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#REDIRECT [[A05394, Forwards Final Summary Rept Addressing IE Bulletin 85-003, Motor-Operated Valve Common Mode Failures. No Addl Work W/ Respect to Bulletin Suppl Necessary for Millstone Unit 1]]
| number = ML20196K851
| issue date = 06/27/1988
| title = Forwards Final Summary Rept Addressing IE Bulletin 85-003, Motor-Operated Valve Common Mode Failures. No Addl Work W/ Respect to Bulletin Suppl Necessary for Millstone Unit 1
| author name = Mroczka E
| author affiliation = CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER CO., NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY CO., NORTHEAST UTILITIES
| addressee name =
| addressee affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
| docket = 05000000, 05000213, 05000245, 05000336, 05000423
| license number =
| contact person =
| document report number = A05394, A5394, IEB-85-003, IEB-85-3, NUDOCS 8807070139
| document type = CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS, INCOMING CORRESPONDENCE, UTILITY TO NRC
| page count = 28
}}
 
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:&    __
89 EM                                  General Offices
* Selden Street. Berkn. Connecticut HARTFORD. CONNECTICUT 06141-0270
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i June 27, 1988 Docket Nos. 50-213 50-245 50-336 50-423 A05394 Re:      Bulletin 85-03 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555 Gentlemen:
Haddam Neck Plant Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit Nos. 1, 2 and 3 NRC Bulletin 85-03 Motor-0perated Valve Common Mode Failures In a letter date                11,  1986,(I) as supplemented by a letter dated October 28,      1986,g) June Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company (CYAPCO) and NortheastNuc'earEnerg) to NRC Bulletin 85-03, Company          (NNECO)submittedtotheNRCStaffaresponse providing certain information and detailing CYAPC0's and NNECO's program for addressing the Bulletin concerns for the Haddam Neck Plant and Millstone Unit Nos.1, 2 and 3, respectively.
The purpose of this letter is to forward to the NRC Staff the attached final report, documenting the results of the program outlined in our June 11, 1986 and October 28, 1986 letters. As specified in NRC Bulletin 85-03, this report includes; (1) a verification of completion of            the requested program, (2) a summary of the findings as to valve operability prior to any adjustments as a result of the bulletin, and (3) a summary of data.                        In a letter dated (1)      J. F. Opeka letter to Dr. Thomas E. Murley, "IE Bulletin 85-03, M0V Common Mode Failures," dated June 11, 1986.
(2)      J. F. Opeka letter to Dr. Thomas E. Hurley, "IE Bulletin 85-03, M0V Common Mode Failures," dated October 28, 1986.
(3)      IE Bulletin 85-03, "Motor-0perated Valve Common Mode Failures During Plant Transients Due to Improper Switch Settings," dated November 15, 1985.
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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission A05394/Page 2 June 27, 1988 December 30,1987,I4) CYAPC0 and NNEC0 provided the Staff with a clarification of the schedule for submitting the final report (s) for the bulletin program.
In that letter CYAPC0 and NNEC0 proposed to submit one composite report for all four nuclear units by May 31, 1988 or 3 months after the end of the last of the refueling outages for the four respective units, whichever comes later.
The Haddam Neck Plant refueling outage ended on March 26, 1987 and was the last to be completed. The attached report is being sub:nitted in accordance with the schedule commitment.
For the record, in a letter dated September 4, 1987,(5) NNEC0 provided additional information to support the NRC Staff review of the program to address the                  at Millstone Unit No. 2. A 'similar letter dated April 18,1988gletin a letter dated MayaddressedNy)StaffquestionsfortheHaddamNeckPlant,and 23, 1988      addressed NRCgtaff questions for Millstone Unit No. 3. In a letter dat                                  NNECO responded to the NRC Bulletin 85-03, Supplement 1,g)May      that27,1988, applies to BWRs only. NNEC0 reported that the program already established at Millstone Unit No. I to address the original bulletin covers the items identified in the bulletin supplement.
Therefore no additional work with respect to the bulletin supplement was necessary for Millstone Unit No.1.
/
(4)    E. J. Mroczka letter to W. T. Russe'l "IE Bulletin 65-03, M0V Common Mode Failures," dated December 30, 1987.
(5)    E. J. Mroczka letter to E. C. Wenzinger," IE Bulletin 85-03, MOV Common Mode Failures," dated September 4, 1987.
(6)    E. J. Mroczka letter to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "IE Bulletin 85-03, M0V Common Mode Failures," dated April 18, 1988.
(7)    E. J. Hroczka letter to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "IE Bulletin
:              85-03, M0V Common Mode Failures, dated May 23, 1988.
(8)    E. J. Mroczka letter to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "NRC Bulletin 85-03, MOV Common Mode Failures," dated May 27, 1988.
(9) NRC Bulletin 85-03, Supplement 1, "Motor-0perated Valve Common Mode Failures During Plant Transients Due to Improper Switch Settings," dated April 27, 1988.
 
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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission A05394/Page 3 June 27, 1988 If you have any questions, please contact us.
Very truly yours,                                ,'
CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPANY NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY Y . d . N Mit        A E. J. Mriczka      y Senior Vice President
                                                                )
By: C. F. Sears Vice President cc:    W. T. Russell, Region I Administrator M. L. Boyle, NRC Project Manager, Millstone Unit No. 1 D. H. Jaffe, NRC Project Manager, Millstone Unit No. 2 R. L. Ferguson, NRC Project Manager, Millstone Unit No. 3 A. B. Wang, NRC Project Manager, Haddam Neck Plant J. T. Shedlosky, Senior Resident Inspector, Haddam Neck Plant W. J. Raymond, Senior Resident Inspector, Millstone Unit Nos. 1, 2 and 3 STATE OF CONNECTICUT )
                                    ) ss. Berlin COUNTY OF HARTFORD      )
Then personally appeared before me C. F. Sears, v'a being duly sworn, did state that he is Vice President of Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, and Connecticut. Yankee Atomic Power Company,        Licensees herein,        that he is authorized to execute and file the foregoing information in the name and on behalf of the Licensees herein and that the statements contained in said information are true and correct to the best of his knowledge nd plief.                    !
                                                                                      /              l Q
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Docket Nos. 50-213 50-245 50-336 50-423 A05394 4
Attachment Haddam Neck Plant Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit Nos.1, 2 and 3 Sumary Report NRC Bulletin 85-03 M0V Common Mode Failures
't June, 1988
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Attachment' A05394/Page 1 Attachment Summary Report - NRC Bulletin 85-03 MOV Common Mode Failures Haddam Neck Plant Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit Nos.1, 2 and 3 General Informatign:        (applies to all four units)
A. Swit h Setooints:
The methods used for selecting and setting both opening and closing minimum stem thrust, torque, limit, and bypass setpoints were reviewed in order to ensure proper setpoints. This review included consideration of such things as unintentional backseating and adequate torque switch bypass through unseating.
Thermal overload setpoints were not reviewed through this program at any of the four nuclear units for the following individual reasons:
o    Haddam Neck:    This issue was previously addressed in SEP Topic III-10-A.
o    til)) stone Unit No.1:      This issue was previously addressed in SEP Topic III-10-A.
o    Millstone Unit No. 2:        Thermal overloads are not used in MOVs.
o    Millstone Unit No. 3:        This issue was reviewed and resolved during unit construction.
B. M0V Testina:
Motor Operated Valves (MOVs) were tested using differential pressure (DP) and/or static signature testings (M0 VATS) as noted in the data tables.
DP Testina:
Differential pressute tests were performed by stroking the valve under the maximum practical differential pressure. The conventional formulas, as follow, were used to extrapolate valve stem thrusts when tested at less than maximum differential pressures:
Valve Thrust (open) - K x DP [ (Seat Area x Seat Coefficient) -
Stem Area ] + Stuffing Box Load Valve Thrust (closed) - K x DP [ (Seat Area x Seat Coefficient) +
Stem Area ] + Stuffing Box 1.oad These formulas are based on physical principles and are used in a similar form by Limitorque, M0 VATS, and the valve manufacturers. The constants I              and the stuffing box load can be determined experimentally from the l              static tests and tests at lower differential pressures.          These formulas l
can then be used to determine the stem thrusts required at the higher differential pressures.
L                                                                                    _
 
