ML20217L831: Difference between revisions

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
(StriderTol Bot insert)
 
(StriderTol Bot change)
Line 1: Line 1:
{{Adams
#REDIRECT [[IR 05000443/1998001]]
| number = ML20217L831
| issue date = 04/27/1998
| title = Insp Rept 50-443/98-01 on 980201-0328.Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Engineering,Maintenance & Plant Support
| author name =
| author affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
| addressee name =
| addressee affiliation =
| docket = 05000443
| license number =
| contact person =
| document report number = 50-443-98-01, 50-443-98-1, NUDOCS 9805040311
| package number = ML20217L038
| document type = INSPECTION REPORT, NRC-GENERATED, TEXT-INSPECTION & AUDIT & I&E CIRCULARS
| page count = 25
}}
See also: [[see also::IR 05000443/1998001]]
 
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:.
                                                                ~
                      U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
                                        REGION I
    Docket No.:    50-443
    License No.:    NPF-86
    Report No.:    50-443/98-01
    Licensee:      North Atlantic Energy Service Corporation
    Facility:      Seabrook Generating Stetion, Unit 1
    Location:      Post Office Box 300
                    Seabrook, New Hampshire 03874
    Dates:          February 1,1998 - March 28,1998
    Inspectors:    Ray K. Lorson, Senior Resident inspector
                    Javier Brand, Resident inspector
                    Robert Summers, Project Engineer
    Approved by:    Curtis J. Cowgill, Chief, Projects Branch 5
                    Division of Reactor Projects
,
  cP8050403tt H30427
  PDR    ADOCK 0  4j3
  G
 
  .
  .
                                                      EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
                                                Seabrook Generating Station, Unit 1
                                                NRC Inspection Report 50-443/98-01
          This inspection included aspects of licensee operations, engineering, maintenance, and
          plant support. The report covers a 9-week period of resident inspection.
        = Ooerations:
          e          The licensee had a method for evaluating spent fuel pool (SFP) liner integrity based
                    on the SFP sump in-leakage. However, in one instance licensee personnel did not
                    identify that the SFP sump level alarm was non-functional which precluded use of
                    this redundant method for monitoring the spent fuel pool liner integrity.
        'o          The inspectors noted good operator performance during motor driven emergency
                        .
                      feedwater pump (EFW) testing and during venting of the emergency core cooling -
                      system (ECCS) discharge piping. The operators performed these activities in                  q
                      accordance with the applicable procedures and demonstrated an excellent
                      questioning attitude,
          e          .The safety system walkdowns were a positive initiative to improve the plant                  I
                      material condition.                                                                          l
          Maintenance:
          e            An electrician demonstrated excellent attention to detail and a questioning attitude,
                      to detect and identify the incorrect installation of two operating mechanism springs
                      on a safety-related breaker. The licensee determined that this condition did not
                      render the breaker (or any other similar breakers used at Seabrook) inoperable, and
                      initiated a plan to inspect and correct any additional non-conforming conditions prior
                      to the end of the next refueling outage.
          e            The licensee performed the planned freeze seal activities well. The work package,
                      and associated on-line maintenance and freeze seal evaluations, and management
                      oversight were effective. The inspector identified that the level of detail provided in
                      the freeze seal thawing instructions could have been enhanced. The licensee
                      promptly enhanced the work instructions to address this' concern.
          e          Safety-related degraded voltage bus testing was performed well, and the test
                      results satisfied technical specification requirements.'
          e          The licensee reported several examples of failure to develop adequa:e surveillance
                      test procedures. The licensee subsequently revised the test procecures and
                        properly tested each component. This licensee identified violation of failure to
                                                                    ii
4  , ,
                .. . .            .. . . . . . .              .  .
                                                                                    .
                                                                                                              ,
                                                                                                                ..
 
                                                                                                  .
                                                                                                  '
            develop adequate test procedures is being treated as a non-cited violation. (NCV
            98-01-01)
    Enaineerina;
    o      The licensee failed to implement adequate design controls to ensure that the safety-
            related components within the residual heat removal system pump room would
            remain within their required temperature limits prior to modifying the room
            ventilation system. A subsequent licensee analysis, performed after the NRC
            identified this deficiency, indicated that the modification reduced the room
            ventilation flow by about 50%, however, the room temperature limits would not
            have been exceeded. This is a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B Criterion lli
            (NOV 98-01-02)-
    o      The licensee promptly reviewed and evaluated the identification of boric acid
            accumulation on a RHR drain line. The identification of this condition reflected
            positively on the licensee's new system walkdown program. The inspector noted
            that the licensee's response to this condition did not include identification of the
          - other plant areas potentially susceptible to periodic wetting. The licensee
l            implemented appropriate actions to address this concern.
    e        Operations personnel performed well by identifying the safety injection accumulator
l-
L            nitrogen leaks. The licensee promptly investigated the leakage and implemented
j            appropriate repairs to reduce the leakage. Engineering properly assessed the impact
l            of this minor leakage on the accumulatcr operability.
i
    e        The licensee determined that incorrectly installed coupling hubs (a condition which
            occurred during initial installation), caused a degraded EFW motor outboard bearing
            condition. The pump remained operable in this condition and the licensee
              implemented appropriate corrective actions to address this deficiency.
    Plant Suooort:
,
    e      ' The inspector that identified four workers were performing maintenance on the "B"
I
              containment spray pump in a posted as a contaminated area without wearing any
  '
              protective clothing as required by the radiation work permit and posted
              instructions. 'The licensee promptly evaluated this issue and implemented adequate
              corrective actions. This is a violation of Technical Specification 6.10.1. (NOV 98-
              01-03)-
                                                        iii
 
