NUREG-1154, Identifies & Assigns Responsibility for Generic & plant- Specific Actions Resulting from Investigation of Davis-Besse Event (Documented in NUREG-1154).Plant-specific Actions Required for Plant Restart to Receive Priority Attention: Difference between revisions

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
(StriderTol Bot insert)
 
(StriderTol Bot change)
 
Line 1: Line 1:
{{Adams
#REDIRECT [[NUREG-1154, Addresses Prioritization of One Subtask Re Schedule for Resolving Generic Issue 125.I.1 Re Availability of Shift Technical Advisor,Per TMI Item I.A.1.1]]
| number = ML20209G018
| issue date = 08/05/1985
| title = Identifies & Assigns Responsibility for Generic & plant- Specific Actions Resulting from Investigation of Davis-Besse Event (Documented in NUREG-1154).Plant-specific Actions Required for Plant Restart to Receive Priority Attention
| author name = Dircks W
| author affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO)
| addressee name = Denton H, Minogue R, Taylor J
| addressee affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE), NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION (NRR), NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REGULATORY RESEARCH (RES)
| docket = 05000346
| license number =
| contact person =
| case reference number = RTR-NUREG-1154
| document report number = NUDOCS 8508090534
| document type = INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL MEMORANDUM, MEMORANDUMS-CORRESPONDENCE
| page count = 9
}}
 
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:_        _
UNIT ED STATES                                                                P ()M_.,
    * *fe                    **
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
      ' f [i'h. h , 7[e                                          nAsmNot on, o. c. 20sss t . s, 4 / f
          ,,        , / *. f
                                                                                            '.-J3 J 51935
                                                                                                                                                                                )
MEMORANDUM FOR:            Harold R. Denton, Director, NRR James M. Taylor, Director, IE Robert B. Minogue, Director, RES C. J. Heltemes, Jr. , Director, AEOD James G. Keppler, Regional Administrator, RIII FROM:                      William J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations
 
==SUBJECT:==
STAFF ACTIONS RESULTING FROM THE INVESTIGATION OF THE JUNE 9 DAVIS-BESSE EVENT (NUREG-1154).
An advance copy of the subject report was transmitted to you by rc.emorandum dated July 22, 1985 from the Davis-Bes'se Team Leader, C. E. Rossi. The report documents the Team's efforts in identifying the circumstances and causes of the June 9, 1985 event, together with findings and conclusions which form the basis for identifying follow-on actions.
You will note from the report that the licensee has not completed trouble-shooting and the determination of root causes for all equipment failures or malfunctions. Consequently, the results of future troubleshooting or analysis activities may form the basis for additional follow-on actions. The identifi-
                    , cation of these additional actions is a responsibility of the nomal program office. The responsibility for the followup and reporting on the licensee's continued troubleshooting and determination'of root cause for equipment failures is Region III.
!                    The purpose of this memorandum is to identify and assign responsibility for generic and plant-specific actions resulting from the investigation of the Davis-Besse event (documented in NUREG-1154). In this regard, you are requested to review the enclosure which specifies staff actions resulting from the investigation of the June 9 Davis-Besse event. You are requested to determine the actions necessary to resolve each of the items in your area of responsibility and, where appropriate, identify additional staff actions or revisions as our review and understanding of this event are refined.
Plant-specific action's required for plant restart should receive priority attention.
Although the NRC Team that investigated the Davis-Besse event did not identify major NRC deficiencies, nonetheless this event provides an opportunity to learn i                    from experience and to feed back the p Consequently, all responsible programanagers                                m,ertinent lessons should      conduct  intoanour.              activities.
in-depth                and searching reapprai, sal of the ,effecitupess of their programs 3nd the lessons of- hqJay_is-Besse            . In,sume how.can we make our programs more effective                            ,
sme<mm):
            ---m      wes, -wam--    -em --m-m  -m--    . - - -      , , , , - - , - - , ,
m-,- -
                                                                                                          -m-  w- -,w  --- ,-      ---,,->e:-,+
 
