View source for W3P86-2557, Forwards Suppl to Initial Dcrdr Final Summary Rept Re Invalid Human Engineering Deficiencies & Corrective Actions in Response to Suppl 1 to NUREG-0737

{{Adams
| number = ML20211B958
| issue date = 10/14/1986
| title = Forwards Suppl to Initial Dcrdr Final Summary Rept Re Invalid Human Engineering Deficiencies & Corrective Actions in Response to Suppl 1 to NUREG-0737
| author name = Cook K
| author affiliation = LOUISIANA POWER &amp; LIGHT CO.
| addressee name = Knighton G
| addressee affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION (NRR)
| docket = 05000382
| license number = 
| contact person = 
| case reference number = RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737
| document report number = W3P86-2557, NUDOCS 8610210236
| document type = CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS, INCOMING CORRESPONDENCE, UTILITY TO NRC
| page count = 34
}}

=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:,
P. O. BOX '60340 LO UISI POWER      AN A
                       & LIGHT    / 317 NEWBARONNESTREET ORLEANS, LOUISTANA 70160   +
(504) 595-3100 MIDDLE SOUTH urnmts system                         October 14, 1986 W3P86-2557 A4.05 QA Mr. George W. Knighton, Director PdR Project Directorate No. 7 Division of PWR Licensing-B Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

==SUBJECT:==
Waterford SES Unit 3 Docket No. 50-382 Detailed Control Room Design Review Final Summary Report Supplement

==REFERENCE:==
W3P85-1015 dated April 30, 1985

==Dear Mr. Knighton:==

By the referenced letter LP&L submitted the Detailed Control Room Design Review (DCRDR) Final Summary Report in response to NUREG 0737 Supplement 1.
Included in Volume 2 of the Summary Report was a listing of the human engineering discrepancies (HEDs) and corrective actions identified during the course of the DCRDR.
In implementing the various HED corrective actions scheduled for completion prior to completion of the first refueling outage it was evident that revisions to the HEDs, the corrective actions, or the implementation schedule were necessary in a minority of cases. It was also determined that a large number of HED corrections originally scheduled for the second refueling outage could be implemented prior to completion of the first refueling outage.
The following discussions are submitted as a supplement to the initial DCRDR Summary Report:
: 1. Invalid HEDs A total of 8 items originally identified as HEDs have been subsequently determined to be invalid:
HED: 92        241 110       267 182       304 202       324 The updated HED description pages along with the reason for declaring the HEDs invalid are included in Attachment 2.                                        o
                                                                                          /\ CO 7 8610210236 861014                                                                         N DR    ADOCK 0500        2       EQUAL OPPORTUNITY EMPLOYER''                                  i  I

'Page 2 W3P86-2557
: 2. Accept As Is Five HEDs were re-evaluated and found to be acceptable as-is:
HED: '35        262 239        413 260 The updated HED description pages along with the reason for declaring the HEDs acceptable as-is are included in Attachment 2.
: 3. Defer to the Second Refueling Outage While.LP&L has made a concerted effort to complete the approximately 100 HEDs scheduled for completion by the end of the first refueling outage, limited engineering resources and lead time on replacement parts have made it necessary to defer implementation for five HEDs to the second refueling outage:
HED:   36       277 126        302 127 The updated description pages for these HEDs are included in Attachment 2. All have been assessed and it has been determined that no undue safety concern is present due to the deferral.
: 4. Implementation Uncertain by the First Refueling Outa_ge As the Waterford 3 refueling outage approaches and more safety significant modifications compete for limited engineering and technician resources, the implementation schedule for eight HEDs is      -
uncertain:
HED: 81         234 176        272 224        321 228        323 These HEDs remain scheduled for completion prior to the first refueling outage; however, should the implementatien not be complete, the.HEDs will be placed on the forced outage list to be worked at unscheduled outages following the first refueling outage. The updated description pages for these HEDs are included in Attachment 2.
: 5. Early Implementation LP&L has made every effort to complete ~HED corrective actions for items not scheduled for completion until the second refueling outage.
A total of 38 second refueling outage HEDs will be complete by the end of the first refueling outage. These HEDs are listed in Attachment 1.
It is also worth noting that significant inroads have been made in completing second refueling -HEDs associated with the plant computer displays.

