ML14357A053: Difference between revisions

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
(Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
(Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
 
(3 intermediate revisions by the same user not shown)
Line 1: Line 1:
{{Adams
#REDIRECT [[AEP-NRC-2014-94, Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report - Response to U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force.]]
| number = ML14357A053
| issue date = 12/18/2014
| title = Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report - Response to U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task
| author name = Lies Q S
| author affiliation = Indiana Michigan Power Co
| addressee name =
| addressee affiliation = NRC/Document Control Desk, NRC/NRR/DORL
| docket = 05000315, 05000316
| license number =
| contact person =
| case reference number = AEP-NRC-2014-94
| document type = Letter
| page count = 156
| project =
| stage = RAI
}}
 
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:INDMIANA Indiana Michigan Power MICHIGAN Cook Nuclear Plant POWER One Cook Place Bridgman, MI 49106 A unit of Amencan Electric Power IndianaMichiganPower.com December 18, 2014 AEP-NRC-2014-94 10 CFR 50.54(f)Docket Nos.: 50-315 50-316 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD 20852 Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report -Response to U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident
 
==References:==
: 1. Letter from E. J. Leeds and M. R. Johnson, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), to All Power Reactor Licensees and Holders of Construction Permits in Active or Deferred Status, "Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident," dated March 12, 2012, Agencywide Document Access Management Systems (ADAMS) Accession Number ML12053A340.
: 2. Letter from T. R. Pietrangelo, Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), to D. L. Skeen, NRC,"Proposed Path Forward for NTTF Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Reevaluations," dated April 9, 2013, ADAMS Accession No. ML13101A379.
: 3. Letter from J. P. Gebbie, Indiana Michigan Power Company, to the NRC, "Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant (CNP) Unit 1 and Unit 2, Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding the Seismic Aspects of Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident," AEP-NRC-2013-41, dated April 25, 2013, ADAMS Accession No. ML13121A059.
: 4. Letter from E. J. Leeds, NRC, to J. E. Pollock, NEI, "Electric Power Research Institute Final Draft Report )XXXXXX, 'Seismic Evaluation Guidance:
Augmented Approach for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic,'
As An Acceptable Alternative to the March 12, 2012, Information Request for Seismic Reevaluations," dated May 7, 2013, ADAMS Accession No. ML13106A331.
YAW U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission AEP-NRC-2014-94 Page 2 On March 12, 2012, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued Reference 1 to all power reactor licensees and holders of construction permits in active or deferred status.Reference 1, Enclosure 1, "Recommendation 2.1: Seismic," requested each addressee located in the Central and Eastern United States (CEUS) to submit a Seismic Hazard Evaluation and Screening Report within 1.5 years from the date of Reference 1.In Reference 2, the Nuclear Energy Institute requested NRC agreement to delay submittal of the CEUS Seismic Hazard Evaluation and Screening Reports so that an update to the Electric Power Research Institute ground motion attenuation model could be completed and used to develop the requested information.
Reference 2 also outlined how a near-term Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP), and long-term plant risk evaluations, would provide a complete response to Reference 1, Enclosure
: 1. By Reference 3, Indiana Michigan Power, licensee for Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant (CNP) Units 1 and 2, informed the NRC of its intent to follow the approach and schedule described in Reference
: 2. By Reference 4, the NRC agreed with the approach proposed in Reference 2, which included licensee submittal of an ESEP report no later than December 31, 2014. This letter provides the ESEP report for CNP Units I and 2.Enclosure 1 to this letter provides an affirmation.
Enclosure 2 provides the ESEP report for CNP Units 1 and 2. There are no new Regulatory Commitments identified in this letter. Should you have any questions, please contact Mr. Michael K. Scarpello, Regulatory Affairs Manager, at (269) 466-2649.Sincerely, Q. Shane Lies Engineering Vice President, Indiana Michigan Power J RW/amp
 
==Enclosures:==
: 1. Affirmation
: 2. Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f)Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term " Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission AEP-NRC-2014-94 Page 3 C: M. L. Chawla, NRC Washington, DC J. T. King, MPSC R. F. Kuntz, NRR, NRC MDEQ -RMD/RPS NRC Resident Inspector C. D. Pederson, NRC Region III A. J. Williamson, AEP Ft. Wayne, w/o enclosures Enclosure I to AEP-NRC-2014-94 AFFIRMATION I, Q. Shane Lies, being duly sworn, state that I am Engineering Vice President of Indiana Michigan Power (I&M), that I am authorized to sign and file this document with the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission on behalf of I&M, and that the statements made and the matters set forth herein pertaining to I&M are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief.Indiana Michigan Power Q. Shane Lies Engineering Vice President, Indiana Michigan Power SWORN TO AND SUBSCRIBED BEFORE ME THIS DAY 0I , ' 2014 THISDAY OF~ &c i~L L, 014DANIELLE BURGOYNE XNotary Public, State of Michigan County of Berrien---.Nbtar ~ic --My Commission Expires 04-04-2018 Acting In the Countyiof My Commission Expires " --"- .*,,,
Enclosure 2 TO AEP-NRC-2014-94 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Document Title: 13Q3208-RPT-005
-Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Document Type: Criteria '1 Interface
[- Report [ Specification E] Other E] Drawing E]Project Name: Seismic Hazard & ESEP Seismic Services for DC Cook Units 1 & 2 Job No.: 13Q3208 Client: American Electric Power This document has been prepared in accordance with the S&A Quality Assurance Program Manual Revision 17 and project requirements:
Initial Issue: Rev. 0 Prepared by: G. G. Thomas n". 4 .Date: 12/10/14 Jennifer Huang Dan Lavarnway12/10/14 Reviewed by: M. Etre P.R. Wilson Date- 12/10/14 Date: 12/10/14 Approved by: M. Etre ,P.R. Wilson 6'dt- d '--, aw Revision Record: Revision Prepared by/ Reviewed by/ Approved by/ Description of Revision No. Date Date Date DOCUMENT CONTRACT NO.APPROVALSHEET 13Q3208 Stevenson
& Associates Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 2 of 151 TABLE OF CONTENTS 1.0 Purpose and Objective
.................................................................................................
4 2.0 Brief Summary of the FLEX Seismic Implementation Strategies
.........................
5 3.0 Equipment Selection Process and ESEL .................................................................
9 3.1 Equipment Selection Process and ESEL ..............................................................
9 3.1.1 E S E L D evelopm ent .................................................................................................
.11 3.1.2 Pow er O perated Valves .........................................................................................
13 3 .1 .3 P u ll B o xe s ......................................................................................................................
14 3.1.4 Term ination C abinets ...............................................................................................
14 3.1.5 Critical Instrumentation Indicators
.......................................................................
14 3.1.6 Electrical Distribution
............................................
15 3.1.7 C ontrol E quipm ent ................................................................................................
..15 3.2 Justification for use of Equipment that is not the Primary Means for FLEX im plem entation .......................................................................................................................
16 4.0 Ground Motion Response Spectrum (GMRS) ......................................................
17 4.1 Plot of GMRS Submitted by the Licensee .........................................................
17 4.2 Comparison to SSE ................................................................................................
18 5.0 Review Level Ground Motion (RLGM) .....................................................................
20 5.1 Description of RLGM selected ...........................................................................
20 5.2 Method to Estimate ISRS ......................................................................................
21 6.0 Seismic Margin Evaluation Approach .....................................................................
22 6.1 Summary of Methodologies Used ........................................................................
22 6.2 HCLPF Screening Process ....................................................................................
23 6.3 Seismic Walkdown Approach ...............................................................................
23 6.3.1 W alkdow n approach ..............................................................................................
23 6.3.2 Application of Previous Walkdown Information
..................................................
25 6.3.3 Significant Walkdown Findings ............................................................................
35 6.4 HCLPF Calculation Process .................................................................................
35 6.5 Functional Evaluation of Relays ..........................................................................
38 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 3 of 151 6.6 Tabulated ESEL HCLPF values (including Key failure modes) .......................
38 7.0 Inaccessible Items and Late Additions to the ESEL .............................................
39 7.1 Identification of Inaccessible Items and Late Additions to the ESEL .............
39 7.2 Planned Walkdown / Evaluation Schedule / Close Out ....................................
40 8.0 ESEP Conclusions and Results ...............................................................................
41 8.1 Supporting Inform ation .........................................................................................
41 8.2 Identification of Planned Modifications
..............................................................
42 8.3 Modification Implementation Schedule ..............................................................
43 8.4 Sum m ary of Actions ..............................................................................................
43 9.0 R eferences
.......................................................................................................................
45 Attachm ent A- C NP Unit 1 ESEL ..........................................................................................
50 Attachm ent B -C NP U nit 2 ESEL ..........................................................................................
67 Attachment C- CNP Unit 1 ESEP HCLPF Values and Failure Mode Tabulation
..................
84 Attachment D -CNP Unit 2 ESEP HCLPF Values and Failure Mode Tabulation
.....................
119 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 4 of 151 1.0 Purpose and Objective Following the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant resulting from the March 11, 2011, Great Tohoku Earthquake and subsequent tsunami, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) established a Near Term Task Force (NTTF) to conduct a systematic review of NRC processes and regulations and to determine if the agency should make additional improvements to its regulatory system. The NTTF developed a set of recommendations intended to clarify and strengthen the regulatory framework for protection against natural phenomena.
Subsequently, the NRC issued a 50.54(f) letter on March 12, 2012 [Ref. 1], requesting information to assure that these recommendations are addressed by all U.S. nuclear power plants. The 50.54(f) letter requests that licensees and holders of construction permits under 10 CFR (Code of Federal Regulations)
Part 50 reevaluate the seismic hazards at their sites against present-day NRC requirements and guidance.
Depending on the comparison between the reevaluated seismic hazard and the current design basis, further risk assessment may be required.
Assessment approaches acceptable to the staff include a seismic probabilistic risk assessment (SPRA), or a seismic margin assessment (SMA). Based upon the assessment results, the NRC staff will determine whether additional regulatory actions are necessary.
This report describes the Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) undertaken for Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant (CNP), Units 1 & 2. The intent of the ESEP is to perform an interim action in response to the NRC's 50.54(f) letter [Ref. 1] to demonstrate seismic margin through a review of a subset of the plant equipment that can be relied upon to protect the reactor core following beyond design basis seismic events.The ESEP is implemented using the methodologies in the NRC endorsed guidance in Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) 3002000704, Seismic Evaluation Guidance:
Augmented Approach for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic [Ref. 2].The objective of this report is to provide summary information describing the ESEP evaluations and results. The level of detail provided in the report is intended to enable the NRC to understand the inputs used, the evaluations performed, and the decisions made as a result of the interim evaluations.
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 5 of 151 2.0 Brief Summary of the FLEX Seismic Implementation Strategies The CNP Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) response strategies for Reactor Core Cooling and Heat Removal, Reactor Inventory Control/ Long-term Subcriticality and Containment Function are similar for both Units. The following discussion is a summary of CNP primary strategies to address a Beyond-Design-Basis Seismic Event (BDBSE). This summary is derived from the CNP Overall Integrated Plan (OIP) and updates in Response to the March 12, 2012, Commission Order EA-12-049
[Ref. 3].Phase 1 FLEX Strategies Reactor Core Cooling and Heat Removal Steam Generator Cooling, for Reactor Coolant System (RCS)/Core Heat Removal is initially provided by operation of the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (TDAFW) Pump taking suction from the Condensate Storage Tank (CST). Site specific analysis [Ref. 29] has been performed to demonstrate adequate CST volume for feeding each Unit's TDAFW pumps from a single CST. This analysis demonstrates sufficient inventory is available to maintain secondary heat sink for 12 hours post Extended Loss of AC Power (ELAP) including cool down of each Unit by depressurizing Steam Generators (SG) in accordance with Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs).An alternate cooling source will need to be aligned to maintain secondary inventory make up when the CST is depleted or becomes unavailable.
Lake water make up to the steam generators uses a FLEX lift pump to deliver lake water from the Circulating Water Intake Forebay to the TDAFW pump suction FLEX connection.
RCS Boration/Inventory Control No pumped RCS Boration or RCS make up is required in Phase 1. Depending upon Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) seal leakage and related RCS depressurization, some Safety Injection Accumulator make up to the RCS may occur based upon the results of CNP analyses.Westinghouse Shield Passive Thermal Shutdown RCP seals limiting RCS leakage are credited for FLEX implementation.
Containment Site specific analytical results [Ref. 29] determined the FLEX Containment Temperature and Pressure control actions. In the MODE 1-4 response, Containment pressure does not reach the maximum design pressure limit until after 70 hours.
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 6 of 151 Power Each Unit's Control Room Instrument Distribution (CRID) and Critical Control Room Power (CCRP) inverters maintain control room instrumentation and control with power supplied from the Train A&B Station batteries.
Secondary inventory make up is controlled using the TDAFW pump with local manual control of the TDAFW pump and hand-wheel operation of key motor operated valves. A Direct Current (DC) load shed will be performed to reduce Train A&B Station battery discharge rate within the first hour to ensure 12 hours are available to deploy FLEX electrical generators.
A plant specific DC load shedding analysis [Ref. 29] demonstrates the 12 hour coping capability for these batteries.
Phase 2 FLEX Strategies Reactor Core Cooling and Heat Removal A FLEX Lift pump is expected to be deployed in Phase 2 as an Alternate Cooling Source (ACS)to provide secondary inventory to maintain core cooling with the Steam Generators (SG).The FLEX lift pump will draw water from the Circulating Water Intake Forebay, delivering flow to the TDAFW pump suction and the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP). The deployment time is within 12 hours. This is based upon the CST capacity determined by site specific analyses [Ref. 29].Four Steam Generators will be used to maintain symmetric RCS cool down for the first 24 hours. Steam Generator Power Operated Relief Valves operated from local control stations or local manual operation that is the credited strategy, are used for control of Steam Generator (SG) pressure and RCS cool down rate.This accounts for the initiation of RCS Boration at 16 hours and provides acceptable Boron mixing in the RCS, and the limiting RCS natural circulation flow rates. The RCS will be fully Borated by twenty four (24) hours after the event. At this 24 hour mark SG cooling may be reduced to two of four Steam Generators.
RCS Boration/Inventory Control In MODEs 1-4, the RCS Boration and make up flow path uses a portable FLEX Boric Acid (BA)pump. The FLEX BA pump takes suction via gravity drain using a hose connected to the Boric Acid Storage Tank (BAST) outlet. The FLEX BA pump discharges to the RCS through the Charging header piping connection, that was modified by installing a high pressure hose connection for CNP Unit 1 and will be modified in the future for CNP Unit 2. The FLEX BA pump provides sufficient pressure and flow to fully borate one unit using a single BAST.
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 7 of 151 Containment Site specific evaluation
[Ref. 29] determined no Phase 2 FLEX Containment Temperature and Pressure control actions or equipment operation are required for the MODE 1-4 Containment response.
After 24 hours containment pressure will exceed the value for Adverse Containment Conditions as defined by Emergency Operating Procedures.
Operators will then use more conservative values for actions based upon Steam Generator and Pressurizer indicated level.Per Reference 29, both CNP Units are Ice Condenser Containments, requiring Phase 2 FLEX Generators to power one train of containment hydrogen igniters in accordance with the Regulatory criterion.
Spent Fuel Control No Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) inventory make up is required until after 24 hours. SFP inventory makeup is available as needed from the FLEX Lift pump deployed in Phase 2 to supply the TDAFW Pump.Power FLEX generators, 600vac (volt alternating current), 500kW (Kilo-watt), will be deployed from the FLEX storage building.
FLEX power will be supplied to select loads through 600vac Buses to allow restoration of loads such as battery chargers, a Boric Acid Transfer pump, the Middle Boric Acid Evaporator feed pump, Train B Hydrogen Igniters, and Train A Reactor Vessel Level Indication System (RVLIS).Phase 3 FLEX Strategies Reactor Core Cooling and Heat Removal Phase 3 equipment includes two, 1.1 MWe, 4160V gas turbine generators supplied from the National SAFER Response Center (NSRC) for each unit. These generators will repower 4kV busses, which allows repowering Train B 4kV safety related motors, 600vac Busses, and related 120vac lighting and low voltage electrical distribution circuits.
Train B was selected because it provides the ideal mix of 4kV safety related pumps such as Component Cooling Water (CCW), Residual Heat Removal (RHR), Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (MDAFW) and Essential Service Water (ESW) (if access to the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS) is available) while restoring 600vac busses.Train B power restoration allows starting the West CCW pump, West RHR pump, Train B control room ventilation and facilitates establishing shutdown cooling in conjunction with the NSRC supplied large volume raw water pump. Using a FLEX connection point, this large volume FLEX pump will supply Train B of the ESW system, from the Circulating Water Forebay, Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 8 of 151 to support the RHR and CCW systems for shutdown cooling alignment if the UHS is unavailable.
RCS Boration/Inventory Control The RCS Boration and make up flow path continues to use the portable FLEX Boric Acid (BA)pump as described in Phase 2.Containment Per Reference 29 Phase 3 Containment cooling and depressurization will be accomplished by the operation of one Containment Hydrogen Skimmer Fan. Operation of this Fan results in flow through the Ice Condenser; cooling and depressurizing the Containment.
Operation of this Fan will reduce Containment Pressure and Temperatures to normal values within 2-3 hours after starting the Fan.Spent Fuel Control SFP cooling is maintained during FLEX response by providing SFP inventory makeup from the Circulating Water Forebay using the FLEX Lift pump. Moisture caused by evaporation or boiling will be removed from the Auxiliary Building by natural draft.Power Two 1 MW 4kV generators from the NSRC per Unit will be ganged together using NSRC output bus and paralleling equipment.
NSRC 4 kV power to Bus 1A (2A) is connected by relocating the Reserve Feed 4kV Bus infeed circuit breaker and FLEX connections at the load side of 4kV circuit breakers.
NSRC 4kV power is sufficient to restore the Train B 4kV vital pump bus and 600Vac busses. 4kV power restoration in Phase 3 facilitates re-energizing loads to support the strategies summarized herein.
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 9 of 151 3.0 Equipment Selection Process and ESEL The selection of equipment for the Expedited Seismic Equipment List (ESEL) followed the guidelines of EPRI 3002000704
[Ref. 2] Seismic Evaluation Guidance and NEI 12-06 FLEX Implementation Guidance [Ref. 24]. The ESEL for Unit 1 & 2 is presented in Attachment A and B respectively.
 
===3.1 Equipment===
 
Selection Process and ESEL The selection of equipment to be included on the ESEL was based on installed plant equipment credited in the FLEX strategies during Phase 1, 2, and 3 mitigation of a Beyond Design Basis External Event (BOBEE), as outlined in the CNP Overall Integrated Plan (OIP) and updates in Response to the March 12, 2012, Commission Order EA-12-049
[Ref. 3]. The OIP provides the CNP FLEX mitigation strategy and serves as the basis for equipment selected for the ESEP.The scope of "installed plant equipment" includes equipment relied upon for the FLEX strategies to sustain the critical functions of core cooling and containment integrity consistent with the CNP OIP and updates [Ref. 3]. FLEX recovery actions are excluded from the ESEP scope per EPRI 3002000704
[Ref. 2]. The overall list of planned FLEX modifications and the scope for consideration herein is limited to those required to support core cooling, reactor coolant inventory and subcriticality, and containment integrity functions.
Portable and pre-staged FLEX equipment (not permanently installed) are excluded from the ESEL per EPRI 3002000704
[Ref. 2].The ESEL component selection followed the EPRI guidance outlined in Section 3.2 of EPRI 3002000704
[Ref. 2].1. The scope of components is limited to that required to accomplish the core cooling and containment safety functions identified in Table 3-2 of EPRI 3002000704
[Ref. 2]. The instrumentation monitoring requirements for core cooling/containment safety functions are limited to those outlined in the EPRI 3002000704 guidance, and are a subset of those outlined in the CNP OIP [Ref. 3].2. The scope of components on the ESEL was limited to installed plant equipment, and FLEX connections necessary to implement the CNP OIP [Ref. 3] as described in Section 2.3. The scope of components assumes the credited FLEX connection modifications are implemented, and are limited to those required to support a single FLEX success path.These are the "Primary" path for CNP.4. The "Primary" FLEX success path is to be specified.
Selection of the "Back-up/Alternate" FLEX success path must be justified.
CNP did not use a "Back-up/Alternate" FLEX success path 5. Phase 3 coping strategies are included in the ESEP scope, whereas recovery strategies are excluded.
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 10 of 151 6. Structures, systems, and components excluded per the EPRI 3002000704
[Ref. 2]guidance are:* Structures (e.g. containment, auxiliary building, etc.)* Piping, cabling, conduit, HVAC, and their supports* Manual valves and rupture disks* Power-operated valves not required to change state as part of the FLEX mitigation strategies
* Nuclear steam supply system (NSSS) components (e.g. reactor pressure vessel and internals, reactor coolant pumps and seals, etc.)7. For cases in which neither train was specified as a primary or back-up strategy, then only one train component (generally
'B' train for CNP) is included in the ESEL Permanent plant equipment required for implementation of the FLEX Strategy was identified by reviewing the FLEX Strategy and associated cooling flow path piping and instrumentation diagrams (P&ID), instrument elementary diagrams, and electrical distribution one-line diagrams.The approach taken in compiling the ESEL was to assume there were no random equipment failures and identify a single success path for each element of the FLEX Strategy.
Note, the EPRI 3002000704
[Ref. 2] Seismic Evaluation Guidance states that only one success path is required.
Also, NEI 12-06 FLEX Implementation Guidance [Ref. 24] does not require postulating single or multiple random failures during or following an Extended Loss of all Alternating Current (AC) Power and Loss of the Ultimate Heat Sink (ELAP/LUHS) event'.Following Section 3.2 of the EPRI 3002000704
[Ref. 2] Seismic Evaluation Guidance the following equipment categories were excluded from consideration: " Structures
* Distributed systems (piping, cabling, conduit, cable trays, Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC))* Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS) components The corresponding components listed in the ESEL have been further screened utilizing the Evaluation Guidance to exclude components having the following criteria:* Non-power operated valves (manual valves, check valves, rupture disks)* Power operated valves not required to change state for any FLEX strategy* Sub-components mounted within equipment already included on the list 2 The FLEX Integrated Plan [Ref. 29] also assumed no single failure of structures, systems, or components (SSC), in accordance with the Implementation Guidance.2 This item refers to the "Rule-of-Box" (ROB). When equipment is screened using the EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7]guidance, all of the components mounted on or in equipment of a particular equipment class are considered to be part of that equipment and do not have to be evaluated separately.
Relays and other contact devices vulnerable to seismically induced chatter are an exception to this rule and should be separately identified and evaluated for seismic adequacy using the ESEP evaluation guidance.
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 11 of 151 Additional screening criteria were applied to exclude components from the ESEL that met the following criteria:* In-line pipe-supported components (without separate mounting)* Pumps and small heat exchangers within piping pressure boundaries but not in the flow path" Components expected to operate during the initial reactor transient (as described in NEI 12-06 section 3.2.1.4 [Ref. 24])The Equipment Selection and ESEL Development is documented in S&A Report 13Q3208-RPT-001, [Ref. 25].3.1.1 ESEL Development The ESEL was developed by reviewing the CNP FLEX Integration Plan [Ref. 29] to determine the major equipment involved in the FLEX strategies.
Further reviews of plant drawings (e.g., Process and Instrumentation Diagrams (P&IDs) and Electrical One Line Diagrams) were performed to identify the boundaries of the flowpaths to be used in the FLEX strategies and to identify specific components in the flowpaths needed to support implementation of the FLEX strategies.
Boundaries were established at an electrical or mechanical isolation device (e.g., isolation amplifier, valve, etc.) in branch circuits / branch lines off the defined strategy electrical or fluid flowpath.
P&IDs were the primary reference documents used to identify mechanical components and instrumentation.
The flow paths used for FLEX strategies were selected and specific components were identified using detailed equipment and instrument drawings, piping isometrics, electrical schematics and one-line drawings, system descriptions, design basis documents, etc., as necessary.
The flow paths credited for the CNP ESEP are shown in Table 3-1.
SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 12 of 151 Table 0-1: Flow Paths Credited for ESEP P&IDs/Reference Drawings Flow Path Unit 1 Unit 2 Phase 1 and Phase 2 Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Heat Removal: Main Steam Power Operated Relief Valves discharge steam from the Steam Generators to the atmosphere.
Feedwater from the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump with suction from the Condensate Storage Tank or portable FLEX pump from the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS).---I I-OP-1-5105D
[26.1]OP-1-5105E
[26.2]OP-1-5106A
[26.31 OP-1-5113
[26.4]OP-1-5113A
[26.5]OP-2-5105D
[26.19]OP-2-5105E
[26.20]OP-2-5106A
[26.21]OP-2-5113
[26.22]OP-2-5113A
[26.23]Phase 3 Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Heat OP-1-5113
[26.4] OP-2-5113
[26.22]Removal: Mode 4 Train B Residual Heat OP-15113A
[26.5] OP-2-5113A
[26.23]Removal (RHR) system, using the Train B Component Cooling (CCW) System, and Train B OP-1-513 [26.6] OP-2-513 [26.24]Essential Service Water (ESW) system supplied OP-1-5135
[26.7] OP-2-5135
[26.251 by a portable FLEX pump from the UHS. OP-1-5135A
[26.8] OP-2-5135A
[26.26]Phase I Reactor Coolant Make Up and Boration Control: Passive injection from the Safety OP-1-5143A
[26.9] OP-2-5143A
[26.27]Injection Accumulators.
Phase 2 and Phase 3 Reactor Coolant Make Up and Boration Control: A portable FLEX pump taking suction from the Boric Acid Storage Tank OP-12-5131
[26.10] OP-12-5131
[26.10](BAST) FLEX connection to the Reciprocating OP-1-5129
[26.11] OP-2-5129
[26.28]Charging Pump discharge piping FLEX OP-1-5142
[26.12] OP-2-5142
[26.29]connection; to the RCS via the Boron Injection Tank.OP-1-5128
[26.13] OP-2-5128
[26.30]RCS Pressure Control: RCS Pressurizer Power OP-1-5128
[26.14] OP-2-5128
[26.311 Operated Relief Valves. OP-1-5120D
[26.15] OP-2-5120D
[26.32]Containment:
Analytical results indicate Phase 1 and Phase 2 FLEX actions are not required.
OP-1-12032126.36]
OP-2-12032
[26.37]Phase 3 uses a Fan to draw air through the Ice Condenser to cool Containment.
Fuel Oil: From the Diesel Oil Storage Tank via a portable FLEX pump to provide fuel for FLEX OP-1-5151C
[26.16] OP-2-5151A
[26.33]equipment.
.
0 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 13 of 151 P&lDs/Reference Drawings Flow Path Unit I Unit 2 Phase 1 Main Control Room (MCR) and Battery Room Ventilation:
Open doors and use portable None None FLEX fans.Phase 2 Main Control Room and Battery Room Ventilation:
Maintain MCR ventilation with open doors and portable FLEX fans. Battery Room OP-1-5148C
[26.17] OP-2-5148C
[26.34]ventilation is powered by portable FLEX Generators along with Station Battery Chargers.Phase 3 Main Control Room and Battery Room Ventilation:
Restore Train B of MCR ventilation OP-1-5148C
[26.17] OP-2-5148C
[26.34]powered by NSRC portable FLEX Generators.
OP-1-5149
[26.18] OP-2-5149
[26.35]Battery Room ventilation is also powered by OP-1-5113
[26.4] OP-2-5113
[26.22]these portable generators.
Each of the following flow paths were analyzed, and all mechanical equipment necessary to establish these flow paths were considered for inclusion in the ESEL: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Main Steam to the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) to the Steam Generators Reactor Coolant Make Up Residual Heat Removal Main Control Room Ventilation Battery Room Ventilation Instrument Air Implementing procedures to establish these flow paths were examined to identify valves that will be manipulated manually using the local valve operator hand wheel. These valves were excluded from the electrical power and control identification activities mentioned in the next two sections.3.1.2 Power Operated Valves Page 3-3 of EPRI 3002000704
[Ref. 2] notes that power operated valves not required to change state are excluded from the ESEL. Page 3-2 also notes that "functional failure modes of electrical and mechanical portions of the installed Phase 1 equipment should be considered (e.g. Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC)/AFW trips)." To address this concern, the following guidance is applied for the CNP Unit 1 and CNP Unit 2 ESEL for functional failure modes associated with power operated valves:
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 14 of 151 Power operated valves that remain energized during the Extended Loss of all AC Power (ELAP) events (such as DC powered valves), were included on the ESEL.Power operated valves not required to change state as part of the FLEX mitigation strategies were not included on the ESEL. The seismic event also causes the ELAP event; therefore, the valves are incapable of spurious operation as they would be de-energized.
Power operated valves not required to change state as part of the FLEX mitigation strategies during Phase 1, and are re-energized and operated during subsequent Phase 2 and 3 strategies, were not evaluated for spurious valve operation as the seismic event that caused the ELAP has passed before the valves are re-powered.
3.1.3 Pull Boxes Pull boxes were deemed unnecessary to add to the ESELs as these components provide completely passive locations for pulling or installing cables. No breaks or connections in the cabling are included in pull boxes. Pull boxes were considered part of conduit and cabling, which are excluded in accordance with EPRI 3002000704
[Ref. 2].3.1.4 Termination Cabinets Termination cabinets, including cabinets necessary for FLEX Phase 2 and Phase 3 connections, provide consolidated locations for permanently connecting multiple cables. The termination cabinets and the internal connections provide a completely passive function;however, the cabinets are included on the ESEL to ensure that industry knowledge of panel/anchorage failure vulnerabilities is addressed.
 
====3.1.5 Critical====
Instrumentation Indicators Critical indicators and recorders are typically physically located on panels/cabinets and are included as separate components; however, seismic evaluation of the instrument indication may be included in the panel/cabinet seismic evaluation (rule-of-the-box).
The FLEX Integrated Plan [Ref. 29] was reviewed and key plant parameters were identified.
Instrumentation required to indicate the following parameters was considered for inclusion in the ESEL: " Steam Generator Pressure and Level Indications" Reactor Coolant System Pressure and Temperature Indications
* Reactor Vessel Level Indication (Utilizing the Reactor Vessel Level Instrumentation System)* Pressurizer Level Indication
* Neutron Flux Indication" Core Exit Temperature Indication
* Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Indication Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 15 of 151" Safety Injection Flow Indication
* Containment Pressure Indication
* Condensate Storage Tank Level Indication
* Boric Acid Storage Tank Level and Temperature Indication To compile the instrumentation included in the ESEL, instrument loop identifiers for these parameters were taken, where possible, from the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Table 7.8-1, Variables Provided the Operator for Manual Functions During and Following an Accident [Ref. 21]. Where both wide and narrow range instruments were indicated for a given parameter on UFSAR Table 7.8-1, the wide-range instrument was chosen. P&lDs were consulted for parameters not included in UFSAR Table 7.8-1.3.1.6 Electrical Distribution The electrical distribution and motor control centers (MCCs) necessary to provide power to the instrumentation, pumps, valves, or any other electrically powered permanent plant equipment identified for ESEP were included in the ESEL. This includes vital instrument power from the station batteries through the inverters to the vital bus panels, instrument racks, and Main Control Room (MCR) panels. Distribution paths were identified from intended FLEX generator connection points to their intended loads.3.1.7 Control Equipment The control equipment necessary to operate the pumps, valves, or any other electrically powered permanent plant equipment identified for ESEP was considered for inclusion in the ESEL. Relays and other sensitive contact devices subject to seismically induced chatter that may lead to a circuit seal-in or lockout were also considered for inclusion on the ESEL. Power sources for the required control circuits were traced and any power distribution component necessary for the control circuits (and not already identified) were added to the ESEL.As mentioned in Section 3.1.2, controls for local manually operated valves were not considered.
The list of valves crediting manual operation includes the Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (TDAFP) Trip and Throttle Valve. None of the relays associated with the TDAFP trip function were included on the ESEL because if an event causes an actuation and trips the TDAFP, operators will reset the TDAFP manually according to the Emergency Operating Procedures described in Stevenson
& Associates (S&A) Report 13Q3208-RPT-001
[Ref. 25]. It is noted that all other relays screened out of consideration for ESEP and thus the ESEL contains no relays.3.1.8 FLEX Connections (Phase 2 and Phase 3 Piping Connections)
Item 2 in Section 3.1 above notes that the scope of equipment in the ESEL includes "... FLEX connections necessary to implement the CNP OIP [Ref. 3] as described in Section 2." Item 3 in Section 3.1 also notes that the scope of components assumes the credited FLEX connection Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 16 of 151 modifications are implemented, and are limited to those required in the case of CNP to support a single Primary FLEX success path. It is noted that these connections have been installed for CNP Unit 1 and are planned to be installed for CNP Unit 2 in the spring 2015 outage.Item 6 in Section 3 above goes on to explain that "Piping, cabling, conduit, HVAC, and their supports" are excluded from the ESEL scope in accordance with EPRI 3002000704
[Ref. 2].Therefore, piping and pipe supports associated with FLEX Phase 2 and Phase 3 connections are excluded from the scope of the ESEP evaluation.
However, any active valves in FLEX Phase 2 and Phase 3 connection flow path are included in the ESEL.The flow paths described in Section 3.1.1 of this report and included with marked up Piping and Instrumentation Drawings (P&IDs) in S&A Report 13Q3208-RPT-001
[Ref. 25] were configured for the FLEX connections consistent with the August 2014 FLEX strategy [Ref. 29]. The scope of equipment in the ESEL includes FLEX connections necessary to implement the CNP OIP[Ref. 3] as described in Section 2. The scope of components assumed the credited FLEX connection modifications are implemented, and are limited to those required to support a single Primary FLEX success path. It is also noted there are no plans to have permanently installed FLEX equipment for CNP Unit I or CNP Unit 2.3.2 Justification for use of Equipment that is not the Primary Means for FLEX implementation All equipment used for FLEX implementation on the CNP ESEL are the primary path. The complete ESELs for CNP Unit 1 and CNP Unit 2 are presented in Attachments A and B, respectively.
Val Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 17 of 151 4.0 Ground Motion Response Spectrum (GMRS)4.1 Plot of GMRS Submitted by the Licensee As documented in Stevenson
& Associates (S&A) Report 13Q3208-RPT-003
[Ref. 4](transmitted by letter from Q. S. Lies, I&M, to NRC, "Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2, Seismic Hazard and Screening Report (CEUS Sites), Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident," dated March 27, 2014)[Ref. 11] the SSE Control Point for Containment is at an elevation of 587.4 ft. which is used for comparison to the Control Point GMRS.The GMRS at 5% equipment damping, taken from S&A Report 13Q3208-RPT-003
[Ref. 4], is shown in Table 4-1 and Figure 4-1.Table 4-1 CNP GMRS Frequency (Hz) GMRS (g) Frequency (Hz) GMRS (g)100 0.248 3.5 0.321 90 0.251 3 0.288 80 0.254 2.5 0.240 70 0.261 2 0.210 60 0.273 1.5 0.167 50 0.302 1.25 0.133 40 0.348 1 0.102 35 0.376 0.9 0.0932 30 0.405 0.8 0.0822 25 0.454 0.7 0.0722 20 0.461 0.6 0.0639 15 0.525 0.5 0.0563 12.5 0.496 0.4 0.0451 10 0.464 0.35 0.0394 9 0.466 0.3 0.0338 8 0.454 0.25 0.0282 7 0.426 0.2 0.0225 6 0.415 0.15 0.0169 5 0.421 0.125 0.0141 4 0.361 0.1 0.0113 H3 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 1303208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 18 of 151 0.0.3 W0Z!!l 01 1 10 100 Frequency (Hz)Figure 4-1 CNP GMRS 4.2 Comparison to SSE As documented in S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-002
[Ref. 23], the GMRS exceeds the SSE in the 3.5 Hz. to 10 Hz range for 5% equipment damping. A comparison of the GMRS to the SSE between 1-10 Hz is shown in Table 4-2 and Figure 4-2.Table 0-2: CNP GMRS and SSE between 1-10Hz Frequency (Hz) SSE (g) GMRS (g)10 0.24 0.464 9 0.252 0.466 8 0.264 0.454 7 0.276 0.426 6 0.305 0.415 5 0.315 0.421 4 0.32 0.361 3.5 0.32 0.321 3 0.304 0.288 2.5 0.287 0.24 2 0.27 0.21 1.5 0.221 0.167 1.25 0.195 0.133 1 0.167 0.102 l Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 19 of 151 00..... I.....GM 10.;3II~V~..........
.... .. .. .... ..... .. ... .. ....... ..0.1 1 10 100 Frequency (Hz)Figure 4-2 GMRS / SSE Comparison SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 20 of 151 5.0 Review Level Ground Motion (RLGM)5.1 Description of RLGM selected The RLGM for CNP was determined in accordance with Section 4 of EPRI 3002000704
[Ref. 2]by linearly scaling the CNP SSE by the maximum GMRS/SSE ratio (SF) between the 1 and 10 Hz range. The RLGM for CNP is also documented in S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-002
[Ref. 23].The results of this calculation are shown in Table 5-1.Table 0-2: CNP Maximum GMRS/SSE Ratio (SF)Frequency Unscaled SSE (g) GMRS/SSE (Hz) GMRS (g)10 0.464 0.24 1.933 9 0.466 0.252 1.849 8 0.454 0.264 1.720 7 0.426 0.276 1.543 6 0.415 0.305 1.361 5 0.421 0.315 1.337 4 0.361 0.32 1.128 3.5 0.321 0.32 1.003 3 0.288 0.304 0.947 2.5 0.24 0.287 0.836 2 0.21 0.27 0.778 1.5 0.167 0.221 0.756 1.25 0.133 0.195 0.682 1 0.102 0.167 0.611 As shown above, the maximum GMRS/SSE ratio occurs at 10 Hz and equals 1.933.The resulting 5% damped RLGM, based on scaling the horizontal SSE by the SF of 1.933, is shown in Table 5-2 and Figure 5-1. Note that the RLGM Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA) is 0.387g.
pla3 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 21 of 151 Table 0-3: CNP RLGM Freq. (Hz) SA (g) Freq. (Hz) SA (g)0.5 0.180 4.17 0.619 0.77 0.271 5.88 0.599 1.11 0.348 6.67 0.541 1.43 0.416 12.5 0.406 1.82 0.483 25 0.387 2 0.522 50 0.387 3.45 0.619 100 0.387 I- --1.93 xSSE=RLGM-ssE 0.1 0,700: 0.600 0.500-*L 0.40D. -------0.000 1 10 100 Frequency (Hz)Figure 0-1: CNP RLGIMI 5.2 Method to Estimate ISRS The method used to derive the ESEP in-structure response spectra (ISRS) was to uniformly scale existing SSE-based ISRS from the CNP Design Basis SSE (referred to as the Design Basis Earthquake (DBE) in the CNP UFSAR [Ref. 21]) [Refs. 17.1, 17.2, 17.3 and 17.4] by the maximum SF of 1.933 from Table 5-1. Existing ISRS were the same as those used for the Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) A-46 program. Scaled ISRS are calculated for all buildings and elevations where ESEL items are located at CNP. The scaled ISRS for CNP are documented in S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-002
[Ref. 23]. These scaled ISRS were used as the basis for screening and for the High Confidence Low Probability of Failure (HCLPF) calculations 13Q3208-CAL-004
[10.1], 13Q3208-CAL-005
[10.2], and 13Q3208-CAL-006
[10.3].
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 22 of 151 6.0 Seismic Margin Evaluation Approach It is necessary to demonstrate that ESEL items have sufficient seismic capacity to meet or exceed the demand characterized by the RLGM. The seismic capacity is characterized as the highest peak ground acceleration (PGA) for which there is a high confidence of a low probability of failure (HCLPF). The PGA is associated with a particular spectral shape, in this case the 5%damped RLGM spectral shape. The calculated HCLPF capacity must be equal to or greater than the RLGM PGA (0.387g from Table 5-2 and Figure 5-1). The criteria for seismic capacity determination are given in Section 5 of EPRI 3002000704
[Ref. 2].There are two basic approaches for developing HCLPF capacities:
: 1. Deterministic approach using the conservative deterministic failure margin (CDFM)methodology of EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7].2. Probabilistic approach using the fragility analysis methodology of EPRI TR-103959
[Ref.8].The deterministic approach using the CDFM methodology of EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7] was used for the CNP to determine HCLPF capacities.
 
===6.1 Summary===
of Methodologies Used CNP performed a seismic probabilistic risk assessment (SPRA) for their Individual Plant Examination for External Events (IPEEE) in 1992. The SPRA is documented in the CNP IPEEE report [Ref. 9] and consisted of screening walkdowns and fragility calculations for anchorage, buildings and tanks. The screening walkdowns used a similar methodology that is included for a Seismic Margin Assessment (SMA) that uses Table 2-4 of EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7] for screening.
The walkdowns were conducted by trained engineers that successfully completed the Seismic Qualification Utility Group (SQUG) Walkdown Screening and Seismic Evaluation Training Course. The walkdown results were documented on Screening Evaluation Work Sheets (SEWS). Anchorage capacity calculations partially used the CDFM criteria from EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7] or the fragility methodology in Reference 8.For the ESEP, CNP applied the SMA methodology of EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7] to all accessible items on the ESEL. The performed screening used Table 2-4 from EPRI NP-6041-SL [Ref. 7]. The walkdowns were conducted by engineers who, as a minimum, have attended the SQUG Walkdown Screening and Seismic Evaluation Training Course. The walkdowns were documented in SEWS consistent with EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7]. Anchorage capacity calculations use the CDFM criteria established within EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7] with CNP specific allowables and material strengths used as applicable.
The input seismic demand used was the RLGM shown in Table 5-2 and Figure 5-1. It is noted that CNP did not use the results from the IPEEE [Ref. 9] directly, but did use the documentation (SEWS forms) that supported Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 23 of 151 the USI A-46 [Ref. 16] for screening.
The walkdown and screening for the ESEP is documented in S&A Report 13Q3208-RPT-004
[Ref. 20].6.2 HCLPF Screening Process The peak spectral acceleration of the RLGM for CNP equals 0.62g. Screening lanes 1 and 2 in Table 2-4 of EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7] are bounded by peak spectral accelerations of 0.8g and 1.2g, respectively.
Both lane limits exceed the RLGM peak spectral acceleration.
ESEL components were screened to lane 1 or 2 of Table 2-4 in EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7]. When lane 2 was used it is documented on the screening summary tabulation contained in Attachment C and D of this report.The CNP Unit 1 and CNP Unit 2 ESEL contain 240 items and 237 items, respectively
[Ref. 25].Of these, there are 33 valves for Unit 1 and 33 valves for Unit 2 (including power-operated, air-operated, and relief valves). In accordance with Table 2-4 of EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7], active valves may be assigned a functional capacity of 0.8g to 1.2g (relative to the spectral peaks for Screening Lane 1 and 2) only requiring a review of valves with large extended operators on small diameter piping. Note that anchorage is not a failure mode. Valves on the ESEL may be screened out, subject to the caveat regarding large extended operators on small diameter piping.The non-valve components in the ESEL can generally be screened using results consistent with the SMA methodology.
It is noted that the screening caveats for screening lane 2 in Table 2-4 of EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7] conform to those used in the USI A-46 [Ref. 16] for CNP. If the evaluation of the equipment item on the ESEL using the SMA methodology shows that the component met the EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7] screening caveats and the CDFM capacity exceeded the Review Level Earthquake (RLE) demand, which it does for CNP, the component can be screened out from the ESEP capacity determination.
This was done for items where equipment item specific SEWS were available from the USI A-46 [Ref. 16] evaluation.
The engineers performing the walkdowns checked for changes made to the equipment since the USI A-46 work was completed that could potentially effect screening.
In addition non-valve components on the ESEL without USI A-46 SEWS were evaluated to the EPRI NP-6041-SL Table 2-4 [Ref. 7] screening caveats, as applicable.
 
===6.3 Seismic===
Walkdown Approach 6.3.1 Walkdown approach Walkdowns for CNP were performed in accordance with the criteria provided in Section 5 of EPRI 3002000704
[Ref. 2], which refers to EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7] for the Seismic Margin Assessment process. Pages 2-26 through 2-30 of EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7] describe the seismic walkdown criteria, including the following key criteria:
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 24 of 151"The SRT [Seismic Review Team] should "walk by" 100% of all components which are reasonably accessible and in non-radioactive or low radioactive environments.
Seismic capability assessment of components which are inaccessible, in high-radioactive environments, or possibly within contaminated containment, will have to rely more on alternate means such as photographic inspection, more reliance on seismic reanalysis, and possibly, smaller inspection teams and more hurried inspections.
A 100% "walk by" does not mean complete inspection of each component, nor does it mean requiring an electrician or other technician to de-energize and open cabinets or panels for detailed inspection of all components.
This walkdown is not intended to be a QA or QC review or a review of the adequacy of the component at the SSE level.If the SRT has a reasonable basis for assuming that the group of components are similar and are similarly anchored, then it is only necessary to inspect one component out of this group. The "similarity-basis" should be developed before the walkdown during the seismic capability preparatory work (Step 3) by reference to drawings, calculations or specifications.
The one component or each type which is selected should be thoroughly inspected which probably does mean de-energizing and opening cabinets or panels for this very limited sample. Generally, a spare representative component can be found so as to enable the inspection to be performed while the plant is in operation.
At least for the one component of each type which is selected, anchorage should be thoroughly inspected.
The walkdown procedure should be performed in an ad hoc manner. For each class of components the SRT should look closely at the first items and compare the field configurations with the construction drawings and/or specifications.
If a one-to-one correspondence is found, then subsequent items do not have to be inspected in as great a detail. Ultimately the walkdown becomes a "walk by" of the component class as the SRT becomes confident that the construction pattem is typical. This procedure for inspection should be repeated for each component class; although, during the actual walkdown the SRT may be inspecting several classes of components in parallel.
If serious exceptions to the drawings or questionable construction practices are found then the system or component class must be inspected in closer detail until the systematic deficiency is defined.
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 25 of 151 The 100% "walk by" is to look for outliers, lack of similarity, anchorage which is different from that shown on drawings or prescribed in criteria for that component, potential SI[Seismic Interaction 3] problems, situations that are at odds with the team members' past experience, and any other areas of serious seismic concern. If any such concems surface, then the limited sample size of one component of each type for thorough inspection will have to be increased.
The increase in sample size which should be inspected will depend upon the number of outliers and different anchorages, etc., which are observed.
It is up to the SRT to ultimately select the sample size since they are the ones who are responsible for the seismic adequacy of all elements which they screen from the margin review. Appendix D gives guidance for sampling selection.
The CNP walkdowns included, as a minimum, a 100% walk-by of all items on the CNP ESEL except as noted in Section 7.0. Previous walkdown information that was relied upon as the basis for the SRT judgment in excluding an item walkdown is documented in Section 6.3.2. It is noted that the walkdown and screening of an individual equipment item was frozen at the time of the walkdown date for that equipment.
Walkdowns were conducted at various times between March 2014 and November 2014. The screening status of the equipment included in this report reflects the configuration at the time the item was walked down and after all evaluations were performed.
The walkdown and screening information for the ESEP is documented in S&A Report 13Q3208-RPT-004
[Ref. 20].6.3.2 Application of Previous Walkdown Information The Augmented Approach Guidance for the NTTF 2.1 Seismic walkdowns
[Ref. 2] references EPRI NP-6041-SL for Screening
[Ref. 7]. The Reference 2 augmented approach allows use of walkdown results from recent walkdowns that include the recently completed NTTF 2.3 walkdowns
[Ref. 18]. EPRI NP-6041-SL states that the walkdown team should attempt a 100%walk-by of all items on the listing. It also states that reasons for this not being possible are that some items may be inaccessible due to the equipment being in a high radiation area or cannot be looked at (like buried tanks).The following list of items were inaccessible but screened in accordance with EPRI NP-6041-SL, based on documentation and similarity to items that were included in the walkdowns.
Previous seismic walkdowns were used to support the ESEP seismic evaluations.
Some of the components on the ESEL were included in the NTTF 2.3 seismic walkdowns
[Ref. 18]. The basis for screening is also included.3 EPRI 3002000704
[Ref. 2] page 5-4 limits the ESEP seismic interaction reviews to "nearby block walls" and "piping attached to tanks" which are reviewed "to address the possibility of failures due to differential displacements." Other potential seismic interaction evaluations are "deferred to the full seismic risk evaluations performed in accordance with EPRI 1025287 [Ref. 14].
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 26 of 151 The following items on the Unit I ESEL were screened in this manner: Item 11, 12-TK-47-CD, EMERGENCY DIESELS FUEL OIL STORAGE TANK: This tank is buried and, by definition, not accessible.
Per the screening criteria of Table 2-4 in EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7], the anchorage configurations of buried tanks are inherently seismically rugged and of no concern. A review of the flexibility of attached piping was performed in SQUG-12-TK-47-CD
[Ref. 22.3] and the tank was evaluated for the potential seismic wave effects for the SSE and had a stress of 3.6 ksi. Since the factor of safety is on the order of 10, this screens for the RLGM which is an earthquake that is the SSE scaled by a factor of 1.93 < 10.Item 89, 1-HV-CEQ-2, CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN SKIMMER VENTILATION FAN #2: HV-CEQ-2 is a large fan unit with very rugged anchorage.
This was walked down during the NTTF 2.3 effort and the walkdown is documented in the Reference 15 report. The anchorage was in good condition and there were no potential adverse interactions.
This was unchanged from the condition documented in SQUG-1-HV-CEQ-2
[Ref. 22.1]. This Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 6041-SL [Ref. 7] by meeting the Generic Implementation Procedure (GIP) caveats [Ref. 30] as documented in SQUG-1-HV-CEQ-2
[Ref.22.1]. A bounding analysis was performed in SQUG-1-HV-CEQ-1
[Ref. 22.2] and had a margin of 7.7 > 1.93 RLGM scaling factor. Therefore this screens.Item 139, 1-NPS-121, REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #2 HOT LEG WIDE RANGE PRESSURE TRANSMITTER:
This was a late addition to the ESEL after the walkdowns were completed as a result of reviews to changes in the August FLEX strategy.
Per the USI A-46 walkdown SEWS the transmitter is mounted on a small floor mounted pipe stand anchored to the reinforced concrete floor with expansion anchors. The installation for 1-NPS-121, 1-NPS-122, 2-NPS-121 and 2-NPS-122 are similar. It is noted that the Foxboro transmitters for 1-NPS-121 and 2-NPS-122 in place during the USI A-46 walkdowns have been replaced with Rosemount transmitters but used the same mounting.
An ANCHOR analysis [Ref. 22.6] for this installation indicated a factor of safety of 4.0 which is above the RLGM screening level of 1.93 < 4.0.Item 140, 1-NPS-122, REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #1 HOT LEG WIDE RANGE PRESSURE TRANSMITTER:
This was a late addition to the ESEL after the walkdowns were completed as a result of reviews to changes in the August FLEX strategy.
Per the USI A-46 walkdown SEWS the transmitter is mounted on a small floor mounted pipe stand anchored to the reinforced concrete floor with expansion anchors. The installation for 1-NPS-121, 1-NPS-122, 2-NPS-121 and 2-NPS-122 are similar. The most limiting installation with the highest weight with the highest center of gravity was evaluated for 2-NPS-121 and the ANCHOR analysis [Ref. 22.7] indicated a factor of safety Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 27 of 151 of 2.7 which is above the RLGM screening level that is the SSE multiplied by a factor of 1.93 and therefore 1-NPS-122 is acceptable by comparison.
Item 141, 1-NRI-21, NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION CHANNEL I WIDE RANGE RADIATION DETECTOR: The location of this detector was very close to the Reactor Vessel and was not accessible.
It is screened based on similarity to other small instruments in containment.
These are small instruments.
The walkdown of accessible instruments of this type in containment determined they were free of interactions and had very rugged anchorage.
These were screened to the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7].Item 145, 1-NTQ-110A, RVLIS TRAIN 'A' UPPER TAP TEMPERATURE COMPENSATION COMPUTER INPUT THERMAL SENSOR 'A': The location of this detector was very close to the Reactor Vessel and was not accessible.
It is screened based on similarity to other small instruments in containment.
These are small instruments.
The walkdown of accessible instruments of this type in containment determined they were free of interactions and had very rugged anchorage.
These were screened to the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7].Item 146, 1-NTQ-110B, RVLIS TRAIN 'A' UPPER TAP TEMPERATURE COMPENSATION COMPUTER INPUT THERMAL SENSOR 'B': The location of this detector was very close to the Reactor Vessel and was not accessible.
It is screened based on similarity to other small instruments in containment.
These are small instruments.
The walkdown of accessible instruments of this type in containment determined they were free of interactions and had very rugged anchorage.
These were screened to the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 71.Item 147, 1-NTQ-130A, RVLIS TRAIN 'A' CONDUIT TEMPERATURE COMPENSATION COMPUTER INPUT THERMAL SENSOR 'A': The location of this detector was very close to the Reactor Vessel and was .not accessible.
It is screened based on similarity to other small instruments in containment.
These are small instruments.
The walkdown of accessible instruments of this type in containment demonstrated they were free of interactions and had very rugged anchorage.
These were screened to the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7].Item 148, 1-NTQ-130C, RVLIS TRAIN 'A' CONDUIT TEMPERATURE COMPENSATION COMPUTER INPUT THERMAL SENSOR 'C': The location of this detector was very close to the Reactor Vessel and was not accessible.
It is screened based on similarity to other small instruments in containment.
These are small instruments.
The walkdown of accessible instruments of this type in containment demonstrated Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 1303208-RPT-005 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 28 of 151 they were free of interactions and had very rugged anchorage.
These were screened to the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7].The following items on the Unit 2 ESEL were screened in this manner: Item 1, 12-TK-47-AB, AB EMERGENCY DIESEL FUEL OIL STORAGE TANK: This tank is buried and, by definition, not accessible.
Per the screening criteria of Table 2-4 in EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7], the anchorage configurations of buried tanks are inherently seismically rugged and of no concern. A review of the flexibility of attached piping was performed in SQUG-12-TK-47-AB
[Ref. 22.4] and the tank was evaluated for the potential seismic wave effects for the SSE and had a stress of 3.6 ksi. Since the factor of safety is on the order of 10, this screens for the RLGM which is an earthquake that is the SSE scaled by a factor of 1.93 < 10.Item 86, 2-HV-CEQ-2 CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN SKIMMER VENTILATION FAN #2: 2-HV-CEQ-2 is a large fan unit with very rugged anchorage.
This was walked down during the NTTF 2.3 effort and the walkdown documented in the Reference 15 report. The anchorage was in good condition and there were no potential adverse interactions.
This was unchanged from the condition documented in SQUG-2-HV-CEQ-2
[Ref. 22.5]. Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL per meeting the GIP caveats [Ref. 30] as documented in SQUG-2-HV-CEQ-2
[Ref. 22.5]. A bounding analysis was performed in SQUG-1-HV-CEQ-1
[Ref. 22.2] and had a margin of 7.7 > 1.93 RLGM factor.Therefore this screens.Item 97, 2-IMO-128, REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #2 HOT LEG TO RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL PUMPS SUCTION SHUTOFF VALVE: This valve is inside the Unit 2 Containment and was not accessible during the walkdown effort, screened based on the walkdown of 1-IMO-128.
Per the USI A-46 SEWS [Ref. 22.8], body and yoke is steel. Pipe diameter is 14". Measured offset = 64" <80" limit from Figure F-26 of EPRI-NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7]. Weight of operator = 460# maximum <750# limit Figure F-26 of EPRI- NP-6041-SL [Ref. 7]. Therefore, valve is screened for 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL [Ref. 7].Item 101, 2-LDISB-B10, CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B'GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B10: This Hydrogen igniter is inside the Unit 2 Containment and was not accessible during the NTTF 2.1 walkdowns.
It was screened based on comparison to all the other 1-LDISB assemblies walkdown that had no adverse interactions, very rugged anchorage and contained rugged components.
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 29 of 151 Item 102, 2-LDISB-B11, CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B'GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B1 1: This Hydrogen igniter is inside the Unit 2 Containment and was not accessible during the NTTF 2.1 walkdowns.
It was screened based on comparison to all the other 1-LDISB assemblies walkdown that had no adverse interactions, very rugged anchorage and contained rugged components.
Item 103, 2-LDISB-B12, CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B'GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B12: This Hydrogen igniter is inside the Unit 2 Containment and was not accessible during the NTTF 2.1 walkdowns.
It was screened based on comparison to all the other 1-LDISB assemblies walkdown that had no adverse interactions, very rugged anchorage and contained rugged components.
Item 104, 2-LDISB-B18, CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B'GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B18: This Hydrogen igniter is inside the Unit 2 Containment and was not accessible during the NTTF 2.1 walkdowns.
It was screened based on comparison to all the other 1-LDISB assemblies walkdown that had no adverse interactions, very rugged anchorage and contained rugged components.
Item 105, 2-LDISB-B19, CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B'GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B19: This Hydrogen igniter is inside the Unit 2 Containment and was not accessible during the NTTF 2.1 walkdowns.
It was screened based on comparison to all the other 1-LDISB assemblies walkdown that had no adverse interactions, very rugged anchorage and contained rugged components.
Item 106, 2-LDISB-B20, CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B'GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B20: This Hydrogen igniter is inside the Unit 2 Containment and was not accessible during the NTTF 2.1 walkdowns.
It was screened based on comparison to all the other 1-LDISB assemblies walkdown that had no adverse interactions, very rugged anchorage and contained rugged components.
Item 107, 2-LDISB-B21, CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B'GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B21 This Hydrogen igniter is inside the Unit 2 Containment and was not accessible during the NTTF 2.1 walkdowns.
It was screened based on comparison to all the other 1-LDISB assemblies Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 30 of 151 walkdown that had no adverse interactions, very rugged anchorage and contained rugged components.
Item 108, 2-LDISB-B22, CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B'GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B22 This Hydrogen igniter is inside the Unit 2 Containment and was not accessible during the NTTF 2.1 walkdowns.
It was screened based on comparison to all the other 1-LDISB assemblies walkdown that had no adverse interactions, very rugged anchorage and contained rugged components.
Item 109, 2-LDISB-B23, CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B'GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B23 This Hydrogen igniter is inside the Unit 2 Containment and was not accessible during the NTTF 2.1 walkdowns.
It was screened based on comparison to all the other 1-LDISB assemblies walkdown that had no adverse interactions, very rugged anchorage and contained rugged components.
Item 114, 2-LDISB-B28, CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B'GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B28 This Hydrogen igniter is inside the Unit 2 Containment and was not accessible during the NTTF 2.1 walkdowns.
It was screened based on comparison to all the other 1-LDISB assemblies walkdown that had no adverse interactions, very rugged anchorage and contained rugged components.
Item 116, 2-LDISB-B8 CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B'IGNITER ASSEMBLY #B8 This Hydrogen igniter is inside the Unit 2 Containment and was not accessible during the NTTF 2.1 walkdowns.
It was screened based on comparison to all the other 1-LDISB assemblies walkdown that had no adverse interactions, very rugged anchorage and contained rugged components.
Item 117, 2-LDISB-B9 CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B'GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B9 This Hydrogen igniter is inside the Unit 2 Containment and was not accessible during the NTTF 2.1 walkdowns.
It was screened based on comparison to all the other 1-LDISB assemblies walkdown that had no adverse interactions, very rugged anchorage and contained rugged components.
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 31 of 151 Item 136, 2-NPS-121, REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #2 HOT LEG.WIDE RANGE PRESSURE TRANSMITTER This was a late addition to the ESEL after the walkdowns were completed as a result of reviews to changes in the August FLEX strategy.
Per the USI A-46 walkdown SEWS the transmitter is mounted on a small floor mounted pipe stand anchored to the reinforced concrete floor with expansion anchors. The installation for 1-NPS-121, 1-NPS-122, 2-NPS-121 and 2-NPS-122 are similar. An ANCHOR analysis [Ref. 22.6] for this installation indicated a factor of safety of 4.0 which is above the RLGM screening level which is the SSE times a factor of 1.93.Item 137, 2-NPS-122, REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #1 HOT LEG WIDE RANGE PRESSURE TRANSMITTER This was a late addition to the ESEL after the walkdowns were completed as a result of reviews to changes in the August FLEX strategy.
Per the USI A-46 walkdown SEWS the transmitter is mounted on a small floor mounted pipe stand anchored to the reinforced concrete floor with expansion anchors. The installation for 1-NPS-121, 1-NPS-122, 2-NPS-121 and 2-NPS-122 are similar. It is noted that the Foxboro transmitters for 1-NPS-121 and 2-NPS-122 in place during the USI A-46 walkdowns have been replaced with Rosemount transmitters but used the same mounting.
An ANCHOR analysis [Ref. 22.7] for this installation indicated a factor of safety of 2.7 which is above the RLGM screening level which is the SSE times a factor of 1.93.Item 138, 2-NRI-21, NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION CHANNEL I WIDE RANGE RADIATION DETECTOR The location of this detector was very close to the Reactor Vessel and was not accessible.
It is screened based on similarity to other small instruments in the Unit 1 containment.
These are small instruments.
The walkdown of accessible instruments of this type in containment determined they were free of interactions and had very rugged anchorage, These were screened to the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7].Item 140, 2-NRV-152, PRESSURIZER TRAIN 'B' PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE This valve was inaccessible.
It is in the Unit 2 Pressurizer doghouse that was not accessible during the NTTF 2.1 walkdowns.
Screened based on comparison to 1-NRV-152.
The equipment screens for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7]. Offset for operator 40" within Earthquake Experience Data of Figure F-25 of EPRI NP-6041-SL, pipe Diameter 3".Item 141, 2-NRV-1 53, PRESSURIZER OME-4 TRAIN 'A' PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE This valve was inaccessible.
It is in the Unit 2 Pressurizer doghouse that was not accessible during the NTTF 2.1 walkdowns.
Screened based on comparison to 1-NRV-153.
The equipment screens for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7]. Offset for Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 32 of 151 operator 40" within Earthquake Experience Data of Figure F-25 of EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7], pipe Diameter 3".Item 142, 2-NTQ-1 10A, RVLIS TRAIN 'A' UPPER TAP TEMPERATURE COMPENSATION COMPUTER INPUT THERMAL SENSOR 'A'The location of this detector was very close to the Reactor Vessel and was not accessible.
It is screened based on similarity to other small instruments in the Unit 1 containment.
These are small instruments.
The walkdown of accessible instruments of this type in containment determined they were free of interactions and had very rugged anchorage.
These were screened to the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7].Item 143, 2-NTQ-11OB, RVLIS TRAIN 'A' UPPER TAP TEMPERATURE COMPENSATION COMPUTER INPUT THERMAL SENSOR 'B'The location of this detector was very close to the Reactor Vessel inside the Crane Wall and was not accessible.
It is screened based on similarity to other small instruments in the Unit 1 containment.
These are small instruments.
The walkdown of accessible instruments of this type in containment determined they were free of interactions and had very rugged anchorage.
These were screened to the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7].Item 144, 2-NTQ-130A, RVLIS TRAIN 'A' CONDUIT TEMPERATURE COMPENSATION COMPUTER INPUT THERMAL SENSOR 'A'The location of this detector was very close to the Reactor Vessel and was not accessible.
It is screened based on similarity to other small instruments in the Unit 1 containment.
These are small instruments.
The walkdown of accessible instruments of this type in containment determined they were free of interactions and had very rugged anchorage.
These were screened to the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7].Item 145, 2-NTQ-130CRVLIS TRAIN 'A' CONDUIT TEMPERATURE COMPENSATION COMPUTER INPUT SPARE THERMAL SENSOR 'C'The location of this detector was very close to the Reactor Vessel and was not accessible.
It is screened based on similarity to other small instruments in the Unit 1 containment.
These are small instruments.
The walkdown of accessible instruments of this type in containment determined they were free of interactions and had very rugged anchorage.
These were screened to the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7].Item 146, 2-NTR-1 10, REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #1 HOT LEG WIDE RANGE TEMPERATURE RECORDER THERMAL SENSOR This small temperature sensor was inaccessible during the NTTF 2.1 walkdowns.
It is in lower Containment, inside the Crane Wall and is only Accessible during an Outage. It was screened based on comparison to 1-NTR-110 and the other similar NTR's in the CNP Unit 1 Containment.
It is a Conax Corp. Model 7H57-10000-01 Thermal Sensor, IEEE-344-1975 qualified by Conax Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 33 of 151 Corp. Seismic Analysis Report #IPS-943.
Rugged component with no seismic interaction concerns.
Equipment screens for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7].Item 147, 2-NTR-130, REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #3 HOT LEG WIDE RANGE TEMPERATURE RECORDER THERMAL SENSOR This small temperature sensor was inaccessible during the NTTF 2.1 walkdowns.
It is in lower Containment, inside the Crane Wall and is only Accessible during an Outage. It was screened based on comparison to 1-NTR-130 and the other similar NTR's in the CNP Unit 1 Containment.
It is a Conax Corp. Model 7H57-10000-01 Thermal Sensor, IEEE-344-1975 qualified by Conax Corp. Seismic Analysis Report #IPS-943.
Rugged component with no seismic interaction concerns.
Equipment screens for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7].Item 148, 2-NTR-210 REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #1 COLD LEG WIDE RANGE TEMPERATURE RECORDER THERMAL SENSOR This small temperature sensor was inaccessible during the NTTF 2.1 walkdowns.
It is in lower Containment, inside the Crane Wall and is only Accessible during an Outage. It was screened based on comparison to 1-NTR-210 and the other similar NTR's in the CNP Unit 1 Containment.
It is a Conax Corp. Model 7H57-10000-01 Thermal Sensor, IEEE-344-1975 qualified by Conax Corp. Seismic Analysis Report #IPS-943.
Rugged component with no seismic interaction concerns.
Equipment screens for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7].Item 149, 2-NTR-230, REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #3 COLD LEG WIDE RANGE TEMPERATURE RECORDER THERMAL SENSOR This small temperature sensor was inaccessible during the NTTF 2.1 walkdowns.
It is in lower Containment, inside the Crane Wall and is only accessible during an Outage. It was screened based on comparison to 1-NTR-230 and the other similar NTR's in the CNP Unit 1 Containment.
It is a Conax Corp. Model 7H57-10000-01 Thermal Sensor, IEEE-344-1975 qualified by Conax Corp. Seismic Analysis Report #IPS-943.
Rugged component with no seismic interaction concerns.
Equipment screens for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7].Item 152, 2-OME-6-1, ACCUMULATOR TANK #1 This Accumulator Tank was added to the ESEL after the entry to the CNP Unit 2 containment was made. It is in lower Containment.
It was screened based on comparison to 1-OME-6-1 and the other similar Accumulator Tanks in the CNP Unit 1 Containment.
These were all found to be free from adverse seismic interactions during the walkdowns of the CNP Unit 1 Accumulators.
A screening calculation was performed for the anchorage and had a very high margin above the RLGM. There was some minor rust found on some bases of the CNP Unit 1 Accumulators but none rose to a concern regarding its seismic capacity.
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 34 of 151 Item 153, 2-OME-6-2, ACCUMULATOR TANK #2 This Accumulator Tank was added to the ESEL after the entry to the CNP Unit 2 containment was made. It is in lower Containment.
It was screened based on comparison to 1-OME-6-2 and the other similar Accumulator Tanks in the CNP Unit 1 Containment.
These were all found to be free from adverse seismic interactions during the walkdowns of the CNP Unit 1 Accumulators.
A screening calculation was performed for the anchorage and had a very high margin above the RLGM. There was some minor rust found on some bases of the CNP Unit 1 Accumulators but none rose to a concern regarding its seismic capacity.Item 154, 2-OME-6-3, ACCUMULATOR TANK #3 This Accumulator Tank was added to the ESEL after the entry to the CNP Unit 2 containment was made. It is in lower Containment.
It was screened based on comparison to 1-OME-6-3 and the other similar Accumulator Tanks in the CNP Unit 1 Containment.
These were all found to be free from adverse seismic interactions during the walkdowns of the CNP Unit 1 Accumulators.
A screening calculation was performed for the anchorage and had a very high margin above the RLGM. There was some minor rust found on some bases of the CNP Unit 1 Accumulators but none rose to a concern regarding its seismic capacity.Item 155, 2-OME-6-4, ACCUMULATOR TANK #4 This Accumulator Tank was added to the ESEL after the entry to the CNP Unit 2 containment was made. It is in lower Containment.
It was screened based on comparison to 1-OME-6-4 and the other similar Accumulator Tanks in the CNP Unit 1 Containment.
These were all found to be free from adverse seismic interactions during the walkdowns of the CNP Unit 1 Accumulators.
A screening calculation was performed for the anchorage and had a very high margin above the RLGM. There was some minor rust found on some bases of the CNP Unit 1 Accumulators but none rose to a concern regarding its seismic capacity.Item 196, 2-TK-253-1, PRESSURIZER TRAIN 'A' PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE NRV-153 RESERVE CONTROL AIR TANK This small horizontal tank was inaccessible during the NTTF 2.1 walkdowns.
It is in lower Containment, inside the Crane Wall and is only accessible during an Outage. It is screened based on comparison to 1-TK-253-1 and the USI A-46 evaluation performed for this component.
This horizontal tank contains air and is supported by other than standard saddles. Anchorage:
Tank is sufficiently welded to building steel, and is more than adequate for the RLGM.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL [Ref. 7] by meeting the GIP caveats [Ref. 30] as documented in Reference 22.9. The anchorage of the small tank is more than adequate for the RLGM for this relatively small tank.
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 35 of 151 Item 197, 2-TK-253-2, PRESSURIZER TRAIN 'B' PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE NRV-152 RESERVE CONTROL AIR TANK This small horizontal tank inaccessible during the NTTF 2.1 walkdowns, it is in lower Containment, inside the Crane Wall and is only accessible during an Outage. It is screened based on comparison to 1-TK-253-1 and the USI A-46 evaluation performed for this component.
This horizontal tank contains air and is supported by other than standard saddles. Anchorage:
Tank is sufficiently welded to building steel, and is more than adequate for the RLGM.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL [Ref. 7] by meeting the GIP caveats [Ref. 30] as documented in Reference 22.10. The anchorage of the small tank is more than adequate for the RLGM for this relatively small tank.All non-energized cabinets were opened when specialized tools were not needed to operate the cabinet doors. Photos were taken during the walkdowns.
The existing calculations and SEWS from the USI A-46 evaluation of CNP [Ref. 16] were utilized to aid the SRT in their screening decisions as indicated in Attachments C and D of this report.6.3.3 Significant Walkdown Findings Consistent with the guidance from EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7], there were two findings noted during the CNP ESEP walkdowns relative to the site RLGM ISRS: 1. The three Boric Acid Storage Tanks (BASTs); 1-TK-12N, 2-TK-12S and 12-TK-12M, were found to have an anchorage HCLPF of 0.227g < 0.387g RLGM.2. BAST Level Alarm Transmitters; 1-QLA-410, 12-QLA-420, 2-QLA-430, BAST Heater Temperature Controllers; 1-QTC-410, 2-QTC-430, 12-QTC-420, and BAST Transfer Pumps; 1-PP-46-1 and 2-PP-46-4, were determined to have a HCLPF of 0.227g <0.387g RLGM due to seismic interaction with the three Boric Acid Storage Tanks.Several block walls were identified in the proximity of ESEL equipment.
These block walls were assessed for their structural adequacy to withstand the seismic loads resulting from the RLGM[Ref. 10.1]. For any cases where the block wall represented the HCLPF failure mode for an ESEL item, it is noted in the tabulated HCLPF values described in Section 6.6.6.4 HCLPF Calculation Process ESEL items were evaluated using the criteria in EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7]. Those evaluations included the following steps:* Performing seismic capability walkdowns for equipment to evaluate the equipment installed plant conditions.
* Performing screening evaluations using the screening tables in EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref.7] as described in Section 6.2.
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 36 of 151 Performing HCLPF calculations considering various failure modes that include both structural failure modes (e.g. anchorage, load path etc.) and functional failure modes.All HCLPF calculations were performed using the CDFM methodology and are documented in S&A calculations 13Q3208-CAL-004
[Ref. 10.1], 13Q3208-CAL-005
[Ref. 10.2], and 13Q3208-CAL-006 [Ref. 10.3].Anchorage configurations for non-valve components were evaluated either by SRT judgment, large margins in existing design basis calculations, or CDFM based on HCLPF calculations
[Refs. 10.1, 10.2 and 10.3]. The results of these analysis methods are documented in Attachment C and D for CNP Unit 1 and CNP Unit 2 respectively.
For components beyond 40 ft. above grade, Table 2-4 of EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7] is not directly applicable.
Per Reference 2, the ESEP Guidance, screening for equipment below 40 ft. above grade is per the screening lanes contained in Tables 2-3 and 2-4 of EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7]. Since the peak of the RLGM established for the ESEP walkdowns is < 0.8g as shown in Figure 5-1, the 0.8g screening lane may be used for all equipment at or below about 40 ft. above grade. Grade has been established for CNP at El. 608 ft. per Reference
: 16. Due to the significant margin between the peak spectral acceleration of the screening lane (0.80g) and the peak of the RLGM (0.62g), equipment up to an elevation of 651 ft. meets the "about" 40 ft. limitation.
Therefore, for equipment at elevations 651 ft. and below this screening is applicable.
All of the equipment in the ESEL for CNP Unit 1 and CNP Unit 2 other than some upper containment hydrogen igniters (1 & 2-UDISB components) are at Elevation 651 ft. or below.The limiting hydrogen igniters were addressed in the Reference 10.3 HCLPF calculation.
These were the assemblies supported by the CNP Unit 1 and CNP Unit 2 catwalks in upper containment.
The limiting HCLPF for these items were shown to be above the defined ISRS for the RLGM.As described in Section 6.0, HCLPF calculations used the CDFM analysis criteria established in Section 6 of EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7] and are used for the detailed analysis of components.
The relevant CDFM criteria from EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7] are summarized in Table 6-1.
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 37 of 151.Table 6-4: CNP CDFM Criteria Load combination:
Normal + seismic margin earthquake (SME)Ground response spectrum:
Conservatively specified (84% non-exceedance probability)
Damping: Conservative estimate of median damping.Structural model: Best estimate (median) + uncertainty variation in frequency.
Code specified minimum strength or 95% exceedance of Material strength:
actual strength if test data is available.
Code ultimate strength (ACI), maximum strength (AISC), Service Level D (ASME) or functional limits. If test data is Static capacity equations:
available to demonstrate excessive conservatism of code equations then use 84% exceedance of test data for capacity equations.
For non-brittle failure modes and linear analysis, use 80% of Inelastic energy absorption:
computed seismic stress in capacity evaluation to account for ductility benefits or perform nonlinear analysis and use 95%exceedance ductility levels.The HCLPF capacity is equal to the PGA at which the strength limit is reached. The HCLPF earthquake load is calculated as follows: U = Normal + Ec Where: 0 0 U = Ultimate strength per Section 6 of EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7]Ec = HCLPF earthquake load* Normal = Normal operating loads (dead and live load expected to be present, etc.)For this calculation, the HCLPF earthquake load is related to a fixed reference earthquake:
Ec = SFc*Eref Where: " Eref = reference earthquake from the relevant in-structure response spectrum (ISRS)* SFc = component-specific scale factor that satisfies U = Normal +Ec Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 38 of 151 The HCLPF will be defined as the PGA produced by Ec. Because the CNP RLGM PGA is 0.387g: HCLPF = 0.387g*SFc
 
===6.5 Functional===
 
Evaluation of Relays As discussed in the NTTF Recommendation
 
===2.1 guidance===
[Ref. 2], the ESEL was to contain all relays and switches which may negatively "seal in" or "lock out" on the CNP ESEL [Ref. 25]. As discussed in Section 3.1.7 of this report none were identified and therefore, there were no HCLPFs for the Functional Evaluation of Relays calculated.
 
