, even going so far as to state the referenced standards in IEEE 603 - 1991 are not mandatory requirements, although IEEE 603 - 1991 invokes the referenced standards by the use of "shall". PSE&G believes the NRC position has not been clarified due to "shall" in the IEEE 603 -1991 standard; once IEEE 603 -1991 becomes part of 10 CFR 50 .55a, then IEEE 603 -1991 becomes part of the license commitment.
: 2. Definition of System Level Replacement The term "system level" replacement is not clearly defined and likely cannot specifically be established regarding what constitutes a system-level replacement versus an upgrade or modification to components and subsystems. The proposed NRC interpretation would require compliance with IEEE-603 -1991 for system level replacement/upgrades of protection systems/subsystems that require replacement due to age or obsolescence. Currently, this can be performed under 10CFR50.59 guidance, using design criteria (IEEE standards and Reg Guides) that are part of the plants design and licensing basis. Imposition of IEEE-603 -
1991 in this situation appears to be a backfit. The NRC's perceived impact of incorporating IEEE-603 in this manner is understated.
: 3. IEEE 603 - 1991 Industry Acceptance PSE&G disagrees that IEEE-603 and RG 1.153 represent a general public consensus position . The NRC's statement that they believe the RG was appropriate due to lack of negative comment on the draft RG (proposing to endorse IEEE 603 -1991) should have considered that the majority of operating plants are not required to meet IEEE-603 -1991 or RG 1.153. The lack of adverse comments (to the draft RG) should not have been construed as an endorsement of IEEE 603 -1991.
 
123 Main Street White Plains, New York 10601 914 68 1.6840 914 287.3309 (FAX)                                                      DOCKETED
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JPN-98-021 IPN-98-062 Chief, Rules and Directives Branch Division of Administrative Services Office of Administration U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001
 
==SUBJECT:==
Indian Point 3 Nuclear Power Plant Docket No. 50-286 James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Docket No. 50-333 COMMENTS ON PROPOSED RULE CHANGES TO PARAGRAPH {h) OF 10 CFR 50.55a "CODES AND STANDARDS"
 
==REFERENCES:==
See below.
 
==Dear Sir:==
 
The Authority has reviewed the proposed rule (Reference 1) published April 23, 1998 amending 10 CFR 50.55a(h). The rule is similar to a final direct rule published in October 1997 (Reference 2) by the NRC in that it proposes to incorporate a reference to IEEE Std.
603-1991 (Reference 3) to replace IEEE Std. 279 (Reference 4). The Authority expressed several concerns (Reference 5) regarding the final direct rule. While the latest proposed rule includes many changes to address the industry's comments on the earlier version of this rule, several concerns remain. These concerns are detailed below.
Safety Bases Not Enumerated The NRC staff has not provided information that demonstrates that the new standard would result in an increased level of protection to the public health and safety, for either new or currently licensed plants.
The FR notice and draft Regulatory Analysis focus on three reasons why the 1991 standard should be incorporated into the regulations. The three reasons cited are: ( 1) standard IEEE 279-1971 is no longer in effect and has been withdrawn by the IEEE; (2) IEEE 603-1991 standard reflects "current technology;" and, (3) the adoption of IEEE 603-1991 is consistent with the provisions of the National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995.
Acknowledged by card .._ JUN , -. ,.4 ...........
1998 ...
 
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Neither the FR notice, nor the Regulatory Analysis, provides a technical or safety basis for the proposed rule.
The fact that an outdated standard is referred to in federal regulations does not alter the fact that it remains an integral part of the licensing basis for many of currently operating US nuclear power plants. IEEE 279-1971 is, and will continue to be, part of the licensing basis for many operating plants.
The development of new standards does not diminish the value, or validity, of older industry standards. They were the basis upon which Operating Licenses were issued and continue to be the basis upon which adequate protection of the public health and safety is assured. The mere existence of a new industry standard does not, by itself, provide sufficient basis for its enforcement as a regulatory requirement.
Industry codes and standards should be adopted by the NRC wherever practical and judicious. Clearly, that was the purpose and intent of the Technology and Transfer Act, and the Authority endorses the use of new standards when appropriate. However, the intent of the act was not to suggest that new standards be made mandatory without compelling justification.
In summary, the reasons enumerated in the FR notice or regulatory analysis do not outline why the new standard is technically superior to it's 1971 equivalent. The FR notice or regulatory analysis do not demonstrate why this change to 10 CFR 50.55a(h) will improve safety at US nuclear power plants. At a minimum, the old and new standards should be compared to demonstrate the extent to which the public health and safety might be improved through the adoption of this rule. The comparison should include an estimate of the magnitude of risk reduction associated with the application of IEEE 603-1991 to new and operating nuclear power plants.
Definition of "System-Level Replacement"
* While the FR notice defines a system, the rule itself doe not define what constitutes a "system-level replacement." As a result, the threshold for the mandatory use of IEEE 603-1991 could be interpreted as the replacement of two components. This is much too low a threshold for operating plants.
While the FR notice implies that modifications or changes to components and subsystems are not "system-level replacements," other portions of the FR notice could be interpreted to conflict with this statement. In particular, the notice defines a "system" as a "combination of two or more interrelated components." The Authority is concerned that this "two component" language could be interpreted to require the introduction of IEEE 603-1991 when only two components are being replaced or modified.
The language of the rule should be clarified to define what constitutes a "system-level replacement." Any rule made final should make it clear that that modifications or changes to components and subsystems are not "system-level replacements." It should establish a high threshold for the introduction of IEEE 603-1991 into an otherwise IEEE-279 qualified system.
 
This letter does not contain any new commitments. If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact the Director - Nuclear Licensing, Ms. C. D. Faison.
Very ; r, ~ ours/ J
                                                                -~
                                                              . Knubel Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer
 
==References:==
: 1. April 23, 1998 FEDERAL REGISTER, Vol. 63, No. 78, pages 20136-20139, "Nuclear Regulatory Commission Proposed Rule, Codes and Standards; IEEE National Consensus Standard"
: 2. October 17, 1997 FEDERAL REGISTER, Vol. 62, No. 20, pages 53932-53935, "Nuclear Regulatory Commission Final Direct Rule, Codes and Standards; IEEE National Consensus Standard"
: 3. IEEE Std. 603-1991, "Criteria for Safety Systems for Nuclear Generating Stations"
: 4. IEEE Std. 279, "Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations"
: 5. NYPA letter, J. Knubel to USN RC, dated December 1, 1997 (JPN-97-037 /IPN-97-164) regarding comment on Final Direct Rule, Changes to Paragraph (h) of 10 CFR 50.55a "Codes and Standards" cc: next page
 
cc: Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406 Office of the Resident Inspector U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P.O. Box 136 Lycoming, NY 13093 Office of the Resident Inspector U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Indian Point 3 P. 0. Box 337 Buchanan, NY 10511 Mr. George F. Wunder, Project Manager Project Directorate 1-1 Division of Reactor Projects 1/11 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop 14B2 Washington, DC 20555 Mr. Joseph Williams, Project Manager Project Directorate 1-1 Division of Reactor Projects 1/11 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop 14B2 Washington, DC 20555
 
Duke Power Company
  ~    Duke                                                              A Duk, Energy Company
  ,_Power..                                                              EC07H 526 South Church Street P.O. Box 1006 Charlotte, NC 28201 -1006 M. S. Tuckman Executive Vice President "98 JUN -2 P2 :14      (704) 382-2200 OFFICE Nuclear Generation                                                (704) 382-4360 FAX May 25, 1998 Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 Attention:              Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff
 
==Subject:==
Comments on NRC Proposed Changes to 10 CFR 50.55a (h)
* to Incorporate IEEE Standard 603-1991 In response to the proposed rulemaking to amend 10 CFR 50.55a(h) to incorporate IEEE Standard 603-1991 which appeared in the April 23, 1998 Federal Register, Duke Energy Corporation endorses the May 20, 1998, NEI comments and offers the following additional comments.
Comment 1 The existing rule does not backfit IEEE Standard 279 on plants with construction permits issued prior to January 1, 1971. The proposed rule states at FR 20137, "However, system-level replacements of protection systems in nuclear power plants initiated on or after January 1, 1999, would be required to meet the requirements in IEEE Std. 603-1991." The interpretation of what constitutes a system level replacement could have significant impact on older plants which wish to upgrade portions of systems but do not necessarily wish to redesign the entire system to meet separation/isolation criteria not included in the original licensing basis.
Comment 2 To the extent IEEE Std. 603-1991 imposes additional requirements over IEEE Std. 279, it represents a backfit for potential system level replacements for plants licensed under IEEE Std. 279. This could have the unintended effect of discouraging licensee's from upgrading their systems.
I urge the Commission to work closely with NEI on this proposed rulemaking prior to implementation.
Acknowledged by card _Ju_N_-_4_99_8......,
 
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May 25, 1998 Page 2 Please address any questions to Lee a. Keller at (704) 382-5826.
Very truly yours, M.S. Tuckman
 
DOCKETED CP&L                                                US RC Carolina Power & Light Company                "98 JUN -1 P4 :OO PO Box 1551 411 Fayetteville Street Mall                                            CP&L Letter: PE&RAS-98-042 Raleigh NC 27602 May 26, 1998 f *
                                                              ~v Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 Attention: Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff
 
==Subject:==
Comments on the NRC Proposed Rule on Codes and Standards:
IEEE National Consensus Standard (63 FR 20136 - April 23, 1998)
 
==Dear Sir or Madam:==
 
Enclosed are the comments of Carolina Power & Light Company (CP&L) on the NRC proposed rule amending 10CFR50.55a(h), "Protection and Safety Systems," to incorporate by reference IEEE standard 603-1991, "Criteria for Safety Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations."
CP&L recognizes that the proposed amendment to the regulations was prompted by the withdrawal of IEEE 279-1971, and CP&L supports efforts to improve nuclear regulations.
However, CP&L does not consider the proposed amendment to be the best approach to handling withdrawn consensus standards. Therefore, CP&L recommends that the NRC withdraw the proposed rule pending further revision, as described in the enclosed specific comments.
Please contact me at (919) 546-690 l if you have questions.
Sincerely, r-    D.B . Alexander, Manager Performance Evaluation & Regulatory Affairs HAS Enclosure J  4 98 Acknowlad      by card- --  ------*
 
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r, Page 2                                                            CP&L Letter PE&RAS-98-042 May 26, 1998 Comments on the NRC Proposed Rule on Codes and Standards:
IEEE National Consensus Standard (63 FR 20136 - April 23, 1998) cc:    Mr. L.J. Callan, Executive Director for Operations Mr. S.J. Collins, Director, USNRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Mr. L.A. Reyes, Regional Administrator, Region II Mr. J.B. Brady, USNRC Resident Inspector - HNP, Unit 1 Mr. G.A. Hutto, USNRC Resident Inspector - HBRSEP, Unit 2 Mr. V.L. Rooney, USNRC Project Manager - HNP, Unit 1 Mr. J.W. Shea, USNRC Project Manager - HBRSEP, Unit 2 Mr. C.A. Patterson, USNRC Resident Inspector - BSEP, Units 1 and 2 Mr. D.C. Trimble, USNRC Project Manager - BSEP, Units 1 and 2 Chair J.A. Sanford - North Carolina Utilities Commission
 
Page 3                                                                CP&L Letter PE&RAS-98-042 May 26, 1998                                                          Enclosure Comments on the NRC Proposed Rule on Codes and Standards:
IEEE National Consensus Standard (63 FR 20136 - April 23, 1998)
Comment 1:  The proposed rule to endorse IEEE Std. 603-1991 in 10CFR50.55a does not establish the technical basis for the change. In particular, the proposed rule:
: 1. Identifies no problem that has resulted from the implementation of the previous standard IEEE Std. 279;
: 2. Identifies no improvement in nuclear safety or plant performance that can be expected to result from the implementation of IEEE Std. 603-1991; and
: 3. Does not permit the licensee to make a risk-informed decision about the technical merits of implementing IEEE Std. 603-1991 on future plant modifications.
In essence, the withdrawal of IEEE Std. 279 only creates an administrative problem for the regulations because 10CFR50.55a specifically cites IEEE Std. 279. If the proposed rule becomes final with the explicit citation of IEEE Std. 603-1991, the same problem will recur when the IEEE decides to withdraw or revise IEEE Std. 603-1991. A better solution is to revise 10CFR50.55a to reference Regulatory Guide 1.153, which endorses IEEE Std. 603-1991. If IEEE Std. 603-1991 changes at some future date, Regulatory Guide 1.153 can be revised as necessary without rulemaking.
Comment 2:  Another reason to revise Paragraph (h) of 10CFR50.55a to reference Regulatory Guide 1.153, rather than directly endorsing the standard, is so that the NRC can provide better guidance which would permit the licensees to make better decisions.
The proposed rule provides an endorsement of IEEE Std. 603-1991 conditioned, in part, on an engineering judgment of the extent of the modification involved. A Regulatory Guide would provide the necessary additional guidance and criteria to enable this engineering judgment to be made reliably and consistently.
: 1. The example in the Supplemental Information illustrates the need for additional guidance with regard to systems, subsystems and components. In the example, "neutron monitoring" is described as a protection system with respect to the plant's final safety analysis report (FSAR). And, the average power range monitor (APRM) is identified as a portion of that neutron monitoring system.
Although the proposed rule does not indicate what "portion" means (e.g.,
component or subsystem) with respect to the APRM, the APRM is clearly not the entire system. However, the proposed rule indicates that the replacement of just a certain set of APRM components (i.e., the detectors, cards and power supplies) would be considered a complete replacement at the system level, and would therefore invoke the IEEE-603-1991 requirement. Licensees would likely have difficulty using this contradictory example to implement the rule appropriately.
 
