NUREG-2165, Safety Culture Common Language

Safety Culture Common Language

• https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1408/ML14083A200.pdf

text

Safety Culture

Common Language

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

NUREG-2165

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Safety Culture

Common Language

Manuscript Completed: February 2014

Date Published: March 2014

Prepared by:

Molly Keefe1

, Ronald Frahm1

,

Kamishan Martin1

, Rebecca Sigmon1

,

Undine Shoop1

, Stephanie Morrow2

Diane Sieracki2

, Ray Powell3

,

Scott Shaeffer4

, Jack Rutkowski5

,

and Eric Ruesch6

1

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

2

Office of Enforcement

3

Region I

4

Region II

5

Region III

6

Region IV

Molly Keefe, NRC Project Manager

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

NUREG-2165

iii

ABSTRACT

The importance of a healthy nuclear safety culture has been demonstrated by a number of

significant events in the United States and throughout the world. Use of consistent definitions

and terms to describe a model safety culture is a first step in ensuring consistent development,

implementation, and monitoring of safety culture. This report documents the outcomes of public

workshops to develop a common language to describe safety culture in the nuclear industry.

These workshops, held in December 2011, April 2012, November 2012, and January 2013,

included panelists from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), the nuclear power

industry, and the public. This report presents a suggested common language, agreed upon by

NRC staff and the nuclear industry for classifying and grouping traits and attributes of a healthy

nuclear safety culture.

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FOREWORD

The information in this report has been developed solely for informational purposes. It is not a

statement of policy. It describes the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff’s

implementation of the Commission’s Safety Culture Policy Statement (76 FR 34773). The NRC

staff intends to use the agreed-upon common language in this document to implement elements

of its programs that provide oversight of regulated activities. Parts of the common language are

being incorporated into the Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) for operating nuclear reactors.

Any changes to oversight programs, including the ROP, will be documented in their associated

Inspection Manual Chapters and Inspection Procedures.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT...............................................................................................................................iii

FORWARD ................................................................................................................................ v

ACKNOWLEDGMENT ..............................................................................................................ix

ACRONYMS..............................................................................................................................xi

1 INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................ 1

2 SAFETY CULTURE COMMON LANGUAGE INITIATIVE.............................................. 3

3 EXPLANATION OF TERMS .......................................................................................... 5

3.1 Terms............................................................................................................................. 5

3.2 Relationships among Roles ............................................................................................ 6

4 TRAITS, ATTRIBUTES, AND EXAMPLES.................................................................... 7

4.1 Leadership Safety Values and Actions (LA).................................................................... 7

4.2 Problem Identification and Resolution (PI).....................................................................11

4.3 Personal Accountability (PA) .........................................................................................13

4.4 Work Processes (WP) ...................................................................................................15

4.5 Continuous Learning (CL)..............................................................................................17

4.6 Environment for Raising Concerns (RC)........................................................................19

4.7 Effective Safety Communication (CO) ...........................................................................21

4.8 Respectful Work Environment (WE) ..............................................................................23

4.9 Questioning Attitude (QA)..............................................................................................25

4.10 Decision making (DM) ...................................................................................................27

5 REFERENCES..............................................................................................................29

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The authors of this report thank the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff members,

industry representatives, and members of the public who participated in the four public

workshops to develop this Safety Culture Common Language. We appreciate the willingness

shown by all parties to work collaboratively to build consensus around a common language.

xi

ACRONYMS

ADAMS Agencywide Documents Access and Management System

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency

INPO Institute for Nuclear Power Operations

FR Federal Register

NEI Nuclear Energy Institute

NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

NRR Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

ROP Reactor Oversight Process

SCPS Safety Culture Policy Statement

SCWE safety-conscious work environment

1 INTRODUCTION

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has long recognized the importance of a

healthy nuclear safety culture. In 1989, in response to an incident at the Peach Bottom Nuclear

Power Plant, the NRC issued a “Policy Statement on the Conduct of Nuclear Power Plant

Operations” [1], which described the NRC’s expectation that licensees place appropriate

emphasis on safety in the operation of nuclear power plants. That policy statement placed an

emphasis on the personal dedication and accountability of all individuals engaged in any activity

that has a bearing on the safety of nuclear power plants. Additionally, the policy statement

underscored management’s responsibility for fostering the development of a healthy safety

culture at each facility and for providing a professional working environment in the control

room—and throughout the facility—to ensure safe operations.

In 1996, following an incident at the Millstone Nuclear Power Station in which workers were

retaliated against for whistleblowing, the Commission issued another policy statement,

“Freedom of Employees in the Nuclear Industry to Raise Safety Concerns without Fear of

Retaliation” [2]. This policy statement described the NRC’s expectation that all NRC licensees

establish a safety-conscious work environment. A safety-conscious work environment (SCWE)

is described as an environment in which workers feel free to raise safety concerns without fear

of harassment, intimidation, retaliation, or discrimination. Such a safety-conscious work

environment continues to be an important attribute of a healthy nuclear safety culture.

In 2002, investigations into the discovery of degradation of the reactor pressure vessel head at

Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station revealed that safety culture weaknesses were a root cause

of the event. The NRC took significant steps within the Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) to

strengthen the agency’s ability to detect potential safety culture weaknesses during inspections

and performance assessments. Regulatory Issue Summary 2006-13, “Information on the

Changes Made to the Reactor Oversight Process To More Fully Address Safety Culture” [3],

was issued on July 31, 2006, to provide information to nuclear power reactor licensees on the

revised ROP. Most notably, the NRC revised the existing cross-cutting areas of human

performance, problem identification and resolution, and safety-conscious work environment to

incorporate aspects that are important to safety culture. The intent of the revisions to the ROP

was threefold:

(1) To provide better opportunities for the NRC staff to consider safety culture weaknesses

and to encourage licensees to take appropriate actions before significant performance

degradation occurs.

