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Forwards Final Exercise Rept for 901205,joint Exercise of Offsite Radiological Emergency Response Plans for Illinois Portion of Quad Cities Plant Emergency Planning Zone.No Deficiencies Noted.W/O Encl
	ML20082S982
Person / Time
Site:	Quad Cities
Issue date:	08/26/1991
From:	Kwiatkowski D; Federal Emergency Management Agency
To:	Congel F; Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
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{{#Wiki_filter:- __ i a li g on .C 204 2 M 2 61991 Mr. Frank J. Congel Director, Division of Radiation Protection and Taargency Preparedness Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Rcgulatory Commission Washington D.C. 20555

Dear Mr. Congel:

Enclosed is a copy of the final exercise report for the December 5, 1990, joint exercise of the offsite radiclogical emergency response plans for the Illinois portion of the Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station energency planning zone (EPZ). The State of Illinois partially participated in the exercise. The Counties of Rock Island and Whiteside, as well as the Commonwealth Edison company, fully participated in the exercise. The exercise report, dated July 29, 1991, was prepared by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Region V staff and copies of the report will be provided to the State of Illinois. The final exercise report addressing the participation of the State of Iowa and the Counties of Clinton and Scott was forwarded to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission on April 26, 1991. There were no Deficiencies identifir.d during the December 5, 1990, exercise. However, the exercise report identifies ten Areas Requiring Corrective Action. A schedule of corrective actions has been provided by the State of Illinois in response to the exercise weaknesses identified. Additional verification will be provided by FEMA Region V during the next exercise for the Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, now scheduled for April 29, 1992. Based on the results of the December 5, 1990, exercise, the offsite radiological emergency response plana and preparedness for the Illinois portion of the Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station EPZ cre adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate measures can be taken offsite to protact the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiolrgical emergency at the site. Therefore, the Title 44 CFR, Part 300 approval of the offsite radiological emergency respense plai.s and preparedness for the Illinois portion of the Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station (EPZ) granted March 2, 1984, continues to be in effect.

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If you have any questions, please contact Mr. Craig S. Wingo, Chief, Radiological Preparedness !ivision, on (202) 646-3026. Sir erely, G , / ye N /W Dennis H. Kwiatkowski Assistant Associate Director Office of Technological Hazards Enclosure

EXERCISE REPORT QUAD CITIES HUCLEAR POWER STATION COMMONWEALTil EDISoll COMPANY l JOINT EXERCIbE racility Locatir.s Cordova, Illinois l Exercise Dato December 5, 1990 Date of Draft Report: March 27, 1991 Date of Final Report July 29, 1991

Participants:

Stdte of Illinois (Partial), Rock Island County (Full), Whiteside County (Tull) FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMDIT AGENCY REGION V NATURAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL llAZARDS DIVISION 175 WEST JACKSON BOULEVARD CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60604

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ti i i l TABLE OF CONTtNTS EXERCISE

Introduction:

page 3 1._ Exercise Background . page 3

2. - State and-Local Government Participation page 3 !

3. List of Evaluators page 3 4.. Evaluation Criteria page 3 .i

                     - 5.               Exercise Objectives                                                                                                                          page      4                                                                    -

6. Summary of Scenario page 4 l

7. State and Local Resources Implemented .

During the Exercise page 4-

8. Previous Exercise rindings page 4 9 .- Required Exercise Objectives Status page 6 Narrative

1. Exercise Summary page 8

2. State of Illinois page 9

                     - 3..              Rock Island County                                                                                                                            page 22

4. Whiteside County page 29 ;

SUMMARY

LISTING OF EXERCISE TINDINGS page 38 l Deficiencies . page-39 Areas Requiring corrective Actions page 40 . page 52 Areas' Recommended for Improvement ATTACHMENTS 2xercise Evaluators Attachment I Exercise-Objectives Attachment II Exercise Scenario -;1arrative Attachment III Exercise Event Tinaline Attachment IV e

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EXERCISE REPORT INTRODUCTION

1. Exercise Background This was the seventh joint exercise for the State of Illinois, Rock Island County, Whiteside County and Commonwealth Edison Company resulting from a simulated accident at the Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station. Earlier exercises vers held on May 20, 1981; August 24, 1982; May 11, 1983; August 28, 1984 ; August 26, 1986 and August 31, 1988. This report addresses the December 5, 1990 exercise, which was a partial participation exercise for the State of Illinois and a full participation exercise for Rock Island and Whiteside Counties.

2. State and Local Government Participation The plume exposure pathway emergency plann.ng zone (10 Mile EPZ) incorporates the planning for all or part of Rock Island and Whiteside Counties. The Rock Island County EOC in Milan was fully activated. The Whitenide County EOC in Morrison was fully activated. The State EOC was partially activated with Illinois Emergency Services and Disaster Agency (IESDA) and Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety (IDNS) personnel. Other State egencies were contacted but were not required to report to the State EOC.

3. List of Evaluators There were a total of 20 Federal evaluators observing offsite exercise activities. Onsite activities were evaluated by a separate team from ti.e Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The offsite evaluation team consisted of 9 FEMA evaluators, and 11 contractors from Argonne National Laboratory. The of f site exercise evaluation list of Team Members is located in Attachment 1 of this report.

4. Evaluation Criteria The plans that were evaluated during this exercise were developed using the " Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants" (NUREG 0654 / FEMA REP-1, Revision 1) . Therefore , the NUREG 0654 criteria and Exercise Evaluation Methodology based on Guidance Memorandum (GM) EX-3 " Managing Pre-Exercise Activities and Post Exercise Meetings" dated February 26, 1988 were used for exercise evaluation.

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5. Exercise objectives The objectives for this exercise were selected from among the thirty-six objectives listed in EX-3. The exercise objectives were submitted for FEMA Region V review on September 24, 1990. FDiA Region V approved the objectives on October 15, 1990. The exercise objectives are located in Attachment 2 of this report.

6. Summary of Scenario The Quad Cities Huclear Power Station emergency preparedness exercise scenario was developed by writers from the utility and the State of Illinois. The scenario was developed to allow demonstration of corrective actions to resolve weaknesses identified in previous exercises. The offsite sequence of events portion of the Quad Cities exercise scenario is Attachment 3 of this report.

7. State and Local Resources Implemented During the Exercise The State of Illinois staf fed the State Emergency operations Center (SEOC) Springfield, State Radiological Emergency Assessment Center (REAC), Springfield and the Joint Public Information Center (JPIC)

Morrison. The REAC was activated to coordinate and provide information to other locations to enable those locations to demonstrate their selected objectives. The State Forward Command Post was located in Garden Plain. Monitoring and decontamination of evacuees and emergency workers was demonstrated out of sequence by Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety. Rock Island County and Whiteside County activated and staf fed their EOCs. Rock Island demonstrated only one out of sequence activity; Protective Action for School Children (EV-2). Whiteside County demonstrated several out of sequence activities; protective action for children (EV-2), registration and congregate care.

3. Previous Exercise Findings During the August 31, 1988 exercise there were no deficiencies identified. Eight (8) Areas Requiring Corrective Actions were identified. All but one (1) of these Areas Requiring Corrective Actions were successfully demonstrated during the December 5, 1990 exercise.

Rock Island Ccunty had four (4) Areas Requiring Corrective Actions during the August 31, 1988 exercise of the Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station. All Areas Requiring Corrective Actions were successfully demonstrated during the December 5, 1990 exercise. 4

Whiteside County also had four (4) Areas Ruquiring corrective Actions during the Au' gust 31, 1988 exercise of the Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station. All Areas Requiring Corrective Actions were successfully demonstrated during the December 5, 1990 exercise.

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9. Required Exercisu Objectives Status CM-EX-3 Objectiven State of Rock Island Whitoside Illinois County County CROUP A

1. Use ECLS D D D

2. Mobilize \ Activate P D D

3. Direction & Control D D D

4. Communications D D D

^ 5. Facilition\ Equipment D D D

6. Emergency Worker control NS D D

7. Field Monitoring NS HA NA B. Airborne Radiciodine Measuremont NS HA NA

9. Particulato Sample \ Lab Analyses NS '

NA NA

10. Dose Projection for Public D NA NA

11. Protective Action Decisicn Making D NA NA

12. Initial Alert-10 milo EPZ D D D

13. Coordinate EBS Mossage D D D

14. Media Driefing D D D

15. Rumor Control P D D CROUP D

16. KI-Emergency Workers NS D D

17. KI-General Public NA NA NA

18. Implement Plumo EPZ PARS HA D D

19. Implement Plume School PARS NA D D

20. Traffic \ Access D D Control NA

21. Monitor \Decon NA Evacuno D NA

22. Adequacy of Congregato Facility D NA NA

23. Transport Contaminated Injured NA NS NS

24. Medical racilities NA NS Hs

25. Decontamination \Emera gency Workers D HA NA 6

r (3 State of Rock Island Whiteside Illinois county county CRCUP C

26. Tederal Assistanen NS NA NA

27. Ingestion Pthvy Sampling Transport Hs NA NA

08. Ingestion Pthvy Lab NS NA NA

29. Ingestion Pthvy Doso Projection \PAks NS NA ilA

30. Implement Ingontion Pthvy PARn NS NJ. NA

31. Est Total Population Dose NA NA NA

32. Determine controlled Reentry NS NA NA

33. Implement Controlled Eeentry NS NS Ns

34. 24 Hour, Staffing NS Ns ps

35. Coordinato Onnite Evac N3 NS Ns

36. Unannounced off-hours Activation NS NS NS LEGDID D Pully Demonstrated NS: Not Selectod for Demonstration .

P: Partially Denonstrated NA: Not applicable NDt Not Successfully Demonstrated 7

l 1 l I l l EXERCISE SUMHARY The Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station radiological emergency preparedness joint exercise was conducted on December 5,1990. The exercise was a partial participation exercise for the State of Illinois and a full participation exercise for Rock Island County, Whiteside County and the Commonwealth Edison Company. l The axercise participants critique was conducted by FD1A at the Quad Cition Training Center, Cordova, Illinois at 1000 on December 7, 1990. Representatives from the State, Counties and the utility were present. The public and media briefing was conducted jointly by FEMA and the NRC at the ar4mo location at 1300. An overview of the findings for the offsite eva3untion of the State of Illinois, Rock Island and Whiteside Counties, is included in this exercise summary. The evaluation is a consensus of the 20 Federal evaluators responsible for dif ferent areas of observati'on. The effort to coordinate siren and EDS activation with the State of Iowa was attempted, but van not effective. (See State time-lines in Attachment IV) The States of Illinois and Iowa should attempt to modify their procedures to ensure more effective coordination is achieved. FEMA will cooperate with this effort following the release of this report. The exercise findings in this report will be identified as one of the following categories: Deficiency: If this event happened or failed to happen during a real emergency public health and safety would have been affected. FEMA will require remedial action to be conducted within 120 days to correct this weakness, because of the seriousness of its potential affect on public health and safety. Area Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA): The event observed during the exercise would not affect public health and safety if it had occurred during a real emergency. The issue is serious enough, though, for FDiA to require a schedule of corrective action. Area Recommended for Improvement (ARFI): The event observed during the exercise wo~uld not affect public health and safety if it had occurred during a real emergency. The issue is-brought to the attention of State or local government as a recommendation to improve plans and operations. A schedule of corrective actions is not required by FEMA. 8

STATE Or ILLIllOIS objectivo #1 Demonstrate the ability to monitor, understand and uso emergency classification levels (ECL) through the appropriate implementation of emergency functions and activities corresponding to ECLs as required by the scenario. The four ECLs aret flotification of Unusual Event, Alert, Site Area Emergency and General Emergency. The State EOC staf f fully demonstrated their understanding and use of the ECLs. The staff of the State Eoc were kept abreast of the ECLs by the utility throughout the exercise. All exercise messages stated the ECL at the time of the message. The ECL's were posted on a status board at the front of the operations room and ECL placards were displayed in a prominent location. The official in charge of the State EOC announced the ECLs to the EOC staff. The staff reacted appropriately in coordinating emergency response activities as each classification level changed. The procedures - were implemented according to tho emergency plan. The notification of Unusual Event was classified at 0836, received by the State EOC at 0842 and verified at 0848. The Alert was classified at 0900, received by the State EOC at 0912 and verified at 0918. The Site Area Emergency was classified at 1107, received by the State EOC at lill and verified at 1115. The General Emergency was classified at 1151, received by the State EOC at 1154 and verified at 1205. phiective #21 Demonstrate the ability to fully alert, mobilize and activate personnel for both facility and field ~-based emergency functions. The ability to fully activate personnel was partially demonstrated. The State Eoc Operations Chief began notifying of f site authorities by telephone beginning at 0930. It was projected to be completed by 0945. The Acting State Director notified the Governor's office of the State FOC activation at 1001. Call up lists used to notify of fsite authorities and State EOC staff were current and accurate; listing name of contact, and the telephone number. The simulated call up was timely, 9