Page 4                                                                CP&L Letter PE&RAS-98-042 May 26, 1998                                                          Enclosure Comments on the NRC Proposed Rule on Codes and Standards:
IEEE National Consensus Standard (63 FR 20136 - April 23, 1998)
: 2. Additional guidance is needed with respect to boundary and support questions. If replacement of just a certain set of components can be considered a complete replacement at the system level, do other components in that system need to be replaced although they were not originally part of the modification scope? Do components or systems that support IEEE-603-1991 components or systems need to conform to IEEE-603-1991? Do the components that form the boundary to IEEE-603-1991 systems need to conform to IEEE-603-1991?
Regulatory Guide 1.153 is a more appropriate format to provide the necessary additional guidance and criteria than paragraph 10CFR50.55a(h).
Comment 3:  Although the Supplemental Information section of the proposed rule discusses the applicability to nuclear power plants with operating licenses, the first paragraph of 10CFR50.55a lacks a reference to paragraph (h). The first paragraph of 10CFR50.55a, which was unchanged by the proposed amendment, states, in part:
                "Each operating license for a boiling or pressurized water-cooled nuclear power facility is subject to the conditions in paragraphs (f) and (g) of this section and each construction permit for a utilization facility is subject to the following conditions .... "
By including references to paragraphs (f) and (g) and omitting a similar reference to paragraph (h), the regulation seems to indicate that paragraph (h) is not applicable to nuclear plants with operating licenses. If the revised paragraph 10CFR50.55a(h) was intended to be applicable to operating plants, then the first paragraph of 10CFR50.55a should include a reference to paragraph (h) as it does for paragraphs (f) and (g).
Comment 4:  The use of the word "initiated" in 10CFR50.55a(h)(2) is ambiguous. Paragraph 10CFR50.55a(h)(2) states, in part:
                "System-level replacement of protection systems and addition of new safety systems in existing operating nuclear power plants initiated on or after January 1, 1999, must meet the requirements stated in IEEE Std. 603-1991 and the correction sheet dated January 30, 1995."
Does "initiated" mean declared OPERABLE per Technical Specifications, or field installation of the design has been started, or the design work has begun, or the problem has been identified and the potential solution has been included in the long range budget? For a multi-unit plant, if the replacement or addition is initiated before January 1, 1999 on one unit would the remaining unit( s) be permitted to initiate the same change or would the designs be forced to diverge?
 
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                                                            *98 JUN -1 A11 :34 ComEd May 27, 1998 DOCKET NUMBER PROPOSED RULE          !:io    .)"
Secretary
( t,3FI. ~Ol 3te, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Rulemaking and Adjudication Staff Washington, DC 20555-0001
 
==Subject:==
Commonwealth Edison Company's Comment on Recent Rulemaking, "Codes and Standards: IEEE National Consensus Standard"
 
==References:==
: 1.        Federal Register Volume 63 Number 78
: 2.        J. Hosmer letter to NRC dated December 1, 1997, transmitting comments and proposed rule change to 10CFR50.55a This letter provides the Commonwealth Edison Company (ComEd)'s comments on the subject Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) proposed Rulemaking.
In the Federal Register Notice, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) considers this rulemaking, which endorses IEEE Std. 603-1991, to be non-controversial because there was no adverse public comments on Regulatory Guide 1.153, Rev. 1, which endorses this standard. As stated in the reference letter, ComEd believes that the lack of public comment was due to the fact that the Regulatory Guide was considered to apply to new plant construction, not existing plant modifications. When the NRC withdrew the IEEE Std. 279, and issued IEEE Std. 603-1991 as a replacement standard, the committee responsible for the withdrawn standard expected IEEE Std. 279 to be used on modifications to existing design. Use ofIEEE Std. 603-1991 on existing designs would result in substantial rework of existing systems without a corresponding improvement in their design. IEEE Std. 603-1991 should be used on all new designs such as for any new systems or for major additions to existing systems.
This revision to the proposed Rule has clarified many of the questions raised by the previous version of the proposed Rule. Specifically, it clarifies that partial system replacement will continue to be subject to the plant's current licensing requirements.
Alternatively, if a complete system is being replaced or a new system is being added, the G:\pruleieee.doc                                                                                  JUN - 4 1998 Acknowledged by card .......______
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMIS:310 '
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system will have to meet the requirements of IEEE Std. 603-1991. This requirement will have a significant impact on older plants because of the additional cost associated with upgrading a system. Utilities may choose to accept less than optimal performance in a system and only repair failing components rather than replacing the system to obtain overall better performance.
ComEd endorses the comments submitted to the NRC by the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) and the Nuclear Utility Backfitting and Reform Group (NUBARG) in their letters dated May 22, 1998, and May 26, 1998, respectively.
Sincerely,
* R. M. Kri h Regulatory Services Vice President cc:        Regional Administrator-RIii Generic Issues Project Manager-NRR Office of Nuclear Safety-IONS G:lpruleieee.doc
 
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Or;c'r;1t1r111s Su[lp(1rt May 26, 1998 Mr. John C. Hoyle Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555-0001 ATTN.:          Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff
 
==Subject:==
Comments on Proposed Rule amending 10CFR50.55a(h), Protection and Safety Systems, to incorporate by reference IEEE Std. 603-1991, "Criteria for Safety Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations"
 
==References:==
Federal Register Volume 63, Page 20136, dated April 23, 1998 Entergy Letter to above dated November 25, 1997 (CNRO-97-00022)
CNRO-98/00015
 
==Dear Mr. Hoyle:==
 
Entergy Operations, Inc. (Entergy) is pleased to provid e its comments on the above captioned matter. The new proposed rule mandates the use of IEEE Std. 603-1991 (instead of IEEE-279-1971 to which most operating plants were licensed) for "system level replacements" to protective systems in operating nuclear power plants initiated after January 1, 1999 and clarifies some adverse comments to the previous direct final rule. The term "system level replacements" is not defined in the proposed rule and leaves too much room for individual interpretation of the new requirements.
Entergy remains concerned that fundamental issues remain unresolved.
NRC has not demonstrated any safety benefit that will be realized above that afforded by the existing standard; indeed IEEE 279-1971 continues to satisfy the commission's regulations and assures the adequate protection of the health and safety of the public. No valid backfit analysis has been offered to justify the costs of meeting the new standard. NRC concludes the rule does not impose a backfit because any modifications of the protection system that would need to satisfy IEEE Std. 603-1991 would be "voluntarily initiated by the licensee ... " Applying the requirement of IEEE Std. 603-1991 to "system level replacements" would still constitute a required modification to current plant licensing bases, and thus qualify as Acknowledged by card JUN - 4 1998
 
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Comments on Proposed Rule amending 10CFR50.55a(h)
May 26, 1998 CNRO-98/00015 Page 2 of 4 a backfit. In the case of obsolescence of components, the modification that a plant is required to make to a protection system is involuntary. As such, this rulemaking applies a change to the current licensing basis for involuntary changes and is, therefore, also a backfit.
By not performing a valid required backfit analysis, the NRC has inappropriately shifted the burden to the public (i.e., the licensees) to prove the rules new provisions are not justified. The numerous changes incorporated by the new standard constitute a significant backfit burden which has not been properly subjected to the requirements of 10CFR50.109. Evaluation and tracking of these additional requirements for a modification clearly imposes a new backfit burden on licensees.
Furthermore, the circular rationale that compliance with the new standard would be "voluntarily initiated by the licensee" completely circumvents the protections intended by 50.109 and would permit promulgation of virtually any new requirement for changes "voluntarily initiated by the licensee" on the same basis without the required backfit analysis. We are concerned that with creative lawyering the staff can easily avoid the backfit analysis protections.
It is stated that the staff backfitting analysis is consistent with past NRC practice and backfitting discussions contained in the Value-Impact Statement prepared for Revision 1 to Regulatory Guide 1.153, "Criteria for Safety Systems." (63 FR20138)
However, that discussion merely states "the incremental cost is negligible if... a current licensee voluntarily chooses to follow the guidance provided in IEEE 603-1991 as opposed to [IEEE603-1980]." The Regulatory Guide Value/Impact analysis thus provides no support for the NRC's decision not to perform a backfitting analysis before implementing the proposed new requirement.
The backfit rule provides a structured and disciplined process governing the establishment of new staff positions. A regulatory analysis is a structured evaluation of all relevant factors associated with the making of a regulatory decision. A substantial part of the regulatory analysis is the value-impact (cost-benefit) analysis which balances the benefits and costs associated with a proposed action or decision.
Benefits and costs are determined consistent with structured guidance and are not merely subjective personal opinion. When this process is followed and documented, a licensee has the opportunity to understand the basis for the proposed new NRC position, and can propose alternatives which would continue to provide adequate protection for the public health and safety Because there has been nothing to suggest that compliance with IEEE-279 is now technically unacceptable the NRC should permit licensees the option to continue to meet their current licensing basis for any modifications after January 1, 1999, or meet
 
Comments on Proposed Rule amending 10CFR50.55a(h)
May 26, 1998 CNRO-98/00015 Page 3 of 4 the later standards. The new standard should only be required for new facilities safety systems with construction permits, operating licenses, final design approvals, design certifications, or combined licenses issued on or after January 1, 1999, not backfits for portions of existing facilities. The current language format of subsection (h) should be modified to include reference to IEEE Std. 603-1991. Suggested language is as follows (footnotes not reproduced herein):
(h) Protection and safety systems. (1) [same as proposed]
(2) Protection systems. For construction permits issued after January 1, 1971, but before January 1, 1999, protection systems must meet the requirements set forth in editions or revisions of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Standard: "Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations,"(IEEE-279) in effect on the formal docket date of the application for a construction permit. Protection systems may meet the requirements set forth in subsequent editions or revisions of IEEE-279 which become effective including IEEE Std. 603-1991 and the correction sheet dated January 30, 1995.
(3)Safety Systems. [same as proposed]
In lieu of rulemaking, the NRC should consider less burdensome alternatives, i.e. to allow licensees to use IEEE Std. 603-1991, as endorsed in Regulatory Guide 1.153, voluntarily for future changes.
Entergy has worked with the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) to develop industry comments. Entergy endorses NEl's letter on this subject. In addition, we have reviewed and concur with Winston & Strawn comments on this subject prepared in behalf of the Nuclear Utility Backfitting and Reform Group (NU BARG), of which Entergy is a member.
If there are any questions regarding these comments, please contact Les England at (601 )-368-5766.
Very truly yours,
  ~.OvkA~~
JGD/SB/LAE/b: ,
cc:      (see next page)
 
Comments on Proposed Rule amending 10CFR50.55a(h)
May 26, 1998 CNRO-98/00015 Page 4 of 4 cc:        Mr. C. M. Dugger (W-GSB-300)
Mr. J. J. Hagan (G-ESC3-VPO)
Mr. C. R. Hutchinson (N-GSB)
Mr. J. R. McGaha (R-GSB-40)
Mr. J. W. Yelverton (M-ECH-65)
Mr. Jack N. Donohew Project Manager (GGNS)
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop 13-H-3 Washington, DC 20555 Mr. George Kalman Project Manager (ANO)
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop 13-H-3 Washington, DC 20555 Mr. Chandu P. Patel Project Manager (W-3)
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop 13-H-3 Washington, DC 20555 Mr. David L. Wigginton Project Manager (RBS)
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop 13-H-3 Washington, DC 20555
 
oor:<ET NUMBER Pacific Gas and Electric Company PROPOSED ULE **
245 Market Street Room 836-N9B
                                                                              --~---
(ft:>?:,~  2.0l.3<o)
Lawrence F. Womack San Francisco. CA 94105 D~ ~ ' E~ical Services I J,11/111,, l t!<in *ss Mai l Code N9B t)~rfKt;'
P O Box 770000 San Francisco. CA 94177 41 51973 -0600 Fax 415/973-656198  MAY 29 P4 :Q5 May 22, 1998 PG&E Letter DCL-98-075 Mr. John C. Hoyle Office of the Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 ATTN: Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff Docket No. 50-275, OL-DPR-80 Docket No. 50-323, OL-DPR-82 Diablo Canyon Units 1 and 2 Comments on Revised Proposed Rule -- Codes and Standards: IEEE National Consensus Standard (63 Federal Register 20136, April 23, 1998)
 
==Dear Mr. Hoyle:==
 
On April 23, 1998, the NRC reissued a proposed rule in the Federal Register (63 FR 20136) to give the public another opportunity to comment on an amendment to 10 CFR 50.55a(h), "Protection and Safety Systems." The proposed rule would incorporate a national consensus standard, IEEE Standard (Std.) 603-1991, "Criteria for Safety Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations," into NRC regulations. IEEE Std. 603-1991 establishes functional and design requirements for power, instrumentation, and control portions of safety systems in nuclear power plants.
On November 25, 1997, Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) provided comments to the Commission on the proposed direct final rule that was published in the Federal Register (62 FR 53932) on October 17, 1997. (The NRC subsequently withdrew the direct final rule on December 23, 1997 because of significant adverse public comments.) Some of the comments in the PG&E November 25 letter were addressed by the clarification provided in the April 23 notice of the proposed rule; however, the primary focus of our comments remains a concern and is reemphasized below.
The revised rule specifies that system-level replacements of existing power, instrumentation, and control portions of protection systems and the addition of new safety systems in operating nuclear power plants initiated on or after January 1, 1999 are required to meet the requirements of IEEE Std. 603-1991 and the correction sheet dated January 30, 1995.
JUN - 4 1998 Acknowledged by card ....  -------*- -**
 
