ML20244A883: Difference between revisions

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
(StriderTol Bot change)
(StriderTol Bot change)
Line 1: Line 1:
{{Adams
#REDIRECT [[IR 05000369/1989001]]
| number = ML20244A883
| issue date = 03/29/1989
| title = Insp Repts 50-369/89-01 & 50-370/89-01 on 890120-0227. Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operations Safety Verification,Surveillance Testing,Maint Activities & Review of Plant Procedures
| author name = Croteau R, Shymlock M, Vandoorn K
| author affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
| addressee name =
| addressee affiliation =
| docket = 05000369, 05000370
| license number =
| contact person =
| document report number = 50-369-89-01, 50-369-89-1, 50-370-89-01, 50-370-89-1, GL-88-17, IEB-85-003, IEB-85-3, NUDOCS 8904180247
| package number = ML20244A875
| document type = INSPECTION REPORT, NRC-GENERATED, INSPECTION REPORT, UTILITY, TEXT-INSPECTION & AUDIT & I&E CIRCULARS
| page count = 19
}}
See also: [[see also::IR 05000369/1989001]]
 
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:- - _ _ _ - _ - _ - _ - _ - _ - _ _ - _ _ _ -                                        _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _
        ,        '.
                                                                          ,
                  '
        .
          ,
                    gep* "%
                    y'        .-                  ,              UNITED STATES                                                    ..
                    ;              ,,
                                        *
                                                    NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
                    e,,
                                    J:                              REGION ll
                                                                101 MARIETTA ST.. N.W.
                    . %+, , , , *j                            ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323
                      Report Nos. 50-369/89-01 and 50-370/89-01
                      Licensee: Duke Power Company
                                    422 South Church. Street
                                    Charlotte, NC 28242
                      Facility Name: McGuire Nuclear Station 1 and 2
                      Docket.No(s): 50-369 and 50-370
                      License No(s):            NPF-9 and NPF-17
                      Inspection Conducted:            an ry 20, 1989 - February 27, 1989
                      Inspectors:          .
                                          K. Y I)o n
                                                            M        !/t./                                                                          at( Signed
                                                                                                                                                                  ff
                                                          SeniorRf1dentInspector
                                                            $/                                                                                  S/              k?
                                      f.~Crte','esident/spector
                                          R                                                                                                      /Date' Signed                                    ,
                      Approved-by:.            .
                                                        , 27/// j                                                                                J/h                    9
                                          M a .'Shymlock, Segfion Chief                                                                          D6te sign #d                                    i
                                          Division of Reactor Projects
l
l
                                                                      SUMMARY
                      Scope:        This routine unannounced inspection involved the areas of operations
                                    safety verification, surveillance testing, maintenance activities,
                                    review cf plant procedures, drawing system verification and follow-up
                                    on previous inspection findings.
                      Results:      In the areas inspected, the following issues were identified:
                                    Violation 369,370/89-01-01,            Failure to Follow Maintenance
                                    Administrative Procedure. Three examples were identified involving
l                                    perfonning work without a work request and improper acceptance of
j'                                  operational control following maintenance. (Paragraphs 5 and 6)
L
!                                    Licensee Identified Violation 369/89-01-02, Missed TS Surveillance on
                                    Snubbers.      (Paragraph 6)
[
                                    Licensee Identified Violation 369/89-01-03, Breach of Fire Barriers.
I
                                    (Paragraph 6)
                                    Violation 369/89-01-04, Inadem> ate Chemistry Procedure Leading to
                                    Inadvertent Dilution.        (Paragraph 6)                                                                                                                    ,
                                                                                                                                                                                                    l
                                                                                                                                                                                                    l
                        $$41802478903a0
                                ADocK 05000369
                        G
                                                    PNU
                                                                                                                                                                                                    l
  Lm . . . .. . .      . . .    __          _            .
                                                                                                                _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .
 
- - _ _                      __ __                _.    _                . - _ _ _
            ,                  .
            *
t
!                                                            .                                                            l
l                                                                                    2
I
                                                  Violation 369,370/89-01-05, Followup of Improvements in Control Room    '
                                                  Drawing Control. For reasons described in the report no Notice of        i
                                                                                                                          '
                                                  Violation is being issued for.this violation.    (Paragraph 10)
                                                  Inspector Followup Item 369,370/89-01-06, Written Guidance on Use of    !
                                                  Procedures.  (Paragraph 11)
                                                  Violation 369,370/89-01-07, Failure to Follow Procedures With Respect to '
                                                  Writing Problem Investigation Reports (PIRs). (Paragraph 12)
                                                                                                                          :
                                                                                                                          1
                                                                                                                            l
                                                                                                                            l
                                                                                                                            (
                                                                                                                            l
                                                                                        .                                    1
- - - - - - - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ - _ .      _.                                                                  l
 
- - - _                    -        . _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ - - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ -                                      _ . _ - _ _ - _ -
          ,.  .
            .
                            !
                                                                                                                REPORT DETAILS
                '1.  Persons Contacted-
                      Licensee Employees
                    *J.'Boyle, Superintendent of Integratea Scheduling
                    *G. Gilbert, Acting Superintendent of Technical Services
                    *T. McConnell, Plant Manager
                      W. Reeside, Operations-Enginesr
                      M. Sample, Superintendent ofiiaintenance
                    *R. Sharp, Compliance Engineer
                      J. Snyder, Performance Engineer
                    *B. Travis, Superintendent of Operations
                      R. White, Instrument and Electrical Engineer
                      Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen,.
                      technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office    _
                      personnel.
                    * Attended exit interview
                  2.  Unresolved Items
                      An unresolved item (UNR) is a matter about which more information is
                      required to determine whether it is acceptable or mayl involve a violation
                      or deviation. There were no unresolved items identified in this report.
        '
                  3.  Plant Operations (71707, 71710)
                      The inspection staff reviewed plant operations during the report period to
                      verify conformance with applicable regulatory requirements. Control room
                      logs, shift supervisors' logs, shift turnover records .and equipment
                      removal and restoration records were routinely reviewed. Interviews were
                      conducted with plant operations, maintenance, chemistry, health physics,
                      and performance personnel.
                      Activities within the control room were monitored during shifts and at
                      shift ~ changes. Actions and/or activities observed were conducted as
                      prescribed in applicable station administrative directives. The complement
                      of licensed personnel on each shift met or exceeded the minimum required
                      by Technical Specifications.
                      Plant tours taken during the reporting period included, but were not                                                                                      ;
                      limited to, the turbine buildings, the auxiliary building, Units 1 and 2                                                                                  4
                      electrical equipment rooms, Units 1 and 2 cable spreading rooms, and the                                                                                  i
                      station yard zone inside the protected area.                                                                                                              j
                                                                                                                                                                                  1
                      During the plant tours, ongoing activities, housekeeping, security,                                                                                      l
                      equipment status and radiation control practices were observed.                                                                                          j
                                                                                                                                                                                I
                                                                                                                                                                                  1
        ,
                                                                                                                                .__._______ __ _ _ __ _                  .. .. J
 
__
  , .
  .
                                                                                        l
                                                                                        '
                                                2
                                                                                        !
                                                                                        }
          A detailed walkdown of the accessible portions of the Unit 1 auxiliary        ;
          feedwater (CA) system was conducted by the inspectors. A CA Resistance        (
          Temperature Detector (RTD) was found disconnected and details are              !
          contained in paragraph 5.                                                      l
                                                                                        l
          The inspectors reviewed the licensees progress relative to Generic            ;
          Letter 88-17, Loss of Decay Heat Removal . The licensee appears to be          ;
          thoroughly addressing the issue with appropriate detailed procedures
          under development.      Further detailed inspections will be conducted at
          a later date.
          a.    Unit 1 Operations
                Unit 1 operated at approximately 100 percent power for most of the
                report period. On February 12, 1989, power was reduced to 90 percent
                to repair the number two governor valve position indicator which had
                failed. The unit returned to full power approximately twelve hours
                later.                                                                  ,
          b.    Unit 2 Operations
                The unit operated at approximate 100 percent power until January 27,
                1989. On January 27, 1989, at 4:30 p.m. the licensee observed
                indication of main condenser tube leakage on Unit 2.          Turbine
                generator load was reduced in accordance with procedures to allow
                isolating and repairing the leaks. Load was reduced to approximately
                40 percent. Three condenser tubes were found leaking and a total of
                fifty two tubes were plugged.      The unit returned to full power at
                10:05 a.m. January 29, 1989.      The licensee believes steam impinging
                on the conderser tubes from a leaking turbine steam drain valve may
                have caused the tube leakage. The leakage from the drain valve was
                not stopped, however, and power was again reduced on February 22,
                1989, to approximately 85 percent in order to inspect and plug
                additional leaking condenser tubes.      The un;t returned to full power
                on February 22, 1989.                                                    !
                                                                                        1
          c.    At the licensees request, the inspectors reviewed the licensees
                progress relative to Generic Letter 88-17, Loss of Decay Heat
                Removal. The licensee appears to be thoroughly addressing the issue
                with appropriate detailed procedures under development. Further
                detailed inspections will be conducted at a later date.
                No violations or deviations were identified.
      4. SurveillanceTesting(61726)
          Selected surveillance tests were analyzed and/or witnessed by the
          inspector to ascertain procedural and performance adequacy and conformance    ;
          with applicable Technical Specifications.                                      {
          Selected tests were witnessed to ascertain that current written approved      1
          procedures were available and in use, that test equipment in use was          {
                                                                                        f
                                                                                        I
                                                                                        i
                                                                                        1
 
                        ..
                                          .
                                                      .      _        _                      _    _.
. .
                                              -
                                                                                                        J
            --
        .,
          .
                k                                                                                    ''
                                                                                                            l
                                                                                          i
      ,                                                    3                                                )
                                                                                                            l
                                                                                                        l
                                                                                                        !
                  calibrated,-that test prerequisites were met, that. system restoration was              I
                  completed and test results were adequate.                                            {
                  Detailed'below are selected tests which were either reviewed or witnessed:
                          PROCEDURE-                  EQUIPMENT / TEST
                          PT/2/A/4208/10B                2B NS HX Heat Balance                        f  '
                          PT/1/A/4200/09A                ESF Test
                          PT/1/A/4206/09A                NI Check Valve Movement Test
                  No violations or deviations were identified.
    '
              5.  Maintenance Observations (62703)
                    a.    Routine maintenance activities were reviewed and/or witnessed by the
                          resident inspection staff to ascertain procedural and performance
                          adequacy and conformance 'with applicable Technical Specifications.
                          The selected activities witnessed were examined to ascertain that,
                          where applicable, current written approved procedures were available
                          and'in use, that prerequisites were met, that equipment restoration'          ,
                          was completed and maintenance results were adequate,                          j
                          Specific maintenance activities observed included:
                          Activity                                      Work Request No.
                                                                                                    .
                          Control Room Activity Door No. 507 Repair      26740 ADM
                          Troubleshooting Diesel Generator                137753 OPS
                          2B Battery Charger
                          Replacement of Power Range                      68487 IAE
                          Nuclear Instrumentation (N41)
                          Meter and Potentiometer.
                                                                                                        !
                          Replace CA-57                                  96430 NSM
                                                                                                        l
                          Repair CA Turbine Trip Mechanism                500488 MNT                :l
                                                                          (ReviewOnly)
                    b.    The . inspectors discussed painting of the auxiliary building relative
                          to operability of the Auxiliary Building Ventilation System (VA),            i
                          Technical Specification (TS) 4.7.7.b. The TS requires testing after            I
                          painting in zones communicating with the system. By previous                  !
                          agr eement with the NRC - painting was defined as 1,000 square feet of        ,
                          painted area and retesting was to be done after painting each 1,000          l
                          square feet. The primary concern being carbon degradation in the              i
                                                                                                        '
                          charcoal absorber. Two years of data has shown negligible effect'on
                          the carbon, therefore, the inspectors agreed that 5,000 square feet
                          could be painted and larger amounts dependent on test results. The            ,
                                                                                                        !
                                                                                                        )
 
            ~
          .    .
              ,
(        '
l                                                                                            i
                                                      4
                                                                                              l
                    licensee requested this relief due to an afiort to improve
                    housekeeping which includes repainting of the auxiliary building.
                    The results after 5,000 square feet also showed no effect on the        l
                    carbon and, therefore, the licensee will paint larger amounts and
                    retest as appropriate.      At a minimum tests will be taken monthly.
                    The inspectors agreed with this approach.
                  c. On February 4,1989, during a walkdown of the auxiliary feedwater
                    system, the Resistance Temperature Detector upstream of ICA-65 was
                    found disconnected by the inspectors. The licensee inspected the
                    other CA RTDs and found the RTD upstream of 1CA-57 also disconnected    i
                    and others were found damaged. These RTDs are installed to monitor      !
                    check valve backleakage from the stecm generators to the CA pumps to    l
                    prevent steam binding of the pumps. The CA RTDs were reinstalled,
                    however, a work request was not used to reinstall them. The RTDs are
                    strap on devices that attach perpendicularly to the pipe. The straps
                    were damaged such that the RTDs had slid under the straps and were
                    parallel to the pipe and could not be reinstalled properly.
                                                                                              l;
                    After reinstallation, the RTD upstream of ICA-57 was reading between    !
                    200 degrees and 246 degrees F; the operability limit is 250              !
                    degrees F.    Attempts were made to reseat the valve with out success.  !
                    The licensee then decided to replace the valve while on line.
                    On February 15, 1989, while checking the job site setup prior to
                    removal of ICA-57, the inspectors found the RTD upstream of ICA-57
                    again disconnected. Operations was not aware that the RTD had been
                    disconnected and no work request had been authorized to remove the
                    RTD.  Work Request 96430NSM indicated that the RTD was removed on      ,
                    February 15, 1989, however the work was not cleared to begin until
                    February 16, 1989.      Operations reconnected the RTD and again no work
                    request was used.
                    On February 16, 1989, maintenance personnel recorded on week request    i
                                                                                              l
                    96430NSM that the CA RTD was already removed prior to starting work.
                    Valve ICA-57 was replaced on February 16 and 17, 1989.
                    After replacing 1CA-57 and restoring the system to operation,
                    operations personnel noted that the RTD was still indicating high
                    piping temperatures. Upon investigation it was discovered that the
                    RTD had been incorrectly placed on the valve ICA-57 rather than
                    further upstream. The RTD was moved, apparently without using a work
                    request. The RTD continued to read high, though improved, and a fan
                    was left on the piping to cool the line between the check valve          i
                    and the RTD.      McGuire Maintenance Management Procedure (MMP) 1.0,
                    " Definition of the Work Request Form," describes the use of a work
                    request form to control work. Paritgraph B under the scope section
                    specifies that corrective maintenance (replacement and/or repair of
                    defective parts) shall require a work request. On several occasions,
                                                                                              1
- _ _ - .
 
- - _              -    _.                .                                                      -
                                                                                                      ,
            , a s
                .
                                                            5
                                                                                                        4
                              as described previously, maintenance was performed in reinstalling
                              and removing the CA RTDs without an authorized work request. This is
                              considered a failure to follow administrative procedures and is
                              identified as a violation of T.S. 6.8.1: 369,370/89-01-01, Failure
                              to Follow Maintenance Administrative Procedure.                          {
                              In reviewing the completed 1CA-57 work request 96430NSM it was noted
                              that the Operation Control Accepted block was signed by the shift
                              engineer (shift technical advisor) and not by a member of the
                              operations department.    MMP 1.0 section 2.20 states that the          ,
                              Operation Control Accepted block shall be signed by a responsible
                              representative of the group that gave clearance to begin work.
                              Operations gave clearance to begin work and the shift engineer is in
                              the Integrated Scheduling department. Apparently past practice has
                              been to allow shift engineers to sign for operators in some
                              circumstances (primarily for modifications), however, this is not in
                              accordance with station procedures. The licensee indicated that it      '
                                                                                                        !
                              is their intent to have shift engineers sign for clearing
                              modifications in some cases. This is a second example of failure to      i
                                                                                                      '
                              follow administrative procedures, violation 269,370/89-01-01.
                        d.    The inspector accompanied NRC/NRR personnel to review the licensee's
                              raw water fouling monitoring program. Heat exhanager and other raw
                              water fouling is a general industry problem and the NRC is gathering
                              information in order to develop a generic communication to the
                              industry. The licensee has developed various methods to maintain
                              heat exchangers included differential pressure (DP) and heat transfer
                              testing, periodic cleaning and flushing and continuous DP monitoring
                              of Component Cooling System heat exchangers. Visual and ultrasonic      !
                              testing is also being utilized.    These programs have been and will
                              continue to be monitered by the NRC.
                              One violation was identified in this area.    (Also see paragraph 6).
                    6. Licensee Event Report (LER) Followup (90712,92700)
                        The following LERs were reviewed to determine whether reporting
                        requirements have been met, the cause appears accurate, the corrective
                        actions appear appropriate, generic applicability has been considered, and
                        whether the event is related to previous events.        Selected LERs were
                        chosen for more detailed followup in verifying the nature, impact, and
                        cause of the event as well as corrective actions taken. The following
                        LERs are considered closed:
                        (Closed)    LER 369/88-23, Required Surveillance was not Performed on Two
                        Snubbers.    These snubbers were omitted since a formal snubber inspection
                        list was not maintained. The snubbers omitted were subsequently inspected
                        and found to be operable. The licensee is developing a computerized data      s
                        base program to track all safety related snubber inspection requirements.
                        This event constitutes a violation of T.S. 3.7.8. This violation meets
                        the criteria specified in Section V of the NRC Enforcement Policy for not
                        issuing a Notice of Violation and is not cited. LIV 369/89-01-02, Missed
                        TS Surveillance on Snubbers.
      __-_ _                                                                                            )
 
E
h3 2: .:
  .
                        .
                                                6
                                                                                          i
                                                                                            !
          (Closed)' LER -369/88-29, Fire Barriers Breached Due to Management
          Deficiency and Unknown Reasons. A management deficiency existed because
          vendor personnel involved had not received the appropriate training.
          Cause of the other breaches could not be determined.. Corrective actions
          are being taken to prevent recurrence of this event, however, there_have
          been several instances of breached fire barriers in the past several
        -years. 1his event constitutes a violation of TS 3.7.11. .This violation
        meets the criteria specified in_ Section V of the NRC Enforcement Policy ~
          for not issuing a Notice of Violation and is not cited. LIV 369/89-01-03,
          Breach of Fire Barriers. The licensee is performing an evaluation of past
          fire barrier violations due to the large number of previous breaches. The        ,
          licensee stated that these occurrences have decreased in number over the
                                                                                          '
          past several years.
          (Closed) LER 369/88-42, ESF Actuation Occurred Due to Personnel Error.
          An operator ' caused the motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump to auto start
        while in Mode 3 by resetting the ATWS Mitigation System and Actuation
          Circuitry (AMSAC). The operator had received training on_ the recently
          installed AMSAC system but reset the circuit when the operator mistakenly
          believed that the system was generating a signal to shut a blowdown valve
          which the operator was attempting to open. The valve was actually
          receiving an isolation signal from a high level in the blowdown tank. The        l
          inspector reviewed the training package for the AMSAC modification and          j
          found it to be adequate with the following exception. The training              i
          package stated that the AMSAC indicating light on the control board was        '
                                                                                          ;
          lit when the system was bypassed.      The indicating light is actually lit
          when the system is in the reset mode (not bypassed). The light itself is        :
                                                                                          '
          not labeled and located between the " Bypass" and " Reset" push buttons.    In
          spite of the erroneous training operations personnel questioned by' the'        i
          inspector were aware that the indication was lit when the system was
          reset. The nomenclature of the AMSAC system and no label on the                  ;
          indicating light are poor from a human factors perspective. Reseting            '
          other plant equipment serves to remove a signal restoring control to the
          operator but in this case reset caused an actuation signal to be generated
          in the plant conditions that existed at the time.        The licensee is
          considering' relabeling the control switch and light.
                                                                                          .
          (Closed)    LER 370/88-06, ESF Actuation Due to Personnel Error and
          Procedure Deficiency. Violation 369,370/88-20-01 was issued with this
          event as one example. Corrective actions will be tracked in followup to
          the violation.
          (Closed)    LER 370/88-13, Water Level ESF Actuation Instrumentation for a
          Main Feedwater Isolation Valve Inoperable for Indeterminate Period of
          Time. Although an ESF instrument was inoperable for an extended period of
          time an NRC Notice of Violation is not considered appropriate since the
          problem was discovered by licensee self initiated corrective actions and
          previous escalated enforcement was issued for problems with the same root
          cause (open sliding links and failure of the test program to discover the
          deficiency), see NRC Report No. 369,370/88-29.
 
                    .- -
                                                                                                                                ,
                                - __ - ___ _-- - -                -            _ - _ _ _ _ . _ _            __.  _ _      -
VL ;,.                        ,
                                                                                                                                ;l
        -
      .
                                                                            7
                                                    '
                        (Closed)-LER 369/89-01, Failure to Take Compensatory Measures When.Both-
                      Trains of Control Room Area Ventilation Were Inoperable. This event was
                        identified as a violation in paragraph 7 and corrective actions will be
                      evaluated in. followup to the violation.                                                            ->
                      The following LERs are also considered closed:                                                          -i
                                                                                                                  '
                                                                                                                                  I
;                              LER 369/88-24                                                  LER 370/88-08.
L                              LER 369/88-35                                                  LER 369/88-43                    !
                                LER 369/88-41'                                                LER 369/88-46                      l
                                LER.369/88-44,'Rev.1                                            LER 369/88-47                    !
                      Two licensee identified violations were identified as described above.
          7.            Follow-up on Previous Inspect' ion Findings                                (92701,92702)
                      The following previously identified items were reviewed to ascertain that
        ^
                        the licensee's responses, where applicable, and licensee actions were.in
                      compliance with regulatory requirements and corrective. actions have been                                  l
                        completed.                    Selective verification included record review, observations,
'
                        and discussions with licensee personnel,                                                                  i
                        (Closed) Inspector Followup Item 370/87-41-02, Both Trains of Control
                        Room Ventilation and Chilled Water Fail Control Room Pressurization Test.
                      The event was reviewed and corrective actions have been taken. A program                                  l
                        for checking control room door seals has been established.
                        (Closed) Violation 369/88-09-03, Inoperable Nuclear Service Water Train
                        Due to Inadequate ' Post Maintenance Test. Planners have reviewed this
                        event to prevent recurrence.                    Failure to perform post maintenance tests                I
                        has occurred since this event. A racent example is documented in Report
                        369,370/88-33, where CA-44 was not retested to set the travel stops after
                      maintenance.
                        (Closed). Violation 370/88-14-02, Failure to Follow Procedure and Failure
                        to Use a Procedure to Perform Safety Related Work. The licensee
                        attributed 'this event to personnel error on the part of the individual
                        performing the work. The individual was counseled and station management
                        has been stressing procedural compliance. This general area continues to
                        be evaluated by the inspectors.
                        (Closed) Violation 370/88-20-01 Failure to Follow Procedures / Inadequate                                l
                        Procedures With Three Examples. The licensees corrective actions for                                      i
                                                                                                                                  '
                        these three examples have been verified complete by the inspectors.                            The
                        second example involved a loss of offsite power due to improper
                          implementation of a general procedure OP/2/A/6350/05, "AC Electrical
                        Operation Other Than Normal Lineup."                      The licensee decided not to change
                        the procedure since the number of possible variations of alignment would
                        make a change to a more detailed procedure impractical. The licensee has
                        chosen to control this type of evolution through the use of the Removal
                        and Restoration (R&R) process. The inspectors will continue to observe
                        licensee performance in the use of R&Rs.
                                                                                                                                    l
___--        _ _ _ _ _                                                                                                            i
 
    _ _ _ _ _
              .
                *  .
                                                                                                  '
                  .
                                                                                                    l
                              '
                                                          8
                      (Closed) Inspector Followup Item 369,370/88-04-01, Long Term Corrective
                      Action Associated With Nuclear Service Water Expansion Joint Liner. The
                      liner and bellows were replaced using a stainless steel flanged joint
                      rather than a welded joint via a Nuclear Station Modification (NSM). The
                      NSM was installed on Unit i during the last outage and will be installed
                      on Unit 2 during the next refueling outage.
                      (Closed) Temporary Instruction 369,370/T2515/77, Survey Of Licensee's
                      Response to Selected Safety Issues. The completion of this instruction
                      was due in 1986. Formal documentation in an inspection report indicating
                      the instruction was completed could not be founu. The inspector verified
                      that the information requested by this instruction had been transmitted to
                      the proper NRC group in 1986 indicating that the instruction had been
                      completed.
                      (Closed) Inspector Followup Item 370/87-36-04, Review Electrical Breaker
                      Coordination Resulting in 9/6/87 Trip. This event involved a ground on an
                      instrument air (VI) compressor motor which tripped both the motor breaker  .
                      and the motor control center (MCC) feeder breaker. The McGuire NRC        !
                      Diagnostic Evaluation Team (DET) report paragraph 3.5.6.2, also discussed
                      this event and concluded that no NRC followup was considered necessary. A  ,
                                                                                                '
                      breaker coordination problem did, however, exist and the licensees Design
                      division has an on-going review underway of breaker coordination as a part
                      of an analytical model review. The essential power supply portion of the  ,
                      review has been completed and the non-essential power supply is currently  !
                      under review. This review includes normal and standby power supplies        4
                      under normal and faulted conditions. The DET was also concerned that the  j
                                                                                                '
                      responsible design personnel were unaware at the time of any concern with
                      breaker coordination problems at McGuire due to a communication concern.  I
                      Since the DET inspection, Design representatives have been stationed at
                      the site and Design has been reorganized such that the design personnel
                      involved deal only with McGuire.      The inspector discussed the
                      communications concern with the General Office Design person involved who  l
                      stated that information input and communication from the site are not a    ;
                                                Design personnel also indicated that breaker
                                                                                                '
                      problem at this time.
                      coordination is not assured in all cases since many of the breakers at
                      McGuire have instantaneous and long time current trips and no short time
                      trip. In some cases a ground may cause breaker coordination problems due
                      to high instantaneous current trips. Design indicated that breakers are
                      being replaced when needed with those having short time over current trips
                      to provide breaker coordination.
                      (Closed) Violation 369/88-09-02, Inoperable Component Cooling Train Due
                      To Inoperable Nuclear Service Water (RN) Valve. The licensee postulated,
                      that the travel stops on RN valve IRN-1908, service water flow control
                      "alve to the component cooling heat exchanger, had come loose and vibrated
                      out of position. Signs were placed on these valves warning against moving
                      the travel stops and locking the stops securely after any authorized
                      positioning. Corrective actions in the licensees response also included
                      placing Loctite thread sealant on th travel stops for 1RN-190B and
                      evaluating the need to put Loctite on all four of these valves. After
                                                                                                '
s __ m
 
                            . _ - - _    _-                      _
                          4          ..                                                                                          ;
                                      '
                                                                                                                                    l
                        .
                                                                .
                                                    '
l                                                                                      9
!
                                            Loctite was initially p          _d on 1RN-190B the licensee subsequently decided  i
                                            to discontinue use of Loctite in this application. Currently none of the            ;
                                                                                              The licensee stated that the
                                                                                                                                  '
                                            valves have Loctite on the travel stops.
                                            travel stops have not been found out of position since this event                  'i
                                            occurred.    In addition, these valves are scheduled to be replaced with
                                            more reliable valves in the early 1990's. All signs have been verified in
                                            place and tightness of the selected travel stops has been verified by the
                                            inspector.
                                            (Closed)  Unresolved Item 369,370/88-33-03:        Review of Control Room Door
                                            Seal Maintenance Affecting Operability of Control Room Ventilation.          On    !
                                            January 17, 1989 Mechanical Maintenance personnel replaced the seals on a          ,
                                            control room door rendering Control Room Ventilation (VC) system                    l
                                            inoperable for approximately 5 hours. Instructions on the work request
                                            (WR) stated " Repair or adjust door closure after door seal is replaced".        j
                                            Another WR was supposed to be implemented first which would have                  ;
                                            implemented adequate controls to maintain VC operable. Although the
                                            statement on the WR could be misleading it did not clearly authorize seal
                                            work to be accomplished.          Maintenance Management Procedure (MMP) Scopa    ,
                                            Section Bl.0 requires a WR for maintenance activities. Responsibility            l
                                            Section Bl.11 requires a description of requested work. This incident is
                                            considered a violation of both sections of MMP 1.0 in that unauthorized
                                            work was accomplished and the description of work was unclear. This is
                                            another example of violation 369,370/89-01-01, Failure to Follow
                                            Maintenance Administrative Procedures.
                                                                                                                                !
                                            (Closed)  Unresolved Item 369/88-33-07:        Followup of Dilution Event. On    ;
                                            January 10, 1989 a cation bed demineralized was placed in service which          !
                                            led to an unplanned dilution of the reactor coolant system. Operators            l
                                                                                                                              '
                                            acted in a timely manner to isolate the demineralized and boron concen-
                                            tration was returned to normal. Excore detectors rose approximately              "
                                                                                                                                .
                                            1.2% and the highest indication of excore power was 100.49%. While this
                                            event was not a significant transient, it is important that procedures            i
                                            adequately control reactivity without unplanned changes. McGuire
                                            Procedure OP/1/A/6200/01, Chemical and Volume Control System, contains            !
                                            instructions for placing the cation bed demineralized in service. This
                                            procedure specifies boron saturating mixed bed demineralizers prior to            ,
                                            placing in service to ensure no change in reactivity, however, the
                                            procedure does not require boron saturating the cation bed demineralized
                                              rior to placing in service.          The chemistry procedure in this case
                                            p(CP/0/B/8400/14) allowed filling of the demineralized with unborated water
                                            leading to the event.          Therefore, this is a violation of Technical
                                            Specification 6.8.1 which requires that adequate written procedures be
                                            maintained for plant systems. This is violation 369/89-01-04: Inadequate
                                            Chemistry Procedure Leading to Inadvertent Dilution.
                                              (0 pen) Bulletin 85-03: As requested by Action Item e. of Bulletin 85-03,
                                            " Motor-Operated Valve Common Mode Failures During Plant Transients Due to
                                              Improper Switch Settings", the licensee identified the required
                                            safety-related valves, the valves' maximum differential pressures and a
                                            prograni to assure valve operability in their letters dated May 16, 1986,
                                            November 20, 1986, and February 18, 1987. Review of these responses
                                            indicated the need for additional information which was requested in NRC
                                            Region II letter dated March 31, 1988.
____ ___ __ _________ __                                  . _ _    _ _ _ _                                                  J
 
                                                                                                                            _ - _ _ _
          _._'                  .
                              .
            4
                                                                                  10
                                                                                                                                      ;
                                              Review of the licensee's May 2,      1988, response to the request for                4
                                              additional information indicates that the licensee's selection of the
                                              applicable safety-related valves to be addressed and the valve's maximum                i
                                              differential pressures meets the requirements of the bulletin and that the            l
                                              program to assure valve operability requested by Action Item e. of the
                                              bulletin is now acceptable, with the exception of providing justification              ;
                                              in cases where testing with maximum differential pressure cannct                      ,
                                              practicably be performed.    Prior to final acceptance, differential                  i
                                              pressure testing will be examined more closely by a regional inspector.
                                              The results of the inspections to verify proper implementation of this
                                              program and the ' review of the final response required by Action Item f. of
                                              the bulletin will be addressed in additional inspection reports.
                                              Two violations were identified as described above.                                    '
                                        8.    Review of Licensed Operators Medical Records    (71707)
                                              10 CFR Part 55 requires that applicants for an operator's license be
                                              certified as medically fit.    Documentation of medical examinations is
                                              required to be maintained and made available for review by the NRC. A
                                              random review of medical examination documentation was conducted from
                                              currently licensed reactor operators.
                                              No violations or deviations were identified.
                                        9.  Escalated Enforcement Issues
                                              On January 19, 1989, two severity level III violations were issued
                                              concerning the operability of the hydrogen. skimmer (VX) system and                    ,
                                              inadequate post modification testing. Reports 369,370/88-24 and 88-29
                                              identified numerous concerns in these areas which ultimately resulted in
                                              the two severity level III violations.    In order to correctly document the
                                              final disposition of these items, previously opened items 88-24-01,
                                              88-24-02, 88-24-03, and 88-24-04 are being combined into one item                      {
                                              369,370/88-24-03,VX Operability Violation. Also, 88-29-01, 88-29-02 and                j
                                              88-29-03 are being combined into one item 369,370/88-29-01, Inadequate                    '
                                              Post Modification / Maintenance Testing. These two items will remain open              ,
                                              pending review of completed corrective actions for the violations.                      l
                                          10.  Drawing System Verification (37701, 39702)
                                              The inspector conducted a special inspection of the drawing control
                                              program and reviewed critical control room and technical support center                  )
                                              drawings to verify the drawings were adequately controlled, legible and                  j
                                              usable by the operations staff for decision making during an emergency.                  l
                                              Licensee Station Directive (SD) 2.1.1 describes the licensee's process for                l
                                              drawing control. SD 4.4.1 and 4.4.2 describe the program for modifica-
                                              tions including incorporation of modifications into drawings. Operations                ;
                                              Management Procedure (OMP) 1-11 provides guidance to operations staff in                  l
                                                                                                                                      )
                                                                                                                                        !
                                                                                                                                        !
                                                                                                                                        1
                                                                                                                                        !
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _        _ _ _
                                                                                                                                        j
 
                                        _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _          _ _ - _
    '
  .  .                                                                                                              !
                                                                                                                      l
  .
                                    .
                                                                            11                                      ;
                      maintaining critical drawings up to date relative to modifications.                        The
                      licensee indicated that OMP 1-11 was being reviewed to add more detailed                        .
                      control for updating drawings relative to modifications. The licensee                          ;
                                                                                                                        '
                      presently red marks critical drawings for significant plant modifications
                      to assure current information is available while waiting on an official
                      drawing change which typically takes several months. Addition of a valve
                      would be a significant change and addition of a note would typically not
                      be considered significant. Temporary modifications are not presently red
                      marked. A note is placed on the drawing and the package is filed in the
                      control room for reference. While these modifications are usuall- cimple
                      in nature, the licensee is evaluating the need for red marking                            'Se  ,
                      licensee also intends to provide more guidance for complicated red marking
                      and partially implemented modifications. The inspectors review showed                          ;
                      that drawings were being red marked with appropriate reference to the                          j
                      modification and a file was maintained of modification packages #or                            l
                      further reference.                  Drawing stamps and red marking are supposed t be
                      initialed by the clerk and a second person who is SR0 licensed.
                      Some discrepancies were identified. An out of date drawing revision was
                      noted. In addition, some markings were not properly initialed, two added
                      drain valves were not red marked, some areas of electrical drawings were
                      illegible and the modification file was in disarray.                          The inspector
                      discussed these problems with the licensee. The licensee immediately
                      initiated a complete audit of critical drawings and found additional
                      similar discrepancies. The licensee initiated corrective actions. Out of
                      date drawings and illegible areas were determined to be insignificant to
                      operations. A number of discrepancies were found on control room drawings                        i
                      but were not critical. These drawings are being evaluated for retention.
                      Some drawings were found with unnecessary stamps or references to
                      temporary modifications. The fi'le was reorganized and a training package
                      was developed for shift clerks.                        Stamps and red marks have been validated
                      and out of date drawings have been replaced. Additional reviews by an NRC
                      team inspection (see Report 369,370/89-02) identified one out-of-date                          ;
                      drawing since the licensee audit, identified several situations where the                      j
                      control rrom had later drawings than the Master File and also discovered                          l
                      that confusion may exist with operators as to whether the drawings are
                      usable without using the NSM's on file. The licensee indicated that a
                      Design Engineering master list was available, that operator training would                        ]
                      be conducted and that Operations, Projects (lead group for modifications)                          l
                      and Document Control personnel would be working together to verify                                I
                      drawings which were affected by the modification process are up-to-date in
                      all station groups.                  The Master file problems were apparently filing
i                    errors only. The licensee also indicated that Document Control personnel
                      had recently deleted distribution / accountability sheets and master file
i                      audits for drawings.                  Individual groups were tasked with auditing. The            l
'
                      licensee committed to evaluate the need for reinstating these processes or                        l
l                      improving existing processes as necessary based on additional problems                            !
'
                      found.
                                                                                                                          l
                                                                                                                          l
        _ _ _ - _ _ _
                                                                                                                          l
 
LJ.  .
  .
                    '
!.                                              12
l          The licensee relies on -internal audits of individual groups and random
            audits / surveillance by quality assurance (QA) personnel.        One QA
            surveillance of modifications was conducted in late 1988 with no problems
          . identified and one audit was conducted in 1987 with one minor finding.
            Past operations audits have apparently not been sufficiently broad based.
            The licensee was requested to consider an improved audit process. A          ,
            detailed walkdown of the Unit 1 Auxiliary Feedwater System against
            as-built drawings was also conducted (see paragraphs 3 and 5).
            The above discrepancies appear to have minor technical significance and
            the licensee initiated appropriate corrective action before the inspection
            period ended. This violation meets the criteria specified in Section V of
            the NRC Enforcement Policy for not issuing a Notice of Violation and is
            not cited.    However, further followup wiil be conducted of licensee
            corrective actions. This is Violation 369,370/89-01-05: Followup of
            Improvements in Control Room Drawing Control.
            One violation was identified as described above which is not being cited.
      11. Review Of Plant Procedures      (42700)
                                                                                          !
            Due to an ongoing concern with failure to follow procedures the
            inspector reviewed procedures which define how specific procedures are to
            be implemented. Procedures reviewed included " Operations Management
            Procedure" (OMP) 1-2, "Use of Procedures"; OMP 2-17, "Tagout/ Removal and
            Restoration (R&R) Procedure" and Station Directive 4.2.1, " Handling of
            Station Procedures". The following comments are provided:
            a.    The first statement in the OMP 1-2 section titled " General Statements
                  of Philosophy" is that " Procedures do not cover all situations".
                  While this is a true statement it appears inappropriate that this
                  statement is listed first under philosophy.    If procedure compliance
                  is to be strongly emphasized, and may imply to some that procedures
                  do not need to be followed. The OMP 1-2 later states that operators
                  are required to take appropriate action to place the plant in a safe
                  condition, independent of procedures. This is also an appropriate
                  statement, however, the OMP should emphasize the use of procedures
                  for most situations and processing changes when the time taken to
                  process the change will not impact plant or personnel safety. In
                  summary, the OMP should reflect the strict procedural compliance, an
                  attitude that the licensee ihas verbally indicated it intends to
                  enforce,
            b.    OMP 1-2, Section 7.1.E under philosophy, states " Prior to using any
                  procedure the initial conditions...must be verified. If these are
                  not met, the procedure cannot be used without supervisory review and
                  approval". This section does not state that a procedure change must
                  be processed and, therefore, is unclear as to whether a change is      ,
                  needed.    A procedure change should be made if initial conditions
                  cannot be met.
 
  ,_      _ ._
1      1.
    ,        .
            .
l
                            .
                                                  13
                c. OMP 1-2, Section 7.2.E.1 allows signing a valve checklist even if the
                    valve is mispositioned as long as a Removal and Restoration (R&R)
                    exists. It seems to be more appropriate to sign the checklist noting
                    that the valve mis-position is acceptable per R&R,
                d. OMP 1-2, Section 7.2.F states " Performance valve checklist may be
                    performed by Operations to allow performance testing of certain
                    systems.  When the testing is complete, the checklist requires the
                    valves to be returned to a " normal" position. This " normal" position
                    may not correspond to the actual valve position required by the
                    approved (0P) Operations Procedures currently in use. In such cases,
                    the Performance valve checklist " normal" position should be signed
                    off as being correctly positioned."
                    There has been difficulty in the past with conflict between the final  j
                    position of valves in a performance test procedure and the position
                    desired by Operations (per the OP in use or an R&R). Performance
                    test procedures use various methods in an attempt to overcome this
                    problem including recording the as found position in the PT and
                    specifying returning the valve to the as found condition; specifying
                    returning the valve to the position desired by operations; and          .
                    specifying final positions but allowing deviation from the final      l
                    position if an R & R is outstanding on the valve. However, the OMP
                    paragraph allows signing for a valve which is out of position. Other
                    alternatives exist that would not give the appearance of the          ,
                                                                                          '
                    performance procedure.
                e. OMP 1-2 Section 10.1.A states that "No deviation from the original
                    intent of the procedure shall be allowed without an approved
                    procedure change". The original intent is not defined and this
                    statement allows the procedure user to interpret original intent
                    without reviews. Original intent needs to be clearly defined and
                    narrowly interpreted by procedure users. TS 6.8.3. in part states      j
                    that temporary changes to procedures may be made if the intent of the
                    original procedure is not altered. Intent in the TS is not defined,
                    however, the TS requires approval of a temporary change by two
                    members of the plant management staff, at least one of whom must
                    holds a senior operator license and review / approval by the plant
                    manager or a superintendent within 14 days. The intent determination
                    made by the procedure user per 0MP 1-2 does not receive the reviews
                    required by the TS.
                f. OMP 1-2 outlines the use of procedures for Operations Department
                    personnel but not for other station personnel. Only minimal guidance
                    is provided for other personnel via Station Directive (SD) 4.2.1,
                    " Handling of Station Procedures".    Section 1.0 states that the
                    objective of Station Directive 4.2.1 is to insure adequate prepara-
                    tion, review and approval for all station procedures, changes and
                    completed procedures.    Ensuring proper use of procedures is not
                    listed as an objective of SD 4.2.1. Section 4.0.9 of SD 4.2.1 is
                    titled "Use of Procedures" but the guidelines are very limited. The
                    licensee committed to revise SD 4.2.1 to be more specific in the
 
                        .                    -          -    -                          -    - - - -
          .
  ,, # .                                                                                                q
  ,
          x                                                                                            q
                                      .
'
                                                              14
                                '
                          requirements for use of procedures in response to violation
                          369/87-41-04 _ The revision of SD 4.2.1 dated' December 18, 1987 was
                          incomplete in that the only change in~this area was to state'"Where
                          an approved Station Procedure exists that covers station activities,            J
                          those station activities shall always be conducted in accordance with          I
            ,            the provisions of the approved procedures." The revision to SD 4.2.1
                          was intended to reflect the management policy clarification on the              .
                          use of procedures as stated in the plant managers memorandum dated              l
                          10/27/87. This memorandum stated:                                            =i
                          (a)    "If a station activity is important enough to have a procedure        l
                                  written to perform the activity, then the procedure will always
                                  be used, in its entirety... Steps may not be deleted, skipped or
                                  altered without a procedure change being made unless specifi-
                                  cally allowed by the procedure. To perform the activity without
                                  the procedure IS NOT OPTIONAL."
                                                                                                          ;
                          (b)    "Do not deviate from the scope of the , procedure unless the
                                  activity is covered by another procedure or administrative
                                  control, such as a troubleshooting procedure.        Again, if the
                                  activity .'s important enough to be performed under procedural
                                  control, DO NOT PERFORM ACTIVITIES THAT G0 BEYOND THE PROCEDURE        l
                                  without also using a procedure or other administrative
                                  controls".
                          The actual change to SD 4.2.1 did not state that steps may not be
                          deleted, skipped, or altered without a procedure change unless
                          specifically allowed by the procedure.        Part 8 of the memorandum      .i
                          likewise was not included in the station directive. Realistically              J
                          there are situations in which procedures cannot be followed or where
                          alternate rethods are acceptable.          Clear guidance needs to be          ;
                                                                                                          '
                          provided for these situations to maintain a proper attitude for
                          following procedures and to assure correction of procedural problems.
                          In summary, SD 4.2.1 appears weak in the area of providing guidance
                          on use of procedures.
                      g.  "Tagout/ Removal and Restoration (R&R) Procedure", OMP 2-17 provides
                          guidance for removal and resto"ation of equipment. However, very
                          little guidance is provided relative to when an R&R can be used in
                          lieu of a procedure. The licensee is developing this guidance based
                          on an NRC violation (369,370/88-31-01).
                      h.  The licetsee hat independently recognized the need to improve
                          guidance for use of Abnormal and Emergency procedures and is
                          developing this guidance.
                          Due to the history of weak procedural compliance and adequacy at
                          McGuire, management has increned emphasis on following procedures
                          and correcting inadequacies in procedures. However, the Station
                          Directive and Operations Management Procedures governing use of
                          procedures continue to be weak in providing adequate guidance 'to
                          plant personnel. Again, it is noted that the OMP applies only to
                          Operations Personnel and the Station Directive applies to all Station
    . _ _ _ - _ _ _ _
 
o-
                          f a r a.,
b.
                                                  4
                                                                .a                                                                                                                                                              4
<m
                                                                                                                                                          .                                                                  ,
                                                                                                                                                                                -15                                                l
                                                                                                                                                                                                                            1
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                1
                                                                                                                                                  Personnel-b'ut the SD gives very l'ittle' guidance on use of procedures.:  .
                                                                                                                                                  The- current written guidance for use of procedures is. considered a              i
                                                                                                                                                  weakness and ~ an Inspector Followup Item IFI- 369,370/89-01-06,                  l
                                                                                                                                                  Written Guidance on Use of Procedures, is being opened to followup in.        j
                                              y                                                                                                  this area.                                                                      ;
                                                                                                                                                  No violations or deviations were' identified.
                                                                                    '12.                                      Review of Problem Investigation Process                      .(71707)                              ,
                                                                                                                              The inspectors reviewed various problems and' events to determine if the'                      j
                                                                                                                              stations corrective action program was being properly implemented relative                        l
                                                                                                                              to these situations. Problem Investigation Reports (PIRs) were also.                              l
                                                                                                                              reviewed .to determine adequacy of program implementation.                    The primary          ,
                                                                                                                              program the licensee uses .for identifying, documenting and correcting                          j
                                                                                                                              problems is the PIR program implemented by Station Directive 2.8.1,                              ;
                                                                                                                                " Problem Investigation Process". This procedure requires in paragraph
                                                                                                                              5.1.1 that " Problems identified that meet the criteria in Attachment 1                      j    '
                                                                                                                              shall be documented as soon as practical..." Attachment 1 defines the.
                                                                                                                              criteria for writing a PIR as follows:
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                ;
                                                                                                                                                  1.    Unplanned,. unexpected, unenalyzed events, or conditions involving    1 '
                                                                                                                                                        important functions.
                                                                                                                                                  2.    Degradation, damage, failure, malfunction or 1oss of plant equipment
                                                                                                                                                        performing important functions.
                                                                                                                                                  3.    Deviation from or deficiencies involving code, specifications
                                                                                                                                                        (includes Tech Specs) requirements, or administrative controls
                                                                                                                                                        involving important functions.                                      o
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                1
                                                                                                                              Two apparent failures- of the licensee to document problems in accordance
                                                                                                                              with the above criteria were discovered by the inspectors. The licensee
                                                                                                                              experienced a loss of Residual Heat Removal on December 1,1988 on Unit 1
                                                                                                                                in part due to a confusing drawing which had not been properly updated
                                                                                                                                (see NRC Re                    369,370/88-33).    A problem was identified by the
                                                                                                                                inspectors (portsee paragraph 5) involving . damaged Auxiliary Feedwater (CA)
                                                                                                                                System temperature detectors. Neither of these issues were documented on
                                                                                                                              a PIR.                  In addition, two other situations were documented on a PIR
                                                                                                                              approximately two weeks after the events and after NRC prompting. One                            ;
                                                                                                                                situation involved-a leaking CA check valve which was documented on PIR                        l
                                                                                                                                1-M89-0046.                  Leakage of this valve can affect CA operability. Another          ,
                                                                                                                                issue involved missing fuses causing a Diesel Generator breaker to not                      1
                                                                                                                                function. Local - function (not emergency start) only was affected,                              i
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                '
                                                                                                                                however, this was a repeat problem which could indicate a program weakness
                                                                                                                                or personnel problem. This situation was documented after prompting on                          ;
_______ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ - _ - _ _ _ - _ - . _ - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
 
            _ __ . _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .
  ,
    *    .
      ..
  d
                                                            .
                                                                                    16
                                              PIR 1-M89-0050.    While the inspector cannot show that the PIRs would not
                                              have been issued, these issues appear to indicate weaknesses in aggressive
                                              program implementation. Another situation involved corrective maintenance    1
                                              on the Unit 1 CA turbine driven pump. This work was documented on Work        l
                                              Request (WR) 500488 MNT.      The WR indicated that the overspeed trip
                                              mechanism was found inoperable indicating a possible past operability
                                              issue or maintenance problem. Upon questioning of two individuals by the      l
                                              inspector each indicated that he thought the other was going to issue a
l
                                              PIR.    The licensee eventually decided to document the problem on an
                                              existing PIR which had been written previously identifying that the
                                              mechanism was not being periodically tested.      This problem may not have
                                              been fully addressed without NRC prompting.
                                              The inspector reviewed PIR 0-M88-0022.      This PIR documented problems with
                                              instrument air lines and prompted filter inspections and review for
                                              adequate sizing. Part of the corrective action was to evaluate the need
                                              for a preventive maintenance (PM) program. Given the problems experienced
                                              at McGuire and generally well known industry problems this corrective
                                              action appeared weak and would have allowed no program to be implemented
                                              based on one individuals decision.        In addition, Quality Assurance
                                              personnel signed off the PIR indicating a PM program had been implemented.
                                              The air system is designed fail safe and is non-safety-related but this
                                              issue may also indicate weaknesses in program implementation. The first
                                              two examples are considered a Violation 369,370/89-01-07: Failure To
                                              Follow Procedure With Respect To Writing Problem Investigation Reports.
                                              Since this violation is indicative of program implementation weaknesses,
                                              both units are included.    A review of licensee statistics did show the
                                              number of PIR's issued had increased through 1988 indicating an improving
                                              documentation trend. The licensee is trending numbers of PIR's on a
                                              monthly basis as a management tool.
                                              One violation was identified.
                13.                            Exit Interview (30703)
                                              The inspection findings identified below were summarized on February 27,
                                                1989, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The following
                                                items were discussed in detail:
                                                (0 pen) Violation 369,370/89-01-01, Failure to Follow Maintenance
                                              Administrative Procedure.      Three examples were identified involving
                                                performing work without a work request and improper acceptance of
                                                operational control following maintenance. (Paragraphs 5 and 6)
                                                (Closed) Licensee Identified Violation 369/89-01-02, Missed TS
                                                Surveillance on Snubbers.    (Paragraph 6)
                                                (Closed) Licensee Identified Violation 369/89-01-03, Breach of Fire
                                                Barriers.  (Paragraph 6)
 
                                                                                            _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ,
  4 0-e
      .
  .
                                .
                                                      17
                  (0 pen) Violation 369/89-01-04, Inadequate Chemistry Procedure Leading to
                  . Inadvertent Dilution. (Paragraph 7)
                  (0 pen) Violation- 369,370/89-01-05, Followup of Improvements in Control
                  Room Drawing Control.    For reasons described in the report no Notice of                      i
                  Violation is being issued for this violation.    (Paragraph 10)
                  (0 pen) Inspector Followup Item 369,370/89-01-06, Weakness in Written
                  Guidance on Use of Procedures.    (Paragraph 11)
                  (0 pen) Violation 369,370/89-01-07, Failure to follow Proceduces With
                  Respect to Writing Problem Investigation Reports (PIRs). (Paragraph 12)
                  The licensee representatives present offered no dissenting comments, nor
                  did they identify as proprietary any of the information reviewed by the                        ;
                  inspectors during the course of their inspection.                                              l
                                                                                                                  ,
                                                                                                                  !
                                                                                                                  ,
                                                                                                                  I
                                                                                                                    i
                                                                                                                      l
                                                                                                                  l;
                                                                                                                  i
                                                                                                                      l
L____ ---__ _ - .                                                                                                    I
}}

Revision as of 00:51, 25 January 2022

Redirect to:

Retrieved from "https://kanterella.com/w/index.php?title=ML20244A883&oldid=3419807"