===6.6 Tabulated===
 
ESEL HCLPF values (including Key failure modes)Tabulated ESEL HCLPF values including the key failure modes are included in Attachment C for Unit 1 and D for Unit 2. The following notes apply to the information in the tables.* For items screened out using EPRI NP 6041-SL [Ref. 7] screening tables, the listed HCLPF is set to be equal to the RLGM PGA (0.387g) and the failure mode is listed as"Screened"." For items where anchorage controls the HCLPF value, and the HCLPF is less than the RLGM PGA (0.387g), the HCLPF value is listed in the table and the failure mode is set to "Anchorage".
When the anchorage HCLPF turned out to be above the RLGM PGA (0.387g), but controlled the HCLPF for the component then the value was also included in the summary tables. When the calculated HCLPF is determined to be well above the RLGM PGA (0.387g) and not limiting the failure mode, it is listed as "Screened" along with a note providing the anchorage HCLPF.* For items where interaction controls the HCLPF value, and the HCLPF is less than the RLGM PGA (0.387g), the HCLPF value is listed in the table and the failure mode is set to "Interaction".
When the interaction HCLPF turned out to be above the RLGM PGA (0.387g), the listed HCLPF is set to be equal to the RLGM PGA (0.387g) and the failure mode is listed as "Screened" along with a note providing the interaction HCLPF. It is noted that interaction did not control any HCLPFs except for those where the HCLPF was below the RLGM.
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 39 of 151 7.0 Inaccessible Items and Late Additions to the ESEL 7.1 Identification of Inaccessible Items and Late Additions to the ESEL There were equipment items for which walkdowns were not performed and therefore, no SEWS were completed.
Some of these items were late add-ons to the ESEL as a result of implementing the August 2014 FLEX strategy [Ref. 29].Unit 1 Items include:* ESEL Item 9, 12-QTC-420, MIDDLE BAST TK-12M TRAIN 'A' HTR TEMP CONTROLLER.
It is noted that the HCLPF for this equipment item is limited by the HCLPF for the middle Boric Acid Storage Tank due to Seismic Interaction.
The HCLPF for the tank was calculated in 13Q3208-CAL-005 to be 0.227g, (Ref. 10.2) and is less than the RLGM of 0.387g and therefore, 12-QTC-420 will not screen.* ESEL Item 76, 1-FMO-211, TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEED PUMP PP-4 DISCHARGE TO STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-1 CONTROL VALVE* ESEL Item 77, 1-FMO-221, TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEED PUMP PP-4 DISCHARGE TO STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-2 CONTROL VALVE" ESEL Item 78, 1-FMO-231, TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEED PUMP SUPPLY TO STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-3 CONTROL VALVE" ESEL Item 79, 1-FMO-241, TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEED PUMP SUPPLY TO STEAM GENERATOR OME-4-4 CONTROL VALVE" ESEL Item 95, 1-ICM-321, WEST RHR TO REACTOR COOLANT LOOPS #2 AND #3 HOTLEGS CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE Unit 2 Items include:* ESEL Item 73, 2-FMO-21 1, TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEED PUMP PP-4 DISCHARGETO STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-1 CONTROL VALVE* ESEL Item 74, 2-FMO-221, TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEED PUMP PP-4 DISCHARGE TO STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-2 CONTROL VALVE* ESEL Item 75, 2-FMO-231, TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEED PUMP SUPPLY TO STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-3 CONTROL VALVE* ESEL Item 76, 2-FMO-241, TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEED PUMP SUPPLY TO STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-4 CONTROL VALVE* ESEL Item 89, 2-1CM-1 11, RHR TO REACTOR COOLANT LOOPS #2 & #3 COLD LEGS CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE* ESEL Item 92, 2-ICM-321, WEST RHR TO REACTOR COOLANT LOOPS #2 AND #3 COLD LEGS CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 40 of 151 There were also items inaccessible during the screening walkdowns (e.g. items in the Unit 2 Lower Containment, inside the Crane Wall that are not accessible except during an outage).Section 6.3.2 of this report includes a listing and discussion of the items for which a walkdown was not performed and therefore SEWS were not prepared.
These items were screened in accordance with the EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7] guidance.
There were also two items for which walkdowns were not performed that have been screened based on the results of the NTTF Recommendation
 
===2.3 walkdowns===
 
[Ref. 18]. The implementation guidance contained in EPRI 3002000704
[Ref. 2] allows use of recent walkdown data including the NTTF 2.3 walkdowns.
The basis for this screening is included in 6.3.2.7.2 Planned Walkdown / Evaluation Schedule / Close Out The schedule for performing walkdowns for the inaccessible and late addition components as listed in Section 7.1 is during the Unit 2 Refueling Outage U2C22 scheduled for the spring 2015.The screening and evaluation of these components will be complete within 90 days following the conclusion of the U2C22 refueling outage. The actions associated with these tasks are included in Section 8.4.
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 41 of 151 8.0 ESEP Conclusions and Results 8.1 Supporting Information CNP has performed the ESEP as an interim action in response to the NRC's 50.54(0 letter [Ref.1]. It was performed using the methodologies in the NRC endorsed guidance in EPRI 3002000704
[Ref. 2].The ESEP provides an important demonstration of seismic margin and expedites plant safety enhancements through evaluations and potential near-term modifications of plant equipment that can be relied upon to protect the reactor core following beyond design basis seismic events.The ESEP is part of the overall CNP response to the NRC's 50.54(f) letter [Ref. 1]. On March 12, 2014, NEI submitted to the NRC results of a study [Ref. 12] of seismic core damage risk estimates based on updated seismic hazard information as it applies to operating nuclear reactors in the Central and Eastern United States (CEUS). The study concluded that "site-specific seismic hazards show that there has not been an overall increase in seismic risk for the fleet of U.S. plants" based on the re-evaluated seismic hazards. As such, the "current seismic design of operating reactors continues to provide a safety margin to withstand potential earthquakes exceeding the seismic design basis."'The NRC's May 9, 2014 NTTF 2.1 Screening and Prioritization letter [Ref. 13] concluded that the "fleetwide seismic risk estimates are consistent with the approach and results used in the GI-199 safety/risk assessment." The letter also stated that "As a result, the staff has confirmed that the conclusions reached in GI-1 99 safety/risk assessment remain valid and that the plants can continue to operate while additional evaluations are conducted." An assessment of the change in seismic risk for CNP was included in the fleet risk evaluation submitted in the March 12, 2014 NEI letter [Ref. 12] therefore, the conclusions in the NRC's May 9 letter [Ref. 131 also apply to CNP.In addition, the March 12, 2014 NEI letter [Ref. 12] provided an attached "Perspectives on the Seismic Capacity of Operating Plants," which (1) assessed a number of qualitative reasons why the design of Structures, Systems, and Components (SSCs) inherently contain margin beyond their design level, (2) discussed industrial seismic experience databases of performance of industry facility components similar to nuclear SSCs, and (3) discussed earthquake experience at operating plants.The fleet of currently operating nuclear power plants was designed using conservative practices, such that the plants have significant margin to withstand large ground motions safely.
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 42 of 151 This has been borne out of those plants that have actually experienced significant earthquakes.
The seismic design process has inherent (and intentional) conservatisms which result in significant seismic margins within SSCs. These conservatisms are reflected in several key aspects of the seismic design process, including: " Safety factors applied in design calculations
* Damping values used in the dynamic analysis of SSCs" Bounding synthetic time histories for in-structure response spectra calculations
* Broadening criteria for in-structure response spectra* Response spectra enveloping criteria typically used in SSC analysis and testing applications" Response spectra based frequency domain analysis rather than explicit time history based time domain analysis* Bounding requirements in codes and standards* Use of minimum strength requirements of structural components (concrete and steel)" Bounding testing requirements, and" Ductile behavior of the primary materials (that is, not crediting the additional capacity of materials such as steel and reinforced concrete beyond the essentially elastic range, etc.)These design practices combine to result in margins such that the SSCs will continue to fulfill their functions at ground motions well above the SSE.The intent of the ESEP is to perform an interim action in response to the NRC's 50.54(f) letter[Ref. 1] to demonstrate seismic margin through a review of a subset of the plant equipment that can be relied upon to protect the reactor core following beyond design basis seismic events. In order to complete the ESEP in an expedited amount of time, the RLGM used for the ESEP evaluation is a scaled version of the plant's SSE rather than the actual GMRS. To more fully characterize the risk impacts of the seismic ground motion represented by the GMRS on a plant specific basis, a more detailed seismic risk assessment (SPRA or risk-based SMA) is to be performed in accordance with EPRI 1025287 [Ref. 14]. As identified in the CNP Seismic Hazard and GMRS submittal
[Ref. 11], CNP screens in for a risk evaluation.
The complete risk evaluation will more completely characterize the probabilistic seismic ground motion input into the plant, the plant response to that probabilistic seismic ground motion input, and the resulting plant risk characterization.
CNP will complete that evaluation in accordance with the schedule identified in NEI's letter dated April 9, 2013 [Ref. 27] and endorsed by the NRC in their May 7, 2013 letter [Ref. 28].8.2 Identification of Planned Modifications There is one planned modification for each of the three Boric Acid Storage Tanks; 1-TK-12N, 2-TK-12S and 12-TK-12M that had an anchorage HCLPF of 0.227g < 0.387g RLGM [Ref. 10.3].The modification will be designed to raise the HCLPF above the RLGM. This will also raise the SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 43 of 151 interaction HCLPF for the BAST Level Alarm Transmitters; 1-QLA-410, 12-QLA-420, 2-QLA-430, the BAST Heater Temperature Controllers; 1-QTC-410, 2-QTC-430, 12-QTC-420, and for the BAST Transfer Pumps; 1-PP-46-1 and 2-PP-46-4 that is the same as that for the anchorage HCLPF for the Boric Acid Tanks.8.3 Modification Implementation Schedule Plant modifications will be performed in accordance with the schedule identified in NEI letter dated April 9, 2013 [Ref. 27], which states that plant modifications not requiring a planned refueling outage will be completed by December 31, 2016 and modifications requiring a refueling outage will be completed within two planned refueling outages after December 31, 2014.The modification of the three Boric Acid Storage Tanks, 1-TK-12N, 12-TK-12M, and 2-TK-12S, has not yet proceeded to a level of development to determine if a refueling outage is required to implement the modifications.
As such, if a refueling outage is not required to implement these modifications, modification of the three Boric Acid Storage Tanks will be complete no later than December 31, 2016. If a refueling outage is required to implement the Boric Acid Storage Tanks anchorage modifications, these modifications will be completed by the end of the second planned refueling outage after December 31, 2014. The second Unit 1 planned refueling outage after December 31, 2014 is U1C28 currently scheduled to end in the 4 th quarter 2017 and the second Unit 2 planned refueling outage after December 31, 2014 is U2C23 scheduled to end in the 4 th quarter of 2016.8.4 Summary of Actions Item Action Date Complete walkdowns for the inaccessible and Prior to restart of Unit 2 at the completion late addition components listed in Section 7.1. of its spring 2015 refueling outage.Complete screening and evaluation of the Within 90 days following restart of Unit 2 2 inaccessible and late addition components listed at the completion of its spring 2015 in Section 7.1. refueling outage.Complete ESEP plant modifications not December 31, 2016 (2 years after ESEP requiring outages. report submittal) p7azl Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 44 of 151 Item Action Date Two outages from ESEP report submittal 4 Complete ESEP plant modifications requiring (U1C28 Fall 2017)outages. (U2C23 Fall 2016)Inform the NRC that the above noted Within 60 days following completion of all 5 evaluations and modifications are complete.
above noted modifications.
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 45 of 151 9.0 References 1 NRC (E Leeds and M Johnson) Letter to All Power Reactor Licensees et al., "Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f)Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3 and 9.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-lchi Accident," March 12, 2012.2 Seismic Evaluation Guidance:
Augmented Approach for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1 -Seismic. EPRI, Palo Alto, CA: May 2013. 3002000704.
3 Order Number EA-12-049 responses:
 
===3.1 Letter===
AEP-NRC-2013-13, from J. P. Gebbie, Indiana Michigan Power Company (I&M), to the NRC, "Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant Unit 1 and Unit 2, Overall Integrated Plan in Response to March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design Basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049)", February 27, 2013 (ML13101A381).
 
===3.2 Letter===
AEP-NRC-2013-71, from J. P. Gebbie, I&M, to the NRC, "Donald C.Cook Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2, First Six-Month Status Report in Response to March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond Design- Basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049)", August 26, 2013 (ML13240A308).
 
===3.3 Letter===
AEP-NRC-2014-17, from J. P. Gebbie, I&M, to the NRC, "Donald C.Cook Nuclear Plant Units I and 2, Second Six-Month Status Report in Response to March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond Design-Basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049)", February 27, 2014 (ML14063A042).
 
