View source for PNO-III-99-058B, second Update on 981209 Fire in Process Bldg.Exit Meeting on 990205 Rescheduled from 990108 Due to Severe Weather.Cause of Fire Still Being Investigated by Usec.Some Release of Hex in Process Bldg Occurred

{{Adams
| number = ML20199D180
| issue date = 01/13/1999
| title = PNO-III-99-058B:second Update on 981209 Fire in Process Bldg.Exit Meeting on 990205 Rescheduled from 990108 Due to Severe Weather.Cause of Fire Still Being Investigated by Usec.Some Release of Hex in Process Bldg Occurred
| author name = Hiland P, Reidinger T
| author affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION &amp; ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
| addressee name = 
| addressee affiliation = 
| docket = 07007002
| license number = 
| contact person = 
| document report number = PNO-III-98-058B, PNO-III-98-58B, NUDOCS 9901190354
| document type = PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION OF EVENT OR OCCURRENCE (PNO,, TEXT-INSPECTION &amp; AUDIT &amp; I&amp;E CIRCULARS
| page count = 2
}}
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: j.                                                                January 13. 1999 P8ELIMI,NARYNOTIFICATIONOFEVENTORUNUSUALOCCURRENCEPNO-III-98-058B This preliminary notification constitutes EARLY notice of events of POSSIBLE           ,
safety or public interest significance. The information is as initially                 ;
received without verification or evaluation, and is basically all that is known by Region III staff (Lisle. Illinois) on this date.                              i Facility                                           Licensee Emergency Classification   ;
l Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant                    Notification of Unusual Event    ;
Piketon.0hio                                          Alert                            !
Dockets: 07007002                                     Site Area Emergency General Emergency X Not Applicable                    .

==Subject:==
FIRE IN PROCESS BUILDING - SECOND UPDATE The Augmented Inspection Team (AIT) reviewing a December 9,1998. fire at                '
,           the Portsmouth plant will present its preliminary findings in an exit j           meeting February 5,1999, with the certificate holder. U. S. Enrichment i
Corporation (USEC). The meeting in Piketon Ohio, will be o)en to the public. This meeting was rescheduled from January 8. 1999. 3ecause of severe weather conditions, j
The fire occurred in a gaseous purge system cell which is used to remove               :
extraneous gases from the processing system. There was extensive damage                i to the components in the cell. The cell was shut off from the rest of the               l processing system. Normal plant operations have continued.
Four plant employees received minor injuries, requiring onsite medical treatment.
The   3rincipal findings of the AIT which will be presented in the rescleduled exit meeting, include:
l
* The specific cause of the fire is still being investigated by USEC. A likely cause is a mechanical failure in a compressor which lead to overheating through friction. The heated metal led to a metal-gas reaction between the aluminum components and the uranium hexafluoride being processed. This hot metal-gas reaction also moved into adjacent components. The fire burned through portions of the system piping.                      ;
l           principally at piping elbows, and there was extensive damage to internal f
components of other equipment in the cell. Plant equipment outside the                  i affected cell was not. damaged.
* The type of fire which occurred, involving a hot metal-gas reaction, is described in the plant's Safety Analysis Report. A similar fire occurred at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant in 1978, and there have been                     '
smaller reactions in the past that have not led to any significant equipment damage at either Portsmouth or Paducah.
r                                                                                                   .
* There was some release of uranium hexafluoride into the process                       l building. Some of the uranium hexafluoride was likely consumed in the j'
metal-gas reaction before the processing system was breached. Radiation
,           monitors and air samplers outside the building showed no evidence of a measurable release.                                                                  f 99        54 990113 py11 PNO-III-98-058 PDR                        ;

~
  ,,    PNO-III-98-058B                             .     .                                                                  l
* About 3,000 gallons of oil used for motor lubrication and hydraulic control equipment spilled during the event. A portion of this oil subsequently ignited and burned.                                          ,
1
* The plant fire brigade's response to the fire was adequate, and proper 3recautions were taken to protect plant personnel and fire fighters.
31 ant emergency )lans and procedures, however, did not have sufficient information on t1e shutdown of the oil systems and on fire fighting technicues to be used when the processing equi) ment was breached. The plant cid not institute a continuous fire watc1 after the fire was        i extinguished ur til questioned by the NRC resident inspectors.
* Plant officials d:d not recognize that the fire met the requirements to j be classified as an alert under the plant emergency plan. This failure    1 meant that notifications of local, state and federal agencies were not    l made in a timely manner, as required.                                     l The State of Ohio will be informed of this updated information. A summary of these preliminary findings has also been discussed with USEC officials.
This information is current as of 2:30 p.m. CST on January 13, 1999.

==Contact:==
Pat Hiland             Tim Reidinger (630)829-9603          (630)829-9816 I
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