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Present in the State EOC were the f ollowing IESDA representativos l Acting Director, Acting Operations Chief, communication Chief and ' operators, Public Informatior. Officer and assistant, and three i Illinois Department of Nuc1 car Safety representatives. The IESDA Operations staff were in place by 0930. The Chief of Fleid services Operations and the Manager of Radiological Emergency Preparedness simulated deployment from the State EOC. The State Public Information Officer was present in the State EOC while the Chief of Field Services staffed the JPIC. The State Illinois Plan for Radiological Accidents specifies the PIO will be deployed to the JPIC, and the Chief of Field Services will direct State activities at the State Forward Command Post. A problem with message recording and handling developed with the first two messages received from the utility. The Communications Operator incorrectly completed the first two NARS forms. Communications staffing was adjusted by the Operations Chief. AREA REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION The Communications Operator incorrectly completed the first two NARS forms. The information could have advanced the ECLs prematurely which could result in premature emergency response activities. RECOMMEllDATION: There is a history of improper handling of NARS from previous-exercises and the problem continues. Training of communication operators is necessary prior to the Dyron exercise. AREA REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION The IPRA - State Plan specifies the State PIO will be deployed to the designated JPIC. The PIO remained in the State EOC throughout the exercise. The plan also specifies that the Chief, Field Operations will direct State activities at the State Torward Command Post. The Chief, Field operations staffed the JPIC. RECOMMENDATION: The 1985 State IPRA requires review to ensure that staffing procedures followed by the State reflect the legal responsibilities assigned in the State Plan. Qbiective #3: Demonstrate the ability to direct, coordinate and control emergency activities. The Chief,. Division of Training and Education fully demonstrated the ability to direct, coordinate and control emergency activities. The State EOC was partially staffed by the Acting Director, IESDA, the Nuclear Accident Reporting System (NARS) communicator, the PIO and the EOC Director. Four IDNS personnel arrived at the EOC at 1130. Staff from IDNS and IESDA were involved in all decisions regarding protective actions. Copics of the 1985 State plan and the 1990 Quad Cities plan were available and used throughout the 10

exercise. Message logs, status boards, activity logs were - maintained, reproduced and distributed to all participantc. The IDNS liaison was the only Illinois Stato person in the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF). He attended all briefings given by the utility. ' In addition, he attended briefings given by the Manager of Emergency Operations f or EOF management staf f. The liaison participated in the briefings and provided information on State activities regarding protective actions and technical , information coordination. The relationship between the State and the utility was good. A copy of the Stato plan was available however, it was used infrequently. A message log of phone calls and other activities pertinent to the exercise was maintained. The utility used an internal message system and the State received copies of all messages and other vital information from the utility. Protective action recommendations were developed at the REAC, however, the utility and IDNS EOF liaison participated in the decisions making process. Obiective #4: Demonstrate the ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel. , The State EOC fully demonstrated the ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel. The communication capability of the State EOC was extensive. The operations room had 20 telephone lines which were connected to telephones on the work tables for staff use. The telephones had three-way conference capability. Cellular telephones were operationally demonstrated from the JPIC, Rock Island and state vehicles to the State EOC in Springfield. The State Radio System was demonstrated as a alternate communications system when other systems were in use. The radio cystems included the ESDA State-wide band and FEMA FNARS. There was a portable ham radio in place but it was not demonstrated. Facsimile was used between the State EOC and the JPIC, Forward Command Post, IDNS and Rock Island and Whiteside Counties. The State NARS utilized dedicated telephone lines between the utility, State And Counties and other key off-site authorities. Communications traffic was established and maintained between the State and Counties and other key off-site authorities. Communications between State agencies was simulated. The flow of communications traffic was well coordinated with no disruptions. Some_ communications problems were encountered at the REAC. The roll-over feature on the phones did not work as expected which resulted in callers frequently getting busy signals. This problem was resolved by assigning callers to call in on designated phone lines. The Illinois State IDNS liaison located in the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) used commercial telephone for all his communication requirements. The EOF (utility operated) had conference 11

capability, telefax, and f acsimile equipmont that was available to the State. The IDNS liaison used the telephone for all his communications. lie had a cordless phone that he used whenever he was in the EOF. Thoro were sufficient phones and phone lines and no delays were encountored. The only back-up system available was a radio in the liaison's car which was part of a statewide 1DNS radio system. lie would have to go to his car to use it. All communication systems at the FCOC worked without problems during the exercise. phie_gli.y> #51 Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equipment, materials and displays. l The State EOC was adequately equipped to be self-sust U ing. The facility can operate with minimal outside support. Equipment supporting the living and work environments was appropriate. Access control was established by the Illinois State Police early in the implementation of emergency procedures. Status boards were : placed for easy viewing and conta:,ned current information. The , addition of new information was entered on the Status board within 1 ten minutes of it being received from the utility and offsite l authorities. The ECLs were posted on the status board along with l PARS and meteorological data. Updating took place as new information became available. Haps pertaining to the Quad Cities site along with other nuclear power plant planning zones were kept in the operations room. Quad Cities maps were available for staff use with the exception of the Quad Cities 50-mile ingestion zone. During the 1988 exercise, the 50-mile map was not available and was identified as an ARCA. The State response to the ARCA indicates the map was in the EOC. Durir.g this exercise the map was still not available for staf f use. The EOF was operated by the utility and was located south of Morrison, Illinois. The facility was fully equipped with office equipment, etc. The EOF was spacious, well ventilated, lighted, etc., and equipped for long term operations. Access to the EOF was controlled by utility security personnel. ' Identification was required to enter the building. The IDNS liaison had available to him all the maps and status boards the utility used, plus maps of evacuation routes, relocation centers, Ep2 planning areas, etc. Most of the maps have been updated between April 1988 and October 1990. AREA REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION The 50-mile ingestion zone map for Quad Cities was not available in the operations room. This was a repeat of an ARCA from 1988 exercise. The map is one of several maps expected to be available in the EOC for tracking ingestion activities. 12 -

     .. _ _ _ _ _ .                                        _.____________.m_____                                                         ____ _ _ _

f RECOMMENDATION: The 50-mile ingestion zone map for Quad Cition needs to be included in the EOC inventory of maps for the Byron exercise on April 3, 1991. Objective lot Demonst, rate the ability, within the plume exposure pathway, to project dosage to the public via plume exposure, based , on plant and field data. REAC demonstrated the ability to project dosage to the public via plume exposure based on plant and field data. The primary system i for dose projections Vas a computer program (MESOREM) with hand calculations used as a backup. Plant status information is provided through the Reuter Stokes monitors, and gaseous effluent monitor data which was provided through a computer link. Projected doses were also. compared with simulated field team data and dose projections were re-calculated as plant status changed. The , projected wind shifts were. considered.in the determination of the affected area. All functions and activities were implemented in

a manner consistent with IDNS procedures.

Dbiective lit Demonstrate -the abjlity to make appropriate I protective action decisions, based on projected or actual dosage,

   .                  EPA PAG's, availability of adequate shelter,                                                     evacuation time                  ,

estimates'and other relevant factors. The State -EOC demonstrated the_ ability to make appropriate protective action decisions following receipt-of recommendations from REAC. The initial PARS _ based on actual or projected doses were developed in Illinois REAC and transmitted to the State EOC for_ final decision-making. Protective action decisions were made with each change in ECLs. Protective action decisions were made : quickly- following several coordination discunsions with IDNS personnel located in the EOF. The Site Area Classification'with 4 a general information~ PAR was made in the EOC at 1120. The first General Emergency PAR.(Evacuate 0-2 miles radius, Shelter 2-5 mile radius, and Shelter in Garden plair., Newton and Erie townships) was

                    -made at 1212.                                  The upgraded. PAR (Evacuate 0-5 mile radius and in
                    ' Garden plain, Newton & Erie townships) was made at 1242. personnel inplemented all functions according to the State Emergency plan and implementing procedures, obiective 112 t-                                     Demonstrate the ability to initially alert the public within the 10-mile EPZ and begin dissemination of an-instructional message within 15 minutes                                                     of. a- decision by appropriate State and/or local official (s).

The ability to initially alert the public within the 10-mile EPZ > and begin dissemination of an instructional message within 15 - minutes of the decision was fully demonstrated by the State EOC personnel. The State EOC received notification of the first General -Emergency ECL with protective action recommendations at 13

1154. The NARS dispatcher verifio, he ECL with the utility at 1:05. The Chief of Operations made ts. % cision to f orward the PAR to the Counties at 1212. Thir. was Sent to Rock Inland and Whiteside Counties at 1216. protective action decisions were discussed with the State of Iowa, however, the sirens and EBS messages were not activated simultaneously. The State of Iowa would not wait for ID11S to verify data and concur with plant recommendations. Efforts were made to coordinate but were not effective. AREA REQUIRIllC CORRECTIVE ACTIOli The effort to coordinate siren and EBS activation with the State of Iowa was not effective. Illinois procedures do not contain adequate information to cause this to happen. RECOMMEllDATIOll: The States of Illinois and Iowa, and the utility should modify their plans and procedures to ensure that siren and EDS activation is coordinated. Q jective #13t Demonstrate the ability to coordinate the formulation and dissenination of accurate information and instructions to the public in a timely fashion after the initial alert and notification has occurred. The ability to continuously advise and inform the public with information and instructional messages was demonstrated at the State EOC. Protective action recommendations which were received from the utility were reviewed and evaluated by State EOC personnel. Based upon these analyses and projections, recommendations were developed and forwarded to the Counties for implementation. Early protective action recommendations were reviewed to assure continuous applicability as the plant situation continued to deteriorate. Decisions relative to evacuation and shelter were conservative in nature and were directed toward protection of the population as first priority. Objective #14 Demonstrate the ability to brief the media in an accurate, coordinated and timely manner. The objective to provide accurate and timely information to the media was met by the State of Illinois at the Joint Public Information Center (JPIC). Consultation and coordination between the utility, the State of Iowa and the State of Illinois produced accurate and coordinated information for media representative use in informing the public. During the exercise thrae media briefings were conducted at the JPIC, three Illinois press releases and four utility press releases were issued. The problems at the plant together with governmental actions being recommended to protect the public were described in 14

i detail. Protective actions recorronded by the State for County impicmentation vore described in geograpaic terms and detailed enough to assure understanding by the public. Adequate arrangements for the media representatives were in place. Inf ormation kits f rom the three major organi7ations represented in the JPIC were available and TV recordings of each media briefing were also availabic for record and information purposes. Technical assistance was provided between briefings to answer specific questions, arrange interviews or to clarity information provided in the briefings. One area that presented a problem was the roccipt and display of emergency classification levels. Because of the proximity of the Iowa and Illinois work areas the dif f erence in roccipt times of the ECLs was very obvious. For example Iowa received and posted the General Emergency ECL at 1153 while Illinois received and posted the same information at 1209. AREA RECOMMENDED TOR IMPROVEMENT There was considerable dif f erences in receipt times of ECLs between the States of Illinois and Iowa. The delay in information at one

     -  State would lead to uncoordinated inf ormation being released by the States.

RECOMMENDATION: ECL changes should be received by both States located in the JPIC without the delay encountered during this exercise. Obiective #15: Demonstrate the ability to establish and operate rumor control in s coordinated and timely fashion. Rumor Control impicment-tion was simulated at the JPIC. At 1110 contact was made with Illinois Bell to discuss establishing the rumor lines to the State EOC in Springfield. The subject was under discussion in Springfield, however, the order to establish the rumor lines vos not given prior to termination. Several rumors were received from the Counties and were included in two of the briefings. Although this objective was not of ficially demonstrated in this partial participation exercise, County originated rumors were part of JPIC media briefing 3. Obiellive #21: Demonstrate the adequacy of procedures, f acilities, equipment and personnel for the registration, radiological monitoring and decontamination of evacuocc. The Whiteside County, Illinois Registration Center located in the Morrison Community High School, Morrison, Illinois simulated the demonstration of the adequacy of the f acility and staf f to register evacuees. Since schools in the area were closed due to a snowstorm, the Whiteside County Emergency Services Coordinator cancelled all of the Ccunty's portion of the demonstration at the 15

1 high school. It was agreed by PEMA Region V and the EOC Coordinator to interview Red Cross and Health Department representatives at the The Red EOC on December 5 to describe registration procedures. Cross representative described the task of registration. consistent with the organization's All procedures appeared to be emergency plan. The State Radiological Team began arriving at the reception area at 0025 and the reception center won activated at 1014. 1DNS was responsible for the monitoring and decontamination of evacuees. two Tvo persons were available for registration of evacueos, one escort to personnel monitors to perform surveys of evacueos, take contaminated persons for decontamination, and one supervisor at the entrance. Another monitor was available to perform thyroid monitoring, and two personnel monitors (1 male and 1 female) for monitoring evacuees af ter decontamination. All monitors were fully suited in PC's, bootics, gloves and caps. Registration personnel recorded the evacuce's name, address, phone number and social security number. Evacuees were monitored utilizing the Eberline PRM-6 in approximately 1 to 2 minutes going over the front and back raf the body and the survey results entered on the registration form. In one case the proper monitoring technique for the feet was not used. " Clean" evacuees were sent If for thyroid taonitoring, which took approximately 30 seconds. sent to a a positive response was received the evacuee would be predesignated medical incility. Evacuees who were found contaminated were escorted to the shower facilities forEvacuees decontamination. There were were instructed to use10soap showers and for men water inand the women. were still showers, and monitored to determine if they contaminated. Cotton swabs were e'railable for cleaning the cars and nose if required. After three attempts in decontemination, if readings are above background, the evacuee is sent to a prodonignated medical facility. Upon successful decontamination (no reading above hackground), the evacuees were provided coveralls and sent for thyroid monitoring. Upon completion of thyroid monitoring the evacueos were sent to the Red cross in the reception center. Any contaminated clothing or possessions would be. put in later plastic bags, properly labeled, and stored for decontanination. The monitors were not familiar with the SOP B.2.D requiring 60-90 seconds f or each side of the body. If the 90 seconds f or each side of the body is used per evacuee, the two monitors in 12 hours could According to the SOP's, accommodate approximately 1400 persons. a person is cor%idered contaminated if the reading was above background for the (,.in and hair, and twice background f or clothing and personal el f er.ts. Monitoring evacueos according to these SOP's at the entranco t o the reception center woula be dif ficult, since the background ceeding was varying between 50-75 counts per minute 16 l

and the contrast from the skin and hair to clothing on'the evacuee would char.ge the reading drastically. All instrun.cnts were recently calibrated, however, the instrument used for thyroid monitoring did not indicate the Other voltage required instruments for in the calibration recoption ofcenter the sodium iodide did have stickers detector. indicating the required voltage. AREA REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION The monitors scanned the evacuees at too fast a scan rate, were not familiar with the SOP's, and in one caso did not use the proper technique in monitoring the feet. The monitors also did The not know monitors contamination levels when monitoring the evacuees. were trained to understand that the contamination levels are twice ' background. Additional training is required for the uenitors, RECOMMENDATION: being obtained will even though new portal monitoring equipmentPersonnel may be required to be clininate the initial monitoring. IDNS Procedure 4 SOP-backups to the portal monitoring equipment. 29 Rev. -06/90 page 8 states the contamination icyc1 for human skin and hair is any reading above background. Additional training in required to give personnel a more comprehensive Additional training is also understanding required with of contamination limits. emphasis on instrument response characteristics. , AREA RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT The high voltage setting for the SPA-3 probe used for the thyroid scans was not identified on the PRM-6 rate meter. The rate meter system uced for the thyroid scans, RECOKMENDATION: sodium-iodide probe, should i.e., the PRM-6 meter with the SPA-3 have the high voltage required identified on the side of the rate meter to ensure the correct setting. PLANNING ISSUES:

1. IDNS Procedure 4-SOP-29 Rev. 0 06/90 page 7 states This states th'at each the side is monitored in approximately 60-90 seconds. seconds which is probably not wha total time allowed is 120-180 was intended.