===3.4 Letter===
AEP-NRC-2014-66 from J. P. Gebbie, I&M, to the NRC, "Donald C.Cook Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2, Third Six-Month Status Report in Response to March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond Design-Basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049)", August 27, 2014 (ML14241A235).
4 Stevenson
& Associates Report 13Q3208-RPT-003
-"Seismic Hazard and Screening Report for the Cook Nuclear Plant (CNP)", Rev. 1.5 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG-1407, Procedural and Submittal Guidance for the Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities, June 1991.
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 46 of 151 6 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Generic Letter No. 88-20 Supplement 4, Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities
-10CFR 50.54(f), June 1991.7 A Methodology for Assessment of Nuclear Power Plant Seismic Margin, Rev. 1, August 1991, Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA. EPRI NP-6041-SL.
8 Methodology for Developing Seismic Fragilities, August 1991, EPRI, Palo Alto, CA.1994, TR-103959.
9 American Electric Service Corporation, Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2,"Individual Plant Examination of External Events Summary Report", April, 1992.10 CNP ESEP High Confidence of Low Probability of Failure (HCLPF) Calculations:
10.1 13Q3208-CAL-004, Rev. 1, "High Confidence Low Probability of Failure (HCLPF) Calculations for Screened in ESEP Components".
10.2 13Q3208-CAL-005, Rev. 1, "High Confidence Low Probability of Failure (HCLPF) Calculations for Screened in ESEP Tanks".10.3 13Q3208-CAL-006, Rev. 1, "High Confidence Low Probability of Failure (HCLPF) Calculations for Containment Catwalk and Attached Hydrogen Glow Plugs".11 NRC Letter AEP-NRC-2014-25, March 27, 2014.12 Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), A. Pietrangelo, Letter to D. Skeen of the USNRC,"Seismic Core Damage Risk Estimates Using the Updated Seismic Hazards for the Operating Nuclear Plants in the Central and Eastern United States", March 12, 2014.13 NRC (E Leeds) Letter to All Power Reactor Licensees et al., "Screening and Prioritization Results Regarding Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(F) Regarding Seismic Hazard Re-Evaluations for Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights From the Fukushima Dai-lchi Accident," May 9, 2014.14 Seismic Evaluation Guidance:
Screening, Prioritization and Implementation Details (SPID) for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic. EPRI, Palo Alto, CA: February 2013. 1025287.15 American Electric Power Report SD-121023-001, "Seismic Walkdown Report, In Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic for the D. C. Cook Unit 1 & Unit 2," Rev. 2, January 13, 2014.16 AEP Report, AEP:NRC:1040C, "Response to NRC G.L. 87-02 Unresolved Safety Issue A-46", AEPSC Task Group, January 1996.17 CNP Design Basis In-Structure Response Spectra:
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014
* Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 47 of 151 17.1 DC-D-3050-1 1-SC, "Seismic Analysis of the Auxiliary Building Complex", Revision 1, Jan. 12, 2000.17.2 SD-000204-004, "Validation and Development of Turbine Building Response Spectra", Revision 0, March 28, 2000.17.3 SD-991008-001, "Seismic Response Spectra for Containment Building", Revision 0, Feb. 26, 2000.17.4 Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant Nuclear Safeguards Design Memo, "Floor Response Curves for EL 591 ft. of Turbine Building & Screenhouse", Correspondence
# 03-23-1971, March 23, 1971.18 American Electric Power, "In Response to the 50.45(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic for the D. C. Cook Unit 1 and 2," Report SD-121023-01, Rev. 2.19 Seismic Fragility Applications Guide Update, December 2009, EPRI, Palo Alto, CA.1994, 1019200.20 Stevenson
& Associates Report 13Q3208-RPT-004, Rev. 0, "ESEP Walkdown and Screening Report for the Cook Nuclear Plant (CNP)".21 Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Rev. 25.22 SQUG USI A-46 Component Specific Documentation 22.1 SQUG-1-HV-CEQ-2, Rev. 0 (USI A-46 SEWS).22.2 SQUG-1-HV-CEQ-1, Rev. 0 (USI A-46 SEWS).22.3 SQUG-12-TK-47-CD, Rev. 0 (USI A-46 SEWS).22.4 SQUG-12-TK-47-AB, Rev. 0 (USI A-46 SEWS).22.5 SQUG-2-HV-CEQ-2, Rev. 0 (USI A-46 SEWS).22.6 SQUG-2-NPS-121, Rev. 0 (USI A-46 SEWS).22.7 SQUG-2-NPS-122, Rev. 0 (USI A-46 SEWS).22.8 SQUG-2-IMO-128, Rev. 0 (USI A-46 SEWS).22.9 SQUG-2-TK-253-1, Rev. 0 (USI A-46 SEWS).22.10 SQUG-2-TK-253-2, Rev. 0 (USI A-46 SEWS).23 Stevenson
& Associates Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-002, Rev. 2, "Response Spectra for Cook Nuclear Plant (CNP) Units 1 & 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP)Evaluations".
24 NEI 12-06, Rev. 0, "Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) Implementation Guide", Aug. 2012.
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 48 of 151 25 Stevenson
& Associates Report 13Q3208-RPT-001, Rev. 4, "Report on Expedited Seismic Equipment List." 26 D.C. Cook P&ID Drawings 26.1 CNP Drawing OP-1-5105D, Rev. 10, "Steam Generating System".26.2 CNP Drawing OP-1-5105E, Rev. 1, "Main Steam".26.3 CNP Drawing OP-1-5106A, Rev. 60, "Auxiliary Feedwater".
26.4 CNP Drawing OP-1-5113, Rev. 92, "Essential Service Water".26.5 CNP Drawing OP-1-5113A, Rev. 9, "Essential Service Water".26.6 CNP Drawing OP-1-5143, Rev. 76, "Emergency Core Cooling (RHR) Unit No. 1".26.7 CNP Drawing OP-1-5135, Rev. 42, "Component Cooling Water Pumps and Component Cooling Water Heat Exchangers".
26.8 CNP Drawing OP-1-5135A, Rev. 43, "Component Cooling Water Safety Related Loads".26.9 CNP Drawing OP-1-5143A, Rev. 5, "Emergency Core Cooling (RHR)Accumulator Piping".26.10 CNP Drawing OP-12-5131, Rev. 47, "Chemical
& Volume Control System Boron Make Up".26.11 CNP Drawing OP-1-5129, Rev. 61, "Chemical
& Volume Control System Reactor Letdown & Charging".
26.12 CNP Drawing OP-1-5142, Rev. 45, "Emergency Core Cooling (SIS)".26.13 CNP Drawing OP-1-5128, Rev. 30, "Reactor Coolant Sheet 1 of 2".26.14 CNP Drawing OP-1-5128A, Rev. 54, "Reactor Coolant -Sheet 2 of 2".26.15 CNP Drawing OP-1-5120D, Rev. 34, "Containment Control Air 85# & 50# Ring Headers".26.16 CNP Drawing OP-1-5151C, Rev. 54, "Emergency Diesel Generator CD".26.17 CNP Drawing OP-1-5148C, Rev. 30, "Flow Diagram Diesel Generator Area &Electrical Switchgear Rooms Heating & Ventilation Sys Unit 1".26.18 CNP Drawing OP-1-5149, Rev. 46, "Control Room Ventilation Unit No. 1".26.19 CNP Drawing OP-2-5105D, Rev. 22, "Steam Generating System".26.20 CNP Drawing OP-2-5105E, Rev. 1, "Main Steam".26.21 CNP Drawing OP-2-5106A, Rev. 55, "Auxiliary Feedwater".
26.22 CNP Drawing OP-2-5113, Rev. 82, "Essential Service Water".26.23 CNP Drawing OP-2-5113A, Rev. 9, "Essential Service Water".26.24 CNP Drawing OP-2-5143, Rev. 72, "Flow Diagram Emergency Core Cooling (RHR) Unit No. 2".26.25 CNP Drawing OP-2-5135, Rev. 37, "Component Cooling Water Pumps And Component Cooling Water Heat Exchangers".
26.26 CNP Drawing OP-2-5135A, Rev. 40, "Component Cooling Water Safety Related Loads".26.27 CNP Drawing OP-2-5143A, Rev. 4, "Emergency Core Cooling (RHR)Accumulator Piping".
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 49 of 151 26.28 CNP Drawing OP-2-5129, Rev. 53, "Chemical
& Volume Control System Reactor Letdown and Charging".
26.29 CNP Drawing OP-2-5142, Rev. 51, "Emergency Core Cooling (SIS)".26.30 CNP Drawing OP-2-5128, Rev. 30, "Reactor Coolant Sheet 1 of 2".26.31 CNP Drawing OP-2-5128A, Rev. 59, "Reactor Coolant Sheet 2 of 2".26.32 CNP Drawing OP-2-5120D, Rev. 31, "Containment Control Air 85# & 50# Ring Headers".26.33 CNP Drawing OP-2-5151A, Rev. 55, "Emergency Diesel Generator "AB"".26.34 CNP Drawing OP-2-5148C, Rev. 31, "Flow Diagram Diesel Generator Area &Electrical Switchgear Rooms Heating & Ventilation Sys Unit 2".26.35 CNP Drawing OP-2-5149, Rev. 54, "Control Room Ventilation".
26.36 CNP Drawing OP-1-1 2032, Rev. 20, "MCC Auxiliary 600V Bus 11 C, 11D Engineered Safety System (Train A)".26.37 CNP Drawing OP-2-12032, Rev. 14, "MCC Auxiliary One-Line 600V Bus 21C, 21D Engineered Safety System (Train A)".27. Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), A. Pietrangelo, Letter to D. Skeen of the USNRC,"Proposed Path Forward for NTTF Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Reevaluations", April 9, 2013.28. NRC (E Leeds) Letter to NEI (J Pollock), "Electric Power Research Institute Final Draft Report xxxxx, "Seismic Evaluation Guidance:
Augmented Approach for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic," as an Acceptable Alternative to the March 12, 2012, Information Request for Seismic Reevaluations," May 7, 2013.29. FLEX Plan Input Transmittal to Stevenson
& Associates, August 25, 2014 (AEP Correspondence Control #2014-716).
: 30. "Generic Implementation Procedure (GIP) for Seismic Verification of Nuclear Plant Equipment," Revision 3, Updated May 16, 1997.
SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 50 of 151 Attachment A- CNP Unit 1 ESEL fExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 51 of 151 CNP Unit 1 ESEL CNP Equipment Operating State Unit 1 U INormal Notes / Comments ESEL ID Description Desired State Item # State 1 1-11A 600VAC BUS 11A SWITCHGEAR ENERGIZED ENERGIZED Power Available in Phase 3 Only 2 1-11B 600VAC BUS 11B SWITCHGEAR ENERGIZED ENERGIZED 3 1-11C 600VAC BUS 1 lC ENERGIZED ENERGIZED Power Available in Phase 3 Only, SWITCHGEAR 11 C1 Breaker must be manually tripped 4 1-11D 600VAC BUS 11D ENERGIZED ENERGIZED SWITCHGEAR 5 1-152- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN ENERGIZED ENERGIZED LDISB IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN >6 1-152- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN ENERGIZED ENERGIZED UDISB IGNITION UPPER VOLUME TRAIN >7 1-1A 4KV BUS 1A SWITCHGEAR ENERGIZED ENERGIZED Power Available in Phase 3 Only 8 12-QLA- MIDDLE BORIC ACID STORAGE OPERATING OPERATING BAST Level Transmitter 420 TANK TK-12M LEVEL ALARM TRANSMITTER 9 12-QTC- MIDDLE BAST TK-12M TRAIN 'A' OPERATING OPERATING BAST Temperature Transmitter 420 HTR TEMP CONTROLLER 10 12-TK- MIDDLE BORIC ACID STORAGE N/A N/A Passive Component 12M TANK 11 12-TK- CD EMERGENCY DIESELS N/A N/A Passive Component 47-CD FUEL OIL STORAGE TANK 12 1 CNTMT HYDROGEN IGNITION ENERGIZED ENERGIZED LDISB LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B> >13 1 CNTMT HYDROGEN IGNITION ENERGIZED ENERGIZED UDISB UPPER VOLUME TRAIN 'B'>14 1-88X- CNTMT HYDROGEN IGNITION NOT USED ENERGIZED LDISB LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' >15 1-88X- CNTMT HYDROGEN IGNITION NOT USED ENERGIZED UDISB UPPER VOLUME TRAIN 'B'>16 1 PLANT BATTERY BATT-AB ENERGIZED ENERGIZED ABBC DISCONNECT SWITCH 17 1 PLANT BATTERY BATT-CD ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CDBC DISCONNECT SWITCH 18 1-AB-A 600VAC MOTOR CONTROL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED Power Available in Phase 3 Only CENTER AB-A 19 1-AB-D 600VAC MOTOR CONTROL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CENTER AB-D 20 1-ABD-B 600VAC MOTOR CONTROL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CENTER ABD-B 21 1-ABD-D 600VAC MOTOR CONTROL OPERATING OPERATING RCS Level, RWST Level CENTER ABD-D 22 1-ABV-A 600VAC VALVE CONTROL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED Power Available in Phase 3 Only CENTER ABV-A SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 1303208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 52 of 151 CNP Unit 1 ESEL CNP Equipment Operating State Unit 1 1Normal Notes / Comments ESEL ID Description Desired State Item # State 23 1-AFWX 120/208VAC AUXILIARY OPERATING OPERATING RCS Level, RWST Level FEEDWATER DISTRIBUTION PANEL 24 1-AM-A 600VAC MOTOR CONTROL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED Power Available in Phase 3 Only CENTER AM-A 25 1-AZV-A 600VAC VALVE CONTROL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED Power Available in Phase 3 Only CENTER AZV-A 26 1-BA BORIC ACID CHARGING AND OPERATING OPERATING BAST Level, BAST Temperature LETDOWN CONTROL PANEL Indicators, Separately Powered 27 1-BATT- PLANT BATTERY AB ENERGIZED ENERGIZED AB 28 1-BATT- PLANT BATTERY BATT-AB ENERGIZED ENERGIZED AB-SH AMMETER SHUNT 29 1-BATT- PLANT BATTERY CD ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CD 30 1-BATT- PLANT BATTERY BATT-CD ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CD-SH AMMETER SHUNT 31 1-BC- PLANT BATTERY BATT-AB ENERGIZED ENERGIZED AB2 CHARGER #2 32 1-BC- PLANT BATTERY BATT-CD ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CD1 CHARGER#1 33 1-BCTC- PLANT BATTERY CHARGERS ENERGIZED ENERGIZED AB BC-AB1 AND BC-AB2 TRANSFER PANEL 34 1-BCTC- PLANT BATTERY CHARGERS ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CD BC-CD1 AND BC-CD2 TRANSFERPANEL 35 1-BLI- STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-1 OPERATING OPERATING SG Level Transmitter 110 WIDE RANGE LEVEL INDICATOR TRANSMITTER 36 1-BLI- STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-2 OPERATING OPERATING SG Level Transmitter 120 WIDE RANGE LEVEL INDICATOR TRANSMITTER 37 1-BLI- STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-3 OPERATING OPERATING SG Level Transmitter 130 WIDE RANGE LEVEL INDICATOR TRANSMITTER 38 1-BLI- STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-4 OPERATING OPERATING SG Level Transmitter 140 WIDE RANGE LEVEL INDICATOR TRANSMITTER 39 1-CCV- 250VDC TRAIN 'B' CRITICAL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED AB SOLENOID VALVES DISTRIBUTION PANEL 40 1-CCV- 250VDC TRAIN 'A' CRITICAL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CD SOLENOID VALVES DISTRIBUTION PANEL 41 1-CCW COMPONENT COOLING OPERATING AVAILABLE Hand Switches powered WATER CONTROL PANEL separately Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 53 of 151 CNP Unit 1 ESEL CNP Equipment Operating State UnitNormal Notes / Comments ESEL ID Description Desired State Item # State 42 1-CG1- REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING SG Level, RCS Injection Flow 14 CONTROL GROUP #1 CABINET#14 43 1-CG1- REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING BAST Level 15 CONTROL GROUP #1 CABINET#15 44 1-CG2- REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING RCS Injection Flow 17 CONTROL GROUP #2 CABINET#17 45 1-CG2- REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING RCS Injection Flow 19 CONTROL GROUP #2 CABINET Instrumentation
#19 46 1-CG3- REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING RCS Injection Flow 20 CONTROL GROUP #3 CABINET#20 47 1-CG3- REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING Containment Pressure, RWST 21 CONTROL GROUP #3 CABINET Level, BAST Level, RCS#21 Injection Flow 48 1-CG4- REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING RCS Injection Flow 22 CONTROL GROUP #4 CABINET#22 49 1-CG4- REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING SG Level 23 CONTROL GROUP #4 CABINET#23 50 1-CLI- CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK OPERATING OPERATING CST Level Transmitter 114 TK-32 LEVEL INDICATOR TRANSMITTER 51 1-CMO- COMPONENT COOLING OPEN CLOSED Local Manual Operation at the 413 WATER PUMPS SUCTION operator hand wheel is credited CROSSTIE TRAIN 'B' SHUTOFF for FLEX Response VALVE 52 1-CMO- COMPONENT COOLING OPEN CLOSED Local Manual Operation at the 414 WATER PUMPS DISCHARGE operator hand wheel is credited CROSS TIE TRAIN 'B' SHUTOFF for FLEX Response VALVE 53 1-CMO- COMPONENT COOLING OPEN CLOSED Local Manual Operation at the 416 WATER TO MISCELLANEOUS operator hand wheel is credited SERVICE TRAIN 'B' SHUTOFF for FLEX Response VALVE 54 1-CMO- WEST RESIDUAL HEAT CLOSED OPEN Power Available in Phase 3 Only 429 REMOVAL HEAT EXCHANGER COMPONENT COOLING WATER OUTLET SHUTOFF VALVE 55 1-CP CONDENSATE PUMP OPERATING OPERATING CST Level Indicator, Separately I CONTROL PANEL Powered SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 PaRe 54 of 151 CNP Unit 1 ESEL CNP Equipment Operating State Unit 1 * ..... .UnitNormal .Notes/ Comments ESEL ID Description Nm Desired State Item # State 56 1-CRID-1 120VAC CONTROL ROOM ENERGIZED ENERGIZED INSTRUMENT DISTRIBUTION CHANNEL I DISTRIBUTION PANEL 57 1-CRID- 120VAC CONTROL ROOM ENERGIZED ENERGIZED 1-INV INSTRUMENT DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM >58 1-CRID-2 120VAC CONTROL ROOM ENERGIZED ENERGIZED INSTRUMENT DISTRIBUTION CHANNEL II DISTRIBUTION PANEL 59 1-CRID- 120VAC CONTROL ROOM ENERGIZED ENERGIZED 2-INV INSTRUMENT DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM >60 1-CRID-3 120VAC CONTROL ROOM ENERGIZED ENERGIZED INSTRUMENT DISTRIBUTION CHANNEL III DISTRIBUTION PANEL 61 1-CRID- 120VAC CONTROL ROOM ENERGIZED ENERGIZED 3-INV INSTRUMENTATION DISTRIBUTION
>62 1-CRID-4 120VAC CONTROL ROOM ENERGIZED ENERGIZED INSTRUMENT DISTRIBUTION CHANNEL IV DISTRIBUTION PANEL 63 1-CRID- 120VAC CONTROL ROOM ENERGIZED ENERGIZED 4-INV INSTRUMENT DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM >64 1-DTU DELTA 'T' AND UNIT CONTROL OPERATING OPERATING RCS Temperature Recorder PANEL 65 1-ELSC 120/208VAC EMERGENCY ENERGIZED ENERGIZED LOCAL SHUTDOWN DISTRIBUTIONPANEL 66 1-EZC-B 600VAC MOTOR CONTROL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CENTER EZC-B 67 1-EZC-C 600VAC MOTOR CONTROL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED Power Available in Phase 3 Only CENTER EZC-C 68 1-EZC-D 600VAC MOTOR CONTROL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CENTER EZC-D 69 1-FFI- AUXILIARY FEEDWATER TO OPERATING OPERATING AFW Flow Transmitter 210 STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-1 FLOW INDICATOR TRANSMITTER 70 1-FFI- AUXILIARY FEEDWATER TO OPERATING OPERATING AFW Flow Transmitter 220 STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-2 FLOW INDICATOR TRANSMITTER P col Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 55 of 151 CNP Unit 1 ESEL CNP Equipment Operating State Unit 1 Normal Notes / Comments ESEL ID Description Desired State Item # State 71 1-FFI- AUXILIARY FEEDWATER TO OPERATING OPERATING AFW Flow Transmitter 230 STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-3 FLOW INDICATOR TRANSMITTER 72 1-FFI- AUXILIARY FEEDWATER TO OPERATING OPERATING AFW Flow Transmitter 240 STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-4 FLOW INDICATOR TRANSMITTER 73 1-FI FIXED INCORE CONTROL OPERATING OPERATING Core Exit Temperature Recorder PANEL 74 1-FICT-A REACTOR CORE THERMO OPERATING OPERATING Core Exit Temperature COUPLE TRAIN 'A'TRANSMITTER CABINET 75 1-FLX FLUX CONTROL PANEL OPERATING OPERATING Neutron Flux Indicator, Separately Powered 76 1-FMO- TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY THROTTLED THROTTLED Throttle position will be adjusted 211 FEED PUMP PP-4 DISCHARGE during FLEX using the local TO STEAM GENERATOR OME- manual operator hand wheel 3-1 CONTROL VALVE 77 1-FMO- TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY THROTTLED THROTTLED Throttle position will be adjusted 221 FEED PUMP PP-4 DISCHARGE during FLEX using the local TO STEAM GENERATOR OME- manual operator hand wheel 3-2 CONTROL VALVE 78 1-FMO- TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY THROTTLED THROTTLED Throttle position will be adjusted 231 FEED PUMP SUPPLY TO during FLEX using the local STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-3 manual operator hand wheel CONTROL VALVE 79 1-FMO- TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY THROTTLED THROTTLED Throttle position will be adjusted 241 FEED PUMP SUPPLY TO during FLEX using the local STEAM GENERATOR OME-4-4 manual operator hand wheel CONTROL VALVE 80 1-HE- WEST COMPONENT COOLING N/A N/A Passive Component 15W WATER HEAT EXCHANGER 81 1-HE- WEST RESIDUAL HEAT N/A N/A Passive Component 17W REMOVAL HEAT EXCHANGER 82 1-HSD1 UNIT 1 HOT SHUTDOWN ENERGIZED ENERGIZED PANEL 83 1-HV- CONTROL ROOM AIR AS NEEDED OPERATING Power Available in Phase 3 Only ACR-2 CONDITIONING SOUTH LIQUID CHILLER 84 1-HV- CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION AS NEEDED OPERATING Power Available in Phase 3 Only ACRA-2 SOUTH AIR CONDITIONINGUNIT 85 1-HV- OUTSIDE AIR TO CONTROL OPERATING OPERATING Power Available in Phase 3 Only ACR-DA- ROOM 2 PRESSURIZATION/CLEANUPFI LTER UNIT HV-ACRF VENT DAMPER SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 56 of 151 CNP Unit 1 ESEL CNP Equipment Operating State UnitNormal Notes/ Comments ESEL ID Description Desired State Item # State 86 1-HV- CONTROL ROOM N/A N/A Passive Component ACRF PRESSURIZATION/CLEANUP FILTER UNIT 87 1-HV- CONTROL ROOM AS NEEDED OPERATING Power Available in Phase 3 Only ACRF-2 PRESSURIZATION/CLEAN UP FILTER UNIT VENT FAN #2 88 1-HV- CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION OPERATING OPERATING Power Available in Phase 3 Only ACR-H2 SOUTH DUCT ELECTRIC HEATING UNIT 89 1-HV- 1-HV-CEQ-2, CONTAINMENT AS NEEDED OPERATING Power Available in Phase 3 Only CEQ-2 HYDROGEN SKIMMER VENTILATION FAN #2 90 1-HV- AB BATTERY EQUIPMENT AS NEEDED OPERATING Battery Room AB Ventilation, SGRX-5 AREA BATTERY ROOM Controlled Locally VENTILATION EXHAUST FAN 91 1-HV- CD BATTERY EQUIPMENT AS NEEDED OPERATING Battery Room CD Ventilation, SGRX-6 AREA BATTERY ROOM Controlled Locally VENTILATIONEXHAUST FAN 92 1-1CM- RHR TO REACTOR COOLANT CLOSED OPEN Power Available in Phase 3 Only 111 LOOPS #2 & #3 COLD LEGS CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE 93 1-1CM- REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #2 CLOSED OPEN Needs closure of PB 403AX 129 HOT LEG TO RESIDUAL relay permissive, Power HEATREMOVAL PUMPS Available in Phase 3 Only SUCTION CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE 94 1-1CM- BORON INJECTION TANK CLOSED OPEN Power Available in Phase 3 Only 251 TRAIN 'B' OUTLET CONTAINMENT
>95 1-1CM- WEST RHR TO REACTOR OPEN CLOSED Local Manual Operation at the 321 COOLANT LOOPS #2 AND #3 operator hand wheel is credited HOT LEGS CONTAINMENT for FLEX Response ISOLATION VALVE 96 1-IFI-51 BORON INJECTION TO OPERATING OPERATING RCS Injection Flow Transmitter REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #1 FLOW INDICATOR TRANSMITTER 97 1-IFI-52 BORON INJECTION TO OPERATING OPERATING RCS Injection Flow Transmitter REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #2 FLOW INDICATOR TRANSMITTER 98 1-IFI-53 BORON INJECTION TO OPERATING OPERATING RCS Injection Flow Transmitter REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #3 FLOW INDICATOR TRANSMITTER SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 57 of 151 CNP Unit 1 ESEL CNP Equipment Operating State Unit 1 ESEL ID Description Normal Desired State Notes / Comments Item # State 99 1-IFI-54 BORON INJECTION TO OPERATING OPERATING RCS Injection Flow Transmitter REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #4 FLOW INDICATOR TRANSMITTER 100 1-IMO- REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #2 CLOSED OPEN Needs closure of PB 405AX 128 HOT LEG TO RESIDUAL HEAT relay permissive REMOVAL PUMPS SUCTION SHUTOFF VALVE 101 1-IMO- BORON INJECTION TANK CLOSED OPEN Power Available in Phase 3 Only 256 TRAIN 'B' INLET SHUTOFF VALVE 102 1-IMO- EAST RESIDUAL HEAT OPEN CLOSED Local manual operation with the 310 REMOVAL PUMP PP-35E operator hand wheel is credited SUCTION SHUTOFF VALVE for FLEX Response 103 1-IMO- WEST RHR HX 1-HE-17W CLOSED OPEN Local manual operation with the 324 DISCHARGE CROSSTIE operator hand wheel is credited SHUTOFF VALVE for FLEX Response 104 1-LDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B19 IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B19 105 1-LDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B20 IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B20 106 1-LDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B21 IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B21 107 1-LDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B22 IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B22 108 1-LDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B23 IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B23 109 1-LDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B24 IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B24 110 1-LDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B25 IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B25 111 1-LDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B26 IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B26 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 58 of 151 CNP Unit 1 ESEL CNP Equipment Operating State Unit 1 Normal Notes Comments ESEL ID Description Desired State Item # State 112 1-LDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B27 IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B27 113 1-LDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B28 IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B28 114 1-LDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B29 IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B29 115 1-LDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B30 IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B30 116 1-LDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B31 IGINTION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B31 117 1-LDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B32 IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B32 118 1-LDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B33 IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B33 119 1-LDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B34 IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B34 120 1-LDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B35 IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B35 121 1-LSI-1 STEAM GENERATORS
#1 AND NON- REMOTE Contains SG Level Transmitter
#4 LOCAL SHUTDOWN OPERATING Transfer Relay, power N/A as STATION (REMOTE) de-energized is desired relay state 122 1-LSI-2 STEAM GENERATORS
#2 AND NON- REMOTE Contains SG Level Transmitter
#3 LOCAL SHUTDOWN OPERATING Transfer Relay, power N/A as STATION (REMOTE) de-energized is desired relay state 123 1-LSI-3 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM NON- REMOTE NPS-122 RCS Pressure CHARGING AND LETDOWN OPERATING Transmitter Transfer Relay, LOCAL SHUTDOWN STATION (REMOTE) power N/A as de-energized is I _desired relay state SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 59 of 151 CNP Unit 1 ESEL CNP Equipment Operating State Unit 1 Unita1 Notes / Comments ESEL ID Description Normal Desired State Item # State 124 1-MCAB 250VDC DISTRIBUTION PANEL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED MCAB 125 1-MCCD 250VDC DISTRIBUTION POWER OPERATING OPERATING Various Instruments PANEL 126 1-MDAB 250VDC DISTRIBUTION PANEL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED MDAB 127 1-MDCD 250VDC DISTRIBUTION PANEL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED MDCD 128 1-MPP- STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-1 OPERATING OPERATING SG Pressure Transmitter 210 CHANNEL I STEAM PRESSURE TRANSMITTER 129 1-MPP- STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-2 OPERATING OPERATING SG Pressure Transmitter 220 CHANNEL I STEAM PRESSURE TRANSMITTER 130 1-MPP- STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-3 OPERATING OPERATING SG Pressure Transmitter 230 CHANNEL I STEAM PRESSURE TRANSMITTER 131 1-MPP- STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-4 OPERATING OPERATING SG Pressure Transmitter 240 CHANNEL I STEAM PRESSURE TRANSMITTER 132 1-MRV- STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-1 CLOSED OPEN Fail Closed, Local manual 213 POWER OPERATED RELIEF operation with the operator hand VALVE wheel is credited for FLEX I Response to throttle the valve 133 1-MRV- STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-2 CLOSED OPEN Fail Closed, Local manual 223 POWER OPERATED RELIEF operation with the operator hand VALVE wheel is credited for FLEX Response to throttle the valve 134 1-MRV- STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-3 CLOSED OPEN Fail Closed, Local manual 233 POWER OPERATED RELIEF operation with the operator hand VALVE wheel is credited for FLEX Response to throttle the valve 135 1-MRV- STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-4 CLOSED OPEN Fail Closed, Local manual 243 POWER OPERATED RELIEF operation with the operator hand VALVE wheel is credited for FLEX Response to throttle the valve 136 1-NIS-l NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION OPERATING OPERATING Neutron Flux Indicator, SYSTEM PROTECTION Separately Powered CHANNEL I CONTROL PANEL 137 1-NLP- PRESSURIZER OME-4 OPERATING OPERATING Pressurizer Level Transmitter 151 PROTECTION CHANNEL I LEVELTRANSMITTER 138 1-NPS- & VER ADDED PER SETPOINT OPERATING OPERATING RCS Pressure Transmitter, also 110 PROJECT REACTOR VESSEL used for RCS Level (RVLIS)TRAIN 'A' WIDE RANGE PRESSURE TRANSMITTER SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 60 of 151 CNP Unit 1 ESEL CNP Equipment Operating State UnitNormal Notes /Comments ESEL ID Description Desired State Item # State 139 1-NPS- REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #2 OPERATING OPERATING Required for valve ICM-1 29 121 HOT LEG WIDE RANGE pressure permissive PRESSURE TRANSMITTER 140 1-NPS- REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #1 OPERATING OPERATING Required for valve IMO-128 122 HOT LEG WIDE RANGE pressure permissive PRESSURE TRANSMITTER 141 1-NRI-21 NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION OPERATING OPERATING Neutron Flux CHANNEL I WIDE RANGE RADIATION DETECTOR 142 1-NRI- NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION OPERATING OPERATING Neutron Flux 21-AMP WIDE RANGE RADIATION AMPLIFIER 143 1-NRV- PRESSURIZER TRAIN 'B' CLOSED OPEN Fail Closed 152 PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE 144 1-NRV- PRESSURIZER OME-4 TRAIN'A' CLOSED OPEN Fail Closed 153 PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE 145 1-NTQ- RVLIS TRAIN 'A' UPPER TAP OPERATING OPERATING Temperature Transmitter used 110A TEMPERATURE for RCS Level (RVLIS)COMPENSATIONCOMPUTER INPUT THERMAL SENSOR 'A'146 1-NTQ- RVLIS TRAIN 'A' UPPER TAP OPERATING OPERATING Temperature Transmitter used 110B TEMPERATURE for RCS Level (RVLIS)COMPENSATIONCOMPUTER INPUT THERMAL SENSOR 'B'147 1-NTQ- RVLIS TRAIN 'A' CONDUIT OPERATING OPERATING Temperature Transmitter used 130A TEMPERATURE for RCS Level (RVLIS)COMPENSATIONCOMPUTER INPUT THERMAL SENSOR 'A'148 1-NTQ- RVLIS TRAIN 'A' CONDUIT OPERATING OPERATING Temperature Transmitter used 130C TEMPERATURE for RCS Level (RVLIS)COMPENSATIONCOMPUTER INPUT THERMAL SENSOR 'C'149 1-NTR- REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #1 OPERATING OPERATING RCS Temperature Transmitter 110 HOT LEG WIDE RANGETEMPERATURE RECORDER THERMAL SENSOR 150 1-NTR- REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #3 OPERATING OPERATING RCS Temperature Transmitter, 130 HOT LEG WIDE also used for RCS Level (RVLIS)RANGETEMPERATURE RECORDER THERMAL SENSOR 151 1-NTR- REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #1 OPERATING OPERATING RCS Temperature Transmitter 210 COLD LEG WIDE RANGETEMPERATURE RECORDER THERMAL SENSOR Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 61 of 151 CNP Unit 1 ESEL CNP Equipment Operating State UnitNormal Notes / Comments ESEL ID Description Desired State Item # State 152 1-NTR- REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #3 OPERATING OPERATING RCS Temperature Transmitter 230 COLD LEG WIDE RANGETEMPERATURE RECORDER THERMAL SENSOR 153 1-OME- TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY N/A N/A Passive Component 33 FEED PUMP PP-4 SUCTION >154 1-OME- WEST ESSENTIAL SERVICE OPERATING OPERATING Passive component when used 34W WATER PUMP PP-7W in FLEX response DISCHARGESTRAINER 155 1-OME- ACCUMULATOR TANK #1 N/A N/A Passive Component 6-1 156 1-OME- ACCUMULATOR TANK #2 N/A N/A Passive Component 6-2 157 1-OME- ACCUMULATOR TANK #3 N/A N/A Passive Component 6-3 158 1-OME- ACCUMULATOR TANK #4 N/A N/A Passive Component 6-4 159 1-PP- WEST COMPONENT COOLING OPERATING OPERATING Power Available in Phase 3 Only loW WATER PUMP OR AVAILABLE 160 1-PP- WEST RESIDUAL HEAT AVAILABLE OPERATING Power Available in Phase 3 Only 35W REMOVAL PUMP 161 1-PP-4 TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY STOP RUN Via ROB Turbine 1-OME-39 FEED PUMP 162 1-PP BORIC ACID STORAGE TANKS NOT USED OPERATING Pump used in Phase 3 after 1 TRANSFER PUMP #1 NSRC Generator Installed 163 1-PP- CONTROL ROOM AIR AS NEEDED OPERATING Power Available in Phase 3 Only 82S CONDITIONING SOUTH CHILL WATER CIRCULATION PUMP 164 1-PPA- UPPER CONTAINMENT OPERATING OPERATING Containment Pressure 310 CHANNEL III WIDE RANGE Transmitter PRESSURE ALARM TRANSMITTER 165 1-PRZ PRESSURIZER CONTROL OPERATING OPERATING Pressurizer level Indicator PANEL Separately Powered 166 1-QLA- NORTH BORIC ACID STORAGE OPERATING OPERATING BAST Level Transmitter 410 TANK TK-12N LEVEL ALARMTRANSMITTER 167 1-QRV- CVCS CHARGING TO OPEN CLOSED Fails to desired position on loss 200 REGENERATIVE HEAT of instrument air EXCHANGER FLOW CONTROL VALVE 168 1-QT-506 TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY CLOSED OPERATING Local Manual Operation at the FEED PUMP PP-4 TRIP operator hand wheel/mechanical ANDTHROTTLE VALVE trip reset is credited for FLEX Response Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 62 of 151 CNP Unit 1 ESEL CNP Equipment Operating State Unit 1 Unita1 Notes / Comments ESEL ID Description Normal Desired State Item # State 169 1-QT-507 AUXILIARY FEED PUMP CLOSED OPERATING Control via 1-QT-507-KR TURBINE GOVERNOR VALVE governor (ROB)170 1-QTC- NORTH BAST TK-12N TRAIN 'A' OPERATING OPERATING BAST Temperature Transmitter 410 HTR TEMP CONTROLLER 171 1-RHR RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL OPERATING AVAILABLE Hand Switches powered CONTROL PANEL separately 172 1-RPC REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING AFW Flow, Pressurizer level 1 CHANNEL I CABINET #1 173 1-RPC REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING AFW Flow 2 CHANNEL I CABINET #2 174 1-RPC REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING SG Pressure 3 CHANNEL I CABINET #3 175 1-RPC REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING SG Pressure 4 CHANNEL I CABINET #4 176 1-RPC REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING RWST Level, RCS Pressure 5 CHANNEL II CABINET #5 Permissive 177 1-RPC REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING AFW Flow, RCS Temperature, 6 CHANNEL II CABINET #6 RWST Level 178 1-RPC REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING RCS Temperature 7 CHANNEL II CABINET #7 179 1-RPC REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING RCS Pressure, RCS Level 8 CHANNEL II CABINET #8 180 1-RPC REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING CST Level 10 CHANNEL III CABINET #10 181 1-RPC REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING AFW Flow, CST Level, RCS 9 CHANNEL III CABINET #9 Temperature, RCS Pressure Permissive 182 1-RPC REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING AFW Flow 12 CHANNEL IV CABINET #12 183 1-RPS-A REACTOR PROTECTION AND OPERATING OPERATING Contains portion of permissive SAFEGUARD ACTUATION circuit for ICM-1 29 TRAIN 'A' CABINET 184 1-RPS-B REACTOR PROTECTION AND OPERATING OPERATING Contains portion of permissive SAFEGUARD ACTUATION circuit for IMO-128 TRAIN 'B' CABINET 185 1-RPSX- REACTOR PROTECTION AND OPERATING OPERATING Contains PB 403AX relay A SAFEGUARD ACTUATION permissive TRAIN 'A' AUXILIARY CABINET 186 1-RPSX- REACTOR PROTECTION AND OPERATING OPERATING Contains PB 405AX relay B SAFEGUARD ACTUATION permissive TRAIN 'B' AUXILIARY CABINET 187 1-RVLC REACTOR VESSEL OME-1 OPERATING OPERATING RCS Level WATER LEVEL INSTRUMENTATION CABINET 188 1-SA STATION AUXILIARIES OPERATING AVAILABLE Hand Switches powered CONTROL PANEL I separately SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 PaRe 63 of 151 CNP Unit 1 ESEL CNP Equipment Operating State Unit 1 Notes/ Comments ESEL" ID Description Normal Desired State Item # State 189 1-SG STEAM GENERATOR AND OPERATING OPERATING AFW Flow, SG Level, and SG AUXILIARY FEED PUMP Pressure Indicators; Manual CONTROLPANEL Control of Main Steam PORVs -Note that valve position indicator and pressure indicator on valve controllers are not credited.Separate Credited SG Pressure Indicators Must be used.190 1-SIS SAFETY INJECTION CONTROL OPERATING OPERATING Control Switches, RCS Pressure PANEL Indicator, RCS Level Indicator, All Separately Powered 191 1-SPY CONTAINMENT SPRAY OPERATING OPERATING Containment Pressure Indicator, CONTROL PANEL RWST Level Recorder 192 1-SSR ENGINEER SAFETY SYSTEM OPERATING AVAILABLE Contains 1-CMO-429 AC control REAR INSTRUMENT/RELAY relay (powered separately)
RACK 193 1-SWR NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTAL OPERATING OPERATING Neutron Flux Instrumentation SOURCE RANGE N21INSTRUMENT/RELAY RACK 194 1-T11A 4KV BUS T11A SWITCHGEAR ENERGIZED ENERGIZED Power Available in Phase 3 Only, Emergency feed breaker T11A12 must be manually tripped 195 1-TDAB 250VDC TRAIN 'B' TRANSFER ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CABINET 196 1-TDCD 250VDC TRAIN 'A' TRANSFER ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CABINET 197 1-TK-11 BORON INJECTION TANK N/A N/A Passive Component 198 1-TK- NORTH BORIC ACID STORAGE N/A N/A Passive Component 12N TANK 199 1-TK- PRESSURIZER TRAIN 'B' N/A N/A Passive Component 253-1 PRESSURE RELIEF VALVENRV-152 RESERVE CONTROL AIR TANK 200 1-TK- PRESSURIZER TRAIN 'A' N/A N/A Passive Component 253-2 PRESSURE RELIEF VALVENRV-153 RESERVE CONTROL AIR TANK 201 1-TK- PRESSURIZER TRAIN 'B' N/A N/A Passive Component 253-3 PRESSURE RELIEF VLV NRV-152EMERGENCY AIR TANK 202 1-TK- PRESSURIZER TRAIN 'A' N/A N/A Passive Component 253-4 PRESSURE RELIEF VLV NRV-153EMERGENCY AIR TANK 203 1-TK- PRESSURIZER TRAIN 'B' N/A N/A Passive Component 253-5 PRESSURE RELIEF VALVENRV-152 EMERGENCY AIR TANK SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 64 of 151 CNP Unit 1 ESEL CNP Equipment Operating State UnitNormal Notes / Comments ESEL ID Description Desired State Item # State 204 1-TK- PRESSURIZER TRAIN 'A' N/A N/A Passive Component 253-6 PRESSURE RELIEF VALVENRV-153 EMERGENCY AIR TANK 205 1-TK- PRESSURIZER TRAIN 'B' N/A N/A Passive Component 253-7 PRESSURE RELIEF VALVENRV-152 EMERGENCY AIR TANK 206 1-TK- PRESSURIZER TRAIN 'A' N/A N/A Passive Component 253-8 PRESSURE RELIEF VALVENRV-153 EMERGENCY AIR TANK 207 1-TK-32 CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK N/A N/A Passive Component 208 1-TK-37 COMPONENT COOLING N/A N/A Passive Component WATER SURGE TANK 209 1-TR11A 600VAC BUS 11A SUPPLY ENERGIZED ENERGIZED Power Available in Phase 3 Only TRANSFORMER 210 1-TR- 120/208VAC AUXILIARY ENERGIZED ENERGIZED Regulating Transformer AFWX FEEDWATER DISTRIBUTION PANELAFWX REGULATING TRANSFORMER 211 1-TR- 120/208VAC EMERGENCY ENERGIZED ENERGIZED ELSC LOCAL SHUTDOWN DISTRIBUTIONPANEL ELSC SUPPLY TRANSFORMER 212 1-UDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B1 IGNITION UPPER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B1 213 1-UDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B10 IGNITION UPPER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B10 214 1-UDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B11 IGNITION UPPER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B131 215 1-UDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B12 IGNITION UPPER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B12 216 1-UDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B13 IGNITION UPPER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B133 217 1-UDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B14 IGNITION UPPER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B14 SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 65 of 151 CNP Unit 1 ESEL CNP Equipment Operating State Unit 1 Notes/ Comments ESEL ID. Description Nm Desired State Item # State 218 1-UDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B15 IGNITION UPPER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B15 219 1-UDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B16 IGNITION UPPER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #816 220 1-UDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B17 IGNITION UPPER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B17 221 1-UDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B18 IGNITION UPPER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B18 222 1-UDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B2 IGNITION UPPER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #82 223 1-UDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B3 IGNITION UPPER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #83 224 1-UDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B4 IGNITION UPPER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #84 225 1-UDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B5 IGNITION UPPER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #85 226 1-UDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B6 IGNITION UPPER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #86 227 1-UDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B7 IGNITION UPPER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #87 228 1-UDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B8 IGNITION UPPER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B8 229 1-UDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B9 IGNITION UPPER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #89 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 66 of 151 CNP Unit I ESEL CNP Equipment Operating State Unit 1 Notes/ Comments ESEL ID Description Normal Desired State Item # State 230 1-VR- LOWER CONTAINMENT TRAIN NOT USED OPERATING LDISB-4 B DISTRIBUTED IGNITION SYSTEM VOLTAGE REGULATOR 231 1-VR- UPPER CONTAINMENT TRAIN NOT USED OPERATING UDISB-3 B DISTRIBUTED IGNITION SYSTEM VOLTAGE REGULATOR 232 1-VS VENTILATION CONTROL OPERATING AVAILABLE Hand Switches powered PANEL separately 233 1-WMO- WEST CONTAINMENT SPRAY OPEN CLOSED Local Manual Operation at the 715 HEAT EXCHANGER 1-HE-18W operator hand wheel is credited ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER for FLEX Response INLET SHUTOFF VALVE 234 1-WMO- ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER CLOSED OPEN Local Manual Operation at the 753 TO TURBINE DRIVEN operator hand wheel is credited AUXILIARY FEED PUMP PP-4 for FLEX Response SHUTOFF VALVE 235 1-WRV- WEST ESW PUMP PP-7W OPEN/ CLOSED Valve Fails Closed on Loss of 762 DISCH STN EAST BASKET BAN CLOSED Air (Its Desired FLEX Position)OUT SHUTOFF VALVE 236 1-WRV- W ESW PUMP PP-7W DISCH OPEN/ CLOSED Valve Fails Closed on Loss of 767 STN EAST BASKET BAN INLET CLOSED Air (Its Desired FLEX Position)SHUTOFF VALVE 237 1-WRV- W ESW PUMP PP-7W DISCH OPEN/ CLOSED Valve Fails Closed on Loss of 772 STN WEST BASKET B/W CLOSED Air (Its Desired FLEX Position)OUTLET SHUTOFF VALVE 238 1-WRV- W ESW PUMP PP-7W DISCH OPEN/ CLOSED Valve Fails Closed on Loss of 777 STN WEST BASKET BAN INLET CLOSED Air (Its Desired FLEX Position)SHUTOFF VALVE 239 1-XRV- BACKUP AIR TO NRV-152 NOT USED REGULATING 152 PRESSURE REGULATOR
_ __1 240 1-XRV- BACKUP AIR TO NRV-153 NOT USED REGULATING 153 PRESSURE REGULATOR SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 67 of 151 Attachment B -CNP Unit 2 ESEL SAi Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 68 of 151 CNP Unit 2 ESEL CNP Equipment Operating State UnitNormal Notes/ Comments ESEL ID Description Desired State Item # State 1 12-TK- AB EMERGENCY DIESEL FUEL N/A N/A Passive Component 47-AB OIL STORAGE TANK 2 2-152- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN ENERGIZED ENERGIZED LDISB IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLIES BACKUP SUPPLY BREAKER 3 2-152- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN ENERGIZED ENERGIZED UDISB IGNITION UPPER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLIES BACKUP SUPPLY BREAKER 4 2-21A 600V BUS 21A SWITCHGEAR ENERGIZED ENERGIZED Power Available in Phase 3 Only 5 2-21B 600V BUS 21B SWITCHGEAR ENERGIZED ENERGIZED 6 2-21C 600V BUS 21C SWITCHGEAR ENERGIZED ENERGIZED Power Available in Phase 3 Only, 11C1 Breaker must be manually tripped 7 2-21D 600V BUS 21D SWITCHGEAR ENERGIZED ENERGIZED 8 2-2A 4KV BUS 2A SWITCHGEAR ENERGIZED ENERGIZED Power Available in Phase 3 Only 9 2 CNTMT HYDROGEN IGNITION ENERGIZED ENERGIZED LDISB LOWER VOLUMN TRAIN'B'GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLIES STARTER COMBO-LDISB CKT BRK 10 2 CNTMT HYDROGEN IGNITION ENERGIZED ENERGIZED UDISB UPPER VOLUME TRAIN'B'GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLIES STARTER COMBO-UDISB CKT BRK 11 2-88X- CNTMT HYDROGEN IGNITION NOT USED ENERGIZED LDISB LOWER VOLUME TRAIN'B'GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLIES STARTER COMBO-LDISB STAR CNTR 12 2-88X- CNTMT HYDROGEN IGNITION NOT USED ENERGIZED UDISB UPPER VOLUME TRAIN'B'GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLIES STARTER COMBO-UDISB CONTACTOR 13 2 PLANT BATTERY BATT-AB ENERGIZED ENERGIZED ABBC DISCONNECT SWITCH 14 2 PLANT BATTERY BATT-CD ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CDBC DISCONNECT SWITCH 15 2-AB-A 600VAC MOTOR CONTROL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED Power Available in Phase 3 Only CENTER AB-A 16 2-AB-D 600VAC MOTOR CONTROL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CENTER AB-D I SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 69 of 151 CNP Unit 2 ESEL CNP Equipment Operating State Unit 2 Normal Notes / Comments ESEL ID Description Desired State Item # State 17 2-ABD-8 600VAC MOTOR CONTROL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CENTER ABD-B 18 2-ABD-D 600VAC MOTOR CONTROL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CENTER ABD-D 19 2-ABV-A 600VAC VALVE CONTROL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CENTER ABV-A 20 2-AFWX 120/208VAC AUXILIARY OPERATING OPERATING RCS Level, RWST Level FEEDWATER DISTRIBUTION PANEL 21 2-AM-A 600VAC MOTOR CONTROL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED Power Available in Phase 3 Only CENTER AM-A 22 2-AZV-A 600VAC VALVE CONTROL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED Power Available in Phase 3 Only CENTER AZV-A 23 2-BA BORIC ACID CHARGING AND OPERATING OPERATING BAST Level, BAST Temperature, LETDOWN CONTROL PANEL RCS Injection Flow 24 2-BATT- PLANT BATTERY AB ENERGIZED ENERGIZED AB 25 2-BATT- PLANT BATTERY BATT-AB ENERGIZED ENERGIZED AB-SH AMMETER SHUNT 26 2-BATT- PLANT BATTERY CD ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CD 27 2-BATT- PLANT BATTERY BATT-CD ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CD-SH AMMETER SHUNT 28 2-BC- PLANT BATTERY BATT-AB ENERGIZED ENERGIZED AB2 CHARGER #2 29 2-BC- PLANT BATTERY BATT-CD ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CD1 BATTERY CHARGER #1 30 2-BCTC- PLANT BATTERY CHARGERS ENERGIZED ENERGIZED AB BC-AB1 AND BC-AB2 TRANSFER PANEL 31 2-BCTC- PLANT BATTERY CHARGERS ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CD BC-CD1 AND BC-CD2 TRANSFER PANEL 32 2-BLI- STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-1 OPERATING OPERATING SG Level Transmitter 110 WIDE RANGE LEVEL INDICATOR TRANSMITTER 33 2-BLI- STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-2 OPERATING OPERATING SG Level Transmitter 120 WIDE RANGE LEVEL INDICATOR TRANSMITTER 34 2-BLI- STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-3 OPERATING OPERATING SG Level Transmitter 130 WIDE RANGE LEVEL INDICATOR TRANSMITTER 35 2-BLI- STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-4 OPERATING OPERATING SG Level Transmitter 140 WIDE RANGE LEVEL INDICATOR TRANSMITTER Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 70 of 151 CNP Unit 2 ESEL CNP Equipment Operating State Unit 2 ESEL ID Description Normal Desired State Notes Comments Item # State 36 2-CCV- 250VDC TRAIN 'B' CRITICAL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED AB SOLENOID VALVES DISTRIBUTION PANEL 37 2-CCV- 250VDC TRAIN 'A' CRITICAL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CD SOLENOID VALVES DISTRIBUTION PANEL 38 2-CCW COMPONENT COOLING WATER OPERATING AVAILABLE Hand Switches powered CONTROL PANEL separately 39 2-CG1- REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING SG Level, RCS Injection Flow 14 CONTROL GROUP #1 CABINET#14 40 2-CG1- REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING BAST Level Instrumentation 15 CONTROL GROUP #1 CABINET#15 41 2-CG2- REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING RCS Injection Flow 17 CONTROL GROUP #2 CABINET#17 42 2-CG2- REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING RCS Injection Flow 19 CONTROL GROUP #2 CABINET Instrumentation
#19 43 2-CG3- REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING RCS Injection Flow 20 CONTROL GROUP #3 CABINET#20 44 2-CG3- REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING Containment Pressure, RWST 21 CONTROL GROUP #3 CABINET Level, BAST Level, RCS#21 Injection Flow 45 2-CG4- REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING RCS Injection Flow 22 CONTROL GROUP #4 CABINET#22 46 2-CG4- REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING SG Level 23 CONTROL GROUP #4 CABINET#23 47 2-CLI- CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK OPERATING OPERATING CST Level Transmitter 114 TK-32 LEVEL INDICATOR TRANSMITTER 48 2-CMO- COMPONENT COOLING WATER OPEN CLOSED Local Manual Operation at the 413 PUMPS SUCTION CROSS TIE operator hand wheel is credited TRAIN 'B' SHUTOFF VALVE for FLEX Response 49 2-CMO- COMPONENT COOLING WATER OPEN CLOSED Local Manual Operation at the 414 PUMPS DISCHARGE CROSS operator hand wheel is credited TIE TRAIN 'B' SHUTOFF VALVE for FLEX Response 50 2-CMO- COMPONENT COOLING WATER OPEN CLOSED Local Manual Operation at the 416 TO MISCELLANEOUS SERVICE operator hand wheel is credited TRAIN 'B' SHUTOFF VALVE for FLEX Response 51 2-CMO- WEST RESIDUAL HEAT CLOSED OPEN Power Available in Phase 3 Only 429 REMOVAL HEAT EXCHANGER COMPONENT COOLING WATER OUTLET SHUTOFF VALVE ISAl Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 71 of 151 CNP Unit 2 ESEL CNP Equipment Operating State Unit 2 Unita2 Notes / Comments ESEL ID Description Normal Desired State Item # State 52 2-CP CONDENSATE PUMP CONTROL OPERATING OPERATING CST Level Indicator, Separately PANEL Powered 53 2-CRID-1 120VAC CONTROL ROOM ENERGIZED ENERGIZED INSTRUMENT DISTRIBUTION CHANNEL I DISTRIBUTION PANEL 54 2-CRID- 120VAC CONTROL ROOM ENERGIZED ENERGIZED 1-INV INSTRUMENT DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM >55 2-CRID-2 120VAC CONTROL ROOM ENERGIZED ENERGIZED INSTRUMENT DISTRIBUTION CHANNEL II DISTRIBUTION PANEL 56 2-CRID- 120VAC CONTROL ROOM ENERGIZED ENERGIZED 2-INV INSTRUMENT DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM >57 2-CRID-3 120VAC CONTROL ROOM ENERGIZED ENERGIZED INSTRUMENT DISTRIBUTION CHANNEL III DISTRIBUTION PANEL 58 2-CRID- 120VAC CONTROL ROOM ENERGIZED ENERGIZED 3-INV INSTRUMENTATION DISTRIBUTION
>59 2-CRID-4 120VAC CONTROL ROOM ENERGIZED ENERGIZED INSTRUMENT DISTRIBUTION CHANNEL IV DISTRIBUTION PANEL 60 2-CRID- 120VAC CONTROL ROOM ENERGIZED ENERGIZED 4-INV INSTRUMENT DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM >61 2-DTU DELTA 'T' AND UNIT CONTROL OPERATING OPERATING RCS Temperature Recorder PANEL 62 2-ELSC EMERGENCY LOCAL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED INDICATION SHUTDOWN AND COOLDOWN DISTRIBUTION PANEL 63 2-EZC-B 600VAC MOTOR CONTROL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CENTER EZC-B 64 2-EZC-C 600VAC MOTOR CONTROL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED Power Available in Phase 3 Only CENTER EZC-C 65 2-EZC-D 600VAC MOTOR CONTROL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CENTER EZC-D 66 2-FFI- AUXILIARY FEEDWATER TO OPERATING OPERATING AFW Flow Transmitter 210 STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-1 FLOW INDICATOR TRANSMITTER SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 72 of 151 CNP Unit 2 ESEL CNP Equipment Operating State Unit 2 Normal Notes / Comments ESEL ID Description Desired State Item # State 67 2-FFI- AUX FEEDWATER TO SG OME- OPERATING OPERATING AFW Flow Transmitter 220 3-2 FLOW INDICATOR TRANSMITTER 68 2-FFI- AUXILIARY FEEDWATER TO OPERATING OPERATING AFW Flow Transmitter 230 STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-3 FLOW INDICATOR TRANSMITTER 69 2-FFI- AUXILIARY FEEDWATER TO OPERATING OPERATING AFW Flow Transmitter 240 STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-4 FLOW INDICATOR TRANSMITTER 70 2-FI FIXED INCORE CONTROL OPERATING OPERATING Core Exit Temperature Recorder PANEL 71 2-FICT-A REACTOR CORE OPERATING OPERATING Core Exit Temperature THERMOCOUPLE TRAIN 'A'TRANSMITTER CABINET 72 2-FLX FLUX CONTROL PANEL OPERATING OPERATING Neutron Flux Indicator, Separately Powered 73 2-FMO- TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY THROTTLED THROTTLED Throttle position will be adjusted 211 FEED PUMP PP-4 during FLEX using the local DISCHARGETO STEAM manual operator hand wheel GENERATOR OME-3-1 CONTROL VALVE 74 2-FMO- TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY THROTTLED THROTTLED Throttle position will be adjusted 221 FEED PUMP PP-4 during FLEX using the local DISCHARGETO STEAM manual operator hand wheel GENERATOR OME-3-2 CONTROL VALVE 75 2-FMO- TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY THROTTLED THROTTLED Throttle position will be adjusted 231 FEED PUMP SUPPLY TO during FLEX using the local STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-3 manual operator hand wheel CONTROL VALVE 76 2-FMO- TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY THROTTLED THROTTLED Throttle position will be adjusted 241 FEED PUMP SUPPLY TO during FLEX using the local STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-4 manual operator hand wheel CONTROL VALVE 77 2-HE- WEST COMPONENT COOLING N/A N/A Passive Component 15W WATER HEAT EXCHANGER 78 2-HE- WEST RESIDUAL HEAT N/A N/A Passive Component 17W REMOVAL HEAT EXCHANGER 79 2-HSD2 UNIT 2 HOT SHUTDOWN PANEL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED 80 2-HV- CONTROL ROOM AIR AS NEEDED OPERATING Power Available in Phase 3 Only ACR-2 CONDITIONING SOUTH LIQUID CHILLER 81 2-HV- CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION AS NEEDED OPERATING Power Available in Phase 3 Only ACRA-2 SOUTH AIR CONDITIONING UNIT SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 73 of 151 CNP Unit 2 ESEL CNP Equipment Operating State Unit 2 ESEL D Normal Notes / Comments ESEL ID Description Desired State Item # State 82 2-HV- OUTSIDE AIR TO CONTROL AS NEEDED OPERATING Power Available in Phase 3 Only ACR-DA- ROOM PRESSURIZATION/
2 CLEANUP FILTER UNIT HV-ACRF VENT DAMPER #2 83 2-HV- CONTROL ROOM N/A N/A Passive Component ACRF PRESSURIZATION/CLEANUP FILTER UNIT 84 2-HV- CONTROL ROOM AS NEEDED OPERATING Power Available in Phase 3 Only ACRF-2 PRESSURIZATION/CLEANUP FILTER UNITVENT FAN #2 85 2-HV- CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION AS NEEDED OPERATING Power Available in Phase 3 Only ACR-H2 SOUTH DUCT ELECTRIC HEATER 86 2-HV- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN AS NEEDED OPERATING Power Available in Phase 3 Only CEQ-2 SKIMMER VENTILATION FAN #2 87 2-HV- AB BATTERY EQUIPMENT AS NEEDED OPERATING Battery Room AB Ventilation, SGRX-5 AREA BATTERY ROOM Controlled Locally VENTILATION EXHAUST FAN 88 2-HV- CD BATTERY EQUIPMENT AS NEEDED OPERATING Battery Room CD Ventilation, SGRX-6 AREA BATTERY ROOM Controlled Locally VENTILATION EXHAUST FAN 89 2-iCM- RHR TO REACTOR COOLANT CLOSED OPEN Power Available in Phase 3 Only 111 LOOPS #2 & #3 COLD LEGSCONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE 90 2-1CM- REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #2 CLOSED OPEN Needs closure of PB 403AX 129 HOT LEG TO RESIDUAL HEAT relay permissive, Power REMOVAL PUMPS SUCTION Available in Phase 3 Only CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE 91 2-iCM- BORON INJECTION TANK CLOSED OPEN Power Available in Phase 3 Only 251 TRAIN 'B' OUTLET CONTAINMENT
>92 2-1CM- WEST RHR TO REACTOR OPEN CLOSED Local Manual Operation at the 321 COOLANT LOOPS #2 AND #3 operator hand wheel is credited COLDLEGS CONTAINMENT for FLEX Response ISOLATION VALVE 93 2-IFI-51 BORON INJECTION TO OPERATING OPERATING RCS Injection Flow Transmitter REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #1 FLOW INDICATOR TRANSMITTER 94 2-IFI-52 BORON INJECTION TO OPERATING OPERATING RCS Injection Flow Transmitter REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #2 FLOWINDICATOR TRANSMITTER 95 2-IFI-53 BORON INJECTION TO OPERATING OPERATING RCS Injection Flow Transmitter REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #3 FLOW INDICATOR TRANSMITTER PSAi Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 74 of 151 CNP Unit 2 ESEL CNP Equipment Operating State Unit 2...Normal Notes / Comments ESEL ID Description Desired State Item # State 96 2-1FI-54 BORON INJECTION TO OPERATING OPERATING RCS Injection Flow Transmitter REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #4 FLOW INDICATOR TRANSMITTER 97 2-IMO- REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #2 CLOSED OPEN Needs closure of PB 405AX 128 HOT LEG TO RESIDUAL HEAT relay permissive REMOVAL PUMPS SUCTION SHUTOFF VALVE 98 2-IMO- BORON INJECTION TANK CLOSED OPEN Power Available in Phase 3 Only 256 TRAIN 'B' INLET SHUTOFF VALVE 99 2-IMO- EAST RESIDUAL HEAT OPEN CLOSED Local manual operation with the 310 REMOVAL PUMP PP-35E operator hand wheel is credited SUCTION SHUTOFF VALVE for FLEX Response 100 2-IMO- WEST RHR HX 2-HE-17W CLOSED OPEN Local manual operation with the 324 DISCHARGE CROSSTIE operator hand wheel is credited SHUTOFF VALVE for FLEX Response 101 2-LDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B10 IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B10 102 2-LDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B11 IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B131 103 2-LDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B12 IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B12 104 2-LDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B18 IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B18 105 2-LDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B19 IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B19 106 2-LDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B20 IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B20 107 2-LDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B21 IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B21 108 2-LDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B22 IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B22 SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic* 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 75 of 151 CNP Unit 2 ESEL CNP Equipment Operating State Unit 2 SNormal Notes / Comments ESEL ID Description Desired State Item # State 109 2-LDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B23 IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B23 110 2-LDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B24 IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B24 111 2-LDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B25 IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B25 112 2-LDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B26 IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B26 113 2-LDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B27 IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B27 114 2-LDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B28 IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B28 115 2-LDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B35 IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B35 116 2-LDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B8 IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' IGNITER ASSEMBLY#B8 117 2-LDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B9 IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B9 118 2-LSI-1 STEAM GENERATORS
#1 AND NON- REMOTE SG Level Transmitter Transfer#4 LOCAL SHUTDOWN OPERATING Relay, power N/A as de-STATION (REMOTE) energized is desired relay state 119 2-LSI-2 STEAM GENERATORS
#2 AND NON- REMOTE SG Level Transmitter Transfer#3 LOCAL SHUTDOWN OPERATING Relay, power N/A as de-STATION (REMOTE) energized is desired relay state 120 2-LSI-3 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM NON- REMOTE NPS-122 RCS Pressure CHARGING AND LETDOWN OPERATING Transmitter Transfer Relay, LOCAL SHUTDOWN STATION (REMOTE) power N/A as de-energized is desired relay state 121 2-MCAB 250VDC DISTRIBUTION PANEL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED I__ _MCAB SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 76 of 151 CNP Unit 2 ESEL CNP Equipment Operating State Unit 2 Normal :Notes / Comments ESEL ID Description Desired State Item # State 122 2-MCCD 250VDC DISTRIBUTION POWER OPERATING OPERATING Various Instruments PANEL 123 2-MDAB 250VDC DISTRIBUTION PANEL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED MDAB 124 2-MDCD 250VDC DISTRIBUTION PANEL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED MDCD 125 2-MPP- STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-1 OPERATING OPERATING SG Pressure Transmitter 210 CHANNEL I STEAM PRESSURE TRANSMITTER 126 2-MPP- STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-2 OPERATING OPERATING SG Pressure Transmitter 220 CHANNEL I STEAM PRESSURE TRANSMITTER 127 2-MPP- STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-3 OPERATING OPERATING SG Pressure Transmitter 230 CHANNEL I STEAM PRESSURE TRANSMITTER 128 2-MPP- STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-4 OPERATING OPERATING SG Pressure Transmitter 240 CHANNEL I STEAM PRESSURE TRANSMITTER 129 2-MRV- STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-1 CLOSED OPEN Fail Closed, Local manual 213 POWER OPERATED RELIEF operation with the operator hand VALVE wheel is credited for FLEX Response to throttle the valve 130 2-MRV- STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-2 CLOSED OPEN Fail Closed, Local manual 223 POWER OPERATED RELIEF operation with the operator hand VALVE wheel is credited for FLEX Response to throttle the valve 131 2-MRV- STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-3 CLOSED OPEN Fail Closed, Local manual 233 POWER OPERATED RELIEF operation with the operator hand VALVE wheel is credited for FLEX Response to throttle the valve 132 2-MRV- STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-4 CLOSED OPEN Fail Closed, Local manual 243 POWER OPERATED RELIEF operation with the operator hand VALVE wheel is credited for FLEX Response to throttle the valve 133 2-NIS-1 NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION OPERATING OPERATING Neutron Flux Indicator, SYSTEM PROTECTION Separately Powered CHANNEL I CONTROL PANEL 134 2-NLP- PRESSURIZER OME-4 OPERATING OPERATING Pressurizer Level Transmitter 151 PROTECTION CHANNEL I LEVEL TRANSMITTER 135 2-NPS- REACTOR VESSEL TRAIN 'A' OPERATING OPERATING RCS Level, RCS Pressure 110 WIDE RANGE PRESSURE Transmitter TRANSMITTER 136 2-NPS- REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #2 OPERATING OPERATING Required for valve ICM-1 29 121 HOT LEG WIDE RANGE pressure permissive PRESSURE TRANSMITTER PO Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 77 of 151 CNP Unit 2 ESEL CNP Equipment Operating State UnitNormal Notes / Comments ESEL ID Description Desired State Item # State 137 2-NPS- REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #1 OPERATING OPERATING Required for valve IMO-128 122 HOT LEG WIDE RANGE pressure permissive PRESSURE TRANSMITTER 138 2-NRI-21 NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION OPERATING OPERATING Neutron Flux CHANNEL I WIDE RANGE RADIATION DETECTOR 139 2-NRI- NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION OPERATING OPERATING Neutron Flux 21-AMP WIDE RANGE RADIATION AMPLIFIER 140 2-NRV- PRESSURIZER TRAIN 'B' CLOSED OPEN Fail Closed 152 PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE 141 2-NRV- PRESSURIZER OME-4 TRAIN'A' CLOSED OPEN Fail Closed 153 PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE 142 2-NTQ- RVLIS TRAIN 'A UPPER TAP OPERATING OPERATING RCS Level Transmitter 110A TEMPERATURE COMPENSATION COMPUTER INPUT THERMAL SENSOR 'A'143 2-NTQ- RVLIS TRAIN 'A' UPPER TAP OPERATING OPERATING RCS Level Transmitter 110B TEMPERATURE COMPENSATION COMPUTER INPUT THERMAL SENSOR 'B'144 2-NTQ- RVLIS TRAIN 'A' CONDUIT OPERATING OPERATING RCS Level Transmitter 130A TEMPERATURE COMPENSATION COMPUTER INPUT THERMAL SENSOR 'A'145 2-NTQ- RVLIS TRAIN 'A' CONDUIT OPERATING OPERATING RCS Level Transmitter 130C TEMPERATURE COMPENSATION COMPUTER INPUT SPARE THERMAL SENSOR 'C'146 2-NTR- REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #1 OPERATING OPERATING RCS Temperature Transmitter 110 HOT LEG WIDE RANGE TEMPERATURE RECORDER THERMAL SENSOR 147 2-NTR- REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #3 OPERATING OPERATING RCS Temperature Transmitter, 130 HOT LEG WIDE RANGE also used for RCS Level (RVLIS)TEMPERATURE RECORDER THERMAL SENSOR 148 2-NTR- REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #1 OPERATING OPERATING RCS Temperature Transmitter 210 COLD LEG WIDE RANGE TEMPERATURE RECORDER THERMAL SENSOR 149 2-NTR- REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #3 OPERATING OPERATING RCS Temperature Transmitter 230 COLD LEG WIDE RANGE TEMPERATURE RECORDER THERMAL SENSOR 150 2-OME- TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY N/A N/A Passive Component 33 FEED PUMP PP-4 SUCTION > _
SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 78 of 151 CNP Unit 2 ESEL CNP Equipment Operating State Unit 2 2Normal Notes / Comments ESEL ID Description Desired State Item # State 151 2-OME- WEST ESSENTIAL SERVICE OPERATING OPERATING Passive component when used 34W WATER PUMP PP-7W DISCH in FLEX response STN 152 2-OME- ACCUMULATOR TANK #1 N/A N/A Passive Component 6-1 153 2-OME- ACCUMULATOR TANK #2 N/A N/A Passive Component 6-2 154 2-OME- ACCUMULATOR TANK #3 N/A N/A Passive Component 6-3 155 2-OME- ACCUMULATOR TANK #4 N/A N/A Passive Component 6-4 156 2-PP- WEST COMPONENT COOLING N/A N/A Power Available in Phase 3 Only loW WATER PUMP 157 2-PP- WEST RESIDUAL HEAT N/A N/A Power Available in Phase 3 Only 35W REMOVAL PUMP 158 2-PP-4 TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY STOP RUN Via ROB Turbine 1-OME-39 FEED PUMP 159 2-PP BORIC ACID STORAGE TANKS NOT USED OPERATING Pump used for Boration Phase 3 4 TRANSFER PUMP #4 after NSRC Generators installed 160 2-PP- CONTROL ROOM AIR AS NEEDED OPERATING Power Available in Phase 3 Only 82S CONDITIONING SOUTH CHILL WATERCIRCULATION PUMP 161 2-PPA- UPPER CONTAINMENT OPERATING OPERATING Containment Pressure 310 CHANNEL III WIDE RANGE Transmitter PRESSURE ALARM TRANSMITTER 162 2-PRZ PRESSURIZER CONTROL OPERATING OPERATING Pressurizer level Indicator and PANEL Control for Pressurizer Relief Valves 163 2-QLA- SOUTH BORIC ACID STORAGE OPERATING OPERATING BAST Level Transmitter 430 TANK TK-12S LEVEL ALARM TRANSMITTER 164 2-QRV- CVCS CHARGING TO OPEN CLOSED Fails to desired position on loss 200 REGENERATIVE HEAT of instrument air EXCHANGER FLOWCONTROL VALVE 165 2-QT-506 TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY CLOSED OPEN Local Manual Operation at the FEED PUMP PP-4 TRIP AND operator hand wheel/mechanical THROTTLE VALVE trip reset is credited for FLEX Response 166 2-QT-507 AUXILIARY FEED PUMP CLOSED OPERATING Control via 1-QT-507-KR TURBINE GOVERNOR VALVE governor (ROB)167 2-QTC- SOUTH BAST TK-12S TRAIN 'A' OPERATING OPERATING BAST Temperature Transmitter 430 HTR TEMP CONTROLLER 168 2-RHR RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL OPERATING AVAILABLE Hand Switches powered CONTROL PANEL separately 169 2-RPC REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING AFW Flow, Pressurizer level, 1 CHANNEL I CABINET #1 1 1 Pressurizer Relief Valve Control SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 79 of 151 CNP Unit 2 ESEL CNP Equipment Operating State Unit 2Normal Notes/Comments ESEL ID Description Desired State Item # State 170 2-RPC REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING AFW Flow 2 CHANNEL I CABINET #2 171 2-RPC REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING SG Pressure 3 CHANNEL I CABINET #3 172 2-RPC REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING SG Pressure 4 CHANNEL I CABINET #4 173 2-RPC REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING RWST Level, RCS Pressure 5 CHANNEL II CABINET #5 Permissive, Pressurizer Relief Valve Control 174 2-RPC REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING AFW Flow, RCS Temperature, 6 CHANNEL II CABINET #6 RWST Level 175 2-RPC REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING RCS Temperature 7 CHANNEL II CABINET #7 176 2-RPC REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING RCS Pressure, RCS Level 8 CHANNEL II CABINET #8 177 2-RPC REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING CST Level 10 CHANNEL III CABINET #10 178 2-RPC REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING AFW Flow, CST Level, RCS 9 CHANNEL III CABINET #9 Temperature, RCS Pressure Permissive, Pressurizer Relief Valve Control 179 2-RPC REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING AFW Flow, Pressurizer Relief 12 CHANNEL IV CABINET #12 Valve Control 180 2-RPS-A REACTOR PROTECTION AND OPERATING OPERATING Contains portion of permissive SAFEGUARD ACTUATIONTRAIN circuit for ICM-1 29'A' CABINET 181 2-RPS-B REACTOR PROTECTION AND OPERATING OPERATING Contains portion of permissive SAFEGUARD ACTUATION circuit for IMO-128 TRAIN 'B' CABINET 182 2-RPSX- REACTOR PROTECTION AND OPERATING OPERATING Contains PB 403AX relay A SAFEGUARD ACTUATIONTRAIN permissive
'A' AUXILIARY CABINET 183 2-RPSX- REACTOR PROTECTION AND OPERATING OPERATING Contains PB 405AX relay B SAFEGUARD ACTUATIONTRAIN permissive
'B' AUXILIARY CABINET 184 2-RVLC REACTOR VESSEL OME-1 OPERATING OPERATING RCS Level WATER LEVEL INSTRUMENTATION CABINET 185 2-SA STATION AUXILIARIES OPERATING AVAILABLE Hand Switches powered CONTROL PANEL separately 186 2-SG STEAM GENERATOR AND OPERATING OPERATING AFW Flow, SG Level, and SG AUXILIARY FEED PUMP Pressure Indicators; Manual CONTROL PANEL Control of Main Steam PORVs -Note that valve position indicator and pressure indicator on valve controllers are not credited.Separate Credited SG Pressure Indicators Must be used.
SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 80 of 151 CNP Unit 2 ESEL CNP Equipment Operating State Unit 2 2Normal Notes / Comments ESEL ID Description Desired State Item # State 187 2-SIS SAFETY INJECTION CONTROL OPERATING OPERATING Control Switches, RCS Pressure PANEL Indicator, RCS Level Indicator, All Separately Powered 188 2-SPY CONTAINMENT SPRAY OPERATING OPERATING Containment Pressure Indicator, CONTROL PANEL RWST Level Recorder 189 2-SSR ENGINEER SAFETY SYSTEM OPERATING AVAILABLE Contains 2-CMO-429 AC control REAR INSTRUMENT/RELAY relay (powered separately)
RACK 190 2-SWR NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTAL OPERATING OPERATING Neutron Flux Instrumentation SOURCE RANGE N21INSTRUMENT/RELAY RACK 191 2-T21A 4KV BUS T21A SWITCHGEAR ENERGIZED ENERGIZED Power Available in Phase 3 Only, Emergency feed breaker T21A12 must be manually tripped 192 2-TDAB 250VDC TRAIN 'B' TRANSFER ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CABINET 193 2-TDCD 250VDC TRAIN 'A' TRANSFER ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CABINET 194 2-TK-11 BORON INJECTION TANK N/A N/A Passive Component 195 2-TK-12S SOUTH BORIC ACID STORAGE N/A N/A Passive Component TAN K 196 2-TK- PRESSURIZER TRAIN 'A' N/A N/A Passive Component 253-1 PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE NRV-153 RESERVE CONTROL AIR TANK 197 2-TK- PRESSURIZER TRAIN 'B' N/A N/A Passive Component 253-2 PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE NRV-152 RESERVE CONTROL AIR TANK 198 2-TK- PRESSURIZER TRAIN 'B' N/A N/A Passive Component 253-3 PRESSURE RELIEF VLV NRV-152 EMERGENCY AIR TANK 199 2-TK- PRESSURIZER TRAIN 'A' N/A N/A Passive Component 253-4 PRESSURE RELIEF VLV NRV-153 EMERGENCY AIR TANK 200 2-TK- PRESSURIZER TRAIN 'B' N/A N/A Passive Component 253-5 PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE NRV-152 EMERGENCY AIR TANK 201 2-TK- PRESSURIZER TRAIN 'A' N/A N/A Passive Component 253-6 PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE NRV-153 EMERGENCY AIR TANK 202 2-TK- PRESSURIZER TRAIN 'B' N/A N/A Passive Component 253-7 PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE NRV-152 EMERGENCY AIR TAN K
*SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 81 of 151 CNP Unit 2 ESEL CNP Equipment Operating State Unit 2 " Normal Notes/ Comments ESEL ID Description Desired State Item # State 203 2-TK- PRESSURIZER TRAIN 'A' N/A N/A Passive Component 253-8 PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE NRV-153 EMERGENCY AIR TANK 204 2-TK-32 CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK N/A N/A Passive Component 205 2-TK-37 COMPONENT COOLING WATER N/A N/A Passive Component SURGE TANK 206 2-TR21A 600V BUS 21A SUPPLY ENERGIZED ENERGIZED Power Available in Phase 3 Only TRANSFORMER 207 2-TR- 120/208VAC AUXILIARY ENERGIZED ENERGIZED Regulating Transformer AFWX FEEDWATER DISTRIBUTION PANEL AFWX REGULATING TRANSFORMER 208 2-TR- 120/208VAC EMERGENCY ENERGIZED ENERGIZED ELSC LOCAL SHUTDOWN DISTRIBUTION POWER TRANSFORMER 209 2-UDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B1 IGNITION UPPER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B1 210 2-UDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B13 IGNITION UPPER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B13 211 2-UDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B14 IGNITION UPPER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B14 212 2-UDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B15 IGNITION UPPER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B15 213 2-UDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B16 IGNITION UPPER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B16 214 2-UDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B17 IGNITION UPPER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B17 215 2-UDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B2 IGNITION UPPER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B2 216 2-UDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B29 IGNITION UPPER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B29 0 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 82 of 151 CNP Unit 2 ESEL CNP Equipment Operating State Unit 2 Normal Notes /.Comments ESEL ID Description Desired State Item # State 217 2-UDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B3 IGNITION UPPER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B3 218 2-UDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B30 IGNITION UPPER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B30 219 2-UDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B31 IGNITION UPPER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B31 ,220 2-UDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B32 IGNITION UPPER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B32 221 2-UDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B33 IGNITION UPPER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B33 222 2-UDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B34 IGNITION UPPER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B34 223 2-UDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B4 IGNITION UPPER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B4 224 2-UDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B5 IGNITION UPPER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B5 225 2-UDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B6 IGNITION UPPER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B6 226 2-UDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B7 IGNITION UPPER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B7 227 2-VR- LOWER CONTAINMENT TRAIN NOT USED OPERATING LDISB-4 B DISTRIBUTED IGNITION SYSTEM VOLTAGE REGULATOR 228 2-VR- UPPER CONTAINMENT TRAIN B NOT USED OPERATING UDISB-3 DISTRIBUTED IGNITION SYSTEM VOLTAGE REGULATOR 10 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 83 of 151 CNP Unit 2 ESEL CNP Equipment Operating State UnitNormal Notes / Comments ESEL ID Description Nral Desired State Item # State 229 2-VS VENTILATION CONTROL PANEL OPERATING AVAILABLE Hand Switches powered separately 230 2-WMO- WEST CONTAINMENT SPRAY OPEN CLOSED Local Manual Operation at the 716 HEAT EXCHANGER ESSENTIAL operator hand wheel is credited SERVICE WATER INLET for FLEX Response SHUTOFF VALVE 231 2-WMO- EMERGENCY ESSENTIAL CLOSED OPEN Local Manual Operation at the 753 SERVICE WATER SUPPLY TO operator hand wheel is credited TDAFP PP-4 SHUTOFF VALVE for FLEX Response 232 2-WRV- W ESW PUMP PP-7W DISCH OPEN/ CLOSED Valve Fails Closed on Loss of 764 STN WEST BASKET BAN OUT CLOSED Air; Its FLEX Position S/OVALVE 233 2-WRV- W ESW PUMP PP-7W DISCH OPEN CLOSED Valve Fails Closed on Loss of 769 STN WEST BASKET B/W INL /CLOSED Air; Its FLEX Position S/O VALVE 234 2-WRV- WEST ESW PUMP PP-7W OPEN/ CLOSED Valve Fails Closed on Loss of 774 DISCH STN EAST BASKET BAN CLOSED Air; Its FLEX Position OUT SHUTOFF VALVE 235 2-WRV- WEST ESW PUMP PP-7W OPEN/ CLOSED Valve Fails Closed on Loss of 779 DISCH STN EAST BASKET BAN CLOSED Air; Its FLEX Position INLSHUTOFF VALVE 236 2-XRV- BACKUP AIR TO NRV-152 NOT USED REGULATING 152 PRESSURE REGULATOR 237 2-XRV- BACKUP AIR TO NRV-153 NOT USED REGULATING 153 PRESSURE REGULATOR PO Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 84 of 151 Attachment C- CNP Unit I ESEP HCLPF Values and Failure Mode Tabulation SAki Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 85 of 151 CNP HCLPF Unit I ID DESCRIPTION Failure (compared Notes ESEL Mode (o Notes Item # to RLGM)Meets EPRI NP-6041-SL Table 2.4 caveats.1-11A 600VAC BUS 11A Screened >RLGM Anchorage screened for RLGM based on SWITCHGEAR scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the switchgear.
Meets EPRI NP-6041-SL Table 2.4 caveats.600VAC BUS 11B Anchorage screened for RLGM based on SWITCHGEAR scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the switchgear.
Meets EPRI NP-6041-SL Table 2.4 caveats.1-11C 600VAC BUS 11C Screened >RLGM Anchorage screened for RLGM based on SWITCHGEAR scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the switchgear.
Meets EPRI NP-6041-SL Table 2.4 caveats.600VAC BUS 11D Anchorage screened for RLGM based on SWITCHGEAR scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the switchgear.
CONTAINMENT Small panel dimensions of 8" wide, 4" deep, HYDROGEN IGNITION and 14" tall. Mounted to the wall using two 1-152-LDISB LOWER VOLUME Screened >RLGM unistruts (anchored using four 1/2" TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG expansion bolts).ASSEMBLIES BACKUP SUPPLY BREAKER CONTAINMENT Small panel dimensions of 8" wide, 4" deep, HYDROGEN IGNITION and 14" tall. Mounted to the wall using two 1-152- UPPER VOLUME TRAIN Screened >RLGM unistruts (anchored using four 1/2" UDISB 'B' GLOW PLUG expansion bolts).ASSEMBLIES BACKUP SUPPLY BREAKER Meets EPRI NP-6041-SL Table 2.4 caveats.1-1A 4KV BUS 1A Screened >RLGM Anchorage screened for RLGM based on SWITCHGEAR scaling of an existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for a similar switchgear.
Meets EPRI NP-6041-SL Table 2.4 caveats.Anchorage rugged by inspection, welded to MIDDLE BORIC ACID one of the Boric Acid Storage Tank 12-TK-12M legs. However, the HCLPF for this 8 12-QLA-420 12M LEVEL ALARM Interaction 0.227g component is limited by the Boric Acid TRANSMITTER Storage Tank 12-TK-12M.
HCLPF from Ref. 10.2 for the tank is 0.227g < 0.387g (RLGM ZPA).The governing HCLPF capacity according to MIDDLE BORIC ACID S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-005
-"High STORAGE TANK Confidence Low Probability of Failure (HCLPF) Calculations for Screened in ESEP Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 PaRe 86 of 151 CNP HCLPF Unit 1 ID DESCRIPTION Failure (compared Notes ESEL Mode to RLGM)Item #Tanks" (Ref. 10.2) is 0.227g that is less than the RLGM of 0.387g.CNTMT HYDROGEN Small panel dimensions of 9" wide, 20" tall, IGNITION LOWER and 6" deep. Equipment mounted on two VOLUMN TRAIN 'B' horizontal running unistruts spaced at 19".12 1-52-LDISB GLOW PLUG Screened >RLGM Unistrut anchors are 1/2" expansion bolts ASSEMBLIES STARTER spaced at 41" plus an additional two 3/8" COMBO-LDISB CKT bolts located 29". Screened based on the BRK light panel with rugged anchorage.
CNTMT HYDROGEN Small panel dimensions of 9" wide, 20" tall, IGNITION UPPER and 6" deep. Equipment mounted on two VOLUME TRAIN 'B' horizontal running unistruts spaced at 19".13 1-52-UDISB GLOW PLUG Screened >RLGM Unistrut anchors are 1/2" expansion bolts ASSEMBLIES STARTER spaced at 41" plus an additional two 3/8" COMBO-UDISB CKT bolts located 29". Screened based on the BRK light panel with rugged anchorage.
CNTMT HYDROGEN Small panel dimensions of 9" wide, 20" tall, IGNITION LOWER and 6" deep. Equipment mounted on two 1-88X- VOLUME TRAIN 'B' horizontal running unistruts spaced at 19".14 LDISB GLOW PLUG Screened >RLGM Unistrut anchors are 1/2" expansion bolts ASSEMBLIES STARTER spaced at 41" plus an additional two 3/8" COMBO-LDISB STAR bolts located 29". Screened based on the CNTR light panel with rugged anchorage.
CNTMT HYDROGEN Small panel dimensions of 9" wide, 20" tall, IGNITION UPPER and 6" deep. Equipment mounted on two 1-88X- VOLUME TRAIN 'B' horizontal running unistruts spaced at 19".15 GLOW PLUG Screened >RLGM Unistrut anchors are 1/2" expansion bolts ASSEMBLIES STARTER spaced at 41" plus an additional two 3/8" COMBO-UDISB bolts located 29". Screened based on the CONTACTOR light panel with rugged anchorage.
Panel dimensions of 48"x24"xl 0".Equipment is bolted to two horizontal unistruts, which are bolted to the wall.Panel meets all IEEE 344-75 testing PLANT BATTERY requirements.
The testing TRS greatly 16 1-89-ABBC BATT-AB DISCONNECT Screened >RLGM exceeds the RRS at the floor level.SWITCH Equipment screens for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage acceptable for RLGM based on similar panels had very high calculated margins for the Design Basis Earthquake.
Panel dimensions of 48"x24"x10".
PLANT BATTERY Equipment is bolted to two horizontal unistruts, which are bolted to the wall.17 1-89-CDBC BATT-CD Screened >RLGM PaemetalIEE347tsin DISCNNET SWTCHPanel meets all IEEE 344-75 testing DISCONNECT SWITCH requirements.
The testing TRS greatly exceeds the RRS at the floor level.
?I Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 87 of 151.CNP HCLPF Unit IFalr ESEL ID DESCRIPTION Failure (compared Notes ESEL Mode (o Notes Item #to RLGM)Item #Equipment screens for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage acceptable for RLGM based on similar panels had very high calculated margins for the Design Basis Earthquake.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 600VAC MOTOR NP-6041-SL.
The 1/4" gap for one anchor 18 1-AB-A CONTROL CENTER Screened >RLGM was judged acceptable.
Anchorage AB-A screened for RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the MCC.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) 600VAC MOTOR for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 19 1-AB-D CONTROL CENTER Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for AB-D RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the MCC.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) 600VAC MOTOR for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 20 1-ABD-B CONTROL CENTER Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for ABD-B RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the MCC.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) 600VAC MOTOR for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 21 1-ABD-D CONTROL CENTER Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for ABD-D RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the MCC.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the MCC. The 600VAC VALVE Seismic potentially governing Block Wall interaction 22 1-ABV-A CONTROL CENTER Interaction 0.578g could not be screened for RLGM based on ABV-A scaling of existing design basis calculation.
The governing HCLPF capacity for the block wall according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-004 -"HCLPF Calculations for Screened in ESEP Components" (Ref. 10.1)is 0.578g.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) 120/208VAC AUXILIARY for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 23 1-AFWX FEEDWATER Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for DISTRIBUTION PANEL RLGM based on screening calculation to the I__II RLGM.600VAC MOTOR Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CONTROL CENTER S R for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI PA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 88 of 151 CNP HCLPF Unit 1 Failure ESEL ID DESCRIPTION Mode (compared Notes Item # to RLGM)AM-A NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the MCC.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage could not be 600VAC VALVE screened for RLGM based on scaling of 25 1-AZV-A CONTROL CENTER Anchorage 0.62g existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for AZV-A the MCC. The governing HCLPF capacity for the anchorage according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-004
-"HCLPF Calculations for Screened in ESEP Components" (Ref. 10.1) is 0.62g.BORIC ACID Meets EPRI NP-6041-SL Table 2.4 caveats.CHARGING AND Anchorage screened for RLGM based on LETDOWN CONTROL scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage PANEL evaluation for the Control Board.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage could not be screened for RLGM based on scaling of 27 1 -BATT-AB PLANT BATTERY AB Anchorage 0.613g existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the Battery Rack. The governing HCLPF capacity for the anchorage according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-004
-"HCLPF Calculations for Screened in ESEP Components" (Ref. 10.1) is 0.613g.Small panel bolted directly to wall using two horizontal unistruts.
Box dimensions of 48.5"x40.5"x8.5".
No interactions identified.
1-BATT-AB-PLANT BATTERY Also contains 1-BC-AB-SH.
Equipment 28 SH BATT-AB AMMETER Screened >RLGM screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g SHUNT to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL. Anchorage screens to the RLGM input based on similar panels yielding significant seismic capacity margins.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 29 1-BATT-CD PLANT BATTERY CD Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the Battery Rack.PLANT BATTERY Typical of cabinet containing shunts (similar 30 1-BATT-CD-BATT-CD AMMETER Screened >RLGM to 1-BATT-AB-SH).
Cabinet also contains SH SHUNT 1-BC-CD-SH.
Equipment screens (other S I I Ithan anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g 0 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 89 of 151 CNP HCLPF Unit 1 Failure ESEL ID DESCRIPTION Mode (compared Notes Item # to RLGM)screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the RLGM input based on similar panels yielding significant seismic capacity margins.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 1BCAB2 PLANT BATTERY NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for BATT-AB CHARGER #2 RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the Battery Charger.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI PLANT BATTERY NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for BATT-CD CHARGER #1 RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the Battery Charger.PLANT BATTERY Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CHARGERS BC-AB1 for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 33 1-BCTC-AB AND BC-AB2 Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for TRANSFER PANEL RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the Panel.PLANT BATTERY Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CHARGERS BC-CD1 for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 34 1-BCTC-CD AND BC-CD2 Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for TRANSFER PANEL RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the Panel.STEAM GENERATOR Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
OME-3-1 WIDE RANGE for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 35 1-BLI-110 LEVEL INDICATOR Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for TRANSMITTER RLGM based on existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for this equipment.
STEAM GENERATOR Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
OME-3-2 WIDE RANGE for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 36 1-BLI-120 LEVEL INDICATOR Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for TRANSMITTER RLGM based on existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for this equipment.
STEAM GENERATOR Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
OME-3-3 WIDE RANGE for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 37 1-BLM-130 LEVEL INDICATOR Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for TRANSMITTER RLGM based on existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for this equipment.
STEAM GENERATOR Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
OME-3-4 WIDE RANGE for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 38 1-BLI-140 LEVEL INDICATOR Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for TRANSMITTER RLGM based on existing USI A-46 I_ I I I anchorage evaluation for this equipment.
SOL Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 90 of 151 CNP HCLPF Unit I ID DESCRIPTION Failure (compared Notes ESEL Mode to RLGM)Item #25OVDC TRAIN 'B' Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CRITICAL SOLENOID for the 0,8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 39 1-CCV-AB CALV S Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for DISTRIBUTION PANEL RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for this item.250VDC TRAIN 'A' Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CRITICAL SOLENOID for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 40 1-CCV-CD CALV S Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for DIVST O PRLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-DISTRIBUTION PANEL 46 anchorage evaluation for this item.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI COMPONENT COOLING NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the 41 1-CCW WATER CONTROL Screened >RLGM RLGM input based on similar panels within PANEL the control room yielding significant seismic capacity margins.REACTOR Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
RTEACTIO for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 42 1-CG1-14 CON Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for CONTROL GROUP #1 RLGM based on existing USI A-46 CABINET__#14_anchorage evaluation for this equipment.
REACTOR Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRi 43 1-CG1-15 CON Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for CONTROL GROUP #1 RLGM based on existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for this equipment.
REACTOR Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 44 1-CG2-17 CON Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for CONTROL GROUP #2 RLGM based on existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for this equipment.
REACTOR Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 45 1-CG2-19 CON Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for CONTROL GROUP #2 RLGM based on existing USI A-46 CABINET___19_anchorage evaluation for this equipment.
REACTOR Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
RTEACTIO for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 46 1-CG3-20 CON Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for CABINET #20 RLGM based on existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for this equipment.
REACTOR Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 47 1-CG3-21 CON Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for CONTROL GROUP #3 RLGM based on existing USI A-46 CABINT I2 I anchorage evaluation for this equipment.
0 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 91 of 151 CNP HCLPF Unit 1 Failure ESEL ID DESCRIPTION Mode (compared Notes ESEL Mode t LM Item # to RLGM)REACTOR Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 48 1-CG4-22 CONTROL GROUP #4 Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for CABINET #22 RLGM based on existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for this equipment.
REACTOR Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
RTEACTIO for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 49 1-CG4-23 CONTROL GROUP #4 Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for CABINETR#23 RLGM based on existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for this equipment.
CONDENSATE Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
STORAGE TANK TK-32 for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 50 1-CLI-114 LEVEL INDICATOR Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for LEEANMICATOR RLGM based on existing USI A-46 TRANSMITTER__anchorage evaluation for this equipment.
COMPONENT This valve is within Earthquake Experience COOLING WATER Data Base (Fig. F-26) in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
51 1-CMO-413 PUMPS SUCTION Screened >RLGM Therefore, valve is screened for 0.8g to 1.2 CROSS TIE TRAIN 'B' g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
SHUTOFF VALVE COMPONENT This valve is within Earthquake Experience COOLING WATER Data Base (Fig. F-26) in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
52 1-CMO-414 PUMPS DISCHARGE Screened >RLGM Therefore, valve is screened for 0.8g to 1.2 CROSS TIE TRAIN 'B' g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
SHUTOFF VALVE COMPONENT This valve is within Earthquake Experience COOLING WATER TO Data Base (Fig. F-26) in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
53 1-CMO-416 MISCELLANEOUS Screened >RLGM Therefore, valve is screened for 0.8g to 1.2 SERVICE TRAIN 'B' g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
SHUTOFF VALVE WEST RESIDUAL HEAT This valve is within Earthquake Experience REMOVAL HEAT Data Base (Fig. F-26) in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
EXCHANGER Therefore, valve is screened for 0.8g to 1.2g 54 1-CMO-429 COMPONENT Screened >RLGM screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
COOLING WATER OUTLET SHUTOFF VALVE Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI CONDENSATE PUMP NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the CONTROL PANEL RLGM input based on similar panels within the control room yielding significant seismic capacity margins.120VAC CONTROL Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
ROOM INSTRUMENT for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI DISTRIBUTION NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for CHANNEL I RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 PaRe 92 of 151 CNP HCLPF Unit I FailureNte EnEt ID DESCRIPTION Mode (compared Notes ESEL Mode t LM Item #to RLGM)Item #DISTRIBUTION PANEL 46 anchorage evaluation of panel 1-ERR, which governs the capacity of this item.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 120VAC CONTROL NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage could not be ROOM screened for RLGM based on scaling of 1-CRID INSTRUMENTATION existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.
57 INV DISTRIBUTION Screened >RLGM The governing HCLPF capacity for the SYSTEM CHANNEL 1 anchorage according to S&A Calculation INVERTER 13Q3208-CAL-004
-"HCLPF Calculations for Screened in ESEP Components" (Ref.10.1) is 0.839g and therefore did not control screening.
120VAC CONTROL Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
ROOM INSTRUMENT for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI ROOM NSTRMENTNP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for 58 1-CRID-2 DISTRIBUTION Screened >RLGM RLGM based oncag ofreng UoA CHANELIIRLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-CHANNEL II DISTRIBUTION PANEL 46 anchorage evaluation of panel 1-ERR, which governs the capacity of this item.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 120VAC CONTROL NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage could not be ROOM screened for RLGM based on scaling of 1-CRID INSTRUMENTATION existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.
59 INV DISTRIBUTION Screened >RLGM The governing HCLPF capacity for the SYSTEM CHANNEL 2 anchorage according to S&A Calculation INVERTER 13Q3208-CAL-004
-"HCLPF Calculations for Screened in ESEP Components" (Ref.10.1) is 0.839g and therefore did not control screening.
120VAC CONTROL Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
ROOM INSTRUMENT for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 60 1-CRID-3 DISTRIBUTION Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for CHANNEL III RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-DISTRIBUTION PANEL 46 anchorage evaluation of panel 1-ERR, which governs the capacity of this item.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 120VAC CONTROL NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage could not be ROOM screened for RLGM based on scaling of 1-CRID INSTRUMENTATION existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.
61 INV DISTRIBUTION Screened >RLGM The governing HCLPF capacity for the SYSTEM CHANNEL 3 anchorage according to S&A Calculation INVERTER 13Q3208-CAL-004
-"HCLPF Calculations for Screened in ESEP Components" (Ref.10.1) is 0.839g and therefore did not control screening.
P 3 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 93 of 151 CNP HCLPF Unit I Failure ESEL ID DESCRIPTION Mode (compared Notes Item # to RLGM)120VAC CONTROL Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
ROOM INSTRUMENT for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for 62 1-CRID-4 DISTRIBUTION Screened >RLGM RLGM based oncag ofreng USA CHANNL IVRLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-CHANNEL IV DISTRIBUTION PANEL 46 anchorage evaluation of panel 1-ERR, which governs the capacity of this item.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 120VAC CONTROL NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage could not be ROOM screened for RLGM based on scaling of 1-CRID INSTRUMENTATION existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.
63 INV DISTRIBUTION Screened >RLGM The governing HCLPF capacity for the SYSTEM CHANNEL 4 anchorage according to S&A Calculation INVERTER 13Q3208-CAL-004
-"HCLPF Calculations for Screened in ESEP Components" (Ref.10.1) is 0.839g and therefore did not control screening.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI DELTA 'T' AND UNIT NP-NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the CONTROL PANEL RLGM input based on similar panels within the control room yielding significant seismic capacity margins.120/208VAC Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
EMERGENCYLOCAL for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI 65 1-ELSC SHUTDOWN Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the DISTRIBUTION PANEL RLGM input based on similar panels yielding significant seismic capacity margins.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) 600VAC MOTOR for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 66 1-EZC-B CONTROL CENTER Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for EZC-B RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation of this MCC.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) 600VAC MOTOR for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 67 1-EZC-C CONTROL CENTER Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for EZC-C RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation of this MCC.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) 600VAC MOTOR for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 68 1-EZC-D CONTROL CENTER Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for EZC-D RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation of this MCC.AUXILIARY Equipment screens (other than anchorage) 69 1-FFI-210 FEEDWATER TO for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI STEAM GENERATOR NP-6041-SL.
Flow transmitter is a small, OME-3-1 FLOW light-weight (27 lb.) component.
Mounted to Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 PaRe 94 of 151 E3 CNP HCLPF Unit I Failure ESEL ID DESCRIPTION Mode (compared Notes Item M e to RLGM)Item #INDICATOR the wall using two 1/2" expansion bolts, TRANSMITTER equipment bolted to 2" pipe, 7" out from the wall and approximately 4" up. Transmitter is IEEE-344-1975 qualified.
Anchorage screens based on light weight component with rugged anchorage.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
AUXILIARY for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI FEEDWATER TO NP-6041-SL.
Flow transmitter is a small, 70 STEAM GENERATOR Screened >RLGM light-weight (27 lb.) component.
Mounted on OME-3-2 FLOW a u-shaped pipe frame which is welded to INDICATOR steel column (box structure) on both sides.TRANSMITTER Anchorage screens based on light weight component with rugged anchorage.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
AUXILIARY for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI FEEDWATER TO NP-6041-SL.
Flow transmitter is a small, STEAM GENERATOR light-weight (27 lb.) component.
Mounted on 71 1-FFI-230 OME-3-3NFLOW Screened >RLGM a u-shaped pipe frame which is welded to INDICATOR steel column (box structure) on both sides.TRANSMITTER Transmitter is IEEE-344-1975 qualified.
Anchorage screens based on light weight component with rugged anchorage.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI AUXILIARY NP-6041-SL.
Flow transmitter is a small, FEEDWATER TO light-weight (27 lb.) component.
It is STEAM GENERATOR mounted on a L-shaped pipe frame (2" pipe, OME-3-4 FLOW 7" out from the wall and approximately 13" INDICATOR up) with 2 1/2" bolts mounted to the wall with TRANSMITTER two expansion anchors. Anchorage screens based on the light weight and the rugged anchorage.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI FIXED INCORE NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the CONTROL PANEL RLGM input based on similar panels within the control room yielding significant seismic capacity margins.REACTOR CORE Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
THERMOCOUPLE for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 74 1-FICT-A TRAIN 'A' Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the TRANSMITTER RLGM input based on a screening CABINET calculation.
FLUX CONTROL Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PANEL for the 0.8g to 1,2g screening lane in EPRI SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 95 of 151 CNP HCLPF Unit I Failure ESEL ID DESCRIPTION Mode (compared Notes Item # to RLGM)NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the RLGM input based on similar panels within the control room yielding significant seismic capacity margins.Anchorage could not be screened for RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 WEST COMPONENT anchorage evaluation for the HX. The 80 1-HE-15W COOLING WATER Anchorage 0.547g governing HCLPF capacity for the anchorage according to S&A Calculation HEAT EXCHANGER 13Q3208-CAL-004
-"HCLPF Calculations for Screened in ESEP Components" (Ref.10.1) is 0.547g.Anchorage screened for RLGM based on WEST RESIDUAL HEAT existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation of 81 1-HE-17W REMOVAL HEAT Screened >RLGM this HX without top braces; braces were EXCHANGER installed after the evaluation and provide substantial support.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the RLGM input based on similar panels within the control room yielding significant seismic capacity margins. The potentially governing UNIT 1 HOT Block Wall interaction could not be screened SHUTDOWN PANEL for RLGM based on scaling of existing design basis calculation.
The governing HCLPF capacity for the block wall according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-004
-"HCLPF Calculations for Screened in ESEP Components" (Ref. 10.1) is 2.682g and therefore did not control screening.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-60411-SL.
Chiller on vibration isolators, later modified to be restrained in all directions.
Anchorage screened to a level greater than the RLGM by scaling the CONTROL ROOM AIR design basis anchorage calculation.
83 1-HV-ACR-2 CONDITIONING SOUTH Screened >RLGM The potentially governing Block Wall LIQUID CHILLER TeptnilygvrigBokWl interaction could not be screened for RLGM based on scaling of existing design basis calculation.
The governing HCLPF capacity for the block wall according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-004
-"HCLPF Calculations for Screened in ESEP Components" (Ref. 10.1) is 1.215g and P ki3 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 96 of 151 CNP HCLPF Unit 1 Failure EnEt ID DESCRIPTION Mode (compared Notes ESEL Mode t LM Item #to RLGM)Item #therefore did not control screening.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for this item. The CONTROL ROOM potentially governing Block Wall interaction 1-HV-ACRA-VENTILATION SOUTH could not be screened for RLGM based on 2 AIR CONDITIONING scaling of existing design basis calculation.
UNIT The governing HCLPF capacity for the block wall according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-004 -"HCLPF Calculations for Screened in ESEP Components" (Ref. 10.1)is 1.215g and therefore did not control screening.
OUTSIDE AIR TO Damper included on HVAC duct work, equipment screens for the 0.8g to 1.2 g 1-HV-ACR-CONTROL ROOM screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
A CNP 85 DA-2 PRESSURIZATION/CLE Screened >RLGM analysis of the duct work and supporting rod ACRF VENT DAMPER hangers indicates a large margin and therefore screens for the RLGM input.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the RLGM input based on similar filter anchorage with significant seismic capacity CONTROL ROOM margins. The potentially governing Block Wall interaction could not be screened for 86 1-HV-ACRF PRESSURIZATION/CLE Screened >RLGM RlG basedon calinof exsting dsg ANUP FILTER UNIT RLGM based on scaling of existing design basis calculation.
The governing HCLPF capacity for the block wall according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-004
-"HCLPF Calculations for Screened in ESEP Components" (Ref. 10.1) is 1.215g and therefore did not control screening.
CONTROL ROOM This equipment item is included in the 87 1-HV-ACRF-PRESSURIZATION/CLE Screened >RLGM existing USI A-46 evaluation for 1-HV-2 ANUP FILTER UNIT ACRA-2. This equipment item screens (see VENT FAN #2 1-HV-ACRA-2 for details).Heater included on HVAC duct work and CONTROL ROOM screens for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane 1-HV-ACR-VENTILATION SOUTH in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
A CNP analysis of the 88 H2 DUCT ELECTRIC Screened >RLGM duct work and supporting rod hangers HEATING UNIT indicates a large margin and therefore screens for the RLGM input.
SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 97 of 151 CNP HCLPF Unit 1 ID DESCRIPTION Failure (compared Notes ESEL Mode to RLGM)Item #Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
AB BATTERY for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI SEQUIPMENT AREA Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Fan hung from ceiling, in 90 5 BATTERY ROOM vertical alignment; fan weighs 360 lbs.VENTILATION Anchorage screens due to relatively small fan with rugged anchorage.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI CD BATTERY NP-6041-SL.
Fan bolted to floor with 8- 1/2" 1-HV-SGRX-EQUIPMENT AREA Screened >RLGM expansion bolts that are adequately 6 BATTERY ROOM embedded; fan weighs 500 lbs. Anchorage VENTILATION screens due to relatively small fan with rugged anchorage.
RHR TO REACTOR This valve is within Earthquake Experience COOLANT LOOPS #2 & Screened >RLGM Data Base (Fig. F-26) in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
92 1-1CM-111
#3 COLD LEGS Therefore, valve is screened for 0.8g to 1.2> g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
REACTOR COOLANT This valve is within Earthquake Experience LOOP #2 HOT LEG TO Data Base (Fig. F-26) in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
RESIDUAL Therefore, valve is screened for 0.8g to 1.2g 93 1-1CM-129 HEATREMOVAL screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
PUMPS SUCTION CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE The weight of this valve is outside the BORON INJECTION Earthquake Experience Data Base (Fig. F-TANK TRAIN 'B' 26) in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
A 3g analysis was 94 1-1CM-251 OUTLET Screened >RLGM performed resulting in acceptable stresses.CONTAINMENT Therefore, valve is screened for 0.8g to 1.2g ISOLATION VALVE screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Equipment screens for the 0.8g to 1.2 g BORON INJECTION TO screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL based REACTOR COOLANT Screened >RLGM on light weight component with rugged 96 1-IFI-51 LOOP #1 FLOW anchorage.
INDICATOR TRANSMITTER Equipment screens for the 0.8g to 1.2 g BORON INJECTION TO screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL based REACTOR COOLANT Screened >RLGM on light weight component with rugged 97 1-IFI-52 LOOP #2 anchorage.
FLOWINDICATOR TRANSMITTER SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 98 of 151 CNP HCLPF Unit I Failure ESEL ID DESCRIPTION Mode (compared Notes Item # to RLGM)Equipment screens for the 0.8g to 1.2 g BORON INJECTION TO screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL based REACTOR COOLANT Screened >RLGM on light weight component with rugged 98 1-IFI-53 LOOP #3 FLOW anchorage.LG anchorage.
INDICATOR TRANSMITTER Equipment screens for the 0.8g to 1.2 g BORON INJECTION TO screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL based REACTOR COOLANT Screened >RLGM on light weight component with rugged 99 1-IFI-54 LOOP #4 FLOW anchorage.
INDICATOR TRANSMITTER REACTOR COOLANT This valve is within Earthquake Experience LOOP #2 HOT LEG TO Data Base (Fig. F-26) in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
RESIDUAL Screened >RLGM Therefore, valve is screened for 0.8g to 1.2g HEATREMOVAL screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
PUMPS SUCTION SHUTOFF VALVE The weight of this valve is outside the Earthquake Experience Data Base (Fig. F-26) in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
A 3g analysis was BORON INJECTION performed resulting in acceptable stresses.101 1-IMO-256 TANK TRAIN'B'INLET Screened >RLGM Therefore, valve is screened for 0.8g to 1.2g SHUTOFF VALVE screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
A potential Block Wall interaction was screened for RLGM based on scaling of existing design basis calculation.
This valve is within the Earthquake Experience Data Base (Fig. F-26) in EPRI 6041-SL. Therefore, valve is screened for 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-EAST RESIDUAL HEAT 6041-SL. The potentially governing Block REMOVAL PUMP PP- Seismic Wall interaction could not be screened for 35EMSCTONA PnteractPon 0.428g 102 1-IMO-310 35E SUCTION Interaction RLGM based on scaling of existing design SHUTOFF VALVE basis calculation.
The governing HCLPF capacity for the block wall according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-004
-"HCLPF Calculations for Screened in ESEP Components" (Ref. 10.1) is 0.428g.103 1-IMO-324 WEST RHR HX 1-HE-17W DISCHARGE CROSSTIE SHUTOFF VALVE Screened>RLGM This valve is within the Earthquake Experience Data Base (Fig. F-26) in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Therefore, valve is screened for 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-0 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 99 of 151 CNP HCLPF Unit 1 Failure ESEL ID DESCRIPTION Mode (compared Notes Item M e to RLGM)Item #6041-SL.The hydrogen igniters are composed of the Igniter Box, glow plug, shield and other associated hardware.
The components within the igniter box are not fragile and are CONTAINMENT encompassed by the Earthquake 1-LDISB- HYDROGEN IGNITION Screened >RLGM Experience Data Base of EPRI NP-6041-SL.
104 B19 LOWER VOLUME Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI ASSEMBLY #B19 NP-6041-SL.
Equipment supported by unistrut cantilevered off the containment wall. Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling existing anchorage evaluation.
CONTAINMENT See notes for 1-LDISB-B19.
Assembly 1-LDISB- HYDROGEN IGNITION Screened >RLGM screened for 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in 105 B20 LOWER VOLUME EPRI NP-6041-SL and anchorage loadings TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG for RLGM.ASSEMBLY #B20 CONTAINMENT See notes for 1-LDISB-B19.
Assembly 1-LDISB- HYDROGEN IGNITION Screened >RLGM screened for 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in 106 B21 LOWER VOLUME EPRI NP-6041-SL and anchorage loadings TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG for RLGM.ASSEMBLY #B21 CONTAINMENT See notes for 1-LDISB-B19.
Assembly 1-LDISB- HYDROGEN IGNITION Screened >RLGM screened for 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in 107 B22 LOWER VOLUME EPRI NP-6041-SL and anchorage loadings TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG for RLGM.ASSEMBLY #B22 CONTAINMENT See notes for 1-LDISB-B19.
Assembly 1-LDISB- HYDROGEN IGNITION Screened >RLGM screened for 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in 108 B23 LOWER VOLUME EPRI NP-6041-SL and anchorage loadings TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG for RLGM.ASSEMBLY #B23 CONTAINMENT See notes for 1-LDISB-B19.
Assembly 1-LDISB- HYDROGEN IGNITION Screened >RLGM screened for 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in 109 B24 LOWER VOLUME EPRI NP-6041-SL and anchorage loadings TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG for RLGM ASSEMBLY #B24 CONTAINMENT Equipment supported by unistrut HYDROGEN IGNITION cantilevered off column. See notes for 1-110 1-LDISB- LOWER VOLUME Screened >RLGM LDISB-B19.
Assembly screened for 0.8g to B25 TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL ASSEMBLY #B25 and anchorage loadings for RLGM SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 PaRe 100 of 151 CNP HCLPF Unit I Failure ESEL ID DESCRIPTION Mode (compared Notes Item # to RLGM)CONTAINMENT Equipment supported by unistrut HYDROGEN IGNITION cantilevered off column. See notes for 1-1-LDISB- LOWER VOLUME Screened >RLGM LDISB-B 19. Assembly screened for 0.8g to B26 TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL ASSEMBLY #826 and anchorage loadings for RLGM CONTAINMENT Equipment supported by unistrut HYDROGEN IGNITION cantilevered off column. See notes for 1-112 1-LDISB- LOWER VOLUME Screened >RLGM LDISB-B319.
Assembly screened for 0.8g to B27 TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL ASSEMBLY #827 and anchorage loadings for RLGM Equipment supported by unistrut CONTAINMENT cantilevered off column, the equipment is HYDROGEN IGNITION approximately 20 ft. above the viewing 113 1-LDISB- LOWER VOLUME Screened >RLGM location.
See notes for 1-LDISB-B19.
B28 TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG Assembly screened for 0.8g to 1.2g ASSEMBLY #B28 screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL and anchorage loadings for RLGM 1-LDISB- CONTAINMENT See notes for 1-LDISB-B19.
Assembly B29 HYDROGEN IGNITION screened for 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in 114 LOWER VOLUME Screened >RLGM EPRI NP-6041-SL and anchorage loadings TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG for RLGM ASSEMBLY #829 CONTAINMENT See notes for 1-LDISB-B19.
Assembly 1-LDISB- HYDROGEN IGNITION Screened >RLGM screened for 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in 115 B30 LOWER VOLUME EPRI NP-6041-SL and anchorage loadings TRAIN'B' GLOW PLUG for RLGM ASSEMBLY #830 CONTAINMENT See notes for 1-LDISB-B19.
Assembly 1-LDISB- HYDROGEN IGINTION Screened >RLGM screened for 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in 116 B31 LOWER VOLUME EPRI NP-6041-SL and anchorage loadings TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG for RLGM ASSEMBLY #831 CONTAINMENT See notes for 1-LDISB-B19.
Assembly 1-LDISB- HYDROGEN IGNITION Screened >RLGM screened for 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in 117 B32 LOWER VOLUME EPRI NP-6041-SL and anchorage loadings TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG for RLGM ASSEMBLY #832 CONTAINMENT See notes for 1-LDISB-B19.
Assembly 1-LDISB- HYDROGEN IGNITION Screened >RLGM screened for 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in 118 B33 LOWER VOLUME EPRI NP-6041-SL and anchorage loadings TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG for RLGM ASSEMBLY #833 1-LDISB- CONTAINMENT Screened >RLGM See notes for 1-LDISB-B19.
Assembly B34 HYDROGEN IGNITION screened for 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 101 of 151 CNP HCLPF Unit I Failure ESEL ID DESCRIPTION Mode (compared Notes Item # to RLGM)LOWER VOLUME EPRI NP-6041-SL and anchorage loadings TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG for RLGM ASSEMBLY #B34 Equipment bolted to unistrut, which is CONTAINMENT cantilevered off column 13 of quad 4, the HYDROGEN IGNITION unistrut is welded to this column. See notes 120 B35 LOWER VOLUME for 1-LDISB-B19.
Assembly screened for TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-ASSEMBLY #B35 6041-SL and anchorage loadings for RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
STEAM GENERATORS for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 121 1-LSI-1 #1 AND # LOCAL Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for SHUTDOWN STATION RLGM based on existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for this panel.Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
STEAM GENERATORS for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 122 1-LSI-2 #2 AND #3 LOCAL Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for SHUTDOWN STATION RLGM based on existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for this panel.Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
REACTOR COOLANT for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI SYSTEM CHARGING Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for AND LETDOWN LOCAL RLGM based on existing USI A-46 SHUTDOWN STATION anchorage evaluation for this panel.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 124 1-MCAB 250VDC DISTRIBUTION Screened .>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for PANEL MCAB RLGM based on existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for this panel.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 250VDC DISTRIBUTION Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for POWER PANEL RLGM based on existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for this panel.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 250VDC DISTRIBUTION Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for PANEL MDAB RLGM based on existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for this panel.250VDC DISTRIBUTION Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PANEL MDCD for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 10 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 102 of 151 CNP HCLPF Unit 1 Failure ESEL ID DESCRIPTION e (compared Notes ESLMode (cmaeNos Item # to RLGM)6041-SL. Anchorage screened for RLGM based on existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for this panel.Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
STEAM GENERATOR for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 128 1-MPP-210 OME-3-1 CHANNEL I Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for STEAM PRESSURE RLGM based on existing USI A-46 TRANSMITTER anchorage evaluation for this transmitter.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
STEAM GENERATOR for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 129 1-MPP-220 OME-3-2 CHANNEL I Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for STEAM PRESSURE RLGM based on existing USI A-46 TRANSMITTER anchorage evaluation for this transmitter.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
STEAM GENERATOR for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 130 1-MPP-230 OME-3-3 CHANNEL I Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for STEAM PRESSURE RLGM based on existing USI A-46 TRANSMITTER anchorage evaluation for this transmitter.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
STEAM GENERATOR for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI OME-3-4 CHANNEL I Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for STEAM PRESSURE RLGM based on existing USI A-46 TRANSMITTER anchorage evaluation for this transmitter.
This valve is outside the Earthquake STEAM GENERATOR Experience Data Base (Fig. F-25) in EPRI OME-3-1 POWER Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
A 3g load analysis was 132 1-MRV-213 OPERATED performed, resulting in acceptable stresses.RELIEFVALVE Therefore, valve is screened for 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 6041-SL.This valve is outside the Earthquake STEAM GENERATOR Experience Data Base (Fig. F-25) in EPRI OME-3-2 POWER Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
A 3g load analysis was 133 1-MRV-223 OPERATED RELIEF performed, resulting in acceptable stresses.VALVE Therefore, valve is screened for 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
STEAM GENERATOR This valve is outside the Earthquake Experience Data Base (Fig. F-25) in EPRI 134 1-MRV-233 OPERATED RELIEF NP-6041-SL.
A 3g load analysis was VALVE performed, resulting in acceptable stresses.Therefore, valve is screened for 0.8g to 1.2 SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 103 of 151 CNP HCLPF Unit IFalr EnEt ID DESCRIPTION Failure (compared Notes ESEL Mode (o Notes Item #to RLGM)Item #g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
This valve is outside the Earthquake STEAM GENERATOR Experience Data Base (Fig. F-25) in EPRI OME-3-4 POWER Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
A 3g load analysis was 135 1-MRV-243 OPERATED performed, resulting in acceptable stresses.RELIEFVALVE Therefore, valve is screened for 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 6041-SL.NUCLEAR Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
INSTRUMENTATION for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 136 1-NIS-1 SYSTEM PROTECTION Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for CHANNEL I CONTROL RLGM based on existing USI A-46 PANEL anchorage evaluation for this panel.Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PRESSURIZER OME-4 for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI PROTECTION Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for CHANNEL I RLGM based on existing USI A-46 LEVELTRANSMITTER anchorage evaluation for this transmitter.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
REACTOR VESSEL for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
The transmitter is IEEE-344-138 1-NPS-110 PRESSURE 75 Qualified.
Anchorage screened for RLGM TRANSMITTER based on existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for this transmitter.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage could not be screened for RLGM based on scaling of NUCLEAR existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for 142 1-NRI INSTRUMENTATION Screened >RLGM the Amplifier.
The governing HCLPF AMP WIDE RANGE capacity for the anchorage according to RADIATION AMPLIFIER S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-004
-"HCLPF Calculations for Screened in ESEP Components" (Ref. 10.1) is 1.16g and did not control the capacity.Equipment is within Earthquake Experience PRESSURIZER TRAIN Data (Fig. F-25) of EPRI NP-6041-SL and 143 1-NRV-152
'B'PRESSURE RELIEF Sscreens for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane VALVE in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
PRESSURIZER OME-4 Equipment is within Earthquake Experience 144 1-NRV-153 TRAIN A PRESSURE Data (Fig. F-25) of EPRI NP-6041-SL and RELIEF VALVE screens for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 104 of 151 CNP HCLPF Unit 1 Failure ESEL ID DESCRIPTION Mode (compared Notes ESEL Mode t LM Item # to RLGM)in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
REACTOR COOLANT The Thermal Sensor is IEEE-344-75 LOOP #1 HOT LEG Qualified.
Rugged component no seismic 149 1-NTR-110 WIDE Screened >RLGM interaction concerns.
Equipment screens for RANGETEMPERATURE the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-RECORDER THERMAL 6041-SL.SENSOR REACTOR COOLANT The Thermal Sensor is IEEE-344-75 LOOP #3 HOT LEG Qualified.
Rugged component no seismic 150 1-NTR-130 WIDE Screened >RLGM interaction concerns.
Equipment screens for RANGETEMPERATURE the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-RECORDER THERMAL 6041-SL.SENSOR REACTOR COOLANT The Thermal Sensor is IEEE-344-75 LOOP #1 COLD LEG Qualified.
Rugged component no seismic 151 1-NTR-210 WIDE Screened >RLGM interaction concerns.
Equipment screens for RANGETEMPERATURE the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-RECORDER THERMAL 6041-SL.SENSOR REACTOR COOLANT The Thermal Sensor is IEEE-344-75 LOOP #3 COLD LEG Qualified.
Rugged component no seismic 152 1-NTR-230 WIDE Screened >RLGM interaction concerns.
Equipment screens for RANGETEMPERATURE the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-RECORDER THERMAL 6041-SL.SENSOR Strainer supported on two 14" wide, 12" deep, and 18" tall concrete pedestals.
TURBINE DRIVEN Equipment bolted to pedestals with four 3/4" anchor bolts, one set of two bolts in each 153 1-OME-33 PUMP PP-4 SUCTION pedestal, spaced at 6" apart. The piping is STRAINER well supported, the strainer is small relative to the anchorage and therefore, this is screened for the RLGM.Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
WEST ESSENTIAL for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 154 1-OME-34W SERVICE WATER Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for PUMP PP-7W DISCH RLGM based on existing USI A-46 STN anchorage evaluation for similar pump.ACCUMULATOR TANK Screened >RLGM Anchorage screened for RLGM input based 155 1-OME-6-1
#1 on screening calculation.
ACCUMULATOR TANK Screened >RLGM Anchorage screened for RLGM input based 156 1-OME-6-2
#2 on screening calculation.
SA I Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 105 of 151 CNP HCLPF Unit I Failure ESEL ID DESCRIPTION Mode (compared Notes Item # to RLGM)ACCUMULATOR TANK Screened >RLGM Anchorage screened for RLGM input based 157 1-OME-6-3
#3 on screening calculation.
ACCUMULATOR TANK Screened >RLGM Anchorage screened for RLGM input based 158 1-OME-6-4
#4 on screening calculation.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
WEST COMPONENT for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 159 1-PP-iOW COOLING WATER Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for PUMP RLGM based on existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for this pump.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Pump is supported vertically, but free to translate laterally.
The Pump screened for RLGM based on existing stress WEST RESIDUAL HEAT Seisi 0.423g evaluation of this pump and attached lines.REMOVAL PUMP The governing HCLPF capacity for the block wall according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-004 -"HCLPF Calculations for Screened in ESEP Components" (Ref. 10.1)is 0.423g.Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
TURBINE DRIVEN for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 161 1-PP-4 AUXILIARY FEED Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for PUMP RLGM based on existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for this pump.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the RLGM input based on robust anchorage for relatively small pump. However, the HCLPF BORIC ACID STORAGE Seismic for this component is limited by the Boric 162 1-PP-46-1 TANKS TRANSFER Interaction 0.227g Acid Storage Tank 1-TK-12N due to the PUMP #1 attached piping. HCLPF capacity according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-005
-"HCLPF Calculations for Screened in ESEP Tanks" (Ref. 10.2) for the tank is 0.227g that is less than the RLGM of 0.387g.CONTROL ROOM AIR Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CONDITROL G R OM H A for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 163 1-PP-82S COITI N NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for CIRCULATION PUMP RLGM based on existing USI A-46 CIRCULATION I IUManchorage evaluation for this pump. The PO Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 106 of 151 CNP HCLPF Unit 1 Failure ESEL ID DESCRIPTION Mode (compared Notes IEm Moe to RLGM)Item #governing HCLPF capacity for the block wall according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-004 -"HCLPF Calculations for Screened in ESEP Components" (Ref. 10.1)is 1.215g and did not control the capacity.Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
UPPER CONTAINMENT for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 164 1-PPA-310 CHANNEL III WIDE Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RANGE PRESSURE RLGM based on comparison to similar ALARM TRANSMITTER transmitters.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the 165 1-PRZ CONTROLEPANEL RLGM input based on similar panels within the control room yielding significant seismic capacity margins.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the RLGM input based on robust anchorage for NORTH BORIC ACID small instrument.
However, the HCLPF for STORAGE TANK TK- Seismic this component is limited by the Boric Acid 16612N LEVEL ALARM Interaction 0.2AStorage Tank 1-TK-12N due to the attached TRANSMITTER piping. HCLPF capacity according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-005
-"HCLPF Calculations for Screened in ESEP Tanks" (Ref. 10.2) for the tank is 0.227g that is less than the RLGM of 0.387g.Equipment is within Earthquake Experience AIR OPERATED VALVE Data (Fig. F-25) of EPRI NP-6041-SL and 167 1-QRV-200 TO ISOLATE BORON Screened >RLGM Daa(i.F2)oEPIN-41Lan screens for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane INJECTION PATH in EPRI 6041-SL.TURBINE DRIVEN Equipment is within Earthquake Experience AUXILIARY FEED Screened >RLGM Data (Fig. F-26) of EPRI NP-6041-SL and 168 1-QT-506 PUMP PP-4 TRIP AND screens for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane THROTTLE VALVE in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Equipment is within Earthquake Experience AUXILIARY TUBN Screened >RLGM Data (Fig. F-26) of EPRI NP-6041-SL and 169 1-QT-507 PUMP TURBINE Sscreens for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane GOVERNOR VALVE in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 107 of 151 CNP HCLPF Unit I ID DESCRIPTION Failure (compared Notes ESEL Mode (o Notes Item # to RLGM)Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the RLGM input based on robust anchorage for small instrument.
However, the HCLPF for NORTH BAST TK-12N Seismic this component is limited by the Boric Acid 170 1-QTC-410 TRAIN 'A' HTR TEMP Interaction 0.227g Storage Tank 1-TK-12N due to the attached CONTROLLER piping. HCLPF capacity according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-005
-"HCLPF Calculations for Screened in ESEP Tanks" (Ref. 10.2) for the tank is 0.227g that is less than the RLGM of 0.387g.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI RESIDUAL HEAT Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the 171 1-RHR REMOVAL CONTROL RLGM based on similar panels within the PANEL control room yielding significant seismic capacity margins.Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
REACTOR for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI PROTECTION Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for CHANNEL I CABINET RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46#1 anchorage evaluation.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
REACTOR for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI PROTECTION Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the CHANNEL I CABINET RLGM based on similar cabinets yielding#2 significant seismic capacity margins.Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
REACTOR for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI 174 1-RPC-1-3 PROTECTION Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the CHANNEL I CABINET RLGM based on similar cabinets yielding#3 significant seismic capacity margins.Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
REACTOR for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI PROTECTION Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the CHANNEL I CABINET RLGM based on similar cabinets yielding#4 significant seismic capacity margins.REACTOR Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION Screened >RLGM for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI CHANNEL II CABINET NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the#5 RLGM based on similar cabinets yielding PO Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 108 of 151 CNP HCLPF Unit 1 ID DESCRIPTION Failure (compared Notes ESEL Mode to RLGM)Item #significant seismic capacity margins.Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
REACTOR for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI PROTECTION Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the CHANNEL II CABINET RLGM based on similar cabinets yielding#6 significant seismic capacity margins.Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
REACTOR for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI PROTECTION Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the CHANNEL II CABINET RLGM based on similar cabinets yielding#7 significant seismic capacity margins.Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
REACTOR for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI 179 1-RPC-2-8 PROTECTION Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the CHANNEL II CABINET RLGM based on similar cabinets yielding#8 significant seismic capacity margins.Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
REACTOR for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI PROTECTION Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the CHANNEL III CABINET RLGM based on similar cabinets yielding#10 significant seismic capacity margins.Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
REACTOR for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI PROTECTION Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the CHANNEL III CABINET RLGM based on similar cabinets yielding#9 significant seismic capacity margins.Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
REACTOR for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI PROTECTION Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the CHANNEL IV CABINET RLGM based on similar cabinets yielding#12 significant seismic capacity margins.Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
REACTOR for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI PROTECTION AND Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the 183 1-RPS-A SAFEGUARD RLGM based on similar panels within the ACTUATION TRAIN 'A' control room yielding significant seismic CABINET capacity margins.REACTOR Equipment screens (other than anchorage) 184 1-RPS-B PROTECTION AND for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI SAFEGUARD NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the PO Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 PaRe 109 of 151 CNP HCLPF Unit 1 (compare ESEL ID DESCRIPTION Failure (compared Notes ESEL Mode to RLGM)Item #ACTUATION TRAIN 'B' RLGM based on similar panels within the CABINET control room yielding significant seismic capacity margins.REACTOR Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION AND for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 185 1-RPSX-A SAFEGUARD Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for ACTUATIO N TRAIN 'A' RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 AUXILIARY CABINET anchorage evaluation.
REACTOR Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION AND for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 186 1-RPSX-B SAFEGUARD Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for ACTUATIO N TRAIN 'B' RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 AUXILIARY CABINET anchorage evaluation.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the REACTOR VESSEL RLGM based on similar cabinets yielding OME-1 WATER LEVEL Screened >RLGM significant seismic capacity margins. The 187 1-RVLC INSTRUMENTATION governing HCLPF capacity for the block wall CABINET according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-004 -"HCLPF Calculations for Screened in ESEP Components" (Ref. 10.1)is 2.682g which does not control capacity.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 188 1-SA STATION AUXILIARIES Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for CONTROL PANEL RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
STEAM GENERATOR for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 189 1-SG AND AUXILIARY FEED Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for PUMP CONTROL RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 PANEL anchorage evaluation.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI SAFETY INJECTION Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the CONTROL PANEL RLGM based on similar panels yielding significant seismic capacity margins.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) 191 1-SPY CONTAINEN for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 110 of 151 CNP HCLPF Unit I Failure ESEL ID DESCRIPTION Mode (compared Notes Item M e to RLGM)Item #RLGM based on similar panels yielding significant seismic capacity margins.Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
ENGINEER SAFETY for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 1-SSR SYSTEM REAR Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for INSTRUMENT/RELAY RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 RACK anchorage evaluation.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
NUCLEAR for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI INSTRUMENTAL Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the 193 1-SWR SOURCE RANGE N21 RLGM based on similar equipment within INSTRUMENT/RELAY the control room yielding significant seismic RACK capacity margins.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI 4KV BUS T11A Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the SWITCHGEAR RLGM based on anchorage evaluation performed to the RLGM.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI 250VDC TRAIN 'B' Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the TRANSFER CABINET RLGM based on similar panels yielding significant seismic capacity margins.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI 250VDC TRAIN A Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the TRANSFER CABINET RLGM based on similar panels yielding significant seismic capacity margins.The Block Wall interaction was screened for RLGM based on scaling of existing design basis calculation.
The governing HCLPF BORON INJECTION Anchorage 0.45g capacity according to S&A Calculation 197 1-TK-11 TANK 13Q3208-CAL-005
-"High Confidence Low Probability of Failure (HCLPF) Calculations for Screened in ESEP Tanks" (Ref. 10.2) is 0.45g for the welded connections.
The Block Wall interaction was screened for RLGM based on scaling of existing design 198 1-TK-12N NORTH BORIC ACID Anchorage 0.227g basis calculation.
The governing HCLPF STORAGE TANK capacity according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-005
-"High Confidence Low SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 111 of 151 CNP HCLPF Unit 1 Failure ESEL ID DESCRIPTION Mode (compared Notes Item # to RLGM)Probability of Failure (HCLPF) Calculations for Screened in ESEP Tanks" (Ref. 10.2) is 0.227g. Therefore, this tank does not screen for the RLGM.Horizontal tank containing air is well supported in addition to standard saddles.PRESSURIZER TRAIN Tank is adequately welded to building steel.'B' PRESSURE RELIEF Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage) 199 1-TK-253-1 VALVE NRV-152 for the 0.89 to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI RESERVE CONTROL NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage judged adequate AIR TANK for RLGM by inspection based on small fan with rugged anchorage.
Horizontal tank containing air is well supported in addition to standard saddles.PRESSURIZER TRAIN Tank is adequately welded to building steel.'A' PRESSURE RELIEF Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage) 200 1-TK-253-2 VALVE NRV-153 for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI RESERVE CONTROL NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage judged adequate AIR TANK for RLGM by inspection based on small fan with rugged anchorage.
Tanks 1-TK-253-3, -5, &-7 grouped together and anchored by four plates bolted to the wall with two 3/4" bolts in each plate. The PRESSURIZER TRAIN tanks are 9" diameter and 56" tall. The air'B' PRESSURE RELIEF bottles are strapped to framing affixed to the 201 1-TK-253-3 VLV NRV152 Screened >RLGM wall by twelve W" bolts. Equipment screens EMERGENCY AIR (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g TANK screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage judged adequate for RLGM by inspection based on rugged configuration of support.Tanks 1-TK-253-4, -6, &-8 grouped together and anchored by four plates bolted to the wall with two 3/4" bolts in each plate. The PRESSURIZER TRAIN tanks are 9" diameter and 56" tall. The air'A' PRESSURE RELIEF bottles are strapped to framing affixed to the 202 1-TK-253-4 VLV NRV153 Screened >RLGM wall by twelve W" bolts. Equipment screens EMERGENCY AIR (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g TANK screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage judged adequate for RLGM by inspection based on rugged configuration of support.
SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 112 of 151 CNP HCLPF Unit I Failure ESEL ID DESCRIPTION Mode (compared Notes Item # to RLGM)Tanks 1-TK-253-3, -5, &-7 grouped together and anchored by four plates bolted to the wall with two 3/4" bolts in each plate. The PRESSURIZER TRAIN tanks are 9" diameter and 56" tall. The air'B' PRESSURE RELIEF bottles are strapped to framing affixed to the 203 1-TK-253-5 VLV NRV-152 Screened >RLGM wall by twelve %" bolts. Equipment screens EMERGENCY AIR (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g TANK screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage judged adequate for RLGM by inspection based on rugged configuration of support.Tanks 1-TK-253-4, -6, &-8 grouped together and anchored by four plates bolted to the wall with two 3/4" bolts in each plate. The PRESSURIZER TRAIN tanks are 9" diameter and 56" tall. The air'A' PRESSURE RELIEF bottles are strapped to framing affixed to the 204 1-TK-253-6 VLV NRV-153 Screened >RLGM wall by twelve W" bolts. Equipment screens EMERGENCY AIR (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g TANK screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage judged adequate for RLGM by inspection based on rugged configuration of support.Tanks 1-TK-253-3, -5, &-7 grouped together and anchored by four plates bolted to the wall with two 3/4" bolts in each plate. The PRESSURIZER TRAIN tanks are 9" diameter and 56" tall. The air'B' PRESSURE RELIEF bottles are strapped to framing affixed to the 205 1-TK-253-7 VLV NRV-152 Screened >RLGM wall by twelve %" bolts. Equipment screens EMERGENCY AIR (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g TANK screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage judged adequate for RLGM by inspection based on rugged configuration of support.Tanks 1-TK-253-4, -6, &-8 grouped together and anchored by four plates bolted to the PRESSURIZER TRAIN wall with two 3/4" bolts in each plate. The'A' PRESSURE RELIEF tanks are 9" diameter and 56" tall. The air 206 1-TK-253-8 VLV NRV-153 Screened >RLGM bottles are strapped to framing affixed to the EMERGENCY AIR wall by twelve W" bolts. Equipment screens TANK (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage judged adequate for RLGM by inspection based on rugged configuration of SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 113 of 151 CNP HCLPF Unit 1 Failure Enit ID DESCRIPTION Mode (compared Notes ESEL Mode t LM Item # to RLGM)support.Rust was found on the strap supports.
A HCLPF calculation was performed for the degraded condition.
The governing HCLPF CONDENSATE Anchorage 0.481g capacity according to S&A Calculation 207 1-TK-32 STORAGE TANK 13Q3208-CAL-005
-"High Confidence Low Probability of Failure (HCLPF) Calculations for Screened in ESEP Tanks" (Ref. 10.2) is 0.481g.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage or the adjacent Block Wall could not be screened for RLGM COMPONENT based on scaling the existing calculations.
208 1-TK-37 COOLING WATER Anchorage 0.447g The governing HCLPF capacity according to SURGE TANK S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-005
-"High Confidence Low Probability of Failure (HCLPF) Calculations for Screened in ESEP Tanks" (Ref. 10.2) is for the tank and is 0.447g due to the anchor bolts.This transformer was purchased to the IEEE 344-75 standard.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on 600VAC BUS 11A Screened >RLGM scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage 209 1-TR11A SUPPLY evaluation.
The governing HCLPF capacity TRANSFORMER for the block wall according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-004
-"HCLPF Calculations for Screened in ESEP Components" (Ref. 10.1) is 1.270g and did not control the capacity.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI TRANSFORMER FOR Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for AFWX DIST PANEL RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 211 1-TR-ELSC TRANSFORMER FOR Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for ELSC DIST PANEL RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.
SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 114 of 151 CNP HCLPF Unit IFalr ESEL ID DESCRIPTION Failure (compared Notes ESEL Mode (o Notes Item # to RLGM)Igniter box is attached to horizontal unistruts bolted to vertical embedded unistruts.
The hydrogen igniters are composed of the Igniter Box, glow plug, shield and other associated hardware.
The components CONTAINMENT within the igniter box are not fragile and are HYDROGEN IGNITION encompassed by that typically contained in 212 1-UDISB-B1 UPPER VOLUME Screened >RLGM other electrical boxes. Therefore, it is TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG determined that the screening lanes ASSEMBLY #B1 contained in EPRI NP-6041-SL are applicable to this equipment.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL. Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling existing anchorage evaluation.
CONTAINMENT Igniter box is bolted to horizontal unistruts HYDROGEN IGNITION bolted to an embedded vertical unistrut on 213 B10 UPPER VOLUME the left and a 3/8" expansion anchor on the TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG right. See notes for 1-UDISB-B1.
ASSEMBLY #B10 CONTAINMENT Igniter box is bolted to horizontal unistruts HYDROGEN IGNITION bolted to an embedded vertical unistrut on 214 B11 UPPER VOLUME the left and a 3/8" expansion anchor on the TRAIN'B'GLOW PLUG right. See notes for 1-UDISB-B1.
ASSEMBLY #B131 CONTAINMENT Igniter box is bolted to horizontal unistruts HYDROGEN IGNITION bolted to an embedded vertical unistrut on 215 B12 UPPER VOLUME the left and a 3/8" expansion anchor on the TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG right. See notes for 1-UDISB-B1.
ASSEMBLY #B12 Igniter box is bolted to two vertical unistruts which are U-bolted to the top and bottom handrail of the catwalk. The hydrogen igniters are composed of the Igniter Box, CONTAINMENT glow plug, shield and other associated HYDROGEN IGNITION hardware.
The igniters attached to the 216 1-UDISB- UPPER VOLUME Screened >RLGM catwalk. The governing HCLPF capacity for B13 TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG the catwalk according to S&A Calculation ASSEMBLY #B13 13Q3208-CAL-006
-"High Confidence Low Probability of Failure (HCLPF) Calculations for Containment Catwalk and Attached Hydrogen Glow Plugs"" (Ref. 10.3) is 0.86g and did not control capacity.1-UDISB- CONTAINMENT Screened >RLGM Igniter box is bolted to two vertical unistrut B14 HYDROGEN IGNITION that are U-bolted to the top and bottom SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 115 of 151 CNP HCLPF Unit I Failure c p ESEL ID DESCRIPTION e (compared Notes Item # to RLGM)UPPER VOLUME handrail of the catwalk. The governing TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG HCLPF capacity for the catwalk according to ASSEMBLY #B14 S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-006
-"High Confidence Low Probability of Failure (HCLPF) Calculations for Containment Catwalk and Attached Hydrogen Glow Plugs"" (Ref. 10.3) is 0.86g and did not control capacity.Igniter box is bolted to two vertical unistruts which are U-bolted to the top and bottom handrail of the catwalk. The governing CONTAINMENT HCLPF capacity for the catwalk according to 1-UDISB- HYDROGEN IGNITION Screened >RLGM S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-006
-"High 218 B15 UPPER VOLUME Confidence Low Probability of Failure TRAIN'B' GLOW PLUG (HCLPF) Calculations for Containment ASSEMBLY #B15 Catwalk and Attached Hydrogen Glow Plugs"" (Ref. 10.3) is 0.86g and did not control capacity.Igniter box is bolted to two vertical unistruts which are U-bolted to the top and bottom handrail of the catwalk. The governing CONTAINMENT HCLPF capacity for the catwalk according to 1-UDISB- HYDROGEN IGNITION Screened >RLGM S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-006
-"High 219 B16 UPPER VOLUME Confidence Low Probability of Failure TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG (HCLPF) Calculations for Containment ASSEMBLY #B16 Catwalk and Attached Hydrogen Glow Plugs"" (Ref. 10.3) is 0.86g and did not control capacity.Igniter box is bolted to two vertical unistruts which are U-bolted to the top and bottom handrail of the catwalk. The governing CONTAINMENT HCLPF capacity for the catwalk according to 1-UDISB- HYDROGEN IGNITION Screened >RLGM S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-006
-"High 220 B17 UPPER VOLUME Confidence Low Probability of Failure TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG (HCLPF) Calculations for Containment ASSEMBLY #B17 Catwalk and Attached Hydrogen Glow Plugs" (Ref. 10.3) is 0.86g and did not control capacity.CONTAINMENT Igniter box is bolted to two vertical unistruts 1-UDISB- HYDROGEN IGNITION Screened >RLGM which are U-bolted to the top and bottom 221 1U UPPER VOLUME handrail of the catwalk. See notes for 1-TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG UDISB-B13 for screening.
The governing ASSEMBLY #B18 HCLPF capacity for the catwalk according to SA3 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-APT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 116 of 151 CNP CNP HCLPF Unit 1 Failure ESEL ID DESCRIPTION Mode (compared Notes Item # to RLGM)S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-006
-"High Confidence Low Probability of Failure (HCLPF) Calculations for Containment Catwalk and Attached Hydrogen Glow Plugs" (Ref. 10.3) is 0.86g and did not control capacity.CONTAINMENT Igniter box is attached to horizontal unistruts HYDROGEN IGNITION bolted to vertical embedded unistruts.
See 222 1-UDISB-B2 UPPER VOLUME Screened >RLGM notes for 1-UDISB-B1 for screening.
TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B2 CONTAINMENT Igniter box is attached to horizontal unistruts HYDROGEN IGNITION bolted to vertical embedded unistruts.
See 223 1-UDISB-B3 UPPER VOLUME Screened >RLGM notes for 1-UDISB-B1 for screening.
TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B3 CONTAINMENT Igniter box is attached to horizontal unistruts HYDROGEN IGNITION bolted to vertical embedded unistruts.
See 224 1-UDISB-B4 UPPER VOLUME Screened >RLGM notes for 1-UDISB-B1 for screening.
TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B4 CONTAINMENT Igniter box is attached to horizontal unistruts HYDROGEN IGNITION bolted to vertical embedded unistruts.
See 225 1-UDISB-B5 UPPER VOLUME Screened >RLGM notes for 1-UDISB-B1 for screening.
TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B5 CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN IGNITION Igniter box is attached to horizontal unistruts 226 1-UDISB-B6 UPPER VOLUME Screened >RLGM bolted to vertical embedded unistruts.
See TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG notes for 1-UDISB-B1 for screening.
ASSEMBLY #B6 CONTAINMENT Igniter box is attached to horizontal unistruts HYDROGEN IGNITION bolted to vertical embedded unistruts.
See 227 1-UDISB-B7 UPPER VOLUME Screened >RLGM notes for 1-UDISB-B1 for screening.
TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B7 CONTAINMENT Igniter box is bolted to horizontal unistruts HYDROGEN IGNITION bolted to an embedded vertical unistrut on 228 1-UDISB-B8 UPPER VOLUME Screened >RLGM the left and a 3/8" expansion anchor on the TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG right. See notes for 1-UDISB-B1 for ASSEMBLY #B8 screening.
SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 117 of 151 CNP HCLPF Unit 1 Failure EnEt ID DESCRIPTION Mode (compared Notes ESEL Mode t LM Item # to RLGM)CONTAINMENT Igniter box is bolted to horizontal unistruts HYDROGEN IGNITION bolted to an embedded vertical unistrut on 229 1-UDISB-B9 UPPER VOLUME Screened >RLGM the left and a 3/8" expansion anchor on the TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG right. See notes for 1-UDISB-B1 for ASSEMBLY #B9 screening.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI LOWER CONTAINMENT NP-6041-SL.
The governing HCLPF 1 -VR- TRAIN B DISTRIBUTED Screened >RLGM capacity for the anchorage according to S&A 230 LDISB-4 IGNITION SYSTEM Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-004- "HCLPF VOLTAGE REGULATOR Calculations for Screened in ESEP Components" (Ref. 10.1) is 0.760g and did not control the capacity.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage could not be screened for RLGM based on scaling of UPPER CONTAINMENT existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.
1-VR- TRAIN B DISTRIBUTED Screened >RLGM The governing HCLPF capacity for the UDISB-3 IGNITION SYSTEM anchorage according to S&A Calculation VOLTAGE REGULATOR 13Q3208-CAL-004- "HCLPF Calculations for Screened in ESEP Components" (Ref.10.1) is 0.760g and did not control the capacity.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the 232 1-VS CONTROLAPANEL RLGM input based on similar panels within the control room yielding significant seismic capacity margins.WEST CONTAINMENT SPRAY HEAT This valve falls within the Earthquake EXCHANGER 1-HE- Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-233 1-WMO-715 18W ESSENTIAL Screened >RLGM SL. Therefore, this valve screens for the SERVICE WATER 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-INLET SHUTOFF 6041-SL.VALVE ESSENTIAL SERVICE This valve falls outside the Earthquake WATER TO TURBINE Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-234 1-WMO-753 DRIVENAUXILIARY Screened >RLGM SL. However, this valve screens for the 0.8g FEED PUMP PP-4 to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL SHUTOFF VALVE based on analysis performed to 3g input.
SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 118 of 151 CNP HCLPF Unit I Failure ESEL ID DESCRIPTION Mode (compared Notes Item # to RLGM)This valve falls within the Earthquake WEST ESW PP PP-7W Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-235 1-WRV-762 DISCH STN EAST Screened >RLGM SL. Therefore, this valve screens for the BASKET BAN OUT S/O 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-VALVE 6041-SL.This valve falls within the Earthquake W ESW PUMP PP-7W Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-DISCH STN EAST Screened >RLGM SL. Therefore, this valve screens for the BASKET B/W INLET 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-> 6041-SL.This valve falls within the Earthquake W ESW PUMP PP-7W Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-DISCH STN WEST Screened >RLGM SL. Therefore, this valve screens for the BASKET BAN OUTLET 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-> 6041-SL.This valve falls within the Earthquake Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-W ESW PUMP PP-7W SL. Therefore, this valve screens for the DISCH STN WEST Screened >RLGM 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-238 1-WRV-777 6041-SL. There is sufficient clearance BASKET BAN INLET> between the valve operator and the walkway. Pipe line well supported and not a credible damaging interaction.
Small valve bolted into a small rack.Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PRESSURE Screened >RLGM for the 0:8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 239 1-XRV-152 REGULATING VALVE NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage judged to be adequate for RLGM by inspection based on light rack with rugged anchorage.
Small valve bolted into a small rack.Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PRESSURE Screened >RLGM for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 240 1-XRV-153 REGULATING VALVE NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage judged to be adequate for RLGM by inspection based on light rack with rugged anchorage.
POA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 1303208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 119 of 151 Attachment D -CNP Unit 2 ESEP HCLPF Values and Failure Mode Tabulation SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 120 of 151 CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF Notes Unit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #2 2-152- CONTAINMENT Screened >RLGM Small panel dimensions of 8" wide, 4" deep, LDISB HYDROGEN IGNITION and 14" tall. Equipment mounted to the wall LOWER VOLUME using two unistruts anchored with four 1/2" TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG expansion bolts. Unistrut anchors are ASSEMBLIES BACKUP spaced at 46" horizontally and 9" vertically.
SUPPLY BREAKER Unistrut anchorage shared by 2-152-UDISB.
Screened based on the light panel with rugged anchorage.
3 2-152- CONTAINMENT Screened >RLGM Small panel dimensions of 8" wide, 4" deep, UDISB HYDROGEN IGNITION and 14" tall. Equipment mounted to the wall UPPER VOLUME TRAIN using two unistruts anchored with four 1/2"'B' GLOW PLUG expansion bolts. Unistrut anchors are ASSEMBLIES BACKUP spaced at 46" horizontally and 9" vertically.
SUPPLY BREAKER Unistrut anchorage shared by 2-152-LDISB.
Screened based on the light panel with rugged anchorage.
4 2-21A 600V BUS 21A Screened >RLGM Meets EPRI NP-6041-SL Table 2.4 caveats.SWITCHGEAR Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the switchgear.
5 2-21B 600V BUS 21B Screened >RLGM Meets EPRI NP-6041-SL Table 2.4 caveats.SWITCHGEAR Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the switchgear.
6 2-21C 600V BUS 21C Screened >RLGM Meets EPRI NP-6041-SL Table 2.4 caveats.SWITCHGEAR Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the switchgear.
7 2-21D 600V BUS 21D Screened >RLGM Meets EPRI NP-6041-SL Table 2.4 caveats.SWITCHGEAR Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the switchgear.
8 2-2A 4KV BUS 2A Screened >RLGM Meets EPRI NP-6041-SL Table 2.4 caveats.SWITCHGEAR Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for a similar switchgear.
9 2 CNTMT HYDROGEN Screened >RLGM Small panel dimensions of 9" wide, 20" tall, LDISB IGNITION LOWER and 6" deep. Equipment mounted on two VOLUMN TRAIN 'B' horizontal running unistruts spaced at 19".GLOW PLUG Unistrut anchors are 1/2" expansion bolts ASSEMBLIES STARTER spaced at 41". Unistruts are shared by 2-52-COMBO-LDISB CKT UDISB. Screened based on the light panel PO Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 121 of 151 CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF Notes Unit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #BRK with rugged anchorage.
10 2 CNTMT HYDROGEN Screened >RLGM Small panel dimensions of 9" wide, 20" tall, UDISB IGNITION UPPER and 6" deep. Equipment mounted on two VOLUME TRAIN 'B' horizontal running unistruts spaced at 19".GLOW PLUG Unistrut anchors are 1/2" expansion bolts ASSEMBLIES STARTER spaced at 41". Unistruts are shared by 2-52-COMBO-UDISB CKT LDISB. Screened based on the light panel BRK with rugged anchorage.
11 2-88X- CNTMT HYDROGEN Screened >RLGM Small panel dimensions of 9" wide, 20" tall, LDISB IGNITION LOWER and 6" deep. Equipment mounted on two VOLUME TRAIN 'B' horizontal running unistruts spaced at 19".GLOW PLUG Unistrut anchors are 1/2" expansion bolts ASSEMBLIES STARTER spaced at 41" plus an additional two 3/8" COMBO-LDISB STAR bolts located 29". Screened based on the CNTR light panel with rugged anchorage.
12 2-88X- CNTMT HYDROGEN Screened >RLGM Small panel dimensions of 9" wide, 20" tall, UDISB IGNITION UPPER and 6" deep. Equipment mounted on two VOLUME TRAIN 'B' horizontal running unistruts spaced at 19".GLOW PLUG Unistrut anchors are 1/2" expansion bolts ASSEMBLIES STARTER spaced at 41" plus an additional two 3/8" COMBO-UDISB bolts located 29". Screened based on the CONTACTOR light panel with rugged anchorage.
13 2 PLANT BATTERY BATT- Screened >RLGM Panel dimensions of 48"x24"xl0".
ABBC AB DISCONNECT Equipment is bolted to two horizontal SWITCH unistruts, which are bolted to the wall. Panel meets all IEEE 344-75 testing requirements.
The testing TRS greatly exceeds the RRS at the floor level. Equipment screens for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL. Anchorage acceptable for RLGM based on similar panels had very high calculated margins for the Design Basis Earthquake.
14 2 PLANT BATTERY BATT- Screened >RLGM Panel dimensions of 48"x24"x10".
CDBC CD DISCONNECT Equipment is bolted to two horizontal SWITCH unistruts, which are bolted to the wall. Panel meets all IEEE 344-75 testing requirements.
The testing TRS greatly exceeds the RRS at the floor level. Equipment screens for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL. Anchorage acceptable for RLGM based on similar panels had very high calculated margins for the Design Basis Earthquake.
15 2-AB-A 600VAC MOTOR Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CONTROL CENTER AB- for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI FSal Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 122 of 151 CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF Notes Unit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #A NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the MCC.16 2-AB-D 600VAC MOTOR Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CONTROL CENTER AB- for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI D NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the MCC.17 2-ABD-13 600VAC MOTOR Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CONTROL CENTER for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI ABD-B NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the MCC.18 2-ABD-D 600VAC MOTOR Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CONTROL CENTER for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI ABD-D NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the MCC.19 2-ABV-A 600VAC VALVE Seismic 0.578g Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CONTROL CENTER Interaction for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI ABV-A NP-6041-SL.
Gaps documented on the Anchor Inspection Data Sheet between the MCC assembly and the grout pad were judged acceptable.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the MCC. The potentially governing Block Wall interaction could not be screened for RLGM based on scaling of existing design basis calculation.
The governing HCLPF capacity for the block wall according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-004 -"HCLPF Calculations for Screened in ESEP Components" (Ref. 10.1)is 0.578g.20 2-AFWX 120/208VAC AUXILIARY Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
FEEDWATER for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI DISTRIBUTION PANEL NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on screening calculation to the RLGM.21 2-AM-A 600VAC MOTOR Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CONTROL CENTER for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI AM-A NP-6041-SL.
An additional four anchor bolts have been added to supplement original anchorage.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 PaRe 123 of 151 CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF Notes Unit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #anchorage evaluation for the MCC.22 2-AZV-A 600VAC VALVE Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CONTROL CENTER for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI AZV-A NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the MCC.23 2-BA BORIC ACID Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CHARGING AND for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI LETDOWN CONTROL NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for PANEL RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the Control Board.24 2-BATT- PLANT BATTERY AB Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
AB for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the Battery Rack.25 2-BATT- PLANT BATTERY BATT- Screened >RLGM Small panel bolted directly to wall using a AB-SH AB AMMETER SHUNT unistrut.
Box dimensions of 48.5"x40.5"x8.5".
No interactions identified.
Also contains 2-BC-AB-SH.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL. Anchorage screens to the RLGM input based on similar panels yielding significant seismic capacity margins.26 2-BATT- PLANT BATTERY CD Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CD for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the Battery Rack.27 2-BATT- PLANT BATTERY BATT- Screened >RLGM Small panel bolted directly to wall using a CD-SH CD AMMETER SHUNT unistrut.
Box dimensions of 49"x40"x8.5".
No interactions identified.
Also contains 2-BC-CD-SH.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the RLGM input based on similar panels yielding significant seismic capacity margins.28 2-BC-AB2 PLANT BATTERY BATT- Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
AB CHARGER #2 for the 0'8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the Battery Charger.
0 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 124 of 151 CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF Notes Unit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #29 2-BC-CD1 PLANT BATTERY BATT- Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CD BATTERY for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI CHARGER #1 NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the Battery Charger.30 2-BCTC- PLANT BATTERY Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
AB CHARGERS BC-AB1 for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI AND BC-AB2 NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for TRANSFER PANEL RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the Panel.31 2-BCTC- PLANT BATTERY Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CD CHARGERS BC-CD1 for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI AND BC-CD2 NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for TRANSFER PANEL RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the Panel.32 2-BLI-110 STEAM GENERATOR Screened >RLGM Equipment bolted directly to wall on small OME-3-1 WIDE RANGE bracket using four 1/2" bolts spaced at 6".LEVEL INDICATOR Supported on 2x2 tube steel cantilevered TRANSMITTER out from the wall, equipment support 3" from the wall.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage judged to be adequate for RLGM by inspection based on light rack with rugged anchorage.
33 2-BLI-120 STEAM GENERATOR Screened >RLGM Floor mounted rack seismically qualified to OME-3-2 WIDE RANGE IEEE-344-75.
LEVEL INDICATOR TRANSMITTER Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage judged to be adequate for RLGM by inspection based on light rack with rugged anchorage.
34 2-BLI-130 STEAM GENERATOR Screened >RLGM Mounted to wall using four 1/2" bolts spaced OME-3-3 WIDE RANGE at 6". Cantilevered out from wall LEVEL INDICATOR approximately 6".TRANSMITTER Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 PaRe 125 of 151 CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF Notes Unit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage judged to be adequate for RLGM by inspection based on light rack with rugged anchorage.
35 2-BLI-140 STEAM GENERATOR Screened >RLGM Equipment bolted directly to wall using four OME-3-4 WIDE RANGE 1/2" bolts spaced at 6". Supported on 2x2 LEVEL INDICATOR tube steel cantilevered out from the wall, TRANSMITTER equipment supported 4.5" from the wall.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage judged to be adequate for RLGM by inspection based on light rack with rugged anchorage.
36 2-CCV-AB 250VDC TRAIN 'B' Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CRITICAL SOLENOID for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI VALVES DISTRIBUTION NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for PANEL RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the panel.37 2-CCV-CD 250VDC TRAIN 'A' Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CRITICAL SOLENOID for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI VALVES DISTRIBUTION NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for PANEL RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the panel.38 2-CCW COMPONENT Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
COOLING WATER for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI CONTROL PANEL NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on similar panels within the control room yielding significant seismic capacity margins.39 2-CG1-14 REACTOR Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI CONTROL GROUP #1 NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for CABINET #14 RLGM based on similar cabinets yielding significant seismic capacity margins.40 2-CG1-15 REACTOR Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI CONTROL GROUP #1 NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for CABINET #15 RLGM based on similar cabinets yielding significant seismic capacity margins.41 2-CG2-17 REACTOR Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI CONTROL GROUP #2 NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for CABINET #17 RLGM based on similar cabinets yielding significant seismic capacity margins.
SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 126 of 151 CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF Notes Unit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #42 2-CG2-19 REACTOR Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI CONTROL GROUP #2 NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for CABINET #19 RLGM based on similar cabinets yielding significant seismic capacity margins.43 2-CG3-20 REACTOR Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI CONTROL GROUP #3 NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for CABINET #20 RLGM based on similar cabinets yielding significant seismic capacity margins.44 2-CG3-21 REACTOR Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI CONTROL GROUP #3 NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for CABINET #21 RLGM based on similar cabinets yielding significant seismic capacity margins.45 2-CG4-22 REACTOR Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI CONTROL GROUP #4 NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for CABINET #22 RLGM based on similar cabinets yielding significant seismic capacity margins.46 2-CG4-23 REACTOR Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI CONTROL GROUP #4 NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for CABINET #23 RLGM based on similar cabinets yielding significant seismic capacity margins.47 2-CLI-1 14 CONDENSATE Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
STORAGE TANK TK-32 for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI LEVEL NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage judged to be INDICATORTRANSMITT adequate for RLGM by inspection based on ER light rack with rugged anchorage.
48 2-CMO- COMPONENT Screened >RLGM This valve falls within the Earthquake 413 COOLING WATER Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-PUMPS SUCTION NP-SL. Therefore, this valve screens for the CROSSTIE TRAIN 'B' 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-SHUTOFF VALVE 6041-SL.49 2-CMO- COMPONENT Screened >RLGM This valve falls within the Earthquake 414 COOLING WATER Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-PUMPS DISCHARGE SL. Therefore, this valve screens for the CROSSTIE TRAIN 'B' 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-SHUTOFF VALVE 6041-SL.50 2-CMO- COMPONENT Screened >RLGM This valve falls within the Earthquake 416 COOLING WATER TO Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-MISCELLANEOUS SL. Therefore, this valve screens for the SERVICE TRAIN 'B' 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-SHUTOFF VALVE 6041-SL.
SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 127 of 151 CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF Notes Unit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #51 2-CMO- WEST RESIDUAL HEAT Screened >RLGM This valve falls within the Earthquake 429 REMOVAL HEAT Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-EXCHANGER SL. Therefore, this valve screens for the COMPONENT 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-COOLING WATER 6041-SL.OUTLET SHUTOFF VALVE 52 2-CP CONDENSATE PUMP Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CONTROL PANEL for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the Panel.53 2-CRID-1 120VAC CONTROL Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
ROOM INSTRUMENT for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI DISTRIBUTION NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for CHANNEL I RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 DISTRIBUTION PANEL anchorage evaluation for the Panel.54 2-CRID 120VAC CONTROL Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
INV ROOM for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI INSTRUMENTATION NP-6041-SL.
The governing HCLPF DISTRIBUTION capacity according to S&A Calculation SYSTEM CHANNEL 1 13Q3208-CAL-004
-"HCLPF Calculations INVERTER for Screened in ESEP Components" (Ref.10.1) is 0.839g and therefore did not control the capacity.55 2-CRID-2 120VAC CONTROL Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
ROOM INSTRUMENT for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI DISTRIBUTION NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for CHANNEL II RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 DISTRIBUTION PANEL anchorage evaluation for the Panel.56 2-CRID 120VAC CONTROL Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
INV ROOM for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI INSTRUMENTATION NP-6041-SL.
The governing HCLPF DISTRIBUTION capacity according to S&A Calculation SYSTEM CHANNEL 2 13Q3208-CAL-004
-"HCLPF Calculations INVERTER for Screened in ESEP Components" (Ref.10.1) is 0.839g and therefore did not control the capacity.57 2-CRID-3 120VAC CONTROL Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
ROOM INSTRUMENT for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI DISTRIBUTION NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for CHANNEL Ill RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 DISTRIBUTION PANEL anchorage evaluation for the Panel.58 2-CRID 120VAC CONTROL Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
INV ROOM for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI INSTRUMENTATION NP-6041-SL.
The governing HCLPF SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 PaRe 128 of 151 CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF Notes Unit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #DISTRIBUTION capacity according to S&A Calculation SYSTEM CHANNEL 3 13Q3208-CAL-004
-"HCLPF Calculations INVERTER for Screened in ESEP Components" (Ref.10.1) is 0.839g and therefore did not control the capacity.59 2-CRID-4 120VAC CONTROL Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
ROOM INSTRUMENT for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI DISTRIBUTION NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for CHANNEL IV RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 DISTRIBUTION PANEL anchorage evaluation for the Panel.59 2-CRID 120VAC CONTROL Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
INV ROOM for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI INSTRUMENTATION NP-6041-SL.
The governing HCLPF DISTRIBUTION capacity according to S&A Calculation SYSTEM CHANNEL 4 13Q3208-CAL-004
-"HCLPF Calculations INVERTER for Screened in ESEP Components" (Ref.10.1) is 0.839g and therefore did not control the capacity.61 2-DTU DELTA 'T' AND UNIT Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CONTROL PANEL for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the Panel.62 2-ELSC EMERGENCY LOCAL Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
INDICATION for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI SHUTDOWN AND NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for COOLDOWN RLGM based on similar panels yielding DISTRIBUTION PANEL significant seismic capacity margins.63 2-EZC-B 600VAC MOTOR Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CONTROL CENTER for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI EZC-B NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the MCC.64 2-EZC-C 600VAC MOTOR Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CONTROL CENTER for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI EZC-C NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the MCC.65 2-EZC-D 600VAC MOTOR Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CONTROL CENTER for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI EZC-D NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the MCC.66 2-FFI-210 AUXILIARY Screened >RLGM Bolted directly to wall with four 3/8" bolts.FEEDWATER TO Equipment supported on 2" pipe coming out STEAM GENERATOR 7" from the wall and approximately 10" up.
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 PaRe 129 of 151 CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF Notes Unit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #OME-3-1 FLOW There is a 5" spacing between the two INDICATOR bottom bolts and between the left-most TRANSMITTER bolts. The top right-most bolt is spaced 10.5" from the top left-most bolt and 5" above the bottom row of bolts.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage judged to be adequate for RLGM by inspection based on light rack with rugged anchorage.
67 2-FFI-220 AUX FEEDWATER TO Screened >RLGM Supported by 2" pipe, extending 8" out and SG OME-3-2 FLOW 24" left. Anchorage mounted on a U-shaped INDICATOR pipe frame, which is then welded to steel TRANSMITTER column (box structure) on both sides.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage judged to be adequate for RLGM by inspection based on light rack with rugged anchorage.
68 2-FFI-230 AUXILIARY Screened >RLGM Supported by 2" pipe, extending 8" out and FEEDWATER TO 24" left. Anchorage mounted on a U-shaped STEAM GENERATOR pipe frame, which is then welded to steel OME-3-3 FLOW column (box structure) on both sides.INDICATOR TRANSMITTER Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage judged to be adequate for RLGM by inspection based on light rack with rugged anchorage.
69 2-FFI-240 AUXILIARY Screened >RLGM Equipment mounted to the wall with four FEEDWATER TO 3/8" bolts. Supported on 2" pipe, coming STEAM GENERATOR 7.5" out from the wall and 7" up (8" from OME-3-4 FLOW equipment to the top of vertical pipe).INDICATOR Equipment bolted to pipe with a 4" channel.TRANSMITTER Minimum spacing of bolts measured to be 5". Anchorage consists of four 3/8" bolts.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage judged to be adequate for RLGM by inspection based on light rack with rugged anchorage.
70 2-FI FIXED INCORE Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CONTROL PANEL for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 130 of 151 CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF Notes Unit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on similar panels yielding significant seismic capacity margins.71 2-FICT-A REACTOR CORE Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
THERMOCOUPLE for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI TRAIN 'A' NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for TRANSMITTER RLGM based on screening calculation to the CABINET RLGM.72 2-FLX FLUX CONTROL PANEL Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the Panel.77 2-HE-15W WEST COMPONENT Anchorage 0.547g Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
COOLING WATER for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI HEAT EXCHANGER NP-6041-SL.
The block wall was far enough away to not be an interaction issue.Anchorage could not be screened for RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the Heat Exchanger.
Therefore, a HCLPF calculation was performed.
The governing HCLPF capacity for the anchorage according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-004
-"HCLPF Calculations for Screened in ESEP Components" (Ref. 10.1) is 0.547g.78 2-HE-17W WEST RESIDUAL HEAT Screened >RLGM Equipment is supported at the top with REMOVAL HEAT brackets in each of the 4 quadrants to resist EXCHANGER overturning loads. The bottom is supported by a heavy-duty steel gusset structure supported by two piers. There are two bolts in each pier. Based upon this inspection, the anchorage is adequate for the RLGM spectra.79 2-HSD2 UNIT 2 HOT Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
SHUTDOWN PANEL for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on similar panels yielding significant seismic capacity margins. The governing HCLPF capacity for the block wall according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-004 -"HCLPF Calculations for Screened in ESEP Components" (Ref. 10.1)is 2.682g and therefore did not control the capacity.
SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 131 of 151 CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF Notes Unit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #80 2-HV- CONTROL ROOM AIR Screened >RLGM Chiller initially on vibration isolators, ACR-2 CONDITIONING SOUTH however later modified to be restrained in all LIQUID CHILLER directions to satisfy GIP outlier resolution.
Equipment screens for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened to a level greater than the RLGM by scaling the design basis anchorage calculation.
81 2-HV- CONTROL ROOM Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
ACRA-2 VENTILATION SOUTH. for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI AIR CONDITIONING NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for UNIT RLGM based on similar air conditioning units yielding significant seismic capacity margins.82 2-HV- OUTSIDE AIR TO Screened >RLGM Damper included on HVAC duct work and ACR-DA-2 CONTROL ROOM screens for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane PRESSURIZATION/
in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Duct work screened CLEANUP FILTER UNIT for RLGM based on existing analysis.HV-ACRF VENT DAMPER #2 83 2-HV- CONTROL ROOM Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
ACRF PRESSURIZATION/
for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI CLEANUP FILTER UNIT NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on similar filter units yielding significant seismic capacity margins. The governing HCLPF capacity for the block wall according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-004 -"HCLPF Calculations for Screened in ESEP Components" (Ref. 10.1)is 1.215g and therefore, did not control the capacity.84 2-HV- CONTROL ROOM Screened >RLGM The base frame is made of 4x4x3/8 angles, ACRF-2 PRESSURIZATION/
with a height of 21" to the top of the angle CLEANUP FILTER frame and an additional 30" to the center of UNITVENT FAN #2 the fan unit. The governing HCLPF capacity for the block wall according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-004
-"HCLPF Calculations for Screened in ESEP Components" (Ref. 10.1) is 1.215g.85 2-HV- CONTROL ROOM Screened >RLGM Heater included on HVAC duct work and ACR-H2 VENTILATION SOUTH screens for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane DUCT ELECTRIC in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Duct work screened HEATER for RLGM based on existing analysis.87 2-HV- AB BATTERY Screened >RLGM Weight of fan is 360 lbs. Fan is hung from SGRX-5 EQUIPMENT AREA ceiling in vertical alignment.
Fan anchored to SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 132 of 151 CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF Notes Unit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #BATTERY ROOM the shim plate which is anchored to ceiling VENTILATION with sixteen 1/2" bolts into embedded angle EXHAUST FAN in ceiling.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on weight of fan compared to rugged anchorage.
88 2-HV- CD BATTERY Screened >RLGM Weight of fan is judged to be maximum of SGRX-6 EQUIPMENT AREA 500 lbs. Fan is bolted to steel platform which BATTERY ROOM is bolted to the wall on 2 sides and VENTILATION supported by an angle column at the other EXHAUST FAN corner.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on weight of fan compared to rugged anchorage.
90 2-1CM-129 REACTOR COOLANT Screened >RLGM This valve falls within the Earthquake LOOP #2 HOT LEG TO Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-RESIDUAL HEAT SL. Therefore, this valve screens for the REMOVAL PUMPS 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-SUCTION 6041-SL.CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE 91 2-ICM-251 BORON INJECTION Screened >RLGM This valve falls outside the Earthquake TANK TRAIN 'B' Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-OUTLET SL. However, this valve screens for the 0.8g CONTAINMENT to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041 ISOLATION VALVE based on analysis performed for a 3g input.93 2-IFI-51 BORON INJECTION TO Screened >RLGM Anchorage consists of four bolts in a REACTOR COOLANT reinforced concrete wall. Two bolts on the LOOP #1 FLOW left are for an embedded unistrut and two INDICATOR bolts on the right are 1/2" expansion anchors.TRANSMITTER Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on light rack with rugged anchorage.
94 2-IFI-52 BORON INJECTION TO Screened >RLGM Rack is light and anchored with four bolts.REACTOR COOLANT Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
LOOP #2 FLOW for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI INDICATOR NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for TRANSMITTER RLGM based on light rack with rugged SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 1303208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 133 of 151 CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF Notes Unit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #anchorage.
95 2-IFI-53 BORON INJECTION TO Screened >RLGM Equipment mounted to wall using two bolts REACTOR COOLANT to embedded unistrut.
Equipment also U-LOOP #3 FLOW bolted to the 2" support pipe cantilevered up INDICATOR approximately 14". Equipment screens TRANSMITTER (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on light rack with rugged anchorage.
96 2-IFI-54 BORON INJECTION TO Screened >RLGM Rack is light and anchored to the floor with REACTOR COOLANT four bolts. Equipment screens (other than LOOP #4 FLOW anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening INDICATOR lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage TRANSMITTER screened for RLGM based on light rack with rugged anchorage.
98 2-IMO-256 BORON INJECTION Screened >RLGM This valve falls outside the Earthquake TANK TRAIN 'B' INLET Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-SHUTOFF VALVE SL. However, this valve screens for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL based on analysis performed for a 3g input.The Block Wall interaction was screened for RLGM based on scaling of existing design basis calculation.
99 2-IMO-310 EAST RESIDUAL HEAT Seismic 0.435g This valve falls within the Earthquake REMOVAL PUMP PP- Interaction Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-35E SUCTION SL. Therefore, this valve screens for the SHUTOFF VALVE 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL. The governing HCLPF capacity for the block wall according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-004
-"HCLPF Calculations for Screened in ESEP Components" (Ref. 10.1) is 0.435g.100 2-IMO-324 WEST RHR HX 2-HE- Screened >RLGM This valve falls within the Earthquake 17W DISCHARGE Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-CROSSTIE SHUTOFF SL. Therefore, this valve screens for the VALVE 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.110 2-LDISB- CONTAINMENT Screened >RLGM The hydrogen igniters are composed of the B24 HYDROGEN IGNITION Igniter Box, glow plug, shield and other LOWER VOLUME associated hardware.
All components of the TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG igniter system were seismically mounted to ASSEMBLY #B24 prevent any interference with safety related equipment during and after a design basis seismic event. The components within the igniter box are not fragile and are encompassed by that typically contained in SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 134 of 151 CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF Notes Unit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #other electrical boxes. Therefore, it is determined that the screening lanes contained in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL. Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling existing anchorage evaluation.
111 2-LDISB- CONTAINMENT Screened >RLGM Equipment bolted directly to Column 8 of B25 HYDROGEN IGNITION Quad 4. See notes for 2-LDISB-B24.
LOWER VOLUME Assembly screened for 0.8g to 1.2g TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL and ASSEMBLY #B25 anchorage loadings for RLGM.112 2-LDISB- CONTAINMENT Screened >RLGM See notes for 2-LDISB-B24.
Assembly B26 HYDROGEN IGNITION screened for 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in LOWER VOLUME EPRI NP-6041-SL and anchorage loadings TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG for RLGM.ASSEMBLY #B26 113 2-LDISB- CONTAINMENT Screened >RLGM Box bolted to unistruts attached directly to B27 HYDROGEN IGNITION column. See notes for 2-LDISB-B24.
LOWER VOLUME Assembly screened for 0.8g to 1.2g TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL and ASSEMBLY #B27 anchorage loadings for RLGM.115 2-LDISB- CONTAINMENT Screened >RLGM Equipment bolted to unistrut, which is B35 HYDROGEN IGNITION welded directly to Column 11. See notes for LOWER VOLUME 2-LDISB-B24.
Assembly screened for 0.8g TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL ASSEMBLY #B35 and anchorage loadings for RLGM.118 2-LSI-1 STEAM GENERATORS Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
#1 AND #4 LOCAL for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI SHUTDOWN STATION NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on similar equipment yielding significant seismic capacity margins.119 2-LSI-2 STEAM GENERATORS Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
#2 AND #3 LOCAL for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI SHUTDOWN STATION NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on similar equipment yielding significant seismic capacity margins.120 2-LSI-3 REACTOR COOLANT Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
SYSTEM CHARGING for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI AND LETDOWN LOCAL NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for SHUTDOWN STATION RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.
121 2-MCAB 250VDC DISTRIBUTION Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PANEL MCAB for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 135 of 151 CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF Notes Unit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #anchorage evaluation for the panel.122 2-MCCD 250VDC DISTRIBUTION Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
POWER PANEL for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on similar panels yielding significant seismic capacity margins.123 2-MDAB 250VDC DISTRIBUTION Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PANEL MDAB for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on similar panels yielding significant seismic capacity margins.124 2-MDCD 250VDC DISTRIBUTION Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PANEL MDCD for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on similar panels yielding significant seismic capacity margins.125 2-MPP- STEAM GENERATOR Screened >RLGM Equipment is mounted directly to the wall 210 OME-3-1 CHANNEL I using two 1/2" bolts, spaced at 4.5".STEAM PRESSURE Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
TRANSMITTER for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on light bracket with relatively rugged anchorage.
126 2-MPP- STEAM GENERATOR Screened >RLGM Equipment is cantilevered from the wall by 220 OME-3-2 CHANNEL I two 1/2" bolts, and surrounded by an STEAM PRESSURE enclosure.
Equipment screens (other than TRANSMITTER anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on light bracket with relatively rugged anchorage.
127 2-MPP- STEAM GENERATOR Screened >RLGM Equipment is supported by two 3/8" bolts.230 OME-3-3 CHANNEL I Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
STEAM PRESSURE for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI TRANSMITTER NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on light bracket with relatively rugged anchorage.
128 2-MPP- STEAM GENERATOR Screened >RLGM Equipment bolted directly to wall using two 240 OME-3-4 CHANNEL I 1/2" bolts spaced at 4.5". Equipment STEAM PRESSURE screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g TRANSMITTER to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL. Anchorage screened for RLGM based on light bracket with relatively rugged anchorage.
129 2-MRV- STEAM GENERATOR Screened >RLGM This valve falls within the Earthquake 213 OME-3-1 POWER Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-OPERATED RELIEF SL. Therefore, this valve screens for the Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 136 of 151 CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF Notes Unit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #VALVE 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.130 2-MRV- STEAM GENERATOR Screened >RLGM This valve falls outside the Earthquake 223 OME-3-2 POWER Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-OPERATED SL. However, this valve screens for the 0.8g RELIEFVALVE to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL based on analysis performed to 3g.131 2-MRV- STEAM GENERATOR Screened >RLGM This valve falls outside the Earthquake 233 OME-3-3 POWER Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-OPERATED SL. However, this valve screens for the 0.8g RELIEFVALVE to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL based on analysis performed to 3g.132 2-MRV- STEAM GENERATOR Screened >RLGM This valve falls within the Earthquake 243 OME-3-4 POWER Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-OPERATED RELIEF SL. Therefore, this valve screens for the VALVE 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.133 2-NIS-I NUCLEAR Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
INSTRUMENTATION for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI SYSTEM PROTECTION NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for CHANNEL I CONTROL RLGM based on similar panels yielding PANEL significant seismic capacity margins.134 2-NLP- PRESSURIZER OME-4 Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage) 151 PROTECTION for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI CHANNEL I LEVEL NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for TRANSMITTER RLGM based on light rack with rugged anchorage.
135 2-NPS- REACTOR VESSEL Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage) 110 TRAIN 'A' WIDE RANGE for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI PRESSURE NP-6041 based on existing rack qualification TRANSMITTER for a similar transmitter.
The rack is seismically qualified to IEEE-344-75.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on a similar transmitter yielding significant seismic capacity margins.139 2-NRI NUCLEAR Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
AMP INSTRUMENTATION for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI WIDE RANGE NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RADIATION AMPLIFIER RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.
150 2-OME-33 TURBINE DRIVEN Screened >RLGM Strainer supported on two 14" wide, 12" AUXILIARY FEED deep, and 18" tall concrete pedestals.
PUMP PP-4 SUCTION Equipment bolted to pedestals with four 3/4" STRAINER anchor bolts, one set of two bolts in each pedestal, spaced at 6" apart. The piping is well supported and the strainer is small SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 137 of 151 CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF Notes Unit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #relative to the anchorage.
Therefore, this equipment is screened for the RLGM.151 2-OME- WEST ESSENTIAL Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage) 34W SERVICE WATER for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI PUMP PP-7W DISCH NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for STN RLGM based on similar pumps yielding significant seismic capacity margins.156 2-PP-10W WEST COMPONENT Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
COOLING WATER for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI PUMP NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on anchor analysis performed to RLGM.157 2-PP-35W WEST RESIDUAL HEAT Seismic 0.428g Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
REMOVAL PUMP Interaction for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on similar filter units yielding significant seismic capacity margins. The potentially governing Block Wall interaction could not be screened for RLGM based on scaling of existing design basis calculation.
Therefore, a HCLPF calculation was performed.
The governing HCLPF capacity for the block wall according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-004
-"HCLPF Calculations for Screened in ESEP Components" (Ref. 10.1) is 0.428g.158 2-PP-4 TURBINE DRIVEN Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
AUXILIARY FEED for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI PUMP NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on anchor analysis performed to RLGM.159 2-PP-46-4 BORIC ACID STORAGE Seismic 0.227g The pump weighs 511 lbs. Equipment TANKS TRANSFER Interaction screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g PUMP #4 to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL. Anchorage screened for RLGM based on the small size of the pump and similar pumps yielding significant seismic capacity margins. The HCLPF is limited by seismic interaction with the piping attached to the Boric Acid Tank. The governing HCLPF capacity according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-005- "High Confidence Low Probability of Failure (HCLPF) Calculations for Screened in ESEP Tanks" (Ref. 10.2) is 0.227g that is less than the RLGM of 0.387g.
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 138 of 151 CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF Notes Unit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #160 2-PP-82S CONTROL ROOM AIR Screened >RLGM The pump weighs 214 lbs. Equipment CONDITIONING SOUTH screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g CHILL WATER to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-CIRCULATION PUMP SL. Anchorage screened for RLGM based on the small size of the pump and similar pumps yielding significant seismic capacity margins.161 2-PPA- UPPER CONTAINMENT Screened >RLGM Rack is supported with 2" tube steel 310 CHANNEL III WIDE anchored to the wall with four plates each RANGE PRESSURE employing two 3/8" anchor bolts, and to the ALARM TRANSMITTER floor with one plate employing four 3/8" anchor bolts. Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on rack with rugged anchorage.
162 2-PRZ PRESSURIZER Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CONTROL PANEL for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the Panel.163 2-QLA- SOUTH BORIC ACID Seismic 0.227g Equipment screens (other than anchorage) 430 STORAGE TANK TK- Interaction for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 12S LEVEL ALARM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for TRANSMITTER RLGM based on rack with rugged anchorage.
The HCLPF is limited by seismic interaction with the piping attached to the Boric Acid Tank. The governing HCLPF capacity according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-005
-"High Confidence Low Probability of Failure (HCLPF) Calculations for Screened in ESEP Tanks" (Ref. 10.2) is 0.227g, that is less than the RLGM of 0.387g.164 2-QRV- AIR OPERATED VALVE Screened >RLGM This valve falls within the Earthquake 200 TO ISOLATE BORON Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-INJECTION PATH SL. Therefore, this valve screens for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.165 2-QT-506 TURBINE DRIVEN Screened >RLGM This valve falls within the Earthquake AUXILIARY FEED Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-PUMP PP-4 TRIP SL. Therefore, this valve screens for the ANDTHROTTLE VALVE 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.166 2-QT-507 AUXILIARY FEED Screened >RLGM This valve falls within the Earthquake PUMP TURBINE Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 139 of 151 CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF Notes Unit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #GOVERNOR VALVE SL. Therefore, this valve screens for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.167 2-QTC- SOUTH BAST TK-12S Seismic 0.227g Equipment welded to one support leg of 2-430 TRAIN 'A' HTR TEMP Interaction TK-12S and supported on a 2" pipe CONTROLLER cantilevered off the tank leg 15" to the right and 9" up. The support pipe is only welded at the top of the connection located 28" above the top of the concrete pedestal.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on rugged configuration of the support. The HCLPF is limited by seismic interaction with the piping attached to the Boric Acid Tank. The governing HCLPF capacity according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-005
-"High Confidence Low Probability of Failure (HCLPF) Calculations for Screened in ESEP Tanks" (Ref. 10.2) is 0.227g that is less than the RLGM of 0.387g.168 2-RHR RESIDUAL HEAT Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
REMOVAL CONTROL for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI PANEL NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the RLGM based on similar panels within the control room yielding significant seismic capacity margins.169 2-RPC-1-1 REACTOR Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI CHANNEL I CABINET NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the#1 RLGM based on similar cabinets yielding significant seismic capacity margins.170 2-RPC-1-2 REACTOR Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI CHANNEL I CABINET NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the#2 RLGM based on similar cabinets yielding significant seismic capacity margins.171 2-RPC-1-3 REACTOR Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI CHANNEL I CABINET NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the#3 RLGM based on similar cabinets yielding significant seismic capacity margins.172 2-RPC-1-4 REACTOR Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI CHANNEL I CABINET NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 140 of 151 CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF Notes Unit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item ##4 RLGM based on similar cabinets yielding significant seismic capacity margins.173 2-RPC-2-5 REACTOR Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI CHANNEL II CABINET NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the#5 RLGM based on similar cabinets yielding significant seismic capacity margins.174 2-RPC-2-6 REACTOR Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI CHANNEL II CABINET NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the#6 RLGM based on similar cabinets yielding significant seismic capacity margins.175 2-RPC-2-7 REACTOR Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI CHANNEL II CABINET NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the#7 RLGM based on similar cabinets yielding significant seismic capacity margins.176 2-RPC-2-8 REACTOR Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI CHANNEL II CABINET NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the#8 RLGM based on similar cabinets yielding significant seismic capacity margins.177 2-RPC REACTOR Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage) 10 PROTECTION for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI CHANNEL Ill CABINET NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the#10 RLGM based on similar cabinets yielding significant seismic capacity margins.178 2-RPC-3-9 REACTOR Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI CHANNEL III CABINET NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the#9 RLGM based on similar cabinets yielding significant seismic capacity margins.179 2-RPC REACTOR Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage) 12 PROTECTION for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI CHANNEL IV CABINET NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the#12 RLGM based on similar cabinets yielding significant seismic capacity margins.180 2-RPS-A REACTOR Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION AND for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI SAFEGUARD NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for ACTUATION TRAIN 'A' RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 CABINET anchorage evaluation.
181 2-RPS-B REACTOR Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION AND for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI SAFEGUARD NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for ACTUATION TRAIN 'B' RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 141 of 151 CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF Notes Unit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #CABINET anchorage evaluation.
182 2-RPSX-A REACTOR Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION AND for the 0.89 to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI SAFEGUARD NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for ACTUATION TRAIN 'A' RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 AUXILIARY CABINET anchorage evaluation.
183 2-RPSX-B REACTOR Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION AND for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI SAFEGUARD NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for ACTUATION TRAIN 'B' RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 AUXILIARY CABINET anchorage evaluation.
184 2-RVLC REACTOR VESSEL Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
OME-1 WATER LEVEL for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI INSTRUMENTATION NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the CABINET RLGM based on similar cabinets yielding significant seismic capacity margins.185 2-SA STATION AUXILIARIES Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CONTROL PANEL for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the RLGM based on similar panels within the control room yielding significant seismic capacity margins.186 2-SG STEAM GENERATOR Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
AND AUXILIARY FEED for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI PUMP CONTROL NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for PANEL RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.
187 2-SIS SAFETY INJECTION Screened >RLGM The panel is welded along the bottom front CONTROL PANEL edge to embedded steel and braced back at the top to reinforced concrete wall. The top of the panel frames back to 2-SSR which is anchored at the top to reinforced concrete wall with six expansion anchors. Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL. Anchorage screened for RLGM based on rugged configuration of the support.188 2-SPY CONTAINMENT SPRAY Screened >RLGM The panel is welded along the bottom front CONTROL PANEL edge to embedded steel and braced back at the top to reinforced concrete wall. The top of the panel frames back to 2-SSR which is anchored at the top to reinforced concrete wall with six expansion anchors. Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL. Anchorage screened for RLGM based 0S Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 142 of 151 CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF Notes Unit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #on rugged configuration of the support.189 2-SSR ENGINEER SAFETY Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
SYSTEM REAR for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI INSTRUMENT/RELAY NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the RACK RLGM based on similar equipment within the control room yielding significant seismic capacity margins.190 2-SWR NUCLEAR Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
INSTRUMENTAL for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI SOURCE RANGE N21 NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the INSTRUMENT/RELAY RLGM based on similar equipment within RACK the control room yielding significant seismic capacity margins.191 2-T21A 4KV BUS T21A Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
SWITCHGEAR for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the RLGM based on anchorage evaluation performed to the RLGM.192 2-TDAB 250VDC TRAIN 'B' Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
TRANSFER CABINET for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.
193 2-TDCD 250VDC TRAIN 'A' Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
TRANSFER CABINET for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the RLGM based on similar cabinets yielding significant seismic capacity margins.194 2-TK-1 1 BORON INJECTION Anchorage 0.45g The Block Wall interaction was screened for TANK RLGM based on scaling of existing design basis calculation.
The tank screening was performed using the existing evaluation for a similar tank (2-TK-12S) with the same support conditions.
Tank 2-TK-12S could not be screened to the RLGM, and thus Tank 2-TK-1 1 did not screen. A HCLPF calculation for the tank was performed.
The governing HCLPF capacity according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-005
-"High Confidence Low Probability of Failure (HCLPF) Calculations for Screened in ESEP Tanks" (Ref. 10.2) is 0.45g for the welded connections.
195 2-TK-12S SOUTH BORIC ACID Anchorage 0.227g The Block Wall interaction was screened for STORAGE TANK RLGM based on scaling of existing design basis calculation.
Existing evaluation for the SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 143 of 151 CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF Notes Unit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #tank shows no additional margin for DBE input. Therefore, this tank did not screen to the RLGM and a HCLPF calculation for the tank was performed.
The governing HCLPF capacity according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-005
-"High Confidence Low Probability of Failure (HCLPF) Calculations for Screened in ESEP Tanks" (Ref. 10.2) is 0.227g for the tank support that is less than the RLGM of 0.387g.198 2-TK-253-PRESSURIZER TRAIN Screened >RLGM Tanks 2-TK-3, -5, &-7 grouped together and 3 'B' PRESSURE RELIEF anchored by four plates bolted to the wall VLV NRV-152 with two 3/4" bolts in each plate. The plates EMERGENCY AIR measured 19" and 44" from the floor to plate TANK centerlines.
The tanks are 9" diameter and 56" tall. The air bottles are strapped with brackets affixed to the wall by four plates employing two W" bolts each. Note that tank configuration has changed since A-46 evaluation but does not change the conclusion.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on rugged configuration of support.199 2-TK-253-PRESSURIZER TRAIN Screened >RLGM Tanks 2-TK-4, -6, &-8 grouped together and 4 'A' PRESSURE RELIEF anchored by four plates bolted to the wall VLV NRV-153 with two 3/4" bolts in each plate. The plates EMERGENCY AIR measured 19" and 44" from the floor to plate TANK centerlines.
The tanks are 9" diameter and 56" tall. The air bottles are strapped with brackets affixed to the wall by four plates employing two W" bolts each. Note that tank configuration has changed since A-46 evaluation but does not change the conclusion.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on rugged configuration of support.200 2-TK-253-PRESSURIZER TRAIN Screened >RLGM Tanks 2-TK-3, -5, &-7 grouped together and 5 'B' PRESSURE RELIEF anchored by four plates bolted to the wall VLV NRV-152 with two 3/4" bolts in each plate. The plates EMERGENCY AIR measured 19" and 44" from the floor to plate TANK centerlines.
The tanks are 9" diameter and 56" tall. The air bottles are strapped with SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 PaRe 144 of 151 CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF Notes Unit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #brackets affixed to the wall by four plates employing two %" bolts each. Note that tank configuration has changed since A-46 evaluation but does not change the conclusion.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on rugged configuration of support.201 2-TK-253-PRESSURIZER TRAIN Screened >RLGM Tanks 2-TK-4, -6, &-8 grouped together and 6 'A' PRESSURE RELIEF anchored by four plates bolted to the wall VLV NRV-153 with two 3/4" bolts in each plate. The plates EMERGENCY AIR measured 19" and 44" from the floor to plate TANK centerlines.
The tanks are 9" diameter and 56" tall. The air bottles are strapped with brackets affixed to the wall by four plates employing two %" bolts each. Note that tank configuration has changed since A-46 evaluation but does not change the conclusion.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on rugged configuration of support.202 2-TK-253-PRESSURIZER TRAIN Screened >RLGM Tanks 2-TK-3, -5, &-7 grouped together and 7 'B' PRESSURE RELIEF anchored by four plates bolted to the wall VLV NRV-152 with two 3/4" bolts in each plate. The plates EMERGENCY AIR measured 19" and 44" from the floor to plate TANK centerlines.
The tanks are 9" diameter and 56" tall. The air bottles are strapped with brackets affixed to the wall by four plates employing two %" bolts each. Note that tank configuration has changed since A-46 evaluation but does not change the conclusion.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on rugged configuration of support.203 2-TK-253-PRESSURIZER TRAIN Screened >RLGM Tanks 2-TK-4, -6, &-8 grouped together and 8 'A' PRESSURE RELIEF anchored by four plates bolted to the wall VLV NRV-153 with two 3/4" bolts in each plate. The plates EMERGENCY AIR measured 19" and 44" from the floor to plate TANK centerlines.
The tanks are 9" diameter and 56" tall. The air bottles are strapped with brackets affixed to the wall by four plates 0 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 PaRe 145 of 151 CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF Notes Unit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #employing two %" bolts each. Note that tank configuration has changed since A-46 evaluation but does not change the conclusion.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on rugged configuration of support.204 2-TK-32 CONDENSATE Anchorage 0.481g Rust was found on the strap supports.
A STORAGE TANK HCLPF calculation was performed for the degraded condition.
The governing HCLPF capacity according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-005
-"High Confidence Low Probability of Failure (HCLPF) Calculations for Screened in ESEP Tanks" (Ref. 10.2) is 0.481g.205 2-TK-37 COMPONENT Anchorage 0.447g Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
COOLING WATER for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI SURGE TANK NP-60411-SL.
Potentially governing Block Wall interaction and the tank anchorage could not be screened for RLGM. The governing HCLPF capacity according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-005
-"High Confidence Low Probability of Failure (HCLPF) Calculations for Screened in ESEP Tanks" (Ref. 10.2) is 0.447g for the tank anchorage.
206 2-TR21A 600V BUS 21A SUPPLY Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
TRANSFORMER for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.
The governing HCLPF capacity for the block wall according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-004
-"HCLPF Calculations for Screened in ESEP Components" (Ref. 10.1) is 1.270g and did not control the capacity.207 2-TR- TRANSFORMER FOR Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
AFWX AFWX DIST PANEL for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.
208 2-TR- TRANSFORMER FOR Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
ELSC ELSC DIST PANEL for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46
& 1 U3 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 146 of 151 CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF Notes Unit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #anchorage evaluation.
209 2-UDISB- CONTAINMENT Screened >RLGM Igniter box is attached to horizontal unistruts B1 HYDROGEN IGNITION bolted to vertical embedded unistruts.
The UPPER VOLUME TRAIN hydrogen igniters are composed of the'B' GLOW PLUG Igniter Box, glow plug, shield and other ASSEMBLY #B1 associated hardware.
The components within the igniter box are not fragile and are encompassed by that typically contained in other electrical boxes. Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling existing anchorage evaluation.
210 2-UDISB- CONTAINMENT Screened >RLGM Igniter box is bolted to horizontal unistruts B13 HYDROGEN IGNITION bolted to an embedded vertical unistrut on UPPER VOLUME TRAIN the left and a 3/8" expansion anchor on the'B' GLOW PLUG right. See notes for 2-UDISB-BI.
ASSEMBLY #B13 211 2-UDISB- CONTAINMENT Screened >RLGM Igniter box is bolted to horizontal unistruts B14 HYDROGEN IGNITION bolted to an embedded vertical unistrut on UPPER VOLUME TRAIN the left and a 3/8" expansion anchor on the'B' GLOW PLUG right. See notes for 2-UDISB-B1.
ASSEMBLY #B14 212 2-UDISB- CONTAINMENT Screened >RLGM Igniter box is bolted to horizontal unistruts B15 HYDROGEN IGNITION bolted to an embedded vertical unistrut on UPPER VOLUME TRAIN the left and a 3/8" expansion anchor on the'B' GLOW PLUG right. See notes for 2-UDISB-B1.
ASSEMBLY #B15 213 2-UDISB- CONTAINMENT Screened >RLGM Igniter box is bolted to horizontal unistruts B16 HYDROGEN IGNITION bolted to an embedded vertical unistrut on UPPER VOLUME TRAIN the left and a 3/8" expansion anchor on the'B' GLOW PLUG right. See notes for 2-UDISB-B1.
ASSEMBLY #B16 214 2-UDISB- CONTAINMENT Screened >RLGM Igniter box is bolted to horizontal unistruts B17 HYDROGEN IGNITION bolted to an embedded vertical unistrut on UPPER VOLUME TRAIN the left and a 3/8" expansion anchor on the'B' GLOW PLUG right. See notes for 2-UDISB-B1.
ASSEMBLY #B17 215 2-UDISB- CONTAINMENT Screened >RLGM Igniter box is attached to horizontal unistruts B2 HYDROGEN IGNITION bolted to vertical embedded unistruts.
See UPPER VOLUME TRAIN notes for 2-UDISB-B1.
'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B2 216 2-UDISB- CONTAINMENT Screened >RLGM Igniter box is bolted to two horizontal B29 HYDROGEN IGNITION unistruts which are welded directly to the UPPER VOLUME TRAIN column. The hydrogen igniters are 0 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 147 of 151 CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF Notes Unit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #'B' GLOW PLUG composed of the Igniter Box, glow plug, ASSEMBLY #B29 shield and other associated hardware.
The igniters attached to the catwalk wide flange members. A HCLPF calculation was performed for 2-UDISB-B29.
The governing HCLPF capacity for the catwalk according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-006
-"High Confidence Low Probability of Failure (HCLPF) Calculations for Containment Catwalk and Attached Hydrogen Glow Plugs"" (Ref. 10.3) is 0.86g and did not control capacity.217 2-UDISB- CONTAINMENT Screened >RLGM Igniter box is attached to horizontal unistruts B3 HYDROGEN IGNITION bolted to vertical embedded unistruts.
See UPPER VOLUME TRAIN notes for 2-UDISB-BI.
'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B3 218 2-UDISB- CONTAINMENT Screened >RLGM Igniter box is bolted to two horizontal B30 HYDROGEN IGNITION unistruts which are welded directly to the UPPER VOLUME TRAIN column. The hydrogen igniters are'B' GLOW PLUG composed of the Igniter Box, glow plug, ASSEMBLY #B30 shield and other associated hardware.
The igniters attached to the catwalk wide flange members. A HCLPF calculation was performed for 2-UDISB-B29.
The governing HCLPF capacity for the catwalk according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-006
-"High Confidence Low Probability of Failure (HCLPF) Calculations for Containment Catwalk and Attached Hydrogen Glow Plugs"" (Ref. 10.3) is 0.86g and did not control capacity.219 2-UDISB- CONTAINMENT Screened >RLGM Igniter box is bolted to two horizontal B31 HYDROGEN IGNITION unistruts which are welded directly to the UPPER VOLUME TRAIN column. The hydrogen igniters are'B' GLOW PLUG composed of the Igniter Box, glow plug, ASSEMBLY #B31 shield and other associated hardware.
The igniters attached to the catwalk wide flange members. A HCLPF calculation was performed for 2-UDISB-B29.
The governing HCLPF capacity for the catwalk according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-006
-"High Confidence Low Probability of Failure (HCLPF) Calculations for Containment Catwalk and Attached Hydrogen Glow Plugs"" (Ref. 10.3) is 0.86g and did not sr~Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 148 of 151 CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF Notes Unit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #control capacity.220 2-UDISB- CONTAINMENT Screened >RLGM Igniter box is bolted to two vertical unistruts B32 HYDROGEN IGNITION which are U-bolted to the top and bottom UPPER VOLUME TRAIN handrail of the catwalk. The hydrogen'B' GLOW PLUG igniters are composed of the Igniter Box, ASSEMBLY #B32 glow plug, shield and other associated hardware.
A HCLPF calculation was performed for 2-UDISB-B32.
The governing HCLPF capacity for the catwalk according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-006
-"High Confidence Low Probability of Failure (HCLPF) Calculations for Containment Catwalk and Attached Hydrogen Glow Plugs"" (Ref. 10.3) is 0.86g and did not control capacity.221 2-UDISB- CONTAINMENT Screened >RLGM Igniter box is bolted to two vertical unistruts B33 HYDROGEN IGNITION which are U-bolted to the top and bottom UPPER VOLUME TRAIN handrail of the catwalk. The hydrogen'B' GLOW PLUG igniters are composed of the Igniter Box, ASSEMBLY #B33 glow plug, shield and other associated hardware.
A HCLPF calculation was performed for 2-UDISB-B32.
The governing HCLPF capacity for the catwalk according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-006
-"High Confidence Low Probability of Failure (HCLPF) Calculations for Containment Catwalk and Attached Hydrogen Glow Plugs"" (Ref. 10.3) is 0.86g and did not control capacity.222 2-UDISB- CONTAINMENT Screened >RLGM Igniter box is bolted to two vertical unistruts B34 HYDROGEN IGNITION which are U-bolted to the top and bottom UPPER VOLUME TRAIN handrail of the catwalk. The hydrogen'B' GLOW PLUG igniters are composed of the Igniter Box, ASSEMBLY #B34 glow plug, shield and other associated hardware.
A HCLPF calculation was performed for 2-UDISB-B32.
The governing HCLPF capacity for the catwalk according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-006
-"High Confidence Low Probability of Failure (HCLPF) Calculations for Containment Catwalk and Attached Hydrogen Glow Plugs"" (Ref. 10.3) is 0.86g and did not control capacity.223 2-UDISB- CONTAINMENT Screened >RLGM Box dimensions are 16"x12"x8".
Unistruts B4 HYDROGEN IGNITION are approximately 16" apart vertically for UPPER VOLUME TRAIN support. Horizontal running support SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 149 of 151 CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF Notes Unit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #'B' GLOW PLUG unistruts are bolted to embedded unistruts ASSEMBLY #B4 spaced at 48" from each other, running vertically.
The box is located such that the bottom of the box is flush with the bottom horizontal unistrut, and 15" from the center of the box to the right vertically running embedded unistrut.See discussion for 2-UDISB-B1.
Assembly screens for 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL (Ref. 1) and anchorage loadings from RLGM input spectra (Ref. 2)224 2-UDISB- CONTAINMENT Screened >RLGM Igniter box is attached to horizontal unistruts B5 HYDROGEN IGNITION bolted to vertical embedded unistruts.
See UPPER VOLUME TRAIN notes for 2-UDISB-BI.
'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B5 225 2-UDISB- CONTAINMENT Screened >RLGM Igniter box is attached to horizontal unistruts B6 HYDROGEN IGNITION bolted to vertical embedded unistruts.
See UPPER VOLUME TRAIN notes for 2-UDISB-B1.
'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B6 226 2-UDISB- CONTAINMENT Screened >RLGM Igniter box is attached to horizontal unistruts B7 HYDROGEN IGNITION bolted to vertical embedded unistruts.
See UPPER VOLUME TRAIN notes for 2-UDISB-B1.
'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B7 227 2-VR- LOWER CONTAINMENT Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
LDISB-4 TRAIN B DISTRIBUTED for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI IGNITION SYSTEM NP-6041-SL.
The governing HCLPF VOLTAGE REGULATOR capacity according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-004
-"HCLPF Calculations for Screened in ESEP Components" (Ref.10.1) is 0.760g and does not control the capacity.228 2-VR- UPPER CONTAINMENT Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
UDISB-3 TRAIN B DISTRIBUTED for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI IGNITION SYSTEM NP-6041-SL.
The governing HCLPF VOLTAGE REGULATOR capacity according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-004
-"HCLPF Calculations for Screened in ESEP Components" (Ref.10.1) is 0.760g and does not control the capacity.229 2-VS VENTILATION Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CONTROL PANEL for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI POA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 150 of 151 CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF Notes Unit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the RLGM based on similar panels within the control room yielding significant seismic capacity margins.230 2-WMO- WEST CONTAINMENT Screened >RLGM This valve falls within the Earthquake 716 SPRAY HEAT Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-EXCHANGER SL. Therefore, this valve screens for the ESSENTIAL SERVICE 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-WATER INLET 6041-SL.SHUTOFF VALVE 231 2-WMO- EMERGENCY Screened >RLGM This valve falls outside the Earthquake 753 ESSENTIAL SERVICE Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-WATER SUPPLY TO SL. However, this valve screens for the 0.8g TDAFPPP-4 SHUTOFF to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL VALVE based on analysis performed for a 3g input.232 2-WRV- W ESW PUMP PP-7W Screened >RLGM This valve falls within the Earthquake 764 DISCH STN WEST Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-BASKET B/W OUT S/O SL. Therefore, this valve screens for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.233 2-WRV- W ESW PUMP PP-7W Screened >RLGM This valve falls within the Earthquake 769 DISCH STN WEST Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-BASKET BAW INL S/O SL. Therefore, this valve screens for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.234 2-WRV- WEST ESW PUMP PP- Screened >RLGM This valve falls within the Earthquake 774 7W DISCH STN EAST Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-BASKET BA/ OUT SL. Therefore, this valve screens for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.235 2-WRV- WEST ESW PUMP PP- Screened >RLGM This valve falls within the Earthquake 779 7W DISCH STN EAST Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-BASKET B/W INL SL. Therefore, this valve screens for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL. There is sufficient clearance between the valve operator and the walkway. Pipe line well supported and not a credible damaging interaction.
Small valve bolted into a small rack.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) 239 2-XRV- PRESSURE Screened >RLGM for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 152 REGULATING VALVE NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage judged to be adequate for RLGM by inspection based on light rack with rugged anchorage.
2-XRV- PRESSURE Small valve bolted into a small rack.240 153 REGULATING VALVE Screened >RLGMSa leed into a allhrack.153____REGULATING_______
VALVE___ ______Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
SA3 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 151 of 151 CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF Notes Unit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage judged to be adequate for RLGM by inspection based on light rack with rugged anchorage.
INDMIANA Indiana Michigan Power MICHIGAN Cook Nuclear Plant POWER One Cook Place Bridgman, MI 49106 A unit of Amencan Electric Power IndianaMichiganPower.com December 18, 2014 AEP-NRC-2014-94 10 CFR 50.54(f)Docket Nos.: 50-315 50-316 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD 20852 Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report -Response to U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident
 
