ML20148S753

Partially Withheld SECY-84-481,informing Commission of NRC Activities & Conclusions That Led to Emergency Response Data Sys Concept & Requesting Approval of Ltr to Congress

ML20148S753
Person / Time
Issue date:	12/26/1984
From:	Dircks W NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO)
To:
Shared Package
ML20148S706	List: ML20148S702 ML20148S731 ML20148S753
References
FOIA-87-737, FRN-55FR41095, TASK-PINV, TASK-SE AD32-1-034, AD32-1-34, SECY-84-481, NUDOCS 8802030139
Download: ML20148S753 (22)

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9 o.c.md., u. 1,84 POLICY ISSUE srev-i4-4n For: The Comission(ersNotation Vote)

From: William J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations

Subject:

UPGRADING THE NRC OPERATIONS CENTER'S ENERGENCY DATA i ACQUISITION CAPABILITY

Purpose:

To infom the Comission of staff activities and conclusions l that led to the Eciergency Response Data System (ERDS) concept , l and to obtain approval of a letter to the Congress.

Background:

As a result of.the Narch 28, 1979. accident at Three Mile Island Unit 2, the NRC and others recognized a need to substantially improve NRC's capability to acquire data on plant conditions during emergencies. The staff's response to this need included a proposal for a Nuclear Data Link (NDL).

A conceptual design for a NDL was produced under contract

( with Sandia National Laboratories, and, in April 1981, the Comission directed the staff to proceed with an NDL proto-type program. However, beginning in June 1981, a series of I Congressional actions and requests have caused the NRC to  !

reassess releasing a Request for Proposals to conduct a i prototype study. In the FY 1983 Pay Raise Supplement and the l FY 1984 Appropriations Bills, the Congress took actions that l

, effectively rejected several NRC requests to the Congress to '

allow the NDL to proceed. However, the NRC's FY 1984-85 Authorization requires the NDL concept to be included as part of any analysis of alternative mans for upgrading NRC data acquisition.

The FY 1934 85 Authorization Act requires analysis of four issues before an NDL or similar system can be implemented:

(1) the apprcpriate role of the Comissien during an acet-dent (2) the inforination needed by the Comission to support that role. (3) the alternative means of acquiring that data, and (4) any changes in Comission authority necessary to enhance Comission response to nuclear emergencies. The Act also requires a cost-benefit analysis of the alternatives considered for acquiring the data.

Informatix in this record was deleted

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The Comissioners

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• The staff proceeded to address the questions raised by ..

the Congress and to compare several alternatives for upgrad-ing emergency data acquisition capabilities for the Operations Center.. Alternative conceptual approaches were developed; their positive and negative attributes were tabulated; and these attributes were then compared to experiences gained j during the Federal Field Exercise, other drills, and actual events. -

The staff concluded that the design which best addresses the j Congressional criticisms of the NDL while meeting the requirements of NRC, is one which utilizes electronic data transmission systems already being developed by licensees for their own emergency response facilities. This concept, i called the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS , was tested

! with the assistance of Duke Power Company in Ju y 1984

) Discus sio'n: The Comission has defined the NRC's primary role in an i e:nergency at a licensed nuclear facility as one of monitoring j the licensee to assure that appropriate recomendations are made with respect to offsite protective actions. The Office i

of the Executive legal Director has reviewed existing legis-

• lation and deterinined that NRC's legal authority provides a J sufficient basis for the Comission s emergency response  ;

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( role. l ,

l The NRC believes that its response role can best be carried i out by a Site Team from the appropriate Regional Office. The - -

Regional Site Team, however, will require from 2 to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />  ;

i for transit, during which time Headcuarters must lead the '

I NRC'; initial response, including addressing requests for information advice, and assistance particularly from the i

- governor (s),oftheaffectedstate(s. Once in place, the '

l Regional Site Team cannot represent a full complement of l experts for dealing with all pertinent aspects of a major 4 event. Headquarttrs provides the Site Team with the addi. .

! tional expertise and analytic support it requires to indepen-i dently assess the risks posed by the event.

I To fulfill the NRC's role, both the Site and Headquarters i

! Teams require accurate, timely data on four types of parare-

! ters: (1) core and coolant system conditions must be known i well enough to assess the extent or likelihood of core (2) conditions inside the containment building must dar. age; ,

be known well enough to assess the likelihood of its failure; '

l (3) radioactivity release rates must be available promptl j assess the ternediacy and degree of public danger; and (4)y the to i data from the plant's meteorological tower is necessary to I e assess the distributions of potential or actual impact on the

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' l public. A list of the particular parameters considered necessary to these assessments is included as Enclosure 1.

