View source for TXX-4692, Final Deficiency Rept CP-86-03 Re Sealing Techniques Used in Installation of Class 1E Instruments.Initially Reported on 860110.Seal Assemblies Provided for Class 1E Devices W/ Exception of Svc Water Intake Areas

{{Adams
| number = ML20141D983
| issue date = 02/07/1986
| title = Final Deficiency Rept CP-86-03 Re Sealing Techniques Used in Installation of Class 1E Instruments.Initially Reported on 860110.Seal Assemblies Provided for Class 1E Devices W/ Exception of Svc Water Intake Areas
| author name = Counsil W
| author affiliation = TEXAS UTILITIES ELECTRIC CO. (TU ELECTRIC)
| addressee name = Johnson E
| addressee affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION &amp; ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
| docket = 05000445, 05000446, 05000455, 05000456
| license number = 
| contact person = 
| document report number = CP-86-03, CP-86-3, SDARYCP-86-3, TXX-4692, NUDOCS 8602250009
| document type = DEFICIENCY REPORTS (PER 10CFR50.55E &amp; PART 21), TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
| page count = 4
}}

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Log i TXX-4692
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File # 10110 TEXAS UTILITIES GENERATING COMPANY                                903.10 SKYWAY TOWER e 400 NORTH OLTVE STREET. L.H. si e DALLAN. TEXAM 7S301 February 7, 1986 i
Eh?Ui?AY.?sh y;Mr'.'EriFHEUohnson, Acting Director Di~'i'si~on v       'of'ReactorfSafety and Projects b})g b!!
c    @ S~4DM<M )j;';
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission                                 u FEB 1919%        il 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000 Arlington, TX 76012                                              h,dO L              M
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==SUBJECT:==
COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION DOCKET N05. 50-445 AND 50-446 SEALING 0F CLASS 1E DEVICES SDAR: CP-86-03

==Dear Mr. Johnson:==

In accordance with 10CFR50.55(e), we are submitting the enclosed final written report of actions token to correct a deficiency in the sealing techniques used in the installation of Class 1E instruments. On January 10, 1986, we verbally notified your Mr. Bill Seidel of this potentially l               reportable issue. Evaluation of this issue has identified a reportable condition under the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e).
Very truly yours, i
W.G. Counsil JCH/gj                                                                                               i Attachment c - NRC Region IV (0 + 1 copy)
Director, Inspection & Enforcement (15 copies)
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 h                                                                             .
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i A DEVISION OF TEXAS UTELETIES ELECTRIC COMPANY                             e ,
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o ATTACHMENT DESCRIPTION During engineering evaluation of a site initiated Corrective Action Request.
(CAR), the sealing techniques-used in the installation of Class 1E instru-ments has been observed to be inadequate.
The original issue addressed in the CAR involved the application of conduit thread sealant and torquing parameters.provided by the supplier of. Class IE limit switches. Sealant is required to preclude the introduction of moisture into the switch under harsh environments. -Torquing limitations are specified to prevent damage. These measures - which have not been pro-perly addressed in installation 'and inspection processes -- could invalidate-the Class lE integrity of the devices.
A review of qualification documents for other devices and instruments has revealed similar instances where measures have not been-implemented to maintain qualification integrity. The following have been identified to require additional sealing provisions when installed in harsh environments:
a) NAMC0 Limit Switches b) ASCO Solenoid Valves c) VALCOR Solenoid Valves d) Magnetrol Level Switches e) Rosemount Transmitters-f) Conax RTD's g) Westinghouse RTD's The omission of proper sealing techniques can be attributed.in part to-the specific qualification requirements of these devices which were developed after design requirements.
The concern is applicable to Units 1 and 2.

==SUMMARY==
OF EVENTS Date Discovered:     December 12, 1985 Date NRC Notified as Potentially Reportable:      January 10, 1986 Date Determined Reportable: January 27, 1986 SAFETY IMPLICATION In the event-these conditions.had remained undetected, the operability of essential Class lE. instruments and other devices could not be assured during accident conditions.
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ATTTACHMENT CORRECTIVE ACTION Seal assemblies will be provided for specific Class IE devices as shown in the attached table. Since HELB (or harsh environment) conditions do not exist in the diesel generatcr and service water intake structure areas, specific installations' located in these areas will not be provided seal-assemblies.
The current schedule.for implementing these corrective actions indicates completion of engineering / design. efforts by February 24, 1986.
Construction-installation efforts are anticipated to'be complete by May.26, 1986, and April 15, 1986, for Units 1 and 2 respectively.
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ATTACHMENT Device                               Corrective Action 4
a) NAMC0 Limit Switches                 Seal assemblies will be pro-b)- ASCO Solenoid Switches              vided for all installations located inside the containment and " Super Pipe". break areas 4
(rooms 100 and 108).
Note: tests are scheduled to
.                                                         be completed by. June 1, 1986, to determine if seal 1                                                        assemblies are_ required in other areas of harsh environments.
c) VALCOR. Solenoid. Valves             Seal assemblies will be s
d) _ Magnetrol Level Switches-         _provided for all assemblies
  ;               e)- Rosemont Transmitters               located in_the primary
                ' f) Conax RTD's                          plant areas with the g) -tiestinghouse RTO's                 exception of the diesel generator and service. water-intake structure-areas.
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