l l
For example, what actions are needed        l and the NRC a better regulatory agency?
when a utility continues to receive low SALP ratings; what impediments or procedures are delaying decisions regarding needed plant upgrades- how can effective corrective action be achieved when plants have a history of maintenance deficiencies; and what should be done when voluntary licensee improvement programs prove less than satisfactory? We need to reflect on these and similar questions and identify further, perhaps more focused actions to gain needed improvements.
In view of the importance of this subject, I intend to have periodic progress review meetings. The first meeting will be in September, and at that time you should be prepared to: (1) discuss the schedule and status of each item with-in your responsibility listed in the enclosure or that you have identified; and (2) provide a written summary of those actions you have identified for achieving improvements in your program areas. Further, I request, that you prepare a written status report on the disposition of your itemst(and anticipated actions for uncompleted items) within six months. Every effort should be made to dispose of these items promptly.                  .
The enclosure is based directly on the NRC Team's report. Accordingly, it does not include all licensee actions, nor does it cover NRC staff activities associated with normal event followup such as authorization for restart, plant inspections, or possible enforcement items. These items are expected to be defined and implemented in a routine manner. Overall lead responsibility for staff actions relating to facility restart is separate from this effort and rests with NRR. Additionally, NRR is responsible for coordinating and pro:mptly communicating the staff's requirements which must be resolved before operations at Davis-Besse may be resumed. Other offices involved in plant-specific actions are to coordinate their efforts with NRR.
Separately from this action, I will be discussing with you further how we may improve the IIT procedures based upon the experience with the Davis-Besse Team.
ppediWilliam J.Dhks William J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations
 
==Enclosure:==
As Stated cc w/ enclosure:                                                                      )
J. Davis, HMSS                                                                        ;
T. Murley, RI J. N. Grace, Ril
      -          R. Martin, RIV J. Martin, RV                                                              .
 
  -                            STAFF ACTIONS RESULTING FROM THE INVESTIGATIO!;
OF THE JUNE 9 DAVIS-BESSE EVEr.T
(
 
==Reference:==
NUREG-1154)
: 1. Item 1: Adequacy of the licensee's management and maintenance practices.
(
 
==Reference:==
Conclusion Section 8)
Action                                    Responsible Office        Category NRR            Plant-specific (a)    Evaluate and take action on the licensee's response to findings relating to corrective actions and preventive main-tenance problems (including testing, root cause determina-                          -
tion of equipment misoperation and operating experience).
Region III        Plant-specific (b)    Evaluate and take action on the                          f licensee's response to findings concerning management practices (e.g., control of maintenance programs and post-trip reviews).
: 2.      Item: Completion of analyses for loss of feedwater events.
(
 
==Reference:==
Section 7)
Responsible Office        Category
      .-            Action
          ~~~
Evaluate the time margins and                    NRR            Plant-specific consequences of alternative secuences for a loss of feed-water event at Davis-Besse.
: 3. Item:      Adequacy of the Steam Feedwater Rupture Control System (SFRCS).
(
 
==References:==
 
Section 5.2.2 and Finding 6)
Responsible Office        Category Action l
Review the design basis for SFRCS                NRR            Plant-specific and the susceptibility of the SFRCS to:    a) spurious actuations involving such items as MSIV closure; and b) single failures.
I l
i J
l
: 4.      Item:        Interaction of plant security features and operator actions.
(
 
==References:==
 
Section 3.6 and Finding 9)
Responsible Office            Category Action _
Evaluate the effect of security                          NRR              Plant-specific features (locked doors, locked                                            Generic equipment, etc.) on the operator's ability to gain prompt access to equipment required to perform safety actions outside the control room in accordance with emergency procedures.
: 5. Item:        Availability of the Shift Technical Advisor (STA)
Section 6.1.3 and Finding 14)              .-
(
 
==References:==
 
Responsible Office            Category Action NRR              Plant-spe'cific Evaluate the time available and                                            Generic role for STA assistance during complex operating events.
: 6. I ten.:    Reliability of the AFW containment isolation valves and other safety-related valves.
Section 5.2.5 and Findings 4, 5, 6, and 15)
(
 
