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#REDIRECT [[3F0811-02, Response to Request for Additional Information to Support NRC Balance of Plant Branch Acceptance Review of the CR-3 Extended Power Uprate LAR]]
| number = ML11228A032
| issue date = 08/11/2011
| title = Crystal River, Unit 3, Response to Request for Additional Information to Support NRC Balance of Plant Branch Acceptance Review of the CR-3 Extended Power Uprate LAR (TAC ME6527)
| author name = Franke J A
| author affiliation = Progress Energy Florida, Inc
| addressee name =
| addressee affiliation = NRC/Document Control Desk, NRC/NRR
| docket = 05000302
| license number = DPR-072
| contact person =
| case reference number = 3F0811-02, TAC ME6527
| document type = Letter
| page count = 59
| project = TAC:ME6527, TAC:ME6527
| stage = Response to RAI
}}
 
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:Progress ErmCrystal River Nuclear PlantDocket No. 50-302Operating License No. DPR-72August 11, 20113F0811-02U.S. Nuclear Regulatory CommissionAttn: Document Control DeskWashington, DC 20555-0001Subject: Crystal River Unit 3 -Response to Request for Additional Information to SupportNRC Balance of Plant Branch Acceptance Review of the CR-3 Extended PowerUprate LAR (TAC No. ME6527)References: 1.CR-3 to NRC letter dated June 15, 2011, "Crystal River Unit 3 -LicenseAmendment Request #309, Revision 0, Extended Power Uprate" (AccessionNo. ML 112070659)2. Email from S. Lingam (NRC) to D. Westcott (CR-3) dated, July 25, 2011,"Crystal River, unit 3 -EPU LAR (ME6527)"Dear Sir:By letter dated June 15, 2011, Florida Power Corporation (FPC), doing business as ProgressEnergy Florida, Inc., requested a license amendment to increase the rated thermal power level ofCrystal River Unit 3 (CR-3) from 2609 megawatts (MWt) to 3014 MWt. The proposed licenseamendment is considered an Extended Power Uprate (EPU). On July 25, 2011, via electronicmail, the NRC provided a request for additional information (RAI) related to turbine generatormissile generation, Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System, and modification of theemergency feedwater pump recirculation valves needed to support the Balance of Plant Branchacceptance review of the CR-3 EPU License Amendment Request (LAR).Attachment A to this submittal, "Response to Request for Additional Information to SupportNRC Balance of Plant Branch Acceptance Review of the CR-3 EPU LAR," provides the CR-3formal response to the RAI.In support of the CR-3 EPU acceptance review RAI responses, four enclosures are provided.Enclosure 1, "Siemens Technical Report CT-27438, "Missile Probability Analysis ReportProgress Energy Crystal River 3," Revision 1 (Confidential), provides the CR-3 specific turbinemissile generation probability analysis performed for EPU conditions. Enclosure 2, "SiemensTechnical Report CT-27438, "Missile Probability Analysis Report Progress Energy CrystalRiver 3," Revision IA (For Public Record), provides a redacted version of the CR-3 specificturbine missile generation probability analysis. Enclosure 3, "EFW Pump Recirculation ValveSimplified Diagrams (Figures 1 and 2)," provides simplified diagrams of the proposed additionof emergency feedwater (EFW) pump recirculation valves. Enclosure 4, "Summary ofEmergency Feedwater Pump Recirculation Valve Modification Failure Modes and EffectsAnalysis," provides a summary of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis prepared for the newEFW pump recirculation valves.IProgress Energy Florida, Inc.Crystal River Nuclear Plant15760 W. Powerline StreetCrystal River, FL 34428týbý U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 of 33F0811-02Enclosure 1 contains Siemens Technical Report CT-27438 which includes information thatSiemens considers confidential. Siemens Energy, Inc., as the owner of that confidentialinformation, has executed the affidavit provided in Attachment B and states that the identifiedproprietary information has been classified as confidential, is customarily held in confidence, andnot made available to the public. Siemens requests that the identified confidential information bewithheld from public disclosure in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 2.390(a)(4).Enclosure 2 is a for public record copy of Siemens Technical Report CT-27438 with theconfidential information redacted.This correspondence contains no new regulatory commitments.If you have any questions regarding this submittal, please contact Mr. Dan Westcott,Superintendent, Licensing and Regulatory Programs at (352) 563-4796.Sincer~el,JnA. Fo.FrankeVice PresidentCrystal River Nuclear PlantJAF/gweAttachments:A. Response to Request for Additional Information to Support NRC Balance of Plant BranchAcceptance Review of the CR-3 EPU LARB. Siemens Affidavit for Withholding Proprietary Information from Public DisclosureEnclosures:1. Siemens Technical Report CT-27438, "Missile Probability Analysis Report ProgressEnergy Crystal River 3," Revision 1 (Confidential)2. Siemens Technical Report CT-27438, "Missile Probability Analysis Report ProgressEnergy Crystal River 3," Revision lA (For Public Record)3. EFW Pump Recirculation Valve Simplified Diagrams (Figures 1 and 2)4. Summary of Emergency Feedwater Pump Recirculation Valve Modification Failure Modesand Effects Analysisxc: NRR Project ManagerRegional Administrator, Region IISenior Resident InspectorState Contact U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 3 of 33F0811-02STATE OF FLORIDACOUNTY OF CITRUSJon A. Franke states that he is the Vice President, Crystal River Nuclear Plant for FloridaPower Corporation, doing business as Progress Energy Florida, Inc.; that he is authorized on thepart of said company to sign and file with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission the informationattached hereto; and that all such statements made and matters set forth therein are true andcorrect to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief.o~nA. Franke//Vice PresidentCrystal River Nuclear PlantThe foregoing document was acknowledged before me this / day of6 KAI2011, by Jon A. Franke.Signature of Notary PublicState of Florida(Print, type, or stamp CommissionedName of Notary Public)Personally ,/ ProducedKnown -OR- Identification FLORIDA POWER CORPORATIONCRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3DOCKET NUMBER 50-302 /LICENSE NUMBER DPR-72ATTACHMENT ARESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATIONTO SUPPORT NRC BALANCE OF PLANT BRANCHACCEPTANCE REVIEW OF THE CR-3 EPU LAR U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attachment A3F0811-02 Page 1 of 8RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION TOSUPPORT NRC BALANCE OF PLANT BRANCH ACCEPTANCEREVIEW OF THE CR-3 EPU LARBy letter dated June 15, 2011, Florida Power Corporation (FPC), doing business as ProgressEnergy Florida, Inc., requested a license amendment to increase the rated thermal power level ofCrystal River Unit 3 (CR-3) from 2609 megawatts (MWt) to 3014 MWt. The proposed licenseamendment is considered an Extended Power Uprate (EPU). On July 25, 2011, via electronicmail, the NRC provided a request for additional information (RAI) related to turbine generatormissile generation, Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System, and modification of theemergency feedwater pump recirculation valves needed to support Balance of Plant Branchacceptance review of the CR-3 EPU License Amendment Request (LAR).NRC Request for Additional InformationOur Balance-of-Plant Branch completed an acceptance review of the Crystal River 3 EPU LAR.We found the application unacceptable with opportunity to supplement consistent with theguidelines of LIC-109. This conclusion is based on the following 3 information insufficienciesin the Technical Report associated with the LAR:1. Section 2.5.1.2.2 of the TR describes that the replacement turbine will have a missilegeneration probability of 3.5 E-05 based on a 100000 hour inspection interval, which thelicensee described as satisfying NRG Guidelines from SRP Section 3.5.1.3. However, thelicensee provided no description of the analysis used to determine the missile generationprobability. At a minimum, the licensee must include a description of the methodology,the basis for acceptance of the methodology, and assumptions used in the analysis.2. Section 2.5.4.1 of the TR describes how acceptable pool temperatures of less than 160'Fcan be achieved at EPU conditions by extending the time after shutdown. However, thelicensee does not describe how these analysis results would be translated into proceduresfor refueling, consistent with the requirements of Criterion 5 of 10 CFR Part 50,Appendix B. The applicant must describe the effect of the analysis results on plantoperating procedures subject to quality assurance program requirements, such asrefueling procedures.3. In several locations in the LAR, the licensee briefly describes a modification to theminimum flow recirculation control for the emergency feedwater pumps. Improperoperation of the modification could cause failure of the pump, and the modification couldbe configured such that it introduces cross-train dependencies. The licensee must providedetails of the modification necessary to establish that the modification would notadversely affect the independence of the emergency feedwater trains, such as a failuremodes and effects analysis, and that the modification would not substantially reduce thereliability of the individual pumps (TMI Action Plan Item II.E. 1.1), consistent with theguidelines of SRP Section 10.4.9.
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attachment A3F0811-02 Page 2 of 8CR-3 Responses:1. Section 2.5.1.2.2 of the TR describes that the replacement turbine will have a missilegeneration probability of 3.5 E-05 based on a 100000 hour inspection interval, whichthe licensee described as satisfying NRG Guidelines from SRP Section 3.5.1.3.However, the licensee provided no description of the analysis used to determine themissile generation probability. At a minimum, the licensee must include adescription of the methodology, the basis for acceptance of the methodology, andassumptions used in the analysis.An analysis to determine the turbine missile generation probability was performed forEPU conditions. A description of the methodology used and the analysis results aredocumented in Siemens Technical Report CT-27438, "Missile Probability AnalysisReport Progress Energy Crystal River 3" (Enclosures 1 and 2) for the Siemens BB281-18m2 low pressure (LP) turbine design. This CR-3 turbine missile probability analysisused the missile analysis methodology provided in Siemens Technical Report CT-27332,"Missile Probability Analysis for the Siemens 13.9 M2 Retrofit Design of Low-PressureTurbine by Siemens AG" (Reference 2). This methodology has been previouslyapproved by the NRC for the BB281-13.9m2 LP turbine design, which is an advancementover the Westinghouse BB281 model originally used at CR-3, as documented in a letterfrom Herbert Berkow (NRC) to Stan Dembkoski (SWPC), dated March 30, 2004(Reference 3). In the associated NRC Safety Evaluation, the NRC staff concluded thatthe technical report could be applied generically to other designs that are dimensionallydifferent but follow the same missile analysis methodology.Assumptions used in the CR-3 turbine missile generation probability analysisdocumented in the CR-3 specific Technical Report CT-27438 are equivalent to thosedocumented in the NRC approved Technical Report CT-27332.A confidential version of the Siemens Technical Report CT-27438 is provided inEnclosure 1 and a for public record copy of the report is provided in Enclosure 2.Maintenance, inspection and testing associated with the turbine rotors and the turbineoverspeed control system, including frequencies of these activities, will not change as aresult of EPU. CR-3 utilizes a quarterly test frequency for the main turbine governor andthrottle valves and an inspection interval on the turbine rotors and blades of every fiverefueling outages (approximately 10 year interval or < 87,600 operating hours), which isconservative to the manufacturer recommended inspection frequency of 100,000operating hours. These current testing and inspection frequencies ensure a reasonablylow probability of generating turbine missiles.
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attachment A3F0811-02 Page 3 of 82. Section 2.5.4.1 of the TR describes how acceptable pool temperatures of less than160'F can be achieved at EPU conditions by extending the time after shutdown.However, the licensee does not describe how these analysis results would betranslated into procedures for refueling, consistent with the requirements ofCriterion 5 of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B. The applicant must describe the effectof the analysis results on plant operating procedures subject to quality assuranceprogram requirements, such as refueling procedures.Consistent with 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V requirements, the CR-3 spent fuelpool (SFP) steady state temperature of 160'F is currently quantitatively controlled viaplant operating procedures by providing appropriate limitations and requirements. CR-3procedure controls include;* Operating Daily Surveillance Log provides a maximum SFP temperatureacceptance criterion of 120'F;" SFP high temperature alarm setpoint is 140'F;* SFP cooling operation procedure provides steps to operate two SFP coolingpumps in parallel, during refueling and when defueled, to ensure the SFPtemperature is maintained < 160'F;* SFP cooling operation procedure provides a Note that precludes placing thepurification demineralizer in service with SFP temperature > 140'F;" Refueling operation procedures require Reactor Coolant System (RCS)temperature to be < 140'F 'during core offload, shuffles, and reload, whichtranslates to the SFP when RCS is connected to the transfer canal; and* Refueling operation procedures require the reactor to be subcritical for at least150 hours prior to movement of irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel to ensure SFPthermal analysis assumptions are maintained. A Note in this procedure allowsfuel to be transferred to the SFP before 150 hours if an engineering evaluation ofthe SFP thermal performance is made provided the reactor has been subcritical for72 hours consistent with the fuel handling accident assumption.A summary of the bounding analyses is presented in Section 2.5.4.1, "Spent Fuel Pool.Cooling and Cleanup System," of the CR-3 EPU Technical Report (TR) (Reference 1,Attachment 7). The bounding analysis indicates that, with a full core offload afteroperating at EPU conditions for a full fuel cycle, both trains of SFP cooling capacity isgreater than the core decay heat load at 11.24 days (270 hours).Potentially affected calculations and associated procedures are identified for EPUimplementation and are being tracked for revision via the CR-3 engineering change (EC)process. In accordance with the CR-3 EPU LAR Regulatory Commitment 2 (Reference 1,Attachment 10), procedures subject to quality assurance program requirements, such asrefueling operation procedures, will be modified to reflect the analysis results presentedin Section 2.5.4.1 of the CR-3 EPU TR prior to exceeding 2609 MWt. Specifically, therefueling operation procedure will be updated to require the reactor to be subcritical for atleast 270 hours prior to movement of irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel. Additionally,the current allowance to perform an engineering evaluation which allows fuel to be U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attachment A3F0811-02 Page 4 of 8transferred to the SFP before the analysis delay time (270 hours) will be maintained foroperation at EPU conditions provided the reactor has been subcritical for 72 hours.3. In several locations in the LAR, the licensee briefly describes a modification to theminimum flow recirculation control for the emergency feedwater pumps. Improperoperation of the modification could cause failure of the pump, and the modificationcould be configured such that it introduces cross-train dependencies. The licenseemust provide details of the modification necessary to establish that the modificationwould not adversely affect the independence of the emergency feedwater trains,such as a failure modes and effects analysis, and that the modification would notsubstantially reduce the reliability of the individual pumps (TMI Action Plan ItemII.E.1.1), consistent with the guidelines of SRP Section 10.4.9.As stated in Appendix E, "Major Plant Modifications," of the CR 3 EPU TR(Reference 1, Attachment 7), Emergency Feedwater (EFW) System flow needs to beincreased roughly in proportion to decay heat for EPU conditions. The required EFWpumps can supply the required flow, but are currently prevented from doing so bycontinuously in-service recirculation flow paths. An upgrade to the EFW pumpsrecirculation design is being developed in accordance with the CR 3 EC process tosupport the higher EFW flow requirements to the once-through steam generators(OTSGs) at EPU conditions. The EFW pump recirculation line modification designconsiders the probability of pump failure due to improper operation of the newcomponents and ensures cross-train dependencies are not introduced as a result of themodification, thereby maintaining independence of the EFW trains.EFW Pump Recirculation Line Modification OverviewAs described in Section 2.8.5.2.3, "Loss of Normal Feedwater," and Appendix E of theCR 3 EPU TR (Reference 1, Attachment 7), the most limiting Design Basis Accident(DBA) for EFW System flow is the loss of feedwater (LOFW) event that requires aminimum EFW flow of 660 gallons per minute (gpm) (330 per SG) within 40 seconds.The current minimum required flow of EFW is 550 gpm (275 gpm per SG) within 60seconds. Therefore, in order to meet the new flow requirements for EPU, the EFWSystem will be modified by installing new safety-related operated valves in the currentlycontinuously open EFW pump recirculation lines. The recirculation valves will closewhen flow (as detected by differential pressure switches) to the OTSGs is sufficient tomeet or exceed the pump manufacture's minimum recommended flow rates and reopenprior to EFW pump flow demand dropping below the minimum required pump flow rate.The differential pressure switches are provided with a dead band to prevent or minimizeexcessive cycling of the new recirculation valves. By installing valves in therecirculation lines that automatically close during times of high flow to the OTSGs, thecurrent EFW pumps capacity and head can supply the OTSGs under EPU conditions.