4 i   Page 3 W3P86-2557 i  I 6 .'                  Increased Priority I
l                       - Upon subsequent review, LP&L has increased the priority of one HED i
4
(#246) as noted in Attachment 2.~
j   7.                   Completed Through Revised Approach
                         'One HED (#99) has been resolved through a revised approach to the                                                                   '
corrective action as noted in Attachment 2.
: 8.                   New HED The LP&L HED Committee, in a meeting following the submittal of'the i                       DCRDR Summary Report, has identified an additional HED (#416) as described in Attachment 2.
4 The above HED determinations were evaluated by the principal and affected members of the HED Assessment Team in accordance.with Section 10.2 of the DCRDR Summary Report.                                                                                                                                    !
 !   As previously noted, the above revisions to HED corrective' action are dictated, in part, by limited resources and higher priority safety significant plant modifications. While the potential exists for not completing 13'HEDs as scheduled by the end of the first refueling outage, the scope of the 38 HEDs_ completed a cycle early far exceeds that of the incomplete HEDs.
I
 !   Should you require further information concerning the Supplement to the l   DCRDR Final Summary' Report, please feel free to contact Mike Meisner at (504) 595-2832.
i                                                                           Yours very truly, K.W. Cook Nuclear Support & Licensing Manager f    KWC:MJM:ssf                                                                                                                                              l 1
Enclosures I    cc:                  R.D. Martin, NRC Region IV J.H. Wilson, NRC-NRR
,                         NRC Resident Inspectors Office B.W. Churchill l                        W.M. Stevenson j
1 I
      ,-.--,---.,,.~n---           --,e-e-,- - - - , - -evw, ,,r. n -- ------,mm   m mn w     -.     --~,~--n--n     1- ~ -
                                                                                                                                 -,w-- , ,-----,,w          s

ATTACHMENT I Second Refueling HEDs To Be Completed By the End of the First Refueling Outage 123                      162                      230 142                      163                      232 143                      164                      251 144                      165                      288 145                      166                      289 146                      167                      291 148                      169                      293 149                      170                      294 150                      1/1                      297 151                      172                      298 152                      173                      404 153                      178                      405 156                      179

ATTACHMENT 2

CORRECTIVE. ACTIONS HED NO.:        0035-GUIDE NO.:      5.4.1.C CATEGORY:       3 FINDING:
'Two scales on the Reactor Core vessel level (CP7) are imposed on the same axis of this recorder. From bottom to top, the recorder reads 0-100 and then another 0-100.

===RESPONSE===
The recorder is appropriately labeled. The green pen indicates the Head Level while the red pen indicates the Plenum Level. These readings are sequential and not concurrent. Because the operators have used this recorder without any problems, it is recommended that this recorder should not be modified.
IMPLEMENTATION:
Accept as is.
A-1

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS HED NO.:        0036 GUIDE NO.:      5.4.1.I CATEGORY:       3 FINDING:
Paper-speed adjustability on the recorders is not available. A high, paper speed option should~be provided to run out records for detachment. A lower speed should be available to permit adjustment of' the time scale so that rate-of-change information can be indicated.

===RESPONSE===
A variable-speed multipen recorder will be placed on CP2 which monitors Tave,'Tc, Start-up Power, and Tref. This modification, however, is not considered critical to operator performance.
IMPLEMENTATION:
By the completion of the second refueling outage.
l A-2 i

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS HED NO.:        0081 GUIDE NO.:      4.1.2.A CATEGORY:       X FINDING:
The clock above Panel CP2 is not permanently mounted. It is subject to falling and could damage or inadvertently actuate controls on the reactor panel. It could also cause personal injury.

===RESPONSE===
A clock will be permanently mounted in the control room.
IMPLEMENTATION:
Prior to the first refueling outage if time and resources permit. If not completed, this enhancement will be placed on the forced outage list.
A-169

I I
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS                                                           .
HED NO.:        0092 GUIDE NO.:      2.1.2.B.6 CATEGORY:       INVILID FINDING:
The telephone vertically mounted on CF2 is in the way of the operators.
When'an operator is using the reactor panel, the phone is an obstruction which prevents him from moving back and forth in front of the instrumentation.