II \
I I
 
Mr. John C. Hoyle May 22, 1998 Page 2 During the operating lifetime of a nuclear generating facility, a number of plant changes may be made due to equipment obsolescence issues. For example, when a vendor no longer supports a particular piece of equipment, licensees often have no reasonable alternative other than to find a suitable replacement, which may require a system-level replacement. Under the revised rule requiring compliance with IEEE Std. 603-1991, the cost of such a system-level replacement could be significant, with no commensurate enhancement to safety. As a consequence, rather than replacing such equipment or system when warranted, licensees may seek to avoid incurring these costs by extending the life of the equipment involved. This alternative is inconsistent with the NRC goal associated with endorsement of the latest version of the national consensus standard in NRC's regulations.
Like other operating power plants of the same vintage as Diablo Canyon Power Plant (DCPP), DCPP is designed and licensed to IEEE Std. 279-1971, "Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations." PG&E believes that licensees should be able to retain their original design and licensing bases and maintain their commitments to existing standards such as IEEE Std. 279-1971. PG&E agrees that, where practical, licensees should adopt standards that are more current; however, licensees should not be required to do so by rulemaking. IEEE Std. 603-1991 is a well-written, technical standard that should be applicable to new plants where its provisions can be effectively incorporated into the original design.
Sincerely,
*  ~ --{ .U  Lawrence F. Womack c:    Steven D. Bloom Michael Schoppman, NEI Ellis W. Merschoff Kenneth E. Perkins David L. Proulx Diablo Distribution dwo/220
 
DOCKET *.~ E PROPOSED RULE~                      Sl>                      )
                                                                          ~3        7l.zo          ,
Florida Power & Light Company, P. 0. Box 14000, Juno Beach, FL 33408-0420 DOCKETED USNP.C "98 MAY 29 P1 :57 OFFIC i , .... -..,.--r : . r:,*'(
                                                                    .._ I  l_. '- _    1    J \, I RULe- .v' :: I'- , ,. . _J                    L-98-142 n,,,r, I*.... J ,*~* I, ;:r ADJUD' u.          , , '"          I
                                                                                                  , r Mr. John C. Hoyle Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 Attention:      Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff
 
==Subject:==
Proposed Rule - Codes and Standards: IEEE National Consensus Standard 63 FR 20136 (April 23, 1998)
 
==Dear Mr. Hoyle:==
 
Florida Power & Light Company (FPL), the licensed operator of two nuclear power plant units in Dade County, Florida, and two units in St. Lucie County, Florida, hereby submits the following comments on the above-referenced notice of proposed rulemaking.
FPL hereby endorses the comments filed by the Nuclear Energy Institute on the above-referenced notice of proposed rulemaking. FPL appreciates the opportunity to comment on this rulemaking .
* Very truly yours, y~
John Gianfrancesco Manager Administrative Support and Special Projects JUN - 4 1998 Acknowledged by card _ _ _ _ ,,_
an FPL Group company
: o. .
l
 
DOCKET NUMBER PROPOSED RULi='        I  so StaUon Supporl Depa.tment  0)
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DOCKETED USt-lRC PECO NUCLEAR                                                              PECO Enerqy Comp3ny 965 Chesterbrook Bouleva rd A Unit of PECO Energy                                                      W3yne, PA 19087-5691 "98 HAY 29 A9 :47 May 26, 1998 OFt;\
RULl ADJUC Mr. John C. Hoyle Secretary of the Commission Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff Washington , DC 20555-0001
 
==Subject:==
Comments Concerning NRC Proposed Rule, "Codes and Standards; IEEE National Consensus Standard" (63FR20136, dated April 23, 1998)
 
==Dear Mr. Hoyle:==
 
This letter is being submitted in response to the NRC's request for comments concerning the Proposed Rule 10 CFR 50, "Codes and Standards; IEEE National Consensus Standard," which were published in the Federal Register (i.e., 63FR20136, dated April 23, 1998). The NRC is proposing to amend its regulations to incorporate by reference the Institute for Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE) Standard 603 -1991, "Criteria for Safety Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations," a national concensus standard for power, instrumentation, and control portions of safety systems in nuclear power plants. Specifically, 10CFR50.55a(h) would be revised to include an endorsement to IEEE Standard 603-1991 in order to establish minimum functional and design requirements for power, instrumentation, and control portions of safety systems for nuclear power plants.
On October 17, 1997, the NRC published a direct final rule in the Federal Register (i.e.,
62FR53932) that was intended to incorporate by reference IEEE Standard 603-1991 . However, this direct final rule was subsequently withdrawn by the NRC due to significant adverse
* comments received from the nuclear industry. The NRC considered the comments it received, and revised the rule . The NRC is now reissuing this revised proposed rule for public comment.
PECO Energy appreciates the opportunity to comment on the subject proposed rule . PECO Energy previously submitted comments on the direct final rule. We recognize that the NRC has satisfactorily resolved some of our previous comments by changes made in the proposed rule or through the discussion of comments contained in the Federal Register notice. However, we are still concerned that this proposed rule may result in additional maintenance costs without a commensurate increase in safety. Accordingly, we offer the attached comments for consideration by the NRC, and recommend that the NRC reconsider promulgation as a final rule .
If the NRC continues with rulemaking we believe that further industry discussion (i.e ., workshop) is warranted due to the significance of this issue.
If you have any questions or require additional information, please do not hesitate to contact us.
Very truly yours,
    &#xb5;JJ~
Garrett D. Edwards Director - Licensing Attachment                                              Acknowledged by cmd, :'lJN~ 4 ,l2i~.... _
 
ATTACHMENT Comments Concerning NRC Proposed Rule 10CFR50, "Codes and Standards: IEEE National Consensus Standard" (63FR20136, dated April 23, 1998)
 
Attachment Page 1of 2 PECO Energy Comments NRC Proposed Rule 10 CFR 50, "Codes and Standards; IEEE National Consensus Standards" PECO Energy offers the following comments for consideration by the NRC.
: 1. We understand that IEEE 603 was written by the IEEE for application to new designs; there was no intent to backfit any revised requirements onto existing plants. However, the proposed rule makes IEEE 603-1991 a requirement for system-level replacement of protection systems and additions of new safety systems at existing operating nuclear plants . The impact of implementing IEEE 603 in existing plants must therefore be carefully assessed . Plant safety analysis reports have commitments to various design criteria and requirements which are identified as major sections of IEEE 603 (e.g .,
independence and electrical separation, capability for test and calibration, bypass and inoperative status indication, setpoints, electrical power sources, etc.). Some of these commitments were made prior to publication of some regulatory guides and others are commitments to previous revisions of IEEE standards and NRC regulatory guides. Furthermore, some of the commitments in the safety analysis reports provide alternate approaches to meeting regulatory requirements. Although portions of these commitments may differ from current regulatory guides and may not be all-inclusive when compared to IEEE 603 or regulatory guide requirements , they constitute an acceptable design and licensing basis for system-level replacement of protection systems and addition of new safety systems to our facilities . We note that the discussion published in the Federal Register notice states:
          "IEEE Std. 603-1991 references several industry codes and standards. Unless these referenced standards are specifically incorporated by reference elsewhere in the NRG regulations, they do not represent the Commission's mandatory requirements. If the referenced standard has been endorsed in a regulatory guide, the standard constitutes a method acceptable to the NRG of meeting a regulatory requirement as described in the regulatory guide. If a referenced standard has not been endorsed in a regulatory guide, the licensees and applicants may consider and use the information in the referenced standard in a manner that is consistent with current regulatory practices."
Although, we realize that the Federal Register notice discussion is part of the regulatory history and clarifies the language used in the rule, omission of this information from the rule could lead to confusion by PECO Energy personnel and NRC staff personnel during implementation of the requirements. Therefore, we recommend that the above discussion be added to the rule.
In addition, we recommend that the following words be added to the rule :
        "For plants licensed prior to January 1, 1999, commitments in the safety analysis report for a facility to the topics covered by IEEE 603 also constitute a method acceptable to the Commission for meeting these regulatory requirements."
 
Attachment Page 2 of2
: 2. PECO Energy's previous understanding of this rulemaking effort, which was based on our review of the Direct Final Rule and Proposed Rule Published in the Federal Register on October 17, 1997 (i.e.,
62FR53932 and 62FR53975, respectively), was that the rulemaking would not apply to our Peach Bottom facility since it would not mandate the use of the guidance specified in IEEE 603-1991 on plants with construction permits issued prior to January 1, 1971. However, the proposed rule as published in the Federal Register on April 23, 1998 (63FR20136) does mandate that "system level replacement of protection systems and addition of new safety systems in existing operating nuclear power plants initiated on or after January 1, 1999, must meet the requirements stated in IEEE Std .
603-1991 and the correction sheet dated January 30, 1995."
At the points of interface with existing components and systems, the application of IEEE 603-1991 has the potential for being confusing and subject to considerable interpretation for plants of Peach Bottom's vintage. For example, the IEEE 603-1991 design criteria for independence and separation with regard to the treatment of non-safety related components and systems is different from industry practices in the 1960's and early 1970's. As such, compliance with IEEE 603-1991 could invoke separation requirements different than those that exist and are licensed at Peach Bottom and similar vintage plants. Differences such as these could make interpretation and application of IEEE 603-1991 to these plants difficult and costly without a commensurate increase in safety.
If the NRC continues with the promulgation of this rulemaking, we request that the rule not be applied to plants with construction permits issued prior to January 1, 1971. If the rulemaking is made applicable to these plants, we request the rule limit the required application of IEEE 603-1991 to within the boundaries of the system to be replaced or added, and clearly define that the application of IEEE 603-1991 is not required at the system interfaces to the plant. Such interfaces include routing of cables through the existing plant raceway system.
 
DOCKE TED
[ii]                                                                              . .. D 1998 I*! Y 26 PM I: q3 US RC "98 MAY 28 P12 :04 Tennessee Valley Authority, 1101 Market Street, Chattanooga, Tennessee 37 402-2801 RULES & DIR. Bfl,i'.\NCH OF iC J.... s~, 1 , ~.R'r May 20, 1998                                                                  US NRC            AULC.-1~ -,7'.:', , J ADJUUCi-,1 *~: ~ 1.. TAFF Chief, Rules Review and Directives Branch ATIN: Rulemaking and Adjudication Staff DAS, Office of Administration U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C'. 20555-0001 Gentlemen:
NUCLEAR REGULA TORY COMMISSION (NRC) - COMMENTS ON PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO NRC REGULATIONS TO IN CORPORATE BY REFERENCE INSTITUTE OF ELECTRICAL & ELECTRONIC ENGINEERS (IEEE) STANDARD 603-1991 On October 17. 1997, the NRC published a direct final rule in the Federal Register to incorporate by reference IEEE Standard 603-1991, "Criteria for Safety Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations," (62FR53932). The direct final rule was withdrawn on December 23, 1997, (62FR66977) because the NRC received significant adverse comments in response to a proposed rule (62FR53975) that was issued on October 17 as a companion to the direct final rule.
The NRC recently revised the proposed rule in response to the public comments. The revised proposed rule was published in the Federal Register on April 23, 1998, (63FR20 I 36). TV A has reviewed this rule revision, and we agree that it is reasonable to impose IEEE 603-1991 requirements on new end devices. However, we strongly object to imposing these same requirements on pre-existing control panel and cable or raceway systems. Our detailed comments are provided in the enclosure.
We appreciare the opportunity co n:spond to the subject prnpose<l rule chai1ge. If you have questions regarding this response, please contact R. M. Brown at (423) 751-7228.
Sincerely,
~t~~!1Ml Manager Nuclear Licensing Enclosure cc (Enclosure):
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATIN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 Acknowledged    card JUN    4 1998 Printed on recycled paper
 
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION RUlEMAKINGS &ADJUDICATIONS STAFF OFFICE OF THE SECRErARY OF THE COMMISSION D      ,l ...
* tics Postmark Date S    /?i-. 91? ~              ~ "r>,;.h, ~
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ENCLOSURE TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY (TVA)
COMMENTS ON PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO NRC REGULATIONS TO INCORPORATE BY REFERENCE IEEE STANDARD 603-1991 FEDERAL REGISTER 62FR53975 Though most of TV A's concerns related to imposition of the earlier version of the rule have been satisfactorily addressed in the present, revised proposed rule, we have a strong objection to imposition of the rule unless the discussion, and associated expectation, is modified. The discussion which introduces the proposed rule presently states, "Reuse of a few existing components (e.g., selected cables, raceway, and control room panels where the displays are mounted) as part of the system-level replacement would still place this type of modification in the category of a complete system-level replacement ." TV A does not agree that replacement of end devices with modern, upgraded components should drive rewiring in existing plants and upgrading other interconnected end or intermediate devices to meet requirements of IEEE 603-1991 such as separations, independence, single failure, testability, etc. This presents a significant disincentive to modernization of equipment and controls. It is reasonable to impose IEEE 603-1991 requirements on the new end devices, but not the pre-existing control panel and cable/raceway systems or other end or intermediate devices connected to the network. If the interpretation is not modified, we face the choice of continuing to use outdated devices or incurring tremendous expense in rewiring and replacing interconnected devices within operating plants. We ask that the discussion be modified to revise the interpretation of the rule such that it clearly states that IEEE 603-1991 requirements would only be invoked on the new end devices of a protection system upgrade, not pre-existing panels, cable and raceway or other end or intermediate devices connected to the network. Also, the sentence in the discussion stating "A 'system' is defined as a combination of two or more interrelated components that perform a specific safety function" should be deleted or the definition reworded to make it explicit that replacing multiple components does not in itself constiiute a system change. This sentence is confusing in that the discussion states elsewhere that the protection systems are listed in the plant's Final Safety Analysis Report and also provides an example where two interrelated components are replaced but are not considered to constitute a system replacement. In addition, we reiterate our previous request that the effective date of the modified rule should be changed to allow at least one year for the development of the revised design procedures and training of employees.
 