2. IDNS should reconsider the impact of the contamination icvel listed in IDNS Procedure 4-SOP-29 Rev. 0 06/90 page B which states the contamination level for human skin and hair is any reading For example, l above background and twice background for clothing. at-that level 50% of non-contaminated evacuees would be determined to be contaminated and directed to the decontamination showers. This unnecessary conservaths could tax the shower and clothing 17

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resourcer. In addition, the contrast from skin and hair to clothing on evacuees coming into the center would be difficult for the monitors to determine. Qb.if.EliY.g_JJJa Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equipment and personnel for congregate care of evacueos. The Whiteside County Relocation and Congregate care Center located in the Horrison Community High School, Morrison, Illinois simulated an out of acquence exercise and procedural walk through at the Whiteside County EOC. The procedures described by the County Red Cross Director were adequate to meet the requirements of the Relocation and Congregate Care facility. The Whiteside County EOC would notify the Red Cross of the need to activate the Congregate Care facility. The Morrison Police Department could provide three traffic control officers and two officers for internal security of the building. The Fire Department would provide emergency vehicles as required. Shelter personnel were aware of anticipated evacunes and could accept up to 1840 people. Any excess would be directed to other County schools. The f acility had cot and bunk locations designated and adequate sanitary f acilities were available to accommodate the shelter capacity. Drinking water, storage and parking -were sufficient. Regular food supplies to feed 5000 meals plus additional supplies would be available from local grocery stores. Handicapped evacuees could be taken care of using existing ramps and elevator. The Health Department provides crisis counseling. The Red Cross Nursing Station provides access to the Morrison Community Hospital, located three blocks from the high school. The hospital could be contacted by 9-Channel portable radio dispatched ambulances. Emergency phone numbers were available and radio communications with the Morrison police and Sheriff's Office insured public saf ety. Information from the EOC would be announced regularly to keep the evacuees informed. Registration and monitoring would be conducted at the same location. Qbiggliv,_e #2 51 Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equipment, supplies, procedures and personnel for decontamination of emergency workers, equipment and vehicles and for waste disposal. The State of Illinois assisted by the Morrison Fire and Police Departments, demonstrated the adequacy of facilities, equipment, supplies, procedures and personnel for decontamination of emergency workers, equipment and vehicles. The decontamination station was established at the Morrison High School and served evacuees as well as emergency workers. Police, signs and barricades were available to control traffic. Traffic was directed to a monitoring point, from which vehicle occupants could walk to the entrance of the facility. Vehicles 18 l

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l l i i could be monitored and, if clean, routed to a clean vehicle parking l area or released to proceed to other destinations. The " clean" l parking area was larger than two football fields. The evaluator i told the monitor of the location of contamination on a vehicle. , A recorder, assisting .the monitor, noted the location on a diagram l and had the driver pull the vehicle ahead on a route separate from I the one used for clean cars. Fire Department personnel directed the vehicle into posi;1on, l looked at the chart given them by the recorder and went through l decontamination procedures except for actually turning on the j water. Outside temperatures were at the freezing point and actual use of water for the exercise would have compounded icy conditions ; in the school parking lot. In an actual emergency, under these ' weather conditions, contaminated vehicles would be held for later decontamination. The fire apparacus was a pumper with 750 gallons of water and could have been connected to a near-by hydrant. The decontamination spot was near a run-off water drain. Af ter decontamination, the vehicle , would be routed to the clean parking area or released, and it would ) be monitored again. If it had been contaminated beyond the means of the team, it would have coen moved into the contaminated vehicle area which was about the size of a football field. Additional parking was available in the County Fair Grounds adjacent to the parking areas. The ;iver would then, have walked to the entrance of the personnel decontamination station. , Personnel performing monitoring, recording and decontamination were dressed in appropriate protective clothing and monitors were using instrumentation described in the plan. Instruments had been calibrated in November 1990. These personnel were knowindgeable of trigger levels for decontamination. Vehicle monitoring i techniques were as prescribed and scan speed (approximately 2 3/4 minutes) is within acceptable limits. 19 l

REAC The Radiological Ltergency Assessment Center (REAC) was located in the IDNS of fices in Springfield. The REAC was activated primarily to coordinate with, and provide information to, other locations to enable those locations to demonstrate their selected objectives. The REAC partially activated for this exercise and aluo provided training for some new IDNS personnel. The dispatcher received notification of the Unusual Event at 0842. He paged the REAC Commander following receipt of the NARS message. . The REAC Commander responded to the Communications conter and communicated with utility personnel regarding the incident. The inforlantion was then passed on to ESDA personnol Ior dissemination to the Counties. The dispatcher listened to the transmission to the Counties as a verification measure to ensure the message had been properly copied. At 0908, notification of the Alert was received. The same procedures were repeated again. The REAC commander instructed the . dispatcher to page the Reactor Analyst to report to the REAC. The Environmental Analyst and Executive Officer were activated 30 minutes later by the REAC Commander. When the State of Iowa notified REAC at 1017 that they were activating their EOC, the REAC Commander decided to activate the remaining REAC staff. At 1045, the REAC Commander briefed staff on the incident. All REAC staf f were in place at this time. At lill notification of the Site Area Emergency was received. REAC followed their procedures which specify minimum PARS based on plant and radiological conditions. They coordinated with the SEoc at thia time to recommend that milk producing animals be placed on stored feed. At 1157, notification of the General Emergency was received. The plant recommendations of shelter 0-2 miles and 2-10 miles downwind were changed several minutes later to evacuate 0-2 miles and shelter 2-10 miles downwind. Following coordination among the

      . REAC ,      SEOC,   and     Iowa,          the State of Illinois recommended the following PARS:         evacuate 0-2 miles, shelter 2-5 miles and shelter 5-10 miles downwind. Additionally, milk producing animals out to 10 miles were placed on stored feed.

Due to changing meteorological conditions and degrading conditions at the plant, the REAC, SEOC, and Iowa decided at 1225 to revise the PARS to be more conservative and evacuate 0-5 miles radially and evacuate 5-10 miles downwind. They also issued a recommendation for emergency workers and institutionalized populations to take KI. The utility concurred and issued a follow-up message at 1252, 20

During this exercise, IDNS demonstrated the ability to alert and activate personnel for both REAC and field based functions. Personnel were paged or telephoned at the appropriate ECLs and reported to the REAC or their field locations. IDNS had liaisons at the TSO, eof, SEoc, County Eoca, and State Forward Command Post. Hobilization of the RAFT was simulated and a PIO with support statt was sent to the JPIC. The RIAc Commander deoonstrated the ability to direct, coordinato and control emergency activities in the REAC. lie held periodic briefings and involved appropriate statf in decision making. lie and his staff effectively coordinated with all field locations and the State of Iowa. A copy of the Illinoin Plan for Radiological Accidents-Quad Cities Station, and the utility's amergency plan vero in the REAC for reference. The dispatchers kept meticulous activity logs to document their activities. The REAC Commander used a tape recorder to document activitico. In addition, all phone conversations were recorded. Some coumunications problems were encountered when the REAC was activated. The roll-over feature on the phonnu did not work as expected which resulted in callers f rnquantly getting busy signals. This problem van resolved by assigning callers to call in on designated phone lines. IDNS should consult with the local phone company to detcruins a ditforent cystem which would accommodate their needs. The REAC was a spacious f acility with adequate furnishings and equipment. The f acility was equipped with computers which are capable of monitoring plant systems, met data and radiological data, large monitor screens were displayed in the Eoc and updated promptly so all utntf could quickly assoso the current situation. An overhead projector screen also displayed the procedural flowchart for determining PARS based on plant and radiological data. The facility also had a 50-mile ingestion map and a monitoring points map on which overlays were placed to depict the affected area. An ARCA from the previous Quad Cities exerciso regarding the 50-mile ingostion map was cleared. The meteorological and radiological data was arinted out about every 15 minutes and faxed to the JPIC for une ,,n press brictings and answering rumor control inquiries. 21

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ROCK ISLAND COUNTY objective #1: Demonstrate the ability to monitor, understand and

 -use emergency classification levels (ECL) through the appropriate implementation of emergency functions and activities corresponding to ECLs as required by the scenario.                                                                      The four ECLs are:

Notification of Unusual Event, Alert, Site Area Emergency and General Emergency. The Rock Island County EOC staff demonstrated the ability to monitor, understand and use ECLs by implementing emergency functions and activitics as the nuclear incident escalated in seriousness. From notification of Unusual Event at 0908, through Alert at 0935 and Site Area Emergency at 1128, to General Emergency received at 1216, the EOC staff raised it's operational readiness I to meet the demands of the situation. Each ECL was promptly and prominently displayed in the Eoc. This posting, with an immediate announcement, and subsequent briefings every half hour, kept the staff aware of the current ECL. pp_iective #2t Demonstrate the ability to fully alert, mobilize and activate personnel for both facility and field-based emergency functions. Full alerting, mobilizing and activating of the EOC facility and operating staff were satisfactorily demonstrated. In accordance with the plan, the Sheriff's dispatcher began making telephone calls to alert the staff at 0944. Using current and correct call lists, the dispatcher completed calls by 2006. By 1030, the roc staff was activated; all were present excepting ene late arrival. Present in the EOC were the Rock Island County Board Chairman, the County ESDA Coordinator and his staff, many of whom were volunteers. Others included representatives of: Health; Regional Schools; Red Cross; IESDA; IDNS; Civil Air Patrol; Coroner; Highway; and the Sheriff's office. obiective #3: Demonstrate the ability to direct, coordinate and control emergency activities. Direction, coordination and control of emergency activities were positively demonstrated by the EOC leadership. Initially. the County ESDA Coordinator managed the emergency response; later, the Chairman of the County Board assumed direction of emergency operations. Both displayed dynamic leadership throughout all phases of the increasingly complex emergency. Throughout the emergency, the staff was involved in decision-making. Protective action decisions, and implementation of those decisions, were coordinated by the Eoc with the State EOC, Forward Command Post, Whiteside County EoC, and the participating municipalities within Rock Island - County's portion of the EPZ. Message logs were 22

_- - - _ - - _ . _ ~ . _ - _ - __ - -_- _ - . , _ _ - - - - - - . _ _ _ i maintained for incoming and outgoing messages and transmissionn; the messages were reproduced, logged, filed, and distributed through an officient internal message handling system. A copy of the plan was available for reference, and relevant functions and activities were implemented in a manner consistent with the plan and procedures. This demonstration of effective direction, coordination and control of emergency activities by the Eoc leadership, supported by a highly professional full-time and volunteer staff, ef fectively resolved an area requiring corrective , action from a previous exercise. I l ghiag_t.lve #4: Demonstrate the ability to communicate with all i appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel. ; Rock Island County demonstrated their ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations and field personnel. Within the EOC, 17 commercial telephone lines served the staff as

primary means of communications. Two of these lines were devoted to the facsimile machines, 12 to the Eoc staff and 3 for other administrative purposes. Radio systems in the EOC were commercial, amateur and citizen's band equipments and included hand-held units i used by. law enforcement and ESDA personnel. l l

The EOC had communications with the State EOC, the Regional ESDA l coordinator, the Whiteside County EOC, Mutual Aid Fire Departments, ambulances and, through the County Sheriff's Department, to local l police in the Quad cities area of Illinois and Iowa. RACES provides radio communication with the congregate care, reception and decontamination stations. There is a dedicated telephone line between the toc and the power plant and a (NARS) telephone in the EOC. In addition, an amateur TV club provides a television 31nk { from the EOC to WOC-TV station. Three computers with one telephone modem are available. A generator sufficient to power the EOC and the communications equipments and over 300 gallons of fuel for the generator are adjacent to the EOC. A mobile communications trailer containing many of the same radio capabilities was garaged at the EOC. Primary systems handled the communication flow throughout the exercise without failure. Back-up systems were functioning and ready in event of a primary system failure. There were no delays in traffic flow over the systems. I pbjtetive #51 Demonstrate _the adequacy of facilities, equipment, I materials and displays. l The Rock Island County EOC had sufficient space, furnishings, restrooms, ventilation and back-up power to support emergency operations. A typewriter and 3 computer word processors were available as well as 2 copiers. Kitchen equipment, cots and availability of catered food in the local area would allow long term emergency operations. Access to the facility was controlled 23

by locked doors and registration of all persons entering the facility. Maps posted in the Eoc included a topographical map, Quad Cities traffic control point map, sheltering and evacuation map, radiological monitoring point map, special facilities map and outdoor siren and watnAng map. ECLs, protective action decisions, and siren activations were posted in a timely manner. Although the ingestion pathway EPZ map was not displayed, the ARCA identified in the last exercise was corrected. This map was included in the IPRA -Quad Cities Plan. The county's copy was readily available. Qbiective #5_L Demonstrate the ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure. The ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure was satisfactorily demonstrated in Rock Island County. Each emergency worker in the EOC was provided with a dosimetry kit containing: one TLD, one 0-200R dosimeter, one 0-20R dosimeter, one vial of KI, instruction for the use of the dosimetry and KI and one personal log for recording dosimetry readings. Each of the County agencies and the local municipalities were provided the same kits for their personnel. The hits were distributed by a designated Dosincter Control officer (DCo) in each agency and municipality. A briefing accompanied the distribution of the kits at the EOC and each person was directed to zero his instruments and record the reading. The staff was also direct ~d to notify the DCO of any exposure over 3R. The DCO vould re % 'his exposure information to the State IDNS representative in the county EOC. 362 dosimetry kits have been distributed to Rock Island County agencies and municipalities. Relevant functions and activities were implemented in a manner consistent with the County's emergency plan and procedures. This exercise play effectively resolved an area requiring corrective action from a previous exercise. Obiective #12 Demonstrate the ability to initially alert the public within the 10-mile EpZ and begin dissemination of an instructional message within 15 minutes of a decision by appropriate State and/or local official (s). Rock Island County demonstrated this objective by receiving the NARS message from the SEoC; deciding to follow the Governor's recommendation selecting the appropriate EDS message; phoning the EBS radio station; reading the message to the station and having the siren sounded. The broadcast of the message and the sounding of the sirens was simulated. Coordination with Whiteside County took place. The sirens were sounded (simulated) at 1134 and then the message was broadcast (simulated) for residents within the plume v.PZ. The radio sution agreed to re-broadcast the message periodically. All of the actions were taken in accordance with the County's plan and procedures. 24

