View source for U-600703, Forwards Response to 860801 Request for Addl Info Re Item E of IE Bulletin 85-003, Motor-Operated Valve Common Mode Failures During Plant Transients Due to Improper Switch Settings

{{Adams
| number = ML20214P091
| issue date = 09/10/1986
| title = Forwards Response to 860801 Request for Addl Info Re Item E of IE Bulletin 85-003, Motor-Operated Valve Common Mode Failures During Plant Transients Due to Improper Switch Settings
| author name = Spangenberg F
| author affiliation = ILLINOIS POWER CO.
| addressee name = Keppler J
| addressee affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION &amp; ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
| docket = 05000461
| license number = 
| contact person = 
| document report number = IEB-85-003, IEB-85-3, U-600703, U-60070303, NUDOCS 8609170262
| package number = ML20214P095
| document type = CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS, INCOMING CORRESPONDENCE, UTILITY TO NRC
| page count = 7
}}

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j U-600703 LO8-86(09-10)-L 1A.120 ILLINDIS POWER COMPANY IP     CLINTON POWER STATION. P.o. BOX 678. CLINTON. ILLINOIS 61727 September 10, 1986 Docket No. 50-461 Mr. James G. Keppler Regional Administrator Region III U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 799 Roosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137

==Subject:==
IE Bulletin No. 85-03:
Motor-Operated Valve Common Mode Failures During Plant Transients Due to Improper Switch Settings

==Dear Mr. Keppler:==

Illinois Power's (IP) {{letter dated|date=May 15, 1986|text=letter dated May 15, 1986}} (U-600529) provided a response to IE Bulletin No. 85-03.       Additional information was re-quested by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in a letter to W. C.
Gerstner (IP) dated August 1, 1986. The additional program information requested per Action Item e of the Bulletin is attached. This letter supersedes the information provided in IP's {{letter dated|date=May 15, 1986|text=May 15, 1986, letter}}. As stated in IP's previous letter, all work required by Action Items b, c, and d will be completed prior to exceeding 5% power.
I hereby affirm that the information in this letter and the attach-ments is correct to the best of my knowledge.
Please contact me if you have any questions on this matter.
Sincerely yours,
                                                  /         a w.A.
F. A. Spange erg             i Manager - Licensing .ind Safety DWW/kaf Attachments cc:    B. L. Siegel, NRC Clinton Licensing Project Manager NRC Resident Office Illinois Department of Nucicar Safety NRC Document Control Desk 0609170262 860910                                                                             I PDR ADOCK 05000461 PDR
                                                                                                      //
G

U-600703 LO8-86 (iO9 -10 )-L 1A.120 Attachment A Action Item a:
Review and document _the design basis for the operation of each valve.
This documentation should include the maximum differential preosure expected during.both' opening and closing the valve for both normal and
    ' abnormal' events to the extent that these valve operations and events are included in the existing, approved design basis, (i.e., the design basis documented in pertinent licensee submittals such as FSAR analyses and fully-approved operating and emergency procedures, etc). When determining the maximum differential pressure, thosa single equipment failures and inadvertent equipment operations (such as inadvertent valve closures or openings) that are within the plant design basis should be
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assumed.
Response to Action Item a:
Please note that valve data is arranged in the recommended format of IE Bulletin 85-03 Table 2. The design basis differential pressure data are from the designer's (General Electric) design specifications. The design differential pressure value data represents the worst case listed for both opening and closing the valve for both normal and abnormal events within the scope of the approved design basis. The design basis includes single failure criteria.
Valve                Valve            Valve Function Component ID,        Operator         (e.'g. AFW pump Manufacturer,        Manufacturer, discharge Type. Model,         Model,           isolation               Design Basic oP (psi)
Size, Rating         Motor RPM        valve)                    'Open & Close (High Pressure Core Spray System) 1E22-F001,           Limitorque,      HP Suction Valve                   90 Anchor Darling,       SMB-00, Gate,                 1700 522201124, 16", 150 lb.
IE22-F004            Limitorque,     Injection Valve                  1575 Anchor Darling.       SB-3,
       ,, Gate,                 3380 52220212, 10", 655 lb.
IE22-F010            Limitorque,     HP Test Return Valve             1575 Anchor Darling.       SMB-4,
                        ~
Globe,                1720 52220511, 10", 900 lb.

