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{{Adams
#REDIRECT [[3F0811-01, Response to Request for Additional Information to Support NRC Instrumentation and Controls Branch Acceptance Review of the CR-3 Extended Power Uprate LAR]]
| number = ML11234A427
| issue date = 08/18/2011
| title = Crystal River Unit 3 - Response to Request for Additional Information to Support NRC Instrumentation and Controls Branch Acceptance Review of the CR-3 Extended Power Uprate LAR
| author name = Swartz J
| author affiliation = Florida Power Corp, Progress Energy Co
| addressee name =
| addressee affiliation = NRC/Document Control Desk, NRC/NRR
| docket = 05000302
| license number = DPR-072
| contact person =
| case reference number = 3F0811-01, TAC ME6527
| document type = Letter, Technical Specifications
| page count = 91
| project = TAC:ME6527
| stage = Response to RAI
}}
 
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:aProgress EnergyCrystal River Nuclear PlantDocket No. 50-302Operating License No. DPR-72August 18, 20113F081 1-01U.S. Nuclear Regulatory CommissionAttn: Document Control DeskWashington, DC 20555-0001Subject: Crystal River Unit 3 -Response to Request for Additional Information to SupportNRC Instrumentation and Controls Branch Acceptance Review of the CR-3Extended Power Uprate LAR (TAC No. ME6527)References: 1. CR-3 to NRC letter dated June 15, 2011, "Crystal River Unit 3 -LicenseAmendment Request #309, Revision 0, Extended Power Uprate" (AccessionNo. ML112070659)2. Email from S. Lingam (NRC) to D. Westcott (CR-3) dated July 19, 2011,"Crystal River, Unit 3 EPU LAR -RAIs from Instrumentation and ControlsBranch (EICB)"Dear Sir:By letter dated June 15, 2011, Florida Power Corporation (FPC), doing business as ProgressEnergy Florida, Inc., requested a license amendment to increase the rated thermal power level ofCrystal River Unit 3 (CR-3) from 2609 megawatts (MWt) to 3014 MWt. The proposed licenseamendment is considered an Extended Power Uprate (EPU). On July 19, 2011, via electronicmail, the NRC provided a request for additional information (RAI) related to the new InadequateCore Cooling Monitoring System (ICCMS), new Fast Cooldown System (FCS), and the newAtmospheric Dump Valves (ADVs) needed to support the Instrumentation and Controls Branchacceptance review of the CR-3 EPU License Amendment Request (LAR).Attachment A to this submittal, "Response to Request for Additional Information to SupportNRC Instrumentation and Controls Branch Acceptance Review of the CR-3 EPU LAR,"provides the CR-3 formal response to the RAI.In support of the EPU acceptance review RAI responses, four enclosures are provided.Enclosure 1, "Markup of Proposed ITS 3.3.19, Inadequate Core Cooling Monitoring SystemInstrumentation, and Associated Bases," provides proposed changes to the new ICCMSImproved Technical Specifications (ITS) and associated Bases to include ICCMS instrumentAllowable Values. Enclosure 2, "ICCMS Instrumentation Setpoint Methodology and SummaryCalculations," provides the setpoint methodology and summary calculations associated with thenew ICCMS consistent with the guidance of Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF)Traveler -493, "Clarify Application of Setpoint Methodology for LSSS Functions." Enclosure3, "IEEE 603-1991 and IEEE 279-1971 Compliance Matrix," provides a summary of how theICCMS, FCS, ADVs, and affected portions of the Emergency Feedwater Initiation and ControlSystem will meet applicable clauses of IEEE 603-1991 and IEEE 279-1971. Enclosure 4,Progress Energy Florida, Inc.Crystal River Nuclear Plant15760 W. Powerline Street AD,)Crystal River, FL 34428 _
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 of 33F081 1-01"ICCMS Simplified Schematic and Control Logic Diagrams," provides simplified schematic andcontrol logic diagrams associated with the new ICCMS.This correspondence contains no new regulatory commitments.The information provided by this response letter does not change the intent or the justificationfor the requested EPU license amendment. FPC has determined that this supplement does notaffect the basis for concluding that the proposed license amendment does not involve aSignificant Hazards Consideration. As such, the 10 CFR 50.92 evaluation provided in the June15, 2011 submittal remains valid.If you have any questions regarding this submittal, please contact Mr. Dan Westcott,Superintendent, Licensing and Regulatory Programs at (352) 563-4796.Sincerely,Jeffrey SwartzDirector-Site OperationsCrystal River Nuclear PlantJS/gweAttachment:.A. Response to Request for Additional Information to Support NRC Instrumentation andControls Branch Acceptance Review of the CR-3 EPU LAREnclosures:1. Markup of Proposed ITS 3.3.19, Inadequate Core Cooling Monitoring SystemInstrumentation, and Associated Bases2. ICCMS Instrumentation Setpoint Methodology and Summary Calculations3. IEEE 603-1991 and IEEE 279-1971 Compliance Matrix4. ICCMS Simplified Schematic and Control Logic Diagramsxc: NRR Project ManagerRegional Administrator, Region IISenior Resident InspectorState Contact U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 3 of 33F081 1-01STATE OF FLORIDACOUNTY OF CITRUSJeffrey Swartz states that he is the Director-Site Operations, Crystal River Nuclear Plantfor Florida Power Corporation, doing business as Progress Energy Florida, Inc.; that he isauthorized on the part of said company to sign and file with the Nuclear Regulatory Commissionthe information attached hereto; and that all such statements made and matters set forth thereinare true and correct to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief.Jeffrey SwartzDirector-Site OperationsCrystal River Nuclear PlantThe foregoing document was acknowledged before me thisACA ___' __-I ,2011, by Jeffrey Swartz.!I day ofSignature of Notary PublicState of FloridaCAROLYN E. PORTMANNCommission # DD 937553Expires March 1, 2014d,)rd Thru Troy Fain Insurance 800-38537019(Print, type, or stamp CommissionedName of Notary Public)Personally /Known VProduced-OR- Identification FLORIDA POWER CORPORATIONCRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3DOCKET NUMBER 50-302 /LICENSE NUMBER DPR-72ATTACHMENT ARESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATIONTO SUPPORT NRC INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLSBRANCH ACCEPTANCE REVIEW OF THE CR-3 EPU LAR U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attachment A3F081 1-01 Page 1 of 6RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION TOSUPPORT NRC INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS BRANCHACCEPTANCE REVIEW OF THE CR-3 EPU LARBy letter dated June 15, 2011, Florida Power Corporation (FPC), doing business as ProgressEnergy Florida, Inc., requested a license amendment to increase the rated thermal power level ofCrystal River Unit 3 (CR-3) from 2609 megawatts (MWt) to 3014 MWt. The proposed licenseamendment is considered an Extended Power Uprate (EPU). On July 19, 2011, via electronicmail, the NRC provided a request for additional information (RAI) related to the new InadequateCore Cooling Monitoring System (ICCMS), new Fast Cooldown System (FCS), and the newAtmospheric Dump Valves (ADVs) needed to support the Instrumentation and Controls Branchacceptance review of the CR-3 EPU License Amendment Request (LAR).NRC Request for Additional InformationWe need the responses for the following RAIs. Please note that RAI responses for 1 thru 4 arerequired for our acceptance review, and therefore, need your immediate attention.1. LAR Attachment 2, Table 3.3.19-1, "Inadequate Core Cooling Monitoring System(ICCMS) Instrumentation" (Pages 3.3-48 and 3.3.49) and Table 3.3.20-1, "InadequateCore Cooling Monitoring System Automatic Actuation Logic" do not list AllowableValues or Limiting Trip Setpoints. Provide Allowable values and/or Limiting TripSetpoints for each FUNCTION in these two Tables, or provide your justification for notlisting these values.2. TSTF-493, Option A "with changes to setpoint values" requires the licensee to providesummary calculations for each type of setpoint being revised, including Limiting TripSetpoint (LTSP), Nominal Trip Setpoint (NTSP), Allowable Value (AV), As-FoundTolerance (AFT), and As-Left Tolerance (ALT). Provide all these values and analyticalsafety limit value for each revised setpoint listed in Table 3.3.19-1, and Table 3.3.20-1(the NRC staff prefers a table of values of all above variables for each LSSS setpoint).Also describe how these values were determined including examples and/or diagrams tosupport the determination.3. The application did not describe how the new ICCMS, FCS, ADVs, and EmergencyFeedwater Initiation and Control (EFIC) meet NRC's requirements for safety systemsdescribed in 10 CFR 50.55a(h), which endorses IEEE Standards 279, "Criteria forProtection Systems for Nuclear power Generating Stations," and 603-1991, "Criteria forSafety Systems for Nuclear power Generating Stations." Describe how these systemsmeet each applicable clause of the applicable industry standard, as well as all otherregulatory requirements.4. Provide instrument loop schematic diagrams and control logic diagrams includingsufficient information to show the input, output parameter signal logic flow, and bistabledevices which implement the setpoints for each FUNCTION of ICCMS to support thesafety evaluation.
