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{{#Wiki_filter:Quantifying Reactor Accident Risk: A History Panel W20: The Metamorphosis to a More Risk
{{#Wiki_filter:Quantifying Reactor Accident Risk: A History Panel W20: The Metamorphosis to a More Risk-Informed Regulator Tom Wellock NRC
-Informed RegulatorTom Wellock NRC Risk-Informed, Performance
 
-Based*A "New Paradigm"
Risk-Informed, Performance-Based
-Efficiency
* A New Paradigm
-Safety Significant
  - Efficiency
-Relieve Regulatory Burden
  - Safety Significant
*PRAs: "Significant Limitations"
  - Relieve Regulatory Burden
-Industry-NRC gap-Methodology
* PRAs: Significant Limitations
-Data-Peer Review
  - Industry-NRC gap
*New Safety IssuesNRC Chairman Shirley Jackson 2
  - Methodology
Three Ds of the Deterministic Era  
  - Data
-Deterministic Design
  - Peer Review
-Design Basis Accidents-Defense-in-Depth*Inherent Safety
* New Safety Issues NRC Chairman Shirley Jackson 2
*Active Systems
 
*Siting*Static Layers (containment) 3 4
Three Ds of the Deterministic Era
WASH-1400 and the Roots of PRA
- Deterministic Design
*Methodology: Models and Goals in the 1960s
- Design Basis Accidents
*Regulatory Necessity
- Defense-in-Depth
*Political Necessity 5
* Inherent Safety
6Accident Modeling in the 1960s Farmer Curve 7Chauncey Starr  
* Active Systems
*Loss of Coolant and the China Syndrome
* Siting
-ECCS*Anticipated Transient Without Scram
* Static Layers (containment) 3
-Beyond the Design Basis Accident-Need for regulatory risk expertiseNew Safety Issues 8
 
4 WASH-1400 and the Roots of PRA
* Methodology: Models and Goals in the 1960s
* Regulatory Necessity
* Political Necessity 5
 
Accident Modeling in the 1960s 6
 
Farmer Curve Chauncey Starr 7
 
New Safety Issues
* Loss of Coolant and the China Syndrome
  - ECCS
* Anticipated Transient Without Scram
  - Beyond the Design Basis Accident
  - Need for regulatory risk expertise 8
 
AEC Under Siege
AEC Under Siege
*Anti-nuclear Movement
* Anti-nuclear Movement
*Environmental Protection Agency-Class 9 accidents
* Environmental Protection Agency
.-Growing interest in risk
  - Class 9 accidents.
*Congress Henry Kendall, UCS 9 WASH-1400: Positives
  - Growing interest in risk
*New tool for regulators
* Congress Henry Kendall, UCS 9
*Aspectrum of accidents
 
*Core damage more likely but lower consequences 10 Small LOCA Event Tree from WASH
WASH-1400: Positives
-1400 11 WASH-1400: Negatives
* New tool for regulators
*Large error bands
* A spectrum of accidents
*Inappropriate comparisons to other risks
* Core damage more likely but lower consequences 10
*Some accidents not analyzed
 
*Lacked adequate peer review
Small LOCA Event Tree from WASH-1400 11 WASH-1400: Negatives
*Lewis Committee (1978) 12 13WASH-1400, Executive Summary 14UCS Critique of WASH
* Large error bands
-1400 Three Mile Island and WASH
* Inappropriate comparisons to other risks
-1400 Human factors and operationsSevere accidentsSafety systems other than ECCS 15TMI Control Room, March 1979 1980s: Beneficially Unfocused
* Some accidents not analyzed
-Beyond the Design Basis: ATWS, SBO, severe accidents
* Lacked adequate peer review
-Unresolved Questions: Generic issues, older plants
* Lewis Committee (1978) 12
-Operating Reactors: Evaluating events
 
-New Reactors: Design certification  
WASH-1400, Executive Summary 13 UCS Critique of WASH-1400 14
-Methodology: Industry PRAs and NUREG
 
-1150-Goals: Safety Goal Policy and Backfits 16 Toward Risk
Three Mile Island and WASH-1400 Human factors and operations Severe accidents Safety systems other than ECCS TMI Control Room, March 1979 15
-Informed Regulation, 1990sIndividual Plant ExaminationsTowers-Perrin ReportMaintenance RulePRA Policy Statement (1995) and Implementation Plan (1994) 17 References
 
