ML17124A163: Difference between revisions

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
(StriderTol Bot change)
(StriderTol Bot change)
Line 1: Line 1:
{{Adams
#REDIRECT [[IR 05000254/2017001]]
| number = ML17124A163
| issue date = 05/03/2017
| title = NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000254/2017001 and 05000265/2017001
| author name = Stoedter K
| author affiliation = NRC/RGN-III/DRP/B1
| addressee name = Hanson B
| addressee affiliation = Exelon Generation Co, LLC, Exelon Nuclear
| docket = 05000254, 05000265
| license number = DPR-029, DPR-030
| contact person =
| document report number = IR 2017001
| document type = Inspection Report, Letter
| page count = 57
}}
See also: [[see also::IR 05000265/2017001]]
 
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES
                            NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
                                                REGION III
                                    2443 WARRENVILLE RD. SUITE 210
                                          LISLE, IL 60532-4352
                                              May 3, 2017
Mr. Bryan C. Hanson
Senior VP, Exelon Generation Company, LLC
President and CNO, Exelon Nuclear
4300 Winfield Road
Warrenville, IL 60555
SUBJECT: QUAD CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2NRC
            INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000254/2017001 AND
            05000265/2017001
Dear Mr. Hanson:
On March 31, 2017, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an integrated
inspection at your Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2. On April 11, 2017, the
NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. S. Darin and other members of
your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
Based on the results of this inspection, the NRC has identified one issue that was evaluated
under the risk significance determination process as having very low safety significance
(Green). The NRC has also determined that one violation is associated with this issue.
Because the licensee initiated condition reports to address this issue, this violation is being
treated as a Non-Cited Violation (NCV), consistent with Section 2.3.2a of the Enforcement
Policy. The NCV is described in the subject inspection report.
If you contest the violation or significance of the NCV, you should provide a response within
30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with
copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the
NRC Resident Inspector at the Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment or a finding not associated with a
regulatory requirement in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date
of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the
Regional Administrator, Region III; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Quad Cities Nuclear
Power Station.
 
B. Hanson                                  -2-
This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection
and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document
Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, and Requests for
Withholding.
                                              Sincerely,
                                              /RA/
                                              Karla Stoedter, Chief
                                              Branch 1
                                              Division of Reactor Projects
Docket Nos. 50-254; 50-265
License Nos. DPR-29; DPR-30
Enclosure:
IR 05000254/2017001; 05000265/2017001
cc: Distribution via LISTSERV
 
B. Hanson                                -3-
Letter to Bryan C. Hanson from Karla Stoedter dated May 3, 2017
SUBJECT: QUAD CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2NRC
            INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000254/2017001 AND
            05000265/2017001
DISTRIBUTION:
Jeremy Bowen
RidsNrrDorlLpl3
RidsNrrPMQuadCities Resource
RidsNrrDirsIrib Resource
Cynthia Pederson
Darrell Roberts
Richard Skokowski
Allan Barker
Carole Ariano
Linda Linn
DRPIII
DRSIII
ROPreports.Resource@nrc.gov
ADAMS Accession Number: ML17124A163
OFFICE      RIII
NAME        KStoedter:bw
DATE        05/03/2017
                                OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
 
          U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
                          REGION III
Docket Nos:        50-254; 50-265
License Nos:        DPR-29, DPR-30
Report No:          05000254/2017001; 05000265/2017001
Licensee:          Exelon Generation Company, LLC
Facility:          Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2
Location:          Cordova, IL
Dates:              January 1 through March 31, 2017
Inspectors:        R. Murray, Senior Resident Inspector
                    K. Carrington, Resident Inspector
                    M. Garza, Emergency Preparedness Inspector
                    A. Dahbur, Fire Protection Inspector
                    J. Neurauter, Reactor Engineer
                    M. Domke, Reactor Engineer
                    J. Cassidy, Senior Health Physicist
                    V. Meyers, Senior Health Physicist
                    C. Mathews, Illinois Emergency Management Agency
Approved by:        K. Stoedter, Chief
                    Branch 1
                    Division of Reactor Projects
                                                                    Enclosure
 
                                              TABLE OF CONTENTS
SUMMARY .................................................................................................................................... 2
REPORT DETAILS ....................................................................................................................... 4
Summary of Plant Status ........................................................................................................... 4
    1.        REACTOR SAFETY ............................................................................................ 4
      1R01    Adverse Weather Protection (71111.01) .............................................................. 4
      1R04    Equipment Alignment (71111.04) ........................................................................ 5
      1R05    Fire Protection (71111.05) ................................................................................... 6
      1R06    Flooding (71111.06) ............................................................................................. 6
      1R07    Annual Heat Sink Performance (71111.07) ......................................................... 7
      1R08    Inservice Inspection Activities (71111.08) ............................................................ 7
      1R11    Licensed Operator Requalification Program (71111.11) ...................................... 9
      1R12    Maintenance Effectiveness (71111.12) .............................................................. 11
      1R13    Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (71111.13) ........ 11
      1R15    Operability Determinations and Functional Assessments (71111.15) ............... 12
      1R19    Post-Maintenance Testing (71111.19) ............................................................... 13
      1R20    Outage Activities (71111.20) .............................................................................. 14
      1R22    Surveillance Testing (71111.22) ........................................................................ 14
      1EP2    Alert and Notification System Evaluation (71114.02) ......................................... 16
      1EP3    Emergency Response Organization Staffing and Augmentation System
              (71114.03).......................................................................................................... 16
      1EP5    Maintenance of Emergency Preparedness (71114.05) ..................................... 17
      1EP6    Drill Evaluation (71114.06)................................................................................. 17
    2.        RADIATION SAFETY ........................................................................................ 18
      2RS1    Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls (71124.01) .............. 18
      2RS2    Occupational As-Low-As-Reasonably-Achievable Planning and Controls
              (71124.02).......................................................................................................... 22
      2RS3    In-Plant Airborne Radioactivity Control and Mitigation (71124.03) .................... 23
      2RS4    Occupational Dose Assessment (71124.04) ...................................................... 25
    4.        OTHER ACTIVITIES .......................................................................................... 27
      4OA1    Performance Indicator Verification (71151) ....................................................... 27
      4OA2    Identification and Resolution of Problems (71152) ............................................ 30
      4OA3    Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion (71153) ............... 33
      4OA5    Other Activities ................................................................................................... 34
      4OA6    Management Meetings ...................................................................................... 37
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION............................................................................................ 1
Key Points of Contact ................................................................................................................ 1
List of Items Opened, Closed, and Discussed........................................................................... 2
List of Documents Reviewed ..................................................................................................... 3
List of Acronyms Used ............................................................................................................ 15
                                                            2
 
                                              SUMMARY
Inspection Report 05000254/2017001, 05000265/2017001; 01/01/2017-03/31/2017;
Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2; Identification and Resolution of Problems.
This report covers a 3-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and announced
baseline inspections by regional inspectors. One Green finding was identified by the inspectors.
The finding involved a Non-Cited Violation (NCV) of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) requirements. The significance of inspection findings is indicated by their
color (i.e., greater than Green, or Green, White, Yellow, Red) and determined using Inspection
Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, "Significance Determination Process," dated April 29, 2015.
Cross-cutting aspects are determined using IMC 0310, "Aspects within the Cross-Cutting
Areas," dated December 4, 2014. All violations of NRC requirements are dispositioned in
accordance with the NRCs Enforcement Policy, dated November 1, 2016. The NRC's program
for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in
NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 6.
        Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems
        Green. A finding of very low safety significance and an associated NCV of 10 CFR 50,
        Appendix B, Criterion V was self-revealed on January 27, 2017, when the Unit 1C
        residual heat removal service water (RHRSW) pump was started for a routine
        surveillance evolution and all expected annunciators and equipment failed to operate
        properly, which led to the licensee declaring the Unit 1C RHRSW pump inoperable.
        Specifically, the licensee failed to establish a procedure for the mechanism operated
        contact (MOC) switch linkage arm that was appropriate to the circumstances to ensure
        the component would continue to perform its function. Immediate corrective actions
        included reconnecting the MOC switch linkage arm assembly and testing it by starting
        the 1C RHRSW pump prior to declaring the pump operable. In addition, the licensee
        planned procedure revisions to QCEPM 0200-11 that would specify a torque value to
        ensure the MOC switch linkage arm was adequately secured and could perform its
        function. This issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Issue
        Report 3967424.
        The finding was determined to be more than minor because the finding was associated
        with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of equipment performance and
        affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of
        systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences.
        Specifically, the failure to ensure the MOC switch linkage arm was adequately fastened
        led to the failure of the component and its associated Unit 1C RHRSW pump during
        breaker operation on January 27, 2017. The finding was determined to be of very low
        safety significance (Green), because the inspectors answered No to all of the
        questions in IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for
        Findings at Power, Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, Section A,
        Mitigating SSCs and Functionality. The inspectors determined this finding affected the
        cross-cutting area of human performance, in the aspect of avoid complacency, which
        states, Individuals recognize and plan for the possibility of mistakes, latent issues, and
        inherent risk, even while expecting successful outcomes. Specifically, the licensee
        failed to recognize a potential risk and inherent latent issue for a condition identified in
        2015 at Quad Cities, when a MOC switch failed to perform its function due to a missing
        nut in a different breakers linkage assembly. The licensee identified and corrected the
                                                2
 
condition but failed to evaluate the cause of the missing nut because it did not impact the
operability of the component. In the 2015 instance, the MOC switch issue only affected
indications for the component and had no adverse impact on the ability of the
component to perform its function [H.12]. (Section 4OA2)
                                      3
 
                                        REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status
Unit 1
With the exception of planned power reductions for turbine testing, control rod pattern
adjustments, and power changes as requested by the transmission system operator, the unit
remained at or near full power from January 1 to January 18, 2017. On January 18, the unit
began coasting down for Refueling Outage Q1R24. On March 27, 2017, the unit shut down for
Q1R24 and remained shut down through the end of the inspection period.
Unit 2
The unit operated at or near full power for the entire inspection period with the exception of
planned power reductions for turbine testing, control rod pattern adjustments, control rod drive
maintenance, and power changes as requested by the transmission system operator.
1.    REACTOR SAFETY
      Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity
1R01 Adverse Weather Protection (71111.01)
  .1  Winter Seasonal Readiness Preparations
  a.  Inspection Scope
      The inspectors conducted a review of the licensees preparations for winter conditions to
      verify that the plants design features and implementation of procedures were sufficient
      to protect mitigating systems from the effects of adverse weather. Documentation for
      selected risk-significant systems was reviewed to ensure that these systems would
      remain functional when challenged by inclement weather. During the inspection, the
      inspectors focused on plant specific design features and the licensees procedures used
      to mitigate or respond to adverse weather conditions. Additionally, the inspectors
      reviewed the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) and performance
      requirements for systems selected for inspection, and verified that operator actions were
      appropriate as specified by plant specific procedures. Cold weather protection, such as
      heat tracing and area heaters, was verified to be in operation where applicable. The
      inspectors also reviewed corrective action program (CAP) items to verify that the
      licensee was identifying adverse weather issues at an appropriate threshold and
      entering them into their CAP in accordance with station corrective action procedures.
      Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report. The inspectors reviews
      focused specifically on the following plant systems due to their risk significance or
      susceptibility to cold weather issues:
      *      345 kilo-volt system; and
      *      Units 1 and 2 standby liquid control systems.
      This inspection constituted one winter seasonal readiness preparation sample as
      defined in Inspection Procedure (IP) 71111.01-05.
                                              4
 
  b. Findings
    No findings were identified.
1R04 Equipment Alignment (71111.04)
.1  Quarterly Partial System Walkdowns
  a. Inspection Scope
    The inspectors performed partial system walkdowns of the following risk-significant
    systems:
    *      Unit 1 and Unit 2 emergency diesel generator (EDG) systems during Unit 1/2 EDG
            surveillance testing;
    *      Unit 2 reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system during Unit 2 high pressure
            coolant injection system planned maintenance;
    *      Unit 2 C and D residual heat removal service water (RHRSW) pump systems
            during A and B RHRSW systems planned maintenance; and
    *      Unit 1 fuel pool cooling system during Unit 1 Q1R24 alternate decay heat removal
            operations.
    The inspectors selected these systems based on their risk significance relative to the
    Reactor Safety Cornerstones at the time they were inspected. The inspectors attempted
    to identify any discrepancies that could impact the function of the system and, therefore,
    potentially increase risk. The inspectors reviewed applicable operating procedures,
    system diagrams, UFSAR, Technical Specification (TS) requirements, outstanding work
    orders (WOs), condition reports, and the impact of ongoing work activities on redundant
    trains of equipment in order to identify conditions that could have rendered the systems
    incapable of performing their intended functions. The inspectors also walked down
    accessible portions of the systems to verify system components and support equipment
    were aligned correctly and operable. The inspectors examined the material condition of
    the components and observed operating parameters of equipment to verify that there
    were no obvious deficiencies. The inspectors also verified that the licensee had properly
    identified and resolved equipment alignment problems that could cause initiating events
    or impact the capability of mitigating systems or barriers and entered them into the CAP
    with the appropriate significance characterization. Documents reviewed are listed in the
    Attachment to this report.
    These activities constituted four partial system walkdown samples as defined in
    IP 71111.04-05.
  b. Findings
    No findings were identified.
                                            5
 