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attachment A3F0811-02 Page 5 of 8The EFW System consists of two independent, 100% capacity, safety-related trains. TheA EFW train consists of a diesel driven pump (EFP-3), flow limiting cavitating venturi,and flow control valves to each OTSG. The B EFW train consists of a turbine drivenpump (EFP-2), flow limiting cavitating venturi, and flow control valves to each OTSG.Each of the new recirculation valves will be controlled by three safety-related differentialpressure switches that sense flow across the associated cavitating venturi. A "2 out of 3logic" will be required to open or close the associated safety-related EFW pumprecirculation valve. EFW pump recirculation valve simplified piping diagrams areprovided in Enclosure 3 showing the new valves in the EFW pump recirculation line andthe sensing differential pressure instrumentation. The differential pressure switches,logic, control and motive power for each recirculation valve will be powered from thesame safety-related electrical train as the associated EFW train.A control switch will be added to the control room for each of the new EFW pumprecirculation valves. Each switch will have "open" position to allow overriding theautomatic operation forcing the valve to the open position. Control room alarms will alsoprovide indication of the new valves "out of position" when the control switches areoverriding the automatic function. As stated in the proposed CR-3 Improved TechnicalSpecifications (ITS) Bases B 3.7.5, "Emergency Feedwater System" (Reference 1,Attachment 4), the EFW pump low flow instrumentation is required to be capable ofclosing the associated recirculation line isolation valve in sufficient time to ensure thatEFW discharge flow to the OTSGs as assumed during transients and accidents is met.Thus, if an EFW pump recirculation valve control switch is placed in the open position,the associated EFW train would be rendered inoperable and ITS 3.7.5 Actions wouldapply.EFW Train IndependenceEnclosure 4 provides a summary of a failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA)conducted for the EFW pump recirculation valve modification. The FMEA was preparedin accordance with the general guidelines of ANSI/IEEE 352-1987, "IEEE Guide forGeneral Principles of Reliability Analysis of Nuclear Power Generating Station SafetySystems." Note that the Number column in Enclosure 4 provides an arbitrary referencenumber for individual components or group of components and may be referenced byother failures in the matrix for cascading failures (e.g., Enclosure 4, Row 70.2). Note 1 tothe Enclosure 4 table is also provided for failure sets which assume varied EFW flowsthrough the cavitating venturi.The FMEA indicates that there are no new potential EFW System failures that couldresult from human errors, common causes, single-point vulnerabilities, and test andmaintenance outages as a result of the EFW pump recirculation valve modification whichwould prevent the EFW System from performing its intended safety function consistentwith the position of NUREG-0737, "Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements,"
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attachment A3F0811-02 Page 6 of 8Item II.E. 1.1. As indicated by the FMEA, postulated component failures are bounded bythe current failure of a single EFW train and do not prevent the EFW System fromperforming its intended safety function.Each EFW train is mechanically independent since each train has its own suction linefrom the emergency feedwater tank (EFT-2), pump, recirculation line back to EFT-2,cavitating venturi, and piping with flow control valves to each OTSG. Although pipingcross connections are supplied at the suction piping from EFT-2 and at the discharge linesto the OTSG's, these cross connections are only used for defense in depth and arecontrolled via ITS Surveillance Requirements (i.e., SR 3.7.5.1) to maintain independence.ITS SR 3.7.5.1 requires, in part, that each EFW manual, power operated, and automaticvalve in each water flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position,is in the correct (i.e., accident) position. The addition of a safety-related recirculationvalve on each independent EFW train recirculation line and utilizing the associatedcavitating venturi for flow measurement will not impact this mechanical independence.Each EFW train is electrically independent with all system instrumentation and controls(I&C) and electrical power supplied by independent safety related busses and batteries.The current electrical and I&C portions of the EFW System are designed and installed inaccordance with IEEE 279-1971, "Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuclear PowerGenerating Stations," which ensures independence with no cross-train dependence. Thenew EFW pump recirculation valves, including the control circuits, control roomswitches, and alarms are also being designed and procured using the same standard (i.e.,IEEE 279-1971).In addition to mechanical and electrical independence, the EFW trains are physicallyseparated. The A EFW train (EFP-3) is located in its own safety-related building locatedon the west side of the plant. Also located in this building is all of the auxiliaryequipment, including starting air, fire protection, HVAC, cavitating venturi, recirculationline, etc. The B EFW train (EFP-2) and all its auxiliary equipment is located in theIntermediate Building inside the plant. The new recirculation valves and associateddifferential pressure switches will be installed locally in the associated pump rooms. Thisensures that the physical separation of the current EFW System is maintained followingcompletion of the modification.Based on the conceptual design of the new EFW pump recirculation valves and theresults of the associated FMEA, CR 3 has determined that mechanical, electrical, andphysical separation and independence of the EFW System will be maintained and that nonew common mode failures are created by the modification.
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attachment A3F0811-02 Page 7 of 8EFW Pump Protection and ReliabilityThe EFW System modification installing new EFW pump recirculation valves isdesigned to maintain or enhance overall reliability by focusing on long term EFW pumpprotection. The current B train EFW pump (EFP-2) has a limitation on the time that itcan be operated under normal conditions (approximately 3 hours) due to an undersizedrecirculation line (1 inch). Because of the undersized line, the minimum manufacturerecommended flow rate of 250 gpm for continuous operation of the pump cannot beachieved with flow solely through the minimum flow line. In addition, the undersizedline results in very high flow velocities which have resulted in past modification tochange materials and increase pipe thickness to compensate for the wear from these highvelocities. The EFW pump recirculation valve modification ensures the pumprecirculation line is isolated when flow to the OTSGs is sufficient to meet minimumrecommended flow rates and automatically un-isolates prior to EFW pump flow droppingbelow the minimum required pump flow rate. Adding the automatic recirculation valveswill allow the recirculation line to be increased in size from the current 1 inch to a 2 inchline while still maintaining adequate pump margin. The increase in the recirculation linesize will improve the recirculation flow rate to support continuous operation of the EFWpump and decrease the flow velocities to normally acceptable rates.The new EFW pump recirculation valves and control logic are designed to ensure pumpprotection for long term reliability. Although the safety function position of the valve isclosed to ensure the minimum 660 gpm for the LOFW event, the new valves are spring toopen and will fail open on a loss of power. In addition the control logic was designedrequiring 2 of 3 flow signals to close the valve and no ability to manually close therecirculation is provided in the main control room. This design was chosen to minimizethe probability of operating the EFW pump with no flow resulting in possible pumpdamage. Designing the valves to fail in the open position is considered acceptable basedon:The LOFW event analysis for EPU conditions indicates that a required EFW flowof 660 gpm. If an EFW pump recirculation valve fails in the closed position, theEFW pump can still supply the required EFW flow to the OTSGs. However,when flow demand to the OTSGs decreases, pump minimum flow requirementsmay not be met resulting in possible pump damage and loss of the EFW pump forlong term accident mitigation.The current worst case single failure is a complete loss of an EFW train (e.g.,pump fails to start, loss of both control valves, etc). The failure of a new EFWpump recirculation valve on one EFW train is considered a single failure. As aresult of one EFW pump recirculation valve failing open, one EFW train couldnot supply the needed 660 gpm, however, the redundant EFW train would be U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attachment A3F0811-02 Page 8 of 8available to supply the required flow to the OTSGs, and the affected EFW pumpwould be available with a reduced flow to the OTSGs.To ensure the reliability of the new components being installed under this modification,components (e.g., valves, pressure transmitters, etc.) are being designed, fabricated, andprocured as safety-related. In addition to IEEE 279-1971 and IEEE 352-1987, the newcomponents are also being seismically and environmentally qualified as applicable andare being designed to meet or exceed the codes and standards as required by CR-3 currentlicensing basis, including the following:" IEEE 308-1969, "Criteria for Class lE Electrical Systems,"" IEEE 323-1974, "IEEE Standard for Qualifying Class IE Equipment for NuclearPower Generating Stations," and" IEEE 344-1971, "IEEE Guide for Seismic Qualification of Class I ElectricalEquipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations."As described in Section 2.13, "Risk Evaluation," of the CR 3 EPU TR (Reference 1,Attachment 7), CR-3 uses a probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) model to determine theeffect of the EPU modifications on core damage frequency (CDF) and large early releasefrequency (LERF). PSA analyses performed for the EPU indicate that the increasedEFW flow assumed in the LOFW analysis is not required to prevent core damage.Therefore, the new EFW pump recirculation valves do not change the PSA successcriteria of the EFW System and the new recirculation valves are not included in the PSAmodel for EPU.CR-3 concludes that since; the new EFW System components are being designed to meetor exceed the current CR-3 codes and standards, the modification is designed with a highemphasis on pump protection and reliability for long term availability, and there is noaffect to the CDF or LERF; the modification to the EFW System will not significantlyreduce the reliability of the individual EFW pumps to perform their safety function.References1 .CR-3 to NRC letter dated June 15, 2011, "Crystal River Unit 3 -License AmendmentRequest #309, Revision 0, Extended Power Uprate" (Accession No. ML1 12070659).2. Siemens Technical Report CT-27332, "Missile Probability Analysis for the Siemens13.9 M2 Retrofit Design of Low-Pressure Turbine by Siemens AG" Revision 2.3. Letter from Mr. Herbert N. Berkow, (NRC) to Mr. Stan Dembkoski (SWPC) dated March30, 2004, Subject: Final Safety Evaluation Regarding Referencing the Siemens TechnicalReport No. CT-27332, Revision 2, "Missile Probability Analysis for the Siemens 13.9 M2Retrofit Design of Low-Pressure Turbine by Siemens AG" (TAC No. MB7964).
FLORIDA POWER CORPORATIONCRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3DOCKET NUMBER 50-302 /LICENSE NUMBER DPR-72ATTACHMENT BSIEMENS AFFIDAVIT FOR WITHHOLDING PROPRIETARYINFORMATION FROM PUBLIC DISCLOSURE AFFIDAVIT OF WITHHOLDINGI, John P. Musone hereby provide this Affidavit and state as follows:1. I am Assistant Secretary for Siemens Energy, Inc., having its principle offices at4400 Alafaya Trail, Orlando, Florida 32826 ("Siemens"), and Associate Chief IntellectualProperty Counsel for its parent Siemens Corporation.2. This statement is under 10 C.F.R. 2.390 and NRC Regulatory Issue Summary2004-11.3. 10 C.F.R. 2.390(a)(4) provides for nondisclosure of information provided to theNuclear Regulatory Commission that constitutes "trade secrets and commercial or financialinformation obtained from a person and privileged or confidential."4. 10 C.F.R. 2.390(b)(1)(ii) and (iii) provide for submission of an Affidavit as themechanism by which such nondisclosure is affected, and specifies that the Affidavit --A. Identifies the document or part sought to be withheld;B. Identifies the official position of the person making the affidavit;C. Declares the basis for proposing the information be withheld, encompassingconsiderations set forth in Sec. 2.390(a);D. Includes a specific statement of the harm that would result if the informationsought to be withheld is disclosed to the public; andE. Indicates the location(s) in the document of all information sought to bewithheld;F. Contain a full statement of the reason for claiming the information should bewithheld from public disclosure. Such statement shall address with specificitythe consideration listed in paragraph (b)(4) of this section.