Demonstrate the ability to cocrdinate the gbfgg.t_ive - #13: and formulation and dissemination of accurate intorn'ation instructions to the public in a timely fashion after the initial alert and notification has occurred. The County demonstrated this objective by receiving the Governor's reconaended PAR over the llARS. The Board Chairman directed the This was done ESDA coordinator to contact the EDS radio station. by simulating the reading of the EBS message to the station and simulating %e sounding of the sirens. The second PAR was used to dec.nstrato this objective. The Governor's recommendation was rece!ved at 1242 and the station was phoned at 1245. The message was a prepared message located in the County's Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) 8. This message used familiar geo-political boundaries to describe the impacted areas. The broadcast of the message and the sounding of the sirens was closely coordinated with Whiteside County. The information provided was timely and copics were availablo to the EOC staff and a log was kept of those messages. The EOC had the capability to monitor the broadcasts. Copies of the message were f axed to the JPIC. All of these actions were in accordance with the County's plan and precedures. pliepily1 fl.u Demonstrate the ability to brief the media in an - accurate, coordinated and timely manner. The EOC staff's ability to brief news media in an accurate coordinated and timely manner was demonstrated at a 1300 news briefing by the Chairman of the RockCurrent, Island County Board accurate and and the timely ID!JS representative at the EOC. inf ormation, based on staf f discussions, EDS messages, and earlier operations briefings, was presented in the media briefing by the two officials, who avoided technical jargon and used familiar geographical landmarks describing the areas af f ected by protective action decisions. Maps were used to amplify briefing content; copies of EBS messages were available f or the media, who were directed to the JPIC f or formal news releases and media inf ormation kits. The briefings were thorough and presented in a small but adequate aret designated for press use. Both television and radio wer. monitorud to check the accuracy of information available to ths ..ablic, pbiective #15: Demonstrate the ability to establish and operate rumor control in a coordinated and timely fashion. Rock Island County officials discussed rumor control at the second staff meeting. All rumors were to be openly discussed and handled by the appropriate County agency or referred to the Joint Public Information Center. Immediate action was stressed. There were fifteen telephones in the facility which provided open lineswere for incoming and outgoing calls. lione of the telephones specifically for rumor control. Incoming calls vere directed to the County coordinator or County Commissioner. One press briefing 25

was given and several EBS messages were sent out to keep the public properly informed. State rumor control procedures call for rumors to be handled by the lowest level of government possible and this was accomplished. ,q h i t g M y e # 1 6 t_ Demonstrate the ability to make the decision to recomaend the use of KI to emergency workers, and institutionalized persons, based on predetermined criteria, as well as to distribute and administer it once the decision is made, if necessitated by radioiodine releases. Rock Island County officials concurred in the Stete's decision to recommend the use of KI for emergency workers, distributed it in accordance with the plan and recommended administration after an offsite release occurred and the General Emergency was declared. The decision did not apply to institutionalized populations since there are none in the 10-mile EPZ. The decision to recommend the use of-KI was made early at State level after the offsite release occurred and was based on projected thyroid doses. The decision was relayed to Rock Island County in a timely manner and KI was distributed agency. on an individual basis in sufficient quantity by each phic.etive #192 Demonstrate the ability and resources necossary te implement appropriate protective actions for the impacted permanent and transient plume EPZ population (including transit-dependent persons, special needs populations, handicapped persons and institutionalized persons). The ability and resources necessary to impicment appropriate protective actions for the impacted permanent and transit plume EPZ population was adequately demonstrated by the closely coordinated efforts of the Rock Island County Sheriff's department and the Rock Island County Health Department. A current listing of transit dependent individuals including special nends individuals and handicapped persons was available in the EOC. This listing was updated by the Emergency Services and Disaster Agency and the County Health Department. There were no institutions in the EPZ. At 1130 when the Site Area Emergency notification was received, the Sheriff's Department, anticipating a need for possible evacuation of these special need individuals, coordinated with the Health Department for the use of a bus with a special lift, two nurses and a driver to be .placed on standby. The Sheriff's Department checked with each municipality affected for last minute additions to the list. The Health Departmant representatives in the Eoc faxed the names and addresses of those to be picked up to the nurses staffing the bus. When evacuation was recommended at 1226, the Sheriff Department notified the affected individuals by phone, informing them that a bus from the Health Department, accompanied by a Sheriff Deputy would pick them up. Evacuation of these sixteen 26

individuals to the sheltei- was completed by 0200. Excellent coordination between the Sheriffs Department and Health Department was demonntrated. Relevant functions and activities impicmented were consistent with the emergency plan and procedures. DMap_tive #191 Demonstrate the ability and resources necessary to implement appropriate protectivo deticas for school children within the plume EPZ. This objective was demonstrated by an interview. The Superintendent, two Principals and the bus driver's nupervisor were present. Copies of procedures for the individuals present for the interview and the teachers and bus drivers wera availible during the interview. Bus drivers, if not at the school, would be phoned at their homes; where they keep the buses. The drivers report to the school where they are given their dosAmetry packets and the , shelter locations for the students. The sur rintendent is notified by the Begional Superintendent. He contaca the supervisor of the bus drivers and asks that the drivers be put on stand by. The Superintendent preparen to report te the Albany EOC if it in activated. He advises the school Principals to prepare for the evacuation of their students. If evacuation is ordered, the Principals execute their procedures. The teachers lead their students onto the buses. The buses then depart for the shelters. Qbiective #20 Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to control evacuation traffic flow and to control access to evacuated and sheltered areas. Rock Island County demonstrated its ability and resources necessary to control evacuation traffic flow and to control access to evacuated and sheltered areas. The County Sheriff's Department had approximately 45 officers to staff this function. During the exercise, out of sequence with the scenario events, one officer was dispatched into the EPZ to perform traffic control. He was issued a dosimetry kit that contained a CDV-742 0-200 mr dosimeter, a Dosimeter Corporation 622 0-20R dosimeter, a simulated TLD, a bottle of KI tablets, instructions f or the dosimeters and e record card (one blue and one yellow) for each dosimeter. The of ficer was knowledgeable and demonstrated the use of the instruments. This corrects an ARCA noted during the previous exercise. Enroute to the area, he was directed by the EOC over two-way radio to establish traffic control point RI-90. *?e consulted a quick reference sheet, which did not list RI-to. He discarded the c.heet and referred to his copy of the Sop, turned to the page listing the locations of all the control points and identified RI-90. He then referred to a detailed area map tu explain the location to the evaluator. Having these materials available in his car and being knowledgeable of them corrects an ARCA identifled in the previous 27

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l i 1 exercise. !!o was awaro that nearby traffic control posts (TCP) would be staffed by other law enforcement officers. 7ho Deputy know areas could bo either evacuated or sholtored and the locationn of possible reception centers and evacuation routes toward the l contors. While stopped at the TCP, he evplained the meQod of using his vehiclo and lights to block the road. Due to the unplowed snow on the road, this inadvortently blocked one car momentarily. The l of ficer would have radiced for wreckers to remove stalled vehicles and pointed out that nearby farmers would provide their tractors, if rec unstod. He was aware that traf fic could bn re-routed through coordLnation with the EOC. I 2B

WHITESIDE COUNTY Obiettive #1: Demonstrate the ability to monitor, understand and use emergency classification IcVels (ECL) through the appropriate implementation of emergency functions and activities corresponding to ECLs as required by the ccenario. The four ECLs are: Notification cJ Unusual Event, Alert, Site Area Emergency and General Erergency. Whiteside county fully demonstrated their understanding and use of ECLs. The staff at the EOC were kept aware of the current ECL through briefings and by a modern ECL status board prominently displayed for all staff members to see. The staff received the notification of Vnusual Event at 0908, 1.lert at 0935, Site Area Emergency at 1128 and the General Emergency at 1216. The notifications were verified and the key staff advised by the dispatcher at the Sheriff's Officer prior to the activation of the EOC. Obiretive #2: Demonstrate the ability to fully alert, mobilit.c an/. activate personnel for both f acility and field-based emergency functions. The ability to alert and activate personnel was fully demonstrated. Af ter each notificacion of an ECL change, the Sherif f's dispatcher, following written procedures, would ncitify the County ESDA Director, and other key staff members and offsite response organizations. At the Alert ECL some staf f members reported to the EOC tc begir the initial activation. At the Site Area ECL, all key staff reported to the EOC. All positions, as stated in the plan, were filled at the EOC. The staff was noLitied by telephone using a current call-out list. This c' rret t; an AhCA frcm the phst exercise. Staff was not dispatch i to other facilities or locations from the County ECC. 2biective #3: Demonstrate the ability to direct, coordinate and control cmergency activities. Direction and control of emergency activities was effectively and smoothly conducted by the Director and staf f. Although the Director was new in his position, he was ably assisted by his deputy and other experienced staf f personnel. Good, clear, detailed briefings to the staff were conducted periodically and whenever important changes occurred. Staff members were competent and provided input in several areas of decision making. A copy of the emergency plan was available. -Message logs were maintained for all incoming and outgoing messages, which were immediately reproduced and distributed. The internal message-handling system worked smoothly ano a recorrl was kept cf all messages. Suf ficient secretarial and administrative assistance was available and thereby eliminated 29 l l

a previous ARCA. Protective action decisions were made and implemented and staff members were reminded of the various actions that had to be taken tu effectively coordinate with other appropriate organizations. Obiectivo #41 Demonstrate the ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel. The communications systems Dmetioned well, without problems or delays. The primary means of coaununication was the telephone. The main radio system consisted of the police two-way communications net within the Sheriff's Department. RACES, within the EOC complex, provided continuous radio contact. A facsimile machine was also available. The EOC maintained communication links with IESDA, Pock Island County EOC, State Police, other RACES, and county wide organizations [e.g. police, fire, and highway departments). The backup system, which was in the Sheriff's Department, was not specifically demonstrated, since it stays in continuous operation. Obiective #5 Demonstrate the adequacy of Oacilities, equipment, materials and displays and other materials to support emergency operations. The Whiteside County EOC was located outside the 10 mile EPZ in the lower level of the County's new Administrative Building. The EOC was partially funded through FEMA's EOC Program and therefore meets FEM.s requirements concerning EOC's. The County EOC contained

 .suffiafent space, equipment, lighting, etc. for workers to perform their tasks. The EOC was equipped with all necessary amenities, such as restrooms, kitchen f acilities and sleeping accommodations.

Access to the facility was controlled by Law Enforecaent personnel and ID's were issued and required for access to the EOC. The County complex maintains a bark up power supply [ generator) to provide for both the EOC and the Sheriff's Deputy Dispatch Center should it be needed. All required maps were updated and located appropriately on the walls for easy _ viewing and reference. ECL's and protective action recommendations were immediately placed on the County's new " Lighted Status Board". Two new datafax machines were prerent. Although one did not function, the second machine performed properly and a previous ARCA concerning the faxing of messages from the EOC to the JPIC is corrected. 30

l I Obiectlye #6 Demonstrate the ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure. The demonstration of this objective got of f to a slow start as the person assigned the responsibility of distribution dosimetry was found to lack the knowlt dge of how to "'oro" the dosimeter, lacked the knowledge of the authorized exposure (3R) and did not know how to set up a dosimeter charger. After questioning this person jt was found he had just been assigned the " distribution" duties for the day of the exercise. To his credit he quickly found a person with good radiological knowledge who provided a quick briefing in dosimetry procedures. The briefing included the function of the dosimeter charger and the process of charging and zeroing the dosincters. Following this brief instruction period this person did set up the dosimeter charger, "zerced" all the dosimeters issued to the EOC staff, logged out and in all dosimeter kita in a most satisf actory manner. However, in view of the f act that this was a "one day" assignment for this exercise it is obvious that someone must be trained to handle those responsibilities on regular basis. In spite of the problem outlined above it was evident that Whiteside county has established an excellent system for ensuring

   . that emergency workers receive the proper instructions and dosimetry in an efficient and timely manner.                                                                                           As the new members of the EOC team                                      receive training and gain experience this radiolegical distribution system will be one of the strengths of the Whiteside County emergency operation.

The Sergeant frce the Whiteside County Sheriff Department who demonstrated the establishment of a Traffic Control Point, was equipped with a TLD, a 0-20R dosimeter and a 0-200R dosimeter. The officer had charged and zeroed the dosimeters before setting out to accomplish his mission. He carried instructions for the use of the dosimeters and an exposure record. He was aware of the need to read and record the 30 minute dosimeter readings. He was also aware that 3R was the authorized exposure without authorization from the EOC to incur exposure in excess of EPA PAG's. He also Knew what to do if he received an exposure higher than authorized. He felt confident he could protect himself with the use of his radiological instruments. Objective 6 was met with each emergency worker (bus driver) to be equipped with a kit consisting of instructions for use of the instruments, exposure record card, a 0-20R dosimeter, a 0-200R dosimeter, a TLD and a bottle of KI tablets with instructions. Each bus is equipped with 2-way radio a31owing the bus driver to report higher than authorized exposures and to request authorization to incur exposures in excess of EPA PAG's. Thc driver interviewed was also aware of the 3R authorized exposure. 31 l, _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ . ______._-_.m_ _ . _ - . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . __ _ _ _ _ _ a_____

The district has enough kits to equip all their drivera. The driver interviewed demonstrated the knowledge to charge (zero) the instruments bef ore distributing the kits. Bus drivers had received training in the use of Dosimetry two years age. They had not received any retraining since that time. AREA REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION The necessity for a well trained person to handle the distribution of dosimeters to emergency workers is a requirement for Whiteside County. In this exercise an unqualified person was assigned the duty of preparation and distribution of dosimetry for the EOC in staff. His lack of knowledge caused considerable delay distribution of charged and zerood dosimeters to EOC personnel. RECOMMENDATION: The present Dosimetry Control Officer, assigned to the EOC, should receive training in the preparation, use and distribution procedures of dosimetry to avoid the need to use unqualified personnel for these duties as in this exercise. AREA REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION The last training in the use of dosimetry for bus drivers was two years ago. RECOMMENCATION: Annual refresher training is required per NUREG 0654 Standard 0.5. Obiective #12t Demonstrate the ability to initislly alert the public within the 10-mile EPZ and begin dissemination of an by instructional message within 15 minutes of a decision appropriate State and/or local official (s). This objective was met. At 1216 Whiteside County received NARS message #4 from IESDA containing a General Emergency ECL, a PAR to extend putting milk producing animals on stored feed and protected water from 0-2 to 0-10 miles, to evacuate 0-2 miles radius, shelter 2-5 miles radius and shelter 5-10 miles in Garden Plain, Erie and Newton Townships. Whiteside County verified the message with IESDA at 1219, sounded the sirens in coordination with Rock Island County at 1225 and immediately followed this with a prescripted EBS message being read to the EBS station at 1226. At 1225 the Sheriff's Department Captain in the EOC simulated sending officers on predetermined routes within the affected townships to announce the same information that was transmitted over the EBS. 32 l