DOCKET NUMBER PROPOSED A E            So        DOCKETED Secretary                                    ( '73FJe ~ol 3t,)  (j)        US , RC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                                                                    *9a MAY 28 Pl2 :04 Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 Att: Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff                          OFf,C- : ,,_ '-*~.
RULt :, : r
* I t 1' n ADJUD'C. I  '.    ( ;>FF Public Service Electric and Gas (PSE&G) had reviewed the proposed rule revising 10CFR50.55a(h) as published in the Federal Register on April 23, 1998 (Volume 63, Number 78, pages 20136-20139) submitting a direct rule to amend the Commissions rules in 10 CFR Part 50.55a, paragraph (h).
The following comments are respectfully submitted.
: 1. Endorsement of other referenced IEEE standards Within the proposed rules published in the Federal Register as noted above, the NRC in its response to significant comment #1, PSE&G does not believe the NRC has fully addressed the outright endorsement of other IEEE standards. The statement that IEEE 603 - 1991 does not imply endorsement of later versions of IEEE Standards is not technically substantiated within the proposed rule by the NRC if IEEE 603 - 1991 is to be endorsed by rule and not regulatory guidance. The NRC states that it did not seek for any other standards referenced in IEEE 603 - 1991 to be approved for incorporation by reference, even going so far as to state the referenced standards in IEEE 603 - 1991 are not mandatory requirements, although IEEE 603 - 1991 invokes the referenced standards by the use of "shall". PSE&G believes the NRC position has not been clarified due to "shall" in the IEEE 603 -1991 standard; once IEEE 603 -1991 becomes part of 10 CFR 50.55a, then IEEE 603 -1991 becomes part of the license commitment.
: 2. Definition of System Level Replacement The term "system level" replacement is not clearly defined and likely cannot specifically be established regarding what constitutes a system-level replacement versus an upgrade or modification to components and subsystems. The proposed NRC intrepretation would require compliance with IEEE-603 -1991 for system level replacement/upgrades of protection systems/subsystems that require replacement due to age or obsolesence. Currently, this can be performed under 10CFR50.59 guidance, using design criteria (IEEE standards and Reg Guides) that are part of the plants design and licensing basis.
Imposition of IEEE-603 -1991 in this situation appears to be a backfit. The NRC's perceived impact of incorporating IEEE-603 in this manner is understated.
 
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIO' RULEMAKINGS&ADJ DICATIONS STAF OFFICE O THE St:CRETARY OF THE CO MiS:ION 0"'    ~  ** .,.ics Postmark Dat                    -1?~ ~ ,4i:t:.J, ~
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: 3. IEEE 603 - 1991 Industry Acceptance PSE&G disagrees that IEEE-603 and RG 1.153 represent a general public consensus position. The NRC's statement that they believe the RG was appropriate due to lack of negative comment on the draft RG (proposing to endorse IEEE 603 -1991) should have considered that the majority of operating plants are not required to meet IEEE-603
-1991 or RG 1.153. The lack of adverse comments (to the draft RG) should not have been construed as an endorsement of IEEE 603 -1991.
 
Duane Arnold Energy Center 3277 DAEC Road Palo. IA 52324 DOCKE TED            Telephone 319 851 76 11 IJ  RS              Fax 319 851 7986
                                                *9a MAY 28 Al 1 :46 Of- .
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May 22, 1998                                  Af.J NG-98-0926 Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff Washington, DC 20555-0001
 
==Subject:==
Duane Arnold Energy Center Docket No: 50-331 Op. License No: DPR-49 Comment on Proposed Rule on Codes and Standards: IEEE National Consensus Standard File:          A-106
 
==Dear Secretary,==
 
On April 23, 1998, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission published for public comment a Proposed Rule on "Codes and Standards: IEEE National Consensus Standard". Attached are lES Utilities, Inc.'s comments on the proposed rulemaking. Should you have any questions regarding the attached information, please contact this office.
Sincerely,
~~
Kenneth E. Peveler Manager, Regulatory Performance KEP/WTA*
 
==Attachment:==
Comment on Proposed Rule on Codes and Standards: IEEE National Consensus Standard cc:    E. Protsch J. Franz D. Wilson R. Laufer (NRC-NRR)
A. B. Beach (Region III)
NRC Resident Office DOCU JUN - 4 1998 Acknowledged by mrd ..(..... ........... ....... ..
An /ES Industries Company
 
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION RUIBAAKINGS &ADJUDICATIONS STAFF OFRCE OFTH!:: SECRETARY OFTHECOM, ,lS"lON Postmark Date _ !5L_    2- ""-"'--- - -
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ii
 
IES UTILITIES                                          Attachment to NG-98-0926 Comment on Proposed Rule on Codes and Standards:
IEEE National Consensus Standard I. Background Based on a lack of objection to the issuance of revision 1 to Reg. Guide (RG) 1.153, the NRC issued a direct final rule that proposed to incorporate reference to IEEE-Std-603 in 10 CFR50.55a(h) in place of withdrawn IEEE-Std-279. The NRC then withdrew the direct final rule when significant adverse comments were received. The Value-Impact Statement for revision 1 to RG 1.153 states: "This regulatory guide does not impose any new requirements or costs on current licensees ... the incremental cost is negligible if an applicant complies with (or an existing licensee voluntarily chooses to follow) the guidance provided in IEEE Std 603-1991 as opposed to the 1980 standard". IES Utilities believes that the absence of comments on the revision to RG 1.153 reflected industry belief that IEEE-Std-603 would only be applicable to new construction plants. Based on reviews of IEEE-Std-603 and the licensing and design bases for its Duane Arnold Energy Center (DAEC), IES Utilities believes the proposed rule would impose significant burdens and costs without substantial benefits or improvements to safety.
II. Discussion A. Reason for Proposed Rule The discussion of the proposed rule does not show justification for imposing IEEE-Std-603 on current licensees. The notice of proposed rulemaking states that it would be consistent with Public Law 104-113, which encourages regulatory agencies to endorse or reference consensus national standards "as an alternative to de novo agency development of standards affecting an industry." The current rule already endorses a national consensus standard, IEEE-279, that although withdrawn by the IEEE, represents the licensing basis standard for many existing licenses. Other plants were licensed based on plant-specific NRC reviews which in some cases included evaluations of compliance to this standard. No reason is provided by the NRC Notice for not designing and reviewing future modifications to already licensed facilities utilizing the current licensing basis for protection systems at those facilities. Nor does the Notice provide an indication that, in the absence of IEEE-603, the NRC would develop a de novo standard for such modifications. Therefore, Public Law 104-113 does not apply.
B. Back.fit In the Backfit Analysis for the proposed rule, the NRC states that the rule does not impose backfits as defined in 10 CFR 50.109(a)(l). IES Utilities believes this proposed rule mandates a "modification of or addition to ... the procedures or organization required to design, construct or operate a facility", and thus is a backfit as defined by 10 CFR 50.109(a)(l). The NRC has not provided a finding 1 of 5
 
IES UTILITIES                                        Attachment to NG-98-0926 Comment on Proposed Rule on Codes and Standards:
IEEE National Consensus Standard that the exceptions of 10 CFR 50.109(a)(4) are applicable. Therefore, IES Utilities believes that the provisions of 10 CFR 50.109(a)(3) direct that the "Commission shall require the backfitting of a facility only when it determines, based on the analysis described in paragraph (c) of this section, that there is a substantial increase in the overall protection of the public health and safety or the common defense and security to be derived from the backfit and that the direct and indirect costs of implementation for that facility are justified in view of this increased protection."
C. Adverse Comments on the Proposed Rule IES Utilities objects to the proposed rule based on the following burdens:
: 1. No Significant Improvement in Public Health and Safety The construction permit for the DAEC was issued on June 22, 1970. IEEE-Std-279 is not applicable to the DAEC under existing rule 10 CFR 50.55a(h).
DAEC was designed to meet General Electric (GE) Design Safety Standards.
GE NEDO 10139, "Compliance of Protection Systems to Industry Criteria:
General Electric BWR Nuclear Steam Supply System", dated June, 1970, describes how the design of the DAEC meets the intent ofIEEE-279 with exceptions. The DAEC has operated safely for 24 years with this licensing basis. IEEE withdrawal of IEEE-Std-279 did not change the licensing basis of the DAEC and will not prevent maintaining compliance with that basis during the remaining licensed life of the plant.
* There is no evidence to suggest that application of the proposed rule would result in any improvement to the public health or safety. The proposed rule, by requiring compliance with IEEE-Std-603, would increase the complexity and costs of plant modifications and would likely make system level upgrades a less attractive option for problem resolution. As a result, the proposed rule is likely to have a negative effect on the rate of licensee initiated system upgrades. Licensees are less likely to implement system level upgrades or additions in cases of equipment obsolescence or in response to performance, maintenance, or reliability problems if the modifications cannot be accomplished within the existing design and licensing basis and within the limitations of existing systems, structures and components.
: 2. Dual Licensing Basis The proposed rule would impose a dual licensing basis for protection systems.
The NRC's conclusion in "Significant Comments on the Direct Final Rule Item (4) Changes: Components vs System Level", states that the application 2 of5
 
IES UTILITIES                                      Attachment to NG-98-0926 Comment on Proposed Rule on Codes and Standards:
IEEE National Consensus Standard of IEEE-Std-603 does not impose a dual licensing basis "within a system".
While this statement may be true for most cases, it would impose on older plants a dual licensing bases across protection systems and between interfacing systems such as components that support the safety functions of more than one system. For example, consider a modification that replaces the sensor, power supplies, and Reactor Protection (scram) System logic based on reactor water level. If the same sensor provides an input signal that initiates an Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS), and the ECCS logic is not being modified, this would impose a dual design and licensing basis between the sensor and the remainder of the ECCS. Another example is the Intermediate Range and Source Range Neutron Monitoring System replacement cited by the NRC in its discussion of the proposed rule. These systems interface with both the Reactor Protection System and Rod Block circuitry. Here again, a system-level modification of the protection system would create a dual licensing basis for the Rod Block System. There are many other instances of components being shared between systems at the DAEC.
: 3. Increase in Exemption Requests Even for a replacement system or added system, it likely will not be practicable to achieve full compliance with IEEE-603 because that standard was not anticipated when the DAEC was designed and constructed. For example, spatial separation to IEEE-603 standards may lead to a need for installing additional control panels that cannot be physically accommodated in
* the control room which already is challenged for space. In such circumstances, the DAEC would be able to accomplish the modification only if exempted from some requirements. Consequently, adoption of the proposed rule would likely lead to an increase in exemption requests.
: 4. Complexity For system replacement and additions the proposed rule will increase the complexity of design, maintenance, configuration management, procurement, construction, documentation, and training. The argument that such modifications are voluntary is specious. The history of commercial nuclear power in the United States demonstrates that future modifications are likely to be required due to the effects of obsolescence and new regulatory requirements. If the proposed rule is implemented, it will eventually create two different licensing bases for protection systems. Personnel involved in plant operation will need to be trained on the differences and how to determine which rules are applicable to a specific system or component. This will be especially complex for interfacing and support systems. Current 3 of5
 
IES UTILITIES                                      Attachment to NG-98-0926 Comment on Proposed Rule on Codes and Standards:
IEEE National Consensus Standard configuration management and design control processes are based on a list of safety-related structures, systems, and components. The proposed rule would require new tools or methods to determine the boundaries between two different classes of safety-related equipment. Increased complexity inevitably increases costs and increases the likelihood of human error.
Consider a case where logic circuitry is replaced but sensors are left intact.
Under the proposed rule this would be performed in accordance with current licensing basis. Suppose that later it becomes necessary to replace the sensors due to instrument obsolescence. The question then arises as to whether it is necessary to rework the full system to compliance with IEEE-Std-603.
Changes will be required to procedures, processes, tools, methods and training if plant configuration management and design control programs have to be arranged to provide for an assessment of the applicability of IEEE-Std-603 in such circumstances.
The proposed rule also would complicate the assessment of proposed regulatory-mandated modifications. The backfit analyses will become more plant specific depending on whether additional modifications would be required to comply with IEEE-603 and whether the licensee had programs and procedures in place to implement the new standards. This additional burden of preparing complex backfit analyses is not in the best interest of the NRC nor the industry.
: 5. Need for Definition Application of the proposed rule would require interpretations by the licensee, by NRC inspectors, and by the staff, including what constitutes a "system-level replacement", and what constitutes "sufficient technical justification" for the use of alternate methodologies rather than the referenced standards. Such interpretations and ambiguity are frequent sources of errors and differing opinions.
The same opportunities for misinterpretation and differing opinions that increase the complexity for a licensee, will also likely increase the unevenness of the application of common standards. When the rules of applicability, definitions, and requirements are unclear, individual auditors and inspectors have wider opportunities for applying their interpretations and opinions as the standard. This will likely increase the number and frequency of violations, disputed findings, and appeals.
4 of5
 
