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{{Adams
#REDIRECT [[AEP-NRC-2014-94, Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report - Response to U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force.]]
| number = ML14357A053
| issue date = 12/18/2014
| title = Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report - Response to U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task
| author name = Lies Q S
| author affiliation = Indiana Michigan Power Co
| addressee name =
| addressee affiliation = NRC/Document Control Desk, NRC/NRR/DORL
| docket = 05000315, 05000316
| license number =
| contact person =
| case reference number = AEP-NRC-2014-94
| document type = Letter
| page count = 156
| project =
| stage = RAI
}}
 
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:INDMIANA Indiana Michigan PowerMICHIGAN Cook Nuclear PlantPOWER One Cook PlaceBridgman, MI 49106A unit of Amencan Electric Power IndianaMichiganPower.com December 18, 2014 AEP-NRC-2014-94 10 CFR 50.54(f)Docket Nos.: 50-31550-316U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk11555 Rockville Pike,Rockville, MD 20852Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report -Response to U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f)
Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of theNear-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident
 
==References:==
: 1. Letter from E. J. Leeds and M. R. Johnson, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), toAll Power Reactor Licensees and Holders of Construction Permits in Active or DeferredStatus, "Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f)
Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task ForceReview of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident,"
dated March 12, 2012,Agencywide Document Access Management Systems (ADAMS) Accession NumberML12053A340.
: 2. Letter from T. R. Pietrangelo, Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), to D. L. Skeen, NRC,"Proposed Path Forward for NTTF Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Reevaluations,"
datedApril 9, 2013, ADAMS Accession No. ML13101A379.
: 3. Letter from J. P. Gebbie, Indiana Michigan Power Company, to the NRC, "Donald C. CookNuclear Plant (CNP) Unit 1 and Unit 2, Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuantto 10 CFR 50.54(f)
Regarding the Seismic Aspects of Recommendation 2.1 of theNear-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident,"
AEP-NRC-2013-41, dated April 25, 2013, ADAMS Accession No. ML13121A059.
: 4. Letter from E. J. Leeds, NRC, to J. E. Pollock, NEI, "Electric Power Research Institute FinalDraft Report )XXXXXX,
'Seismic Evaluation Guidance:
Augmented Approach for theResolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic,'
As AnAcceptable Alternative to the March 12, 2012, Information Request for SeismicReevaluations,"
dated May 7, 2013, ADAMS Accession No. ML13106A331.
YAW U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission AEP-NRC-2014-94 Page 2On March 12, 2012, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued Reference 1 to allpower reactor licensees and holders of construction permits in active or deferred status.Reference 1, Enclosure 1, "Recommendation 2.1: Seismic,"
requested each addressee located inthe Central and Eastern United States (CEUS) to submit a Seismic Hazard Evaluation andScreening Report within 1.5 years from the date of Reference 1.In Reference 2, the Nuclear Energy Institute requested NRC agreement to delay submittal of theCEUS Seismic Hazard Evaluation and Screening Reports so that an update to the Electric PowerResearch Institute ground motion attenuation model could be completed and used to develop therequested information.
Reference 2 also outlined how a near-term Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP), and long-term plant risk evaluations, would provide a complete response toReference 1, Enclosure
: 1. By Reference 3, Indiana Michigan Power, licensee for Donald C. CookNuclear Plant (CNP) Units 1 and 2, informed the NRC of its intent to follow the approach andschedule described in Reference
: 2. By Reference 4, the NRC agreed with the approach proposedin Reference 2, which included licensee submittal of an ESEP report no later thanDecember 31, 2014. This letter provides the ESEP report for CNP Units I and 2.Enclosure 1 to this letter provides an affirmation.
Enclosure 2 provides the ESEP report for CNPUnits 1 and 2. There are no new Regulatory Commitments identified in this letter. Should you haveany questions, please contact Mr. Michael K. Scarpello, Regulatory Affairs Manager, at(269) 466-2649.
Sincerely, Q. Shane LiesEngineering Vice President, Indiana Michigan PowerJ RW/amp
 
==Enclosures:==
: 1. Affirmation
: 2. Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f)Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term
" Task ForceRecommendation 2.1: Seismic U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission AEP-NRC-2014-94 Page 3C: M. L. Chawla, NRC Washington, DCJ. T. King, MPSCR. F. Kuntz, NRR, NRCMDEQ -RMD/RPSNRC Resident Inspector C. D. Pederson, NRC Region IIIA. J. Williamson, AEP Ft. Wayne, w/o enclosures Enclosure I to AEP-NRC-2014-94 AFFIRMATION I, Q. Shane Lies, being duly sworn, state that I am Engineering Vice President of IndianaMichigan Power (I&M), that I am authorized to sign and file this document with the U. S. NuclearRegulatory Commission on behalf of I&M, and that the statements made and the matters setforth herein pertaining to I&M are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information, andbelief.Indiana Michigan PowerQ. Shane LiesEngineering Vice President, Indiana Michigan PowerSWORN TO AND SUBSCRIBED BEFORE METHIS DAY 0I , ' 2014THISDAY OF~ &c i~L L, 014DANIELLE BURGOYNEXNotary Public, State of MichiganCounty of Berrien---.Nbtar ~ic --My Commission Expires 04-04-2018 Acting In the Countyiof My Commission Expires " --"- .*,,,
Enclosure 2 TO AEP-NRC-2014-94 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report inResponse to the 50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic DocumentTitle: 13Q3208-RPT-005
-Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report inResponse to the 50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: SeismicDocument Type:Criteria
'1 Interface
[- Report [ Specification E] Other E] Drawing E]Project Name: Seismic Hazard & ESEP Seismic Services for DC Cook Units 1 & 2Job No.: 13Q3208Client: American Electric PowerThis document has been prepared in accordance with the S&A Quality Assurance ProgramManual Revision 17 and project requirements:
Initial Issue: Rev. 0Prepared by: G. G. Thomas n". 4 .Date: 12/10/14Jennifer Huang Dan Lavarnway12/10/14Reviewed by: M. Etre P.R. Wilson Date- 12/10/14Date: 12/10/14Approved by: M. Etre ,P.R. Wilson 6'dt- d '--, awRevision Record:Revision Prepared by/ Reviewed by/ Approved by/ Description of RevisionNo. Date Date DateDOCUMENT CONTRACT NO.APPROVALSHEET 13Q3208Stevenson
& Associates Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 2 of 151TABLE OF CONTENTS1.0 Purpose and Objective
.................................................................................................
42.0 Brief Summary of the FLEX Seismic Implementation Strategies
.........................
53.0 Equipment Selection Process and ESEL .................................................................
93.1 Equipment Selection Process and ESEL ..............................................................
93.1.1 E S E L D evelopm ent .................................................................................................
.113.1.2 Pow er O perated Valves .........................................................................................
133 .1 .3 P u ll B o xe s ......................................................................................................................
143.1.4 Term ination C abinets ...............................................................................................
143.1.5 Critical Instrumentation Indicators
.......................................................................
143.1.6 Electrical Distribution
............................................
153.1.7 C ontrol E quipm ent ................................................................................................
..153.2 Justification for use of Equipment that is not the Primary Means for FLEXim plem entation
.......................................................................................................................
164.0 Ground Motion Response Spectrum (GMRS) ......................................................
174.1 Plot of GMRS Submitted by the Licensee
.........................................................
174.2 Comparison to SSE ................................................................................................
185.0 Review Level Ground Motion (RLGM) .....................................................................
205.1 Description of RLGM selected
...........................................................................
205.2 Method to Estimate ISRS ......................................................................................
216.0 Seismic Margin Evaluation Approach
.....................................................................
226.1 Summary of Methodologies Used ........................................................................
226.2 HCLPF Screening Process ....................................................................................
236.3 Seismic Walkdown Approach
...............................................................................
236.3.1 W alkdow n approach
..............................................................................................
236.3.2 Application of Previous Walkdown Information
..................................................
256.3.3 Significant Walkdown Findings
............................................................................
356.4 HCLPF Calculation Process .................................................................................
356.5 Functional Evaluation of Relays ..........................................................................
38 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 3 of 1516.6 Tabulated ESEL HCLPF values (including Key failure modes) .......................
387.0 Inaccessible Items and Late Additions to the ESEL .............................................
397.1 Identification of Inaccessible Items and Late Additions to the ESEL .............
397.2 Planned Walkdown
/ Evaluation Schedule
/ Close Out ....................................
408.0 ESEP Conclusions and Results ...............................................................................
418.1 Supporting Inform ation .........................................................................................
418.2 Identification of Planned Modifications
..............................................................
428.3 Modification Implementation Schedule
..............................................................
438.4 Sum m ary of Actions ..............................................................................................
439.0 R eferences
.......................................................................................................................
45Attachm ent A- C NP Unit 1 ESEL ..........................................................................................
50Attachm ent B -C NP U nit 2 ESEL ..........................................................................................
67Attachment C- CNP Unit 1 ESEP HCLPF Values and Failure Mode Tabulation
..................
84Attachment D -CNP Unit 2 ESEP HCLPF Values and Failure Mode Tabulation
.....................
119 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 4 of 1511.0 Purpose and Objective Following the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant resulting from the March11, 2011, Great Tohoku Earthquake and subsequent
: tsunami, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) established a Near Term Task Force (NTTF) to conduct a systematic reviewof NRC processes and regulations and to determine if the agency should make additional improvements to its regulatory system. The NTTF developed a set of recommendations intended to clarify and strengthen the regulatory framework for protection against naturalphenomena.
Subsequently, the NRC issued a 50.54(f) letter on March 12, 2012 [Ref. 1],requesting information to assure that these recommendations are addressed by all U.S. nuclearpower plants. The 50.54(f) letter requests that licensees and holders of construction permitsunder 10 CFR (Code of Federal Regulations)
Part 50 reevaluate the seismic hazards at theirsites against present-day NRC requirements and guidance.
Depending on the comparison between the reevaluated seismic hazard and the current design basis, further risk assessment may be required.
Assessment approaches acceptable to the staff include a seismic probabilistic risk assessment (SPRA), or a seismic margin assessment (SMA). Based upon the assessment
: results, the NRC staff will determine whether additional regulatory actions are necessary.
This report describes the Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) undertaken for DonaldC. Cook Nuclear Plant (CNP), Units 1 & 2. The intent of the ESEP is to perform an interimaction in response to the NRC's 50.54(f) letter [Ref. 1] to demonstrate seismic margin through areview of a subset of the plant equipment that can be relied upon to protect the reactor corefollowing beyond design basis seismic events.The ESEP is implemented using the methodologies in the NRC endorsed guidance in ElectricPower Research Institute (EPRI) 3002000704, Seismic Evaluation Guidance:
Augmented Approach for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1:Seismic [Ref. 2].The objective of this report is to provide summary information describing the ESEP evaluations and results.
The level of detail provided in the report is intended to enable the NRC tounderstand the inputs used, the evaluations performed, and the decisions made as a result ofthe interim evaluations.
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 5 of 1512.0 Brief Summary of the FLEX Seismic Implementation Strategies The CNP Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) response strategies for Reactor CoreCooling and Heat Removal, Reactor Inventory Control/
Long-term Subcriticality andContainment Function are similar for both Units. The following discussion is a summary of CNPprimary strategies to address a Beyond-Design-Basis Seismic Event (BDBSE).
This summaryis derived from the CNP Overall Integrated Plan (OIP) and updates in Response to the March12, 2012, Commission Order EA-12-049
[Ref. 3].Phase 1 FLEX Strategies Reactor Core Cooling and Heat RemovalSteam Generator
: Cooling, for Reactor Coolant System (RCS)/Core Heat Removal is initially provided by operation of the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (TDAFW) Pump taking suctionfrom the Condensate Storage Tank (CST). Site specific analysis
[Ref. 29] has been performed to demonstrate adequate CST volume for feeding each Unit's TDAFW pumps from a singleCST. This analysis demonstrates sufficient inventory is available to maintain secondary heatsink for 12 hours post Extended Loss of AC Power (ELAP) including cool down of each Unit bydepressurizing Steam Generators (SG) in accordance with Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs).An alternate cooling source will need to be aligned to maintain secondary inventory make upwhen the CST is depleted or becomes unavailable.
Lake water make up to the steamgenerators uses a FLEX lift pump to deliver lake water from the Circulating Water IntakeForebay to the TDAFW pump suction FLEX connection.
RCS Boration/Inventory ControlNo pumped RCS Boration or RCS make up is required in Phase 1. Depending upon ReactorCoolant Pump (RCP) seal leakage and related RCS depressurization, some Safety Injection Accumulator make up to the RCS may occur based upon the results of CNP analyses.
Westinghouse Shield Passive Thermal Shutdown RCP seals limiting RCS leakage arecredited for FLEX implementation.
Containment Site specific analytical results [Ref. 29] determined the FLEX Containment Temperature andPressure control actions.
In the MODE 1-4 response, Containment pressure does not reach themaximum design pressure limit until after 70 hours.
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 6 of 151PowerEach Unit's Control Room Instrument Distribution (CRID) and Critical Control Room Power(CCRP) inverters maintain control room instrumentation and control with power supplied fromthe Train A&B Station batteries.
Secondary inventory make up is controlled using the TDAFWpump with local manual control of the TDAFW pump and hand-wheel operation of key motoroperated valves. A Direct Current (DC) load shed will be performed to reduce Train A&BStation battery discharge rate within the first hour to ensure 12 hours are available to deployFLEX electrical generators.
A plant specific DC load shedding analysis
[Ref. 29] demonstrates the 12 hour coping capability for these batteries.
Phase 2 FLEX Strategies Reactor Core Cooling and Heat RemovalA FLEX Lift pump is expected to be deployed in Phase 2 as an Alternate Cooling Source (ACS)to provide secondary inventory to maintain core cooling with the Steam Generators (SG).The FLEX lift pump will draw water from the Circulating Water Intake Forebay, delivering flow tothe TDAFW pump suction and the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP). The deployment time is within 12hours. This is based upon the CST capacity determined by site specific analyses
[Ref. 29].Four Steam Generators will be used to maintain symmetric RCS cool down for the first 24hours. Steam Generator Power Operated Relief Valves operated from local control stations orlocal manual operation that is the credited
: strategy, are used for control of Steam Generator (SG) pressure and RCS cool down rate.This accounts for the initiation of RCS Boration at 16 hours and provides acceptable Boronmixing in the RCS, and the limiting RCS natural circulation flow rates. The RCS will be fullyBorated by twenty four (24) hours after the event. At this 24 hour mark SG cooling may bereduced to two of four Steam Generators.
RCS Boration/Inventory ControlIn MODEs 1-4, the RCS Boration and make up flow path uses a portable FLEX Boric Acid (BA)pump. The FLEX BA pump takes suction via gravity drain using a hose connected to the BoricAcid Storage Tank (BAST) outlet. The FLEX BA pump discharges to the RCS through theCharging header piping connection, that was modified by installing a high pressure hoseconnection for CNP Unit 1 and will be modified in the future for CNP Unit 2. The FLEX BApump provides sufficient pressure and flow to fully borate one unit using a single BAST.
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 7 of 151Containment Site specific evaluation
[Ref. 29] determined no Phase 2 FLEX Containment Temperature andPressure control actions or equipment operation are required for the MODE 1-4 Containment response.
After 24 hours containment pressure will exceed the value for Adverse Containment Conditions as defined by Emergency Operating Procedures.
Operators will then use moreconservative values for actions based upon Steam Generator and Pressurizer indicated level.Per Reference 29, both CNP Units are Ice Condenser Containments, requiring Phase 2 FLEXGenerators to power one train of containment hydrogen igniters in accordance with theRegulatory criterion.
Spent Fuel ControlNo Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) inventory make up is required until after 24 hours. SFP inventory makeup is available as needed from the FLEX Lift pump deployed in Phase 2 to supply theTDAFW Pump.PowerFLEX generators, 600vac (volt alternating current),
500kW (Kilo-watt),
will be deployed from theFLEX storage building.
FLEX power will be supplied to select loads through 600vac Buses toallow restoration of loads such as battery chargers, a Boric Acid Transfer pump, the MiddleBoric Acid Evaporator feed pump, Train B Hydrogen
: Igniters, and Train A Reactor Vessel LevelIndication System (RVLIS).Phase 3 FLEX Strategies Reactor Core Cooling and Heat RemovalPhase 3 equipment includes two, 1.1 MWe, 4160V gas turbine generators supplied from theNational SAFER Response Center (NSRC) for each unit. These generators will repower 4kVbusses, which allows repowering Train B 4kV safety related motors, 600vac Busses, andrelated 120vac lighting and low voltage electrical distribution circuits.
Train B was selectedbecause it provides the ideal mix of 4kV safety related pumps such as Component CoolingWater (CCW), Residual Heat Removal (RHR), Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (MDAFW) andEssential Service Water (ESW) (if access to the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS) is available) whilerestoring 600vac busses.Train B power restoration allows starting the West CCW pump, West RHR pump, Train Bcontrol room ventilation and facilitates establishing shutdown cooling in conjunction with theNSRC supplied large volume raw water pump. Using a FLEX connection point, this largevolume FLEX pump will supply Train B of the ESW system, from the Circulating Water Forebay, Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 8 of 151to support the RHR and CCW systems for shutdown cooling alignment if the UHS isunavailable.
RCS Boration/Inventory ControlThe RCS Boration and make up flow path continues to use the portable FLEX Boric Acid (BA)pump as described in Phase 2.Containment Per Reference 29 Phase 3 Containment cooling and depressurization will be accomplished bythe operation of one Containment Hydrogen Skimmer Fan. Operation of this Fan results in flowthrough the Ice Condenser; cooling and depressurizing the Containment.
Operation of this Fanwill reduce Containment Pressure and Temperatures to normal values within 2-3 hours afterstarting the Fan.Spent Fuel ControlSFP cooling is maintained during FLEX response by providing SFP inventory makeup from theCirculating Water Forebay using the FLEX Lift pump. Moisture caused by evaporation or boilingwill be removed from the Auxiliary Building by natural draft.PowerTwo 1 MW 4kV generators from the NSRC per Unit will be ganged together using NSRC outputbus and paralleling equipment.
NSRC 4 kV power to Bus 1A (2A) is connected by relocating theReserve Feed 4kV Bus infeed circuit breaker and FLEX connections at the load side of 4kVcircuit breakers.
NSRC 4kV power is sufficient to restore the Train B 4kV vital pump bus and600Vac busses. 4kV power restoration in Phase 3 facilitates re-energizing loads to support thestrategies summarized herein.
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 9 of 1513.0 Equipment Selection Process and ESELThe selection of equipment for the Expedited Seismic Equipment List (ESEL) followed theguidelines of EPRI 3002000704
[Ref. 2] Seismic Evaluation Guidance and NEI 12-06 FLEXImplementation Guidance
[Ref. 24]. The ESEL for Unit 1 & 2 is presented in Attachment A andB respectively.
3.1 Equipment Selection Process and ESELThe selection of equipment to be included on the ESEL was based on installed plant equipment credited in the FLEX strategies during Phase 1, 2, and 3 mitigation of a Beyond Design BasisExternal Event (BOBEE),
as outlined in the CNP Overall Integrated Plan (OIP) and updates inResponse to the March 12, 2012, Commission Order EA-12-049
[Ref. 3]. The OIP provides theCNP FLEX mitigation strategy and serves as the basis for equipment selected for the ESEP.The scope of "installed plant equipment" includes equipment relied upon for the FLEX strategies to sustain the critical functions of core cooling and containment integrity consistent with the CNPOIP and updates [Ref. 3]. FLEX recovery actions are excluded from the ESEP scope per EPRI3002000704
[Ref. 2]. The overall list of planned FLEX modifications and the scope forconsideration herein is limited to those required to support core cooling, reactor coolant inventory and subcriticality, and containment integrity functions.
Portable and pre-staged FLEX equipment (not permanently installed) are excluded from the ESEL per EPRI 3002000704
[Ref. 2].The ESEL component selection followed the EPRI guidance outlined in Section 3.2 of EPRI3002000704
[Ref. 2].1. The scope of components is limited to that required to accomplish the core cooling andcontainment safety functions identified in Table 3-2 of EPRI 3002000704
[Ref. 2]. Theinstrumentation monitoring requirements for core cooling/containment safety functions are limited to those outlined in the EPRI 3002000704
: guidance, and are a subset of thoseoutlined in the CNP OIP [Ref. 3].2. The scope of components on the ESEL was limited to installed plant equipment, andFLEX connections necessary to implement the CNP OIP [Ref. 3] as described in Section2.3. The scope of components assumes the credited FLEX connection modifications areimplemented, and are limited to those required to support a single FLEX success path.These are the "Primary" path for CNP.4. The "Primary" FLEX success path is to be specified.
Selection of the "Back-up/Alternate" FLEX success path must be justified.
CNP did not use a "Back-up/Alternate" FLEXsuccess path5. Phase 3 coping strategies are included in the ESEP scope, whereas recovery strategies are excluded.
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 10 of 1516. Structures,
: systems, and components excluded per the EPRI 3002000704
[Ref. 2]guidance are:* Structures (e.g. containment, auxiliary
: building, etc.)* Piping, cabling,
: conduit, HVAC, and their supports* Manual valves and rupture disks* Power-operated valves not required to change state as part of the FLEX mitigation strategies
* Nuclear steam supply system (NSSS) components (e.g. reactor pressure vessel andinternals, reactor coolant pumps and seals, etc.)7. For cases in which neither train was specified as a primary or back-up strategy, then onlyone train component (generally
'B' train for CNP) is included in the ESELPermanent plant equipment required for implementation of the FLEX Strategy was identified byreviewing the FLEX Strategy and associated cooling flow path piping and instrumentation diagrams (P&ID), instrument elementary
: diagrams, and electrical distribution one-line diagrams.
The approach taken in compiling the ESEL was to assume there were no random equipment failures and identify a single success path for each element of the FLEX Strategy.
Note, theEPRI 3002000704
[Ref. 2] Seismic Evaluation Guidance states that only one success path isrequired.
Also, NEI 12-06 FLEX Implementation Guidance
[Ref. 24] does not requirepostulating single or multiple random failures during or following an Extended Loss of allAlternating Current (AC) Power and Loss of the Ultimate Heat Sink (ELAP/LUHS) event'.Following Section 3.2 of the EPRI 3002000704
[Ref. 2] Seismic Evaluation Guidance thefollowing equipment categories were excluded from consideration:
" Structures
* Distributed systems (piping,
: cabling, conduit, cable trays, Heating, Ventilation and AirConditioning (HVAC))* Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS) components The corresponding components listed in the ESEL have been further screened utilizing theEvaluation Guidance to exclude components having the following criteria:
* Non-power operated valves (manual valves, check valves, rupture disks)* Power operated valves not required to change state for any FLEX strategy* Sub-components mounted within equipment already included on the list2The FLEX Integrated Plan [Ref. 29] also assumed no single failure of structures,
: systems, or components (SSC), inaccordance with the Implementation Guidance.
2 This item refers to the "Rule-of-Box" (ROB). When equipment is screened using the EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7]guidance, all of the components mounted on or in equipment of a particular equipment class are considered to bepart of that equipment and do not have to be evaluated separately.
Relays and other contact devices vulnerable toseismically induced chatter are an exception to this rule and should be separately identified and evaluated for seismicadequacy using the ESEP evaluation guidance.
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 11 of 151Additional screening criteria were applied to exclude components from the ESEL that met thefollowing criteria:
* In-line pipe-supported components (without separate mounting)
* Pumps and small heat exchangers within piping pressure boundaries but not in the flowpath" Components expected to operate during the initial reactor transient (as described in NEI12-06 section 3.2.1.4 [Ref. 24])The Equipment Selection and ESEL Development is documented in S&A Report 13Q3208-RPT-001,
[Ref. 25].3.1.1 ESEL Development The ESEL was developed by reviewing the CNP FLEX Integration Plan [Ref. 29] to determine the major equipment involved in the FLEX strategies.
Further reviews of plant drawings (e.g.,Process and Instrumentation Diagrams (P&IDs) and Electrical One Line Diagrams) wereperformed to identify the boundaries of the flowpaths to be used in the FLEX strategies and toidentify specific components in the flowpaths needed to support implementation of the FLEXstrategies.
Boundaries were established at an electrical or mechanical isolation device (e.g.,isolation amplifier, valve, etc.) in branch circuits
/ branch lines off the defined strategy electrical or fluid flowpath.
P&IDs were the primary reference documents used to identify mechanical components and instrumentation.
The flow paths used for FLEX strategies were selected andspecific components were identified using detailed equipment and instrument
: drawings, pipingisometrics, electrical schematics and one-line
: drawings, system descriptions, design basisdocuments, etc., as necessary.
The flow paths credited for the CNP ESEP are shown in Table 3-1.
SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 12 of 151Table 0-1: Flow Paths Credited for ESEPP&IDs/Reference DrawingsFlow PathUnit 1Unit 2Phase 1 and Phase 2 Reactor Coolant System(RCS) Heat Removal:
Main Steam PowerOperated Relief Valves discharge steam fromthe Steam Generators to the atmosphere.
Feedwater from the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump with suction from theCondensate Storage Tank or portable FLEXpump from the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS).---I I-OP-1-5105D
[26.1]OP-1-5105E
[26.2]OP-1-5106A
[26.31OP-1-5113
[26.4]OP-1-5113A
[26.5]OP-2-5105D
[26.19]OP-2-5105E
[26.20]OP-2-5106A
[26.21]OP-2-5113
[26.22]OP-2-5113A
[26.23]Phase 3 Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Heat OP-1-5113
[26.4] OP-2-5113
[26.22]Removal:
Mode 4 Train B Residual Heat OP-15113A
[26.5] OP-2-5113A
[26.23]Removal (RHR) system, using the Train BComponent Cooling (CCW) System, and Train B OP-1-513
[26.6] OP-2-513
[26.24]Essential Service Water (ESW) system supplied OP-1-5135
[26.7] OP-2-5135
[26.251by a portable FLEX pump from the UHS. OP-1-5135A
[26.8] OP-2-5135A
[26.26]Phase I Reactor Coolant Make Up and BorationControl:
Passive injection from the Safety OP-1-5143A
[26.9] OP-2-5143A
[26.27]Injection Accumulators.
Phase 2 and Phase 3 Reactor Coolant Make Upand Boration Control:
A portable FLEX pumptaking suction from the Boric Acid Storage Tank OP-12-5131
[26.10] OP-12-5131
[26.10](BAST) FLEX connection to the Reciprocating OP-1-5129
[26.11] OP-2-5129
[26.28]Charging Pump discharge piping FLEX OP-1-5142
[26.12] OP-2-5142
[26.29]connection; to the RCS via the Boron Injection Tank.OP-1-5128
[26.13] OP-2-5128
[26.30]RCS Pressure Control:
RCS Pressurizer Power OP-1-5128
[26.14] OP-2-5128
[26.311Operated Relief Valves. OP-1-5120D
[26.15] OP-2-5120D
[26.32]Containment:
Analytical results indicate Phase1 and Phase 2 FLEX actions are not required.
OP-1-12032126.36]
OP-2-12032
[26.37]Phase 3 uses a Fan to draw air through the IceCondenser to cool Containment.
Fuel Oil: From the Diesel Oil Storage Tank via aportable FLEX pump to provide fuel for FLEX OP-1-5151C
[26.16] OP-2-5151A
[26.33]equipment.
.
0Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 13 of 151P&lDs/Reference DrawingsFlow PathUnit I Unit 2Phase 1 Main Control Room (MCR) and BatteryRoom Ventilation:
Open doors and use portable None NoneFLEX fans.Phase 2 Main Control Room and Battery RoomVentilation:
Maintain MCR ventilation with opendoors and portable FLEX fans. Battery Room OP-1-5148C
[26.17] OP-2-5148C
[26.34]ventilation is powered by portable FLEXGenerators along with Station Battery Chargers.
Phase 3 Main Control Room and Battery RoomVentilation:
Restore Train B of MCR ventilation OP-1-5148C
[26.17] OP-2-5148C
[26.34]powered by NSRC portable FLEX Generators.
OP-1-5149
[26.18] OP-2-5149
[26.35]Battery Room ventilation is also powered by OP-1-5113
[26.4] OP-2-5113
[26.22]these portable generators.
Each of the following flow paths were analyzed, and all mechanical equipment necessary toestablish these flow paths were considered for inclusion in the ESEL:0000000Main Steam to the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater PumpAuxiliary Feedwater (AFW) to the Steam Generators Reactor Coolant Make UpResidual Heat RemovalMain Control Room Ventilation Battery Room Ventilation Instrument AirImplementing procedures to establish these flow paths were examined to identify valves that willbe manipulated manually using the local valve operator hand wheel. These valves wereexcluded from the electrical power and control identification activities mentioned in the next twosections.
3.1.2 Power Operated ValvesPage 3-3 of EPRI 3002000704
[Ref. 2] notes that power operated valves not required to changestate are excluded from the ESEL. Page 3-2 also notes that "functional failure modes ofelectrical and mechanical portions of the installed Phase 1 equipment should be considered (e.g. Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC)/AFW trips)."
To address this concern, the following guidance is applied for the CNP Unit 1 and CNP Unit 2 ESEL for functional failure modesassociated with power operated valves:
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 14 of 151Power operated valves that remain energized during the Extended Loss of all AC Power(ELAP) events (such as DC powered valves),
were included on the ESEL.Power operated valves not required to change state as part of the FLEX mitigation strategies were not included on the ESEL. The seismic event also causes the ELAPevent; therefore, the valves are incapable of spurious operation as they would be de-energized.
Power operated valves not required to change state as part of the FLEX mitigation strategies during Phase 1, and are re-energized and operated during subsequent Phase2 and 3 strategies, were not evaluated for spurious valve operation as the seismic eventthat caused the ELAP has passed before the valves are re-powered.
3.1.3 Pull BoxesPull boxes were deemed unnecessary to add to the ESELs as these components providecompletely passive locations for pulling or installing cables. No breaks or connections in thecabling are included in pull boxes. Pull boxes were considered part of conduit and cabling,which are excluded in accordance with EPRI 3002000704
[Ref. 2].3.1.4 Termination CabinetsTermination
: cabinets, including cabinets necessary for FLEX Phase 2 and Phase 3connections, provide consolidated locations for permanently connecting multiple cables. Thetermination cabinets and the internal connections provide a completely passive function;
: however, the cabinets are included on the ESEL to ensure that industry knowledge ofpanel/anchorage failure vulnerabilities is addressed.
3.1.5 Critical Instrumentation Indicators Critical indicators and recorders are typically physically located on panels/cabinets and areincluded as separate components;
: however, seismic evaluation of the instrument indication maybe included in the panel/cabinet seismic evaluation (rule-of-the-box).
The FLEX Integrated Plan [Ref. 29] was reviewed and key plant parameters were identified.
Instrumentation required to indicate the following parameters was considered for inclusion in theESEL:" Steam Generator Pressure and Level Indications
" Reactor Coolant System Pressure and Temperature Indications
* Reactor Vessel Level Indication (Utilizing the Reactor Vessel Level Instrumentation System)* Pressurizer Level Indication
* Neutron Flux Indication
" Core Exit Temperature Indication
* Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Indication Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 15 of 151" Safety Injection Flow Indication
* Containment Pressure Indication
* Condensate Storage Tank Level Indication
* Boric Acid Storage Tank Level and Temperature Indication To compile the instrumentation included in the ESEL, instrument loop identifiers for theseparameters were taken, where possible, from the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report(UFSAR) Table 7.8-1, Variables Provided the Operator for Manual Functions During andFollowing an Accident
[Ref. 21]. Where both wide and narrow range instruments were indicated for a given parameter on UFSAR Table 7.8-1, the wide-range instrument was chosen. P&lDswere consulted for parameters not included in UFSAR Table 7.8-1.3.1.6 Electrical Distribution The electrical distribution and motor control centers (MCCs) necessary to provide power to theinstrumentation, pumps, valves, or any other electrically powered permanent plant equipment identified for ESEP were included in the ESEL. This includes vital instrument power from thestation batteries through the inverters to the vital bus panels, instrument racks, and Main ControlRoom (MCR) panels. Distribution paths were identified from intended FLEX generator connection points to their intended loads.3.1.7 Control Equipment The control equipment necessary to operate the pumps, valves, or any other electrically powered permanent plant equipment identified for ESEP was considered for inclusion in theESEL. Relays and other sensitive contact devices subject to seismically induced chatter thatmay lead to a circuit seal-in or lockout were also considered for inclusion on the ESEL. Powersources for the required control circuits were traced and any power distribution component necessary for the control circuits (and not already identified) were added to the ESEL.As mentioned in Section 3.1.2, controls for local manually operated valves were not considered.
The list of valves crediting manual operation includes the Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (TDAFP) Trip and Throttle Valve. None of the relays associated with the TDAFP tripfunction were included on the ESEL because if an event causes an actuation and trips theTDAFP, operators will reset the TDAFP manually according to the Emergency Operating Procedures described in Stevenson
& Associates (S&A) Report 13Q3208-RPT-001
[Ref. 25]. Itis noted that all other relays screened out of consideration for ESEP and thus the ESELcontains no relays.3.1.8 FLEX Connections (Phase 2 and Phase 3 Piping Connections)
Item 2 in Section 3.1 above notes that the scope of equipment in the ESEL includes
"... FLEXconnections necessary to implement the CNP OIP [Ref. 3] as described in Section 2." Item 3 inSection 3.1 also notes that the scope of components assumes the credited FLEX connection Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 16 of 151modifications are implemented, and are limited to those required in the case of CNP to supporta single Primary FLEX success path. It is noted that these connections have been installed forCNP Unit 1 and are planned to be installed for CNP Unit 2 in the spring 2015 outage.Item 6 in Section 3 above goes on to explain that "Piping,
: cabling, conduit, HVAC, and theirsupports" are excluded from the ESEL scope in accordance with EPRI 3002000704
[Ref. 2].Therefore, piping and pipe supports associated with FLEX Phase 2 and Phase 3 connections are excluded from the scope of the ESEP evaluation.
: However, any active valves in FLEXPhase 2 and Phase 3 connection flow path are included in the ESEL.The flow paths described in Section 3.1.1 of this report and included with marked up Piping andInstrumentation Drawings (P&IDs) in S&A Report 13Q3208-RPT-001
[Ref. 25] were configured for the FLEX connections consistent with the August 2014 FLEX strategy
[Ref. 29]. The scopeof equipment in the ESEL includes FLEX connections necessary to implement the CNP OIP[Ref. 3] as described in Section 2. The scope of components assumed the credited FLEXconnection modifications are implemented, and are limited to those required to support a singlePrimary FLEX success path. It is also noted there are no plans to have permanently installed FLEX equipment for CNP Unit I or CNP Unit 2.3.2 Justification for use of Equipment that is not the Primary Means for FLEXimplementation All equipment used for FLEX implementation on the CNP ESEL are the primary path. Thecomplete ESELs for CNP Unit 1 and CNP Unit 2 are presented in Attachments A and B,respectively.
ValExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 17 of 1514.0 Ground Motion Response Spectrum (GMRS)4.1 Plot of GMRS Submitted by the LicenseeAs documented in Stevenson
& Associates (S&A) Report 13Q3208-RPT-003
[Ref. 4](transmitted by letter from Q. S. Lies, I&M, to NRC, "Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant Units 1 and2, Seismic Hazard and Screening Report (CEUS Sites), Response to NRC Request forInformation Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f)
Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident,"
dated March 27, 2014)[Ref. 11] the SSE Control Point for Containment is at an elevation of 587.4 ft. which is used forcomparison to the Control Point GMRS.The GMRS at 5% equipment
: damping, taken from S&A Report 13Q3208-RPT-003
[Ref. 4], isshown in Table 4-1 and Figure 4-1.Table 4-1 CNP GMRSFrequency (Hz) GMRS (g) Frequency (Hz) GMRS (g)100 0.248 3.5 0.32190 0.251 3 0.28880 0.254 2.5 0.24070 0.261 2 0.21060 0.273 1.5 0.16750 0.302 1.25 0.13340 0.348 1 0.10235 0.376 0.9 0.093230 0.405 0.8 0.082225 0.454 0.7 0.072220 0.461 0.6 0.063915 0.525 0.5 0.056312.5 0.496 0.4 0.045110 0.464 0.35 0.03949 0.466 0.3 0.03388 0.454 0.25 0.02827 0.426 0.2 0.02256 0.415 0.15 0.01695 0.421 0.125 0.01414 0.361 0.1 0.0113 H3Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic1303208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 18 of 1510.0.3W0Z!!l01 1 10 100Frequency (Hz)Figure 4-1 CNP GMRS4.2 Comparison to SSEAs documented in S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-002
[Ref. 23], the GMRS exceeds the SSE inthe 3.5 Hz. to 10 Hz range for 5% equipment damping.
A comparison of the GMRS to the SSEbetween 1-10 Hz is shown in Table 4-2 and Figure 4-2.Table 0-2: CNP GMRS and SSE between 1-10HzFrequency (Hz) SSE (g) GMRS (g)10 0.24 0.4649 0.252 0.4668 0.264 0.4547 0.276 0.4266 0.305 0.4155 0.315 0.4214 0.32 0.3613.5 0.32 0.3213 0.304 0.2882.5 0.287 0.242 0.27 0.211.5 0.221 0.1671.25 0.195 0.1331 0.167 0.102 l Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 19 of 15100..... I.....GM 10.;3II~V~..........
.... .. .. .... ..... .. ... .. ....... ..0.1 1 10 100Frequency (Hz)Figure 4-2 GMRS / SSE Comparison SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 20 of 1515.0 Review Level Ground Motion (RLGM)5.1 Description of RLGM selectedThe RLGM for CNP was determined in accordance with Section 4 of EPRI 3002000704
[Ref. 2]by linearly scaling the CNP SSE by the maximum GMRS/SSE ratio (SF) between the 1 and 10 Hzrange. The RLGM for CNP is also documented in S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-002
[Ref. 23].The results of this calculation are shown in Table 5-1.Table 0-2: CNP Maximum GMRS/SSE Ratio (SF)Frequency Unscaled SSE (g) GMRS/SSE(Hz) GMRS (g)10 0.464 0.24 1.9339 0.466 0.252 1.8498 0.454 0.264 1.7207 0.426 0.276 1.5436 0.415 0.305 1.3615 0.421 0.315 1.3374 0.361 0.32 1.1283.5 0.321 0.32 1.0033 0.288 0.304 0.9472.5 0.24 0.287 0.8362 0.21 0.27 0.7781.5 0.167 0.221 0.7561.25 0.133 0.195 0.6821 0.102 0.167 0.611As shown above, the maximum GMRS/SSE ratio occurs at 10 Hz and equals 1.933.The resulting 5% damped RLGM, based on scaling the horizontal SSE by the SF of 1.933, isshown in Table 5-2 and Figure 5-1. Note that the RLGM Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA) is0.387g.
pla3Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 21 of 151Table 0-3: CNP RLGMFreq. (Hz) SA (g) Freq. (Hz) SA (g)0.5 0.180 4.17 0.6190.77 0.271 5.88 0.5991.11 0.348 6.67 0.5411.43 0.416 12.5 0.4061.82 0.483 25 0.3872 0.522 50 0.3873.45 0.619 100 0.387I- --1.93 xSSE=RLGM-ssE0.10,700:0.6000.500-*L0.40D. -------0.000110100Frequency (Hz)Figure 0-1: CNP RLGIMI5.2 Method to Estimate ISRSThe method used to derive the ESEP in-structure response spectra (ISRS) was to uniformly scale existing SSE-based ISRS from the CNP Design Basis SSE (referred to as the DesignBasis Earthquake (DBE) in the CNP UFSAR [Ref. 21]) [Refs. 17.1, 17.2, 17.3 and 17.4] by themaximum SF of 1.933 from Table 5-1. Existing ISRS were the same as those used for theUnresolved Safety Issue (USI) A-46 program.
Scaled ISRS are calculated for all buildings andelevations where ESEL items are located at CNP. The scaled ISRS for CNP are documented inS&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-002
[Ref. 23]. These scaled ISRS were used as the basis forscreening and for the High Confidence Low Probability of Failure (HCLPF) calculations 13Q3208-CAL-004
[10.1], 13Q3208-CAL-005
[10.2], and 13Q3208-CAL-006
[10.3].
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 22 of 1516.0 Seismic Margin Evaluation ApproachIt is necessary to demonstrate that ESEL items have sufficient seismic capacity to meet orexceed the demand characterized by the RLGM. The seismic capacity is characterized as thehighest peak ground acceleration (PGA) for which there is a high confidence of a low probability of failure (HCLPF).
The PGA is associated with a particular spectral shape, in this case the 5%damped RLGM spectral shape. The calculated HCLPF capacity must be equal to or greaterthan the RLGM PGA (0.387g from Table 5-2 and Figure 5-1). The criteria for seismic capacitydetermination are given in Section 5 of EPRI 3002000704
[Ref. 2].There are two basic approaches for developing HCLPF capacities:
: 1. Deterministic approach using the conservative deterministic failure margin (CDFM)methodology of EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7].2. Probabilistic approach using the fragility analysis methodology of EPRI TR-103959
[Ref.8].The deterministic approach using the CDFM methodology of EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7] wasused for the CNP to determine HCLPF capacities.
6.1 Summary of Methodologies UsedCNP performed a seismic probabilistic risk assessment (SPRA) for their Individual PlantExamination for External Events (IPEEE) in 1992. The SPRA is documented in the CNP IPEEEreport [Ref. 9] and consisted of screening walkdowns and fragility calculations for anchorage, buildings and tanks. The screening walkdowns used a similar methodology that is included for aSeismic Margin Assessment (SMA) that uses Table 2-4 of EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7] forscreening.
The walkdowns were conducted by trained engineers that successfully completed the Seismic Qualification Utility Group (SQUG) Walkdown Screening and Seismic Evaluation Training Course. The walkdown results were documented on Screening Evaluation WorkSheets (SEWS). Anchorage capacity calculations partially used the CDFM criteria from EPRINP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7] or the fragility methodology in Reference 8.For the ESEP, CNP applied the SMA methodology of EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7] to allaccessible items on the ESEL. The performed screening used Table 2-4 from EPRI NP-6041-SL [Ref. 7]. The walkdowns were conducted by engineers who, as a minimum, have attendedthe SQUG Walkdown Screening and Seismic Evaluation Training Course. The walkdowns weredocumented in SEWS consistent with EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7]. Anchorage capacitycalculations use the CDFM criteria established within EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7] with CNPspecific allowables and material strengths used as applicable.
The input seismic demand usedwas the RLGM shown in Table 5-2 and Figure 5-1. It is noted that CNP did not use the resultsfrom the IPEEE [Ref. 9] directly, but did use the documentation (SEWS forms) that supported Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 23 of 151the USI A-46 [Ref. 16] for screening.
The walkdown and screening for the ESEP is documented in S&A Report 13Q3208-RPT-004
[Ref. 20].6.2 HCLPF Screening ProcessThe peak spectral acceleration of the RLGM for CNP equals 0.62g. Screening lanes 1 and 2 inTable 2-4 of EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7] are bounded by peak spectral accelerations of 0.8g and1.2g, respectively.
Both lane limits exceed the RLGM peak spectral acceleration.
ESELcomponents were screened to lane 1 or 2 of Table 2-4 in EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7]. Whenlane 2 was used it is documented on the screening summary tabulation contained in Attachment C and D of this report.The CNP Unit 1 and CNP Unit 2 ESEL contain 240 items and 237 items, respectively
[Ref. 25].Of these, there are 33 valves for Unit 1 and 33 valves for Unit 2 (including power-operated, air-operated, and relief valves).
In accordance with Table 2-4 of EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7], activevalves may be assigned a functional capacity of 0.8g to 1.2g (relative to the spectral peaks forScreening Lane 1 and 2) only requiring a review of valves with large extended operators onsmall diameter piping. Note that anchorage is not a failure mode. Valves on the ESEL may bescreened out, subject to the caveat regarding large extended operators on small diameterpiping.The non-valve components in the ESEL can generally be screened using results consistent withthe SMA methodology.
It is noted that the screening caveats for screening lane 2 in Table 2-4of EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7] conform to those used in the USI A-46 [Ref. 16] for CNP. If theevaluation of the equipment item on the ESEL using the SMA methodology shows that thecomponent met the EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7] screening caveats and the CDFM capacityexceeded the Review Level Earthquake (RLE) demand, which it does for CNP, the component can be screened out from the ESEP capacity determination.
This was done for items whereequipment item specific SEWS were available from the USI A-46 [Ref. 16] evaluation.
Theengineers performing the walkdowns checked for changes made to the equipment since the USIA-46 work was completed that could potentially effect screening.
In addition non-valve components on the ESEL without USI A-46 SEWS were evaluated to the EPRI NP-6041-SL Table 2-4 [Ref. 7] screening
: caveats, as applicable.
6.3 Seismic Walkdown Approach6.3.1 Walkdown approachWalkdowns for CNP were performed in accordance with the criteria provided in Section 5 ofEPRI 3002000704
[Ref. 2], which refers to EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7] for the Seismic MarginAssessment process.
Pages 2-26 through 2-30 of EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7] describe theseismic walkdown
: criteria, including the following key criteria:
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 24 of 151"The SRT [Seismic Review Team] should "walk by" 100% of all components which arereasonably accessible and in non-radioactive or low radioactive environments.
Seismiccapability assessment of components which are inaccessible, in high-radioactive environments, or possibly within contaminated containment, will have to rely more onalternate means such as photographic inspection, more reliance on seismic reanalysis, and possibly, smaller inspection teams and more hurried inspections.
A 100% "walk by"does not mean complete inspection of each component, nor does it mean requiring anelectrician or other technician to de-energize and open cabinets or panels for detailedinspection of all components.
This walkdown is not intended to be a QA or QC review ora review of the adequacy of the component at the SSE level.If the SRT has a reasonable basis for assuming that the group of components are similarand are similarly
: anchored, then it is only necessary to inspect one component out ofthis group. The "similarity-basis" should be developed before the walkdown during theseismic capability preparatory work (Step 3) by reference to drawings, calculations orspecifications.
The one component or each type which is selected should be thoroughly inspected which probably does mean de-energizing and opening cabinets or panels forthis very limited sample. Generally, a spare representative component can be found soas to enable the inspection to be performed while the plant is in operation.
At least forthe one component of each type which is selected, anchorage should be thoroughly inspected.
The walkdown procedure should be performed in an ad hoc manner. For each class ofcomponents the SRT should look closely at the first items and compare the fieldconfigurations with the construction drawings and/or specifications.
If a one-to-one correspondence is found, then subsequent items do not have to be inspected in as greata detail. Ultimately the walkdown becomes a "walk by" of the component class as theSRT becomes confident that the construction pattem is typical.
This procedure forinspection should be repeated for each component class; although, during the actualwalkdown the SRT may be inspecting several classes of components in parallel.
Ifserious exceptions to the drawings or questionable construction practices are found thenthe system or component class must be inspected in closer detail until the systematic deficiency is defined.
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 25 of 151The 100% "walk by" is to look for outliers, lack of similarity, anchorage which is different from that shown on drawings or prescribed in criteria for that component, potential SI[Seismic Interaction 3] problems, situations that are at odds with the team members' pastexperience, and any other areas of serious seismic concern.
If any such concemssurface, then the limited sample size of one component of each type for thoroughinspection will have to be increased.
The increase in sample size which should beinspected will depend upon the number of outliers and different anchorages, etc., whichare observed.
It is up to the SRT to ultimately select the sample size since they are theones who are responsible for the seismic adequacy of all elements which they screenfrom the margin review. Appendix D gives guidance for sampling selection.
The CNP walkdowns
: included, as a minimum, a 100% walk-by of all items on the CNP ESELexcept as noted in Section 7.0. Previous walkdown information that was relied upon as thebasis for the SRT judgment in excluding an item walkdown is documented in Section 6.3.2. It isnoted that the walkdown and screening of an individual equipment item was frozen at the timeof the walkdown date for that equipment.
Walkdowns were conducted at various times betweenMarch 2014 and November 2014. The screening status of the equipment included in this reportreflects the configuration at the time the item was walked down and after all evaluations wereperformed.
The walkdown and screening information for the ESEP is documented in S&AReport 13Q3208-RPT-004
[Ref. 20].6.3.2 Application of Previous Walkdown Information The Augmented Approach Guidance for the NTTF 2.1 Seismic walkdowns
[Ref. 2] references EPRI NP-6041-SL for Screening
[Ref. 7]. The Reference 2 augmented approach allows use ofwalkdown results from recent walkdowns that include the recently completed NTTF 2.3walkdowns
[Ref. 18]. EPRI NP-6041-SL states that the walkdown team should attempt a 100%walk-by of all items on the listing.
It also states that reasons for this not being possible are thatsome items may be inaccessible due to the equipment being in a high radiation area or cannotbe looked at (like buried tanks).The following list of items were inaccessible but screened in accordance with EPRI NP-6041-SL, based on documentation and similarity to items that were included in the walkdowns.
Previous seismic walkdowns were used to support the ESEP seismic evaluations.
Some of thecomponents on the ESEL were included in the NTTF 2.3 seismic walkdowns
[Ref. 18]. Thebasis for screening is also included.
3 EPRI 3002000704
[Ref. 2] page 5-4 limits the ESEP seismic interaction reviews to "nearby block walls" and "pipingattached to tanks" which are reviewed "to address the possibility of failures due to differential displacements."
Otherpotential seismic interaction evaluations are "deferred to the full seismic risk evaluations performed in accordance with EPRI 1025287 [Ref. 14].
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 26 of 151The following items on the Unit I ESEL were screened in this manner:Item 11, 12-TK-47-CD, EMERGENCY DIESELS FUEL OIL STORAGE TANK:This tank is buried and, by definition, not accessible.
Per the screening criteria of Table 2-4 inEPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7], the anchorage configurations of buried tanks are inherently seismically rugged and of no concern.
A review of the flexibility of attached piping wasperformed in SQUG-12-TK-47-CD
[Ref. 22.3] and the tank was evaluated for the potential seismic wave effects for the SSE and had a stress of 3.6 ksi. Since the factor of safety is on theorder of 10, this screens for the RLGM which is an earthquake that is the SSE scaled by a factorof 1.93 < 10.Item 89, 1-HV-CEQ-2, CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN SKIMMER VENTILATION FAN #2:HV-CEQ-2 is a large fan unit with very rugged anchorage.
This was walked down during theNTTF 2.3 effort and the walkdown is documented in the Reference 15 report. The anchorage wasin good condition and there were no potential adverse interactions.
This was unchanged from thecondition documented in SQUG-1-HV-CEQ-2
[Ref. 22.1]. This Equipment screens (other thananchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 6041-SL [Ref. 7] by meeting the GenericImplementation Procedure (GIP) caveats [Ref. 30] as documented in SQUG-1-HV-CEQ-2
[Ref.22.1]. A bounding analysis was performed in SQUG-1-HV-CEQ-1
[Ref. 22.2] and had a margin of7.7 > 1.93 RLGM scaling factor. Therefore this screens.Item 139, 1-NPS-121, REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #2 HOT LEG WIDE RANGE PRESSURETRANSMITTER:
This was a late addition to the ESEL after the walkdowns were completed as a result of reviewsto changes in the August FLEX strategy.
Per the USI A-46 walkdown SEWS the transmitter ismounted on a small floor mounted pipe stand anchored to the reinforced concrete floor withexpansion anchors.
The installation for 1-NPS-121, 1-NPS-122, 2-NPS-121 and 2-NPS-122 aresimilar.
It is noted that the Foxboro transmitters for 1-NPS-121 and 2-NPS-122 in place duringthe USI A-46 walkdowns have been replaced with Rosemount transmitters but used the samemounting.
An ANCHOR analysis
[Ref. 22.6] for this installation indicated a factor of safety of4.0 which is above the RLGM screening level of 1.93 < 4.0.Item 140, 1-NPS-122, REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #1 HOT LEG WIDE RANGE PRESSURETRANSMITTER:
This was a late addition to the ESEL after the walkdowns were completed as a result of reviewsto changes in the August FLEX strategy.
Per the USI A-46 walkdown SEWS the transmitter ismounted on a small floor mounted pipe stand anchored to the reinforced concrete floor withexpansion anchors.
The installation for 1-NPS-121, 1-NPS-122, 2-NPS-121 and 2-NPS-122 aresimilar.
The most limiting installation with the highest weight with the highest center of gravitywas evaluated for 2-NPS-121 and the ANCHOR analysis
[Ref. 22.7] indicated a factor of safety Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 27 of 151of 2.7 which is above the RLGM screening level that is the SSE multiplied by a factor of 1.93and therefore 1-NPS-122 is acceptable by comparison.
Item 141, 1-NRI-21, NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION CHANNEL I WIDE RANGE RADIATION DETECTOR:
The location of this detector was very close to the Reactor Vessel and was not accessible.
It isscreened based on similarity to other small instruments in containment.
These are smallinstruments.
The walkdown of accessible instruments of this type in containment determined they were free of interactions and had very rugged anchorage.
These were screened to the0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7].Item 145, 1-NTQ-110A, RVLIS TRAIN 'A' UPPER TAP TEMPERATURE COMPENSATION COMPUTER INPUT THERMAL SENSOR 'A':The location of this detector was very close to the Reactor Vessel and was not accessible.
It isscreened based on similarity to other small instruments in containment.
These are smallinstruments.
The walkdown of accessible instruments of this type in containment determined they were free of interactions and had very rugged anchorage.
These were screened to the0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7].Item 146, 1-NTQ-110B, RVLIS TRAIN 'A' UPPER TAP TEMPERATURE COMPENSATION COMPUTER INPUT THERMAL SENSOR 'B':The location of this detector was very close to the Reactor Vessel and was not accessible.
It isscreened based on similarity to other small instruments in containment.
These are smallinstruments.
The walkdown of accessible instruments of this type in containment determined they were free of interactions and had very rugged anchorage.
These were screened to the0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 71.Item 147, 1-NTQ-130A, RVLIS TRAIN 'A' CONDUIT TEMPERATURE COMPENSATION COMPUTER INPUT THERMAL SENSOR 'A':The location of this detector was very close to the Reactor Vessel and was .not accessible.
It isscreened based on similarity to other small instruments in containment.
These are smallinstruments.
The walkdown of accessible instruments of this type in containment demonstrated they were free of interactions and had very rugged anchorage.
These were screened to the0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7].Item 148, 1-NTQ-130C, RVLIS TRAIN 'A' CONDUIT TEMPERATURE COMPENSATION COMPUTER INPUT THERMAL SENSOR 'C':The location of this detector was very close to the Reactor Vessel and was not accessible.
It isscreened based on similarity to other small instruments in containment.
These are smallinstruments.
The walkdown of accessible instruments of this type in containment demonstrated Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 1303208-RPT-005 50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 28 of 151they were free of interactions and had very rugged anchorage.
These were screened to the0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7].The following items on the Unit 2 ESEL were screened in this manner:Item 1, 12-TK-47-AB, AB EMERGENCY DIESEL FUEL OIL STORAGE TANK:This tank is buried and, by definition, not accessible.
Per the screening criteria of Table 2-4 inEPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7], the anchorage configurations of buried tanks are inherently seismically rugged and of no concern.
A review of the flexibility of attached piping wasperformed in SQUG-12-TK-47-AB
[Ref. 22.4] and the tank was evaluated for the potential seismic wave effects for the SSE and had a stress of 3.6 ksi. Since the factor of safety is on theorder of 10, this screens for the RLGM which is an earthquake that is the SSE scaled by a factorof 1.93 < 10.Item 86, 2-HV-CEQ-2 CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN SKIMMER VENTILATION FAN #2:2-HV-CEQ-2 is a large fan unit with very rugged anchorage.
This was walked down during theNTTF 2.3 effort and the walkdown documented in the Reference 15 report. The anchorage wasin good condition and there were no potential adverse interactions.
This was unchanged fromthe condition documented in SQUG-2-HV-CEQ-2
[Ref. 22.5]. Equipment screens (other thananchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL per meeting the GIPcaveats [Ref. 30] as documented in SQUG-2-HV-CEQ-2
[Ref. 22.5]. A bounding analysis wasperformed in SQUG-1-HV-CEQ-1
[Ref. 22.2] and had a margin of 7.7 > 1.93 RLGM factor.Therefore this screens.Item 97, 2-IMO-128, REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #2 HOT LEG TO RESIDUAL HEATREMOVAL PUMPS SUCTION SHUTOFF VALVE:This valve is inside the Unit 2 Containment and was not accessible during the walkdown effort,screened based on the walkdown of 1-IMO-128.
Per the USI A-46 SEWS [Ref. 22.8], body andyoke is steel. Pipe diameter is 14". Measured offset = 64" <80" limit from Figure F-26 of EPRI-NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7]. Weight of operator
= 460# maximum <750# limit Figure F-26 of EPRI- NP-6041-SL [Ref. 7]. Therefore, valve is screened for 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL [Ref. 7].Item 101, 2-LDISB-B10, CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B'GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY
#B10:This Hydrogen igniter is inside the Unit 2 Containment and was not accessible during the NTTF2.1 walkdowns.
It was screened based on comparison to all the other 1-LDISB assemblies walkdown that had no adverse interactions, very rugged anchorage and contained ruggedcomponents.
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f)
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#B1 1:This Hydrogen igniter is inside the Unit 2 Containment and was not accessible during the NTTF2.1 walkdowns.
It was screened based on comparison to all the other 1-LDISB assemblies walkdown that had no adverse interactions, very rugged anchorage and contained ruggedcomponents.
Item 103, 2-LDISB-B12, CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B'GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY
#B12:This Hydrogen igniter is inside the Unit 2 Containment and was not accessible during the NTTF2.1 walkdowns.
It was screened based on comparison to all the other 1-LDISB assemblies walkdown that had no adverse interactions, very rugged anchorage and contained ruggedcomponents.
Item 104, 2-LDISB-B18, CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B'GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY
#B18:This Hydrogen igniter is inside the Unit 2 Containment and was not accessible during the NTTF2.1 walkdowns.
It was screened based on comparison to all the other 1-LDISB assemblies walkdown that had no adverse interactions, very rugged anchorage and contained ruggedcomponents.
Item 105, 2-LDISB-B19, CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B'GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY
#B19:This Hydrogen igniter is inside the Unit 2 Containment and was not accessible during the NTTF2.1 walkdowns.
It was screened based on comparison to all the other 1-LDISB assemblies walkdown that had no adverse interactions, very rugged anchorage and contained ruggedcomponents.
Item 106, 2-LDISB-B20, CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B'GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY
#B20:This Hydrogen igniter is inside the Unit 2 Containment and was not accessible during the NTTF2.1 walkdowns.
It was screened based on comparison to all the other 1-LDISB assemblies walkdown that had no adverse interactions, very rugged anchorage and contained ruggedcomponents.
Item 107, 2-LDISB-B21, CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B'GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY
#B21This Hydrogen igniter is inside the Unit 2 Containment and was not accessible during the NTTF2.1 walkdowns.
It was screened based on comparison to all the other 1-LDISB assemblies Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f)
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Item 108, 2-LDISB-B22, CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B'GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY
#B22This Hydrogen igniter is inside the Unit 2 Containment and was not accessible during the NTTF2.1 walkdowns.
It was screened based on comparison to all the other 1-LDISB assemblies walkdown that had no adverse interactions, very rugged anchorage and contained ruggedcomponents.
Item 109, 2-LDISB-B23, CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B'GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY
#B23This Hydrogen igniter is inside the Unit 2 Containment and was not accessible during the NTTF2.1 walkdowns.
It was screened based on comparison to all the other 1-LDISB assemblies walkdown that had no adverse interactions, very rugged anchorage and contained ruggedcomponents.
Item 114, 2-LDISB-B28, CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B'GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY
#B28This Hydrogen igniter is inside the Unit 2 Containment and was not accessible during the NTTF2.1 walkdowns.
It was screened based on comparison to all the other 1-LDISB assemblies walkdown that had no adverse interactions, very rugged anchorage and contained ruggedcomponents.
Item 116, 2-LDISB-B8 CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B'IGNITER ASSEMBLY
#B8This Hydrogen igniter is inside the Unit 2 Containment and was not accessible during the NTTF2.1 walkdowns.
It was screened based on comparison to all the other 1-LDISB assemblies walkdown that had no adverse interactions, very rugged anchorage and contained ruggedcomponents.
Item 117, 2-LDISB-B9 CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B'GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY
#B9This Hydrogen igniter is inside the Unit 2 Containment and was not accessible during the NTTF2.1 walkdowns.
It was screened based on comparison to all the other 1-LDISB assemblies walkdown that had no adverse interactions, very rugged anchorage and contained ruggedcomponents.
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f)
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Per the USI A-46 walkdown SEWS the transmitter ismounted on a small floor mounted pipe stand anchored to the reinforced concrete floor withexpansion anchors.
The installation for 1-NPS-121, 1-NPS-122, 2-NPS-121 and 2-NPS-122 aresimilar.
An ANCHOR analysis
[Ref. 22.6] for this installation indicated a factor of safety of 4.0which is above the RLGM screening level which is the SSE times a factor of 1.93.Item 137, 2-NPS-122, REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #1 HOT LEG WIDE RANGE PRESSURETRANSMITTER This was a late addition to the ESEL after the walkdowns were completed as a result of reviewsto changes in the August FLEX strategy.
Per the USI A-46 walkdown SEWS the transmitter ismounted on a small floor mounted pipe stand anchored to the reinforced concrete floor withexpansion anchors.
The installation for 1-NPS-121, 1-NPS-122, 2-NPS-121 and 2-NPS-122 aresimilar.
It is noted that the Foxboro transmitters for 1-NPS-121 and 2-NPS-122 in place duringthe USI A-46 walkdowns have been replaced with Rosemount transmitters but used the samemounting.
An ANCHOR analysis
[Ref. 22.7] for this installation indicated a factor of safety of2.7 which is above the RLGM screening level which is the SSE times a factor of 1.93.Item 138, 2-NRI-21, NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION CHANNEL I WIDE RANGE RADIATION DETECTORThe location of this detector was very close to the Reactor Vessel and was not accessible.
It isscreened based on similarity to other small instruments in the Unit 1 containment.
These aresmall instruments.
The walkdown of accessible instruments of this type in containment determined they were free of interactions and had very rugged anchorage, These werescreened to the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7].Item 140, 2-NRV-152, PRESSURIZER TRAIN 'B' PRESSURE RELIEF VALVEThis valve was inaccessible.
It is in the Unit 2 Pressurizer doghouse that was not accessible during the NTTF 2.1 walkdowns.
Screened based on comparison to 1-NRV-152.
Theequipment screens for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7]. Offset foroperator 40" within Earthquake Experience Data of Figure F-25 of EPRI NP-6041-SL, pipeDiameter 3".Item 141, 2-NRV-1 53, PRESSURIZER OME-4 TRAIN 'A' PRESSURE RELIEF VALVEThis valve was inaccessible.
It is in the Unit 2 Pressurizer doghouse that was not accessible during the NTTF 2.1 walkdowns.
Screened based on comparison to 1-NRV-153.
Theequipment screens for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7]. Offset for Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 32 of 151operator 40" within Earthquake Experience Data of Figure F-25 of EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7],pipe Diameter 3".Item 142, 2-NTQ-1 10A, RVLIS TRAIN 'A' UPPER TAP TEMPERATURE COMPENSATION COMPUTER INPUT THERMAL SENSOR 'A'The location of this detector was very close to the Reactor Vessel and was not accessible.
It isscreened based on similarity to other small instruments in the Unit 1 containment.
These aresmall instruments.
The walkdown of accessible instruments of this type in containment determined they were free of interactions and had very rugged anchorage.
These werescreened to the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7].Item 143, 2-NTQ-11OB, RVLIS TRAIN 'A' UPPER TAP TEMPERATURE COMPENSATION COMPUTER INPUT THERMAL SENSOR 'B'The location of this detector was very close to the Reactor Vessel inside the Crane Wall andwas not accessible.
It is screened based on similarity to other small instruments in the Unit 1containment.
These are small instruments.
The walkdown of accessible instruments of thistype in containment determined they were free of interactions and had very rugged anchorage.
These were screened to the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7].Item 144, 2-NTQ-130A, RVLIS TRAIN 'A' CONDUIT TEMPERATURE COMPENSATION COMPUTER INPUT THERMAL SENSOR 'A'The location of this detector was very close to the Reactor Vessel and was not accessible.
It isscreened based on similarity to other small instruments in the Unit 1 containment.
These aresmall instruments.
The walkdown of accessible instruments of this type in containment determined they were free of interactions and had very rugged anchorage.
These werescreened to the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7].Item 145, 2-NTQ-130CRVLIS TRAIN 'A' CONDUIT TEMPERATURE COMPENSATION COMPUTER INPUT SPARE THERMAL SENSOR 'C'The location of this detector was very close to the Reactor Vessel and was not accessible.
It isscreened based on similarity to other small instruments in the Unit 1 containment.
These aresmall instruments.
The walkdown of accessible instruments of this type in containment determined they were free of interactions and had very rugged anchorage.
These werescreened to the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7].Item 146, 2-NTR-1 10, REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #1 HOT LEG WIDE RANGETEMPERATURE RECORDER THERMAL SENSORThis small temperature sensor was inaccessible during the NTTF 2.1 walkdowns.
It is in lowerContainment, inside the Crane Wall and is only Accessible during an Outage. It was screenedbased on comparison to 1-NTR-110 and the other similar NTR's in the CNP Unit 1 Containment.
It is a Conax Corp. Model 7H57-10000-01 Thermal Sensor, IEEE-344-1975 qualified by Conax Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f)
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Rugged component with no seismic interaction concerns.
Equipment screens for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7].Item 147, 2-NTR-130, REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #3 HOT LEG WIDE RANGETEMPERATURE RECORDER THERMAL SENSORThis small temperature sensor was inaccessible during the NTTF 2.1 walkdowns.
It is in lowerContainment, inside the Crane Wall and is only Accessible during an Outage. It was screenedbased on comparison to 1-NTR-130 and the other similar NTR's in the CNP Unit 1 Containment.
It is a Conax Corp. Model 7H57-10000-01 Thermal Sensor, IEEE-344-1975 qualified by ConaxCorp. Seismic Analysis Report #IPS-943.
Rugged component with no seismic interaction concerns.
Equipment screens for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7].Item 148, 2-NTR-210 REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #1 COLD LEG WIDE RANGETEMPERATURE RECORDER THERMAL SENSORThis small temperature sensor was inaccessible during the NTTF 2.1 walkdowns.
It is in lowerContainment, inside the Crane Wall and is only Accessible during an Outage. It was screenedbased on comparison to 1-NTR-210 and the other similar NTR's in the CNP Unit 1 Containment.
It is a Conax Corp. Model 7H57-10000-01 Thermal Sensor, IEEE-344-1975 qualified by ConaxCorp. Seismic Analysis Report #IPS-943.
Rugged component with no seismic interaction concerns.
Equipment screens for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7].Item 149, 2-NTR-230, REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #3 COLD LEG WIDE RANGETEMPERATURE RECORDER THERMAL SENSORThis small temperature sensor was inaccessible during the NTTF 2.1 walkdowns.
It is in lowerContainment, inside the Crane Wall and is only accessible during an Outage. It was screenedbased on comparison to 1-NTR-230 and the other similar NTR's in the CNP Unit 1 Containment.
It is a Conax Corp. Model 7H57-10000-01 Thermal Sensor, IEEE-344-1975 qualified by ConaxCorp. Seismic Analysis Report #IPS-943.
Rugged component with no seismic interaction concerns.
Equipment screens for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7].Item 152, 2-OME-6-1, ACCUMULATOR TANK #1This Accumulator Tank was added to the ESEL after the entry to the CNP Unit 2 containment was made. It is in lower Containment.
It was screened based on comparison to 1-OME-6-1 and the other similar Accumulator Tanks in the CNP Unit 1 Containment.
These were all foundto be free from adverse seismic interactions during the walkdowns of the CNP Unit 1Accumulators.
A screening calculation was performed for the anchorage and had a very highmargin above the RLGM. There was some minor rust found on some bases of the CNP Unit 1Accumulators but none rose to a concern regarding its seismic capacity.
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 34 of 151Item 153, 2-OME-6-2, ACCUMULATOR TANK #2This Accumulator Tank was added to the ESEL after the entry to the CNP Unit 2 containment was made. It is in lower Containment.
It was screened based on comparison to 1-OME-6-2 andthe other similar Accumulator Tanks in the CNP Unit 1 Containment.
These were all found to befree from adverse seismic interactions during the walkdowns of the CNP Unit 1 Accumulators.
A screening calculation was performed for the anchorage and had a very high margin above theRLGM. There was some minor rust found on some bases of the CNP Unit 1 Accumulators butnone rose to a concern regarding its seismic capacity.
Item 154, 2-OME-6-3, ACCUMULATOR TANK #3This Accumulator Tank was added to the ESEL after the entry to the CNP Unit 2 containment was made. It is in lower Containment.
It was screened based on comparison to 1-OME-6-3 andthe other similar Accumulator Tanks in the CNP Unit 1 Containment.
These were all found to befree from adverse seismic interactions during the walkdowns of the CNP Unit 1 Accumulators.
A screening calculation was performed for the anchorage and had a very high margin above theRLGM. There was some minor rust found on some bases of the CNP Unit 1 Accumulators butnone rose to a concern regarding its seismic capacity.
Item 155, 2-OME-6-4, ACCUMULATOR TANK #4This Accumulator Tank was added to the ESEL after the entry to the CNP Unit 2 containment was made. It is in lower Containment.
It was screened based on comparison to 1-OME-6-4 andthe other similar Accumulator Tanks in the CNP Unit 1 Containment.
These were all found to befree from adverse seismic interactions during the walkdowns of the CNP Unit 1 Accumulators.
A screening calculation was performed for the anchorage and had a very high margin above theRLGM. There was some minor rust found on some bases of the CNP Unit 1 Accumulators butnone rose to a concern regarding its seismic capacity.
Item 196, 2-TK-253-1, PRESSURIZER TRAIN 'A' PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE NRV-153RESERVE CONTROL AIR TANKThis small horizontal tank was inaccessible during the NTTF 2.1 walkdowns.
It is in lowerContainment, inside the Crane Wall and is only accessible during an Outage. It is screenedbased on comparison to 1-TK-253-1 and the USI A-46 evaluation performed for this component.
This horizontal tank contains air and is supported by other than standard saddles.
Anchorage:
Tank is sufficiently welded to building steel, and is more than adequate for the RLGM.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL [Ref. 7] by meeting the GIP caveats [Ref. 30] as documented in Reference 22.9. Theanchorage of the small tank is more than adequate for the RLGM for this relatively small tank.
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This horizontal tank contains air and is supported by other than standard saddles.
Anchorage:
Tank is sufficiently welded to building steel, and is more than adequate for the RLGM.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL [Ref. 7] by meeting the GIP caveats [Ref. 30] as documented in Reference 22.10. Theanchorage of the small tank is more than adequate for the RLGM for this relatively small tank.All non-energized cabinets were opened when specialized tools were not needed to operate thecabinet doors. Photos were taken during the walkdowns.
The existing calculations and SEWSfrom the USI A-46 evaluation of CNP [Ref. 16] were utilized to aid the SRT in their screening decisions as indicated in Attachments C and D of this report.6.3.3 Significant Walkdown FindingsConsistent with the guidance from EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7], there were two findings notedduring the CNP ESEP walkdowns relative to the site RLGM ISRS:1. The three Boric Acid Storage Tanks (BASTs);
1-TK-12N, 2-TK-12S and 12-TK-12M, were found to have an anchorage HCLPF of 0.227g < 0.387g RLGM.2. BAST Level Alarm Transmitters; 1-QLA-410, 12-QLA-420, 2-QLA-430, BAST HeaterTemperature Controllers; 1-QTC-410, 2-QTC-430, 12-QTC-420, and BAST TransferPumps; 1-PP-46-1 and 2-PP-46-4, were determined to have a HCLPF of 0.227g <0.387g RLGM due to seismic interaction with the three Boric Acid Storage Tanks.Several block walls were identified in the proximity of ESEL equipment.
These block walls wereassessed for their structural adequacy to withstand the seismic loads resulting from the RLGM[Ref. 10.1]. For any cases where the block wall represented the HCLPF failure mode for anESEL item, it is noted in the tabulated HCLPF values described in Section 6.6.6.4 HCLPF Calculation ProcessESEL items were evaluated using the criteria in EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7]. Those evaluations included the following steps:* Performing seismic capability walkdowns for equipment to evaluate the equipment installed plant conditions.
* Performing screening evaluations using the screening tables in EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref.7] as described in Section 6.2.
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 36 of 151Performing HCLPF calculations considering various failure modes that include bothstructural failure modes (e.g. anchorage, load path etc.) and functional failure modes.All HCLPF calculations were performed using the CDFM methodology and are documented inS&A calculations 13Q3208-CAL-004
[Ref. 10.1], 13Q3208-CAL-005
[Ref. 10.2], and 13Q3208-CAL-006 [Ref. 10.3].Anchorage configurations for non-valve components were evaluated either by SRT judgment, large margins in existing design basis calculations, or CDFM based on HCLPF calculations
[Refs. 10.1, 10.2 and 10.3]. The results of these analysis methods are documented inAttachment C and D for CNP Unit 1 and CNP Unit 2 respectively.
For components beyond 40ft. above grade, Table 2-4 of EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7] is not directly applicable.
Per Reference 2, the ESEP Guidance, screening for equipment below 40 ft. above grade is perthe screening lanes contained in Tables 2-3 and 2-4 of EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7]. Since thepeak of the RLGM established for the ESEP walkdowns is < 0.8g as shown in Figure 5-1, the0.8g screening lane may be used for all equipment at or below about 40 ft. above grade. Gradehas been established for CNP at El. 608 ft. per Reference
: 16. Due to the significant marginbetween the peak spectral acceleration of the screening lane (0.80g) and the peak of the RLGM(0.62g),
equipment up to an elevation of 651 ft. meets the "about" 40 ft. limitation.
Therefore, forequipment at elevations 651 ft. and below this screening is applicable.
All of the equipment in the ESEL for CNP Unit 1 and CNP Unit 2 other than some uppercontainment hydrogen igniters (1 & 2-UDISB components) are at Elevation 651 ft. or below.The limiting hydrogen igniters were addressed in the Reference 10.3 HCLPF calculation.
Thesewere the assemblies supported by the CNP Unit 1 and CNP Unit 2 catwalks in uppercontainment.
The limiting HCLPF for these items were shown to be above the defined ISRS forthe RLGM.As described in Section 6.0, HCLPF calculations used the CDFM analysis criteria established inSection 6 of EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7] and are used for the detailed analysis of components.
The relevant CDFM criteria from EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7] are summarized in Table 6-1.
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 37 of 151.Table 6-4: CNP CDFM CriteriaLoad combination:
Normal + seismic margin earthquake (SME)Ground response spectrum:
Conservatively specified (84% non-exceedance probability)
Damping:
Conservative estimate of median damping.Structural model: Best estimate (median)
+ uncertainty variation in frequency.
Code specified minimum strength or 95% exceedance ofMaterial strength:
actual strength if test data is available.
Code ultimate strength (ACI), maximum strength (AISC),Service Level D (ASME) or functional limits. If test data isStatic capacity equations:
available to demonstrate excessive conservatism of codeequations then use 84% exceedance of test data for capacityequations.