(2) To provide the NRC staff with a process to determine the need to specifically evaluate a

licensee’s safety culture after performance problems have resulted in the placement of a

licensee in the degraded cornerstone column of the action matrix.

(3) To provide the NRC staff with a structured process to evaluate the licensee’s safety

culture assessment and to independently conduct a safety culture assessment for a

licensee in the multiple/repetitive degraded cornerstone column of the action matrix.

In 2004, also in response to events at Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, the Institute for

Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) published a document titled, “Principles for a Strong Nuclear

Safety Culture” [4], which described principles and attributes of a healthy nuclear safety culture

as developed by an industry advisory group. In 2009, in partnership with the Nuclear Energy

2

Institute (NEI) and INPO, the nuclear power industry began a voluntary initiative to enhance

safety culture. The process for monitoring and improving safety culture used INPO’s principles

and attributes of a healthy nuclear safety culture as a framework and was described in the

document NEI 09-07, “Fostering a Strong Nuclear Safety Culture” [5].

In 2008, at the direction of the Commission, the NRC staff began an effort to expand the

Commission’s safety culture policy to address the unique aspects of security and ensure

applicability to all licensees and certificate holders. The NRC engaged in a unique collaborative

effort with stakeholders, including Agreement States, to develop a definition of nuclear safety

culture and a list of traits that describe that safety culture. The goal of this effort was to develop

a model that could be applied to any of the diverse stakeholders responsible for the safe and

secure use of nuclear materials. The final NRC Safety Culture Policy Statement (SCPS) was

published on June 14, 2011 [6]. This SCPS provides the NRC’s expectation that individuals and

organizations performing regulated activities establish and maintain a healthy safety culture that

recognizes the safety and security significance of their activities and the nature and complexity

of their organizations and functions. Because safety and security are the primary pillars of the

NRC’s regulatory mission, consideration of both safety and security issues, commensurate with

their significance, is an underlying principle of the SCPS.

The SCPS applies to all licensees, certificate holders, permit holders, authorization holders,

holders of quality assurance program approvals, vendors and suppliers of safety-related

components, and applicants for a license, certificate, permit, authorization, or quality assurance

program approval subject to NRC authority. In addition, the Commission encourages the

Agreement States (i.e., States that have signed formal agreements with the NRC to assume

regulatory responsibility over certain nuclear materials within their borders), their licensees, and

other organizations interested in nuclear safety to support the development and maintenance of

a healthy safety culture within their regulated communities.

The SCPS defines nuclear safety culture as the core values and behaviors resulting from a

collective commitment by leaders and individuals to emphasize safety over competing goals to

ensure protection of people and the environment. The SCPS also includes a list of traits further

defining a healthy safety culture. The SCPS notes that these traits describe patterns of thinking,

feeling, and behaving that emphasize safety, particularly in goal conflict situations (e.g., safety

considerations given precedence over concerns about production, schedule, and the cost of the

effort). The SCPS notes that these traits are not all-inclusive. Some organizations may find that

one or more of the traits are particularly relevant to their activities. There may also be traits not

included in the SCPS that are important in a healthy safety culture.

3

2 SAFETY CULTURE COMMON LANGUAGE INITIATIVE

The safety culture common language described in this report builds on the U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission’s (NRC’s) and the nuclear industry’s ongoing focus on safety culture. It

is the result of an attempt to harmonize differences in terms that different groups have used to

describe a healthy nuclear safety culture. In particular, this refers to the Institute for Nuclear

Power Operations’ (INPO’s) principles and attributes of safety culture, the NRC’s safety culture

components and aspects described in the Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) [7], the

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safety culture characteristics [8], and the safety

culture traits in the NRC’s Safety Culture Policy Statement. This initiative is within the

Commission-directed framework for enhancing the ROP treatment of cross-cutting areas to

more fully address safety culture.

Before work began on the 2011 Safety Culture Policy Statement (SCPS), the nuclear power

industry approached the NRC about starting an effort to develop a shared set of terms to

describe safety culture. This effort was deferred while the SCPS was being developed. With

insights gained during the development of the SCPS, the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

(NRR) hosted a public workshop in December 2011 to begin to discuss the idea of a safety

culture common language. The public workshop included a panel of representatives from

INPO, the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), all four NRC regional offices, and several offices

within NRC headquarters. It was open to public participation. The intent of this initiative, as

requested by the industry, was to align terminology between the NRC’s inspection and

assessment processes within the ROP and the industry’s assessment process as documented

in NEI 09-07, “Fostering a Strong Nuclear Safety Culture.”

During the December 2011 workshop, panelists used affinity diagraming methods to group

various safety culture terms and examples under common themes. The panel used the nine

traits of a positive safety culture described in the SCPS as the primary themes. The panelists

also identified an additional theme, “Decision making,” as being equally important as the nine

SCPS traits in describing a healthy safety culture in nuclear organizations. During a subsequent

workshop in April 2012, the panelists created and defined subcategories under each of the

10 traits. These subcategories became the 40 attributes of a healthy nuclear safety culture

described in this report.

To assist individuals and organizations in understanding and applying the common language

traits and attributes, the panelists reconvened in November 2012 and January 2013 to develop

examples of each attribute and a glossary of terms to define levels of an organization. The

examples more fully describe the values and behaviors that a nuclear organization and its

members should demonstrate in maintaining a healthy nuclear safety culture. The common

language was finalized during the January 2013 meeting. This report documents the agreed

upon common language describing the traits, attributes, and examples. INPO has also

published this common language in INPO 12-012, “Traits of a Healthy Nuclear Safety

Culture” [9].