IES UTILITIES                                          Attachment to NG-98-0926 Comment on Proposed Rule on Codes and Standards:
IEEE National Consensus Standard III. Conclusion JES Utilities believes the proposed rule will impose additional costs and vulnerabilities on licensees with no substantial improvement in protection for public health and safety. The proposed rule appears to be motivated by simplifying the process of NRC review of modifications by imposing a generic standard. This appears to depart from NRC re-emphasis that each licensee must have and maintain documentation of its specific design and licensing bases and commitments; and that these bases must be understood and applied when making modifications to the plant or procedures. Instead of simplifying enforcement, the proposed rule will make enforcement more complex, difficult, and contentious.
JES Utilities requests that the NRC withdraw the proposed rule and consider the following alternatives or a combination thereof:
* Revise the proposed rule to apply only to new construction licenses, in the same way previous amendments to the rule were applied.
* Use Regulatory Guide 1.153, Revision 1, to endorse IEEE-Std-603 as a consensus standard that serves as a guideline for existing licensees, rather than imposing it by rulemaking as a requirement.
* Perform the backfit analysis required by 10 CFR 50.109(c) and reconsider the need for the rule in light of the backfit analysis.
5 of5
 
N UCLE AR UTILI T Y GRO U P ON EQUIPMEN T QUALI F ICATI ON SU I TE BOO 1400 L STREET, N . W .
WASHINGTON , 0 . C . 20005-3502 TE L EPHONE ( 202 ) 37 1-5700 May 27, 1998 Mr. John C. Hoyle Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D .C. 20555 RE:    Codes and Standards; IEEE National Consensus Standard (63 Fed. Re2. 20,136 (April 23, 1998))
 
==Dear Mr. Hoyle:==
 
Enclosed please find a copy of the comments of the Nuclear Utility Group on Equipment Qualification regarding the NRC proposed rule on IEEE National Consensus Standard (63 Fed. Reg.
20,136). These comments were submitted yesterday by fax to Mr. Aggarwal.
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William A. Horin Counsel to the Nuclear Utility Group on Equipment Qualification WAH/vj Enclosure MAY 2 8 1998 Acknowledged by
 
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NUCLEAR UTILITY GROUP ON EQUIPMENT QUALIFICATION SUITE 800 1400 L STREET, N. W .
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20005-3502 TELEPHONE (202) 371-5700 May 26, 1998 Mr. John C. Hoyle Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555
* RE:    Codes and Standards; IEEE National Consensus Standard (63 Fed. Re2. 20,136 (April 23, 1998))
 
==Dear Mr. Hoyle:==
 
The Nuclear Utility Group on Equipment Qualification (''NUGEQ")11 hereby submits the following comments on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's ("NRC") proposed rule to revise the current provisions of 10 C.F.R. Part 50.55a(h)).:z.t The NUGEQ has reviewed the comments developed by the Nuclear Utility Backfitting and Reform Group ("NUBARG") and the Nuclear Energy Institute ("NEI") and agrees with the comments, observations, and recommendations presented by these two organizations.
The NUGEQ previously filed comments on the NRC's direct final rule on this matter.3' The NUGEQ appreciates the NRC's decision to issue this rule as a proposed rule for public comment, and believes that the proposed rule sets forth important improvements over the original direct final rule. However, there remain significant issues which the NUGEQ urges the NRC to resolve before a final rule is issued.
l/      The NUGEQ is comprised of 36 electric utilities in the United States and Canada, including NRC licensees authorized to operate over 100 nuclear power reactors. The NUGEQ was formed in 1981 to address and monitor topics and issues related to equipment qualification, particularly with respect to the environmental qualification of electrical equipment pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 50.49.
63 Fed. Reg. 20,136 (April 23, 1998).
J/
62 Fed. Reg. 53,932 (October 17, 1997); see Letter to J. Hoyle (NRC) from William A.
Horin (Winston & Strawn, Counsel to Nuclear Utility Group on Equipment Qualification),
dated December 1, 1997.
 
Mr. John C. Hoyle May 26, 1998 Page 2 In addition to the particular comments on the implementation of the rule, set forth below, we firmly support the NUBARG position that the proposed rule is a backfit that should be subject to a backfit analysis. The NRC's premise that no backfit analysis is required because the rule only applies to voluntary plant changes is fraught with regulatory difficulties and uncertainty given that many plant modifications are undertaken by licensees for maintenance or enhancement purposes and although technically ''voluntary" are done to assure continued safety yet the imposition of differing standards for different portions of the plant would lead to significant confusion in terms of establishing and maintaining licensing bases, inspection and enforcement implementation, and ever the implementation of 10 C.F.R. &sect;50.59. In this regard we would suggest that at a minimum, if the NRC does apply these standards, that they apply only to new plants or to wholly new systems in existing plants, and not to existing protection system modifications.
We also submit the following specific comments.
: 1.      Consistent with our prior comment we are unaware of any compelling safety issue prompting the adoption oflEEE 603 in lieu oflEEE 279 for modifications to existing facilities. Absent this safety need, we are concerned that adoption ofIEEE 603 will promote instability in a technical area (i.e., protection system compliance with IEEE 279) currently containing an extensive history of satisfactory implementation, reflected in licensing bases documentation and practices for NRC power reactor licensees, which defines NRC expectations and industry application of the existing 50.55a(h) reference to IEEE 279 .
* 2.      Consistent with our prior comment we are concerned that the adoption of IEEE 60 3 for plant modifications may have adverse safety consequences. Since the proposed revision will provide little if any safety enhancements, it is reasonable to conclude that negative considerations may dominate the overall effect on safety of the proposed rule change. Such negative considerations include:
* Elimination of prudent use of engineering judgment by licensees and the NRC technical staff when determining the extent to which plant/system/equipment modifications can reasonably accommodate all the provisions ofIEEE 603.
* Uncertainties regarding "modification boundaries" when establishing compliance.
* Expenditure and diversion of resources to interpret and revise licensee, industry, and NRC guidance documents regarding compliance with 10 C.F .R.
55.55a(h) rather than addressing matters of obvious safety benefit.
 
Mr. John C. Hoyle May 26, 1998 Page3
* Added modification complexities and costs which may discourage implementation of modifications that would otherwise to cost/benefit justified.
: 3. Since IEEE 603 appendices are formally not part of IEEE Std 603-1991 please verify that these appendices are not being codified by the cited reference in 50.55(a)(h).
: 4. Currently, 10 C.F.R. 50.55(a)(h) requires compliance with IEEE 279 for protection systems.
However, many licensees have applied IEEE 279 principles to the design of other systems
( e.g., accident monitoring system). The statements of consideration (SOC) should make clear that the modification upgrading provision applies only to protection systems and not other systems designed to IEEE 279.
: 5. We agree that protection systems are a subset of safety systems and that the IEEE 603 definitions for protection systems and safety systems are appropriate. However, the rule text is ambiguous regarding protection systems scope and must be clarified to minimize future confusion. Consistent with the information provided in IEEE-603, particularly Figure 2, we recommend that a clarifying footnote be added to 50.55(a)(h)(2) as follows:
A protection system is those portions of either(]) the reactor trip system (RTS) or (2) the engineered safety features (ESF) extending from the process sensors to the actuation signals used for initiation of execute features (e.g., RTS trip breaker, scram SO Vs, and ESF motive equipment operation). The protection system portion of an ESF is often termed the engineered safety features actuation system (ESFAS).
: 6. We agree that the rule should not result in a dual licensing basis within a system. Currently, the statements of consideration define a system as a combination of two or more interrelated components that perform a specific safety function. This definition, derived from IEEE-1000, is inappropriate to define the scope of "system-level" modifications as proposed in this rule. Using this definition, the NRC's APRM neutron monitoring upgrade example would be erroneously considered a "system level" replacement since two or more interrelated components are replaced. Therefore, this definition directly conflicts with the NRC' own examples of "system level" replacement. We suggest the following modification:
The rule will not result in a dual licensing basis within a system, because it applies only to system-level replacements ofprotection systems and the addition of new safety systems. A "system II has been defined by IEEE as a combination oftwo or more interrelated components that perform a specific safety function. However, for the purposes of this rule, system-level replacement for a protection system must involve complete replacement from the process sensors to the actuation signals used for the initiation of execute features (e.g., RTS trip breaker, scram SO Vs, and ESF motive equipment operation). Reuse of a few existing
 
Mr. John C. Hoyle May 26, 1998 Page4 components (e.g., selected cables, raceways, and control room panels where the displays are mounted) as part of a system-level replacement would still place the modification in the system-level replacement category. A licensee's CLB applies when defining protection system boundaries. A licensee's Protection systems are typically defined and discussed in FSAR Sections 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3.
: 7. The NRC's neutron monitoring system examples may not be consistent with the protection system definitions in several BWRs. In a typical BWR FSAR, the Neutron Monitoring System consists of the neutron detectors, IRMs, LPRMs, APRMs, and the Transversing Incore Probes. Replacement of the APRM portion of the Neutron Monitoring System, including detectors, electronics and power supplies, should not require compliance with IEEE 603 since the APRM subsystem is a portion of the Neutron Monitoring System. This example highlights the difficulty of defining protection system boundaries and the confusion that can occur when licensees, in good faith, attempt to implement the modification upgrade portion of the proposed rule. We suggest eliminating the modification upgrade portion of the rule and encouraging licensees to voluntarily meet IEEE 603 when performing system upgrades. This would encourage licensees to determine those instances where upgrading is feasible and eliminate compliance confusion. Alternatively, adopting the language in our prior two comments will help minimize but not eliminate confusion regarding protection system boundaries.
: 8. We agree that the IEEE 603 referenced standards should not be incorporated by reference.
We believe licensees should maintain their CLB regarding the topics addressed in these references standards. Departure from the CLB creates confusion and the potential for misinterpretation. This is particularly true where newer standard revisions have not been endorsed by regulatory guides. The NRC suggests that in these cases licensees may consider and use the standard's information "in a manner that is consistent with current regulatory practices". However, it is unclear how licensees go about determining what constitutes such "current practice". We recommend the following revision to the SOC:
IEEE Std. 603-1991 references several industry codes and standards. Unless these standards are specifically incorporate by reference elsewhere in the NRC regulations, they do not represent the Commission's mandatory requirements. Licensees may continue to implement their CLB with respect to the IEEE 603 topics discussed in these referenced standards. If the referenced standard or another version has been endorsed in a regulatory guide, the applicable standard revision constitutes a method acceptable to the NRC for meeting a regulatory requirement as described in the regulatory guide. Licensees may use these methods provided they comply with all applicable requirements for making changes to their CLB. If the standard has not been endorsed in a regulatory guide or the licensee's CLB, the licensees may use the information if they determine that it is consistent with current regulatory practices and if they comply with all applicable requirements for making changes
 
Mr. John C. Hoyle May 26, 1998 Page 5 to their CLB. Section 7 of the Standard Review Plan (NUREG-0800) contains additional information on current regulatory practices applicable to protection systems.
: 9.      Regarding the IEEE 603 referenced standards, the NRC states that these referenced standards reflect progress and the current state of technology and encourages licensees to adopt them voluntarily. As noted above, licensees may create unnecessary confusion when they depart from their CLB in favor of newer consensus standards, particularly those not specifically addressed in NRC guidance documents. We note there are numerous nuclear-related IEEE standards that either have never been endorsed by regulatory guides or the more recent versions, some may be quite old, have not been endorsed. In the equipment qualification (EQ) area Regulatory Guide 1.89 currently endorses IEEE 323-1974. The guide was never revised to address IEEE 323-1983. Similarly, the IEEE cable qualification standard, IEEE 383-1974, has never been addressed by a formal regulatory guide even though cable qualification has been an area of significant interest to the NRC.
As indicated in the above comments, NUGEQ does not believe that there is a compelling safety basis for imposing the standard, nor has the NRC conducted a backfitting analysis to determine whether such a basis exists. Accordingly, NUGEQ requests that the proposed rule be withdrawn with respect to its proposed application to existing plants (i.e., to upgrades of existing safety systems, or to new safety systems). We would note that in any event, licensees may under the existing regulatory structure choose to voluntarily implement the standard.
Respectfully submitted, WLa Malcolm H. Philips, Jr.
William A. Horin Counsel to the Nuclear Utility Group on Equipment Qualification
 
NUCLEAR  ENERGY    INSTITUTE Alexander Marion DIRECTOR, PROGRAMS NUCLEAR GENERATION DIVISION
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ATTN:            Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff
 
==SUBJECT:==
Comments on NRC Proposed Rule, "Codes and Standards; IEEE
 
==Dear Mr. Hoyle:==
 
National Consensus Standard," (63 Fed. Reg. 20136, April 23, 1998)
On October 17, 1997, the NRC published a direct final rule amending 10 CFR 50.55a(h) to incorporate by reference IEEE Std. 603-1991, "Criteria for Safety Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations" (62 FR 53932). An identical proposed rule was published concurrently (62 FR 53975). Comment letters were submitted by NEI and several licensees in response to the proposed rule and the direct final rule. In response to the significant adverse comments contained in these letters, the NRC withdrew the direct final rule on December 23, 1997 (62 FR 66977). The NRC considered the comments it received and issued a revised proposed rule on April 23, 1998 (63 FR 20136). On behalf of the nuclear industry, the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEl) 1 submits the following comments on the revised proposed rule.
The revised proposed rule is an improvement over the corresponding proposed rule and direct final rule that were published by NRC in October 1997. Nevertheless, in our opinion many of the policy and scope concerns expressed in our November 26, 1997, comment letter on the initial proposals remain unresolved.
1 NEI is the organization responsible for establishing unified nuclear industry policy on matters affecting the nuclear energy industry, including the regulatory aspects of generic operational and technical issues. NEl's members include all utilities licensed to operate commercial nuclear power plants in the United States, nuclear plant designers, major architect/engineering firms, fuel fabrication facilities, materials licensees, and other organizations and individuals involved in the nuclear energy industry.
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Mr. John C. Hoyle May 20, 1998 Page 2 Our main concerns are:
* The NRC's choice of a method to endorse voluntary consensus standards is an important policy matter. More time is needed for the NRC staff and the industry to discuss and understand the implications of endorsement by prescriptive rulemaking rather than by non-prescriptive regulatory guidance.
* The proposed rule is open to interpretation, which will make its application difficult and costly. More detailed definitions and examples are needed before the rulemaking should be allowed to proceed.
* In the case of IEEE Std. 603, rulemaking is unnecessary and is likely to be coun terprod ucti ve.
We strongly disagree with the Backfit Analysis published as part of the Federal Register notice accompanying the revised proposed rule. The NRC staff should provide the nuclear industry and the public a thorough analysis of the backfitting implications of its proposal.
These concerns are addressed separately and in greater detail in the enclosure to this letter. We urge the Commission to defer further action on the proposed rulemaking until NEI and industry representatives can meet with the NRC staff to discuss our concerns.
Enclosure MAS/ead c:    Mr. Samuel J. Collins, U.S. NRC
 