Experience with the voice-only emergency comunications link, currently utilized for data transmission, has demonstrated that excessive amounts of time are needed for the routine transmission of data and for verification or correction of 1 -

data that appear questionable. Error rates have been exces-sive; initiations have been slow; frequency of updates have ,

, been unreliable. In addition, the current system creates an '

excessive drain on the time of valuable experts. When errors

• occur, they frequently create false issues which, at best, j divert experts from the real problems for seriously long periods of time. At worst, incorrect data.may cause the NRC to respond to offsite officials with inaccurate or outdated j

i advice that results in the implementation of inappropriate protective actions.

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Several options have been considered for upgrading the data j acquisition capabilities at the Operations Center. These are described in Enclosure 2. The options include various means

of acquiring the data

manually, automatically using exist- l ing systems, or automatically using new systems. Appropriate

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options for transmitting the data to the Operations Center 1

( were considered: electronically formatted data, image

facsimile, or by voice through specially qualified Communicators.

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The criteria used to compare these options are delineated in i' Enclosure 3. Many of these criteria were developed from problems encountered during the NRC's participation in various actual events and exercises, particularly the Federal -

i Field Exercise in March 1984 Other criteria have been gleaned from previous criticisms of the NDL design concept.

The criteria involve accuracy, reliability, timeliness, 3

o completeness, costs (in dollars and expert personnel), and backfitting requirements. The detailed consideration of each  ;

option against each criterion is explained and the comparison I of the options is sumarized in Enclosure 4.

The staff has determined that automatic transmission of )

l selected parameters from licensees' existing electronic data l j systems is the option that is most capable of providing

acceptably complete and reliable data on a timely basis at i reasonable cost with the minimum potential for burdening the licensee in an emergency. Most licensees either already have developed or are developing electronic data systems for their

! energency response facilities (ERFs). Because the role of the itcensees' ERFs is similar to the role of the NRC during emergencies, the licensees' data systems already include most

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of the parameters desired by NRC. .Those few parameters which e

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(' are not included in any particular licensee's system can be . !

I comunicated by voice over the Emergency Notification System (ENS), thus avoiding backfitting requirements on the licensee l to include additional parameters on their electronic data Data would be accepted in whatever format the

' systems.

i Itcensee uses and reformatted at the Operations Center, as necessa ry. Because of the wide diversity of data systems utilized by the licensees the best means for extracting the NRC's parameters from each system would be determined on a . t case-by-case basis. The licensees would have control over transmission and would use the system only during emergen- ,

! , cies. This option has been named the Emergency Response Data i .

System (ERDS)5. The design concept for the ERDS is outlined in Enclosure

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To test the ERDS concept, the Duke Power Company agreed to participate in a limited exercise, utilizing their existing Crises Management Data Transmission System. Duke had previously l been the Atomic '3dustrial Forum Observer in the Operations .

! Center during . . Federal Field Exercise in March 1984. This j had permitted them to note firsthand the various data problems

, being experienced by the NRC.

During the test on July 19,1984, data transmissions from the Duke System were intentionally limited to a itst of 69 I l

( specific data points to test the appropriateness of the NRC's l paramrter list. The test was remarkably successful in  !

I fulfilling its goals. The time needed to startup the Reactor -

Safety Team and Protective Measures Team was signific:ntly reduced, and their assessments were made more quickly throughout i the exercise. The nature of their deliberations was also markedly changed; their ability to focus on the events and to Jredict the future course of the scenario was greatly en-j -

aanced by having hardcopy of time-tagged data in unar6iguous l

units. The nature of voice concunications over the ENS and

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Health Physics Network (HPN) telephones also were greatly j improved. Very little basic data was transferred by voice.

Where voice comunications were used, the questions were 1

framed such better and the answers regarding the licensee's

! knowledge and plans were much more timely.

I Region !! personnel indicated that the ERDS would be similar-ly valuable to their Regional Base Team during Standby Mode and that it would provide a better basis for Headquarters

, analytical support for their Site Team during Expanded Activation. They also pointed out that the availability of electronic data during Expanded Activation would greatly i reduce the bu den on the Site Team to verbally transmit data l to Headquarters to obtain Headquarters support. A report on I the ERDS development drill is provided in Enclosure 6.

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Q An estimate of the system costs is included in Enclosure 7.

The estirate delineates the site and headquarters components l of the costs. The estimate also describes a breakout of costs between the NRC and licensees. The cost figures art based on a review of the available infonnation describing Itcensees' data systems and a determination of the proportion of licensees that represent a trivial interface proslem to those that are more conglex. Precise site costs will have to be determined on a case by case basis.