.
*
                                            TABLE OF CONTENTS
                                                                                                                        EAGA
  EX EC UTIV E SU M M ARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
  TA8LE OF CONTENTS          ..............................................                                                  iv
  l . Ope ratio n s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
          01    Conduct of Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1                  ,
          02    Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
                  02.1 Safety System Walkdowns and Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
          04    Operator Knowledge and Performance .........................2                                                  l
                  04.1 Operator Performance During Surveillance Testing . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
                  04.2 Spent Fuel Pool Liner integrity Monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2                          .l
          08    Miscellaneous Operations issues (92901) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3                        i
                  08.1 (Closed) Unresolved item 50-443/97-06-01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
  II . Mainte na nce . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
          M1    Conduct of Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
                  M1.1 incorrect Spring Location on Safety Related Breakers . . . . . . . . . . 5
                  M1.2 Freeze Seal to Support Repair.of a Chemical and Volume Control
                          Valve...........................................6
                  M1.3 Safety Bus Degraded Voltage Surveillance Testing . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
          M8    Miscellaneous Maintenance issues (92902) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
                  M8.1 (Closed) Violation 50-443/96-04-01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
                  M8.2 Licensee Event Report Review: .........................7
  Ill. Engineering ...................................................8
          E1    Conduct of Engineering (37751) ..........,..................8-
                  E1.1    Residual Heat Removal System Ventilation Covers . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
          E2    Engineering Support of Facilities and Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
                  E2.1    Accumulation of Boron on Residual Heat Removal System (RHR) Drain
                          Pipe Connection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
                  E2.2 Nitrogen Leak Of Safety injection Accumulators Supply Header . . 11
                  E2.3 Degraded Emergency Feedwater Motor Outboard Bearing, and
                          (Update) of Unresolved item 9 7-08-0 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12                          1
          E8    Miscellaneous Engineering issues (92903) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13                          l
                  E8.1  (Closed) Violation 50-443/96-08-01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
                  E8.2 (Closed) Unresolved item (URI) 9 7-07-0 3, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
                  E8.3 (Closed) Escalated Enforcement issues (EEI) 97-08-02, 97-08-03, 97-                                      ,
                          08-04, and 97-08-06. ..................... ........ 13                                                  l
                                                                                                                                  l
  IV. Plant Support ................................................14
            R1    Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
                                                            iv
 
                                                                                                                .
                                                                                                                *
            R1.1  Maintenance Work In Posted Contaminated Area Without Protective
                    Clothing
                    ..............................................14
        S1  Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
            S1.1 General Comment (71707, 71750) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .                16
        F8  Miscellaneous Fire Protection Issues (92904) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
            F8.1  (Closed) Violation 50-443/96-03-01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
            F8.2 (Closed) Violation 50-443/96-03-02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
  V. Management Meetings ..........................................17
        X1  Exit Meeting Summary . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
        X3  Other NRC Activities ....................................17
  PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
  INSPECTION PROCEDU RES USED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .      19
  ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
  LIST OF ACRONYMS U SED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
l
l
                                            v
 
  .
  .
                                              Report Details
    Summarv of Plant Stglug
    The facility operated at approximately 100% of rated thermal power throughout the
    inspection period with routine minor power reductions performed to support instrument
    calibrations and testing.
                                              1. Operations
    01      Conduct of Operations
            Using inspection Procedure 71707, the inspectors conducted frequent reviews of
            ongoing plant operations. In general, routine operations were performed in                  ;
                                                                                                        '
            accordance with station procedures and plant evolutions were completed in a
            deliberate manner with clear communications and effective oversight by shift
            supervision. Control room logs accurately reflected plant activities, and observed
            shift turnovers were comprehensive and thoroughly addressed questions posed by
l
            the oncoming crew. Control room operators displayed good questioning                      ~l
l          perspectives prior to releasing work activities for field implementation. The
;
            inspectors found that operators were knowledgeable of plant and system status.
                                                                                                        '
    02    Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment
;:  02.1 Safety System Walkdowns and Status (71707. and 62707)                                          ;
                                                                                                          }
l
          _ The inspectors routinely conducted independent plant tours and equipment
            walkdowns of selected portions of the primary auxiliary building, emergency diesel
            generator, service water, and emergency feedwater buildings. These activities                ,
            consisted of verification that safety-related system configurations, power supplies,          j
            process parameters, support systems, and operational status were consistent with            !
            Technical Specification (TS) requirements, and the Updated Final Safety Analysis
            Report (UFSAR) descriptions. Additionally, system, component, and general area
            material conditions and housekeeping status were observed.
            The inspectors observed a significant increase in the number of equipment
            daficiency tags hung on safety system components during the systematic licensee
            walkdowns. The inspectors reviewed selected deficiency tags and noted that the              I
            deficiencies identified minor system defects that did not present any operability
            concerns. The inspectors concluded that the system walkdowns were a positive
            licensee initiative to _ improve the plant material condition and will continue to follow    ;
            licensee progress in this area.                                                              !
                                                                                                          l
                                                                                                          .
 
                                                                                                .
                                                                                                *
                                                  2
  04    Operator Knowledge and Performance
  04.1 Operator Performance Durina Surveillance Testina
          The inspectors noted good operator performance during motor driven emergency            1
          feedwater pump (EFW) testing and during venting of the emergency core cooling
          system (ECCS) discharge piping. The operators performed these activities in
          accordance with the applicable procedures and demonstrated an excellent
          questioning attitude.
          The operators noted, while venting the ECCS discharge piping per operating
          procedure, OX1456.02, "ECCS Monthly Valve Verification", that the procedure
          acceptance criteria of "no gas observed" was not satisfied. Engineering determined
          that the small bubbles were due to expansion of dissolved nitrogen in the water
          during the. venting process and revised thc procedure to clarify the acceptance
          criteria. The operators subsequently performed the venting activity satisfactory.
          The inspectors obrerved that the EFW surveillance test procedures did not provide
i        clear acceptance limits for venting the pump recirculation line. The in_spectors
          discussed this issue with station management who agreed to review this procedure.
          The inspectors concluded overall good operator performance during motor driven
l        EFW pump testing and during venting of the ECCS discharge piping. The operators
          performed these activities in accordance with the applicable procedures and
          demonstrated an excellent questioning attitude.
  04.2 Soent Fuel Pool Liner Intearity Monitorina
l-
      a.  Inspection Scooe
          The inspectors reviewed the licensee's method for utilizing the spent fuel pool (SFP)
          system sump to evaluate the SFP liner integrity, and also the basis for concluding
          that identified leakage out of two SFP sump leak detection pipes was groundwater.
      b.  Observations and Findinas
    "
          The SFP sump was designed to collect any leakage from the SFP liner. Seabrook
          USAR Section 9.1.2.2 states, in part, that, "The SFP is monitored for leakage by a
          series of leak detection channels located adjacent to each liner seam weld," and "by
          monitoring the leakege rate, any change in the integrity of the liner can be
          established." The inspector noted that this method of monitoring SFP liner integrity
          was independent to SFP level indication system.
          A deficiency tag, dated February 20,1998, stated that "two spent fuel pool leak
          detection pipes have groundwater leaking." The inspector reviewed the applicable
          system drawing and confirmed that the two potential leakage sources included:
I
 
