View source for NLS2008029, Triennial Fire Protection Unresolved Issue

{{Adams
| number = ML080740507
| issue date = 03/10/2008
| title = Triennial Fire Protection Unresolved Issue
| author name = Minahan S
| author affiliation = Nebraska Public Power District (NPPD)
| addressee name = 
| addressee affiliation = NRC/RGN-IV/DNMS
| docket = 05000298
| license number = 
| contact person = 
| case reference number = IR-07-008, NLS2008029
| document type = Letter type:NLS, Licensee Response to Notice of Violation
| page count = 9
}}

=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:Nebraska Public Power District 
/ilrvn).i llicre,I,CII SO "tied u s NLS2008029 March 10. 2008 Regional Administrator, Region IV 1J.S. Nuclear Regulatal-y Commission 61 1 Ryan Plaza Dr., Suite 400 Arlington, TX 7601 1-4005 

==Subject:==
Cooper Nuclear Station Triennial Fire Protection Unresolved Issue 

==Reference:==
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Cominission letter to Nebraska Iuhlic Power District dated February I, 2008, Cooper Nuclear Station - NRC Triennial Fire Protection Inspection Report 05000298/2007008 and Exercise of Enforcement Discretion 

==Dear Sir:==
The puipose of this letter is to provide additional information to tlie Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) related to enforcement discretion, as discussed in a teleplioiiic debrief conducted on March 3, 2008, between Mr. Roy Caniano, otlier NRC staff a i d Cooper Nuclear Station (CNS). The purpose of tlic debrief was to iiiforiii CNS of preliminary decisioiis made by the NRC regarding the disposition of ail Unresolved Iteiri (URI) that was documented in tlie referenced Inspection Report (Hi). During the debrief, CNS was iiifoi-med that the NRC determined CNS would not be afforded cnforcement discretion for a fiiidiiig related to inadequate procedural guidance discovered during tlic 2007 Triennial Fire Protection inspection aiid that the finding did not constitute a high safety significant condition. This decision was iiiadc oii February 28, 2008 and initially communicated to the CNS Liceusing Manager 011 Febi-uary 29, 2008.
Tlic 2007 Triennial Fire Protection inspection was pcrforiiied during the weeks of May 21,2007 tlirougli May 25, 2007 and Julie 11, 2007 tlirougli June 15, 2007. An onsite debrief was conducted on June IS, 2007 at which time three findings were discussed. Two oftlie findings were subject to cnforcerncnt discretion aiid the remaining finding was cliaracterizcd as iiecdiiig further review. In August 2007, CNS was notified that enforccincnt discretion would he applied to the third finding liending a completed significance cvalualioii. 13etweeii August and December 2007, CNS was informed that the safety significance evaluation oftlie rcmaining finding iieedcd additioiial review aiid was not considered to be a high priority, given it only needed to he less tliaii high safety significance. However, prior to the telcplioiiic exit held on December 26, 2007, CNS was notified of tlie possibility that tlie safety significance was unresolved and that the finding would be documentcd as a lJRl and resolved at a later date. As docuiiieiited in the subject IR, three findings were identified. Two were granted eiiforccmeiit discretion and the remaining finding (inadequate procedures) needed additional information to complete ai1 COOPERNUCLEAR STATION P.O. Box 9 8 / Brownville, NE 68321-0098 Telephone: (402) 825-3811 /Fax: (402) 825.5211 w u l p P d. t o m 