The NRC and the nuclear industry recognize continuous learning as an important trait of a

healthy nuclear safety culture. As the NRC’s and the nuclear industry’s knowledge and

experience continues to develop, and as research on safety culture continues, this common

language may require revision to better describe model behaviors observable in a healthy

nuclear safety culture.

3 EXPLANATION OF TERMS

3.1 Terms

Organizations have different structures and terms for organizational roles and positions. This

listing defines terms used in this document and was developed as part of the common language

initiative. Each organization can determine how these terms apply to its unique organizational

structure.

Nuclear Safety Culture

The set of core values and behaviors resulting from a collective commitment by leaders and

individuals to emphasize safety over competing goals to ensure protection of people and the

environment

The Organization

The collective group of all individuals, the reporting structure, and the procedures, policies, and

practices that individuals use to set goals and make decisions, to accomplish tasks, and to

implement and maintain a healthy nuclear safety culture.

Individuals

All people at all levels of the organization; individuals include all leaders, individual contributors,

and supplemental personnel.

Leaders

Individuals who influence, coach, or lead others within the organization and determine the

vision, goals, or objectives of their teams; leaders include executives, managers, supervisors,

and others who influence individuals in the organization.

Executives

Corporate decision makers who are responsible for setting the long-term strategic goals for the

organization; executives develop and implement corporate policies.

Senior Managers

Those managers who are responsible for the execution of business activities, including setting

priorities for and monitoring the performance of the organization.

Managers

Individuals assigned to managerial positions who control, direct, guide, and advise; managers

include senior managers, and may include some supervisors.

Supervisors

Individuals who provide direction of the day-to-day activities of individual contributors;

supervisors may include superintendents, foremen, or work group leads.

Work Groups

Groups of individuals who work collaboratively to accomplish tasks; work groups may exist at

any level of the organization.

6

Individual Contributors

Individuals who operate individually or as members of work groups to accomplish tasks;

individual contributors may include leaders when leaders are acting in a nonsupervisory

capacity or are accomplishing tasks as members of a work group.

Supplemental Personnel

Individuals who accomplish work for but are not employees of the organization; supplemental

personnel include short- and long-term contractors and individuals who are not employed by the

organization but occasionally perform work related to nuclear safety.

Independent Oversight Organizations

Groups that independently review the performance and direction of the organization.

3.2 Relationships among Roles

Figure 3.2-1 is a graphical representation of the interrelationships among the terms defined in

Section 3.1, as visualized by members of the common language initiative.

Figure 3.2-1 Relationships among Roles in a Hypothetical Nuclear Industry Organization

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4 TRAITS, ATTRIBUTES, AND EXAMPLES

4.1 Leadership Safety Values and Actions (LA)

Leaders demonstrate a commitment to safety in their decisions and behaviors.

LA.1 Resources: Leaders ensure that personnel, equipment, procedures, and other

resources are available and adequate to support nuclear safety.

Examples:

(1) Managers ensure staffing levels are consistent with the demands related to maintaining

safety and reliability.

(2) Managers ensure there are sufficient qualified personnel to maintain work hours within

working hour guidelines during all modes of operation.

(3) Managers ensure facilities are available and regularly maintained, including physical

improvements, simulator fidelity, and emergency facilities.

(4) Leaders ensure tools, equipment, procedures, and other resource materials are

available to support successful work performance, including risk management tools and

emergency equipment.

(5) Executives and senior managers ensure sufficient corporate resources are allocated to

the nuclear organization for short- and long-term safe and reliable operation.

(6) Executives and senior managers ensure a rigorous evaluation of the nuclear safety

implications of deferred work.

LA.2 Field Presence: Leaders are commonly seen in working areas of the plant

observing, coaching, and reinforcing standards and expectations. Deviations from

standards and expectations are corrected promptly.

Examples:

(1) Senior managers ensure supervisory and management oversight of work activities,

including contractors and supplemental personnel, such that nuclear safety is supported.

(2) Leaders from all levels in the organization are involved in oversight of work activities.

(3) Managers and supervisors practice visible leadership in the field and during safety

significant evolutions by placing “eyes on the problem,” coaching, mentoring, reinforcing

standards and reinforcing positive decision making practices and behaviors.

(4) Managers and supervisors discuss their observations in detail with the group they

observed and provide useful feedback about how to improve individual performance.

(5) Managers encourage informal leaders to model safe behaviors and high standards of

accountability.

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LA.3 Incentives, Sanctions and Rewards: Leaders ensure incentives, sanctions, and

rewards are aligned with nuclear safety policies and reinforce behaviors and outcomes

that reflect safety as the overriding priority.

Examples:

(1) Managers ensure disciplinary actions are appropriate, consistent, and support both

nuclear safety and a safety conscious work environment.

(2) Managers reward individuals who identify and raise issues affecting nuclear safety.

(3) Leaders foster an environment that promotes accountability and hold individuals

accountable for their actions.

(4) Managers consider the potential chilling effects of disciplinary actions and other

potentially adverse personnel actions and take compensatory actions when appropriate.

(5) Leaders publicly praise behaviors that reflect a positive safety culture.

LA.4 Strategic Commitment to Safety: Leaders ensure plant priorities are aligned to

reflect nuclear safety as the overriding priority.

Examples:

(1) Executives and senior managers reinforce nuclear safety as the overriding priority.

(2) Managers develop and implement cost and schedule goals in a manner that reinforces

the importance of nuclear safety.

(3) Managers ensure production requirements are established, communicated, and put into

practice in a manner that reinforces nuclear safety.