1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05)
  .1  Routine Resident Inspector Tours (71111.05Q)
    a.  Inspection Scope
      The inspectors conducted fire protection walkdowns which were focused on availability,
      accessibility and the condition of firefighting equipment in the following risk-significant
      plant areas:
      *      Fire zone (FZ) 11.2.1, Unit 1 reactor building, elevation 554'-0", southwest corner
              room, 1B core spray;
      *      FZ 8.2.6.B, Unit 1 turbine building, elevation 595-0, low pressure heater bay;
      *      FZ 8.2.7.B, Unit 1 turbine building, elevation 615-6, low Pressure and D heater
              bay; and
      *      FZ 8.2.7.C, Unit 1/2 turbine building, elevation 611, mezzanine floor.
      The inspectors reviewed areas to assess if the licensee had implemented a fire
      protection program that adequately controlled combustibles and ignition sources within
      the plant, effectively maintained fire detection and suppression capability, maintained
      passive fire protection features in good material condition, and implemented adequate
      compensatory measures for out-of-service, degraded or inoperable fire protection
      equipment, systems, or features in accordance with the licensees fire plan.
      The inspectors selected fire areas based on their overall contribution to internal fire risk
      as documented in the plants Individual Plant Examination of External Events with later
      additional insights, their potential to impact equipment which could initiate or mitigate a
      plant transient, or their impact on the plants ability to respond to a security event.
      Using the documents listed in the Attachment to this report, the inspectors verified that
      fire hoses and extinguishers were in their designated locations and available for
      immediate use; that fire detectors and sprinklers were unobstructed; that transient
      material loading was within the analyzed limits; and fire doors, dampers, and penetration
      seals appeared to be in satisfactory condition. The inspectors also verified that minor
      issues identified during the inspection were entered into the licensees CAP.
      Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.
      These activities constituted four quarterly fire protection inspection samples as defined in
      IP 71111.05-05.
    b. Findings
      No findings were identified.
1R06 Flooding (71111.06)
.1    Internal Flooding
    a. Inspection Scope
      The inspectors reviewed selected risk important plant design features and licensee
      procedures intended to protect the plant and its safety-related equipment from internal
      flooding events. The inspectors reviewed flood analyses and design documents,
      including the UFSAR, engineering calculations, and abnormal operating procedures to
                                                6
 
      identify licensee commitments. The specific documents reviewed are listed in the
      Attachment to this report. In addition, the inspectors reviewed licensee drawings to
      identify areas and equipment that may be affected by internal flooding caused by the
      failure or misalignment of nearby sources of water, such as the fire suppression or the
      circulating water systems. The inspectors also reviewed the licensees corrective action
      documents with respect to past flood-related items identified in the corrective action
      program to verify the adequacy of the corrective actions. The inspectors performed a
      walkdown of the following plant area to assess the adequacy of watertight doors and
      verify drains and sumps were clear of debris and were operable, and that the licensee
      complied with its commitments:
      *      Units 1 and 2 RHRSW vaults.
      Documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the Attachment to this report.
      This inspection constituted one internal flooding sample as defined in IP 71111.06-05.
    b. Findings
      No findings were identified.
1R07 Annual Heat Sink Performance (71111.07)
.1    Heat Sink Performance
    a. Inspection Scope
      The inspectors reviewed the licensees testing of the B control room emergency
      ventilation system refrigeration condensing unit heat exchanger to verify that potential
      deficiencies did not mask the licensees ability to detect degraded performance, to
      identify any common cause issues that had the potential to increase risk, and to ensure
      that the licensee was adequately addressing problems that could result in initiating
      events that would cause an increase in risk. The inspectors reviewed the licensees
      observations as compared against acceptance criteria, the correlation of scheduled
      testing and the frequency of testing, and the impact of instrument inaccuracies on test
      results. Inspectors also verified that test acceptance criteria considered differences
      between test conditions, design conditions, and testing conditions. Documents reviewed
      for this inspection are listed in the Attachment to this document.
      This annual heat sink performance inspection constituted one sample as defined in
      IP 71111.07-05.
  b.  Findings
      No findings were identified.
1R08 Inservice Inspection Activities (71111.08)
      From March 27-31, 2017, the inspectors conducted a review of the implementation
      of the licensees Inservice Inspection (ISI) Program for monitoring degradation of the
      Unit 1 reactor coolant system, risk-significant piping and components, and containment
      systems.
                                                7
 
    The inspections described in Sections 1R08.1 and 1R08.5 below constituted one sample
    as defined in IP 71111.08-05.
.1  Piping Systems Inservice Inspection
  a. Inspection Scope
    The inspectors either observed or reviewed the following Non-Destructive
    Examinations (NDE) mandated by the American Society of Mechanical
    Engineers (ASME), Section XI Code to evaluate compliance with the ASME Code
    Section XI and Section V requirements, and if any indications and defects were detected
    to determine if these were dispositioned in accordance with the ASME Code or a NRC
    approved alternative requirement:
    *      Ultrasonic examination of elbow-to-pipe weld (component 30A-S11) in the main
            steam system (WO No. 01831310-01);
    *      Ultrasonic examination of elbow-to-pipe weld (component 30B-S10) in the main
            steam system (WO No. 01831310-01);
    *      Magnetic particle examination (MT) of collar-torus shell (component 1025-50) in
            emergency core cooling system (WO 01831310);
    *      MT of weldsvariable spring can with four lugs welded to pipe (component
            1401-W-201A) in core spray system (WO 01831310);
    *      MT of weldseight guide lugs welded to pipe (component 2304-W-204A) in the
            high pressure coolant injection system (WO No. 01831310);
    *      General visual examination of a sample of metallic containment surface area
            examinations: Penetrations X-016A, X-020, X-025, X-042, X-08, and X-109;
            X-025 MC piping at elevations 647, 623, and 595 (WO No. 01831711-02);
    *      Visual examination (VT-1) of weldsfour lugs welded to pipe (component
            1005A-W-304.5A) in RHRSW system (WO 01831310);
    *      VT-3 of pipe restraintbox guide (component 1005A-W-304.5) in RHRSW
            system (WO 01831310);
    *      VT-3 of pipe supporttwo variable spring cans (component 1401-W-201 A&B)
            in core spray system (WO 01831310); and
    *      VT-3 of flued head anchor (component 1202-M-108.1) in the reactor water
            clean-up system (WO No. 01831310).
    The inspectors reviewed one surface examination from the previous outage with a
    relevant indication that was evaluated and accepted by the licensee for continued
    service. The inspectors verified that the licensees removal of the piping flange
    indications without a weld repair did not impact compliance with ASME Standard B16.5
    for flange design and Standard B31.1 for piping design.
    *      Reactor head vent line indications found during liquid penetrant examinations
            (WO 01636433-07).
    The inspectors reviewed records for the following pressure boundary weld repairs
    completed for risk-significant systems during the last outage to determine whether
    the licensee applied the pre-service NDE and acceptance criteria required by the
    Construction Code, and/or the NRC-approved Code relief request. Additionally, the
    inspectors reviewed the welding procedure specifications and supporting weld
    procedure qualification records to determine whether the weld procedures were
                                            8
 
      qualified in accordance with the requirements of the Construction Code and the
      ASME Code, Section IX:
      *      installation of a 2-to-1 fillet weld at socket welds 1 through 23 on the Unit 1 reactor
              head vent line 1-0215-2-B (WO No. 01636433-01); and
      *      high pressure coolant injection piping rerouteweld map #1 fillet welds at socket
              welds 2, 3, 8, 9, 16, and 17 on line 1-2318-2-LX (WO No. 1877257-11).
  b. Findings
      No findings were identified.
.2  Reactor Pressure Vessel Upper Head Penetration Inspection Activities (Not Applicable)
.3  Boric Acid Corrosion Control (Not Applicable)
.4  Steam Generator Tube Inspection Activities (Not Applicable)
.5  Identification and Resolution of Problems
  a. Inspection Scope
      The inspectors performed a review of ISI-related problems entered into the licensees
      CAP, and conducted interviews with licensee staff to determine if:
      *      the licensee had established an appropriate threshold for identifying ISI-related
              problems;
      *      the licensee had performed a root cause (if applicable), and taken appropriate
              corrective actions; and
      *      the licensee had evaluated operating experience, and industry generic issues
              related to ISI and pressure boundary integrity.
      The inspectors performed these reviews to evaluate compliance with Title 10, Code of
      Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action,
      requirements. The corrective action documents reviewed by the inspectors are listed
      in the Attachment to this report.
  b. Findings
      No findings were identified.
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program (71111.11)
.1  Resident Inspector Quarterly Review of Licensed Operator Requalification (71111.11Q)
  a. Inspection Scope
      On February 7, 2017, the inspectors observed a crew of licensed operators in the plants
      simulator during licensed operator requalification training. The inspectors verified that
      operator performance was adequate, evaluators were identifying and documenting crew
      performance problems, and that training was being conducted in accordance with
      licensee procedures. The inspectors evaluated the following areas:
                                                9
 
    *      licensed operator performance;
    *      crews clarity and formality of communications;
    *      ability to take timely actions in the conservative direction;
    *      prioritization, interpretation, and verification of annunciator alarms;
    *      correct use and implementation of abnormal and emergency procedures;
    *      control board manipulations;
    *      oversight and direction from supervisors; and
    *      ability to identify and implement appropriate TS actions and Emergency Plan
            actions and notifications.
    The crews performance in these areas was compared to pre-established operator action
    expectations and successful critical task completion requirements. Documents reviewed
    are listed in the Attachment to this report.
    This inspection constituted one quarterly licensed operator requalification program
    simulator sample as defined in IP 71111.11-05.
  b. Findings
    No findings were identified.
.2  Resident Inspector Quarterly Observation during Periods of Heightened Activity or Risk
    (71111.11Q)
  a. Inspection Scope
    On March 26, 2017, the inspectors observed control room operators on Unit 1 perform a
    planned shutdown for refueling outage Q1R24. This was an activity that required
    heightened awareness and was related to increased risk. The inspectors evaluated the
    following areas:
    *        licensed operator performance;
    *        crews clarity and formality of communications;
    *        ability to take timely actions in the conservative direction;
    *        prioritization, interpretation, and verification of annunciator alarms;
    *        correct use and implementation of abnormal and emergency procedures;
    *        control board manipulations;
    *        oversight and direction from supervisors; and
    *        ability to identify and implement appropriate TS actions and Emergency Plan
              actions and notifications.
    The performance in these areas was compared to pre-established operator action
    expectations, procedural compliance and task completion requirements. Documents
    reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.
    This inspection constituted one quarterly licensed operator heightened activity/risk
    sample as defined in IP 71111.11-05.
  b. Findings
    No findings were identified.
                                                10
 
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness (71111.12)
.1  Routine Quarterly Evaluations
  a. Inspection Scope
      The inspectors evaluated degraded performance issues involving the following
      risk-significant systems:
      *      Z6600: emergency diesel generator systems; and
      *      Z8300: 125 volt direct current (VDC) battery systems.
      The inspectors reviewed events such as where ineffective equipment maintenance had
      resulted in valid or invalid automatic actuations of engineered safeguards systems and
      independently verified the licensee's actions to address system performance or condition
      problems in terms of the following:
      *      implementing appropriate work practices;
      *      identifying and addressing common cause failures;
      *      scoping of systems in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(b) of the maintenance rule;
      *      characterizing system reliability issues for performance;
      *      charging unavailability for performance;
      *      trending key parameters for condition monitoring;
      *      ensuring 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) or (a)(2) classification or re-classification; and
      *      verifying appropriate performance criteria for structures, systems, and
              components (SSCs)/functions classified as (a)(2), or appropriate and adequate
              goals and corrective actions for systems classified as (a)(1).
      The inspectors assessed performance issues with respect to the reliability, availability,
      and condition monitoring of the system. In addition, the inspectors verified maintenance
      effectiveness issues were entered into the CAP with the appropriate significance
      characterization. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.
      This inspection constituted two quarterly maintenance effectiveness samples as defined
      in IP 71111.12-05.
  b. Findings
      No findings were identified.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (71111.13)
.1  Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
  a. Inspection Scope
      The inspectors reviewed the licensee's evaluation and management of plant risk for the
      maintenance and emergent work activities affecting risk-significant and safety-related
      equipment listed below to verify that the appropriate risk assessments were performed
      prior to removing equipment for work:
                                              11
 
      *      Work week 17-02-05: Unit 1 RCIC system planned maintenance and online risk
            change to yellow, B train of control room emergency heating, ventilation, and air
            conditioning system heat exchanger planned maintenance, 1A core spray pump
            planned maintenance and Unit 1 online risk change to yellow;
      *      Emergent work on the Unit 2 3E automatic depressurization system electromatic
            relief valve light indication on February 3, 2017;
      *      Work week 17-09-12: Unit 2 125 VDC planned maintenance and both units
            unplanned online risk change to yellow due to tornado warnings in Rock Island
            County; and
      *      Work week 17-13-03: Unit 2 online risk change to yellow and Unit 1 shutdown
            safety risk yellow during refueling outage Q1R24Week 1.
      These activities were selected based on their potential risk significance relative to the
      Reactor Safety cornerstones. As applicable for each activity, the inspectors verified that
      risk assessments were performed as required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) and were accurate
      and complete. When emergent work was performed, the inspectors verified that the
      plant risk was promptly reassessed and managed. The inspectors reviewed the scope
      of maintenance work, discussed the results of the assessment with the licensee's
      probabilistic risk analyst or shift technical advisor, and verified plant conditions were
      consistent with the risk assessment. The inspectors also reviewed TS requirements and
      walked down portions of redundant safety systems, when applicable, to verify risk
      analysis assumptions were valid and applicable requirements were met.
      Documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the Attachment to this report.
      These maintenance risk assessments and emergent work control activities constituted
      four samples as defined in IP 71111.13-05.
  b. Findings
      No findings were identified.
1R15 Operability Determinations and Functional Assessments (71111.15)
.1  Operability Evaluations
  a. Inspection Scope
      The inspectors reviewed the following issues:
      *      Issue Report (IR) 2709786: DGCWP [diesel generator cooling water
            pump]/RHRSW Common Suction Piping Degradation;
      *      IR 3968961: Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Thermal Performance Testing Using
            Fluke Model 45;
      *      IR 3967424: Unit 1C RHRSW Pump Abnormal Indications; and
      *      IR 3971856: 1D RHRSW Trip Fuses Worked Out of Fuse Holder.
      The inspectors selected these potential operability issues based on the risk significance
      of the associated components and systems. The inspectors evaluated the technical
      adequacy of the evaluations to ensure that TS operability was properly justified and the
      subject component or system remained available such that no unrecognized increase in
      risk occurred. The inspectors compared the operability and design criteria in the
                                              12
 
      appropriate sections of the TS and UFSAR to the licensees evaluations to determine
      whether the components or systems were operable. Where compensatory measures
      were required to maintain operability, the inspectors determined whether the measures
      in place would function as intended and were properly controlled. The inspectors
      determined, where appropriate, compliance with bounding limitations associated with the
      evaluations. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed a sampling of corrective action
      documents to verify that the licensee was identifying and correcting any deficiencies
      associated with operability evaluations. Documents reviewed are listed in the
      Attachment to this report.
      This operability inspection constituted four samples as defined in IP 71111.15-05.
  b. Findings
      No findings were identified.
1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing (71111.19)
.1  Post-Maintenance Testing
  a. Inspection Scope
      The inspectors reviewed the following post-maintenance testing (PMT) activities to verify
      that procedures and test activities were adequate to ensure system operability and
      functional capability:
      *      WO 1961658 for the Unit 1 RCIC system following planned maintenance;
      *      WO 1846331 for the Unit 2 125 VDC battery system following battery terminal
            board and potentiometer installation under Engineering Change (EC) 402467; and
      *      WO 4612395 for the Unit 1 EDG cooling water pump following emergent work and
            unplanned maintenance.
      These activities were selected based upon the structure, system, or component's ability
      to impact risk. The inspectors evaluated these activities for the following (as applicable):
      the effect of testing on the plant had been adequately addressed; testing was adequate
      for the maintenance performed; acceptance criteria were clear and demonstrated
      operational readiness; test instrumentation was appropriate; tests were performed as
      written in accordance with properly reviewed and approved procedures; equipment was
      returned to its operational status following testing (temporary modifications or jumpers
      required for test performance were properly removed after test completion); and test
      documentation was properly evaluated. The inspectors evaluated the activities against
      TSs, the UFSAR, 10 CFR Part 50 requirements, licensee procedures, and various
      NRC generic communications to ensure that the test results adequately ensured that the
      equipment met the licensing basis and design requirements. In addition, the inspectors
      reviewed corrective action documents associated with post-maintenance tests to
      determine whether the licensee was identifying problems and entering them in the CAP
      and that the problems were being corrected commensurate with their importance to
      safety. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.
      This inspection constituted three PMT samples as defined in IP 71111.19-05.
                                              13
 