  .
  '
                                                        3
            groundwater and the spent fuel pool. The inspector questioned operations              -
            personnel and the system engineer regarding the basis for concluding that this
            leakage was groundwater and learned that chemistry personnel had analyzed the
            sump contents and determined that the leakage was not SFP water. The inspector
            concluded that the licensee had properly evaluated this leakage.
                                                                                                    1
            The system engineer indicated that the SFP sump was equipped with a level alarm
            set to actuate at one foot of water above the sump floor, and this volume of water
            was equivalent to an approximate 0.25 inch decrease in SFP water level. The SFP
            sump alarm response procedure required the checking of indications to confirm the      i
    '
            SFP liner integrity. The inspector concluded that the licensee had established a        )
            method for using SFP sump in-leakage to evaluate the SFP liner condition.
,
            The inspector questioned whether the SFP level alarm was functioning properly
            however, based on a report from a radiation waste technician that approximately
            four feet of water had been recently pumped out of the SFP sump. The licensee
            reviewed the alarm database and determined that the SFP sump level alarm had not
              actuated since January 1996. The licensee subsequently determined that the alarm
              level switch was not functional. The licensee replaced and verified the switch to be
              operational. The period of time that the alarm was non-functional was
              indeterminate since no data was available regarding the actual sump conditions
              during this period of time. The inspector concluded that the recent example where      -
              the licensee did not identify that the SFP sump alarm failed to actuate demonstrated
              a weakness in the identification of degraded equipment. The licensee initiated an
              adverse condition report (ACR) to review the program for monitoring the SFP sump.
        c.    Conclusions
              The licensee had a method for monitoring SFP sump in-leakage as an independent
              confirmation of the SFP liner integrity, however, in one example, licensee personnel
              failed to identify that the SFP sump level alarm was non functional which prevented
              use of this method.
      08      Miscellaneous Operations issues (92901)
      08.1 (Closed) Unresolved item 50-443/97-06-01: review of licensee decision to reduce
              power during September 15,1997 feed pump oscillation event. This item refers to
              the operational decision to contiriue with a planned power reduction to about 90%
              power during the subject event after experiencing a failure of the rod control
              system. An abnormal operating procedure for the rod control system required that
              power evolutions be stopped when an urgent failure of the rod control system
              occurs. At the time of the event the "A" main feed pump governor controls were
              oscillating, resulting in associated high pressure steam supply pipe oscillations.
              While the operators had determined that this condition did not warrant an
              immediate plant trip or shutdown, there was concern about the possible adverse
              effect of the oscillations on the equipment. As a result, plans were implemented to
A
 
                                                                                        .
                                            4
  reduce power to either eliminate the oscillations or remove the "A" main feed pump
  from service so that repairs could be effected.
  When the operators initiated the power reduction a failure in the rod control system
  occurred, such that the control rods could not be manually inserted. After
  determining that the control rods were still able to perform the plant trip function
  and that adequate shutdown margin was available, the decision was made to
  continue with the planned power reduction using chemical shim injection (through
  the emergency boration flow path). The basis for this decision was that, excepting
  the feed pump oscillations, the plant was stable; and, that l&C recommended that a
  small change in power may fix the feed pump control problem, or at least reduce
  the risk of the oscillations causing equipment damage. The operators were also
  briefed at the time that if, during the down power evolution, they believed the plant
  was not stable, or if they were excessively challenged, that a plant trip should be
  initiated.
  As allowed by station procedures, the shift manager (a senior licensed operator)
  authorized initiating a 10% power reduction to reduce the feed pump oscillations.
  The basis for this decision comes from Station Management Manual Chapter 2,
  which permits noncompliance with procedures for very limited conditions involving
  either protection of the health and safety of the public, prevention of personnel
  injury or life threatening situations, or prevention of damage to major plant
  equipment. Operators concluded that the deviation from the abnormal operating
  procedure was acceptable in order to avoid possible damage to the main feed
  pump, or the associated steam supply pipe and resultant plant transient condition,
i  Operators maintained all associated technical specification requirements within
  allowable conditions, such as shutdown margin and axial flux difference. The
  evolution was well controlled and at about 92 % power, the feed pump oscillations
  were significantly reduced, removing the threat to this major plant equipment.
l
  in NRC inspection report 50-443/97-06, the inspectors questioned the
  appropriateness of the operator actions during the September 15 event. An
  unresolved item was issued pending review of the licensee's ACR findings. The
  licensee noted that an ACR had not been immediately initiated following the
  operator's decision to deviate from the operating procedure. At the time, the
  licensee's ACR process did not explicitly require an evaluation for this type of
  event. As a result, the licensee subsequently revised the guidance to require that
  an ACR be initiated for events where this Station Management Manual guidance
  was implemented. The inspectors determined during this current inspection that
  the operator actions were taken in accordance with station procedures. This
  unresolved item is closed.
!~
 