For non-brittle failure modes and linear analysis, use 80% ofInelastic energy absorption:
computed seismic stress in capacity evaluation to account forductility benefits or perform nonlinear analysis and use 95%exceedance ductility levels.The HCLPF capacity is equal to the PGA at which the strength limit is reached.
The HCLPFearthquake load is calculated as follows:U = Normal + EcWhere:00U = Ultimate strength per Section 6 of EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7]Ec = HCLPF earthquake load* Normal = Normal operating loads (dead and live load expected to be present, etc.)For this calculation, the HCLPF earthquake load is related to a fixed reference earthquake:
Ec = SFc*ErefWhere:" Eref = reference earthquake from the relevant in-structure response spectrum (ISRS)* SFc = component-specific scale factor that satisfies U = Normal +Ec Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 38 of 151The HCLPF will be defined as the PGA produced by Ec. Because the CNP RLGM PGA is0.387g:HCLPF = 0.387g*SFc 6.5 Functional Evaluation of RelaysAs discussed in the NTTF Recommendation 2.1 guidance
[Ref. 2], the ESEL was to contain allrelays and switches which may negatively "seal in" or "lock out" on the CNP ESEL [Ref. 25]. Asdiscussed in Section 3.1.7 of this report none were identified and therefore, there were noHCLPFs for the Functional Evaluation of Relays calculated.
6.6 Tabulated ESEL HCLPF values (including Key failure modes)Tabulated ESEL HCLPF values including the key failure modes are included in Attachment Cfor Unit 1 and D for Unit 2. The following notes apply to the information in the tables.* For items screened out using EPRI NP 6041-SL [Ref. 7] screening tables, the listedHCLPF is set to be equal to the RLGM PGA (0.387g) and the failure mode is listed as"Screened".
" For items where anchorage controls the HCLPF value, and the HCLPF is less than theRLGM PGA (0.387g),
the HCLPF value is listed in the table and the failure mode is setto "Anchorage".
When the anchorage HCLPF turned out to be above the RLGM PGA(0.387g),
but controlled the HCLPF for the component then the value was also includedin the summary tables. When the calculated HCLPF is determined to be well above theRLGM PGA (0.387g) and not limiting the failure mode, it is listed as "Screened" alongwith a note providing the anchorage HCLPF.* For items where interaction controls the HCLPF value, and the HCLPF is less than theRLGM PGA (0.387g),
the HCLPF value is listed in the table and the failure mode is setto "Interaction".
When the interaction HCLPF turned out to be above the RLGM PGA(0.387g),
the listed HCLPF is set to be equal to the RLGM PGA (0.387g) and the failuremode is listed as "Screened" along with a note providing the interaction HCLPF. It isnoted that interaction did not control any HCLPFs except for those where the HCLPFwas below the RLGM.
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Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 39 of 1517.0 Inaccessible Items and Late Additions to the ESEL7.1 Identification of Inaccessible Items and Late Additions to the ESELThere were equipment items for which walkdowns were not performed and therefore, no SEWSwere completed.
Some of these items were late add-ons to the ESEL as a result ofimplementing the August 2014 FLEX strategy
[Ref. 29].Unit 1 Items include:* ESEL Item 9, 12-QTC-420, MIDDLE BAST TK-12M TRAIN 'A' HTR TEMPCONTROLLER.
It is noted that the HCLPF for this equipment item is limited by theHCLPF for the middle Boric Acid Storage Tank due to Seismic Interaction.
The HCLPFfor the tank was calculated in 13Q3208-CAL-005 to be 0.227g, (Ref. 10.2) and is lessthan the RLGM of 0.387g and therefore, 12-QTC-420 will not screen.* ESEL Item 76, 1-FMO-211, TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEED PUMP PP-4DISCHARGE TO STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-1 CONTROL VALVE* ESEL Item 77, 1-FMO-221, TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEED PUMP PP-4DISCHARGE TO STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-2 CONTROL VALVE" ESEL Item 78, 1-FMO-231, TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEED PUMP SUPPLY TOSTEAM GENERATOR OME-3-3 CONTROL VALVE" ESEL Item 79, 1-FMO-241, TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEED PUMP SUPPLY TOSTEAM GENERATOR OME-4-4 CONTROL VALVE" ESEL Item 95, 1-ICM-321, WEST RHR TO REACTOR COOLANT LOOPS #2 AND #3HOTLEGS CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVEUnit 2 Items include:* ESEL Item 73, 2-FMO-21 1, TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEED PUMP PP-4DISCHARGETO STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-1 CONTROL VALVE* ESEL Item 74, 2-FMO-221, TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEED PUMP PP-4DISCHARGE TO STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-2 CONTROL VALVE* ESEL Item 75, 2-FMO-231, TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEED PUMP SUPPLY TOSTEAM GENERATOR OME-3-3 CONTROL VALVE* ESEL Item 76, 2-FMO-241, TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEED PUMP SUPPLY TOSTEAM GENERATOR OME-3-4 CONTROL VALVE* ESEL Item 89, 2-1CM-1 11, RHR TO REACTOR COOLANT LOOPS #2 & #3 COLDLEGS CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE* ESEL Item 92, 2-ICM-321, WEST RHR TO REACTOR COOLANT LOOPS #2 AND #3COLD LEGS CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 40 of 151There were also items inaccessible during the screening walkdowns (e.g. items in the Unit 2Lower Containment, inside the Crane Wall that are not accessible except during an outage).Section 6.3.2 of this report includes a listing and discussion of the items for which a walkdownwas not performed and therefore SEWS were not prepared.
These items were screened inaccordance with the EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7] guidance.
There were also two items for whichwalkdowns were not performed that have been screened based on the results of the NTTFRecommendation 2.3 walkdowns
[Ref. 18]. The implementation guidance contained in EPRI3002000704
[Ref. 2] allows use of recent walkdown data including the NTTF 2.3 walkdowns.
The basis for this screening is included in 6.3.2.7.2 Planned Walkdown
/ Evaluation Schedule
/ Close OutThe schedule for performing walkdowns for the inaccessible and late addition components aslisted in Section 7.1 is during the Unit 2 Refueling Outage U2C22 scheduled for the spring 2015.The screening and evaluation of these components will be complete within 90 days following theconclusion of the U2C22 refueling outage. The actions associated with these tasks are includedin Section 8.4.
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 41 of 1518.0 ESEP Conclusions and Results8.1 Supporting Information CNP has performed the ESEP as an interim action in response to the NRC's 50.54(0 letter [Ref.1]. It was performed using the methodologies in the NRC endorsed guidance in EPRI3002000704
[Ref. 2].The ESEP provides an important demonstration of seismic margin and expedites plant safetyenhancements through evaluations and potential near-term modifications of plant equipment that can be relied upon to protect the reactor core following beyond design basis seismicevents.The ESEP is part of the overall CNP response to the NRC's 50.54(f) letter [Ref. 1]. On March12, 2014, NEI submitted to the NRC results of a study [Ref. 12] of seismic core damage riskestimates based on updated seismic hazard information as it applies to operating nuclearreactors in the Central and Eastern United States (CEUS). The study concluded that "site-specific seismic hazards show that there has not been an overall increase in seismic risk for thefleet of U.S. plants" based on the re-evaluated seismic hazards.
As such, the "current seismicdesign of operating reactors continues to provide a safety margin to withstand potential earthquakes exceeding the seismic design basis."'The NRC's May 9, 2014 NTTF 2.1 Screening and Prioritization letter [Ref. 13] concluded thatthe "fleetwide seismic risk estimates are consistent with the approach and results used in theGI-199 safety/risk assessment."
The letter also stated that "As a result, the staff has confirmed that the conclusions reached in GI-1 99 safety/risk assessment remain valid and that the plantscan continue to operate while additional evaluations are conducted."
An assessment of the change in seismic risk for CNP was included in the fleet risk evaluation submitted in the March 12, 2014 NEI letter [Ref. 12] therefore, the conclusions in the NRC'sMay 9 letter [Ref. 131 also apply to CNP.In addition, the March 12, 2014 NEI letter [Ref. 12] provided an attached "Perspectives on theSeismic Capacity of Operating Plants,"
which (1) assessed a number of qualitative reasons whythe design of Structures,
: Systems, and Components (SSCs) inherently contain margin beyondtheir design level, (2) discussed industrial seismic experience databases of performance ofindustry facility components similar to nuclear SSCs, and (3) discussed earthquake experience at operating plants.The fleet of currently operating nuclear power plants was designed using conservative practices, such that the plants have significant margin to withstand large ground motions safely.
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 42 of 151This has been borne out of those plants that have actually experienced significant earthquakes.
The seismic design process has inherent (and intentional) conservatisms which result insignificant seismic margins within SSCs. These conservatisms are reflected in several keyaspects of the seismic design process, including:
" Safety factors applied in design calculations
* Damping values used in the dynamic analysis of SSCs" Bounding synthetic time histories for in-structure response spectra calculations
* Broadening criteria for in-structure response spectra* Response spectra enveloping criteria typically used in SSC analysis and testingapplications
" Response spectra based frequency domain analysis rather than explicit time historybased time domain analysis* Bounding requirements in codes and standards
* Use of minimum strength requirements of structural components (concrete and steel)" Bounding testing requirements, and" Ductile behavior of the primary materials (that is, not crediting the additional capacity ofmaterials such as steel and reinforced concrete beyond the essentially elastic range,etc.)These design practices combine to result in margins such that the SSCs will continue to fulfilltheir functions at ground motions well above the SSE.The intent of the ESEP is to perform an interim action in response to the NRC's 50.54(f) letter[Ref. 1] to demonstrate seismic margin through a review of a subset of the plant equipment thatcan be relied upon to protect the reactor core following beyond design basis seismic events. Inorder to complete the ESEP in an expedited amount of time, the RLGM used for the ESEPevaluation is a scaled version of the plant's SSE rather than the actual GMRS. To more fullycharacterize the risk impacts of the seismic ground motion represented by the GMRS on a plantspecific basis, a more detailed seismic risk assessment (SPRA or risk-based SMA) is to beperformed in accordance with EPRI 1025287 [Ref. 14]. As identified in the CNP SeismicHazard and GMRS submittal
[Ref. 11], CNP screens in for a risk evaluation.
The complete riskevaluation will more completely characterize the probabilistic seismic ground motion input intothe plant, the plant response to that probabilistic seismic ground motion input, and the resulting plant risk characterization.
CNP will complete that evaluation in accordance with the scheduleidentified in NEI's letter dated April 9, 2013 [Ref. 27] and endorsed by the NRC in their May 7,2013 letter [Ref. 28].8.2 Identification of Planned Modifications There is one planned modification for each of the three Boric Acid Storage Tanks; 1-TK-12N, 2-TK-12S and 12-TK-12M that had an anchorage HCLPF of 0.227g < 0.387g RLGM [Ref. 10.3].The modification will be designed to raise the HCLPF above the RLGM. This will also raise the SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 43 of 151interaction HCLPF for the BAST Level Alarm Transmitters; 1-QLA-410, 12-QLA-420, 2-QLA-430, the BAST Heater Temperature Controllers; 1-QTC-410, 2-QTC-430, 12-QTC-420, and forthe BAST Transfer Pumps; 1-PP-46-1 and 2-PP-46-4 that is the same as that for the anchorage HCLPF for the Boric Acid Tanks.8.3 Modification Implementation SchedulePlant modifications will be performed in accordance with the schedule identified in NEI letterdated April 9, 2013 [Ref. 27], which states that plant modifications not requiring a plannedrefueling outage will be completed by December 31, 2016 and modifications requiring arefueling outage will be completed within two planned refueling outages after December 31,2014.The modification of the three Boric Acid Storage Tanks, 1-TK-12N, 12-TK-12M, and 2-TK-12S, has not yet proceeded to a level of development to determine if a refueling outage is required toimplement the modifications.
As such, if a refueling outage is not required to implement thesemodifications, modification of the three Boric Acid Storage Tanks will be complete no later thanDecember 31, 2016. If a refueling outage is required to implement the Boric Acid StorageTanks anchorage modifications, these modifications will be completed by the end of the secondplanned refueling outage after December 31, 2014. The second Unit 1 planned refueling outage after December 31, 2014 is U1C28 currently scheduled to end in the 4th quarter 2017and the second Unit 2 planned refueling outage after December 31, 2014 is U2C23 scheduled to end in the 4th quarter of 2016.8.4 Summary of ActionsItem Action DateComplete walkdowns for the inaccessible and Prior to restart of Unit 2 at the completion late addition components listed in Section 7.1. of its spring 2015 refueling outage.Complete screening and evaluation of the Within 90 days following restart of Unit 22 inaccessible and late addition components listed at the completion of its spring 2015in Section 7.1. refueling outage.Complete ESEP plant modifications not December 31, 2016 (2 years after ESEPrequiring outages.
report submittal) p7azlExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 44 of 151Item Action DateTwo outages from ESEP report submittal 4 Complete ESEP plant modifications requiring (U1C28 Fall 2017)outages.
(U2C23 Fall 2016)Inform the NRC that the above noted Within 60 days following completion of all5 evaluations and modifications are complete.
above noted modifications.
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Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 45 of 1519.0 References 1 NRC (E Leeds and M Johnson)
Letter to All Power Reactor Licensees et al., "Requestfor Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f)Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3 and 9.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review ofInsights from the Fukushima Dai-lchi Accident,"
March 12, 2012.2 Seismic Evaluation Guidance:
Augmented Approach for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1 -Seismic.
EPRI, Palo Alto, CA: May2013. 3002000704.
3 Order Number EA-12-049 responses:
3.1 Letter AEP-NRC-2013-13, from J. P. Gebbie, Indiana Michigan PowerCompany (I&M), to the NRC, "Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant Unit 1 and Unit2, Overall Integrated Plan in Response to March 12, 2012 Commission OrderModifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies forBeyond-Design Basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049)",
February27, 2013 (ML13101A381).
3.2 Letter AEP-NRC-2013-71, from J. P. Gebbie, I&M, to the NRC, "Donald C.Cook Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2, First Six-Month Status Report in Responseto March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard toRequirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond Design- Basis ExternalEvents (Order Number EA-12-049)",
August 26, 2013 (ML13240A308).
3.3 Letter AEP-NRC-2014-17, from J. P. Gebbie, I&M, to the NRC, "Donald C.Cook Nuclear Plant Units I and 2, Second Six-Month Status Report inResponse to March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses withRegard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond Design-Basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049)",
February 27, 2014(ML14063A042).
3.4 Letter AEP-NRC-2014-66 from J. P. Gebbie, I&M, to the NRC, "Donald C.Cook Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2, Third Six-Month Status Report in Responseto March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard toRequirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond Design-Basis ExternalEvents (Order Number EA-12-049)",
August 27, 2014 (ML14241A235).
4 Stevenson
& Associates Report 13Q3208-RPT-003
-"Seismic Hazard and Screening Report for the Cook Nuclear Plant (CNP)", Rev. 1.5 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG-1407, Procedural and Submittal Guidance forthe Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) for Severe AccidentVulnerabilities, June 1991.
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Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 46 of 1516 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Generic Letter No. 88-20 Supplement 4, Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities
-10CFR 50.54(f),
June 1991.7 A Methodology for Assessment of Nuclear Power Plant Seismic Margin, Rev. 1, August1991, Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA. EPRI NP-6041-SL.
8 Methodology for Developing Seismic Fragilities, August 1991, EPRI, Palo Alto, CA.1994, TR-103959.
9 American Electric Service Corporation, Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2,"Individual Plant Examination of External Events Summary Report",
April, 1992.10 CNP ESEP High Confidence of Low Probability of Failure (HCLPF) Calculations:
10.1 13Q3208-CAL-004, Rev. 1, "High Confidence Low Probability of Failure(HCLPF) Calculations for Screened in ESEP Components".
10.2 13Q3208-CAL-005, Rev. 1, "High Confidence Low Probability of Failure(HCLPF) Calculations for Screened in ESEP Tanks".10.3 13Q3208-CAL-006, Rev. 1, "High Confidence Low Probability of Failure(HCLPF) Calculations for Containment Catwalk and Attached Hydrogen GlowPlugs".11 NRC Letter AEP-NRC-2014-25, March 27, 2014.12 Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), A. Pietrangelo, Letter to D. Skeen of the USNRC,"Seismic Core Damage Risk Estimates Using the Updated Seismic Hazards for theOperating Nuclear Plants in the Central and Eastern United States",
March 12, 2014.13 NRC (E Leeds) Letter to All Power Reactor Licensees et al., "Screening andPrioritization Results Regarding Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of FederalRegulations 50.54(F)
Regarding Seismic Hazard Re-Evaluations for Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights From the Fukushima Dai-lchiAccident,"
May 9, 2014.14 Seismic Evaluation Guidance:
Screening, Prioritization and Implementation Details(SPID) for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1:Seismic.
EPRI, Palo Alto, CA: February 2013. 1025287.15 American Electric Power Report SD-121023-001, "Seismic Walkdown Report, InResponse to the 50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.3: Seismic for the D. C. Cook Unit 1 & Unit 2," Rev. 2,January 13, 2014.16 AEP Report, AEP:NRC:1040C, "Response to NRC G.L. 87-02 Unresolved Safety IssueA-46", AEPSC Task Group, January 1996.17 CNP Design Basis In-Structure Response Spectra:
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Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014
* Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 47 of 15117.1 DC-D-3050-1 1-SC, "Seismic Analysis of the Auxiliary Building Complex",
Revision 1, Jan. 12, 2000.17.2 SD-000204-004, "Validation and Development of Turbine Building ResponseSpectra",
Revision 0, March 28, 2000.17.3 SD-991008-001, "Seismic Response Spectra for Containment Building",
Revision 0, Feb. 26, 2000.17.4 Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant Nuclear Safeguards Design Memo, "FloorResponse Curves for EL 591 ft. of Turbine Building
& Screenhouse",
Correspondence
# 03-23-1971, March 23, 1971.18 American Electric Power, "In Response to the 50.45(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic for the D. C. CookUnit 1 and 2," Report SD-121023-01, Rev. 2.19 Seismic Fragility Applications Guide Update, December 2009, EPRI, Palo Alto, CA.1994, 1019200.20 Stevenson
& Associates Report 13Q3208-RPT-004, Rev. 0, "ESEP Walkdown andScreening Report for the Cook Nuclear Plant (CNP)".21 Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Rev. 25.22 SQUG USI A-46 Component Specific Documentation 22.1 SQUG-1-HV-CEQ-2, Rev. 0 (USI A-46 SEWS).22.2 SQUG-1-HV-CEQ-1, Rev. 0 (USI A-46 SEWS).22.3 SQUG-12-TK-47-CD, Rev. 0 (USI A-46 SEWS).22.4 SQUG-12-TK-47-AB, Rev. 0 (USI A-46 SEWS).22.5 SQUG-2-HV-CEQ-2, Rev. 0 (USI A-46 SEWS).22.6 SQUG-2-NPS-121, Rev. 0 (USI A-46 SEWS).22.7 SQUG-2-NPS-122, Rev. 0 (USI A-46 SEWS).22.8 SQUG-2-IMO-128, Rev. 0 (USI A-46 SEWS).22.9 SQUG-2-TK-253-1, Rev. 0 (USI A-46 SEWS).22.10 SQUG-2-TK-253-2, Rev. 0 (USI A-46 SEWS).23 Stevenson
& Associates Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-002, Rev. 2, "Response Spectra forCook Nuclear Plant (CNP) Units 1 & 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP)Evaluations".
24 NEI 12-06, Rev. 0, "Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) Implementation Guide", Aug. 2012.
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& Associates Report 13Q3208-RPT-001, Rev. 4, "Report on Expedited Seismic Equipment List."26 D.C. Cook P&ID Drawings26.1 CNP Drawing OP-1-5105D, Rev. 10, "Steam Generating System".26.2 CNP Drawing OP-1-5105E, Rev. 1, "Main Steam".26.3 CNP Drawing OP-1-5106A, Rev. 60, "Auxiliary Feedwater".
26.4 CNP Drawing OP-1-5113, Rev. 92, "Essential Service Water".26.5 CNP Drawing OP-1-5113A, Rev. 9, "Essential Service Water".26.6 CNP Drawing OP-1-5143, Rev. 76, "Emergency Core Cooling (RHR) Unit No. 1".26.7 CNP Drawing OP-1-5135, Rev. 42, "Component Cooling Water Pumps andComponent Cooling Water Heat Exchangers".
26.8 CNP Drawing OP-1-5135A, Rev. 43, "Component Cooling Water SafetyRelated Loads".26.9 CNP Drawing OP-1-5143A, Rev. 5, "Emergency Core Cooling (RHR)Accumulator Piping".26.10 CNP Drawing OP-12-5131, Rev. 47, "Chemical
& Volume Control SystemBoron Make Up".26.11 CNP Drawing OP-1-5129, Rev. 61, "Chemical
& Volume Control SystemReactor Letdown & Charging".
26.12 CNP Drawing OP-1-5142, Rev. 45, "Emergency Core Cooling (SIS)".26.13 CNP Drawing OP-1-5128, Rev. 30, "Reactor Coolant Sheet 1 of 2".26.14 CNP Drawing OP-1-5128A, Rev. 54, "Reactor Coolant -Sheet 2 of 2".26.15 CNP Drawing OP-1-5120D, Rev. 34, "Containment Control Air 85# & 50# RingHeaders".
26.16 CNP Drawing OP-1-5151C, Rev. 54, "Emergency Diesel Generator CD".26.17 CNP Drawing OP-1-5148C, Rev. 30, "Flow Diagram Diesel Generator Area &Electrical Switchgear Rooms Heating & Ventilation Sys Unit 1".26.18 CNP Drawing OP-1-5149, Rev. 46, "Control Room Ventilation Unit No. 1".26.19 CNP Drawing OP-2-5105D, Rev. 22, "Steam Generating System".26.20 CNP Drawing OP-2-5105E, Rev. 1, "Main Steam".26.21 CNP Drawing OP-2-5106A, Rev. 55, "Auxiliary Feedwater".
26.22 CNP Drawing OP-2-5113, Rev. 82, "Essential Service Water".26.23 CNP Drawing OP-2-5113A, Rev. 9, "Essential Service Water".26.24 CNP Drawing OP-2-5143, Rev. 72, "Flow Diagram Emergency Core Cooling(RHR) Unit No. 2".26.25 CNP Drawing OP-2-5135, Rev. 37, "Component Cooling Water Pumps AndComponent Cooling Water Heat Exchangers".
26.26 CNP Drawing OP-2-5135A, Rev. 40, "Component Cooling Water SafetyRelated Loads".26.27 CNP Drawing OP-2-5143A, Rev. 4, "Emergency Core Cooling (RHR)Accumulator Piping".
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& Volume Control SystemReactor Letdown and Charging".
26.29 CNP Drawing OP-2-5142, Rev. 51, "Emergency Core Cooling (SIS)".26.30 CNP Drawing OP-2-5128, Rev. 30, "Reactor Coolant Sheet 1 of 2".26.31 CNP Drawing OP-2-5128A, Rev. 59, "Reactor Coolant Sheet 2 of 2".26.32 CNP Drawing OP-2-5120D, Rev. 31, "Containment Control Air 85# & 50# RingHeaders".
26.33 CNP Drawing OP-2-5151A, Rev. 55, "Emergency Diesel Generator "AB"".26.34 CNP Drawing OP-2-5148C, Rev. 31, "Flow Diagram Diesel Generator Area &Electrical Switchgear Rooms Heating & Ventilation Sys Unit 2".26.35 CNP Drawing OP-2-5149, Rev. 54, "Control Room Ventilation".
26.36 CNP Drawing OP-1-1 2032, Rev. 20, "MCC Auxiliary 600V Bus 11 C, 11DEngineered Safety System (Train A)".26.37 CNP Drawing OP-2-12032, Rev. 14, "MCC Auxiliary One-Line 600V Bus 21C,21D Engineered Safety System (Train A)".27. Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), A. Pietrangelo, Letter to D. Skeen of the USNRC,"Proposed Path Forward for NTTF Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Reevaluations",
April9, 2013.28. NRC (E Leeds) Letter to NEI (J Pollock),
"Electric Power Research Institute Final DraftReport xxxxx, "Seismic Evaluation Guidance:
Augmented Approach for the Resolution ofFukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic,"
as an Acceptable Alternative to the March 12, 2012, Information Request for Seismic Reevaluations,"
May7, 2013.29. FLEX Plan Input Transmittal to Stevenson
& Associates, August 25, 2014 (AEPCorrespondence Control #2014-716).
: 30. "Generic Implementation Procedure (GIP) for Seismic Verification of Nuclear PlantEquipment,"
Revision 3, Updated May 16, 1997.
SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 50 of 151Attachment A- CNP Unit 1 ESEL fExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 51 of 151CNP Unit 1 ESELCNP Equipment Operating StateUnit 1U INormal Notes / CommentsESEL ID Description Desired StateItem # State1 1-11A 600VAC BUS 11A SWITCHGEAR ENERGIZED ENERGIZED Power Available in Phase 3 Only2 1-11B 600VAC BUS 11B SWITCHGEAR ENERGIZED ENERGIZED 3 1-11C 600VAC BUS 1 lC ENERGIZED ENERGIZED Power Available in Phase 3 Only,SWITCHGEAR 11 C1 Breaker must be manuallytripped4 1-11D 600VAC BUS 11D ENERGIZED ENERGIZED SWITCHGEAR 5 1-152- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN ENERGIZED ENERGIZED LDISB IGNITION LOWER VOLUMETRAIN >6 1-152- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN ENERGIZED ENERGIZED UDISB IGNITION UPPER VOLUMETRAIN >7 1-1A 4KV BUS 1A SWITCHGEAR ENERGIZED ENERGIZED Power Available in Phase 3 Only8 12-QLA- MIDDLE BORIC ACID STORAGE OPERATING OPERATING BAST Level Transmitter 420 TANK TK-12M LEVEL ALARMTRANSMITTER 9 12-QTC- MIDDLE BAST TK-12M TRAIN 'A' OPERATING OPERATING BAST Temperature Transmitter 420 HTR TEMP CONTROLLER 10 12-TK- MIDDLE BORIC ACID STORAGE N/A N/A Passive Component 12M TANK11 12-TK- CD EMERGENCY DIESELS N/A N/A Passive Component 47-CD FUEL OIL STORAGE TANK12 1 CNTMT HYDROGEN IGNITION ENERGIZED ENERGIZED LDISB LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B> >13 1 CNTMT HYDROGEN IGNITION ENERGIZED ENERGIZED UDISB UPPER VOLUME TRAIN 'B'>14 1-88X- CNTMT HYDROGEN IGNITION NOT USED ENERGIZED LDISB LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' >15 1-88X- CNTMT HYDROGEN IGNITION NOT USED ENERGIZED UDISB UPPER VOLUME TRAIN 'B'>16 1 PLANT BATTERY BATT-AB ENERGIZED ENERGIZED ABBC DISCONNECT SWITCH17 1 PLANT BATTERY BATT-CD ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CDBC DISCONNECT SWITCH18 1-AB-A 600VAC MOTOR CONTROL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED Power Available in Phase 3 OnlyCENTER AB-A19 1-AB-D 600VAC MOTOR CONTROL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CENTER AB-D20 1-ABD-B 600VAC MOTOR CONTROL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CENTER ABD-B21 1-ABD-D 600VAC MOTOR CONTROL OPERATING OPERATING RCS Level, RWST LevelCENTER ABD-D22 1-ABV-A 600VAC VALVE CONTROL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED Power Available in Phase 3 OnlyCENTER ABV-A SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic1303208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 52 of 151CNP Unit 1 ESELCNP Equipment Operating StateUnit 11Normal Notes / CommentsESEL ID Description Desired StateItem # State23 1-AFWX 120/208VAC AUXILIARY OPERATING OPERATING RCS Level, RWST LevelFEEDWATER DISTRIBUTION PANEL24 1-AM-A 600VAC MOTOR CONTROL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED Power Available in Phase 3 OnlyCENTER AM-A25 1-AZV-A 600VAC VALVE CONTROL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED Power Available in Phase 3 OnlyCENTER AZV-A26 1-BA BORIC ACID CHARGING AND OPERATING OPERATING BAST Level, BAST Temperature LETDOWN CONTROL PANEL Indicators, Separately Powered27 1-BATT- PLANT BATTERY AB ENERGIZED ENERGIZED AB28 1-BATT- PLANT BATTERY BATT-AB ENERGIZED ENERGIZED AB-SH AMMETER SHUNT29 1-BATT- PLANT BATTERY CD ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CD30 1-BATT- PLANT BATTERY BATT-CD ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CD-SH AMMETER SHUNT31 1-BC- PLANT BATTERY BATT-AB ENERGIZED ENERGIZED AB2 CHARGER #232 1-BC- PLANT BATTERY BATT-CD ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CD1 CHARGER#1 33 1-BCTC- PLANT BATTERY CHARGERS ENERGIZED ENERGIZED AB BC-AB1 AND BC-AB2TRANSFER PANEL34 1-BCTC- PLANT BATTERY CHARGERS ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CD BC-CD1 AND BC-CD2TRANSFERPANEL 35 1-BLI- STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-1 OPERATING OPERATING SG Level Transmitter 110 WIDE RANGE LEVELINDICATOR TRANSMITTER 36 1-BLI- STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-2 OPERATING OPERATING SG Level Transmitter 120 WIDE RANGE LEVELINDICATOR TRANSMITTER 37 1-BLI- STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-3 OPERATING OPERATING SG Level Transmitter 130 WIDE RANGE LEVELINDICATOR TRANSMITTER 38 1-BLI- STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-4 OPERATING OPERATING SG Level Transmitter 140 WIDE RANGE LEVELINDICATOR TRANSMITTER 39 1-CCV- 250VDC TRAIN 'B' CRITICAL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED AB SOLENOID VALVESDISTRIBUTION PANEL40 1-CCV- 250VDC TRAIN 'A' CRITICAL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CD SOLENOID VALVESDISTRIBUTION PANEL41 1-CCW COMPONENT COOLING OPERATING AVAILABLE Hand Switches poweredWATER CONTROL PANEL separately Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 53 of 151CNP Unit 1 ESELCNP Equipment Operating StateUnitNormal Notes / CommentsESEL ID Description Desired StateItem # State42 1-CG1- REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING SG Level, RCS Injection Flow14 CONTROL GROUP #1 CABINET#1443 1-CG1- REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING BAST Level15 CONTROL GROUP #1 CABINET#1544 1-CG2- REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING RCS Injection Flow17 CONTROL GROUP #2 CABINET#1745 1-CG2- REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING RCS Injection Flow19 CONTROL GROUP #2 CABINET Instrumentation
#1946 1-CG3- REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING RCS Injection Flow20 CONTROL GROUP #3 CABINET#2047 1-CG3- REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING Containment
: Pressure, RWST21 CONTROL GROUP #3 CABINET Level, BAST Level, RCS#21 Injection Flow48 1-CG4- REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING RCS Injection Flow22 CONTROL GROUP #4 CABINET#2249 1-CG4- REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING SG Level23 CONTROL GROUP #4 CABINET#2350 1-CLI- CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK OPERATING OPERATING CST Level Transmitter 114 TK-32 LEVEL INDICATOR TRANSMITTER 51 1-CMO- COMPONENT COOLING OPEN CLOSED Local Manual Operation at the413 WATER PUMPS SUCTION operator hand wheel is creditedCROSSTIE TRAIN 'B' SHUTOFF for FLEX ResponseVALVE52 1-CMO- COMPONENT COOLING OPEN CLOSED Local Manual Operation at the414 WATER PUMPS DISCHARGE operator hand wheel is creditedCROSS TIE TRAIN 'B' SHUTOFF for FLEX ResponseVALVE53 1-CMO- COMPONENT COOLING OPEN CLOSED Local Manual Operation at the416 WATER TO MISCELLANEOUS operator hand wheel is creditedSERVICE TRAIN 'B' SHUTOFF for FLEX ResponseVALVE54 1-CMO- WEST RESIDUAL HEAT CLOSED OPEN Power Available in Phase 3 Only429 REMOVAL HEAT EXCHANGER COMPONENT COOLINGWATER OUTLET SHUTOFFVALVE55 1-CP CONDENSATE PUMP OPERATING OPERATING CST Level Indicator, Separately I CONTROL PANEL Powered SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 PaRe 54 of 151CNP Unit 1 ESELCNP Equipment Operating StateUnit 1 * ..... .UnitNormal
.Notes/ CommentsESEL ID Description Nm Desired StateItem # State56 1-CRID-1 120VAC CONTROL ROOM ENERGIZED ENERGIZED INSTRUMENT DISTRIBUTION CHANNEL I DISTRIBUTION PANEL57 1-CRID- 120VAC CONTROL ROOM ENERGIZED ENERGIZED 1-INV INSTRUMENT DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM >58 1-CRID-2 120VAC CONTROL ROOM ENERGIZED ENERGIZED INSTRUMENT DISTRIBUTION CHANNEL II DISTRIBUTION PANEL59 1-CRID- 120VAC CONTROL ROOM ENERGIZED ENERGIZED 2-INV INSTRUMENT DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM >60 1-CRID-3 120VAC CONTROL ROOM ENERGIZED ENERGIZED INSTRUMENT DISTRIBUTION CHANNEL III DISTRIBUTION PANEL61 1-CRID- 120VAC CONTROL ROOM ENERGIZED ENERGIZED 3-INV INSTRUMENTATION DISTRIBUTION
>62 1-CRID-4 120VAC CONTROL ROOM ENERGIZED ENERGIZED INSTRUMENT DISTRIBUTION CHANNEL IV DISTRIBUTION PANEL63 1-CRID- 120VAC CONTROL ROOM ENERGIZED ENERGIZED 4-INV INSTRUMENT DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM >64 1-DTU DELTA 'T' AND UNIT CONTROL OPERATING OPERATING RCS Temperature RecorderPANEL65 1-ELSC 120/208VAC EMERGENCY ENERGIZED ENERGIZED LOCAL SHUTDOWNDISTRIBUTIONPANEL 66 1-EZC-B 600VAC MOTOR CONTROL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CENTER EZC-B67 1-EZC-C 600VAC MOTOR CONTROL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED Power Available in Phase 3 OnlyCENTER EZC-C68 1-EZC-D 600VAC MOTOR CONTROL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CENTER EZC-D69 1-FFI- AUXILIARY FEEDWATER TO OPERATING OPERATING AFW Flow Transmitter 210 STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-1FLOW INDICATOR TRANSMITTER 70 1-FFI- AUXILIARY FEEDWATER TO OPERATING OPERATING AFW Flow Transmitter 220 STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-2FLOW INDICATOR TRANSMITTER P colExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 55 of 151CNP Unit 1 ESELCNP Equipment Operating StateUnit 1Normal Notes / CommentsESEL ID Description Desired StateItem # State71 1-FFI- AUXILIARY FEEDWATER TO OPERATING OPERATING AFW Flow Transmitter 230 STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-3FLOW INDICATOR TRANSMITTER 72 1-FFI- AUXILIARY FEEDWATER TO OPERATING OPERATING AFW Flow Transmitter 240 STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-4FLOW INDICATOR TRANSMITTER 73 1-FI FIXED INCORE CONTROL OPERATING OPERATING Core Exit Temperature RecorderPANEL74 1-FICT-A REACTOR CORE THERMO OPERATING OPERATING Core Exit Temperature COUPLE TRAIN 'A'TRANSMITTER CABINET75 1-FLX FLUX CONTROL PANEL OPERATING OPERATING Neutron Flux Indicator, Separately Powered76 1-FMO- TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY THROTTLED THROTTLED Throttle position will be adjusted211 FEED PUMP PP-4 DISCHARGE during FLEX using the localTO STEAM GENERATOR OME- manual operator hand wheel3-1 CONTROL VALVE77 1-FMO- TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY THROTTLED THROTTLED Throttle position will be adjusted221 FEED PUMP PP-4 DISCHARGE during FLEX using the localTO STEAM GENERATOR OME- manual operator hand wheel3-2 CONTROL VALVE78 1-FMO- TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY THROTTLED THROTTLED Throttle position will be adjusted231 FEED PUMP SUPPLY TO during FLEX using the localSTEAM GENERATOR OME-3-3 manual operator hand wheelCONTROL VALVE79 1-FMO- TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY THROTTLED THROTTLED Throttle position will be adjusted241 FEED PUMP SUPPLY TO during FLEX using the localSTEAM GENERATOR OME-4-4 manual operator hand wheelCONTROL VALVE80 1-HE- WEST COMPONENT COOLING N/A N/A Passive Component 15W WATER HEAT EXCHANGER 81 1-HE- WEST RESIDUAL HEAT N/A N/A Passive Component 17W REMOVAL HEAT EXCHANGER 82 1-HSD1 UNIT 1 HOT SHUTDOWN ENERGIZED ENERGIZED PANEL83 1-HV- CONTROL ROOM AIR AS NEEDED OPERATING Power Available in Phase 3 OnlyACR-2 CONDITIONING SOUTH LIQUIDCHILLER84 1-HV- CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION AS NEEDED OPERATING Power Available in Phase 3 OnlyACRA-2 SOUTH AIRCONDITIONINGUNIT 85 1-HV- OUTSIDE AIR TO CONTROL OPERATING OPERATING Power Available in Phase 3 OnlyACR-DA- ROOM2 PRESSURIZATION/CLEANUPFI LTER UNIT HV-ACRF VENTDAMPER SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 56 of 151CNP Unit 1 ESELCNP Equipment Operating StateUnitNormal Notes/ CommentsESEL ID Description Desired StateItem # State86 1-HV- CONTROL ROOM N/A N/A Passive Component ACRF PRESSURIZATION/CLEANUP FILTER UNIT87 1-HV- CONTROL ROOM AS NEEDED OPERATING Power Available in Phase 3 OnlyACRF-2 PRESSURIZATION/CLEAN UPFILTER UNIT VENT FAN #288 1-HV- CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION OPERATING OPERATING Power Available in Phase 3 OnlyACR-H2 SOUTH DUCT ELECTRICHEATING UNIT89 1-HV- 1-HV-CEQ-2, CONTAINMENT AS NEEDED OPERATING Power Available in Phase 3 OnlyCEQ-2 HYDROGEN SKIMMERVENTILATION FAN #290 1-HV- AB BATTERY EQUIPMENT AS NEEDED OPERATING Battery Room AB Ventilation, SGRX-5 AREA BATTERY ROOM Controlled LocallyVENTILATION EXHAUST FAN91 1-HV- CD BATTERY EQUIPMENT AS NEEDED OPERATING Battery Room CD Ventilation, SGRX-6 AREA BATTERY ROOM Controlled LocallyVENTILATIONEXHAUST FAN92 1-1CM- RHR TO REACTOR COOLANT CLOSED OPEN Power Available in Phase 3 Only111 LOOPS #2 & #3 COLD LEGSCONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE93 1-1CM- REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #2 CLOSED OPEN Needs closure of PB 403AX129 HOT LEG TO RESIDUAL relay permissive, PowerHEATREMOVAL PUMPS Available in Phase 3 OnlySUCTION CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE94 1-1CM- BORON INJECTION TANK CLOSED OPEN Power Available in Phase 3 Only251 TRAIN 'B' OUTLETCONTAINMENT
>95 1-1CM- WEST RHR TO REACTOR OPEN CLOSED Local Manual Operation at the321 COOLANT LOOPS #2 AND #3 operator hand wheel is creditedHOT LEGS CONTAINMENT for FLEX ResponseISOLATION VALVE96 1-IFI-51 BORON INJECTION TO OPERATING OPERATING RCS Injection Flow Transmitter REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #1FLOW INDICATOR TRANSMITTER 97 1-IFI-52 BORON INJECTION TO OPERATING OPERATING RCS Injection Flow Transmitter REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #2FLOW INDICATOR TRANSMITTER 98 1-IFI-53 BORON INJECTION TO OPERATING OPERATING RCS Injection Flow Transmitter REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #3FLOW INDICATOR TRANSMITTER SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 57 of 151CNP Unit 1 ESELCNP Equipment Operating StateUnit 1ESEL ID Description Normal Desired State Notes / CommentsItem # State99 1-IFI-54 BORON INJECTION TO OPERATING OPERATING RCS Injection Flow Transmitter REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #4FLOW INDICATOR TRANSMITTER 100 1-IMO- REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #2 CLOSED OPEN Needs closure of PB 405AX128 HOT LEG TO RESIDUAL HEAT relay permissive REMOVAL PUMPS SUCTIONSHUTOFF VALVE101 1-IMO- BORON INJECTION TANK CLOSED OPEN Power Available in Phase 3 Only256 TRAIN 'B' INLET SHUTOFFVALVE102 1-IMO- EAST RESIDUAL HEAT OPEN CLOSED Local manual operation with the310 REMOVAL PUMP PP-35E operator hand wheel is creditedSUCTION SHUTOFF VALVE for FLEX Response103 1-IMO- WEST RHR HX 1-HE-17W CLOSED OPEN Local manual operation with the324 DISCHARGE CROSSTIE operator hand wheel is creditedSHUTOFF VALVE for FLEX Response104 1-LDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B19 IGNITION LOWER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B19105 1-LDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B20 IGNITION LOWER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B20106 1-LDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B21 IGNITION LOWER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B21107 1-LDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B22 IGNITION LOWER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B22108 1-LDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B23 IGNITION LOWER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B23109 1-LDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B24 IGNITION LOWER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B24110 1-LDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B25 IGNITION LOWER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B25111 1-LDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B26 IGNITION LOWER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B26 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 58 of 151CNP Unit 1 ESELCNP Equipment Operating StateUnit 1Normal Notes CommentsESEL ID Description Desired StateItem # State112 1-LDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B27 IGNITION LOWER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B27113 1-LDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B28 IGNITION LOWER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B28114 1-LDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B29 IGNITION LOWER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B29115 1-LDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B30 IGNITION LOWER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B30116 1-LDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B31 IGINTION LOWER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B31117 1-LDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B32 IGNITION LOWER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B32118 1-LDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B33 IGNITION LOWER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B33119 1-LDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B34 IGNITION LOWER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B34120 1-LDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B35 IGNITION LOWER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B35121 1-LSI-1 STEAM GENERATORS
#1 AND NON- REMOTE Contains SG Level Transmitter
#4 LOCAL SHUTDOWN OPERATING Transfer Relay, power N/A asSTATION (REMOTE) de-energized is desired relaystate122 1-LSI-2 STEAM GENERATORS
#2 AND NON- REMOTE Contains SG Level Transmitter
#3 LOCAL SHUTDOWN OPERATING Transfer Relay, power N/A asSTATION (REMOTE) de-energized is desired relaystate123 1-LSI-3 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM NON- REMOTE NPS-122 RCS PressureCHARGING AND LETDOWN OPERATING Transmitter Transfer Relay,LOCAL SHUTDOWN STATION (REMOTE) power N/A as de-energized isI _desired relay state SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 59 of 151CNP Unit 1 ESELCNP Equipment Operating StateUnit 1Unita1 Notes / CommentsESEL ID Description Normal Desired StateItem # State124 1-MCAB 250VDC DISTRIBUTION PANEL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED MCAB125 1-MCCD 250VDC DISTRIBUTION POWER OPERATING OPERATING Various Instruments PANEL126 1-MDAB 250VDC DISTRIBUTION PANEL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED MDAB127 1-MDCD 250VDC DISTRIBUTION PANEL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED MDCD128 1-MPP- STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-1 OPERATING OPERATING SG Pressure Transmitter 210 CHANNEL I STEAM PRESSURETRANSMITTER 129 1-MPP- STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-2 OPERATING OPERATING SG Pressure Transmitter 220 CHANNEL I STEAM PRESSURETRANSMITTER 130 1-MPP- STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-3 OPERATING OPERATING SG Pressure Transmitter 230 CHANNEL I STEAM PRESSURETRANSMITTER 131 1-MPP- STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-4 OPERATING OPERATING SG Pressure Transmitter 240 CHANNEL I STEAM PRESSURETRANSMITTER 132 1-MRV- STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-1 CLOSED OPEN Fail Closed, Local manual213 POWER OPERATED RELIEF operation with the operator handVALVE wheel is credited for FLEXI Response to throttle the valve133 1-MRV- STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-2 CLOSED OPEN Fail Closed, Local manual223 POWER OPERATED RELIEF operation with the operator handVALVE wheel is credited for FLEXResponse to throttle the valve134 1-MRV- STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-3 CLOSED OPEN Fail Closed, Local manual233 POWER OPERATED RELIEF operation with the operator handVALVE wheel is credited for FLEXResponse to throttle the valve135 1-MRV- STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-4 CLOSED OPEN Fail Closed, Local manual243 POWER OPERATED RELIEF operation with the operator handVALVE wheel is credited for FLEXResponse to throttle the valve136 1-NIS-l NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION OPERATING OPERATING Neutron Flux Indicator, SYSTEM PROTECTION Separately PoweredCHANNEL I CONTROL PANEL137 1-NLP- PRESSURIZER OME-4 OPERATING OPERATING Pressurizer Level Transmitter 151 PROTECTION CHANNEL ILEVELTRANSMITTER 138 1-NPS- & VER ADDED PER SETPOINT OPERATING OPERATING RCS Pressure Transmitter, also110 PROJECT REACTOR VESSEL used for RCS Level (RVLIS)TRAIN 'A' WIDE RANGEPRESSURE TRANSMITTER SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 60 of 151CNP Unit 1 ESELCNP Equipment Operating StateUnitNormal Notes /Comments ESEL ID Description Desired StateItem # State139 1-NPS- REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #2 OPERATING OPERATING Required for valve ICM-1 29121 HOT LEG WIDE RANGE pressure permissive PRESSURE TRANSMITTER 140 1-NPS- REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #1 OPERATING OPERATING Required for valve IMO-128122 HOT LEG WIDE RANGE pressure permissive PRESSURE TRANSMITTER 141 1-NRI-21 NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION OPERATING OPERATING Neutron FluxCHANNEL I WIDE RANGERADIATION DETECTOR142 1-NRI- NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION OPERATING OPERATING Neutron Flux21-AMP WIDE RANGE RADIATION AMPLIFIER 143 1-NRV- PRESSURIZER TRAIN 'B' CLOSED OPEN Fail Closed152 PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE144 1-NRV- PRESSURIZER OME-4 TRAIN'A' CLOSED OPEN Fail Closed153 PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE145 1-NTQ- RVLIS TRAIN 'A' UPPER TAP OPERATING OPERATING Temperature Transmitter used110A TEMPERATURE for RCS Level (RVLIS)COMPENSATIONCOMPUTER INPUT THERMAL SENSOR 'A'146 1-NTQ- RVLIS TRAIN 'A' UPPER TAP OPERATING OPERATING Temperature Transmitter used110B TEMPERATURE for RCS Level (RVLIS)COMPENSATIONCOMPUTER INPUT THERMAL SENSOR 'B'147 1-NTQ- RVLIS TRAIN 'A' CONDUIT OPERATING OPERATING Temperature Transmitter used130A TEMPERATURE for RCS Level (RVLIS)COMPENSATIONCOMPUTER INPUT THERMAL SENSOR 'A'148 1-NTQ- RVLIS TRAIN 'A' CONDUIT OPERATING OPERATING Temperature Transmitter used130C TEMPERATURE for RCS Level (RVLIS)COMPENSATIONCOMPUTER INPUT THERMAL SENSOR 'C'149 1-NTR- REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #1 OPERATING OPERATING RCS Temperature Transmitter 110 HOT LEG WIDERANGETEMPERATURE RECORDER THERMALSENSOR150 1-NTR- REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #3 OPERATING OPERATING RCS Temperature Transmitter, 130 HOT LEG WIDE also used for RCS Level (RVLIS)RANGETEMPERATURE RECORDER THERMALSENSOR151 1-NTR- REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #1 OPERATING OPERATING RCS Temperature Transmitter 210 COLD LEG WIDERANGETEMPERATURE RECORDER THERMALSENSOR Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 61 of 151CNP Unit 1 ESELCNP Equipment Operating StateUnitNormal Notes / CommentsESEL ID Description Desired StateItem # State152 1-NTR- REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #3 OPERATING OPERATING RCS Temperature Transmitter 230 COLD LEG WIDERANGETEMPERATURE RECORDER THERMALSENSOR153 1-OME- TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY N/A N/A Passive Component 33 FEED PUMP PP-4 SUCTION >154 1-OME- WEST ESSENTIAL SERVICE OPERATING OPERATING Passive component when used34W WATER PUMP PP-7W in FLEX responseDISCHARGESTRAINER 155 1-OME- ACCUMULATOR TANK #1 N/A N/A Passive Component 6-1156 1-OME- ACCUMULATOR TANK #2 N/A N/A Passive Component 6-2157 1-OME- ACCUMULATOR TANK #3 N/A N/A Passive Component 6-3158 1-OME- ACCUMULATOR TANK #4 N/A N/A Passive Component 6-4159 1-PP- WEST COMPONENT COOLING OPERATING OPERATING Power Available in Phase 3 OnlyloW WATER PUMP ORAVAILABLE 160 1-PP- WEST RESIDUAL HEAT AVAILABLE OPERATING Power Available in Phase 3 Only35W REMOVAL PUMP161 1-PP-4 TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY STOP RUN Via ROB Turbine 1-OME-39FEED PUMP162 1-PP BORIC ACID STORAGE TANKS NOT USED OPERATING Pump used in Phase 3 after1 TRANSFER PUMP #1 NSRC Generator Installed 163 1-PP- CONTROL ROOM AIR AS NEEDED OPERATING Power Available in Phase 3 Only82S CONDITIONING SOUTH CHILLWATER CIRCULATION PUMP164 1-PPA- UPPER CONTAINMENT OPERATING OPERATING Containment Pressure310 CHANNEL III WIDE RANGE Transmitter PRESSURE ALARMTRANSMITTER 165 1-PRZ PRESSURIZER CONTROL OPERATING OPERATING Pressurizer level Indicator PANEL Separately Powered166 1-QLA- NORTH BORIC ACID STORAGE OPERATING OPERATING BAST Level Transmitter 410 TANK TK-12N LEVELALARMTRANSMITTER 167 1-QRV- CVCS CHARGING TO OPEN CLOSED Fails to desired position on loss200 REGENERATIVE HEAT of instrument airEXCHANGER FLOW CONTROLVALVE168 1-QT-506 TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY CLOSED OPERATING Local Manual Operation at theFEED PUMP PP-4 TRIP operator hand wheel/mechanical ANDTHROTTLE VALVE trip reset is credited for FLEXResponse Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 62 of 151CNP Unit 1 ESELCNP Equipment Operating StateUnit 1Unita1 Notes / CommentsESEL ID Description Normal Desired StateItem # State169 1-QT-507 AUXILIARY FEED PUMP CLOSED OPERATING Control via 1-QT-507-KR TURBINE GOVERNOR VALVE governor (ROB)170 1-QTC- NORTH BAST TK-12N TRAIN 'A' OPERATING OPERATING BAST Temperature Transmitter 410 HTR TEMP CONTROLLER 171 1-RHR RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL OPERATING AVAILABLE Hand Switches poweredCONTROL PANEL separately 172 1-RPC REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING AFW Flow, Pressurizer level1 CHANNEL I CABINET #1173 1-RPC REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING AFW Flow2 CHANNEL I CABINET #2174 1-RPC REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING SG Pressure3 CHANNEL I CABINET #3175 1-RPC REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING SG Pressure4 CHANNEL I CABINET #4176 1-RPC REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING RWST Level, RCS Pressure5 CHANNEL II CABINET #5 Permissive 177 1-RPC REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING AFW Flow, RCS Temperature, 6 CHANNEL II CABINET #6 RWST Level178 1-RPC REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING RCS Temperature 7 CHANNEL II CABINET #7179 1-RPC REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING RCS Pressure, RCS Level8 CHANNEL II CABINET #8180 1-RPC REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING CST Level10 CHANNEL III CABINET #10181 1-RPC REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING AFW Flow, CST Level, RCS9 CHANNEL III CABINET #9 Temperature, RCS PressurePermissive 182 1-RPC REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING AFW Flow12 CHANNEL IV CABINET #12183 1-RPS-A REACTOR PROTECTION AND OPERATING OPERATING Contains portion of permissive SAFEGUARD ACTUATION circuit for ICM-1 29TRAIN 'A' CABINET184 1-RPS-B REACTOR PROTECTION AND OPERATING OPERATING Contains portion of permissive SAFEGUARD ACTUATION circuit for IMO-128TRAIN 'B' CABINET185 1-RPSX- REACTOR PROTECTION AND OPERATING OPERATING Contains PB 403AX relayA SAFEGUARD ACTUATION permissive TRAIN 'A' AUXILIARY CABINET186 1-RPSX- REACTOR PROTECTION AND OPERATING OPERATING Contains PB 405AX relayB SAFEGUARD ACTUATION permissive TRAIN 'B' AUXILIARY CABINET187 1-RVLC REACTOR VESSEL OME-1 OPERATING OPERATING RCS LevelWATER LEVELINSTRUMENTATION CABINET188 1-SA STATION AUXILIARIES OPERATING AVAILABLE Hand Switches poweredCONTROL PANEL I separately SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 PaRe 63 of 151CNP Unit 1 ESELCNP Equipment Operating StateUnit 1 Notes/ CommentsESEL" ID Description Normal Desired StateItem # State189 1-SG STEAM GENERATOR AND OPERATING OPERATING AFW Flow, SG Level, and SGAUXILIARY FEED PUMP Pressure Indicators; ManualCONTROLPANEL Control of Main Steam PORVs -Note that valve position indicator and pressure indicator on valvecontrollers are not credited.
Separate Credited SG PressureIndicators Must be used.190 1-SIS SAFETY INJECTION CONTROL OPERATING OPERATING Control Switches, RCS PressurePANEL Indicator, RCS Level Indicator, All Separately Powered191 1-SPY CONTAINMENT SPRAY OPERATING OPERATING Containment Pressure Indicator, CONTROL PANEL RWST Level Recorder192 1-SSR ENGINEER SAFETY SYSTEM OPERATING AVAILABLE Contains 1-CMO-429 AC controlREAR INSTRUMENT/RELAY relay (powered separately)
RACK193 1-SWR NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTAL OPERATING OPERATING Neutron Flux Instrumentation SOURCE RANGEN21INSTRUMENT/RELAY RACK194 1-T11A 4KV BUS T11A SWITCHGEAR ENERGIZED ENERGIZED Power Available in Phase 3 Only,Emergency feed breaker T11A12must be manually tripped195 1-TDAB 250VDC TRAIN 'B' TRANSFER ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CABINET196 1-TDCD 250VDC TRAIN 'A' TRANSFER ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CABINET197 1-TK-11 BORON INJECTION TANK N/A N/A Passive Component 198 1-TK- NORTH BORIC ACID STORAGE N/A N/A Passive Component 12N TANK199 1-TK- PRESSURIZER TRAIN 'B' N/A N/A Passive Component 253-1 PRESSURE RELIEFVALVENRV-152 RESERVECONTROL AIR TANK200 1-TK- PRESSURIZER TRAIN 'A' N/A N/A Passive Component 253-2 PRESSURE RELIEFVALVENRV-153 RESERVECONTROL AIR TANK201 1-TK- PRESSURIZER TRAIN 'B' N/A N/A Passive Component 253-3 PRESSURE RELIEF VLV NRV-152EMERGENCY AIR TANK202 1-TK- PRESSURIZER TRAIN 'A' N/A N/A Passive Component 253-4 PRESSURE RELIEF VLV NRV-153EMERGENCY AIR TANK203 1-TK- PRESSURIZER TRAIN 'B' N/A N/A Passive Component 253-5 PRESSURE RELIEFVALVENRV-152 EMERGENCY AIR TANK SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 64 of 151CNP Unit 1 ESELCNP Equipment Operating StateUnitNormal Notes / CommentsESEL ID Description Desired StateItem # State204 1-TK- PRESSURIZER TRAIN 'A' N/A N/A Passive Component 253-6 PRESSURE RELIEFVALVENRV-153 EMERGENCY AIR TANK205 1-TK- PRESSURIZER TRAIN 'B' N/A N/A Passive Component 253-7 PRESSURE RELIEFVALVENRV-152 EMERGENCY AIR TANK206 1-TK- PRESSURIZER TRAIN 'A' N/A N/A Passive Component 253-8 PRESSURE RELIEFVALVENRV-153 EMERGENCY AIR TANK207 1-TK-32 CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK N/A N/A Passive Component 208 1-TK-37 COMPONENT COOLING N/A N/A Passive Component WATER SURGE TANK209 1-TR11A 600VAC BUS 11A SUPPLY ENERGIZED ENERGIZED Power Available in Phase 3 OnlyTRANSFORMER 210 1-TR- 120/208VAC AUXILIARY ENERGIZED ENERGIZED Regulating Transformer AFWX FEEDWATER DISTRIBUTION PANELAFWX REGULATING TRANSFORMER 211 1-TR- 120/208VAC EMERGENCY ENERGIZED ENERGIZED ELSC LOCAL SHUTDOWNDISTRIBUTIONPANEL ELSCSUPPLY TRANSFORMER 212 1-UDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B1 IGNITION UPPER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B1213 1-UDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B10 IGNITION UPPER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B10214 1-UDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B11 IGNITION UPPER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B131215 1-UDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B12 IGNITION UPPER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B12216 1-UDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B13 IGNITION UPPER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B133217 1-UDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B14 IGNITION UPPER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B14 SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 65 of 151CNP Unit 1 ESELCNP Equipment Operating StateUnit 1 Notes/ CommentsESEL ID. Description Nm Desired StateItem # State218 1-UDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B15 IGNITION UPPER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B15219 1-UDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B16 IGNITION UPPER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#816220 1-UDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B17 IGNITION UPPER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B17221 1-UDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B18 IGNITION UPPER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B18222 1-UDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B2 IGNITION UPPER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#82223 1-UDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B3 IGNITION UPPER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#83224 1-UDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B4 IGNITION UPPER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#84225 1-UDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B5 IGNITION UPPER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#85226 1-UDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B6 IGNITION UPPER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#86227 1-UDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B7 IGNITION UPPER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#87228 1-UDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B8 IGNITION UPPER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B8229 1-UDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B9 IGNITION UPPER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#89 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 66 of 151CNP Unit I ESELCNP Equipment Operating StateUnit 1 Notes/ CommentsESEL ID Description Normal Desired StateItem # State230 1-VR- LOWER CONTAINMENT TRAIN NOT USED OPERATING LDISB-4 B DISTRIBUTED IGNITIONSYSTEM VOLTAGEREGULATOR 231 1-VR- UPPER CONTAINMENT TRAIN NOT USED OPERATING UDISB-3 B DISTRIBUTED IGNITIONSYSTEM VOLTAGEREGULATOR 232 1-VS VENTILATION CONTROL OPERATING AVAILABLE Hand Switches poweredPANEL separately 233 1-WMO- WEST CONTAINMENT SPRAY OPEN CLOSED Local Manual Operation at the715 HEAT EXCHANGER 1-HE-18W operator hand wheel is creditedESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER for FLEX ResponseINLET SHUTOFF VALVE234 1-WMO- ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER CLOSED OPEN Local Manual Operation at the753 TO TURBINE DRIVEN operator hand wheel is creditedAUXILIARY FEED PUMP PP-4 for FLEX ResponseSHUTOFF VALVE235 1-WRV- WEST ESW PUMP PP-7W OPEN/ CLOSED Valve Fails Closed on Loss of762 DISCH STN EAST BASKET BAN CLOSED Air (Its Desired FLEX Position)
OUT SHUTOFF VALVE236 1-WRV- W ESW PUMP PP-7W DISCH OPEN/ CLOSED Valve Fails Closed on Loss of767 STN EAST BASKET BAN INLET CLOSED Air (Its Desired FLEX Position)
SHUTOFF VALVE237 1-WRV- W ESW PUMP PP-7W DISCH OPEN/ CLOSED Valve Fails Closed on Loss of772 STN WEST BASKET B/W CLOSED Air (Its Desired FLEX Position)
OUTLET SHUTOFF VALVE238 1-WRV- W ESW PUMP PP-7W DISCH OPEN/ CLOSED Valve Fails Closed on Loss of777 STN WEST BASKET BAN INLET CLOSED Air (Its Desired FLEX Position)
SHUTOFF VALVE239 1-XRV- BACKUP AIR TO NRV-152 NOT USED REGULATING 152 PRESSURE REGULATOR
_ __1240 1-XRV- BACKUP AIR TO NRV-153 NOT USED REGULATING 153 PRESSURE REGULATOR SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 67 of 151Attachment B -CNP Unit 2 ESEL SAiExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 68 of 151CNP Unit 2 ESELCNP Equipment Operating StateUnitNormal Notes/ CommentsESEL ID Description Desired StateItem # State1 12-TK- AB EMERGENCY DIESEL FUEL N/A N/A Passive Component 47-AB OIL STORAGE TANK2 2-152- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN ENERGIZED ENERGIZED LDISB IGNITION LOWER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLIES BACKUP SUPPLYBREAKER3 2-152- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN ENERGIZED ENERGIZED UDISB IGNITION UPPER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLIES BACKUP SUPPLYBREAKER4 2-21A 600V BUS 21A SWITCHGEAR ENERGIZED ENERGIZED Power Available in Phase 3 Only5 2-21B 600V BUS 21B SWITCHGEAR ENERGIZED ENERGIZED 6 2-21C 600V BUS 21C SWITCHGEAR ENERGIZED ENERGIZED Power Available in Phase 3 Only,11C1 Breaker must be manuallytripped7 2-21D 600V BUS 21D SWITCHGEAR ENERGIZED ENERGIZED 8 2-2A 4KV BUS 2A SWITCHGEAR ENERGIZED ENERGIZED Power Available in Phase 3 Only9 2 CNTMT HYDROGEN IGNITION ENERGIZED ENERGIZED LDISB LOWER VOLUMN TRAIN'B'GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLIES STARTER COMBO-LDISB CKTBRK10 2 CNTMT HYDROGEN IGNITION ENERGIZED ENERGIZED UDISB UPPER VOLUME TRAIN'B'GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLIES STARTER COMBO-UDISB CKTBRK11 2-88X- CNTMT HYDROGEN IGNITION NOT USED ENERGIZED LDISB LOWER VOLUME TRAIN'B'GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLIES STARTER COMBO-LDISB STARCNTR12 2-88X- CNTMT HYDROGEN IGNITION NOT USED ENERGIZED UDISB UPPER VOLUME TRAIN'B'GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLIES STARTER COMBO-UDISB CONTACTOR 13 2 PLANT BATTERY BATT-AB ENERGIZED ENERGIZED ABBC DISCONNECT SWITCH14 2 PLANT BATTERY BATT-CD ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CDBC DISCONNECT SWITCH15 2-AB-A 600VAC MOTOR CONTROL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED Power Available in Phase 3 OnlyCENTER AB-A16 2-AB-D 600VAC MOTOR CONTROL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CENTER AB-D I SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 69 of 151CNP Unit 2 ESELCNP Equipment Operating StateUnit 2Normal Notes / CommentsESEL ID Description Desired StateItem # State17 2-ABD-8 600VAC MOTOR CONTROL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CENTER ABD-B18 2-ABD-D 600VAC MOTOR CONTROL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CENTER ABD-D19 2-ABV-A 600VAC VALVE CONTROL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CENTER ABV-A20 2-AFWX 120/208VAC AUXILIARY OPERATING OPERATING RCS Level, RWST LevelFEEDWATER DISTRIBUTION PANEL21 2-AM-A 600VAC MOTOR CONTROL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED Power Available in Phase 3 OnlyCENTER AM-A22 2-AZV-A 600VAC VALVE CONTROL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED Power Available in Phase 3 OnlyCENTER AZV-A23 2-BA BORIC ACID CHARGING AND OPERATING OPERATING BAST Level, BAST Temperature, LETDOWN CONTROL PANEL RCS Injection Flow24 2-BATT- PLANT BATTERY AB ENERGIZED ENERGIZED AB25 2-BATT- PLANT BATTERY BATT-AB ENERGIZED ENERGIZED AB-SH AMMETER SHUNT26 2-BATT- PLANT BATTERY CD ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CD27 2-BATT- PLANT BATTERY BATT-CD ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CD-SH AMMETER SHUNT28 2-BC- PLANT BATTERY BATT-AB ENERGIZED ENERGIZED AB2 CHARGER #229 2-BC- PLANT BATTERY BATT-CD ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CD1 BATTERY CHARGER #130 2-BCTC- PLANT BATTERY CHARGERS ENERGIZED ENERGIZED AB BC-AB1 AND BC-AB2TRANSFER PANEL31 2-BCTC- PLANT BATTERY CHARGERS ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CD BC-CD1 AND BC-CD2TRANSFER PANEL32 2-BLI- STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-1 OPERATING OPERATING SG Level Transmitter 110 WIDE RANGE LEVELINDICATOR TRANSMITTER 33 2-BLI- STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-2 OPERATING OPERATING SG Level Transmitter 120 WIDE RANGE LEVELINDICATOR TRANSMITTER 34 2-BLI- STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-3 OPERATING OPERATING SG Level Transmitter 130 WIDE RANGE LEVELINDICATOR TRANSMITTER 35 2-BLI- STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-4 OPERATING OPERATING SG Level Transmitter 140 WIDE RANGE LEVELINDICATOR TRANSMITTER Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 70 of 151CNP Unit 2 ESELCNP Equipment Operating StateUnit 2ESEL ID Description Normal Desired State Notes CommentsItem # State36 2-CCV- 250VDC TRAIN 'B' CRITICAL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED AB SOLENOID VALVESDISTRIBUTION PANEL37 2-CCV- 250VDC TRAIN 'A' CRITICAL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CD SOLENOID VALVESDISTRIBUTION PANEL38 2-CCW COMPONENT COOLING WATER OPERATING AVAILABLE Hand Switches poweredCONTROL PANEL separately 39 2-CG1- REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING SG Level, RCS Injection Flow14 CONTROL GROUP #1 CABINET#1440 2-CG1- REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING BAST Level Instrumentation 15 CONTROL GROUP #1 CABINET#1541 2-CG2- REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING RCS Injection Flow17 CONTROL GROUP #2 CABINET#1742 2-CG2- REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING RCS Injection Flow19 CONTROL GROUP #2 CABINET Instrumentation
#1943 2-CG3- REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING RCS Injection Flow20 CONTROL GROUP #3 CABINET#2044 2-CG3- REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING Containment
: Pressure, RWST21 CONTROL GROUP #3 CABINET Level, BAST Level, RCS#21 Injection Flow45 2-CG4- REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING RCS Injection Flow22 CONTROL GROUP #4 CABINET#2246 2-CG4- REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING SG Level23 CONTROL GROUP #4 CABINET#2347 2-CLI- CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK OPERATING OPERATING CST Level Transmitter 114 TK-32 LEVEL INDICATOR TRANSMITTER 48 2-CMO- COMPONENT COOLING WATER OPEN CLOSED Local Manual Operation at the413 PUMPS SUCTION CROSS TIE operator hand wheel is creditedTRAIN 'B' SHUTOFF VALVE for FLEX Response49 2-CMO- COMPONENT COOLING WATER OPEN CLOSED Local Manual Operation at the414 PUMPS DISCHARGE CROSS operator hand wheel is creditedTIE TRAIN 'B' SHUTOFF VALVE for FLEX Response50 2-CMO- COMPONENT COOLING WATER OPEN CLOSED Local Manual Operation at the416 TO MISCELLANEOUS SERVICE operator hand wheel is creditedTRAIN 'B' SHUTOFF VALVE for FLEX Response51 2-CMO- WEST RESIDUAL HEAT CLOSED OPEN Power Available in Phase 3 Only429 REMOVAL HEAT EXCHANGER COMPONENT COOLING WATEROUTLET SHUTOFF VALVE ISAlExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 71 of 151CNP Unit 2 ESELCNP Equipment Operating StateUnit 2Unita2 Notes / CommentsESEL ID Description Normal Desired StateItem # State52 2-CP CONDENSATE PUMP CONTROL OPERATING OPERATING CST Level Indicator, Separately PANEL Powered53 2-CRID-1 120VAC CONTROL ROOM ENERGIZED ENERGIZED INSTRUMENT DISTRIBUTION CHANNEL I DISTRIBUTION PANEL54 2-CRID- 120VAC CONTROL ROOM ENERGIZED ENERGIZED 1-INV INSTRUMENT DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM >55 2-CRID-2 120VAC CONTROL ROOM ENERGIZED ENERGIZED INSTRUMENT DISTRIBUTION CHANNEL II DISTRIBUTION PANEL56 2-CRID- 120VAC CONTROL ROOM ENERGIZED ENERGIZED 2-INV INSTRUMENT DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM >57 2-CRID-3 120VAC CONTROL ROOM ENERGIZED ENERGIZED INSTRUMENT DISTRIBUTION CHANNEL III DISTRIBUTION PANEL58 2-CRID- 120VAC CONTROL ROOM ENERGIZED ENERGIZED 3-INV INSTRUMENTATION DISTRIBUTION
>59 2-CRID-4 120VAC CONTROL ROOM ENERGIZED ENERGIZED INSTRUMENT DISTRIBUTION CHANNEL IV DISTRIBUTION PANEL60 2-CRID- 120VAC CONTROL ROOM ENERGIZED ENERGIZED 4-INV INSTRUMENT DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM >61 2-DTU DELTA 'T' AND UNIT CONTROL OPERATING OPERATING RCS Temperature RecorderPANEL62 2-ELSC EMERGENCY LOCAL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED INDICATION SHUTDOWN ANDCOOLDOWN DISTRIBUTION PANEL63 2-EZC-B 600VAC MOTOR CONTROL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CENTER EZC-B64 2-EZC-C 600VAC MOTOR CONTROL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED Power Available in Phase 3 OnlyCENTER EZC-C65 2-EZC-D 600VAC MOTOR CONTROL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CENTER EZC-D66 2-FFI- AUXILIARY FEEDWATER TO OPERATING OPERATING AFW Flow Transmitter 210 STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-1FLOW INDICATOR TRANSMITTER SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 72 of 151CNP Unit 2 ESELCNP Equipment Operating StateUnit 2 Normal Notes / CommentsESEL ID Description Desired StateItem # State67 2-FFI- AUX FEEDWATER TO SG OME- OPERATING OPERATING AFW Flow Transmitter 220 3-2 FLOW INDICATOR TRANSMITTER 68 2-FFI- AUXILIARY FEEDWATER TO OPERATING OPERATING AFW Flow Transmitter 230 STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-3FLOW INDICATOR TRANSMITTER 69 2-FFI- AUXILIARY FEEDWATER TO OPERATING OPERATING AFW Flow Transmitter 240 STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-4FLOW INDICATOR TRANSMITTER 70 2-FI FIXED INCORE CONTROL OPERATING OPERATING Core Exit Temperature RecorderPANEL71 2-FICT-A REACTOR CORE OPERATING OPERATING Core Exit Temperature THERMOCOUPLE TRAIN 'A'TRANSMITTER CABINET72 2-FLX FLUX CONTROL PANEL OPERATING OPERATING Neutron Flux Indicator, Separately Powered73 2-FMO- TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY THROTTLED THROTTLED Throttle position will be adjusted211 FEED PUMP PP-4 during FLEX using the localDISCHARGETO STEAM manual operator hand wheelGENERATOR OME-3-1CONTROL VALVE74 2-FMO- TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY THROTTLED THROTTLED Throttle position will be adjusted221 FEED PUMP PP-4 during FLEX using the localDISCHARGETO STEAM manual operator hand wheelGENERATOR OME-3-2CONTROL VALVE75 2-FMO- TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY THROTTLED THROTTLED Throttle position will be adjusted231 FEED PUMP SUPPLY TO during FLEX using the localSTEAM GENERATOR OME-3-3 manual operator hand wheelCONTROL VALVE76 2-FMO- TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY THROTTLED THROTTLED Throttle position will be adjusted241 FEED PUMP SUPPLY TO during FLEX using the localSTEAM GENERATOR OME-3-4 manual operator hand wheelCONTROL VALVE77 2-HE- WEST COMPONENT COOLING N/A N/A Passive Component 15W WATER HEAT EXCHANGER 78 2-HE- WEST RESIDUAL HEAT N/A N/A Passive Component 17W REMOVAL HEAT EXCHANGER 79 2-HSD2 UNIT 2 HOT SHUTDOWN PANEL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED 80 2-HV- CONTROL ROOM AIR AS NEEDED OPERATING Power Available in Phase 3 OnlyACR-2 CONDITIONING SOUTH LIQUIDCHILLER81 2-HV- CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION AS NEEDED OPERATING Power Available in Phase 3 OnlyACRA-2 SOUTH AIR CONDITIONING UNIT SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 73 of 151CNP Unit 2 ESELCNP Equipment Operating StateUnit 2ESEL D Normal Notes / CommentsESEL ID Description Desired StateItem # State82 2-HV- OUTSIDE AIR TO CONTROL AS NEEDED OPERATING Power Available in Phase 3 OnlyACR-DA- ROOM PRESSURIZATION/
2 CLEANUP FILTER UNIT HV-ACRF VENT DAMPER #283 2-HV- CONTROL ROOM N/A N/A Passive Component ACRF PRESSURIZATION/CLEANUP FILTER UNIT84 2-HV- CONTROL ROOM AS NEEDED OPERATING Power Available in Phase 3 OnlyACRF-2 PRESSURIZATION/CLEANUP FILTER UNITVENT FAN #285 2-HV- CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION AS NEEDED OPERATING Power Available in Phase 3 OnlyACR-H2 SOUTH DUCT ELECTRICHEATER86 2-HV- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN AS NEEDED OPERATING Power Available in Phase 3 OnlyCEQ-2 SKIMMER VENTILATION FAN #287 2-HV- AB BATTERY EQUIPMENT AS NEEDED OPERATING Battery Room AB Ventilation, SGRX-5 AREA BATTERY ROOM Controlled LocallyVENTILATION EXHAUST FAN88 2-HV- CD BATTERY EQUIPMENT AS NEEDED OPERATING Battery Room CD Ventilation, SGRX-6 AREA BATTERY ROOM Controlled LocallyVENTILATION EXHAUST FAN89 2-iCM- RHR TO REACTOR COOLANT CLOSED OPEN Power Available in Phase 3 Only111 LOOPS #2 & #3 COLDLEGSCONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE90 2-1CM- REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #2 CLOSED OPEN Needs closure of PB 403AX129 HOT LEG TO RESIDUAL HEAT relay permissive, PowerREMOVAL PUMPS SUCTION Available in Phase 3 OnlyCONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE91 2-iCM- BORON INJECTION TANK CLOSED OPEN Power Available in Phase 3 Only251 TRAIN 'B' OUTLETCONTAINMENT
>92 2-1CM- WEST RHR TO REACTOR OPEN CLOSED Local Manual Operation at the321 COOLANT LOOPS #2 AND #3 operator hand wheel is creditedCOLDLEGS CONTAINMENT for FLEX ResponseISOLATION VALVE93 2-IFI-51 BORON INJECTION TO OPERATING OPERATING RCS Injection Flow Transmitter REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #1FLOW INDICATOR TRANSMITTER 94 2-IFI-52 BORON INJECTION TO OPERATING OPERATING RCS Injection Flow Transmitter REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #2FLOWINDICATOR TRANSMITTER 95 2-IFI-53 BORON INJECTION TO OPERATING OPERATING RCS Injection Flow Transmitter REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #3FLOW INDICATOR TRANSMITTER PSAiExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 74 of 151CNP Unit 2 ESELCNP Equipment Operating StateUnit 2...Normal Notes / CommentsESEL ID Description Desired StateItem # State96 2-1FI-54 BORON INJECTION TO OPERATING OPERATING RCS Injection Flow Transmitter REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #4FLOW INDICATOR TRANSMITTER 97 2-IMO- REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #2 CLOSED OPEN Needs closure of PB 405AX128 HOT LEG TO RESIDUAL HEAT relay permissive REMOVAL PUMPS SUCTIONSHUTOFF VALVE98 2-IMO- BORON INJECTION TANK CLOSED OPEN Power Available in Phase 3 Only256 TRAIN 'B' INLET SHUTOFFVALVE99 2-IMO- EAST RESIDUAL HEAT OPEN CLOSED Local manual operation with the310 REMOVAL PUMP PP-35E operator hand wheel is creditedSUCTION SHUTOFF VALVE for FLEX Response100 2-IMO- WEST RHR HX 2-HE-17W CLOSED OPEN Local manual operation with the324 DISCHARGE CROSSTIE operator hand wheel is creditedSHUTOFF VALVE for FLEX Response101 2-LDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B10 IGNITION LOWER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B10102 2-LDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B11 IGNITION LOWER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B131103 2-LDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B12 IGNITION LOWER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B12104 2-LDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B18 IGNITION LOWER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B18105 2-LDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B19 IGNITION LOWER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B19106 2-LDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B20 IGNITION LOWER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B20107 2-LDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B21 IGNITION LOWER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B21108 2-LDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B22 IGNITION LOWER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B22 SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic* 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 75 of 151CNP Unit 2 ESELCNP Equipment Operating StateUnit 2SNormal Notes / CommentsESEL ID Description Desired StateItem # State109 2-LDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B23 IGNITION LOWER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B23110 2-LDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B24 IGNITION LOWER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B24111 2-LDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B25 IGNITION LOWER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B25112 2-LDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B26 IGNITION LOWER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B26113 2-LDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B27 IGNITION LOWER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B27114 2-LDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B28 IGNITION LOWER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B28115 2-LDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B35 IGNITION LOWER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B35116 2-LDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B8 IGNITION LOWER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' IGNITER ASSEMBLY#B8117 2-LDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B9 IGNITION LOWER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B9118 2-LSI-1 STEAM GENERATORS
#1 AND NON- REMOTE SG Level Transmitter Transfer#4 LOCAL SHUTDOWN OPERATING Relay, power N/A as de-STATION (REMOTE) energized is desired relay state119 2-LSI-2 STEAM GENERATORS
#2 AND NON- REMOTE SG Level Transmitter Transfer#3 LOCAL SHUTDOWN OPERATING Relay, power N/A as de-STATION (REMOTE) energized is desired relay state120 2-LSI-3 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM NON- REMOTE NPS-122 RCS PressureCHARGING AND LETDOWN OPERATING Transmitter Transfer Relay,LOCAL SHUTDOWN STATION (REMOTE) power N/A as de-energized isdesired relay state121 2-MCAB 250VDC DISTRIBUTION PANEL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED I__ _MCAB SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 76 of 151CNP Unit 2 ESELCNP Equipment Operating StateUnit 2Normal :Notes / CommentsESEL ID Description Desired StateItem # State122 2-MCCD 250VDC DISTRIBUTION POWER OPERATING OPERATING Various Instruments PANEL123 2-MDAB 250VDC DISTRIBUTION PANEL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED MDAB124 2-MDCD 250VDC DISTRIBUTION PANEL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED MDCD125 2-MPP- STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-1 OPERATING OPERATING SG Pressure Transmitter 210 CHANNEL I STEAM PRESSURETRANSMITTER 126 2-MPP- STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-2 OPERATING OPERATING SG Pressure Transmitter 220 CHANNEL I STEAM PRESSURETRANSMITTER 127 2-MPP- STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-3 OPERATING OPERATING SG Pressure Transmitter 230 CHANNEL I STEAM PRESSURETRANSMITTER 128 2-MPP- STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-4 OPERATING OPERATING SG Pressure Transmitter 240 CHANNEL I STEAM PRESSURETRANSMITTER 129 2-MRV- STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-1 CLOSED OPEN Fail Closed, Local manual213 POWER OPERATED RELIEF operation with the operator handVALVE wheel is credited for FLEXResponse to throttle the valve130 2-MRV- STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-2 CLOSED OPEN Fail Closed, Local manual223 POWER OPERATED RELIEF operation with the operator handVALVE wheel is credited for FLEXResponse to throttle the valve131 2-MRV- STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-3 CLOSED OPEN Fail Closed, Local manual233 POWER OPERATED RELIEF operation with the operator handVALVE wheel is credited for FLEXResponse to throttle the valve132 2-MRV- STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-4 CLOSED OPEN Fail Closed, Local manual243 POWER OPERATED RELIEF operation with the operator handVALVE wheel is credited for FLEXResponse to throttle the valve133 2-NIS-1 NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION OPERATING OPERATING Neutron Flux Indicator, SYSTEM PROTECTION Separately PoweredCHANNEL I CONTROL PANEL134 2-NLP- PRESSURIZER OME-4 OPERATING OPERATING Pressurizer Level Transmitter 151 PROTECTION CHANNEL ILEVEL TRANSMITTER 135 2-NPS- REACTOR VESSEL TRAIN 'A' OPERATING OPERATING RCS Level, RCS Pressure110 WIDE RANGE PRESSURE Transmitter TRANSMITTER 136 2-NPS- REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #2 OPERATING OPERATING Required for valve ICM-1 29121 HOT LEG WIDE RANGE pressure permissive PRESSURE TRANSMITTER POExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 77 of 151CNP Unit 2 ESELCNP Equipment Operating StateUnitNormal Notes / CommentsESEL ID Description Desired StateItem # State137 2-NPS- REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #1 OPERATING OPERATING Required for valve IMO-128122 HOT LEG WIDE RANGE pressure permissive PRESSURE TRANSMITTER 138 2-NRI-21 NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION OPERATING OPERATING Neutron FluxCHANNEL I WIDE RANGERADIATION DETECTOR139 2-NRI- NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION OPERATING OPERATING Neutron Flux21-AMP WIDE RANGE RADIATION AMPLIFIER 140 2-NRV- PRESSURIZER TRAIN 'B' CLOSED OPEN Fail Closed152 PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE141 2-NRV- PRESSURIZER OME-4 TRAIN'A' CLOSED OPEN Fail Closed153 PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE142 2-NTQ- RVLIS TRAIN 'A UPPER TAP OPERATING OPERATING RCS Level Transmitter 110A TEMPERATURE COMPENSATION COMPUTERINPUT THERMAL SENSOR 'A'143 2-NTQ- RVLIS TRAIN 'A' UPPER TAP OPERATING OPERATING RCS Level Transmitter 110B TEMPERATURE COMPENSATION COMPUTERINPUT THERMAL SENSOR 'B'144 2-NTQ- RVLIS TRAIN 'A' CONDUIT OPERATING OPERATING RCS Level Transmitter 130A TEMPERATURE COMPENSATION COMPUTERINPUT THERMAL SENSOR 'A'145 2-NTQ- RVLIS TRAIN 'A' CONDUIT OPERATING OPERATING RCS Level Transmitter 130C TEMPERATURE COMPENSATION COMPUTERINPUT SPARE THERMALSENSOR 'C'146 2-NTR- REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #1 OPERATING OPERATING RCS Temperature Transmitter 110 HOT LEG WIDE RANGETEMPERATURE RECORDERTHERMAL SENSOR147 2-NTR- REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #3 OPERATING OPERATING RCS Temperature Transmitter, 130 HOT LEG WIDE RANGE also used for RCS Level (RVLIS)TEMPERATURE RECORDERTHERMAL SENSOR148 2-NTR- REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #1 OPERATING OPERATING RCS Temperature Transmitter 210 COLD LEG WIDE RANGETEMPERATURE RECORDERTHERMAL SENSOR149 2-NTR- REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #3 OPERATING OPERATING RCS Temperature Transmitter 230 COLD LEG WIDE RANGETEMPERATURE RECORDERTHERMAL SENSOR150 2-OME- TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY N/A N/A Passive Component 33 FEED PUMP PP-4 SUCTION > _
SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 78 of 151CNP Unit 2 ESELCNP Equipment Operating StateUnit 22Normal Notes / CommentsESEL ID Description Desired StateItem # State151 2-OME- WEST ESSENTIAL SERVICE OPERATING OPERATING Passive component when used34W WATER PUMP PP-7W DISCH in FLEX responseSTN152 2-OME- ACCUMULATOR TANK #1 N/A N/A Passive Component 6-1153 2-OME- ACCUMULATOR TANK #2 N/A N/A Passive Component 6-2154 2-OME- ACCUMULATOR TANK #3 N/A N/A Passive Component 6-3155 2-OME- ACCUMULATOR TANK #4 N/A N/A Passive Component 6-4156 2-PP- WEST COMPONENT COOLING N/A N/A Power Available in Phase 3 OnlyloW WATER PUMP157 2-PP- WEST RESIDUAL HEAT N/A N/A Power Available in Phase 3 Only35W REMOVAL PUMP158 2-PP-4 TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY STOP RUN Via ROB Turbine 1-OME-39FEED PUMP159 2-PP BORIC ACID STORAGE TANKS NOT USED OPERATING Pump used for Boration Phase 34 TRANSFER PUMP #4 after NSRC Generators installed 160 2-PP- CONTROL ROOM AIR AS NEEDED OPERATING Power Available in Phase 3 Only82S CONDITIONING SOUTH CHILLWATERCIRCULATION PUMP161 2-PPA- UPPER CONTAINMENT OPERATING OPERATING Containment Pressure310 CHANNEL III WIDE RANGE Transmitter PRESSURE ALARMTRANSMITTER 162 2-PRZ PRESSURIZER CONTROL OPERATING OPERATING Pressurizer level Indicator andPANEL Control for Pressurizer ReliefValves163 2-QLA- SOUTH BORIC ACID STORAGE OPERATING OPERATING BAST Level Transmitter 430 TANK TK-12S LEVEL ALARMTRANSMITTER 164 2-QRV- CVCS CHARGING TO OPEN CLOSED Fails to desired position on loss200 REGENERATIVE HEAT of instrument airEXCHANGER FLOWCONTROL VALVE165 2-QT-506 TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY CLOSED OPEN Local Manual Operation at theFEED PUMP PP-4 TRIP AND operator hand wheel/mechanical THROTTLE VALVE trip reset is credited for FLEXResponse166 2-QT-507 AUXILIARY FEED PUMP CLOSED OPERATING Control via 1-QT-507-KR TURBINE GOVERNOR VALVE governor (ROB)167 2-QTC- SOUTH BAST TK-12S TRAIN 'A' OPERATING OPERATING BAST Temperature Transmitter 430 HTR TEMP CONTROLLER 168 2-RHR RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL OPERATING AVAILABLE Hand Switches poweredCONTROL PANEL separately 169 2-RPC REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING AFW Flow, Pressurizer level,1 CHANNEL I CABINET #1 1 1 Pressurizer Relief Valve Control SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 79 of 151CNP Unit 2 ESELCNP Equipment Operating StateUnit 2Normal Notes/Comments ESEL ID Description Desired StateItem # State170 2-RPC REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING AFW Flow2 CHANNEL I CABINET #2171 2-RPC REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING SG Pressure3 CHANNEL I CABINET #3172 2-RPC REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING SG Pressure4 CHANNEL I CABINET #4173 2-RPC REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING RWST Level, RCS Pressure5 CHANNEL II CABINET #5 Permissive, Pressurizer ReliefValve Control174 2-RPC REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING AFW Flow, RCS Temperature, 6 CHANNEL II CABINET #6 RWST Level175 2-RPC REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING RCS Temperature 7 CHANNEL II CABINET #7176 2-RPC REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING RCS Pressure, RCS Level8 CHANNEL II CABINET #8177 2-RPC REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING CST Level10 CHANNEL III CABINET #10178 2-RPC REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING AFW Flow, CST Level, RCS9 CHANNEL III CABINET #9 Temperature, RCS PressurePermissive, Pressurizer ReliefValve Control179 2-RPC REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING AFW Flow, Pressurizer Relief12 CHANNEL IV CABINET #12 Valve Control180 2-RPS-A REACTOR PROTECTION AND OPERATING OPERATING Contains portion of permissive SAFEGUARD ACTUATIONTRAIN circuit for ICM-1 29'A' CABINET181 2-RPS-B REACTOR PROTECTION AND OPERATING OPERATING Contains portion of permissive SAFEGUARD ACTUATION circuit for IMO-128TRAIN 'B' CABINET182 2-RPSX- REACTOR PROTECTION AND OPERATING OPERATING Contains PB 403AX relayA SAFEGUARD ACTUATIONTRAIN permissive
'A' AUXILIARY CABINET183 2-RPSX- REACTOR PROTECTION AND OPERATING OPERATING Contains PB 405AX relayB SAFEGUARD ACTUATIONTRAIN permissive
'B' AUXILIARY CABINET184 2-RVLC REACTOR VESSEL OME-1 OPERATING OPERATING RCS LevelWATER LEVELINSTRUMENTATION CABINET185 2-SA STATION AUXILIARIES OPERATING AVAILABLE Hand Switches poweredCONTROL PANEL separately 186 2-SG STEAM GENERATOR AND OPERATING OPERATING AFW Flow, SG Level, and SGAUXILIARY FEED PUMP Pressure Indicators; ManualCONTROL PANEL Control of Main Steam PORVs -Note that valve position indicator and pressure indicator on valvecontrollers are not credited.