==References:==
: 1. Letter from E. J. Leeds and M. R. Johnson, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), to All Power Reactor Licensees and Holders of Construction Permits in Active or Deferred Status, "Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident," dated March 12, 2012, Agencywide Document Access Management Systems (ADAMS) Accession Number ML12053A340.
: 2. Letter from T. R. Pietrangelo, Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), to D. L. Skeen, NRC,"Proposed Path Forward for NTTF Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Reevaluations," dated April 9, 2013, ADAMS Accession No. ML13101A379.
: 3. Letter from J. P. Gebbie, Indiana Michigan Power Company, to the NRC, "Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant (CNP) Unit 1 and Unit 2, Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding the Seismic Aspects of Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident," AEP-NRC-2013-41, dated April 25, 2013, ADAMS Accession No. ML13121A059.
: 4. Letter from E. J. Leeds, NRC, to J. E. Pollock, NEI, "Electric Power Research Institute Final Draft Report )XXXXXX, 'Seismic Evaluation Guidance:
Augmented Approach for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic,'
As An Acceptable Alternative to the March 12, 2012, Information Request for Seismic Reevaluations," dated May 7, 2013, ADAMS Accession No. ML13106A331.
YAW U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission AEP-NRC-2014-94 Page 2 On March 12, 2012, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued Reference 1 to all power reactor licensees and holders of construction permits in active or deferred status.Reference 1, Enclosure 1, "Recommendation 2.1: Seismic," requested each addressee located in the Central and Eastern United States (CEUS) to submit a Seismic Hazard Evaluation and Screening Report within 1.5 years from the date of Reference 1.In Reference 2, the Nuclear Energy Institute requested NRC agreement to delay submittal of the CEUS Seismic Hazard Evaluation and Screening Reports so that an update to the Electric Power Research Institute ground motion attenuation model could be completed and used to develop the requested information.
Reference 2 also outlined how a near-term Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP), and long-term plant risk evaluations, would provide a complete response to Reference 1, Enclosure
: 1. By Reference 3, Indiana Michigan Power, licensee for Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant (CNP) Units 1 and 2, informed the NRC of its intent to follow the approach and schedule described in Reference
: 2. By Reference 4, the NRC agreed with the approach proposed in Reference 2, which included licensee submittal of an ESEP report no later than December 31, 2014. This letter provides the ESEP report for CNP Units I and 2.Enclosure 1 to this letter provides an affirmation.
Enclosure 2 provides the ESEP report for CNP Units 1 and 2. There are no new Regulatory Commitments identified in this letter. Should you have any questions, please contact Mr. Michael K. Scarpello, Regulatory Affairs Manager, at (269) 466-2649.Sincerely, Q. Shane Lies Engineering Vice President, Indiana Michigan Power J RW/amp
 
