View source for NPL-97-0061, LER 97-S01-00:on 970204,compensatory Measures for Microwave Zones Had Not Been Implemented.Caused by Mgt Oversight of CAS & SAS Activities Was Inadequated.Addl Mgt Oversight of CAS & SAS Operations Has Been Implemented

{{Adams
| number = ML20136B906
| issue date = 03/04/1997
| title = LER 97-S01-00:on 970204,compensatory Measures for Microwave Zones Had Not Been Implemented.Caused by Mgt Oversight of CAS & SAS Activities Was Inadequated.Addl Mgt Oversight of CAS & SAS Operations Has Been Implemented
| author name = Johnson D, Mccullum J
| author affiliation = WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER CO.
| addressee name = 
| addressee affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
| docket = 05000266
| license number = 
| contact person = 
| document report number = LER-97-S01, LER-97-S1, NPL-97-0061, NPL-97-61, NUDOCS 9703110188
| document type = LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (SEE ALSO AO RO), TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
| page count = 4
}}

=Text=
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                       . Wisconsin Electnc POWER COMPANY Point Beach Nuclear Plant                                                                   (414) 755-2321 6610 Nuclear Rd.. Two Rivers. WI 54241 NPL-97-006i March 4,1997 Document Control Desk                                                                                     l U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Mail Station Pl-137                                                                                        l Washington, DC 20555 Ladies / Gentlemen:
DOCKETS 50-266 AND 50-301 SECURITY REPORTABLE EVENT 97-S01-00 POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT. UNITS 1 AND 2 Enclosed is Security Event Report 97-S01-00 for Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2. This i
report is provided in accordance with 10 CFR 73.71(b)(1), which requires a 30-day written report to be submitted for safeguards events defined in 10 CFR 73 Appendix G.I.c, "Any failure, degradation, or discovered vulnerability in a safeguards system that could allow unauthorized or undetected access to a protected area, material access area, controlled access area, vital area, or transport for which compensatory measures have not been employed."
If yoa require additional information, please contact us.
Sincerely,
              &Q .fh - -
Douglas F. Johnson                                                                                 f Manager,                                                                                                  ,
Regulatory Services and Licensing                                                                       g FAF/
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Enclosure                                                                                                .
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                    \                                                                                               l cc:      NRC Resident Inspector NRC Regional Administrator bec:     Flentje, Johnson, Malanowski, McCullum, Patulski, 9703110188 970304               "'
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NRC FORM 388                                                U.S. NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION                            APPRaVED SY OMS LQ. 31804104
                            ~
(4-95)                                                                                                                            EXPIRES 04/30/98 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)                                                            REPORTED LESSONS LEARNED ARE INCORPORATED INTO THE LICENSING PROCESS AND FED BACK TO INDUSTRY.
4 FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESilMATE (See reverse for required nurnber of                                        TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAOEMENT digits / characters for each block)                                      BRANCH (T-6 F33), U.S. NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMIS$10N, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJFCT FACILITY NAME (1)                                                                                            DOCKET NUMSER (2)                          PAGE (3)
Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit 1                                                                                      05000266                       1 OF 3 TITLE (4)
Uncompensated PA Alarm Zone EVENT OATE (S)                            LER NUMSER (S)                         REPORT DATE (7)                      OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED IS) l SEQUENTIAL         REVISION                                   FACILITY NAME                      DOCKET NUMBER MONTH         DAY    YEAR IYEAR               NUMBER            NUMBER     MONTH        DAY        YEAR   Unit 2                                05000301 l         l                                                                               FACILITY NAME                      DOCKET NUMBER 02           04 l 97 l 97                -     S01       -          00      03           04         97                                               05000 OPERATING l THIS REPORT IS SUSMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR S: (Check one or more) (11)
MODE (t)                            20 220 %                             20.2203(aH2)M                               50.73<ai(2Ho                  50.73(aH2)(viii)
Nl POWER                   l          20.2203(aH1)                         20.2203(a)(3Hi)                             50.73(aH2Hii)                 50.73(aH2)(x)
LEVEL (10)           0               20.2203(aH2Hij                       20.2203t H3Hii)                             50.73(aH2)(ia)         X      73 71 20.2203(aH2)(ii)                    20.2203(a)(4)                               50.73(eH2Hivl                 OTHER 20.2203(s}{2)(in)                    50.36(c)(1)                                 50.73(aH2)(v)          Specify in Abstract below 20.2203(aH2H6v)                      50.36(c)(2)                                 50.73(aH2)(vli)        or wt NRC Form 3e8A LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)
NAME                                                                                                                     TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)
Joan E. McCullum, Security Supervisor                                                                                     (414) 755-6221 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRISED IN THis REPORT (13)
CAUSE        SYSTEM     COMPONENT             MANUFACTURER        REPORTABLE               CAUSE        SYSTEM        COMPONENT      MANUFACTURER          REPORTABLE TO NPRDS                                                                                TO NPRDS SUPPL         NTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)                                                XPECTED                                     YEAR YES                                                                                                  SUSMISSION (If yes complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).                                   X    NO                   DATE (15)
ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approxirr.ately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16) on February 4, 1997, during the early to mid-morning, PBNP and the surrounding area experienced severe weather conditions (high winds and snow). This resulted in numerous alarms being received on intrusion detection devices from both the strong winds and the weight of the snow.
This requirad posting of additior.a1 personnel. At 1329 hours, the CAS operator initiated compensatory measures for loss of multiple e-fields and microwave zones. At 1342 it was discovered that compensatory measures were not implemented for one alarmed microwave zone (M10) for approximately 16 minutes; 6 mimites longer than the required 10-minutes allowed for establishment of compensatory measures. Compensatory measures were established at 1345 hours. The root cause of this event was personnel failure to follow compensatory measures procedures and checklists and to adhere to communications standards. Contributing factors were weak management oversight of CAS/SAS activities in that adherence to established procedures, use of checklists and standards was not being enforced; corrective actions from previous events were not fully completed; and long-term security hardware issues have not been fully resolved.
NRC FORM 3G6 (4-95)