Demonstrate the ability to coordinate the Qbiective 413: dissemination of accurate information and formulation and instructions to the public in a timely fashion after the initial alert and notification has occurred. Whiteside County EOC personnel adequately demonstrated the procedure to coordinate the formulation and dissemination of follow-up informational and instructional messages to the public after the initial alert and notification had occurred. At 1242, Whiteside County received a NARS message from IESDA containing a General Emergency ECL and a PAR to extend the evacuation in the affected townships to 10 miles and to recommend that Emergency workers and immobile populations take KI. Whiteside County verified the message with IESDA at 1244, activated their sirens at 1250 and began dissemination of their prescripted EBS message at 1252. This.EBS message was also faxed to the JPIC for their use, information and dissemination. This second EBS message sent f rom Whiteside County transmitting the PAR contained in IESDA's NARS message 64 was prepared by the County PIO, in accordance with the County plan. The PIO used the correct in prescripted EBS message when calling the EBS station but, reading the message, he lef t out the townships included in the PAR. He immediately realized his omission and issued a corrected message to the EBS station. In addition, the route alerting officer had already read the proper information over loud speakers in the affected townships. All messages were given to the County ESDA Director / Sherif f for his initials before being disseminated from Lne EOC. AREA REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION The second EBS message sent from Whiteside County transmitting the PAR contained in IESDA's NARS message #4 was prepared by the county PIO, in accordance with the County plan. The PIO used the correct in prescripted EBS message when calling the EBS station but, reading the message, he lef t out the townships included in the PAR. RECOMMENDATION: Additional training of.the PIO in the use of the EBS message system is needed. Objective #14: Demonstrate the ability to brief the media in an accurate, coordinated and timely manner. The media was adequately briefed by the County PIO. The PIO for Whiteside County provided two briefings to the " media", one at 1330 and one at 1345 in the County Board Room. The PIO was assigned to the Whiteside County EOC and had access to current, accurate and timely infnrmation and used prescripted information for theThe media PIO briefings authorized by the Whiteside County EOC Director. 33

provided accurate, responsive information to the media in a prompt manner with accurate information on the protective action recommendations for the public described in terms of familiar landmarks and boundaries for af fected planning areas without using technical jargon. The PIO used maps effectively showing the evacuation routes, provided copies of news releases to the media in a timely manner, and maintained a log of information provided to the media with copies of all roleases kept and accessible to all staff. The PIO maintained sufficient contact with decision makers to keep abreast of current events, however, did not have a radio or television to keep track of information to the public. The Plo did not provide kits to the media, but indicated kits would be available in future briefings. AREA RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT The PIO did not have a radio or television to monitor information to the public. RECOMMENDATION: A radio or television should be made available to the PIO to };eep track of information provided to the public. obicetive #1st Demonstrate the ability to establish and operate rumor control in a coordinated and timely fashion. The rumor control cyoten in the EOC adequately functioned through the PIO, who used his telephone as the designated rumor control number. Thia number was publicized through periodic press briefings conducted by the PIO. Several rumors occurred during the l exercise, whereby input and response was provided by various other l staff members. Although rumors were limited, they were handled l without confusion, and coordination was maintained with the JPIC, who was informed of rumor incidents. The PIo continuously stayed abreast of current, accurate and timely ir % ation from other staff Derbers, the Sheriff's departur..a., and other public information sources. The rumor control rtatf provided rapid response information to callers, after authorization for release by the EOC Director. Obiective #16: Demonstrate the ability to make the decision to recommend the use of KI to omargency workers end institutionalized persons, based on predeternined criteria; os well as to distribute and administer it once the decision is made, if necessitated by radiciodine releases. This objective was adequately demonstrated in the Whiteside County l o EOC. The instruction to use KI was received at 1240 for emergency workers and institutionalized populations. The decision to recommend KI for special populations was based on a projected dose to the thyroid on the basis of FDA PAG's. The emergency workers in the County were informed of this decision at 1255. There wora no institutice.alized persons to be informed in the County. KI had 34 1

l previously boon distributed at 1230 [ simulated) to emergency workers in suf ficient quantities and they followed the instructions given by the authorized officials, with the date, time, and dose for the use of KI recorded for each individual. The official in charge of KI in the Whiteside County EOC was new at the job, and was not familiar with KI, but did obtain the proper information from the staff at the EOC. AREA REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION The official in charge of KI in the Whiteside County EOC was not completely familiar with KI, its use and effects on persons allorgic to KI. RECOMMENDATION: Provide additional training on all aspects of KI to the official to te in charge of KI for the County. Qbjective #18: Demonstrate the ability and resources necessary to implement appropriate Protective Acticns f or the impacted permanent and transient plume EPZ population (including transit-dependent persons, special needs populations, handicapped persons and institutionalized persons). Whiteside County demonstrated appropriate and timely actions, measures, and support for the special groups. The County Health Department was responsible for the special needs and handicapped persons in the County. No institutions are located in the County. The Health Department kept an up-to-date list of these special groups and started evacuation of these groups at 1155 [ simulated) and completed at 1230, utilizing telephone calls, radio and TV to inform individuals with transportation provided by personal vehicles, buses, and ambulances throvgh the Fire Department to appropriate relocation centers. The Sher 3ff's Department was utilized to personally notify all individuals that were hard of hearing to evacuate [ simulated). The resources were adequate for the special groups. ppjective #19: Demonstrate the ability and resources necessary to implement appropriate Protective Actions for school children within the plume EPZ. This ability was demonstrated by an interview conducted with the District Superintendent, Albany Elementary School Principal, the bus dispatcher and a bus driver. The District Superintendent described his chain of communication by telephone to the schools and the bus dispatcher in his district. The Principal indicated that upon notification that evacuation had been ordered, his teachers would be notified to prepare their classes to board the busses in accordance with the printed Albany Grade School Evacuation Procedures. 35 I

These procedures call for the use of 5 busses with one teacher on one bus and two teachers on each of the other four busses. These procedures set forth the class order of dismissal, bus assignment and teacher responsibility. All busses have 2-way radio capability and all drivers are experienced in the use of these radios. The bus drivers are from the vicinity and are familiar with the routes to be used for evacuation along with the location of reception centers. The average bus drivers response to the school is approximately 20 minutes. Each bus was equipped with a copy of the Quad Cities Emergency Information 'acket, which included a map outlining all possible destinations. Each bus is also equipped with an emergency kit containing a TLD, 0-20R dosincter, 0-200R dosimeter, instruction cards for the instruments, exposure record cards, and a bottic of KI tablets. When questioned, the bus driver gave, with some difficulty, the correct a9thorized exposure (3R) and the procedures to be used and who to notify to receive an exposure higher than the 3R administrative limit. The driver also gave correct answers to questions concerning the use of KI. The driver had dif ficulty recalling limits and procedures that are usually covered during initial or annual training in these fundamentals. The driver had not been to a class on dosimetry for approximately two years but was able to recall the basics needed to perform his role. In checking training records from IDNS, training was offered to the bus drivers as evidenced by a copy of a letter dated October 15, 1990 sent by IDNS to the Riverbend School District Superintendent. The bus driver as well as the bus dispatcher had not been informed of the upcoming training and therefore did not receive annual training. The District Superintendent felt confident that they would be able to evacuate their 250 students schooled within the EpZ. Shelter procedures were also discussed with the Superintendent and Principal and both were knowledgeable about sheltering activities. AREA REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION When interviewed, the bus driver had difficulty remembering the authorized exposures, the ranges of his two dosimeters (0-20R, 0-200R) and the instructions concerning taking KI. The driver had not been to a class on dosimetry for approximately two years but was able to recall the basics needed to perform his role. In checking training records from IDNS, training was offered to the bus drivers as evidenced by a copy of a letter dated October 15, 1990 sent by Whiteside County ESDA to the Riverbend School District Superintendent. The bus driver as well as the bus dispatchet had not been informed of the upcoming training and therefore did not receive annual training. 36

i RECOMMENDATION: NUREG-0654 0.5 requires that Emergency Workers including the bus drivers serving the Albany Grade School receive initial and refresher training on their protective equipment annually, gbiective #20: Demonstrate the organizational ability to and resources necessary to control evacuation traffic flow and to control access to evacuated and sheltered areas. The Whiteside County Sheriff's Department Sergeant successfully demonstrated this objective. The EOC staf f representatives f rom the State police and Whiteside Sheriff's Department and County highway department simulated the deployment of personnel and equipment to pre-assigned locations. One actual deployment was directed by the Sheriff's Department as a demonstration. The FEMA evaluators selected the TCP to be established and during the 18 minutes it took to travel the 14 miles to this location, the of ficer displayed accurate knowledge of his role in protective actions, planning areas and special f acilities evacuated, evacuation routes, location of relocation centers and access control. SOPS concerning these actions and related maps were available in his vehicle. Upon arrival at the location for the TCP he demonstrated the actions

 ,     necessary to establish the TCP and his method of communication with the EOC. The officer was confident of his actions, gave correct answers to the questions asked him by the evaluators and demonstrated a rapid establishment of a Traffic Access Control Point.

3i l

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SUMMARY

OF EXERCISE FINDINGS I i 38

~.

Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station Exercise Findings December 5, 1990 Deficiencies There were no deficiencies identified for the State of Illinois or Rock Island and Whiteside Counties during this exercise. 9 39

Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station Exercise Findings December 5, 1990 Areas Requiring Corrective Action STATE OF ILLINOIS OBJECTIVE #2 MOBILIZATION OF EMERGENCY PERSONNEL NUREG Item NARRATIVE STATEMENT OF WEAKNESS fil The Cor.munications operator incorrectly filled out the first two NARS forms. The information could A.2.a have advanced the ECLs prematurely and could have response emergency resulted in premature a history of .impro,ccr _ activities. There is handling of NARS from previous exercises and the problem continues. Training of communications operators is necessary prior to the Byron exercise. Schedule Date: April 3, 1991-Corrective Action: This ARCA was corrected during the April'3, 1991 Byron Exerciso. 40

   -        _. .  .- .-      --.    -- ~         - - . . ~ . _ _ _ - . . - . . - _ . . -     --.

Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station Exercise Findings December 5, 1990 Areas Requiring Corrective Action i STATE OF ILLINOIS 1 OBJECTIVE #2 MOBILIZATION OF EMERGENCY PERSONNEL NUREG Item NARRATIVE STATEMENT OF WEAKNESS A.2.a The IPRA - State Plan specifies the State PIO will be deployed to the designated JPIC. The PIO i remained in the State EOC throughout the exercise. The plan also specifies that the Chief,- Field Operations will direct State activities at the State Forward Command Post. The Chief, Field Operations staffed the JPIC. . The 1985 State plan requires review to ensure that staffing procedures reflects the legal responsibilities assigned to the State plan. Schedule Date: u ective Action: a revision to the IPRA-State. General Plan has been drafted. This draft was implemented successfully during the April 3,_1991 Byron exercise. The revision will be finalized-as-soon as possible. 1 41 4

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Quad Cities Nuclear Power Stativn Exercise Findings December 5, 1990 Areas Requiring Corrective Action STATE OF ILLINOIS OBJECTIVE #5: FACILITIES, EQUIPMENT AND DISPLAYS NUREG Item NARRATIVE STATEMENT OF WEAKNESSES H.3 The 50-mile ingestion zone map for Quad Cities was not available in the operations room. This was a repeat of an ARCA from the 1988 exercise. The map is one of several maps expected to be available in the EOC for tracking ingestion activities. The 50-mile ingestion zone map for Quad cities needs to be included in the EOC inventory of maps for the Byron exercise on April 3, 1991. Schedule Date: April 3, 1991 Corrective Action: This ARCA was corrected during the April 3, 1991 Byron exercise. 42

l Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station Exercise Findings December 5, 1990 Arcas Requiring Corrective Action STATE OF ILLINOIS OBJECTIVE #12: INITIAL ALERT NOTIFICATION / PUBLIC INSTRUCTIONS and #13 NUREG Item NARRATIVE STATEMENT OF WEA}31ESS E.5/E.6 The effort to coordinate siren and EBS activation with the State of Iowa was not effective. Illinois procedures do not contain adequate information to cause this to happen. The States of Illinois and Iowa, and the utility should modify their plans and procedures to ensure that siren and EBS activatien is coordinated. Schedule Date: Corrective Action: As the report states, protective action decisions were discussed with the State of Iowa. The State of Illinois cannot control the timing of siren and EBS activation in the State of Iowa. Nor can Iowa control activities in Illinois. In the future, protective action discussions will continue. This ARCA should be withdrawn. FEMA RESPONSE: The State of Illinois and FEMA Region 5 personnel met July 15, 1991 to discuss the coordination of information problem which exsists between Illinois and Iowa. We agreed to begin addressing this issue with the State of Iowa and FEMA Region 7 following the release of this report. 43

I Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station Exercisc rindings December 5, 1990 Arcas Requiring Corrective Action STATE Or ILLINOIS RELOCATION CENTERS-REGISTRATION, MONITORING OBJECTIVE #21:

                  & DECONTAMINATION NUREG Item       NARRATIVE STATEMENT OF WEAKNESS J.12/O 5         The monitors scanned the evacuees at too fast a scan rate, were not familiar with the SOP's, and in one case did not use the proper technique in monitoring the feet.                     The monitors also did not know the contamination levels when monitoring the evacueos.

Personnel raay be required to Additional be backups to the training portal nonitoring equipment. is required to give personnel a more comprehensive Additional - understanding of contamination limits. emphasis on training is also required with instrument response characteristics. Schedule Date; october 9, 1991 Corrective Action: IDNS has initiated training for its radiological nonitoring staf f. Additional This initial training took place in February, 1991. training will be conducted later in the year. Personnel involved with the drill for the 1991 Drescen exercise will demonstrate _ thorough knowledge of the procedures. 44

i l Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station Exercise Findings December 5, 1990 Areas Requiring Corrective Action ROCK ISLAND COUNTY No Areas Requiring Corrective Action were identified during this exercise. b 45

Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station Exercise Findings December 5, 1990-Areas Requiring Corrective Action WHITESIDE COUNTY l l OBJECTIVE 16 EMERGENCY WORKER EXPOSURE CONTROL NUREG Item NARRATIVE STATEMENT OF WEAKNESSES j

            - 0.5                      The necessity for a well trained person to. handle                                                  !

the preparation and distribution of dosimeters to j emergency workers is a requirement - for Whiteside - ! County. In this exercise, an unqualified . person was assigned- the duty of ' preparation and

                                      ' distribution Of dosimetry for the-EOC staff.                                      His

- lack of knowledge- caused considerable delay in dosimetry distribution to EOC personnel. The present Dosimetry Control Officer, assigned to the

                                      -EOC,      should- receive                  training               in   dosimetry procedures to avoid-- the need to use -unqualified
                                      . personnel for these duties, as in this exercise.

Scheduled Dato: Corrective-Action: Due to-elections less than one month before the exercise, a number of key. county players.-were new to their : duties. The _ Dosimetry Control 'Of ficer' - (DCO) will be offered appropriate DCO _ training according to established training schedule.s. It should be noted

            - that the Whiteside County EOC is well outside the 10-mile '. EPZ ,

obviating-any routine need to issue dosimetry for EOC participants. i-o 46

 .    ~ . -           .:.--_---..-.--.-.-.

Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station Exercise Findings December 5, 1990 Areas Requiring Corrective Action i OBJECTIVE #6 EMERGENCY WORKER EXPOSURE CONTROL l l NUREG Item NARRATIVE STATEMENT OF WEAKNESS 0.5 The last training for bus drivers in the use of I dosimetry was two years ago. Annual refresher i training is required per NUREG 0654 Standard 0.5.

Schedule Date: January 9, 1991

                          .                                                                                            I Corrective Action:

Training was of fered to the Riverbend School District in 1990. The offer-was made by letter through the Whiteside County ESDA Office. A copy of the offer letter was made available to FEMA during the week of the exercise. Training for the school district was subsequently-scheduled and conducted on January 9, 1991. 47

Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station Exercise Findings-December 5, 1990 Areas. Requiring Corrective Action I WHITESIDE COUNTY-

         . OBJECTIVE #13               ALERT, NOTIFICATION & EMERGENCY INFORMATION
                                     .PUBLIC INSTRUCTIONS i

NUREG Item NARRATIVE STATEMENT OF WEAKNESS E.7 The second EBF message sent-from Whiteside County transmitting the PAR contained in IESDA's NARS-

                                    -message #4 was prepared by the County PIO. . The PIO-used the correct prescripted EBS message 'when calling the EBS station but'in reading the message he lett out the' townships included in'the PAR.

Additional training of the PIO in the use of the EBS nessage system is needed. Schedule'Date: 1991.