NLS2008029 Page 2 of 3 evaluation of tlie safety significance. The results fiom that evaluation would he the determining factor whether or not enforcciiieiit discretion would bc applied. The additional evaluation and analysis iieeded to resolve this issue was identified as IJlil 0500298/2007008-01.
During tlie debrief, held oii March 3, 2008, NRC staff indicated thc finding in question was iiot considered to be of high safety significance. In addition, three ofthc four criteria, as defined in Interim Enforcement Policy liegarding Discretion for Certain Fire Irotectioii Issues were considered satisfied. However, NiiC staff detei-mined that criterion ( 3 ) which states It was not lilcely to have been previously identified by routine licensee efforts such as noi-mal surveillance or quality (QA) assurance activities, was not met for several reasons.
in order to better understand tlie staffs position for not granting eiiforceiiieiit discretion, CNS reviewed inspection reports fioiii several stations tliat are in the pi-ocess of transitioiiing to National Fire Protection Association Standard (NFPA 805). It appears that the application of enforcement discretion and evaluation of safety significance, as docuincnted in the associated inspection reports, is not consistent with how the NRC staff decided to address the procedural issue at CNS. Of particular interest was the area of inadequate procedures described in two of tlie inspection reports. in each case, and for those violations where procedures were not the central issue, enforcement discretion was granted with relatively simple statements that documented acceptance ofthe licensee significance evaluation (verifying tlie condition was not of high safety significance) and that tlie enforcement criterion wcrc met.
CNS corninitted to converting tlie Fire Protection Program (FPP) to the requircinents of 10 CFR Part 50.48 (c) and NFPA 805, as docuiiiented in a letter to the NRC dated December 22, 2005.
The decision to make tlie conversion was pi-imarily a function o t ciisuriiig the FPP would gain tlie benefits from developing a fire Probability Risk Assessment model, coi-1-ecting latent issues that are identified during the transition pi-ocess, aiid reconciliation of the liceiise basis which includes resolution of outstanding related issues. The overall intent is to ensure resources are aligned to iiiiprove aiid maintain FPP eleiiieiits that are impoitant to safety.
CNS believes criterion (3) is satisfied and apprcciates NiiC consideration of the additional information presented in the Attachment. If you have any questions, comments, or coiicenis, please contact Paul V. Fleming, Nuclear Safety Assurance Director, at (402) 825-2774.
Vice President-Nuclear and Chief Nuclear Officer Attachment 

NLS2008029 Iagc 3 of 3 cc:
Docuiiieii! Control Dcsk USNRC Cynthia A. Cai-peiiter Director, Office of Enforceiiieiit USNRC - Headquarters Liiida J. Smith Braiich Chief, DRS/Eiigiiieeriiig Braiich 2 USNRC - Region IV Senior Resident Iiispec!oi USNRC - CNS NG Distribution CNS Records 

NLS2008029 Attachment Page 1 of5 2007 TRIENNlhl., IilliE PRO'IECTION UNl<ESOI,VED ITEM INTERIM ENII'ORCEMEN'I' GUIDANCE EVALUATION During the 2007 Trieiitiial Fire Protection inspection, a condition was identified related to the inability of Cooper Nuclear Station (CNS) to locally operate several iiiotor operated valves during or following certain fire scenarios in tlie rcactor building in accordance with station procedurcs in place at the time. The Nuclear Ikgulatory Coiiimissioii (NRC) Enforcement Policy, pages 70 and 71, provides guidance to tlic NRC for when it is acceptable to exercise enforcciiiciil discretion for certain fire protection issues identified at plants transitioning to NFPA 805, "Pcrfoniiiancc-Based Standard for Fire I'rotcction for Light Water Reactor I3ectric Generating Plants (I 0 CFR 50.48)." Tlic following cxccrpt fi-om the Enforcemctit Policy identifies four critci-ia that must be met for enforcement discrction to be given:
Under this iizterinz ci~jbrceineizt policy, eiZforceinei7/ aclioiz noivzally will not be ta/~iz,fiii*
n violaiioii of 10 CFR 50.48(11) (or the requirenieiii.~ in a Jre protectioii. liceizse coiio'itioii) involving a problem snch as in eiigineering, desigii, iii?pleinentiiig procedures, or in.stallation, if the iiiolation is docuineizted iii ai7 inspection r e p ~ ~ t aizd ii i1ieet.r all ofthe,/ollowiizg criteria:
(I)
It was liceizsee-ideizt$iied u.s ci result o/i/.s voluiitary initiative to adopi the risk-ii@nzed.
j)eYfbri?iaiice-basedJire protection p r ~ g, n i n iiicluded under 10 CI'R 50.
NRC ideii@/ies the violnlion, it was lilcely in the NRC st@s view tlzat the liceiisee 14~021ld have identified the violation in light qflhe ckjned,scope, thoroughness, and.schedule of the licen.see!s transition to 10 CFR SO. 48(c) pi.ovided the schedule reasonably pr(11~ide.s for coinpletioiz ofihe transition MjilhiT7 IWO,years qj'the date cfthe licensee's letter of intent to inzplcni.eiit I O CFR SO. 4S(c) or other pei~iod grniiled by NRC; It was corrected or will he con-ecleid as a result qfcompletiizg the traiisitioii to I O CFX 50.48('), Also, iininerliale corrective action aizrl/or coi~ipeiisalo~y iizeasum are tulcen within a reasoizahle time coininemurate i d l i the risk signifjcunce of the isme, folloiiiiiig ident{/ication (this action slzould iizi~oli~c?
expcnidiiig the initiative, cis necessui-y, to ideizt!fi other issue.^ caused l q 1 similar iwot ca~i.ses);
It MUS not liizely to have been pmiiozi.s[y ideiit(fied 11y routine licensee efjjirt,s szrch us ii01'illLl/ surveilluizce or quality cissui~ni~e (QA) activities; and or, $the (2)
(3)
(4) 11 MJUS ?Kll MJil@Ll. 