            .,           ,. - .                      . - - - - - - ~ - .        -- -         . . .   - . _ . -                    . . _ - . - ~ .         --           . . -
NRC FERM 35SA                                                                                                              U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY C&MMISSION le 95)'
                                ~
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME til                                 DOCKET NUMBER (2)                       LER NUMBER (6)                     PAGE 13)
YEAR   SEQUENTIAL             REVISION Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit 1                                                  05000266                                NUMBER               NUMBER     2 OF 3 97  -
S01                   00 TEXT ttf more space is required, use additenalcopies of NRC Form 366A) (17)
 !     Event Start:                            February 4, 1997, at 1329 htars i
Event End                               February 4, 1997, at 1345 hours Location:                               Protected Area Operations:                             Unit 1 at 90% power Unit 2 in refueling shutdown with reactor defueled l     Security Force:                         Contract i
Number & Type of Personnel Involved:                                                 2 contractor personnel i      Event

== Description:==

!      On February 4, 1997, severe weather conditions were being experienced
;      during the early and mid-morning hours. Posting of dedicated observers was performed on a number of occasions throughout the morning. At i       1329 hours, the CAS operator initiater: the compensatory procedure for
,       loss of multiple intrusion detection zones. It was discovered at 1342-hours that compensatory measures for microwave zones M9, M10 and M22 had not been implemented. Of these three microwave zones, only M10 was in an alarmed status.
l i       Immediate Corrective Action:                                        Upon identification at 1342 hours that the microwave M10 had not been compensated, compensatory measures were
..      established at 1345 hours. Approximately 16 minutes had elapsed from initiation of compensatory measures to full implementation.
Cause:
j.
: 1.          The CAS and SAS operators failed to implement procedural guidance and associated checklists for the implementation of severe weather
;-                  compensatory measures.
: 2.          The CAS and SAS operators failed to adhere to accepted communications standards including use of the intercom, public address systems and i                   repeatbacks.
: 3.          Management oversight of CAS and SAS activities was inadequate.
: 4.          Corrective actions identified during previous events have not been fully implemented.
: 5.          A contributing factor was the condition of the security hardware systems.           There are a number of upgrades that have been planned, but they have not yet been implemented.
3    NRC FORM 366A (4 95) l 1

NHC FORtf 3%43                                                                                                 U.S. NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMlSC40N (4WJ)
* iLICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION                                                                                 l FACILITY NAME til                                DOCKET NUMBER (2)                LER NUM8ER (8'i                  PAGE 13)
YEAR          SEQUENTIAL             REVISION                       l Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit 1                                              05000266                        NUMMR                NUMMR    3OF3                  l 97         -
S01                  00 TEX 1 lit more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Fo,m 366A) (11)
Corrective Action:
: 1. Senior security supervision has implemented additional management                                                                                       ,
oversight of CAS and SAS operations by senior contractor supervision.                                                                                   l
: 2.      An administrative po'sition is being added to the security force to relieve senior security supervision of tasks that inhibit their ability to provide an appropriate level of management oversight for security operations.
: 3.      The security supervisor met with all members of the security force on February 12, 1997, and February 19, 1997. During these meetings, the security supervisor informed the security force of the licensee's                                                                                       .
performance standards and expectations, as well as identifying the                                                                                      l methods to be used for monitoring and enforcement of these standards and expectations.                                                                                                                                       l
: 4.      The SAS operator involved in the event received additional training in areas of identified performance deficiencies prior to being rescheduled to perform CAS or SAS duties.                                                                                                               l
: 5. The CAS operator was relieved of CAS/SAS duties.
: 6.        A report delineating the deficiencies and current status of the physical condition of the security hardware system was prepared and presented to senior site management on February 14, 1997. An evaluation of this report on March 3, 1997, by licensee senior engineering management representatives determined there were three areas of the physical security system which required an in-depth engineering evaluation to be performed. These were the security computer, the closed circuit television network, and the perimeter intrusion detection system.                                  By September 1, 1997, engineering evaluations will be completed, decisions will be made, and project plans will be formalized, as appropriate, to address these three areas.
Notifications:
The NRC resident inspector was notified of this event at 1422 hours on February 4, 1997. The event was reported via ENS to the NRC Operations Center at 1413 hours on February 4, 1996.
Similar Occurrences:
LER 266/94-S01-00 LER 266/95-S03-00 LER 266/95-SO4-00 LER 266/96-S01-00 NRC FORM 366A (4-95)}}