I U-600703 LO8-86( 09 16-L -
1A.120 Valve                Valve          Valve Function Component ID,        Operator       (e.g. AFW pump Manufacturer,        Manufacturer, discharge Type Model,          Model,         isolation            Design Basis AP (psi)
Size, Rating         Motor RPM      valve)                 Open & Close (High Pressure Core Spray System) 1E22-F011,           Limitorque,    HP Test Return Valve         1575 Anchor Darling,      SMB-4, Globe,               1720 52220612, 10", 900 lb.
1E22-F012,           Limitorque,    Low Flow Bypass Valve        1575 Anchor Darling,      SB-0, Gate,                3400 52220314, 4", 900 lb.
IE22-F015,           Limitorque,    Suppression Pool               90 Anchor Darling,     .SB-1           Suction Valve Gate,                3450 52220412, 20", 150 lb.
1E22-F023,           Limitorque,    Suppression Pool             1575 Anchor Darling,      SMB-3,         Test Valve Globe,               1725 52220711, 10", 900 lb.
(Beactor Core Isolation Cooling System) 1E51-F010,           Limitorque,    Cond. Storage Tank             75 Anchor Darling,      SMB-000,       Iso. Valve Cate,                1900 E6214291, 6",  150 lb.
1E51-F013           Limitorque,    Pump Discharge Valve         1400 Anchor Darling,      SMB-0, Gate,                1900 E62141691, 6", 900 lb.

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U-600703 LO8-86(09-1Q-L
                                                 -1A.120 Valve                 Valve          Valve Function Component ID,         Operator       (e.g. AFW pump Manufacturer,        Manufacturer, discharge Type, Model,         Model,          isolation            Design Basis AP (psi)
Size, Rating         Motor RPM       valve)                 Open & Close
_(Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System) 1E51-F019,            Limitorque,    Pump Min-Flow. Bypass
* Yarway,               SMB-000        Valve Globe,                1900 E62142767, 2", 900 lb.
1E51-F022,            Limitorque,    Pump Test Return Valve       1400 Anchor Darling,       SMB-00, Globe,                1900 E6214871, 4", 900 lb.
1E51-F031,            Limitorque,    Suppression Pool               75 Anchor Darling,       SMB-000,       Pump Suction Valve Gate,                 1900 E6214311, 6", 150 lb.
1E51-F045,            Limitorque,    Steam Supply Valve           1177 Anchor Darling,       SMB-0, Globe,                1900 E6214881, 4", 900 lb.
1E51-F046,            Limitorque,    Cooling Loop Shut-off        1400 Anchor Darling,       SMB-000,       Valve Globe.                1900 E62142768, 3", 900 lb.
1E51-F059,            Limitorque,    Pump Test Return Valve       1400 Anchor Darling,       SMB-00, Gate,                 1900 E6214721, 4", 900 lb.
1E51-F063,            Limitorque,    RCIC Steam Flow              1177 Anchor Darling,       SMB-0,         Iso. Valve Cate,                 1700 E621451, 8",  600 lb.
1E51-F064,           Limitorque,    RCIC Steam Flow              1177 Anchor Darling,       SMB-0          Iso. Valve Gate,                 1700 E62141431, 8", 600 lb.

U-600703 LO8-86 (09-10 )-L 1A.120 Valve                Valve          Valve Function Component ID,        Operator       (e.g. AFW pump Manufacturer,        Manufacturer, discharge Type, Model,         Model,         isolation             Design Basis a P (psi)
Size, Rating         Motor RPM      valve)                  Open & Close (Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System) 1E51-F068,          Limitorque,    Turbine Exhaust Iso.            30 Anchor Darling,      SMB-000,       Valve Gate,                1700 E6214341, 12", 150 lb.
1E51-F076,          Limitorque,    Steam Warm-up Iso. Valve      1177           '
Rockwell,            SMB-00, Globe,               1700 BLO21, 1", 1500 lb.
1E51-F077,          Limitorque,    Vacuum Breaker Iso. Valve       30 Yarway,              SMB-000, Globe,               1700 5515B, 1.5", 600 lb.
1E51-F078,          Limitorque,    Vacuum Breaker Iso. Valve       30 Anchor Darling,      SMB-000, Gate,                1700 E62141401, 3",  150 lb.
1E51-F095,          Limitorque,    F045-Bypass Valve            1177 Anchor Darling,      SMB-000, Globe,               1900 E62143911, 1", 600 lb.
1E51-C002E,         Limitorque,    RCIC Turbine Trip            1177 Gimpel,              SMB-000,       and Throttle Valve Globe,               1900 7412218 4",  900 lb.
* Shut off head of RCIC pump (1370 psi)
Action Item bt Using the results from item a above, establish the correct switch settings. This shall include a program to review and revise, as necessary, the methods for selecting and setting all switches (i.e., torque, torque bypass, position limit, overload) for each valve operation (opening and closing).
If the licensee determines that a valve it inoperable, the licensee shall also make an appropriate justification for continued operation in accordance with the applicable technical specification.