          . Corrective Action:

Training--will be provided to the Whitesido County PIO. This , training will emphasize the use of the EBS message system. h E 48 _ _ _ . . . _ . _ _ . _ . - . _ _ . _ . _ . . . _ . _ _ . . .. ~ __ _ _ _ . _ __. _ _ . _ . _ . _ . . _ . - . -

 .   .-     . - . .         . . . . _ -          .~     .

i V W Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station l Exercise Findings ! December 5, 1990 ' Areas Requiring Corrective Action ; 1 WHITESIDE COUNTY OBJECTIVE #16 USE OF KI NUREG Item NARRATIVE STATEMENT OF WEAKNESS 0.5 The official in charge of KI in the Whiteside County EOC was not completely familjar with KI, its use and effects on. persons allergic. to. KI. Provide additional training on all aspects of KI to the

                    . official-to be in charge of .*1 for.the County.
 --Schedule Date:
 . Corrective Action:

Due to elections less than one month before the exercise, a number

 - of-key _. County players.were new to their-duties.                           County officials
 . will be offered training on all aspects of KI as.-part of their normal training, in accordance with established training schedules.

1 e 4 49

                      .                          .. --.         . . . -       .       ~  _    . _ - . . . ,           .

  . _ _ _ _ _ . _ - . . _ _ . __     .  ,_- -     _      . _ _ _ _ _ . _ .    -     -_...-m        _._...m.._
                                      ' Quad Cities Nuclear Power-Station Exercise Findings December 5, 1990 Areas' Requiring Corrective Action                                          -;

WHITESIDE COUNTY i OBJECTIVE'#19 IMPLEMENTATION OF PROTECTIVE ACTION-EVACUATION.0F SCHOOLS NUREG Item NARRATIVE STATEMENT OF WEAKNESS 0.5 When interviewed, the bus driver had difficulty remembering the authorized exposures, the ranges of-his two' dosimeters; (0-20R, 0-2OOR) and the instructions concerning taking KI. The driver had-Enot been to a class on dosimetry for approximately two-years but was able to recall the basics needed to perform his role. In checking training records-from IDNS, training was offered to the bus--drivers as evidenced by a copy of a letter dated October 15, 1990 sent by IDNS to the.Riverbend School District Superintendent. The bus driver as well as the bus

                                    -dispatcher had not been informed Lof the upcoming training and therefore did not receive                        annual-training. NUREG-0654 0. 5 requires that emergency workers including the bus drivers serving the Albany Grade School' receive initial and refresher training on their protective equipment annual 3y.

Schedule Date: January-9, 1991 Corrective Action: See. Objective #6, page 47-P 50 i e c ~ _ , -- a

                                                                                                                                                               .I Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station Exercice Findings                                                                                              !

December 5,-1990 l Areas Recommended For Improvement l STATE OF ILLINOIS Obiective 14: There Uas considerable difference in receipt times-of ECLs between ; the States of Illinois and Iowa. The delay in.information at one State could lead to uncoordinated information being released by the- ' States. . ECL changes should be received by both States located in the JPIC without the delay encountered during this exercise. i obiective 21: The high~ voltage setting for the SPA-3 probe used for the thyroid scans wac not identified on the PRM-6 rate meter. The rate meter system used for the thyroid scans-I.E., the PRM-6 meter with the SPA-3 sodium-iodide probe, should'have the high voltage required identified on tha' side of the rate meter to ensure the correct Fetting. ll l l l-51 4 or, , --, e - - r,-, , . . , , , , , , ,.,,,,,rw-, ..-,,mv-w..,,,-me. 1-v, , , , - , - - - , - .-- r--e,,.+

Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station Exercise Findings December 5, 1990 Arca." Recommended For Improvement ROCK ISLAND COUNTY No Areas Recommended For Improvement were identified during this exercise. 4 52

Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station Exercise Findings December 5, 1990 , Areas Recommended For Improvement ] l WHITESIDE COUNTY l Obiective 14: The PIO did not have a radio or television to monitor information to the public. A radio or television should be made available to the PIO to keep track of infcrmation provided to the public. ! l l O 53

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ATTACHMENT I EXERCISE EVALUATORS 4 54

I o i

     *.*.4-.
       ..e     ,
     *1 '4 EXERCISE EVhLUATOR ASSIGNMENTS
       'sh:;

MFWf! EXERCISE DIRECTOR - Dan Bement p391 - '

        "YIb " '                              STATE OF ILLINOIS
     't?b"? "l '
    ' . A F"
                 '-                                                    EVALUATOR STATE-EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER Marcia Smith' ADDRESS:   110 East Adams Street Springfield, IL                    -    Gordon Wenger                                ;

CONTACT: PHONE /t 217/782-7860 (JPIC) Jim Sutch ! ADDRESS: COMMONWEALTH EDISON EOF j 14439 Crosby Rd. (SR 78) i Morrison, Illinois CONTACT: Dave Smith , PHONE #: 815/1772-3113 l 1 EMERGENCY' OPERATIONS FACILITY (EOF) - Frank Wilson -l j ADDRESS: COMMONWEALTH EDISON 14439 Crosby Rd. (SR 78) i Morrison, Illinois j l CONTACT: Paul Sereg PHONE /:. 815/772-3113 ADDRESS: Illinois Department of- - Deb Foutch ' Nuclear Safety 1035 Outer Park Drive l Springfield, Illinois CONTACT: Andrea Pepper PHO:!E #: l 217/785-1990 l l l l l

1 1 l ROCK ISLAND COUNTY ROCK ISIAND COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPT; ADDRESS: Rock Island, Illinois CONTACT: PHONE #: 217/' COUNTY EOC - BOB LAIRD FEMA ADDRESS:- 6120.78th Avenue - ED HAKALA ANL Milan,_IL - CLARA G-BROWN FEMA

                                                                                   -       RICK ANTHONY CPR
         - CONTACT:         Dave DeBarre, ESDA Coordinator.                                Gerald Jacobson ,CPR - ;;
         ~ PHONE.#,:         309/799-5166-In Sequence                                                                                                                                .

ANTHONY TRAFFIC & ACCESS CONTROL - RICK

         .- ADDRES S :       To be announced in the                                 -
                           ' County EOC                                                                                            .

WHITESIDE COUNTY-

         ^WHITESIDE COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT ADDRESS:         county Building _                                      -
                             .30 E. Knox-
                           'Morrison, IL l             CONTACT:

PHONE #: COUNTY EOC. ADDRESS: County Building - BILL KING TEMA 200 E.-Knox- - AL LOOKABAUGH -ANL l' Morrison, IL. _

                                                                                      --     ANNA PUDLO              FEMA BILL SMALL              CPR-'

l - GEORGE GOFORTH CPR CONTACT: E. Stuart Richter, ESDA Coordinator-

PHONE #: 815/772-2800 j TRAFFIC AND ACCESS-CONTROL _(in sequence) -

BILL SMALL_ CPR l- -ADDRESS: To be announced in the EOC - ANNA PUDLO FEMA j; t , , - . - --. -

3 December 3:00 P.M. Protectiv9 Action for School Children Riverdale Senior High School 9622 205th Street North Port Byron, Rock Island County CONTACT: Dale Cattpbell IESDA PHONE: 309/523-3181 EVALUATOR Bob Laird PEMA

                                                                 ? M.                                 Relocation Center Evacueo Monitoring, 4 Decembe~ "-                                         Decontamination, Registration, Congregate care, Emergency Horker Monitoring, and Decontamination Morrison High School 643 Genesco Morrison, Whiteside County / State of Illinois CONTACT:      Pcul Sereg PHONE;        B15/772-4071 EVALU.% TORS:       Bill Serrano Susan Paleschak Tom Carroll Martha Willis Ed Hakala Rick Anthony 6 Decccan- 10:00 A.M.                                  Protective Action for School Children Albany Elementary Schcol 3rd Strcot North Albany, Whitecide County CCUTACT:       Dale Canpbell PHONE:          309/887-4441 EVALUATORS:       Bill Small Anna Pudio

-- ----__,---v-,-,-,--------,--------,--- , - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - , - - - - - - - - - - - - , - - , - - , - , - , , - - - , - , - , - - - - - - - - - - , - - - , - - - - , - - - , . - -- - - - - - - - - - , , - - - - - - , - - - - - - - - ----,- , - - , - , - , - - - - , - - - --- ,- i i i ATTACl! MENT II EXERCISE OBJECTIVES a P t a 55

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s s' (' SCOTE OF PARTICIPATIO!! 1

State _gt Illinois

  ..              The State of Illinois vill participate on a partial scale basis in the The State EOC in Springfield will be Quad Cities     Station exercise.

activated with IESDA and ID!is personnel and prepared to partially

demonstrate the State's ability to accomplish all of the offsite objectives appropriate for that f acility. Other State agencies may be contacted but
vill not report to the State E00.

The Radiological Emergency Assessment Center (REAC) vill be fully l activated as a training -tool for ID!iS personnel. = l 1 i The dtate Torvard command Post in Carden Plain vill be activated IESDA as a personnel training tool for State district and region personnel. to l vill be prepositioned in the Quad cities Station vicinity for response : the Forvard Conaand Post, EOF, the County EOCs and the JPIC. IDriS RATT i vill be' fully activated as a trainin6 tool for ID!is personnel. ID!1s persont.el v111 be prepositioned in the Quad Cities Station vicinity for , J response to the TSC, EOF, RATT, county EOCs and the JPIC, Rock Island County Rock Island County vill fully participate in the Quad Cities exercise. The Rock Island County E0C in Milan vill be fully activated and Rock Island County will be prepared to demonstrate each of the Councy objectives. Two Rock Island County municipalities, Cordova and Port Byron, vill activate EOCs during the exercise, k'hite s ide County k'hiteside County will fully participate in the Quad Cities exercise. The k'hiteside County EOC in Horrison vill be fully activated and k'hiteside County vill be prepared to demonstrate each of the County objectives. EOC during the One k'hiteside County municipality vill activate its exercise: Albany. i . u M

4 EXERCISE OBJECTIVES FOR T11E STATE OF II.1.IN015 AND i U11TTESIDE AND FOCK ISTAND COUNTIES f OUAD CITIES STATION EXERCISE - DECEMBER 5. 1990 i , ROCK ISIAf.J kHITESIDE i COUttTY COUNTY OBJECTIVES FATE

                                                                                                                              .       r 1

I X X l

1. Demonstrate the ability to monitor, understand and use emergency l i'

classification levels (ECL) through the appropriate implementation - of emergency functions and activities corresponding to ECLs as' required by the scenario. The four ECLs are: Notification of 4 unusual event, alert,. site area emergency and general emergency. . X X X

2. Demonstrate the ability to fully alert, mobilize and activate personnel for .both facility and field-based emergency functions.

X X X

3. . Demo 2 rate the ability to direct, coordinate and control emergency activities.

X X X 4 Demonstrate the ability to communicate with all appropriate ' locations, organizations and field personnel.

)                                                                                                                                     l
                          ^

X X X

5. Demonstrate the adequacy of factittias, equipment, displays and other materials to support emergency operations.

t X I 15 . Demonstrate the ability to continuously monitor and cortrol : 2 emergency worker exposure. X

10. Demonstrate the ability, within the pluae exposure pathv.y. j to project dosage to the public via plume exposure, based on ;

plant and field data. I I

11. Demonstrate the ability to make appropriate protective action decisions, based on projected or actual dosage. EPA PACS, ;

availability of adequate shelter, evacuation time estimates i and other relevant factors. . L f l i 4 i I f r L 4

I ROCK 151 rid V.IITESIDE OBJECTIVES STATE COUNTY cnUNTY i i

12. Demonstrate the ability'to initially alert the public within X X X the IO-mile EPZ and begin dissemination of an instructional message within 15 minutes of a decision by appropriate State and/or local official (s). *

13. Demonstrate the ability to coordinate the formulation and X X X dissemination of accurate Information and instructions to the public in a timely. fashion after the initial alert and notification has occurred.

16. Demon;trate the ability to brief the media in an accurate. X ' I X coordinated and timely manner.

i

15. . Demonstrate the ability to establish and operate rumor control X X X in a coordinated and timely fashion.

i Demonstrate the ability to make the decision to recommend the X X 16. use of KI to emergency workers and institutional 1 red persons, based on predeternined criteria, as well as to distribute and administer it once the decision is made, if necessitated by

radiolodine. releases.

Demonstrate the ability and resources necessary to implement I X 10. appropriate protective actions for the impacted permanent and j transient plume EPZ population (including transit-dependent i persons, special needs populations, handicapped persons and

I institutionalized persons).

19. Demonstrate the ability and resources necessary to implement X I

appropriate protective actions for school children within the plume EPZ.

20. Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources , necessary . X X to control evacuation traffic flow and to control access to evacuated .$ ~t sheltered areas.

21. Demonstrate t'ne adequacy of procedures, facilities equipment I t and personnel for the regist*ation, radiological monitoring and decontamination of evac- :.

ROCK ISIJ5D k"dITESIDE . . OBJECTIVES STATE CotRUY C0te.Tf

22. Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equipment and personnel y X for congregate care of evacuees.

25. Demonstrate the -adequacy of facilities, equipment supplies, ,

I procedures and personnel for decontamination of emergency . vorkers, equipment and vehicles and for vaste disposal. l. t ) J 1 i, I, i a f A

                                                                                                                            . ~ _  -. <-

STATE OT ILLINDIS OBJECTIVES FOR THE QUAD CITIES NUCLEAR PO'.'ER PLMIT EXERCISE DECDiBER $.1990

1. Demonstrate the ability to monitor, understand and use emergency classification levels (ECL) through the appropriate ittplementation of emergency functions and activities corresponding NotificationtoofECLs as required unusual event, by the scenario. The four ECLs are:

alert, site area emergency and general emergency. This objective vill be demonstrated by the State of Illinois through the implementation of proceduree at each ECL, includin5 notification and activation procedures.

2. Demonstrate the ability to fully alirt, mobilize and activate person.

nel for both facility and field based emergency functions.

The State Emergency Operations Center (EOC) vill be partially activated. The IESDA Dispatcher vill implement notification procedures as defined in the IPPA State General Plan, Volume 1. Supporting State agency liaisons may be contacted but will not report to the State EOC. The State Forvard Command Post in Carden Plain vill be partially activated as a training tool for State agency personnel in the personnel vill be Quad Cities Station area. IESDA pre. positioned in the Quad Cities Station area and dispatched to the County EOCs, Forvard Command Post, JPIC and EOF. The IDNS Dispatcher vill perform notification procedures as defined in the IFRA State General Plan and in accordance with IDMS SOPS. REAC and RAFT will be fully activated for training purposes only and are not to . be evaluated by TEMA. IDNS personnel vill be pre positioned in the Quad Cities Station area and dispatched to RATT, the county EOCs, Forvard Command Post, JPIC, TSC, and EOF. 3.. Demonstrate the ability to direct, coordinate and control emergency activities. The ability to direct and control emergency response activities will be demonstrated at the State EOC. Coordination vill be demonstrated between the State EOC, REAC, the State forward Command Post, the JPIC, the EOF and the county EOCs.

                            .-   - - . ~ .                      -      ,-,r -   -~.--.------..--------r        -    . , , . ,    -,s - , --.