  b. Findings
      No findings were identified.
1R20 Outage Activities (71111.20)
.1  Refueling Outage Activities
  a. Inspection Scope
      The inspectors reviewed the Outage Safety Plan (OSP) and contingency plans for the
      Unit 1 refueling outage (RFO), that began on March 27, 2017, and continued through the
      end of this inspection period, to confirm that the licensee had appropriately considered
      risk, industry experience, and previous site-specific problems in developing and
      implementing a plan that assured maintenance of defense-in-depth. During the RFO,
      the inspectors observed portions of the shutdown and cooldown processes and
      monitored licensee controls over the outage activities listed below:
      *      licensee configuration management, including maintenance of defense-in-depth
              commensurate with the OSP for key safety functions and compliance with the
              applicable TS when taking equipment out of service;
      *      installation and configuration of reactor coolant pressure, level, and temperature
              instruments to provide accurate indication, accounting for instrument error;
      *      controls over the status and configuration of electrical systems to ensure that
              TS and OSP requirements were met, and controls over switchyard activities;
      *      monitoring of decay heat removal processes, systems, and components;
      *      controls to ensure that outage work was not impacting the ability of the operators
              to operate the spent fuel pool cooling system;
      *      reactor water inventory controls including flow paths, configurations, and
              alternative means for inventory addition, and controls to prevent inventory loss;
      *      controls over activities that could affect reactivity;
      *      maintenance of secondary containment as required by TS;
      *      refueling activities; and
      *      licensee identification and resolution of problems related to RFO activities.
      Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.
      This inspection constituted a partial RFO sample and continued into the next inspection
      period.
  b. Findings
      No findings were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22)
.1  Surveillance Testing
  a. Inspection Scope
      The inspectors reviewed the test results for the following activities to determine whether
      risk-significant systems and equipment were capable of performing their intended safety
                                              14
 
function and to verify testing was conducted in accordance with applicable procedural
and TS requirements:
*      QCIS 1000-09: RHR Pump Discharge Pressure Calibration and Functional Test
      (Routine);
*      QCOS 6600-37(39): Unit 1(2) EDG Largest Load Reject Surveillance (Routine);
*      QCOS 6600-44: Unit 1 EDG Timed Start Test (Routine)
*      QCOS 1000-43: Unit 2 A Loop Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) and
      Containment Cooling Modes of RHRs Non-Outage Logic Test (Routine);
*      QCOS 1400-16: Unit 1 Division II Core Spray Logic Functional Test (Routine);
      and
*      QCOS 1400-09: Core Spray Pressure Isolation Valve Seat Leakage Test
      (In-service Test).
The inspectors observed in-plant activities and reviewed procedures and associated
records to determine the following:
*      did preconditioning occur;
*      the effects of the testing were adequately addressed by control room personnel or
      engineers prior to the commencement of the testing;
*      acceptance criteria were clearly stated, demonstrated operational readiness, and
      were consistent with the system design basis;
*      plant equipment calibration was correct, accurate, and properly documented;
*      as-left setpoints were within required ranges; and the calibration frequency was in
      accordance with TSs, the USAR, procedures, and applicable commitments;
*      measuring and test equipment calibration was current;
*      test equipment was used within the required range and accuracy; applicable
      prerequisites described in the test procedures were satisfied;
*      test frequencies met TS requirements to demonstrate operability and reliability;
      tests were performed in accordance with the test procedures and other applicable
      procedures; jumpers and lifted leads were controlled and restored where used;
*      test data and results were accurate, complete, within limits, and valid;
*      test equipment was removed after testing;
*      where applicable for inservice testing activities, testing was performed in
      accordance with the applicable version of Section XI, American Society of
      Mechanical Engineers code, and reference values were consistent with the
      system design basis;
*      where applicable, test results not meeting acceptance criteria were addressed
      with an adequate operability evaluation or the system or component was declared
      inoperable;
*      where applicable for safety-related instrument control surveillance tests, reference
      setting data were accurately incorporated in the test procedure;
*      where applicable, actual conditions encountering high resistance electrical
      contacts were such that the intended safety function could still be accomplished;
*      prior procedure changes had not provided an opportunity to identify problems
      encountered during the performance of the surveillance or calibration test;
*      equipment was returned to a position or status required to support the
      performance of its safety functions; and
*      all problems identified during the testing were appropriately documented and
      dispositioned in the CAP.
                                      15
 
      Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report. This inspection
      constituted five routine surveillance testing samples, and one in-service test sample as
      defined in IP 71111.22, Sections-02 and-05.
  b. Findings
      No findings were identified.
1EP2 Alert and Notification System Evaluation (71114.02)
.1  Alert and Notification System Evaluation
  a. Inspection Scope
      The inspectors reviewed documents and held discussions with Emergency
      Preparedness (EP) staff regarding the operation, maintenance, and periodic testing
      of the primary and backup Alert and Notification System (ANS) in the plume pathway
      Emergency Planning Zone. The inspectors reviewed monthly trend reports and siren
      test failure records from July 2015 to February 2017. Information gathered during
      document reviews and interviews were used to determine whether the ANS equipment
      was maintained and tested in accordance with Emergency Plan commitments and
      procedures. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.
      This ANS evaluation inspection constituted one sample as defined in IP 71114.02-06.
  b. Findings
      No findings were identified.
1EP3 Emergency Response Organization Staffing and Augmentation System (71114.03)
.1  Emergency Response Organization Staffing and Augmentation System
  a. Inspection Scope
      The inspectors reviewed and discussed with plant EP management and staff the
      Emergency Plan commitments and procedures that addressed the primary and alternate
      methods of initiating an Emergency Response Organization (ERO) activation to augment
      the on-shift staff as well as the provisions for maintaining the plants ERO team and
      qualification lists. The inspectors reviewed reports and a sample of CAP records of
      unannounced off-hour augmentation drills, which were conducted from July 2015 to
      February 2017, to determine the adequacy of the drill critiques and associated corrective
      actions. The inspectors also reviewed a sample of the training records of approximately
      six ERO personnel, who were assigned to key and support positions, to determine the
      status of their training as it related to their assigned ERO positions. Documents
      reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.
      This ERO augmentation testing inspection constituted one sample as defined in
      IP 71114.03-06.
  b. Findings
      No findings were identified.
                                                16
 
1EP5 Maintenance of Emergency Preparedness (71114.05)
.1  Maintenance of Emergency Preparedness
  a. Inspection Scope
      The inspectors reviewed the nuclear oversight staffs April 2016 audit of the Quad Cities
      Nuclear Power Stations Emergency Preparedness Program to determine that the
      independent assessments met the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(t). The inspectors
      reviewed samples of CAP records associated with the 2016 biennial exercise, as well as
      various EP drills conducted in 2016, in order to determine whether the licensee fulfilled
      drill commitments and to evaluate the licensees efforts to identify and resolve identified
      issues. The inspectors reviewed a sample of EP items and corrective actions related to
      the stations EP program, and activities to determine whether corrective actions were
      completed in accordance with the sites CAP. Documents reviewed are listed in the
      Attachment to this report.
      This maintenance of EP inspection constituted one sample as defined in
      IP 71114.05-06.
  b. Findings
      No findings were identified.
1EP6 Drill Evaluation (71114.06)
.1  Emergency Preparedness Drill Observation
  a. Inspection Scope
      The inspectors evaluated the conduct of a routine licensee emergency drill on
      February 15, 2017, to identify any weaknesses and deficiencies in classification,
      notification, and protective action recommendation development activities. The
      inspectors observed emergency response operations in the technical support center and
      operations support center to determine whether the event classification, notifications,
      and protective action recommendations were performed in accordance with procedures.
      The inspectors also attended the licensee drill critique to compare any
      inspector-observed weakness with those identified by the licensee staff in order to
      evaluate the critique and to verify whether the licensee staff was properly identifying
      weaknesses and entering them into the corrective action program. As part of the
      inspection, the inspectors reviewed the drill package and other documents listed in the
      Attachment to this report.
      This EP drill inspection constituted one sample as defined in IP 71114.06-06.
  b. Findings
      No findings were identified.
                                            17
 
2.    RADIATION SAFETY
2RS1 Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls (71124.01)
.1  Radiological Hazard Assessment (02.02)
  a. Inspection Scope
      The inspectors assessed the licensees current and historic isotopic mix, including alpha
      emitters and other hard-to-detect radionuclides. The inspectors evaluated whether
      survey protocols were reasonable to identify the magnitude and extent of the radiological
      hazards.
      The inspectors determined if there have been changes to plant operations since the last
      inspection that may have resulted in a significant new radiological hazard for onsite
      individuals. The inspectors evaluated whether the licensee assessed the potential
      impact of these changes and implemented periodic monitoring, as appropriate, to detect
      and quantify the radiological hazard. The inspectors reviewed the last two radiological
      surveys from selected plant areas and evaluated whether the thoroughness and
      frequency of the surveys were appropriate for the given radiological hazard.
      The inspectors conducted walkdowns of the facility, including radioactive waste
      processing, storage, and handling areas to evaluate material conditions and performed
      independent radiation measurements as needed to verify conditions were consistent
      with documented radiation surveys.
      The inspectors assessed the adequacy of pre-work surveys for select radiologically
      risk-significant work activities.
      The inspectors evaluated the radiological survey program to determine if hazards were
      properly identified. The inspectors discussed procedures, equipment, and performance
      of surveys with radiation protection staff and assessed whether technicians were
      knowledgeable about when and how to survey areas for various types of radiological
      hazards.
      The inspectors reviewed work in potential airborne areas to assess whether air samples
      were being taken appropriately for their intended purpose and reviewed various survey
      records to assess whether the samples were collected and analyzed appropriately. The
      inspectors also reviewed the licensees program for monitoring contamination which has
      the potential to become airborne.
      These inspection activities constituted one complete sample as defined in
      IP 71124.01-05.
  b. Findings
      No findings were identified.
                                            18
 
.2  Instructions to Workers (02.03)
  a. Inspection Scope
    The inspectors reviewed select radiation work permits used to access high radiation
    areas and evaluated the specified work control instructions or control barriers. The
    inspectors also assessed whether workers where made aware of the work instructions
    and area dose rates.
    The inspectors reviewed electronic alarming dosimeter dose and dose rate alarm
    setpoint methodology. For selected electronic alarming dosimeter occurrences, the
    inspectors assessed the workers response to the alarm, the licensees evaluation of the
    alarm, and any follow-up investigations.
    The inspectors reviewed the licensees methods for informing workers of changes in
    plant operations or radiological conditions that could significantly impact their
    occupational dose.
    The inspectors reviewed the labeling of select containers of licensed radioactive material
    that could cause unplanned or inadvertent exposure to workers.
    These inspection activities constituted one complete sample as defined in
    IP 71124.01-05.
  b. Findings
    No findings were identified.
.3  Contamination and Radioactive Material Control (02.04)
  a. Inspection Scope
    The inspectors observed locations where the licensee monitors material leaving the
    radiologically controlled area and assessed the methods used for control, survey, and
    release of material from these areas. As available, the inspectors observed health
    physics personnel surveying and releasing material for unrestricted use.
    The inspectors observed workers leaving the radiologically controlled area and assessed
    their use of tool and personal contamination monitors and reviewed the licensees
    criterial for use of the monitors.
    The inspectors assessed whether instrumentation was used at its typical sensitivity
    levels based on appropriate counting parameters or whether the licensee had
    established a de facto release limit.
    The inspectors selected several sealed sources from the licensees inventory records
    and assessed whether the sources were accounted for and verified to be intact. The
    inspectors also evaluated whether any transactions, since the last inspection, involving
    nationally tracked sources were reported in accordance with 10 CFR 20.2207.
    These inspection activities constituted one complete sample as defined in
    IP 71124.01-05.
                                          19
 
  b. Findings
    No findings were identified.
.4  Radiological Hazards Control and Work Coverage (02.05)
  a. Inspection Scope
    The inspectors evaluated ambient radiological conditions during tours of the facility.
    The inspectors assessed whether the conditions were consistent with applicable posted
    surveys, radiation work permits, and worker briefings.
    The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of radiological controls, such as required
    surveys, radiation protection job coverage, and contamination controls. The inspectors
    evaluated the licensees use of electronic alarming dosimeters in high noise areas as
    high radiation area monitoring devices.
    The inspectors assessed whether radiation monitoring devices were placed on the
    individuals body consistent with licensee procedures. The inspectors assessed whether
    the dosimeter was placed in the location of highest expected dose or that the licensee
    properly employed a U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission approved method of
    determining effective dose equivalent.
    The inspectors reviewed the application of dosimetry to effectively monitor exposure to
    personnel in work areas with significant dose rate gradients.
    For select airborne area radiation work permits, the inspectors reviewed airborne
    radioactivity controls and monitoring, the potential for significant airborne levels,
    containment barrier integrity, and temporary filtered ventilation system operation.
    The inspectors examined the licensees physical and programmatic controls for highly
    activated or contaminated materials stored within pools and assessed whether
    appropriate controls were in place to preclude inadvertent removal of these materials
    from the pool.
    These inspection activities constituted one complete sample as defined in
    IP 71124.01-05.
  b. Findings
    No findings were identified.
.5  High Radiation Area and Very High Radiation Area Controls (02.06)
  a. Inspection Scope
    The inspectors observed posting and physical controls for high radiation areas and very
    high radiation areas to assess adequacy.
    The inspectors conducted a selective inspection of posting and physical controls for high
    radiation areas and very high radiation areas to assess conformance with performance
    indicators.
                                            20
 