: 5. Following the Overview, this Affidavit tracks the affidavit organization andrequirements of 10 C.F.R. 2.390.Overview6. Siemens contracted with Progress Energy Florida, (PEF) to design, fabricate,deliver and install BB281-18m2 turbine improvements to PEF's Crystal River #3 Nuclear PowerPlant in Crystal River Florida. In preparation of the design of the BB281-18m2 turbine, Siemensperformed a Missile Probability Analysis and documented this analysis in Missile ProbabilityAnalysis Report CT-27438 Revision 1 dated 8/25/2008 (the "MPAR").7. PEF has requested Siemens permission to provide the MPAR to the NRC.Siemens is amenable to provide a redacted version of the MPAR titled Missile ProbabilityAnalysis Report CT-27438 Revision 1A dated 8/05/2011 (the "R-MPAR").8. The MPAR contains highly sensitive and confidential design information whichembodies Siemens' state-of-the-art design and analysis parameters for Siemens turbine rotors.9. Public disclosure of the MPAR would (i) provide a windfall shortcut for Siemenscompetitors to obtain Siemens' rotor design and analysis parameters and thereby replicateSiemens components, and (ii) allow Siemens competitors to glean the capabilities and limits ofSiemens' technology. This confidential information is invaluable when competing and akin tohaving the opposing team's playbook before and during the big game.Document or Part Sought to be Withheld10. Siemens specific confidential rotor design and parameters and calculation resultscontained within the MPAR prepared by Siemens pertaining to the BB281-18m2 turbineimprovements at PEF's Crystal River #3 Nuclear Power Plant.2 Official Position of Person Making the Affidavit11. The person making this Affidavit is John P. Musone, Assistant Secretary forSiemens Energy, Inc., having its principle offices at 4400 Alafaya Trail, Orlando, Florida 32826("Siemens"), and Associate Chief Intellectual Property Counsel for its parent SiemensCorporation.Basis for the Information to be Withheld12. The basis for the information to be withheld, is Section 2.390(a)(4) -"tradesecrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged andconfidential." The person to provide the information is Siemens via PEF. The trade secretinformation is the specific rotor design parameters and calculation results contained within theMPAR prepared by Siemens pertaining to the BB281-18m2 turbine improvements at PEF'sCrystal River #3 Nuclear Power Plant that is confidential and proprietary to Siemens and onlyprovided to PEF under strict terms of confidentiality.Specific Statement of Harm Due to Public Disclosure13. The general public has no defined interest in the specific confidential rotor designparameters and calculation results contained within the MPAR and would not undergo any harmdue to its nondisclosure. The general public presumably is not interested in replicating Siemenscomponents. The specific confidential rotor design parameters and calculation results containedwithin the MPAR provide no newsworthy or publicly-relevant information regarding the CrystalRiver Nuclear Plant. A false argument could be made that Siemens' competitors are "the public"and that they would be harmed because they would then not obtain a windfall shortcut toreplicate Siemens components and glean Siemens capabilities.Locations in the Document of Information to be Withheld14. The portions of the R-MPAR identified in brackets that illustrate confidentialrotor design parameters and calculation results (e.g. rotor disk temperatures, rotor disk stresses,fracture toughness and yield strength information, rotor disk crack initiation probability(s),simulation results) for the Crystal River #3 BB281-18m2turbine has been withheld.3 Full Statement of Reason for Claiming the Information Should be Withheld15. Through its own innovation, substantial investment in research and developmentand by virtue of its long established experience as a world renowned going-concern in the powergeneration industry, Siemens successfully developed the turbine design embodied BB281-18m2turbine delivered to PEF. Siemens prepared the MPAR which in turn discloses the designparameters and calculation results (e.g. rotor disk temperatures, rotor disk stresses, fracturetoughness and yield strength information, rotor disk crack initiation probability(s) and simulationresults) from which Siemens' turbine is designed and manufactured. Public disclosure of theMPAR would (i) provide a windfall shortcut for Siemens competitors to obtain Siemens' rotordesign parameters and thereby replicate Siemens components, and (ii) allow Siemenscompetitors to glean the capabilities and limits of Siemens' technology. This confidentialinformation is invaluable when competing and akin to having the opposing team's playbookbefore and during the big game.16. Siemens' specific turbine design information as embodied in the MPAR isvaluable, confidential and proprietary business assets of Siemens and constitute trade secrets.They derive independent economic value from not being generally known and not being readilyascertainable by proper means by other persons who can obtain economic value from theirdisclosure or use. It is Siemens' understanding that the specific turbine design information asembodied in the MPAR is customarily held in confidence throughout the industry and is notmade publicly available.17. Siemens has adopted reasonable measures to maintain the secrecy of its tradesecrets; to-wit: securing their business offices and facilities with private fences and bordersrestricting access via key pads requiring individual access codes, locking main building doors,locking file cabinets, password-protecting computer files, using automated e-mail encryption,and locking portable computers. Siemens also shreds confidential documents that are no longerin use.4
: 18. In addition, Siemens requires its employees with access to Siemens trade secrets,to execute confidentiality agreements agreeing to maintain the confidentiality of the tradesecrets. Further, Siemens employees are required to complete instruction modules covering,inter alia, protection of corporate confidential information and the importance of maintaining thesecrecy of Siemens' trade secrets. Siemens' employees are also required to participate in routinesecurity programs and checks directed by company security officers to ensure that the securitymeasures are being followed.19. Siemens further requires that, prior to any provision of Siemens confidentialinformation to a third party, Siemens's management must authorize such disclosure and the thirdparty must first execute a confidentiality agreement agreeing to maintain Siemens's confidentialinformation in confidence. Siemens included a confidentiality provision in its contract with PEF.20. For the foregoing reasons, Siemens' specific turbine design information asembodied in the MPAR comprise its confidential, proprietary and trade secret information. Thegeneral public has no defined interest in this design information and would not undergo anyharm due to its nondisclosure. On the other hand, public disclosure of this design informationwould (i) provide a windfall shortcut for Siemens competitors to obtain Siemens' rotor designparameters and thereby replicate Siemens components, and (ii) allow Siemens competitors toglean the capabilities and limits of Siemens' technology. It is therefore respectfully requestedthat portions of Siemens MPAR remain in confidence.Ai0SIGNED UNDER THE PAINS AND PENALTIES OF PERJURY THIS 10DAY OFAugust, 2011.J0)~ P. MusoneAssistant Secretary; Siemens Energy, Inc.Associate Chief Intellectual Property Counsel; Siemens Corporation5 FLORIDA POWER CORPORATIONCRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3DOCKET NUMBER 50-302 /LICENSE NUMBER DPR-72ENCLOSURE 3EFW PUMP RECIRCULATION VALVE SIMPLIFIEDDIAGRAMS (FIGURES 1 AND 2)
Figure 1Simplified Diagram of EFP-3 Recirculation ValveFS1,2, 3Opens on low flow of<350 gpmEFV- 4 6 -FAuto OpenNote:Drawing omits some valves, contacts, relaysand instruments for simplicity and clarity.Differential pressure switches use nominalnumbers subject to inst uncertainty.I ef SAR Fig 10-031DPDP-5D BRKR-11 Figure 2Simplified Diagram of EFP-2 Recirculation Valve1"To EFT-2EE~Ifi1V"m= * =II IFS1 FS I M1? FS2 M~351gpMIj &#xfd; 350 g~1  ~350 gmjFS2 FS3 FS3> 350 gFS1,2, 3Opens on low flow of< 250 gpmI F-8 0EFP-2 Recirc ValveL~1I F-2FO10Auto OpenI EFP-I ef SAR Fig 10-03Note:Drawing omits some valves, contacts, relaysand instruments for simplicity and clarity.Differential pressure switches use nominalnumbers subject to inst uncertainty.DPDP-5B BRKR-52 FLORIDA POWER CORPORATIONCRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3DOCKET NUMBER 50-302 /LICENSE NUMBER DPR-72ENCLOSURE 4SUMMARY OF EMERGENCY FEEDWATER PUMPRECIRCULATION VALVE MODIFICATION FAILURE MODESAND EFFECTS ANALYSIS U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission3F0811-02Enclosure 4Page 1 of 37Summary of Emergency Feedwater Pump Recirculation Valve Modification Failure Modes and Effects Analysisz Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Method of Inherent Effect on ECCS Remarks and OtherLocal Effects Detection Compensating Effects(D Including Provision-DependentFailures1.1 EFV-1 79 Fail OPEN Electrical or Ability of one train Annunciator alarm EFW Train B A single (1 of 2) train would nomechanical failure of EFW to mitigate triggered by valve available in the longer be able to perform itsan accident would out of position. event of complete design functions. The affectedbe reduced. Actual position vs. failure of affected trains flow would bedemanded pump. approximately 75% of design.position. 100% design flows are typicallynecessary only early in accidents.The train with the failure willregain the ability to fully mitigatelater in the accident scenario.1.2.1 EFV-1 79 Fail CLOSED Electrical or Immediate Annunciator alarm EFW Train B A single (1 of 2) train would no During periods of low flowmechanical failure, damage to EFP-3 triggered by valve available and longer be able to perform its one train of EFW could be'<250 GPM out of position. running during the design functions. removed from service.through pump.' Actual position vs. event of complete EFV-179 being in thedemanded failure of affected closed position will only beposition. pump. a detriment during periodsof low to no demand. Thisoccurs late or outside ofaccident conditions withexception to LOCA.1.2.2 EFV-1 79 Fail CLOSED Electrical or Accelerated wear / Annunciator alarm EFW Train B The affected train would nomechanical failure, damage to EFP-2 triggered by valve available in the longer be credited to perform its'>250 GPM <300 out of position. event of complete design functions.GPM through Actual position vs. failure of affectedpump., demanded pump.position.1.2.3 EFV-179 Fail CLOSED Electrical or No damage to Annunciator alarm EFW Train B n/amechanical failure. EFP-2 '>300 GPM triggered by valve available.through pump.' out of position.Actual position vs.demandedposition.(1) "a" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >350 GPM"b" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM increasing"c" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM decreasing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission3F0811-02Enclosure 4Page 2 of 37z Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Method of Inherent Effect on ECCS Remarks and Other1 Local Effects Detection Compensating EffectsIncluding Provision-DependentFailures1.3.1 EFV-1 79 Fail Mid-Travel Electrical or Immediate Annunciator alarm EFW Train B During periods of low flow onemechanical failure damage to EFP-3 triggered by valve available and train of EFW could be removed'<250 GPM out of position. running during the from service. EFV-179 being inthrough pump.' Actual position vs. event of complete the closed position will only be ademanded failure of affected detriment during periods of low toposition. (includes pump. no demand. This occurs late orMid position) outside of accident conditions.1.3.2 EFV-1 79 Fail Mid-Travel Electrical or Accelerated wear / Annunciator alarm EFW Train B The affected train would nomechanical failure damage to EFP-3 triggered by valve available in the longer be credited to perform its'>250 GPM <300 out of position. event of complete design functions.GPM through Actual position vs. failure of affectedpump., demanded pump.position. (includesMid position)1.3.3 EFV-1 79 Fail Mid-Travel Electrical or No damage to Annunciator alarm EFW Train B n/amechanical failure EFP-2 >300 GPM triggered by valve available.through pump.' out of position.Actual position vs.demandedposition. (includesMid position)1.6 EFV-1 79 Loss of control Electrical failure Loss of Automatic Periodic Test EFW Train B A single (1 of 2) train would no For all flows throughCircuit power Close of EFV-179 available longer be able to perform its cavitating venturidesign functions. The affectedEFV-1 79 Opens train s flow would beapproximately 75% of design.100% design flows are typicallynecessary only early in accidents.The train with the failure willregain the ability to fully mitigatelater in the accident scenario.1.7 EFV-1 79 Loss of Motive Electrical failure Loss of Automatic Periodic Test EFW Train B A single (1 of 2) train would no For all flows throughpower Close of EFV-179 available longer be able to perform its cavitating venturipFwer 7desegn functions. The affectedEFV-1 79 Opens train s flow would beapproximately 75% of design.100%/ design flows are typicallynecessary only early in accidents.The train with the failure willregain the ability to fully mitigatelater in the accident scenario.(1) "a" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >350 GPM"b" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM increasing"c" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM decreasing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission3F0811-02Enclosure 4Page 3 of 37z Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Method of Inherent Effect on ECCS Remarks and OtherCLocal Effects Detection Compensating EffectsIncluding Provision-DependentFailures10.1 EFV-180 Fail OPEN Electrical or Ability of one train Annunciator alarm EFW Train A One train (1 of 2) of EFW couldmechanical failure of EFW to mitigate triggered by valve available and be removed from service.an accident would out of position, running during thebe reduced. Actual position vs. event of completedemanded failure of affectedposition. pump.10.2.1 EFV-1 80 Fail CLOSED Electrical or Immediate Annunciator alarm EFW Train A A single (1 of 2) train would nomechanical failure. damage to EFP-2 triggered by valve available in the longer be able to perform its'<100 GPM out of position. event of complete design functions.through pump.' Actual position vs. failure of affecteddemanded pump.position.10.2.2 EFV-180 Fail CLOSED Electrical or Accelerated wear / Annunciator alarm EFW Train A The affected train would nomechanical failure, damage to EFP-2 triggered by valve available in the longer be credited to perform its'>100 GPM <250 out of position. event of complete design functions after >3 hr.GPM through Actual position vs. failure of affectedpump., demanded pump.position.102.3 EFV-180 Fail CLOSED Electrical or No damage to Annunciator alarm EFW Train A n/amechanical failure. EFP-2 >250 GPM triggered by valve available.through pump.' out of position.Actual position vs.demandedposition.10.3.1 EFV-180 Fail Mid-Travel Electrical or Immediate Annunciator alarm EFW Train A During periods of low flow onemechanical failure damage to EFP-2 triggered by valve available and train of EFW could be removed'<100 GPM out of position. running during the from service. EFV-180 being inthrough pump.' Actual position vs. event of complete the closed position will only be ademanded failure of affected detriment during periods of low toposition. (includes pump. no demand. This occurs late orMid position) outside of accident conditions.