*Slide 2: U.S. NRC, "An Evening with Dr. Shirley Ann Jackson," November 15, 1995, U.S. NRC ADAMS Main Library, ML003710152.
1980s: Beneficially Unfocused
*Slide 4: C.A. Bennett to A.B. Greninger, "Evaluation of Probability of Disasters, HW-28767," July 20, 1953, DOE Public Reading Room Catalog, Accession # D8451637.*Slide 6: P.A. Crosettiand R.F. Furrer, "Comparative Reliability Analysis
- Beyond the Design Basis: ATWS, SBO, severe accidents
-K-Reactor Secondary Coolant System, DUN
- Unresolved Questions: Generic issues, older plants
-4461" (Hanford, WA: Douglas United Nuclear, September 9, 1968), U.S. Department of Energy Opennet,,https://www.osti.gov/opennet/detail.jsp?osti
- Operating Reactors: Evaluating events
-id=16413875; B.J. Garrick, Reliability Analysis of Nuclear Power Plant Protective Systems, HN
- New Reactors: Design certification
-190 , May 1967, (Los Angeles: Holmes & Narver, May 1967); R.S. Hart and W.T. Harper, Final SNAPSHOT Safeguard Report, NAA
- Methodology: Industry PRAs and NUREG-1150
-SR-10022(Rev.) (San Diego, CA: Atomics International, March 20, 1965
- Goals: Safety Goal Policy and Backfits 16
).*Slide 7: F.R. Farmer, "Siting Criteria
 
-A New Approach," Containment and Siting of Nuclear Power Plants, Proceedings of a Symposium, Vienna 3
Toward Risk-Informed Regulation, 1990s Individual Plant Examinations Towers-Perrin Report Maintenance Rule PRA Policy Statement (1995) and Implementation Plan (1994) 17
-7 April 1967 (Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency, 1976) 322; Chauncey Starr, "Social Benefit vs. Technological Risk," Science165 no. 3899, September 19, 1969, 1232
 
-38. 18 References (cont.)
References
*Slide 9: Archive of the Norfolk Charitable Trust, Sharon, MA.
* Slide 2: U.S. NRC, An Evening with Dr. Shirley Ann Jackson, November 15, 1995, U.S. NRC ADAMS Main Library, ML003710152.
*Slides 11 and 13: U.S. NRC, Reactor Safety Study: An Assessment of Accident Risks in U.S. CommericalNuclear Power Plants, WASH
* Slide 4: C.A. Bennett to A.B. Greninger, Evaluation of Probability of Disasters, HW-28767, July 20, 1953, DOE Public Reading Room Catalog, Accession #
-1400 (NUREG
D8451637.
-75/014) (DC: U.S. NRC, October 1975).
* Slide 6: P.A. Crosetti and R.F. Furrer, Comparative Reliability AnalysisK-Reactor Secondary Coolant System, DUN-4461 (Hanford, WA: Douglas United Nuclear, September 9, 1968), U.S. Department of Energy Opennet,,https://www.osti.gov/opennet/detail.jsp?osti-id=16413875; B.J.
*Slide 14: Sierra Club and Union of Concerned Scientists, Preliminary Review of the AEC Reactor Safety Study(San Francisco
Garrick, Reliability Analysis of Nuclear Power Plant Protective Systems, HN-190, May 1967, (Los Angeles: Holmes & Narver, May 1967); R.S. Hart and W.T. Harper, Final SNAPSHOT Safeguard Report, NAA-SR-10022(Rev.) (San Diego, CA:
-Cambridge, December 1974), 100B.*Slide 15: "TMI Control Room in 1979," U.S. NRC Flickr, https://www.flickr.com/photos/nrcgov/7447591188/in/album
Atomics International, March 20, 1965).
-72157628998200797/.
* Slide 7: F.R. Farmer, Siting CriteriaA New Approach, Containment and Siting of Nuclear Power Plants, Proceedings of a Symposium, Vienna 3-7 April 1967 (Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency, 1976) 322; Chauncey Starr, Social Benefit vs. Technological Risk, Science 165 no. 3899, September 19, 1969, 1232-38.
19 Acronyms*ATWS: Anticipated Transient Without Scram
18
*ECCS: Emergency Core Cooling System
 
*PRA: Probabilistic Risk Assessment
References (cont.)
*SBO: Station Blackout
* Slide 9: Archive of the Norfolk Charitable Trust, Sharon, MA.
*UCS: Union of Concerned Scientists
* Slides 11 and 13: U.S. NRC, Reactor Safety Study: An Assessment of Accident Risks in U.S. Commerical Nuclear Power Plants, WASH-1400 (NUREG-75/014) (DC:
*WASH: AEC Headquarters, Washington, DC 20}}
U.S. NRC, October 1975).
* Slide 14: Sierra Club and Union of Concerned Scientists, Preliminary Review of the AEC Reactor Safety Study (San Francisco-Cambridge, December 1974),
100B.
* Slide 15: TMI Control Room in 1979, U.S. NRC Flickr, https://www.flickr.com/photos/nrcgov/7447591188/in/album-72157628998200797/.
19
 