==References:==
 
Responsible Office              Ca.tecorv
        ~ ~ ~ ~
Action Region III            Plant-specific (a) Monitor        the licensee's troubleshooting activities.
Evaluate the licensee's engineer-                NRR                Plant-specific (b) ing report on root cause analysis and proposed corrective actions.
NRR                Plant-specific (c) Determine if the safety function of the AFW containment isolation valves has been properly s,aecified, i.e., are the valves required to                                                  ..
open as well as close for design basis events.
NRR                Plant-specific    ;
(d) Verify that these valves constitute a single failure point for the AFW system for certain design basis 2-                            events.
                                                            ~  ~ ' '          --
 
3 4
Responsible Office                                      Category Action _
Determine that the procedures for                                                  Region III                      Plant-specific (e) adjustments of the AFW isolation valves such as torque switch bypass l                                          switches are clear and proper, and i
that the associated training programs are adequate. Confirm that adjust-l i
ment settings are consistent with-plant procedures.
Plant-specific (f) Determine                      if the engineering basis for the specification of NRR the adjustnents for safety-related valves such as the                                                                                        i j                                          torque switch and torque i                                          switch bypass switch settings 4
are adequate for all design                                                                                        .
basis events, l
Evaluate the test program for                                                          NRR                          Plant-specific f                                (g) the AFW containment isolation i                                            valves to confirm operability for all design basis events.
Evaluate whether other safety-                                                        NF.R                          Plant-specific
!                                  (h) related valves in Davis-Besse 1        ._--
may be subject to the same type /
4
                ~ - - '                      cause of failure.
AE00                          Generic (i)        Conduct a review of failures of N                    safety-related motor-operated valves and provide an assessment of pertinent failure modes affecting valve performance l                                              under design basis conditions, l
IE                              Generic f                                    (j)      Determine if further generic corres-pondence, such as an NRC Bulletin, is warranted'on this type /cause of                                                                                                                                -
failure of safety-related valves.                                                                                        -
i
: s.        Item: Adequacy of emergency notifications.
Section 6.1.4 and Finding 12)
(
 
==References:==
 
Responsible Office                                              Category                                  ;
Action _
l                                                                                                                                Re9 ton 111 Plant-specific (a) Verify the adequacy of the licensee's procedures and training for reporting of                                                                                                                                      -
events to the'NRC Operations                                                                                                                        '
Center.
l                                                                                                                                                                            .
f                                                              .
          .-----.-,,c,      ,g-  .w-r-,-    v er we---y w,.  -    ------m-,mn-      wa    -.  -~-.r    --e,--,-e-,--~~,-e-            n new,w r n ,p-v  --,-wnr-    ~,        m        +-,.~, wes,-----,        ,
 
4 Review the adequacy of NRC                                  IE          Generic (b) guidance for determination of severity levels when plant
'                              conditions vary and may be stable when the licensee has an opportunity to report.
(c) Review the adequacy of shift                                      IE        Generic staffing for assuring that knowledgeable individuals will be available for properly implementing the emergency plan during complex and long operational events.
Reliability of the AFW pump turbines.                            .-
: 8. Item:                            Sections 5.2.4 and 6.2.4 and Findings 4, 8, and 15)
(
 
==References:==
 
Action                                          Responsible Office            ." Category Region 111              Plant-specific (a) Monitor the licensee's troubleshooting activities l
including possible hot plant i
operation to confirm failure a                                mode.
Evaluate the licensee's engineer-                          NRR        Plant-specific (b)
          - "~                  ing report on root cause analysis 1            .-                  and proposed corrective actions.
NRR        ~ Plant-specific (c) Evaluate the licensee's response and corrective actions relating to the unreliability of the auxiliary feedwater system i
(including the need for a third pump and turbine trip reset
* capability).                                                                "
Region 111              Plant-specific i                        (d) Verify that the AFW system has
* been adequately tested to con-firm system configuration                                                                      ,
'                                  involved with design basis
* events.
Region III            Plant-specific (e) Review the implementation of the operator training program to assure proper operator
#                                  actions, such as resetting of                                                  .
trip throttle valve.
AE00        Generic (f) Conduct a review of past operating experience and l
determine the causes for
      -                            overspeed turbine trips.
 