    The inspectors reviewed procedural changes to assess the adequacy of access controls
    for high and very high radiation areas to determine whether procedural changes
    substantially reduced the effectiveness and level of worker protection.
    The inspectors assessed the controls the high radiation areas greater than 1 rem/hour
    and areas with the potential to become high radiation areas greater than 1 rem/hour for
    compliance with TS and procedures.
    The inspectors assessed the controls for very high radiation areas and areas with the
    potential to become very high radiation areas. The inspectors also assessed whether
    individuals were unable to gain unauthorized access to these areas.
    These inspection activities constituted one complete sample as defined in
    IP 71124.01-05.
  b. Findings
    No findings were identified.
.6  Radiation Worker Performance and Radiation Protection Technician Proficiency (02.07)
  a. Inspection Scope
    The inspectors observed radiation worker performance and assessed their performance
    with respect to radiation protection work requirements, the level of radiological hazards
    present and radiation work permit controls.
    The inspectors assessed worker awareness of electronic alarming dosimeter set points,
    stay times or permissible dose for radiologically significant work as well as expected
    response to alarms.
    The inspectors observed radiation protection technician performance and assessed
    whether the technicians were aware of the radiological conditions and radiation work
    permit controls and whether their performance was consistent with training and
    qualifications for the given radiological hazards.
    The inspectors observed radiation protection technician performance of radiation
    surveys and assessed the appropriateness of the instruments being used, including
    calibration and source checks.
    These inspection activities constituted one complete sample as defined in
    IP 71124.01-05.
  b. Findings
    No findings were identified.
.7  Problem Identification and Resolution (02.08)
  a. Inspection Scope
    The inspectors assessed whether problems associated with radiological hazard
    assessment and exposure controls were being identified at an appropriate threshold and
                                            21
 
      were properly addressed for resolution. For select problems, the inspectors assessed
      the appropriateness of the corrective actions. The inspectors also assessed the
      licensees program for reviewing and incorporating operating experience.
      The inspectors reviewed select problems related to human performance errors and
      assessed whether there was a similar cause and whether corrective actions taken
      resolve the problems.
      The inspectors reviewed select problems related to radiation protection technician error
      and assessed whether there was a similar cause and whether corrective actions taken
      resolve the problems.
      These inspection activities constituted one complete sample as defined in
      IP 71124.01-05.
  b. Findings
      No findings were identified.
2RS2 Occupational As-Low-As-Reasonably-Achievable Planning and Controls (71124.02)
.1  Implementation of As-Low-As-Reasonably-Achievable and Radiological Work Controls
      (02.04)
  a. Inspection Scope
      The inspectors conducted observations of in-plant work activities and assessed whether
      the licensee had effectively integrated the planned administrative, operational, and
      engineering controls into the actual field work to maintain occupational exposure
      As-Low-As-Reasonably-Achievable (ALARA). The inspectors observed pre-job briefings
      and determined if the planned controls were discussed with workers. The inspectors
      evaluated the placement and use of shielding, contamination controls, airborne controls,
      radiation work permit controls and other engineering work controls against the ALARA
      plans.
      These inspection activities supplemented those documented in NRC Integrated
      Inspection Report 05000254/2016002 and 05000265/2016002 and constituted a partial
      sample as defined in IP 71124.02-05.
  b. Findings
      No findings were identified.
.2  Radiation Worker Performance (02.05)
  a. Inspection Scope
      The inspectors observed radiation worker and radiation protection technician
      performance during work activities being performed in radiation areas, airborne
      radioactivity areas, or high radiation areas to assess whether workers demonstrated
      the ALARA philosophy in practice and followed procedures. The inspectors observed
      radiation worker performance to evaluate whether the training and skill level was
      sufficient with respect to the radiological hazards and the work involved.
                                              22
 
      The inspectors interviewed individuals from selected work groups to assess their
      knowledge and awareness of planned and/or implemented radiological and ALARA
      work controls.
      These inspection activities supplemented those documented in NRC Integrated
      Inspection Report 05000254/2016002 and 05000265/2016002 and constituted a partial
      complete sample as defined in IP 71124.02-05.
  b. Findings
      No findings were identified.
2RS3 In-Plant Airborne Radioactivity Control and Mitigation (71124.03)
.1  Engineering Controls (02.02)
  a. Inspection Scope
      The inspectors reviewed procedural guidance for use of ventilation systems and
      assessed whether the systems were used, to the extent practicable, during high-risk
      activities to control airborne radioactivity and minimize the use of respiratory protection.
      The inspectors assessed whether installed ventilation airflow capacity, flow path, and
      filter/charcoal unit efficiencies for selected systems were consistent with maintaining
      concentrations of airborne radioactivity in work areas below the concentrations of an
      airborne area to the extent practicable. The inspectors also evaluated whether selected
      temporary ventilation systems used to support work in contaminated areas were
      consistent with licensee procedural guidance and ALARA.
      These inspection activities supplemented those documented in NRC Integrated
      Inspection Report 05000254/2016002 and 05000265/2016002 and constituted one
      complete sample as defined in IP 71124.03-05.
  b. Findings
      No findings were identified.
.2  Use of Respiratory Protection Devices (02.03)
  a. Inspection Scope
      The inspectors reviewed records of air testing for supplied-air devices and self-contained
      breathing apparatus (SCBA) bottles to assess whether the air used met or exceeded
      Grade D quality. The inspectors evaluated whether plant breathing air supply systems
      satisfied the minimum pressure and airflow requirements for the devices.
      The inspectors reviewed training curricula for use of respiratory protection devices to
      assess whether individuals are adequately trained on donning, doffing, function checks,
      and how to respond to a malfunction.
                                                23
 
    The inspectors observed the physical condition of respiratory protection devices ready
    for issuance and reviewed records of routine inspection for selected devices. The
    inspectors reviewed records of maintenance on the vital components for selected
    devices and assessed whether onsite personnel assigned to repair vital components
    received vendor-provided training.
    These inspection activities supplemented those documented in NRC Integrated
    Inspection Report 05000254/2016002 and 05000265/2016002 and constituted one
    complete sample as defined in IP 71124.03-05.
  b. Findings
    No findings were identified.
.3  Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus for Emergency Use (02.04)
  a. Inspection Scope
    The inspectors reviewed the status and surveillance records for select SCBAs. The
    inspectors evaluated the licensees capability for refilling and transporting SCBA air
    bottles to and from the control room and operations support center during emergency
    conditions.
    The inspectors assessed whether control room operators and other emergency
    response and radiation protection personnel were trained and qualified in the use of
    SCBAs and evaluated whether personnel assigned to refill bottles were trained and
    qualified for that task.
    The inspectors assessed whether appropriate mask sizes and types were available for
    use. The inspectors evaluated whether on-shift operators had no facial hair that would
    interfere with the sealing of the mask and that appropriate vision correction was
    available.
    The inspectors reviewed the past two years of maintenance records for selected
    in service SCBA units used to support operator activities during accident conditions.
    The inspectors assessed whether maintenance or repairs on an SCBA units vital
    components were performed by an individual certified by the manufacturer of the device
    to perform the work. The inspectors evaluated the onsite maintenance procedures
    governing vital component work to determine whether there was any inconsistencies
    with the SCBA manufacturers recommended practices. The inspectors evaluated
    whether SCBA cylinders satisfied the hydrostatic testing required by the
    U.S. Department of Transportation.
    These inspection activities constituted one complete sample as defined in
    IP 71124.03-05.
  b. Findings
    No findings were identified.
                                          24
 
.4  Problem Identification and Resolution (02.05)
  a. Inspection Scope
      The inspectors assessed whether problems associated with the control and mitigation of
      in-plant airborne radioactivity were being identified by the licensee at an appropriate
      threshold and were properly addressed for resolution. Additionally, the inspectors
      evaluated the appropriateness of the corrective actions for selected problems involving
      airborne radioactivity documented by the licensee.
      These inspection activities constituted one complete sample as defined in
      IP 71124.03-05.
  b. Findings
      No findings were identified.
2RS4 Occupational Dose Assessment (71124.04)
.1  External Dosimetry (02.03)
  a. Inspection Scope
      The inspectors evaluated the calibration of active dosimeters. The inspectors assessed
      the bias of the active dosimeters compared to passive dosimeters and the correction
      factor used. The inspectors also assessed the licensees program for comparing active
      and passive dosimeter results, investigations for substantial differences, and recording
      of dose. The inspectors assessed whether there were adverse trends for active
      dosimeters.
      These inspection activities supplemented those documented in NRC Integrated
      Inspection Report 05000254/2016003 and 05000265/2016003 and constituted one
      complete sample as defined in IP 71124.04-05.
  b. Findings
      No findings were identified.
.2  Internal Dosimetry (02.04)
  a. Inspection Scope
      The inspectors reviewed procedures used to determine internal dose using in vitro
      analysis to assess the adequacy of sample collection, determination of entry route and
      assignment of dose.
      The inspectors reviewed the licensee's program for dose assessment based on air
      sampling, as applicable, and calculations of derived air concentration. The inspectors
      determined whether flow rates and collection times for air sampling equipment were
      adequate to allow lower limits of detection to be obtained. The inspectors also reviewed
      the adequacy of procedural guidance to assess internal dose if respiratory protection
      was used.
                                            25
 
    These inspection supplemented those documented in NRC Integrated Inspection Report
    05000254/2016003 and 05000265/2016003 and constituted one complete sample as
    defined in IP 71124.04-05.
  b. Findings
    No findings were identified.
.3  Special Dosimetric Situations (02.05)
  a. Inspection Scope
    The inspectors assessed whether the licensee informs workers of the risks of radiation
    exposure to the embryo/fetus, the regulatory aspects of declaring a pregnancy, and the
    specific process to be used for declaring a pregnancy. The inspectors selected
    individuals who had declared pregnancy during the current assessment period and
    evaluated whether the monitoring program for declared pregnant workers was
    technically adequate to assess the dose to the embryo/fetus. The inspectors assessed
    results and/or monitoring controls for compliance with regulatory requirements.
    The inspectors reviewed the licensee's methodology for monitoring external dose in
    nonuniform radiation fields or where large dose gradients exist. The inspectors
    evaluated the licensee's criteria for determining when alternate monitoring was to
    be implemented. The inspectors reviewed dose assessments performed using
    multibadging to evaluate whether the assessment was performed consistently with
    licensee procedures and dosimetric standards.
    The inspectors evaluated the licensees methods for calculating shallow dose equivalent
    from distributed skin contamination or discrete radioactive particles.
    The inspectors evaluated the licensees program for neutron dosimetry, including
    dosimeter types and/or survey instrumentation. The inspectors reviewed select neutron
    exposure situations and assessed whether dosimetry and/or instrumentation was
    appropriate for the expected neutron spectra, there was sufficient sensitivity, and
    neutron dosimetry was properly calibrated. The inspectors also assessed whether
    interference by gamma radiation had been accounted for in the calibration and whether
    time and motion evaluations were representative of actual neutron exposure events.
    For the special dosimetric situations reviewed in this section, the inspectors assessed
    how the licensee assigned dose of record. This included an assessment of external and
    internal monitoring results, supplementary information on individual exposures, and
    radiation surveys and/or air monitoring results when dosimetry was based on these
    techniques.
    These inspection activities constituted one complete sample as defined in
    IP 71124.04-05.
  b. Findings
    No findings were identified.
                                            26
 
.4  Problem Identification and Resolution (02.06)
  a. Inspection Scope
      The inspectors assessed whether problems associated with occupational dose
      assessment were being identified by the licensee at an appropriate threshold and were
      properly addressed for resolution. The inspectors assessed the appropriateness of the
      corrective actions for a selected sample of problems documented by the licensee
      involving occupational dose assessment.
      These inspection constituted one complete sample as defined in IP 71124.04-05.
  b. Findings
      No findings were identified.
4.    OTHER ACTIVITIES
      Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, Emergency
      Preparedness, Public Radiation Safety, Occupational Radiation Safety, and
      Security
4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification (71151)
.1  Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours
  a. Inspection Scope
      The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical
      Hours performance indicator (PI) for Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2,
      for the period from the first quarter 2016 through the fourth quarter 2016. To determine
      the accuracy of the PI data reported during those periods, PI definitions and guidance
      contained in the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) Document 99-02, Regulatory
      Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 7, dated August 31, 2013, were
      used. The inspectors reviewed the licensees operator narrative logs, IRs, event reports,
      and NRC integrated inspection reports for the period of January 1, 2016, through
      December 31, 2016, to validate the accuracy of the submittals. The inspectors also
      reviewed the licensees IR database to determine if any problems had been identified
      with the PI data collected or transmitted for this indicator, and none were identified.
      Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.
      This inspection constituted two unplanned scrams per 7000 critical hours samples as
      defined in IP 71151-05.
  b. Findings
      No findings were identified.
                                              27
 
.2  Unplanned Scrams with Complications
  a. Inspection Scope
    The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the Unplanned Scrams with
    Complications PI for Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2, for the period
    from the first quarter 2016 through the fourth quarter 2016. To determine the accuracy of
    the PI data reported during those periods, PI definitions and guidance contained in the
    NEI Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline,
    Revision 7, dated August 31, 2013, were used. The inspectors reviewed the licensees
    operator narrative logs, IRs, event reports, and NRC integrated inspection reports for the
    period of January 1, 2016 through December 31, 2016, to validate the accuracy of the
    submittals. The inspectors also reviewed the licensees IR database to determine if any
    problems had been identified with the PI data collected or transmitted for this indicator,
    and none were identified. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this
    report.
    This inspection constituted two unplanned scrams with complications samples as
    defined in IP 71151-05.
  b. Findings
    No findings were identified.
.3  Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours
  a. Inspection Scope
    The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the Unplanned Transients per
    7000 Critical Hours PI for Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2, for the
    period from the first quarter 2016 through the fourth quarter 2016. To determine the
    accuracy of the PI data reported during those periods, PI definitions and guidance
    contained in the NEI Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator
    Guideline, Revision 7, dated August 31, 2013, were used. The inspectors reviewed the
    licensees operator narrative logs, IRs, maintenance rule records, event reports, and
    NRC integrated inspection reports for the period of January 1, 2016 through
    December 31, 2016 to validate the accuracy of the submittals. The inspectors also
    reviewed the licensees issue report database to determine if any problems had been
    identified with the PI data collected or transmitted for this indicator, and none were
    identified. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.
    This inspection constituted two unplanned transients per 7000 critical hours samples as
    defined in IP 71151-05.
  b. Findings
    No findings were identified.
                                            28
 