===RESPONSE===
It has been determined that this HED was based on the isolated opinion of a minority of operators. Subsequent discussions with Operations personnel have identified no further concerns over the telephone location, nor was there a preference to relocate-the telephone.
IMPLEMENTATION:
Accept as is.
l t
l 3
A-129

i 4
s
:                                                                                          CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 1
HED NO.:                                     0099 i
GUIDE NO.:                                    2.1.6.E.2 CATEGORY:                                     2 i
1                        FINDING:
Audio gain controls on the P.A. system are not limited to preclude reducing volume below an audible level, a
i i-
;                        RESPONSE:
1
                                                                                                                                        ~
The recommended change to limit the capability to reduce the volume on the j{
public address system below an audible level has been completed by
                         . Executive Directive ED-017. Periodic sound surveys of the public address
                        - system will be conducted.
i i
IMPLEMENTATION:
Fix complete.
1-i i,
l 1
A-4 t
   ._ _ _ . .     .. -,      ....___,.,yg,_.         , _ _ . , . , _ , . . . , . , , ,. _,,_.c .,y...._,,    ,-_m-..,-_,-.._m.,                  , _. . . _

CORRECTIVE. ACTIONS HED NO.:        0110 GUIDE NO.:      5.1.3.A CATEGORY:       INVALID FINDING:
The lettering on some of the horizontal meters is too small (3/16") to read from the required viewing distance.

===RESPONSE===
This HED is considered to be invalid because the character height of 3/16 inch meets the NUREG-0700 character height guideline for a viewing distance of 30 inches.
l IMPLEMENTATION:
Accept as is.
l i
I i
A-5

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS HED NO.:        0126 GUIDE NO.:      2.1.6.E.1, 2.2.6, 3.2.1.A CATEGORY:       X FINDING:
The auditory signals (annunciator horns) do not provide a value of at least 10dB(A) above average ambient noise. In fact the speaker volume exceeds these annunciators.

===RESPONSE===
All annunciator horns will be modified so that the volume is acceptable.
Due to limited ~ engineering resources and replacement material availability this HED is being deferred to the second refueling outage. An assessment has determined that no undue safety concern exists due to the deferral.
IMPLEMENTATION:
By the completion of the second refueling outage.
A-137

                                               ..                                = _ - ____
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS HED NO.:            0127 GUIDE NO.:         3.2.1.D CATEGORY:          X FINDING:
The average volume of annunciator horns is 71dB. All individual horns deviate from the average more than the +/-2.5 dB recommended by NUREG-0700.
4 i

===RESPONSE===
                                             ~
All annunciator horns will be adjusted to a level 10dB above ambient (HED i          0126) and within +/-2.5dB from the average volume. Due to limited
!          engineering resources and replacement material availability this HED is
]          being deferred to the second refueling outage. An assessment has l          determined that no undue safety concern exists due to the deferral.
i IMPLEMENTATION:
i 4
By the completion of the second refueling outage.
i r
l t
I i
l A-148

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS HED NO.:        0176 GUIDE NO.:      3.3.4.A CATE~'"Y:       X FINDING:
The " Blowdown' Tank Drain Pump Trouble" annunciator tile (CP1-E-D19) is ambiguous to the operators.

===RESPONSE===
The title will be re-engraved based on the operator comments.
IMPLEMENTATION:
Prior to the first refueling outage if time and resources permit. If not complete, this enhancement will be placed on the forced outage list.
A-158