ENCLOSURE I. THE CHOICE OF THE METHOD USED BY NRC TO ENDORSE CONSENSUS STANDARDS IS AN IMPORTANT POLICY ISSUE
* Standards other than the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel (B&PV) Code are typically endorsed by Regulatory Guide, not by rulemaking. This is consistent with the long-standing practice that consensus standards be voluntarily adopted when technically feasible, cost effective, and consistent with the licensee's design basis and licensing basis.
* The National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995 (Public Law 104-113) and the corresponding revision to 0MB Circular A-119 issued in February 1998 do not require standards endorsement by rulemaking.
Incorporating a standard by reference in a regulation is an option, but so is the use of other "appropriate publications," such as a Regulatory Guide.
* The proposed rule does not offer a compelling reason for changing current law.
In our opinion, a better change would be to reserve the regulations for ASME B&PV Code endorsements that relate to the construction, operation, and inspection of nuclear power plants and to use regulatory guidance (i.e.,
Regulatory Guides) for other design-related consensus standards. In other words, the NRC should consider deleting the reference to IEEE 279 from 10 CFR 50.55a(h) as part of a consistent policy of managing consensus standards through non-prescriptive forms of regulatory guidance.
* The prescriptive use of specific consensus standards is neither risk-informed nor performance-based. This is contrary to current regulatory trends that are supported by both the Commissioners and the nuclear industry.
* The proposed rule, which prescribes the use of a specific consensus standard, is not needed to restore lost safety margin or to reduce risk. Nevertheless, NRC has chosen to pursue rulemaking. If the staff continues along this path, it is important that the commentary that accompanies the proposed rule be expanded and that NRC staff meet with industry representatives to ensure that all parties understand how to interpret the new requirements.
II. INTERPRETATION OF THE PROPOSED RULE WILL BE DIFFICULT AND COSTLY
* Considerably more NRC/industry dialogue is needed to understand when and how the new standard would apply. For example, there is no explicit definition of what constitutes a "system level replacement" in either the limited Discussion section of the Federal Register notice or in the proposed rule language itself.
 
This would lead to widely varying interpretations of what types of system modifications are meant to be covered by the rule.
* Based on input NEI has received, there is considerable uncertainty among licensees about the how to interpret system boundaries and interfaces using the NRC staffs examples in the Federal Register notice accompanying the revised proposed rule. If there is uncertainty among licensees about how to apply the proposed regulation, there likely will be a similar uncertainty among NRC inspectors. We believe that consistent enforcement of the regulation, as written and with the limited commentary that now exists, would be difficult.
* In paragraph 50.55a(h)(2) of the proposed rule, there is a sentence that states that replacements and additions initiated on or after January 1, 1999, must meet the new standard. What does the term "initiated" mean? Does it mean the initiation of the modification package, or the initiation of the modification itself?
Or does it mean something else? This is one example of terminology that needs to be better understood before it can be applied properly and consistently.
* The Discussion section of the Federal Register notice accompanying the revised proposed rule states that other standards (over a dozen) referenced in IEEE 603 will not themselves become mandatory, but this position is not restated in the rule language. Unless this regulatory position is made clear in the regulation itself, the potential problem of compliance with "standards incorporated by reference" will not be resolved.
* If the NRC staff believes, as we do, that true "system-level replacements" will be infrequent, then endorsement of IEEE 603 is more appropriate by Regulatory Guide than by rulemaking. Licensees typically evaluate the latest editions of applicable standards when they implement major upgrades of older systems or install new systems to determine whether to incorporate their provisions.
III. RULEMAKING IS UNECESSARY AND IS LIKELY TO BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE
* The NRC has jurisdiction over major modifications and the introduction of new systems through the license amendment process (10 CFR 50.90) and the safety evaluation process (10 CFR 50.59). A system-level replacement or the addition of a new system would involve one or the other. Either prior NRC approval would be necessary, or NRC would be notified in the periodic written report listing plant modifications performed in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59.
* The proposed rule would lead to unintended consequences. The process of updating existing standards would become slower as standards committees
 
became more careful in issuing documents that would contain mandatory, rather than voluntary, guidelines.
* Endorsement by rule would tie compliance to a specific edition of a standard.
Formal rulemaking would be necessary to permit licensees to use future editions. Revisions would take longer, and competition among affected groups would increase. Revision by rule making would be more costly than revision by Regulatory Guide endorsement.
* If one of NRC's regulatory objectives is to foster the use of the latest standards, the rulemaking would be counterproductive. A change from voluntary to mandatory standards could have the detrimental effect of discouraging the use of new technology. It would offer licensees a difficult choice between the retention of outmoded components and the implementation of high-cost modifications .
IV. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS
* Although the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers has withdrawn IEEE 279, it remains the (technically acceptable) licensing basis for many operating reactors. Licensees should not be expected to redesign systems whenever a new version of a design standard is published. The mandatory imposition of the new standard (IEEE 603-1991), even if narrowly applied, would be a backfit.
* The Regulatory Analysis section of the Federal Register notice accompanying the revised proposed rule states that the impact on the nuclear industry would be minimal. This is not the case. Protection system components are often replaced because they are obsolete and become scarce because of vendor manufacturing decisions that are beyond the control of licensees. In such cases, a set of component replacements, which could be interpreted as a system-level replacement if enough components were involved, would no longer be voluntary.
Using this interpretation, the staffs conclusion that the proposed rule is not a backfit because system-level replacements are voluntary is not correct.
* The proposed rule would force licensees to establish a dual licensing basis for protection systems. Some segments would have to comply with IEEE 279-1971, while other segments would have to comply with IEEE 603-1991. The decision to establish, and manage, a dual licensing basis should be voluntary, not mandatory.
* The proposed rule does not demonstrate additional safety benefit beyond the current rule, yet no backfit analysis has been performed to justify the cost of compliance with the new requirements. In fact the Backfit Analysis section of
 
the Federal Register notice accompanying the revised proposed rule states that the backfit rule does not apply because any use of IEEE 603-1991 will be "voluntary." This conclusion ignores modifications that become necessary because of component obsolescence. If a vendor stops supporting a component, licensees that use the component have no alternative other than replacement. If the resulting change is considered a "system-level" change, the licensee would incur the higher costs of IEEE 603 compliance without benefit of any safety improvement.
* Even if a change is voluntary on a licensee's part, the imposition of the new standard by rulemaking is not. If, in fact, the use of IEEE 603 is "voluntary" on the part of the licensee, then its endorsement by Regulatory Guide should be sufficient.
* If NRC proceeds with the proposed rule, it should use compromise language that would preserve the spirit of the current rule while adding an option to upgrade from IEEE 279 to IEEE 603. For example:
10 CFR 50.55a(h)(2) - Protection systems. For nuclear power plants with construction permits issued after January 1, 1971, protection systems must meet the requirements stated in editions or revisions of IEEE Std. 279, "Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations, " in effect on the formal docket date of the application for a construction permit.
Protection systems may meet the requirements stated in subsequent editions or revisions of IEEE Std. 279 which become effective, including editions or revisions of IEEE Std. 603, "Criteria for Safety Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations," which recognizes protections systems as a subset of safety systems.
 
WINSTON & STRAWN 35 WEST WACKER DRIVE                                1400 L STREET, N.W.                                    6, RUE DU CIRQUE CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60601-9703                                                                              75008 PARIS, FRANCE WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3502 200 PARK AVENUE                                                                                      SULAYMANIYAH CENTER (202) 371-5700 NEW YORK, NY 10166-4193                                                                              R IYADH 11495, SAUDI ARABIA FACSIMILE (202) 371 -5950 43, RUE DU RHONE 1  4 GENEVA, SWITZERLAND DANIEL F. STENGER (202) 371-5742                                  May 26, 1998 DOCKETN        BER PROPOSED AUL                50 Mr. John C. Hoyle                  ( fo3Ft< ~o I 3t-)
Office of the Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555-0001
* Re:
 
==Dear Mr. Hoyle:==
 
Comments on "Industry Codes and Standards: IEEE National Consensus Standard," 63 Federal Register 20,136 (April 23, 1998)
Enclosed are a copy of comments on the above rulemaking which were filed on Tuesday, May 26, 1998, via fax to Mr. Satish K. Aggarwal, at 301-415-5074. The comments are submitted on behalf of the Nuclear Utility Backfitting and Reform Group (NUBARG).
NUBARG appreciates the opportunity to provide input on the important rulemaking and is hopeful that the comments will help lead to a more efficient regulatory process in this area.
Very truly yours, Daniel F. Stenger Garth D. Richmond Counsel to the Nuclear Utility Backfitting and Reform Group Enclosure MAY 2 8 1998 Acknowledged by card ..................................
 
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WINSTON & STRAWN 35 WEST WACKER DRIVE                                1400 L STREET, N.W.                            6, RUE DU CIRQUE CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60601-9703                                                                        75008 PARIS, FRANCE WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3502 200 PARK AVENUE                                                                                SULAYMANIYAH CENTER (202) 371-5700 NEW YORK, NY 10166-4193                                                                          RIYADH 11495, SAUDI ARABIA FACSIMILE (202) 371-5950 43, RUE DU RHONE DANIEL F. STENGER                                                                                1204 GENEVA, SWITZERLAND (202) 371-5742                                  May 26, 1998 Mr. John C. Hoyle Office of the Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 Re:                  Comments on "Industry Codes and Standards: IEEE National Consensus Standard," 63 Federal Register 20,136 (April 23, 1998)
 
==Dear Mr. Hoyle:==
 
The following comments are submitted on behalf of the Nuclear Utility Backfitting and Reform Group (NUBARGl on the above-captioned rulemaking. The proposed rule would require licensees to comply with IEEE Std. 603-1991, "Criteria for Safety Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations," for "system-level" replacements of existing plant protection systems and for additions of new safety systems in lieu ofIEEE Std. 279, "Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations," which is currently part of the licensing basis for most plants. The proposed rule would appear to constitute a backfit under 10 C.F .R. &sect; 50.109 for the reasons discussed below, and therefore a backfitting analysis should be performed prior to the rule becoming effective.
The NRC has made certain changes in the proposed rule from the previous direct final rule, which was later withdrawn. For example, the NRC would limit application of IEEE Std. 603-1991 to future "system-level" replacements and to additions of new safety systems. Nevertheless, the proposed rule, if implemented, would have a potentially significant impact on many licensees.
NUBARG members have identified numerous concerns regarding implementation of the proposed rule, including:
* ambiguity in the definitions of "system-level" replacement and "addition of a new safety system" which leads to a potentially broad scope of the rule;
* the creation of a dual-licensing basis for plant protection systems which will complicate configuration management, especially where interface is required with existing systems; ll NUBARG is a consortium of sixteen utilities which was formed in the early l 980's and actively participated in the development of the NRC's backfitting rule in 1985. NUBARG has subsequently monitored the NRC's implementation of the backfitting rule.
 
WINSTON & STRAWN Mr. John C. Hoyle May 26, 1998 Page 2
* the potential for complicating licensee evaluations under Section 50.59 supporting facility changes to systems and procedures subject to different licensing bases;
* the likelihood that many licensees will need to file exemption requests from the rule as existing plant configurations may not fully accommodate compliance with the new standard; and,
* anticipation of rule interpretation disputes in the context of enforcement and inspection.
The principal reason given by the NRC for not performing a backfitting analysis is that the rule does not impose a backfit because any modifications of the protection system that would need to comply with IEEE Std. 603-1991 would be "voluntarily initiated by the licensee .... " 63 Fed. Reg. at 20,138. However, most changes to an existing system cannot be characterized as "voluntary." Changes made on account of equipment obsolescence, planned maintenance, scheduled replacement, or those changes made necessary by revisions to current regulations would not be "voluntary." Nevertheless, under the proposed rule, any such system-level replacements or new safety systems would apparently need to comply with IEEE Std. 603-1991. Thus, for such changes, imposition ofIEEE Std. 603-1991 clearly constitutes a backfit. 21 An additional rationale provided by the NRC for not performing a backfitting analysis is that the rule "would not change the licensing basis for plants that do not intend to make changes to their power and instrumentation and control systems." Contrary to the NRC's conclusion, implementation of the proposed rule would change plants' existing licensing bases applicable to protection systems. 10 C.F.R. &sect; 50.55a(h) currently requires licensees with construction permits issued after January 1, 1971 to comply with the revision ofIEEE Std. 279 in effect on the date of the application for a construction permit. Although IEEE Std. 279 has now been withdrawn by the standards body, it remains the licensing basis for most plants. The proposed revision to 10 C.F .R.
    &sect; 50.55a(h) would require that "system-level" replacements of existing power, instrumentation, and control portions of protection systems initiated on or after January 1, 1999, comply with the additional requirements of IEEE Std. 603-1991. IEEE Std. 603-1991 also requires adherence to additional IEEE standards referenced therein. However, the IEEE standards referenced in IEEE Std.
603-1991, and the related revisions, are not necessarily the standards to which licensees are committed. Incorporating the additional requirements ofIEEE Std. 603-1991 as a binding regulation 21 A licensee's need at some point to replace an entire protection system is not the type of voluntary action the NRC's guidance contemplates as being excluded from the requirement for a backfitting analysis. An example of "voluntary" licensee action for purposes of the backfitting rule is a license amendment request. Statement of Considerations accompanying the issuance of the final rule, 50 Fed. Reg. 38,097, 38,101 (Sept. 20,1985) (noting that the backfitting rule does not require the NRC to prepare a backfitting analysis as a condition precedent to a license amendment if the licensee requested the amendment).
 