N132008029 Attachment Page 2 of 5 During the debrief held on March 3, 2008, bctwccii the NRC Region 1V staff and CNS liersonnel, the NRC iiitlicated that tliree of the four criteria were considcrcd satisfied. Tlie staffdeteriiiined that criterion (3) which states, It was riot likely to have heen previously idciitified by routiiic licensee efforts such as normal surveillance 01-quality assurance (QA) activities was not met.
Tlie NRCs detcrminatioii was based 011 considering CNS processes, such as QA audits, self assessments, and the Corrective Action Irogram, as being routine liceiisee efforts, aiid therefore should have identified the condition. Tliis attachment therefore only addresses that determination, CNS acknowledges that iiiaccuratc information was incorporated fioiii the 1996-1 997 Safe Shutdowu Analysis Report rc-analysis into pi-occdurcs S.41OST-FlRE and 5.4 FIRE-SD.
I-lowever, it is CNSs position that routine efforts would not liave identified this condition due to the depth of actions iiecessai-y to identify tlie condition, the scope of routine liccnsec cfforts such as suiveillance and QA activities, and tlie do not opcii 1x)licy used at tlie station.
Surveillance Program The purpose of tlie CNS surveillance program is to ensure required tests, calibrations, and checks are performed on a frequency required to iiicct Technical Specifications, Technical liequiremeiits Manual, Offsite Dose Assessiiieiit Manual, design rcquircmcnts and licensing commitments. The surveillance procedures that iiiipleiiieiit tlie surveillance prograin providc guidance for the required tests, calibrations, checlts, analysis, iuiid prcvciitive maintenance.
The scope of tlie surveillance program in regard to fire protcction and alternate shutdown equipment includes, but is not limited to, testing of the Alteriiate Shutdown Room functions, Diesel Generator isolation switches, ciiicrgency lighting, fire barriers, lire suppression systems, aiid fire detection. The activities performed under the prograin are coiiducted 011 a repetitive basis, at predeteriiiined ficquencies, and are considered routine licensee cffoi-t.
To identify the issues found during the Triennial Fire Protection inspection would require the opening of motor starters or the review of electrical drawings with the intent to validate the procedural steps ofS.41OST-FIRE and 5.4FIRE-SD against tlie system design. Therc are 110 tests, calibrations, checks, analyses, or preventive maintenance within the scope of the surveillance prograin that iiivolve this level oT intrusiveness. Proccdures 5.41OST-FIRE and 5.4FIRE-SD are not within the scope of the surveillance ~ii-ogram. The routine licensee cffoi-t of conducting a suiveillance prograiii would not likely to have previously itieiitified the condition.
Quality Assurance Activities QA audits on Fire Protection are iierformed on a biennial basis (QA Policy Docuiiieiit and CNS Procedure 0-QA-OS) and were previously conductcd on an annual basis. In the last several years, audits were pcrforiiied on Fire Protection in 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007. The purpose of these types of audits is to assess tlic fire protection prograiii, iiiipleiiienting procedures, and equipment (QA Policy Docuiiient, C.2.a.2.g). The scope of these audits was develoIied from Generic Letter (GL) 82-21, Technical Specifications for Fire Protection Audits. This GL provides guidance 