Separate Credited SG PressureIndicators Must be used.
SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 80 of 151CNP Unit 2 ESELCNP Equipment Operating StateUnit 22Normal Notes / CommentsESEL ID Description Desired StateItem # State187 2-SIS SAFETY INJECTION CONTROL OPERATING OPERATING Control Switches, RCS PressurePANEL Indicator, RCS Level Indicator, All Separately Powered188 2-SPY CONTAINMENT SPRAY OPERATING OPERATING Containment Pressure Indicator, CONTROL PANEL RWST Level Recorder189 2-SSR ENGINEER SAFETY SYSTEM OPERATING AVAILABLE Contains 2-CMO-429 AC controlREAR INSTRUMENT/RELAY relay (powered separately)
RACK190 2-SWR NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTAL OPERATING OPERATING Neutron Flux Instrumentation SOURCE RANGEN21INSTRUMENT/RELAY RACK191 2-T21A 4KV BUS T21A SWITCHGEAR ENERGIZED ENERGIZED Power Available in Phase 3 Only,Emergency feed breaker T21A12must be manually tripped192 2-TDAB 250VDC TRAIN 'B' TRANSFER ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CABINET193 2-TDCD 250VDC TRAIN 'A' TRANSFER ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CABINET194 2-TK-11 BORON INJECTION TANK N/A N/A Passive Component 195 2-TK-12S SOUTH BORIC ACID STORAGE N/A N/A Passive Component TAN K196 2-TK- PRESSURIZER TRAIN 'A' N/A N/A Passive Component 253-1 PRESSURE RELIEF VALVENRV-153 RESERVE CONTROLAIR TANK197 2-TK- PRESSURIZER TRAIN 'B' N/A N/A Passive Component 253-2 PRESSURE RELIEF VALVENRV-152 RESERVE CONTROLAIR TANK198 2-TK- PRESSURIZER TRAIN 'B' N/A N/A Passive Component 253-3 PRESSURE RELIEF VLV NRV-152 EMERGENCY AIR TANK199 2-TK- PRESSURIZER TRAIN 'A' N/A N/A Passive Component 253-4 PRESSURE RELIEF VLV NRV-153 EMERGENCY AIR TANK200 2-TK- PRESSURIZER TRAIN 'B' N/A N/A Passive Component 253-5 PRESSURE RELIEF VALVENRV-152 EMERGENCY AIRTANK201 2-TK- PRESSURIZER TRAIN 'A' N/A N/A Passive Component 253-6 PRESSURE RELIEF VALVENRV-153 EMERGENCY AIRTANK202 2-TK- PRESSURIZER TRAIN 'B' N/A N/A Passive Component 253-7 PRESSURE RELIEF VALVENRV-152 EMERGENCY AIRTAN K
*SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 81 of 151CNP Unit 2 ESELCNP Equipment Operating StateUnit 2 " Normal Notes/ CommentsESEL ID Description Desired StateItem # State203 2-TK- PRESSURIZER TRAIN 'A' N/A N/A Passive Component 253-8 PRESSURE RELIEF VALVENRV-153 EMERGENCY AIRTANK204 2-TK-32 CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK N/A N/A Passive Component 205 2-TK-37 COMPONENT COOLING WATER N/A N/A Passive Component SURGE TANK206 2-TR21A 600V BUS 21A SUPPLY ENERGIZED ENERGIZED Power Available in Phase 3 OnlyTRANSFORMER 207 2-TR- 120/208VAC AUXILIARY ENERGIZED ENERGIZED Regulating Transformer AFWX FEEDWATER DISTRIBUTION PANEL AFWX REGULATING TRANSFORMER 208 2-TR- 120/208VAC EMERGENCY ENERGIZED ENERGIZED ELSC LOCAL SHUTDOWNDISTRIBUTION POWERTRANSFORMER 209 2-UDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B1 IGNITION UPPER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B1210 2-UDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B13 IGNITION UPPER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B13211 2-UDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B14 IGNITION UPPER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B14212 2-UDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B15 IGNITION UPPER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B15213 2-UDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B16 IGNITION UPPER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B16214 2-UDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B17 IGNITION UPPER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B17215 2-UDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B2 IGNITION UPPER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B2216 2-UDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B29 IGNITION UPPER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B29 0Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 82 of 151CNP Unit 2 ESELCNP Equipment Operating StateUnit 2Normal Notes /.Comments ESEL ID Description Desired StateItem # State217 2-UDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B3 IGNITION UPPER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B3218 2-UDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B30 IGNITION UPPER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B30219 2-UDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B31 IGNITION UPPER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B31,220 2-UDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B32 IGNITION UPPER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B32221 2-UDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B33 IGNITION UPPER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B33222 2-UDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B34 IGNITION UPPER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B34223 2-UDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B4 IGNITION UPPER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B4224 2-UDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B5 IGNITION UPPER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B5225 2-UDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B6 IGNITION UPPER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B6226 2-UDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B7 IGNITION UPPER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B7227 2-VR- LOWER CONTAINMENT TRAIN NOT USED OPERATING LDISB-4 B DISTRIBUTED IGNITIONSYSTEM VOLTAGEREGULATOR 228 2-VR- UPPER CONTAINMENT TRAIN B NOT USED OPERATING UDISB-3 DISTRIBUTED IGNITIONSYSTEM VOLTAGEREGULATOR 10Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 83 of 151CNP Unit 2 ESELCNP Equipment Operating StateUnitNormal Notes / CommentsESEL ID Description Nral Desired StateItem # State229 2-VS VENTILATION CONTROL PANEL OPERATING AVAILABLE Hand Switches poweredseparately 230 2-WMO- WEST CONTAINMENT SPRAY OPEN CLOSED Local Manual Operation at the716 HEAT EXCHANGER ESSENTIAL operator hand wheel is creditedSERVICE WATER INLET for FLEX ResponseSHUTOFF VALVE231 2-WMO- EMERGENCY ESSENTIAL CLOSED OPEN Local Manual Operation at the753 SERVICE WATER SUPPLY TO operator hand wheel is creditedTDAFP PP-4 SHUTOFF VALVE for FLEX Response232 2-WRV- W ESW PUMP PP-7W DISCH OPEN/ CLOSED Valve Fails Closed on Loss of764 STN WEST BASKET BAN OUT CLOSED Air; Its FLEX PositionS/OVALVE233 2-WRV- W ESW PUMP PP-7W DISCH OPEN CLOSED Valve Fails Closed on Loss of769 STN WEST BASKET B/W INL /CLOSED Air; Its FLEX PositionS/O VALVE234 2-WRV- WEST ESW PUMP PP-7W OPEN/ CLOSED Valve Fails Closed on Loss of774 DISCH STN EAST BASKET BAN CLOSED Air; Its FLEX PositionOUT SHUTOFF VALVE235 2-WRV- WEST ESW PUMP PP-7W OPEN/ CLOSED Valve Fails Closed on Loss of779 DISCH STN EAST BASKET BAN CLOSED Air; Its FLEX PositionINLSHUTOFF VALVE236 2-XRV- BACKUP AIR TO NRV-152 NOT USED REGULATING 152 PRESSURE REGULATOR 237 2-XRV- BACKUP AIR TO NRV-153 NOT USED REGULATING 153 PRESSURE REGULATOR POExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 84 of 151Attachment C- CNP Unit I ESEP HCLPF Values and Failure ModeTabulation SAkiExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 85 of 151CNP HCLPFUnit I ID DESCRIPTION Failure (compared NotesESEL Mode (o NotesItem # to RLGM)Meets EPRI NP-6041-SL Table 2.4 caveats.1-11A 600VAC BUS 11A Screened
>RLGM Anchorage screened for RLGM based onSWITCHGEAR scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the switchgear.
Meets EPRI NP-6041-SL Table 2.4 caveats.600VAC BUS 11B Anchorage screened for RLGM based onSWITCHGEAR scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the switchgear.
Meets EPRI NP-6041-SL Table 2.4 caveats.1-11C 600VAC BUS 11C Screened
>RLGM Anchorage screened for RLGM based onSWITCHGEAR scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the switchgear.
Meets EPRI NP-6041-SL Table 2.4 caveats.600VAC BUS 11D Anchorage screened for RLGM based onSWITCHGEAR scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the switchgear.
CONTAINMENT Small panel dimensions of 8" wide, 4" deep,HYDROGEN IGNITION and 14" tall. Mounted to the wall using two1-152-LDISB LOWER VOLUME Screened
>RLGM unistruts (anchored using four 1/2"TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG expansion bolts).ASSEMBLIES BACKUPSUPPLY BREAKERCONTAINMENT Small panel dimensions of 8" wide, 4" deep,HYDROGEN IGNITION and 14" tall. Mounted to the wall using two1-152- UPPER VOLUME TRAIN Screened
>RLGM unistruts (anchored using four 1/2"UDISB 'B' GLOW PLUG expansion bolts).ASSEMBLIES BACKUPSUPPLY BREAKERMeets EPRI NP-6041-SL Table 2.4 caveats.1-1A 4KV BUS 1A Screened
>RLGM Anchorage screened for RLGM based onSWITCHGEAR scaling of an existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for a similar switchgear.
Meets EPRI NP-6041-SL Table 2.4 caveats.Anchorage rugged by inspection, welded toMIDDLE BORIC ACID one of the Boric Acid Storage Tank 12-TK-12M legs. However, the HCLPF for this8 12-QLA-420 12M LEVEL ALARM Interaction 0.227g component is limited by the Boric AcidTRANSMITTER Storage Tank 12-TK-12M.
HCLPF fromRef. 10.2 for the tank is 0.227g < 0.387g(RLGM ZPA).The governing HCLPF capacity according toMIDDLE BORIC ACID S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-005
-"HighSTORAGE TANK Confidence Low Probability of Failure(HCLPF) Calculations for Screened in ESEP Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 PaRe 86 of 151CNP HCLPFUnit 1 ID DESCRIPTION Failure (compared NotesESEL Mode to RLGM)Item #Tanks" (Ref. 10.2) is 0.227g that is less thanthe RLGM of 0.387g.CNTMT HYDROGEN Small panel dimensions of 9" wide, 20" tall,IGNITION LOWER and 6" deep. Equipment mounted on twoVOLUMN TRAIN 'B' horizontal running unistruts spaced at 19".12 1-52-LDISB GLOW PLUG Screened
>RLGM Unistrut anchors are 1/2" expansion boltsASSEMBLIES STARTER spaced at 41" plus an additional two 3/8"COMBO-LDISB CKT bolts located 29". Screened based on theBRK light panel with rugged anchorage.
CNTMT HYDROGEN Small panel dimensions of 9" wide, 20" tall,IGNITION UPPER and 6" deep. Equipment mounted on twoVOLUME TRAIN 'B' horizontal running unistruts spaced at 19".13 1-52-UDISB GLOW PLUG Screened
>RLGM Unistrut anchors are 1/2" expansion boltsASSEMBLIES STARTER spaced at 41" plus an additional two 3/8"COMBO-UDISB CKT bolts located 29". Screened based on theBRK light panel with rugged anchorage.
CNTMT HYDROGEN Small panel dimensions of 9" wide, 20" tall,IGNITION LOWER and 6" deep. Equipment mounted on two1-88X- VOLUME TRAIN 'B' horizontal running unistruts spaced at 19".14 LDISB GLOW PLUG Screened
>RLGM Unistrut anchors are 1/2" expansion boltsASSEMBLIES STARTER spaced at 41" plus an additional two 3/8"COMBO-LDISB STAR bolts located 29". Screened based on theCNTR light panel with rugged anchorage.
CNTMT HYDROGEN Small panel dimensions of 9" wide, 20" tall,IGNITION UPPER and 6" deep. Equipment mounted on two1-88X- VOLUME TRAIN 'B' horizontal running unistruts spaced at 19".15 GLOW PLUG Screened
>RLGM Unistrut anchors are 1/2" expansion boltsASSEMBLIES STARTER spaced at 41" plus an additional two 3/8"COMBO-UDISB bolts located 29". Screened based on theCONTACTOR light panel with rugged anchorage.
Panel dimensions of 48"x24"xl 0".Equipment is bolted to two horizontal unistruts, which are bolted to the wall.Panel meets all IEEE 344-75 testingPLANT BATTERY requirements.
The testing TRS greatly16 1-89-ABBC BATT-AB DISCONNECT Screened
>RLGM exceeds the RRS at the floor level.SWITCH Equipment screens for the 0.8g to 1.2 gscreening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage acceptable for RLGM based onsimilar panels had very high calculated margins for the Design Basis Earthquake.
Panel dimensions of 48"x24"x10".
PLANT BATTERY Equipment is bolted to two horizontal unistruts, which are bolted to the wall.17 1-89-CDBC BATT-CD Screened
>RLGM PaemetalIEE347tsin DISCNNET SWTCHPanel meets all IEEE 344-75 testingDISCONNECT SWITCH requirements.
The testing TRS greatlyexceeds the RRS at the floor level.
?IExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 87 of 151.CNP HCLPFUnit IFalrESEL ID DESCRIPTION Failure (compared NotesESEL Mode (o NotesItem #to RLGM)Item #Equipment screens for the 0.8g to 1.2 gscreening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage acceptable for RLGM based onsimilar panels had very high calculated margins for the Design Basis Earthquake.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI600VAC MOTOR NP-6041-SL.
The 1/4" gap for one anchor18 1-AB-A CONTROL CENTER Screened
>RLGM was judged acceptable.
Anchorage AB-A screened for RLGM based on scaling ofexisting USI A-46 anchorage evaluation forthe MCC.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) 600VAC MOTOR for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI19 1-AB-D CONTROL CENTER Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forAB-D RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the MCC.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) 600VAC MOTOR for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI20 1-ABD-B CONTROL CENTER Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forABD-B RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the MCC.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) 600VAC MOTOR for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI21 1-ABD-D CONTROL CENTER Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forABD-D RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the MCC.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forRLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the MCC. The600VAC VALVE Seismic potentially governing Block Wall interaction 22 1-ABV-A CONTROL CENTER Interaction 0.578g could not be screened for RLGM based onABV-A scaling of existing design basis calculation.
The governing HCLPF capacity for the blockwall according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-004 -"HCLPF Calculations forScreened in ESEP Components" (Ref. 10.1)is 0.578g.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) 120/208VAC AUXILIARY for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI23 1-AFWX FEEDWATER Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forDISTRIBUTION PANEL RLGM based on screening calculation to theI__II RLGM.600VAC MOTOR Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CONTROL CENTER S R for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI PAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 88 of 151CNP HCLPFUnit 1 FailureESEL ID DESCRIPTION Mode (compared NotesItem # to RLGM)AM-A NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forRLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the MCC.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Anchorage could not be600VAC VALVE screened for RLGM based on scaling of25 1-AZV-A CONTROL CENTER Anchorage 0.62g existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation forAZV-A the MCC. The governing HCLPF capacityfor the anchorage according to S&ACalculation 13Q3208-CAL-004
-"HCLPFCalculations for Screened in ESEPComponents" (Ref. 10.1) is 0.62g.BORIC ACID Meets EPRI NP-6041-SL Table 2.4 caveats.CHARGING AND Anchorage screened for RLGM based onLETDOWN CONTROL scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage PANEL evaluation for the Control Board.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Anchorage could not bescreened for RLGM based on scaling of27 1 -BATT-AB PLANT BATTERY AB Anchorage 0.613g existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation forthe Battery Rack. The governing HCLPFcapacity for the anchorage according toS&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-004
-"HCLPF Calculations for Screened in ESEPComponents" (Ref. 10.1) is 0.613g.Small panel bolted directly to wall using twohorizontal unistruts.
Box dimensions of48.5"x40.5"x8.5".
No interactions identified.
1-BATT-AB-PLANT BATTERY Also contains 1-BC-AB-SH.
Equipment 28 SH BATT-AB AMMETER Screened
>RLGM screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8gSHUNT to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL. Anchorage screens to the RLGM inputbased on similar panels yielding significant seismic capacity margins.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI29 1-BATT-CD PLANT BATTERY CD Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forRLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the BatteryRack.PLANT BATTERY Typical of cabinet containing shunts (similar30 1-BATT-CD-BATT-CD AMMETER Screened
>RLGM to 1-BATT-AB-SH).
Cabinet also containsSH SHUNT 1-BC-CD-SH.
Equipment screens (otherS I I Ithan anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g 0Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 89 of 151CNP HCLPFUnit 1 FailureESEL ID DESCRIPTION Mode (compared NotesItem # to RLGM)screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the RLGM inputbased on similar panels yielding significant seismic capacity margins.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI1BCAB2 PLANT BATTERY NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forBATT-AB CHARGER #2 RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the BatteryCharger.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRIPLANT BATTERY NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forBATT-CD CHARGER #1 RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the BatteryCharger.PLANT BATTERY Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CHARGERS BC-AB1 for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI33 1-BCTC-AB AND BC-AB2 Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forTRANSFER PANEL RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the Panel.PLANT BATTERY Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CHARGERS BC-CD1 for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI34 1-BCTC-CD AND BC-CD2 Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forTRANSFER PANEL RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the Panel.STEAM GENERATOR Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
OME-3-1 WIDE RANGE for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI35 1-BLI-110 LEVEL INDICATOR Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forTRANSMITTER RLGM based on existing USI A-46anchorage evaluation for this equipment.
STEAM GENERATOR Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
OME-3-2 WIDE RANGE for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI36 1-BLI-120 LEVEL INDICATOR Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forTRANSMITTER RLGM based on existing USI A-46anchorage evaluation for this equipment.
STEAM GENERATOR Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
OME-3-3 WIDE RANGE for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI37 1-BLM-130 LEVEL INDICATOR Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forTRANSMITTER RLGM based on existing USI A-46anchorage evaluation for this equipment.
STEAM GENERATOR Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
OME-3-4 WIDE RANGE for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI38 1-BLI-140 LEVEL INDICATOR Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forTRANSMITTER RLGM based on existing USI A-46I_ I I I anchorage evaluation for this equipment.
SOLExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 90 of 151CNP HCLPFUnit I ID DESCRIPTION Failure (compared NotesESEL Mode to RLGM)Item #25OVDC TRAIN 'B' Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CRITICAL SOLENOID for the 0,8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI39 1-CCV-AB CALV S Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forDISTRIBUTION PANEL RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for this item.250VDC TRAIN 'A' Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CRITICAL SOLENOID for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI40 1-CCV-CD CALV S Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forDIVST O PRLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-DISTRIBUTION PANEL 46 anchorage evaluation for this item.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRICOMPONENT COOLING NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the41 1-CCW WATER CONTROL Screened
>RLGM RLGM input based on similar panels withinPANEL the control room yielding significant seismiccapacity margins.REACTOR Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
RTEACTIO for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI42 1-CG1-14 CON Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forCONTROL GROUP #1 RLGM based on existing USI A-46CABINET__#14_anchorage evaluation for this equipment.
REACTOR Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRi43 1-CG1-15 CON Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forCONTROL GROUP #1 RLGM based on existing USI A-46anchorage evaluation for this equipment.
REACTOR Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI44 1-CG2-17 CON Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forCONTROL GROUP #2 RLGM based on existing USI A-46anchorage evaluation for this equipment.
REACTOR Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI45 1-CG2-19 CON Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forCONTROL GROUP #2 RLGM based on existing USI A-46CABINET___19_anchorage evaluation for this equipment.
REACTOR Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
RTEACTIO for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI46 1-CG3-20 CON Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forCABINET #20 RLGM based on existing USI A-46anchorage evaluation for this equipment.
REACTOR Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI47 1-CG3-21 CON Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forCONTROL GROUP #3 RLGM based on existing USI A-46CABINT I2 I anchorage evaluation for this equipment.
0Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 91 of 151CNP HCLPFUnit 1 FailureESEL ID DESCRIPTION Mode (compared NotesESEL Mode t LMItem # to RLGM)REACTOR Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI48 1-CG4-22 CONTROL GROUP #4 Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forCABINET #22 RLGM based on existing USI A-46anchorage evaluation for this equipment.
REACTOR Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
RTEACTIO for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI49 1-CG4-23 CONTROL GROUP #4 Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forCABINETR#23 RLGM based on existing USI A-46anchorage evaluation for this equipment.
CONDENSATE Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
STORAGE TANK TK-32 for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI50 1-CLI-114 LEVEL INDICATOR Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forLEEANMICATOR RLGM based on existing USI A-46TRANSMITTER__anchorage evaluation for this equipment.
COMPONENT This valve is within Earthquake Experience COOLING WATER Data Base (Fig. F-26) in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
51 1-CMO-413 PUMPS SUCTION Screened
>RLGM Therefore, valve is screened for 0.8g to 1.2CROSS TIE TRAIN 'B' g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
SHUTOFF VALVECOMPONENT This valve is within Earthquake Experience COOLING WATER Data Base (Fig. F-26) in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
52 1-CMO-414 PUMPS DISCHARGE Screened
>RLGM Therefore, valve is screened for 0.8g to 1.2CROSS TIE TRAIN 'B' g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
SHUTOFF VALVECOMPONENT This valve is within Earthquake Experience COOLING WATER TO Data Base (Fig. F-26) in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
53 1-CMO-416 MISCELLANEOUS Screened
>RLGM Therefore, valve is screened for 0.8g to 1.2SERVICE TRAIN 'B' g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
SHUTOFF VALVEWEST RESIDUAL HEAT This valve is within Earthquake Experience REMOVAL HEAT Data Base (Fig. F-26) in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
EXCHANGER Therefore, valve is screened for 0.8g to 1.2g54 1-CMO-429 COMPONENT Screened
>RLGM screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
COOLING WATEROUTLET SHUTOFFVALVEEquipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRICONDENSATE PUMP NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to theCONTROL PANEL RLGM input based on similar panels withinthe control room yielding significant seismiccapacity margins.120VAC CONTROL Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
ROOM INSTRUMENT for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRIDISTRIBUTION NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forCHANNEL I RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 PaRe 92 of 151CNP HCLPFUnit I FailureNte EnEt ID DESCRIPTION Mode (compared NotesESEL Mode t LMItem #to RLGM)Item #DISTRIBUTION PANEL 46 anchorage evaluation of panel 1-ERR,which governs the capacity of this item.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI120VAC CONTROL NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage could not beROOM screened for RLGM based on scaling of1-CRID INSTRUMENTATION existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.
57 INV DISTRIBUTION Screened
>RLGM The governing HCLPF capacity for theSYSTEM CHANNEL 1 anchorage according to S&A Calculation INVERTER 13Q3208-CAL-004
-"HCLPF Calculations for Screened in ESEP Components" (Ref.10.1) is 0.839g and therefore did not controlscreening.
120VAC CONTROL Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
ROOM INSTRUMENT for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRIROOM NSTRMENTNP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for58 1-CRID-2 DISTRIBUTION Screened
>RLGM RLGM based oncag ofreng UoACHANELIIRLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-CHANNEL IIDISTRIBUTION PANEL 46 anchorage evaluation of panel 1-ERR,which governs the capacity of this item.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI120VAC CONTROL NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage could not beROOM screened for RLGM based on scaling of1-CRID INSTRUMENTATION existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.
59 INV DISTRIBUTION Screened
>RLGM The governing HCLPF capacity for theSYSTEM CHANNEL 2 anchorage according to S&A Calculation INVERTER 13Q3208-CAL-004
-"HCLPF Calculations for Screened in ESEP Components" (Ref.10.1) is 0.839g and therefore did not controlscreening.
120VAC CONTROL Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
ROOM INSTRUMENT for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI60 1-CRID-3 DISTRIBUTION Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forCHANNEL III RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-DISTRIBUTION PANEL 46 anchorage evaluation of panel 1-ERR,which governs the capacity of this item.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI120VAC CONTROL NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage could not beROOM screened for RLGM based on scaling of1-CRID INSTRUMENTATION existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.
61 INV DISTRIBUTION Screened
>RLGM The governing HCLPF capacity for theSYSTEM CHANNEL 3 anchorage according to S&A Calculation INVERTER 13Q3208-CAL-004
-"HCLPF Calculations for Screened in ESEP Components" (Ref.10.1) is 0.839g and therefore did not controlscreening.
P 3Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 93 of 151CNP HCLPFUnit I FailureESEL ID DESCRIPTION Mode (compared NotesItem # to RLGM)120VAC CONTROL Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
ROOM INSTRUMENT for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for62 1-CRID-4 DISTRIBUTION Screened
>RLGM RLGM based oncag ofreng USACHANNL IVRLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-CHANNEL IVDISTRIBUTION PANEL 46 anchorage evaluation of panel 1-ERR,which governs the capacity of this item.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI120VAC CONTROL NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage could not beROOM screened for RLGM based on scaling of1-CRID INSTRUMENTATION existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.
63 INV DISTRIBUTION Screened
>RLGM The governing HCLPF capacity for theSYSTEM CHANNEL 4 anchorage according to S&A Calculation INVERTER 13Q3208-CAL-004
-"HCLPF Calculations for Screened in ESEP Components" (Ref.10.1) is 0.839g and therefore did not controlscreening.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRIDELTA 'T' AND UNIT NP-NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to theCONTROL PANEL RLGM input based on similar panels withinthe control room yielding significant seismiccapacity margins.120/208VAC Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
EMERGENCYLOCAL for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI65 1-ELSC SHUTDOWN Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to theDISTRIBUTION PANEL RLGM input based on similar panels yieldingsignificant seismic capacity margins.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) 600VAC MOTOR for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI66 1-EZC-B CONTROL CENTER Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forEZC-B RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation of this MCC.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) 600VAC MOTOR for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI67 1-EZC-C CONTROL CENTER Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forEZC-C RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation of this MCC.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) 600VAC MOTOR for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI68 1-EZC-D CONTROL CENTER Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forEZC-D RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation of this MCC.AUXILIARY Equipment screens (other than anchorage) 69 1-FFI-210 FEEDWATER TO for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRISTEAM GENERATOR NP-6041-SL.
Flow transmitter is a small,OME-3-1 FLOW light-weight (27 lb.) component.
Mounted to Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 PaRe 94 of 151E3CNP HCLPFUnit I FailureESEL ID DESCRIPTION Mode (compared NotesItem M e to RLGM)Item #INDICATOR the wall using two 1/2" expansion bolts,TRANSMITTER equipment bolted to 2" pipe, 7" out from thewall and approximately 4" up. Transmitter isIEEE-344-1975 qualified.
Anchorage screens based on light weight component with rugged anchorage.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
AUXILIARY for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRIFEEDWATER TO NP-6041-SL.
Flow transmitter is a small,70 STEAM GENERATOR Screened
>RLGM light-weight (27 lb.) component.
Mounted onOME-3-2 FLOW a u-shaped pipe frame which is welded toINDICATOR steel column (box structure) on both sides.TRANSMITTER Anchorage screens based on light weightcomponent with rugged anchorage.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
AUXILIARY for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRIFEEDWATER TO NP-6041-SL.
Flow transmitter is a small,STEAM GENERATOR light-weight (27 lb.) component.
Mounted on71 1-FFI-230 OME-3-3NFLOW Screened
>RLGM a u-shaped pipe frame which is welded toINDICATOR steel column (box structure) on both sides.TRANSMITTER Transmitter is IEEE-344-1975 qualified.
Anchorage screens based on light weightcomponent with rugged anchorage.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRIAUXILIARY NP-6041-SL.
Flow transmitter is a small,FEEDWATER TO light-weight (27 lb.) component.
It isSTEAM GENERATOR mounted on a L-shaped pipe frame (2" pipe,OME-3-4 FLOW 7" out from the wall and approximately 13"INDICATOR up) with 2 1/2" bolts mounted to the wall withTRANSMITTER two expansion anchors.
Anchorage screensbased on the light weight and the ruggedanchorage.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRIFIXED INCORE NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to theCONTROL PANEL RLGM input based on similar panels withinthe control room yielding significant seismiccapacity margins.REACTOR CORE Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
THERMOCOUPLE for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI74 1-FICT-A TRAIN 'A' Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to theTRANSMITTER RLGM input based on a screening CABINET calculation.
FLUX CONTROL Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PANEL for the 0.8g to 1,2g screening lane in EPRI SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 95 of 151CNP HCLPFUnit I FailureESEL ID DESCRIPTION Mode (compared NotesItem # to RLGM)NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to theRLGM input based on similar panels withinthe control room yielding significant seismiccapacity margins.Anchorage could not be screened for RLGMbased on scaling of existing USI A-46WEST COMPONENT anchorage evaluation for the HX. The80 1-HE-15W COOLING WATER Anchorage 0.547g governing HCLPF capacity for theanchorage according to S&A Calculation HEAT EXCHANGER 13Q3208-CAL-004
-"HCLPF Calculations for Screened in ESEP Components" (Ref.10.1) is 0.547g.Anchorage screened for RLGM based onWEST RESIDUAL HEAT existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation of81 1-HE-17W REMOVAL HEAT Screened
>RLGM this HX without top braces; braces wereEXCHANGER installed after the evaluation and providesubstantial support.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to theRLGM input based on similar panels withinthe control room yielding significant seismiccapacity margins.
The potentially governing UNIT 1 HOT Block Wall interaction could not be screenedSHUTDOWN PANEL for RLGM based on scaling of existingdesign basis calculation.
The governing HCLPF capacity for the block wall according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-004
-"HCLPF Calculations for Screened in ESEPComponents" (Ref. 10.1) is 2.682g andtherefore did not control screening.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRINP-60411-SL.
Chiller on vibration isolators, later modified to be restrained in alldirections.
Anchorage screened to a levelgreater than the RLGM by scaling theCONTROL ROOM AIR design basis anchorage calculation.
83 1-HV-ACR-2 CONDITIONING SOUTH Screened
>RLGM The potentially governing Block WallLIQUID CHILLER TeptnilygvrigBokWl interaction could not be screened for RLGMbased on scaling of existing design basiscalculation.
The governing HCLPF capacityfor the block wall according to S&ACalculation 13Q3208-CAL-004
-"HCLPFCalculations for Screened in ESEPComponents" (Ref. 10.1) is 1.215g and P ki3Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 96 of 151CNP HCLPFUnit 1 FailureEnEt ID DESCRIPTION Mode (compared NotesESEL Mode t LMItem #to RLGM)Item #therefore did not control screening.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forRLGM based on existing USI A-46anchorage evaluation for this item. TheCONTROL ROOM potentially governing Block Wall interaction 1-HV-ACRA-VENTILATION SOUTH could not be screened for RLGM based on2 AIR CONDITIONING scaling of existing design basis calculation.
UNIT The governing HCLPF capacity for the blockwall according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-004 -"HCLPF Calculations forScreened in ESEP Components" (Ref. 10.1)is 1.215g and therefore did not controlscreening.
OUTSIDE AIR TO Damper included on HVAC duct work,equipment screens for the 0.8g to 1.2 g1-HV-ACR-CONTROL ROOM screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
A CNP85 DA-2 PRESSURIZATION/CLE Screened
>RLGM analysis of the duct work and supporting rodACRF VENT DAMPER hangers indicates a large margin andtherefore screens for the RLGM input.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to theRLGM input based on similar filteranchorage with significant seismic capacityCONTROL ROOM margins.
The potentially governing BlockWall interaction could not be screened for86 1-HV-ACRF PRESSURIZATION/CLE Screened
>RLGM RlG basedon calinof exsting dsgANUP FILTER UNIT RLGM based on scaling of existing designbasis calculation.
The governing HCLPFcapacity for the block wall according to S&ACalculation 13Q3208-CAL-004
-"HCLPFCalculations for Screened in ESEPComponents" (Ref. 10.1) is 1.215g andtherefore did not control screening.
CONTROL ROOM This equipment item is included in the87 1-HV-ACRF-PRESSURIZATION/CLE Screened
>RLGM existing USI A-46 evaluation for 1-HV-2 ANUP FILTER UNIT ACRA-2. This equipment item screens (seeVENT FAN #2 1-HV-ACRA-2 for details).
Heater included on HVAC duct work andCONTROL ROOM screens for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane1-HV-ACR-VENTILATION SOUTH in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
A CNP analysis of the88 H2 DUCT ELECTRIC Screened
>RLGM duct work and supporting rod hangersHEATING UNIT indicates a large margin and therefore screens for the RLGM input.
SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 97 of 151CNP HCLPFUnit 1 ID DESCRIPTION Failure (compared NotesESEL Mode to RLGM)Item #Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
AB BATTERY for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRISEQUIPMENT AREA Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Fan hung from ceiling, in90 5 BATTERY ROOM vertical alignment; fan weighs 360 lbs.VENTILATION Anchorage screens due to relatively smallfan with rugged anchorage.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRICD BATTERY NP-6041-SL.
Fan bolted to floor with 8- 1/2"1-HV-SGRX-EQUIPMENT AREA Screened
>RLGM expansion bolts that are adequately 6 BATTERY ROOM embedded; fan weighs 500 lbs. Anchorage VENTILATION screens due to relatively small fan withrugged anchorage.
RHR TO REACTOR This valve is within Earthquake Experience COOLANT LOOPS #2 & Screened
>RLGM Data Base (Fig. F-26) in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
92 1-1CM-111
#3 COLD LEGS Therefore, valve is screened for 0.8g to 1.2> g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
REACTOR COOLANT This valve is within Earthquake Experience LOOP #2 HOT LEG TO Data Base (Fig. F-26) in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
RESIDUAL Therefore, valve is screened for 0.8g to 1.2g93 1-1CM-129 HEATREMOVAL screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
PUMPS SUCTIONCONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVEThe weight of this valve is outside theBORON INJECTION Earthquake Experience Data Base (Fig. F-TANK TRAIN 'B' 26) in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
A 3g analysis was94 1-1CM-251 OUTLET Screened
>RLGM performed resulting in acceptable stresses.
CONTAINMENT Therefore, valve is screened for 0.8g to 1.2gISOLATION VALVE screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Equipment screens for the 0.8g to 1.2 gBORON INJECTION TO screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL basedREACTOR COOLANT Screened
>RLGM on light weight component with rugged96 1-IFI-51 LOOP #1 FLOW anchorage.
INDICATOR TRANSMITTER Equipment screens for the 0.8g to 1.2 gBORON INJECTION TO screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL basedREACTOR COOLANT Screened
>RLGM on light weight component with rugged97 1-IFI-52 LOOP #2 anchorage.
FLOWINDICATOR TRANSMITTER SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 98 of 151CNP HCLPFUnit I FailureESEL ID DESCRIPTION Mode (compared NotesItem # to RLGM)Equipment screens for the 0.8g to 1.2 gBORON INJECTION TO screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL basedREACTOR COOLANT Screened
>RLGM on light weight component with rugged98 1-IFI-53 LOOP #3 FLOW anchorage.LG anchorage.
INDICATOR TRANSMITTER Equipment screens for the 0.8g to 1.2 gBORON INJECTION TO screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL basedREACTOR COOLANT Screened
>RLGM on light weight component with rugged99 1-IFI-54 LOOP #4 FLOW anchorage.
INDICATOR TRANSMITTER REACTOR COOLANT This valve is within Earthquake Experience LOOP #2 HOT LEG TO Data Base (Fig. F-26) in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
RESIDUAL Screened
>RLGM Therefore, valve is screened for 0.8g to 1.2gHEATREMOVAL screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
PUMPS SUCTIONSHUTOFF VALVEThe weight of this valve is outside theEarthquake Experience Data Base (Fig. F-26) in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
A 3g analysis wasBORON INJECTION performed resulting in acceptable stresses.
101 1-IMO-256 TANK TRAIN'B'INLET Screened
>RLGM Therefore, valve is screened for 0.8g to 1.2gSHUTOFF VALVE screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Apotential Block Wall interaction wasscreened for RLGM based on scaling ofexisting design basis calculation.
This valve is within the Earthquake Experience Data Base (Fig. F-26) in EPRI6041-SL.
Therefore, valve is screened for0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-EAST RESIDUAL HEAT 6041-SL.
The potentially governing BlockREMOVAL PUMP PP- Seismic Wall interaction could not be screened for35EMSCTONA PnteractPon 0.428g102 1-IMO-310 35E SUCTION Interaction RLGM based on scaling of existing designSHUTOFF VALVE basis calculation.
The governing HCLPFcapacity for the block wall according to S&ACalculation 13Q3208-CAL-004
-"HCLPFCalculations for Screened in ESEPComponents" (Ref. 10.1) is 0.428g.1031-IMO-324 WEST RHR HX 1-HE-17W DISCHARGE CROSSTIE SHUTOFFVALVEScreened>RLGMThis valve is within the Earthquake Experience Data Base (Fig. F-26) in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Therefore, valve is screenedfor 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-0Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 99 of 151CNP HCLPFUnit 1 FailureESEL ID DESCRIPTION Mode (compared NotesItem M e to RLGM)Item #6041-SL.The hydrogen igniters are composed of theIgniter Box, glow plug, shield and otherassociated hardware.
The components within the igniter box are not fragile and areCONTAINMENT encompassed by the Earthquake 1-LDISB-HYDROGEN IGNITION Screened
>RLGM Experience Data Base of EPRI NP-6041-SL.
104 B19 LOWER VOLUME Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRIASSEMBLY
#B19 NP-6041-SL.
Equipment supported byunistrut cantilevered off the containment wall. Anchorage screened for RLGM basedon scaling existing anchorage evaluation.
CONTAINMENT See notes for 1-LDISB-B19.
Assembly1-LDISB-HYDROGEN IGNITION Screened
>RLGM screened for 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in105 B20 LOWER VOLUME EPRI NP-6041-SL and anchorage loadingsTRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG for RLGM.ASSEMBLY
#B20CONTAINMENT See notes for 1-LDISB-B19.
Assembly1-LDISB-HYDROGEN IGNITION Screened
>RLGM screened for 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in106 B21 LOWER VOLUME EPRI NP-6041-SL and anchorage loadingsTRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG for RLGM.ASSEMBLY
#B21CONTAINMENT See notes for 1-LDISB-B19.
Assembly1-LDISB-HYDROGEN IGNITION Screened
>RLGM screened for 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in107 B22 LOWER VOLUME EPRI NP-6041-SL and anchorage loadingsTRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG for RLGM.ASSEMBLY
#B22CONTAINMENT See notes for 1-LDISB-B19.
Assembly1-LDISB-HYDROGEN IGNITION Screened
>RLGM screened for 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in108 B23 LOWER VOLUME EPRI NP-6041-SL and anchorage loadingsTRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG for RLGM.ASSEMBLY
#B23CONTAINMENT See notes for 1-LDISB-B19.
Assembly1-LDISB-HYDROGEN IGNITION Screened
>RLGM screened for 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in109 B24 LOWER VOLUME EPRI NP-6041-SL and anchorage loadingsTRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG for RLGMASSEMBLY
#B24CONTAINMENT Equipment supported by unistrutHYDROGEN IGNITION cantilevered off column. See notes for 1-110 1-LDISB-LOWER VOLUME Screened
>RLGM LDISB-B19.
Assembly screened for 0.8g toB25 TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL ASSEMBLY
#B25 and anchorage loadings for RLGM SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 PaRe 100 of 151CNP HCLPFUnit I FailureESEL ID DESCRIPTION Mode (compared NotesItem # to RLGM)CONTAINMENT Equipment supported by unistrutHYDROGEN IGNITION cantilevered off column. See notes for 1-1-LDISB-LOWER VOLUME Screened
>RLGM LDISB-B 19. Assembly screened for 0.8g toB26 TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL ASSEMBLY
#826 and anchorage loadings for RLGMCONTAINMENT Equipment supported by unistrutHYDROGEN IGNITION cantilevered off column. See notes for 1-112 1-LDISB-LOWER VOLUME Screened
>RLGM LDISB-B319.
Assembly screened for 0.8g toB27 TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL ASSEMBLY
#827 and anchorage loadings for RLGMEquipment supported by unistrutCONTAINMENT cantilevered off column, the equipment isHYDROGEN IGNITION approximately 20 ft. above the viewing113 1-LDISB-LOWER VOLUME Screened
>RLGM location.
See notes for 1-LDISB-B19.
B28 TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG Assembly screened for 0.8g to 1.2gASSEMBLY
#B28 screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL andanchorage loadings for RLGM1-LDISB-CONTAINMENT See notes for 1-LDISB-B19.
AssemblyB29 HYDROGEN IGNITION screened for 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in114 LOWER VOLUME Screened
>RLGM EPRI NP-6041-SL and anchorage loadingsTRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG for RLGMASSEMBLY
#829CONTAINMENT See notes for 1-LDISB-B19.
Assembly1-LDISB-HYDROGEN IGNITION Screened
>RLGM screened for 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in115 B30 LOWER VOLUME EPRI NP-6041-SL and anchorage loadingsTRAIN'B' GLOW PLUG for RLGMASSEMBLY
#830CONTAINMENT See notes for 1-LDISB-B19.
Assembly1-LDISB-HYDROGEN IGINTION Screened
>RLGM screened for 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in116 B31 LOWER VOLUME EPRI NP-6041-SL and anchorage loadingsTRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG for RLGMASSEMBLY
#831CONTAINMENT See notes for 1-LDISB-B19.
Assembly1-LDISB-HYDROGEN IGNITION Screened
>RLGM screened for 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in117 B32 LOWER VOLUME EPRI NP-6041-SL and anchorage loadingsTRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG for RLGMASSEMBLY
#832CONTAINMENT See notes for 1-LDISB-B19.
Assembly1-LDISB-HYDROGEN IGNITION Screened
>RLGM screened for 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in118 B33 LOWER VOLUME EPRI NP-6041-SL and anchorage loadingsTRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG for RLGMASSEMBLY
#8331-LDISB-CONTAINMENT Screened
>RLGM See notes for 1-LDISB-B19.
AssemblyB34 HYDROGEN IGNITION screened for 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 101 of 151CNP HCLPFUnit I FailureESEL ID DESCRIPTION Mode (compared NotesItem # to RLGM)LOWER VOLUME EPRI NP-6041-SL and anchorage loadingsTRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG for RLGMASSEMBLY
#B34Equipment bolted to unistrut, which isCONTAINMENT cantilevered off column 13 of quad 4, theHYDROGEN IGNITION unistrut is welded to this column. See notes120 B35 LOWER VOLUME for 1-LDISB-B19.
Assembly screened forTRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-ASSEMBLY
#B35 6041-SL and anchorage loadings for RLGMEquipment screens (other than anchorage)
STEAM GENERATORS for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI121 1-LSI-1 #1 AND # LOCAL Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forSHUTDOWN STATION RLGM based on existing USI A-46anchorage evaluation for this panel.Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
STEAM GENERATORS for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI122 1-LSI-2 #2 AND #3 LOCAL Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forSHUTDOWN STATION RLGM based on existing USI A-46anchorage evaluation for this panel.Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
REACTOR COOLANT for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRISYSTEM CHARGING Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forAND LETDOWN LOCAL RLGM based on existing USI A-46SHUTDOWN STATION anchorage evaluation for this panel.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI124 1-MCAB 250VDC DISTRIBUTION Screened
.>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forPANEL MCAB RLGM based on existing USI A-46anchorage evaluation for this panel.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI250VDC DISTRIBUTION Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forPOWER PANEL RLGM based on existing USI A-46anchorage evaluation for this panel.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI250VDC DISTRIBUTION Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forPANEL MDAB RLGM based on existing USI A-46anchorage evaluation for this panel.250VDC DISTRIBUTION Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PANEL MDCD for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 10Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 102 of 151CNP HCLPFUnit 1 FailureESEL ID DESCRIPTION e (compared NotesESLMode (cmaeNosItem # to RLGM)6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGMbased on existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for this panel.Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
STEAM GENERATOR for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI128 1-MPP-210 OME-3-1 CHANNEL I Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forSTEAM PRESSURE RLGM based on existing USI A-46TRANSMITTER anchorage evaluation for this transmitter.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
STEAM GENERATOR for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI129 1-MPP-220 OME-3-2 CHANNEL I Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forSTEAM PRESSURE RLGM based on existing USI A-46TRANSMITTER anchorage evaluation for this transmitter.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
STEAM GENERATOR for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI130 1-MPP-230 OME-3-3 CHANNEL I Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forSTEAM PRESSURE RLGM based on existing USI A-46TRANSMITTER anchorage evaluation for this transmitter.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
STEAM GENERATOR for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRIOME-3-4 CHANNEL I Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forSTEAM PRESSURE RLGM based on existing USI A-46TRANSMITTER anchorage evaluation for this transmitter.
This valve is outside the Earthquake STEAM GENERATOR Experience Data Base (Fig. F-25) in EPRIOME-3-1 POWER Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
A 3g load analysis was132 1-MRV-213 OPERATED performed, resulting in acceptable stresses.
RELIEFVALVE Therefore, valve is screened for 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI 6041-SL.This valve is outside the Earthquake STEAM GENERATOR Experience Data Base (Fig. F-25) in EPRIOME-3-2 POWER Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
A 3g load analysis was133 1-MRV-223 OPERATED RELIEF performed, resulting in acceptable stresses.
VALVE Therefore, valve is screened for 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
STEAM GENERATOR This valve is outside the Earthquake Experience Data Base (Fig. F-25) in EPRI134 1-MRV-233 OPERATED RELIEF NP-6041-SL.
A 3g load analysis wasVALVE performed, resulting in acceptable stresses.
Therefore, valve is screened for 0.8g to 1.2 SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 103 of 151CNP HCLPFUnit IFalrEnEt ID DESCRIPTION Failure (compared NotesESEL Mode (o NotesItem #to RLGM)Item #g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
This valve is outside the Earthquake STEAM GENERATOR Experience Data Base (Fig. F-25) in EPRIOME-3-4 POWER Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
A 3g load analysis was135 1-MRV-243 OPERATED performed, resulting in acceptable stresses.
RELIEFVALVE Therefore, valve is screened for 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI 6041-SL.NUCLEAR Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
INSTRUMENTATION for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI136 1-NIS-1 SYSTEM PROTECTION Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forCHANNEL I CONTROL RLGM based on existing USI A-46PANEL anchorage evaluation for this panel.Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PRESSURIZER OME-4 for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRIPROTECTION Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forCHANNEL I RLGM based on existing USI A-46LEVELTRANSMITTER anchorage evaluation for this transmitter.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
REACTOR VESSEL for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
The transmitter is IEEE-344-138 1-NPS-110 PRESSURE 75 Qualified.
Anchorage screened for RLGMTRANSMITTER based on existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for this transmitter.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Anchorage could not bescreened for RLGM based on scaling ofNUCLEAR existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for142 1-NRI INSTRUMENTATION Screened
>RLGM the Amplifier.
The governing HCLPFAMP WIDE RANGE capacity for the anchorage according toRADIATION AMPLIFIER S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-004
-"HCLPF Calculations for Screened in ESEPComponents" (Ref. 10.1) is 1.16g and didnot control the capacity.
Equipment is within Earthquake Experience PRESSURIZER TRAIN Data (Fig. F-25) of EPRI NP-6041-SL and143 1-NRV-152
'B'PRESSURE RELIEF Sscreens for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening laneVALVE in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
PRESSURIZER OME-4 Equipment is within Earthquake Experience 144 1-NRV-153 TRAIN A PRESSURE Data (Fig. F-25) of EPRI NP-6041-SL andRELIEF VALVE screens for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 104 of 151CNP HCLPFUnit 1 FailureESEL ID DESCRIPTION Mode (compared NotesESEL Mode t LMItem # to RLGM)in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
REACTOR COOLANT The Thermal Sensor is IEEE-344-75 LOOP #1 HOT LEG Qualified.
Rugged component no seismic149 1-NTR-110 WIDE Screened
>RLGM interaction concerns.
Equipment screens forRANGETEMPERATURE the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-RECORDER THERMAL 6041-SL.SENSORREACTOR COOLANT The Thermal Sensor is IEEE-344-75 LOOP #3 HOT LEG Qualified.
Rugged component no seismic150 1-NTR-130 WIDE Screened
>RLGM interaction concerns.
Equipment screens forRANGETEMPERATURE the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-RECORDER THERMAL 6041-SL.SENSORREACTOR COOLANT The Thermal Sensor is IEEE-344-75 LOOP #1 COLD LEG Qualified.
Rugged component no seismic151 1-NTR-210 WIDE Screened
>RLGM interaction concerns.
Equipment screens forRANGETEMPERATURE the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-RECORDER THERMAL 6041-SL.SENSORREACTOR COOLANT The Thermal Sensor is IEEE-344-75 LOOP #3 COLD LEG Qualified.
Rugged component no seismic152 1-NTR-230 WIDE Screened
>RLGM interaction concerns.
Equipment screens forRANGETEMPERATURE the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-RECORDER THERMAL 6041-SL.SENSORStrainer supported on two 14" wide, 12"deep, and 18" tall concrete pedestals.
TURBINE DRIVEN Equipment bolted to pedestals with four 3/4"anchor bolts, one set of two bolts in each153 1-OME-33 PUMP PP-4 SUCTION pedestal, spaced at 6" apart. The piping isSTRAINER well supported, the strainer is small relativeto the anchorage and therefore, this isscreened for the RLGM.Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
WEST ESSENTIAL for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI154 1-OME-34W SERVICE WATER Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forPUMP PP-7W DISCH RLGM based on existing USI A-46STN anchorage evaluation for similar pump.ACCUMULATOR TANK Screened
>RLGM Anchorage screened for RLGM input based155 1-OME-6-1
#1 on screening calculation.
ACCUMULATOR TANK Screened
>RLGM Anchorage screened for RLGM input based156 1-OME-6-2
#2 on screening calculation.
SAIExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 105 of 151CNP HCLPFUnit I FailureESEL ID DESCRIPTION Mode (compared NotesItem # to RLGM)ACCUMULATOR TANK Screened
>RLGM Anchorage screened for RLGM input based157 1-OME-6-3
#3 on screening calculation.
ACCUMULATOR TANK Screened
>RLGM Anchorage screened for RLGM input based158 1-OME-6-4
#4 on screening calculation.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
WEST COMPONENT for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI159 1-PP-iOW COOLING WATER Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forPUMP RLGM based on existing USI A-46anchorage evaluation for this pump.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Pump is supported vertically, but free to translate laterally.
The Pumpscreened for RLGM based on existing stressWEST RESIDUAL HEAT Seisi 0.423g evaluation of this pump and attached lines.REMOVAL PUMP The governing HCLPF capacity for the blockwall according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-004 -"HCLPF Calculations forScreened in ESEP Components" (Ref. 10.1)is 0.423g.Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
TURBINE DRIVEN for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI161 1-PP-4 AUXILIARY FEED Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forPUMP RLGM based on existing USI A-46anchorage evaluation for this pump.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to theRLGM input based on robust anchorage forrelatively small pump. However, the HCLPFBORIC ACID STORAGE Seismic for this component is limited by the Boric162 1-PP-46-1 TANKS TRANSFER Interaction 0.227g Acid Storage Tank 1-TK-12N due to thePUMP #1 attached piping. HCLPF capacity according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-005
-"HCLPF Calculations for Screened in ESEPTanks" (Ref. 10.2) for the tank is 0.227g thatis less than the RLGM of 0.387g.CONTROL ROOM AIR Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CONDITROL G R OM H A for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI163 1-PP-82S COITI N NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forCIRCULATION PUMP RLGM based on existing USI A-46CIRCULATION I IUManchorage evaluation for this pump. The POExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 106 of 151CNP HCLPFUnit 1 FailureESEL ID DESCRIPTION Mode (compared NotesIEm Moe to RLGM)Item #governing HCLPF capacity for the block wallaccording to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-004 -"HCLPF Calculations forScreened in ESEP Components" (Ref. 10.1)is 1.215g and did not control the capacity.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
UPPER CONTAINMENT for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI164 1-PPA-310 CHANNEL III WIDE Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forRANGE PRESSURE RLGM based on comparison to similarALARM TRANSMITTER transmitters.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the165 1-PRZ CONTROLEPANEL RLGM input based on similar panels withinthe control room yielding significant seismiccapacity margins.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to theRLGM input based on robust anchorage forNORTH BORIC ACID small instrument.
: However, the HCLPF forSTORAGE TANK TK- Seismic this component is limited by the Boric Acid16612N LEVEL ALARM Interaction 0.2AStorage Tank 1-TK-12N due to the attachedTRANSMITTER piping. HCLPF capacity according to S&ACalculation 13Q3208-CAL-005
-"HCLPFCalculations for Screened in ESEP Tanks"(Ref. 10.2) for the tank is 0.227g that is lessthan the RLGM of 0.387g.Equipment is within Earthquake Experience AIR OPERATED VALVE Data (Fig. F-25) of EPRI NP-6041-SL and167 1-QRV-200 TO ISOLATE BORON Screened
>RLGM Daa(i.F2)oEPIN-41Lan screens for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening laneINJECTION PATH in EPRI 6041-SL.TURBINE DRIVEN Equipment is within Earthquake Experience AUXILIARY FEED Screened
>RLGM Data (Fig. F-26) of EPRI NP-6041-SL and168 1-QT-506 PUMP PP-4 TRIP AND screens for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening laneTHROTTLE VALVE in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Equipment is within Earthquake Experience AUXILIARY TUBN Screened
>RLGM Data (Fig. F-26) of EPRI NP-6041-SL and169 1-QT-507 PUMP TURBINE Sscreens for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening laneGOVERNOR VALVE in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 107 of 151CNP HCLPFUnit I ID DESCRIPTION Failure (compared NotesESEL Mode (o NotesItem # to RLGM)Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to theRLGM input based on robust anchorage forsmall instrument.
: However, the HCLPF forNORTH BAST TK-12N Seismic this component is limited by the Boric Acid170 1-QTC-410 TRAIN 'A' HTR TEMP Interaction 0.227g Storage Tank 1-TK-12N due to the attachedCONTROLLER piping. HCLPF capacity according to S&ACalculation 13Q3208-CAL-005
-"HCLPFCalculations for Screened in ESEP Tanks"(Ref. 10.2) for the tank is 0.227g that is lessthan the RLGM of 0.387g.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRIRESIDUAL HEAT Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the171 1-RHR REMOVAL CONTROL RLGM based on similar panels within thePANEL control room yielding significant seismiccapacity margins.Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
REACTOR for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRIPROTECTION Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forCHANNEL I CABINET RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46#1 anchorage evaluation.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
REACTOR for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRIPROTECTION Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to theCHANNEL I CABINET RLGM based on similar cabinets yielding#2 significant seismic capacity margins.Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
REACTOR for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI174 1-RPC-1-3 PROTECTION Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to theCHANNEL I CABINET RLGM based on similar cabinets yielding#3 significant seismic capacity margins.Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
REACTOR for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRIPROTECTION Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to theCHANNEL I CABINET RLGM based on similar cabinets yielding#4 significant seismic capacity margins.REACTOR Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION Screened
>RLGM for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRICHANNEL II CABINET NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the#5 RLGM based on similar cabinets yielding POExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 108 of 151CNP HCLPFUnit 1 ID DESCRIPTION Failure (compared NotesESEL Mode to RLGM)Item #significant seismic capacity margins.Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
REACTOR for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRIPROTECTION Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to theCHANNEL II CABINET RLGM based on similar cabinets yielding#6 significant seismic capacity margins.Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
REACTOR for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRIPROTECTION Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to theCHANNEL II CABINET RLGM based on similar cabinets yielding#7 significant seismic capacity margins.Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
REACTOR for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI179 1-RPC-2-8 PROTECTION Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to theCHANNEL II CABINET RLGM based on similar cabinets yielding#8 significant seismic capacity margins.Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
REACTOR for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRIPROTECTION Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to theCHANNEL III CABINET RLGM based on similar cabinets yielding#10 significant seismic capacity margins.Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
REACTOR for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRIPROTECTION Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to theCHANNEL III CABINET RLGM based on similar cabinets yielding#9 significant seismic capacity margins.Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
REACTOR for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRIPROTECTION Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to theCHANNEL IV CABINET RLGM based on similar cabinets yielding#12 significant seismic capacity margins.Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
REACTOR for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRIPROTECTION AND Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the183 1-RPS-A SAFEGUARD RLGM based on similar panels within theACTUATION TRAIN 'A' control room yielding significant seismicCABINET capacity margins.REACTOR Equipment screens (other than anchorage) 184 1-RPS-B PROTECTION AND for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRISAFEGUARD NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the POExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 PaRe 109 of 151CNP HCLPFUnit 1 (compareESEL ID DESCRIPTION Failure (compared NotesESEL Mode to RLGM)Item #ACTUATION TRAIN 'B' RLGM based on similar panels within theCABINET control room yielding significant seismiccapacity margins.REACTOR Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION AND for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI185 1-RPSX-A SAFEGUARD Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forACTUATIO N TRAIN 'A' RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46AUXILIARY CABINET anchorage evaluation.
REACTOR Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION AND for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI186 1-RPSX-B SAFEGUARD Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forACTUATIO N TRAIN 'B' RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46AUXILIARY CABINET anchorage evaluation.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to theREACTOR VESSEL RLGM based on similar cabinets yieldingOME-1 WATER LEVEL Screened
>RLGM significant seismic capacity margins.
The187 1-RVLC INSTRUMENTATION governing HCLPF capacity for the block wallCABINET according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-004 -"HCLPF Calculations forScreened in ESEP Components" (Ref. 10.1)is 2.682g which does not control capacity.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI188 1-SA STATION AUXILIARIES Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forCONTROL PANEL RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46anchorage evaluation.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
STEAM GENERATOR for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI189 1-SG AND AUXILIARY FEED Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forPUMP CONTROL RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46PANEL anchorage evaluation.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRISAFETY INJECTION Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to theCONTROL PANEL RLGM based on similar panels yieldingsignificant seismic capacity margins.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) 191 1-SPY CONTAINEN for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 110 of 151CNP HCLPFUnit I FailureESEL ID DESCRIPTION Mode (compared NotesItem M e to RLGM)Item #RLGM based on similar panels yieldingsignificant seismic capacity margins.Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
ENGINEER SAFETY for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI1-SSR SYSTEM REAR Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forINSTRUMENT/RELAY RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46RACK anchorage evaluation.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
NUCLEAR for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRIINSTRUMENTAL Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the193 1-SWR SOURCE RANGE N21 RLGM based on similar equipment withinINSTRUMENT/RELAY the control room yielding significant seismicRACK capacity margins.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI4KV BUS T11A Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to theSWITCHGEAR RLGM based on anchorage evaluation performed to the RLGM.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI250VDC TRAIN 'B' Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to theTRANSFER CABINET RLGM based on similar panels yieldingsignificant seismic capacity margins.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI250VDC TRAIN A Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to theTRANSFER CABINET RLGM based on similar panels yieldingsignificant seismic capacity margins.The Block Wall interaction was screened forRLGM based on scaling of existing designbasis calculation.
The governing HCLPFBORON INJECTION Anchorage 0.45g capacity according to S&A Calculation 197 1-TK-11 TANK 13Q3208-CAL-005
-"High Confidence LowProbability of Failure (HCLPF) Calculations for Screened in ESEP Tanks" (Ref. 10.2) is0.45g for the welded connections.
The Block Wall interaction was screened forRLGM based on scaling of existing design198 1-TK-12N NORTH BORIC ACID Anchorage 0.227g basis calculation.
The governing HCLPFSTORAGE TANK capacity according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-005
-"High Confidence Low SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 111 of 151CNP HCLPFUnit 1 FailureESEL ID DESCRIPTION Mode (compared NotesItem # to RLGM)Probability of Failure (HCLPF) Calculations for Screened in ESEP Tanks" (Ref. 10.2) is0.227g. Therefore, this tank does not screenfor the RLGM.Horizontal tank containing air is wellsupported in addition to standard saddles.PRESSURIZER TRAIN Tank is adequately welded to building steel.'B' PRESSURE RELIEF Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage) 199 1-TK-253-1 VALVE NRV-152 for the 0.89 to 1.2g screening lane in EPRIRESERVE CONTROL NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage judged adequateAIR TANK for RLGM by inspection based on small fanwith rugged anchorage.
Horizontal tank containing air is wellsupported in addition to standard saddles.PRESSURIZER TRAIN Tank is adequately welded to building steel.'A' PRESSURE RELIEF Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage) 200 1-TK-253-2 VALVE NRV-153 for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRIRESERVE CONTROL NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage judged adequateAIR TANK for RLGM by inspection based on small fanwith rugged anchorage.
Tanks 1-TK-253-3,
-5, &-7 grouped togetherand anchored by four plates bolted to thewall with two 3/4" bolts in each plate. ThePRESSURIZER TRAIN tanks are 9" diameter and 56" tall. The air'B' PRESSURE RELIEF bottles are strapped to framing affixed to the201 1-TK-253-3 VLV NRV152 Screened
>RLGM wall by twelve W" bolts. Equipment screensEMERGENCY AIR (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 gTANK screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage judged adequate for RLGM byinspection based on rugged configuration ofsupport.Tanks 1-TK-253-4,
-6, &-8 grouped togetherand anchored by four plates bolted to thewall with two 3/4" bolts in each plate. ThePRESSURIZER TRAIN tanks are 9" diameter and 56" tall. The air'A' PRESSURE RELIEF bottles are strapped to framing affixed to the202 1-TK-253-4 VLV NRV153 Screened
>RLGM wall by twelve W" bolts. Equipment screensEMERGENCY AIR (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 gTANK screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage judged adequate for RLGM byinspection based on rugged configuration ofsupport.
SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 112 of 151CNP HCLPFUnit I FailureESEL ID DESCRIPTION Mode (compared NotesItem # to RLGM)Tanks 1-TK-253-3,
-5, &-7 grouped togetherand anchored by four plates bolted to thewall with two 3/4" bolts in each plate. ThePRESSURIZER TRAIN tanks are 9" diameter and 56" tall. The air'B' PRESSURE RELIEF bottles are strapped to framing affixed to the203 1-TK-253-5 VLV NRV-152 Screened
>RLGM wall by twelve %" bolts. Equipment screensEMERGENCY AIR (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 gTANK screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage judged adequate for RLGM byinspection based on rugged configuration ofsupport.Tanks 1-TK-253-4,
-6, &-8 grouped togetherand anchored by four plates bolted to thewall with two 3/4" bolts in each plate. ThePRESSURIZER TRAIN tanks are 9" diameter and 56" tall. The air'A' PRESSURE RELIEF bottles are strapped to framing affixed to the204 1-TK-253-6 VLV NRV-153 Screened
>RLGM wall by twelve W" bolts. Equipment screensEMERGENCY AIR (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 gTANK screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage judged adequate for RLGM byinspection based on rugged configuration ofsupport.Tanks 1-TK-253-3,
-5, &-7 grouped togetherand anchored by four plates bolted to thewall with two 3/4" bolts in each plate. ThePRESSURIZER TRAIN tanks are 9" diameter and 56" tall. The air'B' PRESSURE RELIEF bottles are strapped to framing affixed to the205 1-TK-253-7 VLV NRV-152 Screened
>RLGM wall by twelve %" bolts. Equipment screensEMERGENCY AIR (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 gTANK screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage judged adequate for RLGM byinspection based on rugged configuration ofsupport.Tanks 1-TK-253-4,
-6, &-8 grouped togetherand anchored by four plates bolted to thePRESSURIZER TRAIN wall with two 3/4" bolts in each plate. The'A' PRESSURE RELIEF tanks are 9" diameter and 56" tall. The air206 1-TK-253-8 VLV NRV-153 Screened
>RLGM bottles are strapped to framing affixed to theEMERGENCY AIR wall by twelve W" bolts. Equipment screensTANK (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 gscreening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage judged adequate for RLGM byinspection based on rugged configuration of SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 113 of 151CNP HCLPFUnit 1 FailureEnit ID DESCRIPTION Mode (compared NotesESEL Mode t LMItem # to RLGM)support.Rust was found on the strap supports.
AHCLPF calculation was performed for thedegraded condition.
The governing HCLPFCONDENSATE Anchorage 0.481g capacity according to S&A Calculation 207 1-TK-32 STORAGE TANK 13Q3208-CAL-005
-"High Confidence LowProbability of Failure (HCLPF) Calculations for Screened in ESEP Tanks" (Ref. 10.2) is0.481g.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Anchorage or the adjacentBlock Wall could not be screened for RLGMCOMPONENT based on scaling the existing calculations.
208 1-TK-37 COOLING WATER Anchorage 0.447g The governing HCLPF capacity according toSURGE TANK S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-005
-"HighConfidence Low Probability of Failure(HCLPF) Calculations for Screened in ESEPTanks" (Ref. 10.2) is for the tank and is0.447g due to the anchor bolts.This transformer was purchased to the IEEE344-75 standard.
Equipment screens (otherthan anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 gscreening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on600VAC BUS 11A Screened
>RLGM scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage 209 1-TR11A SUPPLY evaluation.
The governing HCLPF capacityTRANSFORMER for the block wall according to S&ACalculation 13Q3208-CAL-004
-"HCLPFCalculations for Screened in ESEPComponents" (Ref. 10.1) is 1.270g and didnot control the capacity.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRITRANSFORMER FOR Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forAFWX DIST PANEL RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46anchorage evaluation.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI211 1-TR-ELSC TRANSFORMER FOR Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forELSC DIST PANEL RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46anchorage evaluation.
SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 114 of 151CNP HCLPFUnit IFalrESEL ID DESCRIPTION Failure (compared NotesESEL Mode (o NotesItem # to RLGM)Igniter box is attached to horizontal unistruts bolted to vertical embedded unistruts.
Thehydrogen igniters are composed of theIgniter Box, glow plug, shield and otherassociated hardware.
The components CONTAINMENT within the igniter box are not fragile and areHYDROGEN IGNITION encompassed by that typically contained in212 1-UDISB-B1 UPPER VOLUME Screened
>RLGM other electrical boxes. Therefore, it isTRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG determined that the screening lanesASSEMBLY
#B1 contained in EPRI NP-6041-SL areapplicable to this equipment.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8gto 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL. Anchorage screened for RLGM basedon scaling existing anchorage evaluation.
CONTAINMENT Igniter box is bolted to horizontal unistruts HYDROGEN IGNITION bolted to an embedded vertical unistrut on213 B10 UPPER VOLUME the left and a 3/8" expansion anchor on theTRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG right. See notes for 1-UDISB-B1.
ASSEMBLY
#B10CONTAINMENT Igniter box is bolted to horizontal unistruts HYDROGEN IGNITION bolted to an embedded vertical unistrut on214 B11 UPPER VOLUME the left and a 3/8" expansion anchor on theTRAIN'B'GLOW PLUG right. See notes for 1-UDISB-B1.
ASSEMBLY
#B131CONTAINMENT Igniter box is bolted to horizontal unistruts HYDROGEN IGNITION bolted to an embedded vertical unistrut on215 B12 UPPER VOLUME the left and a 3/8" expansion anchor on theTRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG right. See notes for 1-UDISB-B1.
ASSEMBLY
#B12Igniter box is bolted to two vertical unistruts which are U-bolted to the top and bottomhandrail of the catwalk.
The hydrogenigniters are composed of the Igniter Box,CONTAINMENT glow plug, shield and other associated HYDROGEN IGNITION hardware.
The igniters attached to the216 1-UDISB-UPPER VOLUME Screened
>RLGM catwalk.
The governing HCLPF capacity forB13 TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG the catwalk according to S&A Calculation ASSEMBLY
#B13 13Q3208-CAL-006
-"High Confidence LowProbability of Failure (HCLPF) Calculations for Containment Catwalk and AttachedHydrogen Glow Plugs"" (Ref. 10.3) is 0.86gand did not control capacity.
1-UDISB-CONTAINMENT Screened
>RLGM Igniter box is bolted to two vertical unistrutB14 HYDROGEN IGNITION that are U-bolted to the top and bottom SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 115 of 151CNP HCLPFUnit I Failure c pESEL ID DESCRIPTION e (compared NotesItem # to RLGM)UPPER VOLUME handrail of the catwalk.
The governing TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG HCLPF capacity for the catwalk according toASSEMBLY
#B14 S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-006
-"HighConfidence Low Probability of Failure(HCLPF) Calculations for Containment Catwalk and Attached Hydrogen GlowPlugs"" (Ref. 10.3) is 0.86g and did notcontrol capacity.
Igniter box is bolted to two vertical unistruts which are U-bolted to the top and bottomhandrail of the catwalk.
The governing CONTAINMENT HCLPF capacity for the catwalk according to1-UDISB-HYDROGEN IGNITION Screened
>RLGM S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-006
-"High218 B15 UPPER VOLUME Confidence Low Probability of FailureTRAIN'B' GLOW PLUG (HCLPF) Calculations for Containment ASSEMBLY
#B15 Catwalk and Attached Hydrogen GlowPlugs"" (Ref. 10.3) is 0.86g and did notcontrol capacity.
Igniter box is bolted to two vertical unistruts which are U-bolted to the top and bottomhandrail of the catwalk.
The governing CONTAINMENT HCLPF capacity for the catwalk according to1-UDISB-HYDROGEN IGNITION Screened
>RLGM S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-006
-"High219 B16 UPPER VOLUME Confidence Low Probability of FailureTRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG (HCLPF) Calculations for Containment ASSEMBLY
#B16 Catwalk and Attached Hydrogen GlowPlugs"" (Ref. 10.3) is 0.86g and did notcontrol capacity.
Igniter box is bolted to two vertical unistruts which are U-bolted to the top and bottomhandrail of the catwalk.
The governing CONTAINMENT HCLPF capacity for the catwalk according to1-UDISB-HYDROGEN IGNITION Screened
>RLGM S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-006
-"High220 B17 UPPER VOLUME Confidence Low Probability of FailureTRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG (HCLPF) Calculations for Containment ASSEMBLY
#B17 Catwalk and Attached Hydrogen GlowPlugs" (Ref. 10.3) is 0.86g and did notcontrol capacity.
CONTAINMENT Igniter box is bolted to two vertical unistruts 1-UDISB-HYDROGEN IGNITION Screened
>RLGM which are U-bolted to the top and bottom221 1U UPPER VOLUME handrail of the catwalk.
See notes for 1-TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG UDISB-B13 for screening.
The governing ASSEMBLY
#B18 HCLPF capacity for the catwalk according to SA3Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-APT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 116 of 151CNPCNP HCLPFUnit 1 FailureESEL ID DESCRIPTION Mode (compared NotesItem # to RLGM)S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-006
-"HighConfidence Low Probability of Failure(HCLPF) Calculations for Containment Catwalk and Attached Hydrogen GlowPlugs" (Ref. 10.3) is 0.86g and did notcontrol capacity.
CONTAINMENT Igniter box is attached to horizontal unistruts HYDROGEN IGNITION bolted to vertical embedded unistruts.
See222 1-UDISB-B2 UPPER VOLUME Screened
>RLGM notes for 1-UDISB-B1 for screening.
TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B2CONTAINMENT Igniter box is attached to horizontal unistruts HYDROGEN IGNITION bolted to vertical embedded unistruts.
See223 1-UDISB-B3 UPPER VOLUME Screened
>RLGM notes for 1-UDISB-B1 for screening.
TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B3CONTAINMENT Igniter box is attached to horizontal unistruts HYDROGEN IGNITION bolted to vertical embedded unistruts.
See224 1-UDISB-B4 UPPER VOLUME Screened
>RLGM notes for 1-UDISB-B1 for screening.
TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B4CONTAINMENT Igniter box is attached to horizontal unistruts HYDROGEN IGNITION bolted to vertical embedded unistruts.
See225 1-UDISB-B5 UPPER VOLUME Screened
>RLGM notes for 1-UDISB-B1 for screening.
TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B5CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN IGNITION Igniter box is attached to horizontal unistruts 226 1-UDISB-B6 UPPER VOLUME Screened
>RLGM bolted to vertical embedded unistruts.
SeeTRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG notes for 1-UDISB-B1 for screening.
ASSEMBLY
#B6CONTAINMENT Igniter box is attached to horizontal unistruts HYDROGEN IGNITION bolted to vertical embedded unistruts.
See227 1-UDISB-B7 UPPER VOLUME Screened
>RLGM notes for 1-UDISB-B1 for screening.
TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B7CONTAINMENT Igniter box is bolted to horizontal unistruts HYDROGEN IGNITION bolted to an embedded vertical unistrut on228 1-UDISB-B8 UPPER VOLUME Screened
>RLGM the left and a 3/8" expansion anchor on theTRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG right. See notes for 1-UDISB-B1 forASSEMBLY
#B8 screening.
SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 117 of 151CNP HCLPFUnit 1 FailureEnEt ID DESCRIPTION Mode (compared NotesESEL Mode t LMItem # to RLGM)CONTAINMENT Igniter box is bolted to horizontal unistruts HYDROGEN IGNITION bolted to an embedded vertical unistrut on229 1-UDISB-B9 UPPER VOLUME Screened
>RLGM the left and a 3/8" expansion anchor on theTRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG right. See notes for 1-UDISB-B1 forASSEMBLY
#B9 screening.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRILOWER CONTAINMENT NP-6041-SL.
The governing HCLPF1 -VR- TRAIN B DISTRIBUTED Screened
>RLGM capacity for the anchorage according to S&A230 LDISB-4 IGNITION SYSTEM Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-004-
"HCLPFVOLTAGE REGULATOR Calculations for Screened in ESEPComponents" (Ref. 10.1) is 0.760g and didnot control the capacity.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Anchorage could not bescreened for RLGM based on scaling ofUPPER CONTAINMENT existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.
1-VR- TRAIN B DISTRIBUTED Screened
>RLGM The governing HCLPF capacity for theUDISB-3 IGNITION SYSTEM anchorage according to S&A Calculation VOLTAGE REGULATOR 13Q3208-CAL-004-
"HCLPF Calculations for Screened in ESEP Components" (Ref.10.1) is 0.760g and did not control thecapacity.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the232 1-VS CONTROLAPANEL RLGM input based on similar panels withinthe control room yielding significant seismiccapacity margins.WEST CONTAINMENT SPRAY HEAT This valve falls within the Earthquake EXCHANGER 1-HE- Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-233 1-WMO-715 18W ESSENTIAL Screened
>RLGM SL. Therefore, this valve screens for theSERVICE WATER 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-INLET SHUTOFF 6041-SL.VALVEESSENTIAL SERVICE This valve falls outside the Earthquake WATER TO TURBINE Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-234 1-WMO-753 DRIVENAUXILIARY Screened
>RLGM SL. However, this valve screens for the 0.8gFEED PUMP PP-4 to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL SHUTOFF VALVE based on analysis performed to 3g input.
SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 118 of 151CNP HCLPFUnit I FailureESEL ID DESCRIPTION Mode (compared NotesItem # to RLGM)This valve falls within the Earthquake WEST ESW PP PP-7W Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-235 1-WRV-762 DISCH STN EAST Screened
>RLGM SL. Therefore, this valve screens for theBASKET BAN OUT S/O 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-VALVE 6041-SL.This valve falls within the Earthquake W ESW PUMP PP-7W Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-DISCH STN EAST Screened
>RLGM SL. Therefore, this valve screens for theBASKET B/W INLET 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-> 6041-SL.This valve falls within the Earthquake W ESW PUMP PP-7W Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-DISCH STN WEST Screened
>RLGM SL. Therefore, this valve screens for theBASKET BAN OUTLET 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-> 6041-SL.This valve falls within the Earthquake Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-W ESW PUMP PP-7W SL. Therefore, this valve screens for theDISCH STN WEST Screened
>RLGM 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-238 1-WRV-777 6041-SL.
There is sufficient clearance BASKET BAN INLET> between the valve operator and thewalkway.
Pipe line well supported and not acredible damaging interaction.
Small valve bolted into a small rack.Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PRESSURE Screened
>RLGM for the 0:8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI239 1-XRV-152 REGULATING VALVE NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage judged to beadequate for RLGM by inspection based onlight rack with rugged anchorage.
Small valve bolted into a small rack.Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PRESSURE Screened
>RLGM for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI240 1-XRV-153 REGULATING VALVE NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage judged to beadequate for RLGM by inspection based onlight rack with rugged anchorage.
POAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic1303208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 119 of 151Attachment D -CNP Unit 2 ESEP HCLPF Values and Failure ModeTabulation SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 120 of 151CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF NotesUnit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #2 2-152- CONTAINMENT Screened
>RLGM Small panel dimensions of 8" wide, 4" deep,LDISB HYDROGEN IGNITION and 14" tall. Equipment mounted to the wallLOWER VOLUME using two unistruts anchored with four 1/2"TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG expansion bolts. Unistrut anchors areASSEMBLIES BACKUP spaced at 46" horizontally and 9" vertically.
SUPPLY BREAKER Unistrut anchorage shared by 2-152-UDISB.
Screened based on the light panel withrugged anchorage.
3 2-152- CONTAINMENT Screened
>RLGM Small panel dimensions of 8" wide, 4" deep,UDISB HYDROGEN IGNITION and 14" tall. Equipment mounted to the wallUPPER VOLUME TRAIN using two unistruts anchored with four 1/2"'B' GLOW PLUG expansion bolts. Unistrut anchors areASSEMBLIES BACKUP spaced at 46" horizontally and 9" vertically.
SUPPLY BREAKER Unistrut anchorage shared by 2-152-LDISB.
Screened based on the light panel withrugged anchorage.
4 2-21A 600V BUS 21A Screened
>RLGM Meets EPRI NP-6041-SL Table 2.4 caveats.SWITCHGEAR Anchorage screened for RLGM based onscaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the switchgear.
5 2-21B 600V BUS 21B Screened
>RLGM Meets EPRI NP-6041-SL Table 2.4 caveats.SWITCHGEAR Anchorage screened for RLGM based onscaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the switchgear.
6 2-21C 600V BUS 21C Screened
>RLGM Meets EPRI NP-6041-SL Table 2.4 caveats.SWITCHGEAR Anchorage screened for RLGM based onscaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the switchgear.
7 2-21D 600V BUS 21D Screened
>RLGM Meets EPRI NP-6041-SL Table 2.4 caveats.SWITCHGEAR Anchorage screened for RLGM based onscaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the switchgear.
8 2-2A 4KV BUS 2A Screened
>RLGM Meets EPRI NP-6041-SL Table 2.4 caveats.SWITCHGEAR Anchorage screened for RLGM based onscaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for a similar switchgear.
9 2 CNTMT HYDROGEN Screened
>RLGM Small panel dimensions of 9" wide, 20" tall,LDISB IGNITION LOWER and 6" deep. Equipment mounted on twoVOLUMN TRAIN 'B' horizontal running unistruts spaced at 19".GLOW PLUG Unistrut anchors are 1/2" expansion boltsASSEMBLIES STARTER spaced at 41". Unistruts are shared by 2-52-COMBO-LDISB CKT UDISB. Screened based on the light panel POExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 121 of 151CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF NotesUnit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #BRK with rugged anchorage.
10 2 CNTMT HYDROGEN Screened
>RLGM Small panel dimensions of 9" wide, 20" tall,UDISB IGNITION UPPER and 6" deep. Equipment mounted on twoVOLUME TRAIN 'B' horizontal running unistruts spaced at 19".GLOW PLUG Unistrut anchors are 1/2" expansion boltsASSEMBLIES STARTER spaced at 41". Unistruts are shared by 2-52-COMBO-UDISB CKT LDISB. Screened based on the light panelBRK with rugged anchorage.
11 2-88X- CNTMT HYDROGEN Screened
>RLGM Small panel dimensions of 9" wide, 20" tall,LDISB IGNITION LOWER and 6" deep. Equipment mounted on twoVOLUME TRAIN 'B' horizontal running unistruts spaced at 19".GLOW PLUG Unistrut anchors are 1/2" expansion boltsASSEMBLIES STARTER spaced at 41" plus an additional two 3/8"COMBO-LDISB STAR bolts located 29". Screened based on theCNTR light panel with rugged anchorage.
12 2-88X- CNTMT HYDROGEN Screened
>RLGM Small panel dimensions of 9" wide, 20" tall,UDISB IGNITION UPPER and 6" deep. Equipment mounted on twoVOLUME TRAIN 'B' horizontal running unistruts spaced at 19".GLOW PLUG Unistrut anchors are 1/2" expansion boltsASSEMBLIES STARTER spaced at 41" plus an additional two 3/8"COMBO-UDISB bolts located 29". Screened based on theCONTACTOR light panel with rugged anchorage.
13 2 PLANT BATTERY BATT- Screened
>RLGM Panel dimensions of 48"x24"xl0".
ABBC AB DISCONNECT Equipment is bolted to two horizontal SWITCH unistruts, which are bolted to the wall. Panelmeets all IEEE 344-75 testing requirements.
The testing TRS greatly exceeds the RRS atthe floor level. Equipment screens for the0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage acceptable for RLGMbased on similar panels had very highcalculated margins for the Design BasisEarthquake.
14 2 PLANT BATTERY BATT- Screened
>RLGM Panel dimensions of 48"x24"x10".
CDBC CD DISCONNECT Equipment is bolted to two horizontal SWITCH unistruts, which are bolted to the wall. Panelmeets all IEEE 344-75 testing requirements.
The testing TRS greatly exceeds the RRS atthe floor level. Equipment screens for the0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage acceptable for RLGMbased on similar panels had very highcalculated margins for the Design BasisEarthquake.
15 2-AB-A 600VAC MOTOR Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CONTROL CENTER AB- for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI FSalExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 122 of 151CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF NotesUnit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #A NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forRLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46anchorage evaluation for the MCC.16 2-AB-D 600VAC MOTOR Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CONTROL CENTER AB- for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRID NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forRLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46anchorage evaluation for the MCC.17 2-ABD-13 600VAC MOTOR Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CONTROL CENTER for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRIABD-B NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forRLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46anchorage evaluation for the MCC.18 2-ABD-D 600VAC MOTOR Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CONTROL CENTER for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRIABD-D NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forRLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46anchorage evaluation for the MCC.19 2-ABV-A 600VAC VALVE Seismic 0.578g Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CONTROL CENTER Interaction for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRIABV-A NP-6041-SL.
Gaps documented on theAnchor Inspection Data Sheet between theMCC assembly and the grout pad werejudged acceptable.
Anchorage screened forRLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46anchorage evaluation for the MCC. Thepotentially governing Block Wall interaction could not be screened for RLGM based onscaling of existing design basis calculation.
The governing HCLPF capacity for the blockwall according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-004 -"HCLPF Calculations forScreened in ESEP Components" (Ref. 10.1)is 0.578g.20 2-AFWX 120/208VAC AUXILIARY Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
FEEDWATER for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRIDISTRIBUTION PANEL NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forRLGM based on screening calculation to theRLGM.21 2-AM-A 600VAC MOTOR Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CONTROL CENTER for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRIAM-A NP-6041-SL.
An additional four anchorbolts have been added to supplement original anchorage.
Anchorage screened forRLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 PaRe 123 of 151CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF NotesUnit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #anchorage evaluation for the MCC.22 2-AZV-A 600VAC VALVE Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CONTROL CENTER for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRIAZV-A NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forRLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46anchorage evaluation for the MCC.23 2-BA BORIC ACID Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CHARGING AND for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRILETDOWN CONTROL NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forPANEL RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46anchorage evaluation for the Control Board.24 2-BATT- PLANT BATTERY AB Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
AB for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forRLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46anchorage evaluation for the Battery Rack.25 2-BATT- PLANT BATTERY BATT- Screened
>RLGM Small panel bolted directly to wall using aAB-SH AB AMMETER SHUNT unistrut.
Box dimensions of48.5"x40.5"x8.5".
No interactions identified.
Also contains 2-BC-AB-SH.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8gto 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL. Anchorage screens to the RLGM inputbased on similar panels yielding significant seismic capacity margins.26 2-BATT- PLANT BATTERY CD Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CD for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forRLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46anchorage evaluation for the Battery Rack.27 2-BATT- PLANT BATTERY BATT- Screened
>RLGM Small panel bolted directly to wall using aCD-SH CD AMMETER SHUNT unistrut.
Box dimensions of 49"x40"x8.5".
No interactions identified.
Also contains 2-BC-CD-SH.
Equipment screens (other thananchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the RLGM input based on similarpanels yielding significant seismic capacitymargins.28 2-BC-AB2 PLANT BATTERY BATT- Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
AB CHARGER #2 for the 0'8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forRLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the BatteryCharger.
0Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 124 of 151CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF NotesUnit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #29 2-BC-CD1 PLANT BATTERY BATT- Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CD BATTERY for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRICHARGER #1 NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forRLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the BatteryCharger.30 2-BCTC- PLANT BATTERY Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
AB CHARGERS BC-AB1 for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRIAND BC-AB2 NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forTRANSFER PANEL RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46anchorage evaluation for the Panel.31 2-BCTC- PLANT BATTERY Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CD CHARGERS BC-CD1 for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRIAND BC-CD2 NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forTRANSFER PANEL RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46anchorage evaluation for the Panel.32 2-BLI-110 STEAM GENERATOR Screened
>RLGM Equipment bolted directly to wall on smallOME-3-1 WIDE RANGE bracket using four 1/2" bolts spaced at 6".LEVEL INDICATOR Supported on 2x2 tube steel cantilevered TRANSMITTER out from the wall, equipment support 3" fromthe wall.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Anchorage judged to beadequate for RLGM by inspection based onlight rack with rugged anchorage.
33 2-BLI-120 STEAM GENERATOR Screened
>RLGM Floor mounted rack seismically qualified toOME-3-2 WIDE RANGE IEEE-344-75.
LEVEL INDICATOR TRANSMITTER Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Anchorage judged to beadequate for RLGM by inspection based onlight rack with rugged anchorage.
34 2-BLI-130 STEAM GENERATOR Screened
>RLGM Mounted to wall using four 1/2" bolts spacedOME-3-3 WIDE RANGE at 6". Cantilevered out from wallLEVEL INDICATOR approximately 6".TRANSMITTER Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 PaRe 125 of 151CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF NotesUnit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage judged to beadequate for RLGM by inspection based onlight rack with rugged anchorage.
35 2-BLI-140 STEAM GENERATOR Screened
>RLGM Equipment bolted directly to wall using fourOME-3-4 WIDE RANGE 1/2" bolts spaced at 6". Supported on 2x2LEVEL INDICATOR tube steel cantilevered out from the wall,TRANSMITTER equipment supported 4.5" from the wall.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Anchorage judged to beadequate for RLGM by inspection based onlight rack with rugged anchorage.
36 2-CCV-AB 250VDC TRAIN 'B' Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CRITICAL SOLENOID for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRIVALVES DISTRIBUTION NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forPANEL RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the panel.37 2-CCV-CD 250VDC TRAIN 'A' Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CRITICAL SOLENOID for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRIVALVES DISTRIBUTION NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forPANEL RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the panel.38 2-CCW COMPONENT Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
COOLING WATER for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRICONTROL PANEL NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forRLGM based on similar panels within thecontrol room yielding significant seismiccapacity margins.39 2-CG1-14 REACTOR Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRICONTROL GROUP #1 NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forCABINET #14 RLGM based on similar cabinets yieldingsignificant seismic capacity margins.40 2-CG1-15 REACTOR Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRICONTROL GROUP #1 NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forCABINET #15 RLGM based on similar cabinets yieldingsignificant seismic capacity margins.41 2-CG2-17 REACTOR Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRICONTROL GROUP #2 NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forCABINET #17 RLGM based on similar cabinets yieldingsignificant seismic capacity margins.
SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 126 of 151CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF NotesUnit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #42 2-CG2-19 REACTOR Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRICONTROL GROUP #2 NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forCABINET #19 RLGM based on similar cabinets yieldingsignificant seismic capacity margins.43 2-CG3-20 REACTOR Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRICONTROL GROUP #3 NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forCABINET #20 RLGM based on similar cabinets yieldingsignificant seismic capacity margins.44 2-CG3-21 REACTOR Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRICONTROL GROUP #3 NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forCABINET #21 RLGM based on similar cabinets yieldingsignificant seismic capacity margins.45 2-CG4-22 REACTOR Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRICONTROL GROUP #4 NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forCABINET #22 RLGM based on similar cabinets yieldingsignificant seismic capacity margins.46 2-CG4-23 REACTOR Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRICONTROL GROUP #4 NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forCABINET #23 RLGM based on similar cabinets yieldingsignificant seismic capacity margins.47 2-CLI-1 14 CONDENSATE Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
STORAGE TANK TK-32 for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRILEVEL NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage judged to beINDICATORTRANSMITT adequate for RLGM by inspection based onER light rack with rugged anchorage.
48 2-CMO- COMPONENT Screened
>RLGM This valve falls within the Earthquake 413 COOLING WATER Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-PUMPS SUCTION NP-SL. Therefore, this valve screens for theCROSSTIE TRAIN 'B' 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-SHUTOFF VALVE 6041-SL.49 2-CMO- COMPONENT Screened
>RLGM This valve falls within the Earthquake 414 COOLING WATER Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-PUMPS DISCHARGE SL. Therefore, this valve screens for theCROSSTIE TRAIN 'B' 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-SHUTOFF VALVE 6041-SL.50 2-CMO- COMPONENT Screened
>RLGM This valve falls within the Earthquake 416 COOLING WATER TO Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-MISCELLANEOUS SL. Therefore, this valve screens for theSERVICE TRAIN 'B' 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-SHUTOFF VALVE 6041-SL.
SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 127 of 151CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF NotesUnit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #51 2-CMO- WEST RESIDUAL HEAT Screened
>RLGM This valve falls within the Earthquake 429 REMOVAL HEAT Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-EXCHANGER SL. Therefore, this valve screens for theCOMPONENT 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-COOLING WATER 6041-SL.OUTLET SHUTOFFVALVE52 2-CP CONDENSATE PUMP Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CONTROL PANEL for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forRLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46anchorage evaluation for the Panel.53 2-CRID-1 120VAC CONTROL Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
ROOM INSTRUMENT for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRIDISTRIBUTION NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forCHANNEL I RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46DISTRIBUTION PANEL anchorage evaluation for the Panel.54 2-CRID 120VAC CONTROL Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
INV ROOM for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRIINSTRUMENTATION NP-6041-SL.
The governing HCLPFDISTRIBUTION capacity according to S&A Calculation SYSTEM CHANNEL 1 13Q3208-CAL-004
-"HCLPF Calculations INVERTER for Screened in ESEP Components" (Ref.10.1) is 0.839g and therefore did not controlthe capacity.
55 2-CRID-2 120VAC CONTROL Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
ROOM INSTRUMENT for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRIDISTRIBUTION NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forCHANNEL II RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46DISTRIBUTION PANEL anchorage evaluation for the Panel.56 2-CRID 120VAC CONTROL Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
INV ROOM for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRIINSTRUMENTATION NP-6041-SL.
The governing HCLPFDISTRIBUTION capacity according to S&A Calculation SYSTEM CHANNEL 2 13Q3208-CAL-004
-"HCLPF Calculations INVERTER for Screened in ESEP Components" (Ref.10.1) is 0.839g and therefore did not controlthe capacity.
57 2-CRID-3 120VAC CONTROL Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
ROOM INSTRUMENT for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRIDISTRIBUTION NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forCHANNEL Ill RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46DISTRIBUTION PANEL anchorage evaluation for the Panel.58 2-CRID 120VAC CONTROL Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
INV ROOM for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRIINSTRUMENTATION NP-6041-SL.
The governing HCLPF SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 PaRe 128 of 151CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF NotesUnit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #DISTRIBUTION capacity according to S&A Calculation SYSTEM CHANNEL 3 13Q3208-CAL-004
-"HCLPF Calculations INVERTER for Screened in ESEP Components" (Ref.10.1) is 0.839g and therefore did not controlthe capacity.
59 2-CRID-4 120VAC CONTROL Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
ROOM INSTRUMENT for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRIDISTRIBUTION NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forCHANNEL IV RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46DISTRIBUTION PANEL anchorage evaluation for the Panel.59 2-CRID 120VAC CONTROL Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
INV ROOM for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRIINSTRUMENTATION NP-6041-SL.
The governing HCLPFDISTRIBUTION capacity according to S&A Calculation SYSTEM CHANNEL 4 13Q3208-CAL-004
-"HCLPF Calculations INVERTER for Screened in ESEP Components" (Ref.10.1) is 0.839g and therefore did not controlthe capacity.
61 2-DTU DELTA 'T' AND UNIT Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CONTROL PANEL for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forRLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46anchorage evaluation for the Panel.62 2-ELSC EMERGENCY LOCAL Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
INDICATION for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRISHUTDOWN AND NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forCOOLDOWN RLGM based on similar panels yieldingDISTRIBUTION PANEL significant seismic capacity margins.63 2-EZC-B 600VAC MOTOR Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CONTROL CENTER for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRIEZC-B NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forRLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46anchorage evaluation for the MCC.64 2-EZC-C 600VAC MOTOR Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CONTROL CENTER for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRIEZC-C NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forRLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46anchorage evaluation for the MCC.65 2-EZC-D 600VAC MOTOR Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CONTROL CENTER for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRIEZC-D NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forRLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46anchorage evaluation for the MCC.66 2-FFI-210 AUXILIARY Screened
>RLGM Bolted directly to wall with four 3/8" bolts.FEEDWATER TO Equipment supported on 2" pipe coming outSTEAM GENERATOR 7" from the wall and approximately 10" up.
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 PaRe 129 of 151CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF NotesUnit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #OME-3-1 FLOW There is a 5" spacing between the twoINDICATOR bottom bolts and between the left-most TRANSMITTER bolts. The top right-most bolt is spaced 10.5"from the top left-most bolt and 5" above thebottom row of bolts.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Anchorage judged to beadequate for RLGM by inspection based onlight rack with rugged anchorage.
67 2-FFI-220 AUX FEEDWATER TO Screened
>RLGM Supported by 2" pipe, extending 8" out andSG OME-3-2 FLOW 24" left. Anchorage mounted on a U-shapedINDICATOR pipe frame, which is then welded to steelTRANSMITTER column (box structure) on both sides.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Anchorage judged to beadequate for RLGM by inspection based onlight rack with rugged anchorage.
68 2-FFI-230 AUXILIARY Screened
>RLGM Supported by 2" pipe, extending 8" out andFEEDWATER TO 24" left. Anchorage mounted on a U-shapedSTEAM GENERATOR pipe frame, which is then welded to steelOME-3-3 FLOW column (box structure) on both sides.INDICATOR TRANSMITTER Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Anchorage judged to beadequate for RLGM by inspection based onlight rack with rugged anchorage.
69 2-FFI-240 AUXILIARY Screened
>RLGM Equipment mounted to the wall with fourFEEDWATER TO 3/8" bolts. Supported on 2" pipe, comingSTEAM GENERATOR 7.5" out from the wall and 7" up (8" fromOME-3-4 FLOW equipment to the top of vertical pipe).INDICATOR Equipment bolted to pipe with a 4" channel.TRANSMITTER Minimum spacing of bolts measured to be5". Anchorage consists of four 3/8" bolts.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Anchorage judged to beadequate for RLGM by inspection based onlight rack with rugged anchorage.
70 2-FI FIXED INCORE Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CONTROL PANEL for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 130 of 151CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF NotesUnit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forRLGM based on similar panels yieldingsignificant seismic capacity margins.71 2-FICT-A REACTOR CORE Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
THERMOCOUPLE for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRITRAIN 'A' NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forTRANSMITTER RLGM based on screening calculation to theCABINET RLGM.72 2-FLX FLUX CONTROL PANEL Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forRLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46anchorage evaluation for the Panel.77 2-HE-15W WEST COMPONENT Anchorage 0.547g Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
COOLING WATER for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRIHEAT EXCHANGER NP-6041-SL.
The block wall was far enoughaway to not be an interaction issue.Anchorage could not be screened for RLGMbased on scaling of existing USI A-46anchorage evaluation for the HeatExchanger.
Therefore, a HCLPF calculation was performed.
The governing HCLPFcapacity for the anchorage according to S&ACalculation 13Q3208-CAL-004
-"HCLPFCalculations for Screened in ESEPComponents" (Ref. 10.1) is 0.547g.78 2-HE-17W WEST RESIDUAL HEAT Screened
>RLGM Equipment is supported at the top withREMOVAL HEAT brackets in each of the 4 quadrants to resistEXCHANGER overturning loads. The bottom is supported by a heavy-duty steel gusset structure supported by two piers. There are two boltsin each pier. Based upon this inspection, theanchorage is adequate for the RLGMspectra.79 2-HSD2 UNIT 2 HOT Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
SHUTDOWN PANEL for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forRLGM based on similar panels yieldingsignificant seismic capacity margins.
Thegoverning HCLPF capacity for the block wallaccording to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-004 -"HCLPF Calculations forScreened in ESEP Components" (Ref. 10.1)is 2.682g and therefore did not control thecapacity.
SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 131 of 151CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF NotesUnit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #80 2-HV- CONTROL ROOM AIR Screened
>RLGM Chiller initially on vibration isolators, ACR-2 CONDITIONING SOUTH however later modified to be restrained in allLIQUID CHILLER directions to satisfy GIP outlier resolution.
Equipment screens for the 0.8g to 1.2 gscreening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened to a level greater thanthe RLGM by scaling the design basisanchorage calculation.
81 2-HV- CONTROL ROOM Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
ACRA-2 VENTILATION SOUTH. for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRIAIR CONDITIONING NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forUNIT RLGM based on similar air conditioning units yielding significant seismic capacitymargins.82 2-HV- OUTSIDE AIR TO Screened
>RLGM Damper included on HVAC duct work andACR-DA-2 CONTROL ROOM screens for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lanePRESSURIZATION/
in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Duct work screenedCLEANUP FILTER UNIT for RLGM based on existing analysis.
HV-ACRF VENTDAMPER #283 2-HV- CONTROL ROOM Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
ACRF PRESSURIZATION/
for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRICLEANUP FILTER UNIT NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forRLGM based on similar filter units yieldingsignificant seismic capacity margins.
Thegoverning HCLPF capacity for the block wallaccording to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-004 -"HCLPF Calculations forScreened in ESEP Components" (Ref. 10.1)is 1.215g and therefore, did not control thecapacity.
84 2-HV- CONTROL ROOM Screened
>RLGM The base frame is made of 4x4x3/8 angles,ACRF-2 PRESSURIZATION/
with a height of 21" to the top of the angleCLEANUP FILTER frame and an additional 30" to the center ofUNITVENT FAN #2 the fan unit. The governing HCLPF capacityfor the block wall according to S&ACalculation 13Q3208-CAL-004
-"HCLPFCalculations for Screened in ESEPComponents" (Ref. 10.1) is 1.215g.85 2-HV- CONTROL ROOM Screened
>RLGM Heater included on HVAC duct work andACR-H2 VENTILATION SOUTH screens for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening laneDUCT ELECTRIC in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Duct work screenedHEATER for RLGM based on existing analysis.
87 2-HV- AB BATTERY Screened
>RLGM Weight of fan is 360 lbs. Fan is hung fromSGRX-5 EQUIPMENT AREA ceiling in vertical alignment.
Fan anchored to SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 132 of 151CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF NotesUnit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #BATTERY ROOM the shim plate which is anchored to ceilingVENTILATION with sixteen 1/2" bolts into embedded angleEXHAUST FAN in ceiling.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forRLGM based on weight of fan compared torugged anchorage.
88 2-HV- CD BATTERY Screened
>RLGM Weight of fan is judged to be maximum ofSGRX-6 EQUIPMENT AREA 500 lbs. Fan is bolted to steel platform whichBATTERY ROOM is bolted to the wall on 2 sides andVENTILATION supported by an angle column at the otherEXHAUST FAN corner.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forRLGM based on weight of fan compared torugged anchorage.
90 2-1CM-129 REACTOR COOLANT Screened
>RLGM This valve falls within the Earthquake LOOP #2 HOT LEG TO Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-RESIDUAL HEAT SL. Therefore, this valve screens for theREMOVAL PUMPS 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-SUCTION 6041-SL.CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE91 2-ICM-251 BORON INJECTION Screened
>RLGM This valve falls outside the Earthquake TANK TRAIN 'B' Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-OUTLET SL. However, this valve screens for the 0.8gCONTAINMENT to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041ISOLATION VALVE based on analysis performed for a 3g input.93 2-IFI-51 BORON INJECTION TO Screened
>RLGM Anchorage consists of four bolts in aREACTOR COOLANT reinforced concrete wall. Two bolts on theLOOP #1 FLOW left are for an embedded unistrut and twoINDICATOR bolts on the right are 1/2" expansion anchors.TRANSMITTER Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forRLGM based on light rack with ruggedanchorage.
94 2-IFI-52 BORON INJECTION TO Screened
>RLGM Rack is light and anchored with four bolts.REACTOR COOLANT Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
LOOP #2 FLOW for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRIINDICATOR NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forTRANSMITTER RLGM based on light rack with rugged SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic1303208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 133 of 151CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF NotesUnit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #anchorage.
95 2-IFI-53 BORON INJECTION TO Screened
>RLGM Equipment mounted to wall using two boltsREACTOR COOLANT to embedded unistrut.
Equipment also U-LOOP #3 FLOW bolted to the 2" support pipe cantilevered upINDICATOR approximately 14". Equipment screensTRANSMITTER (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 gscreening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based onlight rack with rugged anchorage.
96 2-IFI-54 BORON INJECTION TO Screened
>RLGM Rack is light and anchored to the floor withREACTOR COOLANT four bolts. Equipment screens (other thanLOOP #4 FLOW anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening INDICATOR lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage TRANSMITTER screened for RLGM based on light rack withrugged anchorage.
98 2-IMO-256 BORON INJECTION Screened
>RLGM This valve falls outside the Earthquake TANK TRAIN 'B' INLET Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-SHUTOFF VALVE SL. However, this valve screens for the 0.8gto 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL based on analysis performed for a 3g input.The Block Wall interaction was screened forRLGM based on scaling of existing designbasis calculation.
99 2-IMO-310 EAST RESIDUAL HEAT Seismic 0.435g This valve falls within the Earthquake REMOVAL PUMP PP- Interaction Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-35E SUCTION SL. Therefore, this valve screens for theSHUTOFF VALVE 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
The governing HCLPF capacityfor the block wall according to S&ACalculation 13Q3208-CAL-004
-"HCLPFCalculations for Screened in ESEPComponents" (Ref. 10.1) is 0.435g.100 2-IMO-324 WEST RHR HX 2-HE- Screened
>RLGM This valve falls within the Earthquake 17W DISCHARGE Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-CROSSTIE SHUTOFF SL. Therefore, this valve screens for theVALVE 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.110 2-LDISB-CONTAINMENT Screened
>RLGM The hydrogen igniters are composed of theB24 HYDROGEN IGNITION Igniter Box, glow plug, shield and otherLOWER VOLUME associated hardware.
All components of theTRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG igniter system were seismically mounted toASSEMBLY
#B24 prevent any interference with safety relatedequipment during and after a design basisseismic event. The components within theigniter box are not fragile and areencompassed by that typically contained in SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 134 of 151CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF NotesUnit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #other electrical boxes. Therefore, it isdetermined that the screening lanescontained in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8gto 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL. Anchorage screened for RLGM basedon scaling existing anchorage evaluation.
111 2-LDISB-CONTAINMENT Screened
>RLGM Equipment bolted directly to Column 8 ofB25 HYDROGEN IGNITION Quad 4. See notes for 2-LDISB-B24.
LOWER VOLUME Assembly screened for 0.8g to 1.2gTRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL andASSEMBLY
#B25 anchorage loadings for RLGM.112 2-LDISB-CONTAINMENT Screened
>RLGM See notes for 2-LDISB-B24.
AssemblyB26 HYDROGEN IGNITION screened for 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane inLOWER VOLUME EPRI NP-6041-SL and anchorage loadingsTRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG for RLGM.ASSEMBLY
#B26113 2-LDISB-CONTAINMENT Screened
>RLGM Box bolted to unistruts attached directly toB27 HYDROGEN IGNITION column. See notes for 2-LDISB-B24.
LOWER VOLUME Assembly screened for 0.8g to 1.2gTRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL andASSEMBLY
#B27 anchorage loadings for RLGM.115 2-LDISB-CONTAINMENT Screened
>RLGM Equipment bolted to unistrut, which isB35 HYDROGEN IGNITION welded directly to Column 11. See notes forLOWER VOLUME 2-LDISB-B24.
Assembly screened for 0.8gTRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL ASSEMBLY
#B35 and anchorage loadings for RLGM.118 2-LSI-1 STEAM GENERATORS Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
#1 AND #4 LOCAL for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRISHUTDOWN STATION NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forRLGM based on similar equipment yieldingsignificant seismic capacity margins.119 2-LSI-2 STEAM GENERATORS Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
#2 AND #3 LOCAL for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRISHUTDOWN STATION NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forRLGM based on similar equipment yieldingsignificant seismic capacity margins.120 2-LSI-3 REACTOR COOLANT Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
SYSTEM CHARGING for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRIAND LETDOWN LOCAL NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forSHUTDOWN STATION RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46anchorage evaluation.
121 2-MCAB 250VDC DISTRIBUTION Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PANEL MCAB for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forRLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 135 of 151CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF NotesUnit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #anchorage evaluation for the panel.122 2-MCCD 250VDC DISTRIBUTION Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
POWER PANEL for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forRLGM based on similar panels yieldingsignificant seismic capacity margins.123 2-MDAB 250VDC DISTRIBUTION Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PANEL MDAB for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forRLGM based on similar panels yieldingsignificant seismic capacity margins.124 2-MDCD 250VDC DISTRIBUTION Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PANEL MDCD for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forRLGM based on similar panels yieldingsignificant seismic capacity margins.125 2-MPP- STEAM GENERATOR Screened
>RLGM Equipment is mounted directly to the wall210 OME-3-1 CHANNEL I using two 1/2" bolts, spaced at 4.5".STEAM PRESSURE Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
TRANSMITTER for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forRLGM based on light bracket with relatively rugged anchorage.
126 2-MPP- STEAM GENERATOR Screened
>RLGM Equipment is cantilevered from the wall by220 OME-3-2 CHANNEL I two 1/2" bolts, and surrounded by anSTEAM PRESSURE enclosure.
Equipment screens (other thanTRANSMITTER anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on light bracketwith relatively rugged anchorage.
127 2-MPP- STEAM GENERATOR Screened
>RLGM Equipment is supported by two 3/8" bolts.230 OME-3-3 CHANNEL I Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
STEAM PRESSURE for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRITRANSMITTER NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forRLGM based on light bracket with relatively rugged anchorage.
128 2-MPP- STEAM GENERATOR Screened
>RLGM Equipment bolted directly to wall using two240 OME-3-4 CHANNEL I 1/2" bolts spaced at 4.5". Equipment STEAM PRESSURE screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8gTRANSMITTER to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL. Anchorage screened for RLGM basedon light bracket with relatively ruggedanchorage.
129 2-MRV- STEAM GENERATOR Screened
>RLGM This valve falls within the Earthquake 213 OME-3-1 POWER Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-OPERATED RELIEF SL. Therefore, this valve screens for the Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 136 of 151CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF NotesUnit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #VALVE 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.130 2-MRV- STEAM GENERATOR Screened
>RLGM This valve falls outside the Earthquake 223 OME-3-2 POWER Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-OPERATED SL. However, this valve screens for the 0.8gRELIEFVALVE to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL based on analysis performed to 3g.131 2-MRV- STEAM GENERATOR Screened
>RLGM This valve falls outside the Earthquake 233 OME-3-3 POWER Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-OPERATED SL. However, this valve screens for the 0.8gRELIEFVALVE to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL based on analysis performed to 3g.132 2-MRV- STEAM GENERATOR Screened
>RLGM This valve falls within the Earthquake 243 OME-3-4 POWER Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-OPERATED RELIEF SL. Therefore, this valve screens for theVALVE 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.133 2-NIS-I NUCLEAR Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
INSTRUMENTATION for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRISYSTEM PROTECTION NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forCHANNEL I CONTROL RLGM based on similar panels yieldingPANEL significant seismic capacity margins.134 2-NLP- PRESSURIZER OME-4 Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage) 151 PROTECTION for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRICHANNEL I LEVEL NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forTRANSMITTER RLGM based on light rack with ruggedanchorage.
135 2-NPS- REACTOR VESSEL Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage) 110 TRAIN 'A' WIDE RANGE for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRIPRESSURE NP-6041 based on existing rack qualification TRANSMITTER for a similar transmitter.
The rack isseismically qualified to IEEE-344-75.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on asimilar transmitter yielding significant seismic capacity margins.139 2-NRI NUCLEAR Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
AMP INSTRUMENTATION for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRIWIDE RANGE NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forRADIATION AMPLIFIER RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46anchorage evaluation.
150 2-OME-33 TURBINE DRIVEN Screened
>RLGM Strainer supported on two 14" wide, 12"AUXILIARY FEED deep, and 18" tall concrete pedestals.
PUMP PP-4 SUCTION Equipment bolted to pedestals with four 3/4"STRAINER anchor bolts, one set of two bolts in eachpedestal, spaced at 6" apart. The piping iswell supported and the strainer is small SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 137 of 151CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF NotesUnit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #relative to the anchorage.
Therefore, thisequipment is screened for the RLGM.151 2-OME- WEST ESSENTIAL Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage) 34W SERVICE WATER for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRIPUMP PP-7W DISCH NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forSTN RLGM based on similar pumps yieldingsignificant seismic capacity margins.156 2-PP-10W WEST COMPONENT Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
COOLING WATER for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRIPUMP NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forRLGM based on anchor analysis performed to RLGM.157 2-PP-35W WEST RESIDUAL HEAT Seismic 0.428g Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
REMOVAL PUMP Interaction for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forRLGM based on similar filter units yieldingsignificant seismic capacity margins.
Thepotentially governing Block Wall interaction could not be screened for RLGM based onscaling of existing design basis calculation.
Therefore, a HCLPF calculation wasperformed.
The governing HCLPF capacityfor the block wall according to S&ACalculation 13Q3208-CAL-004
-"HCLPFCalculations for Screened in ESEPComponents" (Ref. 10.1) is 0.428g.158 2-PP-4 TURBINE DRIVEN Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
AUXILIARY FEED for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRIPUMP NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forRLGM based on anchor analysis performed to RLGM.159 2-PP-46-4 BORIC ACID STORAGE Seismic 0.227g The pump weighs 511 lbs. Equipment TANKS TRANSFER Interaction screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8gPUMP #4 to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL. Anchorage screened for RLGM basedon the small size of the pump and similarpumps yielding significant seismic capacitymargins.
The HCLPF is limited by seismicinteraction with the piping attached to theBoric Acid Tank. The governing HCLPFcapacity according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-005-
"High Confidence LowProbability of Failure (HCLPF) Calculations for Screened in ESEP Tanks" (Ref. 10.2) is0.227g that is less than the RLGM of0.387g.
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 138 of 151CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF NotesUnit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #160 2-PP-82S CONTROL ROOM AIR Screened
>RLGM The pump weighs 214 lbs. Equipment CONDITIONING SOUTH screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8gCHILL WATER to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-CIRCULATION PUMP SL. Anchorage screened for RLGM basedon the small size of the pump and similarpumps yielding significant seismic capacitymargins.161 2-PPA- UPPER CONTAINMENT Screened
>RLGM Rack is supported with 2" tube steel310 CHANNEL III WIDE anchored to the wall with four plates eachRANGE PRESSURE employing two 3/8" anchor bolts, and to theALARM TRANSMITTER floor with one plate employing four 3/8"anchor bolts. Equipment screens (otherthan anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 gscreening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based onrack with rugged anchorage.
162 2-PRZ PRESSURIZER Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CONTROL PANEL for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forRLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46anchorage evaluation for the Panel.163 2-QLA- SOUTH BORIC ACID Seismic 0.227g Equipment screens (other than anchorage) 430 STORAGE TANK TK- Interaction for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI12S LEVEL ALARM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forTRANSMITTER RLGM based on rack with ruggedanchorage.
The HCLPF is limited byseismic interaction with the piping attachedto the Boric Acid Tank. The governing HCLPF capacity according to S&ACalculation 13Q3208-CAL-005
-"HighConfidence Low Probability of Failure(HCLPF) Calculations for Screened in ESEPTanks" (Ref. 10.2) is 0.227g, that is lessthan the RLGM of 0.387g.164 2-QRV- AIR OPERATED VALVE Screened
>RLGM This valve falls within the Earthquake 200 TO ISOLATE BORON Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-INJECTION PATH SL. Therefore, this valve screens for the0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.165 2-QT-506 TURBINE DRIVEN Screened
>RLGM This valve falls within the Earthquake AUXILIARY FEED Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-PUMP PP-4 TRIP SL. Therefore, this valve screens for theANDTHROTTLE VALVE 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.166 2-QT-507 AUXILIARY FEED Screened
>RLGM This valve falls within the Earthquake PUMP TURBINE Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 139 of 151CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF NotesUnit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #GOVERNOR VALVE SL. Therefore, this valve screens for the0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.167 2-QTC- SOUTH BAST TK-12S Seismic 0.227g Equipment welded to one support leg of 2-430 TRAIN 'A' HTR TEMP Interaction TK-12S and supported on a 2" pipeCONTROLLER cantilevered off the tank leg 15" to the rightand 9" up. The support pipe is only weldedat the top of the connection located 28"above the top of the concrete pedestal.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forRLGM based on rugged configuration of thesupport.
The HCLPF is limited by seismicinteraction with the piping attached to theBoric Acid Tank. The governing HCLPFcapacity according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-005
-"High Confidence LowProbability of Failure (HCLPF) Calculations for Screened in ESEP Tanks" (Ref. 10.2) is0.227g that is less than the RLGM of0.387g.168 2-RHR RESIDUAL HEAT Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
REMOVAL CONTROL for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRIPANEL NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to theRLGM based on similar panels within thecontrol room yielding significant seismiccapacity margins.169 2-RPC-1-1 REACTOR Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRICHANNEL I CABINET NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the#1 RLGM based on similar cabinets yieldingsignificant seismic capacity margins.170 2-RPC-1-2 REACTOR Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRICHANNEL I CABINET NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the#2 RLGM based on similar cabinets yieldingsignificant seismic capacity margins.171 2-RPC-1-3 REACTOR Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRICHANNEL I CABINET NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the#3 RLGM based on similar cabinets yieldingsignificant seismic capacity margins.172 2-RPC-1-4 REACTOR Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRICHANNEL I CABINET NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 140 of 151CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF NotesUnit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item ##4 RLGM based on similar cabinets yieldingsignificant seismic capacity margins.173 2-RPC-2-5 REACTOR Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRICHANNEL II CABINET NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the#5 RLGM based on similar cabinets yieldingsignificant seismic capacity margins.174 2-RPC-2-6 REACTOR Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRICHANNEL II CABINET NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the#6 RLGM based on similar cabinets yieldingsignificant seismic capacity margins.175 2-RPC-2-7 REACTOR Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRICHANNEL II CABINET NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the#7 RLGM based on similar cabinets yieldingsignificant seismic capacity margins.176 2-RPC-2-8 REACTOR Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRICHANNEL II CABINET NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the#8 RLGM based on similar cabinets yieldingsignificant seismic capacity margins.177 2-RPC REACTOR Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage) 10 PROTECTION for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRICHANNEL Ill CABINET NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the#10 RLGM based on similar cabinets yieldingsignificant seismic capacity margins.178 2-RPC-3-9 REACTOR Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRICHANNEL III CABINET NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the#9 RLGM based on similar cabinets yieldingsignificant seismic capacity margins.179 2-RPC REACTOR Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage) 12 PROTECTION for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRICHANNEL IV CABINET NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the#12 RLGM based on similar cabinets yieldingsignificant seismic capacity margins.180 2-RPS-A REACTOR Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION AND for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRISAFEGUARD NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forACTUATION TRAIN 'A' RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46CABINET anchorage evaluation.
181 2-RPS-B REACTOR Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION AND for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRISAFEGUARD NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forACTUATION TRAIN 'B' RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 141 of 151CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF NotesUnit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #CABINET anchorage evaluation.
182 2-RPSX-A REACTOR Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION AND for the 0.89 to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRISAFEGUARD NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forACTUATION TRAIN 'A' RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46AUXILIARY CABINET anchorage evaluation.
183 2-RPSX-B REACTOR Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION AND for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRISAFEGUARD NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forACTUATION TRAIN 'B' RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46AUXILIARY CABINET anchorage evaluation.
184 2-RVLC REACTOR VESSEL Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
OME-1 WATER LEVEL for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRIINSTRUMENTATION NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to theCABINET RLGM based on similar cabinets yieldingsignificant seismic capacity margins.185 2-SA STATION AUXILIARIES Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CONTROL PANEL for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to theRLGM based on similar panels within thecontrol room yielding significant seismiccapacity margins.186 2-SG STEAM GENERATOR Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
AND AUXILIARY FEED for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRIPUMP CONTROL NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forPANEL RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46anchorage evaluation.
187 2-SIS SAFETY INJECTION Screened
>RLGM The panel is welded along the bottom frontCONTROL PANEL edge to embedded steel and braced back atthe top to reinforced concrete wall. The topof the panel frames back to 2-SSR which isanchored at the top to reinforced concretewall with six expansion anchors.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8gto 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL. Anchorage screened for RLGM basedon rugged configuration of the support.188 2-SPY CONTAINMENT SPRAY Screened
>RLGM The panel is welded along the bottom frontCONTROL PANEL edge to embedded steel and braced back atthe top to reinforced concrete wall. The topof the panel frames back to 2-SSR which isanchored at the top to reinforced concretewall with six expansion anchors.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8gto 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL. Anchorage screened for RLGM based 0SExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 142 of 151CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF NotesUnit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #on rugged configuration of the support.189 2-SSR ENGINEER SAFETY Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
SYSTEM REAR for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRIINSTRUMENT/RELAY NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to theRACK RLGM based on similar equipment withinthe control room yielding significant seismiccapacity margins.190 2-SWR NUCLEAR Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
INSTRUMENTAL for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRISOURCE RANGE N21 NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to theINSTRUMENT/RELAY RLGM based on similar equipment withinRACK the control room yielding significant seismiccapacity margins.191 2-T21A 4KV BUS T21A Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
SWITCHGEAR for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to theRLGM based on anchorage evaluation performed to the RLGM.192 2-TDAB 250VDC TRAIN 'B' Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
TRANSFER CABINET for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forRLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46anchorage evaluation.
193 2-TDCD 250VDC TRAIN 'A' Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
TRANSFER CABINET for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to theRLGM based on similar cabinets yieldingsignificant seismic capacity margins.194 2-TK-1 1 BORON INJECTION Anchorage 0.45g The Block Wall interaction was screened forTANK RLGM based on scaling of existing designbasis calculation.
The tank screening wasperformed using the existing evaluation for asimilar tank (2-TK-12S) with the samesupport conditions.
Tank 2-TK-12S could notbe screened to the RLGM, and thus Tank 2-TK-1 1 did not screen. A HCLPF calculation for the tank was performed.
The governing HCLPF capacity according to S&ACalculation 13Q3208-CAL-005
-"HighConfidence Low Probability of Failure(HCLPF) Calculations for Screened in ESEPTanks" (Ref. 10.2) is 0.45g for the weldedconnections.
195 2-TK-12S SOUTH BORIC ACID Anchorage 0.227g The Block Wall interaction was screened forSTORAGE TANK RLGM based on scaling of existing designbasis calculation.
Existing evaluation for the SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 143 of 151CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF NotesUnit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #tank shows no additional margin for DBEinput. Therefore, this tank did not screen tothe RLGM and a HCLPF calculation for thetank was performed.
The governing HCLPFcapacity according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-005
-"High Confidence LowProbability of Failure (HCLPF) Calculations for Screened in ESEP Tanks" (Ref. 10.2) is0.227g for the tank support that is less thanthe RLGM of 0.387g.198 2-TK-253-PRESSURIZER TRAIN Screened
>RLGM Tanks 2-TK-3, -5, &-7 grouped together and3 'B' PRESSURE RELIEF anchored by four plates bolted to the wallVLV NRV-152 with two 3/4" bolts in each plate. The platesEMERGENCY AIR measured 19" and 44" from the floor to plateTANK centerlines.
The tanks are 9" diameter and56" tall. The air bottles are strapped withbrackets affixed to the wall by four platesemploying two W" bolts each. Note that tankconfiguration has changed since A-46evaluation but does not change theconclusion.
Equipment screens (other thananchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on ruggedconfiguration of support.199 2-TK-253-PRESSURIZER TRAIN Screened
>RLGM Tanks 2-TK-4, -6, &-8 grouped together and4 'A' PRESSURE RELIEF anchored by four plates bolted to the wallVLV NRV-153 with two 3/4" bolts in each plate. The platesEMERGENCY AIR measured 19" and 44" from the floor to plateTANK centerlines.
The tanks are 9" diameter and56" tall. The air bottles are strapped withbrackets affixed to the wall by four platesemploying two W" bolts each. Note that tankconfiguration has changed since A-46evaluation but does not change theconclusion.
Equipment screens (other thananchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on ruggedconfiguration of support.200 2-TK-253-PRESSURIZER TRAIN Screened
>RLGM Tanks 2-TK-3, -5, &-7 grouped together and5 'B' PRESSURE RELIEF anchored by four plates bolted to the wallVLV NRV-152 with two 3/4" bolts in each plate. The platesEMERGENCY AIR measured 19" and 44" from the floor to plateTANK centerlines.
The tanks are 9" diameter and56" tall. The air bottles are strapped with SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 PaRe 144 of 151CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF NotesUnit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #brackets affixed to the wall by four platesemploying two %" bolts each. Note that tankconfiguration has changed since A-46evaluation but does not change theconclusion.
Equipment screens (other thananchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on ruggedconfiguration of support.201 2-TK-253-PRESSURIZER TRAIN Screened
>RLGM Tanks 2-TK-4, -6, &-8 grouped together and6 'A' PRESSURE RELIEF anchored by four plates bolted to the wallVLV NRV-153 with two 3/4" bolts in each plate. The platesEMERGENCY AIR measured 19" and 44" from the floor to plateTANK centerlines.
The tanks are 9" diameter and56" tall. The air bottles are strapped withbrackets affixed to the wall by four platesemploying two %" bolts each. Note that tankconfiguration has changed since A-46evaluation but does not change theconclusion.
Equipment screens (other thananchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on ruggedconfiguration of support.202 2-TK-253-PRESSURIZER TRAIN Screened
>RLGM Tanks 2-TK-3, -5, &-7 grouped together and7 'B' PRESSURE RELIEF anchored by four plates bolted to the wallVLV NRV-152 with two 3/4" bolts in each plate. The platesEMERGENCY AIR measured 19" and 44" from the floor to plateTANK centerlines.
The tanks are 9" diameter and56" tall. The air bottles are strapped withbrackets affixed to the wall by four platesemploying two %" bolts each. Note that tankconfiguration has changed since A-46evaluation but does not change theconclusion.
Equipment screens (other thananchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on ruggedconfiguration of support.203 2-TK-253-PRESSURIZER TRAIN Screened
>RLGM Tanks 2-TK-4, -6, &-8 grouped together and8 'A' PRESSURE RELIEF anchored by four plates bolted to the wallVLV NRV-153 with two 3/4" bolts in each plate. The platesEMERGENCY AIR measured 19" and 44" from the floor to plateTANK centerlines.
The tanks are 9" diameter and56" tall. The air bottles are strapped withbrackets affixed to the wall by four plates 0Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 PaRe 145 of 151CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF NotesUnit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #employing two %" bolts each. Note that tankconfiguration has changed since A-46evaluation but does not change theconclusion.
Equipment screens (other thananchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on ruggedconfiguration of support.204 2-TK-32 CONDENSATE Anchorage 0.481g Rust was found on the strap supports.
ASTORAGE TANK HCLPF calculation was performed for thedegraded condition.
The governing HCLPFcapacity according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-005
-"High Confidence LowProbability of Failure (HCLPF) Calculations for Screened in ESEP Tanks" (Ref. 10.2) is0.481g.205 2-TK-37 COMPONENT Anchorage 0.447g Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
COOLING WATER for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRISURGE TANK NP-60411-SL.
Potentially governing BlockWall interaction and the tank anchorage could not be screened for RLGM. Thegoverning HCLPF capacity according toS&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-005
-"HighConfidence Low Probability of Failure(HCLPF) Calculations for Screened in ESEPTanks" (Ref. 10.2) is 0.447g for the tankanchorage.
206 2-TR21A 600V BUS 21A SUPPLY Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
TRANSFORMER for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forRLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46anchorage evaluation.
The governing HCLPF capacity for the block wall according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-004
-"HCLPF Calculations for Screened in ESEPComponents" (Ref. 10.1) is 1.270g and didnot control the capacity.
207 2-TR- TRANSFORMER FOR Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
AFWX AFWX DIST PANEL for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forRLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46anchorage evaluation.
208 2-TR- TRANSFORMER FOR Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
ELSC ELSC DIST PANEL for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forRLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46
& 1U3Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 146 of 151CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF NotesUnit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #anchorage evaluation.
209 2-UDISB-CONTAINMENT Screened
>RLGM Igniter box is attached to horizontal unistruts B1 HYDROGEN IGNITION bolted to vertical embedded unistruts.
TheUPPER VOLUME TRAIN hydrogen igniters are composed of the'B' GLOW PLUG Igniter Box, glow plug, shield and otherASSEMBLY
#B1 associated hardware.
The components within the igniter box are not fragile and areencompassed by that typically contained inother electrical boxes. Equipment screens(other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 gscreening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based onscaling existing anchorage evaluation.
210 2-UDISB-CONTAINMENT Screened
>RLGM Igniter box is bolted to horizontal unistruts B13 HYDROGEN IGNITION bolted to an embedded vertical unistrut onUPPER VOLUME TRAIN the left and a 3/8" expansion anchor on the'B' GLOW PLUG right. See notes for 2-UDISB-BI.
ASSEMBLY
#B13211 2-UDISB-CONTAINMENT Screened
>RLGM Igniter box is bolted to horizontal unistruts B14 HYDROGEN IGNITION bolted to an embedded vertical unistrut onUPPER VOLUME TRAIN the left and a 3/8" expansion anchor on the'B' GLOW PLUG right. See notes for 2-UDISB-B1.
ASSEMBLY
#B14212 2-UDISB-CONTAINMENT Screened
>RLGM Igniter box is bolted to horizontal unistruts B15 HYDROGEN IGNITION bolted to an embedded vertical unistrut onUPPER VOLUME TRAIN the left and a 3/8" expansion anchor on the'B' GLOW PLUG right. See notes for 2-UDISB-B1.
ASSEMBLY
#B15213 2-UDISB-CONTAINMENT Screened
>RLGM Igniter box is bolted to horizontal unistruts B16 HYDROGEN IGNITION bolted to an embedded vertical unistrut onUPPER VOLUME TRAIN the left and a 3/8" expansion anchor on the'B' GLOW PLUG right. See notes for 2-UDISB-B1.
ASSEMBLY
#B16214 2-UDISB-CONTAINMENT Screened
>RLGM Igniter box is bolted to horizontal unistruts B17 HYDROGEN IGNITION bolted to an embedded vertical unistrut onUPPER VOLUME TRAIN the left and a 3/8" expansion anchor on the'B' GLOW PLUG right. See notes for 2-UDISB-B1.
ASSEMBLY
#B17215 2-UDISB-CONTAINMENT Screened
>RLGM Igniter box is attached to horizontal unistruts B2 HYDROGEN IGNITION bolted to vertical embedded unistruts.
SeeUPPER VOLUME TRAIN notes for 2-UDISB-B1.
'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B2216 2-UDISB-CONTAINMENT Screened
>RLGM Igniter box is bolted to two horizontal B29 HYDROGEN IGNITION unistruts which are welded directly to theUPPER VOLUME TRAIN column. The hydrogen igniters are 0Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 147 of 151CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF NotesUnit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #'B' GLOW PLUG composed of the Igniter Box, glow plug,ASSEMBLY
#B29 shield and other associated hardware.
Theigniters attached to the catwalk wide flangemembers.
A HCLPF calculation wasperformed for 2-UDISB-B29.
The governing HCLPF capacity for the catwalk according toS&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-006
-"HighConfidence Low Probability of Failure(HCLPF) Calculations for Containment Catwalk and Attached Hydrogen GlowPlugs"" (Ref. 10.3) is 0.86g and did notcontrol capacity.
217 2-UDISB-CONTAINMENT Screened
>RLGM Igniter box is attached to horizontal unistruts B3 HYDROGEN IGNITION bolted to vertical embedded unistruts.
SeeUPPER VOLUME TRAIN notes for 2-UDISB-BI.
'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B3218 2-UDISB-CONTAINMENT Screened
>RLGM Igniter box is bolted to two horizontal B30 HYDROGEN IGNITION unistruts which are welded directly to theUPPER VOLUME TRAIN column. The hydrogen igniters are'B' GLOW PLUG composed of the Igniter Box, glow plug,ASSEMBLY
#B30 shield and other associated hardware.
Theigniters attached to the catwalk wide flangemembers.
A HCLPF calculation wasperformed for 2-UDISB-B29.
The governing HCLPF capacity for the catwalk according toS&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-006
-"HighConfidence Low Probability of Failure(HCLPF) Calculations for Containment Catwalk and Attached Hydrogen GlowPlugs"" (Ref. 10.3) is 0.86g and did notcontrol capacity.
219 2-UDISB-CONTAINMENT Screened
>RLGM Igniter box is bolted to two horizontal B31 HYDROGEN IGNITION unistruts which are welded directly to theUPPER VOLUME TRAIN column. The hydrogen igniters are'B' GLOW PLUG composed of the Igniter Box, glow plug,ASSEMBLY
#B31 shield and other associated hardware.
Theigniters attached to the catwalk wide flangemembers.
A HCLPF calculation wasperformed for 2-UDISB-B29.
The governing HCLPF capacity for the catwalk according toS&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-006
-"HighConfidence Low Probability of Failure(HCLPF) Calculations for Containment Catwalk and Attached Hydrogen GlowPlugs"" (Ref. 10.3) is 0.86g and did not sr~Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 148 of 151CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF NotesUnit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #control capacity.
220 2-UDISB-CONTAINMENT Screened
>RLGM Igniter box is bolted to two vertical unistruts B32 HYDROGEN IGNITION which are U-bolted to the top and bottomUPPER VOLUME TRAIN handrail of the catwalk.
The hydrogen'B' GLOW PLUG igniters are composed of the Igniter Box,ASSEMBLY
#B32 glow plug, shield and other associated hardware.
A HCLPF calculation wasperformed for 2-UDISB-B32.
The governing HCLPF capacity for the catwalk according toS&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-006
-"HighConfidence Low Probability of Failure(HCLPF) Calculations for Containment Catwalk and Attached Hydrogen GlowPlugs"" (Ref. 10.3) is 0.86g and did notcontrol capacity.
221 2-UDISB-CONTAINMENT Screened
>RLGM Igniter box is bolted to two vertical unistruts B33 HYDROGEN IGNITION which are U-bolted to the top and bottomUPPER VOLUME TRAIN handrail of the catwalk.
The hydrogen'B' GLOW PLUG igniters are composed of the Igniter Box,ASSEMBLY
#B33 glow plug, shield and other associated hardware.
A HCLPF calculation wasperformed for 2-UDISB-B32.
The governing HCLPF capacity for the catwalk according toS&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-006
-"HighConfidence Low Probability of Failure(HCLPF) Calculations for Containment Catwalk and Attached Hydrogen GlowPlugs"" (Ref. 10.3) is 0.86g and did notcontrol capacity.
222 2-UDISB-CONTAINMENT Screened
>RLGM Igniter box is bolted to two vertical unistruts B34 HYDROGEN IGNITION which are U-bolted to the top and bottomUPPER VOLUME TRAIN handrail of the catwalk.
The hydrogen'B' GLOW PLUG igniters are composed of the Igniter Box,ASSEMBLY
#B34 glow plug, shield and other associated hardware.
A HCLPF calculation wasperformed for 2-UDISB-B32.
The governing HCLPF capacity for the catwalk according toS&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-006
-"HighConfidence Low Probability of Failure(HCLPF) Calculations for Containment Catwalk and Attached Hydrogen GlowPlugs"" (Ref. 10.3) is 0.86g and did notcontrol capacity.
223 2-UDISB-CONTAINMENT Screened
>RLGM Box dimensions are 16"x12"x8".
Unistruts B4 HYDROGEN IGNITION are approximately 16" apart vertically forUPPER VOLUME TRAIN support.
Horizontal running support SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 149 of 151CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF NotesUnit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #'B' GLOW PLUG unistruts are bolted to embedded unistruts ASSEMBLY
#B4 spaced at 48" from each other, runningvertically.
The box is located such that thebottom of the box is flush with the bottomhorizontal
: unistrut, and 15" from the centerof the box to the right vertically runningembedded unistrut.
See discussion for 2-UDISB-B1.
Assemblyscreens for 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane inEPRI NP-6041-SL (Ref. 1) and anchorage loadings from RLGM input spectra (Ref. 2)224 2-UDISB-CONTAINMENT Screened
>RLGM Igniter box is attached to horizontal unistruts B5 HYDROGEN IGNITION bolted to vertical embedded unistruts.
SeeUPPER VOLUME TRAIN notes for 2-UDISB-BI.
'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B5225 2-UDISB-CONTAINMENT Screened
>RLGM Igniter box is attached to horizontal unistruts B6 HYDROGEN IGNITION bolted to vertical embedded unistruts.
SeeUPPER VOLUME TRAIN notes for 2-UDISB-B1.
'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B6226 2-UDISB-CONTAINMENT Screened
>RLGM Igniter box is attached to horizontal unistruts B7 HYDROGEN IGNITION bolted to vertical embedded unistruts.
SeeUPPER VOLUME TRAIN notes for 2-UDISB-B1.
'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B7227 2-VR- LOWER CONTAINMENT Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
LDISB-4 TRAIN B DISTRIBUTED for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRIIGNITION SYSTEM NP-6041-SL.
The governing HCLPFVOLTAGE REGULATOR capacity according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-004
-"HCLPF Calculations for Screened in ESEP Components" (Ref.10.1) is 0.760g and does not control thecapacity.
228 2-VR- UPPER CONTAINMENT Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
UDISB-3 TRAIN B DISTRIBUTED for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRIIGNITION SYSTEM NP-6041-SL.
The governing HCLPFVOLTAGE REGULATOR capacity according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-004
-"HCLPF Calculations for Screened in ESEP Components" (Ref.10.1) is 0.760g and does not control thecapacity.
229 2-VS VENTILATION Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CONTROL PANEL for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI POAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 150 of 151CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF NotesUnit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to theRLGM based on similar panels within thecontrol room yielding significant seismiccapacity margins.230 2-WMO- WEST CONTAINMENT Screened
>RLGM This valve falls within the Earthquake 716 SPRAY HEAT Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-EXCHANGER SL. Therefore, this valve screens for theESSENTIAL SERVICE 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-WATER INLET 6041-SL.SHUTOFF VALVE231 2-WMO- EMERGENCY Screened
>RLGM This valve falls outside the Earthquake 753 ESSENTIAL SERVICE Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-WATER SUPPLY TO SL. However, this valve screens for the 0.8gTDAFPPP-4 SHUTOFF to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL VALVE based on analysis performed for a 3g input.232 2-WRV- W ESW PUMP PP-7W Screened
>RLGM This valve falls within the Earthquake 764 DISCH STN WEST Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-BASKET B/W OUT S/O SL. Therefore, this valve screens for the0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.233 2-WRV- W ESW PUMP PP-7W Screened
>RLGM This valve falls within the Earthquake 769 DISCH STN WEST Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-BASKET BAW INL S/O SL. Therefore, this valve screens for the0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.234 2-WRV- WEST ESW PUMP PP- Screened
>RLGM This valve falls within the Earthquake 774 7W DISCH STN EAST Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-BASKET BA/ OUT SL. Therefore, this valve screens for the0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.235 2-WRV- WEST ESW PUMP PP- Screened
>RLGM This valve falls within the Earthquake 779 7W DISCH STN EAST Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-BASKET B/W INL SL. Therefore, this valve screens for the0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
There is sufficient clearance between the valve operator and thewalkway.
Pipe line well supported and not acredible damaging interaction.
Small valve bolted into a small rack.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) 239 2-XRV- PRESSURE Screened
>RLGM for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI152 REGULATING VALVE NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage judged to beadequate for RLGM by inspection based onlight rack with rugged anchorage.
2-XRV- PRESSURE Small valve bolted into a small rack.240 153 REGULATING VALVE Screened
>RLGMSa leed into a allhrack.
153____REGULATING_______
VALVE___
______Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
SA3Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 151 of 151CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF NotesUnit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Anchorage judged to beadequate for RLGM by inspection based onlight rack with rugged anchorage.