                                                                                                      1
                                                                                                      !
  -
                                                            .
I g-
                                                      5
                                              11. Maintenance
    M1    Conduct of Maintenance                                                                -
    M1~ 1. incorrect Sorina Location on Safety Related Breakers
        .
      a;    inspection Scone:
                                                                                                      I
            On February 25, during refurbishment of a " spare" 4160 volt breaker, an electrician
            identified that two breaker operating mechanism springs had been incorrectly
            interchar.ged by the manufacturer (ABB Services Inc.), during a previous breaker
            refurbishment. The springs, which included the charging carrier reset spring and          1
            the third toggle tension spring, are very similar in appearance, however one of the      d
l
            springs provides a greater tension force. The inspector evaluated the licensee's          !
            response to this issue, reviewed applicable documentation, and met with electrical
            engineering personnel.                                                                    1
      b .-  Observations and Findinas:
            The licensee disassembled the breaker and the springs were installed as
;            recommended by the manufacturer. The final configuration was consistent with the
L            Seabrook breaker refurbishment . procedure, and the vendor drawing. The vendor
l            indicated that originally, these two springs were identical, but in about 1984, the
            charging carrier spring had been redesigned to address a concern with their use in a -  J
L
            different style of breaker, however, the part replacument was effected on several of
            the vendor supplied breakers to eliminate duplicity.
            The licensee identified approximately 23 other similar ABB breakers (fifteen of
            which are currently being used in safety related applications) that may have been
            affected by the possible misassembly. The licensee performed an operability              l
                                                                                                      i
            determination based on a vendor supplied analysis, which concluded that
            interchanging the two springs did not affect the breaker operability. The vendor
            also recommended that the springs be installed in the correct location, and
              Seabrook initiated a plan to inspect all breakers and ensure adequate spring
            ~ installation by the end of the next refueling outage (in 1998).
      ^
              The licensee determined that this issue was not reportable under 10 CFR Part 21,        )
              " Reporting Defects and Noncompliance", because the breakers were evaluated to
,
              remain operable. The vendor initiated testing to demonstrate that the breakers with
              the interchanged springs (incorrect spring location) will remain operable for the
              entire service life (period of nine years), and is evaluating this issue for Part 21    I
              applicability.
                                                                                                      1
                                                                                                      i
 
                                                                                                .
                                                                                  .
                                                  6
      c.  Conclusion:
          The inspector concluded that a Seabrook electrician demonstrated excellent
          attention to detail and a good questioning attitude, to detect and identify the
          interchanged installation of two breaker operating mechanism springs on a safety
          related 4160 volt breaker. The licensee determined that this condition did not
          render the breaker (or any other similar breaker used at Seabrook) inoperable, and
          had initiated a plan to inspect and correct the situation prior to the end of the next
          refueling outage.
  M1.2 Freeze Seal to Sucoort Repair of a Chemical and Volume Control Valve
      a.  Insoection Scope:
          On March 27, the inspector observed pipe freeze seal activities performed by
          mechanical maintenance technicians to support inspection and repairs on valve CS-
          V-408, which isolates the boric acid transfer pump minimum flow recirculation line.
          The inspector reviewed the work package, applicable procedure, interviewed the
          system engineer and work supervisor, and visually inspected the activities.
L
L    b.  Observations and Findinas:
!
          The licensee conducted briefings prior to performing the freeze seal. The work
          package was thorough and included an adequate on-line maintenance assessment.
          Additionally, required precautions, system lineups and contingencies were included
          to prevent or mitigate the consequences of a freeze seal failure. The inspector
          observed proper field coverage by fire protection, management oversight and health
          physics personnel. The system engineer was knowledgeable of the evolutions, and
          provided good support. The oversight group performed a liquid penetrant test of
          the affected pipe before and after the freeze, which confirmed adequate pipe
          conditions.
        The inspector noted that the work scope included an infrequently performed activity
        to speed up the freeze seal thawing process to ensure that any boron in the pipe
          quickly returned to solution. A heat gun with a capacity of 500'F was used, and
    ~
          the inspector noted that the licensee implemented controls which included
          continuously monitoring the pipe surface temperature to prevent exceeding a
          maximum temperature of 150'F. The inspector noted that the work procedure
          instructions could have provided additional guidance to ensure that this infrequently
          performed activity was performed correctly. The licensee addressed the inspector's
        concerns by implementing a work scope change to include additional guidance. The
        freeze seal and subsequent thawing process were completed successfully.
!'
!
>
 
    .
                                                                                                                    1
                                                                                                                    i
    -
                                                                      7                                              !
                    c.      Conclusion:
                            The licensee performed the planned freeze seal activities well and effective
                              management oversight and support were observed. The work package and
                            associated on-line maintenance and freeze seal evaluations were adequate. The
                            licensee implemented prompt actions to address an inspector concern regarding the
                            level of detail provided in the work package instructions for controlling the freeze
                            seal thawing activity.
                    M1.3 Safety Bus Dearaded Voltaae Surveillance Testina
                            The inspector observed electrical technicians perform safety-related bus degraded
                            voltage testing on February 25. The inspector noted that the test activities were
                            performed safely and in accordance with the test procedures. The inspector
                            observed good supervisory oversight, communications, and use of self-checking
                            practices. Measuring and test equipment were calibrated properly, and the
                            equipment performance satisfied the TSs surveillance requirements.
,
                    M8      Miscellaneous Maintenance issues (92902)
                    M8.1 (Closed) Violation 50-443/96-04-01: inoperable turbine driven emergency feedwater
                            pump as a result of inadequate installation of mechanical seals. The inspector
                            verified the corrective actions described in the licensee's response letter, dated
                            August 8,1996, to be reasonable and complete. Among the corrective actions
                            verified were: revisions to the associated maintenance procedures describing
                            greater detail for seal clearances and use of calibrated M&TE to verify adequate
                            clearance; submittal of a supplement to LER 50-443/96-003 to better describe the
                            root causes of the failure, including the repeat nature of the problem and corrective
                            actions for that concern; and, changes to the corrective action program to provide
                            root cause training to the management review team and SORC members, and to
                            . improve the operational experience feedback process, providing clear guidance for
                            the types of events requiring a formal root cause analysis. No similar problems
                            were identified.
                    M8.2 Licensee Event Reoort Review:
                            The following licensee event reports (LERs) are closed based on an in-office review
                            of the LER and the planned and completed corrective actions.
                            .e      (Closed) LER 50-443/96-06-00: Missed Surveillance Requirement                -
                            e      (Closed) LER 50-443/97-03-00: Missed Surveillance Turbine Trip on Reactor
                                    Trip
                            e      (Closed) LER 50-443/97-04-00: Remote Shutdown Circuits Control Room
                                    Isolation Function Not Tested Completely
  . . . . . . . - ..    . .            .
                                              ..
                                                  . . .
 