NLS2008029 A ttachmen t Iagc 3 of5 which is what we l:NlIC] believc would be a comprehensive and conscientious audit program.
Such a program would be responsive to the overall prograiniiiatic recpirements contained in 10CFR50.48(a) and guideline position in 1371 9.5-1 0 rhc details provided in the Generic Letter for Quality Assuraiice audits are a classical assessniciit of the fire protection program which includes QA activities to assess such areas as fire reven en ti on, detection, suppression, mitigation, and brigade response to fires. This is the routine or baseline scopc ofthe fire protcction audit, as recommended by the Generic Letter, and docs not provide guidance for assessing safe shutdown or its emergency procedures, such as CNS Procedure 5.4POST-I~IRl~
or 5.4FIRE-SD.
Additional QA activities are scoped or developed Tor an audit based on the conduct ofa vulnerability review. This is a method by which relevant CNS and industry operating experience, such as NRC Inspection Reports, 1NIO Evaluations, previous CNS and Eiitergy QA audits, self-assessmcnts, and the Correctivc Action lrogimm (CAP) arc reviewed for applicability to the audit area. For the 2007 QA Audit, the primary coiicerii identified cluring the vulnerability review was the ability to perform manual actions in the time available before the plant will he placed in an unrecoverable condition. Deficiencies such as those identified in the 2007 NRC Triennial inspection regarding inadequacies in lrocedurc 5.4POSI-FIRE and 5.4FlRE-SD were not identified as a vuhierable area of coiiccrii based 011 CNS and industry operating experience and therefore were not included in tlie audit scope. QA activities ofthis type arc beyoiid the i-outitie scopc ofthe Fire Pi-otection audit.
To identify the concerns found during the Triennial Fire Protection inspection would require the opening of motor starters or the review of electrical drawings with the intent to validate the procedural steps of every iiiaiiual action in 5.4POST-FIRE and 5.411RE-Sl). In addition, detcnnining that more than one coiltactor needs to be pushed is not straight forward, simplc, or obvious when looking inside the starter panels. hi particular, the starter for Rl-IR-2513 is one of the valves that required additional coiitactors to be pushed. For this valve one contactor was marked open and another marked closed. This would havc matched the procedure instruction. The third contactor is for the motor. Ihe field walk down that discovered this concern involved a two person team fi-on1 Operations and Engineering. Only when a question was raised and a circuit analysis perforiiied did the team undcrstand how to correctly operate this valve. This condition would not have likely been previously discovci-cd even during non-routine QA activities without additional technical assistance.
Corrective Action Program arid tlie 2004 Triennial Fire Protection Ii~spection The pur11ose of CAP is to identify, evaluate, correct and track problems. The process allows ti.aclting of non-CAI related work and dlows trending of CAP information to hell) identify precursor events. The program has a ZCI-O tlireshold cutry point, meaning that any individual can enter what they feel is an issue that needs to he addressed. This identification activity is considered a routine licensee effort. The scopc oftlie evaluation and correclive action phasc of CAP varics as delerinined by the significance of tlie issue that is being adtlrcsscd. Some issues require cause analysis and others direct con-1-ective action. Corrective actions can be varied as to their depth and complexity, and are not routine. 

NIS2008029 A tt aclinicnt Page 4 of 5 llie 2004 Triennial Fire Protection Inspection Report, 2004008, docuiiieiited two findiiigs. Jlic first finding was foi-lion-compliant use of inanual operator actions for 10 CFR 50 Appendix R, Section Ili.G.2 areas of the plant. The second finding was relatcd to inadequate instructions provided in Procedure 5.4POST-FIRE, Fire Induced Shutdown From Outside Control i1ooni.
The report cited three examples for the second finding. TIic first two examples were related to inadequate insti-uctioiis for ensuring: 1) tlie High Prcssurc Coolaiit liijection system was secured within analyzed time Iiinitations and 2) the Main Stcain Isolation Valves wcrc closed in time to prevent feedwater from overfilling the reactor vessel and dainaging safety reliefvalves. Tlic third example was inadequate instructions to ensure operators would con-ectly position inotor operated valves. Also noted in the IR, these same inadequate instructions could result in the over-thrust and potential damage to valves due to bypassing the protective functiou oftorquc and limit switches.
Tlie above findings were entered into CAP as coiidition reports. Short teriii action taken by CNS was to verify that any of tlie valves with the potential to be damaged by over-thrust were not required to be operated later for achieving and inaiiitaiiiing hot or cold shutdown and the procedure was enhanced by Iiigliligliting operator action verbs. Also labels were provided oii thc motor control centers to identi6 open and close contactoi-s.
A long-term corrective action evaluated operator manual actions against certain criteria in tlic NRC inspection manual. One ofthe criteria is to perform a Verification and Validation and states, Detei-mine whether tlic inanual actions have been verified and validated by plant walkdowiis using the current procctlure. Ensure that the licensee has adequately evaluated the capability of operators to perform tlie manual action in the time available befoore tlie plant will be placed in an unrecoverable condition. A follow-up action to the evaluation of operator manual actions was to perform a validation of tlie 5.4POST-FIRE pi-ocedurc. Tlie validation attachment of CNS Procedure 0.4A was used to perform the validation. As documcnted in the cotidition report root cause that was conducted for tlie 2007 finding, the Procedure 0.4.4 validation checklist did not contain clear guidance for validating proccdurc stcps that were to be perfoniied inside inaccessible enclosures and cabinets. Because of the inadequate validation guidance and the ad hoc station policy ofdo not open electrical cabinets, the manual actions were siinulated without opening electrical cabinets, with a focus on tlie timing of the actions thus this non-routine action plan would not have discovered the identified condition.
rlie corrective action program is routinely used to document iiew conditions found, regardless of Bow they are identified. I-Iowcver, the associated evaluation which is tlie function of sigiiificaiicc and the development ofa corrective action plan are activities that are not considered routine as thcy are reactive by design and should not be used to deteriiiine ifcritcrion (3) is met.
2007 Fire Protection Manual Operator Action Feasibility Review Tlie purpose of tlie Maiiual Action Feasibility Review dated May 18, 2007 was to prepare for the Fire Protection Jriennial inspcction. The feasibility of manual actions was documented in several separate docuiiients sucli as tlie Safe Shutdown Analysis Report, corrective actions and 