INDMIANA Indiana Michigan PowerMICHIGAN Cook Nuclear PlantPOWER One Cook PlaceBridgman, MI 49106A unit of Amencan Electric Power IndianaMichiganPower.com December 18, 2014 AEP-NRC-2014-94 10 CFR 50.54(f)Docket Nos.: 50-31550-316U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk11555 Rockville Pike,Rockville, MD 20852Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report -Response to U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f)
Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of theNear-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident
 
==References:==
: 1. Letter from E. J. Leeds and M. R. Johnson, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), toAll Power Reactor Licensees and Holders of Construction Permits in Active or DeferredStatus, "Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f)
Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task ForceReview of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident,"
dated March 12, 2012,Agencywide Document Access Management Systems (ADAMS) Accession NumberML12053A340.
: 2. Letter from T. R. Pietrangelo, Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), to D. L. Skeen, NRC,"Proposed Path Forward for NTTF Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Reevaluations,"
datedApril 9, 2013, ADAMS Accession No. ML13101A379.
: 3. Letter from J. P. Gebbie, Indiana Michigan Power Company, to the NRC, "Donald C. CookNuclear Plant (CNP) Unit 1 and Unit 2, Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuantto 10 CFR 50.54(f)
Regarding the Seismic Aspects of Recommendation 2.1 of theNear-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident,"
AEP-NRC-2013-41, dated April 25, 2013, ADAMS Accession No. ML13121A059.
: 4. Letter from E. J. Leeds, NRC, to J. E. Pollock, NEI, "Electric Power Research Institute FinalDraft Report )XXXXXX,
'Seismic Evaluation Guidance:
Augmented Approach for theResolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic,'
As AnAcceptable Alternative to the March 12, 2012, Information Request for SeismicReevaluations,"
dated May 7, 2013, ADAMS Accession No. ML13106A331.
YAW U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission AEP-NRC-2014-94 Page 2On March 12, 2012, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued Reference 1 to allpower reactor licensees and holders of construction permits in active or deferred status.Reference 1, Enclosure 1, "Recommendation 2.1: Seismic,"
requested each addressee located inthe Central and Eastern United States (CEUS) to submit a Seismic Hazard Evaluation andScreening Report within 1.5 years from the date of Reference 1.In Reference 2, the Nuclear Energy Institute requested NRC agreement to delay submittal of theCEUS Seismic Hazard Evaluation and Screening Reports so that an update to the Electric PowerResearch Institute ground motion attenuation model could be completed and used to develop therequested information.
Reference 2 also outlined how a near-term Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP), and long-term plant risk evaluations, would provide a complete response toReference 1, Enclosure
: 1. By Reference 3, Indiana Michigan Power, licensee for Donald C. CookNuclear Plant (CNP) Units 1 and 2, informed the NRC of its intent to follow the approach andschedule described in Reference
: 2. By Reference 4, the NRC agreed with the approach proposedin Reference 2, which included licensee submittal of an ESEP report no later thanDecember 31, 2014. This letter provides the ESEP report for CNP Units I and 2.Enclosure 1 to this letter provides an affirmation.
Enclosure 2 provides the ESEP report for CNPUnits 1 and 2. There are no new Regulatory Commitments identified in this letter. Should you haveany questions, please contact Mr. Michael K. Scarpello, Regulatory Affairs Manager, at(269) 466-2649.
Sincerely, Q. Shane LiesEngineering Vice President, Indiana Michigan PowerJ RW/amp
 
==Enclosures:==
: 1. Affirmation
: 2. Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f)Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term
" Task ForceRecommendation 2.1: Seismic U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission AEP-NRC-2014-94 Page 3C: M. L. Chawla, NRC Washington, DCJ. T. King, MPSCR. F. Kuntz, NRR, NRCMDEQ -RMD/RPSNRC Resident Inspector C. D. Pederson, NRC Region IIIA. J. Williamson, AEP Ft. Wayne, w/o enclosures Enclosure I to AEP-NRC-2014-94 AFFIRMATION I, Q. Shane Lies, being duly sworn, state that I am Engineering Vice President of IndianaMichigan Power (I&M), that I am authorized to sign and file this document with the U. S. NuclearRegulatory Commission on behalf of I&M, and that the statements made and the matters setforth herein pertaining to I&M are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information, andbelief.Indiana Michigan PowerQ. Shane LiesEngineering Vice President, Indiana Michigan PowerSWORN TO AND SUBSCRIBED BEFORE METHIS DAY 0I , ' 2014THISDAY OF~ &c i~L L, 014DANIELLE BURGOYNEXNotary Public, State of MichiganCounty of Berrien---.Nbtar ~ic --My Commission Expires 04-04-2018 Acting In the Countyiof My Commission Expires " --"- .*,,,
Enclosure 2 TO AEP-NRC-2014-94 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report inResponse to the 50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic DocumentTitle: 13Q3208-RPT-005
-Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report inResponse to the 50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: SeismicDocument Type:Criteria
'1 Interface
[- Report [ Specification E] Other E] Drawing E]Project Name: Seismic Hazard & ESEP Seismic Services for DC Cook Units 1 & 2Job No.: 13Q3208Client: American Electric PowerThis document has been prepared in accordance with the S&A Quality Assurance ProgramManual Revision 17 and project requirements:
Initial Issue: Rev. 0Prepared by: G. G. Thomas n". 4 .Date: 12/10/14Jennifer Huang Dan Lavarnway12/10/14Reviewed by: M. Etre P.R. Wilson Date- 12/10/14Date: 12/10/14Approved by: M. Etre ,P.R. Wilson 6'dt- d '--, awRevision Record:Revision Prepared by/ Reviewed by/ Approved by/ Description of RevisionNo. Date Date DateDOCUMENT CONTRACT NO.APPROVALSHEET 13Q3208Stevenson
& Associates Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 2 of 151TABLE OF CONTENTS1.0 Purpose and Objective
.................................................................................................
42.0 Brief Summary of the FLEX Seismic Implementation Strategies
.........................
53.0 Equipment Selection Process and ESEL .................................................................
93.1 Equipment Selection Process and ESEL ..............................................................
93.1.1 E S E L D evelopm ent .................................................................................................
.113.1.2 Pow er O perated Valves .........................................................................................
133 .1 .3 P u ll B o xe s ......................................................................................................................
143.1.4 Term ination C abinets ...............................................................................................
143.1.5 Critical Instrumentation Indicators
.......................................................................
143.1.6 Electrical Distribution
............................................
153.1.7 C ontrol E quipm ent ................................................................................................
..153.2 Justification for use of Equipment that is not the Primary Means for FLEXim plem entation
.......................................................................................................................
164.0 Ground Motion Response Spectrum (GMRS) ......................................................
174.1 Plot of GMRS Submitted by the Licensee
.........................................................
174.2 Comparison to SSE ................................................................................................
185.0 Review Level Ground Motion (RLGM) .....................................................................
205.1 Description of RLGM selected
...........................................................................
205.2 Method to Estimate ISRS ......................................................................................
216.0 Seismic Margin Evaluation Approach
.....................................................................
226.1 Summary of Methodologies Used ........................................................................
226.2 HCLPF Screening Process ....................................................................................
236.3 Seismic Walkdown Approach
...............................................................................
236.3.1 W alkdow n approach
..............................................................................................
236.3.2 Application of Previous Walkdown Information
..................................................
256.3.3 Significant Walkdown Findings
............................................................................
356.4 HCLPF Calculation Process .................................................................................
356.5 Functional Evaluation of Relays ..........................................................................
38 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 3 of 1516.6 Tabulated ESEL HCLPF values (including Key failure modes) .......................
387.0 Inaccessible Items and Late Additions to the ESEL .............................................
397.1 Identification of Inaccessible Items and Late Additions to the ESEL .............
397.2 Planned Walkdown
/ Evaluation Schedule
/ Close Out ....................................
408.0 ESEP Conclusions and Results ...............................................................................
418.1 Supporting Inform ation .........................................................................................
418.2 Identification of Planned Modifications
..............................................................
428.3 Modification Implementation Schedule
..............................................................
438.4 Sum m ary of Actions ..............................................................................................
439.0 R eferences
.......................................................................................................................
45Attachm ent A- C NP Unit 1 ESEL ..........................................................................................
50Attachm ent B -C NP U nit 2 ESEL ..........................................................................................
67Attachment C- CNP Unit 1 ESEP HCLPF Values and Failure Mode Tabulation
..................
84Attachment D -CNP Unit 2 ESEP HCLPF Values and Failure Mode Tabulation
.....................
119 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 4 of 1511.0 Purpose and Objective Following the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant resulting from the March11, 2011, Great Tohoku Earthquake and subsequent
: tsunami, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) established a Near Term Task Force (NTTF) to conduct a systematic reviewof NRC processes and regulations and to determine if the agency should make additional improvements to its regulatory system. The NTTF developed a set of recommendations intended to clarify and strengthen the regulatory framework for protection against naturalphenomena.
Subsequently, the NRC issued a 50.54(f) letter on March 12, 2012 [Ref. 1],requesting information to assure that these recommendations are addressed by all U.S. nuclearpower plants. The 50.54(f) letter requests that licensees and holders of construction permitsunder 10 CFR (Code of Federal Regulations)
Part 50 reevaluate the seismic hazards at theirsites against present-day NRC requirements and guidance.
Depending on the comparison between the reevaluated seismic hazard and the current design basis, further risk assessment may be required.
Assessment approaches acceptable to the staff include a seismic probabilistic risk assessment (SPRA), or a seismic margin assessment (SMA). Based upon the assessment
: results, the NRC staff will determine whether additional regulatory actions are necessary.
This report describes the Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) undertaken for DonaldC. Cook Nuclear Plant (CNP), Units 1 & 2. The intent of the ESEP is to perform an interimaction in response to the NRC's 50.54(f) letter [Ref. 1] to demonstrate seismic margin through areview of a subset of the plant equipment that can be relied upon to protect the reactor corefollowing beyond design basis seismic events.The ESEP is implemented using the methodologies in the NRC endorsed guidance in ElectricPower Research Institute (EPRI) 3002000704, Seismic Evaluation Guidance:
Augmented Approach for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1:Seismic [Ref. 2].The objective of this report is to provide summary information describing the ESEP evaluations and results.
The level of detail provided in the report is intended to enable the NRC tounderstand the inputs used, the evaluations performed, and the decisions made as a result ofthe interim evaluations.
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 5 of 1512.0 Brief Summary of the FLEX Seismic Implementation Strategies The CNP Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) response strategies for Reactor CoreCooling and Heat Removal, Reactor Inventory Control/
Long-term Subcriticality andContainment Function are similar for both Units. The following discussion is a summary of CNPprimary strategies to address a Beyond-Design-Basis Seismic Event (BDBSE).
This summaryis derived from the CNP Overall Integrated Plan (OIP) and updates in Response to the March12, 2012, Commission Order EA-12-049
[Ref. 3].Phase 1 FLEX Strategies Reactor Core Cooling and Heat RemovalSteam Generator
: Cooling, for Reactor Coolant System (RCS)/Core Heat Removal is initially provided by operation of the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (TDAFW) Pump taking suctionfrom the Condensate Storage Tank (CST). Site specific analysis
[Ref. 29] has been performed to demonstrate adequate CST volume for feeding each Unit's TDAFW pumps from a singleCST. This analysis demonstrates sufficient inventory is available to maintain secondary heatsink for 12 hours post Extended Loss of AC Power (ELAP) including cool down of each Unit bydepressurizing Steam Generators (SG) in accordance with Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs).An alternate cooling source will need to be aligned to maintain secondary inventory make upwhen the CST is depleted or becomes unavailable.
Lake water make up to the steamgenerators uses a FLEX lift pump to deliver lake water from the Circulating Water IntakeForebay to the TDAFW pump suction FLEX connection.
RCS Boration/Inventory ControlNo pumped RCS Boration or RCS make up is required in Phase 1. Depending upon ReactorCoolant Pump (RCP) seal leakage and related RCS depressurization, some Safety Injection Accumulator make up to the RCS may occur based upon the results of CNP analyses.
Westinghouse Shield Passive Thermal Shutdown RCP seals limiting RCS leakage arecredited for FLEX implementation.
Containment Site specific analytical results [Ref. 29] determined the FLEX Containment Temperature andPressure control actions.
In the MODE 1-4 response, Containment pressure does not reach themaximum design pressure limit until after 70 hours.
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 6 of 151PowerEach Unit's Control Room Instrument Distribution (CRID) and Critical Control Room Power(CCRP) inverters maintain control room instrumentation and control with power supplied fromthe Train A&B Station batteries.
Secondary inventory make up is controlled using the TDAFWpump with local manual control of the TDAFW pump and hand-wheel operation of key motoroperated valves. A Direct Current (DC) load shed will be performed to reduce Train A&BStation battery discharge rate within the first hour to ensure 12 hours are available to deployFLEX electrical generators.
A plant specific DC load shedding analysis
[Ref. 29] demonstrates the 12 hour coping capability for these batteries.
Phase 2 FLEX Strategies Reactor Core Cooling and Heat RemovalA FLEX Lift pump is expected to be deployed in Phase 2 as an Alternate Cooling Source (ACS)to provide secondary inventory to maintain core cooling with the Steam Generators (SG).The FLEX lift pump will draw water from the Circulating Water Intake Forebay, delivering flow tothe TDAFW pump suction and the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP). The deployment time is within 12hours. This is based upon the CST capacity determined by site specific analyses
[Ref. 29].Four Steam Generators will be used to maintain symmetric RCS cool down for the first 24hours. Steam Generator Power Operated Relief Valves operated from local control stations orlocal manual operation that is the credited
: strategy, are used for control of Steam Generator (SG) pressure and RCS cool down rate.This accounts for the initiation of RCS Boration at 16 hours and provides acceptable Boronmixing in the RCS, and the limiting RCS natural circulation flow rates. The RCS will be fullyBorated by twenty four (24) hours after the event. At this 24 hour mark SG cooling may bereduced to two of four Steam Generators.
RCS Boration/Inventory ControlIn MODEs 1-4, the RCS Boration and make up flow path uses a portable FLEX Boric Acid (BA)pump. The FLEX BA pump takes suction via gravity drain using a hose connected to the BoricAcid Storage Tank (BAST) outlet. The FLEX BA pump discharges to the RCS through theCharging header piping connection, that was modified by installing a high pressure hoseconnection for CNP Unit 1 and will be modified in the future for CNP Unit 2. The FLEX BApump provides sufficient pressure and flow to fully borate one unit using a single BAST.
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 7 of 151Containment Site specific evaluation
[Ref. 29] determined no Phase 2 FLEX Containment Temperature andPressure control actions or equipment operation are required for the MODE 1-4 Containment response.
After 24 hours containment pressure will exceed the value for Adverse Containment Conditions as defined by Emergency Operating Procedures.
Operators will then use moreconservative values for actions based upon Steam Generator and Pressurizer indicated level.Per Reference 29, both CNP Units are Ice Condenser Containments, requiring Phase 2 FLEXGenerators to power one train of containment hydrogen igniters in accordance with theRegulatory criterion.
Spent Fuel ControlNo Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) inventory make up is required until after 24 hours. SFP inventory makeup is available as needed from the FLEX Lift pump deployed in Phase 2 to supply theTDAFW Pump.PowerFLEX generators, 600vac (volt alternating current),
500kW (Kilo-watt),
will be deployed from theFLEX storage building.
FLEX power will be supplied to select loads through 600vac Buses toallow restoration of loads such as battery chargers, a Boric Acid Transfer pump, the MiddleBoric Acid Evaporator feed pump, Train B Hydrogen
: Igniters, and Train A Reactor Vessel LevelIndication System (RVLIS).Phase 3 FLEX Strategies Reactor Core Cooling and Heat RemovalPhase 3 equipment includes two, 1.1 MWe, 4160V gas turbine generators supplied from theNational SAFER Response Center (NSRC) for each unit. These generators will repower 4kVbusses, which allows repowering Train B 4kV safety related motors, 600vac Busses, andrelated 120vac lighting and low voltage electrical distribution circuits.
Train B was selectedbecause it provides the ideal mix of 4kV safety related pumps such as Component CoolingWater (CCW), Residual Heat Removal (RHR), Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (MDAFW) andEssential Service Water (ESW) (if access to the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS) is available) whilerestoring 600vac busses.Train B power restoration allows starting the West CCW pump, West RHR pump, Train Bcontrol room ventilation and facilitates establishing shutdown cooling in conjunction with theNSRC supplied large volume raw water pump. Using a FLEX connection point, this largevolume FLEX pump will supply Train B of the ESW system, from the Circulating Water Forebay, Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 8 of 151to support the RHR and CCW systems for shutdown cooling alignment if the UHS isunavailable.
RCS Boration/Inventory ControlThe RCS Boration and make up flow path continues to use the portable FLEX Boric Acid (BA)pump as described in Phase 2.Containment Per Reference 29 Phase 3 Containment cooling and depressurization will be accomplished bythe operation of one Containment Hydrogen Skimmer Fan. Operation of this Fan results in flowthrough the Ice Condenser; cooling and depressurizing the Containment.
Operation of this Fanwill reduce Containment Pressure and Temperatures to normal values within 2-3 hours afterstarting the Fan.Spent Fuel ControlSFP cooling is maintained during FLEX response by providing SFP inventory makeup from theCirculating Water Forebay using the FLEX Lift pump. Moisture caused by evaporation or boilingwill be removed from the Auxiliary Building by natural draft.PowerTwo 1 MW 4kV generators from the NSRC per Unit will be ganged together using NSRC outputbus and paralleling equipment.
NSRC 4 kV power to Bus 1A (2A) is connected by relocating theReserve Feed 4kV Bus infeed circuit breaker and FLEX connections at the load side of 4kVcircuit breakers.
NSRC 4kV power is sufficient to restore the Train B 4kV vital pump bus and600Vac busses. 4kV power restoration in Phase 3 facilitates re-energizing loads to support thestrategies summarized herein.
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 9 of 1513.0 Equipment Selection Process and ESELThe selection of equipment for the Expedited Seismic Equipment List (ESEL) followed theguidelines of EPRI 3002000704
[Ref. 2] Seismic Evaluation Guidance and NEI 12-06 FLEXImplementation Guidance
[Ref. 24]. The ESEL for Unit 1 & 2 is presented in Attachment A andB respectively.
3.1 Equipment Selection Process and ESELThe selection of equipment to be included on the ESEL was based on installed plant equipment credited in the FLEX strategies during Phase 1, 2, and 3 mitigation of a Beyond Design BasisExternal Event (BOBEE),
as outlined in the CNP Overall Integrated Plan (OIP) and updates inResponse to the March 12, 2012, Commission Order EA-12-049
[Ref. 3]. The OIP provides theCNP FLEX mitigation strategy and serves as the basis for equipment selected for the ESEP.The scope of "installed plant equipment" includes equipment relied upon for the FLEX strategies to sustain the critical functions of core cooling and containment integrity consistent with the CNPOIP and updates [Ref. 3]. FLEX recovery actions are excluded from the ESEP scope per EPRI3002000704
[Ref. 2]. The overall list of planned FLEX modifications and the scope forconsideration herein is limited to those required to support core cooling, reactor coolant inventory and subcriticality, and containment integrity functions.
Portable and pre-staged FLEX equipment (not permanently installed) are excluded from the ESEL per EPRI 3002000704
[Ref. 2].The ESEL component selection followed the EPRI guidance outlined in Section 3.2 of EPRI3002000704
[Ref. 2].1. The scope of components is limited to that required to accomplish the core cooling andcontainment safety functions identified in Table 3-2 of EPRI 3002000704
[Ref. 2]. Theinstrumentation monitoring requirements for core cooling/containment safety functions are limited to those outlined in the EPRI 3002000704
: guidance, and are a subset of thoseoutlined in the CNP OIP [Ref. 3].2. The scope of components on the ESEL was limited to installed plant equipment, andFLEX connections necessary to implement the CNP OIP [Ref. 3] as described in Section2.3. The scope of components assumes the credited FLEX connection modifications areimplemented, and are limited to those required to support a single FLEX success path.These are the "Primary" path for CNP.4. The "Primary" FLEX success path is to be specified.
Selection of the "Back-up/Alternate" FLEX success path must be justified.
CNP did not use a "Back-up/Alternate" FLEXsuccess path5. Phase 3 coping strategies are included in the ESEP scope, whereas recovery strategies are excluded.
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 10 of 1516. Structures,
: systems, and components excluded per the EPRI 3002000704
[Ref. 2]guidance are:* Structures (e.g. containment, auxiliary
: building, etc.)* Piping, cabling,
: conduit, HVAC, and their supports* Manual valves and rupture disks* Power-operated valves not required to change state as part of the FLEX mitigation strategies
* Nuclear steam supply system (NSSS) components (e.g. reactor pressure vessel andinternals, reactor coolant pumps and seals, etc.)7. For cases in which neither train was specified as a primary or back-up strategy, then onlyone train component (generally
'B' train for CNP) is included in the ESELPermanent plant equipment required for implementation of the FLEX Strategy was identified byreviewing the FLEX Strategy and associated cooling flow path piping and instrumentation diagrams (P&ID), instrument elementary
: diagrams, and electrical distribution one-line diagrams.
The approach taken in compiling the ESEL was to assume there were no random equipment failures and identify a single success path for each element of the FLEX Strategy.
Note, theEPRI 3002000704
[Ref. 2] Seismic Evaluation Guidance states that only one success path isrequired.
Also, NEI 12-06 FLEX Implementation Guidance
[Ref. 24] does not requirepostulating single or multiple random failures during or following an Extended Loss of allAlternating Current (AC) Power and Loss of the Ultimate Heat Sink (ELAP/LUHS) event'.Following Section 3.2 of the EPRI 3002000704
[Ref. 2] Seismic Evaluation Guidance thefollowing equipment categories were excluded from consideration:
" Structures
* Distributed systems (piping,
: cabling, conduit, cable trays, Heating, Ventilation and AirConditioning (HVAC))* Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS) components The corresponding components listed in the ESEL have been further screened utilizing theEvaluation Guidance to exclude components having the following criteria:
* Non-power operated valves (manual valves, check valves, rupture disks)* Power operated valves not required to change state for any FLEX strategy* Sub-components mounted within equipment already included on the list2The FLEX Integrated Plan [Ref. 29] also assumed no single failure of structures,
: systems, or components (SSC), inaccordance with the Implementation Guidance.
2 This item refers to the "Rule-of-Box" (ROB). When equipment is screened using the EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7]guidance, all of the components mounted on or in equipment of a particular equipment class are considered to bepart of that equipment and do not have to be evaluated separately.
Relays and other contact devices vulnerable toseismically induced chatter are an exception to this rule and should be separately identified and evaluated for seismicadequacy using the ESEP evaluation guidance.
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 11 of 151Additional screening criteria were applied to exclude components from the ESEL that met thefollowing criteria:
* In-line pipe-supported components (without separate mounting)
* Pumps and small heat exchangers within piping pressure boundaries but not in the flowpath" Components expected to operate during the initial reactor transient (as described in NEI12-06 section 3.2.1.4 [Ref. 24])The Equipment Selection and ESEL Development is documented in S&A Report 13Q3208-RPT-001,
[Ref. 25].3.1.1 ESEL Development The ESEL was developed by reviewing the CNP FLEX Integration Plan [Ref. 29] to determine the major equipment involved in the FLEX strategies.
Further reviews of plant drawings (e.g.,Process and Instrumentation Diagrams (P&IDs) and Electrical One Line Diagrams) wereperformed to identify the boundaries of the flowpaths to be used in the FLEX strategies and toidentify specific components in the flowpaths needed to support implementation of the FLEXstrategies.
Boundaries were established at an electrical or mechanical isolation device (e.g.,isolation amplifier, valve, etc.) in branch circuits
/ branch lines off the defined strategy electrical or fluid flowpath.
P&IDs were the primary reference documents used to identify mechanical components and instrumentation.
The flow paths used for FLEX strategies were selected andspecific components were identified using detailed equipment and instrument
: drawings, pipingisometrics, electrical schematics and one-line
: drawings, system descriptions, design basisdocuments, etc., as necessary.
The flow paths credited for the CNP ESEP are shown in Table 3-1.
SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 12 of 151Table 0-1: Flow Paths Credited for ESEPP&IDs/Reference DrawingsFlow PathUnit 1Unit 2Phase 1 and Phase 2 Reactor Coolant System(RCS) Heat Removal:
Main Steam PowerOperated Relief Valves discharge steam fromthe Steam Generators to the atmosphere.
Feedwater from the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump with suction from theCondensate Storage Tank or portable FLEXpump from the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS).---I I-OP-1-5105D
[26.1]OP-1-5105E
[26.2]OP-1-5106A
[26.31OP-1-5113
[26.4]OP-1-5113A
[26.5]OP-2-5105D
[26.19]OP-2-5105E
[26.20]OP-2-5106A
[26.21]OP-2-5113
[26.22]OP-2-5113A
[26.23]Phase 3 Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Heat OP-1-5113
[26.4] OP-2-5113
[26.22]Removal:
Mode 4 Train B Residual Heat OP-15113A
[26.5] OP-2-5113A
[26.23]Removal (RHR) system, using the Train BComponent Cooling (CCW) System, and Train B OP-1-513
[26.6] OP-2-513
[26.24]Essential Service Water (ESW) system supplied OP-1-5135
[26.7] OP-2-5135
[26.251by a portable FLEX pump from the UHS. OP-1-5135A
[26.8] OP-2-5135A
[26.26]Phase I Reactor Coolant Make Up and BorationControl:
Passive injection from the Safety OP-1-5143A
[26.9] OP-2-5143A
[26.27]Injection Accumulators.
Phase 2 and Phase 3 Reactor Coolant Make Upand Boration Control:
A portable FLEX pumptaking suction from the Boric Acid Storage Tank OP-12-5131
[26.10] OP-12-5131
[26.10](BAST) FLEX connection to the Reciprocating OP-1-5129
[26.11] OP-2-5129
[26.28]Charging Pump discharge piping FLEX OP-1-5142
[26.12] OP-2-5142
[26.29]connection; to the RCS via the Boron Injection Tank.OP-1-5128
[26.13] OP-2-5128
[26.30]RCS Pressure Control:
RCS Pressurizer Power OP-1-5128
[26.14] OP-2-5128
[26.311Operated Relief Valves. OP-1-5120D
[26.15] OP-2-5120D
[26.32]Containment:
Analytical results indicate Phase1 and Phase 2 FLEX actions are not required.
OP-1-12032126.36]
OP-2-12032
[26.37]Phase 3 uses a Fan to draw air through the IceCondenser to cool Containment.
Fuel Oil: From the Diesel Oil Storage Tank via aportable FLEX pump to provide fuel for FLEX OP-1-5151C
[26.16] OP-2-5151A
[26.33]equipment.
.
0Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 13 of 151P&lDs/Reference DrawingsFlow PathUnit I Unit 2Phase 1 Main Control Room (MCR) and BatteryRoom Ventilation:
Open doors and use portable None NoneFLEX fans.Phase 2 Main Control Room and Battery RoomVentilation:
Maintain MCR ventilation with opendoors and portable FLEX fans. Battery Room OP-1-5148C
[26.17] OP-2-5148C
[26.34]ventilation is powered by portable FLEXGenerators along with Station Battery Chargers.
Phase 3 Main Control Room and Battery RoomVentilation:
Restore Train B of MCR ventilation OP-1-5148C
[26.17] OP-2-5148C
[26.34]powered by NSRC portable FLEX Generators.
OP-1-5149
[26.18] OP-2-5149
[26.35]Battery Room ventilation is also powered by OP-1-5113
[26.4] OP-2-5113
[26.22]these portable generators.
Each of the following flow paths were analyzed, and all mechanical equipment necessary toestablish these flow paths were considered for inclusion in the ESEL:0000000Main Steam to the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater PumpAuxiliary Feedwater (AFW) to the Steam Generators Reactor Coolant Make UpResidual Heat RemovalMain Control Room Ventilation Battery Room Ventilation Instrument AirImplementing procedures to establish these flow paths were examined to identify valves that willbe manipulated manually using the local valve operator hand wheel. These valves wereexcluded from the electrical power and control identification activities mentioned in the next twosections.
3.1.2 Power Operated ValvesPage 3-3 of EPRI 3002000704
[Ref. 2] notes that power operated valves not required to changestate are excluded from the ESEL. Page 3-2 also notes that "functional failure modes ofelectrical and mechanical portions of the installed Phase 1 equipment should be considered (e.g. Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC)/AFW trips)."
To address this concern, the following guidance is applied for the CNP Unit 1 and CNP Unit 2 ESEL for functional failure modesassociated with power operated valves:
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 14 of 151Power operated valves that remain energized during the Extended Loss of all AC Power(ELAP) events (such as DC powered valves),
were included on the ESEL.Power operated valves not required to change state as part of the FLEX mitigation strategies were not included on the ESEL. The seismic event also causes the ELAPevent; therefore, the valves are incapable of spurious operation as they would be de-energized.
Power operated valves not required to change state as part of the FLEX mitigation strategies during Phase 1, and are re-energized and operated during subsequent Phase2 and 3 strategies, were not evaluated for spurious valve operation as the seismic eventthat caused the ELAP has passed before the valves are re-powered.
3.1.3 Pull BoxesPull boxes were deemed unnecessary to add to the ESELs as these components providecompletely passive locations for pulling or installing cables. No breaks or connections in thecabling are included in pull boxes. Pull boxes were considered part of conduit and cabling,which are excluded in accordance with EPRI 3002000704
[Ref. 2].3.1.4 Termination CabinetsTermination
: cabinets, including cabinets necessary for FLEX Phase 2 and Phase 3connections, provide consolidated locations for permanently connecting multiple cables. Thetermination cabinets and the internal connections provide a completely passive function;
: however, the cabinets are included on the ESEL to ensure that industry knowledge ofpanel/anchorage failure vulnerabilities is addressed.
3.1.5 Critical Instrumentation Indicators Critical indicators and recorders are typically physically located on panels/cabinets and areincluded as separate components;
: however, seismic evaluation of the instrument indication maybe included in the panel/cabinet seismic evaluation (rule-of-the-box).
The FLEX Integrated Plan [Ref. 29] was reviewed and key plant parameters were identified.
Instrumentation required to indicate the following parameters was considered for inclusion in theESEL:" Steam Generator Pressure and Level Indications
" Reactor Coolant System Pressure and Temperature Indications
* Reactor Vessel Level Indication (Utilizing the Reactor Vessel Level Instrumentation System)* Pressurizer Level Indication
* Neutron Flux Indication
" Core Exit Temperature Indication
* Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Indication Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 15 of 151" Safety Injection Flow Indication
* Containment Pressure Indication
* Condensate Storage Tank Level Indication
* Boric Acid Storage Tank Level and Temperature Indication To compile the instrumentation included in the ESEL, instrument loop identifiers for theseparameters were taken, where possible, from the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report(UFSAR) Table 7.8-1, Variables Provided the Operator for Manual Functions During andFollowing an Accident
[Ref. 21]. Where both wide and narrow range instruments were indicated for a given parameter on UFSAR Table 7.8-1, the wide-range instrument was chosen. P&lDswere consulted for parameters not included in UFSAR Table 7.8-1.3.1.6 Electrical Distribution The electrical distribution and motor control centers (MCCs) necessary to provide power to theinstrumentation, pumps, valves, or any other electrically powered permanent plant equipment identified for ESEP were included in the ESEL. This includes vital instrument power from thestation batteries through the inverters to the vital bus panels, instrument racks, and Main ControlRoom (MCR) panels. Distribution paths were identified from intended FLEX generator connection points to their intended loads.3.1.7 Control Equipment The control equipment necessary to operate the pumps, valves, or any other electrically powered permanent plant equipment identified for ESEP was considered for inclusion in theESEL. Relays and other sensitive contact devices subject to seismically induced chatter thatmay lead to a circuit seal-in or lockout were also considered for inclusion on the ESEL. Powersources for the required control circuits were traced and any power distribution component necessary for the control circuits (and not already identified) were added to the ESEL.As mentioned in Section 3.1.2, controls for local manually operated valves were not considered.
The list of valves crediting manual operation includes the Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (TDAFP) Trip and Throttle Valve. None of the relays associated with the TDAFP tripfunction were included on the ESEL because if an event causes an actuation and trips theTDAFP, operators will reset the TDAFP manually according to the Emergency Operating Procedures described in Stevenson
& Associates (S&A) Report 13Q3208-RPT-001
[Ref. 25]. Itis noted that all other relays screened out of consideration for ESEP and thus the ESELcontains no relays.3.1.8 FLEX Connections (Phase 2 and Phase 3 Piping Connections)
Item 2 in Section 3.1 above notes that the scope of equipment in the ESEL includes
"... FLEXconnections necessary to implement the CNP OIP [Ref. 3] as described in Section 2." Item 3 inSection 3.1 also notes that the scope of components assumes the credited FLEX connection Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 16 of 151modifications are implemented, and are limited to those required in the case of CNP to supporta single Primary FLEX success path. It is noted that these connections have been installed forCNP Unit 1 and are planned to be installed for CNP Unit 2 in the spring 2015 outage.Item 6 in Section 3 above goes on to explain that "Piping,
: cabling, conduit, HVAC, and theirsupports" are excluded from the ESEL scope in accordance with EPRI 3002000704
[Ref. 2].Therefore, piping and pipe supports associated with FLEX Phase 2 and Phase 3 connections are excluded from the scope of the ESEP evaluation.
: However, any active valves in FLEXPhase 2 and Phase 3 connection flow path are included in the ESEL.The flow paths described in Section 3.1.1 of this report and included with marked up Piping andInstrumentation Drawings (P&IDs) in S&A Report 13Q3208-RPT-001
[Ref. 25] were configured for the FLEX connections consistent with the August 2014 FLEX strategy
[Ref. 29]. The scopeof equipment in the ESEL includes FLEX connections necessary to implement the CNP OIP[Ref. 3] as described in Section 2. The scope of components assumed the credited FLEXconnection modifications are implemented, and are limited to those required to support a singlePrimary FLEX success path. It is also noted there are no plans to have permanently installed FLEX equipment for CNP Unit I or CNP Unit 2.3.2 Justification for use of Equipment that is not the Primary Means for FLEXimplementation All equipment used for FLEX implementation on the CNP ESEL are the primary path. Thecomplete ESELs for CNP Unit 1 and CNP Unit 2 are presented in Attachments A and B,respectively.
ValExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 17 of 1514.0 Ground Motion Response Spectrum (GMRS)4.1 Plot of GMRS Submitted by the LicenseeAs documented in Stevenson
& Associates (S&A) Report 13Q3208-RPT-003
[Ref. 4](transmitted by letter from Q. S. Lies, I&M, to NRC, "Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant Units 1 and2, Seismic Hazard and Screening Report (CEUS Sites), Response to NRC Request forInformation Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f)
Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident,"
dated March 27, 2014)[Ref. 11] the SSE Control Point for Containment is at an elevation of 587.4 ft. which is used forcomparison to the Control Point GMRS.The GMRS at 5% equipment
: damping, taken from S&A Report 13Q3208-RPT-003
[Ref. 4], isshown in Table 4-1 and Figure 4-1.Table 4-1 CNP GMRSFrequency (Hz) GMRS (g) Frequency (Hz) GMRS (g)100 0.248 3.5 0.32190 0.251 3 0.28880 0.254 2.5 0.24070 0.261 2 0.21060 0.273 1.5 0.16750 0.302 1.25 0.13340 0.348 1 0.10235 0.376 0.9 0.093230 0.405 0.8 0.082225 0.454 0.7 0.072220 0.461 0.6 0.063915 0.525 0.5 0.056312.5 0.496 0.4 0.045110 0.464 0.35 0.03949 0.466 0.3 0.03388 0.454 0.25 0.02827 0.426 0.2 0.02256 0.415 0.15 0.01695 0.421 0.125 0.01414 0.361 0.1 0.0113 H3Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic1303208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 18 of 1510.0.3W0Z!!l01 1 10 100Frequency (Hz)Figure 4-1 CNP GMRS4.2 Comparison to SSEAs documented in S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-002
[Ref. 23], the GMRS exceeds the SSE inthe 3.5 Hz. to 10 Hz range for 5% equipment damping.
A comparison of the GMRS to the SSEbetween 1-10 Hz is shown in Table 4-2 and Figure 4-2.Table 0-2: CNP GMRS and SSE between 1-10HzFrequency (Hz) SSE (g) GMRS (g)10 0.24 0.4649 0.252 0.4668 0.264 0.4547 0.276 0.4266 0.305 0.4155 0.315 0.4214 0.32 0.3613.5 0.32 0.3213 0.304 0.2882.5 0.287 0.242 0.27 0.211.5 0.221 0.1671.25 0.195 0.1331 0.167 0.102 l Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 19 of 15100..... I.....GM 10.;3II~V~..........
.... .. .. .... ..... .. ... .. ....... ..0.1 1 10 100Frequency (Hz)Figure 4-2 GMRS / SSE Comparison SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 20 of 1515.0 Review Level Ground Motion (RLGM)5.1 Description of RLGM selectedThe RLGM for CNP was determined in accordance with Section 4 of EPRI 3002000704
[Ref. 2]by linearly scaling the CNP SSE by the maximum GMRS/SSE ratio (SF) between the 1 and 10 Hzrange. The RLGM for CNP is also documented in S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-002
[Ref. 23].The results of this calculation are shown in Table 5-1.Table 0-2: CNP Maximum GMRS/SSE Ratio (SF)Frequency Unscaled SSE (g) GMRS/SSE(Hz) GMRS (g)10 0.464 0.24 1.9339 0.466 0.252 1.8498 0.454 0.264 1.7207 0.426 0.276 1.5436 0.415 0.305 1.3615 0.421 0.315 1.3374 0.361 0.32 1.1283.5 0.321 0.32 1.0033 0.288 0.304 0.9472.5 0.24 0.287 0.8362 0.21 0.27 0.7781.5 0.167 0.221 0.7561.25 0.133 0.195 0.6821 0.102 0.167 0.611As shown above, the maximum GMRS/SSE ratio occurs at 10 Hz and equals 1.933.The resulting 5% damped RLGM, based on scaling the horizontal SSE by the SF of 1.933, isshown in Table 5-2 and Figure 5-1. Note that the RLGM Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA) is0.387g.
pla3Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 21 of 151Table 0-3: CNP RLGMFreq. (Hz) SA (g) Freq. (Hz) SA (g)0.5 0.180 4.17 0.6190.77 0.271 5.88 0.5991.11 0.348 6.67 0.5411.43 0.416 12.5 0.4061.82 0.483 25 0.3872 0.522 50 0.3873.45 0.619 100 0.387I- --1.93 xSSE=RLGM-ssE0.10,700:0.6000.500-*L0.40D. -------0.000110100Frequency (Hz)Figure 0-1: CNP RLGIMI5.2 Method to Estimate ISRSThe method used to derive the ESEP in-structure response spectra (ISRS) was to uniformly scale existing SSE-based ISRS from the CNP Design Basis SSE (referred to as the DesignBasis Earthquake (DBE) in the CNP UFSAR [Ref. 21]) [Refs. 17.1, 17.2, 17.3 and 17.4] by themaximum SF of 1.933 from Table 5-1. Existing ISRS were the same as those used for theUnresolved Safety Issue (USI) A-46 program.
Scaled ISRS are calculated for all buildings andelevations where ESEL items are located at CNP. The scaled ISRS for CNP are documented inS&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-002
[Ref. 23]. These scaled ISRS were used as the basis forscreening and for the High Confidence Low Probability of Failure (HCLPF) calculations 13Q3208-CAL-004
[10.1], 13Q3208-CAL-005
[10.2], and 13Q3208-CAL-006
[10.3].
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 22 of 1516.0 Seismic Margin Evaluation ApproachIt is necessary to demonstrate that ESEL items have sufficient seismic capacity to meet orexceed the demand characterized by the RLGM. The seismic capacity is characterized as thehighest peak ground acceleration (PGA) for which there is a high confidence of a low probability of failure (HCLPF).
The PGA is associated with a particular spectral shape, in this case the 5%damped RLGM spectral shape. The calculated HCLPF capacity must be equal to or greaterthan the RLGM PGA (0.387g from Table 5-2 and Figure 5-1). The criteria for seismic capacitydetermination are given in Section 5 of EPRI 3002000704
[Ref. 2].There are two basic approaches for developing HCLPF capacities:
: 1. Deterministic approach using the conservative deterministic failure margin (CDFM)methodology of EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7].2. Probabilistic approach using the fragility analysis methodology of EPRI TR-103959
[Ref.8].The deterministic approach using the CDFM methodology of EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7] wasused for the CNP to determine HCLPF capacities.
6.1 Summary of Methodologies UsedCNP performed a seismic probabilistic risk assessment (SPRA) for their Individual PlantExamination for External Events (IPEEE) in 1992. The SPRA is documented in the CNP IPEEEreport [Ref. 9] and consisted of screening walkdowns and fragility calculations for anchorage, buildings and tanks. The screening walkdowns used a similar methodology that is included for aSeismic Margin Assessment (SMA) that uses Table 2-4 of EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7] forscreening.
The walkdowns were conducted by trained engineers that successfully completed the Seismic Qualification Utility Group (SQUG) Walkdown Screening and Seismic Evaluation Training Course. The walkdown results were documented on Screening Evaluation WorkSheets (SEWS). Anchorage capacity calculations partially used the CDFM criteria from EPRINP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7] or the fragility methodology in Reference 8.For the ESEP, CNP applied the SMA methodology of EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7] to allaccessible items on the ESEL. The performed screening used Table 2-4 from EPRI NP-6041-SL [Ref. 7]. The walkdowns were conducted by engineers who, as a minimum, have attendedthe SQUG Walkdown Screening and Seismic Evaluation Training Course. The walkdowns weredocumented in SEWS consistent with EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7]. Anchorage capacitycalculations use the CDFM criteria established within EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7] with CNPspecific allowables and material strengths used as applicable.
The input seismic demand usedwas the RLGM shown in Table 5-2 and Figure 5-1. It is noted that CNP did not use the resultsfrom the IPEEE [Ref. 9] directly, but did use the documentation (SEWS forms) that supported Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 23 of 151the USI A-46 [Ref. 16] for screening.
The walkdown and screening for the ESEP is documented in S&A Report 13Q3208-RPT-004
[Ref. 20].6.2 HCLPF Screening ProcessThe peak spectral acceleration of the RLGM for CNP equals 0.62g. Screening lanes 1 and 2 inTable 2-4 of EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7] are bounded by peak spectral accelerations of 0.8g and1.2g, respectively.
Both lane limits exceed the RLGM peak spectral acceleration.
ESELcomponents were screened to lane 1 or 2 of Table 2-4 in EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7]. Whenlane 2 was used it is documented on the screening summary tabulation contained in Attachment C and D of this report.The CNP Unit 1 and CNP Unit 2 ESEL contain 240 items and 237 items, respectively
[Ref. 25].Of these, there are 33 valves for Unit 1 and 33 valves for Unit 2 (including power-operated, air-operated, and relief valves).
In accordance with Table 2-4 of EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7], activevalves may be assigned a functional capacity of 0.8g to 1.2g (relative to the spectral peaks forScreening Lane 1 and 2) only requiring a review of valves with large extended operators onsmall diameter piping. Note that anchorage is not a failure mode. Valves on the ESEL may bescreened out, subject to the caveat regarding large extended operators on small diameterpiping.The non-valve components in the ESEL can generally be screened using results consistent withthe SMA methodology.
It is noted that the screening caveats for screening lane 2 in Table 2-4of EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7] conform to those used in the USI A-46 [Ref. 16] for CNP. If theevaluation of the equipment item on the ESEL using the SMA methodology shows that thecomponent met the EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7] screening caveats and the CDFM capacityexceeded the Review Level Earthquake (RLE) demand, which it does for CNP, the component can be screened out from the ESEP capacity determination.
This was done for items whereequipment item specific SEWS were available from the USI A-46 [Ref. 16] evaluation.
Theengineers performing the walkdowns checked for changes made to the equipment since the USIA-46 work was completed that could potentially effect screening.
In addition non-valve components on the ESEL without USI A-46 SEWS were evaluated to the EPRI NP-6041-SL Table 2-4 [Ref. 7] screening
: caveats, as applicable.
6.3 Seismic Walkdown Approach6.3.1 Walkdown approachWalkdowns for CNP were performed in accordance with the criteria provided in Section 5 ofEPRI 3002000704
[Ref. 2], which refers to EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7] for the Seismic MarginAssessment process.
Pages 2-26 through 2-30 of EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7] describe theseismic walkdown
: criteria, including the following key criteria:
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 24 of 151"The SRT [Seismic Review Team] should "walk by" 100% of all components which arereasonably accessible and in non-radioactive or low radioactive environments.
Seismiccapability assessment of components which are inaccessible, in high-radioactive environments, or possibly within contaminated containment, will have to rely more onalternate means such as photographic inspection, more reliance on seismic reanalysis, and possibly, smaller inspection teams and more hurried inspections.
A 100% "walk by"does not mean complete inspection of each component, nor does it mean requiring anelectrician or other technician to de-energize and open cabinets or panels for detailedinspection of all components.
This walkdown is not intended to be a QA or QC review ora review of the adequacy of the component at the SSE level.If the SRT has a reasonable basis for assuming that the group of components are similarand are similarly
: anchored, then it is only necessary to inspect one component out ofthis group. The "similarity-basis" should be developed before the walkdown during theseismic capability preparatory work (Step 3) by reference to drawings, calculations orspecifications.
The one component or each type which is selected should be thoroughly inspected which probably does mean de-energizing and opening cabinets or panels forthis very limited sample. Generally, a spare representative component can be found soas to enable the inspection to be performed while the plant is in operation.
At least forthe one component of each type which is selected, anchorage should be thoroughly inspected.
The walkdown procedure should be performed in an ad hoc manner. For each class ofcomponents the SRT should look closely at the first items and compare the fieldconfigurations with the construction drawings and/or specifications.
If a one-to-one correspondence is found, then subsequent items do not have to be inspected in as greata detail. Ultimately the walkdown becomes a "walk by" of the component class as theSRT becomes confident that the construction pattem is typical.
This procedure forinspection should be repeated for each component class; although, during the actualwalkdown the SRT may be inspecting several classes of components in parallel.
Ifserious exceptions to the drawings or questionable construction practices are found thenthe system or component class must be inspected in closer detail until the systematic deficiency is defined.
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 25 of 151The 100% "walk by" is to look for outliers, lack of similarity, anchorage which is different from that shown on drawings or prescribed in criteria for that component, potential SI[Seismic Interaction 3] problems, situations that are at odds with the team members' pastexperience, and any other areas of serious seismic concern.
If any such concemssurface, then the limited sample size of one component of each type for thoroughinspection will have to be increased.
The increase in sample size which should beinspected will depend upon the number of outliers and different anchorages, etc., whichare observed.
It is up to the SRT to ultimately select the sample size since they are theones who are responsible for the seismic adequacy of all elements which they screenfrom the margin review. Appendix D gives guidance for sampling selection.
The CNP walkdowns
: included, as a minimum, a 100% walk-by of all items on the CNP ESELexcept as noted in Section 7.0. Previous walkdown information that was relied upon as thebasis for the SRT judgment in excluding an item walkdown is documented in Section 6.3.2. It isnoted that the walkdown and screening of an individual equipment item was frozen at the timeof the walkdown date for that equipment.
Walkdowns were conducted at various times betweenMarch 2014 and November 2014. The screening status of the equipment included in this reportreflects the configuration at the time the item was walked down and after all evaluations wereperformed.
The walkdown and screening information for the ESEP is documented in S&AReport 13Q3208-RPT-004
[Ref. 20].6.3.2 Application of Previous Walkdown Information The Augmented Approach Guidance for the NTTF 2.1 Seismic walkdowns
[Ref. 2] references EPRI NP-6041-SL for Screening
[Ref. 7]. The Reference 2 augmented approach allows use ofwalkdown results from recent walkdowns that include the recently completed NTTF 2.3walkdowns
[Ref. 18]. EPRI NP-6041-SL states that the walkdown team should attempt a 100%walk-by of all items on the listing.
It also states that reasons for this not being possible are thatsome items may be inaccessible due to the equipment being in a high radiation area or cannotbe looked at (like buried tanks).The following list of items were inaccessible but screened in accordance with EPRI NP-6041-SL, based on documentation and similarity to items that were included in the walkdowns.
Previous seismic walkdowns were used to support the ESEP seismic evaluations.
Some of thecomponents on the ESEL were included in the NTTF 2.3 seismic walkdowns
[Ref. 18]. Thebasis for screening is also included.
3 EPRI 3002000704
[Ref. 2] page 5-4 limits the ESEP seismic interaction reviews to "nearby block walls" and "pipingattached to tanks" which are reviewed "to address the possibility of failures due to differential displacements."
Otherpotential seismic interaction evaluations are "deferred to the full seismic risk evaluations performed in accordance with EPRI 1025287 [Ref. 14].
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 26 of 151The following items on the Unit I ESEL were screened in this manner:Item 11, 12-TK-47-CD, EMERGENCY DIESELS FUEL OIL STORAGE TANK:This tank is buried and, by definition, not accessible.
Per the screening criteria of Table 2-4 inEPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7], the anchorage configurations of buried tanks are inherently seismically rugged and of no concern.
A review of the flexibility of attached piping wasperformed in SQUG-12-TK-47-CD
[Ref. 22.3] and the tank was evaluated for the potential seismic wave effects for the SSE and had a stress of 3.6 ksi. Since the factor of safety is on theorder of 10, this screens for the RLGM which is an earthquake that is the SSE scaled by a factorof 1.93 < 10.Item 89, 1-HV-CEQ-2, CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN SKIMMER VENTILATION FAN #2:HV-CEQ-2 is a large fan unit with very rugged anchorage.
This was walked down during theNTTF 2.3 effort and the walkdown is documented in the Reference 15 report. The anchorage wasin good condition and there were no potential adverse interactions.
This was unchanged from thecondition documented in SQUG-1-HV-CEQ-2
[Ref. 22.1]. This Equipment screens (other thananchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 6041-SL [Ref. 7] by meeting the GenericImplementation Procedure (GIP) caveats [Ref. 30] as documented in SQUG-1-HV-CEQ-2
[Ref.22.1]. A bounding analysis was performed in SQUG-1-HV-CEQ-1
[Ref. 22.2] and had a margin of7.7 > 1.93 RLGM scaling factor. Therefore this screens.Item 139, 1-NPS-121, REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #2 HOT LEG WIDE RANGE PRESSURETRANSMITTER:
This was a late addition to the ESEL after the walkdowns were completed as a result of reviewsto changes in the August FLEX strategy.
Per the USI A-46 walkdown SEWS the transmitter ismounted on a small floor mounted pipe stand anchored to the reinforced concrete floor withexpansion anchors.
The installation for 1-NPS-121, 1-NPS-122, 2-NPS-121 and 2-NPS-122 aresimilar.
It is noted that the Foxboro transmitters for 1-NPS-121 and 2-NPS-122 in place duringthe USI A-46 walkdowns have been replaced with Rosemount transmitters but used the samemounting.
An ANCHOR analysis
[Ref. 22.6] for this installation indicated a factor of safety of4.0 which is above the RLGM screening level of 1.93 < 4.0.Item 140, 1-NPS-122, REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #1 HOT LEG WIDE RANGE PRESSURETRANSMITTER:
This was a late addition to the ESEL after the walkdowns were completed as a result of reviewsto changes in the August FLEX strategy.
Per the USI A-46 walkdown SEWS the transmitter ismounted on a small floor mounted pipe stand anchored to the reinforced concrete floor withexpansion anchors.
The installation for 1-NPS-121, 1-NPS-122, 2-NPS-121 and 2-NPS-122 aresimilar.
The most limiting installation with the highest weight with the highest center of gravitywas evaluated for 2-NPS-121 and the ANCHOR analysis
[Ref. 22.7] indicated a factor of safety Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 27 of 151of 2.7 which is above the RLGM screening level that is the SSE multiplied by a factor of 1.93and therefore 1-NPS-122 is acceptable by comparison.
Item 141, 1-NRI-21, NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION CHANNEL I WIDE RANGE RADIATION DETECTOR:
The location of this detector was very close to the Reactor Vessel and was not accessible.
It isscreened based on similarity to other small instruments in containment.
These are smallinstruments.
The walkdown of accessible instruments of this type in containment determined they were free of interactions and had very rugged anchorage.
These were screened to the0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7].Item 145, 1-NTQ-110A, RVLIS TRAIN 'A' UPPER TAP TEMPERATURE COMPENSATION COMPUTER INPUT THERMAL SENSOR 'A':The location of this detector was very close to the Reactor Vessel and was not accessible.
It isscreened based on similarity to other small instruments in containment.
These are smallinstruments.
The walkdown of accessible instruments of this type in containment determined they were free of interactions and had very rugged anchorage.
These were screened to the0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7].Item 146, 1-NTQ-110B, RVLIS TRAIN 'A' UPPER TAP TEMPERATURE COMPENSATION COMPUTER INPUT THERMAL SENSOR 'B':The location of this detector was very close to the Reactor Vessel and was not accessible.
It isscreened based on similarity to other small instruments in containment.
These are smallinstruments.
The walkdown of accessible instruments of this type in containment determined they were free of interactions and had very rugged anchorage.
These were screened to the0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 71.Item 147, 1-NTQ-130A, RVLIS TRAIN 'A' CONDUIT TEMPERATURE COMPENSATION COMPUTER INPUT THERMAL SENSOR 'A':The location of this detector was very close to the Reactor Vessel and was .not accessible.
It isscreened based on similarity to other small instruments in containment.
These are smallinstruments.
The walkdown of accessible instruments of this type in containment demonstrated they were free of interactions and had very rugged anchorage.
These were screened to the0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7].Item 148, 1-NTQ-130C, RVLIS TRAIN 'A' CONDUIT TEMPERATURE COMPENSATION COMPUTER INPUT THERMAL SENSOR 'C':The location of this detector was very close to the Reactor Vessel and was not accessible.
It isscreened based on similarity to other small instruments in containment.
These are smallinstruments.
The walkdown of accessible instruments of this type in containment demonstrated Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 1303208-RPT-005 50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 28 of 151they were free of interactions and had very rugged anchorage.
These were screened to the0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7].The following items on the Unit 2 ESEL were screened in this manner:Item 1, 12-TK-47-AB, AB EMERGENCY DIESEL FUEL OIL STORAGE TANK:This tank is buried and, by definition, not accessible.
Per the screening criteria of Table 2-4 inEPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7], the anchorage configurations of buried tanks are inherently seismically rugged and of no concern.
A review of the flexibility of attached piping wasperformed in SQUG-12-TK-47-AB
[Ref. 22.4] and the tank was evaluated for the potential seismic wave effects for the SSE and had a stress of 3.6 ksi. Since the factor of safety is on theorder of 10, this screens for the RLGM which is an earthquake that is the SSE scaled by a factorof 1.93 < 10.Item 86, 2-HV-CEQ-2 CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN SKIMMER VENTILATION FAN #2:2-HV-CEQ-2 is a large fan unit with very rugged anchorage.
This was walked down during theNTTF 2.3 effort and the walkdown documented in the Reference 15 report. The anchorage wasin good condition and there were no potential adverse interactions.
This was unchanged fromthe condition documented in SQUG-2-HV-CEQ-2
[Ref. 22.5]. Equipment screens (other thananchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL per meeting the GIPcaveats [Ref. 30] as documented in SQUG-2-HV-CEQ-2
[Ref. 22.5]. A bounding analysis wasperformed in SQUG-1-HV-CEQ-1
[Ref. 22.2] and had a margin of 7.7 > 1.93 RLGM factor.Therefore this screens.Item 97, 2-IMO-128, REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #2 HOT LEG TO RESIDUAL HEATREMOVAL PUMPS SUCTION SHUTOFF VALVE:This valve is inside the Unit 2 Containment and was not accessible during the walkdown effort,screened based on the walkdown of 1-IMO-128.
Per the USI A-46 SEWS [Ref. 22.8], body andyoke is steel. Pipe diameter is 14". Measured offset = 64" <80" limit from Figure F-26 of EPRI-NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7]. Weight of operator
= 460# maximum <750# limit Figure F-26 of EPRI- NP-6041-SL [Ref. 7]. Therefore, valve is screened for 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL [Ref. 7].Item 101, 2-LDISB-B10, CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B'GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY
#B10:This Hydrogen igniter is inside the Unit 2 Containment and was not accessible during the NTTF2.1 walkdowns.
It was screened based on comparison to all the other 1-LDISB assemblies walkdown that had no adverse interactions, very rugged anchorage and contained ruggedcomponents.
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 29 of 151Item 102, 2-LDISB-B11, CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B'GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY
#B1 1:This Hydrogen igniter is inside the Unit 2 Containment and was not accessible during the NTTF2.1 walkdowns.
It was screened based on comparison to all the other 1-LDISB assemblies walkdown that had no adverse interactions, very rugged anchorage and contained ruggedcomponents.
Item 103, 2-LDISB-B12, CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B'GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY
#B12:This Hydrogen igniter is inside the Unit 2 Containment and was not accessible during the NTTF2.1 walkdowns.
It was screened based on comparison to all the other 1-LDISB assemblies walkdown that had no adverse interactions, very rugged anchorage and contained ruggedcomponents.
Item 104, 2-LDISB-B18, CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B'GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY
#B18:This Hydrogen igniter is inside the Unit 2 Containment and was not accessible during the NTTF2.1 walkdowns.
It was screened based on comparison to all the other 1-LDISB assemblies walkdown that had no adverse interactions, very rugged anchorage and contained ruggedcomponents.
Item 105, 2-LDISB-B19, CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B'GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY
#B19:This Hydrogen igniter is inside the Unit 2 Containment and was not accessible during the NTTF2.1 walkdowns.
It was screened based on comparison to all the other 1-LDISB assemblies walkdown that had no adverse interactions, very rugged anchorage and contained ruggedcomponents.
Item 106, 2-LDISB-B20, CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B'GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY
#B20:This Hydrogen igniter is inside the Unit 2 Containment and was not accessible during the NTTF2.1 walkdowns.
It was screened based on comparison to all the other 1-LDISB assemblies walkdown that had no adverse interactions, very rugged anchorage and contained ruggedcomponents.
Item 107, 2-LDISB-B21, CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B'GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY
#B21This Hydrogen igniter is inside the Unit 2 Containment and was not accessible during the NTTF2.1 walkdowns.
It was screened based on comparison to all the other 1-LDISB assemblies Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 30 of 151walkdown that had no adverse interactions, very rugged anchorage and contained ruggedcomponents.
Item 108, 2-LDISB-B22, CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B'GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY
#B22This Hydrogen igniter is inside the Unit 2 Containment and was not accessible during the NTTF2.1 walkdowns.
It was screened based on comparison to all the other 1-LDISB assemblies walkdown that had no adverse interactions, very rugged anchorage and contained ruggedcomponents.
Item 109, 2-LDISB-B23, CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B'GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY
#B23This Hydrogen igniter is inside the Unit 2 Containment and was not accessible during the NTTF2.1 walkdowns.
It was screened based on comparison to all the other 1-LDISB assemblies walkdown that had no adverse interactions, very rugged anchorage and contained ruggedcomponents.
Item 114, 2-LDISB-B28, CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B'GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY
#B28This Hydrogen igniter is inside the Unit 2 Containment and was not accessible during the NTTF2.1 walkdowns.
It was screened based on comparison to all the other 1-LDISB assemblies walkdown that had no adverse interactions, very rugged anchorage and contained ruggedcomponents.
Item 116, 2-LDISB-B8 CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B'IGNITER ASSEMBLY
#B8This Hydrogen igniter is inside the Unit 2 Containment and was not accessible during the NTTF2.1 walkdowns.
It was screened based on comparison to all the other 1-LDISB assemblies walkdown that had no adverse interactions, very rugged anchorage and contained ruggedcomponents.
Item 117, 2-LDISB-B9 CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B'GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY
#B9This Hydrogen igniter is inside the Unit 2 Containment and was not accessible during the NTTF2.1 walkdowns.
It was screened based on comparison to all the other 1-LDISB assemblies walkdown that had no adverse interactions, very rugged anchorage and contained ruggedcomponents.
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 31 of 151Item 136, 2-NPS-121, REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #2 HOT LEG.WIDE RANGE PRESSURETRANSMITTER This was a late addition to the ESEL after the walkdowns were completed as a result of reviewsto changes in the August FLEX strategy.
Per the USI A-46 walkdown SEWS the transmitter ismounted on a small floor mounted pipe stand anchored to the reinforced concrete floor withexpansion anchors.
The installation for 1-NPS-121, 1-NPS-122, 2-NPS-121 and 2-NPS-122 aresimilar.
An ANCHOR analysis
[Ref. 22.6] for this installation indicated a factor of safety of 4.0which is above the RLGM screening level which is the SSE times a factor of 1.93.Item 137, 2-NPS-122, REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #1 HOT LEG WIDE RANGE PRESSURETRANSMITTER This was a late addition to the ESEL after the walkdowns were completed as a result of reviewsto changes in the August FLEX strategy.
Per the USI A-46 walkdown SEWS the transmitter ismounted on a small floor mounted pipe stand anchored to the reinforced concrete floor withexpansion anchors.
The installation for 1-NPS-121, 1-NPS-122, 2-NPS-121 and 2-NPS-122 aresimilar.
It is noted that the Foxboro transmitters for 1-NPS-121 and 2-NPS-122 in place duringthe USI A-46 walkdowns have been replaced with Rosemount transmitters but used the samemounting.
An ANCHOR analysis
[Ref. 22.7] for this installation indicated a factor of safety of2.7 which is above the RLGM screening level which is the SSE times a factor of 1.93.Item 138, 2-NRI-21, NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION CHANNEL I WIDE RANGE RADIATION DETECTORThe location of this detector was very close to the Reactor Vessel and was not accessible.
It isscreened based on similarity to other small instruments in the Unit 1 containment.
These aresmall instruments.
The walkdown of accessible instruments of this type in containment determined they were free of interactions and had very rugged anchorage, These werescreened to the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7].Item 140, 2-NRV-152, PRESSURIZER TRAIN 'B' PRESSURE RELIEF VALVEThis valve was inaccessible.
It is in the Unit 2 Pressurizer doghouse that was not accessible during the NTTF 2.1 walkdowns.
Screened based on comparison to 1-NRV-152.
Theequipment screens for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7]. Offset foroperator 40" within Earthquake Experience Data of Figure F-25 of EPRI NP-6041-SL, pipeDiameter 3".Item 141, 2-NRV-1 53, PRESSURIZER OME-4 TRAIN 'A' PRESSURE RELIEF VALVEThis valve was inaccessible.
It is in the Unit 2 Pressurizer doghouse that was not accessible during the NTTF 2.1 walkdowns.
Screened based on comparison to 1-NRV-153.
Theequipment screens for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7]. Offset for Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 32 of 151operator 40" within Earthquake Experience Data of Figure F-25 of EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7],pipe Diameter 3".Item 142, 2-NTQ-1 10A, RVLIS TRAIN 'A' UPPER TAP TEMPERATURE COMPENSATION COMPUTER INPUT THERMAL SENSOR 'A'The location of this detector was very close to the Reactor Vessel and was not accessible.
It isscreened based on similarity to other small instruments in the Unit 1 containment.
These aresmall instruments.
The walkdown of accessible instruments of this type in containment determined they were free of interactions and had very rugged anchorage.
These werescreened to the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7].Item 143, 2-NTQ-11OB, RVLIS TRAIN 'A' UPPER TAP TEMPERATURE COMPENSATION COMPUTER INPUT THERMAL SENSOR 'B'The location of this detector was very close to the Reactor Vessel inside the Crane Wall andwas not accessible.
It is screened based on similarity to other small instruments in the Unit 1containment.
These are small instruments.
The walkdown of accessible instruments of thistype in containment determined they were free of interactions and had very rugged anchorage.
These were screened to the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7].Item 144, 2-NTQ-130A, RVLIS TRAIN 'A' CONDUIT TEMPERATURE COMPENSATION COMPUTER INPUT THERMAL SENSOR 'A'The location of this detector was very close to the Reactor Vessel and was not accessible.
It isscreened based on similarity to other small instruments in the Unit 1 containment.
These aresmall instruments.
The walkdown of accessible instruments of this type in containment determined they were free of interactions and had very rugged anchorage.
These werescreened to the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7].Item 145, 2-NTQ-130CRVLIS TRAIN 'A' CONDUIT TEMPERATURE COMPENSATION COMPUTER INPUT SPARE THERMAL SENSOR 'C'The location of this detector was very close to the Reactor Vessel and was not accessible.
It isscreened based on similarity to other small instruments in the Unit 1 containment.
These aresmall instruments.
The walkdown of accessible instruments of this type in containment determined they were free of interactions and had very rugged anchorage.
These werescreened to the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7].Item 146, 2-NTR-1 10, REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #1 HOT LEG WIDE RANGETEMPERATURE RECORDER THERMAL SENSORThis small temperature sensor was inaccessible during the NTTF 2.1 walkdowns.
It is in lowerContainment, inside the Crane Wall and is only Accessible during an Outage. It was screenedbased on comparison to 1-NTR-110 and the other similar NTR's in the CNP Unit 1 Containment.
It is a Conax Corp. Model 7H57-10000-01 Thermal Sensor, IEEE-344-1975 qualified by Conax Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 33 of 151Corp. Seismic Analysis Report #IPS-943.
Rugged component with no seismic interaction concerns.
Equipment screens for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7].Item 147, 2-NTR-130, REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #3 HOT LEG WIDE RANGETEMPERATURE RECORDER THERMAL SENSORThis small temperature sensor was inaccessible during the NTTF 2.1 walkdowns.
It is in lowerContainment, inside the Crane Wall and is only Accessible during an Outage. It was screenedbased on comparison to 1-NTR-130 and the other similar NTR's in the CNP Unit 1 Containment.
It is a Conax Corp. Model 7H57-10000-01 Thermal Sensor, IEEE-344-1975 qualified by ConaxCorp. Seismic Analysis Report #IPS-943.
Rugged component with no seismic interaction concerns.
Equipment screens for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7].Item 148, 2-NTR-210 REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #1 COLD LEG WIDE RANGETEMPERATURE RECORDER THERMAL SENSORThis small temperature sensor was inaccessible during the NTTF 2.1 walkdowns.
It is in lowerContainment, inside the Crane Wall and is only Accessible during an Outage. It was screenedbased on comparison to 1-NTR-210 and the other similar NTR's in the CNP Unit 1 Containment.
It is a Conax Corp. Model 7H57-10000-01 Thermal Sensor, IEEE-344-1975 qualified by ConaxCorp. Seismic Analysis Report #IPS-943.
Rugged component with no seismic interaction concerns.
Equipment screens for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7].Item 149, 2-NTR-230, REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #3 COLD LEG WIDE RANGETEMPERATURE RECORDER THERMAL SENSORThis small temperature sensor was inaccessible during the NTTF 2.1 walkdowns.
It is in lowerContainment, inside the Crane Wall and is only accessible during an Outage. It was screenedbased on comparison to 1-NTR-230 and the other similar NTR's in the CNP Unit 1 Containment.
It is a Conax Corp. Model 7H57-10000-01 Thermal Sensor, IEEE-344-1975 qualified by ConaxCorp. Seismic Analysis Report #IPS-943.
Rugged component with no seismic interaction concerns.
Equipment screens for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7].Item 152, 2-OME-6-1, ACCUMULATOR TANK #1This Accumulator Tank was added to the ESEL after the entry to the CNP Unit 2 containment was made. It is in lower Containment.
It was screened based on comparison to 1-OME-6-1 and the other similar Accumulator Tanks in the CNP Unit 1 Containment.
These were all foundto be free from adverse seismic interactions during the walkdowns of the CNP Unit 1Accumulators.
A screening calculation was performed for the anchorage and had a very highmargin above the RLGM. There was some minor rust found on some bases of the CNP Unit 1Accumulators but none rose to a concern regarding its seismic capacity.
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 34 of 151Item 153, 2-OME-6-2, ACCUMULATOR TANK #2This Accumulator Tank was added to the ESEL after the entry to the CNP Unit 2 containment was made. It is in lower Containment.
It was screened based on comparison to 1-OME-6-2 andthe other similar Accumulator Tanks in the CNP Unit 1 Containment.
These were all found to befree from adverse seismic interactions during the walkdowns of the CNP Unit 1 Accumulators.
A screening calculation was performed for the anchorage and had a very high margin above theRLGM. There was some minor rust found on some bases of the CNP Unit 1 Accumulators butnone rose to a concern regarding its seismic capacity.
Item 154, 2-OME-6-3, ACCUMULATOR TANK #3This Accumulator Tank was added to the ESEL after the entry to the CNP Unit 2 containment was made. It is in lower Containment.
It was screened based on comparison to 1-OME-6-3 andthe other similar Accumulator Tanks in the CNP Unit 1 Containment.
These were all found to befree from adverse seismic interactions during the walkdowns of the CNP Unit 1 Accumulators.
A screening calculation was performed for the anchorage and had a very high margin above theRLGM. There was some minor rust found on some bases of the CNP Unit 1 Accumulators butnone rose to a concern regarding its seismic capacity.
Item 155, 2-OME-6-4, ACCUMULATOR TANK #4This Accumulator Tank was added to the ESEL after the entry to the CNP Unit 2 containment was made. It is in lower Containment.
It was screened based on comparison to 1-OME-6-4 andthe other similar Accumulator Tanks in the CNP Unit 1 Containment.
These were all found to befree from adverse seismic interactions during the walkdowns of the CNP Unit 1 Accumulators.
A screening calculation was performed for the anchorage and had a very high margin above theRLGM. There was some minor rust found on some bases of the CNP Unit 1 Accumulators butnone rose to a concern regarding its seismic capacity.
Item 196, 2-TK-253-1, PRESSURIZER TRAIN 'A' PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE NRV-153RESERVE CONTROL AIR TANKThis small horizontal tank was inaccessible during the NTTF 2.1 walkdowns.
It is in lowerContainment, inside the Crane Wall and is only accessible during an Outage. It is screenedbased on comparison to 1-TK-253-1 and the USI A-46 evaluation performed for this component.
This horizontal tank contains air and is supported by other than standard saddles.
Anchorage:
Tank is sufficiently welded to building steel, and is more than adequate for the RLGM.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL [Ref. 7] by meeting the GIP caveats [Ref. 30] as documented in Reference 22.9. Theanchorage of the small tank is more than adequate for the RLGM for this relatively small tank.
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 35 of 151Item 197, 2-TK-253-2, PRESSURIZER TRAIN 'B' PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE NRV-152RESERVE CONTROL AIR TANKThis small horizontal tank inaccessible during the NTTF 2.1 walkdowns, it is in lowerContainment, inside the Crane Wall and is only accessible during an Outage. It is screenedbased on comparison to 1-TK-253-1 and the USI A-46 evaluation performed for this component.
This horizontal tank contains air and is supported by other than standard saddles.
Anchorage:
Tank is sufficiently welded to building steel, and is more than adequate for the RLGM.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL [Ref. 7] by meeting the GIP caveats [Ref. 30] as documented in Reference 22.10. Theanchorage of the small tank is more than adequate for the RLGM for this relatively small tank.All non-energized cabinets were opened when specialized tools were not needed to operate thecabinet doors. Photos were taken during the walkdowns.
The existing calculations and SEWSfrom the USI A-46 evaluation of CNP [Ref. 16] were utilized to aid the SRT in their screening decisions as indicated in Attachments C and D of this report.6.3.3 Significant Walkdown FindingsConsistent with the guidance from EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7], there were two findings notedduring the CNP ESEP walkdowns relative to the site RLGM ISRS:1. The three Boric Acid Storage Tanks (BASTs);
1-TK-12N, 2-TK-12S and 12-TK-12M, were found to have an anchorage HCLPF of 0.227g < 0.387g RLGM.2. BAST Level Alarm Transmitters; 1-QLA-410, 12-QLA-420, 2-QLA-430, BAST HeaterTemperature Controllers; 1-QTC-410, 2-QTC-430, 12-QTC-420, and BAST TransferPumps; 1-PP-46-1 and 2-PP-46-4, were determined to have a HCLPF of 0.227g <0.387g RLGM due to seismic interaction with the three Boric Acid Storage Tanks.Several block walls were identified in the proximity of ESEL equipment.
These block walls wereassessed for their structural adequacy to withstand the seismic loads resulting from the RLGM[Ref. 10.1]. For any cases where the block wall represented the HCLPF failure mode for anESEL item, it is noted in the tabulated HCLPF values described in Section 6.6.6.4 HCLPF Calculation ProcessESEL items were evaluated using the criteria in EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7]. Those evaluations included the following steps:* Performing seismic capability walkdowns for equipment to evaluate the equipment installed plant conditions.
* Performing screening evaluations using the screening tables in EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref.7] as described in Section 6.2.
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 36 of 151Performing HCLPF calculations considering various failure modes that include bothstructural failure modes (e.g. anchorage, load path etc.) and functional failure modes.All HCLPF calculations were performed using the CDFM methodology and are documented inS&A calculations 13Q3208-CAL-004
[Ref. 10.1], 13Q3208-CAL-005
[Ref. 10.2], and 13Q3208-CAL-006 [Ref. 10.3].Anchorage configurations for non-valve components were evaluated either by SRT judgment, large margins in existing design basis calculations, or CDFM based on HCLPF calculations
[Refs. 10.1, 10.2 and 10.3]. The results of these analysis methods are documented inAttachment C and D for CNP Unit 1 and CNP Unit 2 respectively.
For components beyond 40ft. above grade, Table 2-4 of EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7] is not directly applicable.
Per Reference 2, the ESEP Guidance, screening for equipment below 40 ft. above grade is perthe screening lanes contained in Tables 2-3 and 2-4 of EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7]. Since thepeak of the RLGM established for the ESEP walkdowns is < 0.8g as shown in Figure 5-1, the0.8g screening lane may be used for all equipment at or below about 40 ft. above grade. Gradehas been established for CNP at El. 608 ft. per Reference
: 16. Due to the significant marginbetween the peak spectral acceleration of the screening lane (0.80g) and the peak of the RLGM(0.62g),
equipment up to an elevation of 651 ft. meets the "about" 40 ft. limitation.
Therefore, forequipment at elevations 651 ft. and below this screening is applicable.
All of the equipment in the ESEL for CNP Unit 1 and CNP Unit 2 other than some uppercontainment hydrogen igniters (1 & 2-UDISB components) are at Elevation 651 ft. or below.The limiting hydrogen igniters were addressed in the Reference 10.3 HCLPF calculation.
Thesewere the assemblies supported by the CNP Unit 1 and CNP Unit 2 catwalks in uppercontainment.
The limiting HCLPF for these items were shown to be above the defined ISRS forthe RLGM.As described in Section 6.0, HCLPF calculations used the CDFM analysis criteria established inSection 6 of EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7] and are used for the detailed analysis of components.
The relevant CDFM criteria from EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7] are summarized in Table 6-1.
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 37 of 151.Table 6-4: CNP CDFM CriteriaLoad combination:
Normal + seismic margin earthquake (SME)Ground response spectrum:
Conservatively specified (84% non-exceedance probability)
Damping:
Conservative estimate of median damping.Structural model: Best estimate (median)
+ uncertainty variation in frequency.
Code specified minimum strength or 95% exceedance ofMaterial strength:
actual strength if test data is available.