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS HED NO.:        0182 GUIDE NO.:      Validation I             CATEGORY:       Invalid.
FINDING:
f Presently the system is not sensitive enough in measuring tube leaks and isolation steam tube rupture isolations. There should be an improvement of the steam.line radiation monitor for det'ction         e       of low level radioactivity during tube rupture, i
j             RESPONSE:
An engineering analysis has been performed to determine radiation instrumentation needs~during a SGTR. The Blowdown Radiation Monitor (see HED 260) will provide sufficient sensitivity to determine the location of a tube rupture.
IMPLEMENTATION:
Accept as is.
1 e
4 l
<                                                               A-6 i
4 l '
                                                                                                                 , - - . - - ...,,.- ,,   -- . .---,c..,
   + m--.-...      .- - - . .         ._-.._,......,-r              ._.___m-   --y m --. - . , . .

t i.
 ,                                                     CORRECTIVE ACTIONS i
i HED NO.:        0202 a
GUIDE NO.:      T.A. HTS, PZR10
                                                                    \                                                                                                     [
i.
l~        CATEGORY:       Invalid i
FINDING:
i l          The pressurize proportional heater meters (CP2) are labeled " current" but
 ,         actually measure power.
1 i
a I

===RESPONSE===
This meter reads current and not power; and therefore, should not be relabeled.
s       ' IMPLEMENTATION:
1 Accept as is.
4 i
k 1
1 i
i 3
4                                                                       A-/
i 1
L
_..     ,,.                 . . _ . . . . - , _ -  ,-__,.-m.m.         -,__.___ _,m., . , . , . m_. ..    .-_-m.,,.  , ,.,     y-_.3,          ,mm.,. , - , ,,, y

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS HED NO.:        0224 GUIDE NO.:      T.A. PWR13, CTS /11 CATFCORY:       X I
FINDING:
i The ranges and divisional markings of each containment pressure. CIAS, and CSAS meter should be standardized, p
I

===RESPONSE===
Communication with the operator has determined that-the CIAS and CSAS Containment Pressure meters should be similar in range and numerical j     progression in order to quickly determine actual pressure. The range for these meters will be 0-30 psia, i
IMPLEMENTATION:
Prior to the first refueling outage if time and resources permit. If not completed, this enhancement will be placed on the forced outage list.                         l l
1 4
A-8
                                                                    ,         --- . ~ , , .. ., , -

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS HED NO.:        0228 GUIDE NO.:      T.A. D17 CATEGORY:       X FINDING:
The setpoint meter on the steam bypass master controller (CPI) should be identical to the process meter on the same controller.

===RESPONSE===
This will be investigated and modified if product availability allows. If no other meter scale can be added it will be reevaluated.
IMPLEMENTATION:
Prior to the first refueling outage if time and resources permit. If not completed, this enhancement will be placed on the forced outage list.
A-63

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS HED NO.:        0234 GUIDE NO.:      T.A. PZRll, 2, 3, 9 CATEGORY:       X FINDING:
The Pressurizer Level recorder should be a dual pen recorder as opposed to a single pen recorder. This additional information would allow the operator to compare trends on both X and Y Channels on the same recorder.

===RESPONSE===
The Pressurizer Level recorder will be changed to a dual pen recorder.
IMPLEMENTATION:
Prior to the first refueling outage if time and resources permit. It not completed, this enhancement will be placed on the forced outage list.
t A-87

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS HED NO.:        0239 GUIDE NO.:      T.A. PWR 18 CATEGORY:       3 FINDING:
The operators need a blowdown radiation level monitor recorder for the steam
. generator on cpl. This trend information assists the operator in the performance of his duties.

===RESPONSE===
There is a live radiation reading every 10-15 minutes from a RAD monitor display which will be on CP6. A Blowdown Radiation recorder for the Steam Generator on CPI will not be added. Trend information is considered not necessary, and very little room is available on CPI for placement.
IMPLEMENTATION:
Accept as is.
i A-9 l
I

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS HED NO.:        0241 GUIDE NO.:      T.A. RCll, EL7 CATEGORY:       Invalid FINDING:
Two 6.9KV voltage meters should be added to CPI to assist the operators in confirming that power is available.

===RESPONSE===
Power unavailability is already annunciated on CPI due to 230KV line undervoltage. Voltage on the bus can be determined by the presence of lights in the appropriate vatthour meter located in the control room.
IMPLEMENTATION:
Accept as is.
A-10

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS i
HED NO.:        0246 CUIDE NO.:      T.A. PWR 13 CATE0GRY:        1 FINDING:
       .Four " Containment Vacuum breaker pressure isolation valve" indicators are
 >      needed on CP18.

