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#REDIRECT [[L-2017-002, License Amendment Request to Revise the Technical Specifications (TS) for the Reactor Protection System (RPS) Power Rate-of-Change Instrumentation and Add New TS 3.0.5]]
| number = ML17025A399
| issue date = 01/23/2017
| title = St. Lucie Units 1 and 2 - License Amendment Request to Revise the Technical Specifications (TS) for the Reactor Protection System (RPS) Power Rate-of-Change Instrumentation and Add New TS 3.0.5
| author name = Summers T
| author affiliation = Florida Power & Light Co
| addressee name =
| addressee affiliation = NRC/Document Control Desk, NRC/NRR
| docket = 05000335, 05000389
| license number = DPR-067, NPF-016
| contact person =
| case reference number = L-2017-002
| document type = Letter, License-Application for Facility Operating License (Amend/Renewal) DKT 50
| page count = 54
}}
 
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington D C 20555-0001 RE: St. Lucie Units 1and2 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389 JAN**2 3 2017 Renewed Facility Operating Licenses DPR-67 and NPF-16 L-2017-002 10 CFR50.90 License Amendment Request to Revise the Technical Specifications (TS) for the Reactor Protection System (RPS) Power Rate-of-Change Instrumentation and Add New TS 3.0.5. Pursuant to 10 CFR Part 50.90, Florida Power & Light Company (FPL) hereby requests amendments to Renewed Facility Operating Licenses DPR-67 for St. Lucie Nuclear Plant Unit 1 and NPF-16 for St. Lucie Nuclear Plant Unit 2, respectively. The proposed license amendments modify the St. Lucie Unit 1 and St. Lucie Unit 2 Technical Specifications (TS) by limiting the MODE of applicability for the Reactor Protection System (RPS), Startup and Operating Rate of Change of Power -High, functional unit trip. The proposed license amendments additionally add new Limiting Conditions of Operation (LCO) 3.0.5 and relatedly modifies LCO 3.0.2, to provide for placing inoperable equipment under administrative control for the purpose of conducting testing required to demonstrate OPERABILITY. The enclosure to this letter provides FPL's evaluation of the proposed changes. Attachment 1 to the enclosure provides the existing St. Lucie Unit 1 TS pages marked up to show the proposed changes. Attachment 2 provides the St. Lucie Unit 2 marked up TS pages. Attachment 3 provides the St. Lucie Unit 1 retyped (clean copy) TS pages with revision bars to identify the proposed changes. Attachment 4 provides the St. Lucie Unit 2 retyped TS pages. Attachment 5 provides the existing St. Lucie Unit 1 TS Bases pages marked up to show the proposed changes. Attachment 6 provides the St. Lucie Unit 2 TS Bases marked up pages. The TS Bases changes are provided for information only and will be incorporated in accordance with the TS Bases Control Program upon implementation of the approved amendments. FPL has determined that the proposed changes do not involve a significant hazards consideration pursuant to 10 CPR 50.92( c), and there are no significant environmental impacts associated with the change. The St. Lucie Plant Onsite Review Group (ORG) has reviewed the proposed license amendments. In accordance with 10 CFR 50.91(b)(1), copies of the proposed license amendments are being forwarded to the State designee for the State of Florida. FPL requests that the proposed changes are processed as a normal license amendment request, with approval within one year of the submittal date. Once approved, the amendments shall be implemented within 90 days. This letter contains no new regulatory commitments. Should you have any questions regarding this submittal, please contact Mr. Mike Snyder, St. Lucie Licensing Manager, at (772)467-7036.
St. Lucie Nuclear Plant Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389 I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on j,_.(l..; c,,,, / 2 31 ;? 7" Sincerely, / Thomas Summers South Region Vice President Florida Power & Light Enclosure cc: USNRC Regional Administrator, Region II USNRC Project Manager, St. Lucie Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 USNRC Senior Resident Inspector, St. Lucie Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 Ms. Cindy Becker, Florida Department of Health L-2017-002 Page 2 of2 St. Lucie Nuclear Plant Docket Nos. 50-.335 and 50-389 Enclosure Evaluation of the Proposed Changes St. Lucie Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 L-2017-002 Enclosure Page 1 of 52-License Amendment Request to Revise the Technical Specifications (TS) for the Reactor Protection System (RPS) Power Rate-of-Change Instrumentation and Add New TS 3.0.5. 1.0 SUMMARY DESCRIPTION ............................................................................................................... 2 2.0 DETAILED DESCRIPTION ................................................................................................................ 2
 
==3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION==
.............................................................................................................. 6
 
==4.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION==
.......................................................................................................... 9 4.1 Applicable Regulatory Requirements/Criteria ................................................................................. 9 4.2 No Significant Hazards Consideration .......................................................................................... 10 4.3 Conclusion .................................................................................................................................... 12
 
==5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION==
........................................................................................... 12 6.0 REFERENCES ................................................................................................................................. 13 Attachment 1 -Proposed Unit 1 Technical Specification Pages (markup) ...................................... 14 Attachment 2 -Proposed Unit 2 Technical Specification Pages (markup) ................................... 21 Attachment 3 -Proposed Unit 1 Technical Specification Pages (clean copy) .................................... 27 Attachment 4 -Proposed' Unit 2 Technical Specification Pages (clean copy) ................................... 31 Attachment 5 -Proposed Unit 1 Technical Specification Bases Pages (markup) ................................ 35 Attachment 6 -Proposed Unit 2 Technical Specification Bases Pages (markup) ................................ 44 St. Lucie Nuclear Plant Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389 L-2017-002 Enclosur.e Page 2 of 52 1.0 SUMMARY DESCRIPTION Florida Power& Light Company (FPL) hereby requests amendments to Renewed Facility Operating Licenses DPR-67 for St. Lucie Nuclear Plant Unit 1 and NPF-16 for St. Lucie Nuclear Plant Unit 2, respectively. The proposed license amendments modify the St. Lucie Unit 1 and St. Lucie Unit 2 Technical Specifications (TS) by limiting the MODE 1 applicability for Reactor Protection System (RPS) functional unit (FU), Startup and Operating Rate of Change of Power -High, to less than or equal 15 percent(%) of RATED THERMAL POWER. The proposed license amendments additionally add new Limiting Conditions of Operation (LCO) 3.0.5 and relatedly modifies LCO 3.0.2, to provide for placing inoperable equipment under administrative control for the purpose of conducting testing required to demonstrate OPERABILITY, thereby aligning the St. Lucie Unit 1 and Unit 2 TS more closely with NUREG-1432, Volume 1, Standard Technical Specifications -Combustion Engineering Plants (Reference 6.1 ). 2.0 DETAILED DESCRIPTION 2.1 System Design and Operation 2. 1. 1 Reactor Protective System (RPS) The RPS is designed to assure adequate protection of the fuel, fuel cladding and reactor coolant pressure boundary during anticipated operational occurrences. The RPS functions to assure that reactor coolant pressure boundary and fuel performance guidelines are not exceeded during moderate frequency events and infrequent events. The system also provides assistance in limiting conditions for certain limiting faults. The reactor protective system consists of sensors, amplifiers, logic, and other equipment necessary to monitor selected nuclear steam supply system parameters and to effect reliable and rapid reactor shutdown if any one or a combination of parameters deviates from a preselected operating range. The RPS initiates a reactor trip whenever a selected parameter reaches its preset limit. Four independent channels normally monitor each of the selected plant parameters. Operability requirements for the RPS channels are specified in Table 3.3-1 of the St Lucie Unit 1 and Unit 2 TS, respectively. RPS channel redundancy is provided to assure that no single failure prevents protective action when required. Since no single failure will either cause or prevent a protective system actuation, and no protective channel feeds a control channel, the arrangement meets the requirements of IEEE Standard 279-1971 (Reference 6.2). 2.1.2 RPS High Rate of Change Power Trip Function The RPS power rate-of-change trip function is provided to protect the core during startup operations and its use serves as a backup to the administratively enforced startup rate limit. This trip is provided to trip the reactor when the of-change of neutron flux power exceeds a preset value. Its purpose is to provide equipment protection and to protect against an exceedingly high rate of change of power resulting from large reactivity insertions during periods of low power operation. The function serves to enhance overall RPS reliability. The rate of change of power is monitored at startup by four wide-range startup channels. When rated thermal power is between 10-4% and 15% of full power, a reactor trip will be automatically initiated if the rate of change of neutron flux is greater than a set rate as measured by any two wide-range channels. When the rate of change of neutron flux is in excess of the set rate, a Control Element St. Lucie Nuclear Plant Docket Nos. 50-335 and .50-389 L-2017-002 Enclosure Page 3 of 52 Assembly (CEA) withdraw prohibit will also become operative and an alarm will be actuated in the Control Room. A Control Room pre-trip alarm is generated from each channel bistable trip unit prior to the rate-of-change of power exceeding the trip set point limit. Though the St. Lucie Unit 1 and Unit 2 TS states that the power rate-of-change trip may be bypassed below 10-4% and above 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER, the power rate-of-change trip is automatically bypassed below 1 o-4% and above 15% power and is automatically restored upon re-entering this power range. The automatic bypass function is periodically tested using test circuitry which verifies both bypass initiation and restoration capability. 2.2 Description of the Proposed Change 2.2.1 Revise MODE 1 Applicability for RPS Power Rate-of-Change Trip Function St. Lucie Unit 1 TS 3/4.3.1, Table 3.3-1, Reactor Protective Instrumentation, establishes LCO(s), ACTION(s) and Surveillance Requirements (SRs) for the St. Lucie Unit 1 RPS instrumentation. RPS Functional Unit (FU) 11, Wide Range Logarithmic Neutron Flux Monitor, of Table 3.3-1, specifies the Total Number* of Channels, Channels to Trip, Minimum Channels Operable, Applicable Modes and ACTION(s) for FU 11.a, Startup and Operating -Rate of Change of Power -High. The proposed change inserts a double-asterisk (**) adjacent to the MODE 1 indication for FU 11.a, in Table 3.3-1, and adds a new note denoted by a double asterisk (**) to the TABLE NOTATION section of Table 3.3-1. The new note states that MODE 1 applies [to FU 11.a] only when Power Range Neutron Flux power 15% of RA TED THERMAL POWER. The proposed changes to the St. Lucie Unit 1 TS are as indicated in italics below: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------. . . . . . . I . ! FUNCTIONAL UNIT ! OF CHANNELS ! TO TRIP i CHANNELS ! MODES ! ACTION : : : : OPERABLE : --: . -- ------------------------------ ----------------------i !,.* 11 ! Wide Range Logarithmic :,.' ; ; :,'. ! Neutron Flux Monitor I New double asterisk ! * ! ! -Rate of Change of Power ! 4 ! 2(d) ! 3 ! 1 **, 2 and* ! 2 ! L .......... l .. .. .................................. L ............................ L. ........................... L .............................. L .................... J 1----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued) TABLE NOTATION
* With the protective system trip breakers in the closed position and the CEA drive system capable of CEA withdrawal.
* New note ** MODE 1 applicable only when Power Range Neutron Flux power is ,::: 15% of RA TED THERMAL POWER.