                                                                                            .
                                                  8                                        -
      e      (Closed) LER 50-443/97-017-00: Inadequate SSPS Surveillance Testing
      e      (Closed) LER 50-443/98-001-00: Inadequate ECCS Venting Surveillance
      Each of the licensee identified LERs listed above involved the failure to develop
      adequate surveillance test procedures to ensure that all required system
      components were tested properly. In each case the licensee declared the affected
      system inoperable, entered TS 4.0.3 as appropriate, and successfully completed the
      required testing within the allotted 24 hour time period. These events were of
      minor significance since each system functioned properly when tested. The
      inspector concluded that this was not indicative of a programmatic breakdown in
      the surveillance test program. The licensee discovered these procedural deficiencies
      during design basis and operational experience reviews and corrected the applicable
      procedures. Additionally, the licensee implemented a generic procedure upgrade
      project to identify and correct any additional potentially affected procedures. This
      licensee identified violation of failure to develop adequate surveillance test
      procedures is being treated as a non-cited violation consistent with Section Vll.B.1
      of the NRC Enforcement Policy. (NCV 98-01-01)
                                          lit. Enoineerina
  E1  Conduct of Engineering (37751)
  E1.1 Residual Heat Removal System Ventilation Covers
,
  a.  Insoection Scooe:
      The inspectors reviewed the engineering analysis performed to install temporary
      covers over the ventilation duct openings in both residual heat removal (RHR) pump
      rooms. The covers were installed per work requests (WAS) 97 WOO 3878 and
      97 WOO 3884 to redirect the ventilation flow to minimize the potential spread of
      contamination from minor system leakage through the bonnet studs of check valves
      RH-V4, and RH-V-40.
  b".  Observations and Findinas:
      The inspectors observed that the plastic covers were securely fastened to three
      sides of the RHR pump room ventilation duct openings. The covers reduced the
      area for ventilation flow and introduced an approximate 90' change in the direction
      of the exit flowpath. The inspectors were concerned that these covers would
      reduce the ventilation flow into the RHR pump room and possibly lead to a
      overtemperature condition and failure of safety-related components inside the room
      during a design basis event.
 
.
-
                                                9
    The ventilation covers were installed per Procedure MA4.8, " Control of Temporary
    Equipment", and were not intended to reduce the ventilation system flow. The
    (MA4.8) evaluation provided general information and guidance and concluded that
    the covers were acceptable as long as they only diverted and did not reduce the
    approximate 12,700 cfm of flow required to maintain the room environmental
    conditions. Neither the evaluation nor the work request provided any specific
    design or installation details to ensure that the "as built" covers would meet the
    design requirements.
    In response to the inspector's questions, the licensee promptly removed the
    ventilation covers and initiated an engineering evaluation (SS-EV-98-008) to
    determine the impact of the covers on the ventilation system and RHR pump room
    temperature. The evaluation calculated that the installed covers would reduce the
    ventilation flow into the RHR pump rooms by about 50% to approximately 6100
    cfm. This would increase the RHR pump room temperature following a loss of
    coolant accident about 15'F from approximately 134*F to about 149'F.
    The inspector noted that the postulated temperature increase would not have
    exceeded the RHR pump room temperature limit of 189'F, and therefore would not
    have rendered any of the safety related RHR pump room components inoperable.
    The inspector noted that the failure to provide sufficiently detailed design          i
      instructions resulted in an inappropriate application of the MA4.8 program and a
      significant reduction in the ventilation flow into the RHR pump room following the
      installation of this modification.                                                  ;
      Appendix B Criterion lil, requires, in part, that measures be implemented to assure
      that the design basis is correctly translated into specifications, drawings,        1
      procedures, and instructions. Contrary to the above, adequate instructions were
      riot developed to ensure that the RHR pump room ventilation system modification
      would not reduce ventilation system flowrate below an unacceptance level. This is
      a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion lli (VIO 50-443/98-01-02).
  c.  Conclusion:
                                                                                          l
      The licensee failed to implement adequate design controls to ensure that the safety- !
      related components within the residual heat removal system pump room would          ;
      remain within their required temp.erature limits prior to modifying the room        i
      ventilation system. A subsequent licensee analysis, performed after the NRC
      identified this deficiency, indicated that the modification reduced the room
      ventilation flow by about 50%, however, the room temperature limits would not
      have been exceeded.
 
                                                                                                .
                                                                                                -
                                                    10
  E2      Engineering Support of Facilities and Equipment-
  E2.1    Accumulation of Boron on Residual Heat Removal System (RHR) Drain Pioe
          Connection
      a.  Insoection Scope:
          The RHR system engineer identified a ring of dried boric acid accumulation on the
          half-coupling for drain valve RH-V-105 on March 5,1998, during a Seabrook
          Improvement Plan system inspection. The engineer initiated an adverse condition
          report (ACR 98-0782) to review this condition. The drain line is immediately below
          relief valve RH-V57. The boron was identified between the pipe insulation and the
          branch "T" fitting where the drain line connects to the "B" Train RHR system
          discharge piping. The inspector reviewed the licensee's response to this issue,
          visually inspected the piping, interviewed applicable personnel, and reviewed
          nondestructive test results,
      b.  Qbservations and Findinas:
        . The licensee promptly removed the insulation and inspected the pipe. No visible
          evidence of leakage.was noted. Additionally, the licensee performed liquid
          penetrant testing which revealed a linear indication in the 8 inch pipe within the
          heat affected area of the 3/4 inch drain line weld connection. The licensee
          performed ultrasonic testing to characterize the flaw, and determined that the
          indication was small and the pipe had adequate wall thickness. The licensee
          elected to repair this indication. The boron residue was attributed to previous fluid
l        spillage when the relief valve, located above this piping, was removed for testing.
i
          The inspectors determined that the licensee responded well to this condition, and
          that it did not impact plant safety. The inspectors also noted that this finding
          indicated that the current system walkdown inspections were thorough, and
          improved over previous licensee inspection activities. The inspector noted a minor
          weakness in that the licensee's investigation of an earlier event involving a minor
          through wall pipe leak below valve RC-V89 did not include a review of other plant
          areas where insulation was periodically wetted. The licensee subsequently
    '
          identified a total of five (5) other similar configurations susceptible to periodic
,.        wetting (areas relating to relief valves RH-V13, RH-V25, SI-V101, SI-V113, and SI-
(        _V76). Inspections of these areas by the system engineer identified no boric acid
          deposits.- Additionally, since the RC-V89 incident, workers have been instructed to
          exercise care to avoid wetting of insulation during relief valve removal, and to
          request replacement of insulation when wetted.
      c.  Conclusion:
          The licensee promptly reviewed and evaluated the identification of boric acid
,        accumulation on a RHR drain line. The identification of this condition reflected
l
L
 