(4) Executives and senior managers use information from independent oversight

organizations to establish priorities that align with nuclear safety.

(5) Executives and senior managers establish strategic and business plans that reflect the

importance of nuclear safety over production.

(6) Executives and senior managers ensure corporate priorities are aligned with nuclear

safety.

LA.5 Change Management: Leaders use a systematic process for evaluating and

implementing change so that nuclear safety remains the overriding priority.

Examples:

(1) When making decisions related to major changes, managers use a systematic process

for planning, coordinating, and evaluating the safety impacts and potential negative

effects on the willingness of individuals to raise safety concerns. This includes decisions

concerning changes to organizational structure and functions, leadership, policies,

programs, procedures, and resources.

9

(2) Executives and senior managers ensure nuclear safety is maintained when planning,

communicating, and executing major changes.

(3) Managers maintain a clear focus on nuclear safety when implementing the change

management process to ensure that significant unintended consequences are avoided.

(4) Managers ensure that individuals understand the importance of, and their role in, the

change management process.

(5) Managers anticipate, manage, and communicate the effects of impending changes.

(6) Managers and supervisors actively monitor and address potential distractions from

nuclear safety during periods of change.

LA.6 Roles, Responsibilities, and Authorities: Leaders clearly define roles,

responsibilities, and authorities to ensure nuclear safety.

Examples:

(1) Leaders ensure roles, responsibilities, and authorities are clearly defined, understood,

and documented.

(2) Managers appropriately delegate responsibility and authority to promote ownership and

accountability.

(3) Executives and senior managers ensure corporate managers who support the nuclear

organization and managers at the station understand their respective roles and

responsibilities.

(4) Recommendations and feedback from corporate governance, review boards, and

independent oversight organizations do not override senior managers’ ultimate

responsibility for decisions affecting nuclear safety.

LA.7 Constant Examination: Leaders ensure that nuclear safety is constantly

scrutinized through a variety of monitoring techniques, including assessments of

nuclear safety culture.

Examples:

(1) Executives and senior managers ensure that board members and members of

independent oversight organizations meet with leaders and individual contributors in

their work environments to develop an understanding of the status of the organization’s

safety culture.

(2) Executives and senior managers obtain outside perspectives of nuclear safety through

selection of qualified and critical independent safety review board members with diverse

backgrounds and perspectives.

(3) Executives and senior managers use a variety of monitoring tools including employee

surveys, self- and independent assessments, external safety review board member

10

feedback, and employee concern investigations to regularly monitor station nuclear

safety culture.

(4) Leaders support and participate in candid assessments of workplace attitudes and

nuclear safety culture, and act on issues that affect trust in management or detract from

a healthy nuclear safety culture.

LA.8 Leader Behaviors: Leaders exhibit behaviors that set the standard for safety.

Examples

(1) Leaders “walk the talk,” modeling correct behaviors, especially when resolving apparent

conflicts between nuclear safety and production.

(2) Leaders act promptly when a nuclear safety issue is raised to ensure it is understood

and appropriately addressed.

(3) Leaders maintain high standards of personal conduct that promote all aspects of a

positive nuclear safety culture.

(4) Leaders demonstrate interest in plant operations and actively seek out the opinions and

concerns of workers at all levels.

(5) Leaders encourage personnel to challenge unsafe behavior and unsafe conditions, and

support personnel when they stop plant activities for safety reasons.

(6) Leaders motivate others to practice positive safety culture behaviors.

11

4.2 Problem Identification and Resolution (PI)

Issues potentially impacting safety are promptly identified, fully evaluated, and promptly

addressed and corrected commensurate with their significance.

PI.1 Identification: The organization implements a corrective action program with a

low threshold for identifying issues. Individuals identify issues completely, accurately,

and in a timely manner in accordance with the program.

Examples:

(1) Individuals recognize deviations from standards.

(2) Individuals understand how to enter issues into the corrective action program.

(3) Individuals ensure that issues, problems, degraded conditions, and near misses are

promptly reported and documented in the corrective action program at a low threshold.

(4) Individuals describe the issues entered in the corrective action program in sufficient

detail to ensure they can be appropriately prioritized, trended, and assigned for

resolution.

PI.2 Evaluation: The organization thoroughly evaluates problems to ensure that

resolutions address causes and extent of conditions, commensurate with their safety

significance.

Examples:

(1) Issues are properly classified, prioritized, and evaluated according to their safety

significance.

(2) Operability and reportability determinations are developed, when appropriate.

(3) Apparent and root cause investigations identify primary and contributing causal factors

as required.

(4) Extent of condition and extent of cause evaluations are completed in a timely manner,

commensurate with the safety significance of the issue.

(5) Issues are thoroughly investigated according to their safety significance.

(6) Root cause analysis is rigorously applied to identify and correct the fundamental cause

of significant issues.

(7) The underlying organizational and safety culture contributors to issues are thoroughly

evaluated and are given the necessary time and resources to be clearly understood.

(8) Cause analyses identify and understand the basis for decisions that contributed to

issues.

(9) Managers conduct effectiveness reviews of significant corrective actions to ensure that

the resolution effectively addressed the causes.

12

PI.3 Resolution: The organization takes effective corrective actions to address issues

in a timely manner, commensurate with their safety significance.

Examples:

(1) Corrective actions are completed in a timely manner.

(2) Deferrals of corrective actions are minimized; when required, due dates are extended

using an established process that appropriately considers safety significance.

(3) Appropriate interim corrective actions are taken to mitigate issues while more

fundamental causes are being assessed.

(4) Corrective actions resolve and correct the identified issues, including causes and extent

of condition.