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Conclusions:

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The Connissioners '

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William J. Dircks i

Executive Director for Operations

Enclosures:

1 1. Plant parameters identified as necessary

{ inputs to reactor safety team and protective measures tasa j 2. Options considered .

3. Criteria for improving technical data acquisition

)' ' 4. Comparisons of options for Operations l Center emergency data acquisition

. 5. ERDS Design Concept 4

8. ERDS Development Drill Repo,rt

! 7. ERDS Cost Estimate j 8. Letter to Congress t

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j Consissioners' comunents should be provided directly to the

{ Office of the Secretary by c.o.b. January 10, 1985.

t Commission Staff office comments, if any, should be subunitted l to the commissioners 3rLT January 3, 198$, with an information copy to SECT. If the paper is of such a natwre that it requires additional time for analytical review and comument,

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e the Comunissioners and the Secretariat should be appriee<1 of when comunents may be upacted.

DISTRIBUT100t:

Comunissioners OCA

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%? saCY bi EDO-DEP DIR FOR OPS

, DEP DIR FOR REGIONAL OPS g & GENERIC REQ ACRS ASLSP

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1 ENCLOSURE 1 PLMT PARMETERS IDENTIFIED AS NECE3SARY INPUTS TO REACTOR SAFETY TEM AND PROTECTIVE MEASURES TEM These parameters have been selected as imediate indicators of core and containment status and deterstr.ates of offsite dose.

Parameters that vary too frequently and/or rapidly for voice update by telephone can best be handled by an automatic data system.

Some other psrameters, such as meteorology, should also be

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. system to minimize errors, whenever those parameters ce available in electronic data format.

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PWR PARAMETER LISTS

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Primary Coolant Pressure System Temperatures - hot leg Temperatures - cold leg Temperatures a core exit thermocouples Subcooling margin l Pressurizer level RCS charging / makeup flow Reactor vessel level (when available)

Reactor coolant flow Neutron flux - startup range

, Secondary Coolant Steam generator levels .

'ystem S Main feedwater flows Auxiliary / Emergency feedwater flows Safety Injection High pressure safety injaction flows low pressure safety injection flows

_ Safetyinjectionflows(Westinghouse)

Borated water, storage tank level Containment Containment pressure

( Containment temperatures Hydrogen concentration Containment sump levels Radiation Monitoring Reactor coolant radioactivity System Containment radiation level Condenser air removal radiation level Effluent' radiation monitors Process radiation monitor levels Meteorological Wind speed Wind direction Atmospheric stability l

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BWR PARAMETER LISTS Reactor Coolant Reactor pressure System Reactor vessel level Feedwater flow Neutron flux-Startup range Safety Injection RCIC flow HPCI/HPCS flow Coro spray flow LPCI flow Condensate storage tank level Containment Drywell pressure Drywell temperature -

Hydrogen & 0xygen Concentration -

Drywell sump level Suppression pool temperature Suppression pool level Radiation Monitorinq ~ Reactor coolant radioactivity level Systems Primary containment radiation level  !

l Condenser off-gas radiation levels I

( Effluent radiation monitor l Process radiation levels Meteorological Wind speed Wind direction Atmospheric stability

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( ENCLOSURE 3 j

l CRITERIA FOR IMPROVING TECHNICAL DATA ACQUISITION ACCURACY:

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- I MINIMIZE ERRORS IN ACQUIRING DATA FROM PLANT SENSORS l MINIMIZE ERRORS IN TRANSMITTING DATA TO OPERATIONS CENTER RELIABILITY:

l AVAILABILITY FOR PROMPT IMPLEMENTATION UPON OCCURRENCE OF AN EVENT l DEPENDABILITY OF ROUTINE UPDATING TIMELINESS:

MINIMIZE DELAY INITIATING DATA TRANSHISSION MINIMIZE TIME ELAPSED BETWEEN DATA ACQUISITION AND AVAILABILITY IN

-( OPERATIONS CENTER COMPLETENESS:

OBTAIN SUFFICIENT NUMBER OF PARAMETERS MAINTAIN ASSOCIATIONS OF TIME AND SOURCE AMONG VARIOUS DATA COST:

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~~ OBTAIN FAVORAP.E COST-BENEFIT COMPARISON WITH OTHER ALTERNATIVES PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS:

MINIMIZE NUMBER OF TECHNICAL EXPERTS NEEDED TO OPERATE SYSTEM

• l BACKFITTING REQUIREMENTS: l MINIMIZE REQUIRENENTS ON LICENSEE AND INTRUSION TO PLANT SYSTEMS

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1 CONSIDERATIONS FOR FULLY AUTOMATED SYSTEM TAKING DATA FROM PLANT SENSORS (NUCLEARDATALINK)

ACCURACY IS EXCELLENT BECAUSE THERE ARE NO HUMAN INTERFACES. ,

RELIABILITY IS EXCELLENT BECAUSE THERE ARE NO HUMAN INTERFACES.

