View source for NRC-90-0027, LER 89-034-01:on 891208,two Members of Fire Watch Did Not Complete Assigned Hourly Rounds from 891002-1207 in Reactor & Auxiliary Bldgs.Both Individuals Terminated & Fire Stations Equipped W/Unique Bar code.W/900221 Ltr

{{Adams
| number = ML20011F359
| issue date = 02/21/1990
| title = LER 89-034-01:on 891208,two Members of Fire Watch Did Not Complete Assigned Hourly Rounds from 891002-1207 in Reactor & Auxiliary Bldgs.Both Individuals Terminated & Fire Stations Equipped W/Unique Bar code.W/900221 Ltr
| author name = Orser W, Pendergast J
| author affiliation = DETROIT EDISON CO.
| addressee name = 
| addressee affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
| docket = 05000341
| license number = 
| contact person = 
| case reference number = CON-NRC-90-0027, CON-NRC-90-27
| document report number = LER-89-034, LER-89-34, NUDOCS 9003050192
| document type = LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (SEE ALSO AO,RO), TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
| page count = 7
}}

=Text=
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R                                                                                              February 21, 1990' NRC-90-oo27-                                           1 l
U.-   S.' Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555-

==Reference:==
Fermi 2 NRC Docket No. 50-381 Facility Operating License No. NPF-43

==Subject:==
                     . Licensee Event Report (LER) No. 89-034-01 Please-find enclosed LER.No. 89 o34-01, dated February 21, 1990, for a reportable avent that occurred on                                .
December 8, 1989                         A copy of this LER is also being sent to the Regional Administrator, USNRC Region III.
If you have any questions, please contact Joseph-Pendergast'at-(313) 586-1682.
Sincerely,-
3

==Enclosure:==
NRC Forms 366, 366A oc:           A. B. Davis J.-R. Eckert R. W. Defayette/W. L. Axelson W. G. Rogers J. F. Stang
%                                                          Wayne County Emergency
(                                                          Management Division o
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f 9003050192 900221 41                             h                                                  l gDR ADOCK 0500                              g                                                     l                          >