.4  Drill and Exercise Performance
  a. Inspection Scope
    The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the Drill and Exercise
    Performance (DEP) Indicator for the fourth quarter 2016. To determine the accuracy
    of the PI data reported during that period, PI definitions and guidance contained in the
    NEI Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment PI Guideline, Revision 7, were used.
    The inspectors reviewed the licensees records associated with the PI to verify that the
    licensee accurately reported the DEP indicator, in accordance with relevant procedures
    and NEI guidance. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed licensee records and
    processes, including procedural guidance on assessing opportunities for the PI;
    assessments of PI opportunities during pre-designated control room simulator training
    sessions; performance during the 2016 biennial exercise; and performance during other
    drills. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.
    This inspection constitutes one DEP sample as defined in IP 71151-05.
  b. Findings
    No findings were identified.
.5  Emergency Response Organization Drill Participation
  a. Inspection Scope
    The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the ERO Drill Participation PI for the
    fourth quarter of 2016. To determine the accuracy of the PI data reported during that
    period, PI definitions and guidance contained in NEI Document 99-02, Regulatory
    Assessment PI Guideline, Revision 7, were used. The inspectors reviewed the
    licensees records associated with the PI to verify that the licensee accurately reported
    the indicator, in accordance with relevant procedures and NEI guidance. Specifically,
    the inspectors reviewed licensee records and processes, including procedural guidance
    on assessing opportunities for the PI; participation during the 2016 biennial exercise and
    other drills; and revisions of the roster of personnel assigned to key ERO positions.
    Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.
    This inspection constitutes one ERO drill participation sample as defined in
    IP 71151-05.
  b. Findings
    No findings were identified.
.6  Alert and Notification System Reliability
  a. Inspection Scope
    The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the ANS PI for the fourth quarter
    of 2016. To determine the accuracy of the PI data reported during that period, PI
    definitions and guidance contained in NEI Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment
    PI Guideline, Revision 7, were used. The inspectors reviewed the licensees records
    associated with the PI to verify that the licensee accurately reported the indicator, in
                                            29
 
      accordance with relevant procedures and NEI guidance. Specifically, the inspectors
      reviewed licensee records and processes, including procedural guidance on
      assessing opportunities for the PI and results of periodic ANS operability tests.
      Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.
      This inspection constitutes one ANS sample as defined in IP 71151-05.
  b. Findings
      No findings were identified.
4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems (71152)
.1  Routine Review of Items Entered into the Corrective Action Program
  a. Inspection Scope
      As discussed in previous sections of this report, the inspectors routinely reviewed issues
      during baseline inspection activities and plant status reviews to verify they were being
      entered into the licensees CAP at an appropriate threshold, adequate attention was
      being given to timely corrective actions, and adverse trends were identified and
      addressed. Some minor issues were entered into the licensees CAP as a result of the
      inspectors observations; however, they are not discussed in this report.
      These routine reviews for the identification and resolution of problems did not constitute
      any additional inspection samples. Instead, by procedure they were considered an
      integral part of the inspections performed during the quarter.
  b. Findings
      No findings were identified.
.2  Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues
  a. Inspection Scope
      The inspectors selected the following issues and condition reports for in-depth review:
      *      IR 3967424, Unit 1C RHRSW Pump Abnormal Indications;
      *      Aggregate review of operator burdens; and
      *      IR 3985153, Core Spray Keep Fill Valve 1-1402-64B, Stuck.
      As appropriate, the inspectors verified the following attributes during their review of the
      licensee's corrective actions for the above condition reports and other related condition
      reports:
      *      complete and accurate identification of the problem in a timely manner
            commensurate with its safety significance and ease of discovery;
      *      consideration of the extent of condition, generic implications, common cause, and
            previous occurrences;
      *      evaluation and disposition of operability/functionality/reportability issues;
                                            30
 
    *      classification and prioritization of the resolution of the problem commensurate with
          safety significance;
    *      identification of the root and contributing causes of the problem; and
    *      identification of corrective actions, which were appropriately focused to correct the
          problem;
    *      completion of corrective actions in a timely manner commensurate with the safety
          significance of the issue;
    *      effectiveness of corrective actions taken to preclude repetition;
    *      evaluate applicability for operating experience and communicate applicable
          lessons learned to appropriate organizations.
    The inspectors discussed the corrective actions and associated evaluations with
    licensee personnel.
    This review constituted three in-depth problem identification and resolution inspection
    samples as defined in IP 71152.
b.  Findings
(1) Failure to Ensure Hardware Secure for Breaker Mechanism Operated Contact Switch
    Linkage
    Introduction: A finding of very low safety significance and an associated NCV of
    10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, was self-revealed on January 27, 2017, when the
    Unit 1C RHRSW pump was started for a routine surveillance evolution and all expected
    annunciators and equipment failed to operate properly. This led to the licensee
    declaring the Unit 1C RHRSW pump inoperable. Specifically, the licensee failed to
    establish a procedure for the mechanism operated contact (MOC) switch linkage arm
    that was appropriate to the circumstances (i.e. ensure the component would continue to
    perform its function).
    Description: On January 27, 2017, the licensee started the Unit 1C RHRSW pump to
    support a RHR pump surveillance. Upon starting the pump, the control room received
    an RHRSW pump trip alarm. Equipment operators in the field reported that the 1C
    RHRSW pump was running; however, room cooler fans for the pump were not operating
    and the breaker light indication for the pump at Bus 14 was not lit. The licensee then
    verified the breakers for the pump room cooler fans were closed. Consequently, the
    licensee secured the RHR and RHRSW pumps, declared the Unit 1C RHRSW pump
    inoperable, and began troubleshooting the issue.
    The licensees troubleshooting revealed that the linkage for the Unit 1C RHRSW pump
    breaker MOC switch had become disconnected. This prevented the MOC switch, which
    controls other component functions (e.g. alarms and room cooler fan operation) through
    the use of auxiliary contacts, from functioning as expected.
    The licensees equipment CAP evaluation identified that the licensees procedure for
    periodic inspection of the breaker cubicle lacked specific guidance to ensure the MOC
    switch linkage assembly hardware was adequately fastened. Specifically, the licensees
    procedures for performing maintenance and inspections of 4 kilo-volt (kV) breakers
    lacked appropriate acceptance criteria or instructions that would ensure the linkage arm
    for the MOC switch would not come loose during repeated breaker cycling. The
                                            31
 
procedure, QCEPM 0200-11, Inspection and Maintenance of Horizontal 4kV Cubicles,
Section 4.5.9.1, directed the user to Verify MOC switch linkage hardware is in place and
tight. The procedure did not specify a method for ensuring the hardware was tight. The
licensee implemented corrective actions to establish appropriate instructions (i.e.
mechanically verify tightness by using a tool, etc.) to ensure the MOC switch linkage
would remain properly secured.
Analysis: The inspectors determined that the licensees failure to establish a procedure
for the MOC switch linkage arm that was appropriate to the circumstances (i.e. ensure
the component would continue to perform its function) was contrary to 10 CFR 50,
Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, and was a
performance deficiency.
The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because the finding
was associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of equipment
performance and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability,
reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent
undesirable consequences. Specifically, the failure to ensure the MOC switch linkage
arm was adequately fastened led to the failure of the component and its associated
1C RHRSW pump during breaker operation on January 27, 2017.
Using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Attachment 4, Initial Characterization of
Findings, and IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for
Findings at Power, issued June 19, 2012, the finding was screened against the
Mitigating Systems cornerstone and determined to be of very low safety significance
(Green), because the inspectors answered No to all of the questions in Exhibit 2,
Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, Section A, Mitigating SSCs and
Functionality.
The inspectors determined this finding affected the cross-cutting area of human
performance, in the aspect of avoid complacency, which states, Individuals recognize
and plan for the possibility of mistakes, latent issues, and inherent risk, even while
expecting successful outcomes. Specifically, the licensee failed to recognize a potential
risk and inherent latent issue for a condition identified in 2015 at Quad Cities, when a
MOC switch failed to perform its function due to a missing nut in a different breakers
linkage assembly. The licensee identified and corrected the condition, but failed to
evaluate the cause of the missing nut because it did not impact the operability of the
component. In the 2015 instance, the MOC switch issue only affected indications for the
component and had no adverse impact on the ability of the component to perform its
function [H.12].
Enforcement: Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures,
and Drawings, requires, in part, that activities affecting quality be prescribed by
documented procedures of a type appropriate to the circumstances and be
accomplished in accordance with these procedures. The licensee established
QCEPM 0200-11, Inspection and Maintenance of Horizontal 4kV Cubicles,
Revision 37, as the implementing procedure for performing inspections and maintenance
on 4kV safety-related breaker cubicles, an activity affecting quality.
Contrary to the above, prior to January 27, 2017, licensee procedure QCEPM 0200-11
failed to be of a type appropriate to the circumstances. Specifically, procedure
                                        32
 
      QCEPM 0200-11 did not contain instruction to ensure that the MOC switch linkage
      arm was adequately fastened and would continue to perform its function. On
      January 27, 2017, during operation of the 1C RHRSW pump breaker, the MOC switch
      linkage arm became disconnected, preventing the MOC switch from performing its
      function, and led the licensee to declare the 1C RHRSW pump inoperable.
      The licensees corrective actions included reconnecting the MOC switch linkage arm
      assembly and testing it by starting the 1C RHRSW pump prior to declaring the pump
      operable. In addition, the licensee planned procedure revisions to QCEPM 0200-11 that
      would specify a torque value to ensure the MOC switch linkage arm was adequately
      secured and could perform its function. Because the violation was of very low safety
      significance and was entered into the licensees CAP as IR 3967424, this violation is
      being treated as a NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
      (NCV 05000254/2017001-01; 05000265/2017001-01; Failure to Ensure Hardware
      Secure for Breaker MOC Switch Linkage)
4OA3 Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion (71153)
.1  Unit 2 Alert Declared Following a Fire that Caused Damage to E Automatic
      Depressurization System Indication and Control Circuitry
  a. Inspection Scope
      The inspectors reviewed the plants response to a small fire in the Unit 2 control room
      panel that caused damage to the E automatic depressurization system (ADS)
      electromatic relief valve (ERV) indication and control circuitry.
      At approximately 7:29 p.m. on February 1, 2017, a reactor operator was changing the
      closed-light indication light bulb on Unit 2 E ADS valve, 2-0203-3E. After inserting the
      new bulb with a bulb tool (a rubber sleeve that holds the small bulb), the operator
      noticed sparking, and attempted to remove the bulb. When he removed the light, the
      bulb had separated from the base, leaving the base in the light socket. The reactor
      operator noticed arcing continued and went to the back of the control panel and
      identified a flame in the underside of the panel. Another operator in the control room
      retrieved a fire extinguisher and discharged a short burst to extinguish the flame, the
      flame was out at 7:32 p.m. No equipment operated and no annunciators were received.
      The Unit 2 supervisor declared the E ADS valve inoperable and the licensee entered
      Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCOs) 3.4.3, RCS Safety and Relief Valves,
      Condition A, for one relief valve inoperable and LCO 3.5.1, ECCS [Emergency Core
      Cooling Systems]Operating, Condition H, for one ADS valve inoperable. The
      licensee subsequently declared an ALERT at 7:38 p.m. for Emergency Action
      Level MA5, Hazardous event affecting a SAFETY SYSTEM required for the current
      operating mode. Specifically, the Emergency Action Level conditions present were: a
      FIRE AND the event caused VISIBLE DAMAGE to a SAFETY SYSTEM component or
      structure required by TS for the current operating mode.
      Following visual inspections of the control panel and verifications that there were no
      other equipment issues impacting plant operations, the licensee terminated from the
      event at 11:36 p.m on February 1, 2017.
                                            33
 
      Licensee corrective actions included replacing the light sockets and wiring for the open
      and closed indications for the E ADS valve, in addition to replacing the fuses for both
      the normal and alternate power supplies for the control circuitry. The licensee declared
      the E ADS valve operable on February 2, 2017. Both units remained at full power
      throughout the event.
      The licensee entered this issue into their CAP as IR 3969324, Light Socket for 2-203-3E
      Damaged during Bulb Change, and their root cause evaluation was in-progress at the
      end of this inspection period. This event follow-up review, including inspection of the
      licensees evaluation of the event and planned corrective actions was in-progress at the
      end of this inspection period and continued into the next inspection period.
      Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.
      This event follow-up review constituted a partial sample and continued into the next
      inspection period.
  b. Findings
      No findings were identified.
.2  (Closed) Licensee Event Report 05000254/2017-001-00: Secondary Containment
      Interlock Doors Opened Simultaneously
      On January 24, 2017, the licensee identified that both doors in the secondary
      containment interlock on the 595 elevation between the reactor building and the Unit 2
      reactor feed pump room were opened simultaneously for approximately 3 seconds. This
      resulted in the licensee making an unplanned entry into LCO 3.6.4.1, Condition A, for an
      inoperable secondary containment. The licensee immediately closed the interlock doors
      to reestablish secondary containment and administratively controlled personnel entry
      and egress through the doors thereafter. The inspectors determined this issue was
      minor because secondary containment pressure remained negative throughout the
      condition, although the event resulted in an unplanned entry into the licensees TS. The
      cause of the event was a dirty contact that caused the interlock relay to stick. Corrective
      actions taken by the licensee included inspecting and cleaning of the interlock relay
      contacts.
      The inspectors reviewed the licensee event report (LER). No findings or violations of
      NRC requirements were identified. This LER is closed.
      This event follow-up review constituted one sample as defined in IP 71153-05.
4OA5 Other Activities
.1  (Closed) NRC Temporary Instruction 2515/192, Inspection of the Licensees Interim
      Compensatory Measures Associated with the Open Phase Condition Design
      Vulnerabilities in Electric Power Systems
  a. Inspection Scope
      The objective of this performance based Temporary Instruction is to verify
      implementation of interim compensatory measures associated with an open phase
                                            34
 
    condition (OPC) design vulnerability in electric power system for operating reactors. The
    inspectors conducted an inspection to determine if the licensee had implemented the
    following interim compensatory measures. These compensatory measures are to
    remain in place until permanent automatic detection and protection schemes are
    installed and declared operable for OPC design vulnerability. The inspectors verified the
    following:
    *        The licensee had identified and discussed with plant staff the lessons-learned
              from the OPC events at the US operating plants, including the Byron station OPC
              event and its consequences. This included conducting operator training for
              promptly diagnosing, recognizing consequences, and responding to an OPC
              event.
    *        The licensee had updated plant operating procedures to help operators promptly
              diagnose and respond to OPC events on off-site power sources credited for safe
              shutdown of the plant.
    *        The licensee had established and continues to implement periodic walkdown
              activities to inspect switchyard equipment such as insulators, disconnect
              switches, and transmission line and transformer connections associated with the
              offsite power circuits to detect a visible OPC.
    *        The licensee had ensured that routine maintenance and testing activities on
              switchyard components have been implemented and maintained. As a part of
              the maintenance and testing activities, the licensee assessed and managed plant
              risk in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) requirements.
  a. Findings and Observations
    No findings of significance were identified. The inspectors verified the criteria were met.
.2  (Closed) Unresolved Item 05000254/2013003-02; 05000265/2013003-02: Question
    Concerning Licensing Bases of the Ultimate Heat Sink
  a. Inspection Scope
    During the 2013 Triennial Heat Sink Inspection, the inspectors identified an unresolved
    item (URI) concerning the current licensing bases with respect to failure of Lock and
    Dam No. 14 on the Mississippi River. Specifically, the inspectors were concerned that
    the licensee had revised its licensing basis as a result of a 1998 UFSAR change without
    NRC approval. The licensees historical documents stated the loss of river event was
    from a loss of Dam No. 14, whereas the current UFSAR discusses the loss of river event
    as damage to the lock. However, there was no discussion in the historical documents as
    to what caused Dam No. 14 failure or the extent of the failure. Although both causes
    result in the river being disconnected from the plant, there would be a significant time
    difference as to how long it would be before the river was no longer available to cool
    plant equipment and the amount of time available for the plant staff to identify and take
    appropriate actions to address the failure at the dam.
    The licensee revised the UFSAR to clarify the loss of river event based on the Ashton
    Study, Study of Mississippi River Water Stage at Quad Cities Nuclear Power Plant,
    dated April 24, 1998, which was performed to resolve a previous NRC URI with the loss
    of dam event. This issue concerned the effects of the ultimate heat sink (UHS)
    temperature being above the design temperature limit for several plant components
                                              35
 