U-600703 LO8-86(09 40 )-L 1A.120 Response to Action Item b:
A list of the nominal and maximum torque switch settings was compiled from each valve's torque switch calibration plate which is located in the limit switch compartment. The seating and unseating thrust required to operate the valve under design conditions was cbtained from the valve manufacturers.
The limit, torque, and torque by-pass switches have been set in accordance with CPS Procedure 8451.02, "MOVATS Testing of Motor Operated Valves" (Attachment B). The torque switches have been set to obtain 110% of the design thrust listed in the controlled torque nwitch setting list.
The torque switch bypass in the open direction is set to open at no less than 20% of the valve stroke, to ensure the valve will unseat and overcome any initial differential pressure loads.
All valves that have a safety related function in the open and/or close direction (as defined in Technical Specification Section 3.8.4.2) contain an additional torque switch and overload heater bypasa circuit in the safety related direction (see Attachment C).
This additional bypass circuit exists for 100% of the open stroke, because the valves open on limit switch. In the closing direction the limit switch is set to open less than one (1) second from the fully closed position (defined as torque switch trip). However, valves with stroke times of less than 20 seconds have their limit switches set to drop out approximately 5% from the end of stroke.
The bypass limit switch is controlled by gear ratio and is strictly a mechanical function. Therefore, it is independent of differential pressure. Therefore, the valves will have torque switch and overload heater bypass protection for 100% of their open travel and a minimum of 95% of their closed travel. In most cases, the disc has already contacted its seat when the torque switch bypass drops out at 95% of closing travel.
Action Item et Individual valve settings shall be changed, as appropriate, to those established in item b, above. Whether the valve setting is changed or not, the valve will be demonstrated to be operable by testing the valve at the naximum differential pressure determined in item 1 above with the exception that testing motor-operated valves under conditions simulating a break in the line containing the valve is not required. Otherwise, justification should be provided for any cases where testing with the naximum differential pressure cannot practicably be performed. This justification should include the alternative to maximum differential pressure testing which will be used to verify the correct settings.
l        Note:       This bulletin is not intended to establish a requirement
;                    for valve testing for the condition simulating a break in
)                    the line containing the valve. However, to the extent that auch valve operation is relied upon in the design basis, a break in the line containing the valve should be considered in the analysen prescribed in items a and b t

U- 600703 LO8-86 (09 40 )-L 1A.120 above. The resulting switch settings for pipe break conditions should be verified, to the extent practical, by the same methods that would be used to verify other settings (if any) that are not tested at the maximum differential pressure.
Each valve shall be stroke tested, to the extent practical, to verify that the settings defined in item b above have been properly implemented even if testing with differential pressure cannot be performed.
Response to Action Item c:
As discussed in the response to Action Item b, valves with safety related functions contain a bypass circuit. This bypass circuit ensures the maximum valve operator output is available to stroke the valve during normal operation conditions. This design-eliminates the need to verify proper torque switch settings using maximum differential pressure testing. The Clinton design bypassed the overload and torque switch protection during normal operation of the valves. This design criterion dictated that the benefit of 100% bypass during normal operations exceeded the risk of damaging the motor. Also, a breaker trip from overload conditions is detected in the Main Control Room since the position indicating light will go out.
Action Item d:
Prepare or revise precedures to ensure that correct switch settings are determined and maintain 8 throughout the life of the plant. Ensure that applicable industry rec 4 endations are considered in the preparation of these procedures.
Response to Action Item d:
Testing and preventative maintenance procedures are being prepared which will include testing from the Motor Control Center (MCC),
monitoring valve motor load and control switch signature traces during the opening specified in the preventative maintenance procedures and closing cycle. The testing frequencies will be specified in the preventative maintenance procedures. Analysis of this test data will determine if any valve parameters have changed significantly from previous test data. The extent of signature analysis will be dictated by the indications found or the maintenance performed. If degradations are clearly imminent, the valve will be considered inoperable, and MOVATS testing and/or corrective maintenance will be performed, as plant conditions permit.
Instruction ME-6 (Attachment D) " Control of Valve Torque Switch Setting List" will ensure proper control when updating the torque switch setting list. This list contains the range of torque and thrust values.
A program is in place and functioning which provides industry information to the appropriate organizations for review and appropriate action.
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