View source for NL-13-1503, Farley, Units 1 and 2, Calculation Number: SE-C051326701-008, NFPA 805 Fire Risk Evaluations, Version 1.0. Part 4 of 5

{{Adams
| number = ML14038A024
| issue date = 09/24/2013
| title = Farley, Units 1 and 2, Calculation Number: SE-C051326701-008, NFPA 805 Fire Risk Evaluations, Version 1.0. Part 4 of 5
| author name = Price C
| author affiliation = Southern Nuclear Operating Co, Inc
| addressee name = 
| addressee affiliation = NRC/NRR
| docket = 05000348, 05000364
| license number = 
| contact person = 
| case reference number = NL-13-1503
| document report number = SE-C051326701-008, Version 1.0
| package number = ML14038A017
| document type = Calculation
| page count = 695
}}

=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 075 Attachment -Unit 2 Fire Area 075 FRE for Fire Area SWIS 5 kV Switchgear Room B and West Stairs Revision:0 Name Fire PRA Preparer Fire PRA Reviewer Fire Protection Preparer Fire Protection Reviewer NSCA Preparer NSCA Reviewer FRE Preparer FRE Reviewer George Hunter Clint Pierce Robert Kirkpatrick Rebecca Puckett Larry Valmonte Dan Funk Micky Heatherly Brandon Jamar Revision 0 Page 1 of 23 Version 1.0 Page 2109 of 3726 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 075 1.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION INPUT .....................................................................
4 1.1 Variances from the Deterministic Requirements 
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4 1.2 Fire Protection Systems and Features ..................................................
4 1.2.1 Construction 
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4 1.2 .2 D e te ctio n ................................................................................... 
..4 1.2.3 Fixed Fire Suppression 
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5 1.2.4 Manual Suppression 
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5 1.2.5 Ventilation (Smoke Removal) .....................................................
5 1.2.6 Other Fire Protection Features .....................................................
5 1.2.7 Fire Hazard Identification 
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5 1.2.8 Fire PRA Input .............................................................................
5 2.0 RISK EVALUATION 
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6 2.1 Fire PRA Variant Case Calculation 
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6 2.2 Compliant Case Calculation 
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10 2.2.1 VFDRs Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA .............................
10 2.2.2 VFDRs Not Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA .....................
10 2.2.3 Compliant Case Results ...........................................................
11 2.2.4 Required Modifications 
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15 2.2.5 Required Recovery Actions .......................................................
15 2.3 Risk Evaluation Results ........................................................................
15 3.0 DID EVALUATION 
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18 3.1 Defense-in-Depth Evaluation 
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18 3.2 Defense-in-Depth Review Results ......................................................
18 3.2.1 Required Modifications 
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19 3.2.2 Required Recovery Actions .......................................................
19 4.0 SAFETY MARGIN EVALUATION 
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20 4.1 Safety Margin Evaluation 
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20 4.1.1 Fire Modeling ............................................................................
20 4.1.2 Plant System Performance 
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20 4.2 Safety Margin Results ..........................................................................
20 5.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION RESULTS ............................................................
21 5.1 Dispositions of VFDRs ........................................................................
21 Revision 0 Page 2 of 23 Version 1.0 Page 2110 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 075 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 Fire Risk Evaluation Summary of Fire Protection Systems and Features 22 Summary of Recovery Actions .............................................................
22 Summary of Plant Modifications 
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22 Fire Area Risk Summary ......................................................................
23 Revision 0 Page 3 of 23 Version 1.0 Page 2111 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 075 1.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION INPUT 1.1 Variances from the Deterministic Requirements The VFDRs identified for evaluation for Unit 2, Fire Area 075, SWIS 5 kV Switchgear Room B and West Stairs are: Table 1-1 VFDRs VFDR Component(s)
Description U2-075-HVAC-Q2R42BO001B:ENE This component, 125V DC Bus 2B, requires HVAC support to remain 001 RGIZED:ENERGIZE functional.
Failure to establish HVAC to support this electrical D-BC2B, 125V DC component will prevent the establishment of all Vital Power. This BUS 2B failure poses a challenge to HVAC support Vital Auxiliaries Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-075-HVAC-Q2R15A0007:ENER This component, Switchgear 2G, requires HVAC support to remain 002 GIZED:ENERGIZED-functional.
Failure to establish HVAC to support this electrical EDG2B, 4160V component will prevent the establishment of all Vital Power. This SWITCHGEAR BUS failure poses a challenge to HVAC support Vital Auxiliaries Nuclear 2G Safety Performance Criteria.U2-075-HVAC-Q2R42E0002B:AVAI This component, 125V DC Battery 2B, requires HVAC support to 003 LABLE:AVAILABLE, remain functional.
Failure to establish HVAC to support this electrical 125V BATTERY 2B component will prevent the establishment of all Vital Power. This failure poses a challenge to HVAC support Vital Auxiliaries Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-075-HVAC-Q2R15A0505:ENER This component, Switchgear 2G, requires HVAC support to remain 004 GIZED:ENERGIZED, functional.
Failure to establish HVAC to support this electrical 4160V component will prevent the establishment of all Vital Power. This SWITCHGEAR BUS failure poses a challenge to HVAC support Vital Auxiliaries Nuclear 2K- Safety Performance Criteria.1.2 Fire Protection Systems and Features Fire Area 075 consists of Fire Zones: SWIS-SG-B 
-SWIS 5 kV Switchgear Room B and West Stairs -Elevation 188'-9" SWIS-STAIR-W 
-SWIS 5 kV Switchgear Room B and West Stairs -Elevation 188'-9" Construction Barriers for this fire area are of substantial construction and have been designed and constructed to meet separation requirements.
In the event the configuration utilized is not in accordance with recognized standards, the deviations have been evaluated to be adequate for the hazard.1.2.1 Detection* Fire Zone SWIS-SG-B is provided with detection.
In addition, heat detectors in the cabinets actuate an automatic CO 2 suppression system with local alam- and annunciation in the Control Room.* Fire Zone SWIS-STAIR-W is provided with detection.
Revision 0 Page 4 of 23 Version 1.0 Page 2112 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 075 1.2.2 Fixed FireSuppression Fixed fire suppression systems to aid in control of both fire growth and spread in the fire area are:* Fire Zone SWIS-SG-B is provided with an automatic CO 2 fire suppression system in the cabinets that protects the switchgear and 5-kV disconnect switch in the area.1.2.3 Manual Suppression Manual suppression equipment to be utilized by plant personnel and/or fire brigade members are:* Fire Area 075 is provided with portable dry chemical fire extinguishersand a CO 2 portable extinguisher.
* Outside hydrants and hose houses are installed within the building's security fence.* Local manual initiation of the switchgear CO 2 system is available.
* Fire hose cabinets are installed within the building.1.2.4 Ventilation (Smoke Removal)Portable smoke ejectors are available to assist with smoke removal.1.2.5 Other Fire Protection Features No additional fire protection features are required for this fire risk evaluation.
1.2.6 Fire Hazard Identification The major sources of combustibles in Fire Area 075 are cable insulation and silicone transformer fluid. Details regarding fire scenarios quantified in the fire PRA, and their associated ignition sources (where applicable) are discussed in Section 2.1.2.7 Fire PRA Input Fire protection features There are no fire protection features specifically modeled in the Fire PRA for this fire area.Fire protection systems The Hot Gas Layer evaluation credits the detection, automatic fire suppression system and manual fire brigade response.
The Multi Compartment Analysis evaluation credits the detection and automatic fire suppression system.Hot Gas Layer Treatment Physical attributes of this fire area require the incorporation of a Hot Gas Layer scenario.
Credit for detection was taken in the Hot Gas Layer evaluation for this fire area. Credit for both automatic fire suppression system and manual fire brigade response was taken in the Hot Gas Layer evaluation for this fire area.Revision 0 Page 5 of 23 Version 1.0 Page 2113 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 075 Multi-compartment analysis Credit for detection was taken in the Multi Compartment Analysis for this fire area. Credit for automatic fire suppression system was taken in the Multi Compartment Analysis for this fire area.Scenario Review All scenarioCCDPs and CLERPsare less than LO, ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency.
2.0 RISK EVALUATION 2.1 Fire PRA Variant Case Calculation Tables 2-1a and 2-1b provide the results of the variant case calculation for Fire Area 075. This is taken directly from the Fire PRA model with no changes or alterations made. The CDF and LERF results are provided on a scenario basis.Revision 0 Page 6 of 23 Version 1.0 Page 2114 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 075 Table 2-1a Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train A Alignment Zone Scen ScenDesclIGF NSP SF CCDP CDF CLERP LERF (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr) (Irx-yr)075-ADJ HGL HGL SCENARIO 2.60E-06 1.0 1.0 2.93E-04 7.62E-10 9.11E-07 2.37E-12 SWIS-SG-B D4 TRANSIENT 7.22E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 4.83E-11 1.61E-10 1.16E-14 SWIS-SG-B D5 TRANSIENT 7.22E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 4.83E-11 1.61E-10 1.16E-14 SWIS-SG-B D6 TRANSIENT 7.22E-05 1.0 1.0 4.13E-06 2.98E-10 1.61E-10 1.16E-14 SWIS-SG-B F ServWtrPmp 1C Disconnect 1.82E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 1.22E-11 1.61E-10 2.93E-15 SWIS-SG-B H1 MCC-1L -SEVERE 2.18E-04 1.0 2.OOE-01 2.74E-04 1.20E-08 8.56E-07 3.74E-11 SWIS-SG-B H2 MCC-1L -NON SEVERE 2.18E-04 1.0 1.0 2.74E-04 5.98E-08 8.56E-07 1.87E-10 SWIS-SG-B I1 4.16KV SWGR 1L -SEVERE 9.10E-05 1.0 2.50E-01 1.40E-04 3.18E-09 4.57E-07 1.04E-11 SWlS-SG-B 12 4.16KV SWGR 1L -NON 9.1OE-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 6.09E-11 1.61E-10 1.46E-14 SEVERE SWIS-SG-B 13 4.16KV SWGR 1L -HEAF 2.61 E-05 1.0 1.0 1.40E-04 3.64E-09 4.57E-07 1.19E-11 SWIS-SG-B Ji 600V LC 1L/2L -SEVERE 9.10E-05 1.0 2.50E-01 1.41E-04 3.21 E-09 4.58E-07 1.04E-11 SWIS-SG-B J2 600VLC 1L/21-NON 9.1OE-05 1.0 1.0 1.40E-04 1.28E-08 4.57E-07 4.16E-11 SEVERE SWIS-SG-B J3 600V LC 1L/2L -HEAF 2.61E-05 1.0 1.0 1.41E-04 3.67E-09 4.58E-07 1.19E-11 SWIS-SG-B K 600VAC SS XFMR 2L 1.74E-04 1.0 1.0 2.74E-04 4.76E-08 8.56E-07 1.49E-10 SWIS-SG-B Li 4160V SWGR 2L -SEVERE 9.10E-05 1.0 2.50E-01 1.23E-03 2.80E-08 1.84E-05 4.18E-10 SWIS-SG-B L2 4160V SWGR 2L -NON 9.1OE-05 1.0 1.0 1.50E-04 1.36E-08 4.40E-07 4.OOE-11 SEVERE SWlS-SG-B L3 4160V SWGR 2L -HEAF 2.61E-05 1.0 1.0 2.93E-04 7.63E-09 9.1OE-07 2.37E-11 SWIS-SG-B M Serv Water Pump 2C Disc 1.82E-05 1.0 1.0 2.93E-04 5.33E-09 9.1OE-07 1.66E-11 4KV SWIS-SAIR- A BASE CASE 2.26E-04 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 1.51E-10 1.61 E-10 3.63E-14 STAIR-W Total CDF/LERF Fire PRA Variant Case 2.02E-07 9.60E-10 a)CD 0 N)M)Revision 0 Page 7 of 23 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 075 Table 2-1 b Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train B Alignment Zone Scen ScenDescl IG-F NSP SF CCDP CDF CLERP LERF (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr) (Irx-yr)075-ADJ HGL HGL SCENARIO 2.60E-06 1.0 1.0 8.27E-04 2.15E-09 1.67E-06 4.35E-12 SWIS-SG-B D4 TRANSIENT 7.22E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 4.80E-11 1.61E-10 1.16E-14 SWIS-SG-B D5 TRANSIENT 7.22E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 4.80E-11 1.61E-10 1.16E-14 SWIS-SG-B D6 TRANSIENT 7.22E-05 1.0 1.0 1.08E-06 7.82E-11 1.61E-10 1.16E-14 SWIS-SG-B F ServWtrPmp 1C Disconnect 1.82E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 1.21E-11 1.61E-10 2.93E-15 SWIS-SG-B H1 MCC-1L -SEVERE 2.18E-04 1.0 2.00E-01 8.13E-04 3.55E-08 1.63E-06 7.14E-11 SWIS-SG-B H2 MCC-1L -NON SEVERE 2.18E-04 1.0 1.0 8.13E-04 1.78E-07 1.63E-06 3.57E-10 SWIS-SG-B I1 4.16KV SWGR 1L -SEVERE 9.10E-05 1.0 2.50E-01 1.40E-04 3.18E-09 4.57E-07 1.04E-11 SWIS-SG-B 12 4.16KV SWGR 1L- NON 9.1OE-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 6.05E-11 1.61E-10 1.46E-14 SEVERE SWIS-SG-B 13 4.16KV SWGR 1L -HEAF 2.61E-05 1.0 1.0 1.40E-04 3.64E-09 4.57E-07 1.19E-11 SWIS-SG-B J1 600V LC 1L/2L -SEVERE 9.1OE-05 1.0 2.50E-01 1.41E-04 3.21E-09 4.58E-07 1.04E-11 SWIS-SG-B J2 600V LC 1L/21 -NON 9.10E-05 1.0 1.0 1.40E-04 1.28E-08 4.57E-07 4.16E-11 SEVERE SWIS-SG-B J3 600V LC 1 L/2L -HEAF 2.61 E-05 1.0 1.0 1.41 E-04 3.68E-09 4.58E-07 1.1 9E-i 1 SWIS-SG-B K 600VAC SS XFMR 2L 1.74E-04 1.0 1.0 8.13E-04 1.41E-07 1.63E-06 2.84E-10 SWIS-SG-B Li 4160V SWGR 2L -SEVERE 9.1OE-05 1.0 2.50E-01 1.14E-03 2.59E-08 1.83E-05 4.16E-10 SWIS-SG-B L2 4160V SWGR 2L -NON 9.10E-05 1.0 1.0 6.84E-04 6.22E-08 1.20E-06 1.09E-10 SEVERE SWIS-SG-B L3 4160V SWGR 2L -HEAF 2.61E-05 1.0 1.0 8.26E-04 2.15E-08 1.67E-06 4.36E-11 SWIS-SG-B M Serv Water Pump 2C Disc 1.82E-05 1.0 1.0 8.26E-04 1.50E-08 1.67E-06 3.05E-1 1 4KV SWIS-SAIR- A BASE CASE 2.26E-04 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 1.50E-10 1.61 E-10 3.63E-14 STAIR-W Total CDF/LERF Fire PRA Variant Case 5.08E-07 1.40E-09 Where: Zone = Fire Zone Scen = 'A' to signify the variant case ScenDesc = Description of the Fire Scenario IGF = Ignition Frequency 
(/rx-yr)NSP = Non Suppression Probability SF = Severity Factor CCDP = Conditional Core Damage Probability Revision 0 Page 8 of 23 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 075 CDF = Core Damage Frequency 
(/rx-yr)CLERP = Conditional Large Early Release Probability LERF = Large Early Release Frequency 
(/rx-yr)1 'Base Case' scenarios are complete room burnout and therefore do not identify specific ignition sources Revision 0 Page 9of23 Revision 0 Page 9 of 23 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 075 2.2 Compliant Case Calculation The following sub-sections provide the basis for modeling each VFDR (or category of VFDRs)and the alterations that have been made to the variant case to represent the compliant case. In each section a discussion of the VFDR (or the category of VFDRs) is provided.2.2.1 VFDRs Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA For VFDRs specifically modeled in the Fire PRA, a table outlining the actual changes made to the Fire PRA model for that VFDR is provided.
The table includes: " Component Numbers associated with the VFDR. In some cases, there may be additional Component Numbers listed that may be the power supplies or other supporting components" Basic Event(s) associated with theComponents" Scenarios which affect the VFDR.2.2.1.1 VFDRU2-075-HVAC-001 U2-075-HVAC-00 1 -Q2R42B000 1 B:ENERGIZED:ENERGIZED-BC2B Table 2-2-1 U2-075-HVAC-001 ALTERATIONS Component ID Basic Event BE Description Model Alterations Scenarios OPERATOR RECOVERY OP-RECOV-OP-RECOV-OF BATTERY CHARGER B Zero All BCSW-B BCSW-B ROOM COOLING FAILS-SW Model Alterations:
Failure mode probability set to nominal to eliminate fire contribution.
This model alteration is done in the Altered Events Table for the -COMPU2 scenario.2.2.2 VFDRs Not Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA A Fire PRA was developed in accordance with the requirements of Part 4 "Requirements for Fires at Power PRA" of the ASME and ANS combined PRA Standard, ASME/ANS RA-Sa-2009, "Standard for Level 1/Large Early Release Frequency Probabilistic Risk Assessment for Nuclear Power Plant Applications".
Consistent with those requirements not all components required to meet the nuclear safety criteria need to be specifically modeled in the Fire PRA. The following VFDRs are associated with components not modeled in the Fire PRA: 2.2.2.1 VFDR U2-075-HVAC-002 and 004 4kV Switchgear Room 2Gand 4kV SWIS Switchgear room Bventilation is not modeled in the fire PRA. Room Heat tip calculations show that there will be no impact to the 4kV Switchgear Rooms due to loss of HVAC within the mission time of 24 hrs in the fire PRA. See calculation Fire PRA Logic Model for Farley Nuclear Plants, PRA-BC-F-1 1-004." U2-075-HVAC-002 
-Q2R 1 5A0007:ENERGIZED:
ENERGIZED-EDG2B" U2-075-HVAC-004 
-Q2R I5A0505:ENERGIZED:ENERGIZED Revision 0 Page 10 of 23 Version 1.0 Page 2118 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 075 2.2.2.2 VFDR U2-075-HVAC-003 Battery Room 2B ventilation is not modeled in the fire PRA. The Battery Room exhaust fan function is to remove the hydrogen that is generated from the battery located within the room.The hydrogen production in the 24 hour mission time of the PRA is less than the required amount for a hydrogen bum, therefore the exhaust fan is not required to be modeled. See calculation Fire PRA Logic Model for Farley Nuclear Plants, PRA-BC-F-1 1-004.0 U2-075-HVAC-003 
-Q2R42E0002B:AVA ILABLE:AVAILABLE 2.2.3 Compliant Case Results Tables 2-3a and 2-3b provide the results of the compliant case calculation for fire area. All of the altered events identified in Section 2.2.1 have been applied to their respective scenarios and the results have been quantified.
The CDF and LERF results are provided on a scenario basis.Revision 0 Page 11 of 23 Version 1.0 Page 2119 of 3726 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 075 Compliant Case Zone 075-ADJ SWIS-SG-B SWIS-SG-B SWIS-SG-B SWIS-SG-B SWIS-SG-B SWIS-SG-B SWIS-SG-B SWIS-SG-B SWIS-SG-B SWIS-SG-B SWIS-SG-B SWIS-SG-B SWIS-SG-B SWIS-SG-B Scen HGL-COMPU2 D4-COMPU2 D5-COMPU2 D6-COMPU2 F-COMPU2 H1-COMPU2 H2-COMPU2 11-COMPU2 12-COMPU2 13-COMPU2 J1-COMPU2 J2-COMPU2 J3-COMPU2 K-COMPU2 Li-COMPU2 Scenario Description HGL SCENARIO TRANSIENT TRANSIENT TRANSIENT ServWtrPmp 1C Disconnect MCC-1 L -SEVERE MCC-1L -NON SEVERE 4.16KV SWGR 1L -SEVERE 4.16KV SWGR IL -NON SEVERE 4.16KV SWGR 1L -H EAF 600V LC 1L/2L -SEVERE 600V LC 1 L/2L -NON SEVERE 600V LC 1L/2L -HEAF 600VAC SS XFMR 2L 4160V SWGR 2L -SEVERE Table 2-3a CDF and LERF Results Train A Alignment Scenario Specific CCDP VFDRs U2-075-HVAC-001 2.93E-04 U2-075-HVAC-001 6.69E-07 U2-075-HVAC-001 6.69E-07 U2-075-HVAC-001 4.13E-06 U2-075-HVAC-001 6.69E-07 U2-075-HVAC-001 2.67E-04 U2-075-HVAC-001 2.67E-04 U2-075-HVAC-001 1.40E-04 U2-075-HVAC-001 6.69E-07 U2-075-HVAC-001 1.40E-04 U2-075-HVAC-001 1.41 E-04 U2-075-HVAC-001 1.40E-04 U2-075-HVAC-001 1.41 E-04 U2-075-HVAC-001 2.67E-04 U2-075-HVAC-001 2.86E-04 CDF (/rx-yr)7.62E-10 4.83E-1 1 4.83E-1 1 2.98E-10 1.22E-1 1 1.17E-08 5.83E-08 3.18E-09 6.09E-1 1 3.64E-09 3.21 E-09 1.28E-08 3.67E-09 4.64E-08 6.51 E-09 CLERP 9.11E-07 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 7.43E-07 7.43E-07 4.57E-07 1.61 E-10 4.57E-07 4.58E-07 4.57E-07 4.58E-07 7.43E-07 7.97E-07 LERF (/rx-yr)2.37E-12 1.16E-14 1.16E-14 1.16E-14 2.93E-15 3.25E-1 1 1.62E-10 1.04E-11 1.46E-14 1.19E-11 1.04E-11.4.16E-1 1 1.19E-11 1.29E-10 1.81 E-11 SWIS-SG- L2- 4160V SWGR 2L -NON U2-075-HVAC-001 1.43E-04 1.30E-08 3.26E-07 2.97E-11 B COMPU2 SEVERE Revision 0 Page 12 of 23 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 075 Zone SWIS-SG-B SWIS-SG-B SWlS-STAIR-W Scen L3-COMPU2 M-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 Table 2-3a Compliant Case CDF and LERF Results Train A Alignment Scenario Scenario Specific CCDP Description VFDRs 4160V SWGR 2L -HEAF U2-075-HVAC-001 2.86E-04 HEAF Serv Water Pump 2C U2-075-HVAC-001 2.86E-04 Disc 4KV BASE CASE U2-075-HVAC-001 6.69E-07 Compliant Scenario Total CDF and LERF CDF (/rx-yr)7.45E-09 5.21 E-09 1.51E-10 1.76E-07 CLERP 7.97E-07 7.97E-07 1.61 E-10 LERF (/rx-yr)2.08E-1 1 1.45E-1 1 3.63E-14 4.96E-1 0 Zone 075-ADJ SWIS-SG-B SWIS-SG-B SWIS-SG-B SWIS-SG-B SWIS-SG-B SWIS-SG-B SWIS-SG-B SWIS-SG-B Scen HGL-COMPU2 D4-COMPU2 D5-COMPU2 D6-COMPU2 F-COMPU2 H1-COMPU2 H2-COMPU2 I1-COMPU2 12-COMPU2 Scenario Description HGL SCENARIC TRANSIENT TRANSIENT TRANSIENT ServWtrPmp 1C Disconnect MCC-1L -SEVEF MCC-1L -NON SEVERE 4.16KV SWGR 11 SEVERE 4.16KV SWGR 1L NON SEVERE Table 2-3b Compliant Case CDF and LERF Results Train B Alignment Scenario Specific CCDP VFDRs D U2-075-HVAC-001 8.27E-0 U2-075-HVAC-001 6.64E-0 U2-075-HVAC-001 6.64E-0 U2-075-HVAC-001 1.08E-0 U2-075-HVAC-001 6.64E-0 ZE U2-075-HVAC-001 8.11 E-0 U2-075-HVAC-001 8.11 E-0 U2-075-HVAC-001 1.40E-0 U2-075-HVAC-001 6.64E-0 4 7 7 6 7 4 4 4 7 CDF (/rx-yr)2.15E-09 4.80E-1 1 4.80E-1 1 7.82E-1 1 1.21 E-11 3.54E-08 1.77E-07 3.18E-09 6.05E-1 1 CLERP 1.67E-06 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.53E-06 1.53E-06 4.57E-07 1.61 E-10 LERF (/rx-yr)4.35E-12 1.16E-14 1.16E-14 1.16E-14 2.93E-1 5 6.67E-1 1 3.33E-10 1.04E-11 1.46E-14 Revision 0 Page 13 of 23 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 075 SE-C051326701 
-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 075 Table 2-3b Compliant Case CDF and LERF Results Train B Alignment Zone Scen Scenario Scenario Specific CCDP CDF CLERP LERF Description VFDRs (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr)SWIS-SG 4.16KV SWGR iL -U2-075-HVAC-001 1.40E-04 3.64E-09 4.57E-07 1,19E-11 B COMPU2 HEAF SWIS-SG- Ji- 600V LC 1L/2L- U2-075-HVAC-001 1.41 E-04 3.21E-09 4.58E-07 1.04E-11 B COMPU2 SEVERE SWIS-SG- J2- 600VLC 1L/2L-NON U2-075-HVAC-001 1,40E-04 1,28E-08 4.57E-07 4.16E-11 B COMPU2 SEVERE SWIS-SG- 600V LC 1L/2L -HEAF U2-075-HVAC-001 1.41E-04 3.68E-09 4.58E-07 1.19E-11 B COMPU2 SWIS-SG- K-B COMPUK 600VAC SS XFMR 2L U2-075-HVAC-001 8.11E-04 1.41 E-07 1.53E-06 2.65E-10 B COMPU2 SWIS-SG- Li- 4160VSWGR2L-U2-075-HVAC-001 8.24E-04 1.88E-08 1.56E-06 3.56E-11 B COMPU2 SEVERE SWIS-SG- L2- 4160VSWGR2L-NON U2-075-HVAC-001 6.82E-04 6.20E-08 1.09E-06 9.94E-11 B COMPU2 SEVERE SWIS-SG- L3- 4160VSWGR2L-U2-075-HVAC-001 8.24E-04 2.15E-08 1.56E-06 4.07E-11 B COMPU2 HEAF SWIS-SG- M- Serv Water Pump 2C U2-075-HVAC-001 8.24E-04 1.50E-08 1.56E-06 2.85E-1 1 B COMPU2 Disc 4KV SWIS- A-STIR- A- BASE CASE U2-075-HVAC-001 6.64E-07 1.50E-10 1.61E-10 3.63E-14 STAIR-W COMPU2 Compliant Scenario Total CDF and LERF 5.00E-07 9.60E-10 Revision 0 Page 14 of 23 Revision 0 Page 14 of 23 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 075 2.2.4 Required Modifications There are no modifications required as a result of the risk evaluation for this fire area.2.2.5 Required Recovery Actions The following recovery actions are required as a result of the risk evaluation for this fire area: Table 2-4 Required Recovery Actions Component ID Basic Event VFDR BE Description Recovery Action Description OPERATOR Operator action to Q2R42B0001B:ENERGIZED:ENE OP-RECOV-U2-075- RECOVERY OF provide alternate RGIZED-BC2B BCSW-B HVAC-001 BATTERY cooling for battery CHARGER B ROOM charger due to loss COOLING FAILS-SW of Train B SW 2.3 Risk Evaluation Results The ACDF/LERF is below the screening acceptance criteria of l E-07/rx-yr (CDF) and IE-08/rx-yr(LERF) for acceptable risk. All scenarioCCDPs and CLERPsare less than 1.0 ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency.
The following tables present the fire zone/scenario fire risk as well as the total fire risk for this fire area.Table 2-5a 1 FIRE AREA ACDF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN A ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CCDP CDF CCDP CDF aCDF 075-ADJ/HGL SWIS-SG-B/D4 SWIS-SG-B/D5 SWIS-SG-B/D6 SWIS-SG-B/F SWIS-SG-B/H1 SWIS-SG-B/H2 SWIS-SG-B/l 1 SWIS-SG-B/12 SWIS-SG-B/13 SWIS-SG-B/J1 SWIS-SG-B/J2 SWIS-SG-B/J3 SWIS-SG-B/K SWIS-SG-B/L1 SWIS-SG-B/L2 SWIS-SG-B/L3 SWIS-SG-B/M SWIS-STAIR-W/A 2.93E-04 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 4.13E-06 6.69E-07 2.74E-04 2.74E-04 1.40E-04 6.69E-07 1.40E-04 1.41 E-04 1.40E-04 1.41E-04 2.74E-04 1.23E-03 1.50E-04 2.93E-04 2.93E-04 7.62E-10 4.83E-1 1 4.83E-1 1 2.98E-10 1.22E-1 1 1.20E-08 5.98E-08 3.18E-09 6.09E-1 1 3.64E-09 3.21 E-09 1.28E-08 3.67E-09 4.76E-08 2.80E-08 1.36E-08 7.63E-09 5.33E-09 2.93E-04 7.62E-10 6.69E-07 4.83E-11 6.69E-07 4.83E-1 1 4.13E-06 2.98E-10 6.69E-07 1.22E-11 2.67E-04 1.17E-08 2.67E-04 5.83E-08 1.40E-04 3.18E-09 6.69E-07 6.09E-1 1 1.40E-04 3.64E-09 1.41 E-04 3.21 E-09 1.40E-04 1.28E-08 1.41 E-04 3.67E-09 2.67E-04 4.64E-08 2.86E-04 6.51 E-09 1.43E-04 1.30E-08 2.86E-04 7.45E-09 2.86E-04 5.21E-09 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 2.98E-1 0 1.49E-09 0.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 1.18E-09 2.15E-08 6.24E-10 1.79E-10 1.25E-10 6.69E-07 1.51 E-10 6.69E-07 1.51 E-10 0.OOE+00 d delta CDF 2 2.02E-07 1.76E-07 2.54E-08 Total CDF an Revision 0 Page 15 of 23 Version 1.0 Page 2123 of 3726 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 075 1 -N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.2 -Total ACDF includes the risk of recovery actions required to demonstrate the availability of a success path for the nuclear safety performance criteria.Table 2-5b'FIRE AREA ACDF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN B ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CCDP CDF CCDP CDF ACDF 075-ADJ/HGL SWIS-SG-B/D4 SWIS-SG-B/D5 SWIS-SG-B/D6 SWIS-SG-B/F SWIS-SG-B/H 1 SWIS-SG-B/H2 SWIS-SG-B/I 1 SWIS-SG-B/12 SWIS-SG-B/13 SWIS-SG-B/J1 SWIS-SG-B/J2 SWIS-SG-B/J3 SWIS-SG-B/K SWIS-SG-B/L1 SWIS-SG-B/L2 SWIS-SG-B/L3 SWIS-SG-B/M 8.27E-04 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 1.08E-06 6.64E-07 8.13E-04 8.13E-04 1.40E-04 6.64E-07 1.40E-04 1.41E-04 1.40E-04 1.41 E-04 8.13E-04 1.14E-03 6.84E-04 8.26E-04 8.26E-04 2.15E-09 4.80E- 11 4.80E-1 1 7.82E-1 1 1.21 E-11 3.55E-08 1.78E-07 3.18E-09 6.05E-1 1 3.64E-09 3.21 E-09 1.28E-08 3.68E-09 1.41 E-07 2.59E-08 6.22E-08 2.15E-08 1.50E-08 8.27E-04 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 1.08E-06 6.64E-07 8.11 E-04 8.11 E-04 1.40E-04 6.64E-07 1.40E-04 1.41 E-04 1.40E-04 1.41E-04 8.11E-04 8.24E-04 6.82E-04 8.24E-04 8.24E-04 2.15E-09 4.80E-1 1 4.80E-1 1 7.82E-1 1 1.21 E-11 3.54E-08 1.77E-07 3.18E-09 6.05E-1 1 3.64E-09 3.21 E-09 1.28E-08 3.68E-09 1.41E-07 1.88E-08 6.20E-08 2.15E-08 1.50E-08 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 8.57E-1 1 4.29E-10 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 3.41 E-10 7.18E-09 1.79E-10 5.13E-1 1 3.58E-1 1 SWIS-STAIR-6.64E-07 1.50E-10 6.64E-07 1.50E-10 0.00E+00 W/A Total CDF and delta CDF 2 5.08E-07 5.OOE-07 8.30E-09-N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.2 Total ACDF includes the risk of recovery actions required to demonstrate the availability of a success path for the nuclear safety performance criteria.Table 2-6a 1 FIRE AREA ALERF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN A ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CLERP LERF CLERP LERF ALERF 075-ADJ/HGL SWIS-SG-B/D4 SWIS-SG-B/D5 SWIS-SG-B/D6 SWIS-SG-B/F SWIS-SG-B/H1 SWIS-SG-B/H2 SWIS-SG-B/I 1 SWIS-SG-B/12 SWIS-SG-B/13 SWIS-SG-B/J1 SWIS-SG-B/J2 9.11 E-07 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 8.56E-07 8.56E-07 4.57E-07 1.61 E-10 4.57E-07 4.58E-07 4.57E-07 2.37E-12 1.16E-14 1.16E-14 1.16E-14 2.93E-15 3.74E-1 1 1.87E-10 1.04E-11 1.46E-14 1.19E-11 1.04E-11 4.16E-1 1 9.11E-07 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 7.43E-07 7.43E-07 4.57E-07 1.61 E-10 4.57E-07 4.58E-07 4.57E-07 2.37E-12 1.16E-14 1.16E-14 1.16E-14 2.93E-1 5 3.25E-1 1 1.62E-10 1.04E-11 1.46E-14 1.19E-11 1.04E-1 1 4.16E-11 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 4.92E-1 2 2.46E-1 1 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 Revision 0 Page 16 of 23 Version 1.0 Page 2124 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 075 Table 2-6a 1 FIRE AREA &#xa3;ALERF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN A ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CLERP LERF CLERP LERF ALERF SWIS-SG-B/J3 4.58E-07 1.19E-11 4.58E-07 1.19E-11 0.OOE+00 SWIS-SG-B/K 8.56E-07 1.49E-10 7.43E-07 1.29E-10 1.96E-11 SWIS-SG-B/L1 1.84E-05 4.18E-10 7.97E-07 1.81E-11 4.00E-10 SWIS-SG-B/L2 4.40E-07 4.00E-11 3.26E-07 2.97E-11 1.04E-11 SWIS-SG-B/L3 9.10E-07 2.37E-11 7.97E-07 2.08E-11 2.97E-12 SWIS-SG-B/M 9.10E-07 1.66E-11 7.97E-07 1.45E-11 2.07E-12 SWIS-STAIR-1.61 E-10 3.63E-14 1.61 E-1 0 3.63E-14 0.OOE+00 W/A Total LERF and delta LERF 2  9.60E-10 4.96E-10 4.64E-10 1 _ N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.2 Total ALERF includes the risk of recovery actions required to demonstrate the availability of a success path for the nuclear safety performance criteria.Table 2-6b 1 FIRE AREA LALERF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN B ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CLERP LERF CLERP LERF ALERF 075-ADJ/HGL SWIS-SG-B/D4 SWIS-SG-B/D5 SWIS-SG-B/D6 SWIS-SG-B/F SWIS-SG-B/H 1 SWIS-SG-B/H2 SWIS-SG-B/I 1 SWIS-SG-B/12 SWIS-SG-B/13 SWIS-SG-B/J 1 SWIS-SG-B/J2 SWIS-SG-B/J3 SWIS-SG-B/K SWIS-SG-B/L1 SWIS-SG-B/L2 SWIS-SG-B/L3 SWIS-SG-B/M 1.67E-06 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.63E-06 1.63E-06 4.57E-07 1.61 E-10 4.57E-07 4.58E-07 4.57E-07 4.58E-07 1.63E-06 1.83E-05 1.20E-06 1.67E-06 1.67E-06 4.35E-12 1.16E-14 1.16E-14 1.16E-14 2.93E-15 7.14E-11 3.57E-10 1.04E- 11 1.46E-14 1.19E-1 1 1.04E-1 1 4.16E-1 1 1.19E-11 2.84E-10 4.16E-10 1.09E-10 4.36E-1 1 3.05E-1 1 1.67E-06 4.35E-1 2 1.61 E-1 0 1.16E-14 1.61E-10 1.16E-14 1.61E-10 1.16E-14 1.61E-10 2.93E-15 1.53E-06 6.67E-1 1 1.53E-06 3.33E-10 4.57E-07 1.04E-1 1 1.61 E-1 0 1.46E-14 4.57E-07 1. 19E-1 1 4.58E-07 1.04E-1 1 4.57E-07 4.16E-1 1 4.58E-07 1.l1gE-1l1 1.53E-06 2.65E-10 1.56E-06 3.56E-1 1 1.09E-06 9.94E-1 1 1.56E-06 4.07E-1 1 1.56E-06 2.85E-1 1 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 4.73E-12 2.37E-1 1 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 1.88E-11 3.81E-10 9.98E-12 2.86E-12 2.OOE-1 2 SWIS-STAIR-1.61 E-10 3.63E-14 1.61 E-10 3.63E-14 0.OOE+00 W/A Total LERF and delta LERF2 1.40E-09 9.60E-10 4.43E-10 1 -N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.2 Total ALERF includes the risk of recovery actions required to demonstrate the availability of a success path for the nuclear safety performance criteria.Revision 0 Page 17 of 23 Version 1.0 Page 2125 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 075 3.0 DID EVALUATION 3.1 Defense-in-Depth Evaluation A review of the impact of the change on defense-in-depth (DID) was performed.
NFPA 805 defines DID as:* Preventing fires from starting* Rapidly detecting fires and controlling and extinguishing promptly those fires that do occur, thereby limiting damage Providing adequate level of fire protection for structures, systems and components important to safety; so that a fire that is not promptly extinguished will not prevent essential plant safety functions from being performed.
In general, the DID requirement was considered satisfied if the proposed change does not result in a substantial imbalance among these elements (or echelons).The review of DIDwas qualitative and addressed each of the elements with respect to the proposed change. Fire protection features and systems relied upon to ensure DIDwere identified in the assessment (e.g., detection, suppression system).The VFDRs and the associated Fire Area risk (CDF) and scenario consequences (CCDP values)were evaluated to identify general DID echelon imbalances.
Potential methods to balance the DID features were identified ensuring an adequate balance of DID features is maintained for the Fire Area. See Section 3.2 for the results of the evaluation.
3.2 Defense-in-Depth Review Results A review of defense in depth and risk evaluation resultsshow that, given the systems and features specified in Table 3-1 and Section 2 respectively, risk acceptance criteria are met and that the balance of defense in depth is maintained.
The risk acceptance criteria are met with substantial margin to account for analytical methods associated with fire scenarios.
The analyzed scenarios bound potential fuel packages which can reasonably be expected to occur in this area.The installed detection and suppression systems are required for DID to support brigade response and to support execution of the required recovery action for risk.In the event of no intervention by the plant fire brigade, it is not expected that a credible fire would develop which would not be bounded by the analyzed scenarios.
Based on the required fire protections systems/features specified, the ability to meet nuclear safety performance criteria is ensured.The table below summarizes how an adequate balance of DID is maintained.
Table 3-1 Defense-in-Depth Impact Review Method of Providing DID Discussion Echelon 1: Prevent fires from starting Combustible Control No change necessary to procedure(s) 
/guidance document(s).
1 Hot Work Control No change necessary to procedure(s) 
/guidance document(s).
1 Echelon 2: Rapidly detect, control and extinguish promptly those fires that do occur thereby limiting fire damage Revision 0 Page 18 of 23 Version 1.0 Page 2126 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 075 Table 3-1 Defense-in-Depth Impact Review Method of Providing DID Discussion Detection System Detection system installed and required.Automatic Fire Suppression Automatic suppression system installed in Fire Zone SWIS-SG-B and required.Portable Fire Extinguishers Portable extinguishers are available, but no enhancements required.1 Hose stations and hydrants Fire hose cabinets and hydrants are available, but no enhancements located in the area(s) required.
1 Pre-Fire Plan No change necessary to procedure(s) 
/guidance document(s).
1 Echelon 3: Provide adequate level of fire protection for systems and structures so that a fire will not prevent essential safety functions from being performed Walls, floors ceilings and structural No changes necessary to existing barriers.elements are rated or have been evaluated as adequate for the hazard.Openings in the fire barrier are rated No changes necessary to existing barrier openings.or have been evaluated as adequate for the hazard.Supplemental barriers (e.g., ERFBS, No supplemental barriers installed and not required.cable tray covers, etc.)Guidance provided to operations No VFDR related DID recovery actions required.personnel detailing the credited success path(s) including recovery actions to achieve nuclear safety performance criteria.1 This fire protection feature is relied upon without further DID enhancements beyond inherent programmatic requirements of NFPA 805, Chap. 3 and will not be reported in Table 5-2.3.2.1 Required Modifications There are no modifications required as a result of the DID evaluation for this fire area.3.2.2 Required Recovery Actions There are no required recovery actions as a result of the DID evaluation for this fire area.Revision 0 Page 19 of 23 Version 1.0 Page 2127 of 3726 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 075 4.0 SAFETY MARGIN EVALUATION 4.1 Safety Margin Evaluation In accordance with NEI 04-02, 5.3.5.3 guidance, the maintenance of adequate Safety Margin is assessed by the consideration of categories of analyses utilized by this fire risk evaluation (FRE).Safety margins are considered to be maintained if:* Codes and standards or their alternatives accepted for use by the NRC are met, and Safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) are met, or provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty.
The maintenance of adequate safety margin for the change analysis is described for each of the specific analysis types used in support of the fire risk assessment.
4.1.1 Fire Modeling Fire modeling performed in support of the transition has been performed within the Fire PRA utilizing codes and standards developed by industry and NRC staff to provide realistic yet conservative results. Specifically, the heat release rates utilized in the transition analysis are based upon NUREG/CR 6850, Task 8, Scoping Fire Modeling.
These heat release rates are conservative and represent values used to screen out fixed ignition sources that do not pose a threat to the targets within specific fire compartments and to assign severity factors to unscreened fixed ignition sources.The combined analysis approach is used during transition; therefore, maximum expected fire scenario/limiting fire scenario have not been analyzed separately.
The bases for the application of these fire modeling codes and standards were not altered in support of this FRE.4.1.2 Plant System Performance Plant system performance parameters were not modified as a result of this FRE. These performance parameters were originally established to support nuclear performance criteria contained in the plant specific accident analyses.
These analyses established component and system performance criteria necessary to establish safe and stable plant operation, as well as, safe shut down of the unit in the event of a fire. These performance parameters were not modified as a result of this FRE.4.2 Safety Margin Results All analyses and assessment have been performed utilizing accepted techniques and industry accepted standards.
In addition, safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) have been considered and provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty.
As such, the Safety Margins are maintained as discussed in Section 4.1.Revision 0 Page 20 of 23 Version 1.0 Page 2128 of 3726 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 075 5.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION RESULTS 5.1 Dispositions of VFDRs Based on the FRE results contained in Sections 2, 3 and 4 the VFDRs identified in Section 1. 1 have been resolved as follows: VFDR ID U2-075-HVAC-001 U2-075-HVAC-002 U2-075-HVAC-003 U2-075-HVAC-004 Table 5-1 Final Variance Disposition Disposition Recovery Action(s)
Required to Satisfy Risk Criteria:
See Table 2-4 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action(VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action(VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action(VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)Revision 0 Page 21 of 23 Revision 0 Page 21 of 23 Version 1.0 Page 2129 of 3726 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 075 5.2 Fire Risk Evaluation Summary of Fire Protection Systems and Features Table 5-2 Summary of Required Fire Protection Systems and Features Required Required Required Fire Fire Area Fire Zone Suppression Detection Protection Feature Required Fire Protection System and Feature Details System System (R, D)(R, D) (R, D)U2 075 R R -Improvements to procedures necessary to incorporate recovery actions required to meet risk criteria (See Table 2-4)SWIS-SG- R, D R, D None R -Automatic suppression system, detection system;B D -Automatic suppression system, detection system SWIS- None R, D None R -Detection system;STAIR-W D -Detection system Required Suppression/Detection/Feature:
required in the Fire Area based on NFPA 805 Chapter 4 compliance.
The information is provided on a zone basis. The basis for the requirement of the fire protection system is designated as follows: R -Risk Criteria:
Systems required to meet the Risk Criteria for the Performance-Based Approach (NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4)D -Defense-in-depth Criteria:
Systems required to maintain adequate balance of Defense-in-Depth for a Performance-Based Approach (NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4)Fire Protection Features in this Table only refer to those features installed in the Fire Area that have a corresponding Chapter 3 requirement.
5.3 Summary of Recovery Actions Fire Area U2 075 Component Q2R42B0001B Table 5-3 -Re Component Description 125V DC BUS 2B ecovery Actions Actions Operator action to provide alternate cooling for battery charger due to loss of Train B SW 5.4 Summary of Plant Modifications No modifications are required for this fire area.Revision 0 Page 22 of 23 Revision 0 Page 22 of 23 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 075 SE-C051326701 
-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 075 5.5 Fire Area Risk Summary Table 5-4 Fire Area Risk Summary NFPA 805 VFDR Fire Area CDF/LERF Basis (Yes/No)4.2.4 3.55E-07/1.18E-09 Yes Fire Area U2 075 Area Description SWIS 5 kV Switchgear Room B and West Stairs RAs (Yes/No)Yes Fire Risk Eval A CDF/LERF 1.69E-08/4.53E-10 Additional Risk of RAs 1.69E-08/4.53E-10 Revision 0 Page 23 of 23 Revision 0 Page 23 of 23 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 076 Attachment 
-Unit 2 Fire Area 076 FRE for Fire Area SWIS 5 kV Switchgear Room A and East Stairs Revision:
0 Name Fire PRA Preparer Fire PRA Reviewer Fire Protection Preparer Fire Protection Reviewer NSCA Preparer NSCA Reviewer FRE Preparer FRE Reviewer Jonathan Hedrick Clint Pierce Robert Kirkpatrick Rebecca Puckett Larry Valmonte Dan Funk Micky Heatherly Brandon Jamar Revision 0 Page 1 of 22 Version 1.o0 Page 2132 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 076 1.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION INPUT .....................................................................
4 1.1 Variances from the Deterministic Requirements 
....................................
4 1.2 Fire Protection Systems and Features ..................................................
4 1.2 .1 C o nstructio n ............................................................................. 
..4 1.2 .2 D ete ctio n ................................................................................... 
..4 1.2.3 Fixed Fire Suppression 
...............................................................
4 1.2.4 Manual Suppression 
...................................................................
5 1.2.5 Ventilation (Smoke Removal) .....................................................
5 1.2.6 Other Fire Protection Features ....................................................
5 1.2.7 Fire Hazard Identification 
.............................................................
5 1.2.8 Fire PRA Input .............................................................................
5 2.0 RISK EVALUATION 
.........................................................................................
6 2.1 Fire PRA Variant Case Calculation 
......................................................
6 2.2 Compliant Case Calculation 
..................................................................
10 2.2.1 VFDRs Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA .............................
10 2.2.2 VFDRs Not Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA .....................
10 2.2.3 Compliant Case Results ...........................................................
11 2.2.4 Required Modifications 
.............................................................
15 2.2.5 Required Recovery Actions .......................................................
15 2.3 Risk Evaluation Results ........................................................................
15 3.0 DID EVALUATION 
.........................................................................................
17 3.1 Defense-in-Depth Evaluation 
...............................................................
17 3.2 Defense-in-Depth Review Results ......................................................
18 3.2.1 Required Modifications 
.............................................................
19 3.2.2 Required Recovery Actions .......................................................
19 4.0 SAFETY MARGIN EVALUATION 
...................................................................
19 4.1 Safety Margin Evaluation 
......................................................................
19 4 .1.1 F ire M o d e ling .......................................................................... 
..19 4.1.2 Plant System Performance 
.......................... 
......................
20 4.2 Safety Margin Results ..........................................................................
20 5.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION RESULTS .............................................................
20 5.1 Dispositions of VFDRs ........................................................................
20 Revision 0 Page 2 of 22 Version 1.0 Page 2133 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 076 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 Fire Risk Evaluation Summary of Fire Protection Systems and Features 21 Summary of Recovery Actions .............................................................
21 Summary of Plant Modifications 
..........................................................
21 Fire A rea R isk Sum m ary ......................................................................
22 Revision 0 Page 3 of 22 Version 1.0 Page 2134 of 3726 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 076 1.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION INPUT 1.1 Variances from the Deterministic Requirements The VFDRs identified for evaluation for Unit 2, Fire Area 076, SWIS 5 kV Switchgear Room A and East Stairs are: Table 1-1 VFDRs VFDR Component(s)
Description U2-076-HVAC-Q2R42BO001A:ENE This component, 125V DC Bus 2A, requires HVAC support to remain 001 RGIZED:ENERGIZE functional.
Failure to establish HVAC to support this electrical D-BC2A, 125V DC component will prevent the establishment of all Vital Power. This BUS 2A failure poses a challenge to HVAC support Vital Auxiliaries Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-076-HVAC-Q2R15A0006:ENER This component, Switchgear 2F, requires HVAC support to remain 002 GIZED:ENERGIZED-functional.
Failure to establish HVAC to support this electrical EDG1-2A, 4160V component will prevent the establishment of all Vital Power. This SWITCHGEAR BUS failure poses a challenge to HVAC support Vital Auxiliaries Nuclear 2F Safety Performance Criteria.U2-076-HVAC-Q2R17B0001:ENER This component, MCC 2A, requires HVAC support to remain 003 GIZED:ENERGIZED, functional.
Failure to establish HVAC to support this electrical MOTOR CONTROL component will prevent the establishment of all Vital Power. This CENTER 2A failure poses a challenge to HVAC support Vital Auxiliaries Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.1.2 Fire Protection Systems and Features Fire Area 076 consists of Fire Zones: " SWIS-SG-A 
-SWIS 5 kV Switchgear Room A and East Stairs -Elevation 188'-9"" SWIS-STAIR-E 
-SWIS 5 kV Switchgear Room A and East Stairs -Elevation 188'-9" 1.2.1 Construction Barriers for this fire area are of substantial construction and have been designed and constructed to meet separation requirements.
In the event the configuration utilized is not in accordance with recognized standards, the deviations have been evaluated to be adequate for the hazard.1.2.2 Detection Fire detection systems to provide notification to the Control Room are: " Fire Zone SWIS-SG-A is provided with detection.
In addition, heat detectors in the cabinets actuate an automatic Co0 suppression system with local alarm and annunciation in the Control Room." Fire Zone SWIS-STAIR-E is provided with detection.
1.2.3 Fixed Fire Suppression Fixed fire suppression systems to aid in control of both fire growth and spread in the fire area are: Revision 0 Page 4 of 22 Revision 0 Page 4 of 22 Version 1.0 Page 2135 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 076* Fire Zone SWIS-SG-A is provided with an automatic CO 2 fire suppression system in the cabinets that protects the switchgear and 5-kV disconnect switch in the area.1.2.4 Manual Suppression Manual suppression equipment to be utilized by plant personnel and/or fire brigade members are:* Fire Area 076 is provided with portable dry chemical fire extinguishers including a CO 2 portable fire extinguisher." Outside hydrants and hose houses are installed within the building's security fence." Local manual initiation of the switchgear CO 2 system is available." Fire hose cabinets are installed within the building.1.2.5 Ventilation (Smoke Removal)Portable smoke ejectors are available to assist with smoke removal.1.2.6 Other Fire Protection Features No additional fire protection features are required for this fire risk evaluation.
1.2.7 Fire Hazard Identification The major sources of combustibles in Fire Area 076 are cable insulation and silicone transformer fluid. Details regarding fire scenarios quantified in the fire PRA, and their associated ignition sources (where applicable) are discussed in Section 2.1.2.8 Fire PRA Input Fire protection features There are no fire protection features specifically modeled in the Fire PRA for this fire area.Fire protection systems The Hot Gas Layer evaluation credits the detection and manual fire brigade response.
The Multi Compartment Analysis evaluation credits the detection and manual fire suppression system.Hot Gas Layer Treatment This fire area screened for potential Hot Gas Layer effects on the Zone Of Influence.
Credit for detection was taken in the Hot Gas Layer evaluation for this fire area. Credit for manual fire brigade response was taken in the Hot Gas Layer evaluation for this fire area.Multi-compartment analysis Credit for detection was taken in the Multi Compartment Analysis for this fire area. Credit for manual fire suppression system was taken in the Multi Compartment Analysis for this fire area.Revision 0 Page 5 of 22 Version 1.0 Page 2136 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 076 Scenario Review All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0, ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency.
2.0 RISK EVALUATION 2.1 Fire PRA Variant Case Calculation Tables 2-1a and 2-1b provide the results of the variant case calculation for Fire Area 076. This is taken directly from the Fire PRA model with no changes or alterations made. The CDF and LERF results are provided on a scenario basis.Revision 0 Page 6 of 22 Version 1.0 Page 2137 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 076 Table 2-1a Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train A Alignment Zone Scen ScenDesc 1  IGF NSP SF CCDP CDF CLERP LERF (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr)076-ADJ HGL HGL SCENARIO SWIS-SG- D1 TRANSIENT A SWIS-SG- D2 TRANSIENT A SWIS-SG- D3 TRANSIENT A SWIS-SG- El 4.16KV SWG 1K -SEVERE A SWIS-SG- 4.16KV SWG 1K -NON A SEVERE SWIS-SG- E3 4.16KV SWG 1K -HEAF A SWIS-SG- F L Cont Sta A SWIS-SG- G1 SWGR 2K 4160V -SEVERE A SWIS-SG- SWGR 2K 4160V -NON A SEVERE SWIS-SG- G3 SWGR 2K 4160V -HEAF A SWIS-SG- H 600-208V MCC 1K A SWIS-SG- Ji 600V Swgr 1K-2K -SEVERE A SWIS-SG- J2 600V Swgr 1K-2K -NON A SEVERE SWIS-SG- J3 600V Swgr 1K-2K -HEAF A SWIS-SG- K SS Xfmr 2K A SWIS-SG- L Disc 2C Serv Water Pmp, BC1 A Serv Wtr, BC2 Serv Wtr SWIS-SG- M QSR42B526A-A 
& B A 3.98E-05 7.28E-05 7.28E-05 7.28E-05 9.10E-05 9.10E-05 2.61 E-05 3.64E-05 9.10E-05 9.1OE-05 2.61 E-05 1.46E-04 9.10E-05 9.10E-05 2.61 E-05 1.74E-04 3.64E-05 1.82E-05 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 2.50E-01 1.0 1.0 1.0 2.50E-01 1.0 1.0 1.0 2.50E-01 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 7.83E-04 7.72E-04 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 7.83E-04 6.69E-07 7.83E-04 6.69E-07 1.36E-03 6.43E-04 1.36E-03 7.72E-04 1.34E-04 1.34E-04 1.34E-04 7.72E-04 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 3.12E-08 5.62E-08 4.87E-1 1 4.87E-1 1 1.78E-08 6.09E-1 1 2.04E-08 2.44E- 11 3.08E-08 5.85E-08 3.53E-08 1.12E-07 3.06E-09 1.22E-08 3.50E-09 1.34E-07 2.44E-1 1 1.22E-11 1.46E-06 1.43E-06 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.46E-06 1.61E-10 1.46E-06 1.61E-10 1.71E-05 1.01E-06 1.71E-05 1.43E-06 4.31E-07 4.31 E-07 4.31 E-07 1.43E-06 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 5.83E-11 1.04E-10 1.17E-14 1.17E-14 3.33E-11 1.46E-14 3.81E- 11 5.86E-15 3.90E-10 9.21 E-11 4.47E-1 0 2.09E-10 9.82E-12 3.93E-11 1.12E-11 2.49E-10 5.86E-1 5 2.93E-1 5 Revision 0 Page 7 of 22 Revision 0 Page 7 of 22 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 076 Table 2-1 a Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train A Alignment Zone Scen ScenDesc 1  IGF NSP SF CCDP CDF CLERP LERF (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr)SW'S-STIR- A BASE CASE 2.26E-04 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 1.51E-10 1.61 E-10 3.63E-14 STAIR-E Total CDF/LERF Fire PRA Variant Case 5.16E-07 1.68E-09 Table 2-1b Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train B Alignment Zone Scen ScenDescl IGF SF CCDP CDF CLERP LERF ZS/rxyr) (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr)076-ADJ HGL HGL SCENARIO 3.98E-05 1.0 1.0 2.46E-04 9.78E-09 6.94E-07 2.76E-1 1 SWIS-SG- D1 TRANSIENT 7.28E-05 1.0 1.0 2.29E-04 1.67E-08 6.47E-07 4.71E-11 A SWIS-SG- D2 TRANSIENT 7.28E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 4.84E-11 1.61E-10 1.17E-14 A SWIS-SG- D3 TRANSIENT 7.28E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 4.84E-11 1.61E-10 1.17E-14 A SWIS-SG- El 4.16KV SWG 1K -SEVERE 9.10E-05 1.0 2.50E-01 2.46E-04 5.59E-09 6.94E-07 1.58E-11 A SWIS-SG- E2 4.16KVSWG 1K-NON 9.1OE-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 6.05E-11 1.61E-10 1.46E-14 A SEVERE SWIS-SG- E3 4.16KV SWG 1K -HEAF 2.61E-05 1.0 1.0 2.46E-04 6.40E-09 6.94E-07 1.81E-11 A SWIS-SG- F L Cont Sta 3.64E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 2.42E-11 1.61E-10 5.86E-15 A SWIS-SG- G1 SWGR 2K 4160V -SEVERE 9.10E-05 1.0 2.50E-01 1.46E-03 3.32E-08 1.63E-05 3.71E-10 A SWIS-SG- G2 SWGR2K4160V-NON 9.10E-05 1.0 1.0 1.08E-04 9.82E-09 2.46E-07 2.24E-11 A SEVERE SWIS-SG- G3 SWGR 2K 4160V -HEAF 2.61E-05 1.0 1.0 1.46E-03 3.80E-08 1.63E-05 4.24E-10 A SWIS-SG- H 600-208V MCC 1K 1.46E-04 1.0 1.0 2.29E-04 3.33E-08 6.47E-07 9.43E-11 A SWIS-SG- Ji 600V Swgr 1K-2K -SEVERE 9.1OE-05 1.0 2.50E-01 1.31E-04 2.99E-09 4.28E-07 9.73E-12 A Revision 0 Page 8 of 22 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 076 Table 2-1b Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train B Alignment Zone Scen ScenDescl IGF NSP SF CCDP CDF CLERP LERF (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr)SWIS-SG- J2 600V Swgr 1K-2K -NON 9.10E-05 1.0 1.0 1.31E-04 1.20E-08 4.28E-07 3.89E-11 A SEVERE SWIS-SG- J3 600V Swgr 1K-2K -HEAF 2.61 E-05 1.0 1.0 1.31 E-04 3.43E-09 4.28E-07 1.11E-11 A SWIS-SG- K SS Xfmr 2K 1.74E-04 1.0 1.0 2.29E-04 3.98E-08 6.47E-07 1.13E-10 A SWIS-SG- Disc 2C Serv Water Pmp, BC1 L 3.64E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 2.42E-11 1.61E-10 5.86E-15 A Serv Wtr, BC2 Serv Wtr SWIS-SG- M QSR42B526A-A 
& B 1.82E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 1.21 E-1 1 1.61 E-1 0 2.93E-1 5 A SWIS-STIR- A BASE CASE 2.26E-04 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 1.50E-10 1.61E-10 3.63E-14 STAIR-E Total CDF/LERF Fire PRA Variant Case 2.11 E-07 1.19E-09 Where: Zone = Fire Zone Scen = 'A' to signify the variant case ScenDesc = Description of the Fire Scenario IGF = Ignition Frequency 
(/rx-yr)NSP = Non Suppression Probability SF = Severity Factor CCDP = Conditional Core Damage Probability CDF = Core Damage Frequency 
(/rx-yr)CLERP = Conditional Large Early Release Probability LERF = Large Early Release Frequency (Irx-yr)1 _ 'Base Case' scenarios are complete room burnout and therefore do not identify specific ignition sources Revision 0 Page 9 of 22 Revision 0 Page 9 of 22 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 076 2.2 Compliant Case Calculation The following sub-sections provide the basis for modeling each VFDR (or category of VFDRs)and the alterations that have been made to the variant case to represent the compliant case. In each section a discussion of the VFDR (or the category of VFDRs) is provided.2.2.1 VFDRs Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA For VFDRs specifically modeled in the Fire PRA, a table outlining the actual changes made to the Fire PRA model for that VFDR is provided.
The table includes: " Component Numbers associated with the VFDR. In some cases, there may be additional Component Numbers listed that may be the power supplies or other supporting components" Basic Event(s) associated with the Components" Scenarios which affect the VFDR.2.2.1.1 VFDR U2-076-HVAC-001
* U2-076-HVAC-001 
-Q2R42B000 1 A: ENERGIZED:ENERGIZED-BC2A Table 2-2-1 U2-076-HVAC-001 ALTERATIONS Component ID Basic Event BE Description Model Alterations Scenarios OPERATOR RECOVERY OP-RECOV-OP-RECOV-OF BATTERY CHARGER B Zero All BCSW-B BCSW-B ROOM COOLING FAILS-SW Model Alterations:
Failure mode probability set to nominal to eliminate fire contribution.
This model alteration is done in the Altered Events Table for the -COMPU2 scenario.2.2.2 VFDRs Not Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA A Fire PRA was developed in accordance with the requirements of Part 4 "Requirements for Fires at Power PRA" of the ASME and ANS combined PRA Standard, ASME/ANS RA-Sa-2009, "Standard for Level I/Large Early Release Frequency Probabilistic Risk Assessment for Nuclear Power Plant Applications".
Consistent with those requirements not all components required to meet the nuclear safety criteria need to be specifically modeled in the Fire PRA. The following VFDRs are associated with components not modeled in the Fire PRA: 2.2.2.1 VFDR U2-076-HVAC-002 4kV Switchgear Room 2F ventilation is not modeled in the fire PRA. Room Heat up calculations show that there will be no impact to the 4kV Switchgear Room due to loss of HVAC within the mission time of 24 hrs in the fire PRA. See calculation Fire PRA Logic Model for Farley Nuclear Plants, PRA-BC-F-1 1-004.0 U2-076-HVAC-002 
-Q2R 15A0006:ENERGIZED:ENERGIZED-EDG 1-2A Revision 0 Page 10 of 22 Version 1.0 Page 2141 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 076 2.2.2.2 VFDR U2-076-HVAC-003 MCC Room 2A ventilation is not modeled in the fire PRA. Room Heat up calculations show that there will be no impact to the MCC Room due to loss of HVAC within the mission time of 24 hrs in the fire PRA. See calculation Fire PRA Logic Model for Farley Nuclear Plants, PRA-BC-F- 11-004.N U2-076-HVAC-003 
-Q2RI17B000 1:ENERGIZED:ENERGIZED 2.2.3 Compliant Case Results Tables 2-3a and 2-3b provide the results of the compliant case calculation for fire area. All of the altered events identified in Section 2.2.1 have been applied to their respective scenarios and the results have been quantified.
The CDF and LERF results are provided on a scenario basis.Revision 0 Page 11 of 22 Version 1.0 Page 2142 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 076 SE-C051 326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 076 Zone Scen HGL-076-ADJ COPU COMPU12 SWIS-SG- D1-A COMPU2 SWIS-SG- D2-A COMPU2 SWIS-SG- D3-A COMPU2 SWIS-SG- El-A COMPU2 SWIS-SG- E2-A COMPU2 SWIS-SG- E3-A COMPU2 SWIS-SG- F-A COMPU2 SWIS-SG- G1-A COMPU2 SWIS-SG- G2-A COMPU2 SWIS-SG- G3-A COMPU2 SWIS-SG- H-A COMPU2 SWIS-SG- J1-A COMPU2 SWIS-SG- J2-A COMPU2 SWIS-SG- J3-A COMPU2 SWIS-SG- K-A COMPU2 Scenario Description HGL SCENARI(TRANSIENT TRANSIENT TRANSIENT 4.16KV SWG 1K SEVERE 4.16KV SWG 1K -SEVERE 4.16KV SWG 1 K HEAF L Cont Sta SWGR 2K 4160'SEVERE SWGR 2K 4160V -SEVERE SWGR 2K 4160&#xa3;HEAF 600-208V MCC 600V Swgr 1K-2l SEVERE 600V Swgr 1 K-21 NON SEVERE 600V Swgr 1 K-2 HEAF SS Xfmr 2K Table 2-3a Compliant Case CDF and LERF Results Train A Alignment Scenario Specific CCDP VFDRs 0 U2-076-HVAC-001 7.80E-0'U2-076-HVAC-001 7.69E-0'U2-076-HVAC-001 6.69E-0 U2-076-HVAC-001 6.69E-0 U2-076-HVAC-001 7.80E-0'NON U2-076-HVAC-00i 6.69E-0 U2-076-HVAC-001 7.80E-0'U2-076-HVAC-001 6.69E-0 I -U2-076-HVAC-001 7.80E-0'NON U2-076-HVAC-001 6.40E-0'-U2-076-HVAC-001 7.80E-0 1K U2-076-HVAC-001 7.69E-0'KOU2-076-HVAC-001 1.34E-0 U2-076-HVAC-001 1.34E-0'K-U2-076-HVAC-001 1.34E-0 U2-076-HVAC-001 4 4 7 7 4 7 4 7 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 CDF (Irx-yr)3.1OE-08 5.60E-08 4.87E-1 1 4.87E-1 1 1.78E-08 6.09E-1 1 2.03E-08 2.44E-1 1 1.78E-08 5.82E-08 2.03E-08 1.12E-07 3.06E-09 1.22E-08 3.50E-09 1.34E-07 CLERP 1.37E-06 1.34E-06 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.37E-06 1.61 E-10 1.37E-06 1.61E-10 1.37E-06 9.21 E-07 1.37E-06 1.34E-06 4.31 E-07 4.31 E-07 4.31 E-07 1.34E-06 LERF (/rx-yr)5.46E-1 1 9.79E-1 1 1.17E-14 1.17E-14 3.12E-11 1.46E-14 3.58E-1 1 5.86E-1 5 3.12E-11 8.39E-11 3.58E-1 1 1.96E-10 9.82E-12 3.93E-1 1 1.12E-11 2.34E-10 Revision 0 Page 12 of 22 Revision 0 Page 12 of 22 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 076 SE-C051 326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 076 Table 2-3a Compliant Case CDF and LERF Results Train A Alignment Zone Scen Scenario Scenario Specific CCDP CDF CLERP LERF Description VFDRs (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr)Disc 2C Serv Water A COMPU2 Pmp, BC1 Serv Wtr, U2-076-HVAC-001 6.69E-07 2.44E-11 1.61 E-10 5.86E-15 BC2 Serv Wtr SWlS-SG- M A MP QS0R42B526A-A 
& B U2-076-HVAC-001 6.69E-07 1.22E-11 1.61E-10 2.93E-15 A COMPUI2 SWIS- A-STIR- A- BASE CASE U2-076-HVAC-001 6.69E-07 1.51 E-10 1.61E-10 3.63E-14 STAIR-E COMPUI2 Compliant Scenario Total CDF and LERF 4.86E-07 8.60E-10 Table 2-3b Compliant Case CDF and LERF Results Train B Alignment Zone Scen Scenario Scenario Specific CCDP CDF CLERP LERF Description VFDRs (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr)HGL-076-ADJ COPU HGL SCENARIO U2-076-HVAC-001 2.38E-04 9.46E-09 6.02E-07 2.40E-1 1 COMPUI2 SWIS-SG- D1- TRANSIENT U2-076-HVAC-001 2.21E-04 1.61 E-08 5.58E-07 4.06E-11 A COMPU2 SWlS-SG- D2-A D2 TRANSIENT U2-076-HVAC-001 6.64E-07 4.84E-11 1.61E-10 1.17E-14 A COMPUI2 SWlS-SG- D3-A D3- TRANSIENT U2-076-HVAC-001 6.64E-07 4.84E-11 1.61E-10 1.17E-14 A COMPU2 SWIS-SG- El- 4.16KVSWG 1K- U2-076-HVAC-001 2.38E-04 5.41E-09 6.02E-07 1.37E-11 A COMPU2 SEVERE SWlS-SG- E2- 4.16KV SWG 1K -NON A E2 SER U2-076-HVAC-001 6.64E-07 6.05E-11 1.61E-10 1.46E-14 A COMPU-2 SEVERE SWIS-SG- E3- 4.16KVSWG 1K- U2-076-HVAC-001 2.38E-04 6.19E-09 6.02E-07 1.57E-11 A COMPU2 HEAF SWIS-SG- F-A COMPUF L Cont Sta U2-076-HVAC-001 6.64E-07 2.42E-11 1.61 E-10 5.86E-15 A COMPU12 SWIS-SG- G1- SWGR2K4160V-U2-076-HVAC-001 2.38E-04 5.41E-09 6.02E-07 1.37E-11 A COMPU2 SEVERE Revision 0 Page 13 of 22 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 076 Table 2-3b Compliant Case CDF and LERF Results Train B Alignment Zone Scen Scenario Scenario Specific CCDP CDF CLERP LERF Description VFDRs (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr)SWIS-SG- G2- SWGR2K4160V-NON U2-076-HVAC-001 9.98E-05 9.08E-09 1.54E-07 1.40E-11 A COMPU2 SEVERE SWIS-SG- G3-A COMPU2 SWIS-SG- H-A COMPU2 SWIS-SG- J1-A COMPU2 SWIS-SG- J2-A COMPU2 SWIS-SG- J3-A COMPU2 SWIS-SG- K-A COMPU2 SWGR 2K 4160V -HEAF 600-208V MCC 1K 600V Swgr 1 K-2K -SEVERE 600V Swgr 1 K-2K -NON SEVERE 600V Swgr 1K-2K -HEAF SS Xfmr 2K U2-076-HVAC-001 U2-076-HVAC-001 U2-076-HVAC-001 U2-076-HVAC-001 U2-076-HVAC-001 U2-076-HVAC-001 2.38E-04 2.21 E-04 1.31 E-04 1.31E-04 1.31E-04 2.21 E-04 6.19E-09 3.22E-08 2.99E-09 1.20E-08 3.43E-09 3.84E-08 6.02E-07 5.58E-07 4.28E-07 4.28E-07 4.28E-07 5.58E-07 1.57E-11 8.12E-11 9.73E-12 3.89E-1 1 1.11E-11 9.70E-1 1 Disc 2C Serv Water A COMPU2 Pmp, BC1 Serv Wtr, U2-076-HVAC-001 6.64E-07 2.42E-11 1.61E-10 5.86E-15 BC2 Serv Wtr SWIS-SG- M- QSR42B526A-A 
& B U2-076-HVAC-001 6.64E-07 1.21E-11 1.61E-10 2.93E-15 A COMPU2 SWIS- A-STIR- A- BASE CASE U2-076-HVAC-001 6.64E-07 1.50E-10 1.61 E-10 3.63E-14 STAIR-E COMPU2 Compliant Scenario Total CDF and LERF 1.47E-07 3.76E-1 0 Revision 0 Page 14 of 22 Revision 0 Page 14 of 22 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 076 2.2.4 Required Modifications There are no modifications required as a result of the risk evaluation for this fire area.2.2.5 Required Recovery Actions The following recovery actions are required as a result of the risk evaluation for this fire area: Table 2-4 Required Recovery Actions Component ID Basic Event VFDR BE Description Recovery Action Description Operator action to OPERATOR RECOVERY provide alternate Q2R42BO001A:ENERGIZED:E OP-RECOV-HVAC- OF BATTERY CHARGER cooling for battery NERGIZED-BC2A BCSW-A 001 A ROOM COOLING charger room due FAILS-SW to loss of Train A SW 2.3 Risk Evaluation Results The ACDF/LERF is below the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr (CDF) and 1E-08/rx-yr (LERF) for acceptable risk. All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0 ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency.
The following tables present the fire zone/scenario fire risk as well as the total fire risk for this fire area.Table 2-5a 1 FIRE AREA ACDF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN A ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case CCDP CDF 076-ADJ/HGL SWIS-SG-A/D1 SWIS-SG-A/D2 SWIS-SG-A/D3 SWIS-SG-A/E1 SWIS-SG-A/E2 SWIS-SG-A/E3 SWIS-SG-A/F SWIS-SG-A/G1 SWIS-SG-A/G2 SWIS-SG-A/G3 SWIS-SG-A/H SWIS-SG-A/J1 SWIS-SG-A/J2 SWIS-SG-A/J3 SWIS-SG-A/K SWIS-SG-A/L SWIS-SG-A/M SWIS-STAIR-E/A 7.83E-04 7.72E-04 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 7.83E-04 6.69E-07 7.83E-04 6.69E-07 1.36E-03 6.43E-04 1.36E-03 7.72E-04 1.34E-04 1.34E-04 1.34E-04 7.72E-04 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 3.12E-08 5.62E-08 4.87E-1 1 4.87E-1 1 1.78E-08 6.09E-1 1 2.04E-08 2.44E-1 1 3.08E-08 5.85E-08 3.53E-08 1.12E-07 3.06E-09 1.22E-08 3.50E-09 1.34E-07 2.44E-1 1 1.22E-11 1.51E-10 5.16E-07 Compliant Case CCDP CDF 7.80E-04 3.10E-08 7.69E-04 5.60E-08 6.69E-07 4.87E-1 1 6.69E-07 4.87E-11 7.80E-04 1.78E-08 6.69E-07 6.09E-11 7.80E-04 2.03E-08 6.69E-07 2.44E-11 7.80E-04 1.78E-08 6.40E-04 5.82E-08 7.80E-04 2.03E-08 7.69E-04 1.12E-07 1.34E-04 3.06E-09 1.34E-04 1.22E-08 1.34E-04 3.50E-09 7.69E-04 1.34E-07 6.69E-07 2.44E-11 6.69E-07 1.22E-11 6.69E-07 1.51 E-10 4.86E-07 Variant -Compliant aCDF 1.26E-10 1.96E-10 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 7.21 E-11 0.OOE+00 8.25E-1 1 0.OOE+00 1.31E-08 2.88E-10 1.50E-08 3.92E-1 0 0.OOE+00 5.10E-13 0.OOE+00 4.67E-1 0 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 2.97E-08 Total CDF and delta CDF 2 Revision 0 Page 15 of 22 Version 1.0 Page 2146 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 076 1 -N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.2 -Total ACDF includes the risk of recovery actions required to demonstrate the availability of a success path for the nuclear safety performance criteria.Table 2-5b 1 FIRE AREA &#xa3;iCDF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN B ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CCDP CDF CCDP CDF aCDF 076-AOJ/HGL SWIS-SG-A/D1 SWIS-SG-A/D2 SWIS-SG-A/D3 SWIS-SG-A/E1 SWIS-SG-A/E2 SWIS-SG-AIE3 SWIS-SG-A/F SWIS-SG-A/G1 SWIS-SG-A/G2 SWIS-SG-A/G3 SWIS-SG-A/H SWIS-SG-A/J1 SWIS-SG-A/J2 SWIS-SG-A/J3 SWIS-SG-A/K SWIS-SG-AIL SWIS-SG-A/M SWIS-STAIR-E/A 2.46E-04 2.29E-04 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 2.46E-04 6.64E-07 2.46E-04 6.64E-07 1.46E-03 1.08E-04 1.46E-03 2.29E-04 1.31E-04 1.31 E-04 1.31 E-04 2.29E-04 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 9.78E-09 1.67E-08 4.84E-1 1 4.84E-1 1 5.59E-09 6.05E-1 1 6.40E-09 2.42E-1 1 3.32E-08 9.82E-09 3.80E-08 3.33E-08 2.99E-09 1.20E-08 3.43E-09 3.98E-08 2.42E-1 1 1.21 E-11 1.50E-10 2.11E-07 2.38E-04 2.21 E-04 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 2.38E-04 6.64E-07 2.38E-04 6.64E-07 2.38E-04 9.98E-05 2.38E-04 2.21 E-04 1.31E-04 1. 31 E-04 1.31 E-04 2.21E-04 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 9.46E-09 1.61E-08 4.84E-11 4.84E-1 1 5.41 E-09 6.05E-1 1 6.19E-09 2.42E-1 1 5.41 E-09 9.08E-09 6.19E-09 3.22E-08 2.99E-09 1.20E-08 3.43E-09 3.84E-08 2.42E-1 I 1.21 E-11 1.50E-10 1.47E-07 3.23E-10 5.53E-10 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 1.85E-10 0.OOE+00 2.11E-10 0.OOE+00 2.78E-08 7.36E-10 3.18E-08 1.11E-09 0.OOE+00 2.58E-12 0.OOE+00 1.32E-09 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 6.40E-08 Total CDF and delta CDF 2-N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.2 Total ACDF includes the risk of recovery actions required to demonstrate the availability of a success path for the nuclear safety performance criteria.Table 2-6a 1 FIRE AREA aLERF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN A ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CLERP LERF CLERP LERF ALERF 076-ADJ/HGL SWIS-SG-A/D1 SWIS-SG-A/D2 SWIS-SG-A/D3 SWIS-SG-A/E1 SWIS-SG-A/E2 SWIS-SG-A/E3 SWIS-SG-AIF SWIS-SG-A/G 1 SWIS-SG-A/G2 SWIS-SG-A/G3 SWIS-SG-A/H SWIS-SG-A/J1 SWIS-SG-A/J2 1.46E-06 1.43E-06 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.46E-06 1.61 E-10 1.46E-06 1.61 E-10 1.71 E-05 1.01E-06 1.71E-05 1.43E-06 4.31E-07 4.31E-07 5.83E-1 1 1.04E-10 1.17E-14 1.17E-14 3.33E-1 1 1.46E-14 3.81 E-11 5.86E-15 3.90E-10 9.21 E-11 4.47E-10 2.09E-10 9.82E-12 3.93E-1 1 1.37E-06 1.34E-06 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.37E-06 1.61E-10 1.37E-06 1.61E-10 1.37E-06 9.21 E-07 1.37E-06 1.34E-06 4.31 E-07 4.31 E-07 5.46E-1 1 9.79E-1 1 1.17E-14 1.17E-14 3.12E-11 1.46E-14 3.58E-11 5.86E-15 3.12E-1 1 8.39E-1 1 3.58E-1l1 1.96E-10 9.82E-12 3.93E-11 3.61E-12 6.45E-12 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 2.07E-1 2 0.OOE+00 2.36E-12 O.OOE+00 3.59E-10 8.26E-1 2 4.11E-10 1.29E-1 1 0.OOE+00 1.39E-14 Revision 0 Page 16 of 22 Version 1.0 Page 2147 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 076 Table 2-6a 1 FIRE AREA ALERF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN A ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CLERP LERF CLERP LERF ALERF SWIS-SG-A/J3 4.31E-07 1.12E-11 4.31E-07 1.12E-11 0.00E+00 SWIS-SG-A/K 1.43E-06 2.49E-10 1.34E-06 2.34E-10 1.54E-11 SWIS-SG-A/L 1.61E-10 5.86E-15 1.61E-10 5.86E-15 0.OOE+00 SWIS-SG-A/M 1.61E-10 2.93E-15 1.61 E-10 2.93E-15 0.OOE+00 SWIS-STAIR-E/A 1.61E-10 3.63E-14 1.61E-10 3.63E-14 0.OOE+00 Total LERF and delta LERF2 1.68E-09 8.60E-10 8.21E-10 2 _ N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.2 Total ALERF includes the risk of recovery actions required to demonstrate the availability of a success path for the nuclear safety performance criteria.Table 2-6b 1 FIRE AREA aLERF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN B ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CLERP LERF CLERP LERF ALERF 076-ADJ/HGL SWIS-SG-A/D1 SWIS-SG-A/D2 SWIS-SG-A/D3 SWIS-SG-A/E1 SWIS-SG-A/E2 SWIS-SG-A/E3 SWIS-SG-A/F SWIS-SG-A/G1 SWIS-SG-A/G2 SWIS-SG-A/G3 SWIS-SG-A/H SWIS-SG-A/J1 SWIS-SG-A/J2 SWIS-SG-A/J3 SWIS-SG-A/K SWIS-SG-A/L SWIS-SG-A/M SWIS-STAIR-E/A 6.94E-07 6.47E-07 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 6.94E-07 1.61E-10 6.94E-07 1.61E-10 1.63E-05 2.46E-07 1.63E-05 6.47E-07 4.28E-07 4.28E-07 4.28E-07 6.47E-07 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 2.76E-1 1 4.71 E-11 1.17E-14 1.17E-14 1.58E-11 1.46E-14 1.81 E-11 5.86E-15 3.71E-10 2.24E-1 1 4.24E-1 0 9.43E-1 1 9.73E-1 2 3.89E-1 1 1.11E-11 1.13E-10 5.86E-15 2.93E-1 5 3.63E-14 1.19E-09 6.02E-07 2.40E-11 5.58E-07 4.06E-1 1 1.61E-10 1.17E-14 1.61E-10 1.17E-14 6.02E-07 1.37E-11 1.61E-10 1.46E-14 6.02E-07 1.57E-11 1.61E-10 5.86E-15 6.02E-07 1.37E-1i1 1.54E-07 1.40E-11 6.02E-07 1.57E-11 5.58E-07 8.12E-11 4.28E-07 9.73E-12 4.28E-07 3.89E-11 4.28E-07 1.11E-11 5.58E-07 9.70E-1 1 1.61E-10 5.86E-15 1.61E-10 2.93E-15 1.61E-10 3.63E-14 3.76E-10 3.65E-12 6.53E-12 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 2.09E-1 2 0.OOE+00 2.39E-12 0.OOE+00 3.57E-10 8.36E-12 4.09E-10 1.31 E-11 0.OOE+00 1.39E-14 0.OOE+00 1.56E-11 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 8.17E-10 Total LERF and delta LERF 2 1 -N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.2 _ Total ALERF includes the risk of recovery actions required to demonstrate the availability of a success path for the nuclear safety performance criteria.3.0 DID EVALUATION 3.1 Defense-in-Depth Evaluation A review of the impact of the change on defense-in-depth (DID) was performed.
NFPA 805 defines DID as: a Preventing fires from starting Revision 0 Page 17 of 22 Version 1.0 Page 2148 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 076" Rapidly detecting fires and controlling and extinguishing promptly those fires that do occur, thereby limiting damage" Providing adequate level of fire protection for structures, systems and components important to safety; so that a fire that is not promptly extinguished will not prevent essential plant safety functions from being performed.
In general, the DID requirement was considered satisfied if the proposed change does not result in a substantial imbalance among these elements (or echelons).
The review of DID was qualitative and addressed each of the elements with respect to the proposed change. Fire protection features and systems relied upon to ensure DID were identified in the assessment (e.g., detection, suppression system).The VFDRs and the associated Fire Area risk (CDF) and scenario consequences (CCDP values)were evaluated to identify general DID echelon imbalances.
Potential methods to balance the DID features were identified ensuring an adequate balance of DID features is maintained for the Fire Area. See Section 3.2 for the results of the evaluation.
3.2 Defense-in-Depth Review Results A review of defense in depth and risk evaluation results show that, given the systems and features specified in Table 3-1 and Section 2 respectively, risk acceptance criteria are met and that the balance of defense in depth is maintained.
The risk acceptance criteria are met with substantial margin to account for analytical methods associated with fire scenarios.
The analyzed scenarios bound potential fuel packages which can reasonably be expected to occur in this area.The installed detection and suppression systems are required for DID to support brigade response and to support execution of the required recovery action for risk.In the event of no intervention by the plant fire brigade, it is not expected that a credible fire would develop which would not be bounded by the analyzed scenarios.
Based on the required fire protections systems/features specified, the ability to meet nuclear safety performance criteria is ensured.The table below summarizes how an adequate balance of DID is maintained.
Table 3-1 Defense-in-Depth Impact Review Method of Providing DID Discussion Echelon 1: Prevent fires from starting Combustible Control No change necessary to procedure(s) 
/guidance document(s).
1 Hot Work Control No change necessary to procedure(s) 
/guidance document(s).
1 Echelon 2: Rapidly detect, control and extinguish promptly those fires that do occur thereby limiting fire damage Detection System Detection system installed and required.Automatic Fire Suppression Automatic suppression system installed in Fire Zone SWIS-SG-A and required.Portable Fire Extinguishers Portable extinguishers are available, but no enhancements required.1 Hose stations and hydrants Fire hose cabinets are available, but no enhancements required.
1 located in the area(s)Pre-Fire Plan No change necessary to procedure(s) 
/guidance document(s).
1 Revision 0 Page 18 of 22 Version 1.0 Page 2149 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 076 Table 3-1 Defense-in-Depth Impact Review Method of Providing DID Discussion Echelon 3: Provide adequate level of fire protection for systems and structures so that a fire will not prevent essential safety functions from being performed Walls, floors ceilings and structural No changes necessary to existing barriers.
1 elements are rated or have been evaluated as adequate for the hazard.Openings in the fire barrier are rated No changes necessary to existing barrier openings.or have been evaluated as adequate for the hazard.Supplemental barriers (e.g., ERFBS, No supplemental barriers installed and not required.cable tray covers, etc.)Guidance provided to operations No VFDR related DID recovery actions required.personnel detailing the credited success path(s) including recovery actions to achieve nuclear safety performance criteria.1 This fire protection feature is relied upon without further DID enhancements beyond inherent programmatic requirements of NFPA 805, Chap. 3 and will not be reported in Table 5-2.3.2.1 Required Modifications There are no modifications required as a result of the DID evaluation for this fire area.3.2.2 Required Recovery Actions There are no required recovery actions as a result of the DID evaluation for this fire area.4.0 SAFETY MARGIN EVALUATION 4.1 Safety Margin Evaluation In accordance with NEI 04-02, 5.3.5.3 guidance, the maintenance of adequate Safety Margin is assessed by the consideration of categories of analyses utilized by this fire risk evaluation (FRE).Safety margins are considered to be maintained if:* Codes and standards or their alternatives accepted for use by the NRC are met, and Safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) are met, or provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty.
The maintenance of adequate safety margin for the change analysis is described for each of the specific analysis types used in support of the fire risk assessment.
4.1.1 Fire Modeling Fire modeling performed in support of the transition has been performed within the Fire PRA utilizing codes and standards developed by industry and NRC staff to provide realistic yet conservative results. Specifically, the heat release rates utilized in the transition analysis are based upon NUREG/CR 6850, Task 8, Scoping Fire Modeling.
These heat release rates are conservative and represent values used to screen out fixed ignition sources that do not pose a Revision 0 Page 19 of 22 Version 1.0 Page 2150 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 076 threat to the targets within specific fire compartments and to assign severity factors to unscreened fixed ignition sources.The combined analysis approach is used during transition; therefore, maximum expected fire scenario/limiting fire scenario have not been analyzed separately.
The bases for the application of these fire modeling codes and standards were not altered in support of this FRE.4.1.2 Plant System Performance Plant system perfornance parameters were not modified as a result of this FRE. These performance parameters were originally established to support nuclear performance criteria contained in the plant specific accident analyses.
These analyses established component and system performance criteria necessary to establish safe and stable plant operation, as well as, safe shut down of the unit in the event of a fire. These performance parameters were not modified as a result of this FRE.4.2 Safety Margin Results All analyses and assessment have been performed utilizing accepted techniques and industry accepted standards.
In addition, safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) have been considered and provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty.
As such, the Safety Margins are maintained as discussed in Section 4.1.5.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION RESULTS 5.1 Dispositions of VFDRs Based on the FRE results contained in Sections 2, 3 and 4 the VFDRs identified in Section 1. 1 have been resolved as follows: Table 5-1 Final Variance Disposition VFDR ID Disposition U2-076-HVAC-001 Recovery Action(s)
Required to Satisfy Risk Criteria:
See Table 2-4 U2-076-HVAC-002 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)U2-076-HVAC-003 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)Revision 0 Page 20 of 22 Revision 0 Page 20 of 22 Version 1.0 Page 2151 of 3726 SE-C051326701 
-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 076 5.2 Fire Risk Evaluation Summary of Fire Protection Systems and Features Table 5-2 Summary of Required Fire Protection Systems and Features Required Required Required Fire FrAra FrZoe Suppression DetectionReurdFe Fire Area Fire Zone Protection Feature Required Fire Protection System and Feature Details System System (R, D)(R, D) (R, D)U2 076 R R -Improvements to procedures necessary to incorporate recovery actions required to meet risk criteria (See Table 2-4)R -Manual initiation of the switchgear C0 2 suppression SWIS-SG-A R, D R, D None system, Detection system;D -Automatic initiation of the switchgear CO 2 suppression system, Detection system SWIS- None R, D None R -Detection system;STAIR-E D -Detection system Required Suppression/Detection/Feature:
required in the Fire Area based on NFPA 805 Chapter 4 compliance.
The information is provided on a zone basis. The basis for the requirement of the fire protection system is designated as follows:* R -Risk Criteria:
Systems required to meet the Risk Criteria for the Performance-Based Approach (NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4)* D -Defense-in-depth Criteria:
Systems required to maintain adequate balance of Defense-in-Depth for a Performance-Based Approach (NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4)Fire Protection Features in this Table only refer to those features installed in the Fire Area that have a corresponding Chapter 3 requirement.
5.3 Summary of Recovery Actions Table 5-3 -Recovery Actions Fire Area Component Component Description Actions U2 076 Q2R42B0001A 125V DC BUS 2A Operator action to provide alternate cooling for battery charger room due to loss of Train A SW 5.4 Summary of Plant Modifications No modifications are required for this fire area.Revision 0 Page 21 of 22 Revision 0 Page 21 of 22 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 076 5.5 Fire Area Risk Summary Fire Area U2 076 Area Description SWIS 5 kV Switchgear Room A and East Stairs Table 5-4 Fire Area Risk Summary NFPA 805 VFDR Fire Area CDF/LERF Basis (Yes/No)4.2.4 3.64E-07/1.44E-09 Yes RAs (Yes/No)Yes Fire Risk Eval A CDF/LERF 4.69E-08/8.19E-10 Additional Risk of RAs 4.69E-08/8.19E-10 Revision 0 Page 22 of 22 Revision 0 Page 22 of 22 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-004 Attachment 
-Unit 2 Fire Area 1-004 FRE for Fire Area Auxiliary Building Revision:
0 Name Fire PRA Preparer Fire PRA Reviewer Fire Protection Preparer Fire Protection Reviewer NSCA Preparer NSCA Reviewer FRE Preparer FRE Reviewer Jonathan Hedrick Clint Pierce Robert Kirkpatrick Rebecca P. Puckett Larry Valmonte Dan Funk Steve Hardy Brandon Jamar Revision 0 Page 1 of 54 Version 1.0 Page 2154 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-004 1.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION INPUT .....................................................................
4 1.1 Variances from the Deterministic Requirements 
....................................
4 1.2 Fire Protection Systems and Features ..................................................
4 1.2.1 Construction 
................................................................................
9 1.2 .2 D ete ctio n ................................................................................... 
..9 1.2.3 Fixed Fire Suppression 
............................................................
10 1.2.4 Manual Suppression 
.................................................................
12 1.2.5 Ventilation (Smoke Removal) ....................................................
12 1.2.6 Other Fire Protection Features ..................................................
12 1.2.7 Fire Hazard Identification 
..........................................................
12 1.2.8 Fire PRA Input ..........................................................................
12 2.0 RISK EVALUATION 
.......................................................................................
13 2.1 Fire PRA Variant Case Calculation 
......................................................
13 2.2 Compliant Case Calculation 
.................................................................
27 2.2.1 VFDRs Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA ............................
27 2.2.2 VFDRs Not Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA .....................
27 2.2.3 Compliant Case Results ...........................................................
27 2.2.4 Required Modifications 
.............................................................
27 2.2.5 Required Recovery Actions ......................................................
27 2.3 Risk Evaluation Results .......................................................................
27 3.0 DID EVALUATION 
........................................................................................
43 3.1 Defense-in-Depth Evaluation 
...............................................................
43 3.2 Defense-in-Depth Review Results ......................................................
44 3.2.1 Required Modifications 
.............................................................
45 3.2.2 Required Recovery Actions ......................................................
45 4.0 SAFETY MARGIN EVALUATION 
..................................................................
45 4.1 Safety Margin Evaluation 
.....................................................................
45 4.1.1 Fire Modeling ...........................................................................
45 4.1.2 Plant System Performance 
......................................................
45 4.2 Safety Margin Results ..........................................................................
46 5.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION RESULTS ............................................................
46 5.1 Dispositions of VFDRs .......................................................................
46 Revision 0 Page 2 of 54 Version 1.0 Page 2155 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-004 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 Fire Risk Evaluation Summary of Fire Protection Systems and Features 47 Summary of Recovery Actions .............................................................
54 Summary of Plant Modifications 
..........................................................
54 Fire Area Risk Summary ......................................................................
54 Revision 0 Page 3 of 54 Version 1.0 Page 2156 of 3726 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-004 1.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION INPUT 1.1 Variances from the Deterministic Requirements The VFDRs identified for evaluation for Unit 2, Fire Area 1-004, Unit I Auxiliary Building are: Table 1-1 VFDRs VFDR Component(s)
Description U2-1-004-SEP-N2B31L0001E:ON:O The Pressurizer Heaters are required to increase RCS Pressure by 001 FF, PRESSURIZER heating Pressurizer Inventory.
In order to establish pressure control, HEATER GROUP 2E the Pressurizer heaters are required off. Fire induced circuit failure DISTRIBUTION could result in spurious starting of the Pressurizer Heater Group 2E.PANEL Failure to secure the Pressurizer Heater could challenge the RCS Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-1-004-SEP-QSV49K0002A:STAN Control Room HVAC is required to provide habitable conditions for 002 DBY:ON, CONTROL operations to perform the necessary actions to achieve hot ROOM A/C standby/hot shutdown from the control room. Both Train A and Train B CONDENSING UNIT related HVAC equipment (Blowers and A/C Units) are impacted in this 2A area, due to the physical presence of the fire. This failure challenges the control room HVAC Vital Auxiliaries Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
1.2 Fire Protection Systems and Features Fire Area 1-004 consists of Fire Zones as listed below. This fire area is located in the Unit 1 Auxiliary Building at the elevations shown below:* 140 -Waste Gas Decay Tank Drain Filter Room, EL. 100'-0"* 151 -Waste Gas Decay Tank Rooms, EL. 100'-0"* 152 -Valve Compartment Room, EL. 100'-0" N 153 -Waste Gas Compressor Room, EL. 100'-0"* 154 -Waste Evaporator Steam Generator Room, EL. 100'-0" o 154A -Valve Compartment Room, EL. 131 '-0"* 155 -Passageway to Unit 2(1), EL. 100'-0" M 156- Holdup Tank Room, EL. 100'-0", 121'-0"* 157 -Holdup Tank Room, EL. 100'-0", 121 '-0"* 158 -Holdup Tank Room, EL. 100'-0", 121'-0"* 159 -Recycle Evaporator Feed Pump Room, EL. 100'-0"* 160 -Hatch Area, EL. 100'-0"* 161 -Corridor, EL. 100'-0"* 162 -Hallway, EL. 100'-0" M 163 -WDS Control Panel Room, EL. 100'-0" 0 164 -Laundry and Hot Shower Tank Room/Storage Room, EL. 100'-0" Revision 0 Page 4 of 54 Version 1.0 Page 2157 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-004 a 165 -Waste Gas Decay Tank Room, EL. 100'-0" N 166 -Waste Gas Decay Tank Room, EL. 100'-0" 0 168 -Chemical and Laundry Drain Tank Room, EL. 100'-0" 0 170 -Letdown Heat Exchanger Room, EL. 100'-0"* 175 -Hallway, EL. 100'-0" M 176 -Secondary Spent-Resin Storage Tank Room, EL. 100'-0" 0 177 -Pump Room, EL. 100'-0" 0 178 -Filter Room, EL. 100'-0" a 180 -Recycle Evaporator Steam Generator Room, EL. 100'-0" 0 186 -Boric Acid Area, EL. 100'-0" 0 187 -Hydro Test Pump Room, EL. 100'-0" 0 188 -Boric Acid Tank Area, EL. 100'-0", 121'-0" a 203 -Waste Condenser Tanks and Pump Room, EL. 121'-0" M 204 -Waste Evaporator Package Room, EL. 12 1'-0" 0 205 -Passageway to Unit 2, EL. 121'-0".206 -Heat Exchanger Room, EL. 121'-0" N 207 -Hatch Area, EL. 121'-0" N 208- Corridor, EL. 121'-0" 0 209- Hallway, EL. 121'-0" 0 215 -Duct and Pipe Chase, EL. 139'-0", 155'-0" M 216- Valve Compartments Area, EL. 121'-0" 0 217 -Volume Control Tank Room, EL. 121'-0" M 218- Chiller Unit Room, EL. 121'-0" M 219- Pipe Chase, EL. 121'-0"-220 -Valve Compartment Room, EL. 121'-0"* 221 -Primary Spent-Resin Storage Tank Room, EL. 12 1'-0" 0 222 -Corridor, EL. 121'-0" a 230 -Recycle Evaporator Package Room, EL. 121 '-0" 0 231 -Sluice Pump Room, EL. 121'-0" 0 232 -Sluice Filter Room, EL. 121'-0" M 236- Duct Chase, EL. 121'-0", 139'-0", 155'-0" 0 237- Corridor, EL. 121'-0".238- Cask Storage Area, EL. 121'-0", 139'-0", 155'-0" Revision 0 Page 5 of 54 Version 1.0 Page 2158 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-004 a 239- Transfer Canal, EL. 121 '-0", 139'-0" 0 240 -Spent-Fuel Pool Room, EL. 121'-0", 139'-0", 155'-0" 0 253 -Valve Compartment, EL. 121'-0" N 301 -Seal Water Filter Room, EL. 139'-0"* 302 -Recycle Evaporator Feed Filter Room, EL. 139'-0"* 303 -Reactor Coolant Filter Room, EL. 139'-0"* 304 -Waste Monitor, EL. 139'-0"* 305 -Seal Injection Filter Room, EL. 139'-0"* 306 -Recycle Evaporator Feed Demineralizer Room, EL. 139'-0"* 307 -Valve Compartment Room, EL. 139'-0" 0 308 -Waste Condensate and Monitor Tank Demineralizer Room, EL. 139'-0" a 309 -Hatch Area, EL. 139'-0" N 310 -Valve Compartment Room, EL. 139'-0"* 311 -Recycle Evaporator Concentrates Filter Room, EL. 139'-0"* 312 -Corridor, EL. 139'-0"* 313 -Floor Drain and Laundry Tank Filter Room, EL. 139'-0"* 314 -Waste Evaporator Feed Filter Room, EL. 139'-0"* 315 -Recycle Waste Condenser Filter Room, EL. 139'-0"* 316 -Passageway to Unit 2, EL. 139'-0"* 322 -Hallway, EL. 139'-0"* 323 -Sample Room, EL. 139'-0".324 -Primary Chemistry Lab, EL. 139'-0"* 325 -Counting Room/Spectro-photometer Lab, EL. 139'-0"* 326 -Radiochemistry Lab, EL. 139'-0"* 327 -Valve Access Area, EL. 139'-0"* 328 -BTR Demineralizer Room, EL. 139'-0"* 329 -Pipe Tunnel, EL. 139'-0" 8 330 -Chiller Surge Tanks Pump Room, EL. 139'-0" 0 331 -Valve Access Area, EL. 139'-0" 2 332 -MCC IA/2A Area, EL. 139'-0" N 340 -Demineralizer Compartment, EL. 139'-0" M 341 -Pipe Chase, EL. 131'-0" 0 342 -Spent-Fuel Pool Pump Room, EL. 139'-0" Revision 0 Page 6 of 54 Version 1.0 Page 2159 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-004 0 348 -Cask Wash Area, EL. 139'-0", 155'-0".351 -Pump Room, EL. 139'-0" 0 400 -Primary Access Point EL. 155'-0" 0 402 -Passage to Unit 2, EL. 155'-0".403 -Hot Instrument Shop, EL. 155'-0" 0 405 -Hatch Room, EL. 155'-0"* 406 -Decontamination Room, EL. 155'-0" 0 407 -Hot Machine Shop, EL. 155'-0".408 -Hallway, EL. 155'-0" E 409 -Hallway, EL. 155'-0" 0 410A -600 V-Load Center, EL. 155'-0" E 410B -600-V Load Center, EL. 155'-0" 0 415 -Corridor, EL. 155'-0" 0 417 -Corridor, EL. 155'-0" E 418 -Aux. Building & Containment Purge Vent Equip. Room, EL. 155'-0" 0 419 -Demineralizer Hatch Area, EL. 155'-0" E 422 -Corridor, EL. 155'-0" 0 423 -Valve Compartment, EL. 155'-0".424 -Demineralizer Compartment, EL. 100'-0" M 425 -Demineralizer Compartment, EL. 100'-0" a 426- Demineralizer Compartment, EL. 100'-0" M 427 -Demineralizer Compartment, EL. 155'-0" 0 429 -Containment Purge Air Equipment Room, EL. 155'-0" a 432 -Corridor, EL. 155'-0" 0 438 -Hot Water Heater Room, EL. 155'-0" M 441 -Tool Room, EL. 155'-0" M 445 -Spent-Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger Room, EL. 155'-0" m 446- Hallway, EL. 155'-0" 8 448 -SFPC Pump Room, EL. 155'-0".449 -Demineralizer Room, EL. 155'-0" a 450 -Valve Compartment, EL. 155'-0" M 451 -Filter Room, EL. 155'-0" M 453 -Janitor Room, EL. 155'-0" Revision 0 Page 7 of 54 Version 1.0 Page 2160 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-004 0 454 -Lobby, EL. 155'-0".455 -Clean Toilet Room (Men's), EL. 155'-0" 0 456 -Drying Area, EL. 155'-0".461 -Dosimetry Lab, EL. 155'-0" 0 462 -Nonradioactive Vent Equipment Room, EL. 155'-0".463 -Storage Room, EL. 155'-0" 0 464- Storage Room, EL. 155'-0" 0 467 -SFP Heat Exchanger Room, EL. 165'-0" a 478 -Motor Control Center Room, EL. 155'-0" 0 480 -Health Physics Briefing/Planning Room, EL. 155'-0" 0 481 -Health Physicist Room, EL. 155'-0" 0 482 -Air Sample & Smear Analysis Room, EL. 155'-0"* 483 -Passage, EL. 155'-0" E 484 -Hot Toilet (Women's), EL. 155'-0" E 485 -Hot Toilet (Men's), EL. 155'-0".486 -Survey Preparation Room, EL. 155'-0"* 487 -Instrument Calibration Room, EL. 155'-0" 0 488 -Instrument Issue & Storage Room, EL. 155'-0".489 -Waste & Decon. Foreman Office, EL. 155'-0" 0 490 -Clean Toilet (Women's), EL. 155'-0" w 491 -Passage, EL. 155'-0" 0 504 -Stair No. 6, El. 175'-0"* 505 -Spent-Fuel Pool Vent Equipment Room, EL. 175'-0"* 506 -Component Cooling Surge Tank Room, EL. 175'-0"* 604- Passage, EL. 131'-0"* 605 -Blowdown Pumps and Surge Tank Room, EL. 13 1'-0" 606 -Filter Room, EL. 131 '-0"* 607- Filter Room, EL. 131 '-0" 608 -Blowdown Heat Exchanger Room, EL. 131 '-0" 609 -Storage Room, EL. 131'-0"* 610- Valve Compartment Room, EL. 131'-0" Revision 0 Page 8 of 54 Version 1.0 Page 2161 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-004 1.2.1 Construction Barriers for this fire area are of substantial construction and have been designed and constructed to meet separation requirements.
In the event the configuration utilized is not in accordance with recognized standards, the deviations have been evaluated to be adequate for the hazard.1.2.2 Detection Fire detection systems to provide notification to the Control Room] are: " Fire Zones 151-154 are provided with detection." Fire Zone 154A is provided with detection." Fire Zones 157-158 are provided with detection." Fire Zones 160-166 are provided with a detection." Fire Zone 168 is provided with detection." Fire Zone 170 is provided with detection." Fire Zone 175 is provided with detection.
* Fire Zones 177-178 are provided with detection." Fire Zone 180 is provided with detection." Fire Zones 186-188 are provided with detection." Fire Zone 203 is provided with detection." Fire Zone 204 is provided with detection." Fire Zone 205 is provided with detection.
* Fire Zones 206-209 are provided with detection." Fire Zone 216 is provided with detection." Fire Zone 218 is provided with detection." Fire Zone 220 is provided with detection." Fire Zone 222 is provided with detection.
* Fire Zone 230-232 are provided with detection." Fire Zones 237-238 are provided with detection." Fire Zone 240 is provided with detection.
* Fire Zone 253 is provided with detection.
* Fire Zones 301-305 are provided with detection.
* Fire Zone 307 is provided with detection." Fire Zones 309-316 are provided with detection." Fire Zones 322-326 are provided with detection." Fire Zones 330-332 are provided with detection.
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-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-004* Fire Zone 342 is provided with detection.
* Fire Zone 351 is provided with detection.
* Fire Zones 402-403 are provided with detection.
* Fire Zones 405-409 are provided with detection.
* Fire Zone 410 A is provided with.* Fire Zone 410B is provided with detection.
* Fire Zone 415 is provided with detection.
* Fire Zone 417 -419 is provided with detection.
* Fire Zone 422 -423 is provided with detection." Fire Zone 429 is provided with detection." Fire Zone 432 is provided with detection." Fire Zone 438 is provided with detection." Fire Zone 441 is provided with detection.
* Fire Zones 445-446 are provided with detection." Fire Zones 453-456 are provided with detection." Fire Zones 461-464 are provided with detection." Fire Zone 467 is provided with detection." Fire Zone 478 is provided with detection." Fire Zones 480-491 are provided with detection.
* Fire Zones 504-506 are provided with detection.
* Fire Zones 604-610 are provided with detection.
1.2.3 Fixed Fire Suppression Fixed fire suppression systems to aid in control of both fire growth and spread in the fire area are:* Fire Zone 160 is provided with suppression that provides partial coverage." Fire Zone 161 is provided with suppression.
The 5kV disconnect switches in this room have an automatic heat-actuated C02 suppression system." Fire Zone 162 is provided with suppression.
* Fire Zone 163 is provided with suppression." Fire Zone 164 is provided with suppression." Fire Zone 168 is provided with suppression." Fire Zone 175 is provided with suppression." Fire Zone 186 is provided with suppression.
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-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-004" Fire Zone 207 is provided with suppression that provides partial coverage." Fire Zone 208 is provided with suppression." Fire Zone 209 is provided with suppression that provides partial coverage." Fire Zone 222 is provided with suppression that provides partial coverage." Fire Zone 312 is provided with suppression that provides partial coverage." Fire Zone 316 is provided with suppression that provides partial coverage." Fire Zone 322 is provided with suppression." Fire Zone 402 is provided with suppression above and below the suspended ceiling." Fire Zone 406 is provided with suppression." Fire Zone 410A is provided with an automatic heat-actuated C02 suppression system in the load centers." Fire Zone 410B is provided with an automatic heat-actuated C02 suppression system in the load centers." Fire Zone 415 is provided with suppression above and below the suspended ceiling." Fire Zone 417 is provided with suppression above and below the suspended ceiling." Fire Zone 432 is provided with suppression above and below the suspended ceiling." Fire Zone 438 is provided with suppression." Fire Zone 453 is provided with suppression below the suspended ceiling." Fire Zone 454 is provided with suppression below the suspended ceiling.* Fire Zone 455 is provided with suppression below the suspended ceiling.* Fire Zone 456 is provided with suppression below the suspended ceiling.* Fire Zone 461 is provided with suppression below the suspended ceiling.* Fire Zone 462 is provided with suppression that provides partial coverage.* Fire Zone 480 is provided with suppression below the suspended ceiling.* Fire Zone 481 is provided with suppression below the suspended ceiling.* Fire Zone 482 is provided with suppression below the suspended ceiling.* Fire Zone 483 is provided with suppression below the suspended ceiling.* Fire Zone 484 is provided with suppression below the suspended ceiling." Fire Zone 485 is provided with suppression below the suspended ceiling." Fire Zone 486 is provided with suppression below the suspended ceiling." Fire Zone 487 is provided with suppression below the suspended ceiling." Fire Zone 488 is provided with suppression below the suspended ceiling." Fire Zone 489 is provided with suppression below the suspended ceiling.Revision 0 Page 11 of 54 Version 1.0 Page 2164 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-004 S Fire Zone 490 is provided with suppression below the suspended ceiling." Fire Zone 491 is provided with suppression below the suspended ceiling.1.2.4 Manual Suppression Manual suppression equipment to be utilized by plant personnel and/or fire brigade members are: " Fire Area 1-004 is provided with fire hose cabinets in the area to satisfy NFPA 14 requirements." Portable fire extinguishers are available in the area.1.2.5 Ventilation (Smoke Removal)Portable smoke ejectors are available to assist with smoke removal.1.2.6 Other Fire Protection Features A portion of corridor 222 is designated as a "No Combustible Storage Area" to prevent storage of transient combustibles.
1.2.7 Fire Hazard Identification The major sources of combustibles in Fire Area 1-004 are plastic, cable and piping insulation, rubber, lube oil, hydrogen in decay tanks, storage lockers, paper, alcohol, solvents, water stop material, Fiberglas, Toluene liquid, PVC, flammable gas bottles, clothing, charcoal filters, silicone transformer fluid, vinyl tubing, carpet, and polyethylene.
Details regarding fire scenarios quantified in the fire PRA, and their associated ignition sources (where applicable) are discussed in Section 2.1.2.8 Fire PRA Input Fire protection features There are no fire protection features specifically modeled in the Fire PRA for this fire area.Fire protection systems The Hot Gas Layer evaluation credits the detection, automatic fire suppression system and manual fire brigade response.
The Multi Compartment Analysis evaluation credits the detection, automatic fire suppression system and manual fire brigade response.Hot Gas Layer Treatment Physical attributes of this fire area require the expansion of the Zone Of Influence beyond the original Zone Of Influence to account for the Hot Gas Layer impacts in this area, see PRA-BC-F- 11-0 15 for further details. Credit for detection was taken in the Hot Gas Layer evaluation for this fire area. Credit for both automatic fire suppression system and manual fire brigade response was taken in the Hot Gas Layer evaluation for this fire area.Revision 0 Page 12 of 54 Version 1.0 Page 2165 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-004 Multi-compartment analysis Credit for detection was taken in the Multi Compartment Analysis for this fire area. Credit for both automatic fire suppression system and manual fire brigade response was taken in the Multi Compartment Analysis for this fire area.Scenario Review All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0, ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency.
2.0 RISK EVALUATION 2.1 Fire PRA Variant Case Calculation Tables 2-la and 2-1b provide the results of the variant case calculation for Fire Area 1-004. This is taken directly from the Fire PRA model with no changes or alterations made. The CDF and LERF results are provided on a scenario basis.The total area CDF and LERF is below the screening acceptance criteria of IE-07/rx-yr and lE-08/rx-yr, respectively.
The total CDF/LERF can be used as a conservative estimate of the delta CDF/LERF with respect to a compliant configuration.
No further analysis of the delta CDF/LERF is required.Revision 0 Page 13 of 54 Version 1.0 Page 2166 of 3726 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-004 Table 2-l a Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train A Alignment Zone Scen 0140 0151 0152 0153 0154 0154A 0155 0156 0157 0158 0159 0160 0161 0162 0162 0162 A A D1 A A A A01 A A A A A A D1 D2 E ScenDescl IGF (/rx-yr)BASE CASE 4.98E-06 BASE CASE 2.70E-05 TRANSIENT 9.21 E-06 BASE CASE 1.35E-04 BASE CASE 2.26E-04 BASE CASE 9.74E-04 BASE CASE -NO UNL 2.65E-05 BASE CASE 2.37E-05 BASE CASE 2.47E-05 BASE CASE 2.52E-05 BASE CASE 2.23E-04 BASE CASE 2.65E-05 BASE CASE 6.29E-05 Transient 2.78E-06 Transient 2.78E-06 WASTE GAS PROCESS PNL 1.82E-05 Liq Waste Processing Panel -1.82E05 SEVERE Liq Waste Processing Panel -1.82E-05 NON SEVERE BASE CASE 5.16E-05 BASE CASE 2.70E-05 BASE CASE 2.70E-05 TRANISIENT AT SE CORNER 9.39E-06 CDT PUMP 9.96E-05 BASE CASE 2.21E-05 TRANSIENT 6.09E-06 BASE CASE 2.20E-05 BASE CASE 1.26E-04 BASE CASE 2.65E-05 BASE CASE 2.25E-04 Boric Acid Transfer Pumps 1.99E-04 NSP SF CCDP CDF CLERP LERF (/-rxyr) (/rx-yr)1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 Table 2-1 a Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train A Alignment 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.59E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 3.33E-12 1.81E-11 6.16E-12 9.03E-1 1 1.51E-10 6.52E-10 1.74E-11 1.58E-11 1.65E-11 1.69E-11 1.50E-10 1.77E-1 1 4.21 E-11 1.86E-12 1.86E-12 1.22E-11 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 8.01E-16 4.34E-1 5 1.48E-15 2.17E-14 3.63E-14 1.57E-13 4.26E-1 5 3.81 E-15 3.98E-15 4.05E-15 3.59E-14 4.26E-1 5 1.01E-14 4.47E-16 4.47E-16 2.93E-15 0163 El E2 1.0 1.OOE-01 6.69E-07 1.22E-12 1.61E-10 2.93E-16 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 1.22E-11 1.61E-10 2.93E-15 0163 0164 0165 0166 0168 0168 0170 0175 0176 0177 0178 0180 0186 A A A D1 E A D1 A A A A E 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 3.45E-11 1.81E-11 1.81E-11 6.29E-12 6.67E-1 1 1.48E-1 1 4.08E-12 1.48E-11 8.44E-1 1 1.77E-11 1.51E-10 1.33E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 8.29E-15 4.34E-15 4.34E-15 1.51 E-15 1.60E-14 3.56E-15 9.79E-16 3.54E-15 2.03E-14 4.26E-1 5 3.62E-14 3.21E-14 Revision 0 Page 14 of 54 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-004 Table 2-1a Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train A Alignment Zone Scen ScenDesc 1  IGF NSP SF CCDP CDF CLERP LERF (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr)0187 A BASE CASE 1.26E-04 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 8.41E-11 1.61E-10 2.02E-14 0188 A BASE CASE 2.20E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 1.48E-11 1.61 E-10 3.54E-15 0203 A BASE CASE 1.29E-04 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 8.63E-11 1.61E-10 2.07E-14 0204 A BASE CASE 2.20E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 1.48E-11 1.61E-10 3.54E-15 0205 A BASE CASE 2.93E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 1.96E-11 1.61E-10 4.72E-15 0206 A BASE CASE 9.07E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 6.07E-11 1.61E-10 1.46E-14 0207 A BASE CASE 1.16E-04 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 7.78E-11 1.61E-10 1.87E-14 0208 A BASE CASE 8.40E-05 1.0 1.0 1.71E-06 1.43E-10 5.66E-10 4.75E-14 0209 D1 TRANSIENT 
-ENTRY INTO 1.57E-06 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 1.05E-12 1.61E-10 2.53E-16 ROOM 0204 0209 D2 TRANSIENT-FROM MCC 1.57E-06 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 1.05E-12 1.61E-10 2.53E-16 1B 0209 E 125 VDC Dist Panel 1F 1.82E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 1.22E-11 1.61E-10 2.93E-15 0209 F XFMR 1.74E-04 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 1.16E-10 1.61E-10 2.80E-14 0209 G2 MCC 1B -NON SEVERE 2.73E-04 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 1.83E-10 1.61E-10 4.39E-14 0209 H MCC 1B Room Cooling Unit 1,37E-04 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 9.19E-11 1.61E-10 2.21E-14"A" 0209 0215 0216 0217 0218 0219 0220 0221 0230 0231 0232 0237 0238 0239 0240 I A A A A A A A A A A A A A A MCC 1D BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE 2.55E-04 2.20E-05 1.09E-04 2.20E-05 2.15E-04 2,20E-05 2,20E-05 2.20E-05 2.45E-05 2.45E-05 2.35E-05 4.76E-05 2.23E-05 2.23E-05 2.23E-05 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 1.71 E-06 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 1.71E-10 1.48E-1 1 7.31E-11 1.48E-11 3.66E-10 1.48E-11 1.48E-11 1.48E-11 1.64E- 11 1.64E-11 1.57E-11 3.18E-11 1.49E-11 1.49E-11 1.49E-11 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 5.66E-1 0 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-1 0 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 4.10E-14 3.54E-1 5 1.76E-14 3.54E-15 1.21E-13 3.54E-1 5 3.54E-15 3.54E-15 3.94E-1 5 3.94E-15 3.78E-1 5 7.65E-1 5 3.58E-1 5 3.58E-15 3.58E-15 Revision 0 Page 15of54 Revision 0 Page 15 of 54 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-004 Table 2-1a Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train A Alignment Zone Scen ScenDesc 1  IGF NSP SF CCDP CDF CLERP LERF (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr)0253 A BASE CASE 2.93E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 1.96E-11 1.61E-10 4.72E-15 0301 A BASE CASE 2.22E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 1.49E-11 1.61E-10 3.58E-15 0302 A BASE CASE 2.22E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 1.49E-11 1.61 E-10 3.58E-15 0303 A BASE CASE 2.22E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 1.49E-11 1.61E-10 3.58E-15 0304 A BASE CASE 2.22E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 1.49E-11 1.61E-10 3.58E-15 0305 A BASE CASE 4.64E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 3.11E-11 1.61E-10 7.47E-15 0306 A BASE CASE 2.20E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 1.48E-11 1.61E-10 3.54E-15 0307 A BASE CASE 2.60E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 1.74E-11 1.61E-10 4.19E-15 0308 A BASE CASE 2.20E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 1.48E-11 1.61 E-10 3.54E-15 0309 DA BASE CASE -TRANSIENT 2.25E-05 1.0 1.0 2.94E-06 6.60E-11 6.94E-08 1.56E-12 0309 E LIGHTINGTRANSFORMER 1.74E-04 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 1.16E-I0 1.61E-10 2.80E-14 1C 0310 A BASE CASE 2.60E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 1.74E-11 1.61 E-10 4.19E-15 0311 A BASE CASE 2.22E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 1.49E-11 1.61E-10 3.58E-15 0312 DA BASE CASE -TRANSIENT 2.25E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 1.50E-11 1.61E-10 3.61E-15 0312 E 125VDC DISTRUBUTION 3.64E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 2.44E-11 1.61E-10 5.86E-15 PANEL 1C<CD 0 o 0313 A 0314 0315 0316 0322 0323 0324 0325 0326 0327 0328 0329 0330 0331 A A A A A A A A A A A A A BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE 2.22E-05 2.22E-05 2.22E-05 2.60E-05 4.28E-04 3.20E-05 5.29E-05 3.60E-05 3.24E-05 2.60E-05 2.20E-05 2.20E-05 2.25E-04 2.20E-05 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 1.49E-1 1 1.49E-11 1.49E-1 1 1.74E-11 2.87E-10 2.14E-11 3.54E-1 1 2.41 E-11 2.17E-11 1.74E-11 1.48E-1 1 1.48E-11 1.51E-10 1.48E-11 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 3.58E-1 5 3.58E-15 3.58E-15 4.19E-15 6.89E-14 5.15E-15 8.51E-15 5.79E-15 5.21 E-15 4.19E-15 3.54E-1 5 3.54E- 15 3.62E-14 3.54E-1 5 Revision 0 Page 16 of 54 Revision 0 Page 16 of 54 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-004 Table 2-1a Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train A Alignment Zone Scen ScenDescI IGF NSP SF CCDP CDF CLERP LERF (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr)0332 D1 TRANSIENT-EASTSIDEOF 3.55E-06 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 2.38E-12 1.61E-10 5.72E-16 0332 0332 D2 TRANSIENT-EASTSIDEOF 3.55E-06 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 2.38E-12 1.61E-10 5.72E-16 0332 TRANSIENT 
-SOUTH EAST 0332 D3 WALL 3.55E-06 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 2.38E-12 1.61E-10 5.72E-16 WALL 0332 D4 TRANSIENT 
-SOUTH WEST 3.55E-06 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 2.38E-12 1.61E-10 5.72E-16 SIDE OF 0332 0332 E2 MCC 1-A -NON SEVERE 2.73E-04 1.0 1.0 6.59E-07 1.80E-10 1.61E-10 4.39E-14 RECEPTABLE 0332 F RANSFORME 1.74E-04 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 1.16E-10 1.61E-10 2.80E-14 TRANSFORMER 1B 0332 0340 0341 0342 0348 0351 0400 0402 0403 0405 0405 G A A A A A A A A A01 A02a MCC1 A ROOM COOLER BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BAE CASE -MODIFIED MCC 1G -NON SEVERE 6.86E-05 2.20E-05 4.98E-06 2.46E-04 2.23E-05 4.62E-05 4.98E-06 3.81 E-05 5.17E-06 2.20E-04 1.82E-04 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 4.59E-1 1 1.48E-11 3.33E-12 1.64E-10 1.49E-11 3.09E-1 1 3.33E-12 2.55E-1 1 3.46E-12 1.48E-10 1.22E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.10E-14 3.54E-15 8.01 E-1 6 3.95E-14 3.58E-1 5 7.43E-1 5 8.01E-16 6.12E-15 8.32E-16 3.54E-14 2.93E-14 0405 A02b RAD MONITOR-NON 1.82E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 1.22E-11 1.61 E-10 2.93E-15 SEVERE 0405 A02c QSR19LO08A-NON SEVERE 1.82E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 1.22E-11 1.61E-10 2.93E-15 0405 A02d N1P13L001 1.82E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 1.22E-11 1.61 E-10 2.93E-15 0406 A BASE CASE 8.79E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 5.89E-11 1.61E-10 1.41E-14 0407 A BASE CASE 7.75E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 5.19E-11 1.61E-10 1.25E-14 0408 A BASE CASE 1.02E-04 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 6.86E-11 1.61E-10 1.65E-14 0409 D1 TRANSIENT 1.17E-06 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 7.82E-13 1.61E-10 1.88E-16 0409 D2 TRANSIENT 1.17E-06 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 7.82E-13 1.61E-10 1.88E-16 0409 E MCC 1F 1.82E-04 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 1.22E-10 1.61E-10 2.93E-14 Revision 0 Page 17 of 54 Revision 0 Page 17 of 54 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-004 Table 2-1a Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train A Alignment Zone Scen ScenDesc' IGF NSP SF CCDP CDF CLERP LERF (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr)0410A 0410B 0418 0419 0422 0423 0424 0425 0426 0427 0429 0432 0438 0441 0445 0446 0448 0449 0450 0451 0453 0455 0456 0461 BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE 3.23E-04 1.49E-04 1.02E-04 1.21E-04 2.99E-05 2.99E-05 2.20E-05 2.20E-05 2.20E-05 2.20E-05 2.31E-04 2.20E-05 2.21 E-05 4.98E-06 2.60E-05 8.43E-05 1.51E-04 2.20E-05 2.20E-05 2.20E-05 3.20E-05 3.33E-05 2.42E-05 3.57E-05 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 4.48E-05 4.48E-05 4.48E-05 4.48E-05 2.16E-10 1.O0E-10 6.84E-1 1 8.08E-1 1 2.OOE-1 1 2.OOE-1 1 1.48E-11 1.48E-11 1.48E-11 1.48E-1 1 1.55E-10 1.48E-1 1 1.48E-1 1 3.33E-12 1.74E-11 5.64E-1 1 1.01E-10 1.48E-1 1 1.48E-1 1 1.48E-1 1 1.43E-09 1.49E-09 1.08E-09 1.60E-09 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 4.05E-08 4.05E-08 4.05E-08 4.05E-08 5.20E-14 2.40E-14 1.64E-14 1.94E-14 4.81 E-15 4.81 E-15 3.54E-15 3.54E-1 5 3.54E-1 5 3.54E-15 3.71E-14 3.54E-1 5 3.55E-1 5 8.01 E-1 6 4.17E-15 1.36E-14 2.42E-14 3.54E-1 5 3.54E-15 3.54E-15 1.30E-12 1.35E-12 9.81 E-1 3 1.45E-12 0462 E Access Control Center AHU 6.86E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 4.59E-11 1.61E-10 1.10E-14 and Non Rad AHU 0462 F Non RadioActiveExhaustFan 2.06E-04 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 1.38E-10 1.61E-10 3.31E-14 and Xfmr 0462 G MCC1 TT 7.28E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 4.87E-11 1.61 E-10 1.17E-14 0463 A BASE CASE 5.15E-04 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 3.44E-10 1.61 E-10 8.28E-14 0464 DA BASE CASE -TRANSIENT 3.24E-05 1.0 1.0 6.95E-05 2.25E-09 6.08E-06 1.97E-10 0464 F SPDS Computer UPS Battery 3.59E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 2.40E-11 1.61 E-10 5.77E-15 Revision 0 Page 18 of 54 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-004 Table 2-l a Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train A Alignment Zone 0464 0467 0478 0480 0481 0482 0483 0484 0485 0486 0487 0488 0489 0490 0491 0504 0505 0506 0604 0605 0606 0607 0608 0609 0610 Scen ScenDescl IGF (/rx-yr)Comp UPS Sec Exh Fan 6.86E-05 BASE CASE 5.02E-06 BASE CASE 6.67E-04 BASE CASE 6.81E-05 BASE CASE 6.79E-05 BASE CASE 3.30E-05 BASE CASE 3.33E-05 BASE CASE 3.20E-05 BASE CASE 3.20E-05 BASE CASE 3.21E-05 BASE CASE 3.21E-05 BASE CASE 4.27E-05 BASE CASE 6.69E-05 BASE CASE 3.20E-05 BASE CASE 2.21E-05 BASE CASE 1.31E-04 BASE CASE 3.99E-04 BASE CASE 2.20E-05 BASE CASE 2.27E-05 BASE CASE 4.23E-04 BASE CASE 2.20E-05 BASE CASE 2.20E-05 BASE CASE 1.22E-04 BASE CASE 1.32E-04 BASE CASE 2.20E-05 Total CDF/LERF Fire PRA Variant Case 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 Table 2-1a Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train A Alignment 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 4.48E-05 6.69E-07 4.48E-05 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 4.48E-05 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 4.48E-05 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 NSP SF CCDP CDF CLERP LERF (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr)4.59E-1 1 3.36E-12 4.46E-10 4.56E-11 3.04E-09 2.21E-11 1.49E-09 2.14E-1 1 2.14E-11.2.15E-11 1.44E-09 2.86E-1 1 4.48E-1 1 2.14E-1 1 9.88E-10 8.75E-11 2.67E-10 1.48E-11 1.52E-1 1 2.83E-10 1.48E-1 1 1.48E-1 1 8.15E-11 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 4.05E-08 1.61 E-10 4.05E-08 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 4.05E-08 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 4.05E-08 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.10E-14 8.08E-16 1.07E-13 1.10E-14 2.75E-12 5.30E-15 1.35E-12 5.15E-15 5.15E-15 5.16E-15 1.30E-12 6.87E-15 1.08E-14 5.15E-15 8.94E-13 2.10E-14 6.41E-14 3.54E-15 3.65E-1 5 6.81E-14 3.54E-15 3.54E-1 5 1.96E-14 2.12E-14 3.54E-15 2.12E-10 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 8.82E-1 1 1.48E-1 1 2.38E-08 Revision 0 Page 19 of 54 Revision 0 Page 19 of 54 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-004 Table 2-1 b Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train B Alignment Zone Scen ScenDesclIGF NSP SF CCDP CDF CLERP LERF (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr)0140 0151 0152 0153 0154.0154A 0155 0156 0157 0158 0159 0160 0161 0162 0162 0162 A A D1 A A A A01 A A A A A A D1 D2 E BASE CASE BASE CASE TRANSIENT BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE -NO UNL BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE Transient Transient WASTE GAS PROCESS PNL 4.98E-06 2.70E-05 9.21 E-06 1.35E-04 2.26E-04 9.74E-04 2.65E-05 2.37E-05 2.47E-05 2.52E-05 2.23E-04 2.65E-05 6.29E-05 2.78E-06 2.78E-06 1.82E-05 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.53E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 3.31E-12 1.79E-11 6.12E-12 8.97E-1 1 1.50E-10 6.47E-10 1.73E-11 1.57E-11 1.64E-11 1.67E-11 1.48E-10 1.76E-11 4.18E-11 1.85E-12 1.85E-12 1.21 E-11 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 0.OOE+00 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 8.01E-16 4.34E-15 0.OOE+00 2.17E-14 3.63E-14 1.57E-13 4.26E-1 5 3.81E-15 3.98E-1 5 4.05E-1 5 3.59E-14 4.26E-1 5 1.01E-14 4.47E-16 4.47E-16 2.93E-1 5 0163 El Liq Waste Processing Panel -1.82E-05 1.0 1.OOE-01 6.64E-07 1.21E-12 1.61E-10 2.93E-16 SEVERE 0163 E2 Liq Waste Processing Panel -1.82E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 1.21E-11 1.61E-10 2.93E-15 NON SEVERE 0164 0165 0166 0168 0168 0170 0175 0176 0177 0178 0180 0186 A A A D1 E A D1 A A A A E BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE TRANISIENT AT SE CORNER CDT PUMP BASE CASE TRANSIENT BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE Boric Acid Transfer Pumps 5.16E-05 2.70E-05 2.70E-05 9.39E-06 9.96E-05 2.21 E-05 6.09E-06 2.20E-05 1.26E-04 2.65E-05 2.25E-04 1.99E-04 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1,0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6&64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 3.43E-1 1 1.79E-11 1.79E-11 6.24E-12 6.62E-1 1 1.47E-1 1 4.05E-12 1 46E-11 8.38E-11 1.76E-11 1.50E-10 1.32E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 8.29E-1 5 4.34E-1 5 4.34E-1 5 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 3.56E-1 5 9.79E-16 3.54E-15 2.03E-14 4.26E-15 3.62E-14 3.21E-14 Revision 0 Page 20 of 54 Revision 0 Page 20 of 54 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-004 Table 2-1 b Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train B Alignment Zone Scen ScenDesc 1  IGF NSP SF CCDP CDF CLERP LERF (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr)0187 A BASE CASE 1.26E-04 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 8.34E-11 1.61E-10 2.02E-14 0188 A BASE CASE 2.20E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 1.46E-11 1.61E-10 3.54E-15 0203 A BASE CASE 1.29E-04 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 8.57E-11 1.61 E-10 2.07E-14 0204 A BASE CASE 2.20E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 1.46E-11 1.61 E-10 3.54E-15 0205 A BASE CASE 2.93E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 1.95E-11 1.61E-10 4.72E-15 0206 A BASE CASE 9.07E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 6.02E-11 1.61E-10 1.46E-14 0207 A BASE CASE 1.16E-04 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 7.72E-11 1.61E-10 1.87E-14 0208 A BASE CASE 8.40E-05 1.0 1.0 1.70E-06 1.43E-10 5.66E-10 4.75E-14 0209 D1 TRANSIENT 
-ENTRY INTO 1.57E-06 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 1.04E-12 1.61E-10 2.53E-16 ROOM 0204 TRANSIENT 
-5' FROM MCC 0209 D2 T N T 1.57E-06 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 1.04E-12 1.61 E-10 2.53E-16 0209 E 125 VDC Dist Panel 1F 1.82E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 1.21E-11 1.61E-10 2.93E-15 0209 F XFMR 1.74E-04 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 1.16E-10 1.61E-10 2.80E-14 0209 G2 MCC 1B -NON SEVERE 2.73E-04 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 1.81E-10 1.61 E-10 4.39E-14 0209 H MCC 1B Room Cooling Unit 1.37E-04 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 9.12E-11 1.61E-10 2.21E-14"A" 0209 I 0215 0216 0217 0218 0219 0220 0221 0230 0231 0232 0237 0238 0239 0240 A A A A A A A A A A MCC 1D BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE 2.55E-04 2.20E-05 1.09E-04 2.20E-05 2.15E-04 2.20E-05 2.20E-05 2.20E-05 2.45E-05 2.45E-05 2.35E-05 4.76E-05 2.23E-05 2.23E-05 2.23E-05 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 1.70E-06 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 1.69E-10 1.46E-11 7.26E-11 1.46E-1 1 3.65E-10 1.46E-11 1.46E-1 1 1.46E-11 1.63E-11 1.63E-11 1.56E-11 3.16E-1 1 1.48E-11 1.48E-1 1 1.48E-11 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 5.66E-1 0 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 4.10E-14 3.54E-1 5 1.76E-14 3.54E-1 5 1.21E-13 3.54E-1 5 3.54E-15 3.54E-15 3.94E-1 5 3.94E-15 3.78E-1 5 7.65E-15 3.58E-1 5 3.58E-1 5 3.58E-1 5 A A A A Revision 0 Page 21 of 54 Revision 0 Page 21 of 54 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-004 Table 2-1b Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train B Alignment Zone Scen ScenDescl IGF NSP SF CCDP CDF CLERP LERF (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr)0253 A BASE CASE 2.93E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 1.95E-11 1.61 E-10 4.72E-15 0301 A BASE CASE 2.22E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 1.48E-11 1.61E-10 3.58E-15 0302 A BASE CASE 2.22E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 1.48E-11 1.61E-10 3.58E-15 0303 A BASE CASE 2.22E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 1.48E-11 1.61 E-10 3.58E-15 0304 A BASE CASE 2.22E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 1.48E-11 1.61 E-10 3.58E-15 0305 A BASE CASE 4.64E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 3.09E-11 1.61 E-10 7.47E-15 0306 A BASE CASE 2.20E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 1.46E-11 1.61E-10 3.54E-15 0307 A BASE CASE 2.60E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 1.73E-11 1.61E-10 4.19E-15 0308 A BASE CASE 2.20E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 1.46E-11 1.61 E-10 3.54E-15 0309 DA BASE CASE -TRANSIENT 2.25E-05 1.0 1.0 2.88E-06 6.46E-11 6.94E-08 1.56E-12 0309 E LIGHTING TRANSFORMER 1.74E-04 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 1.16E-10 1.61E-10 2.80E-14 1C 0310 A BASE CASE 2.60E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 1.73E-11 1.61E-10 4.19E-15 0311 A BASE CASE 2.22E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 1.48E-11 1.61E-10 3.58E-15 0312 DA BASE CASE -TRANSIENT 2.25E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 1.49E-11 1.61E-10 3.61E-15 0312 E 125VDC DISTRUBUTION 3.64E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 2.42E-11 1.61E-10 5.86E-15 PANEL 1C 0313 A 0314 0315 0316 0322 0323 0324 0325 0326 0327 0328 0329 0330 0331 A A A A A A A A A A A A A BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE 2.22E-05 2.22E-05 2.22E-05 2.60E-05 4.28E-04 3.20E-05 5.29E-05 3.60E-05 3.24E-05 2.60E-05 2.20E-05 2.20E-05 2.25E-04 2.20E-05 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 1.48E-1 1 1.48E-1 1 1.48E-1 1 1.73E-1 1 2.85E-10 2.13E-11 3.52E-11 2.39E-1 1 2.15E-11 1.73E-11 1.46E-1 1 1.46E-11 1.50E-10 1.46E-11 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 0.OOE+00 1.61 E-10 3.58E-1 5 3.58E-15 3.58E-15 4.19E-15 6.89E-14 5.15E-15 8.51 E-15 5.79E-1 5 5.21 E-1 5 4.19E-15 3.54E-1 5 3.54E-15 0.OOE+00 3.54E-1 5 Revision 0 Page 22 of 54 Revision 0 Page 22 of 54 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-004 Table 2-1b Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train B Alignment Zone Scen ScenDesc (IrFNSPSF CDF CLERP LERF Zon SP(/rx-yr) 
(/rx-yr) (/rx-yr)0332 D1 TRANSIENT-EASTSIDEOF 3.55E-06 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 2.36E-12 1.61E-10 5.72E-16 0332 0332 D2 TRANSIENT-EASTSIDEOF 3.55E-06 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 2.36E-12 1.61E-10 5.72E-16 0332 TRANSIENT 
-SOUTH EAST 0332 D3 WALL 3.55E-06 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 2.36E-12 1.61E-10 5.72E-16 WALL 0332 D4 TRANSIENT-SOUTHWEST 3.55E-06 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 2.36E-12 1.61E-10 5.72E-16 SIDE OF 0332 0332 E2 MCC 1-A -NON SEVERE 2.73E-04 1.0 1.0 6.53E-07 1.78E-10 1.61 E-10 4.39E-14 0332 F RECEPTABLE 1.74E-04 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 1.16E-10 1.61E-10 2.80E-14 TRANSFORMER 1B 0332 0340 0341 0342 0348 0351 0400 0402 0403 0405 0405 G A A A A A A A A A01 A02a MCC 1A ROOM COOLER BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BAE CASE -MODIFIED MCC IG -NON SEVERE 6.86E-05 2.20E-05 4.98E-06 2.46E-04 2.23E-05 4.62E-05 4.98E-06 3.81 E-05 5.17E-06 2.20E-04 1.82E-04 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 4.56E-11 1.46E-1 1 3.31 E- 12 1.63E-10 1.48E-11 3.07E-1 1 3.31 E-12 2.53E-1 1 3.44E-1 2 1.46E-10 1.21 E-10 1.61E-10 1.10E-14 1.61E-10 3.54E-15 1.61E-10 8.01E-16 1.61E-10 3.95E-14 1.61E-10 3.58E-15 1.61E-10 7.43E-15 1.61E-10 8.01E-16 1.61E-10 6.12E-15 1.61E-10 8.32E-16 1.61E-10 3.54E-14 1.61E-10 2.93E-14 0405 A02b RAD MONITOR- NON 1.82E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 1.21E-11 1.61E-10 2.93E-15 SEVERE 0405 A02c QSR19LO08A-NON SEVERE 1.82E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 1.21E-11 1.61E-10 2.93E-15 0405 A02d N1P13L001 1.82E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 1.21E-11 1.61E-10 2.93E-15 0406 A BASE CASE 8.79E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 5.84E-11 1.61E-10 1.41E-14 0407 A BASE CASE 7,75E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 5.15E-11 1.61 E-10 1.25E-14 0408 A BASE CASE 1,02E-04 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 6.81E-11 1.61E-10 1.65E-14 0409 D1 TRANSIENT 1.17E-06 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 7.76E-13 1.61E-10 1.88E-16 0409 D2 TRANSIENT 1.17E-06 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 7.76E-13 1.61E-10 1.88E-16 0409 E MCC 1F 1,82E-04 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 1.21E-10 1.61E-10 2.93E-14 Revision 0 Page 23 of 54 Revision 0 Page 23 of 54 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-004 Table 2-1b Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train B Alignment Zone Scen ScenDesc 1  IGF NSP SF CCDP CDF CLERP LERF (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr)041 OA 041 OB 0418 0419 0422 0423 0424 0425 0426 0427 0429 0432 0438 0441 0445 0446 0448 0449 0450 0451 0453 0455 0456 0461 BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE 3.23E-04 1.49E-04 1.02E-04 1.21E-04 2.99E-05 2.99E-05 2.20E-05 2.20E-05 2.20E-05 2.20E-05 2.31E-04 2.20E-05 2.21 E-05 4.98E-06 2.60E-05 8.43E-05 1.51E-04 2.20E-05 2.20E-05 2.20E-05 3.20E-05 3.33E-05 2.42E-05 3.57E-05 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 5.04E-05 5.04E-05 5.04E-05 5.04E-05 2.15E-10 9.93E-1 1 6.79E-1 1 8.02E-1 1 1.99E-11 1.99E-11 1.46E-1 1 1.46E-11 1.46E-11 1.46E-11 1.53E-10 1.46E-11 1.47E-11 3.31E-12 1.72E- 11 5.60E-1 1 1.O0E-10 1.46E-1 1 1.46E-1 1 1.46E-1 1 1.61 E-09 1.68E-09 1.22E-09 1.80E-09 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 4.32E-08 4.32E-08 4.32E-08 4.32E-08 5.20E-14 2.40E-14 1.64E-14 1.94E-14 4.81 E-15 4.81E-15 3.54E-15 3.54E-1 5 3.54E-15 3.54E-15 3.71E-14 3.54E-15 3.55E-15 8.01E-16 4.17E-15 1.36E-14 2.42E-14 3.54E-1 5 3.54E-1 5 3.54E-1 5 1.38E-12 1.44E-12 1.05E-12 1.54E-12 0462 E Access Control CenterAHU 6.86E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 4.56E-11 1.61E-10 1.10E-14 and Non Rad AHU 0462 F Non Radio Active Exhaust Fan 2.06E-04 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 1.37E-10 1.61E-10 3.31E-14 and Xfmr 0462 G MCC1 TT 7.28E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 4.84E-11 1.61E-10 1.17E-14 0463 A BASE CASE 5.15E-04 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 3.42E-10 1.61 E-10 8.28E-14 0464 DA BASE CASE -TRANSIENT 3.24E-05 1.0 1.0 6.95E-05 2.25E-09 6.08E-06 1.97E-10 0464 F SPDS Computer UPS Battery 3.59E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 2.38E-11 1.61 E-10 5.77E-15 Revision 0 Page 24 of 54 Revision 0 Page 24 of 54 SE-C051326701 
-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-004 SE-C051 326701 -008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-004 Table 2-1b Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train B Alignment Zone Scen ScenDesc 1  IGF NSP SF CCDP (/rx-yr)0464 0467 0478 0480 0481 0482 0483 0484 0485 0486 0487 0488 0489 0490 0491 0504 0505 0506 0604 0605 0606 0607 0608 0609 0610 G A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A Comp UPS Sec Exh Fan 6.86E-05 BASE CASE 5.02E-06 BASE CASE 6.67E-04 BASE CASE 6.81E-05 BASE CASE 6.79E-05 BASE CASE 3.30E-05 BASE CASE 3.33E-05 BASE CASE 3.20E-05 BASE CASE 3.20E-05 BASE CASE 3.21E-05 BASE CASE 3.21E-05 BASE CASE 4.27E-05 BASE CASE 6.69E-05 BASE CASE 3.20E-05 BASE CASE 2.21E-05 BASE CASE 1.31E-04 BASE CASE 3.99E-04 BASE CASE 2.20E-05 BASE CASE 2.27E-05 BASE CASE 4.23E-04 BASE CASE 2.20E-05 BASE CASE 2.20E-05 BASE CASE 1.22E-04 BASE CASE 1.32E-04 BASE CASE 2.20E-05 Total CDF/LERF Fire PRA Variant Case 1.0 1.0 1,0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 5.04E-05 6.64E-07 5.04E-05 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 5.04E-05 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 5.04E-05 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 CDF LERF (/rx.yr) (irx-yr)4.56E-11 1.61E-10 1.10E-14 3.34E-12 1.61E-10 8.08E-16 4.43E-10 1.61E-10 1.07E-13 4.53E-11 1.61E-10 1.10E-14 3.42E-09 4.32E-08 2.93E-12 2.19E-11 1.61E-10 5.30E-15 1.68E-09 4.32E-08 1.44E-12 2.13E-11 1.61E-10 5.15E-15 2.13E-11 1.61E-10 5.15E-15 2.13E-11 1.61E-10 5.16E-15 1.62E-09 4.32E-08 1.39E-12 2.84E-11 1.61E-10 6.87E-15 4.45E-11 1.61E-10 1.08E-14 2.13E-11 1.61E-10 5.15E-15 1.11E-09 4.32E-08 9.52E-13 8.69E-11 1.61E-10 2.10E-14 2.65E-10 1.61E-10 6.41E-14 1.46E-11 1.61E-10 3.54E-15 1.51E-11 1.61E-10 3.65E-15 2.81E-10 1.61E-10 6.81E-14 1.46E-11 1.61E-10 3.54E-15 1.46E-11 1.61E-10 3.54E-15 8.09E-11 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 8.76E-11 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 1.46E-11 1.61E-10 3.54E-15 2.53E-08 2.13E-10 Where: Zone = Fire Zone Scen = 'A' to signify the variant case ScenDesc = Description of the Fire Scenario IGF = Ignition Frequency 
(/rx-yr)NSP = Non Suppression Probability Revision 0 Page 25 of 54 Revision 0 Page 25 of 54 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-004 SF = Severity Factor CCDP = Conditional Core Damage Probability CDF = Core Damage Frequency 
(/rx-yr)CLERP = Conditional Large Early Release Probability LERF = Large Early Release Frequency 
(/rx-yr)1 -'Base Case' scenarios are complete room burnout and therefore do not identify specific ignition sources Revision 0 Page 26 of 54 Revision 0 Page 26 of 54 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-004 2.2 Compliant Case Calculation The following sub-sections provide the basis for modeling each VFDR (or category of VFDRs)and the alterations that have been made to the variant case to represent the compliant case. In each section a discussion of the VFDR (or the category of VFDRs) is provided.2.2.1 VFDRs Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA The following VFDRs are modeled in the Fire PRA and are therefore included in the total fire area CDF/LERF used as a surrogate for the delta risk evaluation for this fire area: 0 U2-1-004-SEP-00 I -N2B3 1 LOO 1 E:ON:OFF 2.2.2 VFDRs Not Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA A Fire PRA was developed in accordance with the requirements of Part 4 "Requirements for Fires at Power PRA" of the ASME and ANS combined PRA Standard, ASME/ANS RA-Sa-2009, "Standard for Level 1/Large Early Release Frequency Probabilistic Risk Assessment for Nuclear Power Plant Applications".
Consistent with those requirements not all components required to meet the nuclear safety criteria need to be specifically modeled in the Fire PRA. The following VFDRs are associated with components not modeled in the Fire PRA: 2.2.2.1 VFDR U2-1-004-SEP-002 Main Control Room (MCR) ventilation is not modeled in the PRA. Room Heat up calculations show that there will be no impact to the MCR due to loss of HVAC within the mission time of 24 lirs in the PRA. See calculation Fire PRA Logic Model for Farley Nuclear Plants, PRA-BC-F-11-004. The MCR Ventilation is credited for certain cases in the MCR abandonment scenario, the details of this can be found in the Fire PRA Scenario Development Report PRA-BC-F-1 1-014.* U2-1-004-SEP-002 
-QSV49KO002A:STANDBY:ON 2.2.3 Compliant Case Results The total area CDF and LERF is below the screening acceptance criteria of I E-07/rx-yr and IE-08/rx-yr, respectively.
The total CDF/LERF can be used as a conservative estimate of the delta CDF/LERF with respect to a compliant configuration.
No further analysis of the delta CDF/LERF is required.2.2.4 Required Modifications There are no modifications required as a result of the risk evaluation for this fire area.2.2.5 Required Recovery Actions There are no required recovery actions as a result of the risk evaluation for this fire area.2.3 Risk Evaluation Results The total area ACDF/LERF is below the screening criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr and 1E-08/rx-yr, respectively.
All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0 ensuring that the acceptance Revision 0 Page 27 of 54 Version 1.0 Page 2180 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-004 criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency.