(5) Corrective actions prevent the recurrence of significant conditions adverse to quality.

(6) Trends in safety performance indicators are acted upon to resolve problems early.

PI.4 Trending: The organization periodically analyzes information from the corrective

action program and other assessments in the aggregate to identify programmatic and

common cause issues.

Examples:

(1) The organization develops indicators that monitor both equipment and organizational

performance, including safety culture.

(2) Managers use indicators that provide an accurate representation of performance and

provide early indications of declining trends.

(3) Managers routinely challenge the organization’s understanding of declining trends.

(4) Organizational and departmental trend reviews are completed in a timely manner in

accordance with program expectations.

13

4.3 Personal Accountability (PA)

All individuals take personal responsibility for safety

PA.1 Standards: Individuals understand the importance of adherence to nuclear

standards. All levels of the organization exercise accountability for shortfalls in meeting

standards.

Examples:

(1) Individuals encourage each other to adhere to high standards.

(2) Individuals demonstrate a proper focus on nuclear safety and reinforce this focus

through peer coaching and discussions.

(3) Individuals hold themselves personally accountable for modeling nuclear safety

behaviors.

(4) Individuals across the organization apply nuclear safety standards consistently.

(5) Individuals actively solicit and are open to feedback.

(6) Individuals help supplemental personnel understand and practice expected behaviors

and actions.

PA.2 Job Ownership: Individuals understand and demonstrate personal responsibility

for the behaviors and work practices that support nuclear safety.

Examples:

(1) Individuals understand their personal responsibility to foster a professional environment,

encourage teamwork, and identify challenges to nuclear safety.

(2) Individuals understand their personal responsibility to raise nuclear safety issues,

including those identified by others.

(3) Individuals take ownership for the preparation and execution of assigned work activities.

(4) Individuals actively participate in pre-job briefings, understanding their responsibility to

raise nuclear safety concerns before work begins.

(5) Individuals ensure that they are trained and qualified to perform assigned work.

(6) Individuals understand the objective of the work activity, their role in the activity, and

their personal responsibility for safely accomplishing the overall objective.

14

PA.3 Teamwork: Individuals and workgroups communicate and coordinate their

activities within and across organizational boundaries to ensure nuclear safety is

maintained.

Examples:

(1) Individuals demonstrate a strong sense of collaboration and cooperation in connection

with projects and operational activities.

(2) Individuals work as a team to provide peer-checks, verify certifications and training,

ensure detailed safety practices, actively peer coach new personnel, and share tools

and publications.

(3) Individuals strive to meet commitments.

15

4.4 Work Processes (WP)

The process of planning and controlling work activities is implemented so that safety is

maintained.

WP.1 Work Management: The organization implements a process of planning,

controlling, and executing work activities such that nuclear safety is the overriding

priority. The work process includes the identification and management of risk

commensurate to the work.

Examples:

(1) Work is effectively planned and executed by incorporating risk insights, job site

conditions, and the need for coordination with different groups or job activities.

(2) The work process appropriately prioritizes work and incorporates contingency plans,

compensatory actions, and abort criteria, as needed.

(3) Leaders consider the impact of changes to the work scope and the need to keep

personnel apprised of work status.

(4) The work process ensures individuals are aware of plant status, the nuclear safety risks

associated with work in the field, and other parallel station activities.

(5) Insights from probabilistic risk assessments are considered in daily work activities and

change processes.

(6) Work activities are coordinated to address conflicting or changing priorities across the

whole spectrum of activities contributing to nuclear safety.

(7) The work process limits temporary modifications.

WP.2 Design Margins: The organization operates and maintains equipment within

design margins. Margins are carefully guarded and changed only through a systematic

and rigorous process. Special attention is placed on maintaining fission product

barriers, defense-in-depth, and safety-related equipment.

Examples:

(1) The work process supports nuclear safety and maintenance of design margins by

minimizing long-standing equipment issues, preventative maintenance deferrals, and

maintenance and engineering backlogs.

(2) The work process ensures focus on maintaining fission product barriers,

defense-in-depth, and safety-related equipment.

(3) Design and operating margins are carefully guarded and changed only with great

thought and care.

(4) Safety-related equipment is operated and maintained well within design requirements.

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WP.3 Documentation: The organization creates and maintains complete, accurate and

up-to-date documentation.

Examples:

(1) Plant activities are governed by comprehensive, high-quality, programs, processes and

procedures.

(2) Design documentation, procedures, and work packages are complete, thorough,

accurate, and current.

(3) Components are labeled clearly, consistently, and accurately.

(4) The backlog of document changes is understood, prioritized, and actively managed to

ensure quality.

WP.4 Procedure Adherence: Individuals follow processes, procedures, and work

instructions.

Examples:

(1) Individuals follow procedures.

(2) Individuals understand and use human error reduction techniques.

(3) Individuals review procedures and instructions before work to validate that they are

appropriate for the scope of work and that required changes are completed before

implementation.

(4) Individuals manipulate plant equipment only when appropriately authorized and directed

by approved plant procedures or work instructions.

(5) Individuals ensure the status of work activities is properly documented.

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4.5 Continuous Learning (CL)

Opportunities to learn about ways to ensure safety are sought out and implemented.

CL.1 Operating Experience: The organization systematically and effectively collects,

evaluates, and implements relevant internal and external operating experience in a timely

manner.

Examples:

(1) There is a process to ensure a thorough review of operating experience provided by

internal and external sources.

(2) Operating experience is effectively implemented and institutionalized through changes to

station processes, procedures, equipment, and training programs.

(3) Operating experience is used to understand equipment, operational, and industry

challenges and adopt new ideas to improve performance.