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attachment A3F081 1-01 Page 2 of 6CR-3 Responses:1. LAR Attachment 2, Table 3.3.19-1, "Inadequate Core Cooling Monitoring System(ICCMS) Instrumentation" (Pages 3.3-48 and 3.3.49) and Table 3.3.20-1,"Inadequate Core Cooling Monitoring System Automatic Actuation Logic" do notlist Allowable Values or Limiting Trip Setpoints. Provide Allowable values and/orLimiting Trip Setpoints for each FUNCTION in these two Tables, or provide yourjustification for not listing these values.As described in Attachment 1, "Description of Proposed Change, Background,Justification for the Request, Determination of No Significant Hazards Considerations,"of the CR-3 EPU LAR (Reference 1), the ICCMS monitors specific parameters; HighPressure Injection (HPI) System flow, Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure, and coreexit thermocouples (CETs). The ICCMS automatically trips the reactor coolant pumps(RCPs) and automatically adjusts the steam generator secondary side water level controlsetting to the inadequate subcooling margin (SCM) level when inadequate SCM iscoincident with a reactor trip signal. Also, when a loss of SCM occurs concurrent withinadequate HPI flow and a reactor trip, the ICCMS automatically initiates the FCS whichopens both ADVs to ensure sufficient core cooling during certain spectra of loss ofcoolant accidents. Core degrees of subcooling is compared to a reference curve of incoretemperature versus RCS pressure to determine if a loss of SCM exists. Total HPI flow iscompared to a reference curve of minimum HPI flow versus RCS pressure to determineinadequate HPI flow.ITS 3.3.19, ICCMS InstrumentationThe only ICCMS instrument functions listed in Improved Technical Specifications (ITS)Table 3.3.19-1 that provide an initiation channel trip are Loss of Subcooling MarginFunction (Functions 1.e, 2.d, and 3.d) and Inadequate HPI Flow Function (Function 1.f).All other instrument functions listed in ITS Table 3.3.19-1 are instrument inputs to eitherthe Loss of Subcooling Margin Function or the Inadequate HPI Flow Function and haveno trip settings. Additionally, the trip setting values associated with the Loss ofSubcooling Margin and Inadequate HPI Flow Functions are a function of generatedcurves and thus do not have discrete instrument Allowable Values analogous to the RCSVariable Low Pressure Allowable Value in the Reactor Protection System TechnicalSpecification (Reference 2). As a result, an Allowable Value column is not included inITS Table 3.3.19-1.Enclosure 1 provides changes to the new ICCMS instrumentation Technical Specificationand associated Bases proposed in the CR-3 EPU LAR (Reference 1). SR 3.3.19.3 ismodified and two new figures are added to indicate the Allowable Values associated withthe Loss of Subcooling Margin and Inadequate HPI Flow Functions. Enclosure Iincludes a markup of the affected ITS 3.3.19 pages and affected Bases pages of ITSB 3.3.19.ITS 3.3.20, ICCMS Automatic Actuation LogicConsistent with the instrumentation presentation in NUREG-1430, "Standard TechnicalSpecifications Babcock and Wilcox Plants" (Reference 3), ICCMS instrumentationrequirements are covered by two specifications. ITS 3.3.19 provides requirements for the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attachment A3F0811-01 Page 3 of 6ICCMS initiation channels and ITS 3.3.20 provides requirements for the ICCMSactuation logic. The ICCMS automatic actuation logic consists of analog relays andcontacts which do not have discrete setpoints (i.e., logic trains are either tripped oruntripped). As a result, no Allowable Values or trip setpoints are provided in ITS 3.3.20.This is consistent with CR-3 ITS 3.3.7, "Engineered Safeguards Actuation System(ESAS) Automatic Actuation Logic," and ITS 3.3.13, "EFIC Automatic ActuationLogic" (Reference 2).2. TSTF-493, Option A "with changes to setpoint values" requires the licensee toprovide summary calculations for each type of setpoint being revised, includingLimiting Trip Setpoint (LTSP), Nominal Trip Setpoint (NTSP), Allowable Value(AV), As-Found Tolerance (AFT), and As-Left Tolerance (ALT). Provide all thesevalues and analytical safety limit value for each revised setpoint listed in Table3.3.19-1, and Table 3.3.20-1 (the NRC staff prefers a table of values of all abovevariables for each LSSS setpoint). Also describe how these values were determinedincluding examples and/or diagrams to support the determination.The only ICCMS instrument functions with Limiting Safety System Setting (LSSS) tripsetpoint values are Loss of Subcooling Margin Function (Functions 1 .e, 2.d, and 3.d) andInadequate HPI Flow Function (Function 1.f). All other instrument functions listed inITS Table 3.3.19-1 are instrument inputs to either the Loss of Subcooling MarginFunction or the Inadequate HPI Flow Function. Also, ITS 3.3.20 provides requirementsfor the ICCMS actuation logic. The ICCMS automatic actuation logic does not havediscrete setpoints (i.e., logic trains are either tripped or untripped). As a result, setpointcalculations are required to support only the Loss of Subcooling Margin and InadequateHPI Flow Functions listed in ITS Table 3.3.19-1.The proposed ICCMS instrumentation Channel Calibration requirement, SR 3.3.19.3, andassociated Notes (Reference 1, Attachment 2) require measurement errors and bistablesetpoint errors to be within the assumptions of the ICCMS instrumentation calculations,and the Channel Calibrations must also be performed consistent with the assumptions ofthe safety analyses in which the ICCMS Functions are assumed. These Notes areconsistent with Notes (f) and (g) in CR-3 ITS Table 3.3.1-1, "Reactor Protection SystemInstrumentation," (Reference 2) and the guidance provided in Technical SpecificationTask Force (TSTF) Traveler -493, "Clarify Application of Setpoint Methodology forLSSS Functions," (Reference 4).Currently, the overall methodology used for safety-related instruments at CR-3 isdescribed in CR-3 plant procedure ICDC-1, "I&C Design Criteria for Instrument LoopUncertainty Calculations," (Reference 5). The existing RCS pressure input parameter iscurrently calibrated using Category A methodology, which is the most stringent methoddefined in ICDC-1 and meets the 95/95 tolerance limit as identified in Regulatory Guide1.105, "Setpoints for Safety-Related Instrumentation," (Reference 6). A copy of thiscalculation is provided in Attachment 8, "Sample Instrumentation Setpoint Calculation,"of the CR-3 EPU LAR (Reference 1). Calibrating the new ICCMS input parametersusing this methodology ensures the generated curves for the Loss of Subcooling Marginand Inadequate HPI Flow Functions are within the required As-Left Tolerance (ALT).An overall summary of the methodology of calibrating the ICCMS instrumentation isprovided in Enclosure 2, "ICCMS Instrumentation Setpoint Methodology and Summary U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attachment A3F081 1-01 Page 4 of 6Calculations." Enclosure 2 includes summary calculations associated with the Loss ofSubcooling Margin and Inadequate HPI Flow Functions. Each summary calculationprovides a table indicating the Nominal Trip Setpoint/Limiting Trip Setpoint, AllowableValue, As-Found Tolerance, ALT and a description of how these values are determined.Enclosure 2 also includes the analytical limit curves assumed in the safety analyses forminimum subcooling margin and minimum required HPI System flow.The new ICCMS design is being developed in accordance with the CR-3 engineeringchange (EC) process, with the conceptual design phase complete. Initial instrumentcalculations for the Loss of Subcooling Margin and Inadequate HPI Flow Functionsrequired by ITS 3.3.19 have been established. Final instrument calculations will becompleted during finalization of the ICCMS plant modification. The final calculationswill preserve the Allowable Value established in the initial calculations. Further, CR-3provides a commitment, as stated in the List of Regulatory Commitments of the CR-3EPU LAR (Reference 1, Attachment 10), to implement EPU modifications prior toexceeding 2609 MWt. This includes installation of the ICCMS modification andcalibration and testing of the ICCMS instrumentation in accordance with the ProgressEnergy design control processes.3. The application did not describe how the new ICCMS, FCS, ADVs, and EmergencyFeedwater Initiation and Control (EFIC) meet NRC's requirements for safetysystems described in 10 CFR 50.55a(h), which endorses IEEE Standards 279,"Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuclear power Generating Stations," and 603-1991, "Criteria for Safety Systems for Nuclear power Generating Stations."Describe how these systems meet each applicable clause of the applicable industrystandard, as well as all other regulatory requirements.The CR-3 Final Safety Analysis Report Section 7.2.4 (Reference 7) states the EFICSystem meets the requirements of IEEE 279-1971 as