WINSTON & STRAWN Mr. John C. Hoyle May 26, 1998 Page 3 would thus impose a change to the current licensing basis of many plants, and for that reason, would constitute a backfit.
The rule would also necessitate resource-intensive changes to current plant procedures and licensing basis documents, and for that reason as well would constitute a backfit as defined in Section 50.109( a)(l ). Due to the broader scope ofIEEE Std. 603-1991 in comparison with IEEE Std. 279, licensees would be required to make changes to current procedures that administratively control the power source and instrumentation and control functions of protection systems.
The NRC takes the position that its decision to forego a backfitting analysis is consistent with past NRC practice and the backfitting discussions contained in the Value-Impact Statement prepared for Revision 1 to Regulatory Guide 1.153, "Criteria for Safety Systems." 63 Fed. Reg. 20,138. However, the discussion contained in the referenced Value-Impact Statement merely states that "the incremental cost is negligible if ... a current licensee voluntarily chooses to follow the guidance provided in IEEE Std. 603-1991 as opposed to [IEEE Std. 603-1980]." The Regulatory Guide Value/Impact analysis thus provides no support for the NRC's decision not to perform a backfitting analysis before implementing the proposed new requirement.
Separate and apart from the regulatory duty to perform a backfitting analysis, the NRC has an obligation under the Administrative Procedure Act to articulate an adequate technical or safety basis for the proposed ruleY The NRC does not provide any technical or safety basis to justify why it believes the proposed rule is needed. 41 The NRC simply states that IEEE Std. 279-1971 has been withdrawn and superseded by IEEE Std. 603-1991. 51 However, IEEE Std. 279-1971 remains the licensing basis for most plants, and the NRC does not offer any technical or safety data to support the conclusion that IEEE Std. 279 has become obsolete or is otherwise inadequate as a standard. In fact, based on the NRC's proposal to continue to apply IEEE Std. 279 to modifications or changes to components and subsystems, the NRC implicitly affirms that IEEE Std. 279 is not obsolete.
For the reasons stated above, we respectfully request that the proposed rule be withdrawn. However, if the NRC wishes to adopt IEEE Std. 603-1991 as a binding requirement for See Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm 'n, 673 F.2d 525 (D.C. Cir.
1982).
Indeed, the NRC states that the rule will have minimal impact, which suggests it will be of questionable benefit, much less necessitated by technical or safety concerns.
In fact, IEEE Std. 279 has been revised and "superseded" several times in the past and the NRC has updated Regulatory Guide 1.153 accordingly. The NRC did not explain or even hint that there is something different about the most recent IEEE standard that it should be made a regulatory requirement rather than endorsed for use in Regulatory Guide 1.153.
 
WINSTON & STRAWN Mr. John C. Hoyle May 26, 1998 Page4 licensees, a backfitting analysis should be performed in accordance with Section 50.109 to determine if the imposition of IEEE Std. 603-1991 is justified. Alternatively, Section 50.55a(h) could be revised to allow licensees the option of voluntarily complying with either IEEE Std. 279 or IEEE Std. 603-1991. In lieu ofrulemaking, the NRC should also consider less burdensome alternatives.
Specifically, the NRC could encourage licensees to use IEEE Std. 603-1991, as endorsed in Regulatory Guide 1.153, voluntarily for future changes.
Very truly yours,
                                                            ~ ~~L:J Daniel F. Stenger Garth D. Richmond Counsel to the Nuclear Utility Backfitting and Reform Group
 
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MN-98-41        GAZ-98-33                "98 ~ P2:14 Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Attention: Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff
 
==References:==
(a) 10CFR50, RIN 3150AF96, IEEE Std. 603-1991, "Criteria for Safety Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations
 
==Subject:==
Comments on Proposed Rulemaking Gentlemen:
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is proposing an amendment to its regulations that would incorporate by reference IEEE Std. 603-1991, "Criteria for Safety Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations," a national consensus standard for power, instrumentation, and control portions of safety systems in nuclear power plants. The Backfit Analysis section for the proposed rulemaking concluded that the backfit rule, 10CFR50.109, did not apply to this rule because it does not impose any backfits as defined in 10CFR50.109(a)(l) and, therefore, a backfit analysis was not prepared for the proposed rule. However, the proposed rule would require future system-level replacements of existing power and instrumentation and control portions of protection systems, installed in accordance with 10CFR50.59, to comply with the new standard. The staff concluded that this would not be considered a backfit since such a design change (i.e. a change to the facility as described in the safety analysis report) is voluntarily initiated by the licensee.
We believe this is fundamentally contrary to the wording and intent of the Backfitting regulation (10CFR50.109). 10CFR50.59 currently provides criteria by which a licensee can change its facility.
It was not the intent of the Backfitting Rule to allow the staff to impose new requirements independent of their safety/cost benefit any time a licensee makes a change to its facility or procedures pursuant to 10CFR50.59 (all of which could be termed "voluntary"by the staff). The proposed rulemakeing prohibits a licensee from making the subject change (i.e. system-level instrumentation replacements) unless it does so in accordance with the new requirements. Such a change to the regulations clearly is required to be evaluated as a backfit pursuant to 10CFR50 .109.
Nuclear Safety & Regulatory Affairs c:      Document Control Desk Mr. Michael Webb Mr. Hubert Miller Mr. Patrick J. Dostie Mr.Rick Rasmussen Mr. Michael Masnik Mr. Uldis Vanags                                                Acknowledged
 
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==Subject:==
Comments on the Proposed Rule "98 MAY 26 P2 :54 OFFIC r    - .~--, i
* Dr. Aggarwal:                                  RULG,, 1- J' ** , ,:., H)
ADJUDIC: i L **~;:) : l.A.FF My comments on the proposed rule are really in two main areas of concern:
1.) I believe the NRC staff and industry are best served if the IEEE Standard endorsed by a Regulatory Guide is included in the regulatory formula. This is the process that has been common practice in the past, and best serves the NRC staff and industry in the application of newer standards. I believe that the proposed rule may result in the utility and NRC lawyers arguing for years over specific definitions of the word "system" that are best addressed by a Regulatory Guide.
2.) I am very concerned about the use of the word "system" and it's implications. I think you have done a great job at giving exal"'ples and setting up some criteria - BUT, the legal entanglements that can ensue with specific examples including cabinet changeouts, can possibly cause a very large financial drain that does r.Jthing to improve reactor safety.
Please consider these changes and advise if you need further information or clarification, or would like to meet in person.
Sincerely yours; Edward (Ted) L. Quinn ACRS Consultant and ANS President-Elect
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM~SION p,
p.[1 10 CFR Part 50 RIN 3150-AF96 Codes and Standards:
IEEE National Consensus Standard AGENCY:            Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION:            Proposed rule.
 
==SUMMARY==
: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is proposing an amendment to its regulations that would incorporate by reference IEEE Std. 603-1991, "Criteria for Safety Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations," a national consensus standard for power, instrumentation, and control portions of safety systems in nuclear power plants. This action is necessary to endorse the latest version of this national consensus standard in NRC's regulations.
                                                                              ...-y'Y)~  J (p, IC/9<;{
DATES: Comments on the proposed rule must be received on or before (30 elay3 after 13ublieatieF1 ifl tl=le Fede, al Registe,). Comments received after this date will be considered if it is practical to consider them, but the NRC is able to ensure consideration only for comments received on or before this date.
 
2 ADDRESSES: Mail comments to: Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; Attention: Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff. Hand deliver comments to 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland, between 7:30 am and 4:15 pm on Federal workdays. Copies of any comments received may be examined at the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L Street NW. (Lower Level), Washington, D.C.
You may also submit comments via the NRC's interactive rulemaking web site through the NRC Home Page (http://www.nrc.gov). From the NRC home page, select "Rulemaking" from the tool bar. The interactive rulemaking website can then be accessed by selecting "New Rulemaking Website." This site provides the availability to upload comments as files (any format), if your web browser supports that function. For information about the interactive rulemaking web site, contact Ms. Carol Gallagher at 301-415-5905 (e-mail: cag@nrc.gov).
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Satish K. Aggarwal, Senior Program Manager, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; telephone 301-415-6005; Fax 301-415-5074; e-mail:ska@nrc.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Previous History On October 17, 1997 (62 FR 53932), NRC published a direct final rule in the Federal Register that amended its regulations to incorporate by reference IEEE Std. 603-1991 for power, instrumentation, and control portions of safety systems in nuclear power plants.
The direct final rule was withdrawn on December 23, 1997 (62 FR 66977), because the NRC received significant adverse comments in response to the proposed rule that was issued as a companion to the direct final rule on October 17, 1997 (62 FR 53975). The NRC has
 
3 considered the comments it received, revised the proposed rule, and is reissuing a second proposed rule to give the public another opportunity to comment.
This proposed rule supersedes the October 17, 1997, proposed rule.
 
===Background===
10 CFR Part 50, "Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities,"
  &sect;50.55a (h) requires that the protection systems in nuclear power plants meet the requirements stated in IEEE Std. 279, "Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations," in effect on the formal docket date of the application. However, IEEE has withdrawn IEEE Std. 279-1971 and it has now been superseded by IEEE Std. 603-1991, "Criteria for Safety Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations."
In November 1995, the NRC staff issued a draft regulatory guide for public comment, DG-1042, which was a proposed Revision 1 to Regulatory Guide 1.153, "Criteria for Safety Systems." This draft regulatory guide proposed to endorse IEEE Std. 603-1991 (including the
* correction sheet dated January 30, 1995). There were no adverse comments to DG-1042, and Revision 1 to Regulatory Guide 1.153 was issued in June 1996, endorsing IEEE Std. 603-1991.
Because of the absence of adverse public comments to Revision 1 to Regulatory Guide 1.153, the NRC believed that there was general public consensus that IEEE Std. 603-1991 provides acceptable criteria for safety systems in nuclear power plants. For this reason, the NRC published the direct final rule without seeking public comments on the amendment before issuing it. In view of the significant public comments received, the NRC has reconsidered this action (See the discussion under Previous History).
 
4 Discussion This proposed rule would incorporate a national consensus standard, IEEE Std. 603-1991, into NRC regulations to establish minimal functional and design requirements for power, instrumentation, and control portions of safety systems for nuclear power plants. This action would be consistent with the provisions of the National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104-113, which encourages Federal regulatory agencies to consider adopting industry consensus standards as an alternative to de novo agency development of standards affecting an industry. This action would also be consistent with the NRC policy of evaluating the latest versions of national consensus standards in terms of their suitability for endorsement by regulations or regulatory guides.
Currently, 10 CFR 50.55a(h) specifies that "protection systems" for plants with construction permits issued after January 1, 1971, must meet the requirements in IEEE Std. 279 in effect on the formal docket date of the application for a construction permit.
IEEE Std. 279-1971 states that a "protection system" encompasses all electric and mechanical devices and circuitry (from sensors to actuation device input terminals) involved in generating those signals associated with the protective function. These signals include those that actuate reactor trip and that, in the event of a serious reactor accident, actuate engineered safety features (ESFs), such as containment isolation, core spray, safety injection, pressure reduction, and air cleaning. "Protective function" is defined in IEEE Std. 279-1971 as "the sensing of one or more variables associated with a particular generating station condition, signal processing, and the initiation and completion of the protective action at values of the variables established in the design bases."
IEEE Std. 603-1991 uses the term "safety systems" rather than "protection systems."
A "safety system" is defined in IEEE Std. 603-1991 as "a system that is relied upon to remain
 
5 functional during and following design basis events to ensure: (i) the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, (ii) the capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, or (iii) the capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents that could result in potential off-site exposures comparable to the 10 CFR Part 100 guidelines."
A "safety function" is defined in IEEE Std. 603-1991 as "one of the processes or conditions (for example, emergency negative reactivity insertion, post-accident heat removal, emergency core cooling, post-accident radioactivity removal, and containment isolation) essential to maintain plant parameters within acceptable limits established for a design basis event."
* The NRC recognizes that "protection systems" are a subset of "safety systems." Safety system is a broad-based and all-encompassing term, embracing the protection system in addition to other electrical systems. Thus, the term "protection system" is not synonymous with the term "safety system." The proposed rule would not change the scope of the systems covered in the final safety analysis report (FSAR) for currently operating nuclear power plants, whether or not they intend to make system-level replacements of protection systems.
This proposed rule would mandate the use of IEEE Std. 603-1991 (including the
* correction sheet dated January 30, 1995) for safety systems for future nuclear power plants, including final design approvals, design certifications, and combined licenses under 10 CFR Part 52 . Current licensees may continue to meet the requirements stated in the edition or revision of IEEE Std. 279 in effect on the formal date of their application for a construction permit or may, at their option, use IEEE Std. 603-1991, provided they comply with all applicable requirements for making changes to their licensing basis. However, system-level replacements of protection systems and addition of new safety systems in operating nuclear power plants initiated on or after January 1, 1999, would be required to meet the requirements in IEEE Std. 603-1991. A "system" is defined as a combination of two or more interrelated components that perform a specific safety function . The protection systems are listed in the
 
6 plant's FSAR. For example, "neutron monitoring system" is a protection system. The upgrade of the average power range monitor (APRM) portion of the neutron monitoring system to add the ability to detect and suppress potential boiling-water reactor (BWR) instabilty may meet IEEE Std. 279 because the modification only replaces the APRM signal processing components, output relays, recirculation flow transmitters, and operator displays. If this modification were to replace the neutron detectors, local power range monitor cards, and associated power supplies, the modification would be considered a complete replacement at a system level and must meet IEEE Std. 603-1991. Similarly, the replacement of the source range monitors and intermediate range monitors in a BWR with wide-range neutron monitors must meet IEEE Std. 603-1991, because it involves the complete replacement of the system, including sensors, preamps, signal processors, output relays, and operator displays. Reuse of a few existing components (e.g.,
selected cables, raceway, and control room panels where the displays are mounted) as part of the system-level replacement would still place this type of modification in the category of a complete system-level replacement.
IEEE Std. 603-1991 references several industry codes and standards. Unless these referenced standards are specifically incorporated by reference elsewhere in the NRC regulations, they do not represent the Commission's mandatory requirements. If the referenced standard has been endorsed in a regulatory guide, the standard constitutes a method acceptable to the NRC of meeting a regulatory requirement as described in the regulatory guide.
If a referenced standard has not been endorsed in a regulatory guide, the licensees and applicants may consider and use the information in the referenced standard in a manner that is consistent with current regulatory practices.
 