TIMELINESS IS EXCELLENT BECAUSE SYSTEM IS It91EDIATELY AVAILABLE AND 1 CAPABLE OF RAPID TRANSMISSION WITH FREQUENT UPDATING.

i COMPLETENESS IS POTENTIALLY EXCELLENT BECAUSE ANY NECESSARY -

PARAMETER CAN BE ACCESSED.

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COST IS HIGH BECAUSE A TOTALLY NEW SYSTEM HUST BE DEVELOPED l FOR EACM PLANT.

NO PERSONNEL ARE REQUIRED F'OR ACQUISITION, TRANSMISSION, OR RECEIPT OF DATA.

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• BACKFITTING REQUIREHENTS WOULD BE EXTENSIVE ON LICENSEES FOR EQUIPMENT AT PLANTS.

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CONSIDERATIONS FOR AUTOMATED SYSTEM ACCESSING LICENSEES' i EXISTING ELECTRONIC l DATA SYSTEMS I (ENERGENCYRESPONSEDATASYSTEM)

ACCURACY IS EXCELLENT BECAUSE THERE ARE NO HUMAN INTERFACES.

RELIABILITY IS EXCELLENT BECAUSE THERE ARE NO HUMAN INTERFACES, AND MANY SYSTEMS (SUCH AS SPDS) WILL INCORPORATE AUTOMATIC DATA VALIDATION.

TIMELINESS IS EXCELLENT BECAUSE THE SYSTEM IS IM1EDIATELY AVAILABLE AND '

CAPABLE OF RAPID TRANSMISSION WITH FREQUENT UPDATING. PROMPTNESS OF INITIATION MAY YARY DEPENDING UPON LICENSEES' SYSTEM CONFIGURATIONS.

IN SOME CASES, ACTIVATION MAY NOT OCCUR UNTIL THE LICENSEE MANS ITS TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER.

COMPLETENESS IS EXPECTED TO'BE GENERALLY EXCELLENT BECAUSE THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVE OF THE SPDS REQUIREMENT IS TO PROVIDE THE LICENSEE WITH A TOOL FOR QUICKLY ASSESSING THE OVERALL HEALTH OF THE PLANT, I.E., THE

( SAME NEED THAT THE NRC FACES. IT IS EXPECTED THAT THERE WOULD BE MINIMAL REQUESTS FOR SUPPLEMENTAL INF0PliATION TO BE TRANSMITTED SY VOICE.

COST IS RELATIVELY LOW BECAUSE MOST LICENSEES ARE ALREADY INSTALLING SYSTEMS TO TRANSMIT DATA AMONG THEIR OWN ERFS, BUT THERE WILL BE SUBSTANTIAL HARDWARE AND SOFTWARE INTERFACE REQUIREMENTS AT THE OPERATIONS CENTER TO RECEIVE THE DIVERSE SIGNALS AND FORMATS.

NO PERSONNEL ARE REQUIRED FOR ACQUISITION, TRANSMISSION, OR RECEIPT OF DATA ON SPDS. SUPPLEHENTAL VOICE TRANSMISSIONS ARE NOT EXPECTED TO OVERBURDEN EXISTING VOICE LINKS.

BACKFITTING ON PLANT SYSTEMS WOULD BE MINIMAL IN THAT LICENSEES ONLY WOULD HAVE TO PROVIDE ONE ADDITIONAL OUTPUT PORT ON THE SPDS OR OTHER ERF DATA SYSTEM.

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CONSIDERATIONS FOR MANUAL DATA ACQUISITION AND TERMINAL ENTRY FOR ELECTRONIC TRANSHISSION ACCURACY IS POOR BECAUSE MANUAL DATA ACQUISITION AND ENCODING IS SUBJECT TO INSTRUMENT READING ERRORS, HANDWRITING READING ERRORS, AND TYPO-GRAPHICAL ERRORS.

RELIABILITY IS POOR BECAUSF MANUAL DATA ACQUISITION IS EASILY INTERRUPTED.

INITIATION WOULD NOT BE PROMPT BECAUSE OF PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS.

TIMELINESS IS ONLY FAIR BECAUSE ACQUISITION AND ENTRY ARE TIME CON'; MING, BUT DATA HANDLING THEREAFTER AT NRC IS AUTOMATIC. DATA VERIFICATI0a COULD CAUSE MORE EXTENSIVE DELAYS.