4 (g)      Determine the need for further                              IE                      Generic generic correspondence on this failure mode /cause.
: 9. Item:          Reliability of the PORV.
(
 
==References:==
 
Sections 5.2.8 and 6.2.1 and Findings 10 and 13)
Responsible Office                  Category Action Region III                Plant-specific (a) Monitor the licensee's troubleshooting activities.
NRR                  Plant-specific (b)    Evaluate the licensee's engineering report on root cause analysis and proposed                                                      -
corrective actions.                                                            .
NRR                  Generic (c)    Determine the need for a                                                          -
test program to establish                                                      ..
reliability.
NRR                  Generic (d)    Determine if surveillance tests are necessary to confirm opera-tional readiness.
NRR                  Generic (e)    Determine if additional protection against PORY
            - --                    failure is necessary, i.e.,
      ~'
                ,...                 automatic block valve closure.
: 10. Item:          Adequacy of control room instrumentation and controls.
(
 
==References:==
 
Sections 6.1.1, 6.1.2, and 6.2.2 and Findings 10, 11, 17, and 18)
Resoonsible Office                Category
  >                        Action Evaluate the adequacy of                                NRR                  Plant-specific (a) the SFRCS actuation controls and associated
                            -            training program.
NRR          -        Plant-specific (b) Evaluate the adequacy of the installed control room instrumentation to allow operators to make the necessary and prompt determination for                                                                  .
procedure conformance and PORV position.                                                                      .
f
                                                            --.---.,.___,.s                                                    *
                                                                                ,,y  .
                                                                                          -_y -      -.% ,-r-y                          , _ _ . . -
 
Responsible Office                      Category Action NRR                          Plant-specific (c) Determine if NRC requirements                                              Generic should be revised regarding:
(1) SPDS availability; and (2) the need for plant-specific simulator.
: 11. Item: Heed for isolation of the startup feedwater pump.
Section 5.1.3 and Finding 7)
(
 
==References:==
 
Responsible Office                    Category Action NRR                          Plant-specific Reassess acceptability of the provisions which resulted in                                                /
the inability to place the startup feedwater pump in service from the control room.                                              ,.
: 12. Item:    Resolution of equipment deficiencies.
(
 
==References:==
Section 5 and Table 5.1)
Responsible Office                    Category _
Action Region III                    Plant-specific (a) Monitor    the licensee's troubleshooting activities.
NRR                          Plant-specific CI "'^      '
(b)    Evaluate the licensee's engineering report on the root cause analysis and corrective action for the equipment listed on Table 5.1 and not addressed by other items in this action plan.
IE                          Generic
('c) Determine the need for generic correspondence on equipment problems.
13.- ! tem:    Adequacy of plant procedures. Sections 6.1.1 and 6.1.2 and Findings 10                  .
(
 
==References:==
 
Responsible Office _                Category Action NRR                        Generic Verify that plant procedures involving " drastic" actions are required to be sufficiently precise and clear to ensure prompt implementation.
m w          y -  -y--. -., -
 
l e'                                                7_
: 14. Item: Adequacy of safety system testing.
(
 
==Reference:==
Finding 15)
Action                                Responsible Office        Category Evaluate the NRC requirements              NRR                Generic and guidance to assure that safety systems are tested in all configurations required by the design basis analysis.
: 15. Item: Acceptability of current safety assessment methods.
(
 
==References:==
Findings 1 and 2)
Action                                Responsible Office    c Category Assess the implications of                  RES                Generic multiple independent and                                    .-
common code failures as they relate to departures from design assumptions and specifications used in probabilistic safety analyses.
6 4
  .st-e 4  G e}}

Latest revision as of 20:52, 17 December 2021

Redirect to:

Retrieved from "https://kanterella.com/w/index.php?title=NUREG-1154,_Identifies_%26_Assigns_Responsibility_for_Generic_%26_plant-_Specific_Actions_Resulting_from_Investigation_of_Davis-Besse_Event_(Documented_in_NUREG-1154).Plant-specific_Actions_Required_for_Plant_Restart_to_Receive_Priority_Attention&oldid=3382271"