required by NUREG-0737, ItemII.E.1.2. As stated in CR-3 EPU LAR Section 2.4.2.2, "Emergency Feedwater Initiationand Control (EFIC)," the EFIC pressure control circuitry is being modified to add thenew safety-related FCS function for mitigating specific small break loss of coolantaccidents (LOCAs) concurrent with inadequate HPI System flow. With the exception ofthe automatic transfer relaying scheme, the FCS function is separate from andindependent of the EFIC System. No revision to the EFIC instrumentation requirementsof CR-3 ITS 3.3.11, "Emergency Feedwater Initiation and Control SystemInstrumentation," (Reference 2) are required for EPU. Based on analysis, the controlactions of the EFIC System will support the EPU. As a result, the EFIC Systemcontinues to meet applicable industry standards and other regulatory requirements asspecified by the CR-3 current licensing and design basis.The new ICCMS, FCS, ADVs, and affected portions of the EFIC System (e.g., automatictransfer relaying scheme) are currently being designed in accordance with the CR-3 ECprocess, with the conceptual design phase complete. The CR-3 EC process requires newsafety-related systems be designed and installed in accordance with applicable industrycodes and standards and other regulatory requirements as specified by the CR-3 current U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attachment A3F081 1-01 Page 5 of 6licensing and design basis. As indicated in Appendix E, Enclosure 3 of the CR-3 EPULAR (Reference 1, Attachment 7), the ICCMS is classified as a Class 1 E, safety-relatedprotection system, meeting the requirements of IEEE-603 and IEEE-279. The FCS andADVs are also considered safety-related systems/components and are beingdesigned/modified to meet the applicable industry codes and standards and otherregulatory requirements as specified by the CR-3 current licensing and design basis inaccordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(h)(2). The design specifications for the ICCMS, FCS,ADVs and affected portions of the EFIC System provide industry codes, standards, andregulatory requirements applicable to the design of each of these systems, including howthese systems meet the relevant clauses of these documents. Enclosure 3, "IEEE 603-1991 and IEEE 279-1971 Compliance Matrix," provides a summary of how the ICCMSand FCS, including the protective system portions of the ADVs and affected portions ofthe EFIC System, will meet each applicable clause of IEEE 603-1991 and IEEE 279-1971. For clauses not met, the matrix identifies the CR-3 licensing basis alternative inaccordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(h)(2). As stated in the List of Regulatory Commitmentsof the CR 3 EPU LAR (Reference 1, Attachment 10), EPU modifications will be installedprior to exceeding 2609 MWt. This includes installation of the ICCMS, FCS, and ADVmodifications in accordance with the applicable industry codes and standards and otherregulatory requirements as specified by the CR-3 current licensing and design basis.4. Provide instrument loop schematic diagrams and control logic diagrams includingsufficient information to show the input, output parameter signal logic flow, andbistable devices which implement the setpoints for each FUNCTION of ICCMS tosupport the safety evaluation.Enclosure 4, "ICCMS Simplified Schematic and Control Logic Diagrams," providessimplified schematic diagrams showing the ICCMS input instruments (i.e., HPI flow,RCS pressure, and CETs), reactor trip status input, ICCMS initiation channel strings -including Loss of Subcooling Margin and Inadequate HPI Flow modules, ICCMS logictrains, and output logic flow to the actuated devices.ReferencesI1. CR-3 to NRC letter dated June 15, 2011, "Crystal River Unit 3 -License AmendmentRequest #309, Revision 0, Extended Power Uprate." (Accession No. ML1 12070659)2. Crystal River Unit 3 Improved Technical Specifications, Through Amendment 238.3. NUREG-1430, "Standard Technical Specifications Babcock and Wilcox Plants,"Revision 3.4. Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) Traveler -493, "Clarify Application ofSetpoint Methodology for LSSS Functions," Revision 4.
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission3F081 1-01Attachment APage 6 of 65. CR-3 plant procedure ICDC-1, "I&C Design Criteria for Instrument Loop UncertaintyCalculations," Revision 4.6. NRC Regulatory Guide 1.105, "Setpoints for Safety-Related Instrumentation," Revision 3,December 1999.7. Final Safety Analysis Report, Progress Energy Florida, Crystal River Unit 3, Revision 32.1.
FLORIDA POWER CORPORATIONCRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3DOCKET NUMBER 50-302 /LICENSE NUMBER DPR-72ENCLOSURE 1MARKUP OF PROPOSED ITS 3.3.19, INADEQUATE CORECOOLING MONITORING SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION,AND ASSOCIATED BASES ICCMS Instrumentation3.3.19SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)SURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR 3.3.19.3----------------NOTES----------------1. If the as-found channel setpoint isconservative, but outside its predefinedas-found acceptancecriteria band, then the channel should beevaluated to verify that it is functioningas required before returning the channelto service. If the as-found instrumentchannel is not conservative, the channelshall be declared inoperable.2. The instrument channel shall be reset towithin, or more conservative than, thepre-established as-left tolerance:otherwise the channel shall not bereturned to OPERABLE status. Thepre-established tolerance and methodologyused to determine the predefined as-foundand as-left acceptance criteria arespecified in the FSAR.Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION.024 months'The Allowable Value shall be:a. Loss of Subcooling Margin Function: within the Acceptable Region specified in Figure 3.3.19-1; andb. Inadequate HPI Flow Function: within the Acceptable Region specified in Figure 3.3.19-2......... .............I -....I * * * *. ...............* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *Crystal River Unit 33.3-47Amendment No.
ICCMS Instrumentation3.3.19LZDUU:200,0.1500'0(010000Acceptale R'egionTIT F4250- 3O :350 400 450 500 550: 600 650In Core Temperature (TF)Figure 3.3.19-1 (page 1 of 1)Loss of Subcooling Margin Allowable ValueCrystal River Unit 33.3-50Amendment No.
ICCMS Instrumentation3.3.19C)C,,-U0U)U)C-oU)(0250. 1300 350 400 450 500 ,550600 :Total H PI Fow- (gpm)Figure 3.3.19-2 (page 1 of 1)Inadequate HPI Flow Allowable ValueCrystal River Unit 33.3-51Amendment No.
ICCMS InstrumentationB 3.3.19BASESLCO 1.c. 2.b. 3.b Reactor Coolant Pressure -Wide Range(continued)channel includes a sensor, function generator, andassociated analog modules. The analog and bistableportions of each pressure channel are ICCMS initiationchannel specific.Therefore, failure of one channel renders one channelof the Reactor Coolant Pressure -Wide Range in oneICCMS initiation channel inoperable to each ICCMSactuation logic train.Reactor Coolant Pressure -Wide Range Function isautomatically selected when RCS pressure is> 500 psig. To ensure the Reactor Coolant Pressure -Wide Range Function is not bypassed when required tobe OPERABLE by the safety analysis, each channel isrequired to be capable of automatically enabling onincreasing RCS pressure when below the enablingsetpoint.1.d. 2.c. 3.c Core Exit Thermocouples (CETs)One of two channels per core quadrant of CETs isrequired to be OPERABLE per ICCMS initiation channel.Each CET channel includes a sensor, temperaturetransmitter, and associated analog modules. Each CETchannel is ICCMS initiation channel specific.Therefore, failure of one required CET in a corequadrant renders one required channel in one ICCMSinitiation channel inoperable to each ICCMS actuationlogic train.i.e. 2.d. 3.d Loss of Subcooling MarginOne channel of Loss of Subcooling Margin is requiredto be OPERABLE per ICCMS initiation channel. Inputsare provided from the CETs and RCS pressureinstruments. Actual saturation temperature iscompared to a reference saturation temperature curveto determine a loss of subcooling margin. Each Lossof Subcooling Margin channel includes a comparator,function generator, and associated analog modules.Failure of one channel renders one ICCMS initiationchannel inoperable to each ICCMS actuation logictrain.Crvstal River Unit 3 B 3.-1-7 Revision Nn XX Insert B 3.3.19-1The Loss of Subcooling Margin Allowable Value is specified in Figure 3.3.19-1 and was selectedto be conservative enough to detect a loss of subcooling margin thus ensuring the reactorcoolant pumps trip will before reaching two phase conditions within the RCS during LOCAs withloss of offsite power available. The Allowable Value includes severe environment induced errorsbecause ICCMS input sensors and associated instrumentation (e.g., RCS pressure sensors andtransmitters) must function in a harsh environment as defined in 10 CFR 50.49 (Ref. 4).