(4) Operating experience is used to support daily work functions with emphasis on the

possibility that it “could happen here.”

(5) Station operating experience is shared in a timely manner.

CL.2 Self-Assessment: The organization routinely conducts self-critical and objective

assessments of its programs and practices.

Examples:

(1) Self- and independent assessments, including nuclear safety culture assessments, are

thorough and effective and used as a basis for improvements.

(2) The organization values the insights and perspectives provided through assessments.

(3) Self-assessments are performed on a variety of topics, including the self-assessment

process itself.

(4) Self-assessments are performed at a regular frequency and provide objective,

comprehensive, and self-critical information that drive corrective actions.

(5) Targeted self-assessments are performed when a more thorough understanding of an

issue is required.

(6) A balanced approach of self-assessments and independent oversight is used and

periodically adjusted based on changing needs.

(7) Self-assessment teams include individual contributors and leaders from within the

organization, as well as from external organizations, when appropriate.

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CL.3 Benchmarking: The organization learns from other organizations to continuously

improve knowledge, skills, and safety performance.

Examples

(1) The organization uses benchmarking as an avenue for acquiring innovative ideas to

improve nuclear safety.

(2) The organization participates in benchmarking activities with other nuclear and

non-nuclear facilities.

(3) The organization seeks out better practices by using benchmarking to understand how

others perform the same functions.

(4) The organization uses benchmarking to compare station standards to the industry and

make adjustments to improve performance.

(5) Individual contributors are actively involved in benchmarking.

CL.4 Training: The organization provides training and ensures knowledge transfer to

maintain a knowledgeable, technically competent workforce and instill nuclear safety

values.

Examples:

(1) The organization fosters an environment in which individuals value and seek continuous

learning opportunities.

(2) Individuals, including supplemental workers, are adequately trained to ensure technical

competency and an understanding of standards and work requirements.

(3) Individuals master reactor and power plant fundamentals to establish a solid foundation

for sound decisions and behaviors.

(4) The organization develops and effectively implements knowledge transfer and

knowledge retention strategies.

(5) Knowledge transfer and knowledge retention strategies are applied to capture the

knowledge and skill of experienced individuals to advance the knowledge and skill of

less experienced individuals.

(6) Leadership and management skills are systematically developed.

(7) Training is developed and continuously improved using input and feedback from

individual contributors and subject matter experts.

(8) Executives obtain the training necessary to understand basic plant operation and the

relationships between major functions and organizations.

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4.6 Environment for Raising Concerns (RC)

A safety-conscious work environment (SCWE) is maintained where personnel feel free to raise

safety concerns without fear of retaliation, intimidation, harassment, or discrimination.

RC.1 Safety-Conscious Work Environment Policy: The organization effectively

implements a policy that supports individuals’ rights and responsibilities to raise safety

concerns, and does not tolerate harassment, intimidation, retaliation, or discrimination

for doing so.

Examples:

(1) Individuals feel free to raise nuclear safety concerns without fear of retribution, with

confidence that their concerns will be addressed.

(2) Executives and senior managers set and reinforce expectations for establishing and

maintaining a safety-conscious work environment.

(3) Policies and procedures reinforce that individuals have the right and responsibility to

raise nuclear safety concerns.

(4) Policies and procedures define the responsibilities of leaders to create an environment in

which individuals feel free to raise safety concerns.

(5) Policies and procedures establish the expectation that leaders will respond in a

respectful manner and provide timely feedback to the individuals raising concerns.

(6) Leaders are trained to take ownership when receiving and responding to concerns,

recognizing confidentiality if appropriate and ensuring the concerns are adequately

addressed in a timely manner.

(7) Individuals are trained that behaviors or actions that could prevent concerns from being

raised, including harassment, intimidation, retaliation, or discrimination, will not be

tolerated, and are violations of law and policy.

(8) All claims of retaliation are investigated and any necessary corrective actions are taken

in a timely manner, including actions to mitigate any potential chilling effect.

RC.2 Alternate Process for Raising Concerns: The organization effectively implements

a process for raising and resolving concerns that is independent of line-management

influence. Safety issues may be raised in confidence and are resolved in a timely and

effective manner.

Examples:

(1) Executives establish, support, and promote the use of alternative processes for raising

concerns, and ensure corrective actions are taken.

(2) Leaders understand their role in supporting alternate processes for raising concerns.

20

(3) Processes for raising concerns or resolving differing professional opinions that are

alternatives to the corrective action program and operate outside the influence of the

management chain are communicated and accessible to individuals.

(4) Alternate processes are independent, include an option to raise concerns confidentially,

and ensure these concerns are appropriately resolved in a timely manner.

(5) Individuals receive feedback in a timely manner.

(6) Individuals have confidence that issues raised will be appropriately resolved.

(7) Individuals assigned to respond to concerns have the appropriate competencies.

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4.7 Effective Safety Communication (CO)

Communications maintain a focus on safety.

CO.1 Work Process Communications: Individuals incorporate safety communications

in work activities.

Examples:

(1) Communications within workgroups are timely, frequent, and accurate.

(2) Work groups and supervisors communicate work status with other work groups and

supervisors during the performance of their work activities.

(3) Individuals communicate with each other such that everyone has the information

necessary to accomplish work activities safely and effectively.

(4) Communications during shift turnovers and pre-job briefs provide information necessary

to support nuclear safety.

(5) Work groups integrate nuclear safety messages into daily activities and meetings.

CO.2 Basis for Decisions: Leaders ensure that the basis for operational and

organizational decisions is communicated in a timely manner.

Examples:

(1) Leaders promptly communicate expected outcomes, potential problems, planned

contingencies, and abort criteria for important operational decisions.