COMPLETENESS IS POTENTIALLY GOOD, BUT ACQUISITION TIME HAY LIMIT NUMBER OF PARAMETERS THAT CAN BE HANDLED.

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COSTS ARE MODEST, INCLUDING AT LEAST A TERMINAL AND A H0DEM FOR EACH REACTOR.

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• PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS INCLUDE AT LEAST ONE PERSON KNOWLEDGEABLE IN PLANT OPERATIONS TO ACQUIRE DATA AND ONE TECHNICAL TYPIST TO ENTER DATA ON TERMINAL. VERIFICATION OF DATA WOULD REQUIRE AT LEAST ONE HIGHLY EXPERT INDIVIDUAL.

BACKFITTING OF PLANT EQUIPMENT WOULD NOT BE REQUIRED.

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CONSIDERATIONS FOR A SYSTEM TO TELEFAX MANUALLY ACQUIRED DATA TO NRC i

ACCURACY IS POOR BECAUSE MANUAL DATA ACQUISITION AND ENTRY (AT NRC) IS SUBJECT TO INSTRUMENT READING ERRORS, HANDWRITING READING ERRORS. AND TYPOGRAPHICAL ERRORS. VERIFICATION WOULD BE DIFFICULT BECAUSE TYPIST WOULD NOT BE IN ROOM WITH PLANT PERSONNEL.

RELIABILITY IS POOR BECAUSE KANUAL DATA ACQUISITION IS EASILY INTERRUPTED.

INITIATION MAY NOT BE PRDNPT BECAUSE OF PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS.

TIMELINESS IS ONLY FAIR BECAUSE ACQUISITION AND ENTRY ARE TIME CONSUMING.

BUT' DATA HANDLING THEREAFTER AT NRC IS AUTOMATIC. DATA VERIFICATION WOULD REQUIRE RETURN TELEFAX AND MORE DELAY.

COMPLETENESS IS POTENTIALLY GOOD, BUT ACQUISITION TIME MAY LIMIT NUMBER OF PARAMETERS THAT CAN BE HANDLED.

COSTS ARE MODEST, INCLUDING A COMPATIBLE TELEFAX IN EACH CONTROL ROOM.

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• PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS INCLUDE ONE PERSON KNOWLEDGEABLE IN REACTOR OPERATIONS TO ACQUIRE DATA AND ONE NRC_ EMPLOYEE TO ENTER DATA.

BACKFITTING TO PLANT SYSTEMS IS NOT REQUIRED.

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CONSIDERATIONS FOR A SYSTEM USING MANUAL ACQUISITION AND YOICE TRANSMISSION RELIABILITY IS POOR BECAUSE MANUAL DATA ACQUISITION HAY BE EASILY INTERRUPTED. INIT/ATION WOULD NOT BE PROMPT BECAUSE OF PERSONNEL l

REQUIREMENTS.

ACCURACY HAS BEEN SHOWN TO BE UNACCEPTABLE FOR VOICE RELAY OF DATA. ,

DETECTION OF INSTRUMENT READING ERRORS, RANDWRITING READING ERRORS, AND '

TYP0 GRAPHIC ERRORS (AT NRC) WOULD DEPEND ON YOICE LINK READBACK FOR 1 DETECTION AND CORRECTION. l

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TINELINESS HAS BEEN SHOWN TO BE UNACCEPTABLE BECAUSE MANUAL DATA ACQUISITION AND VOICE RELAY IS TOO SLOW TO TRANSMIT REQUIRED DATA.

COMPLETENESS IS POOR BECAUSE TRANSMISSION TIME REQUIREMENTS SERIOUSLY LIMIT NUMBER OF PARAMETERS THAT CAN BE HANDLED. SOURCE AND TIME REFERENCE P. AVE BEEN DEMONSTRATED TO BE DIFFICULT TO MAINTAIN WITH DATA RELAYED PY VOICE.

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• COSTS ARE NOT INCURRED UNLESS ADDITIONAL TELEPHONE LINKS ARE UTILIZED TO INCREASE DATA TRANSHISSION/ VERIFICATION RATE.

PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS INCLUDE ONE INDIVIDUAL XNOWLEDGEABLE IN PLANT OPERATIONS TO ACQUIRE DATA AT THE SITE AND ONE TECHNICAL TYPIST TO ENTER DATA AT NRC. ADDITIONAL TELEPHONE LINES WOULD REQUIRE PAIRS OF ADDITIONAL C0tHUNICATORS.

BACXFITTING WOULD NOT BE REQUIRED.