ICCMS InstrumentationB 3.3.19BASESLCO 1.f Inadequate HPI Flow(continued)One channel of Inadequate HPI Flow is required to beOPERABLE per ICCMS initiation channel of the FCSActuation Function. The total HPI flow input iscompared to a generated curve of HPI flow versus RCSPressure to determine inadequate HPI flow. EachInadequate HPI Flow channel includes an actual HPIflow input, reference RCS pressure input, comparator,function generator, and associated analog modules.Failure of one channel renders one ICCMS initiationchannel inoperable to each FCS actuation logic train.1.g. 2.e. 3.e Reactor Trip Status InsertB3.3.19-2Six channels of Reactor Trip Status are required to beOPERABLE per ICCMS initiation channel. Each ReactorTrip Status channel includes an auxiliary contact andassociated analog modules. Each ICCMS initiationchannel receives six independent auxiliary contactsfrom the CRD trip breakers. Therefore, the auxiliarycontacts of the Reactor Trip Status Function channelsare ICCMS initiation channel specific. Failure of anauxiliary contact renders one Reactor Trip StatusFunction channel in one ICCMS initiation channelinoperable.APPLICABILITY The ICCMS instrumentation channels are applicable asspecified in Table 3.3.19-1.FCS Actuation FunctionsThe ICCMS instrumentation required to actuate FCSshall be OPERABLE with THERMAL POWER > 2609 MWt. TheFCS and operation of the ADVs are assumed with THERMALPOWER > 2609 MWt. With THERMAL POWER < 2609 MWt, theECCS provides sufficient core cooling during a smallbreak LOCA assuming a single failure of one HPIsubsystem without the need for the FCS function of theADVs.RCP Trip FunctionsThe ICCMS instrumentation required to trip the RCPsshall be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 to minimize therate of inventory loss which would reduce the time tothe core becoming uncovered during a LOCA.Crystal River Unit 3B 3.3-158Revision No. XX Insert B 3.3.19-2The Inadequate HPI Flow Allowable Value is specified in Figure 3.3.19-2 and was selected tobe conservative enough to ensure adequate HPI flow is available during a SBLOCA. TheAllowable Value includes severe environment induced errors because ICCMS input sensors andassociated instrumentation (e.g., RCS pressure sensors and transmitters) must function in aharsh environment as defined in 10 CFR 50.49 (Ref. 4).
ICCMS InstrumentationB 3.3.19BASESSURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.19.3 (continued)REQUIREMENTSinstrument calculations. The purpose of theassessment is to ensure confidence in the channelperformance prior to returning the channel to service.For channels determined to be OPERABLE but degradedafter returning the channel to service, theperformance of these channels will be evaluated underthe plant Corrective Action Program (CAP). Entry intothe CAP will ensure required review and documentationof the condition.The second Note requires the as-left setting for thechannel be returned to within, or more conservativethan, the pre-established as-left tolerance. Where asetpoint more conservative than the pre-establishedas-left tolerance is used in the plant surveillanceprocedures, the as-left and as-found tolerances, asapplicable will be applied to the surveillanceprocedure setpoint. This will ensure that sufficientmargin to the Safety Limit and/or Analytical Limit ismaintained. If the as-left channel setting cannot bereturned to a setting within the pre-established as-left tolerance, then the channel shall be declaredinoperable. The second Note also requires thepre-established tolerance and the methodologies forcalculating the as-left and the as-found tolerances bein the FSAR (Ref. 1).REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Section [7.3.4].2. CR-3 EPU Technical Report, Section 2.8.5.6.3.3. FSAR, Chapter 14.2.2.4. 10 FR 5049.Crystal River Unit 3B 3. 3-164Revision No. XX FLORIDA POWER CORPORATIONCRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3DOCKET NUMBER 50-302 /LICENSE NUMBER DPR-72ENCLOSURE 2ICCMS INSTRUMENTATION SETPOINT METHODOLOGYAND SUMMARY CALCULATIONS U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Enclosure 23F081 1-01 Page 1 of 15ICCMS INSTRUMENTATION SETPOINT METHODOLOGYAND SUMMARY CALCULATIONS1.0 INTRODUCTIONThe purpose of this document is to provide a summary description of the Crystal River Unit 3 (CR-3)setpoint methodology used to determine the Limiting Trip Setpoint (LTSP), Nominal Trip Setpoint (NTSP),Allowable Value (AV), As-Found Tolerance (AFT), and As-Left Tolerance (ALT) for the Loss ofSubcooling Margin and Inadequate HPI Flow Functions of the Inadequate Core Cooling MonitoringSystem (ICCMS) in support of the CR-3 Extended Power Uprate (EPU) Project.The new CR-3 Improved Technical Specification (ITS) 3.3.19, "Inadequate Core Cooling MonitoringSystem (ICCMS) Instrumentation," ensures that adequate core protection is provided for a specific rangeof small break loss of coolant accidents (LOCAs). The ICCMS detects a loss of SCM and initiatesmitigation functions based on this condition. The ICCMS also detects inadequate high pressure injection(HPI) flow and initiates a mitigation function based on this condition. As a result, these functions, Loss ofSubcooling Margin and Inadequate HPI Flow Functions, are the only ICCMS instrument functions withLimiting Safety System Setting trip setpoint values. All other instrument functions listed in ITS Table3.3.19-1 are instrument inputs to either the Loss of Subcooling Margin Function or the Inadequate HPIFlow Function.The ICCMS consists of three initiation channels which provide input to two actuation logic trains. Eachactuation logic train is initiated by two-out-of-three ICCMS initiation channels. Either actuation logic traininitiates the associated equipment. The input parameters are processed in the ICCMS circuitry todetermine subcooling margin and HPI flow margin.Each ICCMS initiation channel receives input from the core exit thermocouples and Reactor CoolantSystem (RCS) pressure instruments to determine if a loss of subcooling margin (SCM) exists. Wheninadequate SCM is coincident with a reactor trip signal, each ICCMS initiation channel will generate aloss of SCM signal.Additionally, each ICCMS initiation channel receives HPI System flow input from each of the four HPISystem injection lines. The four signals are summed and the total HPI flow is provided to determineinadequate HPI flow. Upon a sustained loss of SCM coincident with a reactor trip signal and inadequateHPI flow, each ICCMS initiation channel will generate a trip signal.The following are simplified block diagrams of the ICCMS instrument loops indicating the inputparameters associated with the Loss of Subcooling Margin and Inadequate HPI Flow Functions.1.1 Instrument LoopsLoss of Subcooling Margin8 Core Exit Thermocouples ICCMS channels each calculateSubcooling Margin based on selectingthe highest Core Exit Thermocouple.Wide Range orLowRanAbove 500 psig, Wide Range RCSWide Range or Low Range RCS Pressure is selected and below 500Pressure J psig, Low Range RCS Pressure isselected.Inadequate HPI FlowFour HPI Flow Transmitters -one on ICCMS channels each calculate HPIeach injection line Flow Margin. The four HPI flowsignals are summed. Above 500 psig,Wide Range or Low Range RCS 1 Wide Range RCS Pressure isPressure selected and below 500 psig, LowRange RC;,S Pressure is selected.
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Enclosure 23F081 1-01 Page 2 of 152.0 SETPOINT METHODOLOGYThe CR-3 setpoint methodology is described in CR-3 plant procedure ICDC-1, "I&C Design Criteria forInstrument Loop Uncertainty Calculations," (Reference 1). Per ICDC-1, the CR-3 setpoint programestablishes four category levels with Category A being the most stringent. Category A calculations areconsistent with the calculation methodology of ISA-$67.04, Part I, "Setpoints for Nuclear Safety-RelatedInstrumentation," (Reference 2) and ISA-RP67.04, Part II, "Methodologies for the Determination ofSetpoints for Nuclear Safety-Related Instrumentation," (Reference 3) and meet the 95/95 tolerance limitas identified in Regulatory Guide 1.105, "Setpoints for Safety-Related Instrumentation," (Reference 4).At CR-3, Category A applies to, but is not limited to, the Reactor Protection System, EmergencyFeedwater Initiation and Control System and Engineered Safeguards Actuation System instrumentationcalculations.The ICCMS instrumentation calculations associated with the Loss of Subcooling Margin and InadequateHPI Flow Functions utilize ICDC-1 Category A setpoint methodology. The ICCMS instrument setpointsare derived from the safety analysis values (i.e., analytical limit) and are corrected for sources ofuncertainty as defined in ICDC-1 (Reference 1). The methodology used for combining uncertainties forCR-3 Technical Specification setpoints utilizes the Square Root of the Sum of the Squares (SRSS) takenat 2 sigma (Y) confidence level for random uncertainties and taken at 3Z confidence level for directsummation of systematic (correlated) uncertainties. The amount of uncertainty by which a setpoint candeviate from the Technical Specification setpoint is identified as allowable uncertainty. The field setting isthe Technical Specification setpoint offset by the allowable uncertainty.The instrument Calibrated Loop Error (CELOOP) is the overall instrument error and is used to determinesetpoints (NTSP and LTSP) and Allowable Values from the analytical limit or design limit. The followingalgebraic expression is used to determine the overall instrument error:CELOOP = +/- [(ELooP)2 +.