Code ultimate strength (ACI), maximum strength (AISC),Service Level D (ASME) or functional limits. If test data isStatic capacity equations:
available to demonstrate excessive conservatism of codeequations then use 84% exceedance of test data for capacityequations.
For non-brittle failure modes and linear analysis, use 80% ofInelastic energy absorption:
computed seismic stress in capacity evaluation to account forductility benefits or perform nonlinear analysis and use 95%exceedance ductility levels.The HCLPF capacity is equal to the PGA at which the strength limit is reached.
The HCLPFearthquake load is calculated as follows:U = Normal + EcWhere:00U = Ultimate strength per Section 6 of EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7]Ec = HCLPF earthquake load* Normal = Normal operating loads (dead and live load expected to be present, etc.)For this calculation, the HCLPF earthquake load is related to a fixed reference earthquake:
Ec = SFc*ErefWhere:" Eref = reference earthquake from the relevant in-structure response spectrum (ISRS)* SFc = component-specific scale factor that satisfies U = Normal +Ec Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 38 of 151The HCLPF will be defined as the PGA produced by Ec. Because the CNP RLGM PGA is0.387g:HCLPF = 0.387g*SFc 6.5 Functional Evaluation of RelaysAs discussed in the NTTF Recommendation 2.1 guidance
[Ref. 2], the ESEL was to contain allrelays and switches which may negatively "seal in" or "lock out" on the CNP ESEL [Ref. 25]. Asdiscussed in Section 3.1.7 of this report none were identified and therefore, there were noHCLPFs for the Functional Evaluation of Relays calculated.
6.6 Tabulated ESEL HCLPF values (including Key failure modes)Tabulated ESEL HCLPF values including the key failure modes are included in Attachment Cfor Unit 1 and D for Unit 2. The following notes apply to the information in the tables.* For items screened out using EPRI NP 6041-SL [Ref. 7] screening tables, the listedHCLPF is set to be equal to the RLGM PGA (0.387g) and the failure mode is listed as"Screened".
" For items where anchorage controls the HCLPF value, and the HCLPF is less than theRLGM PGA (0.387g),
the HCLPF value is listed in the table and the failure mode is setto "Anchorage".
When the anchorage HCLPF turned out to be above the RLGM PGA(0.387g),
but controlled the HCLPF for the component then the value was also includedin the summary tables. When the calculated HCLPF is determined to be well above theRLGM PGA (0.387g) and not limiting the failure mode, it is listed as "Screened" alongwith a note providing the anchorage HCLPF.* For items where interaction controls the HCLPF value, and the HCLPF is less than theRLGM PGA (0.387g),
the HCLPF value is listed in the table and the failure mode is setto "Interaction".
When the interaction HCLPF turned out to be above the RLGM PGA(0.387g),
the listed HCLPF is set to be equal to the RLGM PGA (0.387g) and the failuremode is listed as "Screened" along with a note providing the interaction HCLPF. It isnoted that interaction did not control any HCLPFs except for those where the HCLPFwas below the RLGM.
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 39 of 1517.0 Inaccessible Items and Late Additions to the ESEL7.1 Identification of Inaccessible Items and Late Additions to the ESELThere were equipment items for which walkdowns were not performed and therefore, no SEWSwere completed.
Some of these items were late add-ons to the ESEL as a result ofimplementing the August 2014 FLEX strategy
[Ref. 29].Unit 1 Items include:* ESEL Item 9, 12-QTC-420, MIDDLE BAST TK-12M TRAIN 'A' HTR TEMPCONTROLLER.
It is noted that the HCLPF for this equipment item is limited by theHCLPF for the middle Boric Acid Storage Tank due to Seismic Interaction.
The HCLPFfor the tank was calculated in 13Q3208-CAL-005 to be 0.227g, (Ref. 10.2) and is lessthan the RLGM of 0.387g and therefore, 12-QTC-420 will not screen.* ESEL Item 76, 1-FMO-211, TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEED PUMP PP-4DISCHARGE TO STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-1 CONTROL VALVE* ESEL Item 77, 1-FMO-221, TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEED PUMP PP-4DISCHARGE TO STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-2 CONTROL VALVE" ESEL Item 78, 1-FMO-231, TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEED PUMP SUPPLY TOSTEAM GENERATOR OME-3-3 CONTROL VALVE" ESEL Item 79, 1-FMO-241, TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEED PUMP SUPPLY TOSTEAM GENERATOR OME-4-4 CONTROL VALVE" ESEL Item 95, 1-ICM-321, WEST RHR TO REACTOR COOLANT LOOPS #2 AND #3HOTLEGS CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVEUnit 2 Items include:* ESEL Item 73, 2-FMO-21 1, TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEED PUMP PP-4DISCHARGETO STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-1 CONTROL VALVE* ESEL Item 74, 2-FMO-221, TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEED PUMP PP-4DISCHARGE TO STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-2 CONTROL VALVE* ESEL Item 75, 2-FMO-231, TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEED PUMP SUPPLY TOSTEAM GENERATOR OME-3-3 CONTROL VALVE* ESEL Item 76, 2-FMO-241, TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEED PUMP SUPPLY TOSTEAM GENERATOR OME-3-4 CONTROL VALVE* ESEL Item 89, 2-1CM-1 11, RHR TO REACTOR COOLANT LOOPS #2 & #3 COLDLEGS CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE* ESEL Item 92, 2-ICM-321, WEST RHR TO REACTOR COOLANT LOOPS #2 AND #3COLD LEGS CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 40 of 151There were also items inaccessible during the screening walkdowns (e.g. items in the Unit 2Lower Containment, inside the Crane Wall that are not accessible except during an outage).Section 6.3.2 of this report includes a listing and discussion of the items for which a walkdownwas not performed and therefore SEWS were not prepared.
These items were screened inaccordance with the EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7] guidance.
There were also two items for whichwalkdowns were not performed that have been screened based on the results of the NTTFRecommendation 2.3 walkdowns
[Ref. 18]. The implementation guidance contained in EPRI3002000704
[Ref. 2] allows use of recent walkdown data including the NTTF 2.3 walkdowns.
The basis for this screening is included in 6.3.2.7.2 Planned Walkdown
/ Evaluation Schedule
/ Close OutThe schedule for performing walkdowns for the inaccessible and late addition components aslisted in Section 7.1 is during the Unit 2 Refueling Outage U2C22 scheduled for the spring 2015.The screening and evaluation of these components will be complete within 90 days following theconclusion of the U2C22 refueling outage. The actions associated with these tasks are includedin Section 8.4.
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 41 of 1518.0 ESEP Conclusions and Results8.1 Supporting Information CNP has performed the ESEP as an interim action in response to the NRC's 50.54(0 letter [Ref.1]. It was performed using the methodologies in the NRC endorsed guidance in EPRI3002000704
[Ref. 2].The ESEP provides an important demonstration of seismic margin and expedites plant safetyenhancements through evaluations and potential near-term modifications of plant equipment that can be relied upon to protect the reactor core following beyond design basis seismicevents.The ESEP is part of the overall CNP response to the NRC's 50.54(f) letter [Ref. 1]. On March12, 2014, NEI submitted to the NRC results of a study [Ref. 12] of seismic core damage riskestimates based on updated seismic hazard information as it applies to operating nuclearreactors in the Central and Eastern United States (CEUS). The study concluded that "site-specific seismic hazards show that there has not been an overall increase in seismic risk for thefleet of U.S. plants" based on the re-evaluated seismic hazards.
As such, the "current seismicdesign of operating reactors continues to provide a safety margin to withstand potential earthquakes exceeding the seismic design basis."'The NRC's May 9, 2014 NTTF 2.1 Screening and Prioritization letter [Ref. 13] concluded thatthe "fleetwide seismic risk estimates are consistent with the approach and results used in theGI-199 safety/risk assessment."
The letter also stated that "As a result, the staff has confirmed that the conclusions reached in GI-1 99 safety/risk assessment remain valid and that the plantscan continue to operate while additional evaluations are conducted."
An assessment of the change in seismic risk for CNP was included in the fleet risk evaluation submitted in the March 12, 2014 NEI letter [Ref. 12] therefore, the conclusions in the NRC'sMay 9 letter [Ref. 131 also apply to CNP.In addition, the March 12, 2014 NEI letter [Ref. 12] provided an attached "Perspectives on theSeismic Capacity of Operating Plants,"
which (1) assessed a number of qualitative reasons whythe design of Structures,
: Systems, and Components (SSCs) inherently contain margin beyondtheir design level, (2) discussed industrial seismic experience databases of performance ofindustry facility components similar to nuclear SSCs, and (3) discussed earthquake experience at operating plants.The fleet of currently operating nuclear power plants was designed using conservative practices, such that the plants have significant margin to withstand large ground motions safely.
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 42 of 151This has been borne out of those plants that have actually experienced significant earthquakes.
The seismic design process has inherent (and intentional) conservatisms which result insignificant seismic margins within SSCs. These conservatisms are reflected in several keyaspects of the seismic design process, including:
" Safety factors applied in design calculations
* Damping values used in the dynamic analysis of SSCs" Bounding synthetic time histories for in-structure response spectra calculations
* Broadening criteria for in-structure response spectra* Response spectra enveloping criteria typically used in SSC analysis and testingapplications
" Response spectra based frequency domain analysis rather than explicit time historybased time domain analysis* Bounding requirements in codes and standards
* Use of minimum strength requirements of structural components (concrete and steel)" Bounding testing requirements, and" Ductile behavior of the primary materials (that is, not crediting the additional capacity ofmaterials such as steel and reinforced concrete beyond the essentially elastic range,etc.)These design practices combine to result in margins such that the SSCs will continue to fulfilltheir functions at ground motions well above the SSE.The intent of the ESEP is to perform an interim action in response to the NRC's 50.54(f) letter[Ref. 1] to demonstrate seismic margin through a review of a subset of the plant equipment thatcan be relied upon to protect the reactor core following beyond design basis seismic events. Inorder to complete the ESEP in an expedited amount of time, the RLGM used for the ESEPevaluation is a scaled version of the plant's SSE rather than the actual GMRS. To more fullycharacterize the risk impacts of the seismic ground motion represented by the GMRS on a plantspecific basis, a more detailed seismic risk assessment (SPRA or risk-based SMA) is to beperformed in accordance with EPRI 1025287 [Ref. 14]. As identified in the CNP SeismicHazard and GMRS submittal
[Ref. 11], CNP screens in for a risk evaluation.
The complete riskevaluation will more completely characterize the probabilistic seismic ground motion input intothe plant, the plant response to that probabilistic seismic ground motion input, and the resulting plant risk characterization.
CNP will complete that evaluation in accordance with the scheduleidentified in NEI's letter dated April 9, 2013 [Ref. 27] and endorsed by the NRC in their May 7,2013 letter [Ref. 28].8.2 Identification of Planned Modifications There is one planned modification for each of the three Boric Acid Storage Tanks; 1-TK-12N, 2-TK-12S and 12-TK-12M that had an anchorage HCLPF of 0.227g < 0.387g RLGM [Ref. 10.3].The modification will be designed to raise the HCLPF above the RLGM. This will also raise the SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 43 of 151interaction HCLPF for the BAST Level Alarm Transmitters; 1-QLA-410, 12-QLA-420, 2-QLA-430, the BAST Heater Temperature Controllers; 1-QTC-410, 2-QTC-430, 12-QTC-420, and forthe BAST Transfer Pumps; 1-PP-46-1 and 2-PP-46-4 that is the same as that for the anchorage HCLPF for the Boric Acid Tanks.8.3 Modification Implementation SchedulePlant modifications will be performed in accordance with the schedule identified in NEI letterdated April 9, 2013 [Ref. 27], which states that plant modifications not requiring a plannedrefueling outage will be completed by December 31, 2016 and modifications requiring arefueling outage will be completed within two planned refueling outages after December 31,2014.The modification of the three Boric Acid Storage Tanks, 1-TK-12N, 12-TK-12M, and 2-TK-12S, has not yet proceeded to a level of development to determine if a refueling outage is required toimplement the modifications.
As such, if a refueling outage is not required to implement thesemodifications, modification of the three Boric Acid Storage Tanks will be complete no later thanDecember 31, 2016. If a refueling outage is required to implement the Boric Acid StorageTanks anchorage modifications, these modifications will be completed by the end of the secondplanned refueling outage after December 31, 2014. The second Unit 1 planned refueling outage after December 31, 2014 is U1C28 currently scheduled to end in the 4th quarter 2017and the second Unit 2 planned refueling outage after December 31, 2014 is U2C23 scheduled to end in the 4th quarter of 2016.8.4 Summary of ActionsItem Action DateComplete walkdowns for the inaccessible and Prior to restart of Unit 2 at the completion late addition components listed in Section 7.1. of its spring 2015 refueling outage.Complete screening and evaluation of the Within 90 days following restart of Unit 22 inaccessible and late addition components listed at the completion of its spring 2015in Section 7.1. refueling outage.Complete ESEP plant modifications not December 31, 2016 (2 years after ESEPrequiring outages.
report submittal) p7azlExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 44 of 151Item Action DateTwo outages from ESEP report submittal 4 Complete ESEP plant modifications requiring (U1C28 Fall 2017)outages.
(U2C23 Fall 2016)Inform the NRC that the above noted Within 60 days following completion of all5 evaluations and modifications are complete.
above noted modifications.
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 45 of 1519.0 References 1 NRC (E Leeds and M Johnson)
Letter to All Power Reactor Licensees et al., "Requestfor Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f)Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3 and 9.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review ofInsights from the Fukushima Dai-lchi Accident,"
March 12, 2012.2 Seismic Evaluation Guidance:
Augmented Approach for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1 -Seismic.
EPRI, Palo Alto, CA: May2013. 3002000704.
3 Order Number EA-12-049 responses:
3.1 Letter AEP-NRC-2013-13, from J. P. Gebbie, Indiana Michigan PowerCompany (I&M), to the NRC, "Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant Unit 1 and Unit2, Overall Integrated Plan in Response to March 12, 2012 Commission OrderModifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies forBeyond-Design Basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049)",
February27, 2013 (ML13101A381).
3.2 Letter AEP-NRC-2013-71, from J. P. Gebbie, I&M, to the NRC, "Donald C.Cook Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2, First Six-Month Status Report in Responseto March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard toRequirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond Design- Basis ExternalEvents (Order Number EA-12-049)",
August 26, 2013 (ML13240A308).
3.3 Letter AEP-NRC-2014-17, from J. P. Gebbie, I&M, to the NRC, "Donald C.Cook Nuclear Plant Units I and 2, Second Six-Month Status Report inResponse to March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses withRegard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond Design-Basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049)",
February 27, 2014(ML14063A042).
3.4 Letter AEP-NRC-2014-66 from J. P. Gebbie, I&M, to the NRC, "Donald C.Cook Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2, Third Six-Month Status Report in Responseto March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard toRequirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond Design-Basis ExternalEvents (Order Number EA-12-049)",
August 27, 2014 (ML14241A235).
4 Stevenson
& Associates Report 13Q3208-RPT-003
-"Seismic Hazard and Screening Report for the Cook Nuclear Plant (CNP)", Rev. 1.5 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG-1407, Procedural and Submittal Guidance forthe Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) for Severe AccidentVulnerabilities, June 1991.
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 46 of 1516 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Generic Letter No. 88-20 Supplement 4, Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities
-10CFR 50.54(f),
June 1991.7 A Methodology for Assessment of Nuclear Power Plant Seismic Margin, Rev. 1, August1991, Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA. EPRI NP-6041-SL.
8 Methodology for Developing Seismic Fragilities, August 1991, EPRI, Palo Alto, CA.1994, TR-103959.
9 American Electric Service Corporation, Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2,"Individual Plant Examination of External Events Summary Report",
April, 1992.10 CNP ESEP High Confidence of Low Probability of Failure (HCLPF) Calculations:
10.1 13Q3208-CAL-004, Rev. 1, "High Confidence Low Probability of Failure(HCLPF) Calculations for Screened in ESEP Components".
10.2 13Q3208-CAL-005, Rev. 1, "High Confidence Low Probability of Failure(HCLPF) Calculations for Screened in ESEP Tanks".10.3 13Q3208-CAL-006, Rev. 1, "High Confidence Low Probability of Failure(HCLPF) Calculations for Containment Catwalk and Attached Hydrogen GlowPlugs".11 NRC Letter AEP-NRC-2014-25, March 27, 2014.12 Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), A. Pietrangelo, Letter to D. Skeen of the USNRC,"Seismic Core Damage Risk Estimates Using the Updated Seismic Hazards for theOperating Nuclear Plants in the Central and Eastern United States",
March 12, 2014.13 NRC (E Leeds) Letter to All Power Reactor Licensees et al., "Screening andPrioritization Results Regarding Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of FederalRegulations 50.54(F)
Regarding Seismic Hazard Re-Evaluations for Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights From the Fukushima Dai-lchiAccident,"
May 9, 2014.14 Seismic Evaluation Guidance:
Screening, Prioritization and Implementation Details(SPID) for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1:Seismic.
EPRI, Palo Alto, CA: February 2013. 1025287.15 American Electric Power Report SD-121023-001, "Seismic Walkdown Report, InResponse to the 50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.3: Seismic for the D. C. Cook Unit 1 & Unit 2," Rev. 2,January 13, 2014.16 AEP Report, AEP:NRC:1040C, "Response to NRC G.L. 87-02 Unresolved Safety IssueA-46", AEPSC Task Group, January 1996.17 CNP Design Basis In-Structure Response Spectra:
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014
* Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 47 of 15117.1 DC-D-3050-1 1-SC, "Seismic Analysis of the Auxiliary Building Complex",
Revision 1, Jan. 12, 2000.17.2 SD-000204-004, "Validation and Development of Turbine Building ResponseSpectra",
Revision 0, March 28, 2000.17.3 SD-991008-001, "Seismic Response Spectra for Containment Building",
Revision 0, Feb. 26, 2000.17.4 Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant Nuclear Safeguards Design Memo, "FloorResponse Curves for EL 591 ft. of Turbine Building
& Screenhouse",
Correspondence
# 03-23-1971, March 23, 1971.18 American Electric Power, "In Response to the 50.45(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic for the D. C. CookUnit 1 and 2," Report SD-121023-01, Rev. 2.19 Seismic Fragility Applications Guide Update, December 2009, EPRI, Palo Alto, CA.1994, 1019200.20 Stevenson
& Associates Report 13Q3208-RPT-004, Rev. 0, "ESEP Walkdown andScreening Report for the Cook Nuclear Plant (CNP)".21 Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Rev. 25.22 SQUG USI A-46 Component Specific Documentation 22.1 SQUG-1-HV-CEQ-2, Rev. 0 (USI A-46 SEWS).22.2 SQUG-1-HV-CEQ-1, Rev. 0 (USI A-46 SEWS).22.3 SQUG-12-TK-47-CD, Rev. 0 (USI A-46 SEWS).22.4 SQUG-12-TK-47-AB, Rev. 0 (USI A-46 SEWS).22.5 SQUG-2-HV-CEQ-2, Rev. 0 (USI A-46 SEWS).22.6 SQUG-2-NPS-121, Rev. 0 (USI A-46 SEWS).22.7 SQUG-2-NPS-122, Rev. 0 (USI A-46 SEWS).22.8 SQUG-2-IMO-128, Rev. 0 (USI A-46 SEWS).22.9 SQUG-2-TK-253-1, Rev. 0 (USI A-46 SEWS).22.10 SQUG-2-TK-253-2, Rev. 0 (USI A-46 SEWS).23 Stevenson
& Associates Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-002, Rev. 2, "Response Spectra forCook Nuclear Plant (CNP) Units 1 & 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP)Evaluations".
24 NEI 12-06, Rev. 0, "Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) Implementation Guide", Aug. 2012.
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 48 of 15125 Stevenson
& Associates Report 13Q3208-RPT-001, Rev. 4, "Report on Expedited Seismic Equipment List."26 D.C. Cook P&ID Drawings26.1 CNP Drawing OP-1-5105D, Rev. 10, "Steam Generating System".26.2 CNP Drawing OP-1-5105E, Rev. 1, "Main Steam".26.3 CNP Drawing OP-1-5106A, Rev. 60, "Auxiliary Feedwater".
26.4 CNP Drawing OP-1-5113, Rev. 92, "Essential Service Water".26.5 CNP Drawing OP-1-5113A, Rev. 9, "Essential Service Water".26.6 CNP Drawing OP-1-5143, Rev. 76, "Emergency Core Cooling (RHR) Unit No. 1".26.7 CNP Drawing OP-1-5135, Rev. 42, "Component Cooling Water Pumps andComponent Cooling Water Heat Exchangers".
26.8 CNP Drawing OP-1-5135A, Rev. 43, "Component Cooling Water SafetyRelated Loads".26.9 CNP Drawing OP-1-5143A, Rev. 5, "Emergency Core Cooling (RHR)Accumulator Piping".26.10 CNP Drawing OP-12-5131, Rev. 47, "Chemical
& Volume Control SystemBoron Make Up".26.11 CNP Drawing OP-1-5129, Rev. 61, "Chemical
& Volume Control SystemReactor Letdown & Charging".
26.12 CNP Drawing OP-1-5142, Rev. 45, "Emergency Core Cooling (SIS)".26.13 CNP Drawing OP-1-5128, Rev. 30, "Reactor Coolant Sheet 1 of 2".26.14 CNP Drawing OP-1-5128A, Rev. 54, "Reactor Coolant -Sheet 2 of 2".26.15 CNP Drawing OP-1-5120D, Rev. 34, "Containment Control Air 85# & 50# RingHeaders".
26.16 CNP Drawing OP-1-5151C, Rev. 54, "Emergency Diesel Generator CD".26.17 CNP Drawing OP-1-5148C, Rev. 30, "Flow Diagram Diesel Generator Area &Electrical Switchgear Rooms Heating & Ventilation Sys Unit 1".26.18 CNP Drawing OP-1-5149, Rev. 46, "Control Room Ventilation Unit No. 1".26.19 CNP Drawing OP-2-5105D, Rev. 22, "Steam Generating System".26.20 CNP Drawing OP-2-5105E, Rev. 1, "Main Steam".26.21 CNP Drawing OP-2-5106A, Rev. 55, "Auxiliary Feedwater".
26.22 CNP Drawing OP-2-5113, Rev. 82, "Essential Service Water".26.23 CNP Drawing OP-2-5113A, Rev. 9, "Essential Service Water".26.24 CNP Drawing OP-2-5143, Rev. 72, "Flow Diagram Emergency Core Cooling(RHR) Unit No. 2".26.25 CNP Drawing OP-2-5135, Rev. 37, "Component Cooling Water Pumps AndComponent Cooling Water Heat Exchangers".
26.26 CNP Drawing OP-2-5135A, Rev. 40, "Component Cooling Water SafetyRelated Loads".26.27 CNP Drawing OP-2-5143A, Rev. 4, "Emergency Core Cooling (RHR)Accumulator Piping".
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 49 of 15126.28 CNP Drawing OP-2-5129, Rev. 53, "Chemical
& Volume Control SystemReactor Letdown and Charging".
26.29 CNP Drawing OP-2-5142, Rev. 51, "Emergency Core Cooling (SIS)".26.30 CNP Drawing OP-2-5128, Rev. 30, "Reactor Coolant Sheet 1 of 2".26.31 CNP Drawing OP-2-5128A, Rev. 59, "Reactor Coolant Sheet 2 of 2".26.32 CNP Drawing OP-2-5120D, Rev. 31, "Containment Control Air 85# & 50# RingHeaders".
26.33 CNP Drawing OP-2-5151A, Rev. 55, "Emergency Diesel Generator "AB"".26.34 CNP Drawing OP-2-5148C, Rev. 31, "Flow Diagram Diesel Generator Area &Electrical Switchgear Rooms Heating & Ventilation Sys Unit 2".26.35 CNP Drawing OP-2-5149, Rev. 54, "Control Room Ventilation".
26.36 CNP Drawing OP-1-1 2032, Rev. 20, "MCC Auxiliary 600V Bus 11 C, 11DEngineered Safety System (Train A)".26.37 CNP Drawing OP-2-12032, Rev. 14, "MCC Auxiliary One-Line 600V Bus 21C,21D Engineered Safety System (Train A)".27. Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), A. Pietrangelo, Letter to D. Skeen of the USNRC,"Proposed Path Forward for NTTF Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Reevaluations",
April9, 2013.28. NRC (E Leeds) Letter to NEI (J Pollock),
"Electric Power Research Institute Final DraftReport xxxxx, "Seismic Evaluation Guidance:
Augmented Approach for the Resolution ofFukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic,"
as an Acceptable Alternative to the March 12, 2012, Information Request for Seismic Reevaluations,"
May7, 2013.29. FLEX Plan Input Transmittal to Stevenson
& Associates, August 25, 2014 (AEPCorrespondence Control #2014-716).
: 30. "Generic Implementation Procedure (GIP) for Seismic Verification of Nuclear PlantEquipment,"
Revision 3, Updated May 16, 1997.
SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 50 of 151Attachment A- CNP Unit 1 ESEL fExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 51 of 151CNP Unit 1 ESELCNP Equipment Operating StateUnit 1U INormal Notes / CommentsESEL ID Description Desired StateItem # State1 1-11A 600VAC BUS 11A SWITCHGEAR ENERGIZED ENERGIZED Power Available in Phase 3 Only2 1-11B 600VAC BUS 11B SWITCHGEAR ENERGIZED ENERGIZED 3 1-11C 600VAC BUS 1 lC ENERGIZED ENERGIZED Power Available in Phase 3 Only,SWITCHGEAR 11 C1 Breaker must be manuallytripped4 1-11D 600VAC BUS 11D ENERGIZED ENERGIZED SWITCHGEAR 5 1-152- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN ENERGIZED ENERGIZED LDISB IGNITION LOWER VOLUMETRAIN >6 1-152- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN ENERGIZED ENERGIZED UDISB IGNITION UPPER VOLUMETRAIN >7 1-1A 4KV BUS 1A SWITCHGEAR ENERGIZED ENERGIZED Power Available in Phase 3 Only8 12-QLA- MIDDLE BORIC ACID STORAGE OPERATING OPERATING BAST Level Transmitter 420 TANK TK-12M LEVEL ALARMTRANSMITTER 9 12-QTC- MIDDLE BAST TK-12M TRAIN 'A' OPERATING OPERATING BAST Temperature Transmitter 420 HTR TEMP CONTROLLER 10 12-TK- MIDDLE BORIC ACID STORAGE N/A N/A Passive Component 12M TANK11 12-TK- CD EMERGENCY DIESELS N/A N/A Passive Component 47-CD FUEL OIL STORAGE TANK12 1 CNTMT HYDROGEN IGNITION ENERGIZED ENERGIZED LDISB LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B> >13 1 CNTMT HYDROGEN IGNITION ENERGIZED ENERGIZED UDISB UPPER VOLUME TRAIN 'B'>14 1-88X- CNTMT HYDROGEN IGNITION NOT USED ENERGIZED LDISB LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' >15 1-88X- CNTMT HYDROGEN IGNITION NOT USED ENERGIZED UDISB UPPER VOLUME TRAIN 'B'>16 1 PLANT BATTERY BATT-AB ENERGIZED ENERGIZED ABBC DISCONNECT SWITCH17 1 PLANT BATTERY BATT-CD ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CDBC DISCONNECT SWITCH18 1-AB-A 600VAC MOTOR CONTROL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED Power Available in Phase 3 OnlyCENTER AB-A19 1-AB-D 600VAC MOTOR CONTROL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CENTER AB-D20 1-ABD-B 600VAC MOTOR CONTROL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CENTER ABD-B21 1-ABD-D 600VAC MOTOR CONTROL OPERATING OPERATING RCS Level, RWST LevelCENTER ABD-D22 1-ABV-A 600VAC VALVE CONTROL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED Power Available in Phase 3 OnlyCENTER ABV-A SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic1303208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 52 of 151CNP Unit 1 ESELCNP Equipment Operating StateUnit 11Normal Notes / CommentsESEL ID Description Desired StateItem # State23 1-AFWX 120/208VAC AUXILIARY OPERATING OPERATING RCS Level, RWST LevelFEEDWATER DISTRIBUTION PANEL24 1-AM-A 600VAC MOTOR CONTROL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED Power Available in Phase 3 OnlyCENTER AM-A25 1-AZV-A 600VAC VALVE CONTROL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED Power Available in Phase 3 OnlyCENTER AZV-A26 1-BA BORIC ACID CHARGING AND OPERATING OPERATING BAST Level, BAST Temperature LETDOWN CONTROL PANEL Indicators, Separately Powered27 1-BATT- PLANT BATTERY AB ENERGIZED ENERGIZED AB28 1-BATT- PLANT BATTERY BATT-AB ENERGIZED ENERGIZED AB-SH AMMETER SHUNT29 1-BATT- PLANT BATTERY CD ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CD30 1-BATT- PLANT BATTERY BATT-CD ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CD-SH AMMETER SHUNT31 1-BC- PLANT BATTERY BATT-AB ENERGIZED ENERGIZED AB2 CHARGER #232 1-BC- PLANT BATTERY BATT-CD ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CD1 CHARGER#1 33 1-BCTC- PLANT BATTERY CHARGERS ENERGIZED ENERGIZED AB BC-AB1 AND BC-AB2TRANSFER PANEL34 1-BCTC- PLANT BATTERY CHARGERS ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CD BC-CD1 AND BC-CD2TRANSFERPANEL 35 1-BLI- STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-1 OPERATING OPERATING SG Level Transmitter 110 WIDE RANGE LEVELINDICATOR TRANSMITTER 36 1-BLI- STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-2 OPERATING OPERATING SG Level Transmitter 120 WIDE RANGE LEVELINDICATOR TRANSMITTER 37 1-BLI- STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-3 OPERATING OPERATING SG Level Transmitter 130 WIDE RANGE LEVELINDICATOR TRANSMITTER 38 1-BLI- STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-4 OPERATING OPERATING SG Level Transmitter 140 WIDE RANGE LEVELINDICATOR TRANSMITTER 39 1-CCV- 250VDC TRAIN 'B' CRITICAL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED AB SOLENOID VALVESDISTRIBUTION PANEL40 1-CCV- 250VDC TRAIN 'A' CRITICAL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CD SOLENOID VALVESDISTRIBUTION PANEL41 1-CCW COMPONENT COOLING OPERATING AVAILABLE Hand Switches poweredWATER CONTROL PANEL separately Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 53 of 151CNP Unit 1 ESELCNP Equipment Operating StateUnitNormal Notes / CommentsESEL ID Description Desired StateItem # State42 1-CG1- REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING SG Level, RCS Injection Flow14 CONTROL GROUP #1 CABINET#1443 1-CG1- REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING BAST Level15 CONTROL GROUP #1 CABINET#1544 1-CG2- REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING RCS Injection Flow17 CONTROL GROUP #2 CABINET#1745 1-CG2- REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING RCS Injection Flow19 CONTROL GROUP #2 CABINET Instrumentation
#1946 1-CG3- REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING RCS Injection Flow20 CONTROL GROUP #3 CABINET#2047 1-CG3- REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING Containment
: Pressure, RWST21 CONTROL GROUP #3 CABINET Level, BAST Level, RCS#21 Injection Flow48 1-CG4- REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING RCS Injection Flow22 CONTROL GROUP #4 CABINET#2249 1-CG4- REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING SG Level23 CONTROL GROUP #4 CABINET#2350 1-CLI- CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK OPERATING OPERATING CST Level Transmitter 114 TK-32 LEVEL INDICATOR TRANSMITTER 51 1-CMO- COMPONENT COOLING OPEN CLOSED Local Manual Operation at the413 WATER PUMPS SUCTION operator hand wheel is creditedCROSSTIE TRAIN 'B' SHUTOFF for FLEX ResponseVALVE52 1-CMO- COMPONENT COOLING OPEN CLOSED Local Manual Operation at the414 WATER PUMPS DISCHARGE operator hand wheel is creditedCROSS TIE TRAIN 'B' SHUTOFF for FLEX ResponseVALVE53 1-CMO- COMPONENT COOLING OPEN CLOSED Local Manual Operation at the416 WATER TO MISCELLANEOUS operator hand wheel is creditedSERVICE TRAIN 'B' SHUTOFF for FLEX ResponseVALVE54 1-CMO- WEST RESIDUAL HEAT CLOSED OPEN Power Available in Phase 3 Only429 REMOVAL HEAT EXCHANGER COMPONENT COOLINGWATER OUTLET SHUTOFFVALVE55 1-CP CONDENSATE PUMP OPERATING OPERATING CST Level Indicator, Separately I CONTROL PANEL Powered SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 PaRe 54 of 151CNP Unit 1 ESELCNP Equipment Operating StateUnit 1 * ..... .UnitNormal
.Notes/ CommentsESEL ID Description Nm Desired StateItem # State56 1-CRID-1 120VAC CONTROL ROOM ENERGIZED ENERGIZED INSTRUMENT DISTRIBUTION CHANNEL I DISTRIBUTION PANEL57 1-CRID- 120VAC CONTROL ROOM ENERGIZED ENERGIZED 1-INV INSTRUMENT DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM >58 1-CRID-2 120VAC CONTROL ROOM ENERGIZED ENERGIZED INSTRUMENT DISTRIBUTION CHANNEL II DISTRIBUTION PANEL59 1-CRID- 120VAC CONTROL ROOM ENERGIZED ENERGIZED 2-INV INSTRUMENT DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM >60 1-CRID-3 120VAC CONTROL ROOM ENERGIZED ENERGIZED INSTRUMENT DISTRIBUTION CHANNEL III DISTRIBUTION PANEL61 1-CRID- 120VAC CONTROL ROOM ENERGIZED ENERGIZED 3-INV INSTRUMENTATION DISTRIBUTION
>62 1-CRID-4 120VAC CONTROL ROOM ENERGIZED ENERGIZED INSTRUMENT DISTRIBUTION CHANNEL IV DISTRIBUTION PANEL63 1-CRID- 120VAC CONTROL ROOM ENERGIZED ENERGIZED 4-INV INSTRUMENT DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM >64 1-DTU DELTA 'T' AND UNIT CONTROL OPERATING OPERATING RCS Temperature RecorderPANEL65 1-ELSC 120/208VAC EMERGENCY ENERGIZED ENERGIZED LOCAL SHUTDOWNDISTRIBUTIONPANEL 66 1-EZC-B 600VAC MOTOR CONTROL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CENTER EZC-B67 1-EZC-C 600VAC MOTOR CONTROL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED Power Available in Phase 3 OnlyCENTER EZC-C68 1-EZC-D 600VAC MOTOR CONTROL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CENTER EZC-D69 1-FFI- AUXILIARY FEEDWATER TO OPERATING OPERATING AFW Flow Transmitter 210 STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-1FLOW INDICATOR TRANSMITTER 70 1-FFI- AUXILIARY FEEDWATER TO OPERATING OPERATING AFW Flow Transmitter 220 STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-2FLOW INDICATOR TRANSMITTER P colExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 55 of 151CNP Unit 1 ESELCNP Equipment Operating StateUnit 1Normal Notes / CommentsESEL ID Description Desired StateItem # State71 1-FFI- AUXILIARY FEEDWATER TO OPERATING OPERATING AFW Flow Transmitter 230 STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-3FLOW INDICATOR TRANSMITTER 72 1-FFI- AUXILIARY FEEDWATER TO OPERATING OPERATING AFW Flow Transmitter 240 STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-4FLOW INDICATOR TRANSMITTER 73 1-FI FIXED INCORE CONTROL OPERATING OPERATING Core Exit Temperature RecorderPANEL74 1-FICT-A REACTOR CORE THERMO OPERATING OPERATING Core Exit Temperature COUPLE TRAIN 'A'TRANSMITTER CABINET75 1-FLX FLUX CONTROL PANEL OPERATING OPERATING Neutron Flux Indicator, Separately Powered76 1-FMO- TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY THROTTLED THROTTLED Throttle position will be adjusted211 FEED PUMP PP-4 DISCHARGE during FLEX using the localTO STEAM GENERATOR OME- manual operator hand wheel3-1 CONTROL VALVE77 1-FMO- TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY THROTTLED THROTTLED Throttle position will be adjusted221 FEED PUMP PP-4 DISCHARGE during FLEX using the localTO STEAM GENERATOR OME- manual operator hand wheel3-2 CONTROL VALVE78 1-FMO- TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY THROTTLED THROTTLED Throttle position will be adjusted231 FEED PUMP SUPPLY TO during FLEX using the localSTEAM GENERATOR OME-3-3 manual operator hand wheelCONTROL VALVE79 1-FMO- TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY THROTTLED THROTTLED Throttle position will be adjusted241 FEED PUMP SUPPLY TO during FLEX using the localSTEAM GENERATOR OME-4-4 manual operator hand wheelCONTROL VALVE80 1-HE- WEST COMPONENT COOLING N/A N/A Passive Component 15W WATER HEAT EXCHANGER 81 1-HE- WEST RESIDUAL HEAT N/A N/A Passive Component 17W REMOVAL HEAT EXCHANGER 82 1-HSD1 UNIT 1 HOT SHUTDOWN ENERGIZED ENERGIZED PANEL83 1-HV- CONTROL ROOM AIR AS NEEDED OPERATING Power Available in Phase 3 OnlyACR-2 CONDITIONING SOUTH LIQUIDCHILLER84 1-HV- CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION AS NEEDED OPERATING Power Available in Phase 3 OnlyACRA-2 SOUTH AIRCONDITIONINGUNIT 85 1-HV- OUTSIDE AIR TO CONTROL OPERATING OPERATING Power Available in Phase 3 OnlyACR-DA- ROOM2 PRESSURIZATION/CLEANUPFI LTER UNIT HV-ACRF VENTDAMPER SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 56 of 151CNP Unit 1 ESELCNP Equipment Operating StateUnitNormal Notes/ CommentsESEL ID Description Desired StateItem # State86 1-HV- CONTROL ROOM N/A N/A Passive Component ACRF PRESSURIZATION/CLEANUP FILTER UNIT87 1-HV- CONTROL ROOM AS NEEDED OPERATING Power Available in Phase 3 OnlyACRF-2 PRESSURIZATION/CLEAN UPFILTER UNIT VENT FAN #288 1-HV- CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION OPERATING OPERATING Power Available in Phase 3 OnlyACR-H2 SOUTH DUCT ELECTRICHEATING UNIT89 1-HV- 1-HV-CEQ-2, CONTAINMENT AS NEEDED OPERATING Power Available in Phase 3 OnlyCEQ-2 HYDROGEN SKIMMERVENTILATION FAN #290 1-HV- AB BATTERY EQUIPMENT AS NEEDED OPERATING Battery Room AB Ventilation, SGRX-5 AREA BATTERY ROOM Controlled LocallyVENTILATION EXHAUST FAN91 1-HV- CD BATTERY EQUIPMENT AS NEEDED OPERATING Battery Room CD Ventilation, SGRX-6 AREA BATTERY ROOM Controlled LocallyVENTILATIONEXHAUST FAN92 1-1CM- RHR TO REACTOR COOLANT CLOSED OPEN Power Available in Phase 3 Only111 LOOPS #2 & #3 COLD LEGSCONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE93 1-1CM- REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #2 CLOSED OPEN Needs closure of PB 403AX129 HOT LEG TO RESIDUAL relay permissive, PowerHEATREMOVAL PUMPS Available in Phase 3 OnlySUCTION CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE94 1-1CM- BORON INJECTION TANK CLOSED OPEN Power Available in Phase 3 Only251 TRAIN 'B' OUTLETCONTAINMENT
>95 1-1CM- WEST RHR TO REACTOR OPEN CLOSED Local Manual Operation at the321 COOLANT LOOPS #2 AND #3 operator hand wheel is creditedHOT LEGS CONTAINMENT for FLEX ResponseISOLATION VALVE96 1-IFI-51 BORON INJECTION TO OPERATING OPERATING RCS Injection Flow Transmitter REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #1FLOW INDICATOR TRANSMITTER 97 1-IFI-52 BORON INJECTION TO OPERATING OPERATING RCS Injection Flow Transmitter REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #2FLOW INDICATOR TRANSMITTER 98 1-IFI-53 BORON INJECTION TO OPERATING OPERATING RCS Injection Flow Transmitter REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #3FLOW INDICATOR TRANSMITTER SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 57 of 151CNP Unit 1 ESELCNP Equipment Operating StateUnit 1ESEL ID Description Normal Desired State Notes / CommentsItem # State99 1-IFI-54 BORON INJECTION TO OPERATING OPERATING RCS Injection Flow Transmitter REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #4FLOW INDICATOR TRANSMITTER 100 1-IMO- REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #2 CLOSED OPEN Needs closure of PB 405AX128 HOT LEG TO RESIDUAL HEAT relay permissive REMOVAL PUMPS SUCTIONSHUTOFF VALVE101 1-IMO- BORON INJECTION TANK CLOSED OPEN Power Available in Phase 3 Only256 TRAIN 'B' INLET SHUTOFFVALVE102 1-IMO- EAST RESIDUAL HEAT OPEN CLOSED Local manual operation with the310 REMOVAL PUMP PP-35E operator hand wheel is creditedSUCTION SHUTOFF VALVE for FLEX Response103 1-IMO- WEST RHR HX 1-HE-17W CLOSED OPEN Local manual operation with the324 DISCHARGE CROSSTIE operator hand wheel is creditedSHUTOFF VALVE for FLEX Response104 1-LDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B19 IGNITION LOWER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B19105 1-LDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B20 IGNITION LOWER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B20106 1-LDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B21 IGNITION LOWER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B21107 1-LDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B22 IGNITION LOWER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B22108 1-LDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B23 IGNITION LOWER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B23109 1-LDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B24 IGNITION LOWER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B24110 1-LDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B25 IGNITION LOWER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B25111 1-LDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B26 IGNITION LOWER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B26 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 58 of 151CNP Unit 1 ESELCNP Equipment Operating StateUnit 1Normal Notes CommentsESEL ID Description Desired StateItem # State112 1-LDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B27 IGNITION LOWER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B27113 1-LDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B28 IGNITION LOWER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B28114 1-LDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B29 IGNITION LOWER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B29115 1-LDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B30 IGNITION LOWER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B30116 1-LDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B31 IGINTION LOWER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B31117 1-LDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B32 IGNITION LOWER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B32118 1-LDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B33 IGNITION LOWER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B33119 1-LDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B34 IGNITION LOWER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B34120 1-LDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B35 IGNITION LOWER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B35121 1-LSI-1 STEAM GENERATORS
#1 AND NON- REMOTE Contains SG Level Transmitter
#4 LOCAL SHUTDOWN OPERATING Transfer Relay, power N/A asSTATION (REMOTE) de-energized is desired relaystate122 1-LSI-2 STEAM GENERATORS
#2 AND NON- REMOTE Contains SG Level Transmitter
#3 LOCAL SHUTDOWN OPERATING Transfer Relay, power N/A asSTATION (REMOTE) de-energized is desired relaystate123 1-LSI-3 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM NON- REMOTE NPS-122 RCS PressureCHARGING AND LETDOWN OPERATING Transmitter Transfer Relay,LOCAL SHUTDOWN STATION (REMOTE) power N/A as de-energized isI _desired relay state SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 59 of 151CNP Unit 1 ESELCNP Equipment Operating StateUnit 1Unita1 Notes / CommentsESEL ID Description Normal Desired StateItem # State124 1-MCAB 250VDC DISTRIBUTION PANEL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED MCAB125 1-MCCD 250VDC DISTRIBUTION POWER OPERATING OPERATING Various Instruments PANEL126 1-MDAB 250VDC DISTRIBUTION PANEL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED MDAB127 1-MDCD 250VDC DISTRIBUTION PANEL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED MDCD128 1-MPP- STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-1 OPERATING OPERATING SG Pressure Transmitter 210 CHANNEL I STEAM PRESSURETRANSMITTER 129 1-MPP- STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-2 OPERATING OPERATING SG Pressure Transmitter 220 CHANNEL I STEAM PRESSURETRANSMITTER 130 1-MPP- STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-3 OPERATING OPERATING SG Pressure Transmitter 230 CHANNEL I STEAM PRESSURETRANSMITTER 131 1-MPP- STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-4 OPERATING OPERATING SG Pressure Transmitter 240 CHANNEL I STEAM PRESSURETRANSMITTER 132 1-MRV- STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-1 CLOSED OPEN Fail Closed, Local manual213 POWER OPERATED RELIEF operation with the operator handVALVE wheel is credited for FLEXI Response to throttle the valve133 1-MRV- STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-2 CLOSED OPEN Fail Closed, Local manual223 POWER OPERATED RELIEF operation with the operator handVALVE wheel is credited for FLEXResponse to throttle the valve134 1-MRV- STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-3 CLOSED OPEN Fail Closed, Local manual233 POWER OPERATED RELIEF operation with the operator handVALVE wheel is credited for FLEXResponse to throttle the valve135 1-MRV- STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-4 CLOSED OPEN Fail Closed, Local manual243 POWER OPERATED RELIEF operation with the operator handVALVE wheel is credited for FLEXResponse to throttle the valve136 1-NIS-l NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION OPERATING OPERATING Neutron Flux Indicator, SYSTEM PROTECTION Separately PoweredCHANNEL I CONTROL PANEL137 1-NLP- PRESSURIZER OME-4 OPERATING OPERATING Pressurizer Level Transmitter 151 PROTECTION CHANNEL ILEVELTRANSMITTER 138 1-NPS- & VER ADDED PER SETPOINT OPERATING OPERATING RCS Pressure Transmitter, also110 PROJECT REACTOR VESSEL used for RCS Level (RVLIS)TRAIN 'A' WIDE RANGEPRESSURE TRANSMITTER SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 60 of 151CNP Unit 1 ESELCNP Equipment Operating StateUnitNormal Notes /Comments ESEL ID Description Desired StateItem # State139 1-NPS- REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #2 OPERATING OPERATING Required for valve ICM-1 29121 HOT LEG WIDE RANGE pressure permissive PRESSURE TRANSMITTER 140 1-NPS- REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #1 OPERATING OPERATING Required for valve IMO-128122 HOT LEG WIDE RANGE pressure permissive PRESSURE TRANSMITTER 141 1-NRI-21 NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION OPERATING OPERATING Neutron FluxCHANNEL I WIDE RANGERADIATION DETECTOR142 1-NRI- NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION OPERATING OPERATING Neutron Flux21-AMP WIDE RANGE RADIATION AMPLIFIER 143 1-NRV- PRESSURIZER TRAIN 'B' CLOSED OPEN Fail Closed152 PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE144 1-NRV- PRESSURIZER OME-4 TRAIN'A' CLOSED OPEN Fail Closed153 PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE145 1-NTQ- RVLIS TRAIN 'A' UPPER TAP OPERATING OPERATING Temperature Transmitter used110A TEMPERATURE for RCS Level (RVLIS)COMPENSATIONCOMPUTER INPUT THERMAL SENSOR 'A'146 1-NTQ- RVLIS TRAIN 'A' UPPER TAP OPERATING OPERATING Temperature Transmitter used110B TEMPERATURE for RCS Level (RVLIS)COMPENSATIONCOMPUTER INPUT THERMAL SENSOR 'B'147 1-NTQ- RVLIS TRAIN 'A' CONDUIT OPERATING OPERATING Temperature Transmitter used130A TEMPERATURE for RCS Level (RVLIS)COMPENSATIONCOMPUTER INPUT THERMAL SENSOR 'A'148 1-NTQ- RVLIS TRAIN 'A' CONDUIT OPERATING OPERATING Temperature Transmitter used130C TEMPERATURE for RCS Level (RVLIS)COMPENSATIONCOMPUTER INPUT THERMAL SENSOR 'C'149 1-NTR- REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #1 OPERATING OPERATING RCS Temperature Transmitter 110 HOT LEG WIDERANGETEMPERATURE RECORDER THERMALSENSOR150 1-NTR- REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #3 OPERATING OPERATING RCS Temperature Transmitter, 130 HOT LEG WIDE also used for RCS Level (RVLIS)RANGETEMPERATURE RECORDER THERMALSENSOR151 1-NTR- REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #1 OPERATING OPERATING RCS Temperature Transmitter 210 COLD LEG WIDERANGETEMPERATURE RECORDER THERMALSENSOR Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 61 of 151CNP Unit 1 ESELCNP Equipment Operating StateUnitNormal Notes / CommentsESEL ID Description Desired StateItem # State152 1-NTR- REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #3 OPERATING OPERATING RCS Temperature Transmitter 230 COLD LEG WIDERANGETEMPERATURE RECORDER THERMALSENSOR153 1-OME- TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY N/A N/A Passive Component 33 FEED PUMP PP-4 SUCTION >154 1-OME- WEST ESSENTIAL SERVICE OPERATING OPERATING Passive component when used34W WATER PUMP PP-7W in FLEX responseDISCHARGESTRAINER 155 1-OME- ACCUMULATOR TANK #1 N/A N/A Passive Component 6-1156 1-OME- ACCUMULATOR TANK #2 N/A N/A Passive Component 6-2157 1-OME- ACCUMULATOR TANK #3 N/A N/A Passive Component 6-3158 1-OME- ACCUMULATOR TANK #4 N/A N/A Passive Component 6-4159 1-PP- WEST COMPONENT COOLING OPERATING OPERATING Power Available in Phase 3 OnlyloW WATER PUMP ORAVAILABLE 160 1-PP- WEST RESIDUAL HEAT AVAILABLE OPERATING Power Available in Phase 3 Only35W REMOVAL PUMP161 1-PP-4 TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY STOP RUN Via ROB Turbine 1-OME-39FEED PUMP162 1-PP BORIC ACID STORAGE TANKS NOT USED OPERATING Pump used in Phase 3 after1 TRANSFER PUMP #1 NSRC Generator Installed 163 1-PP- CONTROL ROOM AIR AS NEEDED OPERATING Power Available in Phase 3 Only82S CONDITIONING SOUTH CHILLWATER CIRCULATION PUMP164 1-PPA- UPPER CONTAINMENT OPERATING OPERATING Containment Pressure310 CHANNEL III WIDE RANGE Transmitter PRESSURE ALARMTRANSMITTER 165 1-PRZ PRESSURIZER CONTROL OPERATING OPERATING Pressurizer level Indicator PANEL Separately Powered166 1-QLA- NORTH BORIC ACID STORAGE OPERATING OPERATING BAST Level Transmitter 410 TANK TK-12N LEVELALARMTRANSMITTER 167 1-QRV- CVCS CHARGING TO OPEN CLOSED Fails to desired position on loss200 REGENERATIVE HEAT of instrument airEXCHANGER FLOW CONTROLVALVE168 1-QT-506 TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY CLOSED OPERATING Local Manual Operation at theFEED PUMP PP-4 TRIP operator hand wheel/mechanical ANDTHROTTLE VALVE trip reset is credited for FLEXResponse Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 62 of 151CNP Unit 1 ESELCNP Equipment Operating StateUnit 1Unita1 Notes / CommentsESEL ID Description Normal Desired StateItem # State169 1-QT-507 AUXILIARY FEED PUMP CLOSED OPERATING Control via 1-QT-507-KR TURBINE GOVERNOR VALVE governor (ROB)170 1-QTC- NORTH BAST TK-12N TRAIN 'A' OPERATING OPERATING BAST Temperature Transmitter 410 HTR TEMP CONTROLLER 171 1-RHR RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL OPERATING AVAILABLE Hand Switches poweredCONTROL PANEL separately 172 1-RPC REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING AFW Flow, Pressurizer level1 CHANNEL I CABINET #1173 1-RPC REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING AFW Flow2 CHANNEL I CABINET #2174 1-RPC REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING SG Pressure3 CHANNEL I CABINET #3175 1-RPC REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING SG Pressure4 CHANNEL I CABINET #4176 1-RPC REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING RWST Level, RCS Pressure5 CHANNEL II CABINET #5 Permissive 177 1-RPC REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING AFW Flow, RCS Temperature, 6 CHANNEL II CABINET #6 RWST Level178 1-RPC REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING RCS Temperature 7 CHANNEL II CABINET #7179 1-RPC REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING RCS Pressure, RCS Level8 CHANNEL II CABINET #8180 1-RPC REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING CST Level10 CHANNEL III CABINET #10181 1-RPC REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING AFW Flow, CST Level, RCS9 CHANNEL III CABINET #9 Temperature, RCS PressurePermissive 182 1-RPC REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING AFW Flow12 CHANNEL IV CABINET #12183 1-RPS-A REACTOR PROTECTION AND OPERATING OPERATING Contains portion of permissive SAFEGUARD ACTUATION circuit for ICM-1 29TRAIN 'A' CABINET184 1-RPS-B REACTOR PROTECTION AND OPERATING OPERATING Contains portion of permissive SAFEGUARD ACTUATION circuit for IMO-128TRAIN 'B' CABINET185 1-RPSX- REACTOR PROTECTION AND OPERATING OPERATING Contains PB 403AX relayA SAFEGUARD ACTUATION permissive TRAIN 'A' AUXILIARY CABINET186 1-RPSX- REACTOR PROTECTION AND OPERATING OPERATING Contains PB 405AX relayB SAFEGUARD ACTUATION permissive TRAIN 'B' AUXILIARY CABINET187 1-RVLC REACTOR VESSEL OME-1 OPERATING OPERATING RCS LevelWATER LEVELINSTRUMENTATION CABINET188 1-SA STATION AUXILIARIES OPERATING AVAILABLE Hand Switches poweredCONTROL PANEL I separately SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 PaRe 63 of 151CNP Unit 1 ESELCNP Equipment Operating StateUnit 1 Notes/ CommentsESEL" ID Description Normal Desired StateItem # State189 1-SG STEAM GENERATOR AND OPERATING OPERATING AFW Flow, SG Level, and SGAUXILIARY FEED PUMP Pressure Indicators; ManualCONTROLPANEL Control of Main Steam PORVs -Note that valve position indicator and pressure indicator on valvecontrollers are not credited.
Separate Credited SG PressureIndicators Must be used.190 1-SIS SAFETY INJECTION CONTROL OPERATING OPERATING Control Switches, RCS PressurePANEL Indicator, RCS Level Indicator, All Separately Powered191 1-SPY CONTAINMENT SPRAY OPERATING OPERATING Containment Pressure Indicator, CONTROL PANEL RWST Level Recorder192 1-SSR ENGINEER SAFETY SYSTEM OPERATING AVAILABLE Contains 1-CMO-429 AC controlREAR INSTRUMENT/RELAY relay (powered separately)
RACK193 1-SWR NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTAL OPERATING OPERATING Neutron Flux Instrumentation SOURCE RANGEN21INSTRUMENT/RELAY RACK194 1-T11A 4KV BUS T11A SWITCHGEAR ENERGIZED ENERGIZED Power Available in Phase 3 Only,Emergency feed breaker T11A12must be manually tripped195 1-TDAB 250VDC TRAIN 'B' TRANSFER ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CABINET196 1-TDCD 250VDC TRAIN 'A' TRANSFER ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CABINET197 1-TK-11 BORON INJECTION TANK N/A N/A Passive Component 198 1-TK- NORTH BORIC ACID STORAGE N/A N/A Passive Component 12N TANK199 1-TK- PRESSURIZER TRAIN 'B' N/A N/A Passive Component 253-1 PRESSURE RELIEFVALVENRV-152 RESERVECONTROL AIR TANK200 1-TK- PRESSURIZER TRAIN 'A' N/A N/A Passive Component 253-2 PRESSURE RELIEFVALVENRV-153 RESERVECONTROL AIR TANK201 1-TK- PRESSURIZER TRAIN 'B' N/A N/A Passive Component 253-3 PRESSURE RELIEF VLV NRV-152EMERGENCY AIR TANK202 1-TK- PRESSURIZER TRAIN 'A' N/A N/A Passive Component 253-4 PRESSURE RELIEF VLV NRV-153EMERGENCY AIR TANK203 1-TK- PRESSURIZER TRAIN 'B' N/A N/A Passive Component 253-5 PRESSURE RELIEFVALVENRV-152 EMERGENCY AIR TANK SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 64 of 151CNP Unit 1 ESELCNP Equipment Operating StateUnitNormal Notes / CommentsESEL ID Description Desired StateItem # State204 1-TK- PRESSURIZER TRAIN 'A' N/A N/A Passive Component 253-6 PRESSURE RELIEFVALVENRV-153 EMERGENCY AIR TANK205 1-TK- PRESSURIZER TRAIN 'B' N/A N/A Passive Component 253-7 PRESSURE RELIEFVALVENRV-152 EMERGENCY AIR TANK206 1-TK- PRESSURIZER TRAIN 'A' N/A N/A Passive Component 253-8 PRESSURE RELIEFVALVENRV-153 EMERGENCY AIR TANK207 1-TK-32 CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK N/A N/A Passive Component 208 1-TK-37 COMPONENT COOLING N/A N/A Passive Component WATER SURGE TANK209 1-TR11A 600VAC BUS 11A SUPPLY ENERGIZED ENERGIZED Power Available in Phase 3 OnlyTRANSFORMER 210 1-TR- 120/208VAC AUXILIARY ENERGIZED ENERGIZED Regulating Transformer AFWX FEEDWATER DISTRIBUTION PANELAFWX REGULATING TRANSFORMER 211 1-TR- 120/208VAC EMERGENCY ENERGIZED ENERGIZED ELSC LOCAL SHUTDOWNDISTRIBUTIONPANEL ELSCSUPPLY TRANSFORMER 212 1-UDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B1 IGNITION UPPER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B1213 1-UDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B10 IGNITION UPPER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B10214 1-UDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B11 IGNITION UPPER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B131215 1-UDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B12 IGNITION UPPER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B12216 1-UDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B13 IGNITION UPPER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B133217 1-UDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B14 IGNITION UPPER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B14 SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 65 of 151CNP Unit 1 ESELCNP Equipment Operating StateUnit 1 Notes/ CommentsESEL ID. Description Nm Desired StateItem # State218 1-UDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B15 IGNITION UPPER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B15219 1-UDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B16 IGNITION UPPER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#816220 1-UDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B17 IGNITION UPPER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B17221 1-UDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B18 IGNITION UPPER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B18222 1-UDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B2 IGNITION UPPER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#82223 1-UDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B3 IGNITION UPPER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#83224 1-UDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B4 IGNITION UPPER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#84225 1-UDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B5 IGNITION UPPER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#85226 1-UDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B6 IGNITION UPPER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#86227 1-UDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B7 IGNITION UPPER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#87228 1-UDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B8 IGNITION UPPER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B8229 1-UDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B9 IGNITION UPPER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#89 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 66 of 151CNP Unit I ESELCNP Equipment Operating StateUnit 1 Notes/ CommentsESEL ID Description Normal Desired StateItem # State230 1-VR- LOWER CONTAINMENT TRAIN NOT USED OPERATING LDISB-4 B DISTRIBUTED IGNITIONSYSTEM VOLTAGEREGULATOR 231 1-VR- UPPER CONTAINMENT TRAIN NOT USED OPERATING UDISB-3 B DISTRIBUTED IGNITIONSYSTEM VOLTAGEREGULATOR 232 1-VS VENTILATION CONTROL OPERATING AVAILABLE Hand Switches poweredPANEL separately 233 1-WMO- WEST CONTAINMENT SPRAY OPEN CLOSED Local Manual Operation at the715 HEAT EXCHANGER 1-HE-18W operator hand wheel is creditedESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER for FLEX ResponseINLET SHUTOFF VALVE234 1-WMO- ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER CLOSED OPEN Local Manual Operation at the753 TO TURBINE DRIVEN operator hand wheel is creditedAUXILIARY FEED PUMP PP-4 for FLEX ResponseSHUTOFF VALVE235 1-WRV- WEST ESW PUMP PP-7W OPEN/ CLOSED Valve Fails Closed on Loss of762 DISCH STN EAST BASKET BAN CLOSED Air (Its Desired FLEX Position)
OUT SHUTOFF VALVE236 1-WRV- W ESW PUMP PP-7W DISCH OPEN/ CLOSED Valve Fails Closed on Loss of767 STN EAST BASKET BAN INLET CLOSED Air (Its Desired FLEX Position)
SHUTOFF VALVE237 1-WRV- W ESW PUMP PP-7W DISCH OPEN/ CLOSED Valve Fails Closed on Loss of772 STN WEST BASKET B/W CLOSED Air (Its Desired FLEX Position)
OUTLET SHUTOFF VALVE238 1-WRV- W ESW PUMP PP-7W DISCH OPEN/ CLOSED Valve Fails Closed on Loss of777 STN WEST BASKET BAN INLET CLOSED Air (Its Desired FLEX Position)
SHUTOFF VALVE239 1-XRV- BACKUP AIR TO NRV-152 NOT USED REGULATING 152 PRESSURE REGULATOR
_ __1240 1-XRV- BACKUP AIR TO NRV-153 NOT USED REGULATING 153 PRESSURE REGULATOR SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 67 of 151Attachment B -CNP Unit 2 ESEL SAiExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 68 of 151CNP Unit 2 ESELCNP Equipment Operating StateUnitNormal Notes/ CommentsESEL ID Description Desired StateItem # State1 12-TK- AB EMERGENCY DIESEL FUEL N/A N/A Passive Component 47-AB OIL STORAGE TANK2 2-152- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN ENERGIZED ENERGIZED LDISB IGNITION LOWER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLIES BACKUP SUPPLYBREAKER3 2-152- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN ENERGIZED ENERGIZED UDISB IGNITION UPPER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLIES BACKUP SUPPLYBREAKER4 2-21A 600V BUS 21A SWITCHGEAR ENERGIZED ENERGIZED Power Available in Phase 3 Only5 2-21B 600V BUS 21B SWITCHGEAR ENERGIZED ENERGIZED 6 2-21C 600V BUS 21C SWITCHGEAR ENERGIZED ENERGIZED Power Available in Phase 3 Only,11C1 Breaker must be manuallytripped7 2-21D 600V BUS 21D SWITCHGEAR ENERGIZED ENERGIZED 8 2-2A 4KV BUS 2A SWITCHGEAR ENERGIZED ENERGIZED Power Available in Phase 3 Only9 2 CNTMT HYDROGEN IGNITION ENERGIZED ENERGIZED LDISB LOWER VOLUMN TRAIN'B'GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLIES STARTER COMBO-LDISB CKTBRK10 2 CNTMT HYDROGEN IGNITION ENERGIZED ENERGIZED UDISB UPPER VOLUME TRAIN'B'GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLIES STARTER COMBO-UDISB CKTBRK11 2-88X- CNTMT HYDROGEN IGNITION NOT USED ENERGIZED LDISB LOWER VOLUME TRAIN'B'GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLIES STARTER COMBO-LDISB STARCNTR12 2-88X- CNTMT HYDROGEN IGNITION NOT USED ENERGIZED UDISB UPPER VOLUME TRAIN'B'GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLIES STARTER COMBO-UDISB CONTACTOR 13 2 PLANT BATTERY BATT-AB ENERGIZED ENERGIZED ABBC DISCONNECT SWITCH14 2 PLANT BATTERY BATT-CD ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CDBC DISCONNECT SWITCH15 2-AB-A 600VAC MOTOR CONTROL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED Power Available in Phase 3 OnlyCENTER AB-A16 2-AB-D 600VAC MOTOR CONTROL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CENTER AB-D I SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 69 of 151CNP Unit 2 ESELCNP Equipment Operating StateUnit 2Normal Notes / CommentsESEL ID Description Desired StateItem # State17 2-ABD-8 600VAC MOTOR CONTROL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CENTER ABD-B18 2-ABD-D 600VAC MOTOR CONTROL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CENTER ABD-D19 2-ABV-A 600VAC VALVE CONTROL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CENTER ABV-A20 2-AFWX 120/208VAC AUXILIARY OPERATING OPERATING RCS Level, RWST LevelFEEDWATER DISTRIBUTION PANEL21 2-AM-A 600VAC MOTOR CONTROL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED Power Available in Phase 3 OnlyCENTER AM-A22 2-AZV-A 600VAC VALVE CONTROL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED Power Available in Phase 3 OnlyCENTER AZV-A23 2-BA BORIC ACID CHARGING AND OPERATING OPERATING BAST Level, BAST Temperature, LETDOWN CONTROL PANEL RCS Injection Flow24 2-BATT- PLANT BATTERY AB ENERGIZED ENERGIZED AB25 2-BATT- PLANT BATTERY BATT-AB ENERGIZED ENERGIZED AB-SH AMMETER SHUNT26 2-BATT- PLANT BATTERY CD ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CD27 2-BATT- PLANT BATTERY BATT-CD ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CD-SH AMMETER SHUNT28 2-BC- PLANT BATTERY BATT-AB ENERGIZED ENERGIZED AB2 CHARGER #229 2-BC- PLANT BATTERY BATT-CD ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CD1 BATTERY CHARGER #130 2-BCTC- PLANT BATTERY CHARGERS ENERGIZED ENERGIZED AB BC-AB1 AND BC-AB2TRANSFER PANEL31 2-BCTC- PLANT BATTERY CHARGERS ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CD BC-CD1 AND BC-CD2TRANSFER PANEL32 2-BLI- STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-1 OPERATING OPERATING SG Level Transmitter 110 WIDE RANGE LEVELINDICATOR TRANSMITTER 33 2-BLI- STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-2 OPERATING OPERATING SG Level Transmitter 120 WIDE RANGE LEVELINDICATOR TRANSMITTER 34 2-BLI- STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-3 OPERATING OPERATING SG Level Transmitter 130 WIDE RANGE LEVELINDICATOR TRANSMITTER 35 2-BLI- STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-4 OPERATING OPERATING SG Level Transmitter 140 WIDE RANGE LEVELINDICATOR TRANSMITTER Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 70 of 151CNP Unit 2 ESELCNP Equipment Operating StateUnit 2ESEL ID Description Normal Desired State Notes CommentsItem # State36 2-CCV- 250VDC TRAIN 'B' CRITICAL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED AB SOLENOID VALVESDISTRIBUTION PANEL37 2-CCV- 250VDC TRAIN 'A' CRITICAL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CD SOLENOID VALVESDISTRIBUTION PANEL38 2-CCW COMPONENT COOLING WATER OPERATING AVAILABLE Hand Switches poweredCONTROL PANEL separately 39 2-CG1- REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING SG Level, RCS Injection Flow14 CONTROL GROUP #1 CABINET#1440 2-CG1- REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING BAST Level Instrumentation 15 CONTROL GROUP #1 CABINET#1541 2-CG2- REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING RCS Injection Flow17 CONTROL GROUP #2 CABINET#1742 2-CG2- REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING RCS Injection Flow19 CONTROL GROUP #2 CABINET Instrumentation
#1943 2-CG3- REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING RCS Injection Flow20 CONTROL GROUP #3 CABINET#2044 2-CG3- REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING Containment
: Pressure, RWST21 CONTROL GROUP #3 CABINET Level, BAST Level, RCS#21 Injection Flow45 2-CG4- REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING RCS Injection Flow22 CONTROL GROUP #4 CABINET#2246 2-CG4- REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING SG Level23 CONTROL GROUP #4 CABINET#2347 2-CLI- CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK OPERATING OPERATING CST Level Transmitter 114 TK-32 LEVEL INDICATOR TRANSMITTER 48 2-CMO- COMPONENT COOLING WATER OPEN CLOSED Local Manual Operation at the413 PUMPS SUCTION CROSS TIE operator hand wheel is creditedTRAIN 'B' SHUTOFF VALVE for FLEX Response49 2-CMO- COMPONENT COOLING WATER OPEN CLOSED Local Manual Operation at the414 PUMPS DISCHARGE CROSS operator hand wheel is creditedTIE TRAIN 'B' SHUTOFF VALVE for FLEX Response50 2-CMO- COMPONENT COOLING WATER OPEN CLOSED Local Manual Operation at the416 TO MISCELLANEOUS SERVICE operator hand wheel is creditedTRAIN 'B' SHUTOFF VALVE for FLEX Response51 2-CMO- WEST RESIDUAL HEAT CLOSED OPEN Power Available in Phase 3 Only429 REMOVAL HEAT EXCHANGER COMPONENT COOLING WATEROUTLET SHUTOFF VALVE ISAlExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 71 of 151CNP Unit 2 ESELCNP Equipment Operating StateUnit 2Unita2 Notes / CommentsESEL ID Description Normal Desired StateItem # State52 2-CP CONDENSATE PUMP CONTROL OPERATING OPERATING CST Level Indicator, Separately PANEL Powered53 2-CRID-1 120VAC CONTROL ROOM ENERGIZED ENERGIZED INSTRUMENT DISTRIBUTION CHANNEL I DISTRIBUTION PANEL54 2-CRID- 120VAC CONTROL ROOM ENERGIZED ENERGIZED 1-INV INSTRUMENT DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM >55 2-CRID-2 120VAC CONTROL ROOM ENERGIZED ENERGIZED INSTRUMENT DISTRIBUTION CHANNEL II DISTRIBUTION PANEL56 2-CRID- 120VAC CONTROL ROOM ENERGIZED ENERGIZED 2-INV INSTRUMENT DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM >57 2-CRID-3 120VAC CONTROL ROOM ENERGIZED ENERGIZED INSTRUMENT DISTRIBUTION CHANNEL III DISTRIBUTION PANEL58 2-CRID- 120VAC CONTROL ROOM ENERGIZED ENERGIZED 3-INV INSTRUMENTATION DISTRIBUTION
>59 2-CRID-4 120VAC CONTROL ROOM ENERGIZED ENERGIZED INSTRUMENT DISTRIBUTION CHANNEL IV DISTRIBUTION PANEL60 2-CRID- 120VAC CONTROL ROOM ENERGIZED ENERGIZED 4-INV INSTRUMENT DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM >61 2-DTU DELTA 'T' AND UNIT CONTROL OPERATING OPERATING RCS Temperature RecorderPANEL62 2-ELSC EMERGENCY LOCAL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED INDICATION SHUTDOWN ANDCOOLDOWN DISTRIBUTION PANEL63 2-EZC-B 600VAC MOTOR CONTROL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CENTER EZC-B64 2-EZC-C 600VAC MOTOR CONTROL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED Power Available in Phase 3 OnlyCENTER EZC-C65 2-EZC-D 600VAC MOTOR CONTROL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CENTER EZC-D66 2-FFI- AUXILIARY FEEDWATER TO OPERATING OPERATING AFW Flow Transmitter 210 STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-1FLOW INDICATOR TRANSMITTER SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 72 of 151CNP Unit 2 ESELCNP Equipment Operating StateUnit 2 Normal Notes / CommentsESEL ID Description Desired StateItem # State67 2-FFI- AUX FEEDWATER TO SG OME- OPERATING OPERATING AFW Flow Transmitter 220 3-2 FLOW INDICATOR TRANSMITTER 68 2-FFI- AUXILIARY FEEDWATER TO OPERATING OPERATING AFW Flow Transmitter 230 STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-3FLOW INDICATOR TRANSMITTER 69 2-FFI- AUXILIARY FEEDWATER TO OPERATING OPERATING AFW Flow Transmitter 240 STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-4FLOW INDICATOR TRANSMITTER 70 2-FI FIXED INCORE CONTROL OPERATING OPERATING Core Exit Temperature RecorderPANEL71 2-FICT-A REACTOR CORE OPERATING OPERATING Core Exit Temperature THERMOCOUPLE TRAIN 'A'TRANSMITTER CABINET72 2-FLX FLUX CONTROL PANEL OPERATING OPERATING Neutron Flux Indicator, Separately Powered73 2-FMO- TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY THROTTLED THROTTLED Throttle position will be adjusted211 FEED PUMP PP-4 during FLEX using the localDISCHARGETO STEAM manual operator hand wheelGENERATOR OME-3-1CONTROL VALVE74 2-FMO- TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY THROTTLED THROTTLED Throttle position will be adjusted221 FEED PUMP PP-4 during FLEX using the localDISCHARGETO STEAM manual operator hand wheelGENERATOR OME-3-2CONTROL VALVE75 2-FMO- TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY THROTTLED THROTTLED Throttle position will be adjusted231 FEED PUMP SUPPLY TO during FLEX using the localSTEAM GENERATOR OME-3-3 manual operator hand wheelCONTROL VALVE76 2-FMO- TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY THROTTLED THROTTLED Throttle position will be adjusted241 FEED PUMP SUPPLY TO during FLEX using the localSTEAM GENERATOR OME-3-4 manual operator hand wheelCONTROL VALVE77 2-HE- WEST COMPONENT COOLING N/A N/A Passive Component 15W WATER HEAT EXCHANGER 78 2-HE- WEST RESIDUAL HEAT N/A N/A Passive Component 17W REMOVAL HEAT EXCHANGER 79 2-HSD2 UNIT 2 HOT SHUTDOWN PANEL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED 80 2-HV- CONTROL ROOM AIR AS NEEDED OPERATING Power Available in Phase 3 OnlyACR-2 CONDITIONING SOUTH LIQUIDCHILLER81 2-HV- CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION AS NEEDED OPERATING Power Available in Phase 3 OnlyACRA-2 SOUTH AIR CONDITIONING UNIT SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 73 of 151CNP Unit 2 ESELCNP Equipment Operating StateUnit 2ESEL D Normal Notes / CommentsESEL ID Description Desired StateItem # State82 2-HV- OUTSIDE AIR TO CONTROL AS NEEDED OPERATING Power Available in Phase 3 OnlyACR-DA- ROOM PRESSURIZATION/
2 CLEANUP FILTER UNIT HV-ACRF VENT DAMPER #283 2-HV- CONTROL ROOM N/A N/A Passive Component ACRF PRESSURIZATION/CLEANUP FILTER UNIT84 2-HV- CONTROL ROOM AS NEEDED OPERATING Power Available in Phase 3 OnlyACRF-2 PRESSURIZATION/CLEANUP FILTER UNITVENT FAN #285 2-HV- CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION AS NEEDED OPERATING Power Available in Phase 3 OnlyACR-H2 SOUTH DUCT ELECTRICHEATER86 2-HV- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN AS NEEDED OPERATING Power Available in Phase 3 OnlyCEQ-2 SKIMMER VENTILATION FAN #287 2-HV- AB BATTERY EQUIPMENT AS NEEDED OPERATING Battery Room AB Ventilation, SGRX-5 AREA BATTERY ROOM Controlled LocallyVENTILATION EXHAUST FAN88 2-HV- CD BATTERY EQUIPMENT AS NEEDED OPERATING Battery Room CD Ventilation, SGRX-6 AREA BATTERY ROOM Controlled LocallyVENTILATION EXHAUST FAN89 2-iCM- RHR TO REACTOR COOLANT CLOSED OPEN Power Available in Phase 3 Only111 LOOPS #2 & #3 COLDLEGSCONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE90 2-1CM- REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #2 CLOSED OPEN Needs closure of PB 403AX129 HOT LEG TO RESIDUAL HEAT relay permissive, PowerREMOVAL PUMPS SUCTION Available in Phase 3 OnlyCONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE91 2-iCM- BORON INJECTION TANK CLOSED OPEN Power Available in Phase 3 Only251 TRAIN 'B' OUTLETCONTAINMENT
>92 2-1CM- WEST RHR TO REACTOR OPEN CLOSED Local Manual Operation at the321 COOLANT LOOPS #2 AND #3 operator hand wheel is creditedCOLDLEGS CONTAINMENT for FLEX ResponseISOLATION VALVE93 2-IFI-51 BORON INJECTION TO OPERATING OPERATING RCS Injection Flow Transmitter REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #1FLOW INDICATOR TRANSMITTER 94 2-IFI-52 BORON INJECTION TO OPERATING OPERATING RCS Injection Flow Transmitter REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #2FLOWINDICATOR TRANSMITTER 95 2-IFI-53 BORON INJECTION TO OPERATING OPERATING RCS Injection Flow Transmitter REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #3FLOW INDICATOR TRANSMITTER PSAiExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 74 of 151CNP Unit 2 ESELCNP Equipment Operating StateUnit 2...Normal Notes / CommentsESEL ID Description Desired StateItem # State96 2-1FI-54 BORON INJECTION TO OPERATING OPERATING RCS Injection Flow Transmitter REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #4FLOW INDICATOR TRANSMITTER 97 2-IMO- REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #2 CLOSED OPEN Needs closure of PB 405AX128 HOT LEG TO RESIDUAL HEAT relay permissive REMOVAL PUMPS SUCTIONSHUTOFF VALVE98 2-IMO- BORON INJECTION TANK CLOSED OPEN Power Available in Phase 3 Only256 TRAIN 'B' INLET SHUTOFFVALVE99 2-IMO- EAST RESIDUAL HEAT OPEN CLOSED Local manual operation with the310 REMOVAL PUMP PP-35E operator hand wheel is creditedSUCTION SHUTOFF VALVE for FLEX Response100 2-IMO- WEST RHR HX 2-HE-17W CLOSED OPEN Local manual operation with the324 DISCHARGE CROSSTIE operator hand wheel is creditedSHUTOFF VALVE for FLEX Response101 2-LDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B10 IGNITION LOWER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B10102 2-LDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B11 IGNITION LOWER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B131103 2-LDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B12 IGNITION LOWER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B12104 2-LDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B18 IGNITION LOWER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B18105 2-LDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B19 IGNITION LOWER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B19106 2-LDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B20 IGNITION LOWER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B20107 2-LDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B21 IGNITION LOWER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B21108 2-LDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B22 IGNITION LOWER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B22 SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic* 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 75 of 151CNP Unit 2 ESELCNP Equipment Operating StateUnit 2SNormal Notes / CommentsESEL ID Description Desired StateItem # State109 2-LDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B23 IGNITION LOWER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B23110 2-LDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B24 IGNITION LOWER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B24111 2-LDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B25 IGNITION LOWER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B25112 2-LDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B26 IGNITION LOWER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B26113 2-LDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B27 IGNITION LOWER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B27114 2-LDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B28 IGNITION LOWER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B28115 2-LDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B35 IGNITION LOWER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B35116 2-LDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B8 IGNITION LOWER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' IGNITER ASSEMBLY#B8117 2-LDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B9 IGNITION LOWER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B9118 2-LSI-1 STEAM GENERATORS
#1 AND NON- REMOTE SG Level Transmitter Transfer#4 LOCAL SHUTDOWN OPERATING Relay, power N/A as de-STATION (REMOTE) energized is desired relay state119 2-LSI-2 STEAM GENERATORS
#2 AND NON- REMOTE SG Level Transmitter Transfer#3 LOCAL SHUTDOWN OPERATING Relay, power N/A as de-STATION (REMOTE) energized is desired relay state120 2-LSI-3 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM NON- REMOTE NPS-122 RCS PressureCHARGING AND LETDOWN OPERATING Transmitter Transfer Relay,LOCAL SHUTDOWN STATION (REMOTE) power N/A as de-energized isdesired relay state121 2-MCAB 250VDC DISTRIBUTION PANEL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED I__ _MCAB SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 76 of 151CNP Unit 2 ESELCNP Equipment Operating StateUnit 2Normal :Notes / CommentsESEL ID Description Desired StateItem # State122 2-MCCD 250VDC DISTRIBUTION POWER OPERATING OPERATING Various Instruments PANEL123 2-MDAB 250VDC DISTRIBUTION PANEL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED MDAB124 2-MDCD 250VDC DISTRIBUTION PANEL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED MDCD125 2-MPP- STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-1 OPERATING OPERATING SG Pressure Transmitter 210 CHANNEL I STEAM PRESSURETRANSMITTER 126 2-MPP- STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-2 OPERATING OPERATING SG Pressure Transmitter 220 CHANNEL I STEAM PRESSURETRANSMITTER 127 2-MPP- STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-3 OPERATING OPERATING SG Pressure Transmitter 230 CHANNEL I STEAM PRESSURETRANSMITTER 128 2-MPP- STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-4 OPERATING OPERATING SG Pressure Transmitter 240 CHANNEL I STEAM PRESSURETRANSMITTER 129 2-MRV- STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-1 CLOSED OPEN Fail Closed, Local manual213 POWER OPERATED RELIEF operation with the operator handVALVE wheel is credited for FLEXResponse to throttle the valve130 2-MRV- STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-2 CLOSED OPEN Fail Closed, Local manual223 POWER OPERATED RELIEF operation with the operator handVALVE wheel is credited for FLEXResponse to throttle the valve131 2-MRV- STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-3 CLOSED OPEN Fail Closed, Local manual233 POWER OPERATED RELIEF operation with the operator handVALVE wheel is credited for FLEXResponse to throttle the valve132 2-MRV- STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-4 CLOSED OPEN Fail Closed, Local manual243 POWER OPERATED RELIEF operation with the operator handVALVE wheel is credited for FLEXResponse to throttle the valve133 2-NIS-1 NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION OPERATING OPERATING Neutron Flux Indicator, SYSTEM PROTECTION Separately PoweredCHANNEL I CONTROL PANEL134 2-NLP- PRESSURIZER OME-4 OPERATING OPERATING Pressurizer Level Transmitter 151 PROTECTION CHANNEL ILEVEL TRANSMITTER 135 2-NPS- REACTOR VESSEL TRAIN 'A' OPERATING OPERATING RCS Level, RCS Pressure110 WIDE RANGE PRESSURE Transmitter TRANSMITTER 136 2-NPS- REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #2 OPERATING OPERATING Required for valve ICM-1 29121 HOT LEG WIDE RANGE pressure permissive PRESSURE TRANSMITTER POExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 77 of 151CNP Unit 2 ESELCNP Equipment Operating StateUnitNormal Notes / CommentsESEL ID Description Desired StateItem # State137 2-NPS- REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #1 OPERATING OPERATING Required for valve IMO-128122 HOT LEG WIDE RANGE pressure permissive PRESSURE TRANSMITTER 138 2-NRI-21 NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION OPERATING OPERATING Neutron FluxCHANNEL I WIDE RANGERADIATION DETECTOR139 2-NRI- NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION OPERATING OPERATING Neutron Flux21-AMP WIDE RANGE RADIATION AMPLIFIER 140 2-NRV- PRESSURIZER TRAIN 'B' CLOSED OPEN Fail Closed152 PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE141 2-NRV- PRESSURIZER OME-4 TRAIN'A' CLOSED OPEN Fail Closed153 PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE142 2-NTQ- RVLIS TRAIN 'A UPPER TAP OPERATING OPERATING RCS Level Transmitter 110A TEMPERATURE COMPENSATION COMPUTERINPUT THERMAL SENSOR 'A'143 2-NTQ- RVLIS TRAIN 'A' UPPER TAP OPERATING OPERATING RCS Level Transmitter 110B TEMPERATURE COMPENSATION COMPUTERINPUT THERMAL SENSOR 'B'144 2-NTQ- RVLIS TRAIN 'A' CONDUIT OPERATING OPERATING RCS Level Transmitter 130A TEMPERATURE COMPENSATION COMPUTERINPUT THERMAL SENSOR 'A'145 2-NTQ- RVLIS TRAIN 'A' CONDUIT OPERATING OPERATING RCS Level Transmitter 130C TEMPERATURE COMPENSATION COMPUTERINPUT SPARE THERMALSENSOR 'C'146 2-NTR- REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #1 OPERATING OPERATING RCS Temperature Transmitter 110 HOT LEG WIDE RANGETEMPERATURE RECORDERTHERMAL SENSOR147 2-NTR- REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #3 OPERATING OPERATING RCS Temperature Transmitter, 130 HOT LEG WIDE RANGE also used for RCS Level (RVLIS)TEMPERATURE RECORDERTHERMAL SENSOR148 2-NTR- REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #1 OPERATING OPERATING RCS Temperature Transmitter 210 COLD LEG WIDE RANGETEMPERATURE RECORDERTHERMAL SENSOR149 2-NTR- REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #3 OPERATING OPERATING RCS Temperature Transmitter 230 COLD LEG WIDE RANGETEMPERATURE RECORDERTHERMAL SENSOR150 2-OME- TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY N/A N/A Passive Component 33 FEED PUMP PP-4 SUCTION > _
SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 78 of 151CNP Unit 2 ESELCNP Equipment Operating StateUnit 22Normal Notes / CommentsESEL ID Description Desired StateItem # State151 2-OME- WEST ESSENTIAL SERVICE OPERATING OPERATING Passive component when used34W WATER PUMP PP-7W DISCH in FLEX responseSTN152 2-OME- ACCUMULATOR TANK #1 N/A N/A Passive Component 6-1153 2-OME- ACCUMULATOR TANK #2 N/A N/A Passive Component 6-2154 2-OME- ACCUMULATOR TANK #3 N/A N/A Passive Component 6-3155 2-OME- ACCUMULATOR TANK #4 N/A N/A Passive Component 6-4156 2-PP- WEST COMPONENT COOLING N/A N/A Power Available in Phase 3 OnlyloW WATER PUMP157 2-PP- WEST RESIDUAL HEAT N/A N/A Power Available in Phase 3 Only35W REMOVAL PUMP158 2-PP-4 TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY STOP RUN Via ROB Turbine 1-OME-39FEED PUMP159 2-PP BORIC ACID STORAGE TANKS NOT USED OPERATING Pump used for Boration Phase 34 TRANSFER PUMP #4 after NSRC Generators installed 160 2-PP- CONTROL ROOM AIR AS NEEDED OPERATING Power Available in Phase 3 Only82S CONDITIONING SOUTH CHILLWATERCIRCULATION PUMP161 2-PPA- UPPER CONTAINMENT OPERATING OPERATING Containment Pressure310 CHANNEL III WIDE RANGE Transmitter PRESSURE ALARMTRANSMITTER 162 2-PRZ PRESSURIZER CONTROL OPERATING OPERATING Pressurizer level Indicator andPANEL Control for Pressurizer ReliefValves163 2-QLA- SOUTH BORIC ACID STORAGE OPERATING OPERATING BAST Level Transmitter 430 TANK TK-12S LEVEL ALARMTRANSMITTER 164 2-QRV- CVCS CHARGING TO OPEN CLOSED Fails to desired position on loss200 REGENERATIVE HEAT of instrument airEXCHANGER FLOWCONTROL VALVE165 2-QT-506 TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY CLOSED OPEN Local Manual Operation at theFEED PUMP PP-4 TRIP AND operator hand wheel/mechanical THROTTLE VALVE trip reset is credited for FLEXResponse166 2-QT-507 AUXILIARY FEED PUMP CLOSED OPERATING Control via 1-QT-507-KR TURBINE GOVERNOR VALVE governor (ROB)167 2-QTC- SOUTH BAST TK-12S TRAIN 'A' OPERATING OPERATING BAST Temperature Transmitter 430 HTR TEMP CONTROLLER 168 2-RHR RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL OPERATING AVAILABLE Hand Switches poweredCONTROL PANEL separately 169 2-RPC REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING AFW Flow, Pressurizer level,1 CHANNEL I CABINET #1 1 1 Pressurizer Relief Valve Control SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 79 of 151CNP Unit 2 ESELCNP Equipment Operating StateUnit 2Normal Notes/Comments ESEL ID Description Desired StateItem # State170 2-RPC REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING AFW Flow2 CHANNEL I CABINET #2171 2-RPC REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING SG Pressure3 CHANNEL I CABINET #3172 2-RPC REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING SG Pressure4 CHANNEL I CABINET #4173 2-RPC REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING RWST Level, RCS Pressure5 CHANNEL II CABINET #5 Permissive, Pressurizer ReliefValve Control174 2-RPC REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING AFW Flow, RCS Temperature, 6 CHANNEL II CABINET #6 RWST Level175 2-RPC REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING RCS Temperature 7 CHANNEL II CABINET #7176 2-RPC REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING RCS Pressure, RCS Level8 CHANNEL II CABINET #8177 2-RPC REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING CST Level10 CHANNEL III CABINET #10178 2-RPC REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING AFW Flow, CST Level, RCS9 CHANNEL III CABINET #9 Temperature, RCS PressurePermissive, Pressurizer ReliefValve Control179 2-RPC REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING AFW Flow, Pressurizer Relief12 CHANNEL IV CABINET #12 Valve Control180 2-RPS-A REACTOR PROTECTION AND OPERATING OPERATING Contains portion of permissive SAFEGUARD ACTUATIONTRAIN circuit for ICM-1 29'A' CABINET181 2-RPS-B REACTOR PROTECTION AND OPERATING OPERATING Contains portion of permissive SAFEGUARD ACTUATION circuit for IMO-128TRAIN 'B' CABINET182 2-RPSX- REACTOR PROTECTION AND OPERATING OPERATING Contains PB 403AX relayA SAFEGUARD ACTUATIONTRAIN permissive
'A' AUXILIARY CABINET183 2-RPSX- REACTOR PROTECTION AND OPERATING OPERATING Contains PB 405AX relayB SAFEGUARD ACTUATIONTRAIN permissive
'B' AUXILIARY CABINET184 2-RVLC REACTOR VESSEL OME-1 OPERATING OPERATING RCS LevelWATER LEVELINSTRUMENTATION CABINET185 2-SA STATION AUXILIARIES OPERATING AVAILABLE Hand Switches poweredCONTROL PANEL separately 186 2-SG STEAM GENERATOR AND OPERATING OPERATING AFW Flow, SG Level, and SGAUXILIARY FEED PUMP Pressure Indicators; ManualCONTROL PANEL Control of Main Steam PORVs -Note that valve position indicator and pressure indicator on valvecontrollers are not credited.