7 Significant Comments on the Direct Final Rule The NRC received 28 letters from the public by December 8, 1997, commenting on the content of the direct final rule. Copies of comment letters are available for public inspection and copying for a fee at the NRC's Public Document Room. The major issues raised by the comments and the NRC staff responses to these issues are as follows:
(1) Referenced Standards.
Issue. There are approximately 100 "shalls" in IEEE Std. 603-1991, which refer to 13 other IEEE standards, 3 ANS/ANSI standards, and 1 ISA standard. This rule would require a full redesign of the plant, if licensees are required to comply with these referenced standards.
Response. Because the NRC did not seek for any of the other standards referenced in IEEE Std. 603-1991 to be approved for incorporation by reference, these standards are not mandatory requirements, even though IEEE Std. 603-1991 invokes the referenced standards by the use of "shall." However, the NRC encourages licensees to adopt these referenced standards voluntarily because these newer consensus standards reflect progress and the current state of technology. If a referenced standard has been endorsed in a regulatory guide, the standard constitutes a method acceptable to the NRC for meeting a regulatory requirement as described in the regulatory guide. In many cases, the regulatory guides endorse a previous version of the IEEE standard. These guides represent the current NRC recommended practices. Licensees may opt to use alternate approaches if they can provide sufficient technical bases.
(2) Scope: Protection System vs. Safety System.
Issue. The terms "protection systems" and "safety systems" are not synonymous.
Response. The NRC staff agrees that protection systems are a subset of safety systems and thus, the terms.are not synonymous. The term protection system is defined in IEEE Std.
 
8 279-1971 (and in IEEE Std. 603-1991), and the term safety system is defined in IEEE Std. 603-1991. The NRC staff endorses these definitions. The protection system has a limited application; safety system is broad based and all-encompassing, thereby embracing the protection system and other electrical systems. This proposed rule would not change the applicable scope of the systems for operating nuclear power plants.
(3) Applicability of Rule.
Issue. The rule does not explicitly state that it does not apply to nuclear power plants with construction permits issued before January 1, 1971.
Response. Nuclear power plants that have not been required to meet IEEE Std. 279-1971, because their construction permit was issued before January 1, 1971, may continue to make modifications or changes to components and subsystems, consistent with their licensing basis and commitments made to the NRC, or may meet the requirements stated in IEEE Std.
603-1991. However, the proposed rule would mandate the use of IEEE Std. 603-1991 for system-level replacements of protection systems and for the addition of new safety systems.
(4) Changes: Components vs System Level.
Issue. The rule would result in a dual licensing basis within a system and would
* introduce significant confusion, because IEEE Std. 603-1991 was written as a system standard.
Replacements of components or subsystems should not be covered by the rule.
Response. The proposed rule would not result in a dual licensing basis within a system, because it would apply only to system-level replacements of protection systems and the addition of new safety systems. Modifications or changes to components and subsystems shall meet the current requirements of IEEE Std. 279, when applicable, but need not meet the requirements of IEEE Std. 603-1991.
 
9 Finding of No Environmental Impact: Availability of Environmental Assessment The NRG has determined under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, as amended, and the NRG's regulations in subpart A of 10 GFR Part 51, that because this proposed rule would not be a major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, an environmental impact statement is not required . The NRG has prepared an environmental assessment supporting this finding of no significant environmental impact.
The NRG has sent a copy of the environmental assessment and a copy of the Federal Register notice to every State liaison officer and requested their comments on the environmental assessment. The environmental assessment is available for inspection at the NRG Public Document Room, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, D.G. Also, the NRG has committed itself to complying in all its actions with Presidential Executive Order 12898, "Federal Actions To Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations" (February 11, 1994). Therefore, the NRG also has determined that there are no disproportionate, high, and adverse impacts on minority and low-income populations. The NRG uses the following working definition of environmental justice: Environmental justice means the fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all people- regardless of race, ethnicity, culture, income, or educational level- with respect to the development, implementation, and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations, and policies.
 
10 Paperwork Reduction Act Statement This proposed rule does not contain a new or amended information collection requirement subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501, et seq.). Existing requirements were approved by the Office of Management and Budget, Approval No. 3150-0011.
Public Protection Notification If an information collection does not display a currently valid 0MB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
Regulatory Analysis The NRC has prepared a regulatory analysis that shows the proposed amendment does not impose any new requirements or costs on current licensees who do not make changes to protection systems. However, licensees planning or proposing system-level replacements of protection systems will be affected because they will be required to meet the requirements of IEEE Std. 603-1991 for system level replacements. This impact would be minimal. Most changes to protection systems only change a part of the system, and IEEE Std. 279-1971 will continue to apply. The draft regulatory analysis is available for inspection in the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L Street NW., Washington, DC.
 
11 Regulatory Flexibility Certification As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (5 U.S.C. 605 (b)), the NRC certifies that this rule, if adopted, would not have a significant economic impact on small entities. This rule affects only the operation of nuclear power plants. The companies that own these plants do not fall within the scope of the definition of "small entities" stated in the Regulatory Flexibility Act or the small business size standards adopted by the NRC (10 CFR 2.810). Because these companies are dominant in their service areas, this rule does not fall within the purview of the act.
Backfit Analysis The proposed rule would require applicants and holders of new construction permits, new operating licenses, new final design certifications, and combined licenses to comply with IEEE Std. 603-1991 (including the correction sheet dated January 30, 1995). System-level replacements to protection systems in existing operating plants initiated on or after January 1, 1999, would be required to meet the requirements of IEEE Std. 603-1991. IEEE Std. 279 will continue to apply to those nuclear power plants required to meet IEEE Std. 279 that do not make system-level replacements of protection systems, but the rule permits the licensee the option of meeting IEEE Std. 603-1991.
The backfit rule was not intended to apply to regulatory actions that change expectations of prospective applicants and, therefore, the backfit rule does not apply to the portion of the rule applicable to new construction permits, new operating licenses, new final design approvals, new design certifications, and combined licenses. This proposed rule would not change the licensing
 
12 basis (i.e., IEEE Std. 279) for plants that do not intend to make any changes to their power and instrumentation and control systems. However, the proposed rule would require future system-level replacements of existing power and instrumentation and control portions of protection systems to comply with the new standard. This would not be con~idered a backfit, because the changes are voluntarily initiated by the licensee, or separately imposed by the NRC after a
* separate backfit analysis. This is consistent with past NRC practice and the discussions on backfitting in the Value-Impact Statement prepared for Revision 1 to Regulatory Guide 1.153. A copy of the Value-Impact Statement is available for inspection or copying for a fee in the NRC's Public Document Room at 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, under Task DG-1042.
In summary, the NRC has determined that the backfit rule, 10 CFR 50.109, does not apply to this rule because it does not impose any backfits as defined in 10 CFR 50.109(a)(1) and, therefore, a backfit analysis has not been prepared for this proposed rule.
List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 50 Antitrust, Classified information, Criminal penalties, Fire protection, Incorporation by reference, Intergovernmental relations, Nuclear power plants and reactors, Radiation protection, Reactor siting criteria, and Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.
For the reasons stated in the preamble and under the authority of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, and 5 U.S.C., the NRC is proposing to adopt the following amendment to 10 CFR Part 50.
 
13 PART SO-DOMESTIC LICENSING OF PRODUCTION AND UTILIZATION FACILITIES
: 1. The authority citation for Part 50 continues to read as follows:
AUTHORITY: Secs. 102, 103, 104, 105, 161, 182, 183, 186, 189, 68 Stat. 936,937, 938, 948, 953, 954, 955, 956, as amended, sec. 234, 83 Stat. 1244, as amended (42 U.S.C.
2132, 2133, 2134, 2135, 2201, 2232, 2233, 2236, 2239, 2282); secs. 201, as amended, 202, 206, 88 Stat. 1242, as amended, 1244, 1246 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5842, 5846).
Section 50. 7 also issued under Pub. L. 95-601,    sec. 10, 92 Stat. 2951 (42 U.S.C.
5851 ). Section 50.10 also issued under secs. 101, 185, 68 Stat. 955 as amended (42 U.S.C.
2131, 2235), sec. 102, Pub. L. 91-190, 83 Stat. 853 (42 U.S.C. 4332). Sections 50.13, and 50.54 (dd), and 50.103 also issued under sec. 108, 68 Stat. 939, as amended (42 U.S.C.
2138), Sections 50.23, 50.35, 50.55, and 50.56 also issued under sec. 185, 68 Stat. 955 (42 U.S.C. 2235), Sections 50.33a, 50.55a and Appendix Q also issued under sec. 102, Pub. L.
91-190, 83 Stat. 853 (42 U.S.C. 4332). Sections 50.34 and 50.54 also issued under sec. 204, 88 Stat. 1245 (42 U.S.C. 5844). Sections 50.58, 50.91, and 50.92 also issued under Pub. L.
97-415, 96 Stat. 2073 (42 U.S.C. 2239). Section 50.78 also issued under sec. 122, 68 Stat.
939 (42 U.S.C. 2152). Sections 50.80 - 50.81 also issued under sec. 184, 68 Stat. 954, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2234). Appendix Falso issued under sec. 187, 68 Stat. 955 (42 U.S.C. 2237).
: 2. In &sect; 50.55a, paragraph (h) is revised to read as follows:
&sect; 50.55a Codes and standards.
 
14                                              J (h) Protection and Safety Systems. (1) IEEE Std. 603-1991, including the correction sheet dated January 30, 1995, which are referenced in paragraphs (h)(2) and (h)(3) of this section, is approved for incorporation by reference by the Director of the Office of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. A notice of any changes made to the material incorporated by reference will be published in the Federal Register. Copies of IEEE Std. 603-1991 may be purchased from the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Service Center, 445 Hoes lane, Piscataway, NJ 08855. The standard is also available for inspection at the NRC library, 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Md; and at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., Suite 700, Washington, D.C.
IEEE Std. 279, which is referenced in paragraph (h)(2) of this section, was approved for incorporation by reference by the Director of the Office of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies of this standard are also available as indicated for IEEE Std. 603-1991.
(2) Protection systems. For nuclear power plants with construction permits issued after January 1, 1971, but before January 1, 1999, protection systems must meet the requirements stated in either IEEE Std. 279, "Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations," or in IEEE Std. 603-1991, "Criteria for Safety Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations," and the correction sheet dated January 30, 1995. For nuclear power plants with construction permits issued before January 1, 1971, protection systems must meet the requirements stated in IEEE Std. 603-1991 or be consistent with their licensing basis. System-level replacement of protection systems and addition of new safety systems in existing operating nuclear power plants initiated on or after January 1, 1999, must meet the requirements stated in
 
15 IEEE Std. 603-1991 and the correction sheet dated January 30, 1995.
(3) Safety systems .. For construction permits, operating licenses, final design approvals, design certifications, and combined licenses issued on or after January 1, 1999, safety systems must meet the requirements stated in IEEE Std. 603-1991 and the correction sheet dated January 30, 1995.
rt Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this    / 7 - day of April, 1998.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission oyle Seer    ry of the Commission
 
From:              Carol Gallagher To:                WND1.WNP2.ATB1 Date:              4/30/98 4:56pm
 
==Subject:==
Codes & Standards; Proposed Rule
: Adria, A proposed rule on Codes & Standards: IEEE National Consensus Standards was published in the FR on April 23, 1998.
Please send me a copy of any comment letters you may receive on this proposed rule.
: Thanks, Carol Gallagher}}

Latest revision as of 20:37, 13 November 2024

PR-050 - 63FR20136 - Codes and Standards: IEEE National Consensus Standard
ML23159A121
Person / Time
Issue date: 04/23/1998
From: Hoyle J
NRC/SECY
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PR-050, 63FR20136
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