(2) Leaders share information on a wide range of issues with individuals and periodically

verify their understanding of the information.

(3) Leaders take steps to avoid unintended or conflicting messages that may be conveyed

by operational decisions.

(4) Leaders encourage individuals to ask questions if they do not understand the basis of

operational and management decisions.

(5) Executives and senior managers communicate the reasons for resource allocation

decisions, including the nuclear safety implications of those decisions.

CO.3 Free Flow of Information: Individuals communicate openly and candidly, both up,

down, and across the organization, and with oversight, audit, and regulatory

organizations.

Examples:

(1) Leaders encourage free flow of information.

(2) Individuals share information openly and candidly.

22

(3) Leaders respond to individuals in an open, honest, and nondefensive manner.

(4) Individuals provide complete, accurate, and forthright information to oversight, audit, and

regulatory organizations.

(5) Leaders actively solicit feedback, listen to concerns, and communicate openly with all

individuals.

(6) Leaders candidly communicate the results of monitoring and assessment throughout the

organization and with independent oversight organizations.

CO.4 Expectations: Leaders frequently communicate and reinforce the expectation that

nuclear safety is the organization’s overriding priority.

Examples:

(1) Executives and senior managers communicate expectations regarding nuclear safety so

that individuals understand that safety is of the highest priority.

(2) Executives and senior managers implement a strategy of frequent communication using

a variety of tools to reinforce that nuclear safety is the overriding priority.

(3) Executives and senior managers reinforce the importance of nuclear safety by clearly

communicating its relationship to strategic issues including budget, workforce planning,

equipment reliability, and business plans.

(4) Leaders communicate desired nuclear safety behaviors to individuals, including

providing examples of how behaviors can positively or negatively affect nuclear safety.

(5) Leaders routinely verify that communications on the importance of nuclear safety have

been heard and understood.

(6) Leaders ensure supplemental personnel understand expected behaviors and actions

necessary to maintain nuclear safety.

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4.8 Respectful Work Environment (WE)

Trust and respect permeate the organization.

WE.1 Respect is Evident: Everyone is treated with dignity and respect.

Examples:

(1) The organization regards individuals and their professional capabilities and experiences

as its most valuable asset.

(2) Individuals at all levels of the organization treat each other with dignity and respect.

(3) Individuals treat each other with respect within and between work groups.

(4) Individuals do not demonstrate or tolerate bullying or humiliating behaviors.

(5) Leaders monitor for behaviors that can have a negative impact on the work environment

and address them promptly.

(6) Leaders ensure policies and expectations are enforced fairly and consistently for

individuals at all levels of the organization.

(7) Individuals treat decisionmakers with respect, even when they disagree with a decision.

(8) Leaders ensure facilities are conducive to a productive work environment and

housekeeping is maintained.

WE.2 Opinions are Valued: Individuals are encouraged to voice concerns, provide

suggestions, and offer questions. Differing opinions are respected.

Examples:

(1) The organization encourages individuals to offer ideas, concerns, suggestions, differing

opinions, and questions to help identify and solve problems.

(2) Leaders are receptive to ideas, concerns, suggestions, differing opinions, and questions.

(3) The organization promotes robust discussions, recognizing that differing opinions are a

natural result of differences in expertise and experience.

(4) Individuals value the insights and perspectives provided by quality assurance, the

employee concerns program, and independent oversight organizations.

WE.3 High Level of Trust: Trust is fostered among individuals and workgroups

throughout the organization.

Examples:

(1) Leaders promote collaboration among work groups.

(2) Leaders respond to questions and concerns in an open and honest manner.

24

(3) Leaders, sensitive to the negative impact of a lack of information, share important

information in an open, honest, and timely manner such that trust is maintained.

(4) Leaders ensure that plant status and important work milestones are communicated

throughout the organization.

(5) Leaders acknowledge positive performance and address negative performance promptly

and directly with the individual involved; confidentiality is maintained as appropriate.

(6) Leaders welcome performance feedback from throughout the organization and modify

their behavior when appropriate.

WE.4 Conflict Resolution: Fair and objective methods are used to resolve conflict.

Examples:

(1) The organization implements processes to ensure fair and objective resolution of

conflicts and differing views.

(2) Leaders ensure conflicts are resolved in a balanced, equitable, and consistent manner,

even when outside of defined processes.

(3) Individuals have confidence that conflicts will be resolved respectfully and professionally.

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4.9 Questioning Attitude (QA)

Individuals avoid complacency and continuously challenge existing conditions and activities in

order to identify discrepancies that might result in error or inappropriate action.

QA.1 Nuclear Is Recognized as Special and Unique: Individuals understand that

complex technologies can fail in unpredictable ways.

Examples:

(1) The organization ensures that activities that could affect reactivity are conducted with

particular care, caution, and oversight.

(2) Individuals recognize the special characteristics and unique hazards of nuclear

technology including radioactive byproducts, concentration of energy in the core, and

decay heat.

(3) Individuals recognize the particular importance of features designed to maintain critical

safety functions, such as core and spent fuel cooling.

(4) Executives and senior managers ask probing questions to understand the implications

and consequences of anomalies in plant conditions.

(5) Executives and senior managers challenge managers to ensure degraded conditions are

fully understood and appropriately resolved, especially those involving equipment

important to nuclear safety.

QA.2 Challenge the Unknown: Individuals stop when faced with uncertain conditions.

Risks are evaluated and managed before proceeding.

Examples:

(1) Leaders reinforce expectations that individuals take the time to do the job right the first

time, seek guidance when unsure, and stop if an unexpected condition or equipment

response is encountered.

(2) Individuals maintain a questioning attitude during pre-job briefs and job-site reviews to

identify and resolve unexpected conditions.