(1) "a" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >350 GPM"b" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM increasing"c" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM decreasing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission3F0811-02Enclosure 4Page 4 of 37Z Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Method of Inherent Effect on ECCS Remarks and OtherCLocal Effects Detection Compensating Effects(D Including ProvisionDependentFailures103.2 EFV-180 Fail Mid-Travel Electrical or Accelerated wear / Annunciator alarm EFW Train A The affected train would nomechanical failure damage to EFP-2 triggered by valve available in the longer be credited to perform its'>100 GPM <250 out of position. event of complete design functions after >3 hr.GPM through Actual position vs. failure of affectedpump., demanded pump.position. (includesMid position)10.3.3 EFV-180 Fail Mid-Travel Electrical or No damage to Annunciator alarm EFW Train A n/amechanical failure EFP-2 '>250 GPM triggered by valve availablethrough pump.' out of position.Actual position vs.demandedposition. (includesMid position)10.6 EFV-180 Loss of control Electrical failure Loss of Automatic Periodic Test EFW Train A A single (1 of 2) train would no For all flows throughCircuit power Close of EFV-180 available longer be able to perform its cavitating venturidesign functions. The affected20XB energized train s flow would beEFV-180 Opens approximately 75% of design.100% design flows are typicallynecessary only early in accidents.The train with Yhe failure willregain the ability to fully mitigatelater in the accident scenario.10.7 EFV-180 Loss of Motive Electrical failure Loss of Automatic Periodic Test EFW Train A A single (1 of 2) train would no For all flows throughpower Close of EFV-180 available longer be able to perform its cavitating venturidesign functions. The affected20XB energized train s flow would beEFV-180 Opens approximately 75% of design.10 design flows are typicallynecessary only early in accidents.The train with the failure willregain the ability to fully mitigatelater in the accident scenario.20.1 EFV-23 Fail OPEN Mechanical failure N/A Surveillance Valve line up. Valves normal position is open Manual valve(1) "a" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >350 GPM"b" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM increasing"c" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM decreasing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission3F0811-02Enclosure 4Page 5 of 37z Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Method of Inherent Effect on ECCS Remarks and OtherC3 Local Effects Detection Compensating EffectsIncluding Provision-DependentFailures20.2.1 EFV-23 Fail CLOSED Mechanical failure Immediate High recirculation EFW Train A One train of EFW could bedamage to EFP-2 line pressure available and removed from service prior to'<100 GPM running during the operators being able to takethrough pump.' event of complete compensatory measures.failure of affectedpump.20.2.2 EFV-23 Fail CLOSED Mechanical failure Accelerated wear / High recirculation EFW Train A One train of EFW could bedamage to EFP-2 line pressure available and removed from service if'>100 GPM <250 running during the undiscovered for anGPM through event of complete indeterminate time greater than 3pump., failure of affected hr. Time periods greater than 3 hrpump. increase wear and pumpdegradation.20.2.3 EFV-23 Fail CLOSED Mechanical failure No damage to High recirculation EFW Train A None.EFP-2 '>250 GPM line pressure available andthrough pump.' running during theevent of completefailure of affectedpump.20.3.1 EFV-23 Fail Mid-Travel Mechanical failure Immediate High recirculation EFW Train A One train of EFW could bedamage to EFP-2 line pressure available and removed from service prior to'<100 GPM running during the operators being able to takethrough pump' event of complete compensatory measures.failure of affectedpump.20.3.2 EFV-23 Fail Mid-Travel Mechanical failure Accelerated wear / High recirculation EFW Train A One train of EFW could bedamage to EFP-2 line pressure available and removed from service if5>100 GPM <250 running during the undiscovered for anGPM through event of complete indeterminate time greater than 3pump., failure of affected hr. Time periods greater than 3 hrpump. increase wear and pumpdegradation.(1) "a" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >350 GPM"b" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM increasing"c" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM decreasing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission3F0811-02Enclosure 4Page 6 of 37z Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Method of Inherent Effect on ECCS Remarks and OtherC3 Local Effects Detection Compensating Effects0 Including Provision-DependentFailures20.3.3 EFV-23 Fail Mid-Travel Mechanical failure No damage to High recirculation EFW Train A None.EFP-2 '>250 GPM line pressure available andthrough pump.' running during theevent of completefailure of affectedpump.30.1 EFV-34 Fail OPEN Mechanical failure EF-6-PI indicates Surveillance EFV-5 prevents Insignificant to no pump Check valvehigher than back flow through performance margin degradationnormal pressure EFP-2during the soleoperation of EFP-130.2.1 EFV-34 Fail CLOSED Mechanical failure Immediate High recirculation EFW Train A One train of EFW could bedamage to EFP-2 line pressure available and removed from service prior to'<100 GPM running during the operators being able to takethrough pump' event of complete compensatory measures.failure of affectedpump.30.2.2 EFV-34 Fail CLOSED Mechanical failure Accelerated wear / High recirculation EFW Train A One train of EFW could bedamage to EFP-2 line pressure available and removed from service if'>100 GPM <250 running during the undiscovered for anGPM through event of complete indeterminate time greater than 3pump.- failure of affected hr. Time periods greater than 3 hrpump. increase wear and pumpdegradation.30.2.3 EFV-34 Fail CLOSED Mechanical failure No damage to High recirculation EFW Train A None.EFP-2 '>250 line pressure available andGPM through running during thepump.- event of completefailure of affectedpump.(1) "a" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >350 GPM"b" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM increasing"c" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM decreasing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission3F0811-02Enclosure 4Page 7 of 37z Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Method of Inherent Effect on ECCS Remarks and OtherC3 Local Effects Detection Compensating EffectsIncluding Provision"- DependentFailures30.3.1 EFV-34 Fail Mid-Travel Mechanical failure Immediate High recirculation EFW Train A One train of EFW could bedamage to EFP-2 line pressure available and removed from service prior toI<100 GPM running during the operators being able to takethrough pump' event of complete compensatory measures.failure of affectedpump.30.3.2 EFV-34 Fail Mid-Travel Mechanical failure Accelerated wear / High recirculation EFW Train A One train of EFW could bedamage to EFP-2 line pressure available and removed from service if>100 GPM <250 running during the *undiscovered for anGPM through event of complete indeterminate time greater than 3pump., failure of affected hr. Time periods greater than 3 hrpump. increase wear and pumpdegradation.30.3.3 EFV-34 Fail Mid-Travel Mechanical failure No damage to High recirculation EFW Train A None.EFP-2 '>250 GPM line pressure available andthrough pump.' running during theevent of completefailure of affectedpump.40.0.a EF-64- Open Electrical failure Degraded logic Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degraded from 2/3FSI(Hi) Loss of available to 2/2Contact 3EF-64-FS19-1040.1 .a EF-64- Close Electrical failure Degraded logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degraded from 2/3FS 1(Hi) of 2 close signals available to 1/2permanently inContact place9-1040.2.a EF-64- Open Electrical failure Degraded logic Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degradedFS1 (LO) Loss of seal to availableContact 3EF-64-FS12-3(1) "a" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >350 GPM"b" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM increasing"c" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM decreasing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission3F0811-02Enclosure 4Page 8 of 37Z Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Method of Inherent Effect on ECCS Remarks and OtherC3 Local Effects Detection Compensating Effectse Including ProvisionDependentFailures40.3.a EF-64- Close Electrical failure Degrade logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degradedFS1 (LO) of 2 close signals availableContact permanently inafter Hi flow2-340.0.b EF-66- Open Electrical failure Degraded logic Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degrade from 2/3 toFS1(Hi) Loss of available 2/2Contact 3EF-66-FS19-1040.1.b EF-66- Close Electrical failure Degraded logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degrade from 2/3 toFS1(Hi) of 2 close signals available 1/2permanently inContact place9-1040.2.b EF-66- Open Electrical failure Degraded logic Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degrade from 2/3 toFS1 (LO) Loss of seal to available 2/2Contact 3EF-66-FS12-340.3.b EF-66- Close Electrical failure Degrade logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degrade from 2/3 toFS1 (LO) of 2close signals available 2/2Contact permanently in2-3 place after Hi flow40.0.c EF-64- Open Electrical failure Degraded logic Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degraded from 2/3FS1(Hi) Loss of available to 2/2Contact 3EF-64-FS19-1040.1 .c EF-64- Close Electrical failure Degraded logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Close Logic degradedFS1(Hi) of 2 close signals available from 2/3 to 1/2; No change to 2/2permanently in Open LogicContact place 3EF-64-9-10 S1 energized(1) "a" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >350 GPM"b" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM increasing"c" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM decreasing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission3F0811-02Enclosure 4Page 9 of 37z Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Method of Inherent Effect on ECCS Remarks and Otherr-3 Local Effects Detection Compensating EffectsIncluding ProvisionDependentFailures40.2.c EF-64- Open Electrical failure Degraded logic Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degraded from 2/3FS1 (LO) Loss of seal to available to 2/2Contact 3EF-64-FS12-340.3.c EF-64- Close Electrical failure Degraded logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Close Logic degradedFS1 (LO) of 2 close signals available from 2/3 to 1/2; No change to 2/2Contact in place w/250 Open Logic2-3 gpm flow41.0.a EF-64- Open Electrical failure Degraded logic. Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degraded from 2/3FS2(Hi) Loss of available to 2/2Contact 3EF-64-FS19-1041.1.a EF-64- Close Electrical failure Degraded logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degraded from 2/3FS2(Hi) of 2 close signals available to 1/2permanently inContact place9-1041.2.a EF-64- Open Electrical failure Degraded logic Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degradedFS2(LO) Loss of seal to availableContact 3EF-64-FS12-341.3.a EF-64- Close Electrical failure Degrade logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degradedFS2(LO) of 2 close signals availableContact permanently inafter Hi flow2-341.0.b EF-66- Open Electrical failure Degraded logic. Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degrade from 2/3 toFS2(Hi) Loss of available 2/2Contact 3EF-66-FS 19-1041.1.b EF-66- Close Electrical failure Degraded logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degrade from 2/3 toFS2(Hi) of 2 close signals available 1/2permanently inContact place al9-10(1) "a" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >350 GPM"b" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM increasing"c" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM decreasing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission3F0811-02Enclosure 4Page 10 of 37Z Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Method of Inherent Effect on ECCS Remarks and OtherLocal Effects Detection Compensating EffectsIncluding ProvisionDependentFailures41.2.b EF-66- Open Electrical failure Degraded logic Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degrade from 2/3 toFS2(LO) Loss of seal to available 2/2Contact 3EF-66-FS12-341.3.b EF-66- Close Electrical failure Degirade logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degrade from 2/3 toFS2(LO) of 2 close signals available 1/2 for after HI flowContact permanently in2-3 place after Hi flow41.0.c EF-64- Open Electrical failure Degraded logic. Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degraded from 2/3FS2(Hi) Loss of available to 2/2Contact 3EF-64-FS29-1041.1 .c EF-64- Close Electrical failure Degraded logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Close Logic degradedFS2(Hi) of 2 close signals available from 2/3 to 1/2; No change to 2/2permanently in Open LogicContact place 3EF-64-9-10 S2 energized41.2.c EF-64- Open Electrical failure Degraded logic Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degraded from 2/3FS2(LO) Loss of seal to available to 2/2 Logic degrade from 2/3 toContact 3EF-64-FS2 2/22-341.3.c EF-64- Close Electrical failure Degraded logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Close Logic degradedFS2(LO) of 2 close signals available from 2/3 to 1/2; No change to 2/2Contact in place w/250 Open Logic2-3 gpm flow42.0.a EF-64- Open Electrical failure Degrade logic. Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degraded from 2/3FS3(Hi) Loss of available to 2/2Contact3EF-64-FS19-1042.1 .a EF-64- Close Electrical failure Degraded logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degraded from 2/3FS3(Hi) of 2 close signals available to 1/2permanently inContact place9-10(1) "a" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >350 GPM"b" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM increasing"c" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM decreasing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission3F0811-02Enclosure 4Page 11 of 37Z Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Method of Inherent Effect on ECCS Remarks and OtherC3 Local Effects Detection Compensating Effects-Including Provision-DependentFailures42.2.a EF-64- Open Electrical failure Degraded logic Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degradedFS4(LO) Loss of seal to availableContact 3EF-64-FS12-342.3.a EF-64- Close Electrical failure Degrade logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degradedFS3(LO) of 2 close signals availableContact permanently inafter Hi flow2-342.0.b EF-66- Open Electrical failure Degrade logic. Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degrade from 2/3 toFS3(Hi) Loss of available 2/2Contact 3EF-66-FS19-1042.1 .b EF-66- Close Electrical failure Degraded logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degrade from 2/3 toFS3(Hi) of 2 close signals available 1/2permanently inContact place al9-1042.2.b EF-66- Open Electrical failure Degraded logic Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degrade from 2/3 toFS4(LO) Loss of sealto available 1/2 after HIflowContact 3EF-66-FS12-342.3.b EF-66- Close Electrical failure Degrade logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degrade from 2/3 toFS3(LO) of 2 close signals available 1/2 for after HI flowContact permanently in2-3 place after Hi flow42.0.c EF-64- Open Electrical failure Degrade logic. Periodic Test EFW Train A & B EF-64-FS3(Hi) ContactFS3(Hi) Loss of availableContact 3EF-64-FS3 9-109-1042.1 .c EF-64- Close Electrical failure Degraded logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Close Logic degradedFS3(Hi) of 2 close signals available from 2/3 to 1/2; go change to 2/2permanently in Open LogicContact place 3EF-64-9-10 S3 energized(1) "a" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >350 GPM"b" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM increasing"c" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM decreasing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission3F0811-02Enclosure 4Page 12 of 37Z Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Method of Inherent Effect on ECCS Remarks and OtherCSLocal Effects Detection Compensating Effects(1 Including Provision-DependentFailures42.2.c EF-64- Open Electrical failure Degraded logic Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degraded from 2/3FS3(LO) Loss of seal to available to 2/2Contact 3EF-64-FS32-342.3.c EF-64- Close Electrical failure Degraded logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Close Logic degradedFS3(LO) of 2 close signals available from 2/3 to 1/2; No change to 2/2Contact in place w/250 Open Logic2-3 gpm flow43.0 SS/EFV- Open Electrical Failure Loss of Remote Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A No Manual Open For all flows through179-SV Manual Open available capability from ControlRoom cavitating venturiContact 3-4 capability43.1 SS/EFV- Close Electrical Failure Loss of Automatic Periodic Test EFW Train B A single (1 of 2) train would no For all flows through179-SV Close of EFV-1 79 available longer be able to perform its itating venturiContact 3-4 20XB energized design functions. The affectedEFV-179 Opens train s flow would beapproximately 75% of design.1 00% design flows are typicallynecessary only early in accidents.The train with the failure willregain the ability to fully mitigatelater in the accident scenario.44.0 33o/EFV- Open Electrical Failure Loss of Alarm for Periodic Test EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows through179 Contact valve out of available cavitating venturic-d position.44.1 33o/EFV- Close Electrical Failure Nuisances Alarm Annunciator Alarm EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows through179 Contact 2EFV-179 availablec-d energized cavitating venturi44.2 33o/EFV- Open Electrical Failure False indication Periodic Test; EFW Train A & B Degraded valve position For all flows through179 Contact for valve position. Operator available Indication cavitating venturia-b Validation44.3 33o/EFV- Close Electrical Failure False indication Periodic Test; EFW Train A & B Degraded valve position For all flows through179 Contact for valve position. Operator available Indication cavitating venturia-b Validation45.0 33c/EFV- Open Electrical Failure Loss of Alarm for Periodic Test EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows through179 Contact valve out of available cavitating venturia-b position.(1) "a" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >350 GPM"b" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM increasing"c" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM decreasing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission3F0811-02Enclosure 4Page 13 of 37Z Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Method of Inherent Effect on ECCS Remarks and OtherLocal Effects Detection Compensating EffectsC Including Provision-DependentFailures45.1 33c/EFV- Close Electrical Failure False Alarm for Periodic Test EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows through179 Contact valve out of availablea-b position. cavitating venturi45.2 33c/EFV- Open Electrical Failure False indication Periodic Test; EFW Train A & B Degraded valve position For all flows through179 Contact for valve position. Operator available Indication cavitating venturia-b Validation45.3 33c/EFV- Close Electrical Failure False indication Periodic Test; EFW Train A & B Degraded valve position For all flows through179 Contact for valve position. Operator available Indication cavitating venturia-b Validation50.0 3EF-64-FS1 Fails to Energize Electrical Failure Degraded logic. Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degraded from 2/3 For all flows throughLoss of 1 close available to 2/2 cavitating venturisignal50.1 3EF-64-FS1 Fails to Electrical Failure Degraded logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degraded from 2/3 For all flows throughDeenergize Close of I close signals available to 1/2 cavitating venturipermanently inplace50.2 3EF-64-FS1 Open Electrical Failure Degraded logic. Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degraded For all flows throughContact 1-2 Loss of Seal-in of available3EF-64-FS 1 cavitating venturi50.3 3EF-64-FS1 Close Electrical Failure Degraded logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degraded from 2/3 For all flows throughContact 1-2 of 2 close signals available to 1/2 cavitating venturipermanently inplace50.4 3EF-64-FS1 Open Electrical Failure Degraded logic. Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degraded from 2/3 For all flows throughContact 7-8 Loss of 1 close available to 2/2signal cavitating venturi50.5 3EF-64-FS1 Close Electrical Failure De raded logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degraded from 2/3 For all flows throughContact 7-8 of 2 close signals available to 1/2 cavitating venturipermanently inplace50.6 3EF-64-FS1 Open Electrical Failure Degraded logic. Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degraded from 2/3 For all flows throughContact 9- Loss of 1 close available to 2/210 signal cavitating venturi(1) "a" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >350 GPM"b" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM increasing"c" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM decreasing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission3F0811-02Enclosure 4Page 14 of 37Z Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Method of Inherent Effect on ECCS Remarks and OtherLocal Effects Detection Compensating Effects-Including ProvisionDependentFailures50.7 3EF-64-FS1 Close Electrical Failure Degraded logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degraded from 2/3 For all flows throughContact 9- of 2 close signals available to 1/2 cavitating venturi10 permanently inplace50.8 3EF-64-FS1 Open Electrical Failure Degraded alarm Periodic Test EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows throughContact 3-4 logic. Loss of 1 available cavitating venturiclose signal50.9 3EF-64-FS1 Close Electrical Failure Degraded alarm Periodic Test EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows throughContact 3-4 logic. 1 of 2 close available cavitating venturisignalspermanently inplace50.10 3EF-64-FS1 Open Electrical Failure Degraded alarm Periodic Test EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows throughContact 5-6 logic. Loss of 1 available cavitating venturiclose signal50.11 3EF-64-FS1 Close Electrical Failure Degraded alarm Periodic Test EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows throughContact 5-6 logic. 1 of 2 close available cavitating venturisignalspermanently inplace51.0 3EF-64-FS2 Fails to Energize Electrical Failure Degraded logic. Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degraded from 2/3 For all flows throughLoss of 1 close available to 2/2 cavitating venturisignal51.1 3EF-64-FS2 Fails to Electrical Failure Degraded logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degraded from 2/3 For all flows throughDeenergize of 2 close signals available to 1/2 cavitating venturipermanently inplace51.2 3EF-64-FS2 Open Electrical Failure Degraded logic. Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degraded For all flows throughContact 1-2 Loss of Seal-in of available cavitating venturi3EF-64-FS151.3 3EF-64-FS2 Close Electrical Failure Degraded logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degraded from 2/3 For all flows throughContact 1-2 of 2 close signals available to 1/2 cavitating venturipermanently inplace51.4 3EF-64-FS2 Open Electrical Failure Degraded logic. Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degraded from 2/3 For all flows throughContact 7-8 Loss of 1 close available to 2/2signal cavitating venturi(1) "a" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >350 GPM"b" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM increasing"c" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM decreasing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission3F0811-02Enclosure 4Page 15 of 37Z Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Method of Inherent Effect on ECCS Remarks and OthercLocal Effects Detection Compensating EffectsIncluding Provision-DependentFailures51.5 3EF-64-FS2 Close Electrical Failure Degraded logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degraded from 2/3 For all flows throughContact 7-8 of 2 close signals available to 1/2 cavitating venturipermanently inplace51.6 3EF-64-FS2 Open Electrical Failure Degraded logic. Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degraded from 2/3 For all flows throughContact 9- Loss of 1 close available to 2/2 cavitating venturi10 signal51.7 3EF-64-FS2 Close Electrical Failure Degraded logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degraded from 2/3 For all flows throughContact 9- of 2 close signals available to 1/2 cavitating venturi10 permanently inplace51.8 3EF-64-FS2 Open Electrical Failure Degraded alarm Periodic Test EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows throughContact 3-4 logic. Loss of 1 available cavitating venturiclose signal51.9 3EF-64-FS2 Close Electrical Failure Degraded alarm Periodic Test EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows throughContact 3-4 logic. 1 of 2 close available cavitating venturisignalspermanently inplace51.10 3EF-64-FS2 Open Electrical Failure Degraded alarm Periodic Test EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows throughContact 5-6 logic. Loss of 1 available cavitating venturiclose signal51.11 3EF-64-FS2 Close Electrical Failure Degraded alarm Periodic Test EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows throughContact 5-6 logic. 1 of 2 close available cavitating venturisignalspermanently inplace52.0 3EF-64-FS2 Fails to Energize Electrical Failure Degraded logic. Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degraded from 2/3 For all flows throughLoss of 1 close available to 2/2 cavitating venturisignal52.1 3EF-64-FS2 Fails to Electrical Failure Degraded logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degraded from 2/3 For all flows throughDeenergize of 2 close signals available to 1/2 cavitating venturipermanently inplace52.2 3EF-64-FS3 Open Electrical Failure Degraded logic. Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degraded For all flows throughContact 1-2 Loss of Seal-in of available3EF-64-FS1 cavitating venturi(1) "a" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >350 GPM"b" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM increasing"c" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM decreasing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission3F0811-02Enclosure 4Page 16 of 37Z Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Method of Inherent Effect on ECCS Remarks and OtherCLocal Effects Detection Compensating Effectsg Including ProvisionDependentFailures52.3 3EF-64-FS3 Close Electrical Failure Degraded logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degraded from 2/3 For all flows throughContact 1-2 of 2 close signals available to 1/2 cavitating venturipermanently inplace52.4 3EF-64-FS3 Open Electrical Failure Degraded logic. Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degraded from 2/3 For all flows throughContact 7-8 Loss of 1 close available to 2/2signal cavitating venturi52.5 3EF-64-FS3 Close Electrical Failure Degraded logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degraded from 2/3 For all flows throughContact 7-8 of 2 close signals available to 1/2 cavitating venturipermanently inplace52.6 3EF-64-FS3 Open Electrical Failure Degraded logic. Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degraded from 2/3 For all flows throughContact 9- Loss of 1 close available to 2/210 signal cavitating venturi52.7 3EF-64-FS3 Close Electrical Failure Degraded logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A Logic degraded from 2/3 For all flows throughContact 9- of 2 close signals available to 1/2 cavitating venturi10 permanently inplace52.8 3EF-64-FS3 Open Electrical Failure Degraded alarm Periodic Test EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows throughContact 3-4 logic. Loss of 1 available cavitating venturiclose signal52.9 3EF-64-FS3 Close Electrical Failure Degraded alarm Periodic Test EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows throughContact 3-4 logic. 1 of 2 close available cavitating venturisignalspermanently inplace52-10 3EF-64-FS3 Open Electrical Failure Degraded alarm Periodic Test EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows throughContact 5-6 logic. Loss of 1 available cavitating venturiclose signal52-11 3EF-64-FS3 Close Electrical Failure Degraded alarm Periodic Test EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows throughContact 5-6 logic. 1 of 2 close available cavitating venturisignalspermanently inplace53.0 20XB Fails to Energize Electrical Failure Loss of Remote Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A No Manual Open For all flows throughManual Open available capability from Control Room cavitating venturicapability(1) "a" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >350 GPM"b" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM increasing"c" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM decreasing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission3F0811-02Enclosure 4Page 17 of 37Z Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Method of Inherent Effect on ECCS Remarks and OtherCLocal Effects Detection Compensating Effects0 Including Provision-DependentFailures53.1 20XB Fails to Electrical Failure Loss of Automatic Periodic Test EFW Train B A single (1 of 2 train would no For all flows throughDeenergize Close of EFV-179 available longer be able to perform its20XB energized design functions. The affected cavitating venturiEFV-179 Opens train s flow would beapproximately 75% of design.100% design flows are typicallynecessary only early in accidents.The train with the failure willregain the ability to fully mitigatelater in the accident scenario.53.2 20XB Open Electrical Failure Loss of Automatic Periodic Test EFW Train B A single (1 of 2) train would no For all flows throughContact 5-6 Close of EFV-179 available longer be able to perform itsEFV-179 Opens design functions. The affected cavitating venturitrain s flow would beapproximately 75% of design.100% design flows are typicallynecessary onl early in accidents.The train with the failure willregain the ability to fully mitigatelater in the accident scenario.53.4 20XB Close Electrical Failure Loss of Remote Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train A No Manual Open For all flows throughContact 5-6 Manual Open available capability from Controi Room cavitating venturicapability53.5 20XB Open Electrical Failure Loss of Alarm Periodic Test EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows throughContact 1-2 Initiation signal available cavitating venturi53.6 20XB Close Electrical Failure Nuisances Alarm Annunciator Alarm EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows throughContact 1-2 2EFV-179 availableenergized cavitating venturi54.0 20XA Fails to Energize Electrical Failure Loss of Alarm for Periodic Test EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows throughvalve out of available venturiposition. cavitating54.1 20XA Fails to Electrical Failure Nuisances Alarm Annunciator Alarm EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows throughDeenergize when valve closes available cavitating venturi2EFV-1 79energized54.2 20XA Open Electrical Failure Loss of Alarm for Periodic Test EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows throughContact 5-6 valve out of available cavitating venturiposition.(1) "a" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >350 GPM"b" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM increasing"c" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM decreasing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission3F0811-02Enclosure 4Page 18 of 37Z Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Method of Inherent Effect on ECCS Remarks and OtherC3 Local Effects Detection Compensating Effectse"Including Provision=DependentFailures54.3 20XA Close Electrical Failure Nuisances Alarm Annunciator Alarm EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows throughContact 5-6 when valve closes available2EFV-179 cavitating venturienergized54.4 20XA Open Electrical Failure Loss of Alarm for Periodic Test EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows throughContact 9- valve out of available10 position. cavitating venturi54.6 20XA Close Electrical Failure Nuisances Alarm Annunciator Alarm EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows throughContact 9- 2EFV-179 available10 energized cavitating venturi55.0 2EFV-1 79 Fails to Energize Electrical Failure Loss of Alarm Periodic Test EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows throughavailable cavitating venturi55.1 2EFV-179 Fails to Electrical Failure Nuisances Alarm Annunciator Alarm EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows throughDeenergize 2EFV-179 availableenergized cavitating venturi55.2 2EFV-179 Open Electrical Failure Loss of Alarm Periodic Test EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows throughContact 1-5 available cavitating venturi55.3 2EFV-179 Close Electrical Failure Nuisances Alarm Annunciator Alarm EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows throughContact 1-5 2EFV-179 availableenergized cavitating venturiEFV-179- Fails to Energize Electrical Failure Valve remains in Periodic Test EFW Train B A single (1 of 2) train would no For all flows throughSV Open position available longer be able to perform its56.0. design functions. The affected cavitating venturitrain s flow would beapproximately 75% of design.100% design flows are typicallynecessary only early in accidents.The train with the failure willregain the ability to fully mitigatelater in the accident scenario.(1) "a" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >350 GPM"b" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM increasing"c" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM decreasing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission3F0811-02Enclosure 4Page 19 of 37Z Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Method of Inherent Effect on ECCS Remarks and OtherCLocal Effects Detection Compensating Effectso"Including Provision-DependentFailures56.1 EFV-1 79- Fails to Electrical Failure Valve remains in Periodic Test EFW Train B A single (1 of 2) train would no For all flows throughSV Deenergize Closed Position available longer be able to perform itsdesign functions. The affected cavitating venturitrain s flow would beapproximately 75% of design.100% design flows are typicallynecessary only early in accidents.The train with The failure willregain the ability to fully mitigatelater in the accident scenario.DPDP-1 D Blown Fuse Electrical Failure Loss of Periodic Test EFW Train B A single (1 of 2 train would no For all flows throughcontrol/motive available longer be able to perform its ting venturi57.0 power for design functions. The affected cavitatrain s flow would beEFV-179 approximately 75% of design.100% design flows are typicallynecessary only early in accidents.The train with the failure willregain the ability to fully mitigatelater in the accident scenario.58.0 2EFV-179/A Fails to Energize Electrical Failure Nuisance Alarm Annunciator Alarm EFW Train A & B EFW Alarms degraded For all flows throughavailable cavitating venturi58.1 2EFV-179/A Fails to Electrical Failure Loss of Alarm Periodic Test EFW Train A & B EFW Alarms degraded For all flows throughDeenergize available cavitating venturi58.2 2EFV-179/A Open Electrical Failure Loss of Alarm Periodic Test EFW Train A & B EFW Alarms degraded For all flows throughContact available cavitating venturi1-558.3 2EFV-1 79/A Close Electrical Failure Nuisances Alarm Annunciator Alarm EFW Train A & B EFW Alarms degraded For all flows throughavailableContact cavitating venturi1-560.1 EF-62-FS1, Fails High Electrical or Affects either Periodic Test Redundant Logic degraded from 2/3 to 2/2 to Mode: High Flow SetpointFS2, FS3 mechanical failure component open EFV-180 actuated with Low Flow(Any 1 of 3) EF-62-FS1, FS2, Setpoint reset. (EFV-180or FS3 closed)(1) "a" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >350 GPM"b" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM increasing"c" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM decreasing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission3F081 1-02Enclosure 4Page 20 of 37z Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Method of Inherent Effect on ECCS Remarks and OtherE3 Local Effects Detection Compensating Effectso-Including ProvisionI DependentzFailures60.2 EF-62-FS1, Fails Low Electrical or Affects either Periodic Test Redundant Logic degraded from 2/3 to 1/2 to Mode: High Flow SetpointFS2, FS3 mechanical failure component open EFV-180 actuated with Low Flow(Any 1 of 3) EF-62-FS1, FS2, Setpoint reset. (EFV-180or FS3 closed)60.3 EF-62-FS1, Fails Constant Electrical or Affects either Periodic Test Redundant Logic degraded from 2/3 to 2/2 to Mode: High Flow SetpointFS2, FS3 mechanical failure component open EFV-180 actuated with Low Flow(Any 1 of 3) EF-62-FS1, FS2, Setpoint reset. (EFV-180or FS3 closed)61.1 EF-62-FS1, Fails High Electrical or Affects either Periodic Test Redundant Logic degraded from 2/3 to 1/2 to Mode: Low Flow SetpointFS2,FS3 mechanical failure component close EFV-180 actuated with High Flow(Any 1 of 3) EF-62-FS1, FS2, Setpoint reset. (EFV-180or FS3 open)61.2 EF-62-FS1, Fails Low Electrical or Affects either Periodic Test Redundant Logic degraded from 2/3 to 2/2 to Mode: Low Flow SetpointFS2,FS3 mechanical failure component close EFV-180 actuated with High Flow(Any 1 of 3) EF-62-FS1, FS2, Setpoint reset. (EFV-180or FS3 open)61.3 EF-62-FS1, Fails Constant Electrical or Affects either Periodic Test Redundant Logic degraded from 2/3 to 2/2 to Mode: Low Flow SetpointFS2,FS3 mechanical failure component close EFV-180 actuated with High Flow(Any 1 of 3) EF-62-FS1, FS2, Setpoint reset. (EFV-180or FS3 open)62.1 EF-62-FS1, Leakage at Mechanical Failure Affects either Periodic Test Redundant Logic degraded from 2/3 to 2/2 to Mode: High Flow SetpointFS2, FS3 pressure component open EFV-180 actuated with Low Flow(Any 1 of 3) boundary -Low EF-62-FS1, FS2, Setpoint reset.Side or FS3(EFV-1 80 closed)(Fails High)62.2 EF-62-FS1, Leakage at Mechanical Failure Affects either Periodic Test Redundant Logic degraded from 2/3 to 1/2 to Mode: High Flow SetpointFS2, FS3 pressure component open EFV-180 actuated with Low Flow(Any 1 of 3) boundary -High EF-62-FS1, FS2, Setpoint reset.Side or FS3(EFV-1 80 closed)(Fails Low)(1) "a" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >350 GPM"b" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM increasing"c" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM decreasing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission3F0811-02Enclosure 4Page 21 of 37z Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Method of Inherent Effect on ECCS Remarks and OtherCLocal Effects Detection Compensating Effectso- Including Provision-DependentFailures63.1 EF-62-FS1, Leakage at Mechanical Failure Affects either Periodic Test Redundant Logic degraded from 2/3 to 1/2 to Mode: Low Flow SetpointFS2, FS3 pressure component close EFV-180 actuated with High Flow(Any 1 of 3) boundary -Low EF-62-FS1, FS2, Setpoint reset.Side or FS3(EFV-1 80 open)(Fails High)63.2 EF-62-FS1, Leakage at Mechanical Failure Affects either Periodic Test Redundant Logic degraded from 2/3 to 2/2 to Mode: Low Flow SetpointFS2, FS3 pressure component close EFV-180 actuated with High Flow(Any 1 of 3) boundary -High EF-62-FS1, FS2, Setpoint reset.Side or FS3(EFV-1 80 open)(Fails Low)64.1 EF-64-FS1, Fails High Electrical or Affects either Periodic Test Redundant Logic degraded from 2/3 to 2/2 to Mode: High Flow SetpointFS2, FS3 mechanical failure component open EFV-179 actuated with Low Flow(Any 1 of 3) EF-64-FS1, FS2, Setpoint reset. (EFV-1 79or FS3 closed)64.2 EF-64-FS1, Fails Low Electrical or Affects either Periodic Test Redundant Logic degraded from 2/3 to 1/2 to Mode: High Flow SetpointFS2, FS3 mechanical failure component open EFV-179 actuated with Low Flow(Any 1 of 3) EF-64-FS1, FS2, Setpoint reset. (EFV-179or FS3 closed)64.3 EF-64-FS1, Fails Constant Electrical or Affects either Periodic Test Redundant Logic degraded from 2/3 to 2/2 to Mode: High Flow SetpointFS2, FS3 mechanical failure component open EFV-179 actuated with Low Flow(Any 1 of 3) EF-64-FS1, FS2, Setpoint reset. (EFV-1 79or FS3 closed)65.1 EF-64-FS1, Fails High Electrical or Affects either Periodic Test Redundant Logic degraded from 2/3 to 1/2 to Mode: Low Flow SetpointFS2,FS3 mechanical failure component close EFV-179 actuated with High Flow(Any 1 out EF-64-FS1, FS2, Setpoint reset. (EFV-179of 3) or FS3 open)65.2 EF-64-FS1, Fails Low Electrical or Affects either Periodic Test Redundant Logic degraded from 2/3 to 2/2 to Mode: Low Flow SetpointFS2,FS3 mechanical failure component close EFV-1 79 actuated with High Flow(Any 1 out EF-64-FS1, FS2, Setpoint reset. (EFV-179of 3) or FS3 open)(1) "a" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >350 GPM"b" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM increasing"c" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM decreasing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission3F0811-02Enclosure 4Page 22 of 37z Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Method of Inherent Effect on ECCS Remarks and OtherLocal Effects Detection Compensating Effectsg Including Provision-DependentFailures65.3 EF-64-FS1, Fails Constant Electrical or Affects either Periodic Test Redundant Logic degraded from 2/3 to 2/2 to Mode: Low Flow SetpointFS2,FS3 mechanical failure component close EFV-179 actuated with High Flow(Any 1 out EF-64-FS1, FS2, Setpoint reset. (EFV-179of 3) or FS3 open)66.1 EF-64-FS1, Leakage at Mechanical Failure Affects either Periodic Test Redundant Logic degraded from 2/3 to 2/2 to Mode: High Flow SetpointFS2, FS3 pressure component open EFV-179 actuated with Low Flow(Any 1 of 3) boundary -Low EF-64-FS1, FS2, Setpoint reset.Side or FS3(EFV-1 79 closed)(Fails High)66.2 EF-64-FS1, Leakage at Mechanical Failure Affects either Periodic Test Redundant Logic degraded from 2/3 to 1/2 to Mode: High Flow SetpointFS2, FS3 pressure component open EFV-179 actuated with Low Flow(Any 1 of 3) boundary -High EF-64-FS1, FS2, Setpoint reset.Side or FS3(EFV-179 open)(Fails Low)67.1 EF-64-FS1, Leakage at Mechanical Failure Affects either Periodic Test Redundant Logic degraded from 2/3 to 1/2 to Mode: Low Flow SetpointFS2, FS3 pressure component close EFV-179 actuated with High Flow(Any 1 of 3) boundary -Low EF-64-FS1, FS2, Setpoint reset.Side or FS3(EFV-179 open)(Fails High)67.2 EF-64-FS1, Leakage at Mechanical Failure Affects either Periodic Test Redundant Logic degraded from 2/3 to 2/2 to Mode: Low Flow SetpointFS2, FS3 pressure component close EFV-179 actuated with High Flow(Any 1 of 3) boundary -High EF-64-FS1, FS2, Setpoint reset.Side or FS3(EFV-179 open)(Fails Low)70.1 EFV-139 Fail Open Operational Mis- Affects EF-62- Periodic Test EFW Train A None High Side root valve of EF-position or FS1, FS2,& FS3. available 62-FO. Mode: High FlowMechanical Failure Setpoint actuated with LowFlow Setpoint reset. (EFV-180 closed)(1) "a" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >350 GPM"b" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM increasing"c" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM decreasing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission3F08 11-02Enclosure 4Page 23 of 37z Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Method of Inherent Effect on ECCS Remarks and OtherC3 Local Effects Detection Compensating EffectsIncluding ProvisionDependentFailures70.2 EFV-1 39 Fail Closed Operational Mis- EFV-180 opens. Periodic Test EFW Train A Will not auto-close EFV-1 80 High Side root valve of EF-position or available Cascades into 10.2 62-FO. Mode: High FlowMechanical Failure Affects EF-62- Red Light Setpoint actuated with LowFS1, FS2,& FS3. Indication for EFV- Flow Setpoint reset. (EFV-180 180 closed)70.3 EFV-1 39 Fail Mid-Travel Operational Mis- Affects EF-62- Periodic Test EFW Train A None High Side root valve of EF-position or FS1, FS2,& FS3. available 62-FO.Mode: High FlowMechanical Failure Setpoint actuated with LowFlow Setpoint reset. (EFV-180 closed)71.1 EFV-139 Fail Open Operational Mis- Affects EF-62- Periodic Test EFW Train A None High Side root valve of EF-position or FS1, FS2,& FS3. available 62-FO. Mode: Low FlowMechanical Failure Setpoint actuated with HighFlow Setpoint reset. (EFV-180 open)71.2 EFV-139 Fail Closed Operational Mis- Affects EF-62- Periodic Test EFW Train A Will not auto-close EFV-1 80 High Side root valve of EF-position or FS1, FS2,& FS3. available Cascades into 10.1 62-FO. Mode: Low FlowMechanical Failure Setpoint actuated with HighFlow Setpoint reset. (EFV-180 open)71.3 EFV-139 Fail Mid-Travel Operational Mis- Affects EF-62- Periodic Test EFW Train A None High Side root valve of EF-position or FS1, FS2,& FS3. available 62-FO. Mode: Low FlowMechanical Failure Setpoint actuated with HighFlow Setpoint reset. (EFV-180 open)72.1 EFV-140 Fail Open Operational Mis- Affects EF-62- Periodic Test EFW Train A None Low Side root valve of EF-position or FS1, FS2,& FS3. available 62-FO. Mode: High FlowMechanical Failure Setpoint actuated with LowFlow Setpoint reset. (EFV-180 closed)(1) "a" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >350 GPM"b" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM increasing"c" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM decreasing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission3F0811-02Enclosure 4Page 24 of 37z Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Method of Inherent Effect on ECCS Remarks and OtherCLocal Effects Detection Compensating EffectsIncluding ProvisionDependentFailures72.2 EFV-140 Fail Closed Operational Mis- Affects EF-62- Periodic Test EFW Train A Will not auto-open EFV-1 80 Low Side root valve of EF-position or FS1, FS2,& FS3. available Cascades into 10.2 62-FO. Mode: High FlowMechanical Failure Setpoint actuated with LowFlow Setpoint reset. (EFV-180 closed)72.3 EFV-140 Fail Mid-Travel Operational Mis- Affects EF-62- Periodic Test EFW Train A None Low Side root valve of EF-position or FS1, FS2,& FS3. available 62-FO. Mode: High FlowMechanical Failure Setpoint actuated with LowFlow Setpoint reset. (EFV-180 closed)73.1 EFV-140 Fail Open Operational Mis- Affects EF-62- Periodic Test EFW Train A None Low Side root valve of