Separate Credited SG PressureIndicators Must be used.
SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 80 of 151CNP Unit 2 ESELCNP Equipment Operating StateUnit 22Normal Notes / CommentsESEL ID Description Desired StateItem # State187 2-SIS SAFETY INJECTION CONTROL OPERATING OPERATING Control Switches, RCS PressurePANEL Indicator, RCS Level Indicator, All Separately Powered188 2-SPY CONTAINMENT SPRAY OPERATING OPERATING Containment Pressure Indicator, CONTROL PANEL RWST Level Recorder189 2-SSR ENGINEER SAFETY SYSTEM OPERATING AVAILABLE Contains 2-CMO-429 AC controlREAR INSTRUMENT/RELAY relay (powered separately)
RACK190 2-SWR NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTAL OPERATING OPERATING Neutron Flux Instrumentation SOURCE RANGEN21INSTRUMENT/RELAY RACK191 2-T21A 4KV BUS T21A SWITCHGEAR ENERGIZED ENERGIZED Power Available in Phase 3 Only,Emergency feed breaker T21A12must be manually tripped192 2-TDAB 250VDC TRAIN 'B' TRANSFER ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CABINET193 2-TDCD 250VDC TRAIN 'A' TRANSFER ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CABINET194 2-TK-11 BORON INJECTION TANK N/A N/A Passive Component 195 2-TK-12S SOUTH BORIC ACID STORAGE N/A N/A Passive Component TAN K196 2-TK- PRESSURIZER TRAIN 'A' N/A N/A Passive Component 253-1 PRESSURE RELIEF VALVENRV-153 RESERVE CONTROLAIR TANK197 2-TK- PRESSURIZER TRAIN 'B' N/A N/A Passive Component 253-2 PRESSURE RELIEF VALVENRV-152 RESERVE CONTROLAIR TANK198 2-TK- PRESSURIZER TRAIN 'B' N/A N/A Passive Component 253-3 PRESSURE RELIEF VLV NRV-152 EMERGENCY AIR TANK199 2-TK- PRESSURIZER TRAIN 'A' N/A N/A Passive Component 253-4 PRESSURE RELIEF VLV NRV-153 EMERGENCY AIR TANK200 2-TK- PRESSURIZER TRAIN 'B' N/A N/A Passive Component 253-5 PRESSURE RELIEF VALVENRV-152 EMERGENCY AIRTANK201 2-TK- PRESSURIZER TRAIN 'A' N/A N/A Passive Component 253-6 PRESSURE RELIEF VALVENRV-153 EMERGENCY AIRTANK202 2-TK- PRESSURIZER TRAIN 'B' N/A N/A Passive Component 253-7 PRESSURE RELIEF VALVENRV-152 EMERGENCY AIRTAN K
*SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 81 of 151CNP Unit 2 ESELCNP Equipment Operating StateUnit 2 " Normal Notes/ CommentsESEL ID Description Desired StateItem # State203 2-TK- PRESSURIZER TRAIN 'A' N/A N/A Passive Component 253-8 PRESSURE RELIEF VALVENRV-153 EMERGENCY AIRTANK204 2-TK-32 CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK N/A N/A Passive Component 205 2-TK-37 COMPONENT COOLING WATER N/A N/A Passive Component SURGE TANK206 2-TR21A 600V BUS 21A SUPPLY ENERGIZED ENERGIZED Power Available in Phase 3 OnlyTRANSFORMER 207 2-TR- 120/208VAC AUXILIARY ENERGIZED ENERGIZED Regulating Transformer AFWX FEEDWATER DISTRIBUTION PANEL AFWX REGULATING TRANSFORMER 208 2-TR- 120/208VAC EMERGENCY ENERGIZED ENERGIZED ELSC LOCAL SHUTDOWNDISTRIBUTION POWERTRANSFORMER 209 2-UDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B1 IGNITION UPPER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B1210 2-UDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B13 IGNITION UPPER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B13211 2-UDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B14 IGNITION UPPER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B14212 2-UDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B15 IGNITION UPPER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B15213 2-UDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B16 IGNITION UPPER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B16214 2-UDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B17 IGNITION UPPER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B17215 2-UDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B2 IGNITION UPPER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B2216 2-UDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B29 IGNITION UPPER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B29 0Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 82 of 151CNP Unit 2 ESELCNP Equipment Operating StateUnit 2Normal Notes /.Comments ESEL ID Description Desired StateItem # State217 2-UDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B3 IGNITION UPPER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B3218 2-UDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B30 IGNITION UPPER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B30219 2-UDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B31 IGNITION UPPER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B31,220 2-UDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B32 IGNITION UPPER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B32221 2-UDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B33 IGNITION UPPER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B33222 2-UDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B34 IGNITION UPPER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B34223 2-UDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B4 IGNITION UPPER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B4224 2-UDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B5 IGNITION UPPER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B5225 2-UDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B6 IGNITION UPPER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B6226 2-UDISB-CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B7 IGNITION UPPER VOLUMETRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B7227 2-VR- LOWER CONTAINMENT TRAIN NOT USED OPERATING LDISB-4 B DISTRIBUTED IGNITIONSYSTEM VOLTAGEREGULATOR 228 2-VR- UPPER CONTAINMENT TRAIN B NOT USED OPERATING UDISB-3 DISTRIBUTED IGNITIONSYSTEM VOLTAGEREGULATOR 10Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 83 of 151CNP Unit 2 ESELCNP Equipment Operating StateUnitNormal Notes / CommentsESEL ID Description Nral Desired StateItem # State229 2-VS VENTILATION CONTROL PANEL OPERATING AVAILABLE Hand Switches poweredseparately 230 2-WMO- WEST CONTAINMENT SPRAY OPEN CLOSED Local Manual Operation at the716 HEAT EXCHANGER ESSENTIAL operator hand wheel is creditedSERVICE WATER INLET for FLEX ResponseSHUTOFF VALVE231 2-WMO- EMERGENCY ESSENTIAL CLOSED OPEN Local Manual Operation at the753 SERVICE WATER SUPPLY TO operator hand wheel is creditedTDAFP PP-4 SHUTOFF VALVE for FLEX Response232 2-WRV- W ESW PUMP PP-7W DISCH OPEN/ CLOSED Valve Fails Closed on Loss of764 STN WEST BASKET BAN OUT CLOSED Air; Its FLEX PositionS/OVALVE233 2-WRV- W ESW PUMP PP-7W DISCH OPEN CLOSED Valve Fails Closed on Loss of769 STN WEST BASKET B/W INL /CLOSED Air; Its FLEX PositionS/O VALVE234 2-WRV- WEST ESW PUMP PP-7W OPEN/ CLOSED Valve Fails Closed on Loss of774 DISCH STN EAST BASKET BAN CLOSED Air; Its FLEX PositionOUT SHUTOFF VALVE235 2-WRV- WEST ESW PUMP PP-7W OPEN/ CLOSED Valve Fails Closed on Loss of779 DISCH STN EAST BASKET BAN CLOSED Air; Its FLEX PositionINLSHUTOFF VALVE236 2-XRV- BACKUP AIR TO NRV-152 NOT USED REGULATING 152 PRESSURE REGULATOR 237 2-XRV- BACKUP AIR TO NRV-153 NOT USED REGULATING 153 PRESSURE REGULATOR POExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 84 of 151Attachment C- CNP Unit I ESEP HCLPF Values and Failure ModeTabulation SAkiExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 85 of 151CNP HCLPFUnit I ID DESCRIPTION Failure (compared NotesESEL Mode (o NotesItem # to RLGM)Meets EPRI NP-6041-SL Table 2.4 caveats.1-11A 600VAC BUS 11A Screened
>RLGM Anchorage screened for RLGM based onSWITCHGEAR scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the switchgear.
Meets EPRI NP-6041-SL Table 2.4 caveats.600VAC BUS 11B Anchorage screened for RLGM based onSWITCHGEAR scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the switchgear.
Meets EPRI NP-6041-SL Table 2.4 caveats.1-11C 600VAC BUS 11C Screened
>RLGM Anchorage screened for RLGM based onSWITCHGEAR scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the switchgear.
Meets EPRI NP-6041-SL Table 2.4 caveats.600VAC BUS 11D Anchorage screened for RLGM based onSWITCHGEAR scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the switchgear.
CONTAINMENT Small panel dimensions of 8" wide, 4" deep,HYDROGEN IGNITION and 14" tall. Mounted to the wall using two1-152-LDISB LOWER VOLUME Screened
>RLGM unistruts (anchored using four 1/2"TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG expansion bolts).ASSEMBLIES BACKUPSUPPLY BREAKERCONTAINMENT Small panel dimensions of 8" wide, 4" deep,HYDROGEN IGNITION and 14" tall. Mounted to the wall using two1-152- UPPER VOLUME TRAIN Screened
>RLGM unistruts (anchored using four 1/2"UDISB 'B' GLOW PLUG expansion bolts).ASSEMBLIES BACKUPSUPPLY BREAKERMeets EPRI NP-6041-SL Table 2.4 caveats.1-1A 4KV BUS 1A Screened
>RLGM Anchorage screened for RLGM based onSWITCHGEAR scaling of an existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for a similar switchgear.
Meets EPRI NP-6041-SL Table 2.4 caveats.Anchorage rugged by inspection, welded toMIDDLE BORIC ACID one of the Boric Acid Storage Tank 12-TK-12M legs. However, the HCLPF for this8 12-QLA-420 12M LEVEL ALARM Interaction 0.227g component is limited by the Boric AcidTRANSMITTER Storage Tank 12-TK-12M.
HCLPF fromRef. 10.2 for the tank is 0.227g < 0.387g(RLGM ZPA).The governing HCLPF capacity according toMIDDLE BORIC ACID S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-005
-"HighSTORAGE TANK Confidence Low Probability of Failure(HCLPF) Calculations for Screened in ESEP Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 PaRe 86 of 151CNP HCLPFUnit 1 ID DESCRIPTION Failure (compared NotesESEL Mode to RLGM)Item #Tanks" (Ref. 10.2) is 0.227g that is less thanthe RLGM of 0.387g.CNTMT HYDROGEN Small panel dimensions of 9" wide, 20" tall,IGNITION LOWER and 6" deep. Equipment mounted on twoVOLUMN TRAIN 'B' horizontal running unistruts spaced at 19".12 1-52-LDISB GLOW PLUG Screened
>RLGM Unistrut anchors are 1/2" expansion boltsASSEMBLIES STARTER spaced at 41" plus an additional two 3/8"COMBO-LDISB CKT bolts located 29". Screened based on theBRK light panel with rugged anchorage.
CNTMT HYDROGEN Small panel dimensions of 9" wide, 20" tall,IGNITION UPPER and 6" deep. Equipment mounted on twoVOLUME TRAIN 'B' horizontal running unistruts spaced at 19".13 1-52-UDISB GLOW PLUG Screened
>RLGM Unistrut anchors are 1/2" expansion boltsASSEMBLIES STARTER spaced at 41" plus an additional two 3/8"COMBO-UDISB CKT bolts located 29". Screened based on theBRK light panel with rugged anchorage.
CNTMT HYDROGEN Small panel dimensions of 9" wide, 20" tall,IGNITION LOWER and 6" deep. Equipment mounted on two1-88X- VOLUME TRAIN 'B' horizontal running unistruts spaced at 19".14 LDISB GLOW PLUG Screened
>RLGM Unistrut anchors are 1/2" expansion boltsASSEMBLIES STARTER spaced at 41" plus an additional two 3/8"COMBO-LDISB STAR bolts located 29". Screened based on theCNTR light panel with rugged anchorage.
CNTMT HYDROGEN Small panel dimensions of 9" wide, 20" tall,IGNITION UPPER and 6" deep. Equipment mounted on two1-88X- VOLUME TRAIN 'B' horizontal running unistruts spaced at 19".15 GLOW PLUG Screened
>RLGM Unistrut anchors are 1/2" expansion boltsASSEMBLIES STARTER spaced at 41" plus an additional two 3/8"COMBO-UDISB bolts located 29". Screened based on theCONTACTOR light panel with rugged anchorage.
Panel dimensions of 48"x24"xl 0".Equipment is bolted to two horizontal unistruts, which are bolted to the wall.Panel meets all IEEE 344-75 testingPLANT BATTERY requirements.
The testing TRS greatly16 1-89-ABBC BATT-AB DISCONNECT Screened
>RLGM exceeds the RRS at the floor level.SWITCH Equipment screens for the 0.8g to 1.2 gscreening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage acceptable for RLGM based onsimilar panels had very high calculated margins for the Design Basis Earthquake.
Panel dimensions of 48"x24"x10".
PLANT BATTERY Equipment is bolted to two horizontal unistruts, which are bolted to the wall.17 1-89-CDBC BATT-CD Screened
>RLGM PaemetalIEE347tsin DISCNNET SWTCHPanel meets all IEEE 344-75 testingDISCONNECT SWITCH requirements.
The testing TRS greatlyexceeds the RRS at the floor level.
?IExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 87 of 151.CNP HCLPFUnit IFalrESEL ID DESCRIPTION Failure (compared NotesESEL Mode (o NotesItem #to RLGM)Item #Equipment screens for the 0.8g to 1.2 gscreening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage acceptable for RLGM based onsimilar panels had very high calculated margins for the Design Basis Earthquake.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI600VAC MOTOR NP-6041-SL.
The 1/4" gap for one anchor18 1-AB-A CONTROL CENTER Screened
>RLGM was judged acceptable.
Anchorage AB-A screened for RLGM based on scaling ofexisting USI A-46 anchorage evaluation forthe MCC.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) 600VAC MOTOR for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI19 1-AB-D CONTROL CENTER Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forAB-D RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the MCC.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) 600VAC MOTOR for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI20 1-ABD-B CONTROL CENTER Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forABD-B RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the MCC.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) 600VAC MOTOR for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI21 1-ABD-D CONTROL CENTER Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forABD-D RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the MCC.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forRLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the MCC. The600VAC VALVE Seismic potentially governing Block Wall interaction 22 1-ABV-A CONTROL CENTER Interaction 0.578g could not be screened for RLGM based onABV-A scaling of existing design basis calculation.
The governing HCLPF capacity for the blockwall according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-004 -"HCLPF Calculations forScreened in ESEP Components" (Ref. 10.1)is 0.578g.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) 120/208VAC AUXILIARY for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI23 1-AFWX FEEDWATER Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forDISTRIBUTION PANEL RLGM based on screening calculation to theI__II RLGM.600VAC MOTOR Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CONTROL CENTER S R for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI PAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 88 of 151CNP HCLPFUnit 1 FailureESEL ID DESCRIPTION Mode (compared NotesItem # to RLGM)AM-A NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forRLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the MCC.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Anchorage could not be600VAC VALVE screened for RLGM based on scaling of25 1-AZV-A CONTROL CENTER Anchorage 0.62g existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation forAZV-A the MCC. The governing HCLPF capacityfor the anchorage according to S&ACalculation 13Q3208-CAL-004
-"HCLPFCalculations for Screened in ESEPComponents" (Ref. 10.1) is 0.62g.BORIC ACID Meets EPRI NP-6041-SL Table 2.4 caveats.CHARGING AND Anchorage screened for RLGM based onLETDOWN CONTROL scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage PANEL evaluation for the Control Board.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Anchorage could not bescreened for RLGM based on scaling of27 1 -BATT-AB PLANT BATTERY AB Anchorage 0.613g existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation forthe Battery Rack. The governing HCLPFcapacity for the anchorage according toS&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-004
-"HCLPF Calculations for Screened in ESEPComponents" (Ref. 10.1) is 0.613g.Small panel bolted directly to wall using twohorizontal unistruts.
Box dimensions of48.5"x40.5"x8.5".
No interactions identified.
1-BATT-AB-PLANT BATTERY Also contains 1-BC-AB-SH.
Equipment 28 SH BATT-AB AMMETER Screened
>RLGM screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8gSHUNT to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL. Anchorage screens to the RLGM inputbased on similar panels yielding significant seismic capacity margins.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI29 1-BATT-CD PLANT BATTERY CD Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forRLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the BatteryRack.PLANT BATTERY Typical of cabinet containing shunts (similar30 1-BATT-CD-BATT-CD AMMETER Screened
>RLGM to 1-BATT-AB-SH).
Cabinet also containsSH SHUNT 1-BC-CD-SH.
Equipment screens (otherS I I Ithan anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g 0Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 89 of 151CNP HCLPFUnit 1 FailureESEL ID DESCRIPTION Mode (compared NotesItem # to RLGM)screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the RLGM inputbased on similar panels yielding significant seismic capacity margins.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI1BCAB2 PLANT BATTERY NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forBATT-AB CHARGER #2 RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the BatteryCharger.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRIPLANT BATTERY NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forBATT-CD CHARGER #1 RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the BatteryCharger.PLANT BATTERY Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CHARGERS BC-AB1 for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI33 1-BCTC-AB AND BC-AB2 Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forTRANSFER PANEL RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the Panel.PLANT BATTERY Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CHARGERS BC-CD1 for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI34 1-BCTC-CD AND BC-CD2 Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forTRANSFER PANEL RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the Panel.STEAM GENERATOR Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
OME-3-1 WIDE RANGE for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI35 1-BLI-110 LEVEL INDICATOR Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forTRANSMITTER RLGM based on existing USI A-46anchorage evaluation for this equipment.
STEAM GENERATOR Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
OME-3-2 WIDE RANGE for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI36 1-BLI-120 LEVEL INDICATOR Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forTRANSMITTER RLGM based on existing USI A-46anchorage evaluation for this equipment.
STEAM GENERATOR Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
OME-3-3 WIDE RANGE for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI37 1-BLM-130 LEVEL INDICATOR Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forTRANSMITTER RLGM based on existing USI A-46anchorage evaluation for this equipment.
STEAM GENERATOR Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
OME-3-4 WIDE RANGE for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI38 1-BLI-140 LEVEL INDICATOR Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forTRANSMITTER RLGM based on existing USI A-46I_ I I I anchorage evaluation for this equipment.
SOLExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 90 of 151CNP HCLPFUnit I ID DESCRIPTION Failure (compared NotesESEL Mode to RLGM)Item #25OVDC TRAIN 'B' Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CRITICAL SOLENOID for the 0,8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI39 1-CCV-AB CALV S Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forDISTRIBUTION PANEL RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for this item.250VDC TRAIN 'A' Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CRITICAL SOLENOID for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI40 1-CCV-CD CALV S Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forDIVST O PRLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-DISTRIBUTION PANEL 46 anchorage evaluation for this item.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRICOMPONENT COOLING NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the41 1-CCW WATER CONTROL Screened
>RLGM RLGM input based on similar panels withinPANEL the control room yielding significant seismiccapacity margins.REACTOR Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
RTEACTIO for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI42 1-CG1-14 CON Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forCONTROL GROUP #1 RLGM based on existing USI A-46CABINET__#14_anchorage evaluation for this equipment.
REACTOR Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRi43 1-CG1-15 CON Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forCONTROL GROUP #1 RLGM based on existing USI A-46anchorage evaluation for this equipment.
REACTOR Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI44 1-CG2-17 CON Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forCONTROL GROUP #2 RLGM based on existing USI A-46anchorage evaluation for this equipment.
REACTOR Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI45 1-CG2-19 CON Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forCONTROL GROUP #2 RLGM based on existing USI A-46CABINET___19_anchorage evaluation for this equipment.
REACTOR Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
RTEACTIO for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI46 1-CG3-20 CON Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forCABINET #20 RLGM based on existing USI A-46anchorage evaluation for this equipment.
REACTOR Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI47 1-CG3-21 CON Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forCONTROL GROUP #3 RLGM based on existing USI A-46CABINT I2 I anchorage evaluation for this equipment.
0Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 91 of 151CNP HCLPFUnit 1 FailureESEL ID DESCRIPTION Mode (compared NotesESEL Mode t LMItem # to RLGM)REACTOR Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI48 1-CG4-22 CONTROL GROUP #4 Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forCABINET #22 RLGM based on existing USI A-46anchorage evaluation for this equipment.
REACTOR Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
RTEACTIO for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI49 1-CG4-23 CONTROL GROUP #4 Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forCABINETR#23 RLGM based on existing USI A-46anchorage evaluation for this equipment.
CONDENSATE Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
STORAGE TANK TK-32 for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI50 1-CLI-114 LEVEL INDICATOR Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forLEEANMICATOR RLGM based on existing USI A-46TRANSMITTER__anchorage evaluation for this equipment.
COMPONENT This valve is within Earthquake Experience COOLING WATER Data Base (Fig. F-26) in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
51 1-CMO-413 PUMPS SUCTION Screened
>RLGM Therefore, valve is screened for 0.8g to 1.2CROSS TIE TRAIN 'B' g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
SHUTOFF VALVECOMPONENT This valve is within Earthquake Experience COOLING WATER Data Base (Fig. F-26) in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
52 1-CMO-414 PUMPS DISCHARGE Screened
>RLGM Therefore, valve is screened for 0.8g to 1.2CROSS TIE TRAIN 'B' g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
SHUTOFF VALVECOMPONENT This valve is within Earthquake Experience COOLING WATER TO Data Base (Fig. F-26) in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
53 1-CMO-416 MISCELLANEOUS Screened
>RLGM Therefore, valve is screened for 0.8g to 1.2SERVICE TRAIN 'B' g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
SHUTOFF VALVEWEST RESIDUAL HEAT This valve is within Earthquake Experience REMOVAL HEAT Data Base (Fig. F-26) in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
EXCHANGER Therefore, valve is screened for 0.8g to 1.2g54 1-CMO-429 COMPONENT Screened
>RLGM screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
COOLING WATEROUTLET SHUTOFFVALVEEquipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRICONDENSATE PUMP NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to theCONTROL PANEL RLGM input based on similar panels withinthe control room yielding significant seismiccapacity margins.120VAC CONTROL Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
ROOM INSTRUMENT for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRIDISTRIBUTION NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forCHANNEL I RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 PaRe 92 of 151CNP HCLPFUnit I FailureNte EnEt ID DESCRIPTION Mode (compared NotesESEL Mode t LMItem #to RLGM)Item #DISTRIBUTION PANEL 46 anchorage evaluation of panel 1-ERR,which governs the capacity of this item.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI120VAC CONTROL NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage could not beROOM screened for RLGM based on scaling of1-CRID INSTRUMENTATION existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.
57 INV DISTRIBUTION Screened
>RLGM The governing HCLPF capacity for theSYSTEM CHANNEL 1 anchorage according to S&A Calculation INVERTER 13Q3208-CAL-004
-"HCLPF Calculations for Screened in ESEP Components" (Ref.10.1) is 0.839g and therefore did not controlscreening.
120VAC CONTROL Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
ROOM INSTRUMENT for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRIROOM NSTRMENTNP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for58 1-CRID-2 DISTRIBUTION Screened
>RLGM RLGM based oncag ofreng UoACHANELIIRLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-CHANNEL IIDISTRIBUTION PANEL 46 anchorage evaluation of panel 1-ERR,which governs the capacity of this item.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI120VAC CONTROL NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage could not beROOM screened for RLGM based on scaling of1-CRID INSTRUMENTATION existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.
59 INV DISTRIBUTION Screened
>RLGM The governing HCLPF capacity for theSYSTEM CHANNEL 2 anchorage according to S&A Calculation INVERTER 13Q3208-CAL-004
-"HCLPF Calculations for Screened in ESEP Components" (Ref.10.1) is 0.839g and therefore did not controlscreening.
120VAC CONTROL Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
ROOM INSTRUMENT for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI60 1-CRID-3 DISTRIBUTION Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forCHANNEL III RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-DISTRIBUTION PANEL 46 anchorage evaluation of panel 1-ERR,which governs the capacity of this item.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI120VAC CONTROL NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage could not beROOM screened for RLGM based on scaling of1-CRID INSTRUMENTATION existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.
61 INV DISTRIBUTION Screened
>RLGM The governing HCLPF capacity for theSYSTEM CHANNEL 3 anchorage according to S&A Calculation INVERTER 13Q3208-CAL-004
-"HCLPF Calculations for Screened in ESEP Components" (Ref.10.1) is 0.839g and therefore did not controlscreening.
P 3Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 93 of 151CNP HCLPFUnit I FailureESEL ID DESCRIPTION Mode (compared NotesItem # to RLGM)120VAC CONTROL Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
ROOM INSTRUMENT for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for62 1-CRID-4 DISTRIBUTION Screened
>RLGM RLGM based oncag ofreng USACHANNL IVRLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-CHANNEL IVDISTRIBUTION PANEL 46 anchorage evaluation of panel 1-ERR,which governs the capacity of this item.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI120VAC CONTROL NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage could not beROOM screened for RLGM based on scaling of1-CRID INSTRUMENTATION existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.
63 INV DISTRIBUTION Screened
>RLGM The governing HCLPF capacity for theSYSTEM CHANNEL 4 anchorage according to S&A Calculation INVERTER 13Q3208-CAL-004
-"HCLPF Calculations for Screened in ESEP Components" (Ref.10.1) is 0.839g and therefore did not controlscreening.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRIDELTA 'T' AND UNIT NP-NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to theCONTROL PANEL RLGM input based on similar panels withinthe control room yielding significant seismiccapacity margins.120/208VAC Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
EMERGENCYLOCAL for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI65 1-ELSC SHUTDOWN Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to theDISTRIBUTION PANEL RLGM input based on similar panels yieldingsignificant seismic capacity margins.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) 600VAC MOTOR for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI66 1-EZC-B CONTROL CENTER Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forEZC-B RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation of this MCC.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) 600VAC MOTOR for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI67 1-EZC-C CONTROL CENTER Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forEZC-C RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation of this MCC.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) 600VAC MOTOR for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI68 1-EZC-D CONTROL CENTER Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forEZC-D RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation of this MCC.AUXILIARY Equipment screens (other than anchorage) 69 1-FFI-210 FEEDWATER TO for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRISTEAM GENERATOR NP-6041-SL.
Flow transmitter is a small,OME-3-1 FLOW light-weight (27 lb.) component.
Mounted to Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 PaRe 94 of 151E3CNP HCLPFUnit I FailureESEL ID DESCRIPTION Mode (compared NotesItem M e to RLGM)Item #INDICATOR the wall using two 1/2" expansion bolts,TRANSMITTER equipment bolted to 2" pipe, 7" out from thewall and approximately 4" up. Transmitter isIEEE-344-1975 qualified.
Anchorage screens based on light weight component with rugged anchorage.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
AUXILIARY for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRIFEEDWATER TO NP-6041-SL.
Flow transmitter is a small,70 STEAM GENERATOR Screened
>RLGM light-weight (27 lb.) component.
Mounted onOME-3-2 FLOW a u-shaped pipe frame which is welded toINDICATOR steel column (box structure) on both sides.TRANSMITTER Anchorage screens based on light weightcomponent with rugged anchorage.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
AUXILIARY for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRIFEEDWATER TO NP-6041-SL.
Flow transmitter is a small,STEAM GENERATOR light-weight (27 lb.) component.
Mounted on71 1-FFI-230 OME-3-3NFLOW Screened
>RLGM a u-shaped pipe frame which is welded toINDICATOR steel column (box structure) on both sides.TRANSMITTER Transmitter is IEEE-344-1975 qualified.
Anchorage screens based on light weightcomponent with rugged anchorage.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRIAUXILIARY NP-6041-SL.
Flow transmitter is a small,FEEDWATER TO light-weight (27 lb.) component.
It isSTEAM GENERATOR mounted on a L-shaped pipe frame (2" pipe,OME-3-4 FLOW 7" out from the wall and approximately 13"INDICATOR up) with 2 1/2" bolts mounted to the wall withTRANSMITTER two expansion anchors.
Anchorage screensbased on the light weight and the ruggedanchorage.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRIFIXED INCORE NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to theCONTROL PANEL RLGM input based on similar panels withinthe control room yielding significant seismiccapacity margins.REACTOR CORE Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
THERMOCOUPLE for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI74 1-FICT-A TRAIN 'A' Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to theTRANSMITTER RLGM input based on a screening CABINET calculation.
FLUX CONTROL Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PANEL for the 0.8g to 1,2g screening lane in EPRI SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 95 of 151CNP HCLPFUnit I FailureESEL ID DESCRIPTION Mode (compared NotesItem # to RLGM)NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to theRLGM input based on similar panels withinthe control room yielding significant seismiccapacity margins.Anchorage could not be screened for RLGMbased on scaling of existing USI A-46WEST COMPONENT anchorage evaluation for the HX. The80 1-HE-15W COOLING WATER Anchorage 0.547g governing HCLPF capacity for theanchorage according to S&A Calculation HEAT EXCHANGER 13Q3208-CAL-004
-"HCLPF Calculations for Screened in ESEP Components" (Ref.10.1) is 0.547g.Anchorage screened for RLGM based onWEST RESIDUAL HEAT existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation of81 1-HE-17W REMOVAL HEAT Screened
>RLGM this HX without top braces; braces wereEXCHANGER installed after the evaluation and providesubstantial support.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to theRLGM input based on similar panels withinthe control room yielding significant seismiccapacity margins.
The potentially governing UNIT 1 HOT Block Wall interaction could not be screenedSHUTDOWN PANEL for RLGM based on scaling of existingdesign basis calculation.
The governing HCLPF capacity for the block wall according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-004
-"HCLPF Calculations for Screened in ESEPComponents" (Ref. 10.1) is 2.682g andtherefore did not control screening.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRINP-60411-SL.
Chiller on vibration isolators, later modified to be restrained in alldirections.
Anchorage screened to a levelgreater than the RLGM by scaling theCONTROL ROOM AIR design basis anchorage calculation.
83 1-HV-ACR-2 CONDITIONING SOUTH Screened
>RLGM The potentially governing Block WallLIQUID CHILLER TeptnilygvrigBokWl interaction could not be screened for RLGMbased on scaling of existing design basiscalculation.
The governing HCLPF capacityfor the block wall according to S&ACalculation 13Q3208-CAL-004
-"HCLPFCalculations for Screened in ESEPComponents" (Ref. 10.1) is 1.215g and P ki3Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 96 of 151CNP HCLPFUnit 1 FailureEnEt ID DESCRIPTION Mode (compared NotesESEL Mode t LMItem #to RLGM)Item #therefore did not control screening.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forRLGM based on existing USI A-46anchorage evaluation for this item. TheCONTROL ROOM potentially governing Block Wall interaction 1-HV-ACRA-VENTILATION SOUTH could not be screened for RLGM based on2 AIR CONDITIONING scaling of existing design basis calculation.
UNIT The governing HCLPF capacity for the blockwall according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-004 -"HCLPF Calculations forScreened in ESEP Components" (Ref. 10.1)is 1.215g and therefore did not controlscreening.
OUTSIDE AIR TO Damper included on HVAC duct work,equipment screens for the 0.8g to 1.2 g1-HV-ACR-CONTROL ROOM screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
A CNP85 DA-2 PRESSURIZATION/CLE Screened
>RLGM analysis of the duct work and supporting rodACRF VENT DAMPER hangers indicates a large margin andtherefore screens for the RLGM input.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to theRLGM input based on similar filteranchorage with significant seismic capacityCONTROL ROOM margins.
The potentially governing BlockWall interaction could not be screened for86 1-HV-ACRF PRESSURIZATION/CLE Screened
>RLGM RlG basedon calinof exsting dsgANUP FILTER UNIT RLGM based on scaling of existing designbasis calculation.
The governing HCLPFcapacity for the block wall according to S&ACalculation 13Q3208-CAL-004
-"HCLPFCalculations for Screened in ESEPComponents" (Ref. 10.1) is 1.215g andtherefore did not control screening.
CONTROL ROOM This equipment item is included in the87 1-HV-ACRF-PRESSURIZATION/CLE Screened
>RLGM existing USI A-46 evaluation for 1-HV-2 ANUP FILTER UNIT ACRA-2. This equipment item screens (seeVENT FAN #2 1-HV-ACRA-2 for details).
Heater included on HVAC duct work andCONTROL ROOM screens for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane1-HV-ACR-VENTILATION SOUTH in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
A CNP analysis of the88 H2 DUCT ELECTRIC Screened
>RLGM duct work and supporting rod hangersHEATING UNIT indicates a large margin and therefore screens for the RLGM input.
SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
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AB BATTERY for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRISEQUIPMENT AREA Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Fan hung from ceiling, in90 5 BATTERY ROOM vertical alignment; fan weighs 360 lbs.VENTILATION Anchorage screens due to relatively smallfan with rugged anchorage.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRICD BATTERY NP-6041-SL.
Fan bolted to floor with 8- 1/2"1-HV-SGRX-EQUIPMENT AREA Screened
>RLGM expansion bolts that are adequately 6 BATTERY ROOM embedded; fan weighs 500 lbs. Anchorage VENTILATION screens due to relatively small fan withrugged anchorage.
RHR TO REACTOR This valve is within Earthquake Experience COOLANT LOOPS #2 & Screened
>RLGM Data Base (Fig. F-26) in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
92 1-1CM-111
#3 COLD LEGS Therefore, valve is screened for 0.8g to 1.2> g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
REACTOR COOLANT This valve is within Earthquake Experience LOOP #2 HOT LEG TO Data Base (Fig. F-26) in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
RESIDUAL Therefore, valve is screened for 0.8g to 1.2g93 1-1CM-129 HEATREMOVAL screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
PUMPS SUCTIONCONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVEThe weight of this valve is outside theBORON INJECTION Earthquake Experience Data Base (Fig. F-TANK TRAIN 'B' 26) in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
A 3g analysis was94 1-1CM-251 OUTLET Screened
>RLGM performed resulting in acceptable stresses.
CONTAINMENT Therefore, valve is screened for 0.8g to 1.2gISOLATION VALVE screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Equipment screens for the 0.8g to 1.2 gBORON INJECTION TO screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL basedREACTOR COOLANT Screened
>RLGM on light weight component with rugged96 1-IFI-51 LOOP #1 FLOW anchorage.
INDICATOR TRANSMITTER Equipment screens for the 0.8g to 1.2 gBORON INJECTION TO screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL basedREACTOR COOLANT Screened
>RLGM on light weight component with rugged97 1-IFI-52 LOOP #2 anchorage.
FLOWINDICATOR TRANSMITTER SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 98 of 151CNP HCLPFUnit I FailureESEL ID DESCRIPTION Mode (compared NotesItem # to RLGM)Equipment screens for the 0.8g to 1.2 gBORON INJECTION TO screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL basedREACTOR COOLANT Screened
>RLGM on light weight component with rugged98 1-IFI-53 LOOP #3 FLOW anchorage.LG anchorage.
INDICATOR TRANSMITTER Equipment screens for the 0.8g to 1.2 gBORON INJECTION TO screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL basedREACTOR COOLANT Screened
>RLGM on light weight component with rugged99 1-IFI-54 LOOP #4 FLOW anchorage.
INDICATOR TRANSMITTER REACTOR COOLANT This valve is within Earthquake Experience LOOP #2 HOT LEG TO Data Base (Fig. F-26) in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
RESIDUAL Screened
>RLGM Therefore, valve is screened for 0.8g to 1.2gHEATREMOVAL screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
PUMPS SUCTIONSHUTOFF VALVEThe weight of this valve is outside theEarthquake Experience Data Base (Fig. F-26) in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
A 3g analysis wasBORON INJECTION performed resulting in acceptable stresses.
101 1-IMO-256 TANK TRAIN'B'INLET Screened
>RLGM Therefore, valve is screened for 0.8g to 1.2gSHUTOFF VALVE screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Apotential Block Wall interaction wasscreened for RLGM based on scaling ofexisting design basis calculation.
This valve is within the Earthquake Experience Data Base (Fig. F-26) in EPRI6041-SL.
Therefore, valve is screened for0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-EAST RESIDUAL HEAT 6041-SL.
The potentially governing BlockREMOVAL PUMP PP- Seismic Wall interaction could not be screened for35EMSCTONA PnteractPon 0.428g102 1-IMO-310 35E SUCTION Interaction RLGM based on scaling of existing designSHUTOFF VALVE basis calculation.
The governing HCLPFcapacity for the block wall according to S&ACalculation 13Q3208-CAL-004
-"HCLPFCalculations for Screened in ESEPComponents" (Ref. 10.1) is 0.428g.1031-IMO-324 WEST RHR HX 1-HE-17W DISCHARGE CROSSTIE SHUTOFFVALVEScreened>RLGMThis valve is within the Earthquake Experience Data Base (Fig. F-26) in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Therefore, valve is screenedfor 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-0Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 99 of 151CNP HCLPFUnit 1 FailureESEL ID DESCRIPTION Mode (compared NotesItem M e to RLGM)Item #6041-SL.The hydrogen igniters are composed of theIgniter Box, glow plug, shield and otherassociated hardware.
The components within the igniter box are not fragile and areCONTAINMENT encompassed by the Earthquake 1-LDISB-HYDROGEN IGNITION Screened
>RLGM Experience Data Base of EPRI NP-6041-SL.
104 B19 LOWER VOLUME Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRIASSEMBLY
#B19 NP-6041-SL.
Equipment supported byunistrut cantilevered off the containment wall. Anchorage screened for RLGM basedon scaling existing anchorage evaluation.
CONTAINMENT See notes for 1-LDISB-B19.
Assembly1-LDISB-HYDROGEN IGNITION Screened
>RLGM screened for 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in105 B20 LOWER VOLUME EPRI NP-6041-SL and anchorage loadingsTRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG for RLGM.ASSEMBLY
#B20CONTAINMENT See notes for 1-LDISB-B19.
Assembly1-LDISB-HYDROGEN IGNITION Screened
>RLGM screened for 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in106 B21 LOWER VOLUME EPRI NP-6041-SL and anchorage loadingsTRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG for RLGM.ASSEMBLY
#B21CONTAINMENT See notes for 1-LDISB-B19.
Assembly1-LDISB-HYDROGEN IGNITION Screened
>RLGM screened for 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in107 B22 LOWER VOLUME EPRI NP-6041-SL and anchorage loadingsTRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG for RLGM.ASSEMBLY
#B22CONTAINMENT See notes for 1-LDISB-B19.
Assembly1-LDISB-HYDROGEN IGNITION Screened
>RLGM screened for 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in108 B23 LOWER VOLUME EPRI NP-6041-SL and anchorage loadingsTRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG for RLGM.ASSEMBLY
#B23CONTAINMENT See notes for 1-LDISB-B19.
Assembly1-LDISB-HYDROGEN IGNITION Screened
>RLGM screened for 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in109 B24 LOWER VOLUME EPRI NP-6041-SL and anchorage loadingsTRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG for RLGMASSEMBLY
#B24CONTAINMENT Equipment supported by unistrutHYDROGEN IGNITION cantilevered off column. See notes for 1-110 1-LDISB-LOWER VOLUME Screened
>RLGM LDISB-B19.
Assembly screened for 0.8g toB25 TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL ASSEMBLY
#B25 and anchorage loadings for RLGM SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 PaRe 100 of 151CNP HCLPFUnit I FailureESEL ID DESCRIPTION Mode (compared NotesItem # to RLGM)CONTAINMENT Equipment supported by unistrutHYDROGEN IGNITION cantilevered off column. See notes for 1-1-LDISB-LOWER VOLUME Screened
>RLGM LDISB-B 19. Assembly screened for 0.8g toB26 TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL ASSEMBLY
#826 and anchorage loadings for RLGMCONTAINMENT Equipment supported by unistrutHYDROGEN IGNITION cantilevered off column. See notes for 1-112 1-LDISB-LOWER VOLUME Screened
>RLGM LDISB-B319.
Assembly screened for 0.8g toB27 TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL ASSEMBLY
#827 and anchorage loadings for RLGMEquipment supported by unistrutCONTAINMENT cantilevered off column, the equipment isHYDROGEN IGNITION approximately 20 ft. above the viewing113 1-LDISB-LOWER VOLUME Screened
>RLGM location.
See notes for 1-LDISB-B19.
B28 TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG Assembly screened for 0.8g to 1.2gASSEMBLY
#B28 screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL andanchorage loadings for RLGM1-LDISB-CONTAINMENT See notes for 1-LDISB-B19.
AssemblyB29 HYDROGEN IGNITION screened for 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in114 LOWER VOLUME Screened
>RLGM EPRI NP-6041-SL and anchorage loadingsTRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG for RLGMASSEMBLY
#829CONTAINMENT See notes for 1-LDISB-B19.
Assembly1-LDISB-HYDROGEN IGNITION Screened
>RLGM screened for 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in115 B30 LOWER VOLUME EPRI NP-6041-SL and anchorage loadingsTRAIN'B' GLOW PLUG for RLGMASSEMBLY
#830CONTAINMENT See notes for 1-LDISB-B19.
Assembly1-LDISB-HYDROGEN IGINTION Screened
>RLGM screened for 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in116 B31 LOWER VOLUME EPRI NP-6041-SL and anchorage loadingsTRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG for RLGMASSEMBLY
#831CONTAINMENT See notes for 1-LDISB-B19.
Assembly1-LDISB-HYDROGEN IGNITION Screened
>RLGM screened for 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in117 B32 LOWER VOLUME EPRI NP-6041-SL and anchorage loadingsTRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG for RLGMASSEMBLY
#832CONTAINMENT See notes for 1-LDISB-B19.
Assembly1-LDISB-HYDROGEN IGNITION Screened
>RLGM screened for 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in118 B33 LOWER VOLUME EPRI NP-6041-SL and anchorage loadingsTRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG for RLGMASSEMBLY
#8331-LDISB-CONTAINMENT Screened
>RLGM See notes for 1-LDISB-B19.
AssemblyB34 HYDROGEN IGNITION screened for 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 101 of 151CNP HCLPFUnit I FailureESEL ID DESCRIPTION Mode (compared NotesItem # to RLGM)LOWER VOLUME EPRI NP-6041-SL and anchorage loadingsTRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG for RLGMASSEMBLY
#B34Equipment bolted to unistrut, which isCONTAINMENT cantilevered off column 13 of quad 4, theHYDROGEN IGNITION unistrut is welded to this column. See notes120 B35 LOWER VOLUME for 1-LDISB-B19.
Assembly screened forTRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-ASSEMBLY
#B35 6041-SL and anchorage loadings for RLGMEquipment screens (other than anchorage)
STEAM GENERATORS for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI121 1-LSI-1 #1 AND # LOCAL Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forSHUTDOWN STATION RLGM based on existing USI A-46anchorage evaluation for this panel.Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
STEAM GENERATORS for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI122 1-LSI-2 #2 AND #3 LOCAL Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forSHUTDOWN STATION RLGM based on existing USI A-46anchorage evaluation for this panel.Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
REACTOR COOLANT for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRISYSTEM CHARGING Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forAND LETDOWN LOCAL RLGM based on existing USI A-46SHUTDOWN STATION anchorage evaluation for this panel.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI124 1-MCAB 250VDC DISTRIBUTION Screened
.>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forPANEL MCAB RLGM based on existing USI A-46anchorage evaluation for this panel.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI250VDC DISTRIBUTION Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forPOWER PANEL RLGM based on existing USI A-46anchorage evaluation for this panel.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI250VDC DISTRIBUTION Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forPANEL MDAB RLGM based on existing USI A-46anchorage evaluation for this panel.250VDC DISTRIBUTION Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PANEL MDCD for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 10Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 102 of 151CNP HCLPFUnit 1 FailureESEL ID DESCRIPTION e (compared NotesESLMode (cmaeNosItem # to RLGM)6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGMbased on existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for this panel.Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
STEAM GENERATOR for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI128 1-MPP-210 OME-3-1 CHANNEL I Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forSTEAM PRESSURE RLGM based on existing USI A-46TRANSMITTER anchorage evaluation for this transmitter.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
STEAM GENERATOR for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI129 1-MPP-220 OME-3-2 CHANNEL I Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forSTEAM PRESSURE RLGM based on existing USI A-46TRANSMITTER anchorage evaluation for this transmitter.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
STEAM GENERATOR for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI130 1-MPP-230 OME-3-3 CHANNEL I Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forSTEAM PRESSURE RLGM based on existing USI A-46TRANSMITTER anchorage evaluation for this transmitter.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
STEAM GENERATOR for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRIOME-3-4 CHANNEL I Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forSTEAM PRESSURE RLGM based on existing USI A-46TRANSMITTER anchorage evaluation for this transmitter.
This valve is outside the Earthquake STEAM GENERATOR Experience Data Base (Fig. F-25) in EPRIOME-3-1 POWER Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
A 3g load analysis was132 1-MRV-213 OPERATED performed, resulting in acceptable stresses.
RELIEFVALVE Therefore, valve is screened for 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI 6041-SL.This valve is outside the Earthquake STEAM GENERATOR Experience Data Base (Fig. F-25) in EPRIOME-3-2 POWER Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
A 3g load analysis was133 1-MRV-223 OPERATED RELIEF performed, resulting in acceptable stresses.
VALVE Therefore, valve is screened for 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
STEAM GENERATOR This valve is outside the Earthquake Experience Data Base (Fig. F-25) in EPRI134 1-MRV-233 OPERATED RELIEF NP-6041-SL.
A 3g load analysis wasVALVE performed, resulting in acceptable stresses.
Therefore, valve is screened for 0.8g to 1.2 SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 103 of 151CNP HCLPFUnit IFalrEnEt ID DESCRIPTION Failure (compared NotesESEL Mode (o NotesItem #to RLGM)Item #g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
This valve is outside the Earthquake STEAM GENERATOR Experience Data Base (Fig. F-25) in EPRIOME-3-4 POWER Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
A 3g load analysis was135 1-MRV-243 OPERATED performed, resulting in acceptable stresses.
RELIEFVALVE Therefore, valve is screened for 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI 6041-SL.NUCLEAR Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
INSTRUMENTATION for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI136 1-NIS-1 SYSTEM PROTECTION Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forCHANNEL I CONTROL RLGM based on existing USI A-46PANEL anchorage evaluation for this panel.Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PRESSURIZER OME-4 for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRIPROTECTION Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forCHANNEL I RLGM based on existing USI A-46LEVELTRANSMITTER anchorage evaluation for this transmitter.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
REACTOR VESSEL for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
The transmitter is IEEE-344-138 1-NPS-110 PRESSURE 75 Qualified.
Anchorage screened for RLGMTRANSMITTER based on existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for this transmitter.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Anchorage could not bescreened for RLGM based on scaling ofNUCLEAR existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for142 1-NRI INSTRUMENTATION Screened
>RLGM the Amplifier.
The governing HCLPFAMP WIDE RANGE capacity for the anchorage according toRADIATION AMPLIFIER S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-004
-"HCLPF Calculations for Screened in ESEPComponents" (Ref. 10.1) is 1.16g and didnot control the capacity.
Equipment is within Earthquake Experience PRESSURIZER TRAIN Data (Fig. F-25) of EPRI NP-6041-SL and143 1-NRV-152
'B'PRESSURE RELIEF Sscreens for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening laneVALVE in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
PRESSURIZER OME-4 Equipment is within Earthquake Experience 144 1-NRV-153 TRAIN A PRESSURE Data (Fig. F-25) of EPRI NP-6041-SL andRELIEF VALVE screens for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 104 of 151CNP HCLPFUnit 1 FailureESEL ID DESCRIPTION Mode (compared NotesESEL Mode t LMItem # to RLGM)in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
REACTOR COOLANT The Thermal Sensor is IEEE-344-75 LOOP #1 HOT LEG Qualified.
Rugged component no seismic149 1-NTR-110 WIDE Screened
>RLGM interaction concerns.
Equipment screens forRANGETEMPERATURE the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-RECORDER THERMAL 6041-SL.SENSORREACTOR COOLANT The Thermal Sensor is IEEE-344-75 LOOP #3 HOT LEG Qualified.
Rugged component no seismic150 1-NTR-130 WIDE Screened
>RLGM interaction concerns.
Equipment screens forRANGETEMPERATURE the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-RECORDER THERMAL 6041-SL.SENSORREACTOR COOLANT The Thermal Sensor is IEEE-344-75 LOOP #1 COLD LEG Qualified.
Rugged component no seismic151 1-NTR-210 WIDE Screened
>RLGM interaction concerns.
Equipment screens forRANGETEMPERATURE the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-RECORDER THERMAL 6041-SL.SENSORREACTOR COOLANT The Thermal Sensor is IEEE-344-75 LOOP #3 COLD LEG Qualified.
Rugged component no seismic152 1-NTR-230 WIDE Screened
>RLGM interaction concerns.
Equipment screens forRANGETEMPERATURE the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-RECORDER THERMAL 6041-SL.SENSORStrainer supported on two 14" wide, 12"deep, and 18" tall concrete pedestals.
TURBINE DRIVEN Equipment bolted to pedestals with four 3/4"anchor bolts, one set of two bolts in each153 1-OME-33 PUMP PP-4 SUCTION pedestal, spaced at 6" apart. The piping isSTRAINER well supported, the strainer is small relativeto the anchorage and therefore, this isscreened for the RLGM.Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
WEST ESSENTIAL for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI154 1-OME-34W SERVICE WATER Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forPUMP PP-7W DISCH RLGM based on existing USI A-46STN anchorage evaluation for similar pump.ACCUMULATOR TANK Screened
>RLGM Anchorage screened for RLGM input based155 1-OME-6-1
#1 on screening calculation.
ACCUMULATOR TANK Screened
>RLGM Anchorage screened for RLGM input based156 1-OME-6-2
#2 on screening calculation.
SAIExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 105 of 151CNP HCLPFUnit I FailureESEL ID DESCRIPTION Mode (compared NotesItem # to RLGM)ACCUMULATOR TANK Screened
>RLGM Anchorage screened for RLGM input based157 1-OME-6-3
#3 on screening calculation.
ACCUMULATOR TANK Screened
>RLGM Anchorage screened for RLGM input based158 1-OME-6-4
#4 on screening calculation.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
WEST COMPONENT for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI159 1-PP-iOW COOLING WATER Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forPUMP RLGM based on existing USI A-46anchorage evaluation for this pump.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Pump is supported vertically, but free to translate laterally.
The Pumpscreened for RLGM based on existing stressWEST RESIDUAL HEAT Seisi 0.423g evaluation of this pump and attached lines.REMOVAL PUMP The governing HCLPF capacity for the blockwall according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-004 -"HCLPF Calculations forScreened in ESEP Components" (Ref. 10.1)is 0.423g.Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
TURBINE DRIVEN for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI161 1-PP-4 AUXILIARY FEED Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forPUMP RLGM based on existing USI A-46anchorage evaluation for this pump.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to theRLGM input based on robust anchorage forrelatively small pump. However, the HCLPFBORIC ACID STORAGE Seismic for this component is limited by the Boric162 1-PP-46-1 TANKS TRANSFER Interaction 0.227g Acid Storage Tank 1-TK-12N due to thePUMP #1 attached piping. HCLPF capacity according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-005
-"HCLPF Calculations for Screened in ESEPTanks" (Ref. 10.2) for the tank is 0.227g thatis less than the RLGM of 0.387g.CONTROL ROOM AIR Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CONDITROL G R OM H A for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI163 1-PP-82S COITI N NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forCIRCULATION PUMP RLGM based on existing USI A-46CIRCULATION I IUManchorage evaluation for this pump. The POExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 106 of 151CNP HCLPFUnit 1 FailureESEL ID DESCRIPTION Mode (compared NotesIEm Moe to RLGM)Item #governing HCLPF capacity for the block wallaccording to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-004 -"HCLPF Calculations forScreened in ESEP Components" (Ref. 10.1)is 1.215g and did not control the capacity.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
UPPER CONTAINMENT for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI164 1-PPA-310 CHANNEL III WIDE Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forRANGE PRESSURE RLGM based on comparison to similarALARM TRANSMITTER transmitters.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the165 1-PRZ CONTROLEPANEL RLGM input based on similar panels withinthe control room yielding significant seismiccapacity margins.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to theRLGM input based on robust anchorage forNORTH BORIC ACID small instrument.
: However, the HCLPF forSTORAGE TANK TK- Seismic this component is limited by the Boric Acid16612N LEVEL ALARM Interaction 0.2AStorage Tank 1-TK-12N due to the attachedTRANSMITTER piping. HCLPF capacity according to S&ACalculation 13Q3208-CAL-005
-"HCLPFCalculations for Screened in ESEP Tanks"(Ref. 10.2) for the tank is 0.227g that is lessthan the RLGM of 0.387g.Equipment is within Earthquake Experience AIR OPERATED VALVE Data (Fig. F-25) of EPRI NP-6041-SL and167 1-QRV-200 TO ISOLATE BORON Screened
>RLGM Daa(i.F2)oEPIN-41Lan screens for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening laneINJECTION PATH in EPRI 6041-SL.TURBINE DRIVEN Equipment is within Earthquake Experience AUXILIARY FEED Screened
>RLGM Data (Fig. F-26) of EPRI NP-6041-SL and168 1-QT-506 PUMP PP-4 TRIP AND screens for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening laneTHROTTLE VALVE in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Equipment is within Earthquake Experience AUXILIARY TUBN Screened
>RLGM Data (Fig. F-26) of EPRI NP-6041-SL and169 1-QT-507 PUMP TURBINE Sscreens for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening laneGOVERNOR VALVE in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 107 of 151CNP HCLPFUnit I ID DESCRIPTION Failure (compared NotesESEL Mode (o NotesItem # to RLGM)Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to theRLGM input based on robust anchorage forsmall instrument.
: However, the HCLPF forNORTH BAST TK-12N Seismic this component is limited by the Boric Acid170 1-QTC-410 TRAIN 'A' HTR TEMP Interaction 0.227g Storage Tank 1-TK-12N due to the attachedCONTROLLER piping. HCLPF capacity according to S&ACalculation 13Q3208-CAL-005
-"HCLPFCalculations for Screened in ESEP Tanks"(Ref. 10.2) for the tank is 0.227g that is lessthan the RLGM of 0.387g.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRIRESIDUAL HEAT Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the171 1-RHR REMOVAL CONTROL RLGM based on similar panels within thePANEL control room yielding significant seismiccapacity margins.Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
REACTOR for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRIPROTECTION Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forCHANNEL I CABINET RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46#1 anchorage evaluation.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
REACTOR for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRIPROTECTION Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to theCHANNEL I CABINET RLGM based on similar cabinets yielding#2 significant seismic capacity margins.Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
REACTOR for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI174 1-RPC-1-3 PROTECTION Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to theCHANNEL I CABINET RLGM based on similar cabinets yielding#3 significant seismic capacity margins.Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
REACTOR for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRIPROTECTION Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to theCHANNEL I CABINET RLGM based on similar cabinets yielding#4 significant seismic capacity margins.REACTOR Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION Screened
>RLGM for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRICHANNEL II CABINET NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the#5 RLGM based on similar cabinets yielding POExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 108 of 151CNP HCLPFUnit 1 ID DESCRIPTION Failure (compared NotesESEL Mode to RLGM)Item #significant seismic capacity margins.Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
REACTOR for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRIPROTECTION Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to theCHANNEL II CABINET RLGM based on similar cabinets yielding#6 significant seismic capacity margins.Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
REACTOR for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRIPROTECTION Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to theCHANNEL II CABINET RLGM based on similar cabinets yielding#7 significant seismic capacity margins.Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
REACTOR for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI179 1-RPC-2-8 PROTECTION Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to theCHANNEL II CABINET RLGM based on similar cabinets yielding#8 significant seismic capacity margins.Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
REACTOR for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRIPROTECTION Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to theCHANNEL III CABINET RLGM based on similar cabinets yielding#10 significant seismic capacity margins.Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
REACTOR for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRIPROTECTION Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to theCHANNEL III CABINET RLGM based on similar cabinets yielding#9 significant seismic capacity margins.Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
REACTOR for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRIPROTECTION Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to theCHANNEL IV CABINET RLGM based on similar cabinets yielding#12 significant seismic capacity margins.Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
REACTOR for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRIPROTECTION AND Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the183 1-RPS-A SAFEGUARD RLGM based on similar panels within theACTUATION TRAIN 'A' control room yielding significant seismicCABINET capacity margins.REACTOR Equipment screens (other than anchorage) 184 1-RPS-B PROTECTION AND for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRISAFEGUARD NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the POExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 PaRe 109 of 151CNP HCLPFUnit 1 (compareESEL ID DESCRIPTION Failure (compared NotesESEL Mode to RLGM)Item #ACTUATION TRAIN 'B' RLGM based on similar panels within theCABINET control room yielding significant seismiccapacity margins.REACTOR Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION AND for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI185 1-RPSX-A SAFEGUARD Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forACTUATIO N TRAIN 'A' RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46AUXILIARY CABINET anchorage evaluation.
REACTOR Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION AND for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI186 1-RPSX-B SAFEGUARD Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forACTUATIO N TRAIN 'B' RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46AUXILIARY CABINET anchorage evaluation.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to theREACTOR VESSEL RLGM based on similar cabinets yieldingOME-1 WATER LEVEL Screened
>RLGM significant seismic capacity margins.
The187 1-RVLC INSTRUMENTATION governing HCLPF capacity for the block wallCABINET according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-004 -"HCLPF Calculations forScreened in ESEP Components" (Ref. 10.1)is 2.682g which does not control capacity.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI188 1-SA STATION AUXILIARIES Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forCONTROL PANEL RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46anchorage evaluation.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
STEAM GENERATOR for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI189 1-SG AND AUXILIARY FEED Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forPUMP CONTROL RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46PANEL anchorage evaluation.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRISAFETY INJECTION Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to theCONTROL PANEL RLGM based on similar panels yieldingsignificant seismic capacity margins.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) 191 1-SPY CONTAINEN for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 110 of 151CNP HCLPFUnit I FailureESEL ID DESCRIPTION Mode (compared NotesItem M e to RLGM)Item #RLGM based on similar panels yieldingsignificant seismic capacity margins.Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
ENGINEER SAFETY for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI1-SSR SYSTEM REAR Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forINSTRUMENT/RELAY RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46RACK anchorage evaluation.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
NUCLEAR for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRIINSTRUMENTAL Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the193 1-SWR SOURCE RANGE N21 RLGM based on similar equipment withinINSTRUMENT/RELAY the control room yielding significant seismicRACK capacity margins.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI4KV BUS T11A Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to theSWITCHGEAR RLGM based on anchorage evaluation performed to the RLGM.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI250VDC TRAIN 'B' Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to theTRANSFER CABINET RLGM based on similar panels yieldingsignificant seismic capacity margins.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI250VDC TRAIN A Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to theTRANSFER CABINET RLGM based on similar panels yieldingsignificant seismic capacity margins.The Block Wall interaction was screened forRLGM based on scaling of existing designbasis calculation.
The governing HCLPFBORON INJECTION Anchorage 0.45g capacity according to S&A Calculation 197 1-TK-11 TANK 13Q3208-CAL-005
-"High Confidence LowProbability of Failure (HCLPF) Calculations for Screened in ESEP Tanks" (Ref. 10.2) is0.45g for the welded connections.
The Block Wall interaction was screened forRLGM based on scaling of existing design198 1-TK-12N NORTH BORIC ACID Anchorage 0.227g basis calculation.
The governing HCLPFSTORAGE TANK capacity according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-005
-"High Confidence Low SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 111 of 151CNP HCLPFUnit 1 FailureESEL ID DESCRIPTION Mode (compared NotesItem # to RLGM)Probability of Failure (HCLPF) Calculations for Screened in ESEP Tanks" (Ref. 10.2) is0.227g. Therefore, this tank does not screenfor the RLGM.Horizontal tank containing air is wellsupported in addition to standard saddles.PRESSURIZER TRAIN Tank is adequately welded to building steel.'B' PRESSURE RELIEF Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage) 199 1-TK-253-1 VALVE NRV-152 for the 0.89 to 1.2g screening lane in EPRIRESERVE CONTROL NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage judged adequateAIR TANK for RLGM by inspection based on small fanwith rugged anchorage.
Horizontal tank containing air is wellsupported in addition to standard saddles.PRESSURIZER TRAIN Tank is adequately welded to building steel.'A' PRESSURE RELIEF Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage) 200 1-TK-253-2 VALVE NRV-153 for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRIRESERVE CONTROL NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage judged adequateAIR TANK for RLGM by inspection based on small fanwith rugged anchorage.
Tanks 1-TK-253-3,
-5, &-7 grouped togetherand anchored by four plates bolted to thewall with two 3/4" bolts in each plate. ThePRESSURIZER TRAIN tanks are 9" diameter and 56" tall. The air'B' PRESSURE RELIEF bottles are strapped to framing affixed to the201 1-TK-253-3 VLV NRV152 Screened
>RLGM wall by twelve W" bolts. Equipment screensEMERGENCY AIR (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 gTANK screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage judged adequate for RLGM byinspection based on rugged configuration ofsupport.Tanks 1-TK-253-4,
-6, &-8 grouped togetherand anchored by four plates bolted to thewall with two 3/4" bolts in each plate. ThePRESSURIZER TRAIN tanks are 9" diameter and 56" tall. The air'A' PRESSURE RELIEF bottles are strapped to framing affixed to the202 1-TK-253-4 VLV NRV153 Screened
>RLGM wall by twelve W" bolts. Equipment screensEMERGENCY AIR (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 gTANK screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage judged adequate for RLGM byinspection based on rugged configuration ofsupport.
SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 112 of 151CNP HCLPFUnit I FailureESEL ID DESCRIPTION Mode (compared NotesItem # to RLGM)Tanks 1-TK-253-3,
-5, &-7 grouped togetherand anchored by four plates bolted to thewall with two 3/4" bolts in each plate. ThePRESSURIZER TRAIN tanks are 9" diameter and 56" tall. The air'B' PRESSURE RELIEF bottles are strapped to framing affixed to the203 1-TK-253-5 VLV NRV-152 Screened
>RLGM wall by twelve %" bolts. Equipment screensEMERGENCY AIR (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 gTANK screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage judged adequate for RLGM byinspection based on rugged configuration ofsupport.Tanks 1-TK-253-4,
-6, &-8 grouped togetherand anchored by four plates bolted to thewall with two 3/4" bolts in each plate. ThePRESSURIZER TRAIN tanks are 9" diameter and 56" tall. The air'A' PRESSURE RELIEF bottles are strapped to framing affixed to the204 1-TK-253-6 VLV NRV-153 Screened
>RLGM wall by twelve W" bolts. Equipment screensEMERGENCY AIR (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 gTANK screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage judged adequate for RLGM byinspection based on rugged configuration ofsupport.Tanks 1-TK-253-3,
-5, &-7 grouped togetherand anchored by four plates bolted to thewall with two 3/4" bolts in each plate. ThePRESSURIZER TRAIN tanks are 9" diameter and 56" tall. The air'B' PRESSURE RELIEF bottles are strapped to framing affixed to the205 1-TK-253-7 VLV NRV-152 Screened
>RLGM wall by twelve %" bolts. Equipment screensEMERGENCY AIR (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 gTANK screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage judged adequate for RLGM byinspection based on rugged configuration ofsupport.Tanks 1-TK-253-4,
-6, &-8 grouped togetherand anchored by four plates bolted to thePRESSURIZER TRAIN wall with two 3/4" bolts in each plate. The'A' PRESSURE RELIEF tanks are 9" diameter and 56" tall. The air206 1-TK-253-8 VLV NRV-153 Screened
>RLGM bottles are strapped to framing affixed to theEMERGENCY AIR wall by twelve W" bolts. Equipment screensTANK (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 gscreening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage judged adequate for RLGM byinspection based on rugged configuration of SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 113 of 151CNP HCLPFUnit 1 FailureEnit ID DESCRIPTION Mode (compared NotesESEL Mode t LMItem # to RLGM)support.Rust was found on the strap supports.
AHCLPF calculation was performed for thedegraded condition.
The governing HCLPFCONDENSATE Anchorage 0.481g capacity according to S&A Calculation 207 1-TK-32 STORAGE TANK 13Q3208-CAL-005
-"High Confidence LowProbability of Failure (HCLPF) Calculations for Screened in ESEP Tanks" (Ref. 10.2) is0.481g.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Anchorage or the adjacentBlock Wall could not be screened for RLGMCOMPONENT based on scaling the existing calculations.
208 1-TK-37 COOLING WATER Anchorage 0.447g The governing HCLPF capacity according toSURGE TANK S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-005
-"HighConfidence Low Probability of Failure(HCLPF) Calculations for Screened in ESEPTanks" (Ref. 10.2) is for the tank and is0.447g due to the anchor bolts.This transformer was purchased to the IEEE344-75 standard.
Equipment screens (otherthan anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 gscreening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on600VAC BUS 11A Screened
>RLGM scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage 209 1-TR11A SUPPLY evaluation.
The governing HCLPF capacityTRANSFORMER for the block wall according to S&ACalculation 13Q3208-CAL-004
-"HCLPFCalculations for Screened in ESEPComponents" (Ref. 10.1) is 1.270g and didnot control the capacity.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRITRANSFORMER FOR Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forAFWX DIST PANEL RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46anchorage evaluation.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI211 1-TR-ELSC TRANSFORMER FOR Screened
>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forELSC DIST PANEL RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46anchorage evaluation.
SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 114 of 151CNP HCLPFUnit IFalrESEL ID DESCRIPTION Failure (compared NotesESEL Mode (o NotesItem # to RLGM)Igniter box is attached to horizontal unistruts bolted to vertical embedded unistruts.
Thehydrogen igniters are composed of theIgniter Box, glow plug, shield and otherassociated hardware.
The components CONTAINMENT within the igniter box are not fragile and areHYDROGEN IGNITION encompassed by that typically contained in212 1-UDISB-B1 UPPER VOLUME Screened
>RLGM other electrical boxes. Therefore, it isTRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG determined that the screening lanesASSEMBLY
#B1 contained in EPRI NP-6041-SL areapplicable to this equipment.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8gto 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL. Anchorage screened for RLGM basedon scaling existing anchorage evaluation.
CONTAINMENT Igniter box is bolted to horizontal unistruts HYDROGEN IGNITION bolted to an embedded vertical unistrut on213 B10 UPPER VOLUME the left and a 3/8" expansion anchor on theTRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG right. See notes for 1-UDISB-B1.
ASSEMBLY
#B10CONTAINMENT Igniter box is bolted to horizontal unistruts HYDROGEN IGNITION bolted to an embedded vertical unistrut on214 B11 UPPER VOLUME the left and a 3/8" expansion anchor on theTRAIN'B'GLOW PLUG right. See notes for 1-UDISB-B1.
ASSEMBLY
#B131CONTAINMENT Igniter box is bolted to horizontal unistruts HYDROGEN IGNITION bolted to an embedded vertical unistrut on215 B12 UPPER VOLUME the left and a 3/8" expansion anchor on theTRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG right. See notes for 1-UDISB-B1.
ASSEMBLY
#B12Igniter box is bolted to two vertical unistruts which are U-bolted to the top and bottomhandrail of the catwalk.
The hydrogenigniters are composed of the Igniter Box,CONTAINMENT glow plug, shield and other associated HYDROGEN IGNITION hardware.
The igniters attached to the216 1-UDISB-UPPER VOLUME Screened
>RLGM catwalk.
The governing HCLPF capacity forB13 TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG the catwalk according to S&A Calculation ASSEMBLY
#B13 13Q3208-CAL-006
-"High Confidence LowProbability of Failure (HCLPF) Calculations for Containment Catwalk and AttachedHydrogen Glow Plugs"" (Ref. 10.3) is 0.86gand did not control capacity.
1-UDISB-CONTAINMENT Screened
>RLGM Igniter box is bolted to two vertical unistrutB14 HYDROGEN IGNITION that are U-bolted to the top and bottom SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 115 of 151CNP HCLPFUnit I Failure c pESEL ID DESCRIPTION e (compared NotesItem # to RLGM)UPPER VOLUME handrail of the catwalk.
The governing TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG HCLPF capacity for the catwalk according toASSEMBLY
#B14 S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-006
-"HighConfidence Low Probability of Failure(HCLPF) Calculations for Containment Catwalk and Attached Hydrogen GlowPlugs"" (Ref. 10.3) is 0.86g and did notcontrol capacity.
Igniter box is bolted to two vertical unistruts which are U-bolted to the top and bottomhandrail of the catwalk.
The governing CONTAINMENT HCLPF capacity for the catwalk according to1-UDISB-HYDROGEN IGNITION Screened
>RLGM S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-006
-"High218 B15 UPPER VOLUME Confidence Low Probability of FailureTRAIN'B' GLOW PLUG (HCLPF) Calculations for Containment ASSEMBLY
#B15 Catwalk and Attached Hydrogen GlowPlugs"" (Ref. 10.3) is 0.86g and did notcontrol capacity.
Igniter box is bolted to two vertical unistruts which are U-bolted to the top and bottomhandrail of the catwalk.
The governing CONTAINMENT HCLPF capacity for the catwalk according to1-UDISB-HYDROGEN IGNITION Screened
>RLGM S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-006
-"High219 B16 UPPER VOLUME Confidence Low Probability of FailureTRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG (HCLPF) Calculations for Containment ASSEMBLY
#B16 Catwalk and Attached Hydrogen GlowPlugs"" (Ref. 10.3) is 0.86g and did notcontrol capacity.
Igniter box is bolted to two vertical unistruts which are U-bolted to the top and bottomhandrail of the catwalk.
The governing CONTAINMENT HCLPF capacity for the catwalk according to1-UDISB-HYDROGEN IGNITION Screened
>RLGM S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-006
-"High220 B17 UPPER VOLUME Confidence Low Probability of FailureTRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG (HCLPF) Calculations for Containment ASSEMBLY
#B17 Catwalk and Attached Hydrogen GlowPlugs" (Ref. 10.3) is 0.86g and did notcontrol capacity.
CONTAINMENT Igniter box is bolted to two vertical unistruts 1-UDISB-HYDROGEN IGNITION Screened
>RLGM which are U-bolted to the top and bottom221 1U UPPER VOLUME handrail of the catwalk.
See notes for 1-TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG UDISB-B13 for screening.
The governing ASSEMBLY
#B18 HCLPF capacity for the catwalk according to SA3Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-APT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 116 of 151CNPCNP HCLPFUnit 1 FailureESEL ID DESCRIPTION Mode (compared NotesItem # to RLGM)S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-006
-"HighConfidence Low Probability of Failure(HCLPF) Calculations for Containment Catwalk and Attached Hydrogen GlowPlugs" (Ref. 10.3) is 0.86g and did notcontrol capacity.
CONTAINMENT Igniter box is attached to horizontal unistruts HYDROGEN IGNITION bolted to vertical embedded unistruts.
See222 1-UDISB-B2 UPPER VOLUME Screened
>RLGM notes for 1-UDISB-B1 for screening.
TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B2CONTAINMENT Igniter box is attached to horizontal unistruts HYDROGEN IGNITION bolted to vertical embedded unistruts.
See223 1-UDISB-B3 UPPER VOLUME Screened
>RLGM notes for 1-UDISB-B1 for screening.
TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B3CONTAINMENT Igniter box is attached to horizontal unistruts HYDROGEN IGNITION bolted to vertical embedded unistruts.
See224 1-UDISB-B4 UPPER VOLUME Screened
>RLGM notes for 1-UDISB-B1 for screening.
TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B4CONTAINMENT Igniter box is attached to horizontal unistruts HYDROGEN IGNITION bolted to vertical embedded unistruts.
See225 1-UDISB-B5 UPPER VOLUME Screened
>RLGM notes for 1-UDISB-B1 for screening.
TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B5CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN IGNITION Igniter box is attached to horizontal unistruts 226 1-UDISB-B6 UPPER VOLUME Screened
>RLGM bolted to vertical embedded unistruts.
SeeTRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG notes for 1-UDISB-B1 for screening.
ASSEMBLY
#B6CONTAINMENT Igniter box is attached to horizontal unistruts HYDROGEN IGNITION bolted to vertical embedded unistruts.
See227 1-UDISB-B7 UPPER VOLUME Screened
>RLGM notes for 1-UDISB-B1 for screening.
TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B7CONTAINMENT Igniter box is bolted to horizontal unistruts HYDROGEN IGNITION bolted to an embedded vertical unistrut on228 1-UDISB-B8 UPPER VOLUME Screened
>RLGM the left and a 3/8" expansion anchor on theTRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG right. See notes for 1-UDISB-B1 forASSEMBLY
#B8 screening.
SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 117 of 151CNP HCLPFUnit 1 FailureEnEt ID DESCRIPTION Mode (compared NotesESEL Mode t LMItem # to RLGM)CONTAINMENT Igniter box is bolted to horizontal unistruts HYDROGEN IGNITION bolted to an embedded vertical unistrut on229 1-UDISB-B9 UPPER VOLUME Screened
>RLGM the left and a 3/8" expansion anchor on theTRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG right. See notes for 1-UDISB-B1 forASSEMBLY
#B9 screening.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRILOWER CONTAINMENT NP-6041-SL.
The governing HCLPF1 -VR- TRAIN B DISTRIBUTED Screened
>RLGM capacity for the anchorage according to S&A230 LDISB-4 IGNITION SYSTEM Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-004-
"HCLPFVOLTAGE REGULATOR Calculations for Screened in ESEPComponents" (Ref. 10.1) is 0.760g and didnot control the capacity.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Anchorage could not bescreened for RLGM based on scaling ofUPPER CONTAINMENT existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.
1-VR- TRAIN B DISTRIBUTED Screened
>RLGM The governing HCLPF capacity for theUDISB-3 IGNITION SYSTEM anchorage according to S&A Calculation VOLTAGE REGULATOR 13Q3208-CAL-004-
"HCLPF Calculations for Screened in ESEP Components" (Ref.10.1) is 0.760g and did not control thecapacity.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the232 1-VS CONTROLAPANEL RLGM input based on similar panels withinthe control room yielding significant seismiccapacity margins.WEST CONTAINMENT SPRAY HEAT This valve falls within the Earthquake EXCHANGER 1-HE- Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-233 1-WMO-715 18W ESSENTIAL Screened
>RLGM SL. Therefore, this valve screens for theSERVICE WATER 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-INLET SHUTOFF 6041-SL.VALVEESSENTIAL SERVICE This valve falls outside the Earthquake WATER TO TURBINE Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-234 1-WMO-753 DRIVENAUXILIARY Screened
>RLGM SL. However, this valve screens for the 0.8gFEED PUMP PP-4 to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL SHUTOFF VALVE based on analysis performed to 3g input.
SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 118 of 151CNP HCLPFUnit I FailureESEL ID DESCRIPTION Mode (compared NotesItem # to RLGM)This valve falls within the Earthquake WEST ESW PP PP-7W Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-235 1-WRV-762 DISCH STN EAST Screened
>RLGM SL. Therefore, this valve screens for theBASKET BAN OUT S/O 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-VALVE 6041-SL.This valve falls within the Earthquake W ESW PUMP PP-7W Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-DISCH STN EAST Screened
>RLGM SL. Therefore, this valve screens for theBASKET B/W INLET 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-> 6041-SL.This valve falls within the Earthquake W ESW PUMP PP-7W Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-DISCH STN WEST Screened
>RLGM SL. Therefore, this valve screens for theBASKET BAN OUTLET 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-> 6041-SL.This valve falls within the Earthquake Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-W ESW PUMP PP-7W SL. Therefore, this valve screens for theDISCH STN WEST Screened
>RLGM 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-238 1-WRV-777 6041-SL.
There is sufficient clearance BASKET BAN INLET> between the valve operator and thewalkway.
Pipe line well supported and not acredible damaging interaction.
Small valve bolted into a small rack.Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PRESSURE Screened
>RLGM for the 0:8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI239 1-XRV-152 REGULATING VALVE NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage judged to beadequate for RLGM by inspection based onlight rack with rugged anchorage.
Small valve bolted into a small rack.Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PRESSURE Screened
>RLGM for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI240 1-XRV-153 REGULATING VALVE NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage judged to beadequate for RLGM by inspection based onlight rack with rugged anchorage.
POAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic1303208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 119 of 151Attachment D -CNP Unit 2 ESEP HCLPF Values and Failure ModeTabulation SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 120 of 151CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF NotesUnit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #2 2-152- CONTAINMENT Screened
>RLGM Small panel dimensions of 8" wide, 4" deep,LDISB HYDROGEN IGNITION and 14" tall. Equipment mounted to the wallLOWER VOLUME using two unistruts anchored with four 1/2"TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG expansion bolts. Unistrut anchors areASSEMBLIES BACKUP spaced at 46" horizontally and 9" vertically.
SUPPLY BREAKER Unistrut anchorage shared by 2-152-UDISB.
Screened based on the light panel withrugged anchorage.
3 2-152- CONTAINMENT Screened
>RLGM Small panel dimensions of 8" wide, 4" deep,UDISB HYDROGEN IGNITION and 14" tall. Equipment mounted to the wallUPPER VOLUME TRAIN using two unistruts anchored with four 1/2"'B' GLOW PLUG expansion bolts. Unistrut anchors areASSEMBLIES BACKUP spaced at 46" horizontally and 9" vertically.
SUPPLY BREAKER Unistrut anchorage shared by 2-152-LDISB.
Screened based on the light panel withrugged anchorage.
4 2-21A 600V BUS 21A Screened
>RLGM Meets EPRI NP-6041-SL Table 2.4 caveats.SWITCHGEAR Anchorage screened for RLGM based onscaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the switchgear.
5 2-21B 600V BUS 21B Screened
>RLGM Meets EPRI NP-6041-SL Table 2.4 caveats.SWITCHGEAR Anchorage screened for RLGM based onscaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the switchgear.
6 2-21C 600V BUS 21C Screened
>RLGM Meets EPRI NP-6041-SL Table 2.4 caveats.SWITCHGEAR Anchorage screened for RLGM based onscaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the switchgear.
7 2-21D 600V BUS 21D Screened
>RLGM Meets EPRI NP-6041-SL Table 2.4 caveats.SWITCHGEAR Anchorage screened for RLGM based onscaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the switchgear.
8 2-2A 4KV BUS 2A Screened
>RLGM Meets EPRI NP-6041-SL Table 2.4 caveats.SWITCHGEAR Anchorage screened for RLGM based onscaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for a similar switchgear.
9 2 CNTMT HYDROGEN Screened
>RLGM Small panel dimensions of 9" wide, 20" tall,LDISB IGNITION LOWER and 6" deep. Equipment mounted on twoVOLUMN TRAIN 'B' horizontal running unistruts spaced at 19".GLOW PLUG Unistrut anchors are 1/2" expansion boltsASSEMBLIES STARTER spaced at 41". Unistruts are shared by 2-52-COMBO-LDISB CKT UDISB. Screened based on the light panel POExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 121 of 151CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF NotesUnit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #BRK with rugged anchorage.
10 2 CNTMT HYDROGEN Screened
>RLGM Small panel dimensions of 9" wide, 20" tall,UDISB IGNITION UPPER and 6" deep. Equipment mounted on twoVOLUME TRAIN 'B' horizontal running unistruts spaced at 19".GLOW PLUG Unistrut anchors are 1/2" expansion boltsASSEMBLIES STARTER spaced at 41". Unistruts are shared by 2-52-COMBO-UDISB CKT LDISB. Screened based on the light panelBRK with rugged anchorage.
11 2-88X- CNTMT HYDROGEN Screened
>RLGM Small panel dimensions of 9" wide, 20" tall,LDISB IGNITION LOWER and 6" deep. Equipment mounted on twoVOLUME TRAIN 'B' horizontal running unistruts spaced at 19".GLOW PLUG Unistrut anchors are 1/2" expansion boltsASSEMBLIES STARTER spaced at 41" plus an additional two 3/8"COMBO-LDISB STAR bolts located 29". Screened based on theCNTR light panel with rugged anchorage.
12 2-88X- CNTMT HYDROGEN Screened
>RLGM Small panel dimensions of 9" wide, 20" tall,UDISB IGNITION UPPER and 6" deep. Equipment mounted on twoVOLUME TRAIN 'B' horizontal running unistruts spaced at 19".GLOW PLUG Unistrut anchors are 1/2" expansion boltsASSEMBLIES STARTER spaced at 41" plus an additional two 3/8"COMBO-UDISB bolts located 29". Screened based on theCONTACTOR light panel with rugged anchorage.
13 2 PLANT BATTERY BATT- Screened
>RLGM Panel dimensions of 48"x24"xl0".
ABBC AB DISCONNECT Equipment is bolted to two horizontal SWITCH unistruts, which are bolted to the wall. Panelmeets all IEEE 344-75 testing requirements.
The testing TRS greatly exceeds the RRS atthe floor level. Equipment screens for the0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage acceptable for RLGMbased on similar panels had very highcalculated margins for the Design BasisEarthquake.
14 2 PLANT BATTERY BATT- Screened
>RLGM Panel dimensions of 48"x24"x10".
CDBC CD DISCONNECT Equipment is bolted to two horizontal SWITCH unistruts, which are bolted to the wall. Panelmeets all IEEE 344-75 testing requirements.
The testing TRS greatly exceeds the RRS atthe floor level. Equipment screens for the0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage acceptable for RLGMbased on similar panels had very highcalculated margins for the Design BasisEarthquake.
15 2-AB-A 600VAC MOTOR Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CONTROL CENTER AB- for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI FSalExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 122 of 151CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF NotesUnit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #A NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forRLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46anchorage evaluation for the MCC.16 2-AB-D 600VAC MOTOR Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CONTROL CENTER AB- for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRID NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forRLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46anchorage evaluation for the MCC.17 2-ABD-13 600VAC MOTOR Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CONTROL CENTER for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRIABD-B NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forRLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46anchorage evaluation for the MCC.18 2-ABD-D 600VAC MOTOR Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CONTROL CENTER for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRIABD-D NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forRLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46anchorage evaluation for the MCC.19 2-ABV-A 600VAC VALVE Seismic 0.578g Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CONTROL CENTER Interaction for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRIABV-A NP-6041-SL.
Gaps documented on theAnchor Inspection Data Sheet between theMCC assembly and the grout pad werejudged acceptable.
Anchorage screened forRLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46anchorage evaluation for the MCC. Thepotentially governing Block Wall interaction could not be screened for RLGM based onscaling of existing design basis calculation.
The governing HCLPF capacity for the blockwall according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-004 -"HCLPF Calculations forScreened in ESEP Components" (Ref. 10.1)is 0.578g.20 2-AFWX 120/208VAC AUXILIARY Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
FEEDWATER for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRIDISTRIBUTION PANEL NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forRLGM based on screening calculation to theRLGM.21 2-AM-A 600VAC MOTOR Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CONTROL CENTER for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRIAM-A NP-6041-SL.
An additional four anchorbolts have been added to supplement original anchorage.
Anchorage screened forRLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 PaRe 123 of 151CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF NotesUnit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #anchorage evaluation for the MCC.22 2-AZV-A 600VAC VALVE Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CONTROL CENTER for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRIAZV-A NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forRLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46anchorage evaluation for the MCC.23 2-BA BORIC ACID Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CHARGING AND for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRILETDOWN CONTROL NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forPANEL RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46anchorage evaluation for the Control Board.24 2-BATT- PLANT BATTERY AB Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
AB for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forRLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46anchorage evaluation for the Battery Rack.25 2-BATT- PLANT BATTERY BATT- Screened
>RLGM Small panel bolted directly to wall using aAB-SH AB AMMETER SHUNT unistrut.
Box dimensions of48.5"x40.5"x8.5".
No interactions identified.
Also contains 2-BC-AB-SH.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8gto 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL. Anchorage screens to the RLGM inputbased on similar panels yielding significant seismic capacity margins.26 2-BATT- PLANT BATTERY CD Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CD for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forRLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46anchorage evaluation for the Battery Rack.27 2-BATT- PLANT BATTERY BATT- Screened
>RLGM Small panel bolted directly to wall using aCD-SH CD AMMETER SHUNT unistrut.
Box dimensions of 49"x40"x8.5".
No interactions identified.
Also contains 2-BC-CD-SH.
Equipment screens (other thananchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the RLGM input based on similarpanels yielding significant seismic capacitymargins.28 2-BC-AB2 PLANT BATTERY BATT- Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
AB CHARGER #2 for the 0'8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forRLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the BatteryCharger.
0Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 124 of 151CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF NotesUnit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #29 2-BC-CD1 PLANT BATTERY BATT- Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CD BATTERY for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRICHARGER #1 NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forRLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the BatteryCharger.30 2-BCTC- PLANT BATTERY Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
AB CHARGERS BC-AB1 for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRIAND BC-AB2 NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forTRANSFER PANEL RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46anchorage evaluation for the Panel.31 2-BCTC- PLANT BATTERY Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CD CHARGERS BC-CD1 for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRIAND BC-CD2 NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forTRANSFER PANEL RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46anchorage evaluation for the Panel.32 2-BLI-110 STEAM GENERATOR Screened
>RLGM Equipment bolted directly to wall on smallOME-3-1 WIDE RANGE bracket using four 1/2" bolts spaced at 6".LEVEL INDICATOR Supported on 2x2 tube steel cantilevered TRANSMITTER out from the wall, equipment support 3" fromthe wall.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Anchorage judged to beadequate for RLGM by inspection based onlight rack with rugged anchorage.
33 2-BLI-120 STEAM GENERATOR Screened
>RLGM Floor mounted rack seismically qualified toOME-3-2 WIDE RANGE IEEE-344-75.
LEVEL INDICATOR TRANSMITTER Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Anchorage judged to beadequate for RLGM by inspection based onlight rack with rugged anchorage.
34 2-BLI-130 STEAM GENERATOR Screened
>RLGM Mounted to wall using four 1/2" bolts spacedOME-3-3 WIDE RANGE at 6". Cantilevered out from wallLEVEL INDICATOR approximately 6".TRANSMITTER Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 PaRe 125 of 151CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF NotesUnit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage judged to beadequate for RLGM by inspection based onlight rack with rugged anchorage.
35 2-BLI-140 STEAM GENERATOR Screened
>RLGM Equipment bolted directly to wall using fourOME-3-4 WIDE RANGE 1/2" bolts spaced at 6". Supported on 2x2LEVEL INDICATOR tube steel cantilevered out from the wall,TRANSMITTER equipment supported 4.5" from the wall.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Anchorage judged to beadequate for RLGM by inspection based onlight rack with rugged anchorage.
36 2-CCV-AB 250VDC TRAIN 'B' Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CRITICAL SOLENOID for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRIVALVES DISTRIBUTION NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forPANEL RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the panel.37 2-CCV-CD 250VDC TRAIN 'A' Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CRITICAL SOLENOID for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRIVALVES DISTRIBUTION NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forPANEL RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the panel.38 2-CCW COMPONENT Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
COOLING WATER for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRICONTROL PANEL NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forRLGM based on similar panels within thecontrol room yielding significant seismiccapacity margins.39 2-CG1-14 REACTOR Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRICONTROL GROUP #1 NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forCABINET #14 RLGM based on similar cabinets yieldingsignificant seismic capacity margins.40 2-CG1-15 REACTOR Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRICONTROL GROUP #1 NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forCABINET #15 RLGM based on similar cabinets yieldingsignificant seismic capacity margins.41 2-CG2-17 REACTOR Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRICONTROL GROUP #2 NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forCABINET #17 RLGM based on similar cabinets yieldingsignificant seismic capacity margins.
SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 126 of 151CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF NotesUnit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #42 2-CG2-19 REACTOR Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRICONTROL GROUP #2 NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forCABINET #19 RLGM based on similar cabinets yieldingsignificant seismic capacity margins.43 2-CG3-20 REACTOR Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRICONTROL GROUP #3 NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forCABINET #20 RLGM based on similar cabinets yieldingsignificant seismic capacity margins.44 2-CG3-21 REACTOR Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRICONTROL GROUP #3 NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forCABINET #21 RLGM based on similar cabinets yieldingsignificant seismic capacity margins.45 2-CG4-22 REACTOR Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRICONTROL GROUP #4 NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forCABINET #22 RLGM based on similar cabinets yieldingsignificant seismic capacity margins.46 2-CG4-23 REACTOR Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRICONTROL GROUP #4 NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forCABINET #23 RLGM based on similar cabinets yieldingsignificant seismic capacity margins.47 2-CLI-1 14 CONDENSATE Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
STORAGE TANK TK-32 for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRILEVEL NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage judged to beINDICATORTRANSMITT adequate for RLGM by inspection based onER light rack with rugged anchorage.
48 2-CMO- COMPONENT Screened
>RLGM This valve falls within the Earthquake 413 COOLING WATER Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-PUMPS SUCTION NP-SL. Therefore, this valve screens for theCROSSTIE TRAIN 'B' 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-SHUTOFF VALVE 6041-SL.49 2-CMO- COMPONENT Screened
>RLGM This valve falls within the Earthquake 414 COOLING WATER Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-PUMPS DISCHARGE SL. Therefore, this valve screens for theCROSSTIE TRAIN 'B' 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-SHUTOFF VALVE 6041-SL.50 2-CMO- COMPONENT Screened
>RLGM This valve falls within the Earthquake 416 COOLING WATER TO Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-MISCELLANEOUS SL. Therefore, this valve screens for theSERVICE TRAIN 'B' 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-SHUTOFF VALVE 6041-SL.
SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 127 of 151CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF NotesUnit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #51 2-CMO- WEST RESIDUAL HEAT Screened
>RLGM This valve falls within the Earthquake 429 REMOVAL HEAT Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-EXCHANGER SL. Therefore, this valve screens for theCOMPONENT 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-COOLING WATER 6041-SL.OUTLET SHUTOFFVALVE52 2-CP CONDENSATE PUMP Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CONTROL PANEL for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forRLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46anchorage evaluation for the Panel.53 2-CRID-1 120VAC CONTROL Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
ROOM INSTRUMENT for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRIDISTRIBUTION NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forCHANNEL I RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46DISTRIBUTION PANEL anchorage evaluation for the Panel.54 2-CRID 120VAC CONTROL Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
INV ROOM for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRIINSTRUMENTATION NP-6041-SL.
The governing HCLPFDISTRIBUTION capacity according to S&A Calculation SYSTEM CHANNEL 1 13Q3208-CAL-004
-"HCLPF Calculations INVERTER for Screened in ESEP Components" (Ref.10.1) is 0.839g and therefore did not controlthe capacity.
55 2-CRID-2 120VAC CONTROL Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
ROOM INSTRUMENT for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRIDISTRIBUTION NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forCHANNEL II RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46DISTRIBUTION PANEL anchorage evaluation for the Panel.56 2-CRID 120VAC CONTROL Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
INV ROOM for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRIINSTRUMENTATION NP-6041-SL.
The governing HCLPFDISTRIBUTION capacity according to S&A Calculation SYSTEM CHANNEL 2 13Q3208-CAL-004
-"HCLPF Calculations INVERTER for Screened in ESEP Components" (Ref.10.1) is 0.839g and therefore did not controlthe capacity.
57 2-CRID-3 120VAC CONTROL Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
ROOM INSTRUMENT for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRIDISTRIBUTION NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forCHANNEL Ill RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46DISTRIBUTION PANEL anchorage evaluation for the Panel.58 2-CRID 120VAC CONTROL Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
INV ROOM for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRIINSTRUMENTATION NP-6041-SL.
The governing HCLPF SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 PaRe 128 of 151CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF NotesUnit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #DISTRIBUTION capacity according to S&A Calculation SYSTEM CHANNEL 3 13Q3208-CAL-004
-"HCLPF Calculations INVERTER for Screened in ESEP Components" (Ref.10.1) is 0.839g and therefore did not controlthe capacity.
59 2-CRID-4 120VAC CONTROL Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
ROOM INSTRUMENT for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRIDISTRIBUTION NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forCHANNEL IV RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46DISTRIBUTION PANEL anchorage evaluation for the Panel.59 2-CRID 120VAC CONTROL Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
INV ROOM for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRIINSTRUMENTATION NP-6041-SL.
The governing HCLPFDISTRIBUTION capacity according to S&A Calculation SYSTEM CHANNEL 4 13Q3208-CAL-004
-"HCLPF Calculations INVERTER for Screened in ESEP Components" (Ref.10.1) is 0.839g and therefore did not controlthe capacity.
61 2-DTU DELTA 'T' AND UNIT Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CONTROL PANEL for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forRLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46anchorage evaluation for the Panel.62 2-ELSC EMERGENCY LOCAL Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
INDICATION for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRISHUTDOWN AND NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forCOOLDOWN RLGM based on similar panels yieldingDISTRIBUTION PANEL significant seismic capacity margins.63 2-EZC-B 600VAC MOTOR Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CONTROL CENTER for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRIEZC-B NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forRLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46anchorage evaluation for the MCC.64 2-EZC-C 600VAC MOTOR Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CONTROL CENTER for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRIEZC-C NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forRLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46anchorage evaluation for the MCC.65 2-EZC-D 600VAC MOTOR Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CONTROL CENTER for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRIEZC-D NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forRLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46anchorage evaluation for the MCC.66 2-FFI-210 AUXILIARY Screened
>RLGM Bolted directly to wall with four 3/8" bolts.FEEDWATER TO Equipment supported on 2" pipe coming outSTEAM GENERATOR 7" from the wall and approximately 10" up.
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 PaRe 129 of 151CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF NotesUnit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #OME-3-1 FLOW There is a 5" spacing between the twoINDICATOR bottom bolts and between the left-most TRANSMITTER bolts. The top right-most bolt is spaced 10.5"from the top left-most bolt and 5" above thebottom row of bolts.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Anchorage judged to beadequate for RLGM by inspection based onlight rack with rugged anchorage.
67 2-FFI-220 AUX FEEDWATER TO Screened
>RLGM Supported by 2" pipe, extending 8" out andSG OME-3-2 FLOW 24" left. Anchorage mounted on a U-shapedINDICATOR pipe frame, which is then welded to steelTRANSMITTER column (box structure) on both sides.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Anchorage judged to beadequate for RLGM by inspection based onlight rack with rugged anchorage.
68 2-FFI-230 AUXILIARY Screened
>RLGM Supported by 2" pipe, extending 8" out andFEEDWATER TO 24" left. Anchorage mounted on a U-shapedSTEAM GENERATOR pipe frame, which is then welded to steelOME-3-3 FLOW column (box structure) on both sides.INDICATOR TRANSMITTER Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Anchorage judged to beadequate for RLGM by inspection based onlight rack with rugged anchorage.
69 2-FFI-240 AUXILIARY Screened
>RLGM Equipment mounted to the wall with fourFEEDWATER TO 3/8" bolts. Supported on 2" pipe, comingSTEAM GENERATOR 7.5" out from the wall and 7" up (8" fromOME-3-4 FLOW equipment to the top of vertical pipe).INDICATOR Equipment bolted to pipe with a 4" channel.TRANSMITTER Minimum spacing of bolts measured to be5". Anchorage consists of four 3/8" bolts.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Anchorage judged to beadequate for RLGM by inspection based onlight rack with rugged anchorage.
70 2-FI FIXED INCORE Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CONTROL PANEL for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 130 of 151CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF NotesUnit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forRLGM based on similar panels yieldingsignificant seismic capacity margins.71 2-FICT-A REACTOR CORE Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
THERMOCOUPLE for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRITRAIN 'A' NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forTRANSMITTER RLGM based on screening calculation to theCABINET RLGM.72 2-FLX FLUX CONTROL PANEL Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forRLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46anchorage evaluation for the Panel.77 2-HE-15W WEST COMPONENT Anchorage 0.547g Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
COOLING WATER for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRIHEAT EXCHANGER NP-6041-SL.
The block wall was far enoughaway to not be an interaction issue.Anchorage could not be screened for RLGMbased on scaling of existing USI A-46anchorage evaluation for the HeatExchanger.
Therefore, a HCLPF calculation was performed.
The governing HCLPFcapacity for the anchorage according to S&ACalculation 13Q3208-CAL-004
-"HCLPFCalculations for Screened in ESEPComponents" (Ref. 10.1) is 0.547g.78 2-HE-17W WEST RESIDUAL HEAT Screened
>RLGM Equipment is supported at the top withREMOVAL HEAT brackets in each of the 4 quadrants to resistEXCHANGER overturning loads. The bottom is supported by a heavy-duty steel gusset structure supported by two piers. There are two boltsin each pier. Based upon this inspection, theanchorage is adequate for the RLGMspectra.79 2-HSD2 UNIT 2 HOT Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
SHUTDOWN PANEL for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forRLGM based on similar panels yieldingsignificant seismic capacity margins.
Thegoverning HCLPF capacity for the block wallaccording to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-004 -"HCLPF Calculations forScreened in ESEP Components" (Ref. 10.1)is 2.682g and therefore did not control thecapacity.
SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 131 of 151CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF NotesUnit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #80 2-HV- CONTROL ROOM AIR Screened
>RLGM Chiller initially on vibration isolators, ACR-2 CONDITIONING SOUTH however later modified to be restrained in allLIQUID CHILLER directions to satisfy GIP outlier resolution.
Equipment screens for the 0.8g to 1.2 gscreening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened to a level greater thanthe RLGM by scaling the design basisanchorage calculation.
81 2-HV- CONTROL ROOM Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
ACRA-2 VENTILATION SOUTH. for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRIAIR CONDITIONING NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forUNIT RLGM based on similar air conditioning units yielding significant seismic capacitymargins.82 2-HV- OUTSIDE AIR TO Screened
>RLGM Damper included on HVAC duct work andACR-DA-2 CONTROL ROOM screens for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lanePRESSURIZATION/
in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Duct work screenedCLEANUP FILTER UNIT for RLGM based on existing analysis.
HV-ACRF VENTDAMPER #283 2-HV- CONTROL ROOM Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
ACRF PRESSURIZATION/
for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRICLEANUP FILTER UNIT NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forRLGM based on similar filter units yieldingsignificant seismic capacity margins.
Thegoverning HCLPF capacity for the block wallaccording to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-004 -"HCLPF Calculations forScreened in ESEP Components" (Ref. 10.1)is 1.215g and therefore, did not control thecapacity.
84 2-HV- CONTROL ROOM Screened
>RLGM The base frame is made of 4x4x3/8 angles,ACRF-2 PRESSURIZATION/
with a height of 21" to the top of the angleCLEANUP FILTER frame and an additional 30" to the center ofUNITVENT FAN #2 the fan unit. The governing HCLPF capacityfor the block wall according to S&ACalculation 13Q3208-CAL-004
-"HCLPFCalculations for Screened in ESEPComponents" (Ref. 10.1) is 1.215g.85 2-HV- CONTROL ROOM Screened
>RLGM Heater included on HVAC duct work andACR-H2 VENTILATION SOUTH screens for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening laneDUCT ELECTRIC in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Duct work screenedHEATER for RLGM based on existing analysis.
87 2-HV- AB BATTERY Screened
>RLGM Weight of fan is 360 lbs. Fan is hung fromSGRX-5 EQUIPMENT AREA ceiling in vertical alignment.
Fan anchored to SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 132 of 151CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF NotesUnit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #BATTERY ROOM the shim plate which is anchored to ceilingVENTILATION with sixteen 1/2" bolts into embedded angleEXHAUST FAN in ceiling.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forRLGM based on weight of fan compared torugged anchorage.
88 2-HV- CD BATTERY Screened
>RLGM Weight of fan is judged to be maximum ofSGRX-6 EQUIPMENT AREA 500 lbs. Fan is bolted to steel platform whichBATTERY ROOM is bolted to the wall on 2 sides andVENTILATION supported by an angle column at the otherEXHAUST FAN corner.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forRLGM based on weight of fan compared torugged anchorage.
90 2-1CM-129 REACTOR COOLANT Screened
>RLGM This valve falls within the Earthquake LOOP #2 HOT LEG TO Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-RESIDUAL HEAT SL. Therefore, this valve screens for theREMOVAL PUMPS 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-SUCTION 6041-SL.CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE91 2-ICM-251 BORON INJECTION Screened
>RLGM This valve falls outside the Earthquake TANK TRAIN 'B' Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-OUTLET SL. However, this valve screens for the 0.8gCONTAINMENT to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041ISOLATION VALVE based on analysis performed for a 3g input.93 2-IFI-51 BORON INJECTION TO Screened
>RLGM Anchorage consists of four bolts in aREACTOR COOLANT reinforced concrete wall. Two bolts on theLOOP #1 FLOW left are for an embedded unistrut and twoINDICATOR bolts on the right are 1/2" expansion anchors.TRANSMITTER Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forRLGM based on light rack with ruggedanchorage.
94 2-IFI-52 BORON INJECTION TO Screened
>RLGM Rack is light and anchored with four bolts.REACTOR COOLANT Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
LOOP #2 FLOW for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRIINDICATOR NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forTRANSMITTER RLGM based on light rack with rugged SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic1303208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 133 of 151CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF NotesUnit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #anchorage.
95 2-IFI-53 BORON INJECTION TO Screened
>RLGM Equipment mounted to wall using two boltsREACTOR COOLANT to embedded unistrut.
Equipment also U-LOOP #3 FLOW bolted to the 2" support pipe cantilevered upINDICATOR approximately 14". Equipment screensTRANSMITTER (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 gscreening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based onlight rack with rugged anchorage.
96 2-IFI-54 BORON INJECTION TO Screened
>RLGM Rack is light and anchored to the floor withREACTOR COOLANT four bolts. Equipment screens (other thanLOOP #4 FLOW anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening INDICATOR lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage TRANSMITTER screened for RLGM based on light rack withrugged anchorage.
98 2-IMO-256 BORON INJECTION Screened
>RLGM This valve falls outside the Earthquake TANK TRAIN 'B' INLET Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-SHUTOFF VALVE SL. However, this valve screens for the 0.8gto 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL based on analysis performed for a 3g input.The Block Wall interaction was screened forRLGM based on scaling of existing designbasis calculation.
99 2-IMO-310 EAST RESIDUAL HEAT Seismic 0.435g This valve falls within the Earthquake REMOVAL PUMP PP- Interaction Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-35E SUCTION SL. Therefore, this valve screens for theSHUTOFF VALVE 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
The governing HCLPF capacityfor the block wall according to S&ACalculation 13Q3208-CAL-004
-"HCLPFCalculations for Screened in ESEPComponents" (Ref. 10.1) is 0.435g.100 2-IMO-324 WEST RHR HX 2-HE- Screened
>RLGM This valve falls within the Earthquake 17W DISCHARGE Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-CROSSTIE SHUTOFF SL. Therefore, this valve screens for theVALVE 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.110 2-LDISB-CONTAINMENT Screened
>RLGM The hydrogen igniters are composed of theB24 HYDROGEN IGNITION Igniter Box, glow plug, shield and otherLOWER VOLUME associated hardware.
All components of theTRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG igniter system were seismically mounted toASSEMBLY
#B24 prevent any interference with safety relatedequipment during and after a design basisseismic event. The components within theigniter box are not fragile and areencompassed by that typically contained in SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 134 of 151CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF NotesUnit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #other electrical boxes. Therefore, it isdetermined that the screening lanescontained in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8gto 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL. Anchorage screened for RLGM basedon scaling existing anchorage evaluation.
111 2-LDISB-CONTAINMENT Screened
>RLGM Equipment bolted directly to Column 8 ofB25 HYDROGEN IGNITION Quad 4. See notes for 2-LDISB-B24.
LOWER VOLUME Assembly screened for 0.8g to 1.2gTRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL andASSEMBLY
#B25 anchorage loadings for RLGM.112 2-LDISB-CONTAINMENT Screened
>RLGM See notes for 2-LDISB-B24.
AssemblyB26 HYDROGEN IGNITION screened for 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane inLOWER VOLUME EPRI NP-6041-SL and anchorage loadingsTRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG for RLGM.ASSEMBLY
#B26113 2-LDISB-CONTAINMENT Screened
>RLGM Box bolted to unistruts attached directly toB27 HYDROGEN IGNITION column. See notes for 2-LDISB-B24.
LOWER VOLUME Assembly screened for 0.8g to 1.2gTRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL andASSEMBLY
#B27 anchorage loadings for RLGM.115 2-LDISB-CONTAINMENT Screened
>RLGM Equipment bolted to unistrut, which isB35 HYDROGEN IGNITION welded directly to Column 11. See notes forLOWER VOLUME 2-LDISB-B24.
Assembly screened for 0.8gTRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL ASSEMBLY
#B35 and anchorage loadings for RLGM.118 2-LSI-1 STEAM GENERATORS Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
#1 AND #4 LOCAL for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRISHUTDOWN STATION NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forRLGM based on similar equipment yieldingsignificant seismic capacity margins.119 2-LSI-2 STEAM GENERATORS Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
#2 AND #3 LOCAL for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRISHUTDOWN STATION NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forRLGM based on similar equipment yieldingsignificant seismic capacity margins.120 2-LSI-3 REACTOR COOLANT Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
SYSTEM CHARGING for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRIAND LETDOWN LOCAL NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forSHUTDOWN STATION RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46anchorage evaluation.
121 2-MCAB 250VDC DISTRIBUTION Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PANEL MCAB for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forRLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 135 of 151CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF NotesUnit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #anchorage evaluation for the panel.122 2-MCCD 250VDC DISTRIBUTION Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
POWER PANEL for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forRLGM based on similar panels yieldingsignificant seismic capacity margins.123 2-MDAB 250VDC DISTRIBUTION Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PANEL MDAB for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forRLGM based on similar panels yieldingsignificant seismic capacity margins.124 2-MDCD 250VDC DISTRIBUTION Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PANEL MDCD for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forRLGM based on similar panels yieldingsignificant seismic capacity margins.125 2-MPP- STEAM GENERATOR Screened
>RLGM Equipment is mounted directly to the wall210 OME-3-1 CHANNEL I using two 1/2" bolts, spaced at 4.5".STEAM PRESSURE Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
TRANSMITTER for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forRLGM based on light bracket with relatively rugged anchorage.
126 2-MPP- STEAM GENERATOR Screened
>RLGM Equipment is cantilevered from the wall by220 OME-3-2 CHANNEL I two 1/2" bolts, and surrounded by anSTEAM PRESSURE enclosure.
Equipment screens (other thanTRANSMITTER anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on light bracketwith relatively rugged anchorage.
127 2-MPP- STEAM GENERATOR Screened
>RLGM Equipment is supported by two 3/8" bolts.230 OME-3-3 CHANNEL I Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
STEAM PRESSURE for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRITRANSMITTER NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forRLGM based on light bracket with relatively rugged anchorage.
128 2-MPP- STEAM GENERATOR Screened
>RLGM Equipment bolted directly to wall using two240 OME-3-4 CHANNEL I 1/2" bolts spaced at 4.5". Equipment STEAM PRESSURE screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8gTRANSMITTER to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL. Anchorage screened for RLGM basedon light bracket with relatively ruggedanchorage.
129 2-MRV- STEAM GENERATOR Screened
>RLGM This valve falls within the Earthquake 213 OME-3-1 POWER Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-OPERATED RELIEF SL. Therefore, this valve screens for the Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 136 of 151CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF NotesUnit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #VALVE 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.130 2-MRV- STEAM GENERATOR Screened
>RLGM This valve falls outside the Earthquake 223 OME-3-2 POWER Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-OPERATED SL. However, this valve screens for the 0.8gRELIEFVALVE to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL based on analysis performed to 3g.131 2-MRV- STEAM GENERATOR Screened
>RLGM This valve falls outside the Earthquake 233 OME-3-3 POWER Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-OPERATED SL. However, this valve screens for the 0.8gRELIEFVALVE to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL based on analysis performed to 3g.132 2-MRV- STEAM GENERATOR Screened
>RLGM This valve falls within the Earthquake 243 OME-3-4 POWER Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-OPERATED RELIEF SL. Therefore, this valve screens for theVALVE 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.133 2-NIS-I NUCLEAR Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
INSTRUMENTATION for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRISYSTEM PROTECTION NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forCHANNEL I CONTROL RLGM based on similar panels yieldingPANEL significant seismic capacity margins.134 2-NLP- PRESSURIZER OME-4 Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage) 151 PROTECTION for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRICHANNEL I LEVEL NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forTRANSMITTER RLGM based on light rack with ruggedanchorage.
135 2-NPS- REACTOR VESSEL Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage) 110 TRAIN 'A' WIDE RANGE for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRIPRESSURE NP-6041 based on existing rack qualification TRANSMITTER for a similar transmitter.
The rack isseismically qualified to IEEE-344-75.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on asimilar transmitter yielding significant seismic capacity margins.139 2-NRI NUCLEAR Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
AMP INSTRUMENTATION for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRIWIDE RANGE NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forRADIATION AMPLIFIER RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46anchorage evaluation.
150 2-OME-33 TURBINE DRIVEN Screened
>RLGM Strainer supported on two 14" wide, 12"AUXILIARY FEED deep, and 18" tall concrete pedestals.
PUMP PP-4 SUCTION Equipment bolted to pedestals with four 3/4"STRAINER anchor bolts, one set of two bolts in eachpedestal, spaced at 6" apart. The piping iswell supported and the strainer is small SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 137 of 151CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF NotesUnit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #relative to the anchorage.
Therefore, thisequipment is screened for the RLGM.151 2-OME- WEST ESSENTIAL Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage) 34W SERVICE WATER for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRIPUMP PP-7W DISCH NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forSTN RLGM based on similar pumps yieldingsignificant seismic capacity margins.156 2-PP-10W WEST COMPONENT Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
COOLING WATER for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRIPUMP NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forRLGM based on anchor analysis performed to RLGM.157 2-PP-35W WEST RESIDUAL HEAT Seismic 0.428g Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
REMOVAL PUMP Interaction for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forRLGM based on similar filter units yieldingsignificant seismic capacity margins.
Thepotentially governing Block Wall interaction could not be screened for RLGM based onscaling of existing design basis calculation.
Therefore, a HCLPF calculation wasperformed.
The governing HCLPF capacityfor the block wall according to S&ACalculation 13Q3208-CAL-004
-"HCLPFCalculations for Screened in ESEPComponents" (Ref. 10.1) is 0.428g.158 2-PP-4 TURBINE DRIVEN Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
AUXILIARY FEED for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRIPUMP NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forRLGM based on anchor analysis performed to RLGM.159 2-PP-46-4 BORIC ACID STORAGE Seismic 0.227g The pump weighs 511 lbs. Equipment TANKS TRANSFER Interaction screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8gPUMP #4 to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL. Anchorage screened for RLGM basedon the small size of the pump and similarpumps yielding significant seismic capacitymargins.
The HCLPF is limited by seismicinteraction with the piping attached to theBoric Acid Tank. The governing HCLPFcapacity according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-005-
"High Confidence LowProbability of Failure (HCLPF) Calculations for Screened in ESEP Tanks" (Ref. 10.2) is0.227g that is less than the RLGM of0.387g.
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 138 of 151CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF NotesUnit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #160 2-PP-82S CONTROL ROOM AIR Screened
>RLGM The pump weighs 214 lbs. Equipment CONDITIONING SOUTH screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8gCHILL WATER to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-CIRCULATION PUMP SL. Anchorage screened for RLGM basedon the small size of the pump and similarpumps yielding significant seismic capacitymargins.161 2-PPA- UPPER CONTAINMENT Screened
>RLGM Rack is supported with 2" tube steel310 CHANNEL III WIDE anchored to the wall with four plates eachRANGE PRESSURE employing two 3/8" anchor bolts, and to theALARM TRANSMITTER floor with one plate employing four 3/8"anchor bolts. Equipment screens (otherthan anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 gscreening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based onrack with rugged anchorage.
162 2-PRZ PRESSURIZER Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CONTROL PANEL for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forRLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46anchorage evaluation for the Panel.163 2-QLA- SOUTH BORIC ACID Seismic 0.227g Equipment screens (other than anchorage) 430 STORAGE TANK TK- Interaction for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI12S LEVEL ALARM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forTRANSMITTER RLGM based on rack with ruggedanchorage.
The HCLPF is limited byseismic interaction with the piping attachedto the Boric Acid Tank. The governing HCLPF capacity according to S&ACalculation 13Q3208-CAL-005
-"HighConfidence Low Probability of Failure(HCLPF) Calculations for Screened in ESEPTanks" (Ref. 10.2) is 0.227g, that is lessthan the RLGM of 0.387g.164 2-QRV- AIR OPERATED VALVE Screened
>RLGM This valve falls within the Earthquake 200 TO ISOLATE BORON Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-INJECTION PATH SL. Therefore, this valve screens for the0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.165 2-QT-506 TURBINE DRIVEN Screened
>RLGM This valve falls within the Earthquake AUXILIARY FEED Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-PUMP PP-4 TRIP SL. Therefore, this valve screens for theANDTHROTTLE VALVE 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.166 2-QT-507 AUXILIARY FEED Screened
>RLGM This valve falls within the Earthquake PUMP TURBINE Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 139 of 151CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF NotesUnit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #GOVERNOR VALVE SL. Therefore, this valve screens for the0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.167 2-QTC- SOUTH BAST TK-12S Seismic 0.227g Equipment welded to one support leg of 2-430 TRAIN 'A' HTR TEMP Interaction TK-12S and supported on a 2" pipeCONTROLLER cantilevered off the tank leg 15" to the rightand 9" up. The support pipe is only weldedat the top of the connection located 28"above the top of the concrete pedestal.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forRLGM based on rugged configuration of thesupport.
The HCLPF is limited by seismicinteraction with the piping attached to theBoric Acid Tank. The governing HCLPFcapacity according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-005
-"High Confidence LowProbability of Failure (HCLPF) Calculations for Screened in ESEP Tanks" (Ref. 10.2) is0.227g that is less than the RLGM of0.387g.168 2-RHR RESIDUAL HEAT Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
REMOVAL CONTROL for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRIPANEL NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to theRLGM based on similar panels within thecontrol room yielding significant seismiccapacity margins.169 2-RPC-1-1 REACTOR Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRICHANNEL I CABINET NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the#1 RLGM based on similar cabinets yieldingsignificant seismic capacity margins.170 2-RPC-1-2 REACTOR Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRICHANNEL I CABINET NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the#2 RLGM based on similar cabinets yieldingsignificant seismic capacity margins.171 2-RPC-1-3 REACTOR Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRICHANNEL I CABINET NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the#3 RLGM based on similar cabinets yieldingsignificant seismic capacity margins.172 2-RPC-1-4 REACTOR Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRICHANNEL I CABINET NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 140 of 151CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF NotesUnit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item ##4 RLGM based on similar cabinets yieldingsignificant seismic capacity margins.173 2-RPC-2-5 REACTOR Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRICHANNEL II CABINET NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the#5 RLGM based on similar cabinets yieldingsignificant seismic capacity margins.174 2-RPC-2-6 REACTOR Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRICHANNEL II CABINET NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the#6 RLGM based on similar cabinets yieldingsignificant seismic capacity margins.175 2-RPC-2-7 REACTOR Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRICHANNEL II CABINET NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the#7 RLGM based on similar cabinets yieldingsignificant seismic capacity margins.176 2-RPC-2-8 REACTOR Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRICHANNEL II CABINET NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the#8 RLGM based on similar cabinets yieldingsignificant seismic capacity margins.177 2-RPC REACTOR Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage) 10 PROTECTION for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRICHANNEL Ill CABINET NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the#10 RLGM based on similar cabinets yieldingsignificant seismic capacity margins.178 2-RPC-3-9 REACTOR Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRICHANNEL III CABINET NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the#9 RLGM based on similar cabinets yieldingsignificant seismic capacity margins.179 2-RPC REACTOR Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage) 12 PROTECTION for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRICHANNEL IV CABINET NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the#12 RLGM based on similar cabinets yieldingsignificant seismic capacity margins.180 2-RPS-A REACTOR Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION AND for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRISAFEGUARD NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forACTUATION TRAIN 'A' RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46CABINET anchorage evaluation.
181 2-RPS-B REACTOR Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION AND for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRISAFEGUARD NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forACTUATION TRAIN 'B' RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 141 of 151CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF NotesUnit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #CABINET anchorage evaluation.
182 2-RPSX-A REACTOR Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION AND for the 0.89 to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRISAFEGUARD NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forACTUATION TRAIN 'A' RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46AUXILIARY CABINET anchorage evaluation.
183 2-RPSX-B REACTOR Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION AND for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRISAFEGUARD NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forACTUATION TRAIN 'B' RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46AUXILIARY CABINET anchorage evaluation.
184 2-RVLC REACTOR VESSEL Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
OME-1 WATER LEVEL for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRIINSTRUMENTATION NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to theCABINET RLGM based on similar cabinets yieldingsignificant seismic capacity margins.185 2-SA STATION AUXILIARIES Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CONTROL PANEL for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to theRLGM based on similar panels within thecontrol room yielding significant seismiccapacity margins.186 2-SG STEAM GENERATOR Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
AND AUXILIARY FEED for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRIPUMP CONTROL NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forPANEL RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46anchorage evaluation.
187 2-SIS SAFETY INJECTION Screened
>RLGM The panel is welded along the bottom frontCONTROL PANEL edge to embedded steel and braced back atthe top to reinforced concrete wall. The topof the panel frames back to 2-SSR which isanchored at the top to reinforced concretewall with six expansion anchors.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8gto 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL. Anchorage screened for RLGM basedon rugged configuration of the support.188 2-SPY CONTAINMENT SPRAY Screened
>RLGM The panel is welded along the bottom frontCONTROL PANEL edge to embedded steel and braced back atthe top to reinforced concrete wall. The topof the panel frames back to 2-SSR which isanchored at the top to reinforced concretewall with six expansion anchors.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8gto 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL. Anchorage screened for RLGM based 0SExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 142 of 151CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF NotesUnit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #on rugged configuration of the support.189 2-SSR ENGINEER SAFETY Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
SYSTEM REAR for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRIINSTRUMENT/RELAY NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to theRACK RLGM based on similar equipment withinthe control room yielding significant seismiccapacity margins.190 2-SWR NUCLEAR Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
INSTRUMENTAL for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRISOURCE RANGE N21 NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to theINSTRUMENT/RELAY RLGM based on similar equipment withinRACK the control room yielding significant seismiccapacity margins.191 2-T21A 4KV BUS T21A Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
SWITCHGEAR for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to theRLGM based on anchorage evaluation performed to the RLGM.192 2-TDAB 250VDC TRAIN 'B' Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
TRANSFER CABINET for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forRLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46anchorage evaluation.
193 2-TDCD 250VDC TRAIN 'A' Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
TRANSFER CABINET for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to theRLGM based on similar cabinets yieldingsignificant seismic capacity margins.194 2-TK-1 1 BORON INJECTION Anchorage 0.45g The Block Wall interaction was screened forTANK RLGM based on scaling of existing designbasis calculation.
The tank screening wasperformed using the existing evaluation for asimilar tank (2-TK-12S) with the samesupport conditions.
Tank 2-TK-12S could notbe screened to the RLGM, and thus Tank 2-TK-1 1 did not screen. A HCLPF calculation for the tank was performed.
The governing HCLPF capacity according to S&ACalculation 13Q3208-CAL-005
-"HighConfidence Low Probability of Failure(HCLPF) Calculations for Screened in ESEPTanks" (Ref. 10.2) is 0.45g for the weldedconnections.
195 2-TK-12S SOUTH BORIC ACID Anchorage 0.227g The Block Wall interaction was screened forSTORAGE TANK RLGM based on scaling of existing designbasis calculation.
Existing evaluation for the SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 143 of 151CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF NotesUnit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #tank shows no additional margin for DBEinput. Therefore, this tank did not screen tothe RLGM and a HCLPF calculation for thetank was performed.
The governing HCLPFcapacity according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-005
-"High Confidence LowProbability of Failure (HCLPF) Calculations for Screened in ESEP Tanks" (Ref. 10.2) is0.227g for the tank support that is less thanthe RLGM of 0.387g.198 2-TK-253-PRESSURIZER TRAIN Screened
>RLGM Tanks 2-TK-3, -5, &-7 grouped together and3 'B' PRESSURE RELIEF anchored by four plates bolted to the wallVLV NRV-152 with two 3/4" bolts in each plate. The platesEMERGENCY AIR measured 19" and 44" from the floor to plateTANK centerlines.
The tanks are 9" diameter and56" tall. The air bottles are strapped withbrackets affixed to the wall by four platesemploying two W" bolts each. Note that tankconfiguration has changed since A-46evaluation but does not change theconclusion.
Equipment screens (other thananchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on ruggedconfiguration of support.199 2-TK-253-PRESSURIZER TRAIN Screened
>RLGM Tanks 2-TK-4, -6, &-8 grouped together and4 'A' PRESSURE RELIEF anchored by four plates bolted to the wallVLV NRV-153 with two 3/4" bolts in each plate. The platesEMERGENCY AIR measured 19" and 44" from the floor to plateTANK centerlines.
The tanks are 9" diameter and56" tall. The air bottles are strapped withbrackets affixed to the wall by four platesemploying two W" bolts each. Note that tankconfiguration has changed since A-46evaluation but does not change theconclusion.
Equipment screens (other thananchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on ruggedconfiguration of support.200 2-TK-253-PRESSURIZER TRAIN Screened
>RLGM Tanks 2-TK-3, -5, &-7 grouped together and5 'B' PRESSURE RELIEF anchored by four plates bolted to the wallVLV NRV-152 with two 3/4" bolts in each plate. The platesEMERGENCY AIR measured 19" and 44" from the floor to plateTANK centerlines.
The tanks are 9" diameter and56" tall. The air bottles are strapped with SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 PaRe 144 of 151CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF NotesUnit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #brackets affixed to the wall by four platesemploying two %" bolts each. Note that tankconfiguration has changed since A-46evaluation but does not change theconclusion.
Equipment screens (other thananchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on ruggedconfiguration of support.201 2-TK-253-PRESSURIZER TRAIN Screened
>RLGM Tanks 2-TK-4, -6, &-8 grouped together and6 'A' PRESSURE RELIEF anchored by four plates bolted to the wallVLV NRV-153 with two 3/4" bolts in each plate. The platesEMERGENCY AIR measured 19" and 44" from the floor to plateTANK centerlines.
The tanks are 9" diameter and56" tall. The air bottles are strapped withbrackets affixed to the wall by four platesemploying two %" bolts each. Note that tankconfiguration has changed since A-46evaluation but does not change theconclusion.
Equipment screens (other thananchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on ruggedconfiguration of support.202 2-TK-253-PRESSURIZER TRAIN Screened
>RLGM Tanks 2-TK-3, -5, &-7 grouped together and7 'B' PRESSURE RELIEF anchored by four plates bolted to the wallVLV NRV-152 with two 3/4" bolts in each plate. The platesEMERGENCY AIR measured 19" and 44" from the floor to plateTANK centerlines.
The tanks are 9" diameter and56" tall. The air bottles are strapped withbrackets affixed to the wall by four platesemploying two %" bolts each. Note that tankconfiguration has changed since A-46evaluation but does not change theconclusion.
Equipment screens (other thananchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on ruggedconfiguration of support.203 2-TK-253-PRESSURIZER TRAIN Screened
>RLGM Tanks 2-TK-4, -6, &-8 grouped together and8 'A' PRESSURE RELIEF anchored by four plates bolted to the wallVLV NRV-153 with two 3/4" bolts in each plate. The platesEMERGENCY AIR measured 19" and 44" from the floor to plateTANK centerlines.
The tanks are 9" diameter and56" tall. The air bottles are strapped withbrackets affixed to the wall by four plates 0Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 PaRe 145 of 151CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF NotesUnit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #employing two %" bolts each. Note that tankconfiguration has changed since A-46evaluation but does not change theconclusion.
Equipment screens (other thananchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on ruggedconfiguration of support.204 2-TK-32 CONDENSATE Anchorage 0.481g Rust was found on the strap supports.
ASTORAGE TANK HCLPF calculation was performed for thedegraded condition.
The governing HCLPFcapacity according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-005
-"High Confidence LowProbability of Failure (HCLPF) Calculations for Screened in ESEP Tanks" (Ref. 10.2) is0.481g.205 2-TK-37 COMPONENT Anchorage 0.447g Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
COOLING WATER for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRISURGE TANK NP-60411-SL.
Potentially governing BlockWall interaction and the tank anchorage could not be screened for RLGM. Thegoverning HCLPF capacity according toS&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-005
-"HighConfidence Low Probability of Failure(HCLPF) Calculations for Screened in ESEPTanks" (Ref. 10.2) is 0.447g for the tankanchorage.
206 2-TR21A 600V BUS 21A SUPPLY Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
TRANSFORMER for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forRLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46anchorage evaluation.
The governing HCLPF capacity for the block wall according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-004
-"HCLPF Calculations for Screened in ESEPComponents" (Ref. 10.1) is 1.270g and didnot control the capacity.
207 2-TR- TRANSFORMER FOR Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
AFWX AFWX DIST PANEL for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forRLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46anchorage evaluation.
208 2-TR- TRANSFORMER FOR Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
ELSC ELSC DIST PANEL for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened forRLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46
& 1U3Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 146 of 151CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF NotesUnit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #anchorage evaluation.
209 2-UDISB-CONTAINMENT Screened
>RLGM Igniter box is attached to horizontal unistruts B1 HYDROGEN IGNITION bolted to vertical embedded unistruts.
TheUPPER VOLUME TRAIN hydrogen igniters are composed of the'B' GLOW PLUG Igniter Box, glow plug, shield and otherASSEMBLY
#B1 associated hardware.
The components within the igniter box are not fragile and areencompassed by that typically contained inother electrical boxes. Equipment screens(other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 gscreening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based onscaling existing anchorage evaluation.
210 2-UDISB-CONTAINMENT Screened
>RLGM Igniter box is bolted to horizontal unistruts B13 HYDROGEN IGNITION bolted to an embedded vertical unistrut onUPPER VOLUME TRAIN the left and a 3/8" expansion anchor on the'B' GLOW PLUG right. See notes for 2-UDISB-BI.
ASSEMBLY
#B13211 2-UDISB-CONTAINMENT Screened
>RLGM Igniter box is bolted to horizontal unistruts B14 HYDROGEN IGNITION bolted to an embedded vertical unistrut onUPPER VOLUME TRAIN the left and a 3/8" expansion anchor on the'B' GLOW PLUG right. See notes for 2-UDISB-B1.
ASSEMBLY
#B14212 2-UDISB-CONTAINMENT Screened
>RLGM Igniter box is bolted to horizontal unistruts B15 HYDROGEN IGNITION bolted to an embedded vertical unistrut onUPPER VOLUME TRAIN the left and a 3/8" expansion anchor on the'B' GLOW PLUG right. See notes for 2-UDISB-B1.
ASSEMBLY
#B15213 2-UDISB-CONTAINMENT Screened
>RLGM Igniter box is bolted to horizontal unistruts B16 HYDROGEN IGNITION bolted to an embedded vertical unistrut onUPPER VOLUME TRAIN the left and a 3/8" expansion anchor on the'B' GLOW PLUG right. See notes for 2-UDISB-B1.
ASSEMBLY
#B16214 2-UDISB-CONTAINMENT Screened
>RLGM Igniter box is bolted to horizontal unistruts B17 HYDROGEN IGNITION bolted to an embedded vertical unistrut onUPPER VOLUME TRAIN the left and a 3/8" expansion anchor on the'B' GLOW PLUG right. See notes for 2-UDISB-B1.
ASSEMBLY
#B17215 2-UDISB-CONTAINMENT Screened
>RLGM Igniter box is attached to horizontal unistruts B2 HYDROGEN IGNITION bolted to vertical embedded unistruts.
SeeUPPER VOLUME TRAIN notes for 2-UDISB-B1.
'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B2216 2-UDISB-CONTAINMENT Screened
>RLGM Igniter box is bolted to two horizontal B29 HYDROGEN IGNITION unistruts which are welded directly to theUPPER VOLUME TRAIN column. The hydrogen igniters are 0Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 147 of 151CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF NotesUnit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #'B' GLOW PLUG composed of the Igniter Box, glow plug,ASSEMBLY
#B29 shield and other associated hardware.
Theigniters attached to the catwalk wide flangemembers.
A HCLPF calculation wasperformed for 2-UDISB-B29.
The governing HCLPF capacity for the catwalk according toS&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-006
-"HighConfidence Low Probability of Failure(HCLPF) Calculations for Containment Catwalk and Attached Hydrogen GlowPlugs"" (Ref. 10.3) is 0.86g and did notcontrol capacity.
217 2-UDISB-CONTAINMENT Screened
>RLGM Igniter box is attached to horizontal unistruts B3 HYDROGEN IGNITION bolted to vertical embedded unistruts.
SeeUPPER VOLUME TRAIN notes for 2-UDISB-BI.
'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B3218 2-UDISB-CONTAINMENT Screened
>RLGM Igniter box is bolted to two horizontal B30 HYDROGEN IGNITION unistruts which are welded directly to theUPPER VOLUME TRAIN column. The hydrogen igniters are'B' GLOW PLUG composed of the Igniter Box, glow plug,ASSEMBLY
#B30 shield and other associated hardware.
Theigniters attached to the catwalk wide flangemembers.
A HCLPF calculation wasperformed for 2-UDISB-B29.
The governing HCLPF capacity for the catwalk according toS&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-006
-"HighConfidence Low Probability of Failure(HCLPF) Calculations for Containment Catwalk and Attached Hydrogen GlowPlugs"" (Ref. 10.3) is 0.86g and did notcontrol capacity.
219 2-UDISB-CONTAINMENT Screened
>RLGM Igniter box is bolted to two horizontal B31 HYDROGEN IGNITION unistruts which are welded directly to theUPPER VOLUME TRAIN column. The hydrogen igniters are'B' GLOW PLUG composed of the Igniter Box, glow plug,ASSEMBLY
#B31 shield and other associated hardware.
Theigniters attached to the catwalk wide flangemembers.
A HCLPF calculation wasperformed for 2-UDISB-B29.
The governing HCLPF capacity for the catwalk according toS&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-006
-"HighConfidence Low Probability of Failure(HCLPF) Calculations for Containment Catwalk and Attached Hydrogen GlowPlugs"" (Ref. 10.3) is 0.86g and did not sr~Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 148 of 151CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF NotesUnit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #control capacity.
220 2-UDISB-CONTAINMENT Screened
>RLGM Igniter box is bolted to two vertical unistruts B32 HYDROGEN IGNITION which are U-bolted to the top and bottomUPPER VOLUME TRAIN handrail of the catwalk.
The hydrogen'B' GLOW PLUG igniters are composed of the Igniter Box,ASSEMBLY
#B32 glow plug, shield and other associated hardware.
A HCLPF calculation wasperformed for 2-UDISB-B32.
The governing HCLPF capacity for the catwalk according toS&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-006
-"HighConfidence Low Probability of Failure(HCLPF) Calculations for Containment Catwalk and Attached Hydrogen GlowPlugs"" (Ref. 10.3) is 0.86g and did notcontrol capacity.
221 2-UDISB-CONTAINMENT Screened
>RLGM Igniter box is bolted to two vertical unistruts B33 HYDROGEN IGNITION which are U-bolted to the top and bottomUPPER VOLUME TRAIN handrail of the catwalk.
The hydrogen'B' GLOW PLUG igniters are composed of the Igniter Box,ASSEMBLY
#B33 glow plug, shield and other associated hardware.
A HCLPF calculation wasperformed for 2-UDISB-B32.
The governing HCLPF capacity for the catwalk according toS&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-006
-"HighConfidence Low Probability of Failure(HCLPF) Calculations for Containment Catwalk and Attached Hydrogen GlowPlugs"" (Ref. 10.3) is 0.86g and did notcontrol capacity.
222 2-UDISB-CONTAINMENT Screened
>RLGM Igniter box is bolted to two vertical unistruts B34 HYDROGEN IGNITION which are U-bolted to the top and bottomUPPER VOLUME TRAIN handrail of the catwalk.
The hydrogen'B' GLOW PLUG igniters are composed of the Igniter Box,ASSEMBLY
#B34 glow plug, shield and other associated hardware.
A HCLPF calculation wasperformed for 2-UDISB-B32.
The governing HCLPF capacity for the catwalk according toS&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-006
-"HighConfidence Low Probability of Failure(HCLPF) Calculations for Containment Catwalk and Attached Hydrogen GlowPlugs"" (Ref. 10.3) is 0.86g and did notcontrol capacity.
223 2-UDISB-CONTAINMENT Screened
>RLGM Box dimensions are 16"x12"x8".
Unistruts B4 HYDROGEN IGNITION are approximately 16" apart vertically forUPPER VOLUME TRAIN support.
Horizontal running support SAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 149 of 151CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF NotesUnit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #'B' GLOW PLUG unistruts are bolted to embedded unistruts ASSEMBLY
#B4 spaced at 48" from each other, runningvertically.
The box is located such that thebottom of the box is flush with the bottomhorizontal
: unistrut, and 15" from the centerof the box to the right vertically runningembedded unistrut.
See discussion for 2-UDISB-B1.
Assemblyscreens for 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane inEPRI NP-6041-SL (Ref. 1) and anchorage loadings from RLGM input spectra (Ref. 2)224 2-UDISB-CONTAINMENT Screened
>RLGM Igniter box is attached to horizontal unistruts B5 HYDROGEN IGNITION bolted to vertical embedded unistruts.
SeeUPPER VOLUME TRAIN notes for 2-UDISB-BI.
'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B5225 2-UDISB-CONTAINMENT Screened
>RLGM Igniter box is attached to horizontal unistruts B6 HYDROGEN IGNITION bolted to vertical embedded unistruts.
SeeUPPER VOLUME TRAIN notes for 2-UDISB-B1.
'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B6226 2-UDISB-CONTAINMENT Screened
>RLGM Igniter box is attached to horizontal unistruts B7 HYDROGEN IGNITION bolted to vertical embedded unistruts.
SeeUPPER VOLUME TRAIN notes for 2-UDISB-B1.
'B' GLOW PLUGASSEMBLY
#B7227 2-VR- LOWER CONTAINMENT Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
LDISB-4 TRAIN B DISTRIBUTED for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRIIGNITION SYSTEM NP-6041-SL.
The governing HCLPFVOLTAGE REGULATOR capacity according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-004
-"HCLPF Calculations for Screened in ESEP Components" (Ref.10.1) is 0.760g and does not control thecapacity.
228 2-VR- UPPER CONTAINMENT Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
UDISB-3 TRAIN B DISTRIBUTED for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRIIGNITION SYSTEM NP-6041-SL.
The governing HCLPFVOLTAGE REGULATOR capacity according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-004
-"HCLPF Calculations for Screened in ESEP Components" (Ref.10.1) is 0.760g and does not control thecapacity.
229 2-VS VENTILATION Screened
>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CONTROL PANEL for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI POAExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 150 of 151CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF NotesUnit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to theRLGM based on similar panels within thecontrol room yielding significant seismiccapacity margins.230 2-WMO- WEST CONTAINMENT Screened
>RLGM This valve falls within the Earthquake 716 SPRAY HEAT Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-EXCHANGER SL. Therefore, this valve screens for theESSENTIAL SERVICE 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-WATER INLET 6041-SL.SHUTOFF VALVE231 2-WMO- EMERGENCY Screened
>RLGM This valve falls outside the Earthquake 753 ESSENTIAL SERVICE Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-WATER SUPPLY TO SL. However, this valve screens for the 0.8gTDAFPPP-4 SHUTOFF to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL VALVE based on analysis performed for a 3g input.232 2-WRV- W ESW PUMP PP-7W Screened
>RLGM This valve falls within the Earthquake 764 DISCH STN WEST Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-BASKET B/W OUT S/O SL. Therefore, this valve screens for the0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.233 2-WRV- W ESW PUMP PP-7W Screened
>RLGM This valve falls within the Earthquake 769 DISCH STN WEST Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-BASKET BAW INL S/O SL. Therefore, this valve screens for the0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.234 2-WRV- WEST ESW PUMP PP- Screened
>RLGM This valve falls within the Earthquake 774 7W DISCH STN EAST Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-BASKET BA/ OUT SL. Therefore, this valve screens for the0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.235 2-WRV- WEST ESW PUMP PP- Screened
>RLGM This valve falls within the Earthquake 779 7W DISCH STN EAST Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-BASKET B/W INL SL. Therefore, this valve screens for the0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
There is sufficient clearance between the valve operator and thewalkway.
Pipe line well supported and not acredible damaging interaction.
Small valve bolted into a small rack.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) 239 2-XRV- PRESSURE Screened
>RLGM for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI152 REGULATING VALVE NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage judged to beadequate for RLGM by inspection based onlight rack with rugged anchorage.
2-XRV- PRESSURE Small valve bolted into a small rack.240 153 REGULATING VALVE Screened
>RLGMSa leed into a allhrack.
153____REGULATING_______
VALVE___
______Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
SA3Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the50.54(f)
Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term TaskForce Recommendation 2.1: Seismic13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 151 of 151CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF NotesUnit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRINP-6041-SL.
Anchorage judged to beadequate for RLGM by inspection based onlight rack with rugged anchorage.}}

Latest revision as of 02:01, 28 April 2019

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