Acronyms
* ATWS: Anticipated Transient Without Scram
* ECCS: Emergency Core Cooling System
* PRA: Probabilistic Risk Assessment
* SBO: Station Blackout
* UCS: Union of Concerned Scientists
* WASH: AEC Headquarters, Washington, DC 20}}

Revision as of 12:07, 21 October 2019

03/14/2018 RIC 2018 Session W20 Tom Wellock Presentation
ML18094A900
Person / Time
Issue date: 03/13/2018
From: Thomas Wellock
NRC/SECY
To:
Moulton C
References
Download: ML18094A900 (20)
v • d • e


Text

Quantifying Reactor Accident Risk: A History Panel W20: The Metamorphosis to a More Risk-Informed Regulator Tom Wellock NRC

Risk-Informed, Performance-Based

  • A New Paradigm

- Efficiency

- Safety Significant

- Relieve Regulatory Burden

  • PRAs: Significant Limitations

- Industry-NRC gap

- Methodology

- Data

- Peer Review

  • New Safety Issues NRC Chairman Shirley Jackson 2

Three Ds of the Deterministic Era

- Deterministic Design

- Design Basis Accidents

- Defense-in-Depth

  • Inherent Safety
  • Active Systems
  • Siting
  • Static Layers (containment) 3

4 WASH-1400 and the Roots of PRA

  • Methodology: Models and Goals in the 1960s
  • Regulatory Necessity
  • Political Necessity 5

Accident Modeling in the 1960s 6

Farmer Curve Chauncey Starr 7

New Safety Issues

  • Loss of Coolant and the China Syndrome

- ECCS

- Beyond the Design Basis Accident

- Need for regulatory risk expertise 8

AEC Under Siege

  • Anti-nuclear Movement

- Class 9 accidents.

- Growing interest in risk

  • Congress Henry Kendall, UCS 9

WASH-1400: Positives

  • New tool for regulators
  • A spectrum of accidents
  • Core damage more likely but lower consequences 10

Small LOCA Event Tree from WASH-1400 11 WASH-1400: Negatives

  • Large error bands
  • Inappropriate comparisons to other risks
  • Some accidents not analyzed
  • Lacked adequate peer review
  • Lewis Committee (1978) 12

WASH-1400, Executive Summary 13 UCS Critique of WASH-1400 14

Three Mile Island and WASH-1400 Human factors and operations Severe accidents Safety systems other than ECCS TMI Control Room, March 1979 15

1980s: Beneficially Unfocused

- Beyond the Design Basis: ATWS, SBO, severe accidents

- Unresolved Questions: Generic issues, older plants

- Operating Reactors: Evaluating events

- New Reactors: Design certification

- Methodology: Industry PRAs and NUREG-1150

- Goals: Safety Goal Policy and Backfits 16

Toward Risk-Informed Regulation, 1990s Individual Plant Examinations Towers-Perrin Report Maintenance Rule PRA Policy Statement (1995) and Implementation Plan (1994) 17

References

  • Slide 4: C.A. Bennett to A.B. Greninger, Evaluation of Probability of Disasters, HW-28767, July 20, 1953, DOE Public Reading Room Catalog, Accession #

D8451637.

Garrick, Reliability Analysis of Nuclear Power Plant Protective Systems, HN-190, May 1967, (Los Angeles: Holmes & Narver, May 1967); R.S. Hart and W.T. Harper, Final SNAPSHOT Safeguard Report, NAA-SR-10022(Rev.) (San Diego, CA:

Atomics International, March 20, 1965).

  • Slide 7: F.R. Farmer, Siting CriteriaA New Approach, Containment and Siting of Nuclear Power Plants, Proceedings of a Symposium, Vienna 3-7 April 1967 (Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency, 1976) 322; Chauncey Starr, Social Benefit vs. Technological Risk, Science 165 no. 3899, September 19, 1969, 1232-38.

18

References (cont.)

  • Slide 9: Archive of the Norfolk Charitable Trust, Sharon, MA.
  • Slides 11 and 13: U.S. NRC, Reactor Safety Study: An Assessment of Accident Risks in U.S. Commerical Nuclear Power Plants, WASH-1400 (NUREG-75/014) (DC:

U.S. NRC, October 1975).

100B.

19

Acronyms

  • SBO: Station Blackout
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