(AFLOOP)2 ]1/2 +/- EBIAS +/- EPROCESSCalculated Loop Error (ELooP) is the instrument channel error, not taking into account calibration,drift, process errors and known biases. The following algebraic expression is used to determinethe calculated instrument channel error:ELooP = +/- [(Ecomp)2 + (EcoMP2) + (ECOMPN)2 ]1/2Component Error (EcoMp) is the SRSS of the errors associated with an individual component (i.e.,Reference Accuracy, Temperature Effect, etc.), with the exception of Drift.Bias Errors (EBIAS) are known biases that affect the operation of an instrument loop, such as staticpressure shifts, insulation resistance effects, etc.Process Errors (EPROCESS) are the errors that result from the range of process operation limits,based on the scaling of the sensing instruments. These errors include either normal or accidentconditions.The ALT or Calibration Tolerance (ALLooP) is the tolerance to which an instrument channel loop is leftafter calibration. This term is determined from the Reference Accuracy (EREF) of the components. Thefollowing algebraic expression is used to determine the ALT:ALLOOP = +/- [(COMP1 -EREF)2 + (COMP2-EREF)2 + (COMPN-EREF)2]112The AFT (AFLooP) is the tolerance in which an instrument channel loop can be found after a period ofoperation, prior to calibration. This term includes the errors due to M&TE and Drift/Stability. Thefollowing algebraic expression is used to determine the AFT:AFLOOP = + {ALT + [(MTELooP)2+ (SBLoop)2]12}
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Enclosure 23F081 1-01 Page 3 of 15Maintenance & Test Equipment (M&TE) error (MTELooP) consists of the errors due to the M&TEused in the calibration of the instrument loop.Stability/Drift (SBLooP) is the error due to the stability and drift of the components in the loop.The new instrument calculations use the existing AFT and ALT from instrument loop uncertaintycalculations associated with the existing ICCMS input instrumentation. The existing AFT and ALT arealso assumed for the new ICCMS input instrumentation. These instrument tolerances form the basis forthe AVs of the Loss of Subcooling Margin and Inadequate HPI Flow Margin Functions. Since thesummary calculations are bounding calculations for the ICCMS instrumentation and no plant-specificmargin has been added, the NTSP is equal to the LTSP. Future adjustments to these instrumentcalculations may be required as a result of instrument component changes. As a result, a lessconservative LTSP may be established thereby allowing for additional instrument margin being availableto maintain the trip setting at the existing NTSP. In this event, the NTSP may be more conservative thanthe LTSP. If the NTSP is set more conservative than the LTSP, the AFT and ALT will be maintainedaround the more conservative NTSP. For the purposes of this report, all references to the NTSP equateto the LTSP.The Allowable Value is the limiting value at which an instrument trip setting may be found, when testedperiodically, beyond which appropriate action must be taken. The Allowable Value is determined by theinstrument calculations considering the maximum possible value for process measurement at which theanalytical limit is protected. Maintaining the instrument channel within the Allowable Value ensures theanalytical limit and associated safety limit are protected. For the ICCMS instrumentation, the AFT for thebounding calculations is conservative and therefore, the Allowable Value is equal to the AFT on the non-conservative side of the LTSP. Future adjustments to these instrument calculations may also result in amore conservative AFT or NTSP. In this event, the AFT will be more conservative than the AllowableValue.The following provides a simplified visual presentation of the above terms consistent with the guidance ofRegulatory Guide 1.105 (Reference 4):Safety LimitAnalytical Limit Difference between Analytical Limit AL and NTSP is CELOOPCELOOP CELOOP = + [(ELooP)2 + (AFLOOP)2 ]112 +/- EBIAS +/- EpROCESSAllowable Value --------------------AFT+ALT+ ALT+ NOTE: The Allowable Value isNTSP LTSP equivalent to AFT on the non-ALT -ALT- conservative side of the NTSP.AFT- AFT-Normal Operating Point ------------3.0 SUMMARY OF ICCMS INSTRUMENT CALCULATIONSThe analytical limit for ICCMS is based on meeting the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) criteriato mitigate a small break LOCA as defined in 10 CFR 50.46, "Acceptance criteria for emergency corecooling systems for light-water nuclear power reactors." The ICCMS initiates the Fast Cooldown System(FCS) to support the ECCS meeting the 10 CFR 50.46 criteria. The calculations begin with theidentification of the analytical limits for Loss of Subcooling Margin and Inadequate HPI Flow Functionsand derive the Allowable Value settings based on these analytical limits.The analytical limit for the Inadequate HPI Flow Function is derived from small break LOCA analyseswhich determined the minimum required HPI flow, corrected for RCS pressure and HPI flow uncertainty.For the Loss of Subcooling Margin Function, the analytical limit is the TSAT curve defined in AmericanSociety of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Steam Tables (Reference 5).
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Enclosure 23F081 1-01 Page 4 of 153.1 Input Parameter Instrument CalculationsCurrent CR-3 approved instrument calculations provide the AFT and ALT for the RCS pressuretransmitters, HPI flow transmitters, and in-core thermocouples that provide input to the ICCMS fordetermination of a loss of SCM and inadequate HPI flow. These calculations were performed inaccordance with CR-3 plant procedure ICDC-1 setpoint methodology (Reference 1) and provide the AFT,ALT and CELOOP. ICCMS input parameter instrument calculations will be revised during finalization of theICCMS modification. If the final calculations result in larger values for AFT, ALT, or CELOOP, the NTSP willbe adjusted in the conservative direction maintaining the same Allowable Value.For calculation purposes, a 30-month interval is used to compute CELOOP to account for a surveillancefrequency interval of 24 months plus 25% as allowed by the CR-3 ITS.3.2 Calculation of Allowable Values for Loss of Subcoolinq FunctionA summary of the Loss of Subcooling Function initial instrument calculation is provided and a finalcalculation which will be completed during finalization of the ICCMS modification. The final calculationwill preserve the Allowable Value established in the initial calculation.The CELOOP from the input parameter instrument calculations are currently used to determine the displayerror for TSAT on the CR-3 Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS). The SPDS instrument calculationuses the Monte Carlo method to establish the TSAT display error and these display errors are used togenerate the curves for TSAT in the SPDS.The current SPDS instrument calculation lists 32 data points from the SCM curve; both temperature andpressure points. The calculation uses linear interpolation for intermediate values. The SCM data pointsand methods of interpolation are also used to determine the AFT and Allowable Value for the Loss ofSubcooling Margin Function. The following are the existing AFT and ALT from the existing SPDScalculation:Table 3.2-1, SPDS TolerancesCalculation Recall Points ALT AFTRCS Wide RangePressure Recall-4 and Recall-5 +/-11.3 psig ,+/-0.45% +/-25.8 psig, +/-1.03%TINCORE N/A +/-4.78F, +0. 19% +6.21'F, +0.25%The analytical limit is the TSAT curve as indicated in Figure 3.2-1 and is obtained from the ASME SteamTables. This ensures the reactor coolant pumps are tripped before reaching two phase conditions in theRCS during LOCAs with offsite power available. The Loss of Subcooling Function NTSP isconservatively established as the SCM curve from the SPDS instrument calculation as indicated onFigure 3.2-1. This SCM curve is obtained by calculating the total CELOOP and adding it to the TSAT curve.The AFT for the Loss of Subcooling Function is determined by using the AFT values from the RCSpressure and TINCORE instrumentation calibration tolerances listed in Table 3.2-1. Pressures (PNTSP) areselected from the data table in the current SPDS instrument calculation. The AL, AV, NTSP, AFT andALT are expressed in units of temperature.The Loss of Subcooling Allowable Value, in units of temperature, is obtained as follows:" Select a PNTSP from the SPDS data table (Table 3.2-3).* Add AFTPRESS (25.8 psig) to obtain PAy.* Using PAy perform linear interpolation to obtain associated temperature TA* Add AFTTEMP (6.21 'F) to TA to obtain TAV* The Allowable Value is TAV and is for a given pressure -PAv.