St. Lucie Nuclear Plant Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389 L-2017-002 Enclosure Page 4 of 52 St. Lucie Unit 2 TS 3/4.3.1, Table 3.3-1, Reactor Protective Instrumentation, establishes LCO(s), ACTION(s) and SR(s) for the St. Lucie Unit 2 RPS instrumentation. RPS Functional Unit (FU) 13, Wide Range Logarithmic Neutron Flux Monitor, of TS 3/4.3.1, Table 3.3-1, specifies the Total Number of Channels, Channels to Trip, Minimum Channels Operable, Applicable Modes and ACTION(s) for FU 13.a, Startup and Operating -Rate of Change of Power -High. The proposed change inserts a double-asterisk (**) adjacent to the MODE 1 indication for FU 13.a, in Table 3.3-1, and adds a new note denoted by a double asterisk (**) to the TABLE NOTATION section of Table 3.3-1. The new note states that MODE 1 applies [to FU 13.a] only when Power Range Neutron Flux power 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER. The proposed changes to the St. Lucie Unit 2 TS are as indicated in italics below: r-.--................ ____ ... __ ................ u .............. ----........... --*--..... TABLET3::f("c"Ciii"tiii"uecff "u""""""--... u*m*m ..... --***-------... ----un*m*u--... -----------... ------REACTOR PROTECTIVE INSTRUMENTATION : .................................................................. T***********************************r****************************r******MiiiiiiiiiUi\ii"""""T""""""""""********************-r******************** FUNCTIONAL UNIT j TOTAL NO. j CHANNELS j CHANNELS j APPLICABLE i ACTION ... OPERABLE _ __j ......... 13 ! Wide Range Logarithmic . . . . . . ! Neutron Flux Monitor l l l / New double asterisk j l ; -Rate of Change of Power ; 4 ; 2(e)(g) : 3 ; 1 ft, 2 ; 2 ; l. ......... J ... . .l::l_i_g_h .......................................... L ................................... L ............................ L. ........................... L ............................. L ..................... : TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued) TABLE NOTATION
* With the protective system trip breakers in the closed position, the CEA drive system capable of CEA withdrawal, and fuel in the reactor vessel. New note f*-> ** MODE 1 applicable only when Power Range Neutron Flux power is 15% of RA TED THERMAL POWER. '------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------2.2.2 Add New LCO 3.0.5 for Testing Under Administrative Control St. Lucie Unit 1 and Unit 2 TS, Section 3/4.0, APPLICABILITY, establish LCOs for TS operation and surveillance requirements. The proposed change adds new LCO 3.0.5 to the St. Lucie Unit 1 and Unit 2 TS in order to provide for placing inoperable equipment under administrative control for the purpose of conducting testing required to demonstrate OPERABILITY. The proposed change relatedly modifies LCO 3.0.2 to provide for the LCO 3.0.5 exception. The proposed changes to the St. Lucie Unit 1 TS are as indicated in italics below: LCO 3.0.2 f\'*Jn*@mp.ljanse 'llith a spe&fisatieR sha!/ exist V'lheR th@ 1<:effWiffiNRBRts @f th@ 1=imitiR*J G@R*1iti@R f-Or OfJe,r;ati@R (LGO) aR*1 asseeiatefi 14.GTlOA.1 refiftJ*\remeRts are Ret met the spesified time iRtfJA'flJs. If the LimitiRg Genfiitlen fer Ope.ratien is rosterofi fJFi@r te @>qJiratieR gf the spesified time iRterlals, semp.'etieR ef the /'GT/Of:\' reQui.r.ements is Ret Pefifulrocl.
St. Lucie Nuclear Plant Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389 LC03.0.5 L-2017-002 Enclosure Page 5 of 52 Upon discovery of a failure to meet an LCO, the Required Actions of the associated conditions shall be met, except as provided in LCO 3.0.5. If the LCO is met or is no longer applicable prior to expiration of the specified time interval(s), completion of the Required ACTION(s) is not required, unless otherwise stated. Equipment removed from service or declared inoperable to comply with ACTIONS may be returned to service under administrative control solely to perform testing required to demonstrate its OPERABILITY or the OPERABILITY of other equipment. This is an exception to LCO 3.0.2 for the system returned to service under administrative control to perform the testing required to demonstrate OPERABILITY. The proposed changes to the St. Lucie Unit 2 TS are as indicated in italics below: LC03.0.2 LC03.0.5 PJeRsefflpliaRse a spesifieatieR shall @xist '*R.'hfJR the reqt:JiremeRts ef the LimitiRg CeRditieR fer Ope.r::atieR aRdlf:Jr asseciatefi ,4,CTl0.''1 mquiromeRts a.t:e 'Ref met tRe SfJB@ifiefi tim@ int@nls.ls. If th@ Mmiting G@nfim@n ffJr Ope.<atien is rosterofi pr::i@r te exfJ,\'TJti@n @f tlw SfJfJ@itiefi time int@A'a!s, &fJmp!etieR ef the /'.CT/ON .r::eqtJ.\remeRts is Ret .requf,red. Upon discovery of a failure to meet an LCO, the Required Actions of the associated conditions shall be met, except as provided in LCO 3.0.5. If the LCO is met or is no longer applicable prior to expiration of the specified time interval(s), completion of the Required ACTION(s) is not required, unless otherwise stated. Equipment removed from service or declared inoperable to comply with ACTIONS may be returned to service under administrative control solely to perform testing required to demonstrate its OPERABILITY or the OPERABILITY of other equipment. This is an exception to LCO 3. 0. 2 for the system returned to service under administrative control to perform the testing required to demonstrate OPERABILITY.
St. Lucie Nuclear Plant Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389
 
==3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION==
-------. L-2017-002 Enclosure Page 6 of 52 The proposed license amendment modifies the St. Lucie Unit 1 and Unit 2 TS by limiting the MODE 1 applicability for RPS functional unit, Startup and Operating Rate of Change of Power -High, to Power Range Neutron Flux Power.:':. 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER. The proposed change additionally adds new LCO 3.0.5 and relatedly modifies LCO 3.0.2, to provide for placing inoperable equipment under administrative control for the purpose of conducting testing required to demonstrate OPERABILITY, thereby aligning the St. Lucie Unit 1 and Unit 2 TS more closely with NUREG-1432, Volume 1 (Reference 6.1 ). 3.1 Revise RPS Power Rate of Change MODE Applicability During plant startup and shutdown, and all cases where power is below 15%, manual operation of the CEAs is used as one means of controlling reactor power. Per Note 2(d) of Unit 1 TS, Table 3.3-1, FU 11.a, [Note 2(e) of Unit 2 TS, Table 3.3-1, FU 13.a], the RPS Startup and Operating Rate of Change of Power -High (aka power rate-of-change) trip function may be bypassed below 10-4% and above 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER. In fact, the power rate-of-change trip function is automatically bypassed below 10-4% and above 15% power, though the St. Lucie Unit 1 and Unit 2 TS do not explicitly require the power rate-of-change trip to be bypassed outside this power range. A wide range logarithmic channel bistable disables the power rate-of-change output to the RPS below 10-4% power. Similarly, a power range safety channel bistable initiates the power rate-of-change trip bypass above 15% full power. No manual operator action is required to initiate the bypass feature. The automatic placement of the power rate-of-change trip in the bypass mode ensures that the trip function is incapable of inadvertent operation which could compromise a smooth and continuous reactivity rate-of-change during startup and power operations. The power rate-of-change high trip provides no specified safety function above 15% power. All anticipated operational occurrences at these power levels credit automatic and manual actions as well as inherent features such as the moderator and fuel temperature coefficients to preclude the likelihood* of an unacceptably high power rate of change. Similarly, the power rate-of-change trip provides no specified safety function at subcritical power levels where poor instrument counting statistics can lead to erroneous indication. The proposed change limits the MODE 1 applicability for the power rate-of-change trip to less than or equal to 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER. Limiting the MODE of applicability to .:':.15% power neither physically changes any plant systems, structures, or components, nor modifies any plant procedure or methodology for this phase of plant operation. More specifically, the power rate-of-change trip function above 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER is not installed instrumentation used to detect, and indicate in the Control Room, a significant abnormal degradation of the reactor coolant pressure boundary; is not a process variable, design feature, or operating restriction that is an initial condition of a design basis accident or transient analysis that assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier; is not a system, structure, or component (SSC) that is part of the primary success path and which functions or actuates to mitigate a design basis accident or transient that assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier; and is not a SSC which operating experience or probabilistic risk assessment has shown to be significant to public health and safety.
St. Lucie Nuclear Plant Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389 L-2017-002 Enclosure Page 7 of 52 Hence the power rate-of-change trip function above 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER does not meet the criteria specified in 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) for TS inclusion as an LCO. Only when rated thermal power is 15% does the power rate-of-change trip function satisfy the 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) criteria for TS inclusion since below 15% power, reactivity changes are limited to manual controls and automatic protective features other than the rate-of-change trip function are not available. The power rate-of-change trip setpoint does not correspond to a safety limit and no credit is taken in the safety analyses for operation of this trip outside the applicability range of power. The presence of the power rate-of-change trip function in the applicability range of power precludes the need for analyses of other events initiated from subcritical conditions. Hence, no revision of any safety analyses is required as a result of the proposed license amendments. Moreover, extending the MODE of applicability above 15% RATED THERMAL POWER creates an unnecessary burden on plant operations by imposing required ACTIONS on equipment with no specified safety function in this phase of plant operation. This unnecessarily results in TS compliance problems and corrective actions which divert maintenance and operations resources from areas more pertinent to plant safety. Limiting the power rate-of-change MODE of applicability 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER is an administrative change in nature and affects neither the physical equipment nor the manner in which they are maintained. As such, the SRs associated with the RPS power rate-of-change trip function will continue to be performed at the periodicity and in the manner currently specified. More specifically, SR 4.3.1.1.1 of the St. Lucie Unit 1 TS and SR 4.3.1.1 of the St. Lucie Unit 2 TS require that each reactor protective instrumentation channel be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL CALIBRATION and CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST operations during the modes and at the frequencies specified in Table 4.3-1 of the St. Lucie Unit 1 and Unit 2 TS, respectively. Included within Table 4.3-1 are RPS functional units RPS logic and WR Logarithmic Neutron Flux Monitors, each of which are tested in accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. Testing includes RPS power rate-of-change trip and power rate-of-change pre-trip setpoint verification. Testing also includes verification of each of the six power rate-of-change logic matrices for appropriate trip signal response. Additionally, Note 2(d) of Unit 1 TS, Table 3.3-1, FU 11.a [Note 2(e) of Unit 2 TS, Table 3.3-1, FU 13.a] states that the power rate-of-change trip bypass shall be automatically removed when Wide Range Logarithmic Neutron Flux power is and Power Range , Neutron Flux power of RATED THERMAL POWER. These operating bypasses are automatically removed when the enabling bypass conditions (i.e. less than 10-4% or above 15% power) are no longer satisfied. Since the proposed change is administrative in nature and neither affects the physical equipment nor the manner in which they are maintained, removing the MODE of applicability above 15% power does not affect the capability of any power rate-of-change trip channel to automatically bypass or automatically reset from the bypass position once the enabling bypass or reset conditions are entered. In addition, the system capability will continue to be periodically tested using appropriate test circuitry which verifies both the bypass initiation and removal features. More specifically, SR 4.3.1.1.2 of the St. Lucie Unit 1 TS requires the bypass logic to be demonstrated OPERABLE during the at-power CHANNEL FUNCTION TEST for channels affected by bypass operation. SR 4.3.1.2 of the St. Lucie Unit 2 TS requires the bypass logic circuitry to be demonstrated OPERABLE prior to each reactor startup (unless performed during the preceding 92 days). Both Units TS require the total bypass function to be demonstrated OPERABLE during CHANNEL CALIBRATION testing in accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. Limiting the MODE of applicability for the power rate-of-change trip to of RATED THERMAL POWER will not affect the total bypass function since the channel surveillances will continue to be St. Lucie Nuclear Plant Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389 L-2017-002 Enclosure Page 8 of 52 performed and the associated surveillance acceptance criteria will continue to be applied as currently specified. Hence, no changes to the applicable St. Lucie Unit 1 and Unit 2 SRs are proposed. The existing defense in depth and diversity described in the St. Lucie Unit 1 and Unit 2 Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) with regard to the power rate-of-change trip functional performance will not be diminished as a result of the proposed change. Limiting the MODE 1 applicability to of RATED THERMAL POWER would not alter the manner in which applicable TS required ACTION(s) are implemented in the event of an inoperable power rate-of-change trip channel while below power. The inoperable channel would be placed in the bypass or trip position within the timeframes currently specified in TS Table 3.3-1, ACTION 2, of the St. Lucie Unit 1 and Unit 2 TS, as applicable. No changes are proposed to TS Table 3.3-1, ACTION 2 for St. Lucie Unit 1 and Unit 2. However above power, the power rate-of-change channels are automatically placed in the bypass position, though not explicitly required by the St. Lucie Unit 1 and Unit 2 TS. As such, repositioning a power rate-of-change channel suspected of malfunction from the bypass to the trip condition would not provide an added degree of safety since the power rate-of-change trip performs no specified safety function above power. In this case, the malfunctioning channel would be declared out-of-service and a work ticket created of sufficient priority such that the malfunctioned channel would be repaired as soon as Should reactor power fall below the 15% power range with a power rate-of-change trip channel out-of-service, ACTION 2 would be invoked as described above. The same scenario would apply should two power rate-of-change trip channels malfunction. Hence, the power rate-of-change trip channels would be operated in accordance with the applicable TS LCO and required ACTION when rated thermal power is of RATED THERMAL POWER; and outside this range, where the power rate-of-change trip provides no specified safety function, no TS LCO and required ACTION would apply, consistent with 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii). For this reason, a new ACTION to address the proposed license amendments is not warranted. Based upon the foregoing, the RPS Startup and Operating Rate of Change of Power -High trip function does not satisfy the 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) criteria for LCO inclusion and is not credited in design basis accident analyses at power levels above 15%. Furthermore, the associated power rate-of-change instrumentation will continue to be maintained in accordance with station surveillance frequency control and maintenance program procedures such that the existing defense in depth and diversity described in the St. Lucie Unit 1 and Unit 2 UFSARs would remain unchanged. As such, the proposed change to limit the MODE 1 applicability for Unit 1 TS Table 3.3-1, FU 11.a, and Unit 2 TS Table 3.3-1, FU 13.a, for the Startup and Operating Rate of Change of Power-High trip, to Power Range Neutron Flux power of RATED THERMAL POWER is reasonable. 3.2 Modify LCO 3.0.2 /Add New LCO 3.0.5 for Operability Tests Under Adminstrative Control The purpose of new LCO 3.0.5 is to allow testing which demonstrates the OPERABILITY of equipment being returned to service or the OPERABILITY of other equipment where otherwise simultaneous testing and compliance with a required ACTION is not possible. As such, LCO 3.0.2 requires modification to provide for the exception in accordance with LCO 3.0.5. The proposed change to LCO 3.0.2 and the new LCO 3.0.5 are as currently written in NU REG 1432, Volume 1 (Reference 6.1 ), with the exception of the term "specified Completion time(s)" which is replaced with "specified time interval(s)", for consistency with the St. Lucie Unit 1 and Unit 2 TS. 
-st. Lucie Nuclear Plant Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389 L-2017-002 Enclosure Page 9 of 52 The administrative controls of LCO 3.0.5 ensure that the amount of time the inoperable equipment is placed inservice, in contradiction to the applicable TS ACTION, is limited to only the time absolutely necessary to perform the OPERABILITY testing. However, intentional non-compliance with LCO 3.0.2 by applying LCO 3.0.5 will not be permitted since LCO 3.0.5 is limited to plant conditions where simultaneous testing and compliance with the TS required actions is not possible. For example, administratively returning inoperable equipment to service during OPERABILITY testing in order to minimize operational risk would not be a valid reason for implementing LCO 3.0.5. The TS Bases will be employed to specify appropriate examples of LCO 3.0.5 usage. Attachments 5 and 6 of this enclosure provide the St. Lucie Unit 1 and Unit 2 TS Bases' marked up pages, respectively. The TS Bases' changes are provided for information only and will be incorporated in accordance with the TS Bases Control Program upon implementation of the approved license amendments. In addition, adding new LCO 3.0.5 to the St. Lucie Unit 1 and Unit 2 TS and relatedly modifying LCO 3.0.2 is consistent with the guidance provided in NUREG-1432, Volume 1 (Reference 6.1) and thereby has been previously evaluated by the Commission for acceptability. As such, the proposed change to add new LCO 3.0.5 to the St. Lucie Unit 1 and Unit 2 TS, and modify LCO 3.0.2 to provide for the LCO 3.0.5 exception, is reasonable.
 
==4.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION==
4.1 Applicable Regulatory Requirements/Criteria
* 10 CFR 50.36, Technical Specifications, requires the establishment of an LCO for any structure, system or component (SSC) satisfying the criteria of 1 O CFR 50.36( c)(2)(ii).
* General Design Criteria (GDC) 13 of Appendix A to 10 CFR 50, Instrumentation and Control, states that instrumentation shall be provided to monitor variables and systems over their anticipated ranges for normal operation, for anticipated operational occurrences, and for accident conditions as appropriate to assure adequate safety, including those variables and systems that can affect the fission process, the integrity of the reactor core, the reactor coolant pressure boundary, and the containment and its associated systems. Appropriate controls shall be provided to maintain these variables and systems within prescribed operating ranges.
* GDC 20 of Appendix A to 10 CFR 50, Protection System Functions, states that the protection system shall be designed (1) to initiate automatically the operation of appropriate systems including the reactivity control systems, to assure that specified acceptable fuel design limits are not exceeded as a result of anticipated operational occurrences and (2) to sense accident conditions and to initiate the operation of systems and components important to safety.
* GDC 21 of Appendix A to 1 O CFR 50, Protection System Reliability and Testability, states that the protection system shall be designed for high functional reliability and inservice testability commensurate with the safety functions to be performed. The protection system shall be designed to permit periodic testing of its functioning when the reactor is in operation, including a capability to test channels independently to determine failures and losses of redundancy that may have occurred.
* GDC 22 of Appendix A to 10 CFR 50, Protection System Independence, states that the protection system shall be designed to assure that the effects of natural St. Lucie Nuclear Plant Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389 L-2017-002 Enclosure Page 10 of 52 phenomena, and of normal operating, maintenance, testing and postulated accident conditions on redundant channels do not result in loss of the protection function, or shall be demonstrated to be acceptable on some other defined basis. Design techniques, such as functional diversity or diversity in component design and principles of operation, shall be used to the extent practical to prevent loss of the protection function.
* GDC 24 of Appendix A to 10 CFR 50, Separation of Protection and Control Systems, states that the protection system shall be separated from control systems to the extent that failure of any single control system component or channel, or failure or removal from service of any single protection system component or channel which is common to the control and protection systems leaves intact a system satisfying all reliability, redundancy, and independence requirements of the protection system. Interconnection of the protection and control systems shall be limited so as to assure that safety is not significantly impaired.
* GDC 25 of Appendix A to 10 CFR 50, Protection System Requirements for Reactivity Control Malfunctions, states that the protection system shall be designed to assure that specified acceptable fuel design limits are not exceeded for any single malfunction of the reactivity control systems, such as accidental withdrawal (not ejection or dropout) of control rods.
* GDC 29 of Appendix A to 1 O CFR 50, Protection Against Anticipated Operational Occurrences, states that the protection and reactivity control systems shall be designed to assure an extremely high probability of accomplishing their safety functions in the event of anticipated operational occurrences.
* Regulatory Guide (RG) 1. 75, Revision 1 (Unit 2 only), Physical Independence of Electric Systems, describes a method acceptable to the NRC staff for complying with the NRC's regulations with respect to the physical independence requirements of the circuits and electric equipment that comprise or are associated with safety systems. (Reference 6.4)
* IEEE 279-1971, Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations, establishes minimum requirements for safety related functional performance and reliability of the reactor protective system (Reference 6.2). The proposed change complies with the requirements of 10 50.36(c)(2)(ii) and does not alter the manner in which the RPS power rate-of-change trip channels are operated and maintained consistent with GDCs 13, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25 and 29 and Regulatory Guide 1. 75. Therefore, all applicable regulatory requirements will continue to be satisfied as a result of this proposed change, 4.2 No Significant Hazards Consideration The proposed license amendment modifies the St. Lucie Units 1 and 2 TS by limiting the MODE 1 applicability for RPS functional unit, Startup and Operating Rate of Change of Power -High, to Power Range Neutron Flux Power _:::. 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER. The proposed change additionally adds new LCO 3.0.5 and relatedly modifies LCO 3.0.2, in order to allow inoperable equipment testing under administrative control for the purpose of demonstrating OPERABILITY, thereby aligning the St. Lucie Unit 1 and Unit 2 TS more closely with NUREG-1432, Volume 1(Reference6.1). As required by 10 CFR 50.91 (a), FPL has evaluated the proposed changes using the criteria in 10 CFR 50.92 and has determined that the proposed changes do not involve a St. Lucie Nuclear Plant Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389 L-2017-002 Enclosure Page 11 of52 significant hazards consideration. An analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration is presented below: (1) Does the proposed amendment involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated? Response: No Limiting the MODE 1 applicability for RPS functional unit, Startup and Operating Rate of Change of Power -High, to Power Range Neutron Flux 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER, is an administrative change in nature and does not alter the manner in which the functional unit is operated or maintained. The proposed changes do not represent any physical change to plant SSC(s), or to procedures established for plant operation. The subject RPS functional unit is not an event initiator nor is it credited in the mitigation of any event or credited in the PRA. As such, the initial conditions associated with accidents previously evaluated and plant systems credited for
* mitigating the consequences of accidents previously evaluated remain unchanged. The proposed addition of new LCO 3.0.5 to the St. Lucie Unit 1 and Unit 2 TS and related modification to LCO 3.0.2 is consistent with the guidance provided in NUREG-1432, Volume 1 (Reference 6.1) and thereby has been previously evaluated by the Commission with a determination that the proposed change does not involve a significant hazards consideration. Therefore, facility operation in accordance with the proposed license amendments would not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. (2) Does the proposed amendment create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated? Response: No Limiting the MODE 1 applicability for the RPS functional unit, Startup and Operating Rate of Change of Power -High, to Power Range Neutron Flux Power 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER, is an administrative change in nature and does not involve the addition of any plant equipment, methodology or analyses. The proposed changes do not alter the design, configuration, or method of operation of the subject RPS functional unit or of any other SSC. More specifically, the proposed changes neither alter the power rate-of-change trip function nor its ability to bypass and reset as required. The subject RPS functional unit remains capable of performing its design function. The proposed addition of new LCO 3.0.5 to the St. Lucie Unit 1 and Unit 2 TS and related modification to LCO 3.0.2 is consistent with the guidance provided in NUREG-1432, Volume 1 (Reference 6.1) and thereby has been previously evaluated by the Commission with a determination. that the proposed change does not involve a significant hazards consideration. Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility of a riew or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated. (3) Does the proposed amendment involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?
St. Lucie Nuclear Plant Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389 L-2017-002 Enclosure Page 12 of 52 Response: No Limiting the MODE 1 applicability for RPS functional unit, Startup and Operating Rate of Change of Power -High, to Power Range Neutron Flux 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER is an administrative change in nature. The proposed changes neither involve changes to any safety analyses assumptions, safety limits, or limiting safety system settings nor do they adversely impact plant operating margins or the reliability of equipment credited in safety analyses. The proposed addition of new LCO 3.0.5 to the St. Lucie Unit 1 and Unit 2 TS and related modification to LCO 3.0.2 is consistent with the guidance provided in NUREG-1432, Volume 1 (Reference 6.1) and thereby has been previously evaluated by the Commission with a determination that the proposed change does not involve a significant hazards consideration. Therefore, operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment will not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety. Based upon the above analysis, FPL concludes that the proposed amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration, under the standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, "Issuance of Amendment," and accordingly, a finding of "no significant hazards consideration" is justified. 4.3 Conclusion In conclusion, based on the considerations discussed above, (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
 
==5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION==
The proposed amendment modifies a regulatory requirement with respect to the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area, as defined in 10 CFR 20, or changes an inspection or surveillance requirement. However, the proposed amendment does not involve (i) a significant hazards consideration, (ii) a significant change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite, or (iii) a significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. Accordingly, the proposed amendment meets the eligibility criterion for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b}, no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the proposed amendment.
St. Lucie Nuclear Plant Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389 6.0 REFERENCES L-2017-002 Enclosure Page 13 of 52 6.1 NUREG-1432, Standard Technical Specifications -Combustion Engineering Plants, Revision 4. 0, Volume 1, Specifications (Accession No. ML 12102A 165) 6.2 IEEE 279-1971, Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations, establishes minimum requirements for safety related functional performance and reliability of the Reactor Protective System. 6.3 NUREG-1432, Standard Technical Specifications -Combustion Engineering Plants Revision 4.0, Volume 2, Bases (Accession No. ML 12102A169) 6.4 Regulatory Guide 1. 75, Physical Independence of Electric Systems, Revision 2 (Accession No. ML 12102A169)
St. Lucie Nuclear Plant-Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389 Attachment 1 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGES (MARKUP) (6 pages follow) L-2017-002 Enclosure Page 14 of 52 St. Lucie Nuclear Plant Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389 Attachment 1 L-2017-002 Enclosure Page 15 of 52 3/4 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3/4.0 APPLICABILITY LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION Compliance with the Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO) contained in .--__......,,......,..,.....,..__---....,the succeeding specifications is required during the OPERATIONAL MODES or other INSERT LCO 3.0:2 conditions specified therein; except that upon failure to meetthe Limiting (see next page) Conditions for Operation, the associated ACTION requirements shall be met. 3;0.1 I 3.0.2 No11co111pliance ovitn a speeifieatieJR shall eicist wkeR tfic Feq1:1iremeflffi-ef the LimitiA&sect; GeRditioA for 013eratioR tl-CO) and assesiatGd FOl&#xa5;oliren:ients ---__,),.. are net !'l'let within the s13esifiee tiFRo intQp,*als. If the Limiting Condition fer 013oration is rostered prior te expiration of tho speoif-iod time intervals, eempletien ef tl'le AGTIQ!>J Feq1:1irements is not roq1:1ired. 3.0.3 When a Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) is not met, except as provided in the associated ACTION requirements, within 1 hour action shall be initiated to place the unit in a MODE in which specification does not apply by placing it, as applicable in: 1. At least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours, 2. At least HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours, and 3. At least COLD SHUTDOWN within the subsequent 24 hours. Where corrective measures are completed that permit operation under the ACTION requirements, the ACTION may be taken in accordance with the specified time limits as measured from the time of failure to meet the LCO. Exceptions to these requirements are stated in the. individual specifications. This specific;ation is not applicable in MODES 5 or 6. 3.0.4 When an LC.O is not met, entry Trito a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability shall only be made: a. When the associated ACTIONS to be entered permit continued operation in the MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability for an unlimited period of time; b. After performance,of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, consideration of the results, determination of the acceptability of entering the MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability, and establishment of risk management actions, if appropriate (exception;; to this Specification are stated in the individual Specifications); or c. When an allowance is stated in the individual value, parameter, or other S pacification. INSERT LCO 3.0.5 (see next page) This Specification shall not prevent changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of a .shutdown '----....-----' of the unit. ST. LUCIE -UNIT 1 314 0-1 Amendment No. 4G, 00, 2ffi-St. Lucie Nuclear Plant Docket Nos. 50-335 and* 50-389 11!\ISERT I "' Attachment 1 L-2017-002 Enclosure Page 16 of 52 3.0.2 Upon discovery of a failure to meet an LCO, the Required ACTION(s) ofthe associated conditions shall be met, except as provided in LCO 3.0.5. lfthe LCO is met eris no longer applicable prior to expiration of the specified time interval(s), completion of the Required ACTION(s) is not required, unless otherv11ise stated. 3.0.5 Equipment removed from service or declared inoperable to comply with ACTION(s) may be returned to service under administrative control solely to perform testing required to demonstrate its OPERABILITY or the OPERABlLITY of other equipment. This is an exception to LCO 3.0.2 for the system returned tQ .service under administrative control to perform the testing required to demonstrate OPERABILITY.
St. Lucie Nuclear Plant Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389 Attachment 1 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.1 REACTOR PROTECTIVE INSTRUMENTATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION L-2017-002 Enclosure Page 17 of 52 This page is for information only. There are no chang.es to this page; 3.3.1.1 As a minimum, the. reactor protective instrumentation channels and bypasses of Table 3.3-1 shall be OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3-1. ACTION: As shown iri Table 3.3-1 .. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.3.1.1.1 Each reactor protective instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL CALIBRATION CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST operations during the modes and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3c1. 4.3.1.1.2 The logic for the bypasses shall be demonstrated OPERABLE during the at power CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of channels affected by bypass operation. The total bypass function shall be demonstrated OPERABLE in accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program during CHANNEL CALIBRATION testing of each channel affect(;)d by bypass operation. 4.3.1.1.3 The REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME of each reactor trip function shall be demonstrated to be within its limit in accordancewith the Surveillance. Frequency Control Program. Neutron detectors are exempt from response time testing. Each test shall include at least one channel per function. ST, LUCIE -UNIT 1 3/4 3-1 Amendment 223 St. Lucie Nuciear Plant Docket Nos. 50-335 and 5.0-389 SL LUCIE -UNIT 1 --------------Attachment 1 3143-2 Amendment No, 4&sect;:, 220 L-20_17 -002 Enclosure Page 18 of 52 St. Lucie Nuclear Plant -Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389 FUNCTIONAL UNIT 11. Wide Range Logarithmic Neutron Flux Monitor a. Startup and Operating Rate of Change of Power -High b. Shutdown 12. Reactor Protection System Logic 13. Reactor Trip Breakers SL LUCIE -UNIT 1 Attachment 1 TABLE 3.3*1 (Continued) REACTOR PROTECTIVE INSTRUMENTATION TOTAL NO. CHANNELS APPLICABLE L-2017-0.02 Enclosure Page 19 of 52 OF CHANNELS TO TRIP MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE MQQ!a ACTION Add double asterik {") 4 2(d) 3 1, 2 and* 2 4 0 -2 3,4,5 3 4 2 4 1, 2* 4 4 2 4 1, 2* 4 3i4 3-3 Nnendment No. -'f..&sect;,
St. Lucie Nuclear Planr L-2017-002 Enclosure Page 20 of 52 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389 Attachment 1 TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued) TABLE NOTATION.
* With the protective system trip breakers in the closed position and the CEA.drive system capable pNSERT I of CEA withdrawal. I ** MODE 1 applicable only when Power Range Neutron Flux poWer is .5. 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER. (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) Trip may be bypassed below 1 % of RA TED THERMAL POWER; bypass shall be automatically removed when Wide Range Logarithmic Neutron Flux power 1% of RATED THERMAL POWER. . Trip may be manually bypassed below 685 psig; bypass shall be automatically removed at or above 685 psig. Trip may be bypassed below 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER; bypass shall-be automatically removed when Power Range Neutron Fiux: power 15%.ofRATED THERMAL POWER. . . .. . . . . *.* . Tr!p may be l:lypassed below 10 % and above 15% of RA TED THERMAL POWER; bypass shall be automatically removed when Wide Range Logarithmic Neutron Fli.Jx power 10*4% and PowerRange Neutron Flux power;:. 15% of RA TED THERMAL POWER. Deleted. There shall be atJeast two decades of overlf!p between the Wide Range Logadthi:nic Neutron Flux Monitoring Channels and the Power Range Neutron Flux Monitoring Channels. ACTION STATEMENTS ACTION 1 -With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than required bytheMinimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or be in HOT STANDBY with!n the next 6 hours.andior open the protective system trip breakers. ACTION 2 -With the number of OPERABLE channels one* than the To.tat Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER*OPERATION may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied: a. The inoperable.channel is placed in either the bypassed or tripped condition within 1 hour. For thei purposes of testing and maintenance, the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 48 hours from time of initial loss of OPERABILITY; however, the inoperable channel shall then be either restqred to OPERABLE status or placed in the tripped condition. ST: LUCIE .. UNIT 1 314 3 .. 4 Amendment No. 4-a, 4-02, St. Lucie Nuclear Plant Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389 Attachment 2 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGES (MARKUP) (5 pages follow) L-2017-002 Enclosure Page 21of52 St. Lucie-Nuclear Plant Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389 Attachment 2 L-2017-002 Enclosure Page 22 of 52 3/4 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3/4.0 APPLICABILITY LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.0.1 Compliance with the Limiting Conditions for Operation contained in the succeeding specifications is required during the OPERATIONAL MODES or other conditions '"'1_,N,_S...,.E""'"R __ T,,,....,..L"""C_0_3-.0-.2..., specified therein; except that upon failure to meet the Limiting Conditions for Operation, (see next page) the associated ACTION requirements shall be met. 3.0.2 NoReemplianee with a spee-ffieatieA sl'lall e>Eist wl'len tl'le FBGJl:!iroffients ef the biffiitin9 Cu11dilio11 fu1 Ope1atio11 a11dfor.associateel AGTIOPJ reeittiFemeflts fire Rat met witl'lifl the spesifieEl time intervals. If the Limiting GeRditioR fer OperatioR is restored prier ta aicpimtieA ef the spesifiea tiffie iAteF&#xa5;als, seA'lpletieA of tl'le reei1:1ireFReRts is not required. 3.0.3 When a Limiting Condition for Operation is not met, except as provided in the associated ACTION requirements, within 1 hour, action shall be initiated to place the unit iri a MODE in which specification .does not apply by placing it, as applicable, in: 1. At least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours, 2. At least HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours, a*nd 3. At least COLD SHUTDOWN within the subsequent 24 hours. Where corrective measures are completed that permit operation under the ACTION requirements, the ACTION may be taken in accordance. with the specified time limits as measured from the time of failure to meet the Limiting Condition for Operation_ Exceptions to these requirements are stated in the individual specifications. This specification is not applicable in MODE 5 or 6. 3.0A When an LCO is not met, entry into a MODE or other spec;ified condition in the Applicability shall only be made: a. b. INSERT LCO 3.0;5 c. (see next page) When the associated ACTIONS to be entered permit continued operation in the MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability for an unlimited period of time; After performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, consideration of the results, determination of the acceptability of entering the MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability, and
* establishment of risk management actions, if appropriate (excepth;ms to this Specification are stated iri the individual SpecificatiOns); or When an allowance is stated in.the individual value, parameter, or other. Specification. Specification shall not prevent changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are .required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of a shutdown of the unit. ST, LUCIE -UNIT 2 3/4 0-1 Amendment No_ aa eerreGieEi, 41'*-
St. Lucie Nuclear Plant Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389 llNSERTI Attachment 2 L-2017-002 Enclosure Page 23 of 52 3.0.2 Upon discovery of a failure to meet an LCO, the Required ACTION(s) ofthe conditions shall be met, except as .provided in LCO 3.0.5. If the LCO is met or is no longer applicable prior to expiration ofthe specified time interval(s), completion of the Required ACTION(s) is not required, unless otherwise stated. 3.0.5 Equipment removed from service or declared inoperable to comply with ACTION(s) may be returned to service under administrative control solely to perform testing required to demonstrate its OPERABILITY or the OPERABILITY of other equipment. This is an exception to LCO 3.0.2 for the system returned to service under administrative control to perfqrm the testing required to demonstrate OPERABILITY.
St. Lucie Nuclear Plant Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389 Attachment 2 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.1 REACTOR PROTECTIVE INSTRUMENTATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION L-2017-002 Enclosure Page 24 of 52 This page is for information only. There are no changes to this page. 3.3.1 As a minimum, the reactor protective instrumentation channels and bypasses of Table 3.3-1 shall be OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3-1. ACTION: As shown in Table 3.3-1. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.3.1.1 Each reactor protective instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL CALIBRATION and CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST operations for the MODES and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-1. 4.3.1.2 The logic for the bypasses shall be demonstrated OPERABLE prior to each reactor startup unless performed during the preceding 92 days. The total bypass function shall be demonstrated OPERABLE in accordance with the Surve*illance Frequency Control Program during CHANNEL CALIBRATION testing of each channel affected by bypass.operation, 4.3.1.3 The REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME of each reactor trip function shall be demonstrated to be within its limit in accordance with the Surveillance. Frequency Control Program. Neutron detectors are exempt from response time testing. Each test shall include at least one channel per function. ST, LUCIE -UNIT 2 3/4 3-1 Amendment.No. a+, 173 St. Lucie Nuclear Plant Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389 FUNCTIONAL UNIT 1. Manual Reactor Trip 2. Variable Power Level -High 3. Pressurizer Pressure -High 4. Thermal Margin/Low Pressure 5. Containment Pressure -High 6. Steam Generator Pressure -Low 7. Steam Generator Pressure Difference -High a. Steam Generator Level -low 9. Local Power Density-High 10. Loss of Component Cooling Water to Reactor Coolant Pumps 11. Reactor Protection System Logic 12. Reactor Trip Breakers 13. Wide Range Logarithmic Neutron Flux Monitor a. Startup and Operating -Rate of Change of Power -High b. Shutdown 14. Reactor Coolant Flow -Low 15. Loss of Lead (Turbine Hydraulic Fluid Pressure -Low) SL LUCIE -UNIT 2 Attachment 2 TABLE 3.3-1 L-2017-002 Enclosure Page 25 of 52 REACTOR PROTECTIVE INSTRUMENTATION MINIMUM TOTAL NO. CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE OF CHANNELS TO TRIP OPERABLE MQQ&sect; ACTION 4 2 4 1, 2 1 4 2 4 3*, 4*, s* 5 4 2(a)(d) 3 1, 2 2 4 2 3 1. 2 2 4 2(a)(d) 3 1,2 2 4 2 3 1, 2 2 4/SG 2/SG(b) 3/SG 1, 2 2 4 2(a)(d) 3 1. 2 2 4/SG 2/SG 3/SG 1. 2 2 4 2(c)(d) 3 2 4 2 3 1. 2 2 4 2 3 1, 2 2 3', 4*, 5* 5 4 2(fJ 4 1, 2 4 3*,4*,s* 5 Add double as!erik ( .. ) 4 2(c)(g) 3 1
* 2 2 4 0 2 3,4,5 3 4/SG 2/SG(a)(d) 3/SG 1, 2 2 4 2(c) 3 2 3143-2 Amendment No. 00, 1"T5 
-------St. Lucie Nuclear Plant L-2017-002 Enclosure Page 26 of 52 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389 Attachment 2 TABLE 3.3-1 !Continued) TABLE NOTATION
* With the protective system trip breakers in the closed position, the CEA drive system capable of CEA withdrawal, and fuel in the reactor vessel. MODE .1 applicable only when Powe;r Range Neutron Flux power is*::: 15% of RA TED .{' THERMAL POWER. (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) Trip may be manually bypassed below 0.5% of RA TED THERMAL POWER in conjunction with (d) below; bypass shall be automatically removed when Wide Range Logarithmic Neutron Flux power is greater than or equal to 0.5% of RA TED THERMAL POWER. Trip may be manually bypassed below 705 psig; bypass shall be automatically removed at or above 705 psig. Trip may be bypassed below 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER; bypass shall be.automatically removed when Power Range Neutron Flux power is greater than or equal to 15% of RA TED THERMAL POWER. Trip may be bypassed during testing pursuant to Special Test Exception3.10.3. Trip may be bypassed below 10-4% and above 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER; bypass shall be automatically removed when Wide Range Logarithmic Neutron Flux power is:::. 10-4% and Power Range Neutron Flux power;: 15% of RA TED THERMAL POWER. Each channel shall be comprised of two trip breakers; actual trip logic shall be one-out-of-two taken twice. There shall be at least two decades of overlap between the Wide Range Logarithmic Neutron Flux Monitoring Channels and the Power Range Ne.utron Flux Monitori,ng Channels. ACTION STATEMENTS ACTION 1 -With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and/or open the protective system trip breakers. ST. LUCIE -UNIT 2 3/43-3 Amendment No. 00, 4;t9 St. Lucie Nuclear Plant -Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389 Attachment 3 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGES (Clean Copy) (3 pages follow) L-2017-002 Enclosure Page 27 of 52 St. Lucie Nuclear Plant Nos. 50-335 and 50-389 Attachment 3 L-2017-002 Enclosure Page 28 of 52 3/4 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3/4.0 APPLICABILITY LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.0.1 Compliance with the Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO) contained in the succeeding specifications is required during the OPERATIONAL MODES or other conditions speCified therein; except that upon failure to meet the Limiting for Operation, the associated ACTION requirements.shall be met. 3.0.2 Upon discovery of a failure to meet an LCO, the Required ACTION(s) of the associated conditions shall be met, except as provided in LCO 3.0.5. If the LCO is met or is no longer applicable prior to expiration of the specified time interval(s), completion of the Required ACTION(s) is not required, unless otherwise stated .. 3.0.3 When a Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) is not met, except as provided in the associated ACTION requirements, within 1 hour action shall be initiated to place the unit in a MODE in Which specification does not apply by placing it, as applicable in: 1. At least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours, 2. At least HOT SHUTDOWN within the folfowing 6 hours, and 3. At least COLD SHUTDOWN within the subsequent 24 hours. Where corrective measures are completed that permit operation under the ACTION .requirements, the ACTION rriay be taken in accordance with the specified time limits as measured from the time of failure to meet the LCO. Exceptions to these requirements are stated in the individual specifications. This specification is not applicable in MODES 5 or 6. 3.0.4 When an LCO is not met, entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability shall only be made: a. When the associated ACTIONS to be entered permit continued operation in the MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability for an unlimited period of time; b. After performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, consideration of the res&#xb5;lts, determination of the acceptability of entering the MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability, and establishment of risk management actions, if appropriate (exceptions to this Specification are stated in the individual Specifications); or c. When an allowance is stated in the individual value, parameter, or other Specification. This Specification shall not prevent changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required .to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of a shutdown of the unit. . 3.0.5 Equipment removed from service or declared inoperable to comply with ACTION(s) may be returned to service under administrative control solely to perform testing required to demonstrate its OPERABILITY or the OPERABILITY of other equipment. This is an exception to LCO 3.0.2 for the system returned to service under administrative control to perform the testing required to demonstrate OPERABILITY. ST, LUCIE -UNIT 1 314 0-1 Amendment No. 4Q, W, .:i.oo; St. Lucie Nuclear Plant Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389 time FUNCTIONAL UNIT 11. Wide Range Logarithmic Neutron Flux Monitor a. Startup and Operating -Rate of Change of Power -High b. Shutdown 12. Reactor Protection System Logic 13. Reactor Trip Breakers ST. LUCIE -UNIT 1 Attachment 3 TABLE 3.3*1 (Continued} REACTOR PROTECTIVE INSTRUMENTATION MINIMUM TOTAL NO. CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE OF CHANNELS IQ..IB!E'. OPERABLE MODES 4 2(d) 3 1**,2and* 4 0 2 3.4,5 4 2 4 1. 2* 4 2 4 1, 2* 3/4 3-3 Amendment No . .;.a,;;&#xb5;., ;;go L-2017-002 Enclosure Page 29 of 52 8fI!QN 2 3 4 4 St. Lucie Nuclear Plant L-2017-002 -Enclosure Page 30 of 52 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389 Attachment 3 TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued) TABLE NOTATION
* With the protective system trip breakers in the closed position and the CEA drive system capable of CEA withdrawal. ** MODE 1 applicable only when Power Range Neutron Flux power is s 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER (a) (b) (c) (e) (f) Trip may be bypassed below 1 % of RA TED THERMAL POWER; bypass shall be automatically removed when Wide Range Logarithmic Neutron Flux power is?. 1 % of RA TED THERMAL POWER. Trip may be manually bypassed below 685 psig; bypass shall be automatically removed at.or above 685 psig. Trip may be bypassed below 15% ofRA TED THERMAL POWER; bypass .shall be automatically removed when Power' Range Neutron Flux power is?. 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER. '-4 . . Trip may be bypassed below 10 % arid above 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER; bypass shall be automatically removed when Wide Range Logarithmic Neutron Flux power is?. 1 o-4% and Power Range Neutron Flux power :S 15% of RATED THERMALPOWER. Deleted. There shall be at least two decades of overlap between the Wide Range Logarithmic Neutron Flux Monitoring Channels and the Power Range Neutron Flux Monitoring Channels. ACTION STATEMENTS ACTION 1 -With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and/or open the protective system trip breakers. ACTION 2 -With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied; a. The inoperable channel is placed in either the bypassed or tripped condition within 1 hour. For the purposes of testing and maintenance, the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 48 hours from time of initial loss of OPERABILITY; however, the inoperable channel shall then be either restored to OPERABLE status or placed in the tripped condition. ST. LUCIE -UNIT 1 3/4 3'-4 Amendment :J+,
St. Lucie Nuclear Plant Docket Nos-. 50-335 and 50-389 Attachment 4 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGES (Clean Copy) (3 pages follow) t-2017-002 Enclosure Page 31 of 52 St. Lucie Nuclear Plant Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389-Attachment 4 L-201 002 Enclosure Page 32 of 52 3i4 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3/4.0 APPLICABILITY LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.0.1 Compliance with the Limiting Conditions for Operation contained in the succeeding specifications is required during the OPERATIONAL MODES or other conditions specified therein; exceptthat upon failure meet.the Limiting Conditions for Operation, the associated ACTION requirements sh'allbe met. 3.0.2 Upon discovery of a failure to meet an LCO, the Required ACTION(s) of the associated conditions shall be met, except as provided in LCO 3.0.5. If the LCO is met or is no longer applicable prior to expiration of the specified time interval(s), completion of the Required ACTION(s) is not required, unless otherwise stated. 3.0.3 When a Limiting Condition for Operation is not met, except as provided in the associated ACTION requirements, within 1 hour, action shall be initiated to place the unit in a MODE in which specification does not apply by placing it, as applicable, in: 1. At least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours, 2. At least HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours, and 3. At lea.st COLD SHUTDOWN within the subsequent 24 hours. Where corrective measures are completed that permit operation under the ACTION requirements, the ACTION may be taken in accordance the specified time limits as measured from the time of failure to meet the Limiting Condition for Operation. Exceptions to these requirements are stated in the individual specifications. This specification is not applicable in MODE 5 or 6. 3.0.4 When an LCO is not met, entry into a MODE or other.specified condition in the Applicability shall only be made: a. When the associated ACTIONS*to be entered permit continued operation in the MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability for an unlimited period of time; b. After performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, consideration C)f the results, determination of the acceptability of entering the MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability, and establishment of risk management actions, if appropriate (exceptions to this Specification are stated in the individual Specifications); or c. When an allowance is stated in the individual value, parameter, or other Specification. This Specificati,on shall not prevent changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with .ACTIONS or that are part of a shutdown of the unit.
* 3,0.5 Equipment removed from service or declared inoperable to comply with ACTION(s) may be returned to service under administrative control solely to perform testing required to demonstrate its OPERABILITY or the OPERABILITY of other This is an exception.to LCO 3.0.2 for the system returned to service under administrative control to perform the testing required to demonstrate OPERABILITY. ST, LUCIE -UNIT 2 314 0-1 Amendment No. ail serrestee, 47G .
St. Lucie Nuclear Piant Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389 FUNCTIONAL UNIT 1. Manual Reactor Trip 2. Variable Power Level -High 3. Pressurizer Pressure -High 4. Thermal Margin/Low Pressure 5. Containment Pressure -High 6. Steam Generator Pressure -Low 7. Steam Generator Pressure Difference -High 8. Steam Generator Level -Low Local Power Density-High 10. Loss of Component Cooling Water to Reactor Coolant Pumps 11. Reactor Protection System Logic 12. Reactor Trip Breakers 13. Wide Range Logarithmic Neutron Flux Monitor a. Startup and Operating -Rate of Change of Power -High b. Shutdown 14. Reactor Coolant Flow -Low 15. Loss of Load (Turbine Hydraulic Fluid Pressure -Low) ST. LUCIE -UNIT 2 Attachment 4 TABLE3.3-1 REACTOR PROTECTIVE INSTRUMENTATION MINIMUM TOTAL NO. CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE OF CHANNELS TO TRIP OPERABLE .M.QQ&sect; 4 2 4 1, 2 4 2 4 3*, 4*, 5* 4 2(a)(d) 3 1, 2 4 2 3 1, 2 4 2(a)(d) 3 1, 2 4 2 3 1, 2 4/SG 2/SG(b) 3/SG 1, 2 4 2(a)(d) 3 1. 2 4/SG 2/SG 3/SG 1,2 4 2(c)(d) 3 1 4 2 3 1,2 4 2 3 1,2 3*, 4*, 5* 4 2(f) 4 1, 2. 3"',4 ... 5* 4 2(e)(g) 3 1**. 2 4 0 2 3,4,5 4/SG 2/SG(a)(d) 3/SG 1, 2 4 2(c) 3 314 3-2 .A.mendment No 00, 44-0 L-2017-002 Enclosure Page 33 of 52 ACTION 1 5 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 5 4 5 2 3 2 2 St. Lucie Nuclear Plant Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50_-389 Attachment 4 TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued) TABLE NOTATION L-2017-002 Enclosure Page 34 of 52
* With the protective system trip breakers in the closed position, the CEA drive system capable of CEA withdrawal, and fuel in the reactor vessel. ** MODE 1 applicable only when Power Range Neutron Flux power is s 15% of RA TED THERMAL POWER. (a) Trip may be manually bypassed below 0.5% of RATED THERMAL POWER in conjundion with (d) below; bypass shall be automatically removed when Wide Range Logarithmic Neutron Flux power is greater than or equal to 0.5% of RA TED THERMAL POWER. (b) Trip may be manually bypassed below 705 psig; bypass shall be automatically removed at or above 705 psig . . (c) Trip may be bypassed below 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER; bypass shall be automatically removed when Power Range Neutron Flux power is greater than or equal to 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER. (d) Trip may be bypassed during testing pursuant to Special Test Exception 3.10.3. (e) Trip may be bypassed below 10-4% and above 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER; bypass shall be automatically removed when Wide Range Logarithmic Neutron Flux power 1 o-4% and Power Range Neutron Flux power.:::_ 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER. (f) Each channel shall be comprised of two trip breakers; actual trip logic shall be one-out-of-two taken twice. (g) There shall be at least two decades of overlap between the Wide Range Logarithmic Neutron Flux Monitoring Channels and the Power Range Neutron Flux Monitoring Channels. ACTION STATEMENTS ACTION 1 -With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY.within the next 6 hours and/or open the protectiVe system trip breakers. ST. LUCIE -UNIT 2 3/4 Amendment No .. W, 4+G St. Lucie Nuclear Plant Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389. Attachment 5 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES PAGES (MARKUP) * (7 pages follow) L-2017-002 Enclosure* Page 35 of 52 St. Lucie Nuclear Plant Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389 L-2017-002 Enclosure Page 36 of 52 Attachment 5 . **,,:*' 1 TECHNICAL SPECIFlCATiONS ' . ATTA.PHMENi2 ., ' Attachment,.No. . . *.* .zil:**>* ' . ... FPL 0 FADM-25.04 CurrentRe,.Visioo No . SAFETY TED Hie: AND SURVEILLANC'E REQUIREMENTS *Re spo n sibl e *Depa rtme m ::: ' '. . . ' . . , ' . , ' . . . ' ' . . ". . . (. . / *' . . . '. . . . , REVISION SUMMARY: .* **. ;, ... , .. :.-... . *.* y. *.* . Re\li.sion *4)1ncorporateCI P,bR 1947974 '.to.modif{TS requfremer:its;for M ode:c'hange limitations in Leo 3.o,tarid sR(oA:. cAuthor: Elmore) . . *.* .. , , , .**. . .: *.. . . .. , . Incorporated PCR 2003212-to*update NRC' Regulatory Guide :reference*. -(Author: N: Elmore) . ' ' ;' . . . . . . R(!\lisi ci,n ncrirpofafedf.C.R,1'855)(.8 e editoria'Ccha ,I}: Sciscehte)'
* Rmnsion P.0Rd9-121:iior CR 2009-4976 fo fncorporate'.TSTF-434" over1at:ue:stifig :-:ir\ (P.,uthiir:'. F;rehat.erf: **. RIMsioif 1*:.:.clJpdatedTS*Bases forTS Amendment *surveillances:' (La'nyDohgbia/b1i0310f ,. . * ** , ** * . "< * **.*.* *: * '* .*.* ., '* ' Re\liSiono . ....:sasesforTechnicalSpecifications. (E.Weinkam,08130/01) '. , . , . . *..-:,... v_,. . : * .. ,_. > .. : . . , ,.-: ... , . :* . , . , , -,: , .-; :* *' *; .. <* , *.. . . * .. *; . , . Revis: ion:: App roved By:-Apprwal;Date** UNIT# UNIT 1 .**,.**';;. 0 R.G>West 03.G0.01 DATE, 1focf PROCEDURE po(N : 9! O!b*t Jil & til 4 R. 12f12113 $)".S;_ STATUS, COl.IP,lETED REV-: .... ,:: , ... .. #'OFP<i-s* 1*
St. Lucie Nuclear-Plant Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389 L-2017-002 Enclosure Page 37 of 52 S::TIJ N tD .: 3.0 & 4 .. 0 REVISl:IN .NO.: ' . . -Attachment 5 TITLE: TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES.ATIACHMENT 2 OF ADMc.:25.04 UM ITI NG CONDITIO NS . .FOR 0 PERA TION REQUIREMENTS----ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 --. -. --TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION BASES FORSECTIONS 3.o'& 4.0 .. : .... ; ... : ... : ......... : ... : ........ : ......... ..... : .......... ; ..... c ******** .3: 314.0
* APPLICABILITY ................................................. ,., ................. _,****:*****:****3 BASES .:_ ... : .. : ...... .' .......... : .. _. -** ___ *--** ....... : .... ::.-. _____ *--*-* .... : '** *"*** __ **--*-_ .. *:: .. 3 3.0.1 *******-:**********************************:**********************-*******************************3 3-.0:2 ....... : ............................. _ ........... **-........ .-.. **"** ............... ,.; ........ ; .: .. 4 -3.0.3 *-*-*--***.************.****-----*--**:**************.********-----*.*-************.**---*-:----**:*:**5 3.o.4* ____ **-___ ....... _._ ........ ___ ****-* --* -** *---*.** ............. -*-___ *-'-** ........... ___ , __ *--____ .... r !Add 3.0.5 I > -4.0.1 .... : ........ :.-'. ... ;. : ....... :.:; ............. ; ....... *" .......... : ... ; .. -* .:: .. : .... ; ... : .... 11 *4:0.2 ....... ,, ... ; .. ; .... _.*-**:************************'******-********.*********-******-*.-**.**********13. 4.0.3 -------......... : .. :. **'-* ---*---------.. *-*'"* .............. :. --------* ........ :.: ... _.-.... ---__ 13 4:0.4 *---... --*-*--............. ***. --** ***.-----*-.-**-.*** .; ..*........ *-* **-.--* ........... _ ... **:*** ... _..15 .(Q-.5 ....... : ................. -: ....... * .................. :;.: ...... : ; ... ::.; : ..... :* ... :_::._.: .. ; ...... -:.16 St. Lucie Nuclear Plant L-2017-002 Enclosure Page 38 of 52 Docket Nos. 50-335 and' 50-389 Attachment 5 ECTION NO.: TITLE: TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS PAGE; 3.0 & 4.0 BASES ATIACHMENT 2 OF ADM-25.04 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 4of16 REVISION NO:: 3/4,0 APPLICABILITY (continued) 3.0.1 ACTION 3.0.2 BASES (continued) (continued) The specified time limits of the ACTION requirements are applicable from the point in time it is identified that a Limiting Condition for Operation is not met. The tinie limits of the ACTION requirements are also applicable when a system or component is removed from service for surveillance testing or investigation of operational problems. Individual specifications may include a citied time limit for the completion of a Surveillance Requirement when equip tis removed from service. In this case, the allowable outage time limits of th requirements are applicable when this limit expires if the surveillance has not been completed. When a shutdown is required to comply with ACTION requirements, the plant may have entered a MODE in which a new specification becomes applicable. In this case, the time limits-of the ACTION requirements would apply from the point in ti.me that the new specification becomes applicable ifthe requirements of the Limiting Condition for Operation are not met. This specification establishes that noncompliance with a specification exists when the requirements of the Limiting Condition for Operation are not met and the associated ACTION requirements have not been implemented within the specified time interval. The purpose of this specification is to clarify that (1) implementation of the ACTION requirements within the specified time interval constitutes compliance with a specification and (2) completion of the remedial measurE?s of the ACTION requirements is not required when compliance with a Limiting Condition for Operation is restored within the time interval specified in the associated ACTION requirements. LCO 3.0.5 provides for an exception to LCO 3.0.2 for the limited purpose of performing required testing to demonstrate either the OPERABILITY of equipment being returned to service or the OPERABILITY of other equipment. Refer to the LCO 3.0.5 discussion for use.
St. Lucie Nuclear Plant Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389 L-2017-002 Enclosure Page 39 of 52 Attachment 5 B:;TDN 't{L: ,* .. ' ***<* 3.o &4.o NO:: .. APPLiCABILITY {continued) BASES (continued) . .'. *''*"*" .. * .. .,.: ,: .* '-:-., (co'ntinuedr '* ..... Upon 'eritrl"iiitB:a)AODE:ofothe'i: in the: ,A;ppiica@lty withth*e: Lco:n*ot, met, Leo 3. 0.1 .and LCO 3,0.Trequire.entry into the applicable* Required Actions l]ntilt)'le c:cindition isresotiied; uhtilthe 1,,-90 is met,* cir lmtil the t:mins*.*not within the Applicabilityce)f.theTethnicai;'' * **..
* Specification. ,_,. , '" .** ': .. lo.be petfofrned :tb be perl:ormed '.on the associated:. ino.perable equipr:hent:(o(on outside:th&#xa2;. specifie'd:limitsf as permittea. by_.'SR .4:0.4 Therefore, utilizingLCO 3.0A is nofaviolatiob Of SR'4:0.1, or SR 4.o:4* for any. sur\ieillance.s that have rioM)een* petformecl:on* inoperable;* *.
* e\;jufpinent/. Havvever; SRsrnuSt to' priqr _equipment o PERABLE (or v*ariable VoiithinJifnits) .and* restoring* compliance with the atfected'LCO:. . .. . ** ....... ' . . . . *.* ' .. *. '.* . ,'.. , .* :: ':' *-; ,' . :. . ., . :' :: . .-:* .. ' .** .. , ., lio.;; (Add I St. Lucie Nuclear Plant Docket Nos. 50:..335 and 50-389 Attachment 5 INSERT L-2017-002 Enclosure Page 40 of 52 3.0,5 Lco*3'.b.5. establishes the allowanee for restoring equipment to service under administrative controls when it has been removed from service or declared inoperable to comply with ACTIONS. The sole purpose of this Specification is to provide an exception to LCO 3.02 (e.g. to not comply with the applicable Required Action(s)) to allow the performance of required testing to demonstrate either: 1. The OPERABILITY of the equipment being returned to service or, 2. The OPERABILITY of other equipment. The administrative controls ensure the time the equipment is returned to service in conflict with the requirements of the ACTIONS is limited to the time absolutely necessary to perform the required testing to demonstrate OPERABILITY. This Specification does not provide time to perform any other preventive or corrective maintenance. Leo 3.0.5 specifically states that equipment removed from service or declared inoperable to comply with ACTION(s) may be returned to service under administrative control solely to perform testing required to demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the equipment or that of other equipment. LCO 3.0.5 is limited to plant conditions.where simultaneous testing and compliance with the required ACTION(s) is not possible. Hence LCO 3.0.5 may only be used if it is the only alternative to performing the required testing, regardless of whether the other alternatives present higher risk to the plant. An example of demonstrating the OPERABILITY of equipment being returned to service is reopening a containment isolation valve that has been closed to comply with required ACTION(s) and must be reopened to perform the required testing. An example of demonstrating the OPERABILITY of other equipment is taking an inoperable channel or trip system out of the tripped condition to prevent the trip function from occurring during the performance of required testing on another channel in the other trip system A similar example of demonstrating the OPERABILITY of other equipment is taking an inoperable channel or trip system out of the tripped condition to permit the logic to function and indicate the appropriate response during the performance of required testing on another channel in the same trip system.
 
==References:==
1. NU REG 1432, Standard Technical Specifications -Combustion Engineering Plants, Revision 4, Volume 2, Bases (ML 12102A 169) 2. Enclosure 1 O: Case Study 6: ANO 1 Use of LCO 3.0.5 Meeting Summary of the January 27 & 28 Meeting with NRC/TSTF (ML 090640444)
St. Lucie Nuclear Plant Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389 L-2017-002 Enclosure Page 41 of 52 Attachment 5 fj ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 Section No. :*,,"' TECHNICAL SPECIFiCA.TIONS No. BASES ATTACHMENT 5 5 0 F ADM-25.04 Current*Rev.ision No .. FPL **** , ; ******** SAFE;TY RELATED .8/' Title: INSTRUMENTATION Responsible Department: Licensing. REVISl_ON S.UMMARY: Revision.5 -Incorporated PCR 2087288 based on NRC approval ofTSTF-422; Change in I TechnicaLSpecifications End States (OE NPSD-1186'). (Author: N. Davidson).
* Revision 4 -Incorporated PCR 2053666 based on NRC approval of the LAR that implements the Surveillance Frequency control Program. (Author: K . .Frehafer) -Incorporated PCR 1-767970 to update forUntt 1 EPU. conditions as modified per EC 2.46569 and the Untt 1 EPU LAR. (Author: Don Pendagast) Revision 2.c Incorporated PCR_ 587518 to include information inadvertentti1* omitted. (Author: K. f rehaf er) Revision. 1-Bases for Technical SpeCifications 195. (M, DiM arco, 12121104) 0 -Bases for Technical Specifications. (E, Weinkam, 0_8130!01) Revision App roved By. ApprOlfal Date UNIT# UNIT 1 DATE 0 R. G. West 88B8Bi DOCT PROCEDURE DOCN 9eC11JI SYS 5 00t26?15 STAJUS . COl.IP.LETED REV ,5.T # OFPGS St. Lucie Nuclear Plant Docket Nos. 50-335 an*a 50-389 L-2017-002 Enclosure Page 42 of 52 Attachment 5 TITLE: ,* TECHf\jlQ{\L SPECIFICJ\TIONq ....*.* BASES ATTACHMENT 5 OF ADM-25.04. BASES (torihnued) .''; JNSJRLIM ENTATiciN . ST:.LUCIE,)JNITJ :r4;;}.fand 314:.12 (continued)' . ,. '*. , ',. . . '* ;,' ;, ':*.* *, ., " . : ..... ' ,. .. , ., Add.JNSERT fi*orr/r1e::d:pag8 :Response time''may be* derribnstratea by arr(seiies*ofsequentiaf.*a.1ertappirig or fatal channef measu'rements'.'.inCluding allocafed sehsor.resporise timi:i; .. p'rovided that such te8ts'de'moi1stratefotal channel response time as d'efined. , *CEOG. Topical Re1fort. 67;' :FPCblo Significant Efaluation prqvicte' the)?Sis and m,ethodology:for:* , using allocated sensor response* times in the overall verification of the channel respOnsetime for specific sensprsidentifieMn these .documents. The alfocafod.'.serisor.response'time musfbe verified prior to placing*a ne'W and r8cverified 'gfter that)nay a!Nersew aft)ctUwsetjsor r,esponse,time of a transmitter DP cell or variable :damping circuits),c*Sensor response time vetificationrnay be demonSth:i'tectby'eifoerJfiH place; onsite>or orfihe test measurements or' 2) utiliZiQg certified , , ' . -.* .. . '* *. ' '-:', '.,-._, ., ,,,. The C.E;QG. tbpicalreporfarid ffL evaluation oritii cqyef cerlainAensbr mo'del. i)umbers. df.sensorS'anfreplaCect.withtypes then . . pefiodidesponseJimetesting (RTf)fcir the'ne\A/ sensor must either be' **, ** performed.and the to,'plant'prcicedures, or an', ,additlohal requestfor RTTelimination must be submitted and J( howe./er,'thejeplacemenfserisqr,iS*orJ.e forwhich,RTT elimination
* has been FPL:fnaY 'modif{the.plant procedufe.s, Llsir1g an allocated response time based upot1:a* r:e9pon.setiine.\1aluf; :o(uporrStatisfical analysis Of historica!'dataJorthattrat)Srr1iftertype*and , . . fti6.cteL' * ........ * ...*... ,, .... *.* .. ** .............. ** .. **. * ................ ''***** .. , /', The Safety. lrijectionActuatioh Signal (81.A,S) provides direct actliajion*ofthe. Contaih,ment}solatibn Sfg'rial (CIS) fo ensure containrnentiSolatiotiin .the.' ev .. eifl bfa. smait breakLOC;A.; * '
St. Lucie Nuclear Plant Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389 Attachment 5 INSERT L-2017-002 Enclosure Page 43 of 52 The wide range nuclear .instruments (Nls) provide a Startup and Operating Rate of Change of Power -High Trip. OPERABILITY of the Startup and Operating Rate of Change of Power -High Trip channels is limited to Power Range Neutron Flux Power of RATED THERMAL POWER, since this trip function performs no specified safety function above this power level. The Startup <!nd Operating Rate of Change of Power -High trip function is automatieally bypassed whenever RATED THERMAL POWER is <104% or >15%, though not explicitly required by the Unit 1 Technical Specifications. The operating bypasses are automatically removed when the enabling bypass conditions are no longer satisfied. When required to be OPERABLE, ACTION 2(a) requires an inoperable Startup and Operating Rate of Change of Power" High Trip channel to be placed in bypass within 1-hour and if not restored within 48-hours, be placed iri the trip position. ACTION 2(c) allows an additional channel to be placed in bypass up to 48-hours for maintenance an.d testing provided the inoperable channel is placed in trip. There are no other RPS functional units affected by an inoperable Startup and Operating Rate of Change of Power -High Trip bypass or trip channel. The Startup and Operating Rate of Change of Power -High Trip function and its bypass and reset capability are periodically tested in accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
St Lucie-Nuclear Plant Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389-Attachment 6 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES PAGES (MARKUP) (7 pages follow) L-2017-002 Enclosure Page 44 of 52 St. Lucie Nuclear Plant Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389 FPL Attachment 6 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 TECHNICAL SPEclFfCAJIONS BASES ATTACHMENT 2 . . . . '. . .. OFADM-25.04 SAFETY REL.JI.TED L-2017-002 Enclosure Page 45 of 52 No. ,,.,,,: .v" ;3:Cf & 4:0 ..
* Attachment*No'f *,. / *" '>"" ** ' Hie.: L_lrvifTING CONDITIONS FOR OPERA.Tl ON AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS* Responsible Department: Licensing ' '' ., *. . . . . . . 4-:lncorporated PCR 19479'91, :to moditlni requirements for Mode change limttations in Leo 3. o: 4.and SR (0.4. (.A.uthof N. Elmore) .* . . ....... * . . .AND' .... * ... * . . . . I ncorp_orated PCR 2003212 to update NRC Regulatory Guide reference. (Autr1or: N. Elmore) Revision lhccirporafod PCR 1. to'. update editorial chahgei: . (Alrthqr: R Scisc:ente) Reu1sion 2 "*Incorporated PCR 09-1217 for* CR 2009-4976to incorporate TSTF:.434 -qverlap,Testing-in Bases for SRA.O.L (Author: f<;en F,rel1afer)" Re\iision 1 :.... UpdatedTS Bases for TS Amendment No. 129 -missed surveillances. (Larry.Donghia,'o1/03l03) * * *. * *. * **** * ** * .** ***' Re\iision O -BasesforTechnicalSpecifications. (E. Weinkam, 08130101) ' . , *:* *. *.* . . . . .*. *:.... . ' .. *.*.. *. **' Hevis:ion
* Approved By Appr01<al.Date
* UNIT# UNIT2 DATE' 0 R.G.West 03t30.01 DOCT PROCEDURE DOCN se ;in & rn SYS 4' R. 6 offeE 12"'12t'le '* :STATUS COl.IPLETED REV: _.4-#OF PGS St. Lucie Nuclear-Plant Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389 ECTO. N 00 .: 3:0 &Xci ./SECTION Attachment 6 TABLE***OF c6NTENTS L-2017-002 Enclosure Page-46 of 52 B:A.SES :FOH. SECt!'.dNS3.0B2 4.b .*.:: :;:>;;;,;.;*;,, .:.:: .* *:,.*;,,,,, :,, : .. ::_,_,_,,: *.. ,:: *. : *..* :.:.;,: .*. :.::* .. :;:: .* J 314:0.. ,A.PPL.ICA13JLIJY>, ,.,. *:: ,,,:,** ....... *: ,,.,-.***.**: *.** , ... ,,,,, .... **: , ... , ...... *.::** ... ***.::**: ""**::'.:'. } . . :s)1.s E.cL" ... ,,.:, .. :.;*, ,*,,; .. ,*:*:* ,: , __ ,, *:,. *: '"":'*'"** : .. : .. :.:.' '*"*" *:: .: .. *,,, :;":*,:. ''*. : ....... , .. *' :::.: .-: .. : -"":' ....... : .:::: ,* ., ......... , ... 3". *3:0:1. ,,. ... . :3_p'.:2 IAcJdi0:5 I ;7*0.4' . 4:0.l *Xo'.3 *4:0'.4 ,:**.*, .. A.Q.5 ,. "C:'."",''' "".' '.",*::,*.::::.;,,*.::*..-:*.*:::*:**** ** , '*"' :".""*' '.":X.:.**.**;**:,,::::::*.**.'Y" *-.*,::.* :* ,., ... **:** .. 3. ; ; '*"* ...... ',;:.;*; *''' ,; ..... *' ; :. ;. ,;; ... *:: .. ; .. *"''""'. ;. "*"; *. ;.;; *.:;. *"' ;.* .. : ; ; . '"' ; ;. '*; .. ; *.**.;; .. ,*; ;.; ; 4 ............... ,, .................... ._,.:: .. * .. : .. *: .. *********"'""",*.* .. *.:.* .. *.** ... *.:*:c:************-.:*.-.,*:.:,*.**P* * * * ./ --* ' *** v ..... , .... , ... , ........... ,.,., .. ,, ....... :: ...*.. , ...... ,:,,, .............. ., ...... , .. , ................ : .. ,c:,.,.,,,., ....... ,.,.T. .. ;;*;;; : .. ::.: ... :::,.:;;;;*:*: ::: *,::*;:;;,, .. ;;; :::*:.:*::*;,; ;;;.,;.:,_:.*::,::.:i::.,.;,.;:; ::;;.: .::* .... : ;,; :: 11': .' ...... * ..* ::: :::;:.":' ;.:.-.* ... '. :::.** .' '. .. ,.,; *.:.::;:* :-.*. :::.:.*<:.: }".': .. -.*, ...... : ..... .' :*. ::,-., '*" '. .::: ,,: .. '''.",',:.'.* -.::* ...... * .. "** .. '* :: :: .'.. :::.".-*;;,* .. :*,:: .. .:::.::: :.*:'(,;;;::: .. :, "; :: .... : ::;*:: ...... :.*:::-.. *:.: .. : .. .... : .:::.-J'3' .......... : .. : *"*;.::*::':;'.,::: '.'.'. *.*::*** ..... .,.:.*:.*:*:"**,:.,::*:* ... '":;*.;:-.::.*_-; ... :,* ............. :*:: ;**:.*, 15,, ; . :;*;*::-.:.; ,;*;*: ... ::"::::::::,;:'i:.:.'::.: .. ,*, .:*:; :.; .. * ::.-::*, :;;;;.;: *.. :. : .* :*:*: ::*,* .*.* ':.*; :: .. *'":*:*,*f1f St. Lucie Nuclear Plant Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389 L-2017-002 .Enclosure Page 47 of 52 Attachment 6 SECTION NO.: TITLE: TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS PAGE:. 3.0 & 4.0 **. REVISION NO.: BASES ATIACHMENT 2 OF ADM-25.04 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 A of 16 / ' 3/4.0 APPLICABILITY (continued) BASES (continued) 3.0.1 (continued) The specified time limits of the ACTION requirements are applicable from the point in time it is identified that a Limiting Condition for Operation is not met. The time limits of the ACTION requirements are also applicable when a system or component is removed from service for surveillance testing or investigation of operational problems. Individual specifications may include a specified time limit for the completion of a Surveillance Requirement when equipment is removed from service. In this case, the allowable outage time limits of the ACTION requirements are applicable when this limit expires if the surveillance has not been completed. When a shutdown is required to comply with ACTION requirements, .the plant may have. entered a MODE in which a new specification becomes applicable. In this case, the time limits of the ACTION requirements would apply from the point in. time that the new specification becomes applicable if the requirements of the Limiting Condition for Operation are not met. 3.0.2 This specification establishes that noncompliance with a specification exists when the requirements of the Limiting Condition for Operation are not met and the associated ACTION requirements have not been implemented within the specified time inte.rval. The purpose of this specification is to clarify that (1) implementation of the ACTION requirements within the specified time interval constitutes compliance with a specification and (2) completion of the remedial measures of the ACTION requirements is not required when compliance with a Limiting Condition for Operation is restored within the time interval specified in the associated ACTION requirements. New paragraph '-"'-._ LCO 3.0.5 provide. s for an exception to LCO 3.0.2 for. the limited purpose of . required testing to demonstrate either the OPERABILITY of equipme*nt being returned to service or the OPERABILITY of other equipment. Refer to the LCO 3.0.5 discussion for use. ..
St. Lucie Nuclear Plant Docket Nos. 50-.335 and 50-389 L-2017-002 Enclosure Page 48 of 52. ECTIJ N tll .: 3.0 & 4.0 R EVISIJ N NO.: Attachment 6 nm: TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS .. BASES ATI A CHM ENT 2 OF 04 LJMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERJl.TION . AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS' >ST. 'LUCIE UNIT 2' . , .. APPLICABILITY (continued) BASES (continued) *, , . ' . (continw3d) Upon entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability with the* LCO not met, LCO 3. 0.1 and LCO 3.0.2 :require entry into the applicable Required Actions until the Condition is resolved, :until the LCO is met, or until the unit is not within the Applicability ofthe.Technical Specification. Surveillances do not have to be performed-to be performed on the associated. inoperable .equipment (or on variables outside the specified limits), as perrnitted by SR 4.0.4 Therefore, utilizing LCO 3.0.4 is not a violation of SR 4.0. for SR 4.0.4 for any Surveillances that have not been performed on inoperable equipment. Ha#ever, SRs rnust*be metto ensure OPERABILITY prior to declaring the associate*d equipment 0 PERABLE (o(variable vl"ithin limits)" and restoring V*liththe'affected LCO .. IJD.5 (Add INSERT from next page) I St. Lucie Nuclear Plant Docket Nos. 50-335-and 50-389 Attachment 6 INSERT L-2017-002 Enclosure Page 49 of 52 3.0 .. 5 LC0.3.0.5 establishes the allow<!nce for restoring equipment to service under administrative controls when it has been removed from service or deClared inoperable to comply with ACTIONS. The sole purpose of this Specification is to provide an exception to LCO 3.0.2 (e.g. to not comply with the applicable Required Action(s)) to allow the performance of required testing to demonstrate either: 1. The OPERABILITY of the equipment being returned to service or, 2. The OPERABILITY of other equipment. The administrative controls ensure the time the equipment is returned to service in confilct with the requirements of the ACTIONS is limited to the time absolutely necessary to perform the required testing to demonstrate OPERABILITY. This Specification does not provide time to perform any other preventive or corrective maintenance. LCO 3.0.5 specifically states that equipment removed from service or declared inoperable to comply With ACTION(s) may be returned to service under administrative c<;mtrol solely to perform testing required to demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the equipment qr that of other equipment. LCO 3.0.5 is limited to plant conditions where simultaneous testing and compliance with the required ACTION(s) is not possible. Hence LCO 3.0.5 may only be used if it the only alternative to performing the testing, regardless whether the other alternatives present higher risk to the plant. An example of demonstrating the OPERABILITY of equipment being returned to service is reopening a containment jsolation valve that has been closed to comply with required ACTION(s) and must be reopened to perform th_e required testing. An example of demonstrating the OPERABILITY of other equipment is taking an inoperable channel or trip system out of the tripped .condition to prevent the trip function from occurring during the performance of required testing on another channel in the other trip system A example ofden:ionstrating the OPERABILITY ofother equipment is taking an inoperable channel or-trip system out of the tripped condition to permit th13 logic to function and indicate the appropriate response during the performance of required testing on another channel in the same trip system.
 
==References:==
1. NUREG 1432, Standard Technical Combustion Engineering Plants, Revision 4, Volume 2, Bases (ML12102A169) 2. Enclosure 10: Case Study 6: ANO 1 Use of LCO 3.0.5 Meeting Summary ofthe January 27 & 28 Meeting with NRC/TSTF (ML 090640444)
St. Lucie Nuclear Plant Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389 ******* *** *** .. . . **-. ' '* .. . . . . . ,. '" .-.-.:-. Ule: R,,EVISl.91\1.S.UMfu'IARY:: Attachment 6 $F>E&#xa2;1 F1 cA:r10 Ns BASES ATIAGHMENT5 . . . 6FADM-25.o4 . SAFETY L-2017-002 Enclosure Page 50 of 52 Atrachmen '/./'*. :,,.*, ,:;5J,; cu rrent;i;<evisioii* No. ... . ,-*ReviSion !{-*1nsorppra.ted. 9n-in Er\d states (CE NPSb-1.186):: t)widsoh). *" * * *
* PCR 2053666 b.ased onNRC appraval of the LAR that impfe.ments tt:ie'surveillance*Fre*quericy ,coritrdl Program: (Ai.Jt-hOr:. K..Frehafer(. * ' * * *. *. \ . -** . Revision 3-lncorprirated'PCR 1792591to'updateJotUnit2EPU.:coriditionsasr'rlbdified per' ,E.C 2.49-9,g5 anq 2 EP.Y (fu\h'or:Qon_ * * .. * ** * * * *. * * * .* **
* PCR 08:6765 ;n:ifcR for8ases changes toTect:inicai, Specifications .155 fcir License Amendments 152 and 153: Procedure Changesio.implement .AST were revi$'Wed *fr{O 'on; as part l:ifithe ifcense amet1'dment'submitta1;. (Aut.hor: l}eri F, rel:le1ferf ..
* Revisi9n 1-" Bases forTechnical SpecificG1tioris -137: (M .DiM 12.i'21 /04f .. <** .* ,*.; .. '.* . . >'. .. :* -* **, ........ _;. ...... '.:--*.
* _'. -,-;**. ** * ** **. : *; -,* .** *.-*' .* . * *.. :;.. . _:._ ... * .... *. *: Rev5io.n .*Approved By*: 'Apprwal Date: 0 R :G, vilest :. 5 UNIT# p):1.ti::'. DOCT: D6cN hs.' UNIT-2 ** -':PROC.EOURE Si! ;3 STATUS'. .**. COl.IPLETED *.> *. * **....*.... --------I R Elf :.e:: # OFPG.S ------1 St. Lucie Nuclear Plant Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389 L-2017-002 Enclosl:ire Page 51 of 52 31*4.3 Attachment 6 TITLE: .. *. TE.CHt:Jl.CAL SPEC! FIC,I\ l_TONS .*.. 8ASESATIACHMENT 5 OFADM-25.04 . :IN STRUM ENJATION *sr LUCIE UNIT) 1risfRUME.NJATION *cdintinuecii B.ASES (continued) . ,.
* f,..3; 1 and 314:.3.2 (continued) ' . ' ' ,, ,. . ., .* *, Add INSERT from-next page ES FAS subgroup Jelay testing.is performed it;(acconfance the surveillance Frequency control Prograrn: * * * * * * * * * * . . ,* . . . . . ' / . The.'measur$ment df response time afthe specifie.d frequencies provides assurancethatthe protectlv*e and*&#xa3;SF actfonfunction associated.\ivittfeach 'channel is completed "within the titne *lii'.nit assumed in the safety analy&deg;ses .. No* credifwastaken:in the analyses for those channels.wtth responseJimes indicated as not applicable. Ttie surveillance Frequency is contr611edunder the Surv;eillance control .Prog_ram. *. .. . .. * . . . . . Response*tirrie mefy' be demonstrated by arr{ *series of sequential, twerlappihg ortdtal chan0"el measurements, tirrie, .. provided that such tests dembnstr.ate total c.hannel resporjse time. as defin"ed' .. CEOG T6pica'1 Report CE NPSD-1f67, and FPL;NoSigtijficant Hazards Evaluation S-03-043,,provide.the basis and methodology .for: using allocated sensor response times ih the oft he .... channerresponse time'fc)rspecific.sehsors identified inthese*dcicume.nts:.* The allqcated"sensor respbnse*time muSt be verified prior to placing a new component in operation anci*re-vedfied after maintenance that may *a'ctv'ersety affect the sensor response .time (e.g., replacement of a transmitter DP cell or variable *damping circuits).. veritic:ation may be derribristrated by'either.1./in* place;. onsite.,or offsite test:measu(emerit? or 2) utilizing replac'ement sensors certified response times. . . .* > '.*.; ,* Tl1e CEOG topical report and FPL evaluation only cover certain sensor model numbers. lfsensors are replaced i.*vith t;ipes notpreviousiy eValLi"ated, th8n .. periodi(responsetime*testing (RTr):for the new serjsor tr)Ust eitr1er.be performed and the appropriate'chaniJE!s made:fo:plant *prci'c.edures,' or.an additional&deg; reques;t for RTT elimination'must be *submitted and approved bv.the NRC. If, however, the replacemehtse.nsor:i's one for elimin'ation has:been approved, then &deg;FPL may modify U)e.plant_prbcedur13s, using at1 allocated time ,based upon response time value, o{upori statistic'al analysis of l1istorical.data fbr'thaf tran*smittedype .and .. model. . . .. The Safety* Injection Actuation Signal (SIAS) provides direct actuation of the Coiltaininent Isolation Signal. (Cl S) to ensure containment isolation in the,* event of a small break LOCA. . . '", :, .. ' . . '
St. Lucie Nuclear Plant Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389 Attachment 6 INSERT L-2017-002 Enclosure Page 52 of 52 The wide range nuclear instruments (Nls) provide a startup and Operating Rate ofChange of Power -High Trip. OPERABILITY of the Startup and Operating Rate of Change of Power -High Trip channels is limited to Power Range Neutron Flux Power of RATED THERMAL POWER, since this trip function performs no specified safety function above this power level. The Startup arid Operating Rate of Change of Power -High trip function is automatically bypassed.whenever RATED TH ER.MAI,. POWER is <1 o-4% or >15%, though explicitly required by the Unit 2 Technical Specifications. The operating bypasses are automatically removed when the enabling bypass conditions are no longer.satisfied. When required to be .OPERABLE. ACTION 2(a) requires an inoperable Startup and Operating Rate of Change of Power -High Trip channel to be placed in either bypass or trip within 1-hour and the channel must be returned to OPERABLE status no later than the next. COLD SHUTDOWN. ACTION 2(b) allows an additional inoperable channel to be placed in bypass provided one of the inoperable channels is placed in trip. There are no other RPS functionai units affected by an inoperable Startup and Operating Rate of Change of Power -High Trip channel in bypass or trip. The Startup and Operating Rate.of Change of Power -High Trip function and its bypass and reset capability are periodically tested in accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. 
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