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( ENCLOSURE 5 EMERGENCY RESPONSE DATA SYSTEM (ERDS)

DESIGN CONCEPT i l

Data Acquisition Parameter inputs to ERDS would be obtained from an existing computer system (e.g. SPDS, plant computer, EOF data systems, etc.) at the plant.

Data Transmission I Data will be transmitted to the NRC Operations Center by modem to comer-cial telephone line or a dedicated line maintained by NRC (e.g. ENS).

Data Collection .

A central processing system located in the NRC Operations Center will .

receive the data stream by modem. The system will be designed to receive I all varied data streams and to reformat the data into a consistent format. [

The reformatted data will be output to CRTs and printer. l l

Parameter List

( The parameter list would include those parameters necessary to ensure that l appropriate protective action is being taken with respect to offsite  !

recommendations. The list would be limited to those parameters involving l plant status, radiological and meteorological r,onditions.. l Licensees will not be required to backfit their systems to include addi-tional parameters to provide data on NRC's parameter list. Data that is t

. not available from the electronic data streati can be provided by voice over existing phone lines. l Transmission Frequency s

The updating frequency of the licensees' systems will determine transmis- l sion frequency to MRC. If more frequent updates are required than those (

provided electronicall l i will be accomplished for (y by a very a particular licensee, limited subset the increased of parameters) by frequency voice '

over existing telephone lines. l Control ,.

, The licensee will have complete control over data transmission. ERDS L would be "switched on" by the licensee in the early stage of a declared emergency.

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.,, umTEo siAras Ph- n NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ENCL 0SURE 6 u s .

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( MEM0'RANDUM FOR: Richard C. DeYoung, Director .

Offic t of Inspectionyand Enforcement r i '

THRU: dA i L. Jordan, Director M f Emergency Preparedness '

and Engineering Response ffi e of Inspection and Enforcemen,t FROM: Kenneth E. Perkins, Chief '

Incident Response Branch

• Division of Emergency Preparedness .

and Engineering Response -.

Office of Inspection and Enforcement

SUBJECT:

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Q EMERGENCY 5 Jul.Y 19,1984RESPONSE DATA SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT EXERCISk <

A limited exercise was h' eld, on July 19, 1984, for the purpose of evaluating the benefits Emergehey of electronic Operations data Centers transmission from a nuclear facility t's the *' -

Ouke Power Company provided dat:a transmissions

from the McGuire plant, while sNRC contractors. played the roles of licensee personnel for simulated Emergency Notification Syst.em (ENS) and Health Physics Network (HPN) communications. NRC Headquarters participation was liafted to

( the Reactor Safety Team, the P.rotective Measures Team, and the Executive Team Coordinator and Director. Regio'n II participation was limited to those personnel necessary to support the five commynications links being exercised: McGuire el.ectronic Team counterpart data, ENS,links. HPN, and the Reactor Safety Team hnd Protective Measures PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES.

The goal of this. exercise was to develop better understanding of the rolp, for i

• electronic were:

. objectives data transmission in NRC's emergency response activities., Specif.ic -

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1. Test the ability of the Emergency Operations Center and * '

Incident Response Center to simultaneously receive electronic i

data trjnsmissions from a huelear power plant. ~

2, . Evaluate.the flow of electronically transmitted data through-the activities 6f the Reactor ' Safety Team and Protective .

Haasures Team. ,

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, 3. Investigate the value of regularly updated, time tagged, 1 .

reliable data on' the Teams deliberatiotis.

4 Test the adequacy of the parameter set designated for

(- e,lectronic transmission.

5. ' Investigate the ef fect on 'the quantity and quality of voice communications over ENS, HPN and. the counterpart links. . ..

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R. C. DeYoung . .

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6. "Consider the relative burden,on the licensee of providing the' data by such a system in a n mergency. .

Scenario -

.- 6 The scenario began with'a small break 1.oss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) and declaration of Site Area emergency at 0400 EDT. Engineered Safety Features (ESF) actuation occurred normally until 0800 EDT, when problems developed with the A train charging pumps and Safety Injection (SI) pumps due to trash in the recirculation su.sp. Offsite power was lost at 0830 EDT, due to a plane crasti.

Emergency diesel generator A started, but diesel generator 8 had been takerf -

cut-of-service for maintenance prior to the event. By 0835 EDT, both trains of Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) were inoperable, placing the. unit in aW cora melt sequence and causing declaration of a General Emergency. Uncontrolled core heating led to gross fuel failure by 1100 EDT. At 1200 EDT. , the ~6 ' -

• Emergency spray were reestablished.