4. Demonstrate the ability to comunicate with all appropriate loca.

tions, organizations and field personnel. IESDA vill use a variety of communication systems [ Nuclear Accident heporting System @ARS), telefax, commercial telephone, , radio) to comunicate with other organizations and locations. IDNS (intra /intir agency) comunicatione. capabilities vill bo demonstrated in accordance with anpropriate 50t's (e.g. NARS, telefax, commercial telephone, radio). .

5. Demonstratt the adequacy of facilities, equipe nt, displays and other materials to support emergency operations.

This objective vill be demonstrated in the State EOC through the use of maps, status boards and displays. IDNS vill demonstrate this objective in RIAC through the use of map,s, status boards and displays. 6 9. These objectives vill not be demonstrated by the State of Illinois,

10. Demonstrate the ability, within the plume exposure pathway, to project dosage to the public via plume exposure, based on plant and field data.

The ability to project dosage to the public via plume exposure based on plant and field data vill be simulated in REAC. 11' . Demonstrate the ability to make appropriate protective action deci. sions, based on projected or actual dosage, EPA PACS, availability of adequate shelter, evacuation time estimates and other relevant factors. The coordination to determine protective action recomendations based upon available shelters, evacuation time estimates and other relevant f actors will be demonstrated between the State EOC and REAC.

12. Demonstrate the ability to initially alert the public within the 10 mile EPZ and begin dissemination of an instructional message within 15 minutes of a decision by appropriate State and/or local official (s).

This capability vill be demonstrated as outlined in the IFRA. State General Plan. The Governor, or his representative in the State EOC, vill notify the appropriate Emergency Broadcast System (EBS) station. The IESDA NARS operator vill notify the County EOCs of the appropriate recommendation regarding protec. tion for the public via NARS. i _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ -___m______ . _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___________m._ - _ _ _ _ _ - - m.

_- - - - - . - . .- . - - __=__ - ._ - .. - _ -.- - .- -_ - -

13. Demonstrate the ability to coordinate the formulation and dissemina.

tion of accurate information and instructions to the public in a timely fashion after the initial alert and notification has occurred. This objective vill be demonstrated in conjunction with and as outlined above for Objective 12.

14. Demonstrate the ability to brief the media in an accurate, coordina.

ted and timely manner. Th!.s objective vill be demonstrated at the JPIC in coordination IESDA and IDNS personnel vill be with the State EOC and REAC. present at the JPIC to coordinate with the utility and counties.

15. Demonstrate the ability to establish and operate rumor contro! ~ in a coordinated and timely fashion, ,

This objective vill be demonstrated by the State through coordi-nation between the JPIC, State EOC, REAC, Forward Command Post and County EOCs. .The ability to coordinate and address rumors will be demonstrated. Becauce this is a partial scale exercise, the need for and ability to establiah a bank of phonea for public inquiries vill be discussed. however the operators to staff the bank of phones vill not be identified, trained and functioning, The demonstration of this objective vill be driven by an exercise message injected by a controller. The 1988 ARCA related to this objective was corrected by the State during the 1989 Byron exercise and the 1990 LaSalle exercise. 16 20. These objectives vill not be demonstrated by the State of Illinois.

21. Demonstrate the adequacy of procedures, facilities, equipment and personnel for the registration, radiological monitoring and decon-tamination of evacuees, This objective vill be demonstrated by the State of Illinois at one of the congregate care shelters designated in IFRA-Quad Cities. Local agencies, i.e, ESDA, law enforcement and Red Cross, vill demonstrate their ability to perform their functions at the relocation center. IDNS monitoring teams vill be activated to demonstrate the IDNS role at the congregate' care shelter. This demonstration will not take place during the exercise but at a pre arranged time prior to the day of thea exercise. Additional information vill be provided to FDiA at later date.

22. Demonstrate the adequacy of f acilities, equipeent and personnel for congregate cane of evacuees. ,

This objective vill be demonstrated in conjunction with and as outlined above for Objective 21. i i

               +         . - -       ,        -    - - .        , - - - - , ,_ , , . , . _ , . , . _ _ -                      , , . .     -           - , - - .

 .23 24. These objectives vill not be demonstrated by the State of Illinois.

25. Demonstrate the adequacy of f acilities, equipment, supplies, pro-cedures and pe.sonnel for decontau.ination of emergency workers, equipment and vehicles and for waste disposal.

The ability to decontaminate emergency workers, equipment and vehicles will be demonstrated IDNS at one RAIT of personnel the facilities villused for be fully a decontamination station. The local fire department activated for this demonstration. vill be present for the demonstration. Additional information vill be provided to FEMA as soon as it is available. 26 36. These objectives vill not be demonstrated by the State of Illinois. e 4

                                            - - , - - , ~ , . , . -       - - . .   ,       e     --..  ,

ROCK ISLAND COUNTY OBJECTIVES ' FOR THE QUAD CITIES NUCLEAR PO'JER PLANT EXERCISE DECES ER 5, 1990

1. Demonstrate the ability to monitor, understand and use emergency classification levels (ECL) through the appropriate implementation of emergency functions and activities corresponding to ECLs as required Hocification of unusual event, by the scenario. The four ECLs are:

alert, site area emergency and general emergency. This objective vill be demonstrated by Rock Island County through the implementation of procedures at each ECL.

2. Demonstrate the ability to fully alert, mobilize and activate personnel for both facility and field based emergency functions.

Rock Island County will fully activate- the Rock Island County E06 in Mil,m, Illinois. The County vill implement notification procedures as defined in IPRA-Quad Cities.

3. Demonstrate the ability to direct, coordinate and control emergency activities.

Decision making vill be demonstrated at the State EOC and the Rock Island County EOC. Coordination of decisions and emergency activities vill be demonstrated between Rock Island County, the State EOC, Forward Command Post and the JPIC, and between the County and the municipalities within the EPZ. 4 Demonstrate the ability to communicate with all appropriate loca-tions, organizations and field personnel. Rock Island County vill use NARS, commercial telephone, radio and telefax to communicate with departments and agencies at other locations. Field personnel vill be contacted by commercial telephone and radio.

5. Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equipment, displays and other materials to support emergency operations.

This capability vill be demonstrated in the Rock Island County EOC throu5h the use of maps, status board and other displays as appropriate.

           ,w.                                        ,<- ,      _m - . - . .                        .   -     - , .-      -  ,e-.., ,,: _-,,n.
                                                                                                                                                ,_w

6. Demonstrate the ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure.

Rock Island County will demonstrate this objective by close coordination with IDNS and timely dissemination and exchange of information within the County Dosimetry Control Officer network. An exercise message vill be injected whf ch vill ensure the opportunity to demonstrate this objective in the EOC. This objective vill also be demonstrated durin5 the EV.2 and traffic and access control demonstrations. 7 11. These objectives vill not be demonstrated by Rock Island County.

12. Dem m trate the ability to initially alert the public within the *

10. mile EPZ and begin dissemination of an instructional message vithin 15 minutes of a decision by appropriate State and/or local official (s).

This objective vill be demonstrated through the simulated activation of the Quad Cities Station EPZ Prompt Notification System as defined in IPRA. Quad Cities and 4 50P 6R, ' Quad Cities The Prompt Station EPZ Prortpt Notification System". Notification System will not be activated during the exercise. The ability to provide instructions to the public will be demonstrated through e.he simulated activation of the local Emergency Broadcast System (ERS) station.

13. Demonstrate the ability to coordinate the formulation and dissemi-nation of accurate information and instructions to the public in a timely fashion after the initial alert and notification has occurred.

Rock Island County will demonstrate this objective by using pre scripted messages, as indicated in IPPA-Quad Cities and

4. SOP.BR, " Quad Cities Station EPZ Sheltering and Evacuation -

Ceneral repulation", to develop the EBS messages. Broadcast of the EBS me_spages vill be simulated.

14. Demonstrato.the ability to brief the mecia in an accurate, coordi.

nated and timely manner. This capability will be demonstrated in the Rock *sland County News Media Briefing Location by the Rock Island County Board Chairman, or designee, under the provisions outlined in the IFRA. Quad Cities , Annex 2A. If actual media are not present, the controller in the Rock Island County EOC v113 initiate the media briefing. 9

       .       .     ,,,,,-.n-               .. - . . . - - . - . , , . ,  -                      -  . - , _ ,    -,,  .n,,      - , . . - , ,      ,        - . , , . - - .

l l

15. Demonstrate the ability to establi6h and operate rumor control in a coordinated and timely fashion.

This objective will be demonstrated by Rock Island County through coordination be twe e n the County EO" - State For.wrd Command Post and the JPIC. The Rock Island County controller vill inject exercise messages whir.h will ensure the opportunity to demonstrate this objective.

16. Demonstrate the ability to make the decision to recommend the use of KI to emergency workers and institutionalized persons, based on predetermined criteria, as well as to distribute and administer it once the decision is made, if necessitated by radiciodine releases.

If notified by the State of Illinois to distribute and admini. ster KI, Rock Island County officials will discuss the issuance of KI to amargency workers and immobile populations, as a volun. tary measure, and will notify the municipalities of the State's recommendation.

17. This objective will not be demonstrated by Rock Island County.

18. Demonstrate the ability and resources necessary to implement appropriate protective actions for the impacted permanent and transient plume EPZ population (including transit. dependent persons, special needs populations, handicapped persons and institutionali:ed persons).

Thia objective will be demonstrated by Rock Island County through the simulated implementation of the appropriate SOPS. The public will not be involved in the demonstration.

19. Demonstrate the ability and resources necessary to implement appropriate protective actions for school children within the plume EPZ.

Rock Island County officials vill demonstrate this capability through the simulated implementation of the appropriate SOPS. In addition, an EV 2 demonstration will he conducted at a Rock Island County school. Details of this demonstration will be provided to FEKA as soon as they are finali:ed.

7

20. Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to control evacuation traf fic flow and to control access to evacuated and sheltered areas.

Coordination betveen Rock Island County a6ancies designated te provide traffic and access control vill be exhibited in the Rock Island County EOC. A County Sheriff's Department deputy will aan one traffic control post during the exercise. The post that is chosen for the demonstration may not be a post that is required by the scenario. The manning of the remaining posts vill be simulated. 21 36. These objectives will not be demonstrated by' Rock Island County. O P e y-,-gw,--- - - ---, wvg--=----y-1

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l k*lllTESIDE COWTY OBJECTIVES FOR Tile I QUAD CITIES NUCLEAR Pok'ER Pl. ANT EXERCISE DECEMBER 5, 1990 , I

1. Demonstrate the ability to monitor, understand and use emergency '

classification levels (ECi.) through the appropriate implenentation of euergency functions and activities corresponding to ECLs as required by the scenario. The four ECLs are: Notification of unusual event, alert, site area emergency and general emergency. This objective vill be demonstrated by k'hiteside County through ti.e implementation of procedures at each ECL.

2. Demonstrate the ability to fully alert, mobilize and activate personnel for both facility and field. based emergency functions.

k'hiteside County will fully activate the k'hiteside County EOC in Horrison, Illinois. The County vill implement notification l procedures as defined in IPRA. Quad Citiu. !

3. De'pnstrate the ability to direct, coordinate and control emergency :

ac'ivities. Decision making vill be demonstrated at the State EOC and the k'hiteside County EOC. Coordination of decisions and emergency activities will be demonstrated between Whiteside County, the State EOC, Torward Connand Post and the JFIC, and between the County and the village of Albany. 4 Demonstrate the ability to communicate with all appropriate loca. tions, organizations and field personnel. L'hiteside County vill use NARS, commercial telephone, radio and telefar to conuuunicate with departments and agencies at other locations. Field personnel vf.11 be contacted by commercial te).ephone and radio.

5. Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equipment displays and other materials to support emergency operations.

This capability will bc demonstrated in the Vhiteside County EOC through the use of maps, status board and other displays as appropriate.

   -.. .               -.     .    - - . - .---            _._ . - . .- ..                              . . - . ~ . . - - . - - . ~

       ,  6. Demonstrate the ability to continuously nonitor and control emergency                                              ,

worker exposure. Whitiside County vill demonstrate this objective by close coordination with IDNS and timely dissemination and exchange of inf;rmation within the County Dosimetry Control Officer not.tork. An exercise message vill be injected which will ensure the opportunity to demonstrate this objective in the E0A This objective vill also be demonstrated during the EV.2 and traffic ' and access control demonstrations. 7 11. These obje tives vill not be demonstrated by Whiteside County. , t

12. Demonstrate the ability to initially alert the public vithin the ,

10 mile EPZ and begin dissemination of an instructional message within 15 minutes of a decision by appropriate State and/or local official (s). , This objective vill be demonstrated ttrough the simulated activation of the Quad Cities Station EPZ Prompt Notification L System as defined in IFRA. Quad Cities and 4 SOP 6W,

Quad Cities Station EPZ Proept Notification System". The Prompt Notification System vill not be activated during the exercise.

The ability to provide instructions to the public vil ' be demonstrated through the simulated activation of the local E.nergency Broadcast System (EBS) station.

13. Demonstrate the ability to coordinate the formulation and dissemi. ,

nation of accurate information and instructions to the public in a timely fashion after the initial alert and notification has occurred. Whiteside County will demonstrate this objective by using pre scripted messages, as indicated in IFRA. Quad Cities and

4. S oi' . 8V , ' Quad Cities Station EPZ Sheltering and Evacuation .

General Population", to develop the EBS messages. Broadcast of the EBS messages vill be simulated. 14 Demonstrate the ability to brief the media in an accurate, coordi. l nated and-timely manner. This capability vill be demonstrated in the. Whiteside County News tiedia Briefing Location by the Whiteside County ESDA Director, or designee, under the provisions outlined in the IPRA. Quad Cities , Annex 3A. If actual media are not present, the controller in the Whiteside County EOC will initiate the l media briefing. l l

_ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ . _ . . . _ . m. __.___ _ __ _ _ ~. 1$. Demonstrate the ability to establish and operate rumor control in a coordinated and timely fashion. This objee.tive vill be demonstrated by Vhiteside County through coordination between the County EOC, State f orward Command l~ost and the JPIC. The Whiteside County controller vill inj ect exercise nessages which will ensure the opportunity to demonstrate this objective.

16. Demonstrate the ability to make the decision to reconaend the use of KI to emergency workers and institutionalized persons, based on predetermined criteria, as well as to distribute and administer it once the decision is made, if necessitated by radioicdine releases, If notified by the State of Illinois to distribute and admini-ster lui, Whiteside County of ficiala vill discuss the issuance of K1 to energency vorkers and immobile populations, as a voluntary measure, and vill notify the municipalities of the State's recommendation, ,

17. This objective vill not be demonstrated by Vhiteside County.

and resources nece ssary to leptement

18. Demonstrate the ability appropriate protective actions for the impacted permanent and transient plume EPZ population (including transit dependent persons, special needs populations, handicapped persons and institutionalized persons).