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1 NRC Perm 300 -                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    l U.S. 5:UCLEAR RETULATO4Y COMMIBBION
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a LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)                                                                   ' " *'a ' 8 8 ''' '"                                                   l F ACILITY NAME (1)                                                                                                                                       DOCKET NUedtER (2)                                                    PAGE (38 Fenni 2 =
T8TLE (di 0l5IoIoIo1314 l1                                                 1loFl016                 i Fire Watches Not Perfohned in Compliance with Technical Specifications IVtNT DAf t W                      LtR NUMBER (el                                REPORT DAf t (76                                             OTHER F A(VTIES INVOLVED ISI MONTH                         YEAR            Qu   sA6                 J F ACILTTY NAMES                                       OOCKET NUMBERi$)
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R                       26X05teH1H4                                      So,34(eH11                         90.73(all2Hvi                                                73.71(e) 0 01         l l             20.405(eH1Hul                                    50.38teH2)                         80.734eN2Heul                                                                                         des A6 cf
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LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER H21 N4ME-                                                                                                                                                                      TELEPHONE NUMBER AME A CODE Joseph Pendergast, Licensing Engineer                                                                                                                  31113           5I8 I 6I-t 116I812 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT F AILURE DESCRIGED IN THIS MAPORT H3)
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I           I I l             l l l                                                               1           I I I                              I I I                                                                       s SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14l                                                                                                        MONTH                              DAY     Y8AR SU8 MIS $10N TtS Of yes, como:ete 19fCTED Sv04rISSION DMEl                                           NO l                   l          l. _
l_          AesnACT w-,e M um a.,n. mm-,ewr .nr wr.no tr-w. u, a no, On December 8,1989, a review of key card transactions showed that one of the roving fire watch personnel had not completed his assigned hourly rounds required by Technical Specifications
!                                        3 3 7 9 and 3 7.8. The records showed that the individual had l~
sissed various portions'of his assigned hourly fire watch rounds l                                        on a randon basis from October 20, to December 7,1989                                                                                                            l                                                 .
1 The individual was interviewed and offered no explanation as to why he had not performed the assigned rounds correctly. The individual' involved was aware of the requirements.
During a subsequent review of key card transactions, it was                                                                                                       l determined that another individual, during the period of time                                                                                                     l from October 7 through December 30, 1989, had not performed the                                                                                                   l assigned rounds. The individual was interviewed and indicated.                                                                                                    l                                                .
that the rounds had been performed properly. Additional review                                                                                                    l did not provide any information that could substantiate the                                                                                                       I individual's clais.                                                                                                                                               I Both individuals involved were discharged. Methods for improvingl the reliability of the fire watch were developed and implemented.l t
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UCENSEE EVENT CEPORT ILER) TEXT CONTINUATION                         maono on wo mo-oms             :
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l Plant Conditions at the Time of Initial Discovery:                                                    l Operational Condition: Mode 2 (StarLup)
Reactor Power 14vels 1.5 Percent                                                                       ;
Reacter Pressure: 165 ' psig                                                                           :
Reactor Temperature 360 Degrees Fahrenheit                                                            l Description of the twents                                                                             j i
i On Decemoer 8,1989, at 0730 hours, a routine review of key card transactions showed that one of the roving fire watch personnel                                        ;
had not completed his assigned hourly fire watch rounds. These                                         l rounds were required by the plant Technical Specifications 3 3 7 9
* and 3 7 8. The review of the records showed that the individual had missed various portions of his assigned hourly fire watch rounds on a randon basis from October 20, to December 7, 1989                    l This individual was assigned to an eight hour shift.                                                  .
1 Fron October 20 through December 5, 1989, the plant was shutdown                                       ;
(Modes 4 and 5) for the first refuel outage. These missed fire watch rounds were required for the reasons described below.
: 1) The Reactor Building (NG) third floor fire detector (FRA)                                     l 782-N455A was not operable.                                                                       ;
: 2) The Reactor Building second floor Fire Rated Assembly                                         ;
i (TB) south of column 12 located in Fire Zone 12 was not operable.
: 3) 'the Reactor Building first floor Fire Door R1-11 (DR) was out of servios.                                                                                  ,
: 4) The Auxiliary Building (NF) Basement Zone 4 Fire Rated                                        ,
Assembly and three Fire Detectors were not operable.
: 5) The Auxiliary Building third floor Penetration Seal                                           '
E-8886 (SEAL) for the Division 2 Switch Gear (SWGR) room was                                     '
not operable.                                                                                    4
: 6) The Auxiliary Building fourth floor Fire Detector T82-N457B was not operable.                                                                      l
: 7) 'the Auxiliary Building fifth floor Fire Detector T82-N464A and Fire Zone 16 Fire Rated Assembly were not                                          i operable.
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t From Deossber 6 through December 7, the individual did not                                                                             ;
complete his assigned hourly fire watch rounds while the plant was                                                                     ,
in Startup (Mode 2) from the outage. The following equipment was out of servloe and required fire watches.
I
: 1) he Reactor Building first floor Fire Door RI-11 was out of service.'                                                                                                                }
l l                                       2) The Auxiliary Building basement Fire Detector T82-N444B l                                       was not operable.
t
: 3) me Auxiliary Building fifth floor Fire Detector                                                                          :
T82-N464A and Penetration Seal 5627 for St.andby Gas Treatment                                                              '
l                                        (BH) area were not operable.                                                                                               I j.
he second individual had not performed the assigned hourly                                              l                             :
rounds during the period of October 7 through December 30, 1989. l                                                                    t he areas described previously were not properly checked. In                                             l                             ,
addition, hourly fire watches for the following areas were not                                          I                             ;
performed: Door 2-14 the Auxiliary Building second floor fire                                           l                             ;
door, Emergency Diesel Generator 11 room and Emergency Diesel                                           l                             ,
l Generator 13 room.                                                                                      l                             l For all of these occasions, both individuals had signed                                                  I documentation stating that they had completed the assignea fire watch rounds. Therefore, Operations personnel believed the requirements of the Technical Specifications had been set,                                               l Both individuals were discharged after they were questioned as                                           I to why they had not performed their assigned rounds.                                                     l Cause of the Events
;                             he review of key card transactions showed that both individuals l                                                                       :
l                             had missed assigaed hourly rounds. They, however, had signed                                             l                             :
off as performing these rounds oorrectly. Mose individuals werel                                                                        l interviewed and offered no reasonable explanation as to why they l
!                             had not performed the assigned rounds correctly. We individuals l                                                                      ,
l involved were aware of the hourly round requirements.                                                    l                             )
i l
l                              Analysis of the Eventt l
The safety consequences were reduced in significanoe due to the plant parameters in existence during most of the time frame                                              l                             j under consideration.                                                                                                                   j