===RESPONSE===
Containment to Annulus DPT containment header valves'CVRISV-401A
;      . (2HV-E634A) and CVRISV-401B (2HV-E633B) open and closed position indication will be included in the control room in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.97, i
a  w f
2 IMPLEMENTATION:
                                                                                   ~
By the completion of the first refueling outage.
1 i                                                                      A-11 i
i
     .    --  ,    .    -- , - . . , - . . , _ _ - - - . , . . , _ , .      ..-..._,~,__,,..,_m.,   . ~ , . . ..       ._,,,,..-...m..,_,_.-.,..m.-..,m r, ,- , . . .~ -

                                ' CORRECTIVE ACTIONS HED NO.:        0260 GUIDE NO.:      A1.06, T.A. PWR18 CATECORY:       X FINDING:
Response to the operator survey indicated that the blowdown radiation f
monitor controls.need to be designed so that the operator can switch alignment to the opposite steam generator. This would aid the operator in determining which steam generator had a tube leak.
f

===RESPONSE===
Further review has determined that identification of the affected steam generator can be accomplished by selectively isolating the steam generator blowdown sample flows either locally at valves SSL-8007A/SSL-8008A and SSL-8007B/SSL-8008B, or from the control room at valves SSL-8004A/SSL-8006A and SSL-8004B/SSL-8006B.
IMPLEMENTATION:
Accept as is.
l l
j                                        A-3 l
4 E.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS HED NO.:        0262 GUIDE NO.:      Oper. Survey A2.01 CATEGORY:       3 FINDING:
Response to the operator survey indicated,that the controller.for the potable water shutoff valve on CP13 is not needed and is never used.

===RESPONSE===
This controlier will not be removed because it is required during potable water line breaks.
IMPLEMENTATION:
Accept as is.
A-12

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS HED NO.:        0267 GUIDE NO.:      Oper. Survey A3.04, A3.13 CATEGORY:       Invalid FINDING:
Response to the operator survey indicates a need for individual voltage indication for all busses on cpl. The computer is too slow and closed breakers do not necessarily mean that the bus is fully power or even energized.

===RESPONSE===
See response to HED 0241.
MPLEMENTATION:
Accept as is.
A-14

           -.   .       -        _.   . -.      =.      --  -      -      -
i CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 1
HED NO.:        0272~
GUIDE NO.:      Op Survey A3.10 CATEGORY:       X 1
FINDING:
J Response to the operator survey indicated a need for a dedicated CVC Volume.                        l Control Tank Chart recorder. When the computer goes down, this indication
! is out, so the operator needs a dedicated recorder.
I

===RESPONSE===
                                                   ~
f A CVC Volume Control Tank Chart Recorder wil1 be added.
I i
1MPLEMENTATION:
Prior to the first refueling outage if time and resources permit. If not completed, this enhancement will be placed on the forced outage list.
A-14
_ . _ _ _ _ _ . - _ _ ~ _

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS HED NO.:       0277 GUIDE NO.:      Op Survey AS.01, C1.01 CATEGORY:       X FINDING:
Communication between the control desk and the protection panel area in the back is impossible due to unnecessarily high background noise levels from CPC ventilation fans on CP21 and CP22. This fan noise bleeds over into front panel area and creates background noise. The RPS noise is a consistent high problem concerning normal verbal control room communication.

===RESPONSE===
Various methods of noise reduction which could lower the background noise levels between the control desk and the back panels have been investigated.
A significant portion of this noise is attributed to the high speed CPC ventilation fans on CP21 and CP22, in the general area of these two panels, the noise level is 72-82 decibels. This fan noise interrupts verbal communication between the front and the back panels, but will not pose any problems to health or cause any potential hearing loss. In addition, the working environment in the front panel area is relatively quiet. Because of the interactive effects of vibration, velocity and heat, it will be necessary to conduct further studies into the trade-offs between these threa variable. These analyses will be initiated after the first refueling outage.
IMPLEMENTATION:
By the completion of the second refueling outage.
A-15