==Enclosures:==
: 1. Affirmation
: 2. Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f)Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term " Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission AEP-NRC-2014-94 Page 3 C: M. L. Chawla, NRC Washington, DC J. T. King, MPSC R. F. Kuntz, NRR, NRC MDEQ -RMD/RPS NRC Resident Inspector C. D. Pederson, NRC Region III A. J. Williamson, AEP Ft. Wayne, w/o enclosures Enclosure I to AEP-NRC-2014-94 AFFIRMATION I, Q. Shane Lies, being duly sworn, state that I am Engineering Vice President of Indiana Michigan Power (I&M), that I am authorized to sign and file this document with the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission on behalf of I&M, and that the statements made and the matters set forth herein pertaining to I&M are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief.Indiana Michigan Power Q. Shane Lies Engineering Vice President, Indiana Michigan Power SWORN TO AND SUBSCRIBED BEFORE ME THIS DAY 0I , ' 2014 THISDAY OF~ &c i~L L, 014DANIELLE BURGOYNE XNotary Public, State of Michigan County of Berrien---.Nbtar ~ic --My Commission Expires 04-04-2018 Acting In the Countyiof My Commission Expires " --"- .*,,,
Enclosure 2 TO AEP-NRC-2014-94 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Document Title: 13Q3208-RPT-005
-Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Document Type: Criteria '1 Interface
[- Report [ Specification E] Other E] Drawing E]Project Name: Seismic Hazard & ESEP Seismic Services for DC Cook Units 1 & 2 Job No.: 13Q3208 Client: American Electric Power This document has been prepared in accordance with the S&A Quality Assurance Program Manual Revision 17 and project requirements:
Initial Issue: Rev. 0 Prepared by: G. G. Thomas n". 4 .Date: 12/10/14 Jennifer Huang Dan Lavarnway12/10/14 Reviewed by: M. Etre P.R. Wilson Date- 12/10/14 Date: 12/10/14 Approved by: M. Etre ,P.R. Wilson 6'dt- d '--, aw Revision Record: Revision Prepared by/ Reviewed by/ Approved by/ Description of Revision No. Date Date Date DOCUMENT CONTRACT NO.APPROVALSHEET 13Q3208 Stevenson
& Associates Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 2 of 151 TABLE OF CONTENTS 1.0 Purpose and Objective
.................................................................................................
4 2.0 Brief Summary of the FLEX Seismic Implementation Strategies
.........................
5 3.0 Equipment Selection Process and ESEL .................................................................
9 3.1 Equipment Selection Process and ESEL ..............................................................
9 3.1.1 E S E L D evelopm ent .................................................................................................
.11 3.1.2 Pow er O perated Valves .........................................................................................
13 3 .1 .3 P u ll B o xe s ......................................................................................................................
14 3.1.4 Term ination C abinets ...............................................................................................
14 3.1.5 Critical Instrumentation Indicators
.......................................................................
14 3.1.6 Electrical Distribution
............................................
15 3.1.7 C ontrol E quipm ent ................................................................................................
..15 3.2 Justification for use of Equipment that is not the Primary Means for FLEX im plem entation .......................................................................................................................
16 4.0 Ground Motion Response Spectrum (GMRS) ......................................................
17 4.1 Plot of GMRS Submitted by the Licensee .........................................................
17 4.2 Comparison to SSE ................................................................................................
18 5.0 Review Level Ground Motion (RLGM) .....................................................................
20 5.1 Description of RLGM selected ...........................................................................
20 5.2 Method to Estimate ISRS ......................................................................................
21 6.0 Seismic Margin Evaluation Approach .....................................................................
22 6.1 Summary of Methodologies Used ........................................................................
22 6.2 HCLPF Screening Process ....................................................................................
23 6.3 Seismic Walkdown Approach ...............................................................................
23 6.3.1 W alkdow n approach ..............................................................................................
23 6.3.2 Application of Previous Walkdown Information
..................................................
25 6.3.3 Significant Walkdown Findings ............................................................................
35 6.4 HCLPF Calculation Process .................................................................................
35 6.5 Functional Evaluation of Relays ..........................................................................
38 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 3 of 151 6.6 Tabulated ESEL HCLPF values (including Key failure modes) .......................
38 7.0 Inaccessible Items and Late Additions to the ESEL .............................................
39 7.1 Identification of Inaccessible Items and Late Additions to the ESEL .............
39 7.2 Planned Walkdown / Evaluation Schedule / Close Out ....................................
40 8.0 ESEP Conclusions and Results ...............................................................................
41 8.1 Supporting Inform ation .........................................................................................
41 8.2 Identification of Planned Modifications
..............................................................
42 8.3 Modification Implementation Schedule ..............................................................
43 8.4 Sum m ary of Actions ..............................................................................................
43 9.0 R eferences
.......................................................................................................................
45 Attachm ent A- C NP Unit 1 ESEL ..........................................................................................
50 Attachm ent B -C NP U nit 2 ESEL ..........................................................................................
67 Attachment C- CNP Unit 1 ESEP HCLPF Values and Failure Mode Tabulation
..................
84 Attachment D -CNP Unit 2 ESEP HCLPF Values and Failure Mode Tabulation
.....................
119 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 4 of 151 1.0 Purpose and Objective Following the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant resulting from the March 11, 2011, Great Tohoku Earthquake and subsequent tsunami, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) established a Near Term Task Force (NTTF) to conduct a systematic review of NRC processes and regulations and to determine if the agency should make additional improvements to its regulatory system. The NTTF developed a set of recommendations intended to clarify and strengthen the regulatory framework for protection against natural phenomena.
Subsequently, the NRC issued a 50.54(f) letter on March 12, 2012 [Ref. 1], requesting information to assure that these recommendations are addressed by all U.S. nuclear power plants. The 50.54(f) letter requests that licensees and holders of construction permits under 10 CFR (Code of Federal Regulations)
Part 50 reevaluate the seismic hazards at their sites against present-day NRC requirements and guidance.
Depending on the comparison between the reevaluated seismic hazard and the current design basis, further risk assessment may be required.
Assessment approaches acceptable to the staff include a seismic probabilistic risk assessment (SPRA), or a seismic margin assessment (SMA). Based upon the assessment results, the NRC staff will determine whether additional regulatory actions are necessary.
This report describes the Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) undertaken for Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant (CNP), Units 1 & 2. The intent of the ESEP is to perform an interim action in response to the NRC's 50.54(f) letter [Ref. 1] to demonstrate seismic margin through a review of a subset of the plant equipment that can be relied upon to protect the reactor core following beyond design basis seismic events.The ESEP is implemented using the methodologies in the NRC endorsed guidance in Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) 3002000704, Seismic Evaluation Guidance:
Augmented Approach for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic [Ref. 2].The objective of this report is to provide summary information describing the ESEP evaluations and results. The level of detail provided in the report is intended to enable the NRC to understand the inputs used, the evaluations performed, and the decisions made as a result of the interim evaluations.
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 5 of 151 2.0 Brief Summary of the FLEX Seismic Implementation Strategies The CNP Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) response strategies for Reactor Core Cooling and Heat Removal, Reactor Inventory Control/ Long-term Subcriticality and Containment Function are similar for both Units. The following discussion is a summary of CNP primary strategies to address a Beyond-Design-Basis Seismic Event (BDBSE). This summary is derived from the CNP Overall Integrated Plan (OIP) and updates in Response to the March 12, 2012, Commission Order EA-12-049
[Ref. 3].Phase 1 FLEX Strategies Reactor Core Cooling and Heat Removal Steam Generator Cooling, for Reactor Coolant System (RCS)/Core Heat Removal is initially provided by operation of the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (TDAFW) Pump taking suction from the Condensate Storage Tank (CST). Site specific analysis [Ref. 29] has been performed to demonstrate adequate CST volume for feeding each Unit's TDAFW pumps from a single CST. This analysis demonstrates sufficient inventory is available to maintain secondary heat sink for 12 hours post Extended Loss of AC Power (ELAP) including cool down of each Unit by depressurizing Steam Generators (SG) in accordance with Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs).An alternate cooling source will need to be aligned to maintain secondary inventory make up when the CST is depleted or becomes unavailable.
Lake water make up to the steam generators uses a FLEX lift pump to deliver lake water from the Circulating Water Intake Forebay to the TDAFW pump suction FLEX connection.
RCS Boration/Inventory Control No pumped RCS Boration or RCS make up is required in Phase 1. Depending upon Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) seal leakage and related RCS depressurization, some Safety Injection Accumulator make up to the RCS may occur based upon the results of CNP analyses.Westinghouse Shield Passive Thermal Shutdown RCP seals limiting RCS leakage are credited for FLEX implementation.
Containment Site specific analytical results [Ref. 29] determined the FLEX Containment Temperature and Pressure control actions. In the MODE 1-4 response, Containment pressure does not reach the maximum design pressure limit until after 70 hours.
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 6 of 151 Power Each Unit's Control Room Instrument Distribution (CRID) and Critical Control Room Power (CCRP) inverters maintain control room instrumentation and control with power supplied from the Train A&B Station batteries.
Secondary inventory make up is controlled using the TDAFW pump with local manual control of the TDAFW pump and hand-wheel operation of key motor operated valves. A Direct Current (DC) load shed will be performed to reduce Train A&B Station battery discharge rate within the first hour to ensure 12 hours are available to deploy FLEX electrical generators.
A plant specific DC load shedding analysis [Ref. 29] demonstrates the 12 hour coping capability for these batteries.
Phase 2 FLEX Strategies Reactor Core Cooling and Heat Removal A FLEX Lift pump is expected to be deployed in Phase 2 as an Alternate Cooling Source (ACS)to provide secondary inventory to maintain core cooling with the Steam Generators (SG).The FLEX lift pump will draw water from the Circulating Water Intake Forebay, delivering flow to the TDAFW pump suction and the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP). The deployment time is within 12 hours. This is based upon the CST capacity determined by site specific analyses [Ref. 29].Four Steam Generators will be used to maintain symmetric RCS cool down for the first 24 hours. Steam Generator Power Operated Relief Valves operated from local control stations or local manual operation that is the credited strategy, are used for control of Steam Generator (SG) pressure and RCS cool down rate.This accounts for the initiation of RCS Boration at 16 hours and provides acceptable Boron mixing in the RCS, and the limiting RCS natural circulation flow rates. The RCS will be fully Borated by twenty four (24) hours after the event. At this 24 hour mark SG cooling may be reduced to two of four Steam Generators.
RCS Boration/Inventory Control In MODEs 1-4, the RCS Boration and make up flow path uses a portable FLEX Boric Acid (BA)pump. The FLEX BA pump takes suction via gravity drain using a hose connected to the Boric Acid Storage Tank (BAST) outlet. The FLEX BA pump discharges to the RCS through the Charging header piping connection, that was modified by installing a high pressure hose connection for CNP Unit 1 and will be modified in the future for CNP Unit 2. The FLEX BA pump provides sufficient pressure and flow to fully borate one unit using a single BAST.
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 7 of 151 Containment Site specific evaluation
[Ref. 29] determined no Phase 2 FLEX Containment Temperature and Pressure control actions or equipment operation are required for the MODE 1-4 Containment response.
After 24 hours containment pressure will exceed the value for Adverse Containment Conditions as defined by Emergency Operating Procedures.
Operators will then use more conservative values for actions based upon Steam Generator and Pressurizer indicated level.Per Reference 29, both CNP Units are Ice Condenser Containments, requiring Phase 2 FLEX Generators to power one train of containment hydrogen igniters in accordance with the Regulatory criterion.
Spent Fuel Control No Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) inventory make up is required until after 24 hours. SFP inventory makeup is available as needed from the FLEX Lift pump deployed in Phase 2 to supply the TDAFW Pump.Power FLEX generators, 600vac (volt alternating current), 500kW (Kilo-watt), will be deployed from the FLEX storage building.
FLEX power will be supplied to select loads through 600vac Buses to allow restoration of loads such as battery chargers, a Boric Acid Transfer pump, the Middle Boric Acid Evaporator feed pump, Train B Hydrogen Igniters, and Train A Reactor Vessel Level Indication System (RVLIS).Phase 3 FLEX Strategies Reactor Core Cooling and Heat Removal Phase 3 equipment includes two, 1.1 MWe, 4160V gas turbine generators supplied from the National SAFER Response Center (NSRC) for each unit. These generators will repower 4kV busses, which allows repowering Train B 4kV safety related motors, 600vac Busses, and related 120vac lighting and low voltage electrical distribution circuits.
Train B was selected because it provides the ideal mix of 4kV safety related pumps such as Component Cooling Water (CCW), Residual Heat Removal (RHR), Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (MDAFW) and Essential Service Water (ESW) (if access to the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS) is available) while restoring 600vac busses.Train B power restoration allows starting the West CCW pump, West RHR pump, Train B control room ventilation and facilitates establishing shutdown cooling in conjunction with the NSRC supplied large volume raw water pump. Using a FLEX connection point, this large volume FLEX pump will supply Train B of the ESW system, from the Circulating Water Forebay, Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 8 of 151 to support the RHR and CCW systems for shutdown cooling alignment if the UHS is unavailable.
RCS Boration/Inventory Control The RCS Boration and make up flow path continues to use the portable FLEX Boric Acid (BA)pump as described in Phase 2.Containment Per Reference 29 Phase 3 Containment cooling and depressurization will be accomplished by the operation of one Containment Hydrogen Skimmer Fan. Operation of this Fan results in flow through the Ice Condenser; cooling and depressurizing the Containment.
Operation of this Fan will reduce Containment Pressure and Temperatures to normal values within 2-3 hours after starting the Fan.Spent Fuel Control SFP cooling is maintained during FLEX response by providing SFP inventory makeup from the Circulating Water Forebay using the FLEX Lift pump. Moisture caused by evaporation or boiling will be removed from the Auxiliary Building by natural draft.Power Two 1 MW 4kV generators from the NSRC per Unit will be ganged together using NSRC output bus and paralleling equipment.
NSRC 4 kV power to Bus 1A (2A) is connected by relocating the Reserve Feed 4kV Bus infeed circuit breaker and FLEX connections at the load side of 4kV circuit breakers.
NSRC 4kV power is sufficient to restore the Train B 4kV vital pump bus and 600Vac busses. 4kV power restoration in Phase 3 facilitates re-energizing loads to support the strategies summarized herein.
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 9 of 151 3.0 Equipment Selection Process and ESEL The selection of equipment for the Expedited Seismic Equipment List (ESEL) followed the guidelines of EPRI 3002000704
[Ref. 2] Seismic Evaluation Guidance and NEI 12-06 FLEX Implementation Guidance [Ref. 24]. The ESEL for Unit 1 & 2 is presented in Attachment A and B respectively.
 
===3.1 Equipment===
 
Selection Process and ESEL The selection of equipment to be included on the ESEL was based on installed plant equipment credited in the FLEX strategies during Phase 1, 2, and 3 mitigation of a Beyond Design Basis External Event (BOBEE), as outlined in the CNP Overall Integrated Plan (OIP) and updates in Response to the March 12, 2012, Commission Order EA-12-049
[Ref. 3]. The OIP provides the CNP FLEX mitigation strategy and serves as the basis for equipment selected for the ESEP.The scope of "installed plant equipment" includes equipment relied upon for the FLEX strategies to sustain the critical functions of core cooling and containment integrity consistent with the CNP OIP and updates [Ref. 3]. FLEX recovery actions are excluded from the ESEP scope per EPRI 3002000704
[Ref. 2]. The overall list of planned FLEX modifications and the scope for consideration herein is limited to those required to support core cooling, reactor coolant inventory and subcriticality, and containment integrity functions.
Portable and pre-staged FLEX equipment (not permanently installed) are excluded from the ESEL per EPRI 3002000704
[Ref. 2].The ESEL component selection followed the EPRI guidance outlined in Section 3.2 of EPRI 3002000704
[Ref. 2].1. The scope of components is limited to that required to accomplish the core cooling and containment safety functions identified in Table 3-2 of EPRI 3002000704
[Ref. 2]. The instrumentation monitoring requirements for core cooling/containment safety functions are limited to those outlined in the EPRI 3002000704 guidance, and are a subset of those outlined in the CNP OIP [Ref. 3].2. The scope of components on the ESEL was limited to installed plant equipment, and FLEX connections necessary to implement the CNP OIP [Ref. 3] as described in Section 2.3. The scope of components assumes the credited FLEX connection modifications are implemented, and are limited to those required to support a single FLEX success path.These are the "Primary" path for CNP.4. The "Primary" FLEX success path is to be specified.
Selection of the "Back-up/Alternate" FLEX success path must be justified.
CNP did not use a "Back-up/Alternate" FLEX success path 5. Phase 3 coping strategies are included in the ESEP scope, whereas recovery strategies are excluded.
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 10 of 151 6. Structures, systems, and components excluded per the EPRI 3002000704
[Ref. 2]guidance are:* Structures (e.g. containment, auxiliary building, etc.)* Piping, cabling, conduit, HVAC, and their supports* Manual valves and rupture disks* Power-operated valves not required to change state as part of the FLEX mitigation strategies
* Nuclear steam supply system (NSSS) components (e.g. reactor pressure vessel and internals, reactor coolant pumps and seals, etc.)7. For cases in which neither train was specified as a primary or back-up strategy, then only one train component (generally
'B' train for CNP) is included in the ESEL Permanent plant equipment required for implementation of the FLEX Strategy was identified by reviewing the FLEX Strategy and associated cooling flow path piping and instrumentation diagrams (P&ID), instrument elementary diagrams, and electrical distribution one-line diagrams.The approach taken in compiling the ESEL was to assume there were no random equipment failures and identify a single success path for each element of the FLEX Strategy.
Note, the EPRI 3002000704
[Ref. 2] Seismic Evaluation Guidance states that only one success path is required.
Also, NEI 12-06 FLEX Implementation Guidance [Ref. 24] does not require postulating single or multiple random failures during or following an Extended Loss of all Alternating Current (AC) Power and Loss of the Ultimate Heat Sink (ELAP/LUHS) event'.Following Section 3.2 of the EPRI 3002000704
[Ref. 2] Seismic Evaluation Guidance the following equipment categories were excluded from consideration: " Structures
* Distributed systems (piping, cabling, conduit, cable trays, Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC))* Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS) components The corresponding components listed in the ESEL have been further screened utilizing the Evaluation Guidance to exclude components having the following criteria:* Non-power operated valves (manual valves, check valves, rupture disks)* Power operated valves not required to change state for any FLEX strategy* Sub-components mounted within equipment already included on the list 2 The FLEX Integrated Plan [Ref. 29] also assumed no single failure of structures, systems, or components (SSC), in accordance with the Implementation Guidance.2 This item refers to the "Rule-of-Box" (ROB). When equipment is screened using the EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7]guidance, all of the components mounted on or in equipment of a particular equipment class are considered to be part of that equipment and do not have to be evaluated separately.
Relays and other contact devices vulnerable to seismically induced chatter are an exception to this rule and should be separately identified and evaluated for seismic adequacy using the ESEP evaluation guidance.
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 11 of 151 Additional screening criteria were applied to exclude components from the ESEL that met the following criteria:* In-line pipe-supported components (without separate mounting)* Pumps and small heat exchangers within piping pressure boundaries but not in the flow path" Components expected to operate during the initial reactor transient (as described in NEI 12-06 section 3.2.1.4 [Ref. 24])The Equipment Selection and ESEL Development is documented in S&A Report 13Q3208-RPT-001, [Ref. 25].3.1.1 ESEL Development The ESEL was developed by reviewing the CNP FLEX Integration Plan [Ref. 29] to determine the major equipment involved in the FLEX strategies.
Further reviews of plant drawings (e.g., Process and Instrumentation Diagrams (P&IDs) and Electrical One Line Diagrams) were performed to identify the boundaries of the flowpaths to be used in the FLEX strategies and to identify specific components in the flowpaths needed to support implementation of the FLEX strategies.
Boundaries were established at an electrical or mechanical isolation device (e.g., isolation amplifier, valve, etc.) in branch circuits / branch lines off the defined strategy electrical or fluid flowpath.
P&IDs were the primary reference documents used to identify mechanical components and instrumentation.
The flow paths used for FLEX strategies were selected and specific components were identified using detailed equipment and instrument drawings, piping isometrics, electrical schematics and one-line drawings, system descriptions, design basis documents, etc., as necessary.
The flow paths credited for the CNP ESEP are shown in Table 3-1.
SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 12 of 151 Table 0-1: Flow Paths Credited for ESEP P&IDs/Reference Drawings Flow Path Unit 1 Unit 2 Phase 1 and Phase 2 Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Heat Removal: Main Steam Power Operated Relief Valves discharge steam from the Steam Generators to the atmosphere.
Feedwater from the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump with suction from the Condensate Storage Tank or portable FLEX pump from the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS).---I I-OP-1-5105D
[26.1]OP-1-5105E
[26.2]OP-1-5106A
[26.31 OP-1-5113
[26.4]OP-1-5113A
[26.5]OP-2-5105D
[26.19]OP-2-5105E
[26.20]OP-2-5106A
[26.21]OP-2-5113
[26.22]OP-2-5113A
[26.23]Phase 3 Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Heat OP-1-5113
[26.4] OP-2-5113
[26.22]Removal: Mode 4 Train B Residual Heat OP-15113A
[26.5] OP-2-5113A
[26.23]Removal (RHR) system, using the Train B Component Cooling (CCW) System, and Train B OP-1-513 [26.6] OP-2-513 [26.24]Essential Service Water (ESW) system supplied OP-1-5135
[26.7] OP-2-5135
[26.251 by a portable FLEX pump from the UHS. OP-1-5135A
[26.8] OP-2-5135A
[26.26]Phase I Reactor Coolant Make Up and Boration Control: Passive injection from the Safety OP-1-5143A
[26.9] OP-2-5143A
[26.27]Injection Accumulators.
Phase 2 and Phase 3 Reactor Coolant Make Up and Boration Control: A portable FLEX pump taking suction from the Boric Acid Storage Tank OP-12-5131
[26.10] OP-12-5131
[26.10](BAST) FLEX connection to the Reciprocating OP-1-5129
[26.11] OP-2-5129
[26.28]Charging Pump discharge piping FLEX OP-1-5142
[26.12] OP-2-5142
[26.29]connection; to the RCS via the Boron Injection Tank.OP-1-5128
[26.13] OP-2-5128
[26.30]RCS Pressure Control: RCS Pressurizer Power OP-1-5128
[26.14] OP-2-5128
[26.311 Operated Relief Valves. OP-1-5120D
[26.15] OP-2-5120D
[26.32]Containment:
Analytical results indicate Phase 1 and Phase 2 FLEX actions are not required.
OP-1-12032126.36]
OP-2-12032
[26.37]Phase 3 uses a Fan to draw air through the Ice Condenser to cool Containment.
Fuel Oil: From the Diesel Oil Storage Tank via a portable FLEX pump to provide fuel for FLEX OP-1-5151C
[26.16] OP-2-5151A
[26.33]equipment.
.
0 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 13 of 151 P&lDs/Reference Drawings Flow Path Unit I Unit 2 Phase 1 Main Control Room (MCR) and Battery Room Ventilation:
Open doors and use portable None None FLEX fans.Phase 2 Main Control Room and Battery Room Ventilation:
Maintain MCR ventilation with open doors and portable FLEX fans. Battery Room OP-1-5148C
[26.17] OP-2-5148C
[26.34]ventilation is powered by portable FLEX Generators along with Station Battery Chargers.Phase 3 Main Control Room and Battery Room Ventilation:
Restore Train B of MCR ventilation OP-1-5148C
[26.17] OP-2-5148C
[26.34]powered by NSRC portable FLEX Generators.
OP-1-5149
[26.18] OP-2-5149
[26.35]Battery Room ventilation is also powered by OP-1-5113
[26.4] OP-2-5113
[26.22]these portable generators.
Each of the following flow paths were analyzed, and all mechanical equipment necessary to establish these flow paths were considered for inclusion in the ESEL: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Main Steam to the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) to the Steam Generators Reactor Coolant Make Up Residual Heat Removal Main Control Room Ventilation Battery Room Ventilation Instrument Air Implementing procedures to establish these flow paths were examined to identify valves that will be manipulated manually using the local valve operator hand wheel. These valves were excluded from the electrical power and control identification activities mentioned in the next two sections.3.1.2 Power Operated Valves Page 3-3 of EPRI 3002000704
[Ref. 2] notes that power operated valves not required to change state are excluded from the ESEL. Page 3-2 also notes that "functional failure modes of electrical and mechanical portions of the installed Phase 1 equipment should be considered (e.g. Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC)/AFW trips)." To address this concern, the following guidance is applied for the CNP Unit 1 and CNP Unit 2 ESEL for functional failure modes associated with power operated valves:
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 14 of 151 Power operated valves that remain energized during the Extended Loss of all AC Power (ELAP) events (such as DC powered valves), were included on the ESEL.Power operated valves not required to change state as part of the FLEX mitigation strategies were not included on the ESEL. The seismic event also causes the ELAP event; therefore, the valves are incapable of spurious operation as they would be de-energized.
Power operated valves not required to change state as part of the FLEX mitigation strategies during Phase 1, and are re-energized and operated during subsequent Phase 2 and 3 strategies, were not evaluated for spurious valve operation as the seismic event that caused the ELAP has passed before the valves are re-powered.
3.1.3 Pull Boxes Pull boxes were deemed unnecessary to add to the ESELs as these components provide completely passive locations for pulling or installing cables. No breaks or connections in the cabling are included in pull boxes. Pull boxes were considered part of conduit and cabling, which are excluded in accordance with EPRI 3002000704
[Ref. 2].3.1.4 Termination Cabinets Termination cabinets, including cabinets necessary for FLEX Phase 2 and Phase 3 connections, provide consolidated locations for permanently connecting multiple cables. The termination cabinets and the internal connections provide a completely passive function;however, the cabinets are included on the ESEL to ensure that industry knowledge of panel/anchorage failure vulnerabilities is addressed.
 
====3.1.5 Critical====
Instrumentation Indicators Critical indicators and recorders are typically physically located on panels/cabinets and are included as separate components; however, seismic evaluation of the instrument indication may be included in the panel/cabinet seismic evaluation (rule-of-the-box).
The FLEX Integrated Plan [Ref. 29] was reviewed and key plant parameters were identified.
Instrumentation required to indicate the following parameters was considered for inclusion in the ESEL: " Steam Generator Pressure and Level Indications" Reactor Coolant System Pressure and Temperature Indications
* Reactor Vessel Level Indication (Utilizing the Reactor Vessel Level Instrumentation System)* Pressurizer Level Indication
* Neutron Flux Indication" Core Exit Temperature Indication
* Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Indication Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 15 of 151" Safety Injection Flow Indication
* Containment Pressure Indication
* Condensate Storage Tank Level Indication
* Boric Acid Storage Tank Level and Temperature Indication To compile the instrumentation included in the ESEL, instrument loop identifiers for these parameters were taken, where possible, from the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Table 7.8-1, Variables Provided the Operator for Manual Functions During and Following an Accident [Ref. 21]. Where both wide and narrow range instruments were indicated for a given parameter on UFSAR Table 7.8-1, the wide-range instrument was chosen. P&lDs were consulted for parameters not included in UFSAR Table 7.8-1.3.1.6 Electrical Distribution The electrical distribution and motor control centers (MCCs) necessary to provide power to the instrumentation, pumps, valves, or any other electrically powered permanent plant equipment identified for ESEP were included in the ESEL. This includes vital instrument power from the station batteries through the inverters to the vital bus panels, instrument racks, and Main Control Room (MCR) panels. Distribution paths were identified from intended FLEX generator connection points to their intended loads.3.1.7 Control Equipment The control equipment necessary to operate the pumps, valves, or any other electrically powered permanent plant equipment identified for ESEP was considered for inclusion in the ESEL. Relays and other sensitive contact devices subject to seismically induced chatter that may lead to a circuit seal-in or lockout were also considered for inclusion on the ESEL. Power sources for the required control circuits were traced and any power distribution component necessary for the control circuits (and not already identified) were added to the ESEL.As mentioned in Section 3.1.2, controls for local manually operated valves were not considered.
The list of valves crediting manual operation includes the Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (TDAFP) Trip and Throttle Valve. None of the relays associated with the TDAFP trip function were included on the ESEL because if an event causes an actuation and trips the TDAFP, operators will reset the TDAFP manually according to the Emergency Operating Procedures described in Stevenson
& Associates (S&A) Report 13Q3208-RPT-001
[Ref. 25]. It is noted that all other relays screened out of consideration for ESEP and thus the ESEL contains no relays.3.1.8 FLEX Connections (Phase 2 and Phase 3 Piping Connections)
Item 2 in Section 3.1 above notes that the scope of equipment in the ESEL includes "... FLEX connections necessary to implement the CNP OIP [Ref. 3] as described in Section 2." Item 3 in Section 3.1 also notes that the scope of components assumes the credited FLEX connection Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 16 of 151 modifications are implemented, and are limited to those required in the case of CNP to support a single Primary FLEX success path. It is noted that these connections have been installed for CNP Unit 1 and are planned to be installed for CNP Unit 2 in the spring 2015 outage.Item 6 in Section 3 above goes on to explain that "Piping, cabling, conduit, HVAC, and their supports" are excluded from the ESEL scope in accordance with EPRI 3002000704
[Ref. 2].Therefore, piping and pipe supports associated with FLEX Phase 2 and Phase 3 connections are excluded from the scope of the ESEP evaluation.
However, any active valves in FLEX Phase 2 and Phase 3 connection flow path are included in the ESEL.The flow paths described in Section 3.1.1 of this report and included with marked up Piping and Instrumentation Drawings (P&IDs) in S&A Report 13Q3208-RPT-001
[Ref. 25] were configured for the FLEX connections consistent with the August 2014 FLEX strategy [Ref. 29]. The scope of equipment in the ESEL includes FLEX connections necessary to implement the CNP OIP[Ref. 3] as described in Section 2. The scope of components assumed the credited FLEX connection modifications are implemented, and are limited to those required to support a single Primary FLEX success path. It is also noted there are no plans to have permanently installed FLEX equipment for CNP Unit I or CNP Unit 2.3.2 Justification for use of Equipment that is not the Primary Means for FLEX implementation All equipment used for FLEX implementation on the CNP ESEL are the primary path. The complete ESELs for CNP Unit 1 and CNP Unit 2 are presented in Attachments A and B, respectively.
Val Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 17 of 151 4.0 Ground Motion Response Spectrum (GMRS)4.1 Plot of GMRS Submitted by the Licensee As documented in Stevenson
& Associates (S&A) Report 13Q3208-RPT-003
[Ref. 4](transmitted by letter from Q. S. Lies, I&M, to NRC, "Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2, Seismic Hazard and Screening Report (CEUS Sites), Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident," dated March 27, 2014)[Ref. 11] the SSE Control Point for Containment is at an elevation of 587.4 ft. which is used for comparison to the Control Point GMRS.The GMRS at 5% equipment damping, taken from S&A Report 13Q3208-RPT-003
[Ref. 4], is shown in Table 4-1 and Figure 4-1.Table 4-1 CNP GMRS Frequency (Hz) GMRS (g) Frequency (Hz) GMRS (g)100 0.248 3.5 0.321 90 0.251 3 0.288 80 0.254 2.5 0.240 70 0.261 2 0.210 60 0.273 1.5 0.167 50 0.302 1.25 0.133 40 0.348 1 0.102 35 0.376 0.9 0.0932 30 0.405 0.8 0.0822 25 0.454 0.7 0.0722 20 0.461 0.6 0.0639 15 0.525 0.5 0.0563 12.5 0.496 0.4 0.0451 10 0.464 0.35 0.0394 9 0.466 0.3 0.0338 8 0.454 0.25 0.0282 7 0.426 0.2 0.0225 6 0.415 0.15 0.0169 5 0.421 0.125 0.0141 4 0.361 0.1 0.0113 H3 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 1303208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 18 of 151 0.0.3 W0Z!!l 01 1 10 100 Frequency (Hz)Figure 4-1 CNP GMRS 4.2 Comparison to SSE As documented in S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-002
[Ref. 23], the GMRS exceeds the SSE in the 3.5 Hz. to 10 Hz range for 5% equipment damping. A comparison of the GMRS to the SSE between 1-10 Hz is shown in Table 4-2 and Figure 4-2.Table 0-2: CNP GMRS and SSE between 1-10Hz Frequency (Hz) SSE (g) GMRS (g)10 0.24 0.464 9 0.252 0.466 8 0.264 0.454 7 0.276 0.426 6 0.305 0.415 5 0.315 0.421 4 0.32 0.361 3.5 0.32 0.321 3 0.304 0.288 2.5 0.287 0.24 2 0.27 0.21 1.5 0.221 0.167 1.25 0.195 0.133 1 0.167 0.102 l Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 19 of 151 00..... I.....GM 10.;3II~V~..........
.... .. .. .... ..... .. ... .. ....... ..0.1 1 10 100 Frequency (Hz)Figure 4-2 GMRS / SSE Comparison SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 20 of 151 5.0 Review Level Ground Motion (RLGM)5.1 Description of RLGM selected The RLGM for CNP was determined in accordance with Section 4 of EPRI 3002000704
[Ref. 2]by linearly scaling the CNP SSE by the maximum GMRS/SSE ratio (SF) between the 1 and 10 Hz range. The RLGM for CNP is also documented in S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-002
[Ref. 23].The results of this calculation are shown in Table 5-1.Table 0-2: CNP Maximum GMRS/SSE Ratio (SF)Frequency Unscaled SSE (g) GMRS/SSE (Hz) GMRS (g)10 0.464 0.24 1.933 9 0.466 0.252 1.849 8 0.454 0.264 1.720 7 0.426 0.276 1.543 6 0.415 0.305 1.361 5 0.421 0.315 1.337 4 0.361 0.32 1.128 3.5 0.321 0.32 1.003 3 0.288 0.304 0.947 2.5 0.24 0.287 0.836 2 0.21 0.27 0.778 1.5 0.167 0.221 0.756 1.25 0.133 0.195 0.682 1 0.102 0.167 0.611 As shown above, the maximum GMRS/SSE ratio occurs at 10 Hz and equals 1.933.The resulting 5% damped RLGM, based on scaling the horizontal SSE by the SF of 1.933, is shown in Table 5-2 and Figure 5-1. Note that the RLGM Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA) is 0.387g.
pla3 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 21 of 151 Table 0-3: CNP RLGM Freq. (Hz) SA (g) Freq. (Hz) SA (g)0.5 0.180 4.17 0.619 0.77 0.271 5.88 0.599 1.11 0.348 6.67 0.541 1.43 0.416 12.5 0.406 1.82 0.483 25 0.387 2 0.522 50 0.387 3.45 0.619 100 0.387 I- --1.93 xSSE=RLGM-ssE 0.1 0,700: 0.600 0.500-*L 0.40D. -------0.000 1 10 100 Frequency (Hz)Figure 0-1: CNP RLGIMI 5.2 Method to Estimate ISRS The method used to derive the ESEP in-structure response spectra (ISRS) was to uniformly scale existing SSE-based ISRS from the CNP Design Basis SSE (referred to as the Design Basis Earthquake (DBE) in the CNP UFSAR [Ref. 21]) [Refs. 17.1, 17.2, 17.3 and 17.4] by the maximum SF of 1.933 from Table 5-1. Existing ISRS were the same as those used for the Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) A-46 program. Scaled ISRS are calculated for all buildings and elevations where ESEL items are located at CNP. The scaled ISRS for CNP are documented in S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-002
[Ref. 23]. These scaled ISRS were used as the basis for screening and for the High Confidence Low Probability of Failure (HCLPF) calculations 13Q3208-CAL-004
[10.1], 13Q3208-CAL-005
[10.2], and 13Q3208-CAL-006
[10.3].
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 22 of 151 6.0 Seismic Margin Evaluation Approach It is necessary to demonstrate that ESEL items have sufficient seismic capacity to meet or exceed the demand characterized by the RLGM. The seismic capacity is characterized as the highest peak ground acceleration (PGA) for which there is a high confidence of a low probability of failure (HCLPF). The PGA is associated with a particular spectral shape, in this case the 5%damped RLGM spectral shape. The calculated HCLPF capacity must be equal to or greater than the RLGM PGA (0.387g from Table 5-2 and Figure 5-1). The criteria for seismic capacity determination are given in Section 5 of EPRI 3002000704
[Ref. 2].There are two basic approaches for developing HCLPF capacities:
: 1. Deterministic approach using the conservative deterministic failure margin (CDFM)methodology of EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7].2. Probabilistic approach using the fragility analysis methodology of EPRI TR-103959
[Ref.8].The deterministic approach using the CDFM methodology of EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7] was used for the CNP to determine HCLPF capacities.
 
===6.1 Summary===
of Methodologies Used CNP performed a seismic probabilistic risk assessment (SPRA) for their Individual Plant Examination for External Events (IPEEE) in 1992. The SPRA is documented in the CNP IPEEE report [Ref. 9] and consisted of screening walkdowns and fragility calculations for anchorage, buildings and tanks. The screening walkdowns used a similar methodology that is included for a Seismic Margin Assessment (SMA) that uses Table 2-4 of EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7] for screening.
The walkdowns were conducted by trained engineers that successfully completed the Seismic Qualification Utility Group (SQUG) Walkdown Screening and Seismic Evaluation Training Course. The walkdown results were documented on Screening Evaluation Work Sheets (SEWS). Anchorage capacity calculations partially used the CDFM criteria from EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7] or the fragility methodology in Reference 8.For the ESEP, CNP applied the SMA methodology of EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7] to all accessible items on the ESEL. The performed screening used Table 2-4 from EPRI NP-6041-SL [Ref. 7]. The walkdowns were conducted by engineers who, as a minimum, have attended the SQUG Walkdown Screening and Seismic Evaluation Training Course. The walkdowns were documented in SEWS consistent with EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7]. Anchorage capacity calculations use the CDFM criteria established within EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7] with CNP specific allowables and material strengths used as applicable.
The input seismic demand used was the RLGM shown in Table 5-2 and Figure 5-1. It is noted that CNP did not use the results from the IPEEE [Ref. 9] directly, but did use the documentation (SEWS forms) that supported Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 23 of 151 the USI A-46 [Ref. 16] for screening.
The walkdown and screening for the ESEP is documented in S&A Report 13Q3208-RPT-004
[Ref. 20].6.2 HCLPF Screening Process The peak spectral acceleration of the RLGM for CNP equals 0.62g. Screening lanes 1 and 2 in Table 2-4 of EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7] are bounded by peak spectral accelerations of 0.8g and 1.2g, respectively.
Both lane limits exceed the RLGM peak spectral acceleration.
ESEL components were screened to lane 1 or 2 of Table 2-4 in EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7]. When lane 2 was used it is documented on the screening summary tabulation contained in Attachment C and D of this report.The CNP Unit 1 and CNP Unit 2 ESEL contain 240 items and 237 items, respectively
[Ref. 25].Of these, there are 33 valves for Unit 1 and 33 valves for Unit 2 (including power-operated, air-operated, and relief valves). In accordance with Table 2-4 of EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7], active valves may be assigned a functional capacity of 0.8g to 1.2g (relative to the spectral peaks for Screening Lane 1 and 2) only requiring a review of valves with large extended operators on small diameter piping. Note that anchorage is not a failure mode. Valves on the ESEL may be screened out, subject to the caveat regarding large extended operators on small diameter piping.The non-valve components in the ESEL can generally be screened using results consistent with the SMA methodology.
It is noted that the screening caveats for screening lane 2 in Table 2-4 of EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7] conform to those used in the USI A-46 [Ref. 16] for CNP. If the evaluation of the equipment item on the ESEL using the SMA methodology shows that the component met the EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7] screening caveats and the CDFM capacity exceeded the Review Level Earthquake (RLE) demand, which it does for CNP, the component can be screened out from the ESEP capacity determination.
This was done for items where equipment item specific SEWS were available from the USI A-46 [Ref. 16] evaluation.
The engineers performing the walkdowns checked for changes made to the equipment since the USI A-46 work was completed that could potentially effect screening.
In addition non-valve components on the ESEL without USI A-46 SEWS were evaluated to the EPRI NP-6041-SL Table 2-4 [Ref. 7] screening caveats, as applicable.
 
===6.3 Seismic===
Walkdown Approach 6.3.1 Walkdown approach Walkdowns for CNP were performed in accordance with the criteria provided in Section 5 of EPRI 3002000704
[Ref. 2], which refers to EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7] for the Seismic Margin Assessment process. Pages 2-26 through 2-30 of EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7] describe the seismic walkdown criteria, including the following key criteria:
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 24 of 151"The SRT [Seismic Review Team] should "walk by" 100% of all components which are reasonably accessible and in non-radioactive or low radioactive environments.
Seismic capability assessment of components which are inaccessible, in high-radioactive environments, or possibly within contaminated containment, will have to rely more on alternate means such as photographic inspection, more reliance on seismic reanalysis, and possibly, smaller inspection teams and more hurried inspections.
A 100% "walk by" does not mean complete inspection of each component, nor does it mean requiring an electrician or other technician to de-energize and open cabinets or panels for detailed inspection of all components.
This walkdown is not intended to be a QA or QC review or a review of the adequacy of the component at the SSE level.If the SRT has a reasonable basis for assuming that the group of components are similar and are similarly anchored, then it is only necessary to inspect one component out of this group. The "similarity-basis" should be developed before the walkdown during the seismic capability preparatory work (Step 3) by reference to drawings, calculations or specifications.
The one component or each type which is selected should be thoroughly inspected which probably does mean de-energizing and opening cabinets or panels for this very limited sample. Generally, a spare representative component can be found so as to enable the inspection to be performed while the plant is in operation.
At least for the one component of each type which is selected, anchorage should be thoroughly inspected.
The walkdown procedure should be performed in an ad hoc manner. For each class of components the SRT should look closely at the first items and compare the field configurations with the construction drawings and/or specifications.
If a one-to-one correspondence is found, then subsequent items do not have to be inspected in as great a detail. Ultimately the walkdown becomes a "walk by" of the component class as the SRT becomes confident that the construction pattem is typical. This procedure for inspection should be repeated for each component class; although, during the actual walkdown the SRT may be inspecting several classes of components in parallel.
If serious exceptions to the drawings or questionable construction practices are found then the system or component class must be inspected in closer detail until the systematic deficiency is defined.
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 25 of 151 The 100% "walk by" is to look for outliers, lack of similarity, anchorage which is different from that shown on drawings or prescribed in criteria for that component, potential SI[Seismic Interaction 3] problems, situations that are at odds with the team members' past experience, and any other areas of serious seismic concern. If any such concems surface, then the limited sample size of one component of each type for thorough inspection will have to be increased.
The increase in sample size which should be inspected will depend upon the number of outliers and different anchorages, etc., which are observed.
It is up to the SRT to ultimately select the sample size since they are the ones who are responsible for the seismic adequacy of all elements which they screen from the margin review. Appendix D gives guidance for sampling selection.
The CNP walkdowns included, as a minimum, a 100% walk-by of all items on the CNP ESEL except as noted in Section 7.0. Previous walkdown information that was relied upon as the basis for the SRT judgment in excluding an item walkdown is documented in Section 6.3.2. It is noted that the walkdown and screening of an individual equipment item was frozen at the time of the walkdown date for that equipment.
Walkdowns were conducted at various times between March 2014 and November 2014. The screening status of the equipment included in this report reflects the configuration at the time the item was walked down and after all evaluations were performed.
The walkdown and screening information for the ESEP is documented in S&A Report 13Q3208-RPT-004
[Ref. 20].6.3.2 Application of Previous Walkdown Information The Augmented Approach Guidance for the NTTF 2.1 Seismic walkdowns
[Ref. 2] references EPRI NP-6041-SL for Screening
[Ref. 7]. The Reference 2 augmented approach allows use of walkdown results from recent walkdowns that include the recently completed NTTF 2.3 walkdowns
[Ref. 18]. EPRI NP-6041-SL states that the walkdown team should attempt a 100%walk-by of all items on the listing. It also states that reasons for this not being possible are that some items may be inaccessible due to the equipment being in a high radiation area or cannot be looked at (like buried tanks).The following list of items were inaccessible but screened in accordance with EPRI NP-6041-SL, based on documentation and similarity to items that were included in the walkdowns.
Previous seismic walkdowns were used to support the ESEP seismic evaluations.
Some of the components on the ESEL were included in the NTTF 2.3 seismic walkdowns
[Ref. 18]. The basis for screening is also included.3 EPRI 3002000704
[Ref. 2] page 5-4 limits the ESEP seismic interaction reviews to "nearby block walls" and "piping attached to tanks" which are reviewed "to address the possibility of failures due to differential displacements." Other potential seismic interaction evaluations are "deferred to the full seismic risk evaluations performed in accordance with EPRI 1025287 [Ref. 14].
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 26 of 151 The following items on the Unit I ESEL were screened in this manner: Item 11, 12-TK-47-CD, EMERGENCY DIESELS FUEL OIL STORAGE TANK: This tank is buried and, by definition, not accessible.
Per the screening criteria of Table 2-4 in EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7], the anchorage configurations of buried tanks are inherently seismically rugged and of no concern. A review of the flexibility of attached piping was performed in SQUG-12-TK-47-CD
[Ref. 22.3] and the tank was evaluated for the potential seismic wave effects for the SSE and had a stress of 3.6 ksi. Since the factor of safety is on the order of 10, this screens for the RLGM which is an earthquake that is the SSE scaled by a factor of 1.93 < 10.Item 89, 1-HV-CEQ-2, CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN SKIMMER VENTILATION FAN #2: HV-CEQ-2 is a large fan unit with very rugged anchorage.
This was walked down during the NTTF 2.3 effort and the walkdown is documented in the Reference 15 report. The anchorage was in good condition and there were no potential adverse interactions.
This was unchanged from the condition documented in SQUG-1-HV-CEQ-2
[Ref. 22.1]. This Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 6041-SL [Ref. 7] by meeting the Generic Implementation Procedure (GIP) caveats [Ref. 30] as documented in SQUG-1-HV-CEQ-2
[Ref.22.1]. A bounding analysis was performed in SQUG-1-HV-CEQ-1
[Ref. 22.2] and had a margin of 7.7 > 1.93 RLGM scaling factor. Therefore this screens.Item 139, 1-NPS-121, REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #2 HOT LEG WIDE RANGE PRESSURE TRANSMITTER:
This was a late addition to the ESEL after the walkdowns were completed as a result of reviews to changes in the August FLEX strategy.
Per the USI A-46 walkdown SEWS the transmitter is mounted on a small floor mounted pipe stand anchored to the reinforced concrete floor with expansion anchors. The installation for 1-NPS-121, 1-NPS-122, 2-NPS-121 and 2-NPS-122 are similar. It is noted that the Foxboro transmitters for 1-NPS-121 and 2-NPS-122 in place during the USI A-46 walkdowns have been replaced with Rosemount transmitters but used the same mounting.
An ANCHOR analysis [Ref. 22.6] for this installation indicated a factor of safety of 4.0 which is above the RLGM screening level of 1.93 < 4.0.Item 140, 1-NPS-122, REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #1 HOT LEG WIDE RANGE PRESSURE TRANSMITTER:
This was a late addition to the ESEL after the walkdowns were completed as a result of reviews to changes in the August FLEX strategy.
Per the USI A-46 walkdown SEWS the transmitter is mounted on a small floor mounted pipe stand anchored to the reinforced concrete floor with expansion anchors. The installation for 1-NPS-121, 1-NPS-122, 2-NPS-121 and 2-NPS-122 are similar. The most limiting installation with the highest weight with the highest center of gravity was evaluated for 2-NPS-121 and the ANCHOR analysis [Ref. 22.7] indicated a factor of safety Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 27 of 151 of 2.7 which is above the RLGM screening level that is the SSE multiplied by a factor of 1.93 and therefore 1-NPS-122 is acceptable by comparison.
Item 141, 1-NRI-21, NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION CHANNEL I WIDE RANGE RADIATION DETECTOR: The location of this detector was very close to the Reactor Vessel and was not accessible.
It is screened based on similarity to other small instruments in containment.
These are small instruments.
The walkdown of accessible instruments of this type in containment determined they were free of interactions and had very rugged anchorage.
These were screened to the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7].Item 145, 1-NTQ-110A, RVLIS TRAIN 'A' UPPER TAP TEMPERATURE COMPENSATION COMPUTER INPUT THERMAL SENSOR 'A': The location of this detector was very close to the Reactor Vessel and was not accessible.
It is screened based on similarity to other small instruments in containment.
These are small instruments.
The walkdown of accessible instruments of this type in containment determined they were free of interactions and had very rugged anchorage.
These were screened to the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7].Item 146, 1-NTQ-110B, RVLIS TRAIN 'A' UPPER TAP TEMPERATURE COMPENSATION COMPUTER INPUT THERMAL SENSOR 'B': The location of this detector was very close to the Reactor Vessel and was not accessible.
It is screened based on similarity to other small instruments in containment.
These are small instruments.
The walkdown of accessible instruments of this type in containment determined they were free of interactions and had very rugged anchorage.
These were screened to the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 71.Item 147, 1-NTQ-130A, RVLIS TRAIN 'A' CONDUIT TEMPERATURE COMPENSATION COMPUTER INPUT THERMAL SENSOR 'A': The location of this detector was very close to the Reactor Vessel and was .not accessible.
It is screened based on similarity to other small instruments in containment.
These are small instruments.
The walkdown of accessible instruments of this type in containment demonstrated they were free of interactions and had very rugged anchorage.
These were screened to the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7].Item 148, 1-NTQ-130C, RVLIS TRAIN 'A' CONDUIT TEMPERATURE COMPENSATION COMPUTER INPUT THERMAL SENSOR 'C': The location of this detector was very close to the Reactor Vessel and was not accessible.
It is screened based on similarity to other small instruments in containment.
These are small instruments.
The walkdown of accessible instruments of this type in containment demonstrated Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 1303208-RPT-005 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 28 of 151 they were free of interactions and had very rugged anchorage.
These were screened to the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7].The following items on the Unit 2 ESEL were screened in this manner: Item 1, 12-TK-47-AB, AB EMERGENCY DIESEL FUEL OIL STORAGE TANK: This tank is buried and, by definition, not accessible.
Per the screening criteria of Table 2-4 in EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7], the anchorage configurations of buried tanks are inherently seismically rugged and of no concern. A review of the flexibility of attached piping was performed in SQUG-12-TK-47-AB
[Ref. 22.4] and the tank was evaluated for the potential seismic wave effects for the SSE and had a stress of 3.6 ksi. Since the factor of safety is on the order of 10, this screens for the RLGM which is an earthquake that is the SSE scaled by a factor of 1.93 < 10.Item 86, 2-HV-CEQ-2 CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN SKIMMER VENTILATION FAN #2: 2-HV-CEQ-2 is a large fan unit with very rugged anchorage.
This was walked down during the NTTF 2.3 effort and the walkdown documented in the Reference 15 report. The anchorage was in good condition and there were no potential adverse interactions.
This was unchanged from the condition documented in SQUG-2-HV-CEQ-2
[Ref. 22.5]. Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL per meeting the GIP caveats [Ref. 30] as documented in SQUG-2-HV-CEQ-2
[Ref. 22.5]. A bounding analysis was performed in SQUG-1-HV-CEQ-1
[Ref. 22.2] and had a margin of 7.7 > 1.93 RLGM factor.Therefore this screens.Item 97, 2-IMO-128, REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #2 HOT LEG TO RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL PUMPS SUCTION SHUTOFF VALVE: This valve is inside the Unit 2 Containment and was not accessible during the walkdown effort, screened based on the walkdown of 1-IMO-128.
Per the USI A-46 SEWS [Ref. 22.8], body and yoke is steel. Pipe diameter is 14". Measured offset = 64" <80" limit from Figure F-26 of EPRI-NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7]. Weight of operator = 460# maximum <750# limit Figure F-26 of EPRI- NP-6041-SL [Ref. 7]. Therefore, valve is screened for 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL [Ref. 7].Item 101, 2-LDISB-B10, CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B'GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B10: This Hydrogen igniter is inside the Unit 2 Containment and was not accessible during the NTTF 2.1 walkdowns.
It was screened based on comparison to all the other 1-LDISB assemblies walkdown that had no adverse interactions, very rugged anchorage and contained rugged components.
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 29 of 151 Item 102, 2-LDISB-B11, CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B'GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B1 1: This Hydrogen igniter is inside the Unit 2 Containment and was not accessible during the NTTF 2.1 walkdowns.
It was screened based on comparison to all the other 1-LDISB assemblies walkdown that had no adverse interactions, very rugged anchorage and contained rugged components.
Item 103, 2-LDISB-B12, CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B'GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B12: This Hydrogen igniter is inside the Unit 2 Containment and was not accessible during the NTTF 2.1 walkdowns.
It was screened based on comparison to all the other 1-LDISB assemblies walkdown that had no adverse interactions, very rugged anchorage and contained rugged components.
Item 104, 2-LDISB-B18, CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B'GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B18: This Hydrogen igniter is inside the Unit 2 Containment and was not accessible during the NTTF 2.1 walkdowns.
It was screened based on comparison to all the other 1-LDISB assemblies walkdown that had no adverse interactions, very rugged anchorage and contained rugged components.
Item 105, 2-LDISB-B19, CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B'GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B19: This Hydrogen igniter is inside the Unit 2 Containment and was not accessible during the NTTF 2.1 walkdowns.
It was screened based on comparison to all the other 1-LDISB assemblies walkdown that had no adverse interactions, very rugged anchorage and contained rugged components.
Item 106, 2-LDISB-B20, CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B'GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B20: This Hydrogen igniter is inside the Unit 2 Containment and was not accessible during the NTTF 2.1 walkdowns.
It was screened based on comparison to all the other 1-LDISB assemblies walkdown that had no adverse interactions, very rugged anchorage and contained rugged components.
Item 107, 2-LDISB-B21, CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B'GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B21 This Hydrogen igniter is inside the Unit 2 Containment and was not accessible during the NTTF 2.1 walkdowns.
It was screened based on comparison to all the other 1-LDISB assemblies Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 30 of 151 walkdown that had no adverse interactions, very rugged anchorage and contained rugged components.
Item 108, 2-LDISB-B22, CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B'GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B22 This Hydrogen igniter is inside the Unit 2 Containment and was not accessible during the NTTF 2.1 walkdowns.
It was screened based on comparison to all the other 1-LDISB assemblies walkdown that had no adverse interactions, very rugged anchorage and contained rugged components.
Item 109, 2-LDISB-B23, CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B'GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B23 This Hydrogen igniter is inside the Unit 2 Containment and was not accessible during the NTTF 2.1 walkdowns.
It was screened based on comparison to all the other 1-LDISB assemblies walkdown that had no adverse interactions, very rugged anchorage and contained rugged components.
Item 114, 2-LDISB-B28, CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B'GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B28 This Hydrogen igniter is inside the Unit 2 Containment and was not accessible during the NTTF 2.1 walkdowns.
It was screened based on comparison to all the other 1-LDISB assemblies walkdown that had no adverse interactions, very rugged anchorage and contained rugged components.
Item 116, 2-LDISB-B8 CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B'IGNITER ASSEMBLY #B8 This Hydrogen igniter is inside the Unit 2 Containment and was not accessible during the NTTF 2.1 walkdowns.
It was screened based on comparison to all the other 1-LDISB assemblies walkdown that had no adverse interactions, very rugged anchorage and contained rugged components.
Item 117, 2-LDISB-B9 CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B'GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B9 This Hydrogen igniter is inside the Unit 2 Containment and was not accessible during the NTTF 2.1 walkdowns.
It was screened based on comparison to all the other 1-LDISB assemblies walkdown that had no adverse interactions, very rugged anchorage and contained rugged components.
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 31 of 151 Item 136, 2-NPS-121, REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #2 HOT LEG.WIDE RANGE PRESSURE TRANSMITTER This was a late addition to the ESEL after the walkdowns were completed as a result of reviews to changes in the August FLEX strategy.
Per the USI A-46 walkdown SEWS the transmitter is mounted on a small floor mounted pipe stand anchored to the reinforced concrete floor with expansion anchors. The installation for 1-NPS-121, 1-NPS-122, 2-NPS-121 and 2-NPS-122 are similar. An ANCHOR analysis [Ref. 22.6] for this installation indicated a factor of safety of 4.0 which is above the RLGM screening level which is the SSE times a factor of 1.93.Item 137, 2-NPS-122, REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #1 HOT LEG WIDE RANGE PRESSURE TRANSMITTER This was a late addition to the ESEL after the walkdowns were completed as a result of reviews to changes in the August FLEX strategy.
Per the USI A-46 walkdown SEWS the transmitter is mounted on a small floor mounted pipe stand anchored to the reinforced concrete floor with expansion anchors. The installation for 1-NPS-121, 1-NPS-122, 2-NPS-121 and 2-NPS-122 are similar. It is noted that the Foxboro transmitters for 1-NPS-121 and 2-NPS-122 in place during the USI A-46 walkdowns have been replaced with Rosemount transmitters but used the same mounting.
An ANCHOR analysis [Ref. 22.7] for this installation indicated a factor of safety of 2.7 which is above the RLGM screening level which is the SSE times a factor of 1.93.Item 138, 2-NRI-21, NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION CHANNEL I WIDE RANGE RADIATION DETECTOR The location of this detector was very close to the Reactor Vessel and was not accessible.
It is screened based on similarity to other small instruments in the Unit 1 containment.
These are small instruments.
The walkdown of accessible instruments of this type in containment determined they were free of interactions and had very rugged anchorage, These were screened to the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7].Item 140, 2-NRV-152, PRESSURIZER TRAIN 'B' PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE This valve was inaccessible.
It is in the Unit 2 Pressurizer doghouse that was not accessible during the NTTF 2.1 walkdowns.
Screened based on comparison to 1-NRV-152.
The equipment screens for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7]. Offset for operator 40" within Earthquake Experience Data of Figure F-25 of EPRI NP-6041-SL, pipe Diameter 3".Item 141, 2-NRV-1 53, PRESSURIZER OME-4 TRAIN 'A' PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE This valve was inaccessible.
It is in the Unit 2 Pressurizer doghouse that was not accessible during the NTTF 2.1 walkdowns.
Screened based on comparison to 1-NRV-153.
The equipment screens for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7]. Offset for Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 32 of 151 operator 40" within Earthquake Experience Data of Figure F-25 of EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7], pipe Diameter 3".Item 142, 2-NTQ-1 10A, RVLIS TRAIN 'A' UPPER TAP TEMPERATURE COMPENSATION COMPUTER INPUT THERMAL SENSOR 'A'The location of this detector was very close to the Reactor Vessel and was not accessible.
It is screened based on similarity to other small instruments in the Unit 1 containment.
These are small instruments.
The walkdown of accessible instruments of this type in containment determined they were free of interactions and had very rugged anchorage.
These were screened to the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7].Item 143, 2-NTQ-11OB, RVLIS TRAIN 'A' UPPER TAP TEMPERATURE COMPENSATION COMPUTER INPUT THERMAL SENSOR 'B'The location of this detector was very close to the Reactor Vessel inside the Crane Wall and was not accessible.
It is screened based on similarity to other small instruments in the Unit 1 containment.
These are small instruments.
The walkdown of accessible instruments of this type in containment determined they were free of interactions and had very rugged anchorage.
These were screened to the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7].Item 144, 2-NTQ-130A, RVLIS TRAIN 'A' CONDUIT TEMPERATURE COMPENSATION COMPUTER INPUT THERMAL SENSOR 'A'The location of this detector was very close to the Reactor Vessel and was not accessible.
It is screened based on similarity to other small instruments in the Unit 1 containment.
These are small instruments.
The walkdown of accessible instruments of this type in containment determined they were free of interactions and had very rugged anchorage.
These were screened to the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7].Item 145, 2-NTQ-130CRVLIS TRAIN 'A' CONDUIT TEMPERATURE COMPENSATION COMPUTER INPUT SPARE THERMAL SENSOR 'C'The location of this detector was very close to the Reactor Vessel and was not accessible.
It is screened based on similarity to other small instruments in the Unit 1 containment.
These are small instruments.
The walkdown of accessible instruments of this type in containment determined they were free of interactions and had very rugged anchorage.
These were screened to the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7].Item 146, 2-NTR-1 10, REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #1 HOT LEG WIDE RANGE TEMPERATURE RECORDER THERMAL SENSOR This small temperature sensor was inaccessible during the NTTF 2.1 walkdowns.
It is in lower Containment, inside the Crane Wall and is only Accessible during an Outage. It was screened based on comparison to 1-NTR-110 and the other similar NTR's in the CNP Unit 1 Containment.
It is a Conax Corp. Model 7H57-10000-01 Thermal Sensor, IEEE-344-1975 qualified by Conax Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 33 of 151 Corp. Seismic Analysis Report #IPS-943.
Rugged component with no seismic interaction concerns.
Equipment screens for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7].Item 147, 2-NTR-130, REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #3 HOT LEG WIDE RANGE TEMPERATURE RECORDER THERMAL SENSOR This small temperature sensor was inaccessible during the NTTF 2.1 walkdowns.
It is in lower Containment, inside the Crane Wall and is only Accessible during an Outage. It was screened based on comparison to 1-NTR-130 and the other similar NTR's in the CNP Unit 1 Containment.
It is a Conax Corp. Model 7H57-10000-01 Thermal Sensor, IEEE-344-1975 qualified by Conax Corp. Seismic Analysis Report #IPS-943.
Rugged component with no seismic interaction concerns.
Equipment screens for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7].Item 148, 2-NTR-210 REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #1 COLD LEG WIDE RANGE TEMPERATURE RECORDER THERMAL SENSOR This small temperature sensor was inaccessible during the NTTF 2.1 walkdowns.
It is in lower Containment, inside the Crane Wall and is only Accessible during an Outage. It was screened based on comparison to 1-NTR-210 and the other similar NTR's in the CNP Unit 1 Containment.
It is a Conax Corp. Model 7H57-10000-01 Thermal Sensor, IEEE-344-1975 qualified by Conax Corp. Seismic Analysis Report #IPS-943.
Rugged component with no seismic interaction concerns.
Equipment screens for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7].Item 149, 2-NTR-230, REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #3 COLD LEG WIDE RANGE TEMPERATURE RECORDER THERMAL SENSOR This small temperature sensor was inaccessible during the NTTF 2.1 walkdowns.
It is in lower Containment, inside the Crane Wall and is only accessible during an Outage. It was screened based on comparison to 1-NTR-230 and the other similar NTR's in the CNP Unit 1 Containment.
It is a Conax Corp. Model 7H57-10000-01 Thermal Sensor, IEEE-344-1975 qualified by Conax Corp. Seismic Analysis Report #IPS-943.
Rugged component with no seismic interaction concerns.
Equipment screens for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7].Item 152, 2-OME-6-1, ACCUMULATOR TANK #1 This Accumulator Tank was added to the ESEL after the entry to the CNP Unit 2 containment was made. It is in lower Containment.
It was screened based on comparison to 1-OME-6-1 and the other similar Accumulator Tanks in the CNP Unit 1 Containment.
These were all found to be free from adverse seismic interactions during the walkdowns of the CNP Unit 1 Accumulators.
A screening calculation was performed for the anchorage and had a very high margin above the RLGM. There was some minor rust found on some bases of the CNP Unit 1 Accumulators but none rose to a concern regarding its seismic capacity.
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 34 of 151 Item 153, 2-OME-6-2, ACCUMULATOR TANK #2 This Accumulator Tank was added to the ESEL after the entry to the CNP Unit 2 containment was made. It is in lower Containment.
It was screened based on comparison to 1-OME-6-2 and the other similar Accumulator Tanks in the CNP Unit 1 Containment.
These were all found to be free from adverse seismic interactions during the walkdowns of the CNP Unit 1 Accumulators.
A screening calculation was performed for the anchorage and had a very high margin above the RLGM. There was some minor rust found on some bases of the CNP Unit 1 Accumulators but none rose to a concern regarding its seismic capacity.Item 154, 2-OME-6-3, ACCUMULATOR TANK #3 This Accumulator Tank was added to the ESEL after the entry to the CNP Unit 2 containment was made. It is in lower Containment.
It was screened based on comparison to 1-OME-6-3 and the other similar Accumulator Tanks in the CNP Unit 1 Containment.
These were all found to be free from adverse seismic interactions during the walkdowns of the CNP Unit 1 Accumulators.
A screening calculation was performed for the anchorage and had a very high margin above the RLGM. There was some minor rust found on some bases of the CNP Unit 1 Accumulators but none rose to a concern regarding its seismic capacity.Item 155, 2-OME-6-4, ACCUMULATOR TANK #4 This Accumulator Tank was added to the ESEL after the entry to the CNP Unit 2 containment was made. It is in lower Containment.
It was screened based on comparison to 1-OME-6-4 and the other similar Accumulator Tanks in the CNP Unit 1 Containment.
These were all found to be free from adverse seismic interactions during the walkdowns of the CNP Unit 1 Accumulators.
A screening calculation was performed for the anchorage and had a very high margin above the RLGM. There was some minor rust found on some bases of the CNP Unit 1 Accumulators but none rose to a concern regarding its seismic capacity.Item 196, 2-TK-253-1, PRESSURIZER TRAIN 'A' PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE NRV-153 RESERVE CONTROL AIR TANK This small horizontal tank was inaccessible during the NTTF 2.1 walkdowns.
It is in lower Containment, inside the Crane Wall and is only accessible during an Outage. It is screened based on comparison to 1-TK-253-1 and the USI A-46 evaluation performed for this component.
This horizontal tank contains air and is supported by other than standard saddles. Anchorage:
Tank is sufficiently welded to building steel, and is more than adequate for the RLGM.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL [Ref. 7] by meeting the GIP caveats [Ref. 30] as documented in Reference 22.9. The anchorage of the small tank is more than adequate for the RLGM for this relatively small tank.
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 35 of 151 Item 197, 2-TK-253-2, PRESSURIZER TRAIN 'B' PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE NRV-152 RESERVE CONTROL AIR TANK This small horizontal tank inaccessible during the NTTF 2.1 walkdowns, it is in lower Containment, inside the Crane Wall and is only accessible during an Outage. It is screened based on comparison to 1-TK-253-1 and the USI A-46 evaluation performed for this component.
This horizontal tank contains air and is supported by other than standard saddles. Anchorage:
Tank is sufficiently welded to building steel, and is more than adequate for the RLGM.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL [Ref. 7] by meeting the GIP caveats [Ref. 30] as documented in Reference 22.10. The anchorage of the small tank is more than adequate for the RLGM for this relatively small tank.All non-energized cabinets were opened when specialized tools were not needed to operate the cabinet doors. Photos were taken during the walkdowns.
The existing calculations and SEWS from the USI A-46 evaluation of CNP [Ref. 16] were utilized to aid the SRT in their screening decisions as indicated in Attachments C and D of this report.6.3.3 Significant Walkdown Findings Consistent with the guidance from EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7], there were two findings noted during the CNP ESEP walkdowns relative to the site RLGM ISRS: 1. The three Boric Acid Storage Tanks (BASTs); 1-TK-12N, 2-TK-12S and 12-TK-12M, were found to have an anchorage HCLPF of 0.227g < 0.387g RLGM.2. BAST Level Alarm Transmitters; 1-QLA-410, 12-QLA-420, 2-QLA-430, BAST Heater Temperature Controllers; 1-QTC-410, 2-QTC-430, 12-QTC-420, and BAST Transfer Pumps; 1-PP-46-1 and 2-PP-46-4, were determined to have a HCLPF of 0.227g <0.387g RLGM due to seismic interaction with the three Boric Acid Storage Tanks.Several block walls were identified in the proximity of ESEL equipment.
These block walls were assessed for their structural adequacy to withstand the seismic loads resulting from the RLGM[Ref. 10.1]. For any cases where the block wall represented the HCLPF failure mode for an ESEL item, it is noted in the tabulated HCLPF values described in Section 6.6.6.4 HCLPF Calculation Process ESEL items were evaluated using the criteria in EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7]. Those evaluations included the following steps:* Performing seismic capability walkdowns for equipment to evaluate the equipment installed plant conditions.
* Performing screening evaluations using the screening tables in EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref.7] as described in Section 6.2.
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 36 of 151 Performing HCLPF calculations considering various failure modes that include both structural failure modes (e.g. anchorage, load path etc.) and functional failure modes.All HCLPF calculations were performed using the CDFM methodology and are documented in S&A calculations 13Q3208-CAL-004
[Ref. 10.1], 13Q3208-CAL-005
[Ref. 10.2], and 13Q3208-CAL-006 [Ref. 10.3].Anchorage configurations for non-valve components were evaluated either by SRT judgment, large margins in existing design basis calculations, or CDFM based on HCLPF calculations
[Refs. 10.1, 10.2 and 10.3]. The results of these analysis methods are documented in Attachment C and D for CNP Unit 1 and CNP Unit 2 respectively.
For components beyond 40 ft. above grade, Table 2-4 of EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7] is not directly applicable.
Per Reference 2, the ESEP Guidance, screening for equipment below 40 ft. above grade is per the screening lanes contained in Tables 2-3 and 2-4 of EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7]. Since the peak of the RLGM established for the ESEP walkdowns is < 0.8g as shown in Figure 5-1, the 0.8g screening lane may be used for all equipment at or below about 40 ft. above grade. Grade has been established for CNP at El. 608 ft. per Reference
: 16. Due to the significant margin between the peak spectral acceleration of the screening lane (0.80g) and the peak of the RLGM (0.62g), equipment up to an elevation of 651 ft. meets the "about" 40 ft. limitation.
Therefore, for equipment at elevations 651 ft. and below this screening is applicable.
All of the equipment in the ESEL for CNP Unit 1 and CNP Unit 2 other than some upper containment hydrogen igniters (1 & 2-UDISB components) are at Elevation 651 ft. or below.The limiting hydrogen igniters were addressed in the Reference 10.3 HCLPF calculation.
These were the assemblies supported by the CNP Unit 1 and CNP Unit 2 catwalks in upper containment.
The limiting HCLPF for these items were shown to be above the defined ISRS for the RLGM.As described in Section 6.0, HCLPF calculations used the CDFM analysis criteria established in Section 6 of EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7] and are used for the detailed analysis of components.
The relevant CDFM criteria from EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7] are summarized in Table 6-1.
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 37 of 151.Table 6-4: CNP CDFM Criteria Load combination:
Normal + seismic margin earthquake (SME)Ground response spectrum:
Conservatively specified (84% non-exceedance probability)
Damping: Conservative estimate of median damping.Structural model: Best estimate (median) + uncertainty variation in frequency.
Code specified minimum strength or 95% exceedance of Material strength:
actual strength if test data is available.
Code ultimate strength (ACI), maximum strength (AISC), Service Level D (ASME) or functional limits. If test data is Static capacity equations:
available to demonstrate excessive conservatism of code equations then use 84% exceedance of test data for capacity equations.
For non-brittle failure modes and linear analysis, use 80% of Inelastic energy absorption:
computed seismic stress in capacity evaluation to account for ductility benefits or perform nonlinear analysis and use 95%exceedance ductility levels.The HCLPF capacity is equal to the PGA at which the strength limit is reached. The HCLPF earthquake load is calculated as follows: U = Normal + Ec Where: 0 0 U = Ultimate strength per Section 6 of EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7]Ec = HCLPF earthquake load* Normal = Normal operating loads (dead and live load expected to be present, etc.)For this calculation, the HCLPF earthquake load is related to a fixed reference earthquake:
Ec = SFc*Eref Where: " Eref = reference earthquake from the relevant in-structure response spectrum (ISRS)* SFc = component-specific scale factor that satisfies U = Normal +Ec Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 38 of 151 The HCLPF will be defined as the PGA produced by Ec. Because the CNP RLGM PGA is 0.387g: HCLPF = 0.387g*SFc
 
===6.5 Functional===
 
Evaluation of Relays As discussed in the NTTF Recommendation
 
===2.1 guidance===
[Ref. 2], the ESEL was to contain all relays and switches which may negatively "seal in" or "lock out" on the CNP ESEL [Ref. 25]. As discussed in Section 3.1.7 of this report none were identified and therefore, there were no HCLPFs for the Functional Evaluation of Relays calculated.
 
===6.6 Tabulated===
 
ESEL HCLPF values (including Key failure modes)Tabulated ESEL HCLPF values including the key failure modes are included in Attachment C for Unit 1 and D for Unit 2. The following notes apply to the information in the tables.* For items screened out using EPRI NP 6041-SL [Ref. 7] screening tables, the listed HCLPF is set to be equal to the RLGM PGA (0.387g) and the failure mode is listed as"Screened"." For items where anchorage controls the HCLPF value, and the HCLPF is less than the RLGM PGA (0.387g), the HCLPF value is listed in the table and the failure mode is set to "Anchorage".
When the anchorage HCLPF turned out to be above the RLGM PGA (0.387g), but controlled the HCLPF for the component then the value was also included in the summary tables. When the calculated HCLPF is determined to be well above the RLGM PGA (0.387g) and not limiting the failure mode, it is listed as "Screened" along with a note providing the anchorage HCLPF.* For items where interaction controls the HCLPF value, and the HCLPF is less than the RLGM PGA (0.387g), the HCLPF value is listed in the table and the failure mode is set to "Interaction".
When the interaction HCLPF turned out to be above the RLGM PGA (0.387g), the listed HCLPF is set to be equal to the RLGM PGA (0.387g) and the failure mode is listed as "Screened" along with a note providing the interaction HCLPF. It is noted that interaction did not control any HCLPFs except for those where the HCLPF was below the RLGM.
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 39 of 151 7.0 Inaccessible Items and Late Additions to the ESEL 7.1 Identification of Inaccessible Items and Late Additions to the ESEL There were equipment items for which walkdowns were not performed and therefore, no SEWS were completed.
Some of these items were late add-ons to the ESEL as a result of implementing the August 2014 FLEX strategy [Ref. 29].Unit 1 Items include:* ESEL Item 9, 12-QTC-420, MIDDLE BAST TK-12M TRAIN 'A' HTR TEMP CONTROLLER.
It is noted that the HCLPF for this equipment item is limited by the HCLPF for the middle Boric Acid Storage Tank due to Seismic Interaction.
The HCLPF for the tank was calculated in 13Q3208-CAL-005 to be 0.227g, (Ref. 10.2) and is less than the RLGM of 0.387g and therefore, 12-QTC-420 will not screen.* ESEL Item 76, 1-FMO-211, TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEED PUMP PP-4 DISCHARGE TO STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-1 CONTROL VALVE* ESEL Item 77, 1-FMO-221, TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEED PUMP PP-4 DISCHARGE TO STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-2 CONTROL VALVE" ESEL Item 78, 1-FMO-231, TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEED PUMP SUPPLY TO STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-3 CONTROL VALVE" ESEL Item 79, 1-FMO-241, TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEED PUMP SUPPLY TO STEAM GENERATOR OME-4-4 CONTROL VALVE" ESEL Item 95, 1-ICM-321, WEST RHR TO REACTOR COOLANT LOOPS #2 AND #3 HOTLEGS CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE Unit 2 Items include:* ESEL Item 73, 2-FMO-21 1, TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEED PUMP PP-4 DISCHARGETO STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-1 CONTROL VALVE* ESEL Item 74, 2-FMO-221, TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEED PUMP PP-4 DISCHARGE TO STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-2 CONTROL VALVE* ESEL Item 75, 2-FMO-231, TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEED PUMP SUPPLY TO STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-3 CONTROL VALVE* ESEL Item 76, 2-FMO-241, TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEED PUMP SUPPLY TO STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-4 CONTROL VALVE* ESEL Item 89, 2-1CM-1 11, RHR TO REACTOR COOLANT LOOPS #2 & #3 COLD LEGS CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE* ESEL Item 92, 2-ICM-321, WEST RHR TO REACTOR COOLANT LOOPS #2 AND #3 COLD LEGS CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 40 of 151 There were also items inaccessible during the screening walkdowns (e.g. items in the Unit 2 Lower Containment, inside the Crane Wall that are not accessible except during an outage).Section 6.3.2 of this report includes a listing and discussion of the items for which a walkdown was not performed and therefore SEWS were not prepared.
These items were screened in accordance with the EPRI NP-6041-SL
[Ref. 7] guidance.
There were also two items for which walkdowns were not performed that have been screened based on the results of the NTTF Recommendation
 
===2.3 walkdowns===
 
[Ref. 18]. The implementation guidance contained in EPRI 3002000704
[Ref. 2] allows use of recent walkdown data including the NTTF 2.3 walkdowns.
The basis for this screening is included in 6.3.2.7.2 Planned Walkdown / Evaluation Schedule / Close Out The schedule for performing walkdowns for the inaccessible and late addition components as listed in Section 7.1 is during the Unit 2 Refueling Outage U2C22 scheduled for the spring 2015.The screening and evaluation of these components will be complete within 90 days following the conclusion of the U2C22 refueling outage. The actions associated with these tasks are included in Section 8.4.
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 41 of 151 8.0 ESEP Conclusions and Results 8.1 Supporting Information CNP has performed the ESEP as an interim action in response to the NRC's 50.54(0 letter [Ref.1]. It was performed using the methodologies in the NRC endorsed guidance in EPRI 3002000704
[Ref. 2].The ESEP provides an important demonstration of seismic margin and expedites plant safety enhancements through evaluations and potential near-term modifications of plant equipment that can be relied upon to protect the reactor core following beyond design basis seismic events.The ESEP is part of the overall CNP response to the NRC's 50.54(f) letter [Ref. 1]. On March 12, 2014, NEI submitted to the NRC results of a study [Ref. 12] of seismic core damage risk estimates based on updated seismic hazard information as it applies to operating nuclear reactors in the Central and Eastern United States (CEUS). The study concluded that "site-specific seismic hazards show that there has not been an overall increase in seismic risk for the fleet of U.S. plants" based on the re-evaluated seismic hazards. As such, the "current seismic design of operating reactors continues to provide a safety margin to withstand potential earthquakes exceeding the seismic design basis."'The NRC's May 9, 2014 NTTF 2.1 Screening and Prioritization letter [Ref. 13] concluded that the "fleetwide seismic risk estimates are consistent with the approach and results used in the GI-199 safety/risk assessment." The letter also stated that "As a result, the staff has confirmed that the conclusions reached in GI-1 99 safety/risk assessment remain valid and that the plants can continue to operate while additional evaluations are conducted." An assessment of the change in seismic risk for CNP was included in the fleet risk evaluation submitted in the March 12, 2014 NEI letter [Ref. 12] therefore, the conclusions in the NRC's May 9 letter [Ref. 131 also apply to CNP.In addition, the March 12, 2014 NEI letter [Ref. 12] provided an attached "Perspectives on the Seismic Capacity of Operating Plants," which (1) assessed a number of qualitative reasons why the design of Structures, Systems, and Components (SSCs) inherently contain margin beyond their design level, (2) discussed industrial seismic experience databases of performance of industry facility components similar to nuclear SSCs, and (3) discussed earthquake experience at operating plants.The fleet of currently operating nuclear power plants was designed using conservative practices, such that the plants have significant margin to withstand large ground motions safely.
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 42 of 151 This has been borne out of those plants that have actually experienced significant earthquakes.
The seismic design process has inherent (and intentional) conservatisms which result in significant seismic margins within SSCs. These conservatisms are reflected in several key aspects of the seismic design process, including: " Safety factors applied in design calculations
* Damping values used in the dynamic analysis of SSCs" Bounding synthetic time histories for in-structure response spectra calculations
* Broadening criteria for in-structure response spectra* Response spectra enveloping criteria typically used in SSC analysis and testing applications" Response spectra based frequency domain analysis rather than explicit time history based time domain analysis* Bounding requirements in codes and standards* Use of minimum strength requirements of structural components (concrete and steel)" Bounding testing requirements, and" Ductile behavior of the primary materials (that is, not crediting the additional capacity of materials such as steel and reinforced concrete beyond the essentially elastic range, etc.)These design practices combine to result in margins such that the SSCs will continue to fulfill their functions at ground motions well above the SSE.The intent of the ESEP is to perform an interim action in response to the NRC's 50.54(f) letter[Ref. 1] to demonstrate seismic margin through a review of a subset of the plant equipment that can be relied upon to protect the reactor core following beyond design basis seismic events. In order to complete the ESEP in an expedited amount of time, the RLGM used for the ESEP evaluation is a scaled version of the plant's SSE rather than the actual GMRS. To more fully characterize the risk impacts of the seismic ground motion represented by the GMRS on a plant specific basis, a more detailed seismic risk assessment (SPRA or risk-based SMA) is to be performed in accordance with EPRI 1025287 [Ref. 14]. As identified in the CNP Seismic Hazard and GMRS submittal
[Ref. 11], CNP screens in for a risk evaluation.
The complete risk evaluation will more completely characterize the probabilistic seismic ground motion input into the plant, the plant response to that probabilistic seismic ground motion input, and the resulting plant risk characterization.
CNP will complete that evaluation in accordance with the schedule identified in NEI's letter dated April 9, 2013 [Ref. 27] and endorsed by the NRC in their May 7, 2013 letter [Ref. 28].8.2 Identification of Planned Modifications There is one planned modification for each of the three Boric Acid Storage Tanks; 1-TK-12N, 2-TK-12S and 12-TK-12M that had an anchorage HCLPF of 0.227g < 0.387g RLGM [Ref. 10.3].The modification will be designed to raise the HCLPF above the RLGM. This will also raise the SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 43 of 151 interaction HCLPF for the BAST Level Alarm Transmitters; 1-QLA-410, 12-QLA-420, 2-QLA-430, the BAST Heater Temperature Controllers; 1-QTC-410, 2-QTC-430, 12-QTC-420, and for the BAST Transfer Pumps; 1-PP-46-1 and 2-PP-46-4 that is the same as that for the anchorage HCLPF for the Boric Acid Tanks.8.3 Modification Implementation Schedule Plant modifications will be performed in accordance with the schedule identified in NEI letter dated April 9, 2013 [Ref. 27], which states that plant modifications not requiring a planned refueling outage will be completed by December 31, 2016 and modifications requiring a refueling outage will be completed within two planned refueling outages after December 31, 2014.The modification of the three Boric Acid Storage Tanks, 1-TK-12N, 12-TK-12M, and 2-TK-12S, has not yet proceeded to a level of development to determine if a refueling outage is required to implement the modifications.
As such, if a refueling outage is not required to implement these modifications, modification of the three Boric Acid Storage Tanks will be complete no later than December 31, 2016. If a refueling outage is required to implement the Boric Acid Storage Tanks anchorage modifications, these modifications will be completed by the end of the second planned refueling outage after December 31, 2014. The second Unit 1 planned refueling outage after December 31, 2014 is U1C28 currently scheduled to end in the 4 th quarter 2017 and the second Unit 2 planned refueling outage after December 31, 2014 is U2C23 scheduled to end in the 4 th quarter of 2016.8.4 Summary of Actions Item Action Date Complete walkdowns for the inaccessible and Prior to restart of Unit 2 at the completion late addition components listed in Section 7.1. of its spring 2015 refueling outage.Complete screening and evaluation of the Within 90 days following restart of Unit 2 2 inaccessible and late addition components listed at the completion of its spring 2015 in Section 7.1. refueling outage.Complete ESEP plant modifications not December 31, 2016 (2 years after ESEP requiring outages. report submittal) p7azl Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 44 of 151 Item Action Date Two outages from ESEP report submittal 4 Complete ESEP plant modifications requiring (U1C28 Fall 2017)outages. (U2C23 Fall 2016)Inform the NRC that the above noted Within 60 days following completion of all 5 evaluations and modifications are complete.
above noted modifications.
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 45 of 151 9.0 References 1 NRC (E Leeds and M Johnson) Letter to All Power Reactor Licensees et al., "Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f)Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3 and 9.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-lchi Accident," March 12, 2012.2 Seismic Evaluation Guidance:
Augmented Approach for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1 -Seismic. EPRI, Palo Alto, CA: May 2013. 3002000704.
3 Order Number EA-12-049 responses:
 
===3.1 Letter===
AEP-NRC-2013-13, from J. P. Gebbie, Indiana Michigan Power Company (I&M), to the NRC, "Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant Unit 1 and Unit 2, Overall Integrated Plan in Response to March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design Basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049)", February 27, 2013 (ML13101A381).
 
===3.2 Letter===
AEP-NRC-2013-71, from J. P. Gebbie, I&M, to the NRC, "Donald C.Cook Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2, First Six-Month Status Report in Response to March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond Design- Basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049)", August 26, 2013 (ML13240A308).
 
===3.3 Letter===
AEP-NRC-2014-17, from J. P. Gebbie, I&M, to the NRC, "Donald C.Cook Nuclear Plant Units I and 2, Second Six-Month Status Report in Response to March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond Design-Basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049)", February 27, 2014 (ML14063A042).
 
===3.4 Letter===
AEP-NRC-2014-66 from J. P. Gebbie, I&M, to the NRC, "Donald C.Cook Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2, Third Six-Month Status Report in Response to March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond Design-Basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049)", August 27, 2014 (ML14241A235).
4 Stevenson
& Associates Report 13Q3208-RPT-003
-"Seismic Hazard and Screening Report for the Cook Nuclear Plant (CNP)", Rev. 1.5 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG-1407, Procedural and Submittal Guidance for the Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities, June 1991.
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 46 of 151 6 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Generic Letter No. 88-20 Supplement 4, Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities
-10CFR 50.54(f), June 1991.7 A Methodology for Assessment of Nuclear Power Plant Seismic Margin, Rev. 1, August 1991, Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA. EPRI NP-6041-SL.
8 Methodology for Developing Seismic Fragilities, August 1991, EPRI, Palo Alto, CA.1994, TR-103959.
9 American Electric Service Corporation, Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2,"Individual Plant Examination of External Events Summary Report", April, 1992.10 CNP ESEP High Confidence of Low Probability of Failure (HCLPF) Calculations:
10.1 13Q3208-CAL-004, Rev. 1, "High Confidence Low Probability of Failure (HCLPF) Calculations for Screened in ESEP Components".
10.2 13Q3208-CAL-005, Rev. 1, "High Confidence Low Probability of Failure (HCLPF) Calculations for Screened in ESEP Tanks".10.3 13Q3208-CAL-006, Rev. 1, "High Confidence Low Probability of Failure (HCLPF) Calculations for Containment Catwalk and Attached Hydrogen Glow Plugs".11 NRC Letter AEP-NRC-2014-25, March 27, 2014.12 Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), A. Pietrangelo, Letter to D. Skeen of the USNRC,"Seismic Core Damage Risk Estimates Using the Updated Seismic Hazards for the Operating Nuclear Plants in the Central and Eastern United States", March 12, 2014.13 NRC (E Leeds) Letter to All Power Reactor Licensees et al., "Screening and Prioritization Results Regarding Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(F) Regarding Seismic Hazard Re-Evaluations for Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights From the Fukushima Dai-lchi Accident," May 9, 2014.14 Seismic Evaluation Guidance:
Screening, Prioritization and Implementation Details (SPID) for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic. EPRI, Palo Alto, CA: February 2013. 1025287.15 American Electric Power Report SD-121023-001, "Seismic Walkdown Report, In Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic for the D. C. Cook Unit 1 & Unit 2," Rev. 2, January 13, 2014.16 AEP Report, AEP:NRC:1040C, "Response to NRC G.L. 87-02 Unresolved Safety Issue A-46", AEPSC Task Group, January 1996.17 CNP Design Basis In-Structure Response Spectra:
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014
* Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 47 of 151 17.1 DC-D-3050-1 1-SC, "Seismic Analysis of the Auxiliary Building Complex", Revision 1, Jan. 12, 2000.17.2 SD-000204-004, "Validation and Development of Turbine Building Response Spectra", Revision 0, March 28, 2000.17.3 SD-991008-001, "Seismic Response Spectra for Containment Building", Revision 0, Feb. 26, 2000.17.4 Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant Nuclear Safeguards Design Memo, "Floor Response Curves for EL 591 ft. of Turbine Building & Screenhouse", Correspondence
# 03-23-1971, March 23, 1971.18 American Electric Power, "In Response to the 50.45(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic for the D. C. Cook Unit 1 and 2," Report SD-121023-01, Rev. 2.19 Seismic Fragility Applications Guide Update, December 2009, EPRI, Palo Alto, CA.1994, 1019200.20 Stevenson
& Associates Report 13Q3208-RPT-004, Rev. 0, "ESEP Walkdown and Screening Report for the Cook Nuclear Plant (CNP)".21 Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Rev. 25.22 SQUG USI A-46 Component Specific Documentation 22.1 SQUG-1-HV-CEQ-2, Rev. 0 (USI A-46 SEWS).22.2 SQUG-1-HV-CEQ-1, Rev. 0 (USI A-46 SEWS).22.3 SQUG-12-TK-47-CD, Rev. 0 (USI A-46 SEWS).22.4 SQUG-12-TK-47-AB, Rev. 0 (USI A-46 SEWS).22.5 SQUG-2-HV-CEQ-2, Rev. 0 (USI A-46 SEWS).22.6 SQUG-2-NPS-121, Rev. 0 (USI A-46 SEWS).22.7 SQUG-2-NPS-122, Rev. 0 (USI A-46 SEWS).22.8 SQUG-2-IMO-128, Rev. 0 (USI A-46 SEWS).22.9 SQUG-2-TK-253-1, Rev. 0 (USI A-46 SEWS).22.10 SQUG-2-TK-253-2, Rev. 0 (USI A-46 SEWS).23 Stevenson
& Associates Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-002, Rev. 2, "Response Spectra for Cook Nuclear Plant (CNP) Units 1 & 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP)Evaluations".
24 NEI 12-06, Rev. 0, "Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) Implementation Guide", Aug. 2012.
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 48 of 151 25 Stevenson
& Associates Report 13Q3208-RPT-001, Rev. 4, "Report on Expedited Seismic Equipment List." 26 D.C. Cook P&ID Drawings 26.1 CNP Drawing OP-1-5105D, Rev. 10, "Steam Generating System".26.2 CNP Drawing OP-1-5105E, Rev. 1, "Main Steam".26.3 CNP Drawing OP-1-5106A, Rev. 60, "Auxiliary Feedwater".
26.4 CNP Drawing OP-1-5113, Rev. 92, "Essential Service Water".26.5 CNP Drawing OP-1-5113A, Rev. 9, "Essential Service Water".26.6 CNP Drawing OP-1-5143, Rev. 76, "Emergency Core Cooling (RHR) Unit No. 1".26.7 CNP Drawing OP-1-5135, Rev. 42, "Component Cooling Water Pumps and Component Cooling Water Heat Exchangers".
26.8 CNP Drawing OP-1-5135A, Rev. 43, "Component Cooling Water Safety Related Loads".26.9 CNP Drawing OP-1-5143A, Rev. 5, "Emergency Core Cooling (RHR)Accumulator Piping".26.10 CNP Drawing OP-12-5131, Rev. 47, "Chemical
& Volume Control System Boron Make Up".26.11 CNP Drawing OP-1-5129, Rev. 61, "Chemical
& Volume Control System Reactor Letdown & Charging".
26.12 CNP Drawing OP-1-5142, Rev. 45, "Emergency Core Cooling (SIS)".26.13 CNP Drawing OP-1-5128, Rev. 30, "Reactor Coolant Sheet 1 of 2".26.14 CNP Drawing OP-1-5128A, Rev. 54, "Reactor Coolant -Sheet 2 of 2".26.15 CNP Drawing OP-1-5120D, Rev. 34, "Containment Control Air 85# & 50# Ring Headers".26.16 CNP Drawing OP-1-5151C, Rev. 54, "Emergency Diesel Generator CD".26.17 CNP Drawing OP-1-5148C, Rev. 30, "Flow Diagram Diesel Generator Area &Electrical Switchgear Rooms Heating & Ventilation Sys Unit 1".26.18 CNP Drawing OP-1-5149, Rev. 46, "Control Room Ventilation Unit No. 1".26.19 CNP Drawing OP-2-5105D, Rev. 22, "Steam Generating System".26.20 CNP Drawing OP-2-5105E, Rev. 1, "Main Steam".26.21 CNP Drawing OP-2-5106A, Rev. 55, "Auxiliary Feedwater".
26.22 CNP Drawing OP-2-5113, Rev. 82, "Essential Service Water".26.23 CNP Drawing OP-2-5113A, Rev. 9, "Essential Service Water".26.24 CNP Drawing OP-2-5143, Rev. 72, "Flow Diagram Emergency Core Cooling (RHR) Unit No. 2".26.25 CNP Drawing OP-2-5135, Rev. 37, "Component Cooling Water Pumps And Component Cooling Water Heat Exchangers".
26.26 CNP Drawing OP-2-5135A, Rev. 40, "Component Cooling Water Safety Related Loads".26.27 CNP Drawing OP-2-5143A, Rev. 4, "Emergency Core Cooling (RHR)Accumulator Piping".
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 13Q3208-RPT-005 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Page 49 of 151 26.28 CNP Drawing OP-2-5129, Rev. 53, "Chemical
& Volume Control System Reactor Letdown and Charging".
26.29 CNP Drawing OP-2-5142, Rev. 51, "Emergency Core Cooling (SIS)".26.30 CNP Drawing OP-2-5128, Rev. 30, "Reactor Coolant Sheet 1 of 2".26.31 CNP Drawing OP-2-5128A, Rev. 59, "Reactor Coolant Sheet 2 of 2".26.32 CNP Drawing OP-2-5120D, Rev. 31, "Containment Control Air 85# & 50# Ring Headers".26.33 CNP Drawing OP-2-5151A, Rev. 55, "Emergency Diesel Generator "AB"".26.34 CNP Drawing OP-2-5148C, Rev. 31, "Flow Diagram Diesel Generator Area &Electrical Switchgear Rooms Heating & Ventilation Sys Unit 2".26.35 CNP Drawing OP-2-5149, Rev. 54, "Control Room Ventilation".
26.36 CNP Drawing OP-1-1 2032, Rev. 20, "MCC Auxiliary 600V Bus 11 C, 11D Engineered Safety System (Train A)".26.37 CNP Drawing OP-2-12032, Rev. 14, "MCC Auxiliary One-Line 600V Bus 21C, 21D Engineered Safety System (Train A)".27. Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), A. Pietrangelo, Letter to D. Skeen of the USNRC,"Proposed Path Forward for NTTF Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Reevaluations", April 9, 2013.28. NRC (E Leeds) Letter to NEI (J Pollock), "Electric Power Research Institute Final Draft Report xxxxx, "Seismic Evaluation Guidance:
Augmented Approach for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic," as an Acceptable Alternative to the March 12, 2012, Information Request for Seismic Reevaluations," May 7, 2013.29. FLEX Plan Input Transmittal to Stevenson
& Associates, August 25, 2014 (AEP Correspondence Control #2014-716).
: 30. "Generic Implementation Procedure (GIP) for Seismic Verification of Nuclear Plant Equipment," Revision 3, Updated May 16, 1997.
SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 50 of 151 Attachment A- CNP Unit 1 ESEL fExpedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 51 of 151 CNP Unit 1 ESEL CNP Equipment Operating State Unit 1 U INormal Notes / Comments ESEL ID Description Desired State Item # State 1 1-11A 600VAC BUS 11A SWITCHGEAR ENERGIZED ENERGIZED Power Available in Phase 3 Only 2 1-11B 600VAC BUS 11B SWITCHGEAR ENERGIZED ENERGIZED 3 1-11C 600VAC BUS 1 lC ENERGIZED ENERGIZED Power Available in Phase 3 Only, SWITCHGEAR 11 C1 Breaker must be manually tripped 4 1-11D 600VAC BUS 11D ENERGIZED ENERGIZED SWITCHGEAR 5 1-152- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN ENERGIZED ENERGIZED LDISB IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN >6 1-152- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN ENERGIZED ENERGIZED UDISB IGNITION UPPER VOLUME TRAIN >7 1-1A 4KV BUS 1A SWITCHGEAR ENERGIZED ENERGIZED Power Available in Phase 3 Only 8 12-QLA- MIDDLE BORIC ACID STORAGE OPERATING OPERATING BAST Level Transmitter 420 TANK TK-12M LEVEL ALARM TRANSMITTER 9 12-QTC- MIDDLE BAST TK-12M TRAIN 'A' OPERATING OPERATING BAST Temperature Transmitter 420 HTR TEMP CONTROLLER 10 12-TK- MIDDLE BORIC ACID STORAGE N/A N/A Passive Component 12M TANK 11 12-TK- CD EMERGENCY DIESELS N/A N/A Passive Component 47-CD FUEL OIL STORAGE TANK 12 1 CNTMT HYDROGEN IGNITION ENERGIZED ENERGIZED LDISB LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B> >13 1 CNTMT HYDROGEN IGNITION ENERGIZED ENERGIZED UDISB UPPER VOLUME TRAIN 'B'>14 1-88X- CNTMT HYDROGEN IGNITION NOT USED ENERGIZED LDISB LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' >15 1-88X- CNTMT HYDROGEN IGNITION NOT USED ENERGIZED UDISB UPPER VOLUME TRAIN 'B'>16 1 PLANT BATTERY BATT-AB ENERGIZED ENERGIZED ABBC DISCONNECT SWITCH 17 1 PLANT BATTERY BATT-CD ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CDBC DISCONNECT SWITCH 18 1-AB-A 600VAC MOTOR CONTROL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED Power Available in Phase 3 Only CENTER AB-A 19 1-AB-D 600VAC MOTOR CONTROL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CENTER AB-D 20 1-ABD-B 600VAC MOTOR CONTROL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CENTER ABD-B 21 1-ABD-D 600VAC MOTOR CONTROL OPERATING OPERATING RCS Level, RWST Level CENTER ABD-D 22 1-ABV-A 600VAC VALVE CONTROL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED Power Available in Phase 3 Only CENTER ABV-A SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 1303208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 52 of 151 CNP Unit 1 ESEL CNP Equipment Operating State Unit 1 1Normal Notes / Comments ESEL ID Description Desired State Item # State 23 1-AFWX 120/208VAC AUXILIARY OPERATING OPERATING RCS Level, RWST Level FEEDWATER DISTRIBUTION PANEL 24 1-AM-A 600VAC MOTOR CONTROL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED Power Available in Phase 3 Only CENTER AM-A 25 1-AZV-A 600VAC VALVE CONTROL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED Power Available in Phase 3 Only CENTER AZV-A 26 1-BA BORIC ACID CHARGING AND OPERATING OPERATING BAST Level, BAST Temperature LETDOWN CONTROL PANEL Indicators, Separately Powered 27 1-BATT- PLANT BATTERY AB ENERGIZED ENERGIZED AB 28 1-BATT- PLANT BATTERY BATT-AB ENERGIZED ENERGIZED AB-SH AMMETER SHUNT 29 1-BATT- PLANT BATTERY CD ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CD 30 1-BATT- PLANT BATTERY BATT-CD ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CD-SH AMMETER SHUNT 31 1-BC- PLANT BATTERY BATT-AB ENERGIZED ENERGIZED AB2 CHARGER #2 32 1-BC- PLANT BATTERY BATT-CD ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CD1 CHARGER#1 33 1-BCTC- PLANT BATTERY CHARGERS ENERGIZED ENERGIZED AB BC-AB1 AND BC-AB2 TRANSFER PANEL 34 1-BCTC- PLANT BATTERY CHARGERS ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CD BC-CD1 AND BC-CD2 TRANSFERPANEL 35 1-BLI- STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-1 OPERATING OPERATING SG Level Transmitter 110 WIDE RANGE LEVEL INDICATOR TRANSMITTER 36 1-BLI- STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-2 OPERATING OPERATING SG Level Transmitter 120 WIDE RANGE LEVEL INDICATOR TRANSMITTER 37 1-BLI- STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-3 OPERATING OPERATING SG Level Transmitter 130 WIDE RANGE LEVEL INDICATOR TRANSMITTER 38 1-BLI- STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-4 OPERATING OPERATING SG Level Transmitter 140 WIDE RANGE LEVEL INDICATOR TRANSMITTER 39 1-CCV- 250VDC TRAIN 'B' CRITICAL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED AB SOLENOID VALVES DISTRIBUTION PANEL 40 1-CCV- 250VDC TRAIN 'A' CRITICAL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CD SOLENOID VALVES DISTRIBUTION PANEL 41 1-CCW COMPONENT COOLING OPERATING AVAILABLE Hand Switches powered WATER CONTROL PANEL separately Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 53 of 151 CNP Unit 1 ESEL CNP Equipment Operating State UnitNormal Notes / Comments ESEL ID Description Desired State Item # State 42 1-CG1- REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING SG Level, RCS Injection Flow 14 CONTROL GROUP #1 CABINET#14 43 1-CG1- REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING BAST Level 15 CONTROL GROUP #1 CABINET#15 44 1-CG2- REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING RCS Injection Flow 17 CONTROL GROUP #2 CABINET#17 45 1-CG2- REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING RCS Injection Flow 19 CONTROL GROUP #2 CABINET Instrumentation
#19 46 1-CG3- REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING RCS Injection Flow 20 CONTROL GROUP #3 CABINET#20 47 1-CG3- REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING Containment Pressure, RWST 21 CONTROL GROUP #3 CABINET Level, BAST Level, RCS#21 Injection Flow 48 1-CG4- REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING RCS Injection Flow 22 CONTROL GROUP #4 CABINET#22 49 1-CG4- REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING SG Level 23 CONTROL GROUP #4 CABINET#23 50 1-CLI- CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK OPERATING OPERATING CST Level Transmitter 114 TK-32 LEVEL INDICATOR TRANSMITTER 51 1-CMO- COMPONENT COOLING OPEN CLOSED Local Manual Operation at the 413 WATER PUMPS SUCTION operator hand wheel is credited CROSSTIE TRAIN 'B' SHUTOFF for FLEX Response VALVE 52 1-CMO- COMPONENT COOLING OPEN CLOSED Local Manual Operation at the 414 WATER PUMPS DISCHARGE operator hand wheel is credited CROSS TIE TRAIN 'B' SHUTOFF for FLEX Response VALVE 53 1-CMO- COMPONENT COOLING OPEN CLOSED Local Manual Operation at the 416 WATER TO MISCELLANEOUS operator hand wheel is credited SERVICE TRAIN 'B' SHUTOFF for FLEX Response VALVE 54 1-CMO- WEST RESIDUAL HEAT CLOSED OPEN Power Available in Phase 3 Only 429 REMOVAL HEAT EXCHANGER COMPONENT COOLING WATER OUTLET SHUTOFF VALVE 55 1-CP CONDENSATE PUMP OPERATING OPERATING CST Level Indicator, Separately I CONTROL PANEL Powered SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 PaRe 54 of 151 CNP Unit 1 ESEL CNP Equipment Operating State Unit 1 * ..... .UnitNormal .Notes/ Comments ESEL ID Description Nm Desired State Item # State 56 1-CRID-1 120VAC CONTROL ROOM ENERGIZED ENERGIZED INSTRUMENT DISTRIBUTION CHANNEL I DISTRIBUTION PANEL 57 1-CRID- 120VAC CONTROL ROOM ENERGIZED ENERGIZED 1-INV INSTRUMENT DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM >58 1-CRID-2 120VAC CONTROL ROOM ENERGIZED ENERGIZED INSTRUMENT DISTRIBUTION CHANNEL II DISTRIBUTION PANEL 59 1-CRID- 120VAC CONTROL ROOM ENERGIZED ENERGIZED 2-INV INSTRUMENT DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM >60 1-CRID-3 120VAC CONTROL ROOM ENERGIZED ENERGIZED INSTRUMENT DISTRIBUTION CHANNEL III DISTRIBUTION PANEL 61 1-CRID- 120VAC CONTROL ROOM ENERGIZED ENERGIZED 3-INV INSTRUMENTATION DISTRIBUTION
>62 1-CRID-4 120VAC CONTROL ROOM ENERGIZED ENERGIZED INSTRUMENT DISTRIBUTION CHANNEL IV DISTRIBUTION PANEL 63 1-CRID- 120VAC CONTROL ROOM ENERGIZED ENERGIZED 4-INV INSTRUMENT DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM >64 1-DTU DELTA 'T' AND UNIT CONTROL OPERATING OPERATING RCS Temperature Recorder PANEL 65 1-ELSC 120/208VAC EMERGENCY ENERGIZED ENERGIZED LOCAL SHUTDOWN DISTRIBUTIONPANEL 66 1-EZC-B 600VAC MOTOR CONTROL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CENTER EZC-B 67 1-EZC-C 600VAC MOTOR CONTROL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED Power Available in Phase 3 Only CENTER EZC-C 68 1-EZC-D 600VAC MOTOR CONTROL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CENTER EZC-D 69 1-FFI- AUXILIARY FEEDWATER TO OPERATING OPERATING AFW Flow Transmitter 210 STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-1 FLOW INDICATOR TRANSMITTER 70 1-FFI- AUXILIARY FEEDWATER TO OPERATING OPERATING AFW Flow Transmitter 220 STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-2 FLOW INDICATOR TRANSMITTER P col Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 55 of 151 CNP Unit 1 ESEL CNP Equipment Operating State Unit 1 Normal Notes / Comments ESEL ID Description Desired State Item # State 71 1-FFI- AUXILIARY FEEDWATER TO OPERATING OPERATING AFW Flow Transmitter 230 STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-3 FLOW INDICATOR TRANSMITTER 72 1-FFI- AUXILIARY FEEDWATER TO OPERATING OPERATING AFW Flow Transmitter 240 STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-4 FLOW INDICATOR TRANSMITTER 73 1-FI FIXED INCORE CONTROL OPERATING OPERATING Core Exit Temperature Recorder PANEL 74 1-FICT-A REACTOR CORE THERMO OPERATING OPERATING Core Exit Temperature COUPLE TRAIN 'A'TRANSMITTER CABINET 75 1-FLX FLUX CONTROL PANEL OPERATING OPERATING Neutron Flux Indicator, Separately Powered 76 1-FMO- TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY THROTTLED THROTTLED Throttle position will be adjusted 211 FEED PUMP PP-4 DISCHARGE during FLEX using the local TO STEAM GENERATOR OME- manual operator hand wheel 3-1 CONTROL VALVE 77 1-FMO- TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY THROTTLED THROTTLED Throttle position will be adjusted 221 FEED PUMP PP-4 DISCHARGE during FLEX using the local TO STEAM GENERATOR OME- manual operator hand wheel 3-2 CONTROL VALVE 78 1-FMO- TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY THROTTLED THROTTLED Throttle position will be adjusted 231 FEED PUMP SUPPLY TO during FLEX using the local STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-3 manual operator hand wheel CONTROL VALVE 79 1-FMO- TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY THROTTLED THROTTLED Throttle position will be adjusted 241 FEED PUMP SUPPLY TO during FLEX using the local STEAM GENERATOR OME-4-4 manual operator hand wheel CONTROL VALVE 80 1-HE- WEST COMPONENT COOLING N/A N/A Passive Component 15W WATER HEAT EXCHANGER 81 1-HE- WEST RESIDUAL HEAT N/A N/A Passive Component 17W REMOVAL HEAT EXCHANGER 82 1-HSD1 UNIT 1 HOT SHUTDOWN ENERGIZED ENERGIZED PANEL 83 1-HV- CONTROL ROOM AIR AS NEEDED OPERATING Power Available in Phase 3 Only ACR-2 CONDITIONING SOUTH LIQUID CHILLER 84 1-HV- CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION AS NEEDED OPERATING Power Available in Phase 3 Only ACRA-2 SOUTH AIR CONDITIONINGUNIT 85 1-HV- OUTSIDE AIR TO CONTROL OPERATING OPERATING Power Available in Phase 3 Only ACR-DA- ROOM 2 PRESSURIZATION/CLEANUPFI LTER UNIT HV-ACRF VENT DAMPER SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 56 of 151 CNP Unit 1 ESEL CNP Equipment Operating State UnitNormal Notes/ Comments ESEL ID Description Desired State Item # State 86 1-HV- CONTROL ROOM N/A N/A Passive Component ACRF PRESSURIZATION/CLEANUP FILTER UNIT 87 1-HV- CONTROL ROOM AS NEEDED OPERATING Power Available in Phase 3 Only ACRF-2 PRESSURIZATION/CLEAN UP FILTER UNIT VENT FAN #2 88 1-HV- CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION OPERATING OPERATING Power Available in Phase 3 Only ACR-H2 SOUTH DUCT ELECTRIC HEATING UNIT 89 1-HV- 1-HV-CEQ-2, CONTAINMENT AS NEEDED OPERATING Power Available in Phase 3 Only CEQ-2 HYDROGEN SKIMMER VENTILATION FAN #2 90 1-HV- AB BATTERY EQUIPMENT AS NEEDED OPERATING Battery Room AB Ventilation, SGRX-5 AREA BATTERY ROOM Controlled Locally VENTILATION EXHAUST FAN 91 1-HV- CD BATTERY EQUIPMENT AS NEEDED OPERATING Battery Room CD Ventilation, SGRX-6 AREA BATTERY ROOM Controlled Locally VENTILATIONEXHAUST FAN 92 1-1CM- RHR TO REACTOR COOLANT CLOSED OPEN Power Available in Phase 3 Only 111 LOOPS #2 & #3 COLD LEGS CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE 93 1-1CM- REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #2 CLOSED OPEN Needs closure of PB 403AX 129 HOT LEG TO RESIDUAL relay permissive, Power HEATREMOVAL PUMPS Available in Phase 3 Only SUCTION CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE 94 1-1CM- BORON INJECTION TANK CLOSED OPEN Power Available in Phase 3 Only 251 TRAIN 'B' OUTLET CONTAINMENT
>95 1-1CM- WEST RHR TO REACTOR OPEN CLOSED Local Manual Operation at the 321 COOLANT LOOPS #2 AND #3 operator hand wheel is credited HOT LEGS CONTAINMENT for FLEX Response ISOLATION VALVE 96 1-IFI-51 BORON INJECTION TO OPERATING OPERATING RCS Injection Flow Transmitter REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #1 FLOW INDICATOR TRANSMITTER 97 1-IFI-52 BORON INJECTION TO OPERATING OPERATING RCS Injection Flow Transmitter REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #2 FLOW INDICATOR TRANSMITTER 98 1-IFI-53 BORON INJECTION TO OPERATING OPERATING RCS Injection Flow Transmitter REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #3 FLOW INDICATOR TRANSMITTER SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 57 of 151 CNP Unit 1 ESEL CNP Equipment Operating State Unit 1 ESEL ID Description Normal Desired State Notes / Comments Item # State 99 1-IFI-54 BORON INJECTION TO OPERATING OPERATING RCS Injection Flow Transmitter REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #4 FLOW INDICATOR TRANSMITTER 100 1-IMO- REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #2 CLOSED OPEN Needs closure of PB 405AX 128 HOT LEG TO RESIDUAL HEAT relay permissive REMOVAL PUMPS SUCTION SHUTOFF VALVE 101 1-IMO- BORON INJECTION TANK CLOSED OPEN Power Available in Phase 3 Only 256 TRAIN 'B' INLET SHUTOFF VALVE 102 1-IMO- EAST RESIDUAL HEAT OPEN CLOSED Local manual operation with the 310 REMOVAL PUMP PP-35E operator hand wheel is credited SUCTION SHUTOFF VALVE for FLEX Response 103 1-IMO- WEST RHR HX 1-HE-17W CLOSED OPEN Local manual operation with the 324 DISCHARGE CROSSTIE operator hand wheel is credited SHUTOFF VALVE for FLEX Response 104 1-LDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B19 IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B19 105 1-LDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B20 IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B20 106 1-LDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B21 IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B21 107 1-LDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B22 IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B22 108 1-LDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B23 IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B23 109 1-LDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B24 IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B24 110 1-LDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B25 IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B25 111 1-LDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B26 IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B26 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 58 of 151 CNP Unit 1 ESEL CNP Equipment Operating State Unit 1 Normal Notes Comments ESEL ID Description Desired State Item # State 112 1-LDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B27 IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B27 113 1-LDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B28 IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B28 114 1-LDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B29 IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B29 115 1-LDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B30 IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B30 116 1-LDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B31 IGINTION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B31 117 1-LDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B32 IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B32 118 1-LDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B33 IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B33 119 1-LDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B34 IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B34 120 1-LDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B35 IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B35 121 1-LSI-1 STEAM GENERATORS
#1 AND NON- REMOTE Contains SG Level Transmitter
#4 LOCAL SHUTDOWN OPERATING Transfer Relay, power N/A as STATION (REMOTE) de-energized is desired relay state 122 1-LSI-2 STEAM GENERATORS
#2 AND NON- REMOTE Contains SG Level Transmitter
#3 LOCAL SHUTDOWN OPERATING Transfer Relay, power N/A as STATION (REMOTE) de-energized is desired relay state 123 1-LSI-3 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM NON- REMOTE NPS-122 RCS Pressure CHARGING AND LETDOWN OPERATING Transmitter Transfer Relay, LOCAL SHUTDOWN STATION (REMOTE) power N/A as de-energized is I _desired relay state SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 59 of 151 CNP Unit 1 ESEL CNP Equipment Operating State Unit 1 Unita1 Notes / Comments ESEL ID Description Normal Desired State Item # State 124 1-MCAB 250VDC DISTRIBUTION PANEL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED MCAB 125 1-MCCD 250VDC DISTRIBUTION POWER OPERATING OPERATING Various Instruments PANEL 126 1-MDAB 250VDC DISTRIBUTION PANEL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED MDAB 127 1-MDCD 250VDC DISTRIBUTION PANEL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED MDCD 128 1-MPP- STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-1 OPERATING OPERATING SG Pressure Transmitter 210 CHANNEL I STEAM PRESSURE TRANSMITTER 129 1-MPP- STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-2 OPERATING OPERATING SG Pressure Transmitter 220 CHANNEL I STEAM PRESSURE TRANSMITTER 130 1-MPP- STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-3 OPERATING OPERATING SG Pressure Transmitter 230 CHANNEL I STEAM PRESSURE TRANSMITTER 131 1-MPP- STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-4 OPERATING OPERATING SG Pressure Transmitter 240 CHANNEL I STEAM PRESSURE TRANSMITTER 132 1-MRV- STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-1 CLOSED OPEN Fail Closed, Local manual 213 POWER OPERATED RELIEF operation with the operator hand VALVE wheel is credited for FLEX I Response to throttle the valve 133 1-MRV- STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-2 CLOSED OPEN Fail Closed, Local manual 223 POWER OPERATED RELIEF operation with the operator hand VALVE wheel is credited for FLEX Response to throttle the valve 134 1-MRV- STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-3 CLOSED OPEN Fail Closed, Local manual 233 POWER OPERATED RELIEF operation with the operator hand VALVE wheel is credited for FLEX Response to throttle the valve 135 1-MRV- STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-4 CLOSED OPEN Fail Closed, Local manual 243 POWER OPERATED RELIEF operation with the operator hand VALVE wheel is credited for FLEX Response to throttle the valve 136 1-NIS-l NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION OPERATING OPERATING Neutron Flux Indicator, SYSTEM PROTECTION Separately Powered CHANNEL I CONTROL PANEL 137 1-NLP- PRESSURIZER OME-4 OPERATING OPERATING Pressurizer Level Transmitter 151 PROTECTION CHANNEL I LEVELTRANSMITTER 138 1-NPS- & VER ADDED PER SETPOINT OPERATING OPERATING RCS Pressure Transmitter, also 110 PROJECT REACTOR VESSEL used for RCS Level (RVLIS)TRAIN 'A' WIDE RANGE PRESSURE TRANSMITTER SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 60 of 151 CNP Unit 1 ESEL CNP Equipment Operating State UnitNormal Notes /Comments ESEL ID Description Desired State Item # State 139 1-NPS- REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #2 OPERATING OPERATING Required for valve ICM-1 29 121 HOT LEG WIDE RANGE pressure permissive PRESSURE TRANSMITTER 140 1-NPS- REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #1 OPERATING OPERATING Required for valve IMO-128 122 HOT LEG WIDE RANGE pressure permissive PRESSURE TRANSMITTER 141 1-NRI-21 NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION OPERATING OPERATING Neutron Flux CHANNEL I WIDE RANGE RADIATION DETECTOR 142 1-NRI- NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION OPERATING OPERATING Neutron Flux 21-AMP WIDE RANGE RADIATION AMPLIFIER 143 1-NRV- PRESSURIZER TRAIN 'B' CLOSED OPEN Fail Closed 152 PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE 144 1-NRV- PRESSURIZER OME-4 TRAIN'A' CLOSED OPEN Fail Closed 153 PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE 145 1-NTQ- RVLIS TRAIN 'A' UPPER TAP OPERATING OPERATING Temperature Transmitter used 110A TEMPERATURE for RCS Level (RVLIS)COMPENSATIONCOMPUTER INPUT THERMAL SENSOR 'A'146 1-NTQ- RVLIS TRAIN 'A' UPPER TAP OPERATING OPERATING Temperature Transmitter used 110B TEMPERATURE for RCS Level (RVLIS)COMPENSATIONCOMPUTER INPUT THERMAL SENSOR 'B'147 1-NTQ- RVLIS TRAIN 'A' CONDUIT OPERATING OPERATING Temperature Transmitter used 130A TEMPERATURE for RCS Level (RVLIS)COMPENSATIONCOMPUTER INPUT THERMAL SENSOR 'A'148 1-NTQ- RVLIS TRAIN 'A' CONDUIT OPERATING OPERATING Temperature Transmitter used 130C TEMPERATURE for RCS Level (RVLIS)COMPENSATIONCOMPUTER INPUT THERMAL SENSOR 'C'149 1-NTR- REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #1 OPERATING OPERATING RCS Temperature Transmitter 110 HOT LEG WIDE RANGETEMPERATURE RECORDER THERMAL SENSOR 150 1-NTR- REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #3 OPERATING OPERATING RCS Temperature Transmitter, 130 HOT LEG WIDE also used for RCS Level (RVLIS)RANGETEMPERATURE RECORDER THERMAL SENSOR 151 1-NTR- REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #1 OPERATING OPERATING RCS Temperature Transmitter 210 COLD LEG WIDE RANGETEMPERATURE RECORDER THERMAL SENSOR Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 61 of 151 CNP Unit 1 ESEL CNP Equipment Operating State UnitNormal Notes / Comments ESEL ID Description Desired State Item # State 152 1-NTR- REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #3 OPERATING OPERATING RCS Temperature Transmitter 230 COLD LEG WIDE RANGETEMPERATURE RECORDER THERMAL SENSOR 153 1-OME- TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY N/A N/A Passive Component 33 FEED PUMP PP-4 SUCTION >154 1-OME- WEST ESSENTIAL SERVICE OPERATING OPERATING Passive component when used 34W WATER PUMP PP-7W in FLEX response DISCHARGESTRAINER 155 1-OME- ACCUMULATOR TANK #1 N/A N/A Passive Component 6-1 156 1-OME- ACCUMULATOR TANK #2 N/A N/A Passive Component 6-2 157 1-OME- ACCUMULATOR TANK #3 N/A N/A Passive Component 6-3 158 1-OME- ACCUMULATOR TANK #4 N/A N/A Passive Component 6-4 159 1-PP- WEST COMPONENT COOLING OPERATING OPERATING Power Available in Phase 3 Only loW WATER PUMP OR AVAILABLE 160 1-PP- WEST RESIDUAL HEAT AVAILABLE OPERATING Power Available in Phase 3 Only 35W REMOVAL PUMP 161 1-PP-4 TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY STOP RUN Via ROB Turbine 1-OME-39 FEED PUMP 162 1-PP BORIC ACID STORAGE TANKS NOT USED OPERATING Pump used in Phase 3 after 1 TRANSFER PUMP #1 NSRC Generator Installed 163 1-PP- CONTROL ROOM AIR AS NEEDED OPERATING Power Available in Phase 3 Only 82S CONDITIONING SOUTH CHILL WATER CIRCULATION PUMP 164 1-PPA- UPPER CONTAINMENT OPERATING OPERATING Containment Pressure 310 CHANNEL III WIDE RANGE Transmitter PRESSURE ALARM TRANSMITTER 165 1-PRZ PRESSURIZER CONTROL OPERATING OPERATING Pressurizer level Indicator PANEL Separately Powered 166 1-QLA- NORTH BORIC ACID STORAGE OPERATING OPERATING BAST Level Transmitter 410 TANK TK-12N LEVEL ALARMTRANSMITTER 167 1-QRV- CVCS CHARGING TO OPEN CLOSED Fails to desired position on loss 200 REGENERATIVE HEAT of instrument air EXCHANGER FLOW CONTROL VALVE 168 1-QT-506 TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY CLOSED OPERATING Local Manual Operation at the FEED PUMP PP-4 TRIP operator hand wheel/mechanical ANDTHROTTLE VALVE trip reset is credited for FLEX Response Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 62 of 151 CNP Unit 1 ESEL CNP Equipment Operating State Unit 1 Unita1 Notes / Comments ESEL ID Description Normal Desired State Item # State 169 1-QT-507 AUXILIARY FEED PUMP CLOSED OPERATING Control via 1-QT-507-KR TURBINE GOVERNOR VALVE governor (ROB)170 1-QTC- NORTH BAST TK-12N TRAIN 'A' OPERATING OPERATING BAST Temperature Transmitter 410 HTR TEMP CONTROLLER 171 1-RHR RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL OPERATING AVAILABLE Hand Switches powered CONTROL PANEL separately 172 1-RPC REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING AFW Flow, Pressurizer level 1 CHANNEL I CABINET #1 173 1-RPC REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING AFW Flow 2 CHANNEL I CABINET #2 174 1-RPC REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING SG Pressure 3 CHANNEL I CABINET #3 175 1-RPC REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING SG Pressure 4 CHANNEL I CABINET #4 176 1-RPC REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING RWST Level, RCS Pressure 5 CHANNEL II CABINET #5 Permissive 177 1-RPC REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING AFW Flow, RCS Temperature, 6 CHANNEL II CABINET #6 RWST Level 178 1-RPC REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING RCS Temperature 7 CHANNEL II CABINET #7 179 1-RPC REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING RCS Pressure, RCS Level 8 CHANNEL II CABINET #8 180 1-RPC REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING CST Level 10 CHANNEL III CABINET #10 181 1-RPC REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING AFW Flow, CST Level, RCS 9 CHANNEL III CABINET #9 Temperature, RCS Pressure Permissive 182 1-RPC REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING AFW Flow 12 CHANNEL IV CABINET #12 183 1-RPS-A REACTOR PROTECTION AND OPERATING OPERATING Contains portion of permissive SAFEGUARD ACTUATION circuit for ICM-1 29 TRAIN 'A' CABINET 184 1-RPS-B REACTOR PROTECTION AND OPERATING OPERATING Contains portion of permissive SAFEGUARD ACTUATION circuit for IMO-128 TRAIN 'B' CABINET 185 1-RPSX- REACTOR PROTECTION AND OPERATING OPERATING Contains PB 403AX relay A SAFEGUARD ACTUATION permissive TRAIN 'A' AUXILIARY CABINET 186 1-RPSX- REACTOR PROTECTION AND OPERATING OPERATING Contains PB 405AX relay B SAFEGUARD ACTUATION permissive TRAIN 'B' AUXILIARY CABINET 187 1-RVLC REACTOR VESSEL OME-1 OPERATING OPERATING RCS Level WATER LEVEL INSTRUMENTATION CABINET 188 1-SA STATION AUXILIARIES OPERATING AVAILABLE Hand Switches powered CONTROL PANEL I separately SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 PaRe 63 of 151 CNP Unit 1 ESEL CNP Equipment Operating State Unit 1 Notes/ Comments ESEL" ID Description Normal Desired State Item # State 189 1-SG STEAM GENERATOR AND OPERATING OPERATING AFW Flow, SG Level, and SG AUXILIARY FEED PUMP Pressure Indicators; Manual CONTROLPANEL Control of Main Steam PORVs -Note that valve position indicator and pressure indicator on valve controllers are not credited.Separate Credited SG Pressure Indicators Must be used.190 1-SIS SAFETY INJECTION CONTROL OPERATING OPERATING Control Switches, RCS Pressure PANEL Indicator, RCS Level Indicator, All Separately Powered 191 1-SPY CONTAINMENT SPRAY OPERATING OPERATING Containment Pressure Indicator, CONTROL PANEL RWST Level Recorder 192 1-SSR ENGINEER SAFETY SYSTEM OPERATING AVAILABLE Contains 1-CMO-429 AC control REAR INSTRUMENT/RELAY relay (powered separately)
RACK 193 1-SWR NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTAL OPERATING OPERATING Neutron Flux Instrumentation SOURCE RANGE N21INSTRUMENT/RELAY RACK 194 1-T11A 4KV BUS T11A SWITCHGEAR ENERGIZED ENERGIZED Power Available in Phase 3 Only, Emergency feed breaker T11A12 must be manually tripped 195 1-TDAB 250VDC TRAIN 'B' TRANSFER ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CABINET 196 1-TDCD 250VDC TRAIN 'A' TRANSFER ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CABINET 197 1-TK-11 BORON INJECTION TANK N/A N/A Passive Component 198 1-TK- NORTH BORIC ACID STORAGE N/A N/A Passive Component 12N TANK 199 1-TK- PRESSURIZER TRAIN 'B' N/A N/A Passive Component 253-1 PRESSURE RELIEF VALVENRV-152 RESERVE CONTROL AIR TANK 200 1-TK- PRESSURIZER TRAIN 'A' N/A N/A Passive Component 253-2 PRESSURE RELIEF VALVENRV-153 RESERVE CONTROL AIR TANK 201 1-TK- PRESSURIZER TRAIN 'B' N/A N/A Passive Component 253-3 PRESSURE RELIEF VLV NRV-152EMERGENCY AIR TANK 202 1-TK- PRESSURIZER TRAIN 'A' N/A N/A Passive Component 253-4 PRESSURE RELIEF VLV NRV-153EMERGENCY AIR TANK 203 1-TK- PRESSURIZER TRAIN 'B' N/A N/A Passive Component 253-5 PRESSURE RELIEF VALVENRV-152 EMERGENCY AIR TANK SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 64 of 151 CNP Unit 1 ESEL CNP Equipment Operating State UnitNormal Notes / Comments ESEL ID Description Desired State Item # State 204 1-TK- PRESSURIZER TRAIN 'A' N/A N/A Passive Component 253-6 PRESSURE RELIEF VALVENRV-153 EMERGENCY AIR TANK 205 1-TK- PRESSURIZER TRAIN 'B' N/A N/A Passive Component 253-7 PRESSURE RELIEF VALVENRV-152 EMERGENCY AIR TANK 206 1-TK- PRESSURIZER TRAIN 'A' N/A N/A Passive Component 253-8 PRESSURE RELIEF VALVENRV-153 EMERGENCY AIR TANK 207 1-TK-32 CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK N/A N/A Passive Component 208 1-TK-37 COMPONENT COOLING N/A N/A Passive Component WATER SURGE TANK 209 1-TR11A 600VAC BUS 11A SUPPLY ENERGIZED ENERGIZED Power Available in Phase 3 Only TRANSFORMER 210 1-TR- 120/208VAC AUXILIARY ENERGIZED ENERGIZED Regulating Transformer AFWX FEEDWATER DISTRIBUTION PANELAFWX REGULATING TRANSFORMER 211 1-TR- 120/208VAC EMERGENCY ENERGIZED ENERGIZED ELSC LOCAL SHUTDOWN DISTRIBUTIONPANEL ELSC SUPPLY TRANSFORMER 212 1-UDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B1 IGNITION UPPER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B1 213 1-UDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B10 IGNITION UPPER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B10 214 1-UDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B11 IGNITION UPPER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B131 215 1-UDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B12 IGNITION UPPER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B12 216 1-UDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B13 IGNITION UPPER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B133 217 1-UDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B14 IGNITION UPPER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B14 SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 65 of 151 CNP Unit 1 ESEL CNP Equipment Operating State Unit 1 Notes/ Comments ESEL ID. Description Nm Desired State Item # State 218 1-UDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B15 IGNITION UPPER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B15 219 1-UDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B16 IGNITION UPPER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #816 220 1-UDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B17 IGNITION UPPER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B17 221 1-UDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B18 IGNITION UPPER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B18 222 1-UDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B2 IGNITION UPPER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #82 223 1-UDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B3 IGNITION UPPER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #83 224 1-UDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B4 IGNITION UPPER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #84 225 1-UDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B5 IGNITION UPPER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #85 226 1-UDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B6 IGNITION UPPER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #86 227 1-UDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B7 IGNITION UPPER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #87 228 1-UDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B8 IGNITION UPPER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B8 229 1-UDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B9 IGNITION UPPER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #89 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 66 of 151 CNP Unit I ESEL CNP Equipment Operating State Unit 1 Notes/ Comments ESEL ID Description Normal Desired State Item # State 230 1-VR- LOWER CONTAINMENT TRAIN NOT USED OPERATING LDISB-4 B DISTRIBUTED IGNITION SYSTEM VOLTAGE REGULATOR 231 1-VR- UPPER CONTAINMENT TRAIN NOT USED OPERATING UDISB-3 B DISTRIBUTED IGNITION SYSTEM VOLTAGE REGULATOR 232 1-VS VENTILATION CONTROL OPERATING AVAILABLE Hand Switches powered PANEL separately 233 1-WMO- WEST CONTAINMENT SPRAY OPEN CLOSED Local Manual Operation at the 715 HEAT EXCHANGER 1-HE-18W operator hand wheel is credited ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER for FLEX Response INLET SHUTOFF VALVE 234 1-WMO- ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER CLOSED OPEN Local Manual Operation at the 753 TO TURBINE DRIVEN operator hand wheel is credited AUXILIARY FEED PUMP PP-4 for FLEX Response SHUTOFF VALVE 235 1-WRV- WEST ESW PUMP PP-7W OPEN/ CLOSED Valve Fails Closed on Loss of 762 DISCH STN EAST BASKET BAN CLOSED Air (Its Desired FLEX Position)OUT SHUTOFF VALVE 236 1-WRV- W ESW PUMP PP-7W DISCH OPEN/ CLOSED Valve Fails Closed on Loss of 767 STN EAST BASKET BAN INLET CLOSED Air (Its Desired FLEX Position)SHUTOFF VALVE 237 1-WRV- W ESW PUMP PP-7W DISCH OPEN/ CLOSED Valve Fails Closed on Loss of 772 STN WEST BASKET B/W CLOSED Air (Its Desired FLEX Position)OUTLET SHUTOFF VALVE 238 1-WRV- W ESW PUMP PP-7W DISCH OPEN/ CLOSED Valve Fails Closed on Loss of 777 STN WEST BASKET BAN INLET CLOSED Air (Its Desired FLEX Position)SHUTOFF VALVE 239 1-XRV- BACKUP AIR TO NRV-152 NOT USED REGULATING 152 PRESSURE REGULATOR
_ __1 240 1-XRV- BACKUP AIR TO NRV-153 NOT USED REGULATING 153 PRESSURE REGULATOR SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 67 of 151 Attachment B -CNP Unit 2 ESEL SAi Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 68 of 151 CNP Unit 2 ESEL CNP Equipment Operating State UnitNormal Notes/ Comments ESEL ID Description Desired State Item # State 1 12-TK- AB EMERGENCY DIESEL FUEL N/A N/A Passive Component 47-AB OIL STORAGE TANK 2 2-152- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN ENERGIZED ENERGIZED LDISB IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLIES BACKUP SUPPLY BREAKER 3 2-152- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN ENERGIZED ENERGIZED UDISB IGNITION UPPER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLIES BACKUP SUPPLY BREAKER 4 2-21A 600V BUS 21A SWITCHGEAR ENERGIZED ENERGIZED Power Available in Phase 3 Only 5 2-21B 600V BUS 21B SWITCHGEAR ENERGIZED ENERGIZED 6 2-21C 600V BUS 21C SWITCHGEAR ENERGIZED ENERGIZED Power Available in Phase 3 Only, 11C1 Breaker must be manually tripped 7 2-21D 600V BUS 21D SWITCHGEAR ENERGIZED ENERGIZED 8 2-2A 4KV BUS 2A SWITCHGEAR ENERGIZED ENERGIZED Power Available in Phase 3 Only 9 2 CNTMT HYDROGEN IGNITION ENERGIZED ENERGIZED LDISB LOWER VOLUMN TRAIN'B'GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLIES STARTER COMBO-LDISB CKT BRK 10 2 CNTMT HYDROGEN IGNITION ENERGIZED ENERGIZED UDISB UPPER VOLUME TRAIN'B'GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLIES STARTER COMBO-UDISB CKT BRK 11 2-88X- CNTMT HYDROGEN IGNITION NOT USED ENERGIZED LDISB LOWER VOLUME TRAIN'B'GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLIES STARTER COMBO-LDISB STAR CNTR 12 2-88X- CNTMT HYDROGEN IGNITION NOT USED ENERGIZED UDISB UPPER VOLUME TRAIN'B'GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLIES STARTER COMBO-UDISB CONTACTOR 13 2 PLANT BATTERY BATT-AB ENERGIZED ENERGIZED ABBC DISCONNECT SWITCH 14 2 PLANT BATTERY BATT-CD ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CDBC DISCONNECT SWITCH 15 2-AB-A 600VAC MOTOR CONTROL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED Power Available in Phase 3 Only CENTER AB-A 16 2-AB-D 600VAC MOTOR CONTROL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CENTER AB-D I SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 69 of 151 CNP Unit 2 ESEL CNP Equipment Operating State Unit 2 Normal Notes / Comments ESEL ID Description Desired State Item # State 17 2-ABD-8 600VAC MOTOR CONTROL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CENTER ABD-B 18 2-ABD-D 600VAC MOTOR CONTROL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CENTER ABD-D 19 2-ABV-A 600VAC VALVE CONTROL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CENTER ABV-A 20 2-AFWX 120/208VAC AUXILIARY OPERATING OPERATING RCS Level, RWST Level FEEDWATER DISTRIBUTION PANEL 21 2-AM-A 600VAC MOTOR CONTROL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED Power Available in Phase 3 Only CENTER AM-A 22 2-AZV-A 600VAC VALVE CONTROL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED Power Available in Phase 3 Only CENTER AZV-A 23 2-BA BORIC ACID CHARGING AND OPERATING OPERATING BAST Level, BAST Temperature, LETDOWN CONTROL PANEL RCS Injection Flow 24 2-BATT- PLANT BATTERY AB ENERGIZED ENERGIZED AB 25 2-BATT- PLANT BATTERY BATT-AB ENERGIZED ENERGIZED AB-SH AMMETER SHUNT 26 2-BATT- PLANT BATTERY CD ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CD 27 2-BATT- PLANT BATTERY BATT-CD ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CD-SH AMMETER SHUNT 28 2-BC- PLANT BATTERY BATT-AB ENERGIZED ENERGIZED AB2 CHARGER #2 29 2-BC- PLANT BATTERY BATT-CD ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CD1 BATTERY CHARGER #1 30 2-BCTC- PLANT BATTERY CHARGERS ENERGIZED ENERGIZED AB BC-AB1 AND BC-AB2 TRANSFER PANEL 31 2-BCTC- PLANT BATTERY CHARGERS ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CD BC-CD1 AND BC-CD2 TRANSFER PANEL 32 2-BLI- STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-1 OPERATING OPERATING SG Level Transmitter 110 WIDE RANGE LEVEL INDICATOR TRANSMITTER 33 2-BLI- STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-2 OPERATING OPERATING SG Level Transmitter 120 WIDE RANGE LEVEL INDICATOR TRANSMITTER 34 2-BLI- STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-3 OPERATING OPERATING SG Level Transmitter 130 WIDE RANGE LEVEL INDICATOR TRANSMITTER 35 2-BLI- STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-4 OPERATING OPERATING SG Level Transmitter 140 WIDE RANGE LEVEL INDICATOR TRANSMITTER Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 70 of 151 CNP Unit 2 ESEL CNP Equipment Operating State Unit 2 ESEL ID Description Normal Desired State Notes Comments Item # State 36 2-CCV- 250VDC TRAIN 'B' CRITICAL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED AB SOLENOID VALVES DISTRIBUTION PANEL 37 2-CCV- 250VDC TRAIN 'A' CRITICAL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CD SOLENOID VALVES DISTRIBUTION PANEL 38 2-CCW COMPONENT COOLING WATER OPERATING AVAILABLE Hand Switches powered CONTROL PANEL separately 39 2-CG1- REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING SG Level, RCS Injection Flow 14 CONTROL GROUP #1 CABINET#14 40 2-CG1- REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING BAST Level Instrumentation 15 CONTROL GROUP #1 CABINET#15 41 2-CG2- REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING RCS Injection Flow 17 CONTROL GROUP #2 CABINET#17 42 2-CG2- REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING RCS Injection Flow 19 CONTROL GROUP #2 CABINET Instrumentation
#19 43 2-CG3- REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING RCS Injection Flow 20 CONTROL GROUP #3 CABINET#20 44 2-CG3- REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING Containment Pressure, RWST 21 CONTROL GROUP #3 CABINET Level, BAST Level, RCS#21 Injection Flow 45 2-CG4- REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING RCS Injection Flow 22 CONTROL GROUP #4 CABINET#22 46 2-CG4- REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING SG Level 23 CONTROL GROUP #4 CABINET#23 47 2-CLI- CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK OPERATING OPERATING CST Level Transmitter 114 TK-32 LEVEL INDICATOR TRANSMITTER 48 2-CMO- COMPONENT COOLING WATER OPEN CLOSED Local Manual Operation at the 413 PUMPS SUCTION CROSS TIE operator hand wheel is credited TRAIN 'B' SHUTOFF VALVE for FLEX Response 49 2-CMO- COMPONENT COOLING WATER OPEN CLOSED Local Manual Operation at the 414 PUMPS DISCHARGE CROSS operator hand wheel is credited TIE TRAIN 'B' SHUTOFF VALVE for FLEX Response 50 2-CMO- COMPONENT COOLING WATER OPEN CLOSED Local Manual Operation at the 416 TO MISCELLANEOUS SERVICE operator hand wheel is credited TRAIN 'B' SHUTOFF VALVE for FLEX Response 51 2-CMO- WEST RESIDUAL HEAT CLOSED OPEN Power Available in Phase 3 Only 429 REMOVAL HEAT EXCHANGER COMPONENT COOLING WATER OUTLET SHUTOFF VALVE ISAl Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 71 of 151 CNP Unit 2 ESEL CNP Equipment Operating State Unit 2 Unita2 Notes / Comments ESEL ID Description Normal Desired State Item # State 52 2-CP CONDENSATE PUMP CONTROL OPERATING OPERATING CST Level Indicator, Separately PANEL Powered 53 2-CRID-1 120VAC CONTROL ROOM ENERGIZED ENERGIZED INSTRUMENT DISTRIBUTION CHANNEL I DISTRIBUTION PANEL 54 2-CRID- 120VAC CONTROL ROOM ENERGIZED ENERGIZED 1-INV INSTRUMENT DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM >55 2-CRID-2 120VAC CONTROL ROOM ENERGIZED ENERGIZED INSTRUMENT DISTRIBUTION CHANNEL II DISTRIBUTION PANEL 56 2-CRID- 120VAC CONTROL ROOM ENERGIZED ENERGIZED 2-INV INSTRUMENT DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM >57 2-CRID-3 120VAC CONTROL ROOM ENERGIZED ENERGIZED INSTRUMENT DISTRIBUTION CHANNEL III DISTRIBUTION PANEL 58 2-CRID- 120VAC CONTROL ROOM ENERGIZED ENERGIZED 3-INV INSTRUMENTATION DISTRIBUTION
>59 2-CRID-4 120VAC CONTROL ROOM ENERGIZED ENERGIZED INSTRUMENT DISTRIBUTION CHANNEL IV DISTRIBUTION PANEL 60 2-CRID- 120VAC CONTROL ROOM ENERGIZED ENERGIZED 4-INV INSTRUMENT DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM >61 2-DTU DELTA 'T' AND UNIT CONTROL OPERATING OPERATING RCS Temperature Recorder PANEL 62 2-ELSC EMERGENCY LOCAL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED INDICATION SHUTDOWN AND COOLDOWN DISTRIBUTION PANEL 63 2-EZC-B 600VAC MOTOR CONTROL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CENTER EZC-B 64 2-EZC-C 600VAC MOTOR CONTROL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED Power Available in Phase 3 Only CENTER EZC-C 65 2-EZC-D 600VAC MOTOR CONTROL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CENTER EZC-D 66 2-FFI- AUXILIARY FEEDWATER TO OPERATING OPERATING AFW Flow Transmitter 210 STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-1 FLOW INDICATOR TRANSMITTER SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 72 of 151 CNP Unit 2 ESEL CNP Equipment Operating State Unit 2 Normal Notes / Comments ESEL ID Description Desired State Item # State 67 2-FFI- AUX FEEDWATER TO SG OME- OPERATING OPERATING AFW Flow Transmitter 220 3-2 FLOW INDICATOR TRANSMITTER 68 2-FFI- AUXILIARY FEEDWATER TO OPERATING OPERATING AFW Flow Transmitter 230 STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-3 FLOW INDICATOR TRANSMITTER 69 2-FFI- AUXILIARY FEEDWATER TO OPERATING OPERATING AFW Flow Transmitter 240 STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-4 FLOW INDICATOR TRANSMITTER 70 2-FI FIXED INCORE CONTROL OPERATING OPERATING Core Exit Temperature Recorder PANEL 71 2-FICT-A REACTOR CORE OPERATING OPERATING Core Exit Temperature THERMOCOUPLE TRAIN 'A'TRANSMITTER CABINET 72 2-FLX FLUX CONTROL PANEL OPERATING OPERATING Neutron Flux Indicator, Separately Powered 73 2-FMO- TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY THROTTLED THROTTLED Throttle position will be adjusted 211 FEED PUMP PP-4 during FLEX using the local DISCHARGETO STEAM manual operator hand wheel GENERATOR OME-3-1 CONTROL VALVE 74 2-FMO- TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY THROTTLED THROTTLED Throttle position will be adjusted 221 FEED PUMP PP-4 during FLEX using the local DISCHARGETO STEAM manual operator hand wheel GENERATOR OME-3-2 CONTROL VALVE 75 2-FMO- TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY THROTTLED THROTTLED Throttle position will be adjusted 231 FEED PUMP SUPPLY TO during FLEX using the local STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-3 manual operator hand wheel CONTROL VALVE 76 2-FMO- TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY THROTTLED THROTTLED Throttle position will be adjusted 241 FEED PUMP SUPPLY TO during FLEX using the local STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-4 manual operator hand wheel CONTROL VALVE 77 2-HE- WEST COMPONENT COOLING N/A N/A Passive Component 15W WATER HEAT EXCHANGER 78 2-HE- WEST RESIDUAL HEAT N/A N/A Passive Component 17W REMOVAL HEAT EXCHANGER 79 2-HSD2 UNIT 2 HOT SHUTDOWN PANEL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED 80 2-HV- CONTROL ROOM AIR AS NEEDED OPERATING Power Available in Phase 3 Only ACR-2 CONDITIONING SOUTH LIQUID CHILLER 81 2-HV- CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION AS NEEDED OPERATING Power Available in Phase 3 Only ACRA-2 SOUTH AIR CONDITIONING UNIT SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 73 of 151 CNP Unit 2 ESEL CNP Equipment Operating State Unit 2 ESEL D Normal Notes / Comments ESEL ID Description Desired State Item # State 82 2-HV- OUTSIDE AIR TO CONTROL AS NEEDED OPERATING Power Available in Phase 3 Only ACR-DA- ROOM PRESSURIZATION/
2 CLEANUP FILTER UNIT HV-ACRF VENT DAMPER #2 83 2-HV- CONTROL ROOM N/A N/A Passive Component ACRF PRESSURIZATION/CLEANUP FILTER UNIT 84 2-HV- CONTROL ROOM AS NEEDED OPERATING Power Available in Phase 3 Only ACRF-2 PRESSURIZATION/CLEANUP FILTER UNITVENT FAN #2 85 2-HV- CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION AS NEEDED OPERATING Power Available in Phase 3 Only ACR-H2 SOUTH DUCT ELECTRIC HEATER 86 2-HV- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN AS NEEDED OPERATING Power Available in Phase 3 Only CEQ-2 SKIMMER VENTILATION FAN #2 87 2-HV- AB BATTERY EQUIPMENT AS NEEDED OPERATING Battery Room AB Ventilation, SGRX-5 AREA BATTERY ROOM Controlled Locally VENTILATION EXHAUST FAN 88 2-HV- CD BATTERY EQUIPMENT AS NEEDED OPERATING Battery Room CD Ventilation, SGRX-6 AREA BATTERY ROOM Controlled Locally VENTILATION EXHAUST FAN 89 2-iCM- RHR TO REACTOR COOLANT CLOSED OPEN Power Available in Phase 3 Only 111 LOOPS #2 & #3 COLD LEGSCONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE 90 2-1CM- REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #2 CLOSED OPEN Needs closure of PB 403AX 129 HOT LEG TO RESIDUAL HEAT relay permissive, Power REMOVAL PUMPS SUCTION Available in Phase 3 Only CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE 91 2-iCM- BORON INJECTION TANK CLOSED OPEN Power Available in Phase 3 Only 251 TRAIN 'B' OUTLET CONTAINMENT
>92 2-1CM- WEST RHR TO REACTOR OPEN CLOSED Local Manual Operation at the 321 COOLANT LOOPS #2 AND #3 operator hand wheel is credited COLDLEGS CONTAINMENT for FLEX Response ISOLATION VALVE 93 2-IFI-51 BORON INJECTION TO OPERATING OPERATING RCS Injection Flow Transmitter REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #1 FLOW INDICATOR TRANSMITTER 94 2-IFI-52 BORON INJECTION TO OPERATING OPERATING RCS Injection Flow Transmitter REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #2 FLOWINDICATOR TRANSMITTER 95 2-IFI-53 BORON INJECTION TO OPERATING OPERATING RCS Injection Flow Transmitter REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #3 FLOW INDICATOR TRANSMITTER PSAi Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 74 of 151 CNP Unit 2 ESEL CNP Equipment Operating State Unit 2...Normal Notes / Comments ESEL ID Description Desired State Item # State 96 2-1FI-54 BORON INJECTION TO OPERATING OPERATING RCS Injection Flow Transmitter REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #4 FLOW INDICATOR TRANSMITTER 97 2-IMO- REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #2 CLOSED OPEN Needs closure of PB 405AX 128 HOT LEG TO RESIDUAL HEAT relay permissive REMOVAL PUMPS SUCTION SHUTOFF VALVE 98 2-IMO- BORON INJECTION TANK CLOSED OPEN Power Available in Phase 3 Only 256 TRAIN 'B' INLET SHUTOFF VALVE 99 2-IMO- EAST RESIDUAL HEAT OPEN CLOSED Local manual operation with the 310 REMOVAL PUMP PP-35E operator hand wheel is credited SUCTION SHUTOFF VALVE for FLEX Response 100 2-IMO- WEST RHR HX 2-HE-17W CLOSED OPEN Local manual operation with the 324 DISCHARGE CROSSTIE operator hand wheel is credited SHUTOFF VALVE for FLEX Response 101 2-LDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B10 IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B10 102 2-LDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B11 IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B131 103 2-LDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B12 IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B12 104 2-LDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B18 IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B18 105 2-LDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B19 IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B19 106 2-LDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B20 IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B20 107 2-LDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B21 IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B21 108 2-LDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B22 IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B22 SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic* 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 75 of 151 CNP Unit 2 ESEL CNP Equipment Operating State Unit 2 SNormal Notes / Comments ESEL ID Description Desired State Item # State 109 2-LDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B23 IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B23 110 2-LDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B24 IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B24 111 2-LDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B25 IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B25 112 2-LDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B26 IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B26 113 2-LDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B27 IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B27 114 2-LDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B28 IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B28 115 2-LDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B35 IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B35 116 2-LDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B8 IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' IGNITER ASSEMBLY#B8 117 2-LDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B9 IGNITION LOWER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B9 118 2-LSI-1 STEAM GENERATORS
#1 AND NON- REMOTE SG Level Transmitter Transfer#4 LOCAL SHUTDOWN OPERATING Relay, power N/A as de-STATION (REMOTE) energized is desired relay state 119 2-LSI-2 STEAM GENERATORS
#2 AND NON- REMOTE SG Level Transmitter Transfer#3 LOCAL SHUTDOWN OPERATING Relay, power N/A as de-STATION (REMOTE) energized is desired relay state 120 2-LSI-3 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM NON- REMOTE NPS-122 RCS Pressure CHARGING AND LETDOWN OPERATING Transmitter Transfer Relay, LOCAL SHUTDOWN STATION (REMOTE) power N/A as de-energized is desired relay state 121 2-MCAB 250VDC DISTRIBUTION PANEL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED I__ _MCAB SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 76 of 151 CNP Unit 2 ESEL CNP Equipment Operating State Unit 2 Normal :Notes / Comments ESEL ID Description Desired State Item # State 122 2-MCCD 250VDC DISTRIBUTION POWER OPERATING OPERATING Various Instruments PANEL 123 2-MDAB 250VDC DISTRIBUTION PANEL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED MDAB 124 2-MDCD 250VDC DISTRIBUTION PANEL ENERGIZED ENERGIZED MDCD 125 2-MPP- STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-1 OPERATING OPERATING SG Pressure Transmitter 210 CHANNEL I STEAM PRESSURE TRANSMITTER 126 2-MPP- STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-2 OPERATING OPERATING SG Pressure Transmitter 220 CHANNEL I STEAM PRESSURE TRANSMITTER 127 2-MPP- STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-3 OPERATING OPERATING SG Pressure Transmitter 230 CHANNEL I STEAM PRESSURE TRANSMITTER 128 2-MPP- STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-4 OPERATING OPERATING SG Pressure Transmitter 240 CHANNEL I STEAM PRESSURE TRANSMITTER 129 2-MRV- STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-1 CLOSED OPEN Fail Closed, Local manual 213 POWER OPERATED RELIEF operation with the operator hand VALVE wheel is credited for FLEX Response to throttle the valve 130 2-MRV- STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-2 CLOSED OPEN Fail Closed, Local manual 223 POWER OPERATED RELIEF operation with the operator hand VALVE wheel is credited for FLEX Response to throttle the valve 131 2-MRV- STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-3 CLOSED OPEN Fail Closed, Local manual 233 POWER OPERATED RELIEF operation with the operator hand VALVE wheel is credited for FLEX Response to throttle the valve 132 2-MRV- STEAM GENERATOR OME-3-4 CLOSED OPEN Fail Closed, Local manual 243 POWER OPERATED RELIEF operation with the operator hand VALVE wheel is credited for FLEX Response to throttle the valve 133 2-NIS-1 NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION OPERATING OPERATING Neutron Flux Indicator, SYSTEM PROTECTION Separately Powered CHANNEL I CONTROL PANEL 134 2-NLP- PRESSURIZER OME-4 OPERATING OPERATING Pressurizer Level Transmitter 151 PROTECTION CHANNEL I LEVEL TRANSMITTER 135 2-NPS- REACTOR VESSEL TRAIN 'A' OPERATING OPERATING RCS Level, RCS Pressure 110 WIDE RANGE PRESSURE Transmitter TRANSMITTER 136 2-NPS- REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #2 OPERATING OPERATING Required for valve ICM-1 29 121 HOT LEG WIDE RANGE pressure permissive PRESSURE TRANSMITTER PO Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 77 of 151 CNP Unit 2 ESEL CNP Equipment Operating State UnitNormal Notes / Comments ESEL ID Description Desired State Item # State 137 2-NPS- REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #1 OPERATING OPERATING Required for valve IMO-128 122 HOT LEG WIDE RANGE pressure permissive PRESSURE TRANSMITTER 138 2-NRI-21 NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION OPERATING OPERATING Neutron Flux CHANNEL I WIDE RANGE RADIATION DETECTOR 139 2-NRI- NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION OPERATING OPERATING Neutron Flux 21-AMP WIDE RANGE RADIATION AMPLIFIER 140 2-NRV- PRESSURIZER TRAIN 'B' CLOSED OPEN Fail Closed 152 PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE 141 2-NRV- PRESSURIZER OME-4 TRAIN'A' CLOSED OPEN Fail Closed 153 PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE 142 2-NTQ- RVLIS TRAIN 'A UPPER TAP OPERATING OPERATING RCS Level Transmitter 110A TEMPERATURE COMPENSATION COMPUTER INPUT THERMAL SENSOR 'A'143 2-NTQ- RVLIS TRAIN 'A' UPPER TAP OPERATING OPERATING RCS Level Transmitter 110B TEMPERATURE COMPENSATION COMPUTER INPUT THERMAL SENSOR 'B'144 2-NTQ- RVLIS TRAIN 'A' CONDUIT OPERATING OPERATING RCS Level Transmitter 130A TEMPERATURE COMPENSATION COMPUTER INPUT THERMAL SENSOR 'A'145 2-NTQ- RVLIS TRAIN 'A' CONDUIT OPERATING OPERATING RCS Level Transmitter 130C TEMPERATURE COMPENSATION COMPUTER INPUT SPARE THERMAL SENSOR 'C'146 2-NTR- REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #1 OPERATING OPERATING RCS Temperature Transmitter 110 HOT LEG WIDE RANGE TEMPERATURE RECORDER THERMAL SENSOR 147 2-NTR- REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #3 OPERATING OPERATING RCS Temperature Transmitter, 130 HOT LEG WIDE RANGE also used for RCS Level (RVLIS)TEMPERATURE RECORDER THERMAL SENSOR 148 2-NTR- REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #1 OPERATING OPERATING RCS Temperature Transmitter 210 COLD LEG WIDE RANGE TEMPERATURE RECORDER THERMAL SENSOR 149 2-NTR- REACTOR COOLANT LOOP #3 OPERATING OPERATING RCS Temperature Transmitter 230 COLD LEG WIDE RANGE TEMPERATURE RECORDER THERMAL SENSOR 150 2-OME- TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY N/A N/A Passive Component 33 FEED PUMP PP-4 SUCTION > _
SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 78 of 151 CNP Unit 2 ESEL CNP Equipment Operating State Unit 2 2Normal Notes / Comments ESEL ID Description Desired State Item # State 151 2-OME- WEST ESSENTIAL SERVICE OPERATING OPERATING Passive component when used 34W WATER PUMP PP-7W DISCH in FLEX response STN 152 2-OME- ACCUMULATOR TANK #1 N/A N/A Passive Component 6-1 153 2-OME- ACCUMULATOR TANK #2 N/A N/A Passive Component 6-2 154 2-OME- ACCUMULATOR TANK #3 N/A N/A Passive Component 6-3 155 2-OME- ACCUMULATOR TANK #4 N/A N/A Passive Component 6-4 156 2-PP- WEST COMPONENT COOLING N/A N/A Power Available in Phase 3 Only loW WATER PUMP 157 2-PP- WEST RESIDUAL HEAT N/A N/A Power Available in Phase 3 Only 35W REMOVAL PUMP 158 2-PP-4 TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY STOP RUN Via ROB Turbine 1-OME-39 FEED PUMP 159 2-PP BORIC ACID STORAGE TANKS NOT USED OPERATING Pump used for Boration Phase 3 4 TRANSFER PUMP #4 after NSRC Generators installed 160 2-PP- CONTROL ROOM AIR AS NEEDED OPERATING Power Available in Phase 3 Only 82S CONDITIONING SOUTH CHILL WATERCIRCULATION PUMP 161 2-PPA- UPPER CONTAINMENT OPERATING OPERATING Containment Pressure 310 CHANNEL III WIDE RANGE Transmitter PRESSURE ALARM TRANSMITTER 162 2-PRZ PRESSURIZER CONTROL OPERATING OPERATING Pressurizer level Indicator and PANEL Control for Pressurizer Relief Valves 163 2-QLA- SOUTH BORIC ACID STORAGE OPERATING OPERATING BAST Level Transmitter 430 TANK TK-12S LEVEL ALARM TRANSMITTER 164 2-QRV- CVCS CHARGING TO OPEN CLOSED Fails to desired position on loss 200 REGENERATIVE HEAT of instrument air EXCHANGER FLOWCONTROL VALVE 165 2-QT-506 TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY CLOSED OPEN Local Manual Operation at the FEED PUMP PP-4 TRIP AND operator hand wheel/mechanical THROTTLE VALVE trip reset is credited for FLEX Response 166 2-QT-507 AUXILIARY FEED PUMP CLOSED OPERATING Control via 1-QT-507-KR TURBINE GOVERNOR VALVE governor (ROB)167 2-QTC- SOUTH BAST TK-12S TRAIN 'A' OPERATING OPERATING BAST Temperature Transmitter 430 HTR TEMP CONTROLLER 168 2-RHR RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL OPERATING AVAILABLE Hand Switches powered CONTROL PANEL separately 169 2-RPC REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING AFW Flow, Pressurizer level, 1 CHANNEL I CABINET #1 1 1 Pressurizer Relief Valve Control SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 79 of 151 CNP Unit 2 ESEL CNP Equipment Operating State Unit 2Normal Notes/Comments ESEL ID Description Desired State Item # State 170 2-RPC REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING AFW Flow 2 CHANNEL I CABINET #2 171 2-RPC REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING SG Pressure 3 CHANNEL I CABINET #3 172 2-RPC REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING SG Pressure 4 CHANNEL I CABINET #4 173 2-RPC REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING RWST Level, RCS Pressure 5 CHANNEL II CABINET #5 Permissive, Pressurizer Relief Valve Control 174 2-RPC REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING AFW Flow, RCS Temperature, 6 CHANNEL II CABINET #6 RWST Level 175 2-RPC REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING RCS Temperature 7 CHANNEL II CABINET #7 176 2-RPC REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING RCS Pressure, RCS Level 8 CHANNEL II CABINET #8 177 2-RPC REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING CST Level 10 CHANNEL III CABINET #10 178 2-RPC REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING AFW Flow, CST Level, RCS 9 CHANNEL III CABINET #9 Temperature, RCS Pressure Permissive, Pressurizer Relief Valve Control 179 2-RPC REACTOR PROTECTION OPERATING OPERATING AFW Flow, Pressurizer Relief 12 CHANNEL IV CABINET #12 Valve Control 180 2-RPS-A REACTOR PROTECTION AND OPERATING OPERATING Contains portion of permissive SAFEGUARD ACTUATIONTRAIN circuit for ICM-1 29'A' CABINET 181 2-RPS-B REACTOR PROTECTION AND OPERATING OPERATING Contains portion of permissive SAFEGUARD ACTUATION circuit for IMO-128 TRAIN 'B' CABINET 182 2-RPSX- REACTOR PROTECTION AND OPERATING OPERATING Contains PB 403AX relay A SAFEGUARD ACTUATIONTRAIN permissive
'A' AUXILIARY CABINET 183 2-RPSX- REACTOR PROTECTION AND OPERATING OPERATING Contains PB 405AX relay B SAFEGUARD ACTUATIONTRAIN permissive
'B' AUXILIARY CABINET 184 2-RVLC REACTOR VESSEL OME-1 OPERATING OPERATING RCS Level WATER LEVEL INSTRUMENTATION CABINET 185 2-SA STATION AUXILIARIES OPERATING AVAILABLE Hand Switches powered CONTROL PANEL separately 186 2-SG STEAM GENERATOR AND OPERATING OPERATING AFW Flow, SG Level, and SG AUXILIARY FEED PUMP Pressure Indicators; Manual CONTROL PANEL Control of Main Steam PORVs -Note that valve position indicator and pressure indicator on valve controllers are not credited.Separate Credited SG Pressure Indicators Must be used.
SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 80 of 151 CNP Unit 2 ESEL CNP Equipment Operating State Unit 2 2Normal Notes / Comments ESEL ID Description Desired State Item # State 187 2-SIS SAFETY INJECTION CONTROL OPERATING OPERATING Control Switches, RCS Pressure PANEL Indicator, RCS Level Indicator, All Separately Powered 188 2-SPY CONTAINMENT SPRAY OPERATING OPERATING Containment Pressure Indicator, CONTROL PANEL RWST Level Recorder 189 2-SSR ENGINEER SAFETY SYSTEM OPERATING AVAILABLE Contains 2-CMO-429 AC control REAR INSTRUMENT/RELAY relay (powered separately)
RACK 190 2-SWR NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTAL OPERATING OPERATING Neutron Flux Instrumentation SOURCE RANGE N21INSTRUMENT/RELAY RACK 191 2-T21A 4KV BUS T21A SWITCHGEAR ENERGIZED ENERGIZED Power Available in Phase 3 Only, Emergency feed breaker T21A12 must be manually tripped 192 2-TDAB 250VDC TRAIN 'B' TRANSFER ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CABINET 193 2-TDCD 250VDC TRAIN 'A' TRANSFER ENERGIZED ENERGIZED CABINET 194 2-TK-11 BORON INJECTION TANK N/A N/A Passive Component 195 2-TK-12S SOUTH BORIC ACID STORAGE N/A N/A Passive Component TAN K 196 2-TK- PRESSURIZER TRAIN 'A' N/A N/A Passive Component 253-1 PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE NRV-153 RESERVE CONTROL AIR TANK 197 2-TK- PRESSURIZER TRAIN 'B' N/A N/A Passive Component 253-2 PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE NRV-152 RESERVE CONTROL AIR TANK 198 2-TK- PRESSURIZER TRAIN 'B' N/A N/A Passive Component 253-3 PRESSURE RELIEF VLV NRV-152 EMERGENCY AIR TANK 199 2-TK- PRESSURIZER TRAIN 'A' N/A N/A Passive Component 253-4 PRESSURE RELIEF VLV NRV-153 EMERGENCY AIR TANK 200 2-TK- PRESSURIZER TRAIN 'B' N/A N/A Passive Component 253-5 PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE NRV-152 EMERGENCY AIR TANK 201 2-TK- PRESSURIZER TRAIN 'A' N/A N/A Passive Component 253-6 PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE NRV-153 EMERGENCY AIR TANK 202 2-TK- PRESSURIZER TRAIN 'B' N/A N/A Passive Component 253-7 PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE NRV-152 EMERGENCY AIR TAN K
*SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 81 of 151 CNP Unit 2 ESEL CNP Equipment Operating State Unit 2 " Normal Notes/ Comments ESEL ID Description Desired State Item # State 203 2-TK- PRESSURIZER TRAIN 'A' N/A N/A Passive Component 253-8 PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE NRV-153 EMERGENCY AIR TANK 204 2-TK-32 CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK N/A N/A Passive Component 205 2-TK-37 COMPONENT COOLING WATER N/A N/A Passive Component SURGE TANK 206 2-TR21A 600V BUS 21A SUPPLY ENERGIZED ENERGIZED Power Available in Phase 3 Only TRANSFORMER 207 2-TR- 120/208VAC AUXILIARY ENERGIZED ENERGIZED Regulating Transformer AFWX FEEDWATER DISTRIBUTION PANEL AFWX REGULATING TRANSFORMER 208 2-TR- 120/208VAC EMERGENCY ENERGIZED ENERGIZED ELSC LOCAL SHUTDOWN DISTRIBUTION POWER TRANSFORMER 209 2-UDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B1 IGNITION UPPER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B1 210 2-UDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B13 IGNITION UPPER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B13 211 2-UDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B14 IGNITION UPPER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B14 212 2-UDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B15 IGNITION UPPER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B15 213 2-UDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B16 IGNITION UPPER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B16 214 2-UDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B17 IGNITION UPPER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B17 215 2-UDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B2 IGNITION UPPER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B2 216 2-UDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B29 IGNITION UPPER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B29 0 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 82 of 151 CNP Unit 2 ESEL CNP Equipment Operating State Unit 2 Normal Notes /.Comments ESEL ID Description Desired State Item # State 217 2-UDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B3 IGNITION UPPER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B3 218 2-UDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B30 IGNITION UPPER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B30 219 2-UDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B31 IGNITION UPPER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B31 ,220 2-UDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B32 IGNITION UPPER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B32 221 2-UDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B33 IGNITION UPPER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B33 222 2-UDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B34 IGNITION UPPER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B34 223 2-UDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B4 IGNITION UPPER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B4 224 2-UDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B5 IGNITION UPPER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B5 225 2-UDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B6 IGNITION UPPER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B6 226 2-UDISB- CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN NOT USED OPERATING B7 IGNITION UPPER VOLUME TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B7 227 2-VR- LOWER CONTAINMENT TRAIN NOT USED OPERATING LDISB-4 B DISTRIBUTED IGNITION SYSTEM VOLTAGE REGULATOR 228 2-VR- UPPER CONTAINMENT TRAIN B NOT USED OPERATING UDISB-3 DISTRIBUTED IGNITION SYSTEM VOLTAGE REGULATOR 10 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 83 of 151 CNP Unit 2 ESEL CNP Equipment Operating State UnitNormal Notes / Comments ESEL ID Description Nral Desired State Item # State 229 2-VS VENTILATION CONTROL PANEL OPERATING AVAILABLE Hand Switches powered separately 230 2-WMO- WEST CONTAINMENT SPRAY OPEN CLOSED Local Manual Operation at the 716 HEAT EXCHANGER ESSENTIAL operator hand wheel is credited SERVICE WATER INLET for FLEX Response SHUTOFF VALVE 231 2-WMO- EMERGENCY ESSENTIAL CLOSED OPEN Local Manual Operation at the 753 SERVICE WATER SUPPLY TO operator hand wheel is credited TDAFP PP-4 SHUTOFF VALVE for FLEX Response 232 2-WRV- W ESW PUMP PP-7W DISCH OPEN/ CLOSED Valve Fails Closed on Loss of 764 STN WEST BASKET BAN OUT CLOSED Air; Its FLEX Position S/OVALVE 233 2-WRV- W ESW PUMP PP-7W DISCH OPEN CLOSED Valve Fails Closed on Loss of 769 STN WEST BASKET B/W INL /CLOSED Air; Its FLEX Position S/O VALVE 234 2-WRV- WEST ESW PUMP PP-7W OPEN/ CLOSED Valve Fails Closed on Loss of 774 DISCH STN EAST BASKET BAN CLOSED Air; Its FLEX Position OUT SHUTOFF VALVE 235 2-WRV- WEST ESW PUMP PP-7W OPEN/ CLOSED Valve Fails Closed on Loss of 779 DISCH STN EAST BASKET BAN CLOSED Air; Its FLEX Position INLSHUTOFF VALVE 236 2-XRV- BACKUP AIR TO NRV-152 NOT USED REGULATING 152 PRESSURE REGULATOR 237 2-XRV- BACKUP AIR TO NRV-153 NOT USED REGULATING 153 PRESSURE REGULATOR PO Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 84 of 151 Attachment C- CNP Unit I ESEP HCLPF Values and Failure Mode Tabulation SAki Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 85 of 151 CNP HCLPF Unit I ID DESCRIPTION Failure (compared Notes ESEL Mode (o Notes Item # to RLGM)Meets EPRI NP-6041-SL Table 2.4 caveats.1-11A 600VAC BUS 11A Screened >RLGM Anchorage screened for RLGM based on SWITCHGEAR scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the switchgear.
Meets EPRI NP-6041-SL Table 2.4 caveats.600VAC BUS 11B Anchorage screened for RLGM based on SWITCHGEAR scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the switchgear.
Meets EPRI NP-6041-SL Table 2.4 caveats.1-11C 600VAC BUS 11C Screened >RLGM Anchorage screened for RLGM based on SWITCHGEAR scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the switchgear.
Meets EPRI NP-6041-SL Table 2.4 caveats.600VAC BUS 11D Anchorage screened for RLGM based on SWITCHGEAR scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the switchgear.
CONTAINMENT Small panel dimensions of 8" wide, 4" deep, HYDROGEN IGNITION and 14" tall. Mounted to the wall using two 1-152-LDISB LOWER VOLUME Screened >RLGM unistruts (anchored using four 1/2" TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG expansion bolts).ASSEMBLIES BACKUP SUPPLY BREAKER CONTAINMENT Small panel dimensions of 8" wide, 4" deep, HYDROGEN IGNITION and 14" tall. Mounted to the wall using two 1-152- UPPER VOLUME TRAIN Screened >RLGM unistruts (anchored using four 1/2" UDISB 'B' GLOW PLUG expansion bolts).ASSEMBLIES BACKUP SUPPLY BREAKER Meets EPRI NP-6041-SL Table 2.4 caveats.1-1A 4KV BUS 1A Screened >RLGM Anchorage screened for RLGM based on SWITCHGEAR scaling of an existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for a similar switchgear.
Meets EPRI NP-6041-SL Table 2.4 caveats.Anchorage rugged by inspection, welded to MIDDLE BORIC ACID one of the Boric Acid Storage Tank 12-TK-12M legs. However, the HCLPF for this 8 12-QLA-420 12M LEVEL ALARM Interaction 0.227g component is limited by the Boric Acid TRANSMITTER Storage Tank 12-TK-12M.
HCLPF from Ref. 10.2 for the tank is 0.227g < 0.387g (RLGM ZPA).The governing HCLPF capacity according to MIDDLE BORIC ACID S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-005
-"High STORAGE TANK Confidence Low Probability of Failure (HCLPF) Calculations for Screened in ESEP Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 PaRe 86 of 151 CNP HCLPF Unit 1 ID DESCRIPTION Failure (compared Notes ESEL Mode to RLGM)Item #Tanks" (Ref. 10.2) is 0.227g that is less than the RLGM of 0.387g.CNTMT HYDROGEN Small panel dimensions of 9" wide, 20" tall, IGNITION LOWER and 6" deep. Equipment mounted on two VOLUMN TRAIN 'B' horizontal running unistruts spaced at 19".12 1-52-LDISB GLOW PLUG Screened >RLGM Unistrut anchors are 1/2" expansion bolts ASSEMBLIES STARTER spaced at 41" plus an additional two 3/8" COMBO-LDISB CKT bolts located 29". Screened based on the BRK light panel with rugged anchorage.
CNTMT HYDROGEN Small panel dimensions of 9" wide, 20" tall, IGNITION UPPER and 6" deep. Equipment mounted on two VOLUME TRAIN 'B' horizontal running unistruts spaced at 19".13 1-52-UDISB GLOW PLUG Screened >RLGM Unistrut anchors are 1/2" expansion bolts ASSEMBLIES STARTER spaced at 41" plus an additional two 3/8" COMBO-UDISB CKT bolts located 29". Screened based on the BRK light panel with rugged anchorage.
CNTMT HYDROGEN Small panel dimensions of 9" wide, 20" tall, IGNITION LOWER and 6" deep. Equipment mounted on two 1-88X- VOLUME TRAIN 'B' horizontal running unistruts spaced at 19".14 LDISB GLOW PLUG Screened >RLGM Unistrut anchors are 1/2" expansion bolts ASSEMBLIES STARTER spaced at 41" plus an additional two 3/8" COMBO-LDISB STAR bolts located 29". Screened based on the CNTR light panel with rugged anchorage.
CNTMT HYDROGEN Small panel dimensions of 9" wide, 20" tall, IGNITION UPPER and 6" deep. Equipment mounted on two 1-88X- VOLUME TRAIN 'B' horizontal running unistruts spaced at 19".15 GLOW PLUG Screened >RLGM Unistrut anchors are 1/2" expansion bolts ASSEMBLIES STARTER spaced at 41" plus an additional two 3/8" COMBO-UDISB bolts located 29". Screened based on the CONTACTOR light panel with rugged anchorage.
Panel dimensions of 48"x24"xl 0".Equipment is bolted to two horizontal unistruts, which are bolted to the wall.Panel meets all IEEE 344-75 testing PLANT BATTERY requirements.
The testing TRS greatly 16 1-89-ABBC BATT-AB DISCONNECT Screened >RLGM exceeds the RRS at the floor level.SWITCH Equipment screens for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage acceptable for RLGM based on similar panels had very high calculated margins for the Design Basis Earthquake.
Panel dimensions of 48"x24"x10".
PLANT BATTERY Equipment is bolted to two horizontal unistruts, which are bolted to the wall.17 1-89-CDBC BATT-CD Screened >RLGM PaemetalIEE347tsin DISCNNET SWTCHPanel meets all IEEE 344-75 testing DISCONNECT SWITCH requirements.
The testing TRS greatly exceeds the RRS at the floor level.
?I Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 87 of 151.CNP HCLPF Unit IFalr ESEL ID DESCRIPTION Failure (compared Notes ESEL Mode (o Notes Item #to RLGM)Item #Equipment screens for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage acceptable for RLGM based on similar panels had very high calculated margins for the Design Basis Earthquake.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 600VAC MOTOR NP-6041-SL.
The 1/4" gap for one anchor 18 1-AB-A CONTROL CENTER Screened >RLGM was judged acceptable.
Anchorage AB-A screened for RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the MCC.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) 600VAC MOTOR for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 19 1-AB-D CONTROL CENTER Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for AB-D RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the MCC.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) 600VAC MOTOR for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 20 1-ABD-B CONTROL CENTER Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for ABD-B RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the MCC.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) 600VAC MOTOR for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 21 1-ABD-D CONTROL CENTER Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for ABD-D RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the MCC.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the MCC. The 600VAC VALVE Seismic potentially governing Block Wall interaction 22 1-ABV-A CONTROL CENTER Interaction 0.578g could not be screened for RLGM based on ABV-A scaling of existing design basis calculation.
The governing HCLPF capacity for the block wall according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-004 -"HCLPF Calculations for Screened in ESEP Components" (Ref. 10.1)is 0.578g.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) 120/208VAC AUXILIARY for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 23 1-AFWX FEEDWATER Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for DISTRIBUTION PANEL RLGM based on screening calculation to the I__II RLGM.600VAC MOTOR Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CONTROL CENTER S R for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI PA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 88 of 151 CNP HCLPF Unit 1 Failure ESEL ID DESCRIPTION Mode (compared Notes Item # to RLGM)AM-A NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the MCC.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage could not be 600VAC VALVE screened for RLGM based on scaling of 25 1-AZV-A CONTROL CENTER Anchorage 0.62g existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for AZV-A the MCC. The governing HCLPF capacity for the anchorage according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-004
-"HCLPF Calculations for Screened in ESEP Components" (Ref. 10.1) is 0.62g.BORIC ACID Meets EPRI NP-6041-SL Table 2.4 caveats.CHARGING AND Anchorage screened for RLGM based on LETDOWN CONTROL scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage PANEL evaluation for the Control Board.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage could not be screened for RLGM based on scaling of 27 1 -BATT-AB PLANT BATTERY AB Anchorage 0.613g existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the Battery Rack. The governing HCLPF capacity for the anchorage according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-004
-"HCLPF Calculations for Screened in ESEP Components" (Ref. 10.1) is 0.613g.Small panel bolted directly to wall using two horizontal unistruts.
Box dimensions of 48.5"x40.5"x8.5".
No interactions identified.
1-BATT-AB-PLANT BATTERY Also contains 1-BC-AB-SH.
Equipment 28 SH BATT-AB AMMETER Screened >RLGM screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g SHUNT to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL. Anchorage screens to the RLGM input based on similar panels yielding significant seismic capacity margins.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 29 1-BATT-CD PLANT BATTERY CD Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the Battery Rack.PLANT BATTERY Typical of cabinet containing shunts (similar 30 1-BATT-CD-BATT-CD AMMETER Screened >RLGM to 1-BATT-AB-SH).
Cabinet also contains SH SHUNT 1-BC-CD-SH.
Equipment screens (other S I I Ithan anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g 0 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 89 of 151 CNP HCLPF Unit 1 Failure ESEL ID DESCRIPTION Mode (compared Notes Item # to RLGM)screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the RLGM input based on similar panels yielding significant seismic capacity margins.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 1BCAB2 PLANT BATTERY NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for BATT-AB CHARGER #2 RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the Battery Charger.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI PLANT BATTERY NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for BATT-CD CHARGER #1 RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the Battery Charger.PLANT BATTERY Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CHARGERS BC-AB1 for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 33 1-BCTC-AB AND BC-AB2 Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for TRANSFER PANEL RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the Panel.PLANT BATTERY Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CHARGERS BC-CD1 for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 34 1-BCTC-CD AND BC-CD2 Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for TRANSFER PANEL RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the Panel.STEAM GENERATOR Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
OME-3-1 WIDE RANGE for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 35 1-BLI-110 LEVEL INDICATOR Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for TRANSMITTER RLGM based on existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for this equipment.
STEAM GENERATOR Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
OME-3-2 WIDE RANGE for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 36 1-BLI-120 LEVEL INDICATOR Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for TRANSMITTER RLGM based on existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for this equipment.
STEAM GENERATOR Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
OME-3-3 WIDE RANGE for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 37 1-BLM-130 LEVEL INDICATOR Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for TRANSMITTER RLGM based on existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for this equipment.
STEAM GENERATOR Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
OME-3-4 WIDE RANGE for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 38 1-BLI-140 LEVEL INDICATOR Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for TRANSMITTER RLGM based on existing USI A-46 I_ I I I anchorage evaluation for this equipment.
SOL Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 90 of 151 CNP HCLPF Unit I ID DESCRIPTION Failure (compared Notes ESEL Mode to RLGM)Item #25OVDC TRAIN 'B' Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CRITICAL SOLENOID for the 0,8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 39 1-CCV-AB CALV S Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for DISTRIBUTION PANEL RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for this item.250VDC TRAIN 'A' Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CRITICAL SOLENOID for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 40 1-CCV-CD CALV S Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for DIVST O PRLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-DISTRIBUTION PANEL 46 anchorage evaluation for this item.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI COMPONENT COOLING NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the 41 1-CCW WATER CONTROL Screened >RLGM RLGM input based on similar panels within PANEL the control room yielding significant seismic capacity margins.REACTOR Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
RTEACTIO for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 42 1-CG1-14 CON Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for CONTROL GROUP #1 RLGM based on existing USI A-46 CABINET__#14_anchorage evaluation for this equipment.
REACTOR Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRi 43 1-CG1-15 CON Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for CONTROL GROUP #1 RLGM based on existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for this equipment.
REACTOR Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 44 1-CG2-17 CON Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for CONTROL GROUP #2 RLGM based on existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for this equipment.
REACTOR Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 45 1-CG2-19 CON Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for CONTROL GROUP #2 RLGM based on existing USI A-46 CABINET___19_anchorage evaluation for this equipment.
REACTOR Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
RTEACTIO for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 46 1-CG3-20 CON Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for CABINET #20 RLGM based on existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for this equipment.
REACTOR Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 47 1-CG3-21 CON Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for CONTROL GROUP #3 RLGM based on existing USI A-46 CABINT I2 I anchorage evaluation for this equipment.
0 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 91 of 151 CNP HCLPF Unit 1 Failure ESEL ID DESCRIPTION Mode (compared Notes ESEL Mode t LM Item # to RLGM)REACTOR Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 48 1-CG4-22 CONTROL GROUP #4 Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for CABINET #22 RLGM based on existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for this equipment.
REACTOR Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
RTEACTIO for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 49 1-CG4-23 CONTROL GROUP #4 Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for CABINETR#23 RLGM based on existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for this equipment.
CONDENSATE Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
STORAGE TANK TK-32 for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 50 1-CLI-114 LEVEL INDICATOR Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for LEEANMICATOR RLGM based on existing USI A-46 TRANSMITTER__anchorage evaluation for this equipment.
COMPONENT This valve is within Earthquake Experience COOLING WATER Data Base (Fig. F-26) in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
51 1-CMO-413 PUMPS SUCTION Screened >RLGM Therefore, valve is screened for 0.8g to 1.2 CROSS TIE TRAIN 'B' g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
SHUTOFF VALVE COMPONENT This valve is within Earthquake Experience COOLING WATER Data Base (Fig. F-26) in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
52 1-CMO-414 PUMPS DISCHARGE Screened >RLGM Therefore, valve is screened for 0.8g to 1.2 CROSS TIE TRAIN 'B' g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
SHUTOFF VALVE COMPONENT This valve is within Earthquake Experience COOLING WATER TO Data Base (Fig. F-26) in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
53 1-CMO-416 MISCELLANEOUS Screened >RLGM Therefore, valve is screened for 0.8g to 1.2 SERVICE TRAIN 'B' g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
SHUTOFF VALVE WEST RESIDUAL HEAT This valve is within Earthquake Experience REMOVAL HEAT Data Base (Fig. F-26) in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
EXCHANGER Therefore, valve is screened for 0.8g to 1.2g 54 1-CMO-429 COMPONENT Screened >RLGM screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
COOLING WATER OUTLET SHUTOFF VALVE Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI CONDENSATE PUMP NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the CONTROL PANEL RLGM input based on similar panels within the control room yielding significant seismic capacity margins.120VAC CONTROL Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
ROOM INSTRUMENT for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI DISTRIBUTION NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for CHANNEL I RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 PaRe 92 of 151 CNP HCLPF Unit I FailureNte EnEt ID DESCRIPTION Mode (compared Notes ESEL Mode t LM Item #to RLGM)Item #DISTRIBUTION PANEL 46 anchorage evaluation of panel 1-ERR, which governs the capacity of this item.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 120VAC CONTROL NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage could not be ROOM screened for RLGM based on scaling of 1-CRID INSTRUMENTATION existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.
57 INV DISTRIBUTION Screened >RLGM The governing HCLPF capacity for the SYSTEM CHANNEL 1 anchorage according to S&A Calculation INVERTER 13Q3208-CAL-004
-"HCLPF Calculations for Screened in ESEP Components" (Ref.10.1) is 0.839g and therefore did not control screening.
120VAC CONTROL Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
ROOM INSTRUMENT for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI ROOM NSTRMENTNP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for 58 1-CRID-2 DISTRIBUTION Screened >RLGM RLGM based oncag ofreng UoA CHANELIIRLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-CHANNEL II DISTRIBUTION PANEL 46 anchorage evaluation of panel 1-ERR, which governs the capacity of this item.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 120VAC CONTROL NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage could not be ROOM screened for RLGM based on scaling of 1-CRID INSTRUMENTATION existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.
59 INV DISTRIBUTION Screened >RLGM The governing HCLPF capacity for the SYSTEM CHANNEL 2 anchorage according to S&A Calculation INVERTER 13Q3208-CAL-004
-"HCLPF Calculations for Screened in ESEP Components" (Ref.10.1) is 0.839g and therefore did not control screening.
120VAC CONTROL Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
ROOM INSTRUMENT for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 60 1-CRID-3 DISTRIBUTION Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for CHANNEL III RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-DISTRIBUTION PANEL 46 anchorage evaluation of panel 1-ERR, which governs the capacity of this item.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 120VAC CONTROL NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage could not be ROOM screened for RLGM based on scaling of 1-CRID INSTRUMENTATION existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.
61 INV DISTRIBUTION Screened >RLGM The governing HCLPF capacity for the SYSTEM CHANNEL 3 anchorage according to S&A Calculation INVERTER 13Q3208-CAL-004
-"HCLPF Calculations for Screened in ESEP Components" (Ref.10.1) is 0.839g and therefore did not control screening.
P 3 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 93 of 151 CNP HCLPF Unit I Failure ESEL ID DESCRIPTION Mode (compared Notes Item # to RLGM)120VAC CONTROL Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
ROOM INSTRUMENT for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for 62 1-CRID-4 DISTRIBUTION Screened >RLGM RLGM based oncag ofreng USA CHANNL IVRLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-CHANNEL IV DISTRIBUTION PANEL 46 anchorage evaluation of panel 1-ERR, which governs the capacity of this item.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 120VAC CONTROL NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage could not be ROOM screened for RLGM based on scaling of 1-CRID INSTRUMENTATION existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.
63 INV DISTRIBUTION Screened >RLGM The governing HCLPF capacity for the SYSTEM CHANNEL 4 anchorage according to S&A Calculation INVERTER 13Q3208-CAL-004
-"HCLPF Calculations for Screened in ESEP Components" (Ref.10.1) is 0.839g and therefore did not control screening.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI DELTA 'T' AND UNIT NP-NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the CONTROL PANEL RLGM input based on similar panels within the control room yielding significant seismic capacity margins.120/208VAC Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
EMERGENCYLOCAL for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI 65 1-ELSC SHUTDOWN Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the DISTRIBUTION PANEL RLGM input based on similar panels yielding significant seismic capacity margins.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) 600VAC MOTOR for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 66 1-EZC-B CONTROL CENTER Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for EZC-B RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation of this MCC.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) 600VAC MOTOR for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 67 1-EZC-C CONTROL CENTER Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for EZC-C RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation of this MCC.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) 600VAC MOTOR for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 68 1-EZC-D CONTROL CENTER Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for EZC-D RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation of this MCC.AUXILIARY Equipment screens (other than anchorage) 69 1-FFI-210 FEEDWATER TO for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI STEAM GENERATOR NP-6041-SL.
Flow transmitter is a small, OME-3-1 FLOW light-weight (27 lb.) component.
Mounted to Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 PaRe 94 of 151 E3 CNP HCLPF Unit I Failure ESEL ID DESCRIPTION Mode (compared Notes Item M e to RLGM)Item #INDICATOR the wall using two 1/2" expansion bolts, TRANSMITTER equipment bolted to 2" pipe, 7" out from the wall and approximately 4" up. Transmitter is IEEE-344-1975 qualified.
Anchorage screens based on light weight component with rugged anchorage.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
AUXILIARY for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI FEEDWATER TO NP-6041-SL.
Flow transmitter is a small, 70 STEAM GENERATOR Screened >RLGM light-weight (27 lb.) component.
Mounted on OME-3-2 FLOW a u-shaped pipe frame which is welded to INDICATOR steel column (box structure) on both sides.TRANSMITTER Anchorage screens based on light weight component with rugged anchorage.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
AUXILIARY for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI FEEDWATER TO NP-6041-SL.
Flow transmitter is a small, STEAM GENERATOR light-weight (27 lb.) component.
Mounted on 71 1-FFI-230 OME-3-3NFLOW Screened >RLGM a u-shaped pipe frame which is welded to INDICATOR steel column (box structure) on both sides.TRANSMITTER Transmitter is IEEE-344-1975 qualified.
Anchorage screens based on light weight component with rugged anchorage.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI AUXILIARY NP-6041-SL.
Flow transmitter is a small, FEEDWATER TO light-weight (27 lb.) component.
It is STEAM GENERATOR mounted on a L-shaped pipe frame (2" pipe, OME-3-4 FLOW 7" out from the wall and approximately 13" INDICATOR up) with 2 1/2" bolts mounted to the wall with TRANSMITTER two expansion anchors. Anchorage screens based on the light weight and the rugged anchorage.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI FIXED INCORE NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the CONTROL PANEL RLGM input based on similar panels within the control room yielding significant seismic capacity margins.REACTOR CORE Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
THERMOCOUPLE for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 74 1-FICT-A TRAIN 'A' Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the TRANSMITTER RLGM input based on a screening CABINET calculation.
FLUX CONTROL Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PANEL for the 0.8g to 1,2g screening lane in EPRI SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 95 of 151 CNP HCLPF Unit I Failure ESEL ID DESCRIPTION Mode (compared Notes Item # to RLGM)NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the RLGM input based on similar panels within the control room yielding significant seismic capacity margins.Anchorage could not be screened for RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 WEST COMPONENT anchorage evaluation for the HX. The 80 1-HE-15W COOLING WATER Anchorage 0.547g governing HCLPF capacity for the anchorage according to S&A Calculation HEAT EXCHANGER 13Q3208-CAL-004
-"HCLPF Calculations for Screened in ESEP Components" (Ref.10.1) is 0.547g.Anchorage screened for RLGM based on WEST RESIDUAL HEAT existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation of 81 1-HE-17W REMOVAL HEAT Screened >RLGM this HX without top braces; braces were EXCHANGER installed after the evaluation and provide substantial support.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the RLGM input based on similar panels within the control room yielding significant seismic capacity margins. The potentially governing UNIT 1 HOT Block Wall interaction could not be screened SHUTDOWN PANEL for RLGM based on scaling of existing design basis calculation.
The governing HCLPF capacity for the block wall according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-004
-"HCLPF Calculations for Screened in ESEP Components" (Ref. 10.1) is 2.682g and therefore did not control screening.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-60411-SL.
Chiller on vibration isolators, later modified to be restrained in all directions.
Anchorage screened to a level greater than the RLGM by scaling the CONTROL ROOM AIR design basis anchorage calculation.
83 1-HV-ACR-2 CONDITIONING SOUTH Screened >RLGM The potentially governing Block Wall LIQUID CHILLER TeptnilygvrigBokWl interaction could not be screened for RLGM based on scaling of existing design basis calculation.
The governing HCLPF capacity for the block wall according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-004
-"HCLPF Calculations for Screened in ESEP Components" (Ref. 10.1) is 1.215g and P ki3 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 96 of 151 CNP HCLPF Unit 1 Failure EnEt ID DESCRIPTION Mode (compared Notes ESEL Mode t LM Item #to RLGM)Item #therefore did not control screening.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for this item. The CONTROL ROOM potentially governing Block Wall interaction 1-HV-ACRA-VENTILATION SOUTH could not be screened for RLGM based on 2 AIR CONDITIONING scaling of existing design basis calculation.
UNIT The governing HCLPF capacity for the block wall according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-004 -"HCLPF Calculations for Screened in ESEP Components" (Ref. 10.1)is 1.215g and therefore did not control screening.
OUTSIDE AIR TO Damper included on HVAC duct work, equipment screens for the 0.8g to 1.2 g 1-HV-ACR-CONTROL ROOM screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
A CNP 85 DA-2 PRESSURIZATION/CLE Screened >RLGM analysis of the duct work and supporting rod ACRF VENT DAMPER hangers indicates a large margin and therefore screens for the RLGM input.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the RLGM input based on similar filter anchorage with significant seismic capacity CONTROL ROOM margins. The potentially governing Block Wall interaction could not be screened for 86 1-HV-ACRF PRESSURIZATION/CLE Screened >RLGM RlG basedon calinof exsting dsg ANUP FILTER UNIT RLGM based on scaling of existing design basis calculation.
The governing HCLPF capacity for the block wall according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-004
-"HCLPF Calculations for Screened in ESEP Components" (Ref. 10.1) is 1.215g and therefore did not control screening.
CONTROL ROOM This equipment item is included in the 87 1-HV-ACRF-PRESSURIZATION/CLE Screened >RLGM existing USI A-46 evaluation for 1-HV-2 ANUP FILTER UNIT ACRA-2. This equipment item screens (see VENT FAN #2 1-HV-ACRA-2 for details).Heater included on HVAC duct work and CONTROL ROOM screens for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane 1-HV-ACR-VENTILATION SOUTH in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
A CNP analysis of the 88 H2 DUCT ELECTRIC Screened >RLGM duct work and supporting rod hangers HEATING UNIT indicates a large margin and therefore screens for the RLGM input.
SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 97 of 151 CNP HCLPF Unit 1 ID DESCRIPTION Failure (compared Notes ESEL Mode to RLGM)Item #Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
AB BATTERY for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI SEQUIPMENT AREA Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Fan hung from ceiling, in 90 5 BATTERY ROOM vertical alignment; fan weighs 360 lbs.VENTILATION Anchorage screens due to relatively small fan with rugged anchorage.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI CD BATTERY NP-6041-SL.
Fan bolted to floor with 8- 1/2" 1-HV-SGRX-EQUIPMENT AREA Screened >RLGM expansion bolts that are adequately 6 BATTERY ROOM embedded; fan weighs 500 lbs. Anchorage VENTILATION screens due to relatively small fan with rugged anchorage.
RHR TO REACTOR This valve is within Earthquake Experience COOLANT LOOPS #2 & Screened >RLGM Data Base (Fig. F-26) in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
92 1-1CM-111
#3 COLD LEGS Therefore, valve is screened for 0.8g to 1.2> g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
REACTOR COOLANT This valve is within Earthquake Experience LOOP #2 HOT LEG TO Data Base (Fig. F-26) in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
RESIDUAL Therefore, valve is screened for 0.8g to 1.2g 93 1-1CM-129 HEATREMOVAL screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
PUMPS SUCTION CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE The weight of this valve is outside the BORON INJECTION Earthquake Experience Data Base (Fig. F-TANK TRAIN 'B' 26) in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
A 3g analysis was 94 1-1CM-251 OUTLET Screened >RLGM performed resulting in acceptable stresses.CONTAINMENT Therefore, valve is screened for 0.8g to 1.2g ISOLATION VALVE screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Equipment screens for the 0.8g to 1.2 g BORON INJECTION TO screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL based REACTOR COOLANT Screened >RLGM on light weight component with rugged 96 1-IFI-51 LOOP #1 FLOW anchorage.
INDICATOR TRANSMITTER Equipment screens for the 0.8g to 1.2 g BORON INJECTION TO screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL based REACTOR COOLANT Screened >RLGM on light weight component with rugged 97 1-IFI-52 LOOP #2 anchorage.
FLOWINDICATOR TRANSMITTER SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 98 of 151 CNP HCLPF Unit I Failure ESEL ID DESCRIPTION Mode (compared Notes Item # to RLGM)Equipment screens for the 0.8g to 1.2 g BORON INJECTION TO screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL based REACTOR COOLANT Screened >RLGM on light weight component with rugged 98 1-IFI-53 LOOP #3 FLOW anchorage.LG anchorage.
INDICATOR TRANSMITTER Equipment screens for the 0.8g to 1.2 g BORON INJECTION TO screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL based REACTOR COOLANT Screened >RLGM on light weight component with rugged 99 1-IFI-54 LOOP #4 FLOW anchorage.
INDICATOR TRANSMITTER REACTOR COOLANT This valve is within Earthquake Experience LOOP #2 HOT LEG TO Data Base (Fig. F-26) in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
RESIDUAL Screened >RLGM Therefore, valve is screened for 0.8g to 1.2g HEATREMOVAL screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
PUMPS SUCTION SHUTOFF VALVE The weight of this valve is outside the Earthquake Experience Data Base (Fig. F-26) in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
A 3g analysis was BORON INJECTION performed resulting in acceptable stresses.101 1-IMO-256 TANK TRAIN'B'INLET Screened >RLGM Therefore, valve is screened for 0.8g to 1.2g SHUTOFF VALVE screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
A potential Block Wall interaction was screened for RLGM based on scaling of existing design basis calculation.
This valve is within the Earthquake Experience Data Base (Fig. F-26) in EPRI 6041-SL. Therefore, valve is screened for 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-EAST RESIDUAL HEAT 6041-SL. The potentially governing Block REMOVAL PUMP PP- Seismic Wall interaction could not be screened for 35EMSCTONA PnteractPon 0.428g 102 1-IMO-310 35E SUCTION Interaction RLGM based on scaling of existing design SHUTOFF VALVE basis calculation.
The governing HCLPF capacity for the block wall according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-004
-"HCLPF Calculations for Screened in ESEP Components" (Ref. 10.1) is 0.428g.103 1-IMO-324 WEST RHR HX 1-HE-17W DISCHARGE CROSSTIE SHUTOFF VALVE Screened>RLGM This valve is within the Earthquake Experience Data Base (Fig. F-26) in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Therefore, valve is screened for 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-0 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 99 of 151 CNP HCLPF Unit 1 Failure ESEL ID DESCRIPTION Mode (compared Notes Item M e to RLGM)Item #6041-SL.The hydrogen igniters are composed of the Igniter Box, glow plug, shield and other associated hardware.
The components within the igniter box are not fragile and are CONTAINMENT encompassed by the Earthquake 1-LDISB- HYDROGEN IGNITION Screened >RLGM Experience Data Base of EPRI NP-6041-SL.
104 B19 LOWER VOLUME Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI ASSEMBLY #B19 NP-6041-SL.
Equipment supported by unistrut cantilevered off the containment wall. Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling existing anchorage evaluation.
CONTAINMENT See notes for 1-LDISB-B19.
Assembly 1-LDISB- HYDROGEN IGNITION Screened >RLGM screened for 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in 105 B20 LOWER VOLUME EPRI NP-6041-SL and anchorage loadings TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG for RLGM.ASSEMBLY #B20 CONTAINMENT See notes for 1-LDISB-B19.
Assembly 1-LDISB- HYDROGEN IGNITION Screened >RLGM screened for 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in 106 B21 LOWER VOLUME EPRI NP-6041-SL and anchorage loadings TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG for RLGM.ASSEMBLY #B21 CONTAINMENT See notes for 1-LDISB-B19.
Assembly 1-LDISB- HYDROGEN IGNITION Screened >RLGM screened for 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in 107 B22 LOWER VOLUME EPRI NP-6041-SL and anchorage loadings TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG for RLGM.ASSEMBLY #B22 CONTAINMENT See notes for 1-LDISB-B19.
Assembly 1-LDISB- HYDROGEN IGNITION Screened >RLGM screened for 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in 108 B23 LOWER VOLUME EPRI NP-6041-SL and anchorage loadings TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG for RLGM.ASSEMBLY #B23 CONTAINMENT See notes for 1-LDISB-B19.
Assembly 1-LDISB- HYDROGEN IGNITION Screened >RLGM screened for 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in 109 B24 LOWER VOLUME EPRI NP-6041-SL and anchorage loadings TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG for RLGM ASSEMBLY #B24 CONTAINMENT Equipment supported by unistrut HYDROGEN IGNITION cantilevered off column. See notes for 1-110 1-LDISB- LOWER VOLUME Screened >RLGM LDISB-B19.
Assembly screened for 0.8g to B25 TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL ASSEMBLY #B25 and anchorage loadings for RLGM SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 PaRe 100 of 151 CNP HCLPF Unit I Failure ESEL ID DESCRIPTION Mode (compared Notes Item # to RLGM)CONTAINMENT Equipment supported by unistrut HYDROGEN IGNITION cantilevered off column. See notes for 1-1-LDISB- LOWER VOLUME Screened >RLGM LDISB-B 19. Assembly screened for 0.8g to B26 TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL ASSEMBLY #826 and anchorage loadings for RLGM CONTAINMENT Equipment supported by unistrut HYDROGEN IGNITION cantilevered off column. See notes for 1-112 1-LDISB- LOWER VOLUME Screened >RLGM LDISB-B319.
Assembly screened for 0.8g to B27 TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL ASSEMBLY #827 and anchorage loadings for RLGM Equipment supported by unistrut CONTAINMENT cantilevered off column, the equipment is HYDROGEN IGNITION approximately 20 ft. above the viewing 113 1-LDISB- LOWER VOLUME Screened >RLGM location.
See notes for 1-LDISB-B19.
B28 TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG Assembly screened for 0.8g to 1.2g ASSEMBLY #B28 screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL and anchorage loadings for RLGM 1-LDISB- CONTAINMENT See notes for 1-LDISB-B19.