Diesel was returned to services and core inlection flow and containment However, an air return fan inside containment shattered,* damaging a penetration with"a fan blade. This caused an airborne ,,

relea,se to the environment until 1230 EDT, when containment pressure was -

reduce (to atmospheric pressure. ,

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The data tra;nsaissions- from f.h.e 'HcGuire plant were connanced at 0800 EDT and included data back to 0400 EDT. 'farticipants were briefed at 0810 EDT, and

( the exercise was conducted from 0830 to 1230 EDT.

The. Initial Activation Mode was purposely maintained for the duration of

, exercis~e play. .

CRITIQUE .

'1. Elec'trer.ie Data Transmission and Reception -

The Duke Power Company utilized their Crisis Management Data Transmission Systes to simulate the output of a more limited type of Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) being conceptually developed by NRC. A preestablished set of 69 data points were transmitted over Federal Telecommunic'attori System (FTS) lines to the Region 2 Incident Response Center and the '.7

' Headquarters Operations Center. . Data from the beginning of the scenario  !

at 0400 EDT was transmitted beginning at 0800 EDT. Regular update transmissions were

a. made at*15 minute intervals front 0830 throu,gh 1230 IDT. ,,- ,

' ' * ' A single terai'nal at the Region 2 Incident Response Center and two te'rainals '

'at'Headquartus (one each for the Reactor Safety Team and Prote'etive Measures Team) were used to receive the data.

System log-on was initiated separately from each of the 3 terminals, using dataphones and 1200 band modems. j Log-on was accomplished without difficulty,

( and the circuits were not interrupted for the duration of the exercise.

Telephone line quality was suf.ficient to avoid transmission errors. l s

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( 2. Evaluation of Information Flow at Headquarters -

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Individual data terminals were pro'vided for the Regional Safety Team (RST) and Protective Measures Team (PMT). The RST terminal was in the team room, while t.he PMT terminal was across the hall from that team voom.

Initially, hard copy was produced at both terminals, but, due to printer noise, the RST later chose to obtain hard copy by xeroxing the PMT output.

An individual in the RST room then began manning the video console and .

visually extracting specific parameters for which the team wanted the fastest possible updates. .-

Both teams promptly began trend analysis of some parameters. During --

. debriefing, both teams expressed the desire for trending capabilities.~.

Both teams also agreed that more frequent updates were desirable for critical parameters during the rapidly moving scer. 'o sequences. ~ Althifugh the teams did not feel inundated by, the data flow of 69 paramet s at li.

minute . intervals, some members expressed concern that only selected parameter updates be presented to them at the accelerated frequency. * '

,These concerns can be addressed by procedural means or altetronic* data * . .

hydling af ter the data is received at the Operations Cohters .

3. r Value of Electronic Datl.T~ ansmissions to RST and P'M T Deliberation

'( The availability of rel'iabl ) time-tagged data greatly enhanced the teams' effectiveness. The speed w,ith which the t'eams began functioning was much more rapid. Very little time was lost in seeking or organizing basic

,- data. Both teams agreed that.this resulted in a major improvement in . t their abilities to focus on the events of the scenario and to concentrate - '

, on predicting its course. '

The unpredictable containme.nt penetration damage at 1200 EDT provided .

a test of the teams' ability to promptly identify unanticipated events, -

tsing the new data. The PMT did correctly identify that. containment "

, pressure (a variable they were closely watching) was dropping earlier...

. and more quickly than expected from spray initiation. However, when .

investigating the cause, the PMT member failed to note that the~ vent-'

monitor had simultaneously gone off-scale high. The phenomenon was "

attributed to a scenario probles until the RST informed the PMT that the plant had made voice notification (over ENS) of a cont'ainment liner leak. 1 This suggest*s that some data overload may have occurred in the , ,.',,,.

f

. . . PMT room. '(This difficulty can'be addFessed by' procedural improvements ' l c'r ele'ctronic data handling af ter the data is received at the Operations '

j .

. Center. )

• P.egional personnel in,dicated that the electronic data transmissions wovid l have great value to their Base Team during Standby Mode, and that it would l provide a better data base for Headquarters to support the Site Team 1

(. during Full Activation.

i R.C. DeYoung '

• '4 . ' '

Adecuacy of Predetermined Parameter lis.

( '

The conceptualization of ERDS involves selection from licensees' preexisting electronic data systems only those parameters which NRC has determined to be important'to its emergency response functions. Due to the cle'se parallel between the roles of the ifcensee's Emergency Operations Facility and the NRC's Oper<ation Center, most parameters which are important to the NRC's role are expected to be available on the licensee's data systems.

The Duke Power company's data system allows simultaneous' access to any--

252 of approximately 8000 data points logged by the plant process computer'.