NLS2008029 Attaclinicnt Page 5 of 5 several vendor reports. lhis review was to create a docuinent that consolidated past effo~?s for determining the feasibility of manual actions.
The scope was to review cui-rent manual actions that are documented within 5.41OST-1:lRI.i and 5.4Fire-SI) and compare against NRC hispection Manual Attachment 71 1 1 1.05TT1, Enclosure 2, InsIxctioii Criteria For Fire Protection Manual Actions. This effort was a docuinent review only iind did not include any design verification or walk downs oftlie nianual actions. A primary industry concern with iiiaiiual actions has been and continues to be the ability to perform tlie actions in tlie time available before the plant will be placed in an unrecoverable condition. Some of the documents reviewed included information regarding tlie timing of manual actions and time requirenients to complete critical functions For this review to discover the discrepancies identified in the IR, tlie review would have needed to include: field walk downs, tlie opening of electrical cabinets, and thc validation of component and wiring configuration for DC starter circuits.
The review did not have the scope or the intent to validate the electrical configuration of motor starters or perform field walk down verifications, and therefore would not have been likely to identify this concern.
Conclusion CNS believes that the pi-pose and scope ofthe audits, surveillances, self assessments, and CAP performed, as described above, were conducted appropriately and would not have identified tlie latent procedure issues. Issues steiiiniing from previous inspections, audits and surveillances were adequately captured in CAP with corrective actions identified and taken. The pi-ocedurai issues that were discovered during the 2007 Trieiiiiial Fire 11-otection inspection and corrective actions taken kom previous inspections, audits and surveillances are not considered routine licensee activities.
In addition, inspection findings of a similar nature for plants in Region 1 and I1 wei-e afforded enforcement discretion. Given tlie information documented in tlie associated inspection reports, it is not clear that a consistent application of tlie criteria that must be satisfied for cnforcenient discretion was provided to CNS. In the third case (a Region 111 plant), where procedures were not the central issue, a condition was known previously, was not effectively resolved in CAI and was identified during a triennial fire protection inspection. Enforcement discretion was provided in this case also.
In light ofthe above information, CNS believes all criterion are met for enforcenient discretion, as outlined in the Enforcement Maii~ial. 

ATTACHMENT 3 LIST OF REGULATORY COMMITMENTSO ATlACHMENl 3 LIST OF L<EGUI.ATORY COMMITMENTSO Correspondence Number: NLS2008029 The following table identifies those actions committed to by Nebraska Public Power District (NPPD) in this document. Any other actions discussed in the submittal represent intended or planned actions by NPPD. They are described for information only and are not regulatory commitments. Please notify the Licensing Manager at Cooper Nuclear Station of any questions regarding this document or any associated regulatory commitments.
COMMITMENT COMMITMENT NUMBER None COMMITTED DATE OR OUTAGE 1 PROCEDURE 0.42 REVISION 22 PAGE 18 OF 25-- I}}