05000498/FIN-2007002-02: Difference between revisions
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| identified by = NRC | | identified by = NRC | ||
| Inspection procedure = IP 71152 | | Inspection procedure = IP 71152 | ||
| Inspector = P Elkmann, P Goldberg, J Dixonj, | | Inspector = P Elkmann, P Goldberg, J Dixonj, Dixonj Taylor, T Farnholtz, J Nadel | ||
| CCA = N/A for ROP | | CCA = N/A for ROP | ||
| INPO aspect = | | INPO aspect = | ||
| description = On December 12, 2006, during the Unit 1 turbine-driven AFW Pump 14 surveillance testing, the pump failed to reach rated speed. The trip and throttle valve (MOV 0514) was taken to open from the control room to commence the surveillance test, but as the valve started to open, the mechanical/electrical trip linkage on the pump tripped; thereby, disconnecting the valve from the actuator. Consequently, the valve failed to move off the closed seat. During troubleshooting activities, it was identified that the impact distance between the slip link lever and the trip rod pin was below the minimum distance required, and the trip hook and latch-up lever engagement was unacceptable. Additionally, it was discovered that the licensee misinterpreted, and misapplied, vendor guidance on the engagement requirement between the trip hook and the latch-up lever. The licensee has a design change package that addresses the impact distance and aligns it more with the EPRI guidance. This design change package has been implemented in Unit 1 and will be implemented in Unit 2 during Refueling Outage 2RE12. The licensee has also changed the maintenance and surveillance procedures to reflect EPRI guidance on the material condition of the trip hook and latch-up lever as well as visual acceptance criteria on acceptable engagement between the trip hook and latch-up lever. AFW Pump 14 was last run successfully on November 16, 2006. On December 14, 2006, the licensee completed repairs/adjustments on the impact distance and successfully performed the surveillance test on AFW Pump 14. The licensee has entered this event into their CAP as CR 06-16805 and -17091. Pending the licensees completion of the sensitivity analysis to electrical auxiliary building temperature during a loss of HVAC (largest contributor to risk for a loss of a turbine-driven AFW pump), LER submittal, and the NRCs review of the circumstances and the evaluation, this issue is considered as an Unresolved Item (URI) 05000498/2007002-02, Inadequate Procedure Leads to Inoperable Turbine-Driven AFW Pump for Longer than TSs Allowed Outage Time. | | description = On December 12, 2006, during the Unit 1 turbine-driven AFW Pump 14 surveillance testing, the pump failed to reach rated speed. The trip and throttle valve (MOV 0514) was taken to open from the control room to commence the surveillance test, but as the valve started to open, the mechanical/electrical trip linkage on the pump tripped; thereby, disconnecting the valve from the actuator. Consequently, the valve failed to move off the closed seat. During troubleshooting activities, it was identified that the impact distance between the slip link lever and the trip rod pin was below the minimum distance required, and the trip hook and latch-up lever engagement was unacceptable. Additionally, it was discovered that the licensee misinterpreted, and misapplied, vendor guidance on the engagement requirement between the trip hook and the latch-up lever. The licensee has a design change package that addresses the impact distance and aligns it more with the EPRI guidance. This design change package has been implemented in Unit 1 and will be implemented in Unit 2 during Refueling Outage 2RE12. The licensee has also changed the maintenance and surveillance procedures to reflect EPRI guidance on the material condition of the trip hook and latch-up lever as well as visual acceptance criteria on acceptable engagement between the trip hook and latch-up lever. AFW Pump 14 was last run successfully on November 16, 2006. On December 14, 2006, the licensee completed repairs/adjustments on the impact distance and successfully performed the surveillance test on AFW Pump 14. The licensee has entered this event into their CAP as CR 06-16805 and -17091. Pending the licensees completion of the sensitivity analysis to electrical auxiliary building temperature during a loss of HVAC (largest contributor to risk for a loss of a turbine-driven AFW pump), LER submittal, and the NRCs review of the circumstances and the evaluation, this issue is considered as an Unresolved Item (URI) 05000498/2007002-02, Inadequate Procedure Leads to Inoperable Turbine-Driven AFW Pump for Longer than TSs Allowed Outage Time. | ||
}} | }} | ||
Latest revision as of 20:32, 20 February 2018
| Site: | South Texas  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000498/2007002 Section 4OA2 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2007 (2007Q2) |
| Type: | URI: |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71152 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | P Elkmann P Goldberg J Dixonj Dixonj Taylor T Farnholtz J Nadel |
| INPO aspect | |
| ' | |