Attachment' A05394/Page 2 Torque swite+          settings were established utilizing stem thrust data obtained frou available DP tests.
Full DP Testina Oniv:
Some MOVs        t Millstone Unit No. 2 were tested by stroking the valve in the direct on which represents its safety related function against full differential pressure. These valves were also stroked as part of the normally required operability testing prior to plant start-up. These tests were considered adequate to confirm operability and proper switch setpoints.
Static Sianature Testir_g:
Static signature tests were used both in conjunction with and in lieu of DP tests.
Signature testing (M0 VATS or similar) is an acceptable alternative to full  DP testing, especially for MOVs where DP testing cannot be performed.        Many critical operational parameters can be measured through static signature testing, such as control switch trip thrust, running load, and bypass switch actuation.              In the absence of DP testing, original aesign thrust and running load requirements (verified by analysis through the use of the above formulas) can be ensured through static signature testing.
Instances of higher DP stem thrusts were encountered which were attributed to degraded seats rather than design deficiencies. These conditions did not adversely affect plant safety. As-left torque switch settings were adjusted to reflect these higher loads or the seats were inspected and any required maintenance performed.
C. Maintainino Switch Setooints All switch setpoints were adjusted as required to ensure as-left M0V operability.            For all work regarding these valves, CYAPC0 and NNEC0 use procedures which ensure that proper switch settings are maintained.
I
_ - _ . -        _                                              - - -  - - ~
 
1 Attachment A05394/Paga 3 Soecific Unit Reports:
I. ILaddam Neck Plant o      Item 1 - Proaram Comoletion The testing program at the Haddam Neck Plant was completed during the 1987-1988 refueling outage. Testing was performed on 14 MOVs as listed in Tables 1-A and 1-8.
o      Ites 2 - Valve Operability Prior to Ad.iustment
/
As-found operability was determined by assessing each M0V's ability to perform its intended safety function as-found.            During the evaluation of each M0V, consideration was given to: stem thrust at control switch trip, total stem thrust, torque switch bypass, unintentional backseating, and remote position indication. While switches were not always found at the optimal setpoints, all M0Vs tested at the Haddam Neck Plant would have adequately performed their intended safety functions.
The valve tests indicated CH-M0V-2928 would not stroke closed against the full design differential pressure.        However, this is acceptable since administrative controls in the form of procedural guidance have been adopted to instruct the operator to close the manual charging line isolation valves if difficulties in closing CH-MOV-292 B and C are encountered.
Also, the tests indicated FW-M0V-35 would not stroke closed against the full design differential pressure.      However, similar to above, procedures instruct the operator to shutdown the auxiliary feedwater pumps prior to stroking the valve. Thus, FW-MOV-35 is acceptable.
o      Item 3 - Qata Summary Tables 1-A and 1-B provide a summary of the data accumulated under this program. The information has been formatted in accordance with the sample recommended format provided in Table 2 of IE Bulletin 85-03.
Some terms used in Tables 1-A and 1-B may nct be universally familiar, the following descriptions are provided for clarity:
Outout Speed - The number of revolutions per minute which the stem nut turns during operation. The stem nut is that part of the screw mechanism which causes the stem to move into or out of the valve thereby moving the valve disk or plug.
Desian Differential P    -
This is a reiteration of minimum allowable differential pr6ssures as detailed in CYAPC0's June 11, 1986 letter. Minimum required base differential pressures for valves SI-MOV-861-A-D and CH-H0V-2928 & C have been revised to      reflect actual operating requirements.      The  revised differential pressures for these valves are listed in Table 1-B.
 
Attachment' A05394/Page 4 Prior and Final S. S. Toroue Switch Setooints (S.S.) - Torque switch settings cannot be read on Teledyne operators.
Therefore it is more relevant to list those settings in Table 1-B as stem thrust (pounds).
PR-MOV-567 and 569 December 12,1986,(y)Inthese                                                                                  response PORVtoblock the NRC valvesStaff wereletter includeddated in the bulletin testing program.                                                                                        These valves and operators are identical to CH-MOV-298 except that the original design differential pressure of 2300 psi was used. Test and valve data                has been                                                  included here in Tables 1-A and 1-B.
Furthermore, with this information, CYAPC0 has completed the commitmentsgI resolve the NRC Staff's concern on NUREG-0737, Item II.D.I.
Individual cases of marginal torque switch bypass, minimum or maximum stem thrusts, and unintentional backseating were found prior to switch adjustment, but none were severe enough to render the MOV inoperable. Setpoints were changed to improve the M0V's already adequate operability and to allow for the highest reasonable safety factor. This was done for each MOV on an individual basis. For example, in some cases the torque switch settings were increased to obtain a greater safety factor at minimum thrust while others were reduced to decrease component stresses and the related possibility of unexpected component failures during operation.
l l
1 (1)  F. M. Ai<stulewicz letter to E. J. Mroczka, "Review of NUREG4'37, item II.D.1, Performance Testing of Relief and Safety Valves for ;?
* iddam Neck Plant," dated December 12, 1986.
(2) See the A. B. Wang to E. J. Mroczka letter, "NUREG-0737, Item II .D.1, Performance Testing of Relief and Safety Valves                                                                                                for Haddam Neck (TAC No. 44585)," dated March 30, 1988.
 
IEB 85-03 RESP WSE - TABLE l-A M002 ECK ETOR @ERATED VALVE DATA VALVE        VALVE        VALW VALVE    VALVE VALVE @ERATDI        @ERATOR ETOR EITNT FUCTim ID          15NEACTLftER TYPE iGEL    SIZE L4 ASS MNLFACTtRER EDEL        M WUD (IN)                                      R WHOI- 2 MBELL            GATE 2467 iME 06    300    TELEDYE      ST4-15    1750 23.9 RWST TD dim 61N6 PW SUCTION ISO l
BA-MN 373 OtAE            6 ATE 47.5(F  04    150    TELEDYNE    ST4-05    1750 53.8 RWST TO DIAR 61N6 SUCT10h ISOLATION CH-MDV-257 CRAE          EATE 47.5 LF  04    150    TELEDYE    ST4-05    1750 53.0 VCT ISOLATION VALVE 04-EV-2925 ESTIGOUSE GATE 90%FMi        03    1500 LIMIT 0RAE S9-00-15 3400 147.8 04M61N6 SYS SHUT 0FF VALVE Ot-O-292C WESilEK)USE 6 ATE 8%8 Frei    03    1500 LIMITOR0lF. SB-00-15 3400 147.8 OWSING SYS SW10FF AVES 01- 0 -293 CRANE          6 ATE 87.5 0  02    1500 LIMIT 0RAE M 10 !?00 41.5 PRESSURIZER AUX SPfiAf VALVE FW- O - 35 LE NE          MiE L-600    03    600    TELEDfhE    TI-05      1750 44.9 EERGENCY FEEDWATER VALVE Fh-O-160 APC *./IGLIP6 6 ATE 600#Fw    03    600    LIM!iDRQLE SMB-00-10 1700 49.9 Aux. FEED PU@ DISO#3E DIVIS!m PR-MDV-567 DAhE          6A!E 67.5 U  02    1500 LIMITORME SMB-00-10 1700 41.5 FOiv BLOC # VALVES M-G-569 CR M            6 ATE 67.5 U  02    1500 LIMIT @QUE SME-v0-10 1700 41.5 PGtV BLDO'. VAVE SI-MOV-861A CRAE        6 ATE 87.5 LF  03    1500 Lim: TOR 0Vi M 15 1700 44.v WS! LDDP ISOLAi!0N VALVE SI-G-6tilB GM            6 ATE 67.5 LF  03    1500 LIMIT @3UE SMB-00-15 1700 44.0 @SI LOOP ISC;ATION VA;.VE SI MOV-861C O M          MTE 67.5 If    03    1500 LIMITCRAE SME-00-15 1700 44.0 H51 LO@ 1S04 !% VA31E S!- O -861D CA M        6 ATE 87.5LF  03    1500 LIMITORQUE SMB-00-15 1700 44.0 @Si trop IS0Ji!Ch VsVE
                              ~ - - --
 
IEB 85-03 RESPONSE - TABLE l-B HADWMIEK E TEST DATA WLW          DESIM BESIGN TEST      TEST    PRIOR PRIM FIEL FINAL AS-FDLMD            . TEST ETH ID          E LTA P E LTA P DELTA P M LTA P S.S. S.S.      S.S. S.S. k VE          AETIFICATION
                @EN      CLDSE  @EN    C1DSE  @EN CLDE @EN C1DSE @ERASILITY BR- O - M 75          75      M      M      15608 17008 28608 24008 SATIFACTORY          SI N TWE TEST DR-90V 373 75        75      m      M      2337f 22%# 27608 2660f SAilSFACTORY          SIGMTWE TEST D H 0V-257 75        75      G      M      17808 1640f 2971f 2879f SATISFETORY          SIGNATWE TEST CH-MOV 2928 2900      1857  2250    2000    2.5    2.5    2.5    2.5    SATISFACTORY  DP / $16M TW E TEST CH- O 292C 2900      1857  M      M      2.25 2.0        2.25  2.0    SATISFACTORY  SIGNATWE TEST CH-MOV-293 2203      2203    2M      2900    2.25 2.25 1.25 1.25 SATISFACTORY            DP / SINTWE TEST FW-MOV- 35 1300      IM      M      M      M      3577f M        51268 SATISFAC10RY    SIGNATWE TEST FW MOV-160 1M        IM      1420    1420    1.0    1.0    1.0    1.0    SATISFACTORY  DP / SINTWE TEST PR- G -567 230V      (A      M      M      2.25 2.25      1.50  1.W    SATISFACTORY  SI6MTWE TEST F4i-MOV-569 23v0    2M      M      M      2.25 2.25 1.675 1.50 SATISFACTORY            SI6M'WE TEST SI-MOV-M14 2v00      0      1450    1450  2.0      2.0    2.0    2.0    SATISFACTORY  DP / 516MTWE TEST SI MJV-Nlt 2w)      0      1459    1450  2.0    2.0    2.75 2.75 SATISFACTORi        DP / Sl % TURE TEST SI-MOV-Mlt EMC      0      m      M      2.0    2.0    2.25 2.25 SATISFACTORY        SIGMTLRE TEST SI-MOV MID 2000      0      NA    E      2.0    2.0    2.25 2.25 SATISFACTORY        SINTWE TEST
 
Atta'hment' c                                                                          l A05394/Page 5                                                                    j II. Millstone Unit No. 1 o    Item 1 - Proaram comoletion The testing program was completed at Millstone Unit No.1.during the 1987 refueling outage except for 1 valve, MOV l-IC-1 (steam supply to the Isolation Condenser (IC)        -
isolation valve inside the drywell). A differential pressure test on this valve was not practical. Due to 10CFR50 Appendix R and 10CFR50.49 projects, this valve was never available for signature testing. Therefore NNEC0 decided to postpone testing on this valve until the next refueling outage. NNEC0 discussed this decision with Region I personnel.
NNECO concluded that the decision to postpone testing on 1-IC-1 until the next refueling outage does not present a safety concern for the following reasons:
o      This valve undergoes local leak rate te' ting during refueling and quarterly stroke testing (for both stroke time and light actuation) to demonstrate valve operation.
o      1-IC-2 provided redundancy for 1-IC-1 in isolating the steam supply line to the isolation condenser.
o      Achieving the maximum postulated differential pressure across that valve is an unlikaly event.
Testing was performed on the 9 other MOVs listed in Tables 2-A Ond 2-8.
o    Item 2 - Valve Operability Prior to Ad.iustment All of tha valves tested successfully passed the testing program.
As-found operability was determined by assessing each MOV's test results and its ability to perform its intended safety function as-found. During the evaluation of each M0V, consideration was given to: stem thrust at control switch trip, total stem thrust, torque switch bypass, unintentional backseating, and remote position indication. While switches were not always found at the optimal setpoints, all MOVs tested would have adequately performed their intended safety functions.
o    Item 3 - Data Summary Tables 2-A hnd 2-8 provide a summary of the data accumulated under this prograat. The information has been formatted in accordance with the sample recommended format provided in Table 2 of IE Bulletin 85 03.
Some terms used in Tables 2-A and 2-B may not be universally familiar so the following descriptions are provided for clarity:
!                            Qutout Soeed - The number of revolutions per minute which the j                            stem nyt turns during operation. The stem nut is that part of i
 
Atta'chment' A05394/Page 6 the screw mechanism which causes the stem to move into or out of the valve thereby moving the valve disk or plug.
Desian Differential P    -
This is a reiteration of minimum allowable differential pressures as detailed in NNECO's June 11, 1986 letter.
Prior and Final Toroue Switch Setooints (S.S.) - This stands for torque switch setpoints. Torque switch setting cannot be read on Teledyne operaters. Therefore it is more relevant to list those settings in Table 2-B as Stem Thrust (pounds).
1-IC Due to Environmental Qualification concerns, M0V l-IC-2 had its Teledyne motor operator replaced with a Limitorque during the outage in which the testing occurred. As-found settings are not available.
Individual cases of marginal torque switch bypass, minimum or maximum stem thrusts and unintentional backseating were found prior to switch adjustment, but none were severe enough to render the MOV inoperable. Setpoints were changed to -improve the MOV's already adequate operability and to allow for the highest reasonable safety factor. This was done for each M0V on an individual basis. For example, in some cases the torque switch settings were increased to obtain a greater safety factor at minimum thrust while others were reduced to decrease component stresses and the related possibility of unexpected component failures during operation.
 
1B 85-03 RESPGCC imLE 2-A MILLSTCBE 'wi!T I ETm (FERATED RVE DATA VilLE    R VE        R VE VALVE    VALVE RVE (PERAim        (PERATOR ETm OUTPUT FUCTICN ID      15BtFACTWER  TYPE IGEL      ElIE C1K0 WItFACTLItER EDEL        RPM IFEED
(!N)                                    RPM i
143 Hip M              GRTE 47.5-XR  06    150    TELDM        T4 10    1750 47.6 MmELL TD CST AEJECT VALVE BM l-FW- 4R IRILietTH    GATE 5262PSE  14    1500 LIMITOR M SMB-3 100 1700 33.9 FEEDdATER RES. BLOCK %.VE - A 1-FM- 48 R WDRTH      GATE 5262 M6  14    1500 LIMITOR M M -3 100 1700 33.9 FEE 1) MATER RES. BLDCK VALVE - B l-FW 4C ANCH./ DARLING 6 ATE 1632175M 04    1500 LIMITOR M SMB-00-15 1700 28.6 FEEDtHTER REG. BLDCX R VE - C 1-!C- 2 CRM            6 ATE L-900    14    900    LIMITOR M 9 6-3-100 1900 43.3 IC STEAM IS0 TAT 10h RVE l !C 3 C? N          GATE L-900      10    900    LIMITOR M SMB-2-60 1900 24.7 IC C0 0ENSATE RETW h V4.41 1-IC- 4 CR M          EATE 83.5 V    10    900    TELED M    T10-60    3500 98.9 IC CO2ENSATE RETW N VA.VE l 1C 10 CR M          6 ATE 47.5 M    03    150    LIMITOR M SMB-000-5 1900 57.9 IC 9 ELL %FS VAa1                    l i
1-Mh 96A CR M        6 ATE 47.5-6    14    15v    TELED%E    T4-25    1750 37.1    Fatl C00. TRE/ER DISO#6E VC.VE
                                                                                                                            ?
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1EB C-03 RE90NE - TABLI 2 8 NILLSTM 1811T 1 IEN TEST DATA VALVE    RESIGN DESiiA TEST    TEST    Prim Prim FIML      FIML AS-FDM            . TEST ETH00 10      ELTA P DELTA P BELTA P DELTA P S.S. S.S. S.S. S.S. URLVE DEM    CLIE    @EN    CLDSE  WEN    CLDSE SEN      CL5E WEMBILITY l Ote    !!7    217    lH    IM      60400 1654Cd 71608 71200 SA!!EACTmY          DP / SIGMT@E TEST    ,
i' 1 FW- 4A  2310    2310  m      M      2.0    1.5    1.0    1.0    SATISFACTORY  S!(KJWE TEST 1-FW- 48  2310    2310  W      M      2.0    1.5    1.0    1.0    SATISFETORY    SIGM TLEE TEST l-FW- 4C  2310    2310  200    200    2.5    2.0      2.5    2.0    SAilSFACTORY  DP / SIGMTURE TEST l-IC- 2  1085    0      M      M      M      M        2.0    1.675 SATISFACTORY    SIGMTLEE TEST l IC- 3  1025    0      M      M      2.25  3.00    2.5    2.E    SATISFACTORt  SIGMTWE TEST      ,
I l-lC- 4  1065    0      M      M      72008 972W 278400 268K4 SATISFACTORY          S16MTWE TEST      l i
1 1C-10  123    122    135    135    2.0    2.0      1.0    1.0    SATISFACT@y    Dp / SIGa4TJE TEST l-MW M    167    167    13      175    9127s E 04 122608 12 & 4 SAilSFE70ky          DP / S169'G E fig; l
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i y___                                                                                      .
 
                        ,,                  I, Atta'chmenf                        # #
A05394/Page 7 W III. tijllstone Unit No. 2 o      Item 1 - Proaram Comoletion l                                                                The testing program at Millstone Unit No. 2 was completed during the l                                                                  1988 refueling outage. Testing was performed on 23 M0Vs as listed in Tables 3-A and 3-B.
o      Item 2 - Valve Operability Prior to Ad.iustment As-found operability was determined by assessing each MOV's test results and its ability to perform its intended safety function.
During the evaluation of each M0V, consideration was given to:        stem thrust at control switch trip, total stem thrust, torque switch bypass, unintentional backseating, and remote position indication.
A review of the results showed that all 23 MOVs had proper remote position indication. Subsequent evaluations of those test results determined that a majority (17 out of 23) of the M0V's met the parameters as detailed in our response to paragraph (a) of Bulletin 85-03 while six did not. However, the review provided in Reference I was, in some cases, more conservative than necessary regarding minimum required differential pressures. For the valves which failed initial testing, additional evaluations were conducted to establish the actual differential pressure requirements.
The following six (6) valves did not meet the parawters specified in NNECO's June 11, 1986 letter: 2-SI-411, 2-CH-501, 2-CH-504, 2-MS-202, 2-SI-655, 2-FW-44. As a result, additional evaluations sul, sequent to NNEC0's letter dated June 11, 1986 have been performed. Those evaluation are as follows:
o      2-SI-411:        This valve would not close against the differential pressure criteria specified. However, this valve is in the B l
HPSI pump suction piping from the RWST. It is normally open, receives no accident signal, and there is no requirement for it to close. It did open successfully so that a mispositioning of the valve could be corrected. If for some reason the valve had to be closed, it could have been closed via the hand wheel.
Therefore the valve and the Safety Injection System were operable "a:,-found". This valve was adjusted to meet the t
acceptance criteria.
o    2-CH-5Gl:          This valve receives a closure signal during an accident situation and did close successfully during testing.
Although it would nnt gnen due to running load being higher than the torque switch setting, this valve receives no automatic signal to open. If for some reason the valve needed to be opened, it could have been opened via the handwheel.
Therefore          the valve and the Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS) were operable "as-found".            This valve was adjusted to meet the acceptance criteria.
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Attaiheent' A05394/Page 8 l
o  2-CH-504: This is the isolation valve on the :uction line from the RWST to the charging pumps. It receives no accident signal for movement. During testing, valve 2-CH-504 would not open due to an improper torque bypass setting. The improper setting    ,
allowed the valve to "torque-out" while the valve disk was unseating. However since during accident conditions, the charging pumps take suction from the Boric Acid Pumps (or the Boric Acid Storage Tanks) the CVCS was operable for the "as-found" condition of valve 2-CH-504.          This valve was adjusted to meet acceptance criteria, o  2-MS-202:    The valve is in the steam line to the steam driven auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pump Terry Turbine from the Number 2 Steam Generator. The valve does not receive an accident signal and is normally open to supply steam to the Terry Turbine piping for warming and Appendix R compliance. A test was performed with a D/P of 690 psi, which is the highest pressure that could be developed for the test. The valve opened and i
closed properly. For the worst case condition of 1065 psi, the valve could be manually closed in the event of valve failure.        3 Therefore,    the AFW system in the as-found condition was concluded to be operable.      This valve was adjusted to meet acceptance criteria.
o  2-SI-655: Valve 2-SI-655 is the crosstie valve between the "swing" (B) HPSI pump and the "A" header. Valve 2-SI-655 was        ,
tested to show it could open against maximum differential pressure, however it failed to stroke fully open.      It opened far enough to provide intermediate position indication signals.
This valve is normally aligned in accordance with valve lineup procedures to be left fully open, and it does not receive any
                        ' automatic actuation signals. The normal position of 2-SI-655        ,
is open which ties the swing (B) pump if needed to the "A" HPSI header. If realignment to the "B" header were required, valve 2-SI-655 would be closed. If another realignment was needed, any subsequent reopening of 2-SI-655 would be performed with the "swing" (8) HPSI pump secured and thus full opening would be assured.      Therefore valve and system operability was maintained by the fact ths.t if 2-SI-655 had to be opened and it failed to do so, shutting down the "swing" (B) HPSI pump would
!                        remove the differential pressure and allow the valve to open.
o  2-FW-44:    This  valve  would  not  have  closed  against  a differential pressure of 1190 psi.      This is a normally open valve during plant power operations. Testing showed the valve would open under maximum differential pressure due to flow.
During "normal", non faulted conditions the valve is required to be open and does not receive a close signal. Thus a failure      ,
to close is not a concern during normal operation.          During
                          ' abnormal" conditions with a leak in the AFW piping when the i                        AFH system is in service, the leak can be isolated by closing either 2-FW-43A or 2-FW-438 if the leak is downstream of either l                        valve. If the leak is between FW-44 and either of the above l                        two valves it can be isolated when the AFW pumps are stopped to l
 
8 Attachment A05394/Page 9 allow isolation of the leak by closing FW-44. Due to the short length of piping a leuk between FW-44 and either of FW-43A or FW-438 is an unlikely possibility. Therefore, the system was operable "as-found". The valve was adjusted to meet the acceptance criteria.
o    Item 3 - Data Summary Tables 3-A and 3-B provide a summary of the data accumulated under this program. The information has been formatted in accordance with the sample recommended format provided in Table 2 of IE Bulletin 85-03.
Individual cases of marginal torque switch bypass, minimum or maximum stem thrusts, and unintentional backseating were found prior to switch adjustment, but none were severe enough to render the systems inoperable. Setpoints were changed to allow for the highest reasonable safety factor.        This was done for each MOV on an individual basis,    c or example, in some cases the torque switch settings were increased to obtain a greater safety factor at minimum thrust while others were reduced to decrease unexpected component failures during operation.
Some terms used in Table 3-A and 3-B may not be universally familiar, the following descriptions are provided for clarity:
Outout Soeed - Thr number of revolutions per minute which the stem nut turns during operation. The stem nut is part of the screw mechanism which causes the stem to move into or out of the valve thereby moving the valve disk or plug.
Desian Differential P    -
This is a reiteration of minimum allowable differential pressures as detailed in NNECO's June 11, 1986 letter.      NNEC0's June 11, 1986 letter incorrectly listed the differential pressures (open and close) for MOVs 2-SI-616, 617, 626, 627, 636, 637, 646, 647, 653, 654, 655, and 656 as 1250 psi. This was found to be a typographical error and the revised differential pressures are hereby provided in Table 3-B.
Prior and Final Toraue Switch Setooints (S.S.) - This stands for torque switch setpoints.
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IES C-03 AEIF016E - TABLE 3-A
{
MILLSTWE 1Mli 2                                                      ;
IEITR ORERATED VRLVE DATA                                                l RE          M VE        R VE R W          VEVE AVE WERATOR            (PERATOR MOTIR OllTPL/I RBCT!k                        l 18          IfteFACTWER TYPE lEIDEL        SilE CU6S 18NLFACTURER M[SEL          MH EIEED (IN)                                        WlH 26          tEUW        BATE WB-3546 13MS 02      1500 UNITORQLE 98-000-5 1900 34.6 D6W616 LIE ISCLATION VALVE 2-06-301    EUW        GATE P-35142-6      04    150      LIMITCRQUE M 5    1900 49.7 VCT IS(LATI0h VALVE 2-01-504    ELAN        GATE P-35142 7      03      150    UMITORM 95 00-5 1900 63.8 RdSi TD DE w SUCTION ISO VRLVE 2-CS 13.!A DARLIE        GATE 9413186        18    150      UMITORQLE SIS + 15 3600 92.0 RWST ISDLATION VALVE 2-C5-13.1B DARLING      6 ATE 9413166      18    150      LIMITORQLE 9 8-0-15  3600 92.0 RWST ISDLATI0h VALE 2-Fu-44      POEL.      6 ATE 16023WE      06      600      LIMITORQUE SMk-1 25 3600 89.8 ALTA FEID PUW CROSS TIE RW 2-MS-201    VELA        GATE B12-25S-2TS 04        600      UMITORQLE 9 9-000-5 1900 34.6 TERRf itRilt STEM SL55tY ISO 2-MS 202    VELA        GATE B12-25PS-2TS 04      600      UM! TORQUE 99-000-5 1900 34.6 TERRY TiRBINE STEAM StiftY 150 2 51 411      DM.1%      GATE C300          or      300      LIMITOR M SIG 4 10 3600 93.3 WSI SUCTICh EADER CRDSSTIE 2-51-412      DELIA      GATE C300          02      300      LIMITORQUE SM6 4 10 1900 46.7 WSI SLET10N KADER CROSSTIE 2-51 616      VELRi      6LOM P-35142 2    02      1500 LIMITORKE 98 4 15 13v0 34.5 451 EADER              'A' IWECTION VRLVE 2-51-617      VEur.      6JK P-35142-2      02      1500 U MITOR M 90-00-15 1900 34.5 451 EADER 'B' IWECI!0h VALVE 2 51-E2i    VELJ6        6.U5E  P- L 42-e  02      15:>0 LIMITORRE SME
* 15 1800 34.5 451 MAMR 'A' IMECTION VKVE 2 51-627    VELA        GtD M P-35142-2    02      1500 LIMITCRRE SRE-00-15 1600 34.5 WS! EADER 'B' IVECTim VALVE 25163        VELAN      6LOM P-35142-2      02      1500 LIMITORAE 9 6-00-15 1900 34.5 WS1 EADER 'A' IWECTION VALVE 2 51-07      VE.M        GLOM P-35142-2      02    1500 LIMITORQLE SMi-00 15 1800 34.5 451 EADER 'B' IMECTifh VALVE 2-51 646    WL/c        6LD6E P-35142 2    02    15(c LIMITORQLE SME*15 1900 34.5 WS! EADER              'A' IWECTION VALVE 2-51-647    VELA        SLOR P 35142 2    02      1500 LIMITCRQLE 9 6-00-15 1900 34.5 WS! EADER 'B' IMECTION VALVE 2-51 653    ELAN        WE P-35142-5      04      900      LIMITORQLE 9 0-00-10 1900 49.7 WSI DISCMRGE KADO CROSSTIE 2 51 434    ELAN        GA!E P-35142-4    06      900      LIMITW RE Sni-00-25 1900 49.7 WS! IWECTION ISOLATICh VALVE 2-5145      ELAh        GATE P-35142-5    04      900      LIMITORQLE 98 4 10 1000 49.7 sfiS! DISD5RSE KADER CROSSTIE
:                      2 S!-656    VELAN      6 ATE P-35142-4    06      $00      LIMITWQlE  90-0-40  1900 51.5 1951 lauECTION ISOLATION VALVE 2 4 4196 GIMEL          9.0BE P-39698      04      900      UNITORAE 9 6-000-5 1900 45.0 TERRY itRilE STEM STOP l
  =magwwgme--w              6  MNh
 
  .a t  >
IEB 85-03 RESPDGE - TABLE 3-3 MILLSTWE LMIT 2 IOV TEST DATA VALVE      IESIGN ESIGN TEST      TEST    PRIOR PRIOR File. FINAL AS-F0thD                      TEST DETHOD ID        BELTA P KITA P DELTA P DELTA F S.S. S.S. S.S. S.S. VALE WEN    ClllSE  @EN    CLDSE  @CN    CLDSE WEh      C1IISE @ STABILITY 2-04-429  77E    2735    W      M      2.0    1.0    2.0    1.0    SAilSFETORY            SIGNATEE TEST 2-0+ 501    150    150    $      $      1.0    1.0    1.0    1.0    SEE ITEM 2 0F RES50NSE SIGM TJ E TEST 2-04-504  150    l'4    NA    NA      1.0    1.0      1.0  1.0    SEE ITEM 2 CF RESFONSE SIEM T@E TEST 2-CS-13.1  25      41      M      M      4.25    4.25    2.25  2.0    SATISFACTmY            SIGNATE E TESi 2-CS 13.19 25      41      NA    M      4.25    4.25    2.75  2.75    SAilSFACTORY            S16 M imE TEST 2-Fw- 44  1150    llM    12;;  1211    4.25    4.25    4.25  4.25    SEE ITEM 2 0F RESEONSE DP / SIGMTW E TEST 2-MS-2Cl  1065    1065    6%    $      3.0    3.5    2.75  3.0    SATISFACTORT            DP / SIGMTWE TEST 2 r.5-202  106!    1065    693    G      4.0    3.5    3.0    2.3    SEE ITER 2 0F RESPON5E DP / SIGM!$E TES!
2-51-411  2f4    250    M      M      2.5    2.5    3.0    2.5    SEE ITEM 2 0F RESf0NSE S15MTJE TESI 2-51 412  250    250    M      M      1.675 1.875 2.25      2.25    SATISFACTORY            SIGMTWE TEST 2-S1 615  1234    1E4    1235  1235    2.0    2.0    2.0    2.0    SATISFACTORY            FUU. MESS. DP TEST 2-S1-617  1234    1234    1240  1240    1.25    1.2d    1.25  1.25    SATISFACTORf            F1.LL MESS. DP TEST 2-51 626  1234    1234    1235  1235    1.5    2.0    1.5    2.0    SAilSFACTDRs            F#.. MESS. DP TEST 2-S1 627  1234    1234    1240  1240    1.5    2.25    1.5    2.25    SATISFACTORf            F W L PRES 3. DP TES1 2-S1-636  1234    1234    1235  !?3    1.0    1.0    1.0    1.0    SATISFACTORt            FULL MESS. @ TEST 2-51 637  1234    1234    1240  1240    1.0    1.5    1.0    1.5    SATISFACTORY            FULL PRESS. DP TEST 2-51-64E  1234    1254    Ic35  1235    1.0    2.0    1.0    2.0    SAi!SFAC*EY            FULL PRESS. DP TEST 2-51 547  1234    1234    1240  1240    1.0    1.5    1.0    1.5    SATISFACTORY            FULL PRESS. DP 1EST 2-51-653  1234    1234    1250  1235    1.5    1.5    1.5    1.5    SATISFACTORt            FULL PRESS. DP TEST 2-51 454  1234    1234    1250  1235    2.0    1.0    2.0    1.0    SAT!SFACTORY            FULL PRESS. DP TESi 2 5    1234    1234    125v  1250    2.0    1.75    2.0    1.75    ELE ITEM 2 7 RQFONSE FULL PRESS. DP TEST 2-S1-656  1234    1234    1250  1240    2.0    2.0    2.0    2.0    SATISFGETORY            FULL PRESS. DP TEST l      2-SV-4166 1065    1065    6%    NA      1.5    2.0    1.25  1.75    MilSFACT3Y              DP / SIGM TJ E TEST l
t
 
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Attachment' A05394/Page 10                                                                    -
        \
IV. Millstone Unit No. 3 o    Item 1 - Proaram Comoletion The testing program at Millstone Unit No. 3 was completed during the 1987-1988 refueling outage. Testing was performed on 33 MOVs as listed in Table 4-A and 4-B.
o    Item 2 - Valve Ooqczbility Prior to Adiustment As-found operability was determined by assessing each M0V's test results and its ability to perform its intended safety function.
During the evaluation of each M0V, consideration was given to:    stem thrust at control switch trip, total stem thrust, torque switch bypass, unintentional backseating, and remote position indication.
A review of the results showed that all 33 MOVs had proper remote position indication and acceptable levels of inertial thrust.
Subsequent evaluations of those test results determined that a majority (21 out of 33) of the MOVs met the parameters as detailed in our response to paragraph (a) of Bulletin 85-03 while 12 did not.
However, the review provided in Reference I was, in some cases, more conservative than necessary. For the valves which failed initial testing, additional evaluations were conducted to remove conservatisms considered during the original differential pressure determinations.
One valve (3CHS*LCVll2D) would not operate as-found due to problems in the motor control center (MCC).        This had nothing to do with switch setpoints and was addressed through existing plant procedures. Subsequent testing after MCC repairs found that the MOV would have been operable at the as-found switch setpoints had there been no MCC problems.
The following twelve (12) valves did not meet the design parameters (D/P) specified in NNECO's June 11, 1986 letter:
3SIH*MV88078, 3SlH*8806, 3FWA*MOV35A, 3FWA*M0V35B,        3CHS*MV8105, 3CHS*HV8111B, 3SIH*MV8801A, 3SIH*MV8814, 3SlH*MV8821B, 3SIH*MV8920, 3SIH*MV8923A, 3SIH*MV8924
,                      NNEC0 has evaluated the impact on system operability for the
                        " a s - fo'in d " condition of each valve. Those evaluations are as follows:
o      3SIH*MV8807B:
The D/P requirement for this valve is 220 psi.      The valve's "as-found" capability was sufficient to move the valve from closed to open (the required direction). Therefore, NNEC0 has concluded that this valve was operable, i
 
    .. L u                                                                                  x Attachment A05394/Page 11 0  3FWA*MOV35A, B:
The D/P requirement for these valves is 1800 psi.      The valves "as-found" capability was:
A: 1370 psi      open to closed H: 1453 psi      open to closed Thue valves are in the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) piping downstream of the motor driven AFW pumps. They are normally maintained open and are monitored on the "Bypass Annunciator Panel" in the control room. If they had closed or even drifted off of the fully open position, the operators would be alerted by annunciation. The actual maximum D/P for these valves would be 1504 psi, the shutoff head of the motor driven AFW pumps (below the as-found capability for "closed to open"). This maximum D/P would be experienced only in rare circumstances and in addition would be minimized by the cavitating venturis in the AFW piping.      However, if an operator had ever experienced difficulty opening one of these valves, he could shutdown the AFW pump, open the valve and restart the pump. If the operator needed to close the valves and experienced difficulties, he could do one of the following:
                                - manually close the subject valves
                                - close FWA*HV31 (series)(remotely)
                                - close FWA*V5, V19 Based on all of the above, NNECO concluded that the AFW system remained operable with the valver "as-found".
o  3SlH*MV8806:
The D/P requirements for this valve is 190 psi.        The valve's "as-found" capability was:
81 psi      open ic :.10 sed (required mode) 66 psi      closed to open This valv3      is involved in the changeover to "cold leg recirculation" during a design basis LOCA. If the operator did not receive positive indication of this valve closing he could do one of the following:
                                - close valves SIH'MV8823 A, B (if these valves were closed, isolation function would be satisfied; these valves tested satisfactorily.)
manually close valve SIL*V1
                                - manually close subject valve: SIH*MV8806 Based on the above, NNEC0 has concluded that the system remained operable.
 
e3  2..
Atta'chment
    .            A05394/Page 12 o'                    3CHS*MV8105:
The D/P requirement for this valve was specified to be 2735                                                              s psi. The va he's "as-found" capability was 2485 psi going from open to closed. . On a safety injection actuation signal (SIAS) this valve must close. However, in addition there is a valve in series (CHS*MV8106) that also receives an automatic closure signal (reoundancy). Also the same SIAS opens two valves that align charging system relief valves that have a 2200 psi setpoint. Therefore in actuality, the maximum D/P would be 2200 psi and the subject valve demonstrated the capability to meet that. Therefore, NNECO has concluded that the valve and system remained operable, o                      3CHS*MV8111B:
The D/P requirement for this valve was specified to be 2735 psi. The valve's "as-found" capability was 2562 psi going from open to closed. NNECO has concluded that this valve and system remained operable for precisely the same reasons as for valve CHS*MV8105. The in-series valve that also automatically closes on a SIAS is CHS*MV8110.                                                  This valve successfully passed the testing program.
o                      3SlH*MV8801A:
The D/P requirement for this valve was specified to be 2735 psi. The valve's "as-found" capability was less than that necessary to meet the criteria.                                                    However, valve SIH*MV8801B is in parallel                                                  and would have opened when it received its automatic open signal.                                                  Therefore, NNECO concluded that the system remained operable.
o                      3SIH*MV8814:
The D/P requirement for this valve was specified to be 1750 psi. The valve's "as-found" capability was 1460 psi going from open to closed. This valve is involved in the changeover to "cold leg recirculation' during a design basis LOCA. If the operator did not receive positive indication of this valve                                                                        ,
closing he could do one of the following:                                                                                          '
                                                                                  - close SIH*MV8813 (remotely operated)
                                                                                  - manually close subject valve: SIH*MV8814
                                                                                  - stop the safety injection pump (SIH*PIB), bleed off the pressure in the line, open the valve remotely and restart the pump                                                                                  ,
Based on the above, NNECO has concluded that the system remained operable, o                      3SIH*MV8920:                                                                                                                      ,
The D/P requirement for this valve was specified to be 1750 psi. The valve's "as-found" capability was 929 psi going from e                    e - - - , . , - - . . - , . - , . . . - - - - - - . - . - - - . . , . . - , , , , , . , - . ~ .--                      ---..n. , - . ,        . - . . . .
 
r                                                                                              \
  ,t 4 e.
              ~
Attachment!
A05394/Page'13 open to closed.      NNEC0 has concluded the system to have remained operable based on the same reasons as stated for valve SIH*MV8814.
o    3S!H*MV8923A:
The D/P requirement for this valve was specified to be 220 psi.
The valve's "as-found" capability was 170 psi going open and 188 psi going closed. This valve is on ths suction piping to the safety injection pumps and receives no automatic signals.
It is only used if there is some type of piping problem in that system. The valve could be manipulated manually if necessary.
The ability of this valve to open or close is not a safety function, o    3SIH*MV8924:
The D/P requirement for this valve was specified to be 220 psi.      ,
The valve's "as-found" capability was 47 psi going open and 97 psi going closed. This valve is only required to close to isolate a f aulted line in the safety injection system.      There are parallel remotely operated isolation valves downstream that provide redundancy.        This valve could also be operated manually.
o    3SIH*MV8821B:
The D/P requirement for this valve was specified to be 1750 psi. 1he valve's "as-found" capability was 908 psi going from open to closed. This valve is required to close only when shifting from cold leg to hot leg recirculation during a design basis LOCA. If two other valves close, as they should (they tested satisfactorily), then the position of SIH*MV8821B is not important.
All of the above MOVs would have been considered operable as-found per Technical Specifications and ASME Section XI.      By using signature te ting (a relatively new technology that can monitor a number        operating parameters which heretofore were not measurable'      :llstone Unit No. 3 has performed a testing program whicn ,,s well beyond the technical specification and ASME *?ction XI M0V testing requirements, o    Item 3 - Data Summary Tables 4-A and 4-B provide a summary of the data accumulated under this program. The information has been formatted in accordance with the sample recommended format provided in Table 2 of IE Bulletin 85-03. NNECO's letters dated June 11, 1986 and October 28, 1986 incorrectly stated the "close Design Delta-P" for 3SIH*MV8813 as 1570 psi. Table 4-B provides the correct value of 227 psi.
Individual cases of marginal torque switch bypass, minimum or maximum stem thrusts, and unintentional backseating were found prior to switch adjustment, but none were severe enough to render the
 
  , ,; 4 ..
Atta'chment A05394/Page 14 system inoperable. Setpoints were changed to allow for the highest reasonable safety factor.      This was done for each MOV on an individual basis. For example, in some cases the torque switch settings were increased to obtain a greater safety factor a minimum thrust while others were reduced to decrease conponent stresses and the related possibility of unexpected component failures during operation.
Some terms used in Tables 4-A and 4-B may not be universally familiar, the following descriptions are provided for clarity:
Outout Soeed - The number of revolutions per minute which the stem nut turns during operation. The stem nut is that part of the screw mechanism which causes the stem to move into or out of the valve thereby moving the valve disk or plug.
Desian Differential P    -
This is a reiteration of minimum allowable differential pressures as detailed in the NNEC0 letters dated June 11, 1986 and October 28, 1986.
Prior and Final Toraue Switch Setooints (S.S.) - This stands for torque switch setpoints.
 
  .
* t.
ID 85-03 RE506E - TSLE 4 A RILISTOE (Jt!T 3 ETOR OPERATED R VE DATA R VE          R VE      R W VALVE        WILVE VALW WERATM          @ERATS ET(It MPUT FlfCT13 10          IFSP. TWE lt0EL        SIZE CLASS 168EACTLitut itBEL      RPM DED (IN)                                    RpR X391U M 1 8 dlu G TH GATE N226-EE-SP      04    150    UMlT39UE 58-000-5 1900 49.3 VCT MLET ISOLATim VALVE 306stIV112C WUGITH GATE N226-EMD-SP      04    !!^    LIMITE M $8-000 5 190) 49.3 VCT QJTLET ISOLATIm VALVE 3D6*LEVll2D WJdORin GATE N226-EM-SP      08    150    LIMITOR M SB 00-10 3600 105.9 RMST SLRLY TO D#61E R80 SUC.
3D6*LCVil2E WALWORTH GATE N226-EMD-SP    08    150    LIMIT 3 M SB-00-10 3600 105.9 RWST SLFPLY TO 09.91N6 Pu@ SUC.
306aWV8105 WALWWTH GATE N6226 EM0-SP 03          1500 LIRlimRE 5p6-00-25 1800 41.3 DW61NS LIE Sl ISOLATION VALVE 3D6*MV8106 W J Oiih GATE le6226-EM0-SP 03        1500 URITORM SME-00-25 1800 41.3 DMG!E UNE SI ISOLAT10h VALVE 3DG*NV8110 VELAh        6 LOBE 2iM7BFN    01.5 1500 UmlTOROLE SMB-00-10 1000 22.0 DW6!NG RMP Mih1 FLOW CONTROL VLV 3D6*E!!!A VELM          6L0bE 2TP76Fh    02    1500 UNITORAC SRS 00-10 1800 19.1 06lRGING PWO MIN:FJN CONTROL VLV 3D69UE'111B VELM        BLDBE 2TM76Fh    02    1500 LIMITWOLE SMB-00-10 1800 26.6 DMSIE R80 Mlk! FLOW C0hTROL VLV 3CHS*M 4111C VELAN      GLCEE 2TiO#h      02    1500 LIRITW M SME-00-10 1800 26.6 0 # GING PC F Mih1FLDW CONTROL VLV 3CHS*MV6436A EST .      6 ATE M78FM      04    2500 LIMITOR M 580-00 15 % 00 127.7 DMSIE EADER IS0JTION kVE 3CHS eV543EE bEST.      GATE GM7&M        04    2500 LIMITOR M SBD 00-15 3600 127.7 0@G E EADER IS0JTION VALVE 3CHS**W4XC EST.        6 ATE 6M78FM      04    2500 URIT30LE SBD-00-15 MOO 127.7 CHAR 6!E EADER ISOLATION VALVE 3Fe*EV35A MJORin GATE 5247PS              03    900  LIMIT & M SMB 000-5 1000 26.5 S/6 AUX. FEIDdTER SQLATION VALVE 3F6*OV35B $UOtTH GATE 5247PS              03    900  LIMITWQUE SM0-000-5 1800 26.5 S/6 FEEDWATER ISO GTION VALVE FWAeMOV35C WAUOtTH GATE 5247PS          03    900  LIMITORQLE SRB-000-5 1800 26.5 S/S AUX. FEED @TER ISCLATION VLV 3FEHOV350 WLWORTH GATE 5247FS            03    900  LIMITE M 96-000-5 1800 26.5 S/6 AUX FEEDWATER ISCLATION R VE 351HeWV88014 WUDITH GATE E226-EMD-SP 04          1500 LIRIT@QUE SB-0-40      1800 51.6 D G Pu @ SAFETY IM . It'ADER ISO 361HWMlWO!B WROORTH GATE E226-EMD-SP 04          1500 LIMITOROLE SB + 40      1800 51.6 DS PWF SAFETY 10 KADER ISO 361HWR M Efl iflOORTH GATE W6226-DO-SP 04        15(C LIMITm0LE SB-0-40      1000 51.6 SIN Pu@ TO 10T LESS - CTRi ISO  l 361HISW W CEB Iflu otTH GATE M6226-D0-SP 04      1500 Llulim0LE SB-0-40      1900 51.6 SDI PW@ TO 10T 1I65 - CTNT ISO 361HgN9906 WAuoRTH GATE N226 DO-SP        08    150  LIRITOROLE $8 0-10    3600 108.7 NSY TO SdlFETY IM. Pu@ ISOLAT!W 351HWN0007A IfluoRTH GATE N226-DG-SP      06    150  URITm0LE SB-00-10 1600 81.7 D55t61E TO SAFETY IW R80S SLC.
l                                              06          URITREE S8-00-10 1900 81.7 DM61E TD SAFETY IW PUWS SUC.
3SihaMV8007b InALWORTH GATE h226-DO SP          150 3S!H WVW13 PGCIFIC 9 ATE 555156          03    1500 URITOROLE SS-00-10 3600 76.9 MIN! FLOW UE TO RW5T 36!HaMV8314 YARWY      612 E $5158-F316R 01.5 1500 LIRITQ?0VE 90-00-5        1900 23.4 S!H R80 MIN!FLDW IS0JT!0h          l
* se i
IEB C-03 REEONSE - TABLE 4-A (C0h?! MIDS MILLSTCE UNIT J                                                    )
WTOR OPLAATED R VE DATA RW                        R VE    E VE R VE          E VE R d WERATOR        WERAim NOTE WTRli R80T10h ID                        IF6A. TYK EL              S!!E CLASS NMFACTWEA EL            RPM DED
(!N)                                    N9L 36164 Wluut!., GRTL N6226 EE-SP 04                          1500 LIMIT 0 m 56 0 25        1900 51.6 S!H PLMP TD C;l LE3 NECT::A 35!HisW9821B WL.WORin GATE N6226 EM0 SP 04                    150v LIRit@AE 58 0-25        !$X 51.6 Sin W 70 C0J LEE N E;*!::.
35! M V8835 W UdDRTH GATE N6226-EC-SP 04                      1500 LIMI:m9tE SB 0-40        1600 51.6 51 COLD LES MRSTEA IS02: h VLV.
3SleMi320 YARet                    GLDEE 5515B F3167. 01.5 1500 LIMITOROVE SMi@-5 :XC 23.4 516,W AWA :50#:Os 351r*Mv923A R WDRih GATE                  N226-EE-F>    06    150  LIR:131E    Si'-00 10 1600 61.7 S!H PUpf SLEi10% IS:LA'::ri VA 4 3S15%:x.::- n. d IF GATE h22i-E% F                      06    15s  LIRiiORI EE-00 10 ;'s i .7          S . M SU;~:2 :5] 5 ;..
351-* M n24 n . G :e W. :. h126 ET-S;                    M    1:0  LIMITDR M 56
* 10 1M 1.7            tr+MS:NG T Siflii :N.' ,v;5 l
 