,
  .
  .
                                                    11
I-
          positively on the licensee's new system walkdown program. The inspector noted
          that the licensee's response to this condition did not include identification of the
          other plant areas potentially susceptible to periodic wetting. The licensee
          implemented appropriate actions to address this concern.
    E2.2 Nitroaen Leak Of Safety Iniection Accumulators Sunolv Header
i
      a.  Insoection Scooe:
          On February 2,1998, operators identified that the nitrogen pressure in the safety
          injection (SI) accumulators was decreasing by approximately 13.5 psig/ day. The
          licensee performed system walkdowns, tests, and evaluations to identify the nitrogen
l          leak source (s) and to implement repairs as necessary. The inspector evaluated the
l-        licensee's response to these issues, interviewed the system engineer and operations
l          personnel, and reviewed the engineering evaluations.
!
l
      b.  Observations and Findinas:
'
          The Sl accumulators are safety-related, and are required to inject borated water into
l
!          the reactor coolant system (RCS) piping loops during certain postulated loss of
l
            coolant events. Technical Specifications (TS) Section 3.5.1.1, requires the
j          accumulator pressure to be maintained between 585 and 664 psig. Nitrogen is used
l          to pressurize and maintain the accumulators pressure within the required range.
            The inspector reviewed and found acceptable a 50.59 evaluation performed to
            support the leak detection testing. During their investigation the licensee identified
            several sources of leakage including valve packing, seat, and body-to-bonnet joints.
            The licensee tightened the body to bonnet bolts and adjusted the packing on those
            valves that could be repaired at power, and initiated work requests to repair the
            remaining valves. One of the largest nitrogen leaks was through the packing of valve
            NG-V14 which the inspector noted had been recently repacked. The inspector-
            identified that the licensee did not question whether this repeat packing deficiency
            was due to improper maintenance performance. The inspector discussed this
            observation with the system engineer who then initiated ACR 98-0771 to review this
            issue.
      *
            The licensee evaluated the identified seat leakage through the "D" accumulator
            nitrogen supply valve NG-V23 and the header manual isolation valve NG-V123 and
            determined that the accumulator remained operable with the minor amount of seat
            leakage,
        c.  Conclusions:
            Operations personnel performed well by identifying the safety injection accumulator
            nitrogen leaks. The licensee promptly investigated the leakage and implemented
 
                                                                                                    .
                                                                                      .
                                                      12
            appropriate repairs to reduce the leakage. Engineering properly assessed the impact
            of this minor leakage on the accumulator operability.
      E2.3 Dearaded Emeroency Feedwater Motor Outboard Bearina. and (Undate) of Unresolved
            Item 97-08-05
      a.'  Insoection Scope:
            On February 4, the licensee operated the motor-driven emergency feedwater (EFW)
            pump to investigate abnormal lubricating oil analysis results which indicated a high
                  .
            tin content. The inspector reviewed these activities and the licensee's lubrication
            analysis program. During this review, the inspector interviewed the system engineer
  '
            and the lubricating oil program coordinator, attended meetings and briefings held by
            the licensee, and reviewed applicable documentation.
      b.  Observations and Findinas:
            There are two EFW pumps at Seabrook required to supply water to the steam
            generators to remove heat from the reactor coolant system during emergency
            conditions. One pump is turbine driven, while the other pump is motor driven. Each
            pump is capable of supplying 100% of the required flow.
            The pump parameters such as flow, pressure and vibration were normal during the
            run. The bearing temperature was approximately 179'F (below its design
            temperature limit of 194*F) and appeared to be steady or increasing very slightly''
            when the run was secured. The licensee elected to open and inspcet the outboard
            bearing following the run and identified that approximately .065 inches of material
            had been removed from the non-load carrying motor bearing thrust face. The
            licensee performed a root cause evaluation and determined the coupling hubs had
            been installed backwards. The condition appeared to have existed since original
            installation in 1987. The system engineer concluded, based on the pump test data,
            and bearing condition that the EFW pump was operable. The inspectors
            independently reviewed the data and determined that the operability _ determination
            was sound.
            The licensee replaced the bearing, correctly re-installed the coupling hubs and
i          initiated an activity to inspect the other potential coupling hub installation problems.
!'          The inspector concluded that the licensee responded well to this specific issue. -The
!          inspector questioned however, whether licensee responded properly to earlier
    '
            indications of elevated tin concentrations within the motor bearing lubricating oil.
l          Inspection report 97-08 identified potential program deficiencies involving -
l          implementation of lubricating oil analysis program and opened unresolved item 97-
            08-05 to review this issue. Evaluation of the licensee's response to the motor driven
            EFW pump oil anomalies will be reviewed along with URI 97-08-05.
 
  .
''
                                                    13
          The licensee has initiated measures to address the inspectors concerns including:
          initiation of an evaluation team to evaluate and redesign Seabrook's lubrication
          program, . industry bench marking and acquiring external assistance. Additionally,
          the oversight program performed an independent evaluation and documented
          extensive findings and proposed corrective actions.
    c.  Conclusion:
          The licensee determined that incorrectly installed coupling hubs (a condition which
          occurred during initialinstallation), caused a degraded EFW motor outboard bearing
          condition. The pump remained operable in this condition and the licensee
          implemented appropriate corrective actions to address this deficiency.
    E8    Miscellaneous Engineering issues 192903)
    E8.1  (Closed) Violation 50-443/96-08-01: covering floor drains in the emergency
          feedwater pumphouse without performance of a safety evaluation. The inspector
          verified the corrective actions described in the licensee's response letter, dated
          December 20,1996, to be reasonable and complete. Among the corrective actions
          verified were: revisions to appropriate maintenance and operating procedures to
          ensure that 10 CFR 50.59 evaluations are performed prior to plugging or blocking
          floor drains; engineering development of a list of floor drains requiring engineering _
          review prior to blocking; revisions to the Regulatory Compliance Manual to provide    ,
          clear management expectations regarding 10 CFR 50.59 reviews for procedure            )
                                                                                                  '
          changes; and, implementation of supervisor training for procedure revision reviews
          and 10 CFR 50.59 evaluations. No similar problems were identified.
    E8.2 (Closed) Unresolved item (URI) 97-07-03. Maintenance rule implementation for the
          control building air conditioning (CBA) system. The inspector questioned in
          Inspection Report 97-07 whether the licensee should have previously categorized the
          CBA system as an "A-1" system in response to a history of repeated CBA
          compressor (train) failures. During this period, the inspector reviewed the issue and
          noted that the Expert Panel had categorized this system as a normally operating, non-
l          risk significant system. This type of system would not have required train level
          monitoring and therefore previous individual compressor failures would not have
!          caused the maintenance rule performance criteria to be exceeded. The inspector
l          concluded that the licensee's previous decision not to classify the CBA system as an
          A-1 system did rot violate the maintenance rule requirements. This unresolved item
          is closed.
    E8.3 (Closed) Eccalated Enforcement issues (EEI) 97-08-02. 97-08-03. 97-08-04. and 97-
          08-06. Inspection report 97-08 identified fcur issues tnat were classified as
          apparent violations. These issues were discussed at a pre-decisional enforcement
          conference on March 24. The NRC determined that three of the issues were
          violation:, of NRC Requirements and transmitted this decision in separate
            correspondence. These issues included eel 97-08-03, eel 97-08-04, and eel 97-08-
[
                                                                                                  ;
l
 