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission3F081 1-01Enclosure 2Page 5 of 15Example:PNTSP is 1967.3 psig. Add the AFT of 25.8 psig from Table 3.2-1 which results in 1993.1 psig.Linearly interpolate between T(N), P(N) and T(N+1), P(N+1) to obtain the temperature that corresponds to1993.1 psig. This is 612.48&deg;F. Add the AFT for the incore temperature (TINcORE) from the incorethermocouple loop accuracy calculation and listed in Table 3.2-1 which is 6.21'F.TAV = 612.48&deg;F + 6.21&deg;F = 618.69&deg;FT(N) is the NTSP = 610.58&deg;FAFT = 618.69&deg;F -NTSP = 618.69&deg;F -610.58&deg;F = 8.1 1&deg;FAllowable Value = 618.690FA similar method is used to obtain the ALT.* Select PNTSP from the SPDS data table (Table 3.2-3).* Add ALTPRESS (11.3 psig) to obtain PAy.* Using PAy perform linear interpolation to obtain associated temperature TA* Add ALTTEMP (4.780F) to TA to obtain ALTThe following table provides a list of results from the above Loss of Subcooling Function instrumentsetpoint methodology using selected RCS pressure values:Table 3.2-2SelectedPressure (psig) 650.00 887.30 1187.30 1587.30 1967.30 2500Analytical Limit(OF) 497.35 532.22 567.40 605.04 634.52 668.98AV (0F) 471.54 510.15 548.06 587.87 618.69 654.52NTSP (&deg;F) 460.53 500.30 539.00 579.41 610.58 646.66AFT (&deg;F) +/-11.01 +/-9.85 +9.06 +/-8.46 +/-8.11 +/-7.86ALT (OF) +/-6.88 +/-6.38 +/-6.03 +/-5.76 +/-5.61 +/-5.50The following is a summary table using the 32 data points from the SCM curve of the SDPS instrumentcalculation. These data points are provided in the NTSP columns. The AL pressures are also providedfrom the SPDS instrument calculation and the temperatures (TSAT) are from the ASME Steam Tables.The AV, AFT and ALT are generated using the methodology described above.Table 3.2-3Analytical Limit (AL) NTSP Allowable Value (AV) TolerancesNTSP NTSP Allowable Allowable AFT ALTPressure TSAT pressure temperature Value Value(psig) (OF) (psig) (OF) (psig) (OF) (OF) (OF)72.30 317.89 72.3 212.96 83.60 239.93 56.88 26.9791.16 331.96 91.16 250 102.46 267.70 35.71 17.70132.30 356.84 132.3 297.04 143.60 310.08 25.06 13.04172.30 376.21 172.3 326.27 183.60 337.19 20.23 10.92213.30 392.94 213.3 348.55 224.60 357.81 16.45 9.26259.30 409.12 259.3 366.8 270.60 375.29 14.68 8.49328.30 429.81 328.3 389.44 339.60 397.31 13.27 7.87397.30 447.50 397.3 408.31 408.60 415.70 12.18 7.39489.30 467.83 489.3 429.6 500.60 436.70 11.50 7.10535.30 476.94 535.3 439.03 546.60 445.94 11.06 6.91604.30 489.57 604.3 452.01 615.60 458.90 11.02 6.89650.00 497.35 650 460.53 661.30 467.41 11.01 6.88707.30 506.54 707.3 471.2 718.60 477.93 10.67 6.73767.30 515.60 767.3 481.57 778.60 488.17 10.36 6.60827.30 524.13 827.3 491.23 838.60 497.72 10.11 6.49 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission3F081 1-01Enclosure 2Page 6 of 15Analytical Limit (AL) NTSP Allowable Value (AV) TolerancesNTSP NTSP Allowable Allowable AFT ALTPressure TSAT pressure temperature Value Value(psig) (OF) (psig) (OF) (psig) (OF) (OF) (OF)887.30 532.22 887.3 500.3 898.60 506.68 9.85 6.38967.30 542.38 967.3 511.6 978.60 517.88 9.63 6.281027.30 549.60 1027.3 519.56 1038.60 525.76 9.44 6.201107.30 558.74 1107.3 529.58 1118.60 535.69 9.25 6.111187.30 567.40 1187.3 539 1198.60 545.03 9.06 6.031287.30 577.62 1287.3 550.06 1298.60 556.01 8.88 5.951387.30 587.26 1387.3 560.42 1398.60 566.30 8.73 5.881487.30 596.38 1487.3 570.18 1498.60 576.00 8.59 5.821587.30 605.04 1587.3 579.41 1598.60 585.17 8.46 5.761707.30 614.89 1707.3 589.87 1718.60 595.58 8.33 5.711825.00 624.05 1825 599.55 1836.30 605.21 8.21 5.661967.30 634.52 1967.3 610.58 1978.60 616.19 8.11 5.612068.14 641.58 2068.14 618 2079.44 623.57 8.00 5.572247.30 653.47 2247.3 630.46 2258.60 635.96 7.86 5.502500.00 668.98 2500 646.66 2511.30 652.16 7.86 5.50Figure 3.2-2 presents a graphical representation of the AL, AV and NTSP based on Table 3.2-3. Themargin between the AV and the NTSP is the AFT and this margin increases as the pressure andtemperature decrease.3.3 Calculation for HPI Flow MarginA summary of the Inadequate HPI Flow Function initial instrument calculation is provided and a finalcalculation which will be completed during finalization of the ICCMS modification. The final calculationwill preserve the Allowable Value established in the initial calculation.Conservative error corrected RCS pressure and total HPI flow were established in an analysis performedto determined the minimum required HPI flow for small break LOCAs at EPU conditions. The errorcorrections for RCS pressure and total HPI flow are 150 psig and 50 gpm, respectively, and areconservative and larger than the existing CELOOpfor both parameters. Figure 3.3-1 shows the minimumrequired HPI flow for small break LOCAs at EPU conditions. The following tables (Tables 3.3-1 and 3.3-2) provide a list indicating the relationship between RCS pressure and total HPI flow:Table 3.3-1Non-error Corrected -Analytical LimitRCS Total FlowPressure (gpm)(psig)0 608.5600 546.5900 511.71200 473.61500 431.21800 3832100 326.22400 254.4Table 3.3-2Error Corrected -NTSPRCS Total FlowPressure (gpm)(psig)150 658.5750 596.51050 561.71350 523.61650 481.21950 4332250 376.22550 304.4These cardinal points are used to establish values at a given total HPI flow. The non-error correctedpoints represent the minimum required HPI flow for small break LOCAs at EPU conditions and therefore U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Enclosure 23F081 1-01 Page7 of 15are considered the analytical limit. The error corrected points are considered the NTSP and arerepresented by the following algebraic expression:y = -0.0095 (x)2 + 2.4222 (x) + 2693 Equation 3.3-1where y corresponds to RCS Pressure and xcorresponds to total HPI flowThe following table provides the AFT and ALT values used in the existing CR-3 HPI System flow loopaccuracy instrument calculation:Table 3.3-3Calculation Recall Points ALT AFTRCS Wide RangePressure Recall-4 and Recall-5 +/-0.45%, +/-11.3 psig +/-1.03%, +/-25.8 psigHPI Flow Recall-260, 261, 262 +/-1.0 gpm +/-4.0 gpmand 263 (one transmitter) (one transmitter)A flow AFT associated with the Inadequate HPI Flow instrument loop is established by considering theAFT of 4 gpm from each HPI flow instrument loop and combining the individual loop AFTs using theSRSS method which yields; [(4.0)2 + (4.0)2 +(4.0)2 + (4.0)2]1/2 or +/-8 gpm.The pressure AFT associated with the Inadequate HPI Flow instrument loop is established by using atwo-step process and an input pressure AFT of 25.8 psig from the existing wide range RCS pressure loopaccuracy instrument calculation.Similarly, the Inadequate HPI flow instrument loop flow ALT is derived by using the SRSS method andyields +/-2.0 gpm. The Inadequate HPI flow instrument loop pressure ALT is derived from an inputpressure ALT of 11.3 psig from the existing wide range RCS pressure loop accuracy instrumentcalculation.To determine the Allowable Value a two step process is used. The Allowable Value, in units of pressure,is obtained as follows:* Select HPI flow from non-corrected error total HPI flow value data table (Table 3.3-1).* Add AFTHPI (8 gpm) to obtain FNEW.* Using Equation 3.3-1 obtain PNEW" Subtract AFTPRESS (25.8 psig) from PNEW to obtain the Allowable Value* The Allowable Value is for a given flow FAVExample:The overall HPI flow AFT of 8 gpm is added to the non-corrected error total HPI flow value (Table 3.3.1)as follows:473.6 gpm + 8 gpm = 481.6 gpmThe resulting HPI flow value is used to calculate a resulting RCS pressurey = -0.0095 *(481.6)2 + 2.4222"(481.6) + 2693y = 1656.12 psigThe RCS wide range pressure AFT of 25.8 psig is subtracted yielding:Allowable Value = 1656.12 -25.8 = 1630.32 psigThe overall Inadequate HPI Flow Function instrument loop pressure AFT is determined as follows:
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission3F081 1-01Enclosure 2Page 8 of 15For x = 473.6 gpmy = -0.0095 *(473.6)2 + 2.4222*(473.6) + 2693y = 1709.33 psig (PNTSP)AFT = PNTSP -PAV = 1709.33- 1630.32 psig = 79.02 psigTable 3.3-4Assumed HPITotal Flow(gpm) 546.50 511.70 473.60 431.20 383.00 326.20 254.40Analytical Limit(psig) 600 900 1200 1500 1800 2100 2400Allowable Value(psig) 1089.34 1360.18 1630.32 1898.51 2161.91 2415.65 2648.67NTSP/LTSP(psig) 1179.44 1444.99 1709.33 1971.08 2227.16 2472.26 2694.37AFT (psig) +/-90.10 +/-84.81 +/-79.02 +/-72.57 +/-65.25 +/-56.61 +/-45.70ALT (psig) +/-27.26 +/-25.94 +/-24.49 +/-22.88 +/-21.05 +/-18.89 +/-16.16To generate intermediate points, Excel 2007 was used to graph the selected pressure and AllowableValue temperatures as an X-Y scatter plot. A trend line was applied to the curve and a curve fit wasperformed for the Inadequate HPI flow Allowable Value and the following algebraic expression wasobtained:y = -0.0095*X2 + 2.2702*x + 2686Equation 3.3-2where x represents total HPI flowin gpm and y represents RCSpressure in psigThis curve closely matches the calculated Allowable Values at selected RCS pressures and is off-set byless than 0.1 psig as shown in Table 3.3-5:Table 3.3-5RCS Pressure Total HPI Flow ErrorAnalytical Limit Analytical Limit AV (psig) (psig) (Allowable Value(psig) (gpm) -Curve Fit)600 546.5 1089.34 1089.37 -0.03900 511.7 1360.18 1360.21 -0.031200 473.6 1630.32 1630.35 -0.031500 431.2 1898.51 1898.54 -0.031800 383 2161.91 2161.94 -0.032100 326.2 2415.65 2415.68 -0.032400 254.4 2648.67 2648.70 -0.03A curve fit was performed using Table 3.3-1 data from 600 psig to 2400 psig. 0 psig was not used sincethe small break LOCA analysis assumes FCS lowers and controls secondary pressure toapproximately 350 psig. The curve fit resulted in the following algebraic expression:y = -0.0095*X2 + 1.4755*x + 2639.5Equation 3.3-3A comparison of the errors in this curve fit with the points from the minimum HPI flow analysis for smallbreak LOCAs yield the following:
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission3F081 1-01Enclosure 2Page 9 of 15Table 3.3-6EPUAnalysis CurveFlow Points fit(gpm) (psig) (psig) Error608.5 0 19.76 -19.76546.5 600 608.57 -8.57511.7 900 907.06 -7.06473.6 1200 1207.48 -7.48431.2 1500 1509.37 -9.37383 1800 1811.07 -11.07326.2 2100 2109.95 -9.95254.4 2400 2400.03 -0.03As indicated by Table 3.3-6, the curve fit is conservative with respect to the minimum HPI flow analysisdata table because the curve fit predicts a higher pressure at all points.3.3.1 Summary of algorithms for the Inadequate HPI Flow FunctionAnalytical Limit: y = -0.0095*X2 + 1.4755*x + 2639.5Allowable Value: y = -0.0095 "X2+ 2.2702*x + 2686Equation 3.3-3Equation 3.3-2Equation 3.3-1NTSP:y = -0.0095 (x)2+ 2.4222 (x) + 2693where y corresponds to RCS Pressureand x corresponds to total HPI flowFigure 3.3-2 shows the resulting curves for the analytical limit, Allowable Value, and NTSP.4.0 RESULTS/CONCLUSIONS4.1 Loss of Subcooling Margin FunctionSelectedPressure 650 psig 887.30 psig 1187.30 psig 1587.30 psig 1967.30 psig 2500 psigAnalyticalLimit 497.35&deg;F 532.22&deg;F 567.40'F 605.04'F 634.52&deg;F 668.98&deg;FAllowableValue 471.54&deg;F 510.15'F 548.06'F 587.87&deg;F 618.69&deg;F 654.52&deg;FLTSP/NTSP 460.53&deg;F 500.30'F 539.00&deg;F 579.41'F 610.58&deg;F 646.66&deg;FAFT +/-11.01'F +/-9.85&deg;F +/-9.06'F +/-8.46&deg;F +/-8.11&deg;F +/-7.86&deg;FALT +/-6.88&deg;F +/-6.38&deg;F +/-6.03'F +/-5.56&deg;F +/-5.61 &deg;F +/-5.50'F U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission3F081 1-01Enclosure 2Page 10 of 15Safety LimitAnalytical LimitAllowable ValueALT +LTSP/NTSPALT -AFT-N/A605.04'F------ -----CELOOPDifference between Analytical Limit AL and NTSP isCELOOP.CELOOP = +/- [(ELooP)2+ (AFLOOP)2]112 + EBtAS +/- EPROCESS587.87&deg;F584.97&deg;F579.41 &deg;F573.85&deg;F570.95&deg;F-550'FNOTE: The Normal Operating Point isthe post reactor trip RCS temperature.For a normal trip -550'F is the NormalOperating Point.Normal Operating Point -----------------------All of the temperature data points in this graphical representation assume an RCS pressure of1587.30 psig.4.2 Inadequate HPI Flow MarginAssumed HPI 546.50 511.70 473.60 431.20 383.00 326.20 254.40Total Flow gpm gpm gpm gpm gpm gpm gpmAnalytical 600 900 1200 1500 1800 2400Limit psig psig psig psig psig 2100 psig psigAllowable 1089.34 1360.18 1630.32 1898.51 2161.91 2415.65 2648.67Value psig psig psig psig psig psig psigLTSP/NTSP 1179.44 1444.99 1709.33 1971.08 2227.16 2472.26 2694.37psig psig psig psig psig psig psigAFT +/-90.10 +/-84.81 +/-79.02 +/-72.57 +/-65.25 +/-56.61 +/-45.70psig psig psig psig psig psig psigALT +/-27.26 +/-25.94 +/-24.49 +/-22.88 +/-21.05 +/-18.89 +/-16.16psig psig psig psig psig psig psigSafety LimitAnalytical LimitCELOOPAllowable ValueALT-LTSP/NTSPALT+AFT+Normal Operating Point -----------------------N/A1500 psigDifference between Analytical Limit AL and NTSP isCELOOP.CELOOP = +/- [(ELooP)2 + (AFLOOP)2 ]112 +/- EBIAS +/- EpROCESS1898.51 psig1948.2 psig1971.08 psig1993.96 psig2043.65 psig-2200 psigNOTE: The Normal Operating Point isbased on a 2-Pump curve operatingcurve.All of the pressure data points in this graphical representation assume a total HPI flow of 431.2 gpm.
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Enclosure 23F081 1-01 Page 11 of 155.0 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION APPLICATION OF INSTRUMENT SETPOINTSThe Loss of Subcooling Margin and Inadequate HPI Flow Functions are demonstrated Operable byapplying the following guidance during instrument Channel Calibrations and Channel Functional Tests:If the instrument setting is found within the ALT, the results are recorded in the surveillance procedureand no further action is required for the instrument surveillance.If the instrument setting is found outside the ALT but within the AFT, the instrument setting is reset towithin the ALT, and no further action is required for the instrument surveillance.If the instrument setting is found outside the AFT but conservative with respect to the Allowable Value,the channel is Operable, but considered degraded. The degraded condition must be further evaluatedduring performance of the surveillance. This evaluation, as a minimum, consists of resetting theinstrument setting to the LTSP/NTSP (within the ALT) and evaluating the channel response. If thechannel is functioning as required and expected to pass the next surveillance, then the channel isOperable and can be restored to service at the completion of the surveillance. Also, for channelsdetermined to be Operable but degraded after returning the channel to service, the performance of thesechannels will be evaluated under the CR-3 Corrective Action Program (CAP). Entry into the CAP willensure required review and documentation of the condition.If the instrument setting is found non-conservative to the Allowable Value, the channel is inoperable untilthe instrument setting is reset to the LTSP/NTSP (within the ALT), and any evaluations necessary toreturn the channel to service are completed. The instrument setting may be more conservative than theLTSP provided the AFT and ALT are applied to the actual instrument setting (NSTP) used to confirmchannel performance.6.0 REFERENCES1. CR-3 plant procedure ICDC-1, "I&C Design Criteria for Instrument Loop Uncertainty Calculations,"Revision 4.2. ISA-$67.04, Part I, "Setpoints for Nuclear Safety-Related Instrumentation," September 1994.3. ISA-RP67.04, Part II, "Methodologies for the Determination of Setpoints for Nuclear Safety-RelatedInstrumentation," September 1994.4. NRC Regulatory Guide 1.105, "Setpoints for Safety-Related Instrumentation," Revision 3, December1999.5. ASME Steam Tables For Industrial Use, Second Edition, 1967.
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission3F081 1-01Enclosure 2Page 12 of 15~VIE-RA-IGE P-T LINMI -NOR~MAL MODE WITM PERMANENT CURAESMA~hTAIK A 50 PSI -MARCT; 1LOM4 TIM SIJRC=LIM & SCM LETST 3W STA1RTInG 1WC PUMPS2300225017501500a.d 750500o250 30) 350 400 450 50 550 6C0 650RCS COOLA.NLT TEMPRATURE, (IF)Figure 3.2-1 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission3F081 1-01Enclosure 2Page 13 of 1525002000* 150010005000Subcooling Margin-44 J L 4 L W 4 W-NTSP psig-AV psig-AL psig250300350400450 500In Core Temperature &deg;F550600650Figure 3.2-2 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission3F0811-01Enclosure 2Page 14 of 15CR-3 Degraded HPI Flow for I and 2 HPI Pumps with a Cv = 6.22500,;2000 -1500U 1000500240340 440 540 640 740 840HPI Flow, 9prn-I HPI Pumip (C-4 2) --Required HPI Flow 2HPI PurnpHPI UneBr~iIl)---Required W~O10psi and 50 gomrn ror --- 2-Pump (CLPE)) Pay. (Required W150 psi and 50 y m inm)Figure 3.3-1 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission3F0811-0130002500 '"2000a-1500i000y =-0.0095x2500Enclosure 2Page 15 of 15-NTSP-AV-AL+ 2.2702x + 2686250 300 350 400 450 500 550 600 650Total HPI Flow (gpm)Figure 3.3-2 0FLORIDA POWER CORPORATIONCRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3DOCKET NUMBER 50-302 /LICENSE NUMBER DPR-72ENCLOSURE 3IEEE 603-1991 AND IEEE 279-1971 COMPLIANCE MATRIX
 
FLORIDA POWER CORPORATIONCRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3DOCKET NUMBER 50-302 /LICENSE NUMBER DPR-72ENCLOSURE 4ICCMS SIMPLIFIED SCHEMATIC AND CONTROL LOGICDIAGRAMS
 
Low Range RCS Pressure Instrument Loop(RC-147-PT / RC-148-PT / RC-244-PT)Enclosure 415 of 19RaEQ Zone 65CCEQ Zone 58ccEQ Zone 13Rosemount FoxboroU54SH9RA :Nt-2AI-12VPT -0"MA&#xfd;K0-1(RC- 14?PT (RC-.147-PYI)(RC-145- PT) c?-4Pn0-600 PSIGRosemount ICC~1154SH9RA __(RC-Int.Instr.E(RC-1147-pifl)'1(R-14&-PI2Z24 Di xsoriFoxcboroN-2A0-V21SIli(RC-147-PV3)aR-4-P3 (RC-148-I'41)FoxboroBaileyN-ZAG-VAI 5250EE E sCRC-147-PY3) ( RC- 3A-P58)VDCFoxboroN-2A0-VA2[(RC-147-PYZ)iFoxboro BieW-MVA 6624610-Il1ZE
* E8 -10CRC-148- PY2 (RC- 14 5-181)BailIey6623819-1E4'5z1ey (Rc- 30-PS)Ba6624610-1211to +1DVOC E FiORC-1468-EI)AlSCH 1147-PT)(RC-224-PT) 4- 20 rnA0 -600 PSIG4 -20 MAICCMS CH 2(RC-148-PT)ICCMS CH 3(RC-224-PT)NUS-A304DB Sht. 5 of 14The 4 -20 mA current loop signal for Low Range RCS Pressure istaken from the instrument loop at the Rosemount transmitter. Theblock diagram only shows the Channel 1 cabinet. The inputs to SPDSfor RC-147-PT and RC-148-PT are RECL-243 and RECL-40 respectivelyand highlighted in the loop drawing above. RC-224-PT will not berouted to SPDS and will only be used for ICCMS.*** Isolation is provided by the Foxboro N-2AI-12V which is a fullyqualified, safety related, current to voltage converter that accepts a4 to 20 mA input and provides a 0 to 10 VDC isolated output.
Core Exit Thermocouple Instrument LoopsEnclosure 4Current ConfigurationReoter Owfr"O119,' elevationEQ tone 39loItTIrd ateUuiid'ngEQ Zone. 87MCBSectia"FRAR~ectorCoreExit ITT' CamnnThermocoupleButdkVg OW $W4VOW / bmociSmtaooupie I Etn4 Ci b61eTh12InCOPIjef Copper COntrol CA&#xfd;OftSdBut Butt I 48 elevationSplICe IST CONAX Splice EO zone 13PelletttomIFabdthraughAPssem200i0s Eurothemlp1 7J21-21M01 01 ~ThWMOCOi"0 C"'sel7J21 .21001-02~ Extensibn RecorderPon 400 14.0' 019 Cable 4100(3Po 4913,5 i eI nX16 of 19SPDSCabinetsCotrol Comptex i124' elevationCon"rocomolex14grelevwtiooPlarntCompatorUI.New Configuration for ICCMS Channels 1 and 24- 20 mANew Configuration for ICCMS Channel 3AUMII Temperature i CH 3-I I flTransmitter Incore T/CNUS-A304DB Sht. 4 of 14The core exit thermocouples are currently routed to the ***Eurotherm Chessell Recorder 4100G in the PSAsection of the Main Control Board. The eight core exit thermocouples that are designated for ICCMS channel 1are currently routed to one recorder (Train A) and eight core exit thermocouples that are designated for ICCMSchannel 2 are routed to the other recorder (Train B). The Eurotherm Chessell Recorder 4100G are fullyqualified, safety related recorders with each recorder providing outputs to SPDS.The eight core exit thermocouples that will be used for channel 3 that are not currently qualified are not routedto SPDS but they are sent to the plant process computer system. These eight core exit thermocouple signals willbe routed to the plant process computer system via the non-safety related online monitor portion of ICCMS.
Wide Range RCS Pressure Instrument Loops(RC-3A-PT3 / RC-3A-PT3 / RC-223-PT)Enclosure 417 of 194QU6 EQZONE5SII =0A--------PASO MIUi MAIIC-13A.VAft6U-PVtIICM C(R -3 -P3SIG 1CMS CH(R -13 Ma:EQ ZOM 1366~0MA1-,4BT3RC-BV90 -10 VDC(wunsAed)6619J0A-RC-3-EFMRC-4TS6619BMRC-O3110RC3-T12GU67ML3A141 0 -10 iIDC0 10 Voc? -2in(WWA1466Z461 ES-MOt M RC-1i-P53RCC-3A-W4IE38 wt-JU-o -10VD((UnWA~RWRosemouni1154GP9Ri(RC-223-PT0 -2500 PS4 -20 mAICCMS CH 3(RC-223-PT)NUS-A304DB Sht. 5 of 14The 4 -20 mA current loop signal for Wide Range RCS Pressure is taken from the instrument loop at theRosemount transmitter. The block diagram in NUS-A304DB only shows the Channel 1 cabinet. The inputs toSPDS for RC-3A-PT3 and RC-3B-PT3 are RECL-4 and RECL-5 respectively and are highlighted in the loop drawingabove. RC-223-PT will not be routed to SPDS and will only be used for ICCMS.*** Isolation is provided by the Bailey Buffer Amplifiers RC-3A-PY3 and RC-3B-PY3 for Trains 'A' and 'B'respectively. The Bailey 6621670A1241 is a fully qualified, safety related, voltage buffer.
Low Range HPI Flow Instrument Loops(MU-23-dPT5 / MU-23-dPT6 / MU-23-dPT7 / MU-23-dPT8)(MU-23-dPT13 / MU-23-dPT14 I MU-23-dPT15 / MU-23-dPT16)Alk cccEnclosure 418 of 19(MU 2-V1 T)tM11-23-FE4)1154IIIUPA t%'2A(4VPMU-3-4UfI) (MUZ23-Y~ilF~UNWMWNA~.z(WU-23-FtS-~0- 10VdcZAOIP0- M~PWW-- -- --- -- --- -- --- -- --- -(M -3F74 0M 4- F17-IJ0. 10 VdiCa-2 $wqMU-Zi.T'I W IroC4(MtI-JJ1.P-)F51I 131-~Ei o oo g00TWO011axdbWO-24-20 mATRosemount1154HH5RA(MU-23-dPT13)(MU-23-dPT14)(MU-23-dPT15)(MU-23-dPT16)ICCMS CH 1(MU-23-dPT7)(MU-23-dPT8)ICCMS CH 2(MU-23-dPT5)(MU-23-dPT6)ICCMS CH 3(MU-23-dPT13)(MU-23-dPT14)(MU-23-dPT15)(MU-23-dPT16)NUS-A304DB Sht. 3 of 14The 4 -20 mA current loop signal for Low Range HPI flow is taken from theinstrument loop at the Rosemount transmitter. The block diagram inNUS-A304DB only shows the Channel 1 cabinet. The inputs toSPDS/RECALL for MU-23-dPT5, MU-23-dPT6, MU-23-dPT7, and MU-23-dPT8, are being added as part of the Fast Cool Down System EngineeringChange package and they will be designated as RECL-113, RECL-119, RECL-120, and RECL-121 respectively. MU-23-dPT13, MU-23-dPT14, MU-23-dPT15 , and MU-23-dPT16 will not be routed to RECALL/SPDS and will onlybe used for ICCMS initiation channel 3.*** Isolation is provided by the Foxboro N-2AI-12V which is a fully qualified, safety related, current to voltage converterthat accepts a 4 to 20 mA input and provides a 0 to 10 VDC isolated output.
Low Range HPI Flow Instrument Loops Enclosure 4(MU-23-dPT9 / MU-23-dPT10 / MU-23-dPT11 / MU-23-dPT12i9 of 191* Za 93 (AZ) E OU43.fl4 23.dt"I MU2S1F"I.O **t52A1-QVO-11tV*9W(MU43-FVPZ4 pEw:"LNUS-A304DB Sht. 3 of 14The 4 -20 mA current loop signal for Low Range HPI flow is taken from the instrument loop at the Rosemount transmitter.The block diagram in NUS-A304DB only shows the Channel 1 cabinet. The inputs to SPDS/RECALL for MU-23-dPT9, MU-23-dPT10, MU-23-dPT11 , and MU-23-dPT12 are designated as RECL-260, RECL-261, RECL-262, and RECL-263 respectively.*** Isolation is provided by the Foxboro N-2AI-12V which is a fully qualified, safety related, current to voltage converterthat accepts a 4 to 20 mA input and provides a 0 to 10 VDC isolated output. The Dixson SA202P flow indicators MU-23-FI9,MU-23-FI1O, MU-23-FI11, and MU-23-FI12 are classified as safety related 1E instrumentation and they do not need to beisolated from ICCMS.
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