, o , ,,
                                                  !EB 85-03 RE90NSE - TABLE 4 B MILLSTOE LMIT 3 10V TEST DATA VAtYE          ES16h ESIGh TEST        TEST  PRIOR PRIOR FIML FINAL AS-F0lMD                          TEST .'ZTK)D ID            DELTA P E LTA P ELTA P DELTA P S.S. S.S. S.S. 5.5. VALVE (FEh    CLEI    (PEA    CLDSE  OPEh    CLDSE (FEh      CLDSE (PERABILITY X39tCvilaB 193        193    NA      M      2.0    2.0      1.0    1.0    SATISFACT3Y            SIGNA M E TEST 3CMSetEV112C 193      193    n      M      2.0    2.0      1.25    1.25    SA!!SFACTmY            SIGM'WE TEST 3CHS*LCvilD 192        193    M      M      1.25    1.25    1.25    1.25    SEE ITER 2 Or RESgoNSE SIGNATJE TEST 306%CVil2E 193        193    M      M      2.0    2.0      1.25    1.25    SATISFETORY            S! W ifi TEST
      '0 6 * /s105 2735    2735    W      M      1.0    1.0      1.25    1.25    SEE ITEX 2 0F RESPONSE SIGMTURE !EST 3CHS w i'd    2735  2735    M      M      1.0    1.0      1.25    1.25    SATISFETORY            SIGMiWE TEST 3CHS+Mvil10 2735      27 2    M      M      1.0    1.25    1.25    1.e5    MilSF/CIDRi            SIGMi&E TES 30.x5*%i1114 2735    2735    4      !G      2.l    2.5    2.5      1.5    SA!!SFEi3Rf            Sl % '.aE TEST 3C + Rii;11b 27 2    17 2    254)    2540    1.5    1.5    2.0      2.0    SEI ITER 2 0F RES; S SE DC / $13Mi4E TES 3CHS* L ill!C 27 H    2735    V      M      2.0    2.0    1.67:    1.5    SATISFACTORY            SIGMTAE TEii 3CHS*M 443 A 2735      100    2544    2540    1.25    1.5    1.5      1.5    SATISFACTORY            DP / S!GMiJE TEST 3CHS*M/i432) 2735      1('. hA      M      2.5    2.5    2.5    2.C      SA!!SFE*0;t            SIGNAi$ E TEST 3Cx5*t443K 272        100    M      M      2.5    2.5    2.0    2.0      SATISFACTORY          SISMiJE TEST YW90rS IM              180;    146!  1435    1.3    1.5    2.0    2.25    SEE ITEM 2 0F RESPON5E DP / 5;GMiWI TEST 3FGC/35i 1800          1800    15(9    1477    1.5    1.5    1.5    2.25    SEE ITEM 2 0F RESf0NSE DP / S! N M E TES
    'InA++tX35C    1M    IM      15(1    14h    1.0    2.0    1.0    1.0    SA!!SFACT3Fr            DP / SI W V E 'ES!
Y Wert:V350 lir00      !!'00  M      M      1.5    3.0    2.0    4.0      SAilFEMY              Sl % if i TES*
351Herrss01A 2735      2 735  25M    25 6    2.5    2.5    2.125 2.25      SEI ITER 2 F RES; m SE li / SIEM M i TES 3S! M V8801B 2735      2735    M      M      2.25    2.25    2.125 2.25      SAT!SF ACTORY          SIEMTJE TEST 351HeWII02A 1750        1750    M      M      1.75    1.75    1.875 1.875 SATISFACTORY                SIGNATW E TEST 3SIIMWII029 1750        1750    M      M      2.5    2.5      2.125 2.25      SAilSFACTORY            SIGMTLFO. TEST 35!H 4 7306 190        190    M      M      2.0    2.0      2.125 2.0      SEE ITEM 2 F MW(MSE SIGM TWE TEST 351M/i407A 220          220    M      M      2.25  2.25    2.75    2.5    SAT!SFACTORY            SIEMME TEST 35!MVB307B 22v          220    m      M      1.125 1.125 1.875      1.6 75 SEE ITEM 2 0F RESKNSE $1GM M E TEST 351HWN8813 1747        227    M      NR      1.5    1.5    2.0    2.0    SATISFAC:0Rf            SIGM if E TEST 3SI M V8314 1750        1750    M      M      1.25    1.25    1.625 1.375 SEE ITLM 2 7 RES;thSE SIGMTJ I TEST
 
IES 85-03 ESP (NSE - TABLE 4-B (CONilm                                        !
i NILLST(BE bNIT 3 10/ TEST DATA R VE          ESIGN ESIGN TEST        TEST    PRIOR PRI0h FI R FI A AS-FDLMD            ,
TEST E!rCL ID            ELTA P E LTA P E'TA
                                    . P E LTA P S.S. S.S. S.S. S.S. R VE (PEh  CLDSE  (PEN    CLDSE    (PEN  CLDSE WEN      CLDSE (PERABILITY 361MWIN1A 1750      1%0    m        M        3.25  3.25    3.5  3.5    SATISFACT(RY          SISMTURE TEST CIMNOS21B 1750      1%C    M        M        3.25  3.25    3.5  3.5    SEE ITER 2 0F RESPONSE SIGS M E TEST 3SIH*WiE6 1750      1750    1568-    1562    2.75    2.75    2.5  2.25  SATISFACTORY          DP / SISMTLEE TEST .
t 35!n+ Mas 20 1750    1%0    M        M        1.0    1.0      1.25  1.25  EE ITEM 2 0F RE50NSE SISM!URE TES:
I'
                                                                                                                          +
1 3 Sin +MW925A 220    220    M        M        2.25  2.125 2.625 2.0      SEE ITEM 2 0F RE50NSE SIGMME TEST        i 3Sim*633231 22v      22v    M        M      2.125 2.125 1.75      2.0    SAi!SFACTORY          S!E W .9E TEST M W+M d 324 2h?      220    M        G        1.25  1.5      2.5  2.0    SEE ITEM 2 0F RES;3 SE SISMis E 'EST e
t i
1
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