The following tables present the fire zone/scenario fire risk as well as the total fire risk for this fire area. Given the relatively low risk for these zones/scenarios the delta risk is defined by the variant case risk, the compliant case risk is conservatively assumed to be 0.Table 2-3a 1 FIRE AREA ACDF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN A ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case 0140/A 0151/A 0152/D1 0153/A 0154/A 0154A/A 0155/AO1 0156/A 0157/A 0158/A 0159/A 0160/A 0161/A 0162/D1 0162/D2 0162/E 0163/El 0163/E2 0164/A 0165/A 0166/A 0168/D1 0168/E 0170/A 0175/D1 0176/A 0177/A 0178/A 0180/A 0186/E 0187/A 0188/A 0203/A 0204/A 0205/A 0206/A 0207/A 0208/A 0209/D1 0209/D2 0209/E CCDP 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.59E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6-69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 1.71 E-06 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 CDF 3.33E-12 1.81 E-11 6.16E-12 9.03E-1 1 1.51 E-10 6.52E-10 1.74E- 11 1.58E-1 1 1.65E-11 1.69E-1 1 1.50E-10 1.77E-11 4.21 E-i1 1.86E-12 1.86E-12 1.22E-11 1.22E-12 1.22E-1 1 3.45E-11 1.81 E-11 1.81 E-11 6.29E-12 6.67E-1 1 1.48E-11 4.08E-1 2 1.48E-1 1 8.44E-1 1 1.77E-1 1 1.51 E-10 1.33E-10 8.41 E-11 1.48E-1 1 8.63E-1 1 1.48E-1 1 1.96E-1 1 6.07E-11 7.78E-1 1 1.43E-10 1.05E-12 1.05E-12 1.22E-1 1 Compliant Case CCDP CDF 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 Variant -Compliant ACDF 3.33E-1 2 1.81 E-11 6.16E-12 9.03E-1 1 1.51 E-10 6.52E-10 1.74E-11 1.58E-11 1.65E-11 1.69E-1 1 1.50E-10 1.77E-11 4.21E-11 1.86E-12 1.86E-12 1.22E- 11 1.22E-12 1.22E-11 3.45E-11 1.81E-11 1.81 E-11 6.29E-12 6.67E-1 1 1.48E-1 1 4.08E-12 1.48E-1 1 8.44E-1 1 1.77E-1 1 1.51E-10 1.33E-10 8.41 E-11 1.48E-1 1 8.63E-1 1 1.48E-1 1 1.96E-11 6.07E-1 1 7.78E-1 1 1.43E-10 1.05E-12 1.05E-12 1.22E-1 1 Revision 0 Page 28 of 54 Version 1.0 Page 2181 of 3726 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-004 SE-C051 326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-004 Table 2-3a 1 FIRE AREA ACDF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN A ALIGNMEN Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case IT 0209/F 0209/G2 0209/H 0209/I 0215/A 0216/A 0217/A 0218/A 0219/A 0220/A 0221/A 0230/A 0231/A 0232/A 0237/A 0238/A 0239/A 0240/A 0253/A 0301/A 0302/A 0303/A 0304/A 0305/A 0306/A 0307/A 0308/A 0309/DA 0309/E 0310/A 0311/A 0312/DA 0312/E 0313/A 0314/A 0315/A 0316/A 0322/A 0323/A 0324/A 0325/A 0326/A 0327/A 0328/A CCDP 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 1.71 E-06 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 2.94E-06 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 CDF 1.16E-10 1.83E-10 9.19E-1 1 1.71E-10 1.48E-11 7.31 E-11 1.48E-11 3.66E-10 1.48E-1 1 1.48E-1 1 1.48E-1 1 1.64E-11 1.64E-11 1.57E-11 3.18E-1 1 1.49E-11 1.49E-1 1 1.49E-1 1 1.96E-11 1.49E- 11 1.49E-1 1 1.49E-1 1 1.49E- 11 3.11E-11 1.48E-11 1.74E-1 1 1.48E-11 6.60E-1 1 1.16E-10 1.74E-1 1 1.49E-11 1.50E-11 2.44E-1 1 1.49E-1 1 1.49E- 11 1.49E-1 1 1.74E-11 2.87E-1 0 2.14E-1 1 3.54E-1 1 2.41 E-11 2.17E-1 1 1.74E-1 1 1.48E-11 1.48E-11 1.51 E-10 CCDP 0.OOE+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 CDF 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 Variant -Compliant aCDF 1.16E-10 1.83E-10 9.19E-11 1.71E-10 1.48E-11 7.31 E-11 1.48E-11 3.66E-10 1.48E-1 1 1.48E-1 1 1.48E-1 1 1.64E- 11 1.64E-11 1.57E-1 1 3.18E-11 1.49E-11 1.49E-11 1.49E-11 1.96E-1 1 1.49E-1 1 1.49E-11 1.49E-1 1 1.49E-11 3.11E-11 1.48E-1 1 1.74E- 11 1.48E-1 1 6.60E-1 1 1.16E-10 1.74E-11 1.49E-11 1.50E-11 2.44E-1 1 1.49E-1 1 1.49E-1 1 1.49E-1 1 1.74E-1 1 2.87E-10 2.14E-1 1 3.54E-1 1 2.41 E-11 2.17E-11 1.74E-11 1.48E-1 1 1.48E-11 1.51 E-10 0329/A 0330/A 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 Revision 0 Page 29 of 54 Version 1.o0 Page 2182 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-004 Table 2-3a 1 FIRE AREA ACDF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN A ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case 0331/A 0332/D1 0332/D2 0332/D3 0332/D4 0332/E2 0332/F 0332/G 0340/A 0341/A 0342/A 0348/A 0351/A 0400/A 0402/A 0403/A 0405/AO1 0405/AO2a 0405/AO2b 0405/AO2c 0405/AO2d 0406/A 0407/A 0408/A 0409/D1 0409/D2 0409/E 041OA/A 0410B/A 0418/A 0419/A 0422/A 0423/A 0424/A 0425/A 0426/A 0427/A 0429/A 0432/A 0438/A 0441/A 0445/A 0446/A 0448/A 0449/A 0450/A CCDP 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.59E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 CDF 1.48E-1 1 2.38E-12 2.38E--12 2.38E-12 2.38E--12 1.80E-10 1.16E-10 4.59E-11 1.48E-1 1 3.33E-1 2 1.64E-10 1.49E-11 3.09E-1 1 3.33E-12 2.55E-11 3.46E-12 1.48E-10 1.22E-10 1.22E-1 1 1.22E-1 1 1.22E-11 5.89E-1 1 5.19E-11 6.86E-1 1 7.82E-1 3 7.82E-13 1.22E-10 2.16E-10 1.OOE-1 0 6.84E-11 8.08E-1 1 2.OOE-11 2.OOE-1 1 1.48E-1 1 1.48E-11 1.48E-11 1.48E-1 1 1.55E-10 1.48E-1 1 1.48E-11 3.33E-1 2 1.74E-11 5.64E-1 1 1.01E-10 1.48E-1 1 1.48E-11 Compliant Case CCDP CDF 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 Variant -Compliant ACDF 1.48E-1 1 2.38E-12 2.38E-12 2.38E-12 2.38E-12 1.80E-10 1.16E-10 4.59E-1 1 1.48E-11 3.33E-12 1.64E-10 1.49E-1 1 3.09E-1 1 3.33E-12 2.55E-1 1 3.46E-12 1.48E-10 1.22E-10 1.22E-1 1 1.22E-1 1 1.22E-1 1 5.89E-1 1 5.19E-11 6.86E-1 1 7.82E-1 3 7.82E-13 1.22E-10 2.16E-10 1.OOE-10 6.84E-11 8.08E-1 1 2.OOE-1 1 2.OOE-1 1 1.48E-1 1 1.48E-11 1.48E-11 1.48E-11 1.55E-10 1.48E-1 1 1.48E-1 1 3.33E-12 1.74E-1 1 5.64E-1 1 1.01E-10 1.48E-11 1.48E-1 1 Revision 0 Page 30 of 54 Revision 0 Page 30 of 54 Version 1.0 Page 2183 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-004 SE-C051 326701 -008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-004 Table 2-3a 1 FIRE AREA ACDF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN A ALIGNMEN Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case CCDP CDF CCDP CDF T 0451/A 0453/A 0455/A 0456/A 046 1/A 0462/E 0462/F 0462/G 0463/A 0464/DA 0464/F 0464/G 0467/A 0478/A 0480/A 0481/A 0482/A 0483/A 0484/A 0485/A 0486/A 0487/A 0488/A 0489/A 0490/A 0491/A 0504/A 0505/A 0506/A 0604/A 0605/A 0606/A 0607/A 0608/A 0609/A 0610/A 6.69E-07 4.48E-05 4.48E-05 4.48E-05 4.48E-05 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.95E-05 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 4.48E-05 6.69E-07 4.48E-05 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 4.48E-05 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 4.48E-05 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 1.48E-11 1.43E-09 1.49E-09 1.08E-09 1.60E-09 4.59E-11 1.38E-10 4.87E-1 1 3.44E-10 2.25E-09 2.40E-1 1 4.59E-1 1 3.36E-12 4.46E-10 4.56E-1 1 3.04E-09 2.21 E-11 1.49E-09 2.14E-11 2.14E-1 1 2.15E-11 1.44E-09 2.86E-11 4.48E-1 1 2.14E- 11 9.88E-10 8.75E-1 1 2.67E-10 1.48E-11 1.52E-1 1 2.83E-1 0 1.48E-11 1.48E-1 1 8.15E-11 8.82E-11 1.48E-11 2.38E-08 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.O0E+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 Variant -Compliant aCDF 1.48E-11 1.43E-09 1.49E-09 1.08E-09 1.60E-09 4.59E-1 1 1.38E-10 4.87E-1 1 3.44E-10 2.25E-09 2.40E-1 1 4.59E- 11 3.36E-12 4.46E-10 4.56E-11 3.04E-09 2.21 E-11 1.49E-09 2.14E-1 1 2.14E-11 2.15E-11 1.44E-09 2.86E-1 1 4.48E-1 1 2.14E-1 1 9.88E-10 8.75E-1 1 2.67E-10 1.48E-1 1 1.52E- 11 2.83E-1 0 1.48E-11 1.48E-1 1 8.15E-11 8.82E-1 1 1.48E-1 1 2.38E-08 Total CDF and delta CDF 1 _ N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.OOE+00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.Table 2-3b'FIRE AREA aCDF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN B ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CCDP CDF CCDP CDF ACDF 0140/A 6.64E-07 3.31 E-12 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 3.31 E-12 Revision 0 Page 31 of 54 Version 1.0 Page 2184 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-004 Table 2-3b 1 FIRE AREA ACDF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN B ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case 0151/A 0152/D1 0153/A 0154/A 0154A/A 0155/AO1 0156/A 0157/A 0158/A 0159/A 0160/A 0161/A 0162/D1 0162/D2 0162/E 0163/El 0163/E2 0164/A 0165/A 0166/A 0168/D1 0168/E 0170/A 0175/D1 0176/A 0177/A 0178/A 0180/A 0186/E 0187/A 0188/A 0203/A 0204/A 0205/A 0206/A 0207/A 0208/A 0209/D1 0209/D2 0209/E 0209/F 0209/G2 0209/H 0209/I 0215/A 0216/A CCDP 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.53E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 1.70E-06 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 CDF 1.79E- 11 6.12E-12 8.97E-1 1 1.50E-10 6.47E-1 0 1.73E-11 1.57E-11 1.64E- 11 1.67E-11 1.48E-10 1.76E-1 1 4.18E-11 1.85E-1 2 1.85E-12 1.21 E-11 1.21 E-12 1.21 E-11 3.43E-1 1 1.79E-1 1 1.79E-1 1 6.24E-1 2 6.62E-11 1.47E-1 1 4.05E-1 2 1.46E-1 1 8.38E-11 1.76E- 11 1.50E-10 1.32E-10 8.34E-1 1 1.46E-11 8.57E-1 1 1.46E-1 1 1.95E-11 6.02E-11 7.72E-1 1 1.43E-1 0 1.04E-12 1.04E-1 2 1.21 E-11 1.16E-10 1.81E-10 9.12E-1 1 1.69E-1 0 1.46E-1 1 7.26E-11 Compliant Case CCDP CDF 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 Variant -Compliant ACDF 1.79E-11 6.12E-12 8.97E-1 1 1.50E-10 6.47E-10 1.73E-11 1.57E-11 1.64E-1 1 1.67E-11 1.48E-10 1.76E-11 4.18E-1 1 1.85E-12 1.85E-12 1.21E-11 1.21 E-12 1.21 E-11 3.43E-1 1 1.79E-1 1 1.79E-1 1 6.24E-12 6.62E-11 1.47E-11 4.05E-12 1.46E-11 8.38E-11 1.76E-11 1.50E-10 1.32E-10 8.34E-11 1.46E-1 1 8.57E-1 1 1.46E-1 1 1.95E-11 6.02E-1 1 7.72E-1 1 1.43E-1 0 1.04E-12 1.04E-12 1.21E-11 1.16E-10 1.81E-10 9.12E-11 1.69E-10 1.46E-11 7.26E-1 1 Revision 0 Page 32 of 54 Version 1.0 Page 2185 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-004 SE-C051 326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-004 Table 2-3b 1 FIRE AREA ACDF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN B ALIGNMEN Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case IT CCDP 0217/A 0218/A 0219/A 0220/A 022 1/A 0230/A 0231/A 0232/A 0237/A 0238/A 0239/A 0240/A 0253/A 0301/A 0302/A 0303/A 0304/A 0305/A 0306/A 0307/A 0308/A 0309/DA 0309/E 0310/A 0311 /A 0312/DA 0312/E 0313/A 0314/A 0315/A 0316/A 0322/A 0323/A 0324/A 0325/A 0326/A 0327/A 0328/A 0329/A 0330/A 0331/A 0332/D1 0332/D2 0332/D3 0332/D4 0332/E2 6.64E-07 1.70E-06 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 2.88E-06 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.53E-07 CCDP CDF 1.46E-1 1 3.65E-10 1.46E-1 1 1.46E-1 1 1.46E-1 1 1.63E-11 1.63E-11 1.56E-11 3.16E-1 1 1.48E-1 1 1.48E-1 1 1.48E-1 1 1.95E-11 1.48E-1 1 1.48E-1 1 1.48E-1 1 1.48E-1 1 3.09E-11 1.46E-1 1 1.73E-1 1 1.46E-1 1 6.46E-1 1 1.16E-10 1.73E-11 1.48E-1 1 1.49E-1 1 2.42E-1 1 1.48E-1 1 1.48E-1 1 1.48E-1 1 1.73E-1 1 2.85E-10 213E-11 3,52E-1 1 2.39E-1 1 2.15E-11 1,73F-11 1.46E-1 1 1.46E-1 1 1.50E-10 1.46E-1 1 2.36E-12 2.36E-1 2 2.36E-12 2.36E-12 1.78E-10 CCDP 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 CDF 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 qT Variant -Compliant ACDF 1.46E-11 3.65E-10 1.46E-1 1 1.46E-11 1.46E-1 1 1.63E-1 1 1.63E-11 1.56E- 11 3.16E-11 1.48E-1 1 1.48E-1 1 1.48E-1 1 1.95E-1I 1.48E-1 1 1.48E-1 1 1.48E-1I 1.48E-1 1 3.09E-1 1 1.46E-1 1 1.73E-11 1.46E-1 1 6.46E-11 1.16E-10 1.73E-11 1.48E-11 1.49E-11 2.42E-1 1 1.48E-11 1.48E-1 1 1.48E-1 1 1.73E-11 2.85E-10 2.13F-11 3.52E-1 1 2.39E-1 1 2.15E-11 1.73E-1 1 1.46E-1 1 1.46E-1 1 1.50E-10 1.46E-1 1 2.36E-12 2.36E-12 2.36E-12 2.36E-12 1.78E-10 Revision 0 Page 33 of 54 Version 1.0 Page 2186 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-004 Table 2-3b 1 FIRE AREA ACDF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN B ALIGNMEN Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case IT 0332/F 0332/G 0340/A 0341/A 0342/A 0348/A 0351/A 0400/A 0402/A 0403/A 0405/AO1 0405/AO2a 0405/AO2b 0405/AO2c 0405/AO2d 0406/A 0407/A 0408/A 0409/D1 0409/D2 0409/E 0410A/A 041 OB/A 0418/A 0419/A 0422/A 0423/A 0424/A 0425/A 0426/A 0427/A 0429/A 0432/A 0438/A 0441/A 0445/A 0446/A 0448/A 0449/A 0450/A 0451/A 0453/A 0455/A 0456/A 0461/A 0462/E CCDP 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 5.04E-05 5.04E-05 5.04E-05 5.04E-05 6.64E-07 CDF 1.16E-10 4.56E-1 1 1.46E-1 1 3.31 E-1 2 1.63E-10 1.48E-1 1 3.07E-1 1 3.31 E-12 2.53E-1 1 3.44E-12 1.46E-10 1.21 E-10 1.21 E-11 1.21 E-11 1.21 E-11 5.84E-1i1 5.15E-11 6.81 E-11 7.76E-13 7.76E-1 3 1.21 E-10 2.15E-10 9.93E-1 1 6.79E-1 1 8.02E-1l1 1.99E-11 1.99E-11 1.46E-11 1.46E-11 1.46E-11 1.46E-1 1 1.53E-10 1.46E-1 1 1.47E-11 3.31E-12 1.72E-1 1 5.60E-1 1 1.OOE-10 1.46E-1 1 1.46E-1 1 1.46E-1 1 1.61 E-09 1.68E-09 1.22E-09 1.80E-09 4.56E-1 1 CCDP 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 CDF 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 Variant -Compliant ACDF 1.16E-10 4.56E-1 1 1.46E-1 1 3.31E-12 1.63E-10 1.48E-11 3.07E-1 1 3.31E-12 2.53E-1 1 3.44E-1 2 1.46E-10 1.21E-10 1.21 E-11 1.21 E-11 1.21 E-11 5.84E-1 1 5.15E-11 6.81 E-11 7.76E-1 3 7.76E-1 3 1.21E-10 2.15E-10 9.93E-1 1 6.79E-1 1 8.02E-1 1 1.99E-1 1 1.99E-1 1 1.46E-1 1 1.46E-11 1.46E-1 1 1.46E-1 1 1.53E-10 1.46E-11 1.47E-11 3.31E-12 1.72E-11 5.60E-1 1 1.OOE-10 1.46E-1 1 1.46E-1 1 1.46E-1 1 1.61E-09 1.68E-09 1.22E-09 1.80E-09 4.56E-1 1 Revision 0 Page 34 of 54 Revision 0 Page 34 of 54 Version 1.0 Page 2187 of 3726 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-004 SE-C051 32670 1-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-004 Table 2-3b 1 FIRE AREA tACDF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN B ALIGNMEN Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case CCDP CDF CCDP CDF IT 0462/F 0462/G 0463/A 0464/DA 0464/F 0464/G 0467/A 0478/A 0480/A 0481/A 0482/A 0483/A 0484/A 0485/A 0486/A 0487/A 0488/A 0489/A 0490/A 0491/A 0504/A 0505/A 0506/A 0604/A 0605/A 0606/A 0607/A 0608/A 0609/A 0610/A 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.95E-05 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 5.04E-05 6.64E-07 5.04E-05 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 5.04E-05 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 5.04E-05 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 1.37E-10 4.84E-11 3.42E-10 2.25E-09 2.38E-1 1 4.56E-1 1 3.34E- 12 4.43E-10 4.53E-1 1 3.42E-09 2.19E-11 1.68E-09 2.13E-11 2.13E-1 1 2.13E-1 1 1.62E-09 2.84 E-11 4.45E-11 2.13E- 11 1.11 E-09 8.69E-1 1 2.65E-1 0 1.46E-1 1 1.51 E-11 2.81E-10 1.46E-1 1 1.46E-1 1 8.09E-1 1 8.76E-11 1.46E-1 1 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOE+00 Variant -Compliant ACDF 1.37E-10 4.84E-11 3.42E-1 0 2.25E-09 2.38E-1 1 4.56E-1 1 3.34E-12 4.43E-10 4.53E-1 1 3.42E-09 2.19E-11 1.68E-09 2.13E-11 2.13E-1 1 2.13E-11 1.62E-09 2.84E-11 4.45E-11 2.13E-11 1.11E-09 8.69E-11 2.65E-10 1.46E-1 1 1.51 E-11 2.81E-10 1.46E-1 1 1.46E-11 8.09E-1 1 8.76E-1 1 1.46E-11 Total CDF and delta CDF 2.53E-08 O.OOE+00 2.53E-08 1 -N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.OOE+00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.Table 2-4a 1 FIRE AREA ALERF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN A ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CLERP LERF CLERP LERF ALERF 0140/A 1.61E-10 8.01 E-16 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 8.01E-16 0151/A 1.61 E-10 4.34E-15 0.5OO+00 0.OOE+00 4.34E-15 0152/D1 1.61E-10 1.48E-15 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 1.48E-15 0153/A 1.61E-10 2.17E-14 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 2.17E-14 0154/A 1.61 E-10 3.63E-14 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 3.63E-14 0154A/A 1.61 E-10 1.57E-13 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 1.57E-13 0155/AO1 1.61E-10 4.26E-15 0.EOO+00 0.OOE+00 4.26E-15 Revision 0 Page 35 of 54 Version 1.0 Page 2188 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-004 Table 2-4a'FIRE AREA ALERF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN A ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case 0156/A 0157/A 0158/A 0159/A 0160/A 0161/A 0162/D1 0162/D2 0162/E 0163/El 0163/E2 0164/A 0165/A 0166/A 0168/D1 0168/E 0170/A 0175/D1 0176/A 0177/A 0178/A 0180/A 0186/E 0187/A 0188/A 0203/A 0204/A 0205/A 0206/A 0207/A 0208/A 0209/D1 0209/D2 0209/E 0209/F 0209/G2 0209/H 0209/I 0215/A 0216/A 0217/A 0218/A 0219/A 0220/A 0221/A 0230/A CLERP 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 5.66E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 5.66E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 LERF 3.81 E-15 3.98E-15 4.05E-15 3.59E-14 4.26E-1 5 1.01E-14 4.47E-1 6 4.47E-1 6 2.93E-1 5 2.93E-16 2.93E-1i5 8.29E-15 4.34E-1 5 4.34E-15 1.51E-15 1.60E-14 3.56E-15 9.79E-1 6 3.54E-15 2.03E-14 4.26E-15 3.62E-14 3.21E-14 2.02E-14 3.54E-15 2.07E-14 3,54E-15 4.72E-15 1.46E-14 1.87E-14 4.75E-14 2.53E-1 6 2.53E-1 6 2.93E-1 5 2.80E-14 4.39E-14 2.21 E-14 4.10E-14 3.54E-1 5 1.76E-14 3.54E-15 1.21 E-13 3.54E-15 3.54E-1 5 3.54E-15 3.94E-1 5 Compliant Case CLERP LERF 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 Variant -Compliant ALERF 3.81E-15 3.98E-15 4.05E-15 3.59E-14 4.26E-15 1.01E-14 4.47E-16 4.47E-16 2.93E-15 2.93E-16 2.93E-1 5 8.29E-1 5 4.34E-1 5 4.34E-15 1.51 E-15 1.60E-14 3.56E-15 9.79E-16 3.54E-15 2.03E-14 4.26E-15 3.62E-14 3.21E-14 2.02E-14 3.54E-1 5 2.07E-14 3.54E-15 4.72E-1 5 1.46E-14 1.87E-14 4.75E-14 2.53E-1 6 2.53E-1 6 2.93E-1 5 2.80E-14 4.39E-14 2.21 E-14 4.10E-14 3.54E-1 5 1.76E-14 3.54E-1 5 1.21E-13 3.54E-1 5 3.54E-15 3.54E-15 3.94E-15 Revision 0 Page 36 of 54 Revision 0 Page 36 of 54 Version 1.0 Page 2189 of 3726 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-004 SE-C051 326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-004 Table 2-4a 1 FIRE AREA ALERF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN A ALIGNMEI Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case NJT 0231/A 0232/A 0237/A 0238/A 0239/A 0240/A 0253/A 0301/A 0302/A 0303/A 0304/A 0305/A 0306/A 0307/A 0308/A 0309/DA 0309/E 0310/A 0311/A 0312/DA 0312/E 0313/A 0314/A 0315/A 0316/A 0322/A 0323/A 0324/A 0325/A 0326/A 0327/A 0328/A 0329/A 0330/A 0331/A 0332/D1 0332/D2 0332/D3 0332/D4 0332/E2 0332/F 0332/G 0340/A 0341/A 0342/A 0348/A CLERP 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 6.94E-08 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 LERF 3.94E-1 5 3.78E-1 5 7.65E-1i5 3.58E-1 5 3.58E-1 5 3.58E-1 5 4.72E-15 3.58E-15 3.58E-15 3.58E-1 5 3.58E-15 7.47E-15 3.54E-15 4.19E-15 3.54E-15 1.56E-12 2.80E-14 4.19E-15 3.58E-15 3.61 E-15 5.86E-1 5 3.58E-15 3.58E-15 3.58E-1i5 4.19E-15 6.89E-14 5.15E-15 8.51 E-15 5.79E-15 5.21 E-15 4.19E-15 3.54E-15 3.54E-15 3.62E-14 3.54E-15 5.72E-16 5.72E-1 6 5.72E-16 5.72E-16 4.39E-14 2.80E-14 1.10E-14 3.54E-15 8.01 E-16 3.95E-14 3.58E-15 CLERP 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.001+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 LERF 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 Variant -Compliant ALERF 3.94E-1i5 3.78E-1 5 7.65E-15 3.58E-15 3.58E-1 5 3.58E-1 5 4.72E-15 3.58E-1i5 3.58E-1 5 3.58E-15 3.58E-1i5 7.47E-15 3.54E-1 5 4.191-15 3.54E-15 1.56E-12 2.80E-14 4.19E-15 3.58E-1 5 3.61E-15 5.86E-15 3.58E-1i5 3.58E-1 5 3.58E-15 4.19E-15 6.89E-14 5.15E-15 8.51E-15 5.79E-15 5.21 E-15 4.19E-15 3.54E-15 3.54E-1i5 3.62E-14 3.54E-15 5.72E-16 5.72E-16 5.72E-16 5.72E-16 4.39E-14 2.80E-14 1.10E-14 3.54E-1b5 8.01 E-1 6 3.95E-14 3.58E-15 Revision 0 Page 37 of 54 Version 1.0 Page 2190 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-004 Table 2-4a 1 FIRE AREA ALERF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN A ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case 0351/A 0400/A 0402/A 0403/A 0405/AO1 0405/AO2a 0405/AO2b 0405/AO2c 0405/AO2d 0406/A 0407/A 0408/A 0409/D1 0409/D2 0409/E 041 OA/A 041 OB/A 0418/A 0419/A 0422/A 0423/A 0424/A 0425/A 0426/A 0427/A 0429/A 0432/A 0438/A 0441/A 0445/A 0446/A 0448/A 0449/A 0450/A 0451/A 0453/A 0455/A 0456/A 0461/A 0462/E 0462/F 0462/G 0463/A 0464/DA 0464/F 0464/G CLERP 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 4.05E-08 4.05E-08 4.05E-08 4.05E-08 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 6.08E-06 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 LERF 7.43E-15 8.01E-16 6.12E-15 8.32E-16 3.54E-14 2.93E-14 2.93E-1 5 2.93E-1 5 2.93E-15 1.41 E-14 1.25E-14 1.65E-14 1.88E-16 1.88E-16 2.93E-14 5.20E-14 2.40E-14 1.64E-14 1.94E-14 4.81 E-15 4.81E-15 3.54E-15 3.54E-15 3.54E-1 5 3.54E-15 3.71 E-14 3.54E-15 3.55E-15 8.01 E-1 6 4.17E-15 1.36E-14 2.42E-14 3.54E-15 3.54E-1 5 3.54E-15 1.30E-1 2 1.35E-1 2 9.81E-13 1.45E-12 1.10E-14 3.31 E-14 1.17E-14 8.28E-14 1.97E-10 5.77E-15 1.10E-14 Compliant Case CLERP LERF 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 Variant -Compliant ALERF 7.43E-15 8.01E-16 6.12E-15 8.32E-16 3.54E-14 2.93E-14 2.93E-1 5 2.93E-15 2.93E-15 1.41E-14 1.25E-14 1.65E-14 1.88E-16 1.88E-16 2.93E-14 5.20E-14 2.40E-14 1.64E-14 1.94E-14 4.81E-15 4.81 E-15 3.54E-1 5 3.54E-15 3.54E-15 3.54E-15 3.71E-14 3.54E-15 3.55E-15 8.01E-16 4.17E-15 1.36E-14 2.42E-14 3.54E-15 3.54E-1 5 3.54E-15 1.30E-12 1.35E-12 9.81E-13 1.45E-1 2 1.10E-14 3.31 E-14 1.17E-14 8.28E-14 1.97E-10 5.77E-15 1.10E-14 Revision 0 Page 38 of 54 Version 1.0 Page 2191 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-004 Table 2-4a 1 FIRE AREA &LERF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN A ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CLERP LERF CLERP LERF ALERF 0467/A 0478/A 0480/A 0481/A 0482/A 0483/A 0484/A 0485/A 0486/A 0487/A 0488/A 0489/A 0490/A 0491/A 0504/A 0505/A 0506/A 0604/A 0605/A 0606/A 0607/A 0608/A 0609/A 0610/A 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 4.05E-08 1.61E-10 4.05E-08 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 4.05E-08 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 4.05E-08 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 8.08E-16 1.07E-13 1.10E-14 2.75E-12 5.30E-15 1.35E-12 5.15E-15 5.15E-15 5.16E-15 1.30E-12 6.87E-1i5 1.08E-14 5.15E-15 8.94E-13 2.10E-14 6.41 E-14 3.54E-15 3.65E-15 6.81E-14 3.54E-15 3.54E-15 1.96E-14 2.12E-14 3.54E-15 2.12E-10 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0. OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0 OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOE+00 8.08E-16 1.07E-13 1.10E-14 2.75E-12 5.30E-1 5 1.35E-12 5.15E-15 5.15E-15 5.16E-15 1.30E-12 6.87E-15 1.08F-14 5.15E-15 8.94E-1 3 2.10E-14 6.41E-14 3.54E-15 3.65E-15 6.81E-14 3.54E-15 3.54E-1 5 1.96E-14 2.12E-14 3.54E-15 2.12E-10 Total LERF and delta LERF 1 _ N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.OOE+00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.Table 2-4b 1 FIRE AREA ALERF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN B ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CLERP LERF CLERP LERF ALERF 0140/A 0151/A 0152/D1 0153/A 0154/A 0154A/A 0155/AO1 0156/A 0157/A 0158/A 0159/A 0160/A 0161/A 0162/D1 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 0.OOE+00 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 8.01E-16 4.34E-15 0.OOE+00 2.17E-14 3.63E-14 1.57E-13 4.26E-15 3.81 E-15 3.98E-15 4.05E-15 3.59 E- 14 4.26E-1i5 1.01E-14 4.47E-1 6 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 8.01E-16 4.34E-15 0.OOE+00 2.17E-14 3.63E-14 1.57E-13 4.26E-15 3.81 E-15 3.98E-1 5 4.05E-15 3.59E-14 4.26E-1i5 1.01E-14 4.47E-16 Revision 0 Page 39 of 54 Version 1.0 Page 2192 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-004 Table 2-4b 1 FIRE AREA ALERF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN B ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case 0162/D2 0162/E 0163/El 0163/E2 0164/A 0165/A 0166/A 0168/D1 0168/E 0170/A 0175/D1 0176/A 0177/A 0178/A 0180/A 0186/E 0187/A 0188/A 0203/A 0204/A 0205/A 0206/A 0207/A 0208/A 0209/D1 0209/D2 0209/E 0209/F 0209/G2 0209/H 0209/I 0215/A 0216/A 0217/A 0218/A 0219/A 0220/A 0221/A 0230/A 0231/A 0232/A 0237/A 0238/A 0239/A 0240/A 0253/A CLERP 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 5.66E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 5.66E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 LERF 4.47E-16 2.93E-15 2.93E-16 2.93E-1 5 8.29E-15 4.34E-15 4.34E-15 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 3.56E-15 9.79E-16 3.54E-15 2.03E-14 4.26E-15 3.62E-14 3.21E-14 2.02E-14 3.54E-15 2.07E-14 3.54E-15 4.72E-15 1.46E-14 1.87E-14 4.75E-14 2.53E-16 2.53E-16 2.93E-1 5 2.80E-14 4.39E-14 2.21 E-14 4.10E-14 3.54E-15 1.76E-14 3.54E-15 1.21E-13 3.54E-15 3.54E-15 3.54E-15 3.94E-15 3.94E-1 5 3.78E-15 7.65E-15 3.58E-1 5 3.58E-15 3.58E-15 4.72E-15 Compliant Case CLERP LERF 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 Variant -Compliant ALERF 4.47E-16 2.93E-1 5 2.93E-16 2.93E-15 8.29E-15 4.34E-1 5 4.34E-15 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 3.56E-1 5 9.79E-16 3.54E-1 5 2.03E-14 4.26E-15 3.62E-14 3.21E-14 2.02E-14 3.54E-15 2.07E-14 3.54E-15 4.72E-15 1.46E-14 1.87E-14 4.75E-14 2.53E-16 2.53E-16 2.93E-15 2.80E-14 4.39E-14 2.21 E-14 4.10E-14 3.54E-15 1.76E-14 3.54E-15 1.21E-13 3.54E-15 3.54E-15 3.54E-15 3.94E-15 3.94E-15 3.78E-15 7.65E-15 3.58E-15 3.58E-15 3.58E-15 4.72E-15 Revision 0 Page 40 of 54 Revision 0 Page 40 of 54 Version 1.0 Page 2193 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-004 Table 2-4b1 FIRE AREA &LERF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN B ALIGNMEI Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case N'T 0301/A 0302/A 0303/A 0304/A 0305/A 0306/A 0307/A 0308/A 0309/DA 0309/E 0310/A 0311/A 0312/DA 0312/E 0313/A 0314/A 0315/A 0316/A 0322/A 0323/A 0324/A 0325/A 0326/A 0327/A 0328/A 0329/A 0330/A 0331/A 0332/D1 0332/D2 0332/D3 0332/D4 0332/E2 0332/F 0332/G 0340/A 0341/A 0342/A 0348/A 0351/A 0400/A 0402/A 0403/A 0405/AO1 0405/AO2a 0405/AO2b CLERP 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 6.94E-08 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 0.OOE+00 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 LERF 3.58E-1 5 3.58E-15 3.58E-1 5 3.58E-1 5 7.47E-15 3.54E-15 4.19E-15 3.54E-1 5 1.56E-12 2.80E-14 4.19E-15 3.58E-15 3.61E-15 5.86E-15 3.58E-15 3.58E-1 5 3.58E-15 4.19E-15 6.89E-14 5.15E-15 8.51 E-15 5.79E-15 5.21E-15 4.19E-15 3.54E-1 5 3.54E-1 5 0.OOE+00 3.54E-15 5.72E-1 6 5.72E-16 5.72E-16 5.72E-16 4.39E-14 2.80E-14 1.10E-14 3.54 E-15 8.01E-16 3.95E-14 3.58E-1b5 7.43E-15 8.01E-16 6.12E-15 8.32E-16 3.54E-14 2.93E-14 2.93E-1 5 CLERP 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 LERF 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 Variant -Compliant ALERF 3.58E-1 5 3.58E-15 3.58E-1 5 3.58E-15 7.47E-15 3.54E-1 5 4.19E-15 3.54E-1 5 1.56E-12 2.80E-14 4.19E-15 3.58E-15 3.61E-15 5.86E-1 5 3.58E-1i5 3.58E-1 5 3.58E-15 4.19E-15 6.89E-14 5.15E-15 8.51 E-15 5.79E-15 5.21E-15 4.19E-15 3.54E-15 3.54E-15 0.OOE+00 3.54E-15 5.72E-1 6 5.72E-16 5.72E-16 5.72E-16 4.39E-14 2.80E-14 1.10E-14 3.54E-1b5 8.01E-16 3.95E-14 3.58E-1 5 7.43E-15 8.01E-16 6.12E-15 8.32E-1 6 3.54E-14 2.93E-14 2.93E-15 Revision 0 Page 41 of 54 Version 1.0 Page 2194 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-004 Table 2-4b 1 FIRE AREA ALERF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN B ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case 0405/A02c 0405/AO2d 0406/A 0407/A 0408/A 0409/D1 0409/D2 0409/E 0410A/A 041 OB/A 0418/A 0419/A 0422/A 0423/A 0424/A 0425/A 0426/A 0427/A 0429/A 0432/A 0438/A 0441/A 0445/A 0446/A 0448/A 0449/A 0450/A 0451/A 0453/A 0455/A 0456/A 0461/A 0462/E 0462/F 0462/G 0463/A 0464/DA 0464/F 0464/G 0467/A 0478/A 0480/A 0481/A 0482/A 0483/A 0484/A CLERP 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 4.32E-08 4.32E-08 4.32E-08 4.32E-08 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 6.08E-06 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 4.32E-08 1.61 E-10 4.32E-08 1.61E-10 LERF 2.93E-1 5 2.93E-1 5 1.41E-14 1.25E-14 1.65E-14 1.88E-16 1.88E-16 2.93E-14 5.20E-14 2.40E-14 1.64E-14 1.94E-14 4.81 E-15 4.81 E-15 3.54E-15 3.54E-15 3.54E-1 5 3.54E-15 3.71 E-14 3.54E-15 3.55E-15 8.01 E-16 4.17E-15 1.36E-14 2.42E-14 3.54E-1i5 3.54E-1i5 3.54F-15 1.38E-12 1.44E-12 1.05E-12 1.54E-12 1.10E-14 3.31 E-14 1.17E-14 8.28E-14 1.97E-10 5.77E-15 1.10E-14 8.08E-1 6 1.07E-13 1.10E-14 2.93E-12 5.30E-15 1.44E-12 5.15E-15 Compliant Case CLERP LERF 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 Variant -Compliant ALERF 2.93E-1i5 2.93E-15 1.41E-14 1.25E-14 1.65E-14 1.88E-16 1.88E-16 2.93E-14 5.20E-14 2.40E-14 1.64E-14 1.94E-14 4.81 E-15 4.81E-15 3.54E-15 3.54E-1 5 3.54E-15 3.54 E- 15 3.71E-14 3.54E-15 3.55E-15 8.01 E-16 4.17E-15 1.36E-14 2.42E-14 3.54E-15 3.54E-15 3.54E-15 1.38E-12 1.44E-12 1.05E-12 1.54E-12 1.10E-14 3.31 E-14 1.17E-14 8.28E-14 1.97E-10 5.77E-1 5 1.10E-14 8.08E-16 1.07E-13 1.10E-14 2.93E-12 5.30E-1 5 1.44E-12 5.15E-15 Revision 0 Page 42 of 54 Version 1.0 Page 2195 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-004 Table 2-4bI FIRE AREA ALERF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN B ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CLERP LERF CLERP LERF ALERF 0485/A 0486/A 0487/A 0488/A 0489/A 0490/A 0491/A 0504/A 0505/A 0506/A 0604/A 0605/A 0606/A 0607/A 0608/A 0609/A 0610/A 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 4.32E-08 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 4.32E-08 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 1.61E-10 5.15E-15 5.16E-15 1.39E-12 6.87E-1 5 1.08E-14 5.15E-15 9.52E-1 3 2.10E-14 6.41 E-14 3.54 E-15 3.65E-15 6.81 E- 14 3.54E-1 5 3.54E-1 5 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 3.54E-15 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 5.15E-15 5.16E-15 1.39E-12 6.87E-15 1.08E-14 5.15E-15 9.52E-13 2.10E-14 6.41E-14 3.54E-1 5 3.65E-15 6.81E-14 3.54E-15 3.54E-1i5 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 3.54E-15 Total LERF and delta LERF 2.13E-10 0.OOE+00 2.13E-10 1 _ N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.OOE+00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.3.0 DID EVALUATION 3.1 Defense-in-Depth Evaluation A review of the impact of the change on defense-in-depth (DID) was performed.
NFPA 805 defines DID as: 8 Preventing fires from starting" Rapidly detecting fires and controlling and extinguishing promptly those fires that do occur, thereby limiting damage" Providing adequate level of fire protection for structures, systems and components important to safety; so that a fire that is not promptly extinguished will not prevent essential plant safety functions from being performed.
In general, the DID requirement was considered satisfied if the proposed change does not result in a substantial imbalance among these elements (or echelons).
The review of DID was qualitative and addressed each of the elements with respect to the proposed change. Fire protection features and systems relied upon to ensure DID were identified in the assessment (e.g., detection, suppression system).The VFDRs and the associated Fire Area risk (CDF) and scenario consequences (CCDP values)were evaluated to identify general DID echelon imbalances.
Potential methods to balance the DID features were identified ensuring an adequate balance of DID features is maintained for the Fire Area. See Section 3.2 for the results of the evaluation.
Revision 0 Page 43 of 54 Version 1.0 Page 2196 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-004 3.2 Defense-in-Depth Review Results A review of defense in depth and risk evaluation results show that, given the systems and features specified in Table 3-1 and Section 2 respectively, risk acceptance criteria are met and that the balance of defense in depth is maintained.
The risk acceptance criteria are met with substantial margin to account for analytical methods associated with fire scenarios.
The analyzed scenarios bound potential fuel packages which can reasonably be expected to occur in this area.Although detection and automatic suppression systems are installed in the fire area they are not required for DID. There are no credible fire scenarios that affect core damage to the extent that additional systems or features, beyond those already required by risk, would provide tangible margin.In the event of no intervention by the plant fire brigade, it is not expected that a credible fire would develop which would not be bounded by the analyzed scenarios.
Based on the systems/features specified above, no additional DID systems/features are warranted and the ability to meet nuclear performance criteria is ensured.The table below summarizes how an adequate balance of DID is maintained.
Table 3-1 Defense-in-Depth Impact Review Method of Providing DID Discussion Echelon 1: Prevent fires from starting Combustible Control No change necessary to procedure(s) 
/guidance document(s).
Hot Work Control No change necessary to procedure(s) 
/guidance document(s).
Echelon 2: Rapidly detect, control and extinguish promptly those fires that do occur thereby limiting fire damage Detection System Detection systems are installed, but not required.Automatic Fire Suppression Automatic suppression systems are installed, but not required.Portable Fire Extinguishers Portable extinguishers are available, but no enhancements required.1 Hose stations and hydrants Fire hose cabinet(s) are available, but no enhancements required.
1 located in the area(s)Pre-Fire Plan No change necessary to procedure(s) 
/guidance document(s).'
Echelon 3: Provide adequate level of fire protection for systems and structures so that a fire will not prevent essential safety functions from being performed Walls, floors ceilings and structural No changes necessary to existing barriers.elements are rated or have been evaluated as adequate for the hazard.Openings in the fire barrier are rated No changes necessary to existing barrier openings.or have been evaluated as adequate for the hazard.Supplemental barriers (e.g., ERFBS, No supplemental barriers installed and not required.cable tray covers, etc.)Guidance provided to operations No VFDR related DID recovery actions required.personnel detailing the credited success path(s) including recovery actions to achieve nuclear safety performance criteria.Revision 0 Page 44 of 54 Version 1.0 Page 2197 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-004 1 This fire protection feature is relied upon without further DID enhancements beyond inherent programmatic requirements of NFPA 805, Chap. 3 and will not be reported in Table 5-2.3.2.1 Required Modifications There are no modifications required as a result of the DID evaluation for this fire area.3.2.2 Required Recovery Actions There are no required recovery actions as a result of the DID evaluation for this fire area.4.0 SAFETY MARGIN EVALUATION 4.1 Safety Margin Evaluation In accordance with NEI 04-02, 5.3.5.3 guidance, the maintenance of adequate Safety Margin is assessed by the consideration of categories of analyses utilized by this fire risk evaluation (FRE).Safety margins are considered to be maintained if: Codes and standards or their alternatives accepted for use by the NRC are met, and Safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) are met, or provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty.
The maintenance of adequate safety margin for the change analysis is described for each of the specific analysis types used in support of the fire risk assessment.
4.1.1 Fire Modeling Fire modeling performed in support of the transition has been performed within the Fire PRA utilizing codes and standards developed by industry and NRC staff to provide realistic yet conservative results. Specifically, the heat release rates utilized in the transition analysis are based upon NUREG/CR 6850, Task 8, Scoping Fire Modeling.
These heat release rates are conservative and represent values used to screen out fixed ignition sources that do not pose a threat to the targets within specific fire compartments and to assign severity factors to unscreened fixed ignition sources.The combined analysis approach is used during transition; therefore, maximum expected fire scenario/limiting fire scenario have not been analyzed separately.
The bases for the application of these fire modeling codes and standards were not altered in support of this FRE.4.1.2 Plant System Performance Plant system performance parameters were not modified as a result of this FRE. These performance parameters were originally established to support nuclear performance criteria contained in the plant specific accident analyses.
These analyses established component and system performance criteria necessary to establish safe and stable plant operation, as well as, safe shut down of the unit in the event of a fire. These performance parameters were not modified as a result of this FRE.Revision 0 Page 45 of 54 Version 1.0 Page 2198 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-004 4.2 Safety Margin Results All analyses and assessment have been performed utilizing accepted techniques and industry accepted standards.
In addition, safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) have been considered and provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty.
As such, the Safety Margins are maintained as discussed in Section 4.1.5.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION RESULTS 5.1 Dispositions of VFDRs Based on the FRE results contained in Sections 2, 3 and 4 the VFDRs identified in Section LI.1 have been resolved as follows: Table 5-1 Final Variance Disposition Disposition VFDR ID U2-1-004-SEP-001 U2-1-004-SEP-002 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)Revision 0 Page 46 of 54 Revision 0 Page 46 of 54 Version 1.0 Page 2199 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-004 5.2 Fire Risk Evaluation Summary of Fire Protection Systems and Features Table 5-2 Summary of Required Fire Protection Systems and Features Required Required Required Fire FireSuppression Detection Protection Feature Required Fire Protection System and Feature Details System System (R, D)(R, D) (R, D)U2 1-004 140 None None None 151 None R None R -Detection system 152 None R None R -Detection system 153 None R None R -Detection system 154 None R None R -Detection system 154A None R None R -Detection system 155 None None None 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 168 None None None None R R R R R None None R None None None None R R R R R R R R None None None None None None None None None None None None R -Detection system, Suppression system R -Detection system, Suppression system R -Detection system, Suppression system R -Detection system, Suppression system R -Detection system, Suppression system R -Detection system R -Detection system R -Detection system, Suppression system Revision 0 Page 47 of 54 Revision 0 Page 47 of 54 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-004 SE-C051326701 
-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-004 Required Fire Area Fire Zone Suppressio System (R, D)170 None 175 R 176 None 177 None 178 None 180 None 186 R 187 188 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 215 216 217 218 219 220 None None None None None None R R R None None None None None None Table 5-2 Summary of Required Fire Protection Systems and Features Required n Detection Required Fire Protection Feature Required Fire Pr System (R, D)(R, D)R None R -Detection systen R None R -Detection systen None None R None R -Detection systen R None R -Detection systen R None R -Detection systen R None R -Detection systen R None R -Detection systen R None R -Detection systen R None R -Detection systen R None R -Detection systen R None R -Detection systen R None R -Detection systen R None R -Detection systen R None R -Detection systen R None R -Detection systen None None R None R -Detection systen None None None None None None R None R -Detection systen n n rotection System and Feature Details i, Suppression system SI"n, Suppression system Suppression system Suppression system Suppression system n n Revision 0 Page 48 of 54 Revision 0 Page 48 of 54 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-004 Table 5-2 Summary of Required Fire Protection Systems and Features Required Required Required Fire Fire Area Fire Zone Suppression Detection Protection Feature Required Fire Protection System and Feature Details System System (R D)(R, D) (R, D)221 None None None 222 R R None R -Detection system, Suppression system 230 None R None R -Detection system 231 None R None R -Detection system 232 None R None R -Detection system 236 None None None 237 None R None R -Detection system 238 None R None R -Detection system 239 None None None 240 None R None R -Detection system 253 None None None 301 None R None R -Detection system 302 None R None R -Detection system 303 None R None R -Detection system 304 None R None R -Detection system 305 None R None R -Detection system 306 None None None 307 None R None R -Detection system 308 None None None 309 None R None R -Detection system 310 None R None R -Detection system 311 None R None R -Detection system Revision 0 Page 49 of 54 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-004 SE-C051 326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-004 Required Fire Area Fire Zone Suppressio System (R, D)312 R 313 None 314 None 315 None 316 R 322 R 323 324 325 326 327 328 329 330 331 332 340 341 342 348 351 400 None None None None None None None None None None None None None None None None Table 5-2 Summary of Required Fire Protection Systems and Features Required Rn Detection Required Fire Protection Feature Required Fire Pr System (R, D)(R, D)R None R -Detection systen R None R -Detection systen R None R -Detection systen R None R -Detection systen R None R -Detection systen R None R -Detection systen R None R -Detection systen R None R -Detection systen R None R -Detection systen R None R -Detection systen None None None None None None R None R -Detection systen R None R -Detection systen R None R -Detection systen None None None None R None R -Detection systen None None R None R -Detection systen None None n rotection System and Feature Details n, Suppression system T1 n, Suppression system i, Suppression system 1n TI TI n Revisionon 0Nago5noe5 Revision 0 Page 50 of 54 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-004 SE-C051 326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1.004 Fire Area Fire Zone 402 403 405 406 407 408 409 41 OA 410B 415 417 418 419 422 423 424 425 426 427 429 432 438 Required Suppressio System (R, D)R None None R None None None R R R R None None None None None None None None None R R Table 5-2 Summary of Required Fire Protection Systems and Features Required Required Fire n Detection Protection Feature Required Fire Pr System (R, D)(R, D)R None R -Detection systen R None R -Detection systen R None R -Detection syster R None R -Detection syster R None R -Detection systen R None R -Detection syster R None R -Detection syster R None R -Detection syster R None R -Detection syster R None R -Detection syster R None R -Detection syster R None R -Detection syster R None R -Detection syster None None R None R -Detection syster None None None None None None None None R None R -Detection syster R None R -Detection syster R None R -Detection syster n, Suppression system n n n, Suppression system n n n n, Suppression system n, Suppression system n, Suppression system n, Suppression system n n otection System and Feature Details n CD N.)N)0 w)n n, Suppression system n, Suppression system Revision 0 Page 51 of 54 Revision 0 Page 51 of 54 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-004 SE-C 051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-004 Fire Area Fire Zone 441 445 446 448 449 450 451 453 454 455 456 461 462 463 464 467 478 480 481 482 483 484 Required Suppressic System (R, D)None None None None None None None R R R R R R None None None None R R R R R Table 5-2 Summary of Required Fire Protection Systems and Features Required Required Fire rn DetectionReurdFe Protection Feature Required Fire Pr System (R, D)(R, D)R None R -Detection systerr R None R -Detection systerr None None None None None None None None None None R None R -Detection systery R None R -Detection systerr R None R -Detection systen R None R -Detection systen R None R -Detection systen R None R -Detection systery R None R -Detection systern R None R -Detection systerr R None R -Detection systen R None R -Detection systerr R None R -Detection systern R None R -Detection systen R None R -Detection systen R None R -Detection systen R None R -Detection systerr otection System and Feature Details n, Suppression system n, Suppression system n, Suppression system n, Suppression system n, Suppression system n, Suppression system iSuppression system iSuppression system 1,Suppression system n, Suppression system n, Suppression system Revision 0 Page 52 of 54 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-004 Table 5-2 Summary of Required Fire Protection Systems and Features Required Required Required Fire Fire Area Fire Zone Suppression Detection Protection Feature Required Fire Protection System and Feature Details System System (R D)(R, D) (R, D)485 R R None R -Detection system, Suppression system 486 R R None R -Detection system, Suppression system 487 R R None R -Detection system, Suppression system 488 R R None R -Detection system, Suppression system 489 R R None R -Detection system, Suppression system 490 R R None R -Detection system, Suppression system 491 R R None R -Detection system, Suppression system 504 None R None R -Detection system 505 None R None R -Detection system 506 None R None R -Detection system 604 None R None R -Detection system 605 None R None R -Detection system 606 None R None R -Detection system 607 None R None R -Detection system 608 None R None R -Detection system 609 None R None R -Detection system 610 None R None R -Detection system Required Suppression/Detection/Feature:
required in the Fire Area based on NFPA 805 Chapter 4 compliance.
The information is provided on a zone basis. The basis for the requirement of the fire protection system is designated as follows:* R -Risk Criteria:
Systems required to meet the Risk Criteria for the Performance-Based Approach (NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4)* D -Defense-in-depth Criteria:
Systems required to maintain adequate balance of Defense-in-Depth for a Performance-Based Approach (NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4)Fire Protection Features in this Table only refer to those features installed in the Fire Area that have a corresponding NFPA 805, Chapter 3 requirement.
Revision 0 Page 53 of 54 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-004 5.3 Summary of Recovery Actions No recovery actions are required for this fire area.5.4 Summary of Plant Modifications No modifications are required for this fire area.5.5 Fire Area Risk Summary Fire Area U2 1-004 Area Description Unit I Auxiliary Building NFPA 805 Basis 4.2.4 Table 5-3 -Fire Area Risk Summary Fire Area CDF/LERF VFDR (Yes/No) (2.45E-08/2.12E-10 Yes RAs Yes/No)No Fire Risk Eval A CDF/LERF 2.45E-08/2.12E-10 Additional Risk of RAs N/A Revision 0 Page 54 of 54 Revision 0 Page 54 of 54 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-008 Attachment 
-Unit 2 Fire Area 1-008 FRE for Fire Area Aux Building Cable Chase Room 116 Revision:
0 Fire PRA Preparer Fire PRA Reviewer Fire Protection Preparer Fire Protection Reviewer NSCA Preparer NSCA Reviewer FRE Preparer FRE Reviewer Name Jonathan Hedrick Clint Pierce Robert Kirkpatrick Rebecca Puckett Larry Valmonte Dan Funk Steve Hardy Brandon Jamar Revision 0 Page 1 of 15 Version 1.0 Page 2208 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-008 1.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION INPUT .....................................................................
4 1.1 Variances from the Deterministic Requirements 
....................................
4 1.2 Fire Protection Systems and Features ..................................................
4 1.2 .1 C o nstructio n ............................................................................. 
..4 1.2 .2 D e te ctio n ................................................................................... 
..4 1.2.3 Fixed Fire Suppression 
...............................................................
4 1.2.4 Manual Suppression 
...................................................................
4 1.2.5 Ventilation (Smoke Removal) .......................................................
5 1.2.6 Other Fire Protection Features ....................................................
5 1.2.7 Fire Hazard Identification 
............................................................
5 1.2.8 Fire PRA Input .............................................................................
5 2.0 RISK EVALUATION 
..........................................................................................
6 2.1 Fire PRA Variant Case Calculation 
.........................................................
6 2.2 Compliant Case Calculation 
..................................................................
8 2.2.1 VFDRs Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA ...............................
8 2.2.2 VFDRs Not Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA .......................
8 2.2.3 Compliant Case Results .............................................................
8 2.2.4 Required Modifications 
...............................................................
8 2.2.5 Required Recovery Actions .........................................................
9 2.3 Risk Evaluation Results ........................................................................
9 3.0 DID EVALUATION 
.........................................................................................
10 3.1 Defense-in-Depth Evaluation 
...............................................................
10 3.2 Defense-in-Depth Review Results ......................................................
11 3.2.1 Required Modifications 
.............................................................
12 3.2.2 Required Recovery Actions .......................................................
12 4.0 SAFETY MARGIN EVALUATION 
...................................................................
12 4.1 Safety Margin Evaluation 
......................................................................
12 4 .1.1 F ire M o d e ling .......................................................................... 
..12 4.1.2 Plant System Performance 
......................................................
12 4.2 Safety Margin Results ..........................................................................
12 5.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION RESULTS ....................................................
13 5.1 Dispositions of VFDRs ........................................................................
13 Revision 0 Page 2 of 15 Version 1.0 Page 2209 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-008 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 Fire Risk Evaluation Summary of Fire Protection Systems and Features 14 Summary of Recovery Actions .............................................................
14 Summary of Plant Modifications 
..........................................................
14 Fire A rea R isk Sum m ary .....................................................................
15 Revision 0 Page 3 of 15 Version 1.0 Page 2210 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-008 1.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION INPUT 1.1 Variances from the Deterministic Requirements The VFDRs identified for evaluation for Unit 2, Fire Area 1-008, Aux Building Cable Chase Room 116 are: Table 1-1 VFDRs VFDR Component(s)
Description U2-1-008-Q2R42B0001A:ENERG This component, 125V DC Bus 2A, requires HVAC support to HVAC-001 IZED:ENERGIZED-remain functional.
Failure to provide HVAC support to this electrical BC2A, 125V DC BUS component challenges electrical support Vital Auxiliaries Nuclear 2A Safety Performance Criteria.U2-1-008-Q2R15A0006:ENERGI This component, Switchgear 2F, requires HVAC support to remain HVAC-002 ZED:ENERGIZED-functional.
Failure to provide HVAC support to this electrical SUT2A, 4160V component challenges electrical support Vital Auxiliaries Nuclear SWITCHGEAR BUS 2F Safety Performance Criteria.U2-1-008-Q2R17B0001:ENERGI This component, MCC 2A, requires HVAC support to remain HVAC-003 ZED:ENERGIZED, functional.
Failure to provide HVAC support to this electrical MOTOR CONTROL component challenges electrical support Vital Auxiliaries Nuclear CENTER 2A Safety Performance Criteria.1.2 Fire Protection Systems and Features Fire Area 1-008 consists of Fire Zone 116. This fire area is located in the Aux Building Cable Chase Room 116 at elevations 83'-0", 100'-0", 121 '-0" and 139'-0".1.2.1 Construction Barriers for this fire area are of substantial construction and have been designed and constructed to meet separation requirements.
In the event the configuration utilized is not in accordance with recognized standards, the deviations have been evaluated to be adequate for the hazard.1.2.2 Detection Fire detection systems to initiate plant suppression systems and provide notification to the control room are:* Fire Zone 116 is provided with detection.
1.2.3 Fixed Fire Suppression Fixed fire suppression systems to aid in control of both fire growth and spread in the fire area are:* Fire Zone 116 is provided with suppression.
1.2.4 Manual Suppression Manual suppression equipment to be utilized by plant personnel and/or fire brigade members are: Fire Area 1-008 is provided with fire hose cabinets located in Room 185 and Room 319 to support manual firefighting activities.
Revision 0 Page 4 of 15 Version 1.0 Page 2211 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-008 1.2.5 Ventilation (Smoke Removal)Portable smoke ejectors are available to assist with smoke removal.1.2.6 Other Fire Protection Features No additional fire protection features are required for this fire risk evaluation.
1.2.7 Fire Hazard Identification The major source of combustibles in Fire Area 1-008 is cable insulation.
Details regarding fire scenarios quantified in the fire PRA, and their associated ignition sources (where applicable) are discussed in Section 2.1.2.8 Fire PRA Input Fire protection features There are no fire protection features specifically modeled in the Fire PRA for this fire area.Fire protection systems The Hot Gas Layer evaluation credits the detection, automatic fire suppression system and manual fire brigade response.
The Multi Compartment Analysis evaluation credits the detection and automatic fire suppression system.Hot Gas Layer Treatment Physical attributes of this fire area require the expansion of the Zone Of Influence beyond the original Zone Of Influence to account for the Hot Gas Layer impacts in this area, see PRA-BC-11 l-F-015 for further details. Credit for detection was taken in the Hot Gas Layer evaluation for this fire area. Credit for both automatic fire suppression system and manual fire brigade response was taken in the Hot Gas Layer evaluation for this fire area.Multi-compartment analysis Credit for detection was taken in the Multi Compartment Analysis for this fire area. Credit for automatic fire suppression system was taken in the Multi Compartment Analysis for this fire area.Scenario Review All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0, ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency.
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-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-008 2.0 RISK EVALUATION 2.1 Fire PRA Variant Case Calculation Tables 2-la and 2-1b provide the results of the variant case calculation for Fire Area 1-008. This is taken directly from the Fire PRA model with no changes or alterations made. The CDF and LERF results are provided on a scenario basis.The total area CDF and LERF is below the screening acceptance criteria of I E-07/rx-yr and I E-08/rx-yr, respectively.
The total CDF/L.ERF can be used as a conservative estimate of the delta CDF/LERF with respect to a compliant configuration.
No further analysis of the delta of CDF/LERF is required.Revision 0 Page 6 of 15 Revision 0 Page 6 of 15 Version 1.0 Page 2213 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-008 Table 2-1a Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train A Alignment IGF CDF LERF Zone Scen ScenDesc (Irx-yr) NSP SF CCDP CDF CLERP (Irx-yr)(/rx-yr) ~(/rx-yr) (r-r 0116 D1 TRANSIENT 
-100' 5.09E-06 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 3.41E-12 1.61E-10 8.19E-16 PLATFORM NEAR LADDER 1-008-ADJ HGL HGL SCENARIO 2.39E-06 1.0 1.0 7.75E-04 1.85E-09 1.53E-06 3.65E-12 Total CDF/LERF Fire PRA Variant Case 1.85E-09 3.65E-12 Table 2-1 b Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train B Alignment IGF CDF LERF Zone Scen ScenDesc (irx-yr) NSP SF CCDP (1ix-yr) CLERP (irx-yr)0116 D1 TRANSIENT-l1o' 5.09E-06 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 3.38E-12 1.61E-10 8.19E-16 PLATFORM NEAR LADDER 1-008-ADJ HGL HGL SCENARIO 2.39E-06 1.0 1.0 8.79E-04 2.10E-09 1.OOE-06 2.40E-12 Total CDF/LERF Fire PRA Variant Case 2.1OE-09 2.40E-12 Where: Zone = Fire Zone Scen = 'A' to signify the variant case ScenDesc = Description of the Fire Scenario IGF = Ignition Frequency 
(/rx-yr)NSP = Non Suppression Probability SF = Severity Factor CCDP = Conditional Core Damage Probability CDF = Core Damage Frequency 
(/rx-yr)CLERP = Conditional Large Early Release Probability LERF = Large Early Release Frequency 
(/rx-yr)Revision 0 Page 7 of 15 Revision 0 Page 7 of 15 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-008 2.2 Compliant Case Calculation The following sub-sections provide the basis for modeling each VFDR (or category of VFDRs)and the alterations that have been made to the variant case to represent the compliant case. In each section a discussion of the VFDR (or the category of VFDRs) is provided.2.2.1 VFDRs Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA The following VFDRs are modeled in the Fire PRA and are therefore included in the total fire area CDF/LERF used as a surrogate for the delta risk evaluation for this fire area:.U2-1-008-HVAC-001 
-Q2R42B000IA:ENERGIZED:ENERGIZED-BC2A 2.2.2 VFDRs Not Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA A Fire PRA was developed in accordance with the requirements of Part 4 "Requirements for Fires at Power PRA" of the ASME and ANS combined PRA Standard, ASME/ANS RA-Sa-2009, "Standard for Level 1/Large Early Release Frequency Probabilistic Risk Assessment for Nuclear Power Plant Applications".
Consistent with those requirements not all components required to meet the nuclear safety criteria need to be specifically modeled in the Fire PRA. The following VFDRs are associated with components not modeled in the Fire PRA: 2.2.2.1 VFDR U2-1-008-HVAC-002 4kV Switchgear Room 2F ventilation is not modeled in the fire PRA. Room Heat up calculations show that there will be no impact to the 4kV Switchgear Room due to loss of HVAC within the mission time of 24 hrs in the fire PRA. See calculation Fire PRA Logic Model for Farley Nuclear Plants, PRA-BC-F-11-004.* U2-1-008-HVAC-002 
-Q2RI 5A0006:ENERG!ZED:ENERGIZED-SUT2A 2.2.2.2 VFDR U2-1-008-HVAC-003 MCC 2A Room ventilation is not modeled in the fire PRA. Room Heat up calculations show that there will be no impact to the MCC Room due to loss of HVAC within the mission time of 24 hrs in the fire PRA. See calculation Fire PRA Logic Model for Farley Nuclear Plants, PRA-BC-F-I 1-004.a U2-1-008-HVAC-003 
-Q2R 17B000 1:ENERGIZED:EN ERGIZED 2.2.3 Compliant Case Results The total area CDF and LERF is below the screening acceptance criteria of IE-07/rx-yr and 1E-08/rx-yr, respectively.
The total CDF/LERF can be used as a conservative estimate of the delta CDF/LERF with respect to a compliant configuration.
No further analysis of the delta CDF/LERF is required.2.2.4 Required Modifications There are no modifications required as a result of the risk evaluation for this fire area.Revision 0 Page 8 of 15 Version 1.0 Page 2215 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-008 2.2.5 Required Recovery Actions The following recovery actions are required as a result of the risk evaluation for this fire area: Table 2-2 Required Recovery Actions Recovery Component ID Basic Event VFDR BE Description Action Description Operator action OPERATOR to provide U2 RECOVERY OF alternate Q2R42B0001A:ENERGIZED:ENERGIZED-OP-RECOV-008- BATTERY cooling for BC2A BCSW-A HVAC- CHARGER A ROOM battery charger 001 COOLING FAILS- room due to SW loss of Train A SW 2.3 Risk Evaluation Results The ACDF/LERF is below the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr (CDF) and l E-08/rx-yr (LERF) for acceptable risk. All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0 ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency.
The following tables present the fire zone/scenario fire risk as well as the total fire risk for this fire area. Given the relatively low risk for these zones/scenarios the delta risk is defined by the variant case risk, the compliant case risk is conservatively assumed to be 0.Table 2-3a 1 FIRE AREA ACDF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN A ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CCDP CDF CCDP CDF aCDF 0116/D1 6.69E-07 3.41 E-12 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 3.41E-12 1-008-ADJ/HGL 7.75E-04 1.85E-09 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 1.85E-09 Total CDF and delta CDF 2  1.85E-09 0.OOE+00 1.85E-09 2 -N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.2 -Total ACDF includes the risk of recovery actions required to demonstrate the availability of a success path for the nuclear safety performance criteria.Table 2-3b 1 FIRE AREA aCDF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN B ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CCDP CDF CCDP CDF ACDF 0116/D1 6.64E-07 3.38E-12 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 3.38E-12 1-008-ADJ/HGL 8.79E-04 2.1OE-09 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 2.10E-09 Total CDF and delta CDF 2  2.1OE-09 0.OOE+00 2.1OE-09 1_N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.2 Total ACDF includes the risk of recovery actions required to demonstrate the availability of a success path for the nuclear safety performance criteria.Revision 0 Page 9 of 15 Version 1.0 Page 2216 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-008 Table 2-4a 1 FIRE AREA ALERF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN A ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CLERP LERF CLERP LERF ALERF 0116/D1 1.61E-10 8.19E-16 0.00E+00 .0.00E+00 8.19E-16 1-008-ADJ/HGL 1.53E-06 3.65E-12 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 3.65E-12 Total LERF and delta LERF2 3.65E-12 0.OOE+00 3.65E-12 1 _ N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.2 Total ALERF includes the risk of recovery actions required to demonstrate the availability of a success path for the nuclear safety performance criteria.Table 2-4b 1 FIRE AREA ALERF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN B ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CLERP LERF CLERP LERF ALERF 0116/D1 1.61E-10 8.19E-16 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 8.19E-16 1-008-ADJ/HGL 1.OOE-06 2.40E-12 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 2.40E-12 Total LERF and delta LERF2 2.40E-12 O.OOE+00 2.40E-12-N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.2 Total ALERF includes the risk of recovery actions required to demonstrate the availability of a success path for the nuclear safety performance criteria.3.0 DID EVALUATION 3.1 Defense-in-Depth Evaluation A review of the impact of the change on defense-in-depth (DID) was performed.
NFPA 805 defines DID as: 0 Preventing fires from starting" Rapidly detecting fires and controlling and extinguishing promptly those fires that do occur, thereby limiting damage" Providing adequate level of fire protection for structures, systems and components important to safety; so that a fire that is not promptly extinguished will not prevent essential plant safety functions from being performed.
In general, the DID requirement was considered satisfied if the proposed change does not result in a substantial imbalance among these elements (or echelons).
The review of DID was qualitative and addressed each of the elements with respect to the proposed change. Fire protection features and systems relied upon to ensure DID were identified in the assessment (e.g., detection, suppression system).The VFDRs and the associated Fire Area risk (CDF) and scenario consequences (CCDP values)were evaluated to identify general DID echelon imbalances.
Potential methods to balance the DID features were identified ensuring an adequate balance of DID features is maintained for the Fire Area. See Section 3.2 for the results of the evaluation.
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-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-008 3.2 Defense-in-Depth Review Results A review of defense in depth and risk evaluation results show that, given the systems and features specified in Table 3-1 and Section 2 respectively, risk acceptance criteria are met and that the balance of defense in depth is maintained.
The risk acceptance criteria are met with substantial margin to account for afialytical methods associated with fire scenarios.
The analyzed scenarios bound potential fuel packages which can reasonably be expected to occur in this area.The installed detection system is required for DID to ensure prompt brigade response and to support execution of the required recovery action for risk.In the event of no intervention by the plant fire brigade, it is not expected that a credible fire would develop which would not be bounded by the analyzed scenarios.
Based on the systems/features specified above, no additional DID systems/features are warranted and the ability to meet nuclear performance criteria is ensured.The table below summarizes how an adequate balance of DID is maintained.
Table 3-1 Defense-in-Depth Impact Review Method of Providing DID Discussion Echelon 1: Prevent fires from starting Combustible Control No change necessary to procedure(s) 
/guidance document(s).
1 Hot Work Control No change necessary to procedure(s) 
/guidance document(s).
1 Echelon 2: Rapidly detect, control and extinguish promptly those fires that do occur thereby limiting fire damage Detection System Detection system is installed and required.Automatic Fire Suppression Automatic suppression system is installed, but not required.Portable Fire Extinguishers No portable extinguishers available and not required.Hose stations and hydrants Fire hose cabinets are available, but no enhancements required.located in the area(s)Pre-Fire Plan No change necessary to procedure(s) 
/guidance document(s).
Echelon 3: Provide adequate level of fire protection for systems and structures so that a fire will not prevent essential safety functions from being performed Walls, floors ceilings and structural No changes necessary to existing barriers.
1 elements are rated or have been evaluated as adequate for the hazard.Openings in the fire barrier are rated No changes necessary to existing barrier openings.or have been evaluated as adequate for the hazard.Supplemental barriers (e.g., ERFBS, No supplemental barriers installed and not required.cable tray covers, etc.)Guidance provided to operations No VFDR related DID recovery actions required.personnel detailing the credited success path(s) including recovery actions to achieve nuclear safety performance criteria.1 This fire protection feature is relied upon without further DID enhancements beyond inherent programmatic requirements of NFPA 805, Chap. 3 and will not be reported in Table 5-2.Revision 0 Page 11 of 15 Version 1.0 Page 2218 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-008 3.2.1 Required Modifications There are no modifications required as a result of the DID evaluation for this fire area.3.2.2 Required Recovery Actions There are no required recovery actions as a result of the DID evaluation for this fire area.4.0 SAFETY MARGIN EVALUATION 4.1 Safety Margin Evaluation In accordance with NEI 04-02, 5.3.5.3 guidance, the maintenance of adequate Safety Margin is assessed by the consideration of categories of analyses utilized by this fire risk evaluation (FRE).Safety margins are considered to be maintained if: " Codes and standards or their alternatives accepted for use by the NRC are met, and Safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) are met, or provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty.
The maintenance of adequate safety margin for the change analysis is described for each of the specific analysis types used in support of the fire risk assessment.
4.1.1 Fire Modeling Fire modeling performed in support of the transition has been performed within the Fire PRA utilizing codes and standards developed by industry and NRC staff to provide realistic yet conservative results. Specifically, the heat release rates utilized in the transition analysis are based upon NUREG/CR 6850, Task 8, Scoping Fire Modeling.
These heat release rates are conservative and represent values used to screen out fixed ignition sources that do not pose a threat to the targets within specific fire compartments and to assign severity factors to unscreened fixed ignition sources.The combined analysis approach is used during transition; therefore, maximum expected fire scenario/limiting fire scenario have not been analyzed separately.
The bases for the application of these fire modeling codes and standards were not altered in support of this FRE.4.1.2 Plant System Performance Plant system performance parameters were not modified as a result of this FRE. These performance parameters were originally established to support nuclear performance criteria contained in the plant specific accident analyses.
These analyses established component and system performance criteria necessary to establish safe and stable plant operation, as well as, safe shut down of the unit in the event of a fire. These performance parameters were not modified as a result of this FRE.4.2 Safety Margin Results All analyses and assessment have been performed utilizing accepted techniques and industry accepted standards.
In addition, safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) have been considered and provides sufficient margin to account for Revision 0 Page 12 of 15 Version 1.0 Page 2219 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-008 analysis and data uncertainty.
As such, the Safety Margins are maintained as discussed in Section 4. 1.5.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION RESULTS 5.1 Dispositions of VFDRs Based on the FRE results contained in Sections 2, 3 and 4 the VFDRs identified in Section 1. 1 have been resolved as follows: VFDR ID U2-1-008-HVAC-001 U2-1-008-HVAC-002 U2-1-008-HVAC-003 Table 5-1 Final Variance Disposition Disposition Recovery Action(s)
Required to Satisfy Risk Criteria:
See Table 2-2 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)Revision 0 Page 13 of 15 Page 2220 of 3726 Version 1.0 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-008 5.2 Fire Risk Evaluation Summary of Fire Protection Systems and Features Table 5-2 Summary of Required Fire Protection Systems and Features Required Required FrAra FrZoe Suppression Detection Required Fire Fire Area Fire Zone Protection Feature Required Fire Protection System and Feature Details System System (R, D)(R, D) (R, D)R -Improvements to procedures necessary to incorporate U2 1-008 R recovery actions required to meet risk criteria (See Table 2-2)116 R R, D None R -Suppression system, detection system;D -Detection system Required Suppression/Detection/Feature:
required in the Fire Area based on NFPA 805 Chapter 4 compliance.
The information is provided on a zone basis. The basis for the requirement of the fire protection system is designated as follows:* R -Risk Criteria:
Systems required to meet the Risk Criteria for the Performance-Based Approach (NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4)* D -Defense-in-depth Criteria:
Systems required to maintain adequate balance of Defense-in-Depth for a Performance-Based Approach (NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4)Fire Protection Features in this Table only refer to those features installed in the Fire Area that have a corresponding NFPA 805, Chapter 3 requirement.
5.3 Summary of Recovery Actions Fire Area U2 1-008 Component Q2R42B0001A Table 5-3 Component Description 125V DC BUS 2A-Recovery Actions Actions Operator action to provide alternate cooling for battery charger room due to loss of Train A SW 5.4 Summary of Plant Modifications No modifications are required for this fire area.Revision 0 Page 14 of 15 Revision 0 Page 14 of 15 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-008 5.5 Fire Area Risk Summary Table 5-4 -Fire Area Risk Summary NFPA 805 VFDR RAs Fire Risk Eval Fire Area Area Description Basis Fire Area CDF/LERF (Yes/No) (Yes/No) A CDF/LERF Additional Risk of RAs U2 1-008 Aux Building Cable 4.2.4 1.98E-09/3.03E-12 Yes Yes 1.98E-09/3.03E-12 1.98E-09/3.03E-12 Chase Room 116 Revision 0 Page 15 of 15 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-009 Attachment 
-Unit 2 Fire Area 1-009 FRE for Fire Area Aux Building Cable Chase Rooms 117 & 246 Revision:
0 Name Fire PRA Preparer Fire PRA Reviewer Fire Protection Preparer Fire Protection Reviewer NSCA Preparer NSCA Reviewer FRE Preparer FRE Reviewer Jonathan Hedrick Clint Pierce Robert Kirkpatrick Rebecca Puckett Larry Valmonte Dan Funk Steve Hardy Brandon Jamar Revision 0 Page 1 of 14 Revision 0 Page 1 of 14 Version 1.0 Page 2223 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-009 1.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION INPUT ....................................................................
4 1.1 Variances from the Deterministic Requirements 
....................................
4 1.2 Fire Protection Systems and Features ..................................................
4 1.2.1 Construction 
................................................................................
4 1.2.2 Detection 
.....................................................................................
4 1.2.3 Fixed Fire Suppression 
..............................................................
4 1.2.4 Manual Suppression 
...................................................................
5 1.2.5 Ventilation (Smoke Removal) ......................................................
5 1.2.6 Other Fire Protection Features ....................................................
5 1.2.7 Fire Hazard Identification 
............................................................
5 1.2.8 Fire PRA Input ............................................................................
5 2.0 RISK EVALUATION 
.........................................................................................
6 2.1 Fire PRA Variant Case Calculation 
........................................................
6 2.2 Compliant Case Calculation 
...................................................................
8 2.2.1 VFDRs Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA ..............................
8 2.2.2 VFDRs Not Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA .......................
8 2.2.3 Compliant Case Results .............................................................
8 2.2.4 Required Modifications 
...............................................................
9 2.2.5 Required Recovery Actions .........................................................
9 2.3 Risk Evaluation Results .........................................................................
9 3.0 DID EVALUATION 
.........................................................................................
10 3.1 Defense-in-Depth Evaluation 
...............................................................
10 3.2 Defense-in-Depth Review Results ......................................................
11 3.2.1 Required Modifications 
.............................................................
12 3.2.2 Required Recovery Actions ......................................................
12 4.0 SAFETY MARGIN EVALUATION 
.................................................................
12 4.1 Safety Margin Evaluation 
.....................................................................
12 4.1.1 Fire Modeling ...........................................................................
12 4.1.2 Plant System Performance 
........................................................
12 4.2 Safety Margin Results ..........................................................................
12 5.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION RESULTS ............................................................
13 5.1 Dispositions of VFDRs ..........................................................................
13 Revision 0 Page 2 of 14 Version 1.0 Page 2224 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-009 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 Fire Risk Evaluation Summary of Fire Protection Systems and Features 14 Summary of Recovery Actions .............................................................
14 Summary of Plant Modifications 
..........................................................
14 Fire A rea R isk Sum m ary ......................................................................
14 Revision 0 Page 3 of 14 Version 1.0 Page 2225 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-009 1.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION INPUT 1.1 Variances from the Deterministic Requirements The VFDRs identified for evaluation for Unit 2, Fire Area 1-009, Aux Building Cable Chase Rooms 117 & 246 are: Table 1-1 VFDRs VFDR Component(s)
Description U2-1-009-Q2R42BO001B:ENE This component, 125V DC Bus 2B, requires HVAC support to remain HVAC-001 RGIZED:ENERGIZE functional.
Failure to provide HVAC support to this vital electrical D-BC2B, 125V DC component challenges electrical support Vital Auxiliaries Nuclear BUS 2B Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-1-009-Q2R15A0006:ENER This component, Switchgear 2G, requires HVAC support to remain HVAC-002 GIZED:ENERGIZED-functional.
Failure to provide HVAC support to this vital electrical SUT2A, 4160V component challenges electrical support Vital Auxiliaries Nuclear SWITCHGEAR BUS Safety Performance Criterion.
2F U2-1-009-Q2R17B0002:ENER This component, MCC 2B, requires HVAC support to remain HVAC-003 GIZED:ENERGIZED, functional.
Failure to provide HVAC support to this vital electrical MOTOR CONTROL component challenges electrical support Vital Auxiliaries Nuclear CENTER 2B Safety Performance Criterion.
1.2 Fire Protection Systems and Features Fire Area 1-009 consists of Fire Zones: 0 117 -Cable Chase -Elevations 83'-0", 100'-0", 121 '-0" and 139'-0" a 246 -Cable Chase -Elevations 
,121 '-0" and 139'-0" 1.2.1 Construction Barriers for this fire area are of substantial construction and have been designed and constructed to meet separation requirements.
In the event the configuration utilized is not in accordance with recognized standards, the deviations have been evaluated to be adequate for the hazard.1.2.2 Detection Fire detection systems to initiate plant suppression systems and to provide notification to the Control Room are: " Fire Zone 117 is provided with detection." Fire Zone 246 is provided with detection.
1.2.3 Fixed Fire Suppression Fixed fire suppression systems to aid in control of both fire growth and spread in the fire area are:* Fire Zone 117 is provided with suppression.
* Fire Zone 246 is provided with suppression.
Revision 0 Page 4 of 14 Version 1.0 Page 2226 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-009 1.2.4 Manual Suppression Manual suppression equipment to be utilized by plant personnel and/or fire brigade members are: Fire Area 1-009 is provided with fire hose cabinets located in rooms 185 and 319 to support manual firefighting efforts.1.2.5 Ventilation (Smoke Removal)Portable smoke ejectors are available to assist with smoke removal.1.2.6 Other Fire Protection Features No additional fire protection features are required for this fire risk evaluation.
1.2.7 Fire Hazard Identification The major source of combustibles in Fire Area 1-009 is cable insulation.
Details regarding fire scenarios quantified in the fire PRA, and their associated ignition sources (where applicable) are discussed in Section 2.1.2.8 Fire PRA Input Fire protection features There are no fire protection features specifically modeled in the Fire PRA for this fire area.Fire protection systems The Hot Gas Layer evaluation credits the detection, automatic fire suppression system and manual fire brigade response.
The Multi Compartment Analysis evaluation credits the detection and automatic fire suppression system.Hot Gas Layer Treatment Physical attributes of this fire area require the incorporation of a Hot Gas Layer scenario.
Credit for detection was taken in the Hot Gas Layer evaluation for this fire area. Credit for both automatic fire suppression system and manual fire brigade response was taken in the Hot Gas Layer evaluation for this fire area.Multi-compartment analysis Credit for detection was taken in the Multi Compartment Analysis for this fire area. Credit for automatic fire suppression system was taken in the Multi Compartment Analysis for this fire area.Scenario Review All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0, ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency.
Revision 0 Page 5 of 14 Version 1.0 Page 2227 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-009 2.0 RISK EVALUATION 2.1 Fire PRA Variant Case Calculation Tables 2-1a and 2-1b provide the results of the variant case calculation for Fire Area 1-009. This is taken directly from the Fire PRA model with no changes or alterations made. The CDF and LERF results are provided on a scenario basis.The total area CDF and LERF is below the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr and IE-08/rx-yr, respectively.
The total CDF/LERF can be used as a conservative estimate of the delta CDF/LERF with respect to a compliant configuration.
No further analysis of the delta CDF/LERF is required.Revision 0 Page 6 of 14 Revision 0 Page 6 of 14 Version 1.0 Page 2228 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-009 Table 2-1a Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train A Alignment IGF CDF LERF Zone Scen ScenDesc Ir) NSP SF CCDP (rr CLERP (/rr (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr)0117 D1 TRANSIENT-100'NE 6.19E-06 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 4.15E-12 1.61E-10 9.96E-16 CORNER 0117 D2 TRANSIENT-139 INSIDE 6.19E-06 1.0 1.0 1.44E-04 8.91E-10 4.66E-07 2.89E-12 DOOR 0246 D1 TRANSIENT 139'NW 2.17E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 1.45E-11 1.61E-10 3.49E-15 CORNER 1-009-ADJ HGL HGL SCENARIO 8.44E-07 1.0 1.0 1.44E-04 1.21E-10 4.66E-07 3.93E-13 Total CDF/LERF Fire PRA Variant Case 1.03E-09 3.28E-12 Table 2-1 b Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train B Alignment IGF CDF LERF Zone Scen ScenDesc lyr NSP SF CCDP (xy CLERP (IRx (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr)0117 D1 TRANSIENT-100 NE 6.19E-06 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 4.11E-12 1.61E-10 9.96E-16 CORNER TRANSIENT 
-139' INSIDE 0117 D2 DOOR 6.19E-06 1.0 1.0 1.44E-04 8.92E-10 4.66E-07 2.89E-12 DOOR 0246 D1 TRANSIENT 139'NW 2.17E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 1.44E-11 1.61E-10 3.49E-15 CORNER 1-009-ADJ HGL HGL SCENARIO 8.44E-07 1.0 1.0 1.44E-04 1.22E-10 4.66E-07 3.93E-13 Total CDF/LERF Fire PRA Variant Case 1.03E-09 3.28E-12 Where: Zone = Fire Zone Scen = 'A' to signify the variant case ScenDesc = Description of the Fire Scenario IGF = Ignition Frequency 
(/rx-yr)NSP = Non Suppression Probability SF = Severity Factor CCDP = Conditional Core Damage Probability CDF = Core Damage Frequency 
(/rx-yr)CLERP = Conditional Large Early Release Probability LERF = Large Early Release Frequency 
(/rx-yr)Revision 0 Page 7 of 14 Revision 0 Page 7 of 14 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-009 2.2 Compliant Case Calculation The following sub-sections provide the basis for modeling each VFDR (or category of VFDRs)and the alterations that have been made to the variant case to represent the compliant case. In each section a discussion of the VFDR (or the category of VFDRs) is provided.2.2.1 VFDRs Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA The following VFDRs are modeled in the Fire PRA and are therefore included in the total fire area CDF/LERF used as a surrogate for the delta risk evaluation for this fire area:.U2-1-009-HVAC-001 
-Q2R42B000 1 B:ENERGIZED:ENERGIZED-BC2B 2.2.2 VFDRs Not Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA A Fire PRA was developed in accordance with the requirements of Part 4 "Requirements for Fires at Power PRA" of the ASME and ANS combined PRA Standard, ASME/ANS RA-Sa-2009, "Standard for Level 1/Large Early Release Frequency Probabilistic Risk Assessment for Nuclear Power Plant Applications".
Consistent with those requirements not all components required to meet the nuclear safety criteria need to be specifically modeled in the Fire PRA. The following VFDRs are associated with components not modeled in the Fire PRA: 2,2.2.1 VFDR U2-1-009-HVAC-002 4kV Switchgear Room 2F ventilation is not modeled in the fire PRA. Room Heat up calculations show that there will be no impact to the 4kV Switchgear Room due to loss of HVAC within the mission time of 24 hrs in the fire PRA. See calculation Fire PRA Logic Model for Farley Nuclear Plants, PRA-BC-F-1 1-004..U2-1-009-HVAC-002 
-Q2R1 5A0006:ENERGIZED:ENERGIZED-SUT2A 2.2.2.2 VFDR U2-1-009-HVAC-003 MCC 2B Room ventilation is not modeled in the fire PRA. Room Heat up calculations show that there will be no impact to the MCC Room due to loss of HVAC within the mission time of 24 hrs in the fire PRA. See calculation Fire PRA Logic Model for Farley Nuclear Plants, PRA-BC-F-I 1-004.a U2-1-009-HVAC-003 
-Q2R17B0002:ENERGIZED:ENERGIZED 2.2.3 Compliant Case Results The total area CDF and LERF is below the screening acceptance criteria of I E-07/rx-yr and 1 E-08/rx-yr, respectively.
The total CDF/LERF can be used as a conservative estimate of the delta CDF/LERF with respect to a compliant configuration.
No further analysis of the delta CDF/LERF is required.Revision 0 Page 8 of 14 Version 1.0 Page 2230 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-009 2.2.4 Required Modifications There are no modifications required as a result of the risk evaluation for this fire area.2.2.5 Required Recovery Actions There are no required recovery actions as a result of the risk evaluation for this fire area.2.3 Risk Evaluation Results The ACDF/LERF is below the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr (CDF) and 1E-08/rx-yr (LERF) for acceptable risk. All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0 ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency.
The following tables present the fire zone/scenario fire risk as well as the total fire risk for this fire area. Given the relatively low risk for these zones/scenarios the delta risk is defined by the variant case risk, the compliant case risk is conservatively assumed to be 0.Table 2-2a 1 FIRE AREA ACDF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN A ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CCDP CDF CCDP CDF ACDF 0117/D1 6.69E-07 4.15E-12 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 4.15E-12 0117/D2 1.44E-04 8.91E-10 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 8.91E-10 0246/D1 6.69E-07 1.45E-11 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 1.45E-11 1-009-ADJ/HGL 1.44E-04 1.21 E-10 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 1.21E-10 Total CDF and delta CDF 1.03E-09 O.OOE+00 1.03E-09 1 _ N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and O.OOE+00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.Table 2-2b 1 FIRE AREA ACDF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN B ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CCDP CDF CCDP CDF ACDF 0117/D1 6.64E-07 4.11 E-12 O0OOE+00 O.OOE+00 4.11E-12 0117/D2 1.44E-04 8.92E-10 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 8.92E-10 0246/D1 6.64E-07 1.44E-11 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 1.44E-11 1-009-ADJ/HGL 1.44E-04 1.22E-10 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 1.22E-10 Total CDF and delta CDF 1.03E-09 0.OOE+00 1.03E-09 1 -N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and O.OOE+00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.Table 2-3a 1 FIRE AREA ALERF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN A ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CLERP LERF CLERP LERF ALERF 0117/D1 1.61E-10 9.96E-16 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 9.96E-16 0117/D2 4.66E-07 2.89E-12 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 2.89E-12 0246/D1 1.61E-10 3.49E-15 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 3.49E-15 Revision 0 Page 9 of 14 Version 1.0 Page 2231 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-009 Table 2-3a 1 FIRE AREA ALERF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN A ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CLERP LERF CLERP LERF ALERF 1-009-ADJ/HGL 4.66E-07 3.93E-1 3 0.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 3.93E-13 Total LERF and delta LERF 3.28E-12 O.OOE+00 3.28E-12 1 _ N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and O.OOE+00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.Table 2-3b 1 FIRE AREA ALERF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN B ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CLERP LERF CLERP LERF ALERF 0117/D1 1.61E-10 9.96E-16 0.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 9.96E-16 0117/D2 4.66E-07 2.89E-12 O.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 2.89E-12 0246/D1 1.61E-10 3.49E-15 0.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 3.49E-15 1-009-ADJ/HGL 4.66E-07 3.93E-1 3 0.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 3.93E-13 Total LERF and delta LERF 3.28E-12 0.OOE+00 3.28E-12 1 _ N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and O.OOE+00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.3.0 DID EVALUATION 3.1 Defense-in-Depth Evaluation A review of the impact of the change on defense-in-depth (DID) was performed.
NFPA 805 defines DID as: E Preventing fires from starting" Rapidly detecting fires and controlling and extinguishing promptly those fires that do occur, thereby limiting damage" Providing adequate level of fire protection for structures, systems and components important to safety; so that a fire that is not promptly extinguished will not prevent essential plant safety functions from being performed.
In general, the DID requirement was considered satisfied if the proposed change does not result in a substantial imbalance among these elements (or echelons).
The review of DID was qualitative and addressed each of the elements with respect to tile proposed change. Fire protection features and systems relied upon to ensure DID were identified in the assessment (e.g., detection, suppression system).The VFDRs and the associated Fire Area risk (CDF) and scenario consequences (CCDP values)were evaluated to identify general DID echelon imbalances.
Potential methods to balance the DID features were identified ensuring an adequate balance of DID features is maintained for the Fire Area. See Section 3.2 for the results of the evaluation.
Revision 0 Page 10 of 14 Version 1.0 Page 2232 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-009 3.2 Defense-in-Depth Review Results A review of defense in depth and risk evaluation results show that, given the systems and features specified in Table 3-1 and Section 2 respectively, risk acceptance criteria are met and that the balance of defense in depth is maintained.
The risk acceptance criteria are met with substantial margin to account for analytical methods associated with fire scenarios.
The analyzed scenarios bound potential fuel packages which can reasonably be expected to occur in this area.The installed detection system is required for DID to ensure prompt brigade response.
In the event of no intervention by the plant fire brigade, it is not expected that a credible fire would develop which would not be bounded by the analyzed scenarios.
Based on the systems/features specified above, no additional DID systems/features are warranted and the ability to meet nuclear performance criteria is ensured.The table below summarizes how an adequate balance of DID is maintained.
Table 3-1 Defense-in-Depth Impact Review Method of Providing DID Discussion Echelon 1: Prevent fires from starting Combustible Control No change necessary to procedure(s) 
/guidance document(s).
1 Hot Work Control No change necessary to procedure(s) 
/guidance document(s).'
Echelon 2: Rapidly detect, control and extinguish promptly those fires that do occur thereby limiting fire damage Detection System Detection system is installed and required.Automatic Fire Suppression Automatic suppression system is installed, but not required.Portable Fire Extinguishers No portable extinguishers available and not required.Hose stations and hydrants Fire hose cabinets are available, but no enhancements required.
1 located in the area(s)Pre-Fire Plan No change necessary to procedure(s) 
/guidance document(s).
1 Echelon 3: Provide adequate level of fire protection for systems and structures so that a fire will not prevent essential safety functions from being performed Walls, floors ceilings and structural No changes necessary to existing barriers.
1 elements are rated or have been evaluated as adequate for the hazard.Openings in the fire barrier are rated No changes necessary to existing barrier openings.or have been evaluated as adequate for the hazard.Supplemental barriers (e.g., ERFBS, No supplemental barriers installed and not required.cable tray covers, etc.)Guidance provided to operations No VFDR related DID recovery actions required.personnel detailing the credited success path(s) including recovery actions to achieve nuclear safety performance criteria.1 This fire protection feature is relied upon without further DID enhancements beyond inherent programmatic requirements of NFPA 805, Chap. 3 and will not be reported in Table 5-2.Revision 0 Page 11 of 14 Version 1.0 Page 2233 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-009 3.2.1 Required Modifications There are no modifications required as a result of the DID evaluation for this fire area.3.2.2 Required Recovery Actions There are no required recovery actions as a result of the DID evaluation for this fire area.4.0 SAFETY MARGIN EVALUATION 4.1 Safety Margin Evaluation In accordance with NEI 04-02, 5.3.5.3 guidance, the maintenance of adequate Safety Margin is assessed by the consideration of categories of analyses utilized by this fire risk evaluation (FRE).Safety margins are considered to be maintained if: " Codes and standards or their alternatives accepted for use by the NRC are met, and" Safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) are met, or provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty.
The maintenance of adequate safety margin for the change analysis is described for each of the specific analysis types used in support of the fire risk assessment.
4.1.1 Fire Modeling Fire modeling performed in support of the transition has been performed within the Fire PRA utilizing codes and standards developed by industry and NRC staff to provide realistic yet conservative results. Specifically, the heat release rates utilized in the transition analysis are based upon NUREG/CR 6850, Task 8, Scoping Fire Modeling.
These heat release rates are conservative and represent values used to screen out fixed ignition sources that do not pose a threat to the targets within specific fire compartments and to assign severity factors to unscreened fixed ignition sources.The combined analysis approach is used during transition; therefore, maximum expected fire scenario/limiting fire scenario have not been analyzed separately.
The bases for the application of these fire modeling codes and standards were not altered in support of this FRE.4.1.2 Plant System Performance Plant system performance parameters were not modified as a result of this FRE. These performance parameters were originally established to support nuclear performance criteria contained in the plant specific accident analyses.
These analyses established component and system performance criteria necessary to establish safe and stable plant operation, as well as, safe shut down of the unit in the event of a fire. These performance parameters were not modified as a result of this FRE.4.2 Safety Margin Results All analyses and assessment have been performed utilizing accepted techniques and industry accepted standards.
In addition, safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) have been considered and provides sufficient margin to account for Revision 0 Page 12 of 14 Version 1.0 Page 2234 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-009 analysis and data uncertainty.
As such, the Safety Margins are maintained as discussed in Section 4.1.5.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION RESULTS 5.1 Dispositions of VFDRs Based on the FRE results contained in Sections 2, 3 and 4 the VFDRs identified in Section 1. 1 have been resolved as follows: Table 5-1 Final Variance Disposition VFDR ID Disposition U2-1-009-HVAC-001 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action U2-1-009-HVAC-002 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)U2-1-009-HVAC-003 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)Revision 0 Page 13 of 14 Version 1.0 Page 2235 of 3726 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-009 5.2 Fire Risk Evaluation Summary of Fire Protection Systems and Features Table 5-2 Summary of Required Fire Protection Systems and Features Required Required Required Fire Fire Area Fire Zone Suppression Detection Protection Feature Required Fire Protection System and Feature Details System System (R, D)(R, D) (R, D)U2 1-009 R -Suppression system, Detection system;D -Detection system R -Suppression system, Detection system;D -Detection system Required Suppression/Detection/Feature:
required in the Fire Area based on NFPA 805 Chapter 4 compliance.
The information is provided on a zone basis. The basis for the requirement of the fire protection system is designated as follows:* R -Risk Criteria:
Systems required to meet the Risk Criteria for the Performance-Based Approach (NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4)* D -Defense-in-depth Criteria:
Systems required to maintain adequate balance of Defense-in-Depth for a Performance-Based Approach (NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4)Fire Protection Features in this Table only refer to those features installed in the Fire Area that have a corresponding NFPA 805, Chapter 3 requirement.
5.3 Summary of Recovery Actions No recovery actions are required for this fire area.5.4 Summary of Plant Modifications No modifications are required for this fire area.5.5 Fire Area Risk Summary Table 5-3 -Fire Area Risk Summary Fire Area Area Description NFPA 805 Fire Area CDF/LERF VFDR RAs Fire Risk Eval Additional Risk of RAs Basis (Yes/No) (Yes/No) A CDF/LERF U2 1-009 Aux Building Cable 4.2.4 1.03E-09/3.28E-12 Yes No 1.03E-09/3.28E-12 N/A Chase Rooms 117 & 246 Revision 0 Page 14 of 14 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-013 Attachment 
-Unit 2 Fire Area 1-013 FRE for Fire Area Aux Building Cable Chase Rooms 227, 300, 465, 466, & 500 Revision:
0 Name Fire PRA Preparer Fire PRA Reviewer Fire Protection Preparer Fire Protection Reviewer NSCA Preparer NSCA Reviewer FRE Preparer FRE Reviewer Jonathan Hedrick Clint Pierce Robert Kirkpatrick Rebecca Puckett Larry Valmonte Dan Funk Steve Hardy Brandon Jamar Revision 0 Page 1 of 16 Revision 0 Page 1 of 16 Version 1.0 Page 2237 of 3726 SE-C051 326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-013 1.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION INPUT ....................................................................
4 1.1 Variances from the Deterministic Requirements 
....................................
4 1.2 Fire Protection Systems and Features ..................................................
4 1.2.1 Construction 
................................................................................
4 1.2 .2 D e te ctio n ................................................................................... 
..4 1.2.3 Fixed Fire Suppression 
..............................................................
4 1.2.4 Manual Suppression 
...................................................................
5 1.2.5 Ventilation (Smoke Removal) ......................................................
5 1.2.6 Other Fire Protection Features ....................................................
5 1.2.7 Fire Hazard Identification 
............................................................
5 1.2.8 Fire PRA Input ............................................................................
5 2.0 RISK EVALUATION 
.........................................................................................
6 2.1 Fire PRA Variant Case Calculation 
........................................................
6 2.2 Compliant Case Calculation 
...................................................................
9 2.2.1 VFDRs Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA ..............................
9 2.2.2 VFDRs Not Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA .......................
9 2.2.3 Compliant Case Results .............................................................
9 2.2.4 Required Modifications 
...............................................................
9 2.2.5 Required Recovery Actions .........................................................
9 2.3 Risk Evaluation Results ..........................................................................
9 3.0 DID EVALUATION 
..........................................................................................
11 3.1 Defense-in-Depth Evaluation 
...............................................................
11 3.2 Defense-in-Depth Review Results ......................................................
11 3.2.1 Required Modifications 
.............................................................
12 3.2.2 Required Recovery Actions ......................................................
13 4.0 SAFETY MARGIN EVALUATION 
..................................................................
13 4.1 Safety Margin Evaluation 
....................................................................
13 4.1.1 Fire Modeling ............................................................................
13 4.1.2 Plant System Performance 
........................................................
13 4.2 Safety Margin Results ..........................................................................
13 5.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION RESULTS ............................................................
14 5.1 Dispositions of VFDRs ..........................................................................
14 Revision 0 Page 2 of 16 Version 1.0 Page 2238 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-013 SE-C051 326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-013 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 Fire Risk Evaluation Summary of Fire Protection Systems and Features 15 Summary of Recovery Actions .............................................................
15 Summary of Plant Modifications 
..........................................................
15 Fire A rea R isk Sum m ary ......................................................................
16 Revision 0 Page 3 of 16 Version 1.0 Page 2239 of 3726 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-013 1.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION INPUT 1.1 Variances from the Deterministic Requirements The VFDRs identified for evaluation for Unit 2, Fire Area 1-013, Aux Building Cable Chase Rooms 227, 300, 465, 466, & 500 are: Table 1-1 VFDRs VFDR Component(s)
Description U2-1-013-SEP-N2B31L0001E:ON:O The Heater is normally in standby, required off to prevent RCS 005 FF, PRESSURIZER pressure transients.
Fire induced damage to power supplies can HEATER GROUP 2E prevent ability to trip heater, and a challenge to the RCS Inventory and DISTRIBUTION Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.PANEL -N2B31L0001E 
-Pressurizer Heater Group 2E Distribution Panel.1.2 Fire Protection Systems and Features Fire Area 1-013 consists of Fire Zones 227, 300, 465, 466, and 500. This fire area is located in the Auxiliary Building Cable Chase Rooms 227, 300, 465, 466, and 500 at elevations 128'-0", 141'-0", 155'-0", 168'-6".1.2.1 Construction Barriers for this fire area are of substantial construction and have been designed and constructed to meet separation requirements.
In the event the configuration utilized is not in accordance with recognized standards, the deviations have been evaluated to be adequate for the hazard.1.2.2 Detection Fire detection systems to initiate plant suppression systems and provide notification to the Control Room are: " Fire Zone 227 is provided with detection." Fire Zone 300 is provided with detection." Fire Zone 465 is provided with detection.
* Fire Zone 466 is provided with detection.
* Fire Zone 500 is provided with detection.
1.2.3 Fixed Fire Suppression Fixed fire suppression systems to aid in control of both fire growth and spread in the fire area are: " Fire Zone 227 is provided with suppression." Fire Zone 300 is provided with suppression.
Revision 0 Page 4 of 16 Version 1.0 Page 2240 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-013 SC Fire Zone 465 is provided with suppression.
* Fire Zone 466 is provided with suppression.
* Fire Zone 500 is provided with suppression.
1.2.4 Manual Suppression Manual suppression equipment to be utilized by plant persomnel and/or fire brigade members are: " Fire Area 1-0 13 is provided with two fire hose cabinets and two portable CO2 extinguishers located outside of Room 300 in Room 319 (Fire Area 1-004)." A CO 2 hose reel and a fire hose cabinet are located outside of Rooms 465 and 466 (Fire Area 1-047).1.2.5 Ventilation (Smoke Removal)Portable smoke ejectors are available to assist with smoke removal.1.2.6 Other Fire Protection Features Fire rated cable configurations are installed in the area.1.2.7 Fire Hazard Identification The major sources of combustibles in Fire Area 1-0 13 are cable insulation and rubber. Details regarding fire scenarios quantified in the fire PRA, and their associated ignition sources (where applicable) are discussed in Section 2.1.2.8 Fire PRA Input Fire protection features Fire rated cables that have been credited in this area (Fire Zones 227 and 300 only).Fire protection systems The Hot Gas Layer evaluation credits the detection and automatic fire suppression system. The Multi Compartment Analysis evaluation credits the detection and automatic fire suppression system.Hot Gas Layer Treatment This fire area screened for potential Hot Gas Layer effects on the Zone Of Influence.
Credit for detection was taken in the Hot Gas Layer evaluation for this fire area. Credit for automatic fire suppression system was taken in the Hot Gas Layer evaluation for this fire area.Multi-compartment analysis Credit for detection was taken in the Multi Compartment Analysis for this fire area. Credit for automatic fire suppression system was taken in the Multi Compartment Analysis for this fire area.Revision 0 Page 5 of 16 Version 1.0 Page 2241 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-013 Scenario Review All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0, ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency.
2.0 RISK EVALUATION 2.1 Fire PRA Variant Case Calculation Tables 2-1a and 2-1b provide the results of the variant case calculation for Fire Area 1-013. This is taken directly from the Fire PRA model with no changes or alterations made. The CDF and LERF results are provided on a scenario basis.The total area CDF and LERF is below the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr and lE-08/rx-yr, respectively.
The total CDF/LERF can be used as a conservative estimate of the delta CDF/LERF with respect to a compliant configuration.
No further analysis of the delta CDF/LERF is required.Revision 0 Page 6 of 16 Version 1.0 Page 2242 of 3726 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-013 Table 2-1a Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train A Alignment Zone Scen ScenDescl IGF NSP SF CCDP CDF CLERP LERF (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr)0227 D1 TRANSIENT 2.47E-06 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 1.65E-12 1.61E-10 3.97E-16 0300 D1 TRANSIENT 
-RIGHT OF 1.44E-06 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 9.65E-13 1.61E-10 2.32E-16 ENTRY DOOR 0300 D2 TRANSIENT-DIRECTLY 1.44E-06 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 9.65E-13 1.61 E-10 2.32E-16 INSIDE OF ENTRY DOOR 0300 D3 TRANSIENT-LEFTOF 2.58E-06 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 1.72E-12 1.61E-10 4.14E-16 ENTRY DOOR 0465 A BASE CASE 2.20E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 1.48E-11 1.61 E-10 3.54E-15 0466 D2 TRANSIENT 7.92E-06 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 5.30E-12 1.61E-10 1.27E-15 0466 D3 TRANSIENT-19' FROM N 7.92E-06 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 5.30E-12 1.61E-10 1.27E-15 END, 2' FROM E WALL 0466 D4 TRANSIENT-WEST OF 7.92E-06 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 5.30E-12 1.61E-10 1.27E-15 LADDER 0500 D2 TRANSIENT-4SOUTH OF 7.92E-06 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 5.30E-12 1.61E-10 1.27E-15 LADDER Total CDF/LERF Fire PRA Variant Case 4.13E-11 9.92E-15 Revision 0 Page 7 of 16 SE-CO51326701 
-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 11 -013 Table 2-1b Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train B Alignment Zone Sce1 ScenDescl IGF NSP SF CCDP CDF CLERP LERF (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr)0227 D1 TRANSIENT 2.47E-06 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 1.64E-12 1.61E-10 3.97E-16 0300 D1 TRANSIENT-RIGHTOF 1.44E-06 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 9.58E-13 1.61E-10 2.32E-16 ENTRY DOOR 0300 D2 TRANSIENT 
-DIRECTLY 1.44E-06 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 9.58E-13 1.61E-10 2.32E-16 INSIDE OF ENTRY DOOR 0300 D3 TRANSIENT 
-LEFT OF 2.58E-06 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 1.71E-12 1.61E-10 4.14E-16 ENTRY DOOR 0465 A BASE CASE 2.20E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 1.46E-11 1.61E-10 3.54E-15 0466 D2 TRANSIENT 7.92E-06 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 5.26E-12 1.61E-10 1.27E-15 0466 D3 TRANSIENT-7.'FROM N 7.92E-06 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 5.26E-12 1.61E-10 1.27E-15 END, 2' FROM E WALL 0466 D4 TRANSIENT-WEST OF 7.92E-06 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 5.26E-12 1.61E-10 1.27E-15 LADDER 0500 D2 TRANSIENT-4 SOUTH OF 7.92E-06 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 5.26E-12 1.61 E-10 1.27E-15 LADDER Total CDF/LERF Fire PRA Variant Case 4.1OE-11 9.92E-15 Where: Zone = Fire Zone Scen = 'A' to signify the variant case ScenDesc = Description of the Fire Scenario IGF = Ignition Frequency 
(/rx-yr)NSP = Non Suppression Probability SF = Severity Factor CCDP = Conditional Core Damage Probability CDF = Core Damage Frequency 
(/rx-yr)CLERP = Conditional Large Early Release Probability LERF = Large Early Release Frequency 
(/rx-yr)-'Base Case' scenarios are complete room burnout and therefore do not identify specific ignition sources Revision 0 Page 8 of 16 Revision 0 Page 8 of 16 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-013 2.2 Compliant Case Calculation The following sub-sections provide the basis for modeling each VFDR (or category of VFDRs)and the alterations that have been made to the variant case to represent the compliant case. In each section a discussion of the VFDR (or the category of VFDRs) is provided.2.2.1 VFDRs Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA The following VFDR is modeled in the Fire PRA and are therefore included in the total fire area CDF/LERF used as a surrogate for the delta risk evaluation for this fire area: 0 U2-1-013-SEP-005 
-N2B31LOOOIE:ON:OFF 2.2.2 VFDRs Not Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA All VFDRs and their associated components are modeled in the Fire PRA.2.2.3 Compliant Case Results The total area CDF and LERF is below the screening acceptance criteria of IE-07/rx-yr and 1E-08/rx-yr, respectively.
The total CDF/LERF can be used as a conservative estimate of the delta CDF/LERF with respect to a compliant configuration.
No further analysis of the delta CDF/LERF is required.2.2.4 Required Modifications There are no modifications required as a result of the risk evaluation for this fire area.2.2.5 Required Recovery Actions There are no required recovery actions as a result of the risk evaluation for this fire area.2.3 Risk Evaluation Results The ACDF/LERF is below the screening acceptance criteria of I E-07/rx-yr (CDF) and 1 E-08/rx-yr (LERF) for acceptable risk. All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0 ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency.
The following tables present the fire zone/scenario fire risk as well as the total fire risk for this fire area. Given the relatively low risk for these zones/scenarios the delta risk is defined by the variant case risk, the compliant case risk is conservatively assumed to be 0.Revision 0 Page 9 of 16 Version 1.0 Page 2245 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-013 Table 2-2a 1 FIRE AREA ACDF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN A ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CCDP CDF CCDP CDF ACDF 0227/D1 6.69E-07 1.65E-12 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 1.65E-12 0300/D1 6.69E-07 9.65E-1 3 0.00E+00 0,OOE+00 9.65E-1 3 0300/D2 6.69E-07 9.65E-13 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 9.65E-13 0300/D3 6.69E-07 1.72E-12 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 1.72E-12 0465/A 6.69E-07 1.48E-11 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 1.48E-11 0466/D2 6.69E-07 5.30E-12 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 5.30E-12 0466/D3 6.69E-07 5.30E-12 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 5.30E-12 0466/D4 6.69E-07 5.30E-12 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 5.30E-12 0500/D2 6.69E-07 5.30E-12 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 5.30E-12 Total CDF and delta CDF 4.13E-11 0.OOE+00 4.13E-11 T N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.Table 2-2b 1 FIRE AREA ACDF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN B ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CCDP CDF CCDP CDF aCDF 0227/D1 6.64E-07 1.64E-12 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 1.64E-12 0300/D1 6.64E-07 9.58E-13 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 9.58E-13 0300/D2 6.64E-07 9.58E-13 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 9.58E-13 0300/D3 6.64E-07 1.71E-12 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 1.71E-12 0465/A 6.64E-07 1.46E-11 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 1.46E-11 0466/D2 6.64E-07 5.26E-12 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 5.26E-1 2 0466/D3 6.64E-07 5.26E-12 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 5.26E-12 0466/D4 6.64E-07 5.26E-12 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 5.26E-12 0500/D2 6.64E-07 5.26E-12 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 5.26E-12 Total CDF and delta CDF 4.10E-11 0.OOE+00 4.1OE-11 1- N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.Table 2-3a'FIRE AREA aLERF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN A ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CLERP LERF CLERP LERF ALERF 0227/D1 1.61E-10 3.97E-16 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 3.97E-16 0300/D1 1.61E-10 2.32E-16 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 2.32E-16 0300/D2 1.61 E-10 2.32E-16 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 2.32E-16 0300/D3 1.61E-10 4.14E-16 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 4.14E-16 0465/A 1.61E-10 3.54E-15 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 3.54E-15 0466/D2 1.61E-10 1.27E-15 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 1.27E-15 0466/D3 1.61E-10 1.27E-15 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 1.27E-15 0466/D4 1.61E-10 1.27E-15 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 1.27E-15 0500/D2 1.61E-10 1.27E-15 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 1.27E-15 Total LERF and delta LERF 9.92E-15 0.OOE+00 9.92E-15&#xf7; N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.Revision 0 Page 10 of 16 Version 1.0 Page 2246 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-013 Table 2-3b 1 FIRE AREA IILERF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN B ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CLERP LERF CLERP LERF ALERF 0227/Dl 1.61 E-10 3.97E-16 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 3.97E-16 0300/D1 1.61 E-10 2.32E-16 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 2.32E-16 0300/D2 1.61E-10 2.32E-16 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 2.32E-16 0300/D3 1.61E-10 4.14E-16 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 4.14E-16 0465/A 1.61 E-10 3.54E-15 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 3.54E-15 0466/D2 1.61E-10 1.27E-15 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 1.27E-15 0466/D3 1.61E-10 1.27E-15 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 1.27E-15 0466/D4 1.61 E-10 1.27E-15 0.00E+00 O.00E+00 1.27E-15 0500/D2 1.61E-10 1.27E-15 0.00E+00 O.00E+00 1.27E-15 Total LERF and delta LERF 9.92E-15 0.OOE+00 9.92E-15 1 _ N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.3.0 DID EVALUATION 3.1 Defense-in-Depth Evaluation A review of the impact of the change on defense-in-depth (DID) was performed.
NFPA 805 defines DID as:* Preventing fires from starting* Rapidly detecting fires and controlling and extinguishing promptly those fires that do occur, thereby limiting damage Providing adequate level of fire protection for structures, systems and components important to safety; so that a fire that is not promptly extinguished will not prevent essential plant safety functions from being performed.
In general, the DID requirement was considered satisfied if the proposed change does not result in a substantial imbalance among these elements (or echelons).
The review of DID was qualitative and addressed each of the elements with respect to the proposed change. Fire protection features and systems relied upon to ensure DID were identified in the assessment (e.g., detection, suppression system).The VFDRs and the associated Fire Area risk (CDF) and scenario consequences (CCDP values)were evaluated to identify general DID echelon imbalances.
Potential methods to balance the DID features were identified ensuring an adequate balance of DID features is maintained for the Fire Area. See Section 3.2 for the results of the evaluation.
3.2 Defense-in-Depth Review Results A review of defense in depth and risk evaluation results show that, given the systems and features specified in Table 3-1 and Section 2 respectively, risk acceptance criteria are met and that the balance of defense in depth is maintained.
The risk acceptance criteria are met with substantial margin to account for analytical methods associated with fire scenarios.
The analyzed scenarios bound potential fuel packages which can reasonably be expected to occur in this area.Revision 0 Page 11 of 16 Version 1.0 Page 2247 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-013 The transient scenarios analyzed present the largest risk contribution in the fire area; however, application of additional DID requirements are not required.
There are no credible fire scenarios that affect core damage to the extent that additional systems or features, beyond those required by risk, would provide tangible margin.In the event of no intervention by the plant fire brigade, it is not expected that a credible fire would develop which would not be bounded by the analyzed scenarios.
Based on the systems/features specified above, no additional DID systems/features are warranted and the ability to meet nuclear performance criteria is ensured.The table below summarizes how an adequate balance of DID is maintained.
Table 3-1 Defense-in-Depth Impact Review Method of Providing DID Discussion Echelon 1: Prevent fires from starting Combustible Control No change necessary to procedure(s) 
/guidance document(s).
Hot Work Control No change necessary to procedure(s) 
/guidance document(s).
Echelon 2: Rapidly detect, control and extinguish promptly those fires that do occur thereby limiting fire damage Detection System Detection system is installed in all zones, but not required.Automatic Fire Suppression Automatic suppression system is installed in all zones, but not required.Portable Fire Extinguishers Portable extinguishers are available, but no enhancements required.1 Hose stations and hydrants Fire hose cabinets are available, but no enhancements required.
1 located in the area(s)Pre-Fire Plan No change necessary to procedure(s) 
/guidance document(s).
Echelon 3: Provide adequate level of fire protection for systems and structures so that a fire will not prevent essential safety functions from being performed Walls, floors ceilings and structural No changes necessary to existing barriers.
1 elements are rated or have been evaluated as adequate for the hazard.Openings in the fire barrier are rated No changes necessary to existing barrier openings.or have been evaluated as adequate for the hazard.Supplemental barriers (e.g., ERFBS, Fire rated cable is installed, but no enhancements required.cable tray covers, etc.)Guidance provided to operations No VFDR related DID recovery actions required.personnel detailing the credited success path(s) including recovery actions to achieve nuclear safety performance criteria.1 This fire protection feature is relied upon without further DID enhancements beyond inherent programmatic requirements of NFPA 805, Chap. 3 and will not be reported in Table 5-2.3.2.1 Required Modifications There are no modifications required as a result of the DID evaluation for this fire area.Revision 0 Page 12 of 16 Version 1.0 Page 2248 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-013 3.2.2 Required Recovery Actions There are no required recovery actions as a result of the DID evaluation for this fire area.4.0 SAFETY MARGIN EVALUATION 4.1 Safety Margin Evaluation In accordance with NEI 04-02, 5.3.5.3 guidance, the maintenance of adequate Safety Margin is assessed by the consideration of categories of analyses utilized by this fire risk evaluation (FRE).Safety margins are considered to be maintained if: " Codes and standards or their alternatives accepted for use by the NRC are met, and" Safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) are met, or provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty.
The maintenance of adequate safety margin for the change analysis is described for each of the specific analysis types used in support of the fire risk assessment.
4.1.1 Fire Modeling Fire modeling performed in support of the transition has been performed within the Fire PRA utilizing codes and standards developed by industry and NRC staff to provide realistic yet conservative results. Specifically, the heat release rates utilized in the transition analysis are based upon NUREG/CR 6850, Task 8, Scoping Fire Modeling.
These heat release rates are conservative and represent values used to screen out fixed ignition sources that do not pose a threat to the targets within specific fire compartments and to assign severity factors to unscreened fixed ignition sources.The combined analysis approach is used during transition; therefore, maximum expected fire scenario/limiting fire scenario have not been analyzed separately.
The bases for the application of these fire modeling codes and standards were not altered in support of this FRE.4.1.2 Plant System Performance Plant system performance parameters were not modified as a result of this FRE. These performance parameters were originally established to support nuclear performance criteria contained in the plant specific accident analyses.
These analyses established component and system performance criteria necessary to establish safe and stable plant operation, as well as, safe shut down of the unit in the event of a fire. These performance parameters were not modified as a result of this FRE.4.2 Safety Margin Results All analyses and assessment have been performed utilizing accepted techniques and industry accepted standards.
In addition, safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) have been considered and provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty.
As such, the Safety Margins are maintained as discussed in Section 4.1.Revision 0 Page 13 of 16 Version 1.0 Page 2249 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-013 5.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION RESULTS 5.1 Dispositions of VFDRs Based on the FRE results contained in Sections 2, 3 and 4 the VFDRs identified in Section 1. 1 have been resolved as follows: VFDR ID U2-1-013-SEP-005 Table 5-1 Final Variance Disposition Disposition Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Revision 0 Page 14 of 16 Version 1.0 Page 2250 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-013 5.2 Fire Risk Evaluation Summary of Fire Protection Systems and Features Table 5-2 Summary of Required Fire Protection Systems and Features Required Required Required Fire FrAra FrZoe Suppression DetectionReurdFe Fire Area Fire Zone Protection Feature Required Fire Protection System and Feature Details System System (R, D)(R, D) (R, D)U2 1-013 227 R R R R -Suppression system, Detection system: Fire Rated Cable 300 R R R R -Suppression system, Detection system: Fire Rated Cable 465 R R None R -Suppression system, Detection system 466 R R None R -Suppression system, Detection system 500 R R None R -Suppression system, Detection system Required Suppression/Detection/Feature:
required in the Fire Area based on NFPA 805 Chapter 4 compliance.
The information is provided on a zone basis. The basis for the requirement of the fire protection system is designated as follows: R -Risk Criteria:
Systems required to meet the Risk Criteria for the Performance-Based Approach (NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4)D -Defense-in-depth Criteria:
Systems required to maintain adequate balance of Defense-in-Depth for a Performance-Based Approach (NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4)Fire Protection Features in this Table only refer to those features installed in the Fire Area that have a corresponding NFPA 805, Chapter 3 requirement.
5.3 Summary of Recovery Actions No recovery actions are required for this fire area.5.4 Summary of Plant Modifications No modifications are required for this fire area.Revision 0 Page 15 of 16 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-013 5.5 Fire Area Risk Summary Table 5-3 -Fire Area Risk Summary Fire Area Area Description NFPA 805 Fire Area CDFILERF VFDR RAs Fire Risk Eval Basis (Yes/No) (Yes/No) A CDF/LERF Additional Risk of RAs Auxiliary Building Cable U2 1-013 Chase Rooms 227, 300, 4.2.4 4.11E-11/9.92E-15 Yes No 4.11E-11/9.92E-15 N/A 465, 466, & 500 Revision 0 Page 16 of 16 Revision 0 Page 16 of 16 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-021 Attachment 
-Unit 2 Fire Area 1-021 FRE for Fire Area Aux Building Switchgear Rooms Revision:
0 Name Fire PRA Preparer Fire PRA Reviewer Fire Protection Preparer Fire Protection Reviewer NSCA Preparer NSCA Reviewer FRE Preparer FRE Reviewer Jonathan Hedrick Clint Pierce Rebecca Puckett Robert Kirkpatrick Larry Valmonte Dan Funk Steve Hardy Brandon Jamar Revision 0 Page 1 of 24 Version 1.0 Page 2253 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-021 1.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION INPUT ....................................................................
4 1.1 Variances from the Deterministic Requirements 
....................................
4 1.2 Fire Protection Systems and Features ..................................................
4 1.2.1 Construction 
................................................................................
4 1.2 .2 D e te ctio n ................................................................................... 
..4 1.2.3 Fixed Fire Suppression 
..............................................................
4 1.2.4 Manual Suppression 
...................................................................
5 1.2.5 Ventilation (Smoke Removal) ......................................................
5 1.2.6 Other Fire Protection Features ....................................................
5 1.2.7 Fire Hazard Identification 
............................................................
5 1.2.8 Fire PRA Input ............................................................................
5 2.0 RISK EVALUATION 
.........................................................................................
6 2.1 Fire PRA Variant Case Calculation 
........................................................
6 2.2 Compliant Case Calculation 
.................................................................
13 2.2.1 VFDRs Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA ............................
13 2.2.2 VFDRs Not Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA .....................
13 2.2.3 Compliant Case Results ...........................................................
13 2.2.4 Required Modifications 
.............................................................
13 2.2.5 Required Recovery Actions ......................................................
14 2.3 Risk Evaluation Results .......................................................................
14 3.0 DID EVALUATION 
..........................................................................................
19 3.1 Defense-in-Depth Evaluation 
...............................................................
19 3.2 Defense-in-Depth Review Results ......................................................
20 3.2.1 Required Modifications 
.............................................................
21 3.2.2 Required Recovery Actions ......................................................
21 4.0 SAFETY MARGIN EVALUATION 
..................................................................
21 4.1 Safety Margin Evaluation 
.....................................................................
21 4.1.1 Fire Modeling ...........................................................................
21 4.1.2 Plant System Performance 
......................................................
21 4.2 Safety Margin Results ..........................................................................
22 5.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION RESULTS ............................................................
22 5.1 Dispositions of VFDRs ..........................................................................
22 Revision 0 Page 2 of 24 Version 1.0 Page 2254 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-021 SE-C 051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-021 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 Fire Risk Evaluation Summary of Fire Protection Systems and Features 23 Summary of Recovery Actions .............................................................
23 Summary of Plant Modifications 
..........................................................
24 Fire Area Risk Summary ......................................................................
24 Revision 0 Page 3 of 24 Version 1.0 Page 2255 of 3726 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-021 1.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION INPUT 1.1 Variances from the Deterministic Requirements The VFDRs identified for evaluation for Unit 2, Fire Area 1-02 1, Aux Building Switchgear Rooms are: Table 1-1 VFDRs VFDR Component(s)
Description U2-1-021-Q2R42BO001B:ENE This component, 125V DC Bus 2B, requires HVAC support to remain HVAC-001 RGIZED:ENERGIZE functional.
Failure to provide HVAC support to this electrical D-BC2B, 125V DC component challenges HVAC support Vital Auxiliaries Nuclear Safety BUS 2B Performance Criteria.U2-1-021-Q2R15A0007:ENER This component, Switchgear 2G, requires HVAC support to remain HVAC-002 GIZED:ENERGIZED-functional.
Failure to provide HVAC support to this electrical SUT2A, 4160V component challenges HVAC support Vital Auxiliaries Nuclear Safety SWITCHGEAR BUS Performance Criteria.2G U2-1-021-Q2R42E0002B:AVAI This component, Battery 2B, requires HVAC support to remain HVAC-003 LABLE:AVAILABLE, functional.
Failure to provide HVAC support to this electrical 125V BATTERY 2B component challenges HVAC support Vital Auxiliaries Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.1.2 Fire Protection Systems and Features Unit 2 Fire Area 1-021 consists of Fire Zones: M 229 -Switchgear Room -Elevation 121 '-0" 0 233 -Switchgear Room -Elevation 121'-0" 1.2.1 Construction Barriers for this fire area are of substantial construction and have been designed and constructed to meet separation requirements.
In the event the configuration utilized is not in accordance with recognized standards, the deviations have been evaluated to be adequate for the hazard.1.2.2 Detection Fire detection systems to provide notification to the Control Room are: " Fire Zones 229 and 233 are provided with detection." Heat detectors are provided inside the 4.16-kV switchgear, the 5-kV disconnect switch, and the four 600-V load centers. These heat detectors initiate the total-flooding CO-systems located within each piece of equipment.
1.2.3 Fixed Fire Suppression Fixed fire suppression systems to aid in control of both fire growth and spread in the fire area are:* Total flooding CO 2 systems are installed inside the 4.16kV switchgear, the 5kV disconnect switch, and the four 600-V load centers.Revision 0 Page 4 of 24 Version 1.0 Page 2256 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-021 1.2.4 Manual Suppression Manual suppression equipment to be utilized by plant personnel and/or fire brigade members are:* A CO 2 hose reel is located in room 210 (Fire Area 1-020).* A fire hose cabinet is available in room 234 (Fire Area 1-020).* A dry chemical portable extinguisher is available in room 234 (Fire Area 1-020).1.2.5 Ventilation (Smoke Removal)Portable smoke ejectors are available to assist with smoke removal.1.2.6 Other Fire Protection Features No additional fire protection features are required for this fire risk evaluation.
1.2.7 Fire Hazard Identification The major sources of combustibles in Fire Area 1-021 are cable insulation, panels, and silicone transformer fluid. Details regarding fire scenarios quantified in the fire PRA, and their associated ignition sources (where applicable) are discussed in Section 2.1.2.8 Fire PRA Input Fire protection features There are no fire protection features specifically modeled in the Fire PRA for this fire area.Fire protection systems Existing in-cabinet CO 2 is being credited to suppress the SWGR fire. The Hot Gas Layer evaluation credits the detection, automatic fire suppression system and manual fire brigade response.
The Multi Compartment Analysis evaluation credits the detection and automatic fire suppression system.Hot Gas Layer Treatment Physical attributes of this fire area require the incorporation of a Hot Gas Layer scenario and the expansion of the Zone Of Influence beyond the original Zone Of Influence to account for the Hot Gas Layer impacts in this area, see PRA-BC- 1 I-F-0 15 for further details. Credit for detection was taken in the Hot Gas Layer evaluation for this fire area. Credit for both automatic fire suppression system and manual fire brigade response was taken in the Hot Gas Layer evaluation for this fire area.Multi-compartment analysis Credit for detection was taken in the Multi Compartment Analysis for this fire area. Credit for automatic fire suppression system was taken in the Multi Compartment Analysis for this fire area.Revision 0 Page 5 of 24 Version 1.0 Page 2257 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-021 Scenario Review All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0, ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency.
2.0 RISK EVALUATION 2.1 Fire PRA Variant Case Calculation Tables 2-1 a and 2-lb provide the results of the variant case calculation for Fire Area 1-021. This is taken directly from the Fire PRA model with no changes or alterations made. The CDF and LERE results are provided on a scenario basis.The total area CDF and LERF is below the screening acceptance criteria of IE-07/rx-yr and IE-08/rx-yr, respectively.
The total CDF/LERF can be used as a conservative estimate of the delta CDF/LERF with respect to a compliant configuration.
No further analysis of the delta CDF/LERF is required.Revision 0 Page 6 of 24 Version 1.0 Page 2258 of 3726 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-021 Table 2-1a 1 Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train A Alignment IGF CDF LERF Zone Scen ScenDesc (ry NSP SF CCDP (xr CLERP (Irx (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr)0229 0229 0229 0229 0229 0229 0229 0229 0229 0229 0229 0229 0229 0229 0229 0229 0229 0229 0229 0229 D1 D2 D3 El E2 E3 F G H I1 12 13 J1 J2a J2b J2c J2d J2e J2f J2g TRANSIENT FIRE TRANSIENT FIRE TRANSIENT FIRE 600 V LOAD CENTER 1C -SEVERE 600 V LOAD CENTER 1C -NON SEVERE 600 V LOAD CENTER 1C -HEAF SS XFMR 1C DIESEL GENERATOR LOADING SEQUENCE SS XFMR IE 600V LC 1E -SEVERE 600V LC 1E -NON SEVERE 600V LC 1E -HEAF 4160V BUS 1G -SEVERE 4160V BUS 1G (DF08)- NON SEVERE 4160V BUS 1G (DF09)- NON SEVERE 4160V BUS 1G (DF10)- NON SEVERE 4160V BUS 1G (DF1 1)- NON SEVERE 4160V BUS 1G (DF12)- NON SEVERE 4160V BUS 1G (DF13)- NON SEVERE 4160V BUS 1G (DF14)- NON SEVERE 7.03E-06 7.03E-06 7.03E-06 1.27E-04 1.27E-04 3.65E-05 1.74E-04 1 .82E-05 1.74E-04 1.27E-04 1.27E-04 3.65E-05 1.46E-04 1.82E-05 1.82E-05 1.82E-05 1.82E-05 1.82E-05 1.82E-05 1.82E-05 1.0 1.0 1.0 4.OOE-02 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 4.OOE-02 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 2.50E-01 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 2.50E-01 1.0 1.0 2.50E-01 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 4.71E-12 4.71E-12 4.71E-12 8.53E-13 8.53E-1 1 2.44E-1 1 1.16E-10 1.22E-11 1.16E-10 2.13E-11 8.53E-1 1 2.44E-1 1 9.75E-13 1.22E-11 1.22E-11 1.22E-11 1.22E-11 1.22E-11 1.22E-11 1.22E-11 1.61E-10 1.13E-15 1.61E-10 1.13E-15 1.61E-10 1.13E-15 1.61E-10 2.05E-16 1.61E-10 2.05E-14 1.61E-10 5.87E-15 1.61E-10 2.80E-14 1.61E-10 2.93E-15 1.61E-10 2.80E-14 1.61E-10 5.12E-15 1.61E-10 2.05E-14 1.61E-10 5.87E-15 1.61E-10 2.34E-16 1.61E-10 2.93E-15 1.61E-10 2.93E-15 1.61E-10 2.93E-15 1.61E-10 2.93E-15 1.61E-10 2.93E-15 1.61E-10 2.93E-15 1.61E-10 2.93E-15 Revision 0 Page 7 of 24 Revision 0 Page 7 of 24 SE-C051326701 
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-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-021 Table 2-1a'Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train A Alignment IGF CDF LERF Zone Scen ScenDesc (rr NSP SF CCDP (xy CLERP (Iry (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr)0229 J2h 4160V BUS 1G (DF15)- NON 1.82E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 1.22E-11 1.61E-10 2.93E-15 SEVERE 0229 0229 0233 0233 0233 0233 0233 0233 0233 0233 0233 0233 0233 0233 0233 0233 0233 0233 0233 0233 J3a J3b D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 F G H 11 12a 12b 12c 12d 12e 12f 12g 13a 4160V BUS 1G -HEAF (DG8)4160V BUS 1G -HEAF (DG9-DG15)TRANSIENT FIRE TRANSIENT FIRE TRANSIENT FIRE TRANSIENT FIRE TRANSIENT FIRE TRANSIENT FIRE 1G CONTROL PANEL MCC I-1 RECEPTACLE XFMR 1A 4160V BUS 1G -SEVERE 4160V BUS 1G -NON SEVERE (DG01)4160V BUS 1G -NON SEVERE (DG02)4160V BUS 1G -NON SEVERE (DG03)4160V BUS 1G -NON SEVERE (DG04)4160V BUS 1G -NON SEVERE (DG05)4160V BUS 1G- NON SEVERE (DG06)4160V BUS 1G- NON SEVERE (DG07)4160V BUS 1G -HEAF (DG01)5.21 E-06 3.59E-05 7.12E-06 7.12E-06 7.12E-06 7.12E-06 7.12E-06 7.12E-06 1.82E-05 1.82E-05 1.74E-04 1.27E-04 1.78E-05 1.78E-05 2.36E-04 1.78E-05 1.78E-05 1.78E-05 1.59E-05 5.11E-06 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 4.OOE-02 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 2.50E-01 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.59E-07 8.16E-07 6.59E-07 6.59E-07 6.59E-07 6.59E-07 6.59E-07 6 .69E-07 3.49E-12 2.40E-1 1 4.77E-12 4.77E-1 2 4.77E-1 2 4.77E-12 4.77E-12 4.77E-12 1.22E-11 1.22E-1 1 1.16E-10 8.53E-13 1.18E-11 1.46E-1 1 1.55E-10 1.18E-11 1.1 8E- 11 1.18E-11 1.05E-1 1 3.42E-12 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-1 0 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 8.38E-16 5.77E-1 5 1.15E-15 1.15E-15 1.15E-15 1.15E-15 1.15E-15 1.15E-15 2.93E-15 2.93E-15 2.80E-14 2.05E-1 6 2.87E-15 2.87E-15 3.79E-14 2,87E-1 5 2,87E-15 2,87E-1 5 2,56E-15 8.21 E-16 0233 13b 4160V BUS 1G-HEAF 3.14E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 2.1OE-11 1.61E-10 5.05E-15 (DG02-DG07)
Revision 0 Page 8 of 24 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-021 Table 2-1a 1 Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train A Alignment IGF CDF LERF Zone Scen ScenDesc (xy NSP SF CCDP (rr CLERP (ER)(/rx-yr) (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr)0233 Li 600V LC 1B -SEVERE 9.1OE-05 1.0 2.50E-01 6.69E-07 1.52E-11 1.61E-10 3.66E-15 0233 L2 600V LC 1B -NON SEVERE 9.10E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 6.09E-11 1.61E-10 1.46E-14 0233 L3 600V LC 1B -HEAF 2.61E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 1.74E-11 1.61E-10 4.19E-15 0233 M LTG XFMR 1G 1.74E-04 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 1.16E-10 1.61E-10 2.80E-14 0233 N SS XFMR 1B 1.74E-04 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 1.16E-10 1.61E-10 2.80E-14 1-021-ADJ HGL HGL SCENARIO 6.92E-07 1.0 1.0 1.44E-04 9.95E-11 4.66E-07 3.22E-13 Total CDF/LERF Fire PRA Variant Case 1.47E-09 6.53E-13 Revision 0 Page 9 of 24 Revision 0 Page 9 of 24 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-021 Table 2-1b 1 Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train B Alignment IGF CDF LERF Zone Scen ScenDesc (Irx-yr) NSP SF CCDP (Irx-yr) CLERP (/rx-yr)0229 D1 TRANSIENT FIRE 7.03E-06 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 4.67E-12 1.61E-10 1.13E-15 0229 D2 TRANSIENT FIRE 7.03E-06 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 4.67E-12 1.61E-10 1.13E-15 0229 D3 TRANSIENT FIRE 7.03E-06 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 4.67E-12 1.61E-10 1.13E-15 0229 El 600 V LOAD CENTER 10- 1.27E-04 4.00E-02 2.50E-01 6.64E-07 8.47E-13 1.61 E-10 2.05E-16 SEVERE 0229 E2 600 V LOAD CENTER 10- 1.27E-04 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 8.47E-11 1.61E-10 2.05E-14 NON SEVERE ,.,,,,,n 600 V LOAD CENTER 10- C ncr -c .....4 ,- .,n .. ...... .o",4 AC U/Z 0229 0229 0229 0229 0229 0229 0229 0229 0229 0229 0229 0229 0229 0229 F G H 11 12 13 Ji J2a J2b J2c J2d J2e J2f J2g HEAF SS XFMR 1C DIESEL GENERATOR LOADING SEQUENCE SS XFMR 1E 600V LC 1E -SEVERE 600V LC lE -NON SEVERE 600V LC 1E -HEAF 4160V BUS 1G -SEVERE 4160V BUS 1G (DF08)- NON SEVERE 4160V BUS 1G (DF09)- NON SEVERE 4160V BUS 1G (DF10)- NON SEVERE 4160V BUS,1G (DF11)- NON SEVERE 4160V BUS 1G (DF12)- NON SEVERE 4160V BUS 1G (DF13)- NON SEVERE 4160V BUS IG (DF14)- NON SEVERE 1.74E-04 1.82E-05 1.74E-04 1.27E-04 1.27E-04 3.65E-05 1.46E-04 1.82E-05 1.82E-05 1.82E-05 1.82E-05 1.82E-05 1.82E-05 1.82E-05 I.U 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 4.OOE-02 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 I.U 1.0 1.0 1.0 2.50E-01 1.0 1.0 2.50E-01 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 6.64EI-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6 .64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 1.16E-10 1.21 E-11 1.16E-10 2.12E-11 8.47E-1 1 2.42E-1 1 9.68E-1 3 1.21 E-11 1.21 E-11 1.21 E-11 1.21 E-11 1.21 E-11 1.21 E-11 1.21 E-11 1. 1Er--IV U0,0/ -- 10 1.61E-10 2.80E-14 1.61E-10 2.93E-15 1.61 E-1 0 2.80E-14 1.61E-10 5.12E-15 1.61E-10 2.05E-14 1.61E-10 5.87E-15 1.61E-10 2.34E-16.1.61E-10 2.93E-15 1.61E-10 2.93E-15 1.61E-10 2.93E-15 1.61E-10 2.93E-15 1.61E-10 2.93E-15 1.61E-10 2.93E-15 1.61E-10 2.93E-15 Revision 0 Page 10 of 24 Revision 0 Page 10 of 24 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-021 Table 2-1 b 1 Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train B Alignment IGF CFLERF Zone Scen ScenDesc (ry NSP SF CCDP COF CLERP (/rx-yr) (Irx-yr) (/rx-yr)0229 J2h 4160V BUS 1G (DF15)- NON 1.82E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 1.21E-11 1.61E-10 2.93E-15 SEVERE 0229 J3a 4160V BUS 1G -HEAF (DG8) 5.21E-06 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 3.46E-12 1.61E-10 8.38E-16 0229 J3b 4160V BUS 1G -HEAF (DG9- 3.59E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 2.38E-11 1.61E-10 5.77E-15 DG15)0233 D1 TRANSIENT FIRE 7.12E-06 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 4.73E-12 1.61E-10 1.15E-15 0233 D2 TRANSIENT FIRE 7.12E-06 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 4.73E-12 1.61E-10 1.15E-15 0233 D3 TRANSIENT FIRE 7.12E-06 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 4.73E-12 1.61E-10 1.15E-15 0233 D4 TRANSIENT FIRE 7.12E-06 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 4.73E-12 1.61E-10 1.15E-15 0233 D5 TRANSIENT FIRE 7.12E-06 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 4.73E-12 1.61E-10 1.15E-15 0233 D6 TRANSIENT FIRE 7.12E-06 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 4.73E-12 1.61E-10 1.15E-15 0233 F 1G CONTROL PANEL 1.82E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 1.21E-11 1.61E-10 2.93E-15 0233 G MCC I-1 1.82E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 1.21E-11 1.61E-10 2.93E-15 0233 H RECEPTACLE XFMR 1A 1.74E-04 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 1.16E-10 1.61 E-10 2.80E-14 0233 I1 4160V BUS 1G -SEVERE 1.27E-04 4.OOE-02 2.50E-01 6.64E-07 8.47E-13 1.61E-10 2.05E-16 0233 12a 4160V BUS 1G-NON 1.78E-05 1.0 1.0 6.53E-07 1.16E-11 1.61E-10 2.87E-15 SEVERE (DG01)0233 12b 4160V BUS 1G -NON 1.78E-05 1.0 1.0 8.1OE-07 1.44E-11 1.61E-10 2.87E-15 SEVERE (DG02)0233 12c 4160V BUS 1G -NON 2.36E-04 1.0 1.0 6.53E-07 1.54E-10 1.61E-10 3.79E-14 SEVERE (DG03)0233 12d 4160V BUS 1G -NON 1.78E-05 1.0 1.0 6.53E-07 1.16E-11 1.61E-10 2.87E-15 SEVERE (DG04)0233 12e 4160V BUS 1G -NON 1.78E-05 1.0 1.0 6.53E-07 1.16E-11 1.61E-10 2.87E-15 SEVERE (DG05)0233 12f 4160V BUS 1G -NON 1.78E-05 1.0 1.0 6.53E-07 1.16E-11 1.61E-10 2.87E-15 SEVERE (DG06)0233 12g 4160V BUS 1G -NON 1.59E-05 1.0 1.0 6.53E-07 1.04E-11 1.61E-10 2.56E-15 SEVERE (DGO7)0233 13a 4160V BUS 1G- HEAF 5.11E-06 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 3.39E-12 1.61E-10 8.21E-16 (DG01)0233 13b 4160V BUS 1G -HEAF 3.14E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 2.08E-11 1.61E-10 5.05E-15 (DG02-DG07)
Revision 0 Page 11 of 24 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-021 Table 2-1b 1 Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train B Alignment IGF CDF LERF Zone Scen ScenDesc (rr NSP SF CCDP CDr CLERP (Iry (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr)0233 Li 600V LC 1B -SEVERE 9.10E-05 1.0 2.50E-01 6.64E-07 1.51E-11 1.61E-10 3.66E-15 0233 L2 600V LC 1B -NON SEVERE 9.10E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 6.05E-11 1.61E-10 1.46E-14 0233 L3 600V LC 1B -HEAF 2.61E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 1.73E-11 1.61E-10 4.19E-15 0233 M LTG XFMR 1G 1.74E-04 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 1.16E-10 1.61E-10 2.80E-14 0233 N SS XFMR 1B 1.74E-04 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 1.16E-10 1.61E-10 2.80E-14 1-021-ADJ HGL HGL SCENARIO 6.92E-07 1.0 1.0 1.44E-04 9.97E-11 4.66E-07 3.22E-13 Total CDF/LERF Fire PRA Variant Case 1.46E-09 6.53E-13 Where: Zone = Fire Zone Scen = 'A' to signify the variant case ScenDesc = Description of the Fire Scenario IGF = Ignition Frequency 
(/rx-yr)NSP = Non Suppression Probability SF = Severity Factor CCDP = Conditional Core Damage Probability CDF = Core Damage Frequency 
(/rx-yr)CLERP = Conditional Large Early Release Probability LERF = Large Early Release Frequency 
(/rx-yr)Revision 0 Page 12 of 24 Revision 0 Page 12 of 24 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-021 2.2 Compliant Case Calculation The following sub-sections provide the basis for modeling each VFDR (or category of VFDRs)and the alterations that have been made to the variant case to represent the compliant case. In each section a discussion of the VFDR (or the category of VFDRs) is provided.2.2.1 VFDRs Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA The following VFDRs are modeled in the Fire PRA and are therefore included in the total fire area CDF/LERF used as a surrogate for the delta risk evaluation for this fire area:.U2-1-021-HVAC-0O1-Q2R42B0001B:ENERGIZED:ENERGIZED-BC2B 2.2.2 VFDRs Not Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA A Fire PRA was developed in accordance with the requirements of Part 4 "Requirements for Fires at Power PRA" of the ASME and ANS combined PRA Standard, ASME/ANS RA-Sa-2009, "Standard for Level 1/Large Early Release Frequency Probabilistic Risk Assessment for Nuclear Power Plant Applications".
Consistent with those requirements not all components required to meet the nuclear safety criteria need to be specifically modeled in the Fire PRA. The following VFDRs are associated with components not modeled in the Fire PRA: 2.2.2.1 VFDR U2-1-021-HVAC-002 4kV Switchgear Room 2G ventilation is not modeled in the fire PRA. Room Heat up calculations show that there will be no impact to the 4kV Switchgear Room due to loss of HVAC within the mission time of 24 hrs in the fire PRA. See calculation Fire PRA Logic Model for Farley Nuclear Plants, PRA-BC-F-I 1-004..U2-1-021-HVAC-002-Q2R15A0007:ENERGIZED:ENERGIZED-SUT2A 2.2.2.2 VFDR U2-1-021-HVAC-003 Battery Room ventilation 2B is not modeled in the fire PRA. The Battery Room exhaust fan function is to remove the hydrogen that is generated from the battery located within the room.The hydrogen production in the 24 hour mission time of the PRA is less than the required amount for a hydrogen burn, therefore the exhaust fan is not required to be modeled. See calculation Fire PRA Logic Model for Farley Nuclear Plants, PRA-BC-F-1 1-004.* U2- 1-021 -HVAC-003-Q2R42E0002B:AVAILABLE:AVAILABLE 2.2.3 Compliant Case Results The total area CDF and LERF is below the screening acceptance criteria of 1 E-07/rx-yr and I E-08/rx-yr, respectively.
The total CDF/LERF can be used as a conservative estimate of the delta CDF/LERF with respect to a compliant configuration.
No further analysis of the delta CDF/LERF is required.2.2.4 Required Modifications There are no modifications required as a result of the risk evaluation for this fire area.Revision 0 Page 13 of 24 Version 1.0 Page 2265 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-021 2.2.5 Required Recovery Actions The following recovery actions are required as a result of the risk evaluation for this fire area: Table 2-2 Required Recovery Actions Recovery Action Component ID Basic Event VFDR BE Description Description OPERATOR Operator action to RECOVERY OF provide alternate Q2R42B0001B:ENERGIZED:E OP-RECOV-U2-1-021-BATTERY CHARGER cooling for battery NERGIZED-BC2B BCSW-B HVAC-001 B ROOM COOLING charger room due FAILS-SW to loss of Train B SW 2.3 Risk Evaluation Results The ACDF/LERF is below the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr (CDF) and l E-08/rx-yr (LERF) for acceptable risk. All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0 ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency.
The following tables present the fire zone/scenario fire risk as well as the total fire risk for this fire area. Given the relatively low risk for these zones/scenarios the delta risk is defined by the variant case risk, the compliant case risk is conservatively assumed to be 0.Table 2-3a 1 FIRE AREA aCDF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN A ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case CCDP CDF 0229/D1 0229/D2 0229/D3 0229/El 0229/E2 0229/E3 0229/F 0229/G 0229/H 0229/11 0229/12 0229/13 0229/J 1 0229/J2a 0229/J2b 0229/J2c 0229/J2d 0229/J2e 0229/J2f 0229/J2g 0229/J2h 0229/J3a 0229/J3b 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 4.71 E-12 4.71 E-12 4.71E-12 8.53E-13 8.53E-11 2.44E-1 1 1.16E-10 1.22E-1 1 1.16E-10 2.13E-11 8.53E-1 1 2.44E-1 1 9.75E-1 3 1.22E-1 1 1.22E-11 1.22E-11 1.22E- 11 1.22E- 11 1.22E-11 1.22E-11 1.22E-11 3.49E-12 2.40E-1 1 Compliant Case CCDP CDF 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 Variant -Compliant ACDF 4.71E-12 4.71E-12 4.71 E- 12 8.53E-1 3 8.53E-1 1 2.44E-1 1 1.16E-10 1.22E-1 1 1.16E-10 2.13E-11 8.53E-1 1 2.44E-1 1 9.75E-13 1.22E-11 1.22E-1 1 1.22E-11 1.22E-1 1 1.22E-1 1 1.22E-11 1.22E-1 1 1.22E-11 3.49E-12 2.40E-1 1 Revision 0 Page 14 of 24 Revision 0 Page 14 of 24 Version 1.0 Page 2266 of 3726 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-021 Table 2-3a 1 FIRE AREA ACDF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN A ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case CCDP CDF 0233/D1 0233/D2 0233/D3 0233/D4 0233/D5 0233/D6 0233/F 0233/G 0233/H 0233/l1 0233/12a 0233/12b 0233/12c 0233/12d 0233/12e 0233/12f 0233/12g 0233/13a 0233/13b 0233/L1 0233/L2 0233/L3 0233/M 0233/N 1-021-ADJ/HGL 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.59E-07 8.16E-07 6.59E-07 6.59E-07 6.59E-07 6.59E-07 6.59E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 1.44E-04 4.77E-1 2 4.77E-12 4.77E-12 4.77E-12 4.77E-12 4.77E-12 1.22E-11 1.22E-1 1 1.16E-10 8.53E-13 1.18E-11 1.46E-11 1.55E-10 1.18E-i1 1.18E-11 1.18E-11 1.05E-1 1 3.42E-12 2.1OE-1 1 1.52E-1 1 6.09E-1 1 1.74E-1 1 1.16E-10 1.16E-10 9.95E-11 1.47E-09 Compliant Case CCDP CDF 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 Variant -Compliant ACDF 4.77E-1 2 4.77E-12 4.77E-12 4.77E-12 4.77E-1 2 4.77E-12 1.22E-1 1 1.22E-1 1 1.16E-10 8.53E-13 1.18E-11 1.46E-1 1 1.55E-10 1.18E-11 1.18E-11 1.18E-11 1.05E-11 3.42E-12 2.10E-11 1.52E-11 6.09E-1 1 1.74E-11 1.16E-10 1.16E-10 9.95E-11 1.47E-09 Total CDF and delta CDF 1 _ N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.2 Total ACDF includes the risk of recovery actions required to demonstrate the availability of a success path for the nuclear safety performance criteria.Table 2-3b 1 FIRE AREA ACDF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN B ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CCDP CDF CCDP CDF ACDF 0229/D1 0229/D2 0229/D3 0229/El 0229/E2 0229/E3 0229/F 0229/G 0229/H 0229/11 0229/12 0229/13 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 4.67E-1 2 4.67E-1 2 4.67E-12 8.47E-1 3 8.47E-1 1 2.42E-1 1 1.16E-10 1.21 E-11 1.16E-10 2.12E-1 1 8.47E-11 2.42E-1 1 0.OOE+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 4.67E-1 2 4.67E-12 4.67E-12 8.47E-1 3 8.47E-1 1 2.42E-1 1 1.16E-10 1.21E-11 1.16E-10 2.12E-11 8.47E-1 1 2.42E-1 1 Revision 0 Page 15 of 24 Version 1.0 Page 2267 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-021 Table 2-3b 1 FIRE AREA ACDF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN B ALIGNMEN Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case IT CCDP 0229/J1 0229/J2a 0229/J2b 0229/J2c 0229/J2d 0229/J2e 0229/J2f 0229/J2g 0229/J2h 0229/J3a 0229/J3b 0233/D1 0233/D2 0233/D3 0233/D4 0233/D5 0233/D6 0233/F 0233/G 0233/H 0233/I1 0233/12a 0233/12b 0233/12c 0233/12d 0233/12e 0233/12f 0233/12g 0233/13a 0233/13b 0233/L1 0233/L2 0233/L3 0233/M 0233/N 1-021 -ADJ/HGL 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.53E-07 8.1OE-07 6.53E-07 6.53E-07 6.53E-07 6.53E-07 6.53E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 1.44E-04 CCDP CDF 9.68E-13 1.21 E-11 1.21 E-11 1.21 E-11 1.21 E-11 1.21 E-11 1.21 E-11 1.21 E-11 1.21 E-11 3.46E-12 2.38E-11 4.73E-12 4.73E-12 4.73E-12 4.73E-12 4.73E-12 4.73E-12 1.21 E-11 1.21 E-11 1.16E-10 8.47E-13 1.16E-11 1.44E-1 1 1.54E-10 1.16E-11 1.16E-11 1.16E-11 1.04E-11 3.39E-12 2.08E-1 1 1.51 E-11 6.05E-1 1 1.73E-11 1.16E-10 1.16E-10 9.97E-1 1 1.46E-09 CCDP 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.00F+00 O.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.00F+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.00F+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 CDF 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 Variant -Compliant ACDF 9.68E-13 1.21E-11 1.21 E-11 1.21 E-11 1.21 E-11 1.21 E-11 1.21 E-11 1.21 E-11 1.21 E-11 3.46E-12 2.38E-1 1 4.73E-12 4.73E-1 2 4.73E-12 4.73E-12 4.73E-1 2 4.73E-12 1.21 E-11 1.21 E-11 1.16E-10 8.47E-13 1.16E-11 1.44E-1 1 1.54E-10 1.16E-11 1 .16E-1 1 1.16E-11 1.04E- 11 3.39E-12 2.08E-1 1 1.51 E-11 6.05E-1 1 1.73E-11 1.16E-10 1.16E-10 9.97E-1 1 1.46E-09 Total CDF and delta CDF-N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.2 Total A CDF includes the risk of recovery actions required to demonstrate the availability of a success path for the nuclear safety performance criteria.Revision 0 Page 16 of 24 Version 1.0 Page 2268 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-021 Table 2-4a 1 FIRE AREA ALERF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN A ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case 0229/D1 0229/D2 0229/D3 0229/El 0229/E2 0229/E3 0229/F 0229/G 0229/H 0229/l1 0229/12 0229/13 0229/J1 0229/J2a 0229/J2b 0229/J2c 0229/J2d 0229/J2e 0229/J2f 0229/J2g 0229/J2h 0229/J3a 0229/J3b 0233/D1 0233/D2 0233/D3 0233/D4 0233/D5 0233/D6 0233/F 0233/G 0233/H 0233/I1 0233/12a 0233/12b 0233/12c 0233/12d 0233/12e 0233/12f 0233/12g 0233/13a 0233/13b 0233/L1 0233/L2 0233/L3 0233/M CLERP 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 LERF 1.13E-15 1.13E-15 1.13E-15 2.05E-16 2.05E-14 5.87E-1i5 2.80E-14 2.93E-1i5 2.80E-14 5.12E-15 2.05E-14 5.87E-1i5 2.34E-16 2.93E-1 5 2.93E-1 5 2.93E-1 5 2.93E-1 5 2.93E-1 5 2.93E-1 5 2.93E-15 2.93E-1 5 8.38E-1 6 5.77E-1 5 1.15E-15 1.15E-15 1.15E-15 1.15E-15 1.15E-15 1.15E-15 2.93E-15 2.93E-15 2.80E-14 2.05E-1 6 2.87E-1i5 2.87E-15 3.79E-14 2.87E-1i5 2.87E-1 5 2.87E-15 2.56E-15 8.21 E-16 5.05E-15 3.66E-1i5 1.46E-14 4.19E-15 2.80E-14 Compliant Case CLERP LERF 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 Variant -Compliant ALERF 1.13E-15 1.13E-15 1.13E-15 2.05E-16 2.05E-14 5.87E-15 2.80E-14 2.93E-15 2.80E-14 5.12E-15 2.05E-14 5.87E-15 2.34E-16 2.93E-15 2.93E-15 2.93E-1i5 2.93E-15 2.93E-15 2.93E-1 5 2.93E-15 2.93E-15 8.38E-16 5.77E-15 1.15E-15 1.15E-15 1.15E-15 1.15E-15 1.15E-15 1.15E-15 2.93E-1 5 2.93E-15 2.80E-14 2.05E-16 2.87E-1 5 2.87E-15 3.79E-14 2.87E-15 2.87E-1i5 2.87E-1i5 2.56E-1 5 8.21 E-16 5.05E-15 3.66E-1i5 1.46E-14 4.19E-15 2.80E-14 Revision 0 Page 17of24 Revision 0 Page 17 of 24 Version 1.0 Page 2269 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-021 Table 2-4a 1 FIRE AREA aLERF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN A ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CLERP LERF CLERP LERF ALERF 0233/N 1.61E-10 2.80E-14 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 2.80E-14 1-021-ADJ/HGL 4.66E-07 3.22E-13 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 3.22E-13 Total LERF and delta LERF 6.53E-13 O.OOE+00 6.53E-13 1 _ N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.2 Total ALERF includes the risk of recovery actions required to demonstrate the availability of a success path for the nuclear safety performance criteria.Table 2-4b 1 FIRE AREA ALERF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN B ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CLERP LERF CLERP LERF ALERF 0229/D1 0229/D2 0229/D3 0229/El 0229/E2 0229/E3 0229/F 0229/G 0229/H 0229/I1 0229/12 0229/13 0229/J1 0229/J2a 0229/J2b 0229/J2c 0229/J2d 0229/J2e 0229/J2f 0229/J2g 0229/J2h 0229/J3a 0229/J3b 0233/D1 0233/D2 0233/D3 0233/D4 0233/D5 0233/D6 0233/F 0233/G 0233/H 0233/11 0233/12a 0233/12b 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-1 0 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.13E-15 1.13E-15 1.13E-15 2.05E-16 2.05E-14 5.87E-15 2.80E-14 2.93E-15 2.80E-14 5.12E-15 2.05E-14 5.87E- 15 2.34E-16 2.93E-1 5 2.93E-15 2.93E-1 5 2.93E-15 2.93E-1 5 2.93E-1 5 2.93E-1 5 2.93E-1 5 8.38E-1 6 5.77E-1 5 1.15E-15 1.15E-15 1.15E-15 1.15E-15 1.15E-15 1.15E-15 2.93E-15 2.93E-1 5 2.80E-14 2.05E-16 2.87E-15 2.87E-1 5 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0O.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 1.13E-15 1.13E-15 1.13E-15 2.05E-16 2.05E-14 5.87E-1 5 2.80E-14 2.93E-15 2.80E-14 5.12E-15 2.05E-14 5.87E-15 2.34E-16 2.93E-1 5 2.93E-15 2.93E-1 5 2.93E-15 2.93E-1 5 2.93E-1 5 2.93E-15 2.93E-15 8.38E-16 5.77E-15 1.15E-15 1.15E-15 1.15E-15 1.15E-15 1.15E-15 1.15E-15 2.93E-15 2.93E-15 2.80E-14 2.05E-16 2.87E-1 5 2.87E-15 Revision 0 Page 18 of 24 Version 1.0 Page 2270 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-021 Table 2-4b 1 FIRE AREA ALERF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN B ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CLERP LERF CLERP LERF ALERF 0233/12c 1.61 E-10 3.79E-14 O.OOE+00 O.00E+00 3.79E-14 0233/12d 1.61 E-10 2.87E-15 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 2.87E-15 0233/12e 1.61 E-10 2.87E-'15 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 2.87E-15 0233/12f 1.61E-10 2.87E-15 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 2.87E-15 0233/12g 1.61E-10 2.56E-15 0.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 2.56E-15 0233/13a 1.61 E-10 8.21 E-16 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 8.21 E-16 0233/13b 1.61 E-10 5.05E-15 O.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 5.05E-15 0233/L1 1.61 E-10 3.66E-15 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 3.66E-15 0233/L2 1.61 E-10 1.46E-14 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 1.46E-14 0233/L3 1.61E-10 4.19E-15 O.00E+00 0.00E+00 4.19E-15 0233/M 1.61E-10 2.80E-14 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 2.80E-14 0233/N 1.61 E-10 2.80E-14 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 2.80E-14 1-021-ADJ/HGL 4.66E-07 3.22E-13 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 3.22E-13 Total LERF and delta LERF 6.53E-13 0.OOE+00 6.53E-13 1 _ N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.2 Total ALERF includes the risk of recovery actions required to demonstrate the availability of a success path for the nuclear safety performance criteria.3.0 DID EVALUATION 3.1 Defense-in-Depth Evaluation A review of the impact of the change on defense-in-depth (DID) was performed.
NFPA 805 defines DID as: " Preventing fires from starting* Rapidly detecting fires and controlling and extinguishing promptly those fires that do occur, thereby limiting damage* Providing adequate level of fire protection for structures, systems and components important to safety; so that a fire that is not promptly extinguished will not prevent essential plant safety functions from being performed.
In general, the DID requirement was considered satisfied if the proposed change does not result in a substantial imbalance among these elements (or echelons).
The review of DID was qualitative and addressed each of the elements with respect to the proposed change. Fire protection features and systems relied upon to ensure DID were identified in the assessment (e.g., detection, suppression system).The VFDRs and the associated Fire Area risk (CDF) and scenario consequences (CCDP values)were evaluated to identify general DID echelon imbalances.
Potential methods to balance the DID features were identified ensuring an adequate balance of DID features is maintained for the Fire Area. See Section 3.2 for the results of the evaluation.
Revision 0 Page 19 of 24 Version 1.0 Page 2271 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-021 3.2 Defense-in-Depth Review Results A review of defense in depth and risk evaluation results show that, given the systems and features specified in Table 3-1 and Section 2 respectively, risk acceptance criteria are met and that the balance of defense in depth is maintained.
The risk acceptance criteria are met with substantial margin to account for analytical methods associated with fire scenarios.
The analyzed scenarios bound potential fuel packages which can reasonably be expected to occur in this area.The installed detection and automatic suppression systems are required for DID to support brigade response and mitigate against fire damage. The main contributors to risk in this fire area associated with 600V load center, 4160V Bus, SS Transformer fires. The total flooding CO 2 systems are installed inside the 4.16kV switchgear, the 5kV disconnect switch, and the four 600-V load centers. Requiring the suppression system applies mitigation against fires in the highest risk contributing scenarios (locations).
In the event of no intervention by the plant fire brigade, it is not expected that a credible fire would develop which would not be bounded by the analyzed scenarios.
Based on the required fire protections systems/features specified, the ability to meet nuclear safety performance criteria is ensured.The table below summarizes how an adequate balance of DID is maintained.
Table 3-1 Defense-in-Depth Impact Review Method of Providing DID Discussion Echelon 1: Prevent fires from starting Combustible Control No change necessary to procedure(s) 
/guidance document(s).
1 Hot Work Control No change necessary to procedure(s) 
/guidance document(s).
Echelon 2: Rapidly detect, control and extinguish promptly those fires that do occur thereby limiting fire damage Detection System Detection system installed and required.Automatic Fire Suppression Automatic suppression system installed and required.Portable Fire Extinguishers Portable extinguishers available, but no enhancements required.
1 Hose stations and hydrants Fire hose cabinets are available in adjacentarea(s), but no located in the area(s) enhancements required.
1 Pre-Fire Plan No change necessary to procedure(s) 
/guidance document(s).
Echelon 3: Provide adequate level of fire protection for systems and structures so that a fire will not prevent essential safety functions from being performed Walls, floors ceilings and structural No changes necessary to existing barriers.
1 elements are rated or have been evaluated as adequate for the hazard.Openings in the fire barrier are rated No changes necessary to existing barrier openings.
1 or have been evaluated as adequate for the hazard.Supplemental barriers (e.g., ERFBS, No supplemental barriers installed and not required.cable tray covers, etc.)Revision 0 Page 20 of 24 Version 1.0 Page 2272 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-021 Table 3-1 Defense-in-Depth Impact Review Method of Providing DID Discussion Guidance provided to operations No VFDR related DID recovery actions required.personnel detailing the credited success path(s) including recovery actions to achieve nuclear safety performance criteria.1 This fire protection feature is relied upon without further DID enhancements beyond inherent programmatic requirements of NFPA 805, Chap. 3 and will not be reported in Table 5-2.3.2.1 Required Modifications There are no modifications required as a result of the DID evaluation for this fire area.3.2.2 Required Recovery Actions There are no required recovery actions as a result of the DID evaluation for this fire area.4.0 SAFETY MARGIN EVALUATION 4.1 Safety Margin Evaluation In accordance with NEI 04-02, 5.3.5.3 guidance, the maintenance of adequate Safety Margin is assessed by the consideration of categories of analyses utilized by this fire risk evaluation (FRE).Safety margins are considered to be maintained if: Codes and standards or their alternatives accepted for use by the NRC are met, and* Safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) are met, or provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty.
The maintenance of adequate safety margin for the change analysis is described for each of the specific analysis types used in support of the fire risk assessment.
4.1.1 Fire Modeling Fire modeling performed in support of the transition has been performed within the Fire PRA utilizing codes and standards developed by industry and NRC staff to provide realistic yet conservative results. Specifically, the heat release rates utilized in the transition analysis are based upon NUREG/CR 6850, Task 8, Scoping Fire Modeling.
These heat release rates are conservative and represent values used to screen out fixed ignition sources that do not pose a threat to the targets within specific fire compartments and to assign severity factors to unscreened fixed ignition sources.The combined analysis approach is used during transition; therefore, maximum expected fire scenario/limiting fire scenario have not been analyzed separately.
The bases for the application of these fire modeling codes and standards were not altered in support of this FRE.4.1.2 Plant System Performance Plant system performance parameters were not modified as a result of this FRE. These performance parameters were originally established to support nuclear performance criteria Revision 0 Page 21 of 24 Version 1.0 Page 2273 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-021 contained in the plant specific accident analyses.
These analyses established component and system performance criteria necessary to establish safe and stable plant operation, as well as, safe shut down of the unit in the event of a fire. These performance parameters were not modified as a result of this FRE.4.2 Safety Margin Results All analyses and assessment have been performed utilizing accepted techniques and industry accepted standards.
In addition, safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) have been considered and provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty.
As such, the Safety Margins are maintained as discussed in Section 4.1.5.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION RESULTS 5.1 Dispositions of VFDRs Based on the FRE results contained in Sections 2, 3 and 4 the VFDRs identified in Section 1. 1 have been resolved as follows: Table 5-1 Final Variance Disposition VFDR ID Disposition U2-1-021-HVAC-001 Recovery Action(s)
Required to Satisfy Risk Criteria:
See Table 2-2 U2-1-021-HVAC-002 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)U2-1-021-HVAC-003 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)Revision 0 Page 22 of 24 Version 1.0 Page 2274 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-021 5.2 Fire Risk Evaluation Summary of Fire Protection Systems and Features Table 5-2 Summary of Required Fire Protection Systems and Features Required Required Required Fire FireSuppression Detection Protection Feature Required Fire Protection System and Feature Details System System (R, D)(R, D) (R, D)U2 1-021 R R -Improvements to procedures necessary to incorporate recovery actions required to meet risk criteria (See Table 2-2)R -Detection system, Suppression system;229D -Detection system, Suppression system R -Detection system, Suppression system;D -Detection system, Suppression system Required Suppression/Detection/Feature:
required in the Fire Area based on NFPA 805 Chapter 4 compliance.
The information is provided on a zone basis. The basis for the requirement of the fire protection system is designated as follows:* R -Risk Criteria:
Systems required to meet the Risk Criteria for the Performance-Based Approach (NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4)* D -Defense-in-depth Criteria:
Systems required to maintain adequate balance of Defense-in-Depth for a Performance-Based Approach (NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4)Fire Protection Features in this Table only refer to those features installed in the Fire Area that have a corresponding Chapter 3 requirement.
5.3 Summary of Recovery Actions Table 5-3 -Recovery Actions Fire Area Component Component Description Actions U2 1-021 Q2R42B0001B 125V DC BUS 2B Operator action to provide alternate cooling for battery charger room due to loss of Train B SW Revision 0 Page 23 of 24 Revision 0 Page 23 of 24 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-021 5.4 Summary of Plant Modifications No modifications are required for this fire area.5.5 Fire Area Risk Summary Fire Area U2 1-021 Area Description AUX BUILDING SWITCHGEAR ROOMS NFPA 805 Basis 4.2.4 Table 5-4 -Fire Area Risk Summary VFDR Fire Area CDF/LERF (Yes/No) (1.47E-09/6.53E-13 Yes RAs (es/No)Yes Fire Risk Eval A CDF/LERF 1.47E-09/6.53E-1 3 Additional Risk of RAs 1.47E-09/6.53E-1 3 Revision 0 Page 24 of 24 Revision 0 Page 24 of 24 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-023 Attachment 
-Unit 2 Area 1-023 FRE for Fire Area Aux Building Switchgear Room Revision:
0 Name Fire PRA Preparer Fire PRA Reviewer Fire Protection Preparer Fire Protection Reviewer NSCA Preparer NSCA Reviewer FRE Preparer FRE Reviewer Jonathan Hedrick Clint Pierce Robert Kirkpatrick Rebecca Puckett Larry Valmonte Dan Funk Micky Heatherly Brandon Jamar Revision 0 Page 1 of 17 Version 1.0 Page 2277 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-023 1.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION INPUT .....................................................................
4 1.1 Variances from the Deterministic Requirements 
....................................
4 1.2 Fire Protection Systems and Features ..................................................
4 1.2.1 Construction 
...............................................................................
4 1.2 .2 D ete ctio n ................................................................................... 
..4 1.2.3 Fixed Fire Suppression 
...............................................................
4 1.2.4 Manual Suppression 
...................................................................
4 1.2.5 Ventilation (Smoke Removal) ....................................................
5 1.2.6 Other Fire Protection Features ....................................................
5 1.2.7 Fire Hazard Identification 
..........................................................
5 1.2.8 Fire PRA Input .............................................................................
5 2.0 RISK EVALUATION 
.........................................................................................
6 2.1 Fire PRA Variant Case Calculation 
......................................................
6 2.2 Compliant Case Calculation 
..................................................................
10 2.2.1 VFDRs Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA ............................
10 2.2.2 VFDRs Not Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA .....................
10 2.2.3 Compliant Case Results ...........................................................
10 2.2.4 Required Modifications 
.............................................................
11 2.2.5 Required Recovery Actions .......................................................
11 2.3 Risk Evaluation Results ........................................................................
11 3.0 DID EVALUATION 
.........................................................................................
13 3.1 Defense-in-Depth Evaluation 
...............................................................
13 3.2 Defense-in-Depth Review Results ......................................................
14 3.2.1 Required Modifications 
.............................................................
15 3.2.2 Required Recovery Actions .......................................................
15 4.0 SAFETY MARGIN EVALUATION 
...................................................................
15 4.1 Safety Margin Evaluation 
......................................................................
15 4.1.1 Fire Modeling ............................................................................
15 4.1.2 Plant System Performance 
......................................................
16 4.2 Safety Margin Results ..........................................................................
16 5.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION RESULTS .............................................................
16 5.1 Dispositions of VFDRs ........................................................................
16 5.2 Fire Risk Evaluation Summary of Fire Protection Systems and Features 17 Revision 0 Page 2 of 17 Version 1.0 Page 2278 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-023 SE-C051 326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-023 5.3 5.4 5.5 Summary of Recovery Actions .............................................................
17 Summary of Plant Modifications 
..........................................................
17 Fire Area Risk Summary ......................................................................
17 Revision 0 Page 3 of 17 Version 1.0 Page 2279 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-023 1.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION INPUT 1.1 Variances from the Deterministic Requirements The VFDRs identified for evaluation for Unit 2, Fire Area 1-023, Aux Building Switchgear Room are: Table 1-1 VFDRs VFDR Component(s)
Description U2-1-023-Q2R42B0001B:ENERGI This component, 125V DC Bus 2B, requires HVAC support to HVAC-001 ZED:ENERGIZED-remain functional.
Failure to provide HVAC support to this BC2B, 125V DC BUS 2B electrical component challenges electrical support Vital Auxiliaries Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-1-023-Q2R15A0007:ENERGIZ This component, Switchgear 2G, requires HVAC support to remain HVAC-002 ED:ENERGIZED-functional.
Failure to provide HVAC support to this electrical SUT2A, 4160V component challenges electrical support Vital Auxiliaries Nuclear SWITCHGEAR BUS 2G Safety Performance Criteria.U2-1-023-Q2R42E0002B:AVAILAB This component, 125V DC Battery 2B, requires HVAC support to HVAC-003 LE:AVAILABLE, 125V remain functional.
Failure to provide HVAC support to this BATTERY 2B electrical component challenges electrical support Vital Auxiliaries Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.1.2 Fire Protection Systems and Features Fire Area 1-023 consists of Fire Zone 235. This fire area is located in the Unit I Auxiliary Building Switchgear Room at elevation 121 '-0".1.2.1 Construction Barriers for this fire area are of substantial construction and have been designed and constructed to meet separation requirements.
In the event the configuration utilized is not in accordance with recognized standards, the deviations have been evaluated to be adequate for the hazard.1.2.2 Detection Fire detection systems to initiate plant suppression systems and to provide notification to the Control Room are: N Fire Zone 235 is provided with detection.
1.2.3 Fixed Fire Suppression Fixed fire suppression systems to aid in control of both fire growth and spread in the fire area are:* Fire Zone 235 is provided with a total flooding Halon system.1.2.4 Manual Suppression Manual suppression equipment to be utilized by plant personnel and/or fire brigade members are:* Fire Area 1-023 is provided with a fire hose cabinet and a dry chemical portable extinguisher located in room 234.Revision 0 Page 4 of 17 Version 1.0 Page 2280 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-023 0 A CO 2 portable extinguisher is available in room 228.1.2.5 Ventilation (Smoke Removal)Portable smoke ejectors are available to assist with smoke removal.1.2.6 Other Fire Protection Features No additional fire protection features are required for this fire risk evaluation.
1.2.7 Fire Hazard Identification The major sources of combustibles in Fire Area 1-023 are cable insulation, panels, Plexiglas access door, and fiberglass.
Details regarding fire scenarios quantified in the fire PRA, and their associated ignition sources (where applicable) are discussed in Section 2.1.2.8 Fire PRA Input Fire protection features There are no fire protection features specifically modeled in the Fire PRA for this fire area.Fire protection systems The Hot Gas Layer evaluation credits the detection, automatic fire suppression system and manual fire brigade response.
The Multi Compartment Analysis evaluation credits the detection and automatic fire suppression system.Hot Gas Layer Treatment This fire area screened for potential Hot Gas Layer effects on the Zone Of Influence.
Credit for detection was taken in the Hot Gas Layer evaluation for this fire area. Credit for both automatic fire suppression system and manual fire brigade response was taken in the Hot Gas Layer evaluation for this fire area.Multi-compartment analysis Credit for detection was taken in the Multi Compartment Analysis for this fire area. Credit for automatic fire suppression system was taken in the Multi Compartment Analysis for this fire area.Scenario Review All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0, ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency.
Revision 0 Page 5 of 17 Version 1.0 Page 2281 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-023 2.0 RISK EVALUATION 2.1 Fire PRA Variant Case Calculation Tables 2-la and 2-1b provide the results of the variant case calculation for Fire Area 1-023. This is taken directly from the Fire PRA model with no changes or alterations made. The CDF and LERF results are provided on a scenario basis.The total area CDF and LERF is below the screening acceptance criteria of I E-07/rx-yr and 1E-08/rx-yr, respectively.
The total CDF/LERF can be used as a conservative estimate of the delta CDF/LERF with respect to a compliant configuration.
No further analysis of the delta CDF/LERF is required.Revision 0 Page 6 of 17 Version 1.0 Page 2282 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-023 Table 2-1a Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train A Alignment IGF CDF LERF Zone Scen ScenDesc Ixy NSP SF CCDP (rr CLERP (Irr (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr)0235 D1 TRANSIENT FIRE 6.05E-06 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 4.05E-12 1.61 E-10 9.74E-16 0235 D2 TRANSIENT FIRE 6.05E-06 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 4.05E-12 1.61E-10 9.74E-16 0235 D3 TRANSIENT FIRE 6.05E-06 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 4.05E-12 1.61E-10 9.74E-16 0235 D4 TRANSIENT FIRE 6.05E-06 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 4.05E-12 1.61E-10 9.74E-16 0235 D5 TRANSIENT FIRE 6.05E-06 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 4.05E-12 1.61E-10 9.74E-16 0235 D6 TRANSIENT FIRE 6.05E-06 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 4.05E-12 1.61E-10 9.74E-16 0235 E POWER CAB 2AC 3.64E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 2.44E-11 1.61E-10 5.86E-15 0235 F POWER CAB 213D 3.64E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 2.44E-1 1 1.61E-10 5.86E-15 0235 G CNTRL CAB 7.28E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 4.87E-11 1.61E-10 1.17E-14 0235 H1 RX TRIP SWGR -SEVERE 3.64E-05 1.0 1.O0E-01 1.41E-04 5.13E-10 4.58E-07 1.67E-12 0235 H2 RX TRIP SWGR -NON 3.64E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 2.44E-11 1.61E-10 5.86E-15 SEVERE 0235 HGL HOT GAS LAYER SCENARIO 1.57E-07 1.0 1.0 1.41E-04 2.21E-11 4.58E-07 7.18E-14 0235 I R-70 ANALYZER-CAB 3.64E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 2.44E-11 1.61 E-10 5.86E-15 0235 J ROD CONT RM AHU 6.86E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 4.59E-11 1.61E-10 1.10E-14 0235 K EA14 LTG XFMR 1.74E-04 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 1.16E-10 1.61E-10 2.80E-14 0235 Li ROD CONTROL CAB- 3.64E-05 1.0 1.OOE-01 1.41E-04 5.13E-10 4.58E-07 1.67E-12 SEVERE 0235 L2 ROD CONTROL CAB -NON 3.64E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 2.44E-11 1.61E-10 5.86E-15 SEVERE 0235 M B ROD CONTROL CAB 3.64E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 2.44E-11 1.61 E-10 5.86E-15 0235 N1 ROD CONTROL CAB DC 1.82E-05 1.0 1.O0E-01 1.41E-04 2.57E-10 4.58E-07 8.33E-13 HOLD UP -SEVERE ROD CONTROL CAB DC 0235 N2 HOD UON SEVERE 1.82E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 1.22E-11 1.61E-10 2.93E-15 HOLD UP -NON SEVERE Total CDF/LERF Fire PRA Variant Case 1.70E-09 4.33E-12 Revision 0 Page 7 of 17 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-023 Table 2-1b Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train B Alignment IGF CDF LERF Zone Scen ScenDesc (ry NSP SF CCDP (F CLERP (Irr (/rx-yr) (1rx-yr) (/rx-yr)0235 D1 TRANSIENT FIRE 6.05E-06 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 4.02E-12 1.61E-10 9.74E-16 0235 D2 TRANSIENT FIRE 6.05E-06 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 4.02E-12 1.61E-10 9.74E-16 0235 D3 TRANSIENT FIRE 6.05E-06 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 4.02E-12 1.61E-10 9.74E-16 0235 D4 TRANSIENT FIRE 6.05E-06 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 4.02E-12 1.61E-10 9.74E-16 0235 D5 TRANSIENT FIRE 6.05E-06 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 4.02E-12 1.61E-10 9.74E-16 0235 D6 TRANSIENT FIRE 6.05E-06 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 4.02E-12 1.61E-10 9.74E-16 0235 E POWER CAB 2AC 3.64E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 2.42E-11 1.61E-10 5.86E-15 0235 F POWER CAB 2BD 3.64E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 2.42E-1 1 1.61E-10 5.86E-1 5 0235 G CNTRL CAB 7.28E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 4.84E-11 1.61E-10 1.17E-14 0235 H1 RX TRIP SWGR -SEVERE 3.64E-05 1.0 1.O0E-01 1.41 E-04 5,14E-10 4.58E-07 1.67E-12 0235 H2 RX TRIP SWGR -NON 3.64E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 2,42E-11 1.61E-10 5.86E-15 SEVERE 0235 HGL HOT GAS LAYER SCENARIO 1.57E-07 1.0 1.0 1.41E-04 2,22E-11 4.58E-07 7.18E-14 0235 I R-70 ANALYZER-CAB 3.64E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 2.42E-11 1.61E-10 5.86E-15 0235 J ROD CONT RM AHU 6.86E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 4,56E-11 1.61E-10 1.10E-14 0235 K EA14 LTG XFMR 1.74E-04 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 1,16E-10 1.61E-10 2,80E-14 ROD CONTROL CAB -0235 Li SEVERE 3.64E-05 1.0 1.OOE-01 1.41 E-04 5.14E-10 4.58E-07 1,67E-12 SEVERE 0235 L2 RDCNRLCB-ON 3.64E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 2,42E-11 1.61E-10 5,86E-15 SEVERE 0235 M B ROD CONTROL CAB 3.64E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 2.42E-11 1.61E-10 5.86E-15 0235 N1 ROD CONTROL CAB DC 1.82E-05 1.0 1.00E-01 1.41 E-04 2.57E-10 4.58E-07 8,33E-13 HOLD UP -SEVERE 0235 N2 ROD CONTROL CAB DC 1.82E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 1.21E-11 1.61E-10 2.93E-15 HOLD UP -NON SEVERE Total CDF/LERF Fire PRA Variant Case 1.70E-09 4.33E-12 Revision 0 Page 8 of 17 SE-C 051326701-008Atahet-FEfrUi2Frera102 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-023 Where: Zone = Fire Zone Scen = 'A' to signify the variant case ScenDesc = Description of the Fire Scenario IGF = Ignition Frequency 
(/rx-yr)NSP = Non Suppression Probability SF = Severity Factor CCDP = Conditional Core Damage Probability CDF = Core Damage Frequency 
(/rx-yr)CLERP = Conditional Large Early Release Probability LERF = Large Early Release Frequency 
(/rx-yr)Revision 0 Page 9 of 17 Revision 0 Page 9 of 17 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-023 2.2 Compliant Case Calculation The following sub-sections provide the basis for modeling each VFDR (or category of VFDRs)and the alterations that have been made to the variant case to represent the compliant case. In each section a discussion of the VFDR (or the category of VFDRs) is provided.2.2.1 VFDRs Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA The following VFDRs are modeled in the Fire PRA and are therefore included in the total fire area CDF/LERF used as a surrogate for the delta risk evaluation for this fire area: a U2-1-023-HVAC-00I-Q2R42B000IB:ENERGIZED:ENERGIZED-BC2B 2.2.2 VFDRs Not Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA A Fire PRA was developed in accordance with the requirements of Part 4 "Requirements for Fires at Power PRA" of the ASME and ANS combined PRA Standard, ASME/ANS RA-Sa-2009, "Standard for Level 1/Large Early Release Frequency Probabilistic Risk Assessment for Nuclear Power Plant Applications".
Consistent with those requirements not all components required to meet the nuclear safety criteria need to be specifically modeled in the Fire PRA. The following VFDRs are associated with components not modeled in the Fire PRA: 2.2.2.1 VFDR U2-1-023-HVAC-002 4kV Switchgear Room 2G ventilation is not modeled in the fire PRA. Room Heat up calculations show that there will be no impact to the 4kV Switchgear Room due to loss of HVAC within the mission time of 24 hrs in the fire PRA. See calculation Fire PRA Logic Model for Farley Nuclear Plants, PRA-BC-F-11-004.N U2-1-023-HVAC-002 
-Q2R 15A0007:ENERGIZED:ENERGIZED-SUT2A 2.2.2.2 VFDR U2-1-023-HVAC-003 Battery Room 2B ventilation is not modeled in the fire PRA. The Battery Room exhaust fan frmnction is to remove the hydrogen that is generated from the battery located within the room.The hydrogen production in the 24 hour mission time of the PRA is less than the required amount for a hydrogen burn, therefore the exhaust fan is not required to be modeled. See calculation Fire PRA Logic Model for Farley Nuclear Plants, PRA-BC-F-1 1-004..U2-1-023-HVAC-003 
-Q2R42E0002B:AVAI LABLE:AVAILABLE 2.2.3 Compliant Case Results The total area CDF and LERF is below the screening acceptance criteria of 1 E-07/rx-yr and 1 E-08/rx-yr, respectively.
The total CDF/LERF can be used as a conservative estimate of the delta CDF/LERF with respect to a compliant configuration.
No further analysis of the delta CDF/LERF is required.Revision 0 Page 10 of 17 Version 1.0 Page 2286 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-023 2.2.4 Required Modifications There are no modifications required as a result of the risk evaluation for this fire area.2.2.5 Required Recovery Actions There are no required recovery actions as a result of the risk evaluation for this fire area.2.3 Risk Evaluation Results The ACDF/LERF is below the screening acceptance criteria of I E-07/rx-yr (CDF) and 1E-08/rx-yr (LERF) for acceptable risk. All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0 ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency.
The following tables present the fire zone/scenario fire risk as well as the total fire risk for this fire area. Given the relatively low risk for these zones/scenarios the delta risk is defined by the variant case risk, the compliant case risk is conservatively assumed to be 0.Table 2-2a 1 FIRE AREA aCDF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN A ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CCDP CDF CCDP CDF ACDF 0235/D1 6.69E-07 4.05E-12 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 4.05E-12 0235/D2 6.69E-07 4.05E-12 0.00E+00 O.OOE+00 4.05E-12 0235/D3 0235/D4 0235/D5 0235/D6 0235/E 0235/F 0235/G 0235/Hi1 0235/H2 0235/HGL 0235/I 0235/J 0235/K 0235/L1 0235/L2 0235/M 0235/N 1 0235/N2 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 1.41 E-04 6.69E-07 1.41 E-04 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 1.41 E-04 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 1.41 E-04 6.69E-07 4.05E-12 4.05E-12 4.05E-12 4.05E-12 2.44E-1i1 2.44E-1i1 4.87E-i 1 5.13E-10 2.44E-11 2.21 E-11 2.44E-i 1 4.59E-1 1 1.16E-10 5.13E-10 2.44E-1 1 2.44E-1 1 2.57E-10 1.22E- 11 1.70E-09 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 O.0.0E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+OO 4.05E-12 4.05E-12 4.05E-12 4.05E-1 2 2.44E-1 1 2.44E- 11 4.87E-1i1 5.13E-10 2.44E-1 1 2.21E-11 2.44E-i 1 4.59E-11 1.16E-10 5.13E-10 2.44E-1 1 2.44E- 11 2.57E- 10 1.22E-11 1.70E-09 Total CDF and delta CDF 1 -N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.Revision 0 Page 11 of 17 Revision 0 Page 11 of 17 Version 1.0 Page 2287 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-023 Table 2-2b 1 FIRE AREA ACDF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN B ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CCDP CDF CCDP CDF ACDF 0235/Di 0235/D2 0235/D3 0235/D4 0235/D5 0235/D6 0235/E 0235/F 0235/G 0235/H 1 0235/H2 0235/HGL 0235/I 0235/J 0235/K 0235/L1 0235/L2 0235/M 0235/N1 0235/N2 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 1.41E-04 6.64E-07 1.41 E-04 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 1.41 E-04 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 1.41E-04 6.64E-07 4.02E-12 4.02E-12 4.02E-12 4.02E-12 4.02E-12 4.02E-12 2.42E-1i1 2.42E-i 1 4.84E-1 1 5.14E-10 2.42E-1i1 2.22E-1i1 2.42E-1 1 4.56E-1i1 1.16E-10 5.14E-10 2.42E-1 1 2.42E-1i1 2.57E-10 1.21E-11 1.70E-09 o.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 4.02E-12 4.02E-12 4.02E-12 4.02E-1 2 4.02E-12 4.02E-12 2.42E-1 I 2.42E-1i1 4.84E-1i1 5.14E-10 2.42E-1 1 2.22E-1i1 2.42E-1i1 4.56E-1i1 1.16E-10 5.14E-10 2.42E-1i1 2.42E-1i1 2.57E-10 1.21E-11 Total CDF and delta CDF O.OOE+00 1.70E-09-N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.Table 2-3a 1 FIRE AREA ALERF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN A ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CLERP LERF CLERP LERF ALERF 0235/D 1 0235/D2 0235/D3 0235/D4 0235/D5 0235/D6 0235/E 0235/F 0235/G 0235/Hi1 0235/H2 0235/HGL 0235/I 0235/J 0235/K 0235/L1 0235/L2 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 4.58E-07 1.61E-10 4.58E-07 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 4.58E-07 1.61E-10 9.74E-16 9.74E-16 9.74E- 16 9.74E-16 9.74E-16 9.74E-16 5.86E-15 5.86E-1 5 1.17E-14 1.67E-12 5.86E-1 5 7.18E-14 5.86E-1 5 1.10E-14 2.80E-14 1.67E-12 5.86E-15 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 9.74E-16 9.74E-16 9.74E-1 6 9.74E-1 6 9.74E-16 9.74E-16 5.86E-15 5.86E-1 5 1.17E-14 1.67E-12 5.86E-1 5 7.18E-14 5.86E-15 1.10E-14 2.80E-14 1.67E-12 5.86E-15 Revision 0 Page 12 of 17 Version 1.0 Page 2288 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-023 Table 2-3a 1 FIRE AREA ALERF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN A ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CLERP LERF CLERP LERF ALERF 0235/M 1.61E-10 5.86E-15 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 5.86E-15 0235/N1 4.58E-07 8.33E-13 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 8.33E-13 0235/N2 1.61E-10 2.93E-15 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 2.93E-15 Total LERF and delta LERF 4.33E-12 0.OOE+00 4.33E-12 1 _ N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.Table 2-3b 1 FIRE AREA ALERF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN B ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CLERP LERF CLERP LERF ALERF 0235/D1 0235/D2 0235/D3 0235/D4 0235/D5 0235/D6 0235/E 0235/F 0235/G 0235/Hi1 0235/H2 0235/HGL 0235/I 0235/J 0235/K 0235/L1 0235/L2 0235/M 0235/N1 0235/N2 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 4.58E-07 1.61E-10 4.58E-07 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 4.58E-07 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 4.58E-07 1.61E-10 9.74E-1 6 9.74E-16 9.74E-16 9.74E-16 9.74E-1 6 9.74E-16 5.86E-1 5 5.86E-1i5 1.17E-14 1.67E-12 5.86E-1 5 7.18E-14 5.86E-1 5 1.10E-14 2.80E-14 1.67E-12 5.86E-15 5.86E-15 8.33E-13 2.93E-1 5 4.33E-1 2 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOF+00 0.00E4-00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 9.74E-1 6 9.74E-1 6 9.74E-16 9.74E-16 9.74E-16 9.74E-16 5.86E-15 5.86E-15 1.17E-14 1.67E-12 5.86E-1 5 7.18E-14 5.86E-15 1.10E-14 2.80E-14 1.67E-12 5.86E-15 5.86E-15 8.33E-1 3 2.93E-1 5 4.33E-12 Total LERF and delta LERF 1 -N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.3.0 DID EVALUATION 3.1 Defense-in-Depth Evaluation A review of the impact of the change on defense-in-depth (DID) was performed.
NFPA 805 defines DID as: " Preventing fires from starting" Rapidly detecting fires and controlling and extinguishing promptly those fires that do occur, thereby limiting damage Revision 0 Page 13 of 17 Version 1.0 Page 2289 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-023 Providing adequate level of fire protection for structures, systems and components important to safety; so that a fire that is not promptly extinguished will not prevent essential plant safety functions from being performed.
In general, the DID requirement was considered satisfied if the proposed change does not result in a substantial imbalance among these elements (or echelons).
The review of DID was qualitative and addressed each of the elements with respect to the proposed change. Fire protection features and systems relied upon to ensure DID were identified in the assessment (e.g., detection, suppression system).The VFDRs and the associated Fire Area risk (CDF) and scenario consequences (CCDP values)were evaluated to identify general DID echelon imbalances.
Potential methods to balance the DID features were identified ensuring an adequate balance of DID features is maintained for the Fire Area. See Section 3.2 for the results of the evaluation.
3.2 Defense-in-Depth Review Results A review of defense in depth and risk evaluation results show that, given the systems and features specified in Table 3-1 and Section 2 respectively, risk acceptance criteria are met and that the balance of defense in depth is maintained.
The risk acceptance criteria are met with substantial margin to account for analytical methods associated with fire scenarios.
The analyzed scenarios bound potential fuel packages which can reasonably be expected to occur in this area.The installed detection system is required for both risk and DID and ensures prompt brigade response.
In addition, the installed suppression is being required to ensure the MCA analysis remains bounding.
There are no credible fire scenarios that affect core damage to the extent that additional systems or features, beyond detection, suppression and brigade response, would provide tangible margin.In the event of no intervention by the plant fire brigade, it is not expected that a credible fire would develop which would not be bounded by the analyzed scenarios.
Based on the systems/features specified above, no additional DID systems/features are warranted and the ability to meet nuclear performance criteria is ensured.The table below summarizes how an adequate balance of DID is maintained.
Table 3-1 Defense-in-Depth Impact Review Method of Providing DID Discussion Echelon 1: Prevent fires from starting Combustible Control No change necessary to procedure(s) 
/guidance document(s).
1 Hot Work Control No change necessary to procedure(s) 
/guidance document(s).
Echelon 2: Rapidly detect, control and extinguish promptly those fires that do occur thereby limiting fire damage Detection System Detection system is installed and required.Automatic Fire Suppression Automatic suppression system is installed, but not required.Portable Fire Extinguishers Portable extinguishers are available, but no enhancements required.1 Hose stations and hydrants Fire hose cabinets are available, but no enhancements required.
1 located in the area(s)Pre-Fire Plan No change necessary to procedure(s) 
/guidance document(s).
1 Revision 0 Page 14 of 17 Version 1.0 Page 2290 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-023 Table 3-1 Defense-in-Depth Impact Review Method of Providing DID Discussion Echelon 3: Provide adequate level of fire protection for systems and structures so that a fire will not prevent essential safety functions from being performed Walls, floors ceilings and structural No changes necessary to existing barriers.elements are rated or have been evaluated as adequate for the hazard.Openings in the fire barrier are rated No changes necessary to existing barrier openings.or have been evaluated as adequate for the hazard.Supplemental barriers (e.g., ERFBS, No supplemental barriers installed and not required.cable tray covers, etc.)Guidance provided to operations No VFDR related DID recovery actions required.personnel detailing the credited success path(s) including recovery actions to achieve nuclear safety performance criteria.1 This fire protection feature is relied upon without further DID enhancements beyond inherent programmatic requirements of NFPA 805, Chap. 3 and will not be reported in Table 5-2.3.2.1 Required Modifications There are no modifications required as a result of the DID evaluation for this fire area.3.2.2 Required Recovery Actions There are no required recovery actions as a result of the DID evaluation for this fire area.4.0 SAFETY MARGIN EVALUATION 4.1 Safety Margin Evaluation In accordance with NEI 04-02, 5.3.5.3 guidance, the maintenance of adequate Safety Margin is assessed by the consideration of categories of analyses utilized by this fire risk evaluation (FRE).Safety margins are considered to be maintained if: " Codes and standards or their alternatives accepted for use by the NRC are met, and" Safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) are met, or provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty.
The maintenance of adequate safety margin for the change analysis is described for each of the specific analysis types used in support of the fire risk assessment.
4.1.1 Fire Modeling Fire modeling performed in support of the transition has been performed within the Fire PRA utilizing codes and standards developed by industry and NRC staff to provide realistic yet conservative results. Specifically, the heat release rates utilized in the transition analysis are based upon NUREG/CR 6850, Task 8, Scoping Fire Modeling.
These heat release rates are conservative and represent values used to screen out fixed ignition sources that do not pose a Revision 0 Page 15 of 17 Version 1.0 Page 2291 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-023 threat to the targets within specific fire compartments and to assign severity factors to unscreened fixed ignition sources.The combined analysis approach is used during transition; therefore, maximum expected fire scenario/limiting fire scenario have not been analyzed separately.
The bases for the application of these fire modeling codes and standards were not altered in support of this FRE.4.1.2 Plant System Performance Plant system performance parameters were not modified as a result of this FRE. These performance parameters were originally established to support nuclear performance criteria contained in the plant specific accident analyses.
These analyses established component and system performance criteria necessary to establish safe and stable plant operation, as well as, safe shut down of the unit in the event of a fire. These performance parameters were not modified as a result of this FRE.4.2 Safety Margin Results All analyses and assessment have been performed utilizing accepted techniques and industry accepted standards.
In addition, safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) have been considered and provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty.
As such, the Safety Margins are maintained as discussed in Section 4.1.5.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION RESULTS 5.1 Dispositions of VFDRs Based on the FRE results contained in Sections 2, 3 and 4 the VFDRs identified in Section 1. 1 have been resolved as follows: Table 5-1 Final Variance Disposition Disposition VFDR ID U2-1-023-HVAC-001 U2-1-023-HVAC-002 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)U2-1 -023-HVAC-003 Revision 0 Page 16 of 17 Version 1 .0 Page 2292 of 3726 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-023 5.2 Fire Risk Evaluation Summary of Fire Protection Systems and Features Table 5-2 Summary of Required Fire Protection Systems and Features Required Required Required Fire Fire Area Fire Zone Suppression Detection Protection Feature Required Fire Protection System and Feature Details System System (R, D)(R, D) (R, D)U2 1-023 235 R R, D None R -Suppression system, Detection system;D -Detection system Required Suppression/Detection/Feature:
required in the Fire Area based on NFPA 805 Chapter 4 compliance.
The information is provided on a zone basis. The basis for the requirement of the fire protection system is designated as follows: R -Risk Criteria:
Systems required to meet the Risk Criteria for the Performance-Based Approach (NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4)D -Defense-in-depth Criteria:
Systems required to maintain adequate balance of Defense-in-Depth for a Performance-Based Approach (NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4)< Fire Protection Features in this Table only refer to those features installed in the Fire Area that have a corresponding NFPA 805, Chapter 3 requirement.
CD cn.o_ 5.3 Summary of Recovery Actions 6 No recovery actions are required for this fire area.5.4 Summary of Plant Modifications No modifications are required for this fire area.5.5 Fire Area Risk Summary Table 5-3 -Fire Area Risk Summary Fire Area Area Description NFPA 805 Fire Area CDF/LERF VFDR RAs Fire Risk Eval Additional Risk of RAs T Basis (Yes/No) (Yes/No) A CDF/LERF CDUnit 1 Auxiliary Building U2 1-023 4.2.4 1.70E-09/4.33E-12 Yes No 1.70E-09/4.33E-12 N/A Switchgear Room CD 0"M 0X9 Reiin0Pae1 f1 Revision 0 Page 17 of 17 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-030 Attachment 
-Unit 2 Fire Area 1-030 FRE for Fire Area Aux Building Cable Chase, Rooms 249 & 252 Revision:
0 Name Fire PRA Preparer Fire PRA Reviewer Fire Protection Preparer Fire Protection Reviewer NSCA Preparer NSCA Reviewer FRE Preparer FRE Reviewer Jonathan Hedrick Clint Pierce Rebecca Puckett Robert Kirkpatrick Larry Valmonte Dan Funk Micky Heatherly Brandon Jamar Revision 0 Page 1 of 14 Version 1.0 Page 2294 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-030 1.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION INPUT .....................................................................
4 1.1 Variances from the Deterministic Requirements 
....................................
4 1.2 Fire Protection Systems and Features ..................................................
4 1.2 .1 C o nstruction 
............................................................................. 
..4 1.2 .2 D e te ctio n ................................................................................... 
..4 1.2.3 Fixed Fire Suppression 
...............................................................
4 1.2.4 Manual Suppression 
...................................................................
4 1.2.5 Ventilation (Smoke Removal) .....................................................
5 1.2.6 Other Fire Protection Features .....................................................
5 1.2.7 Fire Hazard Identification 
...........................................................
5 1.2.8 Fire PRA Input .............................................................................
5 2.0 RISK EVALUATION 
.........................................................................................
6 2.1 Fire PRA Variant Case Calculation 
.......................................................
6 2.2 Compliant Case Calculation 
..................................................................
8 2.2.1 VFDRs Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA ..............................
8 2.2.2 VFDRs Not Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA .......................
8 2.2.3 Compliant Case Results .............................................................
8 2.2.4 Required Modifications 
................................................................
8 2.2.5 Required Recovery Actions .........................................................
9 2.3 Risk Evaluation Results ........................................................................
9 3.0 DID EVALUATION 
.........................................................................................
10 3.1 Defense-in-Depth Evaluation 
...............................................................
10 3.2 Defense-in-Depth Review Results ......................................................
10 3.2.1 Required Modifications 
.............................................................
11 3.2.2 Required Recovery Actions .......................................................
11 4.0 SAFETY MARGIN EVALUATION 
...................................................................
12 4.1 Safety Margin Evaluation 
......................................................................
12 4 .1.1 F ire M o d e ling .......................................................................... 
..12 4.1.2 Plant System Performance 
......................................................
12 4.2 Safety Margin Results ..........................................................................
12 5.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION RESULTS .............................................................
13 5.1 Dispositions of VFDRs ........................................................................
13 5.2 Fire Risk Evaluation Summary of Fire Protection Systems and Features 14 Revision 0 Page 2 of 14 Version 1.0 Page 2295 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-030 SE-C051 326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-030 5.3 5.4 5.5 Summary of Recovery Actions .............................................................
14 Summary of Plant Modifications 
..........................................................
14 Fire Area Risk Summary ......................................................................
14 Revision 0 Page 3 of 14 Version 1.0 Page 2296 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-030 1.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION INPUT 1.1 Variances from the Deterministic Requirements The VFDRs identified for evaluation for Unit 2, Fire Area 1-030, Aux Building Cable Chase, Rooms 249 & 252 are: Table 1-1 VFDRs VFDR Component(s)
Description U2-1-030-Q2R42B0001B:ENERGI This component, 125V DC Bus 2B, requires HVAC support to HVAC-001 ZED:ENERGIZED-remain functional.
Failure to provide HVAC support to this BC2B, 125V DC BUS 2B electrical component challenges electrical support Vital Auxiliaries Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-1-030-Q2R15A0007:ENERGIZ This component, Switchgear 2G, requires HVAC support to remain HVAC-002 ED:ENERGIZED-functional.
Failure to provide HVAC support to this electrical SUT2A, 4160V component challenges electrical support Vital Auxiliaries Nuclear SWITCHGEAR BUS 2G Safety Performance Criteria.U2-1-030-Q2R42E0002B:AVAILAB This component, 125VDC Battery 2B, requires HVAC support to HVAC-003 LE:AVAILABLE, 125V remain functional.
Failure to provide HVAC support to this BATTERY 2B electrical component challenges electrical support Vital Auxiliaries Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.1.2 Fire Protection Systems and Features Fire Area 1-030 consists of Fire Zones: N 249 -Cable Chase -Elevation 121 '-0"and 139'-0" 0 252 -Cable Chase -Elevation 127'-0" 1.2.1 Construction Barriers for this fire area are of substantial construction and have been designed and constructed to meet separation requirements.
In the event the configuration utilized is not in accordance with recognized standards, the deviations have been evaluated to be adequate for the hazard.1.2.2 Detection Fire detection systems to initiate plant suppression systems and to provide notification to the Control Room are:* Fire Zones 249 and 252 are provided with detection.
1.2.3 Fixed Fire Suppression Fixed fire suppression systems to aid in control of both fire growth and spread in the fire area are:* Fire Zones 249 and 252 are provided with suppression.
1.2.4 Manual Suppression Manual suppression equipment to be utilized by plant personnel and/or fire brigade members are: Revision 0 Page 4 of 14 Version 1.0 Page 2297 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-030* Fire Area 1-030 is provided with a fire hose cabinet located in Room 234 (Fire Area 1-020).1.2.5 Ventilation (Smoke Removal)Portable smoke ejectors are available to assist with smoke removal.1.2.6 Other Fire Protection Features No additional fire protection features are required for this fire risk evaluation.
1.2.7 Fire Hazard Identification The major source of combustibles in Fire Area 1-030 is cable insulation.
Details regarding fire scenarios quantified in the fire PRA, and their associated ignition sources (where applicable) are discussed in Section 2.1.2.8 Fire PRA Input Fire protection features There are no fire protection features specifically modeled in the Fire PRA for this fire area.Fire protection systems There are no fire protection systems specifically modeled in the Fire PRA for this fire area.Hot Gas Layer Treatment This fire area screened for potential Hot Gas Layer effects on the Zone Of Influence.
No credit for detection was taken in the Hot Gas Layer evaluation for this fire area. No credit for manual or automatic fire suppression was taken in the Hot Gas Layer evaluation for this fire area.Multi-compartment analysis No credit for detection was taken in the Multi Compartment Analysis for this fire area. No credit for manual or automatic fire suppression was taken in the Multi Compartment Analysis for this fire area.Scenario Review All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0, ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency.
Revision 0 Page 5 of 14 Version 1.0 Page 2298 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-030 2.0 RISK EVALUATION 2.1 Fire PRA Variant Case Calculation Tables 2-1a and 2-1b provide the results of the variant case calculation for Fire Area 1-030. This is taken directly from the Fire PRA model with no changes or alterations made. The CDF and LERF results are provided on a scenario basis.The total area CDF and LERF is below the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr and 1E-08/rx-yr, respectively.
The total CDF/LERF can be used as a conservative estimate of the delta CDF/LERF with respect to a compliant configuration.
No further analysis of the delta CDF/LERF is required.Revision 0 Page 6 of 14 Version 1.0 Page 2299 of 3726 SE-CO51326701 
-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-030 Table 2-1a Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train A Alignment Zone Scen ScenDescl IGF NSP SF CCDP CDF CLERP LERF (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr)0249 A BASE CASE 2.22E-05 1.0 1.0 1.41 E-04 3.13E-09 4.58E-07 1.02E-11 0252 A01 BASE CASE -MODIFIED 2.57E-05 1.0 1.0 1.41E-04 3.63E-09 4.58E-07 1.18E-11 Total CDF/LERF Fire PRA Variant Case 6.76E-09 2.20E-11 Table 2-1b Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train B Alignment Zone Scen ScenDescl IGF NSP SF CCDP CDF CLERP LERF (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr)0249 A BASE CASE 2.22E-05 1.0 1.0 1.41 E-04 3.14E-09 4.58E-07 1.02E-11 0252 A01 BASE CASE -MODIFIED 2.57E-05 1.0 1.0 1.41E-04 3.63E-09 4.58E-07 1.18E-11 Total CDF/LERF Fire PRA Variant Case 6.77E-09 2.20E-11 Where: Zone = Fire Zone Scen = 'A' to signify the variant case ScenDesc = Description of the Fire Scenario IGF = Ignition Frequency 
(/rx-yr)NSP = Non Suppression Probability SF = Severity Factor CCDP = Conditional Core Damage Probability CDF = Core Damage Frequency 
(/rx-yr)CLERP = Conditional Large Early Release Probability LERF = Large Early Release Frequency 
(/rx-yr)1 ' Base Case' scenarios are complete room burnout and therefore do not identify specific ignition sources Revision 0 Page 7 of 14 Revision 0 Page 7 of 14 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-030 2.2 Compliant Case Calculation The following sub-sections provide the basis for modeling each VFDR (or category of VFDRs)and the alterations that have been made to the variant case to represent the compliant case. In each section a discussion of the VFDR (or the category of VFDRs) is provided.2.2.1 VFDRs Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA The following VFDRs are modeled in the Fire PRA and are therefore included in the total fire area CDF/LERF used as a surrogate for the delta risk evaluation for this fire area:.U2-1-030-HVAC-00 I -Q2R42B0001 B:ENERGIZED:ENERGIZED-BC2B 2.2.2 VFDRs Not Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA A Fire PRA was developed in accordance with the requirements of Part 4 "Requirements for Fires at Power PRA" of the ASME and ANS combined PRA Standard, ASME/ANS RA-Sa-2009, "Standard for Level 1/Large Early Release Frequency Probabilistic Risk Assessment for Nuclear Power Plant Applications".
Consistent with those requirements not all components required to meet the nuclear safety criteria need to be specifically modeled in the Fire PRA. The following VFDRs are associated with components not modeled in the Fire PRA: 2.2.2.1 VFDR U2-1-030-HVAC-002 4kV Switchgear Room 2G ventilation is not modeled in the fire PRA. Room Heat up calculations show that there will be no impact to the 4kV Switchgear Room due to loss of HVAC within the mission time of 24 hrs in the fire PRA. See calculation Fire PRA Logic Model for Farley Nuclear Plants, PRA-BC-F-1 1-004.E U2-1-030-HVAC-002-Q2R 15A0007:ENERGIZED:ENERGIZED-SUT2A 2.2.2.2 VFDR U2-1-030-HVAC-003 Battery Room 2B ventilation is not modeled in the fire PRA. The Battery Room exhaust fan function is to remove the hydrogen that is generated from the battery located within the room.The hydrogen production in the 24 hour mission time of the PRA is less than the required amount for a hydrogen burn, therefore the exhaust fan is not required to be modeled. See calculation Fire PRA Logic Model for Farley Nuclear Plants, PRA-BC-F-1 1-004.* U2-1-030-HVAC-003-Q2R42E0002B:AVAILABLE:AVAILABLE 2.2.3 Compliant Case Results The total area CDF and LERF is below the screening acceptance criteria of IE-07/rx-yr and IE-08/rx-yr, respectively.
The total CDF/LERF can be used as a conservative estimate of the delta CDF/LERF with respect to a compliant configuration.
No further analysis of the delta CDF/LERF is required.2.2.4 Required Modifications There are no modifications required as a result of the risk evaluation for this fire area.Revision 0 Page 8 of 14 Version 1.0 Page 2301 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-030 2.2.5 Required Recovery Actions There are no required recovery actions as a result of the risk evaluation for this fire area.2.3 Risk Evaluation Results The ACDF/LERF is below the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr (CDF) and 1E-08/rx-yr (LERF) for acceptable risk. All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0 ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency.
The following tables present the fire zone/scenario fire risk as well as the total fire risk for this fire area. Given the relatively low risk for these zones/scenarios the delta risk is defined by the variant case risk, the compliant case risk is conservatively assumed to be 0.Table 2-2a 1 FIRE AREA aCDF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN A ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CCDP CDF CCDP CDF aCDF 0249/A 1.41 E-04 3.13E-09 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 3.13E-09 0252/AO1 1.41E-04 3.63E-09 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 3.63E-09 Total CDF and delta CDF 6.76E-09 0.OOE+00 6.76E-09 1 _ N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.Table 2-2b 1 FIRE AREA ACDF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN B ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CCDP CDF CCDP CDF aCDF 0249/A 1.41 E-04 3.14E-09 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 3.14E-09 0252/AO1 1.41 E-04 3.63E-09 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 3.63E-09 Total CDF and delta CDF 6.77E-09 0.OOE+00 6.77E-09 1 _ N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.Table 2-3a 1 FIRE AREA aLERF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN A ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CLERP LERF CLERP LERF ALERF 0249/A 4.58E-07 1.02E-11 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 1.02E-11 0252/AO1 4.58E-07 1.18E-11 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 1.18E-11 Total LERF and delta LERF 2.20E-11 0.OOE+00 2.20E-11-N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.Revision 0 Page 9 of 14 Version 1.0 Page 2302 of 3726 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-030 Table 2-3b 1 FIRE AREA ALERF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN B ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CLERP LERF CLERP LERF ALERF 0249/A 4.58E-07 1.02E-11 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 1.02E-11 0252/AO1 4.58E-07 1.18E-11 O.OOE+00 0.00E+00 1.18E-11 Total LERF and delta LERF 2.20E-11 0.OOE+00 2.20E-11-N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.3.0 DID EVALUATION 3.1 Defense-in-Depth Evaluation A review of the impact of the change on defense-in-depth (DID) was performed.
NFPA 805 defines DID as: " Preventing fires from starting" Rapidly detecting fires and controlling and extinguishing promptly those fires that do occur, thereby limiting damage" Providing adequate level of fire protection for structures, systems and components important to safety; so that a fire that is not promptly extinguished will not prevent essential plant safety functions from being performed.
In general, the DID requirement was considered satisfied if the proposed change does not result in a substantial imbalance among these elements (or echelons).
The review of DID was qualitative and addressed each of the elements with respect to the proposed change. Fire protection features and systems relied upon to ensure DID were identified in the assessment (e.g., detection, suppression system).The VFDRs and the associated Fire Area risk (CDF) and scenario consequences (CCDP values)were evaluated to identify general DID echelon imbalances.
Potential methods to balance the DID features were identified ensuring an adequate balance of DID features is maintained for the Fire Area. See Section 3.2 for the results of the evaluation.
3.2 Defense-in-Depth Review Results A review of defense in depth and risk evaluation results show that, given the systems and features specified in Table 3-1 and Section 2 respectively, risk acceptance criteria are met and that the balance of defense in depth is maintained.
The risk acceptance criteria are met with substantial margin to account for analytical methods associated with fire scenarios.
The analyzed scenarios bound potential fuel packages which can reasonably be expected to occur in this area.The installed detection system is required for DID to ensure prompt brigade response.
Although automatic suppression is installed in the fire area, it is not required for DID. There are no credible fire scenarios that affect core damage to the extent that additional systems or features, beyond detection and brigade response, would provide tangible margin.In the event of no intervention by the plant fire brigade, it is not expected that a credible fire would develop which would not be bounded by the analyzed scenarios.
Based on the Revision 0 Page 10 of 14 Version 1.0 Page 2303 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-030 systems/features specified above, no additional DID systems/features are warranted and the ability to meet nuclear performance criteria is ensured.The table below summarizes how an adequate balance of DID is maintained.
Table 3-1 Defense-in-Depth Impact Review Method of Providing DID Discussion Echelon 1: Prevent fires from starting Combustible Control No change necessary to procedure(s) 
/guidance document(s).
1 Hot Work Control No change necessary to procedure(s) 
/guidance document(s).
1 Echelon 2: Rapidly detect, control and extinguish promptly those fires that do occur thereby limiting fire damage Detection System Detection system is installed and required.Automatic Fire Suppression Automatic suppression system is installed, but not required.Portable Fire Extinguishers No portable extinguishers available and not required.Hose stations and hydrants Fire hose cabinets are available, but no enhancements required.
1 located in the area(s)Pre-Fire Plan No change necessary to procedure(s) 
/guidance document(s).
Echelon 3: Provide adequate level of fire protection for systems and structures so that a fire will not prevent essential safety functions from being performed Walls, floors ceilings and structural No changes necessary to existing barriers.
1 elements are rated or have been evaluated as adequate for the hazard.Openings in the fire barrier are rated No changes necessary to existing barrier openings.or have been evaluated as adequate for the hazard.Supplemental barriers (e.g., ERFBS, No supplemental barriers installed and not required.cable tray covers, etc.)Guidance provided to operations No VFDR related DID recovery actions required.personnel detailing the credited success path(s) including recovery actions to achieve nuclear safety performance criteria.This fire protection feature is relied upon without further DID enhancements beyond inherent programmatic requirements of NFPA 805, Chap. 3 and will not be reported in Table 5-2.3.2.1 Required Modifications There are no modifications required as a result of the DID evaluation for this fire area.3.2.2 Required Recovery Actions There are no required recovery actions as a result of the DID evaluation for this fire area.Revision 0 Page 11 of 14 Version 1.0 Page 2304 of 3726 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-030 4.0 SAFETY MARGIN EVALUATION 4.1 Safety Margin Evaluation In accordance with NEI 04-02, 5.3.5.3 guidance, the maintenance of adequate Safety Margin is assessed by the consideration of categories of analyses utilized by this fire risk evaluation (FRE).Safety margins are considered to be maintained if: " Codes and standards or their alternatives accepted for use by the NRC are met, and" Safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) are met, or provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty.
The maintenance of adequate safety margin for the change analysis is described for each of the specific analysis types used in support of the fire risk assessment.
4.1.1 Fire Modeling Fire modeling performed in support of the transition has been perfon-ned within the Fire PRA utilizing codes and standards developed by industry and NRC staff to provide realistic yet conservative results. Specifically, the heat release rates utilized in the transition analysis are based upon NUREG/CR 6850, Task 8, Scoping Fire Modeling.
These heat release rates are conservative and represent values used to screen out fixed ignition sources that do not pose a threat to the targets within specific fire compartments and to assign severity factors to unscreened fixed ignition sources.The combined analysis approach is used during transition; therefore, maximum expected fire scenario/limiting fire scenario have not been analyzed separately.
The bases for the application of these fire modeling codes and standards were not altered in support of this FRE.4.1.2 Plant System Performance Plant system performance parameters were not modified as a result of this FRE. These performance parameters were originally established to support nuclear performance criteria contained in the plant specific accident analyses.
These analyses established component and system performance criteria necessary to establish safe and stable plant operation, as well as, safe shut down of the unit in the event of a fire. These performance parameters were not modified as a result of this FRE.4.2 Safety Margin Results All analyses and assessment have been performed utilizing accepted techniques and industry accepted standards.
In addition, safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) have been considered and provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty.
As such, the Safety Margins are maintained as discussed in Section 4.1.Revision 0 Page 12 of 14 Version 1.0 Page 2305 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-030 5.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION RESULTS 5.1 Dispositions of VFDRs Based on the FRE results contained in Sections 2, 3 and 4 the VFDRs identified in Section 1. 1 have been resolved as follows: Table 5-1 Final Variance Disposition Disposition VFDR ID U2-1-030-HVAC-001 U2-1-030-HVAC-002 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)U2-1-030-HVAC-003 Revision 0 Page 13 of 14 Version 1.0 Page 2306 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-030 5.2 Fire Risk Evaluation Summary of Fire Protection Systems and Features Table 5-2 Summary of Required Fire Protection Systems and Features Required Required Required Fire Fire Area Fire Zone Suppression DetectionReurdFe e Su ssin Stetn Protection Feature Required Fire Protection System and Feature Details System System (R, D)(R, D) (R, D)U2 1-030 249 None D None D -Detection system 252 None D None D -Detection system Required Suppression/Detection/Feature:
required in the Fire Area based on NFPA 805 Chapter 4 compliance.
The information is provided on a zone basis. The basis for the requirement of the fire protection system is designated as follows: R -Risk Criteria:
Systems required to meet the Risk Criteria for the Performance-Based Approach (NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4)D -Defense-in-depth Criteria:
Systems required to maintain adequate balance of Defense-in-Depth for a Performance-Based Approach (NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4)Fire Protection Features in this Table only refer to those features installed in the Fire Area that have a corresponding NFPA 805, Chapter 3 requirement.
5.3 Summary of Recovery Actions No recovery actions are required for this fire area.5.4 Summary of Plant Modifications No modifications are required for this fire area.5.5 Fire Area Risk Summary Table 5-3 -Fire Area Risk Summary Fire Area Area Description NFPA 805 Fire Area CDF/LERF VFDR RAs Fire Risk Eval Additional Risk of RAs Basis (Yes/No) (Yes/No) A CDF/LERF U2 1-030 Unit 1 Auxiliary Building 4.2.4 6.77E-09/2.20E-1 1 Yes No 6.77E-09/2.20E-1 1 N/A Cable Chase Revision 0 Page 14 of 14 Revision 0 Page 14 of 14 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-031 Attachment 
-Unit 2 Fire Area 1-031 FRE for Fire Area Aux Building Cable Chase Rooms 250 and 251 Revision:
0 Name Fire PRA Preparer Fire PRA Reviewer Fire Protection Preparer Fire Protection Reviewer NSCA Preparer NSCA Reviewer FRE Preparer FRE Reviewer Jonathan Hedrick Clint Pierce Rebecca Puckett Robert Kirkpatrick Larry Valmonte, Dan Funk Micky Heatherly Steve Hardy Revision 0 Page 1 of 15 Version 1.0 Page 2308 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-031 1.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION INPUT .....................................................................
4 1.1 Variances from the Deterministic Requirements 
....................................
4 1.2 Fire Protection Systems and Features ..................................................
4 1.2 .1 C o nstructio n ............................................................................. 
..4 1 .2 .2 D ete ctio n ................................................................................... 
..4 1.2.3 Fixed Fire Suppression 
...............................................................
4 1.2.4 Manual Suppression 
...................................................................
4 1.2.5 Ventilation (Smoke Removal) .....................................................
5 1.2.6 Other Fire Protection Features .....................................................
5 1.2.7 Fire Hazard Identification 
..........................................................
5 1.2.8 Fire PRA Input .............................................................................
5 2.0 RISK EVALUATION 
.........................................................................................
5 2.1 Fire PRA Variant Case Calculation 
......................................................
5 2.2 Compliant Case Calculation 
..................................................................
8 2.2.1 VFDRs Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA ..............................
8 2.2.2 VFDRs Not Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA ......................
8 2.2.3 Compliant Case Results .............................................................
8 2.2.4 Required Modifications 
................................................................
8 2.2.5 Required Recovery Actions .........................................................
8 2.3 Risk Evaluation Results ........................................................................
9 3.0 DID EVALUATION 
.........................................................................................
10 3.1 Defense-in-Depth Evaluation 
...............................................................
10 3.2 Defense-in-Depth Review Results ......................................................
11 3.2.1 Required Modifications 
.............................................................
12 3.2.2 Required Recovery Actions .......................................................
12 4.0 SAFETY MARGIN EVALUATION 
...................................................................
12 4.1 Safety Margin Evaluation 
......................................................................
12 4 .1.1 F ire M od e ling .......................................................................... 
..12 4.1.2 Plant System Performance 
......................................................
12 4.2 Safety Margin Results ..........................................................................
13 5.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION RESULTS .............................................................
13 5.1 Dispositions of VFDRs ........................................................................
13 5.2 Fire Risk Evaluation Summary of Fire Protection Systems and Features 14 Revision 0 Page 2 of 15 Version 1.0 Page 2309 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-031 SE-C051 326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-031 5.3 5.4 5.5 Summary of Recovery Actions .............................................................
14 Summary of Plant Modifications 
..........................................................
14 Fire Area Risk Summary .......................................................................
15 Revision 0 Page 3 of 15 Version 1.0 Page 2310 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-031 1.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION INPUT 1.1 Variances from the Deterministic Requirements The VFDRs identified for evaluation for Unit 2, Fire Area 1-03 1, Aux Building Cable Chase Rooms 250 and 251 are: Table 1-1 VFDRs VFDR Component(s)
Description U2-1-031-Q2R42B0001A:ENERGI This component, 125V DC Bus 2A, requires HVAC support to HVAC-001 ZED:ENERGIZED-remain functional.
Failure to provide HVAC support to this BC2C, 125V DC BUS 2A electrical component challenges electrical support Vital Auxiliaries Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-1-031-Q2R15A0006:ENERGIZ This component, Switchgear 2F, requires HVAC support to remain HVAC-002 ED:ENERGIZED-functional.
Failure to provide HVAC support to this electrical SUT2A, 4160V component challenges electrical support Vital Auxiliaries Nuclear SWITCHGEAR BUS 2F Safety Performance Criteria.U2-1-031-Q2R17B0001:ENERGIZ This component, MCC 2A, requires HVAC support to remain HVAC-003 ED:ENERGIZED, functional.
Failure to provide HVAC support to this electrical MOTOR CONTROL component challenges electrical support Vital Auxiliaries Nuclear CENTER 2A Safety Performance Criteria.1.2 Fire Protection Systems and Features Fire Area 1-031 consists of Fire Zones 250 and 251. This fire area is located in the Auxiliary Building Cable Chase Rooms 250 and 251 at elevations 121 '- 0" and 139'- 0".1.2.1 Construction Barriers for this fire area are of substantial construction and have been designed and constructed to meet separation requirements.
In the event the configuration utilized is not in accordance with recognized standards, the deviations have been evaluated to be adequate for the hazard.1.2.2 Detection Fire detection systems to initiate plant suppression systems or to provide notification to the Control Room are: Fire Zone 250 is provided with detection.
Fire Zone 251 is provided with detection.
1.2.3 Fixed Fire Suppression Fixed fire suppression systems to aid in control of both fire growth and spread in the fire area are:* Fire Zone 250 is provided with suppression.
* Fire Zone 251 is provided with suppression.
1.2.4 Manual Suppression Manual suppression equipment to be utilized by plant personnel and/or fire brigade members are: Revision 0 Page 4 of 15 Version 1.0 Page 2311 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-031* Fire Area 1-031 is provided with a fire hose cabinet located in room 234 (Fire Area 1-020).1.2.5 Ventilation (Smoke Removal)Portable smoke ejectors are available to assist with smoke removal.1.2.6 Other Fire Protection Features No additional fire protection features are required for this fire risk evaluation.
1.2.7 Fire Hazard Identification The major source of combustibles in Fire Area 1-031 is cable insulation.
Details regarding fire scenarios quantified in the fire PRA, and their associated ignition sources (where applicable) are discussed in Section 2.1.2.8 Fire PRA Input Fire protection features There are no fire protection features specifically modeled in the Fire PRA for this fire area.Fire protection systems The Multi-Compartment Analysis evaluation credits the detection system and manual fire brigade response.Hot Gas Layer Treatment This fire area screened for potential Hot Gas Layer effects on the Zone Of Influence.
No credit for detection was taken in the Hot Gas Layer evaluation for this fire area. No credit for manual or automatic fire suppression was taken in the Hot Gas Layer evaluation for this fire area.Multi-compartment analysis Credit for detection was taken in the Multi-Compartment Analysis for this fire area. Credit for manual fire brigade response was taken in the Multi Compartment Analysis for this fire area.Scenario Review All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0, ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency.
2.0 RISK EVALUATION 2.1 Fire PRA Variant Case Calculation Tables 2-1a and 2-1b provide the results of the variant case calculation for Fire Area 1-031. This is taken directly from the Fire PRA model with no changes or alterations made. The CDF and LERF results are provided on a scenario basis.Revision 0 Page 5 of 15 Version 1.0 Page 2312 of 3726 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-031 The total area CDF and LERF is below the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr and lE-08/rx-yr, respectively.
The total CDF/LERF can be used as a conservative estimate of the delta CDF/LERF with respect to a compliant configuration.
No further analysis of the delta CDF/LERF is required.Revision 0 Page 6 of 15 Version 1.0 Page 2313 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-031 Table 2-1a Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train A Alignment Zone Scen ScenDescl IGF NSP SF CCDP CDF CLERP LERF (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr)0250 A BASE CASE 2.35E-05 1.0 1.0 9.08E-04 2.13E-08 1.96E-06 4.60E-11 0251 A01 BASE CASE- MODIFIED 2.68E-05 1.0 1.0 8.69E-04 2.33E-08 1.92E-06 5.14E-11 Total CDF/LERF Fire PRA Variant Case 4.46E-08 9.74E-1 1 Table 2-1 b Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train B Alignment Zone Scen ScenDescI IGF NSP SF CCDP CDF CLERP LERF (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr)0250 A BASE CASE 2.35E-05 1.0 1.0 1.01E-03 2.38E-08 1.43E-06 3.37E-11 0251 A01 BASE CASE -MODIFIED 2.68E-05 1.0 1.0 9.59E-04 2.57E-08 1.39E-06 3.73E-1 1 Total CDF/LERF Fire PRA Variant Case 4.95E-08 7.1OE-11 Where: Zone = Fire Zone Scen = 'A' to signify the variant case ScenDesc = Description of the Fire Scenario IGF = Ignition Frequency 
(/rx-yr)NSP = Non Suppression Probability SF = Severity Factor CCDP = Conditional Core Damage Probability CDF = Core Damage Frequency 
(/rx-yr)CLERP = Conditional Large Early Release Probability LERF = Large Early Release Frequency 
(/rx-yr)-'Base Case' scenarios are complete room burnout and therefore do not identify specific ignition sources Revision 0 Page 7 of 15 Revision 0 Page 7 of 15 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-031 2.2 Compliant Case Calculation The following sub-sections provide the basis for modeling each VFDR (or category of VFDRs)and the alterations that have been made to the variant case to represent the compliant case. In each section a discussion of the VFDR (or the category of VFDRs) is provided.2.2.1 VFDRs Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA The following VFDRs are modeled in the Fire PRA and are therefore included in the total fire area CDF/LERF used as a surrogate for the delta risk evaluation for this fire area: a U2-1-031-HVAC-001-Q2R42B0001A:ENERGIZED:ENERGIZED-BC2C 2.2.2 VFDRs Not Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA A Fire PRA was developed in accordance with the requirements of Part 4 "Requirements for Fires at PowerPRA" of the ASME and ANS combined PRA Standard, ASME/ANS RA-Sa-2009, "Standard for Level 1/Large Early Release Frequency Probabilistic Risk Assessment for Nuclear Power Plant Applications".
Consistent with those requirements not all components required to meet the nuclear safety criteria need to be specifically modeled in the Fire PRA. The following VFDRs are associated with components not modeled in the Fire PRA: 2.2.2.1 VFDR U2-1-031-HVAC-002 4kV Switchgear Room 2F ventilation is not modeled in the fire PRA. Room Heat up calculations show that there will be no impact to the 4kV Switchgear Room due to loss of HVAC within the mission time of 24 hrs in the fire PRA. See calculation Fire PRA Logic Model for Farley Nuclear Plants, PRA-BC-F-11-004..U2-1-031-HVAC-002-Q2RI5A0006:ENERGIZED:ENERGIZED-SUT2A 2.2.2.2 VFDR U2-1-031-HVAC-003 MCC 2A ventilation is not modeled in the fire PRA. Room Heat up calculations show that there will be no impact to the MCC 2A due to loss of HVAC within the mission time of 24 hrs in the fire PRA. See calculation Fire PRA Logic Model for Farley Nuclear Plants, PRA-BC-F-11-004.* U2- 1-031 -HVAC-003-Q2R 177B000 1:ENERGIZED:ENERGIZED 2.2.3 Compliant Case Results The total area CDF and LERF is below the screening acceptance criteria of I E-07/rx-yr and I E-08/rx-yr, respectively.
The total CDF/LERF can be used as a conservative estimate of the delta CDF/LERF with respect to a compliant configuration.
No further analysis of the delta CDF/LERF is required.2.2.4 Required Modifications There are no modifications required as a result of the risk evaluation for this fire area.2.2.5 Required Recovery Actions The following recovery actions are required as a result of the risk evaluation for this fire area: Revision 0 Page 8 of 15 Version 1.0 Page 2315 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-031 Table 2-2 Required Recovery Actions Component ID Basic Event VFDR BE Description Recovery Action Description OPERATOR Operator action to RECOVERY OF provide alternate Q2R42B0001 A:ENERGIZED:E OP-RECOV-U2-1-031-BATTERY cooling attery NERGIZED-BC2C BCSW-A HVAC-001 CHARGER 2A cooling for battery ROOM COOLING charger room due to FAMOIS loss of Train A SW FAILS 2.3 Risk Evaluation Results The ACDF/LERF is below the screening acceptance criteria of 1 E-07/rx-yr (CDF) and IE-08/rx-yr (LERF) for acceptable risk. All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0 ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency.
The following tables present the fire zone/scenario fire risk as well as the total fire risk for this fire area. Given the relatively low risk for these zones/scenarios the delta risk is defined by the variant case risk, the compliant case risk is conservatively assumed to be 0.Table 2-3a 1 FIRE AREA ACDF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN A ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CCDP CDF CCDP CDF ACDF 0250/A 9.08E-04 2.13E-08 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 2.13E-08 0251/AO1 8.69E-04 2.33E-08 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 2.33E-08 Total CDF and delta CDF2 4.46E-08 0.OOE+00 4.46E-08 1 -N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.OOE+00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.2 Total ACDF includes the risk of recovery actions required to demonstrate the availability of a success path for the nuclear safety performance criteria.Table 2-3b 1 FIRE AREA ACDF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN B ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CCDP CDF CCDP CDF ACDF 0250/A 1.01 E-03 2.38E-08 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 2.38E-08 0251/AO1 9.59E-04 2.57E-08 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 2.57E-08 Total CDF and delta CDF2 4.95E-08 O.OOE+00 4.95E-08 1 _ N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.OOE+00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.2 _ Total ACDF includes the risk of recovery actions required to demonstrate the availability of a success path for the nuclear safety performance criteria.Revision 0 Page 9 of 15 Version 1.0 Page 2316 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-031 Table 2-4a 1 FIRE AREA ALERF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN A ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CLERP LERF CLERP LERF ALERF 0250/A 1.96E-06 4.60E-11 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 4.60E-11 0251/AO1 1.92E-06 5.14E-11 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 5.14E-11 Total LERF and delta LERF2 9.74E-11 0.OOE+00 9.74E-11 1 _ N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.00E+00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.2_ Total ALERF includes the risk of recovery actions required to demonstrate the availability of a success path for the nuclear safety performance criteria.Table 2-4b 1 FIRE AREA cLERF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN B ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CLERP LERF CLERP LERF ALERF 0250/A 1.43E-06 3.37E-11 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 3.37E- 11 0251/AO1 1.39E-06 3.73E-11 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 3.73E-11 Total LERF and delta LERF2 7.10E-11 0.OOE+00 7.10E-11-N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.OOE+00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.2 _ Total ALERF includes the risk of recovery actions required to demonstrate the availability of a success path for the nuclear safety performance criteria.3.0 DID EVALUATION 3.1 Defense-in-Depth Evaluation A review of the impact of the change on defense-in-depth (DID) was performed.
NFPA 805 defines DID as:* Preventing fires from starting* Rapidly detecting fires and controlling and extinguishing promptly those fires that do occur, thereby limiting damage Providing adequate level of fire protection for structures, systems and components important to safety; so that a fire that is not promptly extinguished will not prevent essential plant safety functions from being performed.
In general, the DID requirement was considered satisfied if the proposed change does not result in a substantial imbalance among these elements (or echelons).
The review of DID was qualitative and addressed each of the elements with respect to the proposed change. Fire protection features and systems relied upon to ensure DID were identified in the assessment (e.g., detection, suppression system).The VFDRs and the associated Fire Area risk (CDF) and scenario consequences (CCDP values)were evaluated to identify general DID echelon imbalances.
Potential methods to balance the DID features were identified ensuring an adequate balance of DID features is maintained for the Fire Area. See Section 3.2 for the results of the evaluation.
Revision 0 Page 10 of 15 Version 1.0 Page 2317 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-031 3.2 Defense-in-Depth Review Results A review of defense in depth and risk evaluation results show that, given the systems and features specified in Table 3-1 and Section 2 respectively, risk acceptance criteria are met and that the balance of defense in depth is maintained.
The risk acceptance criteria are met with substantial margin to account for analytical methods associated with fire scenarios.
The analyzed scenarios bound potential fuel packages which can reasonably be expected to occur in this area.The installed detection and pre-action suppression systems are required for DID. In addition, the detection system supports the brigade response and is required for risk (MCA analysis).
Also, for consistency with the risk analysis and to provide additional risk margin, recovery actions are being required.
Results of the analyzed scenarios indicated additional suppression effects would enhance margin, which is why the pre-action suppression system is required.In the event of no intervention by the plant fire brigade, it is not expected that a credible fire would develop which would not be bounded by the analyzed scenarios.
Based on the systems/features specified above, no additional DID systems/features are warranted and the ability to meet nuclear performance criteria is ensured.The table below summarizes how an adequate balance of DID is maintained.
Table 3-1 Defense-in-Depth Impact Review Method of Providing DID Discussion Echelon 1: Prevent fires from starting Combustible Control No change necessary to procedure(s) 
/guidance document(s).
1 Hot Work Control No change necessary to procedure(s) 
/guidance document(s).
1 Echelon 2: Rapidly detect, control and extinguish promptly those fires that do occur thereby limiting fire damage Detection System Detection system is installed and required.Automatic Fire Suppression Automatic suppression system is installed and required.Portable Fire Extinguishers No portable extinguishers available and not required.Hose stations and hydrants Fire hose cabinets are available, but no enhancements required.located in the area(s)Pre-Fire Plan No change necessary to procedure(s) 
/guidance document(s).
1 Echelon 3: Provide adequate level of fire protection for systems and structures so that a fire will not prevent essential safety functions from being performed Walls, floors ceilings and structural No changes necessary to existing barriers.
1 elements are rated or have been evaluated as adequate for the hazard.Openings in the fire barrier are rated No changes necessary to existing barrier openings.or have been evaluated as adequate for the hazard.Supplemental barriers (e.g., ERFBS, No supplemental barriers installed and not required.cable tray covers, etc.)Revision 0 Page 11 of 15 Version 1.0 Page 2318 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-031 Table 3-1 Defense-in-Depth Impact Review Method of Providing DID Discussion Guidance provided to operations No VFDR related DID recovery actions required.personnel detailing the credited success path(s) including recovery actions to achieve nuclear safety performance criteria.1 This fire protection feature is relied upon without further DID enhancements beyond inherent programmatic requirements of NFPA 805, Chap. 3 and will not be reported in Table 5-2.3.2.1 Required Modifications There are no modifications required as a result of the DID evaluation for this fire area.3.2.2 Required Recovery Actions There are no required recovery actions as a result of the DID evaluation for this fire area.4.0 SAFETY MARGIN EVALUATION 4.1 Safety Margin Evaluation In accordance with NEI 04-02, 5.3.5.3 guidance, the maintenance of adequate Safety Margin is assessed by the consideration of categories of analyses utilized by this fire risk evaluation (FRE).Safety margins are considered to be maintained if: " Codes and standards or their alternatives accepted for use by the NRC are met, and" Safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) are met, or provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty.
The maintenance of adequate safety margin for the change analysis is described for each of the specific analysis types used in support of the fire risk assessment.
4.1.1 Fire Modeling Fire modeling performed in support of the transition has been performed within the Fire PRA utilizing codes and standards developed by industry and NRC staff to provide realistic yet conservative results. Specifically, the heat release rates utilized in the transition analysis are based upon NUREG/CR 6850, Task 8, Scoping Fire Modeling.
These heat release rates are conservative and represent values used to screen out fixed ignition sources that do not pose a threat to the targets within specific fire compartments and to assign severity factors to unscreened fixed ignition sources.The combined analysis approach is used during transition; therefore, maximum expected fire scenario/limiting fire scenario have not been analyzed separately.
The bases for the application of these fire modeling codes and standards were not altered in support of this FRE.4.1.2 Plant System Performance Plant system performance parameters were not modified as a result of this FRE. These performance parameters were originally established to support nuclear performance criteria Revision 0 Page 12 of 15 Version 1.0 Page 2319 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-031 contained in the plant specific accident analyses.
These analyses established component and system perfornance criteria necessary to establish safe and stable plant operation, as well as, safe shut down of the unit in the event of a fire. These performance parameters were not modified as a result of this FRE.4.2 Safety Margin Results All analyses and assessment have been performed utilizing accepted techniques and industry accepted standards.
In addition, safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) have been considered and provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty.
As such, the Safety Margins are maintained as discussed in Section 4. 1.5.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION RESULTS 5.1 Dispositions of VFDRs Based on the FRE results contained in Sections 2, 3 and 4 the VFDRs identified in Section 1. 1 have been resolved as follows: Table 5-1 Final Variance Disposition VFDR ID Disposition U2-1-031-HVAC-001 Recovery Action(s)
Required to Satisfy Risk Criteria:
See Table 2-2 U2-1-031-HVAC-002 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)U2-1-031-HVAC-003 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)Revision 0 Page 13 of 15 Version 1.0 Page 2320 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-031 5.2 Fire Risk Evaluation Summary of Fire Protection Systems and Features Table 5-2 Summary of Required Fire Protection Systems and Features Required Required Suppression Detection Required Fire Fire Area Fire Zone System System Protection Feature Required Fire Protection System and Feature Details (R, D) (R, D) (R, D)U2 1-031 R R -Improvements to procedures necessary to incorporate recovery actions required to meet risk criteria (See Table 2-2)250 D R, D None R -Detection system;D -Suppression system, Detection system 251 D R, D None R -Detection system;D -Suppression system, Detection system Required Suppression/Detection/Feature:
required in the Fire Area based on NFPA 805 Chapter 4 compliance.
The information is provided on a zone basis. The basis for the requirement of the fire protection system is designated as follows:* R -Risk Criteria:
Systems required to meet the Risk Criteria for the Performance-Based Approach (NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4)* D -Defense-in-depth Criteria:
Systems required to maintain adequate balance of Defense-in-Depth for a Performance-Based Approach (NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4)Fire Protection Features in this Table only refer to those features installed in the Fire Area that have a corresponding NFPA 805, Chapter 3 requirement.
5.3 Summary of Recovery Actions Fire Area U2 1-031 Component Q2R42B0001A Table 5-3 -R Component Description 125V DC BUS 2A ecovery Actions Actions Operator action to provide alternate cooling for battery charger room due to loss of Train A SW 5.4 Summary of Plant Modifications No modifications are required for this fire area.Revision 0 Page 14 of 15 Revision 0 Page 14 of 15 SE-C051326701 
-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-031 5.5 Fire Area Risk Summary Table 5-4 Fire Area Risk Summary Fire Area Area Description NFPA 805 Fire Area CDF/LERF VFDR RAs Fire Risk Eval Additional Risk of RAs Basis (Yes/No) (Yes/No) A CDF/LERF U2 1-031 Auxiliary Building Cable 4.2.4 4.71E-08/8.42E-11 Yes Yes 4.71E-08/8.42E-11 4.71E-08/8.42E-11 Chase Rooms 250 and 251 Revision 0 Page 15 of 15 Revision 0 Page 15 of 15 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-040 Attachment 
-Unit 2 Fire Area 1-040 FRE for Fire Area Cable Spreading Room Revision:
0 Name Fire PRA Preparer Jonathan Hedrick Fire PRA Reviewer Clint Pierce Fire Protection Preparer Robert Kirkpatrick Fire Protection Reviewer Rebecca Puckett NSCA Preparer Larry Valmonte NSCA Reviewer Dan Funk FRE Preparer Steve Hardy FRE Reviewer Brandon Jamar Revision 0 Page 1 of 31 Version 1.o0 Page 2323 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-040 1.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION INPUT .....................................................................
4 1.1 Variances from the Deterministic Requirements 
....................................
4 1.2 Fire Protection Systems and Features ..................................................
8 1.2 .1 C o nstructio n ............................................................................. 
..8 1.2 .2 D ete ctio n ................................................................................... 
..8 1.2.3 Fixed Fire Suppression 
...............................................................
8 1.2.4 Manual Suppression 
...................................................................
8 1.2.5 Ventilation (Smoke Removal) .....................................................
8 1.2.6 Other Fire Protection Features ....................................................
8 1.2.7 Fire Hazard Identification 
.............................................................
8 1.2.8 Fire PRA Input .............................................................................
8 2.0 RISK EVALUATION 
.........................................................................................
9 2.1 Fire PRA Variant Case Calculation 
.........................................................
9 2.2 Compliant Case Calculation 
..................................................................
17 2.2.1 VFDRs Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA ............................
17 2.2.2 VFDRs Not Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA .....................
18 2.2.3 Compliant Case Results ...........................................................
19 2.2.4 Required Modifications 
.............................................................
19 2.2.5 Required Recovery Actions .......................................................
19 2.3 Risk Evaluation Results ........................................................................
19 3.0 DID EVALUATION 
..........................................................................................
25 3.1 Defense-in-Depth Evaluation 
...............................................................
25 3.2 Defense-in-Depth Review Results ......................................................
26 3.2.1 Required Modifications 
.............................................................
27 3.2.2 Required Recovery Actions .......................................................
27 4.0 SAFETY MARGIN EVALUATION 
...................................................................
27 4.1 Safety Margin Evaluation 
....................................................................
27 4 .1.1 F ire M odeling .......................................................................... 
..27 4.1.2 Plant System Performance 
......................................................
27 4.2 Safety Margin Results ..........................................................................
27 5.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION RESULTS .............................................................
28 5.1 Dispositions of VFDRs ........................................................................
28 Revision 0 Page 2 of 31 Version 1.0 Page 2324 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-040 SE-C051 326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-040 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 Fire Risk Evaluation Summary of Fire Protection Systems and Features 30 Summary of Recovery Actions .............................................................
30 Summary of Plant Modifications 
..........................................................
31 Fire Area Risk Summary ......................................................................
31 Revision 0 Page 3 of 31 Version 1.0 Page 2325 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-040 1.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION INPUT 1.1 Variances from the Deterministic Requirements The VFDRs identified for evaluation for Unit 2, Fire Area 1-040, Cable Spreading Room are: Table 1-1 VFDRs VFDR Component(s)
Description U2-1-040-SEP-001 QSV49KO001A:STAND The component normally standby, required on. Fire induced BY:ON, CONTROL cable damage to component results in failure to provide HVAC ROOM PACKAGE A/C support, and a challenge to the Control Room HVAC Auxiliaries BLOWER UNIT A; Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.QSV49KO001B:STAND BY:ON, CONTROL ROOM PACKAGE A/C BLOWER UNIT B.U2-1-040-SEP-002 N2B21TR0410:AVAILA This RCS Loop 1 recorder is normally available, only one set of BLE- the indication from credited Steam Generator RCS Loop is TE410:AVAILABLE-required available to provide process monitoring of Decay Heat TE410, RCS COLD Removal Nuclear Performance Criteria.
Fire induced cable LEG TEMPERATURE damage to component results in failure to monitor the decay RECORDER TR-410 heat removal, and a challenge to the process monitoring capability of Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-1-040-SEP-003 N2B21TR0410:AVAILA This RCS Loop 2 recorder is normally available, only one set of BLE- the indication from credited Steam Generator RCS Loop is TE410:AVAILABLE-required available to provide process monitoring of Decay Heat TE420, RCS COLD Removal Nuclear Performance Criteria.
Fire induced cable LEG TEMPERATURE damage to component results in failure to monitor the decay RECORDER TR-420 heat removal, and a challenge to the process monitoring capability of Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-1-040-SEP-004 N2B21TR0410:AVAILA This RCS Loop 2 recorder is normally available, only one set of BLE- the indication from credited Steam Generator RCS Loop is TE41O:AVAILABLE-required available to provide process monitoring of Decay Heat TE430, RCS COLD Removal Nuclear Performance Criteria.
Fire induced cable LEG TEMPERATURE damage to component results in failure to monitor the decay RECORDER TR-430 heat removal, and a challenge to the process monitoring capability of Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-1-040-SEP-005 N2R1 1B0501:ENERGI This transformer is normally energized, required energized.
Fire ZED:ENERGIZED,STA induced cable damage to component results in failure to provide TION SERVICE electrical support, and a challenge to the Electrical Vital TRANSFORMER 2G Auxiliaries Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-1-040-SEP-006 N2R15A0501/DD03:TR This breaker is normally available, required available.
Fire IP AVAILABLE:
TRIP induced cable damage to component results in failure to provide AVAILABLE, 4160V electrical support, and a challenge to the Electrical Vital SWITCHGEAR BUS 2D Auxiliaries Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria..
BREAKER DD03 U2-1-040-SEP-007 N2R16B0501 
:ENERGI This load center is normally energized, required energized.
Fire ZED:ENERGIZED, induced cable damage to component results in failure to provide 600V LOAD CENTER electrical support, and a challenge to the Electrical Vital 2G Auxiliaries Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.Revision 0 Page 4 of 31 Version 1.0 Page 2326 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-040 Table 1-1 VFDRs VFDR Component(s)
Description U2-1-040-SEP-008 Q1P16V0522:CLOSED:
This valve is normally closed, required closed. Fire induced CLOSED, SW-TO DIG cable damage to component results in failure to provide service 1B water support, and a challenge to the service water Vital Auxiliaries Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria..
U2-1-040-SEP-009 Q1P16V0592:CLOSED:
This valve is normally closed, required closed. Fire induced CLOSED, SW-TO D/G cable damage to component results in failure to provide service 2B water support, and a challenge to the service water Vital Auxiliaries Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-1-040-SEP-010 Q1R16B0509:ENERGI This load center is normally energized, required energized.
Fire ZED:ENERGIZED, induced cable damage to component results in failure to provide 600V LOAD CENTER electrical support, and a challenge to the Electrical Vital 1S/2S Auxiliaries Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-1-040-SEP-011 Q1R17B0504:ENERGI This motor control center is normally energized, required ZED:ENERGIZED, energized.
Fire induced cable damage to component results in MOTOR CONTROL failure to provide electrical support, and a challenge to the CENTER 1K Electrical Vital Auxiliaries Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-1-040-SEP-012 Q1R17B0505:ENERGI This motor control center is normally energized, required ZED:ENERGIZED, energized.
Fire induced cable damage to component results in MOTOR CONTROL failure to provide electrical support, and a challenge to the CENTER 1L Electrical Vital Auxiliaries Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-1-040-SEP-013 Q1R17B0508:ENERGI This motor control center is normally energized, required ZED:ENERGIZED, energized.
Fire induced cable damage to component results in MOTOR CONTROL failure to provide electrical support, and a challenge to the CENTER 1P Electrical Vital Auxiliaries Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-1-040-SEP-014 Q1R17B0509:ENERGI This motor control center is normally energized, required ZED:ENERGIZED-U2, energized.
Fire induced cable damage to component results in MOTOR CONTROL failure to provide electrical support, and a challenge to the CENTER 1S Electrical Vital Auxiliaries Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria..
U2-1-040-SEP-015 Q2P16V0538:CLOSED:
This valve is normally closed, required open. Fire induced cable OPEN, SW RECIRC damage to component results in failure to provide service water TO POND TRAIN B support, and a challenge to the service water Vital Auxiliaries Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-1-040-SEP-016 Q2P16V0539:CLOSED:
This valve is normally closed, required open. Fire induced cable OPEN, SW RECIRC damage to component results in failure to provide service water TO POND TRAIN A support, and a challenge to the service water Vital Auxiliaries Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-1-040-SEP-017 Q2P16V0546:OPEN:O This valve is normally open, required to modulate.
Fire induced PEN/CLOSED, TRAIN cable damage to component results in failure to provide service A SW DISCHARGE TO water support, and a challenge to the service water Vital RIVER Auxiliaries Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-1-040-SEP-018 Q2R1 1B0004:ENERGI This transformer is normally energized, required energized.
Fire ZED:ENERGIZED, induced cable damage to component results in failure to provide STATION SERVICE electrical support, and a challenge to the Electrical Vital TRANSFORMER 2D Auxiliaries Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-1-040-SEP-019 Q2R11B0005:ENERGI This transformer is normally energized, required energized.
Fire ZED:ENERGIZED, induced cable damage to component results in failure to provide STATION SERVICE electrical support, and a challenge to the Electrical Vital TRANSFORMER 2E Auxiliaries Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-1-040-SEP-020 Q2R11B0504:ENERGI This transformer is normally energized, required energized.
Fire ZED:ENERGIZED, induced cable damage to component results in failure to provide STATION SERVICE electrical support, and a challenge to the Electrical Vital TRANSFORMER 2K Auxiliaries Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.Revision 0 Page 5 of 31 Version 1.0 Page 2327 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-040 Table 1-1 VFDRs VFDR Component(s)
Description U2-1-040-SEP-021 Q2R11B0505:ENERGI This transformer is normally energized, required energized.
Fire ZED:ENERGIZED, induced cable damage to component results in failure to provide STATION SERVICE electrical support, and a challenge to the Electrical Vital TRANSFORMER 2L Auxiliaries Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria..
U2-1-040-SEP-022 Q2R11B0507:ENERGI This transformer is normally energized, required energized.
Fire ZED:ENERGIZED, induced cable damage to component results in failure to provide STATION SERVICE electrical support, and a challenge to the Electrical Vital TRANSFORMER 2S Auxiliaries Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-1-040-SEP-023 Q2R15A0006:ENERGI This switchgear is normally energized, required energized.
Fire ZED:ENERGIZED, induced cable damage to component results in failure to provide 4160V SWITCHGEAR electrical support, and a challenge to the Electrical Vital 2F Auxiliaries Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-1-040-SEP-024 Q2R15A0007:ENERGI This switchgear is normally energized, required energized.
Fire ZED:ENERGIZED-induced cable damage to component results in failure to provide SUT2B, 4160V electrical support, and a challenge to the Electrical Vital SWITCHGEAR 2G Auxiliaries Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-1-040-SEP-025 Q2R15A0503:ENERGI This switchgear is normally energized, required energized.
Fire ZED:ENERGIZED-induced cable damage to component results in failure to provide BUS2F, 4160V electrical support, and a challenge to the Electrical Vital SWITCHGEAR 2H Auxiliaries Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-1-040-SEP-026 Q2R15A0504:ENERGI This switchgear is normally energized, required energized.
Fire ZED:ENERGIZED-induced cable damage to component results in failure to provide BUS2G, 4160V electrical support, and a challenge to the Electrical Vital SWITCHGEAR 2J Auxiliaries Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-1-040-SEP-027 Q2R15A0505:ENERGI This switchgear is normally energized, required energized.
Fire ZED:ENERGIZED, induced cable damage to component results in failure to provide 4160V SWITCHGEAR electrical support, and a challenge to the Electrical Vital 2K Auxiliaries Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-1-040-SEP-028 Q2R15A0506:ENERGI This switchgear is normally energized, required energized.
Fire ZED:ENERGIZED, induced cable damage to component results in failure to provide 4160V SWITCHGEAR electrical support, and a challenge to the Electrical Vital 2L Auxiliaries Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-1-040-SEP-029 Q2R16B0002:ENERGI This load center is normally energized, required energized.
Fire ZED:ENERGIZED-induced cable damage to component results in failure to provide LC2D, 600V LOAD electrical support, and a challenge to the Electrical Vital CENTER 2A NORMAL- Auxiliaries Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.EMERGENCY U2-1-040-SEP-030 Q2R16B0006:ENERGI This load center is normally energized, required energized.
Fire ZED:ENERGIZED, induced cable damage to component results in failure to provide 600V LOAD CENTER electrical support, and a challenge to the Electrical Vital 2D Auxiliaries Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria U2-1-040-SEP-031 Q2R16B0007:ENERGI This load center is normally energized, required energized.
Fire ZED:ENERGIZED, induced cable damage to component results in failure to provide 600V LOAD CENTER electrical support, and a challenge to the Electrical Vital 2E Auxiliaries Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-1-040-SEP-032 Q2R17B0001 
:ENERGI This motor control center is normally energized, required ZED:ENERGIZED, energized.
Fire induced cable damage to component results in MOTOR CONTROL failure to provide electrical support, and a challenge to the CENTER 2A Electrical Vital Auxiliaries Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.Revision 0 Page 6 of 31 Version 1.o0 Page 2328 of 3726 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-040 Table 1-1 VFDRs VFDR Component(s)
Description U2-1-040-SEP-033 Q2R17B0002:ENERGI This motor control center is normally energized, required ZED:ENERGIZED, energized.
Fire induced cable damage to component results in MOTOR CONTROL failure to provide electrical support, and a challenge to the CENTER 2B Electrical Vital Auxiliaries Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-1-040-SEP-034 Q2R17B0008:ENERGI This motor control center is normally energized, required ZED:ENERGIZED energized.
Fire induced cable damage to component results in MOTOR CONTROL failure to provide electrical support, and a challenge to the CENTER 2U. Electrical Vital Auxiliaries Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-1-040-SEP-035 Q2R17B0009:ENERGI This motor control center is normally energized, required ZED:ENERGIZED, energized.
Fire induced cable damage to component results in MOTOR CONTROL failure to provide electrical support, and a challenge to the CENTER 2V. Electrical Vital Auxiliaries Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-1-040-SEP-036 Q2R17B0099:ENERGI This motor control center is normally energized, required ZED:ENERGIZED,MOT energized.
Fire induced cable damage to component results in OR CONTROL failure to provide electrical support, and a challenge to the CENTER 2DD. Electrical Vital Auxiliaries Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-1-040-SEP-037 Q2R42EO001A:ENERG This battery charger is normally energized, required energized.
IZED:ENERGIZED, Fire induced cable damage to component results in failure to BATTERY CHARGER provide electrical support, and a challenge to the Electrical Vital 2A. Auxiliaries Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-1-040-SEP-038 Q2R42E0001B:ENERG This battery charger is normally energized, required energized.
IZED:ENERGIZED, Fire induced cable damage to component results in failure to BATTERY CHARGER provide electrical support, and a challenge to the Electrical Vital 2B. Auxiliaries Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-1-040-SEP-039 Q2R42E0002A:AVAILA This battery is normally available, required available.
Fire BLE:AVAILABLE, 125V induced cable damage to component results in failure to provide BATTERY 2A. electrical support, and a challenge to the Electrical Vital Auxiliaries Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-1-040-SEP-040 Q2R42E0002B:AVAILA This battery is normally available, required available.
Fire BLE:AVAILABLE, 125V induced cable damage to component results in failure to provide BATTERY 2B. electrical support, and a challenge to the Electrical Vital Auxiliaries Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-1-040-SEP-041 QSR17BOO06:ENERGI This motor control center is normally energized, required ZED:ENERGIZED, U2 energized.
Fire induced cable damage to component results in MOTOR CONTROL failure to provide electrical support, and a challenge to the CENTER 1 F. Electrical Vital Auxiliaries Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-1-040-SEP-042 QSR17B0007:ENERGI This motor control center is normally energized, required ZED:ENERGIZED, U2 energized.
Fire induced cable damage to component results in MOTOR CONTROL failure to provide electrical support, and a challenge to the CENTER 1G. Electrical Vital Auxiliaries Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-1-040-SEP-043 QSR42B0525A:ENERG This component is normally energized, required energized.
Fire IZED:ENERGIZED, induced cable damage to component results in failure to provide SWISBAT1 125V DC electrical support, and a challenge to the Electrical Vital TRAIN A TRANSFER Auxiliaries Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.SWITCH.U2-1-040-SEP-044 QSR42B0525B:ENERG This component is normally energized, required energized.
Fire IZED:ENERGIZED, induced cable damage to component results in failure to provide SWISBAT3 125V DC electrical support, and a challenge to the Electrical Vital TRAIN B TRANSFER Auxiliaries Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.SWITCH.Revision 0 Page 7 of 31 Version 1.0 Page 2329 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-040 1.2 Fire Protection Systems and Features Fire Area 1-040 consists of Fire Zone 318. This fire area is located in the Cable Spreading Room at elevation 139'-0" 1.2.1 Construction Barriers for this fire area are of substantial construction and have been designed and constructed to meet separation requirements.
In the event the configuration utilized is not in accordance with recognized standards, the deviations have been evaluated to be adequate for the hazard.1.2.2 Detection Fire detection systems to initiate plant suppression systems and provide notification to the Control Room are: M Fire Zone 318 is provided with detection.
1.2.3 Fixed Fire Suppression Fixed fire suppression systems to aid in control of both fire growth and spread in the fire area are:* Fire Zone 318 is provided with suppression.
1.2.4 Manual Suppression Manual suppression equipment to be utilized by plant personnel and/or fire brigade members are:* Two fire hose cabinets and three portable CO 2 extinguishers located in rooms 319 and 339 (Fire Area 1-042) are available for use in this area.1.2.5 Ventilation (Smoke Removal)Portable smoke ejectors are available to assist with smoke removal.1.2.6 Other Fire Protection Features No additional fire protection features are required for this fire risk evaluation.
1.2.7 Fire Hazard Identification The major source of combustibles in Fire Area 1-040 is cable insulation.
Details regarding fire scenarios quantified in the fire PRA, and their associated ignition sources (where applicable) are discussed in Section 2.1.2.8 Fire PRA Input Fire protection features There are fire protection features specifically modeled in the Fire PRA as identified in the required plant modification section 2.2.4.Revision 0 Page 8 of 31 Version 1.0 Page 2330 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-040 Fire protection systems There are no fire protection features specifically modeled in the Fire PRA for this fire area.Hot Gas Layer Treatment This fire area screened for potential Hot Gas Layer effects on the Zone Of Influence.
Credit for detection was taken in the Hot Gas Layer evaluation for this fire area. No credit for manual or automatic fire suppression was taken in the Hot Gas Layer evaluation for this fire area.Multi-compartment analysis No credit for detection was taken in the Multi Compartment Analysis for this fire area. No credit for manual or automatic fire suppression was taken in the Multi Compartment Analysis for this fire area.Scenario Review All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0, ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency.
2.0 RISK EVALUATION 2.1 Fire PRA Variant Case Calculation Tables 2-1a and 2-lb provide the results of the variant case calculation for Fire Area 1-040. This is taken directly from the Fire PRA model with no changes or alterations made. The CDF and LERF results are provided on a scenario basis.The total area CDF and LERF is below the screening acceptance criteria of I E-07/rx-yr and IE-08/rx-yr, respectively.
The total CDF/LERF can be used as a conservative estimate of the delta CDF/LERF with respect to a compliant configuration.
No further analysis of the delta CDF/LERF is required.Revision 0 Page 9of31 Revision 0 Page 9 of 31 Version 1.0 Page 2331 of 3726 SE-C051 326701-008Atahet-FEfrUi2Frera104 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-040 Table 2-1a Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train A Alignment Zone Scen ScenDesc IGFNSP SF CCDP CDF CCDP CDF (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr)SE-C051326701-008 0318 0318 0318 0318 0318 0318 0318 0318 0318 0318 0318 0318 0318 0318 0318 0318 0318 0318 0318 0318 0318 0318 0318 0318 D1 D10 D11 D12 D13 D14 D15 D16 D17 D18 D19 D2 D20 D21 D22 D23 D24 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 TRANSIENT FIRE TRANSIENT FIRE TRANSIENT FIRE TRANSIENT FIRE TRANSIENT FIRE TRANSIENT FIRE TRANSIENT FIRE TRANSIENT FIRE TRANSIENT FIRE TRANSIENT FIRE TRANSIENT FIRE TRANSIENT FIRE TRANSIENT FIRE TRANSIENT FIRE TRANSIENT FIRE TRANSIENT FIRE TRANSIENT FIRE TRANSIENT FIRE TRANSIENT FIRE TRANSIENT FIRE TRANSIENT FIRE TRANSIENT FIRE TRANSIENT FIRE TRANSIENT FIRE 1.35E-06 1.35E-06 1.35E-06 1.35E-06 1.35E-06 1.35E-06 6.62E-07 1.35E-06 1.35E-06 1.35E-06 1.35E-06 1.35E-06 1.35E-06 1.35E-06 1.35E-06 1.35E-06 1.35E-06 1.35E-06 1.35E-06 1.35E-06 1.35E-06 1.35E-06 1.35E-06 1.35E-06 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 7.72E-04 7.72E-04 7.72E-04 7.72E-04 6.69E-07 4.78E-03 1.44E-06 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 1.73E-06 2.57E-04 6.69E-07 6.39E-04 7.72E-04 6.43E-04 7.72E-04 9.05E-1 3 1.04E-09 1.04E-09 1.04E-09 1.04E-09 9.05E-13 3.16E-09 1.95E-12 9.05E-13 9.05E-1 3 9.05E-1 3 9.05E-1 3 9.05E-1 3 9.05E-13 9.05E-1 3 9.05E-1 3 9.05E-1 3 2.34E-1 2 3.48E-10 9.05E-1 3 8.65E-1 0 1.04E-09 8.69E-10 1.04E-09 1.61E-10 1.43E-06 1.43E-06 1.43E-06 1.43E-06 1.61 E-10 1.01E-05 1.16E-09 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.24E-09 5.76E-07 1.61 E-10 1.OOE-06 1.43E-06 1.01E-06 1.43E-06 2.18E-16 1.94E-12 1.94E-12 1.94E-12 1.94E-12 2.18E-16 6.71 E-12 1.56E-15 2.18E-16 2.18E-16 2.18E-16 2.18E-16 2.18E-16 2.18E-16 2.18E-16 2.18E-16 2.18E-16 1.68E-15 7.79E-13 2.18E-16 1.36E-12 1.94E-12 1.37E-12 1.94E-12 0318 El Q1H25L005-A, Q1H25L004-A 3.64E-05 2.OOE-02 1.OE-01 6.69E-07 4.87E-14 1.61E-10 1.17E-17-SEVERE 0318 E2a Q1H25L004-A 
-NON 1.82E-05 2.OOE-02 1.0 6.69E-07 2.44E-13 1.61 E-10 5.86E-17 SEVERE 0318 E2b Q1H25L005-A-NON 1.82E-05 2.OOE-02 1.0 6.69E-07 2.44E-13 1.61 E-10 5.86E-17 SEVERE 0318 F1 Q1H25L006-A 
-SEVERE 1.82E-05 2.OOE-02 1.O0E-01 6.24E-04 2.27E-11 1.02E-06 3.72E-14 0318 F2 Q1H25L006-A-NON 1.82E-05 2.OOE-02 1.0 1.61E-06 5.87E-13 1.61E-10 5.86E-17 SEVERE Revision 0 Page 10 of 31 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-040 Table 2-1a Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train A Alignment Zone Scen ScenDesc IGF NSP SF CCDP CDF CCDP CDF (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr)0318 G1 Q1H25L002-A 
-SEVERE 1.82E-05 2.00E-02 1.O0E-01 6.69E-07 2.44E-14 1.61E-10 5.86E-18 0318 G2 Q1H25L002-A-NON 1.82E-05 2.OOE-02 1.0 6.69E-07 2.44E-13 1.61 E-10 5.86E-17 SEVERE Q1H25L016-B, Q1H25L017-B, 0318 H1 Q1H25L018-B, Q1H25L019-B, 1.09E-04 2.OOE-02 1.00E-01 1.24E-03 2.71E-10 2.29E-06 5.OOE-13 Q1H25L020-B, Q1H25L021-B
-SEVERE 0318 H2a QlH25L016-B 
-NON 1.82E-05 2.OOE-02 1.0 6.69E-07 2.44E-13 1.61 E-10 5.86E-17 SEVERE Q1H25L017-B 
-NON ...1.29E-04 4.71E-11 6.11E-07 2.23E-13 Uj10 0318 0318 0318 0318 0318 0318 0318 riMZ H2c H2d H2e H2f I1 12a 12b SEVERE Q1 H25L01 8-B -NON SEVERE Q1H25L019-B 
-NON SEVERE Q1H25L020-B 
-NON SEVERE Q1H25L021-B 
-NON SEVERE Q1H25L008/9/10-A 
-SEVERE Q1H25L008-A 
-NON SEVERE Q1H25L009-A 
-NON SEVERE 1.013/'-U3 1.82E-05 1.82E-05 1.82E-05 1.82E-05 5.46E-05 1.82E-05 1.82E-05 L.UUr_-Uz 2 .OOE-02 2.OOE-02 2.OOE-02 2.OOE-02 2.OOE-02 2.OOE-02 2.OOE-02 I.U 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.OOE-01 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 7.29E-04 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 2.44E-i 3 2.44E-1 3 2.44E-1 3 2.44E-1 3 7.96E-1 1 2.44E-1 3 2.44E-1 3 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.19E-06 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 5.86E-17 5.86E-1 7 5.86E-1 7 5.86E-1 7 1.29E-13 5.86E-1 7 5.86E-1 7 0318 12c Q1H25L0010-A-NON 1.82E-05 2.OOE-02 1.0 6.69E-07 2.44E-13 1.61E-10 5.86E-17 SEVERE 0318 JA Q1H25L029-B, Q1H25L030-B, 5.46E-05 2.OOE-02 1.O0E-01 9.82E-04 1.07E-10 2.05E-06 2.24E-13 Q1H25L031-B 
-SEVERE Q1H25L029-B 
-NON 0318 J2a SEVERE 1.82E-05 2.OOE-02 1.0 6.69E-07 2.44E-13 1.61E-10 5.86E-17 SEVERE 0318 J2b Q1H25L0-B-NON 1.82E-05 2.OOE-02 1.0 6.69E-07 2.44E-13 1.61E-10 5.86E-17 SEVERE 0318 J2c QH2L3-B-NN 1.82E-05 2.00E-02 1.0 6.69E-07 2.44E-1 3 1.61 E-1 0 5.86E-1 7 SEVERE 0318 K1 Q1H25L033-B 
-SEVERE 1.82E-05 2.OOE-02 1.O0E-01 8.77E-04 3.19E-11 1.59E-06 5.79E-14 0318 K2 Q1H25L033-B 
-NON 1.82E-05 2.OOE-02 1.0 6.69E-07 2.44E-13 1.61E-10 5.86E-17 Revision 0 Page 11 of 31 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-040 Table 2-1 a Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train A Alignment Zone Scen ScenDesc lGF NSP SF CCDP CDF CCDP CDF (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr)SEVERE 0318 Li Q1H25L011-A 
-SEVERE 1.82E-05 2.00E-02 1.00E-01 6.39E-04 2.33E-11 1.00E-06 3.65E-14 0318 L2 01H251011-A-NON 1.82E-05 2.00E-02 1.0 6.69E-07 2.44E-13 1.61E-10 5.86E-17 SEVERE 0318 Mi N1H25L041A-N 
-SEVERE 1.82E-05 2.OOE-02 1.OOE-01 8.95E-04 3.26E-11 1.88E-06 6.83E-14 0318 M2 N1H25L41A-N-NON 1.82E-05 2.OOE-02 1.0 6.69E-07 2.44E-13 1.61 E-10 5.86E-17 SEVERE 0318 N1 N1H25L040 A-N THROUGH 9.10E-05 2.00E-02 1.OQE-01 1.03E-03 1.88E-10 2.33E-06 4.25E-13 E-N -SEVERE 0318 0318 0318 0318 0318 0318 0318 0318 0318 0318 N2 01 02 Pi P2a P2b Q1 Q2a Q2b Q2c N1H25LO40 A-N THROUGH E-N -NON SEVERE AMSAC LOGIC CABINET -SEVERE AMSAC LOGIC CABINET -NON SEVERE Q11H25L025-B, Q11H25L027-B
-SEVERE Q1H25L025-B 
-NON SEVERE Q1H25L027-B 
-NON SEVERE Termination Cabinet 36-A, 37-A, 38-B, 39-B -SEVERE Termination Cabinet 36-A -NON SEVERE Termination Cabinet 37-A -NON SEVERE Termination Cabinet 38-B -NON SEVERE Termination Cabinet 39-B -9.1OE-05 1.82E-05 1.82E-05 3.64E-05 1.82E-05 1.82E-05 7.28E-05 1.82E-05 1.82E-05 1.82E-05 2.OOE-02 2.OOE-02 2.OOE-02 2.OOE-02 2.OOE-02 2.OOE-02 2.OOE-02 2.OOE-02 2.OOE-02 2.OOE-02 1.0 1.OOE-01 1.0 1.O0E-01 1.0 1.0 1.O0E-01 1.0 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 7.16E-06 6.69E-07 7.16E-06 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 7.94E-02 4.33E-03 1.36E-04 1.44E-06 1.22E-12 2.61E-13 2.44E-13 5.21 E- 13 2.44E-13 2.44E-13 1.16E-08 1.58E-09 4.94E- 11 5.26E-13 1.61E-10 9.01 E-09 1.61E-10 9.01 E-09 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 2.35E-04 9.34E-06 4.33E-07 1.16E-09 2.93E-1 6 3.28E-1 6 5.86E-1 7 6.56E-16 5.86E-17 5.86E-1 7 3.43E-1 1 3.40E-1 2 1.58E-1 3 4.21E-16 u031 LOz NON SEVERE i.0E-00-u 2.uult-UL 1.u 4. -,13L-UO 1 .51lz-1 1.-t1- lU 5.86E-I7 Total CDF/LERF Fire PRA Variant Case 2.55E-08 6.14E-11 Revision 0 Page 12 of 31 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-040 Table 2-1b Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train B Alignment IGF CFLERF Zone Scen ScenDesc (F NSP SF CCDP COF CLERP (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr)0318 0318 0318 0318 0318 0318 0318 0318 0318 0318 0318 0318 0318 0318 0318 0318 0318 0318 0318 0318 0318 0318 0318 0318 D1 D10 D11 D12 D13 D14 D15 D16 D17 D18 D19 D2 D20 D21 D22 D23 D24 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 TRANSIENT FIRE TRANSIENT FIRE TRANSIENT FIRE TRANSIENT FIRE TRANSIENT FIRE TRANSIENT FIRE TRANSIENT FIRE TRANSIENT FIRE TRANSIENT FIRE TRANSIENT FIRE TRANSIENT FIRE TRANSIENT FIRE TRANSIENT FIRE TRANSIENT FIRE TRANSIENT FIRE TRANSIENT FIRE TRANSIENT FIRE TRANSIENT FIRE TRANSIENT FIRE TRANSIENT FIRE TRANSIENT FIRE TRANSIENT FIRE TRANSIENT FIRE TRANSIENT FIRE 1.35E-06 1.35E-06 1.35E-06 1.35E-06 1.35E-06 1.35E-06 6.62E-07 1.35E-06 1.35E-06 1.35E-06 1.35E-06 1.35E-06 1.35E-06 1.35E-06 1.35E-06 1.35E-06 1.35E-06 1.35E-06 1.35E-06 1.35E-06 1.35E-06 1.35E-06 1.35E-06 1.35E-06 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 2.29E-04 2.29E-04 2.29E-04 2.29E-04 6.64E-07 1.21 E-02 1.69E-06 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 1.52E-06 1.69E-04 6.64E-07 9.93E-05 2.29E-04 1.03E-04 2.29E-04 8.99E-1 3 3.10E-10 3.10E-10 3.10E-10 3.10E-10 8.99E-13 8.OOE-09 2.28E-12 8.99E-13 8.99E-13 8.99E-1 3 8.99E-1 3 8.99E-1 3 8.99E-1 3 8.99E-1 3 8.99E-1 3 8.99E-13 2.06E-12 2.28E-10 8.99E-13 1.34E-10 3.10E-10 1.39E-10 3.10E-10 1.61E-10 2.18E-16 6.47E-07 8.76E-13 6.47E-07 8.76E-13 6.47E-07 8.76E-13 6.47E-07 8.76E-13 1.61E-10 2.18E-16 2.29E-05 1.51 E-11 1.16E-09 1.56E-15 1.61E-10 2.18E-16 1.61E-10 2.18E-16 1.61E-10 2.18E-16 1.61E-10 2.18E-16 1.61E-10 2.18E-16 1.61E-10 2.18E-16 1.61E-10 2.18E-16 1.61E-10 2.18E-16 1.61E-10 2.18E-16 1.24E-09 1.68E-15 5.04E-07 6.82E-13 1.61E-10 2.18E-16 2.22E-07 3.OOE-13 6.47E-07 8.76E-13 2.30E-07 3.10E-13 6.47E-07 8.76E-13 0318 E1 Q1H25L005-A, Q1H25L004-A 3.64E-05 2.OOE-02 1.O0E-01 6.64E-07 4.84E-14 1.61 E-10 1.17E-17-SEVERE 0318 E2a Q1H25L004-A-NON 1.82E-05 2.OOE-02 1.0 6.64E-07 2.42E-13 1.61E-10 5.86E-17 SEVERE 0318 E2b Q1H25L005-A-NON 1.82E-05 2.OOE-02 1.0 6.64E-07 2.42E-13 1.61E-10 5.86E-17 SEVERE 0318 F1 Q1H25L006-A 
-SEVERE 1.82E-05 2.OOE-02 1.OOE-01 1.03E-04 3.74E-12 2.OOE-07 7.27E-15 0318 F2 Q1H25L006-A-NON 1.82E-05 2.OOE-02 1.0 1.61E-06 5.84E-13 1.61E-10 5.86E-17 SEVERE Revision 0 Page 13 of 31 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-040 Table 2-lb Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train B Alignment Zone 0318 0318 Scen G1 G2 0318 H1 0318 0318 0318 0318 0318 0318 0318 0318 0318 H2a H2b H2c H2d H2e H2f I1 12a 12b ScenDesc Q1 H25L002-A 
-SEVERE Q1H25L002-A 
-NON SEVERE Q1H25L016-B, 01H25L017-B, Q1H25L018-B, Q1H25L019-B, Q1H25L020-B, Q1H25L021-B
-SEVERE Q1H25L016-B 
-NON SEVERE Q1H25L017-B 
-NON SEVERE Q1H25L018-B 
-NON SEVERE Q1 H25L01 9-B -NON SEVERE Q1H25L020-B 
-NON SEVERE Q1H25L021-B 
-NON SEVERE Q1H25L008/9/1 0-A -SEVERE Q1H25L008-A 
-NON SEVERE Q1H25L009-A 
-NON SEVERE IGF (Irx-yr)1.82E-05 1.82E-05 NSP 2.OOE-02 2.OOE-02 SF 1.O0E-01 1.0 1.09E-04 2.OOE-02 1.OOE-01 1.50E-03 3.29E-10 2.27E-06 4.95E-13 OCOP 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 CDF (Irx-yr)2.42E-14 2.42E-13 1.82E-05 1.82E-05 1.82E-05 1.82E-05 1.82E-05 1.82E-05 5.46E-05 1.82E-05 1.82E-05 2.OOE-02 2.OOE-02 2.OOE-02 2.OOE-02 2.OOE-02 2.OOE-02 2.OOE-02 2.OOE-02 2.OOE-02 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.O0E-01 1.0 1.0 CLERP 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 LERF (/rx-yr)5.86E-18 5.86E-1 7 6.64E-07 1.32E-04 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 1.08E-04 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 2.42E-1 3 4.81 E-1I 2.42E-1 3 2.42E-1 3 2.42E-1 3 2.42E-13 1.18E-11 2.42E-13 2.42E-1 3 1.61E-10 1.94E-07 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 2.01E-07 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 5.86E- 17 7.06E-14 5.86E-1 7 5.86E-1 7 5.86E-1 7 5.86E-17 2.19E-14 5.86E-1 7 5.86E-1 7 0318 12c Q1H25LOO1O-A-NON 1.82E-05 2.OOE-02 1.0 6.64E-07 2.42E-13 1.61E-10 5.86E-17 SEVERE 0318 1 Q1H25L029-B, Q1H25L030-BR 5.46E-05 2.OOE-02 1.OOE-01 3.62E-04 3.95E-11 1.07E-06 1.17E-13 Q1H25L031-B -SEVERE Q1H25L029-B -NON 0318 J2a S 1.82E-05 2.OOE-02 1.0 6.64E-07 2.42E-13 1.61E-10 5.86E-17 SEVERE 0318 J2b Q1H25L031-B 
-NON 1.82E-05 2.OOE-02 1.0 6.68E-07 2.43E-13 1.61 E-10 5.86E-17 SEVERE 0318 J2c QH531B-NN 1.82E-05 2.00E-02 1.0 6.64E-07 2.42E-1 3 1.61E-10 5.86E-1 7 SEVERE 0318 K1 Q1H25L033-B-SEVERE 1.82E-05 2.OOE-02 1.OOE-01 2.34E-04 8.52E-12 6.48E-07 2.36E-14 0318 K2 Q1H25L033-B 
-NON 1.82E-05 2.OOE-02 1.0 6.64E-07 2.42E-13 1.61E-10 5.86E-17 Revision 0 Page 14 of 31 Revision 0 Page 14 of 31 SE-C051 326701-008Atahet-FEfrUi2Frera104 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-040 Table 2-1b Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train B Alignment IGF CFLERF Zone Scen ScenDesc (rr NSP SF CCDP CDF CLERP (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr)SE-C051326701-008 0318 0318 0318 0318 0318 0318 0318 0318 0318 0318 0318 L1 L2 M1 M2 N1 N2 01 02 P1 P2a P2b SEVERE Q1H25LO11-A 
-SEVERE Q1H25L01 i-A- NON SEVERE N1H25L041A-N 
-SEVERE N1H25LO41A-N 
-NON SEVERE N1H25L040 A-N THROUGH E-N -SEVERE N1H25L040 A-N THROUGH E-N -NON SEVERE AMSAC LOGIC CABINET -SEVERE AMSAC LOGIC CABINET -NON SEVERE Q11H25L025-B, Q11H25L027-B
-SEVERE Q1H25L025-B 
-NON SEVERE Q1H25L027-B 
-NON SEVERE 1.82E-05 1.82E-05 1.82E-05 1.82E-05 9.1OE-05 9.1OE-05 1.82E-05 1.82E-05 3.64E-05 1.82E-05 1.82E-05 2.OOE-02 2.OOE-02 2.OOE-02 2.OOE-02 2.OOE-02 2.OOE-02 2.OOE-02 2.OOE-02 2.OOE-02 2.OOE-02 2.OOE-02 1.OOE-01 1.0 1.OOE-01 1.0 1.OOE-01 1.0 1.OOE-01 1.0 1.OOE-01 1.0 1.0 9.93E-05 6.64E-07 3.59E-04 6.64E-07 4.95E-04 6.64E-07 4.08E-06 6.64E-07 4.08E-06 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 3.62E-12 2.42E-1 3 1.31E-11 2.42E-1 3 9.02E-1 1 1.21E-12 1.48E-13 2.42E-1 3 2.97E-1 3 2.42E-1 3 2.42E-1 3 2.22E-07 1.61E-10 1.12E-06 1.61E-10 1.56E-06 1.61E-10 9.01 E-09 1.61 E-10 9.01 E-09 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 8.08E-15 5.86E-1 7 4.06E-14 5.86E-1 7 2.85E-1 3 2.93E-16 3.28E-16 5.86E-17 6.56E-16 5.86E-1 7 5.86E-1 7 0318 Q1 Termination Cabinet 36-A, 37- 7.28E-05 2.OOE-02 1.OOE-01 9.06E-02 1.32E-08 2.57E-04 3.75E-1 1 A, 38-B, 39-B -SEVERE 0318 Q2a Termination Cabinet 36-A -1.82E-05 2.OOE-02 1.0 4.60E-03 1.67E-09 9.46E-06 3.45E-12 NON SEVERE 0318 Q2b Termination Cabinet 37-A -1.82E-05 2.OOE-02 1.0 1.32E-04 4.82E-1 1 4.29E-07 1.56E-1 3 NON SEVERE 0318 Q2c Termination Cabinet 38-B -1.82E-05 2.OOE-02 1.0 1.69E-06 6.15E-13 1.16E-09 4.21E-16 NON SEVERE 0318 Q2d Termination Cabinet 39-B -1.82E-05 2.OOE-02 1.0 1.08E-06 3.95E-13 1.61 E-10 5.86E-17 NON SEVERE Total CDF/LERF Fire PRA Variant Case 2.58E-08 6.39E-11 Revision 0 Page 15 of 31 SE-CO51326701 
-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-040 SE-C051 326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-040 Where: Zone = Fire Zone Scen = 'A' to signify the variant case ScenDesc = Description of the Fire Scenario IGF = Ignition Frequency 
(/rx-yr)NSP = Non Suppression Probability SF = Severity Factor CCDP = Conditional Core Damage Probability CDF = Core Damage Frequency 
(/rx-yr)CLERP = Conditional Large Early Release Probability LERF = Large Early Release Frequency 
(/rx-yr)Revision 0 Page 16 of 31 Revision 0 Page 16 of 31 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-040 2.2 Compliant Case Calculation The following sub-sections provide the basis for modeling each VFDR (or category of VFDRs)and the alterations that have been made to the variant case to represent the compliant case. In each section a discussion of the VFDR (or the category of VFDRs) is provided.2.2.1 VFDRs Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA The following VFDRs are modeled in the Fire PRA and are therefore included in the total fire area CDF/LERF used as a surrogate for the delta risk evaluation for this fire area:* U2-1-040-SEP-002 
-N2B2 1 TR04 1 O:AVAILABLE-TE4 1 O:AVAILABLE-TE4 10* U2-1-040-SEP-003 
-N2B2 1 TR041 0:AVAILABLE-TE4 I 0:AVA[LABLE-TE420
* U2-t-040-SEP-004 
-N2B2 1 TR041 0:AVAILABLE-TE41 0:AVAILABLE-TE430
* U2-1-040-SEP-005 
-N2R1 1B0501:ENERGIZED:ENERGIZED
* U2-1-040-SEP-006 
-N2RI5A0501/DD03:TRIPAVAILABLE:TRIPAVAILABLE
* U2-1-040-SEP-007 
-N2Rl 6B0501 :ENERGIZED:ENERGIZED
* U2-1-040-SEP-008 
-QiP16V0522:CLOSED:CLOSED
* U2-1-040-SEP-009 
-Qi P1 6V0592:CLOSED:CLOSED
* U2-1-040-SEP-010 
-QI Ri16B0509:ENERGIZED:ENERGIZED
* U2-1-040-SEP-01I 
-QiRi7B0504:ENERGIZED:ENERGIZED
* U2-1-040-SEP-012 
-Q RI 17B0505:ENERGIZED:ENERGIZED
* U2-1-040-SEP-013 
-QI R17B0508:ENERGIZED:ENERGIZED
* U2-1-040-SEP-014 
-Q IRL17B0509:ENERGIZED:ENERGIZED-U2
* U2-1-040-SEP-015 
-Q2P16V0538:CLOSED:OPEN
* U2-1-040-SEP-016 
-Q2P16V0539:CLOSED:OPEN
* U2-1-040-SEP-0 17 -Q2P I 6V0546:OPEN:OPEN/CLOSED
* U2-1-040-SEP-018 
-Q2RI 1B0004:ENERGIZED:ENERGIZED
* U2- I -040-SEP-0 19 -Q2RI I B0005:ENERGIZED:ENERGIZED
* U2-1-040-SEP-020 
-Q2R I B0504:ENERGIZED:ENERGIZED
* U2-1-040-SEP-021 
-Q2R 11B0505:ENERGIZED:ENERGIZED
* U2-1-040-SEP-022 
-Q2RI 1B0507:ENERGIZED:ENERGIZED
* U2-1-040-SEP-023 
-Q2R15A0006:ENERGIZED:ENERGIZED
* U2-1-040-SEP-024 
-Q2R1 5A0007:ENERGIZED:ENERGIZED-SUT2B" U2-1-040-SEP-025 
-Q2Rl5A0503:ENERGIZED:ENERGIZED-BUS2F" U2-1-040-SEP-026 
-Q2R15A0504:ENERGIZED:ENERGIZED-BUS2G" U2-1-040-SEP-027 
-Q2R1 5A0505:ENERGIZED:ENERGIZED Revision 0 Page 17 of 31 Version 1.0 Page 2339 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-040" U2-1-040-SEP-028 
-Q2R I 5A0506:ENERGIZED:ENERGIZED" U2-1-040-SEP-029 
-Q2RI6B0002:ENERGIZED:ENERGIZED-LC2D" U2-1-040-SEP-030 
-Q2R1 6B0006:ENERGIZED:ENERGIZED" U2-1-040-SEP-031 
-Q2R1 6B0007:ENERGIZED:ENERGIZED
* U2-1-040-SEP-032 
-Q2RI 7B000 I:ENERGIZED:ENERGIZED" U2-1-040-SEP-033 
-Q2R137B0002:
ENERGIZED:
ENERGIZED" U2-1-040-SEP-034 
-Q2RI37B0008:ENERGIZED:ENERGIZED" U2-1-040-SEP-035 
-Q2RI 7B0009:ENERGIZED:ENERGIZED
* U2-1-040-SEP-036 
-Q2RI 7B0099:ENERGIZED:ENERGIZED" U2-1-040-SEP-037 
-Q2R42E000 1 A:ENERGIZED:ENERGIZED" U2-1-040-SEP-038 
-Q2R42E000 I B: ENERGIZED:ENERGIZED" U2-1-040-SEP-039 
-Q2R42E0002A:AVAILABLE:AVAILABLE" U2-1-040-SEP-040 
-Q2R42E0002B:AVAILABLE:AVAILABLE
* U2-1-040-SEP-041 
-QSR17B0006:
ENERGIZED:ENERGIZED-U2" U2-1-040-SEP-042 
-QSR 1 7B0007: ENERGIZED:ENERGIZED-U2" U2-1-040-SEP-043 
-QSR42B0525A:ENERGIZED:ENERGIZED-SWISBAT1" U2-1-040-SEP-044 
-QSR42B0525B:ENERGIZED:ENERGIZED-SWISBAT3 2.2.2 VFDRs Not Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA A Fire PRA was developed in accordance with the requirements of Part 4 "Requirements for Fires at Power PRA" of the ASME and ANS combined PRA Standard, ASME/ANS RA-Sa-2009, "Standard for Level 1/Large Early Release Frequency Probabilistic Risk Assessment for Nuclear Power Plant Applications".
Consistent with those requirements not all components required to meet the nuclear safety criteria need to be specifically modeled in the Fire PRA. The following VFDRs are associated with components not modeled in the Fire PRA: 2.2.2.1 VFDR U2-1-040-SEP-001 Main Control Room (MCR) ventilation is not modeled in the PRA. Room Heat up calculations show that there will be no impact to the MCR due to loss of HVAC within the mission time of 24 hrs in the PRA. See calculation Fire PRA Logic Model for Farley Nuclear Plants, PRA-BC-F-11-004. The MCR Ventilation is credited for certain cases in the MCR abandonment scenario, the details of this can be found in the Fire PRA Scenario Development Report PRA-BC-F-I 1-014.0 U2-1-040-SEP-001 
-QSV49K000 1A:STANDBY:ON Revision 0 Page 18 of 31 Version 1.0 Page 2340 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-040 2.2.3 Compliant Case Results The total area CDF and LERF is below the screening acceptance criteria of I E-07/rx-yr and 1 E-08/rx-yr, respectively.
The total CDF/LERF can be used as a conservative estimate of the delta CDF/LERF with respect to a compliant configuration.
No further analysis of the delta CDF/LERF is required.2.2.4 Required Modifications The following modifications are required as a result of the risk evaluation for this fire area: Require protection of cable 2VALA05 B, 2VBLB 18 B to prevent fire damage 2.2.5 Required Recovery Actions There are no required recovery actions as a result of the risk evaluation for this fire area.2.3 Risk Evaluation Results The ACDF/LERF is below the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr (CDF) and 1E-08/rx-yr (LERF) for acceptable risk. All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0 ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency.
The following tables present the fire zone/scenario fire risk as well as the total fire risk for this fire area. Given the relatively low risk for these zones/scenarios the delta risk is defined by the variant case risk, the compliant case risk is conservatively assumed to be 0.Table 2-2a 1 FIRE AREA aCDF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN A ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant C CCDP ase 0318/D1 0318/D10 0318/D11 0318/D12 0318/D13 0318/D14 0318/D15 0318/D16 0318/D17 0318/D18 0318/D19 0318/D2 0318/D20 0318/D21 0318/D22 0318/D23 0318/D24 0318/D3 0318/D4 0318/D5 0318/D6 0318/D7 6.69E-07 7.72E-04 7.72E-04 7.72E-04 7.72E-04 6.69E-07 4.78E-03 1.44E-06 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 1.73E-06 2.57E-04 6.69E-07 6.39E-04 7.72E-04 CDF 9.05E-1 3 1.04E-09 1.04E-09 1.04E-09 1.04E-09 9.05E-13 3.16E-09 1.95E-12 9.05E-1 3 9.05E-1 3 9.05E-1 3 9.05E-13 9.05E-1 3 9.05E-1 3 9.05E-1 3 9.05E-13 9.05E-13 2.34E-12 3.48E-10 9.05E-13 8.65E-10 1.04E-09 Compliant Case CCDP CDF 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 Variant -Compliant ACDF 9.05E-1 3 1.04E-09 1.04E-09 1.04E-09 1.04E-09 9.05E-13 3.16E-09 1.95E-12 9.05E-1 3 9.05E-13 9.05E-13 9.05E-1 3 9.05E-13 9.05E-13 9.05E-1 3 9.05E-13 9.05E-1 3 2.34E-12 3.48E-10 9.05E-13 8.65E-1 0 1.04E-09 Revision 0 Page 19 of 31 Revision 0 Page 19 of 31 Version 1.0 Page 2341 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-040 SE-C051 326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-040 Table 2-2a 1 FIRE AREA ACDF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN A ALIGNMEN Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case IT 0318/D8 0318/D9 0318/El 0318/E2a 0318/E2b 0318/Fl 0318/F2 0318/G1 0318/G2 0318/Hl 0318/H2a 0318/H2b 0318/H2c 0318/H2d 0318/H2e 0318/H2f 0318/11 0318/12a 0318/12b 0318/12c 0318/Jl 0318/J2a 0318/J2b 0318/J2c 0318/K1 0318/K2 0318/L1 0318/L2 0318/Ml 0318/M2 0318/N1 0318/N2 0318/01 0318/02 0318/Pl 0318/P2a 0318/P2b 0318/Q1 0318/Q2a 0318/Q2b 0318/Q2c 0318/Q2d CCDP 6.43E-04 7.72E-04 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.24E-04 1.61 E-06 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 1.24E-03 6.69E-07 1.29E-04 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 7.29E-04 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 9.82E-04 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 8.77E-04 6.69E-07 6.39E-04 6.69E-07 8.95E-04 6.69E-07 1.03E-03 6.69E-07 7.16E-06 6.69E-07 7.16E-06 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 7.94E-02 4.33E-03 1.36E-04 1.44E-06 4.13E-06 CDF 8.69E-1 0 1.04E-09 4.87E-14 2.44E-13 2.44E-13 2.27E-1 1 5.87E-13 2.44E-14 2.44E-1 3 2.71E-10 2.44E-13 4.71E-11 2.44E-1 3 2.44E-13 2.44E-13 2.44E-1 3 7.96E-11 2.44E-1 3 2.44E-13 2.44E-13 1.07E-10 2.44E-13 2.44E-13 2.44E-1 3 3.19E-11 2.44E-13 2.33E-11 2.44E-1 3 3.26E-11 2.44E-1 3 1.88E-10 1.22E-12 2.61 E-1 3 2.44E-13 5.21 E-13 2.44E-13 2.44E-1 3 1.16E-08 1.58E-09 4.94E-1 1 5.26E-13 1.51E-12 2.55E-08 CCDP 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00-CDF 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 qT Variant -Compliant ACDF 8.69E-10 1.04E-09 4.87E-14 2.44E-13 2.44E-13 2.27E-1 1 5.87E-1 3 2.44E-14 2.44E-1 3 2.71 E-1 0 2.44E-13 4.71E-11 2.44E-13 2.44E-13 2.44E-13 2.44E-1 3 7.96E-1 1 2.44E-13 2.44E-1 3 2.44E-1 3 1.07E-10 2.44E-13 2.44E-13 2.44E-1 3 3.19E-11 2.44E-13 2.33E-1 1 2.44E-13 3.26E-1 1 2.44E-13 1.88E-10 1.22E-12 2.61E-13 2.44E-1 3 5.21E-13 2.44E-13 2.44E-13 1.16E-08 1.58E-09 4.94E-1 1 5.26E-1 3 1.51 E-12 2.55E-08 Total CDF and ACDF TIN/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.Revision 0 Page 20 of 31 Version 1.0 Page 2342 of 3726 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-040 Table 2-2b 1 FIRE AREA ACDF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN B ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case 0318/D1 0318/010 0318/Di 1 0318/D12 0318/D13 0318/D14 0318/015 0318/D)16 0318/D17 0318/D18 0318/)19 0318/D2 0318/020 0318/1)21 0318/D22 0318/D23 0318/1)24 0318/D3 0318/D4 0318/D5 0318/D6 0318/D7 0318/D8 0318/D9 0318/El 0318/E2a 0318/E2b 0318/Fl 0318/F2 0318/Gl 0318/G2 0318/H1 0318/H2a 0318/H2b 0318/H2c 0318/H2d 0318/H2e 0318/H2f 0318/11 0318/12a 0318/12b 0318/12c 0318/J1 0318/J2a 0318/J2b 0318/J2c CCDP 6.64E-07 2.29E-04 2.29E-04 2.29E-04 2.29E-04 6.64E-07 1.21E-02 1.69E-06 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 1.52E-06 1.69E-04 6.64E-07 9.93E-05 2.29E-04 1.03E-04 2.29E-04 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 1.03E-04 1.61 E-06 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 1.50E-03 6.64E-07 1.32E-04 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 1.08E-04 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 3.62E-04 6.64E-07 6.68E-07 6.64E-07 CDF 8.99E-1 3 3.10E-10 3.10E-10 3.10E-10 3.10E-10 8.99E-13 8.OOE-09 2.28E-12 8.99E-1 3 8.99E-1 3 8.99E-13 8.99E-13 8.99E-13 8.99E-13 8.99E-1 3 8.99E-1 3 8.99E-1 3 2.06E-12 2.28E-1 0 8.99E-1 3 1.34E-10 3.10E-10 1.39E-10 3.10E-10 4.84E-14 2.42E-13 2.42E-13 3.74E-1 2 5.84E-13 2.42E-14 2.42E-13 3.29E-10 2.42E-1 3 4.81 E-11 2.42E-1 3 2.42E-1 3 2.42E-1 3 2.42E-13 1.18E-11 2.42E-1 3 2.42E-1 3 2.42E-13 3.95E-11 2.42E-1 3 2.43E-13 2.42E-13 Compliant Case CCDP CDF 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 Variant -Compliant ACDF 8.99E-1 3 3.10E-10 3.10E-10 3.10E-10 3.10E-10 8.99E-13 8.OOE-09 2.28E-12 8.99E-1 3 8.99E-13 8.99E-13 8.99E-13 8.99E-13 8.99E-13 8.99E-13 8.99E-13 8.99E-13 2.06E-1 2 2.28E-10 8.99E-1 3 1.34E-10 3.10E-10 1.39E-10 3.10E-10 4.84E-14 2.42E-13 2.42E-13 3.74E-12 5.84E-13 2.42E-14 2.42E-1 3 3.29E-10 2.42E-13 4.81 E-11 2.42E-13 2.42E-13 2.42E-13 2.42E-1 3 1 .18E-1 1 2.42E-13 2.42E-1 3 2.42E-13 3.95E-1 1 2.42E-13 2.43E-13 2.42E-1 3 Revision 0 Page 21 of3l Revision 0 Page 21 of 31 Version 1.0 Page 2343 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-040 Table 2-2b 1 FIRE AREA ACDF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN B ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CCDP CDF CCDP CDF ACDF 0318/K1 0318/K2 0318/L1 0318/L2 0318/Mi 0318/M2 0318/N1 0318/N2 0318/01 0318/02 0318/P1 0318/P2a 0318/P2b 0318/Q 1 0318/Q2a 0318/Q2b 0318/Q2c 0318/Q2d 2.34E-04 6.64E-07 9.93E-05 6.64E-07 3.59E-04 6.64E-07 4.95E-04 6.64E-07 4.08E-06 6.64E-07 4.08E-06 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 9.06E-02 4.60E-03 1.32E-04 1.69E-06 1.08E-06 8.52E-1 2 2.42E-1 3 3.62E-12 2.42E-1 3 1.31 E-11 2.42E-13 9.02E-1 1 1.21E-12 1.48E-13 2.42E-1 3 2.97E-13 2.42E-1 3 2.42E-13 1.32E-08 1.67E-09 4.82E-11 6.15E-13 3.95E-1 3 2.58E-08 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 8.52E-12 2.42E-1 3 3.62E-12 2.42E-1 3 1.31 E-11 2.42E-1 3 9.02E-1 1 1.21E-12 1.48E-13 2.42E-13 2.97E-1 3 2.42E-13 2.42E-1 3 1.32E-08 1.67E-09 4.82E-i 1 6.15E-13 3.95E-1 3 2.58E-08 Total CDF and ACDF 1 _ N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.Table 2-3a 1 FIRE AREA aLERF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN A ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CLERP LERF CLERP LERF ALERF 0318/D1 0318/D10 0318/D11 0318/D12 0318/D13 0318/D14 0318/D15 0318/D16 0318/D17 0318/D18 0318/D19 0318/D2 0318/D20 0318/D21 0318/D22 0318/D23 0318/D24 0318/D3 0318/D4 0318/D5 1.61 E-10 1.43E-06 1.43E-06 1.43E-06 1.43E-06 1.61 E-10 1.01E-05 1.16E-09 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.24E-09 5.76E-07 1.61 E-1 0 2.18E-1 6 1.94E-12 1.94E-12 1.94E-12 1.94E-12 2.18E-16 6.71 E-12 1.56E-1 5 2.18E-16 2.18E-16 2.18E-16 2.18E-16 2.18E-16 2.18E-16 2.18E-16 2.18E-16 2.18E-16 1.68E-15 7.79E-13 2.18E-16 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0O.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+/-00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 2.18E-16 1.94E-12 1.94E-12 1.94E-12 1.94E-12 2.18E-16 6.71E-12 1.56E-1 5 2.18E-16 2.18E-16 2.18E-16 2.18E-16 2.18E-16 2.18E-16 2.18E-16 2.18E-16 2.18E-16 1.68E-1 5 7.79E-13 2.18E-16 Revision 0 Page 22 of 31 Version 1.0 Page 2344 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-040 Table 2-3a 1 FIRE AREA ALERF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN A ALIGNMENT-Scenario Variant Case 0318/D6 0318/D7 0318/D8 0318/D9 0318/El 0318/E2a 0318/E2b 0318/Fl 0318/F2 0318/Gl 0318/G2 0318/Hi1 0318/H2a 0318/H2b 0318/H2c 0318/H2d 0318/H2e 0318/H2f 0318/I1 0318/12a 0318/12b 0318/12c 0318/J1 0318/J2a 0318/J2b 0318/J2c 0318/K1 0318/K2 0318/L1 0318/L2 0318/M 1 0318/M2 0318/N1 0318/N2 0318/01 0318/02 0318/Pi 0318/P2a 031 8/P2b 0318/Qi 0318/Q2a 0318/Q2b 031 8/Q2c 031 8/Q2d CLERP 1.OOE-06 1.43E-06 1.01E-06 1.43E-06 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.02E-06 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 2.29E-06 1.61E-10 6.11E-07 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.19E-06 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 2.05E-06 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.59E-06 1.61E-10 1.OOE-06 1.61 E-10 1.88E-06 1.61E-10 2.33E-06 2.33E-06 9.01 E-09 1.61 E-10 9.01 E-09 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 2.35E-04 9.34E-06 4.33E-07 1.16E-09 1.61 E-10 LERF 1.36E-12 1.94E-12 1.37E-12 1.94E-12 1.17E-17 5.86E-17 5.86E-17 3.72E-14 5.86E-17 5.86E-18 5.86E-17 5.OOE-13 5.86E- 17 2.23E-13 5.86E-17 5.86E-1 7 5.86E-1 7 5.86E-1 7 1.29E-13 5.86E-1 7 5.86E-1 7 5.86E-1 7 2.24E-1 3 5.86E-17 5.86E-1 7 5.86E-1 7 5.79E-14 5.86E-1 7 3.65E-14 5.86E-17 6.83E-14 5.86E- 17 4.25E-1 3 4.25E-13 3.28E-16 5.86E-17 6.56E-16 5.86E-17 5.86E-1 7 3.43E-1 1 3.40E-12 1.58E-13 4.21E-16 5.86E-17 Compliant Case CLERP LERF 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.300E+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 Variant -Compliant ALERF 1.36E-12 1.94E-12 1.37E-12 1.94E-12 1.17E-17 5.86E-1 7 5.86E-17 3.72E-14 5.86E-1 7 5.86E-18 5.86E-17 5.OOE-13 5.86E-17 2.23E-13 5.86E-1 7 5.86E-1 7 5.86E-1 7 5.86E-1 7 1.29E-13 5.86E-17 5.86E-17 5.86E-17 2.24E-13 5.86E-1 7 5.86E-17 5.86E-1 7 5.79E-14 5.86E-1 7 3.65E-14 5.86E-1 7 6.83E-14 5.86E-1 7 4.25E-13 4.25E-13 3.28E-16 5.86E-1 7 6.56E-1 6 5.86E-17 5.86E-17 3.43E-1 1 3.40E-12 1.58E-13 4.21E-16 5.86E-17 Total LERF and ALERF 6.14E-1 1 0.OOE+00 6.14E-1 1 1 _ N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.Revision 0 Page 23 of 31 Version 1.0 Page 2345 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-040 Table 2-3b 1 FIRE AREA ALERF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN B ALIGNMEI Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case N.T 0318/D1 0318/D10 0318/D11 0318/D12 0318/D13 0318/D14 0318/D15 0318/D16 0318/D 17 0318/D18 0318/D19 0318/D2 0318/D20 0318/D21 0318/D22 0318/D23 0318/D24 0318/D3 0318/D4 0318/D5 0318/D6 0318/D7 0318/D8 0318/D9 0318/El 0318/E2a 0318/E2b 0318/Fl 0318/F2 0318/Gl 0318/G2 0318/H1 0318/H2a 0318/H2b 0318/H2c 0318/H2d 0318/H2e 0318/H2f 0318/11 0318/12a 0318/12b 0318/12c 0318/Jl 0318/J2a 0318/J2b 0318/J2c CLERP 1.61E-10 6.47E-07 6.47E-07 6.47E-07 6.47E-07 1.61 E-10 2.29E-05 1.16E-09 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.24E-09 5.04E-07 1.61E-10 2.22E-07 6.47E-07 2.30E-07 6.47E-07 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 2.OOE-07 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 2.27E-06 1.61E-10 1.94E-07 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 2.01 E-07 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.07E-06 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 LERF 2.18E- 16 8.76E-1 3 8.76E-1 3 8.76E-1 3 8.76E-1 3 2.18E-16 1.51E-11 1.56E-15 2.18E-16 2.18E-16 2.18E-16 2.18E-16 2.18E-16 2.18E-16 2.18E-16 2.18E-16 2.18E-16 1.68E-15 6.82E-1 3 2.18E-16 3.OOE-13 8.76E-1 3 3.10E-13 8.76E-13 1.17E-17 5.86E-1 7 5.86E-1 7 7.27E-15 5.86E- 17 5.86E-1 8 5.86E-1 7 4.95E-13 5.86E-1 7 7.06E-14 5.86E-1 7 5.86E-1 7 5.86E-1 7 5.86E-1 7 2.19E-14 5.86E-1 7 5.86E-1 7 5.86E-1 7 1.17E-13 5.86E-1 7 5.86E-17 5.86E-1 7 CLERP 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 LERF 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 Variant -Compliant ALERF 2.18E-16 8.76E-1 3 8.76E-13 8.76E-13 8.76E-13 2.18E-16 1.51E-11 1.56E-15 2.18E-16 2.18E-16 2.18E-16 2.18E-16 2.18E-16 2.18E-16 2.18E-16 2.18E-16 2.18E-16 1.68E-15 6.82E-1 3 2.18E-16 3.OOE-1 3 8.76E-1 3 3.10E-13 8.76E-13 1.17E-17 5.86E-17 5.86E-17 7.27E-1 5 5.86E-1 7 5.86E-18 5.86E-1 7 4.95E-1 3 5.86E-1 7 7.06E-14 5.86E-1 7 5.86E-1 7 5.86E-17 5.86E-1 7 2.19E-14 5.86E- 17 5.86E-1 7 5.86E-1 7 1.17E-13 5.86E-17 5.86E-17 5.86E-1 7 Revision 0 Page 24 of 31 Version 1.0 Page 2346 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-040 Table 2-3b 1 FIRE AREA ALERF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN B ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CLERP LERF CLERP LERF ALERF 0318/K1 0318/K2 0318/Li 0318/L2 0318/Mi 0318/M2 0318/N1 0318/N2 0318/01 0318/02 0318/P1 0318/P2a 0318/P2b 0318/Q1 0318/Q2a 0318/Q2b 0318/Q2c 0318/Q2d 6.48E-07 1.61E-10 2.22E-07 1.61 E-10 1.12E-06 1.61E-10 1.56E-06 1.61E-10 9.01 E-09 1.61E-10 9.01 E-09 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 2.57E-04 9.46E-06 4.29E-07 1.16E-09 1.61 E-10 2.36E-14 5.86E-17 8.08E-15 5.86E-17 4.06E-14 5.86E-1 7 2.85E-13 2.93E-16 3.28E-16 5.86E-17 6.56E-16 5.86E-17 5.86E-1 7 3.75E-1 1 3.45E-12 1.56E-13 4.21E-16 5.86E-1 7 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 2.36E-14 5.86E-17 8.08E-1 5 5.86E-1 7 4.06E-14 5.86E-1 7 2.85E-1 3 2.93E-16 3.28E-1 6 5.86E-1 7 6.56E-16 5.86E-1 7 5.86E-17 3.75E-1 1 3.45E-1 2 1.56E-13 4.21 E-16 5.86E-1 7 Total LERF and ALERF 6.39E-1 1 0.OOE+00 6.39E-1 1 1 _ N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.3.0 DID EVALUATION 3.1 Defense-in-Depth Evaluation A review of the impact of the change on defense-in-depth (DID) was performed.
NFPA 805 defines DID as:* Preventing fires from starting* Rapidly detecting fires and controlling and extinguishing promptly those fires that do occur, thereby limiting damage Providing adequate level of fire protection for structures, systems and components important to safety; so that a fire that is not promptly extinguished will not prevent essential plant safety functions from being performed.
In general, the DID requirement was considered satisfied if the proposed change does not result in a substantial imbalance among these elements (or echelons).
The review of DID was qualitative and addressed each of the elements with respect to the proposed change. Fire protection features and systems relied upon to ensure DID were identified in the assessment (e.g., detection, suppression system).The VFDRs and the associated Fire Area risk (CDF) and scenario consequences (CCDP values)were evaluated to identify general DID echelon imbalances.
Potential methods to balance the DID features were identified ensuring an adequate balance of DID features is maintained for the Fire Area. See Section 3.2 for the results of the evaluation.
Revision 0 Page 25 of 31 Version 1.0 Page 2347 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-040 3.2 Defense-in-Depth Review Results A review of defense in depth and risk evaluation results show that, given the systems and features specified in Table 3-1 and Section 2 respectively, risk acceptance criteria are met and that the balance of defense in depth is maintained.
The risk acceptance criteria are met with substantial margin to account for analytical methods associated with fire scenarios.
The analyzed scenarios bound potential fuel packages which can reasonably be expected to occur in this area.Existing detection and suppression system is credited to provide defense in depth balance.In the event of no intervention by the plant fire brigade, it is not expected that a credible fire would develop which would not be bounded by the analyzed scenarios.
Based on the required fire protections systems/features specified, the ability to meet nuclear safety performance criteria is ensured.The table below summarizes how an adequate balance of DID is maintained.
Table 3-1 Defense-in-Depth Impact Review Method of Providing DID Discussion Echelon 1: Prevent fires from starting Combustible Control No change necessary to procedure(s) 
/guidance document(s).
1 Hot Work Control No change necessary to procedure(s) 
/guidance document(s).
1 Echelon 2: Rapidly detect, control and extinguish promptly those fires that do occur thereby limiting fire damage Detection System Detection system installed and required.Automatic Fire Suppression Suppression system installed and required.Portable Fire Extinguishers Portable extinguishers are available, but no enhancements required.Hose stations and hydrants Fire hose cabinet(s) are available, but no enhancements required.located in the area(s)Pre-Fire Plan No change necessary to procedure(s) 
/guidance document(s).
Echelon 3: Provide adequate level of fire protection for systems and structures so that a fire will not prevent essential safety functions from being performed Walls, floors ceilings and structural No changes necessary to existing barriers.1 elements are rated or have been evaluated as adequate for the hazard.Openings in the fire barrier are rated No changes necessary to existing barrier openings.or have been evaluated as adequate for the hazard.Supplemental barriers (e.g., ERFBS, No supplemental barriers installed and not required.cable tray covers, etc.)Guidance provided to operations No VFDR related DID recovery actions required.personnel detailing the credited success path(s) including recovery actions to achieve nuclear safety performance criteria.This fire protection feature is relied upon without further DID enhancements beyond inherent programmatic requirements of NFPA 805, Chap. 3 and will not be reported in Table 5-2.Revision 0 Page 26 of 31 Revision 0 Page 26 of 31 Version 1.0 Page 2348 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-040 3.2.1 Required Modifications There are no modifications required as a result of the DID evaluation for this fire area.3.2.2 Required Recovery Actions There are no required recovery actions as a result of the DID evaluation for this fire area.4.0 SAFETY MARGIN EVALUATION 4.1 Safety Margin Evaluation In accordance with NEI 04-02, 5.3.5.3 guidance, the maintenance of adequate Safety Margin is assessed by the consideration of categories of analyses utilized by this fire risk evaluation (FRE).Safety margins are considered to be maintained if: " Codes and standards or their alternatives accepted for use by the NRC are met, and" Safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) are met, or provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty.
The maintenance of adequate safety margin for the change analysis is described for each of the specific analysis types used in support of the fire risk assessment.
4.1.1 Fire Modeling Fire modeling performed in support of the transition has been performed within the Fire PRA utilizing codes and standards developed by industry and NRC staff to provide realistic yet conservative results. Specifically, the heat release rates utilized in the transition analysis are based upon NUREG/CR 6850, Task 8, Scoping Fire Modeling.
These heat release rates are conservative and represent values used to screen out fixed ignition sources that do not pose a threat to the targets within specific fire compartments and to assign severity factors to unscreened fixed ignition sources.The combined analysis approach is used during transition; therefore, maximum expected fire scenario/limiting fire scenario have not been analyzed separately.
The bases for the application of these fire modeling codes and standards were not altered in support of this FRE.4.1.2 Plant System Performance Plant system performance parameters were not modified as a result of this FRE. These performance parameters were originally established to support nuclear performance criteria contained in the plant specific accident analyses.
These analyses established component and system performance criteria necessary to establish safe and stable plant operation, as well as, safe shut down of the unit in the event of a fire. These performance parameters were not modified as a result of this FRE.4.2 Safety Margin Results All analyses and assessment have been performed utilizing accepted techniques and industry accepted standards.
In addition, safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) have been considered and provides sufficient margin to account for Revision 0 Page 27 of 31 Version 1.0 Page 2349 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-040 analysis and data uncertainty.
As such, the Safety Margins are maintained as discussed in Section 4. 1.5.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION RESULTS 5.1 Dispositions of VFDRs Based on the FRE results contained in Sections 2, 3 and 4 the VFDRs identified in Section 1 .1 have been resolved as follows: Table 5-1 Final Variance Disposition VFDR ID Disposition U2-1-040-SEP-001 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)U2-1-040-SEP-002 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action U2-1-040-SEP-003 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action U2-1-040-SEP-004 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action U2-1-040-SEP-005 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action U2-1-040-SEP-006 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action U2-1-040-SEP-007 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action U2-1-040-SEP-008 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action U2-1-040-SEP-009 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action U2-1-040-SEP-010 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action U2-1-040-SEP-011 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action U2-1-040-SEP-012 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action U2-1-040-SEP-013 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action U2-1-040-SEP-014 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action U2-1-040-SEP-015 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action U2-1-040-SEP-016 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action U2-1-040-SEP-017 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action U2-1-040-SEP-018 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action U2-1-040-SEP-019 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action U2-1-040-SEP-020 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action U2-1-040-SEP-021 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action U2-1-040-SEP-022 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action U2-1-040-SEP-023 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action U2-1-040-SEP-024 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action U2-1-040-SEP-025 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action U2-1-040-SEP-026 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action U2-1-040-SEP-027 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action U2-1-040-SEP-028 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action U2-1-040-SEP-029 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action U2-1-040-SEP-030 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Revision 0 Page 28 of 31 Version 1.0 Page 2350 of 3726 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-040 SE-C051 326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-040 VFDR ID U2-1-040-SEP-031 U2-1-040-SEP-032 U2-1-040-SEP-033 U2-1-040-SEP-034 U2-1-040-SEP-035 U2-1-040-SEP-036 U2-1-040-SEP-037 U2-1-040-SEP-038 U2-1-040-SEP-039 U2-1-040-SEP-040 U2-1-040-SEP-041 U2-1-040-SEP-042 U2-1-040-SEP-043 U2-1-040-SEP-044 Table 5-1 Final Variance Disposition Disposition Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Revision 0 Page 29 of 31 Version 1.0 Page 2351 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-040 5.2 Fire Risk Evaluation Summary of Fire Protection Systems and Features Table 5-2 Summary of Required Fire Protection Systems and Features Required Required Required Fire Fire Area Fire Zone Suppression DetectionReurdFe e Su ssin Stetn Protection Feature Required Fire Protection System and Feature Details System System (R, D)(R, D) (R, D)U2 1-040 R R -Modification to provide fuse or other electrical isolation device at the DC shunt connection point 318 D R, D None R -Detection system;D -Detection system, Suppression system Required Suppression/Detection/Feature:
required in the Fire Area based on NFPA 805 Chapter 4 compliance.
The information is provided on a zone basis. The basis for the requirement of the fire protection system is designated as follows:* R -Risk Criteria:
Systems required to meet the Risk Criteria for the Performance-Based Approach (NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4)* D -Defense-in-depth Criteria:
Systems required to maintain adequate balance of Defense-in-Depth for a Performance-Based Approach (NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4)Fire Protection Features in this Table only refer to those features installed in the Fire Area that have a corresponding Chapter 3 requirement.
5.3 Summary of Recovery Actions No recovery actions are required for this fire area.Revision 0 Page 30 of 31 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-040 5.4 Summary of Plant Modifications Table 5-3 -Plant Modifications Item Unit Problem Statement Proposed Modification In FPRA Comp Risk Informed Characterization Measure 2VALA05 B- Provide fuse or other Fire Area 1-040 -Require electrical isolation device at the DC Reduce risk due to fire induced failure by 04-1 2 protection of cables to shunt connection point for Yes Yes protecting cables preventing damage to prevent fire damage components:
associated components.
Q2R42E0002A:A:A 2VBLB18 B- Provide fuse or other 12 Fire Area 1-040 -Require electrical isolation device at the DC Reduce risk due to fire induced failure by 040-2 2 protection of cables to shunt connection point for Yes Yes protecting cables preventing damage to prevent fire damage component:
associated components.
Q2R42E0002B:A:A 5.5 Fire Area Risk Summary Table 5 Fire Area Risk Summary NFPA 805 VFDR RAs Fire Risk Eval Fire Area Area Description Ba Fire Area CDF/LERF (e/o RYs F CDF/LERF Additional Risk of RAs Basis (Yes/Na) (Yes/No) A CDF/LERF U2 1-040 Cable Spreading Room 4.2.4 2.57E-08/6.26E-1 1 Yes No 2.57E-08/6.26E-1 1 N/A Revision 0 Page 31 of 31 Revision 0 Page 31 of 31 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-041 Attachment 
-Unit 2 Fire Area 1-041 FRE for Fire Area Train A Switchgear and Load Center Rooms Revision:
0 Name Fire PRA Preparer Fire PRA Reviewer Fire Protection Preparer Fire Protection Reviewer NSCA Preparer NSCA Reviewer FRE Preparer FRE Reviewer Jonathan Hedrick Clint Pierce Rebecca Puckett Robert Kirkpatrick Larry Valmonte Dan Funk Micky Heatherly Brandon Jamar Revision 0 Page 1 of 38 Version 1.0 Page 2354 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-041 1.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION INPUT .....................................................................
4 1.1 Variances from the Deterministic Requirements 
....................................
4 1.2 Fire Protection Systems and Features ..................................................
7 1.2.1 Construction 
...............................................................................
7 1.2 .2 D e te ctio n ................................................................................... 
..8 1.2.3 Fixed Fire Suppression 
...............................................................
8 1.2.4 Manual Suppression 
...................................................................
8 1.2.5 Ventilation (Smoke Removal) .....................................................
8 1.2.6 Other Fire Protection Features ....................................................
8 1.2.7 Fire Hazard Identification 
...........................................................
8 1.2.8 Fire PRA Input.............................................................................
8 2.0 RISK EVALUATION 
.........................................................................................
9 2.1 Fire PRA Variant Case Calculation 
......................................................
9 2.2 Compliant Case Calculation 
..................................................................
16 2.2.1 VFDRs Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA .............................
16 2.2.2 VFDRs Not Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA ......................
17 2.2.3 Compliant Case Results ...........................................................
18 2.2.4 Required Modifications 
.............................................................
27 2.2.5 Required Recovery Actions .......................................................
27 2.3 Risk Evaluation Results ......................................................................
27 3.0 DID EVALUATION 
.........................................................................................
33 3.1 Defense-in-Depth Evaluation 
...............................................................
33 3.2 Defense-in-Depth Review Results ......................................................
34 3.2.1 Required Modifications 
.............................................................
35 3.2.2 Required Recovery Actions .......................................................
35 4.0 SAFETY MARGIN EVALUATION 
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35 4.1 Safety Margin Evaluation 
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35 4 .1.1 F ire M o d e ling .......................................................................... 
..3 5 4.1.2 Plant System Performance 
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35 4.2 Safety Margin Results ..........................................................................
36 5.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION RESULTS .............................................................
36 5.1 Dispositions of VFDRs ........................................................................
36 Revision 0 Page 2 of 38 Version 1.0 Page 2355 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-041 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 Fire Risk Evaluation Summary of Fire Protection Systems and Features 37 Summary of Recovery Actions .............................................................
37 Summary of Plant Modifications 
..........................................................
37 Fire Area Risk Summary ......................................................................
38 Revision 0 Page 3 of 38 Version 1.0 Page 2356 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-041 1.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION INPUT 1.1 Variances from the Deterministic Requirements The VFDRs identified for evaluation for Unit 2, Fire Area 1-04 1, Train A Switchgear and Load Center Rooms are: Table 1-1 VFDRs VFDR Component(s)
Description U2-1-041-BC-N2B21TR0413:AVAI This safe shutdown component requires AC or DC power to perform 001 LABLE- its safe shutdown function.
Ultimately Battery 2A supplies the DC bus TE413:AVAILABLE-that provides power to the component (Either through an inverter in TE413, RCS HOT the case of Vital AC power, or 125V DC control power). The battery LEG charger(s) to this bus is not available in this Fire Area. Decay Heat TEMPERATURE Removal via SG 2A is desired in this fire area. In order to remove RECORDER TR-413 Core Decay Heat, RCS Loop Temperature Indication must remain available for operators at the control room. Fire A loss of power to the RCS Loop 1 Hot and Cold Leg Temperature indicators TR0413 or TR0410 (Hot Leg and Cold Leg respectively) could render Loop 1 Temperature Indication unavailable.
AC panels 2A and 2J (both can be supplied from Battery 2A) provide the necessary power for TR0413. AC panels 2B and 2J supply power for the TE0410 loop (Both supplied from Battery 2A). This failure challenges the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-1-041-BC-Q2B31L0001A:ON/O This safe shutdown component requires AC or DC power to perform 002 FF:OFF, its safe shutdown function.
Ultimately Battery 2A supplies the DC bus PRESSURIZER that provides power to the component (Either through an inverter in HEATER GROUP 2A the case of Vital AC power, or 125V DC control power). The battery DISTRIBUTION charger(s) to this bus is not available in this Fire Area. The PANEL Pressurizer Heaters are required to increase RCS Pressure by heating Pressurizer Inventory.
In order to establish pressure control, the Pressurizer heaters are required off. A loss of control power to DC Panel 2B could result in a failure to train Pressurizer Heater Group 2A.Failure to secure the Pressurizer Heater 2A could challenge the RCS Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-1-041-BC-Q2B31PT0455:AVAI This safe shutdown component requires AC or DC power to perform 003 LABLE:AVAILABLE, its safe shutdown function.
Ultimately Battery 2A supplies the DC bus PRESSURIZER that provides power to the component (Either through an inverter in PRESS PROT the case of Vital AC power, or 125V DC control power). The battery CHANNEL 1 PRESS charger(s) to this bus is not available in this Fire Area. A loss of AC TRANSMITTER power to the transmitter PT455 could initiate a spurious SIAS signal. A spurious SIAS Signal could result in spurious isolation of the charging injection path, due to closure of Valves 8107 and 8108, and a failure to establish a charging injection path. Failure to establish a charging path challenges the RCS Inventory/Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-1-041-BC-Q2C22LT0474:AVAIL This safe shutdown component requires AC or DC power to perform 004 ABLE:AVAILABLE, its safe shutdown function.
Ultimately Battery 2A supplies the DC bus STEAM that provides power to the component (Either through an inverter in GENERATOR 2A the case of Vital AC power, or 125V DC control power). The battery LEVEL charger(s) to this bus is not available in this Fire Area. A loss of TRANSMITTER power to LT474 could initiate a SG 2A Hi-Hi or Lo-Lo water level signal. This signal could potentially start the MDAFW Pumps at the inopportune time before the Auxiliary Feedwater Lineup is established.
This failure challenges the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
Revision 0 Page 4 of 38 Version 1.0 Page 2357 of 3726 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-041 Table 1-1 VFDRs VFDR Component(s)
Description U2-1-041-BC-Q2C22LT0484:AVAIL This safe shutdown component requires AC or DC power to perform 005 ABLE:AVAILABLE, its safe shutdown function.
Ultimately Battery 2A supplies the DC bus STEAM that provides power to the component (Either through an inverter in GENERATOR 2B the case of Vital AC power, or 125V DC control power). The battery LEVEL charger(s) to this bus is not available in this Fire Area. A loss of TRANSMITTER power to LT484 could initiate a SG 2B Hi-Hi or Lo-Lo water level signal. This signal could potentially start the MDAFW Pumps at the inopportune time before the Auxiliary Feedwater Lineup is established.
This failure challenges the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-1-041-BC-Q2C22LT0494:AVAIL This safe shutdown component requires AC or DC power to perform 006 ABLE:AVAILABLE, its safe shutdown function.
Ultimately Battery 2A supplies the DC bus STEAM that provides power to the component (Either through an inverter in GENERATOR 2C the case of Vital AC power, or 125V DC control power). The battery LEVEL charger(s) to this bus is not available in this Fire Area. A loss of TRANSMITTER power to LT494 could initiate a SG 2C Hi-Hi or Lo-Lo water level signal. This signal could potentially start the MDAFW Pumps at the inopportune time before the Auxiliary Feedwater Lineup is established.
This failure challenges the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-1-041-BC-Q2E21P0002A:ON:O This safe shutdown component requires AC or DC power to perform 008 N/OFF, 2A its safe shutdown function.
Ultimately Battery 2B supplies the DC bus CHARGING PUMP that provides power to the component (Either through an inverter in the case of Vital AC power, or 125V DC control power). The battery charger(s) to this bus is not available in this Fire Area. An inability to trip a non credited charging pump could result in an overcharging condition, thereby impairing the ability to control the overall cool-down rate. Charging pump 2A suffers a loss of control power from panel 2B that would prevent remote tripping of the pump and/or potential spurious start of the pump due to fire induced circuit failure. This failure challenges the RCS Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-1-041-BC-Q2E21V0243:CLOSE This safe shutdown component requires AC or DC power to perform 009 D:CLOSED, RCS its safe shutdown function.
Ultimately Battery 2A supplies the DC bus ALTERNATE that provides power to the component (Either through an inverter in CHARGING LINE the case of Vital AC power, or 125V DC control power). The battery charger(s) to this bus is not available in this Fire Area. Isolating the alternate charging line is necessary in order to obtain a significant pressure gradient in order to de-pressurize the RCS via aux-spray.
This valve (the Alternate Charging line supply from CVCS) fails open on a loss of power to DC panel 2A, and hence the necessary pressure gradient will not be sufficient to supply the pressurizer through the spray line. Failure to de-pressurize via aux spray challenges the RCS Pressure/Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-1-041-BC-Q2E21V0347:MODU This safe shutdown component requires AC or DC power to perform 010 LATED:MODULATE, its safe shutdown function.
Ultimately Battery 2A supplies the DC bus CHARGING FLOW that provides power to the component (Either through an inverter in CONTROL VALVE the case of Vital AC power, or 125V DC control power). The battery charger(s) to this bus is not available in this Fire Area. Flow control Valve V0347 permits normal charging flow to be injected into the RCS system. AC power is required to control the flow and thus charging inventory that is injected into the RCS Cold Legs. A loss of power could result in this valve failing in the open position.
Failure to throttle flow to the RCS system challenges the RCS Inventory/Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.Revision 0 Page 5 of 38 Version 1.0 Page 2358 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-041 Table 1-1 VFDRs VFDR Component(s)
Description U2-1-041-BC-Q2N23P0002:OFF:O This safe shutdown component requires AC or DC power to perform 011 N/OFF, TURBINE its safe shutdown function.
Ultimately Battery 2A supplies the DC bus DRIVEN AUX that provides power to the component (Either through an inverter in FEEDWATER PUMP the case of Vital AC power, or 125V DC control power). The battery charger(s) to this bus is not available in this Fire Area. A loss of power to the Steam Generator Level Transmitters (LT474, LT475-SG2A) (LT484, LT485-SG2B) or (LT494, LT495-SG2C) could initiate a spurious TDAFW Pump start signal. This signal could open the steam admission valves to the TDAFW Pump and cause the pump to spuriously steam the Generators.
This failure could result in an overcooling condition and challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-1-041-BC-N2C55NI0032A:AVAI This safe shutdown component requires AC or DC power to perform 012 LABLE:AVAILABLE, its safe shutdown function.
Ultimately Battery 2A supplies the DC bus SOURCE RANGE that provides power to the component (Either through an inverter in COUNT RATE the case of Vital AC power, or 125V DC control power). The battery INDICATOR NI-32A charger(s) to this bus is not available in this Fire Area. Source Range Instrumentation is required to monitor Reactivity Conditions.
A loss of channel 1 and channel 2 Source Range Detectors could occur, due to a loss of power from AC panels 2A and 2B. This would prevent operator ability to monitor source range count levels. Failure to monitor subcritical conditions challenges the Reactivity Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-1-041-BC-Q2N11PV3371A:CL This safe shutdown component requires AC or DC power to perform 013 OSED:MODULATE, its safe shutdown function.
Ultimately Battery 2A supplies the DC bus MAIN STEAM that provides power to the component (Either through an inverter in ATMOS RELIEF the case of Vital AC power, or 125V DC control power). The battery charger(s) to this bus is not available in this Fire Area. The Atmospheric Relief Valves are required to modulate in order to relieve steam to the atmosphere and facilitate the removal of decay heat.Decay Heat Removal via SG2A is desired in this fire area. A loss of power/and or instrument air will cause valve ARV PV3371A to fail closed. Instrument air fails due to a loss of power to load centers 2A and 2G to the compressors.
This failure challenges the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-1-041-Q2R42BO001A:ENE This component, 125V DC Bus 2A, requires HVAC support to remain HVAC-001 RGIZED:ENERGIZE functional.
Failure to provide HVAC support to this electrical D-BC2A, 125V DC component challenges HVAC support Vital Auxiliaries Nuclear Safety BUS 2A Performance Criteria.U2-1-041-Q2R42E0002B:AVAI This component, Battery 2A, requires HVAC support to remain HVAC-002 LABLE:AVAILABLE, functional.
Failure to provide HVAC support to this electrical 125V BATTERY 2B component challenges HVAC support Vital Auxiliaries Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-1-041-IA-Q2E21V0243:CLOSE This component requires instrument air to perform its credited 001 D:CLOSED, RCS function.
Instrument air is assumed to be unavailable in this fire area ALTERNATE because air loss paths have not been identified.
Isolating the alternate CHARGING LINE charging line is necessary in order to obtain a significant pressure gradient in order to de-pressurize the RCS via aux-spray.
This valve (the Alternate Charging line supply from CVCS) fails open on a loss of instrument air, and hence the necessary pressure gradient will not be sufficient to supply the pressurizer through the spray line. Failure to de-pressurize via aux spray challenges the RCS Pressure/Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.Revision 0 Page 6 of 38 Version 1.0 Page 2359 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-041 Table 1-1 VFDRs VFDR Component(s)
Description U2-1-041-IA-Q2E21V0244:OPEN:
This component requires instrument air to perform its credited 002 MODULATE, RCS function.
Instrument air is assumed to be unavailable in this fire area NORMAL because air loss paths have not been identified.
Isolating the normal CHARGING LINE charging line is necessary in order to obtain a significant pressure gradient in order to de-pressurize the RCS via aux-spray.
This valve (the Normal Charging line supply from CVCS) fails open on a loss of instrument air, and hence the necessary pressure gradient will not be sufficient to supply the pressurizer through the aux spray line. Failure to de-pressurize via aux spray challenges the RCS Pressure/Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-1-041-IA-Q2E21V0245:CLOSE This component requires instrument air to perform its credited 003 D:CLOSED, RCS function.
Instrument air is assumed to be unavailable in this fire area PRESSURIZER AUX because air loss paths have not been identified.
This valve is required SPRAY to cycle in order to supply CVCS inventory to the pressurizer to de-pressurize via aux-spray, and the valve fails closed on a loss of instrument air. An inability to cycle this valve due to a loss of instrument air would prevent de-pressurization of the RCS via aux-spray. Failure to ensure cycling capability of this valve challenges the RCS Pressure/Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-1-041-IA-Q2E21V0347:MODU This component requires instrument air to perform its credited 004 LATED:MODULATE, function.
Instrument air is assumed to be unavailable in this fire area CHARGING FLOW because air loss paths have not been identified.
Flow control Valve CONTROL VALVE V0347 permits normal charging flow to be injected into the RCS system. Instrument air is required to control the flow and thus charging inventory that is injected into the RCS Cold Legs. A loss of instrument air could result in this valve failing in the open position.
Failure to throttle flow to the RCS system challenges the RCS Inventory/Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-1-041-SEP-N2B31LO001E:ON:O Pressurizer Group E is not credited for use, and spurious operation of 001 FF, PRESSURIZER the heater may result in an RCS overpressurization condition.
A loss HEATER GROUP 2E of power to DC Panel 1 H due to circuit failure and the panel being DISTRIBUTION physically located in the area, could prevent remote tripping of the PANEL load. This failure challenges the RCS Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-1-041-SEP-Q2E21 P0002A:ON:O An inability to trip a non credited charging pump could result in an 002 N/OFF, 2A overcharging condition, thereby impairing the ability to control the CHARGING PUMP overall cool-down rate. Fire induced control circuit damage to sequencer 2F could spuriously start charging pump 2A. This failure challenges the RCS Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
1.2 Fire Protection Systems and Features Fire Area 1-041 consists of Fire Zones 335, 343, and 346. This fire area is located in the Train A Switchgear and Load Center Rooms at elevation 139'- 0".1.2.1 Construction Barriers for this fire area are of substantial construction and have been designed and constructed to meet separation requirements.
In the event the configuration utilized is not in accordance with recognized standards, the deviations have been evaluated to be adequate for the hazard.Revision 0 Page 7 of 38 Version 1.0 Page 2360 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-041 1.2.2 Detection Fire detection systems to provide notification to the Control Room are:* Fire Zone 335 (Load Center Room, Train A) is provided with detection." Fire Zone 343 (Load Center Room, Train A) is provided with detection." Fire Zone 346 (Switchgear and M-G Set Room) is provided with detection.
1.2.3 Fixed Fire Suppression Fixed fire suppression systems to aid in control of both fire growth and spread in the fire area are: Fire Zones 335, 343, and 346 are provided with heat detectors that will actuate in-cabinet flooding CO 2 systems in the 600-V load centers, the 4.16-kV switchgear and 5-kV disconnect switch panel.1.2.4 Manual Suppression Manual suppression equipment to be utilized by plant personnel and/or fire brigade members are: " Fire Area 1-041 is provided with a CO 2 hose reel located in room 339 (fire area 1-042)." A fire hose cabinet located in room 345 (Fire Area 1-042)." Two fire hose cabinets in room 3 19 are available for use in this area.1.2.5 Ventilation (Smoke Removal)Portable smoke ejectors are available to assist with smoke removal.1.2.6 Other Fire Protection Features Fire rated cable configurations are installed in the area.1.2.7 Fire Hazard Identification The major sources of combustibles in Fire Area 1-041 are cable insulation, cable bus insulation, panels, silicone transformer fluid, fiberglass, and plastic. Details regarding fire scenarios quantified in the fire PRA, and their associated ignition sources (where applicable) are discussed in Section 2.1.2.8 Fire PRA Input Fire protection features Fire rated cables have been credited in this area (Fire Zones 335 and 343 only).Fire protection systems Existing in-cabinet CO 2 is being credited to suppress the SWGR fire. The Hot Gas Layer evaluation credits the detection, automatic fire suppression system and manual fire brigade Revision 0 Page 8 of 38 Version 1.0 Page 2361 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-041 response.
The Multi Compartment Analysis evaluation credits the detection and automatic fire suppression system.Hot Gas Layer Treatment Physical attributes of this fire area require the incorporation of a Hot Gas Layer scenario and the expansion of the Zone Of Influence beyond the original Zone Of Influence to account for the Hot Gas Layer impacts in this area, see PRA-BC-F-1 1-015 for further details. Credit for detection was taken in the Hot Gas Layer evaluation for this fire area. Credit for both automatic fire suppression system and manual fire brigade response was taken in the Hot Gas Layer evaluation for this fire area.Multi-compartment analysis Credit for detection was taken in the Multi Compartment Analysis for this fire area. Credit for automatic fire suppression system was taken in the Multi Compartment Analysis for this fire area.Scenario Review All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0, ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency.
2.0 RISK EVALUATION 2.1 Fire PRA Variant Case Calculation Tables 2-1a and 2-lb provide the results of the variant case calculation for Fire Area 1-041. This is taken directly from the Fire PRA model with no changes or alterations made. The CDF and LERF results are provided on a scenario basis.Revision 0 Page 9 of 38 Version 1.0 Page 2362 of 3726 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-041 Table 2-1a'Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train A Alignment IGF CDF LERF Zone Scen ScenDesc (/rxyr) NSP SF CCDP (/ryr) CLERP (/rx-yr)0335 0335 0335 0335 0335 0335 0335 0335 0335 0335 D1 D2 D3 E F1 F2 G H1 H2 H3 TRANSIENT FIRE TRANSIENT FIRE TRANSIENT FIRE SS XFMR 1-A DG PANEL -SEVERE DG PANEL -NON SEVERE SS XFMR 1-D 600V LC 1-A -SEVERE 600V LC 1-A -NON SEVERE 600V LC 1-A -HEAF 5.04E-06 5.04E-06 5.04E-06 1.74E-04 1.82E-05 1.82E-05 1.74E-04 1.27E-04 1.27E-04 3.65E-05 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 4.OOE-02 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.OOE-01 1.0 1.0 2.50E-01 1.0 1.0 6.46E-06 1.45E-06 6.69E-07 1.45E-06 1.49E-04 6.46E-06 1.45E-06 6.46E-06 6.80E-07 8.27E-04 3.25E-1 1 7.28E-12 3.37E-12 2.51 E-10 2.72E-10 1.18E-10 2.51E-10 8.23E-12 8.67E-1 1 3.02E-08 6.56E-09 1.24E-09 1.61E-10 1.24E-09 4.61 E-07 6.56E-09 1.24E-09 6.56E-09 1.61 E-10 1.66E-06 3.31E-14 6.25E-15 8.10E-16 2.16E-13 8.40E-1 3 1.19E-13 2.16E-13 8.36E-15 2.05E-14 6.05E-1 1 0335 !1 600V LC 1-D -SEVERE 1.27E-04 4.OOE-02 2.50E-01 1.49E-04 1.90E-10 4.61E-07 5.88E-13 0335 12 600V LC 1-D -NON SEVERE 1.27E-04 1.0 1.0 1.45E-06 1.84E-10 1.24E-09 1.58E-13 0335 13 600V LC 1-D -HEAF 3.65E-05 1.0 1.0 1.40E-04 5.1OE-09 4.39E-07 1.60E-11 0335 JA 4160V BUS 1F -SEVERE 1.46E-04 0.04 0.25 3.83E-03 5.58E-09 1.46E-05 2.13E-11 0335 12a 4160V BUS 1F (DF08)- NON 1.82E-05 1.0 1.0 2.44E-03 4.45E-08 1.59E-05 2.90E-10 SEVERE 0335 J2b 4160V BUS 1F (DF09)- NON 1.82E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 1.22E-11 1.61E-10 2.93E-15 SEVERE 0335 J2c 4160V BUS 1F (DF10)- NON 1.82E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 1.22E-11 1.61E-10 2.93E-15 SEVERE 0335 J2d 4160V BUS 1F (DF11)- NON 1.82E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 1.22E-11 1.61E-10 2.93E-15 SEVERE 0335 J2e 4160V BUS 1F (DF12)- NON 1.82E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 1.22E-11 1.61E-10 2.93E-15 SEVERE 0335 J2f 4160V BUS 1F (DF13)- NON 1.82E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 1.22E-11 1.61E-10 2.93E-15 SEVERE 0335 J2g 4160V BUS 1F (DF14)- NON 1.82E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 1.22E-11 1.61 E-10 2.93E-15 SEVERE 0335 J2h 4160V BUS 1F (DF15)- NON 1.82E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 1.22E-11 1.61E-10 2.93E-15 SEVERE 0335 J3a 4160V BUS 1F -HEAF (DF15) 5.21E-06 1.0 1.0 5.33E-03 2.78E-08 2.19E-05 1.14E-10 Revision 0 Page 10 of 38 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-041 Table 2-1a 1 Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train A Alignment IGF CDF LERF Zone Scen ScenDesc (rr NSP SF CCDP (Dy CLERP (IRr (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr)0335 J3b 4160V BUS 1F -HEAF (DF8- 3.65E-05 1.0 1.0 5.33E-03 1.95E-07 2.19E-05 8.00E-10 DF14)0343 D1 TRANSIENT FIRE 5.50E-06 1.0 1.0 6.46E-06 3.55E-11 6.56E-09 3.61E-14 0343 D2 TRANSIENT FIRE 5.50E-06 1.0 1.0 5.50E-06 3.02E-11 6.56E-09 3.61 E-14 0343 D3 TRANSIENT FIRE 5.50E-06 1.0 1.0 5.16E-06 2.83E-11 6.56E-09 3.61E-14 0343 E 4160V BUS iF LOC CONT 1.82E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 1.22E-11 1.61E-10 2.93E-15 STA 0343 F1 4160V BUS 1F -SEVERE 1.27E-04 4.OOE-02 2.50E-01 5.33E-03 6.80E-09 2.19E-05 2.80E-11 0343 0343 0343 0343 0343 0343 0343 0343 0343 0343 0343 0343 0343 F2a F2b F2c F2d F2e F2f F2g F3a F3c G H1 H2 H3 4160V BUS 1F (DF01)- NON SEVERE 4160V BUS 1F (DF02)- NON SEVERE 4160V BUS 1F (DF03)- NON SEVERE 4160V BUS 1F (DF04)- NON SEVERE 4160V BUS 1F (DF05)- NON SEVERE 4160V BUS 1 F (DF06)- NON SEVERE 4160V BUS 1F (DF07)- NON SEVERE 4160V BUS 1F -HEAF (DF01)4160V BUS 1F -HEAF (DF02-DF07)LTG XFMR 1D & 1E 4160V BUS 1C- SEVERE 4160V BUS 1C -NON SEVERE 4160V BUS 1C -HEAF 1.82E-05 1.82E-05 1.82E-05 1.82E-05 1.82E-05 1.82E-05 1.82E-05 5.21 E-06 3.13E-05 3.48E-04 9.1OE-05 9.1 OE-05 2.61 E-05 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 4.OOE-02 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 2.50E-01 1.0 1.0 8.16E-07 8.16E-07 2.64E-06 8.16E-07 8.16E-07 8.16E-07 8.16E-07 9.16E-04 4.99E-03 6.69E-07 6.46E-06 6.69E-07 6.12E-06 1.48E-1 1 1.48E-1 1 4.81 E-11 1.48E-1 1 1.48E-1 1 1.48E-11 1.48E-1 1 4.77E-09 1.56E-07 2.33E-10 5.88E-1 2 6.09E-1 1 1.59E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 4.90E-09 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 2.06E-06 2.11 E-05 1.61E-10 6.56E-09 1.61 E-10 6.56E-09 2.93E-15 2.93E-15 8.92E-14 2.93E-15 2.93E-15 2.93E-15 2.93E-15 1.07E-11 6.58E-10 5.59E-14 5.97E-15 1.46E-14 1.71 E-13 0343 I1 4160V BUS 1B -SEVERE 9.10E-05 4.OOE-02 2.50E-01 8.27E-04 7.53E-10 1.66E-06 1.51E-12 0343 12 4160V BUS lB -NON 9.1OE-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 6.09E-11 1.61E-10 1.46E-14 SEVERE Revision 0 Page 11 of 38 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-041 Table 2-1a 1 Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train A Alignment Zone Scen ScenDesc lGF NSP SF CCDP CDF CLERP LERF (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr) (Irx-yr)0343 13 4160V BUS 1B -HEAF 2.61E-05 1.0 1.0 4.38E-06 1.14E-10 1.97E-09 5.13E-14 0346 D1 TRANSIENT FIRE 4.37E-06 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 2.93E-12 1.61E-10 7.03E-16 0346 D2 TRANSIENT FIRE 5.19E-06 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 3.47E-12 1.61E-10 8.35E-16 0346 El 4160V BUS 1A -SEVERE 1.27E-04 4.00E-02 2.50E-01 8.69E-04 1.11E-09 1.92E-06 2.44E-12 0346 E2 4160V BUS lA-NON 1.27E-04 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 8.53E-11 1.61E-10 2.05E-14 SEVERE 0346 E3 4160V BUS 1A -HEAF 3.65E-05 1.0 1.0 8.69E-04 3.17E-08 1.92E-06 6.99E-11 0346 F LTG XFMR 1A 1.74E-04 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 1.16E-10 1.61E-10 2.80E-14 0346 G SS XFMR 11 1.74E-04 1.0 1.0 7.77E-04 1.35E-07 1.61 E-06 2.80E-10 0346 H1 600V LC 11 -SEVERE 5.46E-05 4.OOE-02 2.50E-01 7.77E-04 4.25E-10 1.61E-06 8.81E-13 0346 H2 600V LC 11 -NON SEVERE 5.46E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 3.66E-11 1.61 E-10 8.78E-15 0346 H3 600V LC 11 -HEAF 1.56E-05 1.0 1.0 7.77E-04 1.22E-08 1.61 E-06 2.52E-1 1 0346 I CRDM MG SET 1B 4.60E-04 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 3.08E-10 1.61E-10 7.40E-14 0346 J CRDM MG SET 1A 4.60E-04 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 3.08E-10 1.61E-10 7A40E-14 1-041-ADJ HGL HGL SCENARIO 3.13E-06 1.0 1.0 5.34E-03 1.67E-08 2.19E-05 6.87E-11 Total CDF/LERF Fire PRA Variant Case 6.76E-07 2.45E-09 Revision 0 Page 12 of 38 Revision 0 Page 12 of 38 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-041 Table 2-1b 1 Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train B Alignment IGF CDF LERF Zone Scen ScenDesc (Irx-yr) NSP SF CCDP (Iryr) CLERP (Irx-yr)0335 D1 TRANSIENT FIRE 5.04E-06 1.0 1.0 6.22E-06 3.13E-11 6.56E-09 3.31E-14 0335 D2 TRANSIENT FIRE 5.04E-06 1.0 1.0 1.44E-06 7.23E-12 1.24E-09 6.25E-15 0335 D3 TRANSIENT FIRE 5.04E-06 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 3.35E-12 1.61E-10 8.10E-16 0335 E SS XFMR 1-A 1.74E-04 1.0 1.0 1.44E-06 2.50E-10 1.24E-09 2.16E-13 0335 F1 DG PANEL -SEVERE 1.82E-05 1.0 1.00E-01 1.49E-04 2.71E-10 4.60E-07 8.37E-13 0335 F2 DG PANEL -NON SEVERE 1.82E-05 1.0 1.0 6.21E-06 1.13E-10 6.56E-09 1.19E-13 0335 G SS XFMR 1-D 1.74E-04 1.0 1.0 1.44E-06 2.50E-10 1.24E-09 2.16E-13 0335 H1 600V LC 1-A -SEVERE 1.27E-04 4.OOE-02 2.50E-01 6.22E-06 7.93E-12 6.56E-09 8.36E-15 0335 H2 600V LC 1-A -NON SEVERE 1.27E-04 1.0 1.0 6.75E-07 8.61E-11 1.61E-10 2.05E-14 0335 H3 600V LC 1-A -HEAF 3.65E-05 1.0 1.0 9.28E-04 3.38E-08 1.14E-06 4.14E-11 0335 I1 600V LC 1-D -SEVERE 1.27E-04 4.OOE-02 2.50E-01 1.49E-04 1.90E-10 4.60E-07 5.86E-13 0335 12 600V LC 1-D -NON SEVERE 1.27E-04 1.0 1.0 1.44E-06 1.83E-10 1.24E-09 1.58E-13 0335 13 600V LC 1-D -HEAF 3.65E-05 1.0 1.0 1.39E-04 5.08E-09 4.37E-07 1.59E-11 0335 J1 4160V BUS 1F -SEVERE 1.46E-04 0.04 0.25 4.41E-05 6.42E-09 9.31E-06 1.36E-11 0335 J2a 4160V BUS 1F (DF08)- NON 1.82E-05 1.0 1.0 2.63E-03 4.78E-08 7.68E-06 1.40E-10 SEVERE 0335 J2b 4160V BUS 1F (DF09)- NON 1.82E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 1.21E-11 1.61E-10 2.93E-15 SEVERE 0335 12c 4160V BUS 1F (DF10)- NON 1.82E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 1.21E-11 1.61E-10 2.93E-15 SEVERE 0335 J2d 4160V BUS IF (DF11)- NON 1.82E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 1.21E-11 1.61E-10 2.93E-15 SEVERE 0335 J2e 4160V BUS 1F (DF12)- NON 1.82E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 1.21E-11 1.61E-10 2.93E-15 SEVERE 0335 J2f 4160V BUS iF (DF13)- NON 1.82E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 1.21E-11 1.61E-10 2.93E-15 SEVERE 0335 4160V BUS iF (DF14)- NON 1.82E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 1.21E-11 1.61E-10 2.93E-15 J~g SEVERE 0335 J2h 4160V BUS 1F (DF15)- NON 1.82E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 1.21E-11 1.61E-10 2.93E-15 SEVERE 0335 J3a 4160V BUS 1F -HEAF (DF15) 5.21E-06 1.0 1.0 5.53E-03 2.88E-08 1.38E-05 7.17E-11 CD 0-4 NJ Revision 0 Page 13 of 38 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-041 Table 2-1 bl Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train B Alignment IGF CDF LERF Zone Scen ScenDesc (xr NSP SF CCDP (rr CLERP (/rx (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr)0335 J3b 4160V BUS 1F -HEAF (DF8- 3.65E-05 1.0 1.0 5.53E-03 2.02E-07 1.38E-05 5.02E-10 DF14)0343 D1 TRANSIENT FIRE 5.50E-06 1.0 1.0 6.21E-06 3.42E-11 6.56E-09 3.61 E-14 0343 D2 TRANSIENT FIRE 5.50E-06 1.0 1.0 5.25E-06 2.89E-11 6.56E-09 3.61 E-14 0343 D3 TRANSIENT FIRE 5.50E-06 1.0 1.0 4.95E-06 2.72E-11 6.56E-09 3.61 E-14 0343 E 4160V BUS 1FLOCCONT 1.82E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 1.21E-11 1.61E-10 2.93E-15 STA 0343 F1 4160V BUS 1F -SEVERE 1.27E-04 4.00E-02 2.50E-01 5.53E-03 7.05E-09 1.38E-05 1.75E-11 0343 F2a 4160V BUS 1F (DF01)- NON 1.82E-05 1.0 1.0 8.10E-07 1.47E-11 1.61E-10 2.93E-15 SEVERE 0343 F2b 4160V BUS 1F (DF02)- NON 1.82E-05 1.0 1.0 8.1OE-07 1.47E-11 1.61E-10 2.93E-15 SEVERE 0343 F2c 4160V BUS 1F (DF03)- NON 1.82E-05 1.0 1.0 2.64E-06 4.80E-11 4.90E-09 8.92E-14 SEVERE 0343 F2d 4160V BUS 1F (DF04)- NON 1.82E-05 1.0 1.0 8.10E-07 1.47E-11 1.61E-10 2.93E-15 SEVERE 0343 F2e 4160V BUS 1F (DF05)- NON 1.82E-05 1.0 1.0 8.1OE-07 1.47E-11 1.61E-10 2.93E-15 SEVERE 0343 F2f 4160V BUS 1F (DF06)- NON 1.82E-05 1.0 1.0 8.10E-07 1.47E-11 1.61E-10 2.93E-15 SEVERE 0343 F2g 4160V BUS 1F (DF07)- NON 1.82E-05 1.0 1.0 8.1OE-07 1.47E-11 1.61E-10 2.93E-15 SEVERE 0343 F3a 4160V BUS 1F -HEAF (DF01) 5.21E-06 1.0 1.0 1.01E-03 5.25E-09 1.54E-06 8.OOE-12 0343 F3c 4160V BUS 1F -HEAF (DF02- 3.13E-05 1.0 1.0 5.18E-03 1.62E-07 1.29E-05 4.02E-10 DF07)0343 G LTG XFMR 1D & 1E 3.48E-04 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 2.31 E-10 1.61E-10 5.59E-14 0343 H1 4160V BUS 1C -SEVERE 9.1OE-05 4.OOE-02 2.50E-01 6.22E-06 5.66E-12 6.56E-09 5.97E-15 0343 H2 4160V BUS 1C -NON 9.1OE-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 6.05E-11 1.61E-10 1.46E-14 SEVERE 0343 H3 4160V BUS 1C -HEAF 2.61E-05 1.0 1.0 5.91E-06 1.54E-10 6.56E-09 1.71E-13 0343 !1 4160V BUS 1B -SEVERE 9.10E-05 4.OOE-02 2.50E-01 9.28E-04 8.45E-10 1.14E-06 1.03E-12 0343 12 4160V BUS 1B -NON 9.10E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 6.05E-11 1.61E-10 1.46E-14 SEVERE Revision 0 Page 14 of 38 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-041 Table 2-1b'Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train B Alignment IGF CDF LERF Zone Scen ScenDesc Iry NSP SF CCDP (ry CLERP (Irr (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr)0343 13 4160V BUS 1B -HEAF 2.61 E-05 1.0 1.0 4.17E-06 1.09E-10 1.97E-09 5.13E-14 0346 D1 TRANSIENT FIRE 4.37E-06 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 2.90E-12 1.61E-10 7.03E-16 0346 D2 TRANSIENT FIRE 5.19E-06 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 3.45E-12 1.61E-10 8.35E-16 0346 El 4160V BUS 1A -SEVERE 1.27E-04 4.OOE-02 2.50E-01 9.59E-04 1.22E-09 1.39E-06 1.77E-12 0346 E2 4160V BUS 1A- NON 1.27E-04 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 8.47E-11 1.61E-10 2.05E-14 SEVERE 0346 E3 4160V BUS 1A -HEAF 3.65E-05 1.0 1.0 9.59E-04 3.50E-08 1.39E-06 5.07E-11 0346 F LTG XFMR 1A 1.74E-04 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 1.16E-10 1.61E-10 2.80E-14 0346 G SS XFMR 11 1.74E-04 1.0 1.0 8.68E-04 1.51E-07 1.09E-06 1.90E-10 0346 H1 600V LC 11 -SEVERE 5.46E-05 4.OOE-02 2.50E-01 8.68E-04 4.74E-10 1.09E-06 5.97E-13 0346 H2 600V LC 11 -NON SEVERE 5.46E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 3.63E-11 1.61 E-10 8.78E-15 0346 H3 600V LC 11 -HEAF 1.56E-05 1.0 1.0 8.68E-04 1.36E-08 1.09E-06 1.71E-11 0346 I CRDM MG SET 1B 4.60E-04 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 3.06E-10 1.61 E-10 7.40E-14 0346 J CRDM MG SET 1A 4.60E-04 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 3.06E-10 1.61E-10 7.40E-14 1-041-ADJ HGL HGL SCENARIO 3.13E-06 1.0 1.0 5.53E-03 1.73E-08 1.38E-05 4.32E-11 Total CDF/LERF Fire PRA Variant Case 7.21 E-07 1.52E-09 Where: Zone = Fire Zone Scen = 'A' to signify the variant case ScenDesc = Description of the Fire Scenario IGF = Ignition Frequency 
(/rx-yr)NSP = Non Suppression Probability SF = Severity Factor CCDP = Conditional Core Damage Probability CDF = Core Damage Frequency 
(/rx-yr)CLERP = Conditional Large Early Release Probability LERF = Large Early Release Frequency 
(/rx-yr)Revision 0 Page 15 of 38 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-041 2.2 Compliant Case Calculation The following sub-sections provide the basis for modeling each VFDR (or category of VFDRs)and the alterations that have been made to the variant case to represent the compliant case. In each section a discussion of the VFDR (or the category of VFDRs) is provided.2.2.1 VFDRs Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA For VFDRs specifically modeled in the Fire PRA, a table outlining the actual changes made to the Fire PRA model for that VFDR is provided.
The table includes:* Component Numbers associated with the VFDR. In some cases, there may be additional
* Component Numbers listed that may be the power supplies or other supporting components
* Basic Event(s) associated with the Components
* Scenarios which affect the VFDR.2.2.1.1 VFDRs U2-1-041-BC-002, 003, 004, 005, 006, 008, 011, SEP-002 The Farley Fire PRA models the battery and battery chargers in the logic for signal instruments, initiating events and early phase of accident sequences.
The batteries are credited to operate consistent with the design basis. For signal instruments that are associated with long term accident mitigation, the battery charger is the only credited power source. Since there is no fire failure of the battery in this fire area the delta associated with these VFDRs is epsilon..U2-1-041-BC-002 
-Q2B31L000IA:ON/OFF:OFF
-U2-1-041 -BC-003 -Q2B331 PT0455:AVAILABLE:AVAILABLE U2-1-041 -BC-004 -Q2C22LT0474:AVAILABLE:AVAILABLE
* U2-1-041-BC-005 
-Q2C22LT0484:AVAILABLE:AVAILABLE
* U2-1-041-BC-006 
-Q2C22LT0494:AVAILABLE:AVAILABLE a U2-1-041-BC-008 
-Q2E21POO02A:ON:ON/OFF
* U2-1-041 -BC-0Il -Q2N23P0002:OFF:ON/OFF
* U2-1-04 I-SEP-002 
-Q2E2 1 P0002A:ON:ON/OFF 2.2.1.2 VFDRs U2-1-041-BC-009, IA-001, 002, 003, SEP-001 The Fire PRA models the spurious start of 3 of the 5 pressurizer heaters in conjunction with a failure of aux spray to challenge the PORVs. In this fire area there is not an unacceptable combination of fire induced failures affecting the pressurizer heaters and pressurizer spray and consequently these VFDRs have no risk impact, therefore, the delta risk associated with these VFDRs is epsilon." U2-1-041-BC-009-Q2E21V0243:CLOSED:CLOSED" U2-1-041-IA-001 
-Q2E2 1V0243:CLOSED:CLOSED" U2-1-041 -IA-002 -Q2E2 1 V0244:OPEN:MODULATE Revision 0 Page 16 of 38 Version 1.0 Page 2369 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-041" U2-1-041 -IA-003 -Q2E2 1 V0245:CLOSED:CLOSED" U2-1-041-SEP-001 
-N2B331L0001E:ON:OFF 2.2.1.3 VFDRs U2-1-041-BC-010, IA-004 In this fire area there is a fire induced failure of FCV 122, however, MOV 8107 and 8108 are not impacted and are available to close if needed. Therefore, the delta risk associated with this VFDR is epsilon." U2-1-041-BC-010-Q2E21V0347:MODULATED:MODULATE" U2-1-041 -IA-004 -Q2E2 I V0347:MODULATED:MODULATE 2.2.1.4 VFDR U2-1-041-BC-013
* U2-1-041-BC-013 
-Q2N11PV3371A:CLOSED:CLOSED Table 2-2-1 U2-1-041-BC-013 ALTERATIONS Component ID Basic Event BE Description Model Alterations Scenarios 0335-D1/Fl1/F2/
Hi /H3/I 1/J 1/J3a/J3b Q2R43E0001A:A:A 2DGSQSEQ FAILS -SEQUENCER BUS N 0343--QB2-- 2 UETOFIENominal D1/D2/D3/F1/F3a/-Q B2F--F 2F DUE TO FIRE F3c/H1/H3/l1/13, 0346-G/H1/H3, 1-041-ADJ-HGL FAILURE OF POWER 0335-J1/J2a/J3b, Q2R15A0006:E:SU 4KV2F- SUPPLY FROM SUT2A TO Nominal 0343-F1/F3c, 1-041-T2A SUT2A--F 4.16KV BUS 2F DUE TO ADJ-HGL FIRE Model Alterations:
Failure mode probability set to nominal to eliminate fire contribution.
This model alteration is done in the Altered Events Table for the -COMPU2 scenario.2.2.1.5 VFDR U2-1-041-HVAC-001 U2-1-041-HVAC-001 
-Q2R42B000IA:ENERGIZED:ENERGIZED-BC2A The following recovery action is credited in the compliant case for this VFDR.Table 2-2-2 U2-1-041-HVAC-001 ALTERATIONS Component ID Basic Event BE Description Model Alterations Scenarios OPERATOR RECOVERY ALL EXCEPT: OP-RECOV-OP-RECOV-OF BATTERY CHARGER A 0335-Zero BCSW-A BCSW-A ROOM COOLING FAILS- Jl/J2a/J3a/J3b, SW 0343-Fl, F3a, F3c Model Alterations:
Failure mode probability set to nominal to eliminate fire contribution.
This model alteration is done in the Altered Events Table for the -COMPU2 scenario.2.2.2 VFDRs Not Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA A Fire PRA was developed in accordance with the requirements of Part 4 "Requirements for Fires at Power PRA" of the ASME and ANS combined PRA Standard, ASME/ANS RA-Sa-Revision 0 Page 17 of 38 Version 1.0 Page 2370 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-041 2009, "Standard for Level 1/Large Early Release Frequency Probabilistic Risk Assessment for Nuclear Power Plant Applications".
Consistent with those requirements not all components required to meet the nuclear safety criteria need to be specifically modeled in the Fire PRA. The following VFDRs are associated with components not modeled in the Fire PRA: 2.2.2.1 VFDR U2-1-041-BC-001 The NSCA credits the hot leg temperature recorder for monitoring of cool down. Hot Leg temperature is not a cue indication of operator actions credited in the fire PRA. Therefore, the loss of hot leg temperature recorder has no impact on the Fire PRA..U2-1-041-BC-001 
-N2B21 TR0413 :AVAILABLE-TE413:AVAILABLE-TE413 2.2.2.2 VFDR U2-1-041-BC-012 The NSCA model credits source range monitoring for verifying subcriticality.
The loss of this monitoring in and of itself does not result in the loss of any other NSCA required function.
The Fire PRA does not credit neutron monitoring as a cue for any credited human action. Therefore, the loss of neutron monitoring has no impact on the Fire PRA.E U2-1-041 -BC-0 12 -N2C55NI0032A:AVAILABLE:AVAILABLE 2.2.2.3 VFDR U2-1-041-HVAC-002 Battery Room 2B ventilation is not modeled in the fire PRA. The Battery Room exhaust fan function is to remove the hydrogen that is generated from the battery located within the room.The hydrogen production in the 24 hour mission time of the PRA is less than the required amount for a hydrogen burn, therefore the exhaust fan is not required to be modeled. See calculation Fire PRA Logic Model for Farley Nuclear Plants, PRA-BC-F-1 1-004.0 U2-1-04I -HVAC-002 
-Q2R42E0002B:AVAILABLE:AVAILABLE 2.2.3 Compliant Case Results Tables 2-3a and 2-3b provide the results of the compliant case calculation for this fire area. All of the altered events identified in Section 2.2.1 have been applied to their respective scenarios and the results have been quantified.
The CDF and LERF results are provided on a scenario basis.Revision 0 Page 18 of 38 Version 1.0 Page 2371 of 3726 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-041 SE-C051 326701 -008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-041 Zone 0335 0335 0335 0335 0335 0335 0335 0335 0335 0335 0335 0335 0335 0335 0335 0335 0335 Scen D1-COMPU2 D2-COMPU2 D3-COMPU2 E-COMPU2 Fl-COMPU2 F2-COMPU2 G-COMPU2 H1-COMPU2 H2-COMPU2 H3-COMPU2 11-COMPU2 12-COMPU2 13-COMPU2 J1-COMPU2 J2a-COMPU2 J2b-COMPU2 J2c-COMPU2 Scenario Description TRANSIENT FIR TRANSIENT FIR TRANSIENT FIF SS XFMR 1-A DG PANEL -SEVE DG PANEL -NO SEVERE SS XFMR 1-D 600V LC 1-A -SEV 600V LC 1-A -N SEVERE 600V LC 1-A -HE 600V LC 1-D -SEV 600V LC 1-D -N(SEVERE 600V LC 1-D -HE 4160V BUS 1F SEVERE 4160V BUS 1F (DF NON SEVERE 4160V BUS 1F (DF NON SEVERE 4160V BUS 1F (DF NON SEVERE Table 2-3a Compliant Case CDF and LERF Results Train A Alignment Scenario Specific CCDP VFDRs E U-2-1-041-HVAC-001, BC-013 5.09E-06 E U-2-1-041-HVAC-001 1.45E-06 E U-2-1-041-HVAC-001 6.69E-07 U-2-1-041-HVAC-001 1.45E-06 ERE U-2-1-041-HVAC-001, BC-013 1.40E-04 U-2-1-041-HVAC-001, BC-013 5.09E-06 U-2-1-041-HVAC-001 1.45E-06 ERE U-2-1-041-HVAC-001, BC-013 5.09E-06 ON U-2-1-041-HVAC-001 6.80E-07-AF U-2-1-041-HVAC-001, BC-013 7.50E-04/ERE U-2-1-041-HVAC-001, BC-013 1.40E-04 ONU-2-1-041-HVAC-001 1.45E-06 AF U-2-1-041-HVAC-001 1.40E-04 U2-1-041-BC-013 9.85E-04 F08)- U2-1-041-BC-013 4.15E-06 F09)- U2-1-041-BC-013 6.69E-07 F10)- U2-1-041-BC-013 6.69E-07 CDF (/rx-yr)2.57E-11 7.28E-12 3.37E-12 2.51E-10 2.54E-10 9.27E-1 1 2.51E-10 6.49E-12 8.67E-1 1 2.74E-08 1.78E-10 1.84E-10 5.1OE-09 1.43E-09 7.55E-1 1 1.22E-11 1.22E-1 1 CLERP 6.56E-09 1.24E-09 1.61E-10 1.24E-09 4.38E-07 6.56E-09 1.24E-09 6.56E-09 1.61 E-10 1.21E-06 4.38E-07 1.24E-09 4.38E-07 1.98E-06 6.56E-09 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 LERF (/rx-yr)3.31E-14 6.25E-1 5 8.10E-16 2.16E-13 7.97E-1 3 1.19E-13 2.16E-13 8.36E-1 5 2.05E-14 4.42E-1 1 5.58E-1 3 1.58E-13 1.60E-1 1 2.88E-12 1.19E-13 2.93E-15 2.93E-15 Revision 0 Page 19 of 38 Revision 0 Page 19 of 38 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-041 Zone 0335 0335 0335 0335 0335 0335 0335 0343 0343 0343 0343 0343 0343 0343 0343 0343 Scen J2d-COMPU2 J2e-COMPU2 J2f-COMPU2 J2g-COMPU2 J2h-COMPU2 J3a-COMPU2 J3b-COMPU2 D1-COMPU2 D2-COMPU2 D3-COMPU2 E-COMPU2 F1-COMPU2 F2a-COMPU2 F2b-COMPU2 F2c-COMPU2 F2d-COMPU2 Scenario Description 4160V BUS 1F (DF NON SEVERE 4160V BUS iF (DF NON SEVERE 4160V BUS iF (DF NON SEVERE 4160V BUS 1F (DF NON SEVERE 4160V BUS iF (DF NON SEVERE 4160V BUS 1F -H (DF15)4160V BUS 1F -H (DF8-DF14)
TRANSIENT FIR TRANSIENT FIR TRANSIENT FIR 4160V BUS 1F L(CONT STA 4160V BUS 1F SEVERE 4160V BUS IF (DF NON SEVERE 4160V BUS IF (DF NON SEVERE 4160V BUS 1F (DF NON SEVERE 4160V BUS 1F (DF NON SEVERE Table 2-3a Compliant Case CDF and LERF Results Train A Alignment Scenario Specific CCDP VFDRs 1 U2-1-041-BC-013 6.69E-07 12)- U2-1-041-BC-013 6.69E-07 13)- U2-1-041-BC-013 6.69E-07 14)- U2-1-041-BC-013 6.69E-07 15)- U2-1-041-BC-013 6.69E-07 EAF U2-i-041-SC-013 9.85E-04 EAF U2-1-041-BC-013 9.85E-04 U-2-1-041-HVAC-001 BC-013 5.09E-06 E U-2-1-041-HVAC-001, BC-013 4.15E-06 E U-2-1-041-HVAC-001, BC-013 4.08E-06 U-2-1-041-HVAC-001 6.69E-07 U-2-1-041-HVAC-001, BC-013 9.85E-04--01))- U-2-1-041-HVAC-001 8.16E-07 02)- U-2-1-041-HVAC-001 8.16E-07 03)- U-2-1-041-HVAC-001, BC-013 2.64E-06 04)- U2-1-041-BC-013 8.16E-07 CDF (/rx-yr)1.22E-11 1.22E-1 1 1.22E-11 1.22E-11 1.22E-11 5.13E-09 3.59E-08 2.80E-1 1 2.28E-1 1 2.24E-1 1 1.22E-1 1 1.26E-09 1.48E-1 1 1.48E-11 4.81 E-11 1.48E-1 1 CLERP 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.98E-06 1.98E-06 6.56E-09 6.56E-09 6.56E-09 1.61E-10 1.98E-06 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 4.90E-09 1.61E-10 LERF (/rx-yr)2.93E-15 2.93E-1 5 2.93E-1 5 2.93E-15 2.93E-1 5 1.03E-11 7.23E-1 1 3.61 E-14 3.61 E-14 3.61 E-14 2.93E-1 5 2.52E-12 2.93E-15 2.93E-1 5 8.92E-14 2.93E-1 5 Revision 0 Page 20 of 38 Revision 0 Page 20 of 38 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-041 Table 2-3a Compliant Case CDF and LERF Results Train A Alignment Zone Scen Scenario Scenario Specific CCDP CDF CLERP LERF Description VFDRs (/rx-yr) (/rxoyr)0343 0343 0343 0343 0343 0343 0343 0343 0343 0343 0343 0343 0346 0346 0346 0346 F2e-COMPU2 F2f-COMPU2 F2g-COMPU2 F3a-COMPU2 F3c-COMPU2 G-COMPU2 H1-COMPU2 H2-COMPU2 H3-COMPU2 11-COMPU2 12-COMPU2 13-COMPU2 D1-COMPU2 D2-COMPU2 El-COMPU2 E2-COMPU2 4160V BUS 1F (DF05)-NON SEVERE 4160V BUS 1F (DF06)-NON SEVERE 4160V BUS IF (DF07)-NON SEVERE 4160V BUS 1F -HEAF (DF01)4160V BUS 1F -HEAF (DF02-DF07)
LTG XFMR 1D & lE 4160V BUS 1C-SEVERE 4160V BUS 1C -NON SEVERE 4160V BUS 1C- HEAF 4160V BUS 1B -SEVERE 4160V BUS 11 -NON SEVERE 4160V BUS 1B -HEAF TRANSIENT FIRE TRANSIENT FIRE 4160V BUS 1A-SEVERE 4160V BUS 1A- NON SEVERE U2-1-041-BC-013 U2-1-041-BC-013 U2-1-041-BC-013 U-2-1-041-HVAC-001, BC-013 U-2-1-041-HVAC-001, BC-013 U-2-1-041-HVAC-001 U-2-1-041-HVAC-001, BC-013 U-2-1-041-HVAC-001 U-2-1-041-HVAC-001, BC-013 U-2-1-041-HVAC-001, BC-013 U-2-1-041-HVAC-001 U-2-1-041-HVAC-001, BC-013 U-2-1-041-HVAC-001 U-2-1-041-HVAC-001 U-2-1-041-HVAC-001 U-2-1-041-HVAC-001 8.16E-07 8.16E-07 8.16E-07 8.66E-04 8.67E-04 6.69E-07 5.09E-06 6.69E-07 5.02E-06 7.50E-04 6.69E-07 3.31 E-06 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 8.44E-04 6.69E-07 1.48E-1 1 1.48E-1 1 1.48E-1 1 4.51 E-09 2.71 E-08 2.33E-10 4.64 E- 12 6.09E-1 1 1.31E-10 6.83E-10 6.09E-1 1 8.62E-1 1 2.93E-12 3.47E-12 1.08E-09 8.53E-11 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.91 E-06 1.91E-06 1.61E-10 6.56E-09 1.61 E-10 6.56E-09 1.21E-06 1.61E-10 1.97E-09 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.60E-06 1.61E-10 2.93E-15 2.93E-1 5 2.93E-15 9.95E-12 5.98E-1 1 5.59E-14 5.97E-15 1.46E-14 1.71E-13 1.10E-12 1.46E-14 5.13E-14 7.03E-1 6 8.35E-16 2.04E-12 2.05E-14 Revision 0 Page 21 of 38 Revision 0 Page 21 of 38 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-041 SE-C051326701 
-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-041 Zone 0346 0346 0346 0346 0346 0346 0346 0346 1-041 -ADJ Scen E3-COMPU2 F-COMPU2 G-COMPU2 Hi-COMPU2 H2-COMPU2 H3-COMPU2 I-COMPU2 J-COMPU2 HGL-COMPU2 Scenario Description 4160V BUS 1A -HI LTG XFMR 1A SS XFMR 11 600V LC 11 -SEVE 600VLC II -NO SEVERE 600V LC 11 -HE, CRDM MG SET CRDM MG SET HGL SCENARIC Table 2-3a Compliant Case CDF and LERF Results Train A Alignment Scenario Specific CCDP VFDRs EAF U-2-1-041-HVAC-001 8.44E-0, U-2-1-041-HVAC-001 6.69E-0 U-2-1-041-HVAC-001, BC-013 7.11E-0-RE U-2-1-041-HVAC-001, BC-013 7.11E-0 4 7 4 4 CDF (/rx-yr)3.08E-08 1.16E-10 1.24E-07 3.88E-10 3.66E-11 1.!1E-08 3.08E-10 3.08E-10 4.74E-09 CLERP N%F 1B 1A O U-2-1-041-HVAC-001 U-2-1-041-HVAC-001, BC-013 U-2-1-041-HVAC-001 U-2-1-041-HVAC-001 U-2-1-041-HVAC-001, BC-013 6.69E-07 7.11E-04 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 1.51 E-03 1.60E-06 1.61E-10 1.17E-06 1.17E-06 1.61E-10 1.17E-06 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 2.93E-06 LERF (/rx-yr)5.84E-1 1 2.80E-14 2.03E-1 0 6.39E-13 8.78E-15 1.83E-1 1 7.40E-14 7.40E-14 9.16E-12 Compliant Scenario Total CDF and LERF 2.83E-07 5.14E-10 Revision 0 Page 22 of 38 Revision 0 Page 22 of 38 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-041 Table 2-3b Compliant Case CDF and LERF Results Train B Alignment Zone Scen Scenario Scenario Specific CCDP CDF CLERP LERF Description VFDRs (Irx-yr) (irx-yr)D1-0335 COMPU2 TRANSIENT FIRE U-2-1-041-HVAC-001, BC-013 5.08E-06 2.56E-11 6.56E-09 3.31E-14 D2-0335 D2 TRANSIENT FIRE U-2-1-041-HVAC-001 1.44E-06 7.23E-12 1.24E-09 6.25E-15 COMPU2 D3-0335 D3- TRANSIENT FIRE U-2-1-041-HVAC-001 6.64E-07 3.35E-12 1.61E-10 8.10E-16 COMPU2 0335 E- SS XFMR 1-A U-2-1-041-HVAC-001 1.44E-06 2.50E-10 1.24E-09 2.16E-13 0335 0335 0335 0335 0335 0335 0335 0335 0335 0335 0335 0335 Fl-COMPU2 F2-COMPU2 G-COMPU2 HI-COMPU2 H2-COMPU2 H3-COMPU2 I1-COMPU2 12-COMPU2 13-COMPU2 Ji-COMPU2 J2a-COMPU2 J2b-COMPU2 DG PANEL -SEVERE DG PANEL -NON SEVERE SS XFMR 1-D 600V LC 1-A -SEVERE 600V LC 1-A -NON SEVERE 600V LC 1-A -HEAF 600V LC 1-D -SEVERE 600V LC 1-D -NON SEVERE 600V LC 1-D -HEAF 4160V BUS IF -SEVERE 4160V BUS IF (DF08)-NON SEVERE 4160V BUS IF (DF09)-NON SEVERE 4160V BUS iF (DF10)-NON SEVERE U-2-1-041-HVAC-001, BC-013 U-2-1-041-HVAC-001, BC-013 U-2-1-041-HVAC-001 U-2-1-041-HVAC-001, BC-013 U-2-1-041-HVAC-001 1.39E-04 5.08E-06 1.44E-06 5.08E-06 6.75E-07 2.54E-10 9.24E-1 1 2.50E-1 0 6.47E-12 8.61 E-1 1 4.36E-07 6.56E-09 1.24E-09 6.56E-09 1.61 E-10 7.94E-13 1.19E-13 2.16E-13 8.36E- 15 2.05E-14 U-2-1-041-HVAC-001, BC-013 U-2-1-041-HVAC-001, BC-013 U-2-1-041-HVAC-001 U-2-1-041-HVAC-001 U2-1-041-BC-013 U2-1-041-BC-013 U2-1-041-BC-013 8.49E-04 1.39E-04 1.44E-06 1.39E-04 1.07E-03 4.13E-06 6.64E-07 3.10E-08 1.78E-10 1.83E-10 5.08E-09 1.56E-09 7.53E-11 1.21 E-11 7.43E-07 4.36E-07 1.24E-09 4.36E-07 1.39E-06 6.56E-09 1.61 E-10 2.71 E-1 1 5.56E-1 3 1.58E-13 1.59E-11 2.02E-12 1.19E-13 2.93E-1 5 J2c-COMPU2 U2-1-041-BC-013 6.64E-07 1.21E-11 1.61E-10 2.93E-15 Revision 0 Page 23 of 38 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-041 SE-C051 326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-041 Zone 0335 0335 0335 0335 0335 0335 0335 0343 0343 0343 0343 0343 0343 0343 0343 0343 Scen J2d-COMPU2 J2e-COMPU2 J2f-COMPU2 J2g-COMPU2 J2h-COMPU2 J3a-COMPU2 J3b-COMPU2 D1-COMPU2 D2-COMPU2 D3-COMPU2 E-COMPU2 Fl-COMPU2 F2a-COMPU2 F2b-COMPU2 F2c-COMPU2 F2d-COMPU2 Scenario Description 4160V BUS 1F (DF NON SEVERE 4160V BUS 1F (DF NON SEVERE 4160V BUS 1F (DF NON SEVERE 4160V BUS 1F (DF NON SEVERE 4160V BUS 1F (DF NON SEVERE 4160V BUS 1F -HI (DF15)4160V BUS 1F -HI (DF8-DF14)
TRANSIENT FIR TRANSIENT FIR TRANSIENT FIR 4160V BUS 1F LC CONT STA 4160V BUS 1F SEVERE 4160V BUS 1F (DF NON SEVERE 4160V BUS 1F (DF NON SEVERE 4160V BUS 1F (DF NON SEVERE 4160V BUS 1F (DF NON SEVERE Table 2-3b Compliant Case CDF and LERF Results Train B Alignment Scenario Specific CCDP VFDRs 11)- U2-1-041-BC-013 6.64E-07 12)- U2-1-041-BC-013 6.64E-07 13)- U2-1-041-BC-013 6.64E-07 14)- U2-1-041-BC-013 6.64E-07 15)- U2-1-041-BC-013 6.64E-07 EAF U2-1-041-BC-013 1.07E-03 EAF U2-1-041-BC-013 1.07E-03 U-2-1-041-HVAC-001, BC-013 5.08E-06.E U-2-1-041-HVAC-001, BC-01 3 4.13E-06 E U-2-1-041-HVAC-001, BC-013 4.07E-06 U-2-1-041-HVAC-001 6.64E-07 U-2-1-041-HVAC-001, BC-013 1.07E-03 01)- U-2-1-041-HVAC-001 8.10E-07 02)- U-2-1-041-HVAC-001 8.10E-07 03)- U-2-1-041-HVAC-001, BC-013 2.64E-06 04)- U2-1-041-BC-013 8.1OE-07 CDF (/rx-yr)1.21 E-11 1.21E-11 1.21E-11 1.21 E-11 1.21E-11 5.59E-09 3.92E-08 2.79E-1 1 2.27E-1 1 2.24E-1 1 1.21E-11 1.37E-09 1.47E-11 1.47E-1 1 4.80E-1 1 1.47E-1 1 CLERP 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.39E-06 1.39E-06 6.56E-09 6.56E-09 6.56E-09 1.61 E-10 1.39E-06 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 4.90E-09 1.61E-10 LERF (/rx-yr)2.93E-1 5 2.93E-15 2.93E-1 5 2.93E-1 5 2.93E-1 5 7.22E-12 5.05E-1 1 3.61 E-14 3.61E-14 3.61E-14 2.93E-1 5 1.77E-12 2.93E-15 2.93E-1 5 8.92E-14 2.93E-1 5 Revision 0 Page 24 of 38 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-041 SE-C051 326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-041 Zone 0343 0343 0343 0343 0343 0343 0343 0343 0343 0343 0343 0343 0346 0346 0346 0346 Scen F2e-COMPU2 F2f-COMPU2 F2g-COMPU2 F3a-COMPU2 F3c-COMPU2 G-COMPU2 H1-COMPU2 H2-COMPU2 H3-COMPU2 11-COMPU2 12-COMPU2 13-COMPU2 D1-COMPU2 D2-COMPU2 El-COMPU2 E2-COMPU2 Scenario Description 4160V BUS 1F (DF NON SEVERE 4160V BUS 1F (DF NON SEVERE 4160V BUS 1F (DF NON SEVERE 4160V BUS 1F -H (DF01)4160V BUS 1F- H (DF02-DF07)
LTG XFMR 1D &4160V BUS 1C SEVERE 4160V BUS 1C -N SEVERE 4160V BUS 1C- H 4160V BUS 1B SEVERE 4160V BUS 1B -N SEVERE 4160V BUS 1B -H TRANSIENT FIR TRANSIENT FIR 4160V BUS 1A SEVERE 4160V BUS 1A -N SEVERE Table 2-3b Compliant Case CDF and LERF Results Train B Alignment Scenario Specific CCDP VFDRs 05)- U2-1-041-BC-013 8.10E-07 06)- U2-1-041-BC-013 8.1OE-07 07)- U2-1-041-BC-013 8.10E-07 EAF U-2-1-041-HVAC-001, BC-013 9.56E-04 EAF U-2-1-041-HVAC-001, BC-013 9.57E-04 1lE U-2-1-041-HVAC-001 6.64E-07 U-2-1-041-HVAC-001, BC-013 5.08E-06 1ON U-2-1-041-HVAC-001 6.64E-07 EAF U-2-1-041-HVAC-001, BC-013 5.01 E-06 U-2-1-041-HVAC-00i, BC-013 8.49E-04 ON U-2-1-041-HVAC-001 6.64E-07 EAF U-2-1-041-HVAC-001, BC-013 3.30E-06 U-2-1-041-HVAC-001 6.64E-07 U-2-1-041-HVAC-001 6.64E-07 U-2-1-041-HVAC-001 9.29E-04 ON U-2-1-041-HVAC-001 6.64E-07 CDF (Irx-yr)1.47E-1 1 1.47E-11 1.47E-11 4.98E-09 2.99E-08 2.31 E-10 4.62E-12 6.05E-1 1 1.31E-10 7.73E-10 6.05E-1 1 8.60E-1 1 2.90E-12 3.45E-12 1.18E-09 8.47E-1 1 CLERP 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.38E-06 1.39E-06 1.61E-10 6.56E-09 1.61 E-10 6.56E-09 7.43E-07 1.61 E-10 1.97E-09 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.13E-06 1.61 E-10 LERF (Irx-yr)2.93E-1 5 2.93E-15 2.93E-1 5 7.21E-12 4.33E-1 1 5.59E-14 5.97E-15 1.46E-14 1.71E-13 6.76E-1 3 1.46E-14 5.13E-14 7.03E-1 6 8.35E-16 1.44E-12 2.05E-14 Revision 0 Page 25 of 38 Revision 0 Page 25 of 38 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-041 SE-C051 326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-041 Zone 0346 0346 0346 0346 Scen E3-COMPU2 F-COMPU2 G-COMPU2 Hi-COMPU2 H2-COMPU2 H3-COMPU2 I-COMPU2 COMPU2 HGL-COMPU2 Scenario Description 4160V BUS 1A -H LTG XFMR 1A SS XFMR 11 600V LC 11 -SEV 600V LC 11- NO SEVERE 600V LC 11 -HE, CRDM MG SET CRDM MG SET HGL SCENARI Table 2-3b Compliant Case CDF and LERF Results Train B Alignment Scenario Specific CCDP VFDRs EAF U-2-1-041-HVAC-001 9.29E-0, U-2-1-041-HVAC-001 6.64E-0 U-2-1-041-HVAC-001, BC-013 7.96E-0, ERE U-2-1-041-HVAC-001, BC-013 7.96E-0 4 7 4 4 CDF (/rx-yr)3.39E-08 1.16E-10 1.38E-07 4.35E-10 CLERP 1.13E-06 1.61E-10 7.02E-07 7.02E-07 LERF (/rx-yr)4.12E-1 1 2.80E-14 1.22E-10 3.84E-13 0346 0346 0346 0346 1-041-ADJ)N AF 1B 1A 0 U-2-1-041-HVAC-001 U-2-1-041-HVAC-001, BC-013 U-2-1-041-HVAC-001 U-2-1-041-HVAC-001 U-2-1-041-HVAC-001, BC-013 6.64E-07 7.96E-04 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 1.75E-03 3.63E-1 1 1.24E-08 3.06E-10 3.06E-1 0 5.48E-09 1.61 E-10 7.02E-07 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 2.41E-06 8.78E-15 1.10E-11 7.40E-14 7.40E-14 7.55E-1 2 Compliant Scenario Total CDF and LERF 3.14E-07 3.42E-10 Revision 0 Page 26 of 38 Revision 0 Page 26 of 38 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-041 2.2.4 Required Modifications There are no modifications required as a result of the risk evaluation for this fire area.2.2.5 Required Recovery Actions The following recovery actions are required as a result of the risk evaluation for this fire area: Table 2-4 Required Recovery Actions Recovery Component ID Basic Event VFDR BE Description Action Description OPERATOR Operator action U2 RECOVERY OF to provide Q2R42B0001A:ENERGIZED:ENERGIZED-OP-RECOV-041- BATTERY alternate cooling BC2A BCSW-A HVAC- CHARGER A for battery 001 ROOM COOLING charger room due to loss of Train A SW 2.3 Risk Evaluation Results The total area ACDF is above the screening criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr and the total area ALERF is below the screening acceptance criteria of lE-08/rx-yr, respectively.
However, the total plant ACDF/LERF is below the RG 1.174 criteria of 1E-05/rx-yr and 1E-06/rx-yr, respectively.
All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0 ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency.
The following tables present the fire zone/scenario fire risk as well as the total fire risk for this fire area.Table 2-5a 1 FIRE AREA ACDF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN A ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CCDP CDF CCDP CDF aCDF 0335/D1 0335/D2 0335/D3 0335/E 0335/Fl 0335/F2 0335/G 0335/H1 0335/H2 0335/H3 0335/11 0335/12 0335/13 0335/J1 0335/J2a 0335/J2b 6.46E-06 1.45E-06 6.69E-07 1.45E-06 1.49E-04 6.46E-06 1.45E-06 6.46E-06 6.80E-07 8.27E-04 1.49E-04 1.45E-06 1.40E-04 3.83E-03 2.44E-03 6.69E-07 3.25E-1 1 7.28E-12 3.37E-12 2.51E-10 2.72E-10 1.18E-10 2.51 E-10 8.23E-12 8.67E-1 1 3.02E-08 1.90E-10 1.84E-10 5.1 OE-09 5.58E-09 4.45E-08 1.22E-11 5.09E-06 2.57E-11 1.45E-06 7.28E-12 6.69E-07 3.37E-12 1.45E-06 2.51E-10 1.40E-04 2.54E-10 5.09E-06 9.27E-11 1.45E-06 2.51E-10 5.09E-06 6.49E-12 6.80E-07 8.67E-11 7.50E-04 2.74E-08 1.40E-04 1.78E-10 1.45E-06 1.84E-10 1.40E-04 5.1OE-09 9.85E-04 1.43E-09 4.15E-06 7.55E-11 6.69E-07 1.22E-11 6.89E-12 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 1.76E- 11 2.49E-1 1 0.OOE+00 1.74E-12 0.OOE+00 2.81 E-09 1.23E-11 0.OOE+00 2.69E-1 3 4.14E-09 4.44E-08 0.OOE+00 Revision 0 Page 27 of 38 Version 1.0 Page 2380 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-041 Table 2-5a 1 FIRE AREA ACDF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN A ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case 0335/J2c 0335/J2d 0335/J2e 0335/J2f 0335/J2g 0335/J2h 0335/J3a 0335/J3b 0343/D1 0343/D2 0343/D3 0343/E 0343/Fl 0343/F2a 0343/F2b 0343/F2c 0343/F2d 0343/F2e 0343/F2f 0343/F2g 0343/F3a 0343/F3c 0343/G 0343/H1 0343/H2 0343/H3 0343/I1 0343/12 0343/13 0346/D1 0346/D2 0346/El 0346/E2 0346/E3 0346/F 0346/G 0346/Hi1 0346/H2 0346/H3 0346/I 0346/J 1-041-ADJ/HGL CCDP 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 5.33E-03 5.33E-03 6.46E-06 5.50E-06 5.16E-06 6.69E-07 5.33E-03 8.16E-07 8.16E-07 2.64E-06 8.16E-07 8.16E-07 8.16E-07 8.16E-07 9.16E-04 4.99E-03 6.69E-07 6.46E-06 6.69E-07 6.12E-06 8.27E-04 6.69E-07 4.38E-06 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 8.69E-04 6.69E-07 8.69E-04 6.69E-07 7.77E-04 7.77E-04 6.69E-07 7.77E-04 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 5.34E-03 CDF 1.22E-11 1.22E-11 1.22E- 11 1.22E-1 1 1.22E-1 1 1.22E-1 1 2.78E-08 1.95E-07 3.55E-11 3.02E-1 1 2.83E-11 1.22E-1 1 6.80E-09 1.48E-1 1 1.48E- 11 4.81 E-11 1.48E-11 1.48E-1 1 1.48E-11 1.48E-11 4.77E-09 1.56E-07 2.33E-1 0 5.88E-1 2 6.09E-1 1 1.59E-10 7.53E-10 6.09E-1 1 1.14E-10 2.93E-12 3.47E-12 1.11E-09 8.53E-11 3.17E-08 1.16E-10 1.35E-07 4.25E-10 3.66E-1 1 1.22E-08 3.08E-10 3.08E-1 0 1.67E-08 6.76E-07 Compliant Case CCDP CDF 6.69E-07 1.22E-11 6.69E-07 1.22E-11 6.69E-07 1.22E-11 6.69E-07 1.22E-11 6.69E-07 1.22E-11 6.69E-07 1.22E-11 9.85E-04 5.13E-09 9.85E-04 3.59E-08 5.09E-06 2.80E-11 4.15E-06 2.28E-11 4.08E-06 2.24E-11 6.69E-07 1.22E-11 9.85E-04 1.26E-09 8.16E-07 1.48E-11 8.16E-07 1.48E-11 2.64E-06 4.81E-11 8.16E-07 1.48E-11 8.16E-07 1.48E-11 8.16E-07 1.48E-11 8.16E-07 1.48E-11 8.66E-04 4.51 E-09 8.67E-04 2.71 E-08 6.69E-07 2.33E-10 5.09E-06 4.64E-12 6.69E-07 6.09E-11 5.02E-06 1.31E-10 7.50E-04 6.83E-10 6.69E-07 6.09E-11 3.31 E-06 8.62E-11 6.69E-07 2.93E-12 6.69E-07 3.47E-12 8.44E-04 1.08E-09 6.69E-07 8.53E-11 8.44E-04 3.08E-08 6.69E-07 1.16E-10 7.11E-04 1.24E-07 7.11E-04 3.88E-10 6.69E-07 3.66E-11 7.11E-04 1.11 E-08 6.69E-07 3.08E-10 6.69E-07 3.08E-10 1.51 E-03 4.74E-09 2.83E-07 Variant -Compliant ACDF O.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 2.27E-08 1.59E-07 7.52E-12 7.39E-12 5.89E-12 0.OOE+00 5.54E-09 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 2.60E-10 1.29E-07 0.OOE+00 1.25E-12 0.OOE+00 2.85E-1 1 7.02E-1 1 0.OOE+00 2.78E-11 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 3.13E-1 1 0.OOE+00 8.96E-10 0.OOE+00 1.15E-08 3.61E-11 0.OOE+00 1.03E-09 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 1.20E-08 3.93E-07 Total CDF and delta CDF 2 1 _ N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.2 -Total ACDF includes the risk of recovery actions required to demonstrate the availability of a success path for the nuclear safety performance criteria.Revision 0 Page 28 of 38 Version 1.0 Page 2381 of 3726 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-041 Table 2-5b 1 FIRE AREA ACDF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN B ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case 0335/D1 0335/D2 0335/D3 0335/E 0335/Fl 0335/F2 0335/G 0335/H1 0335/H2 0335/H3 0335/11 0335/12 0335/13 0335/J 1 0335/J2a 0335/J2b 0335/J2c 0335/J2d 0335/J2e 0335/J2f 0335/J2g 0335/J2h 0335/J3a 0335/J3b 0343/D1 0343/D2 0343/D3 0343/E 0343/Fl 0343/F2a 0343/F2b 0343/F2c 0343/F2d 0343/F2e 0343/F2f 0343/F2g 0343/F3a 0343/F3c 0343/G 0343/Hi 0343/H2 0343/H3 0343/11 0343/12 0343/13 0346/D1 CCDP 6.22E-06 1.44E-06 6.64E-07 1.44E-06 1.49E-04 6.21 E-06 1.44E-06 6.22E-06 6.75E-07 9.28E-04 1.49E-04 1.44E-06 1.39E-04 4.41 E-05 2.63E-03 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 5.53E-03 5.53E-03 6.21 E-06 5.25E-06 4.95E-06 6.64E-07 5.53E-03 8.1OE-07 8.10E-07 2.64E-06 8.10E-07 8.10E-07 8.1OE-07 8.1 OE-07 1.01E-03 5.18E-03 6.64E-07 6.22E-06 6.64E-07 5.91 E-06 9.28E-04 6.64E-07 4.17E-06 6.64E-07 CDF 3.13E-11 7.23E-12 3.35E-12 2.50E-10 2.71 E-10 1.13E-10 2.50E-1 0 7.93E-12 8.61 E-11 3.38E-08 1.90E-10 1.83E-10 5.08E-09 6.42E-09 4.78E-08 1.21E-11 1.21E-11 1.21 E-11 1.21 E-11 1.21E-11 1.21E-11 1.21E-11 2.88E-08 2.02E-07 3.42E-1 1 2.89E-1 1 2.72E-1 1 1.21 E-11 7.05E-09 1.47E-1 1 1.47E-1 1 4.80E-1 1 1.47E-11 1.47E-1 1 1.47E-1 1 1.47E-11 5.25E-09 1.62E-07 2.31E-10 5.66E-12 6.05E-1 1 1.54E-10 8.45E-10 6.05E-1 1 1.09E-10 2.90E-12 Compliant Case CCDP CDF 5.08E-06 2.56E-11 1.44E-06 7.23E-12 6.64E-07 3.35E-12 1.44E-06 2.50E-10 1.39E-04 2.54E-10 5.08E-06 9.24E-11 1.44E-06 2.50E-10 5.08E-06 6.47E-12 6.75E-07 8.61E-11 8.49E-04 3.1OE-08 1.39E-04 1.78E-10 1.44E-06 1.83E-10 1.39E-04 5.08E-09 1.07E-05 1.56E-09 4.13E-06 7.53E-11 6.64E-07 1.21E-11 6.64E-07 1.21 E-11 6.64E-07 1.21 E-11 6.64E-07 1.21 E-11 6.64E-07 1.21E-11 6.64E-07 1.21 E-11 6.64E-07 1.21 E-11 1.07E-03 5.59E-09 1.07E-03 3.92E-08 5.08E-06 2.79E-11 4.13E-06 2.27E-11 4.07E-06 2.24E-11 6.64E-07 1.21 E-11 1.07E-03 1.37E-09 8.10E-07 1.47E-11 8.10E-07 1.47E-11 2.64E-06 4.80E-11 8.10E-07 1.47E-11 8.10E-07 1.47E-11 8.10E-07 1.47E-11 8.10E-07 1.47E-11 9.56E-04 4.98E-09 9.57E-04 2.99E-08 6.64E-07 2.31E-10 5.08E-06 4.62E-12 6.64E-07 6.05E-11 5.01E-06 1.31E-10 8.49E-04 7.73E-10 6.64E-07 6.05E-11 3.30E-06 8.60E-11 6.64E-07 2.90E-12 Variant -Compliant ACDF 5.74E-12 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 1.73E-11 2.07E-1 1 0.OOE+00 1.46E-12 0.OOE+00 2.88E-09 1.21 E-11 0.00E+00 1.09E-12 4.86E-09 4.77E-08 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 2.32E-08 1.63E-07 6.26E-12 6.13E-12 4.81 E-12 0.OOE+00 5.68E-09 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 2.65E-10 1.32E-07 0.OOE+00 1.04E-12 0.OOE+00 2.34E-11 7.19E-1 1 0.OOE+00 2.26E-i 1 0.OOE+00 Revision 0 Page 29 of 38 Version 1.0 Page 2382 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-041 Table 2-5b 1 FIRE AREA ACDF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN B ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CCDP CDF CCDP CDF ACDF 0346/D2 0346/El 0346/E2 0346/E3 0346/F 0346/G 0346/Hi 0346/H2 0346/H3 0346/I 0346/J 1-041-ADJ/HGL 6.64E-07 9.59E-04 6.64E-07 9.59E-04 6.64E-07 8.68E-04 8.68E-04 6.64E-07 8.68E-04 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 5.53E-03 3.45E-1 2 1.22E-09 8.47E-1 1 3.50E-08 1.16E-10 1.51 E-07 4.74E-10 3.63E-11 1.36E-08 3.06E-10 3.06E-1 0 1.73E-08 7.21 E-07 6.64E-07 9.29E-04 6.64E-07 9.29E-04 6.64E-07 7.96E-04 7.96E-04 6.64E-07 7.96E-04 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 1.75E-03 3.45E-1 2 1.18E-09 8.47E-1 1 3.39E-08 1.16E-10 1.38E-07 4.35E-10 3.63E-1 1 1.24E-08 3.06E-10 3.06E-10 5.48E-09 3.14E-07 0.OOE+00 3.81 E-11 0.OOE+00 1.09E-09 0.OOE+00 1.26E-08 3.95E-11 0.OOE+00 1.13E-09 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 1.18E-08 4.06E-07 Total CDF and delta CDF 2 1 -N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level, 2 _ Total ACDF includes the risk of recovery actions required to demonstrate the availability of a success path for the nuclear safety performance criteria.Table 2-6a 1 FIRE AREA ALERF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN A ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case CLERP LERF 0335/D1 0335/D2 0335/D3 0335/E 0335/Fl 0335/F2 0335/G 0335/H1 0335/H2 0335/H3 0335/11 0335/12 0335/13 0335/J1 0335/J2a 0335/J2b 0335/J2c 0335/J2d 0335/J2e 0335/J2f 0335/J2g 0335/J2h 0335/J3a 0335/J3b 6.56E-09 1.24E-09 1.61 E-10 1.24E-09 4.61E-07 6.56E-09 1.24E-09 6.56E-09 1.61E-10 1.66E-06 4.61 E-07 1.24E-09 4.39E-07 1.46E-05 1.59E-05 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 2.19E-05 2.19E-05 3.31E-14 6.25E-15 8.10E-16 2.16E-13 8.40E-13 1.19E-13 2.16E-13 8.36E-15 2.05E-1 4 6.05E-11 5.88E-13 1.58E-13 1.60E-1 1 2.13E-1 1 2.90E-10 2.93E-15 2.93E-1 5 2.93E-15 2.93E-15 2.93E-15 2.93E-1 5 2.93E-15 1.14E-10 8.OOE-10 Compliant Case CLERP LERF 6.56E-09 3.31 E-14 1.24E-09 6.25E-15 1.61E-10 8.10E-16 1.24E-09 2.16E-13 4.38E-07 7.97E-13 6.56E-09 1.19E-13 1.24E-09 2.16E-13 6.56E-09 8.36E-15 1.61E-10 2.05E-14 1.21E-06 4.42E-11 4.38E-07 5.58E-13 1.24E-09 1.58E-13 4.38E-07 1.60E-11 1.98E-06 2.88E-12 6.56E-09 1.19E-13 1.61E-10 2.93E-15 1.61E-10 2.93E-15 1.61 E-10 2.93E-15 1.61E-10 2.93E-15 1.61 E-10 2.93E-15 1.61E-10 2.93E-15 1.61 E-10 2.93E-15 1.98E-06 1.03E-1I 1.98E-06 7.23E-11 Variant -Compliant ALERF 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 4.31E-14 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 1.64E-1 1 3.02E-14 0.OOE+00 2.77E-14 1.84E-1 1 2.90E-1 0 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 1.04E-10 7.28E-10 Revision 0 Page 30 of 38 Version 1.0 Page 2383 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-041 SE-C051 326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-041 Table 2-6a 1 FIRE AREA ALERF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN A ALIGNMEI Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case CLERP LERF CLERP LERF NT 0343/D1 0343/D2 0343/D3 0343/E 0343/Fl 0343/F2a 0343/F2b 0343/F2c 0343/F2d 0343/F2e 0343/F2f 0343IF2g 0343/F3a 0343/F3c 0343/G 0343/H1 0343/H2 0343/H3 0343/I1 0343/12 0343/13 0346/D1 0346/D2 0346/El 0346/E2 0346/E3 0346/F 0346/G 0346/Hl 0346/H2 0346/H3 0346/I 0346/J 1-041-ADJ/HGL 6.56E-09 6.56E-09 6.56E-09 1.61E-10 2.19E-05 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 4.90E-09 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 2.06E-06 2.11 E-05 1.61E-10 6.56E-09 1.61 E-10 6.56E-09 1.66E-06 1.61 E-10 1.97E-09 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.92E-06 1.61 E-10 1.92E-06 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-06 1.61E-06 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-06 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 2.19E-05 3.61E-14 3.61E-14 3.61E-14 2.93E-1 5 2.80E-1 1 2.93E-1 5 2.93E-1 5 8.92E-14 2.93E-1 5 2.93E-1 5 2.93E-1 5 2.93E-15 1.07E-11 6.58E-10 5.59E-14 5.97E-1 5 1.46E-14 1.71E-13 1.51 E-12 1.46E-14 5.13E-14 7.03E-1 6 8.35E-16 2.44E-12 2.05E-14 6.99E-1 1 2.80E-14 2.80E-10 8.81E-13 8.78E-1 5 2.52E-11 7.40E-14 7.40E-14 6.87E-1 1 2.45E-09 6.56E-09 6.56E-09 6.56E-09 1.61 E-10 1.98E-06 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 4.90E-09 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.91E-06 1.91E-06 1.61 E-10 6.56E-09 1.61E-10 6.56E-09 1.21E-06 1.61E-10 1.97E-09 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.60E-06 1.61E-10 1.60E-06 1.61 E-10 1.17E-06 1.17E-06 1.61E-10 1.17E-06 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 2.93E-06 3.61E-14 3.61 E-14 3.61E-14 2.93E-1 5 2.52E-12 2.93E-1 5 2.93E-15 8.92E-14 2.93E-1 5 2.93E-1 5 2.93E-15 2.93E-15 9.95E-12 5.98E-1 1 5.59E-14 5.97E-15 1.46E-14 1.71E-13 1.10E-12 1.46E-14 5.13E-14 7.03E-16 8.35E-16 2.04E-12 2.05E-14 5.84E-11 2.80E-14 2.03E-10 6.39E-13 8.78E-15 1.83E-11 7.40E-14 7.40E-14 9.16E-12 5.14E-10 Variant -Compliant ALERF 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 2.54E-11 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 7.71 E-13 5.98E-10 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 4.08E-13 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 4.05E-1 3 0.OOE+00 1.16E-11 0.OOE+00 7.69E-1 1 2.42E-13 0.OOE+00 6.91 E-1 2 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 5.95E-11 1.94E-09 Total LERF and delta LERF 2-N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.2 -Total ALERF includes the risk of recovery actions required to demonstrate the availability of a success path for the nuclear safety performance criteria.Revision 0 Page 31 of 38 Version 1.0 Page 2384 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-041 Table 2-6b 1 FIRE AREA aLERF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN B ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case 0335/D1 0335/D2 0335/D3 0335/E 0335/Fl 0335/F2 0335/G 0335/H1 0335/H2 0335/H3 0335/11 0335/12 0335/13 0335/J1 0335/J2a 0335/J2b 0335/J2c 0335/J2d 0335/J2e 0335/J2f 0335/J2g 0335/J2h 0335/J3a 0335/J3b 0343/D1 0343/D2 0343/D3 0343/E 0343/Fl 0343/F2a 0343/F2b 0343/F2c 0343/F2d 0343/F2e 0343/F2f 0343/F2g 0343/F3a 0343/F3c 0343/G 0343/H1 0343/H2 0343/H3 0343/11 0343/12 0343/13 0346/D1 CLERP 6.56E-09 1.24E-09 1.61E-10 1.24E-09 4.60E-07 6.56E-09 1.24E-09 6.56E-09 1.61 E-10 1.14E-06 4.60E-07 1.24E-09 4.37E-07 9.31 E-06 7.68E-06 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.38E-05 1.38E-05 6.56E-09 6.56E-09 6.56E-09 1.61E-10 1.38E-05 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 4.90E-09 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.54E-06 1.29E-05 1.61 E-10 6.56E-09 1.61E-10 6.56E-09 1.14E-06 1.61 E-10 1.97E-09 1.61 E-10 LERF 3.31E-14 6.25E-1 5 8.10E-16 2.16E-13 8.37E-13 1.19E-13 2.16E-13 8.36E-15 2.05E-14 4.14E- 11 5.86E-13 1.58E-13 1.59E-1 1 1.36E-1 1 1.40E-10 2.93E-15 2.93E-15 2.93E-1 5 2.93E-1 5 2.93E-15 2.93E-1 5 2.93E-15 7.17E-11 5.02E-10 3.61E-14 3.61E-14 3.61E-14 2.93E-1 5 1.75E-11 2.93E-15 2.93E-1 5 8.92E-14 2.93E-15 2.93E-15 2.93E-1 5 2.93E-1 5 8.OOE-12 4.02E-1 0 5.59E-14 5.97E-15 1.46E-14 1.71E-13 1.03E-12 1.46E-14 5.13E-14 7.03E-16 Compliant Case CLERP LERF 6.56E-09 3.31 E-14 1.24E-09 6.25E-15 1.61E-10 8.10E-16 1.24E-09 2.16E-13 4.36E-07 7.94E-13 6.56E-09 1.19E-13 1.24E-09 2.16E-13 6.56E-09 8.36E-15 1.61E-10 2.05E-14 7.43E-07 2.71E-11 4.36E-07 5.56E-13 1.24E-09 1.58E-13 4.36E-07 1.59E-11 1.39E-06 2.02E-12 6.56E-09 1.19E-13 1.61E-10 2.93E-15 1.61E-10 2.93E-15 1.61E-10 2.93E-15 1.61 E-10 2.93E-15 1.61E-10 2.93E-15 1.61E-10 2.93E-15 1.61 E-10 2.93E-15 1.39E-06 7.22E-12 1.39E-06 5.05E-11 6.56E-09 3.61E-14 6.56E-09 3.61E-14 6.56E-09 3.61 E-14 1.61E-10 2.93E-15 1.39E-06 1.77E-12 1.61E-10 2.93E-15 1.61E-10 2.93E-15 4.90E-09 8.92E-14 1.61E-10 2.93E-15 1.61E-10 2.93E-15 1.61E-10 2.93E-15 1.61E-10 2.93E-15 1.38E-06 7.21E-12 1.39E-06 4.33E-11 1.61E-10 5.59E-14 6.56E-09 5.97E-15 1.61E-10 1.46E-14 6.56E-09 1.71E-13 7.43E-07 6.76E-13 1.61E-10 1.46E-14 1.97E-09 5.13E-14 1.61 E-10 7.03E-16 Variant -Compliant ALERF 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 4.31E-14 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 1.43E-11 3.02E-14 0.OOE+00 2.72E-14 1.15E-11 1.40E-10 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 6.45E-11 4.51 E-10 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 1.58E-11 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 7.92E-13 3.59E-10 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 3.58E-13 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 Revision 0 Page 32 of 38 Revision 0 Page 32 of 38 Version 1.0 Page 2385 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-041 Table 2-6b 1 FIRE AREA ALERF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN B ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CLERP LERF CLERP LERF ALERF 0346/D2 1.61E-10 8.35E-16 1.61E-10 8.35E-16 0.00E+00 0346/El 1.39E-06 1.77E-12 1.13E-06 1.44E-12 3.33E-13 0346/E2 1.61 E-10 2.05E-14 1.61 E-10 2.05E-14 O.OOE+00 0346/E3 1.39E-06 5.07E-11 1.13E-06 4.12E-11 9.52E-12 0346/F 1.61 E-10 2.80E-14 1.61E-10 2.80E-14 0.OOE+00 0346/G 1.09E-06 1.90E-10 7.02E-07 1.22E-10 6.77E-11 0346/Hi 1.09E-06 5.97E-13 7.02E-07 3.84E-13 2.13E-13 0346/H2 1.61E-10 8.78E-15 1.61E-10 8.78E-15 0.00E+00 0346/H3 1.09E-06 1.71E-11 7.02E-07 1.10E-11 6.09E-12 0346/I 1.61 E-10 7.40E-14 1.61 E-10 7.40E-14 0.00E+00 0346/J 1.61 E-10 7.40E-14 1.61 E-10 7.40E-14 0.00E+00 1-041-ADJ/HGL 1.38E-05 4.32E-11 2.41E-06 7.55E-12 3.56E-11 Total LERF and delta LERF 2  1.52E-09 3.42E-10 1.18E-09 1 -N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.2 _ Total ALERF includes the risk of recovery actions required to demonstrate the availability of a success path for the nuclear safety performance criteria.3.0 DID EVALUATION 3.1 Defense-in-Depth Evaluation A review of the impact of the change on defense-in-depth (DID) was performed.
NFPA 805 defines DID as: " Preventing fires from starting" Rapidly detecting fires and controlling and extinguishing promptly those fires that do occur, thereby limiting damage" Providing adequate level of fire protection for structures, systems and components important to safety; so that a fire that is not promptly extinguished will not prevent essential plant safety functions friom being performed.
In general, the DID requirement was considered satisfied if the proposed change does not result in a substantial imbalance among these elements (or echelons).
The review of DID was qualitative and addressed each of the elements with respect to the proposed change. Fire protection features and systems relied upon to ensure DID were identified in the assessment (e.g., detection, suppression system).The VFDRs and the associated Fire Area risk (CDF) and scenario consequences (CCDP values)were evaluated to identify general DID echelon imbalances.
Potential methods to balance the DID features were identified ensuring an adequate balance of DID features is maintained for the Fire Area. See Section 3.2 for the results of the evaluation.
Revision 0 Page 33 of 38 Version 1.0 Page 2386 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-041 3.2 Defense-in-Depth Review Results A review of defense in depth and risk evaluation results show that, given the systems and features specified in Table 3-1 and Section 2 respectively, risk acceptance criteria are met and that the balance of defense in depth is maintained.
The risk acceptance criteria are met with margin to account for analytical methods associated with fire scenarios.
The analyzed scenarios bound potential fuel packages which can reasonably be expected to occur in this area.The fires associated with the 4160 bus and 600V load centers provided the highest risk contribution in the fire area. The installed detection and suppression systems are required to meet the risk criteria.
Additionally, the installed in-cabinet detection and suppression systems are also required for DID to preclude potential adverse fire effects such as HGL formation and uncontrolled fire development, ensuring prompt brigade response and to support execution of the required recovery actions for risk.In the event of no intervention by the plant fire brigade, it is not expected that a credible fire would develop which would not be bounded by the analyzed scenarios.
Based onl the systems/features specified above, no additional DID systems/features are warranted and the ability to meet nuclear performance criteria is ensured.The table below summarizes how an adequate balance of DID is maintained.
Table 3-1 Defense-in-Depth Impact Review Method of Providing DID Discussion Echelon 1: Prevent fires from starting Combustible Control No change necessary to procedure(s) 
/guidance document(s).
1 Hot Work Control No change necessary to procedure(s) 
/guidance document(s).
Echelon 2: Rapidly detect, control and extinguish promptly those fires that do occur thereby limiting fire damage Detection System Detection system is installed in all zones and required.Automatic Fire Suppression Automatic suppression system is installed in all zones and required.Portable Fire Extinguishers No portable extinguishers available and not required.Hose stations and hydrants Fire hose cabinets are available, but no enhancements required.
1 located in the area(s)Pre-Fire Plan No change necessary to procedure(s) 
/guidance document(s).
Echelon 3: Provide adequate level of fire protection for systems and structures so that a fire will not prevent essential safety functions from being performed Walls, floors ceilings and structural No changes necessary to existing barriers.
1 elements are rated or have been evaluated as adequate for the hazard.Openings in the fire barrier are rated No changes necessary to existing barrier openings.
1 or have been evaluated as adequate for the hazard.Supplemental barriers (e.g., ERFBS, No supplemental barriers installed and not required.cable tray covers, etc.)Revision 0 Page 34 of 38 Version 1.0 Page 2387 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-041 Table 3-1 Defense-in-Depth Impact Review Method of Providing DID Discussion Guidance provided to operations No VFDR related DID recovery actions required.personnel detailing the credited success path(s) including recovery actions to achieve nuclear safety performance criteria.This fire protection feature is relied upon without further DID enhancements beyond inherent programmatic requirements of NFPA 805, Chap. 3 and will not be reported in Table 5-2.3.2.1 Required Modifications There are no modifications required as a result of the DID evaluation for this fire area.3.2.2 Required Recovery Actions There are no required recovery actions as a result of the DID evaluation for this fire area.4.0 SAFETY MARGIN EVALUATION 4.1 Safety Margin Evaluation In accordance with NEI 04-02, 5.3.5.3 guidance, the maintenance of adequate Safety Margin is assessed by the consideration of categories of analyses utilized by this fire risk evaluation (FRE).Safety margins are considered to be maintained if: " Codes and standards or their alternatives accepted for use by the NRC are met, and" Safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) are met, or provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty.
The maintenance of adequate safety margin for the change analysis is described for each of the specific analysis types used in support of the fire risk assessment.
4.1.1 Fire Modeling Fire modeling performed in support of the transition has been performed within the Fire PRA utilizing codes and standards developed by industry and NRC staff to provide realistic yet conservative results. Specifically, the heat release rates utilized in the transition analysis are based upon NUREG/CR 6850, Task 8, Scoping Fire Modeling.
These heat release rates are conservative and represent values used to screen out fixed ignition sources that do not pose a threat to the targets within specific fire compartments and to assign severity factors to unscreened fixed ignition sources.The combined analysis approach is used during transition; therefore, maximum expected fire scenario/limiting fire scenario have not been analyzed separately.
The bases for the application of these fire modeling codes and standards were not altered in support of this FRE.4.1.2 Plant System Performance Plant system performance parameters were not modified as a result of this FRE. These performance parameters were originally established to support nuclear performance criteria Revision 0 Page 35 of 38 Version 1.0 Page 2388 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-041 contained in the plant specific accident analyses.
These analyses established component and system performance criteria necessary to establish safe and stable plant operation, as well as, safe shut down of the unit in the event of a fire. These performance parameters were not modified as a result of this FRE.4.2 Safety Margin Results All analyses and assessment have been performed utilizing accepted techniques and industry accepted standards.
In addition, safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) have been considered and provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty.
As such, the Safety Margins are maintained as discussed in Section 4.1.5.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION RESULTS 5.1 Dispositions of VFDRs Based on the FRE results contained in Sections 2, 3 and 4 the VFDRs identified in Section 1. 1 have been resolved as follows: VFDR ID U2-1-041-BC-001 U2-1-041-BC-002 U2-1-041 -BC-003 U2-1-041 -BC-004 U2-1-041 -BC-005 U2-1-041-BC-006 U2-1-041-BC-008 U2-1-041-BC-009 U2-1-041-BC-010 U2-1-041-BC-0 11 U2-1-041-BC-012 Table 5-1 Final Variance Disposition Disposition Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Recovery Action(s)
Required to Satisfy Risk Criteria:
See Table 2-4 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action U2-1-041-BC-013 U2-1-041-HVAC-001 U2-1-041-HVAC-002 U2-1-041-IA-001 U2-1-041 -IA-002 U2-1-041-IA-003 U2-1-041-IA-004 U2-1-041-SEP-001 U2-1-041-SEP-002 Revision 0 Page 36 of 38 Version 1.0 Page 2389 of 3726 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-041 5.2 Fire Risk Evaluation Summary of Fire Protection Systems and Features Table 5-2 Summary of Required Fire Protection Systems and Features Required Required Required Fire Fire Area Fire Zone Suppression Detection Protection Feature Required Fire Protection System and Feature Details System System (R, D)(R, D) (R, D)U2 1-041 R R -Improvements to procedures necessary to incorporate recovery actions required to meet risk criteria (See Table 2-4)335 RR -Suppression system, Detection system, Fire rated cables;D -Suppression system, Detection system R -Suppression system, Detection system, Fire rated cables;343 R, D D -Suppression system, Detection system R -Suppression system, Detection system D -Suppression system, Detection system Required Suppression/Detection/Feature:
required in the Fire Area based on NFPA 805 Chapter 4 compliance.
The information is provided on a zone basis. The basis for the requirement of the fire protection system is designated as follows:* R -Risk Criteria:
Systems required to meet the Risk Criteria for the Performance-Based Approach (NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4)* D -Defense-in-depth Criteria:
Systems required to maintain adequate balance of Defense-in-Depth for a Performance-Based Approach (NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4)Fire Protection Features in this Table only refer to those features installed in the Fire Area that have a corresponding NFPA 805, Chapter 3 requirement.
5.3 Summary of Recovery Actions Table 5-3 -Recovery Actions Fire Area Component Component Description Actions U2 1-041 Q2R42B0001A 125V DC BUS 2A Operator action to provide alternate cooling for battery charger 5.4 Summary of Plant Modifications No modifications are required for this fire area.Revision 0 Page 37 of 38 Revision 0 Page 37 of 38 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-041 5.5 Fire Area Risk Summary Table 5-4 -Fire Area Risk Summary Fire Area Area Description NFPA 805 Fire Area CDFILERF VFDR RAs Fire Risk Eval Additional Risk of RAs Basis (Yes/No) (Yes/No) A CDFILERF U2 1-041 Train A Switchgear and 4.2.4 6.99E-07/1.99E-09 Yes Yes 4.OOE-07/1.56E-09 4.OOE-07/1.56E-09 Load Center Rooms Revision 0 Page 38 of 38 Revision 0 Page 38 of 38 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-042 Attachment 
-Unit 2 Fire Area 1-042 FRE for Fire Area Auxiliary Building Hallways and Corridor Revision:
0 Name Fire PRA Preparer Jonathan Hedrick Fire PRA Reviewer Clint Pierce Fire Protection Preparer Rebecca Puckett Fire Protection Reviewer Robert Kirkpatrick NSCA Preparer Larry Valmonte NSCA Reviewer Dan Funk FRE Preparer Steve Hardy FRE Reviewer Brandon Jamar Revision 0 Page 1 of 16 Version 1.0 Page 2392 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-042 1.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION INPUT .....................................................................
4 1.1 Variances from the Deterministic Requirements 
....................................
4 1.2 Fire Protection Systems and Features ..................................................
5 1 .2 .1 C o n stru ctio n ....................................................................................
5 1.2.2 Detection 
.....................................................................................
5 1.2.3 Fixed Fire Suppression 
..............................................................
5 1.2.4 Manual Suppression 
...................................................................
5 1.2.5 Ventilation (Smoke Removal) ......................................................
5 1.2.6 Other Fire Protection Features ....................................................
5 1.2.7 Fire Hazard Identification 
............................................................
5 1.2.8 Fire PRA Input ............................................................................
6 2.0 RISK EVALUATION 
.........................................................................................
6 2.1 Fire PRA Variant Case Calculation 
........................................................
6 2.2 Compliant Case Calculation 
...................................................................
8 2.2.1 VFDRs Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA ..............................
8 2.2.2 VFDRs Not Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA .......................
8 2.2.3 Compliant Case Results .............................................................
9 2.2.4 Required Modifications 
...............................................................
9 2.2.5 Required Recovery Actions .........................................................
9 2.3 Risk Evaluation Results .........................................................................
9 3.0 DID EVALUATION 
.........................................................................................
11 3.1 Defense-in-Depth Evaluation 
...............................................................
11 3.2 Defense-in-Depth Review Results ......................................................
11 3.2.1 Required Modifications 
.............................................................
12 3.2.2 Required Recovery Actions ......................................................
12 4.0 SAFETY MARGIN EVALUATION 
.................................................................
12 4.1 Safety Margin Evaluation 
.....................................................................
12 4.1.1 Fire Modeling ...........................................................................
13 4.1.2 Plant System Performance 
........................................................
13 4.2 Safety Margin Results ..........................................................................
13 5.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION RESULTS ............................................................
14 5.1 Dispositions of VFDRs ..........................................................................
14 Revision 0 Page 2 of 16 Version 1.0 Page 2393 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-042 SE-C051 326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-042 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 Fire Risk Evaluation Summary of Fire Protection Systems and Features 15 Summary of Recovery Actions .............................................................
15 Summary of Plant Modifications 
..........................................................
15 Fire Area Risk Summary ......................................................................
16 Revision 0 Page 3 of 16 Version 1.0 Page 2394 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-042 1.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION INPUT 1.1 Variances from the Deterministic Requirements The VFDRs identified for evaluation for Unit 2, Fire Area 1-042, Auxiliary Building Hallways and Corridor are: Table 1-1 VFDRs VFDR Component(s)
Description U2-1-042-Q2R42B0001A:ENE This component, 125V DC Bus 2A (Train A Battery Charger Room HVAC-001 RGIZED:ENERGIZE Cooler), requires HVAC support to remain functional.
Failure to D-BC2A, 125V DC provide HVAC support to this electrical component challenges all BUS 2A Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-1-042-Q2R15A0006:ENER This component, Switchgear 2F (600V Load Center D Cooler), HVAC-002 GIZED:ENERGIZED-requires HVAC support to remain functional.
Failure to provide HVAC SUT2A, 4160V support to this electrical component could challenge various Nuclear SWITCHGEAR BUS Safety Performance Criteria.2F U2-1-042-Q2R15A0007:ENER This component, Switchgear 2G (600V Load Center E Room Cooler), HVAC-003 GIZED:ENERGIZED-requires HVAC support to remain functional.
Failure to provide HVAC SUT2A, 4160V support to this electrical component challenges various Nuclear Safety SWITCHGEAR BUS Performance Criteria.2G U2-1-042-Q2R17B0001:ENER This component, MCC 2A, requires HVAC support to remain HVAC-004 GIZED:ENERGIZED, functional.
Failure to provide HVAC support to this electrical MOTOR CONTROL component challenges various Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.CENTER 2A U2-1-042-Q2R15A0006:ENER This component, Switchgear 2F (SUT Cooling Supply), requires HVAC-005 GIZED:ENERGIZED-HVAC support to remain functional.
Failure to provide HVAC support SUT2A, 4160V to this electrical component could challenge various Nuclear Safety SWITCHGEAR BUS Performance Criteria.2F U2-1-042-SEP-Q1P16V0522:CLOSE In order to establish the Service Water Supply, the line associated 001 D:CLOSED, SW TO with the Unit 2 DG Cross Tie must be isolated.
Fire induced circuit D/G 1B failure could spuriously open valve Q1P16V0522 and lead to a diversion path for service water. This failure challenges all Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-1-042-SEP-Q1R43E0001A:AVAI Fire induced circuit failure to the sequencer circuit could impact power 004 LABLE:AVAILABLE-availability if offsite power is not available.
Without proper sequencer SHED, SEQUENCER operation, the Diesel Generator will not be able to satisfy various BUS 1F permissives that permit shedding and loading of selective loads.Offsite power associated with unit 2 may not be available due to a loss of HVAC to Bus 2F, however this is contingent upon the survivability timeframe or a potential paralleling of offsite and diesel sources due to fire induced circuit failure. Failure to ensure the availability of AC power challenges various Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-1-042-SEP-N2B31L0001E:ON:O The Pressurizer Heaters are required off in order control RCS 005 FF, PRESSURIZER Pressure, and avoid overpressure transients.
A loss of control power HEATER GROUP 2E to DC Bus 1 H would prevent remote tripping of Pressurizer Heater DISTRIBUTION Group E. This failure challenges the RCS Pressure Control Nuclear PANEL Safety Performance Criterion.
Revision 0 Page 4 of 16 Version 1.0 Page 2395 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-042 1.2 Fire Protection Systems and Features FireArea 1-042 consists of Fire Zones 319, 339, and 345. This fire area is located in the Auxiliary Building Hallways and Corridor at elevation 139'- 0".1.2.1 Construction Barriers for this fire area are of substantial construction and have been designed and constructed to meet separation requirements.
In the event the configuration utilized is not in accordance with recognized standards, the deviations have been evaluated to be adequate for the hazard.1.2.2 Detection Fire detection systems to provide notification to the Control Room are: " Fire Zone 319 (Corridor 
-Train B) is provided with detection." Fire Zone 339 (Corridor 
-Train A) is provided with detection." Fire Zone 345 (Hallway -Train A) is provided with detection.
1.2.3 Fixed Fire Suppression Fixed fire suppression systems to aid in control of both fire growth and spread in the fire area are:* Fire Zone 319 is provided with suppression." Fire Zone 339 is provided with suppression." Fire Zone 345 is provided with suppression.
1.2.4 Manual Suppression Manual suppression equipment to be utilized by plant persomnel and/or fire brigade members are:* Fire Area 1-042 is provided with two portable extinguishers in Rooms 319 and 339." Two fire hose cabinets are located in room 319 and one fire hose cabinet in room 345." A CO, hose reel is located in room 339.1.2.5 Ventilation (Smoke Removal)Portable smoke ejectors are available to assist with smoke removal.1.2.6 Other Fire Protection Features* A portion of Corridor 339 is designated as "No Combustible Storage Area" to prevent storage of transient combustibles.
Fire rated cable configurations are installed in the area.1.2.7 Fire Hazard Identification The major sources of combustibles in Fire Area 1-042 are cable insulation and cable bus insulation.
Details regarding fire scenarios quantified in the fire PRA, and their associated ignition sources (where applicable) are discussed in Section 2.Revision 0 Page 5 of 16 Version 1.0 Page 2396 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-042 1.2.8 Fire PRA Input Fire protection features Fire rated cables have been credited in this area (Fire Zones 319 and 339 only).Fire protection systems There are no fire protection systems specifically modeled in the Fire PRA for this fire area.Hot Gas Layer Treatment This fire area screened for potential Hot Gas Layer effects on the Zone Of Influence.
No credit for detection was taken in the Hot Gas Layer evaluation for this fire area. No credit for manual or automatic fire suppression was taken in the Hot Gas Layer evaluation for this fire area.Multi-compartment analysis No credit for detection was taken in the Multi Compartment Analysis for this fire area. No credit for manual or automatic fire suppression, was taken in the Multi Compartment Analysis for this fire area.Scenario Review All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0, ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency.
2.0 RISK EVALUATION 2.1 Fire PRA Variant Case Calculation Tables 2-la and 2-1b provide the results of the variant case calculation for Fire Area 1-042. This is taken directly from the Fire PRA model with no changes or alterations made. The CDF and LERF results are provided on a scenario basis.The total area CDF and LERF is below the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr and 1E-08/rx-yr, respectively.
The total CDF/LERF can be used as a conservative estimate of the delta CDF/LERF with respect to a compliant configuration.
No further analysis of the delta CDF/LERF is required.Revision 0 Page 6 of 16 Revision 0 Page 6 of 16 Version 1.0 Page 2397 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-042 Table 2-1a Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train A Alignment IGF CDF LERF Zone Scen ScenDesc IGr NSP SF CCDP CDr CLERP (IRy (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr) (Irx-yr)0319 E 1D LOAD CENTER AHU 6.86E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 4.59E-11 1.61E-10 1.10E-14 0339 D1 TRANSIENT 2.30E-06 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 1.54E-12 1.61E-10 3.69E-16 0345 D1 TRANSIENT FIRE AT EAST 813E-06 1.0 1.0 8.69E-04 7.06E-09 1.92E-06 1.56E-11 WALL 0345 D2 TRANSIENT FIRE AT NW 8.13E-06 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 5.44E-12 1.61E-10 1.31E-15 WALL Total CDF/LERF Fire PRA Variant Case 7.12E-09 1.56E-1I Table 2-1b Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train B Alignment IGF CDF LERF Zone Scen ScenDesc rxr NSP SF CCDP (rr CLERP LRr (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr) (Irx-yr)0319 E 1D LOAD CENTER AHU 6.86E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 4.56E-11 1.61 E-10 1.10E-14 0339 D1 TRANSIENT 2.30E-06 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 1.52E-12 1.61E-10 3.69E-16 0345 D1 TRANSIENT FIRE AT EAST 8.13E-06 1.0 1.0 9.59E-04 7.80E-09 1.39E-06 1.13E-11 WALL 0345 D2 TRANSIENT FIRE AT NW 8.13E-06 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 5.40E-12 1.61E-10 1.31E-15 WALL Total CDF/LERF Fire PRA Variant Case 7.85E-09 1.13E-11 Where: Zone = Fire Zone Scen = 'A' to signify the variant case ScenDesc = Description of the Fire Scenario IGF = Ignition Frequency 
(/rx-yr)NSP = Non Suppression Probability SF = Severity Factor CCDP = Conditional Core Damage Probability CDF = Core Damage Frequency 
(/rx-yr)CLERP = Conditional Large Early Release Probability LERF = Large Early Release Frequency 
(/rx-yr)Revision 0 Page 7 of 16 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-042 2.2 Compliant Case Calculation The following sub-sections provide the basis for modeling each VFDR (or category of VFDRs)and the alterations that have been made to the variant case to represent the compliant case. In each section a discussion of the VFDR (or the category of VFDRs) is provided.2.2.1 VFDRs Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA The following VFDRs are modeled in the Fire PRA and are therefore included in the total fire area CDF/LERF used as a surrogate for the delta risk evaluation for this fire area: " U2-1-042-HVAC-001 
-Q2R42B000 1 A:ENERGIZED:ENERGIZED-BC2A" U2-1-042-SEP-001 
-QIP16V0522:CLOSED:CLOSED" U2-1-042-SEP-005-N2B31LOOO1E:ON:OFF 2.2.2 VFDRs Not Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA A Fire PRA was developed in accordance with the requirements of Part 4 "Requirements for Fires at Power PRA" of the ASME and ANS combined PRA Standard, ASME/ANS RA-Sa-2009, "Standard for Level 1/Large Early Release Frequency Probabilistic Risk Assessment for Nuclear Power Plant Applications".
Consistent with those requirements not all components required to meet the nuclear safety criteria need to be specifically modeled in the Fire PRA. The following VFDRs are associated with components not modeled in the Fire PRA: 2.2.2.1 VFDRs U2-1-042-HVAC-002, SEP-004 4kV Switchgear Room 2F ventilation is not modeled in the fire PRA. Room Heat up calculations show that there will be no impact to the 4kV Switchgear Room due to loss of HVAC within the mission time of 24 hrs in the fire PRA. See calculation Fire PRA Logic Model for Farley Nuclear Plants, PRA-BC-F-11-004." U2-1-042-HVAC-002 
-Q2RI 5A0006:ENERGIZED:ENERGIZED-SUT2A
* U2-1-042-SEP-004 
-QiR43E0001A:AVAILABLE:AVAILABLE-SHED 2.2.2.2 VFDR U2-1-042-HVAC-003 4kV Switchgear Room 2G ventilation is not modeled in the fire PRA. Roorn Heat up calculations show that there will be no impact to the 4kV Switchgear Room due to loss of HVAC within the mission time of 24 hrs in the fire PRA. See calculation Fire PRA Logic Model for Farley Nuclear Plants, PRA-BC-F-1 1-004..U2-1-042-HVAC-003 
-Q2Rl5A0007:ENERGIZED:ENERGIZED-SUT2A 2.2.2.3 VFDR U2-1-042-HVAC-004 MCC Room 2A ventilation is not modeled in the fire PRA. Room Heat up calculations show that there will be no impact to the MCC Room due to loss of HVAC within the mission time of 24 hrs in the fire PRA. See calculation Fire PRA Logic Model for Farley Nuclear Plants, PRA-BC-F- 11-004..U2-1-042-HVAC-004 
-Q2Rl17B000 1:ENERGIZED:ENERGIZED Revision 0 Page 8 of 16 Version 1.0 Page 2399 of 3726 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-042 2.2.2.4 VFDR U2-1-042-HVAC-005 4kV Switchgear Room 2F ventilation is not modeled in the fire PRA. Room Heat up calculations show that there will be no impact to the 4kV Switchgear Room due to loss of HVAC within the mission time of 24 hrs in the fire PRA. See calculation Fire PRA Logic Model for Farley Nuclear Plants, PRA-BC-F-11-004.a U2-1-042-HVAC-005 
-Q2R 15A0006:ENERGIZED:
ENERGIZED-SUT2A 2.2.3 Compliant Case Results The total area CDF and LERF is below the screening acceptance criteria of 1 E-07/yr and 1 E-08/yr, respectively.
The total CDF/LERF can be used as a conservative estimate of the delta CDF/LERF with respect to a compliant configuration.
No further analysis of the delta CDF/LERF is required.2.2.4 Required Modifications There are no modifications required as a result of the risk evaluation for this fire area.2.2.5 Required Recovery Actions The following recovery actions are required as a result of the risk evaluation for this fire area: Table 2-2 Required Recovery Actions Recovery Component ID Basic Event VFDR BE Description Action Description OPERATOR Operator action RECOVERY OF to provide BATTERY alternate Q2R42BO001A:ENERGIZED:ENERGIZED-OP-RECOV-U2-1-042-CARGER Alingto BC2A BCSW-A HVAC-001 ROOMcoomidu to ROOM room due to COOLING loss of Train A FAILS-SW SW 2.3 Risk Evaluation Results The ACDF/LERF is below the screening acceptance criteria of 1 E-07/rx-yr (CDF) and 1 E-08/rx-yr (LERF) for acceptable risk. All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0 ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency.
The following tables present the fire zone/scenario fire risk as well as the total fire risk for this fire area. Given the relatively low risk for these zones/scenarios the delta risk is defined by the variant case risk, the compliant case risk is conservatively assumed to be 0.Revision 0 Page 9 of 16 Version 1.0 Page 2400 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-042 Table 2-3a 1 FIRE AREA ACDF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN B ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CCDP CDF CCDP CDF ACDF 0319/E 6.69E-07 4.59E-11 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 4.59E-11 0339/D1 6.69E-07 1.54E-12 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 1.54E-12 0345/D1 8.69E-04 7.06E-09 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 7.06E-09 0345/D2 6.69E-07 5.44E-12 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 5.44E-12 Total CDF and delta CDF 2  7.12E-09 0.OOE+00 7.12E-09 1 _ N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level 2 Total ACDF includes the risk of recovery actions required to demonstrate the availability of a success path for the nuclear safety performance criteria.Table 2-3b 1 FIRE AREA ACDF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN B ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CCDP CDF CCDP CDF ACDF 0319/E 6.64E-07 4.56E-11 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 4.56E-11 0339/D1 6.64E-07 1.52E-12 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 1.52E-12 0345/D1 9.59E-04 7.80E-09 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 7.80E-09 0345/D2 6.64E-07 5.40E-12 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 5.40E-12 Total CDF and delta CDF 2  7.85E-09 0.OOE+00 7.85E-09-N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.2 Total ACDF includes the risk of recovery actions required to demonstrate the availability of a success path for the nuclear safety performance criteria.Table 2-4a'FIRE AREA ,LERF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN A ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CLERP LERF CLERP LERF ALERF 0319/E 1.61 E-10 1.10E-14 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 1.10E-14 0339/D1 1.61E-10 3.69E-16 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 3.69E-16 0345/D1 1.92E-06 1.56E-11 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 1.56E-11 0345/D2 1.61 E-10 1.31 E-1 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 1.31 E-15 Total LERF and delta LERF2 1.56E-1 1 0.OOE+00 1.56E-1 1-N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.2 Total ALERF includes the risk of recovery actions required to demonstrate the availability of a success path for the nuclear safety performance criteria.Table 2-4b 1 FIRE AREA aLERF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN B ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CLERP LERF CLERP LERF ALERF 0319/E 1.61 E-10 1.10E-14 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 1.10E-14 0339/D1 1.61E-10 3.69E-16 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 3.69E-16 0345/D1 1.39E-06 1.13E-11 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 1.13E-11 0345/D2 1.61E-10 1.31E-15 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 1.31E-15 Revision 0 Page 10 of 16 Version 1.0 Page 2401 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-042 Table 2-4b 1 FIRE AREA ALERF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN B ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CLERP LERF CLERP LERF ALERF Total LERF and delta LERF 2  1.13E-11 0.OOE+00 1.13E-11 1 _ N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.2 Total ALERF includes the risk of recovery actions required to demonstrate the availability of a success path for the nuclear safety performance criteria.3.0 DID EVALUATION 3.1 Defense-in-Depth Evaluation A review of the impact of the change on defense-in-depth (DID) was performed.
NFPA 805 defines DID as: " Preventing fires from starting" Rapidly detecting fires and controlling and extinguishing promptly those fires that do occur, thereby limiting damage" Providing adequate level of fire protection for structures, systems and components important to safety; so that a fire that is not promptly extinguished will not prevent essential plant safety functions from being performed.
In general, the DID requirement was considered satisfied if the proposed change does not result in a substantial imbalance among these elements (or echelons).
The review of DID was qualitative and addressed each of the elements with respect to the proposed change. Fire protection features and systems relied upon to ensure DID were identified in the assessment (e.g., detection, suppression system).The VFDRs and the associated Fire Area risk (CDF) and scenario consequences (CCDP values)were evaluated to identify general DID echelon imbalances.
Potential methods to balance the DID features were identified ensuring an adequate balance of DID features is maintained for the Fire Area. See Section 3.2 for the results of the evaluation.
3.2 Defense-in-Depth Review Results A review of defense in depth and risk evaluation results show that, given the systems and features specified in Table 3-1 and Section 2 respectively, risk acceptance criteria are met and that the balance of defense in depth is maintained.
However due to uncertainties associated with analytical methods and the existence of significant fuel packages in the area, it is deemed prudent to require detection to ensure prompt fire brigade response and provide notification to support recovery actions required to meet the risk criteria.
Suppression is required for DID in Zone 345 to limit the growth and propagation of a potential fire.These additional systems coupled with the other required features will provide additional assurances that any unknown weaknesses or uncertainties, such as HGL formation and uncontrolled fire development, will not adversely affect the ability to meet nuclear safety performance criteria.The table below summarizes how an adequate balance of DID is maintained.
Revision 0 Page 11 of 16 Version 1.0 Page 2402 of 3726 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-042 Table 3-1 Defense-in-Depth Impact Review Method of Providing DID Discussion Echelon 1: Prevent fires from starting Combustible Control No change necessary to procedure(s) 
/guidance document(s).
1 Hot Work Control No change necessary to procedure(s) 
/guidance document(s).
1 Echelon 2: Rapidly detect, control and extinguish promptly those fires that do occur thereby limiting fire damage Detection System Detection systems are installed in Zones 319, 339, and 345 and are all required.Automatic Fire Suppression Automatic suppression system installed in Zones 319, 339, and 345 and required in Zone 345.Portable Fire Extinguishers Portable extinguishers available, but no enhancements required.
1 Hose stations and hydrants Fire hose cabinets are available, but no enhancements required.located in the area(s)Pre-Fire Plan No change necessary to procedure(s) 
/guidance document(s).
Echelon 3: Provide adequate level of fire protection for systems and structures so that a fire will not prevent essential safety functions from being performed Walls, floors ceilings and structural No changes necessary to existing barriers.elements are rated or have been evaluated as adequate for the hazard.Openings in the fire barrier are rated No changes necessary to existing barrier openings.or have been evaluated as adequate for the hazard.Supplemental barriers (e.g., ERFBS, Fire rated cable is installed, but no enhancements required.cable tray covers, etc.)Guidance provided to operations No VFDR related DID recovery actions required.personnel detailing the credited success path(s) including recovery actions to achieve nuclear safety performance criteria.This fire protection feature is relied upon without further DID enhancements beyond inherent programmatic requirements of NFPA 805, Chap. 3 and will not be reported in Table 5-2.3.2.1 Required Modifications There are no modifications required as a result of the DID evaluation for this fire area.3.2.2 Required Recovery Actions There are no required recovery actions as a result of the DID evaluation for this fire area.4.0 SAFETY MARGIN EVALUATION 4.1 Safety Margin Evaluation In accordance with NEI 04-02, 5.3.5.3 guidance, the maintenance of adequate Safety Margin is assessed by the consideration of categories of analyses utilized by this fire risk evaluation (FRE).Safety margins are considered to be maintained if: Revision 0 Page 12 of 16 Version 1.0 Page 2403 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-042" Codes and standards or their alternatives accepted for use by the NRC are met, and" Safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) are met, or provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty.
The maintenance of adequate safety margin for the change analysis is described for each of the specific analysis types used in support of the fire risk assessment.
4.1.1 Fire Modeling Fire modeling performed in support of the transition has been performed within the Fire PRA utilizing codes and standards developed by industry and NRC staff to provide realistic yet conservative results. Specifically, the heat release rates utilized in the transition analysis are based upon NUREG/CR 6850, Task 8, Scoping Fire Modeling.
These heat release rates are conservative and represent values used to screen out fixed ignition sources that do not pose a threat to the targets within specific fire compartments and to assign severity factors to unscreened fixed ignition sources.The combined analysis approach is used during transition; therefore, maximum expected fire scenario/limiting fire scenarios have not been analyzed separately.
The bases for the application of these fire modeling codes and standards were not altered in support of this FRE.4.1.2 Plant System Performance Plant system performance parameters were not modified as a result of this FRE. These performance parameters were originally established to support nuclear performance criteria contained in the plant specific accident analyses.
These analyses established component and system performance criteria necessary to establish safe and stable plant operation, as well as, safe shut down of the unit in the event of a fire. These performance parameters were not modified as a result of this FRE.4.2 Safety Margin Results All analyses and assessment have been performed utilizing accepted techniques and industry.accepted standards.
In addition, safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) have been considered and provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty.
As such, the Safety Margins are maintained as discussed in Section 4. 1.Revision 0 Page 13 of 16 Version 1.0 Page 2404 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-042 5.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION RESULTS 5.1 Dispositions of VFDRs Based on the FRE results contained in Sections 2, 3 and 4 the VFDRs identified in Section 1. t have been resolved as follows: VFDR ID U2-1-042-HVAC-001 U2-1-042-HVAC-002 U2-1-042-HVAC-003 U2-1-042-HVAC-004 U2-1-042-HVAC-005 U2-1-042-SEP-001 U2-1-042-SEP-004 U2-1-042-SEP-005 Table 5-1 Final Variance Disposition Disposition Recovery Action(s)
Required to Satisfy Risk Criteria:
See Table 2-2 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Revision 0 Page 14 of 16 Revision 0 Page 14 of 16 Version 1.0 Page 2405 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-042 5.2 Fire Risk Evaluation Summary of Fire Protection Systems and Features Table 5-2 Summary of Required Fire Protection Systems and Features Required Required Required Fire Fire Area Fire Zone Suppression Detection Protection Feature Required Fire Protection System and Feature Details System System (R, D)(R, D) (R, D)U2 1-042 R R -Improvements to procedures necessary to incorporate recovery actions required to meet risk criteria (See Table 2-2)R -Fire rated cable;D -Detection system R -Fire rated cable;D -Detection system 345 D D None D -Detection system, Suppression system Required Suppression/Detection/Feature:
required in the Fire Area based on NFPA 805 Chapter 4 compliance.
The information is provided on a zone basis. The basis for the requirement of the fire protection system is designated as follows:* R -Risk Criteria:
Systems required to meet the Risk Criteria for the Performance-Based Approach (NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4)* D -Defense-in-depth Criteria:
Systems required to maintain adequate balance of Defense-in-Depth for a Performance-Based Approach (NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4)Fire Protection Features in this Table only refer to those features installed in the Fire Area that have a corresponding Chapter 3 requirement.
5.3 Summary of Recovery Actions Table 5-3 -Recovery Actions Unit-FA Component Component Description Actions U2 1-042 Q2R42BOO01A 125V DC Bus 2A Operator action to provide alternate cooling to BC room due to loss of Train A SW 5.4 Summary of Plant Modifications No modifications are required for this fire area.Revision 0 Page 15 of 16 Revision 0 Page 15 of 16 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-042 SE-C051326701 
-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-042 5.5 Fire Area Risk Summary Fire Area Area Description U2 1-042 Auxiliary Building Hallways and Corridor NFPA 805 Basis 4.2.4 Table 5-4 -Fire Area Risk Summary VFDR Fire Area CDF/LERF (Yes/No) ('7.48E-09/1.35E-1 1 Yes RAs'es/No)Yes Fire Risk Eval A CDF/LERF 7.48E-09/1.35E-1 1 Additional Risk of RAs 7.48E-09/1.35E-1 1 Revision 0 Page 16 of 16 Revision 0 Page 16 of 16 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-075 Attachment 
-Unit 2 Fire Area 1-075 FRE for Fire Area Unit 1 Cable Tunnel -Train A Revision:
0 Name Fire PRA Preparer Fire PRA Reviewer Fire Protection Preparer Fire Protection Reviewer NSCA Preparer NSCA Reviewer FRE Preparer FRE Reviewer Jonathan Hedrick Clint Pierce Robert Kirkpatrick Rebecca Puckett Larry Valmonte Dan Funk Micky Heatherly Brandon Jamar Revision 0 Page 1 of 15 Version 1.0 Page 2408 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-075 1.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION INPUT .....................................................................
4 1.1 Variances from the Deterministic Requirements 
....................................
4 1.2 Fire Protection Systems and Features ..................................................
4 1.2.1 Construction 
................................................................................
4 1.2 .2 D ete ctio n ................................................................................... 
..4 1.2.3 Fixed Fire Suppression 
..............................................................
4 1.2.4 Manual Suppression 
...................................................................
5 1.2.5 Ventilation (Smoke Removal) ......................................................
5 1.2.6 Other Fire Protection Features ....................................................
5 1.2.7 Fire Hazard Identification 
............................................................
5 1.2.8 Fire PRA Input ............................................................................
5 2.0 RISK EVALUATION 
.........................................................................................
6 2.1 Fire PRA Variant Case Calculation 
........................................................
6 2.2 Compliant Case Calculation 
...................................................................
8 2.2.1 VFDRs Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA ..............................
8 2.2.2 VFDRs Not Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA .......................
8 2.2.3 Compliant Case Results .............................................................
8 2.2.4 Required Modifications 
...............................................................
9 2.2.5 Required Recovery Actions .........................................................
9 2.3 Risk Evaluation Results ..........................................................................
9 3.0 DID EVALUATION 
..........................................................................................
10 3.1 Defense-in-Depth Evaluation 
...............................................................
10 3.2 Defense-in-Depth Review Results ......................................................
10 3.2.1 Required Modifications 
.............................................................
11 3.2.2 Required Recovery Actions ......................................................
11 4.0 SAFETY MARGIN EVALUATION 
..................................................................
12 4.1 Safety Margin Evaluation 
.....................................................................
12 4.1.1 Fire Modeling ............................................................................
12 4.1.2 Plant System Performance 
........................................................
12 4.2 Safety Margin Results ..........................................................................
12 5.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION RESULTS ............................................................
13 5.1 Dispositions of VFDRs ..........................................................................
13 5.2 Fire Risk Evaluation Summary of Fire Protection Systems and Features 14 Revision 0 Page 2 of 15 Version 1.0 Page 2409 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-075 SE-COSi 326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-075 5.3 5.4 5.5 Summary of Recovery Actions .............................................................
14 Summary of Plant Modifications 
..........................................................
14 Fire Area Risk Summary ......................................................................
15 Revision 0 Page 3 of 15 Version 1.0 Page 2410 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-075 1.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION INPUT 1.1 Variances from the Deterministic Requirements The VFDRs identified for evaluation for Unit 2, Fire Area 1-075, Unit 1 Cable Tunnel -Train A are: Table 1-1 VFDRs VFDR Component(s)
Description U2-1-075-Q2R42BO001A:ENE This component, 125V DC Bus 2A, requires HVAC support to remain HVAC-001 RGIZED:ENERGIZE functional.
Failure to ensure availability of HVAC for this electrical D-BC2A, 125V DC component challenges electrical support Vital Auxiliaries Nuclear BUS 2A Safety Performance Criteria.U2-1-075-Q2R15A0006:ENER This component, Switchgear 2F, requires HVAC support to remain HVAC-002 GIZED:ENERGIZED-functional.
Failure to provide HVAC support to this Electrical SUT2A, 4160V Component challenges electrical support Vital Auxiliaries Nuclear SWITCHGEAR BUS Safety Performance Criteria.2F U2-1-075-Q2R17B0001:ENER This component, MCC 2A, requires HVAC support to remain HVAC-003 GIZED:ENERGIZED, functional.
Failure to ensure HVAC availability of this component MOTOR CONTROL challenges electrical support Vital Auxiliaries Nuclear Safety CENTER 2A Performance Criteria.U2-1-075-SEP-Q1R43E0001A:AVAI Fire induced circuit failure to the sequencer circuit could impact power 001 LABLE:AVAILABLE-availability if offsite power is not available.
Without proper sequencer SHED, SEQUENCER operation, the Diesel Generator will not be able to satisfy various BUS 1F permissives that permit shedding and loading of selective loads.Offsite power associated with unit 2 may not be available due to a loss of HVAC to Bus 2F, however this is contingent upon the survivability timeframe.
Failure to ensure the availability of AC power challenges electrical support Vital Auxiliaries Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.1.2 Fire Protection Systems and Features Fire Area 1-075 consists of Fire Zone 1-075. This fire area is located in tile Cable Tunnel Train A at elevations located below grade.1.2.1 Construction Barriers for this fire area are of substantial construction and have been designed and constructed to meet separation requirements.
In the event the configuration utilized is not in accordance with recognized standards, the deviations have been evaluated to be adequate for the hazard.1.2.2 Detection There are no detection systems located in this area.1.2.3 Fixed Fire Suppression Fixed fire suppression systems to aid in control of both fire growth and spread in the fire area are: Fire Zone 1-075 is provided with suppression.
Revision 0 Page 4 of 15 Version 1.0 Page 2411 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-075 1.2.4 Manual Suppression Manual suppression equipment to be utilized by plant personnel and/or fire brigade members are: " Fire Area 1-075 is provided with yard hydrants." Fire Area 1-075 is provided with fire hose cabinets in Fire Area 056A and Room 234 (Fire Area 1-020)1.2.5 Ventilation (Smoke Removal)Portable smoke ejectors are available to assist with smoke removal.1.2.6 Other Fire Protection Features No additional fire protection features are required for this fire risk evaluation.
1.2.7 Fire Hazard Identification The major source of combustibles in Fire Area 1-075 is cable insulation.
Details regarding fire scenarios quantified in the fire PRA, and their associated ignition sources (where applicable) are discussed in Section 2.1.2.8 Fire PRA Input Fire protection features There are no fire protection features specifically modeled in the Fire PRA for this fire area.Fire protection systems There are no fire protection systems specifically modeled in the Fire PRA for this fire area.Hot Gas Layer Treatment This fire area screened for potential Hot Gas Layer effects on the Zone Of Influence.
No credit for detection was taken in the Hot Gas Layer evaluation for this fire area. No credit for manual or automatic fire suppression was taken in the Hot Gas Layer evaluation for this fire area.Multi-compartment analysis No credit for detection was taken in the Multi Compartment Analysis for this fire area. No credit for manual or automatic fire suppression was taken in the Multi Compartment Analysis for this fire area.Scenario Review All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0, ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency.
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-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-075 2.0 RISK EVALUATION 2.1 Fire PRA Variant Case Calculation Tables 2-1a and 2-lb provide the results of the variant case calculation for Fire Area 1-075. This is taken directly from the Fire PRA model with no changes or alterations made. The CDF and LERF results are provided on a scenario basis.The total area CDF and LERF is below the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr and 1E-08/rx-yr, respectively.
The total CDF/LERF can be used as a conservative estimate of the delta CDF/LERF with respect to a compliant configuration.
No further analysis of the delta CDF/LERF is required.Revision 0 Page 6 of 15 Version 1.0 Page 2413 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-075 Table 2-1a Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train A Alignment Zone Scen ScenDesc 1  IGF NSP SF CCDP CDF CLERP LERF (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr)1-075 A01 BASE CASE -TRANSIENT 3.90E-05 1.0 1.0 8.69E-04 3.39E-08 1.92E-06 7.47E-11 Total CDF/LERF Fire PRA Variant Case 3.39E-08 7.47E-11 Table 2-1 b Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train B Alignment Zone Scen ScenDesc( IGF NSP SF CCDP CDF CLERP LERF (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr)1-075 A01 BASE CASE -TRANSIENT 3.90E-05 1.0 1.0 9.59E-04 3.74E-08 1.39E-06 5.42E-1 1 Total CDF/LERF Fire PRA Variant Case 3.74E-08 5.42E-1 1 Where: Zone = Fire Zone Scen = 'A' to signify the variant case ScenDesc = Description of the Fire Scenario IGF = Ignition Frequency 
(/rx-yr)NSP Non Suppression Probability SF = Severity Factor CCDP = Conditional Core Damage Probability CDF = Core Damage Frequency 
(/rx-yr)CLERP = Conditional Large Early Release Probability LERF = Large Early Release Frequency 
(/rx-yr)-'Base Case' scenarios are complete room burnout and therefore do not identify specific ignition sources Revision 0 Page 7 of 15 Revision 0 Page 7 of 15 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-075 2.2 Compliant Case Calculation The following sub-sections provide the basis for modeling each VFDR (or category of VFDRs)and the alterations that have been made to the variant case to represent the compliant case. In each section a discussion of the VFDR (or the category of VFDRs) is provided.2.2.1 VFDRs Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA The following VFDRs are modeled in the Fire PRA and are therefore included in the total fire area CDF/LERF used as a surrogate for the delta risk evaluation for this fire area: 0 U2-1-075-HVAC-001-Q2R42B0001A:ENERGIZED:ENERGIZED-BC2A 2.2.2 VFDRs Not Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA A Fire PRA was developed in accordance with the requirements of Part 4 "Requirements for Fires at Power PRA" of the ASME and ANS combined PRA Standard, ASME/ANS RA-Sa-2009, "Standard for Level 1/Large Early Release Frequency Probabilistic Risk Assessment for Nuclear Power Plant Applications".
Consistent with those requirements not all components required to meet the nuclear safety criteria need to be specifically modeled in the Fire PRA. The following VFDRs are associated with components not modeled in the Fire PRA: 2.2.2.1 VFDR U2-1-075-HVAC-002 and U2-1-075-SEP-001 4kV Switchgear Room 2F ventilation is not modeled in the fire PRA. Room Heat up calculations show that there will be no impact to the 4kV Switchgear Room due to loss of HVAC within the mission time of 24 hrs in the fire PRA. See calculation Fire PRA Logic Model for Farley Nuclear Plants, PRA-BC-F-1 1-004." U2-1-075-HVAC-002-Q2R 15A0006:ENERGIZED:ENERG IZED-SUT2A" U2-1-075-SEP-001-Q1R43E0001A:AVAILABLE:AVAILABLE-SHED 2.2.2.2 VFDR U2-1-075-HVAC-003 MCC 2A ventilation is not modeled in the fire PRA. Room Heat up calculations show that there will be no impact to MCC 2A due to loss of HVAC within the mission time of 24 hrs in the fire PRA. See calculation Fire PRA Logic Model for Farley Nuclear Plants, PRA-BC-F-11-004.* U2-1-075-HVAC-003-Q2R17B000 1:ENERGIZED:ENERGIZED 2.2.3 Compliant Case Results The total area CDF and LERF is below the screening acceptance criteria of 1 E-07/rx-yr and 1 E-08/rx-yr, respectively.
The total CDF/LERF can be used as a conservative estimate of the delta CDF/LERF with respect to a compliant configuration.
No further analysis of the delta CDF/LERF is required.Revision 0 Page 8 of 15 Version 1.0 Page 2415 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-075 2.2.4 Required Modifications There are no modifications required as a result of the risk evaluation for this fire area.2.2.5 Required Recovery Actions Table 2-2 Required Recovery Actions Component ID Basic Event VFDR BE Description Recovery Action Description OPERATOR RECOVERY OF Operator action to U2-1-075-BATTERY provide alternate Q2R42B0001A:ENERGIZED:ENERGIZED-OP-RECOV-HVAC- CHARGER 2A cooling for battery BC2A BCSW-A 001 ROO charger room 001 ROOM due to loss of Train COOLING ASW FAILS 2.3 Risk Evaluation Results The ACDF/LERF is below the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr (CDF) and lE-08/rx-yr (LERF) for acceptable risk. All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0 ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency.
The following tables present the fire zone/scenario fire risk as well as the total fire risk for this fire area. Given the relatively low risk for these zones/scenarios the delta risk is defined by the variant case risk, the compliant case risk is conservatively assumed to be 0.Table 2-3a 1 FIRE AREA ACDF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN A ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CCDP CDF CCDP CDF ACDF 1-075/AO1 8.69E-04 3.39E-08 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 3.39E-08 Total CDF and delta CDF 2  3.39E-08 0.OOE+00 3.39E-08 1 _ N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.2 Total ACDF includes the risk of recovery actions required to demonstrate the availability of a success path for the nuclear safety performance criteria.Table 2-3b 1 FIRE AREA aCDF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN B ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CCDP CDF CCDP CDF ACDF 1-075/AO1 9.59E-04 3.74E-08 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 3.74E-08 Total CDF and delta CDF2 3.74E-08 0.OOE+00 3.74E-08-N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.2 Total ACDF includes the risk of recovery actions required to demonstrate the availability of a success path for the nuclear safety performance criteria.Revision 0 Page 9 of 15 Version 1.0 Page 2416 of 3726 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-075 Table 2-4a 1 FIRE AREA ALERF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN A ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CLERP LERF CLERP LERF ALERF 1-075/AO1 1.92E-06 7.47E-11 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 7.47E-11 Total LERF and delta LERF2 7.47E-11 0.OOE+00 7.47E-11 1 -N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.2 Total ALERF includes the risk of recovery actions required to demonstrate the availability of a success path for the nuclear safety performance criteria.Table 2-4b 1 FIRE AREA ALERF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN B ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CLERP LERF CLERP LERF ALERF 1-075/AO1 1.39E-06 5.42E-1 1 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 5.42E-1 1 Total LERF and delta LERF2 5.42E-11 O.OOE+00 5.42E-11' N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.2 Total ALERF includes the risk of recovery actions required to demonstrate the availability of a success path for the nuclear safety performance criteria.3.0 DID EVALUATION 3.1 Defense-in-Depth Evaluation A review of the impact of the change on defense-in-depth (DID) was performed.
NFPA 805 defines DID as: " Preventing fires from starting" Rapidly detecting fires and controlling and extinguishing promptly those fires that do occur, thereby limiting damage" Providing adequate level of fire protection for structures, systems and components important to safety; so that a fire that is not promptly extinguished will not prevent essential plant safety functions from being performed.
In general, the DID requirement was considered satisfied if the proposed change does not result in a substantial imbalance among these elements (or echelons).
The review of DID was qualitative and addressed each of the elements with respect to the proposed change. Fire protection features and systems relied upon to ensure DID were identified in the assessment (e.g., detection, suppression system).The VFDRs and the associated Fire Area risk (CDF) and scenario consequences (CCDP values)were evaluated to identify general DID echelon imbalances.
Potential methods to balance the DID features were identified ensuring an adequate balance of DID features is maintained for the Fire Area. See Section 3.2 for the results of the evaluation.
3.2 Defense-in-Depth Review Results A review of defense in depth and risk evaluation results show that, given the systems and features specified in Table 3-1 and Section 2 respectively, risk acceptance criteria are met and Revision 0 Page 10 of 15 Version 1.0 Page 2417 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-075 that the balance of defense in depth is maintained.
However due to uncertainties associated with analytical methods and the existence of significant fuel packages in the area, it is deemed prudent to require suppression to control the potential fire growth and spread.These additional systems coupled with the other required features will provide additional assurances that any unknown weaknesses or uncertainties, such as HGL formation and uncontrolled fire development, will not adversely affect the ability to meet nuclear safety performance criteria.The table below summarizes how an adequate balance of DID is maintained.
Table 3-1 Defense-in-Depth Impact Review Method of Providing DID Discussion Echelon 1: Prevent fires from starting Combustible Control No change necessary to procedure(s) 
/guidance document(s).
1 Hot Work Control No change necessary to procedure(s) 
/guidance document(s).
1 Echelon 2: Rapidly detect, control and extinguish promptly those fires that do occur thereby limiting fire damage Detection System No detection system is installed and not required.Automatic Fire Suppression Suppression system is installed and required.Portable Fire Extinguishers No portable extinguishers are available and not required Hose stations and hydrants Fire hose cabinets(s) and hydrants are available, but no enhancements located in the area(s) required.
1 Pre-Fire Plan No change necessary to procedure(s) 
/guidance document(s).
1 Echelon 3: Provide adequate level of fire protection for systems and structures so that a fire will not prevent essential safety functions from being performed Walls, floors ceilings and structural No changes necessary to existing barriers.elements are rated or have been evaluated as adequate for the hazard.Openings in the fire barrier are rated No changes necessary to existing barrier openings.
1 or have been evaluated as adequate for the hazard.Supplemental barriers (e.g., ERFBS, No supplement barriers installed and not required.cable tray covers, etc.)Guidance provided to operations No VFDR related DID recovery actions required.personnel detailing the credited success path(s) including recovery actions to achieve nuclear safety performance criteria.1 This fire protection feature is relied upon without further DID enhancements beyond inherent programmatic requirements of NFPA 805, Chap. 3 and will not be reported in Table 5-2.3.2.1 Required Modifications There are no modifications required as a result of the DID evaluation for this fire area.3.2.2 Required Recovery Actions There are no required recovery actions as a result of the DID evaluation for this fire area.Revision 0 Page 11 of 15 Version 1.0 Page 2418 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-075 4.0 SAFETY MARGIN EVALUATION 4.1 Safety Margin Evaluation In accordance with NEI 04-02, 5.3.5.3 guidance, the maintenance of adequate Safety Margin is assessed by the consideration of categories of analyses utilized by this fire risk evaluation (FRE).Safety margins are considered to be maintained if:* Codes and standards or their alternatives accepted for use by the NRC are met, and* Safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) are met, or provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty.
The maintenance of adequate safety margin for the change analysis is described for each of the specific analysis types used in support of the fire risk assessment.
4.1.1 Fire Modeling Fire modeling performed in support of the transition has been performed within the Fire PRA utilizing codes and standards developed by industry and NRC staff to provide realistic yet conservative results. Specifically, the heat release rates utilized in the transition analysis are based upon NUREG/CR 6850, Task 8, Scoping Fire Modeling.
These heat release rates are conservative and represent values used to screen out fixed ignition sources that do not pose a threat to the targets within specific fire compartments and to assign severity factors to unscreened fixed ignition sources.The combined analysis approach is used during transition; therefore, maximum expected fire scenario/limiting fire scenario have not been analyzed separately.
The bases for the application of these fire modeling codes and standards were not altered in support of this FRE.4.1.2 Plant System Performance Plant system performance parameters were not modified as a result of this FRE. These performance parameters were originally established to support nuclear performance criteria contained in the plant specific accident analyses.
These analyses established component and system performance criteria necessary to establish safe and stable plant operation, as well as, safe shut down of the unit in the event of a fire. These performance parameters were not modified as a result of this FRE.4.2 Safety Margin Results All analyses and assessment have been performed utilizing accepted techniques and industry accepted standards.
In addition, safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) have been considered and provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty.
As such, the Safety Margins are maintained as discussed in Section 4. 1.Revision 0 Page 12 of 15 Version 1.0 Page 2419 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-075 5.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION RESULTS 5.1 Dispositions of VFDRs Based on the FRE results contained in Sections 2, 3 and 4 the VFDRs identified in Section 1. 1 have been resolved as follows: Table 5-1 Final Variance Disposition Disposition VFDR ID U2-1-075-HVAC-001 U2-1-075-HVAC-002 U2-1-075-HVAC-003 U2-1-075-SEP-001 Recovery Action(s)
Required to Satisfy Risk Criteria:
See Table 2-2 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)Revision 0 Page 13 of 15 Version 1.0 Page 2420 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-075 5.2 Fire Risk Evaluation Summary of Fire Protection Systems and Features Table 5-2 Summary of Required Fire Protection Systems and Features Required Required Suppression Detection Required Fire Fire Area Fire Zone Sysion Detem Protection Feature Required Fire Protection System and Feature Details System System (R, D)(R, D) (R, D)U2 1-075 R R -Improvements to procedures necessary to incorporate recovery actions required to meet risk criteria (See Table 2-2);1-075 D None None D -Suppression system Required Suppression/Detection/Feature:
required in the Fire Area based on NFPA 805 Chapter 4 compliance.
The information is provided on a zone basis. The basis for the requirement of the fire protection system is designated as follows:* R -Risk Criteria:
Systems required to meet the Risk Criteria for the Performance-Based Approach (NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4)* D -Defense-in-depth Criteria:
Systems required to maintain adequate balance of Defense-in-Depth for a Performance-Based Approach (NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4)Fire Protection Features in this Table only refer to those features installed in the Fire Area that have a corresponding NFPA 805, Chapter 3 requirement.
5.3 Summary of Recovery Actions Table 5-3 -Recovery Actions Fire Area Component Component Description Actions U2 1-075 Q2R42B0001A 125V DC Bus 2A Operator action to provide alternate cooling for battery charger room due to loss of Train A SW 5.4 Summary of Plant Modifications No modifications are required for this fire area.Revision 0 Page 14 of 15 CD 0 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-075 5.5 Fire Area Risk Summary Table 5-4 Fire Area Risk Summary Fire Area Area Description NFPA 805 Fire Area CDF/LERF VFDR RAs Fire Risk Eval Basis (Yes/No) (Yes/No) A CDF/LERF Additional Risk of RAs U2 1-075 Cable Tunnel Train A 4.2.4 3.56E-08/6.45E-1 1 Yes Yes 3.56E-08/6.45E-1 1 3.56E-08/6.45E-1 1 Revision 0 Page 15 of 15 Revision 0 Page 15 of 15 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-076 Attachment 
-Unit 2 Fire Area 1-076 FRE for Fire Area Unit 1 Cable Tunnel -Train B Revision:
0 Name Fire PRA Preparer Fire PRA Reviewer Fire Protection Preparer Fire Protection Reviewer NSCA Preparer NSCA Reviewer FRE Preparer FRE Reviewer Jonathan Hedrick Clint Pierce Robert Kirkpatrick Rebecca Puckett Larry Valmonte Dan Funk Micky Heatherly Brandon Jamar Revision 0 Page 1 of 13 Revision 0 Page 1 of 13 Version 1.0 Page 2423 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-076 1.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION INPUT .....................................................................
4 1.1 Variances from the Deterministic Requirements 
....................................
4 1.2 Fire Protection Systems and Features ..................................................
4 1.2.1 Construction 
...............................................................................
4 1.2 .2 D ete ctio n ................................................................................... 
..4 1.2.3 Fixed Fire Suppression 
...............................................................
5 1.2.4 Manual Suppression 
...................................................................
5 1.2.5 Ventilation (Smoke Removal) .....................................................
5 1.2.6 Other Fire Protection Features ....................................................
5 1.2.7 Fire Hazard Identification 
...........................................................
5 1.2.8 Fire PRA Input .............................................................................
5 2.0 RISK EVALUATION 
.........................................................................................
6 2.1 Fire PRA Variant Case Calculation 
......................................................
6 2.2 Compliant Case Calculation 
..................................................................
8 2.2.1 VFDRs Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA ..............................
8 2.2.2 VFDRs Not Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA .......................
8 2.2.3 Compliant Case Results .............................................................
8 2.2.4 Required Modifications 
................................................................
8 2.2.5 Required Recovery Actions .........................................................
8 2.3 Risk Evaluation Results ........................................................................
8 3.0 DID EVALUATION 
............................................................................................
9 3.1 Defense-in-Depth Evaluation 
.................................................................
9 3.2 Defense-in-Depth Review Results ......................................................
10 3.2.1 Required Modifications 
.............................................................
11 3.2.2 Required Recovery Actions .......................................................
11 4.0 SAFETY MARGIN EVALUATION 
..................................................................
11 4.1 Safety Margin Evaluation 
......................................................................
11 4 .1 .1 F ire M od e ling .......................................................................... 
..11 4.1.2 Plant System Performance 
......................................................
11 4.2 Safety Margin Results ...........................................................................
12 5.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION RESULTS .............................................................
12 5.1 Dispositions of VFDRs ........................................................................
12 5.2 Fire Risk Evaluation Summary of Fire Protection Systems and Features 13 Revision 0 Page 2 of 13 Version 1.0 Page 2424 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-076 SE-C051 326101 -008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-076 5.3 5.4 5.5 Summary of Recovery Actions .............................................................
13 Summary of Plant Modifications 
..........................................................
13 Fire Area Risk Summary ......................................................................
13 Revision 0 Page 3 of 13 Version 1.0 Page 2425 of 3726 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-076 1.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION INPUT 1.1 Variances from the Deterministic Requirements The VFDRs identified for evaluation for Unit 2, Fire Area 1-076, Unit 1 Cable Tunnel -Train B are: Table 1-1 VFDRs VFDR Component(s)
Description U2-1-076-SEP-Q1P16V0522:CLOSE In order to preserve SW supply inventory, valve Q1P16V0422 which 001 D:CLOSED, SW TO supplies the Unit 2 DG with service water must be isolated.
Fire D/G 11B induced circuit failure could result in spurious opening of the valve, thereby limiting the amount of Service Water Inventory.
Failure to ensure the establishment of Service Water Challenges service water Vital Auxiliaries Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-1-076-SEP-Q1R16B0509:ENER Load Center 1S/2S is required to support the functionality of the 002 GIZED:ENERGIZED-Service Water Emergency Recirculation valve Q2P16V0538, which U1, 600V LOAD must open in order to support the establishment of Train B Service CENTER 1S/2S Water. The cited circuit failures on Cables 1DBES02F and 1VBL1E10A may result in a loss of DC control power to the load center, but not the AC supply. Furthermore a fault on cable 1 DYES07P would require a loss of control power on the respective load breaker to cause a loss of the supply. If the Load Center is able to remain intact in order to support the pond recirculation lineup (i.e.open Valve V0538) then loss of the supply afterwards is irrelevant.
Failure to establish Train B Independent Service Water prevents the establishment of Train B Power, which challenges service water Vital Auxiliaries Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-1-076-SEP-Q2P16V0538:CLOSE Service Water Recirculation to the Pond is credited in the analysis.003 D:OPEN, SW Valve Q2P16V0538 (SW Recirc to Pond) is required open to establish RECIRC TO POND the recirculation lineup. Fire induced circuit damage to the cited circuit TRAIN B can only disable the auto-open feature of the valve, or spuriously open the valve. These failures enforce the credited functionality.
If timing requirements are necessary to establish a recirc lineup however, inopportune opening of the valve could pose a problem. Failure to establish SW challenges service water Vital Auxiliaries Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.1.2 Fire Protection Systems and Features Fire Area 1-076 consists of Fire Zone 1-076. This fire area is located in the Unit 1, Cable Tunnel Train B at elevations located below grade.1.2.1 Construction Barriers for this fire area are of substantial construction and have been designed and constructed to meet separation requirements.
In the event the configuration utilized is not in accordance with recognized standards, the deviations have been evaluated to be adequate for the hazard.1.2.2 Detection There are no detection systems located in this area.Revision 0 Page 4 of 13 Revision 0 Page 4 of 13 Version 1.0 Page 2426 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-076 1.2.3 Fixed Fire Suppression Fixed fire suppression systems to aid in control of both fire growth and spread in the fire area are:* Fire Zone 1-076 is provided with suppression.
1.2.4 Manual Suppression Manual suppression equipment to be utilized by plant personnel and/or fire brigade members are:* Fire Area 1-076 is provided with yard hydrants.* Fire Area 1-076 is provided with a fire hose cabinet in Fire Area 056B.1.2.5 Ventilation (Smoke Removal)Portable smoke ejectors are available to assist with smoke removal.1.2.6 Other Fire Protection Features No additional fire protection features are required for this fire risk evaluation.
1.2.7 Fire Hazard Identification The major source of combustibles in Fire Area 1-076 is cable insulation.
Details regarding fire scenarios quantified in the fire PRA, and their associated ignition sources (where applicable) are discussed in Section 2.1.2.8 Fire PRA Input Fire protection features There are no fire protection features specifically modeled in the Fire PRA for this fire area.Fire protection systems There are no fire protection systems specifically modeled in the Fire PRA for this fire area.Hot Gas Layer Treatment This fire area screened for potential Hot Gas Layer effects on the Zone Of Influence.
No credit for detection was taken in the Hot Gas Layer evaluation for this fire area. No credit for manual or automatic fire suppression was taken in the Hot Gas Layer evaluation for this fire area.Multi-compartment analysis No credit for detection was taken in the Multi Compartment Analysis for this fire area. No credit for manual or automatic fire suppression was taken in the Multi Compartment Analysis for this fire area.Scenario Review All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0, ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency.
Revision 0 Page 5 of 13 Version 1.0 Page 2427 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-076 2.0 RISK EVALUATION 2.1 Fire PRA Variant Case Calculation Tables 2-la and 2-1b provide the results of the variant case calculation for Fire Area 1-076. This is taken directly from the Fire PRA model with no changes or alterations made. The CDF and LERF results are provided on a scenario basis.The total area CDF and LERF is below the screening acceptance criteria of IE-07/rx-yr and 1E-08/rx-yr, respectively.
The total CDF/LERF can be used as a conservative estimate of the delta CDF/LERF with respect to a compliant configuration.
No further analysis of the delta CDF/LERF is required.Revision 0 Page 6 of 13 Version 1.0 Page 2428 of 3726 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-076 Table 2-1a Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train A Alignment Zone Scen ScenDescl IGF NSP SF CCDP CDF CLERP LERF (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr)1-076 A01 BASE CASE -MODIFIED 5.93E-05 1.0 1.0 1.41E-04 8.36E-09 4.58E-07 2.71E-11 Total CDF/LERF Fire PRA Variant Case 8.36E-09 2.71E-11 Table 2-1 b Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train B Alignment Zone Scen ScenDescl IGF NSP SF CCDP CDF CLERP LERF (/rx-yr) (Irx-yr) (/rx-yr)1-076 A01 BASE CASE -MODIFIED 5.93E-05 1.0 1.0 1.41E-04 8.37E-09 4.58E-07 2.71E-11 Total CDF/LERF Fire PRA Variant Case 8.37E-09 2.71E-11 Where: Zone = Fire Zone Scen = 'A' to signify the variant case ScenDesc = Description of the Fire Scenario IGF = Ignition Frequency 
(/rx-yr)NSP = Non Suppression Probability SF = Severity Factor CCDP = Conditional Core Damage Probability CDF = Core Damage Frequency 
(/rx-yr)CLERP = Conditional Large Early Release Probability LERF = Large Early Release Frequency 
(/rx-yr)1- 'Base Case' scenarios are complete room burnout and therefore do not identify specific ignition sources Revision 0 Page 7 of 13 Revision 0 Page 7 of 13 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-076 2.2 Compliant Case Calculation The following sub-sections provide the basis for modeling each VFDR (or category of VFDRs)and the alterations that have been made to the variant case to represent the compliant case. In each section a discussion of the VFDR (or the category of VFDRs) is provided.2.2.1 VFDRs Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA The following VFDRs are modeled in the Fire PRA and are therefore included in the total fire area CDF/LERF used as a surrogate for the delta risk evaluation for this fire area: " U2-1-076-SEP-001-QIP16V0522:CLOSED:CLOSED" U2-1-076-SEP-002-QIR16B0509:ENERGIZED:ENERGIZED-U1" U2-1-076-SEP-003-Q2P 1 6V0538:CLOSED:OPEN 2.2.2 VFDRs Not Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA All VFDRs are modeled in the Fire PRA.2.2.3 Compliant Case Results The total area CDF and LERF is below the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr and 1E-08/rx-yr, respectively.
The total CDF/LERF can be used as a conservative estimate of the.delta CDF/LERF with respect to a compliant configuration.
No further analysis of the delta CDF/LERF is required.2.2.4 Required Modifications There are no modifications required as a result of the risk evaluation for this fire area.2.2.5 Required Recovery Actions There are no required recovery actions as a result of the risk evaluation for this fire area.2.3 Risk Evaluation Results The ACDF/LERF is below the screening acceptance criteria of I E-07/rx-yr (CDF) and IE-08/rx-yr (LERF) for acceptable risk. All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0 ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency.
The following tables present the fire zone/scenario fire risk as well as the total fire risk for this fire area. Given the relatively low risk for these zones/scenarios the delta risk is defined by the variant case risk, the compliant case risk is conservatively assumed to be 0.Table 2-2a 1 FIRE AREA ACDF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN A ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CCDP CDF CCDP CDF ACDF 1-076/AO1 1.41 E-04 8.36E-09 O.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 8.36E-09 Total CDF and delta CDF 8.36E-09 0.OOE+00 8.36E-09 Revision 0 Page 8 of 13 Version 1.0 Page 2430 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-076 1 -N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.OOE+00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.Table 2-2b 1 FIRE AREA ACDF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN B ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CCDP CDF CCDP CDF ACDF 1-076/Ao1 1.41E-04 8.37E-09 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 8.37E-09 Total CDF and delta CDF 8.37E-09 0.OOE+00 8.37E-09 1 _ N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.OOE+00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.Table 2-3a 1 FIRE AREA ALERF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN A ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CLERP LERF CLERP LERF ALERF 1-076/Ao1 4.58E-07 2.71 E-11 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 2.71 E-11 Total LERF and delta LERF 2.71 E-1 1 0.OOE+00 2.71 E-1 1-N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.00E+00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.Table 2-3b'FIRE AREA ALERF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN B ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CLERP LERF CLERP LERF ALERF 1-076/Ao1 4.58E-07 2.71 E-11 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 2.71 E-11 Total LERF and delta LERF 2.71E-11 0.OOE+00 2.71E-11-N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.OOE+00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.3.0 DID EVALUATION 3.1 Defense-in-Depth Evaluation A review of the impact of the change on defense-in-depth (DID) was performed.
NFPA 805 defines DID as:* Preventing fires from starting* Rapidly detecting fires and controlling and extinguishing promptly those fires that do occur, thereby limiting damage Providing adequate level of fire protection for structures, systems and components important to safety; so that a fire that is not promptly extinguished will not prevent essential plant safety functions from being performed.
In general, the DID requirement was considered satisfied if the proposed change does not result in a substantial imbalance among these elements (or echelons).
The review of DID was qualitative and addressed each of the elements with respect to the proposed change. Fire Revision 0 Page 9 of 13 Version 1.0 Page 2431 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-076 protection features and systems relied upon to ensure DID were identified in the assessment (e.g., detection, suppression system).The VFDRs and the associated Fire Area risk (CDF) and scenario consequences (CCDP values)were evaluated to identify general DID echelon imbalances.
Potential methods to balance the DID features were identified ensuring an adequate balance of DID features is maintained for the Fire Area. See Section 3.2 for the results of the evaluation.
3.2 Defense-in-Depth Review Results A review of defense in depth and risk evaluation results show that, given the systems and features specified in Table 3-1 and Section 2 respectively, risk acceptance criteria are met and that the balance of defense in depth is maintained.
The risk acceptance criteria are met with substantial margin to account for analytical methods associated with fire scenarios.
The analyzed scenarios bound potential fuel packages which can reasonably be expected to occur in this area.In the event of no intervention by the plant fire brigade, it is not expected that a credible fire would develop which would not be bounded by the analyzed scenarios.
However, to provide additional defense in depth, the installed suppression system is required to limit fire damage in the area.The table below summarizes how an adequate balance of DID is maintained.
Table 3-1 Defense-in-Depth Impact Review Method of Providing DID Discussion Echelon 1: Prevent fires from starting Combustible Control No change necessary to procedure(s) 
/guidance document(s).
1 Hot Work Control No change necessary to procedure(s) 
/guidance document(s).
Echelon 2: Rapidly detect, control and extinguish promptly those fires that do occur thereby limiting fire damage Detection System No detection system is installed and not required.Automatic Fire Suppression Suppression system is installed and required.Portable Fire Extinguishers No portable extinguishers are available and not required Hose stations and hydrants Fire hose cabinets(s) and hydrants are available, but no enhancements located in the area(s) required.
1 Pre-Fire Plan No change necessary to procedure(s) 
/guidance document(s).
1 Echelon 3: Provide adequate level of fire protection for systems and structures so that a fire will not prevent essential safety functions from being performed Walls, floors ceilings and structural No changes necessary to existing barriers.
1 elements are rated or have been evaluated as adequate for the hazard.Openings in the fire barrier are rated No changes necessary to existing barrier openings.or have been evaluated as adequate for the hazard.Supplemental barriers (e.g., ERFBS, No supplement barriers installed and not required.cable tray covers, etc.)Revision 0 Page 10 of 13 Version 1.0 Page 2432 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-076 Table 3-1 Defense-in-Depth Impact Review Method of Providing DID Discussion Guidance provided to operations No VFDR related DID recovery actions required.personnel detailing the credited success path(s) including recovery actions to achieve nuclear safety performance criteria.1 This fire protection feature is relied upon without further DID enhancements beyond inherent programmatic requirements of NFPA 805, Chap. 3 and will not be reported in Table 5-2.3.2.1 Required Modifications There are no modifications required as a result of the DID evaluation for this fire area.3.2.2 Required Recovery Actions There are no required recovery actions as a result of the DID evaluation for this fire area.4.0 SAFETY MARGIN EVALUATION 4.1 Safety Margin Evaluation In accordance with NEI 04-02, 5.3.5.3 guidance, the maintenance of adequate Safety Margin is assessed by the consideration of categories of analyses utilized by this fire risk evaluation (FRE).Safety margins are considered to be maintained if: Codes and standards or their alternatives accepted for use by the NRC are met, and Safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) are met, or provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty.
The maintenance of adequate safety margin for the change analysis is described for each of the specific analysis types used in support of the fire risk assessment.
4.1.1 Fire Modeling Fire modeling performed in support of the transition has been performed within the Fire PRA utilizing codes and standards developed by industry and NRC staff to provide realistic yet conservative results. Specifically, the heat release rates utilized in the transition analysis are based upon NUREG/CR 6850, Task 8, Scoping Fire Modeling.
These heat release rates are conservative and represent values used to screen out fixed ignition sources that do not pose a threat to the targets within specific fire compartments and to assign severity factors to unscreened fixed ignition sources.The combined analysis approach is used during transition; therefore, maximum expected fire scenario/limiting fire scenario have not been analyzed separately.
The bases for the application of these fire modeling codes and standards were not altered in support of this FRE.4.1.2 Plant System Performance Plant system performance parameters were not modified as a result of this FRE. These performance parameters were originally established to support nuclear performance criteria Revision 0 Page 11 of 13 Version 1.0 Page 2433 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-076 contained in the plant specific accident analyses.
These analyses established component and system performance criteria necessary to establish safe and stable plant operation, as well as, safe shut down of the unit in the event of a fire. These performance parameters were not modified as a result of this FRE.4.2 Safety Margin Results All analyses and assessment have been performed utilizing accepted techniques and industry accepted standards.
In addition, safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) have been considered and provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty.
As such, the Safety Margins are maintained as discussed in Section 4.1.5.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION RESULTS 5.1 Dispositions of VFDRs Based on the FRE results contained in Sections 2, 3 and 4 the VFDRs identified in Section 1.1 have been resolved as follows: VFDR ID U2-1-076-SEP-001 U2-1-076-SEP-002 U2-1-076-SEP-003 Table 5-1 Final Variance Disposition Disposition Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Revision 0 Page 12 of 13 Version 1.0 Page 2434 of 3726 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-076 5.2 Fire Risk Evaluation Summary of Fire Protection Systems and Features Table 5-2 Summary of Required Fire Protection Systems and Features Required Required Required Fire Fire Area Fire Zone Suppression Detection Protection Feature Required Fire Protection System and Feature Details System System (R, D)(R, D) (R, D)U2 1-076 1-076 D None None D -Suppression system Required Suppression/Detection/Feature:
required in the Fire Area based on NFPA 805 Chapter 4 compliance.
The information is provided on a zone basis. The basis for the requirement of the fire protection system is designated as follows:* R -Risk Criteria:
Systems required to meet the Risk Criteria for the Performance-Based Approach (NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4)* D -Defense-in-depth Criteria:
Systems required to maintain adequate balance of Defense-in-Depth for a Performance-Based Approach (NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4)Fire Protection Features in this Table only refer to those features installed in the Fire Area that have a corresponding NFPA 805, Chapter 3 requirement.
CD 5.3 Summary of Recovery Actions 0 6 No recovery actions are required for this fire area.5.4 Summary of Plant Modifications No modifications are required for this fire area.5.5 Fire Area Risk Summary Table 5-3 -Fire Area Risk Summary Fire Area Area Description NFPA805 Fire Area CDF/LERF VFDR RAs Fire Risk Eval Additional Risk of RAs-o Basis (Yes/No) (Yes/No) A CDF/LERF Co (D U2 1-076 Cable Tunnel Train B 4.2.4 8.36E-09/2.71E-11 Yes No 8.36E-09/2.71E-11 N/A 0, 4 N3)Revision 0 Page 13 of 13 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-081 Attachment 
-Unit 2 Fire Area 1-081 FRE for Fire Area Turbine Building Battery Room Revision:
0 Name Fire PRA Preparer Jonathan Hedrick Fire PRA Reviewer Clint Pierce Fire Protection Preparer Robert Kirkpatrick Fire Protection Reviewer Rebecca Puckett NSCA Preparer Larry Valmonte NSCA Reviewer Dan Funk FRE Preparer Steve Hardy FRE Reviewer Brandon Jamar Revision 0 Page 1 of 12 Version 1.0 Page 2436 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-081 1.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION INPUT ....................................................................
4 1.1 Variances from the Deterministic Requirements 
....................................
4 1.2 Fire Protection Systems and Features ..................................................
4 1.2.1 Construction 
................................................................................
4 1.2.2 Detection 
.....................................................................................
4 1.2.3 Fixed Fire Suppression 
...............................................................
4 1.2.4 Manual Suppression 
...................................................................
4 1.2.5 Ventilation (Smoke Removal) ......................................................
4 1.2.6 Other Fire Protection Features ....................................................
4 1.2.7 Fire Hazard Identification 
............................................................
5 1.2.8 Fire PRA Input ............................................................................
5 2.0 RISK EVALUATION 
.........................................................................................
5 2.1 Fire PRA Variant Case Calculation 
........................................................
5 2.2 Compliant Case Calculation 
...................................................................
7 2.2.1 VFDRs Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA ..............................
7 2.2.2 VFDRs Not Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA ........................
7 2.2.3 Compliant Case Results .............................................................
7 2.2.4 Required Modifications 
...............................................................
7 2.2.5 Required Recovery Actions .........................................................
7 2.3 Risk Evaluation Results .........................................................................
7 3.0 DID EVALUATION 
...........................................................................................
8 3.1 Defense-in-Depth Evaluation 
.................................................................
8 3.2 Defense-in-Depth Review Results ........................................................
9 3.2.1 Required Modifications 
.............................................................
10 3.2.2 Required Recovery Actions ......................................................
10 4.0 SAFETY MARGIN EVALUATION 
.................................................................
10 4.1 Safety Margin Evaluation 
.....................................................................
10 4.1.1 Fire Modeling ............................................................................
10 4.1.2 Plant System Performance 
........................................................
10 4.2 Safety Margin Results ..........................................................................
10 5.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION RESULTS ............................................................
11 5.1 Dispositions of VFDRs ..........................................................................
11 Revision 0 Page 2 of 12 Version 1.0 Page 2437 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-081 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 Fire Risk Evaluation Summary of Fire Protection Systems and Features 12 Summary of Recovery Actions .............................................................
12 Summary of Plant Modifications 
..........................................................
12 Fire Area Risk Summary ......................................................................
12 Revision 0 Page 3 of 12 Version 1.0 Page 2438 of 3726 SE-C051326701 
-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-081 1.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION INPUT 1.1 Variances from the Deterministic Requirements The VFDRs identified for evaluation for Unit 2, Fire Area 1-08 1, Turbine Building Battery Room are: Table 1-1 VFDRs VFDR Component(s)
Description U2-1-081-SEP-N2B31L0001E:ON:O Pressurizer Heater Group 2E must remain off in order to maintain an 001 FF, PRESSURIZER appropriate Pressurizer Level and pressure.
Failure to trip the HEATER GROUP 2E pressurizer heater group due to a loss of DC control power will DISTRIBUTION challenge the RCS Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance PANEL Criterion.
1.2 Fire Protection Systems and Features Fire Area 1-081 consists of Fire Zones 1-081. This fire area is located in the Turbine Building Battery Room at elevation 137'- 0".1.2.1 Construction Barriers for this fire area are of substantial construction and have been designed and constructed to meet separation requirements.
In the event the configuration utilized is not in accordance with recognized standards, the deviations have been evaluated to be adequate for the hazard.1.2.2 Detection Fire detection systems provide notification to the Control Room are: a Fire Zone 1-081 is provided with detection.
1.2.3 Fixed Fire Suppression There are no fixed suppression systems located in this area.1.2.4 Manual Suppression Manual suppression equipment to be utilized by plant personnel and/or fire brigade members are:* Fire Area 1-081 is provided with manual CO- hose reels, fire hose cabinets and portable extinguishers.
1.2.5 Ventilation (Smoke Removal)Portable smoke ejectors are available to assist with smoke removal.1.2.6 Other Fire Protection Features No additional fire protection features are required for this fire risk evaluation.
Revision 0 Page 4 of 12 Version 1.0 Page 2439 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-081 1.2.7 Fire Hazard Identification The major sources of combustibles in Fire Area 1-081 are hydrogen and cable insulation.
Details regarding fire scenarios quantified in the fire PRA, and their associated ignition sources (where applicable) are discussed in Section 2.1.2.8 Fire PRA Input Fire protection features There are no fire protection features specifically modeled in the Fire PRA for this fire area.Fire protection systems There are no fire protection systems specifically modeled in the Fire PRA for this fire area.Hot Gas Layer Treatment This fire area screened for potential Hot Gas Layer effects on the Zone Of Influence.
No credit for detection was taken in the Hot Gas Layer evaluation for this fire area. No credit for manual or automatic fire suppression was taken in the Hot Gas Layer evaluation for this fire area.Multi-compartment analysis No credit for detection was taken in the Multi Compartment Analysis for this fire area. No credit for manual or automatic fire suppression was taken in the Multi Compartment Analysis for this fire area.Scenario Review All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0, ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency.
2.0 RISK EVALUATION 2.1 Fire PRA Variant Case Calculation Tables 2-la and 2-lb provide the results of the variant case calculation for Fire Area 1-081. This is taken directly from the Fire PRA model with no changes or alterations made. The CDF and LERF results are provided onl a scenario basis.The total area CDF and LERF is below the screening acceptance criteria of I E-07/rx-yr and I E-08/rx-yr, respectively.
The total CDF/LERF can be used as a conservative estimate of the delta CDF/LERF with respect to a compliant configuration.
No further analysis of the delta CDF/LERF is required.Revision 0 Page 5 of 12 Version 1.0 Page 2440 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-081 Table 2-1a Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train A Alignment Zone Scen ScenDescl IGF NSP SF CCDP CDF CLERP LERF (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr)1-081 A BASE CASE 9.38E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 6.28E-11 1.61 E-10 1.51 E-14 Total CDF/LERF Fire PRA Variant Case 6.28E-11 1.51E-14 Table 2-1 b Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train B Alignment Zone Scen ScenDescl IGF NSP SF CCDP CDF CLERP LERF (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr)1-081 A BASE CASE 9.38E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 6.23E-11 1.61E-10 1.51E-14 Total CDF/LERF Fire PRA Variant Case 6.23E-11 1.51E-14 Where: Zone = Fire Zone Scen = 'A' to signify the variant case ScenDesc = Description of the Fire Scenario IGF = Ignition Frequency 
(/rx-yr)NSP = Non Suppression Probability SF = Severity Factor CCDP = Conditional Core Damage Probability CDF = Core Damage Frequency 
(/rx-yr)CLERP = Conditional Large Early Release Probability LERF = Large Early Release Frequency 
(/rx-yr)-'Base Case' scenarios are complete room burnout and therefore do not identify specific ignition sources Revision 0 Page 6 of 12 Revision 0 Page 6 of 12 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-081 2.2 Compliant Case Calculation The following sub-sections provide the basis for modeling each VFDR (or category of VFDRs)and the alterations that have been made to the variant case to represent the compliant case. In each section a discussion of the VFDR (or the category of VFDRs) is provided.2.2.1 VFDRs Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA The following VFDRs are modeled in the Fire PRA and are therefore included in the total fire area CDF/LERF used as a surrogate for the delta risk evaluation for this fire are: 0 U2-1-08 I-SEP-00 1 -N2B33 LO1O IE:ON:OFF 2.2.2 VFDRs Not Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA All VFDRs and their associated components are specifically modeled in the Fire PRA.2.2.3 Compliant Case Results The total area CDF and LERF is below the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/yr and 1E-08/yr, respectively.
The total CDF/LERF can be used as a conservative estimate of the delta CDF/LERF with respect to a compliant configuration.
No further analysis of the delta CDF/LERF is required.2.2.4 Required Modifications There are no modifications required as a result of the risk evaluation for this fire area.2.2.5 Required Recovery Actions There are no required recovery actions as a result of the risk evaluation for this fire area.2.3 Risk Evaluation Results The ACDF/LERF is below the screening acceptance criteria of 1 E-07/rx-yr (CDF) and 1E-08/rx-yr (LERF) for acceptable risk. All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0 ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency.
The following tables present the fire zone/scenario fire risk as well as the total fire risk for this fire area. Given the relatively low risk for these zones/scenarios the delta risk is defined by the variant case risk, the compliant case risk is conservatively assumed to be 0.Table 2-2a 1 FIRE AREA ACDF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN A ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CCDP CDF CCDP CDF ACDF 1-081/A 6.69E-07 6.28E-11 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 6.28E-11 Total CDF and delta CDF 6.28E-11 0.OOE+00 6.28E-11-N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.Revision 0 Page 7 of 12 Version 1.0 Page 2442 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-081 Table 2-2b 1 FIRE AREA ACDF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN B ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CCDP CDF CCDP CDF ACDF 1-081/A 6.64E-07 6.23E-11 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 6.23E-11 Total CDF and delta CDF 6.23E-11 0.OOE+00 6.23E-11 1 -N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.Table 2-3a 1 FIRE AREA aLERF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN A ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CLERP LERF CLERP LERF ALERF 1-081/A 1.61E-10 1.51E-14 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 1.51E-14 Total LERF and delta LERF 1.51E-14 0.OOE+00 1.51E-14-N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.Table 2-3b 1 FIRE AREA aLERF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN B ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CLERP LERF CLERP LERF ALERF 1-081/A 1.61 E-10 1.51E-14 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 1.51E-14 Total LERF and delta LERF 1.51E-14 0.OOE+00 1.51 E-14 1 -N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.3.0 DID EVALUATION 3.1 Defense-in-Depth Evaluation A review of the impact of the change on defense-in-depth (DID) was performed.
NFPA 805 defines DID as: Preventing fires from starting Rapidly detecting fires and controlling and extinguishing promptly those fires that do occur, thereby limiting damage Providing adequate level of fire protection for structures, systems and components important to safety; so that a fire that is not promptly extinguished will not prevent essential plant safety functions from being performed.
In general, the DID requirement was considered satisfied if the proposed change does not result in a substantial imbalance among these elements (or echelons).
The review of DID was qualitative and addressed each of the elements with respect to the proposed change. Fire protection features and systems relied upon to ensure DID were identified in the assessment (e.g., detection, suppression system).The VFDRs and the associated Fire Area risk (CDF) and scenario consequences (CCDP values)were evaluated to identify general DID echelon imbalances.
Potential methods to balance the Revision 0 Page 8 of 12 Version 1.0 Page 2443 of 3726 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-081 DID features were identified ensuring an adequate balance of DID features is maintained for the Fire Area. See Section 3.2 for the results of the evaluation.
3.2 Defense-in-Depth Review Results A review of defense in depth and risk evaluation results show that, given the systems and features specified in Table 3-1 and Section 2 respectively, risk acceptance criteria are met and that the balance of defense in depth is maintained.
However due to uncertainties associated with analytical methods and the existence of significant fuel packages in the area, it is deemed prudent to require detection to ensure prompt fire brigade response.These additional systems coupled with the other required features will provide additional assurances that any unknown weaknesses or uncertainties, such as HGL formation and uncontrolled fire development, will not adversely affect the ability to meet nuclear safety perfornance criteria.The table below summarizes how an adequate balance of DID is maintained.
Table 3-1 Defense-in-Depth Impact Review Method of Providing DID Discussion Echelon 1: Prevent fires from starting Combustible Control No change necessary to procedure(s) 
/guidance document(s).
1 Hot Work Control No change necessary to procedure(s) 
/guidance document(s).
1 Echelon 2: Rapidly detect, control and extinguish promptly those fires that do occur thereby limiting fire damage Detection System Detection system is installed and required.Automatic Fire Suppression No automatic suppression system is installed and not required.Portable Fire Extinguishers Portable extinguishers available, but no enhancements required.
1 Hose stations and hydrants Fire hose cabinets are available, but no enhancements required.located in the area(s)Pre-Fire Plan No change necessary to procedure(s) 
/guidance document(s).
1 Echelon 3: Provide adequate level of fire protection for systems and structures so that a fire will not prevent essential safety functions from being performed Walls, floors ceilings and structural No changes necessary to existing barriers.
1 elements are rated or have been evaluated as adequate for the hazard.Openings in the fire barrier are rated No changes necessary to existing barrier openings.or have been evaluated as adequate for the hazard.Supplemental barriers (e.g., ERFBS, No supplemental barriers installed and not required.cable tray covers, etc.)Guidance provided to operations No VFDR related DID recovery actions required.personnel detailing the credited success path(s) including recovery actions to achieve nuclear safety performance criteria.1 This fire protection feature is relied upon without further DID enhancements beyond inherent programmatic requirements of NFPA 805, Chap. 3 and will not be reported in Table 5-2.Revision 0 Page 9 of 12 Version 1.0 Page 2444 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-081 3.2.1 Required Modifications There are no modifications required as a result of the DID evaluation for this fire area.3.2.2 Required Recovery Actions There are no required recovery actions as a result of the DID evaluation for this fire area.4.0 SAFETY MARGIN EVALUATION 4.1 Safety Margin Evaluation In accordance with NEI 04-02, 5.3.5.3 guidance, the maintenance of adequate Safety Margin is assessed by the consideration of categories of analyses utilized by this fire risk evaluation (FRE).Safety margins are considered to be maintained if: " Codes and standards or their alternatives accepted for use by the NRC are met, and" Safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) are met, or provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty.
The maintenance of adequate safety margin for the change analysis is described for each of the specific analysis types used in support of the fire risk assessment.
4.1.1 Fire Modeling Fire modeling performed in support of the transition has been performed within the Fire PRA utilizing codes and standards developed by industry and NRC staff to provide realistic yet conservative results. Specifically, the heat release rates utilized in the transition analysis are based upon NUREG/CR 6850, Task 8, Scoping Fire Modeling.
These heat release rates are conservative and represent values used to screen out fixed ignition sources that do not pose a threat to the targets within specific fire compartments and to assign severity factors to unscreened fixed ignition sources.The combined analysis approach is used during transition; therefore, maximum expected fire scenario/limiting fire scenarios have not been analyzed separately.
The bases for the application of these fire modeling codes and standards were not altered in support of this FRE.4.1.2 Plant System Performance Plant system performance parameters were not modified as a result of this FRE. These performance parameters were originally established to support nuclear performance criteria contained in the plant specific accident analyses.
These analyses established component and system performance criteria necessary to establish safe and stable plant operation, as well as, safe shut down of the unit in the event of a fire. These performance parameters were not modified as a result of this FRE.4.2 Safety Margin Results All analyses and assessment have been performed utilizing accepted techniques and industry accepted standards.
In addition, safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) have been considered and provides sufficient margin to account for Revision 0 Page 10 of 12 Version 1.0 Page 2445 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-081 analysis and data uncertainty.
As such, the Safety Margins are maintained as discussed in Section 4.1.5.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION RESULTS 5.1 Dispositions of VFDRs Based on the FRE results contained in Sections 2, 3 and 4 the VFDRs identified in Section 1.1 have been resolved as follows: Table 5-1 Final Variance Disposition VFDR ID Disposition U2-1-081-SEP-001 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Revision 0 Page 11 of 12 Page 2446 of 3726 Version 1.0 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-081 5.2 Fire Risk Evaluation Summary of Fire Protection Systems and Features Table 5-2 Summary of Required Fire Protection Systems and Features Required Required FrAra FrZoe Suppression Detection Required Fire Fire Area Fire Zone Protection Feature Required Fire Protection System and Feature Details System System (R, D)(R, D) (R, D)U2 1-081 1-081 None D None D -Detection system Required Suppression/Detection/Feature:
required in the Fire Area based on NFPA 805 Chapter 4 compliance.
The information is provided on a zone basis. The basis for the requirement of the fire protection system is designated as follows:* R -Risk Criteria:
Systems required to meet the Risk Criteria for the Performance-Based Approach (NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4)* D -Defense-in-depth Criteria:
Systems required to maintain adequate balance of Defense-in-Depth for a Performance-Based Approach (NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4)Fire Protection Features in this Table only refer to those features installed in the Fire Area that have a corresponding Chapter 3 requirement.
5.3 Summary of Recovery Actions No recovery actions are required for this fire area.5.4 Summary of Plant Modifications No modifications are required for this fire area.5.5 Fire Area Risk Summary Table 5-3 -Fire Area Risk Summary NFPA 805 VFDR RAs Fire Risk Eval Fire Area Area Description Ba Fire Area CDFILERF (e/o RYs F CDF/LERF[
Additional Risk of RAs Basis (Yes/No) (Yes/No) A CDF/LERF U2 1-081 Turbine Building Battery 4.2.4 6.26E-11/1.51E-14 Yes No 6.26E-11/1.51E-14 N/A Room Revision 0 Page 12 of 12 Revision 0 Page 12 of 12 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-DU-DGSWIS-A Attachment 
-Unit 2 Fire Area 1 -DU-DGSWIS-A FRE for Fire Area Diesel Building to SWIS Ductbank Unit 1 Train A Revision:
0 Name Fire PRA Preparer Fire PRA Reviewer Fire Protection Preparer Fire Protection Reviewer NSCA Preparer NSCA Reviewer FRE Preparer FRE Reviewer Jonathan Hedrick Clint Pierce Robert Kirkpatrick Rebecca Puckett Larry Valmonte Dan Funk Micky Heatherly Brandon Jamar Revision 0 Page 1 of 14 Version 1.0 Page 2448 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-DU-DGSWIS-A 1.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION INPUT .....................................................................
4 1.1 Variances from the Deterministic Requirements 
....................................
4 1.2 Fire Protection Systems and Features ..................................................
4 1.2.1 Construction 
...............................................................................
4 1.2 .2 D etectio n ................................................................................... 
..4 1.2.3 Fixed Fire Suppression 
...............................................................
4 1.2.4 Manual Suppression 
...................................................................
4 1.2.5 Ventilation (Smoke Removal) .......................................................
5 1.2.6 Other Fire Protection Features ....................................................
5 1.2.7 Fire Hazard Identification 
............................................................
5 1.2.8 Fire PRA Input .............................................................................
5 2.0 RISK EVALUATION 
.........................................................................................
5 2.1 Fire PRA Variant Case Calculation 
.........................................................
5 2.2 Compliant Case Calculation 
..................................................................
7 2.2.1 VFDRs Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA ...............................
7 2.2.2 VFDRs Not Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA ........................
7 2.2.3 Compliant Case Results .............................................................
8 2.2.4 Required Modifications 
...............................................................
8 2.2.5 Required Recovery Actions .........................................................
8 2.3 Risk Evaluation Results ........................................................................
8 3.0 DID EVALUATION 
...........................................................................................
9 3.1 Defense-in-Depth Evaluation 
.................................................................
9 3.2 Defense-in-Depth Review Results ......................................................
10 3.2.1 Required Modifications 
.............................................................
11 3.2.2 Required Recovery Actions .......................................................
11 4.0 SAFETY MARGIN EVALUATION 
...................................................................
11 4.1 Safety Margin Evaluation 
......................................................................
11 4 .1.1 F ire M o d e ling .......................................................................... 
..1 1 4.1.2 Plant System Performance 
......................................................
12 4.2 Safety Margin Results ..........................................................................
12 5.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION RESULTS .............................................................
12 5.1 Dispositions of VFDRs ........................................................................
12 5.2 Fire Risk Evaluation Summary of Fire Protection Systems and Features 13 Revision 0 Page 2 of 14 Version 1.0 Page 2449 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-DU-DGSWIS-A 5.3 5.4 5.5 Summary of Recovery Actions .............................................................
13 Summary of Plant Modifications 
..........................................................
13 Fire Area Risk Summary ......................................................................
14 Revision 0 Page 3 of 14 Version 1.0 Page 2450 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-DU-DGSWIS-A 1.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION INPUT 1.1 Variances from the Deterministic Requirements The VFDRs identified for evaluation for Unit 2, Fire Area I-DU-DGSWIS-A, Diesel Building to SWIS Ductbank Unit 1 Train A are: Table 1-1 VFDRs VFDR Component(s)
Description U2-1-DU- Q2R42BO001A:ENERG This component, 125V DC Bus 2A, requires HVAC support to DGSWIS-A-IZED:ENERGIZED-remain functional.
Failure to provide HVAC support to this electrical HVAC-001 BC2A, 125V DC BUS component challenges HVAC support Vital Auxiliaries Nuclear 2A Safety Performance Criteria.U2-1-DU- Q2R15A0006:ENERGI This component, Switchgear 2F, requires HVAC support to remain DGSWIS-A-ZED:ENERGIZED-functional.
Failure to provide HVAC support to this electrical HVAC-002 EDG1-2A, 4160V component challenges HVAC support Vital Auxiliaries Nuclear SWITCHGEAR BUS 2F Safety Performance Criteria.U2-1-DU- Q2R17B0001:ENERGI This component, MCC 2A, requires HVAC support to remain DGSWIS-A-ZED:ENERGIZED, functional.
Failure to provide HVAC support to this electrical HVAC-003 MOTOR CONTROL component challenges HVAC support Vital Auxiliaries Nuclear CENTER 2A Safety Performance Criteria.U2-1-DU- Q2R42E0002A:AVAILA This component, Train A Battery, requires HVAC support to remain DGSWIS-A-BLE:AVAILABLE, 125V functional.
Failure to provide HVAC support to this electrical HVAC-004 BATTERY 2A component challenges HVAC support Vital Auxiliaries Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.1.2 Fire Protection Systems and Features Fire Area I-DU-DGSWIS-A consists of Fire Zone I-DU-DGSWIS-A.
This fire area is located in the Diesel Building to SWIS Ductbank Unit 1 Train A at various elevations below grade.1.2.1 Construction Barriers for this fire area are of substantial construction and have been designed and constructed to meet separation requirements.
In the event the configuration utilized is not in accordance with recognized standards, the deviations have been evaluated to be adequate for the hazard.1.2.2 Detection There are no detection systems located in this area.1.2.3 Fixed Fire Suppression There are no fixed suppression systems located in this area.1.2.4 Manual Suppression Manual suppression equipment to be utilized by plant personmel and/or fire brigade members are: Fire Area 1-DU-DGSWIS-A is provided with yard fire hydrants in various areas near the ductbank.Revision 0 Page 4 of 14 Revision 0 Page 4 of 14 Version 1.0 Page 2451 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1 -DU-DGSWIS-A 1.2.5 Ventilation (Smoke Removal)No smoke removal is available or necessary, since this ductbank is located in the YARD.1.2.6 Other Fire Protection Features No additional fire protection features are required for this fire risk evaluation.
1.2.7 Fire Hazard Identification The major source of combustibles in Fire Area 1-DU-DGSWIS-A is cable insulation.
Details regarding fire scenarios quantified in the fire PRA, and their associated ignition sources (where applicable) are discussed in Section 2.1.2.8 Fire PRA Input Fire protection features There are no fire protection features specifically modeled in the Fire PRA for this fire area.Fire protection systems There are no fire protection systems specifically modeled in the Fire PRA for this fire area.Hot Gas Layer Treatment This fire area screened for potential Hot Gas Layer effects on Zone Of Influence.
No credit for detection was taken in the Hot Gas Layer evaluation for this fire area. No credit for manual or automatic fire suppression was taken in the Hot Gas Layer evaluation for this fire area.Multi-compartment analysis No credit for detection was taken in the Multi Compartment Analysis for this fire area. No credit for manual or automatic fire suppression was taken in the Multi Compartment Analysis for this fire area.Scenario Review All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0, ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency.
2.0 RISK EVALUATION 2.1 Fire PRA Variant Case Calculation Tables 2-la and 2-lb provide the results of the variant case calculation for Fire Area 1-DU-DGSWIS-A.
This is taken directly from the Fire PRA model with no changes or alterations made. The CDF and LERF results are provided on a scenario basis.The total area CDF and LERF is below the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr and 1E-08/rx-yr, respectively.
The total CDF/LERF can be used as a conservative estimate of the delta CDF/LERF with respect to a compliant configuration.
No further analysis of the delta CDF/LERF is required.Revision 0 Page 5 of 14 Version 1.0 Page 2452 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-DU-DGSWIS-A Table 2-1a Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train A Alignment IGF CDF LERF Zone Scen ScenDesc Iry NSP SF CCDP (rr CLERP (Iry (/rx-yr) (Irx-yr) (/rx-yr)1-DU-DGSWIS- D1 TRANSIENT 2.26E-07 1.0 1.0 7.72E-04 1.74E-10 1.43E-06 3.24E-13 A Total CDF/LERF Fire PRA Variant Case 1.74E-10 3.24E-13 Table 2-1 b Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train B Alignment IGF CDF LERF Zone Scen ScenDesc (xy NSP SF CCDP (rr CLERP (F (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr)1-DU-DGSWIS- D1 TRANSIENT 2.26E-07 1.0 1.0 2.29E-04 5.17E-11 6.47E-07 1.46E-13 A Total CDF/LERF Fire PRA Variant Case 5.17E-11 1.46E-13 Where: Zone = Fire Zone Scen = 'A' to signify the variant case ScenDesc = Description of the Fire Scenario IGF = Ignition Frequency 
(/rx-yr)NSP = Non Suppression Probability SF = Severity Factor CCDP = Conditional Core Damage Probability CDF = Core Damage Frequency 
(/rx-yr)CLERP = Conditional Large Early Release Probability LERF = Large Early Release Frequency 
(/rx-yr)Revision 0 Page 6 of 14 Revision 0 Page 6 of 14 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-DU-DGSWIS-A 2.2 Compliant Case Calculation The following sub-sections provide the basis for modeling each VFDR (or category of VFDRs)and the alterations that have been made to the variant case to represent the compliant case. In each section a discussion of the VFDR (or the category of VFDRs) is provided.2.2.1 VFDRs Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA The following VFDR is modeled in the Fire PRA and therefore included in the total fire area CDF/LERF used as a surrogate for the delta risk evaluation for this fire area: 0 U2-I-DU-DGSWIS-A-HVAC-001 
-Q2R42BOOO1A:ENERGIZED:ENERGIZED-BC2A 2.2.2 VFDRs Not Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA A Fire PRA was developed in accordance with the requirements of Part 4 "Requirements for Fires at Power PRA" of the ASME and ANS combined PRA Standard, ASME/ANS RA-Sa-2009, "Standard for Level 1/Large Early Release Frequency Probabilistic Risk Assessment for Nuclear Power Plant Applications".
Consistent with those requirements not all components required to meet the nuclear safety criteria need to be specifically modeled in the Fire PRA. The following VFDRs are associated with components not modeled in the Fire PRA: 2.2.2.1 VFDR U2-1-DU-DGSWlS-A-HVAC-002 4kV Switchgear Room 2F ventilation is not modeled in the fire PRA. Room Heat up calculations show that there will be no impact to the 4kV Switchgear Room due to loss of HVAC within the mission time of 24 hrs in the fire PRA. See calculation Fire PRA Logic Model for Farley Nuclear Plants, PRA-BC-F-11-004:* U I -I -DU-DGSWIS-A-HVAC-002 
-Q2R 15A0006:ENERGIZED:ENERGIZED-EDG I -2A 2.2.2.2 VFDR U2-1-DU-DGSWlS-A-HVAC-003 MCC 2A Room ventilation is not modeled in the fire PRA. Room Heat up calculations show that there will be no impact to the MCC Room due to loss of HVAC within the mission time of 24 hrs in the fire PRA. See calculation Fire PRA Logic Model for Farley Nuclear Plants, PRA-BC-F-I 1-004:.U I -I -DU-DGSWIS-A-HVAC-003 
-Q2RI 7B000 1:ENERGIZED:ENERGIZED 2.2.2.3 VFDR U2-1-DU-DGSWlS-A-HVAC-004 Battery Room ventilation 2A is not modeled in the fire PRA. The Battery Room exhaust fan function is to remove the hydrogen that is generated from the battery located within the room.The hydrogen production in the 24 hour mission time of the PRA is less than the required amount for a hydrogen burn, therefore the exhaust fan is not required to be modeled. See calculation Fire PRA Logic Model for Farley Nuclear Plants, PRA-BC-F-1 1-004: N UI-1-DU-DGSWIS-A-HVAC-004 
-Q2R42E0002A:AVAILABLE:AVAILABLE Revision 0 Page 7 of 14 Version 1.0 Page 2454 of 3726 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-DU-DGSWIS-A 2.2.3 Compliant Case Results The total area CDF and LERF is below the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr and l E-08/rx-yr, respectively.
The total CDF/L.ERF can be used as a conservative estimate of the delta CDF/LERF with respect to a compliant configuration.
No further analysis of the delta CDF/LERF is required.2.2.4 Required Modifications There are no modifications required as a result of the risk evaluation for this fire area.2.2.5 Required Recovery Actions The following recovery actions are required as a result of the risk evaluation for this fire area: Table 2-2 Required Recovery Actions Component ID Basic Event VFDR BE Description Recovery Action Description OPERATOR RECOVERY OF Operator action to U2-1-DU- provide alternate Q2R42B0001 A:ENERGIZED:E OP-RECOV-BATTERY IDGSWIS-A-cooling for battery NERGIZED-BC2A BCSW-A CHARGER 2A HVAC-001 ROOM COOLING charger room due to FAMOIS loss of Train A SW FAILS 2.3 Risk Evaluation Results The ACDF/LERF is below the screening acceptance criteria of IE-07/rx-yr (CDF) and 1E-08/rx-yr (LERF) for acceptable risk. All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0 ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency.
The following tables present the fire zone/scenario fire risk as well as the total fire risk for this fire area. Given the relatively low risk for these zones/scenarios the delta risk is defined by the variant case risk, the compliant case risk is conservatively assumed to be 0.Table 2-3a 1 FIRE AREA ACDF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN A ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CCDP CDF CCDP CDF ACDF 1-DU-DGSWIS-7.72E-04 1.74E-10 O.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 1.74E-10 A/D1 Total CDF and delta CDF 2  1.74E-1O 0.OOE+00 1.74E-10-N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.2 Total ACDF includes the risk of recovery actions required to demonstrate the availability of a success path for the nuclear safety performance criteria.Revision 0 Page 8 of 14 Revision 0 Page 8 of 14 Version 1.0 Page 2455 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1 -DU-DGSWIS-A Table 2-3b 1 FIRE AREA ACDF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN B ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CCDP CDF CCDP CDF aCDF 1-DU-DGSWIS-2.29E-04 5.17E-11 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 5.17E-11 A/D1 Total CDF and delta CDF 2  5.17E-11 0.OOE+00 5.17E-11 1 _ N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.2 Total ACDF includes the risk of recovery actions required to demonstrate the availability of a success path for the nuclear safety performance criteria.Table 2-4a 1 FIRE AREA aLERF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN A ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CLERP LERF CLERP LERF ALERF 1-DU-DGSWIS-1.43E-06 3.24E-13 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 3.24E-13 A/D1 Total LERF and delta LERF2 3.24E-13 0.OOE+00 3.24E-13 1 _ N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.2 Total L\LERF includes the risk of recovery actions required to demonstrate the availability of a success path for the nuclear safety performance criteria.Table 2-4b'FIRE AREA ALERF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN B ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CLERP LERF CLERP LERF ALERF 1-DU-DGSWIS-6.47E-07 1.46E-13 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 1.46E-13 A/D1 Total LERF and delta LERF2 1.46E-13 0.OOE+00 1.46E-13-N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.2 Total ALERF includes the risk of recovery actions required to demonstrate the availability of a success path for the nuclear safety performance criteria.3.0 DID EVALUATION 3.1 Defense-in-Depth Evaluation A review of the impact of the change on defense-in-depth (DID) was performed.
NFPA 805 defines DID as: " Preventing fires from starting" Rapidly detecting fires and controlling and extinguishing promptly those fires that do occur, thereby limiting damage" Providing adequate level of fire protection for structures, systems and components important to safety; so that a fire that is not promptly extinguished will not prevent essential plant safety functions from being performed.
Revision 0 Page 9 of 14 Version 1.0 Page 2456 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-DU-DGSWIS-A In general, the DID requirement was considered satisfied if the proposed change does not result in a substantial imbalance among these elements (or echelons).
The review of DID was qualitative and addressed each of the elements with respect to the proposed change. Fire protection features and systems relied upon to ensure DID were identified in the assessment (e.g., detection, suppression system).The VFDRs and the associated Fire Area risk (CDF) and scenario consequences (CCDP values)were evaluated to identify general DID echelon imbalances.
Potential methods to balance the DID features were identified ensuring an adequate balance of DID features is maintained for the Fire Area. See Section 3.2 for the results of the evaluation.
3.2 Defense-in-Depth Review Results A review of defense in depth and risk evaluation results show that, given the systems and features specified in Table 3-1 and Section 2 respectively, risk acceptance criteria are met and that the balance of defense in depth is maintained.
The risk acceptance criteria are met with substantial margin to account for analytical methods associated with fire scenarios.
The analyzed scenarios bound potential fuel packages which can reasonably be expected to occur in this area.However, to provide additional margin for the risk analysis, recovery actions are required.In the event of no intervention by the plant fire brigade, it is not expected that a credible fire would develop which would not be bounded by the analyzed scenarios.
Based on the required fire protections systems/features specified, the ability to meet nuclear safety performance criteria is ensured.The table below summarizes how an adequate balance of DID is maintained.
Table 3-1 Defense-in-Depth Impact Review Method of Providing DID Discussion Echelon 1: Prevent fires from starting Combustible Control No change necessary to procedure(s) 
/guidance document(s).
Hot Work Control No change necessary to procedure(s) 
/guidance document(s).
1 Echelon 2: Rapidly detect, control and extinguish promptly those fires that do occur thereby limiting fire damage Detection System No detection system installed and not required.Automatic Fire Suppression No automatic suppression system installed and not required.Portable Fire Extinguishers No portable extinguishers available and not required.Hose stations and hydrants Yard fire hydrants are available, but no enhancements required.
1 located in the area(s)Pre-Fire Plan No change necessary to procedure(s) 
/guidance document(s).
Echelon 3: Provide adequate level of fire protection for systems and structures so that a fire will not prevent essential safety functions from being performed Walls, floors ceilings and structural No changes necessary to existing barriers.elements are rated or have been evaluated as adequate for the hazard.Openings in the fire barrier are rated No changes necessary to existing barrier openings.
1 or have been evaluated as adequate for the hazard.Revision 0 Page 10 of 14 Version 1.0 Page 2457 of 3726 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-DU-DGSWIS-A Table 3-1 Defense-in-Depth Impact Review Method of Providing DID Discussion Supplemental barriers (e.g., ERFBS, No supplemental barriers installed and not required.cable tray covers, etc.)Guidance provided to operations No VFDR related DID recovery actions required.personnel detailing the credited success path(s) including recovery actions to achieve nuclear safety performance criteria.1 This fire protection feature is relied upon without further DID enhancements beyond inherent programmatic requirements of NFPA 805, Chap. 3 and will not be reported in Table 5-2.3.2.1 Required Modifications There are no modifications required as a result of the DID evaluation for this fire area.3.2.2 Required Recovery Actions There are no required recovery actions as a result of the DID evaluation for this fire area.4.0 SAFETY MARGIN EVALUATION 4.1 Safety Margin Evaluation In accordance with NEI 04-02, 5.3.5.3 guidance, the maintenance of adequate Safety Margin is assessed by the consideration of categories of analyses utilized by this fire risk evaluation (FRE).Safety margins are considered to be maintained if: " Codes and standards or their alternatives accepted for use by the NRC are met, and" Safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) are met, or provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty.
The maintenance of adequate safety margin for the change analysis is described for each of the specific analysis types used in support of the fire risk assessment.
4.1.1 Fire Modeling Fire modeling performned in support of the transition has been performed within the Fire PRA utilizing codes and standards developed by industry and NRC staff to provide realistic yet conservative results. Specifically, the heat release rates utilized in the transition analysis are based upon NUREG/CR 6850, Task 8, Scoping Fire Modeling.
These heat release rates are conservative and represent values used to screen out fixed ignition sources that do not pose a threat to the targets within specific fire compartments and to assign severity factors to unscreened fixed ignition sources.The combined analysis approach is used during transition; therefore, maximum expected fire scenario/limiting fire scenario have not been analyzed separately.
The bases for the application of these fire modeling codes and standards were not altered in support of this FRE.Revision 0 Page 11 of 14 Version 1.0 Page 2458 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1 -DU-DGSWIS-A 4.1.2 Plant System Performance Plant system performance parameters were not modified as a result of this FRE. These performance parameters were originally established to support nuclear performance criteria contained in the plant specific accident analyses.
These analyses established component and system performance criteria necessary to establish safe and stable plant operation, as well as, safe shut down of the unit in the event of a fire. These performance parameters were not modified as a result of this FRE.4.2 Safety Margin Results All analyses and assessment have been performed utilizing accepted techniques and industry accepted standards.
In addition, safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) have been considered and provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty.
As such, the Safety Margins are maintained as discussed in Section 4.1.5.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION RESULTS 5.1 Dispositions of VFDRs Based on the FRE results contained in Sections 2, 3 and 4 the VFDRs identified in Section 1. 1 have been resolved as follows: Table 5-1 Final Variance Disposition Disposition Recovery Action(s)
Required to Satisfy Risk Criteria:
See Table 2-2 VFDR ID U2-1-DU-DGSWIS-A-HVAC-001 U2-1-DU-DGSWIS-A-HVAC-002 U2-1-DU-DGSWIS-A-HVAC-003 U2-1 -DU-DGSWIS-A-HVAC-004 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)Revision 0 Page 12 of 14 Revision 0 Page 12 of 14 Version 1.0 Page 2459 of 3726 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-DU-DGSWIS-A 5.2 Fire Risk Evaluation Summary of Fire Protection Systems and Features Table 5-2 Summary of Required Fire Protection Systems and Features Required Required FrAra FrZoe Suppression Detection Required Fire Fire Area Fire Zone Protection Feature Required Fire Protection System and Feature Details System System (R, D)(R, D) (R, D)U2 1-DU-DGSWIS-A 1-DU- None None R R -Improvements to procedures necessary to incorporate DGSWtS-A recovery actions required to meet risk criteria (See Table 2-2)Required Suppression/Detection/Feature:
required in the Fire Area based on NFPA 805 Chapter 4 compliance.
The information is provided on a zone basis. The basis for the requirement of the fire protection system is designated as follows: R -Risk Criteria:
Systems required to meet the Risk Criteria for the Performance-Based Approach (NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4)D -Defense-in-depth Criteria:
Systems required to maintain adequate balance of Defense-in-Depth for a Performance-Based Approach (NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4)Fire Protection Features in this Table only refer to those features installed in the Fire Area that have a corresponding Chapter 3 requirement.
5.3 Summary of Recovery Actions Table 5-3 -Recovery Actions Fire Area Component Component Description Actions U2 1-DU- Q2R42B0001A 125V DC BUS 2A Operator action to provide alternate cooling for battery charger room due to loss DGSWIS-A of Train A SW 5.4 Summary of Plant Modifications No modifications are required for this fire area.Revision 0 Page 13 of 14 Revision 0 Page 13 of 14 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-DU-DGSWIS-A 5.5 Fire Area Risk Summary Table 5-4 Fire Area Risk Summary NFPA 805 VFDR RAs Fire Risk Eval Fire Area Area Description Ba Fire Area CDF/LERF (e/o RYs A CDF/LERF Additional Risk of RAs Basis (YesINo) (YesINo) A CDFILERF U2 1-DU- Diesel Building to SWlS U2SWIS-A Ductan Buitding A 4.2.4 1.13E-10/2.35E-13 Yes Yes 1.13E-10/2.35E-13 1.13E-10/2.35E-13 DGSWIS-A Ductbank Unit 2 Train A Revision 0 Page 14 of 14 Revision 0 Page 14 of 14 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area I -DU-DGSWIS-B Attachment 
-Unit 2 Fire Area 1 -DU-DGSWIS-B FRE for Fire Area Diesel Building to SWIS Ductbank Unit I Train B Revision:
0 Name Fire PRA Preparer Fire PRA Reviewer Fire Protection Preparer Fire Protection Reviewer NSCA Preparer NSCA Reviewer FRE Preparer FRE Reviewer Jonathan Hedrick Clint Pierce Robert Kirkpatrick Rebecca Puckett Larry Valmonte Dan Funk Micky Heatherly Brandon Jamar Revision 0 Page 1 of 12 Version 1.0 Page 2462 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-DU-DGSWIS-B 1.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION INPUT .....................................................................
4 1.1 Variances from the Deterministic Requirements 
....................................
4 1.2 Fire Protection Systems and Features ..................................................
4 1.2 .1 C o nstructio n ............................................................................. 
..4 1.2 .2 D ete ctio n ................................................................................... 
..4 1.2.3 Fixed Fire Suppression 
...............................................................
4 1.2.4 Manual Suppression 
...................................................................
4 1.2.5 Ventilation (Smoke Removal) ....................................................
4 1.2.6 Other Fire Protection Features ....................................................
4 1.2.7 Fire Hazard Identification 
.............................................................
5 1.2.8 Fire PRA Input .............................................................................
5 2.0 RISK EVALUATION 
.........................................................................................
5 2.1 Fire PRA Variant Case Calculation 
.........................................................
5 2.2 Compliant Case Calculation 
..................................................................
7 2.2.1 VFDRs Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA ..............................
7 2.2.2 VFDRs Not Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA .......................
7 2.2.3 Compliant Case Results .............................................................
7 2.2.4 Required Modifications 
...............................................................
7 2.2.5 Required Recovery Actions .........................................................
7 2.3 Risk Evaluation Results ........................................................................
7 3.0 DID EVALUATION 
...........................................................................................
8 3.1 Defense-in-Depth Evaluation 
.................................................................
8 3.2 Defense-in-Depth Review Results ........................................................
9 3.2.1 Required Modifications 
.............................................................
10 3.2.2 Required Recovery Actions .......................................................
10 4.0 SAFETY MARGIN EVALUATION 
...................................................................
10 4.1 Safety Margin Evaluation 
......................................................................
10 4 .1.1 F ire M od eling .......................................................................... 
..10 4.1.2 Plant System Performance 
......................................................
10 4.2 Safety Margin Results ..........................................................................
11 5.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION RESULTS .............................................................
11 5.1 Dispositions of VFDRs ........................................................................
11 5.2 Fire Risk Evaluation Summary of Fire Protection Systems and Features 12 Revision 0 Page 2 of 12 Version 1.0 Page 2463 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-DU-DGSWIS-B SE-C051 326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-DU-DGSWIS-B 5.3 5.4 5.5 Summary of Recovery Actions .............................................................
12 Summary of Plant Modifications 
..........................................................
12 Fire Area Risk Summary ......................................................................
12 Revision 0 Page 3 of 12 Version 1.0 Page 2464 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1 -DU-DGSWIS-B 1.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION INPUT 1.1 Variances from the Deterministic Requirements The VFDRs identified for evaluation for Unit 2, Fire Area I-DU-DGSWIS-B, Diesel Building to SWIS Ductbank Unit I Train B are: Table 1-1 VFDRs VFDR Component(s)
Description U2-1-DU- Q2P16V0538:CLOSE Recirculation to the pond is the credited lineup for Service Water.DGSWIS-B-D:OPEN, SW Valve Q2P16V0539 must open in order to establish recirculation.
Fire SEP-001 RECIRC TO POND induced control circuit damage could render the component TRAIN B inoperable or result in spurious closure of the valve. Failure to ensure availability of this valve challenges the establishment of Service Water and Train B Power. This failure challenges service water support Vital Auxiliaries Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.1.2 Fire Protection Systems and Features Fire Area I-DU-DGSWIS-B consists of Fire Zone 1-DU-DGSWIS-B.
This fire area is located in the Diesel Building to SWIS Ductbank Unit 1 Train B at various elevations below grade.1.2.1 Construction Barriers for this fire area are of substantial construction and have been designed and constructed to meet separation requirements.
In the event the configuration utilized is not in accordance with recognized standards, the deviations have been evaluated to be adequate for the hazard.1.2.2 Detection There are no detection systems located in this area.1.2.3 Fixed Fire Suppression There are no fixed suppression systems located in this area.1.2.4 Manual Suppression Manual suppression equipment to be utilized by plant persomnel and/or fire brigade members are: Fire Area I-DU-DGSWIS-B is provided with yard fire hydrants in various areas near the ductbank.1.2.5 Ventilation (Smoke Removal)No smoke removal is available or necessary, since this ductbank is located in the YARD.1.2.6 Other Fire Protection Features No additional fire protection features are required for this fire risk evaluation.
Revision 0 Page 4 of 12 Version 1.0 Page 2465 of 3726 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-DU-DGSWIS-B 1.2.7 Fire Hazard Identification The major source of combustibles in Fire Area l-DU-DGSWIS-B is cable insulation.
Details regarding fire scenarios quantified in the fire PRA, and their associated ignition sources (where applicable) are discussed in Section 2.1.2.8 Fire PRA Input Fire protection features There are no fire protection features specifically modeled in the Fire PRA for this fire area.Fire protection systems There are no fire protection systems specifically modeled in the Fire PRA for this fire area.Hot Gas Layer Treatment This fire area screened for potential Hot Gas Layer effects on the Zone Of Influence.
No credit for detection was taken in the Hot Gas Layer evaluation for this fire area. No credit for manual or automatic fire suppression was taken in the Hot Gas Layer evaluation for this fire area.Multi-compartment analysis No credit for detection was taken in the Multi Compartment Analysis for this fire area. No credit for manual or automatic fire suppression was taken in the Multi Compartment Analysis for this fire area.Scenario Review All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0, ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency.
2.0 RISK EVALUATION 2.1 Fire PRA Variant Case Calculation Tables 2-1a and 2-1b provide the results of the variant case calculation for Fire Area I-DU-DGSWIS-B.
This is taken directly from the Fire PRA model with no changes or alterations made. The CDF and LERF results are provided on a scenario basis.The total area CDF and LERF is below the screening acceptance criteria of 1 E-07/rx-yr and 1 E-08/rx-yr, respectively.
The total CDF/LERF can be used as a conservative estimate of the delta CDF/LERF with respect to a compliant configuration.
No further analysis of the delta CDF/LERF is required.Revision 0 Page 5 of 12 Version 1.0 Page 2466 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area I -DU-DGSWIS-B Table 2-1a Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train A Alignment IGF CFLERF Zone Scen ScenDesc (rr NSP SF CCDP CDF CLERP (IRx (/rx-yr) (Irx-yr) (/rx-yr)1-DU-DGSWIS- D1 TRANSIENT 2.26E-07 1.0 1.0 1.41 E-04 3.18E-11 4.58E-07 1.03E-13 B Total CDF/LERF Fire PRA Variant Case 3.18E-.1 1.03E-13 Table 2-1 b Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train B Alignment IGF DFLERF Zone Scen ScenDesc (rr NSP SF CCDP CDF CLERP (/rx-yr) (Irx-yr) (Irx-yr)1-DU-DGSWIS- D1 TRANSIENT 2.26E-07 1.0 1.0 1.41E-04 3.19E-11 4.58E-07 1.03E-13 B Total CDF/LERF Fire PRA Variant Case 3.19E-11 1.03E-13 Where: Zone = Fire Zone Scen = 'A' to signify the variant case ScenDesc = Description of the Fire Scenario IGF = Ignition Frequency 
(/rx-yr)NSP = Non Suppression Probability SF = Severity Factor CCDP = Conditional Core Damage Probability CDF = Core Damage Frequency 
(/rx-yr)CLERP = Conditional Large Early Release Probability LERF = Large Early Release Frequency 
(/rx-yr)Revision 0 Page 6 of 12 Revision 0 Page 6 of 12 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1 -DU-DGSWIS-B 2.2 Compliant Case Calculation The following sub-sections provide the basis for modeling each VFDR (or category of VFDRs)and the alterations that have been made to the variant case to represent the compliant case. In each section a discussion of the VFDR (or the category of VFDRs) is provided.2.2.1 VFDRs Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA The following VFDRs are modeled in the Fire PRA and are therefore included in the total fire area CDF/LERF used as a surrogate for the delta risk evaluation for this fire area: SU2-1I-DU-DGSWIS-B-SEP-00I 
-Q2P 16V0538:CLOSED:OPEN 2.2.2 VFDRs Not Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA All VFDRs and their associated components are modeled in the Fire PRA.2.2.3 Compliant Case Results The total area CDF and LERF is below the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr and 1E-08/rx-yr, respectively.
The total CDF/LERF can be used as a conservative estimate of the delta CDF/LERF with respect to a compliant configuration.
No further analysis of the delta CDF/LERF is required.2.2.4 Required Modifications There are no modifications required as a result of the risk evaluation for this fire area.2.2.5 Required Recovery Actions There are no required recovery actions as a result of the risk evaluation for this fire area.2.3 Risk Evaluation Results The ACDF/LERF is below the screening acceptance criteria of 1 E-07/rx-yr (CDF) and I E-08/rx-yr (LERF) for acceptable risk. All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0 ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency.
The following tables present the fire zone/scenario fire risk as well as the total fire risk for this fire area. Given the relatively low risk for these zones/scenarios the delta risk is defined by the variant case risk, the compliant case risk is conservatively assumed to be 0.Table 2-2a1 FIRE AREA aCDF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN A ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CCDP CDF CCDP CDF ACDF 1-DU-DGSWIS-1.41 E-04 3.18E-11 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 3.18E-11 BID 1 Total CDF and delta CDF 3.18E-11 0.OOE+00 3.18E-11-N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.Revision 0 Page 7 of 12 Version 1.0 Page 2468 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-DU-DGSWIS-B Table 2-2b 1 FIRE AREA aCDF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN B ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CCDP CDF CCDP CDF ACDF 1-DU-DGSWIS-1.41E-04 3.19E-11 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 3.19E-11 B/D1 Total CDF and delta CDF 3.19E-11 O.OOE+00 3.19E-11 1 _ N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.Table 2-3a 1 FIRE AREA ALERF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN A ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CLERP LERF CLERP LERF ALERF 1-DU-DGSWIS-4.58E-07 1.03E-13 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 1.03E-13 B/D1 Total LERF and delta LERF 1.03E-13 0.OOE+00 1.03E-13-N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.Table 2-3b 1 FIRE AREA aLERF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN B ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CLERP LERF CLERP LERF ALERF 1-DU-DGSWIS-4.58E-07 1.03E-13 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 1.03E-13 B/D1 Total LERF and delta LERF 1.03E-13 O.OOE+00 1.03E-13 1 _ N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.3.0 DID EVALUATION 3.1 Defense-in-Depth Evaluation A review of the impact of the change on defense-in-depth (DID) was performed.
NFPA 805 defines DID as: " Preventing fires from starting" Rapidly detecting fires and controlling and extinguishing promptly those fires that do occur, thereby limiting damage" Providing adequate level of fire protection for structures, systems and components important to safety; so that a fire that is not promptly extinguished will not prevent essential plant safety functions from being performed.
In general, the DID requirement was considered satisfied if the proposed change does not result in a substantial imbalance among these elements (or echelons).
The review of DID was qualitative and addressed each of the elements with respect to the proposed change. Fire protection features and systems relied upon to ensure DID were identified in the assessment (e.g., detection, suppression system).Revision 0 Page 8 of 12 Version 1.0 Page 2469 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1 -DU-DGSWIS-B The VFDRs and the associated Fire Area risk (CDF) and scenario consequences (CCDP values)were evaluated to identify general DID echelon imbalances.
Potential methods to balance the DID features were identified ensuring an adequate balance of DID features is maintained for the Fire Area. See Section 3.2 for the results of the evaluation.
3.2 Defense-in-Depth Review Results A review of defense in depth and risk evaluation results show that, given the systems and features specified in Table 3-1 and Section 2 respectively, risk acceptance criteria are met and that the balance of defense in depth is maintained.
The risk acceptance criteria are met with substantial margin to account for analytical methods associated with fire scenarios.
The analyzed scenarios bound potential fuel packages which can reasonably be expected to occur in this area.In the event of no intervention by the plant fire brigade, it is not expected that a credible fire would develop which would not be bounded by the analyzed scenarios.
Based on the required fire protections systems/features specified, the ability to meet nuclear safety performance criteria is ensured.The table below summarizes how an adequate balance of DID is maintained.
Table 3-1 Defense-in-Depth Impact Review Method of Providing DID Discussion Echelon 1: Prevent fires from starting Combustible Control No change necessary to procedure(s) 
/guidance document(s).
1 Hot Work Control No change necessary to procedure(s) 
/guidance document(s).
1 Echelon 2: Rapidly detect, control and extinguish promptly those fires that do occur thereby limiting fire damage Detection System No detection system installed and not required.Automatic Fire Suppression No automatic suppression system installed and not required.Portable Fire Extinguishers No portable extinguishers available and not required.Hose stations and hydrants Yard fire hydrants are available, but no enhancements required.
1 located in the area(s)Pre-Fire Plan No change necessary to procedure(s) 
/guidance document(s).
Echelon 3: Provide adequate level of fire protection for systems and structures so that a fire will not prevent essential safety functions from being performed Walls, floors ceilings and structural No changes necessary to existing barriers.e!ements are rated or have been evaluated as adequate for the hazard.Openings in the fire barrier are rated No changes necessary to existing barrier openings.
1 or have been evaluated as adequate for the hazard.Supplemental barriers (e.g., ERFBS, No supplemental barriers installed and not required.cable tray covers, etc.)Guidance provided to operations No VFDR related DID recovery actions required.personnel detailing the credited success path(s) including recovery actions to achieve nuclear safety performance criteria.Revision 0 Page 9 of 12 Version 1.0 Page 2470 of 3726 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-DU-DGSWIS-B 1 This fire protection feature is relied upon without further DID enhancements beyond inherent programmatic requirements of NFPA 805, Chap. 3 and will not be reported in Table 5-2.3.2.1 Required Modifications There are no modifications required as a result of the DID evaluation for this fire area.3.2.2 Required Recovery Actions There are no required recovery actions as a result of the DID evaluation for this fire area.4.0 SAFETY MARGIN EVALUATION 4.1 Safety Margin Evaluation In accordance with NEI 04-02, 5.3.5.3 guidance, the maintenance of adequate Safety Margin is assessed by the consideration of categories of analyses utilized by this fire risk evaluation (FRE).Safety margins are considered to be maintained if: " Codes and standards or their alternatives accepted for use by the NRC are met, and" Safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) are met, or provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty.
The maintenance of adequate safety margin for the change analysis is described for each of the specific analysis types used in support of the fire risk assessment.
4.1.1 Fire Modeling Fire modeling performed in support of the transition has been performed within the Fire PRA utilizing codes and standards developed by industry and NRC staff to provide realistic yet conservative results. Specifically, the heat release rates utilized in the transition analysis are based upon NUREG/CR 6850, Task 8, Scoping Fire Modeling.
These heat release rates are conservative and represent values used to screen out fixed ignition sources that do not pose a threat to the targets within specific fire compartments and to assign severity factors to unscreened fixed ignition sources.The combined analysis approach is used during transition; therefore, maximum expected fire scenario/limiting fire scenario have not been analyzed separately.
The bases for the application of these fire modeling codes and standards were not altered in support of this FRE.4.1.2 Plant System Performance Plant system performance parameters were not modified as a result of this FRE. These performance parameters were originally established to support nuclear performance criteria contained in the plant specific accident analyses.
These analyses established component and system performance criteria necessary to establish safe and stable plant operation, as well as, safe shut down of the unit in the event of a fire. These performance parameters were not modified as a result of this FRE.Revision 0 Page 10 of 12 Version 1.0 Page 2471 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-DU-DGSWIS-B 4.2 Safety Margin Results All analyses and assessment have been performed utilizing accepted techniques and industry accepted standards.
In addition, safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) have been considered and provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty.
As such, the Safety Margins are maintained as discussed in Section 4.1.5.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION RESULTS 5.1 Dispositions of VFDRs Based on the FRE results contained in Sections 2, 3 and 4 the VFDRs identified in Section 1.1 have been resolved as follows: Table 5-1 Final Variance Disposition Disposition Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID U2-1-DU-DGSWIS-B-SEP-001 Revision 0 Page 11 of 12 Version 1.0 Page 2472 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-DU-DGSWIS-B 5.2 Fire Risk Evaluation Summary of Fire Protection Systems and Features Table 5-2 Summary of Required Fire Protection Systems and Features Required Required Suppression Detection Required Fire Fire Area Fire Zone Sysion Detem Protection Feature Required Fire Protection System and Feature Details System System (R, 0)(R, D) (R, D)U2 1-DU-DGSWIS-B 1-DU-DWI None None None DGSWlS-B Required Suppression/Detection/Feature:
required in the Fire Area based on NFPA 805 Chapter 4 compliance.
The information is provided on a zone basis. The basis for the requirement of the fire protection system is designated as follows:* R -Risk Criteria:
Systems required to meet the Risk Criteria for the Performance-Based Approach (NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4)* D -Defense-in-depth Criteria:
Systems required to maintain adequate balance of Defense-in-Depth for a Performance-Based Approach (NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4)Fire Protection Features in this Table only refer to those features installed in the Fire Area that have a corresponding Chapter 3 requirement.
5.3 Summary of Recovery Actions No recovery actions are required for this fire area.5.4 Summary of Plant Modifications No modifications are required for this fire area.5.5 Fire Area Risk Summary Table 5 Fire Area Risk Summary NFPA 805 VFDR RAs Fire Risk Eval Fire Area Area Description BA805 Fire Area CDF/LERF (e/o RYs ,r RDF/LERF Additional Risk of RAs Basis (Yes/No) (Yes/No) A CDF/LERF U2 1-DU- Diesel Building to SWIS D2SWIS- D uctbank toTraIn 4.2.4 3.19E-11/1.03E-13 Yes No 3.19E-11/1.03E-13 N/A DGSWIS-B Ductbank Unit 2 Train B Revision 0 Page 12 of 12 Revision 0 Page 12 of 12 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-TB Attachment 
-Unit 2 Fire Area 1-TB FRE for Fire Area Turbine Building General Area Revision:
0 Name Fire PRA Preparer Fire PRA Reviewer Fire Protection Preparer Fire Protection Reviewer NSCA Preparer NSCA Reviewer FRE Preparer FRE Reviewer Jonathan Hedrick Clint Pierce Robert Kirkpatrick Rebecca Puckett Larry Valmonte Dan Funk Steve Hardy Brandon Jamar Revision 0 Page 1 of 28 Version 1.0 Page 2474 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-TB 1.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION INPUT .......................................................................
4 1.1 Variances from the Deterministic Requirements 
....................................
4 1.2 Fire Protection Systems and Features ..................................................
4 1.2 .1 C o nstructio n ............................................................................. 
..4 1.2 .2 D e te ctio n ................................................................................... 
..4 1.2.3 Fixed Fire Suppression 
...............................................................
4 1.2.4 Manual Suppression 
.......................................................................
5 1.2.5 Ventilation (Smoke Removal) ..........................................................
5 1.2.6 Other Fire Protection Features .....................................................
5 1.2.7 Fire Hazard Identification 
................................................................
5 1.2.8 Fire PRA Input .............................................................................
5 2.0 RISK EVALUATION 
.........................................................................................
6 2.1 Fire PRA Variant Case Calculation 
.......................................................
6 2.2 Compliant Case Calculation 
..................................................................
15 2.2.1 VFDRs Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA .............................
15 2.2.2 VFDRs Not Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA .....................
15 2.2.3 Compliant Case Results ...........................................................
15 2.2.4 Required Modifications 
.............................................................
15 2.2.5 Required Recovery Actions .......................................................
15 2.3 Risk Evaluation Results ......................................................................
15 3.0 DID EVALUATION 
.........................................................................................
24 3.1 Defense-in-Depth Evaluation 
...............................................................
24 3.2 Defense-in-Depth Review Results ......................................................
24 3.2.1 Required Modifications 
.............................................................
25 3.2.2 Required Recovery Actions .......................................................
25 4.0 SAFETY MARGIN EVALUATION 
...................................................................
25 4.1 Safety Margin Evaluation 
....................................................................
25 4 .1.1 F ire M od e ling .......................................................................... 
..2 6 4.1.2 Plant System Performance 
......................................................
26 4.2 Safety Margin Results ...........................................................................
26 5.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION RESULTS .............................................................
26 5.1 Dispositions of VFDRs .........................................................................
26 Revision 0 Page 2 of 28 Version 1.0 Page 2475 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1 -TB SE-C051 326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-TB 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 Fire Risk Evaluation Summary of Fire Protection Systems and Features 27 Summary of Recovery Actions .............................................................
27 Summary of Plant Modifications 
..........................................................
27 Fire Area Risk Summary ......................................................................
28 Revision 0 Page 3 of 28 Version 1.0 Page 2476 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-TB 1.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION INPUT 1.1 Variances from the Deterministic Requirements The VFDRs identified for evaluation for Unit 2, Fire Area 1-TB, Turbine Building General Area are: Table 1-1 VFDRs VFDR Component(s)
Description U2-1-TB-SEP-N2B31L0001E:ON:O The Pressurizer Heaters are required off in order control RCS 001 FF, PRESSURIZER Pressure, and avoid overpressure transients.
A loss of control power HEATER GROUP 2E to DC Bus 1H would prevent remote tripping of Pressurizer Heater DISTRIBUTION Group E. This failure challenges the RCS Pressure Control Nuclear PANEL Safety Performance Criterion.
1.2 Fire Protection Systems and Features Fire Area 1-TB consists of Fire Zones:* 1-084 -Turbine Building General Area -Elevations 137'-0" and 155'-0"* 1-085 -Turbine Building General Area -Elevations 137'-0", 155'-0", 173'-0", 189'-0"* 1-087 -Turbine Building General Area -Elevation 155'-0"* 1-088 -Turbine Building General Area -Elevation 155'-0" 1.2.1 Construction Barriers for this fire area are of substantial construction and have been designed and constructed to meet separation requirements.
In the event the configuration utilized is not in accordance with recognized standards, the deviations have been evaluated to be adequate for the hazard.1.2.2 Detection Fire detection systems to initiate plant suppression systems or to provide notification to the Control Room are:* Fire Zone 1-085 -There is a detection system to protect the Steam Generator FW Pump, the LP Turbine, Turbine Generator, Exciter, and HP Turbine Fire Zone 1-087 is provided with detection to protect the Steam Generator Feedwater Pump Turbine.Fire Zone 1-088 is provided detection to protect the 600 Volt Switchgear and the PT Cabinets.1.2.3 Fixed Fire Suppression Fixed fire suppression systems to aid in control of both fire growth and spread in the fire area are: Revision 0 Page 4 of 28 Version 1.0 Page 2477 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1 -TB" Fire Zone 1-084 is provided with suppression on elevations 137' and 155'. The Steam Generator Feed Pump Turbine Oil Conditioner on Elevation 137' is protected by an automatic deluge system." Fire Zone 1-085 is provided with automatically actuated suppression on elevations 137'and 155'. There is a manual fixed water spray system to protect the Steam Generator Feedwater Pump on elevation 155', a manual fixed water spray system to protect the exciter on elevation 189', and the high and low pressure turbines on elevation 189'.There is also a suppression system in the office on elevation 189'." Fire Zone 1-087 is provided with a manually actuated fixed water spray system in the vicinity of the Steam Generator Pump Turbine.Fire Zone 1-088 is provided with low pressure CO 2 systems in the 4160V and 600V Switchgear.
1.2.4 Manual Suppression Manual suppression equipment to be utilized by plant personnel and/or fire brigade members are: 0 Fire Area I-TB is provided with nearby fire hose cabinets and portable extinguishers.
1.2.5 Ventilation (Smoke Removal)Portable smoke ejectors are available to assist with smoke removal.1.2.6 Other Fire Protection Features No additional fire protection features are required for this fire risk evaluation.
1.2.7 Fire Hazard Identification The major sources of combustibles in Fire Area 1-TB are turbine lube oil, oil herder, Amine, cable insulation, hydraulic lift oil, transformer fluid, Hydrazine, hydrogen, Charcoal, Methanol, plastic, fiberglass, rubber, paper, storage lockers, EHC fluid, and various other combustible/flammable liquids. Details regarding fire scenarios quantified in the fire PRA, and their associated ignition sources (where applicable) are discussed in Section 2.1.2.8 Fire PRA Input Fire protection features There are no fire protection features specifically modeled in the Fire PRA for this fire area.Fire protection systems Existing in-cabinet CO 2 is being credited to suppress the SWGR fire for total area risk reduction.
It is not required for Hot Gas Layer or Multi Compartment Analysis.Hot Gas Layer Treatment This fire area screened for potential Hot Gas Layer effects on the Zone Of Influence.
No credit for detection was taken in the Hot Gas Layer evaluation for this fire area. No credit for manual or automatic fire suppression was taken in the Hot Gas Layer evaluation for this fire area.Revision 0 Page 5 of 28 Version 1.0 Page 2478 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1 JB Multi-compartment analysis No credit for detection was taken in the Multi Compartment Analysis for this fire area. No credit for manual or automatic fire suppression was taken in the Multi Compartment Analysis for this fire area.Scenario Review All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0, ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency.
2.0 RISK EVALUATION 2.1 Fire PRA Variant Case Calculation Tables 2-1a and 2-1b provide the results of the variant case calculation for Fire Area 1-TB. This is taken directly from the Fire PRA model with no changes or alterations made. The CDF and LERF results are provided on a scenario basis.The total area CDF and LERF is below the screening acceptance criteria of lE-07/rx-yr and IE-08/rx-yr, respectively.
The total CDF/LERF can be used as a conservative estimate of the delta CDF/LERF with respect to a compliant configuration.
No further analysis of the delta CDF/LERF is required.Revision 0 Page 6 of 28 Version 1.0 Page 2479 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-TB Table 2-1a Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train A Alignment IGF CDF LERF Zone Scen ScenDesc (xy NSP SF CCDP CDr CLERP (Iry (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr) (Irx-yr)1-084 E 1-084B 2.99E-04 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 2.00E-10 1.61E-10 4.81E-14 1-084 F 1-084D 9.96E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 6.67E-11 1.61 E-10 1.60E-14 1-084 G 1-084E 9.96E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 6.67E-1 1 1.61 E-1 0 1.60E-14 1-085 AE 277/480V Lighting Swgr 1.17E-04 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 7.84E-11 1.61 E-10 1.88E-14 1-085 AF Main Lube Oil Res. Xfer Pump 1.99E-04 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 1.33E-10 1.61E-10 3.21E-14 1-085 AG MCC 1-H 3.08E-04 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 2.06E-10 1.61E-10 4.95E-14 1-085 AH EHC Pumps 1A & 1B 1.99E-04 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 1.33E-10 1.61E-10 3.21E-14 1-085 Al 120/208V Distr Cab 3.64E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 2.44E-11 1.61E-10 5.86E-15 1-085 AJ1 125 VDC Dist Cab 1J, 1L, 1K 5.46E-05 1.0 1.OOE-01 6.69E-07 3.66E-12 1.61E-10 8.78E-16 1-085 AJ2a 125 VOC Dist Cab 1J-NON 1.80E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 1.21E-11 1.61E-10 2.90E-15 SEVERE 1-085 AJ2b 125 VDC Dist Cab 1L -NON 1.80E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 1.21E-11 1.61E-10 2.90E-15 SEVERE 1-085 AJ2c 125 VDC Dist Cab 1K-NON 5.46E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 3.66E-11 1.61 E-10 8.78E-15 SEVERE 1-085 AK MCC 1W 1.46E-04 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 9.75E-11 1.61E-10 2.34E-14 1-085 AL 600VAC Dist Panel 1 U, 600 3.64E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 2.44E-11 1.61 E-10 5.86E-15 VAC Dist Panel 1V Generator PT Compartment, 1-085 AM Phase 1,2, 3, metering & 5.46E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 3.66E-11 1.6E-10 8.78E-15 regulating PT's 1-085 AN Exciter Swgr 7.03E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 4.70E-11 1.61E-10 1.13E-14 1-085 AO Gen Neutral Grounding 1.74E-04 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 1.16E-10 1.61E-10 2.80E-14 Transformer 1-085 AP MCC 1AA28VHAACI 9.1 E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 6.09E-11 1.61E-10 1.46E-14 Terminal Bik Compartment 1-085 AQ Main Steam Purity Monitor 1.82E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 1.22E-11 1.61E-10 2.93E-15 1-085 AR 120/208v Swgr Misc Power 1A 1.09E-04 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 7.31E-11 1.61E-10 1.76E-14 1-085 AS TB MN FILTRATION SYSTEM 6.86E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 4.59E-11 1.61E-10 1.10E-14 1-085 AT HEATER DRAIN PUMP 9.96E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 6.67E-11 1.61E-10 1.60E-14 1-085 AU HEATER DRAIN PUMP 9.96E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 6.67E-11 1.61 E-10 1.60E-14 Revision 0 Page 7 of 28 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-TB Table 2-1a Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train A Alignment IGF CDF LERF Zone Scen ScenDesc Iry NSP SF CCDP (xy CLERP (Ir-(/rx-yr) (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr)1-085 AV SECONDARY SAMPLE 1.09E-04 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 7.28E-11 1.61E-10 1.75E-14 COOLERS 1-085 AW TB MN FILTRATION SYS 6.86E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 4.59E-11 1.61E-10 1.10E-14 1-085 AX SECONDARY CHEMICAL 5.98E-04 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 4.00E-10 1.61E-10 9.62E-14 INJECTION PUMPS 1-085 1-085 1-085 1-085 1-085 1-085 1-085 1-085 1-085 1-085 1-085 1-085 1-085 1-085 1-085 AY AZ B B2 BE BF BG BH BI D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 PAP CW PUMPS EXCITOR TURBINE LUBE OIL TURBINE HYDROGEN CNDS EXHAUST FAN CNDS EXHAUST FAN CNDS EXHAUST FAN AHU 2A 1A & 1B CNDS PMP TRANSIENT Transient 
@ col TG, T5 Transient col T7 Transient 
@ col TFA & T7 TRANSIENT Transient SE @ col T 9.96E-05 2.07E-03 3.83E-03 3.18E-03 6.86E-05 6.86E-05 6.86E-05 6.86E-05 1.97E-04 2.01E-06 2.01 E-06 2.01 E-06 2.01 E-06 2.01E-06 2.01 E-06 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 6.59E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6 .69E-07 6.69E1-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.67E-1 1 1.36E-09 2.56E-09 2.13E-09 4.59E-1 1 4.59E-1 1 4.59E-1 1 4.59E-1 1 1.32E-10 1.34E-12 1.34E-12 1.34E-12 1.34E-12 1.34E-12 1.34E-12 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.60E-14 3.33E-13 6.16E-13 5.11E-13 1.10E-14 1.10E-14 1.10E-14 1.10E-14 3.17E-14 3.23E-16 3.23E-1 6 3.23E-16 3.23E-1 6 3.23E-1 6 3.23E-1 6 1-085 D7 Transient So. Wall Btw Doors 2.01E-06 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 1.34E-12 1.61E-10 3.23E-16 T103 & T104 1-085 D8 TRANSIENT 2.01E-06 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 1.34E-12 1.61E-10 3.23E-16 1-085 E AHU Motor (near T9 & TFA) 6.86E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 4.59E-11 1.61 E-10 1.10E-14 1-085 F Condensate Pumps 2.99E-04 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 2.OOE-10 1.61E-10 4.81E-14 1-085 G Hydrogen Control Panel 1.82E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 1.22E-11 1.61E-10 2.93E-15 1-085 H Hydrogen Side Seal Oil PP 9.96E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 6.67E-11 1.61 E-10 1.60E-14 Motor 1-085 I Air Side Seal Oil Back up PP 9.96E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 6.67E-11 1.61E-10 1.60E-14 1-085 J Air Side Seal Oil PP Motor 9.96E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 6.67E-11 1.61E-10 1.60E-14 1-085 K 1C Sta Air Compressor 6.56E-04 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 4.39E-10 1.61E-10 1.05E-13 Revision 0 Page 8 of 28 Revision 0 Page 8 of 28 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area I -TB Table 2-1a Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train A Alignment IGF CDF LERF Zone Scen ScenDesc Ixy NSP SF CCDP CDF CLERP (IRx (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr)1-085 L Inverter 1H DEHC Power 1.82E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 1.22E-11 1.61E-10 2.93E-15 Supply 1-085 1-085 1-085 1-085 1-085 1-085 1-085 1-085 1-085 1-085 1-085 1-085 1-087 1-087 1-087 1-088 1-088 1-088 1-088 1-088 1-088 1-088 1-088 1-088 1-088 1-088 M N P Q S T U V W x Y E IF G 1A Sta Air Compressor 1B Sta Air Compressor Ammertap Control Panel Battery Charger 1IF Battery Charger 1 D Battery Charger 1 E Turb Build Pump PP 502B Turb Bd Sump PP 480V SS Transf 1T 480V SS Transf 1AA 208V BB TERMINAL BLOCKS 480V Panel 1A & 1B SGFP1A SGFP1B 120/208V Distr Cab 1H & 1J (combo)600V Swgr 1Q -SEVERE 600V Swgr 1Q -NON SEVERE 600V Swgr 1Q -HEAF 4160V Bus 1E -SEVERE 4160V Bus 1E -NON SEVERE 4160V Bus 1E -HEAF 4160V Bus 1D -SEVERE 4160V Bus 1D -NON SEVERE 4160V Bus 1D -HEAF 600V SWGR 1-P -SEVERE 600V Swgr 1-P -NON SEVERE 6.56E-04 6.56E-04 5.46E-05 1.56E-04 1.56E-04 1.56E-04 9.96E-05 3.99E-04 1.74E-04 1.74E-04 1.09E-04 3,64E-05 2.68E-03 2.68E-03 3.64E-05 1.64E-04 1.64E-04 4.69E-05 2.37E-04 2.37E-04 6.77E-05 2.55E-04 2.55E-04 7.30E-05 1.64E-04 1.64E-04 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 4.OOE-02 1.0 1.0 4.OOE-02 1.0 1.0 4.OOE-02 1.0 1.0 4.OOE-02 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 2.50E-01 1.0 1.0 2.50E-01 1.0 1.0 2.50E-01 1.0 1.0 2.50E-01 1.0 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 4.39E-10 4.39E-10 3.66E-1 1 1.04E-10 1.04E-10 1.04E-10 6.67E-1 1 2.67E-10 1.16E-10 1.16E-10 7.31 E-11 2.44E-11 1.79E-09 1.79E-09 2.44E-1 1 1.10E-12 1.10E-10 3.14E-1 1 1.58E-12 1.58E-10 4.53E-1 1 1.71 E-12 1.71 E-10 4.88E-1 1 1.10E-12 1.10E-10 1.61E-10 1.05E-13 1.61E-10 1.05E-13 1.61E-10 8.78E-15 1.61E-10 2.51E-14 1.61E-10 2.51E-14 1.61E-10 2.51E-14 1.61E-10 1.60E-14 1.61E-10 6.41E-14 1.61E-10 2.80E-14 1.61E-10 2.80E-14 1.61E-10 1.76E-14 1.61E-10 5.86E-15 1.61E-10 4.30E-13 1.61E-10 4.30E-13 1.61E-10 5.85E-15 1.61E-10 2.64E-16 1.61E-10 2.64E-14 1.61E-10 7.54E-15 1.61E-10 3.81E-16 1.61E-10 3.81E-14 1.61E-10 1.09E-14 1.61E-10 4.10E-16 1.61E-10 4.10E-14 1.61E-10 1.17E-14 1.61E-10 2.64E-16 1.61E-10 2.64E-14 El E2 E3 F1 F2 F3 G1 G2 G3 H1 H2 Revision 0 Page 9 of 28 Revision 0 Page 9 of 28 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-TB SE-C051 326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-TB Table 2-1a Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train A Alignment IGF CDF LERF Zone Scen ScenDesc Ixy NSP SF CCDP (rr CLERP (Ir-(/rx-yr) (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr)1-088 H3 600V Swgr 1-P -HEAF 4.69E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 3.14E-11 1.61E-10 7.54E-15 1-088 I1 600V Swgr 1G -SEVERE 9.10E-05 4.OOE-02 2.50E-01 6.69E-07 6.09E-13 1.61E-10 1.46E-16 1-088 12 600V Swgr 1G -NON 9.1OE-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 6.09E-11 1.61E-10 1.46E-14 SEVERE 1-088 13 600V Swgr 1G -HEAF 2.61E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 1.74E-11 1.61E-10 4.19E-15 1-088 J 1P OIL XFMR 1.74E-04 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 1.16E-10 1.61E-10 2.80E-14 1-088 K OIL XFMR 1G 1.74E-04 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 1.16E-10 1.61E-10 2.80E-14 1-088 L Transformerconnected to LC 1.74E-04 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 1.16E-10 1.61E-10 2.80E-14 10 1-TB-ADJ TURB -FAI TURBINE BUILDING 3.83E-03 1.0 5.OOE-04 2.61E-06 4.99E-12 8.89E-10 1.70E-15 L FAILURE Total CDFILERF Fire PRA Variant Case 1.61E-08 3.88E-12 Table 2-1 b Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train B Alignment IGF CDF LERF Zone Scen ScenDesc (xy NSP SF CCDP CDF CLERP (Ir-(/rx-yr) (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr)1-084 E 1-084B 2.99E-04 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 1.99E-10 1.61 E-10 4.81 E-14 1-084 F 1-084D 9.96E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 6.62E-11 1.61 E-10 1.60E-14 1-084 G 1-084E 9.96E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 6.62E-11 1.61 E-10 1.60E-14 1-085 AE 277/480V Lighting Swgr 1.17E-04 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 7.78E-11 1.61E-10 1.88E-14 1-085 AF Main Lube Oil Res, Xfer Pump 1.99E-04 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 1.32E-10 1.61E-10 3.21E-14 1-085 AG MCC 1-H 3.08E-04 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 2.05E-10 1.61 E-10 4.95E-14 1-085 AH EHC Pumps 1A& 1B 1.99E-04 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 1.32E-10 1.61E-10 3.21E-14 1-085 Al 120/208V Distr Cab 3.64E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 2.42E-11 1.61 E-10 5.86E-15 1-085 AJ1 125 VDC Dist Cab 1J, 1L, 1K 5.46E-05 1.0 1.OOE-01 6.64E-07 3.63E-12 1.61E-10 8.78E-16 1-085 AJ2a 125 VDC Dist Cab 1J-NON 1.80E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 1.20E-11 1.61 E-10 2.90E-15 SEVERE 1-085 AJ2b 125 VDC Dist Cab 1L- NON 1.80E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 1.20E-11 1.61 E-10 2.90E-15 SEVERE r~evi~ion U rage Iu 01 &#xa3;0 R~evisiorn U Vage I u of 28 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area I -Tl3 Table 2-1 b Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train B Alignment IGF DFLERF Zone Scen ScenDesc Iry NSP SF CCDP CDF CLERP (Ir)(/rx-yr) (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr)1-085 AJ2c 125 VDC Dist Cab 1K-NON 5.46E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 3.63E-11 1.61E-10 8.78E-15 SEVERE 1-085 AK MCC 1W 1.46E-04 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 9.68E-11 1.61E-10 2.34E-14 1-085 AL 600VAC Dist Panel 1U, 600 3.64E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 2.42E-11 1.61E-10 5.86E-15 VAC Dist Panel 1V Generator PT Compartment, 1-085 AM Phase 1,2, 3, metering & 5.46E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 3.63E-11 1.61E-10 8.78E-15 regulating PT's 1-085 AN Exciter Swgr 7.03E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 4.67E-11 1.61 E-10 1.13E-14 1-085 AO Gen Neutral Grounding 1.74E-04 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 1.16E-10 1.61E-10 2.80E-14 Transformer 1-085 AP MCC 1AA 208V HAACI 9.1 OE-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 6.05E-1 1 1.61 E-10 1.46E-14 Terminal BIk Compartment 1-085 AQ Main Steam Purity Monitor 1.82E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 1.21 E-11 1.61E-10 2.93E-15 1-085 AR 120/208v Swgr Misc Power 1A 1.09E-04 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 7.26E-11 1.61E-10 1.76E-14 1-085 AS TB MN FILTRATION SYSTEM 6.86E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 4.56E-11 1.61E-10 1.10E-14 1-085 AT HEATER DRAIN PUMP 9.96E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 6.62E-11 1.61 E-10 1.60E-14 1-085 AU HEATER DRAIN PUMP 9.96E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 6.62E-11 1.61E-10 1.60E-14 1-085 AV SECONDARY SAMPLE 1.09E-04 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 7.22E-11 1.61 E-10 1.75E-14 COOLERS 1-085 AW TB MN FILTRATION SYS 6.86E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 4.56E-11 1.61E-10 1.10E-14 1-085SECONDARY CHEMICAL 1-085 AX 5.98E-04 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 3.97E-10 1.61 E-10 9.62E-14 INJECTION PUMPS 1-085 AY PAP CW PUMPS 9.96E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 6.62E-11 1.61E-10 1.60E-14 1-085 AZ EXCITOR 2.07E-03 1.0 1.0 6.53E-07 1.35E-09 1.61 E-10 3.33E-13 1-085 B TURBINE LUBE OIL 3.83E-03 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 2.54E-09 1.61 E-10 6.16E-13 1-085 B2 TURBINE HYDROGEN 3.18E-03 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 2.11E-09 1.61E-10 5.11E-13 1-085 BE CNDS EXHAUST FAN 6.86E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 4.56E-11 1.61E-10 1.10E-14 1-085 BF CNDS EXHAUST FAN 6.86E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 4.56E-11 1.61E-10 1.10E-14 1-085 BG CNDS EXHAUST FAN 6.86E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 4.56E-11 1.61E-10 1.10E-14 1-085 BH AHU 2A 6.86E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 4.56E-11 1.61 E-10 1.10E-14 1-085 BI 1A & 1B CNDS PMP 1.97E-04 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 1.31E-10 1.61E-10 3.17E-14 Revision 0 Page 11 of 28 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1 -TB Table 2-1 b Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train B Alignment IGF CDF LERF Zone Scen ScenDesc Ir) NSP SF CCDP CDr CLERP (IRx (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr)1-085 D1 TRANSIENT 2.01E-06 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 1.33E-12 1.61E-10 3.23E-16 1-085 D2 Transient 
@ col TG, T5 2.01E-06 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 1.33E-12 1.61E-10 3.23E-16 1-085 D3 Transient col T7 2.01E-06 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 1.33E-12 1.61E-10 3.23E-16 1-085 D4 Transient 
@ col TFA & T7 2.01E-06 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 1.33E-12 1.61 E-10 3.23E-16 1-085 D5 TRANSIENT 2.01E-06 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 1.33E-12 1.61E-10 3.23E-16 1-085 D6 Transient SE @ col T 2.01E-06 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 1.33E-12 1.61E-10 3.23E-16 1-085 D7 Transient So. Wall Btw Doors 2.01E-06 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 1.33E-12 1.61E-10 3.23E-16 T103 & T104 1-085 D8 TRANSIENT 2.01E-06 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 1.33E-12 1.61E-10 3.23E-16 1-085 E AHU Motor (near T9 & TFA) 6.86E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 4.56E-11 1.61E-10 1.10E-14 1-085 F Condensate Pumps 2.99E-04 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 1.99E-10 1.61E-10 4.81E-14 1-085 G Hydrogen Control Panel 1.82E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 1.21E-11 1.61E-10 2.93E-15 1-085 H Hydrogen Side Seal Oil PP 9.96E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 6.62E-11 1.61 E-10 1.60E-14 Motor 1-085 I Air Side Seal Oil Back up PP 9.96E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 6.62E-11 1.61E-10 1.60E-14 1-085 J Air Side Seal Oil PP Motor 9.96E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 6.62E-11 1.61E-10 1.60E-14 1-085 K 1C Sta Air Compressor 6.56E-04 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 4.36E-10 1.61 E-10 1.05E-13 1-085 L Inverter 1H DEHC Power 1.82E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 1.21E-11 1.61E-10 2.93E-15 Supply 1-085 1-085 1-085 1-085 1-085 1-085 1-085 1-085 1-085 1-085 1-085 1-085 1-087 M N P Q S T U V W X Y Z E 1A Sta Air Compressor 1 B Sta Air Compressor Ammertap Control Panel Battery Charger 1 F Battery Charger 1 D Battery Charger 1 E Turb Build Pump PP 502B Turb Bd Sump PP 480V SS Transf 1T 480V SS Transf 1AA 208V BB TERMINAL BLOCKS 480V Panel 1A & 1B SGFP1A 6.56E-04 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 4.36E-10 1.61E-10 1.05E-13 6.56E-04 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 4.36E-10 1.61E-10 1.05E-13 5.46E-05 1.56E-04 1.56E-04 1.56E-04 9.96E-05 3.99E-04 1.74E-04 1.74E-04 1.09E-04 3.64E-05 2.68E-03 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 3.63E-1 1 1.04E-10 1.04E-10 1.04E-10 6.62E-1 1 2.65E-10 1.16E-10 1.16E-10 7.26E-1 1 2.42E-1 1 1.78E-09 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 8.78E-1 5 2.51E-14 2.51 E-14 2.51 E-14 1.60E-14 6.41E-14 2.80E-14 2.80E-14 1.76E-14 5.86E-1 5 4.30E-1 3 Revision 0 Page 12 of 28 Revision 0 Page 12 of 28 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-TB Table 2-1 b Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train B Alignment IGF CDF LERF Zone Scen ScenDesc (Irx-yr) NSP SF CCDP (/rx-yr) CLERP (Irx-yr)1-087 F SGFP1B 2.68E-03 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 1.78E-09 1.61E-10 4.30E-13 1-087 G 120/208V Distr Cab 1H & 1J 3.64E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 2.42E-11 1.61E-10 5.85E-15 (combo)1-088 El 600V Swgr 1Q -SEVERE 1.64E-04 4.OOE-02 2.50E-01 6.64E-07 1.09E-12 1.61 E-10 2.64E-16 1-088 E2 600V Swgr 1Q -NON 1.64E-04 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 1.09E-10 1.61 E-10 2.64E-14 SEVERE 1-088 1-088 1-088 1-088 1-088 1-088 1-088 1-088 1-088 1-088 1-088 1-088 1-088 1-088 1-088 E3 F1 F2 F3 G1 G2 G3 HI H2 H3 I1 12 13 J K 600V Swgr 1Q -HEAF 4160V Bus 1E -SEVERE 4160V Bus 1E -NON SEVERE 4160V Bus 1E -HEAF 4160V Bus 1D -SEVERE 4160V Bus 1D -NON SEVERE 4160V Bus 1D -HEAF 600V SWGR 1-P -SEVERE 600V Swgr 1-P -NON SEVERE 600V Swgr 1-P -HEAF 600V Swgr 1G -SEVERE 600V Swgr 1G -NON SEVERE 600V Swgr 1G -HEAF 1P OIL XFMR OIL XFMR 1G Transformer connected to LC 1Q 4.69E-05 2.37E-04 2.37E-04 6.77E-05 2.55E-04 2.55E-04 7.30E-05 1.64E-04 1.64E-04 4.69E-05 9.10E-05 9.1OE-05 2.61 E-05 1.74E-04 1.74E-04 1.74E-04 1.0 4.OOE-02 1.0 1.0 4.OOE-02 1.0 1.0 4.OOE-02 1.0 1.0 4.OOE-02 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 2.50E-01 1.0 1.0 2.50E-01 1.0 1.0 2.50E-01 1.0 1.0 2.50E-01 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 3.12E-1 1 1.57E-12 1.57E-1 0 4.50E-11 1.69E-12 1.69E-1 0 4.85E-1 1 1.09E-12 1.09E-10 3.12E-11 6.05E-13 6.05E- 11 1.73E-11 1.16E-10 1.16E-10 1.16E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 7.54E-15 3.81 E-16 3.81 E-14 1.09E-14 4.10E-16 4.10E-14 1.17E-14 2.64E-16 2.64E-14 7.54 E- 15 1.46E-16 1.46E-14 4.19E-15 2.80E-14 2.80E-14 2.80E-14 1-088 L 1-TB-ADJ TURB FAIL TURBINE BUILDING 3.83E-03 1.0 5.OOE-04 2.60E-06 4.98E-12 8.89E-10 1.70E-15-FAILURE Total CDF/LERF Fire PRA Variant Case 1.60E-08 3.88E-12 Revision 0 Page 13 of 28 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1 -TB SE-C051 326701-008 Attachment-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-TB Where: Zone = Fire Zone Scen = 'A' to signify the variant case ScenDesc = Description of the Fire Scenario IGF = Ignition Frequency 
(/rx-yr)NSP = Non Suppression Probability SF = Severity Factor CCDP = Conditional Core Damage Probability CDF = Core Damage Frequency 
(/rx-yr)CLERP = Conditional Large Early Release Probability LERF = Large Early Release Frequency 
(/rx-yr)Revision 0 Page 14of28 Revision 0 Page 14 of 28 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-TB 2.2 Compliant Case Calculation The following sub-sections provide the basis for modeling each VFDR (or category of VFDRs)and the alterations that have been made to the variant case to represent the compliant case. In each section a discussion of the VFDR (or the category of VFDRs) is provided.2.2.1 VFDRs Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA The following VFDRs are modeled in the Fire PRA and are therefore included in the total fire area CDF/LERF used as a surrogate for the delta risk evaluation for this fire area: E U2-1-TB-SEP-001 
-N2B31LOOOIE:ON:OFF 2.2.2 VFDRs Not Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA All VFDRs are modeled in the Fire PRA.2.2.3 Compliant Case Results The total area CDF and LERF is below the screening acceptance criteria of IE-07/rx-yr and I E-08/rx-yr, respectively.
The total CDF/LERF can be used as a conservative estimate of the delta CDF/LERF with respect to a compliant configuration.
No fuirther analysis of the delta CDF/LERF is required.2.2.4 Required Modifications There are no required modifications as a result of the risk evaluation for this fire area.2.2.5 Required Recovery Actions There are no required recovery actions as a result of the risk evaluation for this fire area.2.3 Risk Evaluation Results The ACDF/LERF is below the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr (CDF) and 1E-08/rx-yr (LERF) for acceptable risk. All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0 ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency.
The following tables present the fire zone/scenario fire risk as well as the total fire risk for this fire area. Given the relatively low risk for these zones/scenarios the delta risk is defined by the variant case risk, the compliant case risk is conservatively assumed to be 0.Revision 0 Page 15 of 28 Version 1.0 Page 2488 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-TB Table 2-2a'FIRE AREA ACDF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN A ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case 1-084/E 1-084/F 1-084/G 1-085/AE 1-085/AF 1-085/AG 1-085/AH 1-085/Al 1-085/AJ1 1-085/AJ2a 1-085/AJ2b 1-085/AJ2c 1-085/AK 1-085/AL 1-085/AM 1-085/AN 1-085/AO 1-085/AP 1-085/AQ 1-085/AR 1-085/AS 1-085/AT 1-085/AU 1-085/AV 1-085/AW 1-085/AX 1-085/AY 1-085/AZ 1-085/B 1-085/B2 1-085/BE 1-085/BF 1-085/BG 1-085/BH 1-085/B1I 1-085/D1 1-085/D2 1-085/D3 1-085/D4 1-085/D5 1-085/D6 1-085/D7 1-085/D8 1-085/E 1-085/F 1-085/G CCDP 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.59E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 CDF 2.OOE-10 6.67E-1 1 6.67E-1 1 7.84E-11 1.33E-10 2.06E-10 1.33E-10 2.44E-1 1 3.66E-12 1.21 E-11 1.21 E-11 3.66E-1 1 9.75E-1 1 2.44E-1 1 3.66E-1 1 4.70E-11 1.16E-10 6.09E-11 1.22E-1 1 7.31 E-11 4.59E-1 1 6.67E-1 1 6.67E-1 1 7.28E-11 4.59E-1 1 4.OOE-1 0 6.67E-11 1.36E-09 2.56E-09 2.13E-09 4.59E-11 4.59E-1 1 4.59E-1 1 4.59E-1 1 1.32E-10 1.34E-12 1.34E-12 1.34E-12 1.34E-12 1.34E-12 1.34E-12 1.34E-12 1.34E-12 4.59E-1 1 2.OOE-10 1.22E-1 1 Compliant Case CCDP CDF 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE-'00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE-'00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.0017+00 Variant -Compliant ACDF 2.OOE-10 6.67E-1 1 6.67E-1 1 7.84E-1i1 1.33E-10 2.06E-10 1.33E-10 2.44E-1 1 3.66E-12 1.21E-11 1.21 E-11 3.66E-11 9.75E-11 2.44E-1 1 3.66E-1 1 4.70E-1 1 1.16E-10 6.09E-1 1 1.22E-1 1 7.31 E-11 4.59E-1i1 6.67E-1 1 6.67E-1 1 7.28E-1 1 4.59E-1 1 4.OOE-10 6.67E-1 1 1.36E-09 2.56E-09 2.13E-09 4.59E-1 1 4.59E-1 1 4.59E-11 4.59E-1 1 1.32E-10 1.34E-12 1.34E-12 1.34E-12 1.34E-12 1.34E-12 1.34E-12 1.34E-12 1.34E-12 4.59E-1 1 2.OOE-10 1.22E-1 1-Revision 0 Page 16 of 28 Revision 0 Page 16 of 28 Version 1.0 Page 2489 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-TB SE-C051 326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-TB Table 2-2a 1 FIRE AREA aCDF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN A ALIGNMEN Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case IT CCDP CDF 1-085/H 1-085/I 1-085/1J 1-085/K 1-085/L 1-085/M 1-085/N 1-085/P 1-085/Q 1-085/S 1-085/T 1-085/U 1-085N 1-085/W 1-085/X 1-085/Y 1-085/Z 1-087/E 1-087/F 1-087/G 1-088/El 1-088/E2 1-088/E3 1-088/Fl 1-088/F2 1-088/F3 1-088/G 1 1-088/G2 1-088/G3 1-088/H 1 1-088/H2 1-088/H3 1-088/I1 1-088/12 1-088/13 1-088/J 1-088/K 1-088/L 1-TB-ADJ/TURB FAIL 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 2.61E-06 CCDP CDF 6.67E-11 6.67E-1 1 6.67E-1 1 4.39E-10 1.22E-1 1 4.39E-10 4.39E-10 3.66E-1 1 1.04E-10 1.04E-10 1.04E-10 6.67E-1 1 2.67E-10 1.16E-10 1.16E-10 7.31E-11 2.44E-1 1 1.79E-09 1.79E-09 2.44E-1 1 1.10E-12 1.10E-10 3.14E-1 1 1.58E-12 1.58E-10 4.53E-11 1.71 E-12 1.71 E-10 4.88E-1 1 1.10E-12 1.10E-10 3.14E-11 6.09E-13 6.09E-1 1 1.74E-1 1 1.16E-10 1.16E-10 1.16E-10 CCDP 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 CDF 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00.0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 Variant -Compliant ACDF 6.67E-1 1 6.67E-1 1 6.67E-1 1 4.39E-10 1.22E-1 1 4.39E-10 4.39E-10 3.66E-1 1 1.04E-10 1.04E-10 1.04E-1 0 6.67E-1 1 2.67E-10 1.16E-10 1.16E-10 7.31 E-1 1 2.44E-1 1 1.79E-09 1.79E-09 2.44E-1 1 1.10E-12 1.10E-10 3.14E-11 1.58E-12 1.58E-1 0 4.53E-1 1 1.71E-12 1.71 E-10 4.88E-1 1 1.10E-12 1.10E-10 3.14E-11 6.09E-1 3 6.09E-1 1 1.74E-1 1 1.16E-10 1.16E-10 1.16E-10 4.99E-12 4.99E-12 Total CDF and delta CDF 1.61E-08 0.OOE+00 1.61E-08 r -N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.Revision 0 Page 17 of 28 Version 1.0 Page 2490 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-TB Table 2-2b 1 FIRE AREA ACDF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN B ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case 1-084/E 1-084/F 1-084/G 1-085/AE 1-085/AF 1-085/AG 1-085/AH 1-085/Al 1-085/AJ 1 1-085/AJ2a 1-085/AJ2b 1-085/AJ2c 1-085/AK 1-085/AL 1-085/AM 1-085/AN 1-085/AO 1-085/AP 1-085/AQ 1-085/AR 1-085/AS 1-085/AT 1-085/AU 1-085/AV 1-085/AW 1-085/AX 1-085/AY 1-085/AZ 1-085/B 1-085/B2 1-085/BE 1-085/BF 1-085/BG 1-085/BH 1-085/B1I 1-085/Di 1-085/D2 1-085/D3 1-085/D4 1-085/D5 1-085/D6 1-085/D7 1-085/D8 1-085/E 1-085/F 1-085/G CCDP 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.53E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 CDF 1.99E-10 6.62E-1 1 6.62E-1 1 7.78 E-11 1.32E-10 2.05E-1 0 1.32E-10 2.42E-1 1 3.63E-12 1.20E- 11 1.20E-11 3.63E- 11 9.68E- 11 2.42E-1 1 3.63E-1 1 4.67E-1 1 1.16E-10 6.05E-1 1 1.21 E-11 7.26E-1 1 4.56E-11 6.62E-1 1 6.62E-1 1 7.22E-1 1 4.56E-11 3.97E-10 6.62E-11 1.35E-09 2.54E-09 2.11E-09 4.56E-11 4.56E-11 4.56E-11 4.56E-1 1 1.31 E-10 1.33E-12 1.33E-12 1.33E-12 1.33E-12 1.33E-12 1.33E-12 1.33E-12 1.33E-12 4.56E-1 1 1.99E-10 1.21 E-11 Compliant Case CCDP CDF 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0O.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 Variant -Compliant ACDF 1.99E-10 6.62E-11 6.62E-11 7.78E-1 1 1.32E-1 0 2.05E-10 1.32E-10 2.42E-11 3.63E-12 1.20E-1 1 1.20E-1 1 3.63E-1 1 9.68E-1 1 2.42E-1 1 3.63E-1 1 4.67E-1 1 1.16E-10 6.05E-11 1.21 E-11 7.26E-11 4.56E-1 1 6.62E-1 1 6.62E-11 7.22E-1 1 4.56E-1 1 3.97E-10 6.62E-11 1.35E-09 2.54E-09 2.11 E-09 4.56E-11 4.56E-1 1 4.56E-1 1 4.56E-1 1 1.31E-10 1.33E-12 1.33E-12 1.33E-12 1.33E-12 1.33E-12 1.33E-12 1.33E-12 1.33E-12 4.56E-1 1 1.99E-10 1.21E-11 Revision 0 Page 18 of 28 Revision 0 Page 18 of 28 Version 1.0 Page 2491 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-TB SE-C051 326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-TB Table 2-2b 1 FIRE AREA ACDF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN B ALIGNMEN Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case IT 1-085/H 1-085/I 1-085/J 1-085/K 1-085/L 1-085/M 1-085/N 1-085/P 1-085/Q 1-085/S 1-085/T 1-085/U 1-085N 1-085/W 1-085/X 1-085/Y 1-085/Z 1-087/E 1-087/F 1-087/G 1-088/El 1-088/E2 1-0881E3 1-088/Fl 1-088/F2 1-088/F3 1-088/G 1 1-088/G2 1-088/G3 1-088/Hl1 1-088/H12 1-088/H3 1-088/11 1-088/12 1-088/13 1-088/J 1-088/K 1-088/L 1-TB-ADJ/TURB FAIL CCDP 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 CDF 6.62E-11 6.62E-11 6.62E-11 4.36E-10 1.21 E-11 4.36E-10 4.36E-10 3.63E-1 1 1.04E-10 1.04E-10 1.04E-10 6.62E-1 1 2.65E-10 1.16E-10 1.16E-10 7.26E-1 1 2.42E-1 1 1.78E-09 1.78E-09 2.42E-1 1 1.09E-12 1.09E-10 3.12E-11 1.57E-12 1.57E-10 4.50E-11 1.69E-12 1.69E-10 4.85E-1 1 1.09E-1 2 1.09E-10 3.12E- 11 6.05E-13 6.05E-1 I 1.73E-11 1.16E-10 1.16E-10 1.16E-10 CCDP 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 CDF 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 Variant -Compliant aCDF 6.62E-1 1 6.62E-1 1 6.62E-11 4.36E-10 1.21 E-11 4.36E-10 4.36E-10 3.63E-1 1 1.04E-10 1.04E-10 1.04E-1 0 6.62E-11 2.65E-10 1.16E-10 1.16E-10 7.26E-1 1 2.42E-1 1 1.78E-09 1.78E-09 2.42E-1 1 1.09E-12 1.09E-10 3.12E-11 1.57E-12 1.57E-10 4.50E-1 1 1.69E-12 1.69E-10 4.85E-1 1 1.09E-12 1.09E-10 3.12E-11 6.05E-1 3 6.05E-1 1 1.73E-1 1 1.16E-10 1.16E-10 1 .16E-10 2.60E-06 4.98E-12 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 4.98E-12 Total CDF and delta CDF 1.60E-08 0.OOE+00 1.60E-08 1 _ N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.Revision 0 Page 19 of 28 Version 1.0 Page 2492 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-TB Table 2-3a 1 FIRE AREA &#xa3;ALERF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN A ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case 1-084/E 1-084/F 1-084/G 1-085/AE 1-085/AF 1-085/AG 1-085/AH 1-085/Al 1-085/AJ 1 1-085/AJ2a 1-085/AJ2b 1-085/AJ2c 1-085/AK 1-085/AL 1-085/AM 1-085/AN 1-085/AO 1-085/AP 1-085/AQ 1-085/AR 1-085/AS 1-085/AT 1-085/AU 1-085/AV 1-085/AW 1-085/AX 1-085/AY 1-085/AZ 1-085/B 1-085/B2 1-085/BE 1-085/BF 1-085/BG 1-085/BH 1-085/B1I 1-085/D1 1-085/D2 1-085/D3 1-085/D4 1-085/D5 1-085/D6 1-085/D7 1-085/D8 1-085/E 1-085/F 1-085/G CLERP 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 LERF 4.81E-14 1.60E-14 1.60E-14 1.88E-14 3.21 E-14 4.95E-14 3.21 E-14 5.86E-1 5 8.78E-16 2.90E-15 2.90E-1 5 8.78E-1 5 2.34E-14 5.86E-1 5 8.78E-1 5 1.13E-14 2.80E-14 1.46E-14 2.93E-1 5 1.76E-14 1.10E-14 1.60E-14 1.60E-14 1.75E-14 1.10E-14 9.62E-14 1.60E-14 3.33E-1 3 6.16E-13 5.11E-13 1.10E-14 1.10E-14 1.10E-14 1.10E-14 3.17E-14 3.23E-1 6 3.23E-1 6 3.23E-1 6 3.23E-1 6 3.23E-16 3.23E-16 3.23E-16 3.23E-1 6 1.10E-14 4.81 E-14 2.93E-1 5 Compliant Case CLERP LERF 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 Variant -Compliant ALERF 4.81E-14 1.60E-14 1.60E-14 1.88E-14 3.21 E-14 4.95E-14 3.21 E-14 5.86E-15 8.78E-16 2.90E-15 2.90E-15 8.78E-1 5 2.34E-14 5.86E-15 8.78E-15 1.13E-14 2.80E-14 1.46E-14 2.93E-15 1.76E-14 1.10E-14 1.60E-14 1.60E-14 1.75E-14 1.10E-14 9.62E-14 1.60E-14 3.33E-13 6.16E-13 5.11 E-13 1.10E-14 1.10E-14 1.10E-14 1.10E-14 3.17E-14 3.23E-16 3.23E-16 3.23E-16 3.23E-16 3.23E-16 3.23E-16 3.23E-16 3.23E-16 1.10E-14 4.81 E-14 2.93E-15 Revision 0 Page 20 of 28 Revision 0 Page 20 of 28 Version 1.0 Page 2493 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1 -TB SE-C051 326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-TB Table 2-3a 1 FIRE AREA ALERF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN A ALIGNMEI Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case NT CLERP LERF 1-085/H 1-085/I 1-085/J 1-085/K 1-085/L 1-085/M 1-085/N 1-085/P 1-085/Q 1-085/S 1-085/i 1-085/U 1-085N 1-085/W 1-085/X 1-085/Y 1-085/Z 1-087/E 1-087/F 1-087/G 1-088/El 1-088/E2 1-088/E3 1-088/Fl 1-088/F2 1-088/F3 1-088/Gl 1-088/G2 1-088/G3 1-088/Hl 1-088/H2 1-088/H3 1-088/11 1-088/12 1-088/13 1-088/J 1-088/K 1-088/L 1-TB-ADJ/TURB_
FAIL 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-1 0 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 CLERP LERF 1.60E-14 1.60E-14 1.60E-14 1.05E-13 2.93E-1 5 1.05E-13 1.05E-13 8.78E-15 2.51E-14 2.51 E-14 2.51E-14 1.60E-14 6.41 E-14 2.80E-14 2.80E-14 1.76E-14 5.86E-1 5 4.30E-13 4.30E-1 3 5.85E-15 2.64E-16 2.64E-14 7.54E-15 3.81 E-16 3.81 E-14 1.09E-14 4.10E-16 4.10E-14 1.17E-14 2.64E-1 6 2.64E-14 7.54E-15 1.46E-16 1.46E-14 4.19E-15 2.80E-14 2.80E-14 2.80E-14 CLERP 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 LERF 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 NT Variant -Compliant ALERF 1.60E-14 1.60E-14 1.60E-14 1.05E-13 2.93E-1 5 1.05E-13 1.05E-13 8.78E-1 5 2.51E-14 2.51 E-14 2.51E-14 1.60E-14 6.41 E-14 2.80E-14 2.80E-14 1.76E-14 5.86E-1 5 4.30E-1 3 4.30E-1 3 5.85E-15 2.64E-16 2.64E-14 7.54E-15 3.81E-16 3.81 E-14 1.09E-14 4.10E-16 4.10E-14 1.17E-14 2.64E-16 2.64E-14 7.54E-1 5 1.46E-16 1.46E-14 4.19E-15 2.80E-14 2.80E-14 2.80E-14 1.70E-15 8.89E-10 1.70E-15 0.OOE+00 Total LERF and delta LERF 3.88E-12 O.OOE+00 3.88E-12 1 -N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.Revision 0 Page 21 of28 Revision 0 Page 21 of 28 Version 1.0 Page 2494 of 3726 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1 -TB Table 2-3b 1 FIRE AREA ALERF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN B ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case 1-084/E 1-084/F 1-084/G 1-085/AE 1-085/AF 1-085/AG 1-085/AH 1-085/Al 1-085/AJ1 1-085/AJ2a 1-085/AJ2b 1-085/AJ2c 1-085/AK 1-085/AL 1-085/AM 1-085/AN 1-085/AO 1-085/AP 1-085/AQ 1-085/AR 1-085/AS 1-085/AT 1-085/AU 1-085/AV 1-085/AW 1-085/AX 1-085/AY 1-085/AZ 1-085/B 1-085/B2 1-085/BE 1-085/BF 1-085/BG 1-085/BH 1-085/B1I 1-085/D1 1-085/D2 1-085/D3 1-085/D4 1-085/D5 1-085/D6 1-085/D7 1-085/D8 1-085/E 1-085/F 1-085/G CLERP 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-1 0 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 LERF 4.81E-14 1.60E-14 1.60E-14 1.88E-14 3.21 E-14 4.95E-14 3.21 E-14 5.86E- 15 8.78E-16 2.90E-15 2.90E-15 8.78E-1 5 2.34E-14 5.86E-15 8.78E-15 1.13E-14 2.80E-14 1.46E-14 2.93E-1 5 1.76E-14 1.10E-14 1.60E-14 1.60E-14 1.75E-14 1.10E-14 9.62E-14 1.60E-14 3.33E-13 6.16E-13 5.11E-13 1.10E-14 1.10E-14 1.10E-14 1.10E-14 3.17E-14 3.23E-1 6 3.23E-1 6 3.23E-1 6 3.23E-1 6 3.23E-16 3.23E-16 3.23E-16 3.23E-16 1.10E-14 4.81 E-14 2.93E-1 5 Compliant Case CLERP LERF 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 Variant -Compliant ALERF 4.81E-14 1.60E-14 1.60E-14 1.88E-14 3.21 E-14 4.95E-14 3.21 E-14 5.86E-15 8.78E-16 2.90E-1 5 2.90E-1 5 8.78E-1 5 2.34E-14 5.86E-1 5 8.78E-1 5 1.13E-14 2.80E-14 1.46E-14 2.93E-15 1.76E-14 1.10E-14 1.60E-14 1.60E-14 1.75E-14 1.10E-14 9.62E-14 1.60E-14 3.33E-1 3 6.16E-13 5.11E-13 1.10E-14 1.10E-14 1.10E-14 1.10E-14 3.17E-14 3.23E-16 3.23E-16 3.23E-16 3.23E-16 3.23E-16 3.23E-16 3.23E-16 3.23E-16 1.10E-14 4.81 E-14 2.93E-15 Revision 0 Page 22 of 28 Revision 0 Page 22 of 28 Version 1.0 Page 2495 of 3726 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-TB Table 2-3b'FIRE AREA AILERF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN B ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CLERP LERF CLERP LERF ALERF 1-085/H 1.61E-10 1.60E-14 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 1.60E-14 1-085/I 1-085/J 1-085/K 1-085/L 1-085/M 1-085/N 1-085/P 1-085/Q 1-085/S 1-085/T 1-085/U 1-085N 1-085/W 1-085/X 1-085/Y 1-085/Z 1-087/E 1-087/F 1-087/G 1-088/El 1-088/E2 1-088/E3 1-088/Fl 1-088/F2 1 -088/F3 1-088/G1 1-088/G2 1-088/G3 1-088/Hi 1-088/H2 1-088/H3 1-088/I1 1-088/12 1-088/13 1-088/J 1-088/K 1-088/L 1-TB-ADJ/TURBFAIL 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E- 10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.60E-14 1.60E-14 1.05E-13 2.93E-15 1.05E-1 3 1.05E-13 8.78E-15 2.51 E-14 2.51 E-14 2.51 E-14 1.60E-14 6.41 E-14 2.80E-14 2.80E-14 1.76E-14 5.86E-1 5 4.30E-1 3 4.30E-1 3 5.85E-15 2.64E-1 6 2.64E-14 7.54 E-15 3.81E-16 3.81 E-14 1.09E-14 4.10E-16 4.10E-14 1.17E-14 2.64E-1 6 2.64E-14 7.54E-15 1.46E-16 1.46E-14 4.19E-15 2.80E-14 2.80E-14 2.80E-14 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.00F4-00 0.OOE+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOF+00 0.00F4-00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 1.60E-14 1.60E-14 1.05E-13 2.93E-15 1.05E-13 1.05E-13 8.78E-15 2.51 E-14 2.51 E-14 2.51E-14 1.60E-14 6.41 E-14 2.80E-14 2.80E-14 1.76E-14 5.86E-15 4.30E-13 4.30E-1 3 5.85E-15 2.64E-16 2.64E-14 7.54E-15 3.81 E-16 3.81 E-14 1.09E-14 4.10E-16 4.10E-14 1.17E-14 2.64E-16 2.64E-14 7.54E-15 1.46E-16 1.46E-14 4.19E-15 2.80E-14 2.80E-14 2.80E-14 Total LERF ar 1 -N/A indicates 8.89E-10 1.70E-15 O.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 1.70E-15 id delta LERF 3.88E-12 0.OOE+00 3.88E-12 at quantification is not applicable and 0.00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.Revision 0 Page 23 of 28 Version 1.0 Page 2496 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-T13 3.0 DID EVALUATION 3.1 Defense-in-Depth Evaluation A review of the impact of the change on defense-in-depth (DID) was performed.
NFPA 805 defines DID as:* Preventing fires from starting* Rapidly detecting fires and controlling and extinguishing promptly those fires that do occur, thereby limiting damage Providing adequate level of fire protection for structures, systems and components important to safety; so that a fire that is not promptly extinguished will not prevent essential plant safety functions from being performed.
In general, the DID requirement was considered satisfied if the proposed change does not result in a substantial imbalance among these elements (or echelons).
The review of DID was qualitative and addressed each of the elements with respect to the proposed change. Fire protection features and systems relied upon to ensure DID were identified in the assessment (e.g., detection, suppression system).The VFDRs and the associated Fire Area risk (CDF) and scenario consequences (CCDP values)were evaluated to identify general DID echelon imbalances.
Potential methods to balance the DID features were identified ensuring an adequate balance of DID features is maintained for the Fire Area. See Section 3.2 for the results of the evaluation.
3.2 Defense-in-Depth Review Results A review of defense in depth and risk evaluation results show that, given the systems and features specified in Table 3-1 and Section 2 respectively, risk acceptance criteria are met and that the balance of defense in depth is maintained.
However due to uncertainties associated with analytical methods and the existence of significant fuel packages in the area, it is deemed prudent to require detection to ensure prompt fire brigade response.In the event of no intervention by the plant fire brigade, it is not expected that a credible fire would develop which would not be bounded by the analyzed scenarios.
Based on the systems/features specified above, no additional DID systems/features are warranted and the ability to meet nuclear performance criteria is ensured.The table below summarizes how an adequate balance of DID is maintained.
Table 3-1 Defense-in-Depth Impact Review Method of Providing DID Discussion Echelon 1: Prevent fires from starting Combustible Control No change necessary to procedure(s) 
/guidance document(s).
1 Hot Work Control No change necessary to procedure(s) 
/guidance document(s).
Echelon 2: Rapidly detect, control and extinguish promptly those fires that do occur thereby limiting fire damage Detection System Detection systems are installed in Zones 1-085, 1-087 and 1-088 and are required.Revision 0 Page 24 of 28 Version 1.0 Page 2497 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area I JB Table 3-1 Defense-in-Depth Impact Review Method of Providing DID Discussion Automatic Fire Suppression Automatic suppression system installed in Zones 1-084, 1-085, 1-087 and 1-088, but are not required.Portable Fire Extinguishers Portable extinguishers are available, but no enhancements required.
1 Hose stations and hydrants Fire hose cabinets are available, but no enhancements required.
1 located in the area(s)Pre-Fire Plan No change necessary to procedure(s) 
/guidance document(s).
1 Echelon 3: Provide adequate level of fire protection for systems and structures so that a fire will not prevent essential safety functions from being performed Walls, floors ceilings and structural No changes necessary to existing barriers.
1 elements are rated or have been evaluated as adequate for the hazard.Openings in the fire barrier are rated No changes necessary to existing barrier openings.
1 or have been evaluated as adequate for the hazard.Supplemental barriers (e.g., ERFBS, No supplemental barriers installed and not required.cable tray covers, etc.)Guidance provided to operations No VFDR related DID recovery actions required.personnel detailing the credited success path(s) including recovery actions to achieve nuclear safety performance criteria.This fire protection feature is relied upon without further DID enhancements beyond inherent programmatic requirements of NFPA 805, Chap. 3 and will not be reported in Table 5-2.3.2.1 Required Modifications There are no modifications required as a result of the DID evaluation for this fire area.3.2.2 Required Recovery Actions There are no required recovery actions as a result of the DID evaluation for this fire area.4.0 SAFETY MARGIN EVALUATION 4.1 Safety Margin Evaluation In accordance with NEI 04-02, 5.3.5.3 guidance, the maintenance of adequate Safety Margin is assessed by the consideration of categories of analyses utilized by this fire risk evaluation (FRE).Safety margins are considered to be maintained if:* Codes and standards or their alternatives accepted for use by the NRC are met, and* Safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) are met, or provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty.
The maintenance of adequate safety margin for the change analysis is described for each of the specific analysis types used in support of the fire risk assessment.
Revision 0 Page 25 of 28 Version 1.0 Page 2498 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-TB 4.1.1 Fire Modeling Fire modeling performed in support of the transition has been performed within the Fire PRA utilizing codes and standards developed by industry and NRC staff to provide realistic yet conservative results. Specifically, the heat release rates utilized in the transition analysis are based upon NUREG/CR 6850, Task 8, Scoping Fire Modeling.
These heat release rates are conservative and represent values used to screen out fixed ignition sources that do not pose a threat to the targets within specific fire compartments and to assign severity factors to unscreened fixed ignition sources.The combined analysis approach is used during transition; therefore, maximum expected fire scenario/limiting fire scenario have not been analyzed separately.
The bases for the application of these fire modeling codes and standards were not altered in support of this FRE.4.1.2 Plant System Performance Plant system performance parameters were not modified as a result of this FRE. These performance parameters were originally established to support nuclear performance criteria contained in the plant specific accident analyses.
These analyses established component and system performance criteria necessary to establish safe and stable plant operation, as well as, safe shut down of the unit in the event of a fire. These performance parameters were not modified as a result of this FRE.4.2 Safety Margin Results All analyses and assessment have been performed utilizing accepted techniques and industry accepted standards.
In addition, safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) have been considered and provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty.
As such, the Safety Margins are maintained as discussed in Section 4.1.5.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION RESULTS 5.1 Dispositions of VFDRs Based on the FRE results contained in Sections 2, 3 and 4 the VFDRs identified in Section 1.1 have been resolved as follows: Table 5-1 Final Variance Disposition VFDR ID Disposition U2-1-TB-SEP-001 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Revision 0 Page 26 of 28 Version 1.0 Page 2499 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-TB 5.2 Fire Risk Evaluation Summary of Fire Protection Systems and Features Table 5-2 Summary of Required Fire Protection Systems and Features Required Required Required Fire FireSuppression Detection Protection Feature Required Fire Protection System and Feature Details System System (R, D)(R, D) (R, D)U2 1-TB 1-084 None None None 1-085 None D None D -Detection system 1-087 None D None D -Detection system R -Suppression system;D -Detection system Required Suppression/Detection/Feature:
required in the Fire Area based on NFPA 805 Chapter 4 compliance.
The information is provided on a zone basis. The basis for the requirement of the fire protection system is designated as follows:* R -Risk Criteria:
Systems required to meet the Risk Criteria for the Performance-Based Approach (NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4)* D -Defense-in-depth Criteria:
Systems required to maintain adequate balance of Defense-in-Depth for a Performance-Based Approach (NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4)Fire Protection Features in this Table only refer to those features installed in the Fire Area that have a corresponding NFPA 805, Chapter 3 requirement.
5.3 Summary of Recovery Actions No recovery actions are required for this fire area.5.4 Summary of Plant Modifications No modifications are required for this fire area.Revision 0 Page 27 of 28 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 1-TB 5.5 Fire Area Risk Summary Table 5-3 -Fire Area Risk Summary Fire Area Area Description NFPA 805 Fire Area CDF/LERF VFDR RAs Fire Risk Eval Additional Risk of RAs Basis (Yes/No) (Yes/No) A CDF/LERF U2 1-TB Turbine Building General 4.2.4 1.61E-08/3.88E-12 Yes No 1.61E-08/3.88E-12 N/A Area Revision 0 Page 28 of 28 Revision 0 Page 28 of 28 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-001 SE-C051 326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-001 Attachment 
-Unit 2 Fire Area 2-001 FRE for Fire Area Aux Building Revision:
1 Fire PRA Preparer Fire PRA Reviewer Fire Protection Preparer Fire Protection Reviewer NSCA Preparer NSCA Reviewer FRE Preparer FRE Reviewer Name Jonathan Hedrick Clint Pierce Rebecca Puckett Robert Kirkpatrick Larry Valmonte Dan Funk Micky Heatherly Brandon Jamar Revision I Page 1 of 34 Version 1.0 Page 2502 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-001 1.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION INPUT .....................................................................
4 1.1 Variances from the Deterministic Requirements 
....................................
4 1.2 Fire Protection Systems and Features ..................................................
8 1.2.1 Construction 
................ 
: ......................
9 1.2 .2 D e te ctio n ................................................................................... 
..9 1.2.3 Fixed Fire Suppression 
...............................................................
9 1.2.4 Manual Suppression 
...................................................................
9 1.2.5 Ventilation (Smoke Removal) ....................................................
9 1.2.6 Other Fire Protection Features ..................................................
10 1.2.7 Fire Hazard Identification 
..........................................................
10 1.2 .8 Fire P R A Input ......................................................................... 
..10 2.0 RISK EVALUATION 
.......................................................................................
10 2.1 Fire PRA Variant Case Calculation 
.......................................................
10 2.2 Compliant Case Calculation 
..................................................................
14 2.2.1 VFDRs Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA ............................
14 2.2.2 VFDRs Not Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA .....................
17 2.2.3 Compliant Case Results ...........................................................
18 2.2.4 Required Modifications 
.............................................................
22 2.2.5 Required Recovery Actions .......................................................
22 2.3 Risk Evaluation Results ......................................................................
22 3.0 DID EVALUATION 
.........................................................................................
26 3.1 Defense-in-Depth Evaluation 
...............................................................
26 3.2 Defense-in-Depth Review Results ......................................................
27 3.2.1 Required Modifications 
.............................................................
28 3.2.2 Required Recovery Actions .......................................................
28 4.0 SAFETY MARGIN EVALUATION 
..................................................................
28 4.1 Safety Margin Evaluation 
....................................................................
28 4 .1.1 F ire M ode ling .......................................................................... 
..28 4.1.2 Plant System Performance 
......................................................
29 4.2 Safety Margin Results ..........................................................................
29 5.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION RESULTS .............................................................
29 5.1 Dispositions of VFDRs ........................................................................
29 5.2 Fire Risk Evaluation Summary of Fire Protection Systems and Features 31 Revision 1 Page 2 of 34 Version 1.0 Page 2503 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-001 SE-C051 326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-001 5.3 5.4 5.5 Summary of Recovery Actions .............................................................
33 Summary of Plant Modifications 
..........................................................
33 Fire Area Risk Summary .......................................................................
34 Revision 1 Page 3 of 34 Version 1.0 Page 2504 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-001 1.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION INPUT 1.1 Variances from the Deterministic Requirements The VFDRs identified for evaluation for Unit 2, Fire Area 2-001, Unit 2 Aux Building are: Table 1-1 VFDRs VFDR Component(s)
Description U2-2-001-Q2R15A0006:ENER A fault on the impacted power cable coupled with a loss of control ASSO-001 GIZED:ENERGIZED-power to the associated load breaker could result in the credited Bus SUT2A, 4160V 2F supply breaker tripping.
This would result in a loss of AC power to SWITCHGEAR BUS Switchgear 2F. This is an associated circuits common power supply 2F issue and needs to be dispositioned accordingly.
Failure to establish vital AC power challenges various Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-001-Q2R15A0007:ENER A fault on the impacted power cable coupled with a loss of control ASSO-002 GIZED:ENERGIZED-power to the associated load breaker could result in the credited Bus SUT2B, 4160V 2G supply breaker tripping.
This would result in a loss of AC power to SWITCHGEAR BUS Switchgear 2G. This is an associated circuits common power supply 2G issue and needs to be dispositioned accordingly.
Failure to establish vital AC power challenges various Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-001-Q2R42BO001A:ENE This component, DC BUS 2A, requires HVAC support to remain HVAC-001 RGIZED:ENERGIZE functional.
Failure to establish HVAC to support this electrical D-BC2C, 125V DC component will prevent the establishment of all Vital Power. This BUS 2A failure poses a challenge to HVAC support Vital Auxiliaries Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-001-Q2R42EO001B:ENE This component, Battery Charger 2B, requires HVAC support to HVAC-002 RGIZED:ENERGIZE remain functional.
Failure to establish HVAC to support this electrical D, BATTERY component will prevent the establishment of all Vital Power. This CHARGER 2B failure poses a challenge to HVAC support Vital Auxiliaries Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-001-Q2R15A0007:ENER This component, Switchgear 2G, requires HVAC support to remain HVAC-003 GIZED:ENERGIZED-functional.
Failure to establish HVAC to support this electrical SUT2A, 4160V component will prevent the establishment of all Vital Power. This SWITCHGEAR BUS failure poses a challenge to HVAC support Vital Auxiliaries Nuclear 2G Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-001-Q2N23PO001A:OFF:
This component, AFW Pump 2A, requires HVAC support to remain HVAC-004 ON/OFF, 2A MDAFW functional.
The Auxiliary Feedwater Pump is required to supply PUMP feedwater to the Steam Generators in order to remove decay heat. A loss of the associated Pump Room Coolers due to fire induced circuit failure could prevent the availability of Pump 2A. Failure to ensure the availability of Pump 2A challenges the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-2-001-Q2R42E0002B:AVAI This component, Battery 2B, requires HVAC support to remain HVAC-005 LABLE:AVAILABLE, functional.
Failure to establish HVAC to support this electrical 125V BATTERY 2B component will prevent the establishment of all Vital Power. This failure poses a challenge to HVAC support Vital Auxiliaries Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.Revision I Page 4 of 34 Revision 1 Page 4 of 34 Version 1.0 Page 2505 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-001 Table 1-1 VFDRs VFDR Component(s)
Description U2-2-001-IA-Q2B31V0061:CLOSE This component requires instrument air to perform its credited 001 D:OPEN/CLOSED, function.
Instrument air is assumed to be unavailable in this fire area PRESSURIZER because air loss paths have not been identified.
The Pressurizer POWER OPERATED Power Relief Valve is required to cycle in order to de-pressurize the RELIEF VALVE RCS System. A loss of instrument air will result in the valve failing in the closed position.
An inability to cycle the Pressurizer Power Relief Valve challenges the RCS Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-2-001-IA-Q2E21V0347:MODU This component requires instrument air to perform its credited 002 LATED:MODULATE, function.
Instrument air is assumed to be unavailable in this fire area CHARGING FLOW because air loss paths have not been identified.
Flow control Valve CONTROL VALVE V0347 permits normal charging flow to be injected into the RCS system. Instrument air is required to control the flow and thus charging inventory that is injected into the RCS Cold Legs. A loss of instrument air could result in this valve failing in the open position.
Failure to throttle flow to the RCS system challenges the RCS Inventory/Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-001-IA-Q2N1 1PV3371A:CL This component requires instrument air to perform its credited 003 OSED:MODULATE, function.
Instrument air is assumed to be unavailable in this fire area MAIN STEAM because air loss paths have not been identified.
Atmospheric relief on ATMOS RELIEF the secondary side is necessary in order to achieve a controlled cooldown rate. Failure to modulate the SG 2A ARV due to a loss of instrument air would cause the valve to fail closed, thereby isolating the secondary side. This failure challenges the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-2-001-SEP-N2B21TR0413:AVAI Decay Heat removal via SG 2A is desired in this Fire Area. RCS 001 LABLE- Temperature Indication at the control room (or local control center) is TE413:AVAILABLE-required in order to remove decay heat through the steam generators.
TE413, RCS HOT Fire induced circuit failure to TR0413 could prevent RCS Loop 1 LEG Temperature indication from being available at the control room.TEMPERATURE These failures challenge the Decay Heat Removal Performance RECORDER TR-413 Criterion.
U2-2-001-SEP-Q2B41PO001C:ON:O The Reactor Coolant pumps are required to remain off in order to 002 FF, RCP 2C maintain natural circulation cooldown conditions.
Spurious start of the Reactor Coolant Pump due to fire induced hot shorts could lead to an uncontrolled cooldown rate. Failure to secure the Reactor Coolant Pumps challenge the RCS Inventory Control/Pressure Control Performance Criteria.U2-2-001-SEP-Q2E13PT0950:AVAI Fire induced circuit failure of PT950 could initiate a spurious CSAS 003 LABLE:AVAILABLE, signal, by initiating a loss of containment pressure signal. A spurious CONTAINMENT CSAS Signal could result in spurious start of the containment spray PRESSURE pumps, thus drawing suction from the RWST, and depleting its TRANSMITTER inventory.
Alternatively the spurious signal could open the discharge PROTECTION path for the pump. A loss of RWST inventory challenges the RCS CHANNEL I Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
Revision 1 Page 5 of 34 Version 1.0 Page 2506 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-001 Table 1-1 VFDRs VFDR Component(s)
Description U2-2-001-SEP-Q2E13PT0951:AVAI Fire induced circuit failure of PT951 could initiate a spurious CSAS 004 LABLE:AVAILABLE, and/or SIAS signal, by initiating a loss of containment pressure signal.CONTAINMENT A spurious CSAS Signal could result in spurious start of the PRESSURE containment spray pumps, thus drawing suction from the RWST, and TRANSMITTER depleting its inventory.
Alternatively the spurious signal could open the PROTECTION discharge path for the pump. A spurious SIAS Signal could result in CHANNEL II spurious isolation of the charging injection path, due to closure of Valves 8107 and 8108, and a failure to establish a charging injection path. Failure to establish a charging path or loss of RWST inventory challenges the RCS Inventory/Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-001-SEP-Q2E13PT0952:AVAI Fire induced circuit failure of PT952 could initiate a spurious CSAS 005 LABLE:AVAILABLE, and/or SIAS signal, by initiating a loss of containment pressure signal.CONTAINMENT A spurious CSAS Signal could result in spurious start of the PRESSURE containment spray pumps, thus drawing suction from the RWST, and TRANSMITTER depleting its inventory.
Alternatively the spurious signal could open the PROTECTION discharge path for the pump. A spurious SIAS Signal could result in CHANNEL III spurious isolation of the charging injection path, due to closure of Valves 8107 and 8108, and a failure to establish a charging injection path. Failure to establish a charging path or loss of RWST inventory challenges the RCS Inventory/Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-001-SEP-Q2E21V0347:MODU Flow control Valve V0347 permits normal charging flow to be injected 006 LATED:MODULATE, into the RCS system. Instrument air is required to control the flow and CHARGING FLOW thus charging inventory that is injected into the RCS Cold Legs. Fire CONTROL VALVE induced circuit failure could result in this valve failing in the open position.
Failure the throttle flow to the RCS system challenges the RCS Inventory/Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-001-SEP-Q2E21V0376A:OPE The Volume Control Tank Outlet Isolation valves must initially remain 007 N:OPEN, VCT open to establish a charging lineup before suction is re-aligned to the OUTLET ISOLATION RWST. Fire induced circuit failure to the outlet valves (V376A and V376B) could result in the valves spuriously closing and isolating the VCT before swap over can be established.
Both valves must remain open. This failure challenges the RCS Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-2-001-SEP-Q2E21V0376B:OPE The Volume Control Tank Outlet Isolation valves must close in order 008 N:CLOSED, VCT to align charging suction to the RWST. Fire induced circuit failure to OUTLET ISOLATION valve Q2E21VO376B could result in the valve failing to closed (it is directly in the fire area too). Failure to isolate the VCT would impact the credited charging lineup. This failure challenges the RCS Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-2-001-SEP-Q2E21V0376B:OPE The Volume Control Tank Outlet Isolation valves must initially remain 009 N:OPEN, VCT open to establish a charging lineup before suction is re-aligned to the OUTLET ISOLATION RWST. Fire induced circuit failure to the outlet valves (V376A and V376B) could result in the valves spuriously closing and isolating the VCT before swap over can be established.
Both valves must remain open. This failure challenges the RCS Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-2-001-SEP-Q2N1 1 PV3371A:CL Atmospheric relief must be isolated on the secondary side initially.
010 OSED:CLOSED, Spurious opening of the Atmospheric Relief Valve PV3371A (SG 2A)MAIN STEAM could result from fire induced circuit failure. This failure challenges the ATMOS RELIEF Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
Revision I Page 6 of 34 Revision 1 Page 6 of 34 Version 1.0 Page 2507 of 3726 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-001 Table 1-1 VFDRs VFDR Component(s)
Description U2-2-001-SEP-Q2N11PV3371B:CL Atmospheric relief must be isolated on the secondary side initially.
011 OSED:CLOSED, Spurious opening of the Atmospheric Relief Valve PV3371 B (SG 2B)MAIN STEAM could result from fire induced circuit failure. This failure challenges the ATMOS RELIEF Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-2-001-SEP-Q2N11PV3371C:CL Atmospheric relief must be isolated on the secondary side initially.
012 OSED:CLOSED, Spurious opening of the Atmospheric Relief Valve PV3371C (SG 2C)MAIN STEAM could result from fire induced circuit failure. This failure challenges the ATMOS RELIEF Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-2-001-SEP-Q2N12VO001B:CLO The TDAFW Pump is not credited for use in this fire area. Fire induced 013 SED:CLOSED, circuit failure to HV3235B could result in the valve spuriously opening, TDAFP STEAM and thus spurious steam admission to the TDAFW Pump. Spurious SUPPLY ISOLATION start of the pump could result in an overcooling condition to the VALVE HV3235B respective steam generator, and pose a challenge to the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-2-001-SEP-Q2E21V0336A:CLOS Valve LCV-0115B provides suction to the charging pumps from the 014 ED:OPEN, RWST TO RWST. Fire induced cable damage that would prevent opening of the CHARGING PUMP valve would pose a challenge to the RCS Reactivity Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-2-001-SEP-Q2N1 1 PV3371A:CL Atmospheric relief on the secondary side is necessary in order to 015 OSED:MODULATE, achieve a controlled cooldown rate. Failure to modulate the SG 2A MAIN STEAM ARV due to fire induced circuit failure would cause the valve to fail ATMOS RELIEF closed, thereby isolating the secondary side. This failure challenges the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-2-001-SEP-Q2P1 5SV3765:CLOS The Sampling System must remain isolated at all times in order to 016 ED:OPEN/CLOSED, ensure that RCS Inventory losses do not inadvertently occur. Spurious RCS HOT LEG opening of the RCS Sample Isolation Valves SV3333 or SV3765 due SAMPLE ISOLATION to fire induced circuit failure could result in an inadvertent diversion SOLENOID flowpath for RCS Inventory.
This failure challenges the RCS Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-2-001-SEP-Q2P15SV3104:CLOS The Sampling System must remain isolated at all times in order to 017 ED:OPEN/CLOSED, ensure that RCS Inventory losses do not inadvertently occur. Spurious PRESSURIZER opening of the Pressurizer Sample Gas Isolation Valves SV31043 or STEAM SAMPLE SV3331 due to fire induced circuit failure could result in an inadvertent ISOLATION diversion flowpath for RCS Inventory.
This failure challenges the RCS Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-2-001-SEP-Q2P15SV3103:CLOS The Sampling System must remain isolated at all times in order to 018 ED:OPEN/CLOSED, ensure that RCS Inventory losses do not inadvertently occur. Spurious PRESSURIZER opening of the Pressurizer Sample Liquid Isolation Valves SV3103 or LIQUID SAMPLE SV3332 due to fire induced circuit failure could result in an inadvertent ISOLATION diversion flowpath for RCS Inventory.
This failure challenges the RCS Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-2-001-SEP-Q2E13PT0953:AVAI Fire induced circuit failure of PT953 could initiate a spurious CSAS 019 LABLE:AVAILABLE, and/or SIAS signal, by initiating a loss of containment pressure signal.CONTAINMENT A spurious CSAS Signal could result in spurious start of the PRESSURE containment spray pumps, thus drawing suction from the RWST, and TRANSMITTER depleting its inventory.
Alternatively the spurious signal could open the PROTECTION discharge path for the pump. A spurious SIAS Signal could result in CHANNEL IV spurious isolation of the charging injection path, due to closure of Valves 8107 and 8108, and a failure to establish a charging injection path. Failure to establish a charging path or loss of RWST inventory challenges the RCS Inventory/Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.Revision 1 Page 7 of 34 Version 1.0 Page 2508 of 3726 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-001 1.2 Fire Protection Systems and Features Fire Area 2-001 consists of Fire Zones: 0 2101 -Waste Gas Decay Tank Room -EL. 83'-0"* 2102 -Valve Compartment Room -EL. 83'-0"* 2103 -Corridor-EL. 83'-0".2104 -Passageway to Unit 1 -EL. 83'-0" N 2105 -Catalytic H2 Recombiner I A Room- EL. 83'-0" N 2106- Catalytic H2 Recombiner 11B Room-EL. 83'-0" M 2108 -Waste Monitor Tank Room -EL. 83'-0" a 2109 -Waste Monitor Tank Pump Room -EL. 83'-0" 0 2110 -Monitor Control Panel Room -EL. 83'-0" 0 2111 -Containment Spray Pump Room IA -El. 77'-0" 0 2112 -Access to Tendon Access Gallery -El. 77'-0" 0 2113 -Valve Encapsulation 
-El. 77'-0" a 2114 -Pipe Chase -El. 77'-0" 0 2115 -Hallway -El. 77'-0" N 2118 -Floor Drain Tank Room -EL. 83'-0" a 2119 -Waste Holdup Tank Room -EL. 83'-0" 0 2120 -Corridor-EL. 83'-0"* 2121 -Floor Drain Tank Pump Room -EL. 83'-0"* 2122 -Waste Evaporator Feed Pump Room -EL. 83'-0"* 2123 -Pipe Chase- EL. 83'-0", 100'-0", 121'-0"* 2124 -Valve Encapsulation 
-El. 77'-0"* 2125 -Containment Spray Pump Room 1B -El. 77'-0"* 2126- Pipe Chase -El. 77'-0"* 2127- Pipe Chase -EL. 83'-0"* 2128 -RHR Heat Exchanger Room -EL. 83'-0"* 2129- RHR Low Head Pump Room -EL. 83'-0"* 2130 -Pipe Chase -EL. 83'-0"* 2131 -RHR Low Head Pump Room -EL. 83'-0"* 2169 -Duct and Pipe Chase -EL. 100'-0"* 2183 -Tendon Access Gallery Entrance -EL. 100'-0"* 2184 -Piping Penetration Room, El. 100'-0" Revision 1 Page 8 of 34 Version 1.0 Page 2509 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-001 0 2196 -Access to Tendon Access Gallery 0 2223 -Piping Penetration Room, El. 121'-0" 1.2.1 Construction Barriers for this fire area are of substantial construction and have been designed and constructed to meet separation requirements.
In the event the configuration utilized is not in accordance with recognized standards, the deviations have been evaluated to be adequate for the hazard.1.2.2 Detection Fire detection systems to provide notification to the Control Room are: " Fire Zones 2101 -2106 are provided with detection." Fire Zones 2108 -2111 are provided with detection." Fire Zone 2113 is provided with detection." Fire Zones 2118 -2122 are provided with detection." Fire Zones 2124 -2125 are provided with detection." Fire Zones 2128 -2129 are provided with detection." Fire Zone 2131 is provided with detection." Fire Zones 2183 -2184 are provided with detection." Fire Zone 2223 is provided with detection.
1.2.3 Fixed Fire Suppression Fixed fire suppression systems to aid in control of both fire growth and spread in the fire area are:* Fire Zone 2223 is provided with suppression that covers the western half of the piping penetration room (Fire Zone 2223) on elevation 121"-0" The floor area of Fire Zone 2184, beneath the covered tendon hatchway into Fire Zone 2223 (above), is the only portion of Fire Area 2-001 that is protected by suppression.
1.2.4 Manual Suppression Manual suppression equipment to be utilized by plant personnel and/or fire brigade members are:* Fire Area 2-001 is provided with CO 2 or dry chemical portable fire extinguishers located in zones 2105, 2106, and 2110.* A fire hose cabinet is located in zone 2209 (Fire Area 2-004).* A CO 2 hose reel is located in zone 2161 (Fire Area 2-004).1.2.5 Ventilation (Smoke Removal)Portable smoke ejectors are available to assist with smoke removal.Revision 1 Page 9 of 34 Version 1.0 Page 2510 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-001 1.2.6 Other Fire Protection Features No additional fire protection features are required for this fire risk evaluation.
1.2.7 Fire Hazard Identification The major sources of combustibles in Fire Area 2-001 are cable insulation, flammable gas bottles, lube oil, storage lockers, hydrogen (in gas decay tanks), panels, charcoal filters, fiberglass and plastic. Details regarding fire scenarios quantified in the fire PRA, and their associated ignition sources (where applicable) are discussed in Section 2.1.2.8 Fire PRA Input Fire protection features There are fire protection features specifically modeled in the Fire PRA as identified in the required plant modification section 2.2.4.Fire protection systems The Hot Gas Layer evaluation credits the detection system and manual fire brigade response.The Multi Compartment Analysis evaluation credits the detection system and manual fire brigade response.Hot Gas Layer Treatment This fire area screened for potential Hot Gas Layer effects on the Zone Of Influence.
Credit for detection was taken in the Hot Gas Layer evaluation for this fire area. Credit for manual fire brigade response was taken in the Hot Gas Layer evaluation for this fire area.Multi-compartment analysis Credit for detection was taken in the Multi Compartment Analysis for this fire area. Credit for manual fire brigade response was taken in the Multi Compartment Analysis for this fire area.Scenario Review All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0, ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency.
2.0 RISK EVALUATION 2.1 Fire PRA Variant Case Calculation Tables 2-la and 2-1b provide the results of the variant case calculation for Fire Area 2-001. This is taken directly from the Fire PRA model with no changes or alterations made. The CDF and LERF results are provided on a scenario basis.Revision 1 Page 10 of 34 Version 1.0 Page 2511 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-001 Table 2-1a Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train A Alignment Zone Scen ScenDesc1 IGF NSP SF CCDP CDF CLERP LERF (/rx-yr) (Irx-yr) (/rx-yr)2101 2102 2103 2105 2106 2108 2109 2110 2111 2112 2113 2114 2115 2118 2119 2120 2121 2122 2123 2124 2125 2126 2127 2129 2130 2131 2169 A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE TRANSIENT 
-SOUTH EAST WALL BASE CASE BASE CASE TRANSIENT 2.39E-05 1.24E-04 2.21 E-05 4.11E-05 4.11E-05 2.30E-05 2.22E-04 4.09E-05 1.46E-04 2.20E-05 1.31E-04 2.20E-05 2.20E-05 2.23E-05 2.32E-05 2.37E-05 1.24E-04 1.23E-04 1.09E-04 1.31E-04 1.46E-04 2.20E-05 2.20E-05 1.46E-04 2.20E-05 1.46E-04 2.20E-05 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 5.85E-06 5.85E-06 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 5.85E-06 6.69E-07 1.61 E-06 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 1.18E-04 5.86E-06 5.86E-06 1.44E-05 6.69E-07 1.61 E-06 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 3.97E-05 6.69E-07 3.85E-05 6.69E-07 1.60E-11 8.27E-1 1 1.29E-10 2.40E-10 2.75E-1 1 1.54E-11 1.30E-09 2.73E-1 1 2.35E-10 1.48E-11 8.75E-1 1 1.48E-11 1.48E-11 1.49E-1 1 1.55E-11 2.81 E-09 7.29E-10 7.19E-10 1.57E-09 8.76E-1 1 2.35E-1 0 1.48E-11 1.48E-11 5.79E-09 1.48E-11 5.62E-09 1.48E-11 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.66E-09 1.66E-09 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.66E-09 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.21 E-07 1.66E-09 1.66E-09 2.54E-08 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 2.63E-08 1.61 E-10 2.72E-08 1.61 E-10 3.84E-1 5 1.99E-14 3.67E-14 6.81E-14 6.61 E-15 3.69E-15 3.68E-1 3 6.57E-1 5 2.35E-14 3.54E-15 2.10E-14 3.54E-1 5 3.54E-1 5 3.59E-1 5 3.73E-1 5 2.87E-12 2.06E-1 3 2.03E-1 3 2.78E-12 2.11E-14 2.35E-14 3.54E-1 5 3.54E-1 5 3.83E-12 3.54E-1 5 3.98E-12 3.54E-15 2183 D1 2184 A 2196 A 2223 D1 6.99E-06 1.0 1.0 6.69E-02 4.67E-07 1.08E-04 7.58E-10 1.37E-04 1.0 1.0 2.40E-04 3.29E-08 5.51E-07 7.55E-11 2.20E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 1.48E-11 1.61E-10 3.54E-15 1.75E-06 1.0 1.0 3.98E-05 6.97E-11 2.49E-08 4.37E-14 Revision I Page 11 of 34 Revision 1 Page 11 of 34 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-001 Table 2-1a Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train A Alignment Zone Scen ScenDesc 1  IGF NSP SF CCDP CDF CLERP LERF (/rx-yr) (Irx-yr) (/rx-yr)2223 D2 TRANSIENT 1.75E-06 1.0 1.0 7.07E-07 1.24E-12 2.80E-10 4.91E-16 2223 D3 TRANSIENT 1.75E-06 1.0 1.0 6.19E-03 1.08E-08 9.57E-06 1.68E-11 2223 D4 TRANSIENT 1.75E-06 1.0 1.0 3.98E-05 6.97E-11 2.49E-08 4.37E-14 2223 D5 TRANSIENT 1.75E-06 1.0 1.0 7.07E-07 1.24E-12 2.80E-10 4.91E-16 2223 D6 TRANSIENT 1.75E-06 1.0 1.0 6.19E-03 1.08E-08 9.57E-06 1.68E-11 Total CDF/LERF Fire PRA Variant Case 5.42E-07 8.81E-10 Table 2-1b Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train B Alignment Zone Scen ScenDesc 1  IGF NSP SF CCDP CDF CLERP LERF (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr) (Irx-yr)2101 A 2102 2103 2105 2106 2108 2109 2110 2111 2112 2113 2114 2115 2118 2119 2120 2121 2122 2101 A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE 2.39E-05 1.24E-04 2.21 E-05 4.11E-05 4.11E-05 2.30E-05 2.22E-04 4.09E-05 1.46E-04 2.20E-05 1.31E-04 2.20E-05 2.20E-05 2.23E-05 2.32E-05 2.37E-05 1.24E-04 1.23E-04 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.26E-06 6.26E-06 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.26E-06 6.64E-07 1.61 E-06 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 1.18E-04 6.28E-06 6.28E-06 1.59E-11 8.21E-11 1.39E-10 2.57E-10 2.73E-1 1 1.53E-1 1 1.39E-09 2.71 E-11 2.34E-10 1.46E-11 8.69E-1 1 1.46E-1 1 1.46E-1 1 1.48E-1 1 1.54E-1 1 2.81 E-09 7.80E-10 7.70E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.66E-09 1.66E-09 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.66E-09 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.21E-07 1.66E-09 1.66E-09 3.84E-15 1.99E-14 3.67E-14 6.81E-14 6.61E-15 3.69E-1 5 3.68E-1 3 6.57E-1 5 2.35E-14 3.54E-15 2.10E-14 3.54E-1 5 3.54E-1 5 3.59E-1 5 3.73E-1 5 2.87E-12 2.06E-13 2.03E-13 Revision I Page 12 of 34 Revision 1 Page 12 of 34 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-001 Table 2-1b Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train B Alignment Zone Scen ScenDesc 1  IGF NSP SF CCDP CDF CLERP LERF (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr)2123 A BASE CASE 1.09E-04 1.0 1.0 1.45E-05 1.58E-09 2.54E-08 2.78E-12 2124 A BASE CASE 1.31E-04 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 8.70E-11 1.61E-10 2.11E-14 2125 A BASE CASE 1.46E-04 1.0 1.0 1.61E-06 2.35E-10 1.61E-10 2.35E-14 2126 A BASE CASE 2.20E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 1.46E-11 1.61E-10 3.54E-15 2127 A BASE CASE 2.20E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 1.46E-11 1.61E-10 3.54E-15 2129 A BASE CASE 1.46E-04 1.0 1.0 3.88E-05 5.66E-09 2.65E-08 3.86E-12 2130 A BASE CASE 2.20E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 1.46E-11 1.61E-10 3.54E-15 2131 A BASE CASE 1.46E-04 1.0 1.0 3.95E-05 5.76E-09 2.71E-08 3.95E-12 2169 A BASE CASE 2.20E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 1.46E-11 1.61 E-10 3.54E-15 2183 D1 TRANSIENT -SOUTH EAST 6.99E-06 1.0 1.0 2.96E-02 2.07E-07 4.81E-05 3.36E-10 WALL 2184 A BASE CASE 1.37E-04 1.0 1.0 5.45E-04 7.47E-08 3.03E-06 4.15E-10 2196 A BASE CASE 2.20E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 1.46E-11 1.61E-10 3.54E-15 2223 D1 TRANSIENT 1.75E-06 1.0 1.0 3.89E-05 6.82E-11 2.51E-08 4.41E-14 2223 D2 TRANSIENT 1.75E-06 1.0 1.0 7.08E-07 1.24E-12 1.12E-09 1.97E-15 2223 D3 TRANSIENT 1.75E-06 1.0 1.0 6.09E-03 1.07E-08 9.42E-06 1.65E-11 2223 D4 TRANSIENT 1.75E-06 1.0 1.0 3.89E-05 6.82E-11 2.51E-08 4.41E-14 2223 D5 TRANSIENT 1.75E-06 1.0 1.0 7.08E-07 1.24E-12 1.12E-09 1.97E-15 2223 D6 TRANSIENT 1.75E-06 1.0 1.0 6.09E-03 1.07E-08 9.42E-06 1.65E-11 Total CDF/LERF Fire PRA Variant Case 3.23E-07 7.99E-10 Where: Zone = Fire Zone Scen = 'A' to signify the variant case ScenDesc = Description of the Fire Scenario IGF = Ignition Frequency 
(/rx-yr)NSP = Non Suppression Probability SF = Severity Factor CCDP = Conditional Core Damage Probability CDF = Core Damage Frequency 
(/rx-yr)CLERP = Conditional Large Early Release Probability LERF = Large Early Release Frequency (Irx-yr)1- 'Base Case' scenarios are complete room burnout and therefore do not identify specific ignition sources Revision I Page 13 of 34 Revision 1 Page 13 of 34 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-001 2.2 Compliant Case Calculation The following sub-sections provide the basis for modeling each VFDR (or category of VFDRs)and the alterations that have been made to the variant case to represent the compliant case. In each section a discussion of the VFDR (or the category of VFDRs) is provided.2.2.1 VFDRs Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA For VFDRs specifically modeled in the Fire PRA, a table outlining the actual changes made to the Fire PRA model for that VFDR is provided.
The table includes: " Component Numbers associated with the VFDR. In some cases, there may be additional Component Numbers listed that may be the power supplies or other supporting components" Basic Event(s) associated with the Components" Scenarios which affect the VFDR.For this fire area room 2183 is the only room evaluated for the model alterations.
All other rooms within this fire area have a CDF/LERF that will be used as a surrogate delta based on their CDF/LERF value.2.2.1.1 VFDRs U2-2-001-ASSO-001 and 002 The power cable associated with the 4kV SWGR is not routed in room 2183. Therefore, there is no scenario that has the power and control power cable affected and the delta risk associated with these VFDRs is epsilon." U2-2-001 -ASSO-00 I -Q2R 15A0006:ENERGIZED:ENERGIZED-SUT2A" U2-2-001 -ASSO-002 
-Q2R 15A0007:ENERGIZED:ENERGIZED-SUT2B 2.2.1.2 VFDRs U2-2-001-HVAC-001 and 002 There is no loss of HVAC in room 2183, therefore the delta risk associated with these VFDRs is epsilon." U2-2-001-HVAC-001 
-Q2R42B0001A:ENERGIZED:ENERGIZED-BC2C
* U2-2-001-HVAC-002 
-QIR42E000IB:ENERGIZED:ENERGIZED 2.2.1.3 VFDR U2-2-001-HVAC-004
* U2-2-001 -HVAC-004 
-Q2N23P000 1 A:OFF:ON/OFF Table 2-2-1 U2-2-001-HVAC-004 ALTERATIONS Component ID Basic Event BE Description Model Alterations Scenarios 2AFRC- FAILURE OF OPERATOR 2AFRC-RMCLR--
RMCLR--H-TO RESPOND TO RC FAN Zero 2183-Dl H-F F ALARM (OPEN ROOM DOOR) DURING A FIRE Model Alterations:
Failure mode probability set to nominal to eliminate fire contribution.
This model alteration is done in the Altered Events Table for the -COMPU2 scenario.Revision 1 Page 14 of 34 Version 1.0 Page 2515 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-001 2.2.1.4 VFDR U2-2-001 -IA-001 a U2-2-001-IA-001 
-Q2B331 V006 1:CLOSED:OPEN/CLOSED IA is lost in this area due to power failure, therefore the basic events identified below are altered to model the compliance for this VFDR.Table 2-2-2 U2-2-001-IA-001 ALTERATIONS Component ID Basic Event BE Description Model Alterations Scenarios Q2P19HV3611:O:
21AAVHV36 AOV HV 3611 0 11--V SPURIOUSLY CLOSES Model Alterations:
Failure mode probability set to nominal to eliminate fire contribution.
This model alteration is done in the Altered Events Table for the -COMPU2 scenario.2.2.1.5 VFDRs U2-2-001-IA-002, SEP-006" U2-2-001 -IA-002 -Q2E2 I V0347:MODULATED:MODULATE" U2-2-001-SEP-006 
-Q2E21V0347:MODULATED:MODULATE Table 2-2-3 U2-2-001-IA-002, SEP-006 ALTERATIONS Component ID Basic Event BE Description Model Alterations Scenarios CHARGING FLOW Q2E21V0347:M:M 122--K CONTROL VALVE FCV- Nominal 2183-Dl 122 FAILS TO CLOSE 2PZLI459A--
PRESSURIZER LEVEL--F INDICATOR LI-459A FAILS Model Alterations:
Failure mode probability set to nominal to eliminate fire contribution.
This model alteration is done in the Altered Events Table for the -COMPU2 scenario.2.2.1.6 VFDRs U2-2-001-IA-003 and SEP-015" U2-2-00 1 -IA-003 -Q2N 11 PV337 1 A:CLOSED:MODULATE" U2-2-001-SEP-015 
-Q2N11PV3371A:CLOSED:MODULATE Table 2-2-4 U2-2-001-IA-003 and 015 ALTERATIONS Component ID Basic Event BE Description Model Alterations Scenarios 2ACANSEQ ANNUNCIATOR 1 UA27:A:A N2H11ALBW14 Nominal 2183-Dl CIRCUITRY FAILS Model Alterations:
Failure mode probability set to nominal to eliminate fire contribution.
This model alteration is done in the Altered Events Table for the -COMPU2 scenario.2.2.1.7 VFDR U2-2-001-SEP-002 0 U2-2-001-SEP-002 
-Q2B41P0001C:ON:OFF To model the compliant case, the 2 out of 3 logic for the RCP temperature indicators, which are not credited in the fire PRA, needs to be set to a random failure probability.
For this, indicators A Revision 1 Page 15 of 34 Version 1.0 Page 2516 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-001 and B were chosen; these indicators, along with the other identified events will model the compliant case for any spurious operation of an RCP.Table 2-2-5 U2-2-001-SEP-002 ALTERATIONS Component ID Basic Event BE Description Model Alterations Scenarios Q2B41 POO1C:X:X 2RCP0001C RCP 2C SPURIOUSLY RE- Nominal 2183-Dl---- U STARTS Q2B41P0001C:ON 2RCP0001C Q X P000F RCP 2C FAILS TO TRIP Nominal 2183-Dl:X ---- F RCP 2B MOTOR BEARING RCP-TI 2 TEMPERATURE 1.OOE-04 2183-Dl INDICATOR FAILS RCP 2A MOTOR BEARING RCP-TI 1 TEMPERATURE 1.OOE-04 2183-Dl INDICATOR FAILS Model Alterations:
Failure mode probability set to nominal to eliminate fire contribution.
This model alteration is done in the Altered Events Table for the -COMPU2 scenario.2.2.1.8 VFDRs U2-2-001-SEP-003, 004, 005, 019 The cables and the transmitter's themselves are not located in room 2183.risk associated with these VFDR is epsilon." U2-2-001-SEP-003 
-Q2E 1 3PT0950:AVAILABLE:AVAILABLE" U2-2-00 I -SEP-004 -Q2E 13PT0951 :AVAILABLE:AVAILABLE
* U2-2-00 1 -SEP-005 -Q2E I3PT0952:AVAILABLE:AVAILABLE
* U2-2-001-SEP-019 
-Q2E13PT0953:AVAILABLE:AVAILABLE Therefore, the delta 2.2.1.9 VFDR U2-2-001-SEP-007 U2-2-001 -SEP-007 -Q2E2 1V0376A:OPEN:OPEN Table 2-2-6 U2-2-001 -SEP-007 ALTERATIONS Component ID Basic Event BE Description Model Alterations Scenarios VCT ISOLATION VALVE Q2E21V0376A:O:
2VCMVLCV CISLTOVAE E 0A1 VCM V 02E21LCV115C Nominal 2183-Dl SPURIOUSLY CLOSES Model Alterations:
Failure mode probability set to nominal to eliminate fire contribution.
This model alteration is done in the Altered Events Table for the -COMPU2 scenario.2.2.1.10 VFDRs U2-2-001-SEP-008, 009, 010, 011, 012, 013 The cables for the valve are not located in room 2183. Therefore, the delta risk associated with these VFDRs is epsilon." U2-2-001-SEP-008 
-Q2E21V0376B:OPEN:CLOSED" U2-2-001 -SEP-009 -Q2E2 I V0376B:OPEN:OPEN" U2-2-001-SEP-010 
-Q2N11PV3371A:CLOSED:CLOSED Revision 1 Page 16 of 34 Version 1.0 Page 2517 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-001" U2-2-001-SEP-01 1 -Q2Nl lPV3371B:CLOSED:CLOSED" U2-2-001-SEP-012 
-Q2N11PV3371C:CLOSED:CLOSED" U2-2-001-SEP-013 
-Q2N12V000IB:CLOSED:CLOSED 2.2.1.11 VFDR U2-2-001-SEP-014
* U2-2-001 -SEP-0 14 -Q2E2 1V0336A:CLOSED:OPEN Table 2-2-1 U2-2-001-SEP-014 ALTERATIONS Component ID Basic Event BE Description Model Alterations Scenarios 2HHMV 15 LCV-1 15B FAILS TO OPEN Q2E21V0336A:C:O DUE TO RANDOM Nominal 2183-Dl FAILURE Model Alterations:
Failure mode probability set to nominal to eliminate fire contribution.
This model alteration is done in the Altered Events Table for the -COMPU2 scenario.2.2.2 VFDRs Not Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA A Fire PRA was developed in accordance with the requirements of Part 4 "Requirements for Fires at Power PRA" of the ASME and ANS combined PRA Standard, ASME/ANS RA-Sa-2009, "Standard for Level 1/Large Early Release Frequency Probabilistic Risk Assessment for Nuclear Power Plant Applications".
Consistent with those requirements not all components required to meet the nuclear safety criteria need to be specifically modeled in the Fire PRA. The following VFDRs are associated with components not modeled in the Fire PRA: 2.2.2.1 VFDR U2-2-001-HVAC-003 4kV Switchgear 2G ventilation is not modeled in the fire PRA. Room Heat up calculations show that there will be no impact to the 4kV Switchgear Room due to loss of HVAC within the mission time of 24 hrs in the fire PRA. See calculation Fire PRA Logic Model for Farley Nuclear Plants, PRA-BC-F-11-004.a U2-2-00 1 -HVAC-003 
-Q2R 15A0007:ENERGIZED:ENERGIZED-SUT2A 2.2.2.2 VFDR U2-2-001-HVAC-005 Battery Room 2B ventilation is not modeled in the fire PRA. The Battery Room exhaust fan function is to remove the hydrogen that is generated fiorn the battery located within the room.The hydrogen production in the 24 hour mission time of the PRA is less than the required amount for a hydrogen burn; therefore the exhaust fan is not required to be modeled. See calculation Fire PRA Logic Model for Farley Nuclear Plants, PRA-BC-F-1 1-004.E U2-2-001-HVAC-005 
-Q2R42E0002B:AVAILABLE:AVAILABLE 2.2.2.3 VFDR U2-2-001-SEP-001 The NSCA credits the hot leg temperature recorder for monitoring of cool down. Hot Leg temperature is not a cue indication of operator actions credited in the fire PRA. Therefore, the loss of hot leg temperature recorder has no impact on the Fire PRA.Revision 1 Page 17 of 34 Version 1.0 Page 2518 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-001 SE-C051 326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-001 H U2-2-001-SEP-001 
-N2B21TRO413:AVAILABLE-TE413:AVAILABLE-TE413 2.2.2.4 VFDRs U2-2-001 -SEP-01 6, 017, 018 Normally the sample lines are closed by manual valves. During the sample line operation, the flow rate is limited to less than 1 gpm and the duration of sampling is about 20 minutes, typically.
Therefore, there is no modeling of the sample lines, see Table A-l, PRA-BC-F-11-002 Equipment Selection calculation." U2-2-00 1-SEP-016 
-Q2P 15SV3765:CLOSED:OPEN/CLOSED" U2-2-001-SEP-017 
-Q2P 15SV3104:CLOSED:OPEN/CLOSED" U2-2-001-SEP-018 
-Q2P 15SV3 t 03:CLOSED:OPEN/CLOSED 2.2.3 Compliant Case Results Tables 2-3a and 2-3b provide the results of the compliant case calculation for this fire area. All of the altered events identified in Section 2.2.1 have been applied to their respective scenarios and the results have been quantified.
The CDF and LERF results are provided on a scenario basis.Revision I Page 18 of 34 Revision 1 Page 18 of 34 Version 1.0 Page 2519 of 3726 SE-C051 326701-008Atamet-FEfrUi2Frera200 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-001 Table 2-3a Compliant Case CDF and LERF Results Train A Alignment Zone Scen Scenario Scenario Specific CCDP CDF CLERP LERF Description VFDRs (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr)SE-C051326701-008 2101 2102 2103 2105 2106 2108 2109 2110 2111 2112 2113 2114 2115 2118 2119 2120 2121 2122 2123 2124 2125 2126 2127 2129 2130 2131 2169 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 5,85E-06 5.85E-06 6,69E-07 6,69E-07 5,85E-06 6&69E-07 1.61 E-06 6,69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 1.18E-04 5.86E-06 5.86E-06 1.44E-05 6.69E-07 1.61 E-06 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 3.97E-05 6.69E-07 3.85E-05 6.69E-07 1.60E-11 1.61E-10 8.27E-11 1.61E-10 1.29E-10 1.66E-09 2.40E-10 1.66E-09 2.75E-11 1.61E-10 1.54E-11 1.61E-10 1.30E-09 1.66E-09 2.73E-11 1.61E-10 2.35E-10 1.61E-10 1.48E-11 1.61E-10 8.75E-11 1.61E-10 1.48E-11 1.61E-10 1.48E-11 1.61E-10 1.49E-11 1.61E-10 1.55E-11 1.61E-10 2.81 E-09 1.21 E-07 7.29E-10 1.66E-09 7.19E-10 1.66E-09 1.57E-09 2.54E-08 8.76E-11 1.61E-10 2.35E-10 1.61E-10 1.48E-11 1.61E-10 1.48E-11 1.61E-10 5.79E-09 2.63E-08 1.48E-11 1.61E-10 5.62E-09 2.72E-08 1.48E-11 1.61E-10 3.84 E- 15 1.99E-14 3.67E-14 6.81E-14 6.61E-15 3.69E-1 5 3.68E-13 6.57E-1 5 2.35E-14 3.54E-1 5 2.10E-14 3.54E-15 3.54E-15 3.59E-15 3.73E-1 5 2.87E-1 2 2.06E-13 2.03E-13 2.78E-12 2.11E-14 2.35E-14 3.54E-1 5 3.54E- 15 3.83E-12 3.54E-15 3.98E-12 3.54E-1 5 T R A N S IE N T -U 2 2 0 1 -V C 0 4 A 0 1 0 2 , 0 3 2183 D1-COMPU2 SOUTH EAST U2-2-001-HVAC-004, IA-0, 01, 0 003, 2.59E-02 1.81 E-07 4.23E-05 2.95E-10 213W-OPU OT AST SEP-002, 006, 007, 014, 015 WALL 2184 A-COMPU2 BASE CASE N/A 2.13E-05 2.92E-09 4.97E-08 6.82E-12 2196 A-COMPU2 BASE CASE N/A 6.69E-07 1.48E-11 1.61E-10 3.54E-15 Revision 1 Page 19 of 34 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-001 Table 2-3a Compliant Case CDF and LERF Results Train A Alignment Zone Scen Scenario Scenario Specific CCDP CDF CLERP LERF Description VFDRs (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr)2223 D1-COMPU2 TRANSIENT N/A 3.97E-05 6.97E-11 2.49E-08 4.37E-14 2223 D2-COMPU2 TRANSIENT N/A 7.07E-07 1.24E-12 2.80E-10 4.91E-16 2223 D3-COMPU2 TRANSIENT N/A 1.10E-05 1.92E-11 3.39E-09 5.95E-15 2223 D4-COMPU2 TRANSIENT N/A 3.97E-05 6.97E-11 2.49E-08 4.37E-14 2223 D5-COMPU2 TRANSIENT N/A 7.07E-07 1.24E-12 2.80E-10 4.91E-16 2223 D6-COMPU2 TRANSIENT N/A 1.1OE-05 1.92E-11 3.39E-09 5.95E-15 Compliant Scenario Total CDF and LERF 2.04E-07 3.17E-10 Table 2-3b Compliant Case CDF and LERF Results Train B Alignment Zone Scen Scenario Scenario Specific CCDP CDF CLERP LERF Description VFDRs (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr)2101 2102 2103 2105 2106 2108 2109 2110 2111 2112 2113 2114 2115 2118 2119 2120 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMP U2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.26E-06 6.26E-06 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.26E-06 6.64E-07 1.61E-06 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 1.18E-04 1.59E-11 1.61E-10 8.21E-11 1.61E-10 1.39E-10 1.66E-09 2.57E-10 1.66E-09 2.73E-11 1.61E-10 1.53E-11 1.61E-10 1.39E-09 1.66E-09 2.71E-11 1.61E-10 2.34E-10 1.61E-10 1.46E-11 1.61E-10 8.69E-11 1.61E-10 1.46E-11 1.61E-10 1.46E-11 1.61E-10 1.48E-11 1.61E-10 1.54E-11 1.61E-10 2.81 E-09 1.21E-07 3.84E- 15 1.99E-14 3.67E-14 6.81 E-14 6.61 E-1 5 3.69E-1 5 3.68E-1 3 6.57E-1 5 2.35E-14 3.54E-15 2.10E-14 3.54E-15 3.54E-15 3.59E-1 5 3.73E-1 5 2.87E-12 2121 A-COMPU2 BASE CASE N/A 6.28E-06 7.80E-10 1.66E-09 2.06E-13 Revision 1 Page 20 of 34 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-001 Table 2-3b Compliant Case CDF and LERF Results Train B Alignment Zone Scen Scenario Scenario Specific CCDP CDF CLERP LERF Description VFDRs (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr)2122 A-COMPU2 BASE CASE N/A 6.28E-06 7.70E-10 1.66E-09 2.03E-13 2123 A-COMPU2 BASE CASE N/A 1.45E-05 1.58E-09 2.54E-08 2.78E-12 2124 A-COMPU2 BASE CASE N/A 6.64E-07 8.70E-11 1.61 E-10 2.11 E-14 2125 A-COMPU2 BASE CASE N/A 1.61 E-06 2.35E-10 1.61 E-10 2.35E-14 2126 A-COMPU2 BASE CASE N/A 6.64E-07 1.46E-11 1.61E-10 3.54E-15 2127 A-COMPU2 BASE CASE N/A 6.64E-07 1.46E-11 1.61E-10 3.54E-15 2129 A-COMPU2 BASE CASE N/A 3.88E-05 5.66E-09 2.65E-08 3.86E-12 2130 A-COMPU2 BASE CASE N/A 6.64E-07 1.46E-11 1.61E-10 3.54E-15 2131 A-COMPU2 BASE CASE N/A 3.95E-05 5.76E-09 2.71 E-08 3.95E-12 2169 A-COMPU2 BASE CASE N/A 6.64E-07 1.46E-11 1.61E-10 3.54E-15 TRANSIENT 
-2183 D1-COMPU2 SOUTH EAST U22-001 HVAC 004, IA001, 0 03, 2.92E-02 2.04E-07 4.75E-05 3.32E-10 WALL SEP-002, 006, 007, 014,015 2184 A-COMPU2 BASE CASE N/A 1.17E-04 1.61 E-08 4.09E-07 5.60E-11 2196 A-COMPU2 BASE CASE N/A 6.64E-07 1.46E-11 1.61E-10 3.54E-15 2223 D1-COMPU2 TRANSIENT N/A 3.89E-05 6.82E-11 2.51E-08 4.41E-14 2223 D2-COMPU2 TRANSIENT N/A 7.08E-07 1.24E-12 1.12E-09 1.97E-15 2223 D3-COMPU2 TRANSIENT N/A 7.46E-06 1.31 E-11 1.78E-09 3.13E-15 2223 D4-COMPU2 TRANSIENT N/A 3.89E-05 6.82E-11 2.51E-08 4.41E-14 2223 D5-COMPU2 TRANSIENT N/A 7.08E-07 1.24E-12 1.12E-09 1.97E-15 2223 D6-COMPU2 TRANSIENT N/A 7.46E-06 1.31E-11 1.78E-09 3.13E-15 Compliant Scenario Total CDF and LERF 2.40E-07 4.02E-10 Revision I Page 21 of 34 Revision 1 Page 21 of 34 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-001 2.2.4 Required Modifications The following modifications are required as a result of the risk evaluation for this fire area: " Install new trip device in panel Q2R42B000 IA, breakers LA 13, LA20" Install new trip device in panel Q2R42B0001B, breaker LB14 2.2.5 Required Recovery Actions The following recovery actions are required as a result of the risk evaluation for this fire area: Table 2-4 Required Recovery Actions Basic Recovery Action Component ID Event VFDR BE Description Decription Event Description FAILURE OF 2AFRC- OPERATOR TO Operator action to provide Q2N23PO001A:OFF RC- U2-2-001-RESPOND TO RC FAN alternated cooling to AFW:ON/OFF H- HVAC-004 ALARM (OPEN ROOM pump room due to loss of H-F AARM OPENROOMfan DOOR) DURING A FIRE 2.3 Risk Evaluation Results The total area ACDF is above the screening criteria of lE-07/rx-yr and the total area ALERF is below the screening acceptance criteria of I E-08/rx-yr, respectively.
However, the total plant delta CDF/LERF is below the RG 1.174 criteria of 1E-05/rx-yr and 1E-06/rx-yr, respectively.
All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0 ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency.
The following tables present the fire zone/scenario fire risk as well as the total fire risk for this fire area.Table 2-5a 1 FIRE AREA ACDF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN A ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CCDP CDF CCDP CDF ACDF 2101/A 2102/A 2103/A 2105/A 2106/A 2108/A 2109/A 2110/A 2111/A 2112/A 2113/A 2114/A 2115/A 2118/A 2119/A 2120/A 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 5.85E-06 5.85E-06 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 5.85E-06 6.69E-07 1.61 E-06 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 1.18E-04 1.60E-1 1 8.27E-1 1 1.29E-10 2.40E-1 0 2.75E-1 1 1.54E-1 1 1.30E-09 2.73E-1 1 2.35E-10 1.48E-11 8.75E-1I 1.48E-1 1 1.48E- 11 1.49E-1 1 1.55E-11 2.81 E-09 6.69E-07 1.60E-11 6.69E-07 8.27E-1 1 5.85E-06 1.29E-10 5.85E-06 2.40E-10 6.69E-07 2.75E-11 6.69E-07 1.54E-11 5.85E-06 1.30E-09 6.69E-07 2.73E-11 1.61E-06 2.35E-10 6.69E-07 1.48E-1 1 6.69E-07 8.75E-11 6.69E-07 1.48E-11 6.69E-07 1.48E-11 6.69E-07 1.49E-11 6.69E-07 1.55E-11 1.18E-04 2.81E-09 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 Revision I Page 22 of 34 Version 1.0 Page 2523 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-001 Table 2-5a 1 FIRE AREA ACDF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN A ALIGNMENT Scenario Variar CCDP nt Case 2121/A 2122/A 2123/A 2124/A 2125/A 2126/A 2127/A 2129/A 2130/A 2131/A 2169/A 2183/D1 2184/A 2196/A 2223/D1 2223/D2 2223/D3 2223/D4 2223/D5 2223/D6 5.86E-06 5.86E-06 1.44E-05 6.69E-07 1.61 E-06 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 3.97E-05 6.69E-07 3.85E-05 6.69E-07 6.69E-02 2.40E-04 6.69E-07 3.98E-05 7.07E-07 6.19E-03 3.98E-05 7.07E-07 6.19E-03 CDF 7.29E-1 0 7.19E-10 1.57E-09 8.76E-11 2.35E-1 0 1.48E- 11 1.48E-1 1 5.79E-09 1.48E-1 1 5.62E-09 1.48E- 11 4.67E-07 3.29E-08 1.48E-1 1 6.97E-1 1 1.24E-12 1,08E-08 6,97E-1 1 1,24E-12 1.08E-08 5.42E-07 Compliant Case CCDP CDF 5.86E-06 7.29E-10 5.86E-06 7.19E-10 1.44E-05 1.57E-09 6.69E-07 8.76E-11 1.61E-06 2.35E-10 6.69E-07 1.48E-11 6.69E-07 1.48E-11 3.97E-05 5.79E-09 6.69E-07 1.48E-11 3.85E-05 5.62E-09 6.69E-07 1.48E-11 2.59E-02 1.81 E-07 2.13E-05 2.92E-09 6.69E-07 1.48E- 11 3.97E-05 6.97E-11 7.07E-07 1.24E-12 1.10E-05 1.92E-11 3.97E-05 6.97E-11 7.07E-07 1.24E-12 1.10E-05 1.92E-11 2.04E-07 Variant -Compliant aCDF 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 2.86E-07 3.OOE-08 0.00E+00 1.54E-14 0.OOE+00 1.08E-08 1.54E-14 0.00E+00 1.08E-08 3.38E-07 Total CDF and delta CDF 2-N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.2 -Total ACDF includes the risk of recovery actions required to demonstrate the availability of a success path for the nuclear safety performance criteria.Table 2-5b 1 FIRE AREA ACDF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN B ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CCDP CDF CCDP CDF aCDF 2101/A 2102/A 2103/A 2105/A 2106/A 2108/A 2109/A 2110/A 2111/A 2112/A 2113/A 2114/A 2115/A 2118/A 2119/A 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.26E-06 6.26E-06 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.26E-06 6.64E-07 1.61E-06 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 1.59E-1 1 8.21 E-1 1 1.39E-10 2.57E-10 2.73E-1 1 1.53E-11 1.39E-09 2.71 E-11 2.34E-1 0 1.46E-1 1 8.69E-1 1 1.46E- 11 1.46E-11 1.48E-1 1 1.54E-11 6.64E-07 1.59E-11 6.64E-07 8.21E-11 6.26E-06 1.39E-10 6.26E-06 2.57E-10 6.64E-07 2.73E-11 6.64E-07 1.53E-1 1 6.26E-06 1.39E-09 6.64E-07 2.71E-11 1.61 E-06 2.34E-10 6.64E-07 1.46E-11 6.64E-07 8.69E-11 6.64E-07 1.46E-11 6.64E-07 1.46E-11 6.64E-07 1.48E-11 6.64E-07 1.54E- 11 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 Revision 1 Page 23 of 34 Version 1.0 Page 2524 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-001 Table 2-5b 1 FIRE AREA LICDF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN B ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CCDP CDF CCDP CDF ACDF 2120/A 1.18E-04 2.81 E-09 1.18E-04 2.81 E-09 0.OOE+00 2121/A 6.28E-06 7.80E-10 6.28E-06 7.80E-10 0.OOE+00 2122/A 6.28E-06 7.70E-10 6.28E-06 7.70E-10 0.OOE+00 2123/A 1.45E-05 1.58E-09 1.45E-05 1.58E-09 0.OOE+00 2124/A 6.64E-07 8.70E-11 6.64E-07 8.70E-11 0.OOE+00 2125/A 1.61E-06 2.35E-10 1.61E-06 2.35E-10 0.OOE+00 2126/A 6.64E-07 1.46E-11 6.64E-07 1.46E-11 0.OOE+00 2127/A 6.64E-07 1.46E-11 6.64E-07 1.46E-11 0.OOE+00 2129/A 3.88E-05 5.66E-09 3.88E-05 5.66E-09 0.OOE+00 2130/A 6.64E-07 1.46E-11 6.64E-07 1.46E-11 0.OOE+00 2131/A 2169/A 2183/D1 2184/A 2196/A 2223/D1 2223/D2 2223/D3 2223/D4 2223/D5 2223/D6 3.95E-05 6.64E-07 2.96E-02 5.45E-04 6.64E-07 3.89E-05 7.08E-07 6.09E-03 3.89E-05 7.08E-07 6.09E-03 5.76E-09 1.46E-1 1 2.07E-07 7.47E-08 1.46E-11 6.82E-1 1 1.24E-12 1.07E-08 6.82E-1 1 1.24E-12 1.07E-08 3.23E-07 3.95E-05 5.76E-09 6.64E-07 1.46E-11 2.92E-02 2.04E-07 1.17E-04 1.61E-08 6.64E-07 1.46E-11 3.89E-05 6.82E-11 7.08E-07 1.24E-12 7.46E-06 1.31E-11 3.89E-05 6.82E-11 7.08E-07 1.24E-12 7.46E-06 1.31E-11 2.40E-07 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 2.85E-09 5.86E-08 O.OOE+00 1.54E-14 O.OOE+00 1.07E-08 1.54E-14 O.OOE+00 1.07E-08 8.28E-08 Total CDF and delta CDF 2 1 _ N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.2 -Total ACDF includes the risk of recovery actions required to demonstrate the availability of a success path for the nuclear safety performance criteria.Table 2-6a 1 FIRE AREA ALERF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN A ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CLERP LERF CLERP LERF ALERF 2101/A 2102/A 2103/A 2105/A 2106/A 2108/A 2109/A 2110/A 2111/A 2112/A 2113/A 2114/A 2115/A 2118/A 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.66E-09 1.66E-09 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.66E-09 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 3.84E-1 5 1.99E-14 3.67E-14 6.81 E-14 6.61 E-15 3.69E-1 5 3.68E-1 3 6.57E-15 2.35E-14 3.54E-1 5 2.10E-14 3.54E-1 5 3.54E-1 5 3.59E-15 1.61E-10 3.84E-15 1.61E-10 1.99E-14 1.66E-09 3.67E-14 1.66E-09 6.81E-14 1.61E-10 6.61E-15 1.61E-10 3.69E-15 1.66E-09 3.68E-13 1.61E-10 6.57E-15 1.61E-10 2.35E-14 1.61E-10 3.54E-15 1.61E-10 2.10E-14 1.61 E-10 3.54E-15 1.61E-10 3.54E-15 1.61E-10 3.59E-15 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOF+00 Revision 1 Page 24 of 34 Version 1.0 Page 2525 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-001 Table 2-6a 1 FIRE AREA ALERF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN A ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CLERP LERF CLERP LERF ALERF 2119/A 2120/A 2121/A 2122/A 2123/A 2124/A 2125/A 2126/A 2127/A 2129/A 2130/A 2131/A 2169/A 2183/D1 2184/A 2196/A 2223/D1 2223/D2 2223/D3 22231D4 2223/D5 2223/D6 1.61E-10 1.21E-07 1.66E-09 1.66E-09 2.54E-08 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 2.63E-08 1.61 E-10 2.72E-08 1.61 E-10 1.08E-04 5.51 E-07 1.61E-10 2.49E-08 2.80E-10 9.57E-06 2.49E-08 2.80E-10 9.57E-06 3.73E-15 2.87E-12 2.06E-1 3 2.03E-1 3 2.78E-1 2 2.11E-14 2.35E-14 3.54E-1 5 3.54E-1 5 3.83E-1 2 3.54E-15 3.98E-1 2 3.54E-15 7.58E-10 7.55E-1 1 3.54E-1 5 4.37E-14 4.91 E-16 1.68 E- 1 4.37E-14 4.91 E-1 6 1.68E-11 8.81 E-1 0 1.61E-10 1.21E-07 1.66E-09 1.66E-09 2.54E-08 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 2.63E-08 1.61E-10 2.72E-08 1.61 E-10 4.23E-05 4.97E-08 1.61E-10 2.49E-08 2.80E-10 3.39E-09 2.49E-08 2.80E-10 3.39E-09 3.73E-1 5 2.87E-12 2.06E-13 2.03E-13 2.78E-12 2.11E-14 2.35E-14 3.54E-1 5 3.54E-1 5 3.83E-1 2 3.54E-1 5 3.98E-12 3.54E-1 5 2.95E-10 6.82E-12 3.54E-1 5 4.37E-14 4.91 E-16 5.95E-15 4.37E-14 4.91E-16 5.95E-15 3.17E-10 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 4.62E-10 6.87E-1 1 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 1.68E-1 1 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 1.68E-1 1 5.65E-10 Total LERF and delta LERF 2-N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.2 -Total ALERF includes the risk of recovery actions required to demonstrate the availability of a success path for the nuclear safety performance criteria.Table 2-6b 1 FIRE AREA ALERF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN B ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CLERP LERF CLERP LERF ALERF 2101/A 2102/A 2103/A 2105/A 2106/A 2108/A 2109/A 2110/A 2111/A 2112/A 2113/A 2114/A 2115/A 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.66E-09 1.66E-09 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.66E-09 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 3.84E-15 1.99E-14 3.67E-14 6.81 E-14 6.61 E-1i5 3.69E-1 5 3.68E-1 3 6.57E-1i5 2.35E-14 3.54E-15 2.10E-14 3.54E-1 5 3.54E-15 1.61E-10 3.84E-15 1.61E-10 1.99E-14 1.66E-09 3.67E-14 1.66E-09 6.81E-14 1.61E-10 6.61E-15 1.61E-10 3.69E-15 1.66E-09 3.68E-13 1.61E-10 6.57E-15 1.61E-10 2.35E-14 1.61E-10 3.54E-15 1.61E-10 2.10E-14 1.61E-10 3.54E-15 1.61E-10 3.54E-15 0.OOE+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 0.OOF+00 Revision 1 Page 25 of 34 Version 1.0 Page 2526 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-001 Table 2-6b 1 FIRE AREA ALERF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN B ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case CLERP LERF 2118/A 2119/A 2120/A 2121/A 2122/A 2123/A 2124/A 2125/A 2126/A 2127/A 2129/A 2130/A 2131/A 2169/A 2183/D1 2184/A 2196/A 2223/D1 2223/D2 2223/D3 2223/D4 2223/D5 2223/D6 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.21 E-07 1.66E-09 1.66E-09 2.54E-08 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 2.65E-08 1.61E-10 2.71E-08 1.61E-10 4.81 E-05 3.03E-06 1.61E-10 2.51 E-08 1.12E-09 9.42E-06 2.51 E-08 1.12E-09 9.42E-06 3.59E-1 5 3.73E-1 5 2.87E-12 2.06E-1 3 2.03E-1 3 2.78E-12 2.11E-14 2.35E-14 3.54E-15 3.54E-15 3.86E-12 3.54E-1 5 3.95E-12 3.54E-15 3.36E-1 0 4.15E-10 3.54E-1 5 4.41 E-14 1.97E-1 5 1.65E-11 4.41E-14 1.97E-15 1.65E-11 Compliant Case CLERP LERF 1.61E-10 3.59E-15 1.61E-10 3.73E-15 1.21 E-07 2.87E-12 1.66E-09 2.06E-13 1.66E-09 2.03E-13 2.54E-08 2.78E-12 1.61E-10 2.11E-14 1.61E-10 2.35E-14 1.61E-10 3.54E-15 1.61E-10 3.54E-15 2.65E-08 3.86E-12 1.61 E-10 3.54E-15 2.71E-08 3.95E-12 1.61 E-10 3.54E-15 4.75E-05 3.32E-10 4.09E-07 5.60E-1 1 1.61E-10 3.54E-15 2.51E-08 4.41E-14 1.12E-09 1.97E-15 1.78E-09 3.13E-15 2.51 E-08 4.41 E-14 1.12E-09 1.97E-15 1.78E-09 3.13E-15 Variant -Compliant ALERF 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 4.51 E-12 3.59E-10 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 1.65E-11 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 1.65E-11 Total LERF and delta LERF 2 7.99E-1 0 4.02E-10 3.96E-10 1 -N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.2 _ Total ALERF includes the risk of recovery actions required to demonstrate the availability of a success path for the nuclear safety performance criteria.3.0 DID EVALUATION 3.1 Defense-in-Depth Evaluation A review of the impact of the change on defense-in-depth (DID) was performed.
NFPA 805 defines DID as:* Preventing fires from starting* Rapidly detecting fires and controlling and extinguishing promptly those fires that do occur, thereby limiting damage* Providing adequate level of fire protection for structures, systems and components important to safety; so that a fire that is not promptly extinguished will not prevent essential plant safety functions from being performed.
In general, the DID requirement was considered satisfied if the proposed change does not result in a substantial imbalance among these elements (or echelons).
The review of DID was qualitative and addressed each of the elements with respect to the proposed change. Fire Revision I Page 26 of 34 Version 1.0 Page 2527 of 3726 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-001 protection features and systems relied upon to ensure DID were identified in the assessment (e.g., detection, suppression system).The VFDRs and the associated Fire Area risk (CDF) and scenario consequences (CCDP values)were evaluated to identify general DID echelon imbalances.
Potential methods to balance the DID features were identified ensuring an adequate balance of DID features is maintained for the Fire Area. See Section 3.2 for the results of the evaluation.
3.2 Defense-in-Depth Review Results A review of defense in depth and risk evaluation results show that, given the systems and features specified in Table 3-1 and Section 2 respectively, risk acceptance criteria are met and that the balance of defense in depth is maintained.
To support the risk analysis, recovery actions (See Table 2-4) are being required.
In addition, due to uncertainties associated with analytical methods and the existence of significant fuel packages in the area, it is deemed prudent to require detection in the area for both risk and DID. Requiring detection ensures prompt fire brigade response and provides notification to support the recovery actions required to meet the risk criteria.
The installed suppression systems in Fire Zones 2183 and 2223 are also required for DID.These additional systems coupled with the other required features will provide additional assurances that any unknown weaknesses or uncertainties, such as HGL formation and uncontrolled fire development, will not adversely affect the ability to meet nuclear safety performance criteria.The table below summarizes how an adequate balance of DID is maintained.
Table 3-1 Defense-in-Depth Impact Review Method of Providing DID Discussion Echelon 1: Prevent fires from starting Combustible Control No change necessary to procedure(s) 
/guidance document(s).
1 Hot Work Control No change necessary to procedure(s) 
/guidance document(s).
1 Echelon 2: Rapidly detect, control and extinguish promptly those fires that do occur thereby limiting fire damage Detection System Detection installed in Area 2-001 and required for the zones listed in Table 5-2.Automatic Fire Suppression Suppression system installed in Zone 2183 and 2223 and required.Portable Fire Extinguishers Portable extinguishers available, but no enhancements required.
1 Hose stations and hydrants Fire hose cabinet(s) are available, but no enhancements required.located in the area(s)Pre-Fire Plan No change necessary to procedure(s) 
/guidance document(s).
Echelon 3: Provide adequate level of fire protection for systems and structures so that a fire will not prevent essential safety functions from being performed Walls, floors ceilings and structural No changes necessary to existing barriers.elements are rated or have been evaluated as adequate for the hazard.Revision 1 Page 27 of 34 Version 1.0 Page 2528 of 3726 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-001 Table 3-1 Defense-in-Depth Impact Review Method of Providing DID Discussion Openings in the fire barrier are rated No changes necessary to existing barrier openings.
1 or have been evaluated as adequate for the hazard.Supplemental barriers (e.g., ERFBS, No supplemental barriers installed and not required.cable tray covers, etc.)Guidance provided to operations No DID related recovery actions are required.personnel detailing the credited success path(s) including recovery actions to achieve nuclear safety performance criteria.1 This fire protection feature is relied upon without further DID enhancements beyond inherent programmatic requirements of NFPA 805, Chap. 3 and will not be reported in Table 5-2.3.2.1 Required Modifications There are no modifications required as a result of the DID evaluation for this fire area.3.2.2 Required Recovery Actions There are no required recovery actions as a result of the DID evaluation for this fire area.4.0 SAFETY MARGIN EVALUATION 4.1 Safety Margin Evaluation In accordance with NEI 04-02, 5.3.5.3 guidance, the maintenance of adequate Safety Margin is assessed by the consideration of categories of analyses utilized by this fire risk evaluation (FRE).Safety margins are considered to be maintained if: " Codes and standards or their alternatives accepted for use by the NRC are met, and" Safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) are met, or provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty.
The maintenance of adequate safety margin for the change analysis is described for each of the specific analysis types used in support of the fire risk assessment.
4.1.1 Fire Modeling Fire modeling performed in support of the transition has been performed within the Fire PRA utilizing codes and standards developed by industry and NRC staff to provide realistic yet conservative results. Specifically, the heat release rates utilized in the transition analysis are based upon NUREG/CR 6850, Task 8, Scoping Fire Modeling.
These heat release rates are conservative and represent values used to screen out fixed ignition sources that do not pose a threat to the targets within specific fire compartments and to assign severity factors to unscreened fixed ignition sources.The combined analysis approach is used during transition; therefore, maximum expected fire scenario/limiting fire scenario have not been analyzed separately.
The bases for the application of these fire modeling codes and standards were not altered in support of this FRE.Revision 1 Page 28 of 34 Version 1.0 Page 2529 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-001 4.1.2 Plant System Performance Plant system performance parameters were not modified as a result of this FRE. These performance parameters were originally established to support nuclear performance criteria contained in the plant specific accident analyses.
These analyses established component and system performance criteria necessary to establish safe and stable plant operation, as well as, safe shut down of the unit in the event of a fire. These performance parameters were not modified as a result of this FRE.4.2 Safety Margin Results All analyses and assessment have been performed utilizing accepted techniques and industry accepted standards.
In addition, safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) have been considered and provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty.
As such, the Safety Margins are maintained as discussed in Section 4. 1.5.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION RESULTS 5.1 Dispositions of VFDRs Based on the FRE results contained in Sections 2, 3 and 4 the VFDRs identified in Section 1. 1 have been resolved as follows: Table 5-1 Final Variance Disposition VFDR ID U2-2-001-ASSO-001 U2-2-001-ASSO-002 U2-2-001-HVAC-001 U2-2-001 -HVAC-002 U2-2-001 -HVAC-003 Disposition Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)U2-2-001-HVAC-004 U2-2-001 -HVAC-005 U2-2-001-IA-001 U2-2-001-1A-002 U2-2-001-IA-003 U2-2-001-SEP-001 Recovery Action(s)
Required to Satisfy Risk Criteria:
See Table 2-4 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action U2-2-OO1-SEP-002 U2-2-001-SEP-003 U2-2-OO1-SEP-004 U2-2-001-SEP-005 U2-2-001-SEP-006 U2-2-001-SEP-007 Revision 1 Page 29 of 34 Version 1.0 Page 2530 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-001 SE-C051 326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-001 VFDR ID U2-2-001-SEP-008 U2-2-001-SEP-009 U2-2-001-SEP-010 U2-2-001-SEP-01 1 U2-2-001-SEP-012 U2-2-001-SEP-013 U2-2-001-SEP-014 U2-2-001-SEP-015 U2-2-001-SEP-016 Table 5-1 Final Variance Disposition Disposition Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action U2-2-001-SEP-017 U2-2-001-SEP-018 U2-2-001-SEP-019 Revision I Page 30 of 34 Revision 1 Page 30 of 34 Version 1.0 Page 2531 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-001 5.2 Fire Risk Evaluation Summary of Fire Protection Systems and Features Table 5-2 Summary of Required Fire Protection Systems and Features Required Required Required Fire Fire Area Fire Zone Suppression Detection Protection Feature Required Fire Protection System and Feature Details System System (R, D)(R, D) (R, D)R -Improvements to procedures necessary to incorporate U2 2-001 R recovery actions required to meet risk criteria (See Table 2-4);Modification to replace trip device in panel Q2R42B0001A, breakers LA13, LA20; Q2R42B0001B, breakers LB14 R -Detection system;2101 None R, D None D -Detection system D -Detection system 2102 None R,-Detection system D -Detection system 2103 None R, D None D -Detection system D -Detection system 2104 None R, D None R -Detection system D -Detection system 2105 None R, D None D -Detection system D -Detection system 2106 None R, D None D -Detection system D -Detection system R -Detection system;D -Detection system R -Detection system;2109 None R, D None D -Detection system D -Detection system 2111 None R, D None R -Detection system;2112 None None None D -Detection system 2111 None R, D None D -Detection system D -Detection system 2112 None None None 2113 None R, D None R- Detection system;D -Detection system 2114 None None None Revision 1 Page 31 of 34 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-001 Table 5-2 Summary of Required Fire Protection Systems and Features Required Required Suppression Detection Required Fire Fire Area Fire Zone Sysion Dete Protection Feature Required Fire Protection System and Feature Details System System (R, D)(R, D) (R, D)2115 None None None R -Detection system;2118 None R, D None D-Dtcinsse 2119 None R, D None R -Detection system;D -Detection system 2120 None R, D None R -Detection system;D -Detection system 2121 None R, D None R -Detection system;D -Detection system R -Detection system;2122 None R, D None 212 -Detection system R -Detection system;2124 None R, D None D -Detection system D -Detection system 2126 None None None 2127 None None None 2128 None R, D None R -Detection system;D -Detection system 2129 None R, D None R -Detection system;D -Detection system 2130 None None None 2131 None Rne NoneR-Dectosyem R -Detection system;2131NoneR, DNoneD -Detection system 2169 None None None ,D None R -Detection system;D -Detection system Revisiononeagen32 ofn3 Revision 1 Page 32 of 34 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-001 Table 5-2 Summary of Required Fire Protection Systems and Features Required Required Required Fire Fire Area Fire Zone Suppression Detection Protection Feature Required Fire Protection System and Feature Details System System (R, D)(R, D) (R, D)2184 D R, D None R -Detection system;D -Detection system, Suppression system 2196 None None None 2223 D R, D None R -Detection system;D -Detection system, Suppression system Required Suppression/Detection/Feature:
required in the Fire Area based on NFPA 805 Chapter 4 compliance.
The information is provided on a zone basis. The basis for the requirement of the fire protection system is designated as follows:* R -Risk Criteria:
Systems required to meet the Risk Criteria for the Performance-Based Approach (NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4)* D -Defense-in-depth Criteria:
Systems required to maintain adequate balance of Defense-in-Depth for a Performance-Based Approach (NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4)Fire Protection Features in this Table only refer to those features installed in the Fire Area that have a corresponding Chapter 3 requirement.
5.3 Summary of Recovery Actions Table 5-3 -Recovery Actions Fire Area Component Component Description Actions U2 2-001 Q2N23P0001A 2A MDAFW PUMP Operator action to provide alternated cooling to AFW pump room due to loss of fan 5.4 Summary of Plant Modifications Table 5-4 -Plant Modifications Item Unit Problem Statement Proposed Modification In Comp Risk Informed Characterization FPRA Measure Replace trip device to ensure Replace trip device in panel Reduce risk due to fire induced U2 breaker coordination of supply Q2R42BOO01A, breakers LA13, Yes Yes failure by modifying the circuit 001-1 and load breakers LA20; Q2R42B0001B, breakers breaker and preventing damage to LB14 downstream components.
Revision I Page 33 of 34 Revision 1 Page 33 of 34 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-001 5.5 Fire Area Risk Summary Table 5-5 -Fire Area Risk Summary NFPA 805 VFDR RAs Fire Risk Eval Fire Area Area Description Ba Fire Area CDF/LERF (e/o RYs F CDF/LERF Additional Risk of RAs Basis (Yes/No) (Yes/No) A CDF/LERF U2 2-001 Unit 2 Auxiliary Building 4.2.4 4.32E-07/8.40E-10 Yes Yes 2.1OE-07/4.80E-10 2.10E-0714.80E-10 Revision 1 Page 34 of 34 Revision 1 Page 34 of 34 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-004 Attachment 
-Unit 2 Fire Area 2-004 FRE for Fire Area Auxiliary Building Revision:
1 Name Fire PRA Preparer Jonathan Hedrick Fire PRA Reviewer Clint Pierce Fire Protection Preparer Fire Protection Reviewer NSCA Preparer NSCA Reviewer FRE Preparer FRE Reviewer Rebecca Puckett Robert Kirkpatrick Larry Valmonte Dan Funk Steve Hardy Brandon Jamar Revision 1 Page 1 of 78 Version 1.0 Page 2536 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-004 1.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION INPUT ....................................................................
4 1.1 Variances from the Deterministic Requirements 
....................................
4 1.2 Fire Protection Systems and Features ..................................................
9 1.2 .1 C o nstructio n ............................................................................. 
..12 1 .2 .2 D ete ctio n ................................................................................. 
..12 1.2.3 Fixed Fire Suppression 
.............................................................
13 1.2.4 Manual Suppression 
.................................................................
14 1.2.5 Ventilation (Smoke Removal) ....................................................
14 1.2.6 Other Fire Protection Features ..................................................
14 1.2.7 Fire Hazard Identification 
..........................................................
14 1.2.8 Fire PRA Input ...........................................................................
14 2.0 RISK EVALUATION 
...........................................................................................
15 2.1 Fire PRA Variant Case Calculation 
......................................................
15 2.2 Compliant Case Calculation 
...............................................................
27 2.2.1 VFDRs Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA ............................
27 2.2.2 VFDRs Not Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA .....................
34 2.2.3 Compliant Case Results ...........................................................
35 2.2.4 Required Modifications 
.............................................................
52 2.2.5 Required Recovery Actions .......................................................
52 2.3 Risk Evaluation Results ......................................................................
52 3.0 DID EVALUATION 
..........................................................................................
66 3.1 Defense-in-Depth Evaluation 
...............................................................
66 3.2 Defense-in-Depth Review Results ......................................................
66 3.2.1 Required Modifications 
.............................................................
67 3.2.2 Required Recovery Actions .......................................................
67 4.0 SAFETY MARGIN EVALUATION 
..................................................................
67 4.1 Safety Margin Evaluation 
....................................................................
67 4.1.1 Fire Modeling ............................................................................
68 4.1.2 Plant System Performance 
......................................................
68 4.2 Safety Margin Results ..........................................................................
68 5.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION RESULTS ...........................................................
68 5.1 Dispositions of VFDRs ........................................................................
68 Revision 1 Page 2 of 78 Version 1.0 Page 2537 of 3726 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-004 SE-C051 326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-004 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 Fire Risk Evaluation Summary of Fire Protection Systems and Features 71 Summary of Recovery Actions .............................................................
77 Summary of Plant Modifications 
.........................................................
77 Fire Area Risk Summary .....................................................................
78 Revision 1 Page 3 of 78 Version 1.0 Page 2538 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-004 1.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION INPUT 1.1 Variances from the Deterministic Requirements The VFDRs identified for evaluation for Unit 2, Fire Area 2-004, Unit 2 Auxiliary Building are: Table 1-1 VFDRs VFDR Component(s)
Description U2-2-004-Q2R42BO001A:ENE This component, 125V DC Bus 2A (Train A Battery Charger Room HVAC-001 RGIZED:ENERGIZE Cooler), requires HVAC support to remain functional.
A loss of D-BC2A, 125V DC supporting HVAC to this electrical component will pose a challenge to BUS 2A various Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-004-Q2R42BO001B:ENE This component, 125V DC Bus 2B (Train B Battery Charger Room HVAC-002 RGIZED:ENERGIZE Cooler), requires HVAC support to remain functional.
A loss of D-BC2B, 125V DC supporting HVAC to this electrical component will pose a challenge to BUS 2B various Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-004-Q2N23PO001A:OFF:
This component, MDAFW Pump 2A, requires HVAC support to remain HVAC-003 ON/OFF, 2A MDAFW functional.
The motor driven feedwater pumps are required to operate PUMP in order to supply high pressure feedwater to the credited steam generator in order to remove decay heat. Failure to ensure availability of the MDAFW Pump 2A challenges the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-2-004-Q2R15A0006:ENER This component, Switchgear 2F (600V Load Center E Room Cooler), HVAC-004 GIZED:ENERGIZED-requires HVAC support to remain functional.
A loss of supporting SUT2A, 4160V HVAC to this electrical component will pose a challenge to various SWITCHGEAR BUS Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.2F U2-2-004-Q2R15A0007:ENER This component, Switchgear 2G (600V Load Center E Room Cooler), HVAC-005 GIZED:ENERGIZED-requires HVAC support to remain functional.
A loss of supporting EDG2B, 4160V HVAC to this electrical component will pose a challenge to various SWITCHGEAR BUS Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.2G U2-2-004-Q2E21P0002A:ON:O This component, Charging Pump 2A (Cooler 2A), requires HVAC HVAC-006 N/OFF, 2A support to remain functional.
Charging via the CVCS system is CHARGING PUMP required to maintain RCS Inventory.
Charging via Pump 2A is sought after in this fire area. A loss of HVAC due to the Charging Pump Cooler Failure could render the charging pump 2A unavailable.
Failure to establish charging challenges the RCS Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-2-004-Q2R42E0002A:AVAI This component, Battery 2A (Train A Battery Room Cooler), requires HVAC-007 LABLE:AVAILABLE, HVAC support to remain functional.
A loss of supporting HVAC to this 125V BATTERY 2A electrical component will pose a challenge to various Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-004-Q2R42E0002B:AVAI This component, Battery 2B (Train B Battery Room Cooler), requires HVAC-008 LABLE:AVAILABLE, HVAC support to remain functional.
A loss of supporting HVAC to this 125V BATTERY 2B electrical component will pose a challenge to various Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-004-IA-Q2B31V0053:CLOSE This component requires instrument air to perform its credited 001 D:OPEN/CLOSED, function.
Instrument air is assumed to be unavailable in this fire area PRESSURIZER because air loss paths have not been identified.
The Pressurizer POWER OPERATED Power Relief Valve is required to cycle in order to de-pressurize the RELIEF RCS System. A loss of instrument air will result in the valve failing in the closed position.
An inability to cycle the Pressurizer Power Relief Valve challenges the RCS Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
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-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-004 Table 1-1 VFDRs VFDR Component(s)
Description U2-2-004-IA-Q2E21V0347:MODU This component requires instrument air to perform its credited 002 LATED:MODULATE, function.
Instrument air is assumed to be unavailable in this fire area CHARGING FLOW because air loss paths have not been identified.
Flow control Valve CONTROL VALVE V0347 permits normal charging flow to be injected into the RCS system. Instrument air is required to control the flow and thus charging inventory that is injected into the RCS Cold Legs. Fire induced circuit failure could result in this valve failing in the open position.
Failure to throttle flow to the RCS system challenges the RCS Inventory/Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-004-IA-Q2N 11PV3371B:CL This component requires instrument air to perform its credited 003 OSED:MODULATE, function.
Instrument air is assumed to be unavailable in this fire area MAIN STEAM because air loss paths have not been identified.
Atmospheric relief on ATMOS RELIEF the secondary side is necessary in order to achieve a controlled cooldown rate. Failure to modulate the SG 2B ARV due to a loss of instrument air would cause the valve to fail closed, thereby isolating the secondary side. This failure challenges the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-2-004-IA-Q2N23HV3228A:OP This component requires instrument air to perform its credited 004 EN:THROTTLED, function.
Instrument air is assumed to be unavailable in this fire area TDAFW SUPPLY TO because air loss paths have not been identified.
Feedwater Flow via STEAM SG 2A needs to be isolated in this fire area, since it is not credited.GENERATOR 2A This valve fails open on a loss of instrument air. Decay Heat Removal via SG 2B is desired in this area. An inability to isolate AFW flow to SG 2A will pose a challenge to the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-2-004-IA-Q2N23HV3228C:OP This component requires instrument air to perform its credited 005 EN:THROTTLED, function.
Instrument air is assumed to be unavailable in this fire area TDAFW SUPPLY TO because air loss paths have not been identified.
Feedwater Flow via STEAM SG 2C needs to be isolated in this fire area, since it is not credited.
A GENERATOR 2C loss of instrument air would result in this valve failing open. Decay Heat Removal via SG 2B is desired in this area. An inability to isolate AFW flow to SG 2C will pose a challenge to the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-2-004-SEP-N2B31LO001C:ON:O The Pressurizer Heaters are required to increase RCS Pressure by 001 FF, PRESSURIZER heating Pressurizer Inventory.
In order to establish pressure control, HEATER GROUP 2C the Pressurizer heaters are required off. Fire induced control circuit DISTRIBUTION damage could spuriously actuate Pressurizer Heater 2C, or prevent PANEL remote tripping of the load. Failure to secure the Pressurizer Heater 2C could challenge the RCS Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-2-004-SEP-N2B31LOO01D:ON:O The Pressurizer Heaters are required to increase RCS Pressure by 002 FF, PRESSURIZER heating Pressurizer Inventory.
In order to establish pressure control, HEATER GROUP 2D the Pressurizer heaters are required off. Fire induced control circuit DISTRIBUTION damage could spuriously actuate Pressurizer Heater 2D, or prevent PANEL remote tripping of the load. Failure to secure the Pressurizer Heater 2D could challenge the RCS Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-2-004-SEP-N2B31L0001E:ON:O The Pressurizer Heaters are required to increase RCS Pressure by 003 FF, PRESSURIZER heating Pressurizer Inventory.
In order to establish pressure control, HEATER GROUP 2E the Pressurizer heaters are required off. Fire induced control circuit DISTRIBUTION damage could spuriously actuate Pressurizer Heater 2E, or prevent PANEL remote tripping of the load. Failure to secure the Pressurizer Heater 2E could challenge the RCS Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
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-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-004 Table 1-1 VFDRs VFDR Component(s)
Description U2-2-004-SEP-Q2B41P0001A:ON:O In order to support a natural circulation cooldown, the Reactor Coolant 004 FF, RCP 2A Pumps must be tripped. Fire induced circuit damage could spuriously start the Reactor Coolant Pump 2A. Failure to ensure the Reactor Coolant Pumps are tripped challenges the RCS Inventory and Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-004-SEP-Q2B41P0001B:ON:O In order to support a natural circulation cooldown, the Reactor Coolant 005 FF, RCP 2B Pumps must be tripped. Fire induced circuit damage could spuriously start the Reactor Coolant Pump 2B. Failure to ensure the Reactor Coolant Pumps are tripped challenges the RCS Inventory and Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-004-SEP-Q2B41P0001C:ON:O In order to support a natural circulation cooldown, the Reactor Coolant 006 FF, RCP 2C Pumps must be tripped. Fire induced circuit damage could spuriously start the Reactor Coolant Pump 2C. Failure to ensure the Reactor Coolant Pumps are tripped challenges the RCS Inventory and Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-004-SEP-Q2E21 P0002B:ON:O An inability to trip a non credited charging pump could result in an 007 N/OFF-TRAIN A, 2B overcharging condition, thereby impairing the ability to control the CHARGING PUMP overall cool-down rate. Charging pump 2B (aligned to Train A) suffers a loss of control power that would prevent remote tripping of the pump and/or potential spurious start of the pump due to fire induced circuit failure. This failure challenges the RCS Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-2-004-SEP-Q2E21 P0002B:ON:O An inability to trip a non credited charging pump could result in an 008 N/OFF-TRAIN B, 2B overcharging condition, thereby impairing the ability to control the CHARGING PUMP overall cool-down rate. Charging pump 2B (aligned to Train B) suffers a loss of control power that would prevent remote tripping of the pump and/or potential spurious start of the pump due to fire induced circuit failure. This failure challenges the RCS Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-2-004-SEP-Q2E21V0376A:OPE The Volume Control Tank Outlet Isolation valves must initially remain 009 N:OPEN, VCT open to establish a charging lineup before suction is re-aligned to the OUTLET ISOLATION RWST. Fire induced circuit failure to the outlet valves (V376A and V376B) could result in the valves spuriously closing and isolating the VCT before swapover can be established.
Both valves must remain open. This failure challenges the RCS Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-2-004-SEP-Q2E21V0376B:OPE The Volume Control Tank Outlet Isolation valves must close in order 010 N:CLOSED, VCT to align charging suction to the RWST. Fire induced circuit failure to OUTLET ISOLATION valve Q2E21V0376B could result in the valve failing to closed (it is directly in the fire area too). Failure to isolate the VCT would impact the credited charging lineup. This failure challenges the RCS Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-2-004-SEP-Q2E21V0376B:OPE The Volume Control Tank Outlet Isolation valves must initially remain 011 N:OPEN, VCT open to establish a charging lineup before suction is re-aligned to the OUTLET ISOLATION RWST. Fire induced circuit failure to the outlet valves (V376A and V376B) could result in the valves spuriously closing and isolating the VCT before swapover can be established.
Both valves must remain open. This failure challenges the RCS Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
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-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-004 Table 1-1 VFDRs VFDR Component(s)
Description U2-2-004-SEP-Q2P16V0558:OPEN:
The Service Water Dilution Bypass Line is required to maintain 012 OPEN, SW appropriate pressure conditions in order to permit an adequate service DILUTION BYPASS water flow to the various Plant buildings.
Spurious closure of the TRAIN A Service Water Dilution Line Bypass MOV (Q2P16V0558) due to fire induced circuit failure could result in a change in line backpressure conditions, thereby resulting in an undesirable flow diversion condition.
This failure poses a challenge to the Establishment of Service Water Train A, and all Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-004-SEP-Q2E21 LT01 12:AVAIL The Volume Control Tank Outlet Isolation valves must initially remain 013 ABLE:AVAILABLE, open to establish a charging lineup before suction is re-aligned to the VCT LEVEL RWST. Fire induced circuit failure to VCT Level Instruments LT01 12 TRANSMITTER and LT115 could result in a spurious VCT Low Level Signal. This would isolate the VCT Supply by closing the associated valves. This failure challenges the RCS Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-2-004-SEP-Q2E21 P0002B:ON:O Control power is required to trip a non-credited charging pump. Failure 014 N/OFF-TRAIN A, 2B to trip a non-credit pump could result in an overcharging condition.
CHARGING PUMP Fire induced circuit failure to Panel 2F could result in a loss of control power to Charging pumps 2B and 2C. This failure challenges the RCS Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-2-004-SEP-Q2E21V0347:MODU Flow control Valve V0347 permits normal charging flow to be injected 015 LATED:MODULATE, into the RCS system. Instrument air is required to control the flow and CHARGING FLOW thus charging inventory that is injected into the RCS Cold Legs. A loss CONTROL VALVE of instrument air will result in this valve failing in the open position.Failure to throttle flow to the RCS system challenges the RCS Inventory/Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-004-SEP-Q2E21V0367:OPEN:
Letdown isolation is necessary in order to maintain adequate 016 OPEN/CLOSED, pressurizer level and thus an adequate amount of RCS Inventory.
LETDOWN LINE Letdown isolation can be achieved by closing the letdown line isolation ISOLATION valves LCV0460 or LCV0459, or by closing all 3 Letdown Orifice Isolation Valves (8149A, B, C). Fire induced control circuit damage to the Letdown Orifice Isolation Valves (all 3) could result in the valves spuriously operating.
A spurious letdown path could result in an inadequate amount of RCS Inventory.
This failure challenges the RCS Inventory and Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-004-SEP-N2C55NI0031A:AVAI Source Range Instrumentation is required to monitor Reactivity 017 LABLE:AVAILABLE, Conditions.
A loss of channel 1 and channel 2 Source Range SOURCE RANGE Detectors could occur, due to fire induced circuit failures.
Failure to COUNT RATE monitor subcritical conditions challenges the Reactivity Control INDICATOR NI-31A Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-2-004-SEP-Q2N1 1PV3371B:CL Atmospheric relief on the secondary side is necessary in order to 018 OSED:MODULATE, achieve a controlled cooldown rate. Failure to modulate the SG 2B MAIN STEAM ARV due to fire induced circuit failure or a loss of power to DC Panel ATMOS RELIEF 2C would cause the valve to fail closed, thereby isolating the secondary side. This failure challenges the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
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-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-004 Table 1-1 VFDRs VFDR Component(s)
Description U2-2-004-SEP-Q2N23HV3228A:OP Feedwater Flow via SG 2A needs to be isolated in this fire area, since 019 EN:THROTTLED, it is not credited.
Fire induced control circuit damage could result in TDAFW SUPPLY TO valve HV3228A spuriously opening, thereby admitting feedwater to STEAM SG2A via the TDAFW Pump. A loss of power at the TDAFW Pump GENERATOR 1A UPS might also result in spurious opening of the valve. Furthermore, the TDAFW Pump could spuriously start due to its steam admission valves spuriously opening. Decay Heat Removal via SG 2B is desired in this area. An inability to isolate AFW flow to SG 2A will pose a challenge to the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-2-004-SEP-Q2N23HV3228C:OP Feedwater Flow via SG 2C needs to be isolated in this fire area, since 020 EN:THROTTLED, it is not credited.
Fire induced control circuit damage could result in TDAFW SUPPLY TO valve HV3228C spuriously opening, thereby admitting feedwater to STEAM SG1C via the TDAFW Pump. The valve could also fail due to a loss of GENERATOR 2C power at the TDAFW Pump UPS. Furthermore, the TDAFW Pump could spuriously start due to its steam admission valves spuriously opening. Decay Heat Removal via SG 2B is desired in this area. An inability to isolate AFW flow to SG 2C will pose a challenge to the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-2-004-SEP-Q2P11L14132A:AVAI The condensate storage tank is the credited source of suction for 021 LABLE:AVAILABLE, auxiliary feedwater.
CST level indication is therefore required to CONDENSATE monitor CST Inventory levels at the control room, and permit STORAGE TANK operators to determine if adequate levels are available.
Fire induced LEVEL INDICATOR control circuit damage to the CST Level Indicators 4132A or 4132B LI-4132A could prevent this indication from being available.
A loss of CST Level indication challenges the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-2-004-SEP-Q2P15SV3333:CLOS The Sampling System must remain isolated at all times in order to 022 ED:OPEN/CLOSED, ensure that RCS Inventory losses do not inadvertently occur. Spurious RX LOOPS 2 AND 3 opening of the RCS Sample Isolation Valves SV3333 or SV3765 due SAMPLE ISOLATION to fire induced circuit failure could result in an inadvertent diversion SOLENOID flowpath for RCS Inventory.
This failure challenges the RCS Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-2-004-SEP-Q2P15SV3104:CLOS The Sampling System must remain isolated at all times in order to 023 ED:OPEN/CLOSED, ensure that RCS Inventory losses do not inadvertently occur. Spurious PRESSURIZER opening of the Pressurizer Sample Gas Isolation Valves SV3104 or STEAM SAMPLE SV3331 due to fire induced circuit failure could result in an inadvertent ISOLATION diversion flowpath for RCS Inventory.
This failure challenges the RCS Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-2-004-SEP-Q2P15SV3103:CLOS The Sampling System must remain isolated at all times in order to 024 ED:OPEN/CLOSED, ensure that RCS Inventory losses do not inadvertently occur. Spurious PRESSURIZER opening of the Pressurizer Sample Liquid Isolation Valves SV3103 or LIQUID SAMPLE SV3332 due to fire induced circuit failure could result in an inadvertent ISOLATION diversion flowpath for RCS Inventory.
This failure challenges the RCS Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-2-004-SEP-Q2P16V0539:CLOSE Service water recirculation to the pond is required in order to maintain 028 D:OPEN, SW adequate service water inventory.
Fire induced circuit failure to valve RECIRC TO POND Q2P16V0539 could result in spurious closure of the valve thereby TRAIN A isolating the makeup path. Additionally, a loss of power from MCC 2CC, would prevent opening of the valve remotely.
These failures challenge the establishment of Service Water, and all Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.Revision 1 Page 8 of 78 Version 1.0 Page 2543 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-004 Table 1-1 VFDRs VFDR Component(s)
Description U2-2-004-SEP-Q2P16V0546:OPEN:
Service water discharge to the river is not credit in the analysis, hence 029 OPEN/CLOSED, it must be isolated.
Valves Q2P16V0546 and Q2P16V0549 must be TRAIN A SW closed in order to prevent service water discharge to the river. Fire DISCHARGE TO induced circuit failure may result in spurious opening of valve V546, or RIVER failure to close once recirculation to the pond is established.
Failure to establish recirculation to the pond challenges the establishment of Train A Service Water, and poses a challenge to all Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-2-004-SEP-QSV49K0002A:STAN Control Room HVAC is required to provide habitable conditions for 030 DBY:ON, CONTROL operations to perform the necessary actions to achieve hot ROOM A/C standby/hot shutdown from the control room. A loss of power from CONDENSING UNIT MCC 1 F (cable feed) prevents the A/C Condensing unit 2A from being 2A available.
This failure challenges a critical vital auxiliary Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-2-004-SEP-QSV49K0001A:STAN Control Room HVAC is required to provide habitable conditions for 031 DBY:ON, CONTROL operations to perform the necessary actions to achieve hot ROOM PACKAGE standby/hot shutdown from the control room. A loss of power from A/C BLOWER UNIT MCC 1 F (cable feed) prevents the A/C Blower unit from being A available.
This failure challenges a critical vital auxiliary Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
1.2 Fire Protection Systems and Features Fire Area 2-004 consists of Fire Zones as listed below. This fire area is located in the Unit 2 Auxiliary Building at the elevations shown below:* 2151 -Waste Gas Decay Tank Rooms, EL. 100'-0"* 2152 -Valve Compartment Room, EL. 100'-0"* 2153 -Waste Gas Compressor Room, EL. 100'-0"* 2154 -Waste Evaporator Steam Generator Room, EL. 100'-0"* 2154A -Valve Compartment Room, EL. 131 '-0"* 2155 -Passageway to Unit 2(1), EL. 100'-0"* 2156- Holdup Tank Room, EL. 100'-0", 121'-0"* 2157 -Holdup Tank Room, EL. 100'-0", 121'-0"* 2158 -Holdup Tank Room, EL. 100'-0", 121'-0"* 2159 -Recycle Evaporator Feed Pump Room, EL. 100'-0"* 2160 -Hatch Area, EL. 100'-0"* 2161 -Corridor, EL. 100'-0"* 2162- Hallway, EL. 100'-0"* 2163 -WDS Control Panel Room, EL. 100'-0"* 2164 -Laundry and Hot Shower Tank Room/Storage Room, EL. 100'-0"* 2165 -Waste Gas Decay Tank Room, EL. 100'-0"* 2166 -Waste Gas Decay Tank Room, EL. 100'-0" 0 2168 -Chemical and Laundry Drain Tank Room, EL. 100'-0" E 2170 -Letdown Heat Exchanger Room, EL. 100'-0" N 2175 -Hallway, EL. 100'-0" 0 2176 -Secondary Spent-Resin Storage Tank Room, EL. 100'-0" 0 2177 -Pump Room, EL. 100'-0" Revision 1 Page 9 of 78 Version 1.0 Page 2544 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-004 SE-C051326701 
-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-004 2178 -Filter Room, EL. 100'-0" 2180 -Recycle Evaporator Steam Generator Room, EL. 100'-0" 2186 -Boric Acid Area, EL. 100'-0" 2187 -Hydro Test Pump Room, EL. 100'-0" 2188 -Boric Acid Tank Area, EL. 100'-0", 121'-0" 2203 -Waste Condenser Tanks and Pump Room, EL. 121'-0" 2204 -Waste Evaporator Package Room, EL. 121 '-0" 2205 -Passageway to Unit 2, EL. 121'-0" 2206- Heat Exchanger Room, E.L. 121 '-0" 2207- Hatch Area, EL. 121 '-0" 2208 -Corridor, EL. 121 '-0" 2209 -Hallway, EL. 121'-0" 2215 -Duct and Pipe Chase, EL. 139'-0", 155'-0" 2216 -Valve Compartments Area, EL. 121'-0" 2217 -Volume Control Tank Room, EL. 121'-0" 2218 -Chiller Unit Room, EL. 121 '-0" 2219- Pipe Chase, EL. 121'-0" 2220- Valve Compartment Room, EL. 121'-0" 2221 -Primary Spent-Resin Storage Tank Room, EL. 121 '-0" 2222- Corridor, EL. 121'-0" 2230 -Recycle Evaporator Package Room, EL. 121'-0" 2231 -Sluice Pump Room, EL. 121'-0" 2232 -Sluice Filter Room, EL. 121 '-0" 2237 -Corridor, EL. 12 1'-0" 2238- Cask Storage Area, EL. 121'-0", 139'-0", 155'-0" 2239 -Transfer Canal, EL. 121 '-0", 139'-0" 2240 -Spent-Fuel Pool Room, EL. 121'-0", 139'-0", 155'-0" 2253 -Valve Compartment, EL. 121 '-0" 2301 -Seal Water Filter Room, EL. 139'-0" 2302 -Recycle Evaporator Feed Filter Room, EL. 139'-0" 2303 -Reactor Coolant Filter Room, EL. 139'-0" 2304 -Waste Monitor, EL. 139'-0" 2305 -Seal Injection Filter Room, EL. 139'-0" 2306 -Recycle Evaporator Feed Demineralizer Room, EL. 139'-0" 2307 -Valve Compartment Room, EL. 139'-0" 2308 -Waste Condensate and Monitor Tank Demineralizer Room, EL. 139'-0" 2309 -Hatch Area, EL. 139'-0" 2310 -Valve Compartment Room, EL. 139'-0" 2311 -Recycle Evaporator Concentrates Filter Room, EL. 139'-0" 2312 -Corridor, EL. 139'-0" 2313 -Floor Drain and Laundry Tank Filter Room, EL. 139'-0" 2314 -Waste Evaporator Feed Filter Room, EL. 139'-0" 2315 -Recycle Waste Condenser Filter Room, EL. 139'-0" 2316 -Passageway to Unit 2, EL. 139'-0" 2321 -Sample Panel Room, EL 139'-0" 2322 -Hallway, EL. 139'-0" Revision I Page 10 of 78 Revision 1 Page 10 of 78 Version 1.0 Page 2545 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-004 N 2323 -Sample Room, EL. 139'-0" W 2324 -Primary Chemistry Lab, EL. 139'-0" a 2325 -Counting Room/Spectro-photometer Lab, EL. 139'-0" a 2326 -Radiochemistry Lab, EL. 139'-0" a 2327 -Valve Access Area, EL. 139'-0" 0 2328 -BTR Demineralizer Room, EL. 139'-0" 0 2329 -Pipe Tunnel, EL. 139'-0" a 2330 -Chiller Surge Tanks Pump Room, EL. 139'-0"* 2331 -Valve Access Area, EL. 139'-0" 0 2332 -MCC 1A/2A Area, EL. 139'-0" 0 2340 -Demineralizer Compartment, EL. 139'-0" a 2341 -Pipe Chase, EL. 130'-0" 0 2342 -Spent-Fuel Pool Pump Room, EL. 139'-0" N 2348 -Cask Wash Area, EL. 139'-0", 155'-0" 0 2351 -Pump Room, EL. 139'-0" N 2402 -Passage to Unit 2, EL. 155'-0" 0 2403 -Hot Instrument Shop, EL. 155'-0" K 2405 -Hatch Room, EL. 155'-0" a 2406 -Decontamination Room, EL. 155'-0" 0 2408 -Hallway, EL. 155'-0" N 2409 -Hallway, EL. 155'-0" 0 2410A -600 V-Load Center, EL. 155'-0" 0 2418 -Aux. Building & Containment Purge Vent Equip. Room, EL. 155'-0" N 2419 -Demineralizer Hatch Area, EL. 155'-0" 0 2422 -Corridor, EL. 155'-0" 0 2423 -Valve Compartment, EL. 155'-0"* 2424 -Demineralizer Compartment, EL. 100'-0" a 2425 -Demineralizer Compartment, EL. 100'-0" K 2426 -Demineralizer Compartment, EL. 100'-0" E 2427 -Demineralizer Compartment, EL. 155'-0" 0 2429 -Containment Purge Air Equipment Room, EL. 155'-0"* 2431 -Duct/Pipe Chase, EL 155'-0"* 2445 -Spent-Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger Room, EL. 155'-0"* 2446 -Hallway, EL. 155'-0"* 2448 -SFPC Pump Room, EL. 155'-0"* 2449 -Demineralizer Room, EL. 155'-0"* 2450 -Valve Compartment, EL. 155'-0"* 2451 -Filter Room, EL. 155'-0"* 2467 -SFP Heat Exchanger Room, EL. 165'-0"* 2478 -Motor Control Center Room, EL. 155'-0"* 2504 -Stair No. 6, El. 184'-0" E 2505 -Spent-Fuel Pool Vent Equipment Room, EL. 175'-0" E 2604 -Passage, EL. 130'-0" a 2605 -Blowdown Pumps and Surge Tank Room, EL. 130'-0" 0 2606 -Filter Room, EL. 130'-0" 0 2607 -Filter Room, EL. 130'-0" Revision 1 Page 11 of 78 Version 1.0 Page 2546 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-004 0 2608 -Blowdown Heat Exchanger Room, EL. 130'-0" M 2609 -Storage Room, EL. 130'-0".2610 -Valve Compartment Room, EL. 130'-0" 1.2.1 Construction Barriers for this fire area are of substantial construction and have been designed and constructed to meet separation requirements.
In the event the configuration utilized is not in accordance with recognized standards, the deviations have been evaluated to be adequate for the hazard.1.2.2 Detection Fire detection systems to provide notification to the Control Room are:* Fire Zones 2151-2154 are provided with detection.
* Fire Zone 2154A is provided with detection.
* Fire Zones 2156-2166 are provided with detection.
* Fire Zone 2162 is provided with detection.
* Fire Zone 2168 is provided with detection.
* Fire Zone 2170 is provided with detection.
* Fire Zone 2175 is provided with detection.
* Fire Zones 2177--2178 are provided with detection.
* Fire Zone 2180 is provided with detection.
* Fire Zones 2186-2188 are provided with detection.
* Fire Zone 2203 is provided with detection.
* Fire Zone 2204 is provided with detection.
[ Fire Zones 2206-2209 are provided with detection.
* Fire Zones 2216-2218 is provided with detection.
[ Fire Zone 2220 is provided with detection.
* Fire Zone 2222 is provided with detection.
* Fire Zone 2230-2232 are provided with detection.
* Fire Zone 2237-2238 are provided with detection.
* Fire Zone 2240 is provided with detection.
* Fire Zone 2253 is provided with detection.
* Fire Zones 2301-2305 are provided with detection." Fire Zone 2307 is provided with a smoke detection system" Fire Zones 2309-23 16 are provided with detection." Fire Zones 2321-2326 are provided with detection.
Revision 1 Page 12 of 78 Version 1.0 Page 2547 of 3726 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-004 S Fire Zones 2330-2332 are provided with detection." Fire Zone 2342 is provided with detection.
* Fire Zones 2402-2403 are provided with detection." Fire Zones 2405-2406 are provided with detection." Fire Zones 2408-2409 are provided with detection.
* Fire Zone 24108-A is provided with detection." Fire Zones 2418 -2419 are provided with detection." Fire Zones 2422 -2423 are provided with detection." Fire Zone 2429 is provided with detection." Fire Zones 2445 -2446 are provided with detection.
* Fire Zone 2467 is provided with detection.
* Fire Zone 2478 is provided with detection.
* Fire Zones 2504-2505 are provided with detection.
* Fire Zones 2604-2610 are provided with detection.
1.2.3 Fixed Fire Suppression Fixed fire suppression systems to aid in control of both fire growth and spread in the fire area are:* Fire Zone 2154A -is provided with suppression.
* Fire Zone 2160 is provided with suppression that provides partial coverage.* Fire Zone 2161 is provided with suppression.
The 5kV disconnect switches in this room have an automatic heat-actuated CO 2 suppression system. The sprinkler heads have been provided with heat collectors.
* Fire Zone 2162 is provided with suppression.
* Fire Zone 2163 is provided with suppression.
* Fire Zone 2175 is provided with suppression.
* Fire Zone 2207 is provided with suppression.
* Fire Zone 2208 is provided with suppression.
-Fire Zone 2209 is provided with suppression.
* Fire Zone 2222 is provided with suppression that provides partial coverage.* Fire Zone 2312 is provided with suppression that provides partial coverage.* Fire Zone 2316 is provided with suppression." Fire Zone 2322 is provided with suppression." Fire Zone 2402 is provided with suppression above and below the suspended ceiling.Revision 1 Page 13 of 78 Version 1.0 Page 2548 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-004 SC Fire Zone 2403 is provided with suppression.
* Fire Zone 2405 is provided with suppression.
* Fire Zone 2406 is provided with suppression.
* Fire Zone 2410A is provided with an automatic heat-actuated CO 2 suppression system in the load centers.* Fire Zone 2419 is provided with suppression.
1.2.4 Manual Suppression Manual suppression equipment to be utilized by plant personnel and/or fire brigade members are: " Fire Area 2-004 is provided with fire hose cabinets in the area to satisfy NFPA 14 requirements." Portable fire extinguishers are available in the area.1.2.5 Ventilation (Smoke Removal)Portable smoke ejectors are available to assist with smoke removal.1.2.6 Other Fire Protection Features A portion of corridor 2222 is designated as a "No Combustible Storage Area" to prevent storage of transient combustibles.
1.2.7 Fire Hazard Identification The major sources of combustibles in Fire Area 2-004 are plastic, cable and piping insulation, rubber, lube oil, hydrogen in decay tanks, storage lockers, paper, alcohol, solvents, water stop material, Fiberglas, Toluene liquid, PVC, flammable gas bottles, clothing, charcoal filters, silicone transformer fluid, and panels. Details regarding fire scenarios quantified in the fire PRA, and their associated ignition sources (where applicable) are discussed in Section 2.1.2.8 Fire PRA Input Fire protection features There are fire protection features specifically modeled in the Fire PRA as identified in the required plant modification section 2.2.4.Fire protection systems The Hot Gas Layer evaluation credits the detection, automatic fire suppression system and manual fire brigade response.
The Multi Compartment Analysis evaluation credits the detection, automatic fire suppression system and manual fire brigade response.Hot Gas Layer Treatment Physical attributes of this fire area require the expansion of the Zone Of Influence beyond the original Zone Of Influence to account for the Hot Gas Layer impacts in this area, see PRA-BC-F- 11-0 15 for further details. Credit for detection was taken in the Hot Gas Layer evaluation for Revision 1 Page 14 of 78 Version 1.0 Page 2549 of 3726 SE-CO51326701 
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-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-004 this fire area. Credit for both automatic fire suppression system and manual fire brigade response was taken in the Hot Gas Layer evaluation for this fire area.Multi-compartment analysis Credit for detection was taken in the Multi Compartment Analysis for this fire area. Credit for both automatic fire suppression system and manual fire brigade response was taken in the Multi Compartment Analysis for this fire area.Scenario Review All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0, ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency.
2.0 RISK EVALUATION 2.1 Fire PRA Variant Case Calculation Tables 2-1a and 2-1b provide the results of the variant case calculation for Fire Area 2-004. This is taken directly from the Fire PRA model with no changes or alterations made. The CDF and LERF results are provided on a scenario basis.Revision 1 Page 15 of 78 Version 1.0 Page 2550 of 3726 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-004 Table 2-1a Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train A Alignment Zone Scen ScenDesc 1  IGF NSP SF CCDP CDF CLERP LERF (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr)2-004-ADJ HGL HGL SCENARIO 1.07E-07 1.0 1.0 8.89E-01 9.51E-08 7.70E-03 8.24E-10 2151 A BASE CASE 2.59E-05 1.0 1.0 1.55E-05 4.01E-10 1.26E-09 3.28E-14 2152 A BASE CASE 2.59E-05 1.0 1.0 1.61E-04 4.18E-09 1.55E-07 4.03E-12 2153 D1 TRANSIENT IN FRONT OF 4.44E-06 1.0 1.0 4.28E-05 1.90E-10 2.68E-08 1.19E-13 WGC'S 2153 2153 2154 2154 2154A 2155 2156 2157 2158 2159 2160 2161 2162 2162 2162 E F D1 D2 A A A A A A A A D1 D2 D3 WASTE GAS COMP PUMP A WASTE GAS COMP PUMP B TRANSIENT 
-SE CORNER TRANSIENT 
-NW CORNER BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE TRANSIENT TRANSIENT TRANSIENT 9.96E-05 9.96E-05 4.65E-06 4.65E-06 2.20E-05 2.76E-05 2.45E-05 2.20E-05 2.45E-05 2.22E-04 2.76E-05 6.40E-05 2.80E-06 2.80E-06 4.50E-06 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 3.94E-05 4.28E-05 1.44E-06 3.94E-05 3.94E-05 3.94E-05 3.94E-05 3.94E-05 5.59E-04 1.44E-05 1.44E-02 1.44E-02 6.69E-07 6.67E-1 1 6.67E-1 1 1.83E-10 1.99E-10 3.18E-1 1 1.09E-09 9.64E-10 8.68E-10 9.64E-10 8.74E-09 1.54E-08 9.24E-10 4.03E-08 4.03E-08 3.01 E-12 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 2.08E-08 2.68E-08 1.16E-09 2.08E-08 2.08E-08 2.08E-08 2.08E-08 2.08E-08 5.86E-07 3.OOE-08 5.48E-05 5.48E-05 1.61 E-10 1.60E-14 1.60E-14 9.70E-14 1.25E-13 2.55E-14 5.75E-13 5.10E-13 4.59E-13 5.10E-13 4.63E-12 1.62E-11 1.92E-12 1.53E-10 1.53E-10 7.23E-16 2162 E SPRAYADDITIVETANK 9.96E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 6.67E-11 1.61E-10 1.60E-14 PUMP 2163 DA TRANIENT BASE 2.26E-05 1.0 1.0 1.78E-02 4.03E-07 6.85E-05 1.55E-09 2163 El WASTE PROCESSING PNL 1.82E-05 1.0 1.O0E-01 3.32E-03 6.04E-09 1.39E-05 2.53E-11 LIQUID -SEVERE 2163 E2 WASTE PROCESSING PNL 1.82E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 1.22E-11 1.61E-10 2.93E-15 LIQUID -NON SEVERE 2163 F1 WASTE PROCESSING PNL 1.82E-05 1.0 1.OE-01 1.78E-02 3.24E-08 6.85E-05 1.25E-10 GAS-SEVERE 2163 F2 WASTE PROCESSING PNL 1.82E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 1.22E-11 1.61E-10 2.93E-15 GAS -NON SEVERE 2164 A BASE CASE 5.64E-05 1.0 1.0 6.61 E-07 3.73E-1 1 2.80E-10 1.58E-14 Revision 1 Page 16 of 78 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-004 Table 2-1a Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train A Alignment Zone Scen ScenDesc 1  IGF NSP SF CCDP CDF CLERP LERF (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr) (Irx-yr)2165 A BASE CASE 2.59E-05 1.0 1.0 3.62E-06 9.38E-11 6.76E-10 1.75E-14 2166 A BASE CASE 2.59E-05 1.0 1.0 3.62E-06 9.38E-11 6.76E-10 1.75E-14 2168 D1 TRANSIENT 
-NORTH WALL 4.71E-06 1.0 1.0 1.63E-03 7.68E-09 6.92E-06 3.26E-11 CETNER OF ROOM 2168 D2 TRANSIENT-NORTH EAST 4.71E-06 1.0 1.0 9.50E-03 4.47E-08 3.62E-05 1.70E-10 CORNER 2170 A BASE CASE 2.21E-05 1.0 1.0 1.04E-04 2.29E-09 8.45E-08 1.87E-12 2175 A BASE CASE 3.14E-05 1.0 1.0 2.55E-03 8.01E-08 3.84E-06 1.21E-10 2176 A BASE CASE 2.20E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 1.48E-11 1.61E-10 3.54E-15 2177 A BASE CASE 2.76E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 1.85E-11 1.61E-10 4.44E-15 2178 A BASE CASE 2.76E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 1.85E-11 1.61E-10 4.44E-15 2180 A BASE CASE 2.25E-04 1.0 1.0 1.40E-06 3.16E-10 1.61E-10 3.62E-14 2186 D1 TRANSIENT-SOUTH WALL 4.85E-06 1.0 1.0 2.82E-02 1.37E-07 4.60E-05 2.23E-10 EAST OF DOOR 2187 2188 2203 2204 2206 2207 2208 2215 2216 2217 2218 2219 2220 2221 2222 A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE TRANSIENT Nrth of last vertical trays on wall BASE CASE 1.26E-04 2.20E-05 2.83E-05 2.20E-05 9.07E-05 2.64E-04 4.65E-05 2.20E-05 1.09E-04 2.20E-05 1.60E-04 2.20E-05 2.20E-05 2.20E-05 2.83E-05 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 1.42E-06 1.40E-06 6.69E-07 3.78E-05 8.51 E-04 6.69E-07 3.14E-06 6.69E-07 3.55E-05 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 8.85E-03 8.42E-1 1 1.48E-11 4.03E-1 1 3.08E-1 1 6.07E-1 1 9.98E-09 3.96E-08 1.48E-11 3.43E-10 1.48E-11 5.67E-09 1.48E-1 1 1.48E-11 1.48E-11 2.51E-07 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.41 E-09 1.41 E-09 1.61E-10 1.98E-08 1.19E-06 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.78E-08 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.361E-05 2.02E-14 3.54E-1 5 4.01E-14 3.12E-14 1.46E-14 5.24E-12 5.54E-1 1 3.54E-15 1.76E-14 3.54E-1 5 2.85E-12 3.54E-1 5 3.54E-15 3.54E-1 5 3.85E-10 2222 D1 2230 A 5.28E-06 1.0 1.0 8.85E-03 4.67E-08 1.36E-05 7.18E-11 2.46E-05 1.0 1.0 1.68E-06 4.14E-11 3.93E-10 9.67E-15 Revision I Page 17 of 78 Revision 1 Page 17 of 78 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-004 Table 2-1a Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train A Alignment Zone Scen ScenDesc 1  IGF NSP SF CCDP CDF CLERP LERF (/rx-yr) (Irx-yr) (/rx-yr)2231 A BASE CASE 2.43E-05 1.0 1.0 1.68E-06 4.09E-11 3.93E-10 9.57E-15 2232 2237 2238 2239 2240 2253 2301 2302 2303 2304 2305 2306 2307 2308 2309 2310 2311 2312 2313 2314 2315 2316 2321 2322 2323 2324 2325 2326 2327 2328 A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE 2.20E-05 2.83E-05 2.21 E-05 2.21 E-05 7.64E-05 2.83E-05 2.23E-05 2.23E-05 2.23E-05 2.23E-05 4.64E-05 2.20E-05 2.58E-05 2.20E-05 2.OOE-04 2.58E-05 2.23E-05 4.40E-05 2.23E-05 2.23E-05 2.23E-05 2.58E-05 5.06E-06 3.92E-04 3.21 E-05 3.21 E-05 3.58E-05 3.20E-05 2.58E-05 2.20E-05 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.68E-06 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 1.40E-06 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.52E-04 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 1.48E-06 6.60E-07 1.48E-05 1.45E-06 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 3.70E-1 1 1.90E-1 1 1.48E-1 1 1.48E-11 5.12E-11 1.90E-1 1 1.49E-1 1 1.49E-1 1 3.12E-11 1.49E-1 1 3.11E-11 1.48E-1 1 1.73E-11 1.48E-1 1 1.34E-10 1.73E-11 1.49E-1 1 2.87E-08 1.49E-11 1.49E-11 1.49E-11 3.81 E-11 3.34E-12 5.82E-09 4.66E-1 1 2.15E-11 2.40E-1 1 2.14E-11 1.73E-11 3.93E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.54E-06 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 2.80E-1 0 4.53E-08 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 8.66E-1 5 4.56E-15 3.55E-15 3.55E-15 1.23E-14 4.56E-15 3.58E-15 3.58E-15 3.58E-15 3.58E-1 5 7.47E-1 5 3.54E-1 5 4.15E-15 3.54E-15 3.21E-14 4.15E-15 3.58E-15 6.77E-1 1 3.58E-15 3.58E-1 5 3.58E-1 5 4.15E-15 1.42E-15 1.77E-11 5.16E-15 5.16E-15 5.76E-1 5 5.15E-15 4.15E-15 1.48E-11 1.61E-10 3.54E-15 2329 A BASE CASE 2.20E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 1.48E-11 1.61E-10 3.54E-15 Revision 1 Page 18 of 78 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-004 Table 2-1a Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train A Alignment Zone Scen ScenDesc 1  IGF NSP SF CCDP CDF CLERP LERF (Irx-yr) (/rx-yr) (Irx-yr)2330 A BASE CASE 2.25E-04 1.0 1.0 2.09E-06 4.72E-10 3.93E-10 8.85E-14 2331 A BASE CASE 2.20E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 1.48E-11 1.61E-10 3.54E-15 2332 D1 TRANSIENT FIRE 3.57E-06 1.0 1.0 2.86E-02 1.02E-07 5.07E-05 1.81E-10 2332 D2 TRANSIENT FIRE 3.57E-06 1.0 1.0 2.86E-02 1.02E-07 5.07E-05 1.81E-10 2332 D3 TRANSIENT FIRE 3.57E-06 1.0 1.0 2.86E-02 1.02E-07 5.07E-05 1.81 E-10 RECEPTABLE 2332 E RANSFORME 1.74E-04 1.0 1.0 3.80E-06 6.61E-10 2.37E-09 4.13E-13 TRANSFORMER 2B 2332 2340 2341 2342 2348 2351 2402 2403 2405 2406 2408 2409 F2 A A A A A A A E2 A A D1 MCC 2A BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE MCC 2DD -NON SEVERE BASE CASE BASE CASE TRANSIENT 2.73E-04 2.20E-05 4.98E-06 2.46E-04 2.21 E-05 4.98E-06 6.31E-06 7.39E-05 1.82E-04 6.84E-05 6.84E-05 1.56E-07 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 4.25E-05 9.11 E-07 2.11E-06 1.15E-06 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 1.35E-06 6.69E-07 6.71 E-07 6.69E-07 6.84E-07 7.46E-06 1.16E-08 2.01 E-11 1.05E-11 2.83E-1 0 1.48E-11 3.33E-1 2 8.51 E- 12 4.95E-1 1 1.22E-10 4.58E-1 1 4.68E-1 1 1.16E-12 1.98E-07 1.61 E-10 2.74E- 10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 3.60E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 8.69E-1 0 5.41 E-11 3.54E-15 1.36E-15 3.95E-14 3.55E-15 8.01 E-16 2.27E-15 1.19E-14 2.93E-14 1.10E-14 1.10E-14 1.35E-16 CONTAINMENT PURGE 2409 E EXHAUST FAN STARTER 1.82E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 1.22E-11 1.61E-10 2.93E-15 PANEL 2409 F1 MCC 2CC -SEVERE 9.1OE-05 1.0 2.OOE-01 2.86E-03 5.21 E-08 8.63E-06 1.57E-10 2409 F2 MCC 2CC -NON SEVERE 9.1OE-05 1.0 1.0 6.71E-07 6.11E-11 1.61E-10 1.46E-14 2410A A BASE CASE 2.82E-04 1.0 1.0 1.35E-06 3.80E-10 3.60E-10 1.01E-13 2418 A BASE CASE 1.29E-04 1.0 1.0 8.30E-07 1.07E-10 1.61 E-10 2.07E-14 2419 D1 TRANSIENT 2.96E-07 1.0 1.0 7.27E-01 2.15E-07 3.06E-03 9.06E-10 2419 D2 TRANSIENT 2.96E-07 1.0 1.0 1.33E-04 3.94E-11 3.96E-07 1.17E-13 CRANE MOTOR ADDING IN 2419 E USING HAND CALC WITH 5.44E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 3.64E-11 1.61E-10 8.75E-15 FIF BASED ON 1 EEU 2422 A BASE CASE 1.41E-05 1.0 1.0 6.84E-07 9.64E-12 1.61 E-10 2.27E-15 Revision 1 Page 19 of 78 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-004 Table 2-1a Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train A Alignment Zone Scen ScenDesc 1  IGF NSP SF CCDP CDF CLERP LERF (/rx-yr) (Irx-yr) (/rx-yr)2423 A BASE CASE 1.41E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 9.43E-12 1.61E-10 2.27E-15 2424 A BASE CASE 2.20E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 1.48E-11 1.61 E-10 3.54E-15 2425 A BASE CASE 2.20E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 1.48E-11 1.61E-10 3.54E-15 2426 A BASE CASE 2.20E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 1.48E-11 1.61E-10 3.54E-15 2427 A BASE CASE 2.20E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 1.48E-11 1.61E-10 3.54E-15 2429 D1 TRANSIENT 2.12E-07 1.0 1.0 3.15E-04 6.69E-11 5.24E-07 1.11E-13 2429 D2 TRANSIENT 2.12E-07 1.0 1.0 7.46E-06 1.58E-12 8.69E-10 1.85E-16 2429 F CTMT PURGE SUPPLY FAN 5.44E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 3.64E-11 1.61E-10 8.75E-15 MOTOR EXPOSED 2429 G RADWASTE SUPPLY FAN 5.44E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 3.64E-11 1.61E-10 8.75E-15 MOTOR 2445 2446 2448 2449 2450 2451 2467 2478 2504 2505 2604 2605 2606 2607 2608 2609 2610 A A A A A A A E2 A A A A A'A A A A BASE CASE 7.04E-06 BASE CASE 6.84E-05 BASE CASE 1.05E-04 BASE CASE 4.98E-06 BASE CASE 4.98E-06 BASE CASE 5.09E-06 BASE CASE 5.01E-06 MCC 2C -NON SEVERE 3.64E-04 BASE CASE 7.65E-05 BASE CASE 4.69E-05 BASE CASE 5.99E-05 BASE CASE 4.23E-04 BASE CASE 2.21E-05 BASE CASE 2.20E-05 BASE CASE 1.22E-04 BASE CASE 1.32E-04 BASE CASE 2.20E-05 Total CDF/LERF Fire PRA Variant Case 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 6.84E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.63E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 2.10E-06 2.1OE-06 6.69E-07 4.82E-1 2 4.58E-1 1 7.OOE-1 1 3.33E-12 3.33E-12 3.40E-12 3.35E-12 2.44E-10 5.12E-11 3.14E-11 4.01 E-11 2.81 E-1 0 1.48E-11 1.48E-1 1 2.56E-10 2.77E-10 1.48E-1 1 1.90E-06 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 2.80E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 3.93E-10 3.93E-1 0 1.61 E-10 1.13E-15 1.10E-14 1.68E-14 8.01E-16 8.01E-16 8.18E-16 8.05E-16 5.86E-14 1.23E-14 7.55E-15 9.64E-1 5 1.19E-13 3.55E-15 3.54E-1 5 4.79E-14 5.18E-14 3.54E-1 5 5.68E-09 (D 01 4 N)Revision 1 Page 20 of 78 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-004 Table 2-1b Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train B Alignment Zone Scen ScenDescl IGF NSP SF CCDP CDF CLERP LERF (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr)2-004-ADJ HGL HGL SCENARIO 1.07E-07 1.0 1.0 8.89E-01 9.51E-08 7.70E-03 8.24E-10 2151 A BASE CASE 2.59E-05 1.0 1.0 6.21E-06 1.61E-10 5.56E-10 1.44E-14 2152 A. BASE CASE 2.59E-05 1.0 1.0 1.06E-04 2.74E-09 1.24E-07 3.21E-12 2153 D1 TRANSIENT IN FRONT OF 4.44E-06 1.0 1.0 4.23E-05 1.88E-10 2.98E-08 1.32E-13 WGC'S 2153 E WASTE GAS COMP PUMP A 9.96E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 6.62E-11 1.61E-10 1.60E-14 2153 F WASTE GAS COMP PUMP B 9.96E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 6.62E-11 1.61E-10 1.60E-14 2154 2154 2154A 2155 2156 2157 2158 2159 2160 2161 2162 2162 2162 D1 D2 A A A A A A A A D1 D2 D3 TRANSIENT 
-SE CORNER TRANSIENT 
-NW CORNER BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE TRANSIENT TRANSIENT TRANSIENT 4.65E-06 4.65E-06 2.20E-05 2.76E-05 2.45E-05 2.20E-05 2.45E-05 2.22E-04 2.76E-05 6.40E-05 2.80E-06 2.80E-06 4.50E-06 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 3.91 E-05 4.23E-05 1.69E-06 3.91 E-05 3.91 E-05 3.91 E-05 3.91 E-05 3.91 E-05 3.14E-04 1.58E-05 1.45E-02 1.45E-02 6.64E-07 1.82E-10 1.97E-10 3.72E-1 1 1.08E-09 9.58E-10 8.62E-10 9.58E-10 8.69E-09 8.66E-09 1.01E-09 4.06E-08 4.06E-08 2.99E-12 2.68E-08 2.98E-08 1.16E-09 2.68E-08 2.68E-08 2.68E-08 2.68E-08 2.68E-08 3.98E-07 3.04E-08 5.49E-05 5.49E-05 1.61E-10 1.25E-1 3 1.39E-13 2.55E-14 7.41 E-1 3 6.57E-1 3 5.92E-13 6.57E-1 3 5.96E-1 2 1.1OE-11 1.95E-12 1.54E-10 1.54E-10 7.23E-16 2162 E SPRAYADDITIVETANK 9.96E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 6.62E-11 1.61E-10 1.60E-14 PUMP 2163 DA TRANIENT BASE 2.26E-05 1.0 1.0 1.79E-02 4.05E-07 6.86E-05 1.55E-09 2163 El WASTE PROCESSING PNL 1.82E-05 1.0 1.O0E-01 3.30E-03 6.02E-09 1.38E-05 2.51E-11 LIQUID -SEVERE 2163 E2 WASTE PROCESSING PNL 1.82E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 1.21E-11 1.61E-10 2.93E-15 LIQUID -NON SEVERE 2163 F1 WASTE PROCESSING PNL 1.82E-05 1.0 1.OE-01 1.79E-02 3.26E-08 6.86E-05 1.25E-10 GAS-SEVERE 2163 F2 WASTE PROCESSING PNL 1.82E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 1.21E-11 1.61E-10 2.93E-15 GAS -NON SEVERE 2164 A BASE CASE 5.64E-05 1.0 1.0 6.54E-07 3.69E-11 2.80E-10 1.58E-14 Revision I Page 21 of 78 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-004 Table 2-1 b Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train B Alignment Zone Scen ScenDesc 1  IGF NSP SF CCDP CDF CLERP LERF (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr)2165 A BASE CASE 2.59E-05 1.0 1.0 1.97E-06 5.12E-11 6.76E-10 1.75E-14 2166 A BASE CASE 2.59E-05 1.0 1.0 1.97E-06 5.12E-11 6.76E-10 1.75E-14 2168 D1 TRANSIENT 
-NORTH WALL 4.71E-06 1.0 1.0 1.65E-03 7.78E-09 6.93E-06 3.26E-11 CETNER OF ROOM 2168 D2 TRANSIENT 
-NORTH EAST 4.71 E-06 1.0 1.0 9.54E-03 4.49E-08 3.62E-05 1.70E-10 CORNER 2170 A BASE CASE 2.21E-05 1.0 1.0 1.04E-04 2.29E-09 8.46E-08 1.87E-12 2175 A BASE CASE 3.14E-05 1.0 1.0 3.17E-03 9.96E-08 4.77E-06 1.50E-10 2176 A BASE CASE 2.20E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 1.46E-11 1.61E-10 3.54E-15 2177 A BASE CASE 2.76E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 1.83E-11 1.61 E-10 4.44E-15 2178 A BASE CASE 2.76E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 1.83E-11 1.61 E-10 4.44E-15 2180 A BASE CASE 2.25E-04 1.0 1.0 9.96E-07 2.24E-10 1.61 E-10 3.62E-14 2186 D1 TRANSIENT-SOUTHWALL 4.85E-06 1.0 1.0 2.79E-02 1.35E-07 4.54E-05 2.20E-10 EAST OF DOOR 2187 2188 2203 2204 2206 2207 2208 2215 2216 2217 2218 2219 2220 2221 2222 A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE TRANSIENT Nrth of last vertical trays on wall BASE CASE 1.26E-04 2.20E-05 2.83E-05 2.20E-05 9.07E-05 2.64E-04 4.65E-05 2.20E-05 1.09E-04 2.20E-05 1.60E-04 2.20E-05 2.20E-05 2.20E-05 2.83E-05 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 1.42E-06 1.39E-06 6.64E-07 4.80E-05 1.33E-03 6.64E-07 1.77E-06 6.64E-07 3.55E-05 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 9.07E-03 8.35E-11 1.46E-11 4.02E- 11 3.07E-1 1 6.02E-11 1.27E-08 6.19E-08 1.46E-1 1 1.93E-10 1.46E-1 1 5.67E-09 1.46E-1 1 1.46E-11 1.46E-11 2.57E-07 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.41 E-09 1.41 E-09 1.61 E-10 2.90E-08 2.06E-06 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.78E-08 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.39E-05 2.02E-14 3.54E-15 4.01E-14 3.12E-14 1.46E-14 7.65E-12 9.59E-11 3.54E-1 5 1.76E-14 3.54E-1 5 2.85E-12 3.54E-15 3.54E-15 3.54E-15 3.94E-10 2222 D1 2230 A 5.28E-06 1.0 1.0 9.07E-03 4.79E-08 1.39E-05 7.34E-11 2.46E-05 1.0 1.0 1.68E-06 4.13E-11 3.93E-10 9.67E-15 Revision 1 Page 22 of 78 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-004 Table 2-1b Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train B Alignment Zone Scen ScenDesclIGF NSP SF CCDP CDF CLERP LERF (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr)2231 2232 2237 2238 2239 2240 2253 2301 2302 2303 2304 2305 2306 2307 2308 2309 2310 2311 2312 2313 2314 2315 2316 2321 2322 2323 2324 2325 2326 2327 2328 2329 A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE 2.43E-05 2.20E-05 2.83E-05 2.21 E-05 2.21 E-05 7.64E-05 2.83E-05 2.23E-05 2.23E-05 2.23E-05 2.23E-05 4.64E-05 2.20E-05 2.58E-05 2.20E-05 2.OOE-04 2.58E-05 2.23E-05 4.40E-05 2.23E-05 2.23E-05 2.23E-05 2.58E-05 5.06E-06 3.92E-04 3.21 E-05 3.21 E-05 3.58E-05 3.20E-05 2.58E-05 2.20E-05 2.20E-05 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.68E-06 4.08E-11 3.93E-10 9.57E- 15 1.67E-06 3.69E-11 3.93E-10 8.66E-15 6.64E-07 1.88E-11 1.61E-10 4.56E-15 6.64E-07 1.47E-11 1.61E-10 3.55E-15 6.64E-07 1.47E-11 1.61E-10 3.55E-15 6.64E-07 5.08E-11 1.61 E-10 1.23E-14 6.64E-07 1.88E-1 1 1.61 E-1 0 4.56E-1 5 6.64E-07 1.48E-11 1.61E-10 3.58E-15 6.64E-07 1.48E-11 1.61E-10 3.58E-15 1.39E-06 3.1OE-11 1.61E-10 3.58E-15 6.64E-07 1.48E-11 1.61E-10 3.58E-15 6.64E-07 3.09E-11 1.61E-10 7.47E-15 6.64E-07 1.46E-11 1.61E-10 3.54E-15 6.64E-07 1.72E-11 1.61E-10 4.15E-15 6.64E-07 1.46E-11 1.61E-10 3.54E-15 6.64E-07 1.33E-10 1.61E-10 3.21E-14 6.64E-07 1.72E-1 1 1.61 E-10 4.15E-15 6.64E-07 1.48E-1 1 1.61 E-10 3.58E-15 6.88E-04 3.03E-08 1.61E-06 7.09E-11 6.64E-07 1.48E-1 1 1.61 E-10 3.58E-15 6.64E-07 1.48E-1 1 1.61 E-10 3.58E-1 5 6.64E-07 1.48E-1 1 1.61 E-1 0 3.58E-15 1.47E-06 3.78E-11 1.61E-10 4.15E-15 6.55E-07 3.32E-12 2.80E-10 1.42E-15 1.09E-05 4.25E-09 3.46E-08 1.35E-1 1 1.44E-06 4.63E-11 1.61E-10 5.16E-15 6.64E-07 2.13E-1 1 1.61 E-10 5.16E-15 6.64E-07 2.38E-11 1.61E-10 5.76E-15 6.64E-07 2.13E- 11 1.61 E-10 5.15E-15 6.64E-07 1.72E-11 1.61E-10 4.15E-15 6.64E-07 1.46E-11 1.61 E-10 3.54E- 15 6.64E-07 1.46E-11 1.61E-10 3.54E-15 Revision I Page 23 of 78 Revision 1 Page 23 of 78 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-004 Table 2-1b Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train B Alignment Zone Scen ScenDesclIGF NSP SF CCDP CDF CLERP LERF (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr)2330 A BASE CASE 2.25E-04 1.0 1.0 2.92E-06 6.58E-10 3.93E-10 8.85E-14 2331 A BASE CASE 2.20E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 1.46E-11 1.61E-10 3.54E-15 2332 D1 TRANSIENT FIRE 3.57E-06 1.0 1.0 2.96E-02 1.06E-07 4.84E-05 1.73E-10 2332 D2 TRANSIENT FIRE 3.57E-06 1.0 1.0 2.96E-02 1.06E-07 4.84E-05 1.73E-10 2332 D3 TRANSIENT FIRE 3.57E-06 1.0 1.0 2.96E-02 1.06E-07 4.84E-05 1.73E-10 RECEPTABLE 2332 E RANSFORME 1.74E-04 1.0 1.0 4.15E-06 7.21 E-10 2.37E-09 4.13E-13 TRANSFORMER 2B 2332 2340 2341 2342 2348 2351 2402 2403 2405 2406 2408 2409 F2 A A A A A A A E2 A A D1 MCC 2A BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE MCC 2DD -NON SEVERE BASE CASE BASE CASE TRANSIENT 2.73E-04 2.20E-05 4.98E-06 2.46E-04 2.21 E-05 4.98E-06 6.31E-06 7.39E-05 1.82E-04 6.84E-05 6.84E-05 1.56E-07 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 7.19E-05 9.06E-07 2.94E-06 I. 15E-06 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 1.30E-06 6.64E-07 6.66E-07 6.64E-07 6.79E-07 7.41 E-06 1.96E-08 2.OOE-1 1 1.46E-11 2.82E-10 1.47E-11 3.31E-12 8.21E-12 4.91 E-11 1.21E-10 4.55E-1 1 4.65E-1 1 1.15E-12 2.OOE-07 1.61E-10 2.74E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 3.60E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 8.69E-10 5.46E-1 1 3.54E-15 1.36E-15 3.95E-14 3.55E-1 5 8.01 E-16 2.27E-1 5 1.19E-14 2.93E-14 1.10E-14 1.10E-14 1.35E-16 CONTAINMENT PURGE 2409 E EXHAUST FAN STARTER 1.82E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 1.21E-11 1.61E-10 2.93E-15 PANEL 2409 F1 MCC 2CC -SEVERE 9.1OE-05 1.0 2.OOE-01 2.87E-03 5.22E-08 7.78E-06 1.42E-10 2409 F2 MCC 2CC -NON SEVERE 9.1OE-05 1.0 1.0 6.66E-07 6.06E-11 1.61 E-10 1.46E-14 2410A A BASE CASE 2.82E-04 1.0 1.0 1.30E-06 3.66E-10 3.60E-10 1.01E-13 2418 A BASE CASE 1.29E-04 1.0 1.0 2.01E-06 2.59E-10 1.61E-10 2.07E-14 2419 D1 TRANSIENT 2.96E-07 1.0 1.0 7.27E-01 2.15E-07 3.06E-03 9.06E-10 2419 D2 TRANSIENT 2.96E-07 1.0 1.0 6.73E-04 1.99E-10 1.17E-06 3.47E-13 CRANE MOTOR ADDING IN 2419 E USING HAND CALC WITH 5.44E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 3.61 E-11 1.61 E-10 8.75E-15 FIF BASED ON 1 EEU 2422 A BASE CASE 1.41E-05 1.0 1.0 6.79E-07 9.57E-12 1.61E-10 2.27E-15 Revision 1 Page 24 of 78 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-004 Table 2-1b Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train B Alignment Zone Scen ScenDesclIGF NSP SF CCDP CDF CLERP LERF (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr)2423 A BASE CASE 1.41E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 9.36E-12 1.61E-10 2.27E-15 2424 A BASE CASE 2.20E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 1.46E-11 1.61 E-10 3.54E-15 2425 A BASE CASE 2.20E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 1.46E-11 1.61E-10 3.54E-15 2426 A BASE CASE 2.20E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 1.46E-11 1.61E-10 3.54E-15 2427 A BASE CASE 2.20E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 1.46E-11 1.61 E-10 3.54E-15 2429 D1 TRANSIENT 2.12E-07 1.0 1.0 3.51E-04 7.46E-11 5.27E-07 1.12E-13 2429 D2 TRANSIENT 2.12E-07 1.0 1.0 7.41E-06 1.57E-12 8.69E-10 1.85E-16 2429 F CTMT PURGE SUPPLY FAN 5.44E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 3.61E-11 1.61E-10 8.75E-15 MOTOR EXPOSED 2429 G RADWASTE SUPPLY FAN 5.44E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 3.61E-11 1.61E-10 8.75E-15 MOTOR 2445 2446 2448 2449 2450 2451 2467 2478 2504 2505 2604 2605 2606 2607 2608 2609 2610 A A A A A A A E2 A A A A A A A A A BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE MCC 2C -NON SEVERE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE 7.04E-06 6.84E-05 1.05E-04 4.98E-06 4.98E-06 5.09E-06 5.01 E-06 3.64E-04 7.65E-05 4.69E-05 5.99E-05 4.23E-04 2.21 E-05 2.20E-05 1.22E-04 1.32E-04 2.20E-05 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 6.86E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.58E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 2.93E-06 2.93E-06 6.64E-07 4.83E-1 2 4.55E-11 6.95E-1 1 3.31E-12 3.31E-12 3.38E-12 3.33E-12 2.42E-10 5.08E- 11 3.12E-11 3.98E-1 1 2.79E-10 1.47E-11 1.46E-1 1 3.57E-10 3.86E-10 1.46E-11 1.97E-06 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 2.80E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 3.93E- 10 3.93E-1 0 1.61E-10 1.13E-15 1.10E-14 1.68E-14 8.01E-16 8.01E-16 8.18E-16 8.05E-16 5.86E-14 1.23E-14 7.55E-15 9.64E-1 5 1.19E-13 3.55E-1 5 3.54E-15 4.79E-14 5.18E-14 3.54E-1 5 5.72E-09 Total CDF/LERF Fire PRA Variant Case Total CDF/LERF Fire PRA Variant Case Revision 1 Page 25 of 78 Revision 1 Page 25 of 78 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-004 SE-C051 326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-004 Where: Zone = Fire Zone Scen = 'A' to signify the variant case ScenDesc = Description of the Fire Scenario IGF Ignition Frequency 
(/rx-yr)NSP = Non Suppression Probability SF = Severity Factor CCDP = Conditional Core Damage Probability CDF = Core Damage Frequency 
(/rx-yr)CLERP = Conditional Large Early Release Probability LERF Large Early Release Frequency 
(/rx-yr)1 Base Case' scenarios are complete room burnout and therefore do not identify specific ignition sources Revision I Page 26 of 78 Revision I Page 26 of 78 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-004 2.2 Compliant Case Calculation The following sub-sections provide the basis for modeling each VFDR (or category of VFDRs)and the alterations that have been made to the variant case to represent the compliant case. In each section a discussion of the VFDR (or the category of VFDRs) is provided.2.2.1 VFDRs Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA For VFDRs specifically modeled in the Fire PRA, a table outlining the actual changes made to the Fire PRA model for that VFDR is provided.
The table includes: " Component Numbers associated with the VFDR. In some cases, there may be additional Component Numbers listed that may be the power supplies or other supporting components" Basic Event(s) associated with the Components
* Scenarios which affect the VFDR.2.2.1.1 VFDRs U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002* U2-2-004-HVAC-00 1 -Q2R42B000 1 A:ENERGIZED:ENERGIZED-BC2A" U2-2-004-HVAC-002 
-Q2R42B000 1 B: ENERGIZED:
ENERGIZED-BC2B Table 2-2-1 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002 ALTERATIONS Component ID Basic Event BE Description Model Alterations Scenarios OP-RECOV-OP-RECOV-OPERATOR RECOVERY OF BATTERY CHARGER A ZERO ALL ROOM COOLING FAILS OPERATOR RECOVERY OP-RECOV-OP-RECOV-OF BATTERY CHARGER ZERO ALL RCBC-B RCBC-B 1B OR 2B ROOM COOLING FAILS OPERATOR RECOVERY OP-RECOV-OP-RECOV-OF BATTERY CHARGER A ZERO ALL BCSW-A BCSW-A ROOM COOLING FAILS-SW OPERATOR RECOVERY OP-RECOV-OP-RECOV-OF BATTERY CHARGER B ZERO ALL BCSW-B BCSW-B ROOM COOLING FAILS-SW Model Alterations:
Failure mode probability set to nominal to eliminate fire contribution.
This model alteration is done in the Altered Events Table for the -COMPU2 scenario.2.2.1.2 VFDR U2-2-004-HVAC-003 a U2-2-004-HVAC-003 
-Q2N23POOOA:OFF:ON/OFF Revision 1 Page 27 of 78 Version 1.0 Page 2562 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-004 Table 2-2-2 U2-2-004-HVAC-003 ALTERATIONS Component ID Basic Event BE Description Model Alterations Scenarios 2AFCN- MDAFW PUMP A ROOM 2312-A, 2323-A, N2H11 ALBJK4:A:A 2AN- COOLER FAN ALARM NOMINAL 2332-D1, D2, D3 FANALMAK FAILS TO ACTUATE Q2P16V0549:O:O 2SWMVQV5 SW MOV FAILS TO NOMINAL 2409-Fl 49---V REMAIN OPEN Q2P16V0546:O:O/
2SWMVQV5 SW MOV FAILS TO C 46---V REMAIN OPEN ANNUNCIATOR 2160-A, 2161-A, 1UA27:A:A 2ACANSEQ N2H11ALBW14 NOMINAL 2162-D1, D2, 2163-F CIRCUITRY FAILS DA, El, F1,2168-D1, D2 Model Alterations:
Failure mode probability set to nominal to eliminate fire contribution.
This model alteration is done in the Altered Events Table for the -COMPU2 scenario.2.2.1.3 VFDR U2-2-004-HVAC-006
* U2-2-004-HVAC-006 
-Q2E21POO02A:ON:ON/OFF Table 2-2-3 U2-2-004-HVAC-006 ALTERATIONS Component ID Basic Event BE Description Model Alterations Scenarios TRAIN A FAN HHFAN-ANN 2HANTR ANNUNCIATOR NOMINAL ALL CIRCUITRY FAILS HHI PUMP COMMON 02E21V0265:O:O 2HHMV8106 MINIFLOW MOV 8106 NOMINAL 2170-A, D2----V TRANSFER CLOSED/PLUGGED CHG PUMP A ROOM Q2El6HO001A:S:O 2HHMOMOO COOLER FAILS TO START NOMINAL 2332-D1, D2, D3, N 1A---A DUE TO RANDOM 2409-Fl, 2419-Dl FAULTS Q2El6HO001A:S:O 2HHMOMOO PMP A FAN COOLER 2332-D1, D2, D3, N 1A---X FAILS TO RUN DUE TO NOMINAL 2409-Fl, 2419-DI RANDOM FAULTS Q2R17B0001:E:E 2ACBSMCC MCC 2A RANDOM NOMINAL 2312-A, 2332-D1, 2A---F FAILURE D2, D3, F2, 2429-Dl VCT ISOLATION VALVE 2160-A, 2175-A, Q2E21V0376B:O:
2VCMVLCV Q2E21LCV115E NOMINAL 2180-A, 2207-A, O 115E-V SPURIOUSLY CLOSES 2208-A, 2216-A, 2322-A VCT ISOLATION VALVE 2175-A, 2186-D1, 0 2VCM V Q2E21LCV115C NOMINAL 2216-A, 2222-A, D1, SPURIOUSLY CLOSES 2332-D1, D2, D3 Model Alterations:
Failure mode probability set to nominal to eliminate fire contribution.
This model alteration is done in the Altered Events Table for the -COMPU2 scenario.2.2.1.4 VFDR U2-2-004-IA-001 M U2-2-004-IA-001 
-Q2B31V0053:CLOSED:OPEN/CLOSED Revision 1 Page 28 of 78 Version 1.0 Page 2563 of 3726 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-004 Table 2-2-4 U2-2-004-1A-001 ALTERATIONS Component ID Basic Event BE Description Model Alterations Scenarios 2151-A, 2152-A, 2162-D1, 2162-D2, Q2B31V0027A:O:
2PZMVMOV MOV 8000A SPURIOUSLY NOMINAL 2163-DA, 2163-Fl, O 8000AV CLOSES 2175-A, 2186-D1, 2222-A, D1, 2332-D1, D2, D3 INSTRU ME NT AIR AOV Q2P1 9HV2228:C:
21AAVHV22 ISRMN I O P 2AVHD Q2P19HV2228 FAILS TO NOMINAL 2208-A, 2218-A O 28--D OE OPEN OPERATOR FAILS TO OAB A_4--- ALIGN NITROGEN TO OABA_4-......
H-F ---H-F PRZR PORVs DURING A NOMINAL 2208-A, 2218-A FIRE EVENT Model Alterations:
Failure mode probability set to nominal to eliminate fire contribution.
This model alteration is done in the Altered Events Table for the -COMPU2 scenario.2.2.1.5 VFDRs U2-2-004-IA-002, SEP-01 5" U2-2-004-IA-002 
-Q2E2 1 V0347:MODULATED:MODULATE" U2-2-004-SEP-0 15 -Q2E2 1 V0347: MODULATED:
MODULATE Table 2-2-5 U2-2-004-IA-002, SEP-015 ALTERATIONS Component ID Basic Event BE Description Model Alterations Scenarios S CHARGING FLOW 2162-D1, D2, 2163-Q2E2V034:MM 2VCAVFCV CHRIGFO Q2E21V0347:M:M 122--K CONTROL VALVE FCV- NOMINAL DA, El, F1,2168-122 FAILS TO CLOSE D1, D2 N2P19V0080:O:O 2AAVHV38 AOV HV 38852208-A 85--V SPURIOUSLY CLOSES 2PZLI459A--
PRESSURIZER LEVEL 2162-D1, D2, 2163-N2B31L10459A:A:A 
--F INDICATOR LI-459A FAILS NOMINAL DA, El, F1, 2168-D1, D2 N2P19V0077:O:O 21AAVHV38 AOV HV 3825 2162-D1, D2, 2163-25--V SPURIOUSLY CLOSES DA, F1, 2168-D2 Model Alterations:
Failure mode probability set to nominal to eliminate fire contribution.
This model alteration is done in the Altered Events Table for the -COMPU2 scenario.2.2.1.6 VFDRs U2-2-004-1A-003, SEP-018" U2-2-004-IA-003 
-Q2N II PV337 1 B:CLOSED:MODULATE" U2-2-004-SEP-018-Q2NI IPV337IB:CLOSED:MODULATE Table 2-2-6 U2-2-004-IA-003, SEP-018 ALTERATIONS Component ID Basic Event BE Description Model Alterations Scenarios Q2N11PV3371B:C:
2MSAVPV3 SG ARV PV3371 B FAILS 2203-A, 2312-A, M 371B-F TO OPEN DUE TO FIRE NOMINAL 2316-A DAMAGE OF CABLE Revision 1 Page 29 of 78 Version 1.0 Page 2564 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-004 Table 2-2-6 U2-2-004-IA-003, SEP-018 ALTERATIONS Component ID Basic Event BE Description Model Alterations Scenarios Q2R41 0001 C:E:E 2DCBSR41L 125V DC PANEL 2C NOMINAL 2312-A 2316-A 001CF RANDOM FAILURE Model Alterations:
Failure mode probability set to nominal to eliminate fire contribution.
This model alteration is done in the Altered Events Table for the -COMPU2 scenario.2.2.1.7 VFDRs U2-2-004-IA-004, 005, SEP-01 9, 020 in this fire area there is no spurious operation of steam supply valves HV3235A and B, because these valves are closed there is no steam supply to the TDAFW pump. Therefore, the delta risk associated with these VFDRs is epsilon.* U2-2-004-IA-004 
-Q2N23HV3228A:OPEN:THROTTLED
* U2-2-004-IA-005 
-Q2N23HV3228C:OPEN:THROTTLED
* U2-2-004-SEP-019-Q2N23 HV3228A: OPEN:THROTTLED Note that the PRA does not model the OPEN:THROTTLED function state for the HV 3228A valve, the throttled function state is used to model the control of flow from the TDAFW pump into the steam generator to prevent overfill.
The PRA treats that in the OPEN:CLOSED function state.* U2-2-004-SEP-020 
-Q2N23HV3228C:OPEN:THROTTLED 2.2.1.8 VFDRs U2-2-004-SEP-001, 002, 003" U2-2-004-SEP-001 
-N2B331L0001C:ON:OFF" U2-2-004-SEP-002 
-N2B31LOOO1D:ON:OFF" U2-2-004-SEP-003 
-N2B31LOOOIE:ON:OFF The Fire PRA models the spurious start of 3 of the 5 pressurizer heaters in conjunction with a failure of aux spray to challenge the PORVs. With the following model alterations there is not an unacceptable combination of fire induced failures affecting the pressurizer heaters and pressurizer spray.Table 2-2-7 U2-2-004-SEP-001, 002, 003 ALTERATIONS Component ID Basic Event BE Description Model Alterations Scenarios N2B331LO01C:ON:
2ACB31LOO PZR HEATER GROUP C 2402-A, 2409-D1, DISTRUBUTION PANEL NOMINAL 2410A-A, 2429-D1, FAILS TO TURN OFF D2 N2131L0001 DON. 2ACB31LOO PZR HEATER GROUP D 2402-A, 2409-D1, DISTRUBUTION PANEL NOMINAL 2410A-A, 2429-D1, FAILS TO TURN OFF D2 Model Alterations:
Failure mode probability set to nominal to eliminate fire contribution.
This model alteration is done in the Altered Events Table for the -COMPU2 scenario.Revision I Page 30 of 78 Revision 1 Page 30 of 78 Version 1.0 Page 2565 of 3726 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-004 2.2.1.9 VFDRs U2-2-004-SEP-004, 005, 006" U2-2-004-SEP-004 
-Q2B41P000IA:ON:OFF" U2-2-004-SEP-005 
-Q2B41P0001B:ON:OFF" U2-2-004-SEP-006 
-Q2B41P0001C:ON:OFF To model the compliant case, the 2 out of 3 logic for the RCP temperature indicators needs to be set to nominal. For this, indicators A and B were chosen; these indicators, along with the other identified events will model the compliant case for any spurious operation of an RCP.Table 2-2-8 U2-2-004-SEP-004, 005, 006 ALTERATIONS Component ID Basic Event BE Description Model Alterations Scenarios 2238-A, 2332-D1, Q2B41PO001-A:ON:
2RCP0001A RCP 2A FAILS TO TRIP NOMINAL D2, D3, E, 2340-A, X ---F 2409-Fl, 2418-A, 2429-D2 2238-A, 2332-D1, 2RCP0001A RCP 2A SPURIOUSLY RE- D2, D3, E, 2340-A,..A.-U STARTS 2409-Fl, 2418-A, 2429-D2 2162-D1, D2, 2163-DA, El, F1, 2168-Q2B41P0001C:ON 2RCP0001C D1, D2, 2175-A,:X N .RPOF RCP 2C FAILS TO TRIP NOMINAL 2186-D1, 2222-A, D1, 2238-A, 2332-D1, D2, D3, E, 2340-A 2162-D1, D2, 2163-DA, El, F1, 2168-2RCP0001C RCP 2C SPURIOUSLY RE- D1, D2, 2175-A, Q2B41 P0001C:X:X RP- R U STARTS NOMINAL 2186-D1, 2222-A, D1, 2238-A, 2332-D1, D2, D3, E, 2340-A 2162-D1, D2, 2163-DA, El, F1, 2168-RCP 2A MOTOR BEARING D1, D2, 2175-A, RCP-TI 2HHTIl1UA3 TEMPERATURE 1.BRE-4 2186-D1, 2222-A, 1 ---F INDICATOR FAILS D1, 2238-A, 2332-D1, D2, D3, E, 2340-A, 2409-Fl, 2418-A, 2429-D2 2162-D1, D2, 2163-DA, El, F1, 2168-RCP 2B MOTOR BEARING D1, D2, 2175-A, RCP-TI 2HHTI1UA3 TEMPERATURE 1.BRE-4 2186-D1, 2222-A, R2T 2---F TEMPERATUR FAS D1, 2238-A, 2332-FINDICATOR FAILS D1, D2, D3, E, 2340-A, 2409-Fl, 2418-A, 2429-D2 Model Alterations:
Failure mode probability set to nominal to eliminate fire contribution.
This model alteration is done in the Altered Events Table for the -COMPU2 scenario.Revision I Page 31 of 78 Version 1.0 Page 2566 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-004 2.2.1.10 VFDRs U2-2-004-SEP-007, 008, 014" U2-2-004-SEP-007 
-Q2E21POO02B:ON:ON/OFF-TRAIN A" U2-2-004-SEP-008 
-Q2E21POO02B:ON:ON/OFF-TRA[N B" U2-2-004-SEP-014-Q2E21POO02B:ON:ON/OFF-TRAIN A Table 2-2-9 U2-2-004-SEP-007, 008, 014 ALTERATIONS Component ID Basic Event BE Description Model Alterations Scenarios HHI TO RCS COLD LEGS 2175-A, 2186-D1, Q2E21VOO16A:C:C 2HHMV8803 VALVE MOV-8803A NOMINAL 2222-A, D1, 2332-A---U SPURIOUSLY OPENS Dl, D2, D3 AFTER CLOSING Model Alterations:
Failure mode probability set to nominal to eliminate fire contribution.
This model alteration is done in the Altered Events Table for the -COMPU2 scenario.2.2.1.11 VFDRs U2-2-004-SEP-009, 010, 011" U2-2-004-SEP-009 
-Q2E2 I V03 76A: OPEN:OPEN" U2-2-004-SEP-0 10 -Q2E2 1V0376B:OPEN:CLOSED" U2-2-004-SEP-01 1 -Q2E21V0376B:OPEN:OPEN Table 2-2-10 U2-2-004-SEP-009, 010, 011 ALTERATIONS Component ID Basic Event BE Description Model Alterations Scenarios VCT ISOLATION VALVE 2175-A, 2186-D1, 0 1125C-V Q2E21LCV115C NOMINAL 2216-A, 2222-A, D1, SPURIOUSLY CLOSES 2332-D1, D2, D3 VCT ISOLATION VALVE 2160-A, 2175-A, Q2E21V0376B:O:
2VCMVLCV Q2E21 LCV1 15E NOMINAL 2180-A, 2207-A, O 115E-V SPURIOUSLY CLOSES 2208-A, 2216-A, 2322-A LCV-115E RANDOM FAILS 2160-A, 2175-A, Q2E21V0376B:O:C 2HHMV115 TO CLOSE OR FIRE 2180-A, 2207-A, E ---- K INDUCED SPURIOUS 2208-A, 2216-A, OPEN (MSO12-A) 2322-A Model Alterations:
Failure mode probability set to nominal to eliminate fire contribution.
This model alteration is done in the Altered Events Table for the -COMPU2 scenario.2.2.1.12 VFDR U2-2-004-SEP-012
* U2-2-004-SEP-0 12 -Q2P I6V0558:OPEN:OPEN Table 2-2-11 U2-2-004-SEP-01 2 ALTERATIONS Component ID Basic Event BE Description Model Alterations Scenarios DILUTION BYPYPASS Q2P16V0558:O:O 8 ..MV V VALVE, 558 SPURIOUSLY NOMINAL 2409-Fl CLOSED Model Alterations:
Failure mode probability set to nominal to eliminate fire contribution.
This model alteration is done in the Altered Events Table for the -COMPU2 scenario.Revision I Page 32 of 78 Version 1.0 Page 2567 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-004 2.2.1.13 VFDR U2-2-004-SEP-013 U2-2-004-SEP-013 
-Q2E21LTO 112:AVAILABLE:AVAILABLE Table 2-2-12 U2-2-004-SEP-013 ALTERATIONS Component ID Basic Event BE Description Model Alterations Scenarios VCT LEVEL 2208-A, 2218-A, 02E21LT0112:A:A 2VCLT1 12-- TRANSMITTER LT-1 12 NOMINAL 2303-A, 2312-A,---F FAILS TO PROVIDE LOW 2316-A, 2323-A LOW LEVEL SIGNAL Model Alterations:
Failure mode probability set to nominal to eliminate fire contribution.
This model alteration is done in the Altered Events Table for the -COMPU2 scenario.2.2.1.14 VFDR U2-2-004-SEP-016
* U2-2-004-SEP-0 16 -Q2E2 1V0367:OPEN:OPEN/CLOSED Table 2-2-13 U2-2-004-SEP-016 ALTERATIONS Component ID Basic Event BE Description Model Alterations Scenarios 2PZLI461-....
PRESSURIZER LEVEL 2162-D1, D2, 2163-N2B31L10461:A:A -F INDICATOR LI-461 FAILS NOMINAL DA, El, F1, 2168-D1, D2 Model Alterations:
Failure mode probability set to nominal to eliminate fire contribution.
This model alteration is done in the Altered Events Table for the -COMPU2 scenario.2.2.1.15 VFDR U2-2-004-SEP-021
* U2-2-004-SEP-021 
-Q2P 1 L14I4132A:AVAILABLE:AVAILABLE Table 2-2-14 U2-2-004-SEP-021 ALTERATIONS Component ID Basic Event BE Description Model Alterations Scenarios Q2P11L14132A:A:
2AFL14132A CST LEVEL INDICATOR NOMINAL NONE A ---F LI-4132A FAILS 2208-A, 2222-A, D1, Q2P11LI4132a:A:
2AFL14132B CST LEVEL INDICATOR NOMINAL 2230-A, 2231-A, A ---F LI-4132B FAILS 2341-A, 2605-A, 2608-A, 2609-A Model Alterations:
Failure mode probability set to nominal to eliminate fire contribution.
This model alteration is done in the Altered Events Table for the -COMPU2 scenario.2.2.1.16 VFDRs U2-2-004-SEP-028, 029" U2-2-004-SEP-028 
-Q2P 1 6V0539:CLOSED:OPEN" U2-2-004-SEP-029 
-Q2P16V0546:OPEN:OPEN/CLOSED Table 2-2-15 U2-2-004-SEP-028, 029 ALTERATIONS Component ID Basic Event BE Description Model Alterations Scenarios 2SWMVQV5 SW TRAIN A POND Q2P16V0539:C:O 39---D RECIRC MOV 539 FAILS NOMINAL 2409-Fl, 2419-D1 Revision 1 Page 33 of 78 Version 1.0 Page 2568 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-004 Table 2-2-15 U2-2-004-SEP-028, 029 ALTERATIONS Component ID Basic Event BE Description Model Alterations Scenarios TO OPEN ON DEMAND Q2R17B0098.E:E 2ACBSB009 600V MCC 2CC 8600F RANDOMLY FAILS NOMINAL 2409-Fl, F2 SW TRAIN A DISCHARGE Q2P16V0546:O:O/
2SWMVQV5 S RI ICAG 024656-- V MOV 546 FAILS TO NOMINAL 2409-F1, 2419-Dl REMAIN OPEN 2SWMVQV549---V 2SWMVQV5 2SWMVQV549---V NOMINAL 2409-Fl 49---V Model Alterations:
Failure mode probability set to nominal to eliminate fire contribution.
This model alteration is done in the Altered Events Table for the -COMPU2 scenario.2.2.2 VFDRs Not Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA A Fire PRA was developed in accordance with the requirements of Part 4 "Requirements for Fires at Power PRA" of the ASME and ANS combined PRA Standard, ASME/ANS RA-Sa-2009, "Standard for Level 1/Large Early Release Frequency Probabilistic Risk Assessment for Nuclear Power Plant Applications".
Consistent with those requirements not all components required to meet the nuclear safety criteria need to be specifically modeled in the Fire PRA. The following VFDRs are associated with components not modeled in the Fire PRA: 2.2.2.1 VFDRs U2-2-004-HVAC-004, 005 4kV Switchgear 2F and 2G Room ventilation is not modeled in the fire PRA. Room Heat up calculations show that there will be no impact to the 4kV Switchgear Room due to loss of HVAC within the mission time of 24 hrs in the fire PRA. See calculation Fire PRA Logic Model for Farley Nuclear Plants, PRA-BC-F-l 1-004." U2-2-004-HVAC-004 
-Q2R 15A0006:ENERGIZED:ENERGIZED-SUT2A" U2-2-004-HVAC-005 
-Q2RI 5A0007:ENERGIZED:ENERGIZED-EDG2B 2.2.2.2 VFDRs U2-2-004-HVAC-007, 008 Battery Room 2A and 2B ventilation is not modeled in the fire PRA. The Battery Room exhaust fan functions are to remove the hydrogen that is generated from the battery located within tile room and remove heat generated in the room. The hydrogen production in the 24 hour mission time of the PRA is less than the required amount for a hydrogen burn and Room Heat up calculation shows that there will be no impact to the Battery Room due to loss of HVAC within the mission time of 24 hrs in the fire PRA; therefore the exhaust fan is not required to be modeled. See calculation Fire PRA Logic Model for Farley Nuclear Plants, PRA-BC-F-11-004.* U2-2-004-HVAC-007 
-Q2R42E0002A:AVAILABLE:AVAILABLE" U2-2-004-HVAC-008 
-Q2R42E0002B:AVAILABLE:AVAILABLE 2.2.2.3 VFDR U2-2-004-SEP-017 The NSCA model credits source range monitoring for verifying subcriticality.
The loss of this monitoring in and of itself does not result in the loss of any other NSCA required function.
The Revision 1 Page 34 of 78 Version 1.0 Page 2569 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-004 Fire PRA does not credit neutron monitoring as a cue for any credited human action. Therefore, the loss of neutron monitoring has no impact on the Fire PRA.0 U2-2-004-SEP-0 17 -N2C55NI003 1 A:AVAILABLE:AVAILABLE 2.2.2.4 VFDRs U2-2-004-SEP-022, 023, 024 Normally the sample lines are closed by manual valves. During the sample line operation, the flow rate is limited to less than 1 gpm and the duration of sampling is about 20 minutes, typically.
Therefore, there is no modeling of the sample lines, see Table A-i, PRA-BC-F-1 1-002 Equipment Selection calculation." U2-2-004-SEP-022 
-Q2P15SV3333:CLOSED:OPEN/CLOSED" U2-2-004-SEP-023 
-Q2PI 5SV3104:CLOSED:OPEN/CLOSED" U2-2-004-SEP-024 
-Q2PI 5SV3103:CLOSED:OPEN/CLOSED 2.2.2.5 VFDRs U2-2-004-SEP-030, 031 Main Control Room (MCR) ventilation is not modeled in the PRA. Room Heat up calculations show that there will be no impact to the MCR due to loss of HVAC within the mission time of 24 hrs in the PRA. See calculation Fire PRA Logic Model for Farley Nuclear Plants, PRA-BC-F-11-004. The MCR Ventilation is credited for certain cases in the MCR abandonment scenario, the details of this can be found in the Fire PRA Scenario Development Report PRA-BC-F-1 1-014." U2-2-004-SEP-030 
-QSV49KO002A:
STANDBY:ON" U2-2-004-SEP-031 
-QSV49KOOOIA:STANDBY:ON 2.2.3 Compliant Case Results Tables 2-3a and 2-3b provide the results of the compliant case calculation for fire area 2-004.All of the altered events identified in Section 2.2.1 have been applied to their respective scenarios and the results have been quantified.
The CDF and LERF results are provided on a scenario basis.Revision 1 Page 35 of 78 Version 1.0 Page 2570 of 3726 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-004 Table 2-3a Compliant Case CDF and LERF Results Train A Alignment Zone Scen Scenario Scenario Specific CCDP CDF CLERP LERF Description VFDRs (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr)H GL-2-004-ADJ COMPU2 HGL SCENARIO U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006, IA-001 8.89E-01 9.51 E-08 6.49E-03 6.95E-10 A-2151 COMPU2 BASE CASE U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006, IA-001 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 2152A-2152 COMPU2 BASE CASE U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006, IA-001 1.61E-04 4.17E-09 1.55E-07 4.01E-12 2153 D1- TRANSIENT IN FRONT U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006, IA-001 4.09E-05 1.82E-10 2.26E-08 1.01E-13 COMPU2 OF WGCAS 2153 E- WASTE GAS COMP U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006, IA-00l 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 COMPU2 PUMP A 2153 2154 2154 2154A 2155 2156 2157 2158 2159 2160 2161 2162 F-COMPU2 D1-COMPU2 D2-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 D1-COMPU2 WASTE GAS COMP PUMP B TRANSIENT 
-SE CORNER TRANSIENT 
-NW CORNER BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE TRANSIENT U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 003, 006, SEP-009, 010, 011 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 003, 006 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 003, 006, IA-001, 002, SEP-004, 005, 006, 015, 016 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 003, 006, IA-001, 002, SEP-004, 005, 006, 015, 016 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 4.09E-05 1.44E-06 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 1.44E-05 5.13E-03 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 1.90E-10 3.18E-11 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 9.22E-1 0 1.43E-08 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 2.26E-08 1.16E-09 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 2.98E-08 1.85E-05 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 1.05E-13 2.55E-14 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 1.91E-12 5.17E-11 Revision I Page 36 of 78 Revision 1 Page 36 of 78 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-004 Table 2-3a Compliant Case CDF and LERF Results Train A Alignment Zone Scen Scenario Scenario Specific CCDP CDF CLERP LERF Description VFDRs (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr)2162 2162 2162 2163 2163 D2-COMPU2 D3-COMPU2 E-COMPU2 DA-COMPU2 El-COMPU2 TRANSIENT TRANSIENT SPRAY ADDITIVE TANK PUMP TRANIENT BASE WASTE PROCESSING PNL LIQUID -SEVERE U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 003, 006, IA-001, 002, SEP-004, 005, 006, 015, 016 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 003, 006, IA-001, 002, SEP-004, 005, 006, 015, 016 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 5.13E-03 O.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 8.98E-03 1.98E-03 1.43E-08 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 2.03E-07 3.61 E-09 1.85E-05 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 3.15E-05 7.19E-06 5.17E-1 1 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 7.11E-10 1.31 E-11 E2- WASTE PROCESSING U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 003, 006, IA- 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 COMPU2 PNL LIQUID -NON 001, 002, SEP-004, 005, 006, 015, 016 2163 OMPU2SEVERE 2163 Fl- WASTE PROCESSING U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 8.98E-03 1.64E-08 3.15E-05 5.73E-11 COMPU2 PNL GAS -SEVERE F2- WASTE PROCESSING 2163 COMPU2 PNL GAS -NON U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 SEVERE A-2164 COMPU2 BASE CASE U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 6.61E-07 3.73E-11 2.80E-10 1.58E-14 2165 A-2165 COMPU2 BASE CASE U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 2166 A- BASE CASE U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 003, 006, IA- 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 COMPU2 001, 002, SEP-004, 005, 006, 015, 016 D- TRANSIENT 
-NORTH 2204HA00,0,03,06IA 2168 TRANSIENTNORTH U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 003, 006, IA- 7.46E-05 3.51 E-10 2.38E-07 1.12E-12 WALLUCETNER OF 001, 002, SEP-004, 005, 006, 015, 016 2168 OMPU2ROOM 2168 D2- TRANSIENT 
-NORTH U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 3.63E-03 1.71 E-08 1.25E-05 5.90E-1 1 COMPU2 EAST CORNER A-2170 COMPU2 BASE CASE U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 1.52E-06 3.36E-11 2.92E-09 6.45E-14 A- U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006, IA-001, 2175 COMPU2 BASE CASE SEP-004, 005, 006, 007, 008, 009, 010, 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 011,014 Revision 1 Page 37 of 78 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-004 Table 2-3a Compliant Case CDF and LERF Results Train A Alignment Zone Scen Scenario Scenario Specific CCDP CDF CLERP LERF Description VFDRs (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr)A-2176 COMPU2 BASE CASE U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 6.69E-07 1.48E-11 1.61 E-10 3.54E-15 A-2177 COMPU2 BASE CASE U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 6.69E-07 1.85E-1I 1.61E-10 4.44E-15 A-2178 COMPU2 BASE CASE U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 6.69E-07 1.85E-11 1.61 E-10 4.44E-15 2180 A- BASE CASE U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006, SEP-009, 6.69E-07 1.51E-10 1.61E-10 3.62E-14 COMPU2 010,011 2186 D1- TRANSIENT 
-SOUTH U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006, IA-001, 2.62E-02 1.27E-07 4.27E-05 2.07E-10 COMPU2 WALL EAST OF DOOR SEP-004, 005, 006, 007, 008, 014 2187 2188 2203 2204 2206 2207 2208 2215 2216 2217 2218 2219 2220 2221 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006, IA-003, SEP-018 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006, SEP-009, 010, 011 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006, IA-001, 002, SEP-009, 010, 011, 013, 015, 021 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006, SEP-009, 010,011 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006,IA-001, SEP-013 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006, IA-001 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 1.40E-06 1.40E-06 6.69E-07 0.OOE+00 4.47E-05 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 8.41 E-06 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 8.42E-1 1 1.48E-1 1 3.96E-1 1 3.08E-1 1 6.07E-11I 0.OOE+00 2.08E-09 1.48E-1 1 7.31 E-11 1.48E-1 1 1.34E-09 1.48E-1 1 1 .48E-1 1 1.48E-1 1 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.41 E-09 1.41 E-09 1.61E-10 0.OOE+00 9.87E-08 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 3.20E-09 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 2.02E-14 3.54E-1 5 4.01 E-14 3.12E-14 1.46E-14 0.OOE+00 4.59E-12 3.54 E-15 1.76E-14 3.54E-1 5 5.12E-13 3.54E-15 3.54E-15 3.54 E-15 Revision I Page 38 of 78 Revision I Page 38 of 78 SE-C051326701 
-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-004 Table 2-3a Compliant Case CDF and LERF Results Train A Alignment 7 Scenario Scenario Specific rrnD CDF , ' LERF Wc ,
2222 2222 2230 2231 2232 2237 2238 2239 2240 2253 2301 2302 2303 2304 2305 2306 2307 2308 A-COMPU2 D1-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 BASE CASE TRANSIENT Nrth of last vertical trays on wall BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE VFDRs U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006, IA-001, SEP-004, 005, 006, 007, 008, 014, 021 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006, IA-001, SEP-004, 005, 006, 007, 008, 014, 021 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006, SEP-021 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006, SEP-021 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006, SEP-004, 005, 006 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006, SEP-013 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 3.85E-03 3.85E-03 1.68E-06 1.68E-06 1.68E-06 6.69E-07 6.67E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 1.09E-07 2.03E-08 4.13E-11 4.08E-1 1 3.70E-1 1 1.90E-1 1 1.47E-1 1 1.48E-11 5.12E-11 1.90E-1 1 1.49E-1 1 1.49E-11 1.49E-11 1.49E-1 1 3.11 E-1 1 1.48E-11 1.73E-1 1 1.48E-1 1 5.98E-06 5.98E-06 3.93E-10 3.93E-10 3.93E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr)1.69E-10 3.16E-11 9.67E-1 5 9.57E-1 5 8.66E-1 5 4.56E-15 3.55E-15 3.55E-1 5 1.23E-14 4.56E-15 3.58E-1 5 3.58E-1 5 3.58E-15 3.58E-1 5 7.47E-15 3.54E-1 5 4.15E-15 3.54E-1 5 A-2309 COMPU2 BASE CASE U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 6.69E-07 1.34E-10 1.61E-10 3.21E-14 Revison I age 3 of 7 Revision I Page 39 of 78 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-004 Table 2-3a Compliant Case CDF and LERF Results Train A Alignment Zone Scen Scenario Scenario Specific CCDP CDF CLERP LERF Description VFDRs (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr)A-2310 COMPU2 BASE CASE U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 6.69E-07 1.73E-11 1.61 E-10 4.15E-15 A-2311 COMPU2 BASE CASE U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 6.69E-07 1.49E-11 1.61 E-10 3.58E-15 2312 A- BASE CASE U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 3.18E-05 1.40E-09 1.05E-07 4.63E-12 COMPUJ2 2313 A- BASE CASE U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 003, 006, IA- 6.69E-07 1.49E-11 1.61E-10 3.58E-15 COMPU2 003, SEP-013, 018 2314 2315 2316 2321 2322 2323 2324 2325 2326 2327 2328 2329 2330 2331 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006, IA-003, SEP-013, 018 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006, SEP-009, 010,011 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 003, 006, SEP-013 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.60E-07 1.04E-05 6.71 E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 2.09E-06 6.69E-07 1.49E-1 1 1.49E-1 1 1.73E-11 3.34E- 12 4.08E-09 2.15E-11 2.15E-11 2.40E-1 1 2.14E-11 1.73E-11 1.48E-1 1 1.48E-1 1 4.72E-10 1.48E-11 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 2.80E-10 3.28E-08 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 3.93E-10 1.61 E-10 3.58E-1 5 3.58E-1 5 4.15E-15 1.42E-15 1.28E- 11 5.16E-15 5.16E-15 5.76E-1 5 5.15E-15 4.15E-15 3.54E-1 5 3.54E-1 5 8.85E-14 3.54E-1 5 D1-2332 COMPU2 TRANSIENT FIRE U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 1.25E-02 4.46E-08 2.01 E-05 7.17E-11 Reviion Pag 40 f 7 Revision 1 Page 40 of 78 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-004 Table 2-3a Compliant Case CDF and LERF Results Train A Alignment Zone Scen Scenario Scenario Specific CCDP CDF CLERP LERF Description VFDRs (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr)2332 D2- TRANSIENT FIRE U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 003, 006, IA- 1.25E-02 4.46E-08 2.01E-05 7.17E-11 COMPU2 001, SEP-004, 005, 006, 007, 008, 014 2332 D3- TRANSIENT FIRE U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 003, 006, IA- 1.25E-02 4.46E-08 2.01E-05 7.17E-11 COMPU2 001, SEP-004, 005, 006, 007, 008, 014 2332 E- RECEPTABLE U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 003, 006, IA- 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 COMPU2 TRANSFORMER 2B 001, SEP-004, 005, 006, 007, 008, 014 2332 F2- MCC 2A U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006, SEP-004, 8.82E-06 2.41 E-09 2.34E-08 6.38E-12 COMPU2 005,006 2340 2341 2342 2348 2351 2402 2403 2405 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 E2-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE MCC2DD-NON SEVERE BASE CASE BASE CASE U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006, SEP-004, 005, 006 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006, SEP-021 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006, SEP 001, 002,003 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 9.06E-07 2.11 E-06 1.15E-06 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 7.72E-07 6.69E-07 0.OOE+00 6.69E-07 6.84E-07 2.OOE-1 1 1.05E-11 2.83E-10 1.48E-11 3.33E-12 4.87E-12 4.95E-1 1 0.OOE+00 4.58E-1 1 4.68E-11 1.61E-10 2.74E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 0.OOE+00 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 3.54E-1 5 1.36E-15 3.95E-14 3.55E-15 8.01 E-16 1.01E-15 1.19E-14 0.OOE+00 1.10E-14 1.10E-14 2406 2408 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 D1-2409 COMPU2 TRANSIENT U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 9.13E-07 1.42E-13 1.61 E-10 2.50E-17 2409 E- CONTAINMENT U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006, SEP 001, 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 249 COMPU2 PURGE EXHAUST FAN 002, 003 .E0 .OE0 .E0 .OE0 STARTER PANEL F1-2409 COMPU2 MCC 2CC -SEVERE U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 7.15E-07 1.30E-11 1.61E-10 2.93E-15 Revsio I age41 f 7 Revision 1 Page 41 of 78 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-004 Table 2-3a Compliant Case CDF and LERF Results Train A Alignment Zone Scen Scenario Scenario Specific CCDP CDF CLERP LERF Description VFDRs (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr)2409 F2- MCC 2CC -NON U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 003, 006, SEP- 6.71E-07 6.11E-11 1.61 E-10 1.46E-14 COMPU2 SEVERE 004,005, 006, 012, 028,029 2410A A- BASE CASE U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006, SEP-028, 7.72E-07 2.17E-10 1.61E-10 4.53E-14 COMPU2 029 2418 A- BASE CASE U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006, SEP-001, 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 COMPU2 002,003 2419 D1- TRANSIENT U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006, SEP-004, 1.65E-04 4.88E-11 3.OOE-07 8.88E-14 COMPU2 005, 006 2419 D2- TRANSIENT U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 003, 006, SEP- 1.27E-04 3.75E-11 2.85E-07 8.43E-14 COMPU2 028,029 CRANE MOTOR E- ADDING IN USING 2419 COMPU2 HAND CALC WITH FIF U2-2-004-HVAC-001,002, 006 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 BASED ON 1 EEU A-2422 COMPU2 BASE CASE U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 6.84E-07 9.64E-12 1.61 E-10 2.27E-15 A-2423 COMPU2 BASE CASE U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 6.69E-07 9.43E-12 1.61 E-10 2.27E-15 2424A-2424 COMPU2 BASE CASE U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 6.69E-07 1.48E-11 1.61E-10 3.54E-15 A-2425 COMPU2 BASE CASE U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 6.69E-07 1.48E-11 1.61 E-10 3.54E-15 A-2426 COMPU2 BASE CASE U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 6.69E-07 1.48E-11 1.61E-10 3.54E-15 A-2427 COMPU2 BASE CASE U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 6.69E-07 1.48E-11 1.61 E-10 3.54E-15 249 D1-2429 COMPU2 TRANSIENT U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 2.47E-05 5.24E-12 2.92E-08 6.20E-15 2429 D2- TRANSIENT U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006, SEP-001, 9.06E-07 1.92E-13 1.61 E-10 3.42E-17 COMPU2 002, 003 F- CTMT PURGE SUPPLY U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006, SEP-001, 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 NCOMPU2 EMOTOR 002,003, 004,005, 006 2429 OMPU2EXPOSED 2429 G- RADWASTE SUPPLY U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 COMPU2 FAN MOTOR Revision 1 Page 42 of 78 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-004 Table 2-3a Compliant Case CDF and LERF Results Train A Alignment Scenario Scenario Specific tpnn CDF %r-00 LERF W.V &#xfd;V" 2445 2446 2448 2449 2450 2451 2467 2478 2504 2505 2604 2605 2606 2607 2608 2609 2610 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 E2-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 Description VFDRs BASE CASE U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 BASE CASE U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 BASE CASE U2-2-004-HVAC-001 002, 006 BASE CASE U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 BASE CASE U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 BASE CASE U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 BASE CASE U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 MCC 2C -NON U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 SEVERE BASE CASE U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 BASE CASE U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 BASE CASE U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006, SEP-021 BASE CASE U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 BASE CASE U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 BASE CASE U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 BASE CASE U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 BASE CASE U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006, SEP-021 BASE CASE U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006, SEP-021 Compliant Scenario Total CDF and LERF 6.84E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 4.82E-12 4.58E-1 1 7.OOE-1 1 3.33E-12 3.33E-12 3.40E-12 3.35E-12 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.13E-15 1.10E-14 1.68E-14 8.01E-16 8.01E-16 8.18E-16 8.05E-1 6 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr)6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.59E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 2.09E-06 2.09E-06 6.69E-07 5.12E-11 3.14E-1 1 4.01 E-1 1 2.79E-10 1.48E-11 1.48E-11 2.55E-10 2.76E-10 1.48E-1 1 7.76E-07 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 2.80E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 3.93E-10 3.93E-10 1.61 E-10 1.23E-14 7.55E-15 9.64E- 15 1.19E-13 3.55E-15 3.54E-15 4.79E-14 5.18E-14 3.54E-15 2.30E-09 Revision I Page 43 of 78 Revision I Page 43 of 78 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-004 Table 2-3b Compliant Case CDF and LERF Results Train B Alignment Zone Scen Scenario Scenario Specific CCDP CDF CLERP LERF Description VFDRs (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr)HGL-2-004-ADJ COMPU2 HGL SCENARIO U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006, IA-001 8.89E-01 9.51E-08 6.49E-03 6.95E-10 A-2151 COMPU2 BASE CASE U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006, IA-001 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 2152A-2152 COMPU2 BASE CASE U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006, IA-001 1.06E-04 2.74E-09 1.23E-07 3.19E-12 2153 D1- TRANSIENT IN FRONT U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006, IA-001 4.04E-05 1.80E-10 2.56E-08 1.14E-13 COMPU2 OF WGC'S 2153 E- WASTE GAS COMP U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006, IA-001 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 COMPU2 PUMP A 2153 F- WASTE GAS COMP U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 COMPU2 PUMP B 2154 D1- TRANSIENT 
-SE U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 COMPU2 CORNER 2154 2154A 2155 2156 2157 2158 2159 2160 2161 2162 D2-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 D1-COMPU2 TRANSIENT 
-NW CORNER BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE TRANSIENT U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 003, 006, SEP-009, 010, 011 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 003, 006 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 003, 006, IA-001, 002, SEP-004, 005, 006, 015, 016 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 003, 006, IA-001, 002, SEP-004, 005, 006, 015, 016 4.04E-05 1.49E-06 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 1.49E-05 5.09E-03 1.88E-10 3.28E-1 1 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 9.52E-10 1.42E-08 2.56E-08 1.16E-09 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 2.98E-08 1.83E-05 1.19E-13 2.55E-14 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 1.91 E-12 5.11 E-11 Revision I Page 44 of 78 Revision 1 Page 44 of 78 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-004 Table 2-3b Compliant Case CDF and LERF Results Train B Alignment Zone Scen Scenario Scenario Specific CCDP CDF CLERP LERF Description VFDRs (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr)2162 2162 2162 2163 2163 2163 2163 2163 2164 2165 2166 2168 2168 2170 D2-COMPU2 D3-COMPU2 E-COMPU2 DA-COMPU2 El-COMPU2 E2-COMPU2 Fl-COMPU2 F2-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 D1-COMPU2 D2-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 TRANSIENT TRANSIENT SPRAY ADDITIVE TANK PUMP TRANIENT BASE WASTE PROCESSING PNL LIQUID -SEVERE WASTE PROCESSING PNL LIQUID -NON SEVERE WASTE PROCESSING PNL GAS -SEVERE WASTE PROCESSING PNL GAS -NON SEVERE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE TRANSIENT 
-NORTH WALL CETNER OF ROOM TRANSIENT 
-NORTH EAST CORNER BASE CASE U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 003, 006, IA-001, 002, SEP-004, 005, 006, 015, 016 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 003, 006, IA-001, 002, SEP-004, 005, 006, 015, 016 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 003, 006, IA-001, 002, SEP-004, 005, 006, 015, 016 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 003, 006, IA-001, 002, SEP-004, 005, 006, 015, 016 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 003, 006, IA-001, 002, SEP-004, 005, 006, 015, 016 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 5.09E-03 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 8.96E-03 1.95E-03 0.OOE+00 8.96E-03 0.OOE+00 6.53E-07 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 7.61 E-05 3.60E-03 1.51E-06 1.42E-08 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 2.03E-07 3.55E-09 0.OOE+00 1.63E-08 0.OOE+00 3.68E-1 1 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 3.58E-1 0 1.69E-08 3.35E-1 1 1.83E-05 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 3.13E-05 7.08E-06 0.OOE+00 3.13E-05 0.OOE+00 2.80E-10 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 2.30E-07 1.24E-05 2.92E-09 5.11 E-11 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 7.07E-1 0 1.29E-11 0.OOE+00 5.69E-1 1 0.OOE+00 1.58E-14 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 1.08E-12 5.84E-1 1 6.45E-14 CD Ci, 0 C4 A- U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006, IA-001, 2175 COMPU2 BASE CASE SEP-004, 005, 006, 007, 008, 009, 010, 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 011, 014 Revision 1 Page 45 of 78 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-004 Table 2-3b Compliant Case CDF and LERF Results Train B Alignment Zone Scen Scenario Scenario Specific CCDP CDF CLERP LERF Description VFDRs (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr)A-2176 COMPU2 BASE CASE U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 6.63E-07 1.46E-11 1.61E-10 3.54E-15 A-2177 COMPU2 BASE CASE U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 6.63E-07 1.83E-11 1.61E-10 4.44E-15 A-2178 COMPU2 BASE CASE U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 6.63E-07 1.83E-11 1.61 E-10 4.44E-15 2180 A- BASE CASE U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006, SEP-009, 6.63E-07 1.49E-10 1.61 E-10 3.62E-14 COMPU2 010,011 2186 D1- TRANSIENT 
-SOUTH U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006, IA-001, 2.61 E-02 1.27E-07 4.25E-05 2.06E-10 COMPU2 WALL EAST OF DOOR SEP-004, 005, 006, 007, 008, 014 2187 2188 2203 2204 2206 2207 2208 2215 2216 2217 2218 2219 2220 2221 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006, IA-003, SEP-018 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006, SEP-009, 010, 011 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006, IA-001, 002, SEP-009, 010, 011, 013, 015, 021 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006, SEP-009, 010, 011 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006,IA-001, SEP-013 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006, IA-001 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 6.63E-07 6.63E-07 1.39E-06 1.39E-06 6.63E-07 0.OOE+00 4.40E-05 6.63E-07 6.63E-07 6.63E-07 8.40E-06 6.63E-07 6.63E-07 6.63E-07 8.34E-11 1.46E-1 1 3.94E-11 3.07E-1 1 6.01 E-11 0.OOE+00 2.05E-09 1.46E-11 7.24E-1 1 1.46E-1 1 1.34E-09 1.46E-11 1.46E-11 1.46E-1 1 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.41 E-09 1.41 E-09 1.61 E-10 0.OOE+00 8.18E-08 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 3.20E-09 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 2.02E-14 3.54E-1 5 4.01E-14 3.12E-14 1.46E-14 0.OOE+00 3.81E-12 3.54E-15 1.76E-14 3.54E-15 5.12E-13 3.54E-15 3.54E-1 5 3.54E-1 5 Revision I Page 46 of 78 Revision 1 Page 46 of 78 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-004 Table 2-3b Compliant Case CDF and LERF Results Train B Alignment Q~nni I~i Q ,f; In:9 F9 Zone 2222 2222 2230 2231 2232 2237 2238 2239 2240 2253 2301 2302 2303 2304 2305 2306 2307 2308 Scen 
,. Description VFDRs A-A- BASE CASE U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 COMPU2 D1- TRANSIENT Nrth of last U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006, IA-001, COMPU2 vertical trays on wall SEP-004, 005, 006, 007, 008, 014, 021 A- BASE CASE U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006, IA-001, COMPU2 SEP-004, 005, 006, 007, 008, 014, 021 A-A- BASE CASE U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006, SEP-021 COMPU2 A-A- BASE CASE U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006, SEP-021 COMPU2 A-A- BASE CASE U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 COMPU-2 A-A- BASE CASE U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 COMPU-2 A- BASE CASE U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006, SEP-004, COMPU2 005, 006 A-A- BASE CASE U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 COMPU2 A-A- BASE CASE U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 A-PU BASE CASE U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 COMPU2 A-A- BASE CASE U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 COMPU2 A-A- BASE CASE U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 COMPU-2 A-A- BASE CASE U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 COMPU2 A-A- BASE CASE U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 COMPU-2 A-A- BASE CASE U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 COMPU2 A-BASE CASE U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 COMPU-2 A-BASE CASE U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 COMPU-2 CCDP ((rx-yr)3.84E-03 3.84E-03 1.67E-06 1.67E-06 1.67E-06 6.63E-07 6.61 E-07 6.63E-07 6.63E-07 6.63E-07 6.63E-07 6.63E-07 6.63E-07 6.63E-07 6.63E-07 6.63E-07 6.63E-07 6.63E-07 1.09E-07 2.03E-08 4.11 E-1 1 4.07E-1 1 3.68E-1 1 1.88E-1 1 1.46E-1 1 1.46E-1 1 5.07E-1 1 1.88E-1 1 1.48E-1 1 1.48E-11 1.48E-1 1 1.48E-1 1 3.08E-1 1 1.46E-11 1.71 E-11 1.46E-1 1 CLERP 5.95E-06 5.95E-06 3.93E-10 3.93E-10 3.93E-1 0 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 (/rx-yr)1.69E-10 3.14E- 11 9.67E-15 9.57E-1 5 8.66E-1 5 4.56E-15 3.55E-1 5 3.55E-1 5 1.23E-14 4.56E-15 3.58E-1 5 3.58E-1 5 3.58E-15 3.58E-15 7.47E-15 3.54 E-15 4.15E-15 3.54E-1 5 A-2309 COMPU2 BASE CASE U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 6.63E-07 1.32E-10 1.61E-10 3.21E-14 Reviion PagM47 f 7 Revision 1 Page 47 of 78 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-004 Table 2-3b Compliant Case CDF and LERF Results Train B Alignment Zone Scen Scenario Scenario Specific CCDP CDF CLERP LERF Description VFDRs (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr)A-2310 COMPU2 BASE CASE U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 6.63E-07 1.71E-11 1.61E-10 4.15E-15 A-2311 COMPU2 BASE CASE U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 6.63E-07 1.48E-11 1.61E-10 3.58E-15 A-2312 COMPU2 BASE CASE U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 3.73E-05 1.64E-09 1.15E-07 5.08E-12 2313 A- BASE CASE U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 003, 006, IA- 6.63E-07 1.48E-11 1.61 E-10 3.58E-15 COMPU2 003, SEP-013, 018 A-2314 A COMPU2 A-2315 A-COMPU2 A-231COMPU12 232A-COMPU2 A-233COMPUJ2 2324 A-COMPU2 A-235 COMPU2 232A-COMPU2 A-237COMPU-2 2328 A-COMPU2 A-23294 A COMPU2 A-230 COMPU12 COMPU2 Al-2332 6 MU COMPU-2 BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006, IA-003, SEP-013, 018 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006, SEP-009, 010, 011 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 003, 006, SEP-013 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 6.63E-07 6.63E-07 6.63E-07 6.54E-07 1.07E-05 6.65E-07 6.63E-07 6.63E-07 6.63E-07 6.63E-07 6.63E-07 6.63E-07 2.45E-06 6.63E-07 1.24E-02 1.48E-1 1 1.48E-1 1 1.71 E-11 3.31 E-12 4.21 E-09 2.13E-1 1 2.13E-11 2.37E-1 1 2.12E-11 1.71E-11 1.46E-1 1 1.46E-11 5.52E-10 1.46E-11 4.45E-08 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 2.80E-10 3.28E-08 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 3.93E-10 1.61 E-10 2.OOE-05 3.58E-1 5 3.58E-1 5 4.15E-15 1.42E-15 1.28E-1 1 5.16E-15 5.16E-15 5.76E-1 5 5.15E-15 4.15E-15 3.54E-15 3.54E-15 8.85E-14 3.54E-15 7.14E-1 1 TRANSIENT FIRE Revision I Page 48 of 78 Revision I Page 48 of 78 SE-C05132670i-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-004 Table 2-3b Compliant Case CDF and LERF Results Train B Alignment Zone Scen Scenario Scenario Specific CCDP CDF CLERP LERF Description VFDRs (Irx-yr) (irx-yr)2332 D2- TRANSIENT FIRE U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 003, 006, IA- 1.24E-02 4.45E-08 2.00E-05 7.14E-11 COMPU2 001, SEP-004, 005, 006, 007, 008, 014 2332 D3- TRANSIENT FIRE U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 003, 006, IA- 1.24E-02 4.45E-08 2.00E-05 7.14E-11 COMPU2 001, SEP-004, 005, 006, 007, 008, 014 2332 E- RECEPTABLE U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 003, 006, IA- O.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 COMPU2 TRANSFORMER 2B 001, SEP-004, 005, 006, 007, 008, 014 2332 F2- MCC 2A U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006, SEP-004, 8.82E-06 2.41E-09 2.34E-08 6.38E-12 COMPU2 005,006 2340 2341 2342 2348 2351 2402 2403 2405 2406 2408 2409 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 E2-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 D1-COMPU2 BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE MCC 2DDD-NON SEVERE BASE CASE BASE CASE TRANSIENT U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006, SEP-004, 005, 006 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006, SEP-021 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006, SEP 001, 002,003 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 9.OOE-07 2.46E-06 1.15E-06 6.63E-07 6.63E-07 7.66E-07 6.63E-07 0.OOE+00 6.63E-07 6.78E-07 9.07E-07 1.98E-11 1.23E-1 1 2.82E-10 1.46E-11 3.30E-1 2 4.83E-12 4.90E-1 1 0.OOE+00 4.54E-11 4.64E-1 1 1.41E-13 1.61E-10 2.74E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 0.OOE+00 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 3.54E-15 1.36E-15 3.95E-14 3.55E-1 5 8.01 E-1 6 1.01E-15 1.19E-14 0.OOE+00 1.10E-14 1.10E-14 2.50E-17 E- CONTAINMENT U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006, SEP 001, 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.O0E+00 2409 COMPU2 PURGE EXHAUST FAN 002, 003 .E0 .OE0 .E0 .OE0 2409 COMPU2 STARTER PANEL F1-2409 COMPU2 MCC 2CC -SEVERE U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 7.09E-07 1.29E-11 1.61E-10 2.93E-15 Revision 1 Page 49 of 78 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-004 Table 2-3b Compliant Case CDF and LERF Results Train B Alignment Zone Scen Scenario Scenario Specific CCDP CDF CLERP LERF Description VFDRs (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr)2409 F2- MCC 2CC -NON U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 003, 006, SEP- 6.65E-07 6.05E-11 1.61 E-10 1.46E-14 COMPU2 SEVERE 004,005, 006,012, 028, 029 2410A A- BASE CASE U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006, SEP-028, 7.66E-07 2.16E-10 1.61E-10 4.53E-14 COMPU2 029 2418 A- BASE CASE U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006, SEP-001, 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 COMPU2 002,003 2419 D1- TRANSIENT U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006, SEP-004, 1.29E-03 3.81 E-10 1.89E-06 5.58E-13 COMPU2 005, 006 2419 D2- TRANSIENT U2-2-004-HVAC.-001, 002, 003, 006, SEP- 6.71E-04 1.99E-10 1.06E-06 3.12E-13 COMPU2 028, 029 CRANE MOTOR E- ADDING IN USING 2419 COMPU2 HAND CALC WITH FIF U2-2-004-HVAC-001,002, 006 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 BASED ON 1 EEU 2422 2423 2424 2425 2426 2427 2429 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 D1-COMPU2 BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE BASE CASE TRANSIENT U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 6.78E-07 6.63E-07 6.63E-07 6.63E-07 6.63E-07 6.63E-07 2.51 E-05 9.55E-12 9.35E-12 1.46E-1 1 1.46E-1 1 1.46E-1 1 1.46E-1 1 5.34E-12 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 2.92E-08 2.27E-1 5 2.27E-15 3.54E-15 3.54E-1 5 3.54E-15 3.54 E-15 6.20E-15 2429 D2- TRANSIENT U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006, SEP-001, 9.OOE-07 1.91E-13 1.61E-10 3.42E-17 COMPU2 002,003 CTMT PURGE SUPPLY U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006, SEP-001, 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 COMPU2 EXPOSED 002,003, 004,005,006 2429 G- RADWASTE SUPPLY U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 COMPU2 FAN MOTOR Revision 1 Page 50 of 78 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-004 Table 2-3b Compliant Case COF and LERF Results Train B Alignment Zone 2445 2446 2448 2449 2450 2451 2467 2478 2504 2505 2604 2605 2606 2607 2608 2609 2610 Scen A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 E2-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 A-COMPU2 Scenario Scenario Specific Description VFDRs BASE CASE U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 BASE CASE U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 BASE CASE U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 BASE CASE U2-2-004-HVAC-001 002, 006 BASE CASE U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 BASE CASE U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 BASE CASE U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 MCC2C-NON U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 SEVERE BASE CASE U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 BASE CASE U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 BASE CASE U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006, SEP-021 BASE CASE U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 BASE CASE U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 BASE CASE U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 BASE CASE U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006 BASE CASE U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006, SEP-021 BASE CASE U2-2-004-HVAC-001, 002, 006, SEP-021 Compliant Scenario Total CDF and LERF CCDP 6.85E-07 6.63E-07 6.63E-07 6.63E-07 6.63E-07 6.63E-07 6.63E-07 0.OOE+00 6.63E-07 6.63E-07 6.63E-07 6.53E-07 6.63E-07 6.63E-07 2.45E-06 2.45E-06 6.63E-07 CDF (/rx-yr)4.83E-1 2 4.54E-1 1 6.94E-1 1 3.30E-12 3.30E-1 2 3.37E-1 2 3.32E-12 0.OOE+00 5.07E-1 1 3.11E-11 3.98E-1 1 2.76E-10 1.46E-11 1.46E-1 1 2.99E-10 3.23E-10 1.46E-11 7.73E-07 CLERP 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 0.OOE+00 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 2.80E-1 0 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 3.93E-10 3.93E-10 1.61 E-10 LERF (/rx-yr)1.13E-15 1.10E-14 1.68E-14 8.01E-16 8.01 E-16 8.18E-16 8.05E-16 0.OOE+00 1.23E-14 7.55E-15 9.64E-1i5 1.19E-13 3.55E-15 3.54E-15 4.79E-14 5.18E-14 3.54E-15 2.29E-09 Revision I Page 51 of78 Revision 1 Page 51 of 78 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-004 2.2.4 Required Modifications The following plant modifications are being credited in the PRA to reduce the risk in this area: " Seal MCCs 2C (N2R17B003) and 2DD (Q2R17B0099)" Install new trip device in panel Q2R42B0001A, breakers LA08, LAI3, LA20" Install new trip device in panel Q2R42B0001B, breakers LB07, LB14 2.2.5 Required Recovery Actions The following recovery actions are required as a result of the risk evaluation for this fire area: Table 2-4 Required Recovery Actions Component ID Basic Event VFDR BE Description Recovery Action Description OPERATOR Operator action to RECOVERY OF provide alternate Q2R42B0001A:ENERGIZE OP-RECOV-U2-2-004-BATTERY CHARGER cooling for battery A ROOM COOLING charger room due FAILS to loss of fan OPERATOR Operator action to RECOVERY OF provide alternate Q2R42BOOO1A:ENERGIZE OP-RECOV-U2-2-004-BATTERY CHARGER cooling for battery D:ENERGIZED-BC2A BCSW-A HVAC-001 A ROOM COOLING charger room due FAILS-SW to loss of Train A SW OPERATOR Operator action to Q2R42BO001B:ENERGIZE OP-RECOV-U2-2-004-RECOVERY OF provide alternate D:ENERGIZED-BC2B RCBC-B HVAC-002 BATTERY CHARGER cooling for battery 1 B OR 2B ROOM charger room due COOLING FAILS to loss of fan OPERATOR Operator action to RECOVERY OF provide alternate Q2R42B0001B:ENERGIZE OP-RECOV-U2-2-004-BATTERY CHARGER cooling for battery D:ENERGIZED-BC2B BCSW-B HVAC-002 B ROOM COOLING charger room due FAILS-SW to loss of Train B SW 2.3 Risk Evaluation Results The total area ACDF is above the screening criteria of I E-07/rx-yr and the ALERF is below the screening criteria of 1 E-08/rx-yr, respectively.
However, the total plant delta CDF/LERF is below the RG 1. 174 criteria of IE-05/rx-yr and IE-06/rx-yr, respectively.
All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0 ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency.
The following tables present the fire zone/scenario fire risk as well as the total fire risk for this fire area.Revision 1 Page 52 of 78 Version 1.0 Page 2587 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-004 SE-C051 326701 -008 Attachment 
-FRE far Unit 2 Fire Area 2-004 Table 2-5a 1 FIRE AREA ACDF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN A ALIGNMEN Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case IT 2-004-ADJ/HGL 2151/A 3 2152/A 2153/D1 2153/E3 2153/F 3 2154/D 1 3 2154/D2 2154A/A 2155/A 3 2156/A 3 2157/A 3 2158/A 3 2159/A 3 2160/A 3 2161/A 2162/D1 2162/D2 2162/D3 3 2162/E 3 21 63/DA 2163/El 21 63/E2 3 2163/Fl 2163/F2 3 2164/A 2 165/A 3 2166/A 3 2168/D1 2168/D2 2170/A 2175/A 3 2176/A 2177/A 2178/A 2180/A 2186/D1 2187/A 2188/A 2203/A 2204/A 2206/A 2207/A 3 2208/A 2215/A 2216/A CCDP 8.89E-01 1.55E-05 1.61E-04 4.28E-05 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 3.94E-05 4.28E-05 1.44E-06 3.94E-05 3.94E-05 3.94E-05 3.94E-05 3.94E-05 5.59E-04 1.44E-05 1.44E-02 1.44E-02 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 1.78E-02 3.32E-03 6.69E-07 1.78E-02 6.69E-07 6.61 E-07 3.62E-06 3.62E-06 1.63E-03 9.50E-03 1.04E-04 2.55E-03 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 1.40E-06 2.82E-02 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 1.42E-06 1.40E-06 6.69E-07 3.78E-05 8.51 E-04 6.69E-07 3.14E-06 CDF 9.51 E-08 4.01E-10 4.18E-09 1.90E-10 6.67E-1 1 6.67E-1 1 1.83E-10 1.99E-10 3.18E-11 1.09E-09 9.64E-1 0 8.68E-10 9.64E-10 8.74E-09 1.54E-08 9.24E-10 4.03E-08 4.03E-08 3.01 E-12 6.67E-1 1 4.03E-07 6.04E-09 1.22E-1 1 3.24E-08 1.22E-11 3.73E-1 1 9.38E-1 1 9.38E-1 1 7.68E-09 4.47E-08 2.29E-09 8.01 E-08 1.48E-1 1 1.85E-11 1.85E-11 3.16E-10 1.37E-07 8.42E-1 1 1.48E-11 4.03E-1 1 3.08E-1 1 6.07E-1 1 9.98E-09 3.96E-08 1.48E-1 1 3.43E-10 CCDP 8.89E-01 0.00E+00 1.61 E-04 4.09E-05 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 4.09E-05 1.44E-06 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 1.44E-05 5.13E-03 5.13E-03 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 8.98E-03 1.98E-03 0.00E+00 8.98E-03 0.OOE+00 6.61 E-07 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 7.46E-05 3.63E-03 1.52E-06 0.00E+00 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 2.62E-02 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 1.40E-06 1.40E-06 6.69E-07 0.00E+00 4.47E-05 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 CDF 9.51 E-08 0.OOE+00 4.17E-09 1.82E-10 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 1.90E-10 3.18E-11 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 9.22E-10 1.43E-08 1.43E-08 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 2.03E-07 3.61 E-09 0.OOE+00 1.64E-08 0.00E+00 3.73E-1 1 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 3.51E-10 1.71E-08 3.36E-1 1 0.00E+00 1.48E-1 1 1.85E-11 1.85E-11 1.51E-10 1.27E-07 8.42E-1 1 1.48E-1 1 3.96E-11 3.08E-1 1 6.07E-1 1 0.OOE+00 2.08E-09 1.48E-1 1 7.31 E-11 qT Variant -Compliant ACDF 0.OOE+00 4.01E-10 1.21 E-11 8.33E-12 6.67E-1 1 6.67E-1 1 1.83E-10 8.72E-12 0.00E+00 1.09E-09 9.64E-10 8.68E-10 9.64E-10 8.74E-09 1.54E-08 2.58E-12 2.60E-08 2.60E-08 3.01E-12 6.67E-1 1 2.OOE-07 2.43E-09 1.22E-1l1 1.61 E-08 1.22E-11 0.OOE+00 9.38E-1 1 9.38E-1 1 7.33E-09 2.76E-08 2.26E-09 8.01 E-08 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 1.65E-10 9.65E-09 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 7.58E-1 3 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 9.98E-09 3.75E-08 0.OOE+00 2.69E-10 Revision 1 Page 53 of 78 Version 1.0 Page 2588 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-004 Table 2-5a 1 FIRE AREA ACDF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN A ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case 2217/A 2218/A 2219/A 2220/A 2221/A 2222/A 2222/D1 2230/A 2231/A 2232/A 2237/A 2238/A 2239/A 2240/A 2253/A 2301/A 2302/A 2303/A 2304/A 2305/A 2306/A 2307/A 2308/A 2309/A 2310/A 2311/A 2312/A 2313/A 2314/A 2315/A 2316/A 2321/A 2322/A 2323/A 2324/A 2325/A 2326/A 2327/A 2328/A 2329/A 2330/A 2331/A 2332/D1 2332/D2 2332/D3 2332/E 3 CCDP 6.69E-07 3.55E-05 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 8.85E-03 8.85E-03 1.68E-06 1.68E-06 1.68E-06 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 1.40E-06 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.52E-04 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 1.48E-06 6.60E-07 1.48E-05 1.45E-06 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 2.09E-06 6.69E-07 2.86E-02 2.86E-02 2.86E-02 3.80E-06 CDF 1.48E- 11 5.67E-09 1.48E- 11 1.48E-1 1 1.48E-1 1 2.51 E-07 4.67E-08 4.14E-l1 4.09E-1 1 3.70E-1 1 1.90E-11 1.48E-1 1 1.48E-1 1 5.12E-1 1 1.90E-11 1.49E-11 1.49E-11 3.12E-11 1.49E-1 1 3.11E-11 1.48E-1 1 1.73E-1 1 1.48E-11 1.34E-10 1.73E-1 1 1.49E-1 1 2.87E-08 1.49E- 11 1.49E-1 1 1.49E-1 1 3.81 E-11 3.34E-1 2 5.82E-09 4.66E-1 1 2.15E-1 1 2.40E-1 I 2.14E-1 1 1.73E-11 1.48E-1 1 1.48E-1 1 4.72E-1 0 1.48E-11 1.02E-07 1.02E-07 1.02E-07 6.61 E-10 Compliant Case CCDP CDF 6.69E-07 1.48E-11 8.41 E-06 1.34E-09 6.69E-07 1.48E-11 6.69E-07 1.48E-11 6.69E-07 1.48E-11 3.85E-03 1.09E-07 3.85E-03 2.03E-08 1.68E-06 4.13E-11 1.68E-06 4.08E-11 1.68E-06 3.70E- 11 6.69E-07 1.90E-11 6.67E-07 1.47E-11 6.69E-07 1.48E-1I 6.69E-07 5.12E-11 6.69E-07 1.90E-11 6.69E-07 1.49E-11 6.69E-07 1.49E-11 6.69E-07 1.49E-11 6.69E-07 1.49E-11 6.69E-07 3.11E-11 6.69E-07 1.48E-11 6.69E-07 1.73E-11 6.69E-07 1.48E-11 6.69E-07 1.34E-10 6.69E-07 1.73E-11 6.69E-07 1.49E-11 3.18E-05 1.40E-09 6.69E-07 1.49E- 11 6.69E-07 1.49E-11 6.69E-07 1.49E-11 6.69E-07 1.73E-11 6.60E-07 3.34E-12 1.04E-05 4.08E-09 6.71E-07 2.15E-11 6.69E-07 2.15E-11 6.69E-07 2.40E-11 6.69E-07 2.14E-11 6.69E-07 1.73E- 11 6.69E-07 1.48E-11 6.69E-07 1.48E-11 2.09E-06 4.72E-10 6.69E-07 1.48E- 11 1.25E-02 4.46E-08 1.25E-02 4.46E-08 1.25E-02 4.46E-08 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 Variant -Compliant ACDF 0.OOE+00 4.33E-09 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 1.42E-07 2.64E-08 1.06E-13 1.05E-13 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 5.75E-14 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 1.63E-1 1 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 2.73E-08 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 2.08E-1 1 0.OOE+00 1.73E-09 2.50E-11 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 5.77E-08 5.77E-08 5.77E-08 6.61E-10 Revision I Page 54 of 78 Revision 1 Page 54 of 78 Version 1.0 Page 2589 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-004 SE-COSI 326701 -008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-004 Table 2-5a 1 FIRE AREA aCDF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN A ALIGNMEN Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case IT 2332/F2 2340/A 2341/A 2342/A 2348/A 2351/A 2402/A 2403/A 2405/E2 3 2406/A 2408/A 2409/D1 2409/E 3 2409/F1 2409/F2 2410A/A 2418/A 3 2419/D1 2419/D2 2419/F 3 2422/A 2423/A 2424/A 2425/A 2426/A 2427/A 2429/D1 2429/D2 2429/F 3 2429/G 3 2445/A 2446/A 2448/A 2449/A 2450/A 2451/A 2467/A 2478/E2 3 2504/A 2505/A 2604/A 2605/A 2606/A 2607/A 2608/A 2609/A CCDP 4.25E-05 9.11E-07 2.11 E-06 1.15E-06 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 1.35E-06 6.69E-07 6.71 E-07 6.69E-07 6.84E-07 7.46E-06 6.69E-07 2.86E-03 6.71 E-07 1.35E-06 8.30E-07 7.27E-01 1.33E-04 6.69E-07 6.84E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 3.15E-04 7.46E-06 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.84E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.63E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 2.1OE-06 2.10E-06 CDF 1.16E-08 2.01 E-11 1.05E-11 2.83E-10 1.48E-11 3.33E-12 8.51 E-12 4.95E-11 1.22E-10 4.58E-1 1 4.68E-1 1 1.16E-12 1.22E-11 5.21 E-08 6.11E-11 3.80E-10 1.07E-10 2.15E-07 3.94E-1 1 3.64E-1 1 9.64E-12 9.43E-12 1.48E-11 1.48E-1 1 1.48E-1 1 1.48E-1 1 6.69E-1 1 1.58E-12 3.64E-11 3.64E-11 4.82E-1 2 4.58E-1 1 7.OOE-1 1 3.33E-1 2 3.33E-12 3.40E-12 3.35E-12 2.44E-1 0 5.12E-1 1 3.14E-1 1 4.01E-11 2.81E-10 1.48E-1 1 1.48E-1 1 2.56E-10 2.77E-10 CCDP 8.82E-06 9.06E-07 2.11E-06 1.15E-06 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 7.72E-07 6.69E-07 0.OOE+00 6.69E-07 6.84E-07 9.13E-07 0.OOE+00 7.15E-07 6.71 E-07 7.72E-07 0.OOE+00 1.65E-04 1.27E-04 0.OOE+00 6.84E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 2.47E-05 9.06E-07 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 6.84E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 0.OOE+00 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.59E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 2.09E-06 2.09E-06 CDF 2.41 E-09 2.OOE-1 1 1.05E-11 2.83E-10 1.48E-1 1 3.33E-12 4.87E-12 4.95E-11 0.OOE+00 4.58E-11 4.68E-1 1 1.42E-13 0.OOE+00 1.30E-1 1 6.11E-11 2.17E-10 0.OOE+00 4.88E-1 1 3.75E-11 0.OOE+00 9.64E-12 9.43E-12 1.48E-1 1 1.48E-1 1 1.48E-11 1.48E-11 5.24E-12 1.92E-13 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 4.82E-12 4.58E-11 7.OOE-1 1 3.33E-12 3.33E-1 2 3.40E-12 3.35E-1 2 0.OOE+00 5.12E-11 3.14E-1 1 4.01E-11 2.79E-10 1.48E-11 1.48E-1 1 2.55E-10 2.76E-10 4T Variant -Compliant dACDF 9.21 E-09 1.23E-1 3 2.14E-14 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 3.65E-1 2 0.OOE+00 1.22E-10 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 1.02E-12 1.22E-11 5.21 E-08 3.01E-14 1.63E-10 1.07E-10 2.15E-07 1.91E-12 3.64E-11 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 6.16E-1 1 1.39E-12 3.64E-1 1 3.64E-1i1 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 2.44E-10 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 1.82E-12 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 5.24E-1 3 5.67E-1 3 Revision 1 Page 55 of 78 Version 1.0 Page 2590 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-004 Table 2-5a 1 FIRE AREA ACDF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN A ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CCDP CDF CCDP CDF ACDF 2610/A 6.69E-07 1.48E-11 6.69E-07 1.48E-11 0.00E+00 Total CDF and delta CDF 2  1.90E-06 7.76E-07 1.13E-06 1 _ N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.2 Total ACDF includes the risk of recovery actions required to demonstrate the availability of a success path for the nuclear safety performance criteria.3_ Compliant CDF/LERF of 0.OOE+00 signifies the use of the variant case CDF/LERF as the surrogate delta.Table 2-5bi FIRE AREA aCDF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN B ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case 2-004-ADJ/HGL 2151/A 3 2152/A 2153/D1 2153/E 3 2153/F 3 2154/D1 3 2154/D2 2154A/A 2155/A 3 2156/A 3 2157/A 3 2158/A 3 2159/A 3 2160/A 3 2161/A 2162/D1 2162/D2 2162/D3 3 2162/E 3 2163/DA 2163/El 2163/E2 3 2163/Fl 2163/F2 3 2164/A 2165/A 3 2166/A 3 2168/D1 2168/D2 2170/A 2175/A 3 2176/A 2177/A CCDP 8.89E-01 6.21 E-06 1.06E-04 4.23E-05 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 3.91 E-05 4.23E-05 1.69E-06 3.91 E-05 3.91 E-05 3.91 E-05 3.91 E-05 3.91 E-05 3.14E-04 1.58E-05 1.45E-02 1.45E-02 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 1.79E-02 3.30E-03 6.64E-07 1.79E-02 6.64E-07 6.54E-07 1.97E-06 1.97E-06 1.65E-03 9.54E-03 1.04E-04 3.17E-03 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 CDF 9.51 E-08 1.61E-10 2.74E-09 1.88E-10 6.62E- 11 6.62E-11 1.82E-10 1.97E-10 3.72E-1 1 1.08E-09 9.58E-10 8.62E-10 9.58E-10 8.69E-09 8.66E-09 1.01E-09 4.06E-08 4.06E-08 2.99E-1 2 6.62E-1.1 4.05E-07 6.02E-09 1.21 E-11 3.26E-08 1.21 E-11 3.69E-1 1 5.12E-1 1 5.12E-1 1 7.78E-09 4.49E-08 2.29E-09 9.96E-08 1.46E-1 1 1.83E-1 1 Compliant Case CCDP CDF 8.89E-01 9.51 E-08 O.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 1.06E-04 2.74E-09 4.04E-05 1.80E-10 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 4.04E-05 1.88E-10 1.49E-06 3.28E-11 O.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 1.49E-05 9.52E-10 5.09E-03 1.42E-08 5.09E-03 1.42E-08 O.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 8.96E-03 2.03E-07 1.95E-03 3.55E-09 O.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 8.96E-03 1.63E-08 O.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 6.53E-07 3.68E-11 0.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 7.61E-05 3.58E-10 3.60E-03 1.69E-08 1.51 E-06 3.35E-11 0.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 6.63E-07 1.46E-1 1 6.63E-07 1.83E-11 Variant -Compliant ACDF 0.00E+00 1.61E-10 3.OOE-12 8.33E-12 6.62E-11 6.62E-1 1 1.82E-10 8.73E-12 4.35E-1 2 1.08E-09 9.58E-10 8.62E-10 9.58E-10 8.69E-09 8.66E-09 6.09E-1 1 2.64E-08 2.64E-08 2.99E-12 6.62E-1 1 2.03E-07 2.46E-09 1.21E-11 1.63E-08 1.21E-11 6.16E-14 5.12E-11 5.12E-11 7.42E-09 2.80E-08 2.26E-09 9.96E-08 2.41 E-14 3.02E-14 Revision I Page 56 of 78 Revision I Page 56 of 78 Version 1.0 Page 2591 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-004 Table 2-5b 1 FIRE AREA aCDF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN B ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case 2178/A 2180/A 2186/D1 2187/A 2188/A 2203/A 2204/A 2206/A 2207/A 3 2208/A 2215/A 2216/A 2217/A 2218/A 2219/A 2220/A 2221/A 2222/A 2222/D1 2230/A 2231/A 2232/A 2237/A 2238/A 2239/A 2240/A 2253/A 2301/A 2302/A 2303/A 2304/A 2305/A 2306/A 2307/A 2308/A 2309/A 2310/A 2311/A 2312/A 2313/A 2314/A 2315/A 2316/A 2321/A 2322/A 2323/A CCDP 6.64E-07 9.96E-07 2.79E-02 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 1.42E-06 1.39E-06 6.64E-07 4.80E-05 1.33E-03 6.64E-07 1.77E-06 6.64E-07 3.55E-05 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 9.07E-03 9.07E-03 1.68E-06 1.68E-06 1.67E-06 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 1.39E-06 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.88E-04 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 1.47E-06 6.55E-07 1.09E-05 1.44E-06 CDF 1.83E-1 1 2.24E-10 1.35E-07 8.35E-11 1.46E-1 1 4.02E-1 1 3.07E-1 1 6.02E-1 1 1.27E-08 6.19E-08 1.46E-1 1 1.93E-10 1.46E-1 1 5.67E-09 1.46E-1 1 1.46E-1 1 1.46E-1 1 2.57E-07 4.79E-08 4.13E-11 4.08E-1 1 3.69E-1 1 1.88E-1l1 1.47E-1 1 1.47E-1 1 5.08E-1 1 1.88E-11 1.48E-1 1 1.48E-1 1 3.10E-11 1.48E-11 3.09E-1 1 1.46E-11 1 .72E-1 1 1.46E-1 1 1.33E-10 1.72E-11 1.48E-1 1 3.03E-08 1.48E-11 1.48E-11 1.48E-1 1 3.78E-1 1 3.32E-12 4.25E-09 4.63E-1 1 Compliant Case CCDP CDF 6.63E-07 1.83E-11 6.63E-07 1.49E-10 2.61E-02 1.27E-07 6.63E-07 8.34E-11 6.63E-07 1.46E-11 1.39E-06 3.94E-11 1.39E-06 3.07E-11 6.63E-07 6.01E-11 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 4.40E-05 2.05E-09 6.63E-07 1.46E-11 6.63E-07 7.24E-11 6.63E-07 1.46E-1 1 8.40E-06 1.34E-09 6.63E-07 1.46E-1 1 6.63E-07 1.46E-11 6.63E-07 1.46E-11 3.84E-03 1.09E-07 3.84E-03 2.03E-08 1.67E-06 4.11E-11 1.67E-06 4.07E-11 1.67E-06 3.68E-11 6.63E-07 1.88E-11 6.61E-07 1.46E-11 6.63E-07 1.46E-1 1 6.63E-07 5.07E-11 6.63E-07 1.88E-11 6.63E-07 1.48E-1 1 6.63E-07 1.48E-11 6.63E-07 1.48E-11 6.63E-07 1.48E-11 6.63E-07 3.08E-11 6.63E-07 1.46E- 11 6.63E-07 1.71E-11 6.63E-07 1.46E-11 6.63E-07 1.32E-10 6.63E-07 1.71E-11 6.63E-07 1.48E-1 1 3.73E-05 1.64E-09 6.63E-07 1.48E-11 6.63E-07 1.48E-11 6.63E-07 1.48E-11 6.63E-07 1.71 E-11 6.54E-07 3.31E-12 1.07E-05 4.21 E-09 6.65E-07 2.13E-11 Variant -Compliant ACDF 3.02E-14 7.49E-1 1 8.46E-09 1.37E-13 2.41E-14 7.89E-1 3 2.41 E-14 9.91E-14 1.27E-08 5.99E-08 2.41 E-14 1.20E-10 2.41 E-14 4.33E-09 2.41 E-14 2.41 E-14 2.41 E-14 1.48E-07 2.76E-08 1.41 E-13 1.39E-13 3.11E-14 3.10E-14 8.16E-14 2.41 E-14 8.35E-14 3.10E-14 2.43E-14 2.43E-14 1.62E-1 1 2.43E-14 5.07E-14 2.41E-14 2.82E-14 2.41 E-14 2.18E-1 3 2.82E-14 2.43E-14 2.86E-08 2.43E-14 2.43E-14 2.43E-14 2.07E-1 1 5.53E-15 4.36E-11 2.49E-1 1 Revision 1 Page 57 of 78 Version 1.0 Page 2592 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-004 Table 2-5b 1 FIRE AREA ACDF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN B ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case 2324/A 2325/A 2326/A 2327/A 2328/A 2329/A 2330/A 2331/A 2332/Di 2332/D2 2332/D3 2332/E 3 2332/F2 2340/A 2341/A 2342/A 2348/A 2351/A 2402/A 2403/A 2405/E2 3 2406/A 2408/A 2409/D1 2409/E 3 2409/Fl 2409/F2 2410A/A 2418/A 3 2419/D1 2419/D2 2419/E 3 2422/A 2423/A 2424/A 2425/A 2426/A 2427/A 2429/D1 2429/D2 2429/F 3 2429/G 3 2445/A 2446/A 2448/A 2449/A CCDP 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 2.92E-06 6.64E-07 2.96E-02 2.96E-02 2.96E-02 4.15E-06 7.19E-05 9.06E-07 2.94E-06 1.15E-06 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 1.30E-06 6.64E-07 6.66E-07 6.64E-07 6.79E-07 7.41 E-06 6.64E-07 2.87E-03 6.66E-07 1.30E-06 2.01E-06 7.27E-01 6.73E-04 6.64E-07 6.79E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 3.51 E-04 7.41 E-06 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.86E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 CDF 2.13E-11 2.38E-11 2.13E-11 1.72E-11 1.46E-11 1.46E-11 6.58E-10 1.46E-1 1 1.06E-07 1.06E-07 1.06E-07 7.21 E- 10 1.96E-08 2.OOE-1 1 1.46E-11 2.82E-10 1.47E-11 3.31 E-12 8.21 E-12 4.91 E-1 1 1.21E-10 4.55E-1 1 4.65E-1 1 1.15E-12 1.21 E-11 5.22E-08 6.06E-1 1 3.66E-10 2.59E-10 2.15E-07 1.99E-10 3.61 E-1 1 9.57E-12 9.36E-12 1.46E-1 1 1.46E-1 1 1.46E-11 1.46E-1 1 7.46E-1 1 1.57E-12 3.61E- 11 3.61E-11 4.83E-12 4.55E-1 1 6.95E-1 1 3.31 E-12 Compliant Case CCDP CDF 6.63E-07 2.13E-11 6.63E-07 2.37E-11 6.63E-07 2.12E-11 6.63E-07 1.71E-11 6.63E-07 1.46E-11 6.63E-07 1.46E-11 2.45E-06 5.52E-10 6.63E-07 1.46E-11 1.24E-02 4.45E-08 1.24E-02 4.45E-08 1.24E-02 4.45E-08 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 8.82E-06 2.41E-09 9.OOE-07 1.98E-11 2.46E-06 1.23E-11 1.15E-06 2.82E-10 6.63E-07 1.46E- 11 6.63E-07 3.30E-12 7.66E-07 4.83E-12 6.63E-07 4.90E-11 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 6.63E-07 4.54E-11 6.78E-07 4.64E-11 9.07E-07 1.41E-13 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 7.09E-07 1.29E-11 6.65E-07 6.05E-11 7.66E-07 2.16E-10 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 1.29E-03 3.81E-10 6.71E-04 1.99E-10 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 6.78E-07 9.55E-12 6.63E-07 9.35E-12 6.63E-07 1.46E- 11 6.63E-07 1.46E-11 6.63E-07 1.46E-11 6.63E-07 1.46E-11 2.51E-05 5.34E-12 9.OOE-07 1.91E-13 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 6.85E-07 4.83E-12 6.63E-07 4.54E-11 6.63E-07 6.94E-11 6.63E-07 3.30E-12 Variant -Compliant dICDF 3.50E-14 3.91E-14 3.50E-14 2.82E-14 2.41E-14 2.41E-14 1.06E-10 2.41E-14 6.11 E-08 6.11 E-08 6.11E-08 7.21E-10 1.72E-08 1.47E-13 2.37E-12 2.68E-13 2.41E-14 5.44E-15 3.37E-1 2 8.08E-14 1.21E-10 7.48E-14 7.48E-14 1.01E-12 1.21E-11 5.22E-08 1.30E-13 1.51 E-10 2.59E-10 2.15E-07 4.21E-13 3.61 E-11 1.54E-14 1.54E-14 2.41 E-14 2.41E-14 2.41E-14 2.41E-14 6.93E-1 1 1.38E-12 3.61 E-1 1 3.61 E-11 7.69E-1 5 7.48E-14 1.14E-13 5.44E-15 Revision I Page 58 of 78 Revision I Page 58 of 78 Version 1.0 Page 2593 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-004 Table 2-5b 1 FIRE AREA &CDF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN B ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CCDP CDF CCDP CDF ACDF 2450/A 2451/A 2467/A 2478/E2 3 2504/A 2505/A 2604/A 2605/A 2606/A 2607/A 2608/A 2609/A 2610/A 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.58E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 2.93E-06 2.93E-06 6.64E-07 3.31 E-12 3.38E-12 3.33E-12 2.42E-10 5.08E-1 1 3.12E-11 3.98E-1 1 2.79E-10 1.47E-11 1.46E-1 1 3.57E-10 3.86E-10 1.46E-1 1 6.63E-07 6.63E-07 6.63E-07 0.OOE+00 6.63E-07 6.63E-07 6.63E-07 6.53E-07 6.63E-07 6.63E-07 2.45E-06 2.45E-06 6.63E-07 3.30E-12 3.37E-12 3.32E-12 0.OOE+00 5.07E-1 1 3.11E-11 3.98E-11 2.76E-10 1.46E-1 1 1.46E-11 2.99E-10 3.23E-10 1.46E-1 1 5.44E-15 5.56E-1 5 5.47E-15 2.42E-10 8.35E-14 5.13E-14 6.55E-14 2.28E-12 2.41E-14 2.41 E-14 5.79E-1 1 6.27E-1 1 2.41E-14 Total CDF and delta CDF 2  1.97E-06 7.73E-07 1.19E-06 1 _ N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.2 Total ACDF includes the risk of recovery actions required to demonstrate the availability of a success path for the nuclear safety performance criteria.3_ Compliant CDF/LERF of 0.OOE+00 signifies the use of the variant case CDF/LERF as the surrogate delta.Table 2-6a 1 FIRE AREA aLERF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN A ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case CLERP LERF 2-004-ADJ/HGL 2151/A 3 2152/A 2153/D1 2153/E 3 2153/F 3 2154/D1 3 2154/D2 2154A/A 2155/A 3 2156/A 3 2157/A 3 2158/A 3 2159/A 3 2160/A 3 2161/A 2162/D1 2162/D2 2162/D3 3 2162/E 3 2163/DA 2163/F1 7.70E-03 1.26E-09 1.55E-07 2.68E-08 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 2.08E-08 2.68E-08 1.16E-09 2.08E-08 2.08E-08 2.08E-08 2.08E-08 2.08E-08 5.86E-07 3.OOE-08 5.48E-05 5.48E-05 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 6.85E-05 1.39E-05 8.24E-10 3.28E-14 4.03E-12 1.19E-13 1.60E-14 1.60E-14 9.70E-14 1.25E-13 2.55E-14 5.75E-1 3 5.10E-13 4.59E-13 5.10E-13 4.63E-12 1.62E-11 1.92E-12 1.53E-10 1.53E-10 7.23E-16 1.60E-14 1.55E-09 2.53E-1 1 Compliant Case CLERP LERF 6.49E-03 6.95E-10 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 1.55E-07 4.01E-12 2.26E-08 1.01E-13 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 2.26E-08 1.05E-13 1.16E-09 2.55E-14 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 2.98E-08 1.91 E-12 1.85E-05 5.17E-11 1.85E-05 5.17E-11 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 3.15E-05 7.11E-10 7.19E-06 1.31 E-11 Variant -Compliant ALERF 1.29E-10 3.28E-14 1.68E-14 1.84E-14 1.60E-14 1.60E-14 9.70E-14 1.93E-14 0.OOE+00 5.75E-1 3 5.1OE-13 4.59E-13 5.10E-13 4.63E-12 1.62E-11 1.15E-14 1.01E-10 1.01 E-10 7.23E-16 1.60E-14 8.38E-1 0 1.22E-11 Revision 1 Page 59 of 78 Version 1.0 Page 2594 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-004 Table 2-6a'FIRE AREA ALERF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN A ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case 2163/E2 3 2163/Fl 2163/F2 3 2164/A 2165/A 3 2166/A 3 2168/D1 2168/D2 2170/A 2175/A 3 2176/A 2177/A 2178/A 2180/A 2186/D1 2187/A 2188/A 2203/A 2204/A 2206/A 2207/A 3 2208/A 2215/A 2216/A 2217/A 2218/A 2219/A 2220/A 2221/A 2222/A 2222/D1 2230/A 2231/A 2232/A 2237/A 2238/A 2239/A 2240/A 2253/A 2301/A 2302/A 2303/A 2304/A 2305/A 2306/A 2307/A CLERP 1.61E-10 6.85E-05 1.61E-10 2.80E-10 6.76E-10 6.76E-10 6.92E-06 3.62E-05 8.45E-08 3.84E-06 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 4.60E-05 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.41 E-09 1.41 E-09 1.61 E-1 0 1.98E-08 1.19E-06 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.78E-08 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.36E-05 1.36E-05 3.93E-10 3.93E-10 3.93E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 LERF 2.93E-15 1.25E-10 2.93E-1 5 1.58E-14 1.75E-14 1.75E-14 3.26E-1 1 1.70E-10 1.87E-12 1.21E-10 3.54E-15 4.44E-1 5 4.44E-1 5 3.62E-14 2.23E-10 2.02E-14 3.54E- 15 4.01E-14 3.12E-14 1.46E-14 5.24E-12 5.54E-11 3.54E- 15 1.76E-14 3.54E-1i5 2.85E-12 3.54E-15 3.54E-1 5 3.54 E-15 3.85E-10 7.18E-1 1 9.67E-1 5 9.57E-15 8.66E-1 5 4.56E-15 3.55E-15 3.55E-15 1.23E-14 4.56E-1i5 3.58E-15 3.58E-15 3.58E-15 3.58E-15 7.47E-1i5 3.54E-15 4.15E-15 Compliant Case CLERP LERF 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 3.15E-05 5.73E-11 0.00E+00 0.o0E+00 2.80E-10 1.58E-14 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 2.38E-07 1.12E-12 1.25E-05 5.90E-11 2.92E-09 6.45E-14 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 1.61E-10 3.54E-15 1.61E-10 4.44E-15 1.61E-10 4.44E-15 1.61E-10 3.62E-14 4.27E-05 2.07E-10 1.61E-10 2.02E-14 1.61E-10 3.54E-15 1.41E-09 4.01E-14 1.41E-09 3.12E-14 1.61E-10 1.46E-14 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 9.87E-08 4.59E-12 1.61E-10 3.54E-15 1.61E-10 1.76E-14 1.61E-10 3.54E-15 3.20E-09 5.12E-13 1.61 E-10 3.54E-15 1.61E-10 3.54E-15 1.61E-10 3.54E-15 5.98E-06 1.69E-10 5.98E-06 3.16E-11 3.93E-10 9.67E-15 3.93E-10 9.57E-15 3.93E-10 8.66E-15 1.61E-10 4.56E-15 1.61E-10 3.55E-15 1.61E-10 3.55E-15 1.61E-10 1.23E-14 1.61E-10 4.56E-15 1.61E-10 3.58E-15 1.61E-10 3.58E-15 1.61E-10 3.58E-15 1.61E-10 3.58E-15 1.61E-10 7.47E-15 1.61E-10 3.54E-15 1.61E-10 4.15E-15 Variant -Compliant ALERF 2.93E-15 6.74E-11 2.93E-15 0.OOE+00 1.75E-14 1.75E-14 3.15E-11 1.11E-10 1.81 E-12 1.21 E-10 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 1.59E-11 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 5.24E-12 5.08E-1 1 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 2.34E-1 2 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 2.16E-10 4.02E-1 1 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.a0E+00 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 Revision I Page 60 of 78 Revision 1 Page 60 of 78 Version 1.0 Page 2595 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-004 Table 2-6a 1 FIRE AREA ALERF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN A ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case 2308/A 2309/A 2310/A 2311/A 2312/A 2313/A 2314/A 2315/A 2316/A 2321/A 2322/A 2323/A 2324/A 2325/A 2326/A 2327/A 2328/A 2329/A 2330/A 2331/A 2332/D1 2332/D2 2332/D3 2332/E 3 2332/F2 2340/A 2341/A 2342/A 2348/A 2351/A 2402/A 2403/A 2405/E2 3 2406/A 2408/A 2409/D 1 2409/E.2409/Fl 2409/F2 2410A/A 2418/A 3 2419/D1 2419/D2 2419/E 3 2422/A 2423/A CLERP 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.54E-06 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 2.80E-10 4.53E-08 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 3.93E-10 1.61 E-10 5.07E-05 5.07E-05 5.07E-05 2.37E-09 1.98E-07 1.61E-10 2.74E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 3.60E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 8.69E-10 1.61 E-10 8.63E-06 1.61 E-10 3.60E-10 1.61 E-10 3.06E-03 3.96E-07 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 LERF 3.54E-15 3.21E-14 4.15E-15 3.58E-15 6.77E-1 1 3.58E-15 3.58E-15 3.58E-15 4.15E-15 1.42E-15 1.77E-11 5.16E-15 5.16E-15 5.76E-15 5.15E-15 4.15E-15 3.54E-15 3.54E-15 8.85E-14 3.54E-1i5 1.81E-10 1.81E-10 1.81E-10 4.13E-13 5.41 E-11 3.54E-15 1.36E-15 3.95E-14 3.55E-15 8.01E-16 2.27E-15 1.19E-14 2.93E-14 1.10E-14 1.10E-14 1.35E-16 2.93E-1 5 1.57E-10 1.46E-14 1.01E-13 2.07E-14 9.06E-10 1.17E-13 8.75E-1b5 2.27E-1 5 2.27E-15 Compliant Case CLERP LERF 1.61E-10 3.54E-15 1.61E-10 3.21E-14 1.61E-10 4.15E-15 1.61E-10 3.58E-15 1.05E-07 4.63E-12 1.61E-10 3.58E-15 1.61E-10 3.58E-15 1.61E-10 3.58E-15 1.61E-10 4.15E-15 2.80E-10 1.42E-15 3.28E-08 1.28E-11 1.61E-10 5.16E-15 1.61E-10 5.16E-15 1.61E-10 5.76E-15 1.61E-10 5.15E-15 1.61E-10 4.15E-15 1.61E-10 3.54E-15 1.61E-10 3.54E-15 3.93E-10 8.85E-14 1.61E-10 3.54E-15 2.01E-05 7.17E-11 2.01E-05 7.17E-11 2.01E-05 7.17E-1I 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 2.34E-08 6.38E-12 1.61E-10 3.54E-15 2.74E-10 1.36E-15 1.61E-10 3.95E-14 1.61E-10 3.55E-15 1.61E-10 8.01E-16 1.61E-10 1.01E-15 1.61E-10 1.19E-14 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 1.61E-10 1.10E-14 1.61E-10 1.10E-14 1.61E-10 2.50E-17 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 1.61E-10 2.93E-15 1.61E-10 1.46E-14 1.61E-10 4.53E-14 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 3.OOE-07 8.88E-14 2.85E-07 8.43E-14 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 1.61E-10 2.27E-15 1.61E-10 2.27E-15 Variant -Compliant ALERF 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 6.31 E-11 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 4.90E-1 2 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 1.10E-10 1.10E-10 1.10E-10 4.13E-13 4.77E-1 1 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 1.26E-15 0.OOE+00 2.93E-14 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 1.10E-16 2.93E-1 5 1.57E-10 0.OOE+00 5.61 E-14 2.07E-14 9.06E-1 0 3.28E-14 8.75E-15 O.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 Revision 1 Page 61 of 78 Version 1.0 Page 2596 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-004 Table 2-6a 1 FIRE AREA ALERF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN A ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case CLERP LERF 2424/A 2425/A 2426/A 2427/A 2429/D1 2429/D2 2429/F 3 2429/G 3 2445/A 2446/A 2448/A 2449/A 2450/A 2451/A 2467/A 2478/F2'2504/A 2505/A 2604/A 2605/A 2606/A 2607/A 2608/A 2609/A 2610/A 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 5.24E-07 8.69E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 2.80E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 3.93E-10 3.93E-10 1.61E-10 3.54E-15 3.54E-15 3.54E-15 3.54E-1 5 1.11E-13 1.85E-16 8.75E-15 8.75E-15 1.13E-15 1.10E-14 1.68E-14 8.01 E-16 8.01E-16 8.18E-16 8.05E-1 6 5.86E-14 1.23E-14 7.55E-15 9.64E-15 1.19E-13 3.55E-15 3.54E-1 5 4.79E-14 5.18E-14 3.54E-15 Compliant Case CLERP LERF 1.61 E-10 3.54E-15 1.61 E-10 3.54E-15 1.61E-10 3.54E-15 1.61E-10 3.54E-15 2.92E-08 6.20E-15 1.61E-10 3.42E-17 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 1.61E-10 1.13E-15 1.61E-10 1.10E-14 1.61E-10 1.68E-14 1.61E-10 8.01E-16 1.61E-10 8.01E-16 1.61E-10 8.18E-16 1.61E-10 8.05E-16 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 1.61E-10 1.23E-14 1.61E-10 7.55E-15 1.61E-10 9.64E-15 2.80E-10 1.19E-13 1.61E-10 3.55E-15 1.61 E-10 3.54E-15 3.93E-10 4.79E-14 3.93E-10 5.18E-14 1.61 E-10 3.54E-15 Variant -Compliant ALERF 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 1.05E-13 1.50E-16 8.75E-15 8.75E-15 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 5.86E-14 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 Total LERF and delta LERF 2  5.68E-09 2.30E-09 3.38E-09 1 -N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.2 Total ALERF includes the risk of recovery actions required to demonstrate the availability of a success path for the nuclear safety performance criteria.3_ Compliant CDF/LERF of 0.OOE+00 signifies the use of the variant case CDF/LERF as the surrogate delta.Table 2-6bI FIRE AREA ALERF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN B ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CLERP LERF CLERP LERF ALERF 2-004-ADJ/HGL 7.70E-03 8.24E-10 6.49E-03 6.95E-10 1.29E-10 2151/A 3  5.56E-10 1.44E-14 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 1.44E-14 2152/A 1.24E-07 3.21 E-12 1.23E-07 3.19E-12 2.44E-14 2153/D1 2.98E-08 1.32E-13 2.56E-08 1.14E-13 1.84E-14 2153/E 3  1.61 E-10 1.60E-14 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 1.60E-14 2153/F 3  1.61 E-10 1.60E-14 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 1.60E-14 2154/D1 3  2.68E-08 1.25E-13 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 1.25E-13 2154/02 2.98E-08 1.39E-13 2.56E-08 1.19E-13 1.93E-14 2154A/A 1.16E-09 2.55E-14 1.16E-09 2.55E-14 0.OOE+00 2155/A 3 2.68E-08 7.41E-13 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 7.41E-13 Revision 1 Page 62 of 78 Version 1.0 Page 2597 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-004 SE-C051 326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-004 Table 2-6b 1 FIRE AREA ALERF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN B ALIGNMEi Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case NIT 2156/A 3 2157/A 3 2158/A 3 2159/A 3 2160/A 3 2161/A 2162/D1 2162/D2 2162/D3 3 2162/E 3 2163/DA 2163/E1 2163/E2 3 2163/Fl 2163/F2 3 2164/A 2165/A 3 2166/A 3 2168/Di 2168/D2 2170/A 2175/A 3 2176/A 2177/A 2178/A 2180/A 2186/D1 2187/A 2188/A 2203/A 2204/A 2206/A 2207/A 3 2208/A 2215/A 2216/A 2217/A 2218/A 2219/A 2220/A 2221/A 2222/A 2222/D1 2230/A 2231/A 2232/A CLERP 2.68E-08 2.68E-08 2.68E-08 2.68E-08 3.98E-07 3.04E-08 5.49E-05 5.49E-05 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 6.86E-05 1.38E-05 1.61E-10 6.86E-05 1.61E-10 2.80E-10 6.76E-10 6.76E-10 6.93E-06 3.62E-05 8.46E-08 4.77E-06 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 4.54E-05 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.41 E-09 1.41 E-09 1.61 E-10 2.90E-08 2.06E-06 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.78E-08 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.39E-05 1.39E-05 3.93E-10 3.93E-10 3.93E-10 LERF 6.57E-13 5.92E-13 6.57E-13 5.96E-12 1.10E-11 1.95E-12 1.54E-10 1.54E-10 7.23E-16 1.60E-14 1.55E-09 2.51E-11 2.93E-1 5 1.25E-10 2.93E-15 1.58E-14 1.75E-14 1.75E-14 3.26E-1 1 1.70E-10 1.87E-12 1.50E-10 3.54E-15 4.44E-1 5 4.44E-1 5 3.62E-14 2.20E-10 2.02E-14 3.54E-15 4.01 E-14 3.12E-14 1.46E-14 7.65E-12 9.59E-1 1 3.54E-15 1.76E-14 3.54E-15 2.85E-12 3.54E-1 5 3.54E-1 5 3.54E-15 3.94E-10 7.34E-1 1 9.67E-15 9.57E-15 8.66E-15 CLERP 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 2.98E-08 1.83E-05 1.83E-05 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 3.13E-05 7.08E-06 0.OOE+00 3.13E-05 0.OOE+00 2.80E-10 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 2.30E-07 1.24E-05 2.92E-09 0.OOE+00 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 4.25E-05 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.41 E-09 1.41 E-09 1.61 E-10 0.OOE+00 8.18E-08 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 3.20E-09 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 5.95E-06 5.95E-06 3.93E-10 3.93E-10 3.93E-10 LERF 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 1.91 E-12 5.11E-11 5.11E-11 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 7.07E-10 1.29E-1 1 0.OOE+00 5.69E-1 1 0.OOE+00 1.58E-14 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 1.08E-12 5.84E-1 1 6.45E-14 0.OOE+00 3.54E-1 5 4.44E-1i5 4.44E-15 3.62E-14 2.06E-10 2.02E-14 3.54E-15 4.01E-14 3.12E-14 1.46E-14 0.OOE+00 3.81 E-12 3.54E-1i5 1.76E-14 3.54E-15 5.12E-13 3.54E- 15 3.54E-1 5 3.54E-1 5 1.69E-10 3.14E-11 9.67E-15 9.57E-1i5 8.66E-1 5 NT Variant -Compliant ALERF 6.57E-13 5.92E-13 6.57E-13 5.96E-12 1.10E-11 3.68E-14 1.02E-10 1.02E-10 7.23E-16 1.60E-14 8.45E-10 1.22E-11 2.93E-15 6.80E-1 1 2.93E-15 0.OOE+00 1.75E-14 1.75E-14 3.16E-1 1 1.12E-10 1.81E-12 1.50E-10 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 1.40E-11 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 7.65E-12 9.21 E-11 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 2.34E-12 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 2.25E-10 4.20E-1 1 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 Revision 1 Page 63 of 78 Version 1.0 Page 2598 of 3726 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-004 Table 2-6b 1 FIRE AREA ALERF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN B ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case 2237/A 2238/A 2239/A 2240/A 2253/A 2301/A 2302/A 2303/A 2304/A 2305/A 2306/A 2307/A 2308/A 2309/A 2310/A 2311/A 2312/A 2313/A 2314/A 2315/A 2316/A 2321/A 2322/A 2323/A 2324/A 2325/A 2326/A 2327/A 2328/A 2329/A 2330/A 2331/A 2332/D1 2332/D2 2332/D3 2332/E 3 2332/F2 2340/A 2341/A 2342/A 2348/A 2351/A 2402/A 2403/A 2405/E2 3 2406/A CLERP 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-06 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 2.80E-10 3.46E-08 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 3.93E-10 1.61 E-10 4.84E-05 4.84E-05 4.84E-05 2.37E-09 2.OOE-07 1.61 E-10 2.74E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 3.60E-1 0 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 LERF 4.56E-15 3.55E-15 3.55E-1i5 1.23E-14 4.56E-1 5 3.58E-15 3.58E-1b5 3.58E-1b5 3.58E-1 5 7.47E-1b5 3.54E-15 4.15E-15 3.54E-1 5 3.21 E-14 4.15E-15 3.58E-15 7.09E-1 1 3.58E-1b5 3.58E-1b5 3.58E-1 5 4.15E-1b5 1.42E-15 1.35E-11 5.16E-15 5.16E-15 5.76E-1b5 5.15E-1b5 4.15E-15 3.54E-1b5 3.54E-15 8.85E-14 3.54E-15 1.73E-10 1.73E-10 1.73E-10 4.13E-13 5.46E-1 1 3.54E-15 1.36E-15 3.95E-14 3.55E-1 5 8.01 E-16 2.27E-15 1.19E-14 2.93E-14 1.10E-14 Compliant Case CLERP LERF 1.61E-10 4.56E-15 1.61E-10 3.55E-15 1.61E-10 3.55E-15 1.61E-10 1.23E-14 1.61E-10 4.56E-15 1.61E-10 3.58E-15 1.61E-10 3.58E-15 1.61E-10 3.58E-15 1.61E-10 3.58E-15 1.61E-10 7.47E-15 1.61E-10 3.54E-15 1.61E-10 4.15E-15 1.61E-10 3.54E-15 1.61E-10 3.21E-14 1.61E-10 4.15E-15 1.61E-10 3.58E-15 1.15E-07 5.08E-12 1.61E-10 3.58E-15 1.61E-10 3.58E-15 1.61E-10 3.58E-15 1.61E-10 4.15E-15 2.80E-10 1.42E-15 3.28E-08 1.28E-11 1.61E-10 5.16E-15 1.61E-10 5.16E-15 1.61E-10 5.76E-15 1.61E-10 5.15E-15 1.61E-10 4.15E-15 1.61E-10 3.54E-15 1.61E-10 3.54E-15 3.93E-10 8.85E-14 1.61E-10 3.54E-15 2.OOE-05 7.14E-11 2.OOE-05 7.14E-11 2.OOE-05 7.14E-11 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 2.34E-08 6.38E-12 1.61 E-10 3.54E-15 2.74E-10 1.36E-15 1.61E-10 3.95E-14 1.61E-10 3.55E-15 1.61E-10 8.01E-16 1.61E-10 1.01E-15 1.61E-10 1.19E-14 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 1.61E-10 1.10E-14 Variant -Compliant ALERF 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 6.58E-1 1 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 7.06E- 13 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 1.02E-10 1.02E-10 1.02E-10 4.13E-13 4.82E-1 1 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 1.26E-1b5 0.OOE+00 2.93E-14 0.OOE+00 Revision I Page 64 of 78 Version 1.0 Page 2599 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-004 Table 2-6b 1 FIRE AREA ALERF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN B ALIGNMEI Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case NlT 2408/A 2409/D1 2409/E 3 2409/F 1 2409/F2 241 OA/A 2418/A 3 2419/D1 2419/D2 2419/E 3 2422/A 2423/A 2424/A 2425/A 2426/A 2427/A 2429/D1 2429/D2 2429/F 3 2429/G 3 2445/A 2446/A 2448/A 2449/A 2450/A 2451/A 2467/A 2478/E2 3 2504/A 2505/A 2604/A 2605/A 2606/A 2607/A 2608/A 2609/A 2610/A CLERP 1.61E-10 8.69E-10 1.61E-10 7.78E-06 1.61 E-10 3.60E-10 1.61 E-10 3.06E-03 1.17E-06 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 5.27E-07 8.69E-1 0 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 2.80E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 3.93E-10 3.93E-10 1.61 E-10 LERF 1.10E-14 1.35E-16 2.93E-15 1.42E-10 1.46E-14 1.01E-13 2.07E-14 9.06E-10 3.47E-13 8.75E-15 2.27E-1 5 2.27E-1 5 3.54E-15 3.54E-1 5 3.54E-1 5 3.54E-15 1.12E-13 1.85F-16 8.75E-1 5 8.75E-15 1.13E-15 1.10E-14 1.68E-14 8.01E-16 8.01 E-16 8.18E-16 8.05E-1 6 5.86E-14 1.23E-14 7.55E-1 5 9.64E-1 5 1.19E-13 3.55E-15 3.54E-1 5 4.79E-14 5.18E-14 3.54E-1i5 5.72E-09 CLERP 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 0.OOE+00 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 0.OOE+00 1.89E-06 1.06E-06 0.OOE+00 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 2.92E-08 1.61 E-10 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 0.OOE+00 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 2.80E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 3.93E-10 3.93E-10 1.61 E-10 LERF 1.10E-14 2.50E-1 7 0.OOE+00 2.93E-15 1.46E-14 4.53E-14 0.OOE+00 5.58E-1 3 3.12E-13 0.OOE+00 2.27E-1 5 2.27E-15 3.54E-1 5 3.54E-15 3.54E-1 5 3.54E-15 6.20E-15 3.42E-17 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 1.13E-15 1.10E-14 1.68E-14 8.01 E-1 6 8.01 E-16 8.18E-16 8.05E-1 6 0.OOE+00 1.23E-14 7.55E-15 9.64E-15 1.19E-13 3.55E-15 3.54E-15 4.79E-14 5.18E-14 3.54E-15 2.29E-09 Variant -Compliant ALERF 0.OOE+00 1.10E-16 2.93E-15 1.42E-10 0.OOE+00 5.61 E-14 2.07E-14 9.06E-10 3.51 E-14 8.75E-15 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 1.06E-13 1.50E-16 8.75E-15 8.75E-15 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 5.86E-14 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 3.43E-09 Total LERF and delta LERF 2 1 _ N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.2_ Total ALERF includes the risk of recovery actions required to demonstrate the availability of a success path for the.nuclear safety performance criteria.3_ Compliant CDF/LERF of 0.OOE+00 signifies the use of the variant case CDF/LERF as the surrogate delta.Revision 1 Page 65 of 78 Version 1.0 Page 2600 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-004 3.0 DID EVALUATION 3.1 Defense-in-Depth Evaluation A review of the impact of the change on defense-in-depth (DID) was performed.
NFPA 805 defines DID as:* Preventing fires from starting" Rapidly detecting fires and controlling and extinguishing promptly those fires that do occur, thereby limiting damage" Providing adequate level of fire protection for structures, systems and components important to safety; so that a fire that is not promptly extinguished will not prevent essential plant safety functions from being performed.
In general, the DID requirement was considered satisfied if the proposed change does not result in a substantial imbalance among these elements (or echelons).
The review of DID was qualitative and addressed each of the elements with respect to the proposed change. Fire protection features and systems relied upon to ensure DID were identified in the assessment (e.g., detection, suppression system).The VFDRs and the associated Fire Area risk (CDF) and scenario consequences (CCDP values)were evaluated to identify general DID echelon imbalances.
Potential methods to balance the DID features were identified ensuring an adequate balance of DID features is maintained for the Fire Area. See Section 3.2 for the results of the evaluation.
3.2 Defense-in-Depth Review Results A review of defense in depth and risk evaluation results show that, given the systems and features specified in Table 3-1 and Section 2 respectively, risk acceptance criteria are met and that the balance of defense in depth is maintained.
The risk acceptance criteria are met with substantial margin to account for analytical methods associated with fire scenarios.
The analyzed scenarios bound potential fuel packages which can reasonably be expected to occur in this area.Full burnout scenarios associated with zone 2222, and transient fires in 2162, 2163, 2186, 2332 and 2419 are high risk contributors in the fire area. Detection is required in these zones to ensure prompt brigade response.
Suppression systems are required in zones 2162, 2163, 2222, and 2419 to mitigate fire damage. Additional combustible control restrictions are required in zones 2162, 2163, 2186, 2332 and 2419 to reduce the likelihood of a fire starting in these zones.In the event of no intervention by the plant fire brigade, it is not expected that a credible fire would develop which would not be bounded by the analyzed scenarios.
Based on the required fire protections systems/features specified, the ability to meet nuclear safety performance criteria is ensured.The table below summarizes how an adequate balance of DID is maintained.
Table 3-1 Defense-in-Depth Impact Review Method of Providing DID Discussion Echelon 1: Prevent fires from starting Revision 1 Page 66 of 78 Version 1.0 Page 2601 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-004 Table 3-1 Defense-in-Depth Impact Review Method of Providing DID Discussion Combustible Control Designate Fire Zones 2162, 2163, 2186, 2332, and 2419 as transient restricted areas.Hot Work Control No change necessary to procedure(s) 
/guidance document(s).
1 Echelon 2: Rapidly detect, control and extinguish promptly those fires that do occur thereby limiting fire damage Detection System Detection systems installed and required for zones 2162, 2163, 2186, 2222, 2332 and 2419.Automatic Fire Suppression Suppression systems installed and required for zones 2162, 2163, 2222, and 2419.Portable Fire Extinguishers Portable extinguishers available, but no enhancements required.
1 Hose stations and hydrants Fire hose cabinets are available, but no enhancements required.located in the area(s)Pre-Fire Plan No change necessary to procedure(s) 
/guidance document(s).
Echelon 3: Provide adequate level of fire protection for systems and structures so that a fire will not prevent essential safety functions from being performed Walls, floors ceilings and structural No changes necessary to existing barriers.elements are rated or have been evaluated as adequate for the hazard.Openings in the fire barrier are rated No changes necessary to existing barrier openings.or have been evaluated as adequate for the hazard.Supplemental barriers (e.g., ERFBS, No supplemental barriers installed and not required.cable tray covers, etc.)Guidance provided to operations No VFDR related DID recovery actions required.personnel detailing the credited success path(s) including recovery actions to achieve nuclear safety performance criteria.This fire protection feature is relied upon without further DID enhancements beyond inherent programmatic requirements of NFPA 805, Chap. 3 and will not be reported in Table 5-2.3.2.1 Required Modifications There are no modifications required as a result of the DID evaluation for this fire area.3.2.2 Required Recovery Actions There are no required recovery actions as a result of the DID evaluation for this fire area.4.0 SAFETY MARGIN EVALUATION 4.1 Safety Margin Evaluation In accordance with NEI 04-02, 5.3.5.3 guidance, the maintenance of adequate Safety Margin is assessed by the consideration of categories of analyses utilized by this fire risk evaluation (FRE).Safety margins are considered to be maintained if: 0 Codes and standards or their alternatives accepted for use by the NRC are met, and Revision 1 Page 67 of 78 Version 1.0 Page 2602 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-004 Safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) are met, or provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty.
The maintenance of adequate safety margin for the change analysis is described for each of the specific analysis types used in support of the fire risk assessment.
4.1.1 Fire Modeling Fire modeling performed in support of the transition has been performed within the Fire PRA utilizing codes and standards developed by industry and NRC staff to provide realistic yet conservative results. Specifically, the heat release rates utilized in the transition analysis are based upon NUREG/CR 6850, Task 8, Scoping Fire Modeling.
These heat release rates are conservative and represent values used to screen out fixed ignition sources that do not pose a threat to the targets within specific fire compartments and to assign severity factors to unscreened fixed ignition sources.The combined analysis approach is used during transition; therefore, maximum expected fire scenario/limiting fire scenario have not been analyzed separately.
The bases for the application of these fire modeling codes and standards were not altered in support of this FRE.4.1.2 Plant System Performance Plant system performance parameters were not modified as a result of this FRE. These performance parameters were originally established to support nuclear performance criteria contained in the plant specific accident analyses.
These analyses established component and system performance criteria necessary to establish safe and stable plant operation, as well as, safe shut down of the unit in the event of a fire. These performance parameters were not modified as a result of this FRE.4.2 Safety Margin Results All analyses and assessment have been performed utilizing accepted techniques and industry accepted standards.
In addition, safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) have been considered and provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty.
As such, the Safety Margins are maintained as discussed in Section 4.1.5.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION RESULTS 5.1 Dispositions of VFDRs Based on the FRE results contained in Sections 2, 3 and 4 the VFDRs identified in Section 1.1 have been resolved as follows: Table 5-1 Final Variance Disposition VFDR ID Disposition U2-2-004-HVAC-001 Recovery Action(s)
Required to Satisfy Risk Criteria:
See Table 2-4 U2-2-004-HVAC-002 Recovery Action(s)
Required to Satisfy Risk Criteria:
See Table 2-4 Revision 1 Page 68 of 78 Version 1.0 Page 2603 of 3726 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-004 Table 5-1 Final Variance Disposition VFDR ID Disposition U2-2-004-HVAC-003 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action U2-2-004-HVAC-004 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)U2-2-004-HVAC-005 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)U2-2-004-HVAC-006 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action U2-2-004-HVAC-007 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)U2-2-004-HVAC-008 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)U2-2-004-IA-001 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action U2-2-004-IA-002 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action U2-2-004-IA-003 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action U2-2-004-IA-004 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action U2-2-004-IA-005 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action U2-2-004-SEP-001 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action U2-2-004-SEP-002 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action U2-2-004-SEP-003 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action U2-2-004-SEP-004 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action U2-2-004-SEP-005 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action U2-2-004-SEP-006 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action U2-2-004-SEP-007 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action U2-2-004-SEP-008 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action U2-2-004-SEP-009 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action U2-2-004-SEP-010 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action U2-2-004-SEP-01 1 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action U2-2-004-SEP-012 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action U2-2-004-SEP-013 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action U2-2-004-SEP-014 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action U2-2-004-SEP-015 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action U2-2-004-SEP-016 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action U2-2-004-SEP-017 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)U2-2-004-SEP-018 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action U2-2-004-SEP-019 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action U2-2-004-SEP-020 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action U2-2-004-SEP-021 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action U2-2-004-SEP-022 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)U2-2-004-SEP-023 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)Revision 1 Page 69 of 78 Version 1.0 Page 2604 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-004 SE-C051 326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-004 VFDR ID U2-2-004-SEP-024 U2-2-004-SEP-028 U2-2-004-SEP-029 U2-2-004-SEP-030 Table 5-1 Final Variance Disposition Disposition Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)U2-2-004-SEP-031 Revision I Page 70 of 78 Revision 1 Page 70 of 78 Version 1.0 Page 2605 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-004 5.2 Fire Risk Evaluation Summary of Fire Protection Systems and Features Table 5-2 Summary of Required Fire Protection Systems and Features Required Required FrAra FrZoe Suppression Detection Required Fire Fire Area Fire Zone Protection Feature Required Fire Protection System and Feature Details System System (R, D)(R, D) (R, D)R -Modification to seal MCCs and replace trip device in panel Q2R42BOO01A, breakers LA08, LA13, LA20; Q2R42B0001B, U2 2-004 R breakers LB07, LB14, Improvements to procedures necessary to incorporate recovery actions required to meet risk criteria (See Table 2-4)2151 2152 2153 2154 2154A 2155 2156 2157 2158 2159 2160 2161 None None None None None None None None None None R R R R R R R None R R R R R R None None None None None None None None None None None None R -Detection system R -Detection system R -Detection system R -Detection system R -Detection system R -Detection system R -Detection system R -Detection system R -Detection system R -Detection system, Suppression system R -Detection system, Suppression system R -Detection system, Suppression system 2162 R, D R, D D D -Detection system, Suppression system, Require fire zone as a restricted transient area R -Detection system, Suppression system 2163 R, D R, D D D -Detection system, Suppression system, Require fire zone as a restricted transient area 2164 None R None R- Detection system Revision 1 Page 71 of 78 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-004 Table 5-2 Summary of Required Fire Protection Systems and Features Required Required FrAra FrZoe Suppression Detection Required Fire Fire Area Fire Zone Protection Feature Required Fire Protection System and Feature Details System System (R, D)(R, D) (R, D)2165 None R None R -Detection system 2166 None R None R -Detection system 2168 None R None R -Detection system, Suppression system 2170 None R None R -Detection system 2175 R R None R -Detection system, Suppression system 2176 None None None 2177 None R None R- Detection system 2178 None R None R -Detection system 2180 None R None R -Detection system R -Detection system 2186 None R, D D D -Detection system, Require fire zone as a restricted transient area 2187 None R None R- Detection system 2188 2203 2204 2205 2206 2207 2208 2209 2215 2216 None None None None None R R R None None R R R None R R R R None None None None None None None None None None R -Detection system R -Detection system R -Detection system R -Detection system R -Detection system, Suppression system R -Detection system, Suppression system R -Detection system, Suppression system None R R -Detection system Revision I Page 72 of 78 Revision 1 Page 72 of 78 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-004 Table 5-2 Summary of Required Fire Protection Systems and Features Required Required Required Fire Suppression Detection Protection Feature Required Fire Protection System and Feature Details FieAra FieZoe System System (,D (R, D) (R, D) (R, D)2217 None R None R -Detection system 2218 None R None R -Detection system 2219 None None None 2220 None R None R -Detection system 2221 None None None R -Detection system, Suppression system D -Detection system, Suppression system 2230 None R None R -Detection system 2231 None R None R -Detection system 2232 2237 2238 2239 2240 2253 2301 2302 2303 2304 2305 2306 2307 None None None None None None None None None None None None None R R R None R R R R R R R None R None None None None None None None None None None None None None R -Detection system R -Detection system R -Detection system R -Detection system R -Detection system R -Detection system R -Detection system R -Detection system R -Detection system R -Detection system R -Detection system Revision I Page 73 of 78 Revision 1 Page 73 of 78 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-004 Fire Area Fire Zone 2308 2309 2310 2311 2312 2313 2314 2315 2316 2321 2322 2323 2324 2325 2326 2327 2328 2329 2330 2331 Required Suppressio System (R, D)None None None None R None None None R None R None None None None None None None None None Table 5-2 Summary of Required Fire Protection Systems and Features Required n Detection Required Fire Protection Feature Required Fire Pr System (R, D)(R, D)None None R None R -Detection systen R None R -Detection systen R None R -Detection systen R None R -Detection systen R None R -Detection systen R None R -Detection systen R None R -Detection systen R None R -Detection systen R None R -Detection systen R None R -Detection syster R None R -Detection systen R None R -Detection systen R None R -Detection systen R None R -Detection systen None None None None None None R None R -Detection systen R None R -Detection svsten"n n n n, Suppression system n n n n n, Suppression system n otection System and Feature Details n n 33 TI R -Detection system 2332 None R, D D D -Detection system, Require fire zone as a restricted transient area Revision 1 Page 74 of 78 SE-C051 326701 -008Atahet-FEfrUi2Frera204 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-004 Required Fire Area Fire Zone Suppressio System (R, D)2340 None 2341 None 2342 None 2348 2351 2402 2403 2405 2406 2408 2409 2410A 2418 None None R R R R None None R None Table 5-2 Summary of Required Fire Protection Systems and Features Required Rn Detection Required Fire Protection Feature Required Fire Pr System (R, D)(R, D)None None None None R None R -Detection syster None None None None R None R -Detection syster R None R -Detection syster R None R -Detection syster R None R -Detection syster R None R -Detection syster R None R -Detection syster R None R -Detection syster R None R -Detection syster*otection System and Feature Details n n, Suppression system n, Suppression system n, Suppression system n, Suppression system n n n, Suppression system n R -Detection system, Suppression system 2419 R, D R, D D D -Detection system, Suppression system, Require fire zone as a restricted transient area 2422 None R None R -Detection system 2423 None R None R -Detection system 2424 None None None 2425 None None None 2426 None None None 2427 None None None 2429 None R None R -Detection system Revision 1 Page 75 of 78 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-004 Table 5-2 Summary of Required Fire Protection Systems and Features Required Required Required Fire Fire Area Fire Zone Suppression Detection Protection Feature Required Fire Protection System and Feature Details System System (R, D)(R, D) (R, D)2431 None None None 2445 None R None R -Detection system 2446 None R None R -Detection system 2448 None None None 2449 None None None 2450 None None None 2451 None None None 2467 None R None R -Detection system 2478 None R None R -Detection system 2504 None R None R -Detection system 2505 None R None R -Detection system 2604 None R None R -Detection system 2605 None R None R -Detection system 2606 None R None R -Detection system 2607 None R None R -Detection system 2608 None R None R -Detection system 2609 None R None R -Detection system 2610 None R None R -Detection system Required Suppression/Detection/Feature:
required in the Fire Area based on NFPA 805 Chapter 4 compliance.
The information is provided on a zone basis. The basis for the requirement of the fire protection system is designated as follows: R -Risk Criteria:
Systems required to meet the Risk Criteria for the Performance-Based Approach (NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4)* D -Defense-in-depth Criteria:
Systems required to maintain adequate balance of Defense-in-Depth for a Performance-Based Approach (NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4)Revision 1 Page 76 of 78 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-004 Fire Protection Features in this Table only refer to those features installed in the Fire Area that have a corresponding Chapter 3 requirement.
5.3 Summary of Recovery Actions Fire Area U2-2-004 U2-2-004 U2-2-004 U2 2-004 Component Q2R42B0001A Q2R42B0001A Q2R42B0001B Q2R42B0001B Table 5-3 -R Component Description 125V DC BUS 2A 125V DC BUS 2A 125V DC BUS 2B 125V DC BUS 2B Actions Operator action to provide alternate cooling for battery charger room due to loss of fan Operator action to provide alternate cooling, for battery charger room due to loss of Train A SW Operator action to provide alternate cooling for battery charger room due to loss of fan Operator action to provide alternate cooling for battery charger room due to loss of Train B SW ecovery Actions 5.4 Summary of Plant Modifications Table 5-4 -Plant Modifications Item Unit Problem Statement Proposed Modification In Comp Risk Informed Characterization FPRA Measure Reduce risk by Sealing of MCCs to U2 2 Require sealing of MCCs to Seal MCCs 2C (N2R17B003) and Yes Yes prevent further fire propagation outside 004-1 prevent fire propagation 2DD (Q2R17B0099) of the ignition source Replace trip device to ensure Replace trip device in panel Reduce risk due to fire induced failure by U2 2 breaker coordination of supply Q2R42B0001A, breakers LA08, modifying the circuit breaker and 004-2 and load breakers LAI3, LA20; Q2R42B0001B, Yes Yes preventing damage to downstream breakers LBO7, LB14 components.
Revision I Page 77 of 78 Revision 1 Page 77 of 78 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-004 5.5 Fire Area Risk Summary Table 5-5 -Fire Area Risk Summary NFPA 805 VFDR RAs Fire Risk Eval Additional Risk of Fire Area Area Description Bss Fire Area CDF/LERF (e/o YsN) ACFLR ~Basis (Yes/No) (Yes/No) A CDF/LERF RAs U2 2-004 Unit 1 Auxiliary Building 4.2.4 1.93E-06/5.70E-09 Yes Yes 1.16E-06/3.40E-09 1.16E-06/3.40E-09 Revision I Page 78 of 78 Revision 1 Page 78 of 78 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-005 Attachment 
-Unit 2 Fire Area 2-005 FRE for Fire Area Aux Building Revision:
0 Name Fire PRA Preparer Fire PRA Reviewer Fire Protection Preparer Fire Protection Reviewer NSCA Preparer NSCA Reviewer FRE Preparer FRE Reviewer Jonathan Hedrick Clint Pierce Robert Kirkpatrick Rebecca Puckett Larry Valmonte Dan Funk Steve Hardy Brandon Jamar Revision 0 Page 1 of 22 Version 1.0 Page 2614 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-005 1.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION INPUT .....................................................................
4 1.1 Variances from the Deterministic Requirements 
....................................
4 1.2 Fire Protection Systems and Features ..................................................
5 1.2.1 Construction 
.................................................................................
5 1.2 .2 D etectio n ................................................................................... 
..6 1.2.3 Fixed Fire Suppression 
...............................................................
6 1.2.4 Manual Suppression 
...................................................................
6 1.2.5 Ventilation (Smoke Removal) ......................................................
6 1.2.6 Other Fire Protection Features ....................................................
6 1.2.7 Fire Hazard Identification 
............................................................
6 1.2.8 Fire PRA Input .............................................................................
6 2.0 RISK EVALUATION 
.........................................................................................
7 2.1 Fire PRA Variant Case Calculation 
........................................................
7 2.2 Compliant Case Calculation 
.................................................................
10 2.2.1 VFDRs Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA ............................
10 2.2.2 VFDRs Not Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA .....................
12 2.2.3 Compliant Case Results ...........................................................
13 2.2.4 Required Modifications 
.............................................................
15 2.2.5 Required Recovery Actions ......................................................
15 2.3 Risk Evaluation Results .......................................................................
15 3.0 DID EVALUATION 
.........................................................................................
17 3.1 Defense-in-Depth Evaluation 
...............................................................
17 3.2 Defense-in-Depth Review Results ......................................................
17 3.2.1 Required Modifications 
.............................................................
18 3.2.2 Required Recovery Actions ......................................................
18 4.0 SAFETY MARGIN EVALUATION 
.................................................................
18 4.1 Safety Margin Evaluation 
.....................................................................
18 4.1.1 Fire Modeling ............................................................................
19 4.1.2 Plant System Performance 
........................................................
19 4.2 Safety Margin Results ..........................................................................
19 5.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION RESULTS ............................................................
20 5.1 Dispositions of VFDRs ........................................................................
20 Revision 0 Page 2 of 22 Version 1.0 Page 2615 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-005 SE-COSI 326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-005 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 Fire Risk Evaluation Summary of Fire Protection Systems and Features 21 Summary of Recovery Actions .............................................................
21 Summary of Plant Modifications 
..........................................................
22 Fire A rea R isk Sum m ary ......................................................................
22 Revision 0 Page 3 of 22 Version 1.0 Page 2616 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-005 1.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION INPUT 1.1 Variances from the Deterministic Requirements The VFDRs identified for evaluation for Unit 2, Fire Area 2-005, Aux Building are: Table 1-1 VFDRs VFDR Component(s)
Description U2-2-005-Q2E21 P0002A:ON:O This component, Charging Pump 2A, requires HVAC support to HVAC-001 N/OFF, 2A remain functional.
Charging is required to support RCS Inventory CHARGING PUMP Makeup. A loss of HVAC could potentially render the charging pump 2A unavailable for use. The associated 2A room cooler suffers fire induced circuit failure in this area, and cannot be relied upon to be available.
Failure to establish charging challenges the RCS Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-2-005-IA-Q2B31V0053:CLOSE This component requires instrument air to perform its credited 001 D:OPEN/CLOSED, function.
Instrument air is assumed to be unavailable in this fire area PRESSURIZER because air loss paths have not been identified.
The Pressurizer POWER OPERATED Power Relief Valve is required to cycle in order to de-pressurize the RELIEF RCS System. A loss of instrument air will result in the valve failing in the closed position.
An inability to cycle the Pressurizer Power Relief Valve challenges the RCS Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-2-005-IA-Q2E21V0347:MODU This component requires instrument air to perform its credited 002 LATED:MODULATE, function.
Instrument air is assumed to be unavailable in this fire area CHARGING FLOW because air loss paths have not been identified.
Flow control Valve CONTROL VALVE V0347 permits normal charging flow to be injected into the RCS system. Instrument air is required to control the flow and thus charging inventory that is injected into the RCS Cold Legs. A loss of instrument air will result in this valve failing in the open position.
Failure to throttle flow to the RCS system challenges the RCS Inventory/Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-005-SEP-Q2B41P0001C:ON:O In order to support a natural circulation cooldown, the Reactor Coolant 001 FF, RCP 2C Pumps must be tripped. Fire induced circuit damage could spuriously start the Reactor Coolant Pump 2C. Failure to ensure the Reactor Coolant Pumps are tripped challenges the RCS Inventory and Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-005-SEP-Q2E21P0002A:ON:O Charging via the CVCS system is required to maintain RCS Inventory.
002 N/OFF, 2A The charging pumps are physically located in this area, hence one CHARGING PUMP pump must remain available for use. Charging via Pump 2A is sought after in this fire area. Fire induced circuit failure could also prevent operation of the pump remotely.
Failure to establish charging challenges the RCS Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-2-005-SEP-Q2E21V0376A:OPE The Volume Control Tank Outlet Isolation valves must initially remain 004 N:OPEN, VCT open to establish a charging lineup before suction is re-aligned to the OUTLET ISOLATION RWST. Fire induced circuit failure to the outlet valves (V376A and V3761) could result in the valves spuriously closing and isolating the VCT before swap over can be established.
This failure challenges the RCS Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-2-005-SEP-Q2E21V0376B:OPE The Volume Control Tank Outlet Isolation valves must initially remain 005 N:OPEN, VCT open to establish a charging lineup before suction is re-aligned to the OUTLET ISOLATION RWST. Fire induced circuit failure to the outlet valves (V376A and V376B) could result in the valves spuriously closing and isolating the VCT before swap over can be established.
This failure challenges the RCS Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
Revision 0 Page 4 of 22 Version 1.0 Page 2617 of 3726 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-005 Table 1-1 VFDRs VFDR Component(s)
Description U2-2-005-SEP-Q2E21V0016A:CLOS The CVCS system is required to inject water into the Reactor Vessel 006 ED:CLOSED, HHSI upon a LOCA or SI signal. This path is not credited for normal TO RCS COLD LEG charging, and therefore must be isolated.
Fire induced circuit failure to ISOLATION valve 8803A resulting in the MOV spuriously opening could introduce a possible diversion path for charging.
Failure to ensure this path remains isolated challenges the RCS Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-2-005-SEP-Q2E21V0016B:CLOS The CVCS system is required to inject water into the Reactor Vessel 007 ED:CLOSED-TRAIN upon a LOCA or SI signal. This path is not credited for normal B, HHSI TO RCS charging, and therefore must be isolated.
Fire induced circuit failure to COLD LEG valve 8803B resulting in the MOV spuriously opening could introduce ISOLATION a possible diversion path for charging.
Failure to ensure this path remains isolated challenges the RCS Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-2-005-SEP-Q2E21V0347:MODU Flow control Valve V0347 permits normal charging flow to be injected 008 LATED:MODULATE, into the RCS system. Throttling capability of this valve is necessary to CHARGING FLOW control RCS Makeup Inventory from the CVCS System. Fire induced CONTROL VALVE circuit failure could result in the valve failing in the open position.Failure to throttle flow to the RCS system' challenges the RCS Inventory/Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-005-SEP-Q2E21V0376A:OPE The Volume Control Tank Outlet Isolation valves must close in order 009 N:CLOSED, VCT to align charging suction to the RWST. Fire induced circuit failure to OUTLET ISOLATION both valves Q2E21V0376B or Q2E21V0376A could result in the valves failing to close, and since they are in series, prevent VCT isolation.
Failure to isolate the VCT would impact the credited charging lineup. This failure challenges the RCS Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-2-005-SEP-Q2N11PV3371A:CL Atmospheric relief on the secondary side is necessary in order to 010 OSED:MODULATE, achieve a controlled cooldown rate. Failure to modulate the SG 2A MAIN STEAM ARV due to a loss of instrument air would cause the valve to fail ATMOS RELIEF closed, thereby isolating the secondary side. This failure challenges the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
1.2 Fire Protection Systems and Features Fire Area 2-005 consists of the following Fire Zones: 0 2171 -Storage Room EL. 100'-0" 0 2172- Hallway EL. 100'-0".2173 -Charging/Safety Injection Pump Room -EL. 100'-0" 0 2174 -Charging/Safety Injection Pump Room -EL. 100'-0"* 2181 -Charging/Safety Injection Pump Room -EL. 100'-0"* 2182 -Contaminated Storage Area -EL. 100'-0" 1.2.1 Construction Barriers for this fire area are of substantial construction and have been designed and constructed to meet separation requirements.
In the event the configuration utilized is not in accordance with recognized standards, the deviations have been evaluated to be adequate for the hazard.Revision 0 Page 5 of 22 Version 1.0 Page 2618 of 3726 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-005 1.2.2 Detection Fire detection systems to provide notification to the Control Room are: " Fire Zone 2171 is provided with detection." Fire Zone 2172 is provided with detection." Fire Zone 2173 is provided with detection." Fire Zone 2174 is provided with detection." Fire Zone 2181 is provided with detection." Fire Zone 2182 is provided with detection.
1.2.3 Fixed Fire Suppression Fixed fire suppression systems to aid in control of both fire growth and spread in the fire area are:* Fire Zone 2172 is provided with suppression that provides partial coverage.1.2.4 Manual Suppression Manual suppression equipment to be utilized by plant personnel and/or fire brigade members are:* Fire Area 2-005 is provided with a fire hose cabinet and CO 2 hose reel located in rooms 2161 and 2162 (Fire Area 2-004).1.2.5 Ventilation (Smoke Removal)Portable smoke ejectors are available to assist with smoke removal.1.2.6 Other Fire Protection Features No additional fire protection features are required for this fire risk evaluation.
1.2.7 Fire Hazard Identification The major sources of combustibles in Fire Area 2-005 are cable insulation and lube oil. Details regarding fire scenarios quantified in the fire PRA, and their associated ignition sources (where applicable) are discussed in Section 2.1.2.8 Fire PRA Input Fire protection features There are fire protection features specifically modeled in the Fire PRA as identified in the required plant modification section 2.2.4.Fire protection systems The Multi Compartment Analysis evaluation credits the detection system and manual fire brigade response.Revision 0 Page 6 of 22 Version 1.0 Page 2619 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-005 Hot Gas Layer Treatment This fire area screened for potential Hot Gas Layer effects on the Zone Of Influence.
No credit for detection was taken in the Hot Gas Layer evaluation for this fire area. No credit for manual or automatic fire suppression was taken in the Hot Gas Layer evaluation for this fire area.Multi-compartment analysis Credit for detection was taken in the Multi Compartment Analysis for this fire area. Credit for manual fire brigade response was taken in the Multi Compartment Analysis for this fire area.Scenario Review All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0, ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency.
2.0 RISK EVALUATION 2.1 Fire PRA Variant Case Calculation Tables 2-1a and 2-1b provide the results of the variant case calculation for Fire Area 2-005. This is taken directly from the Fire PRA model with no changes or alterations made. The CDF and LERF results are provided on a scenario basis.Revision 0 Page 7 of 22 Version 1.0 Page 2620 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-005 Table 2-1a Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train A Alignment Zone Scen ScenDesc 1  IGF NSP SF CCDP CDF CLERP LERF (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr)2171 A BASE CASE 3.20E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 2.14E-11 1.61E-10 5.15E-15 217 DlTRANSIENT -NEAR 2172 D1 WAL 3.21E-06 1.0 1.0 4.40E-02 1.41E-07 7.12E-05 2.28E-10 CORNER ALONG WALL 2173 A BASE CASE 2.15E-04 1.0 1.0 4.04E-06 8.67E-10 5.56E-10 1.19E-13 2174 A BASE CASE 2.15E-04 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 1.44E-10 1.61E-10 3.46E-14 2181 E Charging pump 1.46E-04 1.0 1.0 4.08E-03 5.96E-07 6.19E-06 9.04E-10 2182 D1 TRANSIENT-CENTEROF 5.96E-06 1.0 1.0 6.69E-02 3.98E-07 1.08E-04 6.46E-10 ROOM Total CDF/LERF Fire PRA Variant Case 1.14E-06 1.78E-09 Table 2-1 b Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train B Alignment Zone Scen ScenDescl IGF NSP SF CCDP CDF CLERP LERF (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr) (Irx-yr)2171 A BASE CASE 3.20E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 2.13E-11 1.61E-10 5.15E-15 217 DlTRANSIENT -NEAR 2172 D1 WAL 3.21E-06 1.0 1.0 2.79E-02 8.94E-08 4.54E-05 1.46E-10 CORNER ALONG WALL 2173 A BASE CASE 2.15E-04 1.0 1.0 1.67E-06 3.59E-10 1.61E-10 3.45E-14 2174 A BASE CASE 2.15E-04 1.0 1.0 6.70E-07 1.44E-10 1.61E-10 3.46E-14 2181 E Charging pump 1.46E-04 1.0 1.0 9.43E-03 1.38E-06 1.44E-05 2.1OE-09 2182 D1 TRANSIENT 
-CENTER OF 5.96E-06 1.0 1.0 2.96E-02 1.76E-07 4.81 E-05 2.87E-1 0 ROOM Total CDF/LERF Fire PRA Variant Case 1.64E-06 2.53E-09 Where: Zone = Fire Zone Scen = 'A' to signify the variant case ScenDesc = Description of the Fire Scenario IGF &#xfd; Ignition Frequency 
(/rx-yr)NSP = Non Suppression Probability SF = Severity Factor CCDP = Conditional Core Damage Probability Revision 0 Page 8 of 22 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-005 SE-COSI 326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-005 CDF = Core Damage Frequency 
(/rx-yr)CLERP = Conditional Large Early Release Probability LERF = Large Early Release Frequency 
(/rx-yr)-'Base Case' scenarios are complete room burnout and therefore do not identify specific ignition sources Revision 0 Page 9 of 22 Revision 0 Page 9 of 22 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-005 2.2 Compliant Case Calculation The following sub-sections provide the basis for modeling each VFDR (or category of VFDRs)and the alterations that have been made to the variant case to represent the compliant case. In each section a discussion of the VFDR (or the category of VFDRs) is provided.2.2.1 VFDRs Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA For VFDRs specifically modeled in the Fire PRA, a table outlining the actual changes made to the Fire PRA model for that VFDR is provided.
The table includes:* Component Numbers associated with the VFDR. In some cases, there may be additional" Component Numbers listed that may be the power supplies or other supporting components" Basic Event(s) associated with the Components" Scenarios which affect the VFDR 2.2.1.1 VFDRs U2-2-005-HVAC-001, SEP-002" U2-2-005-HVAC-001 
-Q2E21P0002A:ON:ON/OFF" U2-2-005-SEP-002 
-Q2E21POO02A:ON:ON/OFF Table 2-2-1 U2-2-005-HVAC-001, SEP-002 ALTERATIONS Component ID Basic Event BE Description Model Alterations Scenarios CHG/HHSI PUMP P-002A Q2E21 P0002A:ON:
2HHPMPOO CGHHIPMPP02 O N 2AHPMPOX FAILS TO RUN DUE TO Nominal 2181-E RANDOM CAUSE HHI PUMP A MINIFLOW Q2E21V0259A:O:
2HHMV8109 HPUPAMNFO 02A V MOV 8109A TRANSFER Nominal 2181-E CLOSED/PLUGGED Q2E21P0002A:ON:
2HHPMPOO CHG PUMP P002A FAILS OX 2A---A TO START TRAIN A FAN 2171-A, 2172-D1, HHFAN-ANN AFAN-F ANNUNCIATOR Nominal 2173-A, 2174-A, CIRCUITRY FAILS 2181-E, 2182-Dl Model Alterations:
Failure mode probability set to nominal to eliminate fire contribution.
This model alteration is done in the Altered Events Table for the -COMPU2 scenario.2.2.1.2 VFDRs U2-2-005-IA-001, 002 The PRA model has the IA system dependency logic in the model and is not assumed failed in every fire area. The IA failure is based on a scenario specific basis. IA is modeled in this fire area but not failed due to the fire; therefore, the delta risk associated with this VFDR is epsilon." U2-2-005-IA-00 1 -Q2B331 V0053:CLOSED:OPEN/CLOSED" U2-2-005-IA-002 
-Q2E21V0347:MODULATED:MODULATE Revision 0 Page 10 of 22 Version 1.0 Page 2623 of 3726 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-005 2.2.1.3 VFDR U2-2-005-SEP-001 8 U2-2-005-SEP-00 1 -Q2B41 P0001 C:ON:OFF To model the compliant case, the 2 out of 3 logic for the RCP temperature indicators, which are not credited in the fire PRA, needs to be set to a random failure probability.
For this, indicators A and B were chosen; these indicators, along with the other identified events will model the compliant case for any spurious operation of an RCP.Table 2-2-2 U2-2-005-SEP-001 ALTERATIONS Component ID Basic Event BE Description Model Alterations Scenarios Q2B41P0001C:ON 2RCP0001C RCP 2C FAILS TO TRIP Nominal 2172-D1,2181-E,:X ---- F 2182-Dl 2RCP0001C RCP 2C SPURIOUSLY RE- 2172-D1, 2181-E, Q2B41P0001C:X:X 
--- TRSNominal282D
---- U STARTS 2182-Dl RCP 2A MOTOR BEARING 2172-D1, 2181-E, RCP-TI 2HHTI UA3 TEMPERATURE 1.OOE-04 2182-Dl INDICATOR FAILS 2HHTI1UA3 RCP 2B MOTOR BEARING 2172-D1, 2181-E, RCP-TI 2H---1F TEMPERATURE 1.OOE-04 2182-Dl INDICATOR FAILS Model Alterations:
Failure mode probability set to nominal to eliminate fire contribution.
This model alteration is done in the Altered Events Table for the -COMPU2 scenario.2.2.1.4 VFDRs U2-2-005-SEP-004, 005" U2-2-005-SEP-004 
-Q2E2 1 V0376A:OPEN:OPEN" U2-2-005-SEP-005 
-Q2E2 1 V03 76B1:OPEN:
OPEN Table 2-2-3 U2-2-005-SEP-004, 005 ALTERATIONS Component ID Basic Event BE Description Model Alterations Scenarios Q2E21V0376A:O:
2VCMVLCV VCT ISOLATION VALVE 2172-D1, 2181-E, O 115C-V 02E21 LCV1 15C Nominal 2182-Dl SPURIOUSLY CLOSES VCT ISOLATION VALVE Q2E21V0376B:O:
2VCMVLCV CISLTOVAE 0 2VCVLV Q2E21LCV115E Nominal None SPURIOUSLY CLOSES Model Alterations:
Failure mode probability set to nominal to eliminate fire contribution.
This model alteration is done in the Altered Events Table for the -COMPU2 scenario.2.2.1.5 VFDRs U2-2-005-SEP-006, 007, 008" U2-2-005-SEP-006 
-Q2E21VO016A:CLOSED:CLOSED" U2-2-005-SEP-007 
-Q2E2IVOO16B:CLOSED:CLOSED-TRAIN B" U2-2-005-SEP-008 
-Q2E2 1 V0347:MODULATED:
MODULATE Table 2-2-4 U2-2-005-SEP-006, 007, 008 ALTERATIONS Component ID Basic Event BE Description Model Alterations Scenarios Revision 0 Page 11 of 22 Version 1.0 Page 2624 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-005 Table 2-2-4 U2-2-005-SEP-006, 007, 008 ALTERATIONS Component ID Basic Event BE Description Model Alterations Scenarios CHARGING FLOW Q2E21V0347:M:M 122--K CONTROL VALVE FCV- Nominal None 122 FAILS TO CLOSE HHI TO RCS COLD LEGS 2HHMV8803 VALVE MOV-8803A 2172-Di, 2181-E, Q2E21V0016A:C:C A---U SPURIOUSLY OPENS Nominal 2182-Dl AFTER CLOSING HHI TO RCS COLD LEGS Q2E21V0016B:C:C 2HHMV8803 VALVE MOV-8803B-B B---U SPURIOUSLY OPENS AFTER CLOSING Model Alterations:
Failure mode probability set to nominal to eliminate fire contribution.
This model alteration is done in the Altered Events Table for the -COMPU2 scenario.2.2.1.6 VFDR U2-2-005-SEP-009 U2-2-005-SEP-009 
-Q2E21V0376A:OPEN:CLOSED Table 2-2-5 U2-2-005-SEP-009 ALTERATIONS Component ID Basic Event BE Description Model Alterations Scenarios LCV-115C RANDOM FAILS Q2E21V0376A:O:C 2HHMV115 TO CLOSE OR FIRE 2172-D1, 2181-E, C ---- K INDUCED SPURIOUS 2182-Dl OPEN (MS012-A)Model Alterations:
Failure mode probability set to nominal to eliminate fire contribution.
This model alteration is done in the Altered Events Table for the -COMPU2 scenario.2.2.1.7 VFDR U2-2-005-SEP-010
* U2-2-005-SEP-010 
-Q2N11PV3371A:CLOSED:MODULATE Table 2-2-6 U2-2-005-SEP-010 ALTERATIONS Component ID Basic Event BE Description Model Alterations Scenarios OPERATOR FAILS TO 2EAOP ------- ALIGN EMERGENCY AIR-H-F SYSTEM DURING A FIRE EVENT Model Alterations:
Failure mode probability set to nominal to eliminate fire contribution.
This model alteration is done in the Altered Events Table for the -COMPU2 scenario.2.2.2 VFDRs Not Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA All VFDRs and their associated components are modeled in the Fire PRA.Revision 0 Page 12 of 22 Version 1.0 Page 2625 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-005 2.2.3 Compliant Case Results Tables 2-3a and 2-3b provide the results of the compliant case calculation for this fire area. All of the altered events identified in Section 2.2.1 have been applied to their respective scenarios and the results have been quantified.
The CDF and LERF results are provided on a scenario basis.Revision 0 Page 13 of 22 Revision 0 Page 13 of 22 Version 1.0 Page 2626 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-005 SE-C051 326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-005 Table 2-3a Compliant Case CDF and LERF Results Train A Alignment Zone Scen Scenario Scenario Specific CCDP CDF CLERP LERF Description VFDRs (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr)A-2171 COMPU2 BASE CASE U2-2-005-HVAC-001, SEP-002 6.69E-07 2.14E-11 1.61E-10 5.15E-15 D- TRANSIENT 
-NEAR 2205HA00,I01 SP0, 2172 A1 CORNER ALONG U2-2-005-HVAC-001, IA-001, SEP-001, 2.63E-02 8.42E-08 4.29E-05 1.37E-10 CORNER WALON 002, 004, 006, 007, 008, 009 2172 OMPU2WALL 2173 A-2173 COMPU2 BASE CASE U2-2-005-HVAC-001, SEP-002 3.48E-06 7.48E-10 5.56E-10 1.19E-13 A-2174 COMPU2 BASE CASE U2-2-005-HVAC-001, SEP-002 6.69E-07 1.44E-10 1.61 E-10 3.46E-14 2181 E- Charging pump U2-2-005-HVAC-001, IA-001, 002, SEP- 1.99E-03 2.90E-07 2.97E-06 4.34E-10 COMPU2 001,002,004,006,007, 008,009 2182 D1- TRANSIENT 
-CENTER U2-2-005-HVAC-001, IA-001, 002, SEP- 2.63E-02 1.57E-07 4.29E-05 2.56E-10 COMPU2 OF ROOM 001,002, 004,006, 007,008,009 Compliant Scenario Total CDF and LERF 5.32E-07 8.27E-10 Table 2-3b Compliant Case CDF and LERF Results Train B Alignment Zone Scen Scenario Scenario Specific CCDP CDF CLERP LERF Description VFDRs (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr)2171 A-2171 COMPU2 BASE CASE U2-2-005-HVAC-001, SEP-002 6.63E-07 2.13E-11 1.61 E-10 5.15E-15 D- TRANSIENT 
-NEAR 2205HA00,]01,SP0, 2172 A1 CORNER ALONG U2-2-005-HVAC-001, IA-007 , SEP-800 , 2.62E-02 8.39E-08 4.27E-05 1.37E-10 CORNER WALON 002, 004, 006, 007, 008, 009 2172 OMPU2WALL A-2173 COMPU2 BASE CASE U2-2-005-HVAC-001, SEP-002 1.64E-06 3.52E-10 1.61E-10 3.45E-14 2174 A- BASE CASE U2-2-005-HVAC-001, SEP-002 6.63E-07 1.43E-10 1.61 E-10 3.46E-14 COMPU-2 2181 E- U2-2-005-HVAC-001, IA-001, 002, SEP- 2.29E-03 3.34E-07 3.14E-06 4.59E-10 COMPU2 Charging pump 001,002, 004, 006, 007,008, 009 2182 D1- TRANSIENT 
-CENTER U2-2-005-HVAC-001, IA-001, 002, SEP- 2.96E-02 1.76E-07 4.78E-05 2.85E-10 COMPU2 OF ROOM 001,002, 004, 006, 007,008, 009 Compliant Scenario Total CDF and LERF 5.94E-07 8.80E-10 Revision 0 Page 14 of 22 Revision 0 Page 14 of 22 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-005 2.2.4 Required Modifications The following modifications are required as a result of the risk evaluation for this fire area: M Install new trip device in panel Q2R42B0001A, breaker LA20 2.2.5 Required Recovery Actions The following recovery actions are required as a result of the risk evaluation for this fire area: Table 2-4 Required Recovery Actions Recovery Action Component ID Basic Event VFDR BE Description Description OPERATOR FAILS 2EAOP U2 TO ALIGN Operator action to Q2N11PV3371A:CLOSED:MODULATE H-F 005- EMERGENCY AIR align emergency SEP-010 SYSTEM DURING A air to ARVs FIRE EVENT 2.3 Risk Evaluation Results The total area ACDF is above the screening criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr and the total area ALERF is below the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-08/rx-yr, respectively.
However, the total plant ACDF/LERF is below the RG 1.174 criteria of IE-05/rx-yr and 1E-06/rx-yr, respectively.
All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0 ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency.
The following tables present the fire zone/scenario fire risk as well as the total fire risk for this fire area.Table 2-5a 1 FIRE AREA ACDF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN A ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CCDP CDF CCDP CDF aCDF 2171/A 6.69E-07 2.14E-11 6.69E-07 2.14E-11 0.OOE+00 2172/D1 4.40E-02 1.41 E-07 2.63E-02 8.42E-08 5.67E-08 2173/A 4.04E-06 8.67E-10 3.48E-06 7.48E-10 1.20E-10 2174/A 6.69E-07 1.44E-10 6.69E-07 1.44E-10 0.OOE+00 2181/E 4.08E-03 5.96E-07 1.99E-03 2.90E-07 3.06E-07 2182/D1 6.69E-02 3.98E-07 2.63E-02 1.57E-07 2.41 E-07 Total CDF and delta CDF2 1.14E-06 5.32E-07 6.05E-07 1 _ N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.2 Total ACDF includes the risk of recovery actions required to demonstrate the availability of a success path for the nuclear safety performance criteria.Revision 0 Page 15 of 22 Version 1.0 Page 2628 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-005 Table 2-5b 1 FIRE AREA ACDF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN B ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CCDP CDF CCDP CDF ACDF 2171/A 6.64E-07 2.13E-11 6.63E-07 2.13E-11 3.50E-14 2172/D1 2.79E-02 8.94E-08 2.62E-02 8.39E-08 5.58E-09 2173/A 1.67E-06 3.59E-10 1.64E-06 3.52E-10 7.69E-12 2174/A 6.70E-07 1.44E-10 6.63E-07 1.43E-10 1.37E-12 2181/E 9.43E-03 1.38E-06 2.29E-03 3.34E-07 1.04E-06 2182/D1 2.96E-02 1.76E-07 2.96E-02 1.76E-07 0.00E+00 Total CDF and delta CDF 1.64E-06 5.94E-07 1.05E-06 1 _ N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.2 Total ACDF includes the risk of recovery actions required to demonstrate the availability of a success path for the nuclear safety performance criteria.Table 2-6a 1 FIRE AREA aLERF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN A ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CLERP LERF CLERP LERF ALERF 2171/A 1.61E-10 5.15E-15 1.61 E-10 5.15E-15 0.OOE+00 2172/D1 7.12E-05 2.28E-10 4.29E-05 1.37E-10 9.09E-11 2173/A 5.56E-10 1.19E-13 5.56E-10 1.19E-13 0.OOE+00 2174/A 1.61 E-10 3.46E-14 1.61 E-10 3.46E-14 0.OOE+00 2181/E 6.19E-06 9.04E-10 2.97E-06 4.34E-10 4.70E-10 2182/D1 1.08E-04 6.46E-10 4.29E-05 2.56E-10 3.90E-10 Total LERF and delta LERF2 1.78E-09 8.27E-10 9.51 E-10-N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.2 Total ALERF includes the risk of recovery actions required to demonstrate the availability of a success path for the nuclear safety performance criteria.Table 2-6b 1 FIRE AREA aLERF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN B ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CLERP LERF CLERP LERF ALERF 2171/A 1.61 E-10 5.15E-15 1.61 E-10 5.15E-15 0.OOE+00 2172/D1 4.54E-05 1.46E-10 4.27E-05 1.37E-10 8.75E-12 2173/A 1.61 E-10 3.45E-14 1.61E-10 3.45E-14 0.OOE+00 2174/A 1.61 E-10 3.46E-14 1.61E-10 3.46E-14 0.OOE+00 2181/E 1.44E-05 2.1OE-09 3.14E-06 4.59E-10 1.64E-09 2182/D1 4.81 E-05 2.87E-10 4.78E-05 2.85E-10 2.03E-12 Total LERF and delta LERF2 2.53E-09 8.80E-10 1.65E-09-N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.2 Total ALERF includes the risk of recovery actions required to demonstrate the availability of a success path for the nuclear safety performance criteria.Revision 0 Page 16 of 22 Revision 0 Page 16 of 22 Version 1.0 Page 2629 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-005 3.0 DID EVALUATION 3.1 Defense-in-Depth Evaluation A review of the impact of the change on defense-in-depth (DID) was performed.
NFPA 805 defines DID as: 0 Preventing fires from starting" Rapidly detecting fires and controlling and extinguishing promptly those fires that do occur, thereby limiting damage" Providing adequate level of fire protection for structures, systems and components important to safety; so that a fire that is not promptly extinguished will not prevent essential plant safety functions from being performed.
In general, the DID requirement was considered satisfied if the proposed change does not result in a substantial imbalance among these elements (or echelons).
The review of DID was qualitative and addressed each of the elements with respect to the proposed change. Fire protection features and systems relied upon to ensure DID were identified in the assessment (e.g., detection, suppression system).The VFDRs and the associated Fire Area risk (CDF) and scenario consequences (CCDP values)were evaluated to identify general DID echelon imbalances.
Potential methods to balance the DID features were identified ensuring an adequate balance of DID features is maintained for the Fire Area. See Section 3.2 for the results of the evaluation.
3.2 Defense-in-Depth Review Results A review of defense in depth and risk evaluation results show that, given the systems and features specified in Table 3-1 and Section 2 respectively, risk acceptance criteria are met and that the balance of defense in depth is maintained.
The risk acceptance criteria are met with substantial margin to account for analytical methods associated with fire scenarios.
The analyzed scenarios bound potential fuel packages which can reasonably be expected to occur in this area.The transient scenarios in zones 2172 and 2182, as well as the charging pump fire scenario in zone 218 1, present the highest risk contributions in the fire area. To provide margin for this risk, the detection systems in these three zones are required for DID. In addition, the installed fire suppression of zone 2172 is required for DID to mitigate against transient fires.In the event of no intervention by the plant fire brigade, it is not expected that a credible fire would develop which would not be bounded by the analyzed scenarios.
Based on the systems/features specified above, no additional DID systems/features are warranted and the ability to meet nuclear performance criteria is ensured.The table below summarizes how an adequate balance of DID is maintained.
Table 3-1 Defense-in-Depth Impact Review Method of Providing DID Discussion Echelon 1: Prevent fires from starting Combustible Control No change necessary to procedure(s) 
/guidance document(s).
1 Hot Work Control No change necessary to procedure(s) 
/guidance document(s).
1 Revision 0 Page 17 of 22 Version 1.0 Page 2630 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-005 Table 3-1 Defense-in-Depth Impact Review Method of Providing DID Discussion Echelon 2: Rapidly detect, control and extinguish promptly those fires that do occur thereby limiting fire damage Detection System Detection system is installed in all zones and required in zones 2172, 2181, and 2182 Automatic Fire Suppression Automatic suppression system is installed in zone 2172 and required.Portable Fire Extinguishers No portable extinguishers available and not required.Hose stations and hydrants Fire hose cabinets are available, but no enhancements required.located in the area(s)Pre-Fire Plan No change necessary to procedure(s) 
/guidance document(s).
1 Echelon 3: Provide adequate level of fire protection for systems and structures so that a fire will not prevent essential safety functions from being performed Walls, floors ceilings and structural No changes necessary to existing barriers.
1 elements are rated or have been evaluated as adequate for the hazard.Openings in the fire barrier are rated No changes necessary to existing barrier openings.or have been evaluated as adequate for the hazard.Supplemental barriers (e.g., ERFBS, No supplemental barriers installed and not required.cable tray covers, etc.)Guidance provided to operations No VFDR related DID recovery actions required.personnel detailing the credited success path(s) including recovery actions to achieve nuclear safety performance criteria.1 This fire protection feature is relied upon without further DID enhancements beyond inherent programmatic requirements of NFPA 805, Chap. 3 and will not be reported in Table 5-2.3.2.1 Required Modifications There are no modifications required as a result of the DID evaluation for this fire area.3.2.2 Required Recovery Actions There are no required recovery actions as a result of the DID evaluation for this fire area.4.0 SAFETY MARGIN EVALUATION 4.1 Safety Margin Evaluation In accordance with NEI 04-02, 5.3.5.3 guidance, the maintenance of adequate Safety Margin is assessed by the consideration of categories of analyses utilized by this fire risk evaluation (FRE).Safety margins are considered to be maintained if: 0 Codes and standards or their alternatives accepted for use by the NRC are met, and Revision 0 Page 18 of22 Revision 0 Page 18 of 22 Version 1.0 Page 2631 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-005 Safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) are met, or provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty.
The maintenance of adequate safety margin for the change analysis is described for each of the specific analysis types used in support of the fire risk assessment.
4.1.1 Fire Modeling Fire modeling performed in support of the transition has been perfonned within the Fire PRA utilizing codes and standards developed by industry and NRC staff to provide realistic yet conservative results. Specifically, the heat release rates utilized in the transition analysis are based upon NUREG/CR 6850, Task 8, Scoping Fire Modeling.
These heat release rates are conservative and represent values used to screen out fixed ignition sources that do not pose a threat to the targets within specific fire compartments and to assign severity factors to unscreened fixed ignition sources.The combined analysis approach is used during transition; therefore, maximum expected fire scenario/limiting fire scenario have not been analyzed separately.
The bases for the application of these fire modeling codes and standards were not altered in support of this FRE.4.1.2 Plant System Performance Plant system performance parameters were not modified as a result of this FRE. These performance parameters were originally established to support nuclear performance criteria contained in the plant specific accident analyses.
These analyses established component and system performance criteria necessary to establish safe and stable plant operation, as well as, safe shut down of the unit in the event of a fire. These performance parameters were not modified as a result of this FRE.4.2 Safety Margin Results All analyses and assessment have been performed utilizing accepted techniques and industry accepted standards.
In addition, safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) have been considered and provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty.
As such, the Safety Margins are maintained as discussed in Section 4.1.Revision 0 Page 19 of 22 Version 1.0 Page 2632 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-005 5.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION RESULTS 5.1 Dispositions of VFDRs Based on the FRE results contained in Sections 2, 3 and 4 the VFDRs identified in Section 1. 1 have been resolved as follows: VFDR ID U2-2-005-HVAC-001 U2-2-005-IA-001 U2-2-005-IA-002 U2-2-005-SEP-001 U2-2-005-SEP-002 U2-2-005-SEP-004 U2-2-005-SEP-005 U2-2-005-SEP-006 U2-2-005-SEP-007 U2-2-005-SEP-008 U2-2-005-SEP-009 U2-2-005-SEP-01 0 Table 5-1 Final Variance Disposition Disposition Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Recovery Action(s)
Required to Satisfy Risk Criteria:
See Table 2-4 Revision 0 Page 20 of 22 Version 1.0 Page 2633 of 3726 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-005 5.2 Fire Risk Evaluation Summary of Fire Protection Systems and Features Table 5-2 Summary of Required Fire Protection Systems and Features Required Required Required Fire Fire Area Fire Zone Suppression Detection Protection Feature Required Fire Protection System and Feature Details System System (R, D)(R, D) (R, D)R -Improvements to procedures necessary to incorporate U2 2-005 R recovery actions required to meet risk criteria (See Table 2-4): Modification to replace trip device in panel Q2R42BOO01A, breaker LA20 2171 None R None R -Detection system 2172 D R, D None R -Detection system;D -Detection system, Suppression system 2173 None R None R -Detection system 2174 None R None R -Detection system R -Detection system;2181 None R, D None R -Detection system D -Detection system D NoneR -Detection system;2182 None R, D -Detection system D -Detection system Required Suppression/Detection/Feature:
required in the Fire Area based on NFPA 805 Chapter 4 compliance.
The information is provided on a zone basis. The basis for the requirement of the fire protection system is designated as follows: R -Risk Criteria:
Systems required to meet the Risk Criteria for the Performance-Based Approach (NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4)D -Defense-in-depth Criteria:
Systems required to maintain adequate balance of Defense-in-Depth for a Performance-Based Approach (NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4)Fire Protection Features in this Table only refer to those features installed in the Fire Area that have a corresponding NFPA 805, Chapter 3 requirement.
5.3 Summary of Recovery Actions Fire Area U2 2-005 Component Q2N11 PV3371A Table 5-3 -Recovery Action!Component Description MAIN STEAM ATMOS RELIEF Actions Operator action to align emergency air to ARVs Revision 0 Page 21 of 22 Revision 0 Page 21 of 22 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-005 5.4 Summary of Plant Modifications Table 5-4 -Plant Modifications In Comp Rs nomdCaatrzto Item Unit Problem Statement Proposed Modification FPRA Measure Risk Informed Characterization Reduce risk due to fire induced U2 2- Replace trip device to ensure Replace trip device in panel failure by modifying the circuit 005-1 2 breaker s Q2R42BOO01A, breaker LA20 breaker and preventing damage to and load breakers downstream components.
5.5 Fire Area Risk Summary Table 5-5 -Fire Area Risk Summary Fire Area Area Description NFPA 805 Fire Area CDFILERF VFDR RAs Fire Risk Eval Additional Risk of RAs Basis (Yes/No) (Yes/No) A CDF/LERF U2 2-005 Aux Building 4.2.4 1.39E-06/2.16E-09 Yes Yes 8.27E-07/1.30E-09 8.27E-07/1.30E-09 Revision 0 Page 22 of 22 Revision 0 Page 22 of 22 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-006 Attachment 
-Unit 2 Fire Area 2-006 FRE for Fire Area Aux Building Revision:
0 Name Fire PRA Preparer Fire PRA Reviewer Fire Protection Preparer Fire Protection Reviewer NSCA Preparer NSCA Reviewer FRE Preparer FRE Reviewer Jonathan Hedrick Clint Pierce Robert Kirkpatrick Rebecca Puckett Larry Valmonte Dan Funk Steve Hardy Brandon Jamar Revision 0 Page 1 of 27 Version 1.0 Page 2636 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-006 1.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION INPUT .....................................................................
4 1.1 Variances from the Deterministic Requirements 
....................................
4 1.2 Fire Protection Systems and Features ..................................................
9 1.2 .1 C o nstructio n ............................................................................. 
..9 1.2 .2 D ete ctio n ................................................................................... 
..9 1.2.3 Fixed Fire Suppression 
.............................................................
10 1.2.4 Manual Suppression 
.................................................................
10 1.2.5 Ventilation (Smoke Removal) .....................................................
10 1.2.6 Other Fire Protection Features ..................................................
10 1.2.7 Fire Hazard Identification 
...........................................................
10 1.2.8 Fire PRA Input ...........................................................................
10 2.0 RISK EVALUATION 
.......................................................................................
11 2.1 Fire PRA Variant Case Calculation 
.......................................................
11 2.2 Compliant Case Calculation 
..................................................................
15 2.2.1 VFDRs Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA .............................
15 2.2.2 VFDRs Not Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA .....................
16 2.2.3 Compliant Case Results ...........................................................
16 2.2.4 Required Modifications 
.............................................................
16 2.2.5 Required Recovery Actions .......................................................
16 2.3 Risk Evaluation Results ........................................................................
17 3.0 DID EVALUATION 
.........................................................................................
20 3.1 Defense-in-Depth Evaluation 
...............................................................
20 3.2 Defense-in-Depth Review Results ......................................................
20 3.2.1 Required Modifications 
.............................................................
21 3.2.2 Required Recovery Actions .......................................................
22 4.0 SAFETY MARGIN EVALUATION 
..................................................................
22 4.1 Safety Margin Evaluation 
...................................................................
22 4 .1.1 F ire M ode ling .......................................................................... 
..22 4.1.2 Plant System Performance 
......................................................
23 4.2 Safety Margin Results ..........................................................................
23 5.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION RESULTS .............................................................
23 5.1 Dispositions of VFDRs ........................................................................
23 5.2 Fire Risk Evaluation Summary of Fire Protection Systems and Features 25 Revision 0 Page 2 of 27 Version 1.0 Page 2637 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-006 SE-C051 326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-006 5.3 5.4 5.5 Summary of Recovery Actions .............................................................
26 Summary of Plant Modifications 
..........................................................
26 Fire Area Risk Summary ......................................................................
27 Revision 0 Page 3 of 27 Version 1.0 Page 2638 of 3726 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-006 1.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION INPUT 1.1 Variances from the Deterministic Requirements The VFDRs identified for evaluation for Unit 2, Fire Area 2-006, Aux Building are: Table 1-1 VFDRs VFDR Component(s)
Description U2-2-006-Q2N23P0001A:OFF:
This component, AFW Pump 2A/2B, requires HVAC support to remain HVAC-001 ON/OFF, 2A MDAFW functional.
The Auxiliary Feedwater Pump is required to supply PUMP feedwater to the Steam Generators in order to remove decay heat.Furthermore, a loss of the associated Pump Room Coolers due to fire induced circuit failure could prevent the availability of Pump 2A or 2B.Failure to ensure the availability of Pump 2A or 2B challenges the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-2-006-IA-Q2E21V0243:CLOSE This component requires instrument air to perform its credited 001 D:CLOSED, RCS function.
Instrument air is assumed to be unavailable in this fire area ALTERNATE because air loss paths have not been identified.
Isolating the alternate CHARGING LINE charging line is necessary in order to obtain a significant pressure gradient in order to de-pressurize the RCS via aux-spray.
This valve (the Alternate Charging line supply from CVCS) fails open on a loss of instrument air, and hence the necessary pressure gradient will not be sufficient to supply the pressurizer through the spray line. Failure to de-pressurize via aux spray challenges the RCS Pressure/Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-006-IA-Q2E21V0244:OPEN:
This component requires instrument air to perform its credited 002 MODULATE, RCS function.
Instrument air is assumed to be unavailable in this fire area NORMAL because air loss paths have not been identified.
Isolating the normal CHARGING LINE charging line is necessary in order to obtain a significant pressure gradient in order to de-pressurize the RCS via aux-spray.
This valve (the Normal Charging line supply from CVCS) fails open on a loss of instrument air, and hence the necessary pressure gradient will not be sufficient to supply the pressurizer through the aux spray line. Failure to de-pressurize via aux spray challenges the RCS Pressure/Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-006-IA-Q2E21V0245:CLOSE This component requires instrument air to perform its credited 003 D:CLOSED, RCS function.
Instrument air is assumed to be unavailable in this fire area PRESSURIZER AUX because air loss paths have not been identified.
This valve is required SPRAY to cycle in order to supply CVCS inventory to the pressurizer to de-pressurize via aux-spray, and the valve fails closed on a loss of instrument air. An inability to cycle this valve due to a loss of instrument air would prevent de-pressurization of the RCS via aux-spray. Failure to ensure cycling capability of this valve challenges the RCS Pressure/Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-006-IA-Q2E21V0347:MODU This component requires instrument air to perform its credited 004 LATED:MODULATE, function.
Instrument air is assumed to be unavailable in this fire area CHARGING FLOW because air loss paths have not been identified.
Flow control Valve CONTROL VALVE V0347 permits normal charging flow to be injected into the RCS system. Instrument air is required to control the flow and thus charging inventory that is injected into the RCS Cold Legs. A loss of instrument air will result in this valve failing in the open position.
Failure to throttle flow to the RCS system challenges the RCS Inventory/Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.Revision 0 Page 4 of 27 Revision 0 Page 4 of 27 Version 1.0 Page 2639 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-006 Table 1-1 VFDRs VFDR Component(s)
Description U2-2-006-IA-Q2N1 1 PV3371A:CL This component requires instrument air to perform its credited 005 OSED:MODULATE, function.
Instrument air is assumed to be unavailable in this fire area MAIN STEAM because air loss paths have not been identified.
Atmospheric relief on ATMOS RELIEF the secondary side is necessary in order to achieve a controlled cooldown rate. Failure to modulate the SG 2A ARV due to a loss of instrument air would cause the valve to fail closed, thereby isolating the secondary side. This failure challenges the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-2-006-IA-Q2N23HV3227A:OP This component requires instrument air to perform its credited 006 EN:THROTTLED, function.
Instrument air is assumed to be unavailable in this fire area AFW SUPPLY TO because air loss paths have not been identified.
In order to achieve a STEAM controlled cool-down rate, the ability to control Feedwater Flow along GENERATOR 1A the AFW Discharge path is necessary.
The MDAFW Flow Control Valve HV3227A is throttled in order to control Feedwater Flow. A loss of instrument air could result in the valve failing in the open position (Thereby preventing the ability to control flow). Failure to ensure the availability of FCV HV3227A challenges the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-2-006-IA-Q2N23HV3228B:OP This component requires instrument air to perform its credited 007 EN:THROTTLED, function.
Instrument air is assumed to be unavailable in this fire area TDAFW SUPPLY TO because air loss paths have not been identified.
Decay Heat Removal STEAM via SG 2A is sought after in this Fire Area. Feedwater admission to GENERATOR 1B non-credited Steam Generators such as SG 2B therefore must be isolated.
Valve HV3228B if not closed, would admit feedwater to SG2B if the TDAFW Pump spuriously starts. A loss of instrument air could result in the valve failing in the open position.
This failure challenges the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-2-006-IA-Q2N23HV3228C:OP This component requires instrument air to perform its credited 008 EN:THROTTLED, function.
Instrument air is assumed to be unavailable in this fire area TDAFW SUPPLY TO because air loss paths have not been identified.
This component STEAM requires instrument air to perform its credited function.
Instrument air GENERATOR 1C is assumed to be unavailable in this fire area because air loss paths have not been identified.
Decay Heat Removal via SG 2A is sought after in this Fire Area. Feedwater admission to non-credited Steam Generators such as SG 2C therefore must be isolated.
Valve HV3228C if not closed, would admit feedwater to SG2C if the TDAFW Pump spuriously starts. A loss of instrument air could result in the valve failing in the open position.
This failure challenges the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-2-006-SEP-Q2B41PO001C:ON:O In order to support a natural circulation cooldown, the Reactor Coolant 001 FF, RCP 2C Pumps must be tripped. Fire induced circuit damage could spuriously start the Reactor Coolant Pump 2C. Failure to ensure the Reactor Coolant Pumps are tripped challenges the RCS Inventory and Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-006-SEP-Q2N11PV3371A:CL Atmospheric relief on the secondary side is necessary in order to 002 OSED:MODULATE, achieve a controlled cooldown rate. Failure to modulate the SG 2A MAIN STEAM ARV due to fire induced circuit failure would cause the valve to fail ATMOS RELIEF closed, thereby isolating the secondary side. This failure challenges the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-2-006-SEP-Q2N1 1PV3371A:CL Atmospheric relief must be isolated on the secondary side initially.
003 OSED:CLOSED, Spurious opening of the Atmospheric Relief Valve PV3371A could MAIN STEAM result from fire induced circuit failure. This failure challenges the ATMOS RELIEF Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
Revision 0 Page 5 of 27 Version 1.0 Page 2640 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-006 Table 1-1 VFDRs VFDR Component(s)
Description U2-2-006-SEP-Q2N11PV3371B:CL Atmospheric relief must be isolated on the secondary side initially.
004 OSED:CLOSED, Spurious opening of the Atmospheric Relief Valve PV3371B (SG 2B)MAIN STEAM could result from fire induced circuit failure. This failure challenges the ATMOS RELIEF Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-2-006-SEP-Q2N11PV3371C:CL Atmospheric relief must be isolated on the secondary side initially.
005 OSED:CLOSED, Spurious opening of the Atmospheric Relief Valve PV3371C (SG 2C)MAIN STEAM could result from fire induced circuit failure. This failure challenges the ATMOS RELIEF Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-2-006-SEP-Q2N11VOOO1B:OPE Main Steam Isolation is sought after, to ensure that the Main 006 N:CLOSED, 2B SG Feedwater Pumps are tripped, and no steam admission occurs to MSIV these pumps. The MSIVs provide a steam admission path to start the Main Feedwater Pumps, and hence steam the appropriate generator.
Spurious opening or failure to close MSIV 2B through fire induced circuit failure could result in an RCS overcooling condition.
This failure challenges the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-2-006-SEP-Q2N1 1VO001C:OPE Main Steam Isolation is sought after, to ensure that the Main 007 N:CLOSED, 2C SG Feedwater Pumps are tripped, and no steam admission occurs to MSIV these pumps. The MSIVs provide a steam admission path to start the Main Feedwater Pumps, and hence steam the appropriate generator.
Spurious opening or failure to close MSIV 2C through fire induced circuit failure could result in an RCS overcooling condition.
This failure challenges the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-2-006-SEP-Q2N1 1V0002A:OPE Main Steam Isolation is sought after, to ensure that the Main 008 N:CLOSED, 2A SG Feedwater Pumps are tripped, and no steam admission occurs to MSIV these pumps. The MSIVs provide a steam admission path to start the Main Feedwater Pumps, and hence steam the appropriate generator.
Spurious opening or failure to close MSIV 2A through fire induced circuit failure could result in an RCS overcooling condition.
This failure challenges the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-2-006-SEP-Q2N23HV3227A:OP In order to achieve a controlled cool-down rate, the ability to control 009 EN:THROTTLED, Feedwater Flow along the AFW Discharge path is necessary.
The AFW SUPPLY TO MDAFW Flow Control Valve HV3227A is throttled in order to control STEAM Feedwater Flow. Fire induced circuit failure could cause this valve to GENERATOR lA spuriously close thereby isolating the Feedwater supply, or fail in the open position (Thereby preventing the ability to control flow). Failure to ensure the availability of FCV HV3227A challenges the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-2-006-SEP-Q2P16FV3009C:OPE Component cooling water is required to cool the charging pumps as 010 N:OPEN, SW FROM well as support RHR (Cold Shutdown, NPO) activities.
Fire induced 2C CCW HX circuit failure to the Component Cooling Water SW Discharge valve (Q2P16FV3009C) resulting in spurious closure of the valve, could isolate the credited discharge path for CCW. Failure to ensure the availability of CCW challenges the RCS Pressure/Inventory Control and Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-006-SEP-Q2P17P0001C:STAN The Component Cooling Water Pumps are required to circulate 011 DBY:ON, 2C component cooling water to support cooling of the charging pumps.COMPONENT Fire induced circuit failure to Charging Pump 2B Train A or Charging COOLING WATER Pump 2C could prevent use of the pump in this Fire Area. Failure to PUMP establish CCW challenges the RCS Inventory/Pressure Control and Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.Revision 0 Page 6 of 27 Version 1.0 Page 2641 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-006 Table 1-1 VFDRs VFDR Component(s)
Description U2-2-006-SEP-N2N11LR0477:AVAI Decay Heat removal via SG 2A is desired in this Fire Area. SG Level 012 LABLE- Indication at the control room (or local control center) is required in LT477:AVAILABLE-order to monitor decay heat removal through the steam generators.
LT477, 2A, 2B, 2C Fire induced circuit failure to L10474, L10475, L10476, or L10477 could STEAM prevent these indicators from being available at the control room.GENERATOR WIDE These failures challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety RANGE LEVEL Performance Criterion.
RECORDER U2-2-006-SEP-Q2E21 P0002B:ON:O The circuit failures to the charging pump 2B (Train A) and the 013 N/OFF-TRAIN A, 2B sequencer will not result in spurious start of the charging pump, but CHARGING PUMP only prevent its operation, remotely.
Hence if the pump is normally running, control power may not be available to remotely trip the pump.This failure may result in an overcharging condition and challenge the RCS Inventory Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-2-006-SEP-Q2E21V0347:MODU Flow control Valve V0347 permits normal charging flow to be injected 014 LATED:MODULATE, into the RCS system. Fire induced circuit failure to the control circuitry CHARGING FLOW of the valve could result in this valve failing in the open position.CONTROL VALVE Failure to throttle flow to the RCS system challenges the RCS Inventory/Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-006-SEP-Q2N11V0003D:CLO Main Steam Isolation is sought after, to ensure that the Main 015 SED:CLOSED, 2A Feedwater Pumps are tripped, and no steam admission occurs to SG MSIV BYPASS these pumps. The MSIV Bypass Valves HV3976A and 3368A provide a steam admission path to start the Main Feedwater Pumps, and hence steam the appropriate generator.
Spurious opening or failure to close the MSIV Bypass Valves due to fire induced circuit failure could result in an RCS overcooling condition.
This failure challenges the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-2-006-SEP-Q2N11V0003E:CLO Main Steam Isolation is sought after, to ensure that the Main 016 SED:CLOSED, 2B Feedwater Pumps are tripped, and no steam admission occurs to SG MSIV BYPASS these pumps. The MSIV Bypass Valves HV3976B and 3368B provide a steam admission path to start the Main Feedwater Pumps, and hence steam the appropriate generator.
Spurious opening or failure to close the MSIV Bypass Valves due to fire induced circuit failure could result in an RCS overcooling condition.
This failure challenges the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-2-006-SEP-Q2N11VO003F:CLOS Main Steam Isolation is sought after, to ensure that the Main 017 ED:CLOSED, 2C SG Feedwater Pumps are tripped, and no steam admission occurs to MSIV BYPASS these pumps. The MSIV Bypass Valves HV3976C and 3368C provide a steam admission path to start the Main Feedwater Pumps, and hence steam the appropriate generator.
Spurious opening or failure to close the MSIV Bypass Valves due to fire induced circuit failure could result in an RCS overcooling condition.
This failure challenges the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-2-006-SEP-Q2N23HV3228B:OP Decay Heat Removal via SG 2A is sought after in this Fire Area.018 EN:THROTTLED, Feedwater admission to non-credited Steam Generators such as SG TDAFW SUPPLY TO 2B therefore must be isolated.
Valve HV3228B if not closed, would STEAM admit feedwater to SG2B if the TDAFW Pump spuriously starts. Fire GENERATOR 1B induced circuit failure of this valve or a loss of power from the TDAFW UPS could result in the valve failing in the open position.
This failure challenges the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
Revision 0 Page 7 of 27 Version 1.0 Page 2642 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-006 Table 1-1 VFDRs VFDR Component(s)
Description U2-2-006-SEP-Q2N23HV3228C:OP Decay Heat Removal via SG 2A is sought after in this Fire Area.019 EN:THROTTLED, Feedwater admission to non-credited Steam Generators such as SG TDAFW SUPPLY TO 2C therefore must be isolated.
Valve HV3228C if not closed, would STEAM admit feedwater to SG2C if the TDAFW Pump spuriously starts. Fire GENERATOR 1C induced circuit failure of this valve or a loss of power from the TDAFW UPS could result in the valve failing in the open position.
This failure challenges the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-2-006-SEP-Q2N23V0025B:OPE Decay Heat Removal via SG 2A is sought after in this Fire Area.020 N:CLOSED, Feedwater admission to non-credited Steam Generators such as SG MDAFWP TO 2B 2B therefore must be isolated.
Valves 3764B, 3764D and HV3227B STEAM are located in series and control feedwater flow to SG 2B, and one of GENERATOR these valves must close/remain closed. Fire induced control circuit ISOLATION damage to MOVs 3764B and 3764D could render these valves inoperable from the control room and prevent closure and/or result in spurious opening of these valves. Furthermore, fire induced circuit failure of HV3227B could result in the valve failing open as would a loss of instrument air to this valve. These failures challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-2-006-SEP-Q2N23V0025C:OPE Decay Heat Removal via SG 2A is sought after in this Fire Area.021 N:CLOSED, Feedwater admission to non-credited Steam Generators such as SG MDAFWP TO 2C 2C therefore must be isolated.
Valves 3764C, 3764F and HV3227C STEAM are located in series and control feedwater flow to SG 2C, and one of GENERATOR these valves must close/remain closed. Fire induced control circuit ISOLATION damage to MOVs 3764C and 3764F could render these valves inoperable from the control room and prevent closure and/or result in spurious opening of these valves. Furthermore, fire induced circuit failure of HV3227C could result in the valve failing open as would a loss of instrument air to this valve. These failures challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-2-006-SEP-Q2N23P0001A:OFF:
The Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump is required to supply 022 ON/OFF, 2A MDAFW feedwater to the Steam Generators in order to remove decay heat.PUMP Fire induced circuit failure along with the pump being physically present in this fire area could prevent operation of the Motor Driven AFW Pumps. Failure to ensure the availability of Pump 2A or 2B challenges the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-2-006-SEP-Q2P1 5SV3765:CLOS The Sampling System must remain isolated at all times in order to 023 ED:OPEN/CLOSED, ensure that RCS Inventory losses do not inadvertently occur. Spurious RCS HOT LEG opening of the RCS Sample Isolation Valves SV3333 or SV3765 due SAMPLE ISOLATION to fire induced circuit failure could result in an inadvertent diversion SOLENOID flowpath for RCS Inventory.
This failure challenges the RCS Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-2-006-SEP-Q2P15SV3104:CLOS The Sampling System must remain isolated at all times in order to 024 ED:OPEN/CLOSED, ensure that RCS Inventory losses do not inadvertently occur. Spurious PRESSURIZER opening of the Pressurizer Sample Gas Isolation Valves SV3104 or STEAM SAMPLE SV3331 due to fire induced circuit failure could result in an inadvertent ISOLATION diversion flowpath for RCS Inventory.
This failure challenges the RCS Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
Revision 0 Page 8 of 27 Revision 0 Page 8 of 27 Version 1.0 Page 2643 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-006 Table 1-1 VFDRs VFDR Component(s)
Description U2-2-006-SEP-Q2P15SV3103:CLOS The Sampling System must remain isolated at all times in order to 025 ED:OPEN/CLOSED, ensure that RCS Inventory losses do not inadvertently occur. Spurious PRESSURIZER opening of the Pressurizer Sample Liquid Isolation Valves SV3103 or LIQUID SAMPLE SV3332 due to fire induced circuit failure could result in an inadvertent ISOLATION diversion flowpath for RCS Inventory.
This failure challenges the RCS Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
1.2 Fire Protection Systems and Features Fire Area 2-006 consists of Fire Zones: E 2185 -Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger Room -EL 100'-0" 0 2189 -Plant Heating Equipment Room -EL 100'-0" M 2190 -Motor Control Center 2E Room -EL 100'-0" 0 2191 -Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room -EL 100'-0" W 2192 -Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room -EL 100'-0" 0 2193 -Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room -EL 100'-0".2194 -Equipment Room -EL 100'-0" 0 2195 -Access Hatch Room- EL 100'-0", 127'-0", 155'-0" a 2199 -Phosphate Tank and Pump Area -EL. 100'-0" N 2236 -Duct Chase -EL 121'-0", 139'-0", 155'-0" N 2241 -Main Steam and Feed-water Valve Room -EL 127'-0" E 2242 -Pipe Chase -EL 127'-0", 155'-0" 0 2243 -Pipe Chase -EL 127'-0", 155'-0" 1.2.1 Construction Barriers for this fire area are of substantial construction and have been designed and constructed to meet separation requirements.
In the event the configuration utilized is not in accordance with recognized standards, the deviations have been evaluated to be adequate for the hazard.1.2.2 Detection Fire detection systems to provide notification to the Control Room are: " Fire Zone 2185 is provided with detection.
Heat detectors are provided in the 5-kV disconnect switch which alarm both locally and in the Control Room." Fire Zones 2189 -2194 are provided with detection." Fire Zone 2199 is provided with detection." Fire Zone 2241 is provided with detection.
Revision 0 Page 9 of 27 Version 1.0 Page 2644 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-006 1.2.3 Fixed Fire Suppression Fixed fire suppression systems to aid in control of both fire growth and spread in the fire area are: " Fire Zone 2185 is provided with suppression with partial coverage.
In addition, the 5-kV disconnect switch cabinets are provided with a total flooding CO 2 system which is activated by heat detectors." Fire Zone 2189 is provided with suppression." Fire Zone 2190 is provided with suppression.
* Fire Zone 2199 is provided with suppression.
1.2.4 Manual Suppression Manual suppression equipment to be utilized by plant personnel and/or fire brigade members are: " Fire Area 2-006 is provided with two fire hose cabinets located in rooms 2185 and 2189." A portable dry chemical extinguisher is located in room 2185 outside of room 2167 (Fire Area 2-094)." A fire hose cabinet in room 2234 (Fire Area 2-020) is available for use in this area.1.2.5 Ventilation (Smoke Removal)Portable smoke ejectors are available to assist with smoke removal.1.2.6 Other Fire Protection Features A portion of Fire Zone 2185 is designated as a "No Combustible Storage Area" to prevent the storage of transient combustibles.
1.2.7 Fire Hazard Identification The major sources of combustibles in Fire Area 2-006 are cable insulation, the 5-kV disconnect switch, lubricating oil, fiberglass, plastic, panel(s), waterstop material, polyethylene sheathing, and wooden wedge(s).
Details regarding fire scenarios quantified in the fire PRA, and their associated ignition sources (where applicable) are discussed in Section 2.1.2.8 Fire PRA Input Fire protection features There are fire protection features specifically modeled in the Fire PRA as identified in the required plant modification section 2.2.4.Fire protection systems The Hot Gas Layer evaluation credits the detection, automatic fire suppression system and manual fire brigade response.
The Multi Compartment Analysis evaluation credits the detection, automatic fire suppression system and manual fire brigade response.Revision 0 Page 10 of 27 Version 1.0 Page 2645 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-006 Hot Gas Layer Treatment Credit for detection was taken in the Hot Gas Layer evaluation for this fire area. Credit for both automatic fire suppression system and manual fire brigade response was taken in the Hot Gas Layer evaluation for this fire area.Multi-compartment analysis Credit for detection was taken in the Multi Compartment Analysis for this fire area. Credit for both automatic fire suppression system and manual fire brigade response was taken in the Multi Compartment Analysis for this fire area.Scenario Review All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0, ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency.
2.0 RISK EVALUATION 2.1 Fire PRA Variant Case Calculation.
Tables 2-1a and 2-1b provide the results of the variant case calculation for Fire Area 2-006. This is taken directly from the Fire PRA model with no changes or alterations made. The CDF and LERF results are provided on a scenario basis.The total area CDF and LERF is below the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr and lE-08/rx-yr, respectively.
The total CDF/LERF can be used as a conservative estimate of the delta CDF/LERF with respect to a compliant configuration.
No further analysis of the delta CDF/LERF is required.Revision 0 Page 11 of 27 Version 1.0 Page 2646 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-006 Table 2-1 a Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train A Alignment Zone Scen ScenDesc 1  IGF NSP SF CCDP CDF CLERP LERF (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr)2185 E 2A CCW Pmp 9.96E-05 1.0 1.0 3.78E-05 3.77E-09 1.98E-08 1.98E-12 2185 G 2C CCW Pmp 9.96E-05 1.0 1.0 1.62E-05 1.62E-09 4.94E-09 4.92E-13 2185 H 2B CCW Pump 9.96E-05 1.0 1.0 6.71E-07 6.69E-11 1.61E-10 1.60E-14 2189 E 2B AC Cond Pmp 9.96E-05 1.0 1.0 6.71E-07 6.68E-11 1.61E-10 1.60E-14 2189 F 2A AC Cond Pmp 9.96E-05 1.0 1.0 5.81E-06 5.79E-10 2.80E-10 2.79E-14 2189 G Lower Equip Rm Exh Fan 6.86E-05 1.0 1.0 6.71E-07 4.60E-11 1.61E-10 1.10E-14 SMALL MOTOR FIRE 10HP 2189 H ELECTRIC MOTOR 4.9'V 6.56E-04 1.0 1.0 3.58E-06 2.34E-09 5.04E-09 3.31E-12 3.6'H 2190 D1 TRANSIENT FIRE 6.OOE-07 1.0 1.0 1.98E-06 1.19E-12 2.97E-10 1.78E-16 2190 D2 TRANSIENT FIRE 6.67E-06 1.0 1.0 1.16E-04 7.73E-10 1.47E-07 9.79E-13 2190 E2 MCC 2E -NON-SEVERE 2.55E-04 1.0 1.0 7.87E-06 2.01 E-09 2.80E-10 7.14E-14 2190 F FLOOR MOUNTED XFMR 1.74E-04 1.0 1.0 7.87E-06 1.37E-09 2.80E-10 4.87E-14 2190 G1 TDAFWP UPS -SEVERE 3.64E-05 1.0 1.OOE-01 5.16E-05 1.88E-10 7.16E-08 2.61E-13 2190 G2 TDAFWP UPS -NON- 3.64E-05 1.0 1.0 5.16E-05 1.88E-09 7.16E-08 2.61E-12 SEVERE 2190 H1 MSIV TRIP PANEL -SEVERE 1.82E-05 1.0 1.OOE-01 2.09E-06 3.81E-12 1.61E-10 2.93E-16 2190 H2 MSIVTRIP PANEL-NON-1.82E-05 1.0 1.0 2.09E-06 3.81E-11 1.61E-10 2.93E-15 SEVERE 2191 A BASE CASE 1.47E-04 1.0 1.0 5.21E-05 7.63E-09 7.24E-08 1.06E-11 2192 A BASE CASE 2.18E-04 1.0 1.0 1.25E-04 2.72E-08 3.12E-07 6.81 E-11 2193 A BASE CASE 1.22E-04 1.0 1.0 1.47E-05 1.79E-09 2.54E-08 3.11E-12 2194 D1 South wall by wet layup pump 2.57E-05 1.0 1.0 3.83E-04 9.82E-09 5.50E-07 1.41 E-1 1 2195 A BASE CASE 2.57E-05 1.0 1.0 1.78E-06 4.56E-11 1.61E-10 4.13E-15 2199 A BASE CASE 2.20E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 1.48E-11 1.61E-10 3.54E-15 2236 A BASE CASE 1.09E-04 1.0 1.0 9.11E-07 9.95E-11 1.61 E-10 1.76E-14 2241 D2 Wall transient on W wall at W 1.34E-06 1.0 1.0 3.54E-04 4.75E-10 4.93E-07 6.62E-13 end of Bay B 2241 D3 Wall transient on W1wall at W 1.34E-06 1.0 1.0 8.09E-07 1.09E-12 4.17E-10 5.59E-16 end of Bay C 2242 A BASE CASE 2.20E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 1.48E-11 1.61E-10 3.54E-15 2243 A BASE CASE 2.20E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 1.48E-11 1.61E-10 3.54E-15 Revision 0 Page 12 of 27 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-006 Table 2-1a Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train A Alignment Zone Scen ScenDesc 1  IGF NSP SF CCDP CDF CLERP LERF (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr)Total CDF/LERF Fire PRA Variant Case 6.19E-08 1.06E-10 Table 2-1b Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train B Alignment Zone Scen ScenDesc( IGF NSP SF CCDP CDF CLERP LERF (/rx-yr) (Irx-yr) (/rx-yr)2185 E 2A CCW Pmp 9.96E-05 1.0 1.0 1.55E-05 1.54E-09 4.94E-09 4.92E-13 2185 G 2C CCW Pmp 9.96E-05 1.0 1.0 3.25E-05 3.23E-09 1.70E-08 1.69E-12 2185 H 2B CCW Pump 9.96E-05 1.0 1.0 6.66E-07 6.64E-11 1.61E-10 1.60E-14 2189 E 2B AC Cond Pmp 9.96E-05 1.0 1.0 6.66E-07 6.63E-11 1.61E-10 1.60E-14 2189 F 2A AC Cond Pmp 9.96E-05 1.0 1.0 5.83E-06 5.81E-10 2.80E-10 2.79E-14 2189 G Lower Equip Rm Exh Fan 6.86E-05 1.0 1.0 6.66E-07 4.57E-11 1.61E-10 1.10E-14 SMALL MOTOR FIRE 10HP 2189 H ELECTRIC MOTOR 4.9'V 6.56E-04 1.0 1.0 3.56E-06 2.33E-09 5.04E-09 3.31E-12 3.6'H 2190 D1 TRANSIENT FIRE 6.OOE-07 1.0 1.0 1.97E-06 1.18E-12 2.97E-10 1.78E-16 2190 D2 TRANSIENT FIRE 6.67E-06 1.0 1.0 1.16E-04 7.73E-10 1.47E-07 9.80E-13 2190 E2 MCC 2E -NON-SEVERE 2.55E-04 1.0 1.0 7.89E-06 2.01 E-09 2.80E-10 7.14E-14 2190 F FLOOR MOUNTED XFMR 1.74E-04 1.0 1.0 7.89E-06 1.37E-09 2.80E-10 4.87E-14 2190 G1 TDAFWP UPS -SEVERE 3.64E-05 1.0 1.OOE-01 5.15E-05 1.88E-10 7.16E-08 2.61E-13 2190 G2 TDAFWP UPS -NON 3.64E-05 1.0 1.0 5.15E-05 1.88E-09 7.16E-08 2.61E-12 SEVERE 2190 H1 MSIV TRIP PANEL -SEVERE 1.82E-05 1.0 1.O0E-01 2.09E-06 3.80E-12 1.61 E-10 2.93E-16 2190 H2 MSIV TRIP PANEL -NON- 1.82E-05 1.0 1.0 2.09E-06 3.80E-11 1.61E-10 2.93E-15 SEVERE 2191 A BASE CASE 1.47E-04 1.0 1.0 5.21E-05 7.63E-09 7.24E-08 1.06E-11 2192 A BASE CASE 2.18E-04 1.0 1.0 1.25E-04 2.73E-08 3.12E-07 6.81E-11 2193 A BASE CASE 1.22E-04 1.0 1.0 1.48E-05 1.80E-09 2.54E-08 3.11E-12 2194 D1 South wall by wet layup pump 2.57E-05 1.0 1.0 3.82E-04 9.81E-09 5.50E-07 1.41E-11 2195 A BASE CASE 2.57E-05 1.0 1.0 9.79E-07 2.51E-11 1.61 E-10 4.13E-15 2199 A BASE CASE 2.20E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 1.46E-11 1.61E-10 3.54E-15 Revision 0 Page 13 of 27 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-006 Table 2-1 b Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train B Alignment Zone Scen ScenDesc1 IGF NSP SF CCDP CDF CLERP LERF (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr)2236 A BASE CASE 1.09E-04 1.0 1.0 9.06E-07 9.90E-11 1.61E-10 1.76E-14 2241 D2 Wall transient on W wall at W 1.34E-06 1.0 1.0 3.54E-04 4.75E-10 4.93E-07 6.62E-13 end of Bay B 2241 D3 Wall transient on W'wall atW' 1.34E-06 1.0 1.0 7.99E-07 1.07E-12 4.17E-10 5.59E-16 end of Bay C 2242 A BASE CASE 2.20E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 1.46E-11 1.61E-10 3.54E-15 2243 A BASE CASE 2.20E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 1.46E-11 1.61E-10 3.54E- 15 Total CDF/LERF Fire PRA Variant Case 6.13E-08 1.06E-10 Where: Zone = Fire Zone Scen = 'A' to signify the variant case ScenDesc = Description of the Fire Scenario IGF = Ignition Frequency 
(/rx-yr)NSP = Non Suppression Probability SF = Severity Factor CCDP = Conditional Core Damage Probability CDF = Core Damage Frequency 
(/rx-yr)CLERP = Conditional Large Early Release Probability LERF = Large Early Release Frequency 
(/rx-yr)1 ' Base Case' scenarios are complete room burnout and therefore do not identify specific ignition sources Revision 0 Page 14 of 27 Revision 0 Page 14 of 27 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-006 2.2 Compliant Case Calculation The following sub-sections provide the basis for modeling each VFDR (or category of VFDRs)and the alterations that have been made to the variant case to represent the compliant case. In each section a discussion of the VFDR (or the category of VFDRs) is provided.2.2.1 VFDRs Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA The following VFDRs are modeled in the Fire PRA and are therefore included in the total fire area CDF/LERF used as a surrogate for the delta risk evaluation for this fire area: " U2-2-006-HVAC-001 
-Q2N23P0001A:OFF:ON/OFF" U2-2-006-IA-001 
-Q2E21V0243:CLOSED:CLOSED" U2-2-006-IA-002 
-Q2E2 1 V0244:OPEN:MODULATE" U2-2-006-IA-003 
-Q2E2 1 V0245: CLOSED:CLOSED" U2-2-006-IA-004 
-Q2E2 1 V0347:MODULATED:MODULATE" U2-2-006-IA-005 
-Q2N 11 PV337 1A:CLOSED:MODULATE
* U2-2-006-IA-006 
-Q2N23HV3227A:OPEN:THROTTLED" U2-2-006-IA-007 
-Q2N23HV3228B:OPEN:THROTTLED" U2-2-006-IA-008 
-Q2N23HV3228C:OPEN:THROTTLED
* U2-2-006-SEP-00 1 -Q2B41 P0001 C:ON:OFF" U2-2-006-SEP-002 
-Q2N1lPV3371A:CLOSED:MODULATE" U2-2-006-SEP-003 
-Q2Nl1 PV337 1A:CLOSED:CLOSED
* U2-2-006-SEP-004 
-Q2N 11PV337IB:CLOSED:CLOSED
* U2-2-006-SEP-005 
-Q2N 1 IPV337 1 C:CLOSED:CLOSED
* U2-2-006-SEP-006 
-Q2Nl lV0001B:OPEN:CLOSED
* U2-2-006-SEP-007 
-Q2N IIV0001C:OPEN:CLOSED
* U2-2-006-SEP-008 
-Q2N II V0002A:OPEN:CLOSED
* U2-2-006-SEP-009 
-Q2N23HV3227A:OPEN:THROTTLED
* U2-2-006-SEP-010 
-Q2P16FV3009C:OPEN:OPEN" U2-2-006-SEP-0 11 -Q2P17P0001C:STANDBY:ON" U2-2-006-SEP-0 12 -N2N 11 LR0477:AVAILABLE-LT477:AVAILABLE-LT477" U2-2-006-SEP-013 
-Q2E21POO02B:ON:ON/OFF-TRAIN A* U2-2-006-SEP-014-Q2E2 1 V0347:MODULATED:MODULATE
* U2-2-006-SEP-015 
-Q2N 11V0003D:CLOSED:CLOSED
* U2-2-006-SEP-016 
-Q2N1 1V0003E:CLOSED:CLOSED Revision 0 Page 15 of 27 Version 1.0 Page 2650 of 3726 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-006* U2-2-006-SEP-017 
-Q2N1 1V0003F:CLOSED:CLOSED" U2-2-006-SEP-0 18 -Q2N23HV3228B:OPEN:THROTTLED
* U2-2-006-SEP-019 
-Q2N23HV3228C:OPEN:THROTTLED
* U2-2-006-SEP-020 
-Q2N23V0025B:OPEN:CLOSED" U2-2-006-SEP-021 
-Q2N23V0025C:OPEN:CLOSED" U2-2-006-SEP-022 
-Q2N23P0001A:OFF:ON/OFF 2.2.2 VFDRs Not Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA A Fire PRA was developed in accordance with the requirements of Part 4 "Requirements for Fires at Power PRA" of the ASME and ANS combined PRA Standard, ASME/ANS RA-Sa-2009, "Standard for Level 1/Large Early Release Frequency Probabilistic Risk Assessment for Nuclear Power Plant Applications".
Consistent with those requirements not all components required to meet the nuclear safety criteria need to be specifically modeled in the Fire PRA. The following VFDRs are associated with components not modeled in the Fire PRA: 2.2.2.1 VFDRs U2-2-006-SEP-023, 024, 025 Normally the sample lines are closed by manual valves. During the sample line operation, the flow rate is limited to less than I gpm and the duration of sampling is about 20 minutes, typically.
Therefore, there is no modeling of the sample lines, see Table A-1, PRA-BC-F-11-002 Equipment Selection calculation." U2-2-006-SEP-023 
-Q2PI 5SV3765:CLOSED:OPEN/CLOSED" U2-2-006-SEP-024 
-Q2PI 5SV31 04:CLOSED:OPEN/CLOSED" U2-2-006-SEP-025 
-Q2PI5SV3].03:CLOSED:OPEN/CLOSED 2.2.3 Compliant Case Results The total area CDF and LERF is below the screening acceptance criteria of 1 E-07/rx-yr and I E-08/rx-yr, respectively.
The total CDF/LERF can be used as a conservative estimate of the delta CDF/LERF with respect to a compliant configuration.
No further analysis of the delta CDF/LERF is required.2.2.4 Required Modifications The following modifications are required as a result of the risk evaluation for this fire area:* Install new trip device in panel Q2R42B000 IA, breaker LA20 2.2.5 Required Recovery Actions There are no required recovery actions as a result of the risk evaluation for this fire area.Revision 0 Page 16 of 27 Version 1.0 Page 2651 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-006 2.3 Risk Evaluation Results The ACDF/LERF is below the screening acceptance criteria of l E-07/rx-yr (CDF) and lE-08/rx-yr (LERF) for acceptable risk. All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0 ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency.
The following tables present the fire zone/scenario fire risk as well as the total fire risk for this fire area. Given the relatively low risk for these zones/scenarios the delta risk is defined by the variant case risk, the compliant case risk is conservatively assumed to be 0.Table 2-2a'FIRE AREA ACDF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN A ALIGNMEN Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case CCDP CDF CCDP CDF IT 2185/E 2185/G 2185/H 2189/E 2189/F 2189/G 2189/H 2190/D1 2190/D2 2190/E2 2190/F 2190/G1 2190/G2 2190/Hi 2190/H2 2191/A 2192/A 2193/A 2194/D1 2195/A 2199/A 2236/A 2241/D2 2241/D3 2242/A 2243/A 3.78E-05 1.62E-05 6.71 E-07 6.71 E-07 5.81 E-06 6.71E-07 3.58E-06 1.98E-06 1.16E-04 7.87E-06 7.87E-06 5.16E-05 5.16E-05 2.09E-06 2.09E-06 5.21 E-05 1.25E-04 1.47E-05 3.83E-04 1.78E-06 6.69E-07 9.11E-07 3.54E-04 8.09E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 3.77E-09 1.62E-09 6.69E-11 6.68E-1 1 5.79E-10 4.60E-1 1 2.34E-09 1.19E-12 7.73E-10 2.01 E-09 1.37E-09 1.88E-10 1.88E-09 3.81 E-12 3.81 E-11 7.63E-09 2.72E-08 1.79E-09 9.82E-09 4.56E-1 1 1.48E- 11 9.95E-11 4.75E-1 0 1.09E-12 1.48E-1 1 1.48E-11 6.19E-08 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+OO Variant -Compliant ACDF 3.77E-09 1.62E-09 6.69E-1 1 6.68E-1 1 5.79E-10 4.60E-1 1 2.34E-09 1.19E-12 7.73E-10 2.01 E-09 1.37E-09 1.88E-10 1.88E-09 3.81 E-12 3.81 E-11 7.63E-09 2.72E-08 1.79E-09 9.82E-09 4.56E-11 1.48E-11 9.95E-1 1 4.75E-10 1.09E-12 1.48E-11 1.48E-1 1 6.19E-08 Total CDF and delta CDF 1 -N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.Revision 0 Page 17 of 27 Version 1.0 Page 2652 of 3726 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-006 Table 2-2b 1 FIRE AREA ACDF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN B ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant C CCDP ase 2185/E 2185/G 2185/H 2189/E 2189/F 2189/G 2189/H 2190/D1 2190/D2 2190/E2 2190/F 2190/G1 2190/G2 2190/H 1 2190/H2 2191/A 2192/A 2193/A 2194/D1 2195/A 2199/A 2236/A 224 1/D2 2241/D3 2242/A 2243/A 1.55E-05 3.25E-05 6.66E-07 6.66E-07 5.83E-06 6.66E-07 3.56E-06 1.97E-06 1.16E-04 7.89E-06 7.89E-06 5.15E-05 5.15E-05 2.09E-06 2.09E-06 5.21 E-05 1.25E-04 1.48E-05 3.82E-04 9.79E-07 6.64E-07 9.06E-07 3.54E-04 7.99E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 CDF 1.54E-09 3.23E-09 6.64E-11 6.63E-11 5.81 E-10 4.57E-11 2.33E-09 1.18E-12 7.73E-10 2.01 E-09 1.37E-09 1.88E-1 0 1.88E-09 3.80E-1 2 3.80E-1 1 7.63E-09 2.73E-08 1.80E-09 9.81 E-09 2.51 E-11 1.46E-1 1 9.90E-11 4.75E-10 1.07E-12 1.46E-1 1 1.46E-1 1 6.13E-08 Compliant Case CCDP CDF 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.00E+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 O.00E+00 0.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 O.00E+00 O.00E+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 O.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 Variant -Compliant ACDF 1.54E-09 3.23E-09 6.64E-11 6.63E-1 1 5.81 E-10 4.57E-1 1 2.33E-09 1.18E-12 7.73E-10 2.01 E-09 1.37E-09 1.88E-10 1.88E-09 3.80E-12 3.80E-1 1 7.63E-09 2.73E-08 1.80E-09 9.81 E-09 2.51E-11 1.46E-1 1 9.90E- 11 4.75E-1 0 1.07E-12 1.46E-11 1.46E- 11 6.13E-08 Total CDF and delta CDF-N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.Table 2-3a 1 FIRE AREA aLERF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN A ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CLERP LERF CLERP LERF ALERF 2185/E 2185/G 2185/H 2189/E 2189/F 2189/G 2189/H 2190/D1 2190/D2 2190/E2 2190/F 1.98E-08 4.94E-09 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 2.80E-10 1.61 E-10 5.04E-09 2.97E-10 1.47E-07 2.80E-1 0 2.80E-10 1.98E-12 4.92E-13 1.60E-14 1.60E-14 2.79E-14 1.10E-14 3.31 E-12 1.78E-16 9.79E-1 3 7.14E-14 4.87E-14 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 1.98E-12 4.92E-1 3 1.60E-14 1.60E-14 2.79E-14 1.10E-14 3.31 E-12 1.78E-1 6 9.79E-1 3 7.14E-14 4.87E-14 Revision 0 Page 18 of 27 Version 1.0 Page 2653 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-006 Table 2-3a 1 FIRE AREA ALERF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN A ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CLERP LERF CLERP LERF ALERF 2190/G1 2190/G2 2190/H1 2190/H2 2191/A 2192/A 2193/A 2194/D1 2195/A 2199/A 2236/A 2241/D2 2241/D3 2242/A 2243/A 7.16E-08 7.16E-08 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 7.24E-08 3.12E-07 2.54E-08 5.50E-07 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 4.93E-07 4.17E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61E-10 2.61 E-1 3 2.61E-12 2.93E-16 2.93E-15 1.06E-11 6.81 E-11 3.11E-12 1.41 E-11 4.13E-15 3.54E-15 1.76E-14 6.62E-1 3 5.59E-16 3.54E-15 3.54E-15 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 2.61E-13 2.61E-12 2.93E-16 2.93E-15 1.06E-11 6.81 E-11 3.11E-12 1.41 E-11 4.13E-15 3.54E-15 1.76E-14 6.62E-13 5.59E-16 3.54E-15 3.54E-15 1.06E-10 Total LERF and delta LERF 1.06E-10 1 _ N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.Table 2-3b 1 FIRE AREA ALERF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN B ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CLERP LERF CLERP LERF ALERF 2185/E 2185/G 2185/H 2189/E 2189/F 2189/G 2189/H 2190/D1 2190/D2 2190/E2 2190/F 2190/G1 2190/G2 2190/Hi1 2190/H2 2191/A 2192/A 2193/A 2194/D1 2195/A 2199/A 2236/A 4.94E-09 1.70E-08 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 2.80E-10 1.61 E-10 5.04E-09 2.97E-10 1.47E-07 2.80E-10 2.80E-10 7.16E-08 7.16E-08 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 7.24E-08 3.12E-07 2.54E-08 5.50E-07 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 4.92E-13 1.69E-12 1.60E-14 1.60E-14 2.79E-14 1.10E-14 3.31E-12 1.78E-16 9.80E-13 7.14E-14 4.87E-14 2.61 E-13 2.61E-12 2.93E-16 2.93E-15 1.06E-11 6.81 E-11 3.11E-12 1.41E-11 4.13E-15 3.54E-15 1.76E-14 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 4.92E-13 1.69E-12 1.60E-14 1.60E-14 2.79E-14 1.10E-14 3.31 E-12 1.78E-16 9.80E-13 7.14E-14 4.87E-14 2.61E-13 2.61 E-12 2.93E-16 2.93E-15 1.06E-11 681 E-11 3.11E-12 1.41 E-11 4.13E-15 3.54E-15 1.76E-14-Revision 0 Page 19 of 27 Version 1.0 Page 2654 of 3726 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-006 Table 2-3b 1 FIRE AREA ALERF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN B ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CLERP LERF CLERP LERF ALERF 2241/D2 4.93E-07 6.62E-13 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 6.62E-13 2241/D3 4.17E-10 5.59E-16 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 5.59E-16 2242/A 1.61E-10 3.54E-15 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 3.54E-15 2243/A 1.61E-10 3.54E-15 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 3.54E-15 Total LERF and delta LERF 1.06E-10 0.OOE+00 1.06E-10 1 _ N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.3.0 DID EVALUATION 3.1 Defense-in-Depth Evaluation A review of the impact of the change on defense-in-depth (DID) was performed.
NFPA 805 defines DID as: Preventing fires from starting* Rapidly detecting fires and controlling and extinguishing promptly those fires that do occur, thereby limiting damage Providing adequate level of fire protection for structures, systems and components important to safety; so that a fire that is not promptly extinguished will not prevent essential plant safety functions from being performed.
In general, the DID requirement was considered satisfied if the proposed change does not result in a substantial imbalance among these elements (or echelons).
The review of DID was qualitative and addressed each of the elements with respect to the proposed change. Fire protection features and systems relied upon to ensure DID were identified in the assessment (e.g., detection, suppression system).The VFDRs and the associated Fire Area risk (CDF) and scenario consequences (CCDP values)were evaluated to identify general DID echelon imbalances.
Potential methods to balance the DID features were identified ensuring an adequate balance of DID features is maintained for the Fire Area. See Section 3.2 for the results of the evaluation.
3.2 Defense-in-Depth Review Results A review of defense in depth and risk evaluation results show that, given the systems and features specified in Table 3-1 and Section 2 respectively, risk acceptance criteria are met and that the balance of defense in depth is maintained.
The risk acceptance criteria are met with substantial margin to account for analytical methods associated with fire scenarios.
The analyzed scenarios bound potential fuel packages which can reasonably be expected to occur in this area.The base case, full burnout scenario in zone 2192, presents the highest risk contribution of the fire area, which is why the detection system in this zone is required for DID to support timely brigade response.
Modification to provide backup air supply to control AFQ flow is required for DID (See Table 3-2).Revision 0 Page 20 of 27 Version 1.0 Page 2655 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-006 In the event of no intervention by the plant fire brigade, it is not expected that a credible fire would develop which would not be bounded by the analyzed scenarios.
Based on the systems/features specified above, no additional DID systems/features are warranted and the ability to meet nuclear performance criteria is ensured.The table below summarizes how an adequate balance of DID is maintained.
Table 3-1 Defense-in-Depth Impact Review Method of Providing DID Discussion Echelon 1: Prevent fires from starting Combustible Control No change necessary to procedure(s) 
/guidance document(s).
1 Hot Work Control No change necessary to procedure(s) 
/guidance document(s).
1 Echelon 2: Rapidly detect, control and extinguish promptly those fires that do occur thereby limiting fire damage Detection System Detection system is installed in all zones except 2195, 2236, 2242, and 2243, but is only required in zone 2192.Automatic Fire Suppression Automatic suppression system is installed in zones 2185, 2189, 2190, and 2199, but not required.Portable Fire Extinguishers Portable extinguishers are available, but no enhancements required.'
Hose stations and hydrants Fire hose cabinets are available, but no enhancements required.located in the area(s)Pre-Fire Plan No change necessary to procedure(s) 
/guidance document(s).
Echelon 3: Provide adequate level of fire protection for systems and structures so that a fire will not prevent essential safety functions from being performed Walls, floors ceilings and structural No changes necessary to existing barriers.elements are rated or have been evaluated as adequate for the hazard.Openings in the fire barrier are rated No changes necessary to existing barrier openings.or have been evaluated as adequate for the hazard.Supplemental barriers (e.g., ERFBS, No supplemental barriers installed and not required.cable tray covers, etc.)Guidance provided to operations No VFDR related DID recovery actions required.personnel detailing the credited success path(s) including recovery actions to achieve nuclear safety performance criteria.This fire protection feature is relied upon without further DID enhancements beyond inherent programmatic requirements of NFPA 805, Chap. 3 and will not be reported in Table 5-2.3.2.1 Required Modifications Table 3-2 Required Modifications Problem Statement VFDR Proposed Modification Q2N23HV3227A 
-MDAFW TO A STEAM Plumb air from emergency air compressor GENERATOR FLOW CONTROL: MDAFW header to AFW flow control valve. This will U2-2-006-1A-006 alwgetroeainlcnrlo F supply requires instrument air for remote allow greater operational control of AFW operation.
Valve fails full open on a loss of flow when motor-driven pump is credited Revision 0 Page 21 of 27 Version 1.0 Page 2656 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-006 Table 3-2 Required Modifications Problem Statement VFDR Proposed Modification air and thus cannot be throttled to maintain since the pump will not be cycled on and off proper feed flow to S/G to control flow Q2N23HV3227B 
-MDAFW TO B STEAM Plumb air from emergency air compressor GENERATOR FLOW CONTROL: MDAFW header to AFW flow control valve. This will supply requires instrument air for remote U2-2-006-1A-006 allow greater operational control of AFW operation.
Valve fails full open on a loss of flow when motor-driven pump is credited air and thus cannot be throttled to maintain since the pump will not be cycled on and off proper feed flow to S/G to control flow Q2N23HV3227C 
-MDAFW TO C STEAM Plumb air from emergency air compressor GENERATOR FLOW CONTROL: MDAFW header to AFW flow control valve. This will supply requires instrument air for remote U2-2-006-1A-006 allow greater operational control of AFW operation.
Valve fails full open on a loss of flow when motor-driven pump is credited air and thus cannot be throttled to maintain since the pump will not be cycled on and off proper feed flow to S/G to control flow 3.2.2 Required Recovery Actions There are no required recovery actions as a result of the DID evaluation for this fire area.4.0 SAFETY MARGIN EVALUATION 4.1 Safety Margin Evaluation In accordance with NEI 04-02, 5.3.5.3 guidance, the maintenance of adequate Safety Margin is assessed by the consideration of categories of analyses utilized by this fire risk evaluation (FRE).Safety margins are considered to be maintained if: " Codes and standards or their alternatives accepted for use by the NRC are met, and" Safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) are met, or provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty.
The maintenance of adequate safety margin for the change analysis is described for each of the specific analysis types used in support of the fire risk assessment.
4.1.1 Fire Modeling Fire modeling performed in support of the transition has been performed within the Fire PRA utilizing codes and standards developed by industry and NRC staff to provide realistic yet conservative results. Specifically, the heat release rates utilized in the transition analysis are based upon NUREG/CR 6850, Task 8, Scoping Fire Modeling.
These heat release rates are conservative and represent values used to screen out fixed ignition sources that do not pose a threat to the targets within specific fire compartments and to assign severity factors to unscreened fixed ignition sources.The combined analysis approach is used during transition; therefore, maximum expected fire scenario/limiting fire scenario have not been analyzed separately.
The bases for the application of these fire modeling codes and standards were not altered in support of this FRE.Revision 0 Page 22 of 27 Version 1.0 Page 2657 of 3726 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-006 4.1.2 Plant System Performance Plant system performance parameters were not modified as a result of this FRE. These performance parameters were originally established to support nuclear performance criteria contained in the plant specific accident analyses.
These analyses established component and system performance criteria necessary to establish safe and stable plant operation, as well as, safe shut down of the unit in the event of a fire. These performance parameters were not modified as a result of this FRE.4.2 Safety Margin Results All analyses and assessment have been performed utilizing accepted techniques and industry accepted standards.
In addition, safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) have been considered and provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty.
As such, the Safety Margins are maintained as discussed in Section 4.1.5.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION RESULTS 5.1 Dispositions of VFDRs Based on the FRE results contained in Sections 2, 3 and 4 the VFDRs identified in Section 1.1 have been resolved as follows: Table 5-1 Final Variance Disposition Disposition VFDR ID U2-2-006-HVAC-001 U2-2-006-IA-001 U2-2-006-IA-002 U2-2-006-IA-003 U2-2-006-IA-004 U2-2-006-IA-005 U2-2-006-IA-006 U2-2-006-IA-007 U2-2-006-IA-008 U2-2-006-SEP-001 U2-2-006-SEP-002 U2-2-006-SEP-003 U2-2-006-SEP-004 U2-2-006-SEP-005 U2-2-006-SEP-006 U2-2-006-SEP-007 U2-2-006-SEP-008 U2-2-006-SEP-009 U2-2-006-SEP-010 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Modification required to satisfy DID Criteria (See Table 3-2)Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Revision 0 Page 23 of 27 Version 1.0 Page 2658 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-006 SE-C051 326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-006 VFDR ID U2-2-006-SEP-011 U2-2-006-SEP-012 U2-2-006-SEP-013 U2-2-006-SEP-014 U2-2-006-SEP-015 U2-2-006-SEP-016 U2-2-006-SEP-017 U2-2-006-SEP-018 U2-2-006-SEP-019 U2-2-006-SEP-020 U2-2-006-SEP-021 U2-2-006-SEP-022 U2-2-006-SEP-023 Table 5-1 Final Variance Disposition Disposition Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)U2-2-006-SEP-024 U2-2-006-SEP-025 Revision 0 Page 24 of 27 Revision 0 Page 24 of 27 Version 1.0 Page 2659 of 3726 SE-C051326701 
-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-006 5.2 Fire Risk Evaluation Summary of Fire Protection Systems and Features Table 5-2 Summary of Required Fire Protection Systems and Features Required Required Required Fire Fire Area Fire Zone Suppression Detection Protection Feature Required Fire Protection System and Feature Details System System (R, D)(R, D) (R, D)R -Modification to replace trip device in panel U2 2-006 R, D Q2R42BOO01A, breaker LA20;D -Modification required to plumb air from emergency air compressor header to AFW flow control valve.2185 R R None 2189 2190 2191 2192 2193 2194 2195 2199 2236 2241 2242 R R None None None None None R None None None R R R R, D R R None R None R None None None None None None None None None None None None R -Suppression system, Detection system R -Suppression system, Detection system R -Suppression system, Detection system R -Detection system R -Detection system;D -Detection system R -Detection system R -Detection system None R -Suppression system, Detection system None R -Detection system None 2243 None None None None Required Suppression/Detection/Feature:
required in the Fire Area based on NFPA 805 Chapter 4 compliance.
The information is provided on a zone basis. The basis for the requirement of the fire protection system is designated as follows:* R -Risk Criteria:
Systems required to meet the Risk Criteria for the Performance-Based Approach (NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4)* D -Defense-in-depth Criteria:
Systems required to maintain adequate balance of Defense-in-Depth for a Performance-Based Approach (NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4)Fire Protection Features in this Table only refer to those features installed in the Fire Area that have a corresponding NFPA 805, Chapter 3 requirement.
Revision 0 Page 25 of 27 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-006 5.3 Summary of Recovery Actions No recovery actions are required for this fire area.5.4 Summary of Plant Modifications Table 5-3 -Plant Modifications Item Unit Problem Statement Proposed Modification In FPRA Comp Measure Risk Informed Characterization U2 2-006-1 2 Q2N23HV3227A 
-MDAFW TO A STEAM Plumb air from emergency air No Yes Provides DID by GENERATOR FLOW CONTROL: compressor header to AFW providing backup air MDAFW supply requires instrument air for flow control valve. This will supply to control AFW remote operation.
Valve fails full open on allow greater operational flow.a loss of air and thus cannot be throttled control of AFW flow when to maintain proper feed flow to S/G motor-driven pump is credited since the pump will not be cycled on and off to control flow U2 2-006-2 2 Q2N23HV3227B 
-MDAFW TO B STEAM Plumb air from emergency air No Yes Provides DID by GENERATOR FLOW CONTROL: compressor header to AFW providing backup air MDAFW supply requires instrument air for flow control valve. This will supply to control AFW remote operation.
Valve fails full open on allow greater operational flow.a loss of air and thus cannot be throttled control of AFW flow when to maintain proper feed flow to S/G motor-driven pump is credited since the pump will not be cycled on and off to control flow U2 2-006-3 2 Q2N23HV3227C 
-MDAFW TO C STEAM Plumb air from emergency air No Yes Provides DID by GENERATOR FLOW CONTROL: compressor header to AFW providing backup air MDAFW supply requires instrument air for flow control valve. This will supply to control AFW remote operation.
Valve fails full open on allow greater operational flow.a loss of air and thus cannot be throttled control of AFW flow when to maintain proper feed flow to S/G motor-driven pump is credited since the pump will not be cycled on and off to control flow Revision 0 Page 26 of 27 Revision 0 Page 26 of 27 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-006 Table 5-3 -Plant Modifications Item Unit Problem Statement Proposed Modification In FPRA Comp Measure Risk Informed Characterization Reduce risk due to fire induced failure by Replace trip device to ensure breaker Replace trip device in panel modifying the circuit U2R42-006-4brak2rYes Yes breaker and coordination of supply and load breakers Q2R42B0001A, breakerpreve LA20 preventing damage to downstream components.
5.5 Fire Area Risk Summary Table 5-4 Fire Area Risk Summary Fire Area Area Description NFPA 805 Fire Area CDFILERF VFDR RAs Fire Risk Eval Additional Risk of RAs Basis (Yes/No) (Yes/No) A CDF/LERF U2 2-006 Aux Building 4.2.4 6.16E-08/1.06E-10 Yes No 6.16E-08/1.06E-10 N/A Revision 0 Page 27 of 27 Revision 0 Page 27 of 27 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-008 Attachment 
-Unit 2 Fire Area 2-008 FRE for Fire Area Aux Building Cable Chase Room 2116 Revision:
0 Name Fire PRA Preparer Fire PRA Reviewer Fire Protection Preparer Fire Protection Reviewer NSCA Preparer NSCA Reviewer FRE Preparer FRE Reviewer Jonathan Hedrick Clint Pierce Robert Kirkpatrick Rebecca Puckett Larry Valmonte Dan Funk Steve Hardy Brandon Jamar Revision 0 Page 1 of 25 Revision 0 Page 1 of 25 Version 1.0 Page 2663 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-008 1.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION INPUT .....................................................................
4 1.1 Variances from the Deterministic Requirements 
....................................
4 1.2 Fire Protection Systems and Features ................................................
10 1.2.1 Construction 
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10 1.2 .2 D e te ctio n ................................................................................. 
..10 1.2.3 Fixed Fire Suppression 
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11 1.2.4 Manual Suppression 
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11 1.2.5 Ventilation (Smoke Removal) .....................................................
11 1.2.6 Other Fire Protection Features ..................................................
11 1.2.7 Fire Hazard Identification 
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11 1.2.8 Fire PRA Input ...........................................................................
11 2.0 RISK EVALUATION 
.......................................................................................
12 2.1 Fire PRA Variant Case Calculation 
.......................................................
12 2.2 Compliant Case Calculation 
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14 2.2.1 VFDRs Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA .............................
14 2.2.2 VFDRs Not Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA ......................
15 2.2.3 Compliant Case Results ...........................................................
16 2.2.4 Required Modifications 
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16 2.2.5 Required Recovery Actions .......................................................
16 2.3 Risk Evaluation Results ........................................................................
17 3.0 DID EVALUATION 
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18 3.1 Defense-in-Depth Evaluation 
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18 3.2 Defense-in-Depth Review Results ......................................................
18 3.2.1 Required Modifications 
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19 3.2.2 Required Recovery Actions .......................................................
19 4.0 SAFETY MARGIN EVALUATION 
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20 4.1 Safety Margin Evaluation 
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20 4.1.1 Fire Modeling ............................................................................
20 4.1.2 Plant System Performance 
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20 4.2 Safety Margin Results ..........................................................................
21 5.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION RESULTS .............................................................
21 5.1 Dispositions of VFDRs ........................................................................
21 5.2 Fire Risk Evaluation Summary of Fire Protection Systems and Features 23 Revision 0 Page 2 of 25 Version 1.0 Page 2664 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-008 SE-C 051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-008 5.3 5.4 5.5 Summary of Recovery Actions .............................................................
23 Summary of Plant Modifications 
..........................................................
24 Fire Area Risk Summary ......................................................................
25 Revision 0 Page 3 of 25 Version 1.0 Page 2665 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-008 1.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION INPUT 1.1 Variances from the Deterministic Requirements The VFDRs identified for evaluation for Unit 2, Fire Area 2-008, Aux Building Cable Chase Room 2116 are: Table 1-1 VFDRs VFDR Component(s)
Description U2-2-008-IA-Q2B31V0061:CLOSE This component requires instrument air to perform its credited 001 D:OPEN/CLOSED, function.
Instrument air is assumed to be unavailable in this fire area PRESSURIZER because air loss paths have not been identified.
The normally closed POWER OPERATED PORV valve required to cycle to control RCS pressure transient.
Fire RELIEF VALVE induced damage to instrument air components may result in spuriously closing of the valves, and a challenge to the RCS Inventory and Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-008-SEP-N2B31 L10461 :AVAIL The indicator is normally available, required available at least one 001 ABLE:AVAILABLE, indicator from pressurizer level is required to provide process PRESSURIZER monitoring of RCS level. Fire induced cable result in failure to monitor LEVEL INDICATOR the RCS level, and a challenge to the process monitoring capability of LI-461 RCS Inventory and Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance (PROTECTION Criteria.CHANNEL III)U2-2-008-SEP-Q2B41PO001C:ON:O The pump is normally running required off. Fire induced cable 003 FF, RCP 2C damage can prevent ability to trip pump, and challenge the Reactor Inventory and Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-008-SEP-Q2N1 1 PV3371A:CL The valve is normally closed, required closed to control steam 004 OSED:CLOSED, generator pressure.
Fire induced cable damage can spuriously open MAIN STEAM valve and prevent the ability to control steam generator pressure, and ATMOS RELIEF challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-008-SEP-Q2N11PV3371B:CL The valve is normally closed, required closed to control steam 005 OSED:CLOSED, generator pressure.
Fire induced cable damage can spuriously open MAIN STEAM valve and prevent the ability to control steam generator pressure, and ATMOS RELIEF challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-008-SEP-Q2N11PV3371C:CL The valve is normally closed, required closed to control steam 006 OSED:CLOSED, generator pressure.
Fire induced cable damage can spuriously open MAIN STEAM valve and prevent the ability to control steam generator pressure, and ATMOS RELIEF challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-008-SEP-Q2N12HV3234A:OP The valve is normally open, required closed to prevent uncontrolled 007 EN:OPEN/CLOSED, steam loss. Fire induced cable damage may fail valve open, and TDAFWP STEAM challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance SUPPLY WARM-UP Criteria.ISOLATION U2-2-008-SEP-Q2P15SV3103:CLOS Q2P15SV3103 
-Pressurizer Liquid Solenoid Valve and 008 ED:OPEN/CLOSED, Q2P15SV3332 
-Pressurizer Liquid Sample Isolation Valve. These PRESSURIZER valves are normally closed, required closed to isolate Pressurizer LIQUID SAMPLE sample line. Fire induced cable damage to both valves may ISOLATION spuriously operate valve, and a challenge to the RCS Inventory and Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.Revision 0 Page 4 of 25 Revision 0 Page 4 of 25 Version 1.0 Page 2666 of 3726 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-008 Table 1-1 VFDRs VFDR Component(s)
Description U2-2-008-SEP-Q2P15SV3104:CLOS Q2P15SV3104 
-Pressurizer Steam Solenoid Valve and 009 ED:OPEN/CLOSED, Q2P15SV3331 
-Pressurizer Steam Sample Isolation Valve. These PRESSURIZER valves are normally closed, required closed to isolate Pressurizer STEAM SAMPLE sample line. Fire induced cable damage to both valves may ISOLATION spuriously operate valve, and a challenge to the RCS Inventory and Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-008-SEP-Q2P15SV3331:CLOS Q2P15SV3104 
-Pressurizer Steam Solenoid Valve and 010 ED:OPEN/CLOSED, Q2P15SV3331 
-Pressurizer Steam Sample Isolation Valve. These PRESSURIZER valves are normally closed, required closed to isolate Pressurizer STEAM TO GFFD sample line. Fire induced cable damage to both valves may ISOLATION spuriously operate valve, and a challenge to the RCS Inventory and Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-008-SEP-Q2P15SV3332:CLOS Q2P15SV3103 
-Pressurizer Liquid Solenoid Valve and 011 ED:OPEN/CLOSED, Q2P15SV3332 
-Pressurizer Liquid Sample Isolation Valve. These PRESSURIZER valves are normally closed, required closed to isolate Pressurizer LIQUID ISOLATION sample line. Fire induced cable damage to both valves may spuriously operate valve, and a challenge to the RCS Inventory and Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-008-SEP-Q2P15SV3333:CLOS Q2P15SV3765 
-Reactor Coolant Hot Leg Solenoid Valve and 012 ED:OPEN/CLOSED, Q2P15SV3333 
-Reactor Coolant Hot Leg Sample Isolation Solenoid.RX LOOPS 2 AND 3 These valves are normally closed, required closed to isolate hot leg SAMPLE ISOLATION sample line. Fire induced cable damage to both valves may SOLENOID spuriously operate valve, and a challenge to the RCS Inventory and Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-008-SEP-Q2P15SV3765:CLOS Q2P15SV3765 
-Reactor Coolant Hot Leg Solenoid Valve and 013 ED:OPEN/CLOSED, Q2P15SV3333 
-Reactor Coolant Hot Leg Sample Isolation Solenoid.RCS HOT LEG These valves are normally closed, required closed to isolate hot leg SAMPLE ISOLATION sample line. Fire induced cable damage to both valves may SOLENOID spuriously operate valve, and a challenge to the RCS Inventory and Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-008-SEP-N2B21TR0410:AVAI N2B21TR0410 (TE410) -RCS Cold Leg Temperature Recorder TR-014 LABLE- 410; N2B21TR0413 (TE413)- RCS Hot Leg Temperature Indicator TI-TE410:AVAILABLE-413. These RCS Loop 1 indicators are normally available, only one TE410, RCS COLD set of the indicators from credited Steam Generator RCS Loop is LEG required available to provide process monitoring of Decay Heat TEMPERATURE Removal Nuclear Performance Criteria.
Fire induced cable damage to RECORDER TR-410 component may result in failure to monitor the decay heat removal, and a challenge to the process monitoring capability of Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-008-SEP-N2B21TR0413:AVAI N2B21TR0410 (TE410) -RCS Cold Leg Temperature Recorder TR-015 LABLE- 410; N2B21TR0413 (TE413) -RCS Hot Leg Temperature Indicator TI-TE413:AVAILABLE-413. These RCS Loop 1 indicators are normally available, only one TE413, RCS HOT set of the indicators from credited Steam Generator RCS Loop is LEG required available to provide process monitoring of Decay Heat TEMPERATURE Removal Nuclear Performance Criteria.
Fire induced cable damage to RECORDER TR-413 component may result in failure to monitor the decay heat removal, and a challenge to the process monitoring capability of Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.Revision 0 Page 5of25 Revision 0 Page 5 of 25 Version 1.0 Page 2667 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-008 Table 1-1 VFDRs VFDR Component(s)
Description U2-2-008-SEP-N2B21TR0410:AVAI N2B21TR0410 (TE420) -RCS Cold Leg Temperature Recorder TR-016 LABLE- 410; N2B21TR0413 (TE423) -RCS Hot Leg Temperature Indicator TI-TE420:AVAILABLE-413. These RCS Loop 2 indicators are normally available, only one TE420, RCS COLD set of the indicators from credited Steam Generator RCS Loop is LEG required available to provide process monitoring of Decay Heat TEMPERATURE Removal Nuclear Performance Criteria.
Fire induced cable damage to RECORDER TR-410 component may result in failure to monitor the decay heat removal, and a challenge to the process monitoring capability of Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-008-SEP-N2B21TR0413:AVAI N2B21TR0410 (TE420) -RCS Cold Leg Temperature Recorder TR-017 LABLE- 410; N2B21TR0413 (TE423) -RCS Hot Leg Temperature Indicator TI-TE423:AVAILABLE-413. These RCS Loop 2 indicators are normally available, only one TE423, RCS HOT set of the indicators from credited Steam Generator RCS Loop is LEG required available to provide process monitoring of Decay Heat TEMPERATURE Removal Nuclear Performance Criteria.
Fire induced cable damage to RECORDER TR-413 component may result in failure to monitor the decay heat removal, and a challenge to the process monitoring capability of Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-008-SEP-N2B21TR0410:AVAI N2B21TR0410 (TE430) -RCS Cold Leg Temperature Recorder TR-018 LABLE- 410; N2B21TR0413 (TE433)- RCS Hot Leg Temperature Indicator TI-TE430:AVAILABLE-413. These RCS Loop 3 indicators are normally available, only one TE430, RCS COLD set of the indicators from credited Steam Generator RCS Loop is LEG required available to provide process monitoring of Decay Heat TEMPERATURE Removal Nuclear Performance Criteria.
Fire induced cable damage to RECORDER TR-410 component may result in failure to monitor the decay heat removal, and a challenge to the process monitoring capability of Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-008-SEP-N2B21TR0413:AVAI N2B21TR0410 (TE430) -RCS Cold Leg Temperature Recorder TR-019 LABLE- 410; N2B21TR0413 (TE433) -RCS Hot Leg Temperature Indicator TI-TE433:AVAILABLE-413. These RCS Loop 3 indicators are normally available, only one TE433, RCS HOT set of the indicators from credited Steam Generator RCS Loop is LEG required available to provide process monitoring of Decay Heat TEMPERATURE Removal Nuclear Performance Criteria.
Fire induced cable damage to RECORDER TR-413 component may result in failure to monitor the decay heat removal, and a challenge to the process monitoring capability of Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-008-SEP-Q2B31L0001A:ON/O The Heater is normally in standby, required off to prevent RCS 020 FF:OFF, pressure transients.
Fire induced cable damage and control power PRESSURIZER supply failure can prevent ability to trip heater, and a challenge to the HEATER GROUP 2A RCS Inventory and Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance DISTRIBUTION Criteria.PANEL U2-2-008-SEP-Q2E13PO001A:ON:O Q2E13POO01A 
-2A Containment Spray Pump and Q2E13V0005A 
-021 FF, 2A 2A CS Pump to Spray Header Isolation.
The pump is normally off, CONTAINMENT required off and valve is normally closed required closed to prevent SPRAY PUMP loss borated water source to sump. Fire induced cable damage to valve and failures of instruments generate a CSAS signal to spuriously start pump and open valve, and a challenge to the Reactivity Control and RCS Inventory and Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.Revision 0 Page 6 of 25 Version 1.0 Page 2668 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-008 Table 1-1 VFDRs VFDR Component(s)
Description U2-2-008-SEP-Q2E13V0005A:OPE Q2E13P0001A 
-2A Containment Spray Pump and Q2E13V0005A 
-022 N:CLOSED, 2A CS 2A CS Pump to Spray Header Isolation.
The pump is normally off, PUMP TO SPRAY required off and valve is normally closed required closed to prevent HEADER loss borated water source to sump. Fire induced cable damage to ISOLATION valve and failures of instruments generate a CSAS signal to spuriously start pump and open valve, and a challenge to the Reactivity Control and RCS Inventory and Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-008-SEP-Q2E21 P0002A:ON:O Q2E21 P0002A -2A Charging/HHSI Pump; Q2E21 P0002B -2B 023 N/OFF, 2A Charging/HHSI Pump Q2R41L0001B 
-125Vdc Distribution Panel 2B;CHARGING PUMP Q2R43E0001A 
-Sequencer Bus 2F. The pump is normally in Standby, required off, sequencer normally available, required available, and panel normally energized, required energized to turn off pump to prevent overcharging, and a challenge to the RCS Inventory and Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-008-SEP-Q2E21P0002B:ON:O Q2E21P0002A 
-2A Charging/HHSI Pump; Q2E21P0002B 
-2B 024 N/OFF-TRAIN A, 2B Charging/HHSI Pump Q2R41L0001B 
-125Vdc Distribution Panel 2B;CHARGING PUMP Q2R43E0001A 
-Sequencer Bus 2F. The pump is normally in Standby, required off; sequencer normally available, required available, and panel normally energized, required energized to turn off pump to prevent overcharging, and a challenge to the RCS Inventory and Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-008-SEP-Q2R41L0001B:ENER Q2E21P0002A 
-2A Charging/HHSI Pump; Q2E21P0002B 
-2B 025 GIZED:ENERGIZED, Charging/HHSI Pump Q2R41L0001B 
-125Vdc Distribution Panel 2B;125V DC Q2R43E0001A 
-Sequencer Bus 2F. The pump is normally in DISTRIBUTION Standby, required off, sequencer normally available, required PANEL 2B available, and panel normally energized, required energized to turn off pump to prevent overcharging, and a challenge to the RCS Inventory and Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-008-SEP-Q2R43E0001A:AVAI Q2E21P0002A 
-2A Charging/HHSI Pump; Q2E21P0002B 
-2B 026 LABLE:AVAILABLE-Charging/HHSI Pump Q2R41L0001B 
-125Vdc Distribution Panel 2B;SEQ/SHED, Q2R43EO001A 
-Sequencer Bus 2F. The pump is normally in SEQUENCER BUS Standby, required off, sequencer normally available, required 2F available, and panel normally energized, required energized to turn off pump to prevent overcharging, and a challenge to the RCS Inventory and Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-008-SEP-Q2E21V0016A:CLOS The valve is normally closed, required closed to prevent charging 027 ED:CLOSED, HHSI pump runout. Fire induced damage generates SIAS signal to cause TO RCS COLD LEG failure of charging pump, and a challenge to the Reactivity Control and ISOLATION RCS Inventory and Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-008-SEP-Q2E21V0257:OPEN:
The valve is normally open, required to open to maintain RCS 028 OPEN, CHARGING inventory.
Fire induced damage to instruments generate a spurious PUMPS TO REGEN SIAS signal to close the valve preventing ability to provide charging, HX and a challenge to the Reactivity and RCS Inventory and Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-008-SEP-Q2E21V0347:MODU The valve is normally modulated, required modulated to provide 029 LATED:MODULATE, makeup. Fire induced cable damage, instrument air components CHARGING FLOW failure and cascading power supply failures can prevent makeup, and CONTROL VALVE a challenge to the RCS Inventory and Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.Revision 0 Page 7 of 25 Revision 0 Page 7 of 25 Version 1.0 Page 2669 of 3726 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-008 Table 1-1 VFDRs VFDR Component(s)
Description U2-2-008-SEP-Q2E21V0376A:OPE Q2E21V0376A 
-VCT Outlet Isolation; Q2E21V0376B 
-VCT Outlet 030 N:OPEN, VCT Isolation.
The valves are normally open, required open to supply VCT OUTLET ISOLATION to charging pump. Fire induced damage to instruments generates a SIAS that can spuriously operate valves to cause failure of charging pump, and a challenge to the RCS Inventory and Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-008-SEP-Q2E21V0376B:OPE Q2E21V0376A 
-VCT Outlet Isolation; Q2E21V0376B 
-VCT Outlet 031 N:OPEN, VCT Isolation.
The valves are normally open, required open to supply VCT OUTLET ISOLATION to charging pump. Fire induced damage to instruments generates a SIAS that can spuriously operate valves to cause failure of charging pump, and a challenge to the RCS Inventory and Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-008-SEP-Q2E1 1 P0001A:OFF:
Q2E1 1 P0001A -2A RHR/LPSI Pump; Q2E1 1 P0001 B -2B RHR/LPSI 032 ON/OFF, 2A Pump; Q2R43E0001A 
-Sequencer Bus 2F. The pump is normally off, RHR/LHSI PUMP required off to prevent pump damage prior to transitioning to a NPO mode shutdown.
Fire induced damage generates a SIAS signal and /or damage to sequencer may spuriously start pump, and challenge the RCS Inventory and Pressure Control and Decay Heat Removal NPO Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-008-SEP-Q2E1 1 P0001 B:OFF: Q2E1 1 P0001A -2A RHR/LPSI Pump; Q2E1 1 P0001 B -2B RHR/LPSI 033 ON/OFF, 2B Pump; Q2R43EO001A 
-Sequencer Bus 2F. The pump is normally off, RHR/LHSI PUMP required off to prevent pump damage prior to transitioning to a NPO mode shutdown.
Fire induced damage generates a SIAS signal and /or damage to sequencer may spuriously start pump, and challenge the RCS Inventory and Pressure Control and Decay Heat Removal NPO Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-008-SEP-Q2R43EO001A:AVAI Q2E11P0001A 
-2A RHR/LPSI Pump; Q2E11P0001B 
-2B RHR/LPSI 034 LABLE:AVAILABLE-Pump; Q2R43EO001A 
-Sequencer Bus 2F. The pump is normally off, SEQ/SHED, required off to prevent pump damage prior to transitioning to a NPO SEQUENCER BUS mode shutdown.
Fire induced damage generates a SIAS signal and /2F or damage to sequencer may spuriously start pump, and challenge the RCS Inventory and Pressure Control and Decay Heat Removal NPO Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-008-SEP-N2C55NI0031A:AVAI N2C55NI0031A 
-Source Range Count Rate Indicator NI-31A and 035 LABLE:AVAILABLE, Q1R21L0001A 
-120V Vital AC Instrument Panel 2A; N2C55NI0032A SOURCE RANGE -Source Range Count Rate Indicator NI-32A and Q2R21L0001B 
-COUNT RATE 120V Vital AC Instrument Panel 2B. The indicator is normally INDICATOR NI-31A available, required available to monitor shutdown margin. Fire induced damage due to cascading power supply failures prevent the ability to monitor the achievement of adequate shutdown margin, and a challenge to the Reactivity Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-008-SEP-N2C55NI0032A:AVAI N2C55NI0031A 
-Source Range Count Rate Indicator NI-31A and 036 LABLE:AVAILABLE, Q1R21L0001A 
-120V Vital AC Instrument Panel 2A; N2C55NI0032A SOURCE RANGE -Source Range Count Rate Indicator NI-32A and Q2R21L0001B 
-COUNT RATE 120V Vital AC Instrument Panel 2B. The indicator is normally INDICATOR NI-32A available, required available to monitor shutdown margin. Fire induced damage due to cascading power supply failures prevent the ability to monitor the achievement of adequate shutdown margin, and a challenge to the Reactivity Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.Revision 0 Page 8 of 25 Version 1.0 Page 2670 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-008 Table 1-1 VFDRs VFDR Component(s)
Description U2-2-008-SEP-Q2R21LO001A:ENER Source Range Count Rate Indicator NI-31A and Q1R21L0001A 
-037 GIZED:ENERGIZED, 120V Vital AC Instrument Panel 2A; N2C55NI0032A 
-Source Range 120V VITAL AC Count Rate Indicator NI-32A and Q2R21L0001B 
-120V Vital AC INSTRUMENTATION Instrument Panel 2B. The indicator is normally available, required PANEL 2A -available to monitor shutdown margin. Fire induced damage due to N2C55NI0031A cascading power supply failures prevent the ability to monitor the achievement of adequate shutdown margin, and a challenge to the Reactivity Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-008-SEP-Q2R21L0001B:ENER N2C55NI0031A 
-Source Range Count Rate Indicator NI-31A and 038 GIZED:ENERGIZED, Q1R21L0001A 
-120V Vital AC Instrument Panel 2A; N2C55NI0032A 120V VITAL AC -Source Range Count Rate Indicator NI-32A and Q2R21L0001B 
-INSTRUMENTATION 120V Vital AC Instrument Panel 2B. The indicator is normally PANEL 2B available, required available to monitor shutdown margin. Fire induced damage due to cascading power supply failures prevent the ability to monitor the achievement of adequate shutdown margin, and a challenge to the Reactivity Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-008-SEP-Q2N11PV3371A:CL The valve is normally closed, required modulate to control steam 039 OSED:MODULATE, generator pressure.
Fire induced cable damage, instrument air MAIN STEAM components failures and cascading power supply failures prevent the ATMOS RELIEF ability to control steam generator pressure, and challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-008-SEP-Q2N1 1PV3371B:CL The valve is normally closed, required modulate to control steam 040 OSED:MODULATE, generator pressure.
Fire induced cable damage, instrument air MAIN STEAM components failures and cascading power supply failures prevent the ATMOS RELIEF ability to control steam generator pressure, and challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-008-SEP-Q2N11PV3371C:CL The valve is normally closed, required modulate to control steam 041 OSED:MODULATE, generator pressure.
Fire induced cable damage, instrument air MAIN STEAM components failures and cascading power supply failures prevent the ATMOS RELIEF ability to control steam generator pressure, and challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-008-SEP-Q2N12V0001A:CLO The valve is normally closed, required closed to prevent uncontrolled 042 SED:CLOSED, TDAFW supply to steam generator and overfill.
Fire induced cable TDAFP STEAM damage and cascading power failure can generate actuation signal SUPPLY ISOLATION that can spuriously operate valve, and challenge the Decay Heat VALVE HV3235A Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-008-SEP-Q2N12V0001B:CLO The valve is normally closed, required closed to prevent uncontrolled 043 SED:CLOSED, TDAFW supply to steam generator and overfill.
Fire induced cable TDAFP STEAM damage and cascading power failure can generate actuation signal SUPPLY ISOLATION that can spuriously operate valve, and challenge the Decay Heat VALVE HV3235B Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-008-SEP-Q2N23HV3228A:OP Q2N23P0002 
-TDAFW Pump; Q2N23HV3228A 
-TDAFW Supply to 044 EN:THROTTLED, Steam Generator 1A. The pump is normally off, required off; valve is TDAFW SUPPLY TO normally open required closed to prevent uncontrolled TDAFW supply STEAM to steam generator and overfill.
Fire induced cable damage and GENERATOR 1A instrument air components failures may prevent the ability to turn pump off or close valve, and challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.Revision 0 Page 9 of 25 Version 1.0 Page 2671 of 3726 SE-CO51326701 
-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-008 Table 1-1 VFDRs VFDR Component(s)
Description U2-2-008-SEP-Q2N23P0002:OFF:O Q2N23P0002 
-TDAFW Pump; Q2N23HV3228A 
-TDAFW Supply to 045 N/OFF, TURBINE Steam Generator 1A. The pump is normally off, required off; valve is DRIVEN AUX normally open required closed to prevent uncontrolled TDAFW supply FEEDWATER PUMP to steam generator and overfill.
Fire induced cable damage and instrument air components failures may prevent the ability to turn pump off or close valve, and challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-008-SEP-Q2N23HV3228B:OP Q2N23P0002 
-TDAFW Pump; Q2N23HV3228B 
-TDAFW Supply to 046 EN:THROTTLED, Steam Generator lB. The pump is normally off, required off; valve is TDAFW SUPPLY TO normally open required closed to prevent uncontrolled TDAFW supply STEAM to steam generator and overfill.
Fire induced cable damage and GENERATOR 1B instrument air components failures may prevent the ability to turn pump off or close valve, and challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-008-SEP-Q2N23P0002:OFF:O Q2N23P0002 
-TDAFW Pump; Q2N23HV3228B 
-TDAFW Supply to 047 N/OFF, TURBINE Steam Generator 1 B. The pump is normally off, required off; valve is DRIVEN AUX normally open required closed to prevent uncontrolled TDAFW supply FEEDWATER PUMP to steam generator and overfill.
Fire induced cable damage and instrument air components failures may prevent the ability to turn pump off or close valve, and challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-008-SEP-Q2N23HV3228C:OP Q2N23P0002 
-TDAFW Pump; Q2N23HV3228C 
-TDAFW Supply to 048 EN:THROTTLED, Steam Generator 1C. The pump is normally off, required off; valve is TDAFW SUPPLY TO normally open required closed to prevent uncontrolled TDAFW supply STEAM to steam generator and overfill.
Fire induced cable damage and GENERATOR 1C instrument air components failures may prevent the ability to turn pump off or close valve, and challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-008-SEP-Q2N23P0002:OFF:O Q2N23P0002 
-TDAFW Pump; Q2N23HV3228C 
-TDAFW Supply to 049 N/OFF, TURBINE Steam Generator 1C. The pump is normally off, required off; valve is DRIVEN AUX normally open required closed to prevent uncontrolled TDAFW supply FEEDWATER PUMP to steam generator and overfill.
Fire induced cable damage and instrument air components failures may prevent the ability to turn pump off or close valve, and challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.1.2 Fire Protection Systems and Features Fire Area 2-008 consists of Fire Zone: 2116 -Aux Building Cable Chase Room 2116 139'-0".Elevations 83'-0", 100'-0", 121'-0" and 1.2.1 Construction Barriers for this fire area are of substantial construction and have been designed and constructed to meet separation requirements.
In the event the configuration utilized is not in accordance with recognized standards, the deviations have been evaluated to be adequate for the hazard.1.2.2 Detection Fire detection systems to initiate plant suppression systems and/or provide notification to the Control Room are: Revision 0 Page 10 of 25 Version 1.0 Page 2672 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-008 a Fire Zone 2116 is provided with detection.
1.2.3 Fixed Fire Suppression Fixed fire suppression systems to aid in control of both fire growth and spread in the fire area are: Fire Zone 2116 is provided with suppression.
1.2.4 Manual Suppression Manual suppression equipment to be utilized by plant personmel and/or fire brigade members are:* Fire Area 2-008 is provided with fire hose cabinets located in Room 2185 (Fire Area 2-006) and Room 2319 (Fire Area 2-042).1.2.5 Ventilation (Smoke Removal)Portable smoke ejectors are available to assist with smoke removal.1.2.6 Other Fire Protection Features No additional fire protection features are required for this fire risk evaluation.
1.2.7 Fire Hazard Identification The major source of combustibles in Fire Area 2-008 is cable insulation.
Details regarding fire scenarios quantified in the fire PRA, and their associated ignition sources (where applicable) are discussed in Section 2.1.2.8 Fire PRA Input Fire protection features There are fire protection features specifically modeled in the Fire PRA as identified in the required plant modification section 2.2.4.Fire protection systems The Hot Gas Layer evaluation credits the detection, automatic fire suppression system and manual fire brigade response.
The Multi Compartment Analysis evaluation credits the detection and automatic fire suppression system.Hot Gas Layer Treatment This fire area screened for potential Hot Gas Layer effects on the Zone Of Influence.
Credit for detection was taken in the Hot Gas Layer evaluation for this fire area. Credit for both automatic fire suppression system and manual fire brigade response was taken in the Hot Gas Layer evaluation for this fire area.Revision 0 Page 11 of 25 Version 1.0 Page 2673 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-008 Multi-compartment analysis Credit for detection was taken in the Multi Compartment Analysis for this fire area. Credit for automatic fire suppression system was taken in the Multi Compartment Analysis for this fire area.Scenario Review All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0, ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency.
2.0 RISK EVALUATION 2.1 Fire PRA Variant Case Calculation Tables 2-1a and 2-1b provide the results of the variant case calculation for Fire Area 2-008. This is taken directly from the Fire PRA model with no changes or alterations made. The CDF and LERF results are provided on a scenario basis.The A CDF is above the screening criteria of lE-07/rx-yr and the A LERF is below the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-08/rx-yr, respectively.
However, the total plant delta CDF/LERF is below the RG 1.174 criteria of 1 E-05/rx-yr and 1 E-06/rx-yr, respectively.
The total fire area CDF and LERF is below the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr and IE-08/rx-yr, respectively.
The total fire area CDF/LERF can be used as a conservative estimate of the fire area delta CDF/LERF with respect to a compliant configuration.
No further analysis of the fire area delta CDF/LERF is required.Revision 0 Page 12 of 25 Version 1.0 Page 2674 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-008 Table 2-1a Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train A Alignment IGF CDF CEP LERF Zone Scen ScenDesc (Ir NSP SF CCDP yCLERPR)(/rx-yr) (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr)2-008-ADJ HGL HGL SCENARIO 5.OOE-07 1.0 1.0 8.79E-02 4.39E-08 7.13E-04 3.57E-10 2116 D1 TRANSIENT-100' 1.16E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 7.79E-12 1.61E-10 1.87E-15 ELEVATION 2116 D2 TRANSIENT-139 1.16E-05 1.0 1.0 6.35E-03 7.39E-08 6.55E-05 7.62E-10 ELEVATION Total CDF/LERF Fire PRA Variant Case 1.18E-07 1.12E-09 Table 2-1 b Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train B Alignment IGF CDF LERF Zone Scen ScenDesc IGF NSP SF CCDP CDr CLERP (IRr (Irx-yr) (Irx-yr) (Irx-yr)2-008-ADJ HGL HGL SCENARIO 5.00E-07 1.0 1.0 9.57E-02 4.79E-08 7.57E-04 3.78E-10 2116 D1 TRANSIENT-100 1.16E-05 1.0 1.0 2.08E-06 2.42E-11 1.61E-10 1.87E-15 ELEVATION 2116 D2 TRANSIENT-139' 1.16E-05 1.0 1.0 6.63E-03 7.71E-08 5.84E-05 6.79E-10 ELEVATION Total CDF/LERF Fire PRA Variant Case 1.25E-07 1.06E-09 Where: Zone = Fire Zone Scen = 'A' to signify the variant case ScenDesc = Description of the Fire Scenario IGF = Ignition Frequency 
(/rx-yr)NSP = Non Suppression Probability SF = Severity Factor CCDP = Conditional Core Damage Probability CDF = Core Damage Frequency 
(/rx-yr)CLERP = Conditional Large Early Release Probability LERF = Large Early Release Frequency 
(/rx-yr)Revision 0 Page 13 of 25 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-008 2.2 Compliant Case Calculation The following sub-sections provide the basis for modeling each VFDR (or category of VFDRs)and the alterations that have been made to the variant case to represent the compliant case. In each section a discussion of the VFDR (or the category of VFDRs) is provided.2.2.1 VFDRs Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA The following VFDRs are modeled in the Fire PRA and are therefore included in the total fire area CDF/LERF used as a surrogate for the delta risk evaluation for this fire area: " U2-2-008-IA-001-Q2B3 I V006 1:CLOSED:OPEN/CLOSED" U2-2-008-SEP-00 I -N2B331 L10461 :AVAILABLE:AVAILABLE" U2-2-008-SEP-003-Q2B41P0001C:ON:OFF" U2-2-008-SEP-004-Q2N 11 PV337 1 A:CLOSED:CLOSED" U2-2-008-SEP-005-Q2N 11PV337IB:CLOSED:CLOSED" U2-2-008-SEP-006-Q2NI PV337 1 C:CLOSED:CLOSED" U2-2-008-SEP-007-Q2N12HV3234A:OPEN:OPEN/CLOSED" U2-2-008-SEP-0 14- N2B2 1TR041 0:AVAILABLE-TE41 0:AVAILABLE-TE41 0" U2-2-008-SEP-016-N2B21TR0410:AVAILABLE-TE420:AVAILABLE-TE420" U2-2-008-SEP-0 18- N21B2 1 TR0410: AVAILABLE-TE430:AVAILABLE-TE430" U2-2-008-SEP-020-Q2B3IL0001A:ON/OFF:OFF" U2-2-008-SEP-02 1- Q2E I 3P000 IA:ON:OFF" U2-2-008-SEP-022-Q2EI3V0005A:OPEN:CLOSED" U2-2-008-SEP-023-Q2E21POO02A:ON:ON/OFF
* U2-2-008-SEP-024-Q2E2 1 P0002B:ON:ON/OFF-TRAIN A" U2-2-008-SEP-025-Q2R4 I LOOO I B: ENERGIZED:ENERGIZED" U2-2-008-SEP-026-Q2R43E000 I A:AVAILABLE:AVAILABLE-SEQ/SHED
* U2-2-008-SEP-027-Q2E21VO016A:CLOSED:CLOSED" U2-2-008-SEP-028-Q2E21 V0257:OPEN:OPEN" U2-2-008-SEP-029-Q2E2I V0347: MODULATED:MODULATE" U2-2-008-SEP-030-Q2E2 I V0376A:OPEN:OPEN" U2-2-008-SEP-03 I -Q2E2 1 V0376B:OPEN:OPEN" U2-2-008-SEP-032-Q2EI 1P0001A:OFF:ON/OFF" U2-2-008-SEP-033-Q2E 1 IP0001 B:OFF:ON/OFF" U2-2-008-SEP-034-Q2R43EOOOIA:AVAILABLE:AVAILABLE-SEQ/SHED" U2-2-008-SEP-039-Q2N 11PV3371A:CLOSED:MODULATE Revision 0 Page 14 of 25 Version 1.0 Page 2676 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-008" U2-2-008-SEP-040-Q2N I R PV337 B: CLOSED: MODULATE" U2-2-008-SEP-041-Q2N 1 IPV337 1 C:CLOSED:MODULATE" U2-2-008-SEP-042-Q2N12V00071 A:CLOSED:CLOSED" U2-2-008-SEP-043-Q2N 12V0001B:CLOSED:CLOSED" U2-2-008-SEP-044-Q2N23HV3228A:OPEN:THROTTLED Note that the PRA does not model the OPEN:THROTTLED function state for the HV 3228A valve, the throttled function state is used to model the control of flow from the TDAFW pump into the steam generator to prevent overfill and cause the steam supply to not be available to the TDAFW pump. The overfill of steam generator A will not impact the steam supply to the TDAFW pump based on steam generators B and C being the steam supply, therefore this function state is not modeled. However, based on the problem statement identified in the VFDR the concern is related to steam generator overfill.
The PRA models steam generator A overfill using the Q2N23HV3228A:OPEN:CLOSED, similarly for B and C the OPEN:CLOSED function state is also used to model overfill." U2-2-008-SEP-045-Q2N23P0002:OFF:ON/OFF" U2-2-008-SEP-046-Q2N23HV3 228B:OPEN:THROTTLED" U2-2-008-SEP-047-Q2N23P0002:OFF:ON/OFF" U2-2-008-SEP-048-Q2N23HV3228C:OPEN:THROTTLED" U2-2-008-SEP-049-Q2N23 P0002:OFF:
ON/OFF 2.2.2 VFDRs Not Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA A Fire PRA was developed in accordance with the requirements of Part 4 "Requirements for Fires at Power PRA" of the ASME and ANS combined PRA Standard, ASME/ANS RA-Sa-2009, "Standard for Level I/Large Early Release Frequency Probabilistic Risk Assessment for Nuclear Power Plant Applications".
Consistent with those requirements not all components required to meet the nuclear safety criteria need to be specifically modeled in the Fire PRA. The following VFDRs are associated with components not modeled in the Fire PRA: 2.2.2.1 VFDRs U2-2-008-SEP-008, 009, 010, 011, 012, 013 The sampling lines are normally isolated by manual valves. Manual valves are not impacted in the fire PRA and will therefore remain closed. For the cases where these manual valves are open, the flow rate that is passing through this system is negligible and can be excluded from the PRA. See Table A-I in PRA-BC-F-11-002, Equipment Selection calculation for FPRA and also FNP procedures, FNP- I -CCP-65 1.0 and FNP- 1 -CCP-652.0." U2-2-008-SEP-008-Q2P15SV3103:CLOSED:OPEN/CLOSED" U2-2-008-SEP-009-Q2P15SV3104:CLOSED:OPEN/CLOSED" U2-2-008-SEP-0 10- Q2P 1 5SV333 1:CLOSED:OPEN/CLOSED" U2-2-008-SEP-0 11- Q2P15SV3332:CLOSED:OPEN/CLOSED" U2-2-008-SEP-012-Q2P15SV3333:CLOSED:OPEN/CLOSED Revision 0 Page 15 of 25 Version 1.0 Page 2677 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-008* U2-2-008-SEP-013-Q2P15SV3765:CLOSED:OPEN/CLOSED 2.2.2.2 VFDRs U2-008-SEP-015, 017, 019 The NSCA credits the hot leg temperature recorder for monitoring of cool down. Hot Leg temperature is not a cue indication of operator actions credited in the fire PRA. Therefore, the loss of hot leg temperature recorder has no impact on the Fire PRA." U2-2-008-SEP-015-N2B21TRO413:AVAILABLE-TE413:AVAILABLE-TE413" U2-2-008-SEP-017-N2B21TRO413:AVAILABLE-TE423:AVAILABLE-TE423" U2-2-008-SEP-019-N2B21TRO413:AVAILABLE-TE433:AVAILABLE-TE433 2.2.2.3 VFDRs U2-008-SEP-035, 036, 037, 038 The loss of source range monitoring is associated with a reactor trip. The 24 hour mission time does not require neutron monitoring for boration to cold shutdown.
The fire PRA assumes a reactor trip in every scenario.* U2-2-008-SEP-035-N2C55NI0031A:AVAILABLE:AVAILABLE
* U2-2-008-SEP-036-N2C55NI0032A:AVAILABLE:AVAILABLE
* U2-2-008-SEP-037-Q2R21L,000 1 A:ENERGIZED:ENERGIZED
* U2-2-008-SEP-038-Q2R21L,000 1 B:ENERGIZED:ENERGIZED 2.2.3 Compliant Case Results The A CDF is above the screening criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr and the A LERF is below the screening acceptance criteria of IE-08/rx-yr, respectively.
However, the total plant delta CDF/LERF is below the RG 1. 174 criteria of 1 E-05/rx-yr and 1 E-06/rx-yr, respectively.
The total fire area CDF and LERF is below the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr and I E-08/rx-yr, respectively.
The total fire area CDF/LERF can be used as a conservative estimate of the fire area delta CDF/LERF with respect to a compliant configuration.
No fuirther analysis of the fire area delta CDF/LERF is required.2.2.4 Required Modifications The following modifications are required as a result of the risk evaluation for this fire area:* Require protection of cable 2VALA05 B to prevent fire damage* Install new trip device in panel Q2R42B0001A, breaker LA13 2.2.5 Required Recovery Actions The following recovery actions are required as a result of the risk evaluation for this fire area: Table 2-2 Required Recovery Actions Component ID Basic Event VFDR Description Q2B31V0061 
:CLOSED:OPEN/CLOSED OAB A 4 ------ H-F U2-2-008-1A-001 Operator action to align nitrogen to PORVs Revision 0 Page 16 of 25 Version 1.0 Page 2678 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-008 2.3 Risk Evaluation Results The A CDF is above the screening criteria of I E-07/rx-yr and the A LERF is below the screening acceptance criteria of l E-08/rx-yr, respectively.
However, the total plant delta CDF/LERF is below the RG 1.174 criteria of 1 E-05/rx-yr and 1 E-06/rx-yr, respectively.
All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0 ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency.
The following tables present the fire zone/scenario fire risk as well as the total fire risk for this fire area.Table 2-3a 1 FIRE AREA ACDF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN A ALIGNMENT Variant.-Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Copiant Compliant CCDP CDF CCDP CDF ACDF 2-008-ADJ/HGL 8.79E-02 4.39E-08 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 4.39E-08 2116/D1 6.69E-07 7.79E-12 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 7.79E-12 2116/D2 6.35E-03 7.39E-08 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 7.39E-08 Total CDF and delta CDF 2  1.18E-07 0.OOE+00 1.18E-07 1 _ N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.2_ Total ACDF includes the risk of recovery actions required to demonstrate the availability of a success path for the nuclear safety performance criteria.Table 2-3b 1 FIRE AREA ACDF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN B ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CCDP CDF CCDP CDF aCDF 2-008-ADJ/HGL 9.57E-02 4.79E-08 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 4.79E-08 2116/D1 2.08E-06 2.42E-11 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 2.42E-11 2116/D2 6.63E-03 7.71E-08 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 7.71E-08 Total CDF and delta CDF2 1.25E-07 0.OOE+00 1.25E-07-N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.2 -Total ACDF includes the risk of recovery actions required to demonstrate the availability of a success path for the nuclear safety performance criteria.Table 2-4a 1 FIRE AREA ALERF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN A ALIGNMENT Variant -Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Copiant Compliant CLERP LERF CLERP LERF ALERF 2-008-ADJ/HGL 7.13E-04 3.57E-10 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 3.57E-10 2116/D1 1.61E-10 1.87E-15 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 1.87E-15 2116/D2 6.55E-05 7.62E-10 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 7.62E-10 Total LERF and delta LERF2 1.12E-09 0.OOE+00 1.12E-09 1 _ N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.2 Total ALERF includes the risk of recovery actions required to demonstrate the availability of a success path for the nuclear safety performance criteria.Revision 0 Page 17 of25 Revision 0 Page 17 of 25 Version 1.0 Page 2679 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-008 Table 2-4b 1 FIRE AREA ALERF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN B ALIGNMENT Variant -Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Copiant Compliant CLERP LERF CLERP LERF ALERF 2-008-ADJ/HGL 7.57E-04 3.78E-10 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 3.78E-10 2116/D1 1.61E-10 1.87E-15 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 1.87E-15 2116/D2 5.84E-05 6.79E-10 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 6.79E-10 Total LERF and delta LERF2 1.06E-09 0.OOE+00 1.06E-09 1 _ N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.2 Total ALERF includes the risk of recovery actions required to demonstrate the availability of a success path for the nuclear safety performance criteria.3.0 DID EVALUATION 3.1 Defense-in-Depth Evaluation A review of the impact of the change on defense-in-depth (DID) was performed.
NFPA 805 defines DID as: " Preventing fires from starting" Rapidly detecting fires and controlling and extinguishing promptly those fires that do occur, thereby limiting damage" Providing adequate level of fire protection for structures, systems and components important to safety; so that a fire that is not promptly extinguished will not prevent essential plant safety functions from being performed.
In general, the DID requirement was considered satisfied if the proposed change does not result in a substantial imbalance among these elements (or echelons).
The review of DID was qualitative and addressed each of the elements with respect to the proposed change. Fire protection features and systems relied upon to ensure DID were identified in the assessment (e.g., detection, suppression system).The VFDRs and the associated Fire Area risk (CDF) and scenario consequences (CCDP values)were evaluated to identify general DID echelon imbalances.
Potential methods to balance the DID features were identified ensuring an adequate balance of DID features is maintained for the Fire Area. See Section 3.2 for the results of the evaluation.
3.2 Defense-in-Depth Review Results A review of defense in depth and risk evaluation results show that, given the systems and features specified in Table 3-1 and Section 2 respectively, risk acceptance criteria are met and that the balance of defense in depth is maintained.
However due to the transient fire scenario on the 139' elevation, it is deemed prudent to require detection and suppression systems to ensure prompt fire brigade response and to support execution of the required recovery action for risk.Modification to ensure availability of process monitoring in main control room is required for DID (See Table 3-2).These additional systems coupled with the other required features will provide additional assurances that any unknown weaknesses or uncertainties, such as HGL formation and Revision 0 Page 18 of 25 Version 1.0 Page 2680 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-008 uncontrolled fire development, will not adversely affect the ability to meet nuclear safety performance criteria.The table below summarizes how an adequate balance of DID is maintained.
Table 3-1 Defense-in-Depth Impact Review Discussion Method of Providing DID Echelon 1: Prevent fires from starting Combustible Control No change necessary to procedure(s) 
/guidance document(s).
1 Hot Work Control No change necessary to procedure(s) 
/guidance document(s).
Echelon 2: Rapidly detect, control and extinguish promptly those fires that do occur thereby limiting fire damage Detection System Detection system is installed and required.Automatic Fire Suppression Suppression system is installed and required.Portable Fire Extinguishers No portable extinguishers are available and not required.Hose stations and hydrants Fire hose cabinet(s) are available, but no enhancements required.located in the area(s)Pre-Fire Plan No change necessary to procedure(s) 
/guidance document(s).
Echelon 3: Provide adequate level of fire protection for systems and structures so that a fire will not prevent essential safety functions from being performed Walls, floors ceilings and structural No changes necessary to existing barriers.elements are rated or have been evaluated as adequate for the hazard.Openings in the fire barrier are rated No changes necessary to existing barrier openings.or have been evaluated as adequate for the hazard.Supplemental barriers (e.g., ERFBS, No supplemental barriers are installed and are not required.cable tray covers, etc.)Guidance provided to operations No VFDR related DID recovery actions required.personnel detailing the credited success path(s) including recovery actions to achieve nuclear safety performance criteria.1 This fire protection feature is relied upon without further DID enhancements beyond inherent programmatic requirements of NFPA 805, Chap. 3 and will not be reported in Table 5-2.3.2.1 Required Modifications Table 3-2 Required Modifications Problem Statement VFDR Proposed Modification N2B21TRO410 
-RCS COLD LEG U2-2-008-SEP-014 Provide Train B power to the temperature TEMPERATURE RECORDER TR-410: This U2-2-008-SEP-016 recorder to maintain RCS temperature temperature recorder is powered from U2-2-008-SEP-018 indication for Loop 2 when Train A power is Q2R21L0001 B, 120V VITAL AC not available.
INSTRUMENTATION PANEL 2B. Failure of Train A power to this recorder results in a loss of RCS hot-leg temperature indication for all 3 steam generator loops Revision 0 Page 19 of 25 Version 1.0 Page 2681 of 3726 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-008 Table 3-2 Required Modifications Problem Statement VFDR Proposed Modification N2B21TR0413 
-RCS HOT LEG U2-2-008-SEP-015 Provide Train B power to the temperature TEMPERATURE RECORDER TR-413: This U2-2-008-SEP-017 recorder to maintain RCS temperature temperature recorder is powered from U2-2-008-SEP-019 indication for Loop 2 when Train A power is Q2R21L0001A, 120V VITAL AC not available.
INSTRUMENTATION PANEL 2A. Failure of Train A power to this recorder results in a loss of RCS hot-leg temperature indication for all 3 steam generator loops 3.2.2 Required Recovery Actions There are no required recovery actions as a result of the DID evaluation for this fire area.4.0 SAFETY MARGIN EVALUATION 4.1 Safety Margin Evaluation In accordance with NEI 04-02, 5.3.5.3 guidance, the maintenance of adequate Safety Margin is assessed by the consideration of categories of analyses utilized by this fire risk evaluation (FRE).Safety margins are considered to be maintained if: " Codes and standards or their alternatives accepted for use by the NRC are met, and" Safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) are met, or provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty.
The maintenance of adequate safety margin for the change analysis is described for each of the specific analysis types used in support of the fire risk assessment.
4.1.1 Fire Modeling Fire modeling performed in support of the transition has been performed within the Fire PRA utilizing codes and standards developed by industry and NRC staff to provide realistic yet conservative results. Specifically, the heat release rates utilized in the transition analysis are based upon NUREG/CR 6850, Task 8, Scoping Fire Modeling.
These heat release rates are conservative and represent values used to screen out fixed ignition sources that do not pose a threat to the targets within specific fire compartments and to assign severity factors to unscreened fixed ignition sources.The combined analysis approach is used during transition; therefore, maximum expected fire scenario/limiting fire scenario have not been analyzed separately.
The bases for the application of these fire modeling codes and standards were not altered in support of this FRE.4.1.2 Plant System Performance Plant system performance parameters were not modified as a result of this FRE. These performance parameters were originally established to support nuclear performance criteria contained in the plant specific accident analyses.
These analyses established component and system performance criteria necessary to establish safe and stable plant operation, as well as, safe Revision 0 Page 20 of 25 Version 1.0 Page 2682 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-008 shut down of the unit in the event of a fire. These performance parameters were not modified as a result of this FRE.4.2 Safety Margin Results All analyses and assessment have been performed utilizing accepted techniques and industry accepted standards.
In addition, safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) have been considered and provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty.
As such, the Safety Margins are maintained as discussed in Section 4. 1.5.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION RESULTS 5.1 Dispositions of VFDRs Based on the FRE results contained in Sections 2, 3 and 4 the VFDRs identified in Section 1.1 have been resolved as follows: Table 5-1 Final Variance Disposition VFDR ID Disposition U2-2-008-IA-001 Recovery Action(s)
Required to Satisfy Risk Criteria:
See Table 2-2 U2-2-008-SEP-001 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action U2-2-008-SEP-003 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action U2-2-008-SEP-004 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action U2-2-008-SEP-005 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action U2-2-008-SEP-006 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action U2-2-008-SEP-007 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action U2-2-008-SEP-008 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)U2-2-008-SEP-009 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)U2-2-008-SEP-010 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)U2-2-008-SEP-01 1 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)U2-2-008-SEP-012 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)U2-2-008-SEP-013 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)U2-2-008-SEP-014 Modification required to satisfy DID Criteria (See Table 3-2)U2-2-008-SEP-015 Modification required to satisfy DID Criteria (See Table 3-2)U2-2-008-SEP-016 Modification required to satisfy DID Criteria (See Table 3-2)U2-2-008-SEP-017 Modification required to satisfy DID Criteria (See Table 3-2)U2-2-008-SEP-018 Modification required to satisfy DID Criteria (See Table 3-2)U2-2-008-SEP-019 Modification required to satisfy DID Criteria (See Table 3-2)U2-2-008-SEP-020 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Revision 0 Page 21 of 25 Version 1.0 Page 2683 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-008 SE-C051 326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-008 Table 5-1 VFDR ID U2-2-008-SEP-021 U2-2-008-SEP-022 U2-2-008-SEP-023 U2-2-008-SEP-024 U2-2-008-SEP-025 U2-2-008-SEP-026 U2-2-008-SEP-027 U2-2-008-SEP-028 U2-2-008-SEP-029 U2-2-008-SEP-030 U2-2-008-SEP-031 U2-2-008-SEP-032 U2-2-008-SEP-033 U2-2-008-SEP-034 U2-2-008-SEP-035 Table 5-1 Final Variance Disposition Disposition Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action U2-2-008-SEP-036 U2-2-008-SEP-037 U2-2-008-SEP-038 U2-2-008-SEP-039 U2-2-008-SEP-040 U2-2-008-SEP-041 U2-2-008-SEP-042 U2-2-008-SEP-043 U2-2-008-SEP-044 U2-2-008-SEP-045 U2-2-008-SEP-046 U2-2-008-SEP-047 U2-2-008-SEP-048 U2-2-008-SEP-049 Revision 0 Page 22 of 25 Version 1.0 Page 2684 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-008 5.2 Fire Risk Evaluation Summary of Fire Protection Systems and Features Table 5-2 Summary of Required Fire Protection Systems and Features Required Required Fire Area Fire Zone Suppression Detection Required Fire Protection Feature Required Fire Protection System and Feature Details System System (R, D)(R, D) (R, D)R -Improvements to procedures necessary to incorporate recovery actions required to meet risk criteria (See Table 2-2), Modification to provide fuse or other electrical isolation device at the DC shunt connection point and to replace trip device in panel Q2R42B0001A, breaker LA13;D -Modification to provide Train B power to the temperature recorder to maintain RCS temperature indication for Loop 2 when Train A power is not available R -Detection system, Suppression system;D -Detection system, Suppression system Required Suppression/Detection/Feature:
required in the Fire Area based on NFPA 805 Chapter 4 compliance.
The information is provided on a zone basis. The basis for the requirement of the fire protection system is designated as follows:* R -Risk Criteria:
Systems required to meet the Risk Criteria for the Performance-Based Approach (NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4)* D -Defense-in-depth Criteria:
Systems required to maintain adequate balance of Defense-in-Depth for a Performance-Based Approach (NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4)Fire Protection Features in this Table only refer to those features installed in the Fire Area that have a corresponding NFPA 805, Chapter 3 requirement.
5.3 Summary of Recovery Actions Table 5-3 -Recovery Actions Fire Area Component Component Description Actions PRESSURIZER POWER U2 2-008 Q2B31V0061 OPERATED RELIEF VALVE Operator action to align nitrogen to PORVs Revision 0 Page 23 of 25 Revision 0 Page 23 of 25 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-008 5.4 Summary of Plant Modifications Table 5-4 -Plant Modifications Item Unit Problem Statement Proposed Modification In FPRA Comp Risk Informed Characterization Measure 2VALA05 B- Provide fuse or other U2 Require protection of cables electrical isolation device at the DC Reduce risk due to fire induced failure by Require prection e shunt connection point for Yes Yes protecting cables preventing damage to 21to prevent fire damage component:
associated components.
Q2R42E0002A:A:A N2B21TR0410 
-RCS COLD Provide Train B power to the No Yes Provides DID by ensuring availability of LEG TEMPERATURE temperature recorder to maintain process monitoring in main control room.RECORDER TR-410: This RCS temperature indication for temperature recorder is Loop 2 when Train A power is not powered from available.
U2 Q2R21L0001B, 120V VITAL 008-2 AC INSTRUMENTATION PANEL 2B. Failure of Train A power to this recorder results in a loss of RCS hot-leg temperature indication for all 3 steam generator loops N2B21TR0413 
-RCS HOT Provide Train B power to the No Yes Provides DID by ensuring availability of LEG TEMPERATURE temperature recorder to maintain process monitoring in main control room.RECORDER TR-413: This RCS temperature indication for temperature recorder is Loop 2 when Train A power is not powered from available.
U2 Q2R21L0001A, 120V VITAL 008-3 AC INSTRUMENTATION PANEL 2A. Failure of Train A power to this recorder results in a loss of RCS hot-leg temperature indication for all 3 steam generator loops Reduce risk due to fire induced failure by U2 Rpbreaker coordination of Replace trip device in panel Yes Yes modifying the circuit breaker and 008-4 supply and load breakers Q2R42B0001A, breaker LA13 preventing damage to downstream components.
Revision 0 Page 24 of 25 Revision 0 Page 24 of 25 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-008 SE-C051 326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-008 5.5 Fire Area Risk Summary Fire Area U2 2-008 Area Description Aux Building Cable Chase Room 2116 NFPA 805 Basis 4.2.4 Table 5-5 -Fire Area Risk Summary Fire Area CDF/LERF VFDR (Yes/No) ('1.21 E-07/1.09E-09 Yes RAs Yes/No)Yes Fire Risk Eval A CDF/LERF 1.21 E-07/1.09E-09 Additional Risk of RAs 1.21 E-07/1.09E-09 Revision 0 Page 25 of 25 Revision 0 Page 25 of 25 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-009 Attachment 
-Unit 2 Fire Area 2-009 FRE for Fire Area Aux Building Cable Chase Rooms 2117 & 2246 Revision:
1 Name Fire PRA Preparer Fire PRA Reviewer Fire Protection Preparer Fire Protection Reviewer NSCA Preparer NSCA Reviewer FRE Preparer FRE Reviewer Jonathan Hedrick Clint Pierce Robert Kirkpatrick Rebecca Puckett Larry Valmonte Dan Funk Micky Heatherly Brandon Jamar Revision I Page 1 of 29 Revision 1 Page 1 of 29 Version 1.0 Page 2688 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-009 1.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION INPUT .....................................................................
4 1.1 Variances from the Deterministic Requirements 
....................................
4 1.2 Fire Protection Systems and Features ..................................................
9 1.2.1 Construction 
.................................................................................
9 1.2 .2 D etectio n ................................................................................... 
..9 1.2.3 Fixed Fire Suppression 
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9 1.2.4 Manual Suppression 
...................................................................
9 1.2.5 Ventilation (Smoke Removal) ......................................................
9 1.2.6 Other Fire Protection Features ....................................................
9 1.2.7 Fire Hazard Identification 
..........................................................
10 1.2.8 Fire PRA Input ..........................................................................
10 2.0 RISK EVALUATION 
.......................................................................................
10 2.1 Fire PRA Variant Case Calculation 
......................................................
10 2.2 Compliant Case Calculation 
.................................................................
12 2.2.1 VFDRs Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA ............................
12 2.2.2 VFDRs Not Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA .....................
19 2.2.3 Compliant Case Results ...........................................................
20 2.2.4 Required Modifications 
.............................................................
22 2.2.5 Required Recovery Actions ......................................................
22 2.3 Risk Evaluation Results ........................................................................
22 3.0 DID EVALUATION 
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24 3.1 Defense-in-Depth Evaluation 
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24 3.2 Defense-in-Depth Review Results ......................................................
24 3.2.1 Required Modifications 
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25 3.2.2 Required Recovery Actions ......................................................
25 4.0 SAFETY MARGIN EVALUATION 
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26 4.1 Safety Margin Evaluation 
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26 4.1.1 Fire Modeling ............................................................................
26 4.1.2 Plant System Performance 
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26 4.2 Safety Margin Results ..........................................................................
26 5.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION RESULTS ............................................................
27 5.1 Dispositions of VFDRs ........................................................................
27 5.2 Fire Risk Evaluation Summary of Fire Protection Systems and Features 28 Revision 1 Page 2 of 29 Version 1.0 Page 2689 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
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-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-009 5.3 5.4 5.5 Summary of Recovery Actions .............................................................
28 Summary of Plant Modifications 
..........................................................
29 Fire Area Risk Summary ......................................................................
29 Revision 1 Page 3 of 29 Version 1.0 Page 2690 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-009 1.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION INPUT 1.1 Variances from the Deterministic Requirements The VFDRs identified for evaluation for Unit 2, Fire Area 2-009, Aux Building Cable Chase Rooms 2117 & 2246 are: Table 1-1 VFDRs VFDR Component(s)
Description U2-2-009-Q2R15A0006:ENER Power is required to be available at the vital AC Buses in order to ASSO-001 GIZED:ENERGIZED-provide electrical support to various safe shutdown components.
The EDG1-2A, 4160V offsite power supplies to Bus 2F cannot be guaranteed to be available SWITCHGEAR BUS because of a loss of overcurrent protection at the Start Up 2F Transformer Supply. The Diesel Generator supply may not remain available due a potential loss of coordination.
A fault on the cited cable coupled with a loss of control power to the respective load breaker, could lead to an ultimate loss of Bus 2F. Failure to establish electrical power at Bus 2F challenges all Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-009-Q2R16B0002:ENER A fault on this power cable, concurrent with a loss of control power to ASSO-002 GIZED:ENERGIZED-the associated breaker, could cause the Load Center 2A Supply LC2D, 600V LOAD Breaker to trip. This is an associated circuits issue, that concerns CENTER 2A availability of Load Center 2A. This Load Center provides power to NORMAL- Pressurizer Heater Group 2A, which can be relied upon to provide EMERGENCY positive control of RCS Pressure if operational.
Failure to ensure availability of this load center challenges the RCS Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-2-009-BC-Q2B31LO001B:ON/O This safe shutdown component requires AC or DC power to perform 001 FF:ON/OFF, its safe shutdown function.
Ultimately Battery 2B supplies the DC bus PRESSURIZER that provides power to the component (Either through an inverter in HEATER GROUP 2B the case of Vital AC power, or 125V DC control power). The battery DISTRIBUTION charger(s) to this bus is not available in this Fire Area. In order to PANEL avoid inadvertent RCS Pressure Transients Heater Group B is desired off. A loss of control power to the Heater Group from 125V DC Panel 2E would prevent remote tripping of the load. This failure challenges the RCS Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-2-009-BC-N2B31 PT0445:AVAIL This safe shutdown component requires AC or DC power to perform 002 ABLE:AVAILABLE, its safe shutdown function.
Ultimately Battery 2B supplies the DC bus SAFETY INJECTION that provides power to the component (Either through an inverter in PRESSURIZER the case of Vital AC power, or 125V DC control power). The battery TANK PRESSURE charger(s) to this bus is not available in this Fire Area. The TRANSMITTER Pressurizer Power Relief Valve is required to cycle in order to de-pressurize the RCS System. A loss of the pressurizer control signal from PT445 could prevent re-closure of the valve once the auto-open feature has been actuated.
PT445 suffers a loss of AC Power in this fire area, and cannot be relied upon to remain non-spurious.
An inability to cycle the Pressurizer Power Relief Valve challenges the RCS Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
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-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-009 Table 1-1 VFDRs VFDR Component(s)
Description U2-2-009-BC-Q2E13PT0953:AVAI This safe shutdown component requires AC or DC power to perform 003 LABLE:AVAILABLE, its safe shutdown function.
Ultimately Battery 2B supplies the DC bus CONTAINMENT that provides power to the component (Either through an inverter in PRESSURE the case of Vital AC power, or 125V DC control power). The battery TRANSMITTER charger(s) to this bus is not available in this Fire Area. A loss of AC PROTECTION power to the transmitter PT953 could initiate a spurious Containment CHANNEL IV Hi-Hi signal. A spurious SIAS Signal could result in spurious isolation of the charging injection path, due to closure of Valves 8107 and 8108, and a failure to establish a charging injection path. Failure to establish a charging path challenges the RCS Inventory/Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.
This will not happen until the Battery Endurance time has been exhausted.
This failure challenges the RCS Pressure/Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-009-BC-Q2E13PT0952:AVAI This safe shutdown component requires AC or DC power to perform 004 LABLE:AVAILABLE, its safe shutdown function.
Ultimately Battery 2B supplies the DC bus CONTAINMENT that provides power to the component (Either through an inverter in PRESSURE the case of Vital AC power, or 125V DC control power). The battery TRANSMITTER charger(s) to this bus is not available in this Fire Area. A loss of AC PROTECTION power to the transmitter PT952 could initiate a spurious Containment CHANNEL III Hi-Hi signal. A spurious SIAS Signal could result in spurious isolation of the charging injection path, due to closure of Valves 8107 and 8108, and a failure to establish a charging injection path. Failure to establish a charging path challenges the RCS Inventory/Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.
This will not happen until the Battery Endurance time has been exhausted.
This failure challenges the RCS Pressure/Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-009-BC-Q2E21P0002C:ON:O This safe shutdown component requires AC or DC power to perform 005 N/OFF, 2C its safe shutdown function.
Ultimately Battery 2B supplies the DC bus CHARGING PUMP that provides power to the component (Either through an inverter in the case of Vital AC power, or 125V DC control power). The battery charger(s) to this bus is not available in this Fire Area. A loss of power to charging pump 2C could result in an inability to trip the pump and a potential overcharging scenario.
This failure challenges the RCS Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-009-BC-Q2N1 1PT0475:AVAI This safe shutdown component requires AC or DC power to perform 006 LABLE:AVAILABLE, its safe shutdown function.
Ultimately Battery 2B supplies the DC bus STEAM that provides power to the component (Either through an inverter in GENERATOR 2A the case of Vital AC power, or 125V DC control power). The battery DISCHARGE charger(s) to this bus is not available in this Fire Area. A loss of AC PRESSURE power to the transmitter PT475 could initiate a spurious SIAS signal.This will not happen until the Battery Endurance time has been exhausted.
A spurious SIAS could cause permanent RHR Pump Damage by spuriously starting the pump. The RHR system is required to provide decay heat removal in support of cold shutdown.
These failures challenge the long term Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.Revision 1 Page 5 of 29 Version 1.0 Page 2692 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-009 Table 1-1 VFDRs VFDR Component(s)
Description U2-2-009-BC-Q2N11PT0485:AVAI This safe shutdown component requires AC or DC power to perform 007 LABLE:AVAILABLE, its safe shutdown function.
Ultimately Battery 2B supplies the DC bus STEAM that provides power to the component (Either through an inverter in GENERATOR 2B the case of Vital AC power, or 125V DC control power). The battery DISCHARGE charger(s) to this bus is not available in this Fire Area. A loss of AC PRESSURE power to the transmitter PT485 could initiate a spurious SIAS signal.This will not happen until the Battery Endurance time has been exhausted.
A spurious SIAS could cause permanent RHR Pump Damage by spuriously starting the pump. The RHR system is required to provide decay heat removal in support of cold shutdown.
These failures challenge the long term Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-009-BC-Q2N23HV3227B:OP This safe shutdown component requires AC or DC power to perform 008 EN:THROTTLED, its safe shutdown function.
Ultimately Battery 2B supplies the DC bus AFW SUPPLY TO that provides power to the component (Either through an inverter in STEAM the case of Vital AC power, or 125V DC control power). The battery GENERATOR 1B charger(s) to this bus is not available in this Fire Area. Decay Heat Removal via SG2B is desired in this area, via MDAFW Pump 2B. In order to control feedwater flow to SG2B, either the Flow control Valve HV3227B must be throttled, or MOVs V0025A and V0025B (MOV3764B and 3764D) must be throttled (Either one). A loss of DC power to panel 2D occurs once the endurance time of Battery 2B is exhausted and this prevents operator ability to unlatch relays MR4 or MR9, which would cause valve HV3227B to fail in the open position.These failures will prevent the ability to control feedwater flow to SG 2B, thereby challenging the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-2-009-Q2R42BO001B:ENE This component, 125V DC Bus 2B, requires HVAC support to remain HVAC-001 RGIZED:ENERGIZE functional.
Failure to provide HVAC support to this electrical D-BC2B, 125V DC component could challenge various Nuclear Safety Performance BUS 2B Criteria.U2-2-009-Q2R42E0002B:AVAI This component, Battery 2B, requires HVAC support to remain HVAC-002 LABLE:AVAILABLE, functional.
Failure to provide HVAC support to this electrical 125V BATTERY 2B component could challenge various Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-009-SEP-N2P11VO901:MODU The Condensate Storage Tank is required to supply feedwater to the 001 LATED:CLOSED, AFW Pumps in order to remove Decay Heat. Fire induced control SJAE BYPASS FCV Circuit damage to Valve N2P1 1V0901 could result in diversion of CST inventory to a non-credited path. This failure challenges the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-2-009-SEP-N2P1 1V0902:MODU The Condensate Storage Tank is required to supply feedwater to the 002 LATED:CLOSED, GS AFW Pumps in order to remove Decay Heat. Fire induced control CONDENSATE Circuit damage to Valve N2P1 1V0902 could result in diversion of CST BYPASS FCV inventory to a non-credited path. This failure challenges the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-2-009-SEP-N2P19V0077:OPEN:
Valve HV3825 is required open in order to supply containment 003 OPEN, instrument air to various safe shutdown AOVs in containment (e.g INSTRUMENT AIR PORVs/Aux Spray). Fire induced control circuit damage could result TO PENETRATION in spurious closure of this valve, thereby eliminating the instrument air ROOM ISOLATION supply. Positive control of these AOVs is required to maintain appropriate RCS conditions.
A failure to supply these valves with containment instrument air challenges the RCS Inventory/Pressure Performance Criteria.Revision 1 Page 6 of 29 Version 1.0 Page 2693 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-009 Table 1-1 VFDRs VFDR Component(s)
Description U2-2-009-SEP-Q2B31V0061:CLOSE The pressurizer PORV is required to isolate the Pressurizer from the 004 D:OPEN/CLOSED, RCS in order to prevent inadvertent de-pressurization.
Fire induced PRESSURIZER control circuit damage could spuriously open the PORV, thereby POWER OPERATED leading to a de-pressurization condition.
Failure to secure the RELIEF VALVE pressurizer challenges the RCS Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-2-009-SEP-Q2B41 P0001 B:ON:O The Reactor Coolant Pumps circulate RCS Coolant though the 005 FF, RCP 2B primary side, in order to transfer decay heat. In order to achieve a controlled natural circulation cooldown, the Reactor Coolant Pumps are desired to be off. Fire induced circuit failure may spuriously start Reactor Coolant Pump 2B, and/or prevent tripping capability from the control room. Failure to trip Reactor Coolant Pump 2B challenges the RCS Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-2-009-SEP-Q2E21V0245:CLOSE Aux-Spray should be isolated in order to prevent inadvertent de-006 D:CLOSED, RCS pressurization of the RCS System. Valve V245 supplies the PRESSURIZER AUX pressurizer with charging inventory for Aux-Spray.
Fire induced control SPRAY cable damage could spuriously open this valve, thereby spraying the pressurizer with charging inventory, and leading to uncontrolled RCS de-pressurization.
A failure to isolate this charging supply challenges the RCS Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-2-009-SEP-Q2E21V0258:CLOSE A Charging Path is necessary in order to establish RCS Inventory 007 D:OPEN, Makeup. Valve V258 isolates the charging supply from the letdown CHARGING PUMPS heat exchanger.
In order to establish a charging path this valve must TO REGEN HX remain open. Fire induced circuit failure could result in spurious closure of this valve. Failure to establish a charging path challenges the RCS Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-2-009-SEP-Q2E21V0376B:OPE The charging pumps are initially aligned to the VCT to receive suction.008 N:OPEN, VCT Fire induced control circuit damage could cause the outlet valve OUTLET ISOLATION LCV01 15E to close. The VCT outlet valve must remain open until swap over to the RWST is guaranteed.
Furthermore, spurious SIAS is credible due to a loss of AC power, however it may not occur until the battery (2A and 2B) endurance time is exceeded. (Battery Chargers are not available)
Failure to correctly swap over suction to the RWST challenges the RCS Inventory/Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-009-SEP-Q2N23HV3228A:OP Feedwater Flow via SG 2A needs to be isolated in this fire area, since 009 EN:THROTTLED, it is not credited.
Fire induced control circuit damage could result in TDAFW SUPPLY TO valve HV3228A spuriously opening, thereby admitting feedwater to STEAM SG2A via the TDAFW Pump. Furthermore, the TDAFW Pump could GENERATOR 2A spuriously start due to its steam admission valves spuriously opening.Decay Heat Removal via SG 2B is desired in this area. An inability to isolate AFW flow to SG 2A will pose a challenge to the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-2-009-SEP-Q2N23HV3228C:OP Feedwater Flow via SG 2C needs to be isolated in this fire area, since 010 EN:THROTTLED, it is not credited.
Fire induced control circuit damage could result in TDAFW SUPPLY TO valve HV3228C spuriously opening, thereby admitting feedwater to STEAM SG2C via the TDAFW Pump. Furthermore, the TDAFW Pump could GENERATOR 2C spuriously start due to its steam admission valves spuriously opening.Decay Heat Removal via SG 2B is desired in this area. An inability to isolate AFW flow to SG 2C will pose a challenge to the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
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-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-009 Table 1-1 VFDRs VFDR Component(s)
Description U2-2-009-SEP-Q2B13HV0003:CLO The Reactor Vessel Head Vent Valves isolate the Reactor vessel from 011 SED:CLOSED, the pressurizer relief tank. Spurious opening of Q2B13HV0003 or REACTOR VESSEL Q2B1 3HV0004 due fire induced circuit failure could cause a loss of HEAD VENT RCS inventory through the open reactor head vent path. This failure poses a challenge to the RCS Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-2-009-SEP-N2B31 PT0445:AVAIL The Pressurizer Power Relief Valve is required to cycle in order to de-012 ABLE:AVAILABLE, pressurize the RCS System. A loss of the pressurizer control signal SAFETY INJECTION from PT445 could prevent re-closure of the valve once the auto-open PRESSURIZER feature has been actuated.
PT445 suffers fire induced cable damage TANK PRESSURE in this fire area, and cannot be relied upon to remain non-spurious.
An TRANSMITTER inability to cycle the Pressurizer Power Relief Valve challenges the RCS Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-2-009-SEP-Q2B31V0027B:OPE The PORV or the PORV block valve must close/remain closed in 013 N:OPEN/CLOSED, order to isolate the pressurizer system. A loss of power to the PORV BLOCK Pressurizer PORV block valve would prevent closure of this normally VALVE open MOV. The valve control circuit remains free from fire damage.Failure to secure the Pressurizer challenges the RCS Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-2-009-SEP-Q2E13P0001B:ON:O The RWST is the credited source of suction for Charging.
Inadvertent 014 FF, 2B draindown of the RWST due to spurious opening of the containment CONTAINMENT spray header valves/or spurious start of the CS Pump could lead to SPRAY PUMP draindown.
Fire induced control circuit damage to the Pump 2B and the CS Header valve 8820B could lead to draindown.
Failure to secure CS Pump 2B or isolate the header path challenges the RCS Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-2-009-SEP-Q2N23HV3227B:OP Decay Heat Removal via SG2B is desired in this area, via MDAFW 015 EN:THROTTLED, Pump 2B. In order to control feedwater flow to SG2B, either the Flow AFW SUPPLY TO control Valve HV3227B must be throttled, or MOVs V0025A and STEAM V0025B (MOV3764B and 3764D) must be throttled (Either one). All GENERATOR 2B three valves suffer fire induced control circuit damage in this area that would disable throttling capability.
All of these valves however, will fail in the open position due to fire induced control circuit damage. These failures will prevent the ability to control feedwater flow to SG 2B, thereby challenging the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-2-009-SEP-N2P19V0080:OPEN:
Valve HV3885 is required open in order to supply containment 016 OPEN, instrument air to various safe shutdown AOVs in containment (e.g INSTRUMENT AIR PORVs/Aux Spray). Fire induced control circuit damage could result TO PENETRATION in spurious closure of this valve, thereby eliminating the instrument air ROOM ISOLATION supply. Furthermore, a loss of power to 125V DC Distribution Panel 2D and BOP Cabinet K will also cause this valve to fail in the closed position.
Positive control of these AOVs is required to maintain appropriate RCS conditions.
A failure to supply these valves with containment instrument air challenges the RCS Inventory/Pressure Performance Criteria.Revision I Page 8 of 29 Revision 1 Page 8 of 29 Version 1.0 Page 2695 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-009 Table 1-1 VFDRs VFDR Component(s)
Description U2-2-009-SEP-Q2E11P0001B:OFF:
The RHR system is required to provide decay heat removal in support 017 ON/OFF, 2B of cold shutdown.
Therefore, it should remain available for use during RHR/LHSI PUMP these cold shutdown operations.
Spurious Start of the RHR Pump along due to control circuit damage coupled with spurious closure of the RHR Pump 2B Miniflow valve also due to control circuit damage would prevent recirculation of RHR flow, thereby leading to a potential damage concern for the pump. The RHR Pump could also start upon a spurious load sequencing signal which is credible in this fire area.These failures challenge the long term Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.1.2 Fire Protection Systems and Features Fire Area 2-009 consists of the following Fire Zones: E 2117 -Cable Chase -EL 83'-0", 100'-0", 121 '-0" and 139'-0" 0 2246 -Cable Chase -EL 121 '-0" and 139'-0" 1.2.1 Construction Barriers for this fire area are of substantial construction and have been designed and constructed to meet separation requirements.
In the event the configuration utilized is not in accordance with recognized standards, the deviations have been evaluated to be adequate for the hazard.1.2.2 Detection Fire detection systems to provide notification to the Control Room are:* Fire Zones 2117 and 2246 are provided with detection 1.2.3 Fixed Fire Suppression Fixed fire suppression systems to aid in control of both fire growth and spread in the fire area are:* Fire Zones 2117 and 2246 are provided with suppression.
1.2.4 Manual Suppression Manual suppression equipment to be utilized by plant personnel and/or fire brigade members are:* Fire Area 2-009 is provided with fire hose cabinets located in rooms 2185 (Fire Area 2-006) and 2319 (Fire Area 2-042).1.2.5 Ventilation (Smoke Removal)Portable smoke ejectors are available to assist with smoke removal.1.2.6 Other Fire Protection Features No additional fire protection features are required for this fire risk evaluation.
Revision 1 Page 9 of 29 Version 1.0 Page 2696 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-009 1.2.7 Fire Hazard Identification The major sources of combustibles in Fire Area 2-009 is cable insulation.
Details regarding fire scenarios quantified in the fire PRA, and their associated ignition sources (where applicable) are discussed in Section 2.1.2.8 Fire PRA Input Fire protection features There are fire protection features specifically modeled in the Fire PRA as identified in the required plant modification section 2.2.4.Fire protection systems The Hot Gas Layer evaluation credits the detection, automatic fire suppression system and manual fire brigade response.
The Multi Compartment Analysis evaluation credits the detection and automatic fire suppression system.Hot Gas Layer Treatment This fire area screened for potential Hot Gas Layer effects on the Zone Of Influence.
Credit for detection was taken in the Hot Gas Layer evaluation for this fire area. Credit for both automatic fire suppression system and manual fire brigade response was taken in the Hot Gas Layer evaluation for this fire area.Multi-compartment analysis Credit for detection was taken in the Multi Compartment Analysis for this fire area. Credit for automatic fire suppression system was taken in the Multi Compartment Analysis for this fire area.Scenario Review All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0, ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency.
2.0 RISK EVALUATION 2.1 Fire PRA Variant Case Calculation Tables 2-1 a and 2-1 b provide the results of the variant case calculation for Fire Area 2-009. This is taken directly from the Fire PRA model with no changes or alterations made. The CDF and LERF results are provided on a scenario basis.Revision 1 Page 10 of 29 Version 1.0 Page 2697 of 3726 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-009 Table 2-1a Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train A Alignment IGF CDF LERF Zone Scen ScenDesc Ixy NSP SF CCDP (-y CLERP (Irr (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr)2-009-ADJ HGL HGL SCENARIO 2.78E-07 1.0 1.0 7.04E-02 1.96E-08 5.18E-04 1.44E-10 2117 D1 TRANSIENT-100 6.46E-06 1.0 1.0 5.85E-06 3.78E-11 1.66E-09 1.07E-14 ELEVATION 2117 D2 TRANISENT-139 6.46E-06 1.0 1.0 4.24E-02 2.74E-07 2.18E-04 1.41E-09 ELEVATION 2246 D1 TRANSIENT 2.33E-06 1.0 1.0 9.22E-01 2.15E-06 4.00E-02 9.34E-08 Total CDF/LERF Fire PRA Variant Case 2.44E-06 9.49E-08 Table 2-1 b Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train B Alignment IGF CDF LERF Zone Scen ScenDesc Ir) NSP SF CCDP (xy CLERP (F (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr)2-009-ADJ HGL HGL SCENARIO 2.78E-07 1.0 1.0 6.35E-02 1.77E-08 4.75E-04 1.32E-10 2117 D1 TRANSIENT-100 6.46E-06 1.0 1.0 6.27E-06 4.05E-11 1.66E-09 1.07E-14 ELEVATION 2117 D2 TRANISENT-139' 6.46E-06 1.0 1.0 4.02E-02 2.60E-07 2.12E-04 1.37E-09 ELEVATION 2246 D1 TRANSIENT 2.33E-06 1.0 1.0 9.22E-01 2.15E-06 4.OOE-02 9.34E-08 Total CDF/LERF Fire PRA Variant Case 2.43E-06 9.49E-08 Where: Zone = Fire Zone Scen = 'A' to signify the variant case ScenDesc = Description of the Fire Scenario IGF = Ignition Frequency (Irx-yr)NSP = Non Suppression Probability SF = Severity Factor CCDP = Conditional Core Damage Probability CDF = Core Damage Frequency 
(/rx-yr)CLERP = Conditional Large Early Release Probability LERF = Large Early Release Frequency 
(/rx-yr)Revision 1 Page 11 of 29 Revision I Page I I of 29 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-009 2.2 Compliant Case Calculation The following sub-sections provide the basis for modeling each VFDR (or category of VFDRs)and the alterations that have been made to the variant case to represent the compliant case. In each section a discussion of the VFDR (or the category of VFDRs) is provided.2.2.1 VFDRs Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA For VFDRs specifically modeled in the Fire PRA, a table outlining the actual changes made to the Fire PRA model for that VFDR is provided.
The table includes:* Component Numbers associated with the VFDR. In some cases, there may be additional Component Numbers listed that may be the power supplies or other supporting components" Basic Event(s) associated with the Components" Scenarios which affect the VFDR.2.2.1.1 VFDR U2-2-009-ASSO-001
* U2-2-009-ASSO-001 
-Q2R15A0006:ENERGIZED:ENERGIZED-EDG I-2A Table 2-2-1 U2-2-009-ASSO-001 ALTERATIONS Component ID Basic Event BE Description Model Alterations Scenarios FAILURE OF POWER 4KV2F- SUPPLY FROM Q2R15A0006:E:DG12A EDi2A- ED PL FA O Nominal 2-009-ADJ-HGL EDG12A-F EDG1/2A TO 4.16KV BUS 2F DUE TO FIRE Model Alterations:
Failure mode probability set to nominal to eliminate fire contribution.
This model alteration is done in the Altered Events Table for the -COMPU2 scenario.2.2.1.2 VFDR U2-2-009-ASSO-002
* U2-2-009-ASSO-002 
-Q2RI 6B0002:ENERGIZED:ENERGIZED-LC2D Table 2-2-2 U2-2-009-ASSO-002 ALTERATIONS Component ID Basic Event BE Description Model Alterations Scenarios 2ACBSLC2 EMERGENCYLOAD 2246-D1, 2-009-Q2R16B0002:E:LC2D A-E--F CENTER 2A RANDOM Nominal ADJ-HGL FAILURE 2ACBSLC2 NORMALLOAD 2117-D1, D2, 2246-NONVITAL A-Ni-F CENTER 2A RANDOM Nominal Dl, 2-009-ADJ-HGL FAILURE 2ACBSLC2 LOAD CENTER 2A 2246-D1, 2-009-A-I1-F RANDOM FAILURE ADJ-HGL 2ACBSLC2 LOAD CENTER 2A 2246-D1,2-009-Q2R1 6B0002:E:LC2D A1- RNDMFIUENominal246D, A-12-F RANDOM FAILURE ADJ-HGL 2ACBSLC2 NORMALLOAD 2117-D1, D2, 2246-NONVITAL AN2F CENTER 2A RANDOM Nominal Dl, 2-009-ADJ-HGL FAILURE Revision 1 Page 12 of 29 Version 1.0 Page 2699 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-009 Table 2-2-2 U2-2-009-ASSO-002 ALTERATIONS Component ID Basic Event BE Description Model Alterations Scenarios 2ACBSA501 BUS 2D RANDOM 2117-D1, D2, 2246-N-12F FAILURE D1, 2-009-ADJ-HGL NONVITAL 2ACBSA501 BUS 2D RANDOM Nominal 2117-D1, D2, 2246-N-I1F FAILURE D1, 2-009-ADJ-HGL Model Alterations:
Failure mode probability set to nominal to eliminate fire contribution.
This model alteration is done in the Altered Events Table for the -COMPU2 scenario.2.2.1.3 VFDR U2-2-009-BC-001
* U2-2-009-BC-001 
-Q2B31LOOOIB:ON/OFF:ON/OFF Table 2-2-3 U2-2-009-BC-001 ALTERATIONS Component ID Basic Event BE Description Model Alterations Scenarios PZR HEATER GROUP Q2B31L0001B:OX:OX 2ACB31LOO B DISTRUBUTION 2246-D1, 2-009-01B-U PANEL FAILS TO TURN NominalADJ-HGL OFF Model Alterations:
Failure mode probability set to nominal to eliminate fire contribution.
This model alteration is done in the Altered Events Table for the -COMPU2 scenario.2.2.1.4 VFDRs U2-2-009-BC-002, SEP-01 2" U2-2-009-BC-002 
-N2B3 I PT0445:AVAILABLE:AVAILABLE" U2-2-009-SEP-0 12 -N2B3 1 PT0445:AVAILABLE:AVAILABLE Table 2-2-4 U2-2-009-BC-002, SEP-012 ALTERATIONS Component ID Basic Event BE Description Model Alterations Scenarios PRESSURIZER 2PZPT445--
PRESSURE N2B31 PT0445:A:A 
-- TRANSMTE Nominal 2-009-ADJ-HGL
--F TRANSMITTER PT-445 FAILS Model Alterations:
Failure mode probability set to nominal to eliminate fire contribution.
This model alteration is done in the Altered Events Table for the -COMPU2 scenario.2.2.1.5 VFDR U2-2-009-BC-003
* U2-2-009-BC-003 
-Q2E13PT0953:AVAILABLE:AVAILABLE Table 2-2-5 U2-2-009-BC-003 ALTERATIONS Component ID Basic Event BE Description Model Alterations Scenarios 2CSP1953--
CNTMT PRESS Q2E13PT0953:A:A PRESSURE INDICATOR Nominal 2-009-ADJ-HGL PI-953 FAILS 2PZP1445---
PZR PRESS CONTROL N2B31 P10445:A:A PRESSURE INDICATOR Nominal 2-009-ADJ-HGL PI-445 FAILS Revision 1 Page 13 of 29 Version 1.0 Page 2700 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-009 Model Alterations:
Failure mode probability set to nominal to eliminate fire contribution.
This model alteration is done in the Altered Events Table for the -COMPU2 scenario.2.2.1.6 VFDRs U2-2-009-BC-004, 006, 007 The Farley Fire PRA models the battery and battery chargers in the logic for signal instruments, initiating events and early phase of accident sequences.
The batteries are credited to operate consistent with the design basis. For signal instruments that are associated with long term accident mitigation, the battery charger is the only credited power source. Since there is no fire failure of the battery in this fire area the delta associated with VFDR is epsilon." U2-2-009-BC-004 
-Q2E 13PT0952:AVAILABLE:AVAILABLE" U2-2-009-BC-006-Q2N11PT0475:AVAILABLE:AVAILABLE" U2-2-009-BC-007 
-Q2N11PT0485:AVAILABLE:AVAILABLE 2.2.1.7 VFDR U2-2-009-BC-005 In this fire area there is a fire induced failure of FCV 122, however, MOV 8107 and 8108 are not impacted and are available to close if needed. Therefore, the delta risk associated with this VFDR is epsilon.M U2-2-009-BC-005 
-Q2E21P0002C:ON:ON/OFF 2.2.1.8 VFDRs U2-2-009-BC-008, SEP-015" U2-2-009-BC-008 
-Q2N23HV3227B:OPEN:THROTTLED" U2-2-009-SEP-0 15 -Q2N23HV3227B:OPEN:THROTTLED Table 2-2-6 U2-2-009-BC-008, SEP-015 ALTERATIONS Component ID Basic Event BE Description Model Alterations Scenarios 2AFAV3227 AFW FLOW CONTROL 2117-D2, 2246-D1, Q2N23HV3227B:O:TH B---M VALVE, 3227B FAILS Nominal 2-009-ADJ-HGL TO MODULATE Model Alterations:
Failure mode probability set to nominal to eliminate fire contribution.
This model alteration is done in the Altered Events Table for the -COMPU2 scenario.2.2.1.9 VFDR U2-2-009-HVAC-001
* U2-2-009-HVAC-001 
-Q2R42B000 I B: EN ERG IZED:ENERGIZED-BC2B Table 2-2-7 U2-2-009-HVAC-001 ALTERATIONS Component ID Basic Event BE Description Model Alterations Scenarios OPERATOR RECOVERY OP-RECOV-OP-RECOV-OF BATTERY CHARGER Zero ALL RCBC-B RCBC-B 1 B OR 2B ROOM COOLING FAILS OPERATOR RECOVERY OP-RECOV-OP-RECOV-OF BATTERY CHARGER B Zero ALL BCSW-B BCSW-B ROOM COOLING FAILS-SW Revision 1 Page 14 of 29 Version 1.0 Page 2701 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-009 Model Alterations:
Failure mode probability set to nominal to eliminate fire contribution.
This model alteration is done in the Altered Events Table for the -COMPU2 scenario.2.2.1.10 VFDRs U2-2-009-SEP-001, 002* " U2-2-009-SEP-001 
-N2P1 1V0901 :MODULATED:CLOSED
* U2-2-009-SEP-002 
-N2Pl lV0902:MODULATED:CLOSED Table 2-2-8 U2-2-009-SEP-001, 002 ALTERATIONS Component ID Basic Event BE Description Model Alterations Scenarios CONDENDATE HOTWELL N2P1VO9Ol 
:M:C 2AFP11V09 EMERGENCY FILL 01--U CONTROL VALVE, V901 SPURIOUS OPEN CONDENDATE HOTWELL N2P11V0902:M:C 2AFP11V09 EMERGENCY FILL 02--U CONTROL VALVE, V902 SPURIOUS OPEN Model Alterations:
Failure mode probability set to nominal to eliminate fire contribution.
This model alteration is done in the Altered Events Table for the -COMPU2 scenario.2.2.1.11 VFDR U2-2-009-SEP-003
* U2-2-009-SEP-003 
-N2P 1 9V0077:OPEN:OPEN Table 2-2-9 U2-2-009-SEP-003 ALTERATIONS Component ID Basic Event BE Description Model Alterations Scenarios 21AAVHV38 AOV HV 3825 2246-D1, 2-009-25--V SPURIOUSLY CLOSES ADJ-HGL Model Alterations:
Failure mode probability set to nominal to eliminate fire contribution.
This model alteration is done in the Altered Events Table for the -COMPU2 scenario.2.2.1.12 VFDR U2-2-009-SEP-004
* U2-2-009-SEP-004-Q2B31V0061:CLOSED:OPEN/CLOSED Table 2-2-10 U2-2-009-SEP-004 ALTERATIONS Component ID Basic Event BE Description Model Alterations Scenarios 2PZAV444B PRESSURIZER PORV, 2117-D2, 2246-D1, Q2B31V0061:C:C U 444B FAILS TO REMAIN Nominal 2009ADJ-HGL CLOSE Model Alterations:
Failure mode probability set to nominal to eliminate fire contribution.
This model alteration is done in the Altered Events Table for the -COMPU2 scenario.2.2.1.13 VFDR U2-2-009-SEP-005 0 U2-2-009-SEP-005 
-Q2B41P0001B:ON:OFF Revision 1 Page 15 of 29 Version 1.0 Page 2702 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-009 To model the compliant case, the 2 out of 3 logic for the RCP temperature indicators needs to be set to nominal. For this, indicators A and B were chosen; these indicators, along with the other identified events will model the compliant case for any spurious operation of an RCP.Table 2-2-11 U2-2-009-SEP-005 ALTERATIONS Component ID Basic Event BE Description Model Alterations Scenarios Q2B41P0001B:ON:X 2RCP0001B RCP 2B FAILS TO TRIP Nominal 2-009-ADJ-HGL
---- F Q2B41P0001B:X:X 2RCP001B RCP 2B SPURIOUSLY Nominal 2-009-ADJ-HGL
---- U RE-STARTS 2DCBSR41 DC CABINET 2G N2R41LO001G:E:E LCS4 DO FAILE Nominal 2-009-ADJ-HGL L001GF RANDOM FAILURE RCP 2A MOTOR 2HHTI1 UA3 BEARING RCP-TI 1--- T EARE 1.00E-04 2-009-ADJ-HGL 1 --- F TEMPERATURE INDICATOR FAILS RCP 2B MOTOR 2HHTI 1UA3 BEARING RCP-TI 2---F T EARE 1.00E-04 2-009-ADJ-HGL 2 --- F TEMPERATURE INDICATOR FAILS Model Alterations:
Failure mode probability set to nominal to eliminate fire contribution.
This model alteration is done in the Altered Events Table for the -COMPU2 scenario.2.2.1.14 VFDR U2-2-009-SEP-006 The Fire PRA models the spurious start of 3 of the 5 pressurizer heaters in conjunction with a failure of aux spray to challenge the PORVs. The compliant model alterations for the following VFDRs: U2-2-009-BC-001, made the heaters available for this fire area. Consequently from these alterations the delta risk from this VFDR is included with VFDRs: U2-2-009-BC-00 1.0 U2-2-009-SEP-006-Q2E21V0245:CLOSED:CLOSED 2.2.1.15 VFDR U2-2-009-SEP-007
* U2-2-009-SEP-007 
-Q2E21V0258:CLOSED:OPEN Table 2-2-12 U2-2-009-SEP-007 ALTERATIONS Component ID Basic Event BE Description Model Alterations Scenarios MOV-8108 FAILS TO 2117-D2, 2-009-Q2E21V0258:C:O 2HHMV810 OPEN DUE TO Nominal ADJ-HGL 8....-D RANDOM CAUSE 2ACBSLC2 LOAD CENTER 2E 2117-D2, 2-009-E ---- F RANDOM FAILURE ADJ-HGL 2ACBSMCC MCC 2V RANDOM 2117-D2, 2-009-Q2R17B0009:E:E 2V-FFIUENominal AJG 2V --- F FAILURE ADJ-HGL 2ACTRSUT START UP 2117-D2, 2-009-N2R11A0502:E:E 2B---F TRANSFORMER 2B Nominal ADJ-HGL RANDOM FAILURE 4KV2G- FAILURE OF POWER 2117-D2, 2-009-SUT2B--F SUPPLY FROM ADJ-HGL Revision 1 Page 16 of 29 Version 1.0 Page 2703 of 3726 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-009 Table 2-2-12 U2-2-009-SEP-007 ALTERATIONS Component ID Basic Event BE Description Model Alterations Scenarios SUT2B TO 4.16KV BUS 2G DUE TO FIRE Model Alterations:
Failure mode probability set to nominal to eliminate fire contribution.
This model alteration is done in the Altered Events Table for the -COMPU2 scenario.2.2.1.16 VFDR U2-2-009-SEP-008 U2-2-009-SEP-008 
-Q2E21 V0376B:OPEN:OPEN Table 2-2-13 U2-2-009-SEP-008 ALTERATIONS Component ID Basic Event BE Description Model Alterations Scenarios VCT ISOLATION VALVE Q2E21V0376B:O:O 2VCVLV Q2E21LCV115E Nominal 2-009-ADJ-HGL SPURIOUSLY CLOSES Model Alterations:
Failure mode probability set to nominal to eliminate fire contribution.
This model alteration is done in the Altered Events Table for the -COMPU2 scenario.2.2.1.17 VFDRs U2-2-009-SEP-009, 010" U2-2-009-SEP-009 
-Q2N23 HV3228A:OPEN:THROTTLED Note that the PRA does not model the OPEN:THROTTLED function state for the HV 3228A valve, the throttled function state is used to model the control of flow from the TDAFW pump into the steam generator to prevent overfill.
The PRA treats that in the OPEN:CLOSED function state." U2-2-009-SEP-010-Q2N23HV3228C:OPEN:THROTTLED There will be no spurious operation of the TDAFW pump with the following model alterations.
Table 2-2-14 U2-2-009-SEP-009, 010 ALTERATIONS Component ID Basic Event BE Description Model Alterations Scenarios STEAM SUPPLY TO Q2N12VOOO1A:C:C 2AFKVHV32 TDAFW PUMP FROM SG Nominal 2117-D2, 2246-D1, 35A-U B (HV-3235A)
TRANSFERS 2-009-ADJ-HGL OPEN STEAM SUPPLY TO 2AFKVHV32 TDAFW PUMP FROM SG 2117-D2, 2246-D1, 35B-U C (HV-3235B) 2-009-ADJ-HGL TRANSFERS OPEN Model Alterations:
Failure mode probability set to nominal to eliminate fire contribution.
This model alteration is done in the Altered Events Table for the -COMPU2 scenario.Revision 1 Page 17 of 29 Version 1.0 Page 2704 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-009 2.2.1.18 VFDR U2-2-009-SEP-011 U2-2-009-SEP-0I 1 -Q2B13HV0003:CLOSED:CLOSED Table 2-2-15 U2-2-009-SEP-011 ALTERATIONS Component ID Basic Event BE Description Model Alterations Scenarios 2RCSV2213 
~ RX VESSEL HEAD VENT Q2B13HV0003:C:C SV SV2213B TRANSFERS Nominal 2-009-ADJ-HGL OPEN Model Alterations:
Failure mode probability set to nominal to eliminate fire contribution.
This model alteration is done in the Altered Events Table for the -COMPU2 scenario.2.2.1.19 VFDR U2-2-009-SEP-013
* U2-2-009-SEP-013 
-Q2B31V0027B:OPEN:OPEN/CLOSED Table 2-2-16 U2-2-009-SEP-013 ALTERATIONS Component ID Basic Event BE Description Model Alterations Scenarios Q2R17130009:E:E 2ACBSMCC MOO 2V RANDOM Nominal 2117-D2 2V---F FAILURE START UP 2ACTRSUT SATU N2R11A0502:E:E 2ACTR-UT TRANSFORMER 2B Nominal 2117-D2 RANDOM FAILURE 2ACBSLC2 LOAD CENTER 2E Q2R16B0007:E:E E----F RAD FAILURE Nominal 2117-D2 E ---- F RANDOM FAILURE FAILURE OF POWER 4KV2G- SUPPLY FROM Q2R15A0007:E:SUT2B SUT2B- SUPPL TO Nominal 2117-D2 SUT2B--F SUT2B3 TO 4.16KV BUS 2G DUE TO FIRE PRESSURIZER PORV 2PZMV8000 BLOCK VALVE 8000B 2117-D2, 2246-D1, B---U SPURIOUSLY OPENS 2-009-ADJ-HGL WHEN CLOSED Model Alterations:
Failure mode probability set to nominal to eliminate fire contribution.
This model alteration is done in the Altered Events Table for the -COMPU2 scenario.2.2.1.20 VFDR U2-2-009-SEP-014
* U2-2-009-SEP-014-Q2E13P000IB:ON:OFF Table 2-2-17 U2-2-009-SEP-014 ALTERATIONS Component ID Basic Event BE Description Model Alterations Scenarios 2CSMV8820 CS HEADER ISOLATION 2117-D1, D2, 2-009-Q2E13VO005B:O:C B---U MOV8820B SPURIOUSLY Nominal ADJHGL OPENS Model Alterations:
Failure mode probability set to nominal to eliminate fire contribution.
This model alteration is done in the Altered Events Table for the -COMPU2 scenario.Revision I Page 18 of 29 Revision I Page 18 of 29 Version 1.0 Page 2705 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-009 2.2.1.21 VFDR U2-2-009-SEP-016 U2-2-009-SEP-016 
-N2P19V0080:OPEN:OPEN Table 2-2-18 U2-2-009-SEP-016 ALTERATIONS Component ID Basic Event BE Description Model Alterations Scenarios 21AAVHV38 AOV HV 3885 2117-D2, 2246-D1, 85--V SPURIOUSLY CLOSES 2-009-ADJ-HGL BATTERY CHARGER 2DCBCEOO 1B FAILS DUE TO 2117-D2, 2-009-1B---V SPURIOUS LOAD ADJ-HGL SHEDDING Model Alterations:
Failure mode probability set to nominal to eliminate fire contribution.
This model alteration is done in the Altered Events Table for the -COMPU2 scenario.2.2.1.22 VFDR U2-2-009-SEP-017
* U2-2-009-SEP-017 
-Q2EI1P000IB:OFF:ON/OFF Table 2-2-19 U2-2-009-SEP-01 7 ALTERATIONS Component ID Basic Event BE Description Model Alterations Scenarios 2LHPMP001 SPURIOUS START OF 2117-D2, 2-009-B---U RHR PUMP P-001B ADJ-HGL Model Alterations:
Failure mode probability set to nominal to eliminate fire contribution.
This model alteration is done in the Altered Events Table for the -COMPU2 scenario.2.2.2 VFDRs Not Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA A Fire PRA was developed in accordance with the requirements of Part 4 "Requirements for Fires at Power PRA" of the ASME and ANS combined PRA Standard, ASME/ANS RA-Sa-2009, "Standard for Level 1/Large Early Release Frequency Probabilistic Risk Assessment for Nuclear Power Plant Applications".
Consistent with those requirements not all components required to meet the nuclear safety criteria need to be specifically modeled in the Fire PRA. The following VFDRs are associated with components not modeled in the Fire PRA: 2.2.2.1 VFDR U2-2-009-HVAC-002 Battery Room 2B ventilation is not modeled in the fire PRA. The Battery Room exhaust fan function is to remove the hydrogen that is generated from the battery located within the room and removes heat generated in the room. The hydrogen production in the 24 hour mission time of the PRA is less than the required amount for a hydrogen bum, therefore the exhaust fan is not required to be modeled. See calculation Fire PRA Logic Model for Farley Nuclear Plants, PRA-BC-F-I 1-004.0 U2-2-009-HVAC-002 
-Q2R42E0002B:AVAILABLE:AVAILABLE Revision 1 Page 19 of 29 Version 1.0 Page 2706 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-009 2.2.3 Compliant Case Results Tables 2-3a and 2-3b provide the results of the compliant case calculation for this fire area. All of the altered events identified in Section 2.2.1 have been applied to their respective scenarios and the results have been quantified.
The CDF and LERF results are provided on a scenario basis.Revision 1 Page 20 of 29 Revision 1 Page 20 of 29 Version 1.0 Page 2707 of 3726 SE-C051326701 
-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-009 Table 2-3a Compliant Case CDF and LERF Results Train A Alignment Zone Scen Scenario Scenario Specific CCDP CDF CLERP LERF Description VFDRs (/rx-yr) (Irx-yr)U2-2-009-ASSO-002, U2-2-009-BC-001, 2-009-ADJ HGL- HGL SCENARIO 008, U2-2-009-HVAC-001, U2-2-009-SEP-1.74E-02 4.82E-09 3.46E-04 9.61 E-1 1 COMPU2 001,002,004, 007,009, 010,013,014, 016,017 2117 D1- TRANSIENT 
-100' U2-2-009-ASSO-002, U2-2-009-HVAC-001 , 5.85E-06 3.78E-11 1.66E-09 1.07E-14 COMPU2 ELEVATION U2-2-009-SEP-014 D2- TRANISENT 
-139' U2-2-009-ASSO-002, U2-2-009-BC-008, 2117 COMPU2 ELEVATION U2-2-009-HVAC-001, U2-2-009-SEP-001, 3.13E-03 2.02E-08 6.98E-06 4.51 E-1 1 002,004,007, 009, 010, 013, 014,016, 017 D1- U2-2-009-ASSO-002, U2-2-009-BC-001, 2246 COMPU2 TRANSIENT 008, U2-2-009-HVAC-001, U2-2-009-SEP-8.71E-01 2.03E-06 2.90E-03 6.78E-09 003,004,009, 010,013, 016 Compliant Scenario Total CDF and LERF 2.06E-06 6.92E-09 Table 2-3b Compliant Case CDF and LERF Results Train B Alignment Zone Scen Scenario Scenario Specific CCDP CDF CLERP LERF Description VFDRs (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr)U2-2-009-ASSO-002, U2-2-009-BC-001, 2-009-ADJ HGL- HGL SCENARIO 008, U2-2-009-HVAC-001, U2-2-009-SEP-1.61 E-02 4.49E-09 3.41E-04 9.49E-11 COMPU2 001,002,004, 007, 009, 010, 013, 014, 016,017 2117 D1- TRANSIENT 
-100' U2-2-009-ASSO-002, U2-2-009-HVAC-001 6.27E-06 4.05E-11 1.66E-09 1.07E-14 COMPU2 ELEVATION U2-2-009-SEP-014 D2- TRANISENT 
-139' U2-2-009-ASSO-002, U2-2-009-BC-008, 2117 COMPU2 ELEVATION U2-2-009-HVAC-001, U2-2-009-SEP-001, 3.61 E-03 2.33E-08 1.47E-05 9.47E-1 1 002, 004, 007, 009, 010, 013, 014, 016, 017 D1- U2-2-009-ASSO-002, U2-2-009-BC-001, 2246 COMPU2 TRANSIENT 008, U2-2-009-HVAC-001, U2-2-009-SEP-8.71E-01 2.03E-06 2.90E-03 6.78E-09 003, 004,009, 010, 013, 016 Compliant Scenario Total CDF and LERF 2.06E-06 6.97E-09 Revision I Page 21 of 29 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-009 2.2.4 Required Modifications The following modifications are required as a result of the risk evaluation for this fire area: " Require 1 hr fire wrap of cables 2VYH2CO5B and 2VYDGO1 J to prevent fire damage" Install new trip device in panel Q2R42B0001A, breaker LA08 2.2.5 Required Recovery Actions The following recovery actions are required as a result of the risk evaluation for this fire area: Table 2-4 Required Recovery Actions Recovery Action Component ID Basic Event VFDR BE Description Description OPERATOR RECOVERY Operator action to Q2R42B0001B:ENERGIZED:E OP-RECOV-U22009 OF BATTERY CHARGER provide alternate NERGIZED-BC2B RCBC-B HVAC- 1B OR 2B ROOM cooling for battery 001 COOLING FAILS charger room due to loss of fan OPERATOR RECOVERY Operator action to Q2R42B0001B:ENERGIZED:E OP-RECOV-L22009 OF BATTERY CHARGER provide alternate NERGIZED-BC2B BCSW-B HVAC- B ROOM COOLING cooling for battery 001 FAILS-SW charger room due loss of Train B SW 2.3 Risk Evaluation Results The total area ACDF/LERF is above the screening criteria of lE-07/rx-yr and 1E-08/rx-yr, respectively.
However, the total plant delta CDF/LERF is below the RG 1. 174 criteria of 1 E-05/rx-yr and 1 E-06/rx-yr, respectively.
All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0 ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency.
The following tables present the fire zone/scenario fire risk as well as the total fire risk for this fire area.Table 2-5a 1 FIRE AREA ACDF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN A ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CCDP CDF CCDP CDF ACDF 2-009-ADJ/HGL 7.04E-02 1.96E-08 1.74E-02 4.82E-09 1.47E-08 2117/Di 5.85E-06 3.78E-11 5.85E-06 3.78E-11 0.OOE+00 2117/D2 4.24E-02 2.74E-07 3.13E-03 2.02E-08 2.53E-07 22460D1 9.22E-01 2.15E-06 8.71 E-01 2.03E-06 1.18E-07 Total CDF and delta CDF 2  2.44E-06 2.06E-06 3.86E-07 2 _ N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.2 Total ACDF includes the risk of recovery actions required to demonstrate the availability of a success path for the nuclear safety performance criteria.Revision 1 Page 22 of 29 Version 1.0 Page 2709 of 3726 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-009 Table 2-5b 1 FIRE AREA aCDF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN B ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CCDP CDF CCDP CDF ACDF 2-009-ADJ/HGL 6.35E-02 1.77E-08 1.61 E-02 4.49E-09 1.32E-08 2117/D1 6.27E-06 4.05E-11 6.27E-06 4.05E-11 0.00E+00 2117/D2 4.02E-02 2.60E-07 3.61E-03 2.33E-08 2.37E-07 2246/Di 9.22E-01 2.15E-06 8.71 E-01 2.03E-06 1.18E-07 Total CDF and delta CDF 2  2.43E-06 2.06E-06 3.67E-07-N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.2 Total ACDF includes the risk of recovery actions required to demonstrate the availability of a success path for the nuclear safety performance criteria.Table 2-6a 1 FIRE AREA ALERF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN A ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CLERP LERF CLERP LERF ALERF 2-009-ADJ/HGL 5.18E-04 1.44E-10 3.46E-04 9.61E-11 4.79E-11 2117/D1 1.66E-09 1.07E-14 1.66E-09 1,07E-14 0.00E+00 2117/D2 2.18E-04 1.41E-09 6.98E-06 4.51E-11 1.36E-09 2246/D1 4.OOE-02 9.34E-08 2.90E-03 6.78E-09 8.66E-08 Total LERF and delta LERF 2  9.49E-08 6.92E-09 8.80E-08-N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.2 2 Total ALERF includes the risk of recovery actions required to demonstrate the availability of a success path for the nuclear safety performance criteria.Table 2-6b 1 FIRE AREA ,LERF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN B ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CLERP LERF CLERP LERF ALERF 2-009-ADJ/HGL 4.75E-04 1.32E-10 3.41E-04 9.49E-11 3.71E-11 2117/D1 1.66E-09 1.07E-14 1.66E-09 1.07E-14 0.OOE+00 2117/D2 2.12E-04 1.37E-09 1.47E-05 9.47E-11 1.28E-09 2246/D1 4.OOE-02 9.34E-08 2.90E-03 6.78E-09 8.66E-08 Total LERF and delta LERF2 9.49E-08 6.97E-09 8.79E-08 2 _ N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.2 Total ALERF includes the risk of recovery actions required to demonstrate the availability of a success path for the nuclear safety performance criteria.Revision I Page 23 of 29 Revision 1 Page 23 of 29 Version 1.0 Page 2710 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-009 3.0 DID EVALUATION 3.1 Defense-in-Depth Evaluation A review of the impact of the change on defense-in-depth (DID) was performed.
NFPA 805 defines DID as:* Preventing fires from starting* Rapidly detecting fires and controlling and extinguishing promptly those fires that do occur, thereby limiting damage Providing adequate level of fire protection for structures, systems and components important to safety: so that a fire that is not promptly extinguished will not prevent essential plant safety functions from being performed.
In general, the DID requirement was considered satisfied if the proposed change does not result in a substantial imbalance among these elements (or echelons).
The review of DID was qualitative and addressed each of the elements with respect to the proposed change. Fire protection features and systems relied upon to ensure DID were identified in the assessment (e.g., detection, suppression system).The VFDRs and the associated Fire Area risk (CDF) and scenario consequences (CCDP values)were evaluated to identify general DID echelon imbalances.
Potential methods to balance the DID features were identified ensuring an adequate balance of DID features is maintained for the Fire Area. See Section 3.2 for the results of the evaluation.
3.2 Defense-in-Depth Review Results A review of defense in depth and risk evaluation results show that, given the systems and features specified in Table 3-1 and Section 2 respectively, risk acceptance criteria are met and that the balance of defense in depth is maintained.
The analyzed scenarios bound potential fuel packages which can reasonably be expected to occur in this area.The transient scenarios of zone 2 117 at elevation 139' and zone 2246 present the highest risk contributions of this fire area. In addition to requiring suppression and detection for both risk and DID in all zones, the detection is also necessary to support the recovery action required by risk. To futher reduce the risk associated with transient fire scenarios, fire zones 2117 at elevation 139' and zone 2246 are required to be transient restricted zones for DID. Finally, as a result of the risk analysis, cables 2VYH2C05B and 2VYDG01 J (See Section 2.2.4) require a modification to protect the circuit to limit fire damage.In the event of no intervention by the plant fire brigade, it is not expected that a credible fire would develop which would not be bounded by the analyzed scenarios.
Based on the systems/features specified above, no additional DID systems/features are warranted and the ability to meet nuclear performance criteria is ensured.The table below summarizes how an adequate balance of DID is maintained.
Revision 1 Page 24 of 29 Version 1.0 Page 2711 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-009 SE-C051 326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-009 Table 3-1 Defense-in-Depth Impact Review Method of Providing DID Discussion Echelon 1: Prevent fires from starting Combustible Control Designate Fire Zones 2117, EL 139' and 2246 as transient restricted areas.Hot Work Control No change necessary to procedure(s) 
/guidance document(s).
1 Echelon 2: Rapidly detect, control and extinguish promptly those fires that do occur thereby limiting fire damage Detection System Detection is installed and required Automatic Fire Suppression Automatic suppression system is installed in all zones and required.Portable Fire Extinguishers No portable extinguishers available and not required.Hose stations and hydrants Fire hose cabinet(s) are available, but no enhancements required.
1 located in the area(s)Pre-Fire Plan No change necessary to procedure(s) 
/guidance document(s).
1 Echelon 3: Provide adequate level of fire protection for systems and structures so that a fire will not prevent essential safety functions from being performed Walls, floors ceilings and structural No changes necessary to existing barriers.elements are rated or have been evaluated as adequate for the hazard.Openings in the fire barrier are rated No changes necessary to existing barrier openings.or have been evaluated as adequate for the hazard.Supplemental barriers (e.g., ERFBS, No supplemental barriers installed and not required.cable tray covers, etc.)Guidance provided to operations No VFDR related DID recovery actions required.personnel detailing the credited success path(s) including recovery actions to achieve nuclear safety performance criteria.This fire protection feature is relied upon without further DID enhancements beyond inherent programmatic requirements of NFPA 805, Chap. 3 and will not be reported in Table 5-2.3.2.1 Required Modifications There are no modifications required as a result of the DID evaluation for this fire area.3.2.2 Required Recovery Actions There are no required recovery actions as a result of the DID evaluation for this fire area.Revision 1 Page 25 of 29 Version 1.0 Page 2712 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-009 4.0 SAFETY MARGIN EVALUATION 4.1 Safety Margin Evaluation In accordance with NEI 04-02, 5.3.5.3 guidance, the maintenance of adequate Safety Margin is assessed by the consideration of categories of analyses utilized by this fire risk evaluation (FRE).Safety margins are considered to be maintained if: " Codes and standards or their alternatives accepted for use by the NRC are met, and" Safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) are met, or provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty.
The maintenance of adequate safety margin for the change analysis is described for each of the specific analysis types used in support of the fire risk assessment.
4.1.1 Fire Modeling Fire modeling performed in support of the transition has been performed within the Fire PRA utilizing codes and standards developed by industry and NRC staff to provide realistic yet conservative results. Specifically, the heat release rates utilized in the transition analysis are based upon NUREG/CR 6850, Task 8, Scoping Fire Modeling.
These heat release rates are conservative and represent values used to screen out fixed ignition sources that do not pose a threat to the targets within specific fire compartments and to assign severity factors to unscreened fixed ignition sources.The combined analysis approach is used during transition; therefore, maximum expected fire scenario/limiting fire scenario have not been analyzed separately.
The bases for the application of these fire modeling codes and standards were not altered in support of this FRE.4.1.2 Plant System Performance Plant system performance parameters were not modified as a result of this FRE. These perfornance parameters were originally established to support nuclear performance criteria contained in the plant specific accident analyses.
These analyses established component and system performance criteria necessary to establish safe and stable plant operation, as well as, safe shut down of the unit in the event of a fire. These performance parameters were not modified as a result of this FRE.4.2 Safety Margin Results All analyses and assessment have been performed utilizing accepted techniques and industry accepted standards.
In addition, safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) have been considered and provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty.
As such, the Safety Margins are maintained as discussed in Section 4. 1.Revision 1 Page 26 of 29 Version 1.0 Page 2713 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-009 5.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION RESULTS 5.1 Dispositions of VFDRs Based on the FRE results contained in Sections 2, 3 and 4 the VFDRs identified in Section 1. 1 have been resolved as follows: VFDR ID U2-2-009-ASSO-001 U2-2-009-ASSO-002 U2-2-009-BC-001 U2-2-009-BC-002 U2-2-009-BC-003 U2-2-009-BC-004 U2-2-009-BC-005 U2-2-009-BC-006 U2-2-009-BC-007 U2-2-009-BC-008 U2-2-009-HVAC-001 U2-2-009-HVAC-002 U2-2-009-SEP-001 U2-2-009-SEP-002 U2-2-009-SEP-003 U2-2-009-SEP-004 U2-2-009-SEP-005 U2-2-009-SEP-006 U2-2-009-SEP-007 U2-2-009-SEP-008 U2-2-009-SEP-009 U2-2-009-SEP-010 U2-2-009-SEP-011 U2-2-009-SEP-012 U2-2-009-SEP-013 U2-2-009-SEP-014 U2-2-009-SEP-015 U2-2-009-SEP-016 U2-2-009-SEP-017 Table 5-1 Final Variance Disposition Disposition Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Recovery Action(s)
Required to Satisfy Risk Criteria:
See Table 2-4 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Revision 1 Page 27 of 29 Version 1.0 Page 2714 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-009 5.2 Fire Risk Evaluation Summary of Fire Protection Systems and Features Table 5-2 Summary of Required Fire Protection Systems and Features Required Required FrAra FrZoe Suppression Detection Required Fire Fire Area Fire Zone Protection Feature Required Fire Protection System and Feature Details System System (R, D)(R, D) (R, D)R -Improvements to procedures necessary to incorporate U2 2-009 R recovery actions required to meet risk criteria (See Table 2-4);Modification to wrap cables and to replace trip device in panel Q2R42B0001A, breaker LA08 R -Suppression system, Detection system;2117 R, D R, D D D -Suppression system, Detection system, Require fire zone 2117, EL 139' as a restricted transient area R -Suppression system, Detection system;2246 R, D R, D D D -Suppression system, Detection system, Require fire zone 2246 as a restricted transient area.Required Suppression/Detection/Feature:
required in the Fire Area based on NFPA 805 Chapter 4 compliance.
The information is provided on a zone basis. The basis for the requirement of the fire protection system is designated as follows: " R -Risk Criteria:
Systems required to meet the Risk Criteria for the Performance-Based Approach (NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4)" D -Defense-in-depth Criteria:
Systems required to maintain adequate balance of Defense-in-Depth for a Performance-Based Approach (NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4)Fire Protection Features in this Table only refer to those features installed in the Fire Area that have a corresponding NFPA 805, Chapter 3 requirement.
5.3 Summary of Recovery Actions Table 5-3 -Recovery Actions Fire Area Component Component Description Actions U2 2-009 Q2R42B30001B 125V DC BUS 2B Operator action to provide alternate cooling for battery charger room due to loss of fan U2 2-009 Q2R42B0001B 125V DC BUS 2B Operator action to provide alternate cooling for battery charger room due loss of Train B SW Revision I Page 28 of 29 Revision 1 Page 28 of 29 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-009 5.4 Summary of Plant Modifications Table 5-4 -Plant Modifications Item Unit Problem Statement Proposed Modification In Comp Risk Informed Characterization FPRA Measure Wrap cables 2VYH2CO5B, 2VYDG01 J with 1 hr fire rated wrap to prevent fire damage due to transient fire and HGL. These Reduce risk due to fire induced failure by 009-1 2 rquire proec da ag cables are associated with the Yes Yes protecting cables preventing damage to prevent fire damage following components:
associated components.
N2P1 1V0901 :M:C, N2P1 1V0902:M:C, N2R1 1A0501 :E:E dc Reduce risk due to fire induced failure by U2 Replace trip evice o ensure Replace trip device in panel modifying the circuit breaker and 20-2breaker coordination of supply Q2R42B0001A, breaker LA08 Yes Yes prvetig dmgodwsra 009-2 and load breakers QR2O0AbraeL08preventing damage to downstream components.
5.5 Fire Area Risk Summary Table 5-5 -Fire Area Risk Summary Fire Area Area Description NFPA 805 Fire Area CDF/LERF VFDR RAs Fire Risk Eval Additional Risk of RAs Basis (Yes/No) (Yes/No) A CDF/LERF Auxiliary Building Cable U2 2-009 Chase Rooms 2117 & 4.2.4 2.44E-06/9.49E-08 Yes Yes 3.77E-07/8.79E-08 3.77E-07/8.79E-08 2246 Revision 1 Page 29 of 29 Revision I Page 29 of 29 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-012 Attachment 
-Unit 2 Fire Area 2-012 FRE for Fire Area Hallway & Local Hot Shutdown Panel Room Revision:
0 Name Fire PRA Preparer Fire PRA Reviewer Fire Protection Preparer Fire Protection Reviewer NSCA Preparer NSCA Reviewer FRE Preparer FRE Reviewer George Hunter Clint Pierce Robert Kirkpatrick Rebecca Puckett Larry Valmonte Dan Funk Steve Hardy Brandon Jamar Revision 0 Page 1 of 19 Version 1.0 Page 2717 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-012 1.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION INPUT ....................................................................
4 1.1 Variances from the Deterministic Requirements 
....................................
4 1.2 Fire Protection Systems and Features ..................................................
6 1.2.1 Construction 
................................................................................
6 1.2 .2 D ete ctio n ................................................................................... 
..6 1.2.3 Fixed Fire Suppression 
..............................................................
6 1.2.4 Manual Suppression 
...................................................................
6 1.2.5 Ventilation (Smoke Removal) ......................................................
6 1.2.6 Other Fire Protection Features ....................................................
6 1.2.7 Fire Hazard Identification 
............................................................
6 1.2.8 Fire PRA Input .............................................................................
6 2.0 RISK EVALUATION 
.........................................................................................
7 2.1 Fire PRA Variant Case Calculation 
........................................................
7 2.2 Compliant Case Calculation 
...................................................................
9 2.2.1 VFDRs Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA ..............................
9 2.2.2 VFDRs Not Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA .....................
10 2.2.3 Compliant Case Results ...........................................................
11 2.2.4 Required Modifications 
.............................................................
13 2.2.5 Required Recovery Actions ......................................................
13 2.3 Risk Evaluation Results .......................................................................
13 3.0 DID EVALUATION 
..........................................................................................
14 3.1 Defense-in-Depth Evaluation 
...............................................................
14 3.2 Defense-in-Depth Review Results ......................................................
15 3.2.1 Required Modifications 
.............................................................
15 3.2.2 Required Recovery Actions ......................................................
16 4.0 SAFETY MARGIN EVALUATION 
..................................................................
16 4.1 Safety Margin Evaluation 
.....................................................................
16 4.1.1 Fire Modeling ...........................................................................
16 4.1.2 Plant System Performance 
........................................................
16 4.2 Safety Margin Results ..........................................................................
16 5.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION RESULTS ............................................................
17 5.1 Dispositions of VFDRs ..........................................................................
17 Revision 0 Page 2 of 19 Version 1.0 Page 2718 of 3726 SE-CO51 326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-012 SE-C051 326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-012 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 Fire Risk Evaluation Summary of Fire Protection Systems and Features 18 Summary of Recovery Actions .............................................................
18 Summary of Plant Modifications 
..........................................................
18 Fire A rea R isk Sum m ary ......................................................................
19 Revision 0 Page 3 of 19 Version 1.0 Page 2719 of 3726 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-012 1.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION INPUT 1.1 Variances from the Deterministic Requirements The VFDRs identified for evaluation for Unit 2, Fire Area 2-012, Hallway & Local Hot Shutdown Panel Room are: Table 1.1 VFDRs VFDR Component(s)
Description U2-2-012-1A-Q2E21V0243:CLOSE This component requires instrument air to perform its credited 001 D:CLOSED, RCS function.
Instrument air is assumed to be unavailable in this fire area ALTERNATE because air loss paths have not been identified.
Isolating the alternate CHARGING LINE charging line is necessary in order to obtain a significant pressure gradient in order to de-pressurize the RCS via aux-spray.
This valve (the Alternate Charging line supply from CVCS) fails open on a loss of instrument air, and hence the necessary pressure gradient will not be sufficient to supply the pressurizer through the spray line. Failure to de-pressurize via aux spray challenges the RCS Pressure/Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-012-IA-Q2E21V0244:OPEN:
This component requires instrument air to perform its credited 002 MODULATE, RCS function.
Instrument air is assumed to be unavailable in this fire area NORMAL because air loss paths have not been identified.
Isolating the normal CHARGING LINE charging line is necessary in order to obtain a significant pressure gradient in order to de-pressurize the RCS via aux-spray.
This valve (the Normal Charging line supply from CVCS) fails open on a loss of instrument air, and hence the necessary pressure gradient will not be sufficient to supply the pressurizer through the aux spray line. Failure to de-pressurize via aux spray challenges the RCS Pressure/Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-012-IA-Q2E21V0245:CLOSE This component requires instrument air to perform its credited 003 D:OPEN/CLOSED, function.
Instrument air is assumed to be unavailable in this fire area RCS PRESSURIZER because air loss paths have not been identified.
This valve is required AUX SPRAY to cycle in order to supply CVCS inventory to the pressurizer to de-pressurize via aux-spray, and the valve fails closed on a loss of instrument air. An inability to cycle this valve due to a loss of instrument air would prevent de-pressurization of the RCS via aux-spray. Failure to ensure cycling capability of this valve challenges the RCS Pressure/Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-012-IA-Q2E21V0347:MODU This component requires instrument air to perform its credited 004 LATED:MODULATE, function.
Instrument air is assumed to be unavailable in this fire area CHARGING FLOW because air loss paths have not been identified.
Flow control Valve CONTROL VALVE V0347 permits normal charging flow to be injected into the RCS system. Instrument air is required to control the flow and thus charging inventory that is injected into the RCS Cold Legs. A loss of instrument air could result in this valve failing in the open position.
Failure to throttle flow to the RCS system challenges the RCS Inventory/Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-012-IA-Q2N11PV3371C:CL This component requires instrument air to perform its credited 005 OSED:MODULATE, function.
Instrument air is assumed to be unavailable in this fire area MAIN STEAM because air loss paths have not been identified.
In order to achieve ATMOS RELIEF atmospheric relief on the secondary side, modulation of MSARV valve to SG2C is required.
A loss of instrument air will result in the valve failing closed. This failure challenges the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
Revision 0 Page 4 of 19 Version 1.0 Page 2720 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-012 Table 1-1 VFDRs VFDR Component(s)
Description U2-2-012-SEP-Q2B31LO001B:ON/O The Pressurizer Heaters are required to increase RCS Pressure by 001 FF:ON/OFF, heating Pressurizer Inventory.
In order to establish pressure control, PRESSURIZER the Pressurizer heaters are required off. Fire induced control circuit HEATER GROUP 2B damage could spuriously actuate Pressurizer Heater 2B, or prevent DISTRIBUTION remote tripping of the load. Failure to secure the Pressurizer Heater PANEL 2B could challenge the RCS Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-2-012-SEP-Q2E21P0002B:ON:O Charging via the CVCS system is required to maintain RCS Inventory, 002 N/OFF-TRAIN B, 2B however only one charging pump is credited for operation.
Fire CHARGING PUMP induced control circuit damage to Train B Charging (Pump 2B-aligned Train B) could result in spurious starting of the pump. This could lead to an overcharging condition by adding an excessive amount of Charging Inventory to the RCS. This failure challenges the RCS Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion U2-2-012-SEP-Q2E21P0002C:ON:O Charging via the CVCS system is required to maintain RCS Inventory, 003 N/OFF, 2C however only one charging pump is credited for operation.
Fire CHARGING PUMP induced control circuit damage to Train B Charging (Pump 2C) could result in spurious starting of the pump. This could lead to an overcharging condition by adding an excessive amount of Charging Inventory to the RCS. This failure challenges the RCS Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-2-012-SEP-Q2N12VO001A:CLO The TDAFW Pump Steam Admission valves must remain closed in 004 SED:CLOSED, order to avoid spurious steam admission into the pump, and lead to a TDAFP STEAM spurious pump start. Fire induced control circuit damage to HV3235A SUPPLY ISOLATION could result in the valve spuriously opening and admitting steam to the VALVE HV3235A non-credited TDAFW Pump. Failure to secure these valves challenges the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-2-012-SEP-Q2N12V0001B:CLO The TDAFW Pump Steam Admission valves must remain closed in 005 SED:CLOSED, order to avoid spurious steam admission into the pump, and lead to a TDAFP STEAM spurious pump start. Fire induced control circuit damage to HV3235B SUPPLY ISOLATION could result in the valve spuriously opening and admitting steam to the VALVE HV3235B non-credited TDAFW Pump. Failure to secure these valves challenges the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-2-012-SEP-Q2E21V0347:MODU Flow control Valve V0347 permits normal charging flow to be injected 008 LATED:MODULATE, into the RCS system. This valve is required to throttle in order to CHARGING FLOW control the amount of charging inventory that enters the RCS System.CONTROL VALVE Fire induced control circuit failure could result in this valve failing fully open, or spuriously closing. Failure to throttle flow to the RCS system challenges the RCS Inventory/Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-012-SEP-N2C55NI0031A:AVAI Source Range Instrumentation is required to monitor Reactivity 011 LABLE:AVAILABLE, Conditions.
A loss of channel 1 and channel 2 Source Range SOURCE RANGE Detectors could occur, due to fire induced circuit failures.
This would COUNT RATE prevent operator ability to monitor source range count levels. Failure INDICATOR NI-31A to monitor subcritical conditions challenges the Reactivity Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-2-012-SEP-Q2N1 1PV3371C:CL In order to achieve atmospheric relief on the secondary side, 013 OSED:MODULATE, modulation of MSARV valve to SG2C is necessary.
Since cooldown MAIN STEAM via SG2C is desired in this area, fire induced circuit failure to the ATMOS RELIEF control circuitry of this valve could cause the valve to fail in the closed position.
Failure to secure this valve challenges the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
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-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-012 1.2 Fire Protection Systems and Features Fire Area 2-012 consists of Fire Zone 2254. This fire area is located in the Hallway & Local Hot Shutdown Panel Room at elevation 121 '-0".1.2.1 Construction Barriers for this fire area are of substantial construction and have been designed and constructed to meet separation requirements.
In the event the configuration utilized is not in accordance with recognized standards, the deviations have been evaluated to be adequate for the hazard.1.2.2 Detection Fire detection systems to provide notification to the Control Room are: M Fire Zone 2254 is provided with detection.
1.2.3 Fixed Fire Suppression There are no fixed suppression systems located in this area.1.2.4 Manual Suppression Manual suppression equipment to be utilized by plant personnel and/or fire brigade members are:* Fire Area 2-012 is provided with a CO 2 hose reel located in Room 2210 (Fire Area 2-020).1.2.5 Ventilation (Smoke Removal)Portable smoke ejectors are available to assist with smoke removal.1.2.6 Other Fire Protection Features No additional fire protection features are required for this fire risk evaluation.
1.2.7 Fire Hazard Identification The major sources of combustibles in Fire Area 2-012 are cable insulation, panels, paper and plastic. Details regarding fire scenarios quantified in the fire PRA, and their associated ignition sources (where applicable) are discussed in Section 2.1.2.8 Fire PRA Input Fire protection features There are fire protection features specifically modeled in the Fire PRA as identified in the required plant modification section 2.2.4.Fire protection systems Plant modification is required in this area to install incipient detection as a means of early fire detection.
The Hot Gas Layer evaluation credits the detection and manual fire brigade response.The Multi Compartment Analysis evaluation credits the detection system.Revision 0 Page 6 of 19 Version 1.0 Page 2722 of 3726 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-012 Hot Gas Layer Treatment Physical attributes of this fire area require the incorporation of a Hot Gas Layer scenario.
Credit for detection was taken in the Hot Gas Layer evaluation for this fire area. Credit for manual fire brigade response was taken in the Hot Gas Layer evaluation for this fire area.Multi-compartment analysis Credit for detection was taken in the Multi Compartment Analysis for this fire area. Credit for manual fire brigade response was taken in the Multi Compartment Analysis for this fire area.Scenario Review All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0, ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency.
2.0 RISK EVALUATION 2.1 Fire PRA Variant Case Calculation Tables 2-1a and 2-1b provide the results of the variant case calculation for Fire Area 2-012. This is taken directly from the Fire PRA model with no changes or alterations made. The CDF and LERF results are provided on a scenario basis.Revision 0 Page 7 of 19 Revision 0 Page 7 of 19 Version 1.0 Page 2723 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-012 Table 2-1a Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train A Alignment IGF DFLERF Zone Scen ScenDesc (xy NSP SF CCDP CDF CLERP (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr)2254 D1 TRANSIENT 
-HGL 6.04E-06 1.0 1.0 4.08E-02 2.47E-07 6.91 E-05 4.18E-10 2254 El HSDPs C and F -SEVERE 3.64E-05 2.00E-02 1.00E-01 4.08E-02 2.97E-09 6.91 E-05 5.03E-12 2254 E2a HSDP F -NON SEVERE 1.82E-05 2.00E-02 1.0 7.01 E-04 2.55E-10 9.90E-07 3.61E-13 2254 E2b HSDP C -NON SEVERE 1.82E-05 2.00E-02 1.0 2.91E-02 1.06E-08 4.79E-05 1.75E-11 Total CDF/LERF Fire PRA Variant Case 2.60E-07 4.40E-10 Table 2-1b Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train B Alignment IGF CDF LERF Zone Scen ScenDesc (ry NSP SF CCDP (rr CLERP (Ir-(/rx-yr) (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr)2254 D1 TRANSIENT 
-HGL 6.04E-06 1.0 1.0 3.08E-02 1.86E-07 5.16E-05 3.12E-10 2254 El HSDPs C and F -SEVERE 3.64E-05 2.00E-02 1.O0E-01 3.08E-02 2.24E-09 5.16E-05 3.76E-12 2254 E2a HSDP F -NON SEVERE 1.82E-05 2.00E-02 1.0 7.02E-04 2.56E-10 9.91E-07 3.61E-13 2254 E2b HSDP C -NON SEVERE 1.82E-05 2.OOE-02 1.0 2.48E-02 9.02E-09 4.01 E-05 1.46E-11 Total CDF/LERF Fire PRA Variant Case 1.98E-07 3.30E-10 Where: Zone = Fire Zone Scen = 'A' to signify the variant case ScenDesc = Description of the Fire Scenario IGF = Ignition Frequency 
(/rx-yr)NSP = Non Suppression Probability SF = Severity Factor CCDP = Conditional Core Damage Probability CDF = Core Damage Frequency 
(/rx-yr)CLERP = Conditional Large Early Release Probability LERF = Large Early Release Frequency 
(/rx-yr)Revision 0 Page 8 of 19 Revision 0 Page 8 of 19 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-012 2.2 Compliant Case Calculation The following sub-sections provide the basis for modeling each VFDR (or category of VFDRs)and the alterations that have been made to the variant case to represent the compliant case. In each section a discussion of the VFDR (or the category of VFDRs) is provided.2.2.1 VFDRs Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA For VFDRs specifically modeled in the Fire PRA, a table outlining the actual changes made to the Fire PRA model for that VFDR is provided.
The table includes: " Component Numbers associated with the VFDR. In some cases, there may be additional" Component Numbers listed that may be the power supplies or other supporting components" Basic Event(s) associated with the Components" Scenarios which affect the VFDR.2.2.1.1 VFDRs U2-2-012-IA-001, 002, 003 The PRA model has the IA system dependency logic in the model and is not assumed failed in every fire area. The IA failure is based on a scenario specific basis. IA is modeled in this fire area but not failed due to the fire; therefore, the delta risk associated with this VFDR is epsilon." U2-2-012-IA-00 I -Q2E2I V0243:CLOSED:CLOSED" U2-2-012-IA-002 
-Q2E2 I V0244:OPEN:MODULATE" U2-2-012-IA-003 
-Q2E21 V0245:CLOSED:OPEN/CLOSED 2.2.1.2 VFDRs U2-2-012-IA-004, SEP-002, 003, 008* U2-2-012-IA-004 
-Q2E2 1 V0347:MODULATED:MODULATE
* U2-2-012-SEP-002 
-Q2E21POO02B:ON:ON/OFF-TRAIN B" U2-2-012-SEP-003 
-Q2E21POO02C:ON:ON/OFF" U2-2-012-SEP-008 
-Q2E21 V0347:MODULATED:MODULATE Table 2-2-1 VFDR U2-2-012-IA-004, SEP-002, 003, 008 ALTERATIONS Component ID Basic Event BE Description Model Alterations Scenarios CHARGING FLOW Q2E21V0347:M:M 2VAF CONTROL VALVE FCV- Nominal 2254-Dl/El 122 FAILS TO CLOSE Model Alterations:
Failure mode probability set to nominal to eliminate fire contribution.
This model alteration is done in the Altered Events Table for the -COMPU2 scenario.2.2.1.3 VFDRs U2-2-012-IA-005, SEP-013" U2-2-012-IA-005 
-Q2N 1PV3371C:CLOSED:MODULATE" U2-2-012-SEP-013 
-Q2N11PV3371C:CLOSED:MODULATE Revision 0 Page 9 of 19 Version 1.0 Page 2725 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-012 Table 2-2-2 VFDR U2-2-012-IA-005, SEP-013 ALTERATIONS Component ID Basic Event BE Description Model Alterations Scenarios PRESS. CONTROLLER N2N1 1P13371C:A:
2MSPS3371 PRS.CNOLE N 2MP37 PC-3371CA FAILS Nominal 2254-Dl/El A CATRF RNOL RANDOMLY Model Alterations:
Failure mode probability set to nominal to eliminate fire contribution.
This model alteration is done in the Altered Events Table for the -COMPU2 scenario.2.2.1.4 VFDR U2-2-012-SEP-001 U2-2-012-SEP-001 
-Q2B31L0001 B:ON/OFF:ON/OFF Table 2-2-3 U2-2-012-SEP-001 ALTERATIONS Component ID Basic Event BE Description Model Alterations Scenarios PZR HEATER GROUP B Q2B31LOO01B:OX:
2ACB3 LOO DISTRUBUTION PANEL Nominal 2254-D1/E1/E2b OX 0118-U FAILS TO TURN OFF Model Alterations:
Failure mode probability set to nominal to eliminate fire contribution.
This model alteration is done in the Altered Events Table for the -COMPU2 scenario.2.2.1.5 VFDRs U2-2-012-SEP-004 and 005" U2-2-012-SEP-004-Q2N12V000IA:CLOSED:CLOSED" U2-2-012-SEP-005 
-Q2N 1 2V0001 B:CLOSED:CLOSED Table 2-2-4 U2-2-012-SEP-004 and 005 ALTERATIONS Component ID Basic Event BE Description Model Alterations Scenarios STEAM SUPPLY TO Q2N12V0001A:C:C 2AFKVHV32 TDAFW PUMP FROM SG 35A-U B (HV-3235A)
TRANSFERS OPEN STEAM SUPPLY TO Q2N12VO001B:C:C 2AFKVHV32 TDAFW PUMP FROM SG Nominal 2254-D1/E1/E2a 35B-U C (HV-3235B)
TRANSFERS OPEN Model Alterations:
Failure mode probability set to nominal to eliminate fire contribution.
This model alteration is done in the Altered Events Table for the -COMPU2 scenario.2.2.2 VFDRs Not Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA A Fire PRA was developed in accordance with the requirements of Part 4 "Requirements for Fires at Power PRA" of the ASME and ANS combined PRA Standard, ASME/ANS RA-Sa-2009, "Standard for Level 1/Large Early Release Frequency Probabilistic Risk Assessment for Nuclear Power Plant Applications".
Consistent with those requirements not all components required to meet the nuclear safety criteria need to be specifically modeled in the Fire PRA. The following VFDRs are associated with components not modeled in the Fire PRA: Revision 0 Page 10 of 19 Version 1.0 Page 2726 of 3726 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-012 2.2.2.1 VFDR U2-2-012-SEP-011 The NSCA model credits source range monitoring for verifying subcriticality.
The loss of this monitoring in and of itself does not result in the loss of any other NSCA required function.
The Fire PRA does not credit neutron monitoring as a cue for any credited human action. Therefore, the loss of neutron monitoring has no impact on the Fire PRA..U2-2-012-SEP-0 11 -N2C55NI0031A:AVAILABLE:AVAILABLE 2.2.3 Compliant Case Results Tables 2-3a and 2-3b provide the results of the compliant case calculation for fire area. All of the altered events identified in Section 2.2.1 have been applied to their respective scenarios and the results have been quantified.
The CDF and LERF results are provided on a scenario basis.Revision 0 Page 11 of 19 Revision 0 Page 11 of 19 Version 1.0 Page 2727 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-012 Table 2-3a Compliant Case CDF and LERF Results Train A Alignment Zone Scen Scenario Scenario Specific CCDP CDF CLERP LERF Description VFDRs (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr)2254 D1- TRANSIENT 
-HGL U2-2-012-IA-004, U2-2-012-SEP-002, 003, 3.65E-02 2.20E-07 6.12E-05 3.70E-10 COMPU2 004,005, 008 2254 El- HSDPs C and F -U2-2-012-IA-004, U2-2-012-SEP-002, 003, 3.65E-02 2.66E-09 6.12E-05 4.46E-12 COMPU2 SEVERE 004,005, 008 224 E2a- HSDP F -NON 2254 COMPU2 SEVERE U2-2-012-SEP-004, U2-2-012-SEP-005 8.47E-06 3.09E-12 2.41E-08 8.78E-15 2254 E2b- HSDP C -NON U2-2-012-IA-004, U2-2-012-SEP-002, U2 2.91E-02 1.06E-08 4.79E-05 1.75E-11 COMPU2 SEVERE 012-SEP-003, U2-2-012-SEP-008 Compliant Scenario Total CDF and LERF 2.34E-07 3.92E-10 Table 2-3b Compliant Case CDF and LERF Results Train B Alignment Zone Scen Scenario Scenario Specific CCDP CDF CLERP LERF Description VFDRs (Irx-yr) (/rx-yr)2254 D1- TRANSIENT 
-HGL U2-2-012-IA-004, U2-2-012-SEP-002, 003, 2.64E-02 1.59E-07 4.39E-05 2.65E-10 COMPU2 004,005, 008 2254 El- HSDPs C and F -U2-2-012-IA-004, U2-2-012-SEP-002, 003, 2.64E-02 1.92E-09 4.39E-05 3.20E-12 COMPU2 SEVERE 004, 005, 008 2254 E2a- HSDPF-NON U2-2-012-SEP-004, U2-2-012-SEP-005 8.48E-06 3.09E-12 2.41E-08 8.78E-15 COMPU2 SEVERE 2254 E2b- HSDP C -NON U2-2-012-IA-004, U2-2-012-SEP-002, U2 2.48E-02 9.02E-09 4.01E-05 1.46E-11 COMPU2 SEVERE 012-SEP-003, U2-2-012-SEP-008 Compliant Scenario Total CDF and LERF 1.70E-07 2.83E-10 Revision 0 Page 12 of 19 Revision 0 Page 12 of 19 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-012 2.2.4 Required Modifications The following plant modification is required as a result of the risk evaluation for this fire area:* Incipient detection in panels Q2H21NBAFP2605C and Q2H21NBAFP2605F
* Install new trip device in panel Q2R42B0001B, breaker LB14 2.2.5 Required Recovery Actions There are no required recovery actions as a result of the risk evaluation for this fire area.2.3 Risk Evaluation Results The ACDF/LERF is below the screening acceptance criteria of I E-07/rx-yr (CDF) and 1 E-08/rx-yr (LERF) for acceptable risk. All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0 ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency.
The following tables present the fire zone/scenario fire risk as well as the total fire risk for this fire area Table 2-4a 1 FIRE AREA kCDF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN A ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CCDP CDF CCDP CDF &#xa3;aCDF 2254/D1 4.08E-02 2.47E-07 3.65E-02 2.20E-07 2.62E-08 2254/El 4.08E-02 2.97E-09 3.65E-02 2.66E-09 3.15E-10 2254/E2a 7.01E-04 2.55E-10 8.47E-06 3.09E-12 2.52E-10 2254/E2b 2.91 E-02 1.06E-08 2.91E-02 1.06E-08 O.OOE+00 Total CDF and delta CDF 2.60E-07 2.34E-07 2.67E-08 1 _ N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and O.OOE+00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.Table 2-4b 1 FIRE AREA ACDF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN B ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CCDP CDF CCDP CDF aCDF 2254/D1 3.08E-02 1.86E-07 2.64E-02 1.59E-07 2.69E-08 2254/El 3.08E-02 2.24E-09 2.64E-02 1.92E-09 3.25E-10 2254/E2a 7.02E-04 2.56E-10 8.48E-06 3.09E-12 2.52E-10 2254/E2b 2.48E-02 9.02E-09 2.48E-02 9.02E-09 O.OOE+00 Total CDF and delta CDF 1.98E-07 1.70E-07 2.75E-08 1 _ N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and O.OOE+00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.Revision 0 Page 13 of 19 Version 1.0 Page 2729 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-012 SE-C051 326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-012 Table 2-5a 1 FIRE AREA &#xa3;ALERF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN A ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CLERP LERF CLERP LERF ALERF 2254/D1 6.91E-05 4.18E-10 6.12E-05 3.70E-10 4.77E-11 2254/E 1 6.91 E-05 5.03E-12 6.12E-05 4.46E-12 5.74E-13 2254/E2a 9.90E-07 3.61E-13 2.41E-08 8.78E-15 3.52E-13 2254/E2b 4.79E-05 1.75E- 11 4.79E-05 1.75E-11 O.OOE+00 Total LERF and delta LERF 4.40E-10 3.92E-10 4.86E-11-N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and O.OOE+00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.Table 2-5b 1 FIRE AREA aLERF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN B ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CLERP LERF CLERP LERF ALERF 2254/D1 5.16E-05 3.12E-10 4.39E-05 2.65E-10 4.62E-11 2254/El 5.16E-05 3.76E-12 4.39E-05 3.20E-12 5.56E-13 2254/E2a 9.91E-07 3.61E-13 2.41E-08 8.78E-15 3.52E-13 2254/E2b 4.01 E-05 1.46E-11 4.01E-05 1.46E-11 O.OOE+00 Total LERF and delta LERF 3.30E-10 2.83E-10 4.71E-11-N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.OOE+00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.3.0 DID EVALUATION 3.1 Defense-in-Depth Evaluation A review of the impact of the change on defense-in-depth (DID) was performed.
NFPA 805 defines DID as: " Preventing fires from starting" Rapidly detecting fires and controlling and extinguishing promptly those fires that do occur, thereby limiting damage" Providing adequate level of fire protection for structures, systems and components important to safety; so that a fire that is not promptly extinguished will not prevent essential plant safety functions from being performed.
In general, the DID requirement was considered satisfied if the proposed change does not result in a substantial imbalance among these elements (or echelons).
The review of DID was qualitative and addressed each of the elements with respect to the proposed change. Fire protection features and systems relied upon to ensure DID were identified in the assessment (e.g., detection, suppression system).The VFDRs and the associated Fire Area risk (CDF) and scenario consequences (CCDP values)were evaluated to identify general DID echelon imbalances.
Potential methods to balance the DID features were identified ensuring an adequate balance of DID features is maintained for the Fire Area. See Section 3.2 for the results of the evaluation.
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-FIRE for FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-012 3.2 Defense-in-Depth Review Results A review of defense in depth and risk evaluation results show that, given the systems and features specified in Table 3-1 and Section 2 respectively, risk acceptance criteria are met and that the balance of defense in depth is maintained.
However due to uncertainties associated with analytical methods and the existence of significant fuel packages in the area, it is deemed prudent to require detection to ensure prompt fire brigade response.In the event of no intervention by the plant fire brigade, it is not expected that a credible fire would develop which would not be bounded by the analyzed scenarios.
Based on the required fire protections systems/features specified, the ability to meet nuclear safety performance criteria is ensured.The table below summarizes how an adequate balance of DID is maintained.
Table 3-1 Defense-in-Depth Impact Review Method of Providing DID Discussion Echelon 1: Prevent fires from starting Combustible Control No change necessary to procedure(s) 
/guidance document(s).'
Hot Work Control No change necessary to procedure(s) 
/guidance document(s).
1 Echelon 2: Rapidly detect, control and extinguish promptly those fires that do occur thereby limiting fire damage Detection System Detection system installed and required.Automatic Fire Suppression No automatic suppression system installed and not required.Portable Fire Extinguishers No portable extinguishers available and not required.Hose stations and hydrants CO 2 hose reel is available in adjacent area(s), but no enhancements located in the area(s) required.
1 Pre-Fire Plan No change necessary to procedure(s) 
/guidance document(s).
Echelon 3: Provide adequate level of fire protection for systems and structures so that a fire will not prevent essential safety functions from being performed Walls, floors ceilings and structural No changes necessary to existing barriers.elements are rated or have been evaluated as adequate for the hazard.Openings in the fire barrier are rated No changes necessary to existing barrier openings.
1 or have been evaluated as adequate for the hazard.Supplemental barriers (e.g., ERFBS, No supplemental barriers installed and not required.cable tray covers, etc.)Guidance provided to operations No VFDR related DID recovery actions required.personnel detailing the credited success path(s) including recovery actions to achieve nuclear safety performance criteria.1 This fire protection feature is relied upon without further DID enhancements beyond inherent programmatic requirements of NFPA 805, Chap. 3 and will not be reported in Table 5-2.3.2.1 Required Modifications There are no modifications required as a result of the DID evaluation for this fire area.Revision 0 Page 15 of 19 Version 1.0 Page 2731 of 3726 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-012 3.2.2 Required Recovery Actions There are no required recovery actions as a result of the DID evaluation for this fire area.4.0 SAFETY MARGIN EVALUATION 4.1 Safety Margin Evaluation In accordance with NEt 04-02, 5.3.5.3 guidance, the maintenance of adequate Safety Margin is assessed by the consideration of categories of analyses utilized by this fire risk evaluation (FRE).Safety margins are considered to be maintained if: " Codes and standards or their alternatives accepted for use by the NRC are met, and" Safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) are met, or provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty.
The maintenance of adequate safety margin for the change analysis is described for each of the specific analysis types used in support of the fire risk assessment.
4.1.1 Fire Modeling Fire modeling performed in support of the transition has been performed within the Fire PRA utilizing codes and standards developed by industry and NRC staff to provide realistic yet conservative results. Specifically, the heat release rates utilized in the transition analysis are based upon NUREG/CR 6850, Task 8, Scoping Fire Modeling.
These heat release rates are conservative and represent values used to screen out fixed ignition sources that do not pose a threat to the targets within specific fire compartments and to assign severity factors to unscreened fixed ignition sources.The combined analysis approach is used during transition; therefore, maximum expected fire scenario/limiting fire scenario have not been analyzed separately.
The bases for the application of these fire modeling codes and standards were not altered in support of this FRE.4.1.2 Plant System Performance Plant system performance parameters were not modified as a result of this FRE. These performance parameters were originally established to support nuclear performance criteria contained in the plant specific accident analyses.
These analyses established component and system performance criteria necessary to establish safe and stable plant operation, as well as, safe shut down of the unit in the event of a fire. These performance parameters were not modified as a result of this FRE.4.2 Safety Margin Results All analyses and assessment have been performed utilizing accepted techniques and industry accepted standards.
In addition, safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) have been considered and provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty.
As such, the Safety Margins are maintained as discussed in Section 4.1.Revision 0 Page 16 of 19 Version 1.0 Page 2732 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-012 5.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION RESULTS 5.1 Dispositions of VFDRs Based on the FRE results contained in Sections 2, 3 and 4 the VFDRs identified in Section 1.1 have been resolved as follows: Table 5-1 Final Variance Disposition Disposition VFDR ID U2-2-012-IA-001 U2-2-012-IA-002 U2-2-012-IA-003 U2-2-012-IA-004 U2-2-012-IA-005 U2-2-012-SEP-001 U2-2-012-SEP-002 U2-2-012-SEP-003 U2-2-012-SEP-004 U2-2-012-SEP-005 U2-2-012-SEP-008 U2-2-012-SEP-01 1 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action U2-2-012-SEP-013 Revision 0 Page 17 of 19 Version 1.0 Page 2733 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-012 5.2 Fire Risk Evaluation Summary of Fire Protection Systems and Features Table 5-2 Summary of Required Fire Protection Systems and Features Required Required Required Fire FireSuppression Detection Protection Feature Required Fire Protection System and Feature Details System System (R D)(R, D) (R, D)R -Modification to install incipient detection and to replace trip device in panel Q2R42B0001B, breaker LB14 2254 None R, D None R -Detection system D -Detection system Required Suppression/Detection/Feature:
required in the Fire Area based on NFPA 805 Chapter 4 compliance.
The information is provided on a zone basis. The basis for the requirement of the fire protection system is designated as follows:* R -Risk Criteria:
Systems required to meet the Risk Criteria for the Performance-Based Approach (NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4)* D -Defense-in-depth Criteria:
Systems required to maintain adequate balance of Defense-in-Depth for a Performance-Based Approach (NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4)Fire Protection Features in this Table only refer to those features installed in the Fire Area that have a corresponding Chapter 3 requirement.
5.3 Summary of Recovery Actions No recovery actions are required for this fire area.5.4 Summary of Plant Modifications Table 5-3 -Plant Modifications Item Unit Problem Statement Proposed Modification In Comp Risk Informed Characterization FPRA Measure U22 Panel contains equipment with Install incipient detection in panels Allows early detection which provides U2-1 2 potential to result in significant Q2H21NBAFP2605F, Yes Yes additional risk benefits for CDF and 012-1 risk impacts Q2H21NBAFP2605C LERF.Reduce risk due to fire induced failure by Replace trip device to ensure Replace trip device in panel modifying the circuit breaker and 1_2 2 breaker coordination of supply Yes Yes moiynthcrutbearad 012-2 ake coordatofs Q2R42B0001 B, breaker LB14 preventing damage to downstream and load breakers components.
Revision 0 Page 18 of 19 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-012 SE-C051326701 
-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-012 5.5 Fire Area Risk Summary Fire Area U2 2-012 Area Description Hallway & Local Hot Shutdown Panel Room NFPA 805 Basis 4.2.4 Table 5-4 -Fire Area Risk Summary VFDR Fire Area CDF/LERF (Yes/No) (2.29E-07/3.85E-10 Yes RAs Yes/No)No Fire Risk Eval A CDF/LERF 2.71 E-08/4.78E-1 1 Additional Risk of RAs N/A Revision 0 Page 19 of 19 Revision 0 Page 19 of 19 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-013 Attachment 
-Unit 2 Fire Area 2-013 FRE for Fire Area Aux Building Cable Chase Rooms 2227, 2300, 2466, and 2500 Revision:
1 Name Fire PRA Preparer Fire PRA Reviewer Fire Protection Preparer Fire Protection Reviewer NSCA Preparer NSCA Reviewer FRE Preparer FRE Reviewer Jonathan Hedrick Clint Pierce Robert Kirkpatrick Rebecca Puckett Larry Valmonte Dan Funk Steve Hardy Brandon Jamar Revision 1 Page 1 of 36 Version 1.0 Page 2736 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-013 1.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION INPUT ....................................................................
4 1.1 Variances from the Deterministic Requirements 
....................................
4 1.2 Fire Protection Systems and Features ..................................................
11 1.2.1 Construction 
..............................................................................
11 1.2 .2 D etectio n ................................................................................. 
..1 1 1.2.3 Fixed Fire Suppression 
............................................................
11 1.2.4 Manual Suppression 
.................................................................
11 1.2.5 Ventilation (Smoke Removal) ....................................................
11 1.2.6 Other Fire Protection Features ..................................................
11 1.2.7 Fire Hazard Identification 
..........................................................
12 1.2.8 Fire PRA Input ..........................................................................
12 2.0 RISK EVALUATION 
.......................................................................................
12 2.1 Fire PRA Variant Case Calculation 
......................................................
12 2.2 Compliant Case Calculation 
.................................................................
15 2.2.1 VFDRs Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA ............................
15 2.2.2 VFDRs Not Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA .....................
25 2.2.3 Compliant Case Results ...........................................................
25 2.2.4 Required Modifications 
.............................................................
28 2.2.5 Required Recovery Actions ......................................................
28 2.3 Risk Evaluation Results .......................................................................
28 3.0 DID EVALUATION 
..........................................................................................
30 3.1 Defense-in-Depth Evaluation 
...............................................................
30 3.2 Defense-in-Depth Review Results ......................................................
30 3.2.1 Required Modifications 
.............................................................
31 3.2.2 Required Recovery Actions ......................................................
32 4.0 SAFETY MARGIN EVALUATION 
..................................................................
32 4.1 Safety Margin Evaluation 
.....................................................................
32 4.1.1 Fire Modeling ...........................................................................
32 4.1.2 Plant System Performance 
......................................................
32 4.2 Safety Margin Results ..........................................................................
32 5.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION RESULTS ............................................................
33 5.1 Dispositions of VFDRs .......................................................................
33 Revision 1 Page 2 of 36 Version 1.0 Page 2737 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-013 SE-C051 326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-013 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 Fire Risk Evaluation Summary of Fire Protection Systems and Features 35 Summary of Recovery Actions .............................................................
35 Summary of Plant Modifications 
..........................................................
36 Fire Area Risk Summary ......................................................................
36 Revision 1 Page 3 of 36 Version 1.0 Page 2738 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-013 1.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION INPUT 1.1 Variances from the Deterministic Requirements The VFDRs identified for evaluation for Unit 2, Fire Area 2-013, Aux Building Cable Chase Rooms 2227, 2300, 2466, and 2500 are: Table 1-1 VFDRs VFDR Component(s)
Description U2-2-013-IA-Q2B31V0053:CLOSED:OPEN/C This component requires instrument air to perform its 001 LOