View source for WBL-22-015, Update to Fire Protection Report

{{Adams
| number = ML22131A133
| issue date = 05/11/2022
| title = Update to Fire Protection Report
| author name = Williams A
| author affiliation = Tennessee Valley Authority
| addressee name = 
| addressee affiliation = NRC/Document Control Desk, NRC/NRR
| docket = 05000390, 05000391
| license number = NPF-090, NPF-096
| contact person = 
| case reference number = WBL-22-015
| document type = Fire Protection Plan, Letter type:WBL
| page count = 1
}}

=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:Tennessee Valley Authority, Post Office Box 2000, Spring City, Tennessee 37381 May 11, 2022 WBL-22-015 10 CFR 50.4 10 CFR 50.71(e)
ATTN: Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-90 and NPF-96 NRC Docket Nos. 50-390 and 50-391

==Subject:==
Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 - Update to Fire Protection Report

==Reference:==
TVA letter to NRC, WBL-20-051, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Units 1 and 2 -
Update to Fire Protection Report, dated October 21, 2020 In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50.71(e), enclosed is an update to the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Fire Protection Report (FPR). The FPR is incorporated by reference into the WBN Updated Final Safety Analysis Report. This update includes all changes to the FPR since the referenced submittal.
Tennessee Valley Authorthy (TVA) has reviewed this revision for redaction as indicated by Regulatory Issue Summary 2015-17, "Review and Submission of updates to Final Safety Analysis Reports, Emergency Preparedness Documents, and Fire Protection Documents",
dated December 23, 2015, using the criteria provided by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in SECY-04-191, Withholding Sensitive Unclassified Information Concerning Nuclear Power Reactors From Public Disclosure dated October 19, 2004. Based on the criteria provided for fire protection reports, this revision does not contain drawings subject to withholding.
There are no new regulatory commitments contained in this letter. Please direct any questions concerning this submittal to Jonathan Johnson, WBN Licensing Manager, at jtjohnson0@tva.gov.

ENCLOSURE Tennessee Valley Authority Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 Fire Protection Report Revision 60 Changes since last submittal Includes:
FPR Cover Data Rev. 60 FPR Part I Rev. 60 FPR Part II Rev. 60 FPR Part III Rev. 58 FPR Part IV Rev. 58 FPR Part VI Rev. 60 FPR Part VII Rev. 60 FPR Part X Rev. 60 WBL-22-015              E1 of 1143

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REVISION

==Title:==
WBN Fire Protection Report                                                                        LOG Revision                                                                                               DATE No.                                DESCRIPTION OF REVISION                                      APPROVED Revision 17 of the Fire Protection Report is issued as part of the corrective 17     action for PER 00-015779-000. This PER identified areas in the plant that                 6-5-2001 required surveillance inspection of fire barrier penetration seals, but were not accessible due to the areas being high radiation areas. Section 6.4 has been added to Part VII to evaluate and justify the deletion of the surveillance inspection requirement in these high radiation areas.
This change revises the Table of Contents, the Effective Page Listing, adds pages VII-51 through VII-53, and renumbers existing pages VII-51 and VII-52 to VII-54 and VII-55, respectively. Added statement to page II-102 and revised listing of inaccessible areas on page II-11.
The existing fire hazards analysis is not affected by this revision, and there is no change to any fire safe shutdown component. Combustible loading or distribution is not changed and these is no affect on any safe shutdown circuit or component. Therefore, the engineering evaluations included in this revision do not affect the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire.
Revision 18 of the Fire Protection Report is issued to revise the frequency of 18     performing functional testing of smoke detection and restorable heat detection            7-4-2001 instruments which are in any inaccessible area. This frequency of testing is being changed from During each COLD SHUTDOWN planned to exceed 24 hours, unless the TIR was performed within the previous 6 months to During each REFUELING OUTAGE.
The License Condition Impact Evaluation for this revision follows the Revision Log for Revision 18.
This change revises page x (Listing of Effective Pages), and pages II-60 and II-
: 77. This change adds Revision Log 18 (place after Revision Log 17) and the License Condition Impact Evaluation for Revision 18.
This revision to the Fire Protection Report resolves the discrepancies identified 19     in PER 01-012090-000, PER-01-012173-000, PER-01-013047-000, PER 01-                       1-9-2002 013456-000, and PER 01-016737-000.
This revision changes Part II, Section 7.7 and Section 8.3 to state that Nuclear Assurance audit frequencies are as specified in the NQAP.
This revision also adds the replacement frequency for emergency lighting batteries with 8 year and 20 year service life. This information is added to Part II, Fire Protection Plan section B.14.9.c. This change is implemented by EDC E-51054-A.
The License Condition Impact Evaluation for this revision follows the revision log for Rev. 19.
This change revises the Effective Page Listing and pages II-19, II-20, II-47, II-59, II-108, II-109, II-112, II-114, II-116, II-117, II-119, II-120, II-135, II-139 thru II-141. Pages were renumbered in Section II due to a page being added.

REVISION

==Title:==
WBN Fire Protection Report                                                                     LOG Revision                                                                                            DATE No.                               DESCRIPTION OF REVISION                                    APPROVED This revision to the Fire Protection Report adds a deviation to address minor 20     leakage around the RCP oil collection System, and is part of the corrective           3-22-2002 action for PER 01-012111.
The License Condition Impact Evaluation for this revision follows the Revision Log for Rev. 20.
This change revises the Effective Page Listing and additional pages as noted below:
Pages added: VII-20 through VII-22 Pages revised: VII-1, IX-20 Pages renumbered: VII-23 through VII-58 This revision to the Fire Protection Report removes the requirement to perform 21     a periodic functional test of door WBN-0-DOOR 410-A036, which was                     8-29-2002 permanently locked closed as part of the improved Security Plan.
The License Condition Impact Evaluation for this revision follows the revision log for Rev. 21.
This change revises the Effective Page Listing and additional pages as noted below:
Pages Added: none Pages Revised: II-129, II-132 Pages Renumbered: none 22     This revision to the Fire Protection Report adds OR-14.5.3 and its associated bases information, removes duplicate listings for 1-FCV-1-275 and -277 from           12-6-2002 Table 14.10, and corrects the format in OR-14.3.1.b.2 for readability.
The Licensing Condition Impact Evaluation for this revision follows the revision log for Rev. 22.
This change revises the title for sections associated with Part II, Section 14.10.
This title has been revised to add Fire to make it more descriptive.
This change revises the Effective Page Listing and additional pages as noted below:
Pages Added: II-96 Pages Revised: iv, II-46, II-55, II-57, II-59, II-110, II-112, II-140 to II-143 Pages Renumbered: II-97 through II-143 This revision of the Fire Protection Report notes the installation of an anti-static 23     mat at Panel 1-M-13.                                                                   2-3-2003 The License Condition Impact Evaluation for this revision follows the revision log for Rev. 23.
This change revises the Effective Page Listing and additional pages as noted below:
Pages Added: None Pages Revised: xii, VIII-19 Pages Renumbered: None

REVISION

==Title:==
WBN Fire Protection Report                                                                   LOG Revision                                                                                          DATE No.                               DESCRIPTION OF REVISION                                  APPROVED This revision of the Fire Protection Report corrects discrepancies between the 24     ORs section in 14.1.4.a, 14.3.1.a, and 14.3.1.b.1 and the Basis for these ORs.       5-8-2003 Modified the B.14.3.1 for the reference to TS SQN TS 3.3.3.8, which has been deleted. Corrected elev. For PASF in Table 14.1. Corrected UNID FOR 1-PCV-68-340B in TIR item 14.10.f.
The License Condition Impact Evaluation for this revision follows the revision log for Rev. 24.
This change revises the Effective Page Listing and additional pages as noted below:
Pages Added: None Pages Revised: x, II-55, II-72, II-76, II-88, II-118 Pages Renumbered: None This revision of the Fire Protection Report, Part II provides clarification of the 25     requirements associated with OR-14.2.1.c.                                           9-18-2003 Pages Added: None Pages Revised: II-51, II-80 Pages Renumbered: None This revision of the Fire Protection Report notes the disconnection of the Unit 2 26     120V AC Vital Inverters (2-INV-235-1, -2, -3, -4) and the installation of the        3-2-2004 480V AC Vital Disconnect Panels (0-PNL-236-1-S, S, S, S).
The License Condition Impact Evaluation for this revision follows the Revision Log for Rev. 26.
This change revises pages as noted below:
Pages Added: None Pages Revised: Table of Contents (pages i through xiv), III-20, III-56 Pages Renumbered: None PER 03-001902-000 (6666) identified that the Fire Protection Report (FPR)in 27     Part I, page 1-7 and Part VI, pages VI-166 and VI-169, indicates the Unit 1          4-7-2004 North and South Steam Valve Rooms have thermal detection. This detection was abandoned in place by DCN M-38746. The FPR is being revised to delete the thermal detection in Unit 1 North and South Steam Valve Rooms.
PER 03-003890-000 (6869) identified that some discrepancies between the room listings in the FPR Table 1-1 and Part VI Table of Contents (TOC). Only Part VI TOC is being revised to correct the room listings to agree with Table 1-
: 1. Based on this review, the FPR Table 1-1 was revised to correct the Fire Area name for Unit 2, and to add Fire Area Duct Banks.
PER 04-000373-000 (12976) identified that during performance of an inspection, the blast doors to Unit 2 Reactor Building were ajar. Engineering evaluation for these doors found that the detection system should be included in Part II, Table 14.1

REVISION

==Title:==
WBN Fire Protection Report                                                                    LOG Revision                                                                                           DATE No.                                   DESCRIPTION OF REVISION                                APPROVED PER 03-014910-000 (8497) identified that Revision 3 to FPDP-3, Management 27     Of The Fire Protection Report removed the requirement for PORC review of the (contd)  Fire Protection Report (FPR), however FPR Part II, section 8.1 a. which states that PORC reviews changes to the FPR was not revised. This section has been revised to agree with FPDP-3 and regulatory guidance.
PER 03-020146-000 (12878) identified that valve 0-PCV-26-18 controls the pressure on System 26 when an electric motor driven fire pump(s) is running.
Due to problems with 0-PCV-26-18 failing to control pressure properly, 0-PCV-26-18 was isolated. To prevent the automatic starting of the electric motor driven fire pumps and relying on the pumps' relief valves to control pressure, the FPS circuit was defeated without entering Operation Requirement (OR) 14.2.3. The defeat of the FPS circuit without entry into an OR is allowed by the FPR, as specified in the bases B.14.2 to support testing. This same justification was used to defeat the FPS circuit for this maintenance issue. NCV 50-390/2003-05-01. For completeness and clarity, Section 14.2.8 and B14.2.8 has been added to allow for maintenance of the motor driven fire pumps.
In addition to the PERs, (1) FPR in Part II, page II-109, Bases - Testing and Inspection Requirements (TIR) Emergency Battery Lighting Units contained a reference to the vendor recommendation and NFPA consensus standard 101 criteria for frequency. Reference to NFPA was deleted. (2) Section 9.1 and 9.5 were revised to add a response within the WBN Reservation to protect offsite power as another example of an emergency that would prevent the brigade from being available onsite. (3) Section 10.0 was revised to reference site administrative procedures instead of fire protection engineer.
eCAP PER numbers are in parenthesis.
The License Condition Impact Evaluation for this revision follows the revision log for Revision 27.
This change revises the Effective Page Listing and additional pages as noted below:
Pages Added: I-16, VI-x - VI-xii Pages Revised: x, I I-8, I-10, I I-15, II-20, II-25, II-21, II-26, II-52, II-82, II-83, II-109, II-119, III-58, III-59, III-62, III-71, VI-i - VI-ix, VI-5, VI-13, VI-30, VI-32, VI-55, VI-149, VI-159, VI-166, VI-169, VI-453 Pages Deleted: None DCN 51653-A adds a new category of combustible material for the Fuel 28     Transfer Canal coating in the Part VI, Section 3.14.3, text on page VI-153.            1-7-2005 Although relatively small, this is a significant increase in fuel load for this room compared to the present fuel load. The Fire Severity Index does not change for the Refueling Room A813, 757.0-A13 and remains as Insignificant.
Additionally, this revision resolves a Corrective Action Item for eCAP PER 68663. Part II, Section 14.2.4.a is revised to remove a reference to diesel fire pump operation already contained in Section 14.2.1 and correctly references Section 14.2.1 instead of 14.2.2. Pages II-53 and II-81 was revised to support the Section 14.2.4.a revision.

REVISION

==Title:==
WBN Fire Protection Report                                                                    LOG Revision                                                                                           DATE No.                                 DESCRIPTION OF REVISION                                  APPROVED The License Condition Impact Evaluation (LCIE) for this revision follows the 28     Revision Log for this revision.
(contd)
This change revises the pages indicated below.
Pages Added: None Pages Revised (Replaced): i-xv, II-51, II-53, II-81, VI-153 Pages Deleted (Removed): None x DCN 51766-A installs the RADCON Control Point Building in the Refueling 29         Room, 757.0-A13, which adds a variety of combustible materials. The               6-13-2005 additional materials do increase fuel load for this room. But, the Fire Severity Index remains as Insignificant.
The RADCON Control Point Building plexiglass windows exceed the maximum ASTM E-84 Flame Spread Rating. However, because of safety concerns, available materials, relative volume, and no affect on the Safe Shutdown Analysis, the plexiglass windows were determined to be the best solution.
This revision adds an exception to Part VIII, Section D, General Guidelines for Plant Protection, sub-section D1 Building Design, sub-sub-section d for the plexiglass windows.
The License Condition Impact Evaluation (LCIE) for this revision follows the Revision Log for this revision.
This change revises the pages indicated below.
Pages Added: None Pages Revised (Replaced): i-xv and VIII-19 Pages Deleted (Removed): None x This revision to the WBN Fire Protection Report corrects discrepancies identified on PERs 9620 and 33818.
The License Condition Impact Evaluation and the NEI 02-03 Fire Protection Change Regulatory Review are included for this revision.
This change revises the Effective Page Listing and additional pages as noted below:
Pages Added: None Pages Revised: II-138, VI-184, VI-194, VI-435, VI-436 Pages Deleted: None EDC 51950-A/PER Action 85667-004 revises Part II, Testing and Requirements 30     item 14.10.j Note 1 (p. II-73) and Table 14.10 (p. II-141), to clarify the Note  12-19-2005 requirements for nitrogen bottles. The requirement should state two bottles (i.e., each pair) are required to be connected for the AFW LCVs and S/G PORVs at the required TIR pressure.
Also (not PER related), Part III, Table 3.3, column entries have been adjusted where the margins were incorrectly set and a FR2 designation was changed to FR1 for Fan Room 1. The Part III changes are considered Administrative and do not require a detailed evaluation.

REVISION

==Title:==
WBN Fire Protection Report                                                                 LOG Revision                                                                                        DATE No.                               DESCRIPTION OF REVISION                                 APPROVED The FPDP-3 License Condition Impact Evaluation (LCIE) and NEI-02-03 Fire 30     Protection Change Regulatory Review (FPPCRR) follows this Revision Log Contd   page.
This change revises the Effective Page Listing and other pages indicated below.
Pages Added: None Pages Revised (Replaced): Coversheet, R30 Revision Log, i-xv, II-73, II-141, III-59, III-60, III-65, III-67, and III-73 Pages Deleted (Removed): None 31     The FPDP-3 License Condition Impact Evaluation (LCIE) and NEI-02-03 Fire Protection Change Regulatory Review (FPPCRR) follows this Revision Log              4-7-2006 page.
This change adds OR-14.2 as a reference to OR-14.5.1 and OR-14.5.2 in response to PER 73598 and hose station 2-26-669 to Table 14.6 in response to PER 33660.
Pages Added: None Pages Revised (Replaced): Coversheet, R31 Revision Log, i-xv, II-50, II-57, II-95, II-96, and II-127.
Pages Deleted (Removed): None WBN Fire Protection Report, Coverdata and Part II, was converted from Word 32     95 to Word 2002 using Rev. 31.                                                     4-28-2006 The FPDP-3 License Condition Impact Evaluation (LCIE) and NEI-02-03 Fire Protection Change Regulatory Review (FPPCRR) follow this Revision Log Page.
This change adds hydrant 0-HYD-026-1661 as an alternate hydrant that is to remain operable in the event that hydrant 0-HYD-026-535 becomes inoperable.
Pages Added: None Pages Revised (Replaced): Coversheet, R32 Revision Log, i-xv, II-58, II-101, and II-129 Pages Deleted (Removed): None DCN 51708A: TVA is required to modify its existing VHF radio systems to 33     maintain compliance with new requirements from the Naitonal                         8-4-2006 Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA). The Federal directive requires narrow banding of the frequency spectrum used to operate mobile radio systems.
The scope of DCN 51708A includes removing the F1 radio repeater system from the plant.
The existing F2 and F3 radio repeater systems will be replaced with narrow banded systems. The F3 repeater system will serve as Fire-Ops primary system and will be located in cabinet 0-PNL-253-VHF4 on the Turbine Building floor elevation 755.0 (T13/M). New equipment for the F2 repeater system is housed in cabinet 0-PNL-253-VHF3 located on the Turbine Building floor elevation 755.0 (T13/M).

REVISION

==Title:==
WBN Fire Protection Report                                                                    LOG Revision                                                                                            DATE No.                                DESCRIPTION OF REVISION                                   APPROVED A new NEXTEL cellular radio system, 800 MHz range, will be installed in cabinet 33    0-PNL-253-800MHZ on Turbine Building floor elevation 755.0 (T13/M). This (contd) system provides alternate communications throughout the plant protected areas for Fire-Ops.
Pages added: None Pages revised: x (Index), II-36 & II-82 Pages deleted: None WBN Fire Protection Report, Coverdata, and pages of Part II are affected by this 34    revision. This revision clarifies different sections of Part II relative to the term    9-20-2006 core empty and the term Modes 5 and 6. This is a corrective action for PER 110337.
Pages Added: None Pages Revised: x & xi (Index), II-41, II-44, II-49, II-50, II-54, II-56, II-58, II-74, II-80, II-87, II-92, II-97 and II-103 Pages Deleted: None This revision to the Fire Protection Report notes the replacement of Unit 1 Vital 35    Inverters (1-INV-235-1-D, E, F, G) and the addition of Spare Vital            12-19-2006 Inverters (0-INV-235-1-D, E, F, G).
The License Condition Impact Evaluation for this revision follows the Revision Log for Rev. 35. This change revises the Effective Page Listing and additional pages as noted below:
Pages Added: None Pages Revised: Table of Contents (pages i thru xvi), III-20, III-56, VI-241, VI-275 Pages Renumbered: None DCN D-52033-A changes: A general area light and emergency battery pack with 36    remote heads was added for illumination of 1-FCV-67-458. The Fire Protection            3-22-2007 Report (FPR) was revised to include all manual actions created by DCN D-52033-A.
This change revises the Effective Page Listing and additional pages as noted below:
Pages Added: None Pages Revised: x, xii, xiii, xiv, VI-93, VI-117, VI-121, VI-186, VI-187, VI-200, VI-217, VI-218, VI-235, VI-252, VI-256, VI-288, VI-307, VI-323, VI-331, VI-335, VI-340, VI-345, VI-367, VI-462, VI-472, VI-474, VI-526 Pages Deleted: None Pages Renumbered: None This revision of the Fire Protection Report changes the service life and battery 37    replacement frequency for PM6420 as follows:                                            5-23-2008 x Service life is changed to 5 years from 8 years.
x Replacement frequency is changed to 3 years from 5 years for constantly below 95qF.
x Replacement frequency is changed to 1.5 years from 3 years for constantly above 95qF.

REVISION

==Title:==
WBN Fire Protection Report                                                                     LOG Revision                                                                                             DATE No.                              DESCRIPTION OF REVISION                                      APPROVED The License Condition Impact Evaluation for this revision follows the revision log 37    for Rev. 37.
(contd)
This change revises the Effective Page Listing and additional pages as noted below:
Pages Added: Page to Revision Log Pages Revised: II-109 Pages Renumbered: None DCN 52247 changes: The Fire Protection Report (FPR) was revised to add 38    cables PV240F, B38F, PV1D, and B30D to the list of protected cables in Sections          5-12-2009 3.25.2 and 3.32.2 of Part VI - Fire Hazards Analysis.
Updated Cable Protection Table in Section 3.19.2.1 of Part VI - Fire Hazards Analysis to add cables 1PL4742B and 1PL4743B that were omitted from the changes made by DCN 52033.
This change updates the revision level of the roman numeral numbered pages and additional pages as noted below:
Pages Added: None Pages Revised, xiii, Vi-200, VI-241, VI-275 Pages Deleted: None Pages Renumbered: None 39    DCN 52285 Changes:                                                                        3-4-2010 The Fire Protection Report (FPR) Part III was revised to address the addition of the (4) Unit 1 120V AC Vital Inverters. These are additions to the existing Vital Instrumentation System for channels I, II, II & IV located in rooms 772.0-A2 (480-V Board 1-B) & 772.0-A15 (480-V Board 2-B).
Part III was revised to modify paragraph 4.10.3 to indicate the new Unit 1 & Unit 2 120V AC Vital Instrument Power System description. Table 3-2 was also updated to indicate the addition of the new inverters.
This change updates the revision level of the pages as noted below:
DCN 52283 changes:
The Fire Protection Report (FPR) Part VII was revised to add justification for the use of a new door system in the Unit 2 Equipment Hatch to prevent the propagation of a fire from the Unit 2 Reactor Building to the Refueling Floor. This door system is used in lieu of the blast door.
Part II was revised to add a new fire retardant roll-up door to the list of fire doors.
DCN 54347 changes: The Fire Protection Report (FPR) was revised to include Blast door WBN-0-DOOR-410-ABD2 as part of the Fire Protection Boundary.

REVISION

==Title:==
WBN Fire Protection Report                                                                    LOG Revision                                                                                            DATE No.                               DESCRIPTION OF REVISION                                     APPROVED PER 121905 addresses several issues concerning the Fire Protection Report.
39    (1)The sections where the deviations were not in Part VI have been added These (contd) sections are: The deviation in Part VII Section 4.4 listed the rooms associated with this deviation differently from design output. Also for the deviation in Part VII Section 2.6, the 2 hour fire barrier does not correlate with the design output for the Unit 2 room 737.0-A9. (3) Paragraph (e) has been deleted from the Basis of the Fire Protection Plan section.
PER 121969 is a clarification in the TVA Nuclear organizational structure PER 161040 identifies all four valves associated with the Manual Operator Action 580.
PER 160715 adds a description in the bases of what operability means for the TCVS for the LCCs and CRDM.
PER 161116 has added a testing requirement from the Fire Protection Report Part VII for the deviation of the automatic switchover from the CST to the ERCW using MDAFW pumps. The testing of Flow Control Valves (1-FCV-3-116A-A, 1-FCV-3-116B-A, 1-FCV-3-126A-B, and 1-FCV-3-126B-B) has been added to FPR Part II Testing and Inspection Requirements (TIR) which makes the FPR in compliance with the deviation.
PER 170296 addresses several issues concerning the Fire Protection Report. (1)
Part V1 Section 3.44.2 is being revised to list MOA 729 and MOA 728 in the Local Manual Operator Actions section and (2) Part V1 page 82 a typographical error was corrected with the component identifiers (IDs) and descriptions for the Component Cooling System Pump C-S, Motor-Driven AFW Pump 1A-A, and Motor-Driven AFW Pump 1B-B. Also, Part II, Section 12.10 states that compartmentation drawings are in Part VI and Part II, Section B.14.8 states that fire-rated assemblies/fire barriers are in Part VI. The drawings and barriers are in Part II not in Part VI.
Pages Added: VII-44a, VII-46a Pages Revised: x, xi, xii, xiii, xiv, II-1, II-16, II-18, II- 37, II-73, II-103,II-110, III-20, III-56, VI-82, VI-156, VI-186, VI-340, VI-345, VI-436, VI-522, VII-12, VII-42, VII-44, VII-46 Pages Deleted: None Pages Renumbered: None Work Order Modification (WOM) 09-812270-000 renovates the Control Room 40    kitchen (Room 755.0-C4). These renovations will impact the Fire Protection              05-28-2010 Report Part I, by increasing the fire severity time from <10 minutes to <18 minutes.
Pages Added: None Pages Revised: x, I-11 Pages Deleted: None Pages Renumbered: None

REVISION

==Title:==
WBN Fire Protection Report                                                                 LOG Revision                                                                                         DATE No.                              DESCRIPTION OF REVISION                                   APPROVED DCN 53437 replaces battery chargers 0-CHGR-236-1-D, 0-CHGR-236-2-E, 0-41    CHGR-236-3-F, 0-CHGR-236-4-G, 0-CHGR-236-5, 0-CHGR-236-6-S, & 0-                     02-22-2011 CHGR-236-7-S and adds two additional back up spare battery chargers 0-CHGR-236-8-S and 0-CHGR-236-9-S. 8-S is a backup spare for 7-S. The two transfer switches (0-XSW-236-6AC-S & 0-XSW-236-6DC-S) associated with battery charger 6-S are replaced with four transfer switches (0-XSW-236-68AC1-S, 0-XSW-236-68AC2-S, 0-XSW-236-68DC1-S, & 0-XSW-236-68-DC2-S) that mechanically interlock spare chargers 6-S and 8-S so that only one charger can be utilized at a time. Spare Chargers 7-S and 9-S are interlocked in a similar manner.
Revise Fire Protection Report Part III, Section 4.10.4 to reflect the two additional spare chargers. Revise Fire Protection Report Part III, Table 3-2 (Safe Shutdown Equipment List) to add battery chargers 0-CHGR-236-8 and 0-CHGR-236-9 and replace transfer switches 0-XSW-236-6AC, 0-XSW-236-6DC, 0-XSW-236-7AC, 0-XSW-236-7DC with transfer switches 0-XSW-236-68AC1-S, 0-XSW-236-68AC2-S, 0-XSW-236-68-DC1-S, 0-XSW-236-68DC2-S, 0-XSW-236-79AC1-S, 0-XSW-236-79AC2-S, 0-XSW-236-79-DC1-S, & 0-XSW-236-79DC2-S.
Revise Fire Protection Report Part VI, Section 3.25.2.1 Local Manual Operator Actions and Repairs where the control operated is 0-XSW-236-6DC-S and 0-XSW-236-7DC-S. Replace with 0-XSW-236-68DC1-S and 0-XSW-236-79DC1-S, respectively.
Revise Fire Protection Report Part VI, Section 3.32.2.1 Local Manual Operator Actions and Repairs where the control operated is 0-XSW-236-6DC-S. Replace with 0-XSW-236-68DC1-S.
Revise Fire Protection Report Part VI, Section 3.38.2.2 Local Manual Operator Actions and Repairs where the control operated is 0-XSW-236-6DC-S. Replace with 0-XSW-236-68DC1-S.
Revise Fire Protection Report Part VI, Section 3.47.2.1 Local Manual Operator Actions and Repairs where the control operated is 0-XSW-236-7DC-S. Replace with 0-SXW-236-79-DC1-S.
Pages added: None Pages revised: i-xvi (Coverdata), II-5, III-21, III-56, VI-240, VI-274, VI-314, &
VI-359 Pages deleted: None

REVISION

==Title:==
WBN Fire Protection Report                                                                         LOG Revision                                                                                                DATE No.                                DESCRIPTION OF REVISION                                         APPROVED PER 395485 will incorporate the following admin changes:
42                                                                                                 03-21-2012 Part VII, Section 4.5 was revised to reflect the New fuel Vault is part of the Refueling Room for the deviation.
Part VIII, F. 12 was revised to delete the sentence that states fire detection is provided in the fuel receipt area and to include deviation 4.5 in part VII.
PERs 287772, 296433, 300422, 366866, 376300, and 235469 have been incorporated into PER 235001.
This revision will implement several administrative changes to satisfy PER 235001:
Part I, Table 1-1 increases the fire severity for the Screen Wash and HPFP A Pump Rooms and HPFP B Pumps Room in the IPS. This increase is due to permanent matt flooring installed in these rooms. Also, an administrative correction to this table for room 692-A10 that added 5 minutes to the fire severity for revisions to the combustible loading from a previous revision.
Part II, Section 7.8 and 7, "Nuclear Assurance" has been updated to "Quality Assurance".
Part II, Section 14.8 adds the source documents for electrical raceway fire barriers and electrical raceway radiant energy shields.
Part II, Table 14.8.2 revised room connection for damper 2-ISD-31-3872 Part VI, Section 3.1.3 addresses HVAC duct work that does not have dampers in the duct work at fire barrier penetrations. The write-up indicates this duct work is a part of the EGTS system when it is part of the Auxiliary Building general exhaust system.
Part VI, Section 3.13.1 says there are no evaluations for the Volume Control Tank (VCT) Room, 713.0-A7 but in Part VII, Section 3.5 has an evaluation for the fire door to the VCT Room to have a fire damper.
Part VI, Section 3.14.2, the detection for the Cask Unloading Area (railroad bay) 729.0-A5 was listed as ionization but these detectors were changed to thermal detectors; Part VI, Section 3.17.3 states there are a hose stations on each elevation of the Unit 1 Additional Equipment Building, and lists 5 elevations There are only 4 hose stations in this building.
Part VI, Section 3.18.4 revised room connection for damper 2-ISD-31-3872 Part VI, Section 3.64.2 revised the fire severity for room HPFP B Pump Room for the added combustibles from PER 235469

REVISION

==Title:==
WBN Fire Protection Report                                                                       LOG Revision                                                                                              DATE No.                               DESCRIPTION OF REVISION                                        APPROVED Part VII, Section 3.3 corrects a discrepancy between the FPR and System 42    Description N3-26-4002 regarding the highest hose stations of four standpipe (contd) systems and whether they're serviced by FCVs.
Part VII, Section 3.3 corrects the frequency at which the hydraulic tests will be performed.
Part VII, Section 3.4 corrects the dimensions of the oversized damper.
Part VII, Section 6.2.1 incorrectly states Testing and Inspection Requirements for Dampers to be 18 months at 20%. This is revised to be 12 months at 20%.
Part IX, Section III.O was revised to accurately reflect the design of the RCP Oil Collection System.
Pages added: xvii Pages revised: i-xvii (Coverdata), I-5, I-14, II-19, II-58, II-135, VI-13, VI-147, VI-152, VI-171, VI-183, VI-464, VII-35, VII-36, VII-37, VII-43, VII-50, VIII-68 & IX-20 Pages deleted: None DCN 52292 Changes: The Fire Protection Report (FPR) was revised in Part I, Table 1-1 to reflect the new Combustible Load Fire Severity for rooms 755.0-C12, C13 and FPR Part VII will revise the Btu/ft2 loading for the Main Control Room (755.0-C12) and the Relay Room (755.0-C13).
DCN 53806 changes: The Fire Protection Report (FPR) was revised in Part I, Table 1-1 to reflect the new Combustible Load Fire Severity for room C14.
Pages Added: None Pages Revised: x, xiv, I-12, VII-8 Pages Deleted: None Pages Renumbered: None DCN 58383B mitigates the potential occurrence of MSO 15.
43 MSO Scenario 15 involves the potential transfer of refueling water from the RWST to the containment sump. This scenario is caused by a spurious closing of the load breakers for containment spray pump(s) concurrent with the spurious opening of the associated pump discharge valve due to fire-induced circuit failures for a fire in the 6.9kV and 480V Shutdown Board Room Fire Zones (757-A2 & 757-A9 or 757-A24 &
757-A17). A fire in these fire areas will affect the equipment powered from the 6.9kV and 480 V Shutdown Boards. The shutdown strategy for these fire zones involves the isolation of these boards to prevent the spurious starting of non-credited equipment that will affect safe shutdown. The 6.9 kV Shutdown Boards are isolated by opening breakers outside of the affected fire area to disconnect the 6.9kV Unit Boards and crediting the emergency stop and reset circuitry for the EDG associated with the 6.9kV Shutdown Board to prevent spurious loading. DCN 58383B rewires the diesel generator Emergency Stop circuits to prevent unavailability of the EDGs in fire zones that credit them. This unavailability is avoided by routing new cables that would cause a spurious energizing of the emergency stop circuit relay coil during normal

REVISION

==Title:==
WBN Fire Protection Report                                                               LOG Revision                                                                                      DATE No.                               DESCRIPTION OF REVISION                                APPROVED MCR operation outside of fire zones that credit the availability of the associated 43    EDG.
(contd)
The EDG reset circuitry is re-routed to avoid the 6.9kV and 480V Shutdown Board Room A and B Fire Zones. A sustained hot short on the EDG reset circuits can defeat the ability to perform the EDG emergency stop function.
Revise Fire Protection Report Part VI, to remove from ACR for MOAs 343 & 344.
Pages added: None.
Pages revised: i-xvii (Cover data), VI-218, VI-294 Pages deleted: None Pages renumbered: None EDC 58385A as follows:
MSO Scenario 14 involves the potential inadvertent draining of the RWST into the Containment Sump through the normally open RHR pump suction valves 1-FCV-074-003-A and 1-FCV-074-021-B. This is caused by a multiple spurious operation of the normally closed containment sump isolation valves 1-FCV-063-072-A and 1-FCV-063-073-B.
In order to automatically open the RHR to sump valves 1-FCV-063-072-A or 1-FCV-063-073-B, the following three concurrent signals are required:
: 1. RWST Low Level (2 out of 4 level transmitter signals)
: 2. SUMP High-High level (2 out of 4 level transmitter signals)
: 3. Safety Injection (SI) Signal Analysis of the SAFE (System Assurance & Fire Protection Engineering) program shows that there are no fire zones where fire damage could spuriously initiate the necessary logic signals needed to open the containment sump RHR valves 1-FCV-063-072-A or 1-FCV-063-073-B.
The following level transmitters and associated cables are added to the Appendix R program: 1-LT-063-051, 1-LT-063-053, 1-LT-063-180, 1-LT-063-181, 1-LT-063-182, and 1-LT-063-183. RWST Level Transmitters 1-LT-063-050 & -052 are already part of the Appendix R program.
Revise Fire Protection Report (FPR) Part III, Table 3-2, to add 1-LT-063-051, 1-LT-063-053, 1-LT-063-180, 1-LT-063-181, 1-LT-063-182, and 1-LT-063-183.
In addition, an administrative change was made for PER 578677 to add 1-FCV-67-458-A Manual Operator Action (MOA) to FPR Part V, Section 2.4.3. This change does not affect the FPPCRR since the MOA is already addressed in FPR Part VI.
Pages added: III-50a, V-5a Pages revised: i-xvii (Cover data), III-50, & V-5 Pages deleted: None Pages renumbered: None

REVISION

==Title:==
WBN Fire Protection Report                                                                     LOG Revision                                                                                            DATE No.                               DESCRIPTION OF REVISION                                      APPROVED 44    DCN 58387B mitigates the potential occurrence of MSOs 26, 27, and 28 concerns           02-21-2013 associated with decay heat removal during an Appendix R fire. Deficiencies being addressed by this DCN are the spurious operation of Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (TDAFW) level valves (1-LCV-3-172, 1-LCV-3-173, 1-LCV-3-174, 1-LCV-3-175) and Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (MDAFW) level valves (1-LCV-3-148, 1-LCV-3-148A, 1-LCV-3-171, 1-LCV-3-171A, 1-LCV-3-156, 1-LCV-3-156A, 1-LCV-3-164, 1-LCV-3-164A) and pressure valves (1-PCV-3-122, 1-PCV-3-132). Nitrogen is being added as a secondary motive force for these valves since control air cannot be credited during an Appendix R event. In addition cables are being rerouted or fire wrapping installed which allows the required equipment to be credited to be operated from Main Control Room (MCR) or the Aux Building where applicable.
DCN 58387 connects to the low pressure nitrogen system by connecting to isolation valve 1-ISV-77-2961 located in Unit 2, el 737 Air Intake Room (room A12). Isolation Valve 1-ISV-77-2961 and a new nitrogen line are being installed by DCN 58901, a prerequisite to this DCN. Transfer to the nitrogen supply will be accomplished automatically by using check valves and a pressure regulator. The check valves and nitrogen connection will be installed in the control air header upstream of the existing control and signal inputs to the MDAFW and TDAFW valves such that both are supplied from the nitrogen source once the check valves swap position. There will be two nitrogen sub-headers installed off of the new line being utilized for this DCN. One header will be utilized for nitrogen to the MDAFW Pump LCVs /PCVs. The other header will be utilized for nitrogen to the TDAFW Pump LCVs. Solenoid valves (1-FSV-77-2561 & -2562) will be installed in each sub-header so that in case of a failure of a valve actuator diaphragm(s) or positioner(s) the Main Control Room can isolate nitrogen to that failed sub-header by taking handswitch 1-HS-3-164-A (for MDAFW subheader) or handswitch 1-HS-3-174-A (for TDAFW subheader) to close, pull- to-lock. This will energize the appropriate solenoid valve which will close the valve and isolate the affected sub-header to prevent blowdown of the nitrogen tank and limit the amount of nitrogen that could leak into a room. It is intended that the handswitches will not be utilized during an Appendix R event affecting MDAFW LCVS/PCVS and TDAFW LCVs. Manual isolation valves are located on the nitrogen lines to each of the MDAFW LCVs/PCVs and TDAFW LCVs so nitrogen can be

REVISION

==Title:==
WBN Fire Protection Report                                                                    LOG Revision                                                                                           DATE No.                              DESCRIPTION OF REVISION                                      APPROVED isolated locally.
44 (contd) In addition switch 1-XS-77-2561 is being added to disable handswitch 1-HS-3-164A contacts utilized to actuate nitrogen header valve for MDAFW LCVs/PCVs. This is necessary to mitigate the consequences of an Appendix R fire resulting in the short circuit of the handswitch contacts which would inadvertently energize (close) solenoid valve 1-FSV-77-2561.
Disconnected cables 1PL5396B and 1PL5398B are deleted on page VI-218 for DCN 58383B.
Revise Fire Protection Report Part I, Table 1-1 to change the Combustible Load, Fire Severity column to > 180 minutes for room 737.0-A25 in Fire Area 21.
Revise Fire Protection Report Part II, Table 14.10 to add testing/inspection requirement to verify capability to operate 1-FSV-77-2561 & -2562 from the Main Control Room. Also, verify that 1-XS-77-2561 isolates hand switch 1-HS-3-164-A contacts with a continuity check.
Revise Fire Protection Report Part III Table 3-2, to add 1-FSV-77-2561 &
1-FSV-77-2562.
Revise Fire Protection Report Part VI, to add and remove Opertor Actions to the required fire areas. Also, revise cable protection as required.
Pages added: II-73a & 113a Pages revised: i-xvii (Coverdata), I-8, II-143, III-55, VI-114, VI-117, VI-120, VI-121, VI-124, VI-127, VI-130, VI-161, VI-167, VI-168, VI-173, VI-175, VI-186, VI-187, VI-190, VI-193, VI-196, VI-208*, VI-212, VI-217, VI-218, VI-240, VI-241, VI-244, VI-256, VI-263, VI-274, VI-279, VI-284, VI-294, VI-355, VI-372, VI-413, VI-482, VI-485, VI-488, VI-490, VI-493, VI-495, VI-502, VI-505, VI-508, VI-510, VI-524 Pages deleted: None Pages renumbered: None
          *Predecesoor DCN 58389 adds local manual operator actions for 1-LCV-3-148 &
1-ISV-3-826 which are deleted by this DCN on page VI-208.

REVISION

==Title:==
WBN Fire Protection Report                                                                            LOG Revision                                                                                                   DATE No.                                 DESCRIPTION OF REVISION                                           APPROVED 44 (contd)
DCN 58390B mitigates the potential occurrence of MSO 5. To mitigate this risk the non-essential control air header is isolated by the closure of valve 1-FCV-32-110-A followed by venting of the stored air in the non-essential air header into containment.
Venting the stored air in the non-essential control air header is achieved via operation of new hand switch 1-HS-32-112 which opens new solenoid valves 1-XSV-32-112A1,
           -112A2, -112B1, and -112B2. Venting of the stored air will cause the seal leakoff valves 1-FCV-62-9, 1-FCV-62-22, 1-FCV-62-35, and 1-FCV-62-48 to fail open which is their fail safe position.
Existing Containment Isolation valve 1-FCV-32-110-A and existing RCP seal leakoff valves 1-FCV-62-9, 1-FCV-62-22, 1-FCV-62-35, & 1-FCV-62-48 are added to the Safe Shutdown Equipment List Part III Table 3-2.
MCR OAs 1315 and 1322 are added to isolate & vent the non-essential air header to ensure the RCP seal leakoff valves do not close for fires in certain locations. MCR OA 1326 changes the power supply to the new vent valves for a fire in AV-038 (737-A1B).
Revise Fire Protection Report Part II, Table 14.10 to add testing/inspection requirement to verify interlock capability to open valves 1-XSV-32-112A1, -112A2, 112B1, & -112B2 using the associated hand switch in the Main Control Room after isolation of the non-essential control air header by closure of 1-FCV-32-110-A.
Revise Fire Protection Report Part III Table 3-2, to add 1-FCV-32-110-A, 1-FCV-62-9, 1-FCV-62-22, 1-FCV-62-35, & 1-FCV-62-48.
Revise Fire Protection Report Part VI, to add MCR OAs 1315, 1322, and 1326 to the required fire areas.
Pages added: II-73a Pages revised: i-xvii (Coverdata), II-113, II-142, III-23, III-24, III-32, III-41 thru III-57, VI-187, VI-190, VI-193, VI-196, VI-218, VI-241, VI-244, VI-248, VI-256, VI-264, VI-275, VI-294, VI-327, VI-331, VI-335, VI-482, VI-502, VI-505, VI-510 Pages deleted: None Pages renumbered: None

REVISION

==Title:==
WBN Fire Protection Report                                                                     LOG Revision                                                                                            DATE No.                              DESCRIPTION OF REVISION                                       APPROVED 45    DCN 58384B adds Main Control Room capability to bypass the Thermal Barrier               02-28-2013 Cooling (TBC) flow mismatch detection system for a fire in 692-A7. A new train A and a new train B Main Control Room handswitch are electrically connected to logic relay panels in the Auxiliary Instrument Room by cables routed only in the Control Building. Operation of the handswitches will bypass the differential flow leak detection logic from the TBC system. DCN 58384B eliminates the need for five local manual operator actions and adds two Main Control Room operator actions for a fire in 692-A7.
Revise Fire Protection Report Part II, Table 14.10 to add testing/inspection requirement to verify MCR capability to block the differential flow leak detection logic from the TBC system.
Revise Fire Protection Report Part III, Table 3-2, to add 1-FT-70-81A, -81B, -81D, &
          -81E to the Safe Shutdown Equipment List.
Revise Fire Protection Report Part VI, Section 3.8.2.1, to remove Local Manual Operator Actions for 1-FCV-70-87-B, A, -133-A, -134-B, & 1-MTR-70-130-B and add Main Control Room Operator Actions for 1-FDS-70-81E-A & 1-FDS-70-81B-B.
Pages Added: II-73a Pages Revised: i-xvii (Coverdata), II-113, II-143, III-53, & VI-93 Pages Deleted: None Pages Renumbered: None The License Condition Impact Evaluation for this revision follows the revision log for DCN 58901-A.
This change revises the Effective Page Listing and additional pages as noted below:
Page II-73 Revised TIR 14.10.j.a to change a word from tanks to bottles to match Note 1 at bottom of page that refers to bottles instead of tanks.
Page II-73 Revised - Added Table expansion for section 14.10.o to add components for the low pressure nitrogen system.
Page II-113 B.14.10.o Bases for TIR actions. Includes TIR 14.10.o.a.
Page II-143 Revised to add new system 77 component and two notes at the bottom of page.
Page III-55 Table 3-2 Added the following components to the list: 0-LI-77-2701, 0-TANK-77-2701.
Pages Added: None Pages Revised: x, xi, II-73, II-113, II-143, III-55 Pages Deleted: None Pages Renumbered: None

==Title:==
WBN Fire Protection Report                                                                   REVISION LOG Revision                                                                                             DATE No.                                DESCRIPTION OF REVISION                                      APPROVED DCN 58382B mitigates the potential occurrence of MSO 54. MSO Scenario 54 is 46    characterized by spurious Safety Injection/Containment Isolation (SI/CI) signals due      10-10-2013 to multiple redundant transmitters being physically in the same fire zones. A total of 12 pressure transmitters/differential pressure transmitters (PTs/PdTs) require modifications to eliminate the potential for a fire in a single fire zone from damaging redundant transmitters.
MOAs 611 and 613 are eliminated by this DCN.
Revise Fire Protection Report Part I, to update Table 1-1 for rooms 729.0-A8 &
737.0-A5.
Revise Fire Protection Report Part VI, to eliminate MOAs 611 & 613, revise required cable protection, and revise Table 6-2.
Pages added: None Pages revised: i-xvii (Cover data), 1-7, 1-8, VI-35, VI-36, VI-115, VI-118, VI-121, VI-125, VI-145, VI-146, VI-149, VI-159, VI-161, VI-175, VI-176, VI-208, VI-210, VI-212, VI-413, VI-482, VI-483, VI-485, VI-488, VI-497, VI-498, VI-502, VI-503, VI-505, VI-531, VI-532, VI-533, VI-534, VI-534, VI-535, VI-536 Pages deleted: None Pages renumbered: VI-114 through VI-143, Note 2 page VI-143 DCN 58389B resolves sever~1 multiple spurious operation (MSO) scenarios.
Steam generator overfill or overcooling can occur if conditions exist which prevent the tripping of pumps 1-MTR-3-118-A and 1-MTR-3-128-Byand operation of valve 1-FCV-1-18-B to isolate steam to the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (TDAFW) pump. During an Appendix R Fire, MSO events have been identified with the existing control cable for this valve that could result in spurious pump operation or failure to trip the pumps resulting in steam generator overfill or overcooling. In order to resolve this issue a section of cable 1V2631 B is rerouted to avoid rooms 757-A2 and 757-A9.
In doing so, the current valve control and operational functionality will remain unchanged, with all associated protection and control components in the system path maintained in the present locations. A new local MOA trips Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (MDAFW) pump 1-MTR-3-118-A via operation of 1-XS-3-118-A and 1-HS-3-118C-A at panel 1-BD-211-A-A. A new local MOA trips MDAFW pump 1-MTR-3-128-B via operation of 1-XS-3-128-B and 1-HS-3-128C-B at panel-BD-211-B-B. A new local MOA closes valve 1-FCV-1-17-A via operation of 1-XS-1-17-A and 1-HS-1-17C-A at panel-MCC-213-A2-A. Additionally, a new Main Control Room (MCR) operator action (OA) is required to operate 1-HS-1-17A-A which closes valve 1-FCV-1-17-A. A new MCR OA is required to operate 1-HS-1-18A-B which closes valve 1-FCV-1-18-B.
DCN 58389B installs 1 hour fire rated Thermo-Lag on conduit 1PM6350G within room 737-A5 to protect cable 1PM1241G from fire damage which will make SG #3 available for decay heat removal for a fire anywhere in room 737-A5 and eliminate the need to enter the room to perform a local MOA for SG #1 PORV.
DCN 58389B adds components 1-TCV-70-192 & 1-TIS-62-79A to the Fire Safe Shutdown (FSSD) analysis to ensure availability of letdown heat exchanger cooling

==Title:==
WBN Fire Protection Report                                                                          REVISION LOG Revision                                                                                                    DATE No.                                DESCRIPTION OF REVISION                                             APPROVED water for all fire zones where letdown isolation valve closure is not ensured from the 46    MCR. The existing local MOA is currently applied for all fire zones but has now been (contd) revised as it is only required for the following fire zones: 737-A1A, 757-A1, 757-A10, 757-A2, 757-A25, 757-A9, 772-A1, 772-A7, 782-A1, 782-A2, ANN, RA1, RA2, RA3, RA4, RF1, RF2, RI-N, RI-S, RO-E, RQ-N, and RO-S.
Revise Fire Protection Report Part I Table 1-1 to list "1 hour" in the Fire Rated Wraps column for room 737.0-A5 in Fire Area 16.
Revise Fire Protection Report Part III, Table 3-2, to add 1-TCV-70-192 &
1-TIS-62-79A to the Safe Shutdown Equipment List.
Revise Fire Protection Report Part VI to reflect the changes to local MOAs and MCR OAs by DCN 58389.
Pages added: VI-193a Pages revised: i-xvii (Cover data), I-8, III-49, III-54, VI-39, VI-89, VI-93*, VI-145, VI-184, VI-187, VI-190, VI-193, VI-196, VI-206, VI-207, VI-208, VI-212, VI-218, VI-231, VI-235, VI-240, VI-241, VI-244, VI-248, VI-252, VI-256, VI-263, VI-264, VI-275, VI-288, VI-294, VI-307, VI-312, VI-315, VI-319, VI-323, VI-335, VI-340, VI-342, VI-345, VI-367, VI-372, VI-374, VI-482, VI-485, VI-488, VI-490, VI-493, VI-495, VI-502; VI-505, VI-508. VI-510, VI-529 Pages deleted: None Pages renumbered: None
* DCN 58384 deletes the Local MOA on page VI-93 for 1-MTR-70-130-B. If changes to the FPR for DCN 58384 are incorporated before the changes for DCN 58389, no change is required for Local MOA for 1-MTR-70-130-B on page VI-93 for DCN 58389.
EDC 58394 accounted for combustible loading due to designation of some areas as Long Term Equipment Storage Areas.
Revise Fire Protection Report Table 1-1 "Summary Compliance Fire Protection Conformance"
* to designate Fire Area Unit 2 Locations, room 729.5-A17 as "< 5 minutes" for Combustible Load / Fire Severity
* to change Fire Area 16, 737.0-A5 and Fire Area 60, IPS EL 711 to more closely agree with Part VI, Section 2.1 severity indices based on calculated fire load and associated room area
* to provide editorial corrections to elevations for rooms 729.5-A16 &
729.5-A17 Pages deleted: None Pages added: xvii Pages revised: i-xvi (Cover data), I-7, I-8, I-14, I-15, III-63, III-74, VI-iv, VI-xii, VI-169, VI-172, VI-477, VI-522 DCN 59039B is being performed to support the Appendix R analysis re-examination mandated by Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.189 - "Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants," Revision 2. The scope of work for this DCN resolves concerns with a Multiple Spurious Operation (MSO) Scenario involving System 003A (Main Feed Water) and

==Title:==
WBN Fire Protection Report                                                                 REVISION LOG Revision                                                                                           DATE No.                                DESCRIPTION OF REVISION                                    APPROVED System 030 (Ventilation) valves.
46 (contd)
MCR OAs 1350 through 1357 are added for all Auxiliary Building fires to block the Main Feedwater line control valves by operating the Main Control Room controller in manual mode.
Revise Fire Protection Report Part VI, to add MCR OAs 1350 through 1357 for all Auxiliary Building fires.
Pages added: xviii, xix, xx, 190a, 193a Pages revised: i-xviii (Cover data), VI-36, VI-39, VI-42, VI-45, VI-47, VI-50, VI-52.
VI-55, VI-57, VI-59, VI-61, VI-63, VI-65, VI-68, VI-72, VI-76, VI-79, VI-83, VI-86, VI-89, VI-93, VI-96, VI-99, VI-114, VI-118, VI-122, VI-125, VI-128, VI-131, VI-134, VI-136, VI-138, VI-140, VI-142, VI-145, VI-149, VI-161, VI-164, VI-168, VI-174, VI-176, VI-187, VI-190, VI-193, VI-196, VI-200, VI-203, VI-208. VI-210, VI-212, VI-218, VI-231, VI-235, VI-241, VI-244, VI-248, VI-252, VI-256, VI-264, VI-266, VI-270, VI-275, VI-280, VI-284, VI-288, VI-294, VI-308, VI-312, VI-315, VI-319, VI-323, VI-327, VI-331, VI-335, VI-338, VI-340, VI-343, VI-345, VI-347, VI-351, VI-355, VI-359, VI-363, VI-367, VI-372, VI-374, VI-378, VI-382, VI-524 Pages deleted: None Pages renumbered: None Corrective Action documented in the following Problem Evaluation Reports (PER) 47    are incorporated into the Fire Protection Report. The corrective actions associated     06-16-2014 with PER 817451 is considered to be an administrative change to the Fire Protection Report (FPR).
Per 817451 identified administrative errors in Subsection 3.0 of Fire Protection Report, Part VII. Subsection 3.0 of FPR Part VII is revised to correctly state five (not three) evaluations are contained with this subsection. Subsection 5.0 of FPR Part VII is revised to correctly state two (not one) deviations are documented within this subsection. Table 1-1 of FPR Part I is revised to refer to FPR Part VII, Subsection 3.5 for Rooms 713.0-A6 and 713.0-A7, where an evaluation applicable to these rooms can be found.
Pages Added: None Pages Revised: x, xi, xii, xiii, xiv, xvii, I-7, VII-23, VII-46 Pages Deleted: None Pages Renumbered: None Corrective Actions documented in the following Problem Evaluation Reports (PER) are incorporated into the Fire Protection Report. The corrective actions associated with PERs 650153, 707404, 770339, 779303, and 781377 are considered to be administrative changes to the Fire Protection Report (FPR). The corrective action associated with PER 650159 is considered to be an enhancement to the Fire Protection Report (FPR).
Per 650153 identified deficiencies in Initial Assumptions 2 and 3 in Subsection 3.2 of Fire Protection Report, Part III. Initial Assumptions 2 and 3 are revised to provide critical thinking to ensure there is no confusion regarding either assumption.

==Title:==
WBN Fire Protection Report                                                                         REVISION LOG Revision                                                                                                   DATE No.                               DESCRIPTION OF REVISION                                             APPROVED PER 650159 identified deficiencies in that certain Appendix R safe shutdown 47    components could not be confirmed to be periodically tested under a surveillance (contd) program. This is a non-conforming condition. Fire protection Report, Part II, Section 14.0 is revised to add a new Testing and Inspection Requirement (TIR) 14.10.s to periodically cycle local hand switch 1-HS-62-69B-A.
PER 707404 identified a deficiency in Subsection 3.17.3 of Fire Protection Report, Part VI. Subsequent review of Combustible Loading Calculation EPM-DOM-012990 Revision 73 concluded Part VI is correct. The fire severity level of the Additional Equipment Building in Fire Protection Report Part I, Table 1-1 is revised from a <20 minute to a <25 minute severity level.
PER 770339 identified a deficiency in Testing and Inspection Requirement (TIR) 14.10.r of Fire Protection Report, Part II. Fire Protection Report, Part II, Section 14.0 Testing and Inspection Requirement (TIR) 14.10.r is revised to periodically cycle hand switches 1-HS-77-2561A and 1-HS-77-2562A, rather than hand switches 1-HS-3-164A and 1-HS-3-174A.
PER 779303 identified a deficiency in the Major Equipment Credited section of the Fire Hazard Analysis for Fire Area 48 and AV-076 in Fire Protection Report, Part VI.
Fire Protection Report, Part VI is revised to list the Diesel Fire Pumps as available equipment for Fire Area 48 and AV-076.
PER 781377 identified a deficiency in the Local MOA and Repairs table of the Fire Hazard Analysis for Fire Area 14 and AV-036 in Fire Protection Report, Part VI.
Fire Protection Report, Part VI is revised to list the local manual action to start CCS pump 1-MTR-70-38-B for Fire Area 10 (AV-032) and Fire Area 14 (AV-036 and AV-038).
DCN 60853 incorporated Fire Protection Report, Part VII, Subsection 4.4 revisions concerning the fire barrier between the DG Storage Tanks and the DG corridor.
The DCN 60853 FPR insertions are inappropriate information to be included in the Fire Protection Report and are subsequently deleted.
Pages Added: II-73b Pages Revised: x, xi, xii, xiii, xiv, xvii, I-7, II-73a, II-113a, III-5, IV-1, VI-161, VI-187, VI-196, VI-411, VII-3 Pages Deleted: None Pages Renumbered: None DCN 56341-B changes: The Fire Protection Report (FPR) Part II was revised to add Valve 1-FCV-067-146-A to Table 14.10 (Fire Safe Shutdown Equipment) and to indicate the FSSD condition is now Close.
Pages Added: None Pages Revised: II-142 Pages Deleted: None Pages Renumbered: None

==Title:==
WBN Fire Protection Report                                                                    REVISION LOG Revision                                                                                              DATE No.                                 DESCRIPTION OF REVISION                                      APPROVED DCN 59151 removes the TSC support areas (NRC Office, Corridor, Conference 47    Room) form configuration control with restrictions. This allows for the TSC and the (contd) support areas to be renovated without the need for a DCN. The current renovation has changed has changed the combustible load within the TSC and the support areas causing the combustible load fire severity times to change. Also, DCN 59151 adds additional lighting circuits to the TSC and its support areas. The Fire Protection Report (FPR) is being revised to address PER 466327. This PER addresses a documentation discrepancy change only to make the FPR consistent with TVA drawing 47W240-7.
Revise Fire Protection Report Part I, Table 1-1 Summary Compliance Fire Protection Conformance to reflect the changes in the Combustible Load, Fire Severity in the TSC and support areas.
Revise Fire Protection Report Part VI, Fire Hazards Analysis, 3.53.19 Rooms 755.0-C13, C19, and C20 to correct an incorrect fire severity level within room 755.0-C19 Corridor from Insignificant to Low.
The FPR Part VI, Section 3.53.14 and 3.53.18 are being revised to delete the walls and door as regulatory barriers.
Pages Deleted: None Pages Added: None Pages Revised: i through xvi, I-12, VI-400, VI-405, VI-407 PER 767509 identifies a discrepancy between a statement in the FSAR, and actual plant configuration. PER 767509 was identified as a result of a review of PER 741744, which documented the same problem on WBN Plant Unit 2. The FSAR Section 6.1.2, Organic Materials, states in part, Organic materials within the primary containment are identified and quantified according to the following categories:
electrical insulation, surface coatings, miscellaneous ALARA (catch basin) containment and shielding (lead blankets), ice condenser equipment, and identification tags for valves and instruments. There is no wood or asphalt inside the containment. Contrary to this statement, wood is used as a framing material in the End Wall Doors for the ice condenser, and as an insulating material in the Personnel Access Doors located in the End Wall Doors.
Combustible Loading Calculation EPMDOM012990 R73 did not contain this wood for Fire Area 61, and thus this load had previously not been tabulated.
EPMDOM012990 R74 has been performed due to the increase in load, with the results showing no increase in the fire severity index of moderate.
The Fire Protection Report (FPR) Part I, Table 1 - Revision 46, incorrectly listed the fire severity as <90 minutes for the Primary Containment portion of Fire Area 61.
This should have been listed as <65 minutes based on the existing area fuel load of 84,413 BTU/ft2.      The fuel load for this area was increased by 230 BTU/ft2, due to the wood that was found, which did not increase this time. A revision to the FPR Part I, Table I, is being issued to correct this legacy issue. The fire severity index of moderate was not affected; therefore, there are no impacts from this change.
The FPR Part VI, section 3.66.2, did not list wood as a combustible for fire loading.

==Title:==
WBN Fire Protection Report                                                                 REVISION LOG Revision                                                                                           DATE No.                               DESCRIPTION OF REVISION                                     APPROVED A revision to section 3.66.2 is being issued to list the wood as a combustible located 47    in Primary Containment.
(contd)
An FSAR change package has been initiated and will be issued to correct the statement in section 6.1.2 to show that there is wood in containment.
The PER was evaluated by the Functional Evaluation performed for PER 767509 for non-fire protection related effects. No other impacts were identified.
Pages Added: None Pages Revised: i-xx (coverdata), I-14, VI-478 Pages Deleted: None Pages Renumbered: None The DCN 59234 and PIC 62944 modification replaces the existing outdoor nitrogen skid which contains both the HP and LP nitrogen systems with separate HP and LP systems. The LP system will include a new 9,000 gallon tank for greater storage capacity. This tank will replace the 3,000 gallon tank. The HP system will consist of two (2) nitrogen tube trailer units. The LP system will be designed to support the future addition of pumps and equipment necessary to produce HP nitrogen from that which is stored in the 9,000 gallon tank. The replacement systems will contain the following new components:
* New tube trailer units to supply the HP nitrogen portion of the system
* New storage tank and required pressure build-up system to supply the LP nitrogen portion The FPR is required to be updated to address the new tank level, pressure and flow requirements for the specific tank changes noted above. The DCN 59234A FPR Change package is included in DCN 59234A and revises the following:
Revise Fire Protection Report Part II, Testing and Inspection Requirements (TIR)
Item No. 14.10.o and Note 3 (p.II-73)
Revise Fire Protection Report Part II, TIR Bases B.14.10.o (p.II-113)
Revise Fire Protection Report Part II Table 14.10 (Fire Safe Shutdown Equipment)
Notes 2 & 3 (p.II-143)
Revise Fire Protection Report Part III Table 3-2 (Equipment Analyzed for Fire Safe Shutdown) Page 15 of 17 (p.III-55)
Pages Added: None Pages Revised: i-xx (Coverdata), II-73, II-113, II-143, III-55 Pages Deleted: None Pages Renumbered: None DCN 55250 involves System 257, Closed-Circuit Television & Security, which is not an Appendix R System. Various components are being added to the Secondary Alarm Station (SAS) Room (692.0-C12) increasing the Combustible Load and changing the Combustible Load Fire Severity from <90 minutes to <105 minutes.
The Fire Area 48 Fire Severity does not change due to this SAS Room Combustible Loading Change.
Pages Added:      None

==Title:==
WBN Fire Protection Report                                                                 REVISION LOG Revision                                                                                           DATE No.                                   DESCRIPTION OF REVISION                                 APPROVED Pages Revised: Cover, Revision Log, x, I-11 Pages Deleted: None 47 Pages Renumbered: None (contd)
DCN 62864 Changes:
The Fire Protection Report (FPR) Part VI was revised to resolve a problem identified in PER 809167 where it is postulated (via Appendix R analysis) that there is a potential fire induced failure of both Unit 1 Chemical and Volume Control System (System 062) centrifugal charging pumps (CCPs) (1-PMP-62-108-A and 1-PMP-62-104-B) due a fire in either auxiliary building room 737.0-A1 (general area for elevation 737.0) or 757.0-A2 (6.9 Kv and Shutdown Board Room A).
Pages Added: None Pages Revised: VI-114, VI-117, VI-135, VI-187, VI-190, VI-193a, VI-241, VI-256, VI-275, VI-294, VI-312 & VI-340 Pages Deleted: None Pages Renumbered: None
: 1. Corrective Action #2 documented in Problem Evaluation Reports (PER) 786848 is incorporated into the Fire Protection Report.
PER 786848 documented NRC observations made during the 2013 Fire Protection Triennial Inspection that upon entering Operating Requirement (OR) 14.2.1.a, With two electric pumps operable and the diesel driven fire pump inoperable, the Diesel Fire Pump (DFP) could be out of service for 7 days without any compensatory measures. For plant areas where Fire Protection Report (FPR)
Part VI credits only the DFP or the DFP plus one Electric Driven Fire Pump (EDFP), entry into OR 14.2.1.a would leave the plant with only one or no fire pumps, which could challenge WBNs ability to successfully combat the fire.
Seven fire areas were identified as being vulnerable to the condition. Subsequent detailed evaluations in the Significance Evaluation for PER 786848 concluded the condition is only applicable to two fire areas in Analysis Volumes AV-026 and AV-038, where the DFP is the only fire pump credited in FPR Part VI. In these two areas, an EDFP cannot be used as a source of water for the Fire Protection (FP) suppression systems. It was determined that OR 14.2.1.a should be revised to require initiation of fire watches in the two fire areas of AV-026 and AV-038, to compensate for the unavailable fire pumps. The remaining fire areas from the original seven identified above, were determined to have at least one EDFP available that can deliver the required flow and pressure for the FP suppression systems for those specific areas. Enhancement measures are not required for those five areas. During the preparation of this revision, it was noted that FPR Part VI, Analysis Volume AV-068 does not list EDFP 2-MTR-26-9-A as available, when in fact it is and could be credited.
FPR, Part II, Fire Protection Plan, Sections 4.0, References, and 14.0, Fire Protection Systems and Features Operating Requirements are revised.
Subsection 4.0 is revised to add Reference 4.2.58, PER 786848 Significance Evaluation. Subsection 14.2.1 and its basis section is revised to add a fire watch enhancement measure to the OR 14.2.1.a for those fire areas where only the DFP is credited. FPR Part VI,

==Title:==
WBN Fire Protection Report                                                                  REVISION LOG Revision                                                                                            DATE No.                                 DESCRIPTION OF REVISION                                    APPROVED Analysis Volume AV-068 Table of Major Equipment Credited, is revised to list 47 (contd)     EDFP 2-MTR-26-9-A as a credited fire pump.
: 2. Equivalent Change Technical Evaluation EQV 63015 approved the equivalency of sealed maintenance-free battery UPG UB6240 as a replacement Appendix R Emergency Battery Light (EBL) battery. FPR Part II is updated to reflect a new replacement battery for Emergency Battery Lighting (EBL) units in the Unit 1 Annulus Area.
FPR Part II, Subsection B.14.9.c, basis for Testing and Inspection Requirement (TIR) for inaccessible EBLs is revised to add replacement battery UPG UB6240 as an acceptable replacement battery for applicable EBLs. Environmental conditions, service life, and replacement frequency is also added for the new replacement battery.
: 3. SR 871754 identified SQN 2014 Triennial Fire Protection Inspection concerns regarding impacts upon the Fire Safe Shutdown (FSSD) analysis whenever a Pressurizer PORV is isolated by closing its block valve in accordance with Technical Specifications 3.4.11 (PORV experiencing excessive seat leakage).
Closing the normally open block valve may affect the FSSD analysis in plant areas where the block valve is credited to be open and is subject to fire damage that can prevent it from re-opening from the main control room and at it auxiliary switch locations. FPR Part II is revised to add a new Operating Requirement 14.10.4 that with any Pressurizer PORV Block Valve closed in Modes 1-3, an enhancement action (fire watch) is implemented for those fire areas where the affected Train B Pressurizer PORV Block Valve is credited and is not capable of being re-opened, if placed in the CLOSED position.
Pages Added: II-80a Pages Revised: x, xi, II-5, II-51, II-53, II-59. II-79, II-80, II-109, II-111, VI-354 Pages Deleted: None Pages Renumbered: None 48    DCN 53413-A changes: The Fire Protection Report (FPR) Part II, Part III, Part IV and Part VI were revised to delete Component Cooling System Pump 2B-B as a                10/10/14 Credited Appendix R Component for Unit 1. The FPR Part VI was revised to reflect the powered and variable position of 1-FCV-70-153-B and 2-FCV-70-153-B. The Main Control Room Operator Actions will also be deleted for CCS Pump 2B-B and ten new MOAs will reposition various valves for Appendix R fires.
PIC 61303 to DCN 53413 made required changes to include 2-FCV-70-153-B in the fire protection report in addition to corrections to the previously issued changes.
These corrections include:
Page VI-116 - Correct the Key for 1-MTR-62-108-A from 1 to 1A Page VI-117 - Add 1-FCV-70-153-B handwheel action previous omitted Page VI-119 - Correct the Key for 1-MTR-62-108-A from 1 to 1A Page VI-120 - Add 1-FCV-70-153-B handwheel action previous omitted Page VI-185 - Correct the Keys for 0-MTR-70-51-S and 1-MTR-70-38-B from 1 to 1B Page VI-412 - Delete the action for 2-BD-212-B1-B related to MOA 674 deletion

==Title:==
WBN Fire Protection Report                                                                   REVISION LOG Revision                                                                                             DATE No.                                 DESCRIPTION OF REVISION                                     APPROVED 48     Pages Added: None (contd) Pages Revised: Coverdata, II-72, II-112, II-143, III-51, III-54, IV-4, VI-113, 114, 116, 117, 118, 119, 121, 121, 124, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 192, 195, 198, 202, 217, 218, 230, 239, 247, 278, 283, 293, 296, 298, 300, 303, 307, 311, 314, 318, 341, 346, 353, 359, 362, 371, 378, 412 Pages Deleted: None Pages Renumbered: None 49     DCN 52052A replaces the obsolete fire detection equipment in Main Control Room (MCR) panel 0-M-29 (0-CMPT-013-M029). The new equipment built by the TVAN Computer Engineering Group (CEG) interfaces with the existing fire detection field equipment. The equipment monitors fire detection information from field panels and visibly and audibly annunciates alarms to the operator in the MCR and provides selected outputs to field panels.
Revise Fire Protection Report Part II, paragraph 12.5 to reflect the replacement of a traditional cathode ray tube (CRT) monitor with an LCD monitor. The generic description of monitor is used.
Revise Fire Protection Report Part X, Section 3.3, Table NFPA 72D-1975, Code Sections 1213, 2022, 2023, 2212, 2223, 2520 and 4111 to reflect that the fire alarm console in the MCR will no longer be a UL listed device. An alternative method to meet the code compliance proves that the new system complies with all the applicable sections of the UL listing and NFPA 72D-1975.
Pages Added: None Pages Revised: i-xx (Coverdata), II-33, II-34, X-54, X-56, X-57, X-59, X-62 and X-63 Pages Deleted: None Pages Renumbered: None DCN 59675 develops plant modifications and design documentation changes necessary to support the installation of two (2) new 225 kVA DGs on the Auxiliary Building (AB) roof and provide these DGs with environmental protection including design to NUREG 1.76 for tornado wind and missile protection. The new 225 kVA DGs are installed in their own manufacturer provided enclosures (skids) and these DG skids will be located in new TVA fabricated hardened steel enclosures (i.e.,
rooms) approximately 16 wide by 21 long by 13 high on the AB roof elevation (El.)
786.0. The new 16x21 DG rooms will be designated as 225 kVA DG Room B (786.0-A5) and Room A (786.0-A6) and each will become part of existing Fire Area (FA)-47. The DCN will also provide associated fuse/distribution panels and switchgear within the AB in the vicinity of the Vital Battery Charger transfer switches and will provide the interconnecting control and power cabling, fuel supply, transfer pumps and piping, fire detection and fire suppression water supply.
DCN 59675A FPR Change revises the following pages*:
I-10: Changed fire severity in FA-33 I-11: Added new rooms to Table 1-1
            *Part II is not revised for Detection impacts since these rooms/equipment is not required for Appendix R, nor do they support protection of safety related equipment Figure II-32: Revised to add rooms to El 786 and Room Schedule table

==Title:==
WBN Fire Protection Report                                                                   REVISION LOG Revision                                                                                             DATE No.                                DESCRIPTION OF REVISION                                      APPROVED III-69: Added new DG rooms to Fire Area 47 VI-viii: Added new DG rooms to Fire Area 47 49    VI-308: Added room 786.0-A5 as partial ceiling barrier (contd) VI-368: Added room 786.0-A6 as partial ceiling barrier VI-379: Updated information items in Section 3.52 for Fire Area 47 VI-380: Updated information items in Section 3.52 for Fire Area 47 VIII-25: Added info to Section D.2 VIII-33: Added info to Section D.4.g VIII-64: Added info to Section F.9 VIII-66: Added info to Section F10 VIII-67: Added info to Section F.10.b Pages Added: None Pages Revised: i-xviii (Coverdata), I-10, I-11, III-69, VI-viii, VI-308, VI-368, VI-379, VI-380, VIII-25, VIII-33, VIII-64, VIII-66, VIII-67 Pages Deleted: None Pages Renumbered: None EDC 59725 Changes:
This EDC issues calculation MDQ00103220120188 R5 and R6 *Pressure Drop Calculation for the Nitrogen Supply Piping to AFW Pressure and Level Control Valves.
EDC 59725 also issues calculation MDQ0000772012000033 R9- AFW LCVs and PCVs Backup Nitrogen Supply Requirements that establishes the quantity of nitrogen required to operate the control valves and determines the minimum required level of liquid nitrogen tank to support an Appendix R event. FPR requires revision since it provides nitrogen tank level and flow data.
The following sections of FPR are affected: Part II, Testing and Inspection Requirements (TIR); page II-73, II-113 and II-143.
Pages Added: None Pages Revised: i-xxi (cover data), ll-73, II-113 and ll-143 Pages Deleted: None Pages Renumbered: None DCN 62860 modifies the Auxiliary Control Air System (ACAS) dryers' control logic such that the dryer will only be in the regenerate (purge) and pressurization cycle only when the associated ACAS compressor is running.
Revised Part III to change the discussion on the operation of ACAS in section 4.14.
Pages revised: i-xx (cover data) and III-22 Pages added: None Pages deleted: None Pages Renumbered: None DCN 63030 installs Beyond Design Basis Event (BDBE) FLEX strategy High Pressure and Intermediate Pressure Pumps to be utilized to provide make up cooling water to various end users after a BDBE. DCN 63030 increases the combustible fire

==Title:==
WBN Fire Protection Report                                                                        REVISION LOG Revision                                                                                                  DATE No.                                    DESCRIPTION OF REVISION                                       APPROVED load severity for rooms 737.0-A3, 737.0-A12, and 692.0-A21 in Part I Table 1-1. The 49    fire severity index remains as Low for 737.0-A3 and changes from Insignificant to (contd) Low for 737.0-A12. Part I Table 1-1 is also revised for room 737.0-A9 to include a combustible load, fire severity which was not previously incorporated.
Revise Fire Protection Report Part I, to update Table 1-1 combustible load fire severity for rooms 737.0-A3, 737.0-A9, 737.0-A12, and 692.0-A21.
Revise Fire Protection Report Part VI, to revise the Fire Loading description for rooms 737.0-A3 and 737.0-A12 and the Fire Severity classification from Insignificant to Low for room 737.0-A12.
Pages added: None Pages revised: i-xx (Coverdata), I-8, I-15, VI-197, VI-201 Pages deleted: None Pages renumbered: None 50    DCN 63107 revises Fire Protection Report Part II, III, & VI to resolve Condition Report 845185 where a new Westinghouse calculation indicates there is less time to prevent Pressurizer (PZR) overfill by performing operator manual actions (OMA) for an Appendix R fire than originally determined.
DCN 64031 includes combustible load changes associated with the installation of a Satellite Router in the Relay Room (755-C13) and a Satellite Phone and Voice Siren Activation Electronic Equipment in the Main Control Room (MCR) (755-C12). Both rooms are located in Fire Area 48. This revision performs the Corrective Action for Condition Report 1014797.
DCN 65585 is a Documentation Only DCN to perform Corrective Actions for the following Condition Reports related to Appendix R: 946764, 987663, 997785, 1007678, 966670, 966677, 1006428, 945722, 999926, 1050736.
Additionally, this revision incorporates the changes associated with DCN 65325, PORV and RCP Seal Injection Cable Reroutes & Protection, and DCN 65326, CARF Cable Reroutes and Protection.
Pages added: II-113b, VI-187A, VI-196A, Pages revised: i-xxi (Coverdata), I-8, I-9, I-10, I-12, I-15, II-73b, II-121, II-142, II-143, III-47, III-48, III-49, III-50, III-57, III-58, III-64, III-65, IV-3, VI-35, VI-36, VI-114, VI-117, VI-120, VI-124, VI-145, VI-184, VI-186, VI-187, VI-190, VI-193, VI-194, VI-196, VI-217, VI-229, VI-230, VI-231, VI-239, VI-240, VI-241, VI-243, VI-244, VI-248, VI-259, VI-261, VI-274, VI-304, VI-307, VI-312, VI-315, VI-327, VI-331, VI-411, VI-413, VI-482, VI-485, VI-488, VI-502, VI-505, VI-531, VII-8 Pages deleted: None

==Title:==
WBN Fire Protection Report                                                                      REVISION LOG Revision                                                                                                DATE No.                                DESCRIPTION OF REVISION                                         APPROVED 51    DCN 64237 re-issues the Fire Protection Report for Dual Unit Operation as approved by NRC Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report (SSER) 29. This is a complete re-issuance of the Fire Protection Report. Note that revision bars in Part VI indicate        12/02/15 changes from the submittal to the NRC and are only included for use by the NRC.
52    CR 1156843 documents the need to revise the Fire Protection Report (FPR) for equipment that is going to be removed from the in-service testing (IST) program.            07/07/16 FPR sections 14.10.e, 14.10.f, and 14.10.q took credit for equipment testing in the IST program.
The FPR Bases for Testing and Inspection Requirements (TIR) B.14.10.e is revised to remove all references to the "in-service testing" and "augmented in-service testing" programs for the Thermal Barrier Booster Pumps (1A, 1B, 2A, & 2B).
The FPR Bases for TIR B.14.10.f is revised to remove all reference to the "augmented in-service testing program" for the RCS Pressurizer Spray Valves.
The FPR Bases for TIR B.14.10.q is revised to remove all reference to the augmented in-service testing program for the RCP Seal Leakoff Valves.
The FPR TIR 14.10.x and the Bases for TIR B.14.10.x is revised to remove reference of an antiquated "Section XI testing" program and to add reference to the IST program. This is a nomenclature change only.
DCN 55945 (PIC 66186) adds fire protection compensatory measures required during the use of CSST A or B as a qualified offsite power source while either CSST C or D is out of service for maintenance.
This revision resolves CRs 1044525 and 1117249 associated with the description of the responsibilities of the Fire Operations Supervisor and Fire Marshal in Part II.
This revision makes the following administrative changes:
x Adds the Table 3-3 header to pages III-76 thru -89.
x Deletes 2-ISD-31-1001 from VI-8.
x Adds the Analysis Volume header for AV-001, AV-002, & AV-003 Pages added: III-95 Pages revised: i-xii (Coverdata), II-1 thru II-164, III-1 thru III-94, and VI-1 thru VI-206 Pages deleted: II-165 & II-166

Revision Log

==Title:==
WBN Fire Protection Report Revision                                Description of Revision                                               Date No.                                                                                                     Approved 53          DCN 64181 changes:                                                                         09/07/17 Fire Protection Report (FPR) Part VI was revised to remove duplicate information contained within tables that is also located in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
Refer to EDQ00099920090016 for equipment and flowpaths used to achieve safe shutdown for areas as noted in Part VI. Additionally, the table of contents from Part VI was revised to note the new page numbers of each section and Section 3.67.2 was revised to reference Part VII Section 2.9.22.
Section 2.9.22 was added to Part VII to address cable separation distance exceptions taken from TVA letter CNL-16-108 and issued by NRC docket 50-390.
The content of CNL-16-108, the licensing amendment requested by CNL-16-108, and the evaluation of the exceptions therein were prepared, approved, and issued outside of DCN 64181 and all PIC changes. DCN 64181 does not alter the wording, methodology, or conlcusions of the evaluation contained within Section 2.9.22 from that approved by NRC docket 50-390. The addition of this deviation required re-numbering of pages in Part VII.
Table I-1 of Part I was revised to reference the deviation located in Section 2.9.22 of Part VII discussed above.
The FPR list of effective pages was revised to combine Part VI due to the duplicate information removed. Revisions of each Part that is changed by this revision of the FPR are also updated.
Additionally, DCN 64181 incorporates changes to remove the 3M-M20C (Interam) fire wrap, which is used as a radiant energy shield (RES) on several conduits in order to meet the Appendix R separation criteria.
x The existing RES on cables 1PM590D, 1PM594D, and 1V5663B within the Shield Wall will be removed and the cables will remain in service. These cables are acceptable where currently installed without RES due to the issued deviation from separation requirements in Part VII Section 2.9.22.
x   Cables 1V1207A and 1V5492B will be abandoned-in-place and new cables, with numbers 1V1210A and 1V5499B, respectively, will be routed in new conduit. The new routes pass through the same analyzed volumes and meet physical separation requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix R allowing the removal of the fire wrap from the old routes and preventing the need to wrap the new routes within containment inside of the crane wall.
x   Cables 1PM777E, 1PM595E, 1PM783E, and 1PM784E will be abandoned-in-place and new cables with numbers 1PM788E, 1PM795E, 1PM789E, and 1PM796E, respectively, will be routed in conduit primarily outside of the crane wall, including in the Annulus of WBN U1 Containment.
Separation requirement deviations noted in Part VII Section 2.9.22 and the removal/replacement of cables will allow for the removal of fire wrap within containment. With these changes, 10 CFR 50 Appendix R physical separation requirements will be met within the containment and allow for the removal of all 3M-M20C (Interam) fire wrap inside the crane wall. Area ANN outside the crane wall will TVA 10534 [8-1995]

Revision Log

==Title:==
WBN Fire Protection Report Revision                                Description of Revision                                                 Date No.                                                                                                       Approved require fire wrap to meet the separation criteria of 10 CFR 50 Appendix R; in this           09/07/17 53          space 3M E-54C will be used.
(cont)
DCN 65523 changes:
DCN 65523 installs an in-line analog flow meter, which will more accurately represent the total nitrogen flow being delivered to the sites end devices. FPR Part II B.14.10.o is revised to change the description of the method in which nitrogen flow is measured.
This FPR change also removes the requirement for a fire watch in room 757-A1 when Pressurizer Block Valve 1-FCV-68-332-B is closed. The SAFE analysis was reviewed for the fire watch requirements related to 14.10.4 because of CR 1250743, Missed Fire Watch per OR 14.10.4 for 1-FCV-68-332, and showed that a resolution was applied in the Dual Unit SAFE analysis that made the fire watch unnecessary.
The WBN Fire Watch Time Study referenced in Section 13.1 is added to the list of references.
CR 1203520 documents the need to revise the Fire Protection Report (FPR) Part II Section 8.4 to replace reference to the Nuclear Experience Review (NER) Program.
The Fire Protection Report (FPR) Part II Testing Inspection Requirements (TIR) lists a frequency of 18 months for several 14.10 Operating Requirements (OR). The bases for the OR 14.10 items with an 18 month frequency explain the intent is to be performed every refueling outage. The TIRs are revised to list refueling outage as the frequency instead of 18 months. This resolves CR 1211263.
The Fire Protection Reports Part VI Fire Hazard Analysis is revised to list lead blankets as a type of combustible material to match the areas listed in calculation EPMDOM012990 for CR 1095399.
DCN 65362 changes:
DCN 65362A upgrades the control hardware of the Main Feedwater Regulating Valves (MFRVs) and Main Feedwater Regulating Bypass Valves (MFRBVs) to eliminate and harden Single Point Vulnerabilities (SPVs). The FPR Part III Table 3-2 is revised to reflect new Flow Solenoid Valves to eliminate the SPVs for the MFRBVs.
DCN 65413 changes:
DCN 65413 reroutes and protects cables and conduit associated with the Volume Control Tank (VCT) isolation valves. The changes shown in the DCN to Part VI are not incorporated because DCN 64181 revised Part VI to remove duplicate information contained within tables that is also located in calculation EDQ00099920090016 Pages Added: VII-313 thru -320 Pages Revised/Replaced: i-xii (Coverdata), Part I, Part II, Part III, Part VI, Part VII Pages Deleted: VI-395 thru VI-1389 TVA 10534 [8-1995]

Revision Log

==Title:==
WBN Fire Protection Report Revision                                Description of Revision                                               Date No.                                                                                                     Approved 54          DCN 66338A changes:                                                                         
DCN 66338A will replace the nonsafety-related TVA-Computer Engineering Group (CEG) Multiplex system 013 fire detection equipment installed by DCN 52052 in the control building main control room (MCR) 755.0-C12, fire area 48, panel 0-M-29 (0-CMPT-013-M029). This modification is required because the equipment installed by DCN 52052 was not Underwriters Laboratories (UL) Certified. DCN 66338 will be installing UL Certified commercial grade off-the-shelf components designed, procured, and assembled by TVA CEG that will interface with the existing fire detection field equipment.
Revise Fire Protection Report Part II to add Reference 4.2.81 and revise Part X, Section 4.0, Table NFPA 72D-1975, Code Sections 1213, 2022, 2023, 2212, 2470, 2520, and 2530 to reflect the fire alarm console in the MCR will be using UL Certified components.
DEC 66570 changes:
DEC 66570 re-installs a 2nd a fire damper in the wall between 690.0-A26 (U2 TDAFW Pump Room) and 692.0-A1 (Corridor).
Unit 2 TDAFW Pump room was originally constructed with two architectural air inlet openings. One of the original fire dampers was removed during Unit 1 Startup Testing and the remaining hole was filled with concrete patch. This opening was not recreated during Unit 2 completion and is being re-created by DEC 66570.
This change improves ventilation in the Unit 2 TDAFW Pump Room and makes the Unit 1 and Unit 2 TDAFW Pump Rooms architecturally identical.
This revision also resolves CRs 1277637 and 1326096. CR 1277637 makes a correction to the doors listed in Part II B.14.8 to align with Table 14.8.1. CR 1326096 makes a clarification to Part II B.14.8.1.
FPR parts II and VI are revised to list this new fire damper.
DCN 66251 changes:
DCN 66251 upgrades the control hardware of the Main Feedwater Regulating Valves (MFRVs) and Main Feedwater Regulating Bypass Valves (MFRBVs) to eliminate and harden Single Point Vulnerabilities (SPVs). The FPR Part III Table 3-2 is revised to reflect new Flow Solenoid Valves to eliminate the SPVs for the MFRBVs.
Pages Added: none Pages Revised/Replaced: i-xii (Coverdata), Part II, Part III, Part VI, Part X Pages Deleted: none TVA 10534 [8-1995]

Revision Log

==Title:==
WBN Fire Protection Report Revision                                 Description of Revision                                                Date No.                                                                                                       Approved 55          CRs 1357719, 1366067 & 1371030 changes:                                                      01-21-2019 CR 1357719:
While working WO 119192289 for 0-PNL-013-L611 it was identified that the number of smoke detectors listed for Zones 374, 375, 459, and 460 is incorrect in FPR Part II.
CR 1366067:
During review of the Fire Protection Report (FPR) for CR 1362833, it was identified that FPR Part VII, Section 2.9.13.2.b, incorrectly describes the fire severity for the Unit 2 Reactor Instrument Room (2RIR) as Insignificant. As a result, CR 1366067 was initiated with the action to verify and align the FPR to reflect the correct fire severity level in accordance with the combustible loading calculation EPMDOM012990.
CR 1371030:
Door A049 to the Boric Acid Evaporator Package Room B (692.0-A29) and A050 to Room A (692.0-A30) are described in the Fire Protection Report (FPR), Part VII, Section 2.9.1.2.a as having heavy duty hollow metal doors similar to fire rated doors.
These doors are metal, but both have ventilation louvers in them, which is very different from a fire rated door.
DC 100205 changes:
DC 100205 swaps Long Term Equipment Storage Items 2 (Scaffold Storage Area) and 7 (Hot Valve Cage) on 0-46W602-1. The current Fire Protection Report includes a statement, in Part VI for the Fire Loading associated with 692.0-A14, that refers to the Hot Valve Cage and its insignificant amount of combustibles. This sentence is being removed by this FPR revision. No other changers are being made by this revision. The Fire Loading discussion for 692.0-A18 does not require revision as the insignificant amounts of combustibles being added to this room does not warrant any additional discussion in Part VI.
DCN 59007 changes:
DCN 59007 implements a replacement of the System 003 Auxiliary Feedwater air operated pressure control discharge valves (1-PCV-003-0122-A and -0132-B) with cavitating venturis that will continue to provide runout protection for the Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps (MDAFWPs) 1A-A and 1B-B. Both 1-PCV-003-0122-A and -0132-B and related components (i.e., PDICs) are listed in FPR Part II, Part III, Part IV and Part VII. Reference to these components is removed. The AFW control valves backup nitrogen supply requirements are updated in FPR Part II based on revisions to calculations MDQ00103220120188 and MDQ0000772012000033.
Pages Added: none Pages Revised/Replaced: i-xii (Coverdata), I-24, II-81, II-82, II-125, II-126 II-139, II-114, III-53, III-54, IV-3, VI-110, VI-386, VII-24, VII-65, VII-67, VII-68, VII-171, and VII-172 Pages Deleted: none TVA 10534 [8-1995]

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79$>@

Revision Log

==Title:==
WBN Fire Protection Report Revision                              Description of Revision                                               Date No.                                                                                                   Approved 57         DCP WBN-18-126:                                                                           
DCP WBN-18-126 installs 3M 1-hr fire wrap to protect cables 2V4028B, 2V4029B, 2V4010B and 2V4011B within 480V Transformer Room 1-B, Fire Area 36, Room 772.0-A5, Analysis Volume AV-063. The design function of these cables is to energize Train B solenoids in order to close select SG PORVs for Unit 2. The protection provided for these cables precludes potential hot shorts that would prevent the opening SG PORVs required for FSSD in Key 12. As a result of this modification, OMA 1016 is no longer required for a fire in 772.0-A5. FPR Parts I, VI, and VII are revised to reflect these changes. Part VI Section 3.42.2.1 was also revised to indicate Unit 2 cables are fire wrapped in 772.0-A5.
The FPR change in DCP WBN-18-126 missed deleting reference to Section 8.3.62 in FPR Part I and VI for 772.0-A5 due to the deletion of OMA 1016 for a fire in 772.0-A5. This editorial change is incorporated in this revision.
CR 1590744:
CR 1590744 identified an administrative error on FPR Part II Table 14.1 for the noun name description for detection zones in the Additional Equipment Buildings. Table 14.1 is updated to align with existing plant drawings 0-47W611-13-2 &-3 &
0-47W240-12.
Pages Added: None Pages Revised/Replaced*: i-xii (Coverdata), I-15, II-138, VI-211, VI-212, VII-266, VII-306 Pages Deleted: VII-320 (due to deletion of Section 8.3.39)
                   *Note that all pages in FPR Parts I, VI, and VII are replaced to update the revision level in the header.
TVA 10534 [8-1995]

Revision Log

==Title:==
WBN Fire Protection Report Revision                                 Description of Revision                                                 Date No.                                                                                                        Approved 58         DCN 63820:                                                                                    
DCN 63820 installed a new ACAS C-S swing skid in the Miscellaneous Equipment Room (757.0-A10) (also known as the Reverse Osmosis Room) with capability to manually align to either of the existing ACAS A or B trains. FPR Part II is updated to remove the TIR requirement 14.10.k and basis B 14.10.k to verify functionality of the ACAS compressors due to the redundant nature of this TIR with respect to Technical Specification 3.7.4 to ensure one train of ACAS is operable. This will incorporate needed changes to satisfy the resolutions of CR 1435452. This revision also incorporates the needed change for CR 1683974 which identified the FPR change in DCN 63820 missed removing the A and B Auxiliary Control Air Compressor (0-MTR-32-60 and 0-MTR-32-86) from FPR Part II Table 14.10 corresponding to TIR 14.10.k. FPR Part III (Section 4.14 ACAS and Table 3-2 Safe Shutdown Equipment List) is updated to list the Normal Station Air Compressor Motors and associated motor cooler ERCW header supply valves. FPR Part VI Section 3.31.1 FHA Room 757.0-A10 Fire Loading is updated to note the combustibles associated with the compressor skid.
DCP 66650:
DCP 66650 Rev. 0 implements a replacement of the system 003 auxiliary feedwater air operated pressure control discharge valves (2-PCV-003-0122-A and -0132-B) and associated control instrumentation with cavitating venturis that will continue to provide runout protection for the motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps (MDAFWPs) 2A-A and 2B-B. Both 2-PCV-003-0122-A and -0132-B and related components (i.e., PDICs) are listed in FPR Part II, Part III, Part IV, and Part VII.
References to these components are removed. The AFW control valves backup nitrogen supply requirements are updated in FPR Part II to reference calculations MDQ00103220120188 and MDQ0000772012000033 directly for specific pressure, level, and flow information.
WBN-18-264:
WBN-18-264 upgrades the WBN 2 main feedwater pump turbine (MFPT) controls with a digital control system. As the WBN units have distributed control systems (DCS) that use Foxboro equipment, the turbine controls will use similar hardware for this design.
As a result of this design change, two solenoid valves in the FPR Part III - Safe Shutdown Capabilities, Table 3 Safe Shutdown Equipment List are removed from the plant: 2-FSV-46-9D MFPT A TRIP SOLENOID & 2-FSV-47-36D MFPT B TRIP SOLENOID.
Each FSV is replaced with a trip block assembly which is a two out of three arrangement of solenoid valves to alleviate a single point vulnerability. This trip block arrangement is such that the failure of single solenoid will not result in a turbine trip and will not impede the performance of its design function. The following is the arrangement for each MFPT:
MFPT A TRIP SOLENOIDS: 2-FSV-46-9A, 2-FSV-46-9B, & 2-FSV-46-9D MFPT B TRIP SOLENOIDS: 2-FSV-46-36A, 2-FSV-46-36B & 2-FSV-46-36D TVA 10534 [8-1995]

Revision Log

==Title:==
WBN Fire Protection Report Revision                                 Description of Revision                                                    Date No.                                                                                                           Approved 58 (cont.)     CR 1632011:
CR 1632011 documents Fire Protection Report Part II TIR 14.10.f to verify the capability to close the RCS Spray Line Isolation Valves (1&2-PCV-68-340B & -340D) from the Main Control Room is unnecessary as these valves are not credited to operate from the MCR during any postulated Appendix R scenario. The Appendix R analysis credits an Operator Action to stop the RCPs from the control room for any Fire Areas in which RCS Spray Line Isolation Valves could spuriously operate to prevent an inadvertent Safety Injection (reference calculation EDQ00099920090016 Appendix B43 Table 2 Note 5). The Pressurizer Spray valves normal and failed position is closed. Review of the Fire Safe Shutdown procedures 0-AOI-30.2-series shows there is no action listed to close the RCS Spray Line Isolation Valves. Since the valves are not required to change position during an Appendix R event, FPR Part II TIR 14.10.f is unnecessary and can be deleted and 1&2-PCV-68-340B & -340D can be deleted from FPR Part II Table 14.10.
CR 1658150:
CR 1658150 identified an administrative error in Fire Protection Report Part VI Fire Area 20 Section 3.26.1. The Table for Fire Doors had the Adjacent Areas listed for doors A139 and A140 swapped. The Adjacent Areas for doors A172 and A175 was also swapped.
CR 1665619:
CR 1665619 documents Fire Protection Report Part II Bases for testing emergency battery lighting units Section B.14.9.c has a typo in the note for battery service life. LC-361 is changed to LEC-361. Additionally, the vendor name Lightguard should is removed from this note because the F-100 light is now manufactured by a different company.
Pages Added: None Pages Revised/Replaced*: i-xii (Coverdata), II-79, II-80, II-81, II-82, II-120, II-123, II-124, II-125, II-126, III-22, III-40, III-41, III-65, IV-3, VI-162, VI-174, VII-173, VII-175, VII-246, VII-280, VII-288 Pages Deleted: VII-316 thru VII-319 (due to deletion of Sections 8.3.28.4 & 8.3.49.5)
                   *Note that all pages in FPR Parts II, III, IV, VI, and VII are replaced to update the revision level in the header. Some pages with changes do not have revision bars due to only having rows of tables deleted.
TVA 10534 [8-1995]

Revision Log

==Title:==
WBN Fire Protection Report Revision                                 Description of Revision                                                   Date No.                                                                                                          Approved 59          CR 1691621 documents an NRC identified NFPA 80-1975 code compliance issue with the sliding fire doors in the Turbine Building. Sliding fire doors C026A (708.0-C2), C029A (729.0-C1), C034A (729.0-C1), C036A (755.0-C3), and C054A (755.0-C15) do not conform to the requirements of NFPA 80-1975 Fire Doors and Windows per the FPR. NRC identified CR 1690827 documents the question for C029A and C034A. NFPA 80-1975 requires that fusible links be installed on both sides of the wall and interconnected so that the operation of any single fusible link will cause the door to close. For hollow metal doors a fusible link is required to be centered just above the opening and another at or near the ceiling. The above doors only have a fusible link on the Turbine Building side of the doors. The correction for the CR is to revise the existing deviation 5.2 Sliding Fire Doors with Fusible Links on One Side of Door Only to include the above mentioned doors.
CR 1693966 documents a cancelled reference in the Fire Protection Report.
Technical Instruction TI-291 "Combustible Control Zones and Sensitive Areas" is referenced multiple places in the Fire Protection Report. This TI is cancelled and the information has been replaced by NPG-SPP-18.4.7 "Control of Transient Combustibles". The correction for this CR is to revise the FPR to remove the TI reference and put in the correct reference of NPG-SPP-18.4.7, as required. This change is administrative in nature.
CR 1697976 documents administrative changes to the Fire Protection Report as follows:
: 1) DCN 64181 revised Part VII of the FPR by adding section 2.9.22. However, the table at the beginning of section 2 (acts as a table of contents for that section) was not updated to list section 2.9.22.
: 2) The LAR that supported the REP change from the dedicated fire brigade/medical personnel to the OPS supported fire brigade/medical personnel has a small impact of wording in Part II of the FPR. The current wording states "a life-threatening medical emergency, requiring the plant ambulance and appropriately trained medical personnel to leave the site for transport of the patient" to this wording " a life-threatening medical emergency, requiring on-shift emergency medical professional(s) to leave the site for transport of the patient" Pages Added: None Pages Revised/Replaced*: i-xii (Coverdata), I-17, I-18, I-22, II-25, VI-253, VI-257, VI-263, VI-327, VII-21, VII-25, VII-28, VII-31, VII-35, VII-38, VII-41, VII-44, VII-47, VII-50, VII-53, VII-57, VII-61, VII-65, VII-69, VII-73, VII-78, VII-81, VII-85, VII-91, VII-98, VII-104, VII-147 Pages Deleted: None
                   *Note that all pages in FPR Parts I, II, VI, and VII are replaced to update the revision level in the header.
TVA 10534 [8-1995]

Revision Log

==Title:==
WBN Fire Protection Report Revision                                   Description of Revision                                                   Date No.                                                                                                            Approved 60          ECP WBN-20-1065 Rev. 0 implements a replacement of the existing Spent Fuel                          02/09/22 Handling Bridge (SFHB) with a replacement SFHB. The new SFHB control system is a programmable logic controller (PLC) and variable frequency drive (VFD) based digital system with touch screen operator interfaces. The existing control system is relay based and utilizes pushbuttons, switches and indicator lights in the operator interfaces. The replacement SFHB has many new electronic control panels, cables, and increases the amount of lube oil. This increases the combustible loading for Fire Zone 10 / 757.0-A13, documented in calculation EPMDOM012990, which changes the fire severity classification from insignificant to low. The combustible load and fire severity for Fire Zone 10 / 757.0-A13 is included in FPR Part I, VI, and VII. These sections were revised to reflect the change in fire severity classification for 757.0-A13 from insignificant to low.
CR 1658722 documents the need for a Fire Protection Report change due to the integration of FPDP-1 into OPDP-1 per the Fire Protection Transition Project. The changes are related to elimination of the title Fire Operations Supervisor and addition of ESO Sr. These changes are all administrative in nature.
DEC WBN-19-954 implements the change of a portion of the masonry wall between the centrifugal charging pump (CCP) room 1B-B, 692.0-A10 and the corridor, 692.0-A1 to a stacked block wall with a C-channel border. This change creates a new engineering evaluation that is added to the Part I Table I-1 Summary Compliance Fire Protection for fire area 1, 692.0-A1 and fire area 6, 692.0-A10. Reference to Evaluation 3.6 is added to Part VI, Section 3.1.3. The change of this wall affects wording of the compartmentation and evaluation of Part VI Fire Hazards Analysis of section 3.10.1 Room 692.0-A10 and the wording in Part VII Section 3.1.1.
For Part VII an engineering evaluation section 3.6 Stacked Block Wall between Corridor 692.0-A1 and CCP Room 1B-B 692.0-A10 has been added.
Pages Added: VII-316 Pages Revised/Replaced*:i-xii (Coverdata), I-6, I-8, I-11, II-7, II-8, II-15, II-22, II-23, II-47, II-50, II-55, II-59, II-61, II-64, VI-16, VI-64, VI-105, VII-35, VII-50, VII-53, VII-54, VII-56, VII-58, VII-62, VII-122, VII-138, VII-139, X-3 Pages Deleted: None
                   *Note that all pages in FPR Parts I, II, VI, VII, and X are replaced to update the revision level in the header.
TVA 10534 [8-1995]

Fire Protection Program Change Regulatory Review (FPPCRR) 1.0   Station/Units(s):            WBN                         Activity Document No.:         WBN-20-1065 Preparer:
Technically qualified Manager, Supervisor or Engineering Specialist.
Personnel who are degreed Engineers with a minimum of 4 years nuclear experience.
Licensed (or formally licensed) Operator or equivalent contract personnel.
Recognized Subject Matter Experts approved by the Site Appendix R Program Owner.
Reviewer:
Meets qualification of a preparer and is 50.59 qualified (Initial and Requal, EGT024.008 and EGT024.007 respectively).
Manager/Supervisor/Appendix R qualified person (no 50.59 requirement) 2.0  

== Description:==

Provide a brief description of, including the reason for, the proposed change (or refer to change package that provides description):
At Watts Bar Nuclear (WBN), System 079 Spent Fuel Handling Bridge (SFHB) is common to both Unit 1 and 2. The WBN 10CFR Appenidx R compliance strategy does not credit the SFHB for any fire safe shutdown functions. The Spent Fuel Handling Bridge (SFHB) is being replaced in the Auxiliary Building Refueling Room per EC WBN-20-1065. The SFHB control system is being replaced with a new control system. The new control system is a digital system with touch screen operator interfaces. The existing control system is relay based and utilizes pushbuttons, switches and indicator lights in the operator interfaces. The upgrades address obsolescence and reliability issues.
The replacement has many new electronic control panels, cables, and increases the amount of lube oil. This increases the combustible loading for Fire Area / Fire Zone 10 / 757.0-A13 which changes the fire severity classification from insignificant to low. The additional ingition sources on the SFHB do not impact the existing fire strategies or actions. New cables that are not inside panels, conduits, raceways, or of short length not protected are low intensity flame tested which prevents potential flame spread. The power cables are adequately protected by proper breaker protection.
The SFHB is not located in the vicintiy of the safe shutdown equipment and does not effect the current deviations. There are no changes to the Safe Shutdown equipment or analysis.
The following documents were reviewed in preparation of the FPPCRR:
      - Fire Safe Shutdown (FSSD) Calculation EDQ00099920090012
      - Appendix R Manual Action Requirements Calculation EDQ00099920090016
      - Appendix R Manual Action Evaluation MDQ00299920110381
      - Appendix R Calculation WBPEVAR9004001
      - Combustible Load Calculation EPMDOM012990
      - Design Criteria WBN-DCD-40-51
      - WBN Fire Protection Report, Parts I through VII
      - Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report (SSER) 22, 29, and Amendment 108

==3.0 Screening==
Answer the following questions: include a reference to the applicable regulatory, licensing basis, or NFPA document(s), and a brief description of why the proposed change does or does not satisfy the referenced document(s).
TVA 41084                                         Page 1 of 8                   NPG-SPP-03.6-1 [09-27-2018]

Note: If acceptance of the feature being changed was based on a commitment to exceed an applicable requirement or guidance document, then further evaluation may be necessary.
Note: In answering Question A, also consider applicability of FPP related TVA Nuclear G-specs (for example G-73), site design criteria, and site-committed NFPA codes and standards.
A.          Does the proposed change satisfy applicable fire protection regulatory requirements (such as GDC, 10CFR 50.48 and Appendix R), Guidance documents (such as, NUREG 0800, NRC Generic Letters, NFPA Codes, or NRC-approved NEI guidance documents), and/or the fire protection licensing basis (such as, previously approved alternate compliance strategy, exemption, deviation, SER, docketed correspondence, or NFPA Codes of Record)?
Yes                                               No Basis for Determination:
The WBN Fire Protection Report (FPR), as approved by Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report (SSER) 29 (NUREG-0847), consolidated the plant regulatory required Fire Protection Program (FPP) information into a detailed summary and superseded all previous submittals to the NRC. The following topics address the fire protection regulatory requirements, etc., for this design change:
EDQ00099920090012, Unit 1 and 2 Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis; EDQ00099920090016, Appendix R Units 1 and 2 Manual Action Requirements; MDQ00299920110381, Appendix R Manual Action Evaluation; and WBPEVAR9004001, Appendix R Cables Required for Safe Shutdown Following a Fire The SFHB is not required for fire safe shutdown. There are no fire safe shutdown components or cables directly impacted by this change.
Fire loading and ignition sources, the change adds ignition sources on the SFHB in room 757.0-A13. Due to the location, if these ignition sources fail they only directly impact the the SFHB components. This equipment is not in the vicinity of or impacts the area of the the auxiliary air compressors. The SFHB is normally de-energized when not in use except for the space heaters in the control / power cabinents. The power supply is adequately protected for faults. The change is found to be acceptable as discussed in FPR Change/Deviation Impacts, below. Thus FPR VII (Sections 2.9.10.2.b and 2.9.10.2c) is revised to reflect the changes in igntion sources of Fire Zone 757.0-A13.
Combustible Loading (Calculation EPMDOM012990), Fire Severity and FHA Impacts (Add, Delete, New type, Intervening, Severity):
This ECP adds combustible loads to Auxiliary Building Fire Zone 757.0-A13 in the form of electrical cable insulation and lubricant and other combustibles associated with the new SFHB. The additional combustible materials are accounted for in the revised combustible loading calculation. The fire severity classification for the fire zone is changed from insignificant to low. The load increase is found to be acceptable as discussed in FPR Change/Deviation Impacts," below. Thus FPR Part I Table I-1 is affected by this EC. FPR Part VI, Section 3.15.3 is revised to describe the new classification. FPR Part VII (Sections 2.9.4, 2.9.9, 2.9.10, 2.9.11, and 2.9.12) is revised to reflect the fire severity classification of Fire Zone 757.0-A13.
Appendix R Battery Powered Emergency Lights (BPELs):
TVA 41084                                          Page 2 of 8                  NPG-SPP-03.6-1 [09-27-2018]

There are no BPELs deleted, added, or relocated by this modification. Nor does the EC work scope create a visual obstruction of any FSSD targets or impact the ingress/egress paths associated with Appendix R requirements.
Environmental Conditions Impact (Smoke, Visibility, etc.):
The ECP described in 2.0 does not add or affect the local Operator Manual Actions (OMAs) or MCR OAs such that Environment Conditions have changed for those actions.
Fire Barriers and Fire Barrier Penetrations:
This design change does not require any new fire barriers, penetrations, or seals, or otherwise affect any existing fire barriers, penetrations, or seals.
Appendix R Cable Modifications (Add, Delete, Abandon, Separation):
The new cables associated with this ECP do not affect the circuits / cables required for Appendix R safe shutdown following a fire.
Other Appendix R / Fire Protection Features (Fire Detection, Automatic or Manual Suppression, Fire Doors, Dampers, Stairs, Pipe Tunnels, Elevators, etc.):
This design change does not change the sprinkler spray patterns in any area. These changes do not adversely impact any of the other Appendix R or Fire Protection features listed above.
FPR Change / Deviation Impacts:
This EC revises portions of the FPR; however, it does not require a change to an existing Deviation (FPR Part VII, Sections 2.6.3.1, 2.6.3.2.b, 4.1 and 4.5). The changes to the FPR result in revisions to the following:
* Part I - Update the Table I-1 entry for the Combustible Load, Fire Severity for room 757.0-A13 from Insignificant to Low.
* Part VI (Section 3.15.3 FHA Room 757.0-A13) - Update the fire severity classification.
* Part VII - Update the fire severity classification for 757.0-A13 in sections 2.9.4, 2.9.9, 2.9.10, 2.9.11, and 2.9.12. Update the basis for the new igntion sources not impacting the Fire Safe shutdown strategies in Sections 2.9.10.2.b and 2.9.10.2c.
This EC identifies additional combustibles associated with the SFHB replacement, increasing the total combustible loading in Room 757.0-A13 from insignificant to low,"
with a fire duration of 6.1 minutes. This is acceptable in this room because the new credible ignition sources are separated from the compressors by more than 20 feet.
Thus, a fire occurring at the SFHB due to its failure will damage only the SFHB and will not propagate to either of the compressors due to the separation of more than 20 feet and lack of intervening combustibles.
The rooms adjacent to 757.0-A13 are separated from 757.0-A13 by 2 or 3 hour rated barriers, except for certain steel hatches or concrete plugs. These features are unchanged by this ECP and the acceptability of the configuration is discussed in Section 2.9.10.2 of FPR Part VII. Due to the low concentration of in situ combustibles and ignition sources in 757.0-A13 and the controls for transient combustibles and ignition sources, there is continued assurance that no credible exposure fire could propagate from 757.0-A13 into an adjacent room nor from an adjacent room into 757.0-A13. The existing fire protection features remain adequate for the hazards.
TVA 41084                                Page 3 of 8                    NPG-SPP-03.6-1 [09-27-2018]

A review of SSER 29 (Appendix FF) shows that its conclusions are unaffected by this EC. The evaluation (Fire Hazards Analysis in lieu of App. R III.G.2 separation) of Room 757.0-A13 in Section 6.1.10.2 is unchanged because the ACAS compressor units remain separated by more than 20 feet with no intervening combustibles. This room continues to have defense-in-depth features, limited combustibles, and combustible controls. Similar evaluations (i.e., from FPR Part VII, Sections 2.9.11 and 2.9.12) were approved for rooms having a fire severity classification of Low in Section 6.1.10.3. The SFHB originally was not considered an ignition source since it was always de-energized except when in service. The replacement is de-energized when not in service except for the space heaters. The SFHB power is electrically protected. The cables that are exposed that could potentially propagate a fire are low intensity flame tested which are acceptable per FAQ 14-0071, "Acceptable Uses for Non-IEEE 383 Cables," April 7, 2016. The new ignition sources on the SFHB cannot impact any of the existing Appendix R safe shutdown cables due to the design and location of the SFHB.
In addition, the exception for lack of fire detection system in Room 757.0-A13, discussed in Section 6.2.1, still applies because as stated therein, during normal operations, the in situ combustible loading in the refueling room and the new fuel storage vault is low, resulting in an equivalent fire severity of 6.1 minutes." The room is manned during an outage, which can assist in the early detection of a fire. The combustible materials in the refueling room are widely dispersed, which further diminishes the magnitude of a postulated fire. The combustibles consist of InstaCote (a plastic type fuel transfer canal coating, typically submerged in water); lube oil in air compressors; hoists and cranes; plastics associated with the electrical equipment, panels, fuel pool boundary, lighting and boxes; rubber fire hose; and anticipated amounts of radwaste trash and laundry. The new combustibles in the SFHB are oil, cables, power panels and control panels, and equipment. Transient combustibles in the room are controlled by procedure NPG-SPP-18.4.7, Control of Transient Combustibles. The potential ignition sources in the room are panels, air compressors, transformers, and lighting cabinets. The new ignition sources do not impact the Trains A or B auxiliary air compressors. A fire involving either of the auxiliary air compressors would not impact the normal air supply or the other auxiliary air compressor. The worst case fire scenario would be a loss of one train of auxiliary control air, which would not require either unit to shut down. The other FSSD circuits are routed in conduits in the refueling floor area and are outside the fire zone of influence of the compressors.
Therefore, a fire in the refueling room will not impact FSSD capability.
Plant Licensing Basis:
The result of the implementation of this design change does not adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain fire safe shutdown (FSSD) in the event of a fire and does not adversely impact or violate the WBN FPR or Licensing Basis/Conditions.
TVA 41084                                 Page 4 of 8                   NPG-SPP-03.6-1 [09-27-2018]

==3.0 Screening==
(continued)
Note: If proposed change involves compensatory measures related to an existing problem associated with any of the categories discussed in 3.B, then obtain Licensing concurrence (including signature on 3.B), then mark 3.B N/A and proceed to Step 4.0.
B. Does the proposed change satisfy the detection, suppression and/or separation requirements within the fire area or zone affected by the change specified in Appendix R Sections III.G.2 and/or III.G.3?
Yes            No                N/A       Licensing Review for N/A:
If yes, then proceed to Step 4 (see NEI 02-03 Appendix A for additional guidance).
Basis for Determination:
The EC does not change and continues to satisfy the detection, suppression, and/or separation requirements specified in Appendix R Sections III.G.2 and/or III.G.3 within the FAs/zones affected by the change. Therefore, this proposed change has no adverse effects on the detection, suppression, and/or separation requirements within the FAs/zones affected by the change. Since the 3.0.B answer is Yes, per the question instructions, proceed to the Step 4.0 Evaluation.
If no, then NRC approval is required prior to implementing the proposed change. Proceed to Step 5.
TVA 41084                                      Page 5 of 8                 NPG-SPP-03.6-1 [09-27-2018]

==4.0 Evaluation==
A. Does the proposed change affect safe shutdown procedure entry conditions, Operator Manual Actions (OMA), or change the SSA such that the required time to perform an OMA is reduced?
Yes             No              N/A Basis for Determination:
Based on the work scope and screening information contained in Steps 2.0 and 3.0 above, this ECP does not adversely affect the control, operation, or function of any Appendix R equipment. The proposed change replaces the SFHB in Fire Area 10. The manual action evaluations were unchanged. The modification of the SFHB and associated cables does not affect the performance of an OMA or access to the credited equipment. This modification will not adversely affect any existing FSSD procedure requirements or the required time to perform any local OMA.
Therefore, this modification supports and satisfies the existing Safe Shutdown Basis and maintains the present level of FSSD in the event of a fire. There are no changes to the cables or equipment in the FSSD analysis and there are no other imapcts to the FSSD analysis.
If yes, then the changes must be analyzed (including validation) against the existing Safe Shutdown Basis using NUREG 1852 (Demonstrating the Feasibility and Reliability of Operator Manual Actions in Response to Fire) as a reference guide to evaluate adequate available time. These actions must be performed in accordance with site instruction and results documented in Step 4.0.A.1.
If no, then proceed to Step 4.B.
A.1    Does the change satisfy the requirements of the existing Safe Shutdown Basis and/or can the OMA be performed within the prescribed time?
Yes             No              N/A Basis for Determination:
N/A per Step 4.0 A No response.
If yes, then proceed to Step 4.B.
If no, then revise the proposed change in order that the OMA can meet the required time.
B. Does the proposed change adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire (provide justification below or attach Generic Letter 86-10 type or equivalent evaluation)?
Yes             No              N/A Basis for Determination:
Based on the EC work scope description, screening and evaluation information TVA 41084                                     Page 6 of 8                   NPG-SPP-03.6-1 [09-27-2018]

provided in Steps 2.0, 3.0, and 4.0.A above, Appendix R requirements are met. Based on the Fire Protection and Appendix R related screening and evaluation of the proposed change, a sufficient level of fire protection safety will be maintained to ensure one train of equipment that is necessary to achieve hot shutdown, from either the MCR or approved alternate locations, will remain free of fire damage. Likewise, fire damage to at least one train of equipment necessary to achieve cold shutdown will continue to be limited to ensure that any required repairs can be completed within the allowable time requirements.
This EC does not adversely impact the control, function, or operation of any 10CFR50 Appendix R Safe Shutdown Equipment and does not adversely impact the ability to achieve and maintain FSSD in the event of a fire. There are no changes to the FSSD analysis.
If yes, then proposed change may not be implemented without prior NRC approval.
If no, then prior NRC approval is not required.
TVA 41084                                    Page 7 of 8                  NPG-SPP-03.6-1 [09-27-2018]

5.0  

== Conclusion:==

Proposed change may be implemented without prior NRC approval.
NRC approval is required prior to implementing the proposed change.
6.0   I have determined that the documentation is adequate to support the above conclusion.
(Print)                       (Sign)
Preparer:      &DUO6ZHHO\             /
SWEELY Carl      Digitally signed by SWEELY Carl Date: 2021.05.18 12:59:45 -04'00' Date:
Digitally signed by William L.
:LOOLDP6WXDUG              William L. Stuard       Stuard Reviewer:                              /                           Date: 2021.05.18 14:15:08 -04'00'    Date:
Program                                       Ricks, Jeremy Ray Digitally signed by Ricks, Jeremy Ray Owner:        Jeremy Ricks             /                              Date: 2021.05.18 14:22:13 -04'00' Date:
Other:                                 /                                                                Date:
TVA 41084                                  Page 8 of 8                                         NPG-SPP-03.6-1 [09-27-2018]

FIRE PROTECTION REPORT                                                                   Rev. 60 TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................... i LIST OF TABLES      ....................................................................................................... iv LIST OF FIGURES     ....................................................................................................... v LIST OF ACRONYMS .................................................................................................... vii LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES ......................................................................................... x I     INTRODUCTION 1.0   Background ............................................................................................ I-1 2.0   Purpose .................................................................................................. I-1 3.0   Scope ..................................................................................................... I-1 4.0   Summary Compliance Table .................................................................. I-3 II    FIRE PROTECTION PLAN

==1.0   Purpose and Scope==
 ............................................................................... II-1 2.0   Objective of the Fire Protection Plan ..................................................... II-1 3.0   Basis of the Fire Protection Plan ........................................................... II-1 4.0   References ............................................................................................ II-2 5.0   Definitions ............................................................................................ II-12 6.0   Fire Protection Quality Assurance ....................................................... II-20 7.0   Fire Protection Organization/Programs ............................................... II-20 8.0   Fire Protection Program Administrative and Technical Controls ........................................................................ II-23 9.0   Emergency Response ......................................................................... II-24 10.0  Control of Combustibles ...................................................................... II-29 11.0  Control of Ignition Sources .................................................................. II-30 12.0  Description of Fire Protection Systems and Features ...................................................................................... II-30 13.0  Fire Protection System Impairments and Compensatory Actions ........................................................................ II-46 i

FIRE PROTECTION REPORT                                                                  Rev. 60 TABLE OF CONTENTS II  FIRE PROTECTION PLAN (Continued) 14.0  Fire Protection Systems and Features Operating Requirements (ORs) ............................................................ II-51 Testing and Inspection Requirements .................................................. II-67 Bases .................................................................................................. II-85 III SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES 1.0   Introduction ............................................................................................ III-1 2.0   Safe Shutdown Functions ..................................................................... III-3 3.0   Analysis of Safe Shutdown Systems ..................................................... III-4 4.0   Safe Shutdown Systems ..................................................................... III-11 5.0   Identification of Safe Shutdown System Components......................... III-22 6.0   Identification of Safe Shutdown Circuits and Cables ........................... III-23 7.0   Associated Circuits of Concern ........................................................... III-24 8.0   High/Low Pressure Boundary Interfaces ............................................. III-29 9.0   Location of Safe Shutdown Equipment, Cables and Raceways ......................................................................... III-30 10.0  Safe Shutdown System Separation Evaluation Methodology ...................................................................... III-31 11.0  Multiple Spurious Operation (MSO) Evaluation ................................... III-37 IV  ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY 1.0   Introduction ............................................................................................ IV-1 2.0   Discussion ............................................................................................. IV-1 3.0   Alternate Control Room Capabilities ..................................................... IV-1 V   MANUAL ACTIONS, REPAIRS AND EMERGENCY LIGHTING 1.0   Introduction ............................................................................................. V-1 2.0   Operator Manual Actions ........................................................................ V-1 3.0   Cold Shutdown Repairs ........................................................................ V-16 4.0   Emergency Lighting .............................................................................. V-18 ii

FIRE PROTECTION REPORT                                                                 Rev. 60 TABLE OF CONTENTS VI   FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS Fire Hazards Analysis Table of Contents ........................................................... VI-i 1.0    Introduction ............................................................................................ VI-1 2.0    Fire Hazards Analysis Structure ............................................................ VI-1 3.0    Fire Area Hazards Analysis ................................................................... VI-3 VII  DEVIATIONS AND EVALUATIONS 1.0    Introduction ........................................................................................... VII-1 2.0    Deviations to 10CFR50 Appendix R ..................................................... VII-1 3.0    Engineering Evaluations ................................................................... VII-118 4.0    Deviations to BTP 9.5-1 Appendix A ................................................ VII-138 5.0    NFPA Code Deviations .................................................................... VII-146 6.0    General Engineering Evaluations ..................................................... VII-147 7.0    Unit 1 Operator Manual Actions ....................................................... VII-154 8.0    Feasibility and Reliability Evaluations for Unit 2 Operator Manual Actions ....................................................... VII-157 Attachment 1 - Sprinkler System Criteria for Resolving Intervening Combustible Concerns .............................................................. VII-318 VIII CONFORMANCE TO APPENDIX A TO BTP 9.5-1 GUIDELINES ................ VIII-1 IX   APPENDIX R COMPLIANCE MATRIX ............................................................ IX-1 X    NFPA CODE EVALUATION 1.0    Introduction ............................................................................................. X-1 2.0    Scope ..................................................................................................... X-1 3.0    Applicable NFPA Codes ......................................................................... X-2 4.0    NFPA Code Conformance Summary Compliance List ........................... X-9 iii

FIRE PROTECTION REPORT                                                                Rev. 60 LIST OF TABLES I   INTRODUCTION Table 1-1    Summary Compliance Fire Protection ......................................... I-6 II  FIRE PROTECTION PLAN Table 14.1   Fire Detection Instrumentation................................................ II-129 Table 14.3   Water Based Fire Suppression ............................................... II-141 Table 14.5   Fire Detection Panels ............................................................. II-142 Table 14.6   Fire Hose Stations .................................................................. II-143 Table 14.7   Fire Hydrants .......................................................................... II-147 Table 14.8.1 Fire Doors ............................................................................... II-148 Table 14.8.2 Fire Dampers .......................................................................... II-152 Table 14.10  Fire Safe Shutdown Equipment .............................................. II-158 III SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Table 3-1    Safe Shutdown Systems and Subsystems by Key .................. III-38 Table 3-2    Safe Shutdown Equipment List................................................ III-39 Table 3-3    Analysis Volume by Fire Area List ........................................... III-73 VI  FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS Table 6-1    Local Operator Manual Actions and Main Control Room Operator Actions for All AVs ........................... VI-391 iv

FIRE PROTECTION REPORT                                  Rev. 60 LIST OF FIGURES II FIRE PROTECTION PLAN Figure II-1A   Turbine Building Flow Diagram Figure II-2A   Auxiliary Building Flow Diagram Figure II-3A   Auxiliary Building Flow Diagram Figure II-4A   Auxiliary Building Flow Diagram Figure II-5A   Auxiliary Building and Diesel Generator Building Flow Diagram Figure II-6A   Powerhouse and Control Building Flow Diagram Figure II-7A   Auxiliary Building Flow Diagram Figure II-8A   Turbine Building, 5th Diesel Generator Building, Security Backup Power Building and Make-Up Water Treatment Plant Flow Diagram Figure II-9A   Yard Flow Diagram Figure II-10A  Intake Pumping Station Flow Diagram Figure II-11A  Powerhouse and Yard Flow Diagram Figure II-12A  Diesel Generator Building Flow Diagram Figure II-13A  Powerhouse and Yard Electrical Control Diagram Figure II-14A  Powerhouse and Yard Electrical Control Diagram Figure II-15A  Powerhouse Electrical Control Diagram Figure II-16A  Powerhouse Electrical Control Diagram Figure II-17A  Powerhouse Electrical Control Diagram Figure II-18A  Powerhouse Electrical Control Diagram Figure II-19A  Powerhouse Electrical Control Diagram Figure II-20A  Powerhouse Electrical Control Diagram Figure II-21A  Powerhouse Electrical Control Diagram Figure II-22A  Diesel Generator Building Electrical Control Diagram Figure II-23A  Powerhouse Electrical Logic Diagram Figure II-24A  Powerhouse Electrical Logic Diagram Figure II-25A  Powerhouse Electrical Logic Diagram Figure II-26A  Diesel Generator Building Electrical Logic Diagram Figure II-27A  Auxiliary Bldg Compartmentation EL 676 Figure II-28A  Auxiliary Bldg Compartmentation EL 692 Figure II-29A  Auxiliary Bldg Compartment EL 708 & 713 Figure II-30A  Auxiliary Bldg Compartment EL 729 & 737 Figure II-31A  Auxiliary Bldg Compartment EL 755 & 757 Figure II-32A  Auxiliary Bldg Compartment EL 772, 782 & 786 Figure II-33A  Control Bldg Compartment EL 692 & 708 Figure II-34A  Control Bldg Compartment EL 729 & 755 Figure II-35A  Diesel Generator Bldg Compartmentation Figure II-36A  Intake Pumping Station Compartmentation Figure II-37A  Not Used Figure II-38A  Auxiliary and Reactor Buildings Compartmentation EL 729 & 737 Figure II-39A  Containment Compartmentation EL 702 Figure II-40A  Containment Compartmentation EL 716 Figure II-41A  Auxiliary Building Flow Diagram Figure II-42A  Yard Flow Diagram Figure II-43A  Powerhouse Electrical Control Diagram Figure II-44A  Yard Electrical Control Diagram Figure II-45A  Powerhouse Electrical Logic Diagram Figure II-46A  Powerhouse Electrical Logic Diagram v

FIRE PROTECTION REPORT       Rev. 60 LIST OF FIGURES III SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Figure III-1  Interaction Analysis Flow Chart Figure III-2  Analysis Model and Logics Figure III-3  Analysis Volumes Figure III-4  Interaction Analysis Figure III-5  Safe Shutdown Logic Diagram vi

FIRE PROTECTION REPORT                Rev. 60 LIST OF ACRONYMS AB    Auxiliary Building ABGTS Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System ACR   Auxiliary Control Room ADGB  Additional Diesel Generator Building AFFF  Aqueous Film Forming Foam AFW   Auxiliary Feedwater AHJ   Authority Having Jurisdiction ALARA As Low As Reasonably Achievable ANSI  American National Standards Institute ASME  American Society of Mechanical Engineers ASTM  American Society of Testing and Materials AV    Analysis Volume BIT   Boron Injection Tank BTP   Branch Technical Position BTU   British Thermal Unit BWR   Boiling Water Reactor CB    Control Building CCP   Centrifugal Charging Pump CCRS  Computerized Cable Routing System CCS   Component Cooling System CCTV  Closed Circuit Television CCZ   Combustible Control Zone CDWE  Condensate Demineralizer Waste Evaporator CI    Containment Isolation CIV   Containment Isolation Valve CPU   Central Processor Unit CRDM  Control Rod Drive Mechanism CRT   Cathode Ray Tube CST   Condensate Storage Tank CSST  Common Station Service Transformers CT    Current Transformer CVCS  Chemical and Volume Control System DBA   Design Basis Accident DBE   Design Basis Event DCN   Design Change Notice DG    Diesel Generator DGB   Diesel Generator Building ECCS  Emergency Core Cooling System EDGB  Emergency Diesel Generator Building EGTS  Emergency Gas Treatment System EPS   Emergency Power System ERCW  Essential Raw Cooling Water ERFBS Electrical Raceway Fire Barrier System ETL   Electro-Thermo Link FD    Fire Department vii

FIRE PROTECTION REPORT                              Rev. 60 LIST OF ACRONYMS FHA    Fire Hazards Analysis FLEX   Systems, Structures, and Components used to Implement NRC Order EA-12-049 FP     Fire Protection FPP    Fire Protection Program FPR    Fire Protection Report FSAR   Final Safety Analysis Report FSB    Field Services Building FSSD   Fire Safe Shutdown GDC    General Design Criteria HEPA   High Efficiency Particulate Absorption HPFP   High Pressure Fire Protection HVAC   Heating, Ventilation and Air-Conditioning IPEEE  Individual Plant Examination for External Events IPS    Intake Pumping Station LCC    Lower Compartment Cooling LOCA   Loss of Coolant Accident MCC    Motor Control Center MCR    Main Control Room MOV    Motor Operated Valve NAUO   Nuclear Assistant Unit Operator NELPIA Nuclear Energy Liability and Property Insurance Agency NER    Nuclear Experience Review NFPA   National Fire Protection Association NIOSH  National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health NRC    Nuclear Regulatory Commission NSRB   Nuclear Safety Review Board OR     Operating Requirement OS&Y   Outside Screw and Yoke OSHA   Occupational Safety and Health Administration PIV    Post Indicator Valve PORC   Plant Operations Review Committee PORV   Power-Operated Relief Valve PRT    Pressurizer Relief Tank PWR    Pressurized Water Reactor QA     Quality Assurance RADCON Radiological Control RB     Reactor Building RCP    Reactor Coolant Pump RCS    Reactor Coolant System RCW    Raw Cooling Water RHR    Residual Heat Removal RPS    Reactor Protection System RSW    Raw Service Water RWST   Refueling Water Storage Tank SBPB   Security Backup Power Building SER    Safety Evaluation Report SSER   Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report viii

FIRE PROTECTION REPORT               Rev. 60 LIST OF ACRONYMS SG     Steam Generator SI     Safety Injection SSEL   Safe Shutdown Equipment List TB     Turbine Building TDAFWP Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump TIR    Testing and Inspection Requirements TSC    Technical Support Center TSOB   Temporary Storage and Office Building UL     Underwriters' Laboratories VCT    Volume Control Tank ix

FIRE PROTECTION REPORT                                                              Rev. 60 LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES Pages i through xii ........................................................................................ Rev 60 Part I        .............................................................................................. Rev 60 Part II       .............................................................................................. Rev 60 Part III      .............................................................................................. Rev 58 Part IV       .............................................................................................. Rev 58 Part V        .............................................................................................. Rev 51 Part VI       .............................................................................................. Rev 60 Part VII      .............................................................................................. Rev 60 Part VIII     .............................................................................................. Rev 51 Part IX       .............................................................................................. Rev 51 Part X        .............................................................................................. Rev 60 Figure II-1A  Turbine Building Flow Diagram............................................. Rev 51 Figure II-2A  Auxiliary Building Flow Diagram ........................................... Rev 51 Figure II-3A  Auxiliary Building Flow Diagram ........................................... Rev 51 Figure II-4A  Auxiliary Building Flow Diagram ........................................... Rev 51 Figure II-5A  Auxiliary Building and Diesel Generator Building Flow Diagram....................................................................... Rev 51 Figure II-6A  Powerhouse and Control Building Flow Diagram ................. Rev 51 Figure II-7A  Auxiliary Building Flow Diagram ........................................... Rev 51 Figure II-8A  Turbine Bldg., 5th Diesel Generator Bldg.,
Security Backup Power Bldg., and Make-Up Water Treatment Plant Flow Diagram .................................. Rev 51 Figure II-9A  Yard Flow Diagram ............................................................... Rev 51 Figure II-10A Intake Pumping Station Flow Diagram ................................. Rev 51 Figure II-11A Powerhouse and Yard Flow Diagram ................................... Rev 51 Figure II-12A Diesel Generator Bldg Flow Diagram ................................... Rev 51 Figure II-13A Powerhouse and Yard Electrical Control Diagram ............... Rev 51 Figure II-14A Powerhouse and Yard Electrical Control Diagram ............... Rev 51 x

FIRE PROTECTION REPORT                                             Rev. 60 LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES Figure II-15A Powerhouse Electrical Control Diagram ............................... Rev 51 Figure II-16A Powerhouse Electrical Control Diagram ............................... Rev 51 Figure II-17A Powerhouse Electrical Control Diagram ............................... Rev 51 Figure II-18A Powerhouse Electrical Control Diagram ............................... Rev 51 Figure II-19A Powerhouse Electrical Control Diagram ............................... Rev 51 Figure II-20A Powerhouse Electrical Control Diagram ............................... Rev 51 Figure II-21A Powerhouse Electrical Control Diagram ............................... Rev 51 Figure II-22A Diesel Generator Building Electrical Control Diagram .......... Rev 51 Figure II-23A Powerhouse Electrical Logic Diagram .................................. Rev 51 Figure II-24A Powerhouse Electrical Logic Diagram .................................. Rev 51 Figure II-25A Powerhouse Electrical Logic Diagram .................................. Rev 51 Figure II-26A Diesel Generator Building Electrical Logic Diagram ............. Rev 51 Figure II-27A Auxiliary Building Compartmentation EL 676 ....................... Rev 51 Figure II-28A Auxiliary Building Compartmentation EL 692 ....................... Rev 51 Figure II-29A Auxiliary Bldg Compartmentation EL 708 & 713................... Rev 51 Figure II-30A Auxiliary Bldg Compartmentation EL 729 & 737................... Rev 51 Figure II-31A Auxiliary Bldg Compartmentation EL 755 & 757................... Rev 51 Figure II-32A Auxiliary Bldg Compartment EL 772, 782 & 786 .................. Rev 51 Figure II-33A Control Building Compartmentation EL 692 & 708 ............... Rev 51 Figure II-34A Control Building Compartmentation EL 729 & 755 ............... Rev 51 Figure II-35A Diesel Generator Building Compartmentation ...................... Rev 51 Figure II-36A Intake Pumping Station Compartmentation .......................... Rev 51 Figure II-37A Not Used Figure II-38A Auxiliary and Reactor Buildings Compartmentation EL 729 & 737 ......................................... Rev 51 Figure II-39A Containment Compartmentation EL 702 .............................. Rev 51 Figure II-40A Containment Compartmentation EL 716 .............................. Rev 51 xi

FIRE PROTECTION REPORT                                                        Rev. 60 LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES Figure II-41A Auxiliary Building Flow Diagram ........................................... Rev 51 Figure II-42A Yard Flow Diagram ............................................................... Rev 51 Figure II-43A Powerhouse Electrical Control Diagram ............................... Rev 51 Figure II-44A Yard Electrical Control Diagram ........................................... Rev 51 Figure II-45A Powerhouse Electrical Logic Diagram .................................. Rev 51 Figure II-46A Powerhouse Electrical Logic Diagram .................................. Rev 51 Figure III-1  Safe Shutdown/Interaction Analysis Flow Chart ................... Rev 54 Figure III-2  Analysis Model and Logics ................................................... Rev 54 Figure III-3  Analysis Volumes ................................................................. Rev 54 Figure III-4  Interaction Analysis............................................................... Rev 54 Figure III-5  Safe Shutdown Logic Diagram ............................................. Rev 54 xii

PART I - INTRODUCTION Revision 60

==1.0               BACKGROUND==

On April 18, 1977, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) submitted a Fire Protection Program (FPP) to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) detailing the fire hazards analysis and a comparison to the guidelines of Appendix A to Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.5-1 (Part II, Reference 4.1.10). On September 9, 1980, WBN submitted the Fire Protection Analysis describing the safe shutdown capabilities. On November 19, 1980, the NRC published 10 CFR 50.48, Fire Protection, (Part II, Reference 4.1.1) and a new Appendix R to 10 CFR 50 that established fire protection requirements for operating nuclear power plants. This rule became effective on February 17, 1981; it specified certain fire protection features for operating nuclear power plants licensed before January 1979.
2.0               PURPOSE The purpose of the Fire Protection Report (FPR) is to consolidate a sufficiently detailed summary of the WBN regulatory-required FPP into a single document and to reflect the design of both units. The Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) references this report as detailing WBNs Fire Protection Program. Updates to this report are made on a schedule consistent with updates to the FSAR.
The FPR has been developed in accordance with the guidelines of NRC Generic Letter 86-10, Implementation of Fire Protection Requirements (Part II, Reference 4.1.16) and NRC Generic Letter 88-12, Removal of Fire Protection Requirements from Technical Specifications (Part II, Reference 4.1.18). The FPR brings WBN into compliance with NRC recommendations for documenting the FPP and commitments. The FPR documents WBNs Appendix R evaluation that ensures that safe shutdown capability can be maintained during and after a fire in accordance with Sections III.G, III.J, III.L and III.O of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R (Part II, Reference 4.1.8).
3.0               SCOPE This report includes the following documentation:
: 1.       Introduction (Part I)
Part I provides the introduction and a table that summarizes the plant design. The table is also a guide to the manner used to demonstrate compliance with 10 CFR 50 Appendix R.
: 2.       Fire Protection Plan (Part II)
Part II describes the organizations supporting the WBN Fire Protection Program, the plant fire protection systems and features, fire loss prevention procedures and administrative controls, the plant emergency response organization, the Fire Protection Systems and Features Operating Requirements (OR), and Testing and Inspection Requirements (TIR).
: 3.       Safe Shutdown Capabilities (Part III)
Part III identifies the analysis methodology used to demonstrate compliance with Sections III.G and III.L of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R. It describes the specific safe shutdown functions required to satisfy Appendix R and identifies the major systems used to satisfy the safe shutdown I-1

PART I - INTRODUCTION Revision 60 performance goals. The processes used to identify required components and required circuits are identified. Tabular lists of required mechanical and electrical equipment and components are also included in this part.
: 4.       Alternate Shutdown Capability (Part IV)
Part IV identifies and describes the methodology used to demonstrate compliance with Appendix R Section III.G.3 and III.L for alternative shutdown given a fire in the Control Building.
The general design criteria for electric and physical independence of the alternative shutdown system from the Control Building are addressed.
: 5.       Operator Actions, Repairs, and Emergency Lighting (Part V)
Part V describes the process used to determine manual action requirements. The ability of plant staff to perform the manual actions is evaluated based on minimum staffing levels and the location of the fire. Cold shutdown repairs incorporated into the compliance strategies are identified. The adequacy of emergency lighting for access to, and performance of actions at manual action locations is also assessed.
: 6.       Fire Hazards Analysis (Part VI)
Part VI summarizes the engineering evaluations performed to determine the adequacy of fire protection features for the fire areas and rooms identified for WBN. This part summarizes the physical characteristics of required fire barriers (including fire doors and fire dampers),
combustible loading and fire severity, suppression and detection capabilities, deviations and evaluations, and fire safe shutdown capability for each area and room. The paths and systems available for safe shutdown are identified. Safe shutdown equipment, components, and cables that could be damaged by the fire are identified, along with the mitigating features to ensure availability.
: 7.       Deviations and Evaluations (Part VII)
Part VII contains the deviations identified to the applicable sections of 10 CFR 50 Appendix R and Appendix A to Branch Technical Position (BTP) APCSB 9.5-1 (Part II, Reference 4.1.10).
Engineering evaluations developed in accordance with the guidance of Generic Letters 83-33 (Part II, Reference 4.1.15) and 86-10 (Part II, Reference 4.1.16) are presented. National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) code deviations that impact the operational capabilities of fire protection features protecting safe shutdown or alternate shutdown equipment are also identified. Part VII also contains evaluations of the Unit 2 operator manual actions.
: 8.       Conformance to BTP 9.5-1, Appendix A (Part VIII)
Part VIII contains a line-by-line comparison of WBN against the guidelines of Appendix A to BTP 9.5-1. The status of conformance with the guidelines is summarized. Alternatives to strict compliance are identified where applicable. The details that support Part VIII are contained in other parts of the FPR and in referenced plant documentation.
: 9.       Conformance to 10CFR50, Appendix R (Part IX)
Part IX contains a line-by-line comparison of WBN against the guidelines of Appendix R to I-2

PART I - INTRODUCTION Revision 60 10 CFR 50. The status of conformance with the requirements of Sections III.G, III.J, III.L and III.O is summarized. Alternatives to strict compliance are identified where applicable. The details that support Part IX are contained in other parts of the FPR and in referenced plant documentation.
: 10.      NFPA Code Conformance Evaluation (Part X)
Part X contains a review of the NFPA codes referenced in Appendix A to BTP 9.5-1 and addresses the applicability of the NFPA codes to the WBN regulatory compliance fire protection program.
4.0             

==SUMMARY==
COMPLIANCE TABLE Table I-1 summarizes the classical fire protection features at WBN on a fire area and room basis. Not all of the fire protection features documented in Table I-1 are required to demonstrate compliance with the guidance of Appendix A to BTP 9.5-1 or the requirements of Appendix R to 10CFR50. Part II of the FPR identifies those detection and suppression systems that are required, along with the associated Operability and Testing and Inspection Requirements for the systems. Table I-1 also presents basic information on the fire safe shutdown significance of each room in the plant.
Table I-1 contains ten columns, which capture the following information:
Column 1: (Room              Fire area number and identification of rooms in the fire area Number and Name)
Column 2: (Safe              Presence of safe shutdown cables or components in each room Shutdown Equipment or Cables Y/N)
Column 3: (Automatic         The presence and extent of automatic fire detection provided in each Detection Y/N, Partial)      room Column 4: (Automatic         The presence and extent of automatic fire suppression provided in each Suppression Y/N,             room Partial)
Column 5: ( Fire Rated       Use of fire rated fire barriers and rating on trays or conduits in each Wraps)                       room for which it is credited Column 6:                    The equivalent fire severity of in situ combustible materials in each (Combustible Load,           room (see note below)
Fire Severity)
Column 7: (Deviation         Reference to deviations from 10 CFR 50 Appendix R, Appendix A to Number in Part VII)          BTP 9.5-1, and NFPA codes documented in Part VII that are applicable to the room Column 8: (Evaluation        Reference to engineering evaluations prepared in accordance with the Number in Part VII)          guidance of Generic Letters 83-33 and 86-10 documented in Part VII that are applicable to the room I-3

PART I - INTRODUCTION Revision 60 Column 9: (CSD          Cold shutdown (CSD) repairs which may be required due to a fire in the Repairs required in any specific room (with the repair potentially required due to a fire in any room due to fire in     room in the analysis volume in which the specific room is located) room)
The CSD repair described in Part V, Section 3.3 may be applied for a fire in any room and is therefore not included in Table I-1.
Column 10: ( III.G      Notations in this column indicate the method of compliance with compliance for HSD)     10 CFR 50 Appendix R Section III.G for achieving hot shutdown (HSD):
III.G.1 is not noted in the table, but is credited for some function in all rooms except the control building which is a III.G.3 area.
III.G.2.a is credited for some function in each room indicated by 2a in this column.
III.G.2.b is credited for some function in each room indicated by 2b in this column.
III.G.2.c is credited for some function in each room indicated by 2c in this column.
III.G.2.d, e and f are credited for some functions in each room in containment indicated by 2def in this column.
Operator Manual Actions credited in lieu of physical separation or to mitigate spurious equipment actuation is indicated by the following:
o 2-G indicates a unit 2 OMA performed on equipment in the safe shutdown path (NEI 00-01 Green). The Feasibility and Reliability evaluations for actions required in less than 2 hours are included in Part VII, Section 8.
o 2-O indicates a unit 2 OMA performed on equipment that is important to safe shutdown, but not in the safe shutdown path (NEI 00-01 Orange) o 1-G indicates a unit 1 OMA performed on equipment in the safe shutdown path (NEI 00-01 Green). As discussed in Part VII, Section 7, these OMAs were addressed in Section 3.5, Manual Operator Actions, of SSER 18 .
o 1-O indicates a unit 1 OMA performed on equipment that is important to safe shutdown but not in the safe shutdown path (NEI 00-01 Orange). As discussed in Part VII, Section 7, these OMAs were addressed in Section 3.5 of SSER 18.
o 0-G indicates an OMA applicable to both units performed on equipment in the safe shutdown path (NEI 00-01 Green). These OMAs were addressed in Section 3.5 of SSER 18 for Unit 1 and Part VII, Section 8 if required in less than 2 hours for Unit 2.
These OMAs are addressed in the NRCs review performed prior to Unit 2 startup (Part II, Reference 4.1.41).
o 0-O indicates an OMA applicable to both units performed on equipment that is important to safe shutdown but not in the safe shutdown path (NEI 00-01 Orange). These OMAs are addressed in the NRCs review performed prior to Unit 2 startup (Part II, Reference 4.1.41).
I-4

PART I - INTRODUCTION Revision 60 Note: The equivalent fire severity values are defined in Section 2.1 of Part VI based on fire severity indices. The fire severity indices have five categories. The five categories are:
CLASSIFICATION               COMBUSTIBLE LOAD                      FIRE SEVERITY Insignificant                <6,500 Btu/ft2                        <5 minutes Low                          <80,000 Btu/ft2                       <60 minutes Moderate                     <160,000 Btu/ft2                      <120 minutes Moderately Severe            <240,000 Btu/ft2                      <180 minutes Severe                       >240,000 Btu/ft2                      >180 minutes I-5

PART I - INTRODUCTION TABLE I-1 

==SUMMARY==
COMPLIANCE FIRE PROTECTION Revision 60 CSD Repairs Safe         Automatic      Automatic               Combustible   Deviation  Evaluation Fire Rated                                           req'd in any III.G Shutdown     Detection Y/N, Suppression             Load, Fire    Number in  Number in Room Number and Name                                                          Wraps                                                room due to  Compliance Equipment or Partial        Y/N, Partial            Severity      Part VII   Part VII (Note 6)                                             fire in room for HSD Cables Y/N   (Note 6)       (Note 6)                (Note 6)      (Note 6)   (Note 6)
(Note 7)
FIRE AREA 1:
674.0-A1 - Tritiated Drain Collector Yes          No             No           No         Insignificant            3.1.1, 6.4.2.3 Tank Room 674.0-A2 - Tritiated Drain Collector No           No             No           No         Insignificant            3.1.1 Tank Pumps 676.0-A1 - Corridor                                                                                    2.6.3.2.a, Yes          Yes, Partial   No           3 hour     Low                      3.1.1            Yes          2a 2.6.3.4 676.0-A2 - Holdup Tank Room A        No           No             No           No         Insignificant            3.1.1, 6.4.2.2 676.0-A3 - Holdup Tank Room B        No           No             No           No         Insignificant 2.6.3.2.a  3.1.1, 6.4.2.2 676.0-A4 - Floor Drain Collect Pump, No           No             No           No         Insignificant 2.6.3.2.b  3.1.1 Filter & Tank 676.0-A4a - Floor Drain Collection No           No             No           No         Insignificant            3.1.1 Tank Room 676.0-A5 - Gas Stripper Feed Pump No           Yes, Partial   No           No         Low                      3.1.1 Room 676.0-A6 - Spare                     No           Yes            No           No         Insignificant            3.1.1 676.0-A7 - Spare                     No           No             No           No         Insignificant            3.1.1 676.0-A8 - Containment Spray Pump Yes          Yes, Partial   No           No         Insignificant            3.1.1 Room 1B-B 676.0-A9 - Containment Spray Pump Yes          Yes, Partial   No           No         Insignificant            3.1.1 Room 1A-A 676.0-A14 - Containment Spray Yes          Yes, Partial   No           No         Insignificant            3.1.1 Pump Room 2A-A 676.0-A15 - Containment Spray Yes          Yes, Partial   No           No         Insignificant            3.1.1 Pump Room 2B-B 676.0-A16 - Unit 1 Pipe Chase        Yes          Yes            No           No         Insignificant            3.1.1            Yes 692.0-A1 - Corridor Subdivided into 2.4, 692.0-A1A (692-A1A1,- A1A2,-                                                                                      3.1.1, 3.6,                   1-G, 2b, 2c, Yes          Yes, Partial   Yes, Partial 1 hour     Moderate      2.6.3.2.a,                  Yes A1A3, -A1AN), 692-A1B (692-A1BN,-                                                                                 8.3.1                         2-G, 1-0, 2-0 2.6.3.4 A1B1,- A1B2, -A1B3) and 692-A1C I-6

PART I - INTRODUCTION TABLE I-1 

==SUMMARY==
COMPLIANCE FIRE PROTECTION Revision 60 CSD Repairs Safe         Automatic      Automatic               Combustible   Deviation  Evaluation Fire Rated                                           req'd in any III.G Shutdown     Detection Y/N, Suppression             Load, Fire    Number in  Number in Room Number and Name                                                         Wraps                                                room due to  Compliance Equipment or Partial        Y/N, Partial            Severity      Part VII   Part VII (Note 6)                                             fire in room for HSD Cables Y/N   (Note 6)       (Note 6)                (Note 6)      (Note 6)   (Note 6)
(Note 7) 692.0-A2 - Gas Decay Tank Valve No           No             No           No         Insignificant            3.1.1 Gallery 692.0-A3 - Gas Decay Tank Room      Yes          No             No           No         Insignificant            3.1.1, 6.4.2.4   Yes          1-O 692.0-A4 - Chemical Drain Tank No           Yes            Yes          No         Insignificant Room 692.0-A5 - Gas Decay Tank Room      No           No             No           No         Insignificant            3.1.1, 6.4.2.4 692.0-A8 - Unit 1 Pipe Chase        Yes          Yes            No           No         Low                      3.1.1            Yes 692.0-A9 - Charging Pump 1A-A       Yes          Yes, Partial   Yes, Partial No         Low                      3.1.1 692.0-A12 - Safety Injection Pump Yes          Yes            Yes          No         Insignificant 1B-B 692.0-A13 - Safety Injection Pump Yes          Yes            Yes          No         Insignificant 1A-A 692.0-A17 - Maintenance and Test No           Yes, Partial   Yes, Partial No         Insignificant            3.1.1 Equipment (M&TE) Hot Tool Room 692.0-A18 - Hot Tool Room           Yes          Yes, Partial   Yes, Partial No         Insignificant            3.1.1 692.0-A27 - Concentrate Filter Room No           No             No           No         Insignificant 2.6.3.4    3.1.1 692.0-A29 - Boric Acid Evaporator Yes          No             No           No         Insignificant 2.9.1      3.1.1 Package Room B 692.0-A30 - Boric Acid Evaporator Yes          No             No           No         Insignificant 2.9.1      3.1.1 Package Room A 2.6.3.2.a, 692.0-A31 - Spare                   No           Yes, Partial   No           No         Low                      3.1.1 2.6.3.4 713.0-A28 - Unit 1 Pipe Chase       Yes          Yes            No           No         Insignificant            3.1.1            Yes FIRE AREA 1-1:
692.0-A20 - Safety Injection Pump Yes          Yes            Yes          No         Insignificant 2B-B I-7

PART I - INTRODUCTION TABLE I-1 

==SUMMARY==
COMPLIANCE FIRE PROTECTION Revision 60 CSD Repairs Safe         Automatic      Automatic               Combustible   Deviation Evaluation Fire Rated                                       req'd in any III.G Shutdown     Detection Y/N, Suppression             Load, Fire    Number in Number in Room Number and Name                                                         Wraps                                            room due to  Compliance Equipment or Partial        Y/N, Partial            Severity      Part VII  Part VII (Note 6)                                         fire in room for HSD Cables Y/N   (Note 6)       (Note 6)                (Note 6)      (Note 6)  (Note 6)
(Note 7)
FIRE AREA 1-2:
692.0-A19 - Safety Injection Pump Yes          Yes            Yes          No         Insignificant 2A-A FIRE AREA 2-1:
676.0-A10 - RHR Pump Room 1B-B      Yes          Yes, Partial   No           No         Insignificant FIRE AREA 2-2:
676.0-A13 - RHR Pump Room 2B-B      Yes          Yes, Partial   No           No         Insignificant FIRE AREA 3-1:
676.0-A11 - RHR Pump Room 1A-A      Yes          Yes, Partial   No           No         Insignificant FIRE AREA 3-2:
676.0-A12 - RHR Pump Room 2A-A      Yes          Yes, Partial   No           No         Insignificant FIRE AREA 4:
692.0-A6 - Turbine Driven Auxiliary Yes          Yes            Yes          No         Insignificant Feedwater Pump 1A-S FIRE AREA 5:
692.0-A7 - Unit 1 Penetration Rm                                                                                3.1.1.a, Yes          Yes, Partial   Yes, Partial No         Insignificant                                      1-G 7.1.3.1 FIRE AREA 6:
692.0-A10 - Charging Pump Room                                                                                  3.1.1, 3.6, Yes          Yes, Partial   Yes, Partial No         Low                                                1-G, 1-O 1B-B                                                                                                            7.1.3.1 FIRE AREA 7:
692.0-A11 - Charging Pump Room Yes          Yes, Partial   Yes, Partial No         Low 1C I-8

PART I - INTRODUCTION TABLE I-1 

==SUMMARY==
COMPLIANCE FIRE PROTECTION Revision 60 CSD Repairs Safe         Automatic      Automatic               Combustible   Deviation Evaluation Fire Rated                                          req'd in any III.G Shutdown     Detection Y/N, Suppression             Load, Fire    Number in Number in Room Number and Name                                                            Wraps                                               room due to  Compliance Equipment or Partial        Y/N, Partial            Severity      Part VII  Part VII (Note 6)                                            fire in room for HSD Cables Y/N   (Note 6)       (Note 6)                (Note 6)      (Note 6)  (Note 6)
(Note 7)
FIRE AREA 8:
713.0-A1 - Auxiliary Building Corridor                                                                   2.4, 2.5, Subdivided into 713.0-A1A (713-                                                            Moderately    2.6.3.1,  3.1.2 , 8.3.4,                2b, 2c, 1-G, Yes          Yes            Yes, Partial 1 hour                                              Yes A1A1,- A1A2,- A1A3,- A1A4,-A1AN),                                                          Severe        2.6.3.4,  5, 63 & 64                    1-O, 2-O, 2-G
-A1B (713-A1BN) and -A1C                                                                                 2.6.3.2.a 713.0-A2 - Air Lock                    No           Yes            Yes          No         Low 713.0-A3 - Titration Room              No           Yes            Yes, Partial No         Low 713.0-A4 - Radio Chemical Lab          Yes          Yes            Yes          No         Low 713.0-A5 - Counting Room               No           Yes            Yes          No         Low 713.0-A9 - Unit 1 Mixed Bed And No           No             No           No         Insignificant           3.1.2 Cation Valve Gallery 713.0-A10 - Seal Water Heat No           No             No           No         Low                     3.1.2 Exchanger 1A 713.0-A11 - Heat Exchanger 1B          Yes          No             No           No         Insignificant           3.1.2 713.0-A12 - Heat Exchanger 1A          Yes          No             No           No         Insignificant           3.1.2 713.0-A13 - Sample Room 1              Yes          Yes            Yes          No         Low 713.0-A14 - Sample Room 2              Yes          Yes            Yes          No         Insignificant 713.0-A15 - Heat Exchanger 2A          Yes          No             No           No         Low                     3.1.2 713.0-A16 - Heat Exchanger 2B          Yes          No             No           No         Low                     3.1.2 713.0-A17 - Seal Water Heat No           No             No           No         Insignificant           3.1.2 Exchanger 2A 713.0-A18 - Unit 2 Mixed Bed And No           No             No           No         Insignificant           3.1.2 Cation Valve Gallery 713.0-A22 - Holdup Tank Valve No           Yes            Yes          No         Low Gallery 713.0-A23 - CVCS Valve Gallery         No           No             No           No         Insignificant           3.1.2 I-9

PART I - INTRODUCTION TABLE I-1 

==SUMMARY==
COMPLIANCE FIRE PROTECTION Revision 60 CSD Repairs Safe         Automatic      Automatic               Combustible   Deviation    Evaluation Fire Rated                                             req'd in any III.G Shutdown     Detection Y/N, Suppression             Load, Fire    Number in    Number in Room Number and Name                                                        Wraps                                                  room due to  Compliance Equipment or Partial        Y/N, Partial            Severity      Part VII     Part VII (Note 6)                                               fire in room for HSD Cables Y/N   (Note 6)       (Note 6)                (Note 6)      (Note 6)     (Note 6)
(Note 7) 713.0-A24 - Waste Gas Compressor No           No             No           No         Insignificant              3.1.2 Valve Gallery 713.0-A25 - Waste Gas Compressor No           No             No           No         Low                        3.1.2 B
713.0-A26 - Waste Gas Compressor No           No             No           No         Low                        3.1.2 A
8.3.6, 63 &
713.0-A27 - Decontamination Room   Yes          Yes            Yes          No         Low                                         Yes          1-G, 2-G, 1-O 64 713.0-A30 - Air Lock               No           No             No           No         Insignificant              3.1.2 713.0-A31 - Waste Gas Analyzer No           No             No           No         Insignificant              3.1.2 Room FIRE AREA 9:
3.1.3, 3.2, 713.0-A6 - Unit 1 Penetration Room Yes          Yes            Yes          1 hour     Moderate                                                 2c, 1-G, 1-O 3.5 713.0-A8 - Unit 1 Reactor Building No           No             No           No         Insignificant              3.1.3 Access Room FIRE AREA 9-1:
713.0-A7 - Unit 1 Volume Control                                                                                  3.1.3a, 3.5 &
Yes          Yes            Yes, Partial No         Insignificant                                            1-O Tank (VCT) Room                                                                                                   7.1.3.2 FIRE AREA 10:
692.0-A14 - Cask Decontamination No           Yes, Partial   Yes          No         Insignificant Collection Tank Room 692.0-A15 - Spent Resin Tank Room  No           No             No           No         Insignificant              6.4.2.1 692.0-A16 - Valve Gallery          No           No             No           No         Insignificant 728.0-A7 - Cask Decontamination No           No             No           No         Insignificant Room 729.0-A5 - Cask Unloading Area     No           Yes            Yes          No         Low 729.0-A6 - Nitrogen Storage Area   Yes          Yes, Partial   No           No         Insignificant 2.6.1, 2.9.4 3.1.4, 6.2.2.2 I-10

PART I - INTRODUCTION TABLE I-1 

==SUMMARY==
COMPLIANCE FIRE PROTECTION Revision 60 CSD Repairs Safe         Automatic      Automatic               Combustible   Deviation    Evaluation Fire Rated                                           req'd in any III.G Shutdown     Detection Y/N, Suppression             Load, Fire    Number in    Number in Room Number and Name                                                           Wraps                                                room due to  Compliance Equipment or Partial        Y/N, Partial            Severity      Part VII     Part VII (Note 6)                                             fire in room for HSD Cables Y/N   (Note 6)       (Note 6)                (Note 6)      (Note 6)     (Note 6)
(Note 7) 729.0-A8 - Unit 1 Post Accident Yes          Yes, Partial   Yes, Partial 1 hour     Low           2.6.1        6.2.2.2                     2c Sampling Room 729.0-A9 - Unit 2 Post Accident Yes          Yes, Partial   Yes, Partial 1 hour     Low           2.6.1                                    2c Sampling Room 2.6.3.1, 757.0-A13 - Refueling Room 2.6.3.2.b, (includes 741.5 - New Fuel Storage    Yes          No             No           No         Low 2.9.10, 4.1, Vault) 4.5 772.0-A9 - HEPA Filter Plenum                                                                                        8.3.42, 63 &
Yes          Yes            Yes          No         Low                                                    0-G, 1-G, 2-G Room                                                                                                                 64 776.0-A1 - Elevator Machine Room      No           No             No           No         Severe 786.0-A1 - Fan Room                   No           No             No           No         Insignificant 814.75-ACS - Stair No. 2 &
No           No             No           No         Insignificant Penthouse Stair No. 4 - Stair No. 4 & Penthouse No           Yes, Partial   No           No         Insignificant FIRE AREA 11:
729.0-A3 - Waste Package Area         No           Yes            Yes          No         Low 729.0-A4 - Waste Package Area         No           Yes            Yes          No         Moderate      4.7 FIRE AREA 12:
729.0-A1 - Main Steam Valve Room Yes          No             No           No         Insignificant 2.9.2        3.1.5 (Unit 1 South) 737.0-A6 - Air Lock                   No           No             No           No         Insignificant 2.9.2        3.1.5 FIRE AREA 13:
729.0-A2 - Main Steam Valve Room Yes          No             No           No         Insignificant 2.9.3        3.1.6 (Unit 1 North) 729.5-A16 - Unit 1 Shield Building Yes          No             No           No         Insignificant Vent Radiation Monitoring Room I-11

PART I - INTRODUCTION TABLE I-1 

==SUMMARY==
COMPLIANCE FIRE PROTECTION Revision 60 CSD Repairs Safe         Automatic      Automatic               Combustible   Deviation      Evaluation Fire Rated                                                req'd in any III.G Shutdown     Detection Y/N, Suppression             Load, Fire    Number in      Number in Room Number and Name                                                            Wraps                                                     room due to  Compliance Equipment or Partial        Y/N, Partial            Severity      Part VII       Part VII (Note 6)                                                  fire in room for HSD Cables Y/N   (Note 6)       (Note 6)                (Note 6)      (Note 6)       (Note 6)
(Note 7)
Unit 1 Additional Equipment Building (U1-AEB) - (729.0-A14, 737.0-A13,      Yes          Yes, Partial   No           No         Low                                                         1-G 763.5-A1, 775.25-A1, 786.5-A1) 729.0-A12 - Unit 1 Steam Valve Yes          No             No           No         Low           2.9.7          3.1.6 Instrument Room A FIRE AREA 14:
737.0-A1 - Auxiliary Building Corridor                                                                                                                 2b, 2c, 0-G, Moderately    2.4, 2.6.3.1,   3.4, 8.3.8, 9, (Subdivided into 737.0-A1A, -A1AN,     Yes          Yes            Yes, Partial 1 hour                                                    Yes          0-O, 1-G, 2-G, Severe        2.6.3.2.a, 4.1 10 & 11
-A1BN, -A1CN, A1B and -A1C)                                                                                                                            2-O, 1-O 737.0-A2 - Hot Instrument Shop         No           Yes            No           No         Low                          3.1.7 737.0-A4 - Air Lock                    No           No             No           No         Insignificant                3.1.7 737.0-A7 - Unit 1 Letdown Heat                                                                                                                         0-O, 0-G, 1-G, Yes          No             No           No         Low                          3.1.7             Yes Exchanger                                                                                                                                              1-O, 2-G, 2-O 737.0-A8 - Unit 2 Letdown Heat                                                                                                                         0-O, 0-G, 1-G, Yes          No             No           No         Low                          3.1.7             Yes Exchanger                                                                                                                                              1-O, 2-G, 2-O 737.0-A11 - Air Lock                   No           No             No           No         Insignificant                3.1.7 FIRE AREA 15-1:
737.0-A3 - Unit 1 Heat and Vent Yes          Yes            Yes, Partial 1 hour     Low                          3.4               Yes          2c, 0-O, 1-O Equipment Room FIRE AREA 15-2:
737.0-A12 - Unit 2 Heat and Vent                                                                                        3.4, 8.3.18 &
Yes          Yes            Yes, Partial 1 hour     Low                                                         2c, 1-G, 2-G Equipment Room                                                                                                          65 FIRE AREA 16:
737.0-A5 - Ventilation and Purge Air                                                                                    6.2.2.1, 2b, 2c, 1-G, 1-Room (Subdivided into 737.0-A5S, -     Yes          Yes            Yes, Partial 1 hour     Low           2.4, 2.6.1     8.3.12, 13, O, 2-G A5M, -A5N)                                                                                                              14, 63 & 64 737.0-A15 - Gross Failed Fuel                       No             Yes No                                       No         Insignificant Detector Room                                       (Note 1)       (Note 1)
I-12

PART I - INTRODUCTION TABLE I-1 

==SUMMARY==
COMPLIANCE FIRE PROTECTION Revision 60 CSD Repairs Safe         Automatic      Automatic               Combustible Deviation     Evaluation Fire Rated                                          req'd in any III.G Shutdown     Detection Y/N, Suppression             Load, Fire  Number in     Number in Room Number and Name                                                         Wraps                                               room due to  Compliance Equipment or Partial        Y/N, Partial            Severity    Part VII      Part VII (Note 6)                                            fire in room for HSD Cables Y/N   (Note 6)       (Note 6)                (Note 6)    (Note 6)      (Note 6)
(Note 7)
FIRE AREA 17:
2b, 2c, 0-G, 0-757.0-A2 - 6.9kV and 480V                                                               Moderately  2.4, 2.6.3.1, Yes          Yes            Yes          1 hour                               8.3.20         Yes          O, 1-G, 1-O, 2-Shutdown Board Room A                                                                   Severe      4.3 G
2b, 2c , 0-G, 0-757.0-A9 - Unit 1 Personnel and Yes          Yes            Yes          1 hour     Moderate    2.4           8.3.24         Yes          O, 1-G, 1-O, 2-Equipment Access G
FIRE AREA 18:
757.0-A3 - 125V Vital Battery Board                             No                                                                             1-O, 0-G, 1-G, Yes          Yes                         No         Low                       8.3.21 & 65 Room II                                                         (Note 5)                                                                      2-G FIRE AREA 19:
757.0-A4 - 125V Vital Battery Board                             No                                                8.3.22, 63 &                1-G, 1-O, 0-G, Yes          Yes                         No         Low Room I                                                          (Note 5)                                          64                          2-G FIRE AREA 20:
2c, 0-G, 1-G, 757.0-A1 - Auxiliary Control Room   Yes          Yes            Yes          1 hour     Moderate    2.1           8.3.19         Yes 1-O, 2-G, 2-O FIRE AREA 21:
757.0-A25 - Auxiliary Control                                                                                                                 2c, 0-G, 1-G, Yes          Yes            Yes          1 hour     Severe Instrument Room 1A                                                                                                                            1-O FIRE AREA 22:
757.0-A26 - Auxiliary Control                                                           Moderately                                            2c, 1-G, 1-O, Yes          Yes            Yes          1 hour                               8.3.32 & 65 Instrument Room 1B                                                                      Severe                                                2-G FIRE AREA 23:
757.0-A27 - Auxiliary Control                                                                                     8.3.33, 63 &                2-G, 0-G, 1-G, Yes          Yes            Yes          No         Moderate                                 Yes Instrument Room 2A                                                                                                64                          2-O FIRE AREA 24:
757.0-A28 - Auxiliary Control                                                           Moderately                8.3.34, 62 &                2c, 2-G, 1-O, Yes          Yes            Yes          1 hour Instrument Room 2B                                                                      Severe                    65                          2-O I-13

PART I - INTRODUCTION TABLE I-1 

==SUMMARY==
COMPLIANCE FIRE PROTECTION Revision 60 CSD Repairs Safe         Automatic      Automatic               Combustible Deviation      Evaluation Fire Rated                                           req'd in any III.G Shutdown     Detection Y/N, Suppression             Load, Fire  Number in      Number in Room Number and Name                                                          Wraps                                                room due to  Compliance Equipment or Partial        Y/N, Partial            Severity    Part VII       Part VII (Note 6)                                             fire in room for HSD Cables Y/N   (Note 6)       (Note 6)                (Note 6)    (Note 6)       (Note 6)
(Note 7)
FIRE AREA 25:
757.0-A10 - Miscellaneous                                                                Moderately                 8.3.25, 62 &                2b, 2c, 1-G, 1-Yes          Yes            Yes          1 hour                 2.4, 2.6.3.2.b                Yes Equipment Room                                                                           Severe                     65                          O, 2-G 757.0-A12 - Reactor Building Access Yes          Yes            Yes          No         Moderate                                               1-G Room (Unit 1) 782.0-A1 - Unit 1 Control Rod Drive                                                                                 8.3.51, 62 &
Yes          Yes            Yes          No         Moderate                                               1-G, 1-O, 2-G Equipment Room                                                                                                      65 782.0-A2 - Pressurizer Heater                                                                                       8.3.52, 62 &
Yes          Yes            Yes          No         Moderate                                               1-G, 1-O, 2-G Transformer Room 1                                                                                                  65 FIRE AREA 26:
757.0-A11 - Unit 1 Reactor Bldg Yes          Yes            Yes, Partial 1 hour     Low                        6.1.1                       2c, 1-G Equipment Hatch FIRE AREA 27:
2c, 0-O, 1-G, 757.0-A5 - 480V Shutdown Board                                                           Moderately Yes          Yes            Yes          1 hour                 4.1            8.3.23                      2-G, 1-O, 0-G, Room 1B                                                                                  Severe 2-O FIRE AREA 28:
757.0-A21 - 480V Shutdown Board                                                          Moderately                                             2c, 0-G, 2-G, Yes          Yes            Yes          1 hour                 4.1            8.3.28 & 64    Yes Room 2A                                                                                  Severe                                                 2-O, 1-G, 1-O FIRE AREA 29:
757.0-A22 - 125V Vital Battery Board                             No                                                 8.3.29, 62 &                1-G, 2-G, 0-G, Yes          Yes                         No         Low Room IV                                                          (Note 5)                                           65                          2-O FIRE AREA 30:
757.0-A23 - 125V Vital Battery Board                             No                                                 8.3.30, 63 &                2-O, 0-G, 1-G, Yes          Yes                         No         Low                                       Yes Room III                                                         (Note 5)                                           64                          2-G FIRE AREA 31:
757.0-A17 - Unit 2 Personnel and                                                                                    8.3.27, 62 &                1-G, 2-G, 0-G, Yes          Yes            Yes          No         Low Equipment Access Room                                                                                               65                          2-O 757.0-A24 - 6.9kV & 480V Shutdown                                                        Moderately                 8.3.31, 62 &                2c, 0-G, 1-G, Yes          Yes            Yes          1 hour                 2.6.3.1, 4.3 Board Room B                                                                             Severe                     65                          2-G, 2-O I-14

PART I - INTRODUCTION TABLE I-1 

==SUMMARY==
COMPLIANCE FIRE PROTECTION Revision 60 CSD Repairs Safe         Automatic      Automatic               Combustible Deviation Evaluation Fire Rated                                        req'd in any III.G Shutdown     Detection Y/N, Suppression             Load, Fire  Number in Number in Room Number and Name                                                          Wraps                                             room due to  Compliance Equipment or Partial        Y/N, Partial            Severity    Part VII  Part VII (Note 6)                                          fire in room for HSD Cables Y/N   (Note 6)       (Note 6)                (Note 6)    (Note 6)  (Note 6)
(Note 7)
FIRE AREA 32:
Moderately            8.3.35, 63 &                  2c, 1-G, 1-O, 772.0-A1 - 480V Board Room 1-A       Yes          Yes            Yes          1 hour                 2.6.3.1 Severe                64                            0-G, 0-O, 2-G FIRE AREA 33:
772.0-A2 - 480V Board Room 1-B                                                1 hour                           3.1.8, 8.3.36,                2a, 2b, 2c, 0-(Subdivided into 772.0-A2A1, -A2A2,  Yes          Yes            Yes, Partial 3 hour     Severe      2.4       37, 62, 63,                   O, 0-G, 1-G,
-A2A3, -A2A4)                                                                 (Note 4)                         64 & 65                       1-O, 2-G FIRE AREA 34:
772.0-A3 - 125V Vital Battery Room                               No Yes          Yes                         No         Low                                                 1-O, 1-G II                                                               (Note 5 )
FIRE AREA 35:
No                                            8.3.38, 63 &                  1-G, 1-O, 2-G, 772.0-A4 - 125V Vital Battery Room I Yes          Yes                         No         Low (Note 5)                                      64                            0-G FIRE AREA 36:
772.0-A5 - 480V Transformer Room                                                                                                             2c, 1-G, 1-O, Yes          Yes            Yes          1 hour     Moderate 1-B                                                                                                                                          0-G FIRE AREA 37:
772.0-A6 - 480V Transformer Room                                                                                                             2c, 1-G, 0-G, Yes          Yes            Yes          1 hour     Moderate              8.3.40 & 64      Yes 1-A                                                                                                                                          2-G FIRE AREA 38:
772.0-A7 - Unit 1 Mechanical                                                             Moderately Yes          Yes            Yes          No                     4.3                                     1-O, 0-G Equipment Room                                                                           Severe FIRE AREA 39:
772.0-A8 - Fifth Vital Battery and                                                                             8.3.41, 62,                   0-G, 1-G, 1-O, Yes          Yes            Yes          No         Low Board Room                                                                                                     63, 64 & 65                   2-G, 2-O FIRE AREA 40:
772.0-A10 - Unit 2 Mechanical                                                            Moderately            8.3.43, 63 &
Yes          Yes            Yes          No                     4.1, 4.3                                1-G, 2-G, 0-G Equipment Room                                                                           Severe                64 I-15

PART I - INTRODUCTION TABLE I-1 

==SUMMARY==
COMPLIANCE FIRE PROTECTION Revision 60 CSD Repairs Safe         Automatic      Automatic               Combustible   Deviation    Evaluation Fire Rated                                             req'd in any III.G Shutdown     Detection Y/N, Suppression             Load, Fire    Number in    Number in Room Number and Name                                                         Wraps                                                  room due to  Compliance Equipment or Partial        Y/N, Partial            Severity      Part VII     Part VII (Note 6)                                               fire in room for HSD Cables Y/N   (Note 6)       (Note 6)                (Note 6)      (Note 6)     (Note 6)
(Note 7)
FIRE AREA 41:
772.0-A11 - 480V Transformer Room                                                       Moderately                                               2c, 0-G, 1-G, Yes          Yes            Yes          1-hour                                8.3.44 & 65 2-B                                                                                     Severe                                                   2-G FIRE AREA 42:
772.0-A12 - 480V Transformer Room                                                       Moderately                                               1-G, 1-O, 2-O, Yes          Yes            Yes          No                                    8.3.45 & 64      Yes 2-A                                                                                     Severe                                                   2-G, 0-G FIRE AREA 43:
772.0-A13 - 125V Vital Battery Room                             No                                                 8.3.46, 62 &
Yes          Yes                         No         Low                                                      2-G, 2-O, 0-G IV                                                              (Note 5)                                           65 FIRE AREA 44:
772.0-A14 - 125V Vital Battery Room                             No                                                 8.3.47, 63 &
Yes          Yes                         No         Low                                                      2-G, 0-G, 2-O III                                                             (Note 5)                                           64 FIRE AREA 45:
772.0-A15 - 480V Board Room 2-B 3.1.8, 8.3.48,                2b, 2c, 0-G, (Subdivided into 772.0-A15A1, -     Yes          Yes            Yes, Partial 1-hour     Severe        2.4                           Yes 49, 62 & 65                   2-G, 2-O, 1-G A15A2, - A15A3, - A15A4)
FIRE AREA 46:
Moderately                 8.3.50, 63 &                  2-O, 1-G, 0-G, 772.0-A16 - 480V Board Room 2-A     Yes          Yes            Yes          No                       2.6.3.1, 4.1 Severe                     64                            2-G, 0-O FIRE AREA 47:
786.0-A2 - Roof Access Air Lock     No           No             No           No         Insignificant 786.0-A3 - Mechanical Equipment No           No             No           No         Insignificant Room 2B 786.0-A4 - Mechanical Equipment No           No             No           No         Insignificant Room 1B 786.0-AR - Roof                     Yes          No             No           No         Insignificant 786.0-A5 - 225 kVA DG Room B        No           Yes            Yes          No         Moderate I-16

PART I - INTRODUCTION TABLE I-1 

==SUMMARY==
COMPLIANCE FIRE PROTECTION Revision 60 CSD Repairs Safe         Automatic      Automatic               Combustible   Deviation Evaluation Fire Rated                                      req'd in any III.G Shutdown     Detection Y/N, Suppression             Load, Fire    Number in Number in Room Number and Name                                                         Wraps                                           room due to  Compliance Equipment or Partial        Y/N, Partial            Severity      Part VII  Part VII (Note 6)                                        fire in room for HSD Cables Y/N   (Note 6)       (Note 6)                (Note 6)      (Note 6)  (Note 6)
(Note 7) 786.0-A6 - 225 kVA DG Room A        No           Yes            Yes          No         Moderate FIRE AREA 48: Control Building      (Note 2) 692.0-C1 - Mechanical Equipment Assumed Yes  Yes            Yes          No         Insignificant 2.6.4 Room 692.0-C2 - Mechanical Equipment Assumed Yes  Yes            Yes          No         Insignificant Room 692.0-C3 - 250V Battery Room 1      Assumed Yes  Yes            Yes          No         Low 692.0-C4 - 250V Battery Board Assumed Yes  Yes            No           No         Low           2.3 Room No.1 692.0-C5 - 250V Battery Board Assumed Yes  Yes            No           No         Low           2.3 Room No.2 692.0-C6 - 250V Battery Room 2      Assumed Yes  Yes            Yes          No         Low 692.0-C7 - 24V and 48V Battery Assumed Yes  Yes            Yes          No         Low Room 692.0-C8 - 24V and 48V Battery Assumed Yes  Yes            No           No         Low           2.3 Board and Charger Room 692.0-C9 - Communications Room      Assumed Yes  Yes            Yes          No         Moderate 692.0-C10 - Mechanical Equipment Assumed Yes  Yes            Yes          No         Insignificant 2.6.4 Room 692.0-C11 - Corridor                Assumed Yes  Yes            Yes          No         Low           4.2 692.0-C12 - Secondary Alarm Station Assumed Yes  Yes, Partial   Yes          No         Moderate Room 708.0-C1 - Unit 1 Auxiliary                                                             Moderately Assumed Yes  Yes            Yes          No Instrument Room                                                                         Severe 708.0-C2 - Corridor                 Assumed Yes  Yes            No           No         Low           2.3, 5.2 Moderately 708.0-C3 - Computer Room            Assumed Yes  Yes, Partial   Yes          No Severe 708.0-C4 - Unit 2 Auxiliary                                                             Moderately Assumed Yes  Yes            Yes          No Instrument Room                                                                         Severe I-17

PART I - INTRODUCTION TABLE I-1 

==SUMMARY==
COMPLIANCE FIRE PROTECTION Revision 60 CSD Repairs Safe         Automatic      Automatic               Combustible   Deviation Evaluation Fire Rated                                      req'd in any III.G Shutdown     Detection Y/N, Suppression             Load, Fire    Number in Number in Room Number and Name                                                         Wraps                                           room due to  Compliance Equipment or Partial        Y/N, Partial            Severity      Part VII  Part VII (Note 6)                                        fire in room for HSD Cables Y/N   (Note 6)       (Note 6)                (Note 6)      (Note 6)  (Note 6)
(Note 7) 729.0-C1 - Spreading Room           Yes          Yes            Yes          No         Severe        5.2 755.0-C1 - Mechanical Equipment Assumed Yes  Yes            Yes, Partial No         Low Room 755.0-C2 - Women's Restroom         Assumed Yes  Yes            Yes          No         Low 755.0-C3 - Corridor (includes space above Operations office and living  Assumed Yes  Yes, Partial   Yes          No         Insignificant 5.2 area) 755.0-C4 - Kitchen                  Assumed Yes  Yes            Yes          No         Low 755.0-C5 - Toilet                   Assumed Yes  Yes            Yes          No         Low 755.0-C6 - Locker Room              Assumed Yes  Yes            Yes          No         Insignificant 755.0-C7 - Shower                   Assumed Yes  No             No           No         Insignificant 2.3 755.0-C8 - Shower                   Assumed Yes  No             No           No         Insignificant 2.3 Moderately 755.0-C9 - Conference Room          Assumed Yes  Yes            Yes          No Severe 755.0-C10 - Shift Managers Office  Assumed Yes  Yes            Yes          No         Severe 755.0-C12 - Main Control Room       Yes          Yes, Partial   No           No         Low           2.3, 4.1 755.0-C13 - Relay Room              Assumed Yes  Yes            No           No         Low           2.3 755.0-C14 - Technical Support Assumed Yes  Yes            Yes          No         Low Center 755.0-C15 - Corridor                Assumed Yes  Yes            No           No         Insignificant 2.3, 5.2 755.0-C16 - Conference Room         Assumed Yes  Yes            Yes          No         Low 755.0-C17 - Telephone Room          Assumed Yes  No             No           No         Insignificant 2.3 755.0-C18 - NRC Office              Assumed Yes  Yes            Yes          No         Low I-18

PART I - INTRODUCTION TABLE I-1 

==SUMMARY==
COMPLIANCE FIRE PROTECTION Revision 60 CSD Repairs Safe         Automatic      Automatic               Combustible Deviation     Evaluation Fire Rated                                        req'd in any III.G Shutdown     Detection Y/N, Suppression             Load, Fire  Number in     Number in Room Number and Name                                                          Wraps                                             room due to  Compliance Equipment or Partial        Y/N, Partial            Severity    Part VII      Part VII (Note 6)                                          fire in room for HSD Cables Y/N   (Note 6)       (Note 6)                (Note 6)    (Note 6)      (Note 6)
(Note 7) 755.0-C19 - Corridor                 Assumed Yes  Yes            Yes          No         Low 755.0-C20 - DPSO Shop                Assumed Yes  Yes            No           No         Low         2.3 Stairwell C1                         Assumed Yes  No             No           No         Low         2.3, 4.2, 4.3 Stairwell C2                         Assumed Yes  No             No           No         Low         2.3, 4.2, 4.3 FIRE AREA 49: Diesel Generator Building 742.0-D4 - Diesel Generator Unit 1A-                                                     Moderately Yes          Yes            Yes          No                     4.4 A                                                                                        Severe 760.5-D3 - Unit 1A-A Air Exhaust Yes          Yes            No           No         Moderate    4.7 Room 760.5-D4 - 480V Board Room 1A-A      Yes          Yes            Yes          No         Moderate 760.5-D5 - Unit 1A-A Air Intake Yes          Yes            No           No         Low Room FIRE AREA 50: Diesel Generator Building 742.0-D5 - Diesel Generator Unit                                                         Moderately Yes          Yes            Yes          No                     4.4 2A-A                                                                                     Severe 760.5-D6 - Unit 2A-A Air Exhaust Yes          Yes            No           No         Moderate Room 760.5-D7 - 480V Board Room 2A-A      Yes          Yes            Yes          No         Moderate 760.5-D8 - Unit 2A-A Air Intake Yes          Yes            No           No         Low Room FIRE AREA 51: Diesel Generator Building 742.0-D6 - Diesel Generator Unit 1B-                                                     Moderately Yes          Yes            Yes          No                     4.4 B                                                                                        Severe 760.5-D9 - Unit 1B-B Air Exhaust Yes          Yes            No           No         Moderate Room 760.5-D10 - 480V Board Room 1B-B     Yes          Yes            Yes          No         Moderate I-19

PART I - INTRODUCTION TABLE I-1 

==SUMMARY==
COMPLIANCE FIRE PROTECTION Revision 60 CSD Repairs Safe         Automatic      Automatic               Combustible   Deviation      Evaluation Fire Rated                                           req'd in any III.G Shutdown     Detection Y/N, Suppression             Load, Fire    Number in      Number in Room Number and Name                                                          Wraps                                                room due to  Compliance Equipment or Partial        Y/N, Partial            Severity      Part VII       Part VII (Note 6)                                             fire in room for HSD Cables Y/N   (Note 6)       (Note 6)                (Note 6)      (Note 6)       (Note 6)
(Note 7) 760.5-D11 - Unit 1B-B Air Intake Yes          Yes            No           No         Low Room FIRE AREA 52: Diesel Generator Building 742.0-D7 - Diesel Generator Unit 2B-                                                     Moderately Yes          Yes            Yes          No                       4.4 B                                                                                        Severe 760.5-D12 - Unit 2B-B Air Exhaust Yes          Yes            No           No         Moderate Room 760.5-D13 - 480V Board Room 2B-B     Yes          Yes            Yes          No         Moderate 760.5-D14 - Unit 2B-B Air Intake Yes          Yes            No           No         Low Room FIRE AREA 53: Diesel Generator Building 742.0-D3 - Toilet                    No           No             No           No         Low 742.0-D8 - Fuel Oil Transfer Room    No           Yes            Yes          No         Insignificant 4.6 742.0-D9 - Pipe Gallery and Corridor                                                                   4.3, 4.4, 4.6, Yes          Yes            Yes          No         Low (742.0-D9A,D9B, & D9N)                                                                                 4.7, 5.2 FIRE AREA 54: Diesel Generator Building 742.0-D1 - CO2 Storage Room          No           No             No           No         Insignificant 742.0-D2 - Lube Oil Storage Room     No           Yes            Yes          No         Severe        5.2 742.0-D10 - Conduit Interface Room   No           Yes            No           No         Moderate 760.5-D1 - Corridor                  No           No             No           No         Insignificant 760.5-D2 - Radiation Shelter         No           No             No           No         Low Stairwell D1                         No           No             No           No         Low I-20

PART I - INTRODUCTION TABLE I-1 

==SUMMARY==
COMPLIANCE FIRE PROTECTION Revision 60 CSD Repairs Safe               Automatic         Automatic                Combustible   Deviation    Evaluation Fire Rated                                            req'd in any III.G Shutdown           Detection Y/N,    Suppression              Load, Fire    Number in    Number in Room Number and Name                                                                    Wraps                                                 room due to  Compliance Equipment or       Partial           Y/N, Partial             Severity      Part VII     Part VII (Note 6)                                              fire in room for HSD Cables Y/N         (Note 6)          (Note 6)                 (Note 6)      (Note 6)     (Note 6)
(Note 7)
FIRE AREA 55: Diesel Generator Building Cable Chase - A                      Yes                Yes               Yes           No         Severe FIRE AREA 56: Diesel Generator Building Cable Chase - B                      Yes                Yes               Yes           No         Severe FIRE AREA 57: (Deleted - Formerly Assigned to the Additional Diesel Generator Building)
FIRE AREA 58: IPS IPS EL 741 West - ERCW Pump                                                                                                   6.3, 8.3.57 &
Yes                Yes, Partial      No            No         Moderate      2.6.2.1                                   0-G, 1-G, 2-G Room A                                                                                                                        64 IPS EL 741 West - Screen Wash and Yes                No                No            No         Low           2.6.2.1, 5.1 3.3                          0-G, 1-G, 2-G HPFP A Pump Room IPS EL 722 West - ERCW Strainer Yes                Yes               No            No         Insignificant 4.1                                       0-G, 1-G, 2-G Room A FIRE AREA 59: IPS IPS EL 741 East - ERCW Pump Yes                Yes, Partial      No            No         Moderate      2.6.2.1      8.3.58 & 65                  1-G, 2-G Room B IPS EL 741 East - HPFP B Pump Yes                No                No            No         Low           5.1          3.3                          1-G, 2-G Room IPS EL 722 East - ERCW Strainer Yes                Yes               No            No         Insignificant 4.1                                       1-G, 2-G Room B FIRE AREA 60: IPS IPS EL 711.0 - Board Room 8.3.59, 60,                  2b, 0-G, 1-G, (Subdivided into IPS-CA, IPS-CC-A,   Yes                Yes               Yes           No         Moderate      2.4 61, 64 & 65                  2-G IPS-CB, IPS-CC-B)
IPS Roof Deck EL 728 - RCW Pump No                 No                No            No         Insignificant              6.3 Deck FIRE AREA 61:
Unit 1 Reactor Building - Annulus    Yes                Yes, Partial      Yes, Partial  Yes (RES)  Severe        2.2, 2.7.1   3.2             Yes          2def, 1-O, 1-G I-21

PART I - INTRODUCTION TABLE I-1 

==SUMMARY==
COMPLIANCE FIRE PROTECTION Revision 60 CSD Repairs Safe         Automatic      Automatic               Combustible   Deviation      Evaluation Fire Rated                                             req'd in any III.G Shutdown     Detection Y/N, Suppression             Load, Fire    Number in      Number in Room Number and Name                                                          Wraps                                                  room due to  Compliance Equipment or Partial        Y/N, Partial            Severity      Part VII       Part VII (Note 6)                                               fire in room for HSD Cables Y/N   (Note 6)       (Note 6)                (Note 6)      (Note 6)       (Note 6)
(Note 7)
Unit 1 Reactor Building - Primary Containment (Subdivided into RO-1, 2.2, 2.7.1, RO-2, RO-3, RO-4, RI-1, RI-2, RI-3,  Yes          Yes, Partial   Yes, Partial Yes (RES)  Moderate                                    Yes          2def 2.8, 2.9.22 RI-4, RIR, RA1, RA2, RA3, RA4, RF1, RF2, RU)
FIRE AREA 62: Not required for Fire Safe Shutdown CDWE Building - Condensate Demineralizer Waste Evaporator       No           No             No           No         Low           4.7 Building (CDWE)
FIRE AREA 63:
2.6.4, 2.7.3, Turbine Building                     Yes          Yes, Partial   Yes, Partial No         N/A 5.2 FIRE AREA 64:
Yard (Duct Banks to IPS, Tanks,                                                                                            8.3.55, 56, Yes          Yes, Partial   Yes          No         N/A           2.6.2.2, 2.7.2                             0-G, 1-G, 2-G Transformers and H2 Storage                                                                                           64 & 65 Trailers)
IRE AREA 65:
676.0-A17 - Unit 2 Pipe Chase        Yes          Yes            No           No         Insignificant 2.6.3.4        3.1.9 692.0-A24 - Unit 2 Pipe Chase        Yes          Yes            No           No         Insignificant                3.1.9 713.0-A29 - Unit 2 Pipe Chase        Yes          Yes            No           No         Insignificant                3.1.9                       2-O FIRE AREA 66:
692.0-A21 - Charging Pump 2C         Yes          Yes, Partial   Yes, Partial No         Low FIRE AREA 67:
692.0-A22 - Charging Pump 2B-B       Yes          Yes, Partial   Yes, Partial No         Low                          3.1.1, 8.3.2                2-O, 2-G I-22

PART I - INTRODUCTION TABLE I-1 

==SUMMARY==
COMPLIANCE FIRE PROTECTION Revision 60 CSD Repairs Safe         Automatic      Automatic               Combustible   Deviation Evaluation Fire Rated                                        req'd in any III.G Shutdown     Detection Y/N, Suppression             Load, Fire    Number in Number in Room Number and Name                                                          Wraps                                             room due to  Compliance Equipment or Partial        Y/N, Partial            Severity      Part VII  Part VII (Note 6)                                          fire in room for HSD Cables Y/N   (Note 6)       (Note 6)                (Note 6)      (Note 6)  (Note 6)
(Note 7)
FIRE AREA 68:
692.0-A23 - Charging Pump 2A-A       Yes          Yes, Partial   Yes, Partial No         Moderate                3.1.1 FIRE AREA 69:
692.0-A26 - Turbine Driven Aux Yes          Yes            Yes          No         Low Feedwater Pump 2A-S Room FIRE AREA 70:
3.1.9.a; 692.0-A25 - Unit 2 Penetration Room  Yes          Yes, Partial   Yes, Partial No         Insignificant                                       2-G, 2-O 8.3.3 FIRE AREA 71:
713.0-A19 - Unit 2 Penetration Rm    Yes          Yes            Yes          No         Moderate                3.1.10, 3.2                 2-O 713.0-A21 - Unit 2 RB Access Room    No           No             No           No         Insignificant           3.1.10 FIRE AREA 71-1:
713.0-A20 - Unit 2 Volume Control                                                                                3.1.10a, 3.5 Yes          Yes            Yes, Partial No         Insignificant                                       2-O Tank Room                                                                                                        & 8.4.2 FIRE AREA 72:
737.0-A10 - Air Lock                 No           No             No           No         Insignificant 2.9.6     3.1.11 729.0-A11 - Unit 2 South Main Steam Yes          No             No           No         Insignificant 2.9.6     3.1.11 Valve Rm FIRE AREA 73:
729.0-A10 - Unit 2 North Main Steam Yes          No             No           No         Insignificant 2.9.5     3.1.12 Valve Rm 729.0-A13 - Unit 2 North Main Steam Yes          No             No           No         Insignificant 2.9.8     3.1.12 Valve Instrument Room B Unit 2 Additional Equipment Building (U2-AEB) (Rooms 729.0-A15, 737.0-    Yes          Yes, Partial   No           No         Low           2.9.9 A14, and 763.5-A2)
I-23

PART I - INTRODUCTION TABLE I-1 

==SUMMARY==
COMPLIANCE FIRE PROTECTION Revision 60 CSD Repairs Safe         Automatic      Automatic               Combustible   Deviation   Evaluation Fire Rated                                           req'd in any III.G Shutdown     Detection Y/N, Suppression             Load, Fire    Number in   Number in Room Number and Name                                                          Wraps                                                room due to  Compliance Equipment or Partial        Y/N, Partial            Severity      Part VII    Part VII (Note 6)                                             fire in room for HSD Cables Y/N   (Note 6)       (Note 6)                (Note 6)      (Note 6)    (Note 6)
(Note 7) 729.5-A17 - Unit 2 Shield Bldg Vent Yes          No             No           No         Insignificant             3.1.12 Rad Monitor Room FIRE AREA 74:
737.0-A9 - Ventilation and Purge Air 8.3.15, 16,                  2b, 2c ,1-G, 2-Room (Subdivided into 737.0-A9S, -   Yes          Yes            Yes          1 hour     Low           2.4, 2.6.1 17, 63 & 64                  G A9M, and -A9N) 737.0-A16 - Unit 2 Gross Failed Fuel              No No                          Yes          No         Insignificant Detect. Room                                      (Note 3)
FIRE AREA 75:
757.0-A14 - Unit 2 RB Access Room    Yes          Yes            Yes          No         Low           2.9.11 757.0-A16 - Emergency Gas                                                                                          8.3.26, 63 &
Yes          Yes            Yes, Partial No         Moderate                                               1-G, 2-G, 2-O Treatment Filter Room                                                                                              64 782.0-A3 - Unit 2 CRD Equipment                                                                                    8.3.53, 63 &
Yes          Yes            Yes          No         Moderate                                               1-G, 2-G, 2-O Room                                                                                                               64 782.0-A4 - Pressurizer Heater                                                                                      8.3.54, 63 &
Yes          Yes            Yes          No         Moderate                                               1-G, 2-G, 2-O Transformer Room 2                                                                                                 64 FIRE AREA 76:
757.0-A15 - Unit 2 RB Equipment Yes          Yes            Yes, Partial No         Low           2.9.12      6.1.1 Hatch FIRE AREA 77:
3.2, 8.3.7, &
Unit 2 Reactor Building - Annulus    Yes          Yes, Partial   Yes, Partial RES        Severe        2.7.1                                    2def, 2-G 64 Unit 2 Reactor Building - Primary Containment (Subdivided into 2RO-1,                                                                    2.7.1, 2.8, 2RO-2, 2RO-3, 2RO-4, 2RI-1, 2RI-2,   Yes          Yes, Partial   Yes, Partial No         Low           2.9.13 thru 2RI-3, 2RI-4, 2RIR, 2RA1, 2RA2,                                                                        2.9.21 2RA3, 2RA4, 2RF1, 2RF2, 2RU)
I-24

PART I - INTRODUCTION TABLE I-1 

==SUMMARY==
COMPLIANCE FIRE PROTECTION Revision 60 Note 1: 737.0-A15 is a small room within room 737.0-A5 and contains an insignificant amount of in-situ combustibles. The suppression system in Room 737.0-A5 extends into this room, but the detection system does not (no detectors in Room 737.0-A15). Actuation of detection system in 737.0-A5 is required to release the deluge valve and charge system head in 737.0-A15. See Part VI Section 3.22.1.
Note 2: Entire control building is an alternative shutdown area (III.G.3). Cable location by room not routed; therefore, assumed to be in any room.
Note 3: 737.0-A16 is a small room within room 737.0-A9 and contains an insignificant amount of in-situ combustibles. The suppression system in Room 737.0-A9 extends into this room, but the detection system does not (no detectors in Room 737.0-A16). Actuation of detection system in 737.0-A9 is required to release the deluge valve and charge system head in 737.0-A16. See Part VI Section 3.81.1.
Note 4: Conduit 1VC4024B (in 772.0-A2A1) is wrapped with 3-hour Thermo-Lag from the R-line south to where the conduit exits the room.
Note 5: The 125V Vital Battery and Battery Board Rooms (I, II, III & IV) are provided with a total area suppression system; however, it is manually actuated.
Note 6: See individual rooms in Part VI for additional information on detection, suppression, fire rated wraps, fire severity, deviations, and evaluations.
Note 7: The CSD repair described in Part V, Section 3.3 may be applied for a fire in any room and is therefore not included in Table I-1.
I-25

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                            Revision 60 1.0              PURPOSE AND SCOPE Part II of the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Fire Protection Report describes the Fire Protection Plan (Plan) developed for WBN to ensure compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.48 (Reference 4.1.1), 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Sections III.G, J, L, and O (Reference 4.1.8) and the guidelines of Appendix A to Branch Technical Position (BTP) APCSB 9.5-1 (Reference 4.1.10).
2.0              OBJECTIVES OF THE FIRE PROTECTION PLAN The Plan describes the controls associated with the WBN Fire Protection Program (FPP);
identifies the organizations and positions that are responsible for the FPP; describes the authority of positions responsible for implementing the FPP; and outlines the plans for fire protection, fire detection and suppression capability, and limitation of fire damage. The Plan describes the features necessary to implement the FPP such as: administrative controls; personnel requirements for fire prevention and manual fire suppression activities; automatic and manually operated fire detection and suppression systems; and the means to limit fire damage to structures, systems, and components important to safety so that the capability to safely shutdown the plant is ensured.
The Plan describes the measures that are established at WBN to extend the concept of defense-in-depth to fire protection in areas important to safety. These measures are established:
to prevent fires from starting, to rapidly detect, control, and promptly extinguish those fires that do occur, and to provide protection for systems important to safety, so that a fire that is not promptly extinguished by the fire suppression activities, will not prevent the safe shutdown of the plant.
3.0              BASIS OF THE FIRE PROTECTION PLAN The Plan at WBN has been developed to comply with and is based upon the requirements of General Design Criterion 3 in Appendix A to 10 CFR 50 (Reference 4.1.7), 10 CFR 50.48, paragraph (a) and TVA's commitment to implement Sections III.G, III.J, and III.O to 10 CFR 50, Appendix R and Appendix A to Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.5-1, "Guidelines for Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants Docketed Prior to July 1, 1976" (August 23, 1976). The requirements contained in Section III.L of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50 are also applicable to areas where alternate shutdown capability is selected. This Plan establishes the policy for and describes the manner in which TVA conforms to these requirements and the guidelines which have been promulgated to describe acceptable implementation methods. The applicable guidelines used as the basis for the Plan are listed in Section 4.1, Regulatory Documents.
II-1

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                       Revision 60

==4.0    REFERENCES==

4.1    Regulatory Documents 4.1.1  10 CFR 50.48, Fire Protection 4.1.2  10 CFR 50.59, Changes, tests, and experiments 4.1.3  10 CFR 50.65, Requirements for monitoring the effectiveness of maintenance at nuclear power plants 4.1.4  10 CFR 50.71, Maintenance of records, making of reports 4.1.5  10 CFR 50.72, Immediate notification requirements for operating nuclear power reactors 4.1.6  10 CFR 50.73, Licensee event report system 4.1.7  10 CFR 50 Appendix A, Criterion 3, Fire Protection 4.1.8  10 CFR 50 Appendix R, Fire Protection Program for Nuclear Power Facilities Operating Prior to January 1, 1979 4.1.9  10 CFR 100, Reactor Site Criteria 4.1.10 Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A, Guidelines for Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants Docketed Prior to July 1, 1976 (August 23, 1976) 4.1.11 Branch Technical Position (CMEB) 9.5-1, Guidelines for Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants (NUREG 0800) 4.1.12 Generic Letter 81-12, Fire Protection Rule 4.1.13 Generic Letter 82-21, Technical Specifications for Fire Protection Audits 4.1.14 Generic Letter 83-22, NRC Safety Evaluation of [Westinghouse Owners Group (WOG)] Emergency Response Guidelines, dated June 3, 1983 4.1.15 Generic Letter 83-33, NRC Positions on Certain Requirements of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50 4.1.16 Generic Letter 86-10, Implementation of Fire Protection Requirements 4.1.17 Generic Letter 86-10, Supplement 1, Fire Endurance Acceptance Criteria for Fire Barrier Systems Used to Separate Redundant Safe Shutdown Trains within the Same Fire Area 4.1.18 Generic Letter 88-12, Removal of Fire Protection Requirements from Technical Specifications 4.1.19 Generic Letter 92-08, Thermo-Lag 330-1 Fire Barriers II-2

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                        Revision 60 4.1.20 Information Notice 84-09, Lesson Learned from NRC Inspections of Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Systems (10CFR50, Appendix R) 4.1.21 Information Notice 87-50, Potential LOCA at High- and Low-Pressure Interfaces from Fire Damage 4.1.22 Information Notice 91-47, Failure of Thermo-lag Fire Barrier Material to Pass Fire Endurance Test 4.1.23 Information Notice 91-79, Deficiencies in the Procedures for Installing Thermo-Lag Fire Barrier Materials 4.1.24 Information Notice 91-79 Supplement 1, Deficiencies Found in the Thermo-Lag Fire Barrier Installation 4.1.25 Information Notice 92-46, Thermo-Lag Fire Barrier Material Special Review Team Final Report Findings, Current Fire Endurance Tests, and Ampacity Calculation Errors 4.1.26 Information Notice 92-55, Current Fire Endurance Test Results for Thermo-Lag Fire Barrier Material 4.1.27 Information Notice 92-82, Results of Thermo-Lag 330-1 Combustibility Testing 4.1.28 Information Notice 94-22, Fire Endurance and Ampacity Derating Test Results for 3-Hour Fire-Rated Thermo-Lag 330-1 Fire Barriers 4.1.29 Information Notice 94-34, Thermo-Lag 330-660 Flexi-Blanket Ampacity Derating Concerns 4.1.30 Information Notice 95-27, NRC Review of Nuclear Energy Institute Thermo-Lag 330-1 Combustibility Evaluation Methodology Plant Screening Guide 4.1.31 Information Notice 95-32, Thermo-Lag 330-1 Flame Spread Test Results 4.1.32 Information Notice 95-49, Seismic Adequacy of Thermo-Lag Panels 4.1.33 Information Notice 95-49 Supplement 1, Seismic Adequacy of Thermo-Lag Panels 4.1.34 NRC letter to TVA dated August 29, 1977 - Fire Protection Functional Responsibilities, (Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2) (FRACQA Letter)
ML073120507 4.1.35 NRC Memorandum, March 22, 1982, Fire Protection Rule - Appendix R, (Clarification of Generic Letter 81-12), ML050140137 4.1.36 NRC Supplemental SER dated December 26, 1985, for Revision 1 of the Westinghouse Owners Group Emergency Response Guidelines 4.1.37 NUREG-0452, Standard Technical Specifications for Westinghouse Pressurized Water Reactors II-3

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                       Revision 60 4.1.38  NUREG-0797, Supplement No. 26, Safety Evaluation Report for Texas Utilities' Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station 4.1.39  NUREG-0847, Safety Evaluation Report Related to the Operation of Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, June 1982 4.1.40  NUREG-0847, Supplement 18, Safety Evaluation Report Related to the Operation of Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, October 1995 4.1.41  NUREG-0847, Supplement 29, Safety Evaluation Report Related to the Operation of Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 2, (October 22, 2015) 4.1.42  Deleted 4.1.43  NUREG-1552, Fire Barrier Penetration Seals in Nuclear Power Plants 4.1.44  NUREG-1852, Demonstrating the Feasibility and Reliability of Operator Manual Actions in Response to Fire, Final Report 4.1.44a Regulatory Guide 1.75, Revision 3, Criteria for Independence of Electrical Safety Systems 4.1.45  Regulatory Guide 1.189, Revision 2, Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants 4.1.46  Regulatory Guide 8.15, Revision 1, Acceptable Programs for Respiratory Protection 4.1.47  NRC Letter to TVA dated December 12, 2016 - Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 -
Issuance of Amendment Regarding Revision to the Fire Protection Program Related to Cable Separation in Containment (CAC NO. MF7413), L44 161212 002 4.2     TVA Documents 4.2.1   Calculation EDQ00099920090016, Appendix R - Units 1 and 2 Manual Action Requirements 4.2.2   Calculation EDQ00099920090017, Appendix R - Units 1 and 2 Emergency Lighting Requirements 4.2.3   Calculation EDQ0009992012000085, Appendix R - WBN Unit 2 Multiple Spurious Operation (MSO) Evaluations 4.2.4   Calculation EDQ0009992013000202, Appendix R - Auxiliary Control Air System (ACAS) End User 4.2.5   Calculation EDQ00299920090013, Unit 2 Cables Required for Fire Safe Shutdown Following a Fire 4.2.6   Calculation EPM-BFS-041895, Design Basis of Radiant Energy Shields (RES)
Protecting Electrical Circuits in Secondary Containment 4.2.7   Calculation EPMBFS052395, Fire Hazard Evaluation for the Reactor Coolant Pump Oil Collection System II-4

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                      Revision 60 4.2.8   Calculation EPM-BFS-053195, Design Basis of Radiant Energy Shields (RES)
Protecting Electrical Circuits in Primary Containment 4.2.9   Calculation EPM-BFS-063095, Non-Combustibility Analysis for Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing (3M) M20-A and M20-C Type Radiant Energy Shields (RES) 4.2.10  Calculation EPMDOM012990, Combustible Loading Data (CLD) 4.2.10a Calculation EPMRAC032392, "Evaluation of Suppression System Discharge" 4.2.11  Calculation EPMSMC110292, Backup Nitrogen Supply for Auxiliary Feedwater LCVs and Main Steam PORVs 4.2.12  Calculation MDQ0000772012000033, AFW LCVs and PCVs Backup Nitrogen Supply Requirements 4.2.13  Calculation MDQ0010002012000074, Design Basis of Radiant Energy Shields (RES) Protecting Electrical Circuits in the Reactor Building (3M Type E54C) 4.2.14  Calculation MDQ00103220120188, Pressure Drop Calculation for the Nitrogen Supply Piping to AFW Pressure and Level Control Valves 4.2.15  Calculation MDQ00206220110382, Nitrogen Cylinders and Capacity for Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS) 4.2.16  Calculation MDQ00299920110381, Appendix R - Operator Manual Action Evaluations 4.2.17  Calculation WBNAPS2065, Appendix-R Post-Fire Reactor Coolant System Cooldown and Depressurization 4.2.18  Calculation EDQ00099920090012, Unit 1 and 2 Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis 4.2.19  Calculation WBPE2399301004, 250V DC Battery System Analysis 4.2.20  Calculation WBPEVAR9205004, Appendix R Analysis for Intraplant Communications Systems 4.2.21  WBN Fire Watch Time Studies, T11970512665 4.2.21a Calculation WCG11876, Examination and Documentation of Architectural Doors 4.2.22  Calculation XDN00000020110002, WBN Unit 1 Multiple Spurious Operation Review for RG 1.189 Revision 2 4.2.23  Contract # 822493 Documentation 4.2.24  DCN No. 26366-A, Provide List of Fire Dampers for Fire Safe Shut Down 4.2.25  DCN No. 35361-A, HVAC Duct Fire Dampers II-5

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                        Revision 60 4.2.26  DCN 59675A, Install two 225kVA Air Cooled Diesel Generators on the Auxiliary Building Roof for mitigation of all Beyond Design Basis Events[FLEX diesel generators]
4.2.27  Demonstration Data Package TI-2018, Appendix R Demonstration of Operations Actions Required Following a Fire 4.2.28  Design Criteria WB-DC-30-13, 10CFR50, Appendix R, Type I, II, and III Circuits -- Unit 1 / Unit 2 4.2.29  Design Criteria WB-DC-30-4, Separation/Isolation 4.2.30  Design Criteria WB-DC-40-51, Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Capability (Unit 1 /
Unit 2) 4.2.31  Design Criteria WB-DC-40-58, Auxiliary Control System -- Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 1 / Unit 2 4.2.32  Design Criteria WB-DC-40-59, Personnel Access Doors 4.2.33  Design Criteria WB-DC-40-62, Fire Protection 4.2.34  Drawing Series 45A883, Electrical Penetration Seal Details 4.2.35  Drawing Series 45W883, Conduit & Grounding Penetration Sealing & Fire Stop Details 4.2.35a Drawing Series 47A243, Radiant Energy Shield Schedule 4.2.36  Drawing Series 47A381, HVAC Dampers 4.2.37  Drawing Series 47A472, Mechanical Penetration Seal Details 4.2.38  Drawing 47W200 Sheet 2, Equipment Plan El 772.0 & Above 4.2.39  Drawing Series 47W240, Fire Compartmentation 4.2.40  Drawing Series 47W243, Thermo-Lag Details 4.2.41  Drawing Series 47W866, HVAC Flow Diagram 4.2.42  Drawing Series 47W920, Mechanical HVAC 4.2.43  Emergency Operating Instructions (EOIs) 4.2.44  Engineering Report for Penetration Seal Program Assessment, RIMS T28960712801 4.2.45  Fire test report dated June 15, 1984 for large size damper installation, RIMS MEB840925801 II-6

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                          Revision 60 4.2.46  Fire test report dated July 19, 1984 for large size damper installations, Project 84NK8607, Release No. 1065832 4.2.47  Fire damper installation evaluation dated December 12, 1984 documenting UL's evaluation of TVA's installation of the large dampers, RIMS MEB850115801 4.2.48  General Engineering Specification G-73, Installation, Modification, and Maintenance of Fire Protection Systems and Features 4.2.49  General Engineering Specification G-96, Installation, Modification, and Maintenance of Penetration Seals 4.2.50  General Engineering Specification G-98, Installation, Modification, and Maintenance of Electrical Raceway Fire Barrier Systems 4.2.51  Letter from TVA to NRC, dated July 1, 1994, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Response to NRC Request for Additional Information Related to WBN Fire Protection Report (ML073230669) 4.2.52  Letter from J. W. Hufham (TVA) to E. Adensam (NRC), dated January 4, 1985 (ML073540060) 4.2.53  Letter from L. M. Mills (TVA) to A. Schwencer (NRC), dated 9/9/80 RIMS A27800909005 4.2.54  Mechanical Design Standard DS-M17.2.2, Electrical Raceway Fire Barrier Systems 4.2.55  Memorandum from Ira M. Heatherly to Brian Briody dated October 26, 1998 - High Pressure Fire Protection System Hydraulic Performance Review, RIMS B45981026001 4.2.56  Memorandum from J. J. Pierce and L. E. Perry to R. D. Hall, dated November 16, 1994, Evaluation of Heavy Equipment Doors A154, W10A, and W10B Used as Fire Barriers, RIMS T24941116589 4.2.57  Nonconforming Condition Report (NCR) W-422-P 4.2.58  Problem Evaluation Report (PER) 786848 Significance Evaluation 4.2.59  Procedure 0-AOI-30.1, Plant Fires 4.2.60  Procedure 0-AOI-30.2, Fire Safe Shutdown, Series 4.2.61  Procedure 0-TI-2018, Appendix R Demonstration of Operations Actions Required Following a Fire 4.2.62  Procedure OPDP-1, Conduct of Operations 4.2.62a Procedure FPDP-6, Fire Protection Program Plan 4.2.63  Procedure FPDP-3, Management of the Fire Protection Report II-7

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                       Revision 60 4.2.64  Procedure OPDP-3, Administration Of Prefire Plans, Fire Emergency Response, And Development/Evaluation Of Fire Drills 4.2.64a Procedure NPG-SPP-03.6, Fire Protection Program Change Regulatory Reviews 4.2.65  Procedure NPG-SPP-09.5, Temporary Modifications, Temporary Configuration Changes 4.2.66  Procedure NPG-SPP-18.4.5, Fire Protection Quality Assurance (Q07) 4.2.67  Procedure NPG-SPP-18.4.6, Control of Fire Protection Impairments 4.2.68  Procedure NPG-SPP-18.4.7, Control of Transient Combustibles 4.2.69  Procedure NPG-SPP-18.4.8, Control of Ignition Sources (Hot Work) 4.2.70  Significant Condition Report (SCR) WBNMEB8680 R1 4.2.71  System Description N3-13-4002, Fire Detection System 4.2.72  System Description WBN-SDD-N3-26-4002, High Pressure Fire Protection 4.2.73  System Description N3-39-4002, CO2 Storage, Fire Protection, and Purging 4.2.73a System Description WBN-SDD-N3-77A-4001, "Gaseous Waste Disposal System" 4.2.73b System Description WBN-SDD-N3-228-4003, "Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Lighting (Unit 1/Unit 2)"
4.2.74  Training Program Description TPD-FBT, Fleet Fire Brigade Training 4.2.75  TVA Organization Topical Report TVA-NPOD89, TVA Nuclear Power Group Organization Description 4.2.76  TVA Quality Assurance Program Description, TVA-NQA-PLN89-A, Nuclear Quality Assurance Plan 4.2.77  Procedure 1-MI-0.047, Appendix R Safe Shutdown Repairs 4.2.78  Procedure 2-MI-0.047, Appendix R Safe Shutdown Repairs 4.2.79  Procedure NPG-SPP-22.500, Operating Experience Program 4.2.80  Procedure NPG-SPP-03.10, Managing TVAs Interface With NRC 4.2.81  UL Field Evaluation Services Final Report for Fire Alarm Central Station Receiving System (EDMS Transmittal Reference #SL050418 per DCN 66338) 4.3     Other Documents 4.3.1   ASTM E84-90, Standard Test Method for Surface Burning Characteristics of Building Materials II-8

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                       Revision 60 4.3.1a ASTM E119-88, "Standard Test Methods for Fire Tests of Building Construction and Materials" 4.3.1b ASTM E648, "Standard Test Method for Critical Radiant Flux of Floor-Covering Systems Using a Radiant Heat Energy Source" 4.3.1c ASTM E662, "Standard Test Method for Specific Optical Density of Smoke Generated by Solid Materials" 4.3.1d ASTM E136, "Standard Test Method for Behavior of Materials in a Vertical Tube Furnace at 750&deg;C" 4.3.1e ASTM E162, "Standard Test Method for Surface Flammability of Materials Using a Radiant Heat Energy Source" 4.3.2  ASTM E814-83, Standard Test Method for Fire Tests of Through-Penetration Fire Stops 4.3.2a ASTM E1354, "Standard Test Method for Heat and Visible Smoke Release Rates for Materials and Products Using an Oxygen Consumption Calorimeter" 4.3.3  NRC Letter to TVA, dated May 29, 1986, Deviation Requests From Appendix R of 10 CFR 50 4.3.4  NRC Letter to TVA, dated January 6, 1998, Completion of Licensing Action for Generic Letter 92-08, 'Thermo-Lag 330-1 Fire Barriers' and Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report on Ampacity Issues Related to Thermo-Lag Fire Barriers for Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 4.3.5  NRC Letter to TVA, dated November 6, 1984, Fire Protection Criteria at the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 4.3.6  NEI 00-01, Nuclear Energy Institute Guidance for Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Circuit Analysis, Revision 2, May 2009 4.3.7  NEI 09-14, Nuclear Energy Institute Guidelines for the Management of Underground Piping and Tank Integrity, Revision 1, December 2010 4.3.8  Westinghouse Letter WBT-D-4257, RCP Motor Level Alarm, dated February 21, 2013 II-9

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                      Revision 60 4.4        NFPA Codes and Standards NOTE: Part X of this Fire Protection Report (FPR) documents the level of compliance with the NFPA codes and standards identified in Section 4.4. Major modifications and/or new installations of Fire Protection Systems shall be installed in accordance with the most recent edition of that code at the time the system is designed/installed. For expansions of existing features or installations, the below listed codes of record shall be used. Other codes and standards referenced in Appendix A to BTP 9.5-1 are also addressed in Part X. Deviations from code criteria that impact operational capability of the systems are documented in Part VII of the FPR. Code deviations that do not impact operational capability of the systems are documented in Part X.
4.4.1      National Fire Protection Association Fire Protection Handbook, 17th Edition 4.4.2      NFPA 4-1977, Organization for Fire Services (not applicable) 4.4.3      NFPA 4A-1969, Organization for Fire Department (not applicable) 4.4.4      NFPA 6-1974, Organization of Industrial Fire Loss Prevention (not applicable) 4.4.5      NFPA 7-1974, Management Control of Fire Emergencies (not applicable) 4.4.6      NFPA 8-1974, Recommendations for Management Responsibility for Effects of Fire on Operations (not applicable) 4.4.7      NFPA 10-1975, Portable Fire Extinguishers 4.4.8      NFPA 11B-1977, Synthetic Foam and Combined Agent Systems 4.4.9      NFPA 12-1973, Carbon Dioxide Extinguishing Systems 4.4.10     NFPA 12A-1973, Halogenated Extinguishing Agent Systems Halon 1301 4.4.11     NFPA 12B-1973, Halogenated Extinguishing Agent Systems Halon 1211 4.4.12     NFPA 13-1975, Installation of Sprinkler Systems 4.4.13     NFPA 14-1974, Standpipe and Hose Systems 4.4.14     NFPA 15-1973, Water Spray Fixed Systems for Fire Protection 4.4.15     NFPA 20-1974, Centrifugal Fire Pumps for electric driven pumps 4.4.16     NFPA 20-1993, Centrifugal Fire Pumps for diesel driven fire pumps 4.4.17     NFPA 24-1973, Outside Protection 4.4.18     NFPA 25-1992, Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance of Water-Based Fire Suppression Systems 4.4.19     NFPA 26-1958, Standard for Supervision of Valves II-10

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                          Revision 60 4.4.20 NFPA 27-1975, Private Fire Brigades (not applicable) 4.4.21 NFPA 30-1973, Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code 4.4.22 NFPA 37, Standard for the Installation and Use of Stationary Combustion Engines and Gas Turbines 4.4.23 NFPA 49-1975, Hazardous Chemicals Data 4.4.24 NFPA 50A-1973, Gaseous Hydrogen Systems 4.4.25 NFPA 51-1974, Oxygen Fuel Gas Systems for Welding and Cutting 4.4.26 NFPA 51B-1976, Cutting and Welding Processes 4.4.27 NFPA 69-1973, Explosion Prevention Systems 4.4.28 NFPA 72D-1975, Proprietary Protective Signaling Systems 4.4.29 NFPA 72E-1974, Automatic Fire Detectors 4.4.30 NFPA 80-1975, Fire Doors and Windows 4.4.31 NFPA 90A-1975, Air Conditioning and Ventilating Systems 4.4.32 NFPA 92M-1972, Waterproofing, Draining of Floors (considered not applicable)
(Withdrawn at the1979 Fall Meeting) 4.4.33 NFPA 101-2015, Life Safety Code 4.4.34 NFPA 194-1974, Fire Hose Connectors 4.4.35 NFPA 196-1974, Fire Hose 4.4.36 NFPA 197-1966, Training Standard on Initial Fire Attack (not applicable) 4.4.37 NFPA 204-1968, Guide for Smoke and Heat Venting (not applicable; superseded by 204M) (became NFPA 204M in 1982, became 204 in 1992) 4.4.38 NFPA 220-1985, Standard on Types of Building Construction 4.4.39 NFPA 251-1985, Standard Methods of Fire Tests of Building Construction and Materials 4.4.40 NFPA 253-1978, Flooring Radiant Panel Test 4.4.41 NFPA 255-1979, Test Methods Surface Burning-Building Materials 4.4.42 NFPA 258-1976,  Smoke Generated by Solid Materials II-11

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                          Revision 60 4.4.43   NFPA 601-1975, Guard Service in Fire Loss Prevention (not applicable) 4.4.44   NFPA 803-1983, Fire Protection for Light Water Nuclear Power Plants 5.0             DEFINITIONS Analysis Volume - That portion of a fire area subjected to a detailed Appendix R safe shutdown analysis to ensure one train of Fire Safe Shutdown (FSSD) capabilities is always available. The analysis volume can consist of the entire fire area or a portion of the fire area. When the analysis volume is a portion of the fire area, it can consist of multiple rooms, a single room, portions of a room (as defined by column line locations), or any combination of the above.
Analysis volumes involving only a portion of a room include a 20 foot wide (minimum) overlap with adjacent analysis volumes. Refer to Part III, Section 10.3 and Part VI, Section 2.2 for additional detail. (FPR Preparer)
Approved - Tested and accepted for a specific purpose or application by a nationally recognized testing laboratory (TVA General Engineering Specification G-73) or acceptable to the authority having jurisdiction. (FPR Preparer)
Aqueous Film Forming Foam (AFFF) - Synthetic foam concentrates based on fluorinated surfactants plus foam stabilizers, usually diluted with water to a 3-percent or 6-percent solution.
The foam formed acts both as a barrier to exclude air or oxygen and to develop an aqueous film on the fuel surface capable of suppressing the evolution of fuel vapors. The foam produced with AFFF concentrate is dry chemical compatible; therefore, AFFF is suitable for combined use with dry chemicals. (G-73)
Authority Having Jurisdiction (AHJ) - The Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, or designee, is the AHJ described in NFPA documents, except that NRC does not require review and approval of equivalency evaluations for alternative systems, methods, or devices, and NRC does not require plans and calculations to be submitted before implementation. (RG 1.189, Reference 4.1.45) The Fire Protection Program Change Regulatory Review is used to determine whether NRC approval is required (NPG-SPP-03.6, Reference 4.2.64a). For fire protection changes that do not require NRC approval, the approving authority specified in TVA design control and procedure change processes is the AHJ. For insured facilities, variances from Loss Control Standards also require approval of the insurer. (FPR Preparer)
Automatic - Self-acting, operated by its own mechanism when actuated by some impersonal influence such as a change in current, pressure, temperature or mechanical configuration.
(G-73)
Barrier - A feature of construction provided to separate or enclose various occupancies to create a boundary limit based on functional requirements, or a flexible material designed to withstand the penetration of water, vapor, grease, or harmful gases. (G-96)
Combustible Control Zone (CCZ) - Designated locations (such as spaces, areas, elevations) where transient combustibles storage is prohibited unless adequate evaluation and/or compensatory actions are implemented. These zones are subdivisions of fire areas and serve as a form of fire barrier, providing fire separation of redundant fire safe shutdown (FSSD) equipment. Combustible material stored in these areas is controlled by site instructions. (FPR Preparer)
II-12

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                          Revision 60 Combustible Material - Material which does not meet the definition of noncombustible. Any material which in the form in which it is used and under the conditions anticipated will ignite and burn (e.g., cable insulation, lube oil, plastic sheeting, charcoal, paper, etc.) (G-73)
Combustible Liquid - A liquid having a flash point at or above 100F (37.8C) (G-73)
Electrical Raceway Fire Barrier System (ERFBS) - A special type of Fire Barrier System designed to protect electrical raceways (e.g., conduits, cable trays, junction boxes, etc.)
containing FSSD circuits required for 10 CFR 50, Appendix R safe shutdown. (DS-M17.2.2)
Engineering - The organization responsible for the design basis of the plant. (G-73)
Fire Area - That portion of a building or plant that is separated from other areas by boundary fire barriers. (G-73)
Fire Barrier - Those components of construction; walls, floors, ceilings, and their supports including beams, joists, columns, penetration seals or closures, fire doors, and fire dampers that are rated by approving laboratories in hours of resistance to fire and are used to prevent the spread of fire. (G-73) An ERFBS and radiant energy shields are also considered as fire barriers. (FPR Preparer)
Fire Break (Fire Stop) - A passive fire protection feature of construction intended to limit flame propagation along vertical or horizontal cable tray runs.
NOTE:      Functionally identical to "Fire Stop". (G-73)
Fire Damper - A device, installed in the air distribution system, designed to close automatically to interrupt migratory air flow and to restrict the passage of flame. Fire dampers close upon exposure to heat and some fire dampers also close as a result of a signal from a sensing device such as a CO2 discharge signal or a smoke detector. A combination fire and smoke damper meets the requirements of both. Some fire dampers contain electro-thermal links (ETLs);
however, these devices are non-regulatory and not relied upon. See Section 12.10.5 below for additional information. (G-73)
Fire Detector - A device designed to automatically detect the presence of fire and initiate an alarm system and other appropriate action (see NFPA 72E, "Automatic Fire Detectors"). (G-73)
Fire Door - The door component of a fire door assembly. (G-73)
Fire Door Assembly - Any combination of a fire door, frame, hardware, and other accessories, that together provide a specific degree of fire protection to the opening. (G-73)
II-13

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                         Revision 60 Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA) - An analysis performed by fire protection and systems engineers to consider potential in situ and transient fire hazards; determine the consequences of fire in any location in the plant on the ability to safely shutdown the reactor or on the ability to minimize and control the release of radioactivity to the environment and specify measures for fire prevention, fire detection, fire suppression and fire containment and alternative shutdown capabilities as required for each fire area containing structures, systems and components important to safety that are in conformance with NRC guidelines and regulations. The FHA demonstrates that the plant will maintain the ability to perform safe shutdown functions and minimize radioactive release to the environment in the event of a fire, and should verify that NRC FPP guidelines or equivalent level of protection have been met. (G-73)
Fire Loading - The amount of combustibles present in a given situation, expressed in BTU per square foot. (G-73)
Fire Rated Assembly - A passive fire protection feature that is used to separate redundant fire safe shutdown capabilities. A fire rated assembly includes fire rated walls, floors, ceilings, ERFBSs, equipment hatches, stairwells, doors, dampers, and penetration seals. (FPR Preparer)
Fire Rated Penetration Seal - An opening in a fire barrier for the passage of pipe, cable, etc.,
which has been sealed to the same fire resistive rating of the fire barrier. (DS-M17.2.2)
Fire Resistance Rating - The time that materials or assemblies have withstood a fire exposure in accordance with the test procedures of "Standard Methods of Fire Tests of Building Construction and Materials," NFPA 251 (Reference 4.4.39). (G-73)
Fire Safe Shutdown (FSSD) Equipment - Structures, systems, or components required to shutdown the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition in the event of a fire.
Structures, systems, and components used to satisfy fire safe shutdown requirement commitments do not have to be safety-related. (FPR Preparer)
Fire Severity - A unit of measure, in terms of time (hours or minutes) that is used to quantify the hazards associated with the fire loading in a given plant area. It is based on an approximate relationship between fire loading and exposure to a fire severity equivalent to the ASTM E119 standard time-temperature curve. This measure is based on fire loading of ordinary combustibles such as wood, paper, and similar materials with a heat of combustion of 7000 to 8000 Btu per lb. Therefore fire severity measure should not be used with combustibles having a high heat-release rate. (FPR Preparer)
Fire Suppression - Control and extinguishing of fires. Manual fire suppression is the use of hoses, portable extinguishers, or manually-actuated fixed systems by plant personnel.
Automatic fire suppression is the use of automatically actuated fixed systems such as water, Halon, or carbon dioxide systems. (G-73)
Fire Wall - A wall having adequate fire resistance and structural stability under fire conditions to accomplish the purpose of subdividing buildings to restrict the spread of fire. (DS-M17.2.2)
Fire Watch - A fire watch is a compensatory action used when fire protection systems or features are non-functional or impaired as required by Operating Requirements (ORs).
Additionally, fire watches may be utilized for compensatory actions when limits are exceeded in administrative controls for areas (e.g., excessive transient fire loads). (FPR Preparer)
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PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                      Revision 60 Fire Watch-Roving - Roving fire watch requires that a trained individual be in the specified fire area(s) within specified intervals. A margin of 25 percent is allowed for unforeseen emergencies and to identify, report, and/or minimize unacceptable fire hazards in the area(s).
(FPR Preparer)
Fire Watch-Continuous - Continuous fire watch requires that a trained individual be in the fire area at all times, that the fire area contain no impediment which unduly impedes the movements of the continuous fire watch, and that each compartment within the fire area is patrolled at least once every 15 minutes with a margin of 5 minutes. A fire area designated for a continuous fire watch consists of one or more rooms which are easily accessible to each other and can be patrolled within 15 minutes with a margin of 5 minutes. Exceptions are provided in Section 13.1.A where more than one fire area may be covered by one continuous fire watch. The location(s) that a single continuous fire watch can patrol are based on time studies and require approval of the ESO SR or designee. (FPR Preparer)
Fire (Protection) Water Distribution System - The piping and appurtenances on TVA property between a source of fire protection water and the base of the riser (flange or flange and spigot piece or base tee) for automatic sprinkler systems, fixed water spray systems, standpipe systems, and other water based fire suppression systems. (G-73)
Flammable Liquid - A liquid having a flash point below 100F and having a vapor pressure not exceeding 40 lbs./in2 (absolute) at 100F shall be known as a Class I Liquid. (G-73)
Foam-Water Sprinkler System - An extinguishing system: pipe connected to a source of air-foam concentrate, and a water supply, and appropriate sprinklers, which distributes foam and water over the protected area. (G-73)
Frequency - Each Testing and Inspection Requirement (TIR) has a specified Frequency in which the TIR must be met in order to meet the associated Operating Requirement (OR). The "specified frequency" is discussed in Section 14.1 to 14.10. (FPR-Preparer)
Functional: A system, structure or component (SSC) described in the FPR is capable of performing its FSSD function. SSCs Operable in accordance with the Technical Specifications meet the requirements for FSSD functionality. (FPR Preparer)
Functional Test - Use of a simulated signal to the sensor or device to verify the functionality, including alarm and/or activation functions. (FPR-Preparer)
Inaccessible Area - Those areas defined in FSAR Chapter 12.3 as a Zone IV, IVa, or IVb (High Radiation Area) or a Zone V (Very High Radiation Area). Areas may be designated as inaccessible by the ESO SR or designee because operating conditions that pose immediate danger to life and health from environmental or operational conditions or require the shutdown of essential operating equipment to perform the testing/inspection. Inaccessible areas are as follows:
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PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                       Revision 60 Inaccessible Areas Building                Elevation      Area/Room Auxiliary Bldg            674.0        Tritiated Drain Collector Tank Room, 674.0-A1**
676.0        Hold-Up Tank A, 676.0-A2**
676.0        Hold-up Tank B, 676.0-A3**
676.0        Floor Drain Collection Tank Room, 676.0-A4a 676.0        Unit 1 Pipe Chase, 676.0-A16*
676.0        Unit 2 Pipe Chase, 676.0-A17*
692.0        Spent Resin Tank Room, 692.0-A15**
692.0        Spent Resin Tank Valve Gallery, 692.0-A16 692.0        Unit 1 Pipe Chase. 692.0-A8*
692.0        Unit 2 Pipe Chase. 692.0-A24*
692.0        Gas Decay Tank (F, G, H & J) Room, 692.0-A3**
692.0        Gas Decay Tank (A, B, C, D & E) Room, 692.0-A5**
713.0        Unit 1 Volume Control Tank Room, 713.0-A7 713.0        Unit 2 Volume Control Tank Room, 713.0-A20 713.0        Unit 1 Pipe Chase, 713.0-A28*
713.0        Unit 2 Pipe Chase, 713.0-A29*
713.0        Unit 1 Mixed Bed & Cation Valve Gallery, 713.0-A9*
Unit 2 Mixed Bed & Cation Valve Gallery, 713.0-713.0 A18*
713.0        CVCS Valve Gallery, 713.0-A23*
729.0        Cask Loading Area, 729.0-A5*
Unit 1 North Main Steam Valve Room (all elev.),
729.0 729.0-A2 Unit 1 South Main Steam Valve Room (all elev.),
729.0 729.0-A1 Unit 2 North Main Steam Valve Room (all elev.),
729.0 729.0-A10 729.0        Unit 2 South Main Steam Valve Room (all elev.)
737.0        Unit 1 Letdown Heat Exchanger Room, 737.0-A7 737.0        Unit 2 Letdown Heat Exchanger Room, 737.0-A8 757.0        Unit 1 Reactor Bldg. Equipment Hatch, 757.0-A11 757.0        Unit 2 RB Equipment Hatch, 757.0-A15 U1 Reactor Bldg            All         All U2 Reactor Bldg            All         All
* Inaccessible only during resin transfer.
**Refer to Part VII for engineering evaluation.
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PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                           Revision 60 Internal Conduit Seals (1)     Smoke and Hot Gas Seals - Seals installed inside conduit openings to prevent the passage of smoke and hot gasses through fire barriers. These seals may be located at the fire barrier or at the nearest conduit entry on both sides of the fire barrier. Smoke and hot gas seals are not required to have a fire resistance rating equal to the fire barrier in which they are installed. (G-96)
(2)     Heat and Fire Seals - Fire rated seals installed inside conduits at or in close proximity to the fire barrier. Heat and fire seals have the same or greater fire resistance rating as the fire barrier they are installed in. (G-96)
Labeled - Equipment or materials to which has been attached a label, symbol or other identifying mark of an organization acceptable to the authorities having jurisdiction and concerned with product evaluation, that maintains periodic inspection of production of labeled equipment or materials and by whose labeling the manufacturer indicates compliance with appropriate standards or performance in a specified manner. (G-73)
Limited Combustible Material - As applied to a building construction material, a material not complying with the definition of noncombustible material, which, in the form in which it is used, has a potential heat value not exceeding 3500 Btu per lb. (8141 Kj/Kg), and complies with one of the following paragraphs (1) or (2). Materials subject to increase in combustibility or flame spread rating beyond the limits herein established through the effects of age, moisture, or other atmospheric condition shall be considered combustible.
(1)     Materials having a structural base of noncombustible material, with a surfacing not exceeding a thickness of 1/8 in. (3.2mm) which has a flame spread rating not greater than 50.
(2)     Materials, in the form and thickness used, other than as described in (a), having neither a flame spread rating greater than 25 nor evidence of continued progressive combustion and of such composition that surfaces that would be exposed by cutting through the material on any plane would have neither a flame spread rating greater than 25 nor evidence of continued progressive combustion. (NFPA 220 [Reference 4.4.38]).
Listed - Equipment or materials included in a list published by an organization acceptable to the authority having jurisdiction and concerned with product evaluation, that maintains periodic inspection of production of listed equipment or materials and whose listing states either that the equipment or material meets appropriate standards or has been tested and found suitable for use in a specified manner. (G-73)
Mode - The term Mode is used with the numbers 1 through 6 to associate the plant's status with specific plant physical parameters. For the definition of these parameters see the Technical Specifications. (FPR Preparer)
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PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                         Revision 60 Noncombustible Material -
(1)      A material which in the form in which it is used and under the conditions anticipated, will not ignite, burn, support combustion, or release flammable vapors when subjected to fire or heat; having a structural base of noncombustible material, as defined above, with a surfacing not over 1/8-inch thick that has a flame spread rating not higher than 50 when measured using ASTM E84 Test, "Surface Burning Characteristics of Building Materials" (Reference 4.3.1). (G-73)
                                                 -OR-(2)      A material which, in the form in which it is used and under the conditions anticipated, will not ignite, burn, support combustion, or release flammable vapors, when subjected to fire or heat. Materials which are reported as passing ASTM E136, Standard Test Method for Behavior of Materials in a Vertical Tube Furnace at 750C, shall be considered noncombustible materials. (NFPA 220)
Operating Requirement (OR) - The lowest level functional capabilities or performance levels of equipment required to ensure adequate fire protection capability is established and maintained to protect safety-related and FSSD equipment from the effects of fire. When an OR is not met, action statements are provided to describe remedial action until the OR can be met. (FPR Preparer)
Operator Actions - Operator Actions (OAs) are actions taken by an Operator while in the Main Control Room (MCR). Additionally, actions performed at auxiliary control system stations (e.g.,
Auxiliary Control Room) in response to a main control room abandonment event are considered OAs. See Part V for a detailed discussion. (FPR Preparer)
Operator Manual Actions - Operator Manual Actions (OMAs) are those actions performed by operators to manipulate components and equipment from outside the main control room to achieve and maintain post fire hot shutdown, but do not include repairs. See Part V for additional details. (FPR Preparer)
Penetration - An opening through structural members or barriers such as walls, floors, or ceilings for passage of penetrating components. (G-96)
Penetration Seal - Materials, devices, or assemblies installed in communicating spaces across barriers, which provide effective sealing against defined environmental exposure criteria to achieve the same functional requirement as that originally intended by the structural member or the barrier. (G-96)
Portable Fire Extinguisher - A portable device containing powder, liquid, or gases which can be expelled under pressure for the purpose of suppressing or extinguishing a fire. (FPR Preparer)
Preaction Sprinkler System - A system employing automatic sprinklers attached to a piping system connected to a water supply containing air that may or may not be under pressure, with a supplemental fire detection system installed in the same area as the sprinklers. Actuation of the fire detection system (as from a fire) opens a valve that permits water to flow into the sprinkler piping system and to be discharged from any sprinklers that may be open. (G-73)
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PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                          Revision 60 Primary Containment - A structure that contains the reactor vessel that acts as a barrier to the release of radioactive fission products or other radioactive substances. Primary containment is a gas-tight shell that receives and contains the water, steam, and fission products that flow from any break in the reactor coolant pressure boundary located within the structure. (FPR Preparer)
Reactivity Margin - The subcriticality margin required to ensure Keff<0.99. Maintaining reactivity margin requirements ensures the Appendix R reactivity control requirements of III.G.3 and III.L are met.
Safety-Related - Items that meet the following criteria:
Those functions necessary to ensure:
(1)     The integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary.
(2)     The capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe condition.
(3)     The capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of an incident which could result in potential offsite exposures comparable to those specified in 10 CFR 100 (Reference 4.1.9). (G-73)
Safety-Related Area - Any area containing safety-related equipment. Safety-related areas include: Unit 1 and 2 Reactor Buildings, Auxiliary Building, Unit 1 and Unit 2 North and South Main Steam Valve Rooms, Unit 1 and Unit 2 Additional Equipment Buildings, Control Building, Intake Pumping Station, Diesel Generator Building, duct banks, and portions of the Yard containing safety-related equipment. (FPR Preparer)
Secondary Containment - The structure that provides a plenum for the temporary, low pressure retention of gaseous leakage from primary containment. (FPR Preparer)
Smoke Detector - A device which detects the visible or invisible particles of incomplete combustion. (G-73)
Sprinkler System - A network of piping connected to a reliable water supply that will distribute the water throughout the area protected and will discharge the water through sprinklers in sufficient quantity either to extinguish the fire entirely or to prevent its spread. The system, usually activated by heat, includes a controlling valve and a device for actuating an alarm when the system is functional. (G-73) Manually actuated systems do not contain a device for actuating an alarm when the system is in operation. (FPR Preparer).
Standpipe and Hose System - An arrangement of piping, valves, hose connections, and allied equipment installed in a building with the hose connections located in a manner that the water can be discharged in streams or spray patterns through attached hose and nozzles, for the purpose of extinguishing a fire and so protecting a building and its contents in addition to protecting its occupants. This is accomplished by connections to water supply systems or by pumps, tanks and other equipment necessary to provide an adequate supply of water to the hose connections (G-73).
Testable Valves - Refers to valves such as Outside Stem and Yoke (OS&Y), butterfly, and gate, (with or without automatic operators) that are designed to be cycled or exercised to ensure operation and prevent binding. This does not refer to valves such as check valves, solenoid valves, alarm test valves, or suppression system water flow alarm valves. (FPR Preparer)
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PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                           Revision 60 Testing and Inspection Requirement (TIR) - Physical attributes to be reviewed and reverified to ensure the equipment specified can perform its intended function(s) of the protection of safety related or fire safe shutdown systems. The frequency of this review and reverification is also provided. (FPR Preparer)
Thermal Detector - A device that detects abnormally high temperature or rate of temperature rise. (FPR Preparer)
Transient Fire Loads - Any combustible material that is not permanently present in a given area, and may be introduced during maintenance, repair, rework, or may be transported to a final destination for permanent installation or maintenance, repair, rework of equipment systems and components present there. (G-73)
Water Spray Nozzle - A normally open water discharge device which, when supplied with water under pressure, will distribute the water in a special, directional pattern peculiar to the particular device. (G-73)
Water Spray System - A special fixed piping system connected to a reliable source of fire protection water supply and, equipped with water spray nozzles for specific water discharge and distribution connected to the water supply through an automatically or manually actuated valve which initiates the flow of water. An automatic valve is actuated by operation of automatic detection equipment installed in the same areas as the water spray nozzles. (In special cases the automatic detection equipment may also be located in another area.) (G-73)
Water Supply - An arrangement of pumps, piping, valves, and associated equipment necessary to provide an adequate, reliable supply of water for the extinguishment of fires. (FPR Preparer) 6.0             FIRE PROTECTION QUALITY ASSURANCE TVA procedure NPG-SPP-18.4.5, Fire Protection Quality Assurance (Q07), (Reference 4.2.66) defines the augmented Quality Assurance (QA) Program for fire protection. This procedure satisfies the guidelines for QA for Fire Protection established by Appendix A to Branch Technical Position BTP APCSB 9.5.1 and Nuclear Plant Fire Protection Functional Responsibilities, Administrative Controls and Quality Assurance (dated August 29, 1977
[Reference 4.1.34]) for fire protection features that provide protection for safety-related structures, systems or components and fire safe shutdown systems. Refer to Part VIII of the FPR for a comparison of the WBN Fire Protection Program with Appendix A guidelines. The QA program for fire protection uses the applicable parts of the TVA Nuclear Quality Assurance Plan (TVA-NQA-PLN89-A) (Reference 4.2.76). More stringent QA requirements may apply to fire protection features that also perform nuclear safety-related functions such as secondary containment isolation. This QA program is described in corporate Standards and implemented in WBN procedures.
7.0             FIRE PROTECTION ORGANIZATION/PROGRAMS TVAs Nuclear Organization is described in TVA Organization Topical Report TVA-NPOD89-A, TVA Nuclear Power Group Organization Description (Reference 4.2.75). Standard Department Procedure FPDP-6, Fire Protection Program Plan (Reference 4.2.62a) defines the responsibilities of the Fire Protection Program Functional Organization and provides an overview of the Fire Protection Program. The Fire Protection Program Plan:
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PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                          Revision 60
: a.       Establishes the requirements, expectations, roles, and responsibilities for the Fire Protection Program Functional Organization.
: b.       Provides an overview of the administrative processes and programs that the Fire Protection Program Functional Organization implements and maintains.
7.1              TVA Corporate Management The Executive Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer (CNO) has corporate responsibility for overall plant nuclear safety. The CNO reports directly to the Chief Operating Officer, who reports directly to the Chief Executive Officer.
The Vice President Nuclear Engineering has the overall responsibility for establishing and directing engineering functions within the NPG. This includes managing organization functions for design engineering, which includes a corporate level fire protection group.
7.1.1            Corporate Fire Protection / Appendix R Group The Corporate Fire Protection/Appendix R Group provides oversight and governance of the site fire protection and fire safe shutdown programs. The Corporate Program Manager will meet the requirements of Member Grade in the Society of Fire Protection Engineers. To fulfill its role, the Corporate Fire Protection/Appendix R Group is responsible to:
: a.       Oversee the Fire Protection Program requirements at each of the Nuclear Sites.
: b.       Participate in industry activities to ensure TVA interests are represented in the development of proposed industry and regulatory initiatives for fire protection programs.
: c.       Establish TVA Nuclear direction for compliance with established industry and regulatory practice relative to defense-in-depth as it applies to fire protection.
: d.       Provide corporate level interface for Nuclear Assurance audits, regulatory inspections and insurance property loss reviews.
: e.       Establish TVA Nuclear policy relative to compliance with existing and proposed changes to the applicable regulations and standards for the fire protection program, including fire safe shutdown.
: f.       Provide advice and assistance to plant personnel on fire protection program issues.
: g.       Provide oversight and governance for the fire protection and fire safe shutdown programs 7.2              Site Vice President (VP)
The Site VP reports to the Senior VP, Operations, who reports directly to the CNO. The Site VP is responsible to provide general management and oversight to all operations activities for the site to ensure safe and efficient operation of the plant in compliance with requirements.
The organizational responsibilities specific to the WBN Fire Protection Program are detailed below.
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PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                        Revision 60 7.2.1            Plant Manager The Plant Manager is responsible for management oversight of the development and implementation of the WBN Fire Protection Program. The Plant Manager reports directly to the Site VP.
7.2.1.1          Director, Operations The Operations Director directs the Fire Protection organization to ensure the safety of nuclear plant facilities and to safeguard the health and safety of the general public. The Operations Director reports to the Plant Manager.
7.2.1.1.1        Emergency Services Operator Senior (ESO Sr.)
The WBN ESO Sr. on shift reports to the WCC SRO, who reports to the Shift Manager. The ESO Sr. provides general management and direction of Nuclear Plant Fire Protection Program functions as defined in OPDP-1, Conduct of Operations (Reference 4.2.62).
7.2.1.1.2        Fire Marshal The Fire Marshal reports to the Operations Director. The Fire Marshal oversees all aspects of the Fire Protection and Fire Loss Prevention program for WBN, provides authoritative recommendations regarding critical issues related to fire protection, and ensures appropriate TVA resources are available for fire protection issues. The Fire Marshal has authority to enforce fire protection regulations and commitments. The Fire Marshal ensures effective implementation of administrative controls regarding fire protection and fire prevention throughout the site. The Fire Marshal responsibilities are defined in FPDP-6, Fire Protection Program Plan (Reference 4.2.62a).
7.2.2   Fire Protection Support Personnel Personnel assigned to the fire protection organization or other site organization, perform specific work activities as required to support the fire protection supervisory personnel. These personnel may be under the direct supervision of the fire protection supervisory personnel or other supervisors but provide support functions to fire protection. Examples include such items as planning for work instructions or training fire watch personnel.
7.2.3   Site Engineering The Site Engineering Director provides overall management of engineering functions at the site.
The Site Engineering director manages the sites system health program and engineering programs, which includes the fire protection program. Site engineering staff is provided to:
: a.      Maintain fire protection systems oversight through the use of system monitoring via system health reports, apparent and root cause analyses, etc. as appropriate;
: b.      Perform periodic walk downs of the fire protection systems and components to maintain a current awareness of the system and component conditions;
: c.      Provide fire protection engineering expertise when required to support emergent or sensitive plant issues, troubleshooting, or assistance requests from Operations or Maintenance.
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PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                         Revision 60
: d.       Ensure fire protection systems are designed in accordance with licensing requirements and industry standards and deviations are documented;
: e.       Ensure changes to plant configuration and designs are analyzed and controlled so that no adverse impacts result to the fire protection program.
: f.       Maintains the plant design to ensure continued compliance to Appendix R.
7.2.4    Site Personnel The WBN Fire Protection Report applies to all TVA employees and contractors performing activities at WBN.
Site personnel who have duties or perform work activities at WBN are responsible for being familiar with procedures applicable to them during a fire emergency and conducting day-to-day work activities in accordance with plant fire protection administrative procedures.
Unescorted access-authorized general employee's fire protection-related responsibilities and requirements are provided in annual general employee training.
7.3      Quality Assurance Quality Assurance ensures that audits are performed in accordance with the NQAP which includes the periodic assessments for the fire protection program including fire drill and training conducted by the fire brigade and plant personnel.
8.0              FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM ADMINISTRATIVE AND TECHNICAL CONTROLS This section of the WBN Plan provides the administrative process and controls for implementation of the Fire Protection Program.
8.1              Program Changes and Associated Review and Approval
: a.       The Nuclear Safety Review Board (NSRB) provides independent review, oversight, and technical reviews.
: b.       The Fire Marshall or designee reviews proposed changes to the Fire Protection Report and fire protection administrative procedures to ensure adequacy and compliance with established regulatory commitments in accordance with site specific procedures.
: c.       WBN may make changes to the approved Fire Protection Report without prior approval of the NRC in accordance with the Fire Protection License Condition in each units Operating License.
: d.       The Fire Protection Report is updated on a schedule consistent with 10 CFR 50.71 (Reference 4.1.4).
8.2              Modification Control II-23

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                          Revision 60 A fire protection evaluation is performed (when required) for plant modifications in accordance with established procedures. This evaluation is performed to ensure that adequate fire protection measures are maintained, combustible loading considerations are addressed, the overall Fire Protection Program is not degraded, and requirements and guidelines of regulatory agencies have been considered. The evaluation also addresses specific commitments to the applicable sections of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R (Reference 4.1.8).
8.3              Audits/Inspections of the Fire Protection Program Generic Letter No. 82-21, "Technical Specifications for Fire Protection Audits" (Reference 4.1.13) provides for a system of audits to be conducted to assess the WBN fire protection equipment and FPP implementation to verify continued compliance with NRC requirements and TVA commitments. The audit program is provided in the NQAP. The frequency of audits is different from GL 82-21 per industry guidance as documented in the NQAP.
8.4              Assessment of Information Notices, Generic Letters, Bulletins, etc.
The Watts Bar Operating Experience (OE) Program ensures that NRC Information Notices and INPO Event Reports related to fire protection and/or fire safe shutdown issues are assessed for applicability to WBN. A CR is initiated to document evaluation and resolution of the applicable issue (See Ref. 4.2.79 for the full scope of the OE Program). NRC Regulatory Information Summaries (RIS); Bulletins (IEB); and Generic Letters (GL) are not part of the OE process.
These documents are controlled, evaluated, and dispositioned by Corporate Licensing. Corporate Licensing evaluates NRC generic communications (for example, Generic Letters, Bulletins, Regulatory Issue Summaries) that do not require a response, but may require action(s), to determine if entry into the Corrective Action Program to facilitate evaluation and action is appropriate (Ref. 4.2.80).
8.5              Violation and Reportability Non-compliance with an Operating Requirement (OR) or a Testing and Inspecting Requirement (TIR) described in Section 14.0 shall be evaluated for reportability in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (Reference 4.1.5) and 10 CFR 50.73 (Reference 4.1.6). Non-compliances occur when the limits of the TIR (including allowable extensions) are exceeded or conditions of the OR and its associated action statement are not met. The required reportability evaluations will be performed in accordance with TVAs Corrective Action Program.
9.0              EMERGENCY RESPONSE 9.1              Fire Brigade Staffing Effective handling of fire emergencies is an important aspect of the WBN Fire Protection Program. This is accomplished by trained and qualified emergency response personnel. The fire response organization is staffed and equipped for firefighting activities. Each shift fire brigade is comprised of a fire brigade leader and four fire brigade members. Additionally an Incident Commander is available to direct each shifts fire brigade. The Incident Commander meets the requirements of a Unit Supervisor or Shift Technical Advisor and has sufficient training in or knowledge of plant safety-related systems to understand the effects of fire and fire suppressants on safe shutdown capability. The Incident Commander position is separate from the Shift Manager, Unit Supervisor and Shift Technical Advisor positions. The fire brigade shall not include the Shift Manager or the other members of the minimum shift crew necessary for II-24

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                        Revision 60 safe shutdown of the unit. Additional firefighting support is available when needed through an agreement with a local fire department. The fire brigade is also the medical response personnel so should there be a fire and an injured person found, the fire brigade would address the medical issue as needed to stabilize the patient and then return to fire fighting. The long term response to the fire could require maintenance personnel to implement cold shutdown repairs; however, the Fire Brigade duties would have been completed by this time and thus there would be no conflict if one of the maintenance persons had been on the fire brigade.
The fire brigade composition may be less than the minimum requirements for a period of time not to exceed two hours, in order to accommodate unexpected absence, provided immediate action is taken to fill the required positions. The following are examples of emergencies that may prevent the full fire brigade from being available onsite:
: a.      a life-threatening medical emergency, requiring on-shift emergency medical professional(s) to leave the site for transport of the patient, and
: b.      the fire brigade may respond to fires outside the site area, but still on the TVA Reservation, that has the potential to or is affecting the ability for WBN to maintain the ability to safely shut down. This includes areas such as the Watts Bar Hydro and former Fossil Plant switchyards. A response of this type is at the direction of the Shift Manager based on a concern for plant safety due to the fire or fires threat. These are expected to be rare occurrences.
9.2              Fire Brigade Support Personnel
: a.      Site Nuclear Security provides access to the security controlled area for the fire brigade and offsite fire response personnel during fire emergencies. This includes traffic and crowd control, when necessary.
: b.      Site Radiation Protection (RP) personnel provide radiological support for the fire brigade to advise them on radiological hazards and assist in radiological decontamination efforts if necessary. RP personnel also provide radiological support for offsite fire response personnel.
: c.      Additional support is provided as required, by Operations, Maintenance, Chemistry, etc.
9.3              Training and Qualifications WBN fire brigade training ensures that each fire brigade's capability to combat fires is established and maintained. In addition each fire brigade member and leader annually receives:
a) Training on the use of special respiratory equipment b) Training to maintain qualification for unescorted access to the plant c) A medical evaluation to ensure ability to perform strenuous physical activity The training program consists of initial (classroom and practical) training and recurrent training which includes periodic instruction, fire drills and annual fire brigade training.
: a.      Initial Training II-25

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                          Revision 60 Initial training consists of classroom instruction and practical exercises to include actual fire extinguishment and use of firefighting and related equipment under strenuous firefighting conditions. Training includes:
: 1)        Identification of the fire hazards and associated types of fires that may occur in the plant and an identification of the location of such hazards.
: 2)        Identification of the location of firefighting equipment for each fire area, and familiarization with layout of the plant including access and egress routes to each area.
: 3)        The proper use of available firefighting equipment, and the correct method of fighting each type of fire. The types of fires covered include electrical fires, fires in cables and cable trays, hydrogen fires, flammable liquid fires, waste/debris fires, and record file fires.
: 4)        Indoctrination on the plant firefighting plan with specific coverage of each individual's responsibilities.
: 5)        The proper use of communication, lighting, ventilation, and emergency breathing apparatus.
: 6)        The toxic characteristics of expected products of combustion.
: 7)        The proper methods for fighting fires inside buildings and tunnels.
: 8)        Detailed review of firefighting procedures and procedure changes.
: 9)        Review of latest plant modifications and changes in firefighting plans.
: 10)       The direction and coordination of the firefighting activities (fire brigade leaders only).
In addition, fire brigade leaders receive additional training that provides the fire brigade leader with the knowledge and skills necessary to supervise and direct the activities of the fire brigade during an incident.
: b. Recurrent Training Training and qualification are scheduled with a maximum allowed extension of 25 percent of the listed frequency interval. Performance deficiencies of the fire brigade or individual brigade members are remedied by scheduling additional training. Any individual who misses or fails to complete recurrent training is placed in an ineligible status when the current training expires until the training is completed in accordance with site procedure (Ref. 4.2.74).
: 1)        Periodic Classroom Instruction (PCI)
Regular planned training sessions are held every three months. These planned training sessions repeat the initial training subject matter over a two-year period.
These sessions are normally held on-site. If the appropriate quarterly sessions II-26

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                             Revision 60 subject matter is covered during the Annual Fire Brigade Training, credit may be given for the quarterly PCI.
: 2) Fire Drills Drills are preplanned to establish the objectives and are conducted by the fire training instructor or designated representative. Drills are conducted as follows:
a)       A minimum of one on-site drill per shift (crew) every 92 days.
b)       A minimum of one unannounced drill per shift (crew) per year.
c)       At least one drill per shift (crew) per year on a "backshift" for each fire brigade.
d)       At three-year intervals, a randomly selected, unannounced drill critiqued by qualified individuals performing a triennial audit of the fire protection plan.
e)        An annual fire drill, which includes participation by the offsite fire departments that have an active agreement to provide firefighting and equipment response to the plant.
f)       Fire brigade members including leaders shall participate in at least two on-site drills per year.
g)       When assigned as the shift Incident Commander, the Incident Commander attends the fire drills that occur during that shift.
: 3) Annual Fire Brigade Training Annual Fire Brigade Training is held for the fire brigade on the proper method of fighting various types of fires similar in magnitude, complexity, and difficulty as those that may occur. These types of fires include Class A (ordinary combustible material such as wood, cloth, paper, rubber, plastics, etc.) and/or Class B (flammable liquids, combustible liquids, petroleum greases, oils, flammable gasses, etc.). In addition, some fires may address Class C (energized electrical) fires in combination with a Class A and/or B. This training includes actual fire extinguishment of a live fire similar to that which may occur in the plant of sufficient magnitude to exceed the capacity of a single hand held fire extinguisher and require the use of emergency breathing apparatus under strenuous conditions.
Annual briefings are provided to the local fire departments to assure their continued understanding of their role in the event of a fire emergency at the plant. The annual briefings are required for only those local fire departments that have aid agreements with the plant.
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PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                          Revision 60 9.4              Firefighting Equipment Firefighting equipment is provided throughout the plant. The availability of firefighting equipment is such that delays in obtaining equipment by the fire brigade for fire emergencies are minimized.
Firefighting equipment may, alternatively, be staged adjacent to or at the access to areas/locations to facilitate equipment availability. This may be necessary to address equipment surveillance test concerns relative to life safety and ALARA practices.
Examples of the types of firefighting equipment available are as follows:
motorized apparatus portable ventilation equipment fire extinguishers self-contained breathing apparatus and reserve air bottles fire hose nozzles, gated wyes, fittings, and foam applicators personal protective equipment such as turn-out coats, boots, gloves, and helmets communication equipment portable lights ladders for firefighting use 9.5              Fire Emergency Procedures and Prefire Plans Fire emergency procedures and prefire plans specify actions taken by the individual discovering a fire and actions considered by the emergency response organization. Included in these procedures are operational instructions for response to the fire detection system annunciation.
These procedures provide different levels of response based on whether there is an actual fire or an annunciation (e.g., a single zone annunciation in a cross zoned area will not carry the same level of response as a cross zone annunciation in the same area). An annunciation may or may not carry the same level of response as the report of a fire by site personnel. Prefire plans are not intended to establish a procedure or step-by-step process but to provide guidance, depending upon the particular circumstances, to aid in firefighting efforts. It is recognized that many different firefighting techniques or strategies exist which are acceptable for fire suppression efforts.
Prefire plans are developed to support firefighting activities in safety-related areas, in fire safe shutdown system areas, and areas which may present a hazard to safety-related or FSSD equipment inside the boundaries of the Site Perimeter. The prefire plans include the following information, as appropriate:
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PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                        Revision 60 Identification of plant equipment Access and egress routes for fire areas Firefighting strategy and tactics Location of fire protection features Identification of special fire, toxic material, and radiological hazards Special consideration of hazards Ventilation methodology Safe shutdown procedures are available in the event a fire occurs in safety-related or FSSD equipment areas of the plant.
10.0              CONTROL OF COMBUSTIBLES Combustibles are controlled to reduce the severity of a fire which might occur in a given area and to minimize the amount and type of material available for combustion.
The use and application of combustible materials at WBN are controlled utilizing the following methods:
Instructions/guidelines provided during general employee training/orientation programs The chemical traffic control program Periodic plant housekeeping inspections/tours by management and/or the plant fire protection organization Design/modification and installation process review Administrative procedures (e.g., NPG-SPP-18.4.7 (Ref. 4.2.68) Control of Transient Combustibles)
The fire protection organization performs a periodic fire safety inspection of the safety-related areas of the plant to identify and minimize potential fire hazards.
The use and handling of combustible materials such as fire retardant-treated lumber, paper, plastic, and flammable/combustible gases and liquids are controlled in safety-related areas.
The use of untreated lumber in safety related and selected power production structures requires specific approval of the fire protection organization.
Combustible materials generated as a result of work activities are removed/cleaned up from the work area at the end of the shift or at the conclusion of the work activity, whichever is sooner.
The storage of combustible materials within safety-related areas is controlled by the fire protection organization.
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PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                           Revision 60 The control of hazardous waste and hazardous materials is conducted in accordance with the chemical control and hazardous material processes.
Design considerations in the control of combustibles are utilized when appropriate. These considerations include the application of noncombustible or limited combustible construction materials or components, use of noncombustible fluids in operating equipment, provision of dikes or containments for equipment containing combustible liquids, etc.
Combustible Control Zones (CCZs) are established at WBN to strictly control or prohibit the placement of transient combustibles. Transient combustibles brought into CCZs require an evaluation in accordance with site administrative procedures. The strict control or prohibition of combustibles by site procedures within the combustible control zone provides reasonable assurance that a fire will not propagate and jeopardize redundant FSSD equipment. CCZs are shown on the compartmentation drawings (Figures II-27A through II-46A excluding 37A).
11.0             CONTROL OF IGNITION SOURCES The use of ignition sources such as welding, flame cutting, thermite welding, brazing, grinding, arc gouging, torch applied roofing, and open flame soldering within safety-related areas is controlled through the approval and issuance of an ignition source permit. Permits are reviewed and approved by appropriate plant personnel. The ignition source permit is valid for one job.
Job area inspections shall be performed and documented at the start of each shift that ignition source activities are being performed. If no ignition source activities are performed, then re-inspection is not required.
Designated ignition source activity areas are reviewed and approved by the fire protection organization. A fire watch system shall be established for all ignition source work activities that are performed in safety-related areas of the plant except for specific non-risk ignition source activities of underwater welding, outside areas (fences, light poles, etc.), and electric soldering.
These fire watches remain with the work activity in accordance with the requirements stated in NPG-SPP-18.4.8 (Ref. 4.2.69).
Smoking is not allowed in any safety-related or power production area.

==12.0             DESCRIPTION==
OF FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS AND FEATURES Fire protection systems and related features consist of the following subsystems:
water supply standpipes, hoses, and hydrants automatic and manual fire suppression fire detection lightning protection, emergency lighting, and communications reactor coolant pump lube oil collection, and II-30

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                         Revision 60 fire-rated assemblies.
The following subsections are summary discussions of these fire protection systems and related features.
Those portions of the fire protection systems and features within Seismic Category I structures, whose failure during a seismic event may result in damage to safety-related equipment, have been designed and installed to Seismic Category I(L) requirements. Those portions that satisfy safety-related functions have been designed and installed to Seismic Category I requirements if needed due to the design basis. Piping in the Annulus is Seismic I(L)A, pressure retention.
This has been analyzed to ensure the primary safety function of maintaining secondary containment isolation boundary.
For information in addition to the following: 1) on water based suppression see System Description WBN-SDD-N3-26-4002 (Reference 4.2.72) and Figures II-1A through -10A, -13A through -20A, -23A, -24A and -41A through -46A; 2) on carbon dioxide based suppression see System Description N3-39-4002 (reference 4.2.73) and Figures II-11A, -12A, -21A, -22A, -25A and -26A; 3) on fire detection see System Description N3-13-4002 (reference 4.2.71).
Drainage for water based suppression systems, automatic and manual, is addressed in calculation EPM-RAC-032392, Evaluation of Suppression System Discharge. (Reference 4.2.10a) 12.1              Water Supply The High Pressure Fire Protection (HPFP) system water supply is common to both units and consists of four, ASME Section III, seismic Category I, high pressure, vertical turbine motor-driven pumps and one horizontal, centrifugal diesel fire pump. Each electric pump is rated at 1590 gpm at 300-foot head (130 psig). The diesel pump is rated at 2500 gpm at 288-foot head (125 psig). Electric fire pump capabilities are evaluated by testing at the rated head and at two diverse points, one above and one below the rated head. The diesel fire pump capability is evaluated by testing at three points on the fire pump curve. They are: 1) not to exceed 140% of rated pressure (175 psig/404-foot head) at shutoff capacity 2) develop a minimum 100%
capacity (2500 gpm) at rated pressure (125 psig/288-foot head), and 3) develop a minimum 150% capacity (3750 gpm) at not less than 65% rated pressure (81 psig/187-foot head). The electric pumps are located in the seismic Category I Intake Pumping Station (IPS). A three-hour fire-rated barrier is provided to separate two electric fire pumps from the other two. The diesel fire pump is remotely located in the Yard adjacent to the Unit 1 cooling tower.
The WBN fire protection system has four electric driven pumps and one diesel driven pump. As defined in Section 14.2.a below, fire protection functionality is based on only two of the four electric pumps and the diesel driven pump. The other two electric driven pumps are considered spares for fire protection purposes. The four electric pumps and associated main piping headers are ASME Section III, seismic class I available for supplying auxiliary feedwater during a design basis event (i.e., Flood Mode). During Flood Mode two electric pumps are aligned to each train header. Details of the Flood Mode are documented in several places in the FSAR such as Section 2.4.14.2, Plant Operation During Floods Above Grade. The ASME and seismic requirements are beyond the requirements of the NFPA Code and are not required for fire protection purposes.
The electric pumps are automatically started by activation of the fire detection systems associated with the automatic water-based suppression systems. The electric pumps can be II-31

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                        Revision 60 started manually from either the main control room or the respective 480V shutdown board.
The diesel pump is auto-started on low system pressure, manually from the Main Control Room or manually locally.
Each electric fire pump motor is powered from a separate 480V shutdown board. In the event of loss of offsite power, each shutdown board is powered by an emergency diesel generator.
Indications of fire pump motor running and loss of line power on the line side of the switchgear are provided in the Main Control Room (MCR). Required annunciation signals for the diesel fire pump and its controller are automatically transmitted to the MCR.
Inspection of the strainers for the electric pumps is included in the WBN Preventative Maintenance Program. A single, automatic, motor-driven, self-cleaning strainer is provided for each power train to filter the discharge flow of the two electric pumps on that train. Each strainer is capable of straining 100 percent of the rated flow of two pumps. The strainers are located in the IPS. The strainers conform to the requirements of ASME Section III, Seismic Category I components. Mechanical screens are provided in the suction of the diesel fire pump and a strainer on the discharge.
Water supply for the electric fire pumps is taken from the Tennessee River and is considered unlimited for fire protection purposes. The diesel fire pump takes suction from the Unit 1 cooling tower basin, which has sufficient capacity for the diesel fire pump to run at 150% capacity for two hours. A fire protection water distribution system is provided to serve both units. Sectional isolation valves are provided so that maintenance may be performed on portions of the loop while maintaining firefighting capability. The sectional isolation valves in the underground and building loops are locked or sealed in position and surveillance is performed to ensure proper system alignment. The train headers that are routed from the IPS directly to the Auxiliary Building, that also serve as the flood mode supplies, are provided with isolation valves in the seismically constructed IPS and Auxiliary Building, but not in the underground portions of these headers. The fire protection water distribution system is crosstied between units. The HPFP system is normally pressurized by the raw cooling water (RCW) system when the fire pumps are not running. The RCW system is automatically isolated when a fire pump starts.
The high pressure fire protection system is shared with the raw service water (RSW) system.
Automatic isolation valves are provided to isolate selected large raw service water loads from the HPFP system when any fire pump is started. Specific RSW loads are automatically isolated from the fire protection water system when the fire pump(s) start due to a fire in safety-related areas to reduce the RSW load on the fire protection system to ensure adequate flow and pressure is available.
The electric fire pumps are also used for supplying auxiliary feedwater during a design basis event (i.e. Flood Mode) at which time two pumps are aligned to each train. Details of the Flood Mode operations are documented in the FSAR.
Measures were taken to account and compensate for the effects of corrosion on piping due to biological growth, such as microbiologically induced corrosion (MIC) nodules by designing normally raw water wetted, unlined carbon steel pipe using calculations that:
: 1.      reduced the pipe diameter to account for diameter reducing inclusions, and
: 2.      lowered the Cfactor to C=55 in the Hazen-Williams formula to account for the added roughness.
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PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                          Revision 60 The water used in both the HPFP and RCW system is chemically treated to address concerns resulting from the use of raw water. WBN has a comprehensive chemical treatment program for treating raw water systems. This treatment is a major part of WBN Raw Water Corrosion Program as specified by site procedures. The chemical treatment is used to control corrosion to control organic fouling, including slime, to minimize the effect of MIC and inhibit growth of Asiatic clams in carbon steel. Buried piping portions of the HPFP system are monitored by the buried piping program in accordance with NEI 0914, "Guideline for the Management of Underground Piping and Tank Integrity," (Reference 4.3.7) which provides for the risk ranking of buried piping relative to installed conditions (e.g., design and construction practices, as well as soil) and consequences of a failure and testing of the piping.
Silt from river water is addressed for fire protection in two methods. One method is the design of the IPS. For the fire pumps, water has to travel up two elevations, traverse the basin area that is just under one half the size of the IPS between elevation changes, and there is a weir at the entrance to the fire pumps wet wells. This relative movement of water to reach the fire pump wet wells allows for the majority of the silt to drop out. The other method is the design of the Raw Cooling Water (RCW) system, which provides normal makeup for the HPFP system. The RCW system pumps draw water remotely from the water's entrance to the IPS allowing for silt settlement. The cross tie of the RCW and HPFP is in the Turbine Building close to the service water load on the HPFP system. Thus, silt drawn into the HPFP system is in the paths of these service water loads.
The water used in both the HPFP and RCW system is chemically treated to address concerns resulting from the use of raw water. In 1995 (at licensing of Unit 1), a three year evaluation program was implemented to monitor the performance of the HPFP system by yearly testing of the HPFP distribution system. The results of this evaluation determined that testing on a three year basis (instead of yearly) was adequate (Reference 4.2.55). Actions taken to improve the program include the addition of the buried pipe program with the associated risk ranking and testing using advanced technology, such as guided wave testing.
The chemical treatment for raw water systems, including HPFP, is consistent with other nuclear facilities and includes oxidizing biocide, non-oxidizing biocide, phosphate, and zinc. On the existing HPFP piping, the phosphate is used to sequester iron from existing corrosion products, the zinc is used to passivate the carbon steel surfaces, and the oxidizing and non-oxidizing biocide controls slime, which helps prevent MIC growth. This provides the most effective treatment that a nuclear plant may use to prevent corrosion in raw water systems.
12.2             Standpipes, Hose Stations, and Hydrants Hydrants are located around the yard loop and provide coverage for exterior portions of significant structures. Normally open key operated curb valves or post indicating valves are provided for isolation of each hydrant off the yard loop. Motorized apparatus at WBN is provided with sufficient equipment to effectively fight fires in the yard area.
Interior manual hose installations are provided throughout the plant, typically as back up for the area automatic suppression systems, and, in some cases, as the primary suppression system.
The Unit 1 and Unit 2 Reactor Buildings and the Intake Pumping Station use fixed, installed systems (hose stations and some automatic suppression) as the primary suppression systems supplied from one main supply header. Hose stations from an adjoining area serve as the backup suppression system supplied from a separate, independent main supply header.
Specifically for the Units 1 and 2 Reactor Buildings, selected hazards in the Reactor Buildings have automatic suppression systems protecting specific hazards, but they are supplied from the II-33

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                         Revision 60 same header as the primary suppression systems (the hose stations). These hazards include closed head water spray systems installed for each reactor coolant pump (RCP) and preaction sprinklers in the annulus that serve as water spray on select cable concentrations and prevent specific cable interactions. The backup suppression system for the Reactor Buildings is from hose stations in the Auxiliary Building supplied from a separate, independent main supply header. For the Intake Pumping Station, one area has an automatic preaction sprinkler system protecting specific hazards of transformers and switchgear, but it is supplied from the same header as the primary suppression systems (the hose stations). The backup suppression system for the Intake Pumping Station is from the yard hydrant nearby the Intake Pumping Station supplied from a separate, independent main supply header. In addition to the above, the fixed, installed primary suppression systems supplied from one main supply header within the Reactor Buildings and the Intake Pumping Station are provided with common header isolation valves that will allow for back-feeding the automatic suppression or the hose station systems.
Selected areas in the Diesel Generator Building (DGB) have automatic CO2 and preaction sprinkler systems as primary protection with the standpipe system serving as the backup system in these areas. In areas of the DGB without automatic suppression, the standpipe system serves as the primary system, with yard hydrants providing the backup system. The primary and backup for the Diesel Generator Building's Conduit Interface Room is from yard hydrants. The design of manual hose stations were hydraulically verified per the guidelines of NFPA 14 (Part II, Reference 4.4.13). The Diesel Generator Building (DGB) has two feeds from the fire protection water distribution system. One line feeds the fire suppression system and the other line feeds the standpipe and hose system.
Hose stations in safety-related areas of the plant are supplied from risers separate from those for the preaction sprinkler systems providing general area protection serving the same area.
One exception is the Reactor Buildings in which both the hose station flow control valves and the automatic suppression system flow control valves are supplied from a single header for the systems in the respective Reactor Building.
Class II and III Hose stations are equipped with nozzles rated for the hazards present and with a sufficient amount of hose to support firefighting needs in that area. Hose station equipment may, alternatively, be staged adjacent to or at the access to areas/locations to facilitate equipment availability. This may be necessary to address equipment concerns relative to life safety and ALARA practices.
Most of the buildings are provided with a wet standpipe system. These systems have supply valves open and water pressure to the hose rack isolation valve. The Reactor Buildings (including the Annulus) is provided with a dry standpipe system. The standpipe systems within the Reactor Buildings are normally dry and are arranged to admit water into the systems through manual operation of push buttons located at each hose station. The systems are controlled by electrically or manually operated deluge valves which are located in the Auxiliary Building. The systems for each Reactor Building RCP preaction sprinkler and dry standpipe are provided with automatic containment isolation capabilities for primary containment to address nuclear safety concerns. In case a fire in primary containment causes a spurious containment isolation signal, administrative controls have been established to address reestablishing flow to these systems.
12.3             Automatic Fire Suppression II-34

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                          Revision 60 The automatic fire suppression systems are designed to extinguish a fire or control and minimize the effects of a fire until the fire brigade can respond and extinguish it. The automatic suppression systems consist of water based systems and total flooding CO2 systems. In addition, manually actuated fixed water suppression systems are also addressed in this section.
There are typically three types of automatic suppression systems provided in safety-related areas at WBN:
: a.       automatic preaction sprinkler systems
: b.       automatic fire suppression systems with closed water spray heads
: c.       automatic total flooding CO2 systems The annulus area of the Reactor Building has automatic preaction sprinklers that serve as water spray on select cable concentrations and prevent specific cable interactions.
Transformers in the Yard and specific hazards in the Turbine Building are protected with automatic fixed open head water spray systems.
12.3.1           Preaction Sprinkler Systems Automatic preaction sprinkler systems generally are provided in areas where it is important to prevent accidental discharge of water. In a preaction sprinkler system, the piping network is maintained dry until water is needed for fire suppression. A deluge valve (sometimes referred to as a preaction valve when used in a preaction system) is used to control when the water is introduced into the piping network.
Operation of the preaction sprinkler system is initiated by a signal from a detection system in the protected area. This signal starts two electric fire pumps and causes the preaction valve to open to fill the piping network. Actuation can also be initiated manually by mechanical operation at the preaction valve. Manual initiation does not automatically start the electric fire pumps. In accordance with 0-AOI-30.1, Plant Fires (Reference 4.2.59), the Operations staff ensures the fire pumps are running when notified of a fire. Selected preaction sprinkler systems have manual actuation stations at strategic locations remote from the preaction valve.
Water is then applied to the fire when the heat from the fire melts the fusible element in the sprinkler head. Water flow is stopped by manually closing the associated isolation valve.
12.3.2           Fire Suppression Systems with Closed Water Spray Heads Automatic fire suppression systems with closed water spray heads are provided for charcoal type filter units, the reactor coolant pumps, and cable tray interactions in both Annulus areas.
The actuation of the deluge valves is the same as that described for the preaction sprinkler systems section.
Operation of the fire suppression system is initiated by a signal from a detection system in the protected area. This signal starts two electric fire pumps and opens the deluge valve, filling the piping network with water. Actuation can also be initiated manually by mechanical operation at the deluge valve. Manual initiation does not automatically start the electric fire pumps.
Water is applied when the heat from the fire melts the fusible element in the closed water spray head. Water flow is stopped by manually closing the associated isolation valve.
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PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                         Revision 60 12.3.3           Carbon Dioxide Suppression Systems Automatic total flooding CO2 suppression systems have been provided for the Auxiliary Instrument Rooms and Computer Room in the Control Building; and the Lube Oil Storage Room, each Diesel Engine Room (4), Fuel Oil Transfer Room, and each 480-V Board Room (4) in the Diesel Generator Building. The design basis for the areas protected by CO2 are as follows:
Auxiliary Instrument Rooms - Deep seated fires. Must achieve 30% concentration within 2 minutes, 50% concentration within 7 minutes, and maintain at least 45% concentration for at least 15 minutes.
Computer Room - Deep seated fire. Must achieve 30% concentration within 2 minutes and 50% concentration within 7 minutes.
Diesel Generator Engine Rooms - Surface fire (diesel fuel) and rotating electrical equipment. Must achieve 34% concentration within 1 minute and maintain at least 30%
concentration for at least 20 minutes.
Diesel Generator Electrical Board Rooms - Deep seated fires. Must achieve 30%
concentration within 2 minutes and 50% concentration within 7 minutes.
Lube Oil Storage and Fuel Oil Transfer Rooms - Surface fire. Must achieve 34%
concentration within 1 minute.
A signal from either the fire detection system or a push button station activates the area alarms, CO2 discharge timer which actuates the master control valve and the area selector valve permitting the CO2 to be discharged into the selected area. In addition, the system can be manually operated, even with a loss of power to the system, via the electro-manual pilot valve for each hazard protected Personnel safety is considered by providing the pre-discharge alarm to notify anyone in the area that CO2 is going to be discharged and by the addition of an odorizer to the CO2 to warn personnel that CO2 has been discharged.
Actuation of the CO2 system causes selective closure of dampers and doors to the area protected and shut down HVAC air flows to the protected area. This prevents spread of the fire and ensures that the minimum concentration of CO2 is maintained. Full discharge tests for representative rooms in conjunction with door fan pressurization tests have been conducted to validate CO2 concentration and soak times. The duration of the discharge is determined by the area requirements and is controlled by the discharge timer.
The carbon dioxide system providing protection for the diesel generator building is stored in a tank at the diesel generator building. The diesel generator units are protected from the effects of a postulated failure of this storage tank by an 18-in thick reinforced concrete wall. Therefore, any missiles or pressure buildup generated by a rupture of the carbon dioxide storage tank does not damage safety-related equipment. The vent path for the storage tank compartment is through one set of double doors into a stairwell then, if needed, through another set of double doors which open to the atmosphere from the stairwell.
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PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                           Revision 60 Carbon dioxide for the powerhouse areas is supplied from another storage tank in an underground vault in the yard; therefore, rupture or explosion of the tank cannot pose a threat to any safety-related structure. This part of the carbon dioxide suppression system has a non-seismic portion. The rupture of the non-seismic portion of the carbon dioxide system cannot result in the total depletion of the carbon dioxide supply to areas protecting safety-related and FSSD equipment. A pneumatic timer is located in the carbon dioxide supply line to hazards in non-seismic areas. This timer allows only the discharge equivalent to that required for the greatest hazard in a non-seismic area to be discharged from the system. After this specified length of time, the timer causes closure of the master control valve on the supply line to non-seismic hazards.
12.4             Manual Suppression Systems and Features 12.4.1           Portable Extinguishers Portable fire extinguishers of a size and type compatible with specific hazards are located throughout the plant (Reference 4.2.38).
12.4.2           Manual Sprinkler Systems Manually activated sprinkler systems are provided for the 125-volt vital battery and battery board rooms I, II, III, and IV. The piping network isolation valve is maintained in the closed position. Personnel are alerted to a problem in these areas by the fire detection system. After confirming there is a fire, personnel then open the appropriate isolation valve to allow water to the system. Water is applied to the fire when the heat from the fire melts the fusible element in the sprinkler head.
12.5             Fire Detection Systems Fire detection is installed to provide for prompt detection of a fire in its incipient stage and provide early warning capability. Prompt detection of a fire reduces the potential for damage to structures, systems and equipment and is an important part of the overall fire protection program at WBN. The fire detection systems at WBN are designed to be functional with or without offsite power.
The fire detection systems consist of initiating devices, proprietary protective signaling devices, local control panels, remote transmitter/receiver units which provide remote multiplex (MUX) functions, and computerized multiplex central control equipment.
The system processes the following signal types:
: 1.       Alarm - A signal indicating the actuation of smoke or heat detectors or the sensing of flow through fire suppression systems. Also, some suppression supervision monitoring devices transmit an alarm signal.
: 2.       Trouble - A signal indicating the occurrence of a fault condition in the proprietary protective signaling system. Normally suppression supervision monitoring devices transmit a trouble signal.
A central processor unit (CPU) of the computerized multiplex central control equipment communicates with the local control panels via the remote transmitter/receiver units over looped circuits. The transmitting equipment allows the processor to interrogate each local control panel II-37

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                          Revision 60 in turn and to receive data from the panels. When an initiating device changes from normal to a trouble or alarm status, it is detected at the local control panel and, when next interrogated, the remote transmitter/receiver transmits this status change. The status change is evaluated by the CPU and visual and audible indications are provided. The computerized multiplex central control equipment is located in a constantly attended location.
Where detection is provided for the protection of safety-related or FSSD equipment, Class A, four wire, supervised circuits link the fire detectors to the local control panels. These circuits are used to annunciate status change to a constantly attended location.
A status change generally results in the following system responses:
: 1.      Audible and visual annunciation by the computerized multiplex central control equipment. This annunciation includes identification of the location and the time of receipt of the status change on a monitor and a printer.
: 2.      Illumination of indicating lamps on the local control panel indicating the status change.
: 3.      Actuation of local control panel circuits for the control of automatic suppression systems, fire pumps, fire dampers, or ventilation equipment as appropriate for selected alarm status changes.
: 4.      Printer annunciation is not automatic. A printout is available on demand.
: 5.      An alarm status change can be reset at the local control panel. Local control panel reset, in safety-related areas, can also be achieved through the computerized multiplex central control equipment.
A second CPU is provided in a constantly attended location as an alternate for the primary processor.
The fire detection system for safety-related areas is comprised of different types of devices, components, or parts that provide the system functions of detection, annunciation, and/or activation of automatic suppression systems. The devices used are:
: 1.      Smoke Detectors
: a.      Ionization
: b.      Photoelectric
: 2.      Thermal Detectors The thermal detectors are the rate compensation/fixed temperature type and are self restoring.
They have temperature ratings appropriate for the area environment.
: 3.      Air Duct Detectors The smoke-type air duct detectors are specifically designed to sense the presence of smoke or combustion products in HVAC ducts.
: 4.      Monitoring Devices II-38

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                         Revision 60 The fire detection system utilizes the following devices to monitor the fire suppression systems status.
: a.      Pressure Switch - piping integrity
: b.      Pressure Switch - for water flow
: c.      Pressure Switch - CO2 discharge
: d.      Status Switch - diesel fire pump running
: 5.      Manual Pull Stations
: 6.      Power Supply Two sources of 120V AC power are provided to the portion of the fire detection system protecting the safety-related equipment. The primary power supply is from Class 1E power sources with a high degree of reliability and adequate capacity for the intended service. The standby power is from a diesel generator. An interim power supply is provided when the transfer from the main power supply to the standby power source takes longer than 30 seconds. The interim power supply consists of batteries that provide power to the remote transmitter/receiver modules only. Electrical isolation is provided between the fire detection system and the Class 1E power source from which it is supplied.
12.6            Lightning Protection The basic principle to protecting life and property from damage or loss due to lightning is to provide a direct low impedance path for the lightning to travel to ground rather than through structures and/or equipment (Reference 4.2.33).
The lightning protection system consists of three basic parts which provide the low impedance path:
: 1.      The air terminals on roofs and other elevated locations.
: 2.      The ground grid.
: 3.      The conductors connecting the air terminals to the ground grid.
Overhead shield wires and lightning arrestor protection is provided for the transmission lines, the switchyard, and the transformers.
12.7            Emergency Lighting The plant design includes three lighting systems classifications:
: 1.      Normal - powered only from offsite power,
: 2.      Standby - powered from offsite or onsite power, and
: 3.      Emergency - powered from 125V vital batteries or individual battery packs.
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PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                         Revision 60 Normal and standby lighting are energized during normal plant operation. 125V emergency lighting comes on automatically during the transition from offsite to onsite power. The individual emergency battery pack lights come on automatically upon loss of voltage to the normal lighting circuit serving the area.
Standby and emergency lighting is designed to provide essential lighting to accomplish safe shutdown and for personnel access/egress. However, since fire damage may disable portions of the standby and 125V DC emergency lighting systems, and in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix R, Section III.J, eight-hour emergency battery pack lighting is provided in areas required for manual operation of safe shutdown equipment and in the access/egress routes thereto in all areas except the Turbine Building, Yard Area, and Containment (Reference 4.2.73B).
Emergency Diesel Generator backed standby lighting is available and maintained for the Turbine Building. Diesel generator backed security lighting is provided and maintained for the Yard. Additionally, portable hand-held lighting is carried by the Nuclear Assistant Unit Operators (NAUO) to provide task-lighting capability (e.g., breaker tripping) in these areas.
Portable powered battery lights are used for the Containment. Deviation 2.7 in Part VII, "Deviations and Evaluations," provides TVA's justification for the lighting available for these areas.
The illumination provided by emergency lighting in access routes to and in areas where shutdown functions must be performed is sufficient to enable a qualified operator to perform the shutdown functions. Illumination levels are adequate for personnel to perform their intended task(s).
Additional portable, hand-held lighting is available at predetermined locations for use by Operations personnel in those areas where emergency lighting is temporarily out of service for maintenance or repair or for entry into rooms in which the fire occurred and disabled the installed emergency light.
12.8             Communications There are several means of communication available to the Operations staff such as telephones, code alarm and paging, sound powered phones, and two-way radios. The in-plant radio signal will be the primary means of communication for performing manual actions and for the fire brigade use.
The trunked in-plant radio system consists of radio repeaters, portable radios (including tri-band), and redundant in-plant distributed antenna systems. To ensure communication availability, one of the radios and associated power cabling is located in a separate fire zone or is separated by minimum of 20 feet. The radio repeaters are located at floor elevation 772.0 of the Auxiliary Building within the 480V Board Room 2A and the 480V Transformer Room 2A.
The radios (multiple frequencies) are available for use by the fire brigade and for operations personnel for performing safe shutdown manual actions. The radio equipment features redundant diesel and battery backed power supplies. Antennas for the radios are located on the Aux Building exhaust stack (above elevation 814.75) to transmit and receive the radio signal. In addition to the antennas on the exhaust stack, the internal distributed antenna systems (Radiax) are located in the control and turbine buildings and two widely separated trunk lines feed the radio signal to redundant distributed antenna systems located throughout the auxiliary building.
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PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                          Revision 60 Adequate radio communications are provided for areas of the plant that contain equipment that must be manually operated in the event of a fire. In some rooms such as the RHR heat exchanger room, two-way radio communications may not be adequate in the room; however, adequate communications are available immediately outside this room. The action to be performed does not require that communication be established at the device (e.g., for example open/close valve or breaker).
A sound powered phone system connects the auxiliary control room and various local control stations to supplement the radios during alternative shutdown. Control of communication equipment outages are via the normal work control program. Fire protection impairment permits are not used to control this type of outage.
12.9            Reactor Coolant Lube Pump Oil Collection The major fire hazard within the containment is the reactor coolant pump (RCP) lube oil system.
To prevent a fire as a result of oil leakage WBN has provided an oil collection system for each RCP. The oil collection system includes enclosing the RCP oil lift pump and providing an oil collection basin at the access platform elevation of each pump to collect and drain away any combustible liquid and/or suppression system discharge. Any discharge is drained from the collection basin into the containment floor and equipment drain sump located inside primary containment. See Part VII for the deviation associated with the RCP oil collection system.
Each RCP is provided with a heat collection hood to reduce the response time of the thermal detectors and the thermal-actuated closed head water spray nozzles installed below the heat collector hood.
12.10           Fire-Rated Assemblies Fire rated assemblies at WBN are part of the passive fire protection features which ensure that the function of one set of redundant fire safe shutdown components necessary to achieve and maintain FSSD remains free of fire damage. Fire rated assemblies consist of fire barriers, raceway protection, equipment hatches and stairwells, fire doors, fire dampers, and penetration seals. Fire barriers and fire doors are identified on the compartmentation drawings in Part II of the FPR.
In general, the fire barriers are of either reinforced concrete or reinforced concrete block construction. The concrete barriers are normally a minimum of 12-inch thick (some are 8-inch thick) and the block barriers are normally 8-inch thick. National Fire Protection Association Handbook, 17th Edition Section 6, Chapter 5, Figure 6-5G (Reference 4.4.1) provides a correlation between the thickness of reinforced concrete and its fire resistance. Figure 6-5G shows that six inches of reinforced concrete has a fire resistance of approximately four-hours.
Based on this, the 8-inch thick concrete barriers far exceed the maximum three-hour rating assigned to these barriers at WBN. The UL Fire Resistance Directory identifies similar concrete block barriers (designs U904, U905, U906, and U907) as two-hour to four-hour fire-rated barriers. The 8-inch thick concrete block barriers are only used when barriers are required to have a fire rating of 2-hours or less.
12.10.1         Walls, Floors, and Ceilings Fire areas are separated by 2- or 3-hour equivalent fire barriers that are bounded by UL rated designs. Rooms within each fire area may be separated from other rooms in the same area by regulatory or nonregulatory fire barriers. (Only regulatory fire barriers are relied on for the fire II-41

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                          Revision 60 safe shutdown separation analysis.) Where fire barriers are used to separate rooms in the same area, the barriers have equivalent 2-hour fire ratings, except for portions of the main control room elevation complex which is 1-hour rated. If the separation between rooms in the same fire area is less than 3-hour, then automatic suppression and detection systems are provided or deviations justified (see Part VII for the discussion of deviations).
12.10.2          Raceway Protection Cable raceways that require separation by Electrical Raceway Fire Barrier Systems (ERFBS) are provided with one-hour rated ERFBS and automatic suppression and detection in the area, or three-hour rated ERFBS. Inside the reactor building, which includes primary containment (Unit 1 only) and secondary containment (i.e., annulus), radiant energy shields or automatic detection and suppression are used to obtain separation where a fire may damage redundant safe shutdown components. Note that radiant energy shields are not installed inside the Unit 1 crane wall or in Unit 2 inside primary containment.
The radiant energy shields used in Unit 1 are constructed primarily of 3M M20A or M20C (see Part VII, section 2.2). During the 2012 refueling outage, radiant shields were added to the Unit 1 Annulus and were constructed of 3M E54C (M20 is no longer available and E54C is a replacement). The radiant energy shields used in the Unit 2 Annulus are constructed of 3M E54C (no radiant energy shields are used in Unit 2 Primary containment). The E54C material is non-combustible and has a minimum 30-minute fire resistive rating (Reference 4.2.13). This is in compliance with Appendix R, section III.G.2.f.
The ERFBS for WBN was tested to the guidance provided in GL86-10, Supplement 1 (Reference 4.1.17) and GL92-08 (Reference 4.1.19) and the associated Information Notices (Reference 4.1.22 thru 4.1.33) which have established the industry standards for acceptable ERFBS. Mechanical Design Standard DS-M17.2.2 (Reference 4.2.54) and General Engineering Specification G-98 (Reference 4.2.50) document the testing, design, installation, quality control and maintenance requirements of the ERFBS. The design standard also provided the guidelines for evaluating unique ERFBS configurations to ensure that a unique design is within the important parameters that keep it bounded by tested configurations. NRC previously reviewed and approved this program (References 4.1.40 and 4.3.4).
From 1992 through 1995 TVA performed numerous fire tests on a large variety of ERFBS configurations (cable trays, conduits, junction boxes, air drops, etc.) to ensure the fire resistive rating assigned to the ERFBS was in accordance with the established industry/NRC standards.
These tests also provided sufficient information to establish the bounding parameters (thickness of material, attachment methods, etc.) and thereby develop the design standards for the ERFBS at TVA, In addition to the fire testing, TVA also tested the ERFBS to ensure it may withstand a seismic event; ampacity derating requirements for the various ERFBS applications; and quality assurance standards for the acceptance of the ERFBS material from the vendor, material handling, and installation of the ERFBS.
Standard drawings (References 4.2.40 and 42) document the ERFBS configurations used at WBN. These drawings identify such critical attributes as material thickness, pre-buttering with trowel grade Thermo-Lag, scoring and folding requirements, tie wire/banding spacing, raceway support protection, interfering item protection, attachment of ERFBS to concrete barriers, etc.
The installation of ERFBS is by a modification package (design change notice). If during the installation of an ERFBS, it cannot be installed as per the DCN, a field change request is generated to document the unique configuration. Each unique ERFBS configuration is II-42

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                           Revision 60 evaluated per DS-M17.2.2 (Reference 4.2.54), Appendix H, Guidelines for Evaluation Unique Thermo-Lag 330-1 ERFBS Configurations, by personnel cognizant of the important parameters. These people must be knowledgeable of the impact these important parameters have on the overall performance of the ERFBS assemblies. The evaluator judges the synergistic effects that may be experienced when one or more important parameter(s) is (are) different and ensures compensating design measures are incorporated into the unique ERFBS to overcome these differences. This evaluation ensures that the unique configuration is designed and installed within the list of important parameters that were communicated to utilities in Generic Letter 92-08 (Reference 4.1.19). The installed configuration is therefore ensured of being bounded by the acceptable parameters of a rated fire barrier.
The ERFBS are designed, procured and installed in accordance with the requirements of NPG-SPP-18.4.5, Fire Protection Quality Assurance (Q07), (Reference 4.2.66). TVA inspects the Thermo-Lag at the manufacturer to ensure chemical composition, material thickness and appearance, etc. are in accordance with TVA requirements. The installation of the ERFBS is monitored in accordance with the TVA Quality Assurance Program. This overall program ensures that the design, procurement, installation and maintenance of the ERFBS meets the requirements for adequate separation as stated in Appendix R, Section III.G.2.
12.10.3          Equipment Hatches and Stairwell Equipment hatches in floor or ceiling fire barriers fall into three categories:
a)      Precast concrete plugs which overlap mating surfaces for support--These plugs are usually associated with radiation shielding and provide a fire barrier equivalent to the floor or ceiling in which they are located.
b)      Steel covers that overlap mating surfaces for support--These covers are of substantial construction and provide an effective barrier to prevent fire from propagating from one side of the barrier to the other. However, since they are not fire rated, they are either provided with a draft stop and water curtain around them or redundant safe shutdown components on either side have been separated from each other by a cumulative horizontal distance of 20 or more feet. In either case, automatic fire suppression and detection are provided on both sides of the equipment hatch cover, if appropriate, or an engineering evaluation has been performed. See Part VII for justifications for deviations and/or evaluations.
c)      Open hatches and stairwells - Redundant safe shutdown components located on each side of the opening have been identified. If separated by less than a cumulative distance of 20 feet horizontally, either the hatch/stairwell has been provided with a water curtain to separate elevations, or a one hour fire barrier has been provided on the cables for one of the redundant paths. In either case, automatic fire suppression and detection has been provided on both sides of the opening, except for the refueling area and the 676 ft elevation of the Auxiliary Building. See Part VII for justifications for deviations and/or evaluations.
12.10.4          Fire Doors Fire door assemblies (doors, frames, and hardware) are generally provided for door openings in required fire barriers. These assemblies are UL listed as either "A" label (3-hour rated) or "B" label (1-1/2 hour rated). "A" label doors are provided in 3-hour or less rated fire barriers and "B" label doors are provided in some barriers that require a 2-hour or less fire rating.
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PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                       Revision 60 Sliding fire doors are provided in selected locations. These sliding fire doors are closed by heat melting a fusible link, and in CO2 protected areas, when a CO2 system pressure-activated release occurs.
In some cases, such as air lock doors, equipment doors, submarine type doors, etc., the doors cannot be purchased as labeled fire doors. These doors have been evaluated by a Fire Protection Engineer for their ability to prevent the propagation of a fire. These evaluations are either kept on file for review or are documented in Part VII, Deviations.
Repairs on fire door assemblies require the approval of a Fire Protection Engineer except when replacing a like item for a like item as specified on design output.
12.10.5          Fire Dampers Fire dampers are provided in HVAC ducts that penetrate required fire barriers to prevent the propagation of a fire through the duct. Some duct penetrations do not have fire rated dampers and are shown on the compartmentation drawings as unprotected openings. In some cases, the fire damper is also used to isolate an area prior to CO2 discharge. Fire dampers are provided with appropriately rated fusible links based on the ambient temperatures in the location. The fire dampers provided with CO2 suppression system isolation capability are actuated by CO2 system pressure activated release mechanism and/or by thermal link. Fire dampers in safety-related HVAC systems may have double fusible links installed if required by a single failure analysis.
12.10.6          Penetration Seals When plant commodities (i.e., pipe, cable trays, conduits, etc.) must pass through required fire barriers, the openings are provided with seals that meet or exceed the fire protection requirements of the barrier. The mechanical and electrical penetration seals used at Watts Bar have been bounded by fire tests conducted at independent testing laboratories that are experienced in fire testing (e.g., Underwriters Laboratories, Omega Point Laboratories, Construction Technologies Laboratories, etc.). The testing labs were required to conduct the test using the standard temperature-time curve as described in ASTM E-119. The critical attributes of an acceptable mechanical and electrical seal are defined below. The most important attribute is that the penetration seal has withstood the fire endurance test without passage of flame or gases hot enough to ignite cable or other fire stop material on the unexposed side for a period equal to the required fire rating. In addition, these seals may be required to meet other plant design bases requirements such as radiation shielding, HVAC pressure differential, and/or flood. Engineering Report for Penetration Seal Program Assessment (Reference 4.2.44) documents the testing acceptance parameters and design standards for fire rated penetration seals at WBN. This document along with General Engineering Specification G-96 (Reference 4.2.49) and drawing series 45A883 (Reference 4.2.34), 45W883 (Reference 4.2.35) and 47A472 (Reference 4.2.37) control the penetration seal program at WBN.
(A)      Mechanical Pipe Penetrations Mechanical penetrations in fire walls and floors/ceilings are sealed with fire resistance seals that are based on F rating testing performed in accordance with ASTM E-814-83 section 10.1. The F rating ensures the seal is capable of preventing the passage of flame or gases hot enough to ignite cable, fire stop material or other combustibles on the unexposed side for a period equal to II-44

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                          Revision 60 the required fire rating and following the fire duration will pass a hose stream test. The F rating is acceptable for mechanical pipe penetrations where the penetrant is a steel, non-combustible pipe and the types of construction and material for floors and walls are noncombustible steel or concrete and do not have combustible internal construction materials or combustible surface finishes (e.g., carpet) on the unexposed side. At WBN, transient combustibles that might be introduced due to work activities are addressed by NPG-SPP-18.4.7, Control of Transient Combustibles; consequently, transient combustible material would be restricted on the unexposed side of the seal. Most areas of the plant have detection and suppression on the unexposed side of the seal which would limit the ability of a fire on the unexposed side of a seal to affect a significant amount of equipment. Areas which do not have full suppression and detection are evaluated in Part VII, Section 3.1. Section 3.1 concluded that the addition of full suppression and detection in these rooms is not required for FSSD. The seal must be able to accommodate the service temperature and any thermal or mechanical movement of the pipe ASTM E-814-83 Section 10.2 also contains provisions for establishing a T rating for mechanical penetrations. The T rating ensures the unexposed side temperature of the seal (not the penetrant) is sufficiently low to preclude ignition where combustible walls/floors, interiors, transient combustibles, etc. are present. A T rating is not needed for mechanical pipe penetrations where the types of construction materials, such as used in nuclear power plants, for floors and walls are noncombustible steel or concrete and do not have combustible construction materials or combustible surface finishes (e.g., carpet) on the unexposed side of the seal.
Based on the above discussion, the F rating of the mechanical penetration seals along with the seal passing the hose stream test will be considered as acceptable to maintain the integrity of the fire barriers. See Engineering Report 0006-00922-02 (Reference 4.2.44) for further evaluations of the WBN Penetration Seals.
(B)      Electrical Penetrations A 1-hour, 2-hour, or 3-hour rating in accordance with IEEE 634-1978, section 6.1 was established for electrical penetration seals. Transmission of heat through the penetration seal was limited to 700o F or the lowest auto-ignition temperature of cable in the penetration, whichever is lower.
Conduit penetrations typically require only internal seals since most conduit penetrations were poured-in-place during plant construction. Internal seal materials, design, and locations in walls and floor/ceiling assemblies have been evaluated as equivalent to tested configurations. If a conduit requires an external seal (e.g., the conduit passed through a sleeve larger than the conduit), the external seal meets the same criteria as stated in the above paragraph. The criteria for internal conduit seals that were reviewed and approved by the NRC are based on the information presented in an RAI response from July 1, 1994 (ML073230669) (Reference 4.2.51). The following information is from that submittal. The internal conduit seal criteria is documented on drawing series 45W883 and is as follows.
Smoke and gas seals shall have a (min) 3 inch RTV silicone foam and 1 inch ceramic fiber damming at the bottom/back side of the foam. The fiber damming may or may not exist in the front/top side of the foam. The silicone foam shall be installed at the first available opening.
Conduits that terminate in junction boxes or other non-combustible enclosures need no additional sealing except for Auxiliary Building secondary containment envelope boundaries.
See table below for sealing instructions. A closed electrical cubical similar to a motor control center or switchgear cabinet is not considered a non-combustible enclosure.
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PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                        Revision 60 CONDUIT                  TOTAL LENGTH OF CONDUIT FROM BARRIER CONTINUOUS SIZE                             <1     >1 - <3    >3 - <5 >5 - <22    >22 THRU AREA
            <1           NSR               F        NSR          NSR       NSR         NSR 1            NSR               F          S           S        NSR         NSR
        >1 - <2         NSR               F          S           S        NSR         NSR 2            NSR               F          F           S4       NSR         NSR
        >2 - <4         NSR               F          F           F4         S4        NSR
            >4           NSR               F          F            F         S         NSR Notes:
: 1. NSR - No Seal Required
: 2. S - Smoke and Hot Gas Seal Required
: 3. F - Fire Seal Required
: 4. NSR if cable fill exceeds 40%
(C)      Hose Stream Test for Penetrations Hose stream test requirements are in accordance with IEEE 634-1978 or ASTM E-814-83. The penetration seal configurations at Watts Bar have withstood a hose stream test without the hose stream causing an opening through the penetration seal that permits a projection of water beyond the unexposed side.
13.0            FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM IMPAIRMENTS AND COMPENSATORY ACTIONS Fire protection impairments are controlled to maximize the availability of the active and passive fire protection systems and features.
Fire protection systems and features are intended to remain fully operational to the maximum extent possible. However, it is expected for outages or impairments to occur to support plant or fire protection-related modifications or maintenance. As a minimum, fire protection systems and features are to remain functional whenever the equipment they protect is required to be functional, or appropriate compensatory actions are established as prescribed in the associated ORs.
WBN "Regulatory Required" (REG) fire protection systems and features, although not classified as safety related, provide fire protection capabilities in those areas where protection of safety-related or FSSD equipment is deemed necessary. In the event a REG fire protection system or feature becomes non-functional, compensatory actions have been developed to minimize the effects of the impaired equipment on safe plant operations and safe shutdown. To ensure the maximized availability of REG fire protection systems and features, processes are in place, through administrative procedures, to keep fire protection system and feature non-functionality as short in duration as possible.
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PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                         Revision 60 13.1               Compensatory Actions Compensatory actions for impaired REG fire protection systems or features generally consist of fire watches as defined in the applicable sections of this plan. Alternate compensatory actions such as additional/alternative fire protection equipment, temporary/portable detection systems, temporary alternate feeds to suppression systems, or closed circuit television may be utilized on a case by case basis. These alternative actions are considered when they provide equal or better protection and/or when the primary methods are too restrictive, create further hazards, or represent personnel safety concerns.
A summary of each of the primary and alternate actions are as follows:
A.       Fire Watch - Continuous (Primary)
The locations that a continuous fire watch is required are based on plant conditions existing at the time the fire watch is in place and modified as needed. Continuous fire watches are restricted to patrolling one fire area except as noted below.
Continuous fire watches are only required when the affected unit is in Modes 1 (Power Operation) to 4 (Hot Shutdown), inclusive. A roving fire watch covers the designated areas on an hourly basis in areas where only the unit in Modes 5, 6, or core empty may be affected by a fire. If a fire in an area may affect both units, then a Continuous fire watch is required.
Specific patrol locations are selected to accommodate plant features such as locked doors, security card readers, contaminated areas, etc., so that patrol access is not unduly impeded under existing conditions. The patrol routes are specified such that the fire watch can routinely accomplish the route within 15 minutes with a thorough review of the route, with a margin of 5 minutes to accommodate and handle unforeseen circumstances and to report and/or resolve potential fire hazards in a location.
There are locations where one or more rooms are in different fire areas but their proximity and limited size warrant allowing them to be combined for one continuous fire watch to address.
Time study information (Ref. 4.2.21) is used to identify the rooms, in different fire areas, that can be covered in 15 minutes without putting undue exertion on the person. The below listed rooms have been identified as an exception to the definition of a continuous fire watch. The specific patrol locations requires approval of the ESO SR or designee to ensure the conditions that formed a basis for the time study have not changed such as to invalidate the time study. The routes with more than one fire area that are exceptions to a continuous fire watch staying in one fire area are:
: 1.       Diesel Generator Building, Elev. 742
: 2.       Diesel Generator Building, Elev. 760
: 3.       Auxiliary Building Rooms (0-FCV-26-143 and 0-FCV-26-322 out of service):
757.0-A2                       757.0-A12 757.0-A9                       757.0-A21 757.0-A10                      782.0-A1 757.0-A11                      782.0-A2 II-47

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                  Revision 60
: 4. Auxiliary Building Rooms (0-FCV-26-143 and 0-FCV-26-322 out of service) 772.0-A1                   772.0-A9 772.0-A6                   772.0-A12 772.0-A7                   772.0-A16 772.0-A8
: 5. Auxiliary Building Rooms (0-FCV-26-151 and 0-FCV-26-326 out of service) 757.0-A5                   757.0-A17 757.0-A14                  757.0-A24 757.0-A15                  782.0-A3 757.0-A16                  782.0-A4
: 6. Auxiliary Building Rooms (0-FCV-26-151 and 0-FCV-26-326 out of service) 772.0-A2                   772.0-A11 772.0-A5                   772.0-A15 772.0-A10
: 7. Auxiliary Building Rooms (0-FCV-26-191 out of service)
Covers areas bounded by column lines A1-A8/Q-X 692.0-A1 (partial)         692.0-A10 692.0-A4                   692.0-A11 692.0-A6                   692.0-A12 692.0-A7                   692.0-A13 692.0-A9                   692.0-A14
: 8. Auxiliary Building Rooms (0-FCV-26-191 out of service)
Covers areas bounded by column lines A8-A15/Q-X 692.0-A1 (partial)         692.0-A21 692.0-A17                  692.0-A22 692.0-A18                  692.0-A23 692.0-A19                  692.0-A25 692.0-A20                  692.0-A26
: 9. Auxiliary Building Rooms (0-FCV-26-187 out of service)
Covers areas bounded by column lines C1-A8/Q-RB Centerline 713.0-A1 (partial)         713.0-A6 713.0-A2                   713.0-A7 713.0-A3                   713.0-A13 713.0-A4                   713.0-A22 713.0-A5                   713.0-A27 II-48

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN               Revision 60
: 10. Auxiliary Building Rooms (0-FCV-26-187 out of service)
Covers areas bounded by column lines A8-A15/Q-RB Centerline 713.0-A1 (partial)           713.0-A20 713.0-A14                    713.0-A22 713.0-A19
: 11. Auxiliary Building Rooms (0-FCV-26-183 out of service)
Covers rooms on elevation 729.0 729.0-A3                       729.0-A8 729.0-A4                       729.0-A9 729.0-A5
: 12. Auxiliary Building Rooms (0-FCV-26-183 out of service)
Covers rooms on elevation 737.0 737.0-A1                       737.0-A12 737.0-A3                       737.0-A15 737.0-A5                       737.0-A16 737.0-A9
: 13. Auxiliary Building Room (0-FCV-26-147)
Covers Auxiliary Control Room and associated Instrument Rooms 757.0-A1                       757.0-A27 757.0-A25                      757.0-A28 757.0-A26
: 14. Auxiliary Building Rooms (0-FCV-26-143, 322, 151, 326 out of service)
Covers areas bounded by column lines A1-A15/Q-U 757.0-A2                     757.0-A17 757.0-A5                     757.0-A21 757.0-A9                     757.0-0A24
: 15. Auxiliary Building Rooms (0-FCV-26-143, 322, 151, 326 out of service)
Covers areas bounded by column lines A1-A15/Q-U 772.0-A1                     772.0-A9 772.0-A2                     772.0-A10 772.0-A5                     772.0-A11 772.0-A6                     772.0-A12 772.0-A7                     772.0-S15 772.0-A8                     772.0-A16 II-49

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                          Revision 60
: 16.      Auxiliary Building Rooms (0-FCV-26-143, 322, 151, 326 out of service)
Covers areas bounded by column lines A2-A14/U-X 757.0-A10                       757.0-A16 757.0-A11                       782.0-A1 757.0-A12                       782.0-A2 757.0-A14                       782.0-A3 757.0-A15                       782.0-A4 Situations may arise in which the system or equipment cannot be restored within the time specified by the Fire Protection Systems and Features Operating Requirements (Section 14). In such cases, an augmented compensatory action is taken to ensure that a continuous fire watch does not go to different fire areas. The 15 minute requirement still applies, but the continuous fire watch must remain within the same fire area. This augmented compensatory action is not required for fire locations that only affect the unit that is in Mode 5, 6 or core empty.
B.       Fire Watch - Roving (Primary)
A roving fire watch consists of a trained individual in an affected location at 60 minute intervals with a 15 minute margin to accommodate and handle unforeseen circumstances and to report and/or resolve potential fire hazards in a location. Roving fire watches are required as a compensatory action in all modes of plant operation (i.e., Modes 1 through 6 or core empty).
With a unit in Modes 5, 6, or core empty, locations where a continuous fire watch are required may be combined and patrolled by a roving fire watch when approved by the ESO SR (or designee) if the location only affects the unit in Modes 5, 6, or core empty.
C.       Additional/Alternative Fire Protection Equipment (Alternative)
Additional/alternative fire protection equipment consists of firefighting features such as fire hose and wheeled fire extinguishers, or mobile apparatus. Normal compensatory actions for non-functional fire protection features such as hose stations consist of physical routing and/or staging of backup fire hose capable of supplying water from the nearest functional fire hose station to the area left unprotected by the non-functional hose station. Additionally, the use of wheeled fire extinguishers or mobile apparatus may be considered when physical constraints such as fire barrier integrity preclude breaching the barrier to stage compensatory fire protection equipment. In the event an alternative compensatory action is considered, an evaluation is performed by the plant fire protection staff and documented with the impairment permit or work initiation document to demonstrate technical equivalency to standard compensatory actions identified in Section 14, "Fire Protection Systems and Features Operating Requirements (OR)."
D.       Temporary/Portable Detection Systems (Alternative)
A temporary/portable detection system consists of one or more listed or approved detectors, a power supply and monitor unit, connecting cable, and a method of transmitting an alarm to a constantly attended location. Fire detectors may be placed in more than one room or more than one elevation of the plant. The use of a temporary/portable fire detection system is similar to the industry precedent established by Toledo Edison Company's Davis Besse Nuclear Plant, and other utilities, and approved for use by the NRC. An evaluation is performed by the plant fire protection staff and documented with the impairment permit or work initiation document for each type of temporary/portable detection system to demonstrate technical equivalency to standard compensatory actions identified in Section 14, "Fire Protection Systems and Features II-50

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                         Revision 60 Operating Requirements (OR)." The area with impaired fire protection equipment of Section 14 as well as the associated temporary/portable detection system monitor unit(s) is observed by fire watch personnel at a frequency consistent with standard compensatory actions identified in Section 14, Fire Protection Systems and Features Operating Requirements (OR). Portable detection systems are used where plant configuration and conditions are acceptable for its use.
E.       Closed Circuit Television -CCTV (Alternative)
CCTV equipment consists of CCTV cameras and monitors. Cameras may be placed in more than one room or more than one elevation of the plant. CCTV systems are similar to the ones used by other utilities for monitoring of non-functional fire barriers as well as CCTVs previously utilized at Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant in inaccessible tunnels. An evaluation is performed by the plant fire protection staff and documented with the impairment permit or work initiation document for use of CCTV equipment (cameras and monitors) to demonstrate technical equivalency to standard compensatory actions identified in Section 14, "Fire Protection Systems and Features Operating Requirements (OR)." CCTV monitors are monitored by fire watch personnel at a frequency consistent with standard compensatory actions identified in Section 14, "Fire Protection Systems and Features Operating Requirements (OR)." CCTV may be used in instances where personal safety exceeds OSHA thresholds based on detailed evaluation, operational conditions in high heat areas such as the main steam vault, or ALARA concerns in high radiation areas preclude using a human fire watch in the area.
F.       Constantly Manned Location (Alternative)
In plant areas that are continuously manned, credit may be taken for the constant manning in lieu of establishing either continuous or roving compensatory fire watches when the responsible individual(s) are informed and accept this responsibility. All employees receive training annually on proper reporting of fires. Documentation for the fire watch position is not required provided the manned position is documented (e.g., Main Control Room logs or documented security post).
13.2             Exceeding Return to Service Times Impaired fire protection systems or features are returned to functional condition in the time frame specified in the OR sections. If this restoration is not done, a 10 CFR 50.72 and 10 CFR 50.73 review is performed and documented in accordance with site administrative procedures.
The fire protection organization performs periodic walkdowns to ensure fire protection and compensatory actions are established for those fire protection system impairments or features that are out-of-service.
14.0             FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS AND FEATURES OPERATING REQUIREMENTS (ORs)
The ORs established in this section have been developed to ensure adequate fire protection capability is available and maintained, to detect, control, and extinguish fires occurring in any portion of the plant where safety-related or FSSD equipment are located.
Fire protection systems and features at WBN are not assumed to be functional to mitigate the consequences of a Design Basis Accident (DBA) or plant transient. The bases for this assumption are contained in Section I of Appendix R which states that the need to limit fire II-51

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                          Revision 60 damage to systems required to achieve and maintain FSSD conditions is greater than the need to limit fire damage to those systems required to mitigate the consequences of DBAs. As a result, Section I identifies that fire protection features must be capable of limiting fire damage so that:
: 1.       One train of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions from either the control room, auxiliary control room, or emergency control stations is free of fire damage; and
: 2.       Systems necessary to achieve and maintain cold shutdown from either the control room, auxiliary control room, or emergency control stations can be repaired within 72 hours.
: 3.       Alternate shutdown capability is provided at WBN, when needed, to achieve and maintain cold shutdown within 72 hours.
Functionality of the fire protection systems and features are required whenever safety-related equipment and fire safe shutdown systems protected by the fire protection systems and features are required to be Functional.
The Fire Protection Report provides applicable action statements and thus does not have a requirement similar to Technical Specification 3.0.3 except for equipment listed in Section 14.10. When a piece of equipment in section 14.10 is out of service, there are mode reduction requirements similar to Technical Specification 3.0.3. However, equivalent methods (documented in an engineering evaluation in accordance with site procedures) that ensure fire safe shutdown can be achieved per the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R may be used to delay or remove the mode reduction requirements. These equivalent methods once documented by engineering evaluation provide alternatives to the applicable actions statements when equipment listed in this part, Section 14.10 must be declared non-functional.
The Fire Protection Report does not have a requirement similar to Technical Specifications 3.0.4 preventing mode changes while in an action statement.
The Testing and Inspection Requirements (TIRs) for the WBN fire protection systems and features have been developed taking into consideration industry practice (e.g., similar methods approved for use by other licensed nuclear power facilities), NFPA consensus standards, and insurance carrier loss prevention recommendations.
Engineering judgment has also been utilized in the development of testing and inspection frequencies and criteria for the WBN FPP. The following factors or influences are considered when developing the testing and inspection frequencies and criteria:
: 1.       Personal safety is of paramount concern when developing and implementing the fire protection testing and inspection requirements at WBN. Therefore, alternative frequencies and/or criteria may be necessary when operational considerations, equipment accessibility, or other conditions warrant such changes.
: 2.       Good ALARA practices in concert with equipment/component failure histories are considered to ensure "value add" is achieved without undue challenge to system components and/or personnel.
: 3.       Nuclear facilities by nature and design are controlled and structured environments. The importance of fire protection systems and features and the established administrative II-52

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                         Revision 60 controls at WBN are reinforced to plant personnel through training, sign posting, procedures, and processes.
The performance of the WBN fire protection testing and inspection plan is driven by a trending philosophy which is used to evaluate the success and/or target the testing and inspection activities needing improvement. This philosophy provides an added level of flexibility to increase or decrease as necessary, the testing and inspecting activities based on empirical data.
Refer to the TIR matrix for operational testing requirements. The specified frequency for each TIR is met if the test/inspection is performed within 1.25 times the interval specified in the frequency, as measured from the last scheduled performance date. This extension facilitates TIR scheduling and considers plant operating conditions that may not be suitable for conducting the TIR (e.g., transient conditions or other ongoing TIR or maintenance activities). The provisions for such extensions are not intended to be used repeatedly merely as an operational convenience to extend the TIR testing interval or periodic completion time intervals beyond those specified. The same scheduling policy used for the Technical Specifications is used for each TIR.
Testing of the fire protection systems involve manually disabling portions of them to prevent unwanted responses. These responses can be in the form of excessive starting of deep draft pumps, discharging water in a radiological controlled area, etc. The equipment, generally in the area of the testing, still functions normally once the temporary, intentional impairment is removed. When test personnel are actively performing the test, the compensatory fire watches are not required. This allows for the test personnel to serve as the fire watch for the area in question.
14.1             Fire Detection (Early Warning Fire Detection and Notification Only) (OR)
The minimum number of fire detectors are identified on Table 14.1 and shall be Functional when the safety-related or FSSD equipment in that area is required to be Functional.
NOTE 1:          The action statements below apply to only the Function A fire detectors as defined in Table 14.1. The action statements of Section 14.3 and 14.4 apply to the Function B fire detectors that are associated with automatic suppression systems.
NOTE 2:          Non-functional fire detectors may cause alarms or troubles on the associated local control panels that cause a masking condition addressed in Section 14.5.
NOTE 3:          The central processing unit (CPU) for the fire detection system shall be functional when the fire detection system identified in Operating Requirement 14.1 is required to be functional.
14.1.1           With any of the required Function A fire detectors in a fire detection zone identified on Table 14.1 non-functional in any accessible area, within one hour restore the non-functional equipment
                                                 -OR-II-53

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                        Revision 60 establish a roving fire watch once per hour.
14.1.2.a With any of the required Function A fire detectors in a fire detection zone identified on Table 14.1 non-functional inside containment, within eight hours, restore the non-functional equipment
                                            -OR-either establish a roving fire watch once per 8-hours
                                            -OR-monitor the air temperature for the area affected once per hour using the following:
AREA                                     INSTRUMENT(S)
Upper Containment                      U-9019 on Unit 1 Plant Computer Lower Containment                      U-9020 on Unit 1 Plant Computer Upper Containment                      U-9019 on Unit 2 Plant Computer Lower Containment                      U-9020 on Unit 2 Plant Computer 14.1.2.b With any of the required Function A fire detectors in a fire detection zone identified on Table 14.1 non-functional in an inaccessible area outside containment, within eight hours, restore the non-functional equipment
                                            -OR-establish a roving fire watch once per 8-hours.
14.1.3   Restore the non-functional detector(s) to Functional status within 14 days. If not restored within 14 days, continue the compensatory actions AND perform 10 CFR 50.72 and/or 10 CFR 50.73 reviews per site administrative procedures.
14.1.4   With the CPU non-functional, within one hour establish the following compensatory action:
: a.       Fire detection zones containing Function A detectors in accessible areas shall be continuously monitored at the local fire detection panel.
Exempted from this action are zones inside the Main Control Room and zones associated with supervisory functions (i.e., pressure switches, valve position, fire door position, etc.).
: b.       For fire detection zones containing Function A detectors in inaccessible areas, the air temperature shall be monitored once per hour
                                            -OR-the local fire detection panel shall be monitored once per hour.
: c.       For fire detection zones containing function B detectors or for zones providing a supervisory function in accessible or inaccessible areas, the local fire detection panel shall be monitored hourly.
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PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                            Revision 60 14.1.5         Restore the non-functional CPU to functional status within 14 days. If not restored within 14 days, continue the compensatory actions AND perform 10 CFR 50.72 and/or 10 CFR 50.73 reviews per site administrative procedures.
14.2           Water Supply The Fire Suppression Water Supply System shall be Functional at all times as follows:
NOTE 1:        With a unit in Modes 5, 6, or core empty, locations where a continuous fire watch is required may be combined and patrolled by a roving fire watch when approved by the ESO SR (or designee) if the location only affects the unit in Modes 5, 6, or core empty.
NOTE 2:        Alarms or troubles on the associated local fire detection system control panel (e.g., 0-PNL-13-L631) for the diesel driven pump that may cause a masking condition is addressed in Section 14.5. Section 14.5 is not applicable to the diesel driven pump control panel (e.g., 0-PNL-26-3150A).
: a. Three fire suppression pumps consisting of the diesel driven pump (2500 gpm at 125 psig (288 feet of head)) AND two electric driven pumps, each with a minimum capacity of 1590 gpm at 300 feet of head (130 psig), with their discharge aligned to the fire suppression system header, AND
: b. A functional flow path from the suction supplies, through distribution piping, sectionalizing, control or isolation valves up to but not including the first valve off the headers, leading to the yard hydrant (Section 14.7), the fire hose station/standpipes (Section 14.6), and each water based suppression system (Section 14.3).
14.2.1         With at least two electric pumps functional and the diesel driven fire pump non-functional:
: a.      Restore the diesel driven fire pump to functional status within 7 days AND within one hour a fire watch is established as follows:
1(a). hourly roving fire watch is established In the Auxiliary Building Elevation 713 feet (coordinates Q-U / A10-A15) if the fire detection equipment for the area is functional
                                                 -OR-1(b). continuous fire watches are established In the Auxiliary Building Elevation 713 feet (coordinates Q-U / A10-A15) if the fire detection equipment for the area is non-functional.
                                                -AND-2(a). hourly roving fire watch is established In the Auxiliary Building Elevation 737 feet (coordinates Q-U / A8-A13, Q-S / A13-A15) if the fire detection equipment for the area is functional II-55

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                          Revision 60
                                        -OR-2(b). continuous fire watches are established In the Auxiliary Building Elevation 737 feet (coordinates Q-U / A8-A13, Q-S / A13-A15) if the fire detection equipment for the area is non-functional.
                                        -OR-
: b. Ensure at least three electric driven pumps functional AND within one hour a fire watch is established as follows:
1(a). hourly roving fire watch is established In the Auxiliary Building Elevation 713 feet (coordinates Q-U / A10-A15) if the fire detection equipment for the area is functional
                                        -OR-1(b). continuous fire watches are established In the Auxiliary Building Elevation 713 feet (coordinates Q-U / A10-A15) if the fire detection equipment for the area is non-functional.
                                       -AND-2(a). hourly roving fire watch is established In the Auxiliary Building Elevation 737 feet (coordinates Q-U / A8-A13, Q-S / A13-A15) if the fire detection equipment for the area is functional
                                        -OR-2(b). continuous fire watches are established In the Auxiliary Building Elevation 737 feet (coordinates Q-U / A8-A13, Q-S / A13-A15) if the fire detection equipment for the area is non-functional.
                                        -OR-
: c. Provide a backup pump with at least the same capacity as an electric fire pump
                                       - AND-establish hourly roving fire watch coverage for the areas with common power supplies. Within 7 days after entry from either 14.2.1.a or 14.2.1.b;
: 1.      either enter 14.2.1.b
                                        -OR-
: 2.      restore the diesel driven fire pump to functional status.
14.2.2 With only one electric driven fire pump functional II-56

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                         Revision 60
                                        - AND-the diesel driven fire pump functional:
: a.      Restore an additional electric driven fire pump to functional status within 30 days.
14.2.3 With no electric driven pumps functional
                                        - AND-the diesel driven fire pump functional, within 7 days:
: a.      Restore one electric driven pump to functional status
                                        - AND-enter 14.2.2.
14.2.4 With only one electric driven pump functional
                                        - AND-the diesel driven fire pump non-functional, within 24 hours:
: a.      Restore an additional electric driven pump to functional,
                                        - AND-enter 14.2.1,
                                         -OR-
: b.      Restore the diesel driven fire pump to functional
                                        - AND-enter 14.2.2.
14.2.5 With no water supply system pumps functional:
: a.      Establish a backup water supply system within 24 hours,
                                        - AND-restore one electric driven pump to functional within 48 hours
                                        - AND-a second electric driven pump to functional with 72 hours,
                                        - AND-restore the diesel fire pump to functional within 7 days, II-57

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                          Revision 60
                                        -OR-
: b.      Establish a backup water supply system within 24 hours,
                                       - AND-restore the diesel driven fire pump within 48 hours
                                       - AND-enter 14.2.3.
: c.      Perform 10 CFR 50.72 and/or 10 CFR 50.73 reviews in accordance with site administrative procedures 14.2.6 With the Fire Suppression Water supply system non-functional for reasons other than loss of a fire pump:
: a.      Within one (1) hour enter the applicable Operating Requirements of Section 14.3 AND/OR 14.6 AND/OR 14.7 for those devices with no flow path available. No other action is necessary.
: b.      If the condition involves powering up a normally de-energized valve operator to cycle the valve, then within one (1) hour establish a constant attendant at the breaker.
: c.      Restore the system to normal alignment within 30 days. If not restored within 30 days, continue the compensatory actions AND perform 10 CFR 50.72 and/or 10 CFR 50.73 reviews per site administrative procedures.
14.2.7 With High Pressure Fire Protection (HPFP) or raw service water (RSW) usage's that are not as-designed loads or as-designed loads that have inhibited automatic isolation capability:
: a.      Provide isolation capability
                                       - AND-within one (1) hour establish a constant attendant in communication with the Operations for HPFP/RSW usage's that are not as-designed.
: b.      Ensure the inhibited automatic isolation is controlled by procedure.
: c.      Remove the non-as-designed HPFP/RSW usage
                                        -OR-restore the automatic isolation capability within 30 days. If not restored within 30 days, continue the compensatory actions AND perform 10 CFR 50.72 and/or 10 CFR 50.73 reviews per site administrative procedures.
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PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                          Revision 60 14.2.8          With the functional electric driven pumps capable of manual starting from the Main Control Room (MCR) or their associated 480V shutdown board but the automatic start circuitry non-functional.
: a.      Ensure the inhibited automatic start circuitry is controlled by an approved configuration control method.
: b.      Restore the system to normal alignment within 30 days. If not restored within 30 days perform 10 CFR 50.72 and/or 10 CFR 50.73 reviews per site administrative procedures.
14.3            Water Based Fire Suppression The water based fire suppression systems in the following areas (See Table 14.3 for specific systems) and their associated fire detectors shall be Functional whenever the protected safety-related or FSSD equipment is required to be Functional:
: a.      Unit 1 Reactor building - RC pump area, Annulus.
: b.      Unit 2 Reactor building - RC pump area, Annulus
: c.      Auxiliary building - Elev. 692, 713, 729, 737, 757, 772, and 782.
: d.      Auxiliary building - ABGTS filters, EGTS filters, Containment Purge Air Exhaust Filters, 125V battery and battery board rooms.
: e.      Control building - Elev. 692, cable spreading room, operator living area.
: f.      Control building - MCR air filters.
: g.      Diesel building - Corridor area and Cable Chase A and B.
: h.      Intake Pumping Station
: i.      Turbine Building - Control Building Wall Note 1:         The action statements of this section apply to the Function B fire detectors that are associated with an automatic suppression system. Refer to Table 14.1 for the specific number of fire detectors associated with the water based fire suppression systems in the areas noted below.
Note 2:         Non-functional fire detectors may cause alarm or trouble conditions on the associated local control panels that may cause a masking condition addressed in Section 14.5.
Note 3:         With a unit in Modes 5, 6, or core empty, locations where a continuous fire watch is required may be combined and patrolled by a roving fire watch when approved by the ESO SR (or designee) if the location only affects the unit in Modes 5, 6, or core empty.
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PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                          Revision 60 14.3.1 . With either suppression and/or associated Function B fire detectors non-functional in any of the locations noted above (a-i) in which redundant fire safe shutdown systems or components may be damaged by a single fire, within one hour, restore the non-functional equipment:
                                          -OR-
: a.      For accessible areas, within one hour establish the following:
: 1.      A continuous fire watch AND backup suppression equipment for those areas, if detection or both suppression and detection are non-functional,
                                          -OR-
: 2.      A roving fire watch and backup suppression equipment for those areas, except for 737 elevation of the Auxiliary Building, if only the suppression is non-functional.
                                          -OR-
: 3.      A continuous fire watch and backup suppression equipment for the 737 elevation of the Auxiliary Building if suppression or detection or both are non-functional. This watch shall be limited to the 737 elevation of the Auxiliary Building.
                                          -OR-
: b.      For inaccessible areas, as noted below, establish the following within one hour:
: 1.      For either Reactor Building, Lower Containment, establish a continuous fire watch using the alternatives defined in Sub-section D or E of Section 13.1.
                                          -OR-monitor the air temperature in the area once per hour using U-9020 on Plant Computer.
: 2.      For other inaccessible areas with detection non-functional OR both suppression and detection non-functional, within one hour establish backup suppression equipment:
                                         -AND-II-60

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                          Revision 60
: a.      A continuous fire watch using the alternatives defined in Sub-section D and E of Section 13.1.
                                               -OR-
: b.      Provide alternate compensatory actions in accordance with an engineering evaluation.
: 3.      For other inaccessible areas with non-functional suppression only, within one hour establish backup fire suppression equipment:
                                              -AND-
: a.      An hourly roving fire watch using the alternatives defined in Sub-section D and E of Section 13.1.
                                               -OR-
: b.      Provide alternate compensatory actions in accordance with an engineering evaluation.
14.3.2        With either non-functional suppression or associated Function B fire detectors in any of the locations noted above (a-i) in which redundant fire safe shutdown systems or components are NOT exposed to the damage of a single fire, within one hour establish a roving fire watch AND backup suppression equipment for those areas.
14.3.3        Restore the non-functional suppression and/or associated detection to Functional status within 14 days. If not restored within 14 days, continue the compensatory actions AND perform 10 CFR 50.72 and/or 10 CFR 50.73 reviews per site administrative procedures. Also, determine if any continuous fire watch routes are to be augmented as specified in Section 13.1.A.
14.4          Carbon Dioxide (CO2) Suppression Systems The CO2 suppression systems in the following areas and their associated fire detectors shall be functional whenever the protected safety-related or FSSD equipment is required to be functional:
NOTE 1:       The action statements of this section apply to the Function B fire detectors that are associated with an automatic suppression system. Refer to Table 14.1 for the specific number of fire detectors associated with the CO2 based fire suppression systems in the locations noted below.
NOTE 2:       Non-functional fire detectors may cause alarms or troubles on the associated local control panels that may cause a masking condition addressed in Section 14.5.
NOTE 3:       With a unit in Modes 5, 6, or core empty, the locations where a continuous fire watch is required may be combined and patrolled by a roving fire watch when approved by the ESO SR (or designee) if the location only affects the unit in Modes 5, 6, or core empty.
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PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                           Revision 60
: a.      Auxiliary instrument room (Units 1 and 2).
: b.      Computer room.
: c.      Diesel generator rooms.
: d.      Diesel generator fuel oil pump room.
: e.      Diesel generator electrical board rooms.
: f.      Diesel generator lube oil storage room.
14.4.1        With either suppression or associated Function B fire detectors non-functional in any of the locations noted above (a-f) in which redundant fire safe shutdown systems or components may be damaged, within one hour establish a continuous fire watch AND backup suppression equipment for those areas.
14.4.2        With either non-functional suppression or associated Function B fire detectors in any of the locations noted above (a-f) in which redundant fire safe shutdown systems or components are NOT exposed to the damage of a single fire, within one hour establish a roving fire watch AND backup suppression equipment for those areas.
14.4.3        Restore both the non-functional CO2 suppression and associated detection to functional status within 14 days. If not restored within 14 days, continue the compensatory actions AND perform 10 CFR 50.72 and/or 10 CFR 50.73 reviews per site administrative procedures. Also determine if any continuous fire watch routes are to be augmented as specified in Section 13.1.A.
14.5          Fire Detection Supervision The supervision capabilities of the local control panels identified on Table 14.5 shall be Functional when the associated fire detectors identified on Table 14.1 are required to be functional.
NOTE:         These action statements apply to both Function A and Function B detectors and the actuation circuits for automatic valves in the flow path.
14.5.1        With the supervisory function of a panel listed in Table 14.5 masked by a panel alarm or trouble, within eight hours:
: a.      restore the non-functional equipment,
                                                -OR-
: b.      jumper out the zone(s) providing the masking condition (alarm or trouble)
                                               -AND-implement the compensatory actions and time limits of Section 14.1, 14.2, 14.3, or 14.4 as appropriate.
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PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                          Revision 60 14.5.2           If the masking condition cannot be cleared by jumpering out a zone(s), within 8 hours evaluate the condition for affects on the equipment operation and implement the compensatory actions and time limits of Section 14.1, 14.2, 14.3, and 14.4 as appropriate
                                                   -AND-restore the panel to Functional status within 14 days. If not restored within 14 days, continue the established compensatory actions AND perform 10 CFR 50.72 and/or 10 CFR 50.73 reviews per site administrative procedures.
14.5.3           If conditions exist that warrant returning a masked circuit to a functional status prior to the circuits return to normal, with the supervisory function of a panel listed in Table 14.5 masked by a panel alarm or trouble, defeat the alarm or trouble masking condition while maintaining the circuits functional capability, verify the circuits functional capability,
                                                   -AND-establish the controls to monitor the circuits functional capability periodically.
Restore the panel to Functional status within 30 days. If not restored within 30 days, continue the established compensatory actions -AND- perform 10 CFR 50.72 and/or 10 CFR 50.73 reviews per site administrative procedures.
14.6             Fire Hose Stations/Standpipes The fire hose stations listed in Table 14.6 have been provided to support manual firefighting efforts in safety-related or FSSD buildings, areas, and/or rooms at WBN. The fire hose stations also provide backup suppression when the automatic suppression systems are non-functional.
The fire hose stations listed in Table 14.6 shall be Functional whenever the safety-related or FSSD equipment in the areas protected by the fire hose stations is required to be Functional.
14.6.1           With one or more of the fire hose stations listed in Table 14.6 non-functional, within eight hours:
: a.       restore the non-functional equipment
                                                    -OR-
: b.       provide alternate protection for the area served by the non-functional hose stations(s).
14.6.2           Restore the fire hose station(s) to Functional status within 14 days. If not restored within 14 days, continue the compensatory actions AND perform 10 CFR 50.72 and/or 10 CFR 50.73 reviews per site administrative procedures.
14.7             Fire Hydrants Two fire hydrants listed in Table 14.7 have been provided to support manual firefighting efforts in the Diesel Generator Building's Conduit Interface Room. One fire hydrant listed in Table 14.7 is also provided as backup for hose stations in the Intake Pumping Station. The fire hydrants II-63

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                           Revision 60 listed in Table 14.7 shall be Functional whenever the safety-related or FSSD equipment in the areas protected by the fire hydrants is required to be functional. An additional fire hydrant is included in Table 14.7 as an alternate for a situation in which one of the other hydrants becomes non-functional. The relevant fire hydrants are specified in the table.
14.7.1          With any of the fire hydrants identified on Table 14.7 non-functional, within eight hours:
: a.       restore the non-functional equipment
                                                   -OR-
: b.      provide alternate suppression capabilities for the area served by the non-functional fire hydrant(s).
14.7.2          Restore the fire hydrant to Functional status within 28 days. If not restored within 28 days, continue the compensatory actions AND perform 10 CFR 50.72 and/or 10 CFR 50.73 reviews per site administrative procedures.
14.8            Fire-Rated Assemblies Fire-rated assemblies shall be Functional whenever the safety-related and FSSD equipment on either side of the barrier/assembly is required to be Functional. Fire doors are listed in Table 14.8.1 and fire dampers are listed in Table 14.8.2. Fire barriers are depicted on Fire Compartmentation drawings, Figures II-27A through II-40A excluding 37A.
NOTE:           With either a unit in Modes 5, 6, or core empty, locations where a continuous fire watch is required may be combined and patrolled by a roving fire watch when approved by the ESO SR (or designee) if the location only affects the unit in Modes 5, 6, or core empty.
14.8.1          With one or more of the required fire-rated assemblies/fire barriers, electrical raceway fire barrier systems, or electrical raceway radiant energy shields non-functional, restore the non-functional equipment:
                                                   -OR-Within one hour:
: a.      If no fire detection (as listed in Table 14.1) is designed to protect both sides of the non-functional barrier then, post a continuous fire watch.
                                                   -OR-
: b.      If fire detection (as listed in Table 14.1) is designed to protect only one side of the non-functional barrier, then post a roving fire watch once per hour for the side without detection.
                                                   -OR-
: c.      If suppression (as listed in Section 14.3 and 14.4) and fire detection (as listed in Table 14.1) is designed to protect both sides of the non-functional II-64

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                       Revision 60 barrier, then no compensatory actions are required (not applicable to ERFBS or radiant energy shield raceway protection).
14.8.2         Restore the non-functional fire-rated assembly/fire barrier to Functional status within 30 days. If not restored within 30 days, continue the compensatory actions AND perform 10 CFR 50.72 and/or 10 CFR 50.73 reviews per site administrative procedures. Also determine if any continuous fire watch routes are to be augmented as specified in Section 13.1.A.
14.9           Emergency Battery Lighting Units Emergency battery lighting units provided for FSSD (required in Modes 1, 2 or 3) shall be Functional whenever the illuminated associated fire safe shutdown equipment is required.
14.9.1         With any of the emergency battery lighting units provided for FSSD non-functional, within 24 hours:
: a.       restore the non-functional units to Functional status
                                                -OR-
: b.       ensure alternate lighting is available.
14.9.2         Restore the non-functional emergency battery lighting unit to Functional status within 14 days. If not restored within 14 days, continue the compensatory actions AND perform 10 CFR 50.72 and/or 10 CFR 50.73 reviews per site administrative procedures.
14.10          Fire Safe Shutdown Equipment The equipment listed on Table 14.10 is required for Fire Safe Shutdown (FSSD) and shall be Functional or in its FSSD condition when it supports FSSD for a unit in modes 1, 2, and 3. The non-System 26 valves noted on the plants mechanical flow diagrams as being administratively locked in the open, closed, or throttled position (with breaker open) for Appendix R shall be maintained in that condition when the applicable unit is in Modes 1, 2 and 3.
14.10.1        With one or more required equipment in Table 14.10 non-functional (or not in its FSSD condition), restore to functional status (or its FSSD condition) within 30 days.
14.10.2        With one or more of the breakers and/or valves specified in design output documents not in the noted position or condition, return the breakers and/or valve to the required position within 30 days.
14.10.3        If required action and associated completion time cannot be met,
: a.       place the equipment in the condition required for FSSD,
                                                -OR-
: b.       provide a back-up means of instrumentation monitoring for the equipment in Table 14.10, II-65

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                           Revision 60
                                            -OR-
: c.       perform an evaluation to justify using alternate means to provide FSSD,
                                            -OR-
: d.       be in Mode 3 within 6-hours and Mode 4 within the following 12-hours.
14.10.4 With any of the below listed Pressurizer Block valve closed in Modes 1, 2 or 3:
Block Valve Closed               Fire Watch in Room 1-FCV-68-332-B                       757-A10 2-FCV-68-332-B                       757-A16 737-A1B 2-FCV-68-333-A 757-A21
: a.       Restore the Pressurizer Block valve to OPEN status as soon as possible, but not longer than the next refueling outage:
                                           -AND-
: b.       Establish a fire watch within one hour as follows:
: 1.      If the fire detection equipment for the above affected area is functional, an hourly roving fire watch is established in the Auxiliary Building according to the above table:
                                            -OR-
: 2.      If the fire detection equipment for the above affected area is non-functional, a continuous fire watch is established in the Auxiliary Building according to the above table:
14.10.5 With offsite power being supplied through CSST A or B during testing or while either CSST C or D is out of service for maintenance and either unit in Modes 1, 2, or 3:
Establish a fire watch within one hour as follows:
: 1.      If the fire detection equipment in the associated 6.9kV Shutdown Board Room is functional, an hourly roving fire watch is established in the area.
                                          -OR-
: 2.      If the fire detection equipment in the associated 6.9kV Shutdown Board Room is non-functional, a continuous fire watch is established in the area.
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PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                          Revision 60 TESTING AND INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS (TIR)                                                 PAGE 1 OF 18 ITEM NO.      TYPE OF SYSTEM/COMPONENT              FREQUENCY           TESTING/INSPECTION REQUIREMENT (TIR)                     NOTES NOTE: The TIRs specified by Section 14.1 apply to all input devices listed in Table 14.1.
14.1.a Fire Detection Instrumentation (refer to     6 months     Perform a functional test on at least one detector and Table 14.1)                                               a minimum of 10% of the detectors on each signal initiating circuit of the restorable heat detectors in any accessible area with all detectors tested within five years.
14.1.b                                              6 months     Perform a functional test on each of the required smoke detection instruments in any accessible area.
14.1.c                                             REFUELING     For the unit in a refueling outage, perform a functional OUTAGE       test on each of the required smoke detection and restorable heat detection instruments which are in any inaccessible area.
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PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                        Revision 60 TESTING AND INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS (TIR)                                               PAGE 2 OF 18 ITEM NO. TYPE OF SYSTEM/COMPONENT         FREQUENCY           TESTING/INSPECTION REQUIREMENT (TIR)                   NOTES 14.2.a         Water Supply                31 days      Operate each electric motor driven pump for a minimum of 15 minutes on recirculation flow.
14.2.b                                     92 days      Visually inspect each testable valve in any accessible area in the flow path to ensure it is in its correct position.
14.2.c                                  Twice per year  Perform system flush in conjunction with biocide injection.
14.2.d                                    12 months     Cycle each testable valve located in any accessible area in the flow path through at least one cycle.
14.2.e                                    18 months     Perform a system functional test with simulated automatic actuation, and:
: a. Verify electric motor driven pump starting logic ability for timing design requirements.
: b. Verify electric motor driven pumps develop flow 1590 gpm at a head of  300 feet (130 psig).
: c. Verify automatic valves in the flow path actuate to the correct position.
Refueling Outage d. For the unit in a refueling outage, cycle testable valves in any inaccessible area in the flow path through one cycle.
14.2.f                                     3 years      Perform a flow test of the system in accordance with the National Fire Protection Association Handbook, 17th Edition (Reference 4.4.1).
(continued)
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PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                        Revision 60 TESTING AND INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS (TIR)                                              PAGE 3 OF 18 ITEM NO. TYPE OF SYSTEM/COMPONENT            FREQUENCY          TESTING/INSPECTION REQUIREMENT (TIR)                   NOTES 14.2.g The Diesel Fire Pump shall be              31 days     Operate the diesel engine driven pump for a minimum demonstrated functional:                               of 30 minutes on recirculation flow.
The fuel storage tank contains at least a two hour supply of fuel.
14.2.h                                            92 days     Verify that the diesel fuel has been sampled and is within the acceptable limits specified in Table 1 of ASTM D975-1990, for viscosity, water and sediment.
14.2.i                                           18 months    Inspect the diesel engine per Manufacturers recommendations.
14.2.j                                           18 months    Perform a system functional test with simulated automatic actuation, and:
: a. Verify diesel engine driven pump starts from a drop in system pressure within design specified set point range.
: b. Verify that the diesel engine driven pump develops 2500 gpm at 125 psig (288 feet of head).
(continued)
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PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                         Revision 60 TESTING AND INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS (TIR)                                                 PAGE 4 OF 18 ITEM NO.       TYPE OF SYSTEM/COMPONENT              FREQUENCY          TESTING/INSPECTION REQUIREMENT (TIR)                    NOTES 14.2.k  The diesel engine driven fire pump 24 volt    7 days      Verify the following:
battery bank and charger shall be                         The electrolyte level of each battery is above the demonstrated functional.                                  plates.
The overall battery voltage is  24 volts.
14.2.l                                              92 days      Verify specific gravity is within tolerance for continued service of the battery.
14.2.m                                              18 months     Verify the following:
The batteries, cell plates and battery racks show no visible signs of damage or abnormal deterioration.
The battery to battery and terminal connections are clean, tight, free of corrosion and coated with anti-corrosion material.
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PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                        Revision 60 TESTING AND INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS (TIR)                                               PAGE 5 OF 18 ITEM NO. TYPE OF SYSTEM/COMPONENT             FREQUENCY           TESTING/INSPECTION REQUIREMENT (TIR)                   NOTES 14.3.a Water Based Fire Suppression                92 days      Verify by visual inspection that each testable manual, (Refer to Table 14.3)                                    power-operated, or automatic valve in any accessible area, in the spray or sprinkler system flow path is in the correct position.
14.3.b                                            12 months     Cycle testable valves in any accessible area in the spray or sprinkler system flow path through at least one cycle.
14.3.c                                                          Perform a system functional test including a simulated automatic actuation of the system and:
18 months     a. Verify automatic valves in the spray or sprinkler system flow path actuate on test signal.
Refueling Outage b. For the unit in a refueling outage, cycle testable valves in any inaccessible area in the spray or sprinkler system flow path through at least one cycle.
14.3.d                                                          Perform a general visual system inspection (floor level type observation only) to identify any abnormal conditions and/or physical damage to the riser, sprinkler piping network, and hangers. This includes assurance that sprinkler heads/spray nozzles are not obstructed from providing protection for the hazards present in the areas as follows:
18 months     a. In any accessible area Refueling Outage b. For the unit in a refueling outage in any inaccessible area (continued)
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PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                       Revision 60 TESTING AND INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS (TIR)                                               PAGE 6 OF 18 ITEM NO. TYPE OF SYSTEM/COMPONENT               FREQUENCY           TESTING/INSPECTION REQUIREMENT (TIR)                  NOTES 14.3.e Water Based Fire Suppression             During each       For the unit in shutdown, visually inspect each (Refer to Table 14.3) (continued)        COLD              testable valve in any inaccessible area in the flow SHUTDOWN          path to ensure it is in its correct position.
planned to exceed 24 hours, unless the TIR was performed in the previous 92 days.
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PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                        Revision 60 TESTING AND INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS (TIR)                                               PAGE 7 OF 18 ITEM NO.      TYPE OF SYSTEM/COMPONENT            FREQUENCY           TESTING/INSPECTION REQUIREMENT (TIR)                  NOTES 14.4.a CO2 Systems                                  7 days      Verify 24 ton CO2 storage tank level  38.1 inches and pressure  270 psig. Verify 6 ton CO2 storage tank level  65% and pressure  270 psig.
14.4.b                                             92 days      Verify by visual inspection each systems tank shutoff isolation valve and vapor pilot valve is in the correct position.
14.4.c                                            18 months     Verify each systems valves, timers, associated ventilation system actions (e.g., fan shutdown and damper closure), and fire door release mechanisms actuate automatically upon receipt of a simulated actuation signal. Verify flow from each nozzle during a puff test.
14.4.d                                            18 months     Perform a visual inspection to verify discharge nozzles are not physically damaged and orifice openings are not externally obstructed.
14.5  Fire Detection Supervision                               None.
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PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                        Revision 60 TESTING AND INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS (TIR)                                                   PAGE 8 OF 18 ITEM NO.      TYPE OF SYSTEM/COMPONENT                FREQUENCY           TESTING/INSPECTION REQUIREMENT (TIR)                  NOTES 14.6.a Fire hose stations and associated preaction     92 days      Perform visual inspection of the fire hose stations in control valves (Refer to Table 14.6)                         any accessible area to assure all required equipment is at the station and all required stations are not obstructed.
14.6.b                                                 92 days      Verify by visual inspection each testable manual and power operated dry standpipe control valve in any accessible area in the flow path is in the correct position.
14.6.c                                                12 months     Cycle testable valves in any accessible area in the flow path through at least one cycle.
14.6.d                                                12 months     For hose stored in unheated areas, ensure the hose has been hydrostatically tested at a pressure of 150 psig or at least 50 psig above maximum fire main operating pressure, whichever is greater.
14.6.e                                                              Perform a system functional test including a simulated automatic actuation of the system and:
18 months     a. Verify dry standpipe water flow devices, in the hose station flow path, actuate on test signal.
Refueling Outage b. For the unit in a refueling outage, cycle testable valves in any inaccessible area in the hose station flow path through at least one cycle.
(continued)
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PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                      Revision 60 TESTING AND INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS (TIR)                                               PAGE 9 OF 18 ITEM NO.      TYPE OF SYSTEM/COMPONENT              FREQUENCY           TESTING/INSPECTION REQUIREMENT (TIR)                NOTES 14.6.f Fire Hose stations and associated            Refueling     For the unit in a refueling outage, perform a visual preaction control valves (Refer to Table   Outages and     inspection of the fire hose stations in any 14.6) (continued)                          every 92 days   inaccessible area to assure all required equipment is during refueling at the station and all required stations are not outages      obstructed.
14.6.g                                                            Remove each hose for inspections and repacking /
reracking. Inspect all gaskets and replace any degraded gaskets in couplings in the areas as follows:
18 months     a. In any accessible area.
Refueling Outage b. For the unit in a refueling outage, in any inaccessible area.
14.6.h                                               3 years      For hose stored in heated areas, ensure the hose has been hydrostatically tested at a pressure 150 psig or at least 50 psig above maximum fire main operating pressure, whichever is greater.
14.6.i                                               3 years      Partially open each hose station valve to verify valve functionality and no flow blockage.
14.6.j                                          During each       For the shutdown unit, visually inspect each testable COLD              valve in any inaccessible area in the flow path to SHUTDOWN          ensure it is in its correct position.
planned to exceed 24 hours, unless the TIR was performed within the previous 92 days.
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PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                         Revision 60 TESTING AND INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS (TIR)                                                                   PAGE 10 OF 18 ITEM NO. TYPE OF SYSTEM/COMPONENT            FREQUENCY       TESTING/INSPECTION REQUIREMENT (TIR)                    NOTES 14.7.a    Fire Hydrants (Refer to Table 14.7)     92 days     Perform a visual inspection of the fire hose equipment dedicated to support the use of fire hydrants to assure all required equipment is available.
14.7.b                                            92 days     Verify by visual inspection each testable manual valve in any accessible area in the flow path is in the correct position.
14.7.c                                           6 months     Verify by visual inspection that fire hydrants are accessible and there is no physical damage.
14.7.d                                          12 months     For hose stored in unheated areas, ensure the hose has been hydrostatically tested at a pressure of 150 psig or at least 50 psig above maximum fire main operating pressure, whichever is greater.
14.7.e                                          12 months     Flush hydrants to clear foreign material for more than 1 minute. Confirm automatic drainage.
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PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                        Revision 60 TESTING AND INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS (TIR)                                              PAGE 11 OF 18 ITEM NO.      TYPE OF SYSTEM/COMPONENT           FREQUENCY          TESTING/INSPECTION REQUIREMENT (TIR)                  NOTES 14.8.a Fire-rated Assemblies                     31 days      Perform a visual inspection of the fire doors as follows:
: a. The door is in the correct position
: b. The door is free of obstructions
: c. The door is not damaged and the vision panel (if provided) is intact.
14.8.b                                          12 months     For each fire door, verify functionality of all associated release and closing mechanisms and latches by performing a functional test.
14.8.c                                          12 months     Verify functionality of the required fire-rated assemblies and penetration sealing devices (including dampers) by performing a visual inspection of approximately 20% of the required fire- rated assembly/fire barriers in accessible areas for cracks, holes, or other evidence of physical damage or degradation. A different approximately 20% is selected each 12 months so all fire-rated assemblies/fire barriers are inspected every 5 years.
14.8.d                                       Refueling Outage For the unit in a refueling outage, verify functionality of the required fire-rated assemblies and penetration sealing devices (including dampers) by performing a visual inspection of approximately 33% of the required fire- rated assembly/fire barriers in inaccessible areas for cracks, holes, or other evidence of physical damage or degradation. A different approximately 33% is selected each outage so all fire-rated assemblies/fire barriers are inspected every 5 years.
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PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                        Revision 60 TESTING AND INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS (TIR)                                             PAGE 12 OF 18 ITEM NO. TYPE OF SYSTEM/COMPONENT              FREQUENCY         TESTING/INSPECTION REQUIREMENT (TIR)                  NOTES 14.9.a Emergency battery lighting units (EBL)     92 days      Perform a functional test and visual inspection of each accessible EBL to verify proper function and correct alignment of the lamps of the EBL as a unit by simulating a loss of power.
14.9.b                                            Periodic     Replace batteries of accessible EBL as a function of their service life, environmental condition and as a safety factor.
14.9.c                                        Refueling Outage For the unit in the refueling outage, replace the        Annulus battery and perform a functional test and visual inspection of each inaccessible EBL to verify proper function and correct alignment of the lamps of the EBL as a unit by simulating a loss of power.
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PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                       Revision 60 TESTING AND INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS (TIR)                                             PAGE 13 OF 18 ITEM NO.      TYPE OF SYSTEM/COMPONENT             FREQUENCY          TESTING/INSPECTION REQUIREMENT (TIR)                 NOTES 14.10.a                250 V Batteries              31 days      Verify battery terminal voltage (range: 210 to 280 0-BAT-239-1                             VDC) and alignment to its associated DC bus.
0-BAT-239-2 14.10.b           250 V DC Battery Boards           31 days      Verify proper breaker alignment for supply of control 0-BD-239-1                             power to Main Turbine trip circuits, RCP breaker trip 0-BD-239-2                             circuits and verify equipment is energized and is 250 V DC Turbine                            capable of being the backup power supply to Unit 1 Building Distribution Board                     and 2 Distributed Control System.
0-DPL-239-1 0-DPL-239-2 250 V DC Battery Chargers 0-CHGR-239-1 0-CHGR-239-2 14.10.c          Main Steam System Valves           Refueling    Verify capability to close valves using the associated (Refer to Table 14.10)            Outage      hand switch in the Main Control Room.
14.10.d                Instrumentation              Refueling    Perform a channel calibration for each required (Refer to Table 14.10)            Outage      instrument channel.
14.10.e      Thermal Barrier Booster Pump 1A        92 days      Verify capability of pumps to provide 40 gpm to each Thermal Barrier Booster Pump 1B                     thermal barrier heat exchanger.
Thermal Barrier Booster Pump 2A Thermal Barrier Booster Pump 2B 14.10.f Deleted (continued)
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PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                       Revision 60 TESTING AND INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS (TIR)                                                        PAGE 14 OF 18 ITEM NO.        TYPE OF SYSTEM/COMPONENT                       FREQUENCY           TESTING/INSPECTION REQUIREMENT (TIR)                 NOTES 14.10.g  Control Rod Drive Motor Coolers                        Refueling      Verify capability of dampers to open and motors to (Refer to Table 14.10)                                  Outage        run.
14.10.h  Deleted 14.10.i RB Lower Compartment Cooler and Control                Refueling      Verify capability to open the valves using the Rod Drive Cooler System Valves                          Outage        associated hand switch in the Main Control Room.
(Refer to Table 14.10) 14.10.j Nitrogen Supply to SG PORVs                             31 days       a. Verify pressure of Nitrogen in tanks is 1400      Note 1 (Refer to Table 14.10)                                                     psig for S/G PORVs.
Refueling      b. Verify that the SG PORVs can be operated Outage             properly from backup control stations using the compressed nitrogen.
Backdraft damper                                        31 days       c. Verify dampers will close on loss of air flow.
0-BKD-31-590 0-BKD-31-591 0-BKD-31-592 0-BKD-31-593 14.10.k  Deleted 14.10.l Deleted 14.10.m  Transfer Switch (Refer to Table 14.10)                 Refueling      Verify switch performs intended function by Outage        performance of a continuity check or functional test.
(continued)
Note 1:    Both tanks of each pair are required at or above listed pressure (Reference 4.2.11).
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PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                               Revision 60 TESTING AND INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS (TIR)                                                                                                                 PAGE 15 OF 18 ITEM NO. TYPE OF SYSTEM/COMPONENT                                              FREQUENCY               TESTING/INSPECTION REQUIREMENT (TIR)                           NOTES 14.10.n       1-FCV-3-116A, 1-HS-3-116A/C, 1-XS-3-116A,                          Refueling           Verify with the hand switch in P-Auto and the 1-FCV-3-116B, 1-HS-3-116B/C, 1-XS-3-116B,                           Outage             transfer switch placed in the Aux position that the 1-FCV-3-126A, 1-HS-3-126A/C, 1-XS-3-126A,                                              FCV will automatically open at the designed low 1-FCV-3-126B, 1-HS-3-126B/C, 1-XS-3-126B                                               pressure set point.
2-FCV-3-116A, 2-HS-3-116A/C, 2-XS-3-116A, 2-FCV-3-116B, 2-HS-3-116B/C, 2-XS-3-116B, 2-FCV-3-126A, 2-HS-3-126A/C, 2-XS-3-126A, 2-FCV-3-126B, 2-HS-3-126B/C, 2-XS-3-126B 14.10.o         Nitrogen Supply (0-TANK-77-2701) to Unit 1                           7 days            a. Verify nitrogen supply pressure  the minimum               1 and 2 TDAFW LCVs and MDAFW LCVs                                                             required pressure per MDQ00103220120188 (Ref. 4.2.14).
: b. Verify Liquid Nitrogen Storage Tank (0-TANK-77-2701) has  the minimum required level per MDQ0000772012000033 (Ref. 4.2.12).
: c. Verify normal nitrogen flow is limited to the flows per MDQ0000772012000033 (Ref. 4.2.12).
14.10.p         1-HS-70-81BA & 1-HS-70-81EA                                        Refueling           Verify MCR capability to block the differential flow 2-HS-70-81BA & 2-HS-70-81EA                                         Outage             leak detection logic for RCP Thermal Barrier Cooling by a functional test or continuity check.
14.10.q         1-XSV-32-112A1, 1-XSV-32-112A2,                                    Refueling           Functionally check interlock capability to open 1-XSV-32-112B1, 1-XSV-32-112B2,                                     Outage             valves using the associated hand switch in the Main 1-HS-32-112, 1-XS-32-112,                                                              Control Room after isolation of the non-essential Interlock contact for 1-FCV-32-110-A                                                   control air header by closure of 1-FCV-32-110-A (Unit 1) and 2-FCV-32-111-B (Unit 2). Functional 2-XSV-32-112A1, 2-XSV-32-112A2,                                                        check will test Train A and Train B power via 2-XSV-32-112B1, 2-XSV-32-112B2,                                                        1-XS-32-112 (Unit 1 only). Light Indicators for Vent 2-HS-32-112A, Interlock contact for                                                    Solenoid Valves will be verified functional.
2-FCV-32-111-B (continued)
Note 1. The required alternate nitrogen gas volume is when only the Appendix R required portion of the nitrogen system required for operation of the AFW LCVs is being served with a minimum pressure of 70 psig at the valves and the rest of the system is isolated from the alternate source of nitrogen.
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PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                         Revision 60 TESTING AND INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS (TIR)                                                                          PAGE 16 OF 18 ITEM NO. TYPE OF SYSTEM/COMPONENT                      FREQUENCY   TESTING/INSPECTION REQUIREMENT (TIR)                   NOTES 14.10.r   1-FSV-77-2561, 1-FSV-77-2562,                  Refueling a. Verify capability to operate the solenoid from 1-HS-77-2561A, 1-HS-77-2562A,                   Outage        the associated hand switch in the MCR. Also, 1-XS-77-2561, 1-LCV-3-148, 1-LCV-3-156,                       verify that 1-XS-77-2561 disables hand switch 1-LCV-3-164, 1-LCV-3-171, 1-LCV-3-172,                        1-HS-77-2561A and 2-XS-3-2561 disables 1-LCV-3-173, 1-LCV-3-174, 1-LCV-3-175                         hand switch 2-HS-3-164A contacts used to actuate nitrogen sub-header valves for MDAFW LCVs with continuity or functional check.
2-FSV-77-2561, 2-FSV-77-2562,                   92 days  b. Verify each APP R N2 manual, power operated, 2-HS-3-164A, 2-HS-3-174A,                                     and automatic valve in the flow path that is not 2-XS-3-2561, 2-LCV-3-148, 2-LCV-3-156,                        locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in 2-LCV-3-164, 2-LCV-3-171, 2-LCV-3-172,                        position, that is in an accessible area, from the 2-LCV-3-173, 2-LCV-3-174, 2-LCV-3-175                         liquid nitrogen skid to AFW LCVs is in the correct position.
Refueling c. Verify that the AFW LCVs can be operated Outage        properly with nitrogen by a functional test.
14.10.s   Safety Injection System Boron Injection Tank   Refueling Verify local capability to isolate the BIT path by Inlet Shutoff Valves:                           Outage   closing breaker and hand switch on the 1-FCV-63-39-A                                            Control/Auxiliary (C&A) Vent Boards:
1-FCV-63-40-B                                            1-MCC-214-A2-A 2-FCV-63-39-A                                            1-MCC-214-B2-B 2-FCV-63-40-B                                            2-MCC-214-A2-A 2-MCC-214-B2-B (continued)
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PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                        Revision 60 TESTING AND INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS (TIR)                                                                       PAGE 17 OF 18 14.10.t   Nitrogen Supply to CVCS normal charging flow  31 days  a. Verify pressure in tanks is >800 PSIG for control valve 2-FCV-62-89                                   normal charging flow control valve (Reference 4.2.15).
Refueling b. Verify the CVCS normal charging flow control Outage        valve can be operated properly from the backup control station using the compressed nitrogen.
14.10.u   Alternative Shutdown Hand switches needed    Refueling Verify each required control circuit and transfer for FSSD                                      Outage   switch is capable of performing the intended 1-HS-67-84C, 1-HS-67-85C, 1-HS-67-92C,                 function by a switch continuity check or functional 1-HS-67-93C, 1-HS-67-100C, 1-HS-67-101C,               Test.
1-HS-67-108C, 1-HS-67-109C, 1-HS-3-945, 1-HS-30-1080 2-HS-67-84C, 2-HS-67-85C, 2-HS-67-92C, 2-HS-67-93C, 2-HS-67-100C, 2-HS-67-101C, 2-HS-67-108C, 2-HS-67-109C, 2-HS-3-945 14.10.v   1-HS-62-69B-A                                Refueling Verify local capability to isolate normal letdown by a 2-HS-62-69B-A                                 Outage   functional test or continuity check 14.10.w                                                Refueling Verify that the SFPCS HX Supply Header Control 0-FCV-70-194                                  Outage   Valves can be closed by functional test from the 0-FCV-70-197                                           MCR.
14.10.x   1B-B CCS Pump                                 92 days  Verify pumps are functional IAW the in-service 2B-B CCS Pump                                          testing program and the pumps are aligned to their associated A Train CCS Header, except when in compliance with note (2 and 5) of Table OR 14.10 (continued)
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PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                       Revision 60 TESTING AND INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS (TIR)                                                                       PAGE 18 OF 18 14.10.y   Manual Valves listed in table 14.10          5 years  Cycle each manual valve to ensure the valve has freedom of movement and does not need excessive force to operate.
14.10.z   0-BD-200-A, 0-BD-206-1, 0-OXF-206-1, 1-DPL-  31 days  Verify equipment is energized and is capable of 264-1, 2-DPL-264-1                                    being the backup power supply to Unit 1 & 2 Distributed Control System.
14.10.aa  CARF Transfer switches                      Refueling Verify local capability to isolate the CARF controls 1-XS-30-38A                                  Outage   (ISOL) by a functional test or continuity check 1-XS-30-39A 2-XS-30-38A 2-XS-30-39A II-84

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                           Revision 60 BASES - OPERATING REQUIREMENTS (OR)
FIRE DETECTION B.14.1     Fire detectors are provided within various locations at WBN to ensure adequate warning of fires, detect and locate fires in their early stages to facilitate suppression efforts, and to meet regulatory requirements. Prompt detection of fires reduces the potential for damage to plant equipment and is an integral element in the overall plant FPP. The specific number of required detectors in each room to ensure adequate spatial coverage and the desired level of detector redundancy are specified on Table 14.1. Instrumentation designed to detect smoke as a part of other systems (e.g.,
smoke detectors in HVAC ducts for main control room habitability) are excluded from Table 14.1 since they were designed for purposes other than fire protection.
This requirement is provided to ensure, as a minimum, the Fire Detection Instrumentation for each Fire Detection Zone shown in Table 14.1 is Functional. The functionality of the Fire Detection Instrumentation ensures that adequate warning capability to a constantly attended location is available for prompt detection of fires and that Fire Suppression Systems that are actuated by fire detectors discharge extinguishing agents in a timely manner. Prompt detection and suppression of fires reduces the potential for damage to safety-related equipment and is an integral element in the overall facility fire protection program.
When detectors are non-functional, an acceptable alternative in lieu of fire watches is the use of a portable fire detection system designed specifically for fire protection use.
Placement of the detectors for the portable system is at the approximate location of the non-functional permanent detector on a one-to-one basis. The cables from the detectors to the portable system panel are not installed in conduits or cable trays but are routed and secured so as not to interfere with routine plant operations. The system would not interface with any existing fire detection systems.
Outputs from the Fire Detection system also provide for the automatic shutdown of selected plant fans/air movers and dampers. This output is beyond the scope of this Fire Detection OR for Function A detectors since this automatic shutdown does not affect the function of the system as exhibited by the annunciation of the affected Fire Detection equipment. Manual actions can be used to compensate for this automatic shutdown.
The testing of the fire detection system is based on the codes in place when the system was designed and purchased. As such, the testing of internal circuit supervisory functions (e.g., trouble due to an open circuit or ground on a detection circuit) of the equipment on a periodic basis is not required. The confirmation of the Functionality of such supervisory functions is confirmed as applicable upon a component's initial installation.
B.14.1.1   With any Function A Fire Detection Instrumentation shown in Table 14.1 non-functional in an accessible area, the non-functional instrument(s) must be restored within 1 hour.
The Completion Time of 1 hour to establish a fire watch is reasonable considering that it is consistent with Standard Technical Specifications (Reference 4.1.37). If the non-functional instrument(s) cannot be restored within 1 hour, a fire watch patrol must be established to inspect the zone(s) with non-functional instrument(s), and thereafter, inspect the zone(s) once per hour. The establishment of frequent fire watch patrols in the affected areas is required to provide detection capability until the non-functional instrumentation is restored to Functionality. The Completion Time of one hour to II-85

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                          Revision 60 perform a roving fire watch is reasonable and based upon the typical time necessary to establish a fire watch patrol and perform an inspection.
B.14.1.2.a With any Function A Fire Detection Instrumentation shown in Table 14.1 non-functional in any inaccessible area in either containment, the non-functional instrument(s) must be restored within 8 hours. The Completion Time of 8 hours is based on containment access considerations. If the non-functional instrument(s) cannot be restored within 8 hours, the zone(s) with non-functional instrument(s) must be inspected once per 8 hours, or the air temperature must be monitored in the affected area once per hour.
The Completion Times of once per 8 hours required for a roving fire watch and once per hour required for monitoring of the air temperature are reasonable.
Furthermore, the 1-hour frequency for air temperature monitoring is considered adequate in view of other indications available in the control room, including alarms, to alert the operator to abnormal containment temperature conditions.
Fire detection instrumentation is not assumed to be functional to mitigate the consequences of a design accident or transient. In designing the accident sequence for theoretical hazard evaluation, fires are not assumed to take place simultaneously with the design basis event (DBE) or transient. Therefore, observing the same instruments that are used by SRs 3.6.5.1 and 3.6.5.2 once per hour along with the other indications available in the Main Control Room, including alarms to alert the operator of abnormal containment temperature conditions, provides an equivalent level of fire safety without exposing personnel to unnecessary radiation exposure.
Additionally, this method of compensatory actions for non-functional detection systems in the RB is consistent with industry standard technical specification requirements. If the Technical Specification instrumentation is not available to support this monitoring, then other appropriately maintained and tested instrumentation are used after evaluation.
B.14.1.2.b With any function A Fire Detection Instrumentation shown in Table 14.1 non-functional in any inaccessible area outside of either containment, the non-functional instrument(s) must be restored within 8 hours. The Completion Time of 8 hours is based on access considerations to these hazardous areas to ensure personnel safety. If the non-functional instrument(s) cannot be restored within 8 hours, the zone(s) with non-functional instrument(s) must be inspected once per 8 hours. The completion Times of once per 8 hours required for a roving fire watch is reasonable to ensure protection of personnel and the confined areas (relatively small rooms with heavy concrete wall bounding the areas and limited combustibles) that are involved for areas outside of containment.
B.14.1.3   The restoration of equipment to Functional in 14 days is reasonable based on the type of equipment that is out of service. The time frame is consistent with standard Technical Specifications.
B.14.1.4.a The CPU is considered Functional when it is capable of notifying the constantly attended location personnel of fire alarms for Operating Requirement (OR) detection zones. With the CPU non-functional, for zones containing Function A Fire Detection Instrumentation shown in Table 14.1 in an accessible area, the local detection panel shall be monitored within 1 hour. If the non-functional CPU cannot be restored within 1 hour, a continuous monitor patrol must be established. The establishment of a continuous monitor patrol for the affected panels is required to provide detection capability and notification to a constantly attended location until the non-functional CPU II-86

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                          Revision 60 is restored to Functionality. The Completion Time of one hour to establish a continuous roving monitor is reasonable and based upon the typical time necessary to establish a monitor patrol and to perform an inspection. These actions are consistent with the standard Technical Specifications requirements if the detectors are declared non-functional. The Main Control Room (MCR) is exempted from this action since the MCR is the constantly attended location that is normally notified.
B.14.1.4.b With the CPU non-functional, for zones containing Function A Fire Detection Instrumentation shown in Table 14.1 in an inaccessible area, the monitoring of the air temperature for the affected area once per hour or the monitoring of the local detection panel once per hour is established within one hour. The time frame of one hour to establish one of the compensatory actions is reasonable considering that it is consistent with standard Technical Specifications. The establishment of temperature monitoring or monitor patrols for the affected panels is required to provide detection capability to a constantly attended location until the non-functional CPU is restored to Functionality. The time frame and actions are reasonable and based upon the necessary times and actions that are required if these devices are declared non-functional.
B.14.1.4.c With the CPU non-functional, for zones containing Function B Fire Detection Instrumentation shown in Table 14.1 in an inaccessible or accessible area, the local detection panel shall be monitored hourly within one hour. The establishment of a monitor patrol once per hour for the affected panels is required to provide detection notification to a constantly attended location until the non-functional CPU is restored to Functionality. The automatic actuations are still functional so the more restrictive compensatory action of a continuous fire watch is not needed. The completion time of one hour to establish an hourly roving monitor is reasonable and is consistent with the standard Technical Specifications when annunciation to a constantly attended location is non-functional such as in OR-14.1.1.
B.14.1.5   The restoration of equipment to Functional in 14 days is reasonable based on the type of equipment that is out of service. The time frame is consistent with standard Technical Specifications.
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PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                        Revision 60 BASES - TESTING AND INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS (TIR)
FIRE DETECTION B.14.1.a   TIR 14.1.a is the performance of a functional test (excluding confirmation of setpoint accuracy) on one or more of the required accessible thermal detection instruments in each signal circuit which are accessible during plant operation. At least one detector and a minimum or 10% on each signal initiating circuit shall be tested semi-annually such that all are tested within five years. The frequency of six months is based on NFPA consensus standard 72E (code of record) and has been shown acceptable through industry operating experience.
B.14.1.b   TIR 14.1.b requires a functional test be performed on each of the required accessible smoke detection instruments. The associated frequency for this surveillance is 6 months which is based on NFPA consensus standard 72E criteria and is consistent with standard Technical Specification requirements.
B.14.1.c   TIR 14.1.c is the performance of a functional test on each of the required smoke detection and restorable heat detection instruments which are in any inaccessible area.
This test is performed for the unit in a refueling outage. The expected frequency for this testing is each units Refueling Outage and is based on operating experience.
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PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                            Revision 60 BASES - OPERATING REQUIREMENTS (ORs)
WATER SUPPLY B.14.2     This requirement is provided to ensure, as a minimum, the water supply is Functional.
The water for firefighting is supplied by four vertical turbine, high pressure, motor driven pumps, and one centrifugal diesel driven fire pump. The pumps are required to provide the flow for the most hydraulically demanding area in a safety-related structure.
The water suppression system is a prime element of the overall plant fire suppression capability and is not mode dependent; therefore, its availability is maximized.
Three fire suppression pumps (the diesel and two electric driven pumps) are required to be Functional. With one of the three required pumps non-functional, 100 percent of the required flow can still be provided by the two remaining Functional pumps. The flow path through the distribution piping and valves to each supply terminal are also required to be Functional. In the section of standard Technical Specifications for water supplies, two 100% pumps are addressed. WBN has taken the option allowed by BTP 9.5-1 to provide three pumps; however in place of being three 50% capacity pumps as addressed in the BTP, WBN has a 100% capacity diesel fire pump and two 50%
capacity electric motor driven pumps. Since standard Technical Specifications provide action statements when one pump is non-functional and does not cover the three pump installation, the capacity of functional pumps was taken into account in determining the action statements and associated times for action statement completion in Section 14.2.
The Water Supply consists of a flow path from the water source to the using devices (i.e., water based fire suppression systems, the fire hose station/standpipes, and the fire hydrants). The normal configuration is such that the Water Supply piping is looped, meaning it is fed from two directions. Alternately, the pipe that goes to the using devices is only fed from the point of attachment to the Water Supply piping. WBN identifies piping, valves, fittings, and other appropriate items associated with the Water Supply in Section 14.2 as follows:
: 1)       The piping, valves, fittings, and other appropriate items, starting at the water supply, through the fire pumps and up to the first valve on the pipe going to the using devices are included in Section 14.2. The piping, valves, fittings and other appropriate items downstream of this first valve are included under Section 14.3 and 14.6 as appropriate.
: 2)       The isolation of a single valve on the supply/looped piping, covered by Section 14.2, does not preclude water from getting to the using devices.
: 3)       The isolation of a single valve on the using device piping, covered by Section 14.3 and 14.6, does prevent water from getting to the using devices. Separating the water supply piping/features from the using device piping/features eliminates the confusion presented when comparing WBN's design to the standard Technical Specifications which may lead to entering two action statements.
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PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                           Revision 60 B.14.2.1       With two electric pumps functional and the diesel driven fire pump non-functional, compensatory actions must be taken. These actions consist of:
(a) Restoring the diesel fire pump within 7 days, (b) ensuring that three of the electric motor driven pumps are functional or ( c) ensuring two electric fire pumps are functional and a backup pump, either electric or diesel driven, of at least equal capacity to an electric driven fire pump. For action (b), the three electric motor driven pump option, a fire watch, continuous or hourly roving based on fire detection equipment status in the areas, is established in the Auxiliary Building elevations listed in the table below. For cases involving a continuous fire watch, one continuous fire watch is assigned in the Auxiliary Building elevations listed in the table below. The areas are as noted below:
Building/Elevation            Room Number (Analysis Volume)                      Column Line Auxiliary Building 713.0-A1 (AV-026)                     Q to U and A8 to A15 Elevation 713 Auxiliary Building                                                     Q to U and A8 to A13, plus 737.0-A1 (AV-038)
Elevation 737                                                           Q to S and A13 to A15 For action (c), the two electric fire pumps and a backup fire pump, either a hourly roving or continuous fire watch is established in areas containing common power supplies. The determination of the fire watch(es) frequency and area of coverage are based on information provided in action (b) (e.g. Hourly fire watch(es) in areas with functional detection).
Either Action (a) or (b) is taken within 7 days so that three pumps are available. This provides 150% pump capacity to safety-related areas. The completion time of 7 days is reasonable considering that 100% of the required pumping capacity to safety-related areas is still provided, and the time required to identify the problem and to take the corrective actions. This is consistent with the standard Technical Specifications.
The Auxiliary Building areas requiring either an hourly roving or continuous fire watch are areas where the Diesel Fire Pump (DFP) is the only fire pump credited in Fire Protection Report (FPR) Part VI, Fire Hazards Analysis. In these areas, the Electric Driven Fire Pumps (EDFP) are not credited as a possible source of water to the fire protection suppression systems and enhancement measures must be taken to assist in detecting a general fire at its incipient stage to prevent the fire from becoming an Appendix R fire. Additionally, all areas where the DFP and one EDFP are credited In FPR Part VI were evaluated in Reference 4.2.58 and it was demonstrated one EDFP in these areas can supply the required flow and pressure to the fire protection suppression systems. Therefore these areas where one EDFP remains available do not require the enhancement action.
Action (c) is anticipated for planned outage activities where normally an entry is made into (a) or (b) and then enter (c) for 7 days before re-entry into (a) or (b). While in cases of unplanned outages, it is anticipated an entry is made into (a), (b), or OR 14.2.2, 14.2.3, 14.2.4 or 14.2.5 as appropriate. The backup pump for Action (c) also provides a measure of diversity by the general nature of how the existing electric pumps are installed. The backup pump would be located on another water source, with another energy source and a diverse location to provide a tie-in for supplying the fire protection system. Compliance with Action (c) requires the two electric fire pumps, a backup fire II-90

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                        Revision 60 pump, and an hourly roving fire watch is established in areas containing common power supplies. The determination of the fire watches area of coverage is based on information provided in Action (b) and additional areas where the power supplies for the backup pump are not separated by at least a one hour fire barrier from the cables associated with the Functional electric fire pumps. The provision of fire watches in areas of power supply interaction between the available electric fire pumps as well as the backup pump is consistent with other actions of OR-14.2.1.b. The completion time of 7 days to restore the 150% pump capacity (i.e., entering OR-14.2.1.b or restoration of the diesel fire pump) is reasonable and is consistent with other existing actions to ensure there is 150% pump capacity.
A backup pump is available which meets the following criteria to ensure that the pump is operated within the HPFP design limits.
: 1.        The pump driver is a diesel engine capable and with fuel oil capacity for two hours of continuous operation.
: 2.        The pump provides a minimum 1590 gpm at 300 ft. head as demonstrated by a flow test.
: 3.        Suction supply for the pump is from the Tennessee River, a cooling tower basin, the 35 acre pond, the lined pond or other pond with a minimum of two hour supply at 1590 gpm.
: 4.        A maximum pressure capability of 135 psig at elevation 729 feet. This maximum can be controlled manually provided the pump is constantly attended.
: 5.        The pump is connected to the High Pressure Fire Protection system via a non-OR fire hydrant using one 5 inch and two nominal 21/2 inch hoses that are in current hydrostatic test requirements.
: 6.        Manual start and control of the pump is acceptable provided the pump is constantly attended when required to be available.
When both units are in Modes 5, 6, or core empty, the locations where a continuous fire watch is required may be combined and patrolled by one or more roving fire watch(es). While the plant is in cold shutdown or refueling, there are fewer systems needed for maintaining cold shutdown and more people present that could detect and report a fire (General Employee Training includes how to report a fire). Roving fire watches provide an adequate level of coverage for these systems by ensuring that potential fire hazards are detected and corrected in a timely manner to prevent fires, or if a fire were to occur, ensuring that timely action is taken.
B.14.2.2 With only one electric driven fire pump functional and the diesel driven fire pump functional, compensatory actions must be taken. These actions consist of:
Restore an additional electric motor driven pump (to ensure a total of three functional pumps) within 30 days. The condition with the diesel fire pump and only one electric motor driven pump functional provides 150% pump capacity to safety-related areas.
The action of restoring an additional electric motor driven pump in 30 days is reasonable given that 150% of the required fire pump capacity is functional.
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PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                        Revision 60 B.14.2.3 With no electric driven pumps functional and the diesel driven fire pump functional, compensatory actions must be taken. These actions consist of:
Restoring one electric motor driven pump to functional within 7 days. This provides 150% pump capacity to safety-related areas. The diesel fire pump alone connected to the fire protection system provides 100% pump capacity to safety-related areas. This is consistent with the requirements of 14.2.2 and of standard Technical Specifications.
B.14.2.4 With only one electric driven pump functional and the diesel driven fire pump non-functional, compensatory actions must be taken. These actions consist of:
Restore an additional pump to functional within 24 hours. This provides a minimum 100% pump capacity to safety-related areas. Restore the third required pump to functional in accordance with either 14.2.1 or 14.2.2, as applicable. The time frames are consistent with standard Technical Specification time allowance for related equipment out of service conditions.
B.14.2.5 With no water supply pumps functional, compensatory actions must be taken. These actions consist of:
: a.       1.       Establish a backup water supply within 24 hours, and
: 2.       Restore one electric driven pump within 48 hours, and
: 3.       Restore a second electric driven pump within 72 hours. This provides a 100% pump capacity to safety-related areas, and
: 4.       Restore the diesel fire pump to functional within 7 days. With a backup pump available and two electric driven pumps Functional, fire watches are not required.
: b.       An alternative to the above is to establish a backup water supply within 24 hours and restore the diesel fire pump within 48 hours. Once the diesel is functional, it provides a 100% capacity to safety-related areas and the backup water supply can be secured. Restore one of the two required electric driven pumps within 7 days, and the second required electric drive pumps within 30 days.
This provides a backup supply within 24 hours as required by standard Technical Specifications. This also returns WBN to 100% pump capacity within 72 hours or less. Either method provides a 100% pump capacity to safety-related areas within 72 hours and the time (72 hours) is reasonable considering the seriousness of the situation.
B.14.2.6 The closing of multiple sectional valves in the water supply piping of Section 14.2 can isolate the flow path to the using devices of Section 14.3, 14.6 and 14.7.
: a.       In such a situation, the more restrictive requirements of Section 14.3, 14.6 or 14.7 apply. The requirements of 14.3, .6 or .7 although more restrictive, address the specifically affected area(s). The entering of compensatory actions for the isolated using devices is reasonable.
: b.       Specific valve operators that have had power removed due to Appendix R concerns require re-energizing to perform periodic testing such as cycling of II-92

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                          Revision 60 valves to meet other regulatory requirements. The establishment of an attendant at the breaker allows prompt action to be taken if a fire condition occurs during this time period.
: c.       The restoration time of thirty (30) days is reasonable based on the equipment involved and the limited impairment to the Fire Suppression System.
B.14.2.7 Specific usages are supplied by the HPFP/RSW system and are required to be functional during normal plant operation. A calculation determined the limits for the total HPFP/RSW usage and is as follows:
: a.       Selected as-designed RSW loads to remain unisolated during a fire condition (e.g., chiller packages and plant processes required during plant operation).
: b.       Manual RSW isolation valves to be locked closed to preclude non-as designed RSW loads being added.
: c.       Selected as designed RSW loads to automatically isolate during a fire condition.
This provides control of HPFP/RSW usage to ensure an adequate water supply is available for fire protection when needed.
RSW was originally designed to be used for multiple usages (e.g., supply various chiller units and plant processes, cleaning of plant areas and other miscellaneous uses). Therefore when HPFP/RSW is needed outside the bounds of the established calculation, it is acceptable to establish compensatory actions employing isolation capability that allows for prompt isolation of additional usage without requiring a temporary modification as controlled by NPG-SPP-09.5, Temporary Modifications, Temporary Configuration Changes (Reference 4.2.65).
: a.       For HPFP/RSW usage that automatically isolates, it is not necessary to have the isolation point constantly attended with the attendant in communication with the Main Control Room (MCR). In the case where non-as designed HPFP/RSW loads are needed, a manual isolation capability is required and an attendant established in the area within one (1) hour. The attendant is in communication (e.g., radio, telephone, PA, etc.) with the MCR.
: b.       For those as designed RSW usages that are designed to automatically isolate on a fire pump start, there are times when this automatic isolation capability will need to be inhibited (e.g., during fire pump testing). During hot weather, there are chillers that are needed for plant operations and since the inhibiting of the automatic isolation is procedurally controlled, this allows the plant to continue to operate normally during testing and still provide adequate compensatory actions to ensure an adequate supply of water for firefighting if needed.
: c.       Thirty (30) days is reasonable based on the actions required by Operating Requirement (OR) 14.10, which requires restoration of equipment required for 10 CFR 50, Appendix R within that time limit.
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PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                            Revision 60 B14.2.8 The electric driven pump start circuitry, including the buffer relays, may be temporarily inhibited during maintenance/testing to prevent the fire pumps from starting automatically. The excessive starting of the deep draft electric motor driven fire pumps is an industry concern, therefore, limiting the starting of the electric driven fire pumps is a good practice. This action does not require additional compensatory measures for the following reasons:
: a.       Taking the circuitry out of service and returning it to service is administratively controlled by the testing documentation.
: b.       The manual starting of the electric motor driven fire pumps from the Main Control Room (MCR) or their associated 480V shutdown board is not impaired.
Additional administrative controls and abnormal operating instructions exist that ensure fire pumps are started upon the discovery of a fire.
: c.       The system is normally pressurized without the operation of the fire pumps.
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PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                            Revision 60 BASES - TESTING AND INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS (TIRs)
WATER SUPPLY B.14.2.a   TIR 14.2.a verifies that the electric driven pumps operate as designed. Every 31 days, the pumps are tested by starting each pump and letting it operate for a minimum of 15 minutes on recirculation flow. A test frequency of 31 days is reasonable for pumps which are not normally in operation and is consistent with standard Technical Specification requirements.
B.14.2.b   TIR 14.2.b verifies every 92 days that each testable valve in any accessible area is visually inspected to be in its correct position. This applies to testable valves that are manual, power-operated, and automatic valves in the flow path. Verification of valve position is not required for valves that are not part of the main flow path which feed branch headers to form a train separation boundary, or which have capped or blind flanges downstream of the valves, or if inadvertently opened/left open leads to a visible, noticeable discharge which may be corrected. Valves which are not part of the main flow path which are normally closed and feed to branch headers to closed station drains are included in the verification of position, since if left mispositioned could lead to undetected leakage. Verification of valve position is not required for the pressure control valve which has a designed orifice plate downstream to limit the effect, to within design parameters, of the valve failing. Valves that are locked, sealed or otherwise secured in position need only be verified to be locked, sealed, etc., since these were verified to be in the correct position before locking, sealing, or securing. A frequency of 92 days has been established and is more conservative than the inspection criteria established for primary system valves that are locked, sealed, etc.
B.14.2.c   TIR B.14.2.c requires the fire protection water distribution system be flushed twice per year in conjunction with biocide injection. The frequency of twice per year is needed to support chemical treatment requirements for biocide injection and meets the intent of standard Technical Specification requirements.
B.14.2.d   TIR 14.2.d requires that valves in any accessible area, which are testable, are cycled every 12 months. This verifies that each valve operates properly. Verification of the position of valves every 12 months is based on industry operating experience, and is consistent with standard Technical Specification requirements and NFPA consensus standard 25 criteria.
B.14.2.e   TIR 14.2.e consists of a fire suppression water system functional test every 18 months, which includes the electric motor driven pumps and major valves. The electric motor driven pumps start circuitry uses a time delay to ensure the associated emergency diesel generator is not overloaded and/or a combination of the time delay and pressure demand to start additional pumps if system pressure falls below predetermined setpoints.
Only two of the four pumps are needed to satisfy the requirements of OR 14.2.
Normally, the first two pumps start based on time delay and the remaining pumps start on pressure demand and time delay. However, there are possible pump alignments where one of the two pumps needed for the OR requirement will have a start logic based on time and pressure delay. The electric motor driven pumps start logic is verified for proper normal function by verifying pump time delay starts. TVA does not test the time and pressure delay aspects of the start circuitry because:
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PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                           Revision 60
: 1.       Testing this circuitry involves extensive plant configuration changes in order to minimize the number of pump starts.
: 2.       The pressure switches are periodically maintained and calibrated in accordance with the WBN preventive maintenance program.
: 3.       Plant instructions for responding to fires include verification measures to ensure that at least two electric motor driven pumps are operating.
: 4.       Minimize the number of starts on deep draft pumps.
There are numerous sets of contacts that are associated with the physical fire pump start circuit. These points do not affect the logic beyond providing a start signal for the logic. When there is a set of contacts that provides an automatic start for the logic, it is tested with the associated equipment (e.g. preaction sprinkler system).
Devices that are manual in nature such as hose stations, except as noted in 14.6, do not need the automatic start input because plant personnel are trained to report all fires before trying to fight them. Additional administrative controls are in place to ensure that a fire pump(s) is running after a fire is reported. Testable valves in any inaccessible area are cycled during the refueling outage for the applicable unit.
Automatic valves are checked for correct position and function each 18-months. The functional test frequency of 18 months/refueling outage is based on industry operating experience, gives acceptable assurance that the system is Functional at all times, and is consistent with standard Technical Specification requirements.
B.14.2.f TIR 14.2.f specifies a flow test every three years of the system in accordance with Reference 4.4.1. Underground and exposed piping is flow tested to determine the internal condition of the piping at minimum three-year intervals. Flow tests are made at flows representative of those expected during a fire, for the purpose of comparing friction loss characteristics of the pipe with that expected for the particular type of pipe involved, with due consideration given to the age of the pipe and to the results of previous flow tests. Any flow test results that indicate unacceptable deterioration of available water flow and pressure shall be fully investigated. The test frequency of three years is based on industry experience and NFPA consensus standard 25 and is considered acceptable.
B.14.2.g TIR 14.2.g verifies that the diesel engine driven fire pump operates as designed and has an adequate fuel supply to provide fuel for the running time (i.e. minimum 2 hours).
Every 31 days, the pump is tested by starting the pump and letting it operate for a minimum of 30 minutes on recirculation flow. A test frequency of 31 days is reasonable for pumps which are not normally in operation and is consistent with standard Technical Specification requirements.
B.14.2.h TIR 14.2.h verifies that the quality of the diesel fuel is within the acceptable limits of Table 1 of ASTM-D975-1990. This either uses the documentation from the fuel in the main diesel fuel storage tanks, when filled from the source, or testing performed on the fuel in the diesel fire pump storage tank. Testing on the fuel in the diesel fire pump fuel oil tank is performed on a bottom sample as defined by ASTM-D40507-1990.
Additional samples from the midpoint or top of the fuel tank per ASTM-D-40507 are not needed since the main concern is water and sediment in the tank. A bottom sample is sufficient for detecting water and sediment. The test frequency of 92 days is II-96

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                          Revision 60 reasonable based on the limited consumption during the 31 day runs and is consistent with standard Technical Specification requirements.
B.14.2.i TIR 14.2.i subjects the diesel engine driver to an inspection as specified by the manufacturer for the class of service. The extent of the inspection is based on performance factors of the engine and pump.
B.14.2.j TIR 14.2.j verifies that the diesel engine driven fire pump performs in accordance with the proper normal operation start logic based on plant design of pump. The pump is tested to verify that it starts from a drop in system pressure  the design specified set point and that the performance of the pump meets the following criteria:
150% of rated flow at 65% of rated head, 100% of rated flow at rated head, and Shutoff flow  140% of rated head The frequency of 18 months is consistent with standard Technical Specifications.
B.14.2.k TIR 14.2.k verifies (1) the electrolyte level of each battery in the 24 volt battery bank; and (2) the charger is functional by measuring the voltage at the battery to ensure that it is  24 volts. The test frequency of 7 days is consistent with standard Technical Specifications.
B.14.2.l TIR 14.2.l verifies that the specific gravity of each battery is within tolerance to ensure continued service of the battery. The frequency of 92 days is consistent with standard Technical Specifications.
B.14.2.m TIR 14.2.m verifies that there is no visible physical damage to the batteries, cell plates and battery racks and that the battery to battery connections are clean, tight, free of corrosion and coated with anti corrosion material. The frequency of 18 months is consistent with standard Technical Specifications.
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PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                        Revision 60 BASES - OPERATING REQUIREMENTS (OR)
WATER BASED FIRE SUPPRESSION B.14.3     Water based fire suppression systems and their associated fire detectors are required to be Functional whenever safety-related or FSSD equipment protected by the suppression/detection system is required to be Functional. This is necessary to minimize the adverse effects of fires on structures, systems, and components important to safety.
This water based suppression equipment and associated fire detection equipment is provided as a means to directly detect and annunciate to a constantly attended location, and automatically actuate systems to suppress or control fires with particular emphasis on preserving the ability to achieve and maintain safe plant shutdown by protecting the fire safe shutdown equipment.
The main emphasis is on early detection to a constantly attended location and automatic actuation of the system for the suppression of a fire while the fire is easily controlled and quickly suppressed before it is capable of damaging fire safe shutdown systems. Two levels of actions are provided in recognition of the varying fire safe shutdown impact depending on the location of the fire. The determination whether a single fire can affect redundant FSSD systems or components is based on whether both FSSD paths are in the same fire area with less than a 3-hour fire barrier separating them. This is consistent with Appendix R in that when 3-hour separation is provided within the same fire area, then suppression and detection are not required.
Backup suppression equipment is normally the installed hose stations as discussed in Part II, Section 12.2.
When a unit is in Modes 5, 6, or core empty, the locations where a continuous fire watch is required may be combined and patrolled by one or more roving fire watch(es) provided the area only affects the unit in Modes 5, 6, or core empty. While the plant is in cold shutdown or refueling there are fewer systems needed for maintaining cold shutdown and more people present that could detect and report a fire (General Employee Training includes how to report a fire). Roving fire watches provide an adequate level of coverage for these systems by ensuring that potential fire hazards are detected and corrected in a timely manner to prevent fires, or if a fire were to occur, ensuring that timely action is taken.
Outputs from the associated fire detection equipment also provide for the automatic shutdown of selected plant fans/air movers and dampers. This output is beyond the scope of this OR for Function B detectors since this automatic shutdown does not affect the function of the system as exhibited by the annunciation of the associated fire detection equipment. Manual actions can be used to compensate for this automatic shutdown.
B.14.3.1   More restrictive compensatory actions are appropriate where water based suppression equipment or associated fire detection equipment are provided to protect redundant fire safe shutdown systems or components that may be damaged if a fire occurred. With any fire suppression shown in Table 14.3 non-functional in any accessible or inaccessible area, the non-functional equipment must be restored within one hour. If both the suppression and associated detection are non-functional in an area containing both trains of fire safe shutdown equipment, then it is appropriate to provide continuous II-98

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                           Revision 60 fire watch coverage except as modified below. The completion time of one hour is based on the standard Technical Specifications.
: a.       When detection or both suppression and the associated detection are non-functional in an area, then the more stringent compensatory actions are needed. If only the water based suppression is non-functional, then the early warning detection system provides more extensive coverage of the area and faster notification than can be provided by a fire watch. Therefore, it is appropriate to provide a lesser degree of fire watch coverage (i.e., Hourly roving fire watch). When the detection is non-functional and the associated suppression is still functional then the more restrictive compensatory action is required. In this situation, not only is the early warning capability lost, but so is the automatic actuation capability of the suppression system.
: b.       The non-functional suppression is restored within one hour. If the area is in the Reactor Buildings Lower Containment, then special consideration is needed due to the radiological conditions, building construction, and hazards present.
In this case the area with non-functional suppression and/or detection must have a continuous fire watch established using the alternatives defined in Sub-section D or E of Section 13.1, or the air temperature must be monitored in the affected area once per hour. The completion time of one hour to establish continuous fire watch or hourly monitoring of the air temperature is reasonable.
Either of these compensatory actions and associated time frequency is acceptable based on the air supervision for the Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) sprinkler systems, the RCP oil collection system and the capability to monitor RCP bearings temperatures in the MCR. Furthermore, the one hour frequency for air temperature monitoring is considered adequate in view of other indications available in the MCR, including alarms to alert the operator to abnormal containment temperature conditions. This is also consistent with the standard Technical Specification on the loss of detection in an inaccessible area such as Lower Containment.
Fire suppression is not assumed to be functional to mitigate the consequences of a design accident or transient. In designing the accident sequence for theoretical hazard evaluation, fires are not assumed to take place simultaneously with the design basis event (DBE) or transient. Therefore, observing the same instruments that are used by SRs 3.6.5.1 and 3.6.5.2 once per hour along with the other indications available in the main Control Room, including alarms to alert the operator of abnormal Containment temperature conditions provides an equivalent level of fire safety without exposing personnel to unnecessary radiation exposure. Additionally, this method of compensatory actions for non-functional suppression systems in Lower Containment was approved by NRC for Sequoyah Nuclear Plants TS 3.3.3.8 that was current at the time Watts Bar Nuclear Plants FPR was written. This approval was also contained in Sequoyah Nuclear Plants FPR when Sequoyahs fire protection was removed from TS and placed in the FPR.
If this Technical Specification instrumentation is not available to support this monitoring, then other appropriate maintained and tested instrumentation is used after evaluation.
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PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                         Revision 60 The 737' elevation of the Auxiliary Building is to have a dedicated continuous fire watch when the water based suppression system equipment or associated fire detection equipment is out of service. In such a situation, the continuous fire watch is limited to the 737' elevation due to the FSSD sensitivity of the area. The continuous fire watch is not allowed to cover areas in other elevations that this sprinkler system protects.
Alternate compensatory actions are generally defined in Section 13.1. In selected cases the established compensatory measures may be inadequate or present a concern such as in the areas of personnel safety or radiological safety. In such situations engineering evaluations will be used to define and accomplish adequate compensatory measures. Guidance for these engineering evaluations are provided in regulatory guidance as issued by the NRC in Regulatory Issue Summary (RIS) 2005-07 regarding compensatory measures applicable to Fire Protection Program (FPP) requirements. The purpose of the RIS was to allow licensees with the standard fire protection license condition to make changes to the approved FPP (i.e., WBN FPR) to use alternate compensatory measures. It was specified that if a licensee were to choose to implement alternate compensatory measures as otherwise required by the approved FPP, the licensee must document an evaluation to determine the impact of the alternate measures and the adequacy of those measures relative to those specified by the FPP. Examples of acceptable alternate compensatory measures include operator briefings, additional administrative controls, interim shutdown strategies, temporary procedural requirements, temporary fire protection features, etc. The evaluation must demonstrate that the implementation of alternate actions does not adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire, and should incorporate aspects of risks due to fire hazards, presence of ignition sources, installed fire protection features (manual and automatic), and human error probabilities where applicable.
In accordance with the provisions of Part II, Section 13.1 and OR 14.3.1.b.2.b and OR 14.3.1.b.3.b, an evaluation (see Part VII, section 6.1) has been performed to justify that no alternate compensatory actions inside the room when the shield blocks are installed, normally during power operation are required nor are practical for the two Reactor Building Equipment Hatch Rooms (757.0-A11 & A15). OR 14.3.1.a compensatory actions will be performed inside the room, as applicable, when the shield blocks are removed and alternate compensatory actions will be performed outside the room when the shield blocks are installed.
B.14.3.2 Where redundant FSSD systems or components are not damaged by a single fire, the least restrictive compensatory actions are required for non-functional water based suppression equipment or associated fire detection equipment would necessitate.
B.14.3.3 The restoration of the equipment to Functional in 14 days is reasonable based on the type of equipment that is out of service. The time frame is consistent with the standard Technical Specifications.
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PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                          Revision 60 BASES - TESTING AND INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS (TIR)
WATER BASED FIRE SUPPRESSION B.14.3.a   TIR 14.3.a verifies the correct alignment for testable valves that are manual, power-operated, and automatic valves in any accessible area in the spray/sprinkler systems flow paths and provides assurance that the proper flow paths exists for spray/sprinkler system function. Testable valves do not include deluge valves for preaction systems.
Valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position need only be verified to still be locked, sealed, etc., since these were verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing. This inspection does not require any testing or valve manipulation. Rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of being mispositioned and preventing or inhibiting fire suppression activities are in the correct position. A frequency of 92 days has been established and is more conservative than the inspection criteria established for primary system valves that are locked, sealed, etc.
B.14.3.b   TIR 14.3.b ensures that testable valves in the flow path in any accessible area travel through at least one cycle. This is necessary to ensure valves are Functional in the event of a fire. A frequency of 12 months has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience and is consistent with NFPA consensus standard 25 criteria.
B.14.3.c   TIR 14.3.c ensures that each automatic spray/sprinkler system valve actuates to its correct position. These deluge valves for preaction systems have limited means to ensure a cycle of travel is achieved. Industry practice on cycling these valves by closing the isolation valve all but a few turns until the deluge valve opens and then completing the closing of the isolation valve is used. This TIR also ensures that each testable valve in any inaccessible area travels through at least one cycle. Any pushbuttons provided at deluge valves for manual start of the fire pumps are not tested as a part of this TIR. These pushbuttons are provided for when the deluge valve is manually activated. Upon discovery of a fire, plant personnel are trained to report all fires before trying to fight them. Additional administrative controls are in place to ensure that a fire pump(s) is running when a fire is reported. A units Refueling Outage frequency was developed considering that many surveillances can only be performed during an outage. Standard Technical Specification requirements and operating experience has shown these components routinely pass the TIR when performed on the 18 months/Refueling Outage frequency. Therefore, the frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.
B.14.3.d   TIR 14.3.d performs a general, floor level visual inspection of each spray or sprinkler system once every 18 months for accessible areas and for the unit in a Refueling Outage for inaccessible areas. This general inspection identifies any abnormal conditions and/or physical damage to the riser, sprinkler piping network, and hangers.
This inspection includes assurance that spray/sprinkler head discharge patterns are not obstructed from providing protection from the hazards present. This inspection is not intended to perform a field verification of the design of the installed spray/sprinkler system. The 18 months/Refueling Outage frequencies have been established and are consistent with standard Technical Specification requirements. Design and modification controls exist to prevent improper fire protection system installation or permanent impairment of function through improper installation of plant equipment.
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PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                          Revision 60 B.14.3.e TIR 14.3.e verifies during outages that each testable valve in any inaccessible area is visually inspected to be in its correct position. The test is performed during each cold shutdown exceeding 24 hours unless the TIR was performed in the previous 92 days.
The verification is performed each 92 days during extended outages. The frequency for the TIR is based on the assumption that the required valves cannot be tested until the plant is in cold shutdown for more than 24 hours. Valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position need only be verified to be locked, sealed, etc. since these were verified to be in the correct position before locking, sealing, or securing. A frequency of 92 days during outages has been established and is more conservative than the inspection criteria established for primary system valves that are locked, sealed, etc. The expected frequency for this testing is each units Refueling Outage and is based on operating experience.
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PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                         Revision 60 BASES - OPERATING REQUIREMENTS (OR)
CARBON DIOXIDE (CO2) SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS B.14.4     Carbon Dioxide based fire suppression systems and their associated fire detectors are required to be Functional whenever safety related or FSSD equipment is required to be Functional. The low pressure CO2 equipment and associated fire detection equipment is provided as a means to directly detect and suppress fires with particular emphasis on preserving the ability to achieve and maintain safe plant shutdown by protecting the fire safe shutdown equipment.
The main emphasis is on early detection to a constantly attended location and automatic actuation of the system for the suppression of a fire while the fire is easily controlled and quickly suppressed before it is capable of damaging fire safe shutdown systems. Two levels of actions are provided in recognition of the varying FSSD impact depending on the location of the fire. The determination whether a single fire can affect redundant FSSD systems or components is based on whether both FSSD paths are in an area with less than a 3-hour fire barrier separating them. This is consistent with Appendix R in that when 3-hour separation is provided, then suppression and detection are not required. Backup suppression equipment is normally the installed hose stations as discussed in Part II, Section 12.2.
The Functionality of the total flooding CO2 systems is dependent on the discharge areas' compartment integrity provided by the enclosing civil structure. This structure may or may not be a fire-rated assembly. A penetration of such a non-fire-rated or fire-rated assembly invokes compensatory actions for an inoperative CO2 system only.
Outputs from the associated fire detection equipment also provide for the automatic shutdown of selected plant fans/air movers and dampers. This output is within the scope of this OR for Function B detectors. This automatic shutdown can directly affect the function of the total flooding CO2 system since the original testing was performed with this automatic shutdown. Manual actions may be used to compensate for this automatic shutdown but the delay is unacceptable.
When a unit is in Modes 5, 6, or core empty, the locations where a continuous fire watch is required may be combined and patrolled by one or more roving fire watch(es) provided the area only affects the unit in Modes 5, 6, or core empty. While the plant is in cold shutdown or refueling there are fewer systems needed for maintaining cold shutdown and more people present that could detect and report a fire (General Employee Training includes how to report a fire). Roving fire watches provide an adequate level of coverage for these systems by ensuring that potential fire hazards are detected and corrected in a timely manner to prevent fires, or if a fire were to occur, ensuring that timely action is taken.
B.14.4.1   More restrictive compensatory actions are appropriate where the total flooding CO2 system equipment or associated fire detection equipment are provided to protect redundant fire safe shutdown systems or components that may be damaged if a fire occurred.
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PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                          Revision 60 B.14.4.2 Where redundant fire safe shutdown components are not damaged if a fire occurs, the least restrictive compensatory actions are required for non-functional total flooding CO2 system equipment or associated fire detection equipment.
B.14.4.3 The restoration of the equipment to Functional in 14 days is reasonable based on the type of equipment that is out of service. The time frame is consistent with the standard Technical Specifications.
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PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                           Revision 60 BASES - TESTING AND INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS (TIR)
CARBON DIOXIDE (CO2) SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS B.14.4.a   TIR 14.4.a verifies that each of the carbon dioxide storage tank level is greater than the capacity needed to provide two normal timed discharges to the single largest hazard, and that each tank pressure is greater than 270 psig. This surveillance ensures that the quantity of carbon dioxide and the pressure in the tanks are adequate for fire suppression. The frequency of seven days has been established based on consensus standard NFPA 12, and has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience and is consistent with standard Technical Specification requirements.
B.14.4.b   TIR 14.4.b requires that each valve is visually verified to be in its correct position. This applies to each system's tank shutoff valve and vapor pilot valve. Valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position need only be verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing. No further testing to confirm the valve's position is required to be performed due to the associated hazard of a CO2 discharge. This surveillance does not require any testing or valve manipulation.
Rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position. No NFPA consensus standard requires CO2 valve position verification on a routine basis. A frequency of 92 days has been established and is more conservative than the inspection criteria established for primary system valves that are locked, sealed, etc.
B.14.4.c   TIR 14.4.c requires that the system be demonstrated Functional by verifying that the system's valves, timers, associated ventilation system actions (e.g., fans shutdown and damper closure), fire dampers, and fire door release mechanisms actuate automatically upon receipt of a simulated actuation signal. Manual manipulation of this equipment does not need to be tested since the associated actions are demonstrated during the automatic actuation (e.g., opening of an HVAC fan breaker to stop a fan and shut down a damper is accomplished when the fan is shut down by the automatic actuation). A "puff test" is performed to ensure that flow from each nozzle can be achieved. Pneumatic actions/responses are demonstrated by the "puff test" as opposed to the automatic actuation discussed above to provide a more representative test. A pneumatic full flow "puff test" is accomplished using nitrogen or other suitable gas. The 18 month frequency has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience and is consistent with standard Technical Specification requirements.
B.14.4.d   TIR 14.4.d requires that a visual inspection be performed to verify that discharge nozzles are not physically damaged and that the nozzle orifice openings are not externally obstructed. No actual discharge of carbon dioxide (pneumatic full-flow) is required unless inspection results indicate its advisability. The 18 month frequency is based upon the need to keep CO2 equipment functional during unit operation, and is consistent with standard Technical Specification requirements.
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PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                          Revision 60 BASES - OPERATING REQUIREMENTS (OR)
FIRE DETECTION SUPERVISION B.14.5     The supervisory function of a zone is masked in one of two ways:
: 1.      An Alarm condition on a local panel causes any existing Trouble conditions to clear locally and at the central alarm location. It also prevents any additional Trouble conditions from being annunciated locally and at the constantly attended location.
: 2.      A Trouble condition on a local panel prevents additional Trouble conditions from being annunciated at the constantly attended location. Additional Trouble conditions on other zones or circuits are, however, annunciated on the local panel.
With the supervisory function of a zone listed in Table 14.1 masked by a panel Alarm or Trouble, the supervision must be restored within 8 hours. The 8 hours is reasonable considering: 1) The probability of a zone going into Trouble is minimal; 2) If a zone goes into Trouble, the probability of it being the type of problem that disables the Alarm function of a Class A circuit is minimal; 3) If a zone did have the type of problem that disables the Alarm function, the probability of a fire in that zone is minimal.
If the supervisory function is masked by an annunciation and cannot be unmasked within 8 hours, the zone(s) causing the masking is jumpered out using appropriate plant procedures and compensatory actions and time limits of Section 14.1, 14.2, 14.3, or 14.4, as appropriate, are established. A zone(s) jumpered out, that is addressed by Section 14.1, 14.2, 14.3, or 14.4 will have time limitations to establish compensatory measures, defined compensatory measures, time limitations to address the cause of the masking condition, and reporting requirements to address failure to meet the final repair of the zone(s)of 14.1, 14.2, 14.3, and 14.4. Thus additional time limitations and reporting requirements are not needed in OR 14.5 when an OR related zone(s) is jumpered out. A zone(s) not addressed by Section 14.1, 14.2, 14.3, or 14.4 has controls addressed by the plants loss prevention program and are outside the scope of this OR.
Masking conditions can be caused by equipment defects that cannot be cleared/
removed by jumpering out a zone(s). In such a case, an evaluation must be made to determine the affect the masking condition has on the OR related equipment. Based on this evaluation, then compensatory measures and time limits of Section 14.1, 14.2, 14.3, or 14.4 are established as appropriate. If the masking condition can not be cleared by jumpering but did not cause an entry into an OR for Section 14.1, 14.2, 14.3, or 14.4, then it is appropriate to ensure a panel listed in Table 14.5 is returned to normal within 14 days.
Normally a circuit that causes an alarm or trouble condition that results in a masking condition is repaired within 8 hours or taken out of service. Due to special situations, it may be desired to clear this masking condition while maintaining the circuits functional capability to actuate (i.e., alarm) and to detect grounds and to monitor for internal module failures (i.e., trouble) but not the Class A supervision to detect conductor failure. In such special conditions, the resulting temporary modification as controlled by NPG-SPP-09.5 provides the advantage of the circuit remaining alarm functional which is preferable to the lifting of the field wiring, jumpering the monitoring module out II-106

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                          Revision 60 of service, and thus completely removing any capability of the circuit. An example of this situation is a problem such as a cable between two devices on a circuit must be removed for operational purposes and this causes a trouble but due to the Class A design of the system the devices remain functional. If the circuit field wiring is lifted at the controlling module and the devices taken completely out of service then the resulting compensatory measures is an hourly or continuous fire watch. There is an advantage of having the equipment functional for normal automatic function in lieu of the manual actions of a fire watch and the subsequent fire brigade. The module providing the supervision continues to monitor itself and report trouble conditions of the module and grounds on the circuit. The propose of OR-14.5.3 is to address the masking concern by applying jumpers to the controlling module to clear the trouble and cause the loss of supervision of the field wiring for a break in the conductors but the circuit actuation capability remains functional to provide actuation as well as the circuits ability to detect grounds and internal failures of the monitoring module. The device(s) on either side of this lifted cable are functionally tested for actuation capability at the time the temporary modification is first installed to ensure the functional actuation capability then periodically tested to ensure the continued integrity of the remainder of the circuit. When the portion of the circuit taken out of service includes an initiating device, then the appropriate OR-14.1, -14.3, or -14.4 is entered for the device taken out of service and OR-14.5.3 is entered for the balance of the circuit that is actuation functional. Periodic testing of the circuit is expected every 7 days for detection circuits and every 6 months for suppression system actuation circuits for automatic valves in the flow path. These frequencies are reasonable due to the configuration and work control processes provided at WBN along with the problem reporting process (e.g.,
corrective action program) which investigates any condition that might have endangered a circuit. In addition, the 6 month testing frequency for the suppression system actuation circuits for automatic valves in the flow path, is reasonable since the associated detection circuits are still available to alert plant personnel of any fire. The frequency of 6 months is the same frequency SQN tests similar suppression system actuation circuits for automatic valves in the flow path. The 30 days to correct this condition is reasonable since the problem is of such a nature that the desire for the continued function of the circuit is of sufficient importance that a temporary modification was generated in lieu of using the 14 day limits of the other ORs referenced. This includes the advantage of maintaining equipment in an automatic mode instead of the reliance on manual actions coupled with the reliability of the administrative controls to prevent damage to the equipment. The need for the extra time may be caused by such factors as inaccessibility due to radiological or personnel safety reasons. The physical action, lifting the field cable in the above example, is a temporary modification and is addressed by appropriate site procedures which are prepared to establish the requirements to address this condition in advance of its implementation.
The temporary, unique configuration addressed in OR-14.5.3 is not applicable to the zones that report the diesel fire pump (DFP) annunciations to the Main Control Room since these DFP zones are Class B and not Class A in accordance with NFPA-72D.
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PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                         Revision 60 BASES - OPERATING REQUIREMENTS (OR)
FIRE HOSE STATIONS/STANDPIPES B.14.6     Fire hose stations listed in Table 14.6, as part of the water suppression system, ensure that adequate manual fire suppression capability is available to confine and extinguish fires occurring in any portion of the facility where safety-related or FSSD equipment is located and to provide backup to primary suppression systems.
B.14.6.1   With one or more of the fire hose stations non-functional, the degree of fire protection provided to safety related equipment and fire safe shutdown equipment is degraded.
Consequently, a backup source of fire hose protection must be supplied from the nearest functional fire hose station. This can be accomplished by routing additional fire hose from an Functional water source (hydrant, hose station, etc.) to the affected area; by staging fire hose immediately outside the affected area; or by providing alternate fire suppression equipment commensurable with the fire hazards present. Normally the method to do this is by providing a gated wye(s) and additional fire hose at the nearest functional fire hose station. In some instances, the physical routing of fire hoses from the Functional hose station to the non-functional hose station may result in a recognizable hazard to operating technicians, plant equipment (e.g., breaching a fire barrier), or the hose itself. In such cases, the hose is appropriately stored at the functional hose station. The completion time of eight hours is reasonable since normally the responding fire brigade brings additional fire hose. In addition, this hose is not for occupant use but restricted for use by trained firefighting personnel.
The hose stations in the Reactor Buildings Lower Containment require special consideration. To provide protection during outages (during Modes 5, 6, or core empty), appropriate lengths of hose and nozzles are provided at the fire protection Siamese connection located at the entrance to Lower Containment. In Modes 1 through 4 these hoses are not required since occupancy and access is limited, thus personnel are normally not available locally to use this manual means of firefighting.
The hose station valves and water supply are maintained functional. Extra hose and nozzles are available in the Fire Equipment Cages in the plant in case of an emergency.
B.14.6.2   Restoration of the equipment to Functional status within 14 days is reasonable considering the equipment involved. The time frame is consistent with the standard Technical Specifications.
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PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                            Revision 60 BASES - TESTING AND INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS (TIR)
FIRE HOSE STATIONS/STANDPIPES B.14.6.a   TIR 14.6.a requires performance of a visual inspection of the fire hose stations in any accessible area to assure all required equipment is at the station and the station is not blocked or obstructed. The frequency of 92 days is considered reasonable in view of the infrequent problems found with hoses and is based on operating experience.
B.14.6.b   TIR 14.6.b verifies the correct alignment for testable valves (except hose valves) in any accessible area in the fire hose station/standpipe system flow paths and provides assurance that the proper flow paths exists for hose station function. Testable valves do not include deluge valves for normally dry standpipe systems. Valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position need only be verified to still be locked, sealed, etc., since these were verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing. This inspection does not require any testing or valve manipulation. Rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of being mispositioned and preventing or inhibiting fire suppression activities are in the correct position. A frequency of 92 days has been established and is more conservative than the inspection criteria established for primary systems valves that are locked, sealed, etc.
B.14.6.c   TIR 14.6.c ensures that each testable valve (except hose valves) in any accessible area travels through at least one cycle. This TIR is necessary to ensure the valves are Functional in the event of an actuation for fire suppression needs. A frequency of 12 months has been established based on operating experience, and is consistent with standard Technical Specification requirements and NFPA consensus standard 25 criteria.
B.14.6.d   TIR 14.6.d requires that fire hose, associated with fire hose stations identified in Table 14.6 and stored in unheated areas, undergo a hydrostatic test once every 12 months.
This hydrostatic test ensures that the hose is reliable and can withstand the working fire main pressure. Appropriate manufacturers' markings or initials and date by test personnel are sufficient to document this hydrostatic test. The manufacturers' markings are done in accordance with industry consensus standards. Initials and date by test personnel are sufficient to ensure proper controls are maintained. The frequency of 12 months is based upon regulatory guidelines, has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience, and is consistent with standard Technical Specification requirements.
B.14.6.e   TIR 14.6.e ensures that each dry standpipe water flow device actuates to its correct position upon an initiation signal. The dry standpipe control valve is a deluge valve for which there is limited means to ensure a complete cycle of travel is achieved. For cycling these valves, the industry practice of closing the isolation valve all but a few turns until the deluge valve opens and then completing the closing of the isolation valve. Also, each testable valve in any inaccessible area travels through at least one cycle. The pushbuttons associated with these hose stations in the Reactor Buildings not only provide a means to open the deluge valve that allows water into the normally dry standpipe system as discussed in Section 12.2 but also start the fire pumps.
Although these Reactor Building hose stations are manual and plant personnel are trained to report a fire before fighting it, there are no administrative controls to ensure the deluge valve is activated as there are for the start of the electric motor driven fire pump(s). Therefore, these push buttons are tested. Any other pushbuttons provided II-109

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                          Revision 60 at hose stations other than the Reactor Buildings for manual start of the fire pumps are not tested as part of this TIR. The 18 month frequency for accessible areas and each units Refueling Outage frequency for inaccessible areas was developed considering the scope and requirements of some tests and inspections can only be performed during a unit outage. Operating experience has shown these components routinely pass the TIR when performed on the 18 month/Refueling Outage frequency.
Therefore, the frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint, and is consistent with standard Technical Specification requirements.
B.14.6.f TIR 14.6.f requires performance of a visual inspection of the fire hose stations that are in any inaccessible area to assure all required equipment is at the station and the station is not blocked or obstructed. The Refueling Outage frequency was developed considering that many tests and inspections can only be performed during a unit outage. Operating experience has shown these components routinely pass the TIR when performed on each units Refueling Outage frequency. Therefore, the frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint, and is consistent with standard Technical Specification requirements.
B.14.6.g TIR 14.6.g requires removal of each fire hose for inspection of the hose condition and gaskets in the hose couplings. Degraded gaskets and/or hoses require replacement.
Following inspection and gasket and/or hose replacement, the fire hose must be reracked, preferably at different folds. The 18 month or Refueling Outage frequency was developed considering that some areas can only be accessed during a unit outage, and is consistent with standard Technical Specification requirements.
B.14.6.h TIR 14.6.h requires that fire hose, associated with fire hose stations identified in Table 14.6 and stored in a heated area, undergo a hydrostatic test once every three years.
This hydrostatic test ensures that the hose is reliable and can withstand the working fire main pressure. Appropriate manufacturers' markings or initials and date by test personnel are sufficient to document this hydrostatic test. The manufacturers' markings are done in accordance with industry consensus standards. Initials and date by test personnel are sufficient to ensure proper controls are maintained. The frequency of three years is based upon regulatory guidelines, has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience, and is consistent with standard Technical Specification requirements.
B.14.6.i TIR 14.6.i verifies the Functionality of each fire hose station valve by partially opening the hose station valve with limited water flow. In the case of selected areas such as the Reactor Building, this flow test can use air in order to address the ALARA concerns. The period of three years between tests is reasonable because the infrequent use of the fire hoses provides for little opportunity for physical degradation or buildup of silt or other obstructions. This surveillance frequency and criteria is consistent with standard Technical Specifications.
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PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                          Revision 60 B.14.6.j TIR 14.6.j verifies correct alignment during outages for each testable valve (except hose valves) in any inaccessible area in the fire hose station/standpipe system flow path and provides assurance that the proper flow paths exists for hose station function.
The test is performed during each cold shutdown exceeding 24 hours unless the TIR was performed in the previous 92 days. The verification is performed each 92 days during extended outages. The frequency for the TIR is based on the assumption that the required valves cannot be tested until the plant is in cold shutdown for more than 24 hours. Valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position need only be verified to be locked, sealed, etc. since these were verified to be in the correct position before locking, sealing, or securing. A frequency of 92 days during outages has been established and is more conservative than the inspection criteria established for primary system valves that are locked, sealed, etc. The expected frequency for this testing is each refueling outage and is based on operating experience.
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PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                            Revision 60 BASES - OPERATING REQUIREMENTS (OR)
FIRE HYDRANTS B.14.7     Fire hydrants listed in Table 14.7, as part of the water suppression system, ensure that adequate fire suppression capability is available to provide coverage for selected portions of safety-related structures.
The Intake Pumping Station uses fire hydrants as a backup water source for fire hoses used in manual firefighting. For the Diesel Generator Building's Conduit Interface Room, the fire hydrants are the primary and backup water source for fire hoses used in manual firefighting.
Although the specific fire hydrants in Table 14.7 are to remain functional while the safety related or FSSD equipment in the areas is required to be functional, one hydrant (specified in the table) may be non-functional as long as the alternate hydrant remains functional in its place. In the case that the specified hydrant becomes non-functional, it is acceptable for this hydrant to remain such for as long as necessary, since adequate fire suppression capability is provided by the alternate hydrant.
B.14.7.1   With one or more of the fire hydrants non-functional, the degree of fire protection provided to safety-related equipment and fire safe shutdown systems is degraded.
Consequently, a backup source of water must be supplied from the nearest Functional water supply whether it is another Functional fire hydrant or a hose station. This is done by providing a gated wye(s) at the nearest Functional water source. In some instances, the physical routing of fire hoses from the Functional water source to the non-functional fire hydrant may result in a recognizable hazard to operating personnel, plant equipment (e.g., breaching fire barriers), or the hose itself. In such cases, the hose is appropriately stored at the Functional water source with the hose dedicated for hydrant use. The completion time of eight hours is reasonable since normally the responding fire brigade brings additional fire hose. In addition, this hose is not for occupant use, but restricted for use by trained firefighting personnel.
B.14.7.2   Restoration of the equipment to Functional status within 28 days is reasonable considering the restraints to getting to (i.e., digging up) and restoring (i.e., cure time for concrete thrust blocks) the equipment involved.
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PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                         Revision 60 BASES - TESTING AND INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS (TIR)
FIRE HYDRANTS B.14.7.a   TIR 14.7.a requires performance of a visual inspection of the fire hose equipment dedicated to support the use of fire hydrants for manual firefighting. This assures all required equipment is at the assigned location and is available for use. The frequency of 92 days is considered reasonable in view of the infrequent use of the hose, and is consistent with operating experience.
B.14.7.b   TIR 14.7.b verifies the correct alignment for testable valves in any accessible area in the fire hydrant flow path and provides assurance that the proper flow paths exists for fire hydrant function. Valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position need only be verified to still be locked, sealed, etc., since these were verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing. This inspection does not require any testing or valve manipulation. Rather, it involves verification that those valves, capable of being mispositioned and preventing or inhibiting fire suppression activities, are in the correct position. A frequency of 92 days has been established and is more conservative than the inspection criteria in standard Technical Specifications for safety system valves that are locked, sealed, etc.
B.14.7.c   TIR 14.7.c this visual inspection ensures accessibility and condition of the fire hydrants.
Fire hydrants are more likely subject to mechanical damage due to their normal locations. The six-month frequency is needed to ensure continued Functionality. The frequency of six months is based on industry operating experience and is consistent with standard Technical Specification requirements.
B.14.7.d   TIR 14.7.d requires that fire hose dedicated to support fire hydrant use undergo a hydrostatic test once every 12 months. This hose is normally located on a motorized apparatus and is periodically exposed to uncontrolled environmental conditions, mainly atmospheric temperature extremes. This hydrostatic test ensures that the hose is reliable and can withstand the working fire main pressure. Appropriate manufacturers' markings or initials and date by test personnel are sufficient to document this hydrostatic test. The manufacturers' markings are done in accordance with industry consensus standards. Initials and date by test personnel are sufficient to ensure proper controls are maintained. The frequency of 12 months is based upon regulatory guidelines, has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience, and is consistent with standard Technical Specification requirements and NFPA consensus standard 25 criteria.
B.14.7.e   TIR 14.7.e requires that fire hydrants be inspected and operated once every 12 months to ensure proper function and to flow water from the hydrant until perceptible foreign material has cleared. The frequency of 12 months is consistent with standard Technical Specification requirements and NFPA consensus standard 25 criteria.
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PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                          Revision 60 BASES - OPERATING REQUIREMENTS (OR)
FIRE-RATED ASSEMBLIES B.14.8     Fire-rated assemblies/fire barriers (including walls, floors, ceilings, penetration seals, fire doors, electrical raceway fire barrier systems [ERFBS] and radiant energy shields, and fire dampers that comprise the fire boundaries separating redundant safe shutdown components) or separating systems important to safe shutdown within a fire area ensure that fires are confined or adequately retarded from spreading to adjacent portions of the facility prior to detection and extinguishment. Fire-rated assemblies/fire barriers are used in conjunction with other fire protection features such as fire detection and fire suppression systems. Thus, the completion times and compensatory action requirements vary based on the Functionality of the other fire protection features. With the exception of electrical raceway fire barrier systems and radiant energy shields, fire-rated assemblies/fire barriers are depicted on drawings in Part II of the FPR. Cables that require protection are routed in raceways enclosed with fire barriers or radiant energy shields and are identified in Part VI of the FPR.
When a unit is in Modes 5, 6, or core empty, the locations where a continuous fire watch is required may be combined and patrolled by one or more roving fire watch(es) provided the area only affects the unit in Modes 5, 6, or core empty. While the plant is in cold shutdown or refueling there are fewer systems needed for maintaining cold shutdown and more people present that could detect and report a fire (General Employee Training includes how to report a fire). Roving fire watches provide an adequate level of coverage for these systems by ensuring that potential fire hazards are detected and corrected in a timely manner to prevent fires, or if a fire were to occur, ensuring that timely action is taken.
Additionally, during Modes 5, 6, or core empty, it is necessary to breach some fire barriers for longer than 30 days. These breaches are excluded from the 10 CFR 50.72 and 10 CFR 50.73 reviews. The fire barrier components that are breached are as follows:
Reactor Building Equipment Hatch Shield Blocks for the unit in outage.
Doors:
Unit 1 outages: A65, A95, A96, A156, A164, A165, Unit 2 outages: A78, A97, A98, 157, A166 and A167 Either unit outage: A155 The exemption of the 10 CFR 50.72 and 10 CFR 50.73 reviews for those identified components that are breached to facilitate the outage for longer than 30 days is consistent with other nuclear station practices. Roving fire watches are used until the breaches are restored.
Other than that specified above, the time requirements for correcting equipment problems of OR 14.8 remains the same.
In addition, those fire rated assemblies/fire barriers that are not accessible due to being in long-term high radiation areas are evaluated in Part VII.
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PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                          Revision 60 B.14.8.1 The fire-rated assemblies/fire barriers are provided as a part of the defense-in-depth concept of fire protection. The degradation of an assembly/barrier is reviewed in concert with the other Functional fire protection features. Thus, this review produces the following:
: a.       When the assembly/barrier is degraded and there is no Functional fire detection designed to protect both sides of the assembly/barrier, the continuous fire watch is reasonable.
: b.       When the assembly/barrier is degraded and there is Functional fire detection designed to protect one side of the assembly/barrier, then a roving fire watch is reasonable.
: c.       When the assembly/barrier is degraded and there is Functional suppression and fire detection designed to protect both sides of the assembly/barrier, then no compensatory action is reasonable.
The Functionality or non-functionality of the suppression or fire detection does not need to be addressed in the cases of degraded assemblies/barriers. This is because of the fact that a non-functional suppression or fire detection system/feature that protects Functional safety-related and FSSD equipment has its own compensatory actions. In the case of OR 14.8.1.c, determination that safety-related and FSSD equipment is not required to be functional on both sides of the barrier is required to justify the lessening of any fire watch requirement for the associated non-functional suppression and/or detection protection designed to protect both sides of the barrier.
B.14.8.2 The completion time of 30 days is reasonable based on the curing time of common fire barrier materials.
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PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                              Revision 60 BASES - TESTING AND INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS (TIR)
FIRE-RATED ASSEMBLIES B.14.8.a   TIR 14.8.a ensures that fire doors are in the correct position, free to close, and the door is not damaged. NFPA consensus standards do not delineate specific frequencies for visual inspections of fire doors. Plant personnel are provided training in General Employee Training of the importance of maintaining fire doors closed and Functional.
Plant fire doors are conspicuously identified as fire doors. Therefore, the 31 day frequency is considered acceptable.
B.14.8.b   TIR 14.8.b requires a functional test of all associated release and closing mechanisms and latches on fire door assemblies to ensure fire door Functionality. The frequency of 12 months is consistent with the guidance found in NFPA 80 (Reference 4.4.30).
B.14.8.c   TIR 14.8.c requires visual inspections of the surface areas of fire-rated barriers to verify Functionality. Approximately twenty percent of the barriers are inspected every 12 months to ensure that all barriers are inspected at least once every five years.
Inspection of bellows, metal plates, ERFBS, or insulation covering a penetration seal, provides verification of the fire-rated assembly/fire barrier integrity, provided there is no apparent change in appearance or abnormal degradation. Inspections validate their functional integrity and ensure that fires are confined or adequately retarded from spreading to adjacent portions of the facility.
The exposed surfaces of the fire-rated assembly/fire barrier are visually inspected to ensure the integrity of the assembly. Fire dampers are part of the fire-rated assembly/fire barrier. Damper inspections are performed in accordance with Fire Operating Requirement instruction 0-FOR-304-3, Fire Damper (Internal) Visual Inspection-Auxiliary, Control and Diesel Generator Building. There is no disassembly of equipment (e.g., removal of damming material, junction box covers, or conduit fitting covers) to perform this visual inspection. Documentation of these inspections is based on the acceptability of the barrier or barrier portion (i.e., individual sign-offs for each penetration are not required). The barrier acceptability is used since a failed assembly leads to the barrier being declared non-functional not just the assembly. The surveillance frequency and criteria are considered to be adequate since they are consistent with current industry practice of ensuring all barriers are inspected within 5 years. Although the Standard Technical Specifications call for the inspection of the exposed surfaces of each fire rated assemblies every 18 months, it only required 10%
of the penetration seals to be inspected. This results in a delay of 15 years to review all penetration seals. These penetration seals are more susceptible to damage than concrete walls and thus fire safety is increased with the additional inspections.
B.14.8.d   TIR 14.8.d requires each units Refueling Outage frequency visual inspection of the surface area of approximately 33 percent of fire rated assemblies/fire barriers to determine Functionality. Inspection of bellows, metal plates, ERFBSs, radiant energy shields, or insulation covering a penetration seal, provides verification of the fire rated assembly/fire barrier integrity, provided there is no apparent change in appearance or abnormal degradation. Inspections validate their functional integrity and ensure that fires are confined or adequately retarded from spreading to adjacent portions of the facility.
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PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                              Revision 60 The exposed surfaces of the fire-rated assembly/fire barrier is visually inspected to ensure the integrity of the assembly. There is no disassembly of equipment (e.g.,
removal of damming material, junction box covers, or conduit fitting covers) to perform this visual inspection. Documentation of these inspections is based on the acceptability of the barrier or barrier portion (i.e., individual sign-offs for each penetration are not required). The barrier acceptability is used since a failed assembly leads to the barrier being declared non-functional not just the assembly. The surveillance frequency and criteria are considered conservative since they exceed current industry practice of ensuring all barriers are inspected within 5 years. The frequency for inaccessible areas follows the criteria set out for inspections in accessible areas but adapted to the special circumstances associated with inaccessible areas.
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PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                         Revision 60 BASES - OPERATING REQUIREMENTS (OR)
EMERGENCY BATTERY LIGHTING UNITS B.14.9     Emergency battery lighting units are required to support a unit shutdown in the event of a fire and coincident loss of offsite power.
An ability to access and operate fire safe shutdown systems is required as well as the protection of such systems. This ability must be capable of being performed in conjunction with the loss of offsite power. To achieve this, emergency battery lighting units with 8 hour lighting capacity are provided.
B.14.9.1   Section 14.9.1 uses the term "alternate battery lighting" for a temporary substitute for installed emergency battery lighting units. This "alternate battery lighting" generally refers to portable, hand-held lighting as addressed in Section 12.7, "Emergency Lighting" of this report.
B.14.9.2   The restoration of the equipment to Functional in 14 days is reasonable based on the type of equipment that is out of service.
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PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                          Revision 60 BASES - TESTING AND INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS (TIR)
EMERGENCY BATTERY LIGHTING UNITS B.14.9.a   TIR 14.9.a verifies proper function of Emergency Battery Lighting (EBL) units by simulating a loss of power. When manually actuated, normal AC power is interrupted to the EBL at the primary or secondary side of the step-down transformer. Thus, the EBL's ability to go from the float charge mode to the discharge mode is fully exercised.
This functional test also demonstrates:
: 1)          The EBL is configured for automatic operation and is not in the standby mode
: 2)          The load transfer circuitry is functional
: 3)          The lamps are functional
: 4)          Continuity exists between the battery and all lamps
: 5)          The battery is functional
: 6)          The charging circuit is functional
: 7)          The status indicators are functional A visual inspection to assess the general condition of the EBL, to detect obvious signs of degradation, and to detect any damage to the unit that may affect Functionality is included. The visual inspection can identify degradation mechanisms at an early stage, and in many cases, can warn personnel of an impending failure. Included is a visual inspection to identify electrolyte leakage, and for vented cells, to determine whether water addition is needed. Early detection of battery leakage allows battery replacement before the leakage results in complete battery failure or in severe damage to other EBL components.
The frequency of 92 days for accessible EBLs is based upon vendor recommendations and industry practice. Over time, the optimal inspection frequency is driven by trending data.
The turbine building standby lighting is not tested as a part of the TIR.
B.14.9.b   TIR 14.9.b requires that a battery is replaced periodically as a function of its service life, the environmental conditions the battery experiences, and a safety factor. The service life and the environmental factors are based on information from the manufacturer. This manufacturer's information plus the safety factor results in the frequencies as shown in chart below.
B.14.9.c   TIR 14.9.c requires that the EBL in inaccessible areas inside the Unit 1 and 2 Annulus be replaced each refueling outage for that unit and that the tests and inspection described under bases 14.9.a be performed to ensure EBL functionality. This is being done due to the ALARA considerations in the Reactor Building and the limited accessibility during plant operation. The surveillance frequency and battery replacement are considered conservative and reasonable based on the fact that the batteries life is greater than 18 months that are being replaced on a refueling outage frequency.
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PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                         Revision 60 BASES - TESTING AND INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS (TIR)
EMERGENCY BATTERY LIGHTING UNITS Environmental                   Service              Replacement Type of Conditions*                       Life               Frequency Battery (ambient temperature)                (Years)                 (Years) 5                      3 Sealed lead acid constantly below 95F                   15                      8 and calcium alloy 20                     11 5                    1.5 Sealed lead acid constantly above 95F                   15                      6 and calcium alloy 20                      8 Sealed lead acid Unit 1 and 2 Annulus                 15**             Refueling Outage and calcium alloy Solid gel                constantly below 95F                    4                      3 Solid gel                constantly above 95F                    4                      2
* Based on site environmental drawings for average temperature during normal operation.
       **The 15 year service life is for the existing Exide LEC-36. Replacement battery (Sentry PM 6420) has a service life of 5 years. Replacement EBL (F-100 w/LEC-361 battery) has a service life of 20 years. Regardless of the battery/EBL combination used, the replacement frequency is every refueling outage for batteries in that units Annulus.
Environmental                Service         Replacement Type of Conditions*                   Life           Frequency Battery (ambient temperature)             (Years)            (Years)
UB 6420                     below84&deg;F                     3-5                3 UB6420            above 84&deg;F and below 95&deg;F              <3                1.5 UB 6420                     above 95&deg;F                    <2                 1
* Based on site environmental drawings for average temperature during normal operation.
The replacement method is preferred for the accessible EBL since a periodic, deep discharge (8 hour) test is not recommended by the manufacturer. The refueling outage replacement for inaccessible EBLs is preferred due to ALARA considerations and very limited access to the Reactor Building during operations which means that inspection and testing is only practical during outages. The frequency and criteria is based on vendor recommendations. The turbine building standby lighting is not tested as a part of the TIR.
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PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                         Revision 60 BASES - OPERATING REQUIREMENTS (OR)
FIRE SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT B.14.10     A minimum set of plant systems and components has been identified at WBN to ensure that the plant can achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of plant fires (see Part III, Safe Shutdown Capabilities). In the majority of cases the identified plant systems and components are addressed by WBN Technical Specifications and Technical Requirements Manual which list surveillance requirements for verifying the Operability of the systems and components. This OR lists the systems and components which are not included as part of a Technical Specification or Technical Requirement. The exception to this rule is the 1B-B and 2B-B CCS pumps, this is due to the FSSD analysis for the CCS pumps during different APP R fire scenarios. The 1B-B and 2B-B CCS Pumps are credited to be always available for the 1A and 2A CCS Headers for APP R fire scenarios, when this alignment is not met the associated unit will enter OR 14.10 for that unit. Tech Spec 3.7.16 requires 2 of 3 of the following pumps, C-S CCS Pump, 1B-B CCS Pump and/or 2B-B CCS Pump, be configured to supply the B Train CCS system to mitigate RCS heat loads during the specific plant Modes and conditions for Unit 1 and 2.. The allowance and note in table 14.10 for the 1B-B and 2B-B CCS Pumps removal from the associated units A train CCS alignment within 8 hours of entering Mode 4 from Mode 3 is reasonable, considering time for system re-alignment with low Risk to the associated Unit for an APP R fire to occur within this time limit while still in the applicable APP R Mode. This is the only allowance that would not require entering OR 14.10 conditions actions when the 1B-B or 2B-B CCS Pumps are not aligned to their associated A train CCS Header when in Modes 1-3.
This OR is provided to ensure that systems and components which are required for safe shutdown are maintained functional and tested to ensure functionality. The intent of this OR is to ensure the equipment listed in Table 14.10 is capable of performing its FSSD function for the specific unit or both units. To ensure this, equipment listed in Table 14.10 shall satisfy the applicable TIR listed by being Functional, capable of achieving its FSSD Condition, or in its FSSD Condition. The equipment listed in Table 14.10 is considered non-functional when it is not in or cannot achieve its listed Applicable TIR condition. The TIR requirements are based on similar components found in Technical Specifications 3.3.4, Remote Shutdown System.
B.14.10.1   With a safe shutdown component shown in Table 14.10 non-functional, the non-functional component must be restored within 30 days when the unit is in modes 1, 2, or 3.
B.14.10.2   With a breaker and/or valve specified in design output documents as being administratively controlled for Appendix R out of its required position (as noted on the drawing), the breaker and/or valve must be returned to the required position within 30 days when the unit is in Modes 1, 2, or 3. These breakers and/or valves are administratively controlled to prevent inadvertent operation during an Appendix R fire event. There is no TIR associated with the OR since the valves and/or breaker positions are controlled by the applicable System Operating Instruction and the plants configuration control program.
B.14.10.3   If the required action and associated completion time are not met, the plant must be placed in a condition where the OR does not apply. If possible, the non-functional or misconfigured component can be placed in the condition required for safe shutdown (i.e., close a valve, shutdown a pump, lock open a breaker), or a backup instrument II-121

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                            Revision 60 can be provided for monitoring temperature, flow, or pressure. If this cannot be accomplished, an evaluation can be performed to justify using an alternate means to achieve compliance with Appendix R FSSD requirements. The evaluation is performed using the plants standard review process. The plants temporary modification process (NPG-SPP-09.5, Reference 4.2.65) can also be used to provide the alternate means of FSSD compliance. If none of the above actions can be accomplished, the unit must be brought to at least Mode 3 within 6-hours and to Mode 4 within the following 12-hours.
B.14.10.4 With a Pressurizer Block Valve is closed in Modes 1, 2, or 3, the Pressurizer Block valve must be restored to OPEN status as soon as possible but not longer than the next refueling outage and an hourly roving or continuous fire watch (see OR 14.10.4) is established within one hour in Auxiliary Building (AB) rooms according to the following table:
Block Valve Closed              Fire Watch in Room 1-FCV-68-332-B                       757-A10 2-FCV-68-332-B                       757-A16 737-A1B 2-FCV-68-333-A 757-A21 For a fire in these rooms, the Pressurizer PORV credited for RCS pressure control is the same Train as the CLOSED block valve, and opening of the block valve may not be possible due to the loss of its electrical power source due to cable fire damage. If the block valve is in a CLOSED position, the fire damage may prevent the valve from being opened from the MCR or its auxiliary control switch on its Motor Control Center (MCC) to enable operation of the credited Pressurizer PORV.
WBN procedural guidance (SOI-68.01) directs the operator to close the block valve in the event of a Pressurizer PORV "simmering" excessive leakage to the Pressurizer Relief Tank. Closure of the block valve with power maintained is required under the provisions of Technical Specification 3.4.11 and operation is permitted until the next refueling outage so that maintenance can be performed on the Pressurizer PORV. An Appendix R fire in the rooms listed in the above table damages the power cable or power supply to the block valve, which negates the provision of Technical Specification 3.4.11 to maintain power to the block valve. It also negates the Fire Safe shutdown (FSSD) analysis assumption that the block valve is OPEN or can be opened with a credited Operator Manual Action. In these areas, enhanced measures must be taken to assist in detecting a general fire at its incipient stage to prevent fire growth leading to entry into the Appendix R post fire safe shutdown procedures (0-AOI-30.2 -
Reference 4.2.60).
B.14.10.5 Offsite Power from CSST A or B - With offsite power being supplied through CSST A or B during testing or while either CSST C or D is out of service for maintenance, compensatory measures are required to ensure the safe shutdown capability of the dual unit plant. The 6.9kV Shutdown Board must be de-energized by opening all of the source breakers (normal, alternate, maintenance & EDG) at the source for a fire in the 6.9kV Shutdown Board room. Since the MCR operator cannot remotely open the maintenance source breaker (CSST A or B), compensatory measures in the form of a fire watch in the associated board room is required.
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PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                        Revision 60 BASES - TESTING AND INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS (TIR)
FIRE SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT B.14.10.a   TIR 14.10.a is performance of a terminal voltage check (Reference 4.2.19) and an alignment check of the plant's 250 VDC Batteries 1 and 2. This provides assurance that the batteries are functional and aligned to the appropriate DC bus. This check is performed at least once every 31 days when the plant is in modes 1, 2, or 3.
B.14.10.b   TIR 14.10.b is performance of a breaker alignment check for the 250 VDC Battery Boards 1 and 2 and Distribution Panels 1 and 2. This check provides assurance that breakers which supply control power to Main Turbine trip circuits and RCP breaker trip circuits are aligned properly. This check is performed at least once every 31 days when the plant is in modes 1, 2, or 3.
B.14.10.c   TIR 14.10.c verifies every Refueling Outage that main steam system valves are capable of being closed via Main Control Room switch. This verifies that each valve operates properly to ensure the isolation of main steam loads when main steam isolation valves become non-functional in the event of fire damage. The valves are tested every Refueling Outage when the unit is shutdown since operation of the valve via the hand switch during operation can cause a reactor trip.
B.14.10.d   TIR 14.10.d is performance of a channel calibration on instruments required for safe shutdown. Many of these instruments are required for local operation of plant systems and components during a fire event. The performance of the calibration ensures the accuracy of these instruments if use is required. This calibration is performed once per Refueling Outage.
B.14.10.e   TIR 14.10.e verifies every 92 days that the Thermal Barrier Booster Pumps are capable of providing 40 gpm to each thermal barrier heat exchanger. These pumps are needed to support fire safe shutdown requirements. These pumps are no longer in the in-service testing (IST) program; however, the testing frequency is based on what was previously used for IST.
B.14.10.f   Deleted B.14.10.g   TIR 14.10.g verifies every Refueling Outage that the Control Rod Drive Cooler Motors and associated dampers operate properly from MCR controls. The CRDM Coolers and dampers are tested every Refueling Outage when the unit is shutdown since these coolers are normally in operation during unit operation. Also, cycling these coolers on and off during plant operation may have an adverse effect on the Rod Position Indication System.
B.14.10.h   Deleted B.14.10.i   TIR 14.10.i verifies every Refueling Outage that the Lower Compartment Cooler and Control Rod Drive Cooler System Temperature Control Valves (TCVs) operate properly from MCR controls. The TCVs are tested every Refueling Outage when the unit is shutdown since these coolers are required for Containment cooling during unit operation.
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PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                         Revision 60 B.14.10.j TIR 14.10.j.a verifies every 31 days that the nitrogen tanks have the quantity and pressure of nitrogen required for operation of the SG PORVs as determined by EPM-SMC-110292 (Reference 4.2.11). This check is performed at least once every 31 days when the plant is in modes 1, 2 or 3.
TIR 14.10.j.b verifies every Refueling Outage that the SG PORVs can be operated properly from backup control stations using the compressed nitrogen. The SG PORVs are tested every Refueling Outage when the unit is shutdown since these valves are required to be Operable per plant Technical Specifications when the plant is in operating modes 1 through 4 and testing these valves utilizing the nitrogen system makes the valves non-functional.
TIR 14.10.j.c verifies every 31 days that the back draft will move to the closed position under no/low air flow conditions. The back draft dampers limit the bulk migration of smoke from a fire in the 6.9 Kv Shutdown Board Room (Rooms 757.0-A2 or 757.0-A24) to the corresponding 480 VAC Shutdown Board Room (757.0-A5 or 757.0-A21) in order to facilitate the operation of the steam generator power operated relief valve (PORV) nitrogen stations in the 480 VAC Shutdown Board Rooms. The dampers are designed to close (not required to be air tight) in conjunction with low air flow between the rooms to limit smoke migration. The normal air flow path is from the 6.9 Kv room, through ducting, to the 480 VAC Shutdown Board Room and back to the 6.9 Kv Shutdown Board Room via the dampers. The HVAC system is shutdown during a fire event as part of 0-AOI-30.1 and the dampers will close when the normal air flow is stopped to limit smoke migration from the 6.9 Kv Shutdown Board Room to the 480 VAC Shutdown Board Room. The dampers are not credited for limiting smoke migration in the opposite direction, from the 480 VAC Shutdown Board Room to the 6.9 Kv Shutdown Board Room. The dampers are considered functional when they will close due to low air flow. The FSSD condition for the individual dampers is closed. A damper can be tested by either blocking the air flow through the damper with the door between the two rooms open or by shutting off the air flow. If the door between the two rooms is open, blocking flow to one damper will not affect the HVAC since the area of the open door will exceed the flow area of the back draft damper. These dampers are not required to be NFPA code compliant fire and/or smoke dampers. These dampers facilitate the feasibility and reliability of operator manual actions in accordance with NUREG 1852 (Part II, Reference 4.1.44).
B.14.10.k Deleted B.14.10.l Deleted B.14.10.m TIR 14.10.m verifies every Refueling Outage that Appendix R transfer switches function as intended by the performance of a functional test or continuity check. This ensures that the desired component is available for local control during an Appendix R fire that takes out the normal control circuit. The continuity test is consistent with the surveillance requirements for other safety-related transfer switches (reference Technical Specification Bases SR 3.3.4.2).
B.14.10.n TIR 14.10.n verifies every Refueling Outage the remote switches for P-Auto operate correctly when the associated transfer switch is in AUX. This testing is consistent with the surveillance requirements for these switches (reference Technical Specification SR3.3.2, 3.3.3, 3.3.4 and 3.7.5).
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PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                          Revision 60 B.14.10.o TIR 14.10.o verifies every 7 days there is adequate pressure, volume and flow of liquid nitrogen for supplying the Appendix R required components. Pressure leaving the skid is verified by reading 0-PI-77-2785. Volume is verified by reading 0-LI-77-2701.
Flow is verified by reading 0-FI-77-3140 as the primary method. Flow rates above the required values are indication of a possible leak. These parameters will conservatively supply the operation of the AFW LCVs for 38 hours as determined by Calculation MDQ0000772012000033 (volume and flow) (Reference 4.2.12) and Calculation MDQ00103220120188 (pressure) (Reference 4.2.14). This is reasonable time for Operations to refill the tank or connect an alternate high pressure supply such as a nitrogen gas tube trailer. The required alternate nitrogen gas volume is when only the Appendix R required portion of the nitrogen system required for operation of the AFW LCVs is being served with a minimum pressure of 70 psig at the valves and the rest of the system is isolated from the alternate source of nitrogen. Only the low pressure subsystem of the Liquid Nitrogen skid is required.
B.14.10.p TIR 14.10.p verifies every Refueling Outage RCP Thermal Barrier Booster Pump trip and Thermal Barrier isolation function can be blocked from MCR controls by the performance of a functional test or continuity check. This test is performed every Refueling Outage when the unit is shutdown since the flow transmitters are required to operate during normal plant operation. This ensures RCP Seal Cooling is maintained in the event CVCS Seal Injection Flow becomes unavailable during an Appendix R fire condition. In the event this circuit would be disabled (e.g.: circuit de-energized) then OR 14.10 actions would be entered.
B.14.10.q TlR 14.10.q verifies every Refueling Outage that the RCP Seal Leakoff valves will fail open on loss of air with the Non-essential Control Air header isolated and vented inside Containment. Non-Essential Air solenoids (1-XSV-32-112A1, -112A2, -112B1 & -
112B2 and 2-XSV-32-112A1, -112A2,-112B1, -112B2) vent Non-Essential Air solenoids inside Containment with the use of a single hand switch (1-HS-32-112 or 2-HS-32-112A) in the MCR. The function is to vent non-essential air and fail open the RCP Seal Leakoff Valves in a fire safe shutdown condition. This will ensure the ability to maintain RCP Seal Cooling if an Appendix R fire causes one or more RCP Seal Leakoff valves to spuriously close. Each solenoid vent valve must be tested in conjunction with the close interlock contact with 1-FCV-32-110-A and 2-FCV-32-111-B (Non-Essential Air to Containment).
B.14.10.r TIR 14.10.r.a verifies every Refueling Outage that the isolation solenoid valves for nitrogen to the MDAFW LCVs and isolation of nitrogen to the TDAFW LCVs can be operated from its associated hand switch in the MCR. Nitrogen is a secondary motive force for the MDAFW level valves and the TDAFW level valves since control air is not credited during a postulated Appendix R event. The solenoid valves isolate the nitrogen sub-header to prevent blowdown of the nitrogen tank in case of a failure of valve actuator diaphragm(s) or positioner(s). TIR 14.10.r.a also verifies that 1-XS           2561 disables hand switch 1-HS-77-2561A and 2-XS-3-2561 disables hand switch 2-HS-3-164A contacts used to actuate nitrogen sub-header valves for MDAFW LCVs with a continuity check. This is necessary to mitigate the consequences of a postulated Appendix R fire resulting in the assumed short circuit of the hand switch contacts which could inadvertently energize (close) the solenoid valve. This test is performed every Refueling Outage when System 77 is inspected as part of the leak check program (Ref. 4.2.73a [WBN-SDD-N3-77A-4001, section 6.0 ]).
TIR 14.10.r.b verifies every 92 days that each testable valve, in an accessible area, from the liquid nitrogen skid to the AFW LCVs are inspected to be in its correct II-125

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                         Revision 60 position. Valves that are locked, sealed or otherwise secured in position need only be verified to be locked, sealed, etc., since these were verified to be in the correct position before being locked, sealed or secured.
TIR 14.10.r.c verifies every Refueling Outage functional valve operation with nitrogen for AFW LCVs. This functional check verifies proper control of the AFW LCV when only nitrogen supplies the valve positioner. The valves are tested every Refueling Outage when the unit is shutdown since they are required to be Operable per plant Technical Specifications and testing these valves using the nitrogen system would make the valves inoperable for normal plant operation and LCO 3.7.5, since the Essential Air supply is the normal mode of operation for these AFW valves.
B.14.10.s TIR 14.10.s verifies every Refueling Outage that the Safety Injection System Boron Injection Tank Inlet Shutoff Valves (1/2-FCV-63-39-A, 1/2-FCV-63-40-B) are capable of being closed from a hand switch on a Control and Auxiliary Building (C&A) Vent board by the performance of a functional test. This verifies that each valve operates properly and can be closed if required to support fire safe shutdown. The valves are tested every RFO when the unit is shutdown.
B.14.10.t TIR 14.10.t.a verifies every 31 days that the nitrogen tanks for 2-FCV-62-89 have the quantity and pressure of nitrogen required for operation of the valves as determined by MDQ00206220110382 (Reference 4.2.15). This check is performed at least once every 31 days when the plant is in modes 1, 2 or 3.
TIR 14.10.t.b verifies every Refueling Outage that the CVCS normal charging flow control valve can be operated properly from backup control station using the compressed nitrogen. The CVCS normal charging flow control valve is tested every Refueling Outage when the unit is shutdown since these valves are required to be Operable per plant Technical Specifications when the plant is in operating modes 1 through 4 and testing these valves utilizing the nitrogen system makes the valve inoperable.
B.14.10.u TIR 14.10.u verifies that the Alternate Shutdown Hand switches can place the associated component in its FSSD position. This test can be performed as a continuity check or actual functional test. Inherent in testing the C Hand switches, they can not be tested without placing the associated Auxiliary switch for that component in Aux also, so in testing the C Hand switch the associated Auxiliary switch will also be tested.
B.14.10.v TIR 14.10.v verifies every Refueling Outage normal letdown can be isolated (close 1/2-FCV-62-69B) via local control by the performance of a functional test or continuity check. This test is performed every Refueling Outage when unit is shutdown. This will ensure capability is maintained to isolate and control RCS inventory during an Appendix R fire.
B.14.10.w TIR 14.10.w verifies that the SFPCS HX Supply Header Control Valves can be closed, since these valves are required to be closed in some APP R Fire scenarios.
B.14.10.x TIR 14.10.x verifies that the 1B-B and 2B-B CCS Pumps are functional IAW the in-service testing program and the pumps are aligned to their associated Units A train CCS Header. This ensures the FSSD analysis will be maintained for the CCS system.
Allowance away from this alignment is allowed when in compliance with the notes of table 14.10 for the CCS Pumps.
II-126

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                       Revision 60 B.14.10.y  TIR 14.10.y verifies that the manual valves listed in table 14.10 can be operated to their required position in the event of an APP R fire.
B.14.10.z  TIR 14.10.z verifies the boards and large electrical components needed as a backup power supply to the Unit 1 and Unit 2 DCS systems are energized and are capable of supplying the Unit 1 and Unit 2 DCS system if needed in an APP R fire.
B.14.10.aa TIR 14.10.aa verifies the CARFs can be stopped locally if a fire causes them to inadvertently start and allows control of the CARFs at the switchboards as needed during APP R MCR abandonment. This test can be performed as a continuity check or actual functional test. The transfer switches are tested every Refueling Outage when the unit is shutdown since these fans are required to be operable per plant Technical Specifications.
II-127

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                  Revision 60 TABLE 14.1 FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION (PAGE 1 OF 12)
A.      Diesel Generator Building                               Total Number of Instruments**
HEAT                SMOKE ZONE                    INSTRUMENT LOCATION                     (A/B)               (A/B) 1         742.0-D7 - Diesel Unit 2B-B                          0/5 2         742.0-D7 - Diesel Unit 2B-B                          0/5 3         742.0-D6 - Diesel Unit 1B-B                          0/5 4         742.0-D6 - Diesel Unit 1B-B                          0/5 5         742.0-D5 - Diesel Unit 2A-A                          0/5 6         742.0-D5 - Diesel Unit 2A-A                          0/5 7         742.0-D4 - Diesel Unit 1A-A                          0/5 8         742.0-D4 - Diesel Unit 1A-A                          0/5 9         742.0-D2 - Lube Oil Storage                          0/1 10        742.0-D2 - Lube Oil Storage                          0/1 11        742.0-D8 - Fuel Oil Transfer Room                    0/1 12        742.0-D8 - Fuel Oil Transfer Room                    0/1 13        742.0-D9 - PIPE GALLERY & CORRIDOR                                       0/6 760.5-D14 - Air Intake & 760.5-D12 - Exhaust 14                                                             10/0 Room 2B, El. 7 60 760.5-D11 - Air Intake & 760.5-D9 - Exhaust 15                                                             10/0 Room 1B, El. 760 760.5-D8 - Air Intake & 760.5-D6 - Exhaust Room 16                                                             10/0 2A, El. 760 760.5-D5 - Air Intake & 760.5-D3 - Exhaust Room 17                                                             10/0 1A, El. 760 18        Diesel Gen. 2B-B Relay Bd, (in 742.0-D7)                                 3/0 19        Diesel Gen. 1B-B Relay Bd, (in 742.0-D6)                                 3/0 20        Diesel Gen. 2A-A Relay Bd, (in 742.0-D5)                                 3/0 21        Diesel Gen. 1A-A Relay Bd, (in 742.0-D4)                                 3/0 22        760.5-D13 - 480V Board Room 2B                       0/2 23        760.5-D13 - 480V Board Room 2B                                           0/2 24        760.5-D10 - 480V Board Room 1B                       0/2 25        760.5-D10 - 480V Board Room 1B                                           0/2 26        760.5-D7 - 480V Board Room 2A                        0/2 27        760.5-D7 - 480V Board Room 2A                                            0/2 28        760.5-D4 - 480V Board Room 1A                        0/2 29        760.5-D4 - 480V Board Room 1A                                            0/2 36        East Cable Tray Room, El. 742                                            0/1 37        West Cable Tray Room, El. 742                                            0/1 432        742.0-D10 - DGB Conduit Interface Room                                   9/0 (continued)
       ** -    See Table Notation, Page 12 of 12 II-128

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                   Revision 60 TABLE 14.1 FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION (PAGE 2 OF 12)
B.        Control Building                                  Total Number of Instruments**
HEAT                SMOKE ZONE                  INSTRUMENT LOCATION                     (A/B)               (A/B) 30      729.0-C1 - Cable Spreading Room C7-C11                                   0/15 31      729.0-C1 - Cable Spreading Room C7-C11                                   0/15 32      729.0-C1 - Cable Spreading Room C7-C11                                   0/15 33      729.0-C1 - Cable Spreading Room C7-C11                                   0/15 34      729.0-C1 - Cable Spreading Room C3-C7                                    0/15 35      729.0-C1 - Cable Spreading Room C3-C7                                    0/15 48      692.0-C11 - Control Bldg. Corridor                                       0/4 49      692.0-C11 - Control Bldg. Corridor                                       0/4 50      692.0-C1 - Mechanical Equipment Room                                     0/2 51      692.0-C1 - Mechanical Equipment Room                                     0/2 52      692.0-C2 - Mechanical Equipment Room                                     0/2 53      692.0-C2 - Mechanical Equipment Room                                     0/2 54      692.0-C3 - 250V Battery Room No. 1                                       0/3 55      692.0-C3 - 250V Battery Room No. 1                                       0/3 56      692.0-C4 - 250V Battery Board Room No. 1                                 2/0 57      692.0-C4 - 250V Battery Board Room No. 1                                 2/0 58      692.0-C5 - 250V Battery Board Room No. 2                                 2/0 59      692.0-C5 - 250V Battery Board Room No. 2                                 2/0 60      692.0-C6 - 250V Battery Room No. 2                                       0/3 61      692.0-C6 - 250V Battery Room No. 2                                       0/3 62      692.0-C7 - 24V & 48V Battery Room                                        0/3 63      692.0-C7 - 24V & 48V Battery Room                                        0/3 692.0-C8 - 24V & 48V Battery Board & Charger 64                                                                               2/0 Room 692.0-C8 - 24V & 48V Battery Board & Charger 65                                                                               2/0 Room 692.0-C9 - Communications Room & 692.0-C12 -
66                                                                               0/4 Secondary Alarm Station 692.0-C9 - Communications Room & 692.0-C12 -
67                                                                               0/4 Secondary Alarm Station 68      692.0-C10 - Mechanical Equipment Room                                    0/2 69      692.0-C10 - Mechanical Equipment Room                                    0/2 149      729.0-C1 - Cable Spreading Room                                          0/15 150      729.0-C1 - Cable Spreading Room                                          0/15 214      755.0-C1 - Mechanical Equipment Room                                     0/5 215      755.0-C1 - Mechanical Equipment Room                                     0/5 216      Control Room Filter. B, Duct Det., (in 755.0-C1)                         0/1 217      Control Room Filter. B, Duct Det., (in 755.0-C1)                         0/1 (continued)
     ** -     See Table Notation, Page 12 of 12 II-129

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                   Revision 60 TABLE 14.1 FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION (PAGE 3 OF 12)
B.       Control Building (continued)                        Total Number of Instruments**
HEAT                SMOKE ZONE                 INSTRUMENT LOCATION                       (A/B)               (A/B) 218     Control Room Filter. A, Duct Det., (in 755.0-C1)                            0/1 219     Control Room Filter. A, Duct Det., (in 755.0-C1)                            0/1 220     755.0-C12 - Main Control Room                                              27/0 755.0-C14 - Technical Support Center &
755.0-C16 - Conference Room &
221                                                                                 0/6 755.0-C18 - NRC Office &
755.0-C19 - Corridor 755.0-C14 - Technical Support Center &
755.0-C16 - Conference Room &
222                                                                                 0/6 755.0-C18 - NRC Office &
755.0-C19 - Corridor 223     755.0-C20 - D.P.S.O. SHOP                                                   0/1 224     755.0-C20 - D.P.S.O. SHOP                                                   0/1 225     755.0-C13 - Relay Room                                                     11/0 226     Electric Cont. Bds., (in 755.0-C12)                                        12/0 755.0-C2 - Womens Toilet &
755.0-C3 - Corridor &
755.0-C4 - Kitchen &
227     755.0-C5 - Toilet 7&                                    0/4                 0/4 755.0-C6 - Locker Room &
755.0-C9 - Conference Room &
755.0-C10 - Shift Operations Supervisor Office 755.0-C2 - Womens Toilet &
755.0-C3 - Corridor &
755.0-C4 - Kitchen &
228     755.0-C5 - Toilet 7 &                                                       0/8 755.0-C6 - Locker Room &
755.0-C9 - Conference Room &
755.0-C10 - Shift Operations Supervisor Office 229     Unit 1 Main Control Boards, (in 755.0-C12)                                  8/0 267     708.0-C1 - Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room,                                0/8 268     708.0-C1 - Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room            0/10 269     708.0-C3 - Computer Room                                                    0/4 270     708.0-C3 - Computer Room                                0/4 271     708.0-C4 - Unit 2 Auxiliary Instrument Room                                 0/8 272     708.0-C4 - Unit 2 Auxiliary Instrument Room            0/10 273     708.0-C2 - Corridor                                                         3/0 297     Unit 2 Main Control Boards, (in 755.0-C12)                                  8/0 Common Main Control Boards & M-15, (in 298                                                                                12/0 755.0-C12) 387     Control/Turbine Bldg. Wall, (708, 729, & 755)          0/26 412     Duplex Relay Boards, (in 755.0-C13)                                        4/0 (continued)
    ** -     See Table Notation, Page 12 of 12 II-130

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                   Revision 60 TABLE 14.1 FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION (PAGE 4 OF 12)
C.        Auxiliary Building                                 Total Number of Instruments**
HEAT                SMOKE ZONE                   INSTRUMENT LOCATION                     (A/B)               (A/B) 39      676.0-A9 - Containment Spray Pump 1A-A                                    2/0 40      676.0-A8 - Containment Spray Pump 1B-B                                    2/0 41      676.0-A14 - Containment Spray Pump 2A-A                                   2/0 42      676.0-A15 - Containment Spray Pump 2B-B                                   2/0 676.0-A11 - Residual Heat Removal Pump 1A-A 43                                                                                2/0 Room 676.0-A10 - Residual Heat Removal Pump 1B-B 44                                                                                2/0 Room 676.0-A12 - Residual Heat Removal Pump 2A-A 45                                                                                2/0 Room 676.0-A13 - Residual Heat Removal Pump 2B-B 46                                                                                2/0 Room 676.0-A1 - Corridor &
676.0-A5 - Gas Stripper Feed Pump & HUT Recirc.
47                                                                                11/0 Pump &
676.0-A6 - Spare Room A5-A11, Col. W-X(in 692.0-A1 - Corridor &
692.0-A14 - Cask Decon. Coll.Tank Room 70      692.0-A17 - Maintenance and Test Equipment                                0/6 (M&TE) Hot Tool Room 692.0-A18 - Hot Tool Room A5-A11, Col. W-X(in 692.0-A1 - Corridor &
692.0-A14 - Cask Decon. Coll.Tank Room 71      692.0-A17 - Maintenance and Test Equipment                                0/6 (M&TE) Hot Tool Room 692.0-A18 - Hot Tool Room 692.0-A6 - Turbine Driven Aux Feed Pump RM 1A-72                                                                                0/1 S Room 692.0-A6 - Turbine Driven Aux Feed Pump RM 1A-73                                                                                0/1 S Room 692.0-A26 - Turbine Driven Aux Feed Pump RM 74                                                                                0/1 2A-S Room 692.0-A26 - Turbine Driven Aux Feed Pump RM 75                                                                                0/1 2A-S Room 692.0-A9 - Centrifugal Charging Pump 1A-A Room
           & 692.0-A10 - Centrifugal Charging Pump 1B-B &
76      692.0-A11 - Charging Pump Room 1C Room &                                  0/5 692.0-A12 - Safety Injection Pump 1B-B &
692.0-A13 - Safety Injection Pump 1A-A 77      692.0-A13 - Safety Injection Pump 1A-A                                    0/1 78      692.0-A12 - Safety Injection Pump 1B-B                                    0/1 79      692.0-A11 - Charging Pump Room 1C                                         0/1 (continued)
     ** -     See Table Notation, Page 12 of 12 II-131

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                    Revision 60 TABLE 14.1 FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION (PAGE 5 OF 12)
C.        Auxiliary Building                                 Total Number of Instruments**
HEAT               SMOKE ZONE       INSTRUMENT LOCATION                               (A/B)              (A/B) 692.0-A10 - Centrifugal Charging Pump 1B-B 80                                                                                  0/1 Room 81      692.0-A9 - Centrifugal Charging Pump 1A-A Room                              0/1 692.0-A19 - Safety Injection Pump 2A-A &
692.0-A20 - Safety Injection Pump 2B-B &
692.0-A21 - Charging Pump 2C Room &
82      692.0-A22 - Centrifugal Charging Pump 2B-B                                  0/5 Room &
692.0-A23 - Centrifugal Charging Pump 2A-A Room 83      692.0-A19 - Safety Injection Pump 2A-A                                      0/1 84      692.0-A20 - Safety Injection Pump 2B-B                                      0/1 692.0-A23 - Centrifugal Charging Pump 2A-A 85                                                                                  0/1 Room 692.0-A22 - Centrifugal Charging Pump 2B-B 86                                                                                  0/1 Room 87      692.0-A21 - Charging Pump 2C Room                                           0/1 88      692.0-A1 - Aux. Bldg. Corridor A1-A8                                        0/8 89      692.0-A1 - Aux. Bldg. Corridor A1-A8                                        0/8 90      692.0-A1 - Aux. Bldg. Corridor A8-A15                                      0/12 91      692.0-A1 - Aux. Bldg. Corridor A81-A15                                     0/12 92      692.0-A1 - Aux. Bldg. Corridor U-W                                          0/4 93      692.0-A1 - Aux. Bldg. Corridor U-W                                          0/4 94      692.0-A7 - Unit 1 Penetration Room                                          0/2 95      692.0-A7 - Unit 1 Penetration Room                                          0/2 96      692.0-A25 - Unit 2 Penetration Room                                         0/2 97      692.0-A25 - Unit 2 Penetration Room                                         0/2 Unit 1 Containment Purge Air Filter, A & B, Duct 98      Det., El. 713 (in 713.0-A6 - Unit 1 Penetration                             0/2 Room)
Unit 1Containment Purge Air Filter, A & B, Duct 99      Det., El. 713 (in 713.0-A6 - Unit 1 Penetration                             0/2 Room)
Unit 2 Containment Purge Air Filter A & B (in 100                                                                                   0/2 713.0-A19 - Unit 2 Penetration Room)
Unit 2 Containment Purge Air Filter A & B (in 101                                                                                   0/2 713.0-A19 - Unit 2 Penetration Room) 102       713.0-A6 - Unit 1 Penetration Room                                          0/4 103       713.0-A6 - Unit 1 Penetration Room                                          0/4 104       713.0-A19 - Unit 2 Penetration Room                                         0/4 105       713.0-A19 - Unit 2 Penetration Room                                         0/4 106       713.0-A1 - Auxiliary Corridor A5-11, Col. T-W                               0/8 107       713.0-A1 - Auxiliary Corridor A5-11, Col. T-W                               0/8 (continued)
     ** -    See Table Notation, Page 12 of 12 II-132

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                     Revision 60 TABLE 14.1 FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION (PAGE 6 OF 12)
C.      Auxiliary Building (continued)                         Total Number of Instruments**
HEAT                SMOKE ZONE                  INSTRUMENT LOCATION                        (A/B)               (A/B) 713.0-A3 - Titration Room &
108     713.0-A4 - Radiochemical Lab &                                                0/3 713.0-A5 - Counting Room 713.0-A3 - Titration Room &
109     713.0-A4 - Radiochemical Lab &                                                0/3 713.0-A5 - Counting Room 110     713.0-A1 - Auxiliary Corridor A1-A8, Col. Q-U                                0/24 111     713.0-A1 - Auxiliary Corridor A1-A8, Col. Q-U                                0/22 112     713.0-A1 - Auxiliary Corridor A8-A15, Col. Q-U                               0/15 113     713.0-A1 - Auxiliary Corridor A8-A15, Col. Q-U                               0/15 729.0-A3 - Waste Package Area Compact Room &
114                                                                                   0/3 729.0-A4 - Waste Package Area Drum Storage 729.0-A3 - Waste Package Area Compact Room &
115                                                                                   0/3 729.0-A4 - Waste Package Area Drum Storage 116     729.0-A5 - Cask Loading Area                             0/2 117     729.0-A5 - Cask Loading Area                             0/2 118     729.0-A6 - Nitrogen Storage/PASF Air Filter Room                              4/0 Aux. Bldg. Gas Trtmt. Filter A-A, (in 737.0-A5 -
120                                                                                   0/1 Unit 1 Ventilation & Purge Area)
Aux. Bldg. Gas Trtmt. Filter A-train, (in 737.0-A5 -
121                                                                                   0/1 Unit 1 Ventilation & Purge Area) 123     713.0-A7 - Unit 1 Volume Control Tank Room                                    0/3 125     713.0-A7 - Unit 1 Volume Control Tank Room                                    0/3 126     729.0-A9 - Unit 2 Post Accident Sample Room                                   0/3 127     729.0-A9 - Unit 2 Post Accident Sample Room                                   0/3 128     729.0-A8 - Unit 1 Post Accident Sample Room                                   0/3 129     729.0-A8 - Unit 1 Post Accident Sample Room                                   0/3 130     737.0-A9 - Unit 2 Ventilation & Purge Area                                    0/5 131     737.0-A9 - Unit 2 Ventilation & Purge Area                                    0/5 132     737.0-A3A5 - Unit 1 Ventilation & Purge Area                                 0/5 133     737.0-A3A5 - Unit 1 Ventilation & Purge Area                                 0/5 134     737.0-A1 - Corridor, A5-A11, Col. U-W                                        0/7 135     737.0-A1 - Corridor, A5-A11, Col. U-W                                        0/7 136     737.0-A3 - Unit 1 Heating & Ventilation Room                                  0/5 137     737.0-A3 - Unit 1 Heating & Ventilation Room                                  0/5 138     737.0-A12 - Unit 2 Heating & Ventilation Room                                 0/5 139     737.0-A12 - Unit 2 Heating & Ventilation Room                                 0/5 140     737.0-A2 - Hot Instrument Shop                                                0/1 141     737.0-A2 - Hot Instrument Shop                                                0/1 142     737.0-A1 - Corridor, A1-A8, Col. Q-U                                         0/13 143     737.0-A1 - Corridor, A1-A8, Col. Q-U                                         0/13 144     737.0-A1 - Corridor, A8-A15, Col. Q-U                                        0/10 (continued)
    ** - See Table Notation, Page 12 of 12 II-133

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                        Revision 60 TABLE 14.1 FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION (PAGE 7 OF 12)
C.      Auxiliary Building (continued)                       Total Number of Instruments**
HEAT              SMOKE ZONE                 INSTRUMENT LOCATION                          (A/B)              (A/B) 145    737.0-A1 - Corridor, A8-A15, Col. Q-U                                         0/10 146    729.0-A6 - Nitrogen Storage/PASF Air Filter Room                               4/0 Aux. Bldg Gas Trtmt. Filter B-train, (in 737.0-A9 -
147                                                                                   0/1 Unit 2 Ventilation & Purge Area)
Aux. Bldg Gas Trtmt. Filter B-B, (in 737.0-A9 -
148                                                                                   0/1 Unit 2 Ventilation & Purge Area) 151    713.0-A20 - Unit 2 Volume Control Tank Room                                   0/3 152    713.0-A20 - Unit 2 Volume Control Tank Room                                   0/3 156    757.0-A12 - Unit 1 Reactor Bldg. Access Room                                   0/2 157    757.0-A12 - Unit 1 Reactor Bldg. Access Room                                   0/2 158    757.0-A14 - Unit 2 Reactor Bldg. Access Room                                   0/2 159    757.0-A14 - Unit 2 Reactor Bldg. Access Room                                   0/2 160    757.0-A10 - Miscellaneous Equipment Room                                      0/4 161    757.0-A10 - Miscellaneous Equipment Room                                      0/4 162    757.0-A16 - Emergency Gas Treatment Filter Room                                0/3 163    757.0-A16 - Emergency Gas Treatment Filter Room                                0/3 EGTS Filter A-train (in 757.0-A16 - Emergency Gas 164                                                                                   0/1 Treatment Filter Room)
EGTS Filter. A-train (in 757.0-A16 - Emergency Gas 165                                                                                   0/1 Treatment Filter Room)
EGTS Filter. B-train (in 757.0-A16 - Emergency Gas 166                                                                                   0/1 Treatment Filter Room)
EGTS Filter. B-train (in 757.0-A16 - Emergency Gas 167                                                                                   0/1 Treatment Filter Room) 168    757.0-A11 - Unit 1 Reactor Bldg. Equipment Hatch                              0/1 169    757.0-A11 - Unit 1 Reactor Bldg. Equipment Hatch                              0/1 170    757.0-A15 - Unit 2 Reactor Bldg. Equipment Hatch                              0/1 171    757.0-A15 - Unit 2 Reactor Bldg. Equipment Hatch                              0/1 172    757.0-A9 - Unit 1 Personnel & Equipment Access                                0/1 173    757.0-A9 - Unit 1 Personnel & Equipment Access                                0/1 174    757.0-A17 - Unit 2 Personnel & Equipment Access                               0/1 175    757.0-A17 - Unit 2 Personnel & Equipment Access                               0/1 757.0-A2 - 6.9KV Shutdown Board Room A (480V 176                                                                                   0/2 Shtdn Bd. 1A1)
(continued)
   ** -    See Table Notation, Page 12 of 12 II-134

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                     Revision 60 TABLE 14.1 FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION (PAGE 8 OF 12)
C.       Auxiliary Building (continued)                    Total Number of Instruments **
HEAT              SMOKE ZONE                  INSTRUMENT LOCATION                        (A/B)              (A/B) 757.0-A2 - 6.9KV Shutdown Board Room A (480V 177                                                                                 0/2 Shtdn Bd. 1A1) 757.0-A2 - 6.9KV Shutdown Board Room A (480V 178                                                                                 0/2 Shtdn Bd. 1A2) 757.0-A2 - 6.9KV Shutdown Board Room A (480V 179                                                                                 0/2 Shtdn Bd. 1A2) 180     757.0-A5 - 480V Shutdown Board Room 1B                                      0/2 181     757.0-A5 - 480V Shutdown Board Room 1B                                      0/2 182     757.0-A5 - 480V Shutdown Board Room 1B                                      0/3 183     757.0-A5 - 480V Shutdown Board Room 1B                                      0/3 184     757.0-A2 - 6.9KV Shutdown Board Room A                                      0/7 185     757.0-A2 - 6.9KV Shutdown Board Room A                                      0/7 186     757.0-A24 - 6.9KV Shutdown Board Room B                                     0/7 187     757.0-A24 - 6.9KV Shutdown Board Room B                                     0/7 188     757.0-A21 - 480V Shutdown Board Room 2A                                     0/2 189     757.0-A21 - 480V Shutdown Board Room 2A                                     0/2 190     757.0-A21 - 480V Shutdown Board Room 2A                                     0/3 191     757.0-A21 - 480V Shutdown Board Room 2A                                     0/3 757.0-A24 - 6.9KV Shutdown Board Room B (480V 192                                                                                 0/2 Shtdn Bd. 2B1) 757.0-A24 - 6.9KV Shutdown Board Room B (480V 193                                                                                 0/2 Shtdn Bd. 2B1) 757.0-A24 - 6.9KV Shutdown Board Room B (480V 194                                                                                 0/2 Shtdn Bd. 2B2) 757.0-A24 - 6.9KV Shutdown Board Room B (480V 195                                                                                 0/2 Shtdn Bd. 2B2) 196     757.0-A4 - 125V Vital Battery Board Room I                                  2/0 198     757.0-A3 - 125V Vital Battery Board Room II                                 2/0 200     757.0-A23 - 125V Vital Battery Board Room III                               2/0 202     757.0-A22 - 125V Vital Battery Board Room IV                                2/0 204     757.0-A1 - Auxiliary Control Room                                           0/2 205     757.0-A1 - Auxiliary Control Room                                           0/2 206     757.0-A25 - Auxiliary Control 1-L-11A Room                                  0/1 207     757.0-A25 - Auxiliary Control 1-L-11A Room                                  0/1 208     757.0-A26 - Auxiliary Control 1-L-11B Room                                  0/1 209     757.0-A26 - Auxiliary Control 1-L-11B Room                                  0/1 210     757.0-A27 - Auxiliary Control 2-L-11A Room                                  0/1 211     757.0-A27 - Auxiliary Control 2-L-11A Room                                  0/1 (continued)
    ** -     See Table Notation, Page 12 of 12 II-135

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                   Revision 60 TABLE 14.1 FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION (PAGE 9 OF 12)
C.       Auxiliary Building (continued)                      Total Number of Instruments**
HEAT                SMOKE ZONE                  INSTRUMENT LOCATION                      (A/B)               (A/B) 212     757.0-A28 - Auxiliary Control 2-L-11B Room                                 0/1 213     757.0-A28 - Auxiliary Control 2-L-11B Room                                 0/1 Auxiliary Control Room Bds. L-4A, 4C, 11A & 10 (in 757.0-A1 - Auxiliary Control Room &
230                                                                                12/0 757.0-A25 - Auxiliary Control 1-L-11A Room &
757.0-A27 - Auxiliary Control 2-L-11A Room) 782.0-A3 - Unit 2 Control Rod Drive Equipment 233     Room &                                                                     0/4 782.0-A4 - Pressurizer Heater Xfmr Room - Train B 782.0-A3 - Unit 2 Control Rod Drive Equipment 234     Room &                                                                     0/4 782.0-A4 - Pressurizer Heater Xfmr Room - Train B 782.0-A1 - Unit 1 Control Rod Drive Equipment 235     Room &                                                                     0/4 782.0-A2 - Pressurizer Heater Xfmr Room - Train A 782.0-A1 - Unit 1 Control Rod Drive Equipment 236     Room &                                                                     0/4 782.0-A2 - Pressurizer Heater Xfmr Room - Train A 237     772.0-A7 - Mechanical Equipment Room 1A                                    0/2 238     772.0-A7 - Mechanical Equipment Room 1A                                    0/2 239     772.0-A10 - Mechanical Equipment Room 2A                                   0/2 240     772.0-A10 - Mechanical Equipment Room 2A                                   0/2 241     772.0-A6 - 480V Transformer Room 1A                                        0/3 242     772.0-A6 - 480V Transformer Room 1A                                        0/3 243     772.0-A5 - 480V Transformer Room 1B                                        0/3 244     772.0-A5 - 480V Transformer Room 1B                                        0/3 245     772.0-A12 - 480V Transformer Room 2A                                       0/3 246     772.0-A12 - 480V Transformer Room 2A                                       0/3 247     772.0-A11 - 480V Transformer Room 2B                                       0/3 248     772.0-A11 - 480V Transformer Room 2B                                       0/3 249     772.0-A4 - 125V Vital Battery Room I                                       2/0 251     772.0-A3 - 125V Vital Battery Room II                                      2/0 253     772.0-A14 - 125V Vital Battery Room III                                    2/0 255     772.0-A13 - 125V Vital Battery Room IV                                     2/0 257     772.0-A2 - 480V Board Room 1B                                              0/4 258     772.0-A2 - 480V Board Room 1B                                              0/4 259     772.0-A1 - 480V Board Room 1A                                              0/4 260     772.0-A1 - 480V Board Room 1A                                              0/4 (continued)
    ** -     See Table Notation, Page 12 of 12 II-136

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                    Revision 60 TABLE 14.1 FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION (PAGE 10 OF 12)
C.       Auxiliary Building (continued)                     Total Number of Instruments**
HEAT              SMOKE ZONE                  INSTRUMENT LOCATION (A/B)              (A/B) 261     772.0-A16 - 480V Board Room 2A                                               0/4 262     772.0-A16 - 480V Board Room 2A                                               0/4 263     772.0-A15 - 480V Board Room 2B                                               0/4 264     772.0-A15 - 480V Board Room 2B                                               0/4 Auxiliary Control Room Bds. L-4B, 4D, & 11B, (in                             8/0 757.0-A1 - Auxiliary Control Room &
296 757.0-A26 - Auxiliary Control 1-L-11B Room &
757.0-A28 - Auxiliary Control 2-L-11B Room) 676.0-A16 - Unit 1 Pipe Chase &                                              20/0 330     692.0-A8 - Unit 1 Pipe Chase &
713.0-A28 - Unit 1 Pipe Chase 676.0-A17 - Unit 2 Pipe Chase &                                              24/0 331     692.0-A24 - Unit 2 Pipe Chase &
713.0-A29 - Unit 2 Pipe Chase 441     772.0-A8 - Fifth Vital Battery & Board Room                                  0/2 442     772.0-A8 - Fifth Vital Battery & Board Room                                  0/2 Unit 1 Post Accident Sample Facility Filter, (in                             0/1 455 729.0-A6 - N2 Storage/PASF Air Filter Room)
Unit 1 Post Accident Sample Facility Filter, (in                             0/1 456 729.0-A6 - N2 Storage/PASF Air Filter Room) 487     786.0-A5 - 225kVA ESBO Diesel Gen. B                      0/2 488     786.0-A5 - 225kVA ESBO Diesel Gen. B                      0/2 489     786.0-A6 - 225kVA ESBO Diesel Gen. A                      0/2 490     786.0-A6 - 225kVA ESBO Diesel Gen. A                      0/2 (continued)
    ** -     See Table Notation, Page 12 of 12 II-137

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                    Revision 60 TABLE 14.1 FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION (PAGE 11 OF 12)
D.        Additional Equipment Building                       Total Number of Instruments**
HEAT                SMOKE ZONE                    INSTRUMENT LOCATION                     (A/B)                (A/B) 122      729.0-A14 - Unit 1 Add. Equip. Bldg.                                       6/0 124      729.0-A15 - Unit 2 Add. Equip. Bldg.                                       6/0 153      763.5-A2 - Unit 2 Add. Equip. Bldg.                                        4/0 154      763.5-A1 - Unit 1 Add. Equip. Bldg.                                        6/0 231      786.5-A1 - Unit 1 Add. Equip. Bldg.                                        4/0 232      775.25-A1 - Unit 1 Add. Equip. Bldg.                                       4/0 E.        Intake Pumping Station                              Total Number of Instruments**
HEAT                SMOKE ZONE                    INSTRUMENT LOCATION                     (A/B)                (A/B) 250      ERCW Pump Room A, El. 741                             4/0 ERCW Strainer Room A &
277                                                                                 18/0 ERCW Strainer Room B, El. 722 278      ERCW Pump Room B, El. 741                             4/0 405      Electrical Board Room, El. 711                                             0/5 406      Electrical Board Room, El. 711                                             0/5 F.        Containment Unit 1                                  Total Number of Instruments **
HEAT                SMOKE ZONE                    INSTRUMENT LOCATION                     (A/B)                (A/B) 352      Lower Compt. Coolers, El. 716                                              4/0 354      Upper Compt. Coolers, El. 801                                              4/0 356      RCP 2, El. 716                                        0/2 357      RCP 2, El. 716                                        0/2 360      RCP 1, El. 716                                        0/2 361      RCP 1, El. 716                                        0/2 364      RCP 3, El. 716                                        0/2 365      RCP 3, El. 716                                        0/2 368      RCP 4, El. 716                                        0/2 369      RCP 4, El. 716                                        0/2 372      Reactor Bldg. Annulus                                                      0/26 373      Reactor Bldg. Annulus                                                      0/25 457      Reactor Bldg. Annulus                                                      0/9 458      Reactor Bldg. Annulus                                                      0/8 (continued)
     ** -      See Table Notation, Page 12 of 12 II-138

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                               Revision 60 TABLE 14.1 FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION (PAGE 12 OF 12)
G. Containment Unit 2                                             Total Number of Instruments**
HEAT                   SMOKE ZONE                    INSTRUMENT LOCATION                              (A/B)                   (A/B) 353     Lower Compt. Coolers, El. 716                                                           4/0 355     Upper Compt. Coolers, El. 801                                                           4/0 358     RCP 2, El. 716                                                  0/2 359     RCP 2, El. 716                                                  0/2 362     RCP 1, El. 716                                                  0/2 363     RCP 1, El. 716                                                  0/2 366     RCP 3, El. 716                                                  0/2 367     RCP 3, El. 716                                                  0/2 370     RCP 4, El. 716                                                  0/2 371     RCP 4, El. 716                                                  0/2 374     Reactor Bldg. Annulus                                                                   0/20 375     Reactor Bldg. Annulus                                                                   0/19 459     Reactor Bldg. Annulus                                                                   0/17 460     Reactor Bldg. Annulus                                                                   0/20 The fire detection instruments located within the containment are not required to be functional during the performance of Type A containment leakage rate tests.
TABLE NOTATION
**     A/B:     A is a number of Function A (early warning fire detection and notification only) instruments.
B is a number of Function B (actuation of fire suppression systems and early warning notification) instruments.
II-139

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                     Revision 60 TABLE 14.3 WATER BASED FIRE SUPPRESSION (Page 1 of 1)
OR SECTION                                 SPECIFIC SYSTEMS 14.3.a Unit 1 Reactor Building - RC Pump Area, Annulus 1-FCV-026-219 1-FCV-026-223 Unit 2 Reactor Building - RC Pump Area, Annulus 2-FCV-026-219 2-FCV-026-223 14.3.b Auxiliary Building - El 692, 713, 729, 737, 757, 772, 782 0-FCV-026-191 0-FCV-026-187 0-FCV-026-183 0-FCV-026-143 and 0-FCV-026-322 0-FCV-026-151 and 0-FCV-026-326 0-FCV-026-147 14.3.c Auxiliary Building - ABGTS Filters, EGTS Filters, Unit 1 and 2 Containment Purge Air Exhaust Filters, 125V Battery and Battery Board Rooms 1-FCV-026-163 2-FCV-026-171 0-FCV-026-175 0-FCV-026-179 1-FCV-026-159 2-FCV-026-155 0-ISV-026-996 0-ISV-026-997 0-ISV-026-998 0-ISV-026-999 14.3.d Control Building - El 692, Cable Spreading Room, Operator Living Area 0-FCV-026-203 0-FCV-026-207 0-FCV-026-211 14.3.e Control Building - MCR Air Filters 0-FCV-026-215 14.3.f Diesel Building - Corridor Area 0-FCV-026-167 14.3.g Intake Pump Station 0-FCV-026-26 14.3.h Turbine Building - Control Building Wall 0-FCV-026-199 II-140

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN         Revision 60 Table 14.5 FIRE DETECTION PANELS PAGE 1 OF 1 Panel Number            Building                Elevation 0-PNL-013-L600            Control                   741 0-PNL-013-L601            Control                   741 0-PNL-013-L602            Control                   708 0-PNL-013-L603            Control                   692 0-PNL-013-L604            Control                   692 0-PNL-013-L605           Auxiliary                  772 0-PNL-013-L606           Auxiliary                  772 0-PNL-013-L607           Auxiliary                  772 0-PNL-013-L608           Auxiliary                  713 0-PNL-013-L609           Auxiliary                  713 0-PNL-013-L610           Auxiliary                  782 0-PNL-013-L611           Auxiliary                  782 0-PNL-013-L612     Intake Pump Station              711 0-PNL-013-L613           Auxiliary                  757 0-PNL-013-L614           Auxiliary                  757 0-PNL-013-L615           Auxiliary                  757 0-PNL-013-L616           Auxiliary                  757 0-PNL-013-L617           Auxiliary                  757 0-PNL-013-L618           Auxiliary                  757 0-PNL-013-L619       Diesel Generator               742 0-PNL-013-L620       Diesel Generator               742 0-PNL-013-L621       Diesel Generator               760 0-PNL-013-L622       Diesel Generator               742 0-PNL-013-L623           Auxiliary                  737 0-PNL-013-L624           Auxiliary                  737 0-PNL-013-L625           Auxiliary                  737 0-PNL-013-L626           Auxiliary                  692 0-PNL-013-L627           Auxiliary                  692 0-PNL-013-L628           Auxiliary                  692 0-PNL-013-L629           Auxiliary                  676 0-PNL-013-L630            Turbine                   729 0-PNL-013-L631            Turbine                   729 0-PNL-013-L636            Control                   708 0-PNL-013-L637            Control                   708 0-PNL-013-L638            Control                   708 II-141

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                      Revision 60 TABLE 14.6 FIRE HOSE STATIONS (PAGE 1 OF 4)
LOCATION                         ELEVATION               HOSE RACK #
DIESEL GENERATOR BUILDING Corridor                            742                  0-26-1077 Air Exhaust 2B Room                        760                  0-26-1082 Entrance to 1A Elec. Bd. Room                   760                  0-26-1080 LOCATION                         ELEVATION               HOSE RACK #
UNIT 1 REACTOR BUILDING Reactor Coolant Pumps (*)                     702                  1-26-1220 Reactor Coolant Pumps (*)                     702                  1-26-1221 Reactor Coolant Pumps (*)                     702                  1-26-1222 Reactor Coolant Pumps (*)                     702                  1-26-1223 Reactor Coolant Pumps (*)                     702                  1-26-1224 Reactor Coolant Pumps (*)                     702                  1-26-1225 Standpipe R. Bldg. Annulus               Platform 702              1-26-1216 Standpipe R. Bldg. Annulus               Platform 702              1-26-1217 Standpipe R. Bldg. Annulus               Platform 702              1-26-1218 Standpipe R. Bldg. Annulus               Platform 702              1-26-1219 Standpipe R. Bldg. Annulus               Platform 724              1-26-1212 Standpipe R. Bldg. Annulus               Platform 724              1-26-1213 Standpipe R. Bldg. Annulus               Platform 724              1-26-1214 Standpipe R. Bldg. Annulus               Platform 724              1-26-1215 Standpipe R. Bldg. Annulus               Platform 744              1-26-1208 Standpipe R. Bldg. Annulus               Platform 744              1-26-1209 Standpipe R. Bldg. Annulus               Platform 744              1-26-1210 Standpipe R. Bldg. Annulus               Platform 744              1-26-1211 Standpipe R. Bldg. Annulus               Platform 763              1-26-1204 Standpipe R. Bldg. Annulus               Platform 763              1-26-1205 Standpipe R. Bldg. Annulus               Platform 763              1-26-1206 Standpipe R. Bldg. Annulus               Platform 759              1-26-1207 Standpipe R. Bldg. Annulus               Platform 782              1-26-1200 Standpipe R. Bldg. Annulus               Platform 782              1-26-1201 Standpipe R. Bldg. Annulus               Platform 782              1-26-1202 Standpipe R. Bldg. Annulus               Platform 801              1-26-1196 Standpipe R. Bldg. Annulus               Platform 801              1-26-1197 Standpipe R. Bldg. Annulus               Platform 801              1-26-1198 Standpipe R. Bldg. Annulus               Platform 801              1-26-1199
(*) NOTE:      Hoses and nozzles are provided at the Siamese connection (1-26-674 and 1-26-675) at the entrance to Unit 1 Reactor Building Lower Containment for outages.
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PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                      Revision 60 TABLE 14.6 FIRE HOSE STATIONS (PAGE 2 OF 4)
LOCATION                          ELEVATION             HOSE RACK #
UNIT 2 REACTOR BUILDING Reactor Coolant Pumps (*)                     702                2-26-1220 Reactor Coolant Pumps (*)                     702                2-26-1221 Reactor Coolant Pumps (*)                     702                2-26-1222 Reactor Coolant Pumps (*)                     702                2-26-1223 Reactor Coolant Pumps (*)                     702                2-26-1224 Reactor Coolant Pumps (*)                     702                2-26-1225 Standpipe R. Bldg. Annulus               Platform 702            2-26-1216 Standpipe R. Bldg. Annulus               Platform 702            2-26-1217 Standpipe R. Bldg. Annulus               Platform 702            2-26-1218 Standpipe R. Bldg. Annulus               Platform 702            2-26-1219 Standpipe R. Bldg. Annulus               Platform 724            2-26-1212 Standpipe R. Bldg. Annulus               Platform 724            2-26-1213 Standpipe R. Bldg. Annulus               Platform 724            2-26-1214 Standpipe R. Bldg. Annulus               Platform 724            2-26-1215 Standpipe R. Bldg. Annulus               Platform 744            2-26-1208 Standpipe R. Bldg. Annulus               Platform 744            2-26-1209 Standpipe R. Bldg. Annulus               Platform 744            2-26-1210 Standpipe R. Bldg. Annulus               Platform 744            2-26-1211 Standpipe R. Bldg. Annulus               Platform 763            2-26-1204 Standpipe R. Bldg. Annulus               Platform 763            2-26-1205 Standpipe R. Bldg. Annulus               Platform 763            2-26-1206 Standpipe R. Bldg. Annulus               Platform 759            2-26-1207 Standpipe R. Bldg. Annulus               Platform 782            2-26-1200 Standpipe R. Bldg. Annulus               Platform 782            2-26-1201 Standpipe R. Bldg. Annulus               Platform 782            2-26-1202 Standpipe R. Bldg. Annulus               Platform 801            2-26-1196 Standpipe R. Bldg. Annulus               Platform 801            2-26-1197 Standpipe R. Bldg. Annulus               Platform 801            2-26-1198 Standpipe R. Bldg. Annulus               Platform 801            2-26-1199
(*) NOTE:     Hoses and nozzles are provided at the Siamese connection (2-26-674 and 2-26-675) at the entrance to Unit 2 Reactor Building Lower Containment for outages.
II-143

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN               Revision 60 TABLE 14.6 FIRE HOSE STATIONS (PAGE 3 OF 4)
LOCATION                       ELEVATION        HOSE RACK #
AUXILIARY BUILDING A9V                             676             0-26-691 A8T                             676             0-26-663 A3T                             692             1-26-668 A13S                             692             2-26-668 A7W                             692             0-26-680 A8X                             692             0-26-681 A8T                             692             0-26-662 A3T                             713             1-26-667 A13T                            713             2-26-667 A8W                             713             0-26-690 A8T                             713             0-26-661 ABH-5, A1V                             716 Valves 1-26-674 and -675 ABH-6, A15W                             716 Valves 2-26-674 and -675 A8X                             729             0-26-658 A8X                             729             0-26-659 A5X (AEB-U1)                        729             1-26-686 A11X (AEB-U2)                        729             2-26-686 A11Y (in the CDWE Building stairwell)           730             0-26-854 A3T                             737             1-26-666 A8W                             737             0-26-677 A8T                             737             0-26-660 A13T                            737             2-26-666 A11Y (in the CDWE Building stairwell)           750             0-26-855 A3T                             757             1-26-665 A13T                            757             2-26-665 A4U                             757             1-26-670 A12V                             757             2-26-670 A5X                             757             0-26-682 A8T                             757             0-26-684 ABH-3, A5U                             757 Valves 1-26-671 and -672 ABH-4, A11U                             757 Valves 2-26-671 and -672 A5X (AEB-U1)                       763.5            1-26-693 A11X (AEB-U2)                       763.5            2-26-696 A3T                             772             1-26-664 A13T                            772             2-26-664 A5X (AEB-U1)                        775             1-26-694 A4U                             782             1-26-669 A12V                             782             2-26-669 A5X (AEB-U1)                       786.5            1-26-695 II-144

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN             Revision 60 TABLE 14.6 FIRE HOSE STATIONS (PAGE 4 OF 4)
LOCATION                        ELEVATION     HOSE RACK #
CONTROL BUILDING Stairwell C-1                      692          0-26-1194 Stairwell C-1                      708          0-26-1193 Stairwell C-1                      729          0-26-1192 Stairwell C-1                      755          0-26-1191 Stairwell C-2                      692          0-26-1189 Stairwell C-2                      708          0-26-1188 Stairwell C-2                      729          0-26-1187 Stairwell C-2                      755          0-26-1186 LOCATION                        ELEVATION     HOSE RACK #
INTAKE PUMPING STATION Electrical Board Room                   711          0-26-595 Electrical Board Room                   711          0-26-596 A Strainer Room                      722           0-26-594 B Strainer Room                      722           0-26-597 A Fire Pump Room                       741          0-26-1710 B Fire Pump Room                       741          0-26-1711 II-145

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                      Revision 60 Table 14.7 FIRE HYDRANTS (Page 1 of 1)
Hydrant Number                                     Location 0-HYD-026-574                              Intake Pumping Station 0-HYD-026-819                  Diesel Generator Building (North-West Corner) 0-HYD-026-535
* Diesel Generator Building (South-East Corner) 0-HYD-026-1661 **                Diesel Generator Building (North-East Corner)
* -   This hydrant may be rendered non-functional as long as hydrant 0-HYD-026-1661 is functional as an alternate hydrant.
** -  Hydrant 0-HYD-026-1661 is an alternate hydrant that is to remain functional in the event that hydrant 0-HYD-026-535 becomes non-functional.
II-146

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                  Revision 60 TABLE 14.8.1 FIRE DOORS (PAGE 1 OF 4)
DOOR  ROOMS    CONNECTING          RATING                        REFERENCE NUMB  ROOM 1     ROOM 2             (Hours)      LABEL A3   676.0-A8   676.0-A1              1.5          B               Ref 1&2 A4   676.0-A9   676.0-A1              1.5          B               Ref 1&2 A5  676.0-A10   676.0-A1              1.5          B               Ref 1&2 A6  676.0-A11   676.0-A1              1.5          B               Ref 1&2 A8  676.0-A12   676.0-A1              1.5          B               Ref 1&2 A9  676.0-A13   676.0-A1              1.5          B               Ref 1&2 A10 676.0-A14   676.0-A1              1.5          B               Ref 1&2 A11 676.0-A15   676.0-A1              1.5          B               Ref 1&2 A12 676.0-A17   676.0-A1              1.5          B               Ref 1&2 A25  692.0-A1   692.0-A6              1.5          B               Ref 1&2 A26  692.0-A1   692.0-A7              1.5          B               Ref 1&2 A27  692.0-A7   692.0-A8              1.5          B               Ref 1&2 A28  692.0-A9   692.0-A1              1.5          B               Ref 1&2 A29 692.0-A10   692.0-A1              1.5          B               Ref 1&2 A30 692.0-A11   692.0-A1              1.5          B               Ref 1&2 A31 692.0-A12   692.0-A1              1.5          B               Ref 1&2 A32 692.0-A13   692.0-A1              1.5          B               Ref 1&2 A33 692.0-A14   692.0-A1              1.5          B               Ref 1&2 A36 692.0-A14   692.0-A1              1.5          B             Note (2) Ref 1&2 A39 692.0-A19   692.0-A1              1.5          B               Ref 1&2 A40 692.0-A20   692.0-A1              1.5          B               Ref 1&2 A41 692.0-A21   692.0-A1              1.5          B               Ref 1&2 A42 692.0-A22   692.0-A1              1.5          B               Ref 1&2 A43 692.0-A23   692.0-A1              1.5          B               Ref 1&2 A44 692.0-A25   692.0-A1              1.5          B               Ref 1&2 A45 692.0-A25  692.0-A24              1.5          B               Ref 1&2 A46 692.0-A26   692.0-A1              1.5          B               Ref 1&2 A57  713.0-A2   713.0-A1               3        Note (3)           Ref 1&3 A60  713.0-A1  713.0-A30               3           A               Ref 1&2 A62  713.0-A1   713.0-A6              1.5          B               Ref 1&2 A63  713.0-A6   713.0-A7              1.5          B               Ref 1&2 A65  713.0-A8   RB Unit 1              3        Note (3)           Ref 1&3 A68  713.0-A1  713.0-A11              1.5          B               Ref 1&2 A69  713.0-A1  713.0-A12              1.5          B               Ref 1&2 A71  713.0-A1  713.0-A15              1.5          B               Ref 1&2 A72  713.0-A1  713.0-A16              1.5          B               Ref 1&2 A75  713.0-A1  713.0-A19              1.5          B               Ref 1&2 A76 713.0-A19  713.0-A20              1.5          B               Ref 1&2 (continued)
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PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                 Revision 60 TABLE 14.8.1 FIRE DOORS (PAGE 2 OF 4)
DOOR  ROOMS    CONNECTIN        RATING                         REFERENCE NUMB  ROOM 1     ROOM 2          (Hours)       LABEL A78 713.0-A21  RB Unit 2            3         Note (3)           Ref 1&3 A91 713.0-A13  713.0-A28           1.5           B               Ref 1&2 A92 713.0-A14  713.0-A29           1.5           B               Ref 1&2 A95  713.0-A8 RB U1 Airlock         3         Note (3)           Ref 1&3 A96   RB U1      RB U1              3         Note (3)           Ref 1&3 A97 713.0-A21 RB U2 Airlock         3         Note (3)           Ref 1&3 A98   RB U2      RB U2              3         Note (3)           Ref 1&3 A111  729.0-A5   729.0-A4           1.5           B               Ref 1&2 A122  737.0-A3   737.0-A4           1.5           B               Ref 1&2 A124 737.0-A1A   737.0-A5           1.5           B               Ref 1&2 A125  737.0-A5   737.0-A6           1.5           B               Ref 1&2 A126 737.0-A1C   737.0-A5           1.5           B               Ref 1&2 A129 737.0-A1C   737.0-A9           1.5           B               Ref 1&2 A130  737.0-A9  737.0-A10           1.5           B               Ref 1&2 A131 737.0-A1B   737.0-A9           1.5           B               Ref 1&2 A133 737.0-A11  737.0-A12           1.5           B               Ref 1&2 A138  757.0-A1  757.0-A25           1.5           B               Ref 1&2 A139  757.0-A1  757.0-A26           1.5           B               Ref 1&2 A140  757.0-A1   757.0-A2           1.5           B               Ref 1&2 A141  757.0-A3   757.0-A2            3            A               Ref 1&2 A142  757.0-A4   757.0-A2            3            A               Ref 1&2 A143  757.0-A5   757.0-A2           1.5           B               Ref 1&2 A145  757.0-A5   757.0-A2           1.5           B               Ref 1&2 A152  757.0-A9  757.0-A13           1.5        Note (3)           Ref 1&3 A154 737.0-A1C  757.0-A13           1.5        Note (3)           Ref 1&3 A155 757.0-A10  757.0-A13           1.5        Note (3)           Ref 1&3 A156 757.0-A12  757.0-A13           1.5        Note (3)           Ref 1&3 A157 757.0-A14  757.0-A13           1.5        Note (3)           Ref 1&3 A158 757.0-A16  757.0-A13           1.5        Note (3)           Ref 1&3 A159 757.0-A17  757.0-A13           1.5        Note (3)           Ref 1&3 A162 757.0-A12   763.5-A1            3            A               Ref 1&2 A163 757.0-A21  757.0-A24           1.5           B               Ref 1&2 A164 757.0-A12  RB Unit 1            3         Note (3)           Ref 1&3 A165 757.0-A12  RB Unit 1            3         Note (3)           Ref 1&3 A166 757.0-A14  RB Unit 2            3         Note (3)           Ref 1&3 A167 757.0-A14  RB Unit 2            3         Note (3)           Ref 1&3 A168 757.0-A21  757.0-A24           1.5           B               Ref 1&2 A169 757.0-A22  757.0-A24            3            A               Ref 1&2 A170 757.0-A23  757.0-A24            3            A               Ref 1&2 A171  757.0-A2  757.0-A24           1.5           B               Ref 1&2 A172  757.0-A1  757.0-A24           1.5           B               Ref 1&2 A173 STAIR #4   757.0-A13           1.5        Note (3)           Ref 1&3 (continued)
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PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                 Revision 60 TABLE 14.8.1 FIRE DOORS (PAGE 3 OF 4)
DOOR   ROOMS    CONNECTING           RATING                REFERENCE NUMBE  ROOM 1     ROOM 2             (Hours) LABEL A174  757.0-A1  757.0-A27             1.5      B             Ref 1&2 A175  757.0-A1  757.0-A28             1.5      B             Ref 1&2 A180  772.0-A2   772.0-A1             1.5      B             Ref 1&2 A181  772.0-A2   772.0-A3              3       A             Ref 1&2 A182  772.0-A2   772.0-A4              3       A             Ref 1&2 A183 737.0-A13   737.0-A5              3       A             Ref 1&2 A184  772.0-A2   757.0-A2             1.5   Note (3)         Ref 1&3 A185  772.0-A5   772.0-A6             1.5      B             Ref 1&2 A186  772.0-A1   772.0-A6             1.5      B             Ref 1&2 A187  772.0-A1   772.0-A7             1.5      B             Ref 1&2 A188 772.0-A16  772.0-A10             1.5      B             Ref 1&2 A189 772.0-A16  772.0-A11             1.5      B             Ref 1&2 A190 772.0-A11  772.0-A12             1.5      B             Ref 1&2 A191 772.0-A15  757.0-A24             1.5   Note (3)         Ref 1&3 A192  737.0-A9  737.0-A14              3       A             Ref 1&2 A193 772.0-A15  772.0-A16             1.5      B             Ref 1&2 A194 772.0-A13  772.0-A15              3       A             Ref 1&2 A195 772.0-A14  772.0-A15              3       A             Ref 1&2 A196 772.0-A15   772.0-A2             1.5      B             Ref 1&2 A197 772.0-A16   772.0-A1             1.5      B             Ref 1&2 A210  772.0-A1   772.0-A8             1.5      B             Ref 1&2 A212 772.0-A10   772.0-A9             1.5      B             Ref 1&2 A213 772.0-A10   772.0-A9             1.5      B             Ref 1&2 C19    Area 63   708.0-C1              3       A             Ref 1&2 C22   708.0-C1   708.0-C2             1.5      B             Ref 1&2 C23   708.0-C2   708.0-C3             1.5      B             Ref 1&2 C24   708.0-C2   708.0-C4             1.5      B             Ref 1&2 C26A  708.0-C2  Turb. Bldg.            3       A             Ref 1&2 C29A  729.0-C1  Turb. Bldg.            3       A             Ref 1&2 C34A  729.0-C1  Turb. Bldg.            3       A             Ref 1&2 C36A  755.0-C3  Turb. Bldg.            3       A             Ref 1&2 C49  755.0-C12   757.0-A5              3       A             Ref 1&2 C50  755.0-C12  757.0-A21              3       A             Ref 1&2 C54A 755.0-C15  Turb. Bldg.            3       A             Ref 1&2 D8A   742.0-D2   742.0-D9              3       A             Ref 1&2 D10  742.0-D9A   742.0-D4              3       A             Ref 1&2 D11  742.0-D9A   742.0-D5              3       A             Ref 1&2 D12  742.0-D9B   742.0-D6              3       A             Ref 1&2 D13  742.0-D9B   742.0-D7              3       A             Ref 1&2 D22   760.5-D1   760.5-D4              3       A             Ref 1&2 D24   760.5-D4   760.5-D7              3       A             Ref 1&2 D27   760.5-D7  760.5-D10              3       A             Ref 1&2 D30  760.5-D10  760.5-D13              3       A             Ref 1&2 (continued)
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PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                        Revision 60 TABLE 14.8.1 FIRE DOORS (PAGE 4 OF 4)
DOOR       ROOMS            CONNECTING           RATIN NUMBER      ROOM 1              ROOM 2            (Hour      LABEL           REFERENCE D35      742.0-D9B         Cable Chase B          3            A             Ref 1&2 D36      742.0-D9A         Cable Chase A          3            A             Ref 1&2 DE2       729.0-A4             CDWE               3            A             Ref 1&2 ERCW Pump Room W3          Stair                                 3            A             Ref 1&2 B
Screen Wash &
ERCW Pump W5                         HPFP A Pump            3            A             Ref 1&2 Room A Room ERCW Pump          HPFP B Pump W6                                                3            A             Ref 1&2 Room B              Room Screen Wash HPFP B Pump W8       & HPFP A                                 3            A             Ref 1&2 Room Pump Room Roof Deck      ERCW Pump Room W9                                                3            A         Note (1) Ref 1&2 EL. 728               A ERCW ERCW Strainer W10A        Strainer                               3        Note (3)          Ref 1&3 Room A Room B ERCW ERCW Strainer W10B        Strainer                               3        Note (3)          Ref 1&3 Room A Room B TABLE 14.8.1 NOTES:
(1)  See Part VII, Deviation and Evaluations for deviation of door gap criteria.
(2)  Door has been permanently closed by DCN D-51255-A as part of the Site Security Plan. Operation of this door is not required as part of the Testing and Inspection Requirements (TIR). Visual inspection requirements still apply.
(3)  Heavy Equipment Door TABLE 14.

==8.1 REFERENCES==
: 1. Drawing Series 47W240 Fire Compartmentation (Reference 4.2.39)
: 2. Calculation WCG11876 Examination and Documentation of Architectural Doors (Reference 4.2.21a) 3    WB-DC-40-59, Personnel Access Doors (Reference 4.2.32)
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PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                Revision 60 TABLE 14.8.2 FIRE DAMPERS (PAGE 1 OF 6)
AUXILIARY BUILDING IDENTIFICATION            ROOMS CONNECTING                   RATING NUMBER          ROOM 1                ROOM 2            (Hours) 1-ISD-31-5441      676.0-A1             692.0-A1A             3 2-ISD-31-5441      676.0-A1             692.0-A1B             3 2-ISD-31-5442      676.0-A1             692.0-A1B             3 1-ISD-31-5443      676.0-A5             692.0-A1A             3 2-ISD-31-3853     676.0-A17             676.0-A12            1.5 2-ISD-31-3852     676.0-A17             676.0-A13            1.5 2-ISD-31-3854     676.0-A17             676.0-A14            1.5 2-ISD-31-3855     676.0-A17             676.0-A15            1.5 1-ISD-31-3778     676.0-A16             676.0-A11            1.5 1-ISD-31-3777     676.0-A16             676.0-A10            1.5 1-ISD-31-3776     676.0-A16              676.0-A9            1.5 1-ISD-31-3775     676.0-A16              676.0-A8            1.5 2-ISD-31-1001     676.0-A17              676.0-A1             3 1-ISD-31-5444A     692.0-A1A             713.0-A1A             3 1-ISD-31-5444B     692.0-A1A             713.0-A1A             3 1-ISD-31-5444C     692.0-A1A             713.0-A1A             3 2-ISD-31-5444A     692.0-A1B             713.0-A1B             3 2-ISD-31-5444B     692.0-A1B             713.0-A1B             3 2-ISD-31-5444C     692.0-A1B             713.0-A1B             3 2-ISD-31-3868     692.0-A1B             692.0-A26             3 2-ISD-31-3866     692.0-A1B             692.0-A26             3 2-ISD-31-3865     692.0-A1B             692.0-A26             3 2-ISD-31-3862     692.0-A1B             692.0-A25             3 2-ISD-31-3958     692.0-A1B             692.0-A26             3 2-ISD-31-3780     692.0-A1B             692.0-A26             3 1-ISD-31-5446     692.0-A1C            713.0-A1C              3 2-ISD-31-5445     692.0-A1C            713.0-A1C              3 2-ISD-31-3987     676.0-A4a             692.0-A31             3 2-ISD-31-3856     692.0-A19             692.0-A24            1.5 1-ISD-31-3967     692.0-A1A              692.0-A6             3 1-ISD-31-3801      692.0-A7             676.0-A16             3 1-ISD-31-3799     692.0-A10              692.0-A8            1.5 1-ISD-31-3798     692.0-A11              692.0-A8            1.5 1-ISD-31-3800      692.0-A9              692.0-A8             3 1-ISD-31-3797     692.0-A12              692.0-A8            1.5 1-ISD-31-3782      692.0-A6             692.0-A1A             3 1-ISD-31-3780      692.0-A6             692.0-A1A            1.5 1-ISD-31-3774     692.0-A13              692.0-A8            1.5 1-ISD-31-3988      692.0-A8              692.0-A7             3 1-ISD-31-3802     692.0-A1A              692.0-A7             3 1-ISD-31-3783     692.0-A1A              692.0-A6             3 1-ISD-31-3779     692.0-A1A              692.0-A6             3 (continued)
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PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                Revision 60 TABLE 14.8.2 FIRE DAMPERS (PAGE 2 OF 6)
AUXILIARY BUILDING IDENTIFICATION            ROOMS CONNECTING                   RATING NUMBER          ROOM 1                ROOM 2            (Hours) 2-ISD-31-3857     692.0-A20             692.0-A24            1.5 2-ISD-31-3858     692.0-A21             692.0-A24            1.5 2-ISD-31-3859     692.0-A22             692.0-A24            1.5 2-ISD-31-3860     692.0-A23             692.0-A24            1.5 2-ISD-31-3861     692.0-A24             692.0-A25             3 2-ISD-31-2930     692.0-A24             692.0-A25             3 2-ISD-31-3929     692.0-A25             713.0-A19             3 2-ISD-31-3927     713.0-A19             713.0-A29             3 2-ISD-31-3871     713.0-A1B             713.0-A19             3 2-ISD-31-5447A     713.0-A1B             737.0-A1B             3 2-ISD-31-5447B     713.0-A1B             737.0-A1B             3 1-ISD-31-3976      713.0-A7              713.0-A6            1.5 1-ISD-31-3925      713.0-A6              692.0-A7             3 1-ISD-31-3923      713.0-A6             713.0-A28             3 1-ISD-31-3817      737.0-A5             713.0-A28             3 1-ISD-31-3816     713.0-A12             713.0-A28             3 1-ISD-31-3815     713.0-A11             713.0-A28             3 1-ISD-31-3805      713.0-A7             713.0-A28             3 1-ISD-31-3804     713.0-A1A              713.0-A6             3 2-ISD-31-3988     713.0-A1B             692.0-A1B             3 1-ISD-31-3995     713.0-A1A             692.0-A1A             3 2-ISD-31-3870     713.0-A20             713.0-A29            1.5 2-ISD-31-3970     713.0-A20             713.0-A29            1.5 2-ISD-31-3873     713.0-A29             713.0-A15            1.5 2-ISD-31-3874     713.0-A29             713.0-A16            1.5 2-ISD-31-3875     713.0-A29              737.0-A9            1.5 2-ISD-31-3876     713.0-A29              737.0-A9            1.5 0-ISD-31-3827      729.0-A6             692.0-A14             3 0-ISD-31-3823      729.0-A6             692.0-A14             3 0-ISD-31-3824      729.0-A6             692.0-A14             3 1-ISD-31-3992      729.0-A8             692.0-A14             3 2-ISD-31-3882     737.0-A12             737.0-A1B             3 2-ISD-31-3881     737.0-A1B              737.0-A9             3 2-ISD-31-3880      737.0-A9             737.0-A1B             3 2-ISD-31-3879      737.0-A9             737.0-A1B             3 2-ISD-31-3877     713.0-A29             737.0-A1B             3 2-ISD-31-3869     737.0-A12             713.0-A1B             3 2-ISD-31-3883     737.0-A12             737.0-A1B             3 2-ISD-31-5452     737.0-A12             737.0-A1B             3 (continued)
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PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                Revision 60 TABLE 14.8.2 FIRE DAMPERS (PAGE 3 OF 6)
AUXILIARY BUILDING IDENTIFICATION            ROOMS CONNECTING                   RATING NUMBER          ROOM 1                ROOM 2            (Hours) 2-ISD-31-3872     713.0-A29              737.0-A8            1.5 1-ISD-31-5150     737.0-A1A            713.0-A1A              3 0-ISD-31-3833      729.0-A6              737.0-A9             3 0-ISD-31-3834     737.0-A1C              737.0-A9             3 0-ISD-31-3843     737.0-A1A              737.0-A5             3 0-ISD-31-3845     737.0-A1C              737.0-A5             3 0-ISD-31-3846*      737.0-A5         FUEL XFR CANAL            3 0-ISD-31-3847*      729.0-A6              737.0-A5            1.5 0-ISD-31-3848*      729.0-A6              737.0-A5            1.5 0-ISD-31-3849      729.0-A6              737.0-A5             3 2-ISD-31-3984      729.0-A6              729.0-A9             3 1-ISD-31-3819     737.0-A1A             713.0-A28            1.5 1-ISD-31-3818      737.0-A5             713.0-A28            1.5 1-ISD-31-3814      737.0-A7             713.0-A28            1.5 1-ISD-31-3813      737.0-A5            737.0-A1A              3 1-ISD-31-3809      737.0-A5            737.0-A1A              3 1-ISD-31-3808      737.0-A5            737.0-A1A              3 1-ISD-31-3807      737.0-A3            737.0-A1A              3 1-ISD-31-3806      737.0-A3            737.0-A1A              3 1-ISD-31-3803      737.0-A3            713.0-A1A              3 1-ISD-31-3996     737.0-A1A            713.0-A1A              3 2-ISD-31-3884     757.0-A17             757.0-A16             3 2-ISD-31-3885     757.0-A13             757.0-A16             3 2-ISD-31-3957     757.0-A17             757.0-A13            1.5 2-ISD-31-3240     757.0-A13              782.0-A3            1.5 2-ISD-31-3239     757.0-A13              782.0-A3             3 2-ISD-31-2990     757.0-A13              763.5-A2             3 0-ISD-31-2713      757.0-A3              757.0-A2             3 0-ISD-31-2715      757.0-A3              757.0-A2             3 0-ISD-31-2720      757.0-A1              757.0-A2             3 0-ISD-31-2721      757.0-A1              757.0-A2            1.5 0-ISD-31-2723      757.0-A1             757.0-A25             3 0-ISD-31-2725      757.0-A1             757.0-A25             3 0-ISD-31-2726      757.0-A1             757.0-A26             3 0-ISD-31-2728      757.0-A1             757.0-A26             3 0-ISD-31-2733      757.0-A4              757.0-A2             3 0-ISD-31-2771      757.0-A1             757.0-A24             3 0-ISD-31-2772      757.0-A1             757.0-A24            1.5 0-ISD-31-2774      757.0-A1             757.0-A27             3 0-ISD-31-2775      757.0-A1             757.0-A27             3 (continued)
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PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                Revision 60 TABLE 14.8.2 FIRE DAMPERS (PAGE 4 OF 6)
AUXILIARY BUILDING IDENTIFICATION            ROOMS CONNECTING                   RATING NUMBER          ROOM 1                ROOM 2            (Hours) 0-ISD-31-2777      757.0-A1             757.0-A28             3 0-ISD-31-2779      757.0-A1             757.0-A28             3 0-ISD-31-2780     757.0-A23             757.0-A24             3 0-ISD-31-2782     757.0-A23             757.0-A24             3 0-ISD-31-2785     757.0-A22             757.0-A24             3 0-ISD-31-3835     757.0-A14              737.0-A9             3 0-ISD-31-3836     757.0-A13             757.0-A14             3 0-ISD-31-3837     757.0-A13              729.0-A4             3 0-ISD-31-3838     757.0-A13              729.0-A3             3 0-ISD-31-3839     757.0-A13             757.0-A12            1.5 0-ISD-31-3840     757.0-A12              737.0-A5             3 0-ISD-31-3841     757.0-A13             757.0-A12            1.5 0-ISD-31-3842     757.0-A12              737.0-A5             3 1-ISD-31-3966      757.0-A9             757.0-A13             3 1-ISD-31-3788     757.0-A10             757.0-A13             3 1-ISD-31-3786      757.0-A9             757.0-A10            1.5 0-ISD-31-4618      757.0-A5              757.0-A4             3 0-ISD-31-4620      757.0-A5              757.0-A2            1.5 0-ISD-31-4621      757.0-A5              757.0-A2            1.5 0-ISD-31-4622     757.0-A22             757.0-A21             3 0-ISD-31-4623     757.0-A24             757.0-A21            1.5 0-ISD-31-4624     757.0-A24             757.0-A21            1.5 0-ISD-31-4625     757.0-A24             757.0-A21            1.5 0-ISD-31-4619      757.0-A5              757.0-A2            1.5 1-ISD-31-2987     757.0-A13              763.5-A1             3 2-ISD-31-2564     772.0-A14             772.0-A13             3 2-ISD-31-2559     772.0-A14             772.0-A15             3 2-ISD-31-2558     772.0-A14             772.0-A13             3 2-ISD-31-2557     772.0-A14             772.0-A15             3 2-ISD-31-2554     772.0-A15             772.0-A16             3 2-ISD-31-2526     772.0-A15             772.0-A16             3 2-ISD-31-2525     772.0-A13             772.0-A15             3 2-ISD-31-2523     772.0-A14             772.0-A15             3 1-ISD-31-3119     757.0-A13              782.0-A1             3 1-ISD-31-3117     757.0-A13              782.0-A1             3 2-ISD-31-2516     772.0-A10             772.0-A16             3 2-ISD-31-2515     772.0-A10             772.0-A16            1.5 2-ISD-31-2500     757.0-A17             772.0-A10             3 1-ISD-31-2526      772.0-A1              772.0-A2             3 1-ISD-31-2500      757.0-A9              772.0-A7             3 (continued)
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PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                   Revision 60 TABLE 14.8.2 FIRE DAMPERS (PAGE 5 OF 6)
AUXILIARY BUILDING IDENTIFICATION            ROOMS CONNECTING                     RATING NUMBER          ROOM 1                  ROOM 2             (Hours) 1-ISD-31-2556      772.0-A3                772.0-A4              3 1-ISD-31-2515      772.0-A1                772.0-A7             1.5 0-ISD-31-5455      772.0-A1                772.0-A8              3 1-ISD-31-2554      772.0-A2                772.0-A1              3 1-ISD-31-2555      772.0-A2                772.0-A3              3 1-ISD-31-2525      772.0-A2                772.0-A4              3 1-ISD-31-2516      772.0-A1                772.0-A7              3 1-ISD-31-2523      772.0-A2                772.0-A3              3 1-ISD-31-2504      772.0-A1                772.0-A7              3 2-ISD-31-2504     772.0-A10               772.0-A16              3 2-ISD-31-2519      786.0-A3               772.0-A15              3 2-ISD-31-2518      786.0-A3               772.0-A15              3 2-ISD-31-2517      786.0-A3               772.0-A15              3 1-ISD-31-2517      786.0-A4                772.0-A2              3 1-ISD-31-2518      786.0-A4                772.0-A2              3 1-ISD-31-2519      786.0-A4                772.0-A2              3 CONTROL BUILDING IDENTIFICATION            ROOMS CONNECTING                      RATING NUMBER         ROOM 1                  ROOM 2              (Hours) 0-ISD-31-5036     708.0-C2                708.0-C3                3 0-ISD-31-3968     708.0-C3                708.0-C1               1.5 0-ISD-31-3969     708.0-C3                708.0-C1                3 0-ISD-31-3957     708.0-C3                708.0-C1                3 0-ISD-31-3956     708.0-C1                708.0-C3               1.5 0-ISD-31-5035     708.0-C2                708.0-C3                3 0-ISD-31-5034     708.0-C2                708.0-C3                3 0-ISD-31-5033     708.0-C2                708.0-C3                3 2-ISD-31-2058     708.0-C3                708.0-C4                3 2-ISD-31-3955     708.0-C3                708.0-C4               1.5 0-ISD-31-3953     729.0-C1          Area 63, Turbine Bldg         3 (continued)
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PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                    Revision 60 TABLE 14.8.2 FIRE DAMPERS (PAGE 6 OF 6)
DIESEL GENERATOR BUILDING IDENTIFICATION                        ROOMS CONNECTING                      RATING NUMBER                     ROOM 1                     ROOM 2           (Hours) 0-ISD-30-619                 742.0-D1                   742.0-D4            3 0-ISD-30-594                 742.0-D2                  742.0-D9A            3 0-ISD-30-631                 760.5-D1                   760.5-D5            3 0-ISD-30-621                 760.5-D2                   760.5-D3            3 0-ISD-30-620                 760.5-D3                  742.0-D9A           1.5 0-ISD-30-617                 760.5-D3                  742.0-D9A            3 0-ISD-30-616                760.5-D12                  742.0-D9B            3 0-ISD-30-1090                 760.5-D9                  742.0-D9N            3 CDWE BUILDING IDENTIFICATION                         ROOMS CONNECTING                      RATING NUMBER                     ROOM 1                      ROOM 2           (Hours) 0-ISD-31-2429           Area 62, CDWE BLDG               729.0-A4            1.5 0-ISD-31-2427           Area 62, CDWE BLDG               729.0-A4            1.5
* See FPR Part VII, Section 6.2.
Table 14.8.2 References - See references 4.2.23, 4.2.24, 4.2.25, and 4.2.41.
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PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN         Revision 60 TABLE 14.10 Fire Safe Shutdown Equipment Page 1 of 9 COMPONENT                            COMPONENT               APPLICABLE UNID NUMBER                          DESCRIPTION                  TIR 0-BKD-31-590  480v SHUTDOWN BD RM 2A EXHAUST BACKDRAFT         14.10.j.c DAMPER 0-BKD-31-591  480v SHUTDOWN BD RM 2A EXHAUST BACKDRAFT         14.10.j.c DAMPER 0-BKD-31-592  480v SHUTDOWN BD RM 1B EXHAUST BACKDRAFT         14.10.j.c DAMPER 0-BKD-31-593  480v SHUTDOWN BD RM 1B EXHAUST BACKDRAFT         14.10.j.c DAMPER 0-XS-31-12-A TRANSFER CONTROL DURING APP R FIRE               14.10.m 0-XS-31-11-B TRANSFER CONTROL DURING APP R FIRE               14.10.m 0-FI-67-226 ERCW FLOW TO CCS HX-C INDICATOR                  14.10.d 0-FCV-70-194  SFPCS HX SUPPLY HEADER FCV                       14.10.w 0-FCV-70-197  SFPCS HX SUPPLY HEADER FCV                       14.10.w 0-TANK-77-2701 LIQUID NITROGEN STORAGE TANK                     14.10.o 0-XS-78-12  SFPCS Pump A-A EMEREGENCY STOP SWITCH            14.10.m 0-XS-78-9  SFPCS Pump B-B EMEREGENCY STOP SWITCH            14.10.m 0-XS-78-35-S SFPCS Pump C-S EMEREGENCY STOP SWITCH            14.10.m 0-BD-200-A  6.9kV COMMON BD A                                14.10.z 0-BD-206-1  480V AUXILIARY BUILIDNG COMMON BOARD             14.10.z 0-OXF-206-A  AB COM BD XFMR A                                 14.10.z 0-BAT-239-1  250V BATTERY 1                                   14.10.a 0-BAT-239-2  250V BATTERY 2                                   14.10.a 0-BD-239-1  250V BATTERY BD1                                 14.10.b 0-BD-239-2  250V BATTERY BD2                                 14.10.b 0-CHGR-239-1  250V DC BATTERY CHARGER 1                        14.10.b 0-CHGR-239-2  250V DC BATTERY CHARGER 2                        14.10.b 0-DPL-239-1  250VDC TURBINE BLDG DISTRIBUTION BOARD 1         14.10.b 0-DPL-239-2  250VDC TURBINE BLDG DISTRIBUTION BOARD 2         14.10.b 1-FCV-1-36  MAIN FW PUMP TURBINE HP STOP VALVE               14.10.c 1-FCV-1-37  MAIN FW PUMP TURBINE HP CONTROL VALVE            14.10.c 1-FCV-1-43  MAIN FW PUMP TURBINE HP STOP VALVE               14.10.c 1-FCV-1-44  MAIN FW PUMP TURBINE HP CONTROL VALVE            14.10.c 1-FCV-1-61  MAIN TURBINE HP STOP VALVE - LINE 1              14.10.c 1-FCV-1-62  MAIN TURBINE HP CONTROL VALVE - LINE 1           14.10.c 1-FCV-1-64  MAIN TURBINE HP STOP VALVE - LINE 2              14.10.c 1-FCV-1-65  MAIN TURBINE HP CONTROL VALVE - LINE 2           14.10.c 1-FCV-1-67  MAIN TURBINE HP STOP VALVE - LINE 3              14.10.c 1-FCV-1-68  MAIN TURBINE HP CONTROL VALVE - LINE 3           14.10.c 1-FCV-1-70  MAIN TURBINE HP STOP VALVE - LINE 4              14.10.c 1-FCV-1-71  MAIN TURBINE HP CONTROL VALVE - LINE 4           14.10.c TABLE 14.10 Fire Safe Shutdown Equipment Page 2 of 9 II-157

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                           Revision 60 COMPONENT                                      COMPONENT UNID NUMBER                                   DESCRIPTION                                 APPLICABLE TIR 1-FCV-1-75        MOISTURE SEPARATOR REHEATER A2 CONTROL VALVE                              14.10.c 1-FCV-1-77        MOISTURE SEPARATOR REHEATER B2 CONTROL VALVE                              14.10.c 1-FCV-1-79        MOISTURE SEPARATOR REHEATER C2 CONTROL VALVE                              14.10.c 1-FCV-1-84        MOISTURE SEPARATOR REHEATER A1 CONTROL VALVE                              14.10.c 1-FCV-1-91        MOISTURE SEPARATOR REHEATER B1 CONTROL VALVE                              14.10.c 1-FCV-1-98        MOISTURE SEPARATOR REHEATER C1 CONTROL VALVE                              14.10.c 1-FCV-1-103        MAIN STEAM DUMPVALVE                                                      14.10.c 1-FCV-1-104        MAIN STEAM DUMP VALVE                                                     14.10.c 1-FCV-1-105        MAIN STEAM DUMP VALVE                                                     14.10.c 1-FCV-1-106        MAIN STEAM DUMP VALVE                                                     14.10.c 1-FCV-1-107        MAIN STEAM DUMPVALVE                                                      14.10.c 1-FCV-1-108        MAIN STEAM DUMP VALVE                                                     14.10.c 1-FCV-1-109        MAIN STEAM DUMP VALVE                                                     14.10.c 1-FCV-1-110        MAIN STEAM DUMP VALVE                                                     14.10.c 1-FCV-1-111        MAIN STEAM DUMP VALVE                                                     14.10.c 1-FCV-1-112        MAIN STEAM DUMP VALVE                                                     14.10.c 1-FCV-1-113        MAIN STEAM DUMP VALVE                                                     14.10.c 1-FCV-1-114        MAIN STEAM DUMP VALVE                                                     14.10.c 1-FCV-1-275        MSR A2 LOW POWER BYPASS CONTROL VALVE                                     14.10.c 1-FCV-1-277        MSR B2 LOW POWER BYPASS CONTROL VALVE                                     14.10.c 1-FCV-1-279        MSR C2 LOW POWER BYPASS CONTROL VALVE                                     14.10.c 1-FCV-1-284        MSR A1 LOW POWER BYPASS CONTROL VALVE                                     14.10.c 1-FCV-1-291        MSR B1 LOW POWER BYPASS CONTROL VALVE                                     14.10.c 1-FCV-1-298        MSR C1 LOW POWER BYPASS CONTROL VALVE                                     14.10.c 1-PCV-1-5         N2 OPERATING STATION FOR SG #1 PORV                                       14.10.j 1-PCV-1-12        N2 OPERATING STATION FOR SG #2 PORV                                       14.10.j 1-PCV-1-23        N2 OPERATING STATION FOR SG #3 PORV                                       14.10.j 1-PCV-1-30        N2 OPERATING STATION FOR SG #4 PORV                                       14.10.j 1-TANK-1-0405A       N2 TANK #1 SUPPLY TO 1-PCV-1-12-B                                       14.10.j.a (1) 1-TANK-1-0405B       N2 TANK #2 SUPPLY TO 1-PCV-1-12-B                                       14.10.j.a (1) 1-TANK-1-0406A       N2 TANK #1 SUPPLY TO 1-PCV-1-30-B                                       14.10.j.a (1) 1-TANK-1-0406B       N2 TANK #2 SUPPLY TO 1-PCV-1-30-B                                       14.10.j.a (1) 1-TANK-1-0407A       N2 TANK #1 SUPPLY TO 1-PCV-1-23-A                                       14.10.j.a (1) 1-TANK-1-0407B       N2 TANK #2 SUPPLY TO 1-PCV-1-23-A                                       14.10.j.a (1) 1-TANK-1-0408A       N2 TANK #1 SUPPLY TO 1-PCV-1-5-A                                        14.10.j.a (1) 1-TANK-1-0408B       N2 TANK #2 SUPPLY TO 1-PCV-1-5-A                                        14.10.j.a (1) 1-FCV-3-116A-A       ERCW HDR A ISOLATION VALVE                                                14.10.n 1-FCV-3-116B-A       ERCW HDR A ISOLATION VALVE                                                14.10.n 1-FCV-3-126A-B       ERCW HDR B ISOLATION VALVE                                                14.10.n 1-FCV-3-126B-B       ERCW HDR B ISOLATION VALVE                                                14.10.n Note 1: Both tanks of each pair is required at or above listed pressure (Reference 4.2.11).
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PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN             Revision 60 TABLE 14.10 Fire Safe Shutdown Equipment Page 3 of 9 COMPONENT                             COMPONENT APPLICABLE UNID NUMBER                            DESCRIPTION TIR 1-HS-3-945-A    FIRE SAFE SHUTDOWN ISOL FCV-3-236, 245, 239, 242    14.10.u 1-ISV-3-827    SG 2 MDAFWP LCV ISOLATION VALVE                     14.10.y 1-ISV-3-828    SG 1 MDAFWP LCV ISOLATION VALVE                     14.10.y 1-PI-3-117    LOCAL MDAFWP A SUCTION PRES INDICATOR               14.10.d 1-PI-3-127    LOCAL MDAFWP B SUCTION PRES INDICATOR               14.10.d 1-PI-3-137    LOCAL TDAFW PUMP SUCTION PRES INDICATOR             14.10.d 1-HS-30-1080    CONTROL ROOM ISOLATION DAMPER                       14.10.u 1-MTR-30-80-B    CONTROL ROD DRIVE MOTOR COOLER 1D-B                 14.10.g 1-MTR-30-83-A    CONTROL ROD DRIVE MOTOR COOLER 1A-A                 14.10.g 1-MTR-30-88-A    CONTROL ROD DRIVE MOTOR COOLER 1C-A                 14.10.g 1-MTR-30-92-B    CONTROL ROD DRIVE MOTOR COOLER 1B-B                 14.10.g 1-PDI-30-30C    CONTAINMENT PRESSURE                                14.10.d 1-PDI-30-42-K    U1 CONTAINMENT PRESSURE INDICATOR                   14.10.d 1-PDI-30-43-J   U1 CONTAINMENT PRESSURE INDICATOR                   14.10.d 1-PDI-30-44-K    U1 CONTAINMENT PRESSURE INDICATOR                   14.10.d 1-PDI-30-45-J   U1 CONTAINMENT PRESSURE INDICATOR                   14.10.d CONTROL ROD DRIVE CLING 1D-B RM DIVERSION 1-TCO-30-82-B                                                        14.10.g DAMPER CONTROL ROD DRIVE CLING 1A-A ROOM DIVERSION 1-TCO-30-85-A                                                        14.10.g DAMPER CONTROL ROD DRIVE CLING 1C-A ROOM DIVERSION 1-TCO-30-90-A                                                        14.10.g DAMPER CONTROL ROD DRIVE CLING 1B-B ROOM DIVERSION 1-TCO-30-94-B                                                        14.10.g DAMPER 1-XS-30-38A     CNTMT AIR RETURN FAN 1A-A (ISOL)                   14.10.aa 1-XS-30-39A     CNTMT AIR RETURN FAN 1B-B (ISOL)                   14.10.aa 1-FCV-32-110-A    RB TRAIN A NON-ESSENTAIL CONTROL AIR ISLN VLV       14.10.q 1-XI-32-112A1/A &/B LIGHT INDICATION FOR 1-XSV-32-112A1                 14.10.q 1-XI-32-112A2/A &/B LIGHT INDICATION FOR 1-XSV-32-112A2                 14.10.q 1-XI-32-112B1/A &/B LIGHT INDICATION FOR 1-XSV-32-112B1                 14.10.q 1-XI-32-112B2/A &/B LIGHT INDICATION FOR 1-XSV-32-112B2                 14.10.q 1-XSV-32-112A1    CNTMT NON-ESSENTIAL HDR DUMP SOLENOID               14.10.q 1-XSV-32-112A2    CNTMT NON-ESSENTIAL HDR DUMP SOLENOID               14.10.q 1-XSV-32-112B1    CNTMT NON-ESSENTIAL HDR DUMP SOLENOID               14.10.q 1-XSV-32-112B2    CNTMT NON-ESSENTIAL HDR DUMP SOLENOID               14.10.q 1-XS-32-112    TRANSFER TRAIN A OR TRAIN B POWER                  14.10.q 1-FI-62-1A    RCP-1 SEAL INJECTION FLOW INDICATOR                14.10.d 1-FI-62-14A    RCP-2 SEAL INJECTION FLOW INDICATOR                14.10.d 1-FI-62-27A    RCP-3 SEAL INJECTION FLOW INDICATOR                14.10.d 1-FI-62-40A    RCP-4 SEAL INJECTION FLOW INDICATOR                14.10.d II-159

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN         Revision 60 TABLE 14.10 Fire Safe Shutdown Equipment Page 4 of 9 COMPONENT                          COMPONENT APPLICABLE UNID NUMBER                         DESCRIPTION TIR 1-HS-62-69B  LOCAL LETDOWN ISOLATION                         14.10.v 1-FI-62-93A  NORMAL CHARGING FLOW INDICATOR                  14.10.d 1-LI-62-129A VCT LEVEL INDICATOR                             14.10.d 1-ISV-62-526  CCP 1A-A SEAL INJECTION BYPASS                   14.10.y 1-ISV-62-527  CCP 1A-A DISCHARGE VALVE                         14.10.y 1-ISV-62-533  CCP 1B-B DISCHARGE VALVE                         14.10.y 1-ISV-62-534  CCP 1B-B SEAL INJECTION BYPASS                   14.10.y 1-ISV-62-535  1-FCV-62-93 ISOLATION VALVE                      14.10.y 1-ISV-62-537  FCV-62-89 UPSTREAM ISOL                          14.10.y 1-ISV-62-539  FCV-62-89 DOWNSTREAM ISOL                        14.10.y 1-ISV-62-549  SEAL WATER INJECTION FILTER OUTLET               14.10.y 1-ISV-62-550  SEAL WATER INJECTION FILTER OUTLET               14.10.y 1-TI-62-4  RCP NO. 1 SEAL OUT                              14.10.d 1-TI-62-17  RCP NO. 2 SEAL OUT                              14.10.d 1-TI-62-30  RCP NO. 3 SEAL OUT                              14.10.d 1-TI-62-43  RCP NO. 4 SEAL OUT                              14.10.d 1-FCV-63-39-A  SIS BORON INJECTION TANK SHUTOFF VALVE           14.10.s 1-FCV-63-40-B  SIS BORON INJECTION TANK SHUTOFF VALVE           14.10.s 1-FI-67-61  ERCW SUPPLY HEADER 1A FLOW INDICATOR            14.10.d 1-FI-67-62  ERCW SUPPLY HEADER 1B FLOW INDICATOR            14.10.d 1-TCV-67-84-A  LOWER CNTMT VENT CLR A SUPPLY CONTROL VLV       14.10.i/u CONTROL ROD DRIVE VENT CLR A SUPPLY CONTROL     14.10.i/u 1-TCV-67-85-A VLV 1-TCV-67-92-A  LOWER CNTMT VENT CLR C SUPPLY CONTROL VLV       14.10.i/u CONTROL ROD DRIVE VENT CLR C SUPPLY CONTROL     14.10.i/u 1-TCV-67-93-A VLV 1-TCV-67-100-B LOWER CNTMT VENT CLR B SUPPLY CONTROL VLV       14.10.i/u CONTROL ROD DRIVE VENT CLR B SUPPLY CONTROL     14.10.i/u 1-TCV-67-101-B VLV 1-TCV-67-108-B LOWER CNTMT VENT CLR D SUPPLY CONTROL VLV       14.10.i/u CONTROL ROD DRIVE VENT CLR D SUPPLY CONTROL     14.10.i/u 1-TCV-67-109-B VLV II-160

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                         Revision 60 TABLE 14.10 Fire Safe Shutdown Equipment Page 5 of 9 COMPONENT                                    COMPONENT                             APPLICABLE UNID NUMBER                                   DESCRIPTION                                 TIR 1-PI-68-63          RCS LOOP 1 PRESSURE (RHR INLET)                                 14.10.d 1-PI-68-64          RCS LOOP 3 PRESSURE (RHR INLET)                                 14.10.d 1-HS-70-81BA-B          TBBP FLOW DIFF SIGNAL DEFEAT B                                  14.10.p 1-HS-70-81EA-A          TBBP FLOW DIFF SIGNAL DEFEAT E                                  14.10.p 1-ISV-70-574         CCS SUPPLY TO NON-REGEN LETDOWN HX ISOL                         14.10.y 1-ISV-70-587         CCS OUT/SEAL/ WTR & NON-REGEN LETDOWN HX ISOL                   14.10.y 1-ISV-70-705         EXCESS LETDOWN HX CCS RETURN ISOLATION VALVE                    14.10.y 1-MTR-70-38-B          CCS PUMP 1B-B                                                  14.10.x(2) 1-MTR-70-130-B          THERMAL BARRIER BOOSTER PUMP 1B-B                               14.10.e 1-MTR-70-131-A          THERMAL BARRIER BOOSTER PUMP 1A-A                               14.10.e 1-TI-70-154         RHR HX-B OUTLET TEMP (CCS)                                      14.10.d 1-TI-70-157         RHR HX-A OUTLET TEMP (CCS)                                      14.10.d 1-TI-70-161         ERCW/CCS HX-A OUTLET TEMP (CCS)                                 14.10.d 0-TI-70-162         ERCW/CCS HX-C OUTLET TEMP (CCS)                                 14.10.d 1-TI-74-15         RHR HX-A OUTLET TEMPERATURE                                     14.10.d 1-TI-74-27         RHR HX-B OUTLET TEMPERATURE                                     14.10.d 1-TR-74-14P002         RHR HX-A TEMPERATURE RECORDER                                   14.10.d 1-TR-74-25P002         RHR HX-B TEMPERATURE RECORDER                                   14.10.d 1-FSV-77-2561         ISOLATION VALVE FOR LIQUID NITROGEN                             14.10.r 1-FSV-77-2562         ISOLATION VALVE FOR LIQUID NITROGEN                             14.10.r 1-DPL-264-1          120V TSC Distribution Panel 1                                   14.10.z 2-DPL-264-1          120V TSC Distribution Panel 2                                   14.10.z 2-FCV-1-36          MAIN FW PUMP TURBINE HP STOP VALVE                              14.10.c 2-FCV-1-37          MAIN FW PUMP TURBINE HP CONTROL VALVE                           14.10.c 2-FCV-1-43          MAIN FW PUMP TURBINE HP STOP VALVE                              14.10.c 2-FCV-1-44          MAIN FW PUMP TURBINE HP CONTROL VALVE                           14.10.c 2-FCV-1-61          MAIN TURBINE HP STOP VALVE - LINE 1                             14.10.c 2-FCV-1-62          MAIN TURBINE HP CONTROL VALVE - LINE 1                          14.10.c 2-FCV-1-64          MAIN TURBINE HP STOP VALVE - LINE 2                             14.10.c 2-FCV-1-65          MAIN TURBINE HP CONTROL VALVE - LINE 2                          14.10.c 2-FCV-1-67          MAIN TURBINE HP STOP VALVE - LINE 3                             14.10.c 2-FCV-1-68          MAIN TURBINE HP CONTROL VALVE - LINE 3                          14.10.c 2-FCV-1-70          MAIN TURBINE HP STOP VALVE - LINE 4                             14.10.c 2-FCV-1-71          MAIN TURBINE HP CONTROL VALVE - LINE 4                          14.10.c 2-FCV-1-75          MOISTURE SEPARATOR REHEATER A2 CONTROL VALVE                    14.10.c 2-FCV-1-77          MOISTURE SEPARATOR REHEATER B2 CONTROL VALVE                    14.10.c Note 2: Not Applicable when in Mode 3 and aligned to the B Train CCS Header IAW TS 3.7.16, within the 8 hour period prior to entering Mode 4 from Mode 3 II-161

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                          Revision 60 TABLE 14.10 Fire Safe Shutdown Equipment Page 6 of 9 COMPONENT                                       COMPONENT APPLICABLE UNID NUMBER                                     DESCRIPTION TIR 2-FCV-1-79         MOISTURE SEPARATOR REHEATER C2 CONTROL VALVE                           14.10.c 2-FCV-1-84         MOISTURE SEPARATOR REHEATER A1 CONTROL VALVE                           14.10.c 2-FCV-1-91         MOISTURE SEPARATOR REHEATER B1 CONTROL VALVE                           14.10.c 2-FCV-1-98         MOISTURE SEPARATOR REHEATER C1 CONTROL VALVE                           14.10.c 2-FCV-1-103         MAIN STEAM DUMP VALVE                                                  14.10.c 2-FCV-1-104         MAIN STEAM DUMP VALVE                                                  14.10.c 2-FCV-1-105         MAIN STEAM DUMP VALVE                                                  14.10.c 2-FCV-1-106         MAIN STEAM DUMP VALVE                                                  14.10.c 2-FCV-1-107         MAIN STEAM DUMP VALVE                                                  14.10.c 2-FCV-1-108         MAIN STEAM DUMP VALVE                                                  14.10.c 2-FCV-1-109         MAIN STEAM DUMP VALVE                                                  14.10.c 2-FCV-1-110         MAIN STEAM DUMP VALVE                                                  14.10.c 2-FCV-1-111         MAIN STEAM DUMP VALVE                                                  14.10.c 2-FCV-1-112         MAIN STEAM DUMP VALVE                                                  14.10.c 2-FCV-1-113         MAIN STEAM DUMP VALVE                                                  14.10.c 2-FCV-1-114         MAIN STEAM DUMP VALVE                                                  14.10.c 2-FCV-1-275         MSR A2 LOW POWER BYPASS CONTROL VALVE                                  14.10.c 2-FCV-1-277         MSR B2 LOW POWER BYPASS CONTROL VALVE                                  14.10.c 2-FCV-1-279         MSR C2 LOW POWER BYPASS CONTROL VALVE                                  14.10.c 2-FCV-1-284         MSR A1 LOW POWER BYPASS CONTROL VALVE                                  14.10.c 2-FCV-1-291         MSR B1 LOW POWER BYPASS CONTROL VALVE                                  14.10.c 2-FCV-1-298         MSR C1 LOW POWER BYPASS CONTROL VALVE                                  14.10.c 2-PCV-1-5          N2 OPERATING STATION FOR SG #1 PORV                                    14.10.j 2-PCV-1-12         N2 OPERATING STATION FOR SG #2 PORV                                    14.10.j 2-PCV-1-23         N2 OPERATING STATION FOR SG #3 PORV                                    14.10.j 2-PCV-1-30         N2 OPERATING STATION FOR SG #4 PORV                                    14.10.j 2-TANK-1-0405A        N2 TANK #1 SUPPLY TO 2-PCV-1-12-B                                    14.10.j.a (3) 2-TANK-1-0405B        N2 TANK #2 SUPPLY TO 2-PCV-1-12-B                                    14.10.j.a (3) 2-TANK-1-0406A        N2 TANK #1 SUPPLY TO 2-PCV-1-30-B                                    14.10.j.a (3) 2-TANK-1-0406B        N2 TANK #2 SUPPLY TO 2-PCV-1-30-B                                    14.10.j.a (3) 2-TANK-1-0407A        N2 TANK #1 SUPPLY TO 2-PCV-1-23-A                                    14.10.j.a (3) 2-TANK-1-0407B        N2 TANK #2 SUPPLY TO 2-PCV-1-23-A                                    14.10.j.a (3) 2-TANK-1-0408A        N2 TANK #1 SUPPLY TO 2-PCV-1-5-A                                     14.10.j.a (3) 2-TANK-1-0408B        N2 TANK #2 SUPPLY TO 2-PCV-1-5-A                                     14.10.j.a (3)
Note 3: Both tanks of each pair is required at or above listed pressure (Reference 4.2.11).
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PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN               Revision 60 TABLE 14.10 Fire Safe Shutdown Equipment Page 7 of 9 COMPONENT                               COMPONENT APPLICABLE UNID NUMBER                              DESCRIPTION TIR 2-FCV-3-116A-A  ERCW HDR A ISOLATION VALVE                                  14.10.n 2-FCV-3-116B-A  ERCW HDR A ISOLATION VALVE                                  14.10.n 2-FCV-3-126A-B  ERCW HDR B ISOLATION VALVE                                  14.10.n 2-FCV-3-126B-B  ERCW HDR B ISOLATION VALVE                                  14.10.n FIRE SAFE SHUTDOWN ISOL FCV-3-35, 35A, 48, 48A, 90, 90A, 2-HS-3-945-A                                                              14.10.u 103, 103A, 236, 239, 242, 245, 185, 186, 187, 188 2-ISV-3-827  SG 2 MDAFWP LCV ISOLATION VALVE                             14.10.y 2-ISV-3-828  SG 1 MDAFWP LCV ISOLATION VALVE                             14.10.y 2-PI-3-117  LOCAL MDAFWP A SUCTION PRES INDICATOR                       14.10.d 2-PI-3-127  LOCAL MDAFWP B SUCTION PRES INDICATOR                       14.10.d 2-PI-3-137  LOCAL TDAFW PUMP SUCTION PRES INDICATOR                     14.10.d 2-MTR-30-80-B  CONTROL ROD DRIVE MOTOR COOLER 2D-B                         14.10.g 2-MTR-30-83-A  CONTROL ROD DRIVE MOTOR COOLER 2A-A                         14.10.g 2-MTR-30-88-A  CONTROL ROD DRIVE MOTOR COOLER 2C-A                         14.10.g 2-MTR-30-92-B  CONTROL ROD DRIVE MOTOR COOLER 2B-B                         14.10.g 2-PDI-30-30C  CONTAINMENT PRESSURE                                        14.10.d 2-PDI-30-42-K U2 CONTAINMENT PRESSURE INDICATOR                           14.10.d 2-PDI-30-43-J U2 CONTAINMENT PRESSURE INDICATOR                           14.10.d 2-PDI-30-44-K U2 CONTAINMENT PRESSURE INDICATOR                           14.10.d 2-PDI-30-45-J U2 CONTAINMENT PRESSURE INDICATOR                           14.10.d CONTROL ROD DRIVE CLING 2D-B ROOM DIVERSION 2-TCO-30-82-B                                                              14.10.g DAMPER 2-TCO-30-85-A  CRD COOLING UNIT 2A-A ROOM DIVERSION DAMPER                 14.10.g CONTROL ROD DRIVE CLING 2C-A ROOM DIVERSION                 14.10.g 2-TCO-30-90-A DAMPER 2-TCO-30-94-B  CONTROL ROD DRIVE CLING 2B-B DIVERSION DAMPER               14.10.g 2-XS-30-38A  CNTMT AIR RETURN FAN 1A-A (ISOL)                           14.10.aa 2-XS-30-39A  CNTMT AIR RETURN FAN 1B-B (ISOL)                           14.10.aa 2-XS-30-1080A-A CNTMT PURGE ISOL VLV 2-FCV-30-10A; A; A; A;    14.10.m A; A; A; A 2-XS-30-1080B-A CNTMT PURGE ISOL VLV 2-FCV-30-17A; AND A               14.10.m 2-XS-30-1085A-B CNTMT PURGE ISOL VLV 2-FCV-30-8-B; B; B; B;     14.10.m B; B; B; AND B 2-XS-30-1085B-B CNTMT PURGE ISOL VLV 2-FCV-30-16-B; AND B              14.10.m 2-FCV-32-111-B RB TRAIN B NON-ESSENTIAL CONTROL AIR ISLN VLV               14.10.q LIGHT INDICATION FOR CNTMT NON-ESSENTIAL HDR 2-XI-32-112A                                                              14.10.q DUMP SOLENOIDS 2-XSV-32-112A1  UNIT 2 APPENDIX R RX NON-ESSENTIAL AIR VENT VALVE           14.10.q 2-XSV-32-112A2  UNIT 2 APPENDIX R RX NON-ESSENTIAL AIR VENT VALVE           14.10.q 2-XSV-32-112B1  UNIT 2 APPENDIX R RX NON-ESSENTIAL AIR VENT VALVE           14.10.q 2-XSV-32-112B2  UNIT 2 APPENDIX R RX NON-ESSENTIAL AIR VENT VALVE           14.10.q II-163

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                      Revision 60 TABLE 14.10 Fire Safe Shutdown Equipment Page 8 of 9 COMPONENT                                     COMPONENT UNID NUMBER                                    DESCRIPTION                      APPLICABLE TIR 2-FI-62-1A        RCP-1 SEAL INJECTION FLOW INDICATOR                          14.10.d 2-FI-62-14A       RCP-2 SEAL INJECTION FLOW INDICATOR                          14.10.d 2-FI-62-27A       RCP-3 SEAL INJECTION FLOW INDICATOR                          14.10.d 2-FI-62-40A       RCP-4 SEAL INJECTION FLOW INDICATOR                          14.10.d 2-HS-62-69B        LOCAL LETDOWN ISOLATION                                      14.10.v 2-FI-62-93A       NORMAL CHARGING FLOW INDICATOR                               14.10.d 2-LI-62-129A       VCT LEVEL INDICATOR                                          14.10.d 2-ISV-62-526       CCP 1A-A SEAL INJECTION BYPASS                                14.10.y 2-ISV-62-527       CCP 1A-A DISCHARGE VALVE                                      14.10.y 2-ISV-62-535       2-FCV-62-93 ISOLATION VALVE                                   14.10.y 2-ISV-62-537       FCV-62-89 UPSTREAM ISOL                                       14.10.y 2-ISV-62-549       SEAL WATER INJECTION FILTER OUTLET                            14.10.y 2-ISV-62-550       SEAL WATER INJECTION FILTER OUTLET                            14.10.y 2-TANK-62-89A/1       N2 Tank A/1 Supply to 2-FCV-62-89                           14.10.t(4) 2-TANK-62-89B/2       N2 Tank B/2 Supply to 2-FCV-62-89                           14.10.t(4) 2-TANK-62-89A/3       N2 Tank A/3 Supply to 2-FCV-62-89                           14.10.t(4) 2-TANK-62-89B/4       N2 Tank B/4 Supply to 2-FCV-62-89                           14.10.t(4) 2-TANK-62-89A/5       N2 Tank A/5 Supply to 2-FCV-62-89                           14.10.t(4) 2-TANK-62-89B/6       N2 Tank B/6 Supply to 2-FCV-62-89                           14.10.t(4) 2-TI-62-4       RCP NO. 1 SEAL OUT                                           14.10.d 2-TI-62-17       RCP NO. 2 SEAL OUT                                           14.10.d 2-TI-62-30       RCP NO. 3 SEAL OUT                                           14.10.d 2-TI-62-43       RCP NO. 4 SEAL OUT                                           14.10.d 2-FCV-63-39-A        SIS BORON INJ TANK INLET SHUTOFF VALVE                        14.10.s 2-FCV-63-40-B        SIS BORON INJ TANK INLET SHUTOFF VALVE                        14.10.s 2-FI-67-61       ERCW SUPPLY HEADER 2A FLOW INDICATOR                         14.10.d 2-FI-67-62       ERCW SUPPLY HEADER 2B FLOW INDICATOR                         14.10.d 2-FI-67-222       ERCW SUPPLY HEADER 2A FLOW INDICATOR                         14.10.d 2-TCV-67-84-A        LOWER CNTMT VENT CLR A SUPPLY VLV                            14.10.i/u 2-TCV-67-85-A        CONTROL ROD DRIVE VENT CLR A SUPPLY VLV                      14.10.i/u 2-TCV-67-92-A        LOWER CNTMT VENT CLR C SUPPLY VLV                            14.10.i/u 2-TCV-67-93-A        CONTROL ROD DRIVE VENT CLR C SUPPLY VLV                      14.10.i/u 2-TCV-67-100-B       LOWER CNTMT VENT CLR B SUPPLY VLV                            14.10.i/u 2-TCV-67-101-B       CONTROL ROD DRIVE VENT CLR B SUPPLY VLV                      14.10.i/u 2-TCV-67-108-B       LOWER CNTMT VENT CLR D SUPPLY VLV                            14.10.i/u 2-TCV-67-109-B       CONTROL ROD DRIVE VENT COOLER D SUPPLY VLV                   14.10.i/u 2-PI-68-63       RCS LOOP 1 PRESSURE (RHR) INLET                              14.10.d 2-HS-70-81BA-B        TBBP FLOW DIFF SIGNAL DEFEAT B                               14.10.p 2-HS-70-81EA-A        TBBP FLOW DIFF SIGNAL DEFEAT E                               14.10.p 2-ISV-70-545A       RHR HX 2A-A INLET VALVE                                       14.10.y Note 4: Each tank is required at or above the listed pressure (Reference 4.2.15).
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PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN                          Revision 60 TABLE 14.10 Fire Safe Shutdown Equipment Page 9 of 9 COMPONENT                                     COMPONENT UNID NUMBER                                    DESCRIPTION                             APPLICABLE TIR 2-ISV-70-574         CCS SUPPLY TO NON-REGEN LETDOWN HX ISOL                               14.10.y 2-MTR-70-33-B          CCS PUMP 2B-B                                                       14.10.x (5) 2-MTR-70-130-B         THERMAL BARRIER BOOSTER PUMP 2B-B                                     14.10.e 2-MTR-70-131-A         THERMAL BARRIER BOOSTER PUMP 2A-A                                     14.10.e 2-TI-70-154         RHR HX-B OUTLET TEMP (CCS)                                            14.10.d 2-TI-70-157         RHR HX-A OUTLET TEMP (CCS)                                            14.10.d 2-TI-70-161         ERCW/CCS HX-B OUTLET TEMP (CCS)                                       14.10.d 2-TI-74-15         RHR HX-A OUTLET TEMPERATURE                                           14.10.d 2-TI-74-27         RHR HX-B OUTLET TEMPERATURE                                           14.10.d 2-TR-74-14P002         RHR HX-A TEMPERATURE RECORDER                                         14.10.d 2-TR-74-25P002         RHR HX-B TEMPERATURE RECORDER                                         14.10.d 2-FSV-77-2561         ISOLATION VALVE FOR LIQUID NITROGEN                                   14.10.r 2-FSV-77-2562         ISOLATION VALVE FOR LIQUID NITROGEN                                   14.10.r Note 5: Not Applicable when in Mode 3 and aligned to the B Train CCS Header IAW TS 3.7.16, within the 8 hour period prior to entering Mode 4 from Mode 3 II-165

PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES                                Revision 58

==1.0              INTRODUCTION==

Part III describes the methodology used to identify, select, and analyze the systems, components, and cables needed to demonstrate compliance with Appendix R to 10 CFR 50, and the applicable Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) generic letters. The safe shutdown analysis methodology as applied at Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) is also described.
Paragraph 50.48 of 10 CFR 50 became effective on February 17, 1981 and requires all nuclear plants licensed to operate prior to January 1, 1979 to comply with the requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix R Sections III.G, III.J, and III.O regardless of any previous approvals by the NRC of other design features. Section III.G.1 requires that fire protection features be provided for those systems, structures, and components important to safe shutdown. These features shall be capable of limiting fire damage so that:
(1)       One train of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions from either the control room or the emergency control station(s) is free of fire damage; and (2)       Systems necessary to achieve and maintain cold shutdown from either the control room or the emergency control station(s) can be repaired within 72 hours.
Where alternative shutdown capability is required (i.e., for control building fires that require shutdown from outside of the Main Control Room), cold shutdown must be achieved within 72 hours. Alternate shutdown capability is evaluated per Appendix R Sections III.G.3 and III.L.
Plant locations that do not require alternative shutdown capability are evaluated per Section III.G.2 of Appendix R. Generic Letter 81-12 (February 20, 1981) Enclosure 1 "Staff Position", (Part II, Reference 4.1.12) provides additional guidance on the NRC's requirements for safe shutdown capability.
1.1              Design Basis Evaluation The purpose of this evaluation is to demonstrate fire safe shutdown capability for postulated fires involving in situ and/or transient combustibles that could impact systems, structures, or components located in or adjacent to that area. For purposes of this evaluation, it is assumed that these fires may adversely affect those systems, structures or components essential to safe shutdown. The availability of offsite power for specific systems and/or fire scenarios has been evaluated for non-alternative shutdown locations. Cases for only on-site power available and for off-site power available are evaluated for control building fires, for which alternative shutdown is provided. No concurrent or sequential design basis accidents or transients are assumed to occur. Failures that are a consequence of the fire are evaluated.
1.2              Limiting Safety Consequences The limiting safety consequences used in the evaluation of fire safe shutdown are: (1) no fuel failure due to calculated cladding temperature increases; (2) no rupture of any primary coolant boundary; (3) no rupture of the containment boundary; (4) following the event, the reactor coolant system process variables shall be within those predicted for a loss of normal AC power; and (5) shutdown capability shall be able to achieve and maintain subcritical conditions in the reactor, maintain reactor coolant inventory, achieve and maintain hot standby conditions for an extended period of time, achieve cold shutdown conditions within 72 hours with equipment powered by onsite power sources if using alternative shutdown methods, and maintain cold shutdown conditions thereafter.
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PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES                          Revision 58 Generic Letter 81-12, Enclosure 1, (Part II, Reference 4.1.12) specifies the performance goals and associated safe shutdown functions necessary to ensure the limiting safety consequences of the fire safe shutdown analysis. Other sub-functions may exist under each of these broad headings. Examples of such sub-functions are steam generator level control and steam generator pressure control which exist as part of reactor heat removal. Steam generator level and pressure control are required during hot standby. However, during certain portions of hot shutdown and all of cold shutdown, the residual heat removal system is in operation and these sub-functions are not required. Other sub-functions such as emergency power, process cooling, etc., are included as support functions.
In addition to the performance goals and safe shutdown functions identified in Generic Letter 81-12, the reactor coolant pressure control function has been included. Although this function could be placed within the reactor coolant makeup function and reactor heat removal function, the specific goals achieved by the performance of this function are unique enough to warrant a separate safe shutdown function classification. Multiple spurious operation of components due to fire damage on cables has also been considered.
The performance goals and safe shutdown functions identified in the generic letter adequately ensure that the containment pressure boundary is not threatened. Uncontrolled mass and energy releases to the containment from the primary systems are limited by the achievement of these safe shutdown functions and ensures that no rupture of the reactor coolant or containment pressure boundaries occurs.
Figures III-1 through III-4 present the Appendix R safe shutdown/interaction analysis flow chart.
The figures include:
(1)        Identification of performance goals and functions (2)        Identification of safe shutdown systems (3)        Identification of safe shutdown equipment (4)        Identification of safe shutdown cables (5)        Performance of separation/interaction analysis (6)        Documentation of compliance strategies These topics are described below.
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PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES                             Revision 58 2.0              SAFE SHUTDOWN FUNCTIONS This section provides a brief overview of the WBN safe shutdown functions. The specific safe shutdown functions necessary to satisfy the performance goals and safe shutdown functions of Appendix R as identified in Enclosure 1 to Generic Letter 81-12 are:
(1)        The reactivity control function (2)        The reactor coolant makeup function (3)        The reactor coolant pressure control function (4)        The reactor/residual heat removal function (5)        The process monitoring function (6)        The support function 2.1              Reactivity Control After a reactor trip, the reactivity control systems must be capable of achieving and maintaining adequate reactivity margin from zero power hot standby to cold shutdown. The function must be capable of compensating for any reactivity changes associated with xenon decay and reactor coolant temperature decrease which occur during cooldown to cold shutdown conditions.
2.2              Reactor Coolant Makeup The reactor coolant makeup systems shall be capable of assuring that sufficient makeup inventory is provided to compensate for reactor coolant system (RCS) fluid losses due to identified leakage from the reactor coolant pressure boundary and shrinkage of the RCS water volume during cooldown from hot standby to cold shutdown conditions. Adequate performance of this function is demonstrated by the maintenance of reactor coolant level within the pressurizer.
2.3              Reactor Coolant Pressure Control Reactor coolant pressure control is required to assure that the RCS is operated:
(1)        Within the Technical Specifications for RCS pressure-temperature requirements of WBN T/S 3.4.3; (2)        To prevent peak RCS pressure from exceeding 110% of system design pressure; and (3)        With a sufficient subcooling margin to minimize void formation within the reactor vessel.
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PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES                              Revision 58 2.4              Residual Heat Removal The residual heat removal (RHR) systems shall be capable of transferring fission product decay heat from the reactor core at a rate such that specified acceptable fuel design limits and design conditions of the reactor coolant pressure boundary are not exceeded. The function shall be capable of achieving (for alternative shutdown) cold shutdown within a 72-hour period and maintaining cold shutdown conditions thereafter.
2.5              Process Monitoring When information on process variables is required by operators to modify safe shutdown system alignments or control safe shutdown equipment, such monitoring information must be available. The process monitoring function shall be capable of providing, if possible, direct readings of those plant process variables necessary for plant operators to perform and/or control the previously identified functions.
2.6              Support The systems and equipment used to perform the Fire Safe Shutdown (FSSD) functions may require miscellaneous support functions such as process cooling, lubrication and AC/DC power.
These supporting functions shall be available and capable of providing the support necessary to assure acceptable performance of the FSSD functions.
3.0              ANALYSIS OF SAFE SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS 3.1              Introduction Various analytical approaches ensure that sufficient plant systems are available to perform the FSSD functions. Numerous plant systems are available, alone and in combination with other systems, to provide these required functions. A minimum set of plant systems and components are identified to demonstrate that the plant can achieve and maintain safe shutdown per TVA's commitments to Appendix R at WBN. In addition, for control building fires that require shutdown from outside of the Main Control Room (MCR), the concurrent loss of off-site power is also assumed. Providing adequate protection of this minimum system, component, and cable set from the effects of postulated fires constitutes an adequate and conservative demonstration of the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown for the purpose of fire protection.
The safe shutdown systems selected for WBN are capable of:
(1)       Achieving and maintaining subcritical conditions in the reactor, (2)       Maintaining reactor coolant inventory, (3)       Achieving and maintaining hot shutdown conditions for an extended period of time, (4)       Within 72 hours, performing cold shutdown repairs needed to achieve and maintain cold shutdown (or, for control building fires that require shutdown from outside of the MCR, achieving cold shutdown conditions within 72 hours), and (5)       Maintaining cold shutdown conditions thereafter.
Common Unit 1 and Unit 2 support systems and process monitoring equipment (such as Component Cooling System (CCS), Essential Raw Cooling Water (ERCW), electrical power III-4

PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES                               Revision 58 distribution) are required for the safe shutdown analysis. In the electrical power distribution discussions, reference is made to "per unit" equipment. "Per unit", as used in the discussions, designates the Unit 1 and Unit 2 common support equipment that are required for safe shutdown of the plant.
3.2               Initial Assumptions (1)     Each unit is operating at 100% power upon the occurrence of a fire.
For alternative shutdown locations (control building fires that require shutdown from outside of the MCR), the post fire safe shutdown analysis is conducted for both the (2) case with offsite power available as well as the case with only onsite power available for 72 hours.
The reactor(s) are tripped either manually or automatically. The Appendix R fire response procedures direct the operators to manually trip the reactor. There is also the possibility of an automatic reactor trip initiated by fire damage such as damage (3) to the reactor protection system input cables. The Appendix R safe shutdown analysis begins (t=0) with reactor trip; either manual or automatic, whichever occurs first.
(4)     No failures are considered other than those directly attributable to the fire.
Equipment required for safe shutdown is assumed to be available for operation to (5) perform its fire safe shutdown requirements (i.e., not out of service).
The analysis includes a fire induced spurious Safety Injection (SI) signal in Control (6)     Building fires only. The plant design precludes spurious SI signals for fires in other locations.
Analysis of areas both inside and outside the Control Building considers situations (7)     in which fire related equipment failures result in plant conditions reaching the initiation setpoint for safety injection.
Fire related equipment failures (Item 7 above) can affect the reactor coolant system (RCS) thermodynamic or thermohydraulic conditions (i.e., system pressure, liquid level, etc) and lead to the parameter actually exceeding the setpoint for initiation of a safety injection (SI) (i.e,, not initiated by false indications or fire-induced logic circuit failure). The opening of a pressurizer power operated relief valve (PORV) causes both the RCS pressure to decrease and the RCS mass inventory to decrease. Excessive pressurizer spray due to a pressurizer spray valve failing open coupled with a running reactor coolant pump (RCP) will result in a decrease in RCS pressure. Other fire induced failures such as failure to close the main steam isolation valves, failure to close the main feedwater isolation valves, injection of excessive auxiliary feedwater, or the uncontrolled opening of a steam generator PORV can cause excessive cooling of the secondary side of the steam generators and hence excessive cooling of the RCS. Cooling of the RCS will result in a decrease in both RCS pressure and pressurizer liquid level. Long term inventory releases to the primary containment via the pressurizer PORVs through the pressurizer relief tank will raise the atmospheric pressure inside primary containment. If these conditions are not corrected in a timely manner, the parameter could actually exceed its setpoint for creating an SI signal, and an SI would be initiated (i.e., additional water injected into the RCS).
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PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES                                  Revision 58 In addition to fire damage causing plant parameters to actually reach an SI signal setpoint, the fire itself can damage circuitry such that a spurious safety injection signal is generated (i.e,,
initiated by false indications or fire-induced logic circuit failure), as discussed in item 6 above. In this case, the plant parameters are actually within normal bounds; however, the fire damage causes the false signal to be generated.
The SI function is designed to restore RCS inventory and pressure in the event a parameter exceeds a design basis setpoint indicative of an event with the potential to result in fuel damage. The above described events could lead to actually exceeding an SI setpoint.
However, once the plant condition and the applicable parameter that generated the signal is corrected, the SI can be secured, and the SI signal reset. The SI functions design basis includes events in which the RCS pressure boundary is ruptured. Since Appendix R events are not postulated concurrent with design basis accidents such as an RCS rupture and the resulting loss of RCS inventory, valves opened due to fire induced failures such as the pressurizer PORVs can be closed by Appendix R procedures. Only a short duration injection with SI related systems is expected after which the system parameters must be controlled in a manner to reach cold shutdown within 72 hours.
The WBN analysis considers both the scenario of fire damage generating an SI signal directly (false indications or fire-induced logic circuit failure) and fire related failures causing actual plant parameters to reach the SI setpoint. The fire safe shutdown analysis, and hence plant fire response procedures, contain steps that attempt to correct the plant condition before the RCS parameter actually reaches the SI setpoint (prevent SI). These steps close valves, control flows, etc. to reduce or eliminate (i.e., correct) the unwanted effect which could result in an SI.
In case these actions are not successful (i.e., either not performed soon enough or the fire prevents successful completion of the action) or the SI signal is generated directly due to fire damage, the analysis and plant procedures contain reactive steps to correct the plant condition that induced the SI; secure and reset SI to preserve RCS integrity; and continue managing plant conditions to reach cold shutdown within 72 hours (mitigate SI).
3.3               Definitions Hot Standby (Mode 3)         The initial safe shutdown state with the reactor at zero power, Keff less than 0.99 and average RCS temperature Tavg greater than or equal to 3500 F.
Hot Shutdown (Mode 4)        Reactor at zero power, Keff less than 0.99 and average RCS temperature Tavg less than 3500F and greater than 2000F.
Cold Shutdown (Mode 5)       Reactor at zero power, Keff less than 0.99 and average RCS temperature Tavg below or equal to 2000F.
Subcooling Margin            The difference between the saturation temperature at the RCS pressure, and the maximum temperature in the hot legs or Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV).
3.4               Safe Shutdown Functions The following is a comparison of the Generic Letter 81-12 (Part II, Reference 4.1.12) safe shutdown functions and the corresponding safety functions used in the Appendix R FSSD analysis for WBN:
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PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES                                 Revision 58 GL 81-12 Safe Shutdown Function                        WBN Safety Functions Reactivity Control                                     Initial Reactivity Control Reactor Coolant Makeup Control                         RCS Inventory Control RCP Seal Integrity RCS Pressure Boundary Control RCS Makeup and Letdown RCS Seal Injection Reactor Coolant Pressure Control                       RCS Pressure Control Decay Heat Removal                                     SG Inventory Control Secondary Side Pressure Control Secondary Side Isolation Long -Term Heat Removal Process Monitoring Instrumentation                     (no specific correlation, in logics by system)
Support                                                Electrical Supply Containment Integrity Environmental Control Process Cooling Each plant system or subsystem function relied on to accomplish the above safe shutdown functions is identified. A separate designator is assigned to each plant system or subsystem function to ensure consistency between analysis documents and calculations. Each designator is identified as a safe shutdown "Key". Figure III-5 depicts the safe shutdown system and/or system function, associated Key number, and logical relationships between systems and Keys used to demonstrate compliance with Appendix R criteria. Table 3-1 identifies the plant systems and subsystems sorted by Key. The correlation between Keys and safe shutdown systems is provided in Section 4. The following sections provide a general description of the methods and systems used to satisfy the safe shutdown performance goals and functions as delineated in Generic Letter 81-12 (Part II, Reference 4.1.12).
3.4.1             Reactivity Control Initial reactivity control will result from an automatic reactor protection system (RPS) trip or from operator initiation of a manual trip upon notification of a major fire. This action will de-energize the normally energized control rod drive mechanism (CRDM) to actuate a reactor trip. The RPS has a diversity of inputs, each of which "fails safe" and will actuate on an open circuit or a loss of power. As such, fire damage to the RPS will not preclude the initiation of an automatic trip or control rod insertion.
Following rod insertion, additional negative reactivity insertion is required as xenon decays and RCS temperature is decreased. The addition of borated water from the refueling water storage tank (RWST) is required to maintain the required reactivity margin. The chemical and volume control system (CVCS) is capable of injecting this quantity of borated water into the RCS and maintaining the required reactivity margin throughout safe shutdown.
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PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES                              Revision 58 3.4.2           Reactor Coolant Makeup Control For the assumed fire scenario, reactor coolant makeup control can be achieved by isolation of normal makeup and boron injection tank (BIT) injection path, isolation of the normal and excess letdown CVCS paths, and operation of the charging portion of the CVCS through the reactor coolant pump (RCP) seal injection path. Reactor coolant makeup is available post-reactor trip.
Successful maintenance of RCS integrity is also necessary to achieve adequate inventory control. Inadvertent opening of boundary isolation valves such as the reactor head vent valves and RHR suction isolation valves has been precluded. Adequate reactor coolant pump seal integrity is maintained to assure safe shutdown.
Control of pressurizer water level is achieved manually by controlling CVCS charging flow based on charging flow or pressurizer level information. The total quantity of water from the RWST which must be injected into the RCS to achieve the required reactivity margin is less than the quantity of borated water required to maintain a constant pressurizer level during cooldown (RCS volume shrinkage compensation).
3.4.3           Reactor Coolant Pressure Control Establishing and maintaining a sufficient subcooling margin within the RCS is required to minimize void formation in the core and to ensure the ability to maintain natural circulation (if the RCPs are not in operation) through the steam generators (SGs). This is essential to achieving and maintaining safe shutdown.
Overpressure protection of the RCS prior to a controlled cooldown and depressurization is provided by the pressurizer safety valves. During cooldown from Mode 3 hot standby (above 350F) to Mode 4 hot shutdown (below 350F), pressure control may be by pressurizer heaters or by varying pressurizer level by controlling RCS temperature using SG power operated relief valves (PORVs). Pressure is reduced by discharging to the pressurizer relief tank (PRT) using either the reactor coolant (pressurizer) PORVs or reactor head vent valves.
To ensure adequate RCS pressure and adequate subcooling margin, the operator isolates pressurizer spray valves, or trips the RCPs to limit depressurization, and isolate the pressurizer auxiliary spray. Entering Mode 4 permits aligning the RHR system to the RCS for decay heat removal. While on RHR, the maximum pressures in both the RHR and RCS systems are limited by the RHR system safety valves.
The specific combinations of systems used are identified in Part VI under the safe shutdown analysis discussion for each plant location.
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PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES                              Revision 58 3.4.4             Residual Heat Removal Following a reactor trip with loss of off-site power (either assumed or caused by the fire), decay heat is initially removed by natural circulation within the RCS, heat transfer to the main steam system via the steam generators, and operation of the steam generator PORVs or lift of the main steam system code safety valves.
For decay heat removal via natural circulation a minimum of two steam generators are available. Decay heat removal requires the ability to supply sufficient auxiliary feedwater to the steam generators to make up for the inventory discharged as steam by the safety valves or steam generator PORVs. For maintenance of initial hot standby conditions, the required feedwater flow to the steam generators is supplied by the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system.
AFW sources are available from the condensate storage tanks, and alternatively, from the ERCW system. AFW may be supplied to the steam generators by the motor-driven AFW pumps or by the turbine-driven AFW pump. Continued heat removal is achieved by the controlled operation of the PORVs and continued operation of the AFW system. After reduction of RCS temperature to 3500F, the RHR system is used to establish long-term core cooling by the removal of decay heat from the RCS to the environment via the RHR, CCS, and ERCW systems.
3.4.5             Process Monitoring Instrumentation The operator requires knowledge of various plant parameters to perform required system transitions and essential operator actions. A discussion by safe shutdown function of the necessary instrumentation is provided below.
For the fire scenarios assumed in this analysis, inventory makeup to the RCS is from the RWST through the RCP seal injection lines. As previously discussed, sufficient negative reactivity exists in the RCS after control rod insertion. Furthermore, the negative reactivity inserted by the control rods and borated water injected by the CVCS (to compensate for the RCS volume decrease) maintains the core subcritical while cooling down from hot full power to a cold shutdown condition. Sufficient boron is added to the primary system in a timely manner via charging of borated water through the seals to achieve the necessary reactivity margin for cold shutdown. With boron concentration in the Volume Control Tank (VCT) and RWST under procedural control, no operator actions are required based on direct-reading neutron monitoring to ensure an adequate safe shutdown reactivity margin. However, core source range detectors are available for core reactivity monitoring in the MCR or local station. An additional source range channel indicator is available in the Auxiliary Control Room (ACR) to provide this information for fires in control building areas requiring alternative shutdown.
Various process monitoring functions must be available to adequately achieve and maintain the reactor coolant makeup, pressure control and decay heat removal functions. For the assumed fire scenario, maintenance of hot standby requires that pressurizer level and RCS pressure instrumentation are available. RCS temperature is maintained during hot standby by proper decay heat removal via steam generators using the steam generator PORVs. When the reactor coolant pumps are tripped and cooling is required in the natural circulation mode of operation, the difference between the hot-leg and cold-leg wide range temperatures (Th-Tc) provide indication of the existence of a natural circulation condition.
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PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES                                 Revision 58 RCS hot and cold leg temperature instrumentation is available for use given a fire that does not require MCR abandonment. For alternative shutdown, SG pressure instrumentation is required in order to provide a means of determining RCS cold-leg temperature from the ACR. (Refer to Part VII for the deviation request associated with Tsat in lieu of direct indication of Tc in the ACR.)
During RCS cooldown, RCS temperature is controlled by manual control of the SG PORVs.
Operating personnel maintain RCS pressure to assure that appropriate subcooling margin is achieved by monitoring of RCS pressure and hot leg temperature (Th) instrumentation. Manual control of the pressurizer heaters may be used if available, but is not required for safe shutdown. Pressurizer level control is maintained by monitoring pressurizer level instrumentation and manual control of CVCS charging flow through the RCP seals.
The above methods of controlling primary system parameters by means of the secondary system require monitoring secondary system parameters. Steam generator level and pressure indicators are available to assure adequate and controlled decay heat removal. Steam generator level is controlled by operator manipulation (either from the MCR or locally) of AFW system flow based on steam generator wide range level indication or AFW system flow and steam generator narrow range level indications. Use of AFW flow indication and narrow range level indication for monitoring SG inventory is consistent with analyses for FSAR Chapter 15 design basis events. Secondary system pressure is monitored by steam generator pressure indication.
The plant operators utilize the instrumentation discussed above for monitoring natural circulation conditions, subcooling margin, heat removal and compliance with the RCS low temperature pressure/temperature limits (minimum cold leg temperature for a given RCS pressure).
3.5             Support Functions The support functions for various safe shutdown equipment or systems are provided by the following systems:
(1)       Emergency Power Distribution System (2)       Offsite Power System (3)       Essential Raw Cooling Water System (4)       Component Cooling Water System (5)       Ventilation to areas containing essential fire safe shutdown equipment (6)       Main Control Room chillers and ventilation The following sections discuss the required safe shutdown systems and support systems.
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PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES                                Revision 58 4.0             SAFE SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS A reference system, identified by key number is used to aid the construction of the safe shutdown analysis logic. The safe shutdown logic is depicted in Figure 3-5. The safe shutdown systems and subsystems are identified by key number in Table 3-1.
4.1             Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS) - Keys 1A, 2, 4, 5, 9 The charging portion of the CVCS accomplishes the following safe shutdown functions:
(1)      Reactivity control by injection of boron into the RCS (2)      Reactor coolant makeup control by maintaining seal water injection to the RCS (3)      Maintenance of reactor coolant pump seal integrity Reactivity control for safe shutdown is provided by the control rods, with boron injection used to compensate for positive reactivity insertion due to cooldown and xenon decay. Insertion of the control and shutdown rod groups make the reactor adequately subcritical following trip from any credible operation condition to the hot zero power condition, even assuming the most reactive rod remains in the fully withdrawn position.
For the assumed post-fire scenario, makeup water to the RCS is provided by the CVCS from the RWST. When the unit is at power, the concentration of boron in the RWST exceeds that quantity required to bring the reactor from an initial hot standby condition to hot shutdown and then to cold shutdown, assuming that the only volume injected is that required to make up for reactor water volume decrease due to cooling. Letdown, which permits adding more borated water, is not necessary to achieve adequate boron concentration for cold shutdown reactivity margin.
Numerous CVCS paths are normally available for charging to the RCS. The flow path that is used to provide reactor coolant makeup and boration is the charging line to the reactor coolant pump seals. This path is available by ensuring that at least one of the charging pumps is in operation and charging flow control valve remains open.
For the assumed event, charging and boration is accomplished by operating a minimum of one centrifugal charging pump taking suction from the RWST and injecting borated water through the RCP seal injection line to the RCS. Suction to the charging pump can be delivered from the RWST by opening either one of two normally closed motor-operated valves.
Controlled leakage (letdown) from the RCS normally occurs via the RCP #1 Seal Leakoff path and the normal and excess letdown paths. For the post-fire operational scenario, the normal and excess letdown paths are isolated. Isolation of the normal and excess letdown lines may occur as a result of loss of instrument air or is achieved by operator action to assure adequate inventory control. Procedural controls for isolation of all potentially spurious RCS letdown paths, including pressurizer PORVs and reactor head vents, provide assurance that isolation of letdown paths is achieved.
The injection path from the charging pumps to the reactor coolant pump seals contains the charging flow control valve (normally open) which is provided with a minimum-flow pneumatic stop. Thus, operation of one charging pump ensures availability of minimum RCS charging flow. In the event of failure of the pneumatic stop and complete cutoff of injection path flow, thermal barrier cooling (Key 9) is credited to assure seal integrity until charging is reestablished.
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PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES                               Revision 58 Thermal barrier cooling ensures that the RCP seal integrity is maintained. No boron injection is required during this period.
Isolation of the VCT by closure of either one of two motor-operated valves during emergency makeup from the RWST can be performed either remotely or by local manual operation. The VCT is isolated to prevent introduction of H2 cover gas into the centrifugal charging pump (CCP) suction in the event of VCT drainage.
Pressurizer water level is maintained by operation of one centrifugal charging pump using pressurizer level instrumentation information.
4.1.1            Centrifugal Charging Pumps - Key 1A The two high-head centrifugal charging pumps (per unit) are normally aligned for the CVCS charging function. During design basis accidents, they are part of the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS). The centrifugal charging pumps are of the horizontal multistage type with a design flow rate of 150 gpm at 5800 feet total dynamic head. Each pump is designed to provide rated flow against a pressure equal to the sum of the RCS normal maximum pressure (existing when the pressurizer PORV is operating) and the piping, valve and equipment pressure losses at the design charging flows. Each of the centrifugal charging pumps has a motor-operated minimum re-circulation flow valve to prevent damage to the pump when it is operating at shut-off pressure. The pumps require cooling water from the CCS to their mechanical-seal heat exchangers, gear oil coolers, bearing oil coolers and seal housings.
4.1.2            Refueling Water Storage Tank - Key 5 In addition to its normal duty to supply borated water to the refueling cavity for refueling operations, the RWST provides borated water to ECCS pumps for cooling and to provide shutdown margin.
The capacity of the refueling water storage tank (one per unit) is based on the requirement for filling the refueling cavity. This quantity is in excess of that required for safe shutdown. The Technical Specification requirement for the volume of the RWST is 370,000 gallons of borated water at a minimum concentration of 3100 ppm boron.
4.2              Reactor Coolant System - Keys 7, 8, 28, 48 The RCS consists of four similar heat transfer loops (per unit) connected in parallel to the reactor vessel. Each loop contains a reactor coolant pump and a steam generator. In addition, the system includes a pressurizer with associated code safety and power-operated relief valves (PORVs). RCS instrumentation includes cold-leg and hot-leg temperatures (wide range),
pressure (wide range), and pressurizer water level.
The natural circulation capability of the plant provides a means of decay heat removal when the reactor coolant pumps are unavailable. Natural circulation flow rates are governed by the amount of decay heat, relative component elevations, primary to secondary heat transfer, loop flow resistance, steam generator and RCS inventories, and any RCS voiding. These conditions determine whether adequate primary to secondary heat transfer and subcooling during natural circulation can be maintained.
For this analysis of safe shutdown capability, two of the four RCS loops (for which steam generator level and pressure are controlled - active loop) are available to ensure that natural circulation is established and maintained.
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PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES                             Revision 58 While in natural circulation, adequate heat transfer and coolant flow are dependent on adequate inventory in both the primary and secondary systems. Maintaining water level above the "U" tubes on the secondary side of the active loop steam generators and adequate level within the pressurizer are required for natural circulation. RCS loop temperatures confirm flow and heat transfer while in natural circulation on active loops. Cold-leg temperature (Tc) should drop to a few degrees higher than the saturation temperature of the secondary inventory. Hot-leg temperature (Th) should reach a value which is less than at full power but higher than Tc.
RCS inventory control is based on the operation of CVCS charging paths. High pressure seal water from the CVCS system is injected into the reactor coolant pumps lower radial bearing chamber to prevent leakage of high temperature reactor coolant along the pump shaft. The injection flow splits in the bearing chamber with a portion flowing up through the radial bearing and into the shaft seal chamber. The remaining portion flows down the shaft, through the RCP thermal barrier and into the RCS. For added operational flexibility in certain post-fire scenarios, RCP thermal barrier cooling provided by CCS is available for safe shutdown. Availability of either seal injection or thermal barrier cooling provides adequate protection of the RCP seals.
4.2.1             Pressurizer Heaters The pressurizer heaters are not required to operate for safe shutdown. Alternate means of controlling RCS pressure are credited in the WBN Appendix R analysis. (Refer to Calculation EDQ00099920090012 and EDQ00099920090016 for details.) However, should the pressurizer heaters be available, subcooling within the RCS can be maintained by controlled operation of the pressurizer heaters. The availability of pressurizer heaters has been analyzed to enhance the capability of controlling RCS pressure and subcooling margin. The locations where pressurizer heaters are available are documented in Part VI of the FPR. The heat from one pressurizer heater conservatively covers heat losses from the pressurizer at or below normal operating temperature and pressure.
4.3               Main Steam Systems - Keys 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, 26 For the post-fire scenario, maintenance of the steam generator inventory and control of steam generator pressure are required for both hot standby and subsequent primary system cooldown to support the decay and sensible heat removal function, within the applicable operational limits, until initiation of RHR to bring the affected unit to cold shutdown.
The main steam (MS) system for each unit consists of four parallel flow paths, one from each steam generator to the main turbine of the unit. The MS system is isolated either by operation of the turbine stop and control, dump, reheat, feed turbine stop and control, and gland steam valves; or by the main steam isolation valves.
In accordance with supporting analyses, inventory control of two steam generators provides the reactor heat removal function during natural circulation conditions. Maintenance of the steam generator water level during the period of AFW operation (hot standby) involves either MCR operator or local manual positioning of the AFW level control valves and operation of the motor-driven or turbine-driven AFW pumps based on steam generator level information. Steam generator water level and pressure indication are available in the MCR and in the ACR.
The MS system also delivers motive steam to the turbine-driven AFW pump. Steam to the turbine is supplied by branch connections upstream of the main steam isolation valves on two steam lines (corresponding to steam generators No. 1 and 4). Either line is sufficient to supply steam for the AFW pump turbine, however, credit is only taken for steam supply from steam generator No. 1.
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PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES                             Revision 58 4.3.1            Steam Generator Power - Operated Relief Valves A power-operated relief valve (PORV) provided on each steam line is capable of releasing the sensible and decay heat to the atmosphere. The PORVs are used for plant cooldown by steam discharge to the atmosphere since the steam dump system is assumed to be unavailable. The PORVs have a total combined capacity of approximately 10% of the maximum steam flow. For the assumed fire scenario, a minimum of two PORVs are available to support controlled cooldown of the RCS.
Controls for the steam generator PORVs are provided in the MCR and locally at the shutdown stations. During hot standby conditions, the steam generator PORVs are controlled by MCR non-safety grade controllers (automatic control on steam pressure setpoint), safety grade handswitches (manual quick opening or positive closing control), or local valve position control at the local nitrogen control stations. In this mode, the RCS temperature is controlled by maintaining the steam generator at the corresponding saturation pressure.
4.4              Auxiliary Feedwater System - Keys 11, 12, 14, 16, 17, 19 The AFW system is required during hot standby to support RCS decay heat removal. For hot standby, secondary system (steam generator) inventory control is provided by the AFW system.
Two motor-driven pumps and one turbine-driven pump are provided to each unit. Each motor-driven pump is rated at 450 gpm at a nominal 3270 feet total dynamic head. The turbine-driven pump is rated at 790 gpm at 3350 feet total dynamic head. The pumps have the design capability to provide the rated flow, less bypass, against the lowest steam generator safety valve setpoint plus 3% accumulation and 3% set error.
The AFW system is designed to deliver enough water to maintain sufficient heat transfer in the steam generators in order to prevent loss of primary water through the RCS pressurizer safety or relief valves.
4.4.1            Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump The turbine-driven AFW pump (one per unit) is designed to deliver a sufficient flow to all four steam generators and maintain steam generator water levels at the lower limit of the wide range level indicator. The pump is a horizontal, six-stage, centrifugal pump driven by a single-stage atmospheric exhaust turbine. During automatic operation the turbine speed, and therefore capacity, are governed by pump flow. The turbine is provided with automatic speed control that ensures a minimum of 720 gpm. Manual speed control is also provided to enable the operator to control speed from 2076 rpm to 3950 rpm. Use of the speed control in combination with manual operation of the level control valves (LCVs) allows the operator to control the flow from 0 to 720 gpm. Two overspeed trip devices are provided. The electrical overspeed trip resets automatically. The higher mechanical overspeed trip device must be reset manually.
The AFW pump turbine lube oil system uses a pump driven from the turbine shaft. Water for the turbine oil cooler and pump bearing cooler is supplied from the AFW pump discharge line.
Lube and control oil and lube oil cooling are therefore available whenever the AFW pump turbine is operating.
Steam generators No. 1 and/or 4 provide motive steam to the turbine-driven AFW pump.
However, only the steam supply from steam generator No. 1 is credited for safe shutdown. The turbine-driven AFW pump is capable of operating down to a steam pressure of 115 psia, which is below the pressure at which the RHR system must be placed in service.
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PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES                              Revision 58 4.4.2           Motor-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps WBN is supplied with two motor-driven AFW pumps per unit with only one per unit required for safe shutdown. Pump A supplies SGs 1 and 2 and Pump B supplies SGs 3 and 4. Each pump is a horizontal, nine-stage centrifugal pump. Bearings are cooled by water from the first stage.
A separate motor-driven oil pump is provided for motor bearings. Pump bearings use ring oilers. The pumps require no external lube oil cooling or other support services other than AC power.
4.4.3           Condensate Storage Tank Each unit is provided a Condensate Storage Tank (CST). At hot standby, the minimum volume of water required by the WBN Technical Specification for each CST is 200,000 gallons. The CST is normally aligned to the supply for the AFW pumps. As a backup, cross-ties to the AFW supply from the ERCW system are provided. Ample time is available post-fire for a local manual realignment of the supply to the AFW pumps from CST to ERCW.
4.5             Residual Heat Removal System - Keys 30, 31 The RHR system is designed to remove residual and sensible heat from the core by reducing the temperature of the RCS during the hot and cold shutdown phases of safe shutdown. The following discussion is applicable for each unit.
The RHR system for each unit consists of two RHR heat exchangers, two RHR pumps and associated piping, valving and instrumentation necessary for operational control. The design residual heat load is based on the residual heat fraction of the full core MW (thermal) power level that exists 20 hours following reactor shutdown from an extended power run near full power.
During cold shutdown operations, reactor coolant flows from the RCS to the RHR pumps through the tube side of the RHR heat exchangers and back to the RCS. The heat load is transferred to CCS on the shell side.
Four motor-operated valves isolate the inlet line to the RHR system from the RCS. The four valves are arranged in an "H" Configuration, with pairs of parallel valves in series. To avoid potential RCS boundary leakage at this high/low pressure interface, all four of the motor-operated valves in the RHR suction line are kept closed (pre-fire condition) with the corresponding motor control center breaker in the open position. The return lines are isolated by two series check valves in each line and a common motor-operated valve.
A minimum-flow return line from the downstream side of each RHR heat exchanger to the corresponding pump's suction line is provided to assure that the RHR pumps do not overheat under low flow conditions. A motor-operated valve located in each minimum flow line is opened if RHR pump flow falls below 250 gpm and is closed when the flow increases above 1100 gpm.
The cooldown rate of the reactor coolant is controlled by regulating the flow through the tube side of the RHR heat exchangers. A bypass line, which serves both residual heat exchangers, is used to regulate the temperature of the return flow to the RCS as well as to maintain a constant flow through the RHR system.
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PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES                             Revision 58 The RHR system can be placed in operation when the pressure and temperature of the RCS are about 400 psig and 3500F, respectively. If one of the pumps and/or one of the heat exchangers is not Operable, safe operation of the plant is not affected.
4.5.1           Residual Heat Removal Pumps Two identical pumps per unit are installed in the RHR system. Each pump is sized to deliver sufficient reactor coolant flow through the residual heat exchangers to meet the units cooldown requirements. A seal heat exchanger for each pump is supported by operation of the CCS.
4.5.2           RHR Safety Valves The RHR system safety valves provide RCS cold overpressure protection whenever the RHR system is in operation. The valves are located inside containment, one each on the RHR system suction and discharge path, and discharge to the pressurizer relief tank. The valves are set at 450 psig and 600 psig, respectively.
4.6             Safety Injection System Accumulators - Key 36 During normal plant operating conditions, the safety injection system accumulators are pressurized by nitrogen gas in order to inject borated water in the RCS when RCS pressure falls below 600 psi unintentionally. During a controlled depressurization, the accumulators are isolated to prevent injection of safety injection system accumulator borated water. However, if the isolation valves remain open, the borated water is injected and nitrogen pressure decreases due to the increased empty volume of the accumulators. Injection of nitrogen into the RCS occurs when RCS pressure is less than 325 psig, with allowance for instrument inaccuracy.
The manual isolation of the accumulators is assumed as a post-fire activity. The isolation valve at each accumulator is closed only when the RCS is intentionally depressurized below 900 psig.
If the cables associated with these valves were damaged by fire, isolation is performed locally per appropriate plant procedures (post-fire). In the event the valves are inaccessible, RCS pressure is maintained greater than 325 psig to preclude nitrogen injection into the RCS via the accumulators.
4.7             Component Cooling System (CCS) - Key 1B CCS is a supporting system to other safe shutdown systems. Two redundant trains per unit are available. For each unit, Train A consists of two available pumps (pumps 1A-A and 1B-B for Unit 1 and pumps 2A-A and 2B-B for Unit 2) and the associated valves, piping, instrumentation and heat exchanger (Heat Exchanger A for Unit 1 and Heat Exchanger B for Unit 2). Train B is common for both units and consists of one pump (pump C-S) and the associated valves, piping, instrumentation and heat exchanger (Heat Exchanger C). Each unit has a Train A pump (1A-A for Unit 1 and 2A-A for Unit 2) which receives electrical power from Train A. Each unit also has a Train B pump (1B-B for Unit 1 and 2B-B for Unit 2) which receives electrical power from Train B. These pumps are normally aligned to the Train A piping system for that unit but can be aligned to the common Train B piping system. The C-S pump, which normally receives Train B electrical power while serving as the common Train B CCS pump, is capable of being powered from a Train A power source.
The CCS system serves as an intermediate heat transfer loop between the various safe shutdown components and the ERCW system (ultimate heat sink).
The CCS system provides cooling for the following safe shutdown equipment:
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PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES                               Revision 58 (1)        Centrifugal charging pumps (2)        Residual heat removal heat exchangers (3)        Residual heat removal pumps (4)        Reactor coolant pump thermal barrier coolers (CCS Train A only)
(5)        Chemical volume control system seal water heat exchanger (CCS Train A only)
Note:
In addition to cooling the above listed fire safe shutdown equipment, the spent fuel pool cooling heat exchangers non-fire safe shutdown cooling load may also be cooled by Train A of the component cooling system One CCS pump and its associated CCS heat exchanger fulfill the heat removal function of a unit during normal full-load operation for various components located in the auxiliary and reactor buildings. During normal unit cooldown in RHR mode, two CCS trains (i.e., that units Train A and the common Train B) are utilized to remove the residual heat. If only one train is used, cooldown is at a lower rate.
Other than the RHR heat exchangers, the essential loads are normally valved open to the supply header and discharge to the suction of the CCS pump with which they are normally associated, so that component cooling water is circulated continuously through the essential loads during normal operation.
The CCS outlet lines from each units Train A RHR heat exchangers (one per unit) have a normally closed motor-operated valve which must be opened during RHR cooldown. The CCS outlet lines (one per unit) from the Train B RHR heat exchanger have throttleable motor-operated valves. The valve for the unit undergoing cooldown must be open during RHR cooldown and the other units valve must be closed. The motor-operated valves that isolate the RCP thermal barrier coolers (Train A only) are included as safe shutdown components for operational flexibility in a post-fire scenario, since the thermal barriers may be required to perform a redundant function to RCP seal injection cooling.
4.8             Essential Raw Cooling Water System - Key 1C The ERCW system provides cooling for the following safe shutdown heat transfer equipment:
(1)       Component cooling heat exchangers (2)       Emergency diesel generator heat exchangers (3)       Essential ventilation coolers and water chillers (4)       Auxiliary control air compressors The system also provides a back-up supply of water to the AFW system in the event that the condensate storage tank is depleted.
This system consists of four traveling water screens and their wash pumps, eight pumps, four discharge strainers, and four main headers (1A, 1B, 2A, and 2B). These components, together with the associated heat exchangers, valves, piping and local instrumentation, complete the ERCW system.
The ERCW system can remove the heat transferred to CCS, plus the heat loads of the emergency diesel generator (EDG) engine coolers (i.e.. the air aftercoolers, lubricating oil III-17

PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES                             Revision 58 cooler, and jacket water cooler), auxiliary control air compressors and essential ventilation coolers and water chillers, and provide makeup flow to the turbine and motor-driven AFW pumps.
The four Train A ERCW pumps are installed in a portion of the intake pumping station separate from the Train B pumps. The Train A pumps supply ERCW to two Train A ERCW headers (i.e.,
1A and 2A). Interlocks exist to preclude automatically starting more than one ERCW pump on a single diesel generator. The plant has bypass switches which can be used to manually load a second ERCW pump on a diesel generator when the load on the diesel generator permits. One ERCW pump is sufficient to carry the heat load of one unit during hot shutdown conditions.
Normal ERCW alignment is for Train A ERCW header 2A to provide cooling to both units Train A CCS heat exchangers which utilize two Train A ERCW pumps. Three pumps are normally used to carry the dual unit heat removal duties of the system during RHR cooldown of a unit.
Local manual operation of motor-operated valves and strainers is credited post-fire. Train B pumps and headers are arranged similar to the Train A configuration.
4.9             Essential HVAC - Keys 37A, 37C, 37J, 37K, and 37O Essential HVAC is provided for the Control, Auxiliary, Diesel Generator, and Reactor Buildings.
Portions of the systems in each building that service safe shutdown equipment required for compliance with Appendix R have been analyzed to ensure that at least one path of the required systems is available for an Appendix R fire. The systems consist of filters, fans, ductwork, dampers, heating/cooling coils, instrumentation, and controls for general building ventilation, along with separate systems for individual rooms. The required systems, components, and cables for those subsystems relied on to protect equipment for safe shutdown have been incorporated into the Appendix R analysis as required equipment and cables. The location of equipment and routing of cables has been identified and evaluated as described in Sections 5 and 6 of this Part. These systems are discussed below.
The primary safety-related portions of the MCR are cooled by two independent trains of HVAC.
The two trains are separated by fire barriers and/or separation distance in accordance with Appendix R requirements to ensure that the control building HVAC system remains functional during a fire. The entire control building HVAC system is separate from the HVAC system servicing the ACR.
The auxiliary building HVAC system is required to achieve and maintain hot standby.
Specifically, HVAC is required for the 480V transformer rooms and for the general floor area on the 713' elevation to support the use of the motor-driven auxiliary feedwater (MDAFW) and CCS pumps. Individual room coolers are also required for the CCP and RHR pumps and are addressed in the equipment logics for their respective systems (Keys 1A and 31).
The turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater (TDAFW) pump room is provided with a DC operated exhaust fan sized (1200 CFM +/-10%) to provide required air flow in the room for the volume method of cooling. The fan is a roof ventilator type with intake and venting to the general area of the auxiliary building. The fan automatically starts upon the start of the TDAFW pump. The fan is addressed in the TDAFW pump equipment logic (Key 14).
The diesel generator HVAC systems serve each combination of diesel generator and associated batteries and electrical boards. The diesel generator building HVAC system consists of various subsystems. The subsystems for each combination include diesel generator room HVAC subsystems, generator and electrical panel subsystems, battery hood exhaust subsystems, electric board room exhaust and heating subsystems, and muffler room exhaust systems. A fire in any combination of diesel generator and associated batteries and electrical III-18

PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES                                   Revision 58 boards, which are separate fire areas, will not affect the HVAC systems servicing the adjacent combinations of diesel generator and associated batteries and electrical boards.
The containment air cooling systems are designed to maintain acceptable temperatures within the upper and lower compartments, CRDM shroud, and instrument room for the protection of controls. Each units lower compartment cooling (LCC) system consists of (4) 33-1/3% fan coil assemblies. Each units CRDM cooling system consists of (4) 50% fan coil assemblies combined into two subsystems, with one fan coil assembly in each subsystem normally operating. Each units containment air cooling is evaluated to ensure either 3 out of 4 LCC fan coil assemblies, or 2 out of 4 LCC/CRDM pairs of fan coil assemblies, are available for Appendix R fire scenarios.
All other areas of the plant which contain equipment required for safe shutdown per Appendix R have been evaluated and determined that acceptable temperatures are maintained for the required equipment to perform its intended function if HVAC is lost.
4.10            Onsite Power System - Key 38 The plant Emergency Power System (EPS) includes on-site, independent, automatically-starting emergency power sources that supply power to essential safe shutdown equipment if the normal off-site power sources are unavailable.
The emergency power sources consist of four 6.9kV diesel generators. Each consists of a single generator driven by two engines on a common shaft. Each diesel engine is equipped with its own auxiliaries. These include starting air, fuel oil, lube oil, cooling water, intake and exhaust system, speed regulator (governor) and controls. Cooling water is provided from the ERCW system while electric power for each engine's auxiliaries is provided by its own generator. The governors for each pair of engines are electrically linked.
4.10.1          6.9KV Shutdown Power System Each of the four 6.9kV shutdown boards is normally fed from 161kV/6.9kV Common Station Service Transformers (CSSTs) that receive power from offsite sources. In addition, upon loss of the normal CSST due to a line fault, the 6.9kV boards transfer the power source to another CSST.
Each of four 6.9kV shutdown boards can also be fed from the corresponding 6.9kV diesel generator. Loss of offsite power to the 6.9kV boards is sensed by undervoltage relays. Upon sensing an undervoltage, the master relay(s) automatically start the emergency diesel generators, trip the normal feed switchgear breakers and trip all motor feeder breakers on the boards. The emergency diesel generators can also be manually started locally, from the MCR, or from the ACR. For shutdown scenarios that do not require MCR abandonment, a switchgear breaker on each board is automatically closed when its diesel generator is at rated speed and rated voltage and re-energizes the bus. The essential loads are sequentially connected to the bus. For shutdown scenarios from the ACR, breaker closure and diesel generator loading is done manually. The emergency diesel generators then supply all equipment which must operate under emergency conditions for the respective safeguard train.
4.10.2          480V AC Shutdown Power System The 480V power system distributes power for low voltage station service demands. The normal source of power is the 6.9kV shutdown boards via the 6.9kV/480V transformers.
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PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES                             Revision 58 The 480V power system consists of eight boards, two per unit per train. Each 480V board is fed from the associated unit/train 6.9kV board through the normal or spare 6.9kV/480V transformers. There are a total of eight normal and four spare transformers, with each spare transformer able to feed either of the two boards of the same train/unit. The 480V shutdown boards feed 480V loads and various motor control centers (MCCs). The MCCs in turn feed various motor operated valves and other loads required for safe shutdown. Each MCC has a normal and alternate power source that can be utilized when needed for equipment maintenance.
4.10.3           120V AC Vital Instrument Power System The 120V AC Vital Instrument Power System consists of four separate vital boards per unit.
Each 120V AC Vital Bus is supplied by an independent inverter. Each station battery supplies two inverters (one per unit) of the same channel. Each channel also includes a normally de-energized spare inverter that can be energized and manually aligned to be an alternate supply to either Unit 1 or Unit 2 associated 120V AC vital bus. Each inverter is normally supplied by the 480V AC power system of the associated train (A for D or F and B for E or G) and can be supplied from the opposite trains via a manual transfer switch. In addition, the uninterrupted supply to each inverter is its respective 125V DC battery board via a static transfer switch scheme.
The output of each inverter is connected to its 120V AC vital instrument power board through a normally closed circuit breaker. The vital instrument power boards supply all of the required normal safe shutdown instrumentation per channel.
4.10.4           125V DC Power System The 125V DC power system consists of four batteries, four normal chargers, two pairs of spare chargers, and four main DC battery boards. The 125V dc power system supplies power for control of 6.9kV/480V shutdown boards, operation of vital inverters, pneumatic-operated, solenoid controlled valves, and MCR emergency lights. The battery system consists of four separately located sets of batteries powering four channels of DC boards. Each normal vital battery has its own normal charger. Each vital battery board can also be supplied from one of the two spare chargers in each pair. The battery chargers are energized from normal or alternate MCCs via a manual transfer switch. A fifth vital battery may be used as an installed spare and can be placed into service in place of any of the four normal vital batteries. The fifth vital battery is maintained by its own charger until connected to one of the normal vital battery boards.
During normal operation, the 125V DC loads are fed from the battery chargers, with the batteries being supplied a "trickle" charge floating on the system. Upon loss of ac power, the entire DC load is drawn from the batteries. The batteries are credited for two hours of operation after a loss of charging, predicated upon the continued operation of DC emergency equipment.
However, the battery chargers can be manually aligned to alternate power sources to take over the load and recharge their associated battery.
All direct current loads associated with engineered safeguards equipment are fully redundant.
These loads are arranged so that each battery supplies its associated redundant channel.
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PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES                                  Revision 58 4.10.5           250V DC Power System The 250V DC power system consists of two batteries, two normal chargers, two spare chargers, and two 250V DC battery boards. Control power for start board power circuit breakers and associated protective relays is distributed from the 250V DC supply via circuit breakers on the turbine building DC distribution boards. The 250V DC power system provides power for non-safety-related loads and, for Appendix R fire scenarios, is used to operate steam load trip circuits and to provide capabilities to trip the RCPs.
4.11             Offsite Power System - Key 38A The offsite power system evaluated for safe shutdown consists of CSSTs and common station service boards that provide power from the 161kV offsite power sources to the 6.9kV shutdown boards. Two CSSTs (CSST C and D) provide normal and alternate power to four 6.9kV shutdown boards. One CSST (CSST C) is the normal source for Train A shutdown boards and also supplies the alternate power to the Train B shutdown boards. The other CSST (CSST D) is the normal source for Train B shutdown boards and the alternate source to the Train A shutdown boards. When one of the normal off site supplies (CSST C or D) is out for maintenance the corresponding 6.9kV shutdown boards can be supplied from CSST A or CSST B. Special requirements for maintenance alignment are included in FPR Part II, Section B14.10.5.
4.12             Containment Isolation - Key 10 In order to maintain the integrity of the containment boundary, it is necessary to ensure the capability to isolate all containment penetrations. The normal containment isolation requirements have been relaxed to be consistent with fire safe shutdown requirements and assumptions. Only one isolation boundary is necessary for each penetration and can consist of a check valve or a closed system on either side of the boundary regardless of the piping class.
When penetrations are isolated only by electrically isolated valves, the valves were included as required FSSD components.
4.13             Reactor Trip - Key 29 A fire inside or outside of the control building may require the reactor trip to bring the plant to hot standby. Manual trip circuits for manual shutdown from the MCR are available for any fire. The RPS is not specifically protected from fire damage given the fail safe design of the RPS.
Diversity of input signals could initiate a reactor trip, if required, before the trip is manually initiated. The reactor trip provides sufficient initial reactivity control. Long term reactivity control is accomplished by preventing boron dilution and assuring that injected makeup water is at least the boron concentration of the RWST.
4.14             Auxiliary Control Air System (ACAS) - Key 13 The ACAS provides essential air to the following fire safe shutdown equipment if the normal air supply system cannot maintain minimum system pressure:
(1)       Turbine/Motor-driven auxiliary feedwater level control valves (LCVs)
(2)       Steam generator power operated relief valves (SG PORVs)
The ACAS is separated into two independent trains, one supplied from Train A power and the other supplied from Train B power. Each train consists of a compressor, receiver, dryer and III-21

PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES                                Revision 58 filter. The system is supplied from two motor-driven, non-lubricated, compressors that are integral skid mounted assemblies. Relief valves are in place on the compressors and air receivers for overpressure protection. The ACAS automatically isolates from the non-essential control air system (CAS) on low pressure. A third ACAS air compressor subsystem, designated C-S is available as a swing compressor to be used on either the A or B train in place of the normal compressor. The C-S compressor subsystem contains its own receiver, dryer, and filter and can be aligned to either A or B train ERCW and electrical power.
The ACAS air dryers normal operation is with one of the dual towers in the regeneration (purge) state and the other tower supplying the air loads. With the local hand switch in the automatic mode, the dryer is interlocked with the ACAS compressor such that when the compressor is running the ACAS dryer will operate continuously. The dryer cycle will continue to run after the associated compressor has stopped until the local hand switch is placed in the "stop" position.
The dual air dryer towers are alternately regenerated (purged) and fully pressurized for service via cam-operated cycling valves controlled by adjustable timers in automatic mode. The dryer regeneration and pressurization cycle can be manually started with the local hand switch allowing operations periodically to change which dryer tower is "in-service" to preclude moisture saturation. This will be at significantly reduced periodicity than the cycle timer cycling. The dryer is designed such that in the event of electrical failure to the equipment, it will continue to dry air for 4 to 8 hours. The electrical circuit is designed with interlocks that prevents a purge exhaust valve and an inlet switching valve on the same side of the dryer to be open at the same time. This precludes loss of air from the system through the purge valve.
The ERCW system provides the source of cooling to the ACAS compressors, inter-coolers and after coolers.
5.0              IDENTIFICATION OF SAFE SHUTDOWN SYSTEM COMPONENTS Section 4 described the specific systems which are used to achieve safe shutdown. This subsection discusses the WBN method of selection of safe shutdown components.
For each system, plant flow diagrams (P&IDs), system descriptions and one-line diagrams were used to identify the precise primary flow paths and operational characteristics that must be established to accomplish the desired safe shutdown function. From this information, a list was compiled of the components which participate in the system's performance of its safe shutdown function. These components are:
(1)       Active components that need to be powered to establish, or assist in establishing, the primary flow path and/or the system's operation; (2)       Active components in the primary flow path that normally are in the proper position whose power loss will not result in a change of position, but may be affected by open, short, or ground faults in control or power cabling; (3)       Power-operated components that need to change position to establish or assist in establishing the primary flow path, whose loss of electrical or air supplies result in the component adopting the required safe shutdown position but which may be affected by open, short or ground faults in control or power cabling; and (4)       Major mechanical components that support safe shutdown.
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PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES                               Revision 58 From the analysis of the safe shutdown system flow paths, those components whose spurious operation threatens safe shutdown system functionality were also identified. This identification included those branch flow paths that must be isolated and remain isolated to assure that flow is not substantially diverted from the primary flow path. See Section 7 for the detailed discussion of spurious operations.
A list was generated for safe shutdown devices including device identification and operating requirements for the various shutdown Keys. The shutdown Keys were previously identified in Section 4 and Table 3-1.
The safe shutdown equipment list (SSEL) for WBN is the equipment necessary to safely shut down the affected unit or units. For reasons of operational flexibility, equipment such as pressurizer heater availability for RCS pressure control was identified in Sections 3 and 4.
Optional components are not required for safe shutdown; however, they are included in the safe shutdown equipment list and in the safe shutdown interaction calculation.
The safe shutdown equipment list developed for WBN includes the components required to protect the safe shutdown capability from the exposure fire damage postulated in Appendix R.
The safe shutdown equipment list is provided as Table 3-2.
6.0             IDENTIFICATION OF SAFE SHUTDOWN CIRCUITS AND CABLES The equipment list developed during the WBN safe shutdown system analysis was the basic input for the identification of electrical circuits essential to ensure adequate equipment performance. Essential safe shutdown electrical circuits were identified for all the electrically-dependent devices in Table 3-2. However, for some equipment, either a subset of cables or no cables were identified. For example, cables were not selected for valves where local manual operation is required during cooldown and nitrogen bottle control stations are used for AFW flow control. The circuits identified included power, control, and instrumentation. Type II associated circuits as addressed in Section 7 were also treated as required circuits.
The identification and analysis of these essential electrical circuits was based on one-line diagrams, schematics, and wiring diagrams from which the necessary circuit cables were selected for the subsequent cable routing and separation analysis. Circuit evaluation and identification considers equipment functionality requirements. Circuits are identified for active and passive equipment. Circuit identification for high/low pressure boundary components considered the possibility of more conservative cable faults (e.g., 3 phase to 3 phase faults).
For each electrical component, circuits and cables were identified (1) which are required for safe shutdown to ensure functionality or (2) failure of which is detrimental. The circuits not included per the above criteria included annunciator, computer, motor stator heaters and external monitoring circuits. Those circuits which are electrically isolated from the electrical circuits of concern, or whose failure does not affect functionality, were not included in the separation analysis.
WBN utilizes Distributed Control Systems (DCS) for Non Safety Related Control Systems. Each units DCS is interconnected via fiber optic networks but is isolated from the other unit. Unit 1 has one DCS network which is located totally in the control building Auxiliary Instrument Room (AIR), Room 708.0-C1. The Unit 2 DCS is segmented into two functional segments with one in the Auxiliary Control Room (ACR) and one in the control building AIR, Room 708.0-C4. The network in the ACR is for monitoring and maintenance purposes only and the controls function independent of the network. In order to allow monitoring by the DCS Work Station, the ACR and AIR network segments are interconnected via the DCS network which is configured to III-23

PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES                                Revision 58 mitigate network failures. This prevents a failure of one network segment (i.e., ACR network) from affecting the other segment (i.e., AIR network) and vice versa. Packet rate limiters are used on the DCS network to provide redundant assurance that data transmission cannot impede communications in the AIR segment. This isolation between the ACR and AIR, ensures that no event arising from equipment failures, such as caused by a fire, can inhibit DCS equipment outside that fire zone.
For each safe shutdown Key, cable block diagrams were developed for each safe shutdown component to identify cables required to ensure that the component can perform its safe shutdown function.
7.0              ASSOCIATED CIRCUITS OF CONCERN 7.1              Introduction The separation and protection requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R apply not only to safe shutdown circuits but also to "associated" circuits which could prevent operation or cause maloperation of shutdown systems and equipment. The identification of these associated circuits of concern was performed for WBN in accordance with NRC Generic Letter 81-12, the Staff's clarification to Generic Letter 81-12 (Part II, Reference 4.1.12), and Generic Letter 86-10 (Part II, Reference 4.1.16). The generic letters defined associated circuits of concern as those which have a physical separation less than that required by Section III.G of Appendix R, and have one of the following:
Type I           A common power source with the shutdown equipment and the power source is not electrically protected from the circuit of concern by coordinated breakers, fuses, or similar devices; Type II          A connection to circuits of equipment whose spurious operation would adversely affect the shutdown capability; Type III         A common enclosure with the shutdown cables, and, (1)     are not electrically protected by circuit breakers, fuses or similar devices, or (2)     will allow propagation of the fire into the common enclosure 7.2              Associated Circuits by Common Power Supply and Common Enclosures The electrical distribution system was reviewed to assure that Type I associated circuits by common power supply are addressed by providing selective protective trip coordination for all FSSD power supplies. Type III associated circuits by common enclosures were addressed by ensuring that all existing circuits in Category 1 buildings are electrically protected with a fuse or breaker that actuates prior to the jacket of existing faulted cables reaching their auto-ignition temperature. For new circuits, Type III associated circuit electrical fault protection is provided to ensure that the fuse or breaker operates prior to the temperature of the insulation reaching its insulation damage temperature.
Electrical circuit fault protection was originally designed to provide protection for plant electric circuits via protective relaying, circuit breakers and fuses. Protective equipment was designed and applied to ensure adequate protection of electrical distribution equipment, including cables, from electric faults and overload conditions in the circuits. The selection and application of these devices was in accordance with TVA design practices and is documented in engineering calculations. The protective equipment ensures that electrical faults and overloads do not result in any more cable degradation than is expected when operating conditions are below the set III-24

PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES                                Revision 58 point of the protective equipment. This also limits cable damage and prevents cable faults from resulting in internal cable temperatures which could cause ignition of cable insulation.
An integral part of the original electric system protection was the proper coordination of these electrical protective devices. Such coordination assures that the protective device nearest (in an electrical sense) to the fault operates prior to the operation of any "upstream" protective devices, and provides interruption of electrical service to a minimum amount of equipment. The original electrical protection design at WBN required coordination of such electrical protective devices and is documented in engineering calculations. Electrical design practices ensures that no associated circuits of concern by common power supply (Type I) or by common enclosure (Type III) exist 7.3              Associated Circuits by Spurious Operation Cables that are not part of safe shutdown circuits may be damaged by the effects of postulated fires. This cable damage may consequently prevent the correct operation of safe shutdown components, or result in the maloperation of equipment which directly prevents the proper performance of the safe shutdown systems. The effects of spurious operations may be conceptually divided into two subclasses as follows:
(1)      Maloperation of safe shutdown equipment due to control circuit electrical interlocks between safe shutdown circuits and other circuits; for example, the numerous safe shutdown equipment automatic operation interlocks from process control and instrument circuits.
(2)      Maloperation of equipment that is not defined as part of the safe shutdown systems, but that could prevent the accomplishment of a safe shutdown function; for example, inadvertent depressurization of the RCS or the MS system by spurious opening of boundary valves.
The evaluation of Appendix R events ensures that any failure of associated circuits of concern by spurious operation (Type II) does not prevent safe shutdown. Credible electrical faults considered in the analysis included open circuit, short circuit (conductor-to-conductor), short to ground, and cable-to-cable (hot-short) including 3-phase hot-shorts for high/low pressure interface valves. The analysis also considers that the normally ungrounded 125V DC power distribution system is grounded due to fire damage.
In order for cable faults that generate spurious operation to occur, the following conditions must exist synergistically at the cable fault location:
(1)      Sufficient energy must exist due to the fire to create failure of the cable jacket and insulating material; (2)      The failure of the jacket and insulating material must occur in a way that directly exposes the cable conductors; (3)      For each short circuit, two or more specific conductors must come into direct contact causing low impedance conductor-to-conductor connections; (4)      For certain types of spurious operation, multiple electrically independent shorts must occur; III-25

PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES                             Revision 58 (5)        No additional conductors that would cause circuit fault currents and operation of circuit protective devices may participate in the short condition; and (6)        No ground faults that would cause operation of circuit protective devices must occur.
The spurious operation analysis performed for WBN recognized the extremely low probability of certain types of these faulted conditions. The following cable short conditions causing spurious operation were considered of sufficiently low likelihood that they were assumed not to require additional analysis or modification (unless it involves high-low pressure boundary interfaces):
CASE:
(1)        Three phase-AC power circuit cable-to-cable faults (6.9kV and 480V)
(2)        Two wire ungrounded-DC power circuit cable-to-cable faults (125V)
(3)        Two wire ungrounded-AC control circuit cable-to-cable faults (120V)
With respect to Cases (1), (2), and (3), no conductor-to-conductor faults within the same power cable can cause spurious powering of the associated device. Only power cable-to-cable connections between one de-energized and one energized power circuit could permit operation.
For the case of the three-phase-AC circuit, three electrically independent cable-to-cable shorts must occur without grounds in order to power the associated device. Similarly, for the two-wire ungrounded DC power circuit, two electrically independent cable-to-cable shorts without grounds must occur. The likelihood of such occurrences has been acknowledged by the NRC Staff to be sufficiently low to permit excluding such faulted conditions from consideration except for high/low pressure boundary components. Therefore, for the above identified spurious operations caused by cable faults, only 3-phase hot-shorts for high/low pressure boundary interface valves have been incorporated into the analysis.
The fundamental basis of excluding the remaining shorts from consideration is based on the need for multiple cable-to-cable electrically independent faults in order for spurious operation to occur.
Concerning Case (2), all DC control circuits at WBN are ungrounded. In order for spurious operation to occur due to circuit-to-circuit faults between DC circuits supplied from different sources, at a minimum, two electrically independent cable-to-cable shorts without grounds must occur.
For the ungrounded AC control circuits in Case (3), the identical consideration exists. Most MCC transformer secondary 120V AC control circuits are ungrounded. Therefore, at a minimum, two cable-to-cable shorts must simultaneously occur in order for spurious operation to result for circuits supplied from different sources.
7.4              Multiple High Impedance Faults Multiple High Impedance Faults (MHIFs) are considered in accordance with Appendix B.1 to NEI-00-01 (Part II, Reference 4.3.6) as endorsed by RG 1.189 revision 2 (Part II, Reference 4.1.45) which establishes a base case analysis demonstrating that the probability of MHIFs is sufficiently low such that they do not pose a credible risk to post-fire safe shutdown when certain criteria are met. Those criteria are requirements which establish applicability of the base case to individual plant designs. The Watts Bar electrical power supplies relied upon for motive III-26

PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES                        Revision 58 and control power for safe shutdown equipment that must operate for FSSD comply with those requirements is described in the following table:
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PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES                                Revision 58 NEI-00-01 Rev. 2 Appendix B.1 MHIF Base Case Applicability and Compliance Base Case Condition                              WBN Compliance The power supply in question must operate The applicable WBN FSSD power supplies at a nominal AC or DC voltage greater than all operate at greater than 110V (120V AC, 110 V. Specifically, this analysis does not     125V DC, 250V DC, 480V AC, and 6900V apply to AC and DC control power systems AC) operating at 12 V, 24 V, or 48 V. Nor is the analysis applicable to instrument loops regardless of operating voltage.
For the power supply in question, electrical For FSSD power sources, electrical coordination must exist between the             coordination exists between the supply side supply-side overcurrent protective              overcurrent protective device(s) and load-device(s) and load-side overcurrent             side overcurrent protective devices of protective devices of concern.                  concern. Proper selective tripping is based Achievement of proper selective tripping        on the guidance of IEEE 242. (Note 1) shall be based on the guidance of IEEE 242, or other acceptable criteria For 120 V AC and 125 V DC power                 For 120 V AC and 125 V DC FSSD power supplies, in addition to adequate               supplies the WBN design meets the coordination, a minimum size ratio of 2:1       minimum size ratio of 2:1 between the shall exist between the supply-side             supply-side protective device(s) and load-protective device(s) and load-side devices      side devices of concern.
of concern (for example, a distribution panel with a 50 A main circuit breaker cannot have any load-side breakers larger than 25 A). This stipulation adds additional margin to account for slower protective device clearing times of low-energy circuits.
The electrical system must be capable of        The WBN FSSD electrical power systems supplying the necessary fault current for       are capable of supplying the necessary sufficient time to ensure predictable           fault current for sufficient time to ensure operation of the overcurrent protective         predictable operation of the overcurrent devices in accordance with their time-          protective devices in accordance with their current characteristics.                        time-current characteristics. These features are demonstrated in the WBN electrical power system coordination and protection calculations.
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PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES                                Revision 58 NEI-00-01 Rev. 2 Appendix B.1 MHIF Base Case Applicability and Compliance Base Case Condition                                 WBN Compliance Each overcurrent protective device credited The WBN FSSD power supply overcurrent for interrupting fault current shall:             protective devices credited for interrupting Be applied within its ratings, including        fault current are:
voltage, continuous current, and              Applied within their ratings, including interrupting capacity                             voltage, continuous current, and Be listed or approved by a nationally                interrupting capacity recognized test laboratory (e.g., UL,         Listed or approved by UL to the ETL, CSA, etc.) to the applicable                 applicable product safety standard or product safety standard (fuses, molded            are designed and constructed in case circuit breakers, circuit protectors,        accordance with applicable ANSI and GFI devices) or be designed and                   NEMA standards. (Note 1) constructed in accordance with applicable ANSI and NEMA standards (protective relays, low and medium voltage switchgear).
Proper operation of the overcurrent devices The overcurrent protective devices shall be ensured by appropriate testing,          associated with FSSD electrical power inspection, maintenance, and configuration sources are included in the WBN electrical control.                                          inspection, testing, and maintenance program and are under the WBN configuration control program. (Note 1)
The electrical system associated with the         WBN electrical power systems associated power supply in question shall conform to a with the FSSD power sources conform to recognized grounding scheme.                      recognized grounding schemes. The 480 Recognized schemes include solidly                VAC and DC systems are ungrounded.
grounded, high impedance or resistance            The 120 VAC systems are grounded. The grounded, or ungrounded.                          6900 VAC system is high impedance grounded.
Note 1 - Power supplies whose load cables are not located in fire zones where the supply is credited do not pose a MHIF concern (e.g. Offsite power sources and their breaker control power sources are not safety-related nor Class 1E. But, they are not an MHIF concern because they are not credited where their load cables could be exposed to potential high impedance faults).
7.5               Current Transformer Secondaries When a secondary circuit of a current transformer (CT) opens due to a fire at a remote location, ionized gases and/or additional fires in other locations could be generated, resulting in fire propagation to additional fire areas. Fire hazards due to a fire-induced open circuit in the secondary of CTs installed in high energy panels (i.e., 6.9kV switchgear) of the Appendix R required and non-required power systems have been evaluated. Three types of CT circuits used in the auxiliary power system have been evaluated: ground fault, differential relaying, and protective relaying.
For Appendix R required and non-required 480V switchgear panels, the CT circuits are contained in the panels. For the CT secondary circuit to be opened by the fire, the fire has to be localized inside the switchgear assembly. The same is true for the 6.9kV switchgear panel ground fault circuit. Since it is contained within the 6.9kV panels, the fire has to be localized in III-29

PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES                                Revision 58 the switchgear assembly for the CT secondary circuit to be opened by a fire. Ground fault circuits do not, therefore, result in fire propagation to other fire areas.
The 6.9kV CT circuit that is connected to protective relaying and a current transducer is also contained within the switchgear panel. The output of the current transducer is connected to a remote indicator, and the current transducer is an electrical isolator. Additionally, the output-to-input of the current transducer has been tested for 1500V AC differential. Electrical isolation also exists for the Watt & VAR transducers used on the 6.9kV switchgear at WBN.
With three exceptions, the board differential relaying circuits are totally internal to the switchgear panels. The three exceptions are: (1) between the 6.9kV switchgear emergency supply feeders and the diesel generators which are included in the interaction analysis as required circuits; (2) between the 6.9kV Start and Unit Boards which are not required circuits; and (3) the CSST differential relaying circuits which are required offsite power circuits. Current imbalance created by an open CT circuit causes the protective differential relay to open the supply circuit breaker.
This removes primary power to the CT within the time required for protective relay and breaker operation. Since the EDG or CSST differential relay circuit can cause loss of the power train, it is evaluated as a required circuit. Likewise, current imbalance in the protective differential relay of the non-required circuits also opens the supply circuit breaker.
8.0              HIGH/LOW PRESSURE BOUNDARY INTERFACES Special considerations for high/low pressure interfaces to meet the requirements of 10CFR50 Appendix R are described in Generic Letters 81-12 (Part II, Reference 4.1.12) and 86-10 (Part II, Reference 4.1.16) and Information Notice 87-50 (Part II, Reference 4.1.21). Per Generic Letter 81-12, the following information is required for high/low pressure boundary interfaces in order to ensure that they are adequately protected for the effects of a single fire:
(1)      Identify each high/low pressure interface that uses redundant electrically controlled devices (such as two series motor operated valves) to isolate or preclude rupture of any primary coolant boundary.
(2)      Identify the essential cabling for each device.
(3)      Identify each location where the identified cables are separated by a barrier having less than a 3-hour fire rating.
(4)      For the areas identified in (3) above (if any), provide the bases and justification.
Per Generic Letter 86-10, the possibility of getting a hot short on all three phases of three phase AC circuits in the proper sequence to cause spurious operation of a motor is only required to be evaluated for cases involving high/low pressure interfaces. The same applies to ungrounded DC circuits regarding two hot shorts of proper polarity without grounding resulting in spurious operation of high/low pressure interfaces.
Per Information Notice 87-50, for those low pressure systems that connect to the reactor coolant system (a high pressure system) at least one isolation valve must remain closed despite any damage that may be caused by fire, because the high pressure from the reactor coolant system could result in failure of the low pressure piping.
Based on the above, a review of the systems credited for safe shutdown at WBN was conducted to identify potential high/low pressure interfaces. These interfaces were evaluated to III-30

PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES                                Revision 58 identify valves that, if spuriously opened, expose low pressure piping to high pressure resulting in failure of the low pressure system.
The control system for RHR valves has been designed to prohibit opening unless the reactor coolant pressure is low enough to prevent RHR piping failure. However, if these valves opened spuriously, exposure of RHR piping to high pressure may cause failure of the RHR system piping and render the system inoperable. Therefore, the RHR/RCS isolation valves (1/2-FCV-74-1, 2, 8, and 9) are considered high/low pressure interface valves.
Excess letdown is not required for safe shutdown. However, spurious opening of these valves could expose downstream piping to excess pressure that may cause failure resulting in the rupture of the primary coolant boundary. Therefore, the excess letdown isolation valves (1/2-FCV-62-55, and 56) are considered high/low pressure interface valves.
Normal letdown is not required for safe shutdown. However, spurious opening of these valves may cause failure to maintain RCS inventory control. Therefore, the normal letdown isolation valves (1/2-FCV-62-69 and 70) are considered high/low pressure interface valves.
The safety injection system (SIS)/RHR interface valve with the RCS is located in piping that connects the SIS with the RHR system at a point between the RCS/RHR isolation valves. SIS is not required for safe shutdown. However, spurious opening of valve 1/2-FCV-63-186 along with either 1/2-FCV-74-1-A or B could expose SIS piping to damaging pressure. Therefore, this valve is considered a high/low pressure interface.
The pressurizer PORVs and reactor head vent isolation valves are designed to function at high RCS operating pressure. They provide the safe shutdown function to initially remain closed for RCS inventory control purposes. The pressurizer PORVs also provide RCS pressure control during cool down. The primary method of RCS inventory control during cool down is to maintain pressurizer level while makeup is provided by injecting borated water through the RCP seals as part of seal cooling and the RCS cool down rate is adjusted by controlling steam generator level and pressure to provide RCS volume shrinkage equal to the volume of fluid injected through the RCP seals. The reactor head vent isolation valves (where available) and the pressurizer PORVs can also be used to reduce RCS inventory. Discharge from the RCS through these valves is directed to the inlet of the pressurizer relief tank (PRT). The inlet lines are sized to accommodate vent/relief discharge flow without piping or component failure. Continuous blowdown to the PRT may eventually cause spillage of excess coolant to containment through the PRT rupture disks. Therefore, the pressurizer PORVs and block valve combinations, and reactor head vent isolation valves are considered high/low interface valves.
9.0              LOCATION OF SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT, CABLES AND RACEWAYS The safe shutdown equipment list (Table 3-2) identifies the equipment, components, and sub-components relied on for fire safe shutdown.
The routing (conduits and tray nodes) of each safe shutdown cable was obtained from the Integrated Cable and Raceway Design System (ICRDS). This information was entered into a database concurrently with the corresponding room location of each conduit and cable tray node. The route of each safe shutdown cable by room and by fire area has been identified and later used as part of the separation analysis. For large rooms containing redundant paths of safe shutdown equipment and cables, equipment locations and cable routes were further refined by subdividing the room based on column lines. Walkdowns were conducted to verify the locations of the equipment and conduits.
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PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES                               Revision 58 10.0             SAFE SHUTDOWN SYSTEM SEPARATION EVALUATION METHODOLOGY 10.1             Overview of Evaluation Methodology The safe shutdown analysis first established the systems, components, and cables required for fire safe shutdown purposes. The locations of equipment and routing of cables were determined as described in previous sections. The separation criteria of Appendix R were evaluated on a fire area basis to meet the safe shutdown performance goals as identified in NRC generic letters and guidance documents.
The Appendix R analysis evaluated fire areas that contain systems, components, and cables required for fire safe shutdown. The turbine building, condensate demineralized waste evaporator (CDWE) building, and Yard specific plant locations that directly abut fire areas containing FSSD capabilities, were also included in the separation analysis. Plant structures that do not contain systems, components, or cables associated with FSSD capabilities, or which do not directly abut fire areas containing FSSD capabilities (e.g., service building, modification building, etc.) were not included in the separation analysis. The adequacy of barriers separating safe shutdown-related and non-safe shutdown-related buildings (such as between the control and turbine buildings) was evaluated.
The fire safe shutdown analysis was based on the evaluation of separation in the auxiliary, control, diesel generator, and reactor building, along with the intake pumping station. The auxiliary and diesel generator buildings, and the intake pumping station, were evaluated against the requirements of Appendix R Sections III.G.1, III.G.2a, III.G.2b, and III.G.2c. Detailed procedures have been developed to ensure fire safe shutdown capability in case of an Appendix R fire in the identified locations where applicable.
For purposes of this analysis, the entire control building was evaluated as a single alternative shutdown location under the criteria of Appendix R Section III.G.3 and III.L. Fire safe shutdown activities take place outside of the control building at the ACR and other manual action locations. Detailed procedures have been developed to ensure fire safe shutdown capability in case of an Appendix R fire in the control building.
The reactor buildings were analyzed in accordance with the criteria of Appendix R Sections III.G.2d, III.G.2e, and III.G.2f. Interactions were identified where less than 20 feet, free of intervening combustibles, exist between redundant safe shutdown paths or trains of components. Such interactions are resolved by some combination of protecting one redundant path or train of safe shutdown components with noncombustible radiant energy shields or by fire detectors and automatic suppression in the area. Detailed procedures have been developed to ensure fire safe shutdown capability in case of an Appendix R fire in either reactor building.
Interactions between redundant safe shutdown paths were identified based on the location of the components and cables of redundant safe shutdown trains. Interactions are defined as locations where components of redundant shutdown paths do not meet Appendix R separation criteria. Interactions which require resolution were identified when redundant capabilities did not meet the above criteria. These interactions were evaluated for their impact on the safe shutdown capability of the plant and their resolutions have been documented. The resolutions may consist of modifications, use of alternate equipment, manual operator actions, fire barrier and radiant energy shield installation, post-fire repairs, engineering evaluations prepared in accordance with the guidance of Generic Letter 86-10, or deviation requests.
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PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES                              Revision 58 10.2             Fire Area Evaluation Methodology Separation analyses were initially evaluated for viability on a fire area basis. The fire area separation analysis was effective where only a single room constituted a fire area, and where redundant capability existed outside of the fire area. Large rooms and specific fire areas containing redundant trains of safe shutdown systems, components, or cables have been further subdivided for purposes of the analysis. Where multiple rooms exist in the fire area, regulatory barriers (walls and floor/ceiling assemblies) with a 2-hour fire rating have been credited under Appendix R Section III.G.2c criteria. The 2-hour fire rating exceeds the requirements of Section III.G.2c. The 2-hour rating (as opposed to a minimum 1-hour rating) has been chosen because of the positive effect on fire protection IPEEE and PRA analyses.
Where the 2-hour fire rated barriers have been credited, they are identified as regulatory fire barriers, and automatic detection and suppression capabilities on both sides of the barriers have been evaluated per Section III.G.2c criteria. The fire rated non-regulatory fire barriers (maintained for property protection, but not required for Appendix R separation) have not been credited in the analysis.
Credit has been taken for a minimum of 20 feet of separation under Appendix R Section III.G.2b criteria in those fire areas that contain multiple rooms not separated by regulatory fire barriers.
Section III.G.2b criteria have also been utilized in large rooms that contain redundant trains of safe shutdown capability. Section III.G.2c criteria have been applied where 20 feet of separation was not available. Section III.G.2b criteria have been used in the large open areas of the auxiliary building and adjacent rooms which are not enclosed by regulatory fire barriers. It also applies to the B train 480V reactor MOV board rooms on 772 elevation, above the part-height 1-hour barrier separating redundant CCS pumps and cables, and in the electrical equipment room in the intake pumping station (IPS).
10.3             Analysis Volume Evaluation Methodology An analysis volume (AV) is a defined area subjected to a detailed Appendix R safe shutdown analysis to ensure that one train of FSSD capability is always available. The analysis volume can consist of an entire fire area or a portion of a larger fire area. When the analysis volume is a portion of the fire area, it can consist of multiple rooms, a single room, portions of a room (normally defined by column line locations), or any combination of the above. Each analysis volume that involves only a portion of a room includes a 20 foot wide (minimum) "buffer zone" between it and the adjacent analysis volume. The buffer zones are analyzed as part of the larger analysis volume and as a separate analysis volume.
In performing safe shutdown analyses, safe shutdown components and cables are assigned to the analysis volume containing the component. Additionally, components located in the buffer zones are assigned to an analysis volume for the buffer zone.
The safe shutdown analysis is performed assuming that all components and cables in the analysis volume are damaged. A set of safe shutdown equipment is then selected and corrective actions designated to ensure safe shutdown functions can be maintained with the selected equipment. Corrective actions consist of cable relocation, cable protection by electrical raceway fire barrier system (ERFBS), manual operator actions and/or application of Appendix R, Section III.G.2 separation criteria as described in Sections 10.1, 10.2 and 10.3.
10.3.1           Analysis Volume Types and Appendix R Compliance The following types of analysis volumes were identified and used for evaluating Appendix R compliance.
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PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES                                Revision 58
: a. Fire Area - The fire area is separated from other adjacent areas by rated fire barriers (walls, floors, & ceilings) that are sufficient to withstand the hazards associated with the area and, as necessary, to protect equipment in the area from a fire outside the area.
The fire area may be a single room or several individual rooms. If redundant safe shutdown cables are located in the analysis volume, they are protected by an ERFBS throughout the analysis volume (i.e., from rated fire barrier to rated fire barrier). For example an analysis volume consisting of an entire fire area (FA-19) is shown in Figure 1.
AV-44 (757-A4)
Figure 1 This analysis volume is bounded on all sides by 3-hour rated fire barriers. The 3-hour fire barriers provide for protection of safe shutdown components in accordance with Appendix R Section III.G. Redundant safe shutdown cables in the analysis volume are protected by an ERFBS throughout the analysis volume (i.e., from 3-hour rated fire barrier to 3-hour rated fire barrier).
: b. Single Room within a Fire Area - The room is separated from other adjacent rooms in a fire area by regulatory fire barriers (walls, floors, & ceilings) that have a 1-hour or greater fire rating. The fire barriers are provided in accordance with Appendix R Section III.G.2.a and III.G.2.c. If redundant safe shutdown cables are located in the analysis volume, they are protected by an ERFBS throughout the analysis volume (i.e., from regulatory fire barrier to regulatory fire barrier). An example of an analysis volume consisting of a single room within a fire area (FA-1) is shown in Figure 2.
AV-9 (692-A9)
Figure 2 This analysis volume is bounded on all sides by rated fire barriers. Fire propagation does not occur beyond the physical barriers of the room. This type of analysis volume configuration provides for protection of safe shutdown equipment in accordance with Appendix R Section III.G.2.a and G.2.c. Redundant cables requiring protection are protected with an ERFBS from the rated fire barrier to rated fire barrier.
: c. Combination of Rooms within a Fire Area - The combination of rooms in the analysis volume are separated from other analysis volumes within the same fire area by regulatory fire barriers that are rated for at least 1-hour. The regulatory fire barriers that separate the analysis volume from other analysis volumes in the fire area provide for protection of safe shutdown equipment in accordance with Appendix R Section III.G.2.
Except as discussed in Section 10.2 above and in Part VII, Section 2.5, "Partial Fire Wall III-34

PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES                                 Revision 58 Between CCS Pumps," if redundant safe shutdown cables are located in the analysis volume, they are protected by an ERFBS throughout the analysis volume (i.e., from regulatory fire barrier to regulatory fire barrier that establishes the analysis volume boundary). An example of this type analysis volume configuration is shown in Figure 3.
AV-27 (713-A2)            (713-A3)              (713-A4)             (713-A5)           (713-A30)
Figure 3 Combination of rooms within a Fire Area (dashed lines denote non-regulatory barrier room divisions)
In this example, rooms 713-A2 through A5 and 713-A30 were combined and evaluated as a single analysis volume (AV-27). Fire is unlikely to spread from one room to the next but, in any event, does not propagate beyond the regulatory barriers establishing the boundary of the analysis volume. ERFBS installed to protect redundant cables are applied from regulatory barrier to regulatory barrier and do not stop at the intermediate walls.
: d. Sections of Large General Areas - Analysis volumes consisting of sections of large general areas are separated from each other by "buffer zones." The buffer zones are greater than 20 feet in width. In large general areas where buffer zones are used that include intervening combustibles, enhanced automatic suppression and detection systems are installed in the large general area. Refer to FPR Part VII, Section 2.4, "Intervening Combustibles," for additional information. If redundant safe shutdown cables are located in the analysis volume, one train is selected for protection by an ERFBS. The ERFBS is applied throughout the analysis volume (i.e., from analysis boundary to analysis volume boundary); exceptions are noted and justified for the applicable analysis volumes in FPR Part VI. An example of this type of analysis volume is shown in Figures 4.1 and 4.2.
A15                            A10               A8              A6                              A1 AV-38                                                                AV-36 (737-A1BN)       (737-A1AN)
(737-A1B)                                                             (737-A1A)
Figure 4.1 A15                            A10               A8              A6                             A1 AV-37 (737-A1B)                (737-A1BN)       (737-A1AN)                 (737-A1A)
Figure 4.2 Sections of large general areas (Aux. Bldg. El. 737)
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PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES                               Revision 58 In this example, the 737' elevation of the auxiliary building was subdivided into smaller sections to facilitate analysis. First as shown in Figure 4.1, the 737' elevation was split into two main analysis volumes at column line A8 (AV-36 and AV-38). AV-36 covers the area between column lines A1 to A8. AV-38 covers the area between column lines A8 to A15. Each analysis volume includes a >20' buffer zone (737-A1BN and 737-A1AN) which forms the interface between the analysis volume subdivisions. Next as shown in Figure 4.2, a third analysis volume (AV-37) was formed that consisted of the AV-36 and AV-38 buffer zones. AV-37 consists of the area between column lines A6 to A10 and is approximately 42 feet in width.
TVA first evaluated the main analysis volumes (AV-36 and AV-38). In each of these analysis volumes, TVA performed an evaluation to ensure compliance with Appendix R Section III.G.2. Where cables of redundant safe shutdown equipment are located in an AV, one train is selected for protection with an ERFBS. The selected cables are protected from AV boundary to AV boundary. In this example, Train B cables are protected in the AV-36 area and Train A cables are protected in the AV-38 area. If a Train B cable were to transition AV-36, it would be protected from the rated fire barrier at A1 to the end of the analysis volume at A8.
TVA next evaluated the analysis volume created by combining the AV-36 and AV-38 buffer zones (AV-37). This evaluation addresses potential fires that may occur at the AV-36/AV-38 interface as well as address the potential for a fire to propagate across the interface. In performing the AV-37 analysis, TVA credited components and cables outside AV-37 to the maximum extent practical to ensure that separation between redundant trains was greater than 20 feet. Where cables of redundant safe shutdown equipment were located in AV-37, one train was selected for protection with an ERFBS.
Any ERFBS needed are installed on the selected safe shutdown equipment cables throughout the boundaries of AV-37.
This evaluation process results in an overlap area of greater than 20 feet where both trains of safe shutdown equipment cables are protected. For example, if Train A cables were selected to be protected throughout AV-37, both trains of safe shutdown equipment cables would be protected in AV-36's buffer zone (column lines A-6 to A-8) because Train B cables are protected throughout AV-36. In actual practice, the only cables that require protection in AV-37 are:
(1)       A conduit containing Channel D instrumentation cables (to ensure adequate instrumentation is available)
(2)       A conduit containing PORV and reactor head vent cables (for prevention of hot spurious shorts In each of the above cases, the conduits are wrapped throughout AV-36 and AV-37. For other components, TVA credited cables located outside AV-37 to achieve separation much greater than 20 feet.
: e. Sections of Large Rooms - Analysis volumes that consist of large room sections separated by an overlap region that is greater than 20 ft. The overlap region is considered part of both analysis volumes. If the overlap region contains intervening combustibles, enhanced automatic suppression and detection systems are installed in the large room. Refer to Section 2.4, "Intervening Combustibles," in Part VII for additional information. If redundant safe shutdown cables are located in the analysis III-36

PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES                            Revision 58 volume, they are protected by an ERFBS throughout the analysis volume (i.e., from analysis volume boundary to analysis volume boundary). An example of this type of analysis volume is shown in Figures 5.1 and 5.2.
A8              A6              A5             A4                 A3 AV-59 (772-A2A2)       (772-A2A3)         (772-A2A4)
(772-A2A1)
Figure 5.1 A8              A6              A5             A4                 A3 AV-60 (772-A2A1)      (772-A2A2)       (772-A2A3)
(772-A2A4)
Figure 5.2 Sections of large rooms (Aux. Bldg. El. 772)
Room 772-A2 is a large room subdivided into two analysis volumes to facilitate analysis (AV-59 and AV-60). As showing in Figure 5.1, AV-59 consists of sections A2A1, A2A2, and A2A3. As showing in Figure 5.2, AV-60 consists of sections A2A3 and A2A4.
Section A2A3 is the overlap area that is part of both analysis volumes. This overlap area was selected to provide a separation distance greater than 20 feet between the joining analysis volumes.
In each of these analysis volumes, TVA performed an evaluation to ensure compliance with Appendix R Section III.G.2. Where cables of redundant safe shutdown equipment are located in an AV, one train is selected for protection with an ERFBS. The selected cables are protected from AV boundary to AV boundary. In this example the only cables requiring ERFBS protection in AV-59 and AV-60 were located and protected in both AVs.
Table 3-3 identifies by analysis volume the rooms and portions of rooms included in the Appendix R separation analysis for each analysis volume. The compartmentation drawings, (Figures II-27A through II-46A excluding 37A) contained in Part II of the FPR, locate the fire areas and rooms at WBN.
Intervening combustibles consisting of exposed cable insulation in trays, ERFBS cable protection, or floor-based fixed and transient combustibles have been mitigated by:
(1)       Enhanced suppression consisting of automatic preaction sprinklers located at ceiling level and below obstructions to provide coverage of floor based fires.
(2)       Documented electrical cable protective device sizing to preclude electrical initiation of cable fire.
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PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES                              Revision 58 (3)        Limited flame spread of cable insulation/jacket material - New cables are required to meet IEEE-383 vertical tray test if available. Flame retardant coating is applied to non-IEEE-383 cables in accordance with Design Criteria WB-DC-30-4 (Part II, Reference 4.2.29).
(4)        Very low flame spread of Thermo-Lag 330-1.
(5)        Dedicated onsite fire brigade.
Refer to the intervening combustible deviation request in Part VII of the FPR for additional justification.
Where redundant cables or components could be damaged by fire in an analysis volume, that function was ensured primarily by either: 1) 1-hour raceway fire barriers (or radiant energy shields inside containment) along with automatic suppression and detection or 2) operator manual actions. Three hour raceway fire barriers are used where automatic suppression and detection are not provided.
11.0             Multiple Spurious Operation (MSO) Evaluation Regulatory Guide 1.189, Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants, Revision 2, formalized the requirements for addressing multiple fire induced circuit failures, or MSOs and multiple concurrent hot shorts. RG 1.189 (Part II, Reference 4.1.45) endorsed the methodology in NEI 00-01 Revision 2 (Part II, Reference 4.3.6) for addressing those issues. In accordance with the NEI 00-01 Rev. 2 guidance, an expert panel was used to identify plant specific scenarios that might be caused by MSOs. The results of this expert panel review was documented in calculation NUC-WBN-NTB-XDN0000002011002, WBN Unit 1 Multiple Spurious Operation Review for Regulatory Guide 1.189, Revision 2 (Part II, Reference 4.2.22). Subsequent evaluation of the identified scenarios for Unit 1 resulted in a number of deficiencies which were entered into the plant corrective action tracking system. Results of the scenario evaluation for Unit 2 are documented in Calculation EDQ0009992012000085, Multiple Spurious Operation Evaluation (Part II, Reference 4.2.3).
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PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES                         Revision 58 TABLE 3-1 SAFE SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS AND SUBSYSTEMS BY KEY Key 1A            Centrifugal Charging Paths Key 1B            Component Cooling Paths Emergency Raw Cooling Water Paths Key 1C (TVA System 67, Essential Raw Cooling Water System)
Key 2            Charging Flow Control Paths Key 4            Volume Control Tank Suction Key 5            RWST Suction Key 7            RCS Pressure Boundary Isolation Key 8            Excess Letdown Isolation Key 9            RCP Thermal Barrier Cooling Key 10            Containment Isolation Key 11            Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Paths Key 12            Steam Generator Level Control Paths Key 13            Auxiliary Control Air Key 14            Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Paths using FCV-1-15 Key 16            Steam Generator Level Control using TDAFW Pump Key 17            Condensate Storage Tank Supply Paths to AFW Key 19            Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Suction Paths from ERCW Key 20            Secondary Side Isolation Using MSIVs Key 21            Secondary Side Isolation Using TB Valves Key 22            Main Feedwater Isolation Valves Key 24            Steam Generator Blowdown Isolation Valves Key 25            Secondary Side Safety Valves Key 26            Secondary Side Relief Valves Key 28            RCS Pressure Control Key 29            Reactor Trip System Key 30            RHR Cooling Flow Paths Key 31            RHR Pump Paths Key 36            Safety Injection System Accumulator Isolation Key 37A            Main Control Room HVAC Paths Key 37C            Diesel Generator Building HVAC Paths Key 37J            Containment Cooling System Key 37K            480V Transformer Rooms HVAC Key 37O            CCS/AFW Pump Coolers and AFW Pump Room HVAC Key 38, 38A         Electrical Power (includes Onsite and Offsite)
Key 48            RCS Letdown III-39

PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES          Revision 58 TABLE 3 SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST EQUIPMENT        DESCRIPTION 0-BAT-236-1-D    125 V VITAL BATTERY I 0-BAT-236-2-E    125 V VITAL BATTERY II 0-BAT-236-3-F    125 V VITAL BATTERY III 0-BAT-236-4-G    125 V VITAL BATTERY IV 0-BAT-236-5-S    125 V VITAL BATTERY V 0-BAT-239-1      250V BATTERY 1 0-BAT-239-2      250V BATTERY 2 0-BD-200-A       6.9KV COMMON BOARD A 0-BD-200-C       COMMON SERVICE STATION BOARD C 0-BD-200-D       COMMON SERVICE STATION BOARD D 0-BD-206-1       480V AUXILIARY BUILDING COMMON BOARD 0-BD-236-1-D     125V VITAL BATTERY BOARD I 0-BD-236-2-E     125V VITAL BATTERY BOARD II 0-BD-236-3-F     125V VITAL BATTERY BOARD III 0-BD-236-4-G     125V VITAL BATTERY BOARD IV 0-BD-239-1       250V BATTERY BD1 0-BD-239-2       250V BATTERY BD2 0-BKD-31-590     480v SHUTDOWN BD RM 2A EXHAUST BACKDRAFT DAMPER 0-BKD-31-591     480v SHUTDOWN BD RM 2A EXHAUST BACKDRAFT DAMPER 0-BKD-31-592     480v SHUTDOWN BD RM 1B EXHAUST BACKDRAFT DAMPER 0-BKD-31-593     480v SHUTDOWN BD RM 1B EXHAUST BACKDRAFT DAMPER 0-CHGR-236-1-D   125V VITAL BATTERY CHARGER 1-D 0-CHGR-236-2-E   125V VITAL BATTERY CHARGER 2-E 0-CHGR-236-3-F   125V VITAL BATTERY CHARGER 3-F 0-CHGR-236-4-G   125V VITAL BATTERY CHARGER 4-G 0-CHGR-236-6-S   125V VITAL BATTERY CHARGER 6-S 0-CHGR-236-7-S   125V VITAL BATTERY CHARGER 7-S 0-CHGR-236-8-S   125V VITAL BATTERY CHARGER 8-S 0-CHGR-236-9-S   125V VITAL BATTERY CHARGER 9-S 0-CHGR-239-1     250V DC BATTERY CHARGER 1 0-CHGR-239-2     250V DC BATTERY CHARGER 2 0-DPL-239-1      250VDC TURBINE BLDG DISTRIBUTION BOARD 1 0-DPL-239-2      250VDC TURBINE BLDG DISTRIBUTION BOARD 2 0-FCO-31-11-B    MCR HVAC DAMPER 0-FCO-31-12-A    MCR HVAC DAMPER 0-FCO-31-82-A    MCR HVAC DAMPER 0-FCO-31-91-B    MCR HVAC DAMPER 0-FCV-26-126-A   HP FP AB TRAIN A HDR VALVE 0-FCV-26-127-B   HP FP AUX BLDG TRAIN B HDR VALVE 0-FCV-26-13-B    HPFP TRAIN B HDR FCV TO YARD 0-FCV-26-15      HPFP COMMON HDR FCV 0-FCV-26-16      HPFP COMMON HDR FCV 0-FCV-26-17-B    HPFP COMMON HEADER TO YARD FCV 0-FCV-26-6-A     HPFP TRAIN A HDR FCV TO YARD 0-FCV-67-144-B   CCS HX C ERCW BYPASS FCV 0-FCV-67-151-A   CCS HX C DISCHARGE VLV (HDR A) 0-FCV-67-152-B   CCS HX C DISCHARGE VLV (HDR B) 0-FCV-67-205-A   STA AIR COMPR ERCW SUP HDR 1A ISOL 0-FCV-67-208-B   STA AIR COMPR ERCW SUP HDR 1B ISOL 0-FCV-70-12-B    CCS HX C OUTLET VALVE III-40

PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES          Revision 58 TABLE 3 SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST EQUIPMENT         DESCRIPTION 0-FCV-70-194-B    SFPCS HX SUPPLY HEADER FCV 0-FCV-70-197-A    SFPCS HX SUPPLY HDR FCV 0-FCV-70-22-B     CCS HX C INLET VALVE 0-FI-67-226       ERCW FLOW TO CCS HX-C INDICATOR 0-FT-67-226       ERCW TO CCS HX-C FLOW TRANSMITTER 0-INV-235-1-D     SPARE CHANNEL I VITAL INVERTER 0-INV-235-2-E     SPARE CHANNEL II VITAL INVERTER 0-INV-235-3-F     SPARE CHANNEL III VITAL INVERTER 0-INV-235-4-G     SPARE CHANNEL IV VITAL INVERTER 0-ISV-70-524A     CCS SUPPLY TO SFP HX-A ISOL 0-ISV-70-524B     CCS SUPPLY TO SFP HX-B ISOL VLV 0-MTR-26-1-A      HIGH PRESSURE FIRE PUMP 0-MTR-26-4-B      HIGH PRESSURE FIRE PUMP 0-MTR-26-9-A      HIGH PRESSURE FIRE PUMP 0-MTR-26-11-B     HIGH PRESSURE FIRE PUMP 0-MTR-31-11-B     MCR AHU B-B MOTOR 0-MTR-31-12-A     MCR AHU A-A MOTOR 0-MTR-31-80/1-A   CW CIRC PUMP A-A 0-MTR-31-80/2-A   WATER CHILLER A-A 0-MTR-31-96/1-B   CW CIRC PUMP B-B 0-MTR-31-96/2-B   WATER CHILLER B-B 0-MTR-32-25       CONT & SERV AIR COMPR A 0-MTR-32-26       CONT & SERV AIR COMPR B 0-MTR-32-27       CONT & SERV AIR COMPR C 0-MTR-32-461      AUX AIR COMP A-A CAM TIMER/AIR DRYER FCV 0-MTR-32-462      AUX AIR COMP B-B CAM TIMER/AIR DRYER FCV 0-MTR-32-4900     STATION AIR COMPRESSOR D 0-MTR-32-5800-A   CONTROL AIR COMPRESSOR C-S (ALIGNED TO TRAIN A) 0-MTR-32-5800-B   CONTROL AIR COMPRESSOR C-S (ALIGNED TO TRAIN B) 0-MTR-32-60-A     CONTROL AIR COMPRESSOR A-A 0-MTR-32-86-B     CONTROL AIR COMPRESSOR B-B 0-MTR-67-28-A     ERCW PUMP MOTOR A-A 0-MTR-67-32-A     ERCW PUMP MOTOR B-A 0-MTR-67-36-A     ERCW PUMP MOTOR C-A 0-MTR-67-40-A     ERCW PUMP MOTOR D-A 0-MTR-67-47-B     ERCW PUMP MOTOR E-B 0-MTR-67-51-B     ERCW PUMP MOTOR F-B 0-MTR-67-55-B     ERCW PUMP MOTOR G-B 0-MTR-67-59-B     ERCW PUMP MOTOR H-B 0-MTR-70-51-S     CCS PUMP C-S MOTOR 0-MTR-78-9-B      SPENT FUEL PIT PUMP B-B 0-MTR-78-12-A     SPENT FUEL PIT PUMP A-A 0-MTR-78-35-S     SPENT FUEL PIT PUMP C-S 0-OXF-206-A       AUXILIARY BUILDING COMMON BOARD TRANSFORMER A 0-PMP-26-3150     DIESEL DRIVEN FIRE PUMP 0-PNL-236-1-S     480 VAC VITAL DISCONNECT PNL CHANNEL I 0-PNL-236-2-S     480V AC VITAL DISCONNECT PNL CHANNEL II 0-PNL-236-3-S     480V AC VITAL DISCONNECT PNL CHANNEL III 0-PNL-236-4-S     480V AC VITAL DISCONNECT PNL CHANNEL IV 0-TANK-77-2701    LIQUID NITROGEN STORAGE TANK III-41

PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES             Revision 58 TABLE 3 SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST EQUIPMENT            DESCRIPTION 0-TB-31-80/2-A       WATER CHILLER A-A 0-TB-31-96/2-B       WATER CHILLER B-B 0-TCV-67-1051-A      MAIN CONTROL RM HVAC TCV 0-TCV-67-1053-B      MAIN CONTROL RM HVAC TCV 0-TE-70-162          CCS TEMPERATURE ELEMENT 0-TI-70-162          ERCW/CCS HX-C OUTLET TEMP (CCS) 0-XSW-236-1-S        480V AC VITAL TRANSFER SWITCH I 0-XSW-236-2-S        480V AC VITAL TRANSFER SWITCH II 0-XSW-236-3-S        480V AC VITAL TRANSFER SWITCH III 0-XSW-236-4-S        480V AC VITAL TRANSFER SWITCH IV 0-XSW-236-68AC1-S    480V AC TRANSFER SWITCH, NORM/ALT CHARGERS 6-S/8-S 0-XSW-236-68AC2-S    480V AC TRANSFER SWITCH, SELECT CHARGERS 6-S/8-S 0-XSW-236-68DC1-S    125V DC TRANSFER SWITCH, SELECT BATTERY BOARDS 1/2 0-XSW-236-68DC2-S    125V DC TRANSFER SWITCH, SELECT CHARGERS 6-S/8-S 0-XSW-236-79AC1-S    480V AC TRANSFER SWITCH, NORM/ALT, CHARGER 7-S/9-S 0-XSW-236-79AC2-S    480V AC TRANSFER SWITCH, SELECT CHARGERS 7-S/9-S 0-XSW-236-79DC1-S    125V DC TRANSFER SWITCH, SELECT BATTERY BOARDS 3/4 0-XSW-236-79DC2-S    125V DC TRANSFER SWITCH, SELECT CHARGERS 7-S/9-S 1-BD-211-A-A         6.9KV SHUTDOWN BOARD 1A-A 1-BD-211-B-B         6.9KV SHUTDOWN BOARD 1B-B 1-BD-212-A1-A        480V SHUTDOWN BOARD 1A1-A 1-BD-212-A2-A        480V SHUTDOWN BOARD 1A2-A 1-BD-212-B1-B        480V SHUTDOWN BOARD 1B1-B 1-BD-212-B2-B        480V SHUTDOWN BOARD 1B2-B 1-BD-235-1-D         120V AC VITAL POWER BOARD 1-I 1-BD-235-2-E         120V AC VITAL POWER BOARD 1-II 1-BD-235-3-F         120V AC VITAL POWER BOARD 1-III 1-BD-235-4-G         120V AC VITAL POWER BOARD 1-IV 1-BD-237-A           INSTRUMENT POWER DISTRIBUTION PANEL 1A 1-BD-237-B           INSTRUMENT POWER DISTRIBUTION PANEL 1B 1-BKR-99-L116/1B-A   REACTOR TRIP SWGR A 1-BKR-99-L116/1C-B   REACTOR TRIP SWGR B 1-DG-82-A-A          UNIT 1 TRAIN A DIESEL GENERATOR 1-DG-82-B-B          UNIT 1 TRAIN B DIESEL GENERATOR 1-DPL-264-1          120V TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER DISTRIBUTION PANEL 1 1-FCO-30-244A        480V TRANSFORMER RM 1A INTAKE AIR DAMPER 1-FCO-30-244B        480V TRANSFORMER RM 1A INTAKE AIR DAMPER 1-FCO-30-248A        480V TRANSFORMER RM 1B INTAKE AIR DAMPER 1-FCO-30-248B        480V TRANSFORMER RM 1B INTAKE AIR DAMPER 1-FCO-30-443-A       DIESEL GENERATOR VENT FAN DAMPER 1-FCO-30-445-B       DIESEL GENERATOR VENT FAN DAMPER 1-FCO-30-447-A       DG 1A-A ROOM EXHAUST FAN 1A MOTOR 1-FCO-30-449-B       DIESEL GENERATOR 1B-B ROOM EXHAUST FAN 1B 1-FCO-30-451-A       DG 1A-A ROOM EXHAUST FAN 2A MOTOR 1-FCO-30-453-B       DIESEL GENERATOR 1B-B ROOM EXHAUST FAN 2B 1-FCO-30-459-A       DG 1A-A ELECTRIC BOARD ROOM EXHAUST FAN MOTOR 1-FCO-30-461-B       DIESEL GEN 1B-B 480V ELEC BD ROOM EXHAUST FAN 1-FCV-1-103          MAIN STEAM COOL DOWN VALVE 1-FCV-1-104          MAIN STEAM DUMP VALVE 1-FCV-1-105          MAIN STEAM DUMP VALVE III-42

PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES          Revision 58 TABLE 3 SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST EQUIPMENT       DESCRIPTION 1-FCV-1-106     MAIN STEAM DUMP VALVE 1-FCV-1-107     MAIN STEAM COOL DOWN VALVE 1-FCV-1-108     MAIN STEAM DUMP VALVE 1-FCV-1-109     MAIN STEAM DUMP VALVE 1-FCV-1-11      #2 SG MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVE 1-FCV-1-110     MAIN STEAM DUMP VALVE 1-FCV-1-111     MAIN STEAM COOL DOWN VALVE 1-FCV-1-112     MAIN STEAM DUMP VALVE 1-FCV-1-113     MAIN STEAM COOL DOWN VALVE 1-FCV-1-114     MAIN STEAM DUMP VALVE 1-FCV-1-147-A   STEAM LINE WARMING VALVE LOOP 1 1-FCV-1-148-B   STEAM LINE WARMING VALVE LOOP 2 1-FCV-1-149-A   STEAM LINE WARMING VALVE LOOP 3 1-FCV-1-14-A    SG 2 BLOWDOWN CONTROL VALVE 1-FCV-1-150-B   #4 SG MSIV BYPASS 1-FCV-1-15-A    AFWPT STEAM SUPPLY FROM SG 1 FLOW CONTROL VALVE 1-FCV-1-17-A    STEAM FLOW TO AUX FWPT ISOL VALVE 1-FCV-1-181-A   SG 1 BLOWDOWN ISOLATION VALVE 1-FCV-1-182-B   SG 2 BLOWDOWN ISOLATION VALVE 1-FCV-1-183-A   SG 3 BLOWDOWN ISOLATION VALVE 1-FCV-1-184-B   SG 4 BLOWDOWN ISOLATION VALVE 1-FCV-1-18-B    STEAM FLOW TO AUX FWPT ISOLATION VALVE 1-FCV-1-22      #3 SG MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVE 1-FCV-1-25-B    SG 3 BLOWDOWN CONTROL VALVE 1-FCV-1-275     MSR A2 LOW POWER BYPASS CONTROL VALVE 1-FCV-1-277     MSR B2 LOW POWER BYPASS CONTROL VALVE 1-FCV-1-279     MSR C2 LOW POWER BYPASS CONTROL VALVE 1-FCV-1-284     MSR A1 LOW POWER BYPASS CONTROL VALVE 1-FCV-1-29      #4 SG MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVE 1-FCV-1-291     MSR B1 LOW POWER BYPASS CONTROL VALVE 1-FCV-1-298     MSR C1 LOW POWER BYPASS CONTROL VALVE 1-FCV-1-32-A    SG 4 BLOWDOWN CONTROL VALVE 1-FCV-1-36      MAIN FW PUMP TURBINE HP STOP VALVE 1-FCV-1-37      MAIN FW PUMP TURBINE HP CONTROL VALVE 1-FCV-1-4       #1 SG MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVE 1-FCV-1-43      MAIN FW PUMP TURBINE HP STOP VALVE 1-FCV-1-44      MAIN FW PUMP TURBINE HP CONTROL VALVE 1-FCV-1-51-S    AFW PUMP TURBINE TRIP & THROTTLE VALVE 1-FCV-1-52      TDAFWP TURBINE GOVERNOR VALVE 1-FCV-1-61      MAIN TURBINE CONTROL VALVE 1-FCV-1-62      MAIN TURBINE CONTROL VALVE 1-FCV-1-64      MAIN TURBINE CONTROL VALVE 1-FCV-1-65      MAIN TURBINE CONTROL VALVE 1-FCV-1-67      MAIN TURBINE CONTROL VALVE 1-FCV-1-68      MAIN TURBINE CONTROL VALVE 1-FCV-1-70      MAIN TURBINE CONTROL VALVE 1-FCV-1-71      MAIN TURBINE CONTROL VALVE 1-FCV-1-75      MOISTURE SEPARATOR REHEATER A2 CONTROL VALVE 1-FCV-1-77      MOISTURE SEPARATOR REHEATER B2 CONTROL VALVE 1-FCV-1-79      MOISTURE SEPARATOR REHEATER C2 CONTROL VALVE III-43

PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES          Revision 58 TABLE 3 SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST EQUIPMENT        DESCRIPTION 1-FCV-1-7-B      SG 1 BLOWDOWN CONTROL VALVE 1-FCV-1-84       MOISTURE SEPARATOR REHEATER A1 CONTROL VALVE 1-FCV-1-91       MOISTURE SEPARATOR REHEATER B1 CONTROL VALVE 1-FCV-1-98       MOISTURE SEPARATOR REHEATER C1 CONTROL VALVE 1-FCV-26-240-A   CONTAINMENT STANDPIPE ISOLATION VALVE 1-FCV-26-241-B   ANNULUS STANDPIPE ISOLATION VALVE 1-FCV-26-242-A   ANNULUS STANDPIPE ISOLATION VALVE 1-FCV-26-243-A   RCP SPRAY ISOLATION VALVE 1-FCV-26-244-B   ANNULUS SPRINKLER ISOLATION VALVE 1-FCV-26-245-A   ANNULUS SPRINKLER ISOLATION VALVE 1-FCV-30-10-A    UPPER CONTAINMENT PURGE AIR SUPPLY 1-FCV-30-14-A    LOWER CONTAINMENT PURGE AIR SUPPLY 1-FCV-30-15-B    LOWER CONTAINMENT PURGE AIR SUPPLY 1-FCV-30-16-B    LOWER COMPARTMENT PURGE ISOLATION VALVE 1-FCV-30-17-A    LOWER COMPARTMENT PURGE ISOLATION VALVE 1-FCV-30-19-B    INSTRUMENT ROOM PURGE AIR SUPPLY 1-FCV-30-20-A    INSTRUMENT ROOM PURGE AIR SUPPLY 1-FCV-30-37-B    LOWER COMPARTMENT PURGE ISOLATION VALVE 1-FCV-30-40-A    LOWER COMPARTMENT PURGE ISOLATION VALVE 1-FCV-30-50-B    UPPER CONTAINMENT PURGE AIR EXHAUST 1-FCV-30-51-A    UPPER CONTAINMENT PURGE AIR EXHAUST 1-FCV-30-52-A    UPPER CONTAINMENT PURGE AIR EXHAUST 1-FCV-30-53-B    UPPER CONTAINMENT PURGE AIR EXHAUST 1-FCV-30-56-A    LOWER CONTAINMENT PURGE AIR EXHAUST 1-FCV-30-57-B    LOWER CONTAINMENT PURGE AIR EXHAUST 1-FCV-30-58-B    INSTRUMENT ROOM PURGE AIR EXHAUST 1-FCV-30-59-A    INSTRUMENT ROOM PURGE AIR EXHAUST 1-FCV-30-7-A     UPPER CONTAINMENT PURGE AIR SUPPLY 1-FCV-30-8-B     UPPER CONTAINMENT PURGE AIR SUPPLY 1-FCV-30-9-B     UPPER CONTAINMENT PURGE AIR SUPPLY 1-FCV-3-100-B    STEAM GENERATOR 4 FEEDWATER ISOLATION VALVE 1-FCV-3-103      STEAM GENERATOR 4 FW CONTROL VALVE 1-FCV-3-103A     STEAM GENERATOR 4 FW BYPASS VALVE 1-FCV-3-116A-A   ERCW HDR A ISOLATION VALVE 1-FCV-3-116B-A   ERCW HDR A ISOLATION VALVE 1-FCV-3-126A-B   ERCW HDR B ISOLATION VALVE 1-FCV-3-126B-B   ERCW HDR B ISOLATION VALVE 1-FCV-3-136A-A   ERCW HDR A ISOLATION VALVE 1-FCV-3-136B-A   ERCW HDR A ISOLATION VALVE 1-FCV-3-179A-B   ERCW HDR B ISOLATION VALVE 1-FCV-3-179B-B   ERCW HDR B ISOLATION VALVE 1-FCV-32-110-A   RB TRAIN A NON-ESSENTIAL CONTROL AIR ISLN VLV 1-FCV-3-236      STEAM GENERATOR 1 FW BYPASS ISOLATION VALVE 1-FCV-3-239      STEAM GENERATOR 2 FW BYPASS ISOL SOLENOID VALVE 1-FCV-3-242      STEAM GENERATOR 3 FW BYPASS ISOL VALVE 1-FCV-3-245      STEAM GENERATOR 4 FW BYPASS ISOLATION VALVE 1-FCV-3-33-A     STEAM GENERATOR 1 FEEDWATER ISOLATION VALVE 1-FCV-3-35       STEAM GENERATOR 1 FW CONTROL VALVE 1-FCV-3-35A      STEAM GENERATOR 1 FW BYPASS VALVE 1-FCV-3-47-B     STEAM GENERATOR 2 FEEDWATER ISOLATION VALVE III-44

PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES            Revision 58 TABLE 3 SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST EQUIPMENT         DESCRIPTION 1-FCV-3-48        STEAM GENERATOR 2 FW CONTROL VALVE 1-FCV-3-48A       STEAM GENERATOR 2 FW BYPASS VALVE 1-FCV-3-87-A      STEAM GENERATOR 3 FEEDWATER ISOLATION VALVE 1-FCV-3-90        STEAM GENERATOR 3 FW CONTROL VALVE 1-FCV-3-90A       STEAM GENERATOR 3 FW BYPASS VALVE 1-FCV-62-1228-A   CCP SUCTION HI-POINT VENT 1-FCV-62-1229-B   CCP SUCTION HI-POINT VENT 1-FCV-62-22       RCP 2 SEAL RETURN FCV 1-FCV-62-35       RCP 3 SEAL RETURN FCV 1-FCV-62-48       RCP 4 SEAL RETURN FCV 1-FCV-62-55       EXCESS LETDOWN ISOLATION VALVE 1-FCV-62-56       EXCESS LETDOWN ISOL VALVE 1-FCV-62-69-A     REACTOR COOLANT LOOP 3 LETDOWN FLOW VALVE 1-FCV-62-70-A     REACTOR COOLANT LOOP 3 LETDOWN FLOW VALVE 1-FCV-62-72-A     REGEN HTX LETDOWN ISLN VLV A 1-FCV-62-73-A     REGEN HTX LETDOWN ISLN VLV B 1-FCV-62-74-A     REGEN HTX LETDOWN ISLN VLV C 1-FCV-62-84-A     CHARGING FLOW TO RCS SPRAY VALVE 1-FCV-62-9        RCP 1 SEAL RETURN FCV 1-FCV-62-90-A     CHARGING FLOW ISOLATION VALVE 1-FCV-62-91-B     CHARGING FLOW ISOLATION VALVE 1-FCV-62-93       NORMAL MAKEUP FLOW CONTROL VALVE 1-FCV-62-98-A     CHGING PMP 1A-A FCV 1-FCV-62-99-B     CHGING PMP 1A-A FCV 1-FCV-63-118-A    SIS ACCUMULATOR TANK 1 FLOW ISOLATION VALVE 1-FCV-63-11-B     RHR PUMP SUPPLY TO SIS PUMPS 1-FCV-63-172-B    RHR TO RCS HOT LEG 1 & 3 ISOLATION VALVE 1-FCV-63-186      RHR SUPPLY TEST LINE VALVE 1-FCV-63-1-A      RWST TO RHR PUMP FCV 1-FCV-63-25-B     SIS BORON INJECTION TANK SHUTOFF VLV 1-FCV-63-26-A     SIS BORON INJECTION TANK SHUTOFF VLV 1-FCV-63-39-A     SIS BORON INJECTION TANK SHUTOFF 1-FCV-63-40-B     SIS BORON INJECTION TANK SHUTOFF 1-FCV-63-67-B     SIS ACCUMULATOR TANK 4 FLOW ISOLATION VALVE 1-FCV-63-72-A     CONTAINMENT SUMP TO RHR PUMP A-A 1-FCV-63-73-B     CONTAINMENT SUMP TO RHR PUMP B-B 1-FCV-63-80-A     SIS ACCUMULATOR TANK 3 FLOW ISOLATION VALVE 1-FCV-63-8-A      RHR HX 1A TO CVCS CHARGING PMP CONTROL VALVE 1-FCV-63-93-A     SIS TO RCS LOOPS 2 & 3 FLOW CONTROL VALVE 1-FCV-63-94-B     SIS TO RCS LOOPS 1 & 4 FLOW CONTROL VALVE 1-FCV-63-98-B     SIS ACCUMULATOR TANK 2 FLOW ISOLATION VALVE 1-FCV-67-103-B    LOWER CNTMT 1B CLRS DISCH ISLN VLV INSIDE CNTMT 1-FCV-67-104-A    LOWER CNTMT 1B CLRS DISCH ISLN VLV OUTSIDE CNTMT 1-FCV-67-105-B    LOWER CNTMT 1B CLRS SUPPLY ISLN VLV INSIDE CNTMT 1-FCV-67-107-A    LOWER CNTMT 1D CLRS SUPPLY ISLN VLV OUTSIDE CNTMT 1-FCV-67-10A-B    ERCW STRAINER 1B-B BACKWASH VLV 1-FCV-67-10B-B    ERCW STRAINER 1B-B FLUSH VLV 1-FCV-67-111-B    LOWER CNTMT 1D CLRS DISCH ISLN VLV INSIDE CNTMT 1-FCV-67-112-A    LOWER CNTMT 1D CLRS DISCH ISLN VLV OUTSIDE CNTMT 1-FCV-67-113-B    LOWER CNTMT 1D CLRS SUPPLY ISLN VLV INSIDE CNTMT III-45

PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES            Revision 58 TABLE 3 SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST EQUIPMENT        DESCRIPTION 1-FCV-67-123-B   CNTMT SPRAY HX 1B SUPPLY VLV 1-FCV-67-124-B   CNTMT SPRAY HX 1B DISCHARGE VLV 1-FCV-67-125-A   CONTAINMENT SPRAY HX 1A SUPPLY VLV 1-FCV-67-126-A   CNTMT SPRAY HX 1A DISCHARGE VLV 1-FCV-67-127-A   AUX BLDG AIR CLRS SUP HDR 1A FCV 1-FCV-67-128-B   AUX BLDG AIR CLRS HDR 1B ISLN VLV 1-FCV-67-143-A   CCS HX A ERCW BYPASS FCV 1-FCV-67-146-A   CCS HX A DISCHARGE CONTROL VLV 1-FCV-67-147-A   ERCW SUP HDR 1A TO HDR 2B ISOL VLV 1-FCV-67-162-A   CCS/AFW PUMP SPACE COOLER FLOW CONT AOV 1-FCV-67-164-B   CCS/AFW PUMP RM COOLER 1B FLOW CONT AOV 1-FCV-67-168-A   CCP 1A ROOM COOLER ERCW ISOL 1-FCV-67-170-B   CCP-1B ROOM COOLER ISOL VALVE 1-FCV-67-188-A   RHR PUMP 1A-A RM COOLER ERCW ISOL AOV 1-FCV-67-190-B   RHR PUMP 1B-B RM COOLER ERCW ISOL AOV 1-FCV-67-223-A   SUPPLY HDR 1B TO HDR 2A ISLN VLV 1-FCV-67-22-A    ERCW HDR 1A ISLN VLV BEFORE STRAINER 1-FCV-67-24-B    ERCW HDR 1B ISLN VLV BEFORE STRAINER 1-FCV-67-458-A   ERCW TO CCS HX A ISLN VLV 1-FCV-67-478-B   ERCW TO CCS HX A ISLN VLV 1-FCV-67-66-A    EMERG DSL HT EXH 1A1 & 1A2 SUPP VALVE FM HDR 1A 1-FCV-67-67-B    EMERG DSL HT EXH 1B1 & 1B2 SUPP VALVE FM HDR 1B 1-FCV-67-81-A    AUX BLDG ERCW SUP HDR 1A ISLN VLV 1-FCV-67-82-B    AUX BLDG ERCW SUP HDR 1B ISLN VLV 1-FCV-67-83-B    LOWER CNTMT 1A CLRS SUPPLY ISLN VLV OUTSIDE CNTMT 1-FCV-67-87-A    LOWER CNTMT 1A CLRS DISCH ISLN VLV INSIDE CNTMT 1-FCV-67-88-B    LOWER CNTMT 1A CLRS DISCH ISLN VLV OUTSIDE CNTMT 1-FCV-67-89-A    LOWER CNTMT 1A CLRS SUPPLY ISLN VLV INSIDE CNTMT 1-FCV-67-91-B    LOWER CNTMT 1C CLRS SUPPLY ISLN VLV OUTSIDE CNTMT 1-FCV-67-95-A    LOWER CNTMT 1C CLRS DISCH ISLN VLV INSIDE CNTMT 1-FCV-67-96-B    LOWER CNTMT 1C CLRS DISCH ISLN VLV OUTSIDE CNTMT 1-FCV-67-97-A    LOWER CNTMT 1C CLRS SUPPLY ISLN VLV INSIDE CNTMT 1-FCV-67-99-A    LOWER CNTMT 1B CLRS SUPPLY ISLN VLV OUTSIDE CNTMT 1-FCV-67-9A-A    ERCW STRAINER 1A-A BACKWASH VALVE 1-FCV-67-9B-A    ERCW STRAINER 1A-A FLUSH VLV 1-FCV-68-332-B   REACTOR COOLANT PRESS RELIEF FLOW CONTROL VALVE 1-FCV-68-333-A   REACTOR COOLANT PRESS RELIEF FLOW CONTROL VALVE 1-FCV-70-10-A    CCS HX A & C OUTLET ISLN VLV 1-FCV-70-133-A   RCP THERMAL BARRIER CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE 1-FCV-70-134-B   RCP THERMAL BARRIER CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE 1-FCV-70-13-B    CCS HX A & C INLET ISOLATION VLV 1-FCV-70-143-A   EXCESS LTDN HX INLET ISLN VLV 1-FCV-70-153-B   RHR HX B-B OUTLET VALVE 1-FCV-70-156-A   RHR HX A-A OUTLET VLV 1-FCV-70-23-A    CCS HX A & C INLET ISOLATION VLV 1-FCV-70-25-A    CCS HX A INLET VLV 1-FCV-70-26-B    CCS PMPS 1A-A & 1B-B TO C-S VLV 1-FCV-70-27-B    CCS PMPS 1A-A & 1B-B TO C-S VLV 1-FCV-70-2-A     RHR HX A HDR INLET VLV 1-FCV-70-34-B    CCS PMPS 1A-A TO 1B-B ISLN VLV III-46

PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES          Revision 58 TABLE 3 SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST EQUIPMENT       DESCRIPTION 1-FCV-70-3-B    RHR HX 1B-B HDR INLET VLV 1-FCV-70-4-A    MISC EQUIPMENT HDR INLET VLV 1-FCV-70-64-B   CCS PMPS 1A-A & 1B-B TO C-S VLV 1-FCV-70-74-B   CCS PMPS 1A-A & 1B-B TO C-S VLV 1-FCV-70-75-B   RHR HX 1B-B RETURN HDR ISLN VLV 1-FCV-70-85-B   EXCESS LTDN HX OUTLET VLV 1-FCV-70-87-B   RCP THERMAL BARRIER RETURN CONTAINMENT ISOL VALVE 1-FCV-70-8-A    CCS HX A OUTLET VLV 1-FCV-70-90-A   RCP THERMAL BARRIER RETURN CONTAINMENT ISOL VALVE 1-FCV-70-9-B    CCS HX A & C OUTLET ISLN VLV 1-FCV-72-21-B   RWST TO SPRAY HDR 1B FCV 1-FCV-72-22-A   RWST TO SPRAY HDR 1A FCV 1-FCV-72-2-B    CNTMT SPRAY HDR 1B ISLN VLV 1-FCV-72-39-A   CNTMT SPRAY HDR 1A ISLN VLV 1-FCV-72-40-A   RHR SPRAY HDR 1A ISOLATION VALVE 1-FCV-72-41-B   RHR SPRAY HDR 1B ISOLATION VALVE 1-FCV-72-44-A   CNTMT SUMP TO SPRAY HDR 1A FCV 1-FCV-72-45-B   CNTMT SUMP TO SPRAY HDR 1B FCV 1-FCV-74-12-A   RHR PUMP 1A-A MINIMUM FLOW VALVE 1-FCV-74-16     RHR HX 1A OUTLET FLOW CONTROL VALVE 1-FCV-74-1-A    RHR SYSTEM ISOLATION VALVE 1-FCV-74-21-B   RHR PUMP 1B-B INLET FCV 1-FCV-74-24-B   RHR PUMP 1B-B MINIMUM FLOW VALVE 1-FCV-74-28     RHR HX 1B OUTLET FLOW CONTROL VALVE 1-FCV-74-2-B    RHR SYSTEM ISOLATION VALVE 1-FCV-74-32     RHR HEAT EXCHANGER BYPASS 1-FCV-74-33-A   RHR PUMP HEAT EXCHANGER 1A BYPASS VALVE 1-FCV-74-35-B   RHR PUMP HEAT EXCHANGER 1B BYPASS VALVE 1-FCV-74-3-A    RHR PUMP 1A-A INLET FCV 1-FCV-74-8-A    RHR SYSTEM ISOLATION BYPASS VALVE 1-FCV-74-9-B    RHR SYSTEM ISOLATION BY-PASS VALVE 1-FI-3-142A     TDAFW PUMP DISCHARGE FLOW 1-FI-3-147A     AFW FLOW TO #3SG 1-FI-3-147B     AFW FLOW TO #3SG 1-FI-3-147C     AFW FLOW TO #3 SG 1-FI-3-155A     AFW FLOW TO #2SG 1-FI-3-155B     AFW FLOW TO #2SG 1-FI-3-155C     AFW FLOW TO #2 SG 1-FI-3-163A     AFW FLOW TO #1SG 1-FI-3-163B     AFW FLOW TO #1SG 1-FI-3-163C     AFW FLOW TO #1 SG 1-FI-3-170A     AFW FLOW TO #4SG 1-FI-3-170B     AFW FLOW TO #4 SG 1-FI-3-170C     AFW FLOW TO #4 SG 1-FI-62-14A     RCP-2 SEAL INJECTION FLOW INDICATOR 1-FI-62-1A      RCP-1 SEAL INJECTION FLOW INDICATOR 1-FI-62-27A     RCP-3 SEAL INJECTION FLOW INDICATOR 1-FI-62-40A     RCP-4 SEAL INJECTION FLOW INDICATOR 1-FI-62-93A     NORMAL CHARGING FLOW INDICATOR 1-FI-62-93C     NORMAL CHARGING FLOW INDICATOR (ACR)
III-47

PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES          Revision 58 TABLE 3 SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST EQUIPMENT         DESCRIPTION 1-FI-67-61        ERCW SUPPLY HEADER 1A FLOW INDICATOR 1-FI-67-61C       ERCW SUPPLY HEADER 1A FLOW INDICATOR 1-FI-67-62        ERCW SUPPLY HEADER 1B FLOW INDICATOR 1-FI-67-62C       ERCW SUPPLY HEADER 1B FLOW INDICATOR 1-FIC-3-103       SG 4 FEEDWATER CONTROL VALVE FLOW CONTROLLER 1-FIC-3-35        SG 1 FEEDWATER CONTROL VALVE FLOW CONTROLLER 1-FIC-3-48        SG 2 FEEDWATER CONTROL VALVE FLOW CONTROLLER 1-FIC-3-90        SG 3 FEEDWATER CONTROL VALVE FLOW CONTROLLER 1-FM-62-56        EXCESS LETDOWN FLOW CONTROL VALVE E/P MODULE 1-FSV-1-11A-A     #2SG MSIV OPERATING SOLENOID 1-FSV-1-11B-B     #2SG MSIV OPERATING SOLENOID 1-FSV-1-11D-A     #2SG MSIV OPERATING SOLENOID 1-FSV-1-11E-A     #2SG MSIV OPERATING SOLENOID 1-FSV-1-11F-A     #2SG MSIV OPERATING SOLENOID 1-FSV-1-11G-B     #2SG MSIV OPERATING SOLENOID 1-FSV-1-11H-B     #2SG MSIV OPERATING SOLENOID 1-FSV-1-11J-B     #2SG MSIV OPERATING SOLENOID 1-FSV-1-22A-A     #3SG MSIV OPERATING SOLENOID 1-FSV-1-22B-B     #3SG MSIV OPERATING SOLENOID 1-FSV-1-22D-A     #3SG MSIV OPERATING SOLENOID 1-FSV-1-22E-A     #3SG MSIV OPERATING SOLENOID 1-FSV-1-22F-A     #3SG MSIV OPERATING SOLENOID 1-FSV-1-22G-B     #3SG MSIV OPERATING SOLENOID 1-FSV-1-22H-B     #3SG MSIV OPERATING SOLENOID 1-FSV-1-22J-B     #3SG MSIV OPERATING SOLENOID 1-FSV-1-29A-A     #4SG MSIV OPERATING SOLENOID 1-FSV-1-29B-B     #4SG MSIV OPERATING SOLENOID 1-FSV-1-29D-A     #4SG MSIV OPERATING SOLENOID 1-FSV-1-29E-A     #4SG MSIV OPERATING SOLENOID 1-FSV-1-29F-A     #4SG MSIV OPERATING SOLENOID 1-FSV-1-29G-B     #4SG MSIV OPERATING SOLENOID 1-FSV-1-29H-B     #4SG MSIV OPERATING SOLENOID 1-FSV-1-29J-B     #4SG MSIV OPERATING SOLENOID 1-FSV-1-4A-A      #1SG MSIV OPERATING SOLENOID 1-FSV-1-4B-B      #1SG MSIV OPERATING SOLENOID 1-FSV-1-4D-A      #1SG MSIV OPERATING SOLENOID 1-FSV-1-4E-A      #1SG MSIV OPERATING SOLENOID 1-FSV-1-4F-A      #1SG MSIV OPERATING SOLENOID 1-FSV-1-4G-B      #1SG MSIV OPERATING SOLENOID 1-FSV-1-4H-B      #1SG MSIV OPERATING SOLENOID 1-FSV-1-4J-B      #1SG MSIV OPERATING SOLENOID 1-FSV-3-103C1-A   STEAM GENERATOR 4 FW BYPASS SOLENOID VALVE 1-FSV-3-103C2-A   STEAM GENERATOR 4 FW BYPASS SOLENOID VALVE 1-FSV-3-103AA-A   STEAM GENERATOR 4 FEEDWATER CONTROL SOLENOID VALVE 1-FSV-3-103AB-A   STEAM GENERATOR 4 FEEDWATER CONTROL SOLENOID VALVE 1-FSV-3-103BA-B   STEAM GENERATOR 4 FEEDWATER CONTROL SOLENOID VALVE 1-FSV-3-103BB-B   STEAM GENERATOR 4 FEEDWATER CONTROL SOLENOID VALVE 1-FSV-3-236A-A    STEAM GENERATOR 1 FW BYPASS ISOL SOLENOID VALVE 1-FSV-3-236B-B    STEAM GENERATOR 1 FW BYPASS ISOL SOLENOID VALVE 1-FSV-3-239A-A    STEAM GENERATOR 2 FW BYPASS ISOL SOLENOID VALVE III-48

PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES          Revision 58 TABLE 3 SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST EQUIPMENT        DESCRIPTION 1-FSV-3-239B-B   STEAM GENERATOR 2 FW BYPASS ISOL SOLENOID VALVE 1-FSV-3-242A-A   STEAM GENERATOR 3 FW BYPASS ISOL SOLENOID VALVE 1-FSV-3-242B-B   STEAM GENERATOR 3 FW BYPASS ISOL SOLENOID VALVE 1-FSV-3-245A-A   STEAM GENERATOR 4 FW BYPASS ISOL SOLENOID VALVE 1-FSV-3-245B-B   STEAM GENERATOR 4 FW BYPASS ISOL SOLENOID VALVE 1-FSV-3-35AA-A   STEAM GENERATOR 1 FEEDWATER CONTROL SOLENOID VALVE 1-FSV-3-35AB-A   STEAM GENERATOR 1 FEEDWATER CONTROL SOLENOID VALVE 1-FSV-3-35BA-B   STEAM GENERATOR 1 FEEDWATER CONTROL SOLENOID VALVE 1-FSV-3-35BB-B   STEAM GENERATOR 1 FEEDWATER CONTROL SOLENOID VALVE 1-FSV-3-35C1-B   STEAM GENERATOR 1 FW BYPASS SOLENOID VALVE 1-FSV-3-35C2-B   STEAM GENERATOR 1 FW BYPASS SOLENOID VALVE 1-FSV-3-48C1-A   STEAM GENERATOR 2 FW BYPASS SOLENOID VALVE 1-FSV-3-48C2-A   STEAM GENERATOR 2 FW BYPASS SOLENOID VALVE 1-FSV-3-48AA-A   STEAM GENERATOR 2 FW CONTROL SOLENOID VALVE 1-FSV-3-48AB-A   STEAM GENERATOR 2 FEEDWATER CONTROL SOLENOID VALVE 1-FSV-3-48BA-B   STEAM GENERATOR 2 FEEDWATER CONTROL SOLENOID VALVE 1-FSV-3-48BB-B   STEAM GENERATOR 2 FEEDWATER CONTROL SOLENOID VALVE 1-FSV-3-90C1-B   STEAM GENERATOR 3 FW BYPASS SOLENOID VALVE 1-FSV-3-90C2-B   STEAM GENERATOR 3 FW BYPASS SOLENOID VALVE 1-FSV-3-90AA-A   STEAM GENERATOR 3 FEEDWATER CONTROL SOLENOID VALVE 1-FSV-3-90AB-A   STEAM GENERATOR 3 FEEDWATER CONTROL SOLENOID VALVE 1-FSV-3-90BA-B   STEAM GENERATOR 3 FEEDWATER CONTROL SOLENOID VALVE 1-FSV-3-90BB-B   STEAM GENERATOR 3 FEEDWATER CONTROL SOLENOID VALVE 1-FSV-47-24      TRAIN A MAIN TURBINE TRIP SOLENOID 1-FSV-47-26A-A   EHC OVERSPEED PROTECTION CONTROL 1-FSV-47-26B-B   EHC OVERSPEED PROTECTION CONTROL 1-FSV-47-27      TRAIN B MAIN TURBINE TRIP SOLENOID 1-FSV-67-162-A   CCS AND AUX FW PMP CLR A SOL VALVE 1-FSV-67-164-B   CCS AND AUX FW PMP CLR B SOL VALVE 1-FSV-68-394-A   REACTOR VESSEL HEAD VENT ISOLATION VALVE 1-FSV-68-395-B   REACTOR VESSEL HEAD VENT ISOLATION VALVE 1-FSV-68-396-B   REACTOR VESSEL HEAD VENT THROTTLE VALVE 1-FSV-68-397-A   REACTOR VESSEL HEAD VENT THROTTLE VALVE 1-FSV-77-2561    MDAFW N2 ISOLATION VALVE 1-FSV-77-2562    TDAFW N2 ISOLATION VALVE 1-FT-3-142       TDAFW PUMP DISCHARGE FLOW TRANSMITTER 1-FT-3-147A      AFW TO #3SG FLOW TRANSMITTER 1-FT-3-147B      AFW TO #3SG FLOW TRANSMITTER 1-FT-3-155A      AFW TO #2 SG FLOW TRANSMITTER 1-FT-3-155B      AFW TO #2 SG FLOW TRANSMITTER 1-FT-3-163A      AFW TO #1 SG FLOW TRANSMITTER 1-FT-3-163B      SG1 FW FLOW 1-FT-3-170A      AFW TO #4 SG FLOW TRANSMITTER 1-FT-3-170B      SG4 FW FLOW 1-FT-62-1        RCP-1 SEAL INJECTION FLOW TRANSMITTER 1-FT-62-14       RCP-2 SEAL INJECTION FLOW TRANSMITTER 1-FT-62-27       RCP-3 SEAL INJECTION FLOW TRANSMITTER 1-FT-62-40       RCP-4 SEAL INJECTION FLOW TRANSMITTER 1-FT-62-93A      CHARGING HEADER FLOW CONT 1-FT-62-93C      CVCS CHARGING HEADER FLOW III-49

PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES       Revision 58 TABLE 3 SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST EQUIPMENT             DESCRIPTION 1-FT-67-61            ERCW SUPPLY HEADER 1A FLOW TRANSMITTER 1-FT-67-61C           ERCW SUPPLY HEADER 1A FLOW TRANSMITTER 1-FT-67-62            ERCW SUPPLY HEADER 1B FLOW TRANSMITTER 1-FT-67-62C           ERCW SUPPLY HEADER 1B FLOW TRANSMITTER 1-FT-70-81A           THERMAL BARRIER OUTLET FLOW TRANSMITTER 1-FT-70-81B           THERMAL BARRIER BOOSTER PUMP DISCHARGE FLOW 1-FT-70-81D           THERMAL BARRIER OUTLET FLOW TRANSMITTER 1-FT-70-81E           THERMAL BARRIER BOOSTER PUMP DISCHARGE FLOW 1-HCV-74-36           RHR HX-A BYPASS MANUAL ISOL VLV 1-HCV-74-37           RHR HX-B BYPASS MANUAL ISOL VLV 1-HS-30-63A-A         MANUAL CI PH-A MCR HAND SWITCH 1-HS-30-63B-B         MANUAL CI PH-A MCR HAND SWITCH 1-HS-30-64A-A         MANUAL CI PH-B MCR HAND SWITCH 1-HS-30-64B-B         MANUAL CI PH-B MCR HAND SWITCH 1-HS-30-68A-A         MANUAL CI PH-B MCR HAND SWITCH 1-HS-30-68B-B         MANUAL CI PH-B MCR HAND SWITCH 1-HS-63-133A-T        HAND SWITCH 1-HS-63-133B-T        HAND SWITCH 1-HTR-68-341A/A1-A7   PZR BACKUP HEATER GROUP A 1-HTR-68-341D/B1-B7   PZR BACKUP HEATER GROUP B 1-HTR-68-341F/D1-D6   PZR CONTROL HEATER GROUP D 1-HTR-68-341H/C1-C6   PZR BACKUP HEATER GROUP C 1-HTX-62-66           CVCS SEAL WATER HTX 1-INV-235-1-D         CHANNEL I VITAL INVERTER 1-INV-235-2-E         CHANNEL II VITAL INVERTER 1-INV-235-3-F         CHANNEL III VITAL INVERTER 1-INV-235-4-G         CHANNEL IV VITAL INVERTER 1-INV-264-1           TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER INVERTER 1-ISV-3-827           SG 2 MDAFWP LCV ISOLATION VALVE 1-ISV-3-828           SG 1 MDAFW LCV ISOLATION VALVE 1-ISV-62-526          CCP 1A-A SEAL INJECTION BYPASS 1-ISV-62-527          CCP 1A-A DISCHARGE VALVE 1-ISV-62-533          CCP 1B-B DISCHARGE VALVE 1-ISV-62-534          CCP 1B-B SEAL INJECTION BYPASS 1-ISV-62-535          1-FCV-62-93 ISOLATION VALVE 1-ISV-62-537          FCV-62-89 UPSTREAM ISOL 1-ISV-62-539          FCV-62-89 DOWNSTREAM ISOL 1-ISV-62-549          SEAL WATER INJECTION FILTER OUTLET 1-ISV-62-550          SEAL WATER INJECTION FILTER OUTLET 1-ISV-70-545A         RHR HX 1A-A INLET ISOLATION VALVE (MANUAL) 1-ISV-70-574          CCS SUPPLY TO NON-REGEN LETDOWN HX ISOL 1-ISV-70-587          CCS OUT/SEAL WTR & NON-RGN LETDOWN HX ISO 1-ISV-70-705          EXCESS LETDOWN HX CCS RETURN ISOLATION VALVE 1-PNL-L-276-1000      N2 OPERATING STATION 1-PNL-L-276-1001      N2 OPERATING STATION 1-LCV-3-148           MDAFW FLOW CONTROL VALVE TO #3SG 1-LCV-3-156           MDAFW FLOW CONTROL VALVE TO #2SG 1-LCV-3-164           MDAFW FLOW CONTROL VALVE TO #1SG 1-LCV-3-171           MDAFW FLOW CONTROL VALVE TO #4SG 1-LCV-3-172           TDAFW FLOW CONTROL VALVE TO #3SG III-50

PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES        Revision 58 TABLE 3 SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST EQUIPMENT        DESCRIPTION 1-LCV-3-173      TDAFW FLOW CONTROL VALVE TO #2SG 1-LCV-3-174      TDAFW FLOW CONTROL VALVE TO #1SG 1-LCV-3-175      TDAFW FLOW CONTROL VALVE TO #4SG 1-LCV-62-132-A   VCT OUTLET ISOLATION VALVE 1-LCV-62-133-B   VCT OUTLET ISOLATION VALVE 1-LCV-62-135-A   RWST TO CHARGING PUMPS VALVE CONTROL 1-LCV-62-136-B   RWST TO CHARGING PUMPS VALVE CONTROL 1-LI-3-106       #4SG LEVEL INDICATOR (NR) 1-LI-3-107       #4SG LEVEL INDICATOR (NR) 1-LI-3-110       #4SG LEVEL INDICATOR (NR) 1-LI-3-111A      #4SG LEVEL INDICATOR (WR) 1-LI-3-148C      SG 3 NARROW RANGE LEVEL 1-LI-3-156C      SG 2 NARROW RANGE LEVEL 1-LI-3-164C      SG 1 NARROW RANGE LEVEL 1-LI-3-171C      SG 4 NARROW RANGE LEVEL 1-LI-3-38        #1SG LEVEL INDICATOR (NR) 1-LI-3-39        #1SG LEVEL INDICATOR (NR) 1-LI-3-42        #1SG LEVEL INDICATOR (NR) 1-LI-3-43A       #1SG LEVEL INDICATOR (WR) 1-LI-3-51        #2SG LEVEL INDICATOR (NR) 1-LI-3-52        #2SG LEVEL INDICATOR (NR) 1-LI-3-55        #2SG LEVEL INDICATOR (NR) 1-LI-3-56A       #2SG LEVEL INDICATOR (WR) 1-LI-3-93        #3SG LEVEL INDICATOR (NR) 1-LI-3-94        #3SG LEVEL INDICATOR (NR) 1-LI-3-97        #3SG LEVEL INDICATOR (NR) 1-LI-3-98A       #3SG LEVEL INDICATOR (WR) 1-LI-62-129A     VCT LEVEL INDICATION 1-LI-62-129C     VCT LEVEL INDICATION 1-LI-63-50       RWST LEVEL INDICATOR 1-LI-63-52       RWST LEVEL INDICATOR 1-LI-68-320-F    PZR LEVEL INDICATOR 1-LI-68-325C     RCS PRESSURIZER LEVEL 1-LI-68-326C     RCS PRESSURIZER LEVEL 1-LI-68-335A-E   PZR LEVEL INDICATOR 1-LI-68-339A-D   PZR LEVEL INDICATOR 1-LIC-3-35A      STEAM GENERATOR 1 FEEDWATER BYPASS VALVE CONTROLLER 1-LIC-3-48A      STEAM GENERATOR 2 FEEDWATER BYPASS VALVE CONTROLLER 1-LIC-3-90A      STEAM GENERATOR 3 FEEDWATER BYPASS VALVE CONTROLLER 1-LIC-3-103A     STEAM GENERATOR 4 FEEDWATER BYPASS VALVE CONTROLLER 1-LIC-3-148A     SG 3 LEVEL CONTROLLER 1-LIC-3-156A     SG 2 LEVEL CONTROLLER 1-LIC-3-164A     SG 1 LEVEL CONTROLLER 1-LIC-3-171A     SG 4 LEVEL CONTROLLER 1-LIC-3-172A     TDAFW STEAM GENERATOR 3 LEVEL CONTROLLER 1-LIC-3-173A     TDAFW STEAM GENERATOR 2 LEVEL CONTROLLER 1-LIC-3-174A     TDAFW STEAM GENERATOR 1 LEVEL CONTROLLER 1-LIC-3-175A     TDAFW STEAM GENERATOR 4 LEVEL CONTROLLER 1-LM-3-148A      1-LCV-3-148/148A MODULATOR 1-LM-3-156A      1-LCV-3-156/156A MODULATOR III-51

PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Revision 58 TABLE 3 SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST EQUIPMENT        DESCRIPTION 1-LM-3-164A      1-LCV-3-164/164A MODULATOR 1-LM-3-171A      1-LCV-3-171/171A MODULATOR 1-LM-3-172A      LCV-3-172 MODULATOR 1-LM-3-173A      LCV-3-173 MODULATOR 1-LM-3-174A      LCV-3-174 MODULATOR 1-LM-3-175A      LCV-3-175 MODULATOR 1-LT-3-106       #4SG LEVEL TRANSMITTER (NR) 1-LT-3-107       #4SG LEVEL TRANSMITTER (NR) 1-LT-3-110       #4SG LEVEL TRANSMITTER (NR) 1-LT-3-111       #4SG LEVEL TRANSMITTER (WR) 1-LT-3-148       #SG 3 LEVEL TRANSMITTER (NR) 1-LT-3-156       #SG 2 LEVEL TRANSMITTER (NR) 1-LT-3-164       #SG 1 LEVEL TRANSMITTER (NR) 1-LT-3-171       #SG 4 LEVEL TRANSMITTER (NR) 1-LT-3-172       TDAFW SG 3 LEVEL TRANSMITTER 1-LT-3-173       TDAFW SG 2 LEVEL TRANSMITTER 1-LT-3-174       TDAFW SG 1 LEVEL TRANSMITTER 1-LT-3-175       TDAFW SG 4 LEVEL TRANSMITTER 1-LT-3-38        #1SG LEVEL TRANSMITTER (NR) 1-LT-3-39        #1SG LEVEL TRANSMITTER (NR) 1-LT-3-42        #1SG LEVEL TRANSMITTER (NR) 1-LT-3-43        #1SG LEVEL TRANSMITTER (WR) 1-LT-3-51        #2SG LEVEL TRANSMITTER (NR) 1-LT-3-52        #2SG LEVEL TRANSMITTER (NR) 1-LT-3-55        #2SG LEVEL TRANSMITTER (NR) 1-LT-3-56        #2SG LEVEL TRANSMITTER (WR) 1-LT-3-93        #3SG LEVEL TRANSMITTER (NR) 1-LT-3-94        #3SG LEVEL TRANSMITTER (NR) 1-LT-3-97        #3SG LEVEL TRANSMITTER (NR) 1-LT-3-98        #3SG LEVEL TRANSMITTER (WR) 1-LT-62-129A     VCT LEVEL TRANSMITTER 1-LT-62-129C     VCT LEVEL TRANSMITTER 1-LT-62-130A     VCT LEVEL TRANSMITTER 1-LT-63-50       RWST LEVEL TRANSMITTER 1-LT-63-51       RWST LEVEL TRANSMITTER 1-LT-63-52       RWST LEVEL TRANSMITTER 1-LT-63-53       RWST LEVEL TRANSMITTER 1-LT-63-180-D    CONTAINMENT SUMP LEVEL TRANSMITTER 1-LT-63-181-E    CONTAINMENT SUMP LEVEL TRANSMITTER 1-LT-63-182-F    CONTAINMENT SUMP LEVEL TRANSMITTER 1-LT-63-183-G    CONTAINMENT SUMP LEVEL TRANSMITTER 1-LT-68-320-F    PZR LEVEL TRANSMITTER 1-LT-68-325C     RCS PRESSURIZER LEVEL 1-LT-68-326C     RCS PRESSURIZER LEVEL 1-LT-68-335      PZR LEVEL TRANSMITTER 1-LT-68-339      PZR LEVEL TRANSMITTER 1-MCC-213-A1-A   REACTOR MOV BD 1A1-A 1-MCC-213-A2-A   REACTOR MOV BD 1A2-A 1-MCC-213-B1-B   REACTOR MOV BD 1B1-B 1-MCC-213-B2-B   REACTOR MOV BD 1B2-B III-52

PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES        Revision 58 TABLE 3 SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST EQUIPMENT         DESCRIPTION 1-MCC-214-A1-A    480V CONT AND AUX BLDG VENT BOARD 1A1-A 1-MCC-214-B1-B    480V CONT AND AUX BLDG VENT BOARD 1B1-B 1-MCC-214-A2-A    C&A Building Vent Board 1A2-A 1-MCC-214-B2-B    C&A Building Vent Board 1B2-B 1-MCC-215-A1-A    DIESEL AUX BD 1A1-A 1-MCC-215-A2-A    DIESEL AUX BD 1A2-A 1-MCC-215-B1-B    DIESEL AUX BD 1B1-B 1-MCC-215-B2-B    DIESEL AUX BD 1B2-B 1-MTR-30-175-A    RHR PMP 1A-A RM COOLER MOTOR 1-MTR-30-176-B    RHR PMP 1B-B RM COOLER MOTOR 1-MTR-30-182-B    CCP 1B-B ROOM COOLER FAN 1-MTR-30-183-A    CCP 1A-A ROOM COOLER FAN 1-MTR-30-190-A    CCS/AFW PUMP SPACE COOLER 1A-A MOTOR 1-MTR-30-191-B    CCS/AFW PUMP SPACE COOLER 1B-B MOTOR 1-MTR-30-214      TURBINE DRIVEN AUX FW PUMP ROOM VENT FAN 1-MTR-30-244F-A   XMFR RM 1A EXHAUST FAN 1A1-A MOTOR 1-MTR-30-244G-A   XMFR RM 1A EXHAUST FAN 1A2-A MOTOR 1-MTR-30-244H-A   XMFR RM 1A EXHAUST FAN 1A3-A MOTOR 1-MTR-30-248E-B   XMFR RM 1B EXHAUST FAN 1B1-B MOTOR 1-MTR-30-248F-B   XMFR RM 1B EXHAUST FAN 1B2-B MOTOR 1-MTR-30-248G-B   XMFR RM 1B EXHAUST FAN 1B3-B MOTOR 1-MTR-30-38-A     CONTAINMENT AIR RETURN FAN 1A-A 1-MTR-30-39-B     CONTAINMENT AIR RETURN FAN 1B-B 1-MTR-30-447-A    DG 1A-A ROOM EXHAUST FAN 1A MOTOR 1-MTR-30-449-B    DG 1B-B ROOM EXHAUST FAN 1B MOTOR 1-MTR-30-451-A    DG 1A-A ROOM EXHAUST FAN 2A MOTOR 1-MTR-30-453-B    DG 1B-B ROOM EXHAUST FAN 2B MOTOR 1-MTR-30-459-A    DG 1A-A ELECTRIC BOARD ROOM EXHAUST FAN MOTOR 1-MTR-30-461-B    DG 1B-B ELECTRIC BOARD ROOM EXHAUST FAN MOTOR 1-MTR-30-491-A    DG ELEC PANEL/GENERATOR VENT FAN MOTOR 1-MTR-30-493-B    DG ELEC PANEL/GENERATOR VENT FAN MOTOR 1-MTR-30-74-A     CONTAINMENT LOWER COMPARTMENT COOLER 1A-A MOTOR 1-MTR-30-75-B     CONTAINMENT LOWER COMPARTMENT COOLER 1B-B MOTOR 1-MTR-30-77-A     CONTAINMENT LOWER COMPARTMENT COOLER 1C-A MOTOR 1-MTR-30-78-B     CONTAINMENT LOWER COMPARTMENT COOLER 1D-B MOTOR 1-MTR-30-80-B     CONTROL ROD DRIVE MOTOR COOLER 1D-B 1-MTR-30-83-A     CONTROL ROD DRIVE MOTOR COOLER 1A-A 1-MTR-30-88-A     CONTROL ROD DRIVE MOTOR COOLER 1C-A 1-MTR-30-92-B     CONTROL ROD DRIVE MOTOR COOLER 1B-B 1-MTR-3-118-A     MDAFW PUMP 1A-A 1-MTR-3-118D-A    AUX FEEDWATER PUMP A-A LUBE OIL PUMP A-A 1-MTR-3-128-B     MDAFW PUMP 1B-B 1-MTR-3-128D-B    AUX FEEDWATER PUMP B-B LUBE OIL PUMP B-B 1-MTR-62-104-B    CENTRIFUGAL CHARGING PUMP 1B-B 1-MTR-62-108-A    CENTRIFUGAL CHARGING PUMP 1A-A 1-MTR-63-10-A     SAFETY INJECTION PUMP 1A-A 1-MTR-63-15-B     SAFETY INJECTION PUMP 1B-B 1-MTR-67-10-B     ERCW STRAINER 1B-B 1-MTR-67-431-A    ERCW SCREEN WASH PUMP 1A-A 1-MTR-67-434-A    ERCW TRAVELING SCREEN 1A-A III-53

PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES   Revision 58 TABLE 3 SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST EQUIPMENT         DESCRIPTION 1-MTR-67-440-B    ERCW SCREEN WASH PUMP 1B-B 1-MTR-67-445-B    ERCW TRAVELING SCREEN 1B-B 1-MTR-67-9-A      ERCW STRAINER 1A-A 1-MTR-68-31       REACTOR COOLING PUMP NUMBER 2 1-MTR-68-50       REACTOR COOLING PUMP NUMBER 3 1-MTR-68-73       REACTOR COOLING PUMP NUMBER 4 1-MTR-68-8        REACTOR COOLANT PUMP NUMBER 1 1-MTR-70-130-B    THERMAL BARRIER BOOSTER PUMP 1B-B 1-MTR-70-131-A    THERMAL BARRIER BOOSTER PUMP 1A-A 1-MTR-70-38-B     COMPONENT COOLING SYSTEM PUMP 1B-B 1-MTR-70-46-A     COMPONENT COOLING SYSTEM PUMP 1A-A 1-MTR-72-10-B     CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP 1B-B 1-MTR-72-27-A     CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP 1A-A 1-MTR-74-10-A     RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL PUMP 1A-A 1-MTR-74-20-B     RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL PUMP 1B-B 1-MTR-81-3        PRIMARY MAKEUP WATER PUMP 1A 1-MTR-81-7        PRIMARY MAKEUP WATER PUMP 1B 1-NI-92-131-D     SOURCE RANGE NEUTRON DETECTOR 1-NI-92-132-E     SOURCE RANGE NEUTRON DETECTOR 1-NI-92-138       NEUTRON SOURCE RANGE INDICATOR 1-NI-92-138P      PORTABLE NEUTRON SOURCE RANGE INDICATOR 1-NM-92-131-D     AMPLIFIER 1-NM-92-132-E     AMPLIFIER 1-NMD-92-131-D    NEUTRON DETECTOR 1-NMD-92-132-E    NEUTRON DETECTOR 1-OXF-212-A1-A    480V SHUTDOWN BOARD XMFR 1A1-A 1-OXF-212-A2-A    480V SHUTDOWN BOARD XMFR 1A2-A 1-OXF-212-B1-B    480V SHUTDOWN BOARD XMFR 1B1-B 1-OXF-212-B2-B    480V SHUTDOWN BOARD XMFR 1B2-B 1-PCV-1-12        STEAM GENERATOR ATMOSPHERIC RELIEF VALVE 1-PCV-1-23        STEAM GENERATOR ATMOSPHERIC RELIEF VALVE 1-PCV-1-30        STEAM GENERATOR ATMOSPHERIC RELIEF VALVE 1-PCV-1-5         STEAM GENERATOR ATMOSPHERIC RELIEF VALVE 1-PCV-68-334-B    PZR PORV 1-PCV-68-340A-A   PZR PORV 1-PCV-68-340B     PRESSURIZER SPRAY VALVE 1-PCV-68-340D     PRESSURIZER SPRAY VALVE 1-PDI-30-42-K     U1 CONTAINMENT PRESSURE INDICATOR 1-PDI-30-43-J     U1 CONTAINMENT PRESSURE INDICATOR 1-PDI-30-44-K     U1 CONTAINMENT PRESSURE INDICATOR 1-PDI-30-45-J     U1 CONTAINMENT PRESSURE INDICATOR 1-PDT-30-42-G     PROTECT SET IV - CTMT HI PRESS 1-PDT-30-43-F     PROTECT SET III - CTMT HI PRESS 1-PDT-30-44-E     PROTECT SET II - CTMT HI PRESS 1-PDT-30-45-D     PROTECT SET I - CTMT PRESS HIGH 1-PI-1-12         #2SG PRESSURE INDICATION 1-PI-1-19C        SG 3 STEAM HEADER PRESSURE 1-PI-1-1C         SG 1 STEAM HEADER PRESSURE 1-PI-1-20A        #3SG PRESSURE INDICATION 1-PI-1-20B        #3SG PRESSURE INDICATION III-54

PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES  Revision 58 TABLE 3 SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST EQUIPMENT        DESCRIPTION 1-PI-1-23        #3SG PRESSURE INDICATION 1-PI-1-26C       SG 4 STEAM HEADER PRESSURE 1-PI-1-27A       #4SG PRESSURE INDICATION 1-PI-1-27B       #4SG PRESSURE INDICATION 1-PI-1-2A        #1SG PRESSURE INDICATION 1-PI-1-2B        #1SG PRESSURE INDICATION 1-PI-1-30        #4SG PRESSURE INDICATION 1-PI-1-5         #1SG PRESSURE INDICATION 1-PI-1-8C        SG 2 STEAM HEADER PRESSURE 1-PI-1-9A        #2SG PRESSURE INDICATION 1-PI-1-9B        #2SG PRESSURE INDICATION 1-PI-3-117       LOCAL MDAFWP A SUCTION PRES INDICATOR 1-PI-3-127       LOCAL MDAFWP B SUCTION PRES INDICATOR 1-PI-3-137       LOCAL TDAFW PUMP SUCTION PRES INDICATOR 1-PI-68-342A     PRESSURIZER PRESSURE INSTRUMENT 1-PI-68-342C     PRESSURIZER PRESSURE INSTRUMENT LOOP 1-PI-68-63       RCS LOOP 1 PRESSURE (RHR INLET) 1-PI-68-64       RCS LOOP 3 PRESSURE (RHR INLET) 1-PIC-1-13A      SG 2 PRESSURE CONTROLLER 1-PIC-1-13C      SG 2 PRESSURE CONTROLLER 1-PIC-1-24A      SG 3 PRESSURE CONTROLLER 1-PIC-1-24C      SG 3 PRESSURE CONTROLLER 1-PIC-1-31A      SG 4 PRESSURE CONTROLLER 1-PIC-1-31C      SG 4 PRESSURE CONTROLLER 1-PIC-1-6A       SG 1 PRESSURE CONTROLLER 1-PIC-1-6C       SG 1 PRESSURE CONTROLLER 1-PM-1-13        PCV-1-12 MODULATOR 1-PM-1-24        PCV-1-23 MODULATOR 1-PM-1-31        PCV-1-30 MODULATOR 1-PM-1-6         PCV-1-5 MODULATOR 1-PMP-18-54/1    1-DG-82-A-A FO XFER PP #2 1-PMP-18-54/2    1-DG-82-B-B FO XFER PP #2 1-PMP-18-55/1    1-DG-82-A-A FO XFER PP #1 1-PMP-18-55/2    1-DG-82-B-B FO XFER PP #1 1-PNL-276-L112   1-FCV-62-93 PNEUMATIC STOP INST PANEL 1-PSV-1-13B-B    SG-2 MAIN STM HDR 1-PSV-1-13C-A    SOLENOID VALVE 1-PSV-1-24B-A    SG-3 MAIN STM HDR 1-PSV-1-24C-B    SOLENOID VALVE 1-PSV-1-31B-B    SG-4 MAIN STM HDR 1-PSV-1-31C-A    SOLENOID VALVE 1-PSV-1-6B-A     SG-1 MAIN STM HDR 1-PSV-1-6C-B     SOLENOID VALVE 1-PT-1-1C        SG-1 STEAM HEADER PRESSURE TRANSMITTER 1-PT-1-12-F      PROTECT SET III - SG LOOP 2 1-PT-1-13        SG-2 PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FOR PCV-1-12 1-PT-1-19C       SG-3 STEAM HEADER PRESSURE TRANSMITTER 1-PT-1-20A-D     MAIN STEAM LOOP 3 PRESSURE 1-PT-1-20B-E     MAIN STEAM LOOP 3 PRESSURE 1-PT-1-23-F      PROTECT SET III -SG LOOP 3 III-55

PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES          Revision 58 TABLE 3 SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST EQUIPMENT        DESCRIPTION 1-PT-1-24        SG-3 PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FOR PCV-1-23 1-PT-1-26C       SG-4 STEAM HEADER PRESSURE TRANSMITTER 1-PT-1-27A-D     MAIN STEAM LOOP 4 PRESSURE 1-PT-1-27B-E     MAIN STEAM LOOP 4 PRESSURE 1-PT-1-2A-D      MAIN STEAM LOOP 1 PRESSURE 1-PT-1-2B-E      PROTECT SET II - SG LOOP 3 1-PT-1-30-G      PROTECT SET IV - SG LOOP 4 1-PT-1-31        MAIN STEAM LOOP 4 PRESSURE 1-PT-1-5-G       PROTECT SET IV - SG LOOP 1 1-PT-1-6         MAIN STEAM LOOP 1 PRESSURE 1-PT-1-8C        SG-2 STEAM HEADER PRESSURE TRANSMITTER 1-PT-1-9A-D      MAIN STEAM LOOP 2 PRESSURE 1-PT-1-9B-E      MAIN STEAM LOOP 2 PRESSURE 1-PT-68-323-F    PRESSURIZER PRESSURE 1-PT-68-334-E    PRESSURIZER PRESSURE 1-PT-68-340-D    PRESSURIZER PRESSURE 1-PT-68-342C     PRESSURIZER PRESSURE INSTRUMENT 1-PT-68-63       RCS LOOP 1 PRESSURE (RHR INLET) 1-PT-68-64-E     RCS LOOP 3 PRESSURE (RHR INLET) 1-RTV-30-42A     CTMT PRES XMTR INST SENSING LINE/ISO VLV 1-RTV-30-43A     CTMT PRES XMTR INST SENSING LINE/ISO VLV 1-RTV-30-44A     CTMT PRES XMTR INST SENSING LINE/ISO VLV 1-RTV-30-45A     CTMT PRES XMTR INST SENSING LINE/ISO VLV 1-SC-46-57       TDAFW PUMP SPEED CONTROLLER 1-XSW-46-AC-S    AC MANUAL TRANSFER SW 1-XSW-46-DC-S    DC MANUAL TRANSFER SW 1-TANK-1-405A    N2 TANK #1 SUPPLY TO 1-PCV-1-12-B 1-TANK-1-405B    N2 TANK #2 SUPPLY TO 1-PCV-1-12-B 1-TANK-1-406A    N2 TANK #1 SUPPLY TO 1-PCV-1-30-B 1-TANK-1-406B    N2 TANK #2 SUPPLY TO 1-PCV-1-30-B 1-TANK-1-407A    N2 TANK #1 SUPPLY TO 1-PCV-1-23-A 1-TANK-1-407B    N2 TANK #2 SUPPLY TO 1-PCV-1-23-A 1-TANK-1-408A    N2 TANK #1 SUPPLY TO 1-PCV-1-5-A 1-TANK-1-408B    N2 TANK #2 SUPPLY TO 1-PCV-1-5-A 1-TANK-3-402A    N2 TANK #1 SUPPLY TO 1-LCV-3-173-B 1-TANK-3-402B    N2 TANK #2 SUPPLY TO 1-LCV-3-173-B 1-TANK-3-402C    N2 TANK #1 SUPPLY TO 1-LCV-3-174-B 1-TANK-3-402D    N2 TANK #2 SUPPLY TO 1-LCV-3-174-B 1-TANK-3-403A    N2 TANK #1 SUPPLY TO 1-LCV-3-172-A 1-TANK-3-403B    N2 TANK #2 SUPPLY TO 1-LCV-3-172-A 1-TANK-3-403C    N2 TANK #1 SUPPLY TO 1-LCV-3-175-A 1-TANK-3-403D    N2 TANK #2 SUPPLY TO 1-LCV-3-175-A 1-TCO-30-82-B    CONTROL ROD DRIVE CLING 1D-B RM DIVERSION DMPR 1-TCO-30-85-A    CONTROL ROD DRIVE CLING 1A-A RM DIVERSION DMPR 1-TCO-30-90-A    CONTROL ROD DRIVE CLING 1C-A RM DIVERSION DMPR 1-TCO-30-94-B    CONTROL ROD DRIVE CLING 1B-B RM DIVERSION DMPR 1-TCV-67-100-B   LOWER CNTMT VENT CLR B SUPPLY CONTROL VLV 1-TCV-67-101-B   CONTROL ROD DRIVE VENT CLR B SUPPLY CONTROL VLV 1-TCV-67-108-B   LOWER CNTMT VENT CLR D SUPPLY CONTROL VLV 1-TCV-67-109-B   CONTROL ROD DRIVE VENT CLR D SUPPLY CONTROL VLV III-56

PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES          Revision 58 TABLE 3 SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST EQUIPMENT       DESCRIPTION 1-TCV-67-84-A   LOWER CNTMT VENT CLR A SUPPLY CONTROL VLV 1-TCV-67-85-A   CONTROL ROD DRIVE VENT CLR A SUPPLY CONTROL VLV 1-TCV-67-92-A   LOWER CNTMT VENT CLR C SUPPLY CONTROL VLV 1-TCV-67-93-A   CONTROL ROD DRIVE VENT CLR C SUPPLY CONTROL VLV 1-TCV-70-192    NON-REG LETDOWN HEAT EXCHANGER OUTLET VALVE 1-TE-68-1       RCS LOOP 1 HOT LEG TEMPERATURE 1-TE-68-18      RCS LOOP 1 COLD LEG TEMPERATURE 1-TE-68-1C      RCS LOOP 1 HOT LEG TEMPERATURE 1-TE-68-24      RCS LOOP 2 HOT LEG TEMPERATURE 1-TE-68-24C     RCS LOOP 2 HOT LEG TEMPERATURE 1-TE-68-41      RCS LOOP 2 COLD LEG TEMPERATURE 1-TE-68-43      RCS LOOP 3 HOT LEG TEMPERATURE 1-TE-68-43C     RCS LOOP 3 HOT LEG TEMPERATURE 1-TE-68-60      RCS LOOP 3 COLD LEG TEMPERATURE 1-TE-68-65      RCS LOOP 4 HOT LEG TEMPERATURE 1-TE-68-65C     RCS LOOP 4 HOT LEG TEMPERATURE 1-TE-68-83      RCS LOOP 4 COLD LEG TEMPERATURE 1-TE-70-154     RHR HEAT EXCHANGE 1B CCS RETURN TEMP 1-TE-70-157     RHR HEAT EXCHANGE 1A CCS RETURN TEMP 1-TE-70-161     ERCW/CCS HX-A OUTLET TEMP (CCS) 1-TE-74-14      RHR PMP 1A-A OUTLET TEMP 1-TE-74-25      RHR PMP 1B-B OUTLET TEMP 1-TE-74-29      RHR HEAT EXCHANGER A OUTLET TEMP 1-TE-74-38C     RCS HEAT EXCHANGER A OUTLET TEMPERATURE 1-TE-74-39      RHR HEAT EXCHANGER B OUTLET TEMP 1-TE-74-40C     RCS HEAT EXCHANGER B OUTLET TEMPERATURE 1-THV-70-546A   RHR HX 1A-A OUTLET VALVE (MANUAL) 1-TI-62-4       RCP NO. 1 SEAL OUT 1-TI-62-17      RCP NO. 2 SEAL OUT 1-TI-62-30      RCP NO. 3 SEAL OUT 1-TI-62-43      RCP NO. 4 SEAL OUT 1-TI-68-1       RCS LOOP 1 HOT LEG TEMPERATURE 1-TI-68-18      RCS LOOP 1 COLD LEG TEMPERATURE 1-TI-68-1C      RCS LOOP 1 HOT LEG TEMPERATURE 1-TI-68-24A     RCS LOOP 2 HOT LEG TEMPERATURE 1-TI-68-24C     RCS LOOP 2 HOT LEG TEMPERATURE 1-TI-68-41      RCS LOOP 2 COLD LEG TEMPERATURE 1-TI-68-43      RCS LOOP 3 HOT LEG TEMPERATURE 1-TI-68-43C     RCS LOOP 3 HOT LEG TEMPERATURE 1-TI-68-60      RCS LOOP 3 COLD LEG TEMPERATURE 1-TI-68-65      RCS LOOP 4 HOT LEG TEMPERATURE 1-TI-68-65C     RCS LOOP 4 HOT LEG TEMPERATURE 1-TI-68-83      RCS LOOP 4 COLD LEG TEMPERATURE 1-TI-70-154     RHR HX-B OUTLET TEMP (CCS) 1-TI-70-157     RHR HX-A OUTLET TEMP (CCS) 1-TI-70-161     ERCW/CCS HX-A OUTLET TEMP (CCS) 1-TI-74-14      RHR HX-A INLET TEMPERATURE 1-TI-74-15      RHR HX-A OUTLET TEMPERATURE 1-TI-74-25      RHR HX-B INLET TEMPERATURE 1-TI-74-27      RHR HX-B OUTLET TEMPERATURE III-57

PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES            Revision 58 TABLE 3 SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST EQUIPMENT            DESCRIPTION 1-TI-74-38C          RCS HEAT EXCHANGER A OUTLET TEMPERATURE 1-TI-74-40C          RCS HEAT EXCHANGER B OUTLET TEMPERATURE 1-TIS-62-79          LETDOWN FLOW TEMPERATURE DIVERSION CONTROL 1-TR-74-14P002       RHR HX-A TEMPERATURE RECORDER 1-TR-74-25P002       RHR HX-B TEMPERATURE RECORDER 1-XS-99-1-D          REACTOR PROTECTION SET I TRANSFER SWITCH 1-D 1-XSV-32-112         UNIT 1 CONTAINTMENT NON-ESSENTIAL HDR DUMP SOLENOID 2-BD-211-A-A         6.9KV SHUTDOWN BOARD 2A-A 2-BD-211-B-B         6.9KV SHUTDOWN BOARD 2B-B 2-BD-212-A1-A        480V SHUTDOWN BOARD 2A1-A 2-BD-212-A2-A        480V SHUTDOWN BOARD 2A2-A 2-BD-212-B1-B        480V SHUTDOWN BOARD 2B1-B 2-BD-212-B2-B        480V SHUTDOWN BOARD 2B2-B 2-BD-235-1-D         120V AC VITAL POWER BOARD 2-I 2-BD-235-2-E         120V AC VITAL POWER BOARD 2-II 2-BD-235-3-F         120V AC VITAL POWER BOARD 2-III 2-BD-235-4-G         120V AC VITAL POWER BOARD 2-IV 2-BD-237-A           INSTRUMENT POWER DISTRIBUTION PANEL 2A 2-BD-237-B           INSTRUMENT POWER DISTRIBUTION PANEL 2B 2-BKR-99-L116/1B-A   REACTOR TRIP SWGR A 2-BKR-99-L116/1C-B   REACTOR TRIP SWGR B 2-DG-82-A-A          UNIT 2 TRAIN A DIESEL GENERATOR 2-DG-82-B-B          UNIT 2 TRAIN B DIESEL GENERATOR 2-DPL-264-1          120V TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER DISTRIBUTION PANEL 2 2-FCO-30-246A        480V TRANSFORMER RM 2B INTAKE AIR DAMPER 2-FCO-30-246B        480V TRANSFORMER RM 2B INTAKE AIR DAMPER 2-FCO-30-250A        480V TRANSFORMER RM 2A INTAKE AIR DAMPER 2-FCO-30-250B        480V TRANSFORMER RM 2A INTAKE AIR DAMPER 2-FCO-30-444-A       DIESEL GENERATOR VENT FAN DAMPER 2-FCO-30-446-B       DIESEL GENERATOR VENT FAN DAMPER 2-FCO-30-448-A       DG 2A-A ROOM EXHAUST FAN 2A DISCHARGE 2-FCO-30-450-B       DG 2B-B ROOM EXHAUST FAN 2B DISCHARGE 2-FCO-30-452-A       DG 2A-A ROOM EXHAUST FAN 2A DISCHARGE 2-FCO-30-454-B       DG 2B-B ROOM EXHAUST FAN 2B DISCHARGE 2-FCO-30-460-A       DG 2A-A ELECTRIC BOARD ROOM EXHAUST FAN DISCHARGE 2-FCO-30-462-B       DG 2B-B ELECTRIC BOARD ROOM EXHAUST FAN DISCHARGE 2-FCV-1-103          MAIN STEAM COOL DOWN VALVE 2-FCV-1-104          MAIN STEAM DUMP VALVE 2-FCV-1-105          MAIN STEAM DUMP VALVE 2-FCV-1-106          MAIN STEAM DUMP VALVE 2-FCV-1-107          MAIN STEAM COOL DOWN VALVE 2-FCV-1-108          MAIN STEAM DUMP VALVE 2-FCV-1-109          MAIN STEAM DUMP VALVE 2-FCV-1-11           #2 SG MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVE 2-FCV-1-110          MAIN STEAM DUMP VALVE 2-FCV-1-111          MAIN STEAM COOL DOWN VALVE 2-FCV-1-112          MAIN STEAM DUMP VALVE 2-FCV-1-113          MAIN STEAM COOL DOWN VALVE 2-FCV-1-114          MAIN STEAM DUMP VALVE 2-FCV-1-147-A        STEAM LINE WARMING VALVE LOOP 1 III-58

PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES          Revision 58 TABLE 3 SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST EQUIPMENT        DESCRIPTION 2-FCV-1-148-B    STEAM LINE WARMING VALVE LOOP 2 2-FCV-1-149-A    STEAM LINE WARMING VALVE LOOP 3 2-FCV-1-14-A     SG 2 BLOWDOWN CONTROL VALVE 2-FCV-1-150-B    STEAM LINE WARMING VALVE LOOP 4 2-FCV-1-15-A     AFWPT STEAM SUPPLY FROM SG 1 FLOW CONTROL VALVE 2-FCV-1-17-A     STEAM FLOW AUX FWPT ISOL VALVE 2-FCV-1-181-A    SG 1 BLOWDOWN ISOLATION VALVE 2-FCV-1-182-B    SG 2 BLOWDOWN ISOLATION VALVE 2-FCV-1-183-A    SG 3 BLOWDOWN ISOLATION VALVE 2-FCV-1-184-B    SG 4 BLOWDOWN ISOLATION VALVE 2-FCV-1-18-B     STEAM FLOW TO AUX FWPT ISOLATION VALVE 2-FCV-1-22       #3 SG MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVE 2-FCV-1-25-B     SG 3 BLOWDOWN CONTROL VALVE LOOP 3 2-FCV-1-275      MSR A2 LOW POWER BYPASS CONTROL VALVE 2-FCV-1-277      MSR B2 LOW POWER BYPASS CONTROL VALVE 2-FCV-1-279      MSR C2 LOW POWER BYPASS CONTROL VALVE 2-FCV-1-284      MSR A1 LOW POWER BYPASS CONTROL VALVE 2-FCV-1-29       #4 SG MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVE 2-FCV-1-291      MSR B1 LOW POWER BYPASS CONTROL VALVE 2-FCV-1-298      MSR C1 LOW POWER BYPASS CONTROL VALVE 2-FCV-1-32-A     SG 4 BLOWDOWN CONTROL VALVE LOOP 4 2-FCV-1-36       MAIN FW PUMP TURBINE HP STOP VALVE 2-FCV-1-37       MAIN FW PUMP TURBINE HP CONTROL VALVE 2-FCV-1-4        #1 SG MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVE 2-FCV-1-43       MAIN FW PUMP TURBINE HP STOP VALVE 2-FCV-1-44       MAIN FW PUMP TURBINE HP CONTROL VALVE 2-FCV-1-51-S     AFW PUMP TURBINE TRIP & THROTTLE VALVE 2-FCV-1-52       TDAFWP TURBINE GOVERNOR VALVE 2-FCV-1-61       MAIN TURBINE CONTROL VALVE 2-FCV-1-62       MAIN TURBINE CONTROL VALVE 2-FCV-1-64       MAIN TURBINE CONTROL VALVE 2-FCV-1-65       MAIN TURBINE CONTROL VALVE 2-FCV-1-67       MAIN TURBINE CONTROL VALVE 2-FCV-1-68       MAIN TURBINE CONTROL VALVE 2-FCV-1-70       MAIN TURBINE CONTROL VALVE 2-FCV-1-71       MAIN TURBINE CONTROL VALVE 2-FCV-1-75       MOISTURE SEPARATOR REHEATER A2 CONTROL VALVE 2-FCV-1-77       MOISTURE SEPARATOR REHEATER B2 CONTROL VALVE 2-FCV-1-79       MOISTURE SEPARATOR REHEATER C2 CONTROL VALVE 2-FCV-1-7-B      SG 1 BLOWDOWN CONTROL VALVE 2-FCV-1-84       MOISTURE SEPARATOR REHEATER A1 CONTROL VALVE 2-FCV-1-91       MOISTURE SEPARATOR REHEATER B1 CONTROL VALVE 2-FCV-1-98       MOISTURE SEPARATOR REHEATER C1 CONTROL VALVE 2-FCV-26-240-A   CONTAINMENT STANDPIPE ISOLATION VALVE 2-FCV-26-241-B   ANNULUS STANDPIPE ISOLATION VALVE 2-FCV-26-242-A   ANNULUS STANDPIPE ISOLATION VALVE 2-FCV-26-243-A   RCP SPRAY ISOLATION VALVE 2-FCV-26-244-B   ANNULUS SPRINKLER ISOLATION VALVE 2-FCV-26-245-A   ANNULUS SPRINKLER ISOLATION VALVE 2-FCV-30-10-A    UPPER COMPARTMENT PURGE ISOLATION VALVE III-59

PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES        Revision 58 TABLE 3 SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST EQUIPMENT         DESCRIPTION 2-FCV-30-14-A     LOWER COMPARTMENT PURGE ISOLATION VALVE 2-FCV-30-15-B     LOWER COMPARTMENT PURGE ISOLATION VALVE 2-FCV-30-16-B     LOWER COMPARTMENT PURGE ISOLATION VALVE 2-FCV-30-17-A     LOWER COMPARTMENT PURGE ISOLATION VALVE 2-FCV-30-19-B     INSTRUMENT ROOM PURGE ISOLATION VALVE 2-FCV-30-20-A     INSTRUMENT ROOM PURGE ISOLATION VALVE 2-FCV-30-37-B     LOWER COMPARTMENT PURGE ISOLATION VALVE 2-FCV-30-40-A     LOWER COMPARTMENT PURGE ISOLATION VALVE 2-FCV-30-50-B     UPPER COMPARTMENT PURGE ISOLATION VALVE 2-FCV-30-51-A     UPPER COMPARTMENT PURGE ISOLATION VALVE 2-FCV-30-52-A     UPPER COMPARTMENT PURGE ISOLATION VALVE 2-FCV-30-53-B     UPPER COMPARTMENT PURGE ISOLATION VALVE 2-FCV-30-56-A     LOWER COMPARTMENT PURGE ISOLATION VALVE 2-FCV-30-57-B     LOWER COMPARTMENT PURGE ISOLATION VALVE 2-FCV-30-58-B     INSTRUMENT ROOM PURGE ISOLATION VALVE 2-FCV-30-59-A     INSTRUMENT ROOM PURGE ISOLATION VALVE 2-FCV-30-7-A      UPPER COMPARTMENT PURGE ISOLATION VALVE 2-FCV-30-8-B      UPPER COMPARTMENT PURGE ISOLATION VALVE 2-FCV-30-9-B      UPPER COMPARTMENT PURGE ISOLATION VALVE 2-FCV-3-100-B     STEAM GENERATOR 4 FEEDWATER ISOLATION VALVE 2-FCV-3-103       STEAM GENERATOR 4 FW CONTROL VALVE 2-FCV-3-103A      STEAM GENERATOR 4 FW BYPASS VALVE 2-FCV-3-116A-A    ERCW HDR A ISOLATION VALVE 2-FCV-3-116B-A    ERCW HDR A ISOLATION VALVE 2-FCV-3-126A-B    ERCW HDR B ISOLATION VALVE 2-FCV-3-126B-B    ERCW HDR B ISOLATION VALVE 2-FCV-3-136A-A    ERCW HDR A ISOLATION VALVE 2-FCV-3-136B-A    ERCW HDR A ISOLATION VALVE 2-FCV-3-179A-B    ERCW HDR B ISOLATION VALVE 2-FCV-3-179B-B    ERCW HDR B ISOLATION VALVE 2-FCV-32-111-B    RB TRAIN B NON-ESSENTIAL CONTROL AIR ISLN VLV 2-FCV-3-236       SG1 FEEDWATER BYPASS ISOLATION VALVE 2-FCV-3-239       SG2 FEEDWATER BYPASS ISOLATION VALVE 2-FCV-3-242       SG3 FEEDWATER BYPASS ISOLATION VALVE 2-FCV-3-245       SG4 FEEDWATER BYPASS ISOLATION VALVE 2-FCV-3-33-A      STEAM GENERATOR 1 FEEDWATER ISOLATION VALVE 2-FCV-3-35        STEAM GENERATOR 1 FEEDWATER CONTROL VALVE 2-FCV-3-35A       STEAM GENERATOR 1 FEEDWATER BYPASS VALVE 2-FCV-3-47-B      STEAM GENERATOR 2 FEED WATER ISOL VALVE 2-FCV-3-48        STEAM GENERATOR 2 FW CONTROL VALVE 2-FCV-3-48A       STEAM GENERATOR 2 FW BYPASS VALVE 2-FCV-3-87-A      STEAM GENERATOR 3 FEEDWATER ISOLATION VALVE 2-FCV-3-90        STEAM GENERATOR 3 FW CONTROL VALVE 2-FCV-3-90A       STEAM GENERATOR 3 FW BYPASS VALVE 2-FCV-62-1228-A   CCP SUCTION HI-POINT VENT VALVE 2-FCV-62-1229-B   CCP SUCTION HI-POINT VENT VALVE 2-FCV-62-22       RCP 2 SEAL RETURN FCV 2-FCV-62-35       RCP 3 SEAL RETURN FCV 2-FCV-62-48       RCP 4 SEAL RETURN FCV 2-FCV-62-55       EXCESS LETDOWN ISOLATION VALVE III-60

PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES           Revision 58 TABLE 3 SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST EQUIPMENT        DESCRIPTION 2-FCV-62-56      EXCESS LETDOWN FLOW CONTROL VALVE 2-FCV-62-69-A    REACTOR COOLANT LOOP 3 LETDOWN FLOW VALVE 2-FCV-62-70-A    REACTOR COOLANT LOOP 3 LETDOWN FLOW VALVE 2-FCV-62-72-A    REGEN HT EXCH LETDOWN ISOL VALVE A 2-FCV-62-73-A    REGEN HT EXCH LETDOWN ISOL VALVE B 2-FCV-62-74-A    REGEN HT EXCH LETDOWN ISOL VALVE C 2-FCV-62-84-A    CHARGING FLOW TO RCS SPRAY VALVE 2-FCV-62-89      CHARGING FLOW CONTROL VALVE 2-FCV-62-9       RCP 1 SEAL RETURN FCV 2-FCV-62-90-A    CHARGING FLOW ISOLATION VALVE 2-FCV-62-91-B    CHARGING FLOW ISOLATION VALVE 2-FCV-62-93      NORMAL MAKEUP FLOW CONTROL VALVE 2-FCV-62-98-A    CHGING PMP 2A-A FCV 2-FCV-62-99-B    CHGING PMP 2A-A FCV 2-FCV-63-118-A   SIS ACCUMULATOR TANK 1 FLOW ISOLATION VALVE 2-FCV-63-11-B    RHR PUMP SUPPLY TO SIS PUMPS 2-FCV-63-172-B   RHR TO RCS HOT LEG 1 & 3 ISOLATION VALVE 2-FCV-63-186     RHR SUPPLY TEST LINE VALVE 2-FCV-63-1-A     RWST TO RHR PUMP 2-FCV-63-25-B    SIS BORON INJECTION TANK SHUTOFF VALVE 2-FCV-63-26-A    SIS BORON INJECTION TANK SHUTOFF VALVE 2-FCV-63-39-A    SIS BORON INJ TANK INLET SHUTOFF VALVE 2-FCV-63-40-B    SIS BORON INJ TANK INLET SHUTOFF VALVE 2-FCV-63-67-B    SIS ACCUMULATOR TANK 4 FLOW ISOLATION VALVE 2-FCV-63-72-A    CONTAINMENT SUMP TO RHR PUMP A-A 2-FCV-63-73-B    CONTAINMENT SUMP TO RHR PUMP B-B 2-FCV-63-80-A    SIS ACCUMULATOR TANK 3 FLOW ISOLATION VALVE 2-FCV-63-8-A     RHR HX 2A TO CVCS CHARGING PUMP CONTROL VALVE 2-FCV-63-93-A    SIS TO RCS LOOPS 2 & 3 FLOW CONTROL VALVE 2-FCV-63-94-B    SIS TO RCS LOOPS 1 & 4 FLOW CONTROL VALVE 2-FCV-63-98-B    SIS ACCUMULATOR TANK 2 FLOW ISOLATION VALVE 2-FCV-67-103-B   LOWER CNTMT 2B CLRS DISCH ISLN VLV INSIDE CNTMT 2-FCV-67-104-A   LOWER CNTMT 2B CLRS DISCH ISLN VLV OUTSIDE CNTMT 2-FCV-67-105-B   LOWER CNTMT 2B CLRS SUP ISLN VLV INSIDE CNTMT 2-FCV-67-107-A   LOWER CNTMT 2D CLRS SUP ISLN VLV OUTSIDE CNTMT 2-FCV-67-10A-B   ERCW STRAINER 2B-B BACKWASH VLV 2-FCV-67-10B-B   ERCW STRAINER 2B-B FLUSH VLV 2-FCV-67-111-B   LOWER CNTMT 2D CLRS DISCH ISLN VLV INSIDE CNTMT 2-FCV-67-112-A   LOWER CNTMT 2D CLRS DISCH ISLN VLV OUTSIDE CNTMT 2-FCV-67-113-B   LOWER CNTMT 2D CLRS SUP ISLN VLV INSIDE CNTMT 2-FCV-67-123-B   CNTMT SPRAY HX 2B SUPPLY VLV 2-FCV-67-124-B   CNTMT SPRAY HX 2B DISCHARGE VLV 2-FCV-67-125-A   CONTAINMENT SPRAY HX 2A SUPPLY VLV 2-FCV-67-126-A   CNTMT SPRAY HX 2A DISCHARGE VLV 2-FCV-67-127-A   AUX BLDG AIR COOLERS SUP HDR 2A FCV 2-FCV-67-128-B   AUX BLDG AIR CLRS SUP HDR 2B VLV 2-FCV-67-143-A   CCS HX B ERCW BYPASS FCV 2-FCV-67-146-A   CCS HX B DISCHARGE CONTROL VLV 2-FCV-67-147-B   ERCW SUP HDR 2B TO HDR 1A ISOL VLV 2-FCV-67-168-A   CCP 1A ROOM COOLER ERCW ISOL III-61

PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES            Revision 58 TABLE 3 SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST EQUIPMENT        DESCRIPTION 2-FCV-67-170-B   CCP-1B ROOM COOLER ISOL VALVE 2-FCV-67-188-A   RHR PUMP 2A-A RM COOLER ERCW ISOL AOV 2-FCV-67-190-B   RHR PUMP 2B-B RM COOLER ERCW ISOL AOV 2-FCV-67-217-A   BA TRANSFER & AUX FW PMPS SPACE CLR A 2-FCV-67-219-B   BA/AFW PUMP ROOM COOLER 2B FLOW CONT AOV 2-FCV-67-223-A   SUPPLY HDR 2A TO HDR 1B ISLN VLV 2-FCV-67-22-A    ERCW HDR 2A ISLN VLV BEFORE STRAINER 2-FCV-67-24-B    ERCW HDR 2B ISLN VLV BEFORE STRAINER 2-FCV-67-66-A    EMERG DSL HEAT EXH 2A1 & 2A2 SUPP VALVE FM HDR 1A 2-FCV-67-67-B    EMERG DSL HEAT EXH 2B1 & 2B2 SUPP VALVE FM HDR 1B 2-FCV-67-81-A    AUX BLDG ERCW SUP HDR 2A ISLN VLV 2-FCV-67-82-B    AUX BLDG ERCW SUP HDR 2B ISLN VLV 2-FCV-67-83-B    LOWER CNTMT 2A CLRS SUP ISLN VLV OUTSIDE CNTMT 2-FCV-67-87-A    LOWER CNTMT 2A CLRS DISCH ISLN VLV INSIDE CNTMT 2-FCV-67-88-B    LOWER CNTMT 2A CLRS DISCH ISLN VLV OUTSIDE CNTMT 2-FCV-67-89-A    LOWER CNTMT 2A CLRS SUP ISLN VLV INSIDE CNTMT 2-FCV-67-91-B    LOWER CNTMT 2C CLRS SUP ISLN VLV OUTSIDE CNTMT 2-FCV-67-95-A    LOWER CNTMT 2C CLRS DISCH ISLN VLV INSIDE CNTMT 2-FCV-67-96-B    LOWER CNTMT 2C CLRS DISCH ISLN VLV OUTSIDE CNTMT 2-FCV-67-97-A    LOWER CNTMT 2C CLRS SUP ISLN VLV INSIDE CNTMT 2-FCV-67-99-A    LOWER CNTMT 2B CLRS SUP ISLN VLV OUTSIDE CNTMT 2-FCV-67-9A-A    ERCW STRAINER 2A-A BACKWASH VALVE 2-FCV-67-9B-A    ERCW STRAINER 2A-A FLUSH VLV 2-FCV-68-332-B   REACTOR COOLANT PRESS RELIEF FLOW CONTROL VALVE 2-FCV-68-333-A   REACTOR COOLANT PRESS RELIEF FLOW CONTROL VALVE 2-FCV-70-133-A   RCP THERMAL BARRIER CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE 2-FCV-70-134-B   RCP THERMAL BARRIER CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE 2-FCV-70-143-A   EXCESS LTDN HX INLET ISLN VLV 2-FCV-70-14-B    CCS HX B & C INLET ISOLATION VALVE 2-FCV-70-153-B   RHR HX B-B OUTLET VALVE 2-FCV-70-156-A   RHR HX A-A OUTLET VLV 2-FCV-70-15-A    CCS HX B OUTLET VALVE 2-FCV-70-16-A    CCS HX B INLET VALVE 2-FCV-70-18-A    CCS HX B & C INLET ISOLATION VALVE 2-FCV-70-195-A   CCS HX B & C OUTLET VLV 2-FCV-70-196-B   CCS HX B & C OUTLET VLV 2-FCV-70-28-B    CCS PMPS 2A-A & 2B-B TO C-S OUTLET ISOL VLV- LC 2-FCV-70-29-B    CCS PMPS 2A-A & 2B-B TO C-S OUTLET ISOL VLV- LC 2-FCV-70-2-A     RHR HX A HEADER INLET VALVE 2-FCV-70-39-B    CCS PMP 2A-A TO 2B-B ISLN VLV 2-FCV-70-3-B     RHR HX 2B-B HDR INLET VLV 2-FCV-70-4-A     MISC EQUIPMENT HEADER INLET VALVE 2-FCV-70-75-B    RHR HX 2B-B RETURN HDR ISLN VLV 2-FCV-70-76-B    CCS PMPS 2A-A & 2B-B TO C-S VLV 2-FCV-70-78-B    CCS PMPS 2A-A & 2B-B TO C-S VLV 2-FCV-70-85-B    EXCESS LTDN HX OUTLET VLV 2-FCV-70-87-B    RCP THERMAL BARRIER RETURN CONTAINMENT ISOL VALVE 2-FCV-70-90-A    RCP THERMAL BARRIER RETURN CONTAINMENT ISOL VALVE 2-FCV-72-21-B    RWST TO SPRAY HDR 2B FCV 2-FCV-72-22-A    RWST TO SPRAY HDR 2A FCV III-62

PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES       Revision 58 TABLE 3 SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST EQUIPMENT       DESCRIPTION 2-FCV-72-2-B    CONTAINMENT SPRAY HEADER 2B ISOLATION VALVE 2-FCV-72-39-A   CONTAINMENT SPRAY HEADER 2A ISOLATION VALVE 2-FCV-72-40-A   RHR SPRAY HDR 2A ISOLATION VALVE 2-FCV-72-41-B   RHR SPRAY HDR 2B ISOLATION VALVE 2-FCV-72-44-A   CONTAINMENT SUMP TO SPRAY HEADER 2A FCV 2-FCV-72-45-B   CONTAINMENT SUMP TO SPRAY HEADER 2B FCV 2-FCV-74-12-A   RHR PUMP 2A-A MINIMUM FLOW VALVE 2-FCV-74-16     RHR HX 2A OUTLET FLOW CONTROL VALVE 2-FCV-74-1-A    RHR SYSTEM ISOLATION VALVE 2-FCV-74-21-B   RHR PUMP 2B-B INLET VALVE 2-FCV-74-24-B   RHR PUMP 2B-B MINIMUM FLOW VALVE 2-FCV-74-28     RHR HX 2B OUTLET FLOW CONTROL VALVE 2-FCV-74-2-B    RHR SYSTEM ISOLATION VALVE 2-FCV-74-32     RHR HEAT EXCHANGER BYPASS 2-FCV-74-33-A   RHR PUMP HEAT EXCHANGER 2A BYPASS VALVE 2-FCV-74-35-B   RHR PUMP HEAT EXCHANGER 2B BYPASS VALVE 2-FCV-74-3-A    RHR PUMP 2A-A INLET FCV 2-FCV-74-8-A    RHR SYSTEM ISOLATION BYPASS VALVE 2-FCV-74-9-B    RHR SYSTEM ISOLATION BYPASS VALVE 2-FI-3-142A     TDAFW PUMP DISCHARGE FLOW 2-FI-3-142C     TDAFW PUMP DISCHARGE FLOW 2-FI-3-147A     AFW FLOW TO #3SG 2-FI-3-147B     AFW FLOW TO #3SG 2-FI-3-147C     AFW FLOW TO #3 SG 2-FI-3-155A     SG 2 AFW INLET FLOW 2-FI-3-155B     SG 2 AFW INLET FLOW 2-FI-3-155C     SG 2 AFW INLET FLOW 2-FI-3-163A     SG 1 AFW INLET FLOW 2-FI-3-163B     SG 1 AFW INLET FLOW 2-FI-3-163C     SG 1 AFW INLET FLOW 2-FI-3-170A     AFW FLOW TO #4SG 2-FI-3-170B     AFW FLOW TO #4SG 2-FI-3-170C     SG 4 AFW INLET FLOW 2-FI-62-14A     RCP-2 SEAL INJECTION FLOW INDICATOR 2-FI-62-1A      RCP-1 SEAL INJECTION FLOW INDICATOR 2-FI-62-27A     RCP-3 SEAL INJECTION FLOW INDICATOR 2-FI-62-40A     RCP-4 SEAL INJECTION FLOW INDICATOR 2-FI-62-93A     NORMAL CHARGING FLOW INDICATOR 2-FI-62-93C     NORMAL CHARGING FLOW INDICATOR (ACR) 2-FI-67-222     ERCW SUPPLY HEADER 2A FLOW INDICATOR 2-FI-67-61      ERCW SUPPLY HEADER 2A FLOW INDICATOR 2-FI-67-61C     ERCW SUPPLY HEADER 2A FLOW INDICATOR 2-FI-67-62      ERCW SUPPLY HEADER 2B FLOW INDICATOR 2-FI-67-62C     ERCW SUPPLY HEADER 2B FLOW INDICATOR 2-FIC-3-103     SG 4 FW CONTROL VALVE FLOW CONTROLLER 2-FIC-3-35      SG 1 FEEDWATER CONTROL VALVE FLOW CONTROLLER 2-FIC-3-48      SG 2 FEEDWATER CONTROL VALVE FLOW CONTROLLER 2-FIC-3-90      SG 3 FW CONTROL VALVE FLOW CONTROLLER 2-FM-62-56      EXCESS LETDOWN FLOW CONTROL VALVE E/P MODULE 2-FSV-1-11A-A   #2SG MSIV OPERATING SOLENOID III-63

PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES          Revision 58 TABLE 3 SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST EQUIPMENT         DESCRIPTION 2-FSV-1-11B-B     #2SG MSIV OPERATING SOLENOID 2-FSV-1-11D-A     #2SG MSIV OPERATING SOLENOID 2-FSV-1-11E-A     #2SG MSIV OPERATING SOLENOID 2-FSV-1-11F-A     #2SG MSIV OPERATING SOLENOID 2-FSV-1-11G-B     #2SG MSIV OPERATING SOLENOID 2-FSV-1-11H-B     #2SG MSIV OPERATING SOLENOID 2-FSV-1-11J-B     #2SG MSIV OPERATING SOLENOID 2-FSV-1-22A-A     #3SG MSIV OPERATING SOLENOID 2-FSV-1-22B-B     #3SG MSIV OPERATING SOLENOID 2-FSV-1-22D-A     #3SG MSIV OPERATING SOLENOID 2-FSV-1-22E-A     #3SG MSIV OPERATING SOLENOID 2-FSV-1-22F-A     #3SG MSIV OPERATING SOLENOID 2-FSV-1-22G-B     #3SG MSIV OPERATING SOLENOID 2-FSV-1-22H-B     #3SG MSIV OPERATING SOLENOID 2-FSV-1-22J-B     #3SG MSIV OPERATING SOLENOID 2-FSV-1-29A-A     #4SG MSIV OPERATING SOLENOID 2-FSV-1-29B-B     #4SG MSIV OPERATING SOLENOID 2-FSV-1-29D-A     #4SG MSIV OPERATING SOLENOID 2-FSV-1-29E-A     #4SG MSIV OPERATING SOLENOID 2-FSV-1-29F-A     #4SG MSIV OPERATING SOLENOID 2-FSV-1-29G-B     #4SG MSIV OPERATING SOLENOID 2-FSV-1-29H-B     #4SG MSIV OPERATING SOLENOID 2-FSV-1-29J-B     #4SG MSIV OPERATING SOLENOID 2-FSV-1-4A-A      #1SG MSIV OPERATING SOLENOID 2-FSV-1-4B-B      #1SG MSIV OPERATING SOLENOID 2-FSV-1-4D-A      #1SG MSIV OPERATING SOLENOID 2-FSV-1-4E-A      #1SG MSIV OPERATING SOLENOID 2-FSV-1-4F-A      #1SG MSIV OPERATING SOLENOID 2-FSV-1-4G-B      #1SG MSIV OPERATING SOLENOID 2-FSV-1-4H-B      #1SG MSIV OPERATING SOLENOID 2-FSV-1-4J-B      #1SG MSIV OPERATING SOLENOID 2-FSV-3-103AA-A   STEAM GENERATOR 4 FW CONTROL SOLENOID VALVE 2-FSV-3-103AB-A   STEAM GENERATOR 4 FW CONTROL SOLENOID VALVE 2-FSV-3-103BA-B   STEAM GENERATOR 4 FW CONTROL SOLENOID VALVE 2-FSV-3-103BB-B   STEAM GENERATOR 4 FW CONTROL SOLENOID VALVE 2-FSV-3-103C1-A   STEAM GENERATOR 4 FW BYPASS SOLENOID VALVE 2-FSV-3-103C2-A   STEAM GENERATOR 4 FW BYPASS SOLENOID VALVE 2-FSV-3-236A-A    STEAM GENERATOR 1 FW BYPASS ISOL SOLENOID VALVE 2-FSV-3-236B-B    STEAM GENERATOR 1 FW BYPASS ISOL SOLENOID VALVE 2-FSV-3-239A-A    STEAM GENERATOR 2 FW BYPASS ISOL SOLENOID VALVE 2-FSV-3-239B-B    SG 2 FW BYPASS ISOLATION SOLENOID VALVE 2-FSV-3-242A-A    STEAM GENERATOR 3 FW BYPASS ISOL SOLENOID VALVE 2-FSV-3-242B-B    STEAM GENERATOR 3 FW BYPASS ISOL SOLENOID VALVE 2-FSV-3-245A-A    STEAM GENERATOR 4 FW BYPASS ISOL SOLENOID VALVE 2-FSV-3-245B-B    STEAM GENERATOR 4 FW BYPASS ISOL SOLENOID VALVE 2-FSV-3-35AA-A    SG 1 FEEDWATER CONTROL SOLENOID VALVE 2-FSV-3-35AB-A    SG 1 FEEDWATER CONTROL SOLENOID VALVE 2-FSV-3-35BA-B    SG 1 FEEDWATER CONTROL SOLENOID VALVE 2-FSV-3-35BB-B    SG 1 FEEDWATER CONTROL SOLENOID VALVE 2-FSV-3-35C1-B    STEAM GENERATOR 1 FW BYPASS SOLENOID VALVE III-64

PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES     Revision 58 TABLE 3 SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST EQUIPMENT        DESCRIPTION 2-FSV-3-35C2-B   STEAM GENERATOR 1 FW BYPASS SOLENOID VALVE 2-FSV-3-48AA-A   STEAM GENERATOR 2 FW CONTROL SOLENOID VALVE 2-FSV-3-48AB-A   STEAM GENERATOR 2 FW CONTROL SOLENOID VALVE 2-FSV-3-48BA-B   STEAM GENERATOR 2 FW CONTROL SOLENOID VALVE 2-FSV-3-48BB-B   STEAM GENERATOR 2 FW CONTROL SOLENOID VALVE 2-FSV-3-48C1-A   STEAM GENERATOR 2 FW BYPASS SOLENOID VALVE 2-FSV-3-48C2-A   STEAM GENERATOR 2 FW BYPASS SOLENOID VALVE 2-FSV-3-90AA-A   STEAM GENERATOR 3 FW CONTROL SOLENOID VALVE 2-FSV-3-90AB-A   STEAM GENERATOR 3 FW CONTROL SOLENOID VALVE 2-FSV-3-90BA-B   STEAM GENERATOR 3 FW CONTROL SOLENOID VALVE 2-FSV-3-90BB-B   STEAM GENERATOR 3 FW CONTROL SOLENOID VALVE 2-FSV-3-90C1-B   STEAM GENERATOR 3 FW BYPASS SOLENOID VALVE 2-FSV-3-90C2-B   STEAM GENERATOR 3 FW BYPASS SOLENOID VALVE 2-FSV-46-36A     MFPT B TRIP SOLENOID 2-FSV-46-36B     MFPT B TRIP SOLENOID 2-FSV-46-36D     MFPT B TRIP SOLENOID 2-FSV-46-9A      MFPT A TRIP SOLENOID 2-FSV-46-9B      MFPT A TRIP SOLENOID 2-FSV-46-9D      MFPT A TRIP SOLENOID 2-FSV-47-27A     MAIN TURBINE EMERGENCY TRIP SOLENOID VALVE 2-FSV-47-27B     MAIN TURBINE EMERGENCY TRIP SOLENOID VALVE 2-FSV-47-27C     MAIN TURBINE EMERGENCY TRIP SOLENOID VALVE 2-FSV-47-27D     MAIN TURBINE EMERGENCY TRIP SOLENOID VALVE 2-FSV-67-217-A   BA TRANSFER AND AFW PMPS SPACE CLR A SUP 2-FSV-67-219-B   BA TRANSFER AND AFW PMPS SPACE CLR B SUP 2-FSV-68-394-A   REACTOR VESSEL HEAD VENT ISOLATION VALVE 2-FSV-68-395-B   REACTOR VESSEL HEAD VENT ISOLATION VALVE 2-FSV-68-396-B   REACTOR VESSEL HEAD VENT THROTTLE VALVE 2-FSV-68-397-A   REACTOR VESSEL HEAD VENT THROTTLE VALVE 2-FSV-77-2561    ISOLATION FOR N2 TO MDAFW PUMP LCVS 2-FSV-77-2562    ISOLATION FOR N2 TO TDAFW PUMP LCVS 2-FT-3-142       TDAFW PUMP DISCHARGE FLOW 2-FT-3-147A      AFW FLOW TO #3SG 2-FT-3-147B      AFW FLOW TO #3SG 2-FT-3-155A      SG 2 AFW INLET FLOW 2-FT-3-155B      SG 2 AFW INLET FLOW 2-FT-3-163A      SG 1 AFW INLET FLOW 2-FT-3-163B      SG 1 AFW INLET FLOW 2-FT-3-170A      AFW FLOW TO #4SG 2-FT-3-170B      AFW FLOW TO #4SG 2-FT-62-1        RCP-1 SEAL INJECTION FLOW 2-FT-62-14       RCP-2 SEAL INJECTION FLOW INDICATOR 2-FT-62-27       RCP-3 SEAL INJECTION FLOW 2-FT-62-40       RCP-4 SEAL INJECTION FLOW 2-FT-62-93A      NORMAL CHARGING FLOW INDICATOR 2-FT-62-93C      NORMAL CHARGING FLOW (ACR) 2-FT-67-222      FLOW TRANSMITTER 2-FT-67-61       FLOW TRANSMITTER 2-FT-67-61C      ERCW SUPPLY HEADER 2A FLOW TRANSMITTER 2-FT-67-62       ERCW SUPPLY HEADER 2B FLOW TRANSMITTER III-65

PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES           Revision 58 TABLE 3 SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST EQUIPMENT             DESCRIPTION 2-FT-67-62C           ERCW SUPPLY HEADER 2B FLOW TRANSMITTER 2-FT-70-81A           THERMAL BARRIER SUPPLY HEADER FLOW 2-FT-70-81B           THERMAL BARRIER SUPPLY HEADER FLOW 2-FT-70-81D           THERMAL BARRIER SUPPLY HEADER FLOW 2-FT-70-81E           THERMAL BARRIER SUPPLY HEADER FLOW 2-HCV-74-36           RHR HX-A BYPASS MANUAL ISOL VLV 2-HCV-74-37           RHR HX-B BYPASS MANUAL ISOL VLV 2-HS-30-63A-T         CONTAINMENT ISOLATION PHASE A (CIPA) 2-HS-30-63B-T         CONTAINMENT ISOLATION PHASE A (CIPA) 2-HS-30-64A-T         CONTAINMENT ISOLATION PHASE B (CIPB) 2-HS-30-64B-T         CONTAINMENT ISOLATION PHASE B (CIPB) 2-HS-30-68A-T         CONTAINMENT ISOLATION PHASE B (CIPB) 2-HS-30-68B-T         CONTAINMENT ISOLATION PHASE B (CIPB) 2-HS-63-133A-T        HAND SWITCH 2-HS-63-133B-T        HAND SWITCH 2-HTR-68-341A/A1-A7   PRESSURIZER HEATER BACKUP GROUP 2A-A 2-HTR-68-341D/B1-B7   PRESSURIZER HEATER BACKUP GROUP 2B-B 2-HTR-68-341F/D1-D6   PRESSURIZER HEATER CONTROL GROUP 2D 2-HTR-68-341H/C1-C6   PRESSURIZER HEATER CONTROL GROUP 2C 2-HTX-62-66           SEAL WATER HEAT EXCHANGER 2-INV-235-1-D         120V AC VITAL INVERTER 2-I 2-INV-235-2-E         120V AC VITAL INVERTER 2-II 2-INV-235-3-F         120V AC VITAL INVERTER 2-III 2-INV-235-4-G         120V AC VITAL INVERTER 2-IV 2-ISV-3-827           SG 2 MDAFWP LCV ISOLATION VALVE 2-ISV-3-828           SG 1 MDAFW LCV ISOLATION VALVE 2-ISV-62-526          CCP 1A-A SEAL INJECTION BYPASS 2-ISV-62-527          CCP 1A-A DISCHARGE VALVE 2-ISV-62-535          2-FCV-62-93 ISOLATION VALVE 2-ISV-62-537          FCV-62-89 UPSTREAM ISOL 2-ISV-62-549          SEAL WATER INJECTION FILTER OUTLET 2-ISV-62-550          SEAL WATER INJECTION FILTER OUTLET 2-ISV-70-545A         RHR HX 2A-A INLET VALVE (MANUAL) 2-ISV-70-574          CCS SUPPLY TO NON-REGEN LETDOWN HX ISOL 2-ISV-70-587          CCS OUT/SEAL WTR & NON-RGN LETDOWN HX ISO 2-ISV-70-705          EXCESS LETDOWN HX CCS RETURN ISOLATION VALVE 2-PNL-L-276-1000      N2 OPERATING STATION FOR 2-PCV-1-23, -30 2-PNL-L-276-1001      N2 OPERATING STATION FOR 2-PCV-1-5, -12 2-LCV-3-148           MOTOR DRIVEN AUX FEEDWATER PMP SG 3 LVL CONT VALVE 2-LCV-3-156           MOTOR DRIVEN AUX FEEDWATER PMP SG 2 LVL CONT VALVE 2-LCV-3-164           MOTOR DRIVEN AUX FEEDWATER PMP SG 1 LVL CONT VALVE 2-LCV-3-171           MOTOR DRIVEN AUX FEEDWATER PMP SG 4 LVL CONT VALVE 2-LCV-3-172           TDAFW PUMP SG 3 LEVEL CONTROL VALVE 2-LCV-3-173           TDAFW PUMP SG 2 LEVEL CONTROL VALVE 2-LCV-3-174           TDAFW PUMP SG 1 LEVEL CONTROL VALVE 2-LCV-3-175           TDAFW PUMP SG 4 LEVEL CONTROL VALVE 2-LCV-62-132-A        VCT OUTLET ISOLATION VALVE 2-LCV-62-133-B        VCT OUTLET ISOLATION VALVE 2-LCV-62-135-A        RWST TO CHARGING PUMPS VALVE CONTROL 2-LCV-62-136-B        RWST TO CHARGING PUMPS VALVE CONTROL III-66

PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES       Revision 58 TABLE 3 SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST EQUIPMENT        DESCRIPTION 2-LI-3-106       #4SG LEVEL INDICATOR (NR) 2-LI-3-107       #4SG LEVEL INDICATOR (NR) 2-LI-3-110       #4SG LEVEL INDICATOR (NR) 2-LI-3-111A      #4SG LEVEL INDICATOR (WR) 2-LI-3-148C      SG 3 NARROW RANGE LEVEL 2-LI-3-156C      SG 2 NARROW RANGE LEVEL 2-LI-3-164C      SG 1 NARROW RANGE LEVEL 2-LI-3-171C      SG 4 NARROW RANGE LEVEL 2-LI-3-38        SG 1 NARROW RANGE LEVEL 2-LI-3-39        SG 1 NARROW RANGE LEVEL 2-LI-3-42        SG 1 NARROW RANGE LEVEL 2-LI-3-43A       SG 1 WIDE RANGE LEVEL 2-LI-3-51        SG 2 NARROW RANGE LEVEL 2-LI-3-52        #2SG LEVEL INDICATOR (NR) 2-LI-3-55        #2SG LEVEL INDICATOR (NR) 2-LI-3-56A       #2SG LEVEL INDICATOR (WR) 2-LI-3-93        #3SG LEVEL INDICATOR (NR) 2-LI-3-94        #3SG LEVEL INDICATOR (NR) 2-LI-3-97        #3SG LEVEL INDICATOR (NR) 2-LI-3-98A       #3SG LEVEL INDICATOR (WR) 2-LI-62-129A     VCT LEVEL INDICATION 2-LI-62-129C     VCT LEVEL INDICATION 2-LI-63-50       RWST LEVEL INDICATOR 2-LI-63-52       RWST LEVEL INDICATOR 2-LI-68-320-F    PZR LEVEL INDICATOR 2-LI-68-325C     RCS PRESSURIZER LEVEL 2-LI-68-326C     RCS PRESSURIZER LEVEL 2-LI-68-335A-E   PZR LEVEL INDICATOR 2-LI-68-339A-D   PZR LEVEL INDICATOR 2-LIC-3-103A     STEAM GENERATOR 4 FW BYPASS VALVE CONTROLLER 2-LIC-3-148A     MDAF STEAM GENERATOR 3 LEVEL CONTROLLER 2-LIC-3-156A     SG 2 LEVEL INDICATING CONTROLLER 2-LIC-3-164A     SG 1 LEVEL INDICATING CONTROLLER 2-LIC-3-171A     MDAF STEAM GENERATOR 4 LEVEL CONTROLLER 2-LIC-3-172A     TDAFW PUMP SG 3 LEVEL CONTROLLER 2-LIC-3-173A     TDAFW PUMP SG 2 LEVEL CONTROLLER 2-LIC-3-174A     TDAFW PUMP SG 1 LEVEL CONTROLLER 2-LIC-3-175A     TDAFW PUMP SG 4 LEVEL CONTROLLER 2-LIC-3-35A      STEAM GENERATOR 1 FW BYPASS VALVE CONTROLLER 2-LIC-3-48A      STEAM GENERATOR 2 FW BYPASS VALVE CONTROLLER 2-LIC-3-90A      STEAM GENERATOR 3 FW BYPASS VALVE CONTROLLER 2-LM-3-148A      2-LCV-3-148 MODULATOR 2-LM-3-156A      2-LCV-3-156 MODULATOR 2-LM-3-164A      2-LCV-3-164 MODULATOR 2-LM-3-171A      2-LCV-3-171 MODULATOR 2-LM-3-172A      2-LCV-3-172 MODULATOR 2-LM-3-173A      2-LCV-3-173 MODULATOR 2-LM-3-174A      2-LCV-3-174 MODULATOR 2-LM-3-175A      2-LCV-3-175 MODULATOR 2-LT-3-106       #4SG LEVEL TRANSMITTER (NR)
III-67

PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES     Revision 58 TABLE 3 SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST EQUIPMENT        DESCRIPTION 2-LT-3-107       #4SG LEVEL TRANSMITTER (NR) 2-LT-3-110       #4SG LEVEL TRANSMITTER (NR) 2-LT-3-111       #4SG LEVEL TRANSMITTER (WR) 2-LT-3-148       MDAF STEAM GENERATOR 3 LEVEL TRANSMITTER 2-LT-3-156       SG NO. 2 NARROW RANGE LEVEL TRANSMITTER 2-LT-3-164       SG NO. 1 NARROW RANGE LEVEL TRANSMITTER 2-LT-3-171       MDAF STEAM GENERATOR 4 LEVEL TRANSMITTER 2-LT-3-172       TDAFW PUMP SG 3 LEVEL TRANSMITTER 2-LT-3-173       TDAFW PUMP SG 2 LEVEL TRANSMITTER 2-LT-3-174       TDAFW PUMP SG 1 LEVEL TRANSMITTER 2-LT-3-175       TDAFW PUMP SG 4 LEVEL TRANSMITTER 2-LT-3-38        #1SG LEVEL TRANSMITTER (NR) 2-LT-3-39        #1SG LEVEL TRANSMITTER (NR) 2-LT-3-42        #1SG LEVEL TRANSMITTER (NR) 2-LT-3-43        #1SG LEVEL TRANSMITTER (WR) 2-LT-3-51        #2SG LEVEL TRANSMITTER (NR) 2-LT-3-52        #2SG LEVEL TRANSMITTER (NR) 2-LT-3-55        #2SG LEVEL TRANSMITTER (NR) 2-LT-3-56        #2SG LEVEL TRANSMITTER (WR) 2-LT-3-93        #3SG LEVEL TRANSMITTER (NR) 2-LT-3-94        #3SG LEVEL TRANSMITTER (NR) 2-LT-3-97        #3SG LEVEL TRANSMITTER (NR) 2-LT-3-98        #3SG LEVEL TRANSMITTER (WR) 2-LT-62-129A     VCT LEVEL TRANSMITTER 2-LT-62-129C     VCT LEVEL TRANSMITTER 2-LT-62-130A     VCT LEVEL TRANSMITTER 2-LT-63-50       RWST LEVEL TRANSMITTER 2-LT-63-51       RWST LEVEL TRANSMITTER 2-LT-63-52       RWST LEVEL TRANSMITTER 2-LT-63-53       RWST LEVEL TRANSMITTER 2-LT-63-180-D    CONTAINMENT SUMP LEVEL TRANSMITTER 2-LT-63-181-E    CONTAINMENT SUMP LEVEL TRANSMITTER 2-LT-63-182-F    CONTAINMENT SUMP LEVEL TRANSMITTER 2-LT-63-183-G    CONTAINMENT SUMP LEVEL TRANSMITTER 2-LT-68-320-F    PZR LEVEL TRANSMITTER 2-LT-68-325C     RCS PRESSURIZER LEVEL 2-LT-68-326C     RCS PRESSURIZER LEVEL 2-LT-68-335      PZR LEVEL TRANSMITTER 2-LT-68-339      PZR LEVEL TRANSMITTER 2-MCC-213-A1-A   REACTOR MOV BD 2A1-A 2-MCC-213-A2-A   REACTOR MOV BD 2A2-A 2-MCC-213-B1-B   REACTOR MOV BD 2B1-B 2-MCC-213-B2-B   REACTOR MOV BD 2B2-B 2-MCC-214-A1-A   480V CONTROL AND AUX BLDG VENT BOARD 2A1-A 2-MCC-214-A2-A   480V CONTROL AND AUX BLDG VENT BOARD 2A2-A 2-MCC-214-B1-B   480V CONTROL AND AUX BLDG VENT BOARD 2B1-B 2-MCC-214-B2-B   480V CONTROL AND AUX BLDG VENT BOARD 2B2-B 2-MCC-215-A1-A   DIESEL AUX BD 2A1-A 2-MCC-215-A2-A   DIESEL AUX BD 2A2-A 2-MCC-215-B1-B   DIESEL AUX BD 2B1-B III-68

PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES        Revision 58 TABLE 3 SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST EQUIPMENT         DESCRIPTION 2-MCC-215-B2-B    DIESEL AUX BD 2B2-B 2-MTR-30-175-A    RHR PUMP 2A-A ROOM COOLER FAN 2-MTR-30-176-B    RHR PUMP 2B-B ROOM COOLER FAN 2-MTR-30-182-B    CCP 2B-B ROOM COOLER FAN 2-MTR-30-183-A    CCP 2A-A ROOM COOLER FAN 2-MTR-30-184-A    AFW/BA XFER PUMP SPACE COOLER 2A-A MOTOR 2-MTR-30-185-B    AFW/BA XFER PUMP SPACE COOLER 2B-B MOTOR 2-MTR-30-214      TURBINE DRIVEN AUX FW PUMP ROOM VENT FAN 2-MTR-30-246F-B   XMFR RM 2B EXHAUST FAN 2B1-B MOTOR 2-MTR-30-246G-B   XMFR RM 2B EXHAUST FAN 2B2-B MOTOR 2-MTR-30-246H-B   XMFR RM 2B EXHAUST FAN 2B3-B MOTOR 2-MTR-30-250E-A   XMFR RM 2A EXHAUST FAN 2A1-A MOTOR 2-MTR-30-250F-A   XMFR RM 2A EXHAUST FAN 2A2-A MOTOR 2-MTR-30-250G-A   XMFR RM 2A EXHAUST FAN 2A3-A MOTOR 2-MTR-30-38-A     CONTAINMENT AIR RETURN FAN 2A-A 2-MTR-30-39-B     CONTAINMENT AIR RETURN FAN 2B-B 2-MTR-30-448-A    DG 2A-A ROOM EXHAUST FAN 1A MOTOR 2-MTR-30-450-B    DG 2B-B ROOM EXHAUST FAN 1B MOTOR 2-MTR-30-452-A    DG 2A-A ROOM EXHAUST FAN 2A MOTOR 2-MTR-30-454-B    DG 2B-B ROOM EXHAUST FAN 2B MOTOR 2-MTR-30-460-A    DG 2A-A ELECTRIC BOARD ROOM EXHAUST FAN MOTOR 2-MTR-30-462-B    DG 2B-B ELECTRIC BOARD ROOM EXHAUST FAN MOTOR 2-MTR-30-492-A    DG ELEC PANEL/GENERATOR VENT FAN 2-MTR-30-494-B    DG ELEC PANEL/GENERATOR VENT FAN 2-MTR-30-74-A     REACTOR LOWER COMPARTMENT COOLER FAN 2A-A 2-MTR-30-75-B     REACTOR LOWER COMPARTMENT COOLER FAN 2B-B 2-MTR-30-77-A     REACTOR LOWER COMPARTMENT COOLER FAN 2C-A 2-MTR-30-78-B     REACTOR LOWER COMPARTMENT COOLER FAN 2D-B 2-MTR-30-80-B     CONTROL ROD DRIVE MOTOR COOLER 2D-B 2-MTR-30-83-A     CONTROL ROD DRIVE MOTOR COOLER 2A-A 2-MTR-30-88-A     CONTROL ROD DRIVE MOTOR COOLER 2C-A 2-MTR-30-92-B     CONTROL ROD DRIVE MOTOR COOLER 2B-B 2-MTR-3-118-A     MDAFW PUMP 2A-A 2-MTR-3-118D-A    AUX FEEDWATER PUMP A-A LUBE OIL PUMP A-A 2-MTR-3-128-B     MDAFW PUMP 2B-B 2-MTR-3-128D-B    AUX FEEDWATER PUMP B-B LUBE OIL PUMP B-B 2-MTR-62-104-B    CENTRIFUGAL CHARGING PUMP 2B-B 2-MTR-62-108-A    CENTRIFUGAL CHARGING PUMP 2A-A 2-MTR-63-10-A     SAFETY INJECTION PUMP 2A-A 2-MTR-63-15-B     SAFETY INJECTION PUMP 2B-B 2-MTR-67-10-B     ERCW STRAINER 2B-B 2-MTR-67-437-A    ERCW SCREEN WASH PUMP 2A-A 2-MTR-67-439-A    ERCW TRAVELING SCREEN 2A-A 2-MTR-67-447-B    ERCW SCREEN WASH PUMP 2B-B 2-MTR-67-451-B    ERCW TRAVELING SCREEN 2B-B 2-MTR-67-9-A      ERCW STRAINER 2A-A 2-MTR-68-31       REACTOR COOLING PUMP NUMBER 2 2-MTR-68-50       REACTOR COOLING PUMP NUMBER 3 2-MTR-68-73       REACTOR COOLING PUMP NUMBER 4 2-MTR-68-8        REACTOR COOLANT PUMP NUMBER 1 III-69

PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES       Revision 58 TABLE 3 SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST EQUIPMENT         DESCRIPTION 2-MTR-70-130-B    THERMAL BARRIER BOOSTER PUMP 2B-B 2-MTR-70-131-A    THERMAL BARRIER BOOSTER PUMP 2A-A 2-MTR-70-33-B     COMPONENT COOLING SYSTEM PUMP 2B-B 2-MTR-70-59-A     COMPONENT COOLING SYSTEM PUMP 2A-A 2-MTR-72-10-B     CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP 2B-B 2-MTR-72-27-A     CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP 2A-A 2-MTR-74-10-A     RHR PUMP 2A-A 2-MTR-74-20-B     RHR PUMP 2B-B 2-MTR-81-3        PRIMARY MAKEUP WATER PUMP 2A 2-MTR-81-7        PRIMARY MAKEUP WATER PUMP 2B 2-NI-92-131-D     SOURCE RANGE DETECTOR AND INDICATION 2-NI-92-132-E     SOURCE RANGE DETECTOR AND INDICATION 2-NI-92-138       NEUTRON SOURCE RANGE INDICATOR 2-NM-92-131-D     AMPLIFIER 2-NM-92-132-E     AMPLIFIER 2-NMD-92-131-D    NEUTRON DETECTOR 2-NMD-92-132-E    NEUTRON DETECTOR 2-OXF-212-A1-A    480V SHUTDOWN BOARD XMFR 2A1-A 2-OXF-212-A2-A    480V SHUTDOWN BOARD XMFR 2A2-A 2-OXF-212-B1-B    480V SHUTDOWN BOARD XMFR 2B1-B 2-OXF-212-B2-B    480V SHUTDOWN BOARD XMFR 2B2-B 2-PCV-1-12        SG 2 POWER RELIEF VALVE 2-PCV-1-23        SG 3 POWER RELIEF VALVE 2-PCV-1-30        SG 4 POWER RELIEF VALVE 2-PCV-1-5         SG 1 POWER RELIEF VALVE 2-PCV-68-334-B    PRESSURIZER PORV 2-PCV-68-340A-A   PRESSURIZER PORV 2-PCV-68-340B     PRESSURIZER SPRAY VALVE 2-PCV-68-340D     PRESSURIZER SPRAY VALVE 2-PDI-30-42-K     U2 CONTAINMENT PRESSURE INDICATOR 2-PDI-30-43-J     U2 CONTAINMENT PRESSURE INDICATOR 2-PDI-30-44-K     U2 CONTAINMENT PRESSURE INDICATOR 2-PDI-30-45-J     U2 CONTAINMENT PRESSURE INDICATOR 2-PDT-30-42-G     U2 CONTAINMENT PRESSURE INSTRUMENTATION LOOP 2-PDT-30-43-F     U2 CONTAINMENT PRESSURE INSTRUMENTATION LOOP 2-PDT-30-44-E     U2 CONTAINMENT PRESSURE INSTRUMENTATION LOOP 2-PDT-30-45-D     U2 CONTAINMENT PRESSURE INSTRUMENTATION LOOP 2-PI-1-12         #2SG PRESSURE INDICATION 2-PI-1-19C        SG 3 STEAM HEADER PRESSURE 2-PI-1-1C         SG 1 STEAM HEADER PRESSURE 2-PI-1-20A        #3SG PRESSURE INDICATION 2-PI-1-20B        #3SG PRESSURE INDICATION 2-PI-1-23         #3SG PRESSURE INDICATION 2-PI-1-26C        SG 4 STEAM HEADER PRESSURE 2-PI-1-27A        #4SG PRESSURE INDICATION 2-PI-1-27B        #4SG PRESSURE INDICATION 2-PI-1-2A         SG 1 MAIN STEAM HEADER PRESSURE 2-PI-1-2B         SG 1 MAIN STEAM HEADER PRESSURE 2-PI-1-30         #4SG PRESSURE INDICATION 2-PI-1-5          SG 1 MAIN STEAM HEADER PRESSURE POWER RELIEF III-70

PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES          Revision 58 TABLE 3 SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST EQUIPMENT        DESCRIPTION 2-PI-1-8C        SG 2 STEAM HEADER PRESSURE 2-PI-1-9A        #2SG PRESSURE INDICATION 2-PI-1-9B        #2SG PRESSURE INDICATION 2-PI-3-117       LOCAL MDAFWP A SUCTION PRES INDICATOR 2-PI-3-127       LOCAL MDAFWP B SUCTION PRES INDICATOR 2-PI-3-137       LOCAL TDAFW PUMP SUCTION PRES INDICATOR 2-PI-68-342A     PRESSURIZER PRESSURE INSTRUMENT LOOP 2-PI-68-342C     PRESSURIZER PRESSURE INSTRUMENT LOOP 2-PI-68-63       RCS LOOP 1 PRESSURE (RHR INLET) 2-PIC-1-13A      SG 2 POWER RELIEF VALVE 2-PIC-1-13C      SG 2 POWER RELIEF VALVE 2-PIC-1-24A      SG 3 POWER RELIEF VALVE 2-PIC-1-24C      SG 3 POWER RELIEF VALVE 2-PIC-1-31A      SG 4 POWER RELIEF VALVE 2-PIC-1-31C      SG 4 POWER RELIEF VALVE 2-PIC-1-6A       SG 1 POWER RELIEF VALVE 2-PIC-1-6C       SG 1 POWER RELIEF VALVE 2-PM-1-13        SG 2 POWER RELIEF VALVE MODIFIER 2-PM-1-24        SG 3 POWER RELIEF VALVE MODIFIER 2-PM-1-31        SG 4 POWER RELIEF VALVE MODIFIER 2-PM-1-6         SG1 POWER RELIEF VALVE MODIFIER 2-PMP-18-54/3    2-DG-82-A-A FO XFER PP #2 2-PMP-18-54/4    2-DG-82-B-B FO XFER PP #2 2-PMP-18-55/3    2-DG-82-A-A FO XFER PP #1 2-PMP-18-55/4    2-DG-82-B-B FO XFER PP #1 2-PNL-276-L112   CHARGING PUMP 2B & 2C PANEL 2-PSV-1-13B-B    SG 2 POWER RELIEF SOLENOID VALVE 2-PSV-1-13C-A    SG 2 POWER RELIEF SOLENOID VALVE 2-PSV-1-24B-A    SG 3 POWER RELIEF SOLENOID VALVE 2-PSV-1-24C-B    SG 3 POWER RELIEF SOLENOID VALVE 2-PSV-1-31B-B    SG 4 POWER RELIEF SOLENOID VALVE 2-PSV-1-31C-A    SG 4 POWER RELIEF SOLENOID VALVE 2-PSV-1-6B-A     SG 1 POWER RELIEF SOLENOID VALVE 2-PSV-1-6C-B     SG 1 POWER RELIEF SOLENOID VALVE 2-PT-1-1C        SG-1 STEAM HEADER PRESSURE TRANSMITTER 2-PT-1-12-F      LOOP 2 ATMOSPHERIC RELIEF INSTRUMENT LOOP 2-PT-1-13        SG-2 PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FOR PCV-1-12 2-PT-1-19C       SG-3 STEAM HEADER PRESSURE TRANSMITTER 2-PT-1-20A-D     LOOP 3 MAIN STEAM PRESSURE INSTRUMENTATION LOOP 2-PT-1-20B-E     LOOP 3 MAIN STEAM PRESSURE INSTRUMENTATION LOOP 2-PT-1-23-F      LOOP 3 ATMOSPHERIC RELIEF INSTRUMENT LOOP 2-PT-1-24        SG-3 PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FOR PCV-1-23 2-PT-1-26C       SG-4 STEAM HEADER PRESSURE TRANSMITTER 2-PT-1-27A-D     LOOP 4 MAIN STEAM PRESSURE INSTRUMENTATION LOOP 2-PT-1-27B-E     LOOP 4 MAIN STEAM PRESSURE INSTRUMENTATION LOOP 2-PT-1-2A-D      LOOP 1 MAIN STEAM PRESSURE INSTRUMENTATION LOOP 2-PT-1-2B-E      LOOP 1 MAIN STEAM PRESSURE INSTRUMENTATION LOOP 2-PT-1-30-G      LOOP 4 ATMOSPHERIC RELIEF INSTRUMENT LOOP 2-PT-1-31        MAIN STEAM LOOP 4 PRESSURE 2-PT-1-5-G       LOOP 1 ATMOSPHERIC RELIEF INSTRUMENTATION LOOP III-71

PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES           Revision 58 TABLE 3 SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST EQUIPMENT        DESCRIPTION 2-PT-1-6         MAIN STEAM LOOP 1 PRESSURE 2-PT-1-8C        SG-2 STEAM HEADER PRESSURE TRANSMITTER 2-PT-1-9A-D      LOOP 2 MAIN STEAM PRESSURE INSTRUMENTATION LOOP 2-PT-1-9B-E      LOOP 2 MAIN STEAM PRESSURE INSTRUMENTATION LOOP 2-PT-68-323-F    U2 PRESSURIZER PRESSURE INSTRUMENTATION LOOP 2-PT-68-334-E    U2 PRESSURIZER PRESSURE INSTRUMENTATION LOOP 2-PT-68-340-D    U2 PRESSURIZER PRESSURE INSTRUMENTATION LOOP 2-PT-68-342C     PRESSURIZER PRESSURE INSTRUMENT 2-PT-68-63       RCS LOOP 1 PRESSURE (RHR INLET) 2-RTV-30-42A     2-PDT-30-42-G CTMT PRES XMTR SENSE LINE/ISO VLV 2-RTV-30-43A     2-PDT-30-43-F CTMT PRES XMTR SENSE LINE/ISO VLV 2-RTV-30-44A     2-PDT-30-44-E CTMT PRES XMTR SENSE LINE/ISO VLV 2-RTV-30-45A     2-PDT-30-45-D CTMT PRES XMTR SENSE LINE/ISO VLV 2-SC-46-57       TDAFW PUMP SPEED CONTROLLER 2-XSW-46-AC-S    AC MANUAL TRANSFER SW 2-XSW-46-DC-S    DC MANUAL TRANSFER SW 2-TANK-1-405A    N2 TANK #1 SUPPLY TO 2-PCV-1-12-B 2-TANK-1-405B    N2 TANK #2 SUPPLY TO 2-PCV-1-12-B 2-TANK-1-406A    N2 TANK #1 SUPPLY TO 2-PCV-1-30-B 2-TANK-1-406B    N2 TANK #2 SUPPLY TO 2-PCV-1-30-B 2-TANK-1-407A    N2 TANK #1 SUPPLY TO 2-PCV-1-23-A 2-TANK-1-407B    N2 TANK #2 SUPPLY TO 2-PCV-1-23-A 2-TANK-1-408A    N2 TANK #1 SUPPLY TO 2-PCV-1-5-A 2-TANK-1-408B    N2 TANK #2 SUPPLY TO 2-PCV-1-5-A 2-TANK-3-402A    N2 TANK #1 SUPPLY TO 2-LCV-3-173-B 2-TANK-3-402B    N2 TANK #2 SUPPLY TO 2-LCV-3-173-B 2-TANK-3-402C    N2 TANK #1 SUPPLY TO 2-LCV-3-174-B 2-TANK-3-402D    N2 TANK #2 SUPPLY TO 2-LCV-3-174-B 2-TANK-3-403A    N2 TANK #1 SUPPLY TO 2-LCV-3-172-A 2-TANK-3-403B    N2 TANK #2 SUPPLY TO 2-LCV-3-172-A 2-TANK-3-403C    N2 TANK #1 SUPPLY TO 2-LCV-3-175-A 2-TANK-3-403D    N2 TANK #2 SUPPLY TO 2-LCV-3-175-A 2-TCO-30-82-B    CONTROL ROD DRIVE COOLING 2D-B RM DIVERSION DMPR 2-TCO-30-85-A    CRD COOLING UNIT 2A-A ROOM DIVERSION DAMPER 2-TCO-30-90-A    CONTROL ROD DRIVE COOLING 2C-A RM DIVERSION DMPR 2-TCO-30-94-B    CONTROL ROD DRIVE COOLING 2B-B DIVERSION DMPR 2-TCV-67-100-B   LOWER CNTMT VENT CLR B SUPPLY VLV 2-TCV-67-101-B   CONTROL ROD DRIVE VENT CLR B SUPPLY VLV 2-TCV-67-108-B   LOWER CNTMT VENT CLR D SUPPLY VLV 2-TCV-67-109-B   CONTROL ROD DRIVE VENT COOLER D SUPPLY VLV 2-TCV-67-84-A    LOWER CNTMT VENT CLR A SUPPLY VLV 2-TCV-67-85-A    CONTROL ROD DRIVE VENT CLR A SUPPLY VLV 2-TCV-67-92-A    LOWER CNTMT VENT CLR C SUPPLY VLV 2-TCV-67-93-A    CONTROL ROD DRIVE VENT CLR C SUPPLY VLV 2-TCV-70-192     NON REGEN LETDOWN HEAT EXCHANGER OUTLET VALVE 2-TE-68-1        RCS LOOP 1 HOT LEG TEMPERATURE 2-TE-68-18       RCS LOOP 1 COLD LEG TEMPERATURE 2-TE-68-1C       RCS LOOP 1 HOT LEG TEMPERATURE 2-TE-68-24       RCS LOOP 2 HOT LEG TEMPERATURE 2-TE-68-24C      RCS LOOP 2 HOT LEG TEMPERATURE III-72

PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES           Revision 58 TABLE 3 SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST EQUIPMENT         DESCRIPTION 2-TE-68-41        RCS LOOP 2 COLD LEG TEMPERATURE 2-TE-68-43        RCS LOOP 3 HOT LEG TEMPERATURE 2-TE-68-43C       RCS LOOP 3 HOT LEG TEMPERATURE 2-TE-68-60        RCS LOOP 3 COLD LEG TEMPERATURE 2-TE-68-65        RCS LOOP 4 HOT LEG TEMPERATURE 2-TE-68-65C       RCS LOOP 4 HOT LEG TEMPERATURE 2-TE-68-83        RCS LOOP 4 COLD LEG TEMPERATURE 2-TE-70-154       RHR HEAT EXCHANGE 2B CCS RETURN TEMP 2-TE-70-157       RHR HEAT EXCHANGE 2A CCS RETURN TEMP 2-TE-70-161       ERCW/CCS HX-B OUTLET TEMP (CCS) 2-TE-74-14        RHR PMP 2A-A OUTLET TEMP 2-TI-74-15        RHR HX-A INLET TEMPERATURE 2-TE-74-25        RHR PMP 2B-B OUTLET TEMP 2-TE-74-29        RHR HEAT EXCHANGER A OUTLET TEMP 2-TE-74-38C       RCS HEAT EXCHANGER 2A OUTLET TEMPERATURE 2-TE-74-39        RHR HEAT EXCHANGER B OUTLET TEMP 2-TE-74-40C       RCS HEAT EXCHANGER 2B OUTLET TEMPERATURE 2-THV-70-546A     RHR HX 2A-A OUTLET VALVE (MANUAL) 2-TI-62-4         RCP NO. 1 SEAL OUT 2-TI-62-17        RCP NO. 2 SEAL OUT 2-TI-62-30        RCP NO. 3 SEAL OUT 2-TI-62-43        RCP NO. 4 SEAL OUT 2-TI-68-1         RCS LOOP 1 HOT LEG TEMPERATURE 2-TI-68-18        RCS LOOP 1 COLD LEG TEMPERATURE 2-TI-68-1C        RCS LOOP 1 HOT LEG TEMPERATURE 2-TI-68-24A       RCS LOOP 2 HOT LEG TEMPERATURE 2-TI-68-24C       RCS LOOP 2 HOT LEG TEMPERATURE 2-TI-68-41        RCS LOOP 2 COLD LEG TEMPERATURE 2-TI-68-43        RCS LOOP 3 HOT LEG TEMPERATURE 2-TI-68-43C       RCS LOOP 3 HOT LEG TEMPERATURE 2-TI-68-60        RCS LOOP 3 COLD LEG TEMPERATURE 2-TI-68-65        RCS LOOP 4 HOT LEG TEMPERATURE 2-TI-68-65C       RCS LOOP 4 HOT LEG TEMPERATURE 2-TI-68-83        RCS LOOP 4 COLD LEG TEMPERATURE 2-TI-70-154       RHR HX-B OUTLET TEMP (CCS) 2-TI-70-157       RHR HX-A OUTLET TEMP (CCS) 2-TI-70-161       ERCW/CCS HX-B OUTLET TEMP (CCS) 2-TI-74-14        RHR HX-A INLET TEMPERATURE 2-TI-74-15        RHR HX-A OUTLET TEMPERATURE 2-TI-74-25        RHR HX-B INLET TEMPERATURE 2-TI-74-27        RHR HX-B OUTLET TEMPERATURE 2-TI-74-38C       RCS HEAT EXCHANGER 2A OUTLET TEMPERATURE 2-TI-74-40C       RCS HEAT EXCHANGER 2B OUTLET TEMPERATURE 2-TIS-62-79       LETDOWN FLOW TEMPERATURE IND SWITCH 2-TR-74-14P002    RHR HX-A TEMPERATURE RECORDER 2-TR-74-25P002    RHR HX-B TEMPERATURE RECORDER 2-XSV-32-112      UNIT 2 CONTAINMENT NON-ESSENTIAL HDR DUMP SOLENOID TDAFWP_A-S        TURBINE-DRIVEN AFW PUMP TDAFW_PUMP_2A-S   TURBINE-DRIVEN AFW PUMP III-73

PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES                       Revision 58 TABLE 3 ANALYSIS VOLUME BY FIRE AREA LIST FIRE AREA 1     ROOM NO.       DESCRIPTION AV-001          674.0-A1       Tritiated Drain Collector Tank Room 674.0-A2       Tritiated Drain Collector Tank Pumps 676.0-A1       Corridor 676.0-A2       Holdup Tank Room A 676.0-A3       Holdup Tank Room B 676.0-A4       Floor Drain Collect Pump, Filter & Tank 676.0-A4a      Floor Drain Collection Tank Room 676.0-A5       Gas Stripper Feed Pump Room 676.0-A6       Spare 676.0-A7       Spare 676.0-A16      Unit 1 Pipe Chase 692.0-A1C      Corridor 692.0-A8       Unit 1 Pipe Chase 692.0-A31      Spare 713.0-A28      Unit 1 Pipe Chase FIRE AREA 1     ROOM NO.       DESCRIPTION AV-002          692.0-A1A1     Corridor, Column Lines Q-U/A1-A4 692.0-A1A2     Corridor, Column Lines S-T/A4-A5 692.0-A2       Gas Decay Tank Valve Gallery 692.0-A3       Gas Decay Tank Room 692.0-A4       Chemical Drain Tank Room 692.0-A5       Gas Decay Tank Room 676.0-A2       Holdup Tank Room A 676.0-A3       Holdup Tank Room B FIRE AREA 1     ROOM NO.       DESCRIPTION AV-003          692.0-A1A2     Corridor, Column Lines S-T/A4-A5 692.0-A1A3     Corridor, Column Lines S-T/A5-A6 692.0-A1AN     Corridor, Column Lines S-U/A6-A8 676.0-A2       Holdup Tank Room A 676.0-A3       Holdup Tank Room B FIRE AREA 1     ROOM NO.       DESCRIPTION AV-004A         692.0-A1AN     Corridor, Column Lines S-U/A6-A8 AV-004B         692.0-A1BN     Corridor, Column Lines S-U/A8-A10 (Note 1)        676.0-A2       Holdup Tank Room A 676.0-A3       Holdup Tank Room B FIRE AREA 1     ROOM NO.       DESCRIPTION AV-004AC        692.0-A1AN     Corridor, Column Lines S-U/A6-A8 AV-004BC        692.0-A1BN     Corridor, Column Lines S-U/A8-A10 (Note 2)        692.0-A1C      Corridor FIRE AREA 1     ROOM NO.       DESCRIPTION AV-005          692.0-A1B1     Corridor, Col Lines S-T/A12-A13, S-U/A13-A14, Q-T/A14-A15 FIRE AREA 1     ROOM NO.       DESCRIPTION AV-005          692.0-A1B2     Corridor, Col Lines S-T/A11-A12 III-74

PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES                 Revision 58 TABLE 3 ANALYSIS VOLUME BY FIRE AREA LIST FIRE AREA 1     692.0-A1B3     Corridor, Col Lines S-T/A10-A11 AV-005          692.0-A1BN     Corridor, Column Lines S-U/A8-A10 (contd)        692.0-A27      Concentrate Filter Room 692.0-A29      Boric Acid Evaporator Package Room B 692.0-A30      Boric Acid Evaporator Package Room A 692.0-A31      Spare 676.0-A2       Holdup Tank Room A 676.0-A3       Holdup Tank Room B FIRE AREA 1     ROOM NO.       DESCRIPTION AV-006          692.0-A1C      Corridor, Column Lines U-RxCL/A5-A11 Maintenance and Test Equipment Hot Tool 692.0-A17 Room 692.0-A18      Hot Tool Room FIRE AREA 1     ROOM NO.       DESCRIPTION AV-007          676.0-A8       Containment Spray Pump 1B-B FIRE AREA 1     ROOM NO.       DESCRIPTION AV-008          676.0-A9       Containment Spray Pump 1A-A FIRE AREA 1     ROOM NO.       DESCRIPTION AV-009          692.0-A9       Charging Pump 1A-A FIRE AREA 1     ROOM NO.       DESCRIPTION AV-010          692.0-A12      Safety Injection Pump 1B-B FIRE AREA 1     ROOM NO.       DESCRIPTION AV-011          692.0-A13      Safety Injection Pump 1A-A FIRE AREA 1     ROOM NO.       DESCRIPTION AV-100          676.0-A14      Containment Spray Pump 2A-A FIRE AREA 1     ROOM NO.       DESCRIPTION AV-101          676.0-A15      Containment Spray Pump 2B-B FIRE AREA 1-1   ROOM NO.       DESCRIPTION AV-102          692.0-A20      Safety Injection Pump 2B-B FIRE AREA 1-2   ROOM NO.       DESCRIPTION AV-012          692.0-A19      Safety Injection Pump 2A-A FIRE AREA 2-1   ROOM NO.       DESCRIPTION AV-013          676.0-A10      RHR Pump Room 1B-B FIRE AREA 2-2   ROOM NO.       DESCRIPTION AV-014          676.0-A13      RHR Pump Room 2B-B FIRE AREA 3-1   ROOM NO.       DESCRIPTION AV-015          676.0-A11      RHR Pump Room 1A-A III-75

PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES                           Revision 58 TABLE 3 ANALYSIS VOLUME BY FIRE AREA LIST FIRE AREA 3-2   ROOM NO.       DESCRIPTION AV-016          676.0-A12      RHR Pump Room 2A-A FIRE AREA 4     ROOM NO.       DESCRIPTION 692.0-A6       Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room AV-017 1A-S FIRE AREA 5     ROOM NO.       DESCRIPTION AV-018          692.0-A7       Unit 1 Pentration Rm FIRE AREA 6     ROOM NO.       DESCRIPTION AV-019          692.0-A10      Charging Pump Room 1B-B FIRE AREA 7     ROOM NO.       DESCRIPTION AV-020          692.0-A11      Charging Pump Room 1C FIRE AREA 8     ROOM NO.       DESCRIPTION 713.0-A1A1     Corridor, Col Lines S-U/A1-A4, ceiling level only AV-021 S-CCS Wall/A1-A3 713.0-A9       Unit 1 Mixed Bed and Cation Valve Gallery FIRE AREA 8     ROOM NO.       DESCRIPTION AV-022          713.0-A1A2     Corridor, Col Lines S-U/A1-A4, ceiling level only CCS Wall-U/A1-A3 713.0-A9       Unit 1 Mixed Bed and Cation Valve Gallery FIRE AREA 8     ROOM NO.       DESCRIPTION AV-023          713.0-A1A3     Corridor, Column Lines Q-CCS Wall/A1-A4 713.0-A24      Waste Gas Compressor Valve Gallery 713.0-A25      Waste Gas Compressor B 713.0-A26      Waste Gas Compressor A 713.0-A27      Decontamination Room FIRE AREA 8     ROOM NO.       DESCRIPTION AV-024          713.0-A1A4     Corridor, Column Lines Q-U/A3-A8 713.0-A1AN     Corridor, Column Lines Q-U/A6-A8 713.0-A9       Unit 1 Mixed Bed and Cation Valve Gallery 713.0-A10      Seal Water Heat Exchanger 1A 713.0-A22      Holdup Tank Valve Gallery 713.0-A23      CVCS Valve Gallery 713.0-A24      Waste Gas Compressor Valve Gallery 713.0-A25      Waste Gas Compressor B 713.0-A26      Waste Gas Compressor A FIRE AREA 8     ROOM NO.       DESCRIPTION AV-025          713.0-A1AN     Corridor, Column Lines Q-U/A6-A8 III-76

PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES                  Revision 58 TABLE 3 ANALYSIS VOLUME BY FIRE AREA LIST FIRE AREA 8   ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-025        713.0-A1BN      Corridor, Column Lines Q-U/A8-A10 (contd)      713.0-A22       Holdup Tank Valve Gallery 713.0-A23       CVCS Valve Gallery FIRE AREA 8   ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-025C       713.0-A1AN      Corridor, Column Lines Q-U/A6-A8 (Note 3)      713.0-A1BN      Corridor, Column Lines Q-U/A8-A10 713.0-A1C       Corridor, Column Lines U-W/A7-A9 713.0-A10       Seal Water Heat Exchanger 1A 713.0-A17       Seal Water Heat Exchanger 2A 713.0-A22       Holdup Tank Valve Gallery 713.0-A23       CVCS Valve Gallery FIRE AREA 8   ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-026        713.0-A1B       Corridor, Column Lines Q-U/A10-A15 713.0-A1BN      Corridor, Column Lines Q-U/A8-A10 713.0-A17       Seal Water Heat Exchanger 2A 713.0-A18       Unit 2 Mixed Bed and Cation Valve Gallery 713.0-A22       Holdup Tank Valve Gallery 713.0-A23       CVCS Valve Gallery FIRE AREA 8   ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-26A        713.0-A1C       Corridor, Column Lines U-W/A7-A9 713.0-A13       Sample Room 1 713.0-A14       Sample Room 2 713.0-A31       Waste Gas Analyzer Room FIRE AREA 8   ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-027        713.0-A2        Air Lock 713.0-A3        Titration Room 713.0-A4        Radio Chemical Lab 713.0-A5        Counting Room 713.0-A30       Air Lock FIRE AREA 8   ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-028        713.0-A11       Heat Exchanger 1B FIRE AREA 8   ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-029        713.0-A12       Heat Exchanger 1A FIRE AREA 8   ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-108        713.0-A15       Heat Exchanger 2A FIRE AREA 8   ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-109        713.0-A16       Heat Exchanger 2B FIRE AREA 9   ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-030        713.0-A6        Unit 1 Penetration Room 713.0-A8        Unit 1 Reactor Building Access Room III-77

PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES                         Revision 58 TABLE 3 ANALYSIS VOLUME BY FIRE AREA LIST FIRE AREA 9-1   ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-031          713.0-A7        Unit 1 Volume Control Tank (VCT) room FIRE AREA 10    ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-032          Stair No. 4     Stair No. 4 & Penthouse 692.0-A14       Cask Decontamination Collection Tank Room 692.0-A15       Spent Resin Tank Room 692.0-A16       Valve Gallery 728.0-A7        Cask Decontamination Room 729.0-A5        Cask Unloading Area 729.0-A6        Nitrogen Storage Area 729.0-A8        Unit 1 Post Accident Sampling Room 757.0-A13       Refueling Room (Includes New Storage Area 741.5) 772.0-A9        HEPA Filter Plenum Room 776.0-A1        Elevator Machine Room 786.0-A1        Fan Room 814.075-ACS     Stair No. 2 & Penthouse FIRE AREA 10    ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-119          729.0-A9        Unit 2 Post Accident Sampling Room FIRE AREA 11    ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-033          729.0-A3        Waste Package Area 729.0-A4        Waste Package Area FIRE AREA 12    ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-034          729.0-A1        Main Steam Valve Room (Unit 1 South) 737.0-A6        Air Lock FIRE AREA 13    ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-035          729.0-A12       Unit 1 Steam Valve Instrument Room A 729.0-A14       Unit 1 Upper Head Injection Room 729.5-A16       Unit 1 Shield Building Vent Radiation Monitoring Room 737.0-A13       Unit 1 Additional Equipment Building (AEB) 763.5-A1        U1 Ice Bin Equipment Room 775.25-A1       U1 Ice Machine Equipment Room 786.5-A1        U2 Chiller Package Equipment Room FIRE AREA 13    ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-035A         729.0-A2        Main Steam Valve Room (Unit 1 North)
FIRE AREA 14    ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-036          737.0-A1A       Auxiliary Building, Column Lines Q-U/A1-A6 737.0-A1AN      Auxiliary Building, Column Lines Q-U/A6-A8 FIRE AREA 14    ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-036          737.0-A2        Hot Instrument Shop 737.0-A4        Air Lock III-78

PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES                             Revision 58 TABLE 3 ANALYSIS VOLUME BY FIRE AREA LIST FIRE AREA 14     ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-037           737.0-A1AN      Auxiliary Building, Column Lines Q-U/A6-A8 737.0-A1BN      Auxiliary Building, Column Lines Q-U/A8-A10 FIRE AREA 14     ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-37A           737.0-A7        Unit 1 Letdown Heat Exchanger 737.0-A8        Unit 2 Letdown Heat Exchanger 737.0-A1C       Auxiliary Building, Column Lines U-RxCL/A5-A11 737.0-A1CN      Auxiliary Building, Column Lines V-U/A5-A11 FIRE AREA 14     ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-037C          737.0-A1AN      Auxiliary Building, Column Lines Q-U/A6-A8 (Note 4)         737.0-A1BN      Auxiliary Building, Column Lines Q-U/A8-A10 737.0-A1CN      Auxiliary Building, Column Lines V-U/A5-A11 737.0-A7        Unit 1 Letdown Heat Exchanger 737.0-A8        Unit 2 Letdown Heat Exchanger FIRE AREA 14     ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-038           737.0-A1B       Auxiliary Building, Column Lines Q-U/A10-A15 737.0-A1BN      Auxiliary Building, Column Lines Q-U/A8-A10 737.0-A11       Air Lock FIRE AREA 15-1   ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-039           737.0-A3        Unit 1 Heat and Vent Equipment Room FIRE AREA 15-2   ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-040           737.0-A12       Unit 2 Heat and Vent Equipment Room FIRE AREA 16     ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-041M          737.0-A5M       Ventilation and Purge Air Room, 2 north of column line V to 2-6 south of Reactor Building centerline 737.0-A15       Gross Failed Fuel Detector Room FIRE AREA 16     ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-041N          737.0-A5N       Ventilation and Purge Air Room, 2 north of 737.0-A15 to the north wall of 737.0-A5 AV-041S          737.0-A5S       Ventilation and Purge Air Room, column line U to column line W FIRE AREA 17     ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-042           757.0-A2        6.9kV and 480V Shutdown Board Room A (Note 5          757.0-A9        Unit 1 Personnel and Equipment Access AV-042D, E, F, G)
FIRE AREA 18     ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-043           757.0-A3        125V Vital Battery Board Room II FIRE AREA 19     ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-044           757.0-A4        125V Vital Battery Board Room I III-79

PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES                   Revision 58 TABLE 3 ANALYSIS VOLUME BY FIRE AREA LIST FIRE AREA 20     ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-045           757.0-A1        Auxiliary Control Room FIRE AREA 21     ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-046           757.0-A25       Auxiliary Control Instrument Room 1A FIRE AREA 22     ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-047           757.0 A26       Auxiliary Control Instrument Room 1B FIRE AREA 23     ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-048           757.0-A27       Auxiliary Control Instrument Room 2A FIRE AREA 24     ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-049           757.0-A28       Auxiliary Control Instrument Room 2B FIRE AREA 25     ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-050           782.0-A1        Unit 1 Control Rod Drive Equipment Room 782.0-A2        Pressurizer Heater Transformer Room 1 757.0-A10       Miscellaneous Equipment Room FIRE AREA 25     ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-051           757.0-A12       Reactor Building Access Room (Unit 1)
FIRE AREA 26     ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-052           757.0-A11       Unit 1 Reactor Bldg Equip Hatch FIRE AREA 27     ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-053           757.0-A5        480V Shutdown Board Room 1B FIRE AREA 28     ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-054           757.0-A21       480V Shutdown Board Room 2A FIRE AREA 29     ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-055           757.0-A22       125V Vital Battery Board Room IV FIRE AREA 30     ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-056           757.0-A23       125V Vital Battery Board Room III FIRE AREA 31     ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-057           757.0-A24       6.9kV and 480V Shutdown Board Room B (Note 5          757.0-A17       Unit 2 Personnel and Equipment Access Room AV-057D, E, F, G)
FIRE AREA 32     ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-058           772.0-A1        480V Board Room 1-A FIRE AREA 33     ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-059           772.0-A2A1      480-V Board Room 1-B, Column Lines A8-A6 772.0-A2A2      480-V Board Room 1-B, Column Lines A6-A5 772.0-A2A3      480-V Board Room 1-B, Column Lines A5-A4 III-80

PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES                   Revision 58 TABLE 3 ANALYSIS VOLUME BY FIRE AREA LIST FIRE AREA 33     ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-060           772.0-A2A3      480-V Board Room 1-B, Column Lines A5-A4 772.0-A2A4      480-V Board Room 1-B, Column Lines A4-A3 FIRE AREA 34     ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-061           772.0-A3        125-V Vital Battery Room II FIRE AREA 35     ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-062           772.0-A4        125-V Vital Battery Room I FIRE AREA 36     ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-063           772.0-A5        480-V Transformer Room 1-B FIRE AREA 37     ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-064           772.0-A6        480-V Transformer Room 1-A FIRE AREA 38     ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-065           772.0-A7        Unit 1 Mechanical Equipment Room FIRE AREA 39     ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-066           772.0-A8        Fifth Vital Battery and Board Room (Note 5 AV-066D, E, F, G)
FIRE AREA 40     ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-067           772.0-A10       Unit 2 Mechanical Equipment Room FIRE AREA 41     ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-068           772.0-A11       480-V Transformer Room 2-B FIRE AREA 42     ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-069           772.0-A12       480-V Transformer Room 2-A FIRE AREA 43     ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-070           772.0-A13       125-V Vital Battery Room IV FIRE AREA 44     ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-071           772.0-A14       125-V Vital Battery Room III FIRE AREA 45     ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-072           772.0-A15A1     480-V Board Room 2-B, Column Lines A13-A12 772.0-A15A2     480-V Board Room 2-B, Column Lines A12-A11 FIRE AREA 45     ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-073           772.0-A15A2     480-V Board Room 2-B, Column Lines A12-A11 772.0-A15A3     480-V Board Room 2-B, Column Lines A11-A10 772.0-A15A4     480-V Board Room 2-B, Column Lines A10-A8 FIRE AREA 46     ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-074           772.0-A16       480-V Board Room 2-A III-81

PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES                      Revision 58 TABLE 3 ANALYSIS VOLUME BY FIRE AREA LIST FIRE AREA 47      ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-075            786.0-A2        Roof Access Air Lock 786.0-A3        Mechanical Equipment Room 2B 786.0-A4        Mechanical Equipment Room 1B 786.0-A5        225 kVA DG Room B 786.0-A6        225 kVA DG Room A 786.0-AR        Roof FIRE AREA 48      ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-076 (On-Site   Stair C1        Stairwell C1 Power)            Stair C2        Stairwell C2 AV-076A           692.0-C1        Mechanical Equipment Room (Off-Site         692.0-C2        Mechanical Equipment Room Power)            692.0-C3        250V Battery Room 1 692.0-C4        250-V Battery Board Room No. 1 692.0-C5        250-V Battery Board Room No. 2 692.0-C6        250-V Battery Room 2 692.0-C7        24-V and 48-V Battery Room 692.0-C8        24-V and 48-V Battery Board and Charger Room 692.0-C9        Communications Room 692.0-C10       Mechanical Equipment Room 692.0-C11       Corridor 692.0-C12       Secondary Alarm Station Room 708.0-C1        Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room 708.0-C2        Corridor 708.0-C3        Computer Room 708.0-C4        Unit 2 Auxiliary Instrument Room 729.0-C1        Spreading Room 755.0-C1        Mechanical Equipment Room 755.0-C2        Women's Restroom Corridor (Includes space Above OPS Office and 755.0-C3 Living Area) 755.0-C4        Kitchen 755.0-C5        Toilet 755.0-C6        Locker Room 755.0-C7        Shower 755.0-C8        Shower 755.0-C9        Conference Room 755.0-C10       Shift Engineer's Office 755.0-C12       Main Control Room 755.0-C13       Relay Room III-82

PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES                          Revision 58 TABLE 3 ANALYSIS VOLUME BY FIRE AREA LIST FIRE AREA 48      755.0-C14       Technical Support Center AV-076 (On-Site   755.0-C15       Corridor Power)            755.0-C16       Conference Room AV-076A           755.0-C17       Telephone Room (Off-Site         755.0-C18       NRC Office Power)            755.0-C19       Corridor (contd)          755.0-C20       DPSO Shop CB Roof         Control Building Roof Deleted (Formerly Assigned to the Space Above OPS 763.0 Office and Living Area)
FIRE AREA 49      ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-077            DGB-1A          Diesel Generator Building 1A 742.0-D4, Diesel Generator Unit 1A-A 760.5-D3, Unit 1A-A Air Exhaust Room 760.5-D4, 480-V Board Room 1A-A 760.5-D5, Unit 1A-A Air Intake Room FIRE AREA 50      ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-078            DGB-2A          Diesel Generator Building 2A 742.0-D5, Diesel Generator Unit 2A-A 760.5-D6, Unit 2A-A Air Exhaust Room 760.5-D7, 480-V Board Room 2A-A 760.5-D8, Unit 2A-A Air Intake Room FIRE AREA 51      ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-079            DGB-1B          Diesel Generator Building 1B 742.0-D6, Diesel Generator Unit 1B-B 760.5-D9, Unit 1B-B Air Exhaust Room 760.5-D10, 480-V Board Room 1B-B 760.5-D11, Unit 1B-B Air Intake Room FIRE AREA 52      ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-080            DGB-2B          Diesel Generator Building 2B 742.0-D7, Diesel Generator Unit 2B-B 760.5-D12, Unit 2B-B Air Exhaust Room 760.5-D13, 480-V Board Room 2B-B 760.5-D14, Unit 2B-B Air Intake Room FIRE AREA 53      ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-081A           DGB-PGA         Diesel Generator Building Pipe Gallery A 742.0-D9A, Pipe Gallery/Corridor, West wall to Door D11 742.0-D9N, Pipe Gallery/Corridor, Door D11 to Door D12 742.0-D3, Toilet III-83

PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES                           Revision 58 TABLE 3 ANALYSIS VOLUME BY FIRE AREA LIST FIRE AREA 53  ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-081B       DGB-PGB         Diesel Generator Building Pipe Gallery B 742.0-D9B, Pipe Gallery/Corridor, East wall to Door D12 742.0-D9N, Pipe Gallery/Corridor, Door D11 to Door D12 742.0-D8, Fuel Oil Transfer Room FIRE AREA 54  ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-082        DGB-CO          Diesel Generator Building Corridor 742.0-D1, CO2 Storage Room 742.0-D2, Lube Oil Storage Room 742.0-D10, Conduit Interface Room 742.0-760.5, Stairwell D1 760.5-D1, Corridor 760.5-D2, Radiation Shelter FIRE AREA 55  ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-083        DGB-A           Cable Chase A (From 713.0-A1A3 to DG Building Pipe Gallery A)
FIRE AREA 56  ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-084        DGB-B           Cable Chase B (From 713.0-A1B to DG Building Pipe Gallery B)
FIRE AREA 57  ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-085                        Deleted (Formerly Assigned to the Additional Diesel Generator Building)
FIRE AREA 58  ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-086        IPS-A EL 741    ERCW Pump Room A IPS-A EL 741    Screen Wash and HPFP A Pumps Room IPS-A EL 722    ERCW Strainer Room A FIRE AREA 59  ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-087        IPS-B EL 741    ERCW Pump Room B IPS-B EL 741    HPFP B Pump Room IPS-B EL 722    ERCW Strainer Room B FIRE AREA 60  ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-088        IPS-CA          El. 711.0 Board Room, 20ft west of 480V Bd/Transformer IPS-CC-A        El. 711.0 Board Room, Mid to 20ft west of 480V Bd/Transformer FIRE AREA 60  ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-089        IPS-CC-A        El. 711.0 Board Room, Mid to 20ft west of 480V Bd/Transformer IPS-CC-B        El. 711.0 Board Room, Mid to 20ft east of 480V Bd/Transformer IPS-EL 728      RCW Pump Deck III-84

PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES                      Revision 58 TABLE 3 ANALYSIS VOLUME BY FIRE AREA LIST FIRE AREA 60  ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-090        IPS-CB          El. 711.0 Board Room, 20ft east of 480V Bd/Transformer IPS-CC-B        El. 711.0 Board Room, Mid to 20ft east of 480V Bd/Transformer FIRE AREA 61  ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-091        Annulus         Unit 1 Reactor Building - Annulus FIRE AREA 61  ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-092A                       Unit 1 Reactor Building - Lower Containment:
RO-2            Outside Crane Wall (90 - 180)
RO-3            Outside Crane Wall (180 - 270)
RA2             Accumulator Room 2 RF2             Fan Room 2 FIRE AREA 61  ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-092B                       Unit 1 Reactor Building - Lower Containment RO-2            Outside Crane Wall (90 - 180)
RO-3            Outside Crane Wall (180 - 270)
RA3             Accumulator Room 3 RF2             Fan Room 2 FIRE AREA 61  ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-092C                       Unit 1 Reactor Building - Lower Containment RO-3            Outside Crane Wall (180 - 270)
RO-4            Outside Crane Wall (270 - 360)
RA3             Accumulator Room 3 RA4             Accumulator Room 4 FIRE AREA 61  ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-092D                       Unit 1 Reactor Building - Lower Containment RO-1            Outside Crane Wall (0 - 90)
RO-4            Outside Crane Wall (270 - 360)
RF1             Fan Room 1 RA4             Accumulator Room 4 FIRE AREA 61  ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-092E                       Unit 1 Reactor Building - Lower Containment RO-1            Outside Crane Wall (0 - 90)
RO-4            Outside Crane Wall (270 - 360)
RF1             Fan Room 1 RA1             Accumulator Room 1 FIRE AREA 61  ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-092F                       Unit 1 Reactor Building - Lower Containment RIR             Instrument Room FIRE AREA 61  ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-092G                       Unit 1 Reactor Building - Primary Containment RU              Upper Containment III-85

PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES                        Revision 58 TABLE 3 ANALYSIS VOLUME BY FIRE AREA LIST FIRE AREA 61  ROOM NO.         DESCRIPTION AV-092H                        Unit 1 Reactor Building - Lower Containment RI-2             Inside Crane Wall (90 - 180)
RI-3             Inside Crane Wall (180 - 270)
RA2              Accumulator Room 2 RF2              Fan Room 2 FIRE AREA 61  ROOM NO.         DESCRIPTION AV-092J                        Unit 1 Reactor Building - Lower Containment RI-2             Inside Crane Wall (90 - 180)
RI-3             Inside Crane Wall (180 - 270)
RA3              Accumulator Room 3 RF2              Fan Room 2 FIRE AREA 61  ROOM NO.         DESCRIPTION AV-092K                        Unit 1 Reactor Building - Lower Containment RI-1             Inside Crane Wall (0 - 90)
RI-4             Inside Crane Wall (270 - 360)
RA4              Accumulator Room 4 RF1              Fan Room 1 FIRE AREA 61  ROOM NO.         DESCRIPTION AV-092L                        Unit 1 Reactor Building - Lower Containment RI-1             Inside Crane Wall (0 - 90)
RI-4             Inside Crane Wall (270 - 360)
RA1              Accumulator Room 1 RF1              Fan Room 1 FIRE AREA 62  ROOM NO.         DESCRIPTION AV-093        CDWE             Condensate Demineralizer Waste Evaporator Building (CDWE)
FIRE AREA 63  ROOM NO.         DESCRIPTION AV-094        TB               Turbine Building FIRE AREA 64  ROOM NO.         DESCRIPTION AV-095        Yard             Yard Area FIRE AREA 65  ROOM NO.         DESCRIPTION AV-099        676.0-A17        Unit 2 Pipe Chase 692.0-A24        Unit 2 Pipe Chase 713.0-A29        Unit 2 Pipe Chase FIRE AREA 66  ROOM NO.         DESCRIPTION AV-103        692.0-A21        Charging Pump 2C FIRE AREA 67  ROOM NO.         DESCRIPTION AV-104        692.0-A22        Charging Pump 2B-B FIRE AREA 68  ROOM NO.         DESCRIPTION AV-105        692.0-A23        Charging Pump 2A-A III-86

PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES                           Revision 58 TABLE 3 ANALYSIS VOLUME BY FIRE AREA LIST FIRE AREA 69  ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-107        692.0-A26       Turbine Driven Aux Feedwater Pump 2A-S FIRE AREA 70  ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-106        692.0-A25       Unit 2 Penetration Rm FIRE AREA 71  ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-110        713.0-A19       Unit 2 Penetration Room 713.0-A21       Unit 2 RB Access Room FIRE AREA ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION 71-1 AV-111        713.0-A20       Unit 2 VCT Room FIRE AREA 72  ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-113        729.0-A11       Unit 2 South Main Steam Valve Rm 737.0-A10       Air Lock FIRE AREA 73  ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-112A       729.0-A10       Unit 2 North Main Steam Valve Rm AV-112        729.0-A13       Unit 2 Steam Valve Instrument Room B 729.0-A15       Unit 2 Additional Equipment Building 729.5-A17       Unit 2 Shield Bldg Vent Rad Monitor Room 737.0-A14       Air Lock 763.5-A2        Unit 2 Additional Equipment Building FIRE AREA 74  ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-114S       737.0-A9S       Vent & Purge Air (A11-A13 / Q-W )
AV-114M       737.0-A9M       Vent & Purge Air (A11-A13 / 2ft N of V to 21/2ft S of U2 RB Center Line) 737.0-A16       Unit 2 Gross Failed Fuel Detect. Room AV-114N                       Vent & Purge Air (A11-U2 RB/2 ft north of 737.0-A16 737.0-A9N to N Wall 737.0-A9)
FIRE AREA 75  ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-115        757.0-A16       Emergency Gas Treatment Filter Room 782.0-A3        Unit 2 CRD Equipment Room 782.0-A4        Pressurizer Heater Transformer Room 2 FIRE AREA 75  ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-116        757.0-A14       Unit 2 RB Access Room FIRE AREA 76  ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-096        757.0-A15       Unit 2 RB Equipment Hatch FIRE AREA 77  ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-117        Annulus         Unit 2 Reactor Building Annulus III-87

PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES                 Revision 58 TABLE 3 ANALYSIS VOLUME BY FIRE AREA LIST FIRE AREA 77  ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-118A                       Unit 2 Reactor Bldg - Lower Containment 2RO-2           Outside Crane Wall (90 - 180) 2RO-3           Outside Crane Wall (180 - 270) 2RA2            Accumulator Room 2 2RF2            Fan Room 2 FIRE AREA 77  ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-118B                       Unit 2 Reactor Bldg - Lower Containment 2RO-2           Outside Crane Wall (90 - 180) 2RO-3           Outside Crane Wall (180 - 270) 2RA3            Accumulator Room 3 2RF2            Fan Room 2 FIRE AREA 77  ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-118C                       Unit 2 Reactor Bldg - Lower Containment 2RO-3           Outside Crane Wall (180 - 270) 2RO-4           Outside Crane Wall (270 - 360) 2RA3            Accumulator Room 3 2RA4            Accumulator Room 4 FIRE AREA 77  ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-118D                       Unit 2 Reactor Bldg - Lower Containment 2RO-1           Outside Crane Wall (0 - 90) 2RO-4           Outside Crane Wall (270 - 360) 2RF1            Fan Room 1 2RA4            Accumulator Room 4 FIRE AREA 77  ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-118E                       Unit 2 Reactor Bldg - Lower Containment 2RO-1           Outside Crane Wall (0-90) 2RO-4           Outside Crane Wall (270 - 360) 2RA1            Accumulator Room 1 2RF1            Fan Room 1 FIRE AREA 77  ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-118F                       Unit 2 Reactor Bldg - Lower Containment 2RIR            Instrument Room FIRE AREA 77  ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-118G                       Unit 2 Reactor Bldg - Primary Containment 2RU             Upper Containment FIRE AREA 77  ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-118H                       Unit 2 Reactor Bldg - Lower Containment 2RI-2           Inside Crane Wall (90 - 180) 2RI-3           Inside Crane Wall (180 - 270) 2RA2            Accumulator Room 2 2RF2            Fan Room 2 III-88

PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES                        Revision 58 TABLE 3 ANALYSIS VOLUME BY FIRE AREA LIST FIRE AREA 77  ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-118J                       Unit 2 Reactor Bldg - Lower Containment 2RI-2           Inside Crane Wall (90 - 180) 2RI-3           Inside Crane Wall (180 - 270) 2RA3            Accumulator Room 3 2RF2            Fan Room 2 FIRE AREA 77  ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-118K                       Unit 2 Reactor Bldg - Lower Containment 2RI-1           Inside Crane Wall (0 - 90) 2RI-4           Inside Crane Wall (270 - 360) 2RA4            Accumulator Room 4 2RF1            Fan Room 1 FIRE AREA 77  ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION AV-118L                       Unit 2 Reactor Bldg - Lower Containment 2RI-1           Inside Crane Wall (0 - 90) 2RI-4           Inside Crane (270 - 360) 2RA1            Accumulator Room 1 2RF1            Fan Room 1 DUCT BANKS    ROOM NO.        DESCRIPTION Cable Chase from Auxiliary Building 713.0-A1B to AV-097        DBIPS-A IPS-A Cable Chase from Auxiliary Building 713.0-A1B to AV-098        DBIPS-B IPS-B III-89

PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES                                  Revision 58 TABLE 3 ANALYSIS VOLUME BY FIRE AREA LIST NOTES:
The following notes are applicable to the entire AV or AVs under which they are listed. The lining up of a note with a particular room is only coincidental.
: 1.      This AV contains both RHR power feeds (692.0-A1AN - Train A; 692.0-A1BN - Train B.
Therefore, two separate analyses (AV-004A and AV-004B) are performed to address the use of either path depending on the location of the fire within this volume.
: 2.      This AV is analyzed to address the "soft" interface between 692.0-A1C and 692.0-A1AN and 692.0-A1BN (i.e., to obtain 20 feet of separation on either side of Column Line U).
: 3.      This AV is analyzed to address the "soft" interface between 713.0-A1C and 713.0-A1AN and 713.0-A1BN (i.e., to obtain 20 feet of separation on either side of Column Line U).
: 4.      This AV is analyzed to address the "soft" interface between 737.0-A1CN and 737.0-A1AN and 737.0-A1BN (i.e., to obtain 20 feet of separation on either side of Column Line U).
: 5.      This AV contains cables and/or equipment associated with the fifth vital battery. The fifth vital battery is credited as an "installed spare" that can be used during normal plant operation if one of the existing batteries is down for maintenance. There were an additional four analyses performed for this AV to address the various combinations where the fifth vital battery can be used. These AVs have been analyzed to address the effects of a fire on the 125V DC system if the fifth vital battery is in service in replacement of any one of the other four normally credited batteries.
III-90

PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Revision 58 FIGURE III-1 INTERACTION ANALYSIS FLOW CHART START ANALYSIS                      PERFORMANCE GOALS VOLUMES                         AND FUNCTIONS (See Figure III3)                                     012 FPR SAFE SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS 012 ANALYSIS MODEL AND LOGICS (See Figure III2) 012, IA DATA SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT 012 EQUIPMENT/CABLE LOCATIONS 012, IA DATA SAFE SHUTDOWN CABLES CABLE Calcs Reference Document/Calculations 012 - Calculation EDQ00099920090012                                 INTERACTION ANALYSIS Equipment required for safe shutdown                           (See Figure III4)
IA Calcs FPR - Fire Protection Report IA DATA - Calculation EDQ00099920090012 Interaction Input Data Cable - Calculation WBPEVAR9004001 (UNIT 1)
Calcs EDQ00299920090013 (UNIT 2)(Part II, Reference      1  COMPLIANCE STRATEGIES 4.2.5).                                                                                                      FIRE PROTECTION Required Cable Calculations                                                                              REPORT 2 - MODIFICATIONS/WRAPS/MANUAL IA Calcs - Calculation EDQ00099920090012                     ACTIONS/REPAIRS/PREFIRE ACTIONS Interaction Calculation 1 - MODIFICATIONS                                                           OPERATING 2 - CABLE WRAPS                                                            PROCEDURES 3 - EMERGENCY LIGHTS III-91

PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Revision 58 FIGURE III-2 ANALYSIS MODEL AND LOGICS START DEFINE METHODS TO MODEL PERFORMANCE GOALS AND FUNCTIONS 012 DEFINE KEYS TO MODEL SAFE   PREPARE METHOD LOGICS SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS &       (KEYS SUPPORTING METHODS)
SYSTEM FUNCTIONS 012                       IA DATA PREPARE SYSTEM LOGICS (EQUIPMENT SUPPORTING SYSTEM/KEYS)
IA DATA PREPARE EQUIPMENT LOGICS DEFINE PLANT OPERATING                                    (EQUIPMENT SUPPORTING CONDITIONS FOR EQUIPMENT                                          EQUIPMENT)
AND CABLE LOGICS, FOR ANALYSIS                                                     IA DATA OF SPECIFIC SCENARIOS IA DATA PREPARE CABLE LOGICS (CABLE SUPPORTING EQUIPMENT)
Reference Document/Calculations                                             IA DATA, CABLE Calcs 012 - Calculation EDQ00099920090012 Equipment required for safe shutdown FPR - Fire Protection Report IA DATA - Calculation EDQ00099920090012 Interaction Input Data Cable - Calculation WBPEVAR9004001 (UNIT 1)
Calcs EDQ00299920090013 (UNIT 2).
Required Cable Calculations IA Calcs - Calculation EDQ00099920090012 Interaction Calculation III-92

PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Revision 58 FIGURE III-3 ANALYSIS VOLUMES START FIRE AREAS            ROOMS          PLANT CONFIGURATION:    DEVIATIONS:                      LOCATION OF SUPPRESSION            SUPPRESSION                   REDUNDANT SAFE DETECTION              DETECTION                        SHUTDOWN BARRIERS AND RATINGS   20 FT NO INTERVENING          EQUIPMENT AND UNPROTECTED OPENINGS    COMBUSTIBLE                  CABLES WITHIN FIRE ZONES DEFINE ANALYSIS VOLUMES BASED ON ONE OR COMBINATION OF TYPES BELOW ANALYSIS VOLUME EQUAL                                                       SUBSECTION OF TO FIRE AREA                   COMBINATION OF ROOMS                    ROOM(S) HAVING WITHIN A FIRE AREA                OVERLAPPING REGIONS WITH OTHER ANALYSIS VOLS.
ANALYSIS VOLUMES III-93

PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Revision 58 FIGURE III-4 INTERACTION ANALYSIS START SELECT AN ANALYSIS VOLUME GO TO NEXT ANALYSIS                DETERMINE CABLES, VOLUME                       EQUIPMENT, SYSTEMS, AND FUNCTIONS AFFECTED DETERMINE RESOLUTIONS:
MODIFICATIONS CABLE WRAPS ARE ALL REQUIRED      MANUAL ACTIONS NO REPAIRS PERFORMANCE GOALS ACHIEVED?       PREFIRE ACTIONS EVALUATIONS DEVIATION REQUESTS ALTERNATE STRATEGIES YES DOCUMENT COMPLIANCE SPACE RESOLUTIONS III-94

PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Revision 58 III-95

PART IV - ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY Revision 58

==1.0     INTRODUCTION==

Part IV provides a description of the alternative shutdown capabilities used to achieve compliance with the requirements of Sections III.G.3 and III.L of Appendix R. For purposes of evaluating conformance to Appendix R, the control building at Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) is treated as a single fire area comprised of all rooms within the building. Regulatory and non-regulatory fire barriers are used to separate specific rooms within the building. The Appendix R compliance strategy for the control building is based on ensuring alternative shutdown capability for those fires in the building that cause an Appendix R event which results in abandonment of the Main Control Room (MCR). An overview of required operator actions and operator manual actions associated with MCR abandonment and alternative shutdown capabilities is provided in Part V of the FPR.
2.0     DISCUSSION WBN's design provides an auxiliary control system to address situations requiring MCR abandonment. This system is located outside of the control building and is physically independent of the control building (control room, auxiliary instrument rooms, cable spreading room, etc.). The design provides appropriate means to isolate the necessary safe shutdown equipment and control features from the control building. The system is provided to satisfy General Design Criteria (GDC) 19 in Appendix A to 10 CFR 50 and 10 CFR 50 Appendix R Section III.G.3 and III.L criteria.
In order to meet GDC 19 requirements, the auxiliary control system instrumentation and controls are physically remote from, and their circuits are electrically separated from, their counterparts in the MCR. In order to meet Appendix R requirements, the auxiliary control system is both physically and electrically independent of the control building. Neither GDC 19 nor Appendix R requires redundant auxiliary control systems (e.g., a Train A and Train B auxiliary control systems).
3.0     ALTERNATE CONTROL ROOM CAPABILITIES The principle feature of alternative shutdown capability at WBN is the Auxiliary Control Room (ACR) complex. It is divided into five independent, dedicated rooms. Each room is separated from the others and from the auxiliary building by 2-hour or 3-hour rated fire barriers and from the control building by 3-hour rated fire barriers. The five independent rooms consist of a Train A and a Train B transfer switch room for each unit and a common ACR containing multiple instrumentation and control panels for both units.
The ACR is designed to be the central control point when operating in the auxiliary control mode. Systems requiring frequent manipulations have the necessary controls located in the ACR along with their associated transfer switches located in the adjacent transfer switch rooms.
Adequate instrumentation is provided for monitoring conditions of the plant. (Refer to the deviation request in Part VII of the FPR.).
IV-1

PART IV - ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY Revision 58 The instruments and controls located in the ACR are separated from, or can be electrically isolated from, the corresponding instrumentation and controls located in the MCR. Operators are periodically trained in shutdown procedures from the ACR. The instrumentation and controls are adequate and sufficiently similar to those available in the MCR to permit a safe and orderly shutdown. The post fire alternate safe shutdown analysis is conducted for both the case with offsite power available, as well as the case with only onsite power available for 72 hours.
The safe shutdown analysis (Part II, Reference 4.2.18) for a fire in the control building demonstrates that the auxiliary control system (ACS) components and electrical circuits necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown are free of fire damage and capable of performing the necessary safe shutdown functions or are prevented from causing actions that prevent safe shutdown. The analysis was performed in accordance with the guidance provided in Appendix D to NEI-00-01 revision 2, Guidance for Post Fire Safe Shutdown (Part II, Reference 4.3.6), as endorsed by Regulatory Guide 1.189, revision 2, Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants (Part II, Reference 4.1.45). The analysis considers that offsite power may be available or may not be available for 72 hours. The analysis considers the potential spurious actuations or signals which could occur and evaluates them individually (one at a time) prior to transfer from the main control room to the ACS. Based on potential adverse effects of each spurious actuation or signal, the available time for transfer was established and the worst case (shortest time) applied to transfer completion of each control location. In addition to the single spurious actuation or signal, the analysis considers possible inadvertent safety injection signals which could result from plant conditions reaching the initiation setpoint for safety injection. These signals are referred to in the FPR as inadvertent to differentiate them from spurious safety injection signals. Spurious signals are a direct result of the fire and are not caused by the plant conditions reaching a safety injection setpoint. An assumed spurious SI signal cannot be prevented since it is caused directly by the fire. Inadvertent safety injection signals result from fire induced equipment operations which cause the plant conditions to reach the safety injection setpoint. Inadvertent SI signals can be prevented if actions can be performed in time to prevent the plant conditions from reaching the setpoint. Regardless of whether the SI is initiated due to a spurious or inadvertent signal, the Appendix R procedures contain steps to respond to the event and restore the plant to a condition for proceeding to cold shutdown. After control of the plant is transferred to the ACS, consideration is given to the possibility of multiple spurious actuations that could occur due to fire damage in the control building. The plant fire response procedures contain steps to both prevent the initiation of an inadvertent safety injection and steps to mitigate it if it occurs.
WBN utilizes Distributed Control Systems (DCSs) for Non Safety Related Control Systems.
Each units DCS is intraconnected via fiber optic networks, but is isolated from the other unit.
Unit 1 has one DCS network which is located totally in the control building Auxiliary Instrument Room (AIR), Room 708.0-C1. The Unit 1 ACS does not use DCS. The Unit 2 DCS is segmented into two functional segments with one in the Auxiliary Control Room (ACR) and one in the control building AIR, Room 708.0-C4. The network in the ACR is for monitoring and maintenance purposes only and the controls function independent of the network. In order to allow monitoring by the DCS Work Station, the ACR and AIR network segments are intraconnected via the DCS network which is configured to mitigate network failures. This prevents a failure of one network segment (i.e., ACR network segment) from affecting the other segment (i.e., AIR network segment) and vice versa. Packet rate limiters are used on the DCS network to provide redundant assurance that data transmission cannot impede communications in the AIR segment. This isolation between the ACR and AIR ensures that no event arising IV-2

PART IV - ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY Revision 58 from equipment failures, such as caused by a fire, can inhibit DCS equipment outside that fire zone.
3.1     Instruments Required for Alternative Shutdown in the ACR The instruments and controls found in the ACR that are required for MCR abandonment are as follows:
1/2-LI-68-325C           Pressurizer Level 1/2-LI-68-326C           Pressurizer Level 1/2-PI-68-342C           Pressurizer Pressure 1/2-TI-68-lC             Loop 1 RCS Hot Leg Temperature (T-hot) 1/2-TI-68-24C            Loop 2 RCS Hot Leg Temperature (T-hot) 1/2-TI-68-43C            Loop 3 RCS Hot Leg Temperature (T-hot) 1/2-TI-68-65C            Loop 4 RCS Hot Leg Temperature (T-hot) 1/2-PI-1-1C              Loop 1 SG Pressure w/ corresponding T-sat scale 1/2-PI-1-8C              Loop 2 SG Pressure w/ corresponding T-sat scale 1/2-PI-1-19C             Loop 3 SG Pressure w/ corresponding T-sat scale 1/2-PI-1-26C             Loop 4 SG Pressure w/ corresponding T-sat scale 1/2-LI-3-164C            Loop 1 SG Level 1/2-LIC-3-164B           Loop 1 Level Controller 1/2-LI-3-156C            Loop 2 SG Level 1/2-LIC-3-156B           Loop 2 Level Controller 1/2-LI-3-148C            Loop 3 SG Level 1/2-LIC-3-148B           Loop 3 Level Controller 1/2-LI-3-17lC            Loop 4 SG Level 1/2-LIC-3-171B           Loop 4 Level Controller 1/2-NI-92-138            Source Range Flux Monitor 1/2-LI-62-129C           Volume Control Tank Level 1/2-FI-3-163C            Loop 1 Auxiliary Feed Water (AFW)Flow 1/2-FI-3-155C            Loop 2 Auxiliary Feed Water (AFW)Flow 1/2-FI-3-147C            Loop 3 Auxiliary Feed Water (AFW)Flow 1/2-FI-3-170C            Loop 4 Auxiliary Feed Water (AFW)Flow 1/2-FI-62-93C            Charging Flow 1/2-FI-67-61C            ERCW Supply Header A Flow 1/2-FI-67-62C            ERCW Supply Header B Flow 1/2-TI-74-38C            RHR Supply A Outlet Temperature 1/2-TI-74-40C            RHR Supply B Outlet Temperature 1/2-PDI-30-30C           Containment Pressure The above instrumentation was assessed against the guidance provided in IN 84-09.
IV-3

PART IV - ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY Revision 58 3.2     Controls Required for Alternative Shutdown in the ACR The following controls are located in the ACR and are required for MCR abandonment:
1/2-HS-30-82C             CRDM Cooler Unit D-B Room Division Damper 1/2-HS-30-85C             CRDM Cooler Unit A-A Room Division Damper 1/2-HS-30-90C             CRDM Cooler Unit C-A Room Division Damper 1/2-HS-30-94C             CRDM Cooler Unit B-B Room Division Damper 1/2-HS-62-55C             Excess Letdown Isolation Valve 1/2-HIC-62-56C            Excess Letdown Flow Control 1/2-HS-62-69C             RCS Isolation Valve 1/2-HS-62-70C             RCS Isolation Valve 1/2-HS-62-84C             Charging Flow to RCS Spray 1/2-HS-67-84C             Lower Containment Vent Cooler A Supply Control Valve 1/2-HS-67-85C             CRD Vent Cooler A Supply Control Valve 1/2-HS-67-92C             Lower Containment Vent Cooler C Supply Control Valve 1/2-HS-67-93C             CRD Vent Cooler C Supply Control Valve 1/2-HS-67-100C            Lower Containment Vent Cooler B Supply Control Valve 1/2-HS-67-101C            CRD Vent Cooler B Supply Control Valve 1/2-HS-67-108C            Lower Containment Vent Cooler D Supply Control Valve 1/2-HS-67-109C            CRD Vent Cooler D Supply Control Valve 1/2-HS-68-334C            RCS Pressurizer Pressure PORV 1/2-HS-68-340AC           RCS Pressurizer Pressure PORV 1-HS-82-16C               DG 1A-A Emergency Start 1-HS-82-17C               DG 1A-A Emergency Stop 1-HS-82-46C               DG 1B-B Emergency Start 1-HS-82-47C               DG 1B-B Emergency Stop 2-HS-82-76C               DG 2A-A Emergency Start 2-HS-82-77C               DG 2A-A Emergency Stop 2-HS-82-106C              DG 2B-B Emergency Start 2-HS-82-107C              DG 2B-B Emergency Stop 1/2-XS-1-4A               Main Steam Isolation Valve 1/2-XS-1-4B               Main Steam Isolation Valve 1/2-XS-1-11A              Main Steam Isolation Valve 1/2-XS-1-11B              Main Steam Isolation Valve 1/2-XS-1-22A              Main Steam Isolation Valve 1/2-XS-1-22B              Main Steam Isolation Valve 1/2-XS-1-29A              Main Steam Isolation Valve 1/2-XS-1-29B              Main Steam Isolation Valve 1/2-XS-1-6A               Steam Generator PORV 1/2-XS-1-6B               Steam Generator PORV 1/2-XS-1-13A              Steam Generator PORV 1/2-XS-1-13B              Steam Generator PORV 1/2-XS-1-24A              Steam Generator PORV 1/2-XS-1-24B              Steam Generator PORV 1/2-XS-1-31A              Steam Generator PORV 1/2-XS-1-31B              Steam Generator PORV IV-4

PART IV - ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY Revision 58 3.2     Controls Required for Alternative Shutdown in the ACR (continued) 1/2-XS-1-7                  Steam Generator Blowdown Control Valve Loop 1 1/2-XS-1-14                 Steam Generator Blowdown Control Valve Loop 2 1/2-XS-1-25                 Steam Generator Blowdown Control Valve Loop 3 1/2-XS-1-32                 Steam Generator Blowdown Control Valve Loop 4 1/2-XS-1-181                Steam Generator Blowdown Isolation Valve Loop 1 1/2-XS-1-182                Steam Generator Blowdown Isolation Valve Loop 2 1/2-XS-1-183                Steam Generator Blowdown Isolation Valve Loop 3 1/2-XS-1-184                Steam Generator Blowdown Isolation Valve Loop 4 3.3     Instruments and Controls Required for Alternative Shutdown Not in the ACR The controls for the following are located just outside the ACR in the 6.9kV Shutdown Board Rooms. The number in parentheses is the number available for shutdown.
ERCW pumps (8)
Motor-driven AFW pumps (2 per unit)
RHR pumps (2 per unit)
Centrifugal charging pumps (2 per unit)
Pressurizer heaters (4 groups per unit)
SI pumps (trip) (2 per unit)
Containment Spray pumps (trip) (2 per unit)
The controls for the following are located in the 480V Shutdown Board Rooms which are located adjacent to the 6.9kV Shutdown Board Rooms.
CRDM cooler fans (4 per unit)
Lower compartment cooler fans (4 per unit)
CCS pumps (5)
Electric fire pumps (4)
Controls for the valves powered from the 480V boards are located in the 480V MOV board rooms which are one elevation above the ACR.
The following controls are located in the 125V Vital Battery Board Rooms:
1-HS-3-945-A           Unit 1 Main Feedwater Bypass Valves                       Bd Rm I 1-HS-30-1080A-A        Unit 1 RB Ventilation Isolation Dampers                   Bd Rm I 2-HS-3-945-A           Unit 2 Main Feedwater Bypass Valves                       Bd Rm III 2-XS-30-1080A-A        Containment Purge Isolation Valves 2-FCV-30-10A; A;   Bd Rm III A; A; A; A; A; A 2-XS-30-1080B-A        Containment Purge Isolation Valves 2-FCV-30-17A; and      Bd Rm III A
2-XS-30-1085A-B        Containment Purge Isolation Valves 2-FCV-30-8-B; B; - Bd Rm IV 9-B; B; B; B; B; and B 2-XS-30-1085B-B        Containment Purge Isolation Valves 2-FCV-30-16-B; and     Bd Rm IV B
IV-5

PART IV - ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY Revision 58 In reviewing the guidance provided in IN 84-09 (Part II, Reference 4.1.20), the instrumentation and control capability listed above exceeds the minimum monitoring and design capability discussed in that Information Notice. There are also local indications and controls available to the operators outside the ACR which provide additional information and control which were not included in the above listing.
IV-6

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                                          Revision 60 Table of Contents Section Title                                                                                   Page

==1.0     INTRODUCTION==
--------------------------------------------------------------------        VI-1 2.0     FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS STRUCTURE----------------------------------                       VI-1 2.1     

==SUMMARY==
OF CLASSICAL FIRE PROTECTION FEATURES--------                                   VI-1

==SUMMARY==
OF SAFE SHUTDOWN ANALYSES FOR THE FIRE 2.2 AREA----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- VI-2 3.0     FIRE AREA HAZARDS ANALYSIS---------------------------------------------                 VI-3 3.1     FIRE AREA 1-------------------------------------------------------------------------    VI-3 Room No.              Description 674.0-A1              Tritiated Drain Collector Tank Room 674.0-A2              Tritiated Drain Collector Tank Pumps 676.0-A1              Corridor 676.0-A2              Holdup Tank Room A 676.0-A3              Holdup Tank Room B 676.0-A4              Floor Drain Collect Pump, Filter & Tank 676.0-A4a             Floor Drain Collection Tank Room 676.0-A5              Gas Stripper Feed Pump Room 676.0-A6              Spare 676.0-A7              Spare 676.0-A8              Containment Spray Pump 1B-B 676.0-A9              Containment Spray Pump 1A-A 676.0-A14             Containment Spray Pump 2A-A 676.0-A15             Containment Spray Pump 2B-B 676.0-A16             Unit 1 Pipe Chase 692.0-A1              Corridor [(Subdivided into 692.0- A1A (692-A1A1, -A1A2, -A1A3, -
A1AN), 692-A1B (692-A1B1, -A1B2, -A1B3, A1BN) and 692-A1C]
692.0-A2              Gas Decay Tank Valve Gallery 692.0-A3              Gas Decay Tank Room 692.0-A4              Chemical Drain Tank Room 692.0-A5              Gas Decay Tank Room 692.0-A8              Unit 1 Pipe Chase 692.0-A9              Charging Pump 1A-A 692.0-A12             Safety Injection Pump 1B-B 692.0-A13             Safety Injection Pump 1A-A 692.0-A17             Maintenance and Test Equipment (M&TE) Hot Tool Room 692.0-A18             Hot Tool Room 692.0-A27             Concentrate Filter Room 692.0-A29             Boric Acid Evaporator Package Room B 692.0-A30             Boric Acid Evaporator Package Room A 692.0-A31             Spare 713.0-A28             Unit 1 Pipe Chase Section Title                                                                                   Page 3.2     FIRE AREA 1-1----------------------------------------------------------------------     VI-44 Room No.              Description 692.0-A20             Safety Injection Pump 2B-B VI-i

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                                          Revision 60 Table of Contents (Continued)
Section Title                                                                                Page 3.3     FIRE AREA 1-2----------------------------------------------------------------------  VI-46 Room No.           Description 692.0-A19          Safety Injection Pump 2A-A Section Title                                                                                Page 3.4     FIRE AREA 2-1----------------------------------------------------------------------  VI-48 Room No.           Description 676.0-A10          RHR Pump Room 1B-B Section Title                                                                                Page 3.5     FIRE AREA 2-2----------------------------------------------------------------------  VI-51 Room No.           Description 676.0-A13          RHR Pump Room 2B-B Section Title                                                                                Page 3.6     FIRE AREA 3-1----------------------------------------------------------------------  VI-53 Room No.           Description 676.0-A11          RHR Pump Room 1A-A Section Title                                                                                Page 3.7     FIRE AREA 3-2----------------------------------------------------------------------  VI-56 Room No.           Description 676.0-A12          RHR Pump Room 2A-A Section Title                                                                                Page 3.8     FIRE AREA 4------------------------------------------------------------------------- VI-59 Room No.           Description 692.0-A6           Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1A-S Section Title                                                                                Page 3.9     FIRE AREA 5------------------------------------------------------------------------- VI-61 Room No.           Description 692.0-A7           Unit 1 Penetration RM Section Title                                                                                Page 3.10    FIRE AREA 6------------------------------------------------------------------------- VI-64 Room No.           Description 692.0-A10          Charging Pump Room 1B-B Section Title                                                                                Page 3.11    FIRE AREA 7------------------------------------------------------------------------- VI-67 Room No.           Description 692.0-A11          Charging Pump Room 1C VI-ii

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                                           Revision 60 Table of Contents (Continued)
Section Title                                                                                Page 3.12    FIRE AREA 8------------------------------------------------------------------------- VI-70 Room No.           Description 713.0-A1           Auxiliary Building Corridor (Subdivided into 713.0-A1A [713-A1A1, -
A1A2, -A1A3, -A1A4, -A1AN], 713-A1B [713-A1BN] and 713-A1C) 713.0-A2           Air Lock 713.0-A3           Titration Room 713.0-A4           Radio Chemical Lab 713.0-A5           Counting Room 713.0-A9           Unit 1 Mixed Bed and Cation Valve Gallery 713.0-A10          Seal Water Heat Exchanger 1A 713.0-A11          Heat Exchanger 1B 713.0-A12          Heat Exchanger 1A 713.0-A13          Sample Room 1 713.0-A14          Sample Room 2 713.0-A15          Heat Exchanger 2A 713.0-A16          Heat Exchanger 2B 713.0-A17          Seal Water Heat Exchanger 2A 713.0-A18          Unit 2 Mixed Bed and Cation Valve Gallery 713.0-A22          Holdup Tank Valve Gallery 713.0-A23          CVCS Valve Gallery 713.0-A24          Waste Gas Compressor Valve Gallery 713.0-A25          Waste Gas Compressor B 713.0-A26          Waste Gas Compressor A 713.0-A27          Decontamination Room 713.0-A30          Air Lock 713.0-A31          Waste Gas Analyzer Room Section Title                                                                                Page 3.13    FIRE AREA 9------------------------------------------------------------------------- VI-96 Room No.           Description 713.0-A6           Unit 1 Penetration Room 713.0-A8           Unit 1 Reactor Building Access Room Section Title                                                                                Page 3.14    FIRE AREA 9-1----------------------------------------------------------------------  VI-99 Room No.           Description 713.0-A7           Unit 1 Volume Control Tank (VCT) Room Section Title                                                                                Page 3.15    FIRE AREA 10-----------------------------------------------------------------------  VI-102 Room No.           Description 692.0-A14          Cask Decon. Coll.Tank Room 692.0-A15          Spent Resin Tank Room 692.0-A16          Valve Gallery 728.0-A7           Cask Decontamination Room 729.0-A5           Cask Unloading Area 729.0-A6           Nitrogen Storage Area 729.0-A8           Unit 1 Post Accident Sampling Room VI-iii

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                                           Revision 60 Table of Contents (Continued)
Section Title                                                                               Page 3.15    FIRE AREA 10 (continued)--------------------------------------------------------    VI-102 Room No.          Description 729.0-A9          Unit 2 Post Accident Sampling Room 757.0-A13         Refueling Room (Includes 741.5 - New Fuel Storage Vault) 772.0-A9          HEPA Filter Plenum Room 776.0-A1          Elevator Machine Room 786.0-A1          Fan Room 814.75-ACS         Stair No. 2 & Penthouse Stair No. 4        Stair No. 4 & Penthouse Section Title                                                                               Page 3.16    FIRE AREA 11----------------------------------------------------------------------- VI-114 Room No.          Description 729.0-A3          Waste Package Area 729.0-A4           Waste Package Area Section Title                                                                               Page 3.17    FIRE AREA 12----------------------------------------------------------------------- VI-117 Room No.          Description 729.0-A1          Main Steam Valve Room (Unit 1 South) 737.0-A6          Air Lock Section Title                                                                               Page 3.18    FIRE AREA 13----------------------------------------------------------------------- VI-120 Room No.          Description 729.0-A2          Main Steam Valve Room (Unit 1 North) 729.0-A12         Unit 1 Steam Valve Instrument Room A 729.0-A14         Unit 1 Upper Head Injection Room 729.5-A16         Unit 1 Shield Building Vent Radiation Monitoring Room 737.0-A13         U1 Additional Equip. Building (AEB) 763.5-A1           U1 Ice Bin Equipment Room 775.25-A1          U1 Ice Machine Equipment Room 786.5-A1           U2 Chiller Package Equipment Room Section Title                                                                               Page 3.19    FIRE AREA 14----------------------------------------------------------------------- VI-126 Room No.          Description 737.0-A1          Auxiliary Building Corridor (Subdivided into 737.0-A1A, A1AN, A1BN, A1B, A1CN and A1C) 737.0-A2          Hot Instrument Shop 737.0-A4          Air Lock 737.0-A7          Unit 1 Letdown Heat Exchanger 737.0-A8          Unit 2 Letdown Heat Exchanger 737.0-A11         Air Lock VI-iv

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                                           Revision 60 Table of Contents (Continued)
Section Title                                                                               Page 3.20    FIRE AREA 15-1--------------------------------------------------------------------- VI-138 Room No.          Description 737.0-A3          Unit 1 Heat and Vent Equipment Room Section Title                                                                               Page 3.21    FIRE AREA 15-2--------------------------------------------------------------------- VI-141 Room No.          Description 737.0-A12         Unit 2 Heat and Vent Equipment Room Section Title                                                                               Page 3.22    FIRE AREA 16----------------------------------------------------------------------- VI-144 Room No.          Description 737.0-A5          Ventilation and Purge Air Room (Subdivided into 737.0-A5S, -A5M, -
A5N) 737.0-A15         Gross Failed Fuel Detector Room Section Title                                                                               Page 3.23    FIRE AREA 17----------------------------------------------------------------------- VI-150 Room No.          Description 757.0-A2          6.9kV and 480V Shutdown Board Room A 757.0-A9          Unit 1 Personnel and Equipment Access Section Title                                                                               Page 3.24    FIRE AREA 18----------------------------------------------------------------------- VI-158 Room No.          Description 757.0-A3          125V Vital Battery Board Room II Section Title                                                                               Page 3.25    FIRE AREA 19----------------------------------------------------------------------- VI-160 Room No.          Description 757.0-A4          125V Vital Battery Board Room I Section Title                                                                               Page 3.26    FIRE AREA 20----------------------------------------------------------------------- VI-162 Room No.          Description 757.0-A1          Auxiliary Control Room Section Title                                                                               Page 3.27    FIRE AREA 21----------------------------------------------------------------------- VI-165 Room No.          Description 757.0-A25         Auxiliary Control Instrument Room 1A VI-v

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                                           Revision 60 Table of Contents (Continued)
Section Title                                                                               Page 3.28    FIRE AREA 22----------------------------------------------------------------------- VI-168 Room No.          Description 757.0-A26         Auxiliary Control Instrument Room 1B Section Title                                                                               Page 3.29    FIRE AREA 23----------------------------------------------------------------------- VI-170 Room No.          Description 757.0-A27         Auxiliary Control Instrument Room 2A Section Title                                                                               Page 3.30    FIRE AREA 24----------------------------------------------------------------------- VI-172 Room No.          Description 757.0-A28         Auxiliary Control Instrument Room 2B Section Title                                                                               Page 3.31    FIRE AREA 25----------------------------------------------------------------------- VI-174 Room No.          Description 757.0-A10          Miscellaneous Equipment Room 757.0-A12         Reactor Building Access Room (Unit 1) 782.0-A1          Unit 1 Control Rod Drive Equipment Room 782.0-A2          Pressurizer Heater Transformer Room 1 Section Title                                                                               Page 3.32    FIRE AREA 26----------------------------------------------------------------------- VI-180 Room No.          Description 757.0-A11         Unit 1 Reactor Bldg Equipment Hatch Section Title                                                                               Page 3.33    FIRE AREA 27----------------------------------------------------------------------- VI-182 Room No.          Description 757.0-A5          480V Shutdown Board Room 1B Section Title                                                                               Page 3.34    FIRE AREA 28----------------------------------------------------------------------- VI-185 Room No.          Description 757.0-A21         480V Shutdown Board Room 2A Section Title                                                                               Page 3.35    FIRE AREA 29----------------------------------------------------------------------- VI-188 Room No.          Description 757.0-A22         125V Vital Battery Board Room IV VI-vi

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                                           Revision 60 Table of Contents (Continued)
Section Title                                                                               Page 3.36    FIRE AREA 30----------------------------------------------------------------------- VI-190 Room No.          Description 757.0-A23         125V Vital Battery Board Room III Section Title                                                                               Page 3.37    FIRE AREA 31----------------------------------------------------------------------- VI-192 Room No.          Description 757.0-A17         Unit 2 Personnel and Equipment Access Room 757.0-A24         6.9kV and 480V Shutdown Board Room B Section Title                                                                               Page 3.38    FIRE AREA 32----------------------------------------------------------------------- VI-200 Room No.          Description 772.0-A1          480V Board Room 1-A Section Title                                                                               Page 3.39    FIRE AREA 33----------------------------------------------------------------------- VI-203 Room No.          Description 772.0-A2          480V Board Room 1-B (Subdivided into 772.0-A2A1, A2A2, A2A3, A2A4)
Section Title                                                                               Page 3.40    FIRE AREA 34----------------------------------------------------------------------- VI-207 Room No.          Description 772.0-A3          125V Vital Battery Room II Section Title                                                                               Page 3.41    FIRE AREA 35----------------------------------------------------------------------- VI-209 Room No.          Description 772.0-A4          125V Vital Battery Room I Section Title                                                                               Page 3.42    FIRE AREA 36----------------------------------------------------------------------- VI-211 Room No.          Description 772.0-A5          480V Transformer Room 1-B Section Title                                                                               Page 3.43    FIRE AREA 37----------------------------------------------------------------------- VI-213 Room No.          Description 772.0-A6          480V Transformer Room 1-A VI-vii

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                                           Revision 60 Table of Contents (Continued)
Section Title                                                                               Page 3.44    FIRE AREA 38----------------------------------------------------------------------- VI-215 Room No.          Description 772.0-A7          Unit 1 Mechanical Equipment Room Section Title                                                                               Page 3.45    FIRE AREA 39----------------------------------------------------------------------- VI-218 Room No.          Description 772.0-A8          Fifth Vital Battery and Board Room Section Title                                                                               Page 3.46    FIRE AREA 40----------------------------------------------------------------------- VI-224 Room No.          Description 772.0-A10         Unit 2 Mechanical Equipment Room Section Title                                                                               Page 3.47    FIRE AREA 41----------------------------------------------------------------------- VI-227 Room No.          Description 772.0-A11         480V Transformer Room 2-B Section Title                                                                               Page 3.48    FIRE AREA 42----------------------------------------------------------------------- VI-229 Room No.          Description 772.0-A12         480V Transformer Room 2-A Section Title                                                                               Page 3.49    FIRE AREA 43----------------------------------------------------------------------- VI-231 Room No.          Description 772.0-A13         125V Vital Battery Room IV Section Title                                                                               Page 3.50    FIRE AREA 44----------------------------------------------------------------------- VI-233 Room No.          Description 772.0-A14         125V Vital Battery Room III Section Title                                                                               Page 3.51    FIRE AREA 45----------------------------------------------------------------------- VI-236 Room No.          Description 772.0-A15         480V Board Room 2-B (Subdivided into 772.0-A15A1, A15A2, A15A3, A15A4)
Section Title                                                                               Page 3.52    FIRE AREA 46----------------------------------------------------------------------- VI-240 Room No.          Description 772.0-A16         480V Board Room 2-A VI-viii

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                                           Revision 60 Table of Contents (Continued)
Section Title                                                                               Page 3.53    FIRE AREA 47----------------------------------------------------------------------- VI-243 Room No.          Description 786.0-A2          Roof Access Air Lock 786.0-A3          Mechanical Equipment Room 2B 786.0-A4          Mechanical Equipment Room 1B 786.0-A5          225 kVA DG Room B 786.0-A6          225 kVA DG Room A 786.0-AR          Roof Section Title                                                                               Page 3.54    FIRE AREA 48----------------------------------------------------------------------- VI-246 Room No.          Description 692.0-C1          Mechanical Equipment Room 692.0-C2          Mechanical Equipment Room 692.0-C3          250V Battery Room 1 692.0-C4          250V Battery Board Room No. 1 692.0-C5          250V Battery Board Room No. 2 692.0-C6          250V Battery Room 2 692.0-C7          24V and 48V Battery Room 692.0-C8          24V and 48V Battery Board and Charger Room 692.0-C9          Communications Room 692.0-C10         Mechanical Equipment Room 692.0-C11         Corridor 692.0-C12         Secondary Alarm Station Room 708.0-C1          Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room 708.0-C2          Corridor 708.0-C3          Computer Room 708.0-C4          Unit 2 Auxiliary Instrument Room 729.0-C1          Spreading Room 755.0-C1          Mechanical Equipment Room 755.0-C2          Womens Restroom 755.0-C3          Corridor - Includes space above Operations office and living area 755.0-C4          Kitchen 755.0-C5          Toilet 755.0-C6          Locker Room 755.0-C7          Shower 755.0-C8          Shower 755.0-C9          Conference Room 755.0-C10         Shift Managers Office CB Roof           Control Building Roof 755.0-C12         Main Control Room 755.0-C13         Relay Room 755.0-C14         Technical Support Center 755.0-C15         Corridor 755.0-C16         Conference Room VI-ix

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                                           Revision 60 Table of Contents (Continued)
Section Title                                                                               Page 3.54    FIRE AREA 48 (continued)--------------------------------------------------------    VI-246 Room No.          Description 755.0-C17         Telephone Room 755.0-C18         NRC Office 755.0-C19         Corridor 755.0-C20         DPSO Shop Stair-C1          Stairwell C1 Stair-C2          Stairwell C2 Section Title                                                                               Page 3.55    FIRE AREA 49----------------------------------------------------------------------- VI-268 Room No.          Description 742.0-D4          Diesel Generator Unit 1A-A 760.5-D3          Unit 1A-A Air Exhaust Room 760.5-D4          480V Board Room 1A-A 760.5-D5          Unit 1 A-A Air Intake Room Section Title                                                                               Page 3.56    FIRE AREA 50----------------------------------------------------------------------- VI-272 Room No.          Description 742.0-D5          Diesel Generator Unit 2A-A 760.5-D6          Unit 2A-A Air Exhaust Room 760.5-D7          480V Board Room 2A-A 760.5-D8          Unit 2 A-A Air Intake Room Section Title                                                                               Page 3.57    FIRE AREA 51----------------------------------------------------------------------- VI-275 Room No.          Description 742.0-D6          Diesel Generator Unit 1B-B 760.5-D9          Unit 1B-B Air Exhaust Room 760.5-D10         480V Board Room 1B-B 760.5-D11         Unit 1B-B Air Intake Room Section Title                                                                               Page 3.58    FIRE AREA 52----------------------------------------------------------------------- VI-278 Room No.          Description 742.0-D7          Diesel Generator Unit 2B-B 760.5-D12         Unit 2B-B Air Exhaust Room 760.5-D13         480V Board Room 2B-B 760.5-D14         Unit 2B-B Air Intake Room Section Title                                                                               Page 3.59    FIRE AREA 53----------------------------------------------------------------------- VI-281 Room No.          Description 742.0-D3          Toilet 742.0-D8          Fuel Oil Transfer Room 742.0-D9          Pipe Gallery and Corridor (Subdivided into 742.0-D9A, D9B, -D9N)
VI-x

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                                          Revision 60 Table of Contents (Continued)
Section Title                                                                               Page 3.60    FIRE AREA 54----------------------------------------------------------------------- VI-286 Room No.           Description 742.0-D1           CO2 Storage Room 742.0-D2           Lube Oil Storage Room 742.0-D10          Conduit Interface Room 760.5-D1           Corridor 760.5-D2           Radiation Shelter 742.0-760.5        Stairwell D1 Section Title                                                                               Page 3.61    FIRE AREA 55----------------------------------------------------------------------- VI-290 Room No.           Description DGB-A              Cable Chase - A Section Title                                                                               Page 3.62    FIRE AREA 56----------------------------------------------------------------------- VI-292 Room No.           Description DGB-B              Cable Chase - B Section Title                                                                               Page 3.63    FIRE AREA 57 (Deleted - Formerly Assigned to the Additional Diesel                  VI-294 Generator Building)
Section Title                                                                               Page 3.64    FIRE AREA 58----------------------------------------------------------------------- VI-294 Room No.           Description IPS-A EL 722       ERCW Strainer Room A IPS-A EL 741       ERCW Pump Room A IPS-A EL 741       Screen Wash and HPFP A Pump Room Section Title                                                                               Page 3.65    FIRE AREA 59----------------------------------------------------------------------- VI-299 Room No.           Description IPS-B EL 722       ERCW Strainer Room B IPS-B EL 741       ERCW Pump Room B IPS-B EL 741       HPFP B Pump Room Section Title                                                                               Page 3.66    FIRE AREA 60----------------------------------------------------------------------- VI-303 Room No.           Description IPS EL 711         Board Room (Subdivided into IPS-CA, IPS-CC-A, IPS-CB, IPS-CC-B)
IPS EL 728         RCW Pump Deck VI-xi

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                                           Revision 60 Table of Contents (Continued)
Section Title                                                                               Page 3.67    FIRE AREA 61----------------------------------------------------------------------- VI-308 Room No.          Description Annulus           Unit 1 Reactor Building - Annulus Unit 1 Reactor Building -        Unit 1 Reactor Building - Primary Containment (Subdivided Building Primary           into RA1, RA2, RA3, RA4, RF1, RF2, RIR, RO-1, RO-2, RO-3, RO-4, RU, RI-1, RI-2, RI-3, RI-4)
Section Title                                                                               Page 3.68    FIRE AREA 62----------------------------------------------------------------------- VI-323 Room No.          Description CDWE              Condensate Demineralizer Waste Evaporator Building (CDWE)
Section Title                                                                               Page 3.69    FIRE AREA 63----------------------------------------------------------------------- VI-325 Room No.          Description TB                Turbine Building Section Title                                                                               Page 3.70    FIRE AREA 64----------------------------------------------------------------------- VI-329 Room No.          Description Yard              Yard (Duct Banks to IPS, Tanks, Transformers and H2 Storage Trailers)
Section Title                                                                               Page 3.71    FIRE AREA 65----------------------------------------------------------------------- VI-333 Room No.          Description 676.0-A17         Unit 2 Pipe Chase 692.0-A24         Unit 2 Pipe Chase 713.0-A29         Unit 2 Pipe Chase Section Title                                                                               Page 3.72    FIRE AREA 66----------------------------------------------------------------------- VI-338 Room No.          Description 692.0-A21         Charging Pump 2C Section Title                                                                               Page 3.73    FIRE AREA 67----------------------------------------------------------------------- VI-341 Room No.          Description 692.0-A22         Charging Pump 2B-B Section Title                                                                               Page 3.74    FIRE AREA 68----------------------------------------------------------------------- VI-343 Room No.          Description 692.0-A23         Charging Pump 2A-A VI-xii

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                                           Revision 60 Table of Contents (Continued)
Section Title                                                                               Page 3.75    FIRE AREA 69----------------------------------------------------------------------- VI-345 Room No.          Description 692.0-A26         Turbine Driven Aux Feedwater Pump 2A-S Section Title                                                                               Page 3.76    FIRE AREA 70----------------------------------------------------------------------- VI-347 Room No.          Description 692.0-A25         Unit 2 Penetration Rm Section Title                                                                               Page 3.77    FIRE AREA 71----------------------------------------------------------------------- VI-350 Room No.          Description 713.0-A19         Unit 2 Penetration Room 713.0-A21         Unit 2 RB Access Room Section Title                                                                               Page 3.78    FIRE AREA 71-1--------------------------------------------------------------------- VI-353 Room No.          Description 713.0-A20         Unit 2 Volume Control Tank Room Section Title                                                                               Page 3.79    FIRE AREA 72----------------------------------------------------------------------- VI-356 Room No.          Description 729.0-A11         Unit 2 South Main Steam Valve Rm 737.0-A10         Air Lock Section Title                                                                               Page 3.80    FIRE AREA 73----------------------------------------------------------------------- VI-359 Room No.          Description 729.0-A10         Unit 2 North Main Steam Valve Rm 729.0-A13         Unit 2 North Main Steam Valve Instrument Room B 729.5-A17         Unit 2 Shield Bldg Vent Rad Monitor Room 737.0-A14         Air Lock 729.0-A15         Unit 2 Additional Equipment Building 763.5-A2          Unit 2 Additional Equipment Building Section Title                                                                               Page 3.81    FIRE AREA 74----------------------------------------------------------------------- VI-365 Room No.          Description 737.0-A9          Ventilation and Purge Air Room (Subdivided into 737.0-A9S, -A9M, -
A9N) 737.0-A16         Unit 2 Gross Failed Fuel Detect. Room VI-xiii

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                                           Revision 60 Table of Contents (Continued)
Section Title                                                                               Page 3.82    FIRE AREA 75----------------------------------------------------------------------- VI-370 Room No.          Description 757.0-A14         Unit 2 RB Access Room 757.0-A16         Emergency Gas Treatment Filter Room 782.0-A3          Unit 2 CRD Equipment Room 782.0-A4          Pressurizer Heater Transformer Room 2 Section Title                                                                               Page 3.83    FIRE AREA 76----------------------------------------------------------------------- VI-375 Room No.          Description 757.0-A15         Unit 2 RB Equipment Hatch Section Title                                                                               Page 3.84    FIRE AREA 77----------------------------------------------------------------------- VI-377 Room No.          Description Annulus           Unit 2 Reactor Building - Annulus Unit 2 Reactor Building -        Unit 2 Reactor Building - Primary Containment (Subdivided into Primary           2RA1, 2RA2, 2RA3, 2RA4, 2RF1, 2RF2, 2RIR, 2RO-1, 2RO-2, 2RO-3, 2RO-4, 2RU, 2RI-1, 2RI-2, 2RI-3, 2RI-4)
VI-xiv

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                         Revision 60

==1.0                INTRODUCTION==

Part VI documents the results of the fire hazards and safe shutdown analyses performed for fire areas and rooms at Watts Bar (WBN). The results are documented on a fire area basis, broken down into separate discussions of classical fire protection features and safe shutdown analyses for each area. This section includes the following:
(1)      A summary of the evaluation performed to document the adequacy of the fire protection capabilities for each fire area.
(2)      A summary of the fire safe shutdown analysis performed to document the ability to achieve safe shutdown in case of a fire in each fire area.
The information in this section describes how each fire area meets the requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix R, Sections III.G, III.L and/or III.O. The fire hazards and safe shutdown evaluations were performed by qualified nuclear, mechanical, electrical, and fire protection engineers. The deviation requests and evaluations applicable to each fire area have also been identified in this section.
2.0                FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS STRUCTURE The information for each fire area is presented in two distinct formats, subdivided into a summary of the classical fire protection features, and a summary of the safe shutdown analyses for the fire area. Figures II-27A through II-40A (excluding 37A) identify each plant location by fire area, room number, and room subdivision number referenced in the following sections.
2.1                

==SUMMARY==
OF CLASSICAL FIRE PROTECTION FEATURES Each fire area consists of a single room or a group of rooms. For this discussion the word area can be either a single room or a group of rooms. The Classical Fire Protection Features discussed in this section of the Fire Protection Report document the following for each area evaluated.
(1)      Area evaluated (room number[s])
(2)      Description of the area (e.g., Waste Decay Tank Room, RHR Pump 1A-A Room, etc.).
(3)      Fire loading, including the main combustible materials, and severity rating of the combustible loading in the area. The following Fire Severity Index was developed from the Fire Protection Handbook (Part II, Reference 4.4.1).
FIRE SEVERITY INDEX             COMBUSTIBLE LOADING              EQUIVALENT FIRE SEVERITY Insignificant                   < 6,500 Btu/ft2                   < 5 minutes Low                        < 80,000 Btu/ft2                  < 60 minutes Moderate                     < 160,000 Btu/ft2                  < 120 minutes Moderately Severe                 < 240,000 Btu/ft2                  < 180 minutes Severe                      > 240,000 Btu/ft2                  > 180 minutes (4)      For each area, the following compartmentation information is documented in tabular form:
(a)       Room number, (b)       Barrier description (e.g., North Wall, Ceiling, etc.),
VI-1

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                                 Revision 60 (c)      Adjacent Fire Area/Room, (d)      Compartmentation drawing showing the barrier, (e)      Fire resistive rating of the barrier if it is a regulatory required fire barrier (5)     The next table documents any required fire rated doors in the barriers, including the door number and its fire resistive rating.
(6)     Required fire dampers are identified in the next table, which includes information on the damper number, fire resistive rating, etc.
(7)     Fire detection within the area.
(8)     Fire suppression within the area.
(9)     Identifies if any deviation or engineering evaluation is applicable to the area (Part VII of the Fire Protection Report documents the deviations for TVAs commitments against applicable NRC regulatory criteria and guidance documents and engineering evaluations of the adequacy of specific fire protection features) 2.2              

==SUMMARY==
OF SAFE SHUTDOWN ANALYSES FOR THE FIRE AREA The summaries of safe shutdown capability for each fire area are presented on an Analysis Volume (AV) basis. An AV can consist of a single room, multiple rooms, or sub-divisions of a large volume for the Appendix R separation analysis; generally all required safe shutdown cables and components in the AV are conservatively assumed damaged by the fire. This assumption is conservative, especially for large AVs composed of many rooms which often have an insignificant fire severity index. Refer to Part III, Section 10, for a more complete description of the application of AVs to the analysis of the safe shutdown separation criteria of Appendix R.
The following information on the safe shutdown analysis is presented for each AV in the fire area:
(1)     Identification of the specific AV for which the summary of safe shutdown information is provided, such as AV-001, (2)     Identification of the area that is included in the AV, (3)     Descriptive text of the fire safe shutdown compliance strategy for the AV, (4)     Tabular listings of the following information:
(a)      Identification of the power systems and major equipment affected and credited for a fire in the AV. Listed power systems include 6.9kv shutdown boards powered from offsite and onsite sources, 480vac shutdown boards, 125vdc boards and 125vac vital instrument boards. The 480vac motor control centers are included in the analysis, but not listed as they are generally available when their associated 480vac shutdown board is available. The affected and credited equipment listed in the analysis summary are only the large process pumps which identify the train or path of safe shutdown equipment that is credited.
Valves and instrumentation associated with the listed equipment are included in the analysis but not listed because they must be available for the train or path to be credited.
VI-2

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                           Revision 60 (b)      Mitigating actions taken to return the potentially damaged equipment and/or cables to a functional status for fire safe shutdown or an action taken to prevent fire damage to equipment or cables. The mitigating actions to return equipment to an operable status include local manual operator actions, main control room operator actions and repairs. The mitigating actions also include the use of electrical raceway fire barrier systems (ERFBS) or radiant energy shields to protect the cable(s). The cables listed in the Cable Protection tables are protected by 1-hour rated ERFBS except for those noted which are protected by 3-hour rated ERFBS. The cables in the Cable Protection tables in the Reactor Buildings are protected by radiant energy shields.
In addition to the local and main control room operator actions summarized for each specific AV, Table 6-1 summarizes local manual operator actions and main control room operator actions which may be needed for a fire in any Analysis Volume except control building fires. These generic actions are for pneumatic controlled valves (control air may not be available) or MCR initiation of Fire Safe Shutdown (FSSD) functions specifically listed to properly align MCR hand switches to prevent spurious actuation from fire damaged automatic process interlocks.
Additionally, generic actions may be listed to address the ability to achieve a given FSSD function from the MCR. Each operator action includes a "When Required" time (minutes) in which the action is to be performed. These times are relative with respect to event initiation.
Several actions have 0 for "When Required" time which only serves to indicate that they are the initial actions.
The details associated with fire safe shutdown separation analysis for each AV within the WBN fire areas are contained in the references identified in Part II of the FPR.
3.0               FIRE AREA HAZARDS ANALYSIS 3.1               FIRE AREA 1 Fire Area 1 consists of the following rooms on the lower four elevations of the Auxiliary Building as depicted on Figures II-27A, II-28A, II-29A, and II-30A.
Room No.              Description 674.0-A1              TRITIATED DRAIN COLLECTOR TANK ROOM 674.0-A2              TRITIATED DRAIN COLLECTOR TANK PUMPS 676.0-A1              CORRIDOR 676.0-A2              HOLDUP TANK ROOM A 676.0-A3              HOLDUP TANK ROOM B 676.0-A4              FLOOR DRAIN COLLECT PUMP, FILTER & TANK 676.0-A4a             FLOOR DRAIN COLLECTION TANK ROOM 676.0-A5              GAS STRIPPER FEED PUMP ROOM 676.0-A6              SPARE 676.0-A7              SPARE 676.0-A8              CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP ROOM 1B-B 676.0-A9              CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP ROOM 1A-A 676.0-A14             CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP ROOM 2A-A 676.0-A15             CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP ROOM 2B-B 676.0-A16             UNIT 1 PIPE CHASE 692.0-A8              UNIT 1 PIPE CHASE CORRIDOR (SUBDIVIDED INTO 692.0-A1A (692-A1A1, -A1A2, -A1A3, -A1AN),
692.0-A1 692-A1B (-A1B1, -A1B2, -A1B3, -A1BN) AND 692-A1C VI-3

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                         Revision 60 Room No.           Description 692.0-A2           GAS DECAY TANK VALVE GALLERY 692.0-A3           GAS DECAY TANK ROOM 692.0-A4           CHEMICAL DRAIN TANK ROOM 692.0-A5           GAS DECAY TANK ROOM 692.0-A9           CHARGING PUMP 1A-A 692.0-A12          SAFETY INJECTION PUMP 1B-B 692.0-A13          SAFETY INJECTION PUMP 1A-A 692.0-A17          MAINTENANCE AND TESTING EQUIPMENT (M&TE) HOT TOOL ROOM 692.0-A18          HOT TOOL ROOM 692.0-A27          CONCENTRATE FILTER ROOM 692.0-A29          BORIC ACID EVAPORATOR PACKAGE ROOM B 692.0-A30          BORIC ACID EVAPORATOR PACKAGE ROOM A 692.0-A31          SPARE 713.0-A28          UNIT 1 PIPE CHASE 3.1.1           Rooms 674.0-A1 and A2

==
Description:==
Tritiated Drain Collector Tank Room and Tritiated Drain Collector Tank Pumps Fire Loading: Combustible materials consist of plastics and small amounts of lube oil associated with the Tritiated Drain Collector Tank Pumps and anticipated amounts of radwaste trash and laundry. The fire severity is classified as insignificant.
Compartmentation: The only regulatory barriers are the south walls of both rooms to the RHR pump cubicles and the ceilings of both rooms.
Barriers:
Regulatory Room        Direction    Adjacent Area/Room             FPR Figure Reference Barrier Rating 674.0-A1    South Wall   Area 3-1, Room 676.0-A11       II-27A               2 hours Ceiling      Area 1, Room 692.0-A1          II-27A, II-28A       2 hours Area 1, Room 692.0-A17         II-27A, II-28A       2 hours Area 1, Room 692.0-A18         II-27A, II-28A       2 hours 674.0-A2    South Wall   Area 3-2, Room 676.0-A12       II-27A               2 hours Ceiling      Area 1, Room 692.0-A18         II-27A, II-28A       2 hours Area 1, Room 692.0-A1          II-27A, II-28A       2 hours Doors: None.
Dampers: None.
Detection: None.
Suppression: No automatic suppression is provided. A fire hose station is available in adjacent room (Corridor 676.0-A1).
Deviations: None VI-4

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                           Revision 60 Evaluations: The lack of total area suppression and detection is documented in Part VII, Section 3.1.1. The relaxation of penetration seal surveillance requirements in high radiation areas is documented in Part VII, Section 6.4.2.3 for room 674.0-A1.
3.1.2           Rooms 676.0-A1, A2, A3, A4, A4a, A5, A6, A7, A16, 692.0-A8, 713.0-A28 Room No.                    Description 676.0-A1                    Corridor 676.0-A2                    Holdup Tank Room A 676.0-A3                    Holdup Tank Room B 676.0-A4                    Floor Drain Collect Pump, Filter & Tank 676.0-A4a                   Floor Drain Collector Tank Room 676.0-A5                    Gas Stripper Feed Pump Room 676.0-A6                    Spare 676.0-A7                    Spare 676.0-A16                   Unit 1 Pipe Chase 692.0-A8                    Unit 1 Pipe Chase 713.0-A28                   Unit 1 Pipe Chase Fire Loading: Combustible loading consists of small amounts of lube oil in the pumps, motors, and valves in the area; polyester and rubber for fire hoses; EFRBS Thermo-Lag; canvas duct; cable insulation; plastics associated with the various electrical panels; small amounts of rubber, cloth, and paper in the Health Physics and Plant Services storage cabinets; anticipated amounts of radwaste trash and laundry; and miscellaneous other materials. The fire severity rating is classified as insignificant in all rooms except the Corridor (676.0-A1), the Gas Stripper Feed Pump room (676.0-A5), and the U1 Pipe Chase (692.0-A8). The fire severity rating classification of these three rooms is low.
Compartmentation: The only regulatory barriers are 3-hour between the Control Building and Auxiliary Building and 2-hour rated barriers to the RHR and Containment Spray pump cubicles and between the Unit 2 pipe and valve gallery and the upper elevations. The walls of rooms 676.0-A2, -A3, -A4, -A4a, -A5, -A6, and -A7 are not required fire barriers except as noted in the table below (ref. Figure II-27A):
Barriers:
FPR Figure          Regulatory Room           Direction      Adjacent Area/Room Reference           Barrier Rating 676.0-A1       North Wall     Area 1, Room 676.0-A15         II-27A              2 hours Area 1, Room 676.0-A14         II-27A              2 hours Area 65, Room 676.0-A17        II-27A              2 hours Area 1, Room 676.0-A9          II-27A              2 hours South Wall     Area 1, Room 676.0-A8          II-27A              2 hours Area 3-2, Room 676.0-A12       II-27A, II-28A      2 hours Area 1 , Room 676.0-A15        II-27A              2 hours East Wall      Area 1, Room 676.0-A14         II-27A              2 hours Area 1, Room 676.0-A15         II-27A              2 hours Area 65, Room 676.0-A17        II-27A              2 hours Area 2-2, Room 676.0-A13       II-27A              2 hours Area 3-2, Room 676.0-A12       II-27A              2 hours West Wall      Area 1, Room 676.0-A8          II-27A              2 hours VI-5

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                    Revision 60 Barriers:
FPR Figure         Regulatory Room      Direction  Adjacent Area/Room Reference          Barrier Rating Area 1, Room 676.0-A9    II-27A             2 hours Area 2-1, Room 676.0-A10 II-27A             2 hours Area 3-1, Room 676.0-A11 II-27A             2 hours Ceiling    Area 1, Room 692.0-A1    II-27A, II-28A     2 hours Area 1, Room 692.0-A1    II-27A, II-28A     2 hours Area 1, Room 692.0-A1    II-27A, II-28A     2 hours Area 1, Room 692.0-A12   II-27A, II-28A     2 hours Area 1, Room 692.0-A13   II-27A, II-28A     2 hours Area 1, Room 692.0-A17   II-27A, II-28A     2 hours Area 1-2, Room 692.0-A19 II-27A, II-28A     2 hours Area 1-1, Room 692.0-A20 II-27A, II-28A     2 hours 676.0-A2  South Wall Area 48, 692.0-C3        II-27A, -28A -33A  3 hours Area 48, 692.0-C4        II-27A, -28A -33A  3 hours Area 48, 692.0-C5        II-27A, -28A -33A  3 hours Area 48, 708.0-C1        II-27A, -28A -33A  3 hours Area 48, 708.0-C3        II-27A, -28A -33A  3 hours Ceiling    Area 8, Room 713.0-A1    II-27A, -28A, -29A 2 hours Area 8, Room 713.0-A23   II-27A, -28A, -29A 2 hours Area 8, Room 713.0-A24   II-27A, -28A, -29A 2 hours Area 8, Room 713.0-A25   II-27A, -28A, -29A 2 hours 676.0-A3  South Wall Area 48, 692.0-C5        II-27A, -28A -33A  3 hours Area 48, 692.0-C6        II-27A, -28A -33A  3 hours Area 48, 708.0-C3        II-27A, -28A -33A  3 hours Area 48, 708.0-C4        II-27A, -28A -33A  3 hours Ceiling    Area 8, Room 713.0-A1    II-27A, -28A, -29A 2 hours Area 8, Room 713.0-A1    II-27A, -28A, -29A 2 hours Area 8, Room 713.0-A22   II-27A, -28A, -29A 2 hours Area 8, Room 713.0-A23   II-27A, -28A, -29A 2 hours 676.0-A4  North &    Area 65, Room 676.0-A17  II-27A             2 hours East Wall Ceiling    Area 1, 692.0-A31        II-27A, II-28A     2 hours East Wall  Area 65, Room 676.0-A17  II-27A             2 hours Ceiling    Area 1, 692.0-A31        II-27A, II-28A     2 hours 676.0-A5  Ceiling    Area 1, Room 692.0-A1    II-27A, II-28A     2 hours Area 1, Room 692.0-A1    II-27A, II-28A     2 hours 676.0-A6  Ceiling    Area 1, Room 692.0-A1    II-27A, II-28A     2 hours 676.0-A7  North Wall Area 1, Room 676.0-A8    II-27A             2 hours Ceiling    Area 1, 692.0-A1         II-27A, II-28A     2 hours 676.0-A16 East Wall  Area 1, Room 676.0-A8    II-27A             2 hours VI-6

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                 Revision 60 Barriers:
FPR Figure     Regulatory Room      Direction  Adjacent Area/Room Reference      Barrier Rating Area 1, Room 676.0-A9     II-27A         2 hours Area 2-1, Room 676.0-A10  II-27A         2 hours Area 3-1, Room 676.0-A11  II-27A         2 hours Ceiling    Area 5. Room 692.0-A7     II-27A, II-28A 2 hours Area 6, Room 692.0-A10    II-27A, II-28A 2 hours Area 7, Room 692.0-A11    II-27A, II-28A 2 hours Area 1, Room 692.0-A1     II-27A, II-28A 2 hours 692.0-A8  North and  Area 5, Room 692.0-A7*    II-28A         2 hours West Walls East Wall  Area 1, Room 692.0-A1     II-28A         2 hours Area 1, Room 692.0-A12    II-28A         2 hours Area 1, Room 692.0-A13    II-28A         2 hours South Wall Area 1, Room 692.0-A9     II-28A         2 hours Area 6, Room 692.0-A10    II-28A         2 hours Area 7, Room 692.0-A11    II-28A         2 hours Ceiling    Area 9, Room 713.0-A6     II-28A, II-29A 2 hours Area 9-1, Room 713.0-A7   II-28A, II-29A 2 hours
                     *Entrance Labyrinth Walls and Ceiling 713.0-A28 North Wall Area 10, Room 729.0-A8    II-29A         2 hours Area 10, Spent Fuel Pit   II-29A         2 hours Area 16, 737.0-A5         II-29A, II-30A 2 hours Area 8, 713-A11           II-29A, II-30A 2 hours East Wall  Area 8, Room 713.0-A10    II-29A         2 hours Area 8, Room 713.0-A11    II-29A, II-30A 2 hours Area 8, Room 713.0-A12    II-29A, II-30A 2 hours Area 8, Room 713.0-A13    II-29A         2 hours Area 65, Room 713.0-A29   II-29A         2 hours Area 14, Room 737.0-A7    II-29A, II-30A 2 hours South Wall Area 8, Room 713.0-A1     II-29A         2 hours Area 8, Room 713.0-A13    II-29A         2 hours Area 14, Room 737.0-A1    II-29A, II-30A 2 hours West Wall  Area 9, Room 713.0-A6     II-29A         2 hours Area 9-1, Room 713.0-A7   II-29A         2 hours Area 61, Unit 1 Reactor   II-29A         3 hours Building Area 16, Room 737.0-A5    II-28A, II-29A 2 hours Floor      Area 1, 692.0-A1          II-28A, II-29A 2 hours Area 1, 692.0-A12         II-28A, II-29A 2 hours Area 1, 692.0-A7          II-28A, II-29A 2 hours Ceiling    Area 14, Room 737.0-A1    II-29A, II-30A 2 hours VI-7

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                         Revision 60 Barriers:
FPR Figure            Regulatory Room       Direction    Adjacent Area/Room Reference             Barrier Rating Area 14, Room 737.0-A7      II-29A, II-30A        2 hours Area 16, Room 737.0-A5      II-29A, II-30A        2 hours Area 16, Room 737.0-A15     II-29A, II-30A        2 hours Doors:
Door                                    FPR Figure    Door Room                    Adjacent Area/Room Number                                  Reference     Rating 676.0-A1     A3         Area 1, Room 676.0-A8        II-27A        1.5 hours A4         Area 1, Room 676.0-A9        II-27A        1.5 hours A5         Area 2-1, Room 676.0-A10     II-27A        1.5 hours A6         Area 3-1, Room 676.0-A11     II-27A        1.5 hours A8         Area 3-2, Room 676.0-A12     II-27A        1.5 hours A9         Area 2-2, Room 676.0-A13     II-27A        1.5 hours A10        Area 1, Room 676.0-A14       II-27A        1.5 hours A11        Area 1, Room 676.0-A15       II-27A        1.5 hours A12        Area 65, Room 676.0-A17      II-27A        1.5 hours 692.0-A8     A27        Area 5, Room 692.0-A7        II-28A        1.5 hours 713.0-A28    A91        Area 8, Room 713.0-A13       II-29A        1.5 hours Dampers:
Damper/Mark                                   Drawing       Damper Room                       Adjacent Area/Room Number                                        Reference     Rating 676.0-A1  1-ISD-31-5441    Area 1, Room 692.0-A1        47W866-2      3 hours 47A381-767                                    47W920-3 2-ISD-31-5441    Area 1, Room 692.0-A1        47W866-11     3 hours 47A381-767                                    47W920-3 2-ISD-31-5442    Area 1, Room 692.0-A1        47W866-11     3 hours 47A381-771                                    47W920-1 2-ISD-31-1001    Area 65, Room 676.0-A17      47W920-1      3 hours 47A920-A8022 676.0-A4a 2-ISD-31-3987    Area 1, Room 692.0-A31       47W866-11     3 hours 47A381-649F                                   47W920-2 676.0-A5  1-ISD-31-5443    Area 1, Room 692.0-A1        47W866-2      3 hours 47A381-768                                    47W920-3 676.0-A16 1-ISD-31-3775    Area 1, Room 676.0-A8        47W866-2      1.5 hours 47A381-391                                    47W920-1 1-ISD-31-3776    Area 1, Room 676.0-A9        47W866-2      1.5 hours 47A381-391                                    47W920-1 1-ISD-31-3777    Area 2-1, Room 676.0-A10     47W866-2      1.5 hours VI-8

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                Revision 60 Dampers:
Damper/Mark                           Drawing      Damper Room                    Adjacent Area/Room Number                                Reference    Rating 47A381-391                            47W920-1 1-ISD-31-3778 Area 1, Room 676.0-A11  47W866-2     1.5 hours 47A381-391                            47W920-1 1-ISD-31-3801 Area 5, Room 692.0-A7   47W866-8     3 hours 47A381-442F                           47W920-2, 18 692.0-A8  1-ISD-31-3774 Area 1, Room 692.0-A13  47W866-2     1.5 hours 47A381-394                            47W920-2 1-ISD-31-3797 Area 1, Room 692.0-A12  47W866-2     1.5 hours 47A381-394                            47W920-2 1-ISD-31-3798 Area 7, Room 692.0-A11  47W866-2     1.5 hours 47A381-394                            47W920-2 1-ISD-31-3799 Area 6, Room 692.0-A10  47W866-2     1.5 hours 47A381-394                            47W920-2 1-ISD-31-3800 Area 1, Room 692.0-A9   47W866-2     3 hours 47A381-394F                           47W920-2 1-ISD-31-3988 Area 5, Room 692.0-A7   47W866-2     3 hours 47A381-619F                           47W920-2 713.0-A28 1-ISD-31-3805 Area 9-1, Room 713.0-A7 47W866-2     3 hours 47A381-401F                           47W920-4 1-ISD-31-3814 Area 14, Room 737.0-A7  47W866-2     1.5 hours 47A381-407                            47W920-5 1-ISD-31-3815 Area 8, Room 713.0-A11  47W866-2     3 hours 47A381-407F                           47W920-5 1-ISD-31-3816 Area 8, Room 713.0-A12  47W866-2     3 hours 47A381-407F                           47W920-5 1-ISD-31-3817 Area 16, Room 737.0-A5  47W866-2     3 hours 47A381-409F                           47W920-5 1-ISD-31-3818 Area 16, Room 737.0-A5  47W866-2     1.5 hours 47A381-432                            47W920-23 1-ISD-31-3819 Area 14, Room 737.0-A1  47W866-2     1.5 hours 47A381-398F                           47W920-5 1-ISD-31-3923 Area 9, Room 713.0-A6   47W866-8     3 hours 47A381-408F                           47W920-4 VI-9

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                          Revision 60 Detection: Ionization smoke detectors are only provided in rooms 676.0-A1 (partial), 676.0-A5 (partial), 676.0-A6, 676.0-A16, 692.0-A8, and 713.0-A28. Rooms 676.0-A2, 676.0-A3, 676.0-A4, 676.0-A4a and 676.0-A7 do not have detection.
Suppression: No automatic suppression is provided. A standpipe and hose station is located in room 676.0-A1, 692.0-A1, and 713.0-A13.
Deviations: The unprotected stair and equipment hatch openings in the floor separating elevations 676.0 from 692.0-A1 are documented in Part VII, Section 2.6.3.4. Spiral welded pipe without fire dampers where the pipe penetrates fire barriers in Rooms 676.0-A1, -A3 is justified in Part VII, Section 2.6.3.2.a. A sheet metal duct with no damper in Room 676.0-A4 is documented in Part VII, Section 2.6.3.2.b. No deviations are applicable for Rooms 676.0-A4a, -
A5, -A6, -A7,-A16, 692.0-A8 and 713.0-A28.
Evaluations: The lack of total area suppression and detection is documented in Part VII, Section 3.1.1 for all rooms. The relaxation of penetration seal surveillance requirements in high radiation areas is documented in Part VII, Section 6.4.2.2 for rooms 676.0-A2, -A3.
3.1.3            Rooms 692.0-A1, A2, A3, A4, A5, A17, A18, A27, A29, A30 and A31 Room No.            Description 692.0-A1            Corridor (Subdivided into 692.0-A1A (692-A1A1, -A1A2, -A1A3, -A1AN), 692-A1B (692-A1B1, -A1B2. A1B3, -A1BN) and 692-A1C 692.0-A2            Gas Decay Tank Valve Gallery 692.0-A3            Gas Decay Tank Room 692.0-A4            Chemical Drain Tank Room 692.0-A5            Gas Decay Tank Room 692.0-A17           Maintenance and Testing Equipment (M&TE) Hot Tool Room 692.0-A18           Hot Tool Room 692.0-A27           Concentrate Filter Room 692.0-A29           Boric Acid Evaporator Package Room B 692.0-A30           Boric Acid Evaporator Package Room A 692.0-A31           Spare Fire Loading: The combustibles consist of various amounts of lube oil associated with several pumps and valves, ERFBS Thermo-Lag, rubber for hoses, plastics associated with various electrical panels, lights, flex conduits, and boxes, transformer oil associated with two transformers, insulation on cables in the cable trays and anticipated amounts of radwaste trash and laundry and miscellaneous other materials in the combustible liquid storage cabinet. The fire severity loading for room 692.0-A1 is classified as moderate and room 692.0-A31 is classified as low. The other rooms contain insignificant amounts of combustibles.
Compartmentation: Room 692.0-A1 has been subdivided into 692.0-A1A (692-A1A1, -A1A2, -
A1A3, -A1AN), 692-A1B (692-A1B1, -A1B2, -A1B3, -A1BN) and 692-A1C (see Figure II-28A).
There is one rectangular heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) duct penetration, one round Emergency Gas Treatment System (EGTS) duct penetration without fire dampers in the 692.0-A1 floor slab, and one round EGTS duct penetration without fire dampers in the ceiling of 692.0-A1. Stairwell No. 3, an equipment hatch, three HVAC duct penetrations, and the elevator shaft are also unprotected openings in the 692.0-A1 floor slab, as well as Stairwell No. 3, 5 and 6, an equipment hatch, and the elevator shaft in the 692.0-A1 ceiling. There is one unprotected steel hatch in 692.0-A27 floor slab. There are two rectangular unprotected openings in 692.0-VI-10

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                            Revision 60 A31 floor slab. The walls of rooms 692.0-A2, -A3, -A4, -A5, -A17, -A18, -A27, -A29, -A30 and -
A31 are not required fire barriers except as indicated in the table below.
Barriers:
FPR Figure     Regulatory Room            Direction       Adjacent Area/Room Reference      Barrier Rating 692.0-A1A       North Wall      AREA 4, ROOM 692.0-A6*           II-28A         2 Hours (Column                         AREA 5, ROOM 692.0-A7            II-28A         2 Hours Lines                           AREA 6, ROOM 692.0-A10           II-28A         2 Hours A1-A8/S-U)                      AREA 7, ROOM 692.0-A11**         II-28A         2 Hours AREA 1, ROOM 692.0-A9            II-28A         2 Hours AREA 1, ROOM 692.0-A12           II-28A         2 Hours AREA 10, ELEVATOR SHAFT          II-28A         2 Hours
* TDAFW PUMP ROOM WALLS AND CEILING.
                                **ENTRANCE LABYRINTH WALLS AND CEILINGS South Wall      AREA 10, ELEVATOR SHAFT          II-28A         2 Hours AREA 48, ROOM 692.0-C1           II-28A, II-33A 3 Hours AREA 63, TURBINE BUILDING        II-28A, II-33A 3 Hours East Wall       AREA 1, ROOM 692.0-A9            II-28A         2 Hours AREA 10, ELEVATOR SHAFT          II-28A         2 Hours West Wall       AREA 4, ROOM 692.0-A6*           II-28A         2 Hours AREA 6, ROOM 692.0-A10           II-28A         2 Hours AREA 7, ROOM 692.0-A11**         II-28A         2 Hours Ceiling         AREA 8, ROOM 713.0-A1            II-28A, II-29A 2 Hours AREA 8, ROOM 713.0-A10           II-28A, II-29A 2 Hours AREA 8, ROOM 713.0-A30           II-28A, II-29A 2 Hours Floor           AREA 1, ROOM 676.0-A1            II-27A, II-28A 2 Hours AREA 1, ROOM 676.0-A5            II-27A, II-28A 2 Hours AREA 1, ROOM 676.0-A6            II-27A, II-28A 2 Hours AREA 1, ROOM 676.0-A7            II-27A, II-28A 2 Hours AREA 1, ROOM 676.0-A8            II-27A, II-28A 2 Hours AREA 1, ROOM 676.0-A9            II-27A, II-28A 2 Hours AREA 1, ROOM 676.0-A16           II-27A, II-28A 2 Hours 692.0-A1B       North Wall      AREA 10, ELEVATOR SHAFT          II-28A         2 Hours (Column                         AREA 1-1, ROOM 692.0-A20         II-28A         2 Hours Lines                           AREA 66, ROOM 692.0-A21          II-28A         2 Hours A8-A15/Q-U)                     AREA 67, ROOM 692.0-A22          II-28A         2 Hours AREA 68, ROOM 692.0-A23          II-28A         2 Hours AREA 70, ROOM 692.0-A25          II-28A         2 Hours AREA 69, ROOM 692.0-A26          II-28A         2 Hours East Wall       AREA 66, ROOM 692.0-A21**        II-28A         2 Hours AREA 67, ROOM 692.0-A22          II-28A         2 Hours AREA 69, ROOM 692.0-A26*         II-28A         2 Hours South Wall      AREA 10, ELEVATOR SHAFT          II-28A         2 Hours VI-11

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                   Revision 60 Barriers:
FPR Figure     Regulatory Room       Direction          Adjacent Area/Room Reference      Barrier Rating AREA 48, ROOM 692.0-C10  II-28A, II-33A 3 Hours West Wall          AREA 10, ELEVATOR SHAFT  II-28A         2 Hours AREA 68, ROOM 692.0-A23  II-28A         2 Hours Ceiling            AREA 8, ROOM 713.0-A1    II-28A, II-29A 2 Hours AREA 8, ROOM 713.0-A17   II-28A, II-29A 2 Hours AREA 8, ROOM 713.0-A18   II-28A, II-29A 2 Hours AREA 8, ROOM 713.0-A22   II-28A, II-29A 2 Hours Floor              AREA 1, ROOM 676.0-A1    II-27A, II-28A 2 Hours AREA 1, ROOM 676.0-A5    II-27A, II-28A 2 Hours AREA 1, ROOM 676.0-A14   II-27A, II-28A 2 Hours AREA 1, ROOM 676.0-A15   II-27A, II-28A 2 Hours (partial)  AREA 65, ROOM 676.0-A17  II-27A, II-28A 2 Hours
* TDAFW PUMP ROOM WALLS AND CEILING
                              **ENTRANCE LABYRINTH WALLS AND CEILINGS 692.0-A1C  North Wall         AREA 10, ROOM 692.0-A14  II-28A         2 Hours (Column                       AREA 10 SPENT FUEL PIT   II-28A         2 Hours Lines A5-A11/U-Spent Fuel East Wall          AREA 1-1, ROOM 692.0-A20 II-28A         2 Hours Pit)                          AREA 1-2, ROOM 692.0-A19 II-28A         2 Hours AREA 65, ROOM 692.0-A24  II-28A         2 Hours South Wall         AREA 1, ROOM 692.0-A13   II-28A         2 Hours AREA 1-2, ROOM 692.0-A19 II-28A         2 Hours West Wall          AREA 1, ROOM 692.0-A8    II-28A         2 Hours AREA 1, ROOM 692.0-A12   II-28A         2 Hours AREA 1, ROOM 692.0-A13   II-28A         2 Hours AREA 5, ROOM 692.0-A7    II-28A         2 Hours Ceiling            AREA 8, ROOM 713.0-A1    II-28A, II-29A 2 Hours AREA 8, ROOM 713.0-A12   II-28A, II-29A 2 Hours AREA 8, ROOM 713.0-A13   II-28A, II-29A 2 Hours AREA 8, ROOM 713.0-A15   II-28A, II-29A 2 Hours AREA 1, ROOM 713.0-A28   II-28A, II-29A 2 Hours AREA 65, ROOM 713.0-A29  II-28A, II-29A 2 Hours Floor              AREA 1, ROOM 674.0-A1    II-27A, II-28A 2 Hours AREA 1, ROOM 674.0-A2    II-27A, II-28A 2 Hours AREA 1, ROOM 676.0-A1    II-27A, II-28A 2 Hours AREA 3-1, ROOM 676.0-A11 II-27A, II-28A 2 Hours AREA 3-2, ROOM 676.0-A12 II-27A, II-28A 2 Hours 692.0-A2   Ceiling            AREA 8, ROOM 713.0-A1    II-28A, II-29A 2 Hours 692.0-A3   South Wall         AREA 48, ROOM 692.0-C2   II-28A, II-33A 3 Hours VI-12

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                    Revision 60 Barriers:
FPR Figure     Regulatory Room      Direction        Adjacent Area/Room Reference      Barrier Rating AREA 48, ROOM 692.0-C3    II-28A, II-33A 3 Hours AREA 48, ROOM 708.0-C1    II-28A, II-33A 3 Hours Ceiling          AREA 8, ROOM 713-A1       II-28A, II-29A 2 Hours AREA 8, ROOM 713-A24      II-28A, II-29A 2 Hours AREA 8, ROOM 713-A25      II-28A, II-29A 2 Hours AREA 8, ROOM 713-A26      II-28A, II-29A 2 Hours 692.0-A5  South Wall       AREA 48, ROOM 692.0-C1    II-28A, II-33A 3 Hours AREA 48, ROOM 692.0-C2    II-28A, II-33A 3 Hours AREA 48, ROOM 708.0-C1    II-28A, II-33A 3 Hours AREA 63, TURBINE BUILDING II-28A, II-33A 3 Hours Ceiling          AREA 8, ROOM 713-A1A      II-28A, II-29A 2 Hours AREA 8, ROOM 713-A27      II-28A, II-29A 2 Hours 692.0-A18 East Wall        AREA 65, ROOM 692.0-A24   II-28A         2 Hours Ceiling          AREA 8, ROOM 713.0-A14    II-28A, II-29A 2 Hours AREA 8, ROOM 713.0-A15    II-28A, II-29A 2 Hours Floor            AREA 1, ROOM 674.0-A1     II-27A, II-28A 2 Hours AREA 1, ROOM 674.0-A2     II-27A, II-28A 2 Hours AREA 1, ROOM 676.0-A1     II-27A, II-28A 2 Hours 692.0-A27 South Wall       AREA 48, ROOM 692.0-C10   II-28A, II-33A 3 Hours AREA 63, TURBINE BUILDING II-28A, II-33A 3 Hours Ceiling          AREA 8, ROOM 713.0-A1     II-28A, II-29A 2 Hours Floor            AREA 65, ROOM 676.0-A17   II-27A, II-28A 2 Hours 692.0-A29 South Wall       AREA 48, ROOM 692.0-C9    II-28A, II-33A 3 Hours AREA 48, ROOM 708.0-C4    II-28A, II-33A 3 Hours Ceiling          AREA 8, ROOM 713.0-A1     II-28A, II-29A 2 Hours Floor (Partial)  AREA 65, ROOM 676.0-A17   II-27A, II-28A 2 Hours 692.0-A30 South Wall       AREA 48, ROOM 692.0-C9    II-28A, II-33A 3 Hours AREA 48, ROOM 708.0-C4    II-28A, II-33A 3 Hours AREA 48, ROOM 692.0-C12   II-28A, II-33A 3 Hours 692.0-A30 Ceiling          AREA 8, ROOM 713.0-A1     II-28A, II-29A 2 Hours Floor (Partial)  AREA 65, ROOM 676.0-A17   II-27A, II-28A 2 Hours 692.0-A31 South Wall       AREA 48, ROOM 692.0-C6    II-28A, II-33A 3 Hours AREA 48, ROOM 692.0-C7    II-28A, II-33A 3 Hours AREA 48, ROOM 692.0-C8    II-28A, II-33A 3 Hours AREA 48, ROOM 692.0-C12   II-28A, II-33A 3 Hours AREA 48, ROOM 708.0-C4    II-28A, II-33A 3 Hours VI-13

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                           Revision 60 Barriers:
FPR Figure        Regulatory Room        Direction     Adjacent Area/Room Reference         Barrier Rating Ceiling       AREA 8, ROOM 713.0-A1         II-28A, II-29A    2 Hours AREA 8, ROOM 713.0-A23        II-28A, II-29A    2 Hours Floor         AREA 1, ROOM 676.0-A4         II-27A, II-28A    2 Hours AREA 1, ROOM 676.0-A4a        II-27A, II-28A    2 Hours Doors:
Door                                  FPR Figure         Door Room                    Adjacent Area/Room Number                                Reference          Rating 692.0-A1A  A25          Area 4, Room 692.0-A6    II-28A              1.5 Hours A26          Area 5, Room 692.0-A7    II-28A              1.5 Hours A28          Area 1, Room 692.0-A9    II-28A              1.5 Hours A29          Area 6, Room 692.0-A10   II-28A              1.5 Hours A30          Area 7, Room 692.0-A11   II-28A              1.5 Hours A31          Area 1, Room 692.0-A12   II-28A              1.5 Hours 692.0-A1B  A40          Area 1-1, Room 692.0-A20 II-28A             1.5 Hours A41          Area 66, Room 692.0-A21  II-28A              1.5 Hours A42          Area 67, Room 692.0-A22  II-28A              1.5 Hours A43          Area 68, Room 692.0-A23  II-28A              1.5 Hours A44          Area 70, Room 692.0-A25  II-28A              1.5 Hours A46          Area 69, Room 692.0-A26  II-28A              1.5 Hours 692.0-A1C  A32          Area 1, Room 692.0-A13   II-28A              1.5 Hours A39          Area 1-2, Room 692.0-A19 II-28A              1.5 Hours A33          Area 10, Room 692.0-A14  II-28A              1.5 Hours A36          Area 10, Room 692.0-A14  II-28A              1.5 Hours Dampers:
Damper/Mark                                 Drawing         Damper Room                       Adjacent Area/Room Number                                      Reference       Rating 692.0-A1A 1-ISD-31-3779    AREA 4, ROOM 692.0-A6      47W866-2        3 Hours 47A381-479F                                 47W920-2 1-ISD-31-3780    AREA 4, ROOM 692.0-A6      47W866-2        1.5 Hours 47A381-392                                  47W920-2 1-ISD-31-3782    AREA 4, ROOM 692.0-A6      47W866-2        3 Hours 47A381-647F                                 47W920-2 1-ISD-31-3783    AREA 4, ROOM 692.0-A6      47W866-2        3 Hours 47A381-647F                                 47W920-2 1-ISD-31-3802    AREA 5, ROOM 692.0-A7      47W866-2        3 Hours 47A381-393F                                 47W920-2 1-ISD-31-3967    AREA 4, ROOM 692.0-A6      47W866-2        3 Hours 47A381-131F                                 47W920-2 1-ISD-31-3995    AREA 8, ROOM 713.0-A1      47W866-2        3 Hours 47A381-651F                                 47W920-18 VI-14

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS             Revision 60 Dampers:
Damper/Mark                              Drawing   Damper Room                       Adjacent Area/Room Number                                   Reference Rating 1-ISD-31-5441    AREA 1, ROOM 676.0-A1   47W866-2  3 Hours 47A381-767                               47W920-3 1-ISD-31-5443    AREA 1, ROOM 676.0-A5   47W866-2  3 Hours 47A381-768                               47W920-3 1-ISD-31-5444A   AREA 8, ROOM 713.0-A1   47W866-2  3 Hours 47A381-769                               47W920-3 1-ISD-31-5444B   AREA 8, ROOM 713.0-A1   47W866-2  3 Hours 47A381-769                               47W920-3 1-ISD-31-5444C   AREA 8, ROOM 713.0-A1   47W866-2  3 Hours 47A381-769                               47W920-3 692.0-A1B 2-ISD-31-3862    AREA 70, ROOM 692.0-A25 47W866-11 3 Hours 47A381-393F                              47W920-2 2-ISD-31-3865    AREA 69, ROOM 692.0-A26 47W866-11 3 Hours 47A381-647F                              47W920-2 2-ISD-31-3866    AREA 69, ROOM 692.0-A26 47W866-11 3 Hours 47A381-647F                              47W920-2 2-ISD-31-3868    AREA 69, ROOM 692.0-A26 47W866-11 3 Hours 47A381-479F                              47W920-2 2-ISD-31-3958    AREA 69, ROOM 692.0-A26 47W866-11 3 Hours 47A381-131F                              47W920-2 2-ISD-31-3780    AREA 69, ROOM 692.0-A26 47W866-11 3 Hours 47A381-392                               47W920-2 2-ISD-31-3988    AREA 8, ROOM 713.0-A1   47W866-11 3 Hours 47A381-651F                              47W920-2, 47W920-3 2-ISD-31-5441    AREA 1, ROOM 676.0-A1   47W866-11 3 Hours 47A381-767F                              47W920-3 2-ISD-31-5442    AREA 1, ROOM 676.0-A1   47W866-11 3 Hours 47A381-771                               47W920-1 2-ISD-31-5444A   AREA 8, ROOM 713.0-A1   47W866-11 3 Hours 47A381-769                               47W920-3 2-ISD-31-5444B   AREA 8, ROOM 713.0-A1   47W866-11 3 Hours 47A381-769                               47W920-3 2-ISD-31-5444C   AREA 8, ROOM 713.0-A1   47W866-11 3 Hours 47A381-769                               47W920-3 692.0-A1C 2-ISD-31-5445    AREA 8, ROOM 713.0-A1   47W866-11 3 Hours 47A381-772                               47W920-2 VI-15

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                        Revision 60 Dampers:
Damper/Mark                                       Drawing    Damper Room                               Adjacent Area/Room Number                                            Reference  Rating 1-ISD-31-5446      AREA 8, ROOM 713.0-A1          47W866-2   3 Hours 47A381-770                                        47W920-2 Detection: Ionization smoke detectors are provided in Rooms 692.0-A1, -A17, -A18, and -A31 (except in the tunnels to the RWSTs and the entrance labyrinths for all other rooms). Room 692.0-A4 is a part-height enclosure with no ceiling; as a result, detection coverage in Room 692.0-A1A provides coverage for this room. Rooms 692.0-A2, -A3, -A5, -A27, -A29, and -A30 do not have detection.
Suppression: Automatic sprinker systems are provided in Rooms 692.0-A1, -A17,and -A18.
There is partial coverage due to the tunnels to the RWSTs in Room 692.0-A1 and partial coverage due to the entrance labyrinths to Rooms 692.0-A17 and -A18. Room 692.0-A4 is a part-height enclosure with no ceiling; as a result, suppression coverage in Room 692.0-A1 also provides coverage for this room. No automatic suppression is provided in Rooms 692.0-A2,
-A3, -A5, -A29, -A30, and -A31 Deviations: Intervening combustibles in the form of insulation on cables in trays and Thermo-Lag on electrical raceways are identified and justified in Paart VII, Section 2.4 for Room 692.0-A1. Spiral welded pipe without fire dampers where the pipe penetrates fire barriers in Rooms 676.0-A3 and 692.0-A1, -A31 is justified in Part VII, Section 2.6.3.2.a. Non-rated personnel hatches in Rooms 692.0-A27 and -A31 is justified in Part VII, Section 2.6.3.4.
Compliance to III.G.1 with FHA for Rooms 692.0-A29 and -A30 is justified and documented in Part VII, Section 2.9.1. The unprotected stair and equipment hatch openings in the floor separating elevations 676.0 from 692.0-A1 are documented in Part VII, Section 2.6.3.4. No deviations are applicable for Rooms 692.0-A2, -A3, -A4, -A5, -A17, and -A18.
Evaluations: The lack of total area suppression and detection in the tunnels to the RWSTs (that connect with 692.0-A1) and rooms 692.0-A2, -A3, -A5, -A17, -A27, -A29, -A30, and -A31 and the lack of total area suppression in 692.0-A18 is documented in Part VII, Section 3.1.1.
The use of a stacked block wall between rooms 692.0-A1 and 692.0-A10 is evaluated in Part VII, Section 3.6. The relaxation of penetration seal surveillance requirements in high radiation areas is documented in Part VII, Section 6.4.2.4 for rooms 692.0-A3, -A5. The feasibility and reliability evaluation for Unit 2 Operator Manual Actions is documented in Part VII, Section 8.3.1 for Room 692.0-A1. No evaluations are applicable to Room 692.0-A4.
3.1.4            Room 676.0-A8

==
Description:==
Containment Spray Pump Room 1B-B Fire Loading: The combustibles in the pump room consist of approximately six gallons of lube oil associated with the pump and small amounts of plastics associated with three junction boxes and five light fixtures. The fire severity is classified as insignificant.
Compartmentation: The containment spray pump room is separated from other plant locations by regulatory fire barriers.
VI-16

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                              Revision 60 Barriers:
FPR Figure        Regulatory Room             Direction           Adjacent Area/Room Reference         Barrier Rating 676.0-A8         North Wall          Area 1, Room 676.0-A9       II-27A            2 hours Area 1, Room 676.0-A1       II-27A            2 hours South Wall          Area 1, Room 676.0-A5       II-27A            2 hours Area 1, Room 676.0-A7       II-27A            2 hours East Wall           Area 1, Room 676.0-A1       II-27A            2 hours West Wall           Area 1, Room 676.0-A16      II-27A            2 hours Ceiling             Area 7, Room 692.0-A11      II-27A, II-28A    2 hours Area 1, Room 692.0-A1       II-27A, II-28A    2 hours Doors:
Door                                       FPR Figure       Door Room                             Adjacent Area/Room Number                                     Reference        Rating 1.5 676.0-A8         A3              Area 1, Room 676.0-A1      II-27A hours Dampers:
Damper/Mark                                 Drawing           Damper Room                                    Adjacent Area/Room Number                                      Reference         Rating 676.0-A8           1-ISD-31-3775        Area 1                 47W866-2          1.5 hrs 47A381-391           Room 676.0-A16         47W920-1 Detection: Ionization smoke detectors are provided in the pump room (except in the entrance labyrinth). (See note below)
Suppression: No automatic suppression is provided. A standpipe and hose station is provided in the adjacent room (Corridor 676.0-A1). (See Note below)
Deviations: None.
Evaluations: The lack of total area detection and suppression is documented in Part VII, Section 3.1.1.
Note: Although this room is not provided with suppression and full area detection, as suggested by Appendix A, Section F.11, fire barrier ratings are sufficient given the combustible loadings in the room. This room does not contain redundant safe shutdown equipment.
Therefore, a fire in this room will not endanger other safety related equipment required for safe plant shutdown. Refer to Paragraph F.11 of Part VIII of the FPR for information on conformance to Appendix A regarding this issue.
3.1.5            Room 676.0-A9

==
Description:==
Containment Spray Pump Room 1A-A.
Fire Loading: The combustibles consist of approximately six gallons of lube oil associated with the pump and small amounts of plastics associated with three junction boxes and four light fixtures. The fire severity is classified as insignificant.
VI-17

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                              Revision 60 Compartmentation: The containment spray pump room is separated from other plant locations by regulatory fire barriers.
Barriers:
FPR Figure       Regulatory Room               Direction         Adjacent Area/Room Reference        Barrier Rating 676.0-A9           North Wall        AREA 2-1, ROOM 676.0-       II-27A           2 Hours A10 South Wall        AREA 1, ROOM 676.0-A1       II-27A           2 Hours AREA 1, ROOM 676.0-A8       II-27A           2 Hours West Wall         AREA 1, ROOM 676.0-A16      II-27A           2 Hours East Wall         AREA 1, ROOM 676.0-A1       II-27A           2 Hours Ceiling           AREA 1, ROOM 692.0-A1       II-27A, II-28A   2 Hours AREA 1, ROOM 692.0-A12      II-27A, II-28A   2 Hours AREA 7, ROOM 692.0-A11      II-27A, II-28A   2 Hours Doors:
Door                                    FPR Figure       Door Room                         Adjacent Area/Room Number                                  Reference        Rating 676.0-A9        A4           AREA 1, ROOM 676.0-A1      II-27A            1.5 Hours Dampers:
Damper/Mark                                     Drawing           Damper Room                           Adjacent Area/Room Number                                          Reference         Rating 676.0-A9     1-ISD-31-3776     Area 1, Room 676.0-A16        47W866-2          1.5 Hours 47A381-391                                      47W920-1 Detection: Ionization smoke detectors are provided (except in the entrance labyrinth). (See note below)
Suppression: No automatic suppression is provided. A standpipe and hose station is provided in the adjacent room (Corridor 676.0-A1). (See note below)
Deviations: None.
Evaluations: The lack of total area suppression and detection is documented in Part VII, Section 3.1.1.
Note: Although this room is not provided with suppression and full area detection, as suggested by Appendix A, Section F.11, fire barrier ratings are sufficient given the combustible loadings in the room. This room does not contain redundant safe shutdown equipment.
Therefore, a fire in this room will not endanger other safety related equipment required for safe plant shutdown. Refer to Paragraph F.11 of Part VIII of the FPR for information on conformance to Appendix A regarding this issue.
3.1.6           Rooms 676.0-A2 and A3

==
Description:==
Holdup Tank Rooms A and B.
VI-18

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                         Revision 60 Fire Loading: The combustibles consist of anticipated amounts of radwaste trash and laundry.
The fire severity is classified as insignificant.
Compartmentation: The only regulatory fire barriers for these two rooms are the south walls connecting the rooms with the Control Building at elevation 692.0 and up, and their ceilings.
Barriers:
FPR Figure     Regulatory Barrier Room           Direction     Adjacent Area/Room Reference      Rating 676.0-A2       South         Area 48, Room 692.0-C3        II-28A, II-33A 3 Hours Area 48, Room 692.0-C4        II-28A, II-33A 3 Hours Area 48, Room 692.0-C5        II-28A, II-33A 3 Hours Area 48, Room 708.0-C1        II-28A, II-33A 3 Hours Area 48, Room 708.0-C3        II-28A, II-33A 3 Hours Ceiling       Area 8, Room 713.0-A1         II-28A, II-29A 2 Hours Area 8, Room 713.0-A23        II-28A, II-29A 2 Hours Area 8, Room 713.0-A24        II-28A, II-29A 2 Hours Area 8, Room 713.0-A25        II-28A, II-29A 2 Hours 676.0-A3       South         Area 48, Room 692.0-C5        II-28A, II-33A 3 Hours Area 48, Room 692.0-C6        II-28A, II-33A 3 Hours Area 48, Room 708.0-C3        II-28A, II-33A 3 Hours Area 48, Room 708.0-C4        II-28A, II-33A 3 Hours Ceiling       Area 8, Room 713.0-A1         II-28A, II-29A 2 Hours Area 8, Room 713.0-A1         II-28A, II-29A 2 Hours Area 8, Room 713.0-A22        II-28A, II-29A 2 Hours Area 8, Room 713.0-A23        II-28A, II-29A 2 Hours Doors: None.
Dampers: None.
Detection: None.
Suppression: No automatic suppression is provided. A standpipe and hose station is provided in the adjacent room (Corridor 692.0-A1).
Deviations: Spiral welded pipe without fire dampers where the pipe penetrates fire barriers in Room 676.0-A3 is justified in Part VII, Section 2.6.3.2.a. No deviations are applicable for Room 676.0-A2.
Evaluations: The lack of total area suppression and detection is documented in Part VII, Section 3.1.1. The relaxation of penetration seal surveillance requirements is documented in Part VII, Section 6.4.2.2.
3.1.7           Rooms 692.0-A3 and A5

==
Description:==
Gas Decay Tank Rooms VI-19

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                        Revision 60 Fire Loading: There are no significant combustibles in these rooms. The fire severity is classified as insignificant.
Compartmentation: The only regulatory barriers are the south wall to the Control Building and Turbine Building and the ceiling.
Barriers:
FPR Figure       Regulatory Room           Direction     Adjacent Area/Room Reference        Barrier Rating 692.0-A3       South Wall    Area 48, Room 692.0-C2          II-28A, II-33A   3 Hours Area 48, Room 692.0-C3          II-28A, II-33A   3 Hours Area 48, Room 708.0-C1          II-28A, II-33A   3 Hours Ceiling       Area 8, Room 713.0-A1           II-28A, II-29A   2 Hours Area 8, Room 713.0-A24          II-28A, II-29A   2 Hours Area 8, Room 713.0-A25          II-28A, II-29A   2 Hours Area 8, Room 713.0-A26          II-28A, II-29A   2 Hours 692.0-A5       South Wall    Area 48, Room 692.0-C1          II-28A, II-33A   3 Hours Area 48, Room 692.0-C2          II-28A, II-33A   3 Hours Area 48, Room 708.0-C1          II-28A, II-33A   3 Hours Area 63, Turbine Building       II-28A, II-33A   3 Hours Ceiling       Area 8, Room 713.0-A1           II-28A, II-29A   2 Hours Area 8, Room 713.0-A27          II-28A, II-29A   2 Hours Doors: None.
Dampers: None.
Detection: None.
Suppression: No automatic suppression is provided. A standpipe and hose station is provided in the adjacent room (Corridor 692.0-A1).
Deviations: None.
Evaluations: The lack of total area suppression and detection is documented in Part VII, Section 3.1.1. The relaxation of penetration seal surveillance requirements is documented in Part VII, Section 6.4.2.4.
3.1.8           Room 692.0-A9

==
Description:==
Charging Pump 1A-A Fire Loading: The combustibles consists of approximately 53 gallons of lube oil in the charging pump, plastics associated with lights and a junction box and anticipated amounts of radwaste trash and laundry. The fire severity is classified as low.
Compartmentation: The charging pump room is bounded by regulatory fire barriers, except for the floor which is not adjacent to any other plant location.
VI-20

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                               Revision 60 Barriers:
FPR Figure        Regulatory Room           Direction        Adjacent Area/Room Reference         Barrier Rating 692.0-A9       North Wall       AREA 1, ROOM 692.0-A8          II-28A            2 Hours AREA 5, ROOM 692.0-A7          II-28A            2 Hours South Wall       AREA 1, ROOM 692.0-A1          II-28A            2 Hours East Wall        AREA 6, ROOM 692.0-A10         II-28A            2 Hours West Wall        AREA 1, ROOM 692.0-A1          II-28A            2 Hours Ceiling          AREA 8, ROOM 713.0-A1          II-28A, II-29A    2 Hours AREA 8, ROOM 713.0- A9         II-28A, II-29A    2 Hours Doors:
Door                                    FPR Figure         Door Room                        Adjacent Area/Room Number                                  Reference          Rating 692.0-A9       A28          AREA 1, ROOM 692.0-A1      II-28A              1.5 Hours Dampers:
Damper/Mark                                        Drawing          Damper Room                               Adjacent Area/Room Number                                             Reference        Rating 692.0-A9      1-ISD-31-3800        AREA 1, ROOM 692.0-A8         47W866-2         3 Hours 47A381-394F                                        47W920-2 Detection: Ionization smoke detectors are provided in the room (except in the entrance labyrinth). (See note below)
Suppression: An automatic sprinkler system is provided in the room (except the entrance labyrinth). A standpipe and hose station is provided in the adjacent room (Corridor 692.0-A1).
(See note below)
Deviations: None.
Evaluations: The lack of total area suppression and detection in the entrance labyrinth is documented in Part VII, Section 3.1.1.
Note: Although this room is not provided with full area suppression and detection, as suggested by Appendix A, Section F.11, fire barrier ratings are sufficient given the combustible loadings in the room. This room does not contain redundant safe shutdown equipment.
Therefore, a fire in this room will not endanger other safety related equipment required for safe plant shutdown. Refer to Paragraph F.11 of Part VIII of the FPR for information on conformance to Appendix A regarding this issue.
3.1.9           Room 692.0-A12

==
Description:==
Safety Injection Pump 1B-B.
Fire Loading: The combustibles consist of the lube oil for the pump and two valves, plastics associated with lights and control and junction boxes and anticipated amounts of radwaste trash and laundry. The fire severity is classified as insignificant.
VI-21

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                           Revision 60 Compartmentation: The pump room is bounded by regulatory fire barriers.
Barriers:
FPR Figure       Regulatory Barrier Room           Direction        Adjacent Area/Room Reference        Rating 692.0-A12      North Wall       Area 1, Room 692.0-A13       II-28A           2 Hours South Wall       Area 1, Room 692.0-A1        II-28A           2 Hours Area 7, Room 692.0-A11       II-28A           2 Hours East Wall        Area 1, Room 692.0-A1        II-28A           2 Hours West Wall        Area 1, Room 692.0-A8        II-28A           2 Hours Floor            Area 1, Room 676.0-A1        II-27A, II-28A   2 Hours Area 1, Room 676.0-A9        II-27A, II-28A   2 Hours Area 2-1, Room 676.0-A10     II-27A, II-28A   2 Hours Ceiling          Area 1, Room 713.0-A28       II-28A, II-29A   2 Hours Area 8, Room 713.0-A10       II-28A, II-29A   2 Hours Area 8, Room 713.0-A11       II-28A, II-29A   2 Hours Doors:
Door                                       FPR Figure         Door Room                          Adjacent Area/Room Number                                     Reference          Rating 692.0-A12     A31             Area 1, Room 692.0-A1      II-28A             1.5 Hours Dampers:
Room           Damper/Mark         Adjacent Area/Room           Drawing       Damper Number                                           Reference     Rating 692.0-A12      1-ISD-31-3797       Area 1, Room 692.0-A8        47W866-2      1.5 Hours 47A381-394                                       47W920-2 Detection: Ionization smoke detectors are provided in the room.
Suppression: An automatic preaction sprinkler system is provided in the area. A standpipe and hose station is provided in the adjacent room (Corridor 692.0-A1).
Deviations: None.
Evaluations: None.
3.1.10          Room 692.0-A13

==
Description:==
Safety Injection Pump 1A-A Fire Loading: The combustibles consist of the lube oil in the pump and two valves, plastics associated with lights and a control box and anticipated amounts of radwaste trash and laundry.
The fire severity is classified as insignificant.
Compartmentation: The pump room is bounded by regulatory fire barriers.
VI-22

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                                Revision 60 Barriers:
FPR Figure         Regulatory Room          Direction     Adjacent Area/Room Reference          Barrier Rating 692.0-A13     North Wall    Area 1, Room 692.0-A1            II-28A             2 Hours South Wall    Area 1, Room 692.0-A12           II-28A             2 Hours East Wall     Area 1, Room 692.0-A1            II-28A             2 Hours West Wall     Area 1, Room 692.0-A8            II-28A             2 Hours Floor         Area 1, Room 676.0-A1            II-27A, II-28A     2 Hours Area 2-1, Room 676.0-A10         II-27A, II-28A     2 Hours Area 3-1, Room 676.0-A11         II-27A, II-28A     2 Hours Ceiling       Area 8, Room 713.0-A11           II-28A, II-29A     2 Hours Doors:
Door                                       FPR Figure        Door Room                      Adjacent Area/Room Number                                     Reference         Rating 692.0-A13    A32          Area 1, Room 692.0-A1         II-28A             1.5 Hours Dampers:
Damper/Mark                                      Drawing          Damper Room                             Adjacent Area/Room Number                                           Reference        Rating 692.0-A13    1-ISD-31-3774       AREA 1, ROOM 692.0-A8        47W866-2         1.5 Hours 47A381-394                                       47W920-2 Detection: Ionization smoke detectors are provided in the room.
Suppression: An automatic preaction sprinkler system is provided in the room. A standpipe and hose station is provided in the adjacent room (Corridor 692.0-A1).
Deviations: None.
Evaluations: None.
3.1.11         Room 692.0-A17

==
Description:==
Maintenance and Test Equipment (M&TE) Hot Tool Room Fire Loading: The combustible in the room consist of plastics associated with lighting and miscellaneous covers. The fire severity is classified as insignificant.
Compartmentation: The floor (partial) and ceiling of this room are regulatory fire barriers.
VI-23

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                           Revision 60 Barriers:
FPR Figure         Regulatory Room            Direction     Adjacent Area/Room Reference          Barrier Rating 692.0-A17       FLOOR         AREA 1, ROOM 674.0-A1       II-27A, II-28A     2 Hours (PARTIAL)     AREA 1, ROOM 676.0-A1       II-27A, II-28A     2 Hours CEILING       AREA 8, ROOM 713.0-A1       II-28A, II-29A     2 Hours AREA 8, ROOM 713.0-A14      II-28A, II-29A     2 Hours AREA 8, ROOM 713.0-A31      II-28A, II-29A     2 Hours AREA 8, ROOM 713.0-A15      II-28A, II-29A     2 Hours Doors: None.
Dampers: None.
Detection: Ionization smoke detectors are provided for this room (except in entrance labyrinth).
Suppression: An automatic preaction sprinkler system is provided in the room (except in the entrance labyrinth). A standpipe and hose station is provided in the adjacent room (Corridor 692.0-A1).
Deviations: None.
Evaluations: The lack of total area suppression in the entrance labyrinth is documented in Part VII, Section 3.1.1.
3.1.12           Room 692.0-A31

==
Description:==
Spare Fire Loading: The combustibles consist of lube oil in a hoist, plastics associated with lights plywood flooring, miscellaneous amounts of vinyl, cloth, nylon, rubber, combustible liquid storage cabinets, and anticipated amounts of radwaste trash and laundry. The fire severity is classified low.
Compartmentation: The south wall, floor, and ceiling are regulatory fire barriers.
BARRIERS:
FPR Figure      Regulatory Room          Direction        Adjacent Area/Room Reference       Barrier Rating 692.0-A31     SOUTH WALL       AREA 48, ROOM 692.0-C6       II-28A, II-33A  3 Hours AREA 48, ROOM 692.0-C7       II-28A, II-33A  3 Hours AREA 48, ROOM 692.0-C8       II-28A, II-33A  3 Hours AREA 48, ROOM 692.0-C12      II-28A, II-33A  3 Hours AREA 48, ROOM 708.0-C4       II-28A, II-33A  3 Hours FLOOR            AREA 1, ROOM 676.0-A4        II-27A, II-28A  2 Hours AREA 1, ROOM 676.0-A4A       II-27A, II-28A  2 Hours CEILING          AREA 8, ROOM 713.0-A1        II-28A, II-29A  2 Hours AREA 8, ROOM 713.0-A23       II-28A, II-29A  2 Hours VI-24

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                             Revision 60 Doors: None.
Dampers:
Damper/Mark                                     Drawing           Damper Room                               Adjacent Area/Room Number                                          Reference         Rating 692.0-A31      2-ISD-31-3987       AREA 1, ROOM 676.0-A4A      47W866-11         3 Hours 47A381-649F                                     47W920-2 Detection: Ionization smoke detectors are provided for the room (except in entrance labyrinth).
Suppression: No automatic suppression is provided. A standpipe and hose station is provided in the adjacent room (Corridor 692.0-A1).
Deviations: There is an unprotected opening in the floor to a chase down to room 676.0-A4a, and a non-fire rated hatch cover in the ceiling to a monolithic enclosure on elevation 713. The non-fire rated hatch cover provides a sufficient level of protection due to the insignificant quantities of combustibles on both sides of the hatch. Justification is documented in Part VII, Section 2.6.3.4. Spiral welded pipe without fire dampers where the pipe penetrates fire barriers in Room 692.0-A31 is justified in Part VII, Section 2.6.3.2.a.
Evaluations: The lack of total area suppression is documented in Part VII, Section 3.1.1.
3.1.13           Room 676.0-A14

==
Description:==
Containment Spray Pump Room 2A-A Fire Loading: The combustibles consist of approximately six gallons of lube oil associated with the pump and small amounts of plastics associated with three junction boxes and four light fixtures. The fire severity is classified as insignificant.
Compartmentation: The room is separated from other plant locations by regulatory fire barriers.
Barriers:
Regulatory FPR Figure Room            Direction        Adjacent Area/Room                                  Barrier Reference Rating 676.0-A14       North Wall       Area 2-2, Room 676.0-A13          II-27A            2 Hours South Wall       Area 1, Room 676.0-A1             II-27A            2 Hours Area 1, Room 676.0-A15            II-27A            2 Hours West Wall        Area 1, Room 676.0-A1             II-27A            2 Hours East Wall        Area 65, Room 676.0-A17           II-27A            2 Hours Ceiling          Area 1, Room 692.0-A1             II-27A, II-28A    2 Hours Area 1-1, Room 692.0-A20          II-27A, II-28A    2 Hours Area 66, Room 692.0-A21           II-27A, II-28A    2 Hours VI-25

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                           Revision 60 Doors:
Door                                      FPR Figure     Door Room                          Adjacent Area/Room Number                                    Reference      Rating 676.0-A14        A10          Area 1, Room 676.0-A1        II-27A         1.5 Hours Dampers:
Damper/Mark                                      Drawing      Damper Room                               Adjacent Area/Room Number                                           Reference    Rating 676.0-A14        2-ISD-31-3854     AREA 65, ROOM 676.0-A17        47W866-2     1.5 Hours 47A381-391                                       47W920-1 Detection: Ionization smoke detectors are provided (except in the entrance labyrinth). (See note below)
Suppression: No automatic suppression is provided. A standpipe and hose station is provided in the adjacent room (Corridor 676.0-A1). (See note below)
Deviations: None.
Evaluations: The lack of total area suppression and detection is documented in Part VII, Section 3.1.1.
Note: Although this room is not provided with suppression and full area detection, as suggested by Appendix A, Section F.11, fire barrier ratings are sufficient given the combustible loadings in the room. This room does not contain redundant safe shutdown equipment.
Therefore, a fire in this room will not endanger other safety related equipment required for safe plant shutdown. Refer to Paragraph F.11 of Part VIII of the FPR for information on conformance to Appendix A regarding this issue.
3.1.14           Room 676.0-A15

==
Description:==
Containment Spray Pump Room 2B-B Fire Loading: The combustibles consist of approximately six gallons of lube oil associated with the pump and small amounts of plastics associated with three junction boxes and five light fixtures. The fire severity is classified as insignificant.
Compartmentation: The room is separated from other plant locations by regulatory fire barriers.
Barriers:
FPR Figure     Regulatory Room              Direction       Adjacent Area/Room Reference      Barrier Rating 676.0-A15         North Wall      Area 1, Room 676.0-A14          II-27A         2 Hours Area 1, Room 676.0-A1           II-27A         2 Hours South Wall      Area 1, Room 676.0-A1           II-27A         2 Hours Area 65, Room 676.0-A17         II-27A         2 Hours East Wall       Area 65, Room 676.0-A17         II-27A         2 Hours West Wall       Area 1, Room 676.0-A16          II-27A         2 Hours VI-26

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                              Revision 60 Barriers:
FPR Figure          Regulatory Room             Direction       Adjacent Area/Room Reference           Barrier Rating Ceiling         Area 66, Room 692.0-A21       II-27A, II-28A      2 Hours Area 1, Room 692.0-A1         II-27A, II-28A      2 Hours Doors:
Door                                   FPR Figure        Door Room                         Adjacent Area/Room Number                                 Reference         Rating 676.0-A15        A11         Area 1, Room 676.0-A1      II-27A             1.5 Hours Dampers:
Damper/Mark                                  Drawing           Damper Room                                 Adjacent Area/Room Number                                       Reference         Rating 676.0-A15       2-ISD-31-3855        Area 65                 47W866-11         1.5 Hours 47A381-391           Room 676.0-A17          47W920-1 Detection: Ionization smoke detectors are provided in the pump room (except in the entrance labyrinth). (See note below)
Suppression: No automatic suppression is provided. A standpipe and hose station is provided in the adjacent room (Corridor 676.0-A1). (See Note below)
Deviations: None.
Evaluations: The lack of total area detection and suppression is documented in Part VII, Section 3.1.1.
Note: Although this room is not provided with suppression and full area detection, as suggested by Appendix A, Section F.11, fire barrier ratings are sufficient given the combustible loadings in the room. This room does not contain redundant safe shutdown equipment.
Therefore, a fire in this room will not endanger other safety related equipment required for safe plant shutdown. Refer to Paragraph F.11 of Part VIII of the FPR for information on conformance to Appendix A regarding this issue.
VI-27

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                           Revision 60 01a-VI-1A - AV-001 3.1.15           Fire Area 1 Safe Shutdown Analysis by Analysis Volume 3.1.15.1         AV-001 Room No.                     Description 674.0-A1                     Tritiated Drain Collector Tank Room 674.0-A2                     Tritiated Drain Collector Tank Pumps 676.0-A1                     Corridor 676.0-A2                     Holdup Tank Room A 676.0-A3                     Holdup Tank Room B 676.0-A4                     Floor Drain Collect Pump, Filter & Tank 676.0-A4a                    Floor Drain Collection Tank Room 676.0-A5                     Gas Stripper Feed Pump Room 676.0-A6                     Spare 676.0-A7                     Spare 676.0-A16                    Unit 1 Pipe Chase 692.0-A1C                    Corridor 692.0-A8                     Unit 1 Pipe Chase 692.0-A31                    Spare 713.0-A28                    Unit 1 Pipe Chase A fire in Analysis Volume 1 could potentially affect systems and components necessary to maintain the Unit 1 and Unit 2 long term decay heat removal and steam generator inventory control functions and Unit 2 reactor coolant inventory control function. Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016, Appendix R - Units 1 & 2 Manual Action Requirements, as credited.
Offsite power is available. The required mitigating features include providing fire wrap (3-hour ERFBS) to selected cables to preclude damage to the Unit 1 and Unit 2 A RHR pump power cable in the event of a fire and manual operation of Unit 1 and Unit 2 equipment required for safe shutdown and post fire repairs. Operator Manual Actions (OMAs) are not required to mitigate fire in room 674.0-A1 per engineering evaluation in Part VII, section 3.1.1. These features and equipment affected and credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-28

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                            Revision 60 02a-VI-1A - AV-002 3.1.15.2        AV-002 Room No.                   Description 676.0-A2                   Holdup Tank Room A 676.0-A3                   Holdup Tank Room B 692.0-A1A1                 Corridor, Column Lines Q-U/A1-A4 692.0-A1A2                 Corridor, Column Lines S-T/A4-A5 692.0-A2                   Gas Decay Tank Valve Gallery 692.0-A3                   Gas Decay Tank Room 692.0-A4                   Chemical Drain Tank Room 692.0-A5                   Gas Decay Tank Room A fire in Analysis Volume 2 could potentially affect systems and components necessary to maintain the Unit 1 and Unit 2 long term decay heat removal, containment HVAC, steam generator inventory control and Unit 1 reactor coolant inventory control functions. Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Offsite power is available. The required mitigating features include manual operation of Unit 1 and Unit 2 equipment required for safe shutdown, post fire repairs, and providing fire wrap to selected Unit 1 cables to preclude damage in the event of a fire. These features and equipment affected and credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-29

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                          Revision 60 03a-VI-1A - AV-003 3.1.15.3        AV-003 Room No.                          Description 692.0-A1A2                        Corridor, Column Lines S-T/A4-A5 692.0-A1A3                        Corridor, Column Lines S-T/A5-A6 692.0-A1AN                        Corridor, Column Lines S-U/A6-A8 676.0-A2                          Holdup Tank Room A 676.0-A3                          Holdup Tank Room B A fire in AV-003 could potentially affect systems and components necessary to maintain the Unit 1 and Unit 2 long term decay heat removal, steam generator inventory control and reactor coolant inventory control functions and Unit 2 containment HVAC functions. Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shut down. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Offsite power is available. The required mitigating features include manual operation of Unit 1 and Unit 2 equipment required for safe shutdown, post fire repairs, and providing fire wrap to selected Unit 2 cables to preclude damage in the event of a fire. These features and equipment affected and credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-30

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                            Revision 60 04a-VI-1A - AV-004A 3.1.15.4        AV-004A Room No.                     Description 692.0-A1AN                   Corridor, Column Lines S-U/A6-A8 692.0-A1BN                   Corridor, Column Lines S-U/A8-A10 676.0-A2                     Holdup Tank Room A 676.0-A3                     Holdup Tank Room B AV-004 contains both RHR power feeds. Therefore, two separate analyses (AV-004A and AV-004B) are performed to address the use of either path depending upon on the location of the fire within this analysis volume. Only RHR Train A power feeds for both units are provided with a 1-hour fire barrier until a minimum of 20 feet of separation exists between trains. This is an exception to the general methodology of providing cable protection (ERFBS) from analysis volume boundary to analysis boundary as described in FPR Part III, Section 10.3.1. The Train A RHR pump power cable is protected such that there is greater than 20 feet of separation between the Train A and Train B RHR pump cables to ensure that a fire cannot damage the power cables for both pumps.
A fire in Analysis Volume 4A could potentially affect systems and components necessary to maintain the Unit 1 and Unit 2 long term decay heat removal, steam generator inventory control and reactor coolant inventory control functions and Unit 2 containment HVAC functions.
Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Offsite power is available.
The required mitigating features for Unit 1 and Unit 2 include providing fire wrap to preclude damage to the A RHR pump power cables in the event of a fire and manual operation of equipment required for safe shutdown and post fire repairs. These features and equipment affected and credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-31

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                            Revision 60 05a-VI-1A - AV-004B 3.1.15.5         AV-004B Room No.                      Description 692.0-A1AN                    Corridor, Column Lines S-U/A6-A8 692.0-A1BN                    Corridor, Column Lines S-U/A8-A10 676.0-A2                      Holdup Tank Room A 676.0-A3                      Holdup Tank Room B AV-004 contains both RHR power feeds. Therefore, two separate analyses (AV-004A and AV-004B) are performed to address the use of either path depending upon on the location of the fire within this volume. Only Unit 1 and Unit 2 RHR Train A power feeds are provided with a 1-hour fire barrier until a minimum of 20 feet of separation exists between trains. This is an exception to the general methodology of providing cable protection (ERFBS) from analysis volume boundary to analysis boundary as described in FPR Part III, Section 10.3.1. The Train A RHR pump power cable is protected such that there is greater than 20 feet of separation between the Train A and Train B RHR pump cables to ensure that a fire cannot damage the power cables for both pumps.
A fire in Analysis Volume 4B could potentially affect systems and components necessary to maintain the Unit 1 and Unit 2 long term decay heat removal, steam generator inventory control and reactor coolant inventory control functions and Unit 2 containment HVAC. Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Offsite power is available. The required mitigating features for Unit 1 and Unit 2 include providing fire wrap to preclude damage to the A RHR pump power cables in the event of a fire and manual operation of equipment required for safe shutdown and post fire repairs. These features and equipment affected and credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-32

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                            Revision 60 06a-VI-1A - AV-004AC 3.1.15.6        AV-004AC Room No.                    Description 692.0-A1AN                  Corridor, Column Lines S-U/A6-A8 692.0-A1BN                  Corridor, Column Lines S-U/A8-A10 692.0-A1C                   Corridor This AV is analyzed to address the interface between 692.0-A1C and 692.0-A1AN and 692.0-A1BN (i.e., to obtain 20 feet of separation on either side of Column Line U).
A fire in Analysis Volume 4AC could potentially affect systems and components necessary to maintain the Unit 1 and Unit 2 long term decay heat removal, steam generator inventory control and reactor coolant inventory control functions and Unit 2 containment HVAC functions.
Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Offsite power is available.
The required mitigating features for Unit 1 and Unit 2 include providing fire wrap to selected cables to preclude damage to the A RHR pump power cables in the event of a fire and manual operation of equipment required for safe shutdown and post fire repairs. AV-004 contains both RHR power feeds. Therefore, two separate analyses (AV-004AC and AV-004BC) are performed to address the use of either path depending upon the location of the fire within this analysis volume. The Train A RHR pump power feeds for both units are provided with a 1-hour fire barrier until more than 20 feet of separation exists between trains. This is an exception to the general methodology of providing cable protection (ERFBS) from analysis volume boundary to analysis boundary as described in FPR Part III, Section 10.3.1. The Train A RHR pump power cable is protected such that there is greater than 20 feet of separation between the Train A and Train B RHR pump cables to ensure that a fire cannot damage the power cables for both pumps. These features and equipment affected and credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-33

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                            Revision 60 07a-VI-1A - AV-004BC 3.1.15.7        AV-004BC Room No.                    Description 692.0-A1AN                  Corridor, Column Lines S-U/A6-A8 692.0-A1BN                  Corridor, Column Lines S-U/A8-A10 692.0-A1C                   Corridor This AV is analyzed to address the interface between 692.0-A1C and 692.0-A1AN and 692.0-A1BN (i.e., to obtain 20 feet of separation on either side of Column Line U).
A fire in Analysis Volume 4BC could potentially affect systems and components necessary to maintain the Unit 1 and Unit 2 long term decay heat removal, steam generator inventory control and reactor coolant inventory control functions and Unit 2 containment HVAC. Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited as credited. Offsite power is available. The required mitigating features for Unit 1 and Unit 2 include providing fire wrap to selected cables to preclude damage to the A RHR pump power cables in the event of a fire and manual operation of equipment required for safe shutdown and post fire repairs. AV-004 contains both RHR power feeds. Therefore, two separate analyses (AV-004AC and AV-004BC) are performed to address the use of either path depending upon the location of the fire within this analysis volume. The Train A RHR pump power feeds for both units are provided with a 1-hour fire barrier until more than 20 feet of separation exists between trains. This is an exception to the general methodology of providing cable protection (ERFBS) from analysis volume boundary to analysis boundary as described in FPR Part III, Section 10.3.1. The Train A RHR pump power cable is protected such that there is greater than 20 feet of separation between the Train A and Train B RHR pump cables to ensure that a fire cannot damage the power cables for both pumps. These features and equipment affected and credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-34

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                         Revision 60 08a-VI-1A - AV-005 3.1.15.8        AV-005 Room No.                Description 692.0-A1B1              Corridor, Col Lines S-T/A12-A13, S-U/A13-A14, Q-T/A14-A15 692.0-A1B2              Corridor, Col Lines S-T/A11-A12 692.0-A1B3              Corridor, Col Lines S-T/A10-A11 692.0-A1BN              Corridor, Column Lines S-U/A8-A10 692.0-A27               Concentrate Filter Room 692.0-A29               Boric Acid Evaporator Package Room B 692.0-A30               Boric Acid Evaporator Package Room A 692.0-A31               Spare 676.0-A2                Holdup Tank Room A 676.0-A3                Holdup Tank Room B A fire in Analysis Volume 5 could potentially affect systems and components necessary to maintain the Unit 1 and Unit 2 long term decay heat removal, steam generator inventory control and reactor coolant inventory control functions and Unit 2 containment HVAC functions.
Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Offsite power is available.
The required mitigating features for Unit 1 and Unit 2 include manual operation of equipment required for safe shutdown and repair procedures. Operator Manual Actions (OMAs) are not required to mitigate fire in rooms 692.0-A29 or 692.0-A30 per deviation in Part VII, section 2.9.
These features and equipment affected and credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-35

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                           Revision 60 09a-VI-1A - AV-006 3.1.15.9        AV-006 Room No.                    Description 692.0-A1C                   Corridor, Column Lines U-RxCL/A5-A11 692.0-A17                   Maintenance and Testing Equipment (M&TE) Hot Tool Room 692.0-A18                   Hot Tool Room A fire in Analysis Volume 6 could potentially affect systems and components necessary to maintain the Unit 1 and Unit 2 long term decay heat removal, Unit 2 reactor coolant inventory control functions, and steam generator inventory control functions. Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Offsite power is available. The required mitigating features for Unit 1 and Unit 2 include manual operation of equipment required for safe shutdown and repair procedures. These features and equipment affected and credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-36

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                          Revision 60 10a-VI-1A - AV-007 3.1.15.10       AV-007 Room No.                   Description 676.0-A8                   Containment Spray Pump 1B-B A fire in Analysis Volume 7 does not impact major equipment required to maintain safe shutdown functions. Shutdown for both units can be achieved by utilizing both train A and B systems and components without mitigating actions. Equipment credited to achieve shutdown is identified below:
VI-37

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                           Revision 60 11a-VI-1A - AV-008 3.1.15.11       AV-008 Room No.                   Description 676.0-A9                   Containment Spray Pump 1A-A A fire in Analysis Volume 8 could potentially affect systems and components necessary to maintain the Unit 1 long term decay heat removal functions however no mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Unit 2 major equipment required to maintain safe shutdown functions is not impacted such that shutdown can be achieved by utilizing both train A and B systems and components without mitigating actions. Offsite power is available. Equipment affected and credited to achieve shutdown are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016:
VI-38

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                          Revision 60 12a-VI-1A - AV-009 3.1.15.12       AV-009 Room No.                   Description 692.0-A9                   Charging Pump 1A-A A fire in Analysis Volume 9 could potentially affect systems and components necessary to maintain the Unit 1 reactor coolant inventory control functions however no mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Unit 2 major equipment required to maintain safe shutdown functions is not impacted such that shutdown can be achieved by utilizing both train A and B systems and components without mitigating actions. Offsite power is available. Equipment affected and credited to achieve shutdown are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016:
VI-39

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                        Revision 60 13a-VI-1A - AV-010 3.1.15.13       AV-010 Room No.              

== Description:==

692.0-A12              Safety Injection Pump 1B-B A fire in Analysis Volume 10 does not impact major equipment required to maintain safe shutdown functions. Shutdown for both units can be achieved by utilizing both train A and B systems and components without mitigating actions. Equipment credited to achieve shutdown is identified below:
VI-40

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                          Revision 60 14a-VI-1A - AV-011 3.1.15.14       AV-011 Room No.                   Description 692.0-A13                  Safety Injection Pump 1A-A A fire in Analysis Volume 11 could potentially affect systems and components necessary to maintain the Unit 1 long term decay heat removal. Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Offsite power is available. The required mitigating features include manual operation of Unit 1 equipment required for safe shutdown. These features and equipment affected and credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-41

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                           Revision 60 15a-VI-1A - AV-100 3.1.15.15       AV-100 Room No.                   Description 676.0-A14                  Containment Spray Pump 2A-A A fire in Analysis Volume 100 could potentially affect systems and components necessary to maintain the Unit 2 long term decay heat removal functions however no mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Unit 1 major equipment required to maintain safe shutdown functions is not impacted such that shutdown can be achieved by utilizing both train A and B systems and components without mitigating actions. Offsite power is available. Equipment credited to achieve shutdown is identified below:
VI-42

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                         Revision 60 16a-VI-1A - AV-101 3.1.15.16        AV-101 Room No.                    Description 676.0-A15                   Containment Spray Pump 2B-B A fire in Analysis Volume 101 could potentially affect systems and components necessary to maintain the Unit 2; however, no mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown below, as credited. Unit 1 major equipment required to maintain safe shutdown functions is not impacted such that shutdown can be achieved by utilizing both train A and B systems and components without mitigating actions. Offsite power is available. Equipment credited to achieve shutdown is identified below:
VI-43

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                             Revision 60 3.2             FIRE AREA 1-1 3.2.1           Room 692.0-A20

==
Description:==
Safety Injection Pump 2B-B Fire Loading: The combustibles consist of the lube oil in the pump and valves and plastics associated with electrical boxes and lights anticipated amounts of radwaste trash and laundry.
The fire severity is classified as insignificant.
Compartmentation: The pump room is bounded by regulatory fire barriers.
Barriers:
FPR Figure          Regulatory Room        Direction         Adjacent Area/Room Reference           Barrier Rating 692.0-A20   NORTH             AREA 1-2, ROOM 692.0-A19         II-28A              2 HOURS WALL EAST WALL         AREA 65, ROOM 692.0-A24          II-28A              2 HOURS SOUTH             AREA 1, ROOM 692.0-A1            II-28A              2 HOURS WALL AREA 66, ROOM 692.0-A21          II-28A              2 HOURS WEST WALL         AREA 1, ROOM 692.0-A1            II-28A              2 HOURS FLOOR             AREA 1, ROOM 676.0-A1            II-27A, II-28A      2 HOURS AREA 1, ROOM 676.0-A14           II-27A, II-28A      2 HOURS AREA 2-2, ROOM 676.0-A13         II-27A, II-28A      2 HOURS CEILING           AREA 8, ROOM 713.0-A16           II-28A, II-29A      2 HOURS AREA 8, ROOM 713.0-A17           II-28A, II-29A      2 HOURS AREA 65, ROOM 713.0-A29          II-28A, II-29A      2 HOURS Doors:
Door                                        FPR Figure Room                          Adjacent Area/Room                          Door Rating Number                                      Reference 692.0-A20   A40               AREA 1, 692.0-A1          II-28A             1.5 HOURS Dampers:
Damper/Mark                                    Drawing          Damper Room                                 Adjacent Area/Room Number                                         Reference        Rating 692.0-A20        2-ISD-31-3857       Area 65, Room 692.0-A24    47W866-11        1.5 47A381-394                                     47W920-2         HOURS Detection: Ionization smoke detectors are provided in this room.
Suppression: An automatic preaction sprinkler system is provided in this room. A standpipe and hose station is provided in the adjacent room (Corridor 692.0-A1).
Deviations: None.
Evaluations: None VI-44

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                      Revision 60 01a-VI-1B - AV-102 3.2.2           Fire Area 1-1 Safe Shutdown Analysis by Analysis Volume 3.2.2.1         AV-102 Room No.              

== Description:==

692.0-A20              Safety Injection Pump 2B-B A fire in Analysis Volume 102 does not impact major equipment required to maintain safe shutdown functions. Shutdown can be achieved by utilizing both train A and B systems and components without mitigating actions. Equipment credited to achieve shutdown is identified below:
VI-45

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                               Revision 60 3.3             FIRE AREA 1-2 3.3.1           Room 692.0-A19

==
Description:==
Safety Injection Pump 2A-A Fire Loading: The combustibles consist of the lube oil in the pump and valves and plastics associated with electrical boxes and lights anticipated amounts of radwaste trash and laundry.
The fire severity is classified as insignificant.
Compartmentation: The pump room is bounded by regulatory fire barriers.
Barriers:
FPR Figure        Regulatory Room        Direction         Adjacent Area/Room Reference         Barrier Rating 692.0-A19   North Wall        Area 1, Room 692.0-A1            II-28A            2 HOURS South Wall        Area 1-1, Room 692.0-A20         II-28A            2 HOURS East Wall         Area 65, Room 692.0-A24          II-28A            2 HOURS West Wall         Area 1, Room 692.0-A1            II-28A            2 HOURS Ceiling           Area 8, Room 713.0-A16           II-28A, II-29A    2 HOURS Floor             Area 1, Room 676.0-A1            II-27A, II-28A    2 HOURS Area 3-2, Room 676.0-A12         II-27A, II-28A    2 HOURS Area 2-2, Room 676.0-A13         II-27A, II-28A    2 HOURS Doors:
Door                                   FPR Figure Room                     Adjacent Area/Room                          Door Rating Number                                 Reference 692.0-A19      A39           Area 1, 692.0-A1           II-28A           1.5 HOURS Dampers:
Damper/Mark          Adjacent             Drawing Room                                                                  Damper Rating Number               Area/Room            Reference 692.0-A19    2-ISD-31-3856         Area 65, Room       47W866-11           1.5 HOURS 47A381-394            692.0-A24          47W920-2 Detection: Ionization smoke detectors are provided in this room.
Suppression: An automatic preaction sprinkler system is provided in this room. A standpipe and hose station is provided in the adjacent room (Corridor 692.0-A1).
Deviations: None.
Evaluations: None VI-46

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                         Revision 60 02a-VI-1B - AV-012 3.3.2           Fire Area 1-2 Safe Shutdown Analysis by Analysis Volume 3.3.2.1         AV-012 Room No.              

== Description:==

692.0-A19              Safety Injection Pump 2A-A A fire in Analysis Volume 12 could potentially affect Unit 2 systems and components necessary to maintain the long term decay heat removal function. Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Unit 1 major equipment required to maintain safe shutdown functions is not impacted such that shutdown can be achieved by utilizing both train A and B systems and components without mitigating actions. Offsite power is available. The required mitigating features include manual operation of Unit 2 equipment required for safe shutdown.
These features and equipment affected and credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-47

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                                Revision 60 3.4             FIRE AREA 2-1 3.4.1           Room 676.0-A10

==
Description:==
RHR Pump Room 1B-B Fire Loading: The combustibles consists of lube oil associated with the RHR pump and valve, small amounts of plastics associated with lights and a control panel and anticipated amounts of radwaste trash and laundry. The fire severity is classified as insignificant.
Compartmentation: The pump room is constructed of reinforced concrete.
Barriers:
FPR Figure         Regulatory Room         Direction       Adjacent Area/Room Reference          Barrier Rating 676.0-A10    NORTH WALL      AREA 3-1, ROOM 676.0-A11        II-27A             2 HOURS SOUTH WALL      AREA 1, ROOM 676.0-A9           II-27A             2 HOURS EAST WALL       AREA 1, ROOM 676.0-A1           II-27A             2 HOURS WEST WALL       AREA 1, ROOM 676.0-A16          II-27A             2 HOURS CEILING         AREA 1, ROOM 692.0-A12          II-27A, II-28A     2 HOURS AREA 1, ROOM 692.0-A13          II-27A, II-28A     2 HOURS Doors:
Door                                   FPR Figure Room                     Adjacent Area/Room                             Door Rating Number                                 Reference 676.0-A10    A5          AREA 1, ROOM 676.0-A1        II-27A             1.5 HOURS Dampers:
Damper/Mark                                  Drawing          Damper Room                           Adjacent Area/Room Number                                       Reference        Rating 676.0-A10     1-ISD-31-3777    AREA 1, ROOM 676.0-A16      47W866-2         1.5 HOURS 47A381-391                                   47W920-1 Detection: Ionization smoke detectors are provided (except in the entrance labyrinth).
(See Note below)
Suppression: No automatic suppression is provided. A standpipe and hose station is provided in the adjacent room (corridor 676.0-A1). (See Note below)
Deviations: None.
Evaluations: None VI-48

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                           Revision 60 Note: Although this area is not provided with suppression or full area detection, fire barrier ratings are sufficient given the combustible loadings in the area. This is a separate fire area which does not contain redundant safe shutdown equipment. Therefore, a fire in this area will not endanger other safety related equipment required for safe plant shutdown. Refer to Paragraph F.11 of Part VIII of the FPR for information on conformance to Appendix A guidelines regarding this issue.
VI-49

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                         Revision 60 03a-VI-1B - AV-013 3.4.2           Fire Area 2-1 Safe Shutdown Analysis by Analysis Volume 3.4.2.1         AV-013 Room No.              

== Description:==

676.0-A10              RHR Pump Room 1B-B A fire in Analysis Volume 13 could potentially affect Unit 1 systems and components necessary to maintain the long term decay heat removal function. Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Unit 2 major equipment required to maintain safe shutdown functions is not impacted such that shutdown can be achieved by utilizing both Train A and B systems and components without mitigating actions. Offsite power is available. The required mitigating features include manual operation of Unit 1 equipment required for safe shutdown.
These features and equipment affected and credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-50

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                            Revision 60 3.5             FIRE AREA 2-2 3.5.1           Room 676.0-A13

==
Description:==
RHR Pump Room 2B-B Fire Loading: The combustibles in this room consist of lube oil associated with the RHR pump and valve and small amounts of plastics associated with lights and a control panel. The fire severity is classified as insignificant.
Compartmentation: The pump room is constructed of reinforced concrete.
Barriers:
FPR Figure       Regulatory Room         Direction         Adjacent Area/Room Reference        Barrier Rating 676.0-A13    NORTH WALL        AREA 3-2, ROOM 676.0-A12         II-27A          2-HOURS SOUTH WALL        AREA 1, ROOM 676.0-A14          II-27A           2 HOURS EAST WALL         AREA 65, ROOM 676.0-A17         II-27A           2 HOURS WEST WALL         AREA 1, ROOM 676.0-A1           II-27A           2 HOURS CEILING           AREA 1-2, ROOM 692.0-A19        II-27A, 2-28A    2 HOURS AREA 1-1, ROOM 692.0-A20        II-27A, 2-28A    2 HOURS Doors:
Door                                     FPR Figure      Door Room                          Adjacent Area/Room Number                                   Reference       Rating 676.0-A13      A9             Area 1, Room 676.0-A1     II-27A           1.5 Hours Dampers:
Damper/Mark                                    Drawing          Damper Room                              Adjacent Area/Room Number                                         Reference        Rating 676.0-A13     2-ISD-31-3853       Area 65, Room 676.0-A17    47W866-11        1.5 Hours 47A381-391                                     47W920-1 Detection: The pump room is provided with ionization smoke detectors (except in the entrance labyrinth). (See note below)
Suppression: No automatic suppression is provided. A standpipe and hose station is provided in the adjacent room (corridor 676.0-A1). (See note below)
Deviations: None.
Evaluations: None.
Note: Although this area is not provided with suppression and full area detection, as suggested by Appendix A, Section F.11, fire barrier ratings are sufficient given the combustible loadings in the area. This is a separate fire area which does not contain redundant safe shutdown equipment. Therefore, a fire in this area will not endanger other safety related equipment required for safe plant shutdown. Refer to Paragraph F.11 of Part VIII of the FPR for information on conformance to Appendix A regarding this issue.
VI-51

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                          Revision 60 04a-VI-1B - AV-014 3.5.2           Fire Area 2-2 Safe Shutdown Analysis by Analysis Volume 3.5.2.1         AV-014 Room No.              

== Description:==

676.0-A13              RHR Pump Room 2B-B A fire in Analysis Volume 14 could potentially affect Unit 2 long term decay heat removal functions through loss of Unit 2 Train B RHR but does not otherwise impact major equipment required to maintain safe shutdown functions. Offsite power is available. Shutdown for Unit 1 and Unit 2 can be achieved by utilizing remaining Train A and B systems and components without mitigating actions. Equipment credited to achieve shutdown is identified below:
VI-52

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                               Revision 60 3.6            FIRE AREA 3-1 3.6.1          Room 676.0-A11

==
Description:==
RHR Pump Room 1A-A Fire Loading: The combustibles consist of lube oil associated with the RHR pump and valve, small amounts of plastics associated with lights and a control panel and anticipated amounts of radwaste trash and laundry. The fire severity is classified as insignificant.
Compartmentation:
The pump room is constructed of reinforced concrete.
Barriers:
FPR Figure         Regulatory Room         Direction       Adjacent Area/Room Reference          Barrier Rating 676.0-A11    North Wall      AREA 1, ROOM 674.0-A1            II-27A             2 Hours South Wall      AREA 2-1, ROOM 676.0-A10         II-27A             2 Hours East Wall       AREA 1, ROOM 676.0-A1            II-27A             2 Hours West Wall       AREA 1, ROOM 676.0-A16           II-27A             2 Hours Ceiling         AREA 1, ROOM 692.0-A13           II-27A, II-28A     2 Hours AREA 1, ROOM 692.0-A1            II-27A, II-28A     2 Hours Doors:
Door                                 FPR Figure Room                        Adjacent Area/Room                           Door Rating Number                               Reference 676.0-A11         A6        Area 1, Room 676.0-A1      II-27A             1.5 HOURS Dampers:
Damper/Mark                                   Drawing          Damper Room                             Adjacent Area/Room Number                                        Reference        Rating 676.0-A11      1-ISD-31-3778     Area 1, Room 676.0-A16      47W866-2         1.5 47A381-391                                    47W920-1         HOURS Detection: Ionization smoke detectors are provided (except in the entrance labyrinth). (See Note below)
Suppression: No automatic suppression is provided. A standpipe and hose station is provided in the adjacent room (Corridor 676.0-A1). (See Note below)
Deviations: None.
Evaluations: None.
VI-53

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                           Revision 60 Note: Although this area is not provided with suppression or full area detection, fire barrier ratings are sufficient given the combustible loadings in the area. This is a separate fire area which does not contain redundant safe shutdown equipment. Therefore, a fire in this area will not endanger other safety related equipment required for safe plant shutdown. Refer to Paragraph F.11 of Part VIII of the FPR for information on conformance to Appendix A guidelines regarding this issue.
VI-54

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                          Revision 60 05a-VI-1B - AV-015 3.6.2           Fire Area 3-1 Safe Shutdown Analysis by Analysis Volume 3.6.2.1         AV-015 Room No.              

== Description:==

676.0-A11              RHR Pump Room 1A-A A fire in Analysis Volume 15 could potentially affect Unit 1 long term heat decay removal functions through the loss of Unit 1 Train A RHR but does not otherwise impact major equipment required to maintain safe shutdown functions. Offsite power is available. Shutdown for Unit 1 and Unit 2 can be achieved by utilizing remaining Train A and B systems and components without mitigating actions. Equipment credited to achieve shutdown is identified below:
VI-55

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                           Revision 60 3.7              FIRE AREA 3-2 3.7.1            Room 676.0-A12

==
Description:==
RHR Pump Room 2A-A Fire Loading: The combustibles in this room consist of lube oil associated with the RHR pump and valve and small amounts of plastics associated with lights. The fire severity is classified as insignificant.
Compartmentation: The pump room is constructed of reinforced concrete.
Barriers:
FPR Figure       Regulatory Room          Direction         Adjacent Area/Room Reference        Barrier Rating 676.0-A12     NORTH WALL        AREA 1, ROOM 674.0-A2       II-27A           2 HOURS AREA 1, ROOM 676.0-A1       II-27A           2 HOURS SOUTH WALL        AREA 2-2, ROOM 676.0-A13    II-27A           2 HOURS EAST WALL         AREA 65, ROOM 676.0-A17     II-27A           2 HOURS WEST WALL         AREA 1, ROOM 676.0-A1       II-27A           2 HOURS CEILING           AREA 1-2, ROOM 692.0-A19    II-27A, II-28A   2 HOURS AREA 1, ROOM 692.0-A1       II-27A, II-28A   2 HOURS Doors:
Door                               FPR Figure Room                        Adjacent Area/Room                         Door Rating Number                             Reference 676.0-A12         A8        AREA 1, ROOM 676.0-A1    II-27A            1.5 HOURS Dampers:
Damper/Mark                                 Drawing         Damper Room                             Adjacent Area/Room Number                                      Reference       Rating 676.0-A12       2-ISD-31-3852    AREA 65, ROOM 676.0-       47W866-11       1.5 47A381-391       A17                        47W920-1        HOURS Detection: The pump room is provided with ionization smoke detectors (except in the entrance labyrinth). (See note below)
Suppression: No automatic suppression is provided. A standpipe and hose station is provided in the adjacent room (Corridor 676.0-A1). (See note below)
Deviations: None.
Evaluations: None.
VI-56

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                            Revision 60 Note: Although this area is not provided with suppression and full area detection, as suggested by Appendix A, Section F.11, fire barrier ratings are sufficient given the combustible loadings in the area. This is a separate fire area which does not contain redundant safe shutdown equipment. Therefore, a fire in this area will not endanger other safety related equipment required for safe plant shutdown. Refer to Paragraph F.11 of Part VIII of the FPR for information on conformance to Appendix A regarding this issue.
VI-57

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                          Revision 60 06a-VI-1B - AV-016 3.7.2           Fire Area 3-2 Safe Shutdown Analysis by Analysis Volume 3.7.2.1         AV-016 Room No.              

== Description:==

676.0-A12              RHR Pump Room 2A-A A fire in Analysis Volume 16 could potentially affect Unit 2 long term decay heat removal functions through the loss of Unit 2 Train A RHR but does not otherwise impact major equipment required to maintain safe shutdown functions. Offsite power is available. Shutdown for Unit 1 and Unit 2 can be achieved by utilizing remaining Train A and B systems and components without mitigating actions. Equipment credited to achieve shutdown is identified below:
VI-58

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                               Revision 60 3.8              FIRE AREA 4 3.8.1            Room 692.0-A6

==
Description:==
Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1A-S Fire Loading: The combustibles consists of lube oil associated with the feedwater pump, turbine, oil cooler, 2 sump pumps, and 5 valves and various amounts of plastics associated with electrical panels and lights. The fire severity is classified as insignificant.
Compartmentation: The Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room is of reinforced concrete construction.
Barriers:
FPR Figure      Regulatory Room             Direction        Adjacent Area/Room Reference       Barrier Rating 692.0-A6         North Wall       Area 5, Room 692.0-A7          II-28A         2 Hours South and East   Area 1, Room 692.0-A1          II-28A         2 Hours Walls and Ceiling Doors:
Door                                      FPR Figure Room                      Adjacent Area/Room                            Door Rating Number                                    Reference 692.0-A6      A25         AREA 1, ROOM 692.0-A1         II-28A          1.5 HOURS Dampers:
Damper/Mark                                       Drawing        Damper Room                            Adjacent Area/Room Number                                            Reference      Rating 692.0-A6      1-ISD-31-3779     AREA 1, ROOM 692.0-A1           47W866-2       3 HRS 47A381-479F                                       47W920-2 1-ISD-31-3780     AREA 1, ROOM 692.0-A1           47W866-2       1.5 HRS 47A381-392                                        47W920-2 1-ISD-31-3782     AREA 1, ROOM 692.0-A1           47W866-2       3 HRS 47A381-647F                                       47W920-2 1-ISD-31-3967     AREA 1, ROOM 692.0-A1           47W866-2       3 HRS 47A381-131F                                       47W920-2 1-ISD-31-3783     AREA 1, ROOM 692.0-A1           47W866-2       3 HRS 47A381-647F                                       47W920-2 Detection: Ionization smoke detectors are provided in the pump room.
Suppression: An automatic preaction sprinkler system is provided. A standpipe and hose station is provided in the adjacent room (Corridor 692.0-A1).
Deviations: None.
Evaluations: None.
VI-59

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                         Revision 60 07a-VI-1B - AV-017 3.8.2           Fire Area 4 Safe Shutdown Analysis by Analysis Volume 3.8.2.1         AV-017 Room No.              

== Description:==

692.0-A6               Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1A-S A fire in Analysis Volume 17 could potentially affect Unit 1 systems and components used to maintain steam generator inventory control functions by affecting the Unit 1 Turbine-Driven AFW pump. Safe shutdown for Unit 1 and Unit 2 can be achieved through the remaining train A and B systems and components without mitigating actions. Offsite power is available. These features and equipment affected and credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-60

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                               Revision 60 3.9            FIRE AREA 5 3.9.1          Room 692.0-A7

==
Description:==
Unit 1 Penetration RM Fire Loading: The combustibles located in the room consist of the lube oil and grease associated with the fans, pumps, and valves and the plastics associated with the electrical panels and boxes and lights. The fire severity is classified as insignificant.
Compartmentation: The room is of reinforced concrete construction.
Barriers:
FPR Figure       Regulatory Room         Direction          Adjacent Area/Room Reference        Barrier Rating 692.0-A7     NORTH WALL         Area 61, Reactor Building        II-28A           3 hours SOUTH WALL         AREA 1, ROOM 692.0-A1            II-28A           2 HOURS AREA 1, ROOM 692.0-A9            II-28A           2 HOURS AREA 1, ROOM 692.0-A8*           II-28A           2 HOURS AREA 4. ROOM 692.0-A6            II-28A           2 HOURS 692.0-A7     EAST WALL          AREA 1, ROOM 692.0-A1            II-28A           2 HOURS (continued)                     AREA 1, ROOM 692, 0-A8*          II-28A           2 HOURS CEILING            AREA 1, ROOM 713.0-A28           II-28A, II-29A   2 HOURS AREA 9, ROOM 713.0-A6            II-28A, II-29A   2 HOURS AREA 9-1, ROOM 713.0-A7          II-28A, II-29A   2 HOURS FLOOR (Partial)    AREA 1, ROOM 676.0-A16           II-28A           2 HOURS
(*ENTRANCE LABYRINTH WALLS AND CEILING)
Doors:
Door                                    FPR Figure Room                       Adjacent Area/Room                          Door Rating Number                                  Reference 692.0-A7       A26         Area 1, Room 692.0-A1       II-28A           1.5 Hours A27         Area 1, Room 692.0-A8       II-28A           1.5 Hours Dampers:
Damper/Mark                                      Drawing           Damper Room                          Adjacent Area/Room Number                                           Reference         Rating 692.0-A7    1-ISD-31-3801     AREA 1, ROOM 676.0-A16         47W866-8          3 HOURS 47A381-442F                                      47W920-2, 18 1-ISD-31-3802     AREA 1, ROOM 692.0-A1          47W866-2          3 HOURS 47A381-393F                                      47W920-2 1-ISD-31-3925     AREA 9, ROOM 713.0-A6          47W866-8          3 HOURS 47A381-397F                                      47W920-2, 4 1-ISD-31-3988     AREA 1, ROOM 692.0-A8          47W866-2          3 HOURS 47A381-619F                                      47W920-2 Detection: Ionization smoke detection is provided in the room except for the RHR Valve Vault.
Suppression: An automatic, preaction suppression system is provided for the room except for the RHR Valve Vault. A standpipe and hose station is provided in the adjacent room (Corridor 692.0-A1).
VI-61

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                           Revision 60 Deviations: None.
Evaluations: The lack of detection and suppression in the RHR Valve Vault is documented in Part VII, section 3.1.1.a. The Unit 1 evaluation for performing a manual action in the room of fire origin is documented in Part VII, section 7.1.3.1.
VI-62

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                         Revision 60 08a-VI-1B - AV-018 3.9.2           Fire Area 5 Safe Shutdown Analysis by Analysis Volume 3.9.2.1         AV-018 Room No.               

== Description:==

692.0-A7                Unit 1 Penetration RM A fire in Analysis Volume 18 could potentially affect Unit 1 systems and components necessary to maintain the long term decay heat removal, steam generator inventory control, reactor coolant inventory control and containment HVAC functions. Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Unit 2 major equipment required to maintain safe shutdown functions is not impacted such that shutdown can be achieved by utilizing both train A and B systems and components without mitigating actions. Offsite power is available. The required mitigating features for Unit 1 include manual operation of equipment required for safe shutdown.
These features and equipment affected and credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-63

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                              Revision 60 3.10            FIRE AREA 6 3.10.1          Room 692.0-A10

==
Description:==
Charging Pump Room 1B-B Fire Loading: The combustibles consist of the lube oil in the charging pump and plastics associated with lights and a junction box and anticipated amounts of radwaste trash and laundry. The fire severity is classified as low.
Compartmentation: The pump room is bounded by regulatory fire barriers.
Barriers:
FPR Figure      Regulatory Room          Direction          Adjacent Area/Room Reference       Barrier Rating 692.0-A10     NORTH WALL         AREA 1, ROOM 692.0-A8         II-28A          2 HOURS AREA 7, ROOM 692.0-A11        II-28A          2 HOURS SOUTH WALL         AREA 1, ROOM 692.0-A1         II-28A          2 HOURS EAST WALL          AREA 7, ROOM 692.0-A11        II-28A          2 HOURS AREA 1, ROOM 692-A1           II-28A          2 HOURS WEST WALL          AREA 1, ROOM 692.0-A9         II-28A          2 HOURS CEILING            AREA 8, ROOM 713.0-A1         II-28A, II-29A  2 HOURS AREA 8, ROOM 713.0-A9         II-28A, II-29A  2 HOURS FLOOR (partial)    AREA 1, ROOM 676.0-A16        II-27A, II-28A  2 HOURS Doors:
Door                                    FPR Figure Room                         Adjacent Area/Room                         Door Rating Number                                  Reference 692.0-A10       A29          Area 1, Room 692.0-A1      II-28A           1.5 HOURS Dampers:
Damper/Mark                                    Drawing        Damper Room                                 Adjacent Area/Room Number                                         Reference      Rating 692.0-A10       1-ISD-31-3799        Area 1, Room 692.0-A8     47W866-2       1.5 HOURS 47A381-394                                     47W920-2 Detection: Ionization smoke detectors are provided in the room (except in the entrance labyrinth). (See Note below)
Suppression: An automatic preaction sprinkler system is provided in the room (except in the entrance labyrinth). A standpipe and hose station is provided in the adjacent room (Corridor 692.0-A1). (See Note below)
Deviations: None.
Evaluations: The lack of total area suppression and detection in the entrance labyrinth is addressed in the Centrifugal Charging Pump discussion in Part VI, Section 3.1.1 for Fire Area 1.
The Unit 1 evaluation for performing a manual action in the room of fire origin is documented in Part VII, Section 7.1.3.1. The use of a stacked block wall between rooms 692.0-A1 and 692.0-A10 is evaluated in Part VII, Section 3.6.
VI-64

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                            Revision 60 Note: Although this area is not provided with full area detection and suppression, as suggested by Appendix a guideline, Section F.11, fire barrier ratings are sufficient given the combustible loadings in the area. This is a separate fire area which does not contain redundant safe shutdown equipment. Therefore, a fire in this area will not endanger other safety related equipment required for safe plant shutdown. Refer to Paragraph F.11 of Part VIII of the FPR for information on conformance to Appendix A regarding this issue.
VI-65

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                       Revision 60 09a-VI-1B - AV-019 3.10.2           Fire Area 6 Safe Shutdown Analysis by Analysis Volume 3.10.2.1         AV-019 Room No.               

== Description:==

692.0-A10               Charging Pump Room 1B-B A fire in Analysis Volume 19 could potentially affect systems and components necessary to maintain the Unit 1 long term decay heat removal and reactor coolant inventory control functions through the loss of Unit 1 Train B RHR and Charging pumps. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Offsite power is available. Unit 2 major equipment required to maintain safe shutdown functions is not impacted such that shutdown can be achieved by utilizing both train A and B systems and components. The required mitigating features include manual operation of Unit 1 equipment. Equipment credited to achieve shutdown is identified below:
VI-66

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                                Revision 60 3.11            FIRE AREA 7 3.11.1          Room 692.0-A11

==
Description:==
Charging Pump Room 1C Fire Loading: The combustibles consist of the lube oil in the charging pump and a valve; plastics associated with lights and a junction box and anticipated amounts of radwaste trash and laundry. The fire severity is classified as low.
Compartmentation: The pump room is bounded by regulatory fire barriers.
Barriers:
FPR Figure        Regulatory Room           Direction        Adjacent Area/Room Reference         Barrier Rating 692.0-A11      North Wall       Area 1, Room 692.0-A8             II-28A            2 hours Area 1, Room 692.0-A12            II-28A            2 hours South Wall       Area 1, Room 692.0-A1             II-28A            2 hours Area 6, Room 692.0-A10            II-28A            2 hours East Wall        Area 1, Room 692.0-A1             II-28A            2 hours West Wall        Area 6, Room 692.0-A10            II-28A            2 hours Ceiling          Area 1, Room 692.0-A1*            II-28A, II-29A    2 hours Area 8, Room 713.0-A1             II-28A, II-29A    2 hours Floor            Area 1, Room 676.0-A8             II-27A, II-28A    2 hours Area 1, Room 676.0-A9             II-27A, II-28A    2 hours Area 1, Room 676.0-A16            II-27A, II-28A    2 hours
(*Entrance Labyrinth Ceiling)
Doors:
Door                                     FPR Figure      Door Room                       Adjacent Area/Room Number                                   Reference       Rating 692.0-A11       A30        Area 1, Room 692.0-A1         II-28A          1.5 hours Dampers:
Damper/Mark                                     Drawing          Damper Room                               Adjacent Area/Room Number                                          Reference        Rating 692.0-A11       1-ISD-31-3798      Area 1, Room 692.0-A8        47W866-2         1.5 hrs 47A381-394                                      47W920-2 Detection: Ionization smoke detectors are provided in the room (except in the entrance labyrinth). (See Note below)
Suppression: An automatic preaction sprinkler system is provided in the room (except in the entrance labyrinth). A standpipe and hose station is provided in the adjacent room (Corridor 692.0-A1). (See Note below)
Deviations: None.
VI-67

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                            Revision 60 Evaluations: None.
Note: Although this area is not provided with full area detection and suppression, per the guidelines of Appendix A, Section F.11, fire barrier ratings are sufficient given the combustible loadings in the area. This is a separate fire area which does not contain redundant safe shutdown equipment. Therefore, a fire in this area will not endanger other safety related equipment required for safe plant shutdown. Refer to Section F.11 of Part VIII of the FPR for information on conformance to Appendix A regarding this issue.
VI-68

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                        Revision 60 10a-VI-1B - AV-020 3.11.2           Fire Area 7 Safe Shutdown Analysis by Analysis Volume 3.11.2.1         AV-020 Room No.               

== Description:==

692.0-A11               Charging Pump Room 1C A fire in Analysis Volume 20 does not impact major equipment required to maintain safe shutdown functions. Shutdown for both units can be achieved by utilizing both train A and B systems and components without mitigating actions. Equipment credited to achieve shutdown is identified below:
VI-69

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                             Revision 60 3.12             FIRE AREA 8 Fire Area 8 consists of several rooms on Auxiliary Building Elevation 713.0.
3.12.1           Rooms 713.0-A1, A9, A10, A17, A18, A22, A23, A24, A25, A26 and A27 Room No.                

== Description:==

713.0-A1                 Auxiliary Building Subdivided into 713.0-A1A (713-A1A1, -A1A2, -A1A3, -
A1A4, A1AN), -A1B (713-A1BN) and -A1C 713.0-A9                 Unit 1 Mixed Bed and Cation Valve Gallery 713.0-A10                Seal Water Heat Exchanger 1A 713.0-A17                Seal Water Heat Exchanger 2A 713.0-A18                Unit 2 Mixed Bed and Cation Valve Gallery 713.0-A22                Holdup Tank Valve Gallery 713.0-A23                CVCS Valve Gallery 713.0-A24                Waste Gas Compressor Valve Gallery 713.0-A25                Waste Gas Compressor B 713.0-A26                Waste Gas Compressor A 713.0-A27                Decontamination Room Fire Loading: The fire severity for rooms 713.0-A9, A17, A18, A23, and A24 is classified as insignificant. The combustibles in room 713.0-A1 consist of lube oil in the pumps, motors, and valves, ERFBS Thermo-Lag plastics associated with the electrical panels, boxes and lights, insulation on cables routed in cable trays and anticipated amounts of radwaste trash and laundry and other miscellaneous combustibles. The fire severity for this room is classified as moderately severe. The combustibles in rooms 713.0-A10 and A22 consist of anticipated amounts of radwaste trash and laundry. Rooms 713.0-A25 and A26 have combustibles consisting of lube oil in compressors, plastics associated with electrical panels, equipment, light covers and radwaste/laundry. Room 713.0-A27 has combustibles consisting of plastics associated with electrical panels, equipment, light covers, trash, and temporary shielding blankets. The fire severity for all of these rooms is classified as low.
Compartmentation: Room 713.0-A1 has been subdivided into 713.0-A1A (column lines A1-A8/Q-U), 713.0-A1B (A8-A15/Q-U), and 713.0-A1C (A7-A9/U-W), each of which is identified in the tabular listing of regulatory barriers. All of these rooms are of reinforced concrete construction.
Barriers:
FPR Figure      Regulatory Room             Direction          Adjacent Area/Room Reference       Barrier Rating 713.0-A1A        North Wall         Area 1, Room 713.0-A28          II-29A          2 Hours Area 8, Room 713.0-A11          II-29A          2 Hours Area 8, Room 713.0-A30          II-29A          3 Hours Area 9, Room 713.0-A6           II-29A          2 Hours Area 9-1, Room 713.0-A7         II-29A          2 Hours Area 10, Elevator Shaft         II-29A          2 Hours Area 12, Room 729.0-A1          II-29A, II-30A  2 Hours South Wall         Area 8, Room 713.0-A30          II-29A          3 Hours Area 10, Elevator Shaft         II-29A          2 Hours Area 48, Room 708.0-C1          II-29A, II-33A  3 Hours Area 48, Room 708.0-C3          II-33A          3 Hours Area 48, Room 729.0-C1          II-29A, II-34A  3 Hours VI-70

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                     Revision 60 Barriers:
FPR Figure     Regulatory Room      Direction    Adjacent Area/Room Reference      Barrier Rating Area 63, Turbine Building II-29A, II-33A 3 Hours East Wall    Area 10, Elevator Shaft   II-29A         2 Hours West Wall    Area 8, Room 713.0-A2     II-29A         3 Hours Area 8, Room 713.0-A3     II-29A         3 Hours Area 8, Room 713.0-A4     II-29A         3 Hours Area 8, Room 713.0-A5     II-29A         3 Hours Area 8, Room 713.0-A30    II-29A         3 Hours Ceiling      Area 14, Room 737.0-A1    II-29A, II-30A 2 Hours Area 14, Room 737.0-A2    II-29A, II-30A 2 Hours Area 14, Room 737.0-A4    II-29A, II-30A 2 Hours Area 15-1, Room 737.0-A3  II-29A, II-30A 2 Hours Floor        Area 1, Room 692.0-A1     II-28A, II-29A 2 Hours Area 1, Room 676.0-A2     II-28A, II-29A 2 Hours Area 1, Room 676.0-A3     II-28A, II-29A 2 Hours Area 1, Room 692.0-A2     II-28A, II-29A 2 Hours Area 1, Room 692.0-A3     II-28A, II-29A 2 Hours Area 1, Room 692.0-A5     II-28A, II-29A 2 Hours Area 1, Room 692.0-A9     II-28A, II-29A 2 Hours Area 6, Room 692.0-A10    II-28A, II-29A 2 Hours Area 7, Room 692.0-A11    II-28A, II-29A 2 Hours 713.0-A1B North Wall   Area 8, Room 713.0-A16    II-29A         2 Hours Area 71, Room 713.0-A19   II-29A         2 Hours Area 71-1, Room 713.0-A20 II-29A         2 Hours Area 65, Room 713.0-A29   II-29A         2 Hours Area 10, Elevator Shaft   II-29A         2 Hours South Wall   Area 48, Room 708.0-C3    II-29A, II-33A 3 Hours Area 48, Room 708.0-C4    II-29A, II-33A 3 Hours Area 48, Room 729.0-C1    II-29A, II-34A 3 Hours Area 63, Turbine Building II-29A, II-33A 3 Hours II-34A West Wall    Area 10, Elevator Shaft   II-29A         2 Hours Ceiling      Area 15-2, Room 737.0-A12 II-29A, II-30A 2 Hours Area 14, Room 737.0-A11   II-29A, II-30A 2 Hours Area 14, Room 737.0-A1    II-29A, II-30A 2 Hours Floor        Area 1, Room 676.0-A3     II-28A, II-29A 2 Hours Area 1, Room 692.0-A1     II-28A, II-29A 2 Hours Area 66, Room 692.0-A21   II-28A, II-29A 2 Hours Area 67, Room 692.0-A22   II-28A, II-29A 2 Hours Area 68, Room 692.0-A23   II-28A, II-29A 2 Hours Area 1, Room 692.0-A27    II-28A, II-29A 2 Hours Area 1, Room 692.0-A29    II-28A, II-29A 2 Hours Area 1, Room 692.0-A30    II-28A, II-29A 2 Hours Area 1, Room 692.0-A31    II-28A, II-29A 2 Hours VI-71

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                     Revision 60 Barriers:
FPR Figure     Regulatory Room      Direction           Adjacent Area/Room Reference      Barrier Rating 713.0-A1C North Wall          Area 8, Room 713.0-A12    II-29A         2 Hours Area 8, Room 713.0-A15    II-29A         2 Hours East Wall           Area 8, Room 713.0-A15    II-29A         2 Hours Area 8, Room 713.0-A16    II-29A         2 Hours West Wall           Area 8, Room 713.0-A11    II-29A         2 Hours Area 8, Room 713.0-A12    II-29A         2 Hours Ceiling             Area 14, Room 737.0-A1    II-29A, II-30A 2 Hours Floor               Area 1, Room 692.0-A1     II-28A, II-29  2 Hours Area 1, Room 692.0-A17    II-28A, II-29A 2 Hours 713.0-A9  North Wall          Area 9, Room 713.0-A7     II-29A         2 Hours Floor               Area 1, Room 692.0-A9     II-28A, II-29A 2 Hours Area 6, Room 692.0-A10    II-28A, II-29A 2 Hours 713.0-A10 North and           Area 8, Room 713.0-A11    II-29A         2 Hours East Walls West Wall           Area 1, Room 713.0-A28    II-29A         2 Hours Floor               Area 1, Room 692.0-A1     II-28A, II-29A 2 Hours Area 1, Room 692.0-A12    II-28A, II-29A 2 Hours Area 7, Room 692.0-A11    II-28A, II-29A 2 Hours Ceiling             Area 14, Room 737.0-A1    II-29A, II-30A 2 Hours (partial)           Area 14, Room 737.0-A7    II-29A, II-30A 2 Hours 713.0-A17 North and West      Area 8, Room 713.0-A16    II-29A         2 Hours Walls East Wall           Area 65, Room 713.0-A29   II-29A         2 Hours Floor               Area 1, Room 692.0-A1     II-28A, II-29A 2 Hours Area 1-1, Room 692.0-A20  II-28A, II-29A 2 Hours Area 66, Room 692.0-A21   II-28A, II-29A 2 Hours Ceiling (partial)   Area 14, Room 737.0-A1    II-29A         2 Hours Area 14, Room 737.0-A8    II-30A         2 Hours 713.0-A18 North Wall          Area 71-1, Room 713.0-A20 II-29A         2 Hours Floor               Area 67, Room 692.0-A22   II-28A, II-29A 2 Hours Area 68, Room 692.0-A23   II-28A, II-29A 2 Hours 713.0-A22 Floor               Area 1, Room 676.0-A3     II-28A, II-29A 2 Hours 713.0-A23 Floor               Area 1, Room 676.0-A2     II-28A, II-29A 2 Hours Area 1, Room 676.0-A3     II-28A, II-29A 2 Hours Area 1, Room 692.0-A31    II-28A, II-29A 2 Hours VI-72

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                    Revision 60 Doors:
Door                                FPR Figure Room                  Adjacent Area/Room                       Door Rating Number                              Reference 713.0-A1A    A57      Air Lock, Room 713.0-A2    II-29A          3 Hours A60      Area 8, Room 713.0-A30     II-29A          3 Hours A62      Area 9, Room 713.0-A6      II-29A        1.5 Hours 713.0-A1B    A75      Area 71, Room 713.0-A19    II-29A        1.5 Hours 713.0-A1C    A68      Area 8, 713.0-A11          II-29A        1.5 Hours A69      Area 8, 713.0-A12          II-29A        1.5 Hours A71      Area 8, 713.0-A15          II-29A        1.5 Hours A72      Area 8, 713.0-A16          II-29A        1.5 Hours Dampers:
Damper/Mark                                   Drawing      Damper Room                       Adjacent Area/Room Number                                        Reference    Rating 713.0-A1A 1-ISD-31-3803    Area 15-1, Room 737.0-A3     47W866-2     3 Hours 47A381-443F                                   47W920-18 1-ISD-31-3804    Area 9, Room 713.0-A6        47W866-2     3 Hours 47A381-400F                                   47W920-4 1-ISD-31-3995    Area 1, Room 692.0-A1        47W866-2     3 Hours 47A381-651F                                   47W920-18 1-ISD-31-3996    Area 14, Room 737.0-A1       47W866-2     3 Hours 47A381-652F                                   47W920-5,7 1-ISD-31-5150    Area 14, Room 737.0-A1       47W866-2     3 Hours 47A381-726                                    47W920-5 1-ISD-31-5444A   Area 1, Room 692.0-A1        47W866-11    3 Hours 47A381-769                                    47W920-3 1-ISD-31-5444B   Area 1, Room 692.0-A1        47W866-2     3 Hours 47A381-769                                    47W920-3 1-ISD-31-5444C   Area 1, Room 692.0-A1        47W866-2     3 Hours 47A381-769                                    47W920-3 713.0-A1B 2-ISD-31-3869    Area 15-2, Room 737.0-A12    47W866-11    3 Hours 47A381-443F                                   47W920-18 2-ISD-31-3871    Area 71, Room 713.0-A19      47W866-11    3 Hours 47A381-403F                                   47W920-4 2-ISD-31-3988    Area 1, Room 692.0-A1        47W866-11    3 Hours 47A381-651F                                   47W920-2,3 2-ISD-31-5444A   Area 1, Room 692.0-A1        47W866-11    3 Hours 47A381-769                                    47W920-3 VI-73

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                            Revision 60 Dampers:
Damper/Mark                                       Drawing        Damper Room                             Adjacent Area/Room Number                                            Reference      Rating 2-ISD-31-5444B     Area 1, Room 692.0-A1          47W866-11      3 Hours 47A381-769                                        47W920-3 2-ISD-31-5444C     Area 1, Room 692.0-A1          47W866-11      3 Hours 47A381-769                                        47W920-3 2-ISD-31-5447A     Area 14, Room 737.0-A1         47W866-11      3 Hours 47A381-773                                        47W920-4 2-ISD-31-5447B     Area 14, Room 737.0-A1         47W866-11      3 Hours 47A381-773                                        47W920-4 713.0-A1C     2-ISD-31-5445      Area 1, Room 692.0-A1          47W866-11      3 Hours 47A381-772                                        47W920-2 1-ISD-31-5446      Area 1, Room 692.0-A1          47W866-2       3 Hours 47A381-770                                        47W920-2 Detection: Rooms 713.0-A9, A10, A17, A18, A23, A24, A25, and A26 do not have detection.
Room 713.0-A1 is provided with ionization smoke detectors. Room 713.0-A22 is enclosed by part-height walls with no ceiling; as a result, detection coverage in room 713.0-A1 also provides coverage for room 713.0-A22. Room 713.0-A27 is provided with ionization smoke detection.
Suppression: Automatic sprinklers are provided for room 713.0-A1 and 713.0-A27 (Suppression in 713.0-A1 does not extend over Boric Acid equipment). No automatic suppression provided in the other rooms. Room 713.0-A22 is enclosed by part-height walls with no ceiling; as a result, suppression coverage in room 713.0-A1 also provides coverage for room 713.0-A22. Standpipe and hose stations are provided for all these rooms from 713.0 A1.
Deviations: Intervening combustibles in the form of insulation on cables routed in cable trays and ERFBS are present, but are compensated for by an enhanced automatic preaction sprinkler system. Justification is documented in Part VII, Section 2.4 (713.0-A1). The CCS pumps are separated by a partial 1 hour fire barrier. Justification is documented in Part VII, Section 2.5 (713.0-A1). The floor slabs at elevation 713.0 and 737.0 have stairwells that are protected with draft stops and water curtains in lieu of enclosed stairwells. Justification is documented in Part VII, Section 2.6.3.1. There is a 12 inch round spiral welded HVAC duct that penetrates the floor of 713.0-A1B. The duct continues through the ceiling of 713.0-A1B onto elevation 737. The penetrations are not provided with fire dampers. This duct is part of the Emergency Gas Treatment System (EGTS). Spiral welded pipe is treated like a pipe and is provided with fire rated seals between the pipe and the sleeve. Justification is documented in Part VII, Section 2.6.3.2.a. A non-rated personnel hatch in Room 713.0-A1 is justified in Part VII, Section 2.6.3.4.
No deviations are applicable for Rooms 713.0-A9, A10, A17, A18, A22, A23, A24, A25, A26 and A27.
Evaluations: The lack of total area suppression in 713.0-A1 over the boric acid transfer pumps, tanks and filters (column lines A11.5-A14/Q-R) is documented in Part VII, Section 3.1.2.
The other portions of Fire Area 8 that are not provided with total area suppression and detection are documented in Part VII, Section 3.1.2 for Rooms 713.0-A1, -A9, -A10, -A17, -A18, -A23, -
A24, -A25, and -A26. The feasibility and reliability evaluations for Unit 2 Operator Manual VI-74

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                               Revision 60 Actions are documented in Part VII, Sections 8.3.4, 5, 63 and 64 for room 713.0-A1 and 8.3.6, 63, and 64 for Room 713.0-A27.. No evaluations are applicable to room 713.0-A22.
3.12.2           Rooms 713.0-A13, A14, and A31 Room No.                

== Description:==

713.0-A13                Sample Room 1 713.0-A14                Sample Room 2 713.0-A31                Waste Gas Analyzer Room Fire Loading: The combustibles in Sample Room 1 (713.0-A13) consist of lube oil in a chiller, valve and radiation monitor, plastic associated with electrical panels, boxes and lights, and anticipated amounts of radwaste trash and laundry and a wood countertop. The fire severity is classified as low. The combustibles in the Waste Gas Analyzer Room (713.0-A31) consist of plastic associated with electrical panels. The fire severity is classified as insignificant. The combustibles in Sample Room 2 (713.0-A14) consist of lube oil in a chiller and valve, plastic associated with electrical panels, boxes and lights, and anticipated amounts of radwaste trash and laundry and a wood countertop. The fire severity is classified as insignificant.
Compartmentation: The rooms are of reinforced concrete construction.
Barriers:
Regulatory FPR Figure Room           Direction              Adjacent Area/Room                            Barrier Reference Rating 713.0-A13      North and West Wall    Area 1, Room 713.0-A28        II-29A          2 Hours South Wall             Area 8, Room 713.0-A12        II-29A          2 Hours Ceiling                Area 14, Room 737.0-A1        II-29A, II-30A  2 Hours Floor                  Area 1, Room 692.0-A1         II-28A, II-29A  2 Hours 713.0-A14      North and East Walls   Area 65, Room 713.0-A29       II-29A          2 Hours South Wall             Area 8, Room 713.0-A15        II-29A          2 Hours Ceiling                Area 14, Room 737.0-A1        II-29A, II-30A  2 Hours Floor                  Area 1, Room 692.0-A17        II-28A, II-29A  2 Hours Area 1, Room 692.0-A18        II-28A, II-29A  2 Hours 713.0- A31     North Wall             Area 65, Room 713.0-A29       II-29A          2 Hours Floor                  Area 1, Room 692.0-A17        II-28A, II-29A  2 Hours VI-75

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                           Revision 60 Doors:
Door                                       FPR Figure    Door Room                         Adjacent Area/Room Number                                     Reference     Rating 713.0-A13      A91           Area 1, Room 713.0-A28      II-29A          1.5 Hours 713.0-A14      A92           Area 65, Room 713.0-A29     II-29A          1.5 Hours Dampers: None.
Detection: Ionization smoke detectors are provided in the sample rooms. The Waste Gas Analyzer room is not provided with detection.
Suppression: Automatic preaction sprinkler systems are provided in the sample rooms. The Waste Gas Analyzer room is not provided with suppression. A standpipe and hose station is available from the room 713.0-A1.
Deviations: None.
Evaluations: The lack of total area suppression and detection in the Waste Gas Analyzer rooms is documented in Part VII, Section 3.1.2 for room 713.0-A31.
3.12.3          Rooms 713.0-A2, A3, A4, A5, and A30 Room No.               

== Description:==

713.0-A2                Air Lock 713.0-A3                Titration Room 713.0-A4                Radio Chemical Lab 713.0-A5                Counting Room 713.0-A30               Air Lock Fire Loading: The combustibles in the Air Lock (713.0-A2) consist of plastics associated with junction boxes and a lighting unit and anticipated amounts of radwaste trash and laundry. The combustibles in the Titration Room (713.0-A3) consist of lube oil in two pumps, plastic associated with electrical panels and other plastics, rubber and paper. The combustibles in the Radio Chemical Lab (713.0-A4) consist of lube oil in a pump, miscellaneous plastic, rubber, wood, and paper, and anticipated amounts of radwaste trash and laundry, and miscellaneous combustibles in a liquid storage cabinet and diesel fuel. The combustibles in the Counting Room (713.0-A5) consist of miscellaneous plastic, paper and wood. The fire severity for these rooms is classified as low. The fire severity in the Air Lock (713.0-A30) is classified as insignificant.
Compartmentation: These rooms are of reinforced concrete construction.
Barriers:
FPR Figure       Regulatory Room          Direction          Adjacent Area/Room Reference        Barrier Rating 713.0-A2      East Wall          Area 8, Room 713.0-A1         II-29A           3 Hours 713.0-A3      East Wall          Area 8, Room 713.0-A1         II-29A           3 Hours VI-76

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                           Revision 60 Barriers:
FPR Figure        Regulatory Room          Direction          Adjacent Area/Room Reference         Barrier Rating 713.0-A4      East Wall          Area 8, Room 713.0-A1         II-29A            3 Hours 713.0-A5      North Wall         Area 9, Room 713.0-A6         II-29A            3 Hours East Wall          Area 8, Room 713.0-A1         II-29A            3 Hours 713.0-A30     North, East,       Area 8, Room 713.0-A1         II-29A            3 Hours South Wall Ceiling            Area 8, Room 713.0-A1         II-29A            3 Hours Floor              Area 1, Room 692.0-A1         II-28A, II-29A    2 Hours Doors:
Door                                     FPR Figure Room                       Adjacent Area/Room                         Door Rating Number                                   Reference 713.0-A2      A57          Area 8, Room 713.0-A1       II-29A         3 Hours 713.0-A30     A60          Area 8, Room 713.0-A1       II-29A         3 Hours Dampers: None.
Detection: Ionization smoke detectors are provided in all of these rooms except in the 713.0-A30 Airlock. Room 713.0-A2 contains one of two cross-zoned detectors.
Suppression: Automatic sprinklers are provided in all of these rooms except in the 713.0-A30 Airlock. Room 713.0-A3 does not have coverage inside the large instrument panel.
Standpipe and hose stations are provided from the adjacent room (Corridor 713.0-A1).
Deviations: None.
Evaluations: The lack of total area suppression and detection in the Air Lock (713.0-A30) is documented in Part VII, Section 3.1.2.
3.12.4           Rooms 713.0-A24, A25, A26, and A27 Room No.                

== Description:==

713.0-A24                Waste Gas Compressor Valve Gallery 713.0-A25                Waste Gas Compressor B 713.0-A26                Waste Gas Compressor A 713.0-A27                Decontamination Room Fire Loading: The combustibles in the Waste Gas Compressor rooms consist of lube oil in the compressors, plastic associated with panels and lights, and anticipated amounts of radwaste trash and laundry. The fire severity in 713.0-A25 and -A26 are classified as low. The fire severity is insignificant in 713.0-A24. The fire severity in the Decontamination Room (Room 713.0-A27) consists of plastic associated with electrical panels, equipment, lights and temporary shielding blankets is classified as low.
VI-77

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                          Revision 60 Compartmentation: The rooms are of reinforced concrete construction.
Barriers:
FPR Figure            Regulatory Room           Direction   Adjacent Area/Room Reference             Barrier Rating 713.0-A24      Floor       Area 1, Room 676.0-A2        II-28A, II-29A        2 Hours Area 1, Room 692.0-A3        II-28A, II-29A        2 Hours 713.0-A25      South Wall  Area 48, Room 708.0-C1       II-29A, II-33A        3 Hours Floor       Area 1, Room 676.0-A2        II-28A, II-29A        2 Hours Area 1, Room 692.0-A3        II-28A, II-29A        2 Hours 713.0-A26      South Wall  Area 48, Room 708.0-C1       II-29A, II-33A        3 Hours Floor       Area 1, Room 692.0-A3        II-28A, II-29A        2 Hours 713.0-A27      South Wall  Area 48, Room 708.0-C1       II-29A, II-33A        3 Hours Area 48, Room 729.0-C1       II-29A, II-34A        3 Hours Area 63, Turbine Building    II-29A, II-33A        3 Hours Ceiling     Area 14, Room 737.0-A1       II-29A, II-30A        2 Hours Floor       Area 1, Room 692.0-A5        II-28A, II-29A        2 Hours Doors: None.
Dampers: None.
Detection: The Decontamination Room (713.0-A27) is provided with ionization smoke detectors. The remaining rooms are not provided with detection systems.
Suppression: The Decontamination Room (713.0-A27) is provided with automatic sprinklers.
The remaining rooms are not provided with suppression systems. Standpipe and hose stations are provided in the adjacent room (Corridor 713.0-A1).
Deviations: None.
Evaluations: The lack of total area suppression and detection is documented in Part VII, Section 3.1.2 for rooms 713.0-A24, -A25, and -A26. The feasibility and reliability evaluations for Unit 2 Operator Manual Actions are documented in Part VII, Sections 8.3.6, 63 and 64 for room 713.0-A27.
3.12.5          Room 713.0-A11

==
Description:==
Heat Exchanger 1B Fire Loading: The combustibles consist of lube oil in four valves, plastic associated with lights, and anticipated amounts of radwaste trash and laundry. The fire severity is classified as insignificant.
Compartmentation: The room is of reinforced concrete construction.
VI-78

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                              Revision 60 Barriers:
Regulatory FPR Figure Room            Direction     Adjacent Area/Room                                    Barrier Reference Rating 713.0-A11       North Wall    Area 8, Room 713.0-A12            II-29A              2 Hours South Wall    Area 1, Room 713.0-A28            II-29A              2 Hours Area 8, Room 713.0-A1             II-29A              2 Hours Area 8, Room 713.0-A10            II-29A              2 Hours Area 14, Room 737.0-A1            II-30A              2 Hours Area 14, Room 737.0-A7            II-30A              2 Hours East Wall     Area 8, Room 713.0-A1             II-29A              2 Hours Area 14, Room 737.0-A1            II-30A              2 Hours West Wall     Area 1, Room 713.0-A28            II-29A              2 Hours Ceiling       Area 10, Room 757.0-A13           II-29A, II-31A      2 Hours Area 14, Room 737.0-A7            II-29A, II-30A      2 Hours Area 14, Room 737.0-A1            II-29A, II-30A      2 Hours Floor         Area 1, Room 692.0-A12            II-28A, II-29A      2 Hours Area 1, Room 692.0-A13            II-28A, II-29A      2 Hours Doors:
Door                                      FPR Figure Room                        Adjacent Area/Room                         Door Rating Number                                    Reference 713.0-       A68            Area 8, Room 713.0-A1      II-29A          1.5 Hours A11 Dampers:
Damper/Mark                                  Drawing         Damper Room                            Adjacent Area/Room Number                                       Reference       Rating 713.0-A11      1-ISD-31-3815    Area 1, Room 713.0-A28      47W866-2        3 Hours 47A381-407F                                  47W920-5 Detection: None.
Suppression: No automatic suppression is provided. Standpipe and hose stations are provided from the adjacent room (corridor 713.0-A1).
Deviations: None.
Evaluations: The lack of total area suppression and detection is documented in Part VII, Section 3.1.2.
3.12.6            Room 713.0-A12

==
Description:==
Heat Exchanger 1A Fire Loading: The combustibles consist of lube oil in three valves, plastic associated with lights, and anticipated amounts of radwaste trash and laundry. The fire severity is classified as insignificant.
VI-79

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                             Revision 60 Compartmentation: The room is of reinforced concrete construction.
Barriers:
Regulatory FPR Figure Room            Direction       Adjacent Area/Room                                  Barrier Reference Rating 713.0-A12       North Wall      Area 8, Room 713.0-A13            II-29A            2 Hours Area 14, Room 737.0-A1            II-30A            2 Hours South Wall      Area 8, Room 713.0-A11            II-29A, II-30A    2 Hours Area 8, Room 713.0-A1             II-29A            2 Hours East Wall       Area 8, Room 713.0-A1             II-29A            2 Hours Area 14, Room 737.0-A1            II-30A            2 Hours West Wall       Area 1, Room 713.0-A28            II-29A            2 Hours Area 16, Room 737.0-A5            II-30A            2 Hours Floor           Area 1, Room 692.0-A1             II-28A, II-29A    2 Hours Ceiling         Area 8, Room 713.0-A1             II-29A            2 Hours Area 14, Room 737.0-A1            II-29A, II-30A    2 Hours Area 10, Room 757.0-A13           II-29A, II-31A    2 Hours Doors:
Door                                     FPR Figure Room                    Adjacent Area/Room                            Door Rating Number                                   Reference 713.0-A12    A69        Area 8, Room 713.0-A1         II-29A          1.5 Hours Dampers:
Damper/Mark                                    Drawing         Damper Room                           Adjacent Area/Room Number                                         Reference       Rating 713.0-A12    1-ISD-31-3816     Area 1, Room 713.0-A28       47W866-2        3 Hours 47A381-407                                     47W920-5 Detection: None.
Suppression: No automatic suppression is provided. Standpipe and hose stations are provided from the adjacent room (corridor 713.0-A1).
Deviations: None.
Evaluations: The lack of total area suppression and detection is documented in Part VII, Section 3.1.2.
3.12.7          Room 713.0-A16

==
Description:==
Heat Exchanger 2B Fire Loading: The combustibles consist of lube oil in four valves, plastic associated with lights, and anticipated amounts of radwaste trash and laundry and miscellaneous plastic and rubber items for outage work. The fire severity is classified as low.
VI-80

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                                Revision 60 Compartmentation: The room is of reinforced concrete construction.
Barriers:
FPR Figure           Regulatory Room         Direction    Adjacent Area/Room Reference            Barrier Rating 713.0-A16    North Wall   Area 8, Room 713.0-A15           II-29A               2 Hours South Wall   Area 65, Room 713.0-A29          II-29A               2 Hours Area 8, Room 713.0-A1            II-29A               2 Hours Area 8, Room 713.0-A17           II-29A               2 Hours Area 14, Room 737.0-A1           II-30A               2 Hours Area 14, Room 737.0-A8           II-30A               2 Hours West Wall    Area 8, Room 713.0-A1            II-29A               2 Hours Area 14, Room 737.0-A1           II-30A               2 Hours East Wall    Area 65, Room 713.0-A29          II-29A               2 Hours Ceiling      Area 10, Room 757.0-A13          II-29A, II-31A       2 Hours Area 14, Room 737.0-A8           II-29A, II-30A       2 Hours Area 14, Room 737.0-A1           II-29A, II-30A       2 Hours Floor        Area 1-1, Room 692.0-A20         II-28A, II-29A       2 Hours Area 1-2, Room 692.0-A19         II-28A, II-29A       2 Hours Doors:
Door                                    FPR Figure Room                   Adjacent Area/Room                             Door Rating Number                                  Reference 713.0-A16   A72        Area 8, Room 713.0-A1        II-29A             1.5 Hours Dampers:
Damper/Mark                                      Drawing       Damper Room                            Adjacent Area/Room Number                                           Reference     Rating 713.0-A16    2-ISD-31-3874      Area 65, Room 713.0-A29       47W866-11     3 Hours 47A381-407F                                      47W920-5 Detection: None.
Suppression: No automatic suppression is provided. Standpipe and hose stations are provided from the adjacent room (corridor 713.0-A1).
Deviations: None.
Evaluations: The lack of total area suppression and detection is documented in Part VII, Section 3.1.2.
VI-81

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                              Revision 60 3.12.8          Room 713.0-A15

==
Description:==
Heat Exchanger 2A Fire Loading: The combustibles consist of lube oil in three valves, plastic associated with lights, and anticipated amounts of radwaste trash and laundry and miscellaneous plastic and rubber items for outage work. The fire severity is classified as low.
Compartmentation: The room is of reinforced concrete construction.
Barriers:
Regulatory FPR Figure Room            Direction      Adjacent Area/Room                                   Barrier Reference Rating 713.0-A15       North Wall     Area 8, Room 713.0-A14            II-29A             2 Hours Area 14, Room 737.0-A1            II-30A             2 Hours South Wall     Area 8, Room 713.0-A16            II-29A, II-30A     2 Hours Area 8, Room 713.0-A1             II-29A             2 Hours West Wall      Area 8, Room 713.0-A1             II-29A             2 Hours Area 14, Room 737.0-A1            II-30A             2 Hours East Wall      Area 65, Room 713.0-A29           II-29A             2 Hours Area 74, Room 737.0-A9            II-30A             2 Hours Floor          Area 1, Room 692.0-A1             II-28A, II-29A     2 Hours Area 1, Room 692.0-A17            II-28A, II-29A     2 Hours Area 1, Room 692.0-A18            II-28A, II-29A     2 Hours Ceiling        Area 8, Room 713.0-A1             II-29A             2 Hours Area 10, Room 757.0-A13           II-29A, II-31A     2 Hours Doors:
Door                                     FPR Figure         Door Room                      Adjacent Area/Room Number                                   Reference          Rating 713.0-A15    A71          Area 8, Room 713.0-A1       II-29A              1.5 Hours Dampers:
Damper/Mark                                    Drawing          Damper Room                             Adjacent Area/Room Number                                         Reference        Rating 713.0-A15     2-ISD-31-3873      Area 1, Room 713.0-A29      47W866-11        1.5 Hours 47A381-407                                     47W920-5 Detection: None.
Suppression: No automatic suppression is provided. Standpipe and hose stations are provided from the adjacent room (corridor 713.0-A1).
Deviations: None.
Evaluations: The lack of total area suppression and detection is documented in Part VII, Section 3.1.2.
VI-82

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                             Revision 60 01a-VI-2A - AV-021 3.12.9           Fire Area 8 Safe Shutdown Analysis by Analysis Volume 3.12.9.1         AV-021 Room No.                

== Description:==

713.0-A1A1               Corridor, Col Lines S-U/A1-A4, ceiling level only S-CCS Wall/A1-A3 713.0-A9                 Unit 1 Mixed Bed and Cation Valve Gallery A fire in Analysis Volume 21 could potentially affect systems and components necessary to maintain the Unit 1 and Unit 2 long term decay heat removal, steam generator inventory control and reactor coolant inventory control functions and Unit 1 containment HVAC functions.
Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Offsite power is available.
The required mitigating features for Unit 1 and Unit 2 include providing fire wrap to selected cables to preclude damage in the event of a fire and manual operation of equipment required for safe shutdown and post fire repairs. These features and equipment affected and credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-83

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                             Revision 60 02a-VI-2A - AV-022 3.12.9.2        AV-022 Room No.              

== Description:==

713.0-A1A2             Corridor, Col Lines S-U/A1-A4, Ceiling level only CCS Wall-U/A1-A3 713.0-A9               Unit 1 Mixed Bed and Cation Valve Gallery A fire in Analysis Volume 22 could potentially affect systems and components necessary to maintain the Unit 1 and Unit 2 long term decay heat removal, steam generator inventory control, reactor coolant inventory control functions and MCR HVAC functions and Unit 1 containment HVAC. Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Offsite power is available.
The required mitigating features for Unit 1 and Unit 2 include providing fire wrap to selected cables to preclude damage in the event of a fire, manual operation of equipment required for safe shutdown and post fire repairs. The following is an exception to the general methodology of providing cable protection (ERFBS) from analysis volume boundary to analysis boundary as described in FPR Part III, Section 10.3.1. The control cables for CCS Pumps 1A/2A and 1B/2B are protected such that there is greater than 20 feet separation between the two different train pumps to ensure that A train CCS header is available for both units. These features and equipment affected and credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-84

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                           Revision 60 03a-VI-2A - AV-023 3.12.9.3        AV-023 Room No.              

== Description:==

713.0-A1A3             Corridor, Column Lines Q-CCS Wall/A1-A4 713.0-A24              Waste Gas Compressor Valve Gallery 713.0-A25              Waste Gas Compressor B 713.0-A26              Waste Gas Compressor A 713.0-A27              Decontamination Room A fire in Analysis Volume 23 could potentially affect systems and components necessary to maintain the Unit 1 and Unit 2 long term decay heat removal, MCR & containment HVAC, steam generator inventory control and reactor coolant inventory control functions. Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Offsite power is available. The required mitigating features for Unit 1 and 2 include providing fire wrap to selected cables to preclude damage in the event of a fire and manual operation of equipment required for safe shutdown and post fire repairs.
These features and equipment affected and credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-85

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                         Revision 60 04a-VI-2A - AV-024 3.12.9.4         AV-024 Room No:                

== Description:==

713.0-A1A4               Corridor, Column Lines Q-U/A3-A8 713.0-A1AN               Corridor, Column Lines Q-U/A6-A8 713.0-A9                 Unit 1 Mixed Bed and Cation Valve Gallery 713.0-A10                Seal Water Heat Exchanger 1A 713.0-A22                Holdup Tank Valve Gallery 713.0-A23                CVCS Valve Gallery 713.0-A24                Waste Gas Compressor Valve Gallery 713.0-A25                Waste Gas Compressor B 713.0-A26                Waste Gas Compressor A A fire in Analysis Volume 24 could potentially affect systems and components necessary to maintain the Unit 1 and Unit 2 long term decay heat removal, MCR HVAC, steam generator inventory control, and reactor coolant inventory control and functions and Unit 1 containment HVAC. Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Offsite power is available.
The required mitigating features include providing fire wrap to selected Unit 1 cables to preclude damage in the event of a fire and Unit 1 and Unit 2 manual operation of equipment required for safe shutdown and post fire repairs. These features and equipment affected and credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-86

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                         Revision 60 05a-VI-2A - AV-025 3.12.9.5        AV-025 Room No.               

== Description:==

713.0-A1AN              Corridor, Column Lines Q-U/A6-A8 713.0-A1BN              Corridor, Column Lines Q-U/A8-A10 713.0-A22               Holdup Tank Valve Gallery 713.0-A23               CVCS Valve Gallery A fire in Analysis Volume 25 could potentially affect systems and components necessary to maintain the Unit 1 and Unit 2 long term decay heat removal, steam generator inventory control, reactor coolant inventory control and Unit 1 containment HVAC functions. Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Offsite power is available. The required mitigating features include providing fire wrap to selected Unit 1 cables to preclude damage in the event of a fire and manual operation of Unit 1 and Unit 2 equipment required for safe shutdown and Unit 2 repair procedures. These features and equipment affected and credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-87

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                         Revision 60 06a-VI-2A - AV-025C 3.12.9.6        AV-025C Room No.               

== Description:==

713.0-A1AN              Corridor, Column Lines Q-U/A6-A8 713.0-A1BN              Corridor, Column Lines Q-U/A8-A10 713.0-A1C               Corridor, Column Lines U-W/A7-A9 713.0-A10               Seal Water Heat Exchanger 1A 713.0-A17               Seal Water Heat Exchanger 2A 713.0-A22               Holdup Tank Valve Gallery 713.0-A23               CVCS Valve Gallery This AV is analyzed to address the interface between 713.0-A1C and 713.0-A1AN and 713.0-A1BN (i.e., to obtain 20 feet of separation on either side of Column Line U).
A fire in Analysis Volume 25C could potentially affect systems and components necessary to maintain the Unit 1 and Unit 2 long term decay heat removal, steam generator inventory control, reactor coolant inventory control and Unit 1 containment HVAC functions. Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Offsite power is available. The required mitigating features include providing fire wrap to selected Unit 1 cables to preclude damage in the event of a fire, manual operation of Unit 1 and Unit 2 equipment required for safe shutdown, and Unit 2 repair procedures. These features and equipment affected and credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-88

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                           Revision 60 07a-VI-2A - AV-026 3.12.9.7         AV-026 Room No.               

== Description:==

713.0-A1B               Corridor, Column Lines Q-U/A10-A15 713.0-A1BN              Corridor, Column Lines Q-U/A8-A10 713.0-A17               Seal Water Heat Exchanger 2A 713.0-A18               Unit 2 Mixed Bed and Cation Valve Gallery 713.0-A22               Holdup Tank Valve Gallery 713.0-A23               CVCS Valve Gallery A fire in Analysis Volume 26 could potentially affect systems and components necessary to maintain the Unit 1 and Unit 2 long term decay heat removal, MCR & containment HVAC, steam generator inventory control, reactor coolant inventory control functions. Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Offsite power is available. The required mitigating features for Unit 1 and Unit 2 include providing fire wrap to selected cables to preclude damage in the event of a fire, manual operation of equipment required for safe shutdown, and Unit 2 repair procedures. These features and equipment affected and credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-89

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                         Revision 60 08a-VI-2A - AV-0026A 3.12.9.8        AV-026A Room No.              

== Description:==

713.0-A1C              Corridor, Column Lines U-W/A7-A9 713.0-A13              Sample Room 1 713.0-A14              Sample Room 2 713.0-A31              Waste Gas Analyzer Room A fire in Analysis Volume 26A could potentially affect systems and components necessary to maintain the Unit 1 and Unit 2 long term decay heat removal and reactor inventory control functions. Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown.
Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Offsite power is available. The required mitigating features include manual operation of Unit 1 and Unit 2 equipment required for safe shutdown. These features and equipment credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-90

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                        Revision 60 09a-VI-2A - AV-027 3.12.9.9        AV-027 Room No.              

== Description:==

713.0-A2               Air Lock 713.0-A3               Titration Room 713.0-A4               Radio Chemical Lab 713.0-A5               Counting Room 713.0-A30              Air Lock A fire in Analysis Volume 27 does not result in the loss of safe shutdown functions. No damage to other safe shutdown equipment is expected. The specific equipment affected and credited is identified below:
VI-91

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                        Revision 60 10a-VI-2A - AV-028 3.12.9.10       AV-028 Room No.              

== Description:==

713.0-A11              Heat Exchanger 1B A fire in Analysis Volume 28 could potentially affect Unit 1 systems and components necessary to maintain the long term decay heat removal and reactor coolant inventory control functions.
Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Unit 2 major equipment required to maintain safe shutdown functions is not impacted such that shutdown can be achieved by utilizing both train A and B systems and components without mitigating actions.
Offsite power is available. The required mitigating features include manual operation of Unit 1 equipment required for safe shutdown. These features and equipment credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-92

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                           Revision 60 11a-VI-2A - AV-029 3.12.9.11       AV-029 Room No.              

== Description:==

713.0-A12              Heat Exchanger 1A A fire in Analysis Volume 29 could potentially affect systems and components necessary to maintain the long term decay heat removal function for Unit 1. Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Unit 2 major equipment required to maintain safe shutdown functions is not impacted such that shutdown can be achieved by utilizing both train A and B systems and components without mitigating actions. Offsite power is available. The required mitigating features include manual operation of Unit 1 equipment required for safe shutdown.
These features and equipment credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-93

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                           Revision 60 12a-VI-2A - AV-108 3.12.9.12       AV-108 Room No.              

== Description:==

713.0-A15              Heat Exchanger 2A A fire in Analysis Volume 108 could potentially affect systems and components necessary to maintain the long term decay heat removal function for Unit 2. Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Unit 1 major equipment required to maintain safe shutdown functions is not impacted such that shutdown can be achieved by utilizing both train A and B systems and components without mitigating actions. Offsite power is available. The required mitigating features include manual operation of Unit 2 equipment required for safe shutdown.
These features and equipment credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-94

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                           Revision 60 13a-VI-2A - AV-109 3.12.9.13       AV-109 Room No.              

== Description:==

713.0-A16              Heat Exchanger 2B A fire in Analysis Volume 109 could potentially affect systems and components necessary to maintain the long term decay heat removal function for Unit 2. Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Unit 1 major equipment required to maintain safe shutdown functions is not impacted such that shutdown can be achieved by utilizing both train A and B systems and components without mitigating actions. Offsite power is available. The required mitigating features include manual operation of Unit 2 equipment required for safe shutdown.
These features and equipment credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-95

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                               Revision 60 3.13             FIRE AREA 9 3.13.1           Room 713.0-A6

==
Description:==
Unit 1 Penetration Room Fire Loading: The combustibles consist of lube oil and grease in a valve and air handling unit, ERFBS Thermo-Lag, charcoal in an air exhaust filter assembly, plastics associated with electrical panels, radiation monitors and lights, insulation on cables in cable trays, and anticipated amounts of radwaste trash and laundry. The fire severity is classified as moderate.
Compartmentation: The room is of reinforced concrete construction.
Barriers:
FPR Figure        Regulatory Barrier Room        Direction      Adjacent Area/Room Reference         Rating 713.0-A6    North Wall     Area 9-1, Room 713.0-A7        II-29A            2 Hours Area 61, Unit 1 Reactor        II-29A            3 Hours Bldg                           II-29A            2 Hours Area 1, Room 713.0-A28 South Wall     Area 8, Room 713.0-A1          II-29A            2 Hours Area 8, Room 713.0-A5          II-29A            3 Hours Area 9-1, Room 713.0-A7        II-29A            2 Hours East Wall      Area 1, Room 713.0-A28         II-29A            2 Hours Area 9-1, Room 713.0-A7        II-29A            2 Hours West Wall      Area 12, Room 729.0-A1         II-29A, II-30A    2 Hours Floor          Area 5, Room 692.0-A7          II-28A, II-29A    2 Hours Ceiling        Area 12, Room 729.0-A1         II-29A, II-30A    2 Hours Area 12, Room 737.0-A6         II-29A, II-30A    2 Hours Area 16, Room 737.0-A5         II-29A, II-30A    2 Hours Doors:
Door                                        FPR Figure Room                       Adjacent Area/Room                            Door Rating Number                                      Reference 713.0-A6    A62            Area 8, Room 713.0-A1        II-29A           1.5 Hours A63            Area 9-1, Room 713.0-A7      II-29A           1.5 Hours Dampers:
Damper/Mark                                      Drawing          Damper Room                          Adjacent Area/Room Number                                           Reference        Rating 713.0-A6     1-ISD-31-3804    Area 8, Room 713.0-A1           47W866-2         3 Hours 47A381-400F                                      47W920-4 1-ISD-31-3923    Area 1, Room 713.0-A28          47W866-8         3 Hours 47A381-408F                                      47W920-4 1-ISD-31-3925    Area 5, Room 692.0-A7           47W866-8         3 Hours 47A381-397F                                      47W920-2, 4 1-ISD-31-3976    Area 9-1, Room 713.0-A7         47W866-2         1.5 Hours 47A381-331                                       47W920-4 Detection: Ionization smoke detectors are provided in the room.
VI-96

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                         Revision 60 Suppression: An automatic preaction sprinkler system is provided for the room. Standpipe and hose stations are provided from the adjacent room (corridor 713.0-A1).
Deviations: None.
Evaluations: Detection and suppression capability is discussed in Part VII, Section 3.1.3.
Justification for the lack of fire dampers in the containment purge air system return and exhaust air duct openings to the annulus is documented in Part VII, Section 3.2. Justification of the fire door in this room is documented in Part VII, Section 3.5.
3.13.2           Room 713.0-A8

==
Description:==
Unit 1 Reactor Building Access Room Fire Loading: The combustibles consist of plastic associated with electrical panels and boxes and lights and miscellaneous items for outage work. The fire severity is classified as insignificant.
Compartmentation: The Reactor Building Access Room is of reinforced concrete construction.
Barriers:
Regulatory FPR Figure Room         Direction       Adjacent Area/Room                                   Barrier Reference Rating 713.0-A8     North Wall      Area 61, Unit 1 Reactor Bldg        II-29A           3 Hours Doors:
Door                                          FPR Figure     Door Room                         Adjacent Area/Room Number                                        Reference      Rating 713.0-A8     A65             Area 61, Unit 1 Reactor Bldg  II-29A         3 Hours Dampers: None.
Detection: None.
Suppression: No automatic suppression is provided. A standpipe and hose station is provided in the room.
Deviations: None.
Evaluations: The lack of total area suppression and detection is documented in Part VII, Section 3.1.3. .
VI-97

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                          Revision 60 14a-VI-2A - AV-030 3.13.3          Fire Area 9 Safe Shutdown Analysis by Analysis Volume 3.13.3.1        AV-030 Room No.              

== Description:==

713.0-A6               Unit 1 Penetration Room 713.0-A8               Unit 1 Reactor Building Access Room A fire in Analysis Volume 30 could potentially affect Unit 1 systems and components necessary to maintain the long term decay heat removal, containment HVAC, steam generator inventory control and reactor coolant inventory control functions. Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Unit 2 major equipment required to maintain safe shutdown functions is not impacted such that shutdown can be achieved by utilizing both train A and B systems and components without mitigating actions. Offsite power is available. The required mitigating features include providing a 1-hour fire barrier for selected cables and manual operation of Unit 1 equipment required for safe shutdown. These features and equipment affected and credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-98

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                               Revision 60 3.14           FIRE AREA 9-1 3.14.1         Room 713.0-A7

==
Description:==
Unit 1 Volume Control Tank (VCT) Room Fire Loading: The combustibles consist of the hydrogen in the VCT, lube oil in two valves, plastic associated with electrical boxes and lights, and anticipated amounts of radwaste trash and laundry. The fire severity is classified as insignificant.
Compartmentation: The VCT room is of reinforced concrete construction.
Barriers:
FPR Figure         Regulatory Room        Direction        Adjacent Area/Room Reference          Barrier Rating 713.0-A7    NORTH AND        Area 9, Room 713.0-A6           II-29A             2 Hours WEST WALLS SOUTH WALL       Area 8, Room 713.0-A1           II-29A             2 Hours Area 8, Room 713.0-A9           II-29A             2 Hours Area 9, Room 713.0-A6           II-29A             2 Hours EAST WALL        Area1, Room 713.0-A28           II-29A             2 Hours CEILING          Area 16, Room 737.0-A5          II-29A, II-30A     2 Hours Area 9, Room 713.0-A6           II-29A             2 Hours FLOOR            Area 1, Room 692.0-A8           II-28A, II-29A     2 Hours Area 5, Room 692.0-A7           II-28A, II-29A     2 Hours Doors:
Door                                    FPR Figure Room                      Adjacent Area/Room                              Door Rating Number                                  Reference 713.0-A7      A63         Area 9, Room 713.0-A6       II-29A              1.5 Hours Dampers:
Damper/Mark                                       Drawing        Damper Room                                Adjacent Area/Room Number                                            Reference      Rating 713.0-A7       1-ISD-31-3805        Area 1, Room 713.0-A28       47W866-2       3 Hours 47A381-401F                                       47W920-4 1-ISD-31-3976        Area 9, Room 713.0-A         47W866-2       1.5 Hours 47A381-331                                        47W920-4 Detection: Ionization smoke detectors are provided in the room.
Suppression: An automatic preaction sprinkler system is provided in the room (except in the entrance labyrinth). Standpipe and hose stations are provided from the adjacent room (corridor 713.0-A1).
Deviations: None.
VI-99

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                           Revision 60 Evaluations: Refer to Part VII, Section 3.1.3a for the evaluation of the lack of full suppression and Part VII, Section 3.5 for the evaluation of the fire damper in the VCT room door. The Unit 1 evaluation for performing a manual action in the room of fire origin is documented in Part VII, Section 7.1.3.2.
VI-100

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                          Revision 60 15a-VI-2A - AV-031 3.14.2          Fire Area 9-1 Safe Shutdown Analysis by Analysis Volume 3.14.2.1        AV-031 Room No.              

== Description:==

713.0-A7               Unit 1 Volume Control Tank (VCT) room A fire in Analysis Volume 31 could potentially affect Unit 1 systems and components necessary to maintain the reactor coolant inventory control functions. Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Unit 2 major equipment required to maintain safe shutdown functions is not impacted such that shutdown can be achieved by utilizing both train A and B systems and components without mitigating actions. Offsite power is available. The required mitigating features include manual operation of Unit 1 equipment required for safe shutdown.
These features and equipment credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-101

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                             Revision 60 3.15            FIRE AREA 10 Fire Area 10 consists of several rooms in the Auxiliary Building on elevations 692.0, 729.0, 757.0, and 772.0, and connecting spaces.
3.15.1          Auxiliary Building Elevation 729.0

==
Description:==

Room No.               

== Description:==

728.0-A7                Cask Decontamination Room 729.0-A6                Nitrogen Storage Area 729.0-A8                Unit 1 Post Accident Sampling Room 729.0-A9                Unit 2 Post Accident Sampling Room Stair No. 4              Stair No. 4 & Penthouse Fire Loading: The combustibles consist of lube oil in motors, charcoal in the filter units, and plastic associated with electrical panels and boxes and lights and ERFBS Thermo-Lag. The Fuel Transfer Valve Rooms contain small compressed gas cylinders of hydrogen at concentrations of less the 10 percent by volume. The fire severity, for each of the rooms, is classified as insignificant except 729.0-A8, -A9 which are classified as low.
Compartmentation: The rooms are of reinforced concrete construction. The barriers of the rooms in this fire area have been evaluated in accordance with the guidelines of Appendix A, Section D.1.j. The barrier ratings are adequate for the level of fire hazard (i.e., insignificant fire severity) in the area/rooms.
Barriers:
FPR Figure       Regulatory Room           Direction        Adjacent Area/Room Reference        Barrier Rating 728.0-A7       South Wall       Area 10, Spent Fuel Pit       II-38A           2 Hours Ceiling          Area 10, Room 757.0-A13       II-31A, II-38A   See Part VII (hatch)                                                         Section 2.6 729.0-A6       West Wall        Area 13, Room 729.0-A14       II-38A           3 Hours Area 16, Room 737.0-A5        II-30A           2 Hours Area 10, Spent Fuel Pit       II-38A           2 Hours Area 16, Room 729.0-A8        II-30A           2 Hours South Wall       Area 10, Spent Fuel Pit       II-38A           2 Hours Area 10, Room 737.0-A1        II-30A           2 Hours East Wall        Area 73, Room 729.0-A15       II-38A           3 Hours Area 10, Spent Fuel Pit       II-30A           2 Hours Area 10, Room 729.0-A9        II-30A           2 Hours Area 10, New Fuel Storage     II-38A           2 Hours Vault Area 74, Room 737.0-A9        II-30A           2 Hours Ceiling          Area 10, New Fuel Storage     II-38A           2 Hours Vault Area 10, Room 757.0-A13       II-38A           2 Hours VI-102

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                                Revision 60 Barriers:
FPR Figure        Regulatory Room           Direction       Adjacent Area/Room Reference         Barrier Rating 729.0-A8       North Wall      Area 13, Room 729.0-A14           II-38A            3 Hours South Wall      Area 1, Room 713.0-A28            II-29A            2 Hours East Wall       Area 10, Spent Fuel Pit           II-38A            2 Hours Area 10, Room 729.0-A6            II-30A, II-38A    2 Hours West Wall       Area 61, Unit 1 Reactor Bldg      II-29A            3 Hours Ceiling         Area 16, Room 737.0-A5            II-30A, II-38A    2 Hours Area 13, Room 737.0-A13           II-29A, II-30A    3 Hours 729.0-A9       North Wall      Area 73, Room 729.0-A15           II-30A, II-38A    3 Hours East Wall       Area 77, Unit 2 Reactor Bldg      II-30A            3 Hours South Wall      Area 65, Room 713.0-A29           II-38A            2 Hours West Wall       Area 10, Spent Fuel Pit           II-30A            2 Hours Area 10, Room 729.0-A6            II-30A, II-38A    2 Hours Ceiling         Area 74, Room 737.0-A9            II-30A            2 Hours Area 73, Room 737.0-A14           II-30A            3 Hours Stair No. 4    Ceiling, North, Area 10, Room 757.0-A13           II-38A            2 Hours East, and South Walls at EL 757 West Wall       Area 13, Room 729.0-A14           II-38A            3 Hours West Wall at    Area 13, Room 763.5-A1            II-38A            3 Hours EL 757 Doors:
Door                                      FPR Figure         Door Room                      Adjacent Area/Room Number                                    Reference          Rating Stair No. 4  A173         Area 10, Room 757.0-A13      II-38A              1.5 Hours Dampers:
Damper/Mark                                      Drawing            Damper Room                            Adjacent Area/Room Number                                           Reference          Rating 729.0-A6    0-ISD-31-3823       Area 1, Room 692.0-A14       47W866-10          3 Hours 47A381-510F                                      47W920-6 0-ISD-31-3824       Area 1, Room 692.0-A14       47W866-10          3 Hours 47A381-418F                                      47W920-6 0-ISD-31-3827       Area 1, Room 692.0-A14       47W866-10          3 Hours VI-103

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                           Revision 60 Dampers:
Damper/Mark                                    Drawing           Damper Room                              Adjacent Area/Room Number                                         Reference         Rating 47A381-494F                                    47W920-6 0-ISD-31-3833        Area 74, Room 737.0-A9    47W866-10         3 Hours 47A381-426F                                    47W920-6 0-ISD-31-3847        Area 16, Room 737.0-A5    47W866-10         1.5 Hours 47A381-421                                     47W920-6, 7 0-ISD-31-3848        Area 16, Room 737.0-A5    47W866-10         1.5 Hours 47A381-440                                     47W920-6, 7 0-ISD-31-3849        Area 16, Room 737.0-A5    47W866-10         3 Hours 47A381-419F                                    47W920-6 2-ISD-31-3984        Area 10, Room 729.0-A9    47W866-10         3 Hours 47A381-508F                                    47W920-6 729.0-A8     1-ISD-31-3992        Area 1, Room 692.0-A14    47W866-10         3 Hours 47A381-509F                                    47W920-6 729.0-A9     2-ISD-31-3984        Area 10, Room 729.0-A6    47W866-10         3 Hours 47A381-508F                                    47W920-6 Detection: Smoke detection is provided in the Nitrogen Storage room (partial), the two Post Accident Sampling Rooms (except in the entrance corridors), and Stair No. 4 (partial). No detection in Room 728.0-A7.
Suppression: No automatic suppression is provided in Rooms 728.0-A7, 729.0-A6, or Stairwell No.4. Automatic sprinkler systems are provided for the two Post Accident Sampling Rooms (except in the entrance corridors). A standpipe and hose station is provided in the Nitrogen Storage Area.
Deviations: Justification for the HVAC ducts without fire dampers between rooms 729.0-A6, -A8 and -A9 and adjacent fire areas is documented in Part VII, Section 2.6.1.
Compliance to III.G.1 with FHA for room 729.0-A6 (see Part VII, Section 2.9.4). No deviations are applicable for Rooms 728.0-A7 and Stair No.4.
Evaluations: The corridors associated with 729.0-A6 have been evaluated for conformance to the guidelines of Appendix A, Section D.1.j and for the lack of suppression and detection. Given the insignificant fire load in the corridors and the 2 and 3 hour ratings of the corridor walls, the design provides an adequate level of fire protection. The lack of total area suppression in room 729.0-A6 is documented in Part VII, Section 3.1.4. The relaxation of fire damper surveillance is documented in Part VII, Section 6.2.2.2 for Room 729.0-A6 and -A8.
3.15.2           Room 729.0-A5

==
Description:==
Cask Unloading Area VI-104

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                               Revision 60 Fire Loading: The combustibles consist of plastic associated with storage tanks, electrical panels and boxes, and lights and temporary combustibles consisting of fuel oils and tires. The fire severity is classified as low.
Compartmentation: The area is of reinforced concrete construction.
Barriers:
FPR Figure      Regulatory Room            Direction        Adjacent Area/Room Reference       Barrier Rating 729.0-A5        North Wall       Area 11, Room 729.0-A3           II-38A          2 Hours Area 11, Room 729.0-A4           II-38A          2 Hours South Wall       Area 10, Room 741.5              II-38A          2 Hours (partial)
West Wall        Area 13, Room 729.0-A14          II-38A          3 Hours East Wall        Area 62, CDWE Building           II-38A          3 Hours Area 73, Room 729.0-A15          II-38A          3 Hours Doors:
Door                                        FPR Figure Room                       Adjacent Area/Room                              Door Rating Number                                      Reference 729.0-A5     A111          Area 11, Room 729.0-A4        II-38A             1.5 Hours Dampers: None.
Detection: Thermal smoke detectors are provided for the area.
Suppression: An automatic preaction sprinkler system is provided for the area.
Deviations: None.
Evaluations: None.
3.15.3            Room 757.0-A13

==
Description:==
Refueling Room (Includes 741.5 - New Fuel Storage Vault)
Fire Loading: The combustibles consist of InstaCote, (a plastic type Fuel Transfer Canal coating), lube oil in the compressors and cranes, plastics associated with the electrical equipment, panels and boxes, and anticipated amounts of radwaste trash and laundry. The fire severity is classified as low.
Compartmentation: The Refueling Area is of reinforced concrete construction.
Barriers:
FPR Figure       Regulatory Room            Direction       Adjacent Area/Room Reference        Barrier Rating 757.0-A13       North Wall      Area 10, Stair No. 4            II-38A           2 Hours Area 11, Room 729.0-A3          II-38A           2 Hours Area 11, Room 729.0-A4          II-38A           2 Hours VI-105

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                      Revision 60 Barriers:
FPR Figure     Regulatory Room Direction  Adjacent Area/Room Reference      Barrier Rating Area 14, Stair No. 3      II-31A         2 Hours Area 26, Room 757.0-A11   II-31A         3 Hours Area 76 Room 757.0-A15    II-31A         3 Hours South Wall Area 10, Stair No. 4      II-38A         2 Hours Area 14, Stair No. 3      II-31A         2 Hours Area 17, Room 757.0-A2    II-31A         2 Hours Area 26, Room 757.0-A11   II-31A         3 Hours Area 31, Room 757.0-A24   II-31A         2 Hours Area 32, Room 772.0-A1    II-32A         2 Hours Area 46, Room 772.0-A16   II-32A         2 Hours Area 76 Room 757.0-A15    II-31A         3 Hours East Wall  Area 14, Stair No. 3      II-31A         2 Hours Area 31, Room 757.0-A17   II-31A         2 Hours Area 73, Room 729.0-A15   II-38A         3 Hours Area 75, Room 757.0-A16   II-31A         2 Hours Area 76, Room 757.0-A15   II-31A         3 Hours Area 75, Room 757.0-A14   II-31A         2 Hours Area 73, Room 763.5-A2    II-38A         3 Hours Area 75, Room 782.0-A3    II-32A         2 Hours Area 75, Room 782.0-A4    II-32A         2 Hours West Wall  Area 10, Stair No. 4      II-38A         2 Hours Area 13, Room 729.0-A14   II-38A         3 Hours Area 13, Room 786.5-A1    II-32A         3 Hours Area 14, Stair No. 3      II-31A         2 Hours Area 13, Room 763.5-A1    II-31A, II-38A 3 Hours Area 17, Room 757.0-A9    II-31A         2 Hours Area 25, Room 757.0-A10   II-31A         2 Hours Area 25, Room 757.0-A12   II-31A         2 Hours Area 26, Room 757.0-A11   II-31A         3 Hours Area 25, Room 782.0-A1    II-32A         2 Hours Area 39, Room 772.0-A8    II-32A         2 Hours Area 25, Room 782.0-A2    II-32A         2 Hours Area 13, Room 775.25-A1   II-32A         3 Hours Floor      Area 8, Room 713.0-A11    II-30A, II-31A 2 Hours Area 8, Room 713.0-A12    II-30A, II-31A 2 Hours Area 8, Room 713.0-A15    II-30A, II-31A 2 Hours Area 8, Room 713.0-A16    II-30A, II-31A 2 Hours Area 10, Room 729.0-A5    II-38A         2 Hours Area 10, Room 729.0-A6    II-38A         2 Hours Area 10, Stair No. 4*     II-38A         2 Hours Area 14, Room 737.0-A1    II-30A, II-31A 2 Hours Area 14, Room 737.0-A1    II-30A, II-31A 2 Hours Area 14, Room 737.0-A7    II-30A, II-31A 2 Hours Area 14, Room 737.0-A1    II-30A, II-31A 2 Hours Area 14, Room 737.0-A8    II-30A, II-31A 2 Hours Area 14, Stair No. 3*     II-31A         2 Hours Area 26, Room 757.0-A11*  II-31A         3 Hours Area 76, Room 757.0-A15*  II-31A         3 Hours VI-106

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                        Revision 60 Barriers:
FPR Figure    Regulatory Room       Direction    Adjacent Area/Room Reference     Barrier Rating
(* Partial height rooms)
Barriers:
FPR Figure    Regulatory Room       Direction    Adjacent Area/Room Reference     Barrier Rating 741.5      East Wall    Area 73, U2 AEB               II-38A        3 Hours South Wall   Area 10, Spent Fuel Pit       II-38A        2 Hours West Wall    Area 10, Room 729.0-A6        II-38A        2 Hours North Wall   Area 10, Room 729.0-A5        II-38A        2 Hours Floor        Area 10, Room 729.0-A6        II-38A        2 Hours Doors:
Door                                     FPR Figure      Door Room                   Adjacent Area/Room Number                                   Reference       Rating 757.0-A13  A152        Area 17, Room 757.0-A9       II-31A          1.5 Hours A154        Area 14, STAIR No. 3         II-31A          1.5 Hours A155        Area 25, Room 757.0-A10      II-31A          1.5 Hours A156        Area 25, Room 757.0-A12      II-31A          1.5 Hours A157        Area 75, Room 757.0-A14      II-31A          1.5 Hours A158        Area 75, Room 757.0-A16      II-31A          1.5 Hours A159        Area 31, Room 757.0-A17      II-31A          1.5 Hours A173        Area 10, Stair No. 4         II-38A          1.5 Hours Dampers:
Damper/Mark                                   Drawing     Damper Room                        Adjacent Area/Room Number                                        Reference   Rating 757.0-A13 1-ISD-31-2987     Area 13, Room 763.5-A1      47W866-8    3 Hours 47A381-528F                                   47W920-7 2-ISD-31-2990     Area 73, Room 763.5-A2      47W866-8    3 Hours 47A381-528F                                   47W920-7 1-ISD-31-3117     Area 25, Room 782.0-A1      47W866-2    3 Hours 47A381-440F                                   47W920-8 1-ISD-31-3119     Area 25, Room 782.0-A1      47W866-2    3 Hours 47A381-256F                                   47W920-9 0-ISD-31-3836     Area 75, Room 757.0-A14     47W866-10   3 Hours 47A381-433F                                   47W920-7 0-ISD-31-3838     Area 11, Room 729.0-A3      47W866-10   3 Hours 47A381-413F                                   47W920-7 0-ISD-31-3839     Area 25, Room 757.0-A12     47W866-10   1.5 Hours 47A381-434F                                   47W920-6, 7 0-ISD-31-3841     Area 25, Room 757.0-A12     47W866-10   1.5 Hours 47A381-435F                                   47W920-7 2-ISD-31-3239     Area 75, Room 782.0-A3      47W866-11   3 Hours 47A381-256F                                   47W920-9 VI-107

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                            Revision 60 Dampers:
Damper/Mark                                      Drawing       Damper Room                             Adjacent Area/Room Number                                           Reference     Rating 2-ISD-31-3240      Area 75, Room 782.0-A3        47W866-11     1.5 Hours 47A381-253                                       47W920-10 1-ISD-31-3788      Area 25, Room 757.0-A10       47W866-2      3 Hours 47A381-440F                                      47W920-8 2-ISD-31-3885      Area 75, Room 757-A16         47W866-11     3 Hours 47A381-439F                                      47W920-8 2-ISD-31-3957      Area 31, Room 757.0-A17       47W866-11     1.5 Hours 47A381-438                                       47W920-8 1-ISD-31-3966      Area 17, Room 757.0-A9        47W866-2      3 Hours 47A381-441F                                      47W920-8 0-ISD-31-3837      Area 11, Room 729.0-A4        47W866-10     3 Hours 47A381-621F                                      47W920-6, 7 Detection: None.
Suppression: No automatic suppression is provided. Standpipes and hose stations are provided in adjacent Rooms 757.0-A10 and -A16.
Deviations: The justification for heavy sheet metal ducts and fire doors is documented in Part VII, Sections 2.6.3.2.b and 4.1. The justification for compliance with III.G.1 using a FHA is in Part VII, Section 2.9.10. The justification for lack of detection is documented in Part VII, Section 4.5. The 757.0 floor slab has equipment hatch and elevator door openings that are not provided with fire rated closures. The justification for those openings is documented in Part VII, Section 2.6.3.1.
Evaluations: None.
3.15.4           Room 772.0-A9

==
Description:==
HEPA Filter Plenum Room Fire Loading: The combustibles consist of plastic associated with the lights and insulation on cables in the trays. The fire severity is classified as low.
Compartmentation: The room is of reinforced concrete construction.
Barriers:
FPR Figure        Regulatory Room          Direction       Adjacent Area/Room Reference         Barrier Rating 772.0-A9      North Wall      Area 75, Room 757.0-A16         II-31A, II-32A    2 Hours Area 75, Room 782-A3            II-32A            2 Hours South Wall      Area 46, Room 772.0-A16         II-32A            2 Hours VI-108

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                            Revision 60 East Wall        Area 40, Room 772.0-A10        II-32A               2 Hours Floor            Area 31, Room 757.0-A17        II-31A, II-32A       2 Hours Doors:
Door                                      FPR Figure         Door Room                     Adjacent Area/Room Number                                    Reference          Rating 772.0-A9     A212        Area 40, Room 772.0-A10       II-32A              1.5 Hours A213        Area 40, Room 772.0-A10       II-32A              1.5 Hours Dampers: None.
Detection: Ionization smoke detectors are provided in the room.
Suppression: An automatic preaction sprinkler system is provided in the room. A standpipe and hose station is provided from the adjacent room (772.0-A10).
Deviations: None.
Evaluations: The feasibility and reliability evaluations for Unit 2 Operator Manual Actions are documented in Part VII, Sections 8.3.42, 63 & 64.
3.15.5          Rooms 776.0-A1, 786.0-A1, and 814.75-ACS Room No.               

== Description:==

776.0-A1                Elevator Machine Room 786.0-A1                Fan Room 814.75-ACS              Stair No. 2 & Penthouse Fire Loading: The combustibles in the elevator machine room consist of oil and plastic associated with the hoisting machine and plastics associated with telephone and electrical equipment. The fire severity for this room is classified as severe. The combustibles in the fan room include plastic associated with the fans and other electrical equipment. The combustibles in the Stair No. 2 & Penthouse include plastics associated with lights and a telephone. The fire severity for these rooms is classified as insignificant.
Compartmentation: These rooms are of reinforced concrete or reinforced concrete block construction.
Barriers: None.
Doors: None.
Dampers: None.
Detection: None.
Suppression: No automatic suppression is provided. Standpipe and hose stations are provided in adjoining spaces.
Deviations: None.
VI-109

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                             Revision 60 Evaluations: None.
3.15.6         Rooms 692.0-A14, A15 and A16 Room No.              

== Description:==

692.0-A14              Cask Decontamination Collection Tank Room 692.0-A15              Spent Resin Tank Room 692.0-A16              Valve Gallery Fire Loading: The combustibles consist of small amounts of plastics associated with electrical panels, a sampling station and lights. The fire severity is classified as insignificant.
Compartmentation: The only regulatory fire barriers are the east walls to the Unit 2 Pipe Chase and the walls separating 692.0-A14 from 692.0-A1C and the Spent Fuel Pit.
Barriers:
FPR Figure         Regulatory Room         Direction       Adjacent Area/Room Reference          Barrier Rating 692.0-A14    West Wall       Area 10, Spent Fuel Pit         II-28A             2 Hours East Wall       Area 65, Room 692.0-A24         II-28A             2 Hours Area 10, Spent Fuel Pit         II-28A             2 Hours South Wall      Area 1, Room 692.0-A1           II-28A             2 Hours Area 10, Spent Fuel Pit         II-28A             2 Hours 692.0-A15    East Wall       Area 65, Room 692.0-A24         II-28A             2 Hours 692.0-A16    East Wall       Area 65, Room 692.0-A24         II-28A             2 Hours Doors:
Door                                     FPR Figure        Door Room                     Adjacent Area/Room Number                                   Reference         Rating 692.0-A14   A33          Area 1, Room 692.0-A1       II-28A            1.5 Hours A36          Area 1, Room 692.0-A1       II-28A            1.5 Hours Dampers:
Damper/Mark                                   Drawing           Damper Room                            Adjacent Area/Room Number                                        Reference         Rating 692.0-A14    0-ISD-31-3823      Area 10, Room 729.0-A6     47W866-10         3 Hours 47A381-510F                                   47W920-6 0-ISD-31-3824      Area 10, Room 729.0-A6     47W866-10         3 Hours 47A381-418F                                   47W920-6 0-ISD-31-3827      Area 10, Room 729.0-A6     47W866-10         3 Hours 47A381-494F                                   47W920-6 1-ISD-31-3992      Area 10, Room 729.0-A8     47W866-10         3 Hours 47A381-509F                                   47W920-6 VI-110

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                           Revision 60 Detection: Ionization smoke detectors are only provided in 692.0-A14 (except for a portion of the east corridor).
Suppression: Automatic sprinklers are provided in Room 692.0-A14 only. A standpipe and hose station is provided in room 692.0-A14.
Deviations: None.
Evaluations: The justification for relaxation of penetration seal (692.0-A15) surveillance requirements is documented in Part VII, Section 6.4.2.1. No evaluations are applicable to Rooms 692.0-A14, -A16.
VI-111

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                         Revision 60 01a-VI-2B - AV-032 3.15.7           Fire Area 10 Safe Shutdown Analysis by Analysis Volume 3.15.7.1         AV-032 Room No.                

== Description:==

Stair No. 4              Stair No. 4 & Penthouse 692.0-A14                Cask Decontamination Collection Tank Room 692.0-A15                Spent Resin Tank Room 692.0-A16                Valve Gallery 728.0-A7                 Cask Decontamination Room 729.0-A5                 Cask Unloading Area 729.0-A6                 Nitrogen Storage Area 729.0-A8                 Unit 1 Post Accident Sampling Room 757.0-A13                Refueling Room 772.0-A9                 HEPA Filter Plenum Room 776.0-A1                 Elevator Machine Room 786.0-A1                 Fan Room 814.75-ACS               Stair No. 2 & Penthouse A fire in Analysis Volume 32 could potentially affect systems and components necessary to maintain the Unit 1 and Unit 2 MCR HVAC, and steam generator inventory control and the Unit 2 long term decay heat removal, reactor coolant inventory control, containment HVAC functions.
Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Offsite power is available.
The required mitigating features include providing fire protection for Unit 1selected cables and manual operation of Unit 1 and Unit 2 equipment required for safe shutdown. Operator Manual Actions (OMAs) are not required to mitigate fire in room 729.0-A6 or 757.0-A13 per deviation documented in Part VII, section 2.9. These features and equipment affected and credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-112

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                          Revision 60 02a-VI-2B - AV-119 3.15.7.2        AV-119 Room No.               

== Description:==

729.0-A9                Unit 2 Post Accident Sampling Room A fire in Analysis Volume 119 could potentially affect systems and components necessary to maintain the Unit 2 steam generator inventory control functions. Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Unit 1 major equipment required to maintain safe shutdown functions is not impacted such that shutdown can be achieved by utilizing both train A and B systems and components without mitigating actions. Offsite power is available. The required mitigating features for Unit 2 include providing fire wrap to selected cables to preclude damage in the event of a fire. These features and equipment credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-113

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                           Revision 60 3.16             FIRE AREA 11 3.16.1           Rooms 729.0-A3 and A4

==
Description:==
Waste Package Areas Fire Loading: The combustibles in the rooms consist of oil and plastic associated with the crane and plastic associated with control and junction boxes and resin storage tanks. The fire severity for room 729.0-A3 is classified as low, and for room 729.0-A4 is classified as moderate.
Compartmentation: The rooms are of reinforced concrete construction.
Barriers:
FPR Figure       Regulatory Room          Direction      Adjacent Area/Room Reference        Barrier Rating 729.0-A3      South Wall     Area 10, Room 729.0-A5        II-38A           2 Hours Area 10, Room 757.0-A13       II-38A           2 Hours 729.0-A4      South Wall     Area 10, Room 729.0-A5        II-38A           2 Hours Area 10, Room 757.0-A13       II-38A           2 Hours East Wall      Area 62, CDWE Building        II-38A           3 Hours Doors:
Door                                     FPR Figure      Door Room                     Adjacent Area/Room Number                                   Reference       Rating 729.0-A4    A111         Area 10, Room 729.0-A5      II-38A           1.5 Hours DE2          Area 62, CDWE Building      II-38A          3 Hours Dampers:
Damper/Mark                                   Drawing         Damper Room                            Adjacent Area/Room Number                                        Reference       Rating 729.0-A3     0-ISD-31-3838      Area 10, Room 757.0-A13    47W866-10       3 Hours 47A381-413F                                   47W920-6, 7 729.0-A4     0-ISD-31-3837      Area 10, Room 757.0-A13    47W866-10       3 Hours 47A381-621F                                   47W920-6, 7 0-ISD-31-2427      Area 62, CDWE Building     47W866-10       1.5 Hours 47A381-517                                    47W920-39 0-ISD-31-2429      Area 62, CDWE Building     47W866-10       1.5 Hours 47A381-517                                    47W920-39 Detection: Ionization detectors are provided for both rooms.
Suppression: Automatic preaction sprinkler systems are provided for both rooms. A standpipe and hose station is provided from 729.0-A.5 VI-114

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                            Revision 60 Deviations: The justification for the 1-1/2 hour dampers in the 3 hour fire barrier between the Waste Package Area (729.0-A4) and the CDWE is documented in Part VII, Section 4.7.
Evaluations: None.
VI-115

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                         Revision 60 03a-VI-2B - AV-033 3.16.2          Fire Area 11 Safe Shutdown Analysis by Analysis Volume 3.16.2.1        AV-033 Room No.              

== Description:==

729.0-A3               Waste Package Area 729.0-A4               Waste Package Area A fire in Analysis Volume 33 does not impact major equipment required to maintain safe shutdown functions for Unit 1 or Unit 2. Shutdown can be achieved by utilizing both train A and B systems and components without mitigating actions. Equipment available to achieve shutdown is identified below:
VI-116

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                             Revision 60 3.17             FIRE AREA 12 3.17.1           Room 729.0-A1 and 737.0-A6 Room No.                 

== Description:==

729.0-A1                  Main Steam Valve Room (Unit 1 South) 737.0-A6                  Air Lock Fire Loading: The combustibles in 729.0-A1 consist of lube oil in the valves and plastic associated with electrical panels and boxes and lights. The fire severity is classified as insignificant. The combustibles in 737.0-A6 consist of plastic associated with light covers. The fire severity is classified as insignificant.
Compartmentation: The walls of these rooms are of reinforced concrete construction.
Barriers:
FPR Figure       Regulatory Room           Direction         Adjacent Area/Room Reference        Barrier Rating 729.0-A1       North Wall        Area 61, Unit 1 Reactor Bldg    II-30A           3 Hours South Wall        Area 8, Room 713.0-A1           II-29A, II-30A   2 Hours Area 15-1, Room 737.0-A3        II-30A           2 Hours Area 17, Room 757.0-A2          II-31A           2 Hours Area 37, Room 772.0-A6          II-32A           2 Hours East Wall         Area 16, Room 737.0-A5          II-30A           2 Hours Area 25, Room 757.0-A10         II-31A           2 Hours Area 25, Room 782.0-A1          II-32A           2 Hours Floor             Area 9, Room 713.0-A6           II-29A, II-30A   2 Hours 737.0-A6       North             Area 61, Unit 1 Reactor Bldg    II-30A           3 Hours South             Area 15-1, Room 737.0-A3        II-30A           2 Hours Area 14, Room 737.0-A4          II-30A           2 Hours East              Area 16, Room 737.0-A5          II-30A           2 Hours Floor             Area 9, Room 713.0-A6           II-29A, II-30A   2 Hours Ceiling           Area 16, Room 737.0-A5          II-30A           2 Hours Doors:
Door                                         FPR Figure       Door Room                         Adjacent Area/Room Number                                       Reference        Rating 737.0-A6     A125            Area 16, Room 737.0-A5       II-30A            1.5 Hours Dampers: None.
Detection: No detectors are provided in Room 729.0-A1. No detection is provided in room 737.0-A6.
VI-117

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                       Revision 60 Suppression: No automatic suppression is provided. Standpipe and hose station provided from adjacent Room 737.0-A1.
Deviations: Compliance to III.G.1 with FHA is documented in Part VII, Section 2.9.2.
Evaluations: The lack of total area suppression and detection in specific rooms is documented in Part VII, Sections 3.1.5 for both rooms.
VI-118

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                          Revision 60 04a-VI-2B - AV-034 3.17.2           Fire Area 12 Safe Shutdown Analysis by Analysis Volume 3.17.2.1         AV-034 Room No.               

== Description:==

729.0-A1                Main Steam Valve Room (Unit 1 South) 737.0-A6                Air Lock The in situ combustible loading for AV-034 consists of small quantities of lubricants in several valves and miscellaneous plastics associated with area radiation monitors, small electrical control panels and boxes, and lighting. The total combustible loading results in a fire severity classification of Insignificant . The area is designated a Combustible Control Zone which in conjunction with procedure NPG-SPP-18.4.7, Control of Transient Combustibles provides assurance that transient combustibles will not be introduced into the area without adequate compensatory measures. The valve motors are normally de-energized (power is only applied when an operator moves the valve from open to close (or close to open); therefore, the valve motors are not considered an ignition source. The area radiation monitors are not considered a significant ignition source because they contain insignificant quantities of combustible material and their power supply is adequately protected with properly sized breakers/fuses. Procedure NPG-SPP-18.4.8, Control of Ignition Sources (Hot Work) ensures that ignition sources (e.g.
cutting, welding, grinding) will not be introduced into the area without adequate compensatory measures. Since there are no concentrations of in situ combustibles and no credible ignition sources, it is concluded that there will be no credible fire in the analysis volume that would result in the loss of required fire safe shutdown (FSSD) components or other components that could result in the necessity to shutdown either Unit 1 or Unit 2. Therefore, there is no impact to FSSD for this analysis volume. Operator Manual Actions (OMAs) are not required to mitigate a fire in room 729.0-A1 or 737.0-A6 per deviation documented in Part VII, section 2.9.
VI-119

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                           Revision 60 3.18             FIRE AREA 13 Fire Area 13 consists of several rooms within the Auxiliary Building associated with the Main Steam Valve Room (Unit 1 North).
3.18.1           Room 729.0-A2

==
Description:==
Main Steam Valve Room (Unit 1 North)
Fire Loading: The combustibles consist of lube oil in the valves and plastic associated with electrical panels and boxes and lights, and ERFBS Thermo-Lag. The fire severity is classified as insignificant.
Compartmentation: The valve room walls are of reinforced concrete construction.
Barriers:
FPR Figure        Regulatory Room         Direction           Adjacent Area/Room Reference         Barrier Rating 729.0-A2     South Wall          Area 61, Unit 1 Reactor    II-38A            3 Hours Bldg South and East      Area 13, Room 729.0-A12    II-38A            3 Hours Walls and Ceiling of 729.0-A12 Doors: None.
Dampers: None.
Detection: No detectors are provided in the room.
Suppression: No automatic suppression is provided. A standpipe and hose station is provided from the Unit 1 Additional Equipment Building (729.0-A14).
Deviations: Compliance to III.G.1 with FHA is documented in Part VII, Section 2.9.3.
Evaluations: The lack of total area suppression and detection in room 729.0-A2 is documented in Part VII, Sections 3.1.6.
3.18.2           Room 729.5-A16

==
Description:==
Unit 1 Shield Building Vent Radiation Monitoring Room Fire Loading: The combustibles consist of lube oil in pumps and plastic associated with electrical panels and boxes and lights. The fire severity is classified as insignificant.
Compartmentation: The room is of reinforced concrete construction.
Barriers:
FPR Figure        Regulatory Room           Direction       Adjacent Area/Room Reference         Barrier Rating 729.5-A16      South Wall      Area 61, Unit 1 Reactor Bldg II-38A            3 Hours VI-120

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                            Revision 60 Doors: None.
Dampers: None.
Detection: None.
Suppression: No automatic suppression is provided. A standpipe and hose station is provided from the adjacent room (729.0-A14).
Deviations: None.
Evaluations: None 3.18.3         Unit 1 Additional Equipment Building (U1-AEB)

==
Description:==
Unit 1 Additional Equipment Building (U1-AEB) (729.0-A14, 737.0-A13, 763.5-A1, 775.25-A1, 786.5-A1)
Fire Loading: The combustibles consist of lube oil and hydraulic fluid in valves, pumps and motors, plastics associated with electrical panels and boxes and lights and glycol in the chiller packages and barrels, and ERFBS Thermo-Lag. The fire severity is classified as low.
Compartmentation: The Unit 1 Additional Equipment Building is of reinforced concrete construction.
Barriers:
FPR Figure       Regulatory Room          Direction     Adjacent Area/Room Reference        Barrier Rating 729.0-A14     South Wall    Area 10, Room 729.0-A8          II-29A           3 Hours Area 25, Room 757.0-A12         II-31A           3 Hours Area 16, Room 737.0-A5          II-30A           3 Hours Area 61, Unit 1 Reactor Bldg    II-38A           3 Hours Area 16, Room 737.0-A13         II-30A           3 Hours East Wall     Area 10, Room 729.0-A5          II-38A           3 Hours Area 10, Room 729.0-A6          II-38A           3 Hours Area 10, Room 757.0-A13         II-38A           3 Hours Area 10, Stair No. 4            II-38A           3 Hours 737.0-A13     South Wall    Area 16, Room 737.0-A5          II-30A           3 Hours West Wall     Area 61, Unit 1 Reactor Bldg    II-30A           3 Hours East Wall     Area 16, Room 737.0-A5          II-30A           3 Hours North Wall    Area 16, Room 729.0-A14         II-30A, II-38A   3 Hours Ceiling       Area 16, Room 737.0-A5          II-30A           3 Hours Floor         Area 10, Room 729.0-A8          II-29A, II-30A   3 Hours 763.5-A1      South Wall    Area 25, Room 757.0-A12         II-31A, II-38A   3 Hours VI-121

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                               Revision 60 Barriers:
FPR Figure        Regulatory Room          Direction     Adjacent Area/Room Reference         Barrier Rating Area 61, Unit 1 Reactor Bldg        II-38A            3 Hours East Wall     Area 10, Room 757.0-A13             II-31A, II-38A    3 Hours Area 10, Stair No. 4                II-38A            3 Hours 775.25-A1     South Wall    Area 25, Room 757.0-A12             II-31A            3 Hours Area 25, Room 782.0-A2              II-32A            3 Hours Area 61, Unit 1 Reactor Bldg        II-32A            3 Hours East Wall     Area 10, Room 757.0-A13             II-32A            3 Hours South Wall    Area 61, Unit 1 Reactor Bldg        II-32A            3 Hours 786.5-A1      East Wall     Area 10, Room 757.0-A13             II-38A            3 Hours Doors:
Door                                       FPR Figure        Door Room                     Adjacent Area/Room Number                                     Reference         Rating 737.0-A13    A183        Area 16, Room 737.0-A5          II-30A           3 Hours 763.5-A1     A162        Area 25, Room 757.0-A12         II-31A           3 Hours Dampers:
Damper/Mark                                       Drawing           Damper Room                           Adjacent Area/Room Number                                            Reference         Rating 763.5-A1    1-ISD-31-2987      Area 10, Room 757.0-A13        47W866-8          3 Hours 47A381-528F                                       47W920-7 Detection: Partial ionization smoke detector protection is provided in the AEB. No detection is provided in 737.0-A13 Air lock.
Suppression: No automatic suppression is provided. Standpipe and hose stations are provided for each elevation in the AEB except for the 737 elevation.
Deviations: None.
Evaluations: None.
3.18.4          Room 729.0-A12

==
Description:==
Unit 1 Steam Valve Instrument Room A Fire Loading: The combustibles consist of Thermo-Lag and plastic associated with electrical boxes, panels and lights. The fire severity is classified as low.
Compartmentation: The instrument room is of reinforced concrete construction.
VI-122

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                             Revision 60 Barriers:
FPR Figure       Regulatory Room         Direction           Adjacent Area/Room Reference        Barrier Rating 729.0-A12    North and West      Area 13, Room 729.0-A2       II-38A           3 Hours Walls and Ceiling South Wall          Area 61, Unit 1 Reactor      II-38A           3 Hours Bldg Doors: None.
Dampers: None.
Detection: None.
Although the Unit 1 Steam Valve Instrument Room A contains remote safety related panels, it is not considered a "general area" as described in Section F.6 of Appendix A. It is a small isolated room containing only instrumentation and as such, Section F.6 of Appendix A is not considered applicable. Due to the lack of combustibles (i.e., low fire severity) and the availability of a standpipe hose station in the area, the fire protection available is considered adequate for the hazards involved.
Suppression: No automatic suppression is provided. A standpipe and hose station is provided from the Unit 1 Additional Equipment Building (729.0-A14).
Deviations: Compliance to III.G.1 with FHA is documented in Part VII, Section 2.9.7.
Evaluations: The lack of total area suppression and detection and the limited fire damage in room 729.0-A12 is documented in Part VII, Sections 3.1.6.
VI-123

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                        Revision 60 05a-VI-2B - AV-035 3.18.5           Fire Area 13 Safe Shutdown Analysis by Analysis Volume 3.18.5.1         AV-035 Room No.                

== Description:==

729.0-A12                Unit 1 Steam Valve Instrument Room A 729.0-A14                Unit 1 Additional Equipment Building 729.5-A16                Unit 1 Shield Building Vent Radiation Monitoring Room 737.0-A13                Air Lock 763.5-A1                 U1 Ice Bin Equipment Room 775.25-A1                U1 Ice Machine Equipment Room 786.5-A1                 U1 Chiller Package Equipment Room A fire in Analysis Volume 35 could potentially affect systems and components necessary to maintain the Unit 1 steam generator inventory control secondary side isolation functions. The Appendix R required circuits that route through room 729.5-A16 are all routed in conduits that are embedded in the floor and are not affected by a postulated fire in the room; therefore, a fire in this room does not affect any required FSSD function. Operator Manual Actions (OMAs) are not required to mitigate fire in room 729.5-A16. Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Unit 2 major equipment required to maintain safe shutdown functions is not impacted such that shutdown can be achieved by utilizing both Train A and B system components without mitigating actions. Offsite power is available. The required mitigating features include manual operation of Unit 1 equipment required for safe shutdown. Operator Manual Actions (OMAs) are not required to mitigate fire in room 729.0-A12 per deviation documented in Part VII, section 2.9. These features and equipment affected and credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-124

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                          Revision 60 06a-VI-2B - AV-035A 3.18.5.2         AV-035A Room No.               

== Description:==

729.0-A2                Main Steam Valve Room (Unit 1 North)
The in situ combustible loading for AV-035A consists of small quantities of lubricants in several valves and miscellaneous plastics associated with area radiation monitors, small electrical control panels and boxes, and lighting. The total combustible loading results in a fire severity classification of Insignificant . The area is designated a Combustible Control Zone which in conjunction with procedure NPG-SPP-18.4.7, Control of Transient Combustibles provides assurance that transient combustibles will not be introduced into the area without adequate compensatory measures. The valve motors are normally de-energized (power is only applied when an operator moves the valve from open to close (or close to open); therefore, the valve motors are not considered an ignition source. The area radiation monitors are not considered a significant ignition source because they contain insignificant quantities of combustible material and their power supply is adequately protected with properly sized breakers/fuses. Procedure NPG-SPP-18.4.8, Control of Ignition Sources (Hot Work), ensures that ignition sources (e.g.
cutting, welding, grinding) will not be introduced into the area without adequate compensatory measures. Since there are no concentrations of in situ combustibles and no credible ignition sources, it is concluded that there will be no credible fire in the analysis volume that would result in the loss of required fire safe shutdown (FSSD) components or other components that could result in the necessity to shutdown either Unit 1 or Unit 2. Therefore, there is no impact to FSSD for this analysis volume. Operator Manual Actions (OMAs) are not required to mitigate fire in room 729.0-A2 per deviation documented in Part VII, section 2.9.
VI-125

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                              Revision 60 3.19            FIRE AREA 14 Fire Area 14 consists of various rooms on Auxiliary Building Elevation 737.
3.19.1          Rooms 737.0-A1, A4, A11

==
Description:==

Room No.      

== Description:==

737.0-A1       Auxiliary Building (Subdivided into 737.0-A1A, -A1AN, -A1BN, -A1CN, -A1B, and -
A1C) 737.0-A4       Air Lock 737.0-A11      Air Lock Fire Loading: The combustibles in 737.0-A1 consist of lube oil in the pumps, motors, and valves, plastic associated with electrical panels and boxes and lights and insulation on cables in trays, and ERFBS Thermo-Lag. The majority of the combustibles are the insulation on the cables. The fire severity is classified as moderately severe. The fire severity in the airlocks is classified as insignificant.
Compartmentation: Room 737.0-A1 has been subdivided into 737.0-A1A (column lines A1-A8/Q-U), 737.0-A1B (A8-A15/Q-U), and 737.0-A1C (remaining area of 737.0-A1 north of column line U), each of which is identified in the tabular listing of regulatory barriers. The rooms are of reinforced concrete construction.
Barriers:
FPR Figure       Regulatory Room           Direction        Adjacent Area/Room Reference        Barrier Rating 737.0-A1A      North Wall       Area 1, Room 713.0-A28            II-29A, II-30A   2 Hours Area 10, Elevator Shaft           II-30A           2 Hours Area 15-1, Room 737.0-A3          II-30A           2 Hours Area 16, Room 737.0-A5            II-30A           2 Hours South Wall       Area 10, Elevator Shaft           II-30A           2 Hours Area 48, Room 729.0-C1            II-30A, II-34A   3 Hours Area 48, Room 755.0-C1            II-30A, II-34A   3 Hours Area 48, Room 755.0-C6            II-30A, II-34A   3 Hours Area 48, Room 755.0-C8            II-30A, II-34A   3 Hours Area 48, Room 755.0-C9            II-30A, II-34A   3 Hours Area 48, Room 755.0-C12           II-30A, II-34A   3 Hours Area 63, Turbine Building         II-30A, II-34A   3 Hours West Wall        Area 15-1, Room 737.0-A3          II-30A           2 Hours East Wall        Area 10, Elevator Shaft           II-30A           2 Hours Ceiling          Area 10, Room 757.0-A13           II-30A, II-31A   2 Hours Area 17, Room 757.0-A2            II-30A, II-31A   2 Hours Area 17, Room 757.0-A9            II-30A, II-31A   2 Hours Area 18, Room 757.0-A3            II-30A, II-31A   3 Hours Area 19, Room 757.0-A4            II-30A, II-31A   3 Hours Area 20, Room 757.0-A1            II-30A, II-31A   2 Hours Area 21, Room 757.0-A25           II-30A, II-31A   2 Hours Area 22, Room 757.0-A26           II-30A, II-31A   2 Hours VI-126

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                    Revision 60 Barriers:
FPR Figure     Regulatory Room      Direction  Adjacent Area/Room Reference      Barrier Rating Area 27, Room 757.0-A5    II-30A, II-31A 2 Hours Floor      Area 8, Room 713.0-A1     II-29A, II-30A 2 Hours Area 8, Room 713.0-A23    II-29A, II-30A 2 Hours Area 8, Room 713.0-A27    II-29A, II-30A 2 Hours 737.0-A1B North Wall Area 10, Elevator Shaft   II-30A         2 Hours Area 15-2, Room 737.0-A12 II-30A         2 Hours Area 77, Room 737.0-A9    II-30A         2 Hours Area 65, Room 713.0-A29   II-29A, II-30A 2 Hours South Wall Area 10, Elevator Shaft   II-30A         2 Hours Area 48, Room 729.0-C1    II-30A, II-34A 3 Hours Area 48, Room 755.0-C12   II-30A, II-34A 3 Hours Area 48, Room 755.0-C13   II-30A, II-34A 3 Hours Area 48, Room 755.0-C18   II-30A, II-34A 3 Hours Area 48, Room 755.0-C20   II-30A, II-34A 3 Hours Area 63, Turbine Building II-30A, II-34A 3 Hours East Wall  Area 15-2, Room 737.0-A12 II-30A         2 Hours West Wall  Area 10, Elevator Shaft   II-30A         2 Hours Ceiling    Area 10, Room 757.0-A13   II-30A, II-31A 2 Hours Area 20, Room 757.0-A1    II-30A, II-31A 2 Hours Area 23, Room 757.0-A27   II-30A, II-31A 2 Hours Area 24, Room 757.0-A28   II-30A, II-31A 2 Hours Area 28, Room 757.0-A21   II-30A, II-31A 2 Hours Area 29, Room 757.0-A22   II-30A, II-31A 3 Hours Area 30, Room 757.0-A23   II-30A, II-31A 3 Hours Area 31, Room 757.0-A24   II-30A, II-31A 2 Hours Area 31, Room 757.0-A17   II-30A, II-31A 2 Hours Floor      Area 8, Room 713.0-A1     II-29A, II-30A 2 Hours Area 8, Room 713.0-A23    II-29A, II-30A 2 Hours 737.0-A1C North Wall Area 10, Spent Fuel Pit   II-30A         2 Hours Area 8, Room 713.0-A11    II-30A         2 Hours Area 8, Room 713.0-A16    II-30A         2 Hours South Wall Area 8, Room 713.0-A12    II-30A         2 Hours Area 8, Room 713.0-A15    II-30A         2 Hours East Wall  Area 8, Room 713.0-A15    II-30A         2 Hours Area 8, Room 713.0-A16    II-30A         2 Hours Area 74, Room 737.0-A9    II-30A         2 Hours West Wall  Area 8, Room 713.0-A11    II-30A         2 Hours Area 8, Room 713.0-A12    II-30A         2 Hours Area 16, Room 737.0-A5    II-30A         2 Hours Ceiling    Area 10, Room 757.0-A13   II-30A, II-31A 2 Hours Area 26, Room 757.0-A11   II-30A, II-31A 3 Hours VI-127

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                              Revision 60 Barriers:
FPR Figure        Regulatory Room       Direction      Adjacent Area/Room Reference         Barrier Rating Area 76, Room 757.0-A15          II-30A, II-31A    3 Hours Floor          Area 1, Room 713.0-A28           II-29A, II-30A    2 Hours Area 8, Room 713.0-A1            II-29A, II-30A    2 Hours Area 8, Room 713.0-A10           II-29A, II-30A    2 Hours Area 8, Room 713.0-A11           II-29A, II-30A    2 Hours Area 8, Room 713.0-A12           II-29A, II-30A    2 Hours Area 8, Room 713.0-A13           II-29A, II-30A    2 Hours Area 8, Room 713.0-A14           II-29A, II-30A    2 Hours Area 8, Room 713.0-A17           II-29A, II-30A    2 Hours Area 8, Room 713.0-A15           II-29A, II-30A    2 Hours Area 8, Room 713.0-A16           II-29A, II-30A    2 Hours Area 65, Room 713.0-A29          II-29A, II-30A    2 Hours 737.0-A4   North Wall     Area 12, Room 737.0-A6           II-30A            2 Hours Area 16, Room 737.0-A5           II-30A            2 Hours South and      Area 15-1, Room 737.0-A3         II-30A            2 Hours West Wall Ceiling        Area 15-1, Room 737.0-A3         II-30A            2 Hours Floor          Area 8, Room 713.0-A1            II-29A, II-30A    2 Hours 737.0-A11  North Wall     Area 74, Room 737.0-A9           II-30A            2 Hours Area 72, Room 737.0-A10          II-30A            2 Hours South and      Area 15-2, Room 737.0-A12       II-30A             2 Hours East Wall Ceiling        Area 15-2, Room 737.0-A12       II-30A             2 Hours Floor          Area 8, Room 713.0-A1            II-29A, II-30A    2 Hours Doors:
Door                                     FPR Figure Room                  Adjacent Area/Room                            Door Rating Number                                   Reference 737.0-A1A A124        Area 16, Room 737.0-A5       II-30A            1.5 Hours 737.0-A1B A131        Area 74, Room 737.0-A9       II-30A            1.5 Hours 737.0-A1C A126        Area 16, Room 737.0-A5       II-30A           1.5 Hours A129        Area 74, Room 737.0-A9       II-30A            1.5 Hours 737.0-A11 A133        Area 15-2, Room 737.0-A12    II-30A            1.5 Hours 737.0-A4  A122        Area 15-1, Room 737.0-A3     II-30A           1.5 Hours Dampers:
Damper/Mark                                   Drawing           Damper Room                       Adjacent Area/Room Number                                        Reference         Rating 737.0-A1A 1-ISD-31-3806    Area 15-1, Room 737.0-A3     47W866-2          3 Hours VI-128

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                 Revision 60 Dampers:
Damper/Mark                             Drawing      Damper Room                     Adjacent Area/Room Number                                  Reference    Rating 47A381-404F                             47W920-5 1-ISD-31-3807  Area 15-1, Room 737.0-A3 47W866-2     3 Hours 47A381-410F                             47W920-5 1-ISD-31-3808  Area 16, Room 737.0-A5   47W866-2     3 Hours 47A381-405F                             47W920-5 1-ISD-31-3809  Area 16, Room 737.0-A5   47W866-2     3 Hours 47A381-405F                             47W920-5 1-ISD-31-3813  Area 16, Room 737.0-A5   47W866-2     3 Hours 47A381-406F                             47W920-5 1-ISD-31-3819  Area 1, Room 713.0-A28   47W866-2     1.5 Hrs 47A381-398F                             47W920-5 0-ISD-31-3843  Area 16, Room 737.0-A5   47W866-10    3 Hours 47A381-399F                             47W920-5, 23 1-ISD-31-3996  Area 8, Room 713.0-A1    47W866-2     3 Hours 47A381-652F                             47W920-5, 7 1-ISD-31-5150  Area 8, Room 713.0-A1    47W866-11    3 Hours 47A381-726                              47W920-5 737.0-A1B 2-ISD-31-3877  Area 74, Room 713.0-A29  47W866-11    1.5 Hours 47A381-398F                             47W920-5 2-ISD-31-3879  Area 74, Room 737.0-A9   47W866-11    3 Hours 47A381-431F                             47W920-5 2-ISD-31-3880  Area 74, Room 737.0-A9   47W866-11    3 Hours 47A381-405F                             47W920-5 2-ISD-31-3881  Area 74, Room 737.0-A9   47W866-11    3 Hours 47A381-405F                             47W920-5 2-ISD-31-3882  Area 15-2, Room 737.0-   47W866-11    3 Hours 47A381-410F    A12                      47W920-5 2-ISD-31-3883  AREA 14, Room 737.0-A1   47W866-11    3 Hours 47A381-404F                             47W920-5 2-ISD-31-5452  AREA 14, Room 737.0-A12  47W866-11    3 Hours 47A381-775                              47W920-5 2-ISD-31-5447A Area 8, Room 713.0-A1    47W866-11    3 Hours 47A381-773                              47W920-4 2-ISD-31-5447B Area 8, Room 713.0-A1    47W866-11    3 Hours 47A381-773                              47W920-4 VI-129

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                           Revision 60 Dampers:
Damper/Mark                                   Drawing        Damper Room                             Adjacent Area/Room Number                                        Reference      Rating 737.0-A1C      0-ISD-31-3834     Area 74, Room 737.0-A9      47W866-10      3 Hours 47A381-425F                                   47W920-6 0-ISD-31-3845     Area 16, Room 737.0-A5      47W866-10      3 Hours 47A381-424F                                   47W920-6 0-ISD-31-3846     Area 16, Room 737.0-A5      47W866-10      1.5 Hours 47A381-423                                    47W920-6,7 Detection: Ionization smoke detectors are provided in room 737.0-A1. No detection is provided in the airlocks.
Suppression: Automatic sprinklers are provided in room 737.0-A1 except for Stairwell No.3.
No automatic suppression is provided in Rooms 737.0-A4 and -A11. Standpipe and hose stations are provided for these rooms from Room 737.0-A1.
Deviations: The presence of intervening combustibles (insulation on cables in trays) is justified and documented in Part VII, Section 2.4 for Room 737.0-A1. The 737.0 floor slab has stairwell and hatch openings that are not provided with fire rated closures. The justification for these openings is documented in Part VII, Section 2.6.3.1. There is a 12 inch round spiral welded HVAC duct that penetrates the floor of 737.0-A1B. The penetration is not provided with a fire damper. This duct is part of the Emergency Gas Treatment system. Spiral welded pipe is treated like a pipe and is provided with fire rated seals between the pipe and the sleeve.
Justification is documented in Part VII, Section 2.6.3.2.a. The acceptability of fire door A154 is justified in Part VII, Section 4.1. No deviations are applicable for Rooms 737.0-A4 and 737.0-A11.
Evaluations: The lack of total area suppression and detection in the airlocks is documented in Part VII, Section 3.1.7 and large damper is documented in Part VII, Section 3.4 for Room 737.0-A1. The feasibility and reliability evaluations for Unit 2 Operator Manual Actions are documented in Part VII, Sections 8.3.8, 9, 10 and 11 for Room 737.0-A1.
3.19.2            Room 737.0-A2

==
Description:==
Hot Instrument Shop Fire Loading: The combustibles consist of miscellaneous plastics, paper and furniture and anticipated amounts of radwaste trash and laundry. The fire severity is classified as low.
Compartmentation: The room is of reinforced concrete construction.
Barriers:
FPR Figure      Regulatory Room          Direction      Adjacent Area/Room Reference       Barrier Rating 737.0-A2      North Wall     Area 15-1, Room 737.0-A3       II-30A          2 Hours Floor          Area 8, Room 713.0-A1          II-29A, II-30A  2 Hours VI-130

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                         Revision 60 Doors: None.
Dampers: None.
Detection: Automatic ionization detection is provided in the room.
Suppression: No automatic suppression is provided.. A standpipe and hose station is provided from the adjacent room (737.0-A1).
Deviations: None.
Evaluations: The lack of total area suppression is documented in Part VII, Section 3.1.7.
3.19.3          Room 737.0-A7

==
Description:==
Unit 1 Letdown Heat Exchanger Fire Loading: The combustibles consist of plastic associated with the panel, junction box, and light covers and anticipated amounts of radwaste trash and laundry. The fire severity is classified as low.
Compartmentation: The room is of reinforced concrete construction.
Barriers:
FPR Figure      Regulatory Barrier Room        Direction      Adjacent Area/Room Reference       Rating 737.0-A7    North Wall     Area 8, Room 713.0-A11      II-30A          2 Hours West Wall      Area 1, Room 713.0-A28      II-30A          2 Hours Floor          Area 1, Room 713.0-A28      II-29A, II-30A  2 Hours Area 8, Room 713.0-A11      II-29A, II-30A  2 Hours Area 8, Room 713.0-A10      II-29A, II-30A  2 Hours Doors: None.
Dampers:
Damper/Mark                                  Drawing       Damper Room                           Adjacent Area/Room Number                                       Reference     Rating 737.0-A7    1-ISD-31-3814      Area 1, Room 713.0-A28    47W866-2      1.5 Hours 47A381-407                                   47W920-5 Detection: None.
Suppression: No automatic suppression is provided. A standpipe and hose station is provided in the adjacent room (737.0-A1).
Deviations: None.
Evaluations: The lack of total area suppression and detection is documented in Part VII, Section 3.1.7.
VI-131

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                            Revision 60 3.19.4         Room 737.0-A8

==
Description:==
Unit 2 Letdown Heat Exchanger Fire Loading: The combustibles in this room consist of plastic associated with light covers and anticipated amounts of radwaste trash and laundry. The fire severity is classified as low.
Compartmentation: The room is of reinforced concrete construction.
Barriers:
FPR Figure            Regulatory Barrier Room        Direction     Adjacent Area/Room Reference             Rating 737.0-A8    North Wall    Area 8, Room 713.0-A16    II-30A                2 Hours East Wall     Area 65, Room 713.0-A29   II-29A, II-30A        2 Hours Floor         Area 8, Room 713.0-A17    II-29A, II-30A        2 Hours Area 8, Room 713.0-A16    II-29A, II-30A        2 Hours Area 65, Room 713.0-A29   II-29A, II-30A        2 Hours Ceiling       Area 10, Room 757.0-A13   II-30A, II-31A        2 Hours Doors: None.
Dampers:
Damper/Mark                                  Drawing            Damper Room                          Adjacent Area/Room Number                                       Reference          Rating 737.0-A8    2-ISD-31-3872     Area 10, Room 713.0-A29    47W866-11          1.5 Hours 47A381-407                                   47W920-5 Detection: None.
Suppression: No automatic suppression is provided. A standpipe and hose station is provided in the adjacent room (737.0-A1).
Deviations: None.
Evaluations: The lack of total area suppression and detection is documented in Part VII, Section 3.1.7.
VI-132

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                         Revision 60 07a-VI-2B - AV-036 3.19.5           Fire Area 14 Safe Shutdown Analysis by Analysis Volume 3.19.5.1         AV-036 Room No.                

== Description:==

737.0-A1A                Auxiliary Building, Column Lines Q-U/A1-A6 737.0-A1AN               Auxiliary Building, Column Lines Q-U/A6-A8 737.0-A2                 Hot Instrument Shop 737.0-A4                 Air Lock A fire in Analysis Volume 36 could potentially affect systems and components necessary to maintain the Unit 1 and Unit 2 steam generator inventory control, long term decay heat removal, reactor coolant inventory control, reactor pressure control, MCR & containment HVAC, secondary side isolation functions. Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Offsite power is available for 1B Train with onsite power available for 2B Train. The required mitigating features for Unit 1 and Unit 2 include providing fire wrap to selected cables to preclude damage in the event of a fire, manual operation of equipment required for safe shutdown and repair procedures. The following are exceptions to the general methodology of providing cable protection (ERFBS) from analysis volume boundary to analysis boundary as described in FPR Part III, Section 10.3.1. The control cables for 1-PSV-1-13B-B and 1-PSV 13C-A are protected such that there is greater than 20 feet horizontal separation between the two PSVs to ensure that 1-PCV-1-12 (Steam Generator 2 Power Relief Valve) will close. The control cables for 1-PSV-1-31B-B and 1-PSV-1-31C-A are protected such that there is greater than 20 feet horizontal separation between the two PSVs to ensure that 1-PCV-1-30 (Steam Generator 4 Power Relief Valve) will close. The power supply cables for RCPs 1 & 3 seal injection flow indicators are separated by 20 feet of horizontal separation from the power supply cable for the RCPs 2 & 4 seal injection flow indicators and the normal charging flow indicators to ensure availability of at least one set. The features and equipment affected and credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-133

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                         Revision 60 08a-VI-2B - AV-037 3.19.5.2               AV-037 Room No.              

== Description:==

737.0-A1AN             Auxiliary Building, Column Lines Q-U/A6-A8 737.0-A1BN             Auxiliary Building, Column Lines Q-U/A8-A10 A fire in Analysis Volume 37 could potentially affect systems and components necessary to maintain the Unit 1 and Unit 2 steam generator inventory control, long term decay heat removal, MCR & containment HVAC, reactor coolant inventory control, reactor pressure control functions.
Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Offsite power may not be available. Onsite power is available for 1A and 2A Trains. The required mitigating features for Unit 1 and Unit 2 include providing fire wrap to selected cables to preclude damage in the event of a fire and manual operation of equipment required for safe shutdown and Unit 2 repair procedures. The features are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016:
VI-134

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                          Revision 60 09a-VI-2B - AV-037A 3.19.5.3        AV-037A Room No.              

== Description:==

737.0-A1C              Auxiliary Building, Column Lines V-RxCL/A5-A11 737.0-A1CN             Auxiliary Building, Column Lines U-V/A5-A11 737.0-A7               Unit 1 Letdown Heat Exchanger 737.0-A8               Unit 2 Letdown Heat Exchanger A fire in Analysis Volume 37A could potentially affect systems and components necessary to maintain the Unit 1 and Unit 2 steam generator inventory control, reactor coolant inventory control and reactor pressure control functions. Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Offsite power is available. The required mitigating features for Unit 1 and Unit 2 include providing fire wrap to selected cables to preclude damage in the event of a fire and manual operation of equipment required for safe shutdown. These features and equipment affected and credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-135

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                           Revision 60 10a-VI-2B - AV-037C 3.19.5.4        AV-037C Room No.              

== Description:==

737.0-A1AN             Auxiliary Building, Column Lines Q-U/A6-A8 737.0-A1BN             Auxiliary Building, Column Lines Q-U/A8-A10 737.0-A1CN             Auxiliary Building, Column Lines U-RxCL/A5-A11 737.0-A7               Unit 1 Letdown Heat Exchanger 737.0-A8               Unit 2 Letdown Heat Exchanger This AV is analyzed to address the interface between 737.0-A1C and 737.0-A1AN and 737.0-A1BN (i.e., to obtain 20 feet of separation on either side of Column Line U).
A fire in Analysis Volume 37C could potentially affect systems and components necessary to maintain the Unit 1 and Unit 2 steam generator inventory control, long term decay heat removal, MCR & containment HVAC, reactor coolant inventory control, reactor pressure control functions.
Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Offsite power may not be available. Onsite power is available to 1A and 2A Trains. The required mitigating features for Unit 1 and Unit 2 include providing fire wrap to selected cables to preclude damage in the event of a fire, manual operation of equipment required for safe shutdown and Unit 2 repair procedures. The following are exceptions to the general methodology of providing cable protection (ERFBS) from analysis volume boundary to analysis volume boundary as described in FPR Part III, Section 10.3.1. Greater than 20 feet horizontal separation is also credited to prevent possible CCP-2B overheating due to delayed letdown isolation concurrent with loss of letdown heat exchanger (HTX) cooling. The letdown isolation valve (2-FCV-62-70-A) cables are horizontally separated more than 20 feet from the HTX cooling water temperatures controls (2-TIS-62-79) such that a credible fire could not cause both failures. The features and equipment affected and credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-136

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                          Revision 60 11a-VI-2B - AV-038 3.19.5.5               AV-038 Room No.              

== Description:==

737.0-A1B              Auxiliary Building, Column Lines Q-U/A10-A15 737.0-A1BN             Auxiliary Building, Column Lines Q-U/A8-A10 737.0-A11              Air Lock A fire in Analysis Volume 38 could potentially affect systems and components necessary to maintain the Unit 1 and Unit 2 steam generator inventory control and long term decay heat removal, MCR & containment HVAC, reactor coolant inventory control, reactor pressure control functions. Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown.
Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Offsite power is available for 6.9kV Shutdown Board 1A-A and onsite power is available for 6.9kV Shutdown Board 2A-A. The required mitigating features for Unit 1 and Unit 2 include providing fire wrap to selected cables to preclude damage in the event of a fire, manual operation of equipment required for safe shutdown and Unit 2 repair procedures. The following are exceptions to the general methodology of providing cable protection (ERFBS) from analysis volume boundary to analysis volume boundary as described in FPR Part III, Section 10.3.1. The control cables for 1-PSV-1-6B-A and 1-PSV-1-6C-B are protected such that there is greater than 20 feet horizontal separation between the two PSVs to ensure that 1-PCV-1-5 (Steam Generator 1 Power Relief Valve) will close. Greater than 20 feet horizontal separation is also credited to prevent possible CCP-2B overheating due to delayed letdown isolation concurrent with loss of letdown heat exchanger (HTX) cooling. The letdown isolation valve (2-FCV-62-70-A) cables are horizontally separated more than 20 feet from the HTX cooling water temperatures controls (2-TIS-62-79) such that a credible fire could not cause both failures. The features and equipment affected and credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-137

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                               Revision 60 3.20             FIRE AREA 15-1 3.20.1           Room 737.0-A3

==
Description:==
Unit 1 Heat and Vent Equipment Room Fire Loading: The combustibles consist of lubricant for the fans, ERFBS Thermo-Lag, plastic associated with electrical panels and boxes and lights and insulation on cables in trays and lube oil for the FLEX pump. The fire severity is classified as low.
Compartmentation: The room is of reinforced concrete construction.
Barriers:
FPR Figure          Regulatory Room            Direction    Adjacent Area/Room Reference           Barrier Rating 737.0-A3        North Wall   Area 12, Room 729.0-A1            II-30A              2 Hours Area 14, Room 737.0-A4            II-30A              2 Hours Area 12, Room 737.0-A6            II-30A              2 Hours Area 16, Room 737.0-A5            II-30A              2 Hours East Wall    Area 14, Room 737.0-A1            II-30A              2 Hours Area 14, Room 737.0-A4            II-30A              2 Hours South Wall   Area 14, Room 737.0-A1            II-30A              2 Hours Area 14, Room 737.0-A2            II-30A              2 Hours Floor        Area 8, Room 713.0-A1             II-29A, II-30A      2 Hours Area 14, Room 737.0-A4*           II-30A              2 Hours Ceiling      Area 17, Room 757.0-A2            II-30A, II-31A      2 Hours Area 27, Room 757.0-A5            II-30A, II-31A      2 Hours
(* Partial height room)
Doors:
Door                                       FPR Figure         Door Room                        Adjacent Area/Room Number                                     Reference          Rating 737.0-A3        A122        Area 14, Room 737.0-A4         II-30A             1.5 Hours Dampers:
Damper/Mark                                     Drawing           Damper Room                            Adjacent Area/Room Number                                          Reference         Rating 737.0-A3      1-ISD-31-3803     Area 8, Room 713.0-A1         47W866-2          3 Hours 47A381-443F                                     47W920-18 1-ISD-31-3806     Area 14, Room 737.0-A1        47W866-2          3 Hours 47A381-404F                                     47W920-5 1-ISD-31-3807     Area 14, Room 737.0-A1        47W866-2          3 Hours 47A381-410F                                     47W920-5 VI-138

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                           Revision 60 Detection: Ionization smoke detectors are provided in the room.
Suppression: An automatic preaction sprinkler system is provided in the room except the area below grating. Standpipe and hose stations are provided from the adjacent room (737.0-A1).
Deviations: None.
Evaluations: The justification for large fire dampers is documented in Part VII, Section 3.4.
VI-139

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                          Revision 60 12a-VI-2B - AV-039 3.20.2          Fire Area 15-1 Safe Shutdown Analysis by Analysis Volume 3.20.2.1        AV-039 Room No.               

== Description:==

737.0-A3                Unit 1 Heat and Vent Equipment Room A fire in Analysis Volume 39 could potentially affect systems and components necessary to maintain the Unit 1 and 2 MCR HVAC function and Unit 1 long term decay heat removal, steam generator inventory control, containment HVAC, reactor coolant inventory control and secondary side isolation functions and Unit 2 steam generator inventory control functions.
Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Offsite power is available.
The required mitigating features for Unit 1 and Unit 2 include providing fire wrap to selected cables to preclude damage in the event of a fire, manual operation of equipment required for safe shutdown and Unit 1 repair procedures. These features and equipment affected and credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-140

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                               Revision 60 3.21             FIRE AREA 15-2 3.21.1           Room 737.0-A12

==
Description:==
Unit 2 Heat and Vent Equipment Room Fire Loading: The combustibles consist of lubricant for fans, plastic associated with electrical panels, boxes and lights, ERFBS Thermo-Lag, and lube oil for the FLEX pump. The fire severity is classified as low.
Compartmentation: The room is of reinforced concrete construction.
Barriers:
FPR Figure          Regulatory Room           Direction         Adjacent Area/Room Reference           Barrier Rating 737.0-A12      North Wall        Area 14, Room 737.0-A11        II-30A              2 Hours Area 72, Room 729.0-A11        II-30A              2 Hours Area 72, Room 737.0-A10        II-30A              2 Hours Area 74, Room 737.0-A9         II-30A              2 Hours South Wall        Area 14, Room 737.0-A1         II-30A              2 Hours West Wall         Area 14, Room 737.0-A1         II-30A              2 Hours Area 14, Room 737.0-A11        II-30A              2 Hours Floor             Area 8, Room 713.0-A1          II-29A, II-30A      2 Hours Area 14, Room 737.0-A11*       II-30A              2 Hours Ceiling           Area 31, Room 757.0-A24        I-30A, II-31A       2 Hours Area 28, Room 757.0-A21        II-30A, II-31A      2 Hours
(*PARTIAL HEIGHT ROOM)
Doors:
Door                                     FPR Figure         Door Room                        Adjacent Area/Room Number                                   Reference          Rating 737.0-A12     A133          Area 14, Room 737.0-A11    II-30A              1.5 Hours Dampers:
Damper/                                         Drawing            Damper Room                             Adjacent Area/Room Mark Number                                     Reference          Rating 737.0-A12     2-ISD-31-3869      Area 8, Room 713.0-A1        47W866-11          3 Hours 47A381-443F                                     47W920-18 2-ISD-31-3882      Area 14, Room 737.0-A1       47W866-11          3 Hours 47A381-410F                                     47W920-5 2-ISD-31-3883      Area 14, Room 737.0-A1       47W866-11          3 Hours 47A381-404F                                     47W920-5 2-ISD-31-5452      Area 14, Room 737.0-A1       47W866-11          3 Hours 47A381-775                                      47W920-5 Detection: Ionization smoke detectors are provided in the room.
Suppression: An automatic preaction sprinkler system is provided in the room except the area below grating. Standpipe and hose stations are provided from the adjacent room (737.0-A1).
VI-141

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                        Revision 60 Deviations: None.
Evaluations: The justification for large fire dampers is documented in Part VII, Section 3.4.
The feasibility and reliability evaluations for Unit 2 Operator Manual Actions are documented in Part VII, Sections 8.3.18 and 65.
VI-142

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                         Revision 60 01a-VI-3A - AV-040 3.21.2          Fire Area 15-2 Safe Shutdown Analysis by Analysis Volume 3.21.2.1        AV-040 Room No.               

== Description:==

737.0-A12               Unit 2 Heat and Vent Equipment Room A fire in Analysis Volume 40 could potentially affect systems and components necessary to maintain the Unit 1 and 2 long term decay heat removal, MCR & containment HVAC, steam generator inventory control and reactor coolant inventory control functions. Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Offsite power is available. The required mitigating features include providing fire protection for selected Unit 2 cables and manual operation of Unit 1 and Unit 2 equipment required for safe shutdown. These features and equipment affected and credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-143

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                            Revision 60 3.22             FIRE AREA 16 3.22.1           Rooms 737.0-A5 and A15 Room No.                 

== Description:==

737.0-A5                  Ventilation and Purge Air Room (Subdivided into 737.0-A5S, -A5M, -A5N) 737.0-A15                 Gross Failed Fuel Detector Room Fire Loading: The combustibles in the Ventilation and Purge Air Room consist of lube oil in valves and plastic associated with electrical panels and lights, ERFBS Thermo-Lag and charcoal in the ABGTS filter, radiation protection related trash and rubber expansion joints. The fire severity is classified as low. The fire severity in the Gross Failed Fuel Detector room is classified as insignificant.
Compartmentation: The rooms are of reinforced concrete construction.
Barriers:
FPR Figure       Regulatory Room            Direction       Adjacent Area/Room Reference        Barrier Rating 737.0-A5        North Wall      Area 13, Room 729.0-A14           II-30, II-38A    3 Hours Area 13, Room 737.0-A13           II-30A           3 Hours Area 61, Unit 1 Reactor Bldg      II-30A           3 Hours South Wall      Area 1, Room 713.0-A28            II-29A, II-30A   2 Hours Area 14, Room 737.0-A1            II-30A           2 Hours Area 14, Room 737.0-A3            II-30A           2 Hours Area 14, Room 737.0-A4            II-30A           2 Hours East Wall       Area 1, Room 713.0-A28            II-30A           2 Hours Area 8, Room 713.0-A12            II-30A           2 Hours Area 10, Spent Fuel Pit           II-30A           2 Hours Area 10, Room 729.0-A6            II-30A, II-38A   2 Hours Area 14, Room 737.0-A1            II-30A           2 Hours West Wall       Area 12, Room 729.0-A1            II-30A           2 Hours Area 12, Room 737.0-A6            II-30A           2 Hours Area 13, Room 737.0-A13           II-30A           3 Hours Area 61, Unit 1 Reactor Bldg      II-30A           3 Hours Floor           Area 1, Room 713.0-A28            I-29A, II-30A    2 Hours Area 9, Room 713.0-A6             II-29A, II-30A   2 Hours Area 9, Room 713.0-A7             II-29A, II-30A   2 Hours Area 10, Room 729.0-A8            II-29A, II-30A   2 Hours Area 12, Room 737.0-A6*           II-30A           2 Hours Area 13, Room 737.0-A13*          II-30A           3 Hours
(*Partial height room)
Ceiling         Area 25, Room 757.0-A10           II-30A, II-31A   2 Hours Area 25, Room 757.0-A12           II-30A, II-31A   2 Hours Area 26, Room 757.0-A11           II-30A, II-31A   3 Hours 737.0-A15       Floor           Area 1, Room 713.0-A28            II-29A, II-30A   2 Hours VI-144

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                        Revision 60 Doors:
Door                                    FPR Figure Room                   Adjacent Area/Room                        Door Rating Number                                  Reference 737.0-A5    A124       Area 14, Room 737.0-A1       II-30A        1.5 Hours A125       Area 12, Room 737.0-A6       II-30A        1.5 Hours A126       Area 14, Room 737.0-A1       II-30A       1.5 Hours A183       Area 13, Room 737.0-A13      II-30A       3 Hours Dampers:
Damper/Mark                                  Drawing        Damper Room                         Adjacent Area/Room Number                                       Reference      Rating 737.0-A5    1-ISD-31-3808    Area 14, Room 737.0-A1      47W866-2       3 Hours 47A381-405F                                  47W920-5 1-ISD-31-3809    Area 14, Room 737.0-A1      47W866-2       3 Hours 47A381-405F                                  47W920-5 1-ISD-31-3813    Area 14, Room 737.0-A1      47W866-2       3 Hours 47A381-406F                                  47W920-5 1-ISD-31-3817    Area 1, Room 713.0-A28      47W866-2       3 Hours 47A381-409F                                  47W920-5 1-ISD-31-3818    Area 1, Room 713.0-A28      47W866-2       1.5 Hours 47A381-432                                   47W920-23 0-ISD-31-3840    Area 25, Room 757.0-A12     47W866-10      3 Hours 47A381-399F                                  47W920-7 0-ISD-31-3842    Area 25, Room 757.0-A12     47W866-10      3 Hours 47A381-399F                                  47W920-7 0-ISD-31-3843    Area 14, Room 737.0-A1      47W866-10      3 Hours 47A381-399F                                  47W920-5, 23 0-ISD-31-3845    Area 14, Room 737.0-A1      47W866-10      3 Hours 47A381-424F                                  47W920-6 0-ISD-31-3846    Area 10, Fuel Transfer      47W866-10      1.5 Hours 47A381-423       Canal                       47W920-6, 7 0-ISD-31-3847    Area 10, Room 729.0-A6      47W866-10      1.5 Hours 47A381-421                                   47W920-6, 7 0-ISD-31-3848    Area 10, Room 729.0-A6      47W866-10      1.5 Hours 47A381-420                                   47W920-6, 7 0-ISD-31-3849    Area 10, Room 729.0-A6      47W866-10      3 Hours 47A381-419F                                  47W920-6 Detection: Ionization smoke detectors are provided in room 737.0-A5. (See note below)
Suppression: Automatic preaction sprinkler systems are provided in both rooms. (See note below) Standpipe and hose stations are provided from the adjacent room (737.0-A1).
VI-145

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                            Revision 60 Deviations: HVAC ducts penetrate two of the required fire barriers but are not provided with fire dampers. The justification is documented in Part VII, Section 2.6.1. Intervening combustibles are present in Room 737.0-A5. The justification for intervening combustibles, such as insulation on cables in trays and themo-lag, is documented in Part VII, Section 2.4. No deviations are applicable for Room 737.0-A15.
Evaluations: The justification for the relaxation of fire damper surveillance requirements is documented in Part VII, Section 6.2.2.1. The feasibility and reliability evaluations for Unit 2 Operator Manual Actions are documented in Part VII, Sections 8.3.12, 13, 14, 63 and 64. No evaluations are applicable to Room 737.0-A15.
Note: Room 737.0-A15 is a partial height room and is contained within room 737.0-A5 (See FPR Figure II-30A). There are no detectors in room 737.0-A15. The walls and ceiling of the room are not rated. The suppression head in the room is considered an obstruction coverage head for the full area suppression of room 737.0-A5. Room 737.0-A15 contains no safe shutdown equipment or cables. Actuation of the preaction sprinkler system in room 737.0-A15 requires the actuation of the detection system in room 737.0-A5.
VI-146

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                               Revision 60 3.22.2          Fire Area 16 Safe Shutdown Analysis by Analysis Volume 3.22.2.1        AV-041 Room No.              

== Description:==

737.0-A5                Ventilation and Purge Air Room 737.0-A15               Gross Failed Fuel Detector Room AV-041 contains redundant Steam Generator circuits/components and redundant source range circuits. Therefore, three separate analyses (AV-041M, AV-041N, and AV-041S) are performed to address the use of either path depending upon on the location of the fire within this volume.
02a-VI-3A - AV-041M 3.22.2.2        AV-041M Room No.              

== Description:==

737.0-A5M              Middle portion of 737-A5 extending from 2 north of column line V to 2-6 south of the RX Bldg centerline (includes 737-A15).
A fire in Analysis Volume 41M could potentially affect systems and components necessary to maintain the Unit 1 and Unit 2 steam generator inventory control functions, reactor coolant inventory control functions and Unit 2 long term decay heat removal. Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Offsite power is available. The required mitigating features include providing fire wrap to selected Unit 1 cables to preclude damage in the event of a fire and manual operation of Unit 1 and Unit 2 equipment required for safe shutdown. These features and equipment affected and credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-147

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                                Revision 60 03a-VI-3A - AV-041N 3.22.2.3        AV-041N Room No.              

== Description:==

737.0-A5N              North portion of 737-A5 extending from 2 north of 737-A15 to the north wall of 737-A5.
A fire in Analysis Volume 41N could potentially affect systems and components necessary to maintain the Unit 1 and Unit 2 steam generator inventory control functions, reactor coolant inventory control function and Unit 2 long term decay heat removal function. Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Offsite power is available. The required mitigating features include manual operation of Unit 1 and Unit 2 equipment required for safe shutdown. These features and equipment affected and credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-148

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                              Revision 60 04a-VI-3A - AV-041S 3.22.2.4        AV-041S Room No.               

== Description:==

737.0-A5S               South portion of 737-A5 extending from column line U to column line W.
A fire in Analysis Volume 41S could potentially affect systems and components necessary to maintain the Unit 1 and Unit 2 steam generator inventory control and reactor inventory control, Unit 1 secondary side isolation functions, and containment HVAC functions and Unit 2 long term decay heat removal function. Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited.
Offsite power is available. The required mitigating features include providing fire wrap to selected cables to preclude damage in the event of a fire and manual operation of Unit 1 and Unit 2 equipment required for safe shutdown. These features and equipment affected and credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-149

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                         Revision 60 3.23            FIRE AREA 17 3.23.1          Rooms 757.0-A2 and A9 Room No.               

== Description:==

757.0-A2                6.9kV and 480V Shutdown Board Room A 757.0-A9                 Unit 1 Personnel and Equipment Access Fire Loading: The combustibles in the 6.9kV and 480V Shutdown Board Room A consist of plastics associated with electrical boards, panels, and boxes and lights and insulation on cables in trays, and ERFBS Thermo-Lag, rubber hoses and other miscellaneous plastics and paper.
The fire severity is classified as moderately severe. The combustibles in the Personnel and Equipment Access consist of plastics associated with the panel and junction boxes and insulation on cables in trays, and ERFBS Thermo-Lag. The fire severity is classified as moderate.
Compartmentation: The rooms are of reinforced concrete construction. The equipment hatch opening is normally closed with a steel hatch cover that is non-rated, and the opening is protected with a water curtain.
Barriers:
FPR Figure     Regulatory Room        Direction         Adjacent Area/Room Reference      Barrier Rating 757.0-A2    North Wall        Area 10, Room 757.0-A13         II-31A         2 Hours Area 12, Room 729.0-A1          II-31A         2 Hours Area 25, Room 757.0-A10         II-31A         2 Hours Area 10, Elevator Shaft         II-31A         2 Hours Area 32, Room 772.0-A1          II-32A         2 Hours South Wall        Area 18, Room 757.0-A3          II-31A         3 Hours Area 19, Room 757.0-A4          II-31A         3 Hours Area 20, Room 757.0-A1          II-31A         2 Hours Area 22, Room 757.0-A26         II-31A         2 Hours Area 27, Room 757.0-A5          II-31A         2 Hours Area 33, Room 772.0-A2          II-32A         2 Hours East Wall         Area 31, Room 757.0-A24         II-31A         2 Hours Area 33, Room 772.0-A2          II-32A         2 Hours West Wall         Area 36, Room 772.0-A5          II-32A         2 Hours Area 27, Room 757.0-A5          II-31A         2 Hours Floor             Area 14, Room 737.0-A1          II-30A, II-31A 2 Hours Area 15-1, Room 737.0-A3        II-30A, II-31A 2 Hours Ceiling           Area 32, Room 772.0-A1          II-31A, II-32A 2 Hours Area 33, Room 772.0-A2          II-31A, II-32A 2 Hours Area 37, Room 772.0-A6          II-31A, II-32A 2 Hours Area 38, Room 772.0-A7          II-31A, II-32A 2 Hours 757.0-A9    North Wall        Area 25, Room 757.0-A10         II-31A         2 Hours East Wall         Area 10, Room 757.0-A13         II-31A         2 Hours VI-150

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                           Revision 60 Barriers:
FPR Figure        Regulatory Room     Direction     Adjacent Area/Room Reference         Barrier Rating Floor         Area 14, Room 737.0-A1         II-30A, II-31A    2 Hours Ceiling       Area 38, Room 772.0-A7         II-31A, II-32A    2 Hours Area 39, Room 772.0-A8         II-31A, II-32A    2 Hours Doors:
Door                              FPR Figure       Door Room                    Adjacent Area/Room Number                            Reference        Rating 757.0-A2       A140     Area 20, Room 757.0-A1   II-31A           1.5 Hours A141     Area 18, Room 757.0-A3   II-31A           3 Hours A142     Area 19, Room 757.0-A4   II-31A           3 Hours A143     Area 27, Room 757.0-A5   II-31A           1.5 Hours A145     Area 27, Room 757.0-A5   II-31A           1.5 Hours A171     Area 31, Room 757.0-A24  II-31A           1.5 Hours A184     Area 33, Room 772.0-A2   II-32A           1.5 Hours 757.0-A9       A152     Area 10, Room 757.0-A13  II-31A           1.5 Hours Dampers:
Damper/Mark                              Drawing         Damper Room                     Adjacent Area/Room Number                                   Reference       Rating 757.0-A2 0-ISD-31-2713   Area 18, Room 757.0-A3   47W866-3        3 Hours 47A381-192F                              47W920-8 0-ISD-31-2715   Area 18, Room 757.0-A3   47W866-3        3 Hours 47A381-115F                              47W920-8 0-ISD-31-2720   Area 20, Room 757.0-A1   47W866-3        3 Hours 47A381-130F                              47W920-26 0-ISD-31-2721   Area 20, Room 757.0-A1   47W866-3        1.5 Hours 47A381-113F                              47W920-26 0-ISD-31-2733   Area 19, Room 757.0-A4   47W866-3        3 Hours 47A381-115G                              47W920-8 0-ISD-31-4619   Area 27, Room 757.0-A5   47W866-3        1.5 Hours 47A381-497F                              47W920-8 0-ISD-31-4620   Area 27, Room 757.0-A5   47W866-3        1.5 Hours 47A381-495F                              47W920-8 0-ISD-31-4621   Area 27, Room 757.0-A5   47W866-3        1.5 Hours 47A381-495F                              47W920-8 757.0-A9 1-ISD-31-2500   Area 38, Room 772.0-A7   47W866-3        3 Hours 47A381-326F                              47W920-17 1-ISD-31-3786   Area 25, Room 757.0-A10  47W866-2        1.5 Hours 47A381-438                               47W920-8 1-ISD-31-3966   Area 10, Room 757.0-A13  47W866-2        3 Hours VI-151

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                          Revision 60 Dampers:
Damper/Mark                                    Drawing      Damper Room                           Adjacent Area/Room Number                                         Reference    Rating 47A381-441F                                    47W920-8 Detection: Ionization smoke detectors are provided in both rooms.
Suppression: Automatic preaction sprinkler systems are provided in both rooms. In addition, a water curtain is provided for the equipment hatch. A standpipe and hose station is provided in Room 757.0-A2.
Deviations: The 772.0 floor slab has an equipment hatch with a non-rated cover that is protected by a water curtain. The justification for this opening is documented in Part VII, Section 2.6.3.1. The justification for manual hose stations having hose lengths greater than 100 feet is documented in Part VII, Section 4.3. No deviations are applicable for Room 757.0-A9.
Evaluations: The feasibility and reliability evaluations for Unit 2 Operator Manual Actions are documented in Part VII, Sections 8.3.20 and 24.
VI-152

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                          Revision 60 05a-VI-3A - AV-042 3.23.2           Fire Area 17 Safe Shutdown Analysis by Analysis Volume 3.23.2.1         AV-042 Room No.                

== Description:==

757.0-A2                 6.9kV and 480V Shutdown Board Room A 757.0-A9                 Unit 1 Personnel and Equipment Access This AV contains cables and/or equipment associated with the 5th Vital Battery. The 5th Vital Battery is credited as an "installed spare" that can be used during normal plant operation if one of the existing batteries is down for maintenance. This AV has been analyzed to address the effects of a fire on the 125V DC system if the 5th Vital Battery is in service in replacement of any one of the other four normally credited batteries. There has been an additional four analyses performed (AV-042D through G) for this AV to address the various combinations where the 5th Vital Battery can be used.
A fire in Analysis Volume 42 could potentially affect systems and components necessary to maintain the Unit 1 and Unit 2 steam generator inventory control, long term decay heat removal, MCR & containment HVAC, reactor coolant inventory control, reactor pressure control and Unit 1 secondary side isolation functions. Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Offsite power may not be available. Onsite power is available to 1B and 2B Trains.
The required mitigating features include providing fire wrap to selected Unit 1 and 2 cables to preclude damage in the event of a fire and manual operation of Unit 1 and Unit 2 equipment required for safe shutdown and repair procedures. These features and equipment affected and credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-153

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                           Revision 60 06a-VI-3A - AV-042D 3.23.2.2        AV-042D Room No.              

== Description:==

757.0-A2               6.9kV and 480V Shutdown Board Room A 757.0-A9               Unit 1 Personnel and Equipment Access A fire in Analysis Volume 42D could potentially affect systems and components necessary to maintain the Unit 1 and Unit 2 steam generator inventory control, long term decay heat removal, MCR & containment HVAC, reactor coolant inventory control, reactor pressure control, and Unit 1 secondary side isolation functions. Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Offsite power may not be available. Onsite power is available to 1B and 2B Trains.
The required mitigating features for Unit 1 and Unit 2 include providing fire wrap to selected cables to preclude damage in the event of a fire, manual operation of equipment required for safe shutdown and repair procedures. The 5th vital battery cables and equipment are separated greater than 20 feet horizontal separation from Channel E Containment High Pressure Transmitter 1-PDT-30-44-E cable to prevent initiation of spurious safety injection.
These features and equipment affected and credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-154

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                         Revision 60 3.23.2.3         AV-042E Room No.                

== Description:==

757.0-A2                 6.9kV and 480V Shutdown Board Room A 757.0-A9                 Unit 1 Personnel and Equipment Access A fire in Analysis Volume 42E could potentially affect systems and components necessary to maintain the Unit 1 and Unit 2 steam generator inventory control, long term decay heat removal, MCR & containment HVAC, reactor coolant inventory control, reactor pressure control, and Unit 1 secondary side isolation functions. Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Offsite power may not be available. Onsite power is available to 1B and 2B Trains.
The required mitigating features for Unit 1 and Unit 2 include providing fire wrap to selected cables to preclude damage in the event of a fire, manual operation of equipment required for safe shutdown and repair procedures. These features and equipment affected and credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-155

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                           Revision 60 08a-VI-3A - AV-042F 3.23.2.4        AV-042F Room No.              

== Description:==

757.0-A2               6.9kV and 480V Shutdown Board Room A 757.0-A9               Unit 1 Personnel and Equipment Access A fire in Analysis Volume 42F could potentially affect systems and components necessary to maintain the Unit 1 and Unit 2 steam generator inventory control, long term decay heat removal, MCR & containment HVAC, reactor coolant inventory control, reactor pressure control and Unit 1 secondary side isolation functions. Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Offsite power may not be available. Onsite power is available to 1B and 2B Trains.
The required mitigating features for Unit 1 and Unit 2 include providing fire wrap to selected cables to preclude damage in the event of a fire, manual operation of equipment required for safe shutdown and repair procedures. The 5th vital battery cables and equipment are separated greater than 20 feet horizontal separation from Channel E Containment High Pressure Transmitter 1-PDT-30-44-E cable to prevent initiation of spurious safety injection.
These features and equipment affected and credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-156

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                         Revision 60 3.23.2.5         AV-042G Room No.                

== Description:==

757.0-A2                 6.9kV and 480V Shutdown Board Room A 757.0-A9                 Unit 1 Personnel and Equipment Access A fire in Analysis Volume 42G could potentially affect systems and components necessary to maintain the Unit 1 and Unit 2 steam generator inventory control, long term decay heat removal, MCR & containment HVAC, reactor coolant inventory control, reactor pressure control and Unit 1 secondary side isolation functions. Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Offsite power may not be available. Onsite power is available to 1B and 2B Trains.
The required mitigating features for Unit 1 and Unit 2 include providing fire wrap to selected cables to preclude damage in the event of a fire, manual operation of equipment required for safe shutdown and repair procedures. These features and equipment affected and credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-157

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                                Revision 60 3.24            FIRE AREA 18 3.24.1          Room 757.0-A3

==
Description:==
125V Vital Battery Board Room II Fire Loading: The combustibles consist of plastics associated with electrical panels and boxes and insulation on cables in trays. The fire severity is classified as low.
Compartmentation: The room is of reinforced concrete construction.
Barriers:
FPR Figure                Regulatory Room         Direction    Adjacent Area/Room Reference                 Barrier Rating 757.0-A3     North Wall   Area 17, Room 757.0-A2          II-31A                    3 Hours South Wall   Area 48, Room 755.0-C12         II-31A, II-34A            3 Hours East Wall    Area 21, Room 757.0-A25         II-31A                    3 Hours Area 22, Room 757.0-A26         II-31A                    3 Hours West Wall    Area 19, Room 757.0-A4          II-31A                    3 Hours Floor        Area 14, Room 737.0-A1          II-30A, II-31A            3 Hours Ceiling      Area 34, Room 772.0-A3          II-31A, II-32A            3 Hours Area 35, Room 772.0-A4          II-31A, II-32A            3 Hours Doors:
Door                                     FPR Figure Room                    Adjacent Area/Room                               Door Rating Number                                   Reference 757.0-A3    A141        Area 17, Room 757.0-A2       II-31A              3 Hours Dampers:
Damper/Mark                                      Drawing          Damper Room                             Adjacent Area/Room Number                                           Reference        Rating 757.0-A3      0-ISD-31-2713      Area 17, Room 757.0-A2        47W866-3         3 Hours 47A381-192F                                      47W920-8 0-ISD-31-2715      Area 17, Room 757.0-A2        47W866-3         3 Hours 47A381-115F                                      47W920-8 Detection: Ionization smoke detectors are provided in the room.
Suppression: A manually actuated sprinkler system is provided in the room. A standpipe and hose station is provided from room 757.0-A2.
Deviations: None.
Evaluations: The feasibility and reliability evaluations for Unit 2 Operator Manual Actions are documented in Part VII, Sections 8.3.21 and 65.
VI-158

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                       Revision 60 10a-VI-3A - AV-043 3.24.2           Fire Area 18 Safe Shutdown Analysis by Analysis Volume 3.24.2.1         AV-043 Room No.                

== Description:==

757.0-A3                 125-V Vital Battery Board Room II A fire in Analysis Volume 43 could potentially affect systems and components necessary to maintain the long term decay heat removal, reactor coolant inventory control, steam generator inventory control, MCR & containment HVAC and reactor pressure control functions for both units. Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Offsite power is available for 1A and 2A Trains. The required mitigating features include providing fire wrap to selected Unit 1 cables to preclude damage in the event of a fire and manual operation Unit 1 and Unit 2 of equipment required for safe shutdown. These features and equipment affected and credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-159

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                                Revision 60 3.25            FIRE AREA 19 3.25.1          Room 757.0-A4

==
Description:==
125V Vital Battery Board Room I Fire Loading: The combustibles consist of plastics associated with electrical panels and boxes and insulation on cables in trays. The fire severity is classified as low.
Compartmentation: The room is of reinforced concrete construction.
Barriers:
FPR Figure          Regulatory Room          Direction       Adjacent Area/Room Reference           Barrier Rating 757.0-A4      North Wall      Area 17, Room 757.0-A2            II-31A              3 Hours South Wall      Area 48, Room 755.0-C12           II-31A, II-34A      3 Hours Area 48, Room 755.0-C3            II-31A, II-34A      3 Hours East Wall       Area 18, Room 757.0-A3            II-31A              3 Hours West Wall       Area 27, Room 757.0-A5            II-31A              3 Hours Floor           Area 14, Room 737.0-A1            II-30A, II-31A      3 Hours Ceiling         Area 33, Room 772.0-A2            II-31A, II-32A      3 Hours Area 35, Room 772.0-A4            II-31A, II-32A      3 Hours Doors:
Door                                     FPR Figure Room                        Adjacent Area/Room                           Door Rating Number                                   Reference 757.0-A4        A142        Area 17, Room 757.0-A2       II-31A          3 Hours Dampers:
Damper/Mark                                        Drawing         Damper Room                             Adjacent Area/Room Number                                             Reference       Rating 757.0-A4      0-ISD-31-4618      Area 27, Room 757.0-A5          47W866-3        3 Hours 47A381-513G                                        47W920-8 0-ISD-31-2733      Area 17, Room 757.0-A2          47W866-3        3 Hours 47A381-115G                                        47W920-8 Detection: Ionization detectors are provided in the room.
Suppression: A manually actuated sprinkler system is provided in the room. A standpipe and hose station is provided from room 757.0-A2.
Deviations: None.
Evaluations: The feasibility and reliability evaluations for Unit 2 Operator Manual Actions are documented in Part VII, Sections 8.3.22, 63 and 64.
VI-160

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                        Revision 60 11a-VI-3A - AV-044 3.25.2          Fire Area 19 Safe Shutdown Analysis by Analysis Volume 3.25.2.1        AV-044 Room No.              

== Description:==

757.0-A4               125V Vital Battery Board Room I A fire in Analysis Volume 44 could potentially affect systems and components necessary to maintain the long term decay heat removal, reactor coolant inventory control, steam generator inventory control, MCR & containment HVAC and reactor pressure control functions. Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Offsite power is available to 1B and 2B Trains.
The required mitigating features include manual operation of Unit 1 and Unit 2 equipment required for safe shutdown. These features and equipment affected and credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-161

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                             Revision 60 3.26            FIRE AREA 20 3.26.1          Room 757.0-A1

==
Description:==
Auxiliary Control Room Fire Loading: The combustibles consist of plastics associated with electrical panels and boxes and lights and insulation on cables in trays, and ERFBS Thermo-Lag. The fire severity is classified as moderate.
Compartmentation: The room is reinforced concrete construction.
Barriers:
FPR Figure        Regulatory Room             Direction      Adjacent Area/Room Reference         Barrier Rating 757.0-A1         North Wall     Area 17, Room 757.0-A2        II-31A            2 Hours Area 31, Room 757.0-A24       II-31A            2 Hours South Wall     Area 48, Room 755.0-C12       II-31A, II-34A    3 Hours East Wall      Area 23, Room 757.0-A27       II-31A            2 Hours Area 24, Room 757.0-A28       II-31A            2 Hours West Wall      Area 21, Room 757.0-A25       II-31A            2 Hours Area 22, Room 757.0-A26       II-31A            2 Hours Floor          Area 14, Room 737.0-A1        II-30A, II-31A    2 Hours Area 14, Room 737.0-A1        II-30A, II-31A    2 Hours Ceiling        Area 33, Room 772.0-A2        II-31A, II-32A    2 Hours Area 45, Room 772.0-A15       II-31A, II-32A    2 Hours Doors:
Door                                   FPR Figure       Door Room                        Adjacent Area/Room Number                                 Reference        Rating 757.0-A1         A138       Area 21, Room 757.0-A25     II-31A           1.5 Hours A139       Area 22, Room 757.0-A26     II-31A           1.5 Hours A140       Area 17, Room 757.0-A2      II-31A           1.5 Hours A172       Area 31, Room 757.0-A24     II-31A           1.5 Hours A174       Area 23, Room 757.0-A27     II-31A           1.5 Hours A175       Area 24, Room 757.0-A28     II-31A           1.5 Hours Dampers:
Damper/Mark                                Drawing            Damper Room                         Adjacent Area/Room Number                                     Reference          Rating 757.0-A1     0-ISD-31-2720   Area 17, Room 757.0-A2     47W866-3           3 Hours 47A381-130F                                47W920-26 0-ISD-31-2721   Area 17, Room 757.0-A2     47W866-3           1.5 Hours 47A381-113F                                47W920-26 0-ISD-31-2723   Area 21, Room 757.0-A25    47W866-3           3 Hours 47A381-258F                                47W920-26 VI-162

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                            Revision 60 Dampers:
Damper/Mark                                 Drawing         Damper Room                        Adjacent Area/Room Number                                      Reference       Rating 0-ISD-31-2725  Area 21, Room 757.0-A25      47W866-3        3 Hours 47A381-257F                                 47W920-26 0-ISD-31-2726  Area 22, Room 757.0-A26      47W866-3        3 Hours 47A381-257F                                 47W920-26 0-ISD-31-2728  Area 22, Room 757.0-A26      47W866-3        3 Hours 47A381-259F                                 47W920-26 0-ISD-31-2771  Area 31, Room 757.0-A24      47W866-3        3 Hours 47A381-130F                                 47W920-8, 26 0-ISD-31-2772  Area 31, Room 757.0-A24      47W866-3        1.5 Hours 47A381-113F                                 47W920-8, 26 0-ISD-31-2774  Area 23, Room 757.0-A27      47W866-3        3 Hours 47A381-258F                                 47W920-8 0-ISD-31-2775  Area 23, Room 757.0-A27      47W866-3        3 Hours 47A381-257F                                 47W920-26 0-ISD-31-2777  Area 24, Room 757.0-A28      47W866-3        3 Hours 47A381-257F                                 47W920-26 0-ISD-31-2779  Area 24, Room 757.0-A28      47W866-3        3 Hours 47A381-259F                                 47W920-26 Detection: Ionization detectors are provided in the room.
Suppression: An automatic preaction sprinkler system is provided in the room. Standpipe and hose stations are provided from rooms 757.0-A2 and A24.
Deviations: The following instrumentation has not been provided in the Auxiliary Control Room:
: a. Wide range steam generator level
: b. Tank level for the condensate storage tank (CST) and refueling water storage tank (RWST).
: c. RCS cold leg temperature (Tc).
The justifications are documented in Part VII, Section 2.1.
Evaluations: The feasibility and reliability evaluation for Unit 2 Operator Manual Action is documented in Part VII, Section 8.3.19.
VI-163

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                          Revision 60 12a-VI-3A - AV-045 3.26.2          Fire Area 20 Safe Shutdown Analysis by Analysis Volume 3.26.2.1        AV-045 Room No.               

== Description:==

757.0-A1                Auxiliary Control Room A fire in Analysis Volume 45 could potentially affect systems and components necessary to maintain the Unit 1 and Unit 2 steam generator inventory control, long term decay heat removal, containment HVAC, reactor coolant inventory control and reactor pressure control functions.
Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Offsite power is available.
The required mitigating features for Unit 1 and Unit 2 include providing fire wrap to selected cables to preclude damage in the event of a fire, manual operation of equipment required for safe shutdown and Unit 2 repair procedures. These features and equipment affected and credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-164

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                             Revision 60 3.27           FIRE AREA 21 3.27.1         Room 757.0-A25

==
Description:==
Auxiliary Control Instrument Room 1A Fire Loading: The combustibles consist of plastics associated with electrical panels and boxes and lights, Thermo-Lag, and insulation on cables in trays. The fire severity is classified as severe.
Compartmentation: The room is of reinforced concrete construction.
Barriers:
Regulatory FPR Figure Room             Direction         Adjacent Area/Room                             Barrier Reference Rating 757.0-A25        North Wall        Area 22, Room 757.0-A26      II-31A            2 Hours South Wall        Area 48, Room 755.0-C12      II-31A, II-34A    3 Hours East Wall         Area 20, Room 757.0-A1       II-31A            2 Hours West Wall         Area 18, Room 757.0-A3       II-31A            3 Hours Floor             Area 14, Room 737.0-A1       II-30A, II-31A    2 Hours Ceiling           Area 33, Room 772.0-A2       II-31A, II-32A    2 Hours Area 34, Room 772.0-A3       II-31A, II-32A    3 Hours Doors:
Door                                    FPR Figure       Door Room                       Adjacent Area/Room Number                                  Reference        Rating 757.0-A25     A138         Area 20, Room 757.0-A1     II-31A           1.5 Hours Dampers:
Damper/Mark                                    Drawing         Damper Room                            Adjacent Area/Room Number                                         Reference       Rating 757.0-A25     0-ISD-31-2723     Area 20, Room 757.0-A1       47W866-3        3 Hours 47A381-258F                                    47W920-26 0-ISD-31-2725     Area 20, Room 757.0-A1       47W866-3        3 Hours 47A381-257F                                    47W920-26 Detection: Ionization detectors are provided in the room.
Suppression: An automatic preaction sprinkler system is provided in the room. Standpipe and hose stations are provided from rooms 757.0-A2 and A24.
VI-165

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS Revision 60 Deviations: None.
Evaluations: None.
VI-166

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                         Revision 60 13a-VI-3A - AV-046 3.27.2          Fire Area 21 Safe Shutdown Analysis by Analysis Volume 3.27.2.1        AV-046 Room No.               

== Description:==

757.0-A25               Auxiliary Control Instrument Room 1A A fire in Analysis Volume 46 could potentially affect systems and components necessary to maintain the Unit 1 and Unit 2 steam generator inventory control, and Unit 1 reactor coolant inventory control and long term decay heat removal functions, containment HVAC, and reactor pressure control functions. Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited.
Offsite power is available. The required mitigating features include providing fire wrap to selected cables to preclude damage in the event of a fire and manual operation of Unit 1 and Unit 2 equipment required for safe shutdown. These features and equipment affected and credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-167

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                                Revision 60 3.28           FIRE AREA 22 3.28.1         Room 757.0-A26

==
Description:==
Auxiliary Control Instrument Room 1B.
Fire Loading: The combustibles consist of plastics associated with electrical panels and boxes and lights, Thermo-Lag, and insulation on cables in trays. The fire severity is classified as moderately severe.
Compartmentation: The room is of reinforced concrete construction.
Barriers:
Regulatory FPR Figure Room            Direction        Adjacent Area/Room                                 Barrier Reference Rating 757.0-A26       North Wall       Area 17, Room 757.0-A2           II-31A            2 Hours South Wall       Area 21, Room 757.0-A25          II-31A            2 Hours East Wall        Area 20, Room 757.0-A1           II-31A            2 Hours West Wall        Area 18, Room 757.0-A3           II-31A            3 Hours Floor            Area 14, Room 737.0-A1           II-30A, II-31A    2 Hours Ceiling          Area 33, Room 772.0-A2           II-31A, II-32A    2 Hours Area 34, Room 772.0-A3           II-31A, II-32A    3 Hours Doors:
Door                                    FPR Figure      Door Room                        Adjacent Area/Room Number                                  Reference       Rating 757.0-A26       A139        Area 20, Room 757.0-A1      II-31A           1.5 Hours Dampers:
Damper/Mark                                     Drawing          Damper Room                           Adjacent Area/Room Number                                          Reference        Rating 757.0-A26    0-ISD-31-2726     Area 20, Room 757.0-A1        47W866-3         3 Hours 47A381-257F                                     47W920-26 0-ISD-31-2728     Area 20, Room 757.0-A1        47W866-3         3 Hours 47A381-259F                                     47W920-26 Detection: Ionization smoke detectors are provided in the room.
Suppression: An automatic preaction sprinkler system is provided in the room. Standpipe and hose stations are provided from rooms 757.0-A2 and A24.
Deviations: None.
Evaluations: The feasibility and reliability evaluations for Unit 2 Operator Manual Actions are documented in Part VII, Sections 8.3.32 and 65.
VI-168

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                          Revision 60 14a-VI-3A - AV-047 3.28.2          Fire Area 22 Safe Shutdown Analysis by Analysis Volume 3.28.2.1        AV-047 Room No.               

== Description:==

757.0 A26               Auxiliary Control Instrument Room 1B A fire in Analysis Volume 47 could potentially affect systems and components necessary to maintain the Unit 1 and Unit 2 steam generator inventory control, MCR HVAC, long term decay heat removal and Unit 1 reactor coolant inventory control functions, reactor pressure control and containment HVAC functions. Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited.
Offsite power is available. The required mitigating features for Unit 1 and Unit 2 include providing fire wrap to selected cables to preclude damage in the event of a fire and manual operation of equipment required for safe shutdown. These features and equipment affected and credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-169

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                                Revision 60 3.29           FIRE AREA 23 3.29.1         Room 757.0-A27

==
Description:==
Auxiliary Control Instrument Room 2A Fire Loading: The combustibles consist of plastics associated with electrical panels and boxes and lights and insulation on cables in trays. The fire severity is classified as moderate.
Compartmentation: The room is of reinforced concrete construction.
Barriers:
Regulatory FPR Figure Room             Direction        Adjacent Area/Room                                 Barrier Reference Rating 757.0-A27        North Wall       Area 24, Room 757.0-A28          II-31A            2 Hours South Wall       Area 48, Room 755.0-C12          II-31A, II-34A    3 Hours East Wall        Area 30, Room 757.0-A23          II-31A            3 Hours West Wall        Area 20, Room 757.0-A1           II-31A            2 Hours Floor            Area 14, Room 737.0-A1           II-30A, II-31A    2 Hours Ceiling          AREA 44, ROOM 772.0-A14          II-31A, II-32A    3 Hours AREA 45, ROOM 772.0-A15          II-31A, II-32A    2 Hours Doors:
Door                                     FPR Figure Room                        Adjacent Area/Room                         Door Rating Number                                   Reference 757.0-A27    A174           Area 20, Room 757.0-A1    II-31A           1.5 Hours Dampers:
Damper/Mark                                    Drawing           Damper Room                           Adjacent Area/Room Number                                         Reference         Rating 757.0-A27    0-ISD-31-2774     Area 20, Room 757.0-A1       47W866-3          3 Hours 47A381-258F                                    47W920-8 0-ISD-31-2775     Area 20, Room 757.0-A1       47W866-3          3 Hours 47A381-257F                                    47W920-26 Detection: Ionization smoke detectors are provided in the room.
Suppression: An automatic preaction sprinkler system is provided in the room. Standpipe and hose stations are provided from rooms 757.0-A2 and A24.
Deviations: None.
Evaluations: The feasibility and reliability evaluations for Unit 2 Operator Manual Actions are documented in Part VII, Sections 8.3.33, 63, and 64.
VI-170

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                        Revision 60 3.29.2          Fire Area 23 Safe Shutdown Analysis by Analysis Volume 3.29.2.1        AV-048 Room No.              

== Description:==

757.0-A27              Auxiliary Control Instrument Room 2A A fire in Analysis Volume 48 could potentially affect systems and components necessary to maintain the long term decay heat removal, reactor coolant inventory control, steam generator inventory control, MCR & containment HVAC and reactor pressure control functions for both units. Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Offsite power is available to 1B and 2B Trains. The required mitigating features include manual operation of Unit 1 and Unit 2 equipment required for safe shutdown and Unit 2 repair procedures. These features and equipment affected and credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-171

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                              Revision 60 3.30            FIRE AREA 24 3.30.1          Room 757.0-A28

==
Description:==
Auxiliary Control Instrument Room 2B Fire Loading: The combustibles consist of plastics associated with electrical panels and boxes and lights and insulation on cables in trays, and ERFBS Thermo-Lag. The fire severity is classified as moderately severe.
Compartmentation: The room is of reinforced concrete construction.
Barriers:
FPR Figure        Regulatory Room            Direction        Adjacent Area/Room Reference         Barrier Rating 757.0-A28       North Wall       Area 31, Room 757.0-A24        II-31A            2 Hour South Wall       Area 23, Room 757.0-A27        II-31A            2 Hours East Wall        Area 30, Room 757.0-A23        II-31A            3 Hours West Wall        Area 20, Room 757.0-A1         II-31A            2 Hours Floor            Area 14, Room 737.0-A1         II-30A, II-31A    2 Hours Ceiling          Area 44, Room 772.0-A14        II-31A, II-32A    3 Hours Area 45, Room 772.0-A15        II-31A, II-32A    2 Hours Doors:
Door                                    FPR Figure Room                      Adjacent Area/Room                         Door Rating Number                                  Reference 757.0-A28     A175        Area 20, Room 757.0-A1      II-31A          1.5 Hours Dampers:
Damper/Mark                                     Drawing         Damper Room                            Adjacent Area/Room Number                                          Reference       Rating 757.0-A28    0-ISD-31-2777      Area 20, Room 757.0-A1       47W866-3        3 Hours 47A381-257F                                     47W920-26 0-ISD-31-2779      Area 20, Room 757.0-A1       47W866-3        3 Hours 47A381-259F                                     47W920-26 Detection: Ionization detectors are provided in the room.
Suppression: An automatic preaction sprinkler system is provided for the room. Standpipe and hose stations are provided from rooms 757.0-A2 and A24.
Deviations: None.
Evaluations: The feasibility and reliability evaluations for Unit 2 Operator Manual Actions are documented in Part VII, Sections 8.3.34, 62 and 65.
VI-172

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                          Revision 60 16a-VI-3A - AV-049 3.30.2          Fire Area 24 Safe Shutdown Analysis by Analysis Volume 3.30.2.1        AV-049 Room No.              

== Description:==

757.0-A28              Auxiliary Control Instrument Room 2B A fire in Analysis Volume 49 could potentially affect systems and components necessary to maintain the Unit 1 and Unit 2 long term decay heat removal, containment HVAC, reactor coolant inventory control, steam generator inventory control and reactor pressure control functions. Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown.
Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Offsite power is available. The required mitigating features include providing fire wrap to selected cables to preclude damage in the event of a fire and manual operation of Unit 1 and Unit 2 equipment required for safe shutdown. These features and equipment affected and credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-173

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                          Revision 60 3.31            FIRE AREA 25 3.31.1          Rooms 782.0-A1 and A2, 757.0-A10 Room No.               

== Description:==

782.0-A1                Unit 1 Control Rod Drive Equipment Room 782.0-A2                Pressurizer Heater Transformer Room 1 757.0-A10                Miscellaneous Equipment Room Fire Loading: The combustibles consist of plastics associated with the electrical panels, transformers, and lights, oil in the transformers, combustibles associated with control air compressor skid, oil associated with a 4-ton hoist, wood storage racks, nylon ropes, the insulation on the cables in the trays, and ERFBS Thermo-Lag. The fire severity of Rooms 782.0-A1 and -A2 are classified as moderate. The fire severity of Room 757.0-A10 is classified as moderately severe.
Compartmentation: The rooms are of reinforced concrete construction. The floor slab in Room 782.0-A1 to 757.0-A10 has an equipment hatch that is covered with a nonfire rated steel cover, two HVAC ducts without fire dampers, and a stairway enclosed by 2 hour non-regulatory fire barriers. The floor slab in Room 782.0-A2 to Room 757.0-A12 has a stairway enclosed by 2 hour non-regulatory fire barriers.
Barriers:
FPR Figure     Regulatory Room          Direction      Adjacent Area/Room Reference      Barrier Rating 782.0-A1      North Wall     Area 61, Unit 1 Reactor Bldg        II-32A         3 Hours South Wall     Area 37, Room 772.0-A6              II-32A         2 Hours Area 38, Room 772.0-A7              II-32A         2 Hours Area 39, Room 772.0-A8              II-32A         2 Hours East Wall      Area 10, Room 757.0-A13             II-32A         2 Hours West Wall      Area 12, Room 729.0-A1              II-32A         2 Hours Area 61, Unit 1 Reactor Bldg        II-32A         3 Hours Floor          Area 25, Room 757.0-A10             II-31A, II-32A 2 Hours Area 26, Room 757.0-A11             II-31A, II-32A 3 Hours 782.0-A2      North Wall     Area 13, Room 775.25-A1             II-32A         3 Hours Area 13, Room 786.5-A1              II-32A         3 Hours East Wall      Area 10, Room 757.0-A13             II-32A         2 Hours West Wall      Area 61, Unit 1 Reactor Bldg        II-32A         3 Hours Floor          Area 25, Room 757.0-A12             II-31A, II-32A 2 Hours Area 26, Room 757.0-A11             II-31A, II-32A 3 Hours 757.0-A10     North Wall     Area 26, Room 757.0-A11             II-31A         3 Hours Area 61, Unit 1 Reactor Bldg        II-31A         3 Hours South Wall     Area 17, Room 757.0-A2              II-31A         2 Hours Area 17, Room 757.0-A9              II-31A         2 Hours VI-174

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                             Revision 60 Barriers:
FPR Figure       Regulatory Room         Direction       Adjacent Area/Room Reference        Barrier Rating Area 37, Room 772.0-A6               II-31A, II-32A   2 Hours Area 38, Room 772.0-A7               II-31A, II-32A   2 Hours Area 39, Room 772.0-A8               II-31A, II-32A   2 Hours East Wall       Area 10, Room 757.0-A13              II-31A           2 Hours West Wall       Area 12, Room 729.0-A1               II-31A           2 Hours Floor           Area 1, Room 713.0-A28               II-30A, II-31A   2 Hours Area 16, Room 737.0-A5               II-30A, II-31A   2 Hours Ceiling         Area 25, Room 782.0-A1               II-31A, II-32A   2 Hours Doors:
FPR Figure      Door Room         Door Number       Adjacent Area/Room Reference       Rating 757.0-A10    A155              Area 10, Room 757.0-A13    II-31A          1.5 Hours Dampers:
Damper/Mark                                     Drawing         Damper Room                              Adjacent Area/Room Number                                          Reference       Rating 782.0-A1      1-ISD-31-3119       Area 10, Room 757.0-A13     47W866-2        3 Hours 47A381-256F                                     47W920-9 1-ISD-31-3117       Area 10, Room 757.0-A13     47W866-2        3 Hours 47A381-253                                      47W920-10 757.0-A10     1-ISD-31-3786       Area 17, Room 757.0-A9      47W866-2        1.5 Hours 47A381-438                                      47W920-8 1-ISD-31-3788       Area 10, Room 757.0-A13     47W866-2        3 Hours 47A381-440F                                     47W920-8 Detection: Ionization smoke detectors are provided in the rooms.
Suppression: Automatic preaction sprinkler systems are provided in the rooms. A standpipe and hose station is provided in Rooms 782.0-A1 and 757.0-A10.
Deviations: The justification for the heavy sheet metal ducts is documented in Part VII, Section 2.6.3.2.b. The room contains intervening combustables in the form of insulation of cable in trays. The justification for using an enhanced suppression system to compensate for intervening combustibles is documented in Part VII, Section 2.4. No deviations are applicable to Rooms 782.0-A1 and -A2.
Evaluations: The feasibility and reliability evaluations for Unit 2 Operator Manual Actions are documented in Part VII, Sections 8.3.25, 51, 52, 62 and 65.
3.31.2         Room 757.0-A12

==
Description:==
Reactor Building Access Room (Unit 1)
VI-175

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                               Revision 60 Fire Loading: The combustibles consist of plastics associated with electrical panels and boxes and lights, insulation on cables in trays, and anticipated amounts of radwaste trash and laundry.
The fire severity is classified as moderate.
Compartmentation: The room is of reinforced concrete construction. A stairway provides access to Room 757.0-A12 from Room 782.0-A2.
Barriers:
FPR Figure          Regulatory Room            Direction        Adjacent Area/Room Reference           Barrier Rating 757.0-A12       North Wall       Area 13, Room 763.5-A1          II-31A, II-38A      3 Hours Area 13, Room 775.25-A1         II-31A, II-32A      3 Hours Area 13, Room 729.0-A14         II-31A, II-38A      3 Hours South Wall       Area 26, Room 757.0-A11         II-31A              3 Hours East Wall        Area 10, Room 757.0-A13         II-31A              2 Hours West Wall        Area 61, Unit 1 Reactor Bldg    II-31A              3 Hours Floor            Area 16, Room 737.0-A5          II-30A, II-31A      2 Hours Ceiling          Area 25, Room 782.0-A2          II-31A, II-32A      2 Hours Doors:
Door                                        FPR Figure       Door Room                        Adjacent Area/Room Number                                      Reference        Rating 757.0-A12     A156          Area 10, Room 757.0-A13       II-31A           1.5 Hours A162          Area 13, Room 763.5-A1        II-31A           3 Hours A164          Area 61, Unit 1 Reactor Bldg  II-31A            3 Hours A165          Area 61, Unit 1 Reactor Bldg  II-31A           3 Hours Dampers:
Damper/                                         Drawing          Damper Room                              Adjacent Area/Room Mark Number                                     Reference        Rating 757.0-A12      0-ISD-31-3839      Area 10, Room 757.0-A13      47W866-10        1.5 Hours 47A381-434F                                     47W920-7 0-ISD-31-3840      Area 16, Room 737.0-A5       47W866-10        3 Hours 47A381-623F                                     47W920-7 0-ISD-31-3841      Area 10, Room 757.0-A13      47W866-10        1.5 Hours 47A381-435F                                     47W920-7 0-ISD-31-3842      Area 16, Room 737.0-A5       47W866-10        3 Hours 47A381-626F                                     47W920-7 Detection: Ionization smoke detectors are provided in the room.
Suppression: Automatic sprinklers are provided in the room. Standpipe and hose stations are provided.
Deviations: None.
VI-176

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS Revision 60 Evaluations: None.
VI-177

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                         Revision 60 3.31.3          Fire Area 25 Safe Shutdown Analysis By Analysis Volume 3.31.3.1        AV-050 Room No.               

== Description:==

757.0-A10                Miscellaneous Equipment Room 782.0-A1                Unit 1 Control Rod Drive Equipment Room 782.0-A2                Pressurizer Heater Transformer Room 1 A fire in Analysis Volume 50 could potentially affect systems and components necessary to maintain the Unit 1 and Unit 2 steam generator inventory control and reactor pressure control functions and Unit 1 containment HVAC, reactor coolant inventory control, and secondary side isolation functions. Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Offsite power is available. The required mitigating features include providing fire wrap to selected Unit 1 cables to preclude damage in the event of a fire, manual operation of Unit 1 and Unit 2 equipment required for safe shutdown and Unit 1 repair procedures. The power cable for the Containment Air Return Fan 1B-B has a greater than 20 feet of horizontal separation with Containment Air Return Fan 1A-A to ensure availability to maintain containment pressure by starting and stopping one Containment Air Return Fan. These features and equipment affected and credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-178

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                         Revision 60 3.31.3.2        AV-051 Room No.              

== Description:==

757.0-A12              Reactor Building Access Room (Unit 1)
A fire in Analysis Volume 51 could potentially affect systems and components necessary to maintain the Unit 1 steam generator inventory control and secondary side isolation functions.
Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Offsite power is available.
The required mitigating features include manual operation of Unit 1 equipment required for safe shutdown. These features and equipment affected and credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-179

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                            Revision 60 3.32            FIRE AREA 26 3.32.1          Room 757.0-A11

==
Description:==
Unit 1 Reactor Bldg Equipment Hatch (During power operations this room is considered as part of Unit 1 Reactor Building.)
Fire Loading: The combustibles consist of plastics associated with the lights and insulation on cables in trays and Thermo-Lag on conduits. The fire severity is classified as low.
Compartmentation: The room is of reinforced concrete construction. The concrete plugs that close the opening provide an equivalent 3-hour fire barrier.
Barriers:
FPR Figure          Regulatory Room          Direction    Adjacent Area/Room Reference           Barrier Rating 757.0-A11     North Wall   Area 10, Room 757.0-A13         II-31A              3 Hours Area 25, Room 757.0-A12         II-31A              3 Hours South Wall   Area 10, Room 757.0-A13         II-31A              3 Hours Area 25, Room 757.0-A10         II-31A              3 Hours East Wall    Area 10, Room 757.0-A13         II-31A              3 Hours Floor        Area 14, Room 737.0-A1          II-30A, II-31A      3 Hours Area 16, Room 737.0-A5          II-30A, II-31A      3 Hours Ceiling      Area 25, Room 782.0-A1          II-31A, II-32A      3 Hours Area 10, Room 757.0-A13         II-31A, II-32A      3 Hours Doors: None.
Dampers: None.
Detection: Ionization smoke detectors are provided in the room.
Suppression: Automatic sprinklers are provided in the room except area near blast door.
Standpipe and hose stations are provided from the adjacent room (757.0-A13) when the equipment hatch concrete plugs are removed, e.g., during outages. This room is not accessible during power operations.
Deviations: None.
Evaluations: The justification for the surveillance frequency for sprinklers, detectors, penetration seals and Thermo-lag in the room and the justification for not requiring compensatory measures inside the room when the shield blocks are installed if fire protection related equipment in the room is impaired is documented in Part VII, Section 6.1 of the FPR.
VI-180

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                           Revision 60 3.32.2          Fire Area 26 Safe Shutdown Analyses By Analysis Volume 3.32.2.1        AV-052 Room No.               

== Description:==

757.0-A11               Unit 1 Reactor Bldg Equipment Hatch (During power, part of U1 Rx Bldg)
A fire in Analysis Volume 52 could potentially affect Unit 1 systems and components necessary to maintain the steam generator inventory control, containment HVAC, reactor pressure control and secondary side isolation functions. Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Offsite power is available. The required mitigating features for Unit 1 include providing fire wrap to selected cables to preclude damage in the event of a fire and manual operation of equipment required for safe shutdown. These features and equipment affected and credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-181

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                                Revision 60 3.33            FIRE AREA 27 3.33.1          Room 757.0-A5

==
Description:==
480V Shutdown Board Room 1B Fire Loading: The combustibles consist of plastics associated with electrical panels and boxes and lights and insulation on cables in trays, ERFBS Thermo-Lag, and miscellaneous items in a Fire Emergency Response Equipment Cage. The fire severity is classified as moderately severe.
Compartmentation: The room is of reinforced concrete construction.
Barriers:
Room         Direction      Adjacent Area/Room              FPR Figure              Regulatory Reference               Barrier Rating 757.0-A5     North Wall     Area 17, Room 757.0-A2          II-31A                  2 Hours South Wall     Area 48, Room 755.0-C1          II-31A, II-34A          3 Hours Area 48, Room 755.0-C6          II-31A, II-34A          3 Hours Area 48, Room 755.0-C8          II-31A, II-34A          3 Hours Area 48, Room 755.0-C9          II-31A, II-34A          3 Hours Area 48, Room 755.0-C12         II-31A, II-34A          3 Hours Area 48, Room 755.0-C3          II-31A, II-34A          3 Hours East Wall      Area 17, Room 757.0-A2          II-31A                  2 Hours Area 19, Room 757.0-A4          II-31A                  3 Hours Floor          Area 14, Room 737.0-A1          II-30A, II-31A          2 Hours Area 15-1, Room 737.0-A3        II-30A, II-31A          2 Hours Ceiling        Area 33, Room 772.0-A2          II-31A, II-32A          2 Hours Area 36, Room 772.0-A5          II-31A, II-32A          2 Hours Doors:
Door                                     FPR Figure Room                   Adjacent Area/Room                               Door Rating Number                                   Reference 757.0-A5    A143       Area 17, Room 757.0-A2        II-31A             1.5 Hours A145       Area 17, Room 757.0-A2        II-31A             1.5 Hours C49        Area 48, Room 755.0-C12       II-31A, II-34A     3 Hours Dampers:
Damper/Mark                                   Drawing         Damper Room                         Adjacent Area/Room Number                                        Reference       Rating 757.0-A5    0-ISD-31-4618    Area 19, Room 757.0-A4       47W866-3        3 Hours 47A381-513G                                   47W920-8 0-ISD-31-4619    Area 17, Room 757.0-A2       47W866-3        1.5 Hours 47A381-497F                                   47W920-8 0-ISD-31-4620    Area 17, Room 757.0-A2       47W866-3        1.5 Hours 47A381-495F                                   47W920-8 VI-182

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                           Revision 60 Dampers:
Damper/Mark                                  Drawing      Damper Room                         Adjacent Area/Room Number                                       Reference    Rating 0-ISD-31-4621    Area 17, Room 757.0-A2      47W866-3     1.5 Hours 47A381-495F                                  47W920-8 Detection: Ionization smoke detectors are provided in the room.
Suppression: Automatic sprinklers are provided in the room. Standpipe and hose stations are provided from the adjacent room (757.0-A2).
Deviations: The justification for fire doors is documented in Part VII, Section 4.1.
Evaluations: The feasibility and reliability evaluation for Unit 2 Operator Manual Action is documented in Part VII, Section 8.3.23.
VI-183

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                             Revision 60 3.33.2          Fire Area 27 Safe Shutdown Analysis By Analysis Volume 3.33.2.1        AV-053 Room No.               

== Description:==

757.0-A5                480V Shutdown Board Room 1B A fire in Analysis Volume 53 could potentially affect systems and components necessary to maintain the Unit 1 and Unit 2 steam generator inventory control, long term decay heat removal, MCR & containment HVAC, reactor coolant inventory control and Unit 2 reactor pressure control functions. Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown.
Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Offsite power is available. The required mitigating features for Unit 1 and Unit 2 include providing fire wrap to selected cables to preclude damage in the event of a fire and manual operation of equipment required for safe shutdown. These features and equipment affected and credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-184

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                                Revision 60 3.34            FIRE AREA 28 3.34.1          Room 757.0-A21

==
Description:==
480V Shutdown Board Room 2A Fire Loading: The combustibles consist of plastics associated with electrical panels and boxes and lights and insulation on cables in trays, and ERFBS Thermo-Lag. The fire severity is classified as moderately severe.
Compartmentation: The room is of reinforced concrete construction.
Barriers:
FPR Figure          Regulatory Room           Direction     Adjacent Area/Room Reference           Barrier Rating 757.0-A21      North Wall    Area 31, Room 757.0-A24           II-31A              2 Hours South Wall    Area 48, Room 755.0-C12           II-31A, II-34A      3 Hours Area 48, Room 755.0-C13           II-31A, II-34A      3 Hours Area 48, Room 755.0-C18           II-31A, II-34A      3 Hours Area 48, Room 755.0-C20           II-31A, II-34A      3 Hours West Wall     Area 29, Room 757.0-A22           II-31A              3 Hours Area 31, Room 757.0-A24           II-31A              2 Hours Floor         Area 14, Room 737.0-A1            II-30A, II-31A      2 Hours Area 15-2, Room 737.0-A12         II-30A, II-31A      2 Hours Ceiling       Area 42, Room 772.0-A12           II-31A, II-32A      2 Hours Area 45, Room 772.0-A15           II-31A, II-32A      2 Hours Doors:
Door                                    FPR Figure Room                      Adjacent Area/Room                              Door Rating Number                                  Reference 757.0-A21     A163        Area 31, Room 757.0-A24     II-31a              1.5 Hours A168        Area 31, Room 757.0-A24     II-31a              1.5 Hours C50         Area 48, Room 755.0-C12     II-31a, II-34a      3 Hours Dampers:
Damper/Mark                                    Drawing          Damper Room                           Adjacent Area/Room Number                                         Reference        Rating 757.0-A21    0-ISD-31-4622     Area 29, Room 757.0-A22      47W866-3         3 Hours 47A381-513G                                    47W920-8 0-ISD-31-4623     Area 31, Room 757.0-A24      47W866-3         1.5 Hours 47A381-497F                                    47W920-8 0-ISD-31-4624     Area 31, Room 757.0-A24      47W866-3         1.5 Hours 47A381-495F                                    47W920-8 0-ISD-31-4625     Area 31, Room 757.0-A24      47W866-3         1.5 Hours 47A381-495F                                    47W920-8 Detection: Ionization smoke detectors are provided in the room.
VI-185

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                          Revision 60 Suppression: Automatic sprinklers are provided in the room. Standpipe and hose stations are provided from the adjacent room (757.0-A24).
Deviations: The justification for fire doors is documented in Part VII, Section 4.1.
Evaluations: The feasibility and reliability evaluations for Unit 2 Operator Manual Actions are documented in Part VII, Sections 8.3.28 and 64.
VI-186

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                            Revision 60 3.34.2          Fire Area 28 Safe Shutdown Analysis By Analysis Volume 3.34.2.1        AV-054 Room No.               

== Description:==

757.0-A21               480V Shutdown Board Room 2A A fire in Analysis Volume 54 could potentially affect systems and components necessary to maintain the Unit 1 and Unit 2 steam generator inventory control and long term decay heat removal functions and Unit 2 containment HVAC, secondary side isolation and reactor coolant inventory control functions. Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited.
Offsite power is available. The required mitigating features for Unit 1 and Unit 2 include providing fire wrap to selected cables to preclude damage in the event of a fire, manual operation of equipment required for safe shutdown and Unit 2 repair procedures. These features and equipment affected and credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-187

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                                Revision 60 3.35            FIRE AREA 29 3.35.1          Room 757.0-A22

==
Description:==
125V Vital Battery Board Room IV Fire Loading: The combustibles consist of plastics associated with electrical panels and boxes and insulation on cables in trays. The fire severity is classified as low.
Compartmentation: The room is of reinforced concrete construction.
Barriers:
FPR Figure        Regulatory Room            Direction       Adjacent Area/Room Reference         Barrier Rating 757.0-A22       North Wall      Area 31, Room 757.0-A24           II-31A            3 Hours South Wall      Area 48, Room 755.0-C12           II-31A, II-34A    3 Hours East Wall       Area 28, Room 757.0-A21           II-31A            3 Hours West Wall       Area 30, Room 757.0-A23           II-31A            3 Hours Floor           Area 14, Room 737.0-A1            II-30A, II-31A    3 Hours Ceiling         Area 43, Room 772.0-A13           II-31A, II-32A    3 Hours Area 45, Room 772.0-A15           II-31A, II-32A    3 Hours Doors:
Door                                      FPR Figure Room                    Adjacent Area/Room                             Door Rating Number                                    Reference 757.0-A22    A169       Area 31, Room 757.0-A24        II-31A          3 Hours Dampers:
Damper/Mark                                      Drawing            Damper Room                           Adjacent Area/Room Number                                           Reference          Rating 757.0-A22    0-ISD-31-2785     Area 31, Room 757.0-A24        47W866-3           3 Hours 47A381-115G                                      47W920-8 0-ISD-31-4622     Area 28, Room 757.0-A21        47W866-3           3 Hours 47A381-513G                                      47W920-8 Detection: Ionization detection is provided in the room.
Suppression: A manually actuated preaction sprinkler system is provided in the room. A standpipe and hose station is provided from the adjacent room (757.0-A24).
Deviations: None.
Evaluations: The feasibility and reliability evaluations for Unit 2 Operator Manual Actions are documented in Part VII, Sections 8.3.29, 62 and 65.
VI-188

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                          Revision 60 3.35.2          Fire Area 29 Safe Shutdown Analysis By Analysis Volume 3.35.2.1        AV-055 Room No.               

== Description:==

757.0-A22               125V Vital Battery Board Room IV A fire in Analysis Volume 55 could potentially affect systems and components necessary to maintain the Unit 1 and Unit 2 long term decay heat removal, MCR & containment HVAC, reactor coolant inventory control, steam generator inventory control, and reactor pressure control functions. Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Offsite power is available to 1A and 2A Trains. The required mitigating features include manual operation of Unit 1 and Unit 2 equipment required for safe shutdown. These features and equipment affected and credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-189

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                                Revision 60 3.36           FIRE AREA 30 3.36.1         Room 757.0-A23

==
Description:==
125V Vital Battery Board Room III Fire Loading: The combustibles consist of plastics associated with electrical panels and boxes and insulation on cables in trays. The fire severity is classified as low.
Compartmentation: The room is of reinforced concrete construction.
Barriers:
FPR Figure        Regulatory Room            Direction       Adjacent Area/Room Reference         Barrier Rating 757.0-A23       North Wall      Area 31, Room 757.0-A24        II-31A            3 Hours South Wall      Area 48, Room 755.0-C12        II-31A, II-34A    3 Hours East Wall       Area 29, Room 757.0-A22        II-31A            3 Hours West Wall       Area 23, Room 757.0-A27        II-31A            3 Hours Area 24, Room 757.0-A28        II-31A            3 Hours Floor           Area 14, Room 737.0-A1         II-30A, II-31A    3 Hours Ceiling         Area 43, Room 772.0-A13        II-31A, II-32A    3 Hours Area 44, Room 772.0-A14        II-31A, II-32A    3 Hours Doors:
Door                                      FPR Figure Room                      Adjacent Area/Room                            Door Rating Number                                    Reference 757.0-A23    A170         Area 31, Room 757.0-A24      II-31A           3 Hours Dampers:
Damper/Mark                                      Drawing           Damper Room                           Adjacent Area/Room Number                                           Reference         Rating 757.0-A23    0-ISD-31-2780     Area 31, Room 757.0-A24        47W866-3          3 Hours 47A381-192F                                      47W920-8 0-ISD-31-2782     Area 31, Room 757.0-A24        47W866-3          3 Hours 47A381-115G                                      47W920-8 Detection: Ionization detectors are provided in the room.
Suppression: A manually actuated preaction sprinkler system is provided in the room. A standpipe and hose station is provided from the adjacent room (757.0-A24).
Deviations: None.
Evaluations: The feasibility and reliability evaluations for Unit 2 Operator Manual Actions are documented in Part VII, Sections 8.3.30, 63 and 64.
VI-190

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                            Revision 60 3.36.2          Fire Area 30 Safe Shutdown Analysis By Analysis Volume 3.36.2.1        AV-056 Room No.              

== Description:==

757.0-A23              125V Vital Battery Board Room III A fire in Analysis Volume 56 could potentially affect systems and components necessary to maintain the long term decay heat removal, MCR & containment HVAC, steam generator inventory control, reactor coolant inventory control and reactor pressure control functions.
Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Offsite power is available to 1B and 2B Trains. The required mitigating features include manual operation of Unit 1 and Unit 2 equipment required for safe shutdown and Unit 2 repair procedures. These features and equipment affected and credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-191

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                         Revision 60 3.37            FIRE AREA 31 3.37.1          Rooms 757.0-A17 and A24 Room No.               

== Description:==

757.0-A17               Unit 2 Personnel and Equipment Access Room 757.0-A24               6.9kV and 480V Shutdown Board Room B Fire Loading: The combustibles in the Personnel and Equipment Access room consist of plastics associated with electrical panels and boxes and lights and insulation on cables in trays.
The fire severity is classified as low. The combustibles in the 6.9kV and 480V Shutdown Board Room B consist of plastics associated with electrical panels and boxes and lights, rubber hoses, other miscellaneous plastics and paper and insulation on cables in trays, and ERFBS Thermo-Lag. The fire severity is classified as moderately severe.
Compartmentation: The room is of reinforced concrete construction. The equipment hatch is normally closed with a steel cover that is non-rated and the opening is protected with a water curtain.
Barriers:
FPR Figure         Regulatory Room         Direction         Adjacent Area/Room Reference          Barrier Rating 757.0-A24    North Wall        Area 10, Elevator Shaft     II-31A             2 Hours Area 10, Room 757.0-A13     II-31A             2 Hours Area 46, Room 772.0-A16     II-32A             2 Hours Area 72, room 729.0-A11     II-31A             2 Hours Area 75, Room 757.0-A16     II-31A             2 Hours South Wall        Area 20, Room 757.0-A1      II-31A             2 Hours Area 24, Room 757.0-A28     II-31A             2 Hours Area 28, Room 757.0-A21     II-31A             3 Hours Area 29, Room 757.0-A22     II-31A             3 Hours Area 30, Room 757.0-A23     II-31A             2 Hours East Wall         Area 28, Room 757.0-A21     II-31A             2 Hours Area 42, Room 772.0-A12     II-32A             2 Hours West Wall         Area 17, Room 757.0-A2      II-31A             2 Hours Area 45, Room 772.0-A15     II-32A             2 Hours Floor             Area 14, Room 737.0-A1      II-30A, II-31A     2 Hours Area 15-2, Room 737.0-A12   II-30A, II-31A     2 Hours Ceiling           Area 40, Room 772.0-A10     II-31A, II-32A     2 Hours Area 41, Room 772.0-A11     II-31A, II-32A     2 Hours Area 45, Room 772.0-A15     II-31A, II-32A     2 Hours Area 46, Room 772.0-A16     II-31A, II-32A     2 Hours 757.0-A17    North Wall        Area 75, Room 757.0-A16     II-31A             2 Hours West Wall         Area 10, Room 757.0-A13     II-31A             2 Hours VI-192

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                               Revision 60 Barriers:
FPR Figure             Regulatory Room      Direction      Adjacent Area/Room Reference              Barrier Rating Floor          Area 14, Room 737.0-A1        II-30A, II-31A         2 Hours Ceiling        Area 10, Room 772.0-A9        II-31A, II-32A         2 Hours Area 40, Room 772.0-A10       II-31A, II-32A         2 Hours Doors:
Door                                   FPR Figure Room                  Adjacent Area/Room                             Door Rating Number                                 Reference 757.0-A24  A163       Area 28, Room 757.0-A21     II-31A              1.5 Hours A168       Area 28, Room 757.0-A21     II-31A              1.5 Hours A169       Area 29, Room 757.0-A22     II-31A             3 Hours A170       Area 30, Room 757.0-A23     II-31A             3 Hours A171       Area 17, Room 757.0-A2      II-31A              1.5 Hours A175       Area 20, Room 757.0-A1      II-31A              1.5 Hours A191       Area 45, Room 772.0-A15     II-32A              1.5 Hours 757.0-A17  A159       Area 10, Room 757.0-A13     II-31A             1.5 Hours Dampers:
Damper/Mark                                    Drawing          Damper Room                       Adjacent Area/Room Number                                         Reference        Rating 757.0-A24 0-ISD-31-2771    Area 20, Room 757.0-A1        47W866-3         3 Hours 47A381-130F                                    47W920-8, 26 0-ISD-31-2772    Area 20, Room 757.0-A1        47W866-3         1.5 Hours 47A381-113F                                    47W920-8, 26 0-ISD-31-2780    Area 30, Room 757.0-A23       47W866-3         3 Hours 47A381-192F                                    47W920-8 0-ISD-31-2782    Area 30, Room 757.0-A23       47W866-3         3 Hours 47A381-115G                                    47W920-8 0-ISD-31-2785    Area 29, Room 757.0-A22       47W866-3         3 Hours 47A381-115G                                    47W920-8 0-ISD-31-4623    Area 28, Room 757.0-A21       47W866-3         1.5 Hours 47A381-497F                                    47W920-8 757.0-A17 0-ISD-31-4624    Area 28, Room 757.0-A21       47W866-3         1.5 Hours 47A381-495F                                    47W920-8 0-ISD-31-4625    Area 28, Room 757.0-A21       47W866-3         1.5 Hours 47A381-495F                                    47W920-8 2-ISD-31-2500    Area 40, Room 772.0-A10       47W866-3         3 Hours 47A381-326F                                    47W920-28 2-ISD-31-3884    Area 75, Room 757.0-A16       47W866-11        3 Hours 47A381-438F                                    47W920-8 VI-193

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                          Revision 60 Dampers:
Damper/Mark                                  Drawing        Damper Room                             Adjacent Area/Room Number                                       Reference      Rating 2-ISD-31-3957     Area 10, Room 757.0-A13    47W866-11      1.5 Hours 47A381-438                                   47W920-8 Detection: Ionization smoke detectors are provided in the rooms.
Suppression: Automatic sprinklers are provided in the rooms. In addition a water curtain is provided for the equipment hatch. A standpipe and hose station is provided in Room 757.0-A24.
Deviations: The 772.0 floor slab has an equipment hatch with a non-rated cover that is protected by a water curtain. The justification is documented in Part VII, Section 2.6.3.1. The justification for hose stations having more than 100 feet of hose is documented in Part VII, Section 4.3.
Evaluations: The feasibility and reliability evaluations for Unit 2 Operator Manual Actions are documented in Part VII, Sections 8.3.27, 31, 62 and 65.
VI-194

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                          Revision 60 3.37.2          Fire Area 31 Safe Shutdown Analysis By Analysis Volume 3.37.2.1        AV-057 Room No.               

== Description:==

757.0-A17               Unit 2 Personnel and Equipment Access 757.0-A24               6.9kV and 480V Shutdown Room B This AV contains cables and/or equipment associated with the 5th Vital Battery. The 5th Vital Battery is credited as an "installed spare" that can be used during normal plant operation if one of the existing batteries is down for maintenance. This AV is analyzed to address the effects of a fire on the 125V DC system if the 5th Vital Battery is in service in replacement of any one of the other four normally credited batteries. An additional four analyses are performed (AV-057D through G) for this AV to address the various combinations where the 5th Vital Battery can be used.
A fire in Analysis Volume 57 could potentially affect systems and components necessary to maintain the steam generator inventory control, long term decay heat removal, MCR &
containment HVAC, reactor coolant inventory control and reactor pressure control functions.
Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Offsite power may not be available. Onsite power is available to 1A and 2A Trains. The required mitigating features include providing fire wrap to selected Unit 1 and Unit 2 cables to preclude damage in the event of a fire and manual operation of equipment required for safe shutdown. These features and equipment affected and credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-195

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                         Revision 60 3.37.2.2        AV-057D Room No.              

== Description:==

757.0-A17              Unit 2 Personnel and Equipment Access Room 757.0-A24              6.9kV and 480V Shutdown Room B A fire in Analysis Volume 57D could potentially affect systems and components necessary to maintain the steam generator inventory control, long term decay heat removal, MCR &
containment HVAC, reactor coolant inventory control and reactor pressure control functions.
Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Offsite power may not be available. Onsite power is available to 1A and 2A Trains. The required mitigating features for Unit 1 and Unit 2 include providing fire wrap to selected cables to preclude damage in the event of a fire and manual operation of equipment required for safe shutdown. These features and equipment affected and credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-196

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                         Revision 60 3.37.2.3        AV-057E Room No.              

== Description:==

757.0-A17              Unit 2 Personnel and Equipment Access Room 757.0-A24              6.9kV and 480V Shutdown Room B A fire in Analysis Volume 57E could potentially affect systems and components necessary to maintain the steam generator inventory control, long term decay heat removal, MCR &
containment HVAC, reactor coolant inventory control and reactor pressure control functions.
Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Offsite power may not be available. Onsite power is available to 1A and 2A Trains. The required mitigating features for Unit 1 and Unit 2 include providing fire wrap to selected cables to preclude damage in the event of a fire and manual operation of equipment required for safe shutdown. These features and equipment affected and credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-197

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                         Revision 60 3.37.2.4        AV-057F Room No.              

== Description:==

757.0-A17              Unit 2 Personnel and Equipment Access Room 757.0-A24              6.9kV and 480V Shutdown Room B A fire in Analysis Volume 57F could potentially affect systems and components necessary to maintain the steam generator inventory control, long term decay heat removal, MCR &
containment HVAC, reactor coolant inventory control and reactor pressure control functions.
Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Offsite power may not be available. Onsite power is available to 1A and 2A Trains. The required mitigating features for Unit 1 and Unit 2 include providing fire wrap to selected cables to preclude damage in the event of a fire and manual operation of equipment required for safe shutdown. These features and equipment affected and credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-198

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                         Revision 60 3.37.2.5        AV-057G Room No.              

== Description:==

757.0-A17              Unit 2 Personnel and Equipment Access Room 757.0-A24              6.9kV and 480V Shutdown Room B A fire in Analysis Volume 57G could potentially affect systems and components necessary to maintain the steam generator inventory control, long term decay heat removal, MCR &
containment HVAC, reactor coolant inventory control and reactor pressure control functions.
Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Offsite power may not be available. Onsite power is available to 1A and 2A Trains. The required mitigating features for Unit 1 and Unit 2 include providing fire wrap to selected cables to preclude damage in the event of a fire and manual operation of equipment required for safe shutdown. These features and equipment affected and credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-199

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                              Revision 60 3.38             FIRE AREA 32 3.38.1           Room 772.0-A1

==
Description:==
480V Board Room 1-A Fire Loading: The combustibles in the 480V Board room consist of plastics associated with the electrical panels and boards and lights, oil in a hoist, and insulation on cables in trays, and ERFBS Thermo-Lag. The fire severity is classified as moderately severe.
Compartmentation: The rooms are of reinforced concrete construction. The equipment hatch in the floor of the 480V Board room is provided with a non-fire rated steel cover, and the opening is protected with a water curtain.
Barriers:
FPR Figure        Regulatory Room             Direction      Adjacent Area/Room Reference         Barrier Rating 772.0-A1         NORTH          AREA 10, ELEVATOR SHAFT           II-32A            2 Hours WALL           AREA 10, ROOM 757.0-A13           II-32A            2 Hours AREA 38, ROOM 772.0-A7            II-32A            2 Hours AREA 39, ROOM 772.0-A8            II-32A            2 Hours SOUTH          AREA 33, ROOM 772.0-A2            II-32A            2 Hours WALL           AREA 17, ROOM 757.0-A2            II-31A, II-32A    2 Hours EAST WALL      AREA 46, ROOM 772.0-A16           II-32A            2 Hours WEST WALL      AREA 36, ROOM 772,0-A5            II-32A            2 Hours AREA 37, ROOM 772.0-A6            II-32A            2 Hours FLOOR          AREA 17, ROOM 757.0-A2            II-31A, II-32A    2 Hours Doors:
Door                                     FPR Figure Room                       Adjacent Area/Room                            Door Rating Number                                   Reference 772.0-A1      A180         Area 33, Room 772.0-A2      II-32A             1.5 Hours A186         Area 37, Room 772.0-A6      II-32A             1.5 Hours A187         Area 38, Room 772.0-A7      II-32A             1.5 Hours A197         Area 46, Room 772.0-A16     II-32A             1.5 Hours A210         Area 39, Room 772.0-A8      II-32A             1.5 Hours Dampers:
Room          Damper/Mark         Adjacent                Drawing          Damper Number              Area/Room               Reference        Rating 772.0-A1      1-ISD-31-2504       Area 38, Room           47W886-3         3 Hours 47A381-301F         772.0-A7                47W920-9 1-ISD-31-2515       Area 38, Room           47W866-3         1.5 Hours 47A381-644G         772.0-A7                47W920-9 1-ISD-31-2516       Area 38, Room           47W866-3         3 Hours 47A381-301F         772.0-A7                47W920-9 1-ISD-31-2526       Area 33, Room           47W866-3         3 Hours VI-200

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                         Revision 60 Dampers:
Room         Damper/Mark        Adjacent              Drawing         Damper Number             Area/Room             Reference       Rating 47A381-311F        772.0-A2              47W920-9 1-ISD-31-2554      Area 33, Room         47W866-3        3 Hours 47A381-739         772.0-A2              47W920-9 0-ISD-31-5455      Area 39, Room         47W866-3        3 Hours 47A381-776         772.0-A8              47W920-16 Detection: Ionization smoke detectors are provided in the room.
Suppression: Automatic preaction sprinkler systems are provided in the room. A standpipe and hose station is provided from adjacent room (772.0-A7).
Deviations: The floor has an equipment hatch with a non-rated cover that is protected by a water curtain. The justification is documented in Part VII, 2.6.3.1.
Evaluations: The feasibility and reliability evaluations for Unit 2 Operator Manual Actions are documented in Part VII, Sections 8.3.35, 63, and 64.
VI-201

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                           Revision 60 3.38.2          Fire Area 32 Safe Shutdown Analyses By Analysis Volume 3.38.2.1        AV-058 Room No.              

== Description:==

772.0-A1               480V Board Room 1-A A fire in Analysis Volume 58 could potentially affect systems and components necessary to maintain the long term decay heat removal, steam generator inventory control, MCR &
containment HVAC, reactor pressure control and reactor coolant inventory control functions.
Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Offsite power is available.
The required mitigating features include providing fire wrap to selected Unit 1 cables to preclude damage in the event of a fire and manual operation of Unit 1 and Unit 2 equipment required for safe shutdown. These features and equipment affected and credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016; VI-202

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                            Revision 60 3.39             FIRE AREA 33 3.39.1           Room 772.0-A2

==
Description:==
480V Board Room 1-B (Subdivided into 772.0-A2A1, -A2A2, -A2A3, -A2A4)
Fire Loading: The combustibles consist of plastics associated with electrical boards, panels, and boxes, HVAC duct insulation, insulation on cables in trays, and ERFBS Thermo-Lag. The fire severity is classified as severe.
Compartmentation: The room is of reinforced concrete construction.
Barriers:
FPR Figure         Regulatory Room             Direction          Adjacent Area/Room Reference          Barrier Rating 772.0-A2         North Wall         Area 17, Room 757.0-A2        II-31A, II-32A     2 Hours Area 32, Room 772.0-A1        II-32A             2 Hours South Wall         Area 34, Room 772.0-A3        II-32A             3 Hours Area 35, Room 772.0-A4        II-32A             3 Hours Area 48, Room 755.0-C12       II-32A, II-34A     3 Hours Area 48, Room 755.0-C9        II-32A, II-34A     3 Hours East Wall          Area 35, Room 772.0-A4        II-32A             3 Hours Area 45, Room 772.0-A15       II-32A             2 Hours West Wall          Area 17, Room 757.0-A2        II-31A, II-32A     2 Hours Area 34, Room 772.0-A3        II-32A             3 Hours Area 36, Room 772.0-A5        II-32A             2 Hours Floor              Area 17, Room 757.0-A2        II-31A, II-32A     2 Hours Area 19, Room 757.0-A4        II-31A, II-32A     2 Hours Area 20, Room 757.0-A1        II-31A, II-32A     2 Hours Area 21, Room 757.0-A25       II-31A, II-32A     2 Hours Area 22, Room 757.0-A26       II-31A, II-32A     2 Hours Area 27, Room 757.0-A5        II-31A, II-32A     2 Hours Ceiling (partial)  Area 47, Room 786.0-A4        II-32A             2 Hours Area 47, Room 786.0-A5        II-32A             3 Hours Doors:
Door                                       FPR Figure        Door Room                        Adjacent Area/Room Number                                     Reference         Rating 772.0-A2        A180        Area 32, Room 772.0-A1         II-32A             1.5 Hours A181        Area 34, Room 772.0-A3         II-32A            3 Hours A182        Area 35, Room 772.0-A4         II-32A            3 Hours A184        Area 17, Room 757.0-A2         II-31A, II-32A    1.5 Hours A196        Area 45, Room 772.0-A15        II-32              1.5 Hours Dampers:
Damper/Mark                                       Drawing           Damper Room                                 Adjacent Area/Room Number                                            Reference         Rating 772.0-A2       1-ISD-31-2517         Area 47, Room 786.0-A4      47W866-3          3 Hours 47A381-308F                                       47W920-29 VI-203

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                             Revision 60 Dampers:
Damper/Mark                                      Drawing         Damper Room                              Adjacent Area/Room Number                                           Reference       Rating 1-ISD-31-2518       Area 47, Room 786.0-A4       47W866-3        3 Hours 47A381-313F                                      47W920-29 1-ISD-31-2519       Area 47, Room 786.0-A4       47W866-3        3 Hours 47A381-307F                                      47W920-29 1-ISD-31-2523       Area 34, Room 772.0-A3       47W866-3        3 Hours 47A381-312F                                      47W920-9 1-ISD-31-2525       Area 35, Room 772.0-A4       47W866-3        3 Hours 47A381-311F                                      47W920-9 1-ISD-31-2526       Area 32, Room 772.0-A1       47W866-3        3 Hours 47A381-311F                                      47W920-9 1-ISD-31-2554       Area 32, Room 772.0-A1       47W866-3        3 Hours 47A381-739                                       47W920-9 1-ISD-31-2555       Area 34, Room 772.0-A3       47W866-3        3 Hours 47A381-738                                       47W920-9 Detection: Ionization smoke detectors are provided in the room.
Suppression: An automatic preaction sprinkler system is provided for the room, except between column lines A6-A8/Q-R. A standpipe and hose station is provided from room 772.0-A7.
Deviations: The room contains intervening combustibles in the form of insulation on cables in trays and ERFBS. The justification for using an enhanced suppression system to compensate for the intervening combustibles is documented in Part VII, Section 2.4.
Evaluations: The lack of suppression between column lines A6-A8/Q-R is documented in Part VII, Section 3.1.8. The feasibility and reliability evaluations for Unit 2 Operator Manual Actions are documented in Part VII, Sections 8.3.36, 37, 62, 63, 64, and 65.
VI-204

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                           Revision 60 3.39.2          Fire Area 33 Safe Shutdown Analysis By Analysis Volume 3.39.2.1        AV-059 Room No.              

== Description:==

772.0-A2A1             480V Board Room 1-B, Column Lines A8-A6 772.0-A2A2             480V Board Room 1-B, Column Lines A6-A5 772.0-A2A3             480V Board Room 1-B, Column Lines A5-A4 A fire in Analysis Volume 59 could potentially affect systems and components necessary to maintain the Unit 1 and Unit 2 steam generator inventory control, long term decay heat removal, MCR &containment HVAC, reactor coolant inventory control and reactor pressure control functions. Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown.
Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Offsite power is available for Trains 1A and 2A. The Unit 1 Train B 480VAC C&A Vent Boards are initially available, but may be lost after 3 hours due to transformer vent fan failures. Train 1B C&A Vent Board power is only needed to close one MOV (seven minutes) to prevent RWST drawdown.
The required mitigating features include providing fire wrap to selected Unit 1 cables to preclude damage in the event of a fire and manual operation of Unit 1 and Unit 2 equipment required for safe shutdown. These features and equipment affected and credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-205

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                          Revision 60 3.39.2.2        AV-060 Room No.              

== Description:==

772.0-A2A3              480V Board Room 1-B, Column Lines A5-A4 772.0-A2A4              480V Board Room 1-B, Column Lines A4-A3 A fire in Analysis Volume 60 could potentially affect systems and components necessary to maintain the Unit 1 and Unit 2 steam generator inventory control, long term decay heat removal, MCR & containment HVAC, reactor coolant inventory control functions. Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Offsite power is available. The required mitigating features include providing fire wrap to selected Unit 1 cables to preclude damage in the event of a fire and manual operation of Unit 1 and Unit 2 equipment required for safe shutdown. These features and equipment affected and credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-206

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                             Revision 60 3.40           FIRE AREA 34 3.40.1         Room 772.0-A3

==
Description:==
125V Vital Battery Room II Fire Loading: The combustibles consist of plastics associated with electrical panels and boxes and the battery cases. Adequate ventilation is provided to preclude explosive concentrations of hydrogen. The fire severity is classified as low.
Compartmentation: The room is of reinforced concrete construction.
Barriers:
FPR Figure       Regulatory Room         Direction        Adjacent Area/Room Reference        Barrier Rating 772.0-A3     North Wall       Area 33, Room 772.0-A2            II-32A           3 hours South Wall       Area 48, Room 755.0-C12           II-32A, II-34A   3 hours East Wall        Area 33, Room 772.0-A2            II-32A           3 hours West Wall        Area 35, Room 772.0-A4            II-32A           3 hours Floor            Area 18, Room 757.0-A3            II-31A, II-32A   3 hours Area 21, Room 757.0-A25           II-31A, II-32A   3 hours Area 22, Room 757.0-A26           II-31A, II-32A   3 hours Doors:
Door                                      FPR Figure     Door Room                    Adjacent Area/Room Number                                    Reference      Rating 772.0-A3    A181        Area 33, Room 772.0-A2        II-32A         3 hours Dampers:
Damper/Mark                                      Drawing         Damper Room                           Adjacent Area/Room Number                                           Reference       Rating 772.0-A3    1-ISD-31-2523      Area 33, Room 772.0-A2        47W866-3        3 hours 47A381-312F                                      47W920-9 1-ISD-31-2555      Area 33, Room 772.0-A2        47W866-3        3 hours 47A381-738                                       47W920-9 1-ISD-31-2556      Area 35, Room 772.0-A4        47W866-3        3 hours 47A381-737                                       47W920-9 Detection: Ionization smoke detection is provided in the room.
Suppression: A manually actuated preaction sprinkler system is provided in the room. A standpipe and hose station is provided from room 772.0-A7.
Deviations: None.
Evaluations: None.
VI-207

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                        Revision 60 3.40.2          Fire Area 34 Safe Shutdown Analysis By Analysis Volume 3.40.2.1        AV-061 Room No.              

== Description:==

772.0-A3               125V Vital Battery Room II A fire in Analysis Volume 61 could potentially affect systems and components necessary to maintain the long term decay heat removal, reactor coolant inventory control, steam generator inventory control, MCR & containment HVAC and reactor pressure control functions. Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Offsite power is available to 1A and 2A Trains.
The required mitigating features include manual operation of Unit 1 and Unit 2 equipment required for safe shutdown. These features and equipment affected and credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-208

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                               Revision 60 3.41           FIRE AREA 35 3.41.1         Room 772.0-A4

==
Description:==
125V Vital Battery Room I Fire Loading: The combustibles consist of plastics associated with electrical panels and boxes and the battery cases. Adequate ventilation is provided to preclude explosive concentrations of hydrogen. The fire severity is classified as low.
Compartmentation: The room is of reinforced concrete construction.
Barriers:
FPR Figure       Regulatory Room       Direction           Adjacent Area/Room Reference        Barrier Rating 772.0-A4   NORTH WALL          AREA 33, ROOM 772.0-A2           II-32A           3 Hours SOUTH WALL          AREA 48, ROOM 755.0-C12          II-32A           3 Hours EAST WALL           AREA 34, ROOM 772.0-A3           II-32A           3 Hours WEST WALL           AREA 33, ROOM 772.0-A2           II-32A           3 Hours FLOOR               AREA 18, ROOM 757.0-A3           II-31A, II-32A   3 Hours AREA 19, ROOM 757.0-A4           II-31A, II-32A   3 Hours Doors:
Door                                      FPR Figure Room                   Adjacent Area/Room                            Door Rating Number                                    Reference 772.0-A4   A182        AREA 33, ROOM 772.0-A2        II-32A          3 Hours Dampers:
Damper/Mark                                        Drawing          Damper Room                          Adjacent Area/Room Number                                             Reference        Rating 772.0-A4   1-ISD-31-2525      AREA 33, ROOM 772.0-A2          47W866-3         3 Hours 47A381-311F                                        47W920-9 1-ISD-31-2556      AREA 34, ROOM 772.0-A3          47W866-3         3 Hours 47A381-737                                         47W920-9 Detection: Ionization smoke detectors are provided in the room.
Suppression: A manually actuated preaction sprinkler system is provided in the room.
Standpipe and hose stations are provided from room 772.0-A7.
Deviations: None.
Evaluations: The feasibility and reliability evaluations for Unit 2 Operator Manual Actions are documented in Part VII, Sections 8.3.38, 63, and 64.
VI-209

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                        Revision 60 3.41.2          Fire Area 35 Safe Shutdown Analysis By Analysis Volume 3.41.2.1        AV-062 Room No.              

== Description:==

772.0-A4               125V VITAL BATTERY ROOM I A fire in Analysis Volume 62 could potentially affect systems and components necessary to maintain the long term decay heat removal, reactor coolant inventory control, steam generator inventory control, MCR & containment HVAC and reactor pressure control functions. Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Offsite power is available to 1B and 2B Trains.
The required mitigating features include manual operation of Unit 1 and Unit 2 equipment required for safe shutdown. These features and equipment affected and credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-210

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                               Revision 60 3.42           FIRE AREA 36 3.42.1         Room 772.0-A5

==
Description:==
480V Transformer Room 1-B Fire Loading: The combustibles consist of plastics associated with electrical panels, oil in the transformers, insulation on the cables in the trays, and ERFBS Thermo-Lag. The fire severity is classified as moderate.
Compartmentation: The room is of reinforced concrete construction.
Barriers:
FPR Figure          Regulatory Room         Direction     Adjacent Area/Room Reference           Barrier Rating 772.0-A5     NORTH         AREA 37, ROOM 772.0-A6          II-32A              2 Hours WALL SOUTH         AREA 48, ROOM 755.0-C1          II-32A, II-34A      3 Hours WALL          AREA 48, ROOM 755.0-C6          II-32A, II-34A      3 Hours AREA 48, ROOM 755.0-C8          II-32A, II-34A      3 Hours AREA 48, ROOM 755.0-C9          II-32A, II-34A      3 Hours EAST WALL     AREA 17, ROOM 757.0-A2          II-31A, II-32A      2 Hours AREA 32, ROOM 772.0-A1          II-32A              2 Hours AREA 33, ROOM 772.0-A2          II-32A              2 Hours FLOOR         AREA 27, ROOM 757.0-A5          II-31A, II-32A      2 Hours Doors:
Door                                     FPR Figure Room                    Adjacent Area/Room                             Door Rating Number                                   Reference 772.0-A5    A185        AREA 37, ROOM 772.0-A6       II-32A            1.5 Hours Dampers: None.
Detection: Ionization detectors are provided in the room.
Suppression: An automatic preaction sprinkler system is provided in the room. A standpipe and hose station is provided from room 772.0-A7.
Deviations: None.
Evaluations: None.
VI-211

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                          Revision 60 3.42.2           Fire Area 36 Safe Shutdown Analysis By Analysis Volume 3.42.2.1         AV-063 Room No.               

== Description:==

772.0-A5                480V Transformer Room 1-B A fire in Analysis Volume 63 could potentially affect systems and components necessary to maintain the Unit 1 and Unit 2 long term decay heat removal, MCR HVAC, steam generator inventory control functions and Unit 1 reactor coolant inventory control and containment HVAC functions. Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown.
Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Offsite power is available. The required mitigating features include providing fire wrap to selected Unit 1 and Unit 2 cables to preclude damage in the event of a fire and manual operation of Unit 1 and Unit 2 equipment required for safe shutdown. These features and equipment affected and credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-212

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                              Revision 60 3.43            FIRE AREA 37 3.43.1          Room 772.0-A6

==
Description:==
480V Transformer Room 1-A Fire Loading: The combustibles consist of plastics associated with electrical panels, oil in the transformers, insulation on the cables in the trays, and ERFBS Thermo-Lag.. The fire severity is classified as moderate.
Compartmentation: The room is of reinforced concrete construction.
Barriers:
FPR Figure        Regulatory Barrier Room          Direction      Adjacent Area/Room Reference         Rating 772.0-A6      NORTH          AREA 12, ROOM 729.0-A1         II-32A            2 Hours WALL           AREA 25, ROOM 757.0-A10        II-31A, II-32A    2 Hours AREA 25, ROOM 782.0-A1         II-32A            2 Hours SOUTH          AREA 36, ROOM 772.0-A5         II-32A            2 Hours WALL EAST WALL      AREA 32, ROOM 772.0-A1         II-32A            2 Hours AREA 38, ROOM 772.0-A7         II-32A            2 Hours FLOOR          AREA 17, ROOM 757.0-A2         II-31A, II-32A    2 Hours Doors:
Door                                    FPR Figure Room                    Adjacent Area/Room                             Door Rating Number                                  Reference 772.0-A6     A185       AREA 36, ROOM 772.0-A5       II-32A             1.5 Hours A186       AREA 32, ROOM 772.0-A1       II-32A             1.5 Hours Dampers: None.
Detection: Ionization smoke detectors are provided in the room.
Suppression: An automatic preaction sprinkler system is provided in the room. A standpipe and hose station is provided from the adjacent room (772.0-A7).
Deviations: None.
Evaluations: The feasibility and reliability evaluations for Unit 2 Operator Manual Actions are documented in Part VII, Sections 8.3.40 and 64.
VI-213

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                          Revision 60 3.43.2          Fire Area 37 Safe Shutdown Analysis By Analysis Volume 3.43.2.1        AV-064 Room No.              

== Description:==

772.0-A6               480V Transformer Room 1-A A fire in Analysis Volume 64 could potentially affect systems and components necessary to maintain the Unit 1 and Unit 2 steam generator inventory control and MCR & containment HVAC functions and Unit 1 long term decay heat removal, reactor coolant inventory control and reactor pressure control functions. Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Offsite power is available. The required mitigating features include providing fire wrap to selected Unit 1 cables to preclude damage in the event of a fire, manual operation of Unit 1 and Unit 2 equipment required for safe shutdown and Unit 1 repair procedures. These features and equipment affected and credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-214

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                            Revision 60 3.44             FIRE AREA 38 3.44.1           Room 772.0-A7

==
Description:==
Unit 1 Mechanical Equipment Room Fire Loading: The combustibles consist of lube oil in motors and compressors, plastics associated with the electrical panels and boxes and lights, and insulation on piping and cables in trays. The fire severity is classified as moderately severe.
Compartmentation: The room is of reinforced concrete construction.
Barriers:
Regulatory FPR Figure Room        Direction           Adjacent Area/Room                                  Barrier Reference Rating 772.0-A7    North Wall          Area 25, Room 757.0-A10          II-31A, II-32A     2 Hours Area 25, Room 782.0-A1           II-32A             2 Hours South Wall          Area 32, Room 772.0-A1           II-32A             2 Hours East Wall           Area 39, Room 772.0-A8           II-32A             2 Hours West Wall           Area 37, Room 772.0-A6           II-32A             2 Hours Floor               Area 17, Room 757.0-A2           II-31A, II-32A     2 Hours Area 17, Room 757.0-A9           II-31A, II-32A     2 Hours Doors:
Door                                       FPR Figure      Door Room                   Adjacent Area/Room Number                                     Reference       Rating 772.0-A7    A187       AREA 32, ROOM 772.0-A1          II-32A           1.5 Hours Dampers:
Damper/Mark                                      Drawing          Damper Room                              Adjacent Area/Room Number                                           Reference        Rating 772.0-A7     1-ISD-31-2500        AREA 17, ROOM 757.0-A9      47W866-3         3 Hours 47A381-326F                                      47W920-17 1-ISD-31-2504        AREA 32, ROOM 772.0-A1      47W866-3         3 Hours 47A381-301F                                      47W920-9 1-ISD-31-2515        AREA 32, ROOM 772.0-A1      47W866-3         1.5 Hours 47A381-644G                                      47W920-9 1-ISD-31-2516        AREA 32, ROOM 772.0-A1      47W866-3         3 Hours 47A381-301F                                      47W920-9 Detection: Ionization smoke detectors are provided in the room.
Suppression: An automatic preaction sprinkler system is provided in the room. A standpipe and hose station is provided in the room.
VI-215

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                         Revision 60 Deviations: The justification for hose stations having more than 100 feet of hose is documented in Part VII, Section 4.3.
Evaluations: None.
VI-216

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                         Revision 60 3.44.2          Fire Area 38 Safe Shutdown Analysis By Analysis Volume 3.44.2.1        AV-065 Room No.               

== Description:==

772.0-A7                Unit 1 Mechanical Equipment Room A fire in Analysis Volume 65 could potentially affect systems and components necessary to maintain the Unit 1 and Unit 2 reactor pressure control and MCR & containment HVAC functions and Unit 1 long term decay heat removal, reactor coolant inventory control and steam generator inventory control functions. Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited.
Offsite power is available. The required mitigating features include manual operation of Unit 1 and Unit 2 equipment required for safe shutdown. These features and equipment affected and credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-217

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                              Revision 60 3.45             FIRE AREA 39 3.45.1           Room 772.0-A8

==
Description:==
Fifth Vital Battery and Board Room Fire Loading: The combustibles consist of lube oil in the fan motors and plastics associated with electrical panels, boxes and battery cases. The fire severity is classified as low.
Compartmentation: The rooms are of reinforced concrete construction.
Barriers:
FPR Figure        Regulatory Barrier Room         Direction       Adjacent Area/Room Reference         Rating 772.0-A8     NORTH WALL      AREA 25, ROOM 757.0-A10        II-31A, II-32A    2 Hours AREA 25, ROOM 782.0-A1         II-32A            2 Hours SOUTH WALL      AREA 32, ROOM 772.0-A1         II-32A            2 Hours EAST WALL       AREA 10, ROOM 757.0-A13        II-32A            2 Hours WEST WALL       AREA 38, ROOM 772.0-A7         II-32A            2 Hours FLOOR           AREA 17, ROOM 757.0-A9         II-31A, II-32A    2 Hours Doors:
Door                                    FPR Figure Room                     Adjacent Area/Room                            Door Rating Number                                  Reference 772.0-A8     A210        AREA 32, ROOM 772.0-A1      II-32A             1.5 Hours Dampers:
Damper/Mark       Adjacent              Drawing           Damper Room Number            Area/Room             Reference         Rating 772.0-A8     0-ISD-31-5455     AREA 32, ROOM         47W866-3          3 Hours 47A381-776        772.0-A1              47W920-16 Detection: Ionization smoke detectors are provided in the room.
Suppression: An automatic preaction sprinkler system is provided in the room. A standpipe and hose station is provided from the adjacent room (772.0-A7).
Deviations: None.
Evaluations: The feasibility and reliability evaluations for Unit 2 Operator Manual Actions are documented in Part VII, Sections 8.3.41, 62, 63, 64, and 65.
VI-218

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                            Revision 60 3.45.2          Fire Area 39 Safe Shutdown Analysis By Analysis Volume 3.45.2.1        AV-066 Room No.               

== Description:==

772.0-A8                Fifth Vital Battery and Board Room This AV contains cables and/or equipment associated with the 5th Vital Battery. The 5th Vital Battery is credited as an "installed spare" that can be used during normal plant operation if one of the existing batteries is down for maintenance. This AV is analyzed to address the effects of a fire on the 125V DC system if the 5th Vital Battery is in service in replacement of any one of the other four normally credited batteries. An additional four analyses are performed (AV-066D through G) for this AV to address the various combinations where the 5th Vital Battery can be used.
A fire in Analysis Volume 66 could potentially affect only the 5th vital battery. A fire in Analysis Volume 66 would not impact major equipment required to maintain safe shutdown functions.
Shutdown can be achieved by utilizing both train A and B systems and components without mitigating actions. Equipment available to achieve shutdown are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016:
VI-219

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                        Revision 60 3.45.2.2        AV-066D Room No.              

== Description:==

772.0-A8               Fifth Vital Battery and Board Room A fire in Analysis Volume 66D could potentially affect Unit 1 and Unit 2 systems and components necessary to maintain the long term decay heat removal, reactor coolant inventory control, steam generator inventory control, MCR & containment HVAC and reactor pressure control functions. Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Offsite power is available to Train B. The required mitigating features include manual operation of Unit 1 and Unit 2 equipment required for safe shutdown. These features and equipment affected and credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-220

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                        Revision 60 3.45.2.3        AV-066E Room No.              

== Description:==

772.0-A8               Fifth Vital Battery and Board Room A fire in Analysis Volume 66E could potentially affect Unit 1 and Unit 2 systems and components necessary to maintain the long term decay heat removal, reactor coolant inventory control, steam generator inventory control, MCR & containment HVAC and reactor pressure control functions. Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Offsite power is available to Train A. The required mitigating features include manual operation of Unit 1 and Unit 2 equipment required for safe shutdown. These features and equipment affected and credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-221

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                        Revision 60 3.45.2.4        AV-066F Room No.              

== Description:==

772.0-A8               Fifth Vital Battery and Board Room A fire in Analysis Volume 66F could potentially affect Unit 1 and Unit 2 systems and components necessary to maintain the long term decay heat removal, reactor coolant inventory control, MCR & containment HVAC, steam generator inventory control and reactor pressure control functions. Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Offsite power is available to Train B. The required mitigating features include manual operation of Unit 1 and Unit 2 equipment required for safe shutdown. These features and equipment affected and credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-222

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                         Revision 60 3.45.2.5        AV-066G Room No.              

== Description:==

772.0-A8               Fifth Vital Battery and Board Room A fire in Analysis Volume 66G could potentially affect Unit 1 and Unit 2 systems and components necessary to maintain the long term decay heat removal, reactor coolant inventory control, steam generator inventory control, MCR & containment HVAC, and reactor pressure control functions. Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Offsite power is available to Train A. The required mitigating features include manual operation of Unit 1 and Unit 2 equipment required for safe shutdown. These features and equipment affected and credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-223

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                               Revision 60 3.46           FIRE AREA 40 3.46.1         Room 772.0-A10

==
Description:==
Unit 2 Mechanical Equipment Room Fire Loading: The combustibles consist of lube oil in the air cooler equipment, plastic associated with lights, and insulation on pipes and cables in trays. The fire severity is classified as moderately severe.
Compartmentation: The room is of reinforced concrete construction.
Barriers:
FPR Figure        Regulatory Room         Direction         Adjacent Area/Room Reference         Barrier Rating 772.0-A10    NORTH WALL        AREA 75, ROOM 757.0-A16       II-31A, II-32A    2 Hours AREA 75, ROOM 782.0-A3        II-32A            2 Hours SOUTH WALL        AREA 46, ROOM 772.0-A16       II-32A            2 Hours EAST WALL         AREA 41, ROOM 772.0-A11       II-32A            2 Hours WEST WALL         AREA 10, ROOM 772.0-A9        II-32A            2 Hours FLOOR             AREA 31, ROOM 757.0-A24       II-31A, II-32A    2 Hours AREA 31, ROOM 757.0-A17       II-31A, II-32A    2 Hours Doors:
Door                                      FPR Figure       Door Room                     Adjacent Area/Room Number                                    Reference        Rating 772.0-A10   A188         AREA 46, ROOM 772.0-A16      II-32A            1.5 Hours A212         AREA 10, ROOM 772.0-A9       II-32A            1.5 Hours A213         AREA 10, ROOM 772.0-A9       II-32A            1.5 Hours Dampers:
Damper/Mark                                       Drawing        Damper Room                            Adjacent Area/Room Number                                            Reference      Rating 772.0-A10    2-ISD-31-2500      AREA 31, ROOM 757.0-A17        47W866-3       3 Hours 47A381-326F                                       47W920-28 2-ISD-31-2504      AREA 46, ROOM 772.0-A16        47W866-3       3 Hours 47A381-301F                                       47W920-9 2-ISD-31-2515      AREA 46, ROOM 772.0-A16        47W866-3       1.5 Hours 47A381-644G                                       47W920-9 2-ISD-31-2516      AREA 46, ROOM 772.0-A16        47W866-3       3 Hours 47A381-301F                                       47W920-9 Detection: Ionization smoke detectors are provided in the room.
Suppression: An automatic preaction sprinkler system is provided in the room. A standpipe and hose station is provided in the room.
VI-224

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                         Revision 60 Deviations: The justification for fire doors is documented in Part VII, Section 4.1. The justification for hose stations with more than 100 foot hose is documented in Part VII, Section 4.3.
Evaluations: The feasibility and reliability evaluations for Unit 2 Operator Manual Actions are documented in Part VII, Sections 8.3.43, 63, and 64.
VI-225

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                        Revision 60 3.46.2          FIRE AREA 40 SAFE SHUTDOWN ANALYSIS BY ANALYSIS VOLUME 3.46.2.1        AV-067 Room No.               

== Description:==

772.0-A10               Unit 2 Mechanical Equipment Room A fire in Analysis Volume 67 could potentially affect systems and components necessary to maintain the Unit 1 and Unit 2 steam generator inventory control and containment HVAC functions and Unit 2 long term decay heat removal, reactor coolant inventory control and reactor pressure control functions. Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited.
Offsite power is available. The required mitigating features include manual operation of Unit 1 and Unit 2 equipment required for safe shutdown. These features and equipment affected and credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-226

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                               Revision 60 3.47            FIRE AREA 41 3.47.1          Room 772.0-A11

==
Description:==
480V Transformer Room 2-B Fire Loading: The combustibles consist of the oil in the transformers, plastic associated with hand switches, insulation on the cables in the trays, and ERFBS Thermo-Lag. The fire severity is classified as moderately severe.
Compartmentation: The room is of reinforced concrete construction.
Barriers:
FPR Figure        Regulatory Room          Direction       Adjacent Area/Room Reference         Barrier Rating 772.0-A11     NORTH WALL      AREA 75, ROOM 782.0-A3          II-32A            2 Hours AREA 72, ROOM 729.0-A11         II-32A            2 Hours AREA 75, ROOM 757.0-A16         II-31A, II-32A    2 Hours SOUTH WALL      AREA 42, ROOM 772.0-A12         II-32A            2 Hours WEST WALL       AREA 40, ROOM 772.0-A10         II-32A            2 Hours AREA 46, ROOM 772.0-A16         II-32A            2 Hours FLOOR           AREA 31, ROOM 757.0-A24         II-31A, II-32A    2 Hours Doors:
Door                                     FPR Figure Room                     Adjacent Area/Room                              Door Rating Number                                   Reference 772.0-A11     A189       AREA 46, ROOM 772.0-A16       II-32A             1.5 Hours A190       AREA 42, ROOM 772.0-A12       II-32A             1.5 Hours Dampers: None.
Detection: Ionization smoke detectors are provided in the room.
Suppression: An automatic preaction sprinkler system is provided in the room. A standpipe and hose station is provided from the adjacent room (772.0-A10).
Deviations: None.
Evaluations: The feasibility and reliability evaluations for Unit 2 Operator Manual Actions are documented in Part VII, Sections 8.3.44 and 65.
VI-227

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                         Revision 60 3.47.2          Fire Area 41 Safe Shutdown Analysis By Analysis Volume 3.47.2.1        AV-068 Room No.              

== Description:==

772.0-A11              480V Transformer Room 2-B A fire in Analysis Volume 68 could potentially affect systems and components necessary to maintain the Unit 1 and Unit 2 steam generator inventory control, long term decay heat removal, MCR & containment HVAC, reactor coolant inventory control functions, and Unit 2 reactor coolant pressure control functions. Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Offsite power is available. The required mitigating features include providing fire wrap to selected Unit 2 cables to preclude damage in the event of a fire and manual operation of Unit 1 and Unit 2 equipment required for safe shutdown. These features and equipment affected and credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-228

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                               Revision 60 3.48           FIRE AREA 42 3.48.1         Room 772.0-A12

==
Description:==
480V Transformer Room 2-A Fire Loading: The combustibles consist of oil in the transformers, insulation on the cables in the trays, and ERFBS Thermo-Lag. The fire severity is classified as moderately severe.
Compartmentation: The room is of reinforced concrete construction.
Barriers:
FPR Figure        Regulatory Barrier Room         Direction       Adjacent Area/Room Reference         Rating 772.0-A12    NORTH WALL      AREA 41, ROOM 772.0-A11         II-32A            2 Hours SOUTH WALL      AREA 48, ROOM 755.0-C13         II-32A, II-34A    3 Hours AREA 48, ROOM 755.0-C18         II-32A, II-34A    3 Hours AREA 48, ROOM 755.0-C14         II-32A, II-34A    3 Hours WEST WALL       AREA 31, ROOM 757.0-A24         II-31A, II-32A    2 Hours AREA 45, ROOM 772.0-A15         II-32A            2 Hours AREA 46, ROOM 772.0-A16         II-32A            2 Hours FLOOR           AREA 28, ROOM 757.0-A21         II-31A, II-32A    2 Hours Doors:
Door                                       FPR Figure        Door Room                    Adjacent Area/Room Number                                     Reference         Rating 772.0-A12    A190       AREA 41, ROOM 772.0-A11         II-32A             1.5 Hours Dampers: None.
Detection: Ionization smoke detectors are provided in the room.
Suppression: An automatic preaction sprinkler system is provided in the room. A standpipe and hose station is provided from room 772.0-A10.
Deviations: None.
Evaluations: The feasibility and reliability evaluations for Unit 2 Operator Manual Actions are documented in Part VII, Sections 8.3.45 and 64.
VI-229

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                         Revision 60 3.48.2          Fire Area 42 Safe Shutdown Analysis By Analysis Volume 3.48.2.1        AV-069 Room No.              

== Description:==

772.0-A12              480V Transformer Room 2-A A fire in Analysis Volume 69 could potentially affect systems and components necessary to maintain the Unit 1 and Unit 2 steam generator inventory control, MCR & containment HVAC functions and Unit 2 long term decay heat removal and reactor coolant inventory control functions. Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown.
Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Offsite power is available. The required mitigating features include manual operation of Unit 1 and Unit 2 equipment required for safe shutdown and Unit 2 repair procedures. These features and equipment affected and credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-230

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                              Revision 60 3.49            FIRE AREA 43 3.49.1          Room 772.0-A13

==
Description:==
125V Vital Battery Room IV Fire Loading: The combustibles consist of plastics associated with electrical panels, boxes and battery cases. Adequate ventilation is provided to preclude explosive concentrations of hydrogen. The fire severity is classified as low.
Compartmentation: The room is of reinforced concrete construction.
Barriers:
FPR Figure        Regulatory Barrier Room        Direction       Adjacent Area/Room Reference         Rating 772.0-A13   NORTH AND       AREA 45, ROOM 772.0-A15         II-32A            3 Hours EAST WALLS SOUTH           AREA 48, ROOM 755.0-C12         II-32A, II-34A    3 Hours WALL WEST WALL       AREA 44, ROOM 772.0-A14         II-32A            3 Hours FLOOR           AREA 29, ROOM 757.0-A22         II-31A, II-32A    3 Hours AREA 30, ROOM 757.0-A23         II-31A, II-32A    3 Hours Doors:
Door                                      FPR Figure         Door Room                    Adjacent Area/Room Number                                    Reference          Rating 772.0-A13    A194       AREA 45, ROOM 772.0-A15        II-32A             3 Hours Dampers:
Damper/Mark                                       Drawing        Damper Room                           Adjacent Area/Room Number                                            Reference      Rating 772.0-A13    2-ISD-31-2525     AREA 45, ROOM 772.0-A15         47W866-3       3 Hours 47A381-311F                                       47W920-9 2-ISD-31-2558     AREA 44, ROOM 772.0-A14         47W866-3       3 Hours 47A381-690                                        47W920-9 2-ISD-31-2564     AREA 44, ROOM 772.0-A14         47W866-3       3 Hours 47A381-736                                        47W920-9 Detection: Ionization smoke detectors are provided in the room.
Suppression: A manually actuated preaction sprinkler system is provided in the room. A standpipe and hose station is provided from room 772.0-A10.
Deviations: None.
Evaluations: The feasibility and reliability evaluation for Unit 2 Operator Manual Action is documented in Part VII, Section 8.3.46, 62 and 65.
VI-231

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                         Revision 60 3.49.2          Fire Area 43 Safe Shutdown Analysis By Analysis Volume 3.49.2.1        AV-070 Room No.              

== Description:==

772.0-A13              125V Vital Battery Room IV A fire in Analysis Volume 70 could potentially affect Unit 1 and 2 systems and components necessary to maintain the long term decay heat removal, steam generator inventory control, MCR & containment HVAC, reactor coolant inventory control and reactor pressure control functions. Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown.
Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Offsite power is available to Trains 1A and 2A. The required mitigating features include manual operation of Unit 1 and Unit 2 equipment required for safe shutdown. These features and equipment affected and credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-232

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                              Revision 60 3.50           FIRE AREA 44 3.50.1         Room 772.0-A14

==
Description:==
125V Vital Battery Room III Fire Loading: The combustibles consist of plastics associated with electrical panels, boxes and battery cases. Adequate ventilation is provided to preclude explosive concentrations of hydrogen. The fire severity is classified as low.
Compartmentation: The room is of reinforced concrete construction.
Barriers FPR Figure       Regulatory Room         Direction        Adjacent Area/Room Reference        Barrier Rating 772.0-A14    NORTH AND        AREA 45, ROOM 772.0-A15         II-32A           3 Hours WEST WALLS SOUTH WALL       AREA 48, ROOM 755.0-C12         II-32A, II-34A   3 Hours EAST WALL        AREA 43, ROOM 772.0-A13         II-32A           3 Hours FLOOR            AREA 23, ROOM 757.0-A27         II-31A, II-32A   3 Hours AREA 24, ROOM 757.0-A28         II-31A, II-32A   3 Hours AREA 30, ROOM 757.0-A23         II-31A, II-32A   3 Hours Doors:
Door                                     FPR Figure       Door Room                    Adjacent Area/Room Number                                   Reference        Rating 772.0-A14    A195       AREA 45, ROOM 772.0-A15       II-32A           3 Hours Dampers:
Damper/Mark                                    Drawing         Damper Room                         Adjacent Area/Room Number                                         Reference       Rating 772.0-A14   2-ISD-31-2523    AREA 45, ROOM 772.0-A15       47W866-3        3 Hours 47A381-312F                                    47W920-9 2-ISD-31-2557    AREA 45, ROOM 772.0-A15       47W866-3        3 Hours 47A381-734                                     47W920-9 2-ISD-31-2558    AREA 43, ROOM 772.0-A13       47W866-3        3 Hours 47A381-690                                     47W920-9 2-ISD-31-2559    AREA 45, ROOM 772.0-A15       47W866-3        3 Hours 47A381-691                                     47W920-9 2-ISD-31-2564    AREA 43, ROOM 772.0-A13       47W866-3        3 Hours 47A381-736                                     47W920-9 Detection: Ionization smoke detectors are provided in the room.
Suppression: A manually actuated preaction sprinkler system is provided in the room. A standpipe and hose station is provided from room 772.0-A10.
VI-233

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                            Revision 60 Deviations: None.
Evaluations: The feasibility and reliability evaluation for Unit 2 Operator Manual Action is documented in Part VII, Section 8.3.47, 63 and 64.
VI-234

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                         Revision 60 3.50.2          Fire Area 44 Safe Shutdown Analysis By Analysis Volume 3.50.2.1        AV-071 Room No.              

== Description:==

772.0-A14              125V Vital Battery Room III A fire in Analysis Volume 71 could potentially affect Unit 1 and 2 systems and components necessary to maintain the long term decay heat removal, steam generator inventory control, MCR & containment HVAC, reactor coolant inventory control and reactor pressure control functions. Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown.
Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Offsite power is available to Trains 1B and 2B. The required mitigating features include manual operation of Unit 1 and Unit 2 equipment required for safe shutdown. These features and equipment affected and credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-235

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                              Revision 60 3.51           FIRE AREA 45 3.51.1         Room 772.0-A15

==
Description:==
480V Board Room 2-B (Subdivided into 772.0-A15A1, -A15A2, -A15A3, -A15A4)
Fire Loading: The combustibles consist of plastics associated with the electrical boards, panels, boxes and lights and insulation on the HVAC ducts and on the cables in the trays, and ERFBS Thermo-Lag. The fire severity is classified as severe.
Compartmentation: The room is of reinforced concrete construction.
Barriers:
FPR Figure         Regulatory Room        Direction        Adjacent Area/Room Reference          Barrier Rating 772.0-A15   NORTH WALL       AREA 31, ROOM 757.0-A24       II-31A, II-32A     2 Hours AREA 46, ROOM 772.0-A16       II-32A             2 Hours SOUTH WALL       AREA 48, ROOM 755.0-C12       II-32A, II-34A     3 Hours AREA 48, ROOM 755.0-C13       II-32A, II-34A     3 Hours AREA 48, ROOM 755.0-C20       II-32A, II-34A     3 Hours AREA 43, ROOM 772.0-A13       II-32A             3 Hours AREA 44, ROOM 772.0-A14       II-32A             3 Hours EAST WALL        AREA 31, ROOM 757.0-A24       II-31A, II-32A     2 Hours AREA 42, ROOM 772.0-A12       II-32A             2 Hours AREA 44, ROOM 772.0-A14       II-32A             3 Hours WEST WALL        AREA 33, ROOM 772.0-A2        II-32A             2 Hours AREA 43, ROOM 772.0-A13       II-32A             3 Hours FLOOR            AREA 20, ROOM 757.0-A1        II-31A, II-32A     2 Hours AREA 23, ROOM 757.0-A27       II-31A,II-32A      2 Hours AREA 24, ROOM 757.0-A28       II-31A, II-32A     2 Hours AREA 28, ROOM 757.0-A21       II-31A, II-32A     2 Hours AREA 29, ROOM 757.0-A22       II-31A, II-32A     3 Hours AREA 31, ROOM 757.0-A24       II-31A, II-32A     2 Hours CEILING          AREA 47, ROOM 786.0-A3        II-32A             2 Hours (PARTIAL)        AREA 47, ROOM 786.0-A6        II-32A             3 Hours Doors:
Door                                    FPR Figure        Door Room                      Adjacent Area/Room Number                                  Reference         Rating 772.0-A15     A191        AREA 31, ROOM 757.0-A24     II-32A          1.5 Hours A193        AREA 46, ROOM 772.0-A16     II-32A          1.5 Hours A194        AREA 43, ROOM 772.0-A13     II-32A          3 Hours A195        AREA 44, ROOM 772.0-A14     II-32A          3 Hours A196        AREA 33, ROOM 772.0-A2      II-32A          1.5 Hours Dampers:
Damper/Mark                                  Drawing           Damper Room                         Adjacent Area/Room Number                                       Reference         Rating 772.0-A15   2-ISD-31-2517    AREA 47, ROOM 786.0-A3      47W866-3          3 Hours VI-236

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                             Revision 60 Dampers:
Damper/Mark                                     Drawing          Damper Room                          Adjacent Area/Room Number                                          Reference        Rating 47A381-308F                                     47W920-29 2-ISD-31-2518    AREA 47, ROOM 786.0-A3         47W866-3         3 Hours 47A381-313F                                     47W920-29 2-ISD-31-2519    AREA 47, ROOM 786.0-A3         47W866-3         3 Hours 47A381-307F                                     47W920-29 2-ISD-31-2523    AREA 44, ROOM 772.0-           47W866-3         3 Hours A14 47A381-312F                                     47W920-9 2-ISD-31-2525    AREA 43, ROOM 772.0-           47W866-3         3 Hours A13 47A381-311F                                     47W920-9 2-ISD-31-2526    AREA 46, ROOM 772.0-           47W866-3         3 Hours A16 47A381-311F                                     47W920-9 2-ISD-31-2554    AREA 46, ROOM 772.0-           47W866-3         3 Hours A16 47A381-693                                      47W920-9 2-ISD-31-2557    AREA 44, ROOM 772.0-           47W866-3         3 Hours A14 47A381-734                                      47W920-9 2-ISD-31-2559    AREA 44, ROOM 772.0-           47W866-3         3 Hours A14 47A381-691                                      47W920-9 Detection: Ionization smoke detectors are provided in the room.
Suppression: An automatic preaction sprinkler system is provided for the room, except for the area between column lines A8-A10/Q-R. A standpipe and hose station is provided from room 772.0-A10.
Deviations: The room contains intervening combustibles in the form of insulation on cables in trays and ERFBS. The justification for using an enhanced automatic preaction sprinkler system to compensate for these intervening combustibles is documented in Part VII, Section 2.4.
Evaluations: The lack of suppression between column lines A8-A10/Q-R is documented in Part VII, Section 3.1.8. The feasibility and reliability evaluations for Unit 2 Operator Manual Actions are documented in Part VII, Sections 8.3.48, 49, 62, and 65.
VI-237

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                          Revision 60 3.51.2          Fire Area 45 Safe Shutdown Analysis By Analysis Volume 3.51.2.1        AV-072 Room No.               

== Description:==

772.0-A15A1             480V Board Room 2-B, Column Lines A13-A12 772.0-A15A2             480V Board Room 2-B, Column Lines A12-A11 A fire in Analysis Volume 72 could potentially affect Unit 1 and 2 systems and components necessary to maintain the long term decay heat removal, MCR & containment HVAC, reactor coolant inventory control, and steam generator inventory control functions. Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Offsite power is available. The required mitigating features include providing fire wrap to selected Unit 2 cables to preclude damage in the event of a fire, manual operation of Unit 1 and Unit 2 equipment required for safe shutdown and Unit 2 repair procedures. These features and equipment affected and credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-238

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                          Revision 60 3.51.2.2        AV-073 Room No.              

== Description:==

772.0-A15A2            480V Board Room 2-B, Column Lines A12-A11 772.0-A15A3            480V Board Room 2-B, Column Lines A11-A10 772.0-A15A4            480V Board Room 2-B, Column Lines A10-A8 A fire in Analysis Volume 73 could potentially affect systems Unit 1 and 2 and components necessary to maintain the long term decay heat removal, MCR & containment HVAC, reactor coolant inventory control, and steam generator inventory control functions. Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Onsite 1A and 2A power and offsite 1B and 2B power is available. The required mitigating features include manual operation of Unit 1 and Unit 2 equipment required for safe shutdown and Unit 2 repair procedures. These features and equipment affected and credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-239

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                             Revision 60 3.52            FIRE AREA 46 3.52.1          Room 772.0-A16

==
Description:==
480V Board Room 2-A Fire Loading: The combustibles consist of plastics associated with the electrical boards, panels, boxes and lights, oil associated with the 6-ton hoist and the insulation on the cables in the trays. The fire severity is classified as moderately severe.
Compartmentation: The room is of reinforced concrete construction. The equipment hatch opening in the floor slab is provided with a nonrated steel cover and is also protected by a water curtain.
Barriers:
FPR Figure       Regulatory Room         Direction          Adjacent Area/Room Reference        Barrier Rating 772.0-A16    NORTH WALL         AREA 10, ELEVATOR SHAFT           II-32A           2 Hours AREA 10, ROOM 772.0-A9            II-32A           2 Hours AREA 10, ROOM 757.0-A13           II-31A, II-32A   2 Hours AREA 40, ROOM 772.0-A10           II-32A           2 Hours SOUTH WALL         AREA 31, ROOM 757.0-A24           II-31A, II-32A   2 Hours AREA 45, ROOM 772.0-A15           II-32A           2 Hours EAST WALL          AREA 41, ROOM 772.0-A11           II-32A           2 Hours AREA 42, ROOM 772.0-A12           II-32A           2 Hours WEST WALL          AREA 32, ROOM 772.0-A1            II-32A           2 Hours FLOOR              AREA 31, ROOM 757.0-A24           II-31A, II-32A   2 Hours Doors:
Door                                      FPR Figure Room                      Adjacent Area/Room                           Door Rating Number                                    Reference 772.0-A16     A188        AREA 40, ROOM 772.0-A10       II-32A         1.5 Hours A189        AREA 41, ROOM 772.0-A11       II-32A         1.5 Hours A193        AREA 45, ROOM 772.0-A15       II-32A         1.5 Hours A197        AREA 32, ROOM 772.0-A1        II-32A         1.5 Hours Dampers:
Damper/Mark                                       Drawing         Damper Room                             Adjacent Area/Room Number                                            Reference       Rating 772.0-A16    2-ISD-31-2504       AREA 40, ROOM 772.0-A10       47W866-3        3 Hours 47A381-301F                                       47W920-9 2-ISD-31-2515       AREA 40, ROOM 772.0-A10       47W866-3        1.5 Hours 47A381-644G                                       47W920-9 2-ISD-31-2516       AREA 40, ROOM 772.0-A10       47W866-3        3 Hours 47A381-301F                                       47W920-9 2-ISD-31-2526       AREA 45, ROOM 772.0-A15       47W866-3        3 Hours 47A381-311F                                       47W920-9 VI-240

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                              Revision 60 Dampers:
Damper/Mark                                       Drawing       Damper Room                           Adjacent Area/Room Number                                            Reference     Rating 2-ISD-31-2554      AREA 45, ROOM 772.0-A15        47W866-3      3 Hours 47A381-693                                        47W920-9 Detection: Ionization smoke detectors are provided in the room.
Suppression: An automatic preaction sprinkler system is provided in the room. A standpipe and hose station is provided from the adjacent room 772.0-A10.
Deviations: The justification for the hatch opening through the floor is documented in Part VII, Section 2.6.3.1. This hatch is protected with a water curtain. The justification for fire doors is documented in Part VII, Section 4.1.
Evaluations: The feasibility and reliability evaluations for Unit 2 Operator Manual Actions are documented in Part VII, Section 8.3.50, 63, and 64.
VI-241

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                            Revision 60 3.52.2          Fire Area 46 Safe Shutdown Analysis By Analysis Volume 3.52.2.1        AV-074 Room No.              

== Description:==

772.0-A16              480V Board Room 2-A A fire in Analysis Volume 74 could potentially affect systems and components necessary to maintain the Unit 1 and Unit 2 steam generator inventory control, and MCR & containment HVAC functions and Unit 2 long term decay heat removal, reactor coolant inventory control and reactor coolant pressure control functions. Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Offsite power is available. The required mitigating features include manual operation of Unit 1 and Unit 2 equipment required for safe shutdown. These features and equipment affected and credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-242

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                             Revision 60 3.53             FIRE AREA 47 3.53.1           Room 786.0-A2, A3, A4, AR, A5, A6

==
Description:==

Room No.               

== Description:==

786.0-A2                Roof Access Air Lock 786.0-A3                Mechanical Equipment Room 2B 786.0-A4                Mechanical Equipment Room 1B 786.0-A5                225 kVA DG Room B 786.0-A6                225 kVA DG Room A 786.0-AR                Roof Fire Loading: The combustibles in rooms 786.0-A2, -A3, -A4, and -AR consists of plastics associated with electrical panels and lights and oil in chillers. The fire severity in these rooms is classified as insignificant. The combustibles in rooms 786.0-A5 and -A6 consists of fuel and lube oil contained In the DG skids and associated plastics in electrical components. The fire severity in these rooms is classified as moderate.
Compartmentation: Rooms 786.0-A2, -A3 and A4 are reinforced concrete construction.
Rooms 786.0-A5 and -A6 are reinforced concrete (floor and north wall) and steel frame and plate (roof and east, west and south walls).
Barriers:
FPR Figure     Regulatory Barrier Room           Direction     Adjacent Area/Room Reference      Rating 786.0-A3       Floor         Area 45, Room 772.0-A15         II-32A         2 Hours Area 31, Room 757.0-A24         II-31A, II-32A 2 Hours 786.0-A3       South Wall    Area 47, Room 786.0-A6          II-32A         3 Hours 786.0-A4       Floor         Area 33, Room 772.0-A2          II-32A         2 Hours Area 17, Room 757.0-A2          II-31A, II-32A 2 Hours 786.0-A4       South Wall    Area 47, Room 786.0-A5          II-32A         3 Hours 786.0-A5       Floor         Area 33, Room 772.0A2          II-32A         3 Hours 786.0-A5       North Wall    Area 47, Room 786.0-A4          II-32A         3 Hours 786.0-A6       Floor         Area 45, Room 772.0-A15         II-32A         3 Hours 786.0-A6       North Wall    Area 47, Room 786.0-A3          II-32A         3 Hours Doors: None. (Metal Doors In Rooms 786.0-A5 and 786.0-A6 are not Fire Rated)
Dampers:
Damper/Mark                                         Drawing       Damper Room                            Adjacent Area/Room Number                                              Reference     Rating 786.0-A3     2-ISD-31-2517      AREA 45, ROOM 772.0-A15          47W866-3      3 Hours 47A381-308F                                         47W920-29 2-ISD-31-2518      AREA 45, ROOM 772.0-A15          47W866-3      3 Hours 47A381-313F                                         47W920-29 2-ISD-31-2519      AREA 45, ROOM 772.0-A15          47W866-3      3 Hours 47A381-307F                                         47W920-29 786.0-A4     1-ISD-31-2517      AREA 33, ROOM 772.0-A2           47W866-3      3 Hours 47A381-308F                                         47W920-29 VI-243

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                     Revision 60 Dampers:
Damper/Mark                                       Drawing    Damper Room                          Adjacent Area/Room Number                                            Reference  Rating 1-ISD-31-2518      AREA 33, ROOM 772.0-A2         47W866-3   3 Hours 47A381-313F                                       47W920-29 1-ISD-31-2519      AREA 33, ROOM 772.0-A2         47W866-3   3 Hours 47A381-307F                                       47W920-29 Detection: Thermal detectors are provided for Rooms 786.0-A5 and 786.0-A6.
Suppression: Automatic preaction suppression is provided for Rooms 786.0-A5 and 786.0-A6.
No automatic suppression provided in Rooms 786.0-A2, -A3, -A4 and -AR. Standpipe and hose stations are provided from the Auxiliary Building roof (786.0-AR).
Deviations: None.
Evaluations: None.
VI-244

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                       Revision 60 3.53.2           Fire Area 47 Safe Shutdown Analysis By Analysis Volume 3.53.2.1         AV-075 Room No.               

== Description:==

786.0-A2                Roof Access Air Lock 786.0-A3                Mechanical Equipment Room 2B 786.0-A4                Mechanical Equipment Room 1B 786.0-A5                225 kVA DG Room B 786.0-A6                225 kVA DG Room A 786.0-AR                Roof A fire in Analysis Volume 75 does not impact major equipment required to maintain safe shutdown functions. However, offsite power may be lost. Shutdown can be achieved by utilizing both train A and B systems and components without mitigating actions. Onsite power is available. Equipment credited to achieve shutdown is identified below:
VI-245

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                              Revision 60 3.54             FIRE AREA 48 Fire Area 48 consists of the entire Control Building.
3.54.1           Rooms 692.0-C1 and C2

==
Description:==
Mechanical Equipment Rooms Fire Loading: The combustibles consist of plastics associated with electrical panels, boxes and lights and insulation on pipes. The fire severity is classified as insignificant.
Compartmentation: The rooms are of reinforced concrete construction. The walls separating the Control Building and Auxiliary Building are equivalent to three-hour fire rated barriers. The ceiling separating the Control Building from the Turbine Building is equivalent to a three-hour fire rated barrier, except for the equipment hatch. The equipment hatch is covered with non-fire rated steel plates.
Barriers:
FPR Figure       Regulatory Room         Direction       Adjacent Area/Room Reference        Barrier Rating 692.0-C1     NORTH           AREA 1, ROOM 692.0-A1             II-28A, II-33A   3 Hours WALL            AREA 1, ROOM 692.0-A5             II-28A, II-33A   3 Hours CEILING         AREA 63, TURBINE BUILDING         II-33A           3 Hours 692.0-C2     NORTH           AREA 1, ROOM 692.0-A3             II-28A, II-33A   3 Hours WALL            AREA 1, ROOM 692.0-A5             II-28A, II-33A   3 Hours Doors: None.
Dampers: None.
Detection: Ionization smoke detectors are provided in the rooms.
Suppression: Automatic preaction sprinkler systems are provided in the rooms. Standpipes and hose stations are provided in other rooms on this building elevation (692 Stairwell C1).
Deviations: The justification for the hatch opening through the ceiling of 692.0-C1 to the Turbine Building is documented in Part VII, Section 2.6.4. No deviations are applicable to 692.0-C2.
Evaluations: None.
3.54.2           Room 692.0-C3

==
Description:==
250V Battery Room 1 Fire Loading: The combustibles consist of plastics associated with electrical panels and boxes and lights and the battery cases. The fire severity is classified as low.
VI-246

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                         Revision 60 Compartmentation: The room is of reinforced concrete block and reinforced concrete construction.
Barriers:
FPR Figure     Regulatory Barrier Room         Direction         Adjacent Area/Room Reference      Rating 692.0-C3     NORTH             AREA 1, ROOM 676.0-A2       II-28A, II-33A 3 Hours WALL              AREA 1, ROOM 692.0-A3       II-28A, II-33A 3 Hours Doors: None.
Dampers: None.
Detection: Ionization smoke detectors are provided in the room.
Suppression: An automatic preaction sprinkler system is provided in the room. A standpipe and hose station is provided from the stairwell (692 Stairwell C1).
Deviations: None.
Evaluations: None.
3.54.3           Rooms 692.0-C4, C5, C8, C11, and C12

==
Description:==

Room No.                

== Description:==

692.0-C4                 250V Battery Board Room No.1 692.0-C5                 250V Battery Board Room No. 2 692.0-C8                 24V and 48V Battery Board and Charger Room 692.0-C11                Corridor 692.0-C12                Secondary Alarm Station Room Fire Loading: The combustibles consist of plastics associated with electrical panels, boards, chargers, TV monitors and lights, furniture, pipe insulation and insulation on cables is trays. The fire severity classification for each room is as follows:
Room No.              

== Description:==
Fire Loading 692.0-C4               250V Battery Board Room No. 1                          Low 692.0-C5               250V Battery Board Room No. 2                          Low 692.0-C8               24V and 48V Battery Board and Charger Room             Low 692.0-C11              Corridor                                               Low 692.0-C12              Secondary Alarm Station Room                           Moderate Compartmentation: The rooms are of reinforced concrete block and reinforced concrete construction.
VI-247

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                          Revision 60 Barriers:
FPR Figure      Regulatory Room          Direction         Adjacent Area/Room Reference       Barrier Rating 692.0-C4      NORTH WALL        AREA 1, ROOM 676.0-A2        II-28A, II-33A  3 Hours 692.0-C5      NORTH WALL        AREA 1, ROOM 676.0-A2        II-28A, II-33A  3 Hours AREA 1, ROOM 676.0-A3        II-28A, II-33A  3 Hours CEILING           AREA 48, ROOM 708.0-C3       II-33A          2 Hours (PARTIAL) 692.0-C8      NORTH WALL        AREA 1, ROOM 692.0-A31       II-28A, II-33A  3 Hours 692.0-C11     CEILING           AREA 48, ROOM 708.0-C2       II-33A          2 Hours (PARTIAL) 692.0-C12     NORTH WALL        AREA 1, ROOM 692.0-A30       II-28A, II-33A  3 Hours AREA 1, ROOM 692.0-A31       II-28A, II-33A  3 Hours Doors: None.
Dampers: None.
Detection: Ionization smoke detectors are provided for all the rooms except the area above the ceiling in Room 692.0-C12.
Suppression: Automatic sprinklers are provided in Rooms 692.0-C11 and C12. No suppression is provided in Rooms 692.0-C4, -C5 and -C8. Standpipe and hose stations are provided from the stairwells located at each end of the Corridor.
Deviations: The justification for not providing an automatic suppression system in rooms C4, C5, and C8 is documented in Part VII, Section 2.3. The justification for the gutter penetration in the walls separating the stairwells from corridor 692.0-C11 is documented in Part VII, Section 4.2. No deviations are applicable for Room 692.0-C12.
Evaluations: None.
3.54.4          Room 692.0-C6

==
Description:==
250V Battery Room 2 Fire Loading: The combustibles consist of plastic associated with the batteries. The fire severity is classified as low.
Compartmentation: The room is of reinforced concrete block and reinforced concrete construction.
VI-248

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                          Revision 60 Barriers:
FPR Figure         Regulatory Room          Direction      Adjacent Area/Room Reference          Barrier Rating 692.0-C6      NORTH          AREA 1, ROOM 676.0-A3        II-28A, II-33A     3 Hours WALL           AREA 1, ROOM 692.0-A31       II-28A, II-33A     3 Hours CEILING        AREA 48, ROOM 708.0-C3       II-33A             2 Hours (PARTIAL)
Doors: None.
Dampers: None.
Detection: Ionization smoke detectors are provided in the room.
Suppression: An automatic preaction sprinkler system is provided in the room. Standpipe and hose stations are provided from the stairwells.
Deviations: None.
Evaluations: None.
3.54.5          Room 692.0-C7

==
Description:==
24V and 48V Battery Room Fire Loading: The combustibles consist of plastic associated with the batteries. The fire severity is classified as low.
Compartmentation: The room is of reinforced concrete block and reinforced concrete construction.
Barriers:
FPR Figure      Regulatory Room           Direction        Adjacent Area/Room Reference       Barrier Rating 692.0-C7       NORTH WALL       AREA 1, ROOM 692.0-A31        II-28A, II-33A  3 Hours Doors: None.
Dampers: None.
Detection: Ionization smoke detectors are provided in the room.
Suppression: An automatic preaction sprinkler system is provided in the room. A standpipe and hose station is provided from the stairwells located at the end of the Room C11 Corridor.
Deviations: None.
Evaluations: None.
VI-249

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                             Revision 60 3.54.6           Room 692.0-C9

==
Description:==
Communications Room Fire Loading: The combustibles consist of plastics, resins, and paper associated with the communications equipment panels, furniture and insulation on cables in trays. The fire severity is classified as moderate.
Compartmentation: The room is of reinforced concrete block and reinforced concrete construction.
Barriers:
FPR Figure         Regulatory Barrier Room            Direction    Adjacent Area/Room Reference          Rating 692.0-C9        NORTH        AREA 1, ROOM 692.0-A27      II-28A, II-33A     3 Hours WALL         AREA 1, ROOM 692.0-A29      II-28A, II-33A     3 Hours AREA 1, ROOM 692.0-A30      II-28A, II-33A     3 Hours Doors: None.
Dampers: None.
Detection: Ionization smoke detectors are provided in the room.
Suppression: An automatic preaction sprinkler system is provided in the room. A standpipe and hose station is provided from the C2 stairwell.
Deviations: None.
Evaluations: None.
3.54.7           Room 692.0-C10

==
Description:==
Mechanical Equipment Room Fire Loading: The combustibles consist of lube oil in the chillers, plastics associated with the electrical panels, boxes and lights and insulation on piping. The fire severity is classified as insignificant.
Compartmentation: The room is of reinforced concrete construction. The equipment hatch in the ceiling is covered with a nonfire rated steel cover.
Barriers:
FPR Figure     Regulatory Barrier Room           Direction    Adjacent Area/Room Reference      Rating 692.0-C10      NORTH        AREA 1, ROOM 692.0-A27           II-28A, II-33A 3 Hours WALL CEILING      AREA 63, TURBINE                 II-33A         3 Hours BUILDING Doors: None.
VI-250

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                            Revision 60 Dampers: None.
Detection: Ionization smoke detectors are provided in the room.
Suppression: An automatic preaction sprinkler system is provided in the room. A standpipe and hose station is provided from the C2 stairwell.
Deviations: The justification for the hatch opening through the ceiling of 692.0-C10 to the Turbine Building is documented in Part VII, Section 2.6.4.
Evaluations: None.
3.54.8         Room 708.0-C1

==
Description:==
Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room Fire Loading: The combustible materials consist of plastics associated with the electrical instrument panels and insulation on cables in trays. The fire severity is classified as moderately severe.
Compartmentation: The room is of reinforced concrete construction.
Barriers:
Room        Direction           Adjacent Area/Room            FPR Figure       Regulatory Reference        Barrier Rating 708.0-C1    NORTH WALL          AREA 1, ROOM 676.0-A2         II-28A, II-33A   3 Hours AREA 1, ROOM 692.0-A3         II-28A, II-33A   3 Hours AREA 1, ROOM 692.0-A5         II-28A, II-33A   3 Hours AREA 8, ROOM 713.0-A1         II-29A, II-33A   3 Hours AREA 8, ROOM 713.0-A25        II-29A, II-33A   3 Hours AREA 8, ROOM 713.0-A26        II-29A, II-33A   3 Hours AREA 8, ROOM 713.0-A27        II-29A, II-33A   3 Hours AREA 63, TURBINE              II-33A           3 Hours BUILDING SOUTH WALL          AREA 63, TURBINE              II-33A           3 Hours BUILDING EAST WALL           AREA 48, ROOM 708.0-C2        II-33A           2 Hours AREA 48, ROOM 708.0-C3        II-33A           2 Hours WEST WALL           AREA 63, TURBINE              II-33A           3 Hours BUILDING CEILING             AREA 63, TURBINE              II-33A           3 Hours (PARTIAL)           BUILDING Doors:
Door                                      FPR Figure      Door Room                   Adjacent Area/Room Number                                    Reference       Rating 708.0-C1   C19         AREA 63, TURBINE              II-33A          3 Hours BUILDING VI-251

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                              Revision 60 Doors:
Door                                      FPR Figure       Door Room                    Adjacent Area/Room Number                                    Reference        Rating C22         AREA 48, ROOM 708.0-C2        II-33A           1.5 Hours Dampers:
Damper/Mark                                     Drawing          Damper Room                          Adjacent Area/Room Number                                          Reference        Rating 708.0-C1    0-ISD-31-3956     AREA 48, ROOM 708.0-C3        47W866-4         1.5 Hours 47A381-500                                      47W930-1 0-ISD-31-3957     AREA 48, ROOM 708.0-C3        47W866-4         3 Hours 47A381-501F                                     47W930-1 0-ISD-31-3968     AREA 48, ROOM 708.0-C3        47W866-4         1.5 Hours 47A381-542                                      47W930-1 0-ISD-31-3969     AREA 48, ROOM 708.0-C3        47W866-4         3 Hours 47A381-541F                                     47W930-1 Detection: Ionization smoke detectors cross zoned with heat detectors are provided in the room.
Suppression: An automatic CO2 suppression system is provided in the room. A standpipe and hose station is provided from the stairwell C1.
Deviations: None.
Evaluations: None.
3.54.9          Room 708.0-C2

==
Description:==
Corridor Fire Loading: The combustible material consist of plastics associated with the electrical boxes and lights and insulation on the cables in trays. The fire severity is classified as low.
Compartmentation: The room is of reinforced concrete construction.
Barriers:
FPR Figure        Regulatory Room        Direction        Adjacent Area/Room Reference         Barrier Rating 708.0-C2    NORTH WALL       AREA 48, ROOM 708.0-C3            II-33A            2 Hours SOUTH WALL       AREA 63, TURBINE BUILDING         II-33A            3 Hours EAST WALL        AREA 48, ROOM 708.0-C4            II-33A            2 Hours WEST WALL        AREA 48, ROOM 708.0-C1            II-33A            2 Hours FLOOR            AREA 48, ROOM 692.0-C11           II-33A            2 Hours CEILING          AREA 48, ROOM 729.0-C1            II-33A, II-34A    2 Hours VI-252

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                              Revision 60 Doors:
Door                                       FPR Figure Room                     Adjacent Area/Room                             Door Rating Number                                     Reference 708.0-C2     C22         AREA 48, ROOM 708.0-C1         II-33A          1.5 Hours C23         AREA 48, ROOM 708.0-C3         II-33A          1.5 Hours C24         AREA 48, ROOM 708.0-C4         II-33A          1.5 Hours C26A        AREA 63, TURBINE               II-33A          3 Hours*
BUILDING
*Sliding Fire Door Dampers:
Damper/Mark                                      Drawing         Damper Room                            Adjacent Area/Room Number                                           Reference       Rating 708.0-C2     0-ISD-31-5033      AREA 48, ROOM 708.0-C3        47W866-4        3 Hours 47A381-730F                                      47W930-1 47W930-10 0-ISD-31-5034      AREA 48, ROOM 708.0-C3        47W866-4        3 Hours 47A381-730F                                      47W930-1 47W930-10 0-ISD-31-5035      AREA 48, ROOM 708.0-C3        47W866-4        3 Hours 47A381-731F                                      47W930-1 47W930-10 0-ISD-31-5036      AREA 48, ROOM 708.0-C3        47W866-4        3 Hours 47A381-731F                                      47W930-1 47W930-10 Detection: Ionization smoke detectors are provided in the corridor.
Suppression: No automatic suppression is provided. Standpipe and hose stations are provided from the two stairwells.
Deviations: The justification for the lack of total area suppression is documented in Part VII, Section 2.3. The justification for sliding fire doors having fusible links on only one side of barrier opening is documented in Part VII, Section 5.2.
Evaluations: None.
3.54.10          Room 708.0-C3

==
Description:==
Computer Room Fire Loading: The combustibles consist of plastics associated with the various computer equipment and electrical panels, furniture, and insulation on the cables in trays. The fire severity is classified as moderately severe.
Compartmentation: The room is of reinforced concrete construction.
VI-253

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                            Revision 60 Barriers:
FPR Figure        Regulatory Room       Direction       Adjacent Area/Room Reference         Barrier Rating 708.0-C3   NORTH WALL      AREA 1, ROOM 676.0-A3         II-28A, II-33A    3 Hours AREA 8, ROOM 713.0-A1         II-29A, II-33A    3 Hours AREA 8, ROOM 713.0-A23        II-29A, II-33A    3 Hours SOUTH WALL      AREA 48, ROOM 708.0-C2        II-33A            2 Hours EAST WALL       AREA 48, ROOM 708.0-C4        II-33A            2 Hours WEST WALL       AREA 48, ROOM 708.0-C1        II-33A            2 Hours FLOOR           AREA 48, ROOM 692.0-C5        II-33A            2 Hours AREA 48, ROOM 692.0-C6        II-33A            2 Hours CEILING         AREA 48, ROOM 729.0-C1        II-33A, II-34A    2 Hours Doors:
Door                                  FPR Figure Room                Adjacent Area/Room                        Door Rating Number                                Reference 708.0-C3 C23        AREA 48, ROOM 708.0-C2     II-33A         1.5 Hours Dampers:
Damper/Mark                                 Drawing         Damper Room                       Adjacent Area/Room Number                                      Reference       Rating 708.0-C3  2-ISD-31-2058    AREA 48, ROOM 708.0-C4     47W866-4        3 Hours 47A381-499F                                 47W930-1 2-ISD-31-3955    AREA 48, ROOM 708.0-C4     47W866-4        1.5 Hours 47A381-498                                  47W930-1 0-ISD-31-3956    AREA 48, ROOM 708.0-C1     47W866-4        1.5 Hours 47A381-500                                  47W930-1 0-ISD-31-3957    AREA 48, ROOM 708.0-C1     47W866-4        3 Hours 47A381-501F                                 47W930-1 0-ISD-31-3968    AREA 48, ROOM 708.0-C1     47W866-4        1.5 Hours 47A381-542                                  47W930-1 0-ISD-31-3969    AREA 48, ROOM 708.0-C1     47W866-4        3 Hours 47A381-541F                                 47W930-1 0-ISD-31-5033    AREA 48, ROOM 708.0-C2     47W866-4        3 Hours 47A381-730F                                 47W930-1 47W930-10 0-ISD-31-5034    AREA 48, ROOM 708.0-C2     47W866-4        3 Hours 47A381-730F                                 47W930-1 47W930-10 0-ISD-31-5035    AREA 48, ROOM 708.0-C2     47W866-4        3 Hours 47A381-731F                                 47W930-1 VI-254

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                             Revision 60 Dampers:
Damper/Mark                                   Drawing         Damper Room                           Adjacent Area/Room Number                                        Reference       Rating 47W930-10 0-ISD-31-5036     AREA 48, ROOM 708.0-C2      47W866-4        3 Hours 47A381-731F                                   47W930-1 47W930-10 Detection: Ionization smoke detectors cross zoned with heat detectors are provided in the room except for certain areas such as the area below the raised floor.
Suppression: An automatic CO2 suppression system is provided in the room. Standpipe and hose stations are provided from the Stairwells C1 and C2.
Deviations: None.
Evaluations: None.
3.54.11        Room 708.0-C4

==
Description:==
Unit 2 Auxiliary Instrument Room Fire Loading: The combustibles consist of plastics associated with the electrical instrument panels and boxes and insulation on the cables in trays. The fire severity is classified as moderately severe.
Compartmentation: The room is of reinforced concrete construction.
Barriers:
FPR Figure        Regulatory Room         Direction       Adjacent Area/Room Reference         Barrier Rating 708.0-C4     NORTH WALL      AREA 1, ROOM 676.0-A3           II-28A, II-33A    3 Hours AREA 1, ROOM 692.0-A29          II-28A, II-33A    3 Hours AREA 1, ROOM 692.0-A30          II-28A, II-33A    3 Hours AREA 1, ROOM 692.0-A31          II-28A, II-33A    3 Hours AREA 8, ROOM 713.0-A1           II-29A, II-33A    3 Hours AREA 8, ROOM 713.0-A23          II-29A, II-33A    3 Hours SOUTH WALL      AREA 63, TURBINE BUILDING       II-33A            3 Hours EAST WALL       AREA 63, TURBINE BUILDING       II-33A            3 Hours WEST WALL       AREA 48, ROOM 708.0-C2          II-33A            2 Hours AREA 48, ROOM 708.0-C3          II-33A            2 Hours Doors:
Door                                   FPR Figure      Door Room                     Adjacent Area/Room Number                                 Reference       Rating 708.0-C4     C24         AREA 48, ROOM 708.0-C2     II-33A          1.5 Hours VI-255

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                              Revision 60 Dampers:
Damper/Mark                                      Drawing         Damper Room                               Adjacent Area/Room Number                                           Reference       Rating 708.0-C4       2-ISD-31-2058       AREA 48, ROOM 708.0-C3       47W866-4        3 Hours 47A381-499F                                      47W930-1 2-ISD-31-3955       AREA 48, ROOM 708.0-C3       47W866-4        1.5 Hours 47A381-498                                       47W930-1 Detection: Ionization smoke detectors cross zoned with heat detectors are provided in the room.
Suppression: An automatic CO2 suppression system is provided in the room. Standpipe and hose stations are provided from the Stairwell C2.
Deviations: None.
Evaluations: None.
3.54.12           Room 729.0-C1

==
Description:==
Spreading Room Fire Loading: The combustibles consist of plastics associated with electrical panels and lights and insulation on cables in the trays. The fire severity is classified as severe.
Compartmentation: The walls and floor of this room is of reinforced concrete construction. The ceiling is not claimed as a fire rated barrier.
Barriers:
FPR Figure        Regulatory Room           Direction         Adjacent Area/Room Reference         Barrier Rating 729.0-C1       NORTH WALL        AREA 8, ROOM 713.0-A1             II-29A, II-34A    3 Hours AREA 8, ROOM 713.0-A1             II-29A, II-34A    3 Hours AREA 8, ROOM 713.0-A27            II-29A, II-34A    3 Hours AREA 14, ROOM 737.0-A1            II-30A, II-34A    3 Hours AREA 14, ROOM 737.0-A1            II-30A, II-34A    3 Hours SOUTH WALL        AREA 63, TURBINE BUILDING         II-34A            3 Hours EAST WALL         AREA 63, TURBINE BUILDING         II-34A            3 Hours WEST WALL         AREA 63, TURBINE BUILDING         II-34A            3 Hours FLOOR*            AREA 48, ROOM 708.0-C2            II-33A, II-34A    2 Hours AREA 48, ROOM 708.0-C3            II-33A, II-34A    2 Hours
* Floor is a 2 hour regulatory barrier only above the Computer Room (708.0-C3) and the Corridor (708.0-C2).The remaining floor area is a 2 hour non-regulatory barrier.
VI-256

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                             Revision 60 Doors:
Door                                      FPR Figure      Door Room                      Adjacent Area/Room Number                                    Reference       Rating 729.0-C1       C29A       AREA 63, TURBINE BUILDING      II-34A          3 Hours*
C34A       AREA 63, TURBINE BUILDING      II-34A          3 Hours*
*Sliding fire doors Dampers:
Damper/Mark                                      Drawing        Damper Room                           Adjacent Area/Room Number                                           Reference      Rating 729.0-C1       0-ISD-31-3953   AREA 63, TURBINE BUILDING        47W866-4       3 Hours 47A381-473F                                      47W930-2 Detection: Ionization smoke detectors are provided in the room.
Suppression: An automatic preaction sprinkler system with a ceiling layer and an intermediate layer of sprinklers is provided for the room. Standpipe and hose stations are provided from the two stairwells and from the Turbine Building.
Deviations: The justification for sliding fire doors having fusible links on only one side of barrier opening is documented in Part VII, Section 5.2.
Evaluations: None.
3.54.13            Room 755.0-C1

==
Description:==
Mechanical Equipment Room Fire Loading: The combustibles consist of charcoal in the filter units and plastics associated with electrical panels and radiation monitors. The fire severity is classified as low.
Compartmentation: The room is constructed of reinforced concrete block or reinforced concrete, except for the ceiling of the living area, which is constructed of gypsum board and plaster.
Barriers:
FPR Figure        Regulatory Room          Direction        Adjacent Area/Room Reference         Barrier Rating 755.0-C1      NORTH WALL       AREA 14, ROOM 737.0-A1           II-30A, II-34A    3 Hours AREA 27, ROOM 757.0-A5           II-31A, II-34A    3 Hours AREA 36, ROOM 772.0-A5           II-32A, II-34A    3 Hours SOUTH WALL       AREA 63, TURBINE BUILDING        II-34A            3 Hours FLOOR            AREA 63, TURBINE BUILDING        II-34A            3 Hours Doors: None.
VI-257

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                             Revision 60 Dampers: None Detection: Ionization smoke detectors are provided in the room.
Suppression: Automatic sprinklers are provided in the room except for areas such as north of the MCR filter housing. The charcoal filter units are provided with a fixed water spray system. A standpipe and hose station is provided in the C1 Stairwell.
Deviations: None.
Evaluations: None.
3.54.14         Stairwell C1

==
Description:==
Stairwell C1 Fire Loading: The combustibles consist of fire hoses and plastic associated with electrical panels and lights and pipe insulation. The fire severity is classified as low.
Compartmentation: The stairwell is of reinforced concrete construction.
Barriers:
Regulatory FPR Figure Room                Direction              Adjacent Area/Room                      Barrier Reference Rating STAIRWELL C1        SOUTH WALL (ALL        AREA 63, TURBINE         II-33A, II-34A 3 Hours ELEVATIONS             BUILDING EXCLUDING 692)
WEST WALL              AREA 63, TURBINE         II-33A, II-34A 3 Hours (ELS 708 AND 729)      BUILDING Doors: None.
Dampers: None.
Detection: None.
Suppression: No automatic suppression is provided. Standpipe and hose stations are located on elevations 692.0, 708.0, 729.0, and 755.0 in the stairwell.
Deviations: The justification for not providing detection and automatic suppression in the stairwell is documented in Part VII, Section 2.3. The justification for the gutter penetration in the wall separating the stairwell from corridor 692.0-C11 is documented in Part VII, Section 4.2.
The justification for hose stations having more than 100 feet of hose is documented in Part VII, Section 4.3.
Evaluations: None.
VI-258

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                             Revision 60 3.54.15         Stairwell C2

==
Description:==
Stairwell C2 Fire Loading: The combustibles consist of fire hoses and plastic associated with electrical panels, boxes and lights. The fire severity is classified as low.
Compartmentation: The stairwell is of reinforced concrete construction.
Barriers:
FPR Figure       Regulatory Room                Direction             Adjacent Area/Room Reference        Barrier Rating STAIRWELL C2        SOUTH WALL            AREA 63, TURBINE        II-33A, II-34A   3 Hours (ALL ELEVATIONS       BUILDING EXCLUDING 692)
EAST WALL             AREA 63, TURBINE        II-33A, II-34A   3 Hours (ELS 708 AND 729)     BUILDING Doors: None.
Dampers: None.
Detection: None.
Suppression: No automatic suppression is provided. Standpipe and hose stations are located on elevations 692.0, 708.0, 729.0, and 755.0 in the stairwell.
Deviations: The justification for not providing detection and automatic suppression in the stairwell is documented in Part VII, Section 2.3.The justification for the gutter penetration in the wall separating the stairwell from corridor 692.0-C11 is documented in Part VII, Section 4.2.
The justification for hose stations having more than 100 feet of hose is documented in Part VII, Section 4.3.
Evaluations: None.
3.54.16         Room 755.0-C2

==
Description:==
Women's Restroom Fire Loading: The combustibles consist of miscellaneous wood, paper and plastic. The fire severity is classified as low.
Compartmentation: The room is of reinforced concrete construction.
Barriers:
FPR Figure       Regulatory Barrier Room         Direction        Adjacent Area/Room Reference        Rating 755.0-C2     SOUTH            AREA 63, TURBINE               II-34A           3 Hours WALL             BUILDING VI-259

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                                Revision 60 Barriers:
FPR Figure        Regulatory Barrier Room         Direction         Adjacent Area/Room Reference         Rating FLOOR             AREA 63, TURBINE               II-34A            3 Hours BUILDING Doors: None.
Dampers: None.
Detection: Ionization smoke and thermal (cross zoned) detectors are provided in the room.
Suppression: An automatic preaction sprinkler system is provided in the room. A standpipe and hose station is provided from the stairwell.
Deviations: None.
Evaluations: None.
3.54.17         Rooms 755.0-C4, C5, C6, C7, C8, C9 and C10

==
Description:==
These rooms constitute the kitchen, locker room, men's restroom and showers, and Shift Managers office and conference room.
Fire Loading: The combustibles consist of miscellaneous wood, paper, plastic and furniture.
The fire severity classification for each room is as follows:
Room No.              

== Description:==
Fire Loading 755.0-C4               Kitchen                                           Low 755.0-C5               Toilet                                            Low 755.0-C6               Locker Room                                       Insignificant 755.0-C7, C8           Showers                                           Insignificant 755.0-C9               Conference Room                                   Moderately severe 755.0-C10              Shift Managers Office                            Severe Compartmentation: The rooms are of reinforced concrete block or reinforced concrete, except for the ceilings which are gypsum board and plaster.
Barriers:
FPR Figure           Regulatory Room         Direction          Adjacent Area/Room Reference            Barrier Rating FLOOR 755.0-C4                        AREA 63, TURBINE BUILDING         II-34A               3 Hours (Partial)
NORTH WALL         AREA 14, ROOM 737.0-A1            II-34A               3 Hours AREA 27, ROOM 757.0-A5            II-34A               3 Hours 755.0-C6     NORTH WALL         AREA 14, ROOM 737.0-A1            II-30A, II-34A       3 Hours AREA 27, ROOM 757.0-A5            II-31A, II-34A       3 Hours FLOOR AREA 63, TURBINE BUILDING         II-34A               3 Hours (Partial)
VI-260

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                              Revision 60 Barriers:
FPR Figure          Regulatory Room         Direction         Adjacent Area/Room Reference           Barrier Rating 755.0-C8     NORTH WALL        AREA 14, ROOM 737.0-A1           II-30A, II-34A      3 Hours AREA 27, ROOM 757.0-A5           II-31A, II-34A      3 Hours 755.0-C9     NORTH WALL        AREA 14, ROOM 737.0-A1           II-30A, II-34A      3 Hours AREA 27, ROOM 757.0-A5           II-31A, II-34A      3 Hours Doors: None.
Dampers: None Detection: Ionization smoke detectors are provided in the rooms, except for the showers.
Thermal detectors are provided in the kitchen, toilet, and locker room cross zoned with the ionization smoke detectors in these rooms.
Suppression: An automatic preaction sprinkler system is provided in the rooms, except for the showers (Rooms 755.0-C7 and C8). A standpipe and hose station is provided from Stairwell C1.
Deviations: The justification for not providing total area detection and suppression in the showers (Rooms 755.0-C7 and C8) is documented in Part VII, Section 2.3. No deviations are applicable for Rooms 755.0-C4, C5, C6, C9 and C10.
Evaluations: None.
3.54.18         Rooms 755.0-C3, C12, C15

==
Description:==

Room No.               

== Description:==

755.0-C3                Corridor (includes space above Operations office and living area) 755.0-C12               Main Control Room 755.0-C15               Corridor Fire Loading: The combustibles in 755.0-C3 consist of paper, cloth, plastic and wood associated with the lockers and cabinets. The fire severity is classified as insignificant. The combustibles in 755.0-C12 consist of plastics associated with the electrical panels, furniture, and lights, miscellaneous paper, wood and plastics and cables for electrical panels. The fire severity is classified as low. There are no significant combustibles in 755.0-C15. The fire severity is classified as insignificant.
Compartmentation: The room is constructed of reinforced concrete block or reinforced concrete with the following exceptions.
: 1.      The ceiling of the living area is composed of gypsum board and plaster.
: 2.      The Main Control Room floor is not claimed as a fire rated barrier.
VI-261

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                         Revision 60 Barriers:
Regulatory FPR Figure Room           Direction           Adjacent Area/Room                             Barrier Reference Rating 755.0-C3       NORTH WALL          AREA 33, 772.0-A2               II-32A, II-34A 3 Hours AREA 36, 772.0-A5               II-32A, II-34A 3 Hours Area 27, 757.0-A5               II-31A, II-34A 3 Hours SOUTH WALL          AREA 63, TURBINE BUILDING       II-34A         3 Hours FLOOR (PARTIAL)     AREA 63, TURBINE BUILDING       II-34A         3 Hours 755.0-C12      NORTH WALL          AREA 14, ROOM 737.0-A1          II-30A, II-34A 3 Hours AREA 14, ROOM 737.0-A1          II-30A, II-34A 3 Hours AREA 18, ROOM 757.0-A3          II-31A, II-34A 3 Hours AREA 19, ROOM 757.0-A4          II-31A, II-34A 3 Hours AREA 20, ROOM 757.0-A1          II-31A, II-34A 3 Hours AREA 21, ROOM 757.0-A25         II-31A, II-34A 3 Hours AREA 23, ROOM 757.0-A27         II-31A, II-34A 3 Hours AREA 27, ROOM 757.0-A5          II-31A, II-34A 3 Hours AREA 28, ROOM 757.0-A21         II-31A, II-34A 3 Hours AREA 29, ROOM 757.0-A22         II-31A, II-34A 3 Hours AREA 30, ROOM 757.0-A23         II-31A, II-34A 3 Hours AREA 33, ROOM 772.0-A2          II-32A. II-34A 3 Hours AREA 34, ROOM 772.0-A3          II-32A. II-34A 3 Hours AREA 35, ROOM 772.0-A4          II-32A, II-34A 3 Hours AREA 43, ROOM 772.0-A13         II-32A, II-34A 3 Hours AREA 44, ROOM 772.0-A14         II-32A, II-34A 3 Hours AREA 45, ROOM 772.0-A15         II-32A, II-34A 3 Hours SOUTH WALL          AREA 63, TURBINE BUILDING       II-34A         3 Hours 755.0-C15      SOUTH WALL          AREA 63, TURBINE BUILDING       II-34A         3 Hours Doors:
Door                                    FPR Figure        Door Room                      Adjacent Area/Room Number                                  Reference         Rating 755.0-C3       C36A       AREA 63, TURBINE             II-34A            3 Hours*
BUILDING 755.0-C12      C49        AREA 27, ROOM 757.0-A5       II-31A, II-34A    3 Hours C50        AREA 28, ROOM 757.0-A21      II-31A, II-34A    3 Hours 755.0-C15      C54A       AREA 63, TURBINE             II-34A            3 Hours*
BUILDING
* Sliding Fire Doors and Swinging Doors Dampers: None Detection: Ionization smoke detectors are provided in the rooms except for certain areas such as above the MCR ceiling. Room 755.0-C3 the space above the operations office and living area has no detection.
VI-262

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                             Revision 60 Suppression: Automatic sprinklers are provided for Room C3. No automatic suppression is provided in Rooms C12 and C15. Standpipe and hose stations are provided in the stairwells and from the Turbine Building.
Deviations: The justification for not providing automatic suppression in the control room (755.0-C12) and corridor (Room 755.0-C15) is documented in Part VII, Section 2.3. The justification for the fire doors for 755.0-C12 is documented in Part VII, Section 4.1. No deviations are applicable for Room 755.0-C3. The justification for sliding fire doors having fusible links on only one side of barrier opening is documented in Part VII, Section 5.2.
Evaluations: None.
3.54.19         Rooms 755.0-C13, C19 and C20 Room No.               

== Description:==

755.0-C13               Relay Room 755.0-C19               Corridor 755.0-C20               DPSO Shop Fire Loading: The combustibles consist of plastics associated with the electrical relay boards and panels, paper and furniture. The fire severity classification for each room is as follows:
Room No.             

== Description:==
Fire Loading 755.0-C13             Relay Room                                                Low 755.0-C19             Corridor                                                  Low 755.0-C20             DPSO Shop                                                 Low Compartmentation: The rooms are of reinforced concrete block and reinforced concrete construction. There is a drop gypsum board ceiling in the corridor, but it is not a required fire barrier.
Barriers:
Regulatory FPR Figure Room          Direction        Adjacent Area/Room                                  Barrier Reference Rating 755.0-C13     NORTH WALL       AREA 14, ROOM 737.0-A1            II-30A, II-34A    3 Hours AREA 28, ROOM 757.0-A21           II-31A, II-34A    3 Hours AREA 42, ROOM 772.0-A12           II-32A, II-34A    3 Hours AREA 45, ROOM 772.0-A15           II-32A, II-34A    3 Hours FLOOR            AREA 63, TURBINE BUILDING         II-34A            3 Hours 755.0-C19     SOUTH WALL       AREA 63, TURBINE BUILDING         II-34A            3 Hours FLOOR            AREA 63, TURBINE BUILDING         II-34A            3 Hours 755.0-C20     NORTH WALL       AREA 14, ROOM 737.0-A1            II-30A, II-34A    3 Hours AREA 28, ROOM 757.0-A21           II-31A, II-34A    3 Hours AREA 45, ROOM 772.0-A15           II-32A            3 Hours Doors: None.
VI-263

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                              Revision 60 Dampers: None Detection: Ionization smoke detectors are provided in each room.
Suppression: Automatic sprinklers are provided in Room C19. No automatic suppression is provided in Rooms C13 and C20. Standpipe and hose stations are provided from the adjacent stairwell C2 and from the Turbine Building.
Deviations: The justification for not having automatic suppression in the Relay Room (755.0-C13) and DPSO Shop (Room 755.0-C20) is documented in Part VII, Section 2.3. No deviation are applicable for Room 755.0-C19.
Evaluations: None.
3.54.20         Rooms 755.0-C14, C16, C17, and C18 Room No.               

== Description:==

755.0-C14               Technical Support Center 755.0-C16               Conference Room 755.0-C17               Telephone Room 755.0-C18               NRC Office Fire Loading: The combustibles consist of wood and cloth associated with the furniture, paper and plastic. The fire severity classification for each room is as follows:
Room No.            

== Description:==
Fire Loading 755.0-C14            Technical Support Center                       Low 755.0-C16            Conference Room                                Low 755.0-C17            Telephone Room                                 Insignificant 755.0-C18            NRC Office                                     Low Compartmentation: The rooms are of reinforced concrete block or reinforced concrete construction that is equivalent to at least one-hour to three-hour fire barriers.
Barriers:
FPR Figure        Regulatory Room         Direction      Adjacent Area/Room Reference         Barrier Rating 755.0-C14    SOUTH          AREA 63, TURBINE BUILDING           II-34A            3 Hours WALL AND FLOOR 755.0-C16    FLOOR          AREA 63, TURBINE BUILDING           II-34A            3 Hours 755.0-C17    FLOOR          AREA 63, TURBINE BUILDING           II-34A            3 Hours 755.0-C18    NORTH          AREA 14, ROOM 737.0-A1              II-30A, II-34A    3 Hours WALL AREA 28, ROOM 757.0-A21             II-31A, II-34A    3 Hours AREA 42, ROOM 772.0-A12             II-32A, II-34A    3 Hours FLOOR          AREA 63, TURBINE BUILDING           II-34             3 Hours VI-264

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                           Revision 60 Doors: None.
Dampers: None Detection: Ionization smoke detectors are provided in each room, except the Telephone Room.
Suppression: Automatic sprinklers are provided in each room, except the Telephone Room C7.
A standpipe and hose station is provided from Stairwell C2.
Deviations: The justification for not having total area detection and suppression in the Telephone Room (755.0-C17) is documented in Part VII, Section 2.3. No deviations are applicable for Room 755.0-C14, C16 and C18.
Evaluations: None.
VI-265

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                            Revision 60 3.54.21          Fire Area 48 Safe Shutdown Analysis By Analysis Volume Fire Area 48 is considered an alternative shutdown area and must consider offsite power to be available and also consider offsite power being unavailable for 72 hours. For that reason there are two analyses for fire area 48 and both analyses cover the same physical area. Analysis volume AV-076 considers the case where offsite power may not be available and analysis volume AV-076A assumes that offsite power is available. That is, the fire is assumed to not damage the offsite power and control cables located in the control building. In both cases the fire is assumed to cause the Main Control Room to be abandoned and control of plant systems to be transferred to the Auxiliary Control System (ACS). After transfer the ACS provides controls and instrumentation necessary to achieve and maintain safe reactor shutdown from outside the MCR. Mitigating actions, including operator actions prior to abandoning the MCR, are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016 for each of the two analysis volumes.
3.54.21.1        AV-076 and AV-076A Room No.                

== Description:==

Stair C1                 Stairwell, elevation 692 through 755 Stair C2                 Stairwell, elevation 692 through 755 692.0-C1                 Mechanical Equipment Room 692.0-C2                 Mechanical Equipment Room 692.0-C3                 250V Battery Room 1 692.0-C4                 250V Battery Board Room No. 1 692.0-C5                 250V Battery Board Room No. 2 692.0-C8                 24V and 48V Battery Board and Charger Room 692.0-C11                Corridor 692.0-C12                Secondary Alarm Station Room 692.0-C6                 250V Battery Room 2 692.0-C7                 24V and 48V Battery Room 692.0-C9                 Communications Room 692.0-C10                Mechanical Equipment Room 708.0-C1                 Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room 708.0-C2                 Corridor 708.0-C3                 Computer Room 708.0-C4                 Unit 2 Auxiliary Instrument Room 729.0-C1                 Spreading Room 755.0-C1                 Mechanical Equipment Room 755.0-C2                 Women's Restroom 755.0-C4                 Kitchen 755.0-C5                 Toilet 755.0-C6                 Locker Room 755.0-C7                 Shower 755.0-C8                 Shower 755.0-C9                 Conference Room 755.0-C10                Shift Manager's Office 755.0-C3                 Corridor (includes space above Operations office and living area) 755.0-C12                Main Control Room 755.0-C15                Corridor 755.0-C13                Relay Room 755.0-C19                Corridor VI-266

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS Revision 60 Room No. 

== Description:==

755.0-C20 DPSO Shop 755.0-C14 Technical Support Center 755.0-C16 Conference Room 755.0-C17 Telephone Room 755.0-C18 NRC Office CB Roof   Control Building Roof VI-267

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                           Revision 60 3.55             FIRE AREA 49 3.55.1           Room 742.0-D4

==
Description:==
Diesel Generator Unit 1A-A Fire Loading: The combustibles in this room consist of lube oil in the diesel generator and valves, fuel oil in the diesel generator and the day tanks, plastics associated with electrical panels and boards and insulation on cables in trays. The fire severity is classified as moderately severe.
Compartmentation: This room is constructed of reinforced concrete.
Barriers:
FPR Figure       Regulatory Room             Direction       Adjacent Area/Room Reference        Barrier Rating 742.0-D4         South Wall      Area 53, Room 742.0-D9A        II-35A           3 Hours East Wall       Area 50, Room 742.0-D5         II-35A           3 Hours West Wall       Area 54, Room 742.0-D1         II-35A           3 Hours Area 54, Room 742.0-D2         II-35A           3 Hours Area 54, Stair D1              II-35A           3 Hours Doors:
Door                                        FPR Figure        Door Room                        Adjacent Area/Room Number                                      Reference         Rating 742.0-D4     D10            Area 53, Room 742.0-D9A      II-35A            3 Hours Dampers:
Damper/Mark                                      Drawing         Damper Room                             Adjacent Area/Room Number                                           Reference       Rating 742.0-D4     0-ISD-30-619        Area 54, Room 742.0-D1       47W866-9        3 Hours 47A381-448F                                      17W910-1 Detection: The room is provided with thermal detectors. Relay Board Panel has ionization smoke detectors.
Suppression: The room is provided with a total flooding CO2 suppression system. Standpipe and hose stations are provided within the Diesel Generator Building on both elevations, and fire hydrant from the Yard.
Deviations: The justification for the Appendix A deviation for the manway openings to the buried tanks is documented in Part VII, Section 4.4.
Evaluations: None.
3.55.2           DGB Rooms 760.5-D3, D4, and D5 Room No.                

== Description:==

760.5-D3                 Unit 1A-A Air Exhaust Room VI-268

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                            Revision 60 Room No.                

== Description:==

760.5-D4                 480V Board Room 1A-A 760.5-D5                 Unit 1A-A Air Intake Room Fire Loading: The combustibles in room 760.5-D3 consist of grease for the fans and insulation on cables in trays. The fire severity classified as moderate. The combustibles in room 760.5-D4 consist of plastic associated with electrical boards and panels and insulation on cables in trays.
The fire severity is classified as moderate. The combustibles in room 760.5-D5 consist of lube oil for the combustion air intake filters, and ERFBS Thermo-Lag. The fire severity is classified as low.
Compartmentation: The rooms are of reinforced concrete construction.
Barriers:
FPR Figure      Regulatory Room            Direction         Adjacent Area/Room Reference       Barrier Rating 760.5-D3        East Wall         Area 50, Room 760.5-D6       II-35A          3 Hours West Wall         Area 54, Room 760.5-D2       II-35A          3 Hours Floor (partial)   Area 53, Room 742.0-D9A      II-35A          3 Hours 760.5-D4        East Wall         Area 50, Room 760.5-D7       II-35A          3 Hours West Wall         Area 54, Room 760.5-D1       II-35A          3 Hours Area 54, Room 760.5-D2       II-35A          3 Hours 760.5-D5        East Wall         Area 50, Room 760.5-D8       II-35A          3 Hours West Wall         Area 54, Room 760.5-D1       II-35A          3 Hours Doors:
Door           Adjacent                   FPR Figure     Door Room Number         Area/Room                  Reference      Rating 760.5-D4      D22            Area 54, Room 760.5-D1     II-35A         3 Hours D24            Area 50, Room 760.5-D7     II-35A         3 Hours Dampers:
Damper/Mark                                     Drawing         Damper Room                             Adjacent Area/Room Number                                          Reference       Rating 760.5-D3      0-ISD-30-617       Area 53, Room 742.0-D9A      47W866-9        3 Hours 47A381-449F                                     17W910-2 0-ISD-30-620       Area 53, Room 742.0-D9A      47W866-9        1.5 Hours 47A381-447                                      17W910-2 0-ISD-30-621       Area 54, Room 760.5-D2       47W866-9        3 Hours 47A381-537F                                     17W910-2 760.5-D5      0-ISD-30-631       Area 54, Room 760.5-D1       47W866-9        3 Hours 47A381-526F                                     17W910-1 Detection: Heat detectors are provided for rooms 760.5-D3 and -D5; ionization smoke detectors cross zoned with heat detectors are provided in room 760.5-D4.
VI-269

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                            Revision 60 Suppression: Room 760.5-D4 is provided with a total flooding CO2 suppression system. No automatic suppression is provided in Rooms 760.5-D3 and D5. Standpipe and hose stations are provided from rooms 742.0-D9 and 760.5-D1.
Deviations: The justification for the 1-1/2 hour damper in the 3 hour fire barrier between the Unit 1 1A-A Air Exhaust Room (760.5-D3) and the Corridor (742.0-D9A) is documented in Part VII, Section 4.7.
Evaluations: None.
VI-270

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                       Revision 60 3.55.3          Fire Area 49 Safe Shutdown Analysis By Analysis Volume 3.55.3.1        AV-077 DGB-1A, Diesel Generator Building 1A:
Room No.              

== Description:==

742.0-D4               Diesel Generator Unit 1A-A 760.5-D3               Unit 1A-A Air Exhaust Room 760.5-D4               480-V Board Room 1A-A 760.5-D5               Unit 1A-A Air Intake Room A fire in Analysis Volume 77 would not impact major equipment required to maintain safe shutdown functions. Shutdown can be achieved by utilizing both train A and B systems and components without mitigating actions. Equipment affected and credited to achieve shutdown is identified below:
VI-271

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                           Revision 60 3.56             FIRE AREA 50 3.56.1           Room 742.0-D5

==
Description:==
Diesel Generator Unit 2A-A Fire Loading: The combustibles in this room consist of lube oil in the diesel generator and valves, fuel oil in the diesel generator and the day tanks, plastics associated with electrical panels and boards and insulation on cables in trays. The fire severity is classified as moderately severe.
Compartmentation: This room is constructed of reinforced concrete.
Barriers:
FPR Figure      Regulatory Room          Direction          Adjacent Area/Room Reference       Barrier Rating 742.0-D5      South Wall         Area 53, Room 742.0-D9A       II-35A          3 Hours Area 53, Room 792.0-D9N       II-35A          3 Hours East Wall          Area 51, Room 742.0-D6        II-35A          3 Hours West Wall          Area 49, Room 742.0-D4        II-35A          3 Hours Doors:
Door                                      FPR Figure       Door Room                           Adjacent Area/Room Number                                    Reference        Rating 742.0-D5        D11            Area 53, Room 742.0-D9A    II-35A           3 Hours Dampers: None.
Detection: This room is provided with thermal detectors. Relay Board Panel has ionization smoke detectors.
Suppression: This room is provided with a total flooding CO2 suppression system. Standpipe and hose stations are provided within the Diesel Generator Building on both elevations, and fire hydrant from the Yard.
Deviations: The justification for the Appendix A deviation for the manway openings to the buried tanks is documented in Part VII, Section 4.4.
Evaluations: None.
3.56.2           Rooms 760.5-D6, D7, and D8 Room No.                

== Description:==

760.5-D6                 Unit 2A-A Air Exhaust Room 760.5-D7                 480V Board Room 2A-A 760.5-D8                 Unit 2A-A Air Intake Room VI-272

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                              Revision 60 Fire Loading: The combustibles in room 760.5-D6 consist of grease for the fans and insulation on cables in trays. The fire severity is classified as moderate. The combustibles in room 760.5-D7 consist of plastic associated with electrical boards and panels and insulation on cables in trays. The fire severity is classified as moderate. The combustibles in room 760.5-D8 consist of lube oil for the combustion air intake filters. The fire severity is classified as low.
Compartmentation: The rooms are of reinforced concrete construction.
Barriers:
FPR Figure        Regulatory Room         Direction         Adjacent Area/Room Reference         Barrier Rating 760.5-D6     East Wall         Area 51, Room 760.5-D9           II-35A            3 Hours West Wall         Area 49, Room 760.5-D3           II-35A            3 Hours Floor (partial)   Area 53, Room 742.0-D9A          II-35A            3 Hours Area 53, Room 742.0-D9N          II-35A            3 Hours 760.5-D7     East Wall         Area 51, Room 760.5-D10          II-35A            3 Hours West Wall         Area 49, Room 760.5-D4           II-35A            3 Hours 760.5-D8     East Wall         Area 51, Room 760.5-D11          II-35A            3 Hours West Wall         Area 49, Room 760.5-D5           II-35A            3 Hours Doors:
Door                                           FPR Figure     Door Room                         Adjacent Area/Room Number                                         Reference      Rating 760.5-D7    D24              Area 49, Room 760.5-D4        II-35A         3 Hours D27              Area 51, Room 760.5-D10       II-35A         3 Hours Dampers: None.
Detection: Heat detectors are provided for room 760.5-D6 and -D8; ionization smoke detectors cross zoned with heat detectors are provided in room 760.5-D7.
Suppression: Room 760.5-D7 is provided with a total flooding CO2 suppression system. No automatic suppression is provided in Rooms 760.5-D6 and D8. Standpipe and hose stations are provided from rooms 742.0-D9 and 760.5-D1.
Deviations: None.
Evaluations: None.
VI-273

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                       Revision 60 3.56.3          Fire Area 50 Safe Shutdown Analysis By Analysis Volume 3.56.3.1        AV-078 DGB-2A, Diesel Generator Building 2A:
Room No.              

== Description:==

742.0-D5               Diesel Generator Unit 2A-A 760.5-D6               Unit 2A-A Air Exhaust Room 760.5-D7               480V Board Room 2A-A 760.5-D8               Unit 2A-A Air Intake Room A fire in Analysis Volume 78 would not impact major equipment required to maintain safe shutdown functions. Shutdown can be achieved by utilizing both train A and B systems and components without mitigating actions. Equipment affected and credited to achieve shutdown is identified below:
VI-274

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                           Revision 60 3.57             FIRE AREA 51 3.57.1           Room 742.0-D6

==
Description:==
Diesel Generator Unit 1B-B Fire Loading: The combustibles in this room consist of lube oil in the diesel generator and valves, fuel oil in the diesel generator and the day tanks, plastics associated with electrical panels and boards and insulation on cables in trays. The fire severity is classified as moderately severe.
Compartmentation: This room is constructed of reinforced concrete.
Barriers:
FPR Figure     Regulatory Barrier Room        Direction         Adjacent Area/Room Reference      Rating 742.0-D6    South Wall        Area 53, Room 742.0-D9B       II-35A         3 Hours Area 53, Room 742.0-D9N       II-35A         3 Hours East Wall         Area 52, Room 742.0-D7        II-35A         3 Hours West Wall         Area 50, Room 742.0-D5        II-35A         3 Hours Doors:
Door                                        FPR Figure       Door Room                       Adjacent Area/Room Number                                      Reference        Rating 742.0-D6    D12            Area 53, Room 742.0-D9B      II-35A           3 Hours Dampers: None.
Detection: This room is provided with heat detectors. Relay Board Panel has ionization smoke detectors.
Suppression: This room is provided with a total flooding CO2 suppression system. Standpipe and hose stations are provided within the Diesel Generator Building on both elevations, and fire hydrant from the yard.
Deviations: The justification for the Appendix A deviation for the manway openings to the buried tanks is documented in Part VII, Section 4.4.
Evaluations: None.
3.57.2           Rooms 760.5-D9, D10, and D11 Room No.                

== Description:==

760.5-D9                 Unit 1B-B Air Exhaust Room 760.5-D10                480V Board Room 1B-B 760.5-D11                Unit 1B-B Air Intake Room VI-275

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                           Revision 60 Fire Loading: The combustibles in room 760.5-D9 consist of grease for the fans and insulation on cables in trays. The combustible loading for this room is moderate. The combustibles in room 760.5-D10 consist of plastic associated with electrical boards and panels and insulation on cables in trays. The fire severity is classified as moderate. The combustibles in room 760.5-D11 consist of lube oil for the combustion air intake filters. The fire severity is classified as low.
Compartmentation: The rooms are of reinforced concrete construction.
Barriers:
FPR Figure      Regulatory Room           Direction            Adjacent Area/Room Reference       Barrier Rating 760.5-D9        East Wall           Area 52, Room 760.5-D12      II-35A          3 Hours West Wall           Area 50, Room 760.5-D6       II-35A          3 Hours Floor (partial)     Area 53, Room 742.0-D9B      II-35A          3 Hours Area 53, Room 742.0-D9N      II-35A          3 Hours 760.5-D10      East Wall            Area 52, Room 760.5-D13      II-35A          3 Hours West Wall           Area 50, Room 760.5-D7       II-35A          3 Hours 760.5-D11      East Wall            Area 52, Room 760.5-D14      II-35A          3 Hours West Wall           Area 50, Room 760.5-D8       II-35A          3 Hours Doors:
Door                                         FPR Figure       Door Room                            Adjacent Area/Room Number                                       Reference        Rating 760.5-D10      D27              Area 50, Room 760.5-D7      II-35A           3 Hours D30              Area 52, Room 760.5-D13     II-35A           3 Hours Dampers:
Damper/Mark                                      Drawing         Damper Room                               Adjacent Area/Room Number                                           Reference       Rating 760.5-D9     0-ISD-30-1090         Area 53, Room 742.0-D9N    47W866-9        3 Hours 47A381-757                                       17W910-2 Detection: Heat detectors are provided for room 760.5-D9 and D11; ionization smoke detectors cross zoned with heat detectors are provided in room 760.5-D10.
Suppression: Room 760.5-D10 is provided with a total flooding CO2 suppression system. No automatic suppression is provided in Rooms 760.5-D9 and D11. Standpipe and hose stations are provided from rooms 742.0-D9 and 760.5-D1.
Deviations: None.
Evaluations: None.
VI-276

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                       Revision 60 3.57.3          Fire Area 51 Safe Shutdown Analysis By Analysis Volume 3.57.3.1        AV-079 DGB-1B - Diesel Generator Building 1B:
Room No.              

== Description:==

742.0-D6               Diesel Generator Unit 1B-B 760.5-D9               Unit 1B-B Air Exhaust Room 760.5-D10              480V Board Room 1B-B 760.5-D11              Unit 1B-B Air Intake Room A fire in Analysis Volume 79 would not impact major equipment required to maintain safe shutdown functions. Shutdown can be achieved by utilizing both train A and B systems and components without mitigating actions. Equipment affected and credited to achieve shutdown is identified below:
VI-277

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                              Revision 60 3.58             FIRE AREA 52 3.58.1           Room 742.0-D7

==
Description:==
Diesel Generator Unit 2B-B Fire Loading: The combustibles in this room consist of lube oil in the diesel generator and valves, fuel oil in the diesel generator and the day tanks, plastics associated with electrical panels and boards and insulation on cables in trays. The fire severity is classified as moderately severe.
Compartmentation: This room is constructed of reinforced concrete.
Barriers:
FPR Figure       Regulatory Barrier Room          Direction        Adjacent Area/Room Reference        Rating 742.0-D7      South Wall       Area 53, Room 742.0-D9B        II-35A           3 Hours West Wall        Area 51, Room 742.0-D6         II-35A           3 Hours Doors:
Door                                        FPR Figure       Door Room                         Adjacent Area/Room Number                                      Reference        Rating 742.0-D7       D13           Area 53, Room 742.0-D9B       II-35A           3 Hours Dampers: None.
Detection: This room is provided with heat detectors. Relay Board Panel has ionization smoke detectors.
Suppression: This room is provided with a total flooding CO2 suppression system. Standpipe and hose stations are provided within the Diesel Generator Building on both elevations, and fire hydrant from the yard.
Deviations: The justification for the Appendix A deviation for the manway openings to the buried tanks is documented in Part VII, Section 4.4.
Evaluations: None.
3.58.2           Rooms 760.5-D12, D13, and D14 Room No.                

== Description:==

760.5-D12                Unit 2B-B Air Exhaust Room 760.5-D13                480V Board Room 2B-B 760.5-D14                Unit 2B-B Air Intake Room Fire Loading: The combustibles in room 760.5-D12 consist of grease for the fans and insulation on cables in trays. The fire severity is classified as moderate. The combustibles in room 760.5-D13 consist of plastic associated with electrical boards and panels and insulation on cables in trays. The fire severity is classified as moderate. The combustibles in room 760.5-D14 consist of lube oil for the combustion air intake filters. The fire severity is classified as low.
VI-278

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                         Revision 60 Compartmentation: The rooms are of reinforced concrete construction.
Barriers:
FPR Figure      Regulatory Room          Direction        Adjacent Area/Room Reference       Barrier Rating 760.5-D12     West Wall        Area 51, Room 760.5-D9        II-35A          3 Hours Floor (Partial)  Area 53, Room 742.0-D9B       II-35A          3 Hours 760.5-D13     West Wall        Area 51, Room 760.5-D10       II-35A          3 Hours 760.5-D14     West Wall        Area 51, Room 760.5-D11       II-35A          3 Hours Doors:
Door                                    FPR Figure       Door Room                          Adjacent Area/Room Number                                  Reference        Rating 760.5-D13     D30             Area 51, 760.5-D10      II-35A           3 Hours Dampers:
Damper/Mark                                      Drawing      Damper Room                            Adjacent Area/Room Number                                           Reference    Rating 760.5-D12   0-ISD-30-616        AREA 53, ROOM 742.0-D9B      47W866-9     3 Hours 47A381-449F                                      17W910-2 Detection: Heat detectors are provided for room 760.5-D12 and -D14; ionization smoke detectors cross zoned with heat detectors are provided in room 760.5-D13.
Suppression: Room 760.5-D13 is provided with a total flooding CO2 suppression system. No automatic suppression is provided in Rooms 760.5-D12 and D14. Standpipe and hose stations are provided from rooms 742.0-D9 and 760.5-D1.
Deviations: None.
Evaluations: None.
VI-279

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                       Revision 60 3.58.3          Fire Area 52 Safe Shutdown Analysis By Analysis Volume 3.58.3.1        AV-080 DGB-2B - Diesel Generator Building 2B:
Room No.              

== Description:==

742.0-D7               Diesel Generator Unit 2B-B 760.5-D12              Unit 2B-B Air Exhaust Room 760.5-D13              480V Board Room 2B-B 760.5-D14              Unit 2B-B Air Intake Room A fire in Analysis Volume 80 would not impact major equipment required to maintain safe shutdown functions. Shutdown can be achieved by utilizing both train A and B systems and components without mitigating actions. Equipment affected and credited to achieve shutdown is identified below:
VI-280

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                              Revision 60 3.59     FIRE AREA 53 3.59.1 Rooms 742.0-D3 and D9

==
Description:==

Room No.                

== Description:==

742.0-D3                 Toilet 742.0-D9                 Pipe Gallery and Corridor (742.0-D9A, D9B, & D9N)
Fire Loading: The fire severity is classified as low for 742.0-D3. The combustibles in 742.0-D9 consist of miscellaneous material in the storage cages, plastics associated with electrical panels and lights and insulation on cables in trays. The fire severity is classified as low.
Compartmentation: The walls separating the Fuel Oil Transfer room from the Pipe Gallery and Corridor are of reinforced concrete block construction and the ceiling is reinforced concrete. The Pipe Gallery and Corridor is of reinforced concrete construction. The walls and ceiling of the Toilet are reinforced concrete block and reinforced concrete.
Barriers:
FPR Figure        Regulatory Room          Direction       Adjacent Area/Room Reference         Barrier Rating 742.0-D3      South and       Area 54, Room 742.0-D10            II-35A            3 Hours West Walls 742.0-D9      North Wall      Area 49, Room 742.0-D4             II-35A            3 Hours Area 50, Room 742.0-D5             II-35A            3 Hours Area 51, Room 742.0-D6             II-35A            3 Hours Area 52, Room 742.0-D7             II-35A            3 Hours South Wall      Area 54, Room 742.0-D10            II-35A            3 Hours Area 55, DGB Cable Chase - A       II-35A            3 Hours Area 56, DGB Cable Chase - B       II-35A            3 Hours West Wall       Area 54, Room 742.0-D2             II-35A            3 Hours Area 54, Room 742.0-D10            II-35A            3 Hours Ceiling         Area 49, Room 760.5-D3             II-35A            3 Hours Area 50, Room 760.5-D6             II-35A            3 Hours Area 51, Room 760.5-D9             II-35A            3 Hours Area 52, Room 760.5-D12            II-35A            3 Hours Doors:
Door                                          FPR Figure     Door Room                       Adjacent Area/Room Number                                        Reference      Rating 742.0-D9      D8A          Area 54, Room 742.0-D2           II-35A         3 Hours*
D10          Area 49, Room 742.0-D4           II-35A         3 Hours D11          Area 50, Room 742.0-D5           II-35A         3 Hours D12          Area 51, Room 742.0-D6           II-35A         3 Hours D13          Area 52, Room 742.0-D7           II-35A         3 Hours D35          Area 56, DGB Cable Chase -B      II-35A         3 Hours D36          Area 55, DGB Cable Chase -A      II-35A         3 Hours
* Sliding Fire Door VI-281

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                           Revision 60 Dampers:
Room           Damper/Mark        Adjacent Area/Room           Drawing        Damper Number                                          Reference      Rating 742.0-D9A      0-ISD-30-594       Area 54, Room 742.0-D2       47W866-9       3 Hours 47A381-627F                                     17W910-2 742.0-D9B      0-ISD-30-616       Area 52, Room 760.5-D12      47W866-9       3 Hours 47A381-449F                                     17W910-2 742.0-D9A      0-ISD-30-617       Area 49, Room 760.5-D3       47W866-9       3 Hours 47A381-449F                                     17W910-2 742.0-D9A      0-ISD-30-620       Area 49, Room 760.5-D3       47W866-9       1.5 Hours 47A381-447                                      17W910-2 742.0-D9N      0-ISD-30-1090      Area 51, Room 760.5-D9       47W866-9       3 Hours 47A381-757                                      17W910-2 Detection: Smoke detectors are provided in the Pipe Gallery and Corridor. No detection for toilet (742.0-D3).
Suppression: An automatic preaction sprinkler system is provided in the Pipe Gallery and Corridor. No automatic suppression is provided in Room 742.0-D3. A standpipe and hose station is provided in the Pipe Gallery and Corridor.
Deviations: Deviations are as follows for Rooms 742.0-D9. The justification for the Appendix A deviation for the manway openings to the buried tanks in the pipe gallery/corridor is documented in Part VII, Section 4.4. The justification for the Appendix A deviation for the fire barrier separating the Fuel Oil Transfer Pump Room from the DG Building Corridor is documented in Part VII, Section 4.6. The justification for sliding fire doors having fusible links on only one side of barrier opening is documented in Part VII, Section 5.2. The justification for a hose station having more than 100 feet of hose is documented in Part VII, Section 4.3. The justification for the 1-1/2 hour damper in the 3 hour fire barrier between the Unit 1 1A-A Air Exhaust Room (760.5-D3) and the Corridor (742.0-D9A) is documented in Part VII, Section 4.7.
No deviations are applicable for Room 742.0-D3.
Evaluations: None.
3.59.2            Room 742.0-D8

==
Description:==
Fuel Oil Transfer Room Fire Loading: The combustibles consist of plastics associated with electrical panels and lights and insulation. The fire severity is classified as insignificant.
Compartmentation: The room is of reinforced concrete block walls with a reinforced concrete ceiling.
Barriers:
FPR Figure      Regulatory Barrier Room          Direction      Adjacent Area/Room Reference       Rating 742.0-D8      South Wall     Area 54, Room 742.0-D10       II-35A          3 Hours VI-282

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                             Revision 60 Doors: None.
Dampers: None.
Detection: Heat detectors are provided in the room.
Suppression: An automatic total flooding CO2 suppression system is provided in the room. A standpipe and hose station is provided from the adjacent Pipe Gallery and Corridor.
Deviations: The justification for the Appendix A deviation for the fire barrier separating the Fuel Oil Transfer Pump Room from the DG Building Corridor is documented in Part VII, Section 4.6.
Evaluations: None.
VI-283

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                       Revision 60 3.59.3          Fire Area 53 Safe Shutdown Analysis By Analysis Volume 3.59.3.1        AV-081A DGB-PGA - Diesel Generator Building Pipe Gallery A:
Room No.              

== Description:==

742.0-D9A              Pipe Gallery/Corridor, West wall to Door D11 742.0-D9N              Pipe Gallery/Corridor, Door D11 to Door D12 742.0-D3               Toilet A fire in Analysis Volume 81A would not impact major equipment required to maintain safe shutdown functions. Shutdown can be achieved by utilizing both train A and B systems and components without mitigating actions. Equipment affected and credited to achieve shutdown is identified below:
VI-284

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                       Revision 60 3.59.3.2        AV-081B DGB-PGB - Diesel Generator Building Pipe Gallery B:
Room No.              

== Description:==

742.0-D9B              Pipe Gallery/Corridor, East wall to Door D12 742.0-D9N              Pipe Gallery/Corridor, Door D11 to Door D12 742.0-D8               Fuel Oil Transfer Room A fire in Analysis Volume 81B would not impact major equipment required to maintain safe shutdown functions. Shutdown can be achieved by utilizing both train A and B systems and components without mitigating actions. Equipment affected and credited to achieve shutdown is identified below:
VI-285

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                             Revision 60 3.60           FIRE AREA 54 3.60.1         Room 742.0-D10

==
Description:==
Conduit Interface Room Fire Loading: The combustibles consist of insulation on cables in trays. The fire severity is classified as moderate.
Compartmentation: The room is of reinforced concrete construction.
Barriers:
FPR Figure       Regulatory Room         Direction    Adjacent Area/Room Reference        Barrier Rating 742.0-D10    North Wall   Area 53, Room 742.0-D3         II-35A           3 Hours Area 53, Room 742.0-D8         II-35A           3 Hours Area 53, Room 742.0-D9         II-35A           3 Hours Area 55, DGB Cable Chase - A   II-35A           3 Hours Area 56, DGB Cable Chase - B   II-35A           3 Hours East Wall    Area 53, Room 742.0-D3         II-35A           3 Hours Area 55, DGB Cable Chase - A   II-35A           3 Hours Area 56, DGB Cable Chase - B   II-35A           3 Hours West Wall    Area 55, DGB Cable Chase - A   II-35A           3 Hours Area 56, DGB Cable Chase - B   II-35A           3 Hours Doors: None.
Dampers: None.
Detection: Ionization smoke detectors are provided in the room.
Suppression: No automatic suppression is provided. Fire hydrants are located across the street between the DG and Auxiliary Buildings outside the entrance doors at each end of the room.
Deviations: None.
Evaluations: None.
3.60.2         Room 742.0-D2

==
Description:==
Lube Oil Storage Room Fire Loading: The combustibles consist of insignificant amounts of in situ combustibles and various numbers of sealed 55 gallon drums of lube oil and fuel oil. A number of drums (18) were chosen to represent a conservative fixed combustible load. The fire severity classification with the above assumption is severe.
Compartmentation: The walls are of reinforced concrete construction. The ceiling is of reinforced construction.
VI-286

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                             Revision 60 Barriers:
FPR Figure        Regulatory Room           Direction           Adjacent Area/Room Reference         Barrier Rating 742.0-D2       East Wall           Area 49, Room 742.0-D4      II-35A            3 Hours Area 53, Room 742.0-D9      II-35A            3 Hours Doors:
FPR Figure        Door Room           Door Number      Adjacent Area/Room Reference         Rating 742.0-D2       D8A              Area 53, Room 742.0-D9     II-35A            3 Hours (Sliding)
Dampers:
Damper/Mark                                        Drawing       Damper Room                               Adjacent Area/Room Number                                             Reference     Rating 742.0-D2     0-ISD-30-594          Area 53, Room 742.0-D9A      47W866-9      3 Hours 47A381-627F                                        17W910-2 Detection: Heat detectors are provided in the room.
Suppression: A total flooding CO2 suppression system is provided in the room. A standpipe and hose station is provided from the adjacent Corridor and Pipe Gallery 742.0-D9.
Deviations: The justification for the sliding fire doors only having fusible links on one side of the opening is documented in Part VII, Section 5.2.
Evaluations: None.
3.60.3          Rooms 742.0-D1, Stairwell D1, 760.5-D1 and 760.5-D2 Room No.                

== Description:==

742.0-D1                 CO2 Storage Room Stair D1                 Stairwell 760.5-D1                 Corridor 760.5-D2                 Radiation Shelter Fire Loading: The combustibles in these rooms consist of plastics, wood and paper associated with storage cabinets, electrical panels and lights. The fire severity classification for each room is as follows:
Room No.             

== Description:==
Fire Loading:
742.0-D1              CO2 Storage Room                                      Insignificant Stair D1              Stairwell                                             Low 760.5-D1              Corridor                                              Insignificant 760.5-D2              Radiation Shelter                                     Low Compartmentation: The rooms are of reinforced concrete construction.
VI-287

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                          Revision 60 Barriers:
FPR Figure      Regulatory Barrier Room      Direction      Adjacent Area/Room Reference       Rating 742.0-D1  East Wall      Area 49, Room 742.0-D4       II-35A          3 Hours Stair D1  East Wall      Area 49, Room 742.0-D4       II-35A          3 Hours 760.5-D1  East Wall      Area 49, Room 760.5-D4       II-35A          3 Hours Area 49, Room 760.5-D5       II-35A          3 Hours 760.5-D2  East Wall      Area 49, Room 760.5-D3       II-35A          3 Hours Area 49, Room 760.5-D4       II-35A          3 Hours Doors:
Door                                  FPR Figure        Door Room                   Adjacent Area/Room Number                                Reference         Rating 760.5-D1   D22         Area 49, Room 760.5-D4    II-35A            3 Hours Dampers:
Damper/Mark                                     Drawing       Damper Room                         Adjacent Area/Room Number                                          Reference     Rating 742.0-D1   0-ISD-30-619      Area 49, Room 742.0-D4        47W866-9      3 Hours 47A381-448F                                     17W910-1 760.5-D1   0-ISD-30-631      Area 49, Room 760.5-D5        47W866-9      3 Hours 47A381-526F                                     17W910-1 760.5-D2   0-ISD-30-621      Area 49, Room 760.5-D3        47W866-9      3 Hours 47A381-537F                                     17W910-2 Detection: None.
Suppression: No automatic suppression is provided. Standpipe and hose stations provided in Room 760.5-D1.
Deviations: None.
Evaluations: None.
VI-288

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                       Revision 60 3.60.4          FIRE AREA 54 SAFE SHUTDOWN ANALYSIS BY ANALYSIS VOLUME 3.60.4.1        AV-082 DGB-CO - Diesel Generator Building Corridor:
Room No.              

== Description:==

742.0-D1               CO2 Storage Room 742.0-D10              Conduit Interface Room 742.0-D2               Lube Oil Storage Room Stair D1               Stairwell 760.5-D1               Corridor 760.5-D2               Radiation Shelter A fire in Analysis Volume 82 would not impact major equipment required to maintain safe shutdown functions. Shutdown can be achieved by utilizing both train A and B systems and components without mitigating actions. Equipment affected and credited to achieve shutdown is identified below:
VI-289

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                        Revision 60 3.61            FIRE AREA 55 3.61.1          Cable Chase - A

==
Description:==
Cable Chase - A Fire Loading: The combustibles are insulation on the cables in the trays. The fire severity is classified as severe.
Compartmentation: The room is of reinforced concrete construction.
Barriers:
FPR Figure    Regulatory Room            Direction           Adjacent Area/Room Reference     Barrier Rating Cable Chase     North Wall          Area 53, Room 742.0-D9A   II-35A        3 Hours
-A South, East, and    Area 54, Room 742.0-D10   II-35A        3 Hours West Walls Ceiling             Area 54, Room 742.0-D10   II-35A        3 Hours Doors:
Door                                    FPR Figure Room                       Adjacent Area/Room                         Door Rating Number                                  Reference Cable         D36          Area 53, Room 742.0-D9A    II-35A          3 Hours Chase - A Dampers: None.
Detection: Ionization smoke detectors are provided in the room.
Suppression: An automatic preaction sprinkler system is provided in the room. A standpipe and hose station is provided from the adjacent Pipe Gallery and Corridor.
Deviations: None.
Evaluations: None.
VI-290

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                        Revision 60 3.61.2          Fire Area 55 Safe Shutdown Analysis By Analysis Volume 3.61.2.1        AV-083 Room No.              

== Description:==

DGB-A                  Cable Chase - A (From 713.0-A1A3 to DG Building Pipe Gallery A)
A fire in Analysis Volume 83 would not impact major equipment required to maintain safe shutdown functions. Shutdown can be achieved by utilizing both train A and B systems and components without mitigating actions. Equipment affected and credited to achieve shutdown is identified below:
VI-291

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                           Revision 60 3.62            FIRE AREA 56 3.62.1          Cable Chase - B

==
Description:==
Cable Chase - B Fire Loading: The combustibles are insulation on the cables in the trays. The fire severity is classified as severe.
Compartmentation: The room is of reinforced concrete construction.
Barriers:
FPR Figure        Regulatory Room          Direction         Adjacent Area/Room Reference         Barrier Rating Cable         North Wall        Area 53, Room 742.0-D9B      II-35A            3 Hours Chase - B South, East, and  Area 54, Room 742.0-D10      II-35A            3 Hours West Walls Ceiling           Area 54, Room 742.0-D10      II-35A            3 Hours Doors:
Door                                   FPR Figure Room                        Adjacent Area/Room                         Door Rating Number                                 Reference Cable Chase    D35          Area 53, Room 742.0-      II-35A           3 Hours
-B                          D9B Dampers: None.
Detection: Ionization smoke detectors are provided in the room.
Suppression: An automatic preaction sprinkler system is provided in the room. A standpipe and hose station is provided from the adjacent Pipe Gallery and Corridor.
Deviations: None.
Evaluations: None.
VI-292

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                        Revision 60 3.62.2          Fire Area 56 Safe Shutdown Analysis By Analysis Volume 3.62.2.1        AV-084 Room No.              

== Description:==

DGB-B                  Cable Chase - B (From 713.0-A1B to DG Building Pipe Gallery B)
A fire in Analysis Volume 84 would not impact major equipment required to maintain safe shutdown functions. Shutdown can be achieved by utilizing both train A and B systems and components without mitigating actions. Equipment affected and credited to achieve shutdown is identified below:
VI-293

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                             Revision 60 3.63           FIRE AREA 57 3.63.1         (Deleted - Formerly Assigned to the Additional Diesel Generator Building) 3.64           FIRE AREA 58 3.64.1         IPS EL 741 West

==
Description:==
ERCW Pump Room A Fire Loading: The combustibles in the ERCW Pump Room A consist of lube oil associated with the pumps, pipe insulation, plastics associated with electrical panels and lights and insulation on cables in trays. The fire severity is classified as moderate.
Compartmentation: The walls and floor of this room are of reinforced concrete construction.
The wall between the pump room and the Screen Wash pump room has two unprotected openings (scupper holes). The ceiling is an open steel missile barrier that allows air flow to the outside.
Barriers:
FPR Figure    Regulatory Room           Direction         Adjacent Area/Room Reference     Barrier Rating ERCW Pump      North, East and   Area 60, Roof Deck EL 728        II-36A        3 Hours Room A         West Walls South Wall        Area 58, Screen Wash and         II-36A        3 Hours HPFP A Pump Room East Wall         Area 59, ERCW Pump               II-36A        3 Hours Room B Doors:
Door                                          FPR Figure     Door Room                         Adjacent Area/Room Number                                        Reference      Rating ERCW Pump       W5           Area 58, Screen Wash and         II-36A         3 Hours Room A                       HPFP A Pump Room W9           Area 60, Roof Deck EL 728        II-36A         3 Hours Dampers: None.
Detection: Heat detectors are provided over the ERCW pumps. (See note below)
Suppression: No automatic suppression is provided. Standpipe and hose stations are accessible from the ERCW Strainer room and the Screen Wash Pump room. (See note below)
Deviations: The justification for the unprotected openings (scupper holes) in the wall between this room and the Screen Wash Pump room is documented in Part VII, Section 2.6.2.1.
Evaluations: The justification for the gap between the door and frame for Door W9 is documented in Part VII, Section 6.3. The feasibility and reliability evaluations for Unit 2 Operator Manual Actions are documented in Part VII, Section 8.3.57 and 64.
VI-294

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                          Revision 60 Note: Although this room is not provided with suppression and full area detection, per the guidelines of Appendix A, Section F.11, fire area barrier ratings are sufficient given the combustible loadings in the area. This fire area does not contain redundant safe shutdown equipment. Therefore, a fire in this area will not endanger other safety related equipment required for safe plant shutdown. Refer to Section F.11 of Part VIII of the FPR for information on conformance to Appendix A regarding this issue.
3.64.2           IPS EL 741 West

==
Description:==
Screen Wash and HPFP A Pump Room Fire loading: The combustibles in the Screen Wash and HPFP A Pump room consist of lube oil in the pumps, hydraulic oil in the Crane, and plastic associated with electrical panels and lights. The fire severity is classified as low.
Compartmentation: The walls and floor of this room are of reinforced concrete construction.
The wall between the Pump room and the Screen Wash Pump room has two unprotected openings (scupper holes). The ceiling of this room is an open steel missile barrier that allows air flow into the room.
Barriers:
FPR Figure      Regulatory Room          Direction       Adjacent Area/Room Reference       Barrier Rating Screen        North Wall      Area 58, ERCW Pump Room A         II-36A          3 Hours Wash and                      Area 59, ERCW Pump Room B         II-36A          3 Hours HPFP A Pumps         South Wall      Area 59, ERCW Strainer Room B     II-36A          3 Hours Room Area 59, HPFP B Pump Room         II-36A          3 Hours East Wall Area 59, ERCW Strainer Room B     II-36A          3 Hours Floor Area 59, ERCW Strainer Room B     II-36A          3 Hours (partial)
Doors:
Door                                      FPR Figure Room                         Adjacent Area/Room                          Door Rating Number                                    Reference Screen         W5            Area 58, ERCW Pump          II-36A          3 Hours Wash and                     Room A HPFP A Pumps          W8            Area 59, HPFP B Pump        II-36A          3 Hours Room                         Room Dampers: None.
Detection: None. (See note below)
VI-295

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                          Revision 60 Suppression: A standpipe and hose station is provided in this room and another is accessible from the ERCW strainer room. (See note below)
Deviations: The justification for the unprotected openings (scupper holes) in the wall between this room and the ERCW Pump Room is documented in Part VII, Section 2.6.2.1. The justification for the non-listed, non-approved fire pumps and fire pump controllers is documented in Part VII, Section 5.1.
Evaluations: The justification of the adequacy of HPFP system pumps and controllers is documented in Part VII, Section 3.3 Note: Although this room is not provided with suppression and detection, per the guidelines of Appendix A, Section F.11, fire area barrier ratings are sufficient given the combustible loadings in the area. This fire area does not contain redundant safe shutdown equipment. Therefore, a fire in this area will not endanger other safety related equipment required for safe plant shutdown. Refer to Section F.11 of Part VIII of the FPR for information on conformance to Appendix A regarding this issue.
3.64.3            IPS EL 722 West

==
Description:==
ERCW Strainer Room A Fire loading: The combustibles in this room consist of lube oil associated with the strainers and valves, and plastics associated with electrical panels and lights. The fire severity is classified as insignificant.
Compartmentation: This room is constructed of reinforced concrete.
Barriers:
FPR Figure     Regulatory Room          Direction      Adjacent Area/Room Reference      Barrier Rating ERCW          North Wall     Area 60, IPS 711 Board Room        II-36A         3 Hours Strainer                     Area 60, Roof Deck Area EL 728     II-36A         3 Hours Room A East Wall      Area 59, ERCW Strainer Room B      II-36A         3 Hours Doors:
Door                                          FPR Figure       Door Room                       Adjacent Area/Room Number                                        Reference        Rating ERCW          W10A         Area 59, ERCW Strainer Room B    II-36A           3 Hours Strainer Room A        W10B         Area 59, ERCW Strainer Room B    II-36A           3 Hours Dampers: None.
Detection: This room is provided with ionization smoke detectors.
VI-296

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                            Revision 60 Suppression: No automatic suppression is provided. A standpipe and hose station is provided in this room and another is accessible from the Screen Wash pump room.
Deviations: The justification for the fire doors is documented in Part VII, Section 4.1 Evaluations: None.
VI-297

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                          Revision 60 3.64.4          Fire Area 58 Safe Shutdown Analysis by Analysis Volume 3.64.4.1        AV-086 Room No.              

== Description:==

IPS-A El. 741          ERCW Pump Room A IPS-A El. 741          Screen Wash and HPFP A Pump Room IPS-A El. 722          ERCW Strainer Room A A fire in Analysis Volume 86 could potentially affect systems and components necessary to maintain the long term decay heat removal, steam generator inventory control, containment HVAC and reactor coolant inventory control functions. Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Offsite power is available. The required mitigating features include manual operation of Unit 1 and Unit 2 equipment required for safe shutdown. These features and equipment affected and credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-298

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                             Revision 60 3.65           FIRE AREA 59 3.65.1         IPS EL 741 East

==
Description:==
ERCW Pump Room B Fire Loading: The combustibles in the ERCW Pump Room B consist of lube oil associated with the pumps, pipe insulation, plastics associated with electrical panels and lights and insulation on cables in trays. The fire severity is classified as moderate.
Compartmentation: The walls and floor of this room are of reinforced concrete construction.
The wall between the pump room and the Screen Wash pump room has two unprotected openings (scupper holes). The ceiling is an open steel missile barrier that allows air flow to the outside.
Barriers:
FPR Figure     Regulatory Room        Direction       Adjacent Area/Room Reference      Barrier Rating ERCW        North Wall      Area 60, Roof Deck EL 728            II-36A         3 Hours Pump                        Area 60, IPS 711 Board Room          II-36          3 Hours Room B South Wall      Area 58, Screen Wash and             II-36A         3 Hours HPFP A Pump Room Area 59, HPFP B Pump Room            II-36A         3 Hours West Wall       Area 58, ERCW Pump Room A            II-36A         3 Hours Doors:
Door                                            FPR Figure      Door Room                     Adjacent Area/Room Number                                          Reference       Rating ERCW        W3           Area 60, STAIR                     II-36A          3 Hours Pump Room B      W6           Area 59, HPFP B Pump Room          II-36A          3 Hours Dampers: None.
Detection: Heat detectors are provided over the ERCW pumps. (See note below)
Suppression: No automatic suppression is provided. Standpipe and hose stations are provided from the ERCW strainer room and the Screen Wash Pump room. (See note below)
Deviations: The justification for the unprotected openings (scupper holes) in the wall between this room and the Screen Wash Pump room is documented in Section VII, Section 2.6.2.1.
Evaluations: The feasibility and reliability evaluations for Unit 2 Operator Manual Actions are documented in Part VII, Sections 8.3.58 and 65.
Note: Although this room is not provided with suppression and full area detection, per the guidelines of Appendix A, Section F.11, fire area barrier ratings are sufficient given the combustible loadings in the area. This fire area does not contain redundant safe shutdown equipment. Therefore, a fire in this area will not endanger other safety related equipment VI-299

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                            Revision 60 required for safe plant shutdown. Refer to Section F.11 of Part VIII of the FPR for information on conformance to Appendix A regarding this issue.
3.65.2            IPS EL 741 East

==
Description:==
HPFP B Pump Room Fire loading: The combustibles in this room consist of lube oil in the pumps, and plastic associated with junction boxes and rubber floor mats. The fire severity is classified as low.
Compartmentation: The walls and floor of this room is of reinforced concrete construction.
The ceiling of this room is an open steel missile barrier that allows air flow into the room.
Barriers:
FPR Figure       Regulatory Room          Direction      Adjacent Area/Room Reference        Barrier Rating HPFP B        North Wall     Area 59, ERCW Pump Room B          II-36A           3 Hours Pump Room          West Wall      Area 58, Screen Wash and HPFP      II-36A           3 Hours A Pump Room Floor          Area 59, ERCW Strainer Room B      II-36A           3 Hours Doors:
Door                                          FPR Figure        Door Room                     Adjacent Area/Room Number                                        Reference         Rating HPFP B      W6           Area 59, ERCW Pump Room B        II-36A            3 Hours Pump Room        W8           Area 58, Screen Wash and         II-36A            3 Hours HPFP A Pump Room Dampers: None.
Detection: None. (See note below)
Suppression: No automatic suppression is provided. A standpipe and hose station is provided in this room and another is accessible from the ERCW strainer room. (See note below)
Deviations: The justification for the non-listed, non-approved fire pumps and fire pump controllers is documented in Part VII, Section 5.1.
Evaluations: The justification for the adequacy of the HPFP system pumps and controllers is documented in Part VII, Section 3.3.
Note: Although this room is not provided with suppression and detection, per the guidelines of Appendix A, Section F.11, fire area barrier ratings are sufficient given the combustible loadings in the area. This fire area does not contain redundant safe shutdown equipment. Therefore, a fire in this area will not endanger other safety related equipment required for safe plant shutdown. Refer to Section F.11 of Part VIII of the FPR for information on conformance to Appendix A regarding this issue.
3.65.3            IPS EL 722 East VI-300

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                          Revision 60

==
Description:==
ERCW Strainer Room B Fire loading: The combustibles in this room consist of lube oil associated with the strainers and valves, and plastics associated with electrical panels and lights. The fire severity is classified as insignificant.
Compartmentation: This room is constructed of reinforced concrete.
Barriers:
FPR Figure   Regulatory Room        Direction        Adjacent Area/Room Reference    Barrier Rating ERCW        North            Area 60, IPS 711 Board Room         II-36A       3 Hours Strainer                     Area 60, Roof Deck EL 728           II-36A       3 Hours Room B West             Area 58, ERCW Strainer Room A       II-36A       3 Hours Area 58, Screen Wash and HPFP A     II-36A       3 Hours Pump Room Ceiling          Area 59, HPFP B Pump Room           II-36A       3 Hours (partial)        Area 58, Screen Wash and HPFP A     II-36A       3 Hours Pump Room Doors:
Door                                           FPR Figure       Door Room                      Adjacent Area/Room Number                                         Reference        Rating ERCW        W10A          Area 58, ERCW Strainer Room A    II-36A           3 Hours Strainer Room B      W10B          Area 58, ERCW Strainer Room A    II-36A           3 Hours Dampers: None.
Detection: This room is provided with ionization smoke detectors.
Suppression: No automatic suppression is provided. A standpipe and hose station is provided in this room and another is accessible from the Screen Wash pump room.
Deviations: The justification for fire doors is documented in Part VII, Section 4.1.
Evaluations: None.
VI-301

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                          Revision 60 3.65.4          Fire Area 59 Safe Shutdown Analysis by Analysis Volume 3.65.4.1        AV-087 Room No.              

== Description:==

IPS-B El. 741          ERCW Pump Room B IPS-B El. 741          HPFP B Pump Room IPS-B El. 722          ERCW Strainer Room B A fire in Analysis Volume 87 could potentially affect systems and components necessary to maintain the long term decay heat removal, steam generator inventory control, containment HVAC and reactor coolant inventory control functions. Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Offsite power is available. The required mitigating features include manual operation of Unit 1 and Unit 2 equipment required for safe shutdown. These features and equipment affected and credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-302

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                           Revision 60 3.66            FIRE AREA 60 3.66.1          Room IPS-711.0

==
Description:==
Board Room (Subdivided into IPS-CA, IPS-CC-A, IPS-CB, IPS-CC-B)
Fire Loading: The combustibles in the room consist of plastics associated with electrical panels and boards; oil in the transformers; lube oil, grease and hydraulic oil in the crane and insulation on cables in trays. The fire severity is classified moderate.
Compartmentation: The room is of reinforced concrete construction.
Barriers:
FPR Figure      Regulatory Room         Direction      Adjacent Area/Room Reference       Barrier Rating IPS-711.0    South Wall     Area 58, ERCW Strainer Room A       II-36A          3 Hours Area 59, ERCW Strainer Room B       II-36A          3 Hours Area 58, ERCW Pump Room A           II-36A          3 Hours Area 59, ERCW Pump Room B           II-36A          3 Hours Doors:
Door                                        FPR Figure Room                         Adjacent Area/Room                            Door Rating Number                                      Reference IPS-711.0     W3             Area 59, STAIR B             II-36A           3 Hours Dampers: None.
Detection: Ionization smoke detectors are provided in the room.
Suppression: An automatic sprinkler system is provided in the room. A standpipe and hose station is provided in the room.
Deviations: The room contains intervening combustibles in the form of insulation on cables in trays. The justification for using an enhanced automatic preaction sprinkler system to compensate for these intervening combustibles is documented in Part VII, Section 2.4.
Evaluations: The feasibility and reliability evaluations for Unit 2 Operator Manual Actions are documented in Part VII, Sections 8.3.59, 60, 61, 64, and 65.
VI-303

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                              Revision 60 3.66.2         Roof Deck EL 728

==
Description:==
RCW Pump Deck EL 728 Fire Loading: The combustibles in this area consist of lube oil in the pumps and plastics associated with junction and control boxes. The fire severity is classified as insignificant.
Compartmentation: The RCW Pump area is on the roof deck of the Board Room (IPS 711.0).
The barrier separating the roof deck from Areas 58 and 59 is of reinforced concrete construction.
Barriers:
FPR Figure        Regulatory Room      Direction      Adjacent Area/Room Reference         Barrier Rating Roof      South Wall     Area 58, ERCW Strainer Room A        II-36A            3 Hours Deck EL                  Area 58, ERCW Pump Room A            II-36A            3 Hours 728                      Area 59, ERCW Strainer Room B        II-36A            3 Hours Area 59, ERCW Pump Room B            II-36A            3 Hours Doors:
FPR Figure       Door Room          Door Number     Adjacent Area/Room Reference        Rating Roof Deck     W9              Area 58, ERCW Pump            II-36A           3 Hours EL 728                        Room A Dampers: None.
Detection: None.
Suppression: No automatic suppression is provided. A standpipe and hose station is provided in the Screen Wash Pump Room.
Deviations: None.
Evaluations: Evaluation of gap between door and frame on door W9 is documented in Part VII, Section 6.3 of FPR.
The RCW pump area is on the roof of the Intake Pumping Station Electrical Board Room and open to the atmosphere. There are no required fire safe shutdown (FSSD) components (equipment or cables) located on the deck, and a fire on the deck will not impact any FSSD components. The pump deck is thus not included in the analysis for the Intake Pumping Station (AV-088, AV-089, AV-090) because it has no impact.
VI-304

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                          Revision 60 3.66.3          Fire Area 60 Safe Shutdown Analysis by Analysis Volume 3.66.3.1        AV-088 Room No.              

== Description:==

IPS-CA El. 711.0       Board Room, 20ft West of 480V Bd/Transformer IPS-CC-A El. 711.0     Board Room, Mid to 20ft West of 480V Bd/Transformer A fire in Analysis Volume 88 could potentially affect systems and components necessary to maintain the long term decay heat removal, steam generator inventory control, containment HVAC and reactor coolant inventory control functions. Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Offsite power is available. The required mitigating features include manual operation of Unit 1 and Unit 2 equipment required for safe shutdown. These features and equipment affected and credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-305

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                           Revision 60 3.66.3.2        AV-089 Room No.              

== Description:==

IPS-CC-A El. 711.0     Board Room, Mid to 20ft West of 480V Bd/Transformer IPS-CC-B El. 711.0     Board Room, Mid to 20ft East of 480V Bd/Transformer A fire in Analysis Volume 89 could potentially affect systems and components necessary to maintain the long term decay heat removal, containment HVAC, reactor coolant inventory control and steam generator inventory control functions. Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown for both units. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Offsite power is available. The required mitigating features include providing manual operation of Unit 1 and Unit 2 equipment required for safe shutdown.
These features and equipment affected and credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-306

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                        Revision 60 3.66.3.3        AV-090 Room No.              

== Description:==

IPS-CB El. 711.0       Board Room, 20ft East of 480V Bd/Transformer IPS-CC-B El. 711.0     Board Room, Mid to 20ft East of 480V Bd/Transformer A fire in Analysis Volume 90 could potentially affect systems and components necessary to maintain the Unit 1 and Unit 2 long term decay heat removal, steam generator inventory control, containment HVAC and reactor coolant inventory control functions. Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Offsite power is available. The required mitigating features include manual operation of Unit 1 and Unit 2 equipment required for safe shutdown. These features and equipment affected and credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-307

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                              Revision 60 3.67            FIRE AREA 61 3.67.1          Unit 1 Reactor Building - Annulus

==
Description:==
Annulus Fire Loading: The combustibles consist of foam plastic insulation, plastic associated with electrical panels and boxes, rubber expansion joints, temporary shielding blankets, and insulation on cables in trays. The fire severity is classified as severe.
Compartmentation: The Annulus is separated from Primary Containment by the Steel Containment Vessel which prevents the passage of flames, smoke and hot gases, but allows heat transfer. The Annulus is separated from the Auxiliary Building fire areas by reinforced concrete construction.
Barriers:
Room         Adjacent Area/Room             FPR Figure Reference        Regulatory Barrier Rating ANNULUS      AREA 1, ROOM 713.0-A28         II-29A                      3 Hours AREA 5, ROOM 692.0-A7          II-28A                      3 Hours AREA 9, ROOM 713.0-A6          II-29A                      3 Hours AREA 9, ROOM 713.0-A8          II-29A                      3 Hours AREA 10, ROOM 729.0-A8         II-29A                      3 Hours AREA 12, ROOM 729.0-A1         II-30A, II-31A, II-32A      3 Hours AREA 13, ROOM 729.0-A2         II-38A                      3 Hours AREA 13, ROOM 729.0-A12        II-38A                      3 Hours AREA 13, ROOM 729.0-A14        II-38A                      3 Hours AREA 13, ROOM 729.5-A16        II-38A                      3 Hours AREA 12, ROOM 737.0-A6         II-30A                      3 Hours AREA 16, ROOM 737.0-A5         II-30A                      3 Hours AREA 13, ROOM 737.0-A13        II-30A                      3 Hours AREA 13, ROOM 775.25-A1        II-32A                      3 Hours AREA 13, ROOM 763.5-A1         II-38A                      3 Hours AREA 13, ROOM 786.5-A1         II-32A                      3 Hours AREA 25, ROOM 757.0-A10        II-31A                      3 Hours AREA 25, ROOM 757.0-A12        II-31A                      3 Hours AREA 25, ROOM 782.0-A1         II-32A                      3 Hours AREA 25, ROOM 782.0-A2         II-32A                      3 Hours Doors:
Door         Adjacent           FPR Figure Room                                                             Door Rating Number       Area/Room          Reference ANNULUS       A65          AREA 9, ROOM II-29A                   3 Hours 713.0-A8A Dampers: None.
Detection: Photoelectric smoke detectors provide partial coverage in the Annulus.
Suppression: Automatic preaction sprinkler systems provide partial coverage in the Annulus.
Standpipe and hose stations are provided throughout the Annulus.
VI-308

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                            Revision 60 Deviations: The justification for the radiant energy shields not meeting the ASTM E136 criteria of non-combustibility is documented in Part VII, Section 2.2. The justification for using dedicated hand-held portable lanterns in lieu of installed battery pack lighting is documented in Part VII, Section 2.7.1.
Evaluations: The lack of fire dampers for the containment purge air system return and exhaust air duct openings to the 713.0-A6 Unit 1 Penetration Room is documented in Part VII, Section 3.2.
3.67.2           Unit 1 Reactor Building - Primary Containment

==
Description:==
Primary Containment (Subdivided into RO-1, RO-2, RO-3, RO-4, RI-1, RI-2, RI-3, RI-4, RIR, RA1, RA2, RA3, RA4, RF1, RF2, RU)
Fire Loading: The combustibles consist of foam plastic insulation, plastic associated with electrical panels and boxes, rubber expansion joints, lube oil in pumps, motors and valves, glycol for the ice condenser insulation on cables in trays and wood (used only for insulation and framing of the ice condenser intermediate deck end wall doors). The fire severity for individual areas, range from a classification of insignificant to moderate.
Compartmentation: The Primary Containment is separated from the Annulus by the Steel Containment Vessel which prevents the passage of flames, smoke and hot gases, but allows heat transfer.
Barriers: None.
Doors:
FPR Door                                                  Door Room                          Adjacent Area/Room            Figure Number                                                Rating Reference PRIMARY             A95       AREA 9, ROOM 713.0-A8         II-29A        3 HR CONTAINMENT A96       AREA 9, ROOM 713.0-A8         II-29A        3 HR A164      AREA 25, ROOM 757.0-A12       II-31A        3 HR A165      AREA 25, ROOM 757.0-A12       II-31A        3 HR Dampers: None.
Detection: Ionization smoke detectors are provided in the LOWER and upper compartment cooler units. Heat detectors are provided over the Reactor Coolant Pumps.
Suppression: Automatic fixed water spray systems are provided for each Reactor Coolant Pump. Standpipes and hose stations are provided inside containment.
VI-309

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                            Revision 60 Deviations: The justification for the radiant energy shields not meeting the ASTM E136 criteria of non-combustibility is documented in Part VII, Section 2.2. The justification for using dedicated hand-held portable lanterns in lieu of installed battery pack lighting is documented in Part VII, Section 2.7.1. The justification to allow for minor amount of oil to escape the RCP oil collection system is documented in Part VII, Section 2.8. The justification for having less than 20 ft. of horizontal separation between some cables for redundant equipement is documented in Part VII, Section 2.9.22.
Evaluations: None.
VI-310

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                          Revision 60 3.67.3           Fire Area 61 Safe Shutdown Analysis by Analysis Volume 3.67.3.1         AV-091 Room No.                 

== Description:==

ANN                       Unit 1 Reactor Building - Annulus A fire in Analysis Volume 91 could potentially affect systems and components necessary to maintain the Unit 1 steam generator inventory control functions and Unit 1 long term decay heat removal, containment HVAC, reactor coolant inventory control and reactor pressure control functions. Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown.
Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Offsite power is available. The required mitigating features include providing smoke detectors, automatic fire suppression, and non-combustible radiant energy shields to protect redundant Unit 1 safe shutdown cables in the event of a fire and manual operations of Unit 1 equipment required for safe shutdown and repair procedures. These features and equipment affected and credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016. Since compliance in this area utilizes options III.G.2.d, e, and / or f the equipment train which is affected or credited for containment cooling, primary system depressurization during cooldown and RHR cooldown is determined subsequent to firefighting activities by the location of the fire. Adequate time is available to make this determination since the earliest safe shutdown requirement for these functions is approximately 2 hours when containment cooling must be established.
VI-311

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                          Revision 60 3.67.3.2                 AV-092A Unit 1 Reactor Building - Lower Containment Room No.                

== Description:==

RO-2                     Outside Crane Wall (90&deg; - 180&deg;)
RO-3                     Outside Crane Wall (180&deg; - 270&deg;)
RA2                      Accumulator Room 2 RF2                      Fan Room 2 A fire in Analysis Volume 92A could potentially affect systems and components necessary to maintain the Unit 1 long term decay heat removal, containment HVAC, reactor coolant inventory control, reactor pressure control and steam generator inventory control functions. Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Offsite power is available. The required mitigating features for Unit 1 include providing radiant energy shields to selected cables to preclude damage in the event of a fire and manual operation of equipment required for safe shutdown. The following is an exception to the general methodology for providing cable protection (ERFBS) from analysis volume boundary to analysis boundary as described in FPR Part III, Section 10.3.1. The redundant control cables and/or equipment are separated greater than 20 feet inside containment. These features and equipment affected and credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-312

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                          Revision 60 3.67.3.3                AV-092B Unit 1 Reactor Building - Lower Containment Room No.               

== Description:==

RO-2                    Outside Crane Wall (90&deg; - 180&deg;)
RO-3                    Outside Crane Wall (180&deg; - 270&deg;)
RA3                     Accumulator Room 3 RF2                     Fan Room 2 A fire in Analysis Volume 92B could potentially affect systems and components necessary to maintain the Unit 1 long term decay heat removal, containment HVAC, reactor coolant inventory control, reactor pressure control and steam generator inventory control functions. Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Offsite power is available. The required mitigating features for Unit 1 include providing radiant energy shields to selected cables to preclude damage in the event of a fire and manual operation of equipment required for safe shutdown and repair procedures. The following is an exception to the general methodology for providing cable protection (ERFBS) from analysis volume boundary to analysis boundary as described in FPR Part III, Section 10.3.1. The redundant control cables and/or equipment are separated greater than 20 feet inside containment. These features and equipment affected and credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-313

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                           Revision 60 3.67.3.4        AV-092C Unit 1 Reactor Building - Lower Containment Room No.              

== Description:==

RO-3                   Outside Crane Wall (180&deg; - 270&deg;)
RO-4                   Outside Crane Wall (270&deg; - 360&deg;)
RA3                    Accumulator Room 3 RA4                    Accumulator Room 4 A fire in Analysis Volume 92C could potentially affect systems and components necessary to maintain the Unit 1 steam generator inventory control, long term decay heat removal, reactor coolant inventory control and reactor pressure control functions. Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Offsite power is available. The required mitigating features include manual operation of Unit 1 equipment required for safe shutdown and repair procedures. These features and equipment affected and credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-314

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                         Revision 60 3.67.3.5        AV-092D Unit 1 Reactor Building - Lower Containment Room No.              

== Description:==

RO-1                   Outside Crane Wall (0&deg; - 90&deg;)
RO-4                   Outside Crane Wall (270&deg; - 360&deg;)
RF1                    Fan Room 1 RA4                    Accumulator Room 4 A fire in Analysis Volume 92D could potentially affect systems and components necessary to maintain the Unit 1 steam generator inventory control, long term decay heat removal, containment HVAC, reactor coolant inventory control and reactor pressure control functions.
Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Offsite power is available.
The required mitigating features for Unit 1 include manual operation of equipment required for safe shutdown and repair procedures. The following is an exception to the general methodology for providing cable protection (ERFBS) from analysis volume boundary to analysis boundary as described in FPR Part III, Section 10.3.1. The redundant control cables and/or equipment are expempt from separation criteria inside containment per FPR Part VII, Section 2.9.22. These features and equipment affected and credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-315

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                         Revision 60 3.67.3.6        AV-092E Unit 1 Reactor Building - Lower Containment Room No.               

== Description:==

RO-1                    Outside Crane Wall (0&deg; - 90&deg;)
RO-4                    Outside Crane Wall (270&deg; - 360&deg;)
RF1                     Fan Room 1 RA1                     Accumulator Room 1 A fire in Analysis Volume 92E could potentially affect systems and components necessary to maintain the Unit 1 long term decay heat removal, containment HVAC, reactor coolant inventory control, reactor pressure control, and steam generator inventory control functions. Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Offsite power is available. The required mitigating features for Unit 1 include manual operation of equipment required for safe shutdown and repair procedures. The following is an exception to the general methodology for providing cable protection (ERFBS) from analysis volume boundary to analysis boundary as described in FPR Part III, Section 10.3.1. The redundant control cables and/or equipment are expempt from separation criteria inside containment per FPR Part VII, Section 2.9.22. These features and equipment affected and credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-316

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                         Revision 60 3.67.3.7         AV-092F Unit 1 Reactor Building - Lower Containment Room No.                

== Description:==

RIR                      Instrument Room A fire in Analysis Volume 92F could potentially affect systems and components necessary to maintain the Unit 1 reactor coolant inventory control and reactor pressure control functions.
Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Offsite power is available.
The required mitigating features for Unit 1 include providing radiant energy shields to selected cables to preclude damage in the event of a fire and operation of equipment required for safe shutdown. The following is an exception to the general methodology for providing cable protection (ERFBS) from analysis volume boundary to analysis boundary as described in FPR Part III, Section 10.3.1. The redundant control cables and/or equipment are separated greater than 20 feet inside containment. These features and equipment affected and credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-317

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                       Revision 60 3.67.3.8        AV-092G Unit 1 Reactor Building - Primary Containment Room No.              

== Description:==

RU                     Upper Containment A fire in Analysis Volume 92G would not impact major equipment required to maintain safe shutdown functions. Shutdown can be achieved by utilizing both train A and B systems and components without mitigating actions. Equipment available to achieve shutdown are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016:
VI-318

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                         Revision 60 3.67.3.9         AV-092H Unit 1 Reactor Building - Lower Containment Room No.                

== Description:==

RI-2                     Inside Crane Wall (90&deg; - 180&deg;)
RI-3                     Inside Crane Wall (180&deg; - 270&deg;)
RA2                      Accumulator Room 2 RF2                      Fan Room 2 A fire in Analysis Volume 92H could potentially affect Unit 1 systems and components necessary to maintain the long term decay heat removal, containment HVAC, reactor coolant inventory control, reactor pressure control and steam generator inventory control functions.
Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Offsite power is available.
The required mitigating features for Unit 1 include providing radiant energy shields to selected cables to preclude damage in the event of a fire and manual operation of equipment required for safe shutdown. The following is an exception to the general methodology for providing cable protection (ERFBS) from analysis volume boundary to analysis boundary as described in FPR Part III, Section 10.3.1. The redundant control cables and/or equipment are separated greater than 20 feet inside containment. These features and equipment affected and credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-319

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                         Revision 60 3.67.3.10        AV-092J Unit 1 Reactor Building - Lower Containment Room No.                

== Description:==

RI-2                     Inside Crane Wall (90&deg; - 180&deg;)
RI-3                     Inside Crane Wall (180&deg; - 270&deg;)
RA3                      Accumulator Room 3 RF2                      Fan Room 2 A fire in Analysis Volume 92J could potentially affect systems and components necessary to maintain the Unit 1 long term decay heat removal, containment HVAC, reactor coolant inventory control, reactor pressure control and steam generator inventory control functions. Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Offsite power is available. The required mitigating features for Unit 1 include providing radiant energy shields to selected cables to preclude damage in the event of a fire and manual operation of equipment required for safe shutdown. The following is an exception to the general methodology for providing cable protection (ERFBS) from analysis volume boundary to analysis boundary as described in FPR Part III, Section 10.3.1. The redundant control cables and/or equipment are separated greater than 20 feet inside containment. These features and equipment affected and credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-320

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                         Revision 60 3.67.3.11       AV-092K Unit 1 Reactor Building - Lower Containment Room No.              

== Description:==

RI-1                   Inside Crane Wall (0&deg; - 90&deg;)
RI-4                   Inside Crane Wall (270&deg; - 360&deg;)
RA4                    Accumulator Room 4 RF1                    Fan Room 1 A fire in Analysis Volume 92K could potentially affect Unit 1 systems and components necessary to maintain the long term decay heat removal, containment HVAC, reactor coolant inventory control, reactor pressure control and steam generator inventory control functions.
Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Offsite power is available.
The required mitigating features for Unit 1 include manual operation of equipment required for safe shutdown and post fire repairs. The following is an exception to the general methodology for providing cable protection (ERFBS) from analysis volume boundary to analysis boundary as described in FPR Part III, Section 10.3.1. The redundant control cables and/or equipment are expempt from separation criteria inside containment per FPR Part VII, Section 2.9.22. These features and equipment affected and credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-321

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                        Revision 60 3.67.3.12       AV-092L Unit 1 Reactor Building - Lower Containment Room No.               

== Description:==

RI-1                    Inside Crane Wall (0&deg; - 90&deg;)
RI-4                    Inside Crane Wall (270&deg; - 360&deg;)
RA1                     Accumulator Room 1 RF1                     Fan Room 1 A fire in Analysis Volume 92L could potentially affect Unit 1 systems and components necessary to maintain the long term decay heat removal, containment HVAC, reactor coolant inventory control, reactor pressure control and steam generator inventory control functions. Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Offsite power is available. The required mitigating features for Unit 1 include manual operation of equipment required for safe shutdown and post fire repairs. The following is an exception to the general methodology for providing cable protection (ERFBS) from analysis volume boundary to analysis boundary as described in FPR Part III, Section 10.3.1. The redundant control cables and/or equipment are expempt from separation criteria inside containment per FPR Part VII, Section 2.9.22. These features and equipment affected and credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-322

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                           Revision 60 3.68          FIRE AREA 62 3.68.1        CDWE Building

==
Description:==
Condensate Demineralizer Waste Evaporator Building (CDWE)
Fire Loading: The combustibles in this building consist of plastic associated with electrical equipment and lights and lubricating oil associated with various pumps and motors, and rubber hoses. The fire severity is classified as low.
Compartmentation: The CDWE building is of reinforced concrete construction.
Barriers:
FPR Figure      Regulatory Room             Direction       Adjacent Area/Room Reference       Barrier Rating CDWE Building    West Wall       Area 10, Room 729.0-A5        II-38A          3 Hours Area 11, Room 729.0-A4        II-38A          3 Hours Doors:
Door                                     FPR Figure       Door Room                           Adjacent Area/Room Number                                   Reference        Rating CDWE Building    DE2           Area 11, Room 729.0-A4     II-38A           3 Hours Dampers:
Damper/Mark                                 Drawing           Damper Room                           Adjacent Area/Room Number                                      Reference         Rating AREA 62,   0-ISD-31-2427       Area 11, Room 729.0-    47W866-10         1.5 Hours 47A381-517          A4                      47W920-39 CDWE       0-ISD-31-2429       Area 11, Room 729.0-    47W866-10         1.5 Hours Building   47A381-517          A4                      47W920-39 Detection: None.
Suppression: No automatic suppression is provided. The CDWE building is provided with a standpipe and hose stations at various levels.
Deviations: The justification for the 1-1/2 hour dampers in the 3 hour fire barrier between the Waste Package Area (729.0-A4) and the CDWE is documented in Part VII, Section 4.7.
Evaluations: None.
VI-323

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                        Revision 60 3.68.2          Fire Area 62 Safe Shutdown Analysis by Analysis Volume 3.68.2.1        AV-093 Room No.              

== Description:==

CDWE                   Condensate Demineralizer Waste Evaporator Building (CDWE)
A fire in Analysis Volume 93 would not impact major equipment required to maintain safe shutdown functions. Shutdown can be achieved by utilizing both train A and B systems and components without mitigating actions. Equipment available to achieve shutdown are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016:
VI-324

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                              Revision 60 3.69            FIRE AREA 63 3.69.1          Turbine Building

==
Description:==
Turbine Building Fire Loading: The combustibles in the Turbine Building include lubricating oils and greases, plastics associated with electrical equipment and cables, fuel oil for the auxiliary boiler, and other miscellaneous materials associated with the function of an electrical generating facility. A combustible loading walkdown has not been performed for this building; however, this occupancy would be defined as mixed Ordinary Group 2 and 3 per NFPA 13 (Part II, Reference 4.4.12).
Compartmentation: The Turbine Building is of steel frame construction with concrete floors and is separated from the Control Building and Auxiliary Building by reinforced concrete walls, ceilings and floors which are equivalent to 3 hour fire barriers. The floors separating the various elevations within the Turbine Building are not fire rated barriers.
Barriers:
Regulatory FPR Figure Room            Direction      Adjacent Area/Room                                  Barrier Reference Rating TURBINE         NORTH          AREA 1, ROOM 692.0-A1          II-28A, II-33A       3 Hours BUILDING        WALL AREA 1, ROOM 692.0-A5          II-28A, II-33A       3 Hours AREA 1, ROOM 692.0-A27         II-28A, II-33A       3 Hours AREA 8, ROOM 713.0-A1          II-29A, II-33A,      3 Hours II-34A AREA 8, ROOM 713.0-A1          II-29A, II-33A       3 Hours AREA 8, ROOM 713.0-A2          II-29A, II-33A,      3 Hours II-34A AREA 8, ROOM 713.0-A27         II-29A, II-33A       3 Hours AREA 14, ROOM 737.0-A1         II-30A, II-34A       3 Hours AREA 14, ROOM 737.0-A1         II-30A, II-34A       3 Hours AREA 48, ROOM 708.0-C1         II-33A               3 Hours AREA 48, ROOM 708.0-C2         II-33A               3 Hours AREA 48, ROOM 708.0-C4         II-33A               3 Hours AREA 48, ROOM 729.0-C1         II-34A               3 Hours AREA 48, ROOM 755.0-C1         II-34A               3 Hours AREA 48, ROOM 755.0-C2         II-34A               3 Hours AREA 48, ROOM 755.0-C3         II-34A               3 Hours AREA 48, ROOM 755.0-C12        II-34A               3 Hours AREA 48, ROOM 755.0-C14        II-34A               3 Hours AREA 48, ROOM 755.0-C15        II-34A               3 Hours AREA 48, ROOM 755.0-C19        II-34A               3 Hours STAIR C1 (ALL ELS              II-33A, II-34A       3 Hours EXCEPT 692)
STAIR C2 (ALL ELS              II-33A, II-34A       3 Hours EXCEPT 692)
SERVICE BUILDING               II-29A, II-33A       3 Hours SOUTH          AREA 48, ROOM 708.0-C1         II-33A               3 Hours WALL EAST WALL      AREA 48, ROOM 708.0-C1         II-33A               3 Hours AREA 48, ROOM 729.0-C1         II-34A               3 Hours VI-325

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                            Revision 60 Barriers:
Regulatory FPR Figure Room              Direction      Adjacent Area/Room                                Barrier Reference Rating WEST WALL      AREA 48, ROOM 708.0-C4          II-33A            3 Hours AREA 48, ROOM 729.0-C1          II-34A            3 Hours CEILING        AREA 48, ROOM 755.0-C1          II-34A            3 Hours AREA 48, ROOM 755.0-C2          II-34A            3 Hours AREA 48, ROOM 755.0-C3          II-34A            3 Hours AREA 48, ROOM 755.0-C4          II-34A            3 Hours AREA 48, ROOM 755.0-C6          II-34A            3 Hours AREA 48, ROOM 755.0-C13         II-34A            3 Hours AREA 48, ROOM 755.0-C14         II-34A            3 Hours AREA 48, ROOM 755.0-C16         II-34A            3 Hours AREA 48, ROOM 755.0-C17         II-34A            3 Hours AREA 48, ROOM 755.0-C18         II-34A            3 Hours AREA 48, ROOM 755.0-C19         II-34A            3 Hours FLOOR          AREA 48, ROOM 692.0-C1          II-33A            3 Hours AREA 48, ROOM 692.0-C10         II-33A            3 Hours AREA 48, ROOM 708.0-C1*         II-33A            3 Hours
(*PARTIAL HEIGHT ENTRANCE)
Doors:
Door                                       FPR Figure      Door Room                        Adjacent Area/Room Number                                     Reference       Rating TURBINE        C19          AREA 48, ROOM 708.0-C1        II-33A          3 Hours BUILDING C26A               AREA 48, ROOM 708.0-C2        II-33A          3 Hours*
C29A         AREA 48, ROOM 729.0-C1        II-34A          3 Hours*
C34A         AREA 48, ROOM 729.0-C1        II-34A          3 Hours*
C36A         AREA 48, ROOM 755.0-C3        II-34A          3 Hours*
C54A         AREA 48, ROOM 755.0-C15       II-34A          3 Hours*
* Sliding Fire Doors Dampers:
Damper/Mark                                    Drawing       Damper Room                             Adjacent Area/Room Number                                         Reference     Rating AREA 63,        0-ISD-31-3953    AREA 48, ROOM 729.0-C1        47W866-4      3 HRS TURBINE         47A381-473F                                    47W930-2 BUILDING Detection: Heat detectors are provided to actuate the various fixed suppression systems.
Area detection is not provided.
Suppression: Fixed automatic water spray systems are provided for the feedwater pump turbine oil tanks, main turbine oil tanks, seal oil units and turbine head ends. An automatic sprinkler system is provided around the Auxiliary Boilers. A water curtain is provided for each tray penetration into the Control Building. Standpipes and hose stations are provided for each elevation.
VI-326

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                            Revision 60 Deviations: The justification for the hatch openings through the floor to the Control Building Mechanical Equipment Rooms is documented in Part VII, Section 2.6.4. The justification for using DG Backed Standby Lighting in the Turbine Building is documented in Part VII, Section 2.7.3. The justification for sliding fire doors having fusible links on only one side of barrier opening is documented in Part VII, Section 5.2.
Evaluations: None VI-327

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                        Revision 60 3.69.2          Fire Area 63 Safe Shutdown Analysis by Analysis Volume 3.69.2.1        AV-094 Room No.              

== Description:==

TB                     Turbine Building A fire in Analysis Volume 94 could potentially affect systems and components necessary to maintain the Unit 1 and Unit 2 containment HVAC function. Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Onsite power is available. The equipment available to achieve shutdown is identified below:
VI-328

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                            Revision 60 3.70             FIRE AREA 64 3.70.1           Yard

==
Description:==
Above Ground - Yard Below Ground - Duct Banks A and B Fire Loading: The major combustibles in the Yard include fuel oil and turbine oil in storage tanks, transformers, hydrogen in storage tank/trailers, and various combustible structures.
Compartmentation: The oil tanks and transformers are located at least 50 feet from any safety related structure. The transformers are provided with an absorbent bed of gravel which drains spills away from all structures. The oil tanks are provided with spill containment dikes which are sized to collect the entire contents of the largest single tank within the dike. The hydrogen storage trailers are located 300 feet from any safety related structure. Other combustible structures are located at least 30 feet from safety related buildings.
Barriers: None. The Duct Banks are separated and are buried underground. They are separated from the Yard by locked covers.
Doors: None.
Dampers: None.
Detection: Heat detectors are provided to actuate water spray systems where provided.
Suppression: The yard is provided with a looped, cross connected, underground fire main and fire hydrants. The fire hydrants are spaced approximately every 250 feet with fire equipment houses located every 1000 feet. The transformers and hydrogen storage trailers are provided with fixed automatic water spray systems.
Deviations: The justification for the scupper openings in the manholes for the duct banks is documented in Part VII, Section 2.6.2.2. The justification for using dedicated portable hand-held lantern in lieu of installed battery pack lighting is documented in Part VII, Section 2.7.2.
Evaluations: The feasibility and reliability evaluations for Unit 2 Operator Manual Actions, needed for a fire in this area are documented in Part VII, Sections 8.3.55, 56, 64 and 65.
VI-329

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                         Revision 60 3.70.2          Fire Area 64 Safe Shutdown Analysis by Analysis Volume 3.70.2.1        AV-095 Room No.              

== Description:==

Yard                   Yard A fire in Analysis Volume 95 could potentially affect systems and components necessary to maintain the Unit 1 and Unit 2 containment HVAC and reactor coolant inventory control functions. Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown.
Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Onsite power is available. The required mitigating features include manual operation of equipment required for safe shutdown. These features and equipment credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-330

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                           Revision 60 3.70.2.2        DUCT BANK A Duct Bank A runs from the Auxiliary Building 713.0-A1B to Intake Pumping Station A and is analyzed as AV-097.
AV-097 Room No.          

== Description:==

DBIPS-A            Cable Chase from Auxiliary Building 713.0-A1B to IPS-A A fire in Analysis Volume 97 could potentially affect Unit 1 and Unit 2 systems and components necessary to maintain the long term decay heat removal, containment HVAC, steam generator inventory control and reactor coolant inventory control functions. Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Offsite power is available. The required mitigating features for Unit 1 and Unit 2 include manual operation of equipment required for safe shutdown. These features and equipment credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-331

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                           Revision 60 3.70.2.3        DUCT BANK B Duct Bank B runs from Auxiliary Building 713.0-A1B to Intake Pumping Station B and is analyzed as AV-098.
AV-098 Room No.          

== Description:==

DBIPS-B            Cable Chase from Auxiliary Building 713.0-A1B to IPS-B A fire in Analysis Volume 98 could potentially affect Unit 1 and Unit 2 systems and components necessary to maintain the long term decay heat removal, containment HVAC, steam generator inventory control and reactor coolant inventory control functions. Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Offsite power is available. The required mitigating features for Unit 1 and Unit 2 include manual operation of equipment required for safe shutdown. These features and equipment credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-332

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                          Revision 60 3.71             FIRE AREA 65 Fire Area 65 is the Unit 2 Pipe Chase. The area is composed of rooms 676.0-A17, 692.0-A24, and 713.0-A29. Parts of this area go from floor elevation 676.0 to ceiling elevation 756.0 with only metal grating at intermediate elevations.
3.71.1           Room 676.0-A17, 692.0-A24 and 713.0-A29 Room No.               

== Description:==

676.0-A17               Unit 2 Pipe Chase 692.0-A24               Unit 2 Pipe Chase 713.0-A29               Unit 2 Pipe Chase Fire Loading: The fire severity for these rooms (individually and combined) is classified as insignificant. The in situ combustibles consist of small amounts of lube oil in valves and plastics associated with electrical panels, boxes and lights; anticipated amounts of Radwaste trash and laundry; and miscellaneous other materials.
Compartmentation: These rooms are separated from adjacent fire areas in the Auxiliary Building by reinforced concrete that has a fire resistance of at least 2-hours and from the Unit 2 Reactor Building by reinforced concrete that has a fire resistance of at least 3-hours.
Barriers:
FPR Figure       Regulatory Room          Direction         Adjacent Area/Room Reference        Barrier Rating 676.0-A17     SOUTH WALL        Area 1, Room 676.0-A4          II-27A           2-Hours WEST WALL         Area 1, Room 676.0-A1          II-27A           2-Hours Area 1, Room 676.0-A4          II-27A           2-Hours Area 1, Room 676.0-A4A         II-27A           2-Hours Area 1, Room 676.0-A14         II-27A           2-Hours Area 1, Room 676.0-A15         II-27A           2-Hours Area 2-2, Room 676.0-A13       II-27A           2-Hours Area 3-2, Room 676.0-A12       II-27A           2-Hours 692.0-A24     NORTH WALL        Area 70, Room 692.0-A25        II-28A           2-Hours SOUTH WALL        Area 66, Room 692.0-A21        II-28A           2-Hours Area 67, Room 692.0-A22        II-28A           2-Hours Area 68, Room 692.0-A23        II-28A           2-Hours EAST WALL         Area 70, Room 692.0-A25        II-28A           2-Hours WEST WALL         Area 1, Room 692.0-A1          II-28A           2-Hours Area 1 Room 692.0-A18          II-28A           2-Hours Area 1-1, Room 692.0-A20       II-28A           2-Hours Area 1-2, Room 692.0-A19       II-28A           2-Hours Area 10, Room 692.0-A14        II-28A           2-Hours Area 10, Room 692.0-A15        II-28A           2-Hours Area 10, Room 692.0-A16        II-28A           2-Hours 713.0-A29     NORTH WALL        Area 10, Room 729.0-A9         II-29A           2-Hours Area 74, Room 737.0-A9         II-30A           2-Hours Area 10, Spent Fuel Pit        II-29A           2-Hours VI-333

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                              Revision 60 Barriers:
FPR Figure          Regulatory Room      Direction       Adjacent Area/Room Reference           Barrier Rating SOUTH WALL      Area 8, Room 713.0-A18          II-29A              2-Hours Area 8, Room 713.0-A14          II-29A              2-Hours Area 8, Room 713.0-A31          II-29A              2-Hours Area 14, Room 737.0-A1          II-30A              2-Hours Area 71, Room 713.0-A19         II-29A              2-Hours EAST WALL       Area 71, Room 713.0-A19         II-29A              2-Hours Area 71-1, Room 713.0-A20       II-29A              2-Hours Area 74, Room 737.0-A9          II-30A              2-Hours Area 77, Unit 2 Reactor         II-29A              3-Hours Building WEST WALL       Area 1, Room 713.0-A28          II-29A              2-Hours Area 8, Room 713.0-A14          II-29A              2-Hours Area 8, Room 713.0-A15          II-29A              2-Hours Area 8, Room 713.0-A16          II-29A              2-Hours Area 8, Room 713.0-A17          II-30A              2-Hours Area 14, Room 737.0-A1          II-30A              2-Hours Area 14, Room 737.0-A8          II-30A              2-Hours FLOOR           Area 1, Room 692.0-A1           II-28A & II-29A     2-Hours Area 70, Room 692.0-A25         II-28, II-29        2-Hours CEILING         Area 14, Room 737.0-A1          II-29A & II-30A     2-Hours Area 74, Room 737.0-A9          II-29A & II-30A     2-Hours Area 74, Room 737.0-A8          II-29A & II-30A     2-Hours Area 75, Room 757.0-A16         II-29A, II-30A,     2-Hours II-31A Doors:
Door                                     FPR Figure Room                  Adjacent Area/Room                             Door Rating Number                                   Reference 676.0-A17 A12         Area 1, Room 676.0-A1        II-27A            1.5 Hours 692.0-A24 A45         Area 70, Room 692.0-A25      II-28A            1.5 -Hours 713.0-A29 A92         Area 8, Room 713.0-A14       II-28A            1.5 Hours Dampers:
Damper/Mark                                  Drawing           Damper Room                        Adjacent Area/Room Number                                       Reference         Rating 676.0-A17  2-ISD-31-3852    Area 3-2, Room 676.0-A12    47W920-1          1.5-Hours 47A381-391                                   47W866-11 2-ISD-31-3853    Area 2-2, Room 676.0-A13    47W920-1          1.5-Hours 47A381-391                                   47W866-11 2-ISD-31-3854    Area 1, Room 676.0-A14      47W920-1          1.5-Hours 47A381-391                                   47W866-11 2-ISD-31-3855    Area 1, Room 676.0-A15      47W920-1          1.5-Hours 47A381-391                                   47W866-11 VI-334

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                 Revision 60 Dampers:
Damper/Mark                             Drawing     Damper Room                     Adjacent Area/Room Number                                  Reference   Rating 2-ISD-31-1001  Area 1, Room 676.0-A1    47W920-1    3 Hours 47A920-A8022 692.0-A24 2-ISD-31-3856  Area 1-2, Room 692.0-A19 47W920-2    1.5-Hours 47A381-394                              47W866-11 2-ISD-31-3857  Area 1-1, Room 692.0-A20 47W920-2    1.5-Hours 47A381-394                              47W866-11 2-ISD-31-3858  Area 66, Room 692.0-A21  47W920-2    1.5-Hours 47A381-394                              47W866-11 2-ISD-31-3859  Area 67, Room 692.0-A22  47W920-2    3-Hours 47A381-394F                             47W866-11 2-ISD-31-3860  Area 68, Room 692.0-A23  47W920-2    1.5-Hours 47A381-394                              47W866-11 2-ISD-31-3861  Area 70, Room 692.0-A25  47W920-2    3-Hours 47A381-396F                             47W866-11 2-ISD-31-3862  Area 70, Room 692.0-A25  47W920-2    1.5-Hours 47A381-393F                             47W866-11 2-ISD-31-2930  Area 70, Room 692.0-A25  47W866-8    1.5-Hours 47A381-402F                             47W920-2, 3 713.0-A29 2-ISD-31-3927  Area 71, Room 713.0-A19  47W920-4    1.5-Hours 47A381-408F                             47W866-8 2-ISD-31-3870  Area 71-1, Room 713.0-   47W920-4    3-Hours A20 47A381-401F                             47W866-11 2-ISD-31-3872  Area 14, Room 737.0-A8   47W920-5    1.5-Hours 47A381-407                              47W866-11 2-ISD-31-3873  Area 8, Room 713.0-A15   47W866-11   1.5-Hours 47A381-407                              47W920-5 2-ISD-31-3874  Area 8, Room 713.0-A16   47W866-11   3-Hours 47A381-407F                             47W920-5 2-ISD-31-3875  Area 65, Room 713.0-A29  47W920-23   3-Hours 47A381-432F                             47W866-11 2-ISD-31-3876  Area 65, Room 713.0-A29  47W920-5    3-Hours 47A381-409F                             47W866-11 2-ISD-31-3877  Area 14, Room 737.0-A1   47W920-5    1.5-Hours 47A388-398F                             47W866-11 VI-335

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                           Revision 60 Detection: Ionization smoke detectors are provided in all three rooms.
Suppression: There is no automatic suppression in these rooms. Fire hose stations are available from adjacent rooms (676.0-A1, 692.0-A1 and 713.0-A1).
Deviations: Non-Rated Hatch in room 676.0-A17 provides access into room 692.0-A27.
Justification is documented in Part VII, Section 2.6.3.4. No deviations are applicable for rooms 692.0-A24 and 713.0-A29.
Evaluations: The lack of total area suppression and detection is addressed in Part VII, Section 3.1.9.
VI-336

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                          Revision 60 3.71.2          Fire Area 65 Safe Shutdown Analysis by Analysis Volume AV-099 Room No.              

== Description:==

676.0-A17              Unit 2 Pipe Chase 692.0-A24              Unit 2 Pipe Chase 713.0-A29              Unit 2 Pipe Chase A fire in Analysis Volume 99 could potentially affect Unit 2 systems and components necessary to maintain the long term decay heat removal, reactor coolant inventory control and steam generator inventory control functions. Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Unit 1 major equipment required to maintain safe shutdown functions is not impacted such that shutdown can be achieved by utilizing both train A and B systems and components without mitigating actions. Offsite power is available. The required mitigating features include manual operation of equipment required for safe shutdown. Equipment affected and credited is identified below:
VI-337

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                            Revision 60 3.72            FIRE AREA 66 3.72.1          Room 692.0-A21

==
Description:==
Charging Pump 2C Fire Loading: The combustibles consist of lube oil in the flex pump and flex equipment consisting of wood, plastic, nylon, urethane, polyethylene, and rubber. The existing pump and valves have been abandoned in place. The fire severity is classified as low.
Compartmentation: The room is bounded by regulatory fire barriers.
Barriers:
FPR Figure        Regulatory Room          Direction        Adjacent Area/Room Reference         Barrier Rating 692.0-A21     North Wall       Area 1-1, Room 692.0-A20       II-28A            2 Hours Area 65, Room 692.0-A24        II-28A            2 Hours East Wall        Area 67, Room 692.0-A22        II-28A            2 Hours South Wall       Area 1, Room 692.0-A1          II-28A            2 Hours West Wall        Area 1, Room 692.0-A1          II-28A            2 Hours Floor            Area 1, Room 676.0-A14         II-27A, II-28A    2 Hours Area 1, Room 676.0-A15         II-27A, II-28A    2 Hours Area 65, Room 676.0-A17        II-27A, II-28A    2 Hours Ceiling          Area 8, Room 713.0-A1          II-28A, II-29A    2 Hours Area 8, Room 713.0-A17         II-28A, II-29A    2 Hours Area 8, Room 713.0-A18         II-28A, II-29A    2 Hours Doors:
Door                                    FPR Figure      Door Room                      Adjacent Area/Room Number                                  Reference       Rating 692.0-A21    A41          Area 1, Room 692.0-A1      II-28A           1.5 Hours Dampers:
Damper Mark                                  Drawing          Damper Room                         Adjacent Area/Room Number                                       Reference        Rating 692.0-A21    2-ISD-31-3858   Area 65, Room 692.0-A24      2-47W866-11      1.5 Hours 47A381-394                                   47W920-2 Detection: Ionization smoke detectors are provided in the room (except in the entrance labyrinth). See note below.
Suppression: An automatic, preaction suppression system is provided in the room (except in the entrance labyrinth). See note below. A standpipe and hose station is available from the adjacent room (Corridor 692.0-A1).
VI-338

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                           Revision 60 Deviations: None.
Evaluations: None.
Note: Due to the insignificant quantity of in situ combustibles and robust rated fire barriers, this room is not provided with full area detection and suppression. The room is a separate fire area which does not contain redundant safe shutdown equipment. Therefore, a fire in this area/room will not endanger other safety related equipment required for safe plant shutdown VI-339

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                             Revision 60 3.72.2          Fire Area 66 Safe Shutdown Analysis by Analysis Volume 3.72.2.1        AV-103 Room No.              

== Description:==

692.0-A21              Charging Pump 2C A fire in Analysis Volume 103 could not impact safe shutdown. The only safe shutdown components in the room are circuits (routed in conduit) associated with Train B Containment Spray. The Positive Displacement charging pump has been abandoned in place as well as its associated components disabled. The room is constructed of reinforced concrete with a fire resistance rating of 2-hours; has insignificant quantities of combustible material; and is provided with detection and automatic suppression. Shutdown can be achieved by utilizing both Train A and B systems and components without mitigation actions. Offsite power is available.
Equipment credited to achieve shutdown is identified below:
VI-340

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                              Revision 60 3.73            FIRE AREA 67 3.73.1          Room 692.0-A22

==
Description:==
Charging Pump 2B-B Fire Loading: The combustibles consist of the lube oil in the charging pump and plastics associated with lights and junction boxes and anticipated amounts of radwaste trash and laundry. The fire severity is classified as low.
Compartmentation: The room is bounded by regulatory fire barriers.
Barriers:
FPR Figure       Regulatory Room           Direction     Adjacent Area/Room Reference        Barrier Rating 692.0-A22      North Wall    Area 65, Room 692.0-A24             II-28A           2 hours East Wall     Area 68, Room 692.0-A23             II-28A           2 hours South Wall    Area 1, Room 692.0-A1               II-28A           2 hours West Wall     Area 1, Room 692.0-A1               II-28A           2 hours Area 66, Room 692.0-A21             II-28A           2 hours Floor         Area 65, Room 676.0-A17             II-27A, II-28A   2 hours Ceiling       Area 8, Room 713.0-A1               II-28A, II-29A   2 hours Area 8, Room 713.0-A18              II-28A, II-29A   2 hours Doors:
Door                                    FPR Figure Room                      Adjacent Area/Room                           Door Rating Number                                  Reference 692.0-A22      A42        Area 1, Room 692.0-A1        II-28A           1.5 hours Dampers:
Damper Mark                                  Drawing Room                              Adjacent Area/Room                     Damper Rating Number                                       Reference 692.0-A22      2-ISD-31-3859      Area 65, Room 692.0-      2-47W866-    1.5 hours A24                       11 47A381-394                                   47W920-2 Detection: Ionization smoke detectors are provided in the room (except in the entrance labyrinth). See Evaluations below.
Suppression: An automatic, preaction suppression system is provided in the room (except in the entrance labyrinth). See Evaluations below. A standpipe and hose station is available from the adjacent room (Corridor 692.0-A1).
Deviations: None.
Evaluations: The justification for not having full area detection and suppression is documented in Part VII, Section 3.1.1. The feasibility and reliability evaluation for Unit 2 Operator Manual Action is documented in Part VII, Section 8.3.2.
VI-341

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                        Revision 60 3.73.2          Fire Area 67 Safe Shutdown Analysis by Analysis Volume 3.73.2.1        AV-104 Room No.               

== Description:==

692.0-A22               Charging Pump 2B-B A fire in Analysis Volume 104 could potentially affect systems and components necessary to maintain the Unit 2 reactor coolant inventory control and steam generator inventory control functions. Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown.
Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Unit 1 major equipment required to maintain safe shutdown functions is not impacted such that shutdown can be achieved by utilizing both train A and B systems and components without mitigating actions. Offsite power is available. The required mitigating features include manual operation of Unit 2 equipment required for safe shutdown. These features and equipment affected and credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-342

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                                Revision 60 3.74            FIRE AREA 68 3.74.1          Room 692.0-A23

==
Description:==
Charging Pump 2A-A Fire Loading: The combustibles consist of the lube oil in the charging pump and plastics associated with lights and junction boxes and anticipated amounts of radwaste trash and laundry, and grease, oil, paint, glue, and solvent contained in a storage cabinet. The fire severity is classified as moderate.
Compartmentation: The room is bounded by regulatory fire barriers.
Barriers:
FPR Figure          Regulatory Room          Direction        Adjacent Area/Room Reference           Barrier Rating 692.0-A23     NORTH WALL       Area 65, Room 692.0-A24      II-28A              2 Hours Area 70, Room 692.0-A25      II-28A              2 Hours EAST AND         Area 1, Room 692.0-A1        II-28A              2 Hours SOUTH WALL WEST WALL        Area 67, Room 692.0-A22      II-28A              2 Hours CEILING          Area 8, Room 713.0-A1        II-28A, II-29A      2 Hours Area 8, Room 713.0-A18       II-28A, II-29A      2 Hours Doors:
Door                                   FPR Figure        Door Room                       Adjacent Area/Room Number                                 Reference         Rating 692.0-A23     A43          Area 1, Room 692.0-A1     II-28A             1.5 Hours Dampers:
Damper Mark                                  Drawing           Damper Room                           Adjacent Area/Room Number                                       Reference         Rating 692.0-A23     2-ISD-31-3860    Area 65, Room 692.0-A24     2-47W866-11       1.5 Hours 47A381-394                                   47W920-2 Detection: Ionization smoke detectors are provided in the room (except in the entrance labyrinth). See Evaluations below.
Suppression: An automatic, preaction suppression system is provided in the room (except in the entrance labyrinth). See Evaluations below. A standpipe and hose station is available from the adjacent room (Corridor 692.0-A1).
Deviations: None.
Evaluations: The Justification for not having full area suppression and detection is documented in Part VII, Section 3.1.1.
VI-343

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                       Revision 60 3.74.2           Fire Area 68 Safe Shutdown Analysis by Analysis Volume 3.74.2.1         AV-105 Room No.                

== Description:==

692.0-A23                Charging Pump 2A-A A fire in Analysis Volume 105 could potentially affect systems and components necessary to maintain the Unit 2 reactor coolant inventory control and steam generator inventory control functions however no mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Unit 1 major equipment required to maintain safe shutdown functions is not impacted such that shutdown can be achieved by utilizing both train A and B systems and components without mitigating actions. Offsite power is available. Equipment affected and credited to achieve shutdown are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016:
VI-344

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                            Revision 60 3.75             FIRE AREA 69 3.75.1           Room 692.0-A26

==
Description:==
Turbine Driven Aux Feedwater Pump 2A-S Room Fire Loading: The combustibles consist of the lube oil associated with the feedwater pump, turbine oil cooler, 2 sump pumps and 5 valves and various amounts of plastics associated with electrical panels and lights, and rubber hoses. The fire severity is classified as low.
Compartmentation: The room is bounded by regulatory fire barriers constructed of reinforced concrete.
Barriers:
FPR Figure     Regulatory Room          Direction        Adjacent Area/Room Reference      Barrier Rating 692.0-A26     NORTH WALL       Area 70, Room 692.0-A25           II-28A         2 Hours SOUTH AND        Area 1, Room 692.0-A1             II-28A         2 Hours WEST WALL CEILING          Area 1, Room 692.0-A1             II-28A         2 Hours Doors:
Door                                    FPR Figure     Door Room                       Adjacent Area/Room Number                                  Reference      Rating 692.0-A26     A46          Area 1, Room 692.0-A1      II-28A         1.5 Hours Dampers:
Damper Mark                                  Drawing           Damper Room                             Adjacent Area/Room Number                                       Reference         Rating 692.0-A26     2-ISD-31-3958      Area 1, Room 692.0-A1     2-47W866-11       3 Hours 47A381-131F                                  47W920-2 2-ISD-31-3780      Area 1, Room 692.0-A1     2-47W866-11       3 Hours 47A381-392                                   47W920-2 2-ISD-31-3865      Area 1, Room 692.0-A1     2-47W866-11       3 Hours 47A381-647F                                  47W920-2 2-ISD-31-3866      Area 1, Room 692.0-A1     2-47W866-11       3 Hours 47A381-647F                                  47W920-2 2-ISD-31-3868      Area 1, Room 692.0-A1     2-47W866-11       3 Hours 47A381-131F                                  47W920-2 Detection: Ionization smoke detectors are provided in the room.
Suppression: An automatic, preaction suppression system is provided in the room. A standpipe and hose station is available from the adjacent room (692.0-A1).
Deviations: None.
VI-345

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                         Revision 60 Evaluations: None.
3.75.2          Fire Area 69 Safe Shutdown Analysis by Analysis Volume 3.75.2.1        AV-107 Room No.              

== Description:==

692.0-A26              Turbine Driven Aux Feedwater Pump 2A-S Room A fire in Analysis Volume 107 could potentially affect Unit 2 systems and components used to maintain steam generator inventory control functions by affecting the Unit 2 Turbine-Driven AFW pump. Safe shutdown for Unit 1 and Unit 2 can be achieved through the remaining Train A and B systems and components without mitigating actions. Offsite power is available. These features and equipment affected and credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-346

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                                Revision 60 3.76            FIRE AREA 70 3.76.1          Room 692.0- A25

==
Description:==
Unit 2 Penetration Room Fire Loading: The combustibles located in the room consist of lube oil and grease associated with fans, pumps and valves and plastics associated with electrical panels, boxes and lights, and rubber hoses. The fire severity classification is insignificant.
Compartmentation: The room is bounded by regulatory fire barriers constructed of reinforced concrete.
Barriers:
Regulatory FPR Figure Room         Direction       Adjacent Area/Room                                     Barrier Reference Rating 692.0-A25    North Wall      Area 77, Unit 2 Reactor Building     II-28A            3 Hours South Wall      Area 1, Room 692.0-A1                II-28A            2 Hours Area 65, Room 692.0-A24              II-28A            2 Hours Area 69, Room 692.0-A26              II-28A            2 Hours West Wall       Area 65, Room 692.0-A24              II-28A            2 Hours Ceiling         Area 65, Room 713.0-A29              II-28A, II-29A    2 Hours Area 71, Room 713.0-A19              II-28A, II-29A    2 Hours Area 71-1, Room 713.0-A20            II-28A, II-29A    2 Hours Doors:
Door                                     FPR Figure        Door Room                     Adjacent Area/Room Number                                   Reference         Rating 692.0-A25    A44         Area 1, Room 692.0-A1        II-28A            1.5 Hours A45         Area 65, Room 692.0-A24      II-28A            1.5 Hours Dampers:
Damper Mark                                        Drawing          Damper Room                           Adjacent Area/Room Number                                             Reference        Rating 692.0-A25    2-ISD-31-3861     Area 65, Room 692.0-A24          2-47W866-11      3 Hours 47A381-396F                                        47W920-2, 3 2-ISD-31-2930     Area 65, Room 692.0-A24          2-47W866-8       3 Hours 47A381-402F                                        47W920-2, 3 2-ISD-31-3862     Area 1, Room 692.0-A1            2-47W866-11      3 Hours 47A381-393F                                        47W920-2 Detection: Ionization smoke detectors are provided in the room except for the RHR Valve Vault.
VI-347

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                              Revision 60 Suppression: An automatic, preaction suppression system is provided in the room except for the RHR Valve Vault. A standpipe and hose station is available from the adjacent room (692.0-A1).
Deviations: None.
Evaluations: The lack of detection and suppression in the RHR Valve Vault is documented in Part VII, section 3.1.9.a. The feasibility and reliability evaluation for Unit 2 Operator Manual Action in 692.A25 is documented in Part VII, Section 8.3.3.
VI-348

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                        Revision 60 3.76.2          Fire Area 70 Safe Shutdown Analysis by Analysis Volume 3.76.2.1        AV-106 Room No.               

== Description:==

692.0-A25               Unit 2 Penetration Rm A fire in Analysis Volume 106 could potentially affect Unit 2 systems and components necessary to maintain the long term decay heat removal, steam generator inventory control, reactor coolant inventory control and containment HVAC functions. Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Unit 1 major equipment required to maintain safe shutdown functions is not impacted such that shutdown can be achieved by utilizing both train A and B systems and components without mitigating actions. Offsite power is available. The required mitigating features for Unit 2 include manual operation of equipment required for safe shutdown.
These features and equipment credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-349

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                                Revision 60 3.77            FIRE AREA 71 3.77.1          Room 713.0-A19 and -A21

==
Description:==
Unit 2 Penetration Rm and Unit 2 RB Access Room Fire Loading: The combustibles located in the area consist of lube oil and grease associated with air handling units, charcoal in an air exhaust filter assembly, plastics associated with electrical panels, radiation monitors and lights, insulation on cables in cable trays and anticipated quantities of radwaste trash and laundry. The fire severity classification for room 713.0-A19 is moderate, and for room 713.0-A21 is insignificant.
Compartmentation: The room is bounded by regulatory fire barriers constructed of reinforced concrete.
Barriers:
Regulatory FPR Figure Room         Direction         Adjacent Area/Room                                      Barrier Reference Rating 713.0-A19    NORTH WALL        Area 77, Unit 2 Reactor Building      II-29A            3 Hours SOUTH WALL        Area 8, Room 713.0-A1                 II-29A            2 Hours Area 71-1, Room 713.0-A20             II-29A            2 Hours WEST WALL         Area 65, Room 713.0-A29               II-29A            2 Hours Area 71-1, Room 713.0-A20             II-29A FLOOR             Area 65, Room 692.0-A24               II-28A, II-29A    2 Hours Area 70, Room 692.0-A25               II-28A, II-29A    2 Hours CEILING           Area 72, Room 729.0-A11               II-29A, II-30A    2 Hours Area 74, Room 737.0-A9                II-29A, II-30A    2 Hours Area 74, Room 737.0-A10               II-29A, II-30A    2 Hours 713.0-A21    NORTH             Area 77, Unit 2 Reactor Building      II-29A            3 Hours Doors:
Door                                             FPR Figure      Door Room                     Adjacent Area/Room Number                                           Reference       Rating 713.0-A19    A75         Area 1, Room 713.0-A1                II-29A           1.5 Hours A76         Area 71-1, Room 713.0-A20            II-29A          1.5 Hours 713.0-A21    A78         Area 77, Unit 2 Reactor Building     II-29A          3 Hours*
* See Note 4 on FPR Fig. II-28 Dampers:
Damper Mark       Adjacent                       Drawing             Damper Room Number            Area/Room                      Reference           Rating 713.0-A19    2-ISD-31-3871     Area 8, Room 713.0-A1          2-47W866-11        3 Hours 47A381-403F                                      47W920-4 2-ISD-31-3927     Area 65, Room 713.0-A29        2-47W866-8         1.5 Hours 47A381-408F                                      47W920-4 VI-350

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                           Revision 60 Dampers:
Damper Mark     Adjacent                       Drawing        Damper Room Number          Area/Room                      Reference      Rating 2-ISD-31-3970   Area 71-1, Room 713.0-A20      2-47W866-11    1.5 Hours 47A381-331                                     47W920-4 2-ISD-31-3929   Area 70, Room 692,0-A25        2-47W866-8     3 Hours 47A381-397F                                    47W920-4 Detection: Ionization smoke detectors are provided in the Unit 2 Penetration Rm, 713.0-A19 only.
Suppression: An automatic, preaction suppression system is provided in the Unit 2 Penetration Rm, 713.0-A19 only. A standpipe and hose station is available from the adjacent room (713.0-A1).
Deviations: None.
Evaluations: Justification for the lack of fire dampers in the containment purge air system return and exhaust air duct openings to the annulus is documented in Part VII, Section 3.2 for Room 713.0-A19. The lack of total area suppression and detection is documented in Part VII, Section 3.1.10 for both rooms.
VI-351

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                         Revision 60 3.77.2          Fire Area 71 Safe Shutdown Analysis by Analysis Volume 3.77.2.1        AV-110 Room No.               

== Description:==

713.0-A19               Unit 2 Penetration Rm 713.0-A21               Unit 2 RB Access Room A fire in Analysis Volume 110 could potentially affect Unit 2 systems and components necessary to maintain the long term decay heat removal, containment HVAC, steam generator inventory control and reactor coolant inventory control functions. Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Unit 1 major equipment required to maintain safe shutdown functions is not impacted such that shutdown can be achieved by utilizing both train A and B systems and components without mitigating actions. Offsite power is available. The required mitigating features for Unit 2 include manual operation of equipment required for safe shutdown.
These features and equipment credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-352

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                              Revision 60 3.78            FIRE AREA 71-1 3.78.1          Room 713.0-A20

==
Description:==
Unit 2 Volume Control Tank (VCT) Room Fire Loading: The combustibles located in the area consist of hydrogen in the VCT, lube oil associated with valves, plastics associated with electrical panels and lights, and anticipated quantities of radwaste trash and laundry. The fire severity classification is insignificant.
Compartmentation: The room is bounded by regulatory fire barriers constructed of reinforced concrete.
Barriers:
Regulatory FPR Figure Room          Direction           Adjacent Area/Room                               Barrier Reference Rating 713.0-A20     North Wall          Area 71, Room 713.0-A19        II-29A            2 Hours East Wall           Area 71, Room 713.0-A19        II-29A            2 Hours South Wall          Area 8, Room 713.0-A1          II-29A            2 Hours Area 8, Room 713.0-A18         II-29A            2 Hours West Wall           Area 65, Room 713.0-A29        II-29A            2 Hours Floor               Area 65, Room 692.0-A24        II-28A, II-29A    2 Hours Area 70, Room 692.0-A25        II-28A, II-29A    2 Hours Ceiling             Area 74, Room 737.0-A9         II-29A, II-30A    2 Hours Doors:
Door        Adjacent               FPR Figure Room                                                             Door Rating Number      Area/Room              Reference 713.0-A20     A76         Area 71-1, Room        II-29A          1.5 Hours 713.0-A20 Dampers:
Damper Mark                                   Drawing         Damper Room                             Adjacent Area/Room Number                                        Reference       Rating 713.0-A20      2-ISD-31-3870     Area 71-1, Room 713.0-A29   47W920-4        3 Hours 47A381-401F                                   47W866-11 2-ISD-31-3970     Area 71, Room 713.0-A19     47W920-4        1.5-Hours 47A381-331                                    47W866-11 Detection: Ionization smoke detectors are provided in the room.
Suppression: An automatic, preaction suppression system is provided in the room (except in the entrance labyrinth). A standpipe and hose station is available from adjacent room (713.0-A1).
VI-353

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                        Revision 60 Deviations: None Evaluations: The fire damper in door A76 (Unit 2 VCT room 713.0-A20) is the same configuration as door A63 (Unit 1 VCT room 713.0-A7) which has been reviewed by NRC and documented in Part VII, Section 3.5 of the FPR. Refer to Part VII, Section 3.1.10a for the evaluation of the lack of full suppression. The Unit 2 evaluation for performing a manual action in the room of fire origin is documented in Part VII, Section 8.4.2.
VI-354

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                          Revision 60 3.78.2          Fire Area 71-1 Safe Shutdown Analysis by Analysis Volume 3.78.2.1        AV-111 Room No.              

== Description:==

713.0-A20              Unit 2 Volume Control Tank Room A fire in Analysis Volume 111 could potentially affect Unit 2 systems and components necessary to maintain the reactor coolant inventory control functions. Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Unit 1 major equipment required to maintain safe shutdown functions is not impacted such that shutdown can be achieved by utilizing both train A and B systems and components without mitigating actions. Offsite power is available. The required mitigating features include manual operation of Unit 2 equipment required for safe shutdown.
These features and equipment credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-355

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                            Revision 60 3.79           FIRE AREA 72 3.79.1         Room 729.0-A11 and 737.0-A10 Room No.               

== Description:==

729.0-A11               Unit 2 South Main Steam Valve Rm 737.0-A10               Air Lock Fire Loading: The combustibles located in the area consist of lube oil associated with valves and plastics associated with electrical panels and lights. The fire severity classification for both rooms is insignificant.
Compartmentation: The rooms are bounded by regulatory fire barriers constructed of reinforced concrete.
Barriers:
Regulatory FPR Figure Room          Direction          Adjacent Area/Room                                Barrier Reference Rating 729.0-A11     NORTH WALL         Area 77, Unit 2 Reactor Building   II-30A         3 Hours SOUTH WALL         Area 15-2, Room 737.0-A12          II-30A         2 Hours Area 31, Room 757.0-A24            II-31A         2 Hours Area 41, Room 772.0-A11            II-32A         2 Hours WEST WALL          Area 74, Room 737.0-A9             II-30A         2 Hours Area 75, Room 757.0-A16            II-31A         2 Hours Area 75, Room 782.0-A3             II-32A         2 Hours FLOOR              Area 71, Room 713.0-A19            II-29A, II-30A 2 Hours 737.0-A10     NORTH WALL         Area 77, Unit 2 Reactor Building   II-30A         3 Hours SOUTH WALL         Area 15-2, Room 737.0-A12          II-30A         2 Hours WEST WALL          Area 74, Room 737.0-A9             II-30A         2 Hours CEILING            Area 74, Room 737.0-A9             II-30A         2 Hours Doors:
Door                                        FPR Figure      Door Room                        Adjacent Area/Room Number                                      Reference       Rating 737.0-A10    A130           Area 74, Room 737.0-A9       II-30A          1.5 Hours Dampers: None Detection: None.
VI-356

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                            Revision 60 Suppression: No automatic suppression is provided. Standpipe and hose stations are available from Room 737.0-A1B.
Deviations:    The justification of compliance with III.G.1 with a FHA is in Part VII, Section 2.9.6.
Evaluations: The lack of total area suppression and detection is documented in Part VII, Section 3.1.11.
VI-357

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                            Revision 60 3.79.2           Fire Area 72 Safe Shutdown Analysis by Analysis Volume 3.79.2.1         AV-113 Room No.               

== Description:==

729.0-A11               Unit 2 South Main Steam Valve Rm 737.0-A10               Air Lock The in situ combustible loading for AV-113 consists of small quantities of lubricants in several valves and miscellaneous plastics associated with area radiation monitors, small electrical control panels and boxes, and lighting. The total combustible loading results in a fire severity classification of Insignificant. The area is designated a Combustible Control Zone which in conjunction with procedure NPG-SPP-18.4.7, Control of Transient Combustibles provides assurance that transient combustibles will not be introduced into the area without adequate compensatory measures. The valve motors are normally de-energized (power is only applied when an operator moves the valve from open to close (or close to open)); therefore, the valve motors are not considered an ignition source. The area radiation monitors are not considered a significant ignition source because they contain insignificant quantities of combustible material and their power supply is adequately protected with properly sized breakers/fuses. Procedure NPG-SPP-18.4.8, Control of Ignition Sources (Hot Work) ensures that ignition sources (e.g.
cutting, welding, grinding) will not be introduced into the area without adequate compensatory measures. Since there are no concentrations of in situ combustibles and no credible ignition sources, it is concluded that there is no credible fire in the analysis volume that results in the loss of required fire safe shutdown (FSSD) components or other components that results in the necessity to shutdown either Unit 1 or Unit 2. Therefore, there is no impact to FSSD for this analysis volume. Operator Manual Actions (OMAs) are not required to mitigate fire in rooms 729.0-A11 or 737.0-A10 per deviation documented in Part VII, Section 2.9.
VI-358

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                            Revision 60 3.80             FIRE AREA 73 Fire Area 73 consists of several rooms within the Auxiliary Building associated with the Unit 2 North Main Steam Valve Room and the Unit 2 Additional Equipment Building.
3.80.1           Room 729.0-A10 Room No.               

== Description:==

729.0-A10               Unit 2 North Main Steam Valve Rm Fire Loading: The combustibles located in the room consist of lube oil associated with valves and plastics associated with electrical panels and lights. The fire severity classification is insignificant.
Compartmentation: The room is bounded by regulatory fire barriers constructed of reinforced concrete.
Barriers:
FPR Figure   Regulatory Room          Direction          Adjacent Area/Room Reference    Barrier Rating 729.0-A10     SOUTH WALL         Area 77, Unit 2 Reactor Building   II-38A       3 Hours Area 73, Room 729.0-A13            II-38A       3 Hours WEST WALL          Area 73, Room 729.0-A13            II-38A       3 Hours Doors: None Dampers: None Detection: None.
Suppression: No automatic suppression is provided. Standpipe and hose stations are available from Room 729.0-A15.
Deviations: The justification of compliance with III.G.1 with a FHA is in Part VII, Section 2.9.5.
Evaluations: The lack of total area suppression and detection is documented in Part VII, Section 3.1.12.
3.80.2           Room 729.0-A13 Room No.               

== Description:==

729.0-A13               Unit 2 North Main Steam Valve Instrument Room B Fire Loading: The combustibles located in the room consist of plastics associated with electrical panels and lights. The fire severity classification is insignificant.
Compartmentation: The room is bounded by regulatory fire barriers constructed of reinforced concrete.
VI-359

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                           Revision 60 Barriers:
FPR Figure   Regulatory Room         Direction          Adjacent Area/Room Reference    Barrier Rating 729.0-A13    NORTH WALL         Area 73, Room 729.0-A10             II-38A       3 Hours EAST WALL          Area 73, Room 729.0-A10             II-38A       3 Hours SOUTH WALL         Area 77, Unit 2 Reactor Building    II-38A       3 Hours CEILING            Area 73, Room 729.0-A10             II-38A       3 Hours Doors: None.
Dampers: None Detection: None.
Suppression: No automatic suppression is provided. Standpipe and hose stations are available from the Unit 2 Additional Equipment Room Building 729.0-A15.
Deviations: The justification of compliance with III.G.1 with a FHA is in Part VII, Section 2.9.8.
Evaluations: The lack of total area suppression and detection is documented in Part VII, Section 3.1.12.
3.80.3          Room 729.5-A17 Room No.               

== Description:==

729.5-A17               Unit 2 Shield Bldg Vent Rad Monitor Room Fire Loading: The combustibles located in the room consist of plastics associated with electrical panels and lights. The fire severity classification is insignificant.
Compartmentation: The room is bounded by regulatory fire barriers constructed of reinforced concrete.
Barriers:
Regulatory FPR Figure Room         Direction          Adjacent Area/Room                                Barrier Reference Rating 729.5-A17    SOUTH WALL         Area 77, Unit 2 Reactor Building      II-38A      3 Hours Doors: None Dampers: None Detection: None.
Suppression: No automatic suppression is provided. Standpipe and hose stations are available from the U2-AEB 729.0-A15.
Deviations: None VI-360

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                                Revision 60 Evaluations: The lack of total area suppression and detection is documented in Part VII, Section 3.1.12.
3.80.4          Unit 2 Additional Equipment Building (U2 AEB)

==
Description:==
U2-AEB (Rooms 729.0-A15, 737.0-A14, and 763.5-A2).
Fire Loading: The combustibles located in the rooms consist of plastics associated with electrical panels and lights, and flex equipment. The fire severity classification for room 737.0-A14 is insignificant and rooms 729.0-A15 and 763.5-A2 is low.
Compartmentation: The room is bounded by regulatory fire barriers constructed of reinforced concrete.
Barriers:
Regulatory FPR Figure Room        Direction        Adjacent Area/Room                                       Barrier Reference Rating U2 AEB      EAST WALL        Area 77, Unit 2 Reactor Building       II-38A            3 Hours BLDG.
(ALL        SOUTH WALL       Area 10, Room 729.0-A9                 II-30A, II-38A    3 Hours ELEV.)                       Area 74, Room 737.0-A9                 II-30A, II-38A    3 Hours Area 73, Room 737.0-A14                II-30A, II-38A    3 Hours Area 75, Room 757.0-A14                II-31A, II-38A    3 Hours Area 75, Room 782.0-A4                 II-32A, II-38A    3 Hours WEST WALL        Area 10, Room 729.0-A6                 II-30A, II-38A    3 Hours Area 10, Room 741.5                    II-38A            3 Hours Area 10, Room 757.0-A13                II-31A, II-38A    3 Hours Doors:
Door         Adjacent                       FPR Figure       Door Room Number       Area/Room                      Reference        Rating 737.0-A14     A192         Area 74, Room 737.0-A9         II-30A           3 Hours Dampers:
Damper Mark      Adjacent                      Drawing            Damper Room Number           Area/Room                     Reference          Rating 763.5-A2       2-ISD-31-2990    Area 10, Room 757.0A13        47W920-7           3 Hours 47A381-528F                                    47W866-8 Detection: Ionization smoke detectors are provided in the building on the 729.0 and 763.5 elevations. There are no detectors in room 737.0-A14.
VI-361

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                       Revision 60 Suppression: No automatic suppression is provided. Standpipe and hose stations are available in Room 729.0-A15.
Deviations: The justification of compliance with III.G.1 with a FHA for rooms 729.0-A15 and 763.5-A2 is in Part VII, Section 2.9.9. No deviations are applicable for Room 737.0-A14.
Evaluations: None.
VI-362

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                         Revision 60 3.80.5           Fire Area 73 Safe Shutdown Analysis by Analysis Volume 3.80.5.1         AV-112 Room No.               

== Description:==

729.0-A13               Unit 2 North Main Steam Valve Instrument Room B 729.5-A17               Unit 2 Shield Bldg Vent Rad Monitor Room 729.0-A15               U2-AEB 737.0-A14               Air Lock 763.5-A2                U2-AEB A fire in Analysis Volume 112 could potentially affect systems and components necessary to maintain the Unit 2 steam generator inventory control and secondary side isolation functions.
The Appendix R required circuits that route through room 729.5-A17 are all routed in conduits that are embedded in the floor and are not affected by a postulated fire in the room; therefore, a fire in this room does not affect any required FSSD function. Operator Manual Actions (OMAs) are not required to mitigate fire in rooms 729.0-A13, 729.0-A15 or 763.5-A2 per deviation documented in Part VII, Section 2.9.
Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Unit 1 major equipment required to maintain safe shutdown functions is not impacted such that shutdown can be achieved by utilizing both Train A and B system components. Offsite power is available. Safe shutdown for both units can be achieved without mitigating actions. These features and equipment credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-363

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                            Revision 60 3.80.5.2         AV-112A Room No.               

== Description:==

729.0-A10               Unit 2 North Main Steam Valve Rm The in situ combustible loading for AV-112A consists of small quantities of lubricants in several valves and miscellaneous plastics associated with area radiation monitors, small electrical control panels and boxes, and lighting. The total combustible loading results in a fire severity classification of Insignificant. The area is designated a Combustible Control Zone which in conjunction with procedure NPG-SPP-18.4.7, Control of Transient Combustibles provides assurance that transient combustibles will not be introduced into the area without adequate compensatory measures. The valve motors are normally de-energized (power is only applied when an operator moves the valve from open to close (or close to open)); therefore, the valve motors are not considered an ignition source. The area radiation monitors are not considered a significant ignition source because they contain insignificant quantities of combustible material and their power supply is adequately protected with properly sized breakers/fuses. Procedure NPG-SPP-18.4.8, Control of Ignition Sources (Hot Work) ensures that ignition sources (e.g.
cutting, welding, grinding) will not be introduced into the area without adequate compensatory measures. Since there are no concentrations of in situ combustibles and no credible ignition sources, it is concluded that there is no credible fire in the analysis volume that results in the loss of required fire safe shutdown (FSSD) components or other components that results in the necessity to shutdown either Unit 1 or Unit 2. Therefore, there is no impact to FSSD for this analysis volume. Operator Manual Actions (OMAs) are not required to mitigate fire in room 729.0-A10 per deviation documented in Part VII, Section 2.9.
VI-364

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                            Revision 60 3.81            FIRE AREA 74 3.81.1          Rooms 737.0-A9 and -A16 Room No.          

== Description:==

737.0-A9           Ventilation and Purge Air Room (Subdivided into 737.0-A9S, -A9M, -A9N) 737.0-A16          Unit 2 Gross Failed Fuel Detect. Room Fire Loading: The combustibles in the rooms consist of lube oil in valves, and ERFBS Thermo-Lag, charcoal filter, rubber hoses, plastic associated with electrical panels and lights, cloth and plastic from hazardous material spill kits, rubber expansion joints. The fire severity classification for room 737.0-A9 is low and for room 737.0-A16 is insignificant.
Compartmentation: The area is enclosed by regulatory fire barriers constructed of reinforced concrete. Room 737.0-A16 is within Room 737.0-A9.
Barriers:
Regulatory FPR Figure Room         Direction           Adjacent Area/Room                                  Barrier Reference Rating 737.0-A9     North Wall          Area 73, Room 729.0-A15            II-30A, II-38A   3 Hours Area 73, Room 737.0-A14            II-30A           3 Hours East Wall           Area 72, Room 729.0-A11            II-30A           2 Hours Area 72, Room 737.0-A10            II-30A           2 Hours Area 73, Room 737.0-A14            II-30A           3 Hours Area 77, UNIT 2 RB                 II-30A           3 Hours South Wall          Area 14, Room 737.0-A1             II-30A           2 Hours Area 65, Room 713.0-A29            II-29A, II-30A   2 Hours West Wall           Area 10, Room 737.0-A1             II-30A           2 Hours Area 10, Room 713.0-A15            II-30A           2 Hours Area 10, Room 729.0-A6             II-30A, II-38A   2 Hours Area 10, Spent Fuel Pit            II-30A           2 Hours Area 65, Room 713.0-A29            II-30A           2 Hours Floor               Area 10, Room 729.0-A9             II-30A           2 Hours Area 65, Room 713.0-A29            II-29A, II-30A   2 Hours Area 71, Room 713.0-A19            II-29A, II-30A   2 Hours Area 71-1, Room 713.0-A20          II-29A, II-30A   2 Hours Ceiling             Area 75, Room 757.0-A14            II-30A, II-31A   2 Hours Area 75, Room 757.0-A16            II-30A, II-31A   2 Hours Area 76, Room 757.0-A15            II-30A, II-31A   3 Hours 737.0-A16    Floor               Area 65, Room 713.0-A29            II-29A, II-30A   2 Hours VI-365

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                        Revision 60 Doors:
Door      Adjacent                      FPR Figure Room                                                                Door Rating Number    Area/Room                     Reference 737.0-A9     A129      Area 14, Room 737.0-A1        II-30A          1.5 Hours A130      Area 72, Room 737.0-A10       II-30A         1.5 Hours A131      Area 14, Room 737.0-A1        II-30A          1.5 Hours A192      Area 73, Room 737.0-A14       II-30A         3 Hours Dampers:
Damper Mark                                     Drawing          Damper Room                           Adjacent Area/Room Number                                          Reference        Rating 737.0-A9    2-ISD-31-3879      Area 14, Room 737.0-A1       47W920-5         3-Hours 47A381-431F                                     47W866-11 2-ISD-31-3880      Area 14, Room 737.0-A1       47W920-5         3-Hours 47A381-405F                                     47W866-11 2-ISD-31-3881      Area 14, Room 737.0-A1       47W920-5         3-Hours 47A381-405F                                     47W866-11 0-ISD-31-3833      Area 14, Room 729.0-A6       47W920-6         3-Hours 47A381-426F                                     47W866-10 0-ISD-31-3834      Area 14, Room 737.0-A1       47W920-5         3-Hours 47A381-425                                      47W866-11 0-ISD-31-3835      Area 74, Room 757.0-A14      47W920-23        3-Hours 47A381-446F                                     47W866-10 2-ISD-31-3876      Area 65, Room 713.0-A29      47W920-5         3 Hours 47A381-409F                                     47W866-11 2-ISD-31-3875      Area 65, Room 713.0-A29      47W920-23        3 Hours 47A381-432F                                     47W866-11 2-ISD-31-3883      Area 75, Room 737.0-A14      47W920-23        3-Hours 47A381-405F                                     47W866-11 Detection: Ionization smoke detectors are provided in the area (see note below).
Suppression: Automatic preaction sprinkler system is provided in the area (see note below).
Standpipe and hose stations are available from adjacent room (737.0-A1).
Note: Room 737.0-A16 is a small room inside room 737.0-A9 (see FPR Figure II-30A) and is of reinforced masonry construction. There are no detectors inside the room, but there is a sprinkler head. This sprinkler head is on the same suppression system piping that protects room 737.0-A9 and is activated by the detection system in 737.0-A9. This small room has an insignificant amount of combustibles and has no safe shutdown equipment or cables.
Deviations: HVAC ducts (spiral wound pipe ducts) penetrate two of the required fire barriers, but are not provided with fire dampers. The justification for these undampered HVAC penetrations is documented in Part VII, Section 2.6.1 of the FPR. Intervening combustibles are present in Room 737.0-A9. The justification for intervening combustibles, such as cables in VI-366

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                                Revision 60 trays and thermo-lag, is documented in Part VII, Section 2.4. No deviations are applicable for Room 737.0-A16.
Evaluations: The feasibility and reliability evaluations for Unit 2 Operator Manual Actions are documented in Part VII, Sections 8.3.15, 16, 17, 63 and 64 for room 737.0-A9. No evaluations are applicable to Room 737.0-A16.
3.81.2          Fire Area 74 Safe Shutdown Analysis by Analysis Volume 3.81.2.1        AV-114 Room No.          

== Description:==

737.0-A9           Ventilation and Purge Air Room 737.0-A16          Unit 2 Gross Failed Fuel Detect. Room AV-114 is a large area and is divided into three analysis volumes AV-114M, AV-114N and AV-114S.
3.81.2.2        AV-114M Room No.          

== Description:==

737.0-A9M          Middle portion of the room extending from 2 feet north of column line V to 2-6 737.0-A16          south of the Unit 2 Reactor Building center line.
A fire in Analysis Volume 114M could potentially affect systems and components necessary to maintain the Unit 1 and Unit 2 steam generator inventory control functions and Unit 2 reactor coolant inventory control function. Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Offsite power is available. The required mitigating features include providing fire wrap for selected Unit 2 cables and manual operation of Unit 1 and Unit 2 equipment required for safe shutdown. These features and equipment credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-367

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                               Revision 60 3.81.2.3        AV-114N Room No.              

== Description:==

737.0-A9N              North portion of room 737.0-A9 extending from 2 feet north of room 737.0-A16 to the north wall of room 737.0-A9.
A fire in Analysis Volume AV-114N could potentially affect systems and components necessary to maintain the Unit 1 and Unit 2 steam generator inventory control functions and Unit 2 reactor coolant inventory control functions. Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Offsite power is available. The required mitigating features include providing fire wrap for selected Unit 2 cables and manual operation of Unit 1 and Unit 2 equipment required for safe shutdown. These features and equipment credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-368

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                              Revision 60 3.81.2.4        AV-114S Room No.          

== Description:==

737.0-A9S          South portion of room 737.0-A9 extending from column line U to column line W.
A fire in Analysis Volume AV-114S could potentially affect systems and components necessary to maintain the Unit 1 and Unit 2 steam generator inventory control and Unit 2 reactor coolant pressure control, containment HVAC, secondary side isolation, long term decay heat removal and reactor coolant inventory control functions. Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Offsite power is available. The required mitigating features include providing fire wrap to selected Unit 2 cables to preclude damage in the event of a fire and manual operation of Unit 1 and Unit 2 equipment required for safe shutdown. These features and equipment credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-369

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                           Revision 60 3.82             FIRE AREA 75 3.82.1           Rooms 757.0-A14 and -A16 and 782.0-A3 and -A4 Room No.           

== Description:==

757.0-A14           Unit 2 RB Access Room 757.0-A16           Emergency Gas Treatment Filter Room 782.0-A3            Unit 2 CRD Equipment Room 782.0-A4            Pressurizer Heater Transformer Room 2 Fire Loading: The combustibles in the rooms consist of plastics associated with electrical transformers, panels, a telephone and lights, charcoal in filter housings, oil in the transformers, and insulation on cables in trays. The fire severity classification for room 757.0-A14 is low. The fire severity classification for the other three rooms is moderate.
Compartmentation: The area is enclosed by regulatory fire barriers constructed of reinforced concrete. The floor slab separating Room 782.0-A3 from Room 757.0-A16 has an equipment hatch that is covered with a non-fire rated steel cover, two HVAC ducts without fire dampers, and a stairway entry enclosure that is a non-regulatory 2-hour rated fire barrier. The floor slab separating Room 782.0-A4 from Room 757.0-A14 also has a stairway entry enclosure that is a non-regulatory 2-hour rated fire barrier.
Barriers:
Regulatory FPR Figure Room           Direction          Adjacent Area/Room                                Barrier Reference Rating 757.0-A14      NORTH WALL         Area 73, Room 729.0-A15           II-31A, II-38A  3 Hours Area 73, Room 763.5-A2            II-31A, II-38A  3 Hours EAST WALL          Area 77, Unit 2 Reactor Building  II-31A          3 Hours SOUTH WALL         Area 76, Room 757.0-A15           II-31A          3 Hours WEST WALL          Area 10, Room 757.0-A13           II-31A          2 Hours FLOOR              Area 10, Room 737.0-A9            II-31A, II-31A   2 Hours CEILING            Area 75, Room 782.0-A4            II-31A, II-32A  2 Hours 757.0-A16      NORTH WALL         Area 76, Room 757.0-A15           II-31A          3 Hours Area 77, Unit 2 Reactor Building  II-31A          3 Hours EAST WALL          Area 72, Room 729.0-A11           II-31A          2 Hours SOUTH WALL         Area 31, Room 757.0-A17           II-31A          2 Hours Area 31, Room 757.0-A24           II-31A          2 Hours WEST WALL          Area 10, Room 757.0-A13           II-31A          2 Hours FLOOR              Area 65, Room 713.0-A29           II-31A          2 Hours Area 74, Room 737.0-A9            II-31A          2 Hours CEILING            Area 75, Room 782.0-A3            II-31A          2 Hours VI-370

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                               Revision 60 Barriers:
Regulatory FPR Figure Room          Direction         Adjacent Area/Room                                     Barrier Reference Rating 782.0-A3      NORTH WALL        Area 77, Unit 2 Reactor Building     II-32A            3 Hours EAST WALL         Area 72, Room 729.0-A11              II-32A            2 Hours SOUTH WALL        Area 10, Room 772.0-A9               II-32A            2 Hours Area 40, Room 772.0-A10              II-32A            2 Hours Area 41, Room 772.0-A11              II-32A            2 Hours WEST WALL         Area 10, Room 757.0-A13              II-32A            2 Hours FLOOR             Area 75, Room 757.0-A16              II-31A, II-32A    2 Hours Area 76, Room 757.0-A15              II-31A, II-32A    3 Hours 782.0-A4      NORTH WALL        Area 73, Room 763.5-A2               II-32A, II-38A    3 Hours EAST WALL         Area 77, Unit 2 Reactor Building     II-32A            3 Hours WEST WALL         Area 10, Room 757.0-A13              II-32A            2 Hours FLOOR             Area 75, Room 757.0-A14              II-31A, II-32A    2 Hours Area 76, Room 757.0-A15              II-31A, II-32A    3 Hours Doors:
FPR Door                                                         Door Room                    Adjacent Area/Room                  Figure Number                                                       Rating Reference 757.0-A14    A157       Area 10, Room 757.0-A13             II-32A        1.5 Hours*
A166       Area 77, Unit 2 Reactor Building    II-32A        3 Hours*
A167       Area77, Unit 2 Reactor Building     II-32A        3 Hours*
757.0-A16    A158       Area 10, Room 757.0-A13             II-32A        1.5 Hours*
* See Note 4 on FPR Fig. II-28 Dampers:
Damper Mark                                       Drawing           Damper Room                              Adjacent Area/Room Number                                            Reference         Rating 757.0-A14     0-ISD-31-3836       Area 10, Room 757.0-A13       47W920-7          3-Hours 47A381-433F                                       47W866-10 0-ISD-31-3835       Area 74, Room 737.0-A9        47W920-23        3-Hours 47A381-446F                                       47W866-10 757.0-A16     2-ISD-31-3884       Area 75, Room 757.0-A16       47W866-11         3- Hours 47A381-438F                                       47W920-8 2-ISD-31-3885       Area 10, Room 757.0-A13       47W920-8          3-Hours 47A381-439F                                       47W866-11 VI-371

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                          Revision 60 Dampers:
Damper Mark                                     Drawing         Damper Room                            Adjacent Area/Room Number                                          Reference       Rating 782.0-A3     2-ISD-31-3239      Area 10, Room 757.0-A13      47W920-9        3-Hours 47A381-256F                                     47W866-11 2-ISD-31-3240      Area 10, Room 757.0-A13      47W920-10       1.5-Hours 47A381-253                                      47W866-11 Detection: Ionization smoke detectors are provided in all four of the rooms.
Suppression: Automatic preaction sprinkler systems are provided in all four of the rooms except for the stairwell penthouse area in Room 757.0-A16. A standpipe and hose station is available from Rooms 782.0-A3 and 757.0-A16.
Deviations: The justification of compliance with III.G.1 with a FHA for room 757.0-A14 is in Part VII, Section 2.9.11. No deviations are applicable for Rooms 757.0-A16, 783.0-A3 and - A4.
Evaluations: The feasibility and reliability evaluations for Unit 2 Operator Manual Actions are documented in Part VII, Sections 8.3.26, 53, 54, 63 and 64. No evaluations are applicable to Room 757.0-A14.
VI-372

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                          Revision 60 3.82.2          Fire Area 75 Safe Shutdown Analysis by Analysis Volume 3.82.2.1        AV-115 Room No.          

== Description:==

757.0-A16          Emergency Gas Treatment Filter Room 782.0-A3           Unit 2 CRD Equipment Room 782.0-A4           Pressurizer Heater Transformer Room 2 A fire in Analysis Volume AV-115 could potentially affect systems and components necessary to maintain the Unit 1 steam generator inventory control and containment HVAC functions and Unit 2 steam generator inventory control, long term decay heat removal, containment HVAC, reactor coolant inventory control, reactor pressure control and secondary side isolation functions.
Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Offsite power is available.
The required mitigating features for Unit 1 and Unit 2 include manual operation of equipment required for safe shutdown. These features and equipment credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016.
VI-373

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                             Revision 60 3.82.2.2        AV-116 Room No.          

== Description:==

757.0-A14          Unit 2 RB Access Room The in situ combustible loading for AV-116 consists of insulation on cables routed in two cable trays (accounts for 96% of the total combustibles in the room), small quantities of plastics associated with lighting units, control and junction boxes, and the fire hose. The total combustible loading results in a fire severity classification of Low. The lighting units, control and junction boxes are not credible ignition sources (electrical power to these devices is low voltage (120VAC) and these circuits are properly protected with fuses/breakers). The room is provided with automatic detection and suppression. NPG-SPP-18.4.7, Control of Transient Combustibles, and NPG-SPP-18.4.8, Control of Ignition Sources (Hot Work) provide assurances that transient combustibles and ignition sources (cutting, grinding, welding, etc.) will not be introduced into the room without adequate compensatory measures. Since there are no concentration of combustibles other than the cables in the trays and no credible ignition sources, it is concluded that the only damage from a postulated fire from a lighting unit, control or junction box would be to that individual device. Therefore, it is concluded that no credible fire in this room could result in damage to equipment that would require an emergency shutdown of either unit. Any postulated fire would be quickly detected by the area wide smoke detection system and the plant would quickly respond in accordance with normal plant procedure for a fire (0-AOI-30.1 - Part II, Reference 4.2.59). Since there is no impact to fire safe shutdown Operator Manual Actions (OMAs) are not required to mitigate fire in room 757.0-A14 per deviation documented in Part VII, Section 2.9.
VI-374

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                               Revision 60 3.83            Fire Area 76 3.83.1          Room 757.0-A15

==
Description:==
Unit 2 RB Equipment Hatch Fire Loading: The combustibles in the room consist of plastics associated with the lights and insulation on cables in trays. The fire severity classification is low.
Compartmentation: The room is of reinforced concrete construction with a fire resistive rating of 3-hours. During power operations the opening to Room 757.0-A13 is closed with concrete plugs that provide an equivalent fire resistive rating of 3-hours.
Barriers:
Regulatory FPR Figure Room          Direction         Adjacent Area/Room                                  Barrier Reference Rating 757.0-A15     North Wall        Area 10, Room 757.0-A13              II-31A         3 Hours Area 75, Room 757.0-A14              II-31A         3 Hours South Wall        Area 10, Room 757.0-A13              II-31A         3 Hours Area 75, Room 757.0-A16              II-31A         3 Hours West Wall         Area 10, Room 757.0-A13              II-31A         3 Hours Floor             Area 14, Room 737.0-A1               II-30A, II-31A 3 Hours Area 74, Room 737.0-A9               II-30A, II-31A 3 Hours Area 74, Room 737.0-A9               II-30A, II-31A 3 Hours Ceiling           Area 75, Room 782.0-A3               II-31A, II-32A 3 Hours Area 75, Room 782.0-A4               II-31A, II-32A 3 Hours Doors: None.
Dampers: None.
Detection: Ionization smoke detectors are provided in the room.
Suppression: Automatic preaction sprinkler system is provided in the room except for area near blast door. Standpipe and hose stations are available from the adjacent room (757.0-A13) when the plugs are removed (i.e., during outages). This room is not accessible during power operations.
Deviations: The justification of compliance with III.G.1 with a FHA is in Part VII, Section 2.9.12.
Evaluations: The justification for the relaxation in surveillance frequency for the sprinklers, smoke detectors and penetrations seals and the justification for not requiring compensatory measures inside the room when the shield blocks are installed if fire protection related equipment in the room is impaired is documented in Part VII, Section 6.1.
VI-375

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                             Revision 60 3.83.2          Fire Area 76 Safe Shutdown Analysis by Analysis Volume 3.83.2.1        AV-096 Room No.           

== Description:==

757.0-A15           Unit 2 RB Equipment Hatch The in situ combustible loading for AV-96 consists of insulation on cables routed in cable trays (accounts for 99% of the total combustibles in the room) and small quantities of plastics associated with lighting units,. The total combustible loading results in a fire severity classification of Low. The lighting units are not credible ignition sources and the room is provided with automatic detection and suppression. NPG-SPP-18.4.7, Control of Transient Combustibles, and NPG-SPP-18.4.8, Control of Ignition Sources (Hot Work) provide assurances that transient combustibles and ignition sources (cutting, grinding, welding, etc.) will not be introduced into the room without adequate compensatory measures. Since there are no concentration of combustibles other than the cables in the trays and no credible ignition sources, it is concluded that the only damage from a postulated fire from a lighting unit would be to that individual device. Therefore, it is concluded that no credible fire in this room could result in damage to equipment that would require an emergency shutdown of either unit. Any postulated fire would be quickly detected by the smoke detection system and the plant would quickly respond in accordance with normal plant procedure for a fire (0-AOI-30.1 - Part II, Reference 4.2.59). Since there is no impact to fire safe shutdown (FSSD), Operator Manual Actions (OMAs) are not required to mitigate fire in room 757.0-A15 per deviation documented in Part VII, Section 2.9.
VI-376

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                            Revision 60 3.84            FIRE AREA 77 3.84.1          Unit 2 Reactor Building Annulus

==
Description:==
Unit 2 Annulus.
Fire Loading: The combustible loading consists of foam plastic insulation, plastics associated with electrical panels and boxes, rubber expansion joints, HEPA filters, lighting fixtures, and insulation on cables routed in trays. The fire severity classification is severe.
Compartmentation: The Annulus is separated from Primary Containment by the Steel Containment Vessel which prevents the passage of flames, smoke and hot gases, but allows heat transfer. The Annulus is separated from the Auxiliary Building fire areas by reinforced concrete that provides a minimum fire resistance of 3-hours.
Barriers:
FPR Figure      Regulatory Barrier Room                 Adjacent Area/Room Reference       Rating Unit 2 Annulus       Area 10, Room 729.0-A9                  II-38A          3 Hours Area 65, Room 713.0-A29                 II-29A          3 Hours Area 70, Room 692.0-A25                 II-28A          3 Hours Area 71, Room 713.0-A19                 II-29A          3 Hours Area 71, Room 713.0-A21                 II-29A          3 Hours Area 72, Room 729.0-A11                 II-30A          3 Hours Area 72, Room 737.0-A10                 II-30A          3 Hours Area 73, Room 729.0-A10                 II-38A          3 Hours Area 73, Room 729.0-A13                 II-38A          3 Hours Area 73, Room 729.5-A17                 II-38A          3 Hours Area 73, Room 737.0-A14                 II-30A          3 Hours Area 73, Room 729.0-A15                 II-38A          3 Hours Area 73, Room 763.5-A2                  II-38A          3 Hours Area 74, Room 737.0-A9                  II-30A          3 Hours (S, M & N)
Area 75, Room 757.0-A14                 II-31A          3 Hours Area 75, Room 757.0-A16                 II-31A          3 Hours Area 75, Room 782.0-A3                  II-32A          3 Hours Area 75, Room 782.0-A4                  II-32A          3 Hours Doors:
Door                                   FPR Figure       Door Room                          Adjacent Area/Room Number                                 Reference        Rating Unit 2 Annulus    A78         Area 71, Room 713.0-A21    II-29A           3 Hours*
* See Note 4 on FPR Fig. II-28A Dampers: None.
Detection: Photoelectric smoke detectors are provided for selected portions of the cable tray system in the Unit 2 Annulus.
Suppression: Automatic preaction sprinkler system is provided for selected portions of the cable tray system in the Unit 2 Annulus. Standpipe and hose stations are provided throughout the Annulus.
VI-377

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                            Revision 60 Deviations: The use of portable lanterns in lieu of fixed 8-hour battery powered lights inside the Reactor Building is documented in Part VII, Section 2.7.1 of the FPR.
Evaluations: The use of fire barrier wrap on the Purge Air System return and exhaust air ducts in lieu of fire damper in the openings that separate the Annulus for the Auxiliary Building is documented in Part VII, Section 3.2 of the FPR. The feasibility and reliability evaluation for Unit 2 operator manual actions is documented in Part VII, Section 8.3.7 and 64.
3.84.2            Unit 2 Reactor Building Primary Containment

==
Description:==
Primary Containment (Subdivided into 2RO-1, 2RO-2, 2RO-3, 2RO-4, 2RI-1, 2RI-2, 2RI-3, 2RI-4, 2RIR, 2RA1, 2RA2, 2RA3, 2RA4, 2RF1, 2RF2, 2RU)
Fire Loading: The combustibles loading consists of foam plastic insulation, plastic associated with electrical panels and boxes, rubber expansion joints, lube oil in pumps, motors and valves, insulation on cables in trays and wood (used only for insulation and framing of the ice condenser intermediate deck end wall doors), and glycol for the ice condenser. The fire severity for individual areas, range from a classification of insignificant to moderate.
Compartmentation: The Primary Containment is separated from the Annulus by the Steel Containment Vessel which prevents the passage of flames, smoke and hot gases, but allows radiant heat transfer.
Barriers: None.
Doors:
Door       Adjacent                    FPR Figure     Door Room Number     Area/Room                   Reference      Rating PRIMARY             A166       Area 75, Room 757-A14       II-31A         3 HR CONTAINMENT         A167       Area 75, Room 757-A14       II-31A         3 HR Dampers: None.
Detection: Ionization smoke detectors are provided in the upper and lower compartment cooler units. Heat detectors are provided over the Reactor Coolant Pumps.
Suppression: Automatic fixed water spray systems are provided for each Reactor Coolant Pump. Standpipes and hose stations are provided inside containment.
Deviations: The use of portable lanterns in lieu of fixed 8-hour battery powered lights inside the Reactor Building is documented in Part VII, Section 2.7.1 of the FPR. The allowance for minor amounts of oil that could escape the oil collection system is documented in Part VII, Section 2.8 of the FPR. The justification of compliance to III.G.A with a FHA is documented in Part VII, Section 2.9.13 thru 2.9.21.
Evaluations: None VI-378

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                            Revision 60 3.84.3           Fire Area 77 Safe Shutdown Analysis By Analysis Volume 3.84.3.1         AV-117 Room No.            

== Description:==

2ANN                 Unit 2 Annulus A fire in Analysis Volume 117 could potentially affect systems and components necessary to maintain the Unit 2 steam generator inventory control functions and Unit 2 long term decay heat removal, containment HVAC, reactor coolant inventory control and reactor pressure control functions. Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown.
Safe shutdown for Units 1 and/or 2 is achieved through the use of the equipment and associated flowpaths shown in calculation EDQ00099920090016 as credited. Unit 1 major equipment required to maintain safe shutdown functions is not impacted such that shutdown can be achieved by utilizing both train A and B systems and components without mitigating actions. Offsite power is available. The required mitigating features include providing smoke detectors, automatic fire suppression, non-combustible radiant energy shields to protect redundant Unit 2 safe shutdown cables in the event of a fire and manual operations of Unit 2 equipment required for safe shutdown. These features and equipment credited are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016. Since compliance in this area utilizes options III.G.2.d, e, and/or f, the equipment train which is affected or credited for containment cooling, primary system depressurization during cooldown and RHR cooldown is determined subsequent to firefighting activities by the location of the fire. Adequate time is available to make this determination since the earliest safe shutdown requirement for these functions is approximately 2 hours when containment cooling must be established.
VI-379

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                             Revision 60 3.84.3.2        AV-118A Room No.           

== Description:==

2RA2                Unit 2 Accumulator Room 2 2RF2                Unit 2 Fan Room 2 2RO-2               Outside Unit 2 Crane Wall (90 - 180) 2RO-3               Outside Unit 2 Crane Wall (180 - 270)
The in situ combustible loading for AV-118A consists of small quantities of lubricants in several valves (accounts for 89% of combustible load in 2RA2 and 39% in 2RF2) and miscellaneous plastics associated with small electrical control panels and boxes, and lighting. The cables to these devices are routed in conduit. The rooms designated 2RO-2 and 2RO-3 contain a rubberized joint sealant material used in the building joints that constitutes 90% of the combustible load. The total combustible loading in each room (not counting the joint sealant material) results in a fire severity classification of Insignificant for each room. Access to the areas inside the Unit 2 Reactor Building is strictly controlled which, in conjunction with procedure NPG-SPP-18.4.7, Control of Transient Combustibles, provides assurance that transient combustibles will not be introduced into the area without adequate compensatory measures. Cables routed in conduit and lubricants in the valves/motors are not exposed; therefore, their contribution to a postulated fire is greatly reduced. The valve motors are normally de-energized (power is only applied when an operator moves the valve from open to close (or close to open); therefore, the valve motors are not considered an ignition source. The fan motor are not considered a significant ignition source because the fan housing contain insignificant quantities of combustible material and the power supply circuits to the fan motors are adequately protected with properly sized breakers/fuses. Procedure NPG-SPP-18.4.8, Control of Ignition Sources (Hot Work) ensures that ignition sources (e.g. cutting, welding, grinding) will not be introduced into the area without adequate compensatory measures. Since there are no concentrations of in situ combustibles and no credible ignition sources, it is concluded that there is no credible fire in the analysis volume that results in the loss of required fire safe shutdown (FSSD) components or other components that results in the necessity to shutdown either Unit 1 or Unit 2. Therefore, there is no impact to FSSD for this analysis volume. Operator Manual Actions (OMAs) are not required to mitigate fire in rooms 2RA2, 2RF2, 2RO-2 OR 2RO-3 per deviation documented in Part VII, Section 2.9.
VI-380

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                             Revision 60 3.84.3.3        AV-118B Room No.           

== Description:==

2RA3                Unit 2 Accumulator Room 3 2RF2                Unit 2 Fan Room 2 2RO-2               Outside Unit 2 Crane Wall (90&deg; - 180&deg;)
2RO-3               Outside Unit 2 Crane Wall (180&deg; - 270&deg;)
The in situ combustible loading for AV-118B consists of small quantities of lubricants in several valves (accounts for 88% of the combustible load in 2RA3 and 39% in 2RF2) and miscellaneous plastics associated with small electrical control panels and boxes, and lighting. The cables to these devices are routed in conduit. The rooms designated 2RO-2 and 2RO-3 contain a rubberized joint sealant material used in the building joints that constitutes 90% of their combustible load. The total combustible loading in each room (not counting the joint sealant material) results in a fire severity classification of Insignificant for each room. Access to the areas inside the Unit 2 Reactor Building is strictly controlled which, in conjunction with procedure NPG-SPP-18.4.7, Control of Transient Combustibles, provides assurance that transient combustibles will not be introduced into the area without adequate compensatory measures. Cables routed in conduit and lubricants in the valves/motors are not exposed; therefore, their contribution to a postulated fire is greatly reduced. The valve motors are normally de-energized (power is only applied when an operator moves the valve from open to close (or close to open)); therefore, the valve motors are not considered an ignition source. The fan motor are not considered a significant ignition source because the fan housing contain insignificant quantities of combustible material and the power supply circuits to the fan motors are adequately protected with properly sized breakers/fuses. Procedure NPG-SPP-18.4.8, Control of Ignition Sources (Hot Work) ensures that ignition sources (e.g. cutting, welding, grinding) will not be introduced into the area without adequate compensatory measures. Since there are no concentrations of in situ combustibles and no credible ignition sources, it is concluded that there is no credible fire in the analysis volume that results in the loss of required fire safe shutdown (FSSD) components or other components that results in the necessity to shutdown either Unit 1 or Unit 2. Therefore, there is no impact to FSSD for this analysis volume. Operator Manual Actions (OMAs) are not required to mitigate fire in rooms 2RA2, 2RF2, 2RO-2 OR 2RO-3 per deviation documented in Part VII, Section 2.9.
VI-381

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                             Revision 60 3.84.3.4                 AV-118C Room No.           

== Description:==

2RA3                Unit 2 Accumulator Room 3 2RA4                Unit 2 Accumulator Room 4 2RO-3               Outside Unit 2 Crane Wall (180&deg; - 270&deg;)
2RO-4               Outside Unit 2 Crane Wall (270&deg; - 360&deg;)
The in situ combustible loading for AV-118C consists of small quantities of lubricants in several valves (accounts for 88% of the combustible load in 2RA3 and 82% in 2RA4) and miscellaneous plastics associated with small electrical control panels and boxes, and lighting. The cables to these devices are routed in conduit. The rooms designated 2RO-3 and 2RO-4 contain a rubberized joint sealant material used in the building joints that constitutes 90% of their combustible load. The total combustible loading in each room (not counting the joint sealant material) results in a fire severity classification of Insignificant for each room. Access to the areas inside the Unit 2 Reactor Building is strictly controlled which, in conjunction with procedure NPG-SPP-18.4.7, Control of Transient Combustibles, provides assurance that transient combustibles will not be introduced into the area without adequate compensatory measures. Cables routed in conduit and lubricants in the valves/motors are not exposed; therefore, their contribution to a postulated fire is greatly reduced. The valve motors are normally de-energized (power is only applied when an operator moves the valve from open to close (or close to open)); therefore, the valve motors are not considered an ignition source. The fan motor are not considered a significant ignition source because the fan housing contain insignificant quantities of combustible material and the power supply circuits to the fan motors are adequately protected with properly sized breakers/fuses. Procedure NPG-SPP-18.4.8, Control of Ignition Sources (Hot Work) ensures that ignition sources (e.g. cutting, welding, grinding) will not be introduced into the area without adequate compensatory measures. Since there are no concentrations of in situ combustibles and no credible ignition sources, it is concluded that there is no credible fire in the analysis volume that results in the loss of required fire safe shutdown (FSSD) components or other components that results in the necessity to shutdown either Unit 1 or Unit 2. Therefore, there is no impact to FSSD for this analysis volume. Operator Manual Actions (OMAs) are not required to mitigate fire in rooms 2RA3, 2RA4, 2RO-3 OR 2RO-4 per deviation documented in Part VII, Section 2.9.
VI-382

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                             Revision 60 3.84.3.5        AV-118D Room No.           

== Description:==

2RF1                Unit 2 Fan Room 1 2RA4                Unit 2 Accumulator Room 4 2RO-1               Outside Unit 2 Crane Wall (0&deg; - 90&deg;)
2RO-4               Outside Unit 2 Crane Wall (270&deg; - 360&deg;)
The in situ combustible loading for AV-118D consists of small quantities of lubricants in several valves (accounts for 82% of the combustible load in 2RA4 and 51% in 2RF1) and miscellaneous plastics associated with small electrical control panels and boxes, and lighting. The cables to these devices are routed in conduit. The rooms designated 2RO-1 and 2RO-4 contain a rubberized joint sealant material used in the building joints that constitutes 90% of their combustible load. The total combustible loading in each room (not counting the joint sealant material) results in a fire severity classification of Insignificant for each room. Access to the areas inside the Unit 2 Reactor Building is strictly controlled which, in conjunction with procedure NPG-SPP-18.4.7, Control of Transient Combustibles, provides assurance that transient combustibles will not be introduced into the area without adequate compensatory measures. Cables routed in conduit and lubricants in the valves/motors are not exposed; therefore, their contribution to a postulated fire is greatly reduced. The valve motors are normally de-energized (power is only applied when an operator moves the valve from open to close (or close to open)); therefore, the valve motors are not considered an ignition source. The fan motor are not considered a significant ignition source because the fan housing contain insignificant quantities of combustible material and the power supply circuits to the fan motors are adequately protected with properly sized breakers/fuses. Procedure NPG-SPP-18.4.8, Control of Ignition Sources (Hot Work) ensures that ignition sources (e.g. cutting, welding, grinding) will not be introduced into the area without adequate compensatory measures. Since there are no concentrations of in situ combustibles and no credible ignition sources, it is concluded that there is no credible fire in the analysis volume that results in the loss of required fire safe shutdown (FSSD) components or other components that results in the necessity to shutdown either Unit 1 or Unit 2. Therefore, there is no impact to FSSD for this analysis volume. Operator Manual Actions (OMAs) are not required to mitigate fire in rooms 2RF1, 2RA4, 2RO-1 OR 2RO-4 per deviation documented in Part VII, Section 2.9.
VI-383

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                             Revision 60 3.84.3.6        AV-118E Room No.           

== Description:==

2RA1                Unit 2 Accumulator Room 1 2RF1                Unit 2 Fan Room 1 2RO-1               Outside Unit 2 Crane Wall (0&deg; - 90&deg;)
2RO-4               Outside Unit 2 Crane Wall (270&deg; - 360&deg;)
The in situ combustible loading for AV-118E consists of small quantities of lubricants in several valves (accounts for 61% of the combustible load in 2RA1 and 51% in 2RF1) and miscellaneous plastics associated with small electrical control panels and boxes, and lighting. The cables to these devices are routed in conduit. The rooms designated 2RO-1 and 2RO-4 contain a rubberized joint sealant material used in the building joints that constitutes 90% of the calculated combustible load. The total combustible loading in each room (not counting the joint sealant material) results in a fire severity classification of Insignificant for each room. Access to the areas inside the Unit 2 Reactor Building is strictly controlled which, in conjunction with procedure NPG-SPP-18.4.7, Control of Transient Combustibles, provides assurance that transient combustibles will not be introduced into the area without adequate compensatory measures. Cables routed in conduit and lubricants in the valves/motors are not exposed; therefore, their contribution to a postulated fire is greatly reduced. The valve motors are normally de-energized (power is only applied when an operator moves the valve from open to close (or close to open)); therefore, the valve motors are not considered an ignition source. The fan motors are not considered a significant ignition source because the fan housings contain insignificant quantities of combustible material and the power supply circuits to the fan motors are adequately protected with properly sized breakers/fuses. Procedure NPG-SPP-18.4.8, Control of Ignition Sources (Hot Work) ensures that ignition sources (e.g. cutting, welding, grinding) will not be introduced into the area without adequate compensatory measures. Since there are no concentrations of in situ combustibles and no credible ignition sources, it is concluded that there is no credible fire in the analysis volume that results in the loss of required fire safe shutdown (FSSD) components or other components that results in the necessity to shutdown either Unit 1 or Unit 2. Therefore, there is no impact to FSSD for this analysis volume. Operator Manual Actions (OMAs) are not required to mitigate fire in rooms 2RA1, 2RF1, 2RO-1 OR 2RO-4 per deviation documented in Part VII, Section 2.9.
VI-384

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                             Revision 60 3.84.3.7         AV-118F Room No.                   

== Description:==

Unit 2 Reactor Building     Lower Containment 2RIR                        Unit 2 Instrument Room The in situ combustible loading for AV-118F consists of small quantities of lubricants in several small pumps (2RO-1 and -2 only) and miscellaneous plastics associated with small electrical control panels and boxes, and lighting. The cables for these devices are routed in conduit. The rooms designated 2RO-1 and 2RO-2 contain a rubberized joint sealant material used in the building joints that constitutes 90% of their combustible load. The total combustible loading in each room (not counting the joint sealant material) results in a fire severity classification of Low.
Access to the areas inside the Unit 2 Reactor Building is strictly controlled which, in conjunction with procedure NPG-SPP-18.4.7, Control of Transient Combustibles, provides assurance that transient combustibles will not be introduced into the area without adequate compensatory measures. The power supply circuits to the pump motors are adequately protected with properly sized breakers/fuses. Procedure NPG-SPP-18.4.8, Control of Ignition Sources (Hot Work) ensures that ignition sources (e.g. cutting, welding, grinding) will not be introduced into the area without adequate compensatory measures. Since there are no concentrations of in situ combustibles and no credible ignition sources, it is concluded that there is no credible fire in the analysis volume that results in the loss of required fire safe shutdown (FSSD) components or other components that results in the necessity to shutdown either Unit 1 or Unit 2. Therefore, there is no impact to FSSD for this analysis volume. Operator Manual Actions (OMAs) are not required to mitigate fire in room 2RIR per deviation documented in Part VII, Section 2.9.
VI-385

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                      Revision 60 3.84.3.8         AV-118G Room No.                   

== Description:==

Unit 2 Reactor Building     Primary Containment 2RU                         Upper Containment A fire in Analysis Volume 118G would not impact major equipment required to maintain safe shutdown functions. Shutdown can be achieved by using both Train A and B systems and components without mitigating actions. Equipment credited available to achieve shutdown are identified in calculation EDQ00099920090016 VI-386

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                           Revision 60 3.84.3.9         AV-118H Room No.           

== Description:==

2RA2                Unit 2 Accumulator Room 2 2RF2                Unit 2 Fan Room 2 2RI-2               Inside Unit 2 Crane Wall (90&deg; - 180&deg;)
2RI-3               Inside Unit 2 Crane Wall (180&deg; - 270&deg;)
The in situ combustible loading for AV-118H consists of small quantities of lubricants in several valves and fan motors (accounts for 89% of combustible load in 2RA2 and 39% in 2RF2) and miscellaneous plastics associated with small electrical control panels and boxes, and lighting.
The cables to these devices are routed in conduit. The zones designated 2RI-2 and 2RI-3 each contain a reactor coolant pump (RCP) that constitutes 98% and 97%, respectively of the combustible load and several valves. Each RCP is provided with an oil collection system that complies with Appendix R, Section III.O and is protected with an automatic suppression and detection system. The total combustible loading in rooms 2RA2 and 2RF2 results in a fire severity classification of Insignificant for each room. Zones 2RI-2 and 2RI-3 have combustible loading that results in a fire severity classification of Low when including the RCP oil, but is Insignificant not counting the oil. Access to the areas inside the Unit 2 Reactor Building is strictly controlled which, in conjunction with procedure NPG-SPP-18.4.7, Control of Transient Combustibles, provides assurance that transient combustibles will not be introduced into the area without adequate compensatory measures. Cables routed in conduit and lubricants in the valves/motors are not exposed; therefore, their contribution to a postulated fire is greatly reduced. The valve motors are normally de-energized (power is only applied when an operator moves the valve from open to close (or close to open)); therefore, the valve motors are not considered an ignition source. The fan motors are not considered a significant ignition source because the fan housings contain insignificant quantities of combustible material and the power supply circuits to the fan motors are adequately protected with properly sized breakers/fuses.
Procedure NPG-SPP-18.4.8, Control of Ignition Sources (Hot Work) ensures that ignition sources (e.g. cutting, welding, grinding) will not be introduced into the area without adequate compensatory measures. Since there are no concentrations of in situ combustibles (other than the RCP oil which is provided with adequate compensatory protection) and no credible ignition sources, it is concluded that there is no credible fire in the analysis volume that results in the loss of required fire safe shutdown (FSSD) components or other components that results in the necessity to shutdown either Unit 1 or Unit 2. Therefore, there is no impact to FSSD for this analysis volume. Operator Manual Actions (OMAs) are not required to mitigate fire in rooms 2RA2, 2RF2, 2RI-2 OR 2RI-3 per deviation documented in Part VII, Section 2.9.
VI-387

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                           Revision 60 3.84.3.10        AV-118J Room No.           

== Description:==

2RA3                Unit 2 Accumulator Room 3 2RF2                Unit 2 Fan Room 2 2RI-2               Inside Unit 2 Crane Wall (90&deg; - 180&deg;)
2RI-3               Inside Unit 2 Crane Wall (180&deg; - 270&deg;)
The in situ combustible loading for AV-118J consists of small quantities of lubricants in several valves and fan motors (accounts for 88% of combustible load in 2RA3 and 39% in 2RF2) and miscellaneous plastics associated with small electrical control panels and boxes, and lighting.
The cables to these devices are routed in conduit. The zones designated 2RI-2 and 2RI-3 each contain a reactor coolant pump (RCP) that constitutes 98% and 97%, respectively of the combustible load and several valves. Each RCP is provided with an oil collection system that complies with Appendix R, Section III.O and is protected with an automatic suppression and detection system. The total combustible loading in rooms 2RA3 and 2RF2 results in a fire severity classification of Insignificant for each room. Zones 2RI-2 and 2RI-3 have combustible loading that results in a fire severity classification of Low when including the RCP oil, but is Insignificant not counting the oil. Access to the areas inside the Unit 2 Reactor Building is strictly controlled which, in conjunction with procedure NPG-SPP-18.4.7, Control of Transient Combustibles, provides assurance that transient combustibles will not be introduced into the area without adequate compensatory measures. Cables routed in conduit and lubricants in the valves/motors are not exposed; therefore, their contribution to a postulated fire is greatly reduced. The valve motors are normally de-energized (power is only applied when an operator moves the valve from open to close (or close to open)); therefore, the valve motors are not considered an ignition source. The fan motors are not considered a significant ignition source because the fan housings contain insignificant quantities of combustible material and the power supply circuits to the fan motors are adequately protected with properly sized breakers/fuses.
Procedure NPG-SPP-18.4.8, Control of Ignition Sources (Hot Work) ensures that ignition sources (e.g. cutting, welding, grinding) will not be introduced into the area without adequate compensatory measures. Since there are no concentrations of in situ combustibles (other than the RCP oil which is provided with adequate compensatory protection) and no credible ignition sources, it is concluded that there is no credible fire in the analysis volume that would result in the loss of required fire safe shutdown (FSSD) components or other components that results in the necessity to shutdown either Unit 1 or Unit 2. Therefore, there is no impact to FSSD for this analysis volume. Operator Manual Actions (OMAs) are not required to mitigate fire in rooms 2RA3, 2RF2, 2RI-2 OR 2RI-3 per deviation documented in Part VII, Section 2.9.
VI-388

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                           Revision 60 3.84.3.11        AV-118K Room No.           

== Description:==

2RA4                Unit 2 Accumulator Room 4 2RF1                Unit 2 Fan Room 1 2RI-1               Inside Unit 2 Crane Wall (0&deg; - 90&deg;)
2RI-4               Inside Unit 2 Crane Wall (270&deg; - 360&deg;)
The in situ combustible loading for AV-118K consists of small quantities of lubricants in several valves and fan motors (accounts for 82% of combustible load in 2RA4 and 51% in 2RF1) and miscellaneous plastics associated with small electrical control panels and boxes, and lighting.
The cables to these devices are routed in conduit. The zones designated 2RI-1 and 2RI-4 each contain a reactor coolant pump (RCP) that constitutes 99% and 98%, respectively of the combustible load and several valves. Each RCP is provided with an oil collection system that complies with Appendix R, Section III.O and is protected with an automatic suppression and detection system. The total combustible loading in rooms 2RA4 and 2RF1 results in a fire severity classification of Insignificant for each room. Zones 2RI-1 and 2RI-4 have combustible loading that results in a fire severity classification of Low when including the RCP oil, but is Insignificant not counting the oil. Access to the areas inside the Unit 2 Reactor Building is strictly controlled which, in conjunction with procedure NPG-SPP-18.4.7, Control of Transient Combustibles, provides assurance that transient combustibles will not be introduced into the area without adequate compensatory measures. Cables routed in conduit and lubricants in the valves/motors are not exposed; therefore, their contribution to a postulated fire is greatly reduced. The valve motors are normally de-energized (power is only applied when an operator moves the valve from open to close (or close to open)); therefore, the valve motors are not considered an ignition source. The fan motors are not considered a significant ignition source because the fan housings contain insignificant quantities of combustible material and the power supply circuits to the fan motors are adequately protected with properly sized breakers/fuses.
Procedure NPG-SPP-18.4.8, Control of Ignition Sources (Hot Work) ensures that ignition sources (e.g. cutting, welding, grinding) will not be introduced into the area without adequate compensatory measures. Since there are no concentrations of in situ combustibles (other than the RCP oil which is provided with adequate compensatory protection) and no credible ignition sources, it is concluded that there is no credible fire in the analysis volume that results in the loss of required fire safe shutdown (FSSD) components or other components that results in the necessity to shutdown either Unit 1 or Unit 2. Therefore, there is no impact to FSSD for this analysis volume. Operator Manual Actions (OMAs) are not required to mitigate fire in rooms 2RA4, 2RF1, 2RI-1 OR 2RI-4 per deviation documented in Part VII, Section 2.9.
VI-389

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                          Revision 60 3.84.3.12        AV-118L Room No.            

== Description:==

2RA1                 Unit 2 Accumulator Room 1 2RF1                 Unit 2 Fan Room 1 2RI-1                Inside Unit 2 Crane Wall (0&deg; - 90&deg;)
2RI-4                Inside Unit 2 Crane Wall (270&deg; - 360&deg;)
The in situ combustible loading for AV-118L consists of small quantities of lubricants in several valves and fan motors (accounts for 61% of combustible load in 2RA1 and 51% in 2RF1) and miscellaneous plastics associated with small electrical control panels and boxes, and lighting.
The cables to these devices are routed in conduit. The zones designated 2RI-1 and 2RI-4 each contain a reactor coolant pump (RCP) that constitutes 99% and 98%, respectively of the combustible load and several valves. Each RCP is provided with an oil collection system that complies with Appendix R, Section III.O and is protected with an automatic suppression and detection system. The total combustible loading in rooms 2RA1 and 2RF1 results in a fire severity classification of Low for 2RA1 and Insignificant for 2RF1. Zones 2RI-1 and 2RI-4 have combustible loading that results in a fire severity classification of Low when including the RCP oil, but is Insignificant (less than 1-minute) not counting the oil. Access to the areas inside the Unit 2 Reactor Building is strictly controlled which, in conjunction with procedure NPG-SPP-18.4.7, Control of Transient Combustibles, provides assurance that transient combustibles will not be introduced into the area without adequate compensatory measures. Cables routed in conduit and lubricants in the valves/motors are not exposed; therefore, their contribution to a postulated fire is greatly reduced. The valve motors are normally de-energized (power is only applied when an operator moves the valve from open to close (or close to open)); therefore, the valve motors are not considered an ignition source. The fan motors are not considered a significant ignition source because the fan housings contain insignificant quantities of combustible material and the power supply circuits to the fan motors are adequately protected with properly sized breakers/fuses. Procedure NPG-SPP-18.4.8, Control of Ignition Sources (Hot Work) ensures that ignition sources (e.g. cutting, welding, grinding) will not be introduced into the area without adequate compensatory measures. Since there are no concentrations of in situ combustibles (other than the RCP oil which is provided with adequate compensatory protection) and no credible ignition sources, it is concluded that there is no credible fire in the analysis volume that results in the loss of required fire safe shutdown (FSSD) components or other components that results in the necessity to shutdown either Unit 1 or Unit 2. Therefore, there is no impact to FSSD for this analysis volume. Operator Manual Actions (OMAs) are not required to mitigate fire in rooms 2RA1, 2RF1, 2RI-1 OR 2RI-4 per deviation documented in Part VII, Section 2.9.
VI-390

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS               Revision 60 TABLE 6-1 LOCAL OPERATOR MANUAL ACTIONS AND MAIN CONTROL ROOM OPERATOR ACTIONS FOR ALL AVS EXCEPT CONTROL BUILDING FIRES When Function End Device                                 Control Operated5 Required Performed (Minutes) 1/2-BKR-99-L116/1B-A1        TRIP         1/2-RT-1 (MCR)               0 1/2-FCV-1-11                CLOSE         1/2-HS-1-11A (MCR)           0 1/2-FCV-1-14-A              CLOSE         1/2-HS-1-14/182-T (MCR)      0 1/2-FCV-1-22                CLOSE         1/2-HS-1-22A (MCR)           0 1/2-FCV-1-25-B              CLOSE         1/2-HS-1-25/183-T (MCR)      0 1/2-FCV-1-29                CLOSE         1/2-HS-1-29A (MCR)           0 1/2-FCV-1-32-A              CLOSE         1/2-HS-1-32/184-T (MCR)      0 1/2-FCV-1-4                 CLOSE         1/2-HS-1-4A (MCR)            0 1/2-FCV-1-7-B               CLOSE         1/2-HS-1-7/181-T (MCR)       0 1/2-FCV-3-103               CLOSE         1/2-FIC-3-103 (MCR)          0 1/2-FCV-3-103A              CLOSE         1/2-LIC-3-103A (MCR)         0 1/2-FCV-3-35                CLOSE         1/2-FIC-3-35 (MCR)           0 1/2-FCV-3-35A               CLOSE         1/2-LIC-3-35A (MCR)          0 1/2-FCV-3-48                CLOSE         1/2-FIC-3-48 (MCR)           0 1/2-FCV-3-48A               CLOSE         1/2-LIC-3-48A (MCR)          0 1/2-FCV-3-90                CLOSE         1/2-FIC-3-90 (MCR)           0 1/2-FCV-3-90A               CLOSE         1/2-LIC-3-90A (MCR)          0 1/2-PCV-1-12                CLOSE         1/2-HS-1-13 (MCR)            0 1/2-PCV-1-23                CLOSE         1/2-HS-1-24 (MCR)            0 1/2-PCV-1-30                CLOSE         1/2-HS-1-31 (MCR)            0 1/2-PCV-1-5                 CLOSE         1/2-HS-1-6 (MCR)             0 0-MTR-67-28-A1,10           START         0-HS-67-28A-A (MCR)          0 0-MTR-67-32-A1,10           START         0-HS-67-32A-A (MCR)          0 0-MTR-67-36-A1,10           START         0-HS-67-36A-A (MCR)          0 0-MTR-67-40-A1,10           START         0-HS-67-40A-A (MCR)          0 1-MTR-70-46-A1,11           START         1-HS-70-46A-A (MCR)          0 2-MTR-70-59-A1,11           START         2-HS-70-59A-A (MCR)          0 0-MTR-70-51-S11             START         0-HS-70-51A-S (MCR)          0 1/2-MTR-62-108-A1           START         1/2-HS-62-108A-A (MCR)       4 TDAFW_PUMP_2A-S              TRIP         2-HS-46-55A-S (MCR)         13 TDAFWP_A-S                   TRIP         1-HS-46-55A-S (MCR)         13 1/2-LCV-3-1561            CONTROL         1/2-LIC-3-156A (MCR)        13 1/2-LCV-3-1641            CONTROL         1/2-LIC-3-164A (MCR)        13 1/2-MTR-3-118-A1            START         1/2-HS-3-118A-A (MCR)       13 1/2-MTR-3-128-B1            STOP          1/2-HS-3-128A-B (MCR)       13 1/2-FCV-62-551,12           CLOSE         1/2-HS-62-55A (MCR)         14 1/2-FCV-62-69-A8,9,12       CLOSE         1/2-HS-62-69A-A (MCR)       14 1/2-LCV-62-135-A1,9         OPEN          1/2-HS-62-135A-A (MCR)      14 1/2-MTR-81-3                STOP          1/2-HS-81-3A (MCR)          15 1/2-MTR-81-7                STOP          1/2-HS-81-7A (MCR)          15 1/2-HTR-68-341A/A1-A7    DEENERGIZE       1/2-HS-68-341A (MCR)        25 1/2-HTR-68-341D/B1-B7    DEENERGIZE       1/2-HS-68-341D (MCR)        25 1/2-HTR-68-341H/C1-C6    DEENERGIZE       1/2-XS-68-341H              25 1/2-HTR-68-341F/D1-D6    DEENERGIZE       1/2-HS-68-341F (MCR)        25 1/2-FCV-62-90-A1            CLOSE         1/2-HS-62-90A-A (MCR)       35 1/2-FCV-30-10-A             CLOSE         1/2-HS-30-10-A (MCR)        60 VI-391

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                    Revision 60 TABLE 6-1 LOCAL OPERATOR MANUAL ACTIONS AND MAIN CONTROL ROOM OPERATOR ACTIONS FOR ALL AVS EXCEPT CONTROL BUILDING FIRES When Function End Device                                 Control Operated5      Required Performed (Minutes) 1/2-FCV-30-14-A              CLOSE         1/2-HS-30-14-A (MCR)             60 1/2-FCV-30-15-B              CLOSE         1/2-HS-30-15-B (MCR)             60 1/2-FCV-30-16-B              CLOSE         1/2-HS-30-16-B (MCR)             60 1/2-FCV-30-17-A              CLOSE         1/2-HS-30-17-A (MCR)             60 1/2-FCV-30-19-B              CLOSE         1/2-HS-30-19-B (MCR)             60 1/2-FCV-30-20-A              CLOSE         1/2-HS-30-20-A (MCR)             60 1/2-FCV-30-37-B              CLOSE         1/2-HS-30-37-B (MCR)             60 1/2-FCV-30-40-A              CLOSE         1/2-HS-30-40-A (MCR)             60 1/2-FCV-30-50-B              CLOSE         1/2-HS-30-8-B (MCR)              60 1/2-FCV-30-51-A              CLOSE         1/2-HS-30-7-A (MCR)              60 1/2-FCV-30-52-A              CLOSE         1/2-HS-30-10-A (MCR)             60 1/2-FCV-30-53-B              CLOSE         1/2-HS-30-9-B (MCR)              60 1/2-FCV-30-56-A              CLOSE         1/2-HS-30-14-A (MCR)             60 1/2-FCV-30-57-B              CLOSE         1/2-HS-30-15-B (MCR)             60 1/2-FCV-30-58-B              CLOSE         1/2-HS-30-19-B (MCR)             60 1/2-FCV-30-59-A              CLOSE         1/2-HS-30-20-A (MCR)             60 1/2-FCV-30-7-A               CLOSE         1/2-HS-30-7-A (MCR)              60 1/2-FCV-30-8-B               CLOSE         1/2-HS-30-8-B (MCR)              60 1/2-FCV-30-9-B               CLOSE         1/2-HS-30-9-B (MCR)              60 THROTTLE AS 1/2-ISV-62-5501,3                          HANDWHEEL                        60 REQUIRED 1/2-HS-1-13 (MCR) 1/2-PCV-1-121, 7           CONTROL                                          60 1/2-PIC-1-13A (MCR) 1/2-HS-1-6 (MCR) 1/2-PCV-1-51, 7            CONTROL                                          60 1/2-PIC-1-6A (MCR) 1/2-PCV-68-340A-A1,2      OPEN/CLOSE       1/2-HS-68-340AA-A (MCR)          60 1/2-LCV-62-132-A1            CLOSE         1/2-HS-62-132A-A                 70 1/2-MTR-30-38-A13          OPERATE         1/2-HS-30-38A-A                  100 1/2-MTR-30-39-B13          OPERATE         1/2-HS-30-39A-B                  100 1/2-MTR-30-74-A1           OPERATE         1/2-HS-30-74A-A                  120 1/2-MTR-30-77-A1           OPERATE         1/2-HS-30-77A-A                  120 1/2-MTR-30-83-A1           OPERATE         1/2-HS-30-83A-A                  120 1/2-MTR-30-88-A1           OPERATE         1/2-HS-30-88A-A                  120 0-MTR-31-121,6               START         0-HS-31-12A                      240 0-PMP-24-104            OPEN BREAKER       0-BKR-24-10                     1140 0-PMP-24-134            OPEN BREAKER       0-BKR-24-13                     1140 0-PMP-24-1414           OPEN BREAKER       0-BKR-24-141                    1140 0-PMP-24-1444           OPEN BREAKER       0-BKR-24-144                    1140 0-PMP-24-174            OPEN BREAKER       0-BKR-24-17                     1140 0-PMP-24-204            OPEN BREAKER       0-BKR-24-20                     1140 0-PMP-24-74             OPEN BREAKER       0-BKR-24-7                      1140 1/2-BKR-74-1B-A, 1/2-XS-74 1/2-FCV-74-1-A               OPEN                                          1140 A, 1/2-HS-74-1C-A 1/2-BKR-74-2B-B, 1/2-XS-74 1/2-FCV-74-2-B               OPEN                                          1140 B, 1/2-HS-74-2C-B THROTTLE AS 1/2-HCV-74-36                              HANDWHEEL                       1140 REQUIRED VI-392

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                             Revision 60 TABLE 6-1 LOCAL OPERATOR MANUAL ACTIONS AND MAIN CONTROL ROOM OPERATOR ACTIONS FOR ALL AVS EXCEPT CONTROL BUILDING FIRES When Function End Device                                         Control Operated5           Required Performed (Minutes)
THROTTLE AS 1/2-HCV-74-37                                      HANDWHEEL                            1140 REQUIRED 0-LAC-228-131 LIGHTS6                        DEENERGIZE                                               1440 (BRKS 8, 9, & 10) 0-LAC-228-231 LIGHTS6                        DEENERGIZE                                               1440 (BRKS 8, 9, & 10) 1/2-FSV-68-394-A3,7             ENERGIZE           1/2-SW-68-394-A (MCR)               (Note 2) 1/2-FSV-68-397-A3,7             ENERGIZE           1/2-SW-68-394-A (MCR)               (Note 2) 1/2-FSV-68-395-B3,7             ENERGIZE           1/2-SW-68-395-B (MCR)               (Note 2) 1/2-FSV-68-396-B3,7             ENERGIZE           1/2-SW-68-395-B (MCR)               (Note 2)
: 1. Configuration as shown if Train-A is chosen. May be different if Train-B is chosen. Also applies to other redundant components.
: 2. De-pressurize RCS by opening a pressurizer PORV. Alternatively the reactor vessel head vent valves can be used for depressurization by alternately draining fluid from the pressurizer and allowing it to refill. Since the reactor vessel head vents is an alternate method, no required time is specified. The pressurizer PORVs can be used for RCS inventory reduction in addition to pressure control.
: 3. If MCR Operator directs.
: 4. Turn off three Raw Cooling Water pumps to control temperature in the Intake Pumping Station Electrical Board Room.
: 5. Functional representation of actions that must be performed. Individual fires may require the function shown to be performed by alternative means.
: 6. Not applicable or required for a control building fire as the actions can only be performed in the Control Building.
: 7. Using the SG PORVs to control cool down rate is the preferred method for inventory control, i.e. makeup = shrinkage. Maintain pressurizer level by adjusting RCS cooldown rate such that RCS volume shrinkage offsets makeup through the reactor coolant pump seals. The RCS head vents can also be used to reduce RCS inventory if they are available.
: 8. 1,2-FCV-62-69 letdown valve cannot be closed via the MCR hand switch unless the letdown orifice valves are closed (i.e. -69 valve circuitry prevents closure from MCR unless orifice valves are closed).
: 9. CCP suction should be transferred from VCT to RWST prior to isolating normal letdown even when OMAs identify different required times for these actions (i.e. If an OMA has VI-393

PART VI -- FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS                          Revision 60 TABLE 6-1 LOCAL OPERATOR MANUAL ACTIONS AND MAIN CONTROL ROOM OPERATOR ACTIONS FOR ALL AVS EXCEPT CONTROL BUILDING FIRES required time for RWST transfer step, that time shall be used for transfer step. If not, the normal letdown required time shall be used for RWST transfer step.).
: 10. Two ERCW pumps on each train, one per each shutdown board preferred, are normally supplying cooling water requirements for two unit plant operation.
: 11. One CCS pump is normally supplying cooling water requirements for each CCS Train A header with the other pump in standby. Also, the CCS Pump C-S is normally supplying water requirements for the CCS Train B header.
: 12. Isolation of Non-essential air opens the RCP seal return FCVs, isolates RCS letdown, opens containment cooling TCVs and TCOs, and isolates excess letdown.
: 13. Monitor the containment pressure using available indicators 1/2-PDI-30-42-K, 1/2-PDI-30-43-J, 1/2-PDI-30-44-K, or 1/2-PDI-30-45-J to maintain containment pressure<0.6 psig (setpoint is 1.5 psig) by starting and stopping the containment air return fans.
VI-394

PART VII - DEVIATIONS AND EVALUATIONS                        Revision 60 1.0              Introduction Part VII documents deviations from Watts Bar (WBN) commitments against applicable NRC regulatory criteria and guidance documents and presents engineering evaluations of the adequacy of specific fire protection features. Section 2.0 contains the justifications for deviations (in accordance with the guidance in Generic Letter (GL) 86-10 (Part II, Reference 4.1.16) from the applicable sections of 10CFR50 Appendix R (Part II, Reference 4.1.8). Section 3.0 contains the engineering evaluations on the adequacy of fire protection features developed in accordance with the guidance of Generic Letters 83-33 (Part II, Reference 4.1.15) and 86-10 (Part II, Reference 4.1.16). Section 4.0 contains the justifications for deviations from the guidance of Appendix A to BTP 9.5-1. Section 5.0 contains deviations from the requirements of NFPA codes and standards that could impact on the operational capabilities of fire protection features. NFPA Code deviations that have no impact on operational capabilities are identified in Part X. Section 6.0 contains other general engineering evaluations that pertain to the fire protection program. Section 7 contains engineering evaluations of operator manual actions performed in the room of fire origin after the fire has been extinguished. Section 8 contains the evaluations and justifications (in accordance with Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.189 and NUREG-1852 (Part II, References 4.1.45 and 4.1.44)) of the Unit 2 operator manual actions.
2.0              Deviations to 10CFR50 Appendix R This section documents the technical justifications for deviations from the criteria of Appendix R consistent with Generic Letter 86-10 guidance. A total of nine deviations are contained in this section. The deviations documented in this section include the following:
: 1.       Required Instrumentation for Alternate Shutdown
: 2.       Non-combustible Radiant Energy Shields
: 3.       Fixed Suppression Systems for Alternate Shutdown Locations (Control Building)
: 4.       Intervening Combustible Material
: 5.       1-Hour Rated Part-Height Wall Separating Redundant CCS Pumps
: 6.       Openings in Regulatory Fire Barriers
: 7.       Portable Lanterns
: 8.       Reactor Coolant Pump Oil Collection System
: 9.       Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA) in lieu of 10CFR50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2 Separation The following sections present the bases for acceptability of the deviation requests.
2.1              Required Instrumentation for Alternate Shutdown REQUIREMENT - Section III.L.2.d of 10CFR50, Appendix R, requires the process monitoring function for alternative or dedicated shutdown to be capable of providing direct readings of the process variables necessary to perform and control a plant cool down. In Attachment 1 of Information Notice No. 84-09 dated February 13, 1984 (Part II, Reference 4.1.20), the NRC identified the instrumentation they considered necessary for alternative or dedicated shutdown.
DEVIATION - Contrary to these guidelines, the following instrumentation has not been provided (or assured) in the auxiliary control room (ACR):
: 1.       Wide range steam generator level.
: 2.       Tank level for the condensate storage tank (CST) and refueling water storage tank (RWST).
VII-1

PART VII - DEVIATIONS AND EVALUATIONS                       Revision 60
: 3.       Cold leg temperature (Tc).
This deviation applies to room(s) 757.0-A1 2.1.1           Justification for Wide Range Steam Generator Level Narrow range steam generator level and auxiliary feedwater (AFW) flow indication to each generator is provided in the ACR. This instrumentation provides input to the automatic controls used to maintain steam generator level during plant shutdown during a fire.
Although wide range instrumentation is available in the main control room (MCR), no automatic control or safety system inputs are derived from this instrumentation. Using AFW flow indication, the operator is able to confirm adequate post trip steam generator inventory control should the level fall below the narrow range.
Narrow range level indication along with AFW flow indication, which provides primary indication of heat removal capability, is sufficient for use in safe shutdown procedures whenever the ACR is utilized.
2.1.2           Justification for CST and RWST Tank Level Indication The CST level indication is not considered essential in the ACR due to automatic switchover capability to the essential raw cooling water (ERCW) header. During shutdown procedures, automatic switchover of the AFW pump suction from the CST to the ERCW header will be functional when control is established in the ACR.
RWST level indication is not considered essential in the ACR due to the large inventory and small demand. The RWST holds about 20 times the inventory necessary for cold shutdown and is primarily used as makeup for contraction due to cooldown over a period of hours.
2.1.3           Justification for Cold Leg Temperature (Tc)
The need for Tc in the ACR at WBN is based on the adequacy of the instrumentation and controls to safely achieve and maintain safe shutdown. The following factors are taken into consideration for this justification:
: 1.       Unique ACR design as described in Part IV - Alternate Shutdown Capability
: 2.       Level of control and instrumentation available in the ACR and in the adjacent shutdown board rooms
: 3.       Westinghouse Owners Group (WOG) recommendations
: 4.       Plant procedures and training on ACR
: 5.       Accuracy of Steam Generator Tsat to infer Tc The benefit of the operators ability to read Tc directly in the ACR does not offset the long term maintenance and ALARA considerations as well as the increased probability of a small break LOCA as a result of four additional penetrations to the RCS.
The ACR is designed to be the central control point when operating in the auxiliary control mode. Systems requiring frequent manipulations have the necessary controls located in the ACR along with their associated transfer switches located in the adjacent transfer switch rooms.
Adequate instrumentation is provided for monitoring conditions of the plant. A detailed VII-2

PART VII - DEVIATIONS AND EVALUATIONS                        Revision 60 identification of the instruments and controls available in the ACR for alternative shutdown is contained in Part IV of the FPR.
The instruments and controls located in the ACR are separate, or can be electrically isolated, from the corresponding instrumentation and controls located in the MCR. Operators are periodically trained in shutdown procedures from the ACR. The instrumentation and controls are adequate and sufficiently similar to those available in the MCR to permit a safe and orderly shutdown. In addition, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN) testing has adequately demonstrated the ability to safely shutdown from the ACR.
The following indications are available for the operator in the ACR to indicate status of natural circulation cooling:
: 1.       RCS subcooling (conversion of pressurizer pressure to Tsat and subtracting T-hot)
: 2.       T-hot stable or decreasing
: 3.       SG pressure stable or decreasing The WOG Emergency Response Guidelines (ERG), Revision 1, Generic Issue on Natural Circulation, offers specific guidelines on operator verification of natural circulation. The primary means recommended by this section for verifying natural circulation are:
: 1.       Verification of RCS subcooling
: 2.       Wide Range T-hot
: 3.       SG Pressure The natural circulation section further states that, "Cold leg temperature (Tc) readings can be used as additional verification that heat removal through the steam generators is occurring." It should be noted that Tc is an additional verification of natural circulation cooling, not the primary means. WOG ERGs also state that, "Actual tests have shown that loop Tc's follow almost exactly (in trends) the steam generator pressure variations, with minimal time lag." NRC issued a Safety Evaluation Report (SER) of the WOG ERG's on June 3, 1983 (Part II, Reference 4.1.14), stating that, "We have concluded that the guidelines are acceptable for implementation and will provide improved guidance for emergency operating procedure development." A supplemental SER was issued by NRC on December 26, 1985, for Revision 1 of WOG ERGs (Part II, Reference 4.1.36), and closing out open items from Rev. 0 (natural circulation was not an open item).
Steam Generator Pressure Instrumentation is adequate to infer Tc. From the data obtained during startup testing at SQN (ST-9B) and Diablo Canyon (Test Procedure 42.7), the following statistical evaluation was performed concerning the Tsat (obtained from S/G pressure) and Tc relationship (Tc - Tsat).
Sequoyah                Diablo Canyon Mean                        4.33&deg;F                  4.67&deg;F Standard Deviation          3.29&deg;F                  1.65&deg;F The above temperature differences are well within the tolerance and accuracy levels of the instrumentation. The SQN cool down was terminated at approximately 465&deg;F; however, the Diablo Canyon cool down was continued to below RHR initiation. Since both sets of data were obtained simultaneously (Tc and SG pressure), the data demonstrates the adequacy of using VII-3

PART VII - DEVIATIONS AND EVALUATIONS                         Revision 60 SG pressure to determine Tsat and infer Tc, and the lack of significant time lag between the two indicators.
The natural circulation test at SQN was performed from the main control room and the equipment (not controls) used during the natural circulation tests is identical to the equipment which is used in fire initiated safe shutdown from the ACR. For example, the AFW pumps, the CCPs, ERCW pumps, and CCS pumps are used for natural circulation cool down from the ACR and were also used during the MCR natural circulation tests. Therefore, the test results are applicable to shutdown from the ACR.
Tc Summary and Conclusion After a thorough review of the issues surrounding the Tc question, the facts support that Tsat, along with other plant features as discussed, will provide for adequate assurance that the plant can achieve and maintain a safe shutdown condition. Installation of additional Tc instrumentation in the ACR (per reactor) is not justified based on the following key considerations:
: 1.       The uniqueness of the WBN ACR design
: 2.       The large amount of instrumentation and controls available for shutdown from the ACR
: 3.       Experience and training in plant shutdown from the ACR
: 4.       Instrumentation provided for verification of natural circulation is consistent with WOG ERG's
: 5.       Adequacy of SG pressure instrumentation to infer Tc
: 6.       Increased probability of a small break LOCA as a result of four additional penetrations to the RCS.
The evaluation described above demonstrates the adequacy of the present design's capability to provide sufficient information to the operators to safely shutdown the plant.
2.2      Non-Combustible Radiant Energy Shields REQUIREMENT - Section III.G.2.f of 10CFR50, Appendix R states that an acceptable means of ensuring that a redundant train of the systems located inside non-inerted containment and necessary to ensure safe hot shutdown will be protected from damage from a fire is to separate the trains by a non-combustible radiant energy shield (RES).
DEVIATION - The NRC recognized standard test method for the determination of the combustibility classification for a material is ASTM E136. The radiant energy shields installed inside the Unit 1 Reactor Building at WBN is Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing (3M) M-20A (Secondary Containment - Annulus) and M-20C (Primary Containment). These materials do not meet the criteria for non-combustibility per ASTM E136.
JUSTIFICATION - Branch Technical Position (BTP) CMEB 9.5-1 (NUREG 0800) (Part II, Reference 4.1.11) provides the guidelines for the design basis of the RES in Section C.7.a(1)b.
It states that redundant trains should be separated "by a noncombustible radiant energy shield having a minimum fire rating of one-half hour." In NRC Generic Letter 86-10, the NRC states, "In our opinion, any material with a 1/2-hour fire rating should be capable of performing the required function. The guidelines of BTP CMEB 9.5-1 relating to a fire-rated radiant energy shield are being considered in our current reviews of NTOL plants. However, to the extent that an applicant can justify that a proposed radiant energy shield can achieve an equivalent level of VII-4

PART VII - DEVIATIONS AND EVALUATIONS                     Revision 60 safety, we have been accepting shields that have not been tested against the acceptance criteria of ASTM E119 (Part II, Reference 4.3.1a). In our Appendix R reviews, we have accepted non-fire rated radiant energy shields that have been demonstrated by fire hazards analysis to provide an acceptable level of protection against the anticipated hazard of a localized fire within the containment."
TVA/WBN calculations (EPM-BFS-041895 [Part II, Reference 4.2.6] and EPM-BFS-053195
[Part II, Reference 4.2.8]) provide the design basis for the number of layers of M20A (Annulus) and M20C (Primary Containment) necessary to provide approximately 1/2-hour radiant energy shields for electrical raceways containing fire safe shutdown circuits. These calculations were based on fire tests performed by the vendor (3M) to UL Subject 1724, "Outline of Investigation for Fire Tests for Electrical Circuit Protective Systems". The fire exposure used in the tests is the Standard Time-Temperature curve from ASTM E119 (Part II, Reference 4.3.1a). It was determined that 4 layers of M20A on the raceways (conduits, junction boxes, and penetration boxes) and 2 layers on the supports and intervening items are adequate for raceways located inside the Annulus. Since the combustible loading is substantially lower inside Primary Containment, 3 layers of M20C on the raceways and 2 layers on the supports and intervening items provide an adequate RES.
ASTM E136 test reports on the M20A or M20C were not available from the vendor; therefore, TVA had a series of fire resistance tests performed on the material at an independent, nationally recognized testing laboratory (Omega Point Laboratories). The following tests were performed:
ASTM E136        Standard Test Method for Behavior of Materials in a Vertical Tube Furnace at 750o C (Reference 4.3.1d)
ASTM E162        Standard Test Method for Surface Flammability of Materials Using a Radiant Heat Energy Source (Reference 4.3.1e)
ASTM E1354 Standard Test Method for Heat and Visible Smoke Release Rates for Materials and Products Using an Oxygen Consumption Calorimeter (Reference 4.3.2a)
In addition to the M20A and M20C, other common rated fire barrier materials (fire-rated gypsum and marinite boards) were included in the tests to provide reference information. The Vendor has previously performed UL 723 "Standard Tests for Surface Burning Characteristics of Building Materials" on M20A. (Note: UL 723 is equivalent to ASTM E84 "Standard Test Method for Surface Burning Characteristics of Building Materials" [Part II, Reference 4.3.1]) A detailed evaluation of these tests is documented in WBN calculation EPM-BFS-063095 (Part II, Reference 4.2.9). The results are summarized below.
ASTM E136: RESULTS The M20 material with the exterior covering (A=Aluminum; C=Stainless Steel) failed the flaming and temperature rise criteria. The fire rated gypsum board also failed the temperature rise criteria. The fire rated marinite board passed.
ASTM E162: RESULTS This test method is used for research and development purposes in evaluating the response of a material when exposed to a radiant heat energy source. This test has been performed to augment the UL 723 testing in determining the flame spread of the M20A and M20C when VII-5

PART VII - DEVIATIONS AND EVALUATIONS                         Revision 60 exposed to the radiant heat flux of a fire. This standard does not have an acceptance criterion.
All of the materials exhibited very low Flame Spread Index (Is) values. Fire rated marinite board had the lowest Is value of 0.1, followed by gypsum at 0.9 and M20 materials with values from 0.9 to 1.2. Values for Is of materials typically range from 0 to <100.
ASTM E1354: RESULTS ASTM E1354, Section 5 states, "This test method is used primarily to determine the heat evolved in, or contributed to, a fire involving products of the test material. Also included is a determination of the effective heat of combustion, mass loss rate, the time to sustain flaming and smoke production." In addition the Appendix states, The rate of heat release is one of the most important variables, in many cases the single most important variable, in determining the hazard from fire."
The principle property to be determined by this test is the rate of heat released by a material.
The heat flux used for the test was 75 kW/m2 with external electric spark ignition. The time period was ten minutes. The peak Heat Release Rate (HRR) and the Total Heat Release rate (THR) for the M20A and M20C was lower than that of the fire rated gypsum and marinite boards. The M20A and M20C average HRR was <10 kW/m2 and the average THR was <5kJ.
The average HRR for gypsum board was 134.1 kW/m2 with an average THR of 31.3kJ. The average HRR for marinite board was 11.6 kW/m2 with an average THR of 31.1 kJ. This equates to a quantifiable effective heat of combustion of 4.1 MJ/kg for the gypsum board and 7.2 MJ/kg for the marinite board, but no quantifiable effective heat of combustion for the M20A and M20C.
The average mass loss of the material showed marinite board with the lowest at 5.6% and the M20C with the highest at 15.9%. The average time to ignition was 19 seconds for the gypsum board, but the marinite board, M20A and M20C did not ignite.
UL 723 (ASTM E84): RESULTS The flame spread rating for the M20A and M20C was determined to be 3.7 with 0 fuel contributed or smoke developed.

==SUMMARY==

Although not passing the ASTM E136 test for combustibility, the 3M M20A and M20C have been demonstrated by testing to be able to perform as effective radiant energy shields. The material can be defined as a "Limited Combustible" in accordance with NFPA 220 "Standard on Types of Building Construction" (Part II, Reference 4.4.38). These materials as designed and installed at WBN will achieve an equivalent level of safety and adequately perform their intended function as radiant energy shields; therefore, WBN requests approval of this deviation.
This deviation applies to room(s) U1 Annulus and U1 Containment.
2.3               Fixed Suppression for Alternate Shutdown Locations REQUIREMENT - Appendix R Section III.G.3 states that alternative or dedicated shutdown capability and its associated circuits, independent of cables, systems or components in the area, room or zone under consideration, shall be provided:
: 1.       Where the protection of systems whose function is required for hot shutdown does not satisfy the requirement of paragraph G.2; or VII-6

PART VII - DEVIATIONS AND EVALUATIONS                          Revision 60
: 2.       Where redundant trains of systems required for hot shutdown located in the same fire area may be subject to damage from fire suppression activities or from the rupture or inadvertent operation of fire suppressions systems.
In addition, fire detection and a fixed fire suppression system shall be installed in the area, room, or zone under consideration.
DEVIATION - A fire in the control building may result in abandonment of the MCR and shutting down from the ACR, which is considered alternative shutdown. The control building must therefore meet the criteria of Section III.G.3. Contrary to the criteria of Section III.G.3, fire detection and fixed fire suppression systems are not provided throughout the control building.
JUSTIFICATION - The control building is a single fire area and is separated from adjacent fire areas by reinforced concrete construction as identified in Part VI of the FPR (FPR Part VI Section 3.54). Fire detection is provided throughout the control building except for stairways C1 and C2 (all elevations), and the showers, telephone room, the space above the egg-crate ceiling in the main control room, and the space above the living area on elevation 755 (FPR Part VI Section 3.54). Unit 2 Auxiliary Instrument Room 708.0-C4 is provided with full detection but has one detector that exceeds the allowed spacing to the south wall by 3 feet. The identified locations are enclosed with 11/2 or 2 hour regulatory and/or non-regulatory fire barriers. The showers, telephone room, corridor (755.0-C15) and the space above the living area contain insignificant amounts of combustibles (see FPR Part VI Section 3.54.17 for combustible loading in the showers, FPR Part VI Section 3.54.18 for combustible loading in the corridor and space above the living quarters and FPR Part VI Section 3.54.20 for the Telephone Room).
Standpipe and hose stations and portable fire extinguishers are provided throughout the control building. Fixed fire suppression systems are provided throughout the control building except for the following rooms:
Room Name                                       Room No.                   Fire Severity 250V Battery Board Room                         692.0-C4 and C5            Low (per room) 24-48V Battery Board and Charger Room           692.0-C8                   Low Stairs                                          C1 and C2                  Low (each stair)
Corridor                                        708.0-C2                   Low Shower Rooms                                    755.0-C7 and C8            Insignificant Main Control Room                               755.0-C12                  Low Relay Room                                      755.0-C13                  Low Corridor                                        755.0-C15                  Insignificant Telephone Room                                  755.0-C17                  Insignificant DPSO Shop                                       755.0-C20                  low The purpose of providing fire detection and fixed fire suppression in an area containing normal shutdown equipment is to limit the severity of a fire in the area such that it will not damage alternate safe shutdown capability. By design, there are no alternative shutdown cables or equipment in the control building. Therefore, the design intent has been achieved by an alternate design concept - the ACR which is installed in the auxiliary building. The limited quantity of in situ combustibles in the above listed rooms, fire compartmentation, fire detection, and fire protection features provided satisfy this purpose.
VII-7

PART VII - DEVIATIONS AND EVALUATIONS                        Revision 60 This deviation applies to room(s) 692.0-C4, 692.0-C5, 692.0-C8, 708.0-C2, 755.0-C7, 755.0-C8, 755.0-C12, 755.0-C13, 755.0-C15, 755.0-C17, 755.0-C20, Stair C1, and Stair C2 2.4              Intervening Combustibles REQUIREMENT - Section III.G.2.b requires separation of redundant paths of safe shutdown cables and equipment by a horizontal distance of more than 20 feet with no intervening combustibles. In addition, fire detection and an automatic fire suppression system shall be installed in the area.
DEVIATION - Safe shutdown components in the auxiliary building and Electrical Equipment room in the Intake Pumping Station (IPS) are in compliance with III.G.2.b requirements except that intervening combustibles, in the form of fluid filled transformers (IPS only), insulation on cables in open ladder type cable trays and Thermo-Lag fire barrier material, are located between the redundant components.
JUSTIFICATION - The combustible loading in the areas of the auxiliary building where redundant safe shutdown components are spatially separated is primarily the insulation on the cables in the cable trays and the Thermo-Lag fire barrier material (90% to 96%). The remaining in situ combustible loading consists of lubricating oil in pumps, motors, and valves; transformer silicone liquid (IPS only); plastics in electrical panels and junction boxes, etc. The combustible loading in the Electrical Equipment room in the IPS consists primarily of transformer silicone liquid (approximately 13% of the load) and cables in cable trays (approximately 83% of the load) and the remainder is due to lubricating oil in small pumps and plastics associated with electrical panels and junction boxes, etc.
The presence of these intervening combustibles is a concern for two reasons. First, they could add to the fire's thermal plume. Second, they could provide a path for the fire to propagate between redundant components. TVA has addressed these concerns by relying upon existing ceiling level sprinkler systems coupled with supplemental sprinkler protection, where required, to compensate for the intervening combustibles.
Sprinkler protection has been provided at the ceiling level in rooms containing redundant FSSD components. Due to the presence of obstructions such as HVAC ducts, cable trays, pipes, and supports, these systems have been upgraded in accordance with the applicable system description (Part II Reference 4.2.72). These criteria applications have resulted in the addition of a significant number of sprinkler heads to provide full coverage at the ceiling level and to compensate for large intermediate level obstructions. Thus the modified systems will release large quantities of water in well developed patterns at the ceiling during a fire, and the water will cascade down through the cable trays and intermediate obstructions. The cooling effect of this water will prevent the formation of a high temperature heat plume and will control room temperatures.
The cascading effect of the water will stop the propagation of fire along cable trays and raceways protected with Thermo-Lag between redundant components. Therefore, transient combustibles at the floor level present the only significant fire exposure to the redundant components.
To mitigate the effects of an exposure fire from transient combustibles at the floor level, TVA has ensured that floor level sprinkler coverage is provided under intermediate obstructions for up to a 30-foot wide path for spatially separated redundant FSSD components. The criteria in VII-8

PART VII - DEVIATIONS AND EVALUATIONS                          Revision 60  are used to ensure this floor coverage. The use of the sprinklers below intermediate level obstructions to compensate for intervening combustibles has been recommended by the staff in meetings on August 29, 1984, and September 13, 1984, and in a letter from Thomas M. Novak to H. G. Parris dated November 6, 1984 (Part II, Reference 4.3.5).
Similar deviation requests at Sequoyah and exemption requests at Browns Ferry have been approved.
Sprinkler systems that meet the criteria of Part II, Reference 4.2.72 provide a level of protection that adequately compensates for the presence of intervening combustibles located between spatially separated redundant FSSD components.
The post fire safe shutdown analysis credits 20 feet of horizontal separation between redundant paths in accordance with section III.G.2.b in the intake pumping station electrical equipment room and in auxiliary building rooms 692.0-A1, 713.0-A1, 737.0-A1, 737.0-A5, 737.0-A9, 757.0-A2, 757.0-A10, 757.0-A9, 772.0-A2, and 772.0-A15.
2.5             Partial Fire Wall Between CCS Pumps REQUIREMENT - 10CFR50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2.b and III.G.2.c require redundant safe shutdown components to be separated from each other by one of the following methods:
III.G.2.b       Separation of cables and equipment and associated non-safety circuits of redundant trains by a horizontal distance of more than 20 feet with no intervening combustibles or fire hazards. In addition, fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression system shall be installed in the fire area.
III.G.2.c       Enclosure of cables and equipment and associated non-safety circuits of one redundant train in a fire barrier having a 1-hour rating. In addition, fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression system shall be installed in the fire area.
DEVIATION - The redundant component cooling water system (CCS) pumps are protected by fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression system, but are separated by a part-height and part-width 1-hour fire barrier.
JUSTIFICATION - The five CCS pumps are located in the same area on elevation 713 of the auxiliary building. The two train B pumps are separated from the two train A pumps and the spare pump by a 1-hour barrier which extends 3 feet above the highest point of the pumps.
The majority (95%) of the in situ combustible loading in this area is due to the insulation on cables routed in cable trays and the Thermo-Lag fire barrier material. These cables are protected electrically with appropriately sized circuit protective devices (breakers and fuses).
Therefore the probability of an internally generated cable tray fire is not considered to be a credible event. The majority of the remaining combustible loading in the immediate area is due to the approximately 6 gallons of lube oil associated with each CCS pump and approximately 45 gallons of lube oil associated with each of the two Unit 1 AFW pumps (there is approximately 12 feet separating the closest pumps - 1A-A AFW pump from 1A-A CCS pump. The fire safe shutdown analysis considered both pumps lost for a fire near them).
The redundant circuits for the CCS pumps are separated either by 1-hour barriers or more than 20 feet. A ceiling level preaction sprinkler system is provided for general area coverage.
Additional sprinkler coverage has been provided under the steel grate mezzanine over the CCS VII-9

PART VII - DEVIATIONS AND EVALUATIONS                          Revision 60 pumps. Cross-zoned ionization smoke detectors are provided to actuate the preaction suppression system and provide early warning in the event of a fire.
The barrier between the trained CCS pumps prevents radiant heat transfer from a fire involving one train of pumps from affecting the redundant pumps. The large room volume of 391,000 cubic feet and the 23-foot high ceilings will dissipate the thermal effects of a transient combustible fire.
A fire due to transient combustibles located near the edge of the fire barriers at A3/T will not pose a threat to more than one CCS pump. The 3-foot square column at this end of the barrier ensures that an exposure fire that could damage the CCS pump 1A-A will be 20 feet away from CCS pump 1B-B. The location of electrical panels and instrumentation lines at A1/T will also prevent any appreciable amounts of transient combustibles from being placed near this edge of the barrier. The mezzanine above the CCS pumps is a combustible control zone (CCZ) to limit potential transient combustibles in the area above the pumps.
The lack of combustibles and the combination of ceiling level sprinklers, plus the sprinklers located under the mezzanine, will prevent a fire due to transient combustibles located near the edge of the barrier at A1/T from posing a threat to more than one CCS pump. The NRC staff previously reviewed the fire protection features provided in the vicinity of the CCS pumps for compliance with guidelines set forth in Appendix A of BTP APCSB 9-5.1 and found those features to be adequate (see section 9.5.1.5 of the WBN Safety Evaluation Report dated June 1982). The staff also approved a similar deviation at the Sequoyah plant (see letter from B. J.
Youngblood to S. A. White, dated May 29, 1986 [Part II, References 4.3.3]).
In conclusion, the fire protection features for this area provide a level of fire protection consistent with the fire hazards identified for the area. The fire protection features provide reasonable assurance that at least one train of fire safe shutdown equipment and cables will remain free of fire damage following any credible fire in this area This deviation applies to room(s) 713.0-A1.
2.6             Openings in Fire Barriers REQUIREMENT - Appendix R Section III.G.1 requires that one train of systems necessary for FSSD be free from fire damage. Where fire area boundaries are used to provide system separation, NRC generic letters and guidance documents require that penetrations in walls, floors, and ceilings forming part of a fire area boundary be protected with seals or closure devices having a fire resistive rating equivalent to that required of the barrier.
DEVIATION - The following deviations to these guidelines exist at WBN:
(NOTE:          Some unprotected openings are the subject of deviation requests or engineering evaluations in this Part of the FPR. Where an unprotected opening is not the subject of either a deviation request or an engineering evaluation, the rooms on opposite sides of the unprotected openings were combined for purposes of the Appendix R separation analysis. The following items address those "unprotected" openings which are the subject of this deviation request.)
: 1.      The walls and floor of the ventilation and purge air (VPA) rooms, Rooms 737.0-A5 and 737.0-A9, are equivalent to two hour fire barriers. HVAC penetrations through these VII-10

PART VII - DEVIATIONS AND EVALUATIONS                      Revision 60 barriers to the fuel transfer valve (FTV) rooms, also known as the post accident sampling (PAS) rooms, Rooms 729.0-A8 and 729.0-A9, do not have fire dampers.
: 2.       The walls separating the ERCW pump rooms from the traveling screen room on elevation 741 of the Intake Pumping Station (IPS) are equivalent to 3-hour fire barriers, but have unprotected scupper openings. The common walls between yard manholes have unprotected scuppers.
: 3.       Floor slabs in the Auxiliary Building are used as separation fire barriers between elevations, but some HVAC penetrations do not have fire dampers. Stairwells and equipment hatches are provided with water curtains in lieu of rated barriers.
: 4.       The Control Building mechanical equipment rooms on elevation 692 are separated from turbine building elevation 708 by a 3-hour fire rated floor/ceiling assembly; however, an equipment hatch in the ceiling of each mechanical equipment room is only provided with a metal hatch cover.
2.6.1            Justification for Ventilation and Purge Air Room Ventilation Penetrations The ventilation and purge air (VPA) rooms, Room 737.0-A5 located in Fire Area 16 and Room 737.0-A9 in Fire Area 74, contains safe shutdown components. Room 737.0-A5 and Room 737.0-A9, are separated from the fuel transfer valve (FTV) rooms, also known as the post accident sampling (PAS) rooms (Rooms 729.0-A8 and -A9), and nitrogen storage room (Room 729.0-A6) in Fire Area 10 by 2-hour rated fire barriers. Three round HVAC ducts per unit (8-,
10-, and 12-inches) in the FTV/PAS room pass through the VPA room for a short distance and then reenter the FTV/PAS and nitrogen storage rooms. These ducts have no openings into the VPA rooms.
In addition, one 12-inch round duct per unit associated with the VPA system penetrates the walls separating each VPA room from the nitrogen storage room. There are no openings in these ducts between the wall and the normally closed isolation dampers FCO-31-342 and FCO-31-343. These ducts are constructed from schedule 40 carbon steel pipe, ASTM A106, grade B and are seismically supported to category I(L) requirements. As is typical of mechanical penetrations, pipe sleeves are provided where the ducts penetrate the barriers between the VPA rooms and the FTV/PAS and nitrogen storage rooms.
The annular space between the sleeves and the pipes are sealed with a fire rated seal that has a fire rating equivalent to that of the barrier. The in situ combustible loads for the rooms are as follows:
Nitrogen Storage Room (Room 729.0-A6 in Fire Area 10)                    Insignificant FTV/PAS Room (Room 729.0-A8 in Fire Area 10)                             Low FTV/PAS Room (Room 729.0-A9 in Fire Area 10)                             Low VPA Rooms (Room 737.0-A5 in Fire Area 16, and Unit 2 VPA                 Low Room 737.0-A9 in Fire Area 74)
The major source of combustibles in the VPA rooms is charcoal filters. The charcoal filters are protected with closed head sprinkler (water spray nozzles) systems that are actuated by duct VII-11

PART VII - DEVIATIONS AND EVALUATIONS                         Revision 60 mounted ionization detectors. The FTV/PAS rooms are provided with preaction sprinkler systems (except in the entrance corridors to the rooms) that are actuated by ionization smoke detectors. Each VPA room is also provided with a preaction sprinkler system that is actuated by ionization smoke detectors. The nitrogen storage room is provided with ionization smoke detectors.
The only effect of a fire in the FTV/PAS or nitrogen storage rooms which could impact on the VPA room is radiant heat due to hot gases passing through the ducts. The absence of fixed combustibles in the immediate area of the ducts, the typical mechanical penetration design which includes pipe sleeves for the ducts, and more than 20 feet of spacial separation between the ducts and the nearest safe shutdown circuit provides a high degree of assurance that this radiant heat will not be a threat to safe shutdown components located in the VPA rooms. The fire protection provided for these rooms is adequate for the hazards present and the addition of fire dampers in these ducts would not significantly enhance the fire protection in these areas.
This deviation applies to room(s)737.0-A5, 737.0-A9, 729-A6, 729.0-A8, and 729.0-A9.
2.6.2            Justification for Scupper Openings Scupper openings penetrate fire barriers in two locations. One is in the IPS between the ERCW pump rooms and the traveling screen room. The other is between the Train A and Train B duct banks that run from the auxiliary building to the IPS where they share a common wall in three manholes in the yard. Each is discussed in more detail below.
2.6.2.1          ERCW Pump Room Scuppers The scupper openings in the IPS that penetrate the fire wall between the ERCW pump rooms and traveling screen room are located at the floor and provide drainage of rainwater from the ERCW pump rooms to the traveling screen wells.
The floor at elevation 741 of the IPS slopes away from the ERCW pumps toward the scuppers.
A postulated oil spill will drain away from the pumps to the scuppers, pass through the scupper openings, and immediately drop through floor grating into the traveling screen well. The high flash point of the lubricating oil (432&deg;F) makes it highly unlikely that the spilled oil would ignite.
However, if it did, the wall separating the two ERCW pump rooms from the traveling screen room will provide radiant heat protection from the fire. The roof design permits free air flow between the missile shield beams and will also allow the heat from a fire to dissipate to the outside environment and minimize the temperature rise within the room.
A fire in one ERCW pump room will not propagate through the scuppers and jeopardize a redundant train of ERCW pumps. The existing separation between redundant ERCW pumps is adequate for the hazards present. The scupper holes in the IPS have been previously reviewed and accepted by the NRC in the WBN SER dated June 1982.
This deviation applies to room(s) IPS-741 ERCW PUMP ROOM A and IPS-741 ERCW PUMP ROOM B.
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PART VII - DEVIATIONS AND EVALUATIONS                        Revision 60 2.6.2.2          Yard Duct Bank Scuppers The scupper openings in the common wall between duct banks in the yard are located at floor level for drainage purposes. Manholes 1A and 1B, 2A and 2B, and 3A and 3B are used to access the train A and train B duct banks that connect the auxiliary building to the IPS. The train A and train B duct banks are separated by a 12" reinforced concrete wall at each pair of manholes. One manhole in each pair (i.e., 2A or 2B) contains a sump pump. The other manhole is connected to the manhole with the sump pump by a 2 inch diameter scupper opening. There are no other openings in the common wall separating the train A and train B manholes.
The combustible material in the yard duct banks is insulation associated with cables. There are no other combustible materials or equipment (except for the sump pump) in the duct banks where they share a common wall. A postulated fire in the cable insulation of one duct bank or in the sump pump will not propagate through the scupper openings to the adjacent duct bank due to the lack of continuity of combustible materials between duct banks.
This deviation applies to room(s) Yard Ducts.
2.6.3            Justification for Auxiliary Building HVAC, Stair, Elevator and Hatch Penetrations The auxiliary building is a multi-level structure that is subdivided into separate fire areas. Each elevation contains fire areas that are separated from adjacent elevations. Each fire area contains individual or multiple rooms. Fire barriers within the auxiliary building are minimum 2-hour fire rated and fire barriers separating the auxiliary building from adjacent buildings are 3-hour rated.
Each elevation of the auxiliary building is provided with ionization smoke detectors and, with the exception of elevation 676, automatic suppression systems. (Individual rooms without detection and/or suppression are documented in Section 3 of this Part.) The mechanical pipe penetrations and electrical penetrations are provided with appropriate penetration seals. The in situ combustible loading for the open areas (e.g. general floor areas of elevations 692, 713, 737, etc.) consists primarily of insulation on cables in the cable trays and Thermo-Lag fire barrier material (approximately 90% or greater). Flame retardant coating is applied to non-IEEE-383 cables in accordance with Design Criteria WB-DC-30-4 (Part II, Reference 4.2.29). As documented in Part III, Section 7.2, the cables are provided with appropriately sized circuit protective devices (breakers and fuses). This provides a high degree of confidence that an internally generated cable tray fire is highly improbable.
The rest of the in situ combustible loading is dispersed throughout the areas/rooms and consist of lubricating oil in valves and motors, plastics in panels and junction boxes, etc. The justifications for open stairs and hatches, undampered ducts, spare conduit sleeves, and non-rated personnel hatches in the auxiliary building are presented below.
2.6.3.1          Water Curtains for Open Stairs and Hatches A water curtain designed in accordance with NFPA 13, section 4-4.8.2 (Part II, Reference 4.4.12) has been provided for the following openings:
: 1.       Stairwell number 5 located near column lines A11/S below elevations 713 and 737.
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PART VII - DEVIATIONS AND EVALUATIONS                      Revision 60
: 2.       Stairwell number 6 located near column lines A5/S below elevations 713 and 737.
: 3.       Stairwell number 3 located near column lines A8/U-V below elevations 713 and 737.
: 4.       Normally closed equipment hatch located near column lines A3/S below elevation 772.
: 5.       Normally closed equipment hatch located near column lines A13/S below elevation 772.
: 6.       Equipment hatch openings located near column lines A8/U-W below elevations 713, 737, and 757.
: 7.       The elevator door openings located at column lines A8/T below elevations 713, 737, and 757.
The water curtains provide an adequate level of protection to prevent a postulated fire on one elevation from propagating to another elevation through one of these openings.
This deviation applies to room(s) 713.0-A1, 737.0-A1, 757.0-A13, 772.0-A1, and 772.0-A16.
2.6.3.2          Undampered HVAC Ducts 2.6.3.2.a        Constructed of Spiral Welded Pipe Round HVAC ducts (pipes) are not provided with fire dampers where the pipe penetrates fire barriers. Such pipes penetrate the east wall of Room 676.0-A3 from an adjacent pipe chase, and through the north wall of Room 676.0-A3 to Room 676.0-A1. Neither of these walls is required for fire safe shutdown. The pipe inside the pipe chase passes up through the ceiling into Room 692.0-A1 near column line A10/S. The pipe then runs north and passes through the wall (not required for fire safe shutdown) of 692.0-A31 to the east side of the elevator shaft and passes up through the ceiling into Room 713.0-A1. The pipe continues up through the ceiling into Room 737.0-A1 in the same general location.
These ducts are constructed of either spiral welded pipe or schedule 10 pipe and are treated as normal pipe penetrations. Therefore they are provided with fire rated mechanical penetration seals and provide an adequate level of fire protection for these types of ducts.
This deviation applies to room(s) 676.0-A3, 676.0-A1, 692.0-A1, 692.0-A31, 713.0-A1, and 737.0-A1.
2.6.3.2.b        Heavy Sheet Metal Ducts Sheet metal ducts that are not provided with fire dampers are identified on the Fire Compartmentation drawings (Figures II-27A through II-46A excluding 37A). They are constructed of minimum 22 gauge sheet metal and will provide a 1-hour equivalent level of protection. The safe shutdown analysis considered these opening as unprotected and ensured that a fire on either side of the opening could not impact both paths of redundant safe shutdown components (cable or equipment). Automatic suppression and detection is provided on at least one side of the opening.
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PART VII - DEVIATIONS AND EVALUATIONS                     Revision 60 2.6.3.3          Spare Conduit Sleeves with Both Ends Capped Spare conduit sleeves which penetrate fire barriers are provided with approved sealant material, capped on each end with metal caps or plugs (for example Crouse-Hinds type PLG), or a combination of the two. Neither flames nor hot gases will propagate through these spare conduits sleeves and these sealing methods provide an adequate fire seal.
2.6.3.4          Non-Rated Personnel Hatches There are specific locations where non-rated steel hatches are used in floor/ceiling assemblies to enclose personnel access routes between rooms on different elevations. The locations where these steel hatches exist are identified on the compartmentation drawings in Part II of the FPR. One such hatch provides access from Room 692.0-A31 up into a monolithic concrete filter enclosure on elevation 713 near column lines A10/S. A second location provides access into a monolithic concrete filter enclosure identified as Room 692.0-A27 from the Unit 2 Pipe Chase 676.0-A17.
Neither monolithic enclosure in which the steel hatch is located is open to the remainder of the rooms on elevations 692 and 713. The steel hatches are provided from the elevations below specifically due to the lack of access into the monolithic enclosures from elevations 692 and 713. There are no safe shutdown cables or components within the monolithic enclosures on these two elevations; therefore, even should fire spread up through the steel hatch into an enclosure, there is no impact on fire safe shutdown capability.
Summary The above described conditions provide a level of fire protection that is adequate to ensure that safe shutdown can be achieved and that additional modifications would not significantly improve the fire protection capability of the plant.
This deviation applies to room(s) 676.0-A17, 692.0-A27, 692.0-A31, and 713.0-A1.
2.6.4            Control Building Equipment Hatches to the Turbine Building The mechanical equipment rooms (692.0-C1 and C10) on elevation 692 of the control building are provided with equipment hatches in the ceiling separating them from elevation 708.0 of the turbine building. The equipment hatches are provided with metal covers flush with the floor that are not fire rated. Since the equipment hatches provide access from the turbine to the control building, the metal covers are vital area boundaries with access controlled and security contacts attached to the underside of the hatches. As such, the hatch covers will not be inadvertently removed.
The metal covers do not form a water-tight seal where they cover the hatch openings; however, the metal covers will limit flammable and combustible liquid spills through the hatch openings into the control building mechanical equipment rooms. Seepage could occur through the hatches around the perimeter where the covers are mounted to the floor and through the small diameter holes in the hatches which are provided to facilitate their removal.
There are no safe shutdown components in the turbine building within 20 feet of the equipment hatches; as such, fire spread up into the turbine building will not impact FSSD capability. The mechanical equipment rooms are provided with automatic detection and preaction sprinkler VII-15

PART VII - DEVIATIONS AND EVALUATIONS                         Revision 60 systems, including sidewall heads in the vicinity of the hatches. Detection and suppression in the mechanical equipment rooms control and/or extinguish postulated fires prior to arrival of the fire brigade This deviation applies to room(s) 692.0-C1 and 692.0-C10.
2.7              Portable Lights for Containment, Post Fire Areas and Yard and DG Backed Lighting in Turbine Building REQUIREMENT - Section III.J of Appendix R states, "Emergency lighting units with at least an 8-hour battery power supply shall be provided in all areas needed for operation of safe shutdown equipment and in access and egress routes thereto.
DEVIATION - Installed 8-hour battery pack emergency lighting units are not provided in either of the Containments, Turbine Building, or the Yard. Portable battery powered lights are used in lieu of installed battery pack lighting units in both Containments. Emergency diesel generator (EDG) backed standby lighting is installed and maintained for the Turbine Building. Security diesel generator backed standby lighting is installed and maintained for the Yard. The Nuclear Assistant Unit Operators (NAUOs) carry portable lighting to supplement Yard and Turbine Building diesel backed lighting systems to provide task lighting capability (e.g., breaker tripping).
2.7.1            Justification for Containment In addition to the portable battery powered lights carried by the NAUOs, WBN has provided dedicated, hand-held portable lanterns in convenient locations that can be used for the manual actions to be performed inside Containment. Manual operator actions requiring entry into primary containment only result from fire damage to the RHR isolation valves or cables near the valves which are located inside lower containment.
Ample time is available to extinguish the fire, obtain the portable lanterns (if required), and operate the valves, because valve alignment may be performed anytime within two hours after reactor trip. Other actions identified for inside primary containment are optional. That is, closure of the cold leg accumulator valves is desirable, but not essential because reactor coolant pressure can be maintained above 150 psi. A fire affecting the RHR isolation valves could damage lighting circuits in the immediate vicinity, but does not disable all lower containment lighting because of circuit multiplicity and source diversity. Lower containment is equipped with both normal and diesel backed, standby lighting with fixtures located on three different elevations both inside and outside the crane wall. Fixtures at all elevations contribute to the general lighting level for access and egress.
The lights at each elevation are powered from two normal lighting circuits and, in general, different circuits are used at each elevation. Additionally, two standby lighting circuits, with fixtures strategically located throughout lower containment, provide adequate lighting in case of fire damage to the normal lighting cabinet. Batteries for the 8-hour emergency lighting units are not designed for the environmental conditions (e.g., high temperature and humidity) inside Containment. Due to ALARA considerations, access to the Containment during operations is very limited which means that inspection and testing of the battery units is only practical during an outage. Also, adding emergency lighting units inside Containment introduces additional material that could potentially impact the performance of the safety related equipment during accident conditions. In addition to the portable lights carried by the NAUOs, TVA has provided dedicated hand-held portable lighting units for use in Containment. The portable lanterns VII-16

PART VII - DEVIATIONS AND EVALUATIONS                        Revision 60 provide an acceptable source of emergency lighting capability and ensure adequate lighting for Operators to be able to perform manual actions.
This deviation applies to room(s) U1 Containment, U2 Containment, U1 Annulus, and U2 Annulus.
2.7.2   Justification Yard Area Yard Area manual actions or manual actions for which traversing the Yard is necessary for fires in the Auxiliary Building or Control Building. The fires involving or requiring access to the Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) trip breakers are an example. Lighting in the Yard is necessary for the manual action that trips the RCP breakers located in the breaker house in the switchyard. Tripping of the following breakers may be necessary for selected fires.
1-MTR-68-8 (local trip breaker 52-1A) 1-MTR-68-31 (local trip breaker 52-1B) 1-MTR-68-50 (local trip breaker 52-1C) 1-MTR-68-73 (local trip breaker 52-1D) 2-MTR-68-8 (local trip breaker 52-2A) 2-MTR-68-31 (local trip breaker 52-2B) 2-MTR-68-50 (local trip breaker 52-2C) 2-MTR-68-73 (local trip breaker 52-2D)
Access to these breakers is through the transformer/switchyard. Other manual actions are performed in the Diesel Generator Building and the Intake Pumping Station. The Yard is provided with normal lighting and security lighting. It is TVA's conclusion that the use of portable lanterns (in the event the normal and security lighting was lost) provides a dependable source of light and therefore meets the intended purpose of ensuring adequate lighting for the Operator to access and perform the manual action. WBN has provided dedicated, hand-held portable lanterns in convenient locations that are maintained for the manual actions to be performed inside the Yard Area.
This deviation applies to room(s) Yard.
2.7.3           Justification for Turbine Building The Turbine Building manual operator actions (breaker manipulation) are only necessary for fire that prevents access to the reactor trip switchgear in Rooms 757.0-A10 and 782-A1 for Unit 1 and 757-A16 and 782.0-A3 for Unit 2. The normal lighting and the emergency diesel generator backed standby lighting system provides adequate lighting to access and perform these actions in the Turbine Building. The standby lighting system is powered from a diesel generator backed power supply which is judged equivalent to 8-hour battery packs. The power supply cables to the Turbine Building standby lighting panel and the feeder cables are not routed in the rooms where a fire could create the need for the Turbine Building manual actions. Therefore, the standby lighting system will be available when needed This deviation applies to room(s) Turbine Bldg.
2.7.4           Justification for Post-Fire Areas For those areas in which a postulated fire occurred and a manual action is necessary to be performed after the fire has been extinguished, the Operator will use portable hand lanterns for lighting. Adequate installed emergency lighting is provided for the access routes to those areas.
WBN has provided dedicated, hand-held portable lanterns in convenient locations that are VII-17

PART VII - DEVIATIONS AND EVALUATIONS                       Revision 60 maintained for the manual actions to be performed in the areas where manual action(s) must be performed after the fire has been extinguished. At least two diverse access routes are provided to each fire area.
It is TVA's conclusion that the above described alternatives to installing 8-hour battery pack emergency lighting and providing lighting in areas where manual actions are performed after the fire has been extinguished provides a reliable source of lighting for an Operator to perform the manual actions and therefore request approval of this deviation.
This deviation applies to room(s)Post Fire Areas (Generic OPS hand lanterns).
2.8     Reactor Coolant Pump Oil Collection System REQUIREMENT - Section III.O of 10CFR50 Appendix R, Oil Collection System for Reactor Coolant Pump, provides the guideline for an oil collection system for the Reactor Coolant pumps. WBN has provided an oil collection system for each reactor coolant pump which consists of splash shields, a collection basin directly below each RCP motor, and closed piping from the collection basin to the closed and vented concrete equipment drain sump. All potential leakage sites are protected by a combination of spray shields that are designed to direct the flow of oil into the collection basin in the event of a leak.
DEVIATION - The guideline of Section III.O of 10CFR50 Appendix R states in part that Such collection systems shall be capable of collecting lube oil from all potential pressurized and unpressurized leakage sites in the reactor coolant pump lube oil systems. The guideline as stated means that any oil leakage that is not collected and found external to the oil collection system would not meet 10CFR50 Appendix R Section III.O. This deviation is to allow for minor amounts of oil that escape the oil collection system. There is also the potential of up to seventeen gallons of lube oil collecting in the lower motor housing. This deviation does not provide for allowable leakage due to damage, disassembly, or improper maintenance of the oil collection system as designed.
JUSTIFICATION - The RCP oil collection system must function in an area with significant ventilation airflows from both the CRDM Cooling Units and the RCP motor itself. A minor leak in the lubrication system in the lower guide bearing and reservoir collects in the bottom of the lower motor support housing. This area is provided with a drain line to the oil collection system, but up to 17 gallons of oil could potentially accumulate before it begins to drain to the collection system. However, the amount of oil that could be in the housing is less than 2 gallons because the low level alarm on the lower oil reservoir is set for a loss of less than 2 gallons (Part II, Reference 4.3.8). Since the alarm response instruction includes problem investigation and online oil addition is not an accepted practice, the amount of undetected oil that may collect in the housing will be less than 2 gallons.
The high ventilation airflow between the lower guide bearing and reservoir and the bottom of the lower motor support housing can result in some of the oil becoming entrained in ventilation air, which in turn could prevent some of the leakage from ever entering the collection system. The need for ventilation around the RCP dictates that some ventilation flow areas must be present in areas around the lube oil system and the oil collection system. In designing the oil collection system, it is not feasible in all instances to prevent minor amounts of oil from becoming entrained in the ventilation air and escaping the collection system. This oil becomes a thin film on piping and supports in the vicinity of the RCPs.
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PART VII - DEVIATIONS AND EVALUATIONS                      Revision 60 A minor leak in the lubrication system in the lower guide bearing and reservoir collects in the bottom of the lower motor support housing. The lower motor support housing is provided with a drain pipe that will drain any accumulation of liquid (water and/or oil) over seventeen gallons from the lower support housing to the oil collection system. This ensures that postulated leakage will be contained and drained per the requirements of Appendix R, Section III.O. The combustible loading calculation considers the entire inventory of oil in each pump when determining the fire severity for each reactor building; therefore, the postulated accumulation of oil in the lower support housing has already been accounted for. Unit 1 has not experienced any accumulation of oil from any of the pumps. Section III.O states:
Such collection systems shall be capable of collecting lube oil from all potential pressurized and unpressurized leakage sites in the reactor coolant pump lube oil systems. Leakage shall be collected and drained to a vented closed container that can hold the entire lube oil system inventory.
Therefore this postulated accumulation of oil is considered to not present a hazard to fire safe shutdown and to be in compliance to the requirements of III.O for the following reasons:
: a. The oil is collected and amounts over seventeen gallons are drained to a vented closed container.
: b. Each pump is provided with automatic suppression and detection.
: c. The entire inventory of lube oil from each pump is accounted for in the combustible loading calculation and fire hazards analysis. The fire severity index is not affected.
: d. No measurable leakage has occurred in the operating life of Unit 1.
: e. The collected oil is not exposed to an ignition source.
: f. Each pump is provided with low oil level annunciation that alerts the main control room for lube oil loss of less than 2 gallons.
A modification to drain all postulated oil accumulation in the lower motor housing would not increase the safety of the plant.
Significant defense-in-depth measures exist to prevent a fire event due to a failure in the reactor coolant pump lube oil system. In the unlikely event that a fire did start, there are defense-in-depth measures to ensure that the fire is quickly identified and extinguished, and that the effect of the fire does not prevent the safe shutdown of the plant. These measures, in addition to the RCP oil collection system, include the use of suppression and detection above the RCPs, the proximity of manual hose stations, the use of mirror insulation on the RCS system piping, and the absence of ignition sources in the vicinity of the RCPs. A low oil level alarm annunciates once the oil loss reached the alarm setpoint and alert the operator to investigate the problem.
Oil used for the RCP motor bearings is Mobil SHC 824 Synthesized lubricant. This oil has a flash point of 480&deg;F. This high flash point classifies the lubricant as a Class IIIB combustible liquid in accordance with NFPA 30 (Part II, Reference 4.4.21). The normal operating temperature of the oil is 131&deg;F. The oil at its normal operating temperature is well below its flashpoint and does not present a hazard.
The normal reactor coolant system temperature is 588&deg;F. The reactor coolant piping could be a potential source of heat that could volatilize the lubricant if any leakage contacted the piping.
This hazard is mitigated by the mirror insulation on the pump and reactor coolant piping. The VII-19

PART VII - DEVIATIONS AND EVALUATIONS                       Revision 60 stainless steel mirror insulation is non-combustible and at normal operation, the exterior of the insulation is 142&deg;F. The surface of the high temperature piping is well insulated with non-combustible, non-permeable insulation such that the surface temperature of the insulation is well below the flash point of the lubricant and is not a potential ignition source. Minor amounts of oil that escape the collection system could potentially be deposited on mirror panels in the vicinity. The amount of oil, however, that is expected to escape the collection system is minor, so only a fine film coating is deposited on the panel. The mirror insulation panels are fitted together with overlapping seams and secured in place, which minimizes the likelihood that any oil seeps through the seams between panels. In addition, since only a minor amount of oil is present on the outside of the panel, it is not expected that a significant amount of oil could run into any of the panel seams.
Fire hazards due to electrical systems both within the pump assembly itself and those which are located in areas within possible range of leakage from the oil collection system have been evaluated. To prevent damage to the motor from interior oil leaks, the stator windings are coated with an epoxy resin and the oil sources are separated from electrical components by high silicone steel sheets. Electrical cables and terminals in the vicinity of the RCP have been shielded. As such, leakage will not come in contact with any potential electrical ignition source in the area of the RCP.
In addition, each of the RCPs is protected by fixed fire suppression and detection systems.
These systems provide early detection and fire control until manual suppression activities can be achieved. The RCPs are protected by a closed head preaction automatic water spray system supplied by a common header. Each pump is protected by a ring header containing eight closed head spray nozzles. The header is located approximately four feet above the top of the RCP motor. Each nozzle has a temperature rating of 500 F. The 500&deg;F fusible bulb elements provide reasonable assurance that the nozzles will not operate during other design basis events, yet will open for fire conditions caused by a combustible liquid fire on the RCP.
Each of the RCPs is protected by automatic detection systems. Each RCP has four rate compensating / fixed temperature spot type thermal detectors. The detection circuits are Class A supervised. The temperature rating of the detectors is 225&deg;F, and the detectors are cross-zoned (two in each zone). Upon actuation of one detector in each of the zones, the detection system automatically actuates the deluge valve to fill the supply piping for the closed head water spray system. The area above the RCPs is also equipped with a hood. In the event of a fire, the hood will act as a ceiling, forcing the heat to bank down, thus reducing the response time of the detectors and fusible elements in the spray nozzles.
In conclusion, based on the above discussion, there is reasonable assurance that adequate defense-in-depth measures are in place to prevent a RCP lube oil fire, and to quickly detect and suppress a postulated fire that might occur. Therefore, the allowance for minor leakage from the oil collection system does not affect the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown.
This deviation applies to room(s) U1 Containment and U2 Containment.
2.9.0            Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA) in Lieu of 10CFR50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2 Separation REQUIREMENT - Section III.G.2 provides physical separation criteria applicable to fire areas where cables or equipment of redundant trains of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown are located in the same fire area. Compliance with these criteria is one means of ensuring that one of the redundant trains is free of fire damage as required by Section III.G.1.
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PART VII - DEVIATIONS AND EVALUATIONS                         Revision 60 DEVIATION - For the purpose of addressing operator manual actions (OMAs), electrical raceway fire barrier systems (ERFBS) and radiant energy shields (RES), the rooms listed in the following table demonstrate compliance with the intent of Section III.G.1 by a fire hazards analysis with no OMA, ERFBS or RES in lieu of the prescriptive separation criteria described in Section III.G.2.
SECTION          ROOM NUMBER 2.9.1            692.0-A29 & 692.0-A30 2.9.2            729.0-A1 & 737.0-A6 2.9.3            729.0-A2 2.9.4            729.0-A6 2.9.5            729.0-A10 2.9.6            729.0-A11 & 737.0-A10 2.9.7            729.0-A12 2.9.8            729.0-A13 2.9.9            729.0-A15 & 763.5-A2 2.9.10           757.0-A13 2.9.11           757.0-A14 2.9.12           757.0-A15 2.9.13           2RIR 2.9.14           2RA1 2.9.15           2RA2 2.9.16           2RA3 2.9.17           2RA4 2.9.18           2RF1 2.9.19           2RF2 2.9.20           2RI (2RI-1, 2, 3, 4) 2.9.21           2RO (2RO-1, 2, 3, 4) 2.9.22           RI (RI-1, RI-2, RI-3, RI-4)
JUSTIFICATION - A fire hazards analysis (FHA) as documented below has been performed for each of the rooms listed in the above table and is provided here for NRC review and approval.
The FHA has been performed in accordance with the guidelines of GL 86-10. When a barrier is identified as a rated fire barrier, the penetrations through that barrier are rated for the barrier and are maintained by appropriate engineering design and maintenance programs (e.g. fire doors, fire dampers, and penetration seal programs [Part II, Reference 4.2.48, 4.2.44, 4.2.49, 4.2.34, 4.2.35, and 4.2.67]). The combustible loading information is derived from the Combustible Loading calculation (Part II, Reference 4.2.10) and the fire rated barriers are documented on the Fire Protection Compartmentation drawings (Part II, Reference 4.2.39).
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PART VII - DEVIATIONS AND EVALUATIONS                         Revision 60 FHA General Information FSSD path refers to a set of components that are sufficient to accomplish a fire safe shutdown function. In this deviation the word component is used when discussing equipment or cables.
Equipment is used in regard to an end device such as a motor control center, valve, handswitch, etc. Cable is referring to the electrical power, control and instrumentation circuits.
Motor operated valves (MOVs) are not considered credible ignition sources because it would take multiple failures (electrical and mechanical) to result in a fire. During normal operation, the power cables to the MOVs are de-energized (they are only energized when the valve is given a signal to move). The power cable (routed in conduit) is provided with circuit protective devices (fuses/breakers) that are designed to clear a fault prior to cable insulation ignition. The motor is enclosed and the gear box on the MOV would have to fail and leak lubricating oil at the same time that a power cable to the valve was energized and failed. The lubricating oil for the valves is not exposed combustibles, but the combustible loading calculation has assumed that the oil is exposed; therefore, the combustible loading for each room is very conservative. In addition, NUREG/CR-6850 identifies that any enclosed motor, including MOV drive motors, regardless of size are not considered as ignition sources.
Flow solenoid valves (FSVs) are not considered credible ignition sources because the cables (routed in conduit) are low voltage circuits that are provided with circuit protection (fuses and/or breakers) that are designed to clear a fault prior to cable ignition. There is insignificant combustible material associated with a FSV and the worst result of a fault on these circuits is to blow a fuse or open a breaker.
Small wall mounted transformers, electrical control panels (e.g. local control panels, push button stations, open instrument panels on which are mounted transmitters, indicators, etc.) and lighting units are not considered credible ignition sources because the cables (routed in conduit) terminating on/in these small transformers, panels or lighting units are low voltage circuits that are provided with circuit protection (fuses/breakers) that are designed to clear a fault prior to cable insulation ignition. There is insignificant combustible material associated with these devices. In addition, NUREG/CR-6850 identifies that dry transformers with a rating of 45kVA or less are expected to have insufficient combustible material to produce a fire with the potential to spread beyond the bounds of the initiating component or to represent a direct threat to other plant equipment or cables. The electrical panels and lighting units are less of a hazard than the dry transformers.
Small motors of 5 hp or less are not considered credible ignition sources because there is insignificant combustible material associated with the motor. In addition some motors such as sump pump motors are normally de-energized. The power cables to the motors are properly sized and the protective devices (breaker/fuse) are designed to clear a fault before the cable reaches its auto-ignition temperature. NUREG/CR-6850 states: "Pumps with a rating of 5 hp or less are assumed to have little or no significant contribution to risk".
Radiation monitors are not considered credible ignition sources because they contain insignificant quantities of combustible material and the circuits to these devices are low voltage, routed in conduit and are protected by properly designed circuit protective devices (fuses/breakers) that will clear a circuit fault prior to the insulation on the cables reaching its auto-ignition temperature. As with a dry transformer (see above), the radiation monitors have VII-22

PART VII - DEVIATIONS AND EVALUATIONS                        Revision 60 insufficient combustible material to produce a fire with the potential to spread beyond the monitor or to represent a direct threat to other plant equipment or cables.
The following deviation requests address the individual rooms or group of closely related rooms.
Each contains four parts:
: a.       Description of Condition - Describes the room(s) and its relationship to the fire area and analysis volume it is in and gives a brief description of the OMAs and/or cable protection (i.e. electrical raceway fire barrier system (ERFBS) or radiant energy shields (RES)) that would be required in order to meet Section III.G.2 if an assumed fire damaged all of the components in the room. This part describes the approach which would be required if the deviation were not approved by the NRC.
: b.       Fire Hazards Analysis - This part provides the following:
: 1.       A description of the room size, fire barriers and other fire protection features of the room(s).
: 2.       Identifies the fire load and fire severity associated with the room(s) and the type of combustibles.
: 3.       Defines the control of transient combustibles and ignition sources.
: 4.       Identifies the adjacent rooms and the potential for fire propagation from one room to another.
: c.       System Evaluation - The System Evaluation considers expected, realistic fire damage (based on the FHA) and its effect on FSSD components in the room(s). The three subsections are:
: 1.       Redundant FSSD Components in the Room - Identifies and evaluates the redundant FSSD components located in the room and justifies that no OMAs, ERFBSs or RESs must be implemented or installed since failure of redundant equipment or cables is not expected. The evaluation includes relative locations of the redundant components with respect to each other and to ignition sources and combustibles in the room(s). Additional factors providing defense-in-depth are included as appropriate.
: 2.       FSSD Components with Redundant FSSD Components in an Adjacent Room within the Same Analysis Volume - Evaluation of components in the room(s) whose redundant counterpart is located in another room within the same analysis volume. Specific consideration is given to adequacy of the barrier separating the redundant components.
: 3.       Other FSSD Components in the Room - Evaluates the potential impact to normal plant operation due to failure of the non-credited FSSD components in the room(s).
: d.       Conclusion - The results of the FHA and system evaluation have determined that no credible fire could occur that would impact the FSSD analysis and that no OMAs or ERFBSs or RESs are necessary for the protection of the components in the room(s).
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PART VII - DEVIATIONS AND EVALUATIONS                       Revision 60 2.9.1           Rooms 692.0-A29 and 692.0-A.30: Boric Acid Evaporator Package Rooms A and B 2.9.1.1         Description of Condition These two rooms are a part of fire area 1 (See Part III, Table 3-3 for room listing) and they are analyzed in analysis volume AV-005. Fire area 1 is considered a III.G.2 area; however, rooms 692.0-A29 and 692.0-A30 do not contain redundant shutdown paths, or any FSSD equipment.
The only FSSD components located in rooms 692.0-A29 and 692.0-A30 are cables routed in conduits.
Physical separation in accordance with III.G.2 cannot be achieved in AV-005. An FSSD analysis which assumes failure of all equipment and cables in the rooms would result in OMAs being credited in lieu of III.G.2 physical separation for these two rooms. Therefore, the following OMAs are implemented to achieve fire safe shutdown:
: a.      Unit 1 - Stop primary makeup water pump within 15 minutes by tripping the breaker on the MCC.
: b.      Unit 2 - Stop both primary makeup water pumps within 15 minutes by tripping the breaker on the MCC.
: c.      Unit 2 - Bypass normal makeup control valve and throttle RCP seal injection flow within 75 minutes by operation of manual valves.
: d.      Unit 2 - Monitor RWST level from gage on side of tank.
2.9.1.2         Fire Hazards Analysis 2.9.1.2.a       Room Description The Boric Acid Evaporator Package Room B (692.0-A29) and Room A (692.0-A30) are of reinforced concrete construction (walls, floors and ceiling thicknesses from 12 to 36-inches).
The ceilings and part of the floors with a room below have a fire resistance rating of 2 hours and the walls separating the rooms from the Control Building have a fire resistance rating of 3 hours.
The walls separating these rooms from adjacent rooms on 692.0 are minimum 24-inches thick reinforced concrete, but are not assigned a fire resistive rating because electrical and mechanical openings in these barriers are not provided with fire rated seals/closures. The doors into the rooms are heavy duty hollow metal doors with ventilation louvers. The rooms have a floor area of 888-ft2 (692.0-A29) and 850-ft2 (692.0-A30) and a nominal ceiling height of 19-feet. Rooms 692.0-A29 and 692.0-A30 are designated as Combustible Control Zones (CCZs) (see Part II section 5.0 for definition of a CCZ).
2.9.1.2.b       Fire Load The fire severity classification due to the combustible loading in the room is insignificant. The minor amount of combustible material is due to a quart of lube oil for each pump associated with each Evaporator Package and plastics associated with a small wall mounted dry type transformer, junction boxes and light covers in each room. The Evaporator Packages are not in VII-24

PART VII - DEVIATIONS AND EVALUATIONS                        Revision 60 use and the pumps are not powered; therefore, they are not an ignition source. Cables in the room are routed in conduits and are not considered to be ignition sources.
The small wall mounted dry type transformer, junction boxes and lights are not considered to be ignition sources (see Justification in 2.9.0 above). It is concluded that the insignificant quantity of in situ combustibles and no ignition sources combined with the strict control of transient combustibles assures that no credible fire in 692.0-29 or 692.0-A30 could occur and propagate into an adjacent room.
2.9.1.2.c        Control of Combustibles and Ignition Sources NPG-SPP-18.4.7, Control of Transient Combustibles and NPG-SPP-18.4.8, Control of Ignition Sources (Hot Work) defines the fire preventive measures to preclude introduction of significant quantities of combustible material or ignition sources into the rooms and the compensatory measures necessary when transient combustibles or ignition sources are in a room. Rooms 692.0-A29 and 692.0-A30 are CCZs (see Part II, sections 10 and 11). The approval of an evaluation must be obtained before any transient combustible can be introduced into the room or hot work performed in the room. Access to the rooms is not controlled; however, the lack of significant concentrations of in situ combustible material and ignition sources and the controls for transient combustibles and ignition sources provides assurance that no credible exposure fire would occur. Based on this, it is not expected that the plant will enter the fire safe shutdown procedure.
2.9.1.2.d        Adjacent Rooms The room below (676.0-A17) is provided with a fire detection system and contains insignificant quantities of in situ combustible. It is separated from rooms 692.0-A29 and 692.0-A30 by a 2 hour fire rated barrier. No credible fire in 676.0-A17 could propagate into 692.0-A29 or 692.0-A30.
Adjacent room 692.0-A1 is provided with fire detection and automatic suppression systems and is separated from the two rooms by at least 24-inch thick reinforced concrete walls that are not assigned a fire resistance rating because of electrical and mechanical opening not being provided with fire rated seals/closures. Over 97% of the combustible loading in 692.0-A1 is due to insulation on cables routed in cable trays. The combination of automatic suppression in 692.0-A1 and the concrete walls that separate 692.0-A1 from 692.0-A29 or 692.0-A30 provide assurance that no credible fire in 692.0-A1 could propagate into 692.0-A29 or 692.0-A30.
The wall between room 692.0-A27 and adjacent room 692.0-A29 is a 36-inch thick reinforced concrete barrier but is not assigned a fire rating. Room 692.0-A27 contains the concentrate filter (a high radiation area) and does not contain any in situ combustibles or ignition sources.
There is no credible fire in 692.0-A27 that could propagate through the wall into 692.0-A29.
The wall between 692.0-A30 and 692.0-A31 is a 36-inch thick reinforced concrete wall that is assigned a 2 hour fire resistive rating. However, the wall is not credited for FSSD. Room 692.0-A31 is provided with a fire detection system and has low in situ combustible loading. The only significant penetration through this wall is an HVAC duct and it is provided with a fire damper. There is no credible fire in Room 692.0-A31 that could propagate through this wall separating room 692.0-A30 from 692.0-A31.
VII-25

PART VII - DEVIATIONS AND EVALUATIONS                         Revision 60 Adjacent room 713.0-A1 is separated from 692.0-A29 and 692.0-A30 by a 2 hour rated concrete floor. Part of 713.0-A1 containing the Boric Acid Tanks are above 692.0-A30 and this area does not have automatic suppression (See Part VII, section 3.1). The rest of the area of 713.0-A1 above 692.0-A29 and 692.0-A30 is protected with automatic suppression. Over 98% of the combustible load in 713.0-A1 is due to the insulation on cables routed in cable trays. It is concluded that the combination of 2 hour rated fire barrier and suppression on 713.0-A1 assures that no credible fire on 713.0-A1 could propagate into 692.0-A29 or 692.0-A30.
TVA concludes that, based on the above information, no credible fire could propagate from a room adjacent to 692.0-A29 or 692.0-A30 nor could a credible fire propagate from 692.0-A29 or 692.0-A30 into an adjacent room.
2.9.1.3          System Evaluation 2.9.1.3.a        Redundant FSSD Components in the Room None.
2.9.1.3.b        FSSD Components with Redundant FSSD Components in an Adjacent Room within the same Analysis Volume The cables whose failure could necessitate the OMAs listed in 2.9.1.1.a, .b, .c and .d are located in adjacent room 692-A1B which is part of AV-005. Based on the insignificant combustible materials and no ignition sources, no credible fire could propagate from 692.0-A29 or 692.0-A30 into 692.0-A1B and damage cables in 692.0-A1B that would necessitate the performance of OMAs.
2.9.1.3.c        Other FSSD Components in the Room Rooms 692.0-A29 or 692.0-A30 contains cables associated with FSSD equipment relied upon for fires in other areas of the plant (i.e., cables not credited for a fire in Rooms 692.0-A29 or 692.0-A30). The cables are routed in conduit. Although no fire induced failures are expected due to the insignificant fire hazard in the rooms, postulated failure of the non-credited FSSD cables has been evaluated to assess its effect on plant operation. Failure of these FSSD cables is detected and mitigated by normal plant procedures and would not initiate or result in a plant trip.
Charging flow transmitter cables Turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump governor valve and speed control valve cables Containment differential pressure transmitter channel G cable Refueling water storage tank level transmitter channel D cable Steam line pressure transmitter channel E cables Reactor building sump level transmitter channel G cable Steam generator #2 level transmitter cable Containment spray valve cables Steam generator #1 auxiliary feedwater inlet flow transmitter cable VII-26

PART VII - DEVIATIONS AND EVALUATIONS                        Revision 60 2.9.1.4         Conclusion Since there is insignificant threat from transient combustibles or in situ combustible material and no credible ignition sources; it is concluded that no cables routed in conduit could be damaged by any credible fire in either room and therefore, the performance of OMAs is not necessary. In addition, the redundant cables are routed in another room (692.0-A1B) which is provided with automatic suppression and detection. TVA concludes that the intent of III.G.1 is ensured and requests approval of this deviation demonstrating compliance to III.G.1 criteria with a fire hazard analysis in lieu of the prescriptive separation criteria of III.G.2 2.9.2           Rooms 729.0-A1 and 737.0-A6 - Unit 1 South Main Steam Valve Room and Air Lock 2.9.2.1         Description of Condition These two rooms make up fire area 12 which is analysis volume 34 (AV-034) in the FSSD analysis (see Part III, Table 3-3 for room listing). The fire area is considered a III.G.2 area because components related to both redundant shutdown paths are located in 729-A1.
The redundant components are not cables or equipment that must operate for FSSD, but rather control air users connected to the Train A and the Train B auxiliary control air system (ACAS) headers. The FSSD analysis generally assumes that fire damage to one ACAS air user could depressurize the header (Train A or Train B). If all the ACAS air users located in this area were assumed to fail due to postulated fire damage; both trains of the ACAS are assumed failed.
Since the ACAS is common to both units, both units are affected.
Physical separation in accordance with III.G.2 cannot be achieved in this area. An FSSD analysis assuming failure of all equipment and cables in the room would result in an OMA being credited in lieu of III.G.2 physical separation. Therefore, the following OMA is implemented to achieve fire safe shutdown:
: a.      Unit 1 and Unit 2 - Control pressure in two steam generators within 60 minutes by operation of SG PORV via local nitrogen control station.
2.9.2.2         Fire Hazard Analysis 2.9.2.2.a       Room Description Room 729.0-A1 is the Unit 1 South Main Steam Valve room and room 737.0-A6 is the entrance to the valve room from the Auxiliary Building. The walls and floor of 729.0-A1 are of reinforced concrete construction and have fire resistive ratings of 2-hours for the walls and floor that separate the valve room from adjacent areas of the Auxiliary Building and fire resistive rating of 3-hours for the wall separating it from the Unit 1 Reactor Building. The walls separating 729.0-A1 from the Yard are 36-inch thick reinforced concrete but are not assigned a fire resistive rating. There are two access paths into the valve room. One is from the Auxiliary Building into the labyrinth (the two doors in the labyrinth from the Auxiliary Building and into the valve room are interlocked such that only one door can be opened at a time). The other path is from the Yard. Access to the valve room is limited due to the hazardous environmental conditions in the room (high humidity, high temperature, and presence of high energy lines (main steam and feedwater)).
VII-27

PART VII - DEVIATIONS AND EVALUATIONS                        Revision 60 2.9.2.2.b        Fire Load The in situ combustible loading for 729.0-A1 and 737.0-A6 is insignificant. The in situ combustibles in 729.0-A1 consist of small quantities of lubricant in each valve and small quantities of miscellaneous plastics associated with area radiation monitors, small electrical control panels and boxes and lighting units. The in situ combustibles in 737.0-A6 are the light covers. The credible ignition sources in 729.0-A1 are the radiation monitors and the valve motors. None of these devices are considered to be significant ignition sources due to the small quantity of in situ combustible material associated with them and the circuit protection (properly sized and coordinated fuses/breakers) that is designed to clear an electrical fault before the cable insulation reaches ignition temperature.
2.9.2.2.c        Control of Combustibles and Ignition Sources NPG-SPP-18.4.7, Control of Transient Combustibles and NPG-SPP-18.4.8, Control of Ignition Sources (Hot Work) defines the fire preventive measures to preclude introduction of significant quantities of combustible material or ignition sources into the rooms and the compensatory measures necessary when transient combustibles or ignition sources are in a room. Room 729.0-A1 and 737.0-A6 are CCZs (see Part II, sections 10 and 11). The approval of an evaluation must be obtained before any transient combustible can be introduced into the room or hot work performed in the room. Access to the room is limited due to the hazardous conditions in 729.0-A1. The lack of significant concentrations of in situ combustible material and ignition sources and the controls for transient combustibles and ignition sources provides assurance that no credible exposure fire would occur. Based on this, it is not expected that the plant will enter the fire safe shutdown procedure.
2.9.2.2.d        Adjacent Rooms There is no threat of a fire in an adjacent room in the Auxiliary Building propagating into 729.0-A1 or 737.0-A6 due to the combination of fire rated barriers and automatic fire suppression and detection in those rooms. The thick reinforced concrete walls separating 729.0-A1 from the Yard would prevent a fire in the Yard from propagating into the room. The door in this wall is located in a labyrinth which would shield the door from a transient fire in the Yard. In addition, main feedwater and steam lines which run alongside the wall prevent any significant transient combustibles from being in the vicinity of the wall, labyrinth and door. The 3 hour fire rated concrete wall separating the Unit 1 Reactor Building from 729.0-A1 and 737.0-A6 would prevent a fire in the Unit 1 Reactor Building propagating into the rooms.
TVA concludes, based on the above information that no credible fire could propagate from an adjacent room into room 729.0-A1 and 737.0-A6 or from 729.0-A1 or 737.0-A6 into an adjacent room.
VII-28

PART VII - DEVIATIONS AND EVALUATIONS                       Revision 60 2.9.2.3          System Evaluation 2.9.2.3.a        Redundant FSSD Components in the Room There are no redundant cables for FSSD equipment in 729.0-A1 or 737.0-A6 and 737.0-A6 does not contain any FSSD components. The only redundant FSSD equipment in room 729.0-A1 are train A and train B air endusers connected to the redundant ACAS headers. To achieve safe shutdown without OMAs at least one ACAS header must be functional to supply Unit 1 and Unit 2 air users in other plant locations. As described in calculation EDQ0009992013000202, Appendix R - Auxiliary Control Air System (ACAS) End User (Part II, reference 4.2.4), the ACAS is a safety system and uses welded stainless steel piping and fittings; however, some of the air user devices may be susceptible to fire damage based on their physical construction and/or material make up (e.g., pressure regulators, diaphragms, controllers, etc.).
The ACAS air users in 729.0-A1 are two level control valves (LCVs) and two power operated relief valves (PORVs) associated with the steam generators #1 and #4. Their redundant counterparts are not in 729.0-A1. The FSSD analysis does not credit these steam generators nor the air supply to these valves to achieve safe shutdown with a fire in this room. However, at least one train of ACAS is needed to operate equipment located elsewhere in the plant. One LCV and one PORV are connected to each train of the ACAS. The LCVs are in parallel horizontal piping runs three feet on center at elevation 748 (19 feet above the floor). The PORVs are in parallel horizontal piping runs 19-2 on center at elevation 758 (29 feet above the floor).
As described in the FHA (2.9.2.2) the absence of ignition sources and insignificant in situ combustibles is sufficient to conclude that a credible fire could not damage air users connected to both ACAS headers. The existence of transient combustibles is reduced because this room is rarely entered during operations due to the high temperature and humidity in the main steam valve vaults. For additional defense-in-depth this room is maintained as a CCZ. A very large amount of transient combustibles and an ignition source would have to be brought into the valve vault to produce a fire that could damage the level control valves located a minimum of 19 feet above the floor in a room with a 55 foot high ceiling.
Based on the above information, it is concluded that no credible fire in 729.0-A1 could occur and the implementation of the OMA identified in 2.9.2.1 is not necessary.
2.9.2.3.b        Components with Redundant FSSD Components in an Adjacent Room within the Same Analysis Volume Rooms 729.0-A1 and 737.0-A6 are the only rooms in AV-034 (fire area 12). The barriers that separate rooms 729.0-A1 and 737.0-A6 from adjacent rooms in the Auxiliary Building are 2 hour fire rated barriers and from the Unit 2 Reactor Building is a 3 hour fire rated barrier. The only non-fire rated barrier is the outside wall that separates 729.0-A1 from the Yard and there are no redundant FSSD equipment or cables in the Yard near this wall (see 2.9.2.2 above).
2.9.2.3.c        Other FSSD Components in the Room Room 729.0-A1 contains FSSD equipment and cables associated with FSSD equipment relied upon for fires in other areas of the plant (i.e., equipment and cables not credited for a fire in Room 729.0-A1). The cables are routed in conduit. Although no fire induced failures are VII-29

PART VII - DEVIATIONS AND EVALUATIONS                           Revision 60 expected due to the insignificant fire hazard in the rooms, postulated failure of the non-credited FSSD equipment and cables has been evaluated to assess its effect on plant operation. Failure of this FSSD equipment or cables are detected and mitigated by normal plant procedures and would not initiate or result in a plant trip.
Steam line warming valves and associated cables (Valves are normally closed with power removed during normal operation.)
Steam generator blowdown outboard containment isolation valve cables Main steam isolation valves and cables for steam generators #1 and #4 Steam generators #1 and #4 main feedwater isolation MOVs and bypass line isolation valves and associated cables Steam generators #1 and #4 power operated relief valves and one train of control solenoids and associated cables Turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump steam supply MOV cables Turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump level control valves and cables for steam generators #1 and #4 Pressurizer heater backup group 1B cables 2.9.2.4           Conclusion There is insignificant threat from transient combustibles or in situ combustible material, no significant ignition sources; therefore, there is no fire hazard in 729.0-A1 or 737.0-A6 that could cause loss of ACAS pressure and necessitate any OMAs. TVA concludes that the intent of III.G.1 is ensured and requests approval of this deviation demonstrating compliance to III.G.1 criteria with a fire hazard analysis in lieu of the prescriptive separation criteria of III.G.2.
2.9.3             Room 729.0-A2 - Unit 1 North Main Steam Valve Room 2.9.3.1           Description of Condition Room 729-A2 is part of fire area 13 and is analysis volume 35A (AV-035A) in the FSSD analysis (see Part III, Table 3-3 for room listing). Fire area 13 is considered a III.G.2 area because it contains components related to both redundant safe shutdown paths. Electrical Raceway Fire Barrier Systems (ERFBS) are credited to protect two Unit 1 cables and a FSSD analysis assuming failure of all equipment and cables in the room concludes that OMAs are necessary in lieu of III.G.2 physical separation.
The redundant components are not cables or equipment that must operate for FSSD, but rather control air users connected to the Train A and the Train B auxiliary control air system (ACAS) headers. The FSSD analysis generally assumes that fire damage to one ACAS air user could depressurize the header (Train A or Train B). If all the ACAS air users located in this area were assumed to fail due to postulated fire damage; both trains of the ACAS are assumed failed.
Since the ACAS is common to both units, both units are affected.
Physical separation in accordance with III.G.2 cannot be achieved in this area. An FSSD analysis which assumes failure of all equipment and cables in this room results in an OMA being credited in lieu of III.G.2 physical separation. Therefore, the following OMA is implemented to achieve fire safe shutdown:
VII-30

PART VII - DEVIATIONS AND EVALUATIONS                        Revision 60
: a.      Unit 1 and Unit 2 - Control pressure in two steam generators within 60 minutes by operation of SG PORV via local nitrogen control station.
2.9.3.2          Fire Hazard Analysis 2.9.3.2.a        Room Description Room 729.0-A2 is the Unit 1 North Main Steam Valve room. The walls of 729.0-A2 are of reinforced concrete construction and have fire resistive ratings of 3 hours that separate the valve room from adjacent areas of the Auxiliary Building and fire resistive rating of 3 hours for the wall separating it from the Unit 1 Reactor Building. The walls separating 729.0-A2 from the Yard are 36-inch thick reinforced concrete but are not assigned a fire resistive rating. Two doors are located in these walls. One door is located in a labyrinth which would shield the door from a transient fire in the Yard. The other door is located in a labyrinth and behind the main feedwater and steam lines which run alongside the wall and prevent any significant transient combustibles in the Yard from being in the vicinity of the labyrinth and door.
2.9.3.2.b        Fire Load The in situ combustible loading for room 729.0-A2 is insignificant. The in situ combustibles in 729.0-A2 consist of small quantities of lubricant in each valve and small quantities of miscellaneous plastics associated with area radiation monitors, small electrical control panels and boxes and lighting units. The radiation monitors and the valve motors are not considered to be ignition sources due to the small quantity of in situ combustible material associated with them and the circuit protection (properly sized and coordinated fuses/breakers) for each (see Justification in 2.9.0). There are no credible ignition sources in the room.
2.9.3.2.c        Control of Combustibles and Ignition Sources NPG-SPP-18.4.7, Control of Transient Combustibles and NPG-SPP-18.4.8, Control of Ignition Sources (Hot Work) defines the fire preventive measures to preclude introduction of significant quantities of combustible material or ignition sources into the rooms. Compensatory measures must be implemented when transient combustibles or ignition sources are located in a room.
Room 729.0-A2 is a CCZ (see Part II, sections 10 and 11). The approval of an evaluation must be obtained before any transient combustible can be introduced into the room or hot work performed in the room. Access to the room is limited due to the hazardous conditions in 729.0-A2. The lack of significant concentrations of in situ combustible material and ignition sources and the controls for transient combustibles and ignition sources provides assurance that no credible exposure fire would occur. Based on this, it is not expected that the plant will enter the fire safe shutdown procedure.
2.9.3.2.d        Adjacent Rooms There is no threat of a fire in an adjacent room in the Auxiliary Building propagating into 729.0-A2 due to the 3 hour fire rated barriers and insignificant quantities of in situ combustibles in the adjacent rooms.
The Unit 1 Reactor Building is separated from 729.0-A2 by the 3 hour fire rated 36 inch thick reinforced concrete wall; therefore, there is no threat of a fire in the Unit 1 Reactor Building propagating into 729.0-A2.
VII-31

PART VII - DEVIATIONS AND EVALUATIONS                           Revision 60 The Yard area adjacent to the exterior walls of 729.0-A2 is maintained free of any significant combustibles. Two doors provide access from the Yard into 729.0-A2 and they are located in walls on opposite sides of 729.0-2. The door on the west side is back in a labyrinth and is behind the main feedwater and steam lines. The door on the east side is back in a labyrinth.
No significant quantities of either in situ or transient combustibles are in the vicinity of either of the doors. There is no credible fire in the Yard near these walls that could propagate into 729.0-A2.
TVA concludes, based on the above information, that no credible fire could propagate from an adjacent room into 729.0-A2 nor from 729.0-A2 into an adjacent room.
2.9.3.3         System Evaluation 2.9.3.3.a       Redundant FSSD Components in the Room Cables for the train A and train B solenoid valves associated with the SG #2 and SG #3 power operated relief valves (PORVs) are routed in conduit through 729.0-A2. The cables for one train for each SG are protected with 3-hour rated ERFBS to ensure PORV closure capability. Even though there is no credible fire that necessitates cable protection, it continues to be credited.
The only redundant FSSD equipment in the room are train A and train B air users connected to the redundant ACAS headers. To achieve safe shutdown without OMAs, at least one ACAS header must be functional to supply Unit 1 and Unit 2 air users in other plant locations. As described in calculation EDQ0009992013000202, Appendix R - Auxiliary Control Air System (ACAS) End User (Part II, reference 4.2.4), the ACAS is a safety system and uses welded stainless steel piping and fittings; however some of the air user devices may be susceptible to fire damage based on their physical construction and/or material make up (e.g., pressure regulators, diaphragms, controllers, etc.).
The ACAS air users in 729.0-A2 are two power operated relief valves (PORVs) associated with the steam generators #2 and #3. The FSSD analysis does not credit these steam generators nor the air supply to these valves to achieve safe shutdown with a fire in this room. However, at least one train of ACAS is needed to operate equipment located elsewhere in the plant. One PORV is connected to each train of the ACAS. The PORVs are in parallel horizontal piping runs 19-2 on center at elevation 758 (29 feet above the floor). As described in the 2.9.3.2 the absence of ignition sources and insignificant in situ combustibles is sufficient to conclude that a credible fire could not damage air users connected to both ACAS headers. For additional defense-in-depth this room is maintained as a CCZ. The existence of transient combustibles is further reduced because this room is rarely entered during operations due to the high temperature and humidity in the main steam valve vaults. A very large amount of transient combustibles and an ignition source would have to be brought into the valve vault to produce a fire that could damage the level control valves located a minimum of 19 feet above the floor in a room with a 53 foot high ceiling.
Based on the above information, it is concluded that the OMA identified in 2.9.3.1 is not necessary.
VII-32

PART VII - DEVIATIONS AND EVALUATIONS                       Revision 60 2.9.3.3.b        Components with Redundant FSSD Components in an Adjacent Room within the Same Analysis Volume Room 729.0-A2 is the only room in AV-035A (fire area 13). The barriers that separate room 729.0-A2 from adjacent rooms in the Auxiliary Building and from the Unit 1 Reactor Building are 3 hour fire rated barriers. The only non-fire rated barrier is the outside wall that separates 729.0-A2 from the Yard and there are no redundant FSSD equipment or cables in the Yard near this wall (see 2.9.3.2 above).
2.9.3.3.c        Other FSSD Components in the Room Room 729.0-A2 contains FSSD equipment and cables associated with FSSD equipment relied upon for fires in other areas of the plant (i.e., equipment and cables not credited for a fire in Room 729.0-A2). The cables are routed in conduit. Although no fire induced failures are expected due to the insignificant fire hazard in the rooms, postulated failure of the non-credited FSSD equipment and cables has been evaluated to assess its effect on plant operation. Failure of this FSSD equipment or cables is detected and mitigated by normal plant procedures and would not initiate or result in a plant trip.
Steam line warming valves and associated cables (Valves are normally closed with power removed during normal operation.)
Main steam isolation valves and cables for steam generators #2 and #3 Steam generators #2 and #3 main feedwater isolation MOVs and bypass line isolation valves and associated cables Steam generators #2 and #3 power operated relief valves and one train of control solenoids and associated cables Steam line pressure transmitter cable 2.9.3.4          Conclusion There is insignificant threat from transient combustibles or in situ combustible material, no significant ignition sources; therefore, there is no fire hazard in 729.0-A2 that could cause loss of ACAS pressure and necessitate any OMAs. TVA concludes that the intent of III.G.1 is ensured and requests approval of this deviation demonstrating compliance with III.G.1 criteria with a fire hazard analysis in lieu of the prescriptive separation criteria of III.G.2.
2.9.4            Room 729.0-A6 - Nitrogen Storage Area 2.9.4.1          Description of Condition This room is a part of fire area 10 (See Part III Table 3-3) and is analyzed in analysis volume AV-032. Fire area 10 is considered a III.G.2 area because it contains components related to both redundant shutdown paths. Room 729.0-A6 does not contain any FSSD equipment but does contain cables to redundant safe shutdown equipment.
Physical separation in accordance with III.G.2 cannot be achieved in this analysis volume. An FSSD analysis which assumes failure of all equipment and cables in the room results in OMAs being credited in lieu of III.G.2 physical separation. Therefore, the following OMAs are implemented to achieve fire safe shutdown for a fire in Room 729.0-A6:
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PART VII - DEVIATIONS AND EVALUATIONS                         Revision 60
: a.      Unit 1 - Operate steam generators #1 and #2 power operated relief valves to control secondary pressure within 60 minutes at local nitrogen control panels.
: b.      Unit 1 & 2 - Provide alternate 480VAC power to battery charger and inverter for channel 3-F within 120 minutes.
: c.      Unit 2 - Operate steam generator #3 and #4 power operated relief valve to control secondary pressure within 60 minutes at local nitrogen control panel.
: d.      Unit 1&2 - Backwash and rotate essential raw cooling water strainers within 720 minutes to ensure strainer operation.
2.9.4.2          Fire Hazards Analysis 2.9.4.2.a        Room Description Room 729.0-A6, Nitrogen Storage Area, is part of Fire Area 10 and is of reinforced concrete construction. The ceiling separating 692.0-A14 from 729.0-A6 is a 2 hour fire rated barrier. The walls separating 729.0-A6 from 729.0-A14 and 729.0-A15 are 3 hour fire rated barriers; from the New Fuel Storage Vault, Spent Fuel Pit and Fuel Transfer Canal are 2 hour fire rated barriers; and the ceiling which separates 729.0-A6 from 757.0-A13 is a 2 hour fire rated barrier. The walls separating 729.0-A6 from 728.0-A7, 729.0-A5, A8 and A9 are not assigned a fire rating but are of reinforced concrete construction and the doors are heavy duty hollow-metal doors.
The room has a floor area of 1,623 ft2 and a ceiling height of 26-feet. Room 729.0-A6 is designated as a CCZ (see Part II, section 5.0).
2.9.4.2.b        Fire Load The in situ combustible load results in a fire severity classification of insignificant. The combustible loading for the room consists of the charcoal filters within the air filter units, various plastics associated with a small control panel, lighting units, junction boxes and instruments, and class A combustibles (plastic and paper) in the Post Accident Sampling cabinet. The small control panel, lighting units and junction boxes are not credible ignition sources (see Justification in 2.9.0).
There are two air filter units located in the room. The units contain charcoal filters which are the major equipment in the room and the only significant fire hazard. These filters are protected by dedicated closed nozzle fixed pipe water spray systems as defined in section 3.1.3.3 of N3-26-4002 (Part II, reference 4.2.72). The two air filter units are normally shutdown and are not an ignition source. They are in operation when they are being tested and if there is a Post Accident Sampling event. In either case, personnel at the units take immediate appropriate action to initiate suppression and secure the units.
The room is provided with a smoke detection system, but does not have an automatic suppression system for the room. The installed fire detection system would detect a fire in its insipient stage and alert the Main Control Room staff. The site fire brigade would quickly respond and have portable extinguishers and a standpipe and hose station readily available to extinguish any expected fire.
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PART VII - DEVIATIONS AND EVALUATIONS                       Revision 60 2.9.4.2.c        Control of Combustibles and Ignition Sources NPG-SPP-18.4.7, Control of Transient Combustibles and NPG-SPP-18.4.8, Control of Ignition Sources (Hot Work) defines the fire preventive measures to preclude introduction of significant quantities of combustible material or ignition sources into the rooms. Compensatory measures must be implemented when transient combustibles or ignition sources are located in a room.
Room 729.0-A6 is a CCZ (see Part II, sections 10 and 11. The approval of an evaluation must be obtained before any transient combustible can be introduced into the room or hot work performed in the room. Access to the room is via security control doors from 729.0-A5. The lack of significant concentrations of in situ combustible material and ignition sources and the controls for transient combustibles and ignition sources provides assurance that no credible exposure fire would occur. Based on this, it is not expected that the plant will enter the fire safe shutdown procedure.
2.9.4.2.d        Adjacent Rooms Room 692.0-A14 is separated from 729.0-A6 by a 2 hour fire rated ceiling, except for the open stairs. Room 692.0-A14 has an insignificant combustible load and is provided with automatic suppression and detection. This room does not contain an ignition source. The room contains the Cask Decontamination Collector Tank and is not a normally accessed room.
Adjacent rooms 729.0-A14 and 729.0-A15 are separated from 729.0-A6 by reinforced concrete walls that are 3 hour fire rated barriers. The in situ combustible load in 729.0-A14 is low. The in situ combustible load in 729.0-A15 is low. Both rooms are provided with smoke detection. No credible fire in 729.0-A14 or 729.0-A15 could propagate through the 3 hour fire rated walls into 729.0-A6.
Rooms 729.0-A8 and 729.0-A9 are the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Post Accident Sampling rooms and separated from 729.0-A6 by concrete walls that are 2 hour fire rated barriers. The in situ combustible load in 729.0-A8 is low and there are no ignition sources in the rooms. Both rooms are provided with smoke detectors. The in situ combustible load in 729.0-A9 is low. Access to these rooms is from 729.0-A6. No credible fire in 729.0-A8 or 729.0-A9 could propagate through the 2 hour fire barriers into 729.0-A6.
Room 728.0-A7 is separated from 729.0-A6 by 24 inch thick reinforced concrete walls/ceiling that are not assigned a fire rating. The in situ combustible load in 728.0-A7 is insignificant and there are no ignition sources in the room. This room is the Cask Decontamination Room and its only access is from 729.0-A6. No credible fire in 728.0-A7 could propagate into 729.0-A6.
Room 757.0-A13 (includes the New Fuel Storage Vault 741.5) is separated from 729.0-A6 by a reinforced concrete floor with a 2 hour fire rating. The in situ combustible load in 741.5 and 757.0-A13 is low. No credible fire could propagate from 741.5 or 757.0-A13 into 729.0-A6.
TVA concludes that based on the above information, that no credible fire could propagate from an adjacent room into room 729.0-A6 or from 729.0-A6 into an adjacent room.
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PART VII - DEVIATIONS AND EVALUATIONS                       Revision 60 2.9.4.3         System Evaluation 2.9.4.3.a       Redundant FSSD Components in the Room There is no FSSD equipment located in this room, but there are some cables as described below.
Cables for Unit 2 steam generator #2 and #3 PORVs to control secondary pressure are routed in conduits and junction boxes that are embedded in the concrete wall with only the face of the junction boxes exposed in room 729.0-A6. The junction boxes are located more than 25-feet horizontally from the only ignition source (charcoal filters inside the metal housing of Air Cleanup Unit A) in the room. The charcoal filters are provided with a closed head water suppression system to handle a fire initiated in the charcoal. There is no credible ignition source that could cause damage to these circuits. Therefore, the OMA (2.9.4.1.c) to locally operate the steam generator PORVs is not necessary.
Cables for the solenoid valves for Unit 2 steam generator #2 and #3 redundant bypass line feedwater isolation and control valves and the main feed water line isolation and control valves are routed in conduits and junction boxes that are embedded in the concrete wall with only the face of the junction boxes exposed in room 729.0-A6. The junction boxes are located more than 25-feet horizontally from the only ignition source (charcoal filters inside the metal housing of Air Cleanup Unit A) in the room. The charcoal filters are provided with a closed head water suppression system to handle a fire initiated in the charcoal. There is no credible ignition source that could cause damage to these circuits.
Cable for the Unit 1 steam generator #2 and #3 PORV to control secondary pressure is routed in exposed conduits and a junction box in room 729.0-A6. The conduits and junction box are located more than 25-feet horizontally from the only ignition source (charcoal filters inside the metal housing of Air Cleanup Unit A) in the room. The charcoal filters are provided with a closed head water suppression system to handle a fire initiated in the charcoal. There is no credible ignition source that could cause damage to this circuit. Therefore, the OMA (2.9.4.1.a) to locally operate the steam generator #2 PORV is not necessary.
As defense-in-depth it is noted that these units are seldom used and locally operated, any fire is identified by the operator in its early stages and extinguished. Additionally, the room is designated as a combustible control zone to ensure no combustible material or ignition sources are inadvertently left in the area.
Based on the small combustible loading and limited ignition sources, horizontal separation, and minimal cable exposure, it is concluded that there is no credible ignition source that could cause damage to these circuits. Therefore, the OMAs (2.9.4.1.a and .c) to locally operate the steam generator PORVs is not necessary.
2.9.4.3.b       FSSD Components with Redundant FSSD Components in an adjacent Room within the same Analysis Volume Cables whose failure could necessitate the OMAs listed in 2.9.4.1.a through .d are not in room 729.0-A6. They are located in other rooms (729.0-A8, 757.0-A13, and 772.0-A9) within AV-032.
As described in 2.9.4.2, there is no credible fire that could propagate from 729.0-A6 to another room within AV-032 to damage these cables. Therefore the OMAs listed in 2.9.4.1.a through d are not necessary.
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PART VII - DEVIATIONS AND EVALUATIONS                           Revision 60 2.9.4.3.c        Other FSSD Components in the Room Room 729.0-A6 contains cables associated with Unit 1 and Unit 2 FSSD equipment relied upon for fires in other areas of the plant (i.e., equipment and cables not credited for a fire in Room 729.0-A6). The cables are routed in conduit. Although no fire induced failures are expected due to the insignificant fire hazard in the rooms, postulated failure of the non-credited FSSD cables has been evaluated to assess its effect on plant operation. Failure of these FSSD cables is detected and mitigated by normal plant procedures and does not initiate or result in a plant trip.
Unit 1 steam generator #2 and #3 main feedwater isolation valve cables Unit 1 steam generator #2 and #3 power operated relief valve (PORV) control and pressure transmitter auxiliary cables Unit 1 steam generator #3 PORV control cable Unit 2 steam generator #2 and #3 steam line warming valve cables (Valves are normally closed with power removed during normal operation.)
Unit 2 steam generator #2 and #3 main steam isolation valve solenoid valve cables 2.9.4.4          Conclusion There is insignificant threat from transient combustibles or in situ combustible material, no credible ignition sources, ample horizontal separation, and no impact to FSSD; therefore, there is no fire hazard in 729.0-A6 that necessitates any OMAs. TVA concludes that the intent of III.G.1 is ensured and requests approval of this deviation demonstrating compliance to III.G.1 criteria with a fire hazard analysis in lieu of the prescriptive separation criteria of III.G.2.
2.9.5            Room 729.0-A10 - Unit 2 North Main Steam Valve Rm 2.9.5.1          Description of Condition Room 729.0-A10 is part of fire area 73 and is analysis volume 112A (AV-112A) in the FSSD analysis (see Part III, Table 3-3 for room listing). Fire area 73 is considered a III.G.2 area because it contains components related to both redundant shutdown paths.
The redundant components are not cables or equipment that must operate for FSSD, but rather control air users connected to the Train A and the Train B auxiliary control air system (ACAS) headers. The FSSD analysis generally assumes that fire damage to one ACAS air user could depressurize the header (Train A or Train B). If all the ACAS air users located in this area were assumed to fail due to postulated fire damage; both trains of the ACAS are assumed failed.
Since the ACAS is common to both units, both units are affected.
Physical separation in accordance with III.G.2 cannot be achieved in this area. An FSSD analysis which assumes failure of all equipment and cables in the room would result in OMAs being credited in lieu of III.G.2 physical separation. Therefore, the following OMA is implemented to achieve fire safe shutdown:
: a.       Unit 1 and Unit 2 - Control pressure in two steam generators within 60 minutes by operation of SG PORV via local nitrogen control station.
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PART VII - DEVIATIONS AND EVALUATIONS                       Revision 60 2.9.5.2         Fire Hazard Analysis 2.9.5.2.a       Room Description Room 729.0-A10 is the Unit 2 North Main Steam Valve room. The walls of 729.0-A10 are of reinforced concrete construction and have fire resistive ratings of 3-hours that separate the valve room from adjacent areas of the Auxiliary Building and fire resistive rating of 3-hours for the wall separating it from the Unit 2 Reactor Building. The walls separating 729.0-A10 from the Yard are 36-inch thick reinforced concrete but are not assigned a fire resistive rating. Two doors are located in these walls. One door is located in a labyrinth which would shield the door from a transient fire in the Yard. The other door is located in a labyrinth and behind the main feedwater and steam lines which run alongside the wall and prevent any significant transient combustibles in the Yard from being in the vicinity of the labyrinth and door. The concrete walls and fire rated barriers surrounding 729.0-A10 will prevent any credible fire from propagating into an adjoining room or the Yard 729.0-A10.
2.9.5.2.b       Fire Load The in situ combustible loading for 729.0-A10 is insignificant. The in situ combustibles in 729.0-A10 consist of small quantities of lubricant in each valve and small quantities of miscellaneous plastics associated with area radiation monitors, small electrical control panels and boxes, and lighting units. The radiation monitors and the valve motors are not considered to be significant ignition sources due to the small quantity of in situ combustible material associated with them and the circuit protection (properly sized and coordinated fuses/breakers) for each (see Justification in 2.9.0 above).
2.9.5.2.c       Control of Combustibles and Ignition Sources NPG-SPP-18.4.7, Control of Transient Combustibles and NPG-SPP-18.4.8, Control of Ignition Sources (Hot Work) defines the fire preventive measures to preclude introduction of significant quantities of combustible material or ignition sources into the rooms. Compensatory measures must be implemented when transient combustibles or ignition sources are located in a room.
Room 729.0-A10 is a CCZ (see Part II, sections 10 and 11). The approval of an evaluation must be obtained before any transient combustible can be introduced into the room or hot work performed in the room. Access to the room is limited due to the hazardous conditions in 729.0-A10. The lack of significant concentrations of in situ combustible material and ignition sources and the controls for transient combustibles and ignition sources provides assurance that no credible exposure fire would occur. Based on this, it is not expected that the plant will enter the fire safe shutdown procedure.
2.9.5.2.d       Adjacent Rooms There is no threat of a fire in an adjacent room in the Auxiliary Building propagating into 729.0-A10 due to the 3 hour fire rated barriers and insignificant quantities of in situ combustibles in the adjacent rooms.
The Unit 2 Reactor Building is separated from 729.0-A10 by the 3 hour fire rated 36 inch thick reinforced concrete wall.
The Yard area adjacent to the exterior walls of 729.0-A10 is maintained free of any significant combustibles. There are two doors located in walls on opposite sides of 729.0-A10. The door VII-38

PART VII - DEVIATIONS AND EVALUATIONS                         Revision 60 on the east side is back in a labyrinth and is behind the main feedwater and steam lines. The door on the west side is back in a labyrinth. No significant quantities of either in situ or transient combustibles are in the vicinity of either of the doors.
TVA concludes, based on the above information, that no credible fire could propagate from an adjacent room into room 729.0-A10 or from 729.0-A10 into an adjacent room.
2.9.5.3          System Evaluation 2.9.5.3.a        Redundant FSSD Components in the Room There are no redundant cables for FSSD equipment in the room. The only redundant FSSD equipment in the room are train A and train B air users connected to the redundant ACAS headers. To achieve safe shutdown without OMAs at least one ACAS header must be functional to supply Unit 1 and Unit 2 air users in other plant locations. As described in calculation EDQ0009992013000202, Appendix R - Auxiliary Control Air System (ACAS) End User (Part II, reference 4.2.4), the ACAS is a safety system and uses welded stainless steel piping and fittings; however some of the air user devices may be susceptible to fire damage based on their physical construction and/or material make up (e.g., pressure regulators, diaphragms, controllers, etc.).
The ACAS air users in 729.0-A10 are two power operated relief valves (PORVs) associated with the steam generators #2 and #3. The FSSD analysis does not credit these steam generators nor the air supply to these valves to achieve safe shutdown with a fire in this room. However, at least one train of ACAS is needed to operate equipment located elsewhere in the plant. One PORV is connected to each train of the ACAS. The PORVs are in parallel horizontal piping runs 19-2 on center at elevation 758 (29 feet above the floor). As described in the FHA (2.9.5.2) the absence of ignition sources and insignificant in situ combustibles is sufficient to conclude that a credible fire could not damage air users connected to both ACAS headers. For additional defense-in-depth this room is maintained as a CCZ. The existence of transient combustibles is further reduced because this room is rarely entered during operations due to the high temperature and humidity in the main steam valve vaults. A very large amount of transient combustibles and an ignition source would have to be brought into the valve vault to produce a fire that could damage the PORVs located a minimum of 29 feet above the floor in a room with a 53 foot high ceiling.
Based on the above information, it is concluded that the OMA identified in 2.9.5.1 is not necessary.
2.9.5.3.b        Components with Redundant FSSD Components in an Adjacent Room within the Same Analysis Volume Room 729.0-A10 is the only room in AV-112A (fire area 73). The barriers that separate room 729.0-A10 from adjacent rooms in the Auxiliary Building and from the Unit 2 Reactor Building are 3 hour fire rated barriers. The only non-fire rated barrier is the outside wall that separates 729.0-A10 from the Yard and there are no redundant FSSD equipment or cables in the Yard near this wall (see 2.9.5.2 above).
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PART VII - DEVIATIONS AND EVALUATIONS                        Revision 60 2.9.5.3.c        Other FSSD Components in the Room Room 729.0-A10 contains FSSD equipment and cables associated with FSSD equipment relied upon for fires in other areas of the plant (i.e., equipment and cables not credited for a fire in Room 729.0-A10). The cables are routed in conduit. Although no fire induced failures are expected due to the insignificant fire hazard in the rooms, postulated failure of the non-credited FSSD equipment and cables has been evaluated to assess its effect on plant operation. Failure of this FSSD equipment or cables is detected and mitigated by normal plant procedures and does not initiate or result in a plant trip.
Steam line warming valves and associated cables (Valves are normally closed with power removed during normal operation.)
Main steam isolation valves and cables for steam generators #2 and #3 Steam generators #2 and #3 main feedwater isolation MOVs and bypass line isolation valves and associated cables Steam generators #2 and #3 power operated relief valves and one train of control solenoids and associated cables Steam line pressure transmitter (channel E) cable 2.9.5.4          Conclusion There is insignificant threat from transient combustibles or in situ combustible material, no significant ignition sources; therefore, there is no fire hazard in 729.0-A10 that could cause loss of ACAS pressure and necessitate any OMAs. TVA concludes that the intent of III.G.1 is ensured and requests approval of this deviation demonstrating compliance with III.G.1 criteria with a fire hazard analysis in lieu of the prescriptive separation criteria of III.G.2.
2.9.6            Rooms 729.0-A11 and 737.0-A10 - Unit 2 South Main Steam Valve Rm and Air Lock 2.9.6.1          Description of Condition These two rooms make up fire area 72 which is analysis volume 113 (AV-113) in the FSSD analysis (see Part III, Table 3-3 for room listing). The fire area is considered a III.G.2 area because it contains components related to both redundant shutdown paths.
The redundant components are not cables or equipment that must operate for FSSD, but rather control air users connected to the Train A and the Train B auxiliary control air system (ACAS) headers. The FSSD analysis generally assumes that fire damage to one ACAS air user could depressurize the header (Train A or Train B). If all the ACAS air users located in this area were assumed to fail due to postulated fire damage; both trains of the ACAS are assumed failed.
Since the ACAS is common to both units, both units are affected.
Physical separation in accordance with III.G.2 cannot be achieved in this area. An FSSD analysis which assumes failure of all equipment and cables in the room would result in OMAs being credited in lieu of III.G.2 physical separation. Therefore, the following OMA is implemented to achieve fire safe shutdown:
: a.       Unit 1 and Unit 2 - Control pressure in two steam generators within 60 minutes by operation of SG PORV via local nitrogen control station.
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PART VII - DEVIATIONS AND EVALUATIONS                        Revision 60 2.9.6.2          Fire Hazard Analysis 2.9.6.2.a        Room Description Room 729.0-A11 is the Unit 2 South Main Steam Valve rm and room 737.0-A10 is the entrance labyrinth into the valve room from the Auxiliary Building. The walls and floor of 729.0-A11 are of reinforced concrete construction and have fire resistive ratings of 2 hours for the walls and floor that separate the valve room from adjacent areas of the Auxiliary Building and fire resistive rating of 3 hours for the wall separating it from the Unit 2 Reactor Building. The walls separating 729.0-A11 from the Yard are 36-inch thick reinforced concrete but are not assigned a fire resistive rating. The walls, floor and ceiling of room 737.0-A10 are of reinforced concrete construction and have fire resistive ratings of 2 hours for those barriers separating it from adjacent rooms in the Auxiliary Building and 3 hours from the Unit 2 Reactor Building. There are two access paths into the valve room. One is from the Auxiliary Building into the labyrinth (the two doors in the labyrinth from the Auxiliary Building and into the valve room are interlocked such that only one door can be opened at a time). The other path is from the Yard. Access to the valve room is limited due to the hazardous environmental conditions in the room (high humidity, high temperature, and presence of high energy lines (main steam and feedwater)).
2.9.6.2.b        Fire Load The in situ combustible loading index for 729.0-A11 and 737.0-A10 is insignificant. The in situ combustibles in 729.0-A11 consist of small quantities of lubricant in each valve and small quantities of miscellaneous plastics associated with area radiation monitors, small electrical control panels and boxes and lighting units. The electrical cables are routed in conduits. The in situ combustibles in 737.0-A10 are the light covers. There are no credible ignition sources in the rooms (see Justification in 2.9.0).
2.9.6.2.c        Control of Combustibles and Ignition Sources NPG-SPP-18.4.7, Control of Transient Combustibles and NPG-SPP-18.4.8, Control of Ignition Sources (Hot Work) defines the fire preventive measures to preclude introduction of significant quantities of combustible material or ignition sources into the rooms. Compensatory measures must be implemented when transient combustibles or ignition sources are located in a room.
Room 729.0-A11 and 737.0-A10 are CCZs (see Part II, sections 10 and 11). The approval of an evaluation must be obtained before any transient combustible can be introduced into the room or hot work performed in the room. Access to the room is limited due to the hazardous conditions in 729.0-A11. The lack of significant concentrations of in situ combustible material and ignition sources and the controls for transient combustibles and ignition sources provides assurance that no credible exposure fire would occur. Based on this, it is not expected that the plant will enter the fire safe shutdown procedure.
2.9.6.2.d        Adjacent Rooms The adjacent rooms in the Auxiliary Building are provided with automatic suppression and detection. The combination of automatic suppression and detection and the 2-hour fire rated barriers ensures that no credible fire in any of these adjacent rooms will propagate into 729.0-A11 or 737.0-A10. The thick reinforced concrete walls separating 729.0-A11 from the Yard would prevent a fire in the Yard from propagating into the room. The door in this wall is located in a labyrinth which would shield the door from a transient fire in the Yard. In addition, VII-41

PART VII - DEVIATIONS AND EVALUATIONS                        Revision 60 main feedwater and steam lines which run alongside the wall prevent any significant transient combustibles from being in the vicinity of the wall, labyrinth and door. The 3 hour fire rated concrete wall separating the Unit 2 Reactor Building from 729.0-A11 and 737.0-A10 would prevent a fire in the Unit 2 Reactor Building propagating into the rooms.
TVA concludes, based on the above information that no credible fire could propagate from an adjacent room into room 729.0-A11 and 737.0-A10 or from 729.0-A11 or 737.0-A10 into an adjacent room.
2.9.6.3          System Evaluation 2.9.6.3.a        Redundant FSSD Components in the Room There are no redundant cables for FSSD equipment in the rooms. The only redundant FSSD equipment in the rooms are train A and train B air users connected to the redundant ACAS headers. To achieve safe shutdown without OMAs at least one ACAS header must be functional to supply Unit 1 and Unit 2 air users in other plant locations. As described in calculation EDQ0009992013000202, Appendix R - Auxiliary Control Air System (ACAS) End User (Part II, reference 4.2.4), the ACAS is a safety system and uses welded stainless steel piping and fittings; however some of the air user devices may be susceptible to fire damage based on their physical construction and/or material make up (e.g., pressure regulators, diaphragms, controllers, etc.).
The ACAS air users in 729.0-A11 are two level control valves (LCVs) and two power operated relief valves (PORVs) associated with the steam generators #1 and #4. The FSSD analysis does not credit these steam generators nor the air supply to these valves to achieve safe shutdown with a fire in this room. However, at least one train of ACAS is needed to operate equipment located elsewhere in the plant. One LCV and one PORV are connected to each train of the ACAS. The LCVs are in parallel horizontal piping runs three feet on center at elevation 748 (19 feet above the floor). The PORVs are in parallel horizontal piping runs 19-2 on center at elevation 758 (29 feet above the floor).
As described in the FHA (2.9.6.2) the absence of ignition sources and insignificant in situ combustibles is sufficient to conclude that a credible fire could not damage air users connected to both ACAS headers. For additional defense-in-depth this room is maintained as a CCZ. The existence of transient combustibles is further reduced because this room is rarely entered during operations due to the high temperature and humidity in the main steam valve vaults. A very large amount of transient combustibles and an ignition source would have to be brought into the valve vault to produce a fire that could damage the level control valves located a minimum of 19 feet above the floor in a room with a 55 foot high ceiling.
Based on the above information, it is concluded that the OMA identified in 2.9.6.1 is not necessary.
2.9.6.3.b        Components with Redundant FSSD Components in an Adjacent Room within the Same Analysis Volume Rooms 729.0-A11 and 737.0-A10 are the only rooms in AV-113 (fire area 72). The barriers that separate rooms 729.0-A11 and 737.0-A10 from adjacent rooms in the Auxiliary Building are 2 hour fire rated barriers and from the Unit 2 Reactor Building is a 3 hour fire rated barrier. The VII-42

PART VII - DEVIATIONS AND EVALUATIONS                          Revision 60 only non-fire rated barrier is the outside wall that separates 729.0-A11 from the Yard and there is no redundant FSSD equipment or cables in the Yard near this wall (see 2.9.6.2 above).
2.9.6.3.c        Other FSSD Components in the Room Room 729.0-A11 contains FSSD equipment and cables associated with FSSD equipment relied upon for fires in other areas of the plant (i.e., equipment and cables not credited for a fire in Room 729.0-A11). The cables are routed in conduit. Although no fire induced failures are expected due to the insignificant fire hazard in the rooms, postulated failure of the non-credited FSSD equipment and cables has been evaluated to assess its effect on plant operation. Failure of this FSSD equipment or cables is detected and mitigated by normal plant procedures and does not initiate or result in a plant trip.
Steam line warming valves and associated cables (Valves are normally closed with power removed during normal operation.)
Steam generator blowdown outboard containment isolation valve cables Main steam isolation valves and cables for steam generators #1 and #4 Steam generators #1 and #4 main feedwater isolation MOVs and bypass line isolation valves and associated cables Steam generators #1 and #4 power operated relief valves and one train of control solenoids and associated cables Turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump steam supply MOV cables Turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump level control valves and cables for steam generators #1 and #4 Reactor building lower compartment cooler and control rod drive cooler cables Containment pressure transmitter channel E cable Emergency raw cooling water discharge MOV cables for component cooling system heat exchanger Charging pump 2A room cooler cables Steam generator #2 level transmitter cable Charging header flow transmitter cable Non-essential control air isolation and vent valves 2.9.6.4          Conclusion There is insignificant threat from transient combustibles or in situ combustible material, no significant ignition sources; therefore, there is no fire hazard in 729.0-A11 or 737.0-A10 that could cause loss of ACAS pressure and necessitate any OMAs. TVA concludes that the intent of III.G.1 is ensured and requests approval of this deviation demonstrating compliance with III.G.1 criteria with a fire hazard analysis in lieu of the prescriptive separation criteria of III.G.2.
2.9.7            Room 729.0-A12 - Unit 1 Steam Valve Instrument Room A 2.9.7.1          Description of Condition Room 729.0-A12 is a part of fire area 13 and is in analysis volume AV-035 (see Part III, Table 3-3 for room listing). The fire area is considered a III.G.2 area because it contains Unit 1 components related to both redundant shutdown paths. The following OMA was previously identified for this room based on the assumption that all of the cables and equipment in AV-035 are damaged by a postulated fire:
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PART VII - DEVIATIONS AND EVALUATIONS                        Revision 60
: a.      Unit 1 - Operate steam generator #2 power operated relief valve (PORV) to control secondary pressure within 60 minutes at local nitrogen control panel.
In addition an embedded junction box whose cover plate is exposed in the room was previously protected with a 3-hour fire rated ERFBS (Thermo-Lag) to prevent postulated fire damage to the cables routed through the embedded box.
2.9.7.2          Fire Hazards Analysis 2.9.7.2.a        Room Description Room 729.0-A12 is the Unit 1 Steam Valve Instrument Room A and is of reinforced concrete construction which is 12 to 48 inches thick and has fire resistance rating of 3-hours for the barriers that separate the room from room 729.0-A2 and the Unit 1 Reactor Building. The wall separating 729.0-A12 from 729.5-A16 is not assigned a fire rating, but is a 12-inch thick reinforced concrete wall. Room 729.0-A12 has a floor area of 74-ft2 and a ceiling height of 8-feet.
2.9.7.2.b        Fire Load The in situ combustible loading in the room is classified as low and is due to miscellaneous plastics inside electrical control panels and junction boxes, lights, and Thermo-Lag fire wrap on an embedded junction box cover. There are no credible ignition sources in the room. No credible fire in 729.0-A12 could propagate into an adjacent room.
2.9.7.2.c        Control of Combustibles and Ignition Sources NPG-SPP-18.4.7, Control of Transient Combustibles and NPG-SPP-18.4.8, Control of Ignition Sources (Hot Work) defines the fire preventive measures to preclude introduction of significant quantities of combustible material or ignition sources into the rooms. Compensatory measures must be implemented when transient combustibles or ignition sources are located in a room.
Room 729.0-A12 is a CCZ (see Part II, sections 10 and 11). The approval of an evaluation must be obtained before any transient combustible can be introduced into the room or hot work performed in the room. Access to the room is from the Yard into room 729.5-A16 and then into 729.0-A12. The lack of in situ combustible material and ignition sources and the controls for transient combustibles and ignition sources provides assurance that no credible exposure fire would occur. Based on this, it is not expected that the plant will enter the fire safe shutdown procedure.
2.9.7.2.d        Adjacent Rooms Room 729.0-A2 is separated from 729.0-A12 by 3 hour fire rated reinforced concrete walls and ceiling. The in situ combustible loading in 729.0-A2 is insignificant; therefore, no credible fire in 729.0-A2 could propagate into 729.0-A12.
The Unit 1 Reactor Building Annulus is separated from 729.0-A12 by a 36 inch thick, reinforced concrete wall that is 3 hour fire rated. The in situ combustible load in the Unit 1 Annulus is severe, but insulation on cables in trays accounts for over 98% of the combustible load.
Automatic suppression and detection are provided for selected cable tray separation in the Annulus. No credible fire in the Annulus could propagate into 729.0-A12.
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PART VII - DEVIATIONS AND EVALUATIONS                        Revision 60 Room 729.5-A16 is separated from 729.0-A12 by a 12 inch thick reinforced concrete wall, but electrical and mechanical openings in the wall are not provided with fire rated seals/closures.
The in situ combustible loading in 729.5-A16 is insignificant and consists of a pint of lubricant in a small pump (less than 5 HP) and plastics associated with junction boxes, lighting and a telephone. There are no ignition sources in the room. It is concluded that no credible fire in 729.5-A16 that could propagate into 729.0-A12.
TVA concludes, based on the above information, that no credible fire could propagate from an adjacent room into room 729.0-A12 nor from 729.0-A12 into an adjacent room.
2.9.7.3          System Evaluation 2.9.7.3.a        Redundant FSSD Components in the Room Two Unit 1 steam generator pressure control valve solenoid valves (one per train) connected to the ACAS headers in this room are not air users but control the air flow to the air users that are located in another room. Typical control air users (e.g. air operated valves) have a flexible diaphragm or bellows that could rupture if overheated in a significant fire and cause an air leak assumed equal to the input line size. A fire of greater intensity than the in situ combustibles may damage solenoid valve o-rings or seals and even then the leakage rate is much less than a typical air user. Due to the lack of in situ combustibles and no credible ignition sources (See 2.9.7.2) in the room, it is concluded that there is no credible fire in 729.0-A12 that could cause failure of either solenoid valve or of the ACAS headers. The limited leakage associated with failure of either of these solenoid valves would not depressurize its train air header. Additional defense-in-depth is the ACAS is a safety system and utilizes welded stainless steel piping and fittings as described in calculation EDQ0009992013000202, Appendix R - Auxiliary Control Air System (ACAS) End User (Part II, reference 4.2.4). Also the air operated components are supplied from the normal control air system whose compressors are located in the Turbine Building. This is a large capacity system and the failure of an individual end user would not impact the function of the system. In addition to the normal air compressors, the train A & B compressors provide backup support to ensure minimum system pressure is maintained.
Therefore, the OMA listed in 2.9.7.1 is not necessary.
Unit 1 steam generator #3 PORV has a train A and a train B solenoid valve. Energizing either solenoid ensures PORV closure. The train B solenoid valve is located in room 729.0-A12. The cable for the redundant train A solenoid valve is routed in embedded conduits and through the embedded junction box with an exposed cover plate. The junction box is more than five feet (horizontal distance) from the train B solenoid. Due to the lack of in situ combustibles and no credible ignition sources (See 2.9.7.2) in the room, it is concluded that there is no credible fire in 729.0-A12 that would damage both the train A solenoid cable and the train B solenoid or its cables; therefore, there is no need for the previously applied Thermo-Lag protection over the exposed junction box cover plate identified in 2.9.7.1.
2.9.7.3.b        Components with Redundant FSSD Components in an Adjacent Room within the Same Analysis Volume There are no redundant components in adjacent rooms within AV-035. The in situ combustible load in the adjacent room 729.5-A16 is insignificant and the potential for spread of a fire from 729.5-A16 into 729.0-A12 is not considered to be credible.
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PART VII - DEVIATIONS AND EVALUATIONS                        Revision 60 2.9.7.3.c         Other FSSD Components in the Room Room 729.0-A12 contains FSSD equipment and cables associated with FSSD equipment relied upon for fires in other areas of the plant (i.e., equipment and cables not credited for a fire in Room 729.0-A12). The cables are routed in conduit. Although no fire induced failures are expected due to the insignificant fire hazard in the rooms, postulated failure of the non-credited FSSD equipment and cables has been evaluated to assess its effect on plant operation. Failure of this FSSD equipment or cables are detected and mitigated by normal plant procedures and does not initiate or result in a plant trip.
Unit 1 steam generator #3 steam line warming valve cable Unit 1 steam generator #2 & #3 feedwater isolation valve cables Unit 1 steam generator #2 & #3 PORV control cables Unit 1 steam generator #2 & #3 auxiliary pressure indicator and auxiliary PORV control cables Unit 1 steam generator #2 & #3 main steam header pressure indicator and safety injection (SI) low steam line 2 & 3 pressure (LSP2 & LSP3) cables 2.9.7.4           Conclusion Since there is insignificant threat from transient combustibles or in situ combustible material and no credible ignition sources; it is concluded that no credible fire in 729.0-A12 could damage cables routed in the conduits or junction boxes nor the solenoid valves; therefore, no OMAs or fire wrap on the junction box cover are necessary. TVA concludes that the intent of III.G.1 is ensured and requests approval of this deviation demonstrating compliance to III.G.1 criteria with a fire hazard analysis in lieu of the prescriptive separation criteria of III.G.2.
2.9.8             Room 729.0-A13 - Unit 2 Steam Valve Instrument Room B 2.9.8.1           Description of Condition Room 729.0-A13 is a part of fire area 73 and is in analysis volume 112 (AV-112) in the FSSD analysis (see Part III, Table 3-3 for room listing). Fire area 73 is considered a III.G.2 area because it contains Unit 2 components related to both shutdown paths.
Physical separation in accordance with III.G.2 cannot be achieved in this room. An FSSD analysis that assumes failure of all cables and equipment in AV-112 would result in the following OMAs and installation of electrical raceway fire barrier systems:
: a.       Unit 1 - Operate steam generators 1 & 2 power operated relief valves (PORV) to control secondary pressure within 60 minutes at local nitrogen control panels.
: b.       Unit 2 - Operate steam generators 1 & 2 power operated relief valves to control secondary pressure within 60 minutes at local nitrogen control panel.
: c.       An embedded junction box whose cover plate is exposed in the room was previously identified to be protected with a 3-hour fire rated cover (Thermo-Lag).
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PART VII - DEVIATIONS AND EVALUATIONS                        Revision 60 2.9.8.2         Fire Hazards Analysis 2.9.8.2.a       Room Description Room 729.0-A13 is the Unit 2 Steam Valve Instrument Room B and is of reinforced concrete construction which is 12 to 48 inches thick and has fire resistance rating of 3-hours for the barriers that separate the room from room 729.0-A10 and the Unit 2 Reactor Building. The wall separating 729.0-A13 from 729.5-A17 is not assigned a fire rating, but is a 12-inch thick reinforced concrete wall. Room 729.0-A13 has a floor area of 74-ft2 and a ceiling height of 8-feet.
2.9.8.2.b       Fire Load The in situ combustible loading in the room is classified as insignificant and is due to miscellaneous plastics associated with small electrical control panels and lights. There are no credible ignition sources in the room. No credible fire in 729.0-A13 could propagate into an adjacent room.
2.9.8.2.c       Control of Combustibles and Ignition Sources NPG-SPP-18.4.7, Control of Transient Combustibles and NPG-SPP-18.4.8, Control of Ignition Sources (Hot Work) defines the fire preventive measures to preclude introduction of significant quantities of combustible material or ignition sources into the rooms. Compensatory measures must be implemented when transient combustibles or ignition sources are located in a room.
Room 729.0-A13 is a CCZ (see Part II, sections 10 and 11). The approval of an evaluation must be obtained before any transient combustible can be introduced into the room or hot work performed in the room. Access to the room is from the Yard into room 729.5-A16 and then into 729.0-A12. The lack of in situ combustible material and ignition sources and the controls for transient combustibles and ignition sources provides assurance that no credible exposure fire would occur. Based on this, it is not expected that the plant will enter the fire safe shutdown procedure.
2.9.8.2.d       Adjacent Rooms Room 729.0-A10 is separated from 729.0-A13 by 12 to 36 inch thick reinforced concrete that is 3 hour fire rated barriers. The in situ combustible load in 729.0-A10 is insignificant and there are no credible ignition sources in the room. No credible fire could propagate from 729.0-A10 into 729.0-A13 or from 729.0-A13 into 729.0-A10.
Room 729.5-A17 is separated from 729.0-A13 by a 12 inch thick reinforced concrete wall that is not assigned a fire rating. The in situ combustible load in 729.5-A17 is insignificant and there are no credible ignition sources in the room. No credible fire in 729.5-A17 could propagate from 729.5-A17 into 729.0-A13 or from 729.0-A13 into 729.5-A17.
The Unit 2 Reactor Building Annulus is separated from 729.0-A13 by a 36 inch thick reinforced concrete wall that has a minimum 3 hour fire rating. No credible fire in the Unit 2 Annulus could propagate into 729.0-A13 or from 729.0-A13 into the Annulus.
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PART VII - DEVIATIONS AND EVALUATIONS                        Revision 60 2.9.8.3          System Evaluation 2.9.8.3.a        Redundant FSSD Components in the Room The two Unit 2 steam generator power operated relief valve (PORV) solenoid valves (one per train) connected to the ACAS headers in this room are not air users, but control the air flow to the air users that are located in another room. Typical control air users (e.g. air operated valves) have a flexible diaphragm or bellows that could rupture if exposed to a significant fire.
The failure of a diaphragm or bellows is assumed to result in an air leak equal to the input line size. The insignificant quantity of in situ combustibles and lack of an ignition source would not produce a fire that could damage the solenoid valves. Even assuming a fire could damage the o-rings or seals in the solenoids, the leakage from that type of failure would not result in a depressurization of the auxiliary control air system. Due to the lack of in situ combustibles and no credible ignition sources (See 2.9.8.2) in the room, it is concluded that there is no credible fire in 729.0-A13 that could cause failure of either solenoid valve nor of the ACAS headers. As additional defense-in-depth, the air operated components are supplied from the normal control air system whose compressors are located in the Turbine Building. This is a large capacity system and the failure of an individual end user would not impact the function of the system. In addition to the normal air compressors, the train A & B auxiliary control air system (ACAS) headers are also backed up by the auxiliary air compressors located on the Refueling Floor.
Each of these compressors is available as backup support to ensure minimum system pressure is maintained on each header (see EDQ0009992013000202, Appendix R - Auxiliary Control Air System (ACAS) End User, Part II, reference 4.2.4). Therefore, it is concluded that the OMA listed in 2.9.8.1 is not necessary.
Unit 2 steam generator #3 PORV has a train A and a train B solenoid valve. Energizing either solenoid ensures PORV closure. The train B solenoid valve is located in room 729.0-A13 and the redundant train A solenoid valve cable is routed through embedded conduits and an embedded junction box. The junction box cover plate is exposed in 729-A13. The junction box and the train B solenoid valve (and cables) are separated horizontally by at least 5 feet. Due to the lack of in situ combustibles and no credible ignition sources (See 2.9.8.2) in the room, it is concluded that there is no credible fire in 729.0-A13 that could damage both of these components; therefore, there is no need for ERFBS (Thermo-Lag) protection on the junction box cover.
2.9.8.3.b        Components with Redundant FSSD Components in an Adjacent Room within the Same Analysis Volume There are no redundant components in adjacent rooms within AV-112. The insignificant in situ combustible loads and lack of ignition sources in 729.0-A13 and the adjacent rooms of the Auxiliary Building (see 2.9.8.2 above) ensures that no credible fire in 729.0-A13 could propagate into an adjacent room or from an adjacent room into 729.0-A13. Therefore, it is not necessary to implement an OMA, install an ERFBS, or enter the FSSD procedure.
2.9.8.3.c        Other FSSD Components in the Room Room 729.0-A13 contains FSSD equipment and cables associated with FSSD equipment relied upon for fires in other areas of the plant (i.e., equipment and cables not credited for a fire in Room 729.0-A13). The cables are routed in conduit. Although no fire induced failures are expected due to the insignificant fire hazard in the room, postulated failure of the non-credited FSSD equipment and cables has been evaluated to assess its effect on plant operation. Failure VII-48

PART VII - DEVIATIONS AND EVALUATIONS                      Revision 60 of FSSD equipment or cables are detected and mitigated by normal plant procedures and does not initiate or result in a plant trip.
Unit 2 steam generator #2 & #3 steam line warming valve cable Unit 2 steam generator #2 & #3 feedwater isolation valve and bypass cables Unit 2 steam generator #2 & #3 main steam isolation valve (MSIV) solenoid cables Unit 2 steam generator #2 & #3 PORV valve and cables Unit 2 main steam line pressure indicator and safety injection (SI) low steam line 2 & 3 pressure cables (Channel F).
2.9.8.4           Conclusion Since there is insignificant threat from transient combustibles or in situ combustible material and no credible ignition sources; it is concluded that no credible fire in 729.0-A13 could damage cables routed in the conduits or junction boxes nor the solenoid valves; therefore, no OMAs or fire wrap on the junction box cover are necessary. TVA concludes that the intent of III.G.1 is ensured and requests approval of this deviation demonstrating compliance to III.G.1 criteria with a fire hazard analysis in lieu of the prescriptive separation criteria of III.G.2.
2.9.9             Room 729.0-A15 and 763.5-A2 - Unit 2 Additional Equipment Building 2.9.9.1           Description of Condition Rooms 729.0-A15 and 763.5-A2 are part of fire area 73 and are analyzed in analysis volume AV-112 (see Part III, Table 3-3 for room listing). Fire area 73 is considered a III.G.2 area; however, 729.0-A15 and 763.5-A2 contains cables associated with both redundant shutdown paths. There is no FSSD equipment located in the Unit 2 Additional Equipment Building, but there are cables routed in conduit that are FSSD circuits. A FSSD analysis assuming failure of all cables and equipment in all of the rooms in AV-112 would result in the following OMAs and electrical raceway fire barrier system (ERFBS) applications:
: a.        Unit 1 - Operate steam generators 1 & 2 power operated relief valves to control secondary pressure within 60 minutes at local nitrogen control panels.
: b.        Unit 2 - Operate steam generators 3 & 4 power operated relief valves (PORV) to control secondary pressure within 60 minutes at local nitrogen control panels.
: c.        Three-hour ERFBS cable protection to ensure closure of Unit 2 SG #2 and SG #3 PORVs.
: d.        Three-hour ERFBS cable protection to ensure isolation of main feed water line and bypass feed water line.
2.9.9.2           Fire Hazards Analysis 2.9.9.2.a         Room Description The Unit 2 Additional Equipment Building consists of the bottom floor (room 729.0-A15) and a partial floor/mezzanine (763.5-A2) of reinforced concrete construction. The floor is at grade level and is constructed of reinforced concrete. The ceiling is the roof of the building and is of VII-49

PART VII - DEVIATIONS AND EVALUATIONS                        Revision 60 reinforced concrete construction. The walls that separate the Unit 2 Additional Equipment Building from adjacent rooms in the Auxiliary Building 729.0-A6, 729.0-A9, 737.0-A9, 757.0-A13, 757.0-A14, 782.0-A4 and the Unit 2 Reactor Building are 3-hour fire rated reinforced concrete (24 to 36 inches thick) barriers. The wall separating the Unit 2 Additional Equipment Building from 729.5-A17 is 12-inch thick reinforced concrete, but is not assigned as a rated fire barrier due to some unsealed conduits that penetrate the wall. The Unit 2 Additional Equipment Building has a floor area of 1,378 square feet (the mezzanine 763.5-A2 has a floor area of 344 square feet) is open from the floor (elevation 729.0) to the ceiling (elevation 773.25). The room is provided with a smoke detection system. No credible fire could go undetected and propagate into an adjacent room or to the Yard.
2.9.9.2.b       Fire Load The in situ combustible loading is classified as low and consists of a small quantity of lubricant for two sump pumps; small amounts of plastic associated with two electrical control panels; lighting and hoses (FLEX components stored in metal enclosures and are 90% of the combustible load). The two sump pumps are not considered to be ignition sources (see 2.9.0 above). The only conduits routed near the pumps are associated with the pumps. The lack of exposed combustibles and ignition sources ensures no credible fire could occur that would damage FSSD cables routed in conduits through the room or propagate from the room into an adjacent room.
2.9.9.2.c       Control of Combustibles and Ignition Sources NPG-SPP-18.4.7, Control of Transient Combustibles and NPG-SPP-18.4.8, Control of Ignition Sources (Hot Work) defines the fire preventive measures to preclude introduction of significant quantities of combustible material or ignition sources into the rooms. Compensatory measures must be implemented when transient combustibles or ignition sources are located in a room.
Room 729.0-A15 is a CCZ (see Part II, sections 10 and 11). The approval of an evaluation must be obtained before any transient combustible can be introduced into the room or hot work performed in the room. Access to the room is from the Yard. Room 729.0-A15 is not in a normal access path and entry to the room is not part of normal operations. The lack of in situ combustible material and ignition sources and the controls for transient combustibles and ignition sources provides assurance that no credible exposure fire that could damage FSSD component would occur. Based on this, it is not expected that the plant will enter the fire safe shutdown procedure.
2.9.9.2.d       Adjacent Rooms The walls that separate the Unit 2 Additional Equipment Building from adjacent rooms 729.0-A6, 729.0-A9, 737.0-A9, 757.0-A13, 757.0-A14, 782.0-A4 in the Auxiliary Building and the Unit 2 Reactor Building are 3-hour fire rated barriers. Two of the Auxiliary Building rooms have insignificant combustible loading, three have low combustible loading and one has a moderate combustible loading. They all have a smoke detection system and the three with combustible loading greater than 5 minutes are provided with an automatic suppression system. This ensures that no credible fire in these rooms could propagate into 729.0-A15.
The Unit 2 Annulus is also separated from 729.0-A15 by a 36 inch thick reinforced concrete wall that has a minimum 3 hour fire rating. In addition automatic suppression and detection is provided in the Unit 2 Annulus for selected cable tray protection. The conclusion is that no credible fire could propagate from the Unit 2 Annulus into 729.0-A15.
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PART VII - DEVIATIONS AND EVALUATIONS                           Revision 60 Room 729.5-A17 is separated from 729.0-A15 by a 12 inch thick reinforced concrete wall that does not have an assigned fire rating due to some conduits that are not provided with fire rated penetration seals. The in situ combustible load in 729.5-A17 is insignificant and the room is not susceptible to transient combustibles; therefore, no credible fire could occur that could propagate into 729.0-A15.
The Yard is separated from 729.0-A15 by a minimum 12-inch thick reinforced concrete wall that is not assigned a fire rating. The lack of in situ and transient combustibles near this wall provides assurance that no credible fire could occur that could propagate into 729.0-A15.
TVA concludes, based on the above, there is no credible fire that could occur that could propagate from 729.0-A15 into an adjacent room or from an adjacent room into 729.0-A15.
2.9.9.3          System Evaluation 2.9.9.3.a        Redundant FSSD Components in the Room There are two conduits (one Train A and one Train B) in room 729.0-A15 which contain cables for Steam Generator #2 and #3 Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs). The cables in these conduits are normally energized and de-energizing either train will close the MSIV. There are no circuits in these conduits other than the MSIV solenoid valve circuits; therefore, fire damage could not create a hot short to energize the solenoid valves. As defense-in-depth main steam isolation can be achieved by closing the steam load valves (located in the turbine building) from the main control room.
Cables for SG #2 and SG #3 main feed water isolation valves (MOVs) are routed in conduit through this room. Cables for the train A and train B solenoid valve circuits for main feed water flow control valves (air operated) for these two steam generators are also routed in conduit through this room. For FSSD main feed water flow to the steam generators is terminated by closing either the isolation MOV or the air operated flow control valve. De-energizing either the train A or the train B solenoid valve circuit will close the flow control valve. If both solenoid valves (train A and train B) are energized, the control valve is closed from the main control room by manual operation of the flow indicating controller. Fire damage to the main feed water flow control and isolation valve circuits cannot prevent termination of main feed water flow.
Main feed water bypass line isolation valve circuit cables (both train A and Train B) for SG #2 and SG #3 are routed in conduits in the Unit 2 Additional Equipment Building. If either train is de-energized the isolation valve will close. Concurrent cable to cable hot shorts in both trains would have to occur to prevent isolation valve closure. The small bypass lines are used during startup and shutdown to maintain the desired low flow rates. During normal power operation the bypass line control valves are nearly closed and admit only enough flow to keep the pipes warm. Even if the bypass line isolation valves could fail to close, the control valve can be fully closed by manual operation of the flow controller in the main control room. Therefore the cable protection ERFBS listed in 2.9.9.1.d is not necessary.
2.9.9.3.b        Components with Redundant FSSD Components in an Adjacent Room within the Same Analysis Volume The OMAs listed in 2.9.9.1 are all due to the assumed loss of ACAS header pressure resulting from postulated fire damage to ACAS air users located in room 729.0-A13 which is part of VII-51

PART VII - DEVIATIONS AND EVALUATIONS                        Revision 60 analysis volume AV-112. A fire in the Unit 2 Additional Equipment Building (729.0-A15 and 763.5-A2) could not affect the air users in 729.0-A13 because to do so the fire would have to propagate into and across 729.5-A17 and then into 729.0-A13 (a horizontal distance greater than 9 feet). The in situ combustible loading in the Unit 2 Additional Equipment Building is low and 729.5-A17 is insignificant; therefore, there is no credible fire in the Unit 2 Additional Equipment Building that could result in damage to ACAS air users in 729.0-A13. Therefore, the OMAs listed in 2.9.9.1 are not necessary.
Closure of a steam generator PORV is ensured by energizing one of two opposite train solenoid valves. Cables for one of the two solenoid valves for SG #2 PORV and for SG #3 PORV are located in the Unit 2 Additional Equipment Building, and cables for the redundant (opposite train) solenoid valves are located in 729.0-A13. Energizing either solenoid (train A or train B) will close the PORV. As described above and in 2.9.9.2, a fire originating in the Unit 2 Additional Equipment Building could not propagate through two walls and across 729.5-A17 and damage cables routed in conduit in 729.0-A13. Therefore, fire damage cannot prevent closure of the PORVs and the ERFBS listed in 2.9.9.1.c is not necessary.
2.9.9.3.c        Other FSSD Components in the Room Rooms 729.0-A15 and 763.5-A2 contain FSSD equipment and cables associated with FSSD equipment relied upon for fires in other areas of the plant (i.e., equipment and cables not credited for a fire in Rooms 729.0-A15 or 763.5-A2). The cables are routed in conduit.
Although no fire induced failures are expected due to the low fire hazard in the rooms, postulated failure of the non-credited FSSD equipment and cables has been evaluated to assess its effect on plant operation. Failure of this function is detected and mitigated by normal plant procedures and does not initiate or result in a plant trip.
2.9.9.4          Conclusion Since there is insignificant threat from transient combustibles or in situ combustible material and no credible ignition sources; it is concluded that no cables routed in the conduits could be damaged by any credible fire in the Unit 2 Additional Equipment Building; therefore, no OMAs or fire wrap on the conduits are necessary. TVA concludes that the intent of III.G.1 is ensured and requests approval of this deviation demonstrating compliance to III.G.1 criteria with a fire hazard analysis in lieu of the prescriptive separation criteria of III.G.2.
2.9.10           Room 757.0-A13 - Refueling Floor and New Fuel Storage Vault 2.9.10.1         Description of Condition This room is part of fire area 10 (See Part III, Table 3-3 for room listing) and is analyzed in analysis volume 32 (AV-032) along with several other rooms. Fire area 10 is considered a III.G.2 area because it contains components associated with both shutdown paths. If all equipment and cables located in this analysis volume were assumed to fail due to postulated fire damage; both trains of the ACAS are assumed failed. The 480vac shutdown boards 2A1 and 2A2 are unavailable. Therefore, the following OMAs are implemented to achieve fire safe shutdown:
: a.       Unit 1 and Unit 2 -- Control pressure in two steam generators within 60 minutes by operation of SG PORV via local nitrogen control station.
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PART VII - DEVIATIONS AND EVALUATIONS                        Revision 60
: b.       Transfer normal battery charger for 125vdc vital battery board 3-F to its alternate 480vac supply within 120 minutes.
: c.       Unit 1 and Unit 2 - Locally rotate and backwash ERCW strainer within 720 minutes.
2.9.10.2         Fire Hazard Analysis 2.9.10.2.a       Room Description Room 757.0-A13 is the Refueling Floor and also contains the New Fuel Storage Vault. The New Fuel Storage Vault is accessed through the floor of 757.0-A13 and is constructed of minimum 18-inch thick reinforced concrete. The opening in the floor to the New Fuel Storage Vault is normally closed with a steel hatch cover. There is also a non-fire rated steel hatch cover protecting the opening in the floor to room 728.0-A7. Room 757.0-A13 is of 24 to 36-inch thick reinforced concrete construction with 2 or 3 hour fire resistance rating. These concrete walls, floor and ceiling separates 757.0-A13 from adjacent rooms in the Auxiliary Building (except rooms 728.0-A7 and 772.0-A9) by either 2 or 3 hour fire barriers. The wall between 757.0-A13 and 772.0-A9 is 18-inch thick reinforced concrete, but is not a rated fire barrier. The adjacent rooms are provided with automatic suppression and detection except the heat exchanger rooms which have insignificant in situ combustible loading and room 729.0-A6 (see 2.9.4 above).
2.9.10.2.b       Fire Load The in situ combustible loading in the New Fuel Storage Vault is negligible and in room 757.0-A13 is classified as Low. The in situ combustibles consist of hydraulic fluid associated with the crane and hoists, plastics associated with various electrical and control panels, small dry type transformers and lights, etc. The credible ignition sources are the two auxiliary air compressor units, the spent fuel handling bridge control panels, and the 125-ton crane. The wall mounted area heaters, transformers, electrical control panels, hoists and junction boxes are not considered to be significant ignition sources (see FHA General Information 2.9.0 above) because there is negligible combustible material associated with them and the power cables associated with them are protected by properly sized circuit protection (breakers/fuses). Their failure would not damage any other component. The Spent Fuel Handling Bridge (SFHB) exposed cables in cable track and cable reels are low intensity flame tested, and are not subject to flame spread. The power cables are protected by properly sized circuit protection (breakers/fuses). The SFHB is powered down when not in use however heating is required to the motors and control power enclosures to prevent condensation. The control panels are not considered a significant ignition source because they contain insignificant quantities of combustible material and their power supply is adequately protected with properly sized breakers. The SFHB is parked on the east (Unit 1) side of the spent fuel pool when not in use.
This location is not in the proximity of safe shutdown equipment or cables and will not impact the safe shutdown strategy.
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PART VII - DEVIATIONS AND EVALUATIONS                            Revision 60 2.9.10.2.c        Control of Combustibles and Ignition Sources NPG-SPP-18.4.7, Control of Transient Combustibles and NPG-SPP-18.4.8, Control of Ignition Sources (Hot Work) defines the fire preventive measures to preclude introduction of significant quantities of combustible material or ignition sources into the rooms. Compensatory measures must be implemented when transient combustibles or ignition sources are located in a room.
The area around and between the auxiliary air compressors are CCZ (see Part II, sections 10 and 11 ). The approval of an evaluation must be obtained before any transient combustible can be introduced into the area or hot work performed in the area.
The 125-ton crane is only an ignition source when it is in use; therefore, if a fire occurs in the crane, it is immediately detected by personnel and extinguished before it could damage any other equipment in the immediate vicinity. There is no impact to FSSD.
The Spent Fuel Handling Bridge (SFHB) exposed cables in cable track and cable reels are low int}}