(3) Individuals challenge unanticipated test results rather than rationalize them. For

example, abnormal indications are not automatically attributed to indication problems,

but are thoroughly investigated before activities are allowed to continue.

(4) Individuals communicate unexpected plant responses and conditions to the control

room.

(5) Individuals stop work activities when confronted with an unexpected condition,

communicate with supervisors, and resolve the condition prior to continuing work

activities. When appropriate, individuals consult system and equipment experts.

(6) If a procedure or work document is unclear or cannot be performed as written,

individuals stop work until the issue is resolved.

26

QA.3 Challenge Assumptions: Individuals challenge assumptions and offer opposing

views when they think something is not correct.

Examples:

(1) Leaders solicit challenges to assumptions when evaluating nuclear safety issues.

(2) Individual contributors ask questions to fully understand the bases of operational and

management decisions that appear to be contrary to nuclear safety.

(3) Managers question assumptions, decisions, and justifications that do not appear to

sufficiently consider impacts to nuclear safety.

QA.4 Avoid Complacency: Individuals recognize and plan for the possibility of

mistakes, latent problems, or inherent risk, even while expecting successful outcomes.

Examples:

(1) The organization is aware that latent conditions can exist, addresses them as they are

discovered, and considers the extent of the conditions and their causes.

(2) Before authorizing work, individuals verify procedure prerequisites are met rather than

assume they are met based on general plant conditions.

(3) Individual contributors perform a thorough review of the work site and planned activity

every time work is performed rather than relying on past successes and assumed

conditions.

(4) Leaders ensure specific contingency actions are discussed and understood during job

planning and pre-job briefs.

(5) Individuals consider potential undesired consequences of their actions before performing

work and implement appropriate error-reduction tools.

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4.10 Decision making (DM)

Decisions that support or affect nuclear safety are systematic, rigorous, and thorough.

DM.1 Consistent Process: Individuals use a consistent, systematic approach to make

decisions. Risk insights are incorporated as appropriate.

Examples:

(1) The organization establishes a well-defined decision making process, with variations

allowed for the complexity of the issue being decided.

(2) Individuals demonstrate an understanding of the decision making process and use it

consistently.

(3) Leaders seek inputs from different work groups or organizations as appropriate when

making safety- or risk-significant decisions.

(4) When previous operational decisions are called into question by new facts, leaders

re-evaluate these decisions to ensure they remain appropriate.

(5) The organization uses the results of effectiveness reviews to improve future decisions.

DM.2 Conservative Bias: Individuals use decision making practices that emphasize

prudent choices over those that are simply allowable. A proposed action is determined

to be safe to proceed, rather than unsafe in order to stop.

Examples:

(1) Managers ensure that conservative assumptions are used when determining whether

emergent or unscheduled work can be conducted safely.

(2) Leaders take a conservative approach to decision making, particularly when information

is incomplete or conditions are unusual.

(3) Leaders consider long-term consequences when determining how to resolve emergent

concerns.

(4) Managers take timely action to address degraded conditions commensurate with their

safety significance.

(5) Executives and senior managers reinforce the expectation that the reactor will be shut

down when procedurally required, when the margin for safe operation has degraded

unacceptably, or when the condition of the reactor is uncertain. Managers implement

this expectation.

(6) Individuals do not rationalize assumptions for the sake of completing a task.

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DM.3 Accountability for Decisions: Single-point accountability is maintained for

nuclear safety decisions.

Examples:

(1) The on-shift licensed operators have the authority and responsibility to place the plant in

a safe condition when faced with unexpected or uncertain conditions.

(2) A designated, on-shift licensed senior reactor operator has the authority and

responsibility to determine equipment operability.

(3) Managers maintain single-point accountability for important safety decisions.

(4) The organization ensures that important nuclear safety decisions are made by the

correct person at the lowest appropriate level.

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5 REFERENCES

[1] Nuclear Regulatory Commission. (1989). Policy Statement on the Conduct of Nuclear

Power Plant Operations. Federal Register Notice 54 FR 3424.

[2] Nuclear Regulatory Commission. (1996). Freedom of Employees in the Nuclear

Industry to Raise Safety Concerns Without Fear of Retaliation. Federal Register notice

61 FR 24336.

[3] Nuclear Regulatory Commission. (2006). Regulatory Issue Summary 2006-13.

Information on the Changes Made to the Reactor Oversight Process to More Fully

Address Safety Culture. Agencywide Documents Access and Management System

(ADAMS) Accession No. ML061880341.

[4] Institute for Nuclear Power Operations. (2004). Principles for a Strong Nuclear Safety

Culture. ADAMS Accession No. ML091940546.

[5] Nuclear Energy Institute. (2009). NEI 09-07. Fostering a Strong Nuclear Safety

Culture. ADAMS Accession No. ML091590728.

[6] Nuclear Regulatory Commission. (2011). Final Safety Culture Policy Statement.

Federal Register notice 76 FR 34773. ADAMS Accession No. ML111650336.

[7] Nuclear Regulatory Commission. (2011). Components within the Cross-Cutting Areas.

NRC Inspection Manual, Chapter 0310. Version Issued October 28, 2011. ADAMS

Accession No. ML091480473.

[8] International Atomic Energy Agency. (2006). Application of the Management System

for Facilities and Activities: Safety Guide. IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GS-G-3.1.

Available at http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1253_web.pdf

[9] Institute for Nuclear Power Operations. (2012). INPO 12-012. Traits of a Healthy

Nuclear Safety Culture. ADAMS Accession No. ML13031A707.

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001

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OFFICIAL BUSINESS

NUREG-2165 Safety Culture Common Language March 2014