 ,                                                                                                      CORRECTIVE ACTIONS i
i HED NO.:                          0302 GUIDE NO.:                        B6.02, C1.02
                     ~ CATEGORY:                        X FINDING:
Emergency alarms, i.e.. plant fire, plant emergency alarm, controls should be near plant operator console.. The low volume of the first alarms makes j                      them difficult to hear at a distence.
i t
t

===RESPONSE===
}                     The fire alarm auditory cignal levels will be adjusted to an acceptable j                      level. The acknowledge buttons are in the control room and are accessible
;                      to'the operators. Due to limited engineering resourcrs and replacement j                    material availability this HED is being deferred to the second refueling outage. An assessment has determined that no undue safety concern exists due to the deferral.
t i
I IMPLEMENTATION:
                    'By the completion of the second refueling outage.
f I
i 4
I
!                                                                                                                              A-33 4
4
    , . - - - , -    ,m.      _  . . . , _ , , . . . _ . _ _ , _ . . _ ~ , . _ _ , . _ _ . , _ _ . . . - . , , _ . . . . . _ . - . . _ _ . - - . _ _ , , - _ _ . , . . , _ _ . _ - _ _ . - - _ - - _

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS HED No.:        0304 FJIDE NO.:      B6.04 CATEGORY:       Invalid FINDING:
On some HICs, it is difficult to determine what the output or setpoint should be since a 0-100% setpoint may not correspond to a 0-100% valve stroke or whatever output is controlling.

===RESPONSE===
This HED is invalid because the output and setpoint meter indications should not be correlated on a one-to-one basis.
IMPLEMENTATION:
Accept as is.
A-16

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS HED NO.:        0321 GUIDE NO.:      C3.02 CATEGORY:       X FINDING:
CP2 panel K ESFAS annunciators can lead the operators to believe that actuations have occurred which may not have occurred.

===RESPONSE===
Alarm actuations will be modified to match actual PPS actuations.
IMPLEMENTATION:
Prior to the first refueling outage if time and resources permit. If not completed, this enhancement will be placed on the forced outage list.
A-45

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS HED NO.:       .0323 GUIDE NO.:      Oper. Survey C6.03 CATEGORY:       X FINDING:
CP18 annunciator panels SA and SA Row A column 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9 are very confusing engravings. " Seal Water" is engraved on the tiles when the actual affected parameter is "CCW".

===RESPONSE===
These annunciator tiles will be reengraved.
IMPLEMENTATION:
Prior to the first refueling outage if time and resources permit. If not completed, this enhancement will be placed on the forced outage list.
4 A-47

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS HED NO.:         0324 GUIDE NO.:       Oper. Survey C6.04 CATEGORY:        Invalid FINDING:
  "RCP Seal Water Low" annunciator should actually be " Seal Cooling Flow".

===RESPONSE===
This annunciator tile does not exist, therefore it is invalid.
IMPLEMENTATION:
Accept as is.
A-17 1
m.+-*

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS HED NO.:        0413 CUIDE No.:      5.2.1.B CATEGORY:       3 FINDING:
Three meters at.LCP43 contain superheated and subcooled values. Add positive and negative signs on the meters to clarify this.

===RESPONSE===
Positive and negative signs will not be added to the meter faces. These are considered by the operators as being unnecessary additions to the control panels. The scales are already labeled with the abbreviations "SUPHT'.' and "SUBCOOL." which is considered sufficient indication.
IMPLEMENTATION:
Accept as is.
      -i A-18

I COR'RECTIVE ACTIONS HED NO.:        0416 GUIDE NO.:      E0P VERIFICATION CATEGORY:       2 FINDING:
The scales on the Reactor Core Saturation Margin temperature recorders on CP-7 depicts temperatures that are not valid.

===RESPONSE===
The scales should be modified to read the appropriate Saturation Margin temperatures.
IMPLEMENTATION:
By the completion of the first refueling outage.
A-19
_ _ _ . . _      - . _ _ _ . - _ . . _ _ _ _ _ . _ . . _ _ _ _   ____ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _}}