Assembly B29 HYDROGEN IGNITION screened for 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in 114 LOWER VOLUME Screened >RLGM EPRI NP-6041-SL and anchorage loadings TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG for RLGM ASSEMBLY #829 CONTAINMENT See notes for 1-LDISB-B19.
Assembly 1-LDISB- HYDROGEN IGNITION Screened >RLGM screened for 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in 115 B30 LOWER VOLUME EPRI NP-6041-SL and anchorage loadings TRAIN'B' GLOW PLUG for RLGM ASSEMBLY #830 CONTAINMENT See notes for 1-LDISB-B19.
Assembly 1-LDISB- HYDROGEN IGINTION Screened >RLGM screened for 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in 116 B31 LOWER VOLUME EPRI NP-6041-SL and anchorage loadings TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG for RLGM ASSEMBLY #831 CONTAINMENT See notes for 1-LDISB-B19.
Assembly 1-LDISB- HYDROGEN IGNITION Screened >RLGM screened for 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in 117 B32 LOWER VOLUME EPRI NP-6041-SL and anchorage loadings TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG for RLGM ASSEMBLY #832 CONTAINMENT See notes for 1-LDISB-B19.
Assembly 1-LDISB- HYDROGEN IGNITION Screened >RLGM screened for 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in 118 B33 LOWER VOLUME EPRI NP-6041-SL and anchorage loadings TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG for RLGM ASSEMBLY #833 1-LDISB- CONTAINMENT Screened >RLGM See notes for 1-LDISB-B19.
Assembly B34 HYDROGEN IGNITION screened for 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 101 of 151 CNP HCLPF Unit I Failure ESEL ID DESCRIPTION Mode (compared Notes Item # to RLGM)LOWER VOLUME EPRI NP-6041-SL and anchorage loadings TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG for RLGM ASSEMBLY #B34 Equipment bolted to unistrut, which is CONTAINMENT cantilevered off column 13 of quad 4, the HYDROGEN IGNITION unistrut is welded to this column. See notes 120 B35 LOWER VOLUME for 1-LDISB-B19.
Assembly screened for TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-ASSEMBLY #B35 6041-SL and anchorage loadings for RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
STEAM GENERATORS for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 121 1-LSI-1 #1 AND # LOCAL Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for SHUTDOWN STATION RLGM based on existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for this panel.Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
STEAM GENERATORS for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 122 1-LSI-2 #2 AND #3 LOCAL Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for SHUTDOWN STATION RLGM based on existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for this panel.Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
REACTOR COOLANT for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI SYSTEM CHARGING Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for AND LETDOWN LOCAL RLGM based on existing USI A-46 SHUTDOWN STATION anchorage evaluation for this panel.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 124 1-MCAB 250VDC DISTRIBUTION Screened .>RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for PANEL MCAB RLGM based on existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for this panel.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 250VDC DISTRIBUTION Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for POWER PANEL RLGM based on existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for this panel.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 250VDC DISTRIBUTION Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for PANEL MDAB RLGM based on existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for this panel.250VDC DISTRIBUTION Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PANEL MDCD for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 10 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 102 of 151 CNP HCLPF Unit 1 Failure ESEL ID DESCRIPTION e (compared Notes ESLMode (cmaeNos Item # to RLGM)6041-SL. Anchorage screened for RLGM based on existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for this panel.Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
STEAM GENERATOR for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 128 1-MPP-210 OME-3-1 CHANNEL I Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for STEAM PRESSURE RLGM based on existing USI A-46 TRANSMITTER anchorage evaluation for this transmitter.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
STEAM GENERATOR for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 129 1-MPP-220 OME-3-2 CHANNEL I Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for STEAM PRESSURE RLGM based on existing USI A-46 TRANSMITTER anchorage evaluation for this transmitter.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
STEAM GENERATOR for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 130 1-MPP-230 OME-3-3 CHANNEL I Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for STEAM PRESSURE RLGM based on existing USI A-46 TRANSMITTER anchorage evaluation for this transmitter.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
STEAM GENERATOR for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI OME-3-4 CHANNEL I Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for STEAM PRESSURE RLGM based on existing USI A-46 TRANSMITTER anchorage evaluation for this transmitter.
This valve is outside the Earthquake STEAM GENERATOR Experience Data Base (Fig. F-25) in EPRI OME-3-1 POWER Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
A 3g load analysis was 132 1-MRV-213 OPERATED performed, resulting in acceptable stresses.RELIEFVALVE Therefore, valve is screened for 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 6041-SL.This valve is outside the Earthquake STEAM GENERATOR Experience Data Base (Fig. F-25) in EPRI OME-3-2 POWER Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
A 3g load analysis was 133 1-MRV-223 OPERATED RELIEF performed, resulting in acceptable stresses.VALVE Therefore, valve is screened for 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
STEAM GENERATOR This valve is outside the Earthquake Experience Data Base (Fig. F-25) in EPRI 134 1-MRV-233 OPERATED RELIEF NP-6041-SL.
A 3g load analysis was VALVE performed, resulting in acceptable stresses.Therefore, valve is screened for 0.8g to 1.2 SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 103 of 151 CNP HCLPF Unit IFalr EnEt ID DESCRIPTION Failure (compared Notes ESEL Mode (o Notes Item #to RLGM)Item #g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
This valve is outside the Earthquake STEAM GENERATOR Experience Data Base (Fig. F-25) in EPRI OME-3-4 POWER Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
A 3g load analysis was 135 1-MRV-243 OPERATED performed, resulting in acceptable stresses.RELIEFVALVE Therefore, valve is screened for 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 6041-SL.NUCLEAR Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
INSTRUMENTATION for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 136 1-NIS-1 SYSTEM PROTECTION Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for CHANNEL I CONTROL RLGM based on existing USI A-46 PANEL anchorage evaluation for this panel.Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PRESSURIZER OME-4 for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI PROTECTION Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for CHANNEL I RLGM based on existing USI A-46 LEVELTRANSMITTER anchorage evaluation for this transmitter.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
REACTOR VESSEL for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
The transmitter is IEEE-344-138 1-NPS-110 PRESSURE 75 Qualified.
Anchorage screened for RLGM TRANSMITTER based on existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for this transmitter.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage could not be screened for RLGM based on scaling of NUCLEAR existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for 142 1-NRI INSTRUMENTATION Screened >RLGM the Amplifier.
The governing HCLPF AMP WIDE RANGE capacity for the anchorage according to RADIATION AMPLIFIER S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-004
-"HCLPF Calculations for Screened in ESEP Components" (Ref. 10.1) is 1.16g and did not control the capacity.Equipment is within Earthquake Experience PRESSURIZER TRAIN Data (Fig. F-25) of EPRI NP-6041-SL and 143 1-NRV-152
'B'PRESSURE RELIEF Sscreens for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane VALVE in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
PRESSURIZER OME-4 Equipment is within Earthquake Experience 144 1-NRV-153 TRAIN A PRESSURE Data (Fig. F-25) of EPRI NP-6041-SL and RELIEF VALVE screens for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 104 of 151 CNP HCLPF Unit 1 Failure ESEL ID DESCRIPTION Mode (compared Notes ESEL Mode t LM Item # to RLGM)in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
REACTOR COOLANT The Thermal Sensor is IEEE-344-75 LOOP #1 HOT LEG Qualified.
Rugged component no seismic 149 1-NTR-110 WIDE Screened >RLGM interaction concerns.
Equipment screens for RANGETEMPERATURE the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-RECORDER THERMAL 6041-SL.SENSOR REACTOR COOLANT The Thermal Sensor is IEEE-344-75 LOOP #3 HOT LEG Qualified.
Rugged component no seismic 150 1-NTR-130 WIDE Screened >RLGM interaction concerns.
Equipment screens for RANGETEMPERATURE the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-RECORDER THERMAL 6041-SL.SENSOR REACTOR COOLANT The Thermal Sensor is IEEE-344-75 LOOP #1 COLD LEG Qualified.
Rugged component no seismic 151 1-NTR-210 WIDE Screened >RLGM interaction concerns.
Equipment screens for RANGETEMPERATURE the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-RECORDER THERMAL 6041-SL.SENSOR REACTOR COOLANT The Thermal Sensor is IEEE-344-75 LOOP #3 COLD LEG Qualified.
Rugged component no seismic 152 1-NTR-230 WIDE Screened >RLGM interaction concerns.
Equipment screens for RANGETEMPERATURE the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-RECORDER THERMAL 6041-SL.SENSOR Strainer supported on two 14" wide, 12" deep, and 18" tall concrete pedestals.
TURBINE DRIVEN Equipment bolted to pedestals with four 3/4" anchor bolts, one set of two bolts in each 153 1-OME-33 PUMP PP-4 SUCTION pedestal, spaced at 6" apart. The piping is STRAINER well supported, the strainer is small relative to the anchorage and therefore, this is screened for the RLGM.Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
WEST ESSENTIAL for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 154 1-OME-34W SERVICE WATER Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for PUMP PP-7W DISCH RLGM based on existing USI A-46 STN anchorage evaluation for similar pump.ACCUMULATOR TANK Screened >RLGM Anchorage screened for RLGM input based 155 1-OME-6-1
#1 on screening calculation.
ACCUMULATOR TANK Screened >RLGM Anchorage screened for RLGM input based 156 1-OME-6-2
#2 on screening calculation.
SA I Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 105 of 151 CNP HCLPF Unit I Failure ESEL ID DESCRIPTION Mode (compared Notes Item # to RLGM)ACCUMULATOR TANK Screened >RLGM Anchorage screened for RLGM input based 157 1-OME-6-3
#3 on screening calculation.
ACCUMULATOR TANK Screened >RLGM Anchorage screened for RLGM input based 158 1-OME-6-4
#4 on screening calculation.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
WEST COMPONENT for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 159 1-PP-iOW COOLING WATER Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for PUMP RLGM based on existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for this pump.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Pump is supported vertically, but free to translate laterally.
The Pump screened for RLGM based on existing stress WEST RESIDUAL HEAT Seisi 0.423g evaluation of this pump and attached lines.REMOVAL PUMP The governing HCLPF capacity for the block wall according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-004 -"HCLPF Calculations for Screened in ESEP Components" (Ref. 10.1)is 0.423g.Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
TURBINE DRIVEN for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 161 1-PP-4 AUXILIARY FEED Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for PUMP RLGM based on existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for this pump.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the RLGM input based on robust anchorage for relatively small pump. However, the HCLPF BORIC ACID STORAGE Seismic for this component is limited by the Boric 162 1-PP-46-1 TANKS TRANSFER Interaction 0.227g Acid Storage Tank 1-TK-12N due to the PUMP #1 attached piping. HCLPF capacity according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-005
-"HCLPF Calculations for Screened in ESEP Tanks" (Ref. 10.2) for the tank is 0.227g that is less than the RLGM of 0.387g.CONTROL ROOM AIR Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CONDITROL G R OM H A for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 163 1-PP-82S COITI N NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for CIRCULATION PUMP RLGM based on existing USI A-46 CIRCULATION I IUManchorage evaluation for this pump. The PO Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 106 of 151 CNP HCLPF Unit 1 Failure ESEL ID DESCRIPTION Mode (compared Notes IEm Moe to RLGM)Item #governing HCLPF capacity for the block wall according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-004 -"HCLPF Calculations for Screened in ESEP Components" (Ref. 10.1)is 1.215g and did not control the capacity.Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
UPPER CONTAINMENT for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 164 1-PPA-310 CHANNEL III WIDE Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RANGE PRESSURE RLGM based on comparison to similar ALARM TRANSMITTER transmitters.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the 165 1-PRZ CONTROLEPANEL RLGM input based on similar panels within the control room yielding significant seismic capacity margins.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the RLGM input based on robust anchorage for NORTH BORIC ACID small instrument.
However, the HCLPF for STORAGE TANK TK- Seismic this component is limited by the Boric Acid 16612N LEVEL ALARM Interaction 0.2AStorage Tank 1-TK-12N due to the attached TRANSMITTER piping. HCLPF capacity according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-005
-"HCLPF Calculations for Screened in ESEP Tanks" (Ref. 10.2) for the tank is 0.227g that is less than the RLGM of 0.387g.Equipment is within Earthquake Experience AIR OPERATED VALVE Data (Fig. F-25) of EPRI NP-6041-SL and 167 1-QRV-200 TO ISOLATE BORON Screened >RLGM Daa(i.F2)oEPIN-41Lan screens for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane INJECTION PATH in EPRI 6041-SL.TURBINE DRIVEN Equipment is within Earthquake Experience AUXILIARY FEED Screened >RLGM Data (Fig. F-26) of EPRI NP-6041-SL and 168 1-QT-506 PUMP PP-4 TRIP AND screens for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane THROTTLE VALVE in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Equipment is within Earthquake Experience AUXILIARY TUBN Screened >RLGM Data (Fig. F-26) of EPRI NP-6041-SL and 169 1-QT-507 PUMP TURBINE Sscreens for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane GOVERNOR VALVE in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 107 of 151 CNP HCLPF Unit I ID DESCRIPTION Failure (compared Notes ESEL Mode (o Notes Item # to RLGM)Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the RLGM input based on robust anchorage for small instrument.
However, the HCLPF for NORTH BAST TK-12N Seismic this component is limited by the Boric Acid 170 1-QTC-410 TRAIN 'A' HTR TEMP Interaction 0.227g Storage Tank 1-TK-12N due to the attached CONTROLLER piping. HCLPF capacity according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-005
-"HCLPF Calculations for Screened in ESEP Tanks" (Ref. 10.2) for the tank is 0.227g that is less than the RLGM of 0.387g.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI RESIDUAL HEAT Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the 171 1-RHR REMOVAL CONTROL RLGM based on similar panels within the PANEL control room yielding significant seismic capacity margins.Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
REACTOR for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI PROTECTION Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for CHANNEL I CABINET RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46#1 anchorage evaluation.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
REACTOR for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI PROTECTION Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the CHANNEL I CABINET RLGM based on similar cabinets yielding#2 significant seismic capacity margins.Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
REACTOR for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI 174 1-RPC-1-3 PROTECTION Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the CHANNEL I CABINET RLGM based on similar cabinets yielding#3 significant seismic capacity margins.Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
REACTOR for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI PROTECTION Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the CHANNEL I CABINET RLGM based on similar cabinets yielding#4 significant seismic capacity margins.REACTOR Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION Screened >RLGM for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI CHANNEL II CABINET NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the#5 RLGM based on similar cabinets yielding PO Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 108 of 151 CNP HCLPF Unit 1 ID DESCRIPTION Failure (compared Notes ESEL Mode to RLGM)Item #significant seismic capacity margins.Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
REACTOR for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI PROTECTION Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the CHANNEL II CABINET RLGM based on similar cabinets yielding#6 significant seismic capacity margins.Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
REACTOR for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI PROTECTION Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the CHANNEL II CABINET RLGM based on similar cabinets yielding#7 significant seismic capacity margins.Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
REACTOR for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI 179 1-RPC-2-8 PROTECTION Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the CHANNEL II CABINET RLGM based on similar cabinets yielding#8 significant seismic capacity margins.Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
REACTOR for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI PROTECTION Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the CHANNEL III CABINET RLGM based on similar cabinets yielding#10 significant seismic capacity margins.Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
REACTOR for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI PROTECTION Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the CHANNEL III CABINET RLGM based on similar cabinets yielding#9 significant seismic capacity margins.Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
REACTOR for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI PROTECTION Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the CHANNEL IV CABINET RLGM based on similar cabinets yielding#12 significant seismic capacity margins.Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
REACTOR for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI PROTECTION AND Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the 183 1-RPS-A SAFEGUARD RLGM based on similar panels within the ACTUATION TRAIN 'A' control room yielding significant seismic CABINET capacity margins.REACTOR Equipment screens (other than anchorage) 184 1-RPS-B PROTECTION AND for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI SAFEGUARD NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the PO Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 PaRe 109 of 151 CNP HCLPF Unit 1 (compare ESEL ID DESCRIPTION Failure (compared Notes ESEL Mode to RLGM)Item #ACTUATION TRAIN 'B' RLGM based on similar panels within the CABINET control room yielding significant seismic capacity margins.REACTOR Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION AND for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 185 1-RPSX-A SAFEGUARD Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for ACTUATIO N TRAIN 'A' RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 AUXILIARY CABINET anchorage evaluation.
REACTOR Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION AND for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 186 1-RPSX-B SAFEGUARD Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for ACTUATIO N TRAIN 'B' RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 AUXILIARY CABINET anchorage evaluation.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the REACTOR VESSEL RLGM based on similar cabinets yielding OME-1 WATER LEVEL Screened >RLGM significant seismic capacity margins. The 187 1-RVLC INSTRUMENTATION governing HCLPF capacity for the block wall CABINET according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-004 -"HCLPF Calculations for Screened in ESEP Components" (Ref. 10.1)is 2.682g which does not control capacity.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 188 1-SA STATION AUXILIARIES Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for CONTROL PANEL RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
STEAM GENERATOR for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 189 1-SG AND AUXILIARY FEED Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for PUMP CONTROL RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 PANEL anchorage evaluation.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI SAFETY INJECTION Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the CONTROL PANEL RLGM based on similar panels yielding significant seismic capacity margins.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) 191 1-SPY CONTAINEN for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 110 of 151 CNP HCLPF Unit I Failure ESEL ID DESCRIPTION Mode (compared Notes Item M e to RLGM)Item #RLGM based on similar panels yielding significant seismic capacity margins.Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
ENGINEER SAFETY for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 1-SSR SYSTEM REAR Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for INSTRUMENT/RELAY RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 RACK anchorage evaluation.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
NUCLEAR for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI INSTRUMENTAL Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the 193 1-SWR SOURCE RANGE N21 RLGM based on similar equipment within INSTRUMENT/RELAY the control room yielding significant seismic RACK capacity margins.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI 4KV BUS T11A Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the SWITCHGEAR RLGM based on anchorage evaluation performed to the RLGM.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI 250VDC TRAIN 'B' Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the TRANSFER CABINET RLGM based on similar panels yielding significant seismic capacity margins.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI 250VDC TRAIN A Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the TRANSFER CABINET RLGM based on similar panels yielding significant seismic capacity margins.The Block Wall interaction was screened for RLGM based on scaling of existing design basis calculation.
The governing HCLPF BORON INJECTION Anchorage 0.45g capacity according to S&A Calculation 197 1-TK-11 TANK 13Q3208-CAL-005
-"High Confidence Low Probability of Failure (HCLPF) Calculations for Screened in ESEP Tanks" (Ref. 10.2) is 0.45g for the welded connections.
The Block Wall interaction was screened for RLGM based on scaling of existing design 198 1-TK-12N NORTH BORIC ACID Anchorage 0.227g basis calculation.
The governing HCLPF STORAGE TANK capacity according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-005
-"High Confidence Low SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 111 of 151 CNP HCLPF Unit 1 Failure ESEL ID DESCRIPTION Mode (compared Notes Item # to RLGM)Probability of Failure (HCLPF) Calculations for Screened in ESEP Tanks" (Ref. 10.2) is 0.227g. Therefore, this tank does not screen for the RLGM.Horizontal tank containing air is well supported in addition to standard saddles.PRESSURIZER TRAIN Tank is adequately welded to building steel.'B' PRESSURE RELIEF Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage) 199 1-TK-253-1 VALVE NRV-152 for the 0.89 to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI RESERVE CONTROL NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage judged adequate AIR TANK for RLGM by inspection based on small fan with rugged anchorage.
Horizontal tank containing air is well supported in addition to standard saddles.PRESSURIZER TRAIN Tank is adequately welded to building steel.'A' PRESSURE RELIEF Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage) 200 1-TK-253-2 VALVE NRV-153 for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI RESERVE CONTROL NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage judged adequate AIR TANK for RLGM by inspection based on small fan with rugged anchorage.
Tanks 1-TK-253-3, -5, &-7 grouped together and anchored by four plates bolted to the wall with two 3/4" bolts in each plate. The PRESSURIZER TRAIN tanks are 9" diameter and 56" tall. The air'B' PRESSURE RELIEF bottles are strapped to framing affixed to the 201 1-TK-253-3 VLV NRV152 Screened >RLGM wall by twelve W" bolts. Equipment screens EMERGENCY AIR (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g TANK screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage judged adequate for RLGM by inspection based on rugged configuration of support.Tanks 1-TK-253-4, -6, &-8 grouped together and anchored by four plates bolted to the wall with two 3/4" bolts in each plate. The PRESSURIZER TRAIN tanks are 9" diameter and 56" tall. The air'A' PRESSURE RELIEF bottles are strapped to framing affixed to the 202 1-TK-253-4 VLV NRV153 Screened >RLGM wall by twelve W" bolts. Equipment screens EMERGENCY AIR (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g TANK screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage judged adequate for RLGM by inspection based on rugged configuration of support.
SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 112 of 151 CNP HCLPF Unit I Failure ESEL ID DESCRIPTION Mode (compared Notes Item # to RLGM)Tanks 1-TK-253-3, -5, &-7 grouped together and anchored by four plates bolted to the wall with two 3/4" bolts in each plate. The PRESSURIZER TRAIN tanks are 9" diameter and 56" tall. The air'B' PRESSURE RELIEF bottles are strapped to framing affixed to the 203 1-TK-253-5 VLV NRV-152 Screened >RLGM wall by twelve %" bolts. Equipment screens EMERGENCY AIR (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g TANK screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage judged adequate for RLGM by inspection based on rugged configuration of support.Tanks 1-TK-253-4, -6, &-8 grouped together and anchored by four plates bolted to the wall with two 3/4" bolts in each plate. The PRESSURIZER TRAIN tanks are 9" diameter and 56" tall. The air'A' PRESSURE RELIEF bottles are strapped to framing affixed to the 204 1-TK-253-6 VLV NRV-153 Screened >RLGM wall by twelve W" bolts. Equipment screens EMERGENCY AIR (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g TANK screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage judged adequate for RLGM by inspection based on rugged configuration of support.Tanks 1-TK-253-3, -5, &-7 grouped together and anchored by four plates bolted to the wall with two 3/4" bolts in each plate. The PRESSURIZER TRAIN tanks are 9" diameter and 56" tall. The air'B' PRESSURE RELIEF bottles are strapped to framing affixed to the 205 1-TK-253-7 VLV NRV-152 Screened >RLGM wall by twelve %" bolts. Equipment screens EMERGENCY AIR (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g TANK screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage judged adequate for RLGM by inspection based on rugged configuration of support.Tanks 1-TK-253-4, -6, &-8 grouped together and anchored by four plates bolted to the PRESSURIZER TRAIN wall with two 3/4" bolts in each plate. The'A' PRESSURE RELIEF tanks are 9" diameter and 56" tall. The air 206 1-TK-253-8 VLV NRV-153 Screened >RLGM bottles are strapped to framing affixed to the EMERGENCY AIR wall by twelve W" bolts. Equipment screens TANK (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage judged adequate for RLGM by inspection based on rugged configuration of SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 113 of 151 CNP HCLPF Unit 1 Failure Enit ID DESCRIPTION Mode (compared Notes ESEL Mode t LM Item # to RLGM)support.Rust was found on the strap supports.
A HCLPF calculation was performed for the degraded condition.
The governing HCLPF CONDENSATE Anchorage 0.481g capacity according to S&A Calculation 207 1-TK-32 STORAGE TANK 13Q3208-CAL-005
-"High Confidence Low Probability of Failure (HCLPF) Calculations for Screened in ESEP Tanks" (Ref. 10.2) is 0.481g.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage or the adjacent Block Wall could not be screened for RLGM COMPONENT based on scaling the existing calculations.
208 1-TK-37 COOLING WATER Anchorage 0.447g The governing HCLPF capacity according to SURGE TANK S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-005
-"High Confidence Low Probability of Failure (HCLPF) Calculations for Screened in ESEP Tanks" (Ref. 10.2) is for the tank and is 0.447g due to the anchor bolts.This transformer was purchased to the IEEE 344-75 standard.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on 600VAC BUS 11A Screened >RLGM scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage 209 1-TR11A SUPPLY evaluation.
The governing HCLPF capacity TRANSFORMER for the block wall according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-004
-"HCLPF Calculations for Screened in ESEP Components" (Ref. 10.1) is 1.270g and did not control the capacity.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI TRANSFORMER FOR Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for AFWX DIST PANEL RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 211 1-TR-ELSC TRANSFORMER FOR Screened >RLGM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for ELSC DIST PANEL RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.
SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 114 of 151 CNP HCLPF Unit IFalr ESEL ID DESCRIPTION Failure (compared Notes ESEL Mode (o Notes Item # to RLGM)Igniter box is attached to horizontal unistruts bolted to vertical embedded unistruts.
The hydrogen igniters are composed of the Igniter Box, glow plug, shield and other associated hardware.
The components CONTAINMENT within the igniter box are not fragile and are HYDROGEN IGNITION encompassed by that typically contained in 212 1-UDISB-B1 UPPER VOLUME Screened >RLGM other electrical boxes. Therefore, it is TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG determined that the screening lanes ASSEMBLY #B1 contained in EPRI NP-6041-SL are applicable to this equipment.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL. Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling existing anchorage evaluation.
CONTAINMENT Igniter box is bolted to horizontal unistruts HYDROGEN IGNITION bolted to an embedded vertical unistrut on 213 B10 UPPER VOLUME the left and a 3/8" expansion anchor on the TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG right. See notes for 1-UDISB-B1.
ASSEMBLY #B10 CONTAINMENT Igniter box is bolted to horizontal unistruts HYDROGEN IGNITION bolted to an embedded vertical unistrut on 214 B11 UPPER VOLUME the left and a 3/8" expansion anchor on the TRAIN'B'GLOW PLUG right. See notes for 1-UDISB-B1.
ASSEMBLY #B131 CONTAINMENT Igniter box is bolted to horizontal unistruts HYDROGEN IGNITION bolted to an embedded vertical unistrut on 215 B12 UPPER VOLUME the left and a 3/8" expansion anchor on the TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG right. See notes for 1-UDISB-B1.
ASSEMBLY #B12 Igniter box is bolted to two vertical unistruts which are U-bolted to the top and bottom handrail of the catwalk. The hydrogen igniters are composed of the Igniter Box, CONTAINMENT glow plug, shield and other associated HYDROGEN IGNITION hardware.
The igniters attached to the 216 1-UDISB- UPPER VOLUME Screened >RLGM catwalk. The governing HCLPF capacity for B13 TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG the catwalk according to S&A Calculation ASSEMBLY #B13 13Q3208-CAL-006
-"High Confidence Low Probability of Failure (HCLPF) Calculations for Containment Catwalk and Attached Hydrogen Glow Plugs"" (Ref. 10.3) is 0.86g and did not control capacity.1-UDISB- CONTAINMENT Screened >RLGM Igniter box is bolted to two vertical unistrut B14 HYDROGEN IGNITION that are U-bolted to the top and bottom SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 115 of 151 CNP HCLPF Unit I Failure c p ESEL ID DESCRIPTION e (compared Notes Item # to RLGM)UPPER VOLUME handrail of the catwalk. The governing TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG HCLPF capacity for the catwalk according to ASSEMBLY #B14 S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-006
-"High Confidence Low Probability of Failure (HCLPF) Calculations for Containment Catwalk and Attached Hydrogen Glow Plugs"" (Ref. 10.3) is 0.86g and did not control capacity.Igniter box is bolted to two vertical unistruts which are U-bolted to the top and bottom handrail of the catwalk. The governing CONTAINMENT HCLPF capacity for the catwalk according to 1-UDISB- HYDROGEN IGNITION Screened >RLGM S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-006
-"High 218 B15 UPPER VOLUME Confidence Low Probability of Failure TRAIN'B' GLOW PLUG (HCLPF) Calculations for Containment ASSEMBLY #B15 Catwalk and Attached Hydrogen Glow Plugs"" (Ref. 10.3) is 0.86g and did not control capacity.Igniter box is bolted to two vertical unistruts which are U-bolted to the top and bottom handrail of the catwalk. The governing CONTAINMENT HCLPF capacity for the catwalk according to 1-UDISB- HYDROGEN IGNITION Screened >RLGM S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-006
-"High 219 B16 UPPER VOLUME Confidence Low Probability of Failure TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG (HCLPF) Calculations for Containment ASSEMBLY #B16 Catwalk and Attached Hydrogen Glow Plugs"" (Ref. 10.3) is 0.86g and did not control capacity.Igniter box is bolted to two vertical unistruts which are U-bolted to the top and bottom handrail of the catwalk. The governing CONTAINMENT HCLPF capacity for the catwalk according to 1-UDISB- HYDROGEN IGNITION Screened >RLGM S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-006
-"High 220 B17 UPPER VOLUME Confidence Low Probability of Failure TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG (HCLPF) Calculations for Containment ASSEMBLY #B17 Catwalk and Attached Hydrogen Glow Plugs" (Ref. 10.3) is 0.86g and did not control capacity.CONTAINMENT Igniter box is bolted to two vertical unistruts 1-UDISB- HYDROGEN IGNITION Screened >RLGM which are U-bolted to the top and bottom 221 1U UPPER VOLUME handrail of the catwalk. See notes for 1-TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG UDISB-B13 for screening.
The governing ASSEMBLY #B18 HCLPF capacity for the catwalk according to SA3 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-APT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 116 of 151 CNP CNP HCLPF Unit 1 Failure ESEL ID DESCRIPTION Mode (compared Notes Item # to RLGM)S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-006
-"High Confidence Low Probability of Failure (HCLPF) Calculations for Containment Catwalk and Attached Hydrogen Glow Plugs" (Ref. 10.3) is 0.86g and did not control capacity.CONTAINMENT Igniter box is attached to horizontal unistruts HYDROGEN IGNITION bolted to vertical embedded unistruts.
See 222 1-UDISB-B2 UPPER VOLUME Screened >RLGM notes for 1-UDISB-B1 for screening.
TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B2 CONTAINMENT Igniter box is attached to horizontal unistruts HYDROGEN IGNITION bolted to vertical embedded unistruts.
See 223 1-UDISB-B3 UPPER VOLUME Screened >RLGM notes for 1-UDISB-B1 for screening.
TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B3 CONTAINMENT Igniter box is attached to horizontal unistruts HYDROGEN IGNITION bolted to vertical embedded unistruts.
See 224 1-UDISB-B4 UPPER VOLUME Screened >RLGM notes for 1-UDISB-B1 for screening.
TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B4 CONTAINMENT Igniter box is attached to horizontal unistruts HYDROGEN IGNITION bolted to vertical embedded unistruts.
See 225 1-UDISB-B5 UPPER VOLUME Screened >RLGM notes for 1-UDISB-B1 for screening.
TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B5 CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN IGNITION Igniter box is attached to horizontal unistruts 226 1-UDISB-B6 UPPER VOLUME Screened >RLGM bolted to vertical embedded unistruts.
See TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG notes for 1-UDISB-B1 for screening.
ASSEMBLY #B6 CONTAINMENT Igniter box is attached to horizontal unistruts HYDROGEN IGNITION bolted to vertical embedded unistruts.
See 227 1-UDISB-B7 UPPER VOLUME Screened >RLGM notes for 1-UDISB-B1 for screening.
TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B7 CONTAINMENT Igniter box is bolted to horizontal unistruts HYDROGEN IGNITION bolted to an embedded vertical unistrut on 228 1-UDISB-B8 UPPER VOLUME Screened >RLGM the left and a 3/8" expansion anchor on the TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG right. See notes for 1-UDISB-B1 for ASSEMBLY #B8 screening.
SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 117 of 151 CNP HCLPF Unit 1 Failure EnEt ID DESCRIPTION Mode (compared Notes ESEL Mode t LM Item # to RLGM)CONTAINMENT Igniter box is bolted to horizontal unistruts HYDROGEN IGNITION bolted to an embedded vertical unistrut on 229 1-UDISB-B9 UPPER VOLUME Screened >RLGM the left and a 3/8" expansion anchor on the TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG right. See notes for 1-UDISB-B1 for ASSEMBLY #B9 screening.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI LOWER CONTAINMENT NP-6041-SL.
The governing HCLPF 1 -VR- TRAIN B DISTRIBUTED Screened >RLGM capacity for the anchorage according to S&A 230 LDISB-4 IGNITION SYSTEM Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-004- "HCLPF VOLTAGE REGULATOR Calculations for Screened in ESEP Components" (Ref. 10.1) is 0.760g and did not control the capacity.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage could not be screened for RLGM based on scaling of UPPER CONTAINMENT existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.
1-VR- TRAIN B DISTRIBUTED Screened >RLGM The governing HCLPF capacity for the UDISB-3 IGNITION SYSTEM anchorage according to S&A Calculation VOLTAGE REGULATOR 13Q3208-CAL-004- "HCLPF Calculations for Screened in ESEP Components" (Ref.10.1) is 0.760g and did not control the capacity.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the 232 1-VS CONTROLAPANEL RLGM input based on similar panels within the control room yielding significant seismic capacity margins.WEST CONTAINMENT SPRAY HEAT This valve falls within the Earthquake EXCHANGER 1-HE- Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-233 1-WMO-715 18W ESSENTIAL Screened >RLGM SL. Therefore, this valve screens for the SERVICE WATER 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-INLET SHUTOFF 6041-SL.VALVE ESSENTIAL SERVICE This valve falls outside the Earthquake WATER TO TURBINE Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-234 1-WMO-753 DRIVENAUXILIARY Screened >RLGM SL. However, this valve screens for the 0.8g FEED PUMP PP-4 to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL SHUTOFF VALVE based on analysis performed to 3g input.
SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 118 of 151 CNP HCLPF Unit I Failure ESEL ID DESCRIPTION Mode (compared Notes Item # to RLGM)This valve falls within the Earthquake WEST ESW PP PP-7W Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-235 1-WRV-762 DISCH STN EAST Screened >RLGM SL. Therefore, this valve screens for the BASKET BAN OUT S/O 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-VALVE 6041-SL.This valve falls within the Earthquake W ESW PUMP PP-7W Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-DISCH STN EAST Screened >RLGM SL. Therefore, this valve screens for the BASKET B/W INLET 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-> 6041-SL.This valve falls within the Earthquake W ESW PUMP PP-7W Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-DISCH STN WEST Screened >RLGM SL. Therefore, this valve screens for the BASKET BAN OUTLET 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-> 6041-SL.This valve falls within the Earthquake Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-W ESW PUMP PP-7W SL. Therefore, this valve screens for the DISCH STN WEST Screened >RLGM 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-238 1-WRV-777 6041-SL. There is sufficient clearance BASKET BAN INLET> between the valve operator and the walkway. Pipe line well supported and not a credible damaging interaction.
Small valve bolted into a small rack.Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PRESSURE Screened >RLGM for the 0:8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 239 1-XRV-152 REGULATING VALVE NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage judged to be adequate for RLGM by inspection based on light rack with rugged anchorage.
Small valve bolted into a small rack.Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PRESSURE Screened >RLGM for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 240 1-XRV-153 REGULATING VALVE NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage judged to be adequate for RLGM by inspection based on light rack with rugged anchorage.
POA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 1303208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 119 of 151 Attachment D -CNP Unit 2 ESEP HCLPF Values and Failure Mode Tabulation SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 120 of 151 CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF Notes Unit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #2 2-152- CONTAINMENT Screened >RLGM Small panel dimensions of 8" wide, 4" deep, LDISB HYDROGEN IGNITION and 14" tall. Equipment mounted to the wall LOWER VOLUME using two unistruts anchored with four 1/2" TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG expansion bolts. Unistrut anchors are ASSEMBLIES BACKUP spaced at 46" horizontally and 9" vertically.
SUPPLY BREAKER Unistrut anchorage shared by 2-152-UDISB.
Screened based on the light panel with rugged anchorage.
3 2-152- CONTAINMENT Screened >RLGM Small panel dimensions of 8" wide, 4" deep, UDISB HYDROGEN IGNITION and 14" tall. Equipment mounted to the wall UPPER VOLUME TRAIN using two unistruts anchored with four 1/2"'B' GLOW PLUG expansion bolts. Unistrut anchors are ASSEMBLIES BACKUP spaced at 46" horizontally and 9" vertically.
SUPPLY BREAKER Unistrut anchorage shared by 2-152-LDISB.
Screened based on the light panel with rugged anchorage.
4 2-21A 600V BUS 21A Screened >RLGM Meets EPRI NP-6041-SL Table 2.4 caveats.SWITCHGEAR Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the switchgear.
5 2-21B 600V BUS 21B Screened >RLGM Meets EPRI NP-6041-SL Table 2.4 caveats.SWITCHGEAR Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the switchgear.
6 2-21C 600V BUS 21C Screened >RLGM Meets EPRI NP-6041-SL Table 2.4 caveats.SWITCHGEAR Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the switchgear.
7 2-21D 600V BUS 21D Screened >RLGM Meets EPRI NP-6041-SL Table 2.4 caveats.SWITCHGEAR Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the switchgear.
8 2-2A 4KV BUS 2A Screened >RLGM Meets EPRI NP-6041-SL Table 2.4 caveats.SWITCHGEAR Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for a similar switchgear.
9 2 CNTMT HYDROGEN Screened >RLGM Small panel dimensions of 9" wide, 20" tall, LDISB IGNITION LOWER and 6" deep. Equipment mounted on two VOLUMN TRAIN 'B' horizontal running unistruts spaced at 19".GLOW PLUG Unistrut anchors are 1/2" expansion bolts ASSEMBLIES STARTER spaced at 41". Unistruts are shared by 2-52-COMBO-LDISB CKT UDISB. Screened based on the light panel PO Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 121 of 151 CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF Notes Unit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #BRK with rugged anchorage.
10 2 CNTMT HYDROGEN Screened >RLGM Small panel dimensions of 9" wide, 20" tall, UDISB IGNITION UPPER and 6" deep. Equipment mounted on two VOLUME TRAIN 'B' horizontal running unistruts spaced at 19".GLOW PLUG Unistrut anchors are 1/2" expansion bolts ASSEMBLIES STARTER spaced at 41". Unistruts are shared by 2-52-COMBO-UDISB CKT LDISB. Screened based on the light panel BRK with rugged anchorage.
11 2-88X- CNTMT HYDROGEN Screened >RLGM Small panel dimensions of 9" wide, 20" tall, LDISB IGNITION LOWER and 6" deep. Equipment mounted on two VOLUME TRAIN 'B' horizontal running unistruts spaced at 19".GLOW PLUG Unistrut anchors are 1/2" expansion bolts ASSEMBLIES STARTER spaced at 41" plus an additional two 3/8" COMBO-LDISB STAR bolts located 29". Screened based on the CNTR light panel with rugged anchorage.
12 2-88X- CNTMT HYDROGEN Screened >RLGM Small panel dimensions of 9" wide, 20" tall, UDISB IGNITION UPPER and 6" deep. Equipment mounted on two VOLUME TRAIN 'B' horizontal running unistruts spaced at 19".GLOW PLUG Unistrut anchors are 1/2" expansion bolts ASSEMBLIES STARTER spaced at 41" plus an additional two 3/8" COMBO-UDISB bolts located 29". Screened based on the CONTACTOR light panel with rugged anchorage.
13 2 PLANT BATTERY BATT- Screened >RLGM Panel dimensions of 48"x24"xl0".
ABBC AB DISCONNECT Equipment is bolted to two horizontal SWITCH unistruts, which are bolted to the wall. Panel meets all IEEE 344-75 testing requirements.
The testing TRS greatly exceeds the RRS at the floor level. Equipment screens for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL. Anchorage acceptable for RLGM based on similar panels had very high calculated margins for the Design Basis Earthquake.
14 2 PLANT BATTERY BATT- Screened >RLGM Panel dimensions of 48"x24"x10".
CDBC CD DISCONNECT Equipment is bolted to two horizontal SWITCH unistruts, which are bolted to the wall. Panel meets all IEEE 344-75 testing requirements.
The testing TRS greatly exceeds the RRS at the floor level. Equipment screens for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL. Anchorage acceptable for RLGM based on similar panels had very high calculated margins for the Design Basis Earthquake.
15 2-AB-A 600VAC MOTOR Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CONTROL CENTER AB- for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI FSal Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 122 of 151 CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF Notes Unit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #A NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the MCC.16 2-AB-D 600VAC MOTOR Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CONTROL CENTER AB- for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI D NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the MCC.17 2-ABD-13 600VAC MOTOR Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CONTROL CENTER for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI ABD-B NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the MCC.18 2-ABD-D 600VAC MOTOR Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CONTROL CENTER for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI ABD-D NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the MCC.19 2-ABV-A 600VAC VALVE Seismic 0.578g Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CONTROL CENTER Interaction for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI ABV-A NP-6041-SL.
Gaps documented on the Anchor Inspection Data Sheet between the MCC assembly and the grout pad were judged acceptable.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the MCC. The potentially governing Block Wall interaction could not be screened for RLGM based on scaling of existing design basis calculation.
The governing HCLPF capacity for the block wall according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-004 -"HCLPF Calculations for Screened in ESEP Components" (Ref. 10.1)is 0.578g.20 2-AFWX 120/208VAC AUXILIARY Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
FEEDWATER for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI DISTRIBUTION PANEL NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on screening calculation to the RLGM.21 2-AM-A 600VAC MOTOR Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CONTROL CENTER for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI AM-A NP-6041-SL.
An additional four anchor bolts have been added to supplement original anchorage.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 PaRe 123 of 151 CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF Notes Unit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #anchorage evaluation for the MCC.22 2-AZV-A 600VAC VALVE Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CONTROL CENTER for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI AZV-A NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the MCC.23 2-BA BORIC ACID Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CHARGING AND for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI LETDOWN CONTROL NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for PANEL RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the Control Board.24 2-BATT- PLANT BATTERY AB Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
AB for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the Battery Rack.25 2-BATT- PLANT BATTERY BATT- Screened >RLGM Small panel bolted directly to wall using a AB-SH AB AMMETER SHUNT unistrut.
Box dimensions of 48.5"x40.5"x8.5".
No interactions identified.
Also contains 2-BC-AB-SH.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL. Anchorage screens to the RLGM input based on similar panels yielding significant seismic capacity margins.26 2-BATT- PLANT BATTERY CD Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CD for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the Battery Rack.27 2-BATT- PLANT BATTERY BATT- Screened >RLGM Small panel bolted directly to wall using a CD-SH CD AMMETER SHUNT unistrut.
Box dimensions of 49"x40"x8.5".
No interactions identified.
Also contains 2-BC-CD-SH.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the RLGM input based on similar panels yielding significant seismic capacity margins.28 2-BC-AB2 PLANT BATTERY BATT- Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
AB CHARGER #2 for the 0'8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the Battery Charger.
0 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 124 of 151 CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF Notes Unit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #29 2-BC-CD1 PLANT BATTERY BATT- Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CD BATTERY for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI CHARGER #1 NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the Battery Charger.30 2-BCTC- PLANT BATTERY Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
AB CHARGERS BC-AB1 for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI AND BC-AB2 NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for TRANSFER PANEL RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the Panel.31 2-BCTC- PLANT BATTERY Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CD CHARGERS BC-CD1 for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI AND BC-CD2 NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for TRANSFER PANEL RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the Panel.32 2-BLI-110 STEAM GENERATOR Screened >RLGM Equipment bolted directly to wall on small OME-3-1 WIDE RANGE bracket using four 1/2" bolts spaced at 6".LEVEL INDICATOR Supported on 2x2 tube steel cantilevered TRANSMITTER out from the wall, equipment support 3" from the wall.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage judged to be adequate for RLGM by inspection based on light rack with rugged anchorage.
33 2-BLI-120 STEAM GENERATOR Screened >RLGM Floor mounted rack seismically qualified to OME-3-2 WIDE RANGE IEEE-344-75.
LEVEL INDICATOR TRANSMITTER Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage judged to be adequate for RLGM by inspection based on light rack with rugged anchorage.
34 2-BLI-130 STEAM GENERATOR Screened >RLGM Mounted to wall using four 1/2" bolts spaced OME-3-3 WIDE RANGE at 6". Cantilevered out from wall LEVEL INDICATOR approximately 6".TRANSMITTER Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 PaRe 125 of 151 CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF Notes Unit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage judged to be adequate for RLGM by inspection based on light rack with rugged anchorage.
35 2-BLI-140 STEAM GENERATOR Screened >RLGM Equipment bolted directly to wall using four OME-3-4 WIDE RANGE 1/2" bolts spaced at 6". Supported on 2x2 LEVEL INDICATOR tube steel cantilevered out from the wall, TRANSMITTER equipment supported 4.5" from the wall.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage judged to be adequate for RLGM by inspection based on light rack with rugged anchorage.
36 2-CCV-AB 250VDC TRAIN 'B' Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CRITICAL SOLENOID for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI VALVES DISTRIBUTION NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for PANEL RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the panel.37 2-CCV-CD 250VDC TRAIN 'A' Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CRITICAL SOLENOID for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI VALVES DISTRIBUTION NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for PANEL RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the panel.38 2-CCW COMPONENT Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
COOLING WATER for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI CONTROL PANEL NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on similar panels within the control room yielding significant seismic capacity margins.39 2-CG1-14 REACTOR Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI CONTROL GROUP #1 NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for CABINET #14 RLGM based on similar cabinets yielding significant seismic capacity margins.40 2-CG1-15 REACTOR Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI CONTROL GROUP #1 NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for CABINET #15 RLGM based on similar cabinets yielding significant seismic capacity margins.41 2-CG2-17 REACTOR Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI CONTROL GROUP #2 NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for CABINET #17 RLGM based on similar cabinets yielding significant seismic capacity margins.
SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 126 of 151 CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF Notes Unit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #42 2-CG2-19 REACTOR Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI CONTROL GROUP #2 NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for CABINET #19 RLGM based on similar cabinets yielding significant seismic capacity margins.43 2-CG3-20 REACTOR Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI CONTROL GROUP #3 NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for CABINET #20 RLGM based on similar cabinets yielding significant seismic capacity margins.44 2-CG3-21 REACTOR Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI CONTROL GROUP #3 NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for CABINET #21 RLGM based on similar cabinets yielding significant seismic capacity margins.45 2-CG4-22 REACTOR Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI CONTROL GROUP #4 NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for CABINET #22 RLGM based on similar cabinets yielding significant seismic capacity margins.46 2-CG4-23 REACTOR Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI CONTROL GROUP #4 NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for CABINET #23 RLGM based on similar cabinets yielding significant seismic capacity margins.47 2-CLI-1 14 CONDENSATE Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
STORAGE TANK TK-32 for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI LEVEL NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage judged to be INDICATORTRANSMITT adequate for RLGM by inspection based on ER light rack with rugged anchorage.
48 2-CMO- COMPONENT Screened >RLGM This valve falls within the Earthquake 413 COOLING WATER Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-PUMPS SUCTION NP-SL. Therefore, this valve screens for the CROSSTIE TRAIN 'B' 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-SHUTOFF VALVE 6041-SL.49 2-CMO- COMPONENT Screened >RLGM This valve falls within the Earthquake 414 COOLING WATER Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-PUMPS DISCHARGE SL. Therefore, this valve screens for the CROSSTIE TRAIN 'B' 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-SHUTOFF VALVE 6041-SL.50 2-CMO- COMPONENT Screened >RLGM This valve falls within the Earthquake 416 COOLING WATER TO Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-MISCELLANEOUS SL. Therefore, this valve screens for the SERVICE TRAIN 'B' 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-SHUTOFF VALVE 6041-SL.
SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 127 of 151 CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF Notes Unit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #51 2-CMO- WEST RESIDUAL HEAT Screened >RLGM This valve falls within the Earthquake 429 REMOVAL HEAT Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-EXCHANGER SL. Therefore, this valve screens for the COMPONENT 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-COOLING WATER 6041-SL.OUTLET SHUTOFF VALVE 52 2-CP CONDENSATE PUMP Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CONTROL PANEL for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the Panel.53 2-CRID-1 120VAC CONTROL Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
ROOM INSTRUMENT for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI DISTRIBUTION NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for CHANNEL I RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 DISTRIBUTION PANEL anchorage evaluation for the Panel.54 2-CRID 120VAC CONTROL Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
INV ROOM for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI INSTRUMENTATION NP-6041-SL.
The governing HCLPF DISTRIBUTION capacity according to S&A Calculation SYSTEM CHANNEL 1 13Q3208-CAL-004
-"HCLPF Calculations INVERTER for Screened in ESEP Components" (Ref.10.1) is 0.839g and therefore did not control the capacity.55 2-CRID-2 120VAC CONTROL Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
ROOM INSTRUMENT for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI DISTRIBUTION NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for CHANNEL II RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 DISTRIBUTION PANEL anchorage evaluation for the Panel.56 2-CRID 120VAC CONTROL Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
INV ROOM for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI INSTRUMENTATION NP-6041-SL.
The governing HCLPF DISTRIBUTION capacity according to S&A Calculation SYSTEM CHANNEL 2 13Q3208-CAL-004
-"HCLPF Calculations INVERTER for Screened in ESEP Components" (Ref.10.1) is 0.839g and therefore did not control the capacity.57 2-CRID-3 120VAC CONTROL Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
ROOM INSTRUMENT for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI DISTRIBUTION NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for CHANNEL Ill RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 DISTRIBUTION PANEL anchorage evaluation for the Panel.58 2-CRID 120VAC CONTROL Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
INV ROOM for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI INSTRUMENTATION NP-6041-SL.
The governing HCLPF SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 PaRe 128 of 151 CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF Notes Unit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #DISTRIBUTION capacity according to S&A Calculation SYSTEM CHANNEL 3 13Q3208-CAL-004
-"HCLPF Calculations INVERTER for Screened in ESEP Components" (Ref.10.1) is 0.839g and therefore did not control the capacity.59 2-CRID-4 120VAC CONTROL Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
ROOM INSTRUMENT for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI DISTRIBUTION NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for CHANNEL IV RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 DISTRIBUTION PANEL anchorage evaluation for the Panel.59 2-CRID 120VAC CONTROL Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
INV ROOM for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI INSTRUMENTATION NP-6041-SL.
The governing HCLPF DISTRIBUTION capacity according to S&A Calculation SYSTEM CHANNEL 4 13Q3208-CAL-004
-"HCLPF Calculations INVERTER for Screened in ESEP Components" (Ref.10.1) is 0.839g and therefore did not control the capacity.61 2-DTU DELTA 'T' AND UNIT Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CONTROL PANEL for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the Panel.62 2-ELSC EMERGENCY LOCAL Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
INDICATION for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI SHUTDOWN AND NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for COOLDOWN RLGM based on similar panels yielding DISTRIBUTION PANEL significant seismic capacity margins.63 2-EZC-B 600VAC MOTOR Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CONTROL CENTER for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI EZC-B NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the MCC.64 2-EZC-C 600VAC MOTOR Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CONTROL CENTER for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI EZC-C NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the MCC.65 2-EZC-D 600VAC MOTOR Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CONTROL CENTER for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI EZC-D NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the MCC.66 2-FFI-210 AUXILIARY Screened >RLGM Bolted directly to wall with four 3/8" bolts.FEEDWATER TO Equipment supported on 2" pipe coming out STEAM GENERATOR 7" from the wall and approximately 10" up.
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 PaRe 129 of 151 CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF Notes Unit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #OME-3-1 FLOW There is a 5" spacing between the two INDICATOR bottom bolts and between the left-most TRANSMITTER bolts. The top right-most bolt is spaced 10.5" from the top left-most bolt and 5" above the bottom row of bolts.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage judged to be adequate for RLGM by inspection based on light rack with rugged anchorage.
67 2-FFI-220 AUX FEEDWATER TO Screened >RLGM Supported by 2" pipe, extending 8" out and SG OME-3-2 FLOW 24" left. Anchorage mounted on a U-shaped INDICATOR pipe frame, which is then welded to steel TRANSMITTER column (box structure) on both sides.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage judged to be adequate for RLGM by inspection based on light rack with rugged anchorage.
68 2-FFI-230 AUXILIARY Screened >RLGM Supported by 2" pipe, extending 8" out and FEEDWATER TO 24" left. Anchorage mounted on a U-shaped STEAM GENERATOR pipe frame, which is then welded to steel OME-3-3 FLOW column (box structure) on both sides.INDICATOR TRANSMITTER Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage judged to be adequate for RLGM by inspection based on light rack with rugged anchorage.
69 2-FFI-240 AUXILIARY Screened >RLGM Equipment mounted to the wall with four FEEDWATER TO 3/8" bolts. Supported on 2" pipe, coming STEAM GENERATOR 7.5" out from the wall and 7" up (8" from OME-3-4 FLOW equipment to the top of vertical pipe).INDICATOR Equipment bolted to pipe with a 4" channel.TRANSMITTER Minimum spacing of bolts measured to be 5". Anchorage consists of four 3/8" bolts.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage judged to be adequate for RLGM by inspection based on light rack with rugged anchorage.
70 2-FI FIXED INCORE Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CONTROL PANEL for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 130 of 151 CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF Notes Unit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on similar panels yielding significant seismic capacity margins.71 2-FICT-A REACTOR CORE Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
THERMOCOUPLE for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI TRAIN 'A' NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for TRANSMITTER RLGM based on screening calculation to the CABINET RLGM.72 2-FLX FLUX CONTROL PANEL Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the Panel.77 2-HE-15W WEST COMPONENT Anchorage 0.547g Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
COOLING WATER for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI HEAT EXCHANGER NP-6041-SL.
The block wall was far enough away to not be an interaction issue.Anchorage could not be screened for RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the Heat Exchanger.
Therefore, a HCLPF calculation was performed.
The governing HCLPF capacity for the anchorage according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-004
-"HCLPF Calculations for Screened in ESEP Components" (Ref. 10.1) is 0.547g.78 2-HE-17W WEST RESIDUAL HEAT Screened >RLGM Equipment is supported at the top with REMOVAL HEAT brackets in each of the 4 quadrants to resist EXCHANGER overturning loads. The bottom is supported by a heavy-duty steel gusset structure supported by two piers. There are two bolts in each pier. Based upon this inspection, the anchorage is adequate for the RLGM spectra.79 2-HSD2 UNIT 2 HOT Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
SHUTDOWN PANEL for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on similar panels yielding significant seismic capacity margins. The governing HCLPF capacity for the block wall according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-004 -"HCLPF Calculations for Screened in ESEP Components" (Ref. 10.1)is 2.682g and therefore did not control the capacity.
SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 131 of 151 CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF Notes Unit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #80 2-HV- CONTROL ROOM AIR Screened >RLGM Chiller initially on vibration isolators, ACR-2 CONDITIONING SOUTH however later modified to be restrained in all LIQUID CHILLER directions to satisfy GIP outlier resolution.
Equipment screens for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened to a level greater than the RLGM by scaling the design basis anchorage calculation.
81 2-HV- CONTROL ROOM Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
ACRA-2 VENTILATION SOUTH. for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI AIR CONDITIONING NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for UNIT RLGM based on similar air conditioning units yielding significant seismic capacity margins.82 2-HV- OUTSIDE AIR TO Screened >RLGM Damper included on HVAC duct work and ACR-DA-2 CONTROL ROOM screens for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane PRESSURIZATION/
in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Duct work screened CLEANUP FILTER UNIT for RLGM based on existing analysis.HV-ACRF VENT DAMPER #2 83 2-HV- CONTROL ROOM Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
ACRF PRESSURIZATION/
for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI CLEANUP FILTER UNIT NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on similar filter units yielding significant seismic capacity margins. The governing HCLPF capacity for the block wall according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-004 -"HCLPF Calculations for Screened in ESEP Components" (Ref. 10.1)is 1.215g and therefore, did not control the capacity.84 2-HV- CONTROL ROOM Screened >RLGM The base frame is made of 4x4x3/8 angles, ACRF-2 PRESSURIZATION/
with a height of 21" to the top of the angle CLEANUP FILTER frame and an additional 30" to the center of UNITVENT FAN #2 the fan unit. The governing HCLPF capacity for the block wall according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-004
-"HCLPF Calculations for Screened in ESEP Components" (Ref. 10.1) is 1.215g.85 2-HV- CONTROL ROOM Screened >RLGM Heater included on HVAC duct work and ACR-H2 VENTILATION SOUTH screens for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane DUCT ELECTRIC in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Duct work screened HEATER for RLGM based on existing analysis.87 2-HV- AB BATTERY Screened >RLGM Weight of fan is 360 lbs. Fan is hung from SGRX-5 EQUIPMENT AREA ceiling in vertical alignment.
Fan anchored to SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 132 of 151 CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF Notes Unit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #BATTERY ROOM the shim plate which is anchored to ceiling VENTILATION with sixteen 1/2" bolts into embedded angle EXHAUST FAN in ceiling.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on weight of fan compared to rugged anchorage.
88 2-HV- CD BATTERY Screened >RLGM Weight of fan is judged to be maximum of SGRX-6 EQUIPMENT AREA 500 lbs. Fan is bolted to steel platform which BATTERY ROOM is bolted to the wall on 2 sides and VENTILATION supported by an angle column at the other EXHAUST FAN corner.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on weight of fan compared to rugged anchorage.
90 2-1CM-129 REACTOR COOLANT Screened >RLGM This valve falls within the Earthquake LOOP #2 HOT LEG TO Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-RESIDUAL HEAT SL. Therefore, this valve screens for the REMOVAL PUMPS 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-SUCTION 6041-SL.CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE 91 2-ICM-251 BORON INJECTION Screened >RLGM This valve falls outside the Earthquake TANK TRAIN 'B' Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-OUTLET SL. However, this valve screens for the 0.8g CONTAINMENT to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041 ISOLATION VALVE based on analysis performed for a 3g input.93 2-IFI-51 BORON INJECTION TO Screened >RLGM Anchorage consists of four bolts in a REACTOR COOLANT reinforced concrete wall. Two bolts on the LOOP #1 FLOW left are for an embedded unistrut and two INDICATOR bolts on the right are 1/2" expansion anchors.TRANSMITTER Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on light rack with rugged anchorage.
94 2-IFI-52 BORON INJECTION TO Screened >RLGM Rack is light and anchored with four bolts.REACTOR COOLANT Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
LOOP #2 FLOW for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI INDICATOR NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for TRANSMITTER RLGM based on light rack with rugged SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 1303208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 133 of 151 CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF Notes Unit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #anchorage.
95 2-IFI-53 BORON INJECTION TO Screened >RLGM Equipment mounted to wall using two bolts REACTOR COOLANT to embedded unistrut.
Equipment also U-LOOP #3 FLOW bolted to the 2" support pipe cantilevered up INDICATOR approximately 14". Equipment screens TRANSMITTER (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on light rack with rugged anchorage.
96 2-IFI-54 BORON INJECTION TO Screened >RLGM Rack is light and anchored to the floor with REACTOR COOLANT four bolts. Equipment screens (other than LOOP #4 FLOW anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening INDICATOR lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage TRANSMITTER screened for RLGM based on light rack with rugged anchorage.
98 2-IMO-256 BORON INJECTION Screened >RLGM This valve falls outside the Earthquake TANK TRAIN 'B' INLET Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-SHUTOFF VALVE SL. However, this valve screens for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL based on analysis performed for a 3g input.The Block Wall interaction was screened for RLGM based on scaling of existing design basis calculation.
99 2-IMO-310 EAST RESIDUAL HEAT Seismic 0.435g This valve falls within the Earthquake REMOVAL PUMP PP- Interaction Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-35E SUCTION SL. Therefore, this valve screens for the SHUTOFF VALVE 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL. The governing HCLPF capacity for the block wall according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-004
-"HCLPF Calculations for Screened in ESEP Components" (Ref. 10.1) is 0.435g.100 2-IMO-324 WEST RHR HX 2-HE- Screened >RLGM This valve falls within the Earthquake 17W DISCHARGE Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-CROSSTIE SHUTOFF SL. Therefore, this valve screens for the VALVE 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.110 2-LDISB- CONTAINMENT Screened >RLGM The hydrogen igniters are composed of the B24 HYDROGEN IGNITION Igniter Box, glow plug, shield and other LOWER VOLUME associated hardware.
All components of the TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG igniter system were seismically mounted to ASSEMBLY #B24 prevent any interference with safety related equipment during and after a design basis seismic event. The components within the igniter box are not fragile and are encompassed by that typically contained in SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 134 of 151 CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF Notes Unit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #other electrical boxes. Therefore, it is determined that the screening lanes contained in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL. Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling existing anchorage evaluation.
111 2-LDISB- CONTAINMENT Screened >RLGM Equipment bolted directly to Column 8 of B25 HYDROGEN IGNITION Quad 4. See notes for 2-LDISB-B24.
LOWER VOLUME Assembly screened for 0.8g to 1.2g TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL and ASSEMBLY #B25 anchorage loadings for RLGM.112 2-LDISB- CONTAINMENT Screened >RLGM See notes for 2-LDISB-B24.
Assembly B26 HYDROGEN IGNITION screened for 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in LOWER VOLUME EPRI NP-6041-SL and anchorage loadings TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG for RLGM.ASSEMBLY #B26 113 2-LDISB- CONTAINMENT Screened >RLGM Box bolted to unistruts attached directly to B27 HYDROGEN IGNITION column. See notes for 2-LDISB-B24.
LOWER VOLUME Assembly screened for 0.8g to 1.2g TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL and ASSEMBLY #B27 anchorage loadings for RLGM.115 2-LDISB- CONTAINMENT Screened >RLGM Equipment bolted to unistrut, which is B35 HYDROGEN IGNITION welded directly to Column 11. See notes for LOWER VOLUME 2-LDISB-B24.
Assembly screened for 0.8g TRAIN 'B' GLOW PLUG to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL ASSEMBLY #B35 and anchorage loadings for RLGM.118 2-LSI-1 STEAM GENERATORS Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
#1 AND #4 LOCAL for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI SHUTDOWN STATION NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on similar equipment yielding significant seismic capacity margins.119 2-LSI-2 STEAM GENERATORS Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
#2 AND #3 LOCAL for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI SHUTDOWN STATION NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on similar equipment yielding significant seismic capacity margins.120 2-LSI-3 REACTOR COOLANT Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
SYSTEM CHARGING for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI AND LETDOWN LOCAL NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for SHUTDOWN STATION RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.
121 2-MCAB 250VDC DISTRIBUTION Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PANEL MCAB for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 135 of 151 CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF Notes Unit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #anchorage evaluation for the panel.122 2-MCCD 250VDC DISTRIBUTION Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
POWER PANEL for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on similar panels yielding significant seismic capacity margins.123 2-MDAB 250VDC DISTRIBUTION Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PANEL MDAB for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on similar panels yielding significant seismic capacity margins.124 2-MDCD 250VDC DISTRIBUTION Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PANEL MDCD for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on similar panels yielding significant seismic capacity margins.125 2-MPP- STEAM GENERATOR Screened >RLGM Equipment is mounted directly to the wall 210 OME-3-1 CHANNEL I using two 1/2" bolts, spaced at 4.5".STEAM PRESSURE Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
TRANSMITTER for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on light bracket with relatively rugged anchorage.
126 2-MPP- STEAM GENERATOR Screened >RLGM Equipment is cantilevered from the wall by 220 OME-3-2 CHANNEL I two 1/2" bolts, and surrounded by an STEAM PRESSURE enclosure.
Equipment screens (other than TRANSMITTER anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on light bracket with relatively rugged anchorage.
127 2-MPP- STEAM GENERATOR Screened >RLGM Equipment is supported by two 3/8" bolts.230 OME-3-3 CHANNEL I Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
STEAM PRESSURE for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI TRANSMITTER NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on light bracket with relatively rugged anchorage.
128 2-MPP- STEAM GENERATOR Screened >RLGM Equipment bolted directly to wall using two 240 OME-3-4 CHANNEL I 1/2" bolts spaced at 4.5". Equipment STEAM PRESSURE screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g TRANSMITTER to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL. Anchorage screened for RLGM based on light bracket with relatively rugged anchorage.
129 2-MRV- STEAM GENERATOR Screened >RLGM This valve falls within the Earthquake 213 OME-3-1 POWER Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-OPERATED RELIEF SL. Therefore, this valve screens for the Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 136 of 151 CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF Notes Unit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #VALVE 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.130 2-MRV- STEAM GENERATOR Screened >RLGM This valve falls outside the Earthquake 223 OME-3-2 POWER Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-OPERATED SL. However, this valve screens for the 0.8g RELIEFVALVE to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL based on analysis performed to 3g.131 2-MRV- STEAM GENERATOR Screened >RLGM This valve falls outside the Earthquake 233 OME-3-3 POWER Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-OPERATED SL. However, this valve screens for the 0.8g RELIEFVALVE to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL based on analysis performed to 3g.132 2-MRV- STEAM GENERATOR Screened >RLGM This valve falls within the Earthquake 243 OME-3-4 POWER Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-OPERATED RELIEF SL. Therefore, this valve screens for the VALVE 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.133 2-NIS-I NUCLEAR Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
INSTRUMENTATION for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI SYSTEM PROTECTION NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for CHANNEL I CONTROL RLGM based on similar panels yielding PANEL significant seismic capacity margins.134 2-NLP- PRESSURIZER OME-4 Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage) 151 PROTECTION for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI CHANNEL I LEVEL NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for TRANSMITTER RLGM based on light rack with rugged anchorage.
135 2-NPS- REACTOR VESSEL Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage) 110 TRAIN 'A' WIDE RANGE for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI PRESSURE NP-6041 based on existing rack qualification TRANSMITTER for a similar transmitter.
The rack is seismically qualified to IEEE-344-75.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on a similar transmitter yielding significant seismic capacity margins.139 2-NRI NUCLEAR Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
AMP INSTRUMENTATION for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI WIDE RANGE NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RADIATION AMPLIFIER RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.
150 2-OME-33 TURBINE DRIVEN Screened >RLGM Strainer supported on two 14" wide, 12" AUXILIARY FEED deep, and 18" tall concrete pedestals.
PUMP PP-4 SUCTION Equipment bolted to pedestals with four 3/4" STRAINER anchor bolts, one set of two bolts in each pedestal, spaced at 6" apart. The piping is well supported and the strainer is small SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 137 of 151 CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF Notes Unit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #relative to the anchorage.
Therefore, this equipment is screened for the RLGM.151 2-OME- WEST ESSENTIAL Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage) 34W SERVICE WATER for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI PUMP PP-7W DISCH NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for STN RLGM based on similar pumps yielding significant seismic capacity margins.156 2-PP-10W WEST COMPONENT Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
COOLING WATER for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI PUMP NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on anchor analysis performed to RLGM.157 2-PP-35W WEST RESIDUAL HEAT Seismic 0.428g Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
REMOVAL PUMP Interaction for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on similar filter units yielding significant seismic capacity margins. The potentially governing Block Wall interaction could not be screened for RLGM based on scaling of existing design basis calculation.
Therefore, a HCLPF calculation was performed.
The governing HCLPF capacity for the block wall according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-004
-"HCLPF Calculations for Screened in ESEP Components" (Ref. 10.1) is 0.428g.158 2-PP-4 TURBINE DRIVEN Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
AUXILIARY FEED for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI PUMP NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on anchor analysis performed to RLGM.159 2-PP-46-4 BORIC ACID STORAGE Seismic 0.227g The pump weighs 511 lbs. Equipment TANKS TRANSFER Interaction screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g PUMP #4 to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL. Anchorage screened for RLGM based on the small size of the pump and similar pumps yielding significant seismic capacity margins. The HCLPF is limited by seismic interaction with the piping attached to the Boric Acid Tank. The governing HCLPF capacity according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-005- "High Confidence Low Probability of Failure (HCLPF) Calculations for Screened in ESEP Tanks" (Ref. 10.2) is 0.227g that is less than the RLGM of 0.387g.
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 138 of 151 CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF Notes Unit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #160 2-PP-82S CONTROL ROOM AIR Screened >RLGM The pump weighs 214 lbs. Equipment CONDITIONING SOUTH screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g CHILL WATER to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-CIRCULATION PUMP SL. Anchorage screened for RLGM based on the small size of the pump and similar pumps yielding significant seismic capacity margins.161 2-PPA- UPPER CONTAINMENT Screened >RLGM Rack is supported with 2" tube steel 310 CHANNEL III WIDE anchored to the wall with four plates each RANGE PRESSURE employing two 3/8" anchor bolts, and to the ALARM TRANSMITTER floor with one plate employing four 3/8" anchor bolts. Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on rack with rugged anchorage.
162 2-PRZ PRESSURIZER Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CONTROL PANEL for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for the Panel.163 2-QLA- SOUTH BORIC ACID Seismic 0.227g Equipment screens (other than anchorage) 430 STORAGE TANK TK- Interaction for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 12S LEVEL ALARM NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for TRANSMITTER RLGM based on rack with rugged anchorage.
The HCLPF is limited by seismic interaction with the piping attached to the Boric Acid Tank. The governing HCLPF capacity according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-005
-"High Confidence Low Probability of Failure (HCLPF) Calculations for Screened in ESEP Tanks" (Ref. 10.2) is 0.227g, that is less than the RLGM of 0.387g.164 2-QRV- AIR OPERATED VALVE Screened >RLGM This valve falls within the Earthquake 200 TO ISOLATE BORON Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-INJECTION PATH SL. Therefore, this valve screens for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.165 2-QT-506 TURBINE DRIVEN Screened >RLGM This valve falls within the Earthquake AUXILIARY FEED Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-PUMP PP-4 TRIP SL. Therefore, this valve screens for the ANDTHROTTLE VALVE 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.166 2-QT-507 AUXILIARY FEED Screened >RLGM This valve falls within the Earthquake PUMP TURBINE Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 139 of 151 CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF Notes Unit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #GOVERNOR VALVE SL. Therefore, this valve screens for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.167 2-QTC- SOUTH BAST TK-12S Seismic 0.227g Equipment welded to one support leg of 2-430 TRAIN 'A' HTR TEMP Interaction TK-12S and supported on a 2" pipe CONTROLLER cantilevered off the tank leg 15" to the right and 9" up. The support pipe is only welded at the top of the connection located 28" above the top of the concrete pedestal.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on rugged configuration of the support. The HCLPF is limited by seismic interaction with the piping attached to the Boric Acid Tank. The governing HCLPF capacity according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-005
-"High Confidence Low Probability of Failure (HCLPF) Calculations for Screened in ESEP Tanks" (Ref. 10.2) is 0.227g that is less than the RLGM of 0.387g.168 2-RHR RESIDUAL HEAT Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
REMOVAL CONTROL for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI PANEL NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the RLGM based on similar panels within the control room yielding significant seismic capacity margins.169 2-RPC-1-1 REACTOR Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI CHANNEL I CABINET NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the#1 RLGM based on similar cabinets yielding significant seismic capacity margins.170 2-RPC-1-2 REACTOR Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI CHANNEL I CABINET NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the#2 RLGM based on similar cabinets yielding significant seismic capacity margins.171 2-RPC-1-3 REACTOR Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI CHANNEL I CABINET NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the#3 RLGM based on similar cabinets yielding significant seismic capacity margins.172 2-RPC-1-4 REACTOR Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI CHANNEL I CABINET NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 140 of 151 CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF Notes Unit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item ##4 RLGM based on similar cabinets yielding significant seismic capacity margins.173 2-RPC-2-5 REACTOR Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI CHANNEL II CABINET NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the#5 RLGM based on similar cabinets yielding significant seismic capacity margins.174 2-RPC-2-6 REACTOR Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI CHANNEL II CABINET NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the#6 RLGM based on similar cabinets yielding significant seismic capacity margins.175 2-RPC-2-7 REACTOR Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI CHANNEL II CABINET NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the#7 RLGM based on similar cabinets yielding significant seismic capacity margins.176 2-RPC-2-8 REACTOR Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI CHANNEL II CABINET NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the#8 RLGM based on similar cabinets yielding significant seismic capacity margins.177 2-RPC REACTOR Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage) 10 PROTECTION for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI CHANNEL Ill CABINET NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the#10 RLGM based on similar cabinets yielding significant seismic capacity margins.178 2-RPC-3-9 REACTOR Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI CHANNEL III CABINET NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the#9 RLGM based on similar cabinets yielding significant seismic capacity margins.179 2-RPC REACTOR Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage) 12 PROTECTION for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI CHANNEL IV CABINET NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the#12 RLGM based on similar cabinets yielding significant seismic capacity margins.180 2-RPS-A REACTOR Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION AND for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI SAFEGUARD NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for ACTUATION TRAIN 'A' RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 CABINET anchorage evaluation.
181 2-RPS-B REACTOR Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION AND for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI SAFEGUARD NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for ACTUATION TRAIN 'B' RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 141 of 151 CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF Notes Unit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #CABINET anchorage evaluation.
182 2-RPSX-A REACTOR Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION AND for the 0.89 to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI SAFEGUARD NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for ACTUATION TRAIN 'A' RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 AUXILIARY CABINET anchorage evaluation.
183 2-RPSX-B REACTOR Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
PROTECTION AND for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI SAFEGUARD NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for ACTUATION TRAIN 'B' RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 AUXILIARY CABINET anchorage evaluation.
184 2-RVLC REACTOR VESSEL Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
OME-1 WATER LEVEL for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI INSTRUMENTATION NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the CABINET RLGM based on similar cabinets yielding significant seismic capacity margins.185 2-SA STATION AUXILIARIES Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CONTROL PANEL for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the RLGM based on similar panels within the control room yielding significant seismic capacity margins.186 2-SG STEAM GENERATOR Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
AND AUXILIARY FEED for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI PUMP CONTROL NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for PANEL RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.
187 2-SIS SAFETY INJECTION Screened >RLGM The panel is welded along the bottom front CONTROL PANEL edge to embedded steel and braced back at the top to reinforced concrete wall. The top of the panel frames back to 2-SSR which is anchored at the top to reinforced concrete wall with six expansion anchors. Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL. Anchorage screened for RLGM based on rugged configuration of the support.188 2-SPY CONTAINMENT SPRAY Screened >RLGM The panel is welded along the bottom front CONTROL PANEL edge to embedded steel and braced back at the top to reinforced concrete wall. The top of the panel frames back to 2-SSR which is anchored at the top to reinforced concrete wall with six expansion anchors. Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL. Anchorage screened for RLGM based 0S Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 142 of 151 CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF Notes Unit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #on rugged configuration of the support.189 2-SSR ENGINEER SAFETY Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
SYSTEM REAR for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI INSTRUMENT/RELAY NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the RACK RLGM based on similar equipment within the control room yielding significant seismic capacity margins.190 2-SWR NUCLEAR Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
INSTRUMENTAL for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI SOURCE RANGE N21 NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the INSTRUMENT/RELAY RLGM based on similar equipment within RACK the control room yielding significant seismic capacity margins.191 2-T21A 4KV BUS T21A Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
SWITCHGEAR for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the RLGM based on anchorage evaluation performed to the RLGM.192 2-TDAB 250VDC TRAIN 'B' Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
TRANSFER CABINET for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.
193 2-TDCD 250VDC TRAIN 'A' Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
TRANSFER CABINET for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the RLGM based on similar cabinets yielding significant seismic capacity margins.194 2-TK-1 1 BORON INJECTION Anchorage 0.45g The Block Wall interaction was screened for TANK RLGM based on scaling of existing design basis calculation.
The tank screening was performed using the existing evaluation for a similar tank (2-TK-12S) with the same support conditions.
Tank 2-TK-12S could not be screened to the RLGM, and thus Tank 2-TK-1 1 did not screen. A HCLPF calculation for the tank was performed.
The governing HCLPF capacity according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-005
-"High Confidence Low Probability of Failure (HCLPF) Calculations for Screened in ESEP Tanks" (Ref. 10.2) is 0.45g for the welded connections.
195 2-TK-12S SOUTH BORIC ACID Anchorage 0.227g The Block Wall interaction was screened for STORAGE TANK RLGM based on scaling of existing design basis calculation.
Existing evaluation for the SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 143 of 151 CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF Notes Unit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #tank shows no additional margin for DBE input. Therefore, this tank did not screen to the RLGM and a HCLPF calculation for the tank was performed.
The governing HCLPF capacity according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-005
-"High Confidence Low Probability of Failure (HCLPF) Calculations for Screened in ESEP Tanks" (Ref. 10.2) is 0.227g for the tank support that is less than the RLGM of 0.387g.198 2-TK-253-PRESSURIZER TRAIN Screened >RLGM Tanks 2-TK-3, -5, &-7 grouped together and 3 'B' PRESSURE RELIEF anchored by four plates bolted to the wall VLV NRV-152 with two 3/4" bolts in each plate. The plates EMERGENCY AIR measured 19" and 44" from the floor to plate TANK centerlines.
The tanks are 9" diameter and 56" tall. The air bottles are strapped with brackets affixed to the wall by four plates employing two W" bolts each. Note that tank configuration has changed since A-46 evaluation but does not change the conclusion.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on rugged configuration of support.199 2-TK-253-PRESSURIZER TRAIN Screened >RLGM Tanks 2-TK-4, -6, &-8 grouped together and 4 'A' PRESSURE RELIEF anchored by four plates bolted to the wall VLV NRV-153 with two 3/4" bolts in each plate. The plates EMERGENCY AIR measured 19" and 44" from the floor to plate TANK centerlines.
The tanks are 9" diameter and 56" tall. The air bottles are strapped with brackets affixed to the wall by four plates employing two W" bolts each. Note that tank configuration has changed since A-46 evaluation but does not change the conclusion.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on rugged configuration of support.200 2-TK-253-PRESSURIZER TRAIN Screened >RLGM Tanks 2-TK-3, -5, &-7 grouped together and 5 'B' PRESSURE RELIEF anchored by four plates bolted to the wall VLV NRV-152 with two 3/4" bolts in each plate. The plates EMERGENCY AIR measured 19" and 44" from the floor to plate TANK centerlines.
The tanks are 9" diameter and 56" tall. The air bottles are strapped with SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 PaRe 144 of 151 CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF Notes Unit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #brackets affixed to the wall by four plates employing two %" bolts each. Note that tank configuration has changed since A-46 evaluation but does not change the conclusion.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on rugged configuration of support.201 2-TK-253-PRESSURIZER TRAIN Screened >RLGM Tanks 2-TK-4, -6, &-8 grouped together and 6 'A' PRESSURE RELIEF anchored by four plates bolted to the wall VLV NRV-153 with two 3/4" bolts in each plate. The plates EMERGENCY AIR measured 19" and 44" from the floor to plate TANK centerlines.
The tanks are 9" diameter and 56" tall. The air bottles are strapped with brackets affixed to the wall by four plates employing two %" bolts each. Note that tank configuration has changed since A-46 evaluation but does not change the conclusion.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on rugged configuration of support.202 2-TK-253-PRESSURIZER TRAIN Screened >RLGM Tanks 2-TK-3, -5, &-7 grouped together and 7 'B' PRESSURE RELIEF anchored by four plates bolted to the wall VLV NRV-152 with two 3/4" bolts in each plate. The plates EMERGENCY AIR measured 19" and 44" from the floor to plate TANK centerlines.
The tanks are 9" diameter and 56" tall. The air bottles are strapped with brackets affixed to the wall by four plates employing two %" bolts each. Note that tank configuration has changed since A-46 evaluation but does not change the conclusion.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on rugged configuration of support.203 2-TK-253-PRESSURIZER TRAIN Screened >RLGM Tanks 2-TK-4, -6, &-8 grouped together and 8 'A' PRESSURE RELIEF anchored by four plates bolted to the wall VLV NRV-153 with two 3/4" bolts in each plate. The plates EMERGENCY AIR measured 19" and 44" from the floor to plate TANK centerlines.
The tanks are 9" diameter and 56" tall. The air bottles are strapped with brackets affixed to the wall by four plates 0 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 PaRe 145 of 151 CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF Notes Unit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #employing two %" bolts each. Note that tank configuration has changed since A-46 evaluation but does not change the conclusion.
Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on rugged configuration of support.204 2-TK-32 CONDENSATE Anchorage 0.481g Rust was found on the strap supports.
A STORAGE TANK HCLPF calculation was performed for the degraded condition.
The governing HCLPF capacity according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-005
-"High Confidence Low Probability of Failure (HCLPF) Calculations for Screened in ESEP Tanks" (Ref. 10.2) is 0.481g.205 2-TK-37 COMPONENT Anchorage 0.447g Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
COOLING WATER for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI SURGE TANK NP-60411-SL.
Potentially governing Block Wall interaction and the tank anchorage could not be screened for RLGM. The governing HCLPF capacity according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-005
-"High Confidence Low Probability of Failure (HCLPF) Calculations for Screened in ESEP Tanks" (Ref. 10.2) is 0.447g for the tank anchorage.
206 2-TR21A 600V BUS 21A SUPPLY Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
TRANSFORMER for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.
The governing HCLPF capacity for the block wall according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-004
-"HCLPF Calculations for Screened in ESEP Components" (Ref. 10.1) is 1.270g and did not control the capacity.207 2-TR- TRANSFORMER FOR Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
AFWX AFWX DIST PANEL for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.
208 2-TR- TRANSFORMER FOR Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
ELSC ELSC DIST PANEL for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of existing USI A-46
& 1 U3 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 146 of 151 CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF Notes Unit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #anchorage evaluation.
209 2-UDISB- CONTAINMENT Screened >RLGM Igniter box is attached to horizontal unistruts B1 HYDROGEN IGNITION bolted to vertical embedded unistruts.
The UPPER VOLUME TRAIN hydrogen igniters are composed of the'B' GLOW PLUG Igniter Box, glow plug, shield and other ASSEMBLY #B1 associated hardware.
The components within the igniter box are not fragile and are encompassed by that typically contained in other electrical boxes. Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling existing anchorage evaluation.
210 2-UDISB- CONTAINMENT Screened >RLGM Igniter box is bolted to horizontal unistruts B13 HYDROGEN IGNITION bolted to an embedded vertical unistrut on UPPER VOLUME TRAIN the left and a 3/8" expansion anchor on the'B' GLOW PLUG right. See notes for 2-UDISB-BI.
ASSEMBLY #B13 211 2-UDISB- CONTAINMENT Screened >RLGM Igniter box is bolted to horizontal unistruts B14 HYDROGEN IGNITION bolted to an embedded vertical unistrut on UPPER VOLUME TRAIN the left and a 3/8" expansion anchor on the'B' GLOW PLUG right. See notes for 2-UDISB-B1.
ASSEMBLY #B14 212 2-UDISB- CONTAINMENT Screened >RLGM Igniter box is bolted to horizontal unistruts B15 HYDROGEN IGNITION bolted to an embedded vertical unistrut on UPPER VOLUME TRAIN the left and a 3/8" expansion anchor on the'B' GLOW PLUG right. See notes for 2-UDISB-B1.
ASSEMBLY #B15 213 2-UDISB- CONTAINMENT Screened >RLGM Igniter box is bolted to horizontal unistruts B16 HYDROGEN IGNITION bolted to an embedded vertical unistrut on UPPER VOLUME TRAIN the left and a 3/8" expansion anchor on the'B' GLOW PLUG right. See notes for 2-UDISB-B1.
ASSEMBLY #B16 214 2-UDISB- CONTAINMENT Screened >RLGM Igniter box is bolted to horizontal unistruts B17 HYDROGEN IGNITION bolted to an embedded vertical unistrut on UPPER VOLUME TRAIN the left and a 3/8" expansion anchor on the'B' GLOW PLUG right. See notes for 2-UDISB-B1.
ASSEMBLY #B17 215 2-UDISB- CONTAINMENT Screened >RLGM Igniter box is attached to horizontal unistruts B2 HYDROGEN IGNITION bolted to vertical embedded unistruts.
See UPPER VOLUME TRAIN notes for 2-UDISB-B1.
'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B2 216 2-UDISB- CONTAINMENT Screened >RLGM Igniter box is bolted to two horizontal B29 HYDROGEN IGNITION unistruts which are welded directly to the UPPER VOLUME TRAIN column. The hydrogen igniters are 0 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 147 of 151 CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF Notes Unit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #'B' GLOW PLUG composed of the Igniter Box, glow plug, ASSEMBLY #B29 shield and other associated hardware.
The igniters attached to the catwalk wide flange members. A HCLPF calculation was performed for 2-UDISB-B29.
The governing HCLPF capacity for the catwalk according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-006
-"High Confidence Low Probability of Failure (HCLPF) Calculations for Containment Catwalk and Attached Hydrogen Glow Plugs"" (Ref. 10.3) is 0.86g and did not control capacity.217 2-UDISB- CONTAINMENT Screened >RLGM Igniter box is attached to horizontal unistruts B3 HYDROGEN IGNITION bolted to vertical embedded unistruts.
See UPPER VOLUME TRAIN notes for 2-UDISB-BI.
'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B3 218 2-UDISB- CONTAINMENT Screened >RLGM Igniter box is bolted to two horizontal B30 HYDROGEN IGNITION unistruts which are welded directly to the UPPER VOLUME TRAIN column. The hydrogen igniters are'B' GLOW PLUG composed of the Igniter Box, glow plug, ASSEMBLY #B30 shield and other associated hardware.
The igniters attached to the catwalk wide flange members. A HCLPF calculation was performed for 2-UDISB-B29.
The governing HCLPF capacity for the catwalk according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-006
-"High Confidence Low Probability of Failure (HCLPF) Calculations for Containment Catwalk and Attached Hydrogen Glow Plugs"" (Ref. 10.3) is 0.86g and did not control capacity.219 2-UDISB- CONTAINMENT Screened >RLGM Igniter box is bolted to two horizontal B31 HYDROGEN IGNITION unistruts which are welded directly to the UPPER VOLUME TRAIN column. The hydrogen igniters are'B' GLOW PLUG composed of the Igniter Box, glow plug, ASSEMBLY #B31 shield and other associated hardware.
The igniters attached to the catwalk wide flange members. A HCLPF calculation was performed for 2-UDISB-B29.
The governing HCLPF capacity for the catwalk according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-006
-"High Confidence Low Probability of Failure (HCLPF) Calculations for Containment Catwalk and Attached Hydrogen Glow Plugs"" (Ref. 10.3) is 0.86g and did not sr~Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 148 of 151 CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF Notes Unit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #control capacity.220 2-UDISB- CONTAINMENT Screened >RLGM Igniter box is bolted to two vertical unistruts B32 HYDROGEN IGNITION which are U-bolted to the top and bottom UPPER VOLUME TRAIN handrail of the catwalk. The hydrogen'B' GLOW PLUG igniters are composed of the Igniter Box, ASSEMBLY #B32 glow plug, shield and other associated hardware.
A HCLPF calculation was performed for 2-UDISB-B32.
The governing HCLPF capacity for the catwalk according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-006
-"High Confidence Low Probability of Failure (HCLPF) Calculations for Containment Catwalk and Attached Hydrogen Glow Plugs"" (Ref. 10.3) is 0.86g and did not control capacity.221 2-UDISB- CONTAINMENT Screened >RLGM Igniter box is bolted to two vertical unistruts B33 HYDROGEN IGNITION which are U-bolted to the top and bottom UPPER VOLUME TRAIN handrail of the catwalk. The hydrogen'B' GLOW PLUG igniters are composed of the Igniter Box, ASSEMBLY #B33 glow plug, shield and other associated hardware.
A HCLPF calculation was performed for 2-UDISB-B32.
The governing HCLPF capacity for the catwalk according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-006
-"High Confidence Low Probability of Failure (HCLPF) Calculations for Containment Catwalk and Attached Hydrogen Glow Plugs"" (Ref. 10.3) is 0.86g and did not control capacity.222 2-UDISB- CONTAINMENT Screened >RLGM Igniter box is bolted to two vertical unistruts B34 HYDROGEN IGNITION which are U-bolted to the top and bottom UPPER VOLUME TRAIN handrail of the catwalk. The hydrogen'B' GLOW PLUG igniters are composed of the Igniter Box, ASSEMBLY #B34 glow plug, shield and other associated hardware.
A HCLPF calculation was performed for 2-UDISB-B32.
The governing HCLPF capacity for the catwalk according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-006
-"High Confidence Low Probability of Failure (HCLPF) Calculations for Containment Catwalk and Attached Hydrogen Glow Plugs"" (Ref. 10.3) is 0.86g and did not control capacity.223 2-UDISB- CONTAINMENT Screened >RLGM Box dimensions are 16"x12"x8".
Unistruts B4 HYDROGEN IGNITION are approximately 16" apart vertically for UPPER VOLUME TRAIN support. Horizontal running support SA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 149 of 151 CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF Notes Unit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #'B' GLOW PLUG unistruts are bolted to embedded unistruts ASSEMBLY #B4 spaced at 48" from each other, running vertically.
The box is located such that the bottom of the box is flush with the bottom horizontal unistrut, and 15" from the center of the box to the right vertically running embedded unistrut.See discussion for 2-UDISB-B1.
Assembly screens for 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL (Ref. 1) and anchorage loadings from RLGM input spectra (Ref. 2)224 2-UDISB- CONTAINMENT Screened >RLGM Igniter box is attached to horizontal unistruts B5 HYDROGEN IGNITION bolted to vertical embedded unistruts.
See UPPER VOLUME TRAIN notes for 2-UDISB-BI.
'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B5 225 2-UDISB- CONTAINMENT Screened >RLGM Igniter box is attached to horizontal unistruts B6 HYDROGEN IGNITION bolted to vertical embedded unistruts.
See UPPER VOLUME TRAIN notes for 2-UDISB-B1.
'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B6 226 2-UDISB- CONTAINMENT Screened >RLGM Igniter box is attached to horizontal unistruts B7 HYDROGEN IGNITION bolted to vertical embedded unistruts.
See UPPER VOLUME TRAIN notes for 2-UDISB-B1.
'B' GLOW PLUG ASSEMBLY #B7 227 2-VR- LOWER CONTAINMENT Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
LDISB-4 TRAIN B DISTRIBUTED for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI IGNITION SYSTEM NP-6041-SL.
The governing HCLPF VOLTAGE REGULATOR capacity according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-004
-"HCLPF Calculations for Screened in ESEP Components" (Ref.10.1) is 0.760g and does not control the capacity.228 2-VR- UPPER CONTAINMENT Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
UDISB-3 TRAIN B DISTRIBUTED for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI IGNITION SYSTEM NP-6041-SL.
The governing HCLPF VOLTAGE REGULATOR capacity according to S&A Calculation 13Q3208-CAL-004
-"HCLPF Calculations for Screened in ESEP Components" (Ref.10.1) is 0.760g and does not control the capacity.229 2-VS VENTILATION Screened >RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
CONTROL PANEL for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI POA Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 150 of 151 CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF Notes Unit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage screens to the RLGM based on similar panels within the control room yielding significant seismic capacity margins.230 2-WMO- WEST CONTAINMENT Screened >RLGM This valve falls within the Earthquake 716 SPRAY HEAT Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-EXCHANGER SL. Therefore, this valve screens for the ESSENTIAL SERVICE 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-WATER INLET 6041-SL.SHUTOFF VALVE 231 2-WMO- EMERGENCY Screened >RLGM This valve falls outside the Earthquake 753 ESSENTIAL SERVICE Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-WATER SUPPLY TO SL. However, this valve screens for the 0.8g TDAFPPP-4 SHUTOFF to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL VALVE based on analysis performed for a 3g input.232 2-WRV- W ESW PUMP PP-7W Screened >RLGM This valve falls within the Earthquake 764 DISCH STN WEST Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-BASKET B/W OUT S/O SL. Therefore, this valve screens for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.233 2-WRV- W ESW PUMP PP-7W Screened >RLGM This valve falls within the Earthquake 769 DISCH STN WEST Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-BASKET BAW INL S/O SL. Therefore, this valve screens for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.234 2-WRV- WEST ESW PUMP PP- Screened >RLGM This valve falls within the Earthquake 774 7W DISCH STN EAST Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-BASKET BA/ OUT SL. Therefore, this valve screens for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.235 2-WRV- WEST ESW PUMP PP- Screened >RLGM This valve falls within the Earthquake 779 7W DISCH STN EAST Experience Database from EPRI NP-6041-BASKET B/W INL SL. Therefore, this valve screens for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL. There is sufficient clearance between the valve operator and the walkway. Pipe line well supported and not a credible damaging interaction.
Small valve bolted into a small rack.Equipment screens (other than anchorage) 239 2-XRV- PRESSURE Screened >RLGM for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI 152 REGULATING VALVE NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage judged to be adequate for RLGM by inspection based on light rack with rugged anchorage.
2-XRV- PRESSURE Small valve bolted into a small rack.240 153 REGULATING VALVE Screened >RLGMSa leed into a allhrack.153____REGULATING_______
VALVE___ ______Equipment screens (other than anchorage)
SA3 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic 13Q3208-RPT-005 Rev. 0 12-10-2014 Page 151 of 151 CNP ID DESCRIPTION Failure HCLPF Notes Unit 2 Mode (compared ESEL to RLGM)Item #for the 0.8g to 1.2 g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Anchorage judged to be adequate for RLGM by inspection based on light rack with rugged anchorage.}}

Latest revision as of 02:01, 28 April 2019

Redirect to:

Retrieved from "https://kanterella.com/w/index.php?title=ML14357A053&oldid=1531920"