For purposes of this exercise, Duke's preformatted data set (67 paramet~ers) was slightly altered to' eliminate data not on NRC's list and to add some-tank levels and radioactivity release data not routinely transmitted' by.-j Duke. -

~

\. ~

. . 6

During the exercise, the NRC teams found the data set to be adequate. . The

only. supplemental parameter requested over ENS was reactor vessel level,~

.which is on NRC's list but still being implemented on Duke's system. Th.e.

.AST also expressed interest in steam generator pressure pata'(which had 4. '

been deleted from Duke's usual data set), but concluded that it was not essentia1 to their delib' era,tions, given 'other parameters on the list.

s

• Although no single scenario can completely test the adequacy of the list.

.- the results of this exercise indicate that the NRC's parameter list is a

( -

good guide for data point selection.

5.

Effects of Electronic Data Transmission on the Voice Link Activity As previously mentioned, the use of. the electronic data transmissions virtually eliminated routine data transmissions over. ENS. Questions.to .

verify and/or correct previously transmitted data were completely eliminated.

The amount of data requested over HPN was greatly reduced. (Many. PMT. data requests are for offsite dose projections and measurements, which are not on licensee's electronic data systems), .

@ l The contractors acting as the licensee's communicators.for ENS and HPN both indicatgd that the questions they received were less confused and i more likely to be prompt,1yand competently handled.by.the. license.e's

'/ comsun'icato'rs.. " .

Although the site Team was not exercised, Regional personnel expressed .

the opinion that the electronic data transmissions would greatly reduce l

, the burden of data transmission which usually was placed upon Site Team . l members whenever they communicated with the Headquarters Operations Center.

Conclusions

( . .

The exercise has demonstrated that there is great value in using electronic

. data transmission for obtaining a very modest set of reliable, time-tagged i data at modest' f requency. Reactor Safaty Team and Protective Measures Team activities were substantially more ef ficient and their assessments

---.,.n-, - . , . . - , , - -

. 1 E

, i R.C. DeYoung. .

.o s

\

( were more timely. Both Teams exbibited a major improvement in their

' abilities to focus on the signiTTeant factors and to predict the course of events. Questions posed to the licensee were better focused. The burden on the licensee's ENS and HPN communicators was substantially reduced.

The Region indicated that such a data transmiss. ion system would assist them is in "Standby". in determining the' safety significance of an incident when the agency The Region also stated that such a system would relieve the burden on the Site Team for verbal transmission of data to Headquarters and provide a better basis for Headquarters analytical support to the' Site Team in Expanded Activation.

- ~ -

~.-

The exercise also demonstrated that the electronic data system a utility *.

- produces for its own emergency use is likely to provide ready acce.ss to,,

a major portion of the basic parameters desired by NRC. By devt '.opn i i the flexibility to accept data from. such preexisting utility s). . ems,gthe '

HRC the Operations can corre'et the majority of the, data deficiencies being experienced.in Center.

^

's *

'T.ie Duke Power Company is continuing to make the outputs'of their' data d. .

trinsmissionsystemavylabletotheNRCincaseitisn'eededforan actual event. This syst'em alone covers 7 of the approximately 90 power reactors now in operation o'4 near operation. '

s+y g n,r. .4 ' -

• 50t*,.:.r. C. .

Xenneth E. Perkins, Chief -

Incident Response Branch ,

Division of Emergency Preparedness . -

and Engineering Response -

office of Inspection and Enforcement Philip Stohr, Region II cc:

Don Marksberry . .

John Hickman i. '

Oistribution: ,

. ~

' DCS .'

'a. IRB Fi-le- .. .

,DEPER Rdg. * * '.

E. Jordan .

5. Schwartz

• X. ,Pe rkins .

S. l.ong '

( *IRB:DEPER:!EFor Concurrence see previous page.

. !RB: 0EPER:IE St.ong: dkh KPerkins  : -

08/ /84 08/, /84 I .

o 4 . .

(

ENCLOSURE 7 EROS COST ESTIMATE i Combined Site Costs: NRC Licensees Total Hardware 9 $6.5 K/ site '

$ 740 K $ 740 K Software 9 $21.8 K/ site $2,486 K $2,486 K i

Design 9 $3.2 K/ site $ 367 K

. Implementation 9 $10.1 K/ site $ 367 K

$ 527 K $ 628 K $1,155 K

)

Headquarters Costs: I

{

Hardware $ 58 K $ 58 K Software $ 270 K l Design and Implementation $ 270 K i 3 395 K $ 395 K '

Total $1,250 K $4,221 K $5,471 K

\

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