    cooled by the service water systems. This issue was documented in NRC Inspection
    Report 05000254/1998201; 05000265/1998201 (ML9805180380) and subsequently
    closed in NRC Inspection Report 05000254/1998019; 05000265/1998019
    (ML9812290041). The closure of the 1998 URI was based on the results of the Ashton
    study, which concluded that the most likely failure of the dam was a navigation event
    that would result in the loss of the dam lock. The study concluded that it would take 48
    hours for the river level to lower to the point it disconnected from the UHS. In addition,
    the study concluded based on the assumed low seismic region where the dam was
    located, a seismic event would not cause a failure of the dam, but result in the inability to
    operate the dams rolling and miter gates. In addition, subsequent to the UFSAR
    change, the NRC granted Quad Cities an amendment for an extended power uprate,
    dated December 21, 2001. The Safety Evaluation Report associated with this
    amendment (ML013540222) discussed the loss of dam event using the clarified UFSAR
    wording of the lock failure as a basis for its approval.
    Based on the review of historical records and discussions with the Office of Nuclear
    Reactor Regulation, the inspectors did not identify a concern with the current licensing
    basis with respect to the failure of Mississippi River Lock and Dam No. 14. As a result,
    this URI is closed.
  b. Findings
    No findings were identified.
.3  (Closed) Unresolved Item 05000254/2013003-04; 05000265/2013003-04: Question
    Concerning Availability of Dam Following a Seismic Event
  a. Inspection Scope
    During the 2013 Triennial Heat Sink Inspection, the inspectors identified a URI
    concerning the assumed availability of Mississippi River Lock and Dam No.14 following
    a design bases earthquake event. Discussion in the UFSAR implied the river was
    considered available during a Design Basis Event (DBE) even though the downstream
    dam was not designed or constructed to remain functional during the assumed DBE.
    Although the site appeared to be within their licensing bases (assume availability of the
    river during a DBE), the inspectors questioned whether this assumption considered
    actual potential consequences, i.e., the need to assume a loss of dam during a seismic
    event.
    The NRC issued Order EA-12-049, Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to
    Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond Design-Basis External Events,
    dated March 12, 2012, which is being addressed by licensees based on the guidance of
    NEI 12-06, Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) Implementation Guide. Per
    Section 5 of the guidance document, the licensee was to address impact on the
    availability of the UHS that relies on a non-seismically robust downstream dam to
    contain water used as the source of water for the UHS. The licensee submitted their
    response in a letter, Overall Integrated Plan in Response to March 12, 2012,
    Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation
    Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049),
    dated February 28, 2013. The NRC reviewed the licensee plan and issued Quad Cities
    Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2Interim Staff Evaluation Relating to Overall
                                            36
 
      Integrated Plan in Response to Order EA-12-049 (Mitigation Strategies), dated
      November 22, 2013. The evaluation stated the integrated plan to address the order did
      not provide sufficient information to evaluate conformance with NEI 12-06,
      Consideration 3. As a result, the NRC established Open Item 3.1.1.2.B for licensees to
      assess a postulated downstream dam failure from a seismic event. In a letter, Fifth
      Six-Month Status Report in Response to March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying
      Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond Design-Basis
      External Events (Order Number EA-12-049), dated August 28, 2015, the licensee
      documented its proposed actions to address this scenario from a FLEX standpoint. This
      included designing and installing a single deep well as a seismically qualified source of
      water for the FLEX mitigation strategy. This single deep well would be fully capable of
      supplying both Unit 1 and Unit 2 FLEX requirements simultaneously. The alternate
      approach discussed in the letter consisted of a FLEX pump and portable submersible
      pump that would take suction from the discharge canal. The discharge canal would
      supply the necessary backup water supply. Although the discharge canal has not been
      seismically evaluated, there is reasonable assurance that this water supply will remain
      available as a source of water following a seismic event effecting the downstream dam
      due to the size of the two diffuser pipes which connect to the main channel of the
      Mississippi River.
      These actions will be reviewed by the NRC in a safety evaluation to assess the
      licensees response to the order. Since this URI is being addressed by NRC Order
      EA-12-049, this URI is closed.
  b. Findings
      No findings were identified.
4OA6 Management Meetings
.1  Exit Meeting Summary
      On April 11, 2017, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. S. Darin, and
      other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented.
      The inspectors confirmed that none of the potential report input discussed was
      considered proprietary.
.2  Interim Exit Meetings
      Interim exits were conducted for:
      *      The results of the ultimate heat sink URI inspection was conducted by phone with
            Mr. T. Petersen, Regulatory Assurance Lead, on February 27, 2017.
      *      The results of the Emergency Preparedness Program inspection were presented
            to Mr. K. Ohr, Plant Manager, on March 9, 2017.
      *      The results of the Radiation Safety Program review were presented to
            Mr. S. Darin, Site Vice President, on March 31, 2017.
      *      The results of the ISI inspection were presented to Mr. S. Darin, Site Vice
            President, and other members of the licensee staff on March 31, 2017.
                                            37
 
    The inspectors confirmed that none of the potential report input discussed was
    considered proprietary. Proprietary material received during the inspection was returned
    to the licensee.
ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
                                        38
 
                              SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
                                  KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee
S. Darin, Site Vice President
W. Beck, Regulatory Assurance Manager
J. Bries, Operations Support and Services Senior Manager
J. Colgan, Chemistry Supervisor
D. Collins, Radiation Protection Manager
R. Craddick, Performance Improvement Manager
H. Dodd, Operations Director
G. Harris, Fleet Assessment
R. Hight, Maintenance Director
D. Luebbe, Work Control Manager
T. Petersen, Regulatory Assurance Lead
R. Sieprawski, Training Support Manager
T. Wojcik, Engineering Manager
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
K. Stoedter, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 1
R. Murray, Senior Resident Inspector
K. Carrington, Resident Inspector
Illinois Emergency Management Agency
C. Mathews, IEMA
C. Settles, IEMA
                                                        Attachment
 
                LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Opened
05000254/2017001-01;    NCV    Failure to Ensure Hardware Secure for Breaker MOC
05000265/2017001-01            Switch Linkage (Section 4OA2.3)
Closed
05000254/2017001-01;    NCV    Failure to Ensure Hardware Secure for Breaker MOC
05000265/2017001-01            Switch Linkage (Section 4OA2.3)
05000254/2017001-00    LER    Secondary Containment Interlock Doors Opened
                                Simultaneously (Section 4OA3.2)
2515/192                TI    Inspection of the Licensee Interim Compensatory
                                Measures Associated with the Open Phase Condition
                                Design Vulnerabilities in Electric Power Systems
                                (Section 4OA5.1)
05000254/2013003-02;    URI    Question Concerning Licensing Bases of the Ultimate
05000265/2013003-02            Heat Sink (Section 4OA5.2)
05000254/2013003-04;    URI    Question Concerning Availability of Dam Following a
05000264/2013003-04            Seismic Event (Section 4OA5.3)
Discussed
None.
                                      2
 
                                  LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
The following is a partial list of documents reviewed during the inspection. Inclusion on this list
does not imply that the NRC inspector reviewed the documents in their entirety, but rather that
selected sections or portions of the documents were evaluated as part of the overall inspection
effort. Inclusion of a document on this list does not imply NRC acceptance of the document or
any part of it, unless this is stated in the body of the inspection report.
Section Document                  Description or Title                            Revision or
Number Number                                                                      Date
                                              Section 1R01
  1R01                            WC-A-107: Seasonal ReadinessRevision 18
                                    Summary of Changes
  1R01                            2016 Site Winter Readiness Challenge Meeting
  1R01      SVP 16-072            2016-2017 Quad Cities Certification Letter for  11/18/2016
                                    Winter Readiness
  1R01      WC-AA-107              Seasonal Readiness                                    17
                                              Section 1R04
  1R04      QCOP 6600-23          Unit 1 Diesel Generator Preparation for Standby        2
                                    Operation
  1R04      QCOP 6600-24          Unit 2 Diesel Generator Preparation for Standby        2
                                    Operation
  1R04      QOM 2-1300-01          RCIC Valves on Rack 2202-58 Checklist (RCIC            4
                                    Room)
  1R04      QOM 2-1300-02          Unit 2 RCIC Valve Checklist                          11
  1R04      GEK-9597              Chapter 27
  1R04      QOM 2-6900-12          250 Vdc Reactor Building MCC 2B Breaker                7
                                    Checklist
  1R04      QCOS 1000-26          RHR Valve Position Verification                      23
  1R04      QCOP 1900-23          Unit 1 Fuel Pool Cooling System Startup and          13
                                    Shutdown
                                              Section 1R05
  1R05      FZ 11.2.1              Quad Cites Generating Station Pre-Fire Plan:      July 2009
                                    Unit 1 RB 554-0 Elev. SW Corner Room1B
                                    Core Spray
  1R05                            Fire Hazards Analysis Methodology and            Revision 21
                                    Assumptions
  1R05      FZ 8.2.6.B            Unit 1 Turbine Bldg, El. 595-0 L.P. Heater Bay  October
                                                                                        2013
  1R05      FZ 8.2.7.B            Unit 1 Turbine Bldg. El. 615-6 LP Heater Bay    October
                                    (East)/D Heater Bay                                2013
  1R05      FZ 8.2.7.C            Unit 1/2 Turbine Bldg Mezzanine Floor
                                              Section 1R06
  1R06      IR 2207744            Pan 125 1D RHRSW Vault Penetration LLRT          09/11/2014
                                    Exceeds 50 SCFH
  1R06      IR 2386350            High Leakage Rate on 2D RHRSW Vault              09/25/2014
                                    Penetration
  1R06      IR 2386366            High Leakage Rate on 2D RHRSW Vault              09/25/2014
                                    Penetration
  1R06      IR 2711786            Water in Cable Vaults                            09/02/2016
                                                3
 
1R06 IR 3943664    MK-504 1D RHRSW Vault Penetration Exceeds    11/21/2016
                  50 SCFH
1R06 IR 3953663    MK-478 1D RHRSW Vault Penetration Exceeds    11/21/2016
                  50 SCFH
1R06 IR 3974107    NRC ID: Corroded Piping Penetration          02/14/2017
1R06 IR 3974108    NRC ID: Mounting Plate Corroded              02/14/2017
1R06 IR 3974132    NRC ID: 2D RHR SW Pump Oil Bubbler Darker    02/14/2017
                  Than Others
1R06 IR 3974143    NRC ID: 1B/C RHRSW Vault Door Seal Worn      02/14/2017
1R06 Drawing FL-1  Flood Barriers Basement Floor                    D
1R06 QCOS 0100-01  Unit 1 RHR Service Water Vault Flood Seal        1
                  Leakage Testing
1R06 QCOS 0100-02  Unit 2 RHR Service Water Vault Flood Seal        1
                  Leakage Testing
1R06 QCTP 0130-14  Evaluation of RHRSW Vault Flood Protection
                  Leakage Test Results
1R06 QCTP 0130-14, 1A RHRSW VaultEvaluation for Condensate    08/07/2015
    Attachment A  Pump Room
1R06 QCTP 0130-14, 1B/C RHRSW VaultEvaluation for              06/06/2016
    Attachment B  Condensate Pump Room Flood
1R06 QCTP 0130-14, Evaluation of Flood Barriers Between 1A and  08/07/2015
    Attachment D  1B/C RHRSW Vaults
1R06 QCOS 0100-01, 1D and 1B/C RHR Service Water Vault Wall    11/18/2016
    Attachment E
1R06 QCOS 0100-01, 1D RHR Service Water Vault Condensate Pump  11/18/2016
    Attachment C  Room Wall
1R06 QCTP 0130-14, 2A RHRSW VaultEvaluation for Condensate    06/08/2016
    Attachment F  Pump Room Flood
1R06 QCOS 0100-02, 2B/C RHR Service Water Vault Condensate      09/24/2016
    Attachment B  Pump Room Wall
1R06 QCOS 0100-02, Evaluation of Flood Barriers Between 2A and  06/07/2016
    Attachment I  2B/C RHRSW Vaults
1R06 QCOS 0100-02, 2D and 2B/C RHR Service Water Vault Wall    11/18/2016
    Attachment E
1R06 QDC-0030-M-  Determination of Allowable Leakage Rates for 12/01/1998
    0772          RHRSW Vaults Flood Protection
                            Section 1R07
1R07 ER-AA-340-    Service Water Heat Exchanger Inspection          6
    1002          Guide
1R07 WO 1757717    Clean/Inspect Heat Exchanger Control Room    01/11/2017
                  HVAC Train B RCU Condenser
1R07 EC 39054      Request Torque on End Caps for RCU 0-9400-      00
                  102
1R07 IR 3962368    B Control Room HVAC Inspection Results    01/12/2017
                            Section 1R08
1R08 IR 2464920    Indications Found during NDE on Reactor Head 03/07/2015
                  Vent Piping
1R08 IR 2465233    PSUIVVI New Indication on Core Spray Weld  03/08/2015
                  2P4D
                                4
 