                                                          _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
                                                14
      06 which are being closed administratively. Followup licensee actions to these
      violations will be tracked under the following enforcement action items: 98-073-
      01013, 98-073-02013, and 98-073-03013.
      The final issue involving operation of the safety injection system (eel-97-08-02) was
      determined not to be a violation and is closed.
                                      IV. Plant SuDDort
  R1  Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls
  R1.1 Maintenance Work in Posted Contaminated Area Without Protective Clothina
:  a.  Inspection Scone:
      On March 13,1998, the inspector observed three maintenance technicians and one
      engineer performing maintenance activities on the "B" containment building spray
      (CBS) pump, inside a posted contamination area without any protective clothing.
      The activities wHch included sampling of the pump bearing oil, and repair of the
      pump inboard bearing thermocouple, were being performed under radiation work
      permits (RWPs) 98 R-00002, 98-R-00004, and 98-R-00011.
  b.  Observations and Findinas:
      The inspector observed that all four workers had reached across the contamination
      boundary with their bare hands to perform or support the maintenance activ! ties. The
      inspector questioned the workers whether they had consulted with the health physics
      department (HP) on the acceptability of working without protection inside the
      contaminated boundary. One worker indicated that he had spoken with a HP
      technician and believed that he had been authorized to perform the maintenance
      activities without any additional protective clothing.
      The inspector reported the events to a HP technician and notified the HP Manager.
      Thwe individuals stated that they expected all personnel working inside a contaminated
      area to wear, as a minimum, hand protection. The inspector reviewed the applicable
      radiation work permits (RWP-98-R-00002,98-R-00004, and 98-R-00011) and
      confirmed that all three RWPs required the ute of nuerts, and rubber gloves.
      The inspector r . Aened iP radiological surveys of the applicable areas performed before
      and after this e- m' o,d noted that the survey levels were lower (approx. 409
        DPM/100 m ' ' man the required posting value (Greater than 1,000 DPM/100 cm).
l      However, Hf e sted these areas conservatively due to the potential for varying
        radic:cgical! onditions. None of the four workers or the tools used became
        contaminated during these activities. however, the inspector was concerned that
                                                                                                                                              !
                _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
 
  .
  *
                                                  15
        multiple workerc across a number of disciplines failed to comply with the Station HP
        requirements.
        On March 16,1998, HP management removed the workers' dosimetry to prevent their
        entry into the RCA, and initiated a full investigation of this issue (ACR 98-0882). The
      - event was thoroughly reviewed and several corrective actions were implemented
        including:
        o      Coachin0 and counseling of allindividuals involved
        *      HP management held briefings with engineering and maintenance personnel, 'o
                review this incident and reinforce HP expectations.
        o      Performing reviews of the rad training materials for " Contaminated Areas"
                boundary delineation and controls, to ensure adequate understanding of postings
                and to enforce contaminated area practices.
        *      Evaluating existing " Contaminated Area" postings, to ensure better delineation of
                posted boundaries.
        The inspector determined that the licensee addressed this issue well and that their
        investigation was comprehensive.
        Technical Specification (TS) 6.10.1 requires that procedures for personnel radiation
        protection be prepared consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 20 and shall be
        adhered to for all operations involving personnel radiation exposure. Seabrook
        administrative procedure RP 9.1, "RCA Access / Egress Requirements", revision 12,
        dated 2/11/98, requires, in part, that personnel perform work inside the RCA in
        accordance with the RWP and posted instructions. Contrary to the above, on March
          13,1998, four individuals failed to comply with their RWP and posted radiological
        instructions. This is violation of TS 6.10.1 (VIO 50-443/98-01-03).
    c.  Conclusion:
        The inspector identified four workers performing maintenance on the "B" containment
        spray pump which had been posted as a contaminated area without wearing any
          protective clothing as required by the radiation work permit and posted instructions.
        The Ucensee promptly evaluated this issue' and implemented adequate corrective
          actions.
I
 
                                                                                                                                        q
                                                                                                                                          1
                                                                                                                                      -(
                                                                                                                                          !
                                                                                                                                      *
                                                                                        16
                          S1              Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities
                          S1.1 General Comment (71707, 71750)
                                          The inspectors observed security force performance during inspection activities.
                                          Protected area access controls were found to be properly implemented during random
                                          observations. Proper est. ort control of visitors was observed. Security officers were
                                          alert and attentive to their duties.
                          F8              Miscellaneous Fire Protection issues (92904)
                          F8.1            (Closed) Violation 50-443/96-03-01: two examples of staff failure to follow procedures
                                          regarding control of combustible materials and repair of emergency lights. The first
                                          example involved a failure to adhere to fire protection procedure 2.2, Rev 2, " Control of
                                          Combustibles," when, on April 18,1996, three plastic pails of a Class I combustible
                                            (epoxy primer paint) were inappropriately stored and left unattended in the turbine
                                            building. The second example involved a failure to adhere to operations procedure
                                            OSO443.47, Revision 5, "8 Hour Emergency Lighting Units Monthly Functional Test,"
                                            when, on January 28,1996, three inoperable emergency lights were found, but not
                                            properly reported to the Unit Shift Supervisor (USS), nor was a work order initiated to
                                            restore the lights to service. The inspector verified the corrective actions described in
                                            the licensee's response letter, dated July 12,1996, to be reasonable and complete.
                                            Among the corrective actions verified were: procedure changes to ensure the control of
                                            combustible materials, providing additional clarification of requirements for approved
                                            storage; procedure changes to ensure timely notification of the USS and initiation of
                                            work orders for inoperable emergency lighting; and, licensee records indicating that
                                            othar required activities were completed. No similar problems were identified. This
                                            item is closed.
                            F8.2 (Closed) Violation 50-443/96-03-02: one example of inadequate fire protection
                                            procedures regarding timely restoration of inoperable emergency lighting. This violation
                                            involved two Seabrook procedures not incorporating Seabrook Design Basis Document,
                                            DBD-FP-01, " Emergency Lights," design criteria of returning emergency lights to an
                                            operable status within 30-days of being identified as inoperable. The inspector verified
                                            the corrective actions described in the licensee's response letter, dated July 12,1996,
                                            to be reasonable and complete. Among the corrective actions verified were: procedure
                                            changes to the associated surveilla;.ce and maintenance procedures to ensure that
                                            inoperable emergency lighting would be assigned a priority 2 work request; completien
                                            of an effectiveness monitoring program in the maintenance organization to ensure that
          '
                                          . this violation did not repeat; and, a re-evaluation by the maintena.1ce organization of
                                              other similarly "self-identified" violations where corrective actions had not been fully
                                              implemented leading to repeat violations. This latter action was considered by the
                                              inspector as a comprehensive review and self-assessment of the corrective actions
                                              program tracking system for maintenance concerns. No similar problems were
'
                                              identified. This item is closed.
  .. . - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ -
 
  .
  '
                                                17
                                    V. Manaoement Meetinas                                  )
    X1 Exit Meeting Summary
      The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management,
      following the conclusion of the inspection period, on April 8,1998. The licensee
      acknowledged the findings presented.
    X3 Other NRC Activities
      A pre-decisional enforcement conference was held on March 23,1997 at the Region I
      office in King of Prussia, Pennsylvania. The conference was conducted to review four
      apparent violations of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion XVI. The NRC enforcement
      decision was transmitted via separate correspondence.
,
1
                                                                                            1
                                                                                            1
 
                                                                          .
                                                                        '
                                                      18                .
                                      PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
      Licensee
      W. Diprofio, Unit Director
      R. White, Design Engineering Manager
      J. Grillo, Technical Support Manager
      G. St Pierre, Operations Manager
      B. Seymour, Security Manager
      J. Linville, Chemistry and Health Physics Manager
      J. Vargas, Engineering Director
.
  _ _m  _                    _ ~ _- -
 
  .
  '
                                                      19
                                      INSF'ECTION PROCEDURES USED
    IP 37551:    Onsite Engineering
    IP 61726:    Surveillance Observation
    IP 62707:    Maintenance Observation
    IP 71707:    Plant Operations
    IP 71750:    Plant Support Activities
    IP 92700:    Onsite Followup of Written Reports of Nonroutine Events at Power Reactor
                  Facilities
                                ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
    Ooened
    NCV 98-01-01          Failure to Develop Adequate Surveillance Test Procedures
    VIO    98-01-02        Failure to implement Adequate Design Controls
    VIO    98-01-03        Failure to Adhere to Radiation Work Permit and Posted Instructions
    Closed
    VIO    96-03-01        Failure to Follow Procedures Regarding Control of Combustible Materials
                          and Repair of Emergency Lights
    VIO    96-03-02        Inadequate Fire Protection Procedures Regarding Timely Restoration of
                          Inoperable Emergency Lighting
,
    VIO    96-04-01        Inadequate Emergency Feedwater Pump Maintenance
l    URI  97-06-01        Review of Operator Actions Following a Main Feedwater Pump Pipo
l                          Oscillations
l    LER  96-06-00        Missed Surveillance Requirement
l    LER  97-03-00        Missed Surveillance Turbine Trip on Reactor Trip
!    LER  97-04-00        Remote Shutdown Circuits Not Tested Completely
    LER  97-17-00        Inadequate SSPS Surveillance Testing
    LER  98-01-00        Inadequate ECCS Venting Procedurs
    NCV 98-01-01          Failure to Develop Adequate Surveillance Test Procedures
    VIO  96-08-01        Covering Floor Drains Without a Safety Evaluation
    URI  97-07-03        Review of Maintenance Rule Characterization of Control Building Air    ;
                          Conditioning Compressors                                                l
    eel  97-08-02        Operation of the Safety injection System Test Header                    j
    eel  97-08-03        Failure to implement Prompt Correctivo Action for a Degraded Pipe
    eel  97-08-04        Failure to implement Prompt Corrective Actions for Degraded Control
                            Building Air Conditioning Compressors
    eel  97-08-06        Failure to implement Prompt Corrective Actions for a Degraded Positive
                            Displacement Charging Pump                                            ,
                                                                                                  i
    Discussed
    URI 97-08-05          Potential Lubricating Oil Program Deficiencies
                                                                                                  i
                                                                                                  )
 
                                                      .
                                                      '
                                            20
                                LIST OF ACRONYMS USED
    ACR    Adverse Condition Report
    ASME    American Society of Mechanical Engineers
    CAS    Central Alarm Station
    CBS    containment building spray
    EDG    Emergency Diesel Generator
  . EFW    Emergency Feedwater
    FME    Foreign Material Exclusion
    gpd    gallons per day
    gpm    gallons per minute
    LCO    Limiting Condition for Operation
    MOV    motor operated valve
    MPCS  Main Plant Computer System
    NSARC  Nuclear Safety and Audit Review Committee
    psig  pounds per square inch gauge
    QC    Quality Control
l    RHR    Residual Heat Removal
!    SG    steam generator
l    SIR    Station Information Report
l.  SORC  Station Operations Review Committee
    SUFP  Startup Feedwater Pump
i
    SW      Service Water
l    TDEFW  Turbine Driven Emergency Feedwater Pump
L  _TS    Technical Specifications
'
      UFSAR  Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
    WR      Work Request
I
}}

Revision as of 15:17, 26 January 2022

Redirect to:

Retrieved from "https://kanterella.com/w/index.php?title=ML20217L831&oldid=3420693"