EF-position or FS1, FS2,& FS3. available 62-FO. Mode: Low FlowMechanical Failure Setpoint actuated with HighFlow Setpoint reset. (EFV-180 open)73.2 EFV-140 Fail Closed Operational Mis- EFV-1 80 closes. Periodic Test EFW Train A Will not auto-open EFV-1 80 Low Side root valve of EF-position or Affects EF-62- available Cascades into 10.2 62-FO. Mode: Low FlowMechanical Failure FS1, FS2,& FS3. Green Light Setpoint actuated with HighIndication for EFV- Flow Setpoint reset. (EFV-180 180 open)73.3 EFV-140 Fail Mid-Travel Operational Mis- Affects EF-62- Periodic Test EFW Train A None Low Side root valve of EF-position or FS1, FS2,& FS3. available 62-FO. Mode: Low FlowMechanical Failure Setpoint actuated with HighFlow Setpoint reset. (EFV-180 open)74.1 EFV-181 Fail Open Operational Mis- Affects EF-64- Periodic Test EFW Train B None High Side root valve of EF-position or FS1, FS2,& FS3. available 64-FO. Mode: High FlowMechanical Failure Setpoint actuated with LowFlow Setpoint reset. (EFV-179 closed)(1) "a" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >350 GPM"b" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM increasing"c" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM decreasing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission3F0811-02Enclosure 4Page 25 of 37z Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Method of Inherent Effect on ECCS Remarks and Other,.: Local Effects Detection Compensating Effects-Including ProvisionDependentFailures74.2 EFV-181 Fail Closed Operational Mis- EFV-1 79 opens. Periodic Test EFW Train B Will not auto-close EFV-1 80 High Side root valve of EF-position or Affects EF-64- available Cascades into 10.1 64-FO. Mode: High FlowMechanical Failure FS1, FS2,& FS3. Red Light Setpoint actuated with LowIndication for EFV- Flow Setpoint reset. (EFV-179 179 closed)74.3 EFV-1 81 Fail Mid-Travel Operational Mis- Affects EF-64- Periodic Test EFW Train B None High Side root valve of EF-position or FS1, FS2,& FS3. available 64-FO. Mode: High FlowMechanical Failure Setpoint actuated with LowFlow Setpoint reset. (EFV-179 closed)75.1 EFV-1 81 Fail Open Operational Mis- Affects EF-64- Periodic Test EFW Train B None High Side root valve of EF-position or FS1, FS2,& FS3. available 64-FO. Mode: Low FlowMechanical Failure Setpoint actuated with HighFlow Setpoint reset. (EFV-179 open)75.2 EFV-181 Fail Closed Operational Mis- Affects EF-64- Periodic Test EFW Train B Will not auto-close EFV-1 79 High Side root valve of EF-position or FS1, FS2,& FS3. available Cascades into 1.1 64-FO. Mode: Low FlowMechanical Failure Setpoint actuated with HighFlow Setpoint reset.(EFV-179 open)75.3 EFV-181 Fail Mid-Travel Operational Mis- Affects EF-64- Periodic Test EFW Train B None High Side root valve of EF-position or FS1, FS2,& FS3. available 64-FO. Mode: Low FlowMechanical Failure Setpoint actuated with HighFlow Setpoint reset.(EFV-179 open)76.1 EFV-182 Fail Open Operational Mis- Affects EF-64- Periodic Test EFW Train B None Low Side root valve of EF-position or FS1, FS2,& FS3. available 64-FO. Mode: High FlowMechanical Failure Setpoint actuated with LowFlow Setpoint reset. (EFV-179 closed)(1) "a" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >350 GPM"b" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM increasing"c" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM decreasing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission3F0811-02Enclosure 4Page 26 of 37z Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Method of Inherent Effect on ECCS Remarks and OtherCLocal Effects Detection Compensating EffectsCD Including ProvisionDependentFailures76.2 EFV-182 Fail Closed Operational Mis- Affects EF-64- Periodic Test EFW Train B Will not auto-open EFV-179 Low Side root valve of EF-position or FS1, FS2,& FS3. available Cascades into 1.2 64-FO.Mode: High FlowMechanical Failure Setpoint actuated with LowFlow Setpoint reset. (EFV-179 closed)76.3 EFV-1 82 Fail Mid-Travel Operational Mis- Affects EF-64- Periodic Test EFW Train B None Low Side root valve of EF-position or FS1, FS2,& FS3. available 64-FO. Mode: High FlowMechanical Failure Setpoint actuated with LowFlow Setpoint reset. (EFV-179 closed)77.1 EFV-182 Fail Open Operational Mis- Affects EF-64- Periodic Test EFW Train B None Low Side root valve of EF-position or FS1, FS2,& FS3. available 64-FO. Mode: Low FlowMechanical Failure Setpoint actuated with HighFlow Setpoint reset. (EFV-179 open)77.2 EFV-1 82 Fail Closed Operational Mis- Affects EF-64- Periodic Test EFW Train B Will not auto-open EFV-1 79 Low Side root valve of EF-position or FS1, FS2,& FS3. available Cascades into 1.2 64-FO. Mode: Low FlowMechanical Failure Setpoint actuated with HighFlow Setpoint reset. (EFV-179 open)77.3 EFV-182 Fail Mid-Travel Operational Mis- Affects EF-64- Periodic Test EFW Train B None Low Side root valve of EF-position or FS1, FS2,& FS3. available 64-FO. Mode: Low FlowMechanical Failure Setpoint actuated with HighFlow Setpoint reset. (EFV-179 open)140.Oa EF-62- Open Electrical failure Degraded logic Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Logic degraded from 2/3FS1(Hi) Loss of available to 2/2Contact 3EF-62-FS19-10140.1 a EF-62- Close Electrical failure Degraded logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Logic degraded from 2/3FS1 (Hi) of 2 close signals available to 1/2permanently inContact place9-10(1) "a" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >350 GPM"b" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM increasing"c" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM decreasing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission3F0811-02Enclosure 4Page 27 of 37Z Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Method of Inherent Effect on ECCS Remarks and OtherCSLocal Effects Detection Compensating Effectso"Including ProvisionDependentFailures140.2a EF-62- Open Electrical failure Degraded logic Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Logic degradedFS1 (LO) Loss of seal to availableContact3EF-62-FS12-3140.3a EF-62- Close Electrical failure Degrade logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Logic degradedFS1 (LO) of 2 close signals availableContact permanently inafter Hi flow2-3140.Ob EF-62- Open Electrical failure Degraded logic Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Logic degraded from 2/3FS1 (Hi) Loss of 3EF-B2- available to 2/2Contact 9- FS110140.1 b EF-62- Open Electrical failure Degraded logic Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Logic degradedFS1 (LO) Loss of seal to availableContact 2-3 3EF-62-FS1140.2b EF-62- Close Electrical failure Degraded logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Logic degraded from 2/3FS1 (Hi) of 2 close signals available to 1/2Contact 9- permanently in10 place140.3b EF-62- Close Electrical failure Degrade logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Logic degradedFS1 (LO) of 2 close signals availableContact 2-3 permanently inafter Hi flow140.0c EF-62- Open Electrical failure Degraded logic Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Logic degraded from 2/3FS1 (Hi) Loss of available to 2/2Contact 3EF-62-FS19-10140.1 c EF-62- Close Electrical failure Degraded logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Close Logic degradedFS1 (Hi) of 2 close signals available from 2/3 to 1/2; go change to 2/2permanently in Open LogicContact place 3EF-62-9-10 S1 energized(1) "a" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >350 GPM"b" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM increasing"c" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM decreasing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission3F0811-02Enclosure 4Page 28 of 37z Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Method of Inherent Effect on ECCS Remarks and OtherLocal Effects Detection Compensating EffectsIncluding Provision-DependentFailures140.2c EF-62- Open Electrical failure Degraded logic Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Logic degraded from 2/3FS1 (LO) Loss of seal to available to 2/2Contact3EF-62-FS12-3140.3c EF-62- Open Electrical failure Degraded logic Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Logic degraded from 2/3FS 1 (LO) Loss of seal to available to 2/2Contact3EF-62-FS12-3141.Oa EF-62- Open Electrical failure Degraded logic. Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Logic degraded from 2/3FS2(Hi) Loss of available to 2/2Contact3EF-62-FS19-10141 .la EF-62- Close Electrical failure Degraded logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Logic degraded from 2/3FS2(Hi) of 2 close signals available to 1/2permanently inContact place9-10141.2a EF-62- Open Electrical failure Degraded logic Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Logic degradedFS2(LO) Loss of seal o availableContact3EF-62-FS12-3141.3a EF-62- Close Electrical failure Degrade logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Logic degradedFS2(LO) of 2 close signals availableContact permanently inafter Hi flow2-3141.Ob EF-62- Open Electrical failure Degraded logic. Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Logic degraded from 2/3FS2(Hi) Loss of available to 2/2Contact 9-10 3EF-62-FS1141.1b EF-62- Open Electrical failure Degraded logic Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Logic degradedFS2(LO) Loss of seal to availableContact 2-33EF-62-FS1(1) "a" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >350 GPM"b" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM increasing"c" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM decreasing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission3F0811-02Enclosure 4Page 29 of 37z Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Method of Inherent Effect on ECCS Remarks and OtherCLocal Effects Detection Compensating Effectso"Including Provision=DependentFailures141.2b EF-62- Close Electrical failure Degraded logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Logic degraded from 2/3FS2(Hi) of 2 close signals available to 1/2Contact 9- permanently in10 place141.3b EF-62- Close Electrical failure Degrade logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Logic degradedFS2(LO) of 2 close signals availableContact 2-3 permanently inafter Hi flow141.0c EF-62- Open Electrical failure Degraded logic Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Logic degraded from 2/3FS1(Hi) Loss of available to 2/2Contact 3EF-62-FS19-10141.1 c EF-62- Open Electrical failure Degraded logic Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Logic degraded from 2/3FS2(LO) Loss of seal to available to 2/2 Logic degrade from 2/3 toContact 3EF-62-FS2 2/22-3141.2c EF-62- Open Electrical failure Degraded logic Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Logic degraded from 2/3FS1(Hi) Loss of available to 2/2Contact 3EF-62-FS 19-10141.3c EF-62- Close Electrical failure Degraded logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Close Logic degradedFS2(LO) of 2 close signals available from 2/3 to 1/2; No change to 2/2Contact in place w/250 Open Logic2-3 gpm flow142.0a EF-62- Open Electrical failure Degrade logic. Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Logic degraded from 2/3FS3(Hi) Loss of available to 2/2Contact 9-10 3EF-62-FS1142.1 a EF-62- Close Electrical failure Degraded logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Logic degraded from 2/3FS3(Hi) of 2 close signals available to 1/2Contact 9- permanently in10 place(1) "a" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >350 GPM"b" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM increasing"c" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM decreasing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission3F0811-02Enclosure 4Page 30 of 37Z Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Method of Inherent Effect on ECCS Remarks and OtherCr=!Local Effects Detection Compensating Effects" Including Provision-DependentFailures142.2a EF-62- Open Electrical failure Degraded logic Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Logic degraded from 2/3FS3(LO) Loss of seal to available to 2/2Contact 3EF-62-FS32-3142.3a EF-62- Close Electrical failure Degraded logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Close Logic degradedFS3(LO) of 2 close signals available from 2/3 to 1/2; No change to 2/2Contact in place w/250 Open Logic2-3 gpm flow143.0 SS/EFV- Open Electrical Failure Loss of Remote Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B No Manual Open For all flows through180-SV Manual Open available capability from Control Room cavitating venturiContact 3-4 capability143.1 SS/EFV- Close Electrical Failure Loss of Automatic Periodic Test EFW Train A A single (1 of 2) train would no For all flows through180-SV Close of EFV-1 80 available longer be able to perform its cavitating venturiContact 3-4 design functions. The affected20XB energized train s flow would beEFV-180 Opens approximately 75% of design.100% design flows are typicallynecessary only early in accidents.The train with The failure willregain the ability to fully mitigatelater in the accident scenario.144.0 33o/EFV- Open Electrical Failure Loss of Alarm for Periodic Test EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows through180 Contact valve out of available cavitating venturic-d position.144.1 33o/EFV- Close Electrical Failure Nuisances Alarm Annunciator Alarm EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows through180 Contact available cavitating venturic-d 2EFV-180energized144.2 33o/EFV- Open Electrical Failure False indication Periodic Test; EFW Train A & B Degraded valve position For all flows through180 Contact for valve position. Operator Validation available Indication cavitating venturia-b144.3a 33o/EFV- Close Electrical Failure False indication Periodic Test; EFW Train A & B Degraded valve position For all flows through180 Contact for valve position. Operator Validation available Indication cavitating venturia-b145.0 33c/EFV- Open Electrical Failure Loss of Alarm for Periodic Test EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows through180 Contact valve out of available cavitating venturia-b position.(1) "a" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >350 GPM"b" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM increasing"c" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM decreasing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission3F0811-02Enclosure 4Page 31 of 37Z Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Method of Inherent Effect on ECCS Remarks and OtherLocal Effects Detection Compensating Effects( Including Provision-DependentFailures145.1 33c/EFV- Close Electrical Failure False Alarm for Periodic Test EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows through180 Contact valve out of available cavitating venturia-b position.145.2 33c/EFV- Open Electrical Failure False indication Periodic Test; EFW Train A & B Degraded valve position For all flows through180 Contact for valve position. Operator Validation available Indication cavitating venturia-b145.3 33c/EFV- Close Electrical Failure False indication Periodic Test; EFW Train A & B Degraded valve position For all flows through180 Contact for valve position. Operator Validation available Indication cavitating venturia-b150.0 3EF-62-FS1 Fails to Energize Electrical Failure Degraded logic. Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Logic degraded from 2/3 For all flows throughLoss of 1 close available to 2/2 cavitating venturisignal150.1 a 3EF-62-FS1 Fails to Electrical Failure Degraded logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Logic degraded from 2/3 For all flows throughDeenergize Close of 2 close signals available to 1/2 cavitating venturipermanently inplace150.2 3EF-62-FS1 Open Electrical Failure Degraded logic. Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Logic degraded For all flows throughContact 1-2 Loss of Seal-in of available cavitating venturi3EF-62-FS1150.3 3EF-62-FS1 Close Electrical Failure Degraded logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Logic degraded from 2/3 For all flows throughContact 1-2 of 2 close signals available to 1/2 cavitating venturipermanently inplace150.4 3EF-62-FS1 Open Electrical Failure Degraded logic. Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Logic degraded from 2/3 For all flows throughContact 7-8 Loss of 1 close available to 2/2 cavitating venturisignal150.5 3EF-62-FS1 Close Electrical Failure Degraded logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Logic degraded from 2/3 For all flows throughContact 7-8 of 2 close signals available to 1/2 cavitating venturipermanently inplace150.6 3EF-62-FS1 Open Electrical Failure Degraded logic. Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Logic degraded from 2/3 For all flows throughContact 9- Loss of 1 close available to 2/2 cavitating venturi10 signal(1) "a" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >350 GPM"b" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM increasing"c" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM decreasing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission3F0811-02Enclosure 4Page 32 of 37Z Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Method of Inherent Effect on ECCS Remarks and OtherLocal Effects Detection Compensating Effects" Including Provision-DependentFailures150.7 3EF-62-FS1 Close Electrical Failure Degraded logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Logic degraded from 2/3 For all flows throughContact 9- of 2 close signals available to 1/2 cavitating venturi10 permanently inplace150.8 3EF-62-FS1 Open Electrical Failure Degraded alarm Periodic Test EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows throughContact 3-4 logic. Loss of 1 available cavitating venturiclose signal150.9 3EF-62-FS1 Close Electrical Failure Degraded alarm Periodic Test EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows throughContact 3-4 logic. 1 of 2 close available cavitating venturisignalspermanently inplace150.10 3EF-62-FS1 Open Electrical Failure Degraded alarm Periodic Test EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows throughContact 5-6 logic. Loss of 1 available cavitating venturiclose signal150.11 3EF-62-FS1 Close Electrical Failure Degraded alarm Periodic Test' EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows throughContact 5-6 logic. 1 of 2 close available cavitating venturisignalspermanently inplace151.0 3EF-62-FS2 Fails to Energize Electrical Failure Degraded logic. Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Logic degraded from 2/3 For all flows throughLoss of 1 close available to 2/2 cavitating venturisignal151.1 3EF-62-FS2 Fails to Electrical Failure Degraded logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Logic degraded from 2/3 For all flows throughDeenergize of close signals available to 1/2 cavitating venturipermanently inplace151.2 3EF-62-FS2 Open Electrical Failure Degraded logic. Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Logic degraded For all flows throughContact 1-2 Loss of Seal-in of available cavitating venturi3EF-62-FS1151.3 3EF-62-FS2 Close Electrical Failure Degraded logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Logic degraded from 2/3 For all flows throughContact 1-2 of 2close signals available to 1/2 cavitating venturipermanently inplace151.4 3EF-62-FS2 Open Electrical Failure Degraded logic. Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Logic degraded from 2/3 For all flows throughContact 7-8 Loss of 1 close available to 2/2 cavitating venturisignal(1) "a" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >350 GPM"b" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM increasing"c" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM decreasing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission3F0811-02Enclosure 4Page 33 of 37Z Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Method of Inherent Effect on ECCS Remarks and Otherr_3 Local Effects Detection Compensating EffectsCD Including Provision" DependentFailures151.5 3EF-62-FS2 Close Electrical Failure Degraded logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Logic degraded from 2/3 For all flows throughContact 7-8 of 2 close signals available to 1/2 cavitating venturipermanently inplace151.6 3EF-62-FS2 Open Electrical Failure Degraded logic. Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Logic degraded from 2/3 For all flows throughContact 9- Loss of 1 close available to 2/2 cavitating venturi10 signal151.7 3EF-62-FS2 Close Electrical Failure Degraded logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Logic degraded from 2/3 For all flows throughContact 9- of 2 close signals available to 1/2 cavitating venturi10 permanently inplace151.8 3EF-62-FS2 Open Electrical Failure Degraded alarm Periodic Test EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows throughContact 3-4 logic. Loss of 1 available cavitating venturiclose signal151.9 3EF-62-FS2 Close Electrical Failure Degraded alarm Periodic Test EFW Train B & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows throughContact 3-4 Iogic. 1 of 2 close available cavitating venturisignalspermanently inplace151.10 3EF-62-FS2 Open Electrical Failure Degraded alarm Periodic Test EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows throughContact 5-6 logic. Loss of 1 available cavitating venturiclose signal151.11 3EF-62-FS2 Close Electrical Failure Degraded alarm Periodic Test EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows throughContact 5-6 logic. 1 of 2 close available cavitating venturisignalspermanently inplace152.0 3EF-62-FS2 Fails to Energize Electrical Failure Degraded logic. Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Logic degraded from 2/3 For all flows throughLoss of 1 close available to 2/2 cavitating venturisignal152.1 3EF-62-FS2 Fails to Electrical Failure Degraded logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Logic degraded from 2/3 For all flows throughDeenergize of 2 close signals available to 1/2 cavitating venturipermanently inplace152.2 3EF-62-FS3 Open Electrical Failure Degraded logic. Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Logic degraded For all flows throughContact 1-2 Loss of Seal-in of available cavitating venturi3EF-62-FS1(1) "a" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >350 GPM"b" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM increasing"c" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM decreasing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission3F0811-02Enclosure 4Page 34 of 37Z Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Method of Inherent Effect on ECCS Remarks and OtherCLocal Effects Detection Compensating EffectsC- Including ProvisionDependentFailures152.3 3EF-62-FS3 Close Electrical Failure Degraded logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Logic degraded from 2/3 For all flows throughContact 1-2 of 2 close signals available to 1/2 cavitating venturipermanently inplace152.4 3EF-62-FS3 Open Electrical Failure Degraded logic. Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Logic degraded from 2/3 For all flows throughContact 7-8 Loss of 1 close available to 2/2 cavitating venturisignal152.5 3EF-62-FS3 Close Electrical Failure Degraded logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Logic degraded from 2/3 For all flows throughContact 7-8 of 2 close signals available to 1/2 cavitating venturipermanently inplace152.6 3EF-62-FS3 Open Electrical Failure Degraded logic. Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Logic degraded from 2/3 For all flows throughContact 9- Loss of 1 close available to 2/2 cavitating venturi10 signal152.7 3EF-62-FS3 Close Electrical Failure Degraded logic. 1 Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B Logic degraded from 2/3 For all flows throughContact 9- of 2 close signals available to 1/2 cavitating venturi10 permanently inplace152.8 3EF-62-FS3 Open Electrical Failure Degraded alarm Periodic Test EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows throughContact 3-4 logic. Loss of 1 available cavitating venturiclose signal152.9 3EF-62-FS3 Close Electrical Failure Degraded alarm Periodic Test EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows throughContact 3-4 logic. 1 of 2 close available cavitating venturisignalspermanently inplace152-10 3EF-62-FS3 Open Electrical Failure Degraded alarm Periodic Test EFW Train A & B EFFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows throughContact 5-6 logic. Loss of 1 available cavitating venturiclose signal152-11 3EF-62-FS3 Close Electrical Failure Degraded alarm Periodic Test EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows throughContact 5-6 logic. 1 of 2 close available cavitating venturisignalspermanently inplace153.0 20XB Fails to Energize Electrical Failure Loss of Remote Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B No Manual Open For all flows throughManual Open available capability from Control Room cavitating venturicapability(1) "a" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >350 GPM"b" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM increasing"c" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM decreasing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission3F0811-02Enclosure 4Page 35 of 37Z Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Method of Inherent Effect on ECCS Remarks and OtherCLocal Effects Detection Compensating Effects(D Including Provision=DependentFailures153.1 20XB Fails to Electrical Failure Loss of Automatic Periodic Test EFW Train A A single (1 of 2) train would no For all flows throughDeenergize Close of EFV-1 80 available longer be able to perform its cavitating venturidesign functions. The affected20XB energized train s flow would beEFV-180 Opens approximately 75% of design.100% design flows are typicallynecessary only early in accidents.The train with the failure willregain the ability to fully mitigatelater in the accident scenario.153.2 20XB Open Electrical Failure Loss of Automatic Periodic Test EFW Train A A single (1 of 2) train would no For all flows throughContact 5-6 Close of EFV-1 80 available longer be able to perform its cavitating venturidesign functions. The affectedEFV-1 80 Opens train s flow would beapproximately 75% of design.100% design flows are typicallynecessary only early in accidents.The train with The failure willregain the ability to fully mitigatelater in the accident scenario.153.4 20XB Close Electrical Failure Loss of Remote Periodic Test EFW Train A & B Train B No Manual Open For all flows throughContact 5-6 Manual Open available capability from Control Room cavitating venturicapability153.5 20XB Open Electrical Failure Loss of Alarm Periodic Test EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows throughContact 1-2 Initiation signal available cavitating venturi153.6 20XB Close Electrical Failure Nuisances Alarm Annunciator Alarm EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows throughContact 1-2 2EFV-180 available cavitating venturienergized154.0 20XA Fails to Energize Electrical Failure Loss of Alarm for Periodic Test EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows throughvalve out of available cavitating venturiposition.154.1 20XA Fails to Electrical Failure Nuisances Alarm Annunciator Alarm EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows throughDeenergize when valve closes available cavitating venturi2EFV-180energized154.2 20XA Open Electrical Failure Loss of Alarm for Periodic Test EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows throughContact 5-6 valve out of available cavitating venturiposition.(1) "a" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >350 GPM"b" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM increasing"c" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM decreasing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission3F0811-02Enclosure 4Page 36 of 37Z Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Method of Inherent Effect on ECCS Remarks and OtherCLocal Effects Detection Compensating Effectso Including Provision-DependentFailures154.3 20XA Close Electrical Failure Nuisances Alarm Annunciator Alarm EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows throughContact 5-6 when valve closes available cavitating venturi2EFV-180energized154.4 20XA Open Electrical Failure Loss of Alarm for Periodic Test EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows throughContact 9- valve out of available cavitating venturi10 position.154.6 20XA Close Electrical Failure Nuisances Alarm Annunciator Alarm EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows throughContact 9- available cavitating venturi10 2EFV-180energized155.0 2EFV-180 Fails to Energize Electrical Failure Loss of Alarm Periodic Test EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows throughavailable cavitating venturi155.1 2EFV-180 Fails to Electrical Failure Nuisances Alarm Annunciator Alarm EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows throughDeenergize 2EFV-180 available cavitating venturienergized155.2 2EFV-180 Open Electrical Failure Loss of Alarm Periodic Test EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows throughContact 1-5 available cavitating venturi155.3 2EFV-180 Close Electrical Failure Nuisances Alarm Annunciator Alarm EFW Train A & B EFW Alarm Logic degraded For all flows throughContact 1-5 2EFV-180 available cavitating venturienergized156.0 EFV-180-SV Fails to Energize Electrical Failure Valve remains in Annunciator Alarm EFW Train A A single (1 of 2) train would no For all flows throughOpen position available longer be able to perform its cavitating venturidesign functions. The affectedtrain s flow would beapproximately 75% of design.100% design flows are typicallynecessary only early in accidents.The train with the failure willregain the ability to fully mitigatelater in the accident scenario.(1) "a" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >350 GPM"b" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM increasing"c" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM decreasing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission3F0811-02Enclosure 4Page 37 of 37z Name Failure Mode Cause Symptoms and Method of Inherent Effect on ECCS Remarks and OtherLocal Effects Detection Compensating EffectsCrIncluding Provision-DependentFailures156.1 EFV-180-SV Fails to Electrical Failure Valve remains in Annunciator Alarm EFW Train A A single (1 of 2) train would no For all flows throughDeenergize Closed Position available longer be able to perform its cavitating venturidesign functions. The affectedtrain s flow would bea pproximately 75% of design.100% design flows are typicallynecessary only early in accidents.The train with the failure willregain the ability to fully mitigatelater in the accident scenario.157.0 DPDP-5B Blown Fuse Electrical Failure Loss of Automatic Periodic Test EFW Train A A single (1 of 2) train would no For all flows throughClose of EFV-1 80 available longer be able to perform its cavitating venturidesign functions. The affectedEFV-180 Opens train s flow would beapproximately 75% of design.100% design flows are typicallynecessary only early in accidents.The train with the failure willregain the ability to fully mitigatelater in the accident scenario.(1) "a" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >350 GPM"b" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM increasing"c" denotes flow through the cavitating venturi of >250 GPM <350 GPM decreasing
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