This objective. vill be demonstrated by Whiteside C..unty through The the simulated implementation of the appropriate SOPS. public will not be involved in the demonstration. and resources . necessary to implement

19. Demonstrate the ability appropriate protective actions for school children within the plume EP2.

Vhiteside County officials will demonstrate this capability through the simulated implementation of the appropriate SOPS. In addition, an EV 2 demonstration vill be conducted at Albany Elementary School. Details of this demonstration vill be provided to TEMA as soon as they are finalited. e k

            . , - .. -                , , , , ,  --     . . . .        , _ . . . . + -      , , . _              , - . , , - - . , , . , , , . . , , _ _ _ _ , - -              -, .. ,   ,.m,

  .     .     . ...    ...- .       - - . - . ~ . - . - . - . _            . - _ . _ - ~    _ - .  .. _. -

20. Demonstrate the orSanizational ability and resources necessary to control evacuation traffic f. low and to control access to evacuated and sheltered areas.

Coordination between k'hiteside County agencies designated to provide traffic and access control vill be exhibited in the k'hiteside County Eoc. A County Sheriff's Department deputy will aan one traffic control post during the exercise. The post that is chosen for the demonstration may not be a post that is required by the scenario. The manning of the remaininC posts vill be simulated. 21 36. These objectives will not be deuenstrated by L'hiteside County. l. 0

                                                                                                      +
                                                                                                             +

9

      '                         n.,         , , , , , _ , _ , _         __

1 I s l 4 ATTAC11HENT III l l j EXERCISE SEllARIO }1ARRATIVE i i i l N R-b 56

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  , -                                               QUAD CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION 1990 GSEP EXERCISE DECEh! DER 5,1990 INITI AL CONDITIONS (0730 0S00)

OENERAL Work is being performed on the Turbine Duitding Exhaust fan which has a bad bearing. A RAD waste truck is on site and a shipment l of dewatered resins and DAW is scheduled for later today. Sub station personnel are scheduled to work in the switchyard later this morning . UNIT 1 Unit 1 is in day 14 of a Refueling outage. Fuel has beca transferred from the vessel to the fuel storage placard overhaul was started but delayed to get the CRD cart . The 1/2 Diesel is Out of Service for an Outage Inspection, the 1/2 Diesel side covers are off for timing of injectors, two bearings ; have been removed for inspection, and oil fill and coolant fill ) are in progress. Operability verification of the Unit ? Diesel l was performed at 0600 this morning. Bus 141 is OOS for E.O. Inspection. Unit 1 Torus water levels are high and a transfer of water from the torus to the Unit 1 fuel pool is scheduled for later today. The "B" Train SBGTs is OOS for Flow Control Valve replacement. UNIT 2 Unit 2 has been power, and has been operating at 100 % power for the last 180 days. Hydrogen addition has been shut off for work on the system. The 2A CRD Pump has developed a problem and has elevated DP across the filter and Operators are checking the DP periodically. The 2A Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Pressure is reading fifty pounds less than the 2B Recite Pump. Floor plugs have been removed to gain access to the CRD Cart. The 35' loop seals have dried out causing a problem with i condenser vacuum and Steam Jet Air Ejector Flow (SJAE), 1

OUAD CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION 1990 GSEP EXERCISP DECEMDER 5,1990 UNUSUAL EVENT (0800 0900) At 0800 an electrician working on the Turbine Duilding Vent fan falls while climbing on scaffolding and hits the back of his head. His coworker calls the Control Room and reports that l the worker is unconscious and bleeding from the back of his head. First aid responders will find that the victim regains 4 consciousness and that there appears to be no serious injuries. llowever, the cut to the head is deep and still bleeding. In l addition Rad Plotection Personnel surveying the injured ' electrician will find radioactive containination in the cut. At approximately 0820 a low condenser vacuum alarm occurs in the the Control Room. When checked, condenser back pressure will have an increasing trend and there will be high Steam Jet Air Ejector (SJAE) flow. The problem is being caused by the loss of the 35' SJAE loop seals. The NSO will check turbine seal steam pressure. However, operations wtll not be able to determine the cause of the problem from the Control Room and Operators will be dispatched to check the 55' loop seals, the SJAE loop seals and the Condenser vacuum breaker, it will not be possible to determine the exact cause of the problem and all the seals will have to be refilled. Once the 35' SJAE seals are filled the problem will clect, EXPECTED ACTIONS A first aid crew will be dispatched to the injured electrician. First aid will be administered, a Rad Survey performed and an ambulance will be called to take the worker to the hospital. An Unusual Event should be called due to the contarninated injury, it should be noted that this evolution will end with the simulated call for the Ambulance and no ambulance will actually come on site., Control Room actions in response to the low vacuum alarm should be prompt. Operators should be quickly dispatched into the plant. Access to the L.P. heater bay will require dressing out in protective clothing and ob:aining an "R" key. Rx pressure may be lowered slightly which will help increase condenser vacuum. Operators should refill loop seals which will correct the prob..m once the 35' SJAE seals are filled.

L QUAD CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION 19?0 GSEP EXERCISE

               -       DECEMBER 5,1990 ALERT (0900 1030)

At 0S58 a bell is heard in the Control Room and the annunciator for 125 V, BUS GROUND ALARM- 902 8 B9 comes on. This is shortly followed by loss of all annunciators in the Control Room. Dere is a small amount of smoke in the Aux Electric Room which causes the Control Room Ventilation to purge. Personnel will be sent to determine the loss of 125 V DC. Depending on how the Control Room interprets the smoke in the AUX Electric Room, The Fire Brigade may be dispatched. Entry into the Aux Electric Room will show indications of a burnt panel but no fire in progress.The loss of 125 V DC may be corrected by switching to reserve feed which will restore 125 V DC and Control Room Annunciators. While the Control Room is dealing with the loss of annunciators an EA calls the Control Room and repor1s that the DP across the CRD Fiher is high and increasing. If checked the running CRD pump also has low amps and excessive vibration. This problem will require turning off the operating CRD pump, turning on the standby CRD pump and switching CRD Filters. At 1055 a Sub Station truck backs into a Tower Causir a phe.se to phase fault and lose of Transformer 21 (TR 21). EXPECTED ACTIONS Upon loss of Annunciators the Control Room should declare an AJert and the TSC and OSC should be activated. Personnel should be dispatched to the AUX Electric Room to determine the cause and correct the lose of 125 V DC. Control Room personnel should closely monitor parameters, since annunciators have been lost. Once the 125 V DC has been repaired annunciators will be returned. The Operating CRD Pump should be shut down and the standby unit statted. CRD Filters should switched. c _

                                                                         ~~'
               ; ; ;,7 1990 GSEP EXERCISE DECEMBER 5,1990 SITE AREA EMERGENCY (1100 1200)

The loss of TR 21 causes the Generator and Turbine to trip resulting in a Reactor Trip. One bank of the CRDs experiences a hydraulic lock and an incomplete scram occurs. When Operators attempt a manual scram it is unsuccesful ano the reds do not drop. Power is approxi:..ately 23% with an ATWS oc:urring. Reactor pressure spikes, relief and safety valves lift, and reactcr level drops to approximately O. The Unit 2 Diesel Generator initiates due to a spike in Dry Well Pressu. A Group 2,3 isolation occurs, Rx Building vents isolate and the B Train Standby Gas ! Treatment System (SBGTS) comes on. HPCI Auto stans, MSIVs remain open, and Turbine Bypass Valves are open. Operators should be sent to close the 302 25 valve and rods should stan to be driven in one at,a time. Rod will drive at approximately one per minute. A Safety Valve remains unseated and steam and radioactivity are released in the Dry Welt. Pressure in the vest:1 is being controlled with the Safety and open MSIVs/L Tine Bypass Valves. Torus Temperatures are slightly elevated due tc, the Reliefs having lifted and Torus Cocling is put on. Torus temperatures will be easily controlled with Torus cooling. At 1303 the DG trips due to overspeed problems. Personnel will be dispatched to determine the problem and discover that the DG governor is broken and needs to be repaired. The 1/2 DG is OOS and can not be quickly retumed to service. Dry Well radiation is increasing slowly. Dry well pressure and temperature are being handled by Dry Well Coolers. At 1104 the UNIT 2 CRD Hatch which has been unbolted by mistake stans to leak. This leak will eventually increase and become the path path for radioactivity to escape from the Dry Well to escape it;to the environment. The wolker who has mistakenly loosened the bolts to Unit 2's CRD Hatch leaves the area due to the load noises associated with the SCRAM. While leaving the area he tiotices the that the CRD hatch is loose. The worker will repon his crior when questioned after being found contaminated in the assembly area. F

QUAD CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION 1990 GSEP EXERCISE l DECEMBER 5,1990 . SITE AREA EMERGENCY (Continued) 1100-1200 i . ! If initiation of Standby Liquid Control (SBLC) is attempied _ ,

             - before 1130, SBLC will not initiate due to a problem with the KEY Switch. _ Operators should start to lower level and power will drop to - 21/2 % when vessel level is at 120". Minor fuct damage occurs from the ATWS and also a loose pan from the RECIRC pump.

Main Steam line rad levels increase and alarm causing the MSIVS to close. Reactor Pressure spikes causing safety and reliefs to~ lift. Reactor pressure is controlled by Relief valves, but power l

              - and level oscillate causing more fuel damage as the relief l

valves are cycled. The radioactivity coming from the leaking- -1 CRD Hatch causes area radiation levels to exceed maximum safe I levels in more than two areas and the reactor is depressurized in actordance with procedures. EXPECTED ACTIONS l The TSC should declare a Site Emergency due to the ATWS. Assembly '

              .should be called and evacuation of non essential personnel should take place after assembly is completed . Reactor Coolant samples                                                                                                                                               ;

L should be obtained, dose calculations should be performed and i L environs teams should be dispatched. The Control Room should take appropriate acti_ons in response to l- _ " the trip. Efforts should be qulekly staned to drive Rods. Personnel should be dispatched to investigate and repair the-Diesel Generator and SBLC problems. Reactor water levels should be dropped and maintained just above the top of active fuel. The Reactor should be depressurized when the maximum safe rad levels ' are exceeded at two or more locations.

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QUAD CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION 1990 GSEP EXERCISE DECEMBER 5,1990 GENERAL EMERGENCY 1140-1400 Once depressurization is staned, Reactor pressure and level drop rapidly, and level goes below the top of active fuel causing additional fuel damage. (Total fuel damage is approximately 1% of the core.) Dry Well Pres F., temperature and radiation level increase with Dry Well .adiation greater than 2000 R/Hr. Once deprest.urized, reactor power is 0% and efforts to refill the vessel to top of active fuel are successful. However the radioactivity from inside the Dry Well is leaking through the CRD hatch into the Reactor' Building. The Reactor Building pressure panels start to leak and the SBGTs has degraded flow and filter efficiency due to the steam escaping into the Reactor Building. A large release to the environs starts and will continue until the activity in Ac T ywell and Reactor Building has dissipated.

Repair efforts to the DG are completed. All rods have been inserted and SBLC injection is completed (if started). A lugh DP Alarm on the Unit Travelling Screens is received due to a run of shad on the screens. A low service water pressure alarm, RHR Service Water Alarms and DP Alarms are received. Cite Water, Service Water and RHR Sen' ice water pumps start to cavitate. EXPECTED ACTIONS The TSC or EOF should declare a General Emergency. Extensive Monitoring of Environs and Plume tracking should take place with measured levels compared to dose projections. Fuel damage estimates should be made. Extensive discussions with State and NRC Personnel should occur. ne JPIC should be activated and press releases issued. Planning should start on how to maintain suffWem long term cooling of the core and how to get the unit to ceM Wmt down. Teams should be dispatched to deal with the shad problem on the travelling scre9ns. Extra care must be taken when dealing with the elevated rad levels found throughout the plant and in the environs.

                                       .    .            _. -      _- . _ _ _ . - ~__

n -.....-.. l vunu ciota ovuuunn 4v.. 1990 OSEP EXERCISE DECEh1BER 5,1990 f RECOVERY 1400 1500 There has been a forty eight hour time jump. During the past two days both the Unit 2 and 1/2 Diesel Generators have been retumed to service. Temporary lines have been installed in the switch yard and the Phase to Pnase fault has been corrected. The broken REClRC seal has been identified. Reactor coolant samples have been obtained and analyzed and fuel damage calculations indicate that 1% percent of the fuel was damaged. hiost of the damage is thought to be clad damage from the loose part going through the core. Although a some fuel damage is thought to have occurred when the core was uncovered. A Temporary plug has been successfully installed on the CRD Penetration. Drywell Jadiation levels are 20 R/hr and Reactor Building radiation levels are less than 100 mr/hr. High levels of f(xfine and small amounts of Cesium contamination are known to exist in

 '   the Reactor Building. Personnel have been able to enter the Reactor Building and the Unit has been placedy in cold shutdown.

The shad have been removeu from the moving screens and the RHR pump is running with no problems. State and CECO environs teams have found contamination at several locations on site and in Iowa and Illinois. Non essential personnel have not yet returned to the station. Expected Actions Conditions should be assessed and compared with recovery criteria in both the TSC and EOF and further actions planned. Discussions should be held between State and Utility personnel Contamination in the plant and Hot spots in the Environs should be evaluated. Recovery may be declared since the plant is in cold shut down and current Dry Well readings are 20 R/Hr. Illinois will be able start re-entry for all effected areas. Iowa will be able to start re entry but will have to deal with hot spots in 1.ow hioor and hicCausland. f 1

ATTACEMENT IV gy.ERCISE EVENT TIMELIllE 1 l l l t t 4 57

s Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station December 5, 1990 Time Line Rock Island Whiteside CECO State County County HARS/ECL

1. HUE Classified 0836 0908 0900 Received 0842 0848 0848 0911 0912 Verified

2. ALERT Classified 0900 0935 0935 Received 0912 .

0918 0937 0938 Verified ,

3. SAE i Classified 1107 1128 1128 Received 1111 1115 1129 1130 Verified 1134 1135 Siren 1136 1136 EBS Milk producing animals stored food, protected water PAR 0-2 miles. Issue general information message -

Prepare for action involving public.

4. GE -

Classified 1151 1216 1216 Received 1154 1205 1218 1219 Verified Decision 1212

                                                                     -         1225                         1225 Siren                                               1226                        1226 EBS                                                                                        i PAR                 Evacuate 0-2 mile          radius / shelter 2-5 mile radius Garden Plain. Confine milk producers out to a 10 mile radius.

5. GE Classified 1151 1208 1242 1242 Received 1243 1244 Verified 1210 1250 1250 Sirens 1252 1252 EBS PAR Evacuate 0-2 mile radius / 1-5 mile radius / 5-10 Garden Plain, Newton and confine milk producers out .

l to a 10 mile radius, j 58 i

y,__ _ _ _ . - .. . _ , _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , Iowa Time Chart ) CECA State Clinton County Scott County NARS/ECL E_ SAE Clascified 3107 Received 1111 Verified _ Siren 1121 1121 EBS 1123 1123

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ML20082S982: Difference between revisions

Revision as of 07:41, 26 September 2022

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Dear Mr. Congel:

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