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                            ' LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION                        anaovio one wo sin-om
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: 1)  The Reactor Building third floor Fire Detector 782-W455A was not operable however, the remaining Fire Detectors on the third floor were operable. In addition, the fire loading on the third floor reactor building was at a minimum level throughout the outage and no significant fire hasard existed.
: 2)   The Reactor Building second floor Auxiliary Building Basement and Auxiliary Building fifth floor fire zone Fire Rated Assemblies are for the Safe Shutdown Equipment. The significance of these missed rounds was reduced since the plant was in a shut down oondition (mode 4 or mode 5) during the time frame under consideration. 1he ability of the plant to shut down safely was therefore not a significant factor. The fire loading in these sress was maintained at a minimum level throughout the out4ge and no significant fire hazards existed.
: 3)   The Reactor Building first floor rire door R1-11 was located in an area under a continuous watch by security personnel. The security personnel are aware of the steps necessary if a fire occurs.       In addition radiation protection personnel were often stationed in the area.
These factors in conjunction with the fire detection being in an operable state, fire loading being maintained as low as possible, and the outage associated personnel working in this area reduced the possibility of a fire remaining undetected for any substantial period of time.
: 4)   The cited Auxiliary Building fourth floor and basement fire detectors that were inoperable did not reduce the detection capabilities to the point that a fire would
: k.                                  remain undetected for any substantial period of time.
The fire loading in these areas was maintained at a minimum level throughout the outage and plant personnel routinely passed through these areas during various work assignments. The Auxiliary Building basenent is also protected with a sprinkler system which was operable.
No significant fire hazards existed in this areas during the outage.
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: 5)         The Auxiliary Building fifth floor Fire Detector                                                       ,
T82-N464A is located in the Reactor Building / Auxiliary                                                j Building Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC)                                              )
(VB) (VF) air intake, and is intended to detect the                                                  -
presence of smoke being introdaced sinto the plant from                                               )
an outside source. The remaining detection devices                                                   )
located in the HVAC air intake were operable as well as                                              i those located in the general floor area. The fire                                                    j loading was also maintained at a minisua through the                                                  i time frame in question. The lack of this device did not                                           j significantly reduce the ability to detect smoke in the incoming air supply. In addition, the plant was in a shut down condition for most of the time period under consideration.
: 6)           The penetration seals E-8886 for Division 2 Switch Gear                                             j Room and 5627 for Division 1 Standby Gas Treatment                                                    <
System were declared inoperable. However, they were  .
j inplace and had some ability to resist the passage of                                              '
,!-                                                      flame from one area to another. Also, the fire detection devices in these areas were operable and the                                              -
fire loading was maintained at a minimum level. These                                               .
factors would reduce the possibility of a fire remaining undetected for a substantial period of time and reduce the chance of a fire penetrating the barriers in question.
Second Individual                                                                                                            ,
For the additional areas in question the fire loading was                             l at a minimal level during this period. The fire detection l systems were operable in the areas except Zone 5 (one                                 ll detector out of service) and Zone 16 (one HVAC duct detector out of service). No significant fire hazards                                                            ;
existed in these areas and plant or outage personnel                                 I                          ;
routinely passed through these areas during various work                            j                           l assignments.                                                                         l                           ,
Corrective Actionst
: 1)           Both individuals involved were discharged.                                 l 4
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: 2)    gffective January 24, 1990, the following steps were                         i taken to improve fire watch reliability:                                     l l
: a. Licensee Event Report 89-034-00 was discussed withi fire watch personnel.                                                  I
: b. Fire untoh stations have been placed throughout                        I the RNR complex, Reactor Building, Auxiliary                           l Building and General Service Water Pump House.                         l These stations are equipped with a unique bar codeI number. The fire watches are required to                               I electronically read the bar code on the fire watchi stations located in areas appearing on the hourly l rounds sheet.                                                          I
: c. The nuclear fire protection specialist will                            l periodically review the performance of each                            l individual fire watch. The performance of newly                        l                        i hired fire watch personnel will be reviewed until l                                           l the fire protection specialist is satisfied as to 1                                           -
the individuals ability to satisfactorily perfora l                                             l the assigned rounds.                                                    I Previous Similar Events:
Licensee Event Report 88-036, " Failure to Properly Perform Startup                                             i Checklist and Daily Plant Surveillances", described an event where                                              !
an individual signed off a surveillance he had not completed.
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