1R08 IR 2465734    FME1 x 1/2 Diameter Round Stock Found in    03/09/2015
                    RPV Annulus
1R08 IR 2466464    FME Historical 3/8 Steel Flat Washer on Top of 03/10/2015
                    Tie Rod
1R08 IR 2267257    FME PSU Ball Bearing Case Found in RPV          03/12/2015
1R08 IR 2467669    PSU Q1R23 IVI Jet Pump 2 & 7 AD-3 Weld          03/12/2015
                    Indications
1R08 IR 2467887    Flange on Piping Is Damaged and Needs          03/13/2015
                    Repair
1R08 IR 2468353    FME Q1R23 Manual Core Spray Injection Tool      03/13/2016
                    Failure
1R08 IR 2545901    Unit 1 Shroud Weld IVVI Exams Not in            08/25/2015
                    Compliance with BRWVIP
1R08 IR 2682384    Foreign Material Identified in Spent Fuel Pool  06/16/2016
1R08 EC 400050      Evaluation of Q1R23 IVVI Inspection Findings        0
1R08 ER-AA-335-003  Magnetic Particle Examination                        7
1R08 ER-AA-335-010  Guidelines for ASME Code Allowable Flaw              6
                    Evaluation and ASME Code Coverage
                    Calculations
1R08 ER-AA-335-    VT-1 Visual Examination in Accordance with          0
    014-2008      ASME 2007 Edition, 2008 Addenda
1R08 ER-AA-335-016  VT-3 Visual Examination of Component                10
                    Supports, Attachments and Interiors of Reactor
                    Vessels
1R08 ER-AA-335-018  Visual Examination of ASME IWE Class MC and        12
                    Metallic Liners of IWL Class CC Components
1R08 ER-AA-335-    Code Acceptance & Recording Criteria for            4
    1008          Nondestructive (NDE) Surface Examination
1R08 ER-AA-335-F-  PDI Generic Procedure for the Ultrasonic            1
    02            Examination of Ferritic Pipe Welds
1R08 GEH-PDI-UT-1  PDI Generic Procedure for the Ultrasonic            10
                    Examination of Ferritic Pipe Welds
1R08 NDE Report    Elbow-Pipe Weld 30A-S11                        03/30/2017
    Q1R24-UT-016
1R08 NDE Report    Elbow-Pipe Weld 30B-S10                        03/30/2017
    Q1R24-UT-017
1R08 NDE Report    Guide with 8 Lugs Welded to Pipe                03/29/2017
    Q1R24-MT-001
1R08 NDE Report    Variable Spring Can with 4 Lugs Welded to Pipe  03/29/2017
    Q1R24-MT-004
1R08 NDE Report    Collar-Torus Shell                              03/28/2017
    Q1R24-MT-005
1R08 NDE Report 17- General Visual Examination: ASME IWE (Class    04/10/2017
    VT3-024        MC) Containment and IWL (Class CC) Metallic
                    Liners
1R08 NDE Report    Flued Head Anchor                              03/29/2017
    Q1R24-VT-001
1R08 NDE Report    Box Guide                                      03/28/2017
    Q1R24-VT-015
                                5
 
1R08 NDE Report    4 Lugs Welded to Pipe                        03/29/2017
    Q1R24-VT-016
1R08 NDE Report    2 Variable Spring Cans                      03/29/2017
    Q1R24-VT-022
1R08 PQR 1-50C                                                  01/03/1984
1R08 PQR A-001                                                  10/19/1998
1R08 PQR A-002                                                  03/09/1999
1R08 WO 1636433-01 MM Upgrade U1 Head Vent Line Socket Welds    03/12/2015
                  to EPRI 2: 1 Welds
1R08 WO 1636433-07 MM ContingentRepair Indication(s) Found    03/11/2015
                  During PT Exams
1R08 WO 1877257-01 MM Re-route Piping as Required to Support    11/20/2015
                  New Motor Install
1R08 WPQ ID No.    Record No. WPQ22427                          11/12/2013
    V9896
1R08 WPQ ID No. 50 Record No. WPQ12116                          07/30/2003
1R08 WPQ ID No.    Record No. WPQ14848                          01/23/2007
    N1206
1R08 WPQ ID No.    Record No. WPQ22292                          03/15/2012
    T2733
1R08 WPQ ID No.    Record No. WPQ21376                          03/07/2012
    T2733
1R08 WPS 1-1-                                                        2
    GTSM-PWHT
1R08 IR 3990603    NRC IdentifiedDocumentation Issue in Q1R23  03/28/2017
                  90-Day Report
1R08 IR 3991149    LL Q1R24NRC In-Office Preparation Week      03/29/2017
                  Document Request
1R08 IR 3991531    Q1R24 ISI Inspection: Issue with ECR 418116  03/30/2017
                  on Material Removed
1R08 IR 3991743    Q1R24 ISI Inspection: Observation on        03/30/2017
                  Procedure CC-AA-407
                            Section 1R11
1R11 QCGP 2-1      Normal Unit Shutdown                            87
1R11 QCOP 1000-05  Shutdown Cooling Operation                      53
1R11              Reactor Shutdown JITT                        March 2017
1R11              Reactor Start-up JITT                        March 2017
                            Section 1R12
1R12              Maintenance Rule Criteria Exceeded
                  Spreadsheet for DC 8300-01 and DC 8300-02
1R12              System Report Details (Units 1 and 2)125
                  Vdc
1R12              Unit 1, DC8300, System Health Report        01/01/2016-
                                                                03/31/2016
1R12              Unit 2, DC8300, System Health Report        01/01/2016-
                                                                03/31/2016
1R12 EACE 2736223  1A 125 Vdc Charger Ripple Voltage Step
                  Change During the 4 Hour Load Test
1R12 IR 1646354    901-8 A9 125 Vdc Battery Charger Trip Alarm. 04/11/2014
                  1A Charger On
                              6
 
1R12 IR 1653585  U1 125 Vdc Charger 1A Failed to Meet 125 Vdc  04/30/2014
                  & 200 Amps
1R12 IR 2732501  1A Charger Has a Step Change in AC Ripple      10/25/2016
                  Volts
1R12 IR 2736593  1A 125 Vdc Battery Would Not Load up to 200    11/03/2016
                  Amps
1R12 IR 2511446  Received Unexpected Alarm 901-8 A-7, Diesel    06/07/2015
                  Gen 1 Trouble
1R12 IR 2516072  NRC Question Posed on U-2 EDG Operability      06/17/2015
1R12 IR 2532957  U1 EDG Trouble Alarm Received                  07/26/2015
1R12 IR 2591780  Unit 2 EDG Oil Pump Issue                      11/24/2015
1R12 IR 2594097  IST Unfavorable Trend: U0 EDG Fuel Oil        12/01/2015
                  Transfer Pump Flow
1R12 IR 2646558  Spurious 1/2 EDG Engine High Temp Alarm After    03/28/2016
                  S/D
1R12 IR 2654576  Replace Engine Protective Relays on Unit 1/2    04/12/2016
                  EDG
1R12 IR 2655056  Replace Field Flash Cutout Relay on Unit 1    04/13/2016
                  EDG
1R12 IR 2655063  Replace Field Flash Cutout Relay on Unit 1/2    04/13/2016
                  EDG
1R12 IR 2713622  Re-Evaluate DGCW Operability/EDG HX Flow      09/08/2016
                  Rate Requirements
1R12 IR 3965676  Received Momentary 1/2 EDG High Temperature      01/23/2017
                            Section 1R13
1R13              Work Week 17-02-05 Safety Profile
1R13              Work Week 17-09-12 Safety Profile
1R13 OU-QC-104,  Q1R24 Risk Factor ChartMode 4, 5 and            03/27-
    Attachment 1 Defueled                                      03/31/2017
1R13              Q1R24 Shutdown Safety Report                    03/26-
                                                                03/31-2017
                            Section 1R15
1R15 IR 3968961  QCOS 1000-29 Not Completed as Scheduled        02/01/2017
                  due to M&TE Issue
1R15 IR 469542    IM Shop Unaware of Inaccuracies Associated    03/22/2006
                  with Fluke 45 Use
1R15 OE 180293    Calibration Methods Result in Non-Linearity of 05/29/1999
                  Rosemount 1154H Transmitters
1R15 OE 11896    Test Instrument High Input Impedance Causes    05/25/2000
                  Non-Linearity In Transmitter Calibration at
                  Arkansas Nuclear One Unit 1
1R15 IR 3971856  1D RHRSW Trip Fuses Worked Out of Fuse        02/08/2017
                  Holder
1R15 IR 3967424  1C RHRSW Pump Abnormal Indications            01/27/2017
1R15 IR 3970782  Extent of Condition for IR 3967424 (Cubicle 1- 02/06/2017
                  6705-13-1-1)
1R15 IR 3969273  Extent of Condition for IR 3967424 (MOC        02/01/2017
                  Switch Hardware Insp)
                              7
 
1R15 IR 3970964  Extent of Condition for IR 3967424 (Cubicle 1- 02/06/2017
                  6703-13-1)
1R15 ECAP 3971856 1D RHRSW Trip Fuses Worked Out of Fuse        03/31/2017
                  Holder
                          Section 1R19
1R19 WO 1961658  RCIC Pump Operability (IST)                    01/11/2017
1R19 QCEMS 0210-  Battery Charger Testing for Safety Related        15
    02          125 Vdc Batteries
1R19 WO 1846331  2-125 Battery Charger Terminal Board and      01/18/2017
                  Potentiometer EC 402467
1R19 QCOS 6600-06 Diesel Generator Cooling Water Pump Flow          45
                  Rate Test
                          Section 1R20
1R20 QDC-0200-N-  Q1R24 Decay Heat and Related Calculations          0
    2257
1R20 QCGP 2-1    Normal Unit Shutdown                              87
1R20              Q1R24 Shutdown Safety Plan                          0
1R20              Q1R24 Raw Water Management Plan
1R20 QCOP 0201-13 Reactor Level Upper Wide Range Reference          10
                  Leg Extension Use and Control
1R20 QCOP 0201-14 Reactor Vessel Level Control Using a Local        11
                  Pressure Gauge
1R20 QCOP 1000-05 Shutdown Cooling Operation                        53
1R20 QCOP 1000-44 Alternate Decay Heat Removal                      24
1R20 QCOP 6100-33 Unit 1 Main Power Transformer Backfeed              8
                  Operation
1R20 QCTS 0600-05 Main Steam Isolation Valve Local Leak Rate        17
                  Test (AO-1(2)-203-1A/B/C/D, AO-1(2)-203-
                  2A/B/C/D)
1R20 IR 3989801  PSU Unit 1 SRM 23 Not Tracking                03/27/2017
1R20 IR 3990176  PSU Q1R24 NRC ID Oil Leak in U1 DW            03/27/2017
1R20 IR 3990198  PSU 1-0203-3D ERV Steady Stream of Water      03/27/2017
                  Leakage
1R20 IR 3990244  Q1R24 PSU MSIV 1-0203-1A LLRT Exceeded        03/27/2017
                  TS Limit
1R20 IR 3990246  Q1R24 PSUINBD MSIV 1-0203-1D                  03/27/2017
                  Exceeded TS Limit
1R20 IR 3990247  PSU Q1R24 OUTBD MSIV 1-0203-2C                03/27/2017
                  Exceeded TS Limit
1R20 IR 3990255  PSU Q1R24: 1-0203-3D ERV Pilot Valve          03/28/2017
                  Leaking
1R20 IR 3990285  PSU Unexpected Rod Block from SDV High        03/28/2017
                  Level
1R20 IR 3990393  PSU Q1R24 1C RHR Pump Seal Cooler Piping      03/28/2017
                  Clogged
1R20 IR 3990758  PSU Q1R24 2C Outboard MSIV Found Outside      03/29/2017
                  of 9.8%
1R20 IR 3990885  PSU Q1R24 1-0220-105B Failed Outage PM        03/29/2016
                  Opening Force Check
                              8
 
1R20 IR 3991086  PSU Q1R24 1A MSIV PMT Leakage Exceeds          03/29/2017
                  TS Limit
1R20 SPOG: 1-3-C  System Planning Operating Guide                    11
                            Section 1R22
1R22 QCIS 1000-09 RHR Pump Discharge Pressure Calibration and        9
                  Functional Test
1R22 IR 3964960  PS 1-1053e Valve Had Slow Leakby              01/20/2017
1R22 QCOS 6600-37 Unit 1 EDG Largest Load Reject Surveillance        31
1R22 QCOS 6600-39 Unit 2 EDG Largest Load Reject Surveillance        29
1R22 QCOS 6600-44 Unit Diesel Generator Timed Start Test            22
1R22 IR 3950031  1/2 EDG Coolant Temperature Switch Alarmed      12/06/2016
                  Below Setpoint
1R22 IR 3949824  1/2 EDG Did Not Start During QCOP 6600-58        12/06/2016
                  Hot Fast Restart
1R22 IR 3943740  2nd LVL UV Relay 2-6706-1274-B241              11/21/2016
                  Contacts Found Degraded
1R22 QCOS 1000-43 Unit 2 A Loop Low Pressure Coolant Injection    26
                  (LPCI) and Containment Cooling Modes of
                  RHRs Non-Outage Logic Test
1R22 Drawing 4E-  Schematic Diagram Core Spray Systems I and        BD
    1430        II
1R22 Drawing 4E-  Schematic Diagram Core Spray Motor Operated        Y
    1431        Valves
1R22 Drawing 4E-  Schematic Diagram Core Spray Motor Operated        U
    1432        Valves
1R22 QCOS 1400-16 Unit 1 Division II Core Spray Logic Functional      7
                  Test
1R22 QCOP 0201-18 Hydro Test Pump Operation                          1
1R22 QCOS 1400-19 Core Spray Pressure Isolation Valve Seat            0
                  Leakage Test
                            Section 1EP2
1EP2              FEMA ANS Design Basis Report                    May 2013
1EP2              FEMA ANS Letter for Backup ANS                12/10/2012
1EP2              Siren Testing and Maintenance Data            July 2015-
                                                                  February
                                                                    2017
1EP2 IR 2533243  EPSiren Failure (QC37)                        07/27/2015
1EP2 IR 2534053  Potential Site Wide Trend in EP Facilities &  07/28/2015
                  Equipment
1EP2 IR 2543847  EPSiren Failure (QC37)                        08/19/2017
1EP2 IR 2558312  EPSiren Failure (QC05)                        09/21/2015
1EP2 IR 2565873  EPInvestigation of Siren Failures (QC37,      10/05/2015
                  QC39)
1EP2 IR 2581456  EPSiren Failure (QC05)                        11/03/2015
1EP2 IR 2724917  EP1st Half 2016 MW ANS Siren Trend            10/06/2016
1EP2 IR 3983549  EPSiren Design Report Approval Letter Not    03/07/2017
                  Provided to NRC
                              9
 
                          Section 1EP3
1EP3            2015 Station Off-hours Drive-in Augmentation    09/30/2015
                and Performance Indicator Drills Findings and
                Observation Report
1EP3            First Quarter of 2016 ERO Augmentation Drill    03/02/2016
                Report
1EP3            Fourth Quarter of 2015 ERO Augmentation Drill    12/05/2015
                Report
1EP3            Fourth Quarter of 2016 ERO Augmentation Drill    10/20/2016
                Report
1EP3            Second Quarter of 2016 ERO Augmentation          06/25/2016
                Drill Report
1EP3            Selected Station Emergency Response
                Personnel Training Records
1EP3            Third Quarter of 2016 ERO Augmentation Drill    09/23/2016
                Report
1EP3 IR 2715584  MA/MW ERO Notification System Delayed            09/13/2016
                Notifications
1EP3 IR 2716129  Everbridge Delay in ERO Notification For Call-In 09/13/2016
                Drill
                          Section 1EP5
1EP5 EP-QC-1000  Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station Radiological        0
                Emergency Plan
1EP5 EP-AA-1006  Radiological Emergency Plan Annex For Quad          38
                Cities Station
1EP5 EP-AA-1006, Emergency Action Levels For Quad Cities              2
    Addendum 3  Station
1EP5 EP-AA-122  Drills and Exercise Program                          18
1EP5 EP-AA-125  Emergency Preparedness Self Evaluation              10
                Process
1EP5 NOSA-QDC-  Emergency Preparedness Audit Report              04/20/2016
    16-03
1EP5            Quad Cities Alert Event Report February 1,      03/01/2017
                2017
1EP5            Pre-2017 NRC EP Routine/Program PI              01/17/2017
                Verification Inspection
1EP5            Apparent Cause Investigation Report 901-54      12/09/2016
                C1 Offgas Condenser Hi Level Unexpected
                Alarm
1EP5 IR 3970216  Observations from the MCR During E-Plan          02/01/2017
                Execution
1EP5 IR 3979009  QDC-EP-2017-MA5ALERT-TSC-OTHER                  02/27/2017
                Issues
1EP5 IR 3970213  ENS Line Communication Issue During E-Plan      02/01/2017
                Execution
1EP5 IR 3970242  EP-REAL Event (QDC Alert)-EOF-FAILED            02/01/2017
                Objective
1EP5 IR 3970210  Bridge Line Issue Identified During E-Plan      02/01/2017
                Execution
                              10
 
1EP5 IR 3972155    EP-REAL EVENT (QDC ALERT)-EOF-                    02/01/2017
                  FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT Issues
1EP5 IR 2655742    NOS ID: 5 of 13 Forms Were Not Initialed,        04/14/2016
                  Signed, or Checked
1EP5 IR 2733875    Potential Trend in EP Facilities & Equipment      10/28/2016
1EP5 IR 2742255    QC EP NRC Graded Exercise OSC                    11/16/2016
                  Performance
1EP5 IR 2742262    QC EP NRC Graded Exercise TSC                    11/16/2016
                  Performance
1EP5 IR 2742202    QC EP NRC Graded Exercise CR/SIM                  11/16/2016
                  Performance
1EP5 IR 2737679    SJAE Rad Monitors Reading Low                    11/05/2016
1EP5 IR 3949032    QDC-EP-2016-NRC-TSC-OTHER Issues                  11/16/2016
1EP5 IR 3970920    Reinforce Expectations for EP Event Response      02/01/2017
1EP5              Most current review of Letters of Agreement
                  with: St. Joseph Medical Center, General
                  Electric, Rock Island County Sheriff, Cordova
                  Fire Protection District, Trinity Medical Center,
                  Silvis Campus Hospital
                            Section 1EP6
1EP6 1Q17 PI Drill 2017 1st Qtr PI DrillQuad Cities Generating      02/15/2017
                  Station
                            Section 2RS1
2RS1 IR 3964145-04 Check-In: NRC RPExposure Controls                02/26/2017
                  Inspection
2RS1              Quad Cities Radiation Protection; 2015 Alpha      12/29/2015
                  Assessment
2RS1              Quad Cities Radiation Protection; 2016 Alpha      12/27/2016
                  Assessment
2RS1              Radioactive Source Inventory                      08/31/2016
2RS1              Radioactive Source Inventory                      02/23/2017
2RS1              Semi-Annual Source Leak Test Report              08/31/2016
2RS1              Semi-Annual Source Leak Test Report              02/24/2017
2RS1 RP-AA-210    Dosimetry Issue, Usage, and Control                  27
2RS1 RP-AA-300    Radiological Survey Program                          14
2RS1 RP-QC-300-    Radiological Survey Surveillance Program              11
    1001
2RS1 RP-AA-301    Radiological Air Sampling Program                    10
2RS1 RP-AA-302    Determination of Alpha Levels and Monitoring          8
2RS1 RP-AA-350-    Response to Guardhouse Portal Monitor Alarms          2
    1001
2RS1 RP-AA-460    Controls for High and Locked Radiation Areas          29
2RS1 RP-QC-460-    High Radiation Area Inspections                        7
    1002
2RS1 RWP QC-01-    Radiation Work Permit and Associated ALARA            1
    17-00510      File; DW Main Steam Safety Relief Valve
                  Activities (Q1R24)
2RS1 RWP QC-01-    Radiation Work Permit and Associated ALARA            0
    17-00519      File; DW Insulation Activities (Q1R24)
                                11
 
2RS1 RWP QC-01-  Radiation Work Permit and Associated ALARA        0
    17-00541    File; DW I/B MSIV Over Haul (Q1R24)
2RS1 RWP QC-01-  Radiation Work Permit and Associated ALARA        0
    17-00901    File; FF Rx Disassembly/Reassembly Activities
                  (Q1R24)
                          Section 2RS2
2RS2 RP-AA-403    Administration of the Radiation Work Permit        9
                  Program
2RS2 RP-QC-552    Source Term External System/Component              1
                  Flushing
                          Section 2RS3
2RS3 RP-AA-440    Respiratory Protection Program                    13
2RS3 RP-AA-825-  Operation of the MSA Optimair MM 2K Mask          2
    1033        Mounted Air Purifying Respirator
2RS3 RP-QC-835    Operation, Inspection, and Use of the MSA          4
                  Firehawk M7XT Air Mask Self-Contained
                  Breathing Apparatus
2RS3 RP-AA-825-  Operation and Inspection of the 3M Versaflo        3
    1014        TR-300 PAPR System
2RS3 RP-AA-825-  Operation and Use of Air Line Supplied            1
    1020        Respirators
2RS3 RP-AA-441    Evaluation and Selection Process for              6
                  Radiological Respirator Use
2RS3 RP-AA-440,  Review of Contractor Respiratory Protection  03/21/2017
    Attachment 2 Program
2RS3 RP-QC-835,  Flow Testing and Overhauls                    Various
    Attachment 7                                                Dates
2RS3 RP-QC-835,  MSA Firehawk M7XT Air Mask Inspection          Various
    Attachment 3                                                Dates
2RS3              Generic Respiratory Protection Classroom      08/22/2016
                  Training
2RS3              Respiratory Protection Training Level I        January
                                                                  2013
2RS3              Respiratory Protection Training Level II      01/16/2016
2RS3              Respiratory Protection Qualification Reports  Various
                                                                  Dates
2RS3              Quarterly Service Air and Self Contained      03/24/2017
                  Breathing Apparatus
2RS3 IR 3990963  MRC SCBA Manifold Fitting Size Incorrect      03/29/2017
                          Section 2RS4
2RS4 RP-AA-203-  Personnel Exposure Investigations                  9
    1001
2RS4 RP-AA-220    Bioassay Program                                  12
2RS4 RP-AA-210    Dosimetry Issue, Usage, and Control              27
2RS4 RP-AA-203-  Personnel Exposure Investigation              Various
    1001,                                                        Dates
    Attachment 1
2RS4 RP-AA-214,  Area Dosimetry Worksheet                      Various
    Attachment 2                                                Dates
                              12
 
2RS4 IR 3982939  Correct Dose in Sentinel, but not Printing on    03/07/2017
                  Form 4
                            Section 4OA1
4OA1              Explanation for Performance Indicator P.8.1.2      January-
                                                                    December
                                                                      2016
4OA1              Operator Narrative Logs                            January-
                                                                    December
                                                                      2016
4OA1              NRC Performance Indicator Data, Emergency          October-
                  PreparednessDrill/Exercise Performance          December
                                                                      2016
4OA1              NRC Performance Indicator Data, Emergency          October-
                  PreparednessERO Readiness                        December
                                                                      2016
4OA1              NRC Performance Indicator Data, Emergency          October-
                  PreparednessAlert and Notification System        December
                  Reliability                                          2016
                            Section 4OA2
4OA2 IR 3959913  CO2 Released into Turbine Building                01/05/2017
4OA2 IR 3964028  A AFU [Air Filtration Unit] Fan Failed to Start 01/18/2017
4OA2 IR 3965646  NRC ID: Pipe Unsupported Feed Pump Suction        01/23/2017
                  Press A
4OA2 EACE 3956145 Feedwater Heater Trip and Emergency Power        02/13/2017
                  Reduction
4OA2 IR 3977123  Unit 1 Essential Service Inverter Input Breaker  02/22/2017
                  Trip
4OA2 IR 3981113  Received 902-5 H6 Alarm                          03/03/2017
4OA2 IR 3979804  U2 Turbine Oil Reservoir Level Rising            02/28/2017
4OA2 IR 3980721  2A Turbine Oil Cooler Tube Leak Identified        03/02/2017
4OA2 IR 3981972  2B ASD Backup PLC Failure                        03/06/2017
4OA2 IR 3981671  Received 901-7 B5 and DEHC S1-P312                03/05/2017
4OA2 ECAP 3967424 1C RHRSW Pump Abnormal Indications                03/20/2017
4OA2 Drawing M-36 Diagram of Core Spray Piping                          BI
4OA2 IR 3985153  Core Spray Keep Fill Check Valve 1-1402-64B,
                  Stuck
4OA2 IR 3983951  2-8802-A Valve Failed to Open During Return      03/10/2017
                  to Service
4OA2 IR 3984062  1B RPS MG Generator Voltage Out of Spec          03/10/2017
4OA2 IR 3984303  RPS B 1/2 ScramSDV High Level (Blown              03/12/2017
                  Safety Related Fuse)
4OA2 IR 3983620  1B RPS EPAs Tripped Following MG Set Start      03/09/2017
4OA2 IR 3984044  2A Turbine Oil Cooler Tube Leak Still Leaking    03/10/2017
4OA2 IR 3981835  U1 SDV Drain Valves Failed to Open During        03/06/2017
                  Surveillance
4OA2 IR 3990038  PSU MSIV As Found Closure Timing Out of          03/27/2017
                  Band
4OA2 IR 3990217  Received 902-5 H-6, SBLC Squib Valve Circuit      03/27/2017
                  AlarmA Squib
                              13
 
4OA2                First Quarter 2017 Operator Burdens List for
                    Units 1 and 2
4OA2 IR 3991293    IEMA Identified, Scaffold in Contact with 1B    03/30/2017
                    RHR Room Cooler
4OA2 IR 3983983    1A RFP FME Impeller Pieces Found Missing        03/10/2017
                    During Maintenance
4OA2 EC 618850      Lost Parts Evaluation Per ER-AA-2008 for the        0
                    Lost Parts Missing from 1A Reactor Feed Pump
                    1-3201-A Prior to Q1R24 During Maintenance
                    Under WO 1842789
4OA2 CY-QC-170-    Quad Cities Offsite Dose Calculation Manual      January
    301            (ODCM )                                            2013
4OA2 CY-QC-120-    Main Chimney & Reactor Vent Noble Gas          04/15/2016
    735,          Release RateNoble Gas Release Rates
    Attachment 1
4OA2 GEK-27808A    Calculation of Alarm and Trip Setpoints for the
                    Reactor Building Vent Stack Noble Gas Monitor
                              Section 4OA3
4OA3 Drawing 4E-    Internal Schematic and Device Location              N
    1654C          Diagram 4160V Switchgear Bus 14 Cubicles
                    1,3,7,8,10, 12 and 14
4OA3 EN 52527      Fire in Unit 2 MCR Panel 902-3                  02/01/2017
4OA3 IR 3969324    Light Socket for 2-203-3E Damaged During        02/01/2017
                    Bulb Change
4OA3 IR 3971265    Remove Fuse and Send to Power LabsRoot        02/07/2017
                    Cause 3969324
4OA3 IR 3971834    Safety Related Fuse Replacement in 2-2202-      02/08/2017
                    32 Panel
4OA3 OP-AA-101-    Human Performance Issue Verbal Report              36
    113-1004      Format
                              Section 4OA5
4OA5 IR 3952808    Check-in Self-Assessment: Interim              01/31/2017
                    Compensatory Measures Associated with the
                    Open Phase Condition Design Vulnerabilities in
                    Electric Power Systems
4OA5 LN 6500        4KV/480V Distribution                              27
4OA5 Standing Order Single Open Phase Detection                    03/16/2012
    S12-06
4OA5 STN 12-021    Switchyard VulnerabilitySingle Open Phase
                    Detection Operability Evaluation Compensatory
                    Measure
4OA5 QCAN 902-8 F-  Reserve Auxiliary Transformer 22 Open Phase          2
    4              Detection Low Load/Trouble
4OA5 EC 0000387740  Switchyard VulnerabilitySingle Open Phase          5
                    Detection
                                  14
 
                          LIST OF ACRONYMS USED
ALARA As-Low-As-Reasonably-Achievable
ADAMS Agencywide Document Access Management System
ADS  Automatic Depressurization System
ANS  Alert and Notification System
ASME  American Society of Mechanical Engineers
CAP  Corrective Action Program
CFR  Code of Federal Regulations
DBE  Design Basis Event
DEP  Drill and Exercise Performance
DGCWP Diesel Generator Cooling Water Pump
DRP  Division of Reactor Projects
EC    Engineering Change
EDG  Emergency Diesel Generator
EP    Emergency Preparedness
ERO  Emergency Response Organization
ERV  Electromatic Relief Valve
FZ    Fire Zone
HPCI  High Pressure Coolant Injection
IMC  Inspection Manual Chapter
IP    Inspection Procedure
IR    Issue Report
ISI  Inservice Inspection
LCO  Limiting Condition for Operation
LER  Licensee Event Report
LPCI  Low Pressure Coolant Injection
MOC  Mechanism Operated Contact
MT    Magnetic Particle Examination
NCV  Non-Cited Violation
NDE  Non-Destructive Examination
NEI  Nuclear Energy Institute
NRC  U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
OPC  Open Phase Condition
OSP  Outage Safety Plan
PARS  Publicly Available Records System
PI    Performance Indicator
PMT  Post-Maintenance Testing
RCIC  Reactor Core Isolation Cooling
RFO  Refueling Outage
RHR  Residual Heat Removal
RHRSW Residual Heat Removal Service Water
SCBA  Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus
SSCs  Structures, Systems, and Components
TS    Technical Specification
UFSAR Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
UHS  Ultimate Heat Sink
URI  Unresolved Item
VDC  Voltage Direct Current
VT    Visual Examination
WO    Work Order
                                    15
}}

Revision as of 22:34, 8 March 2020

Redirect to:

Retrieved from "https://kanterella.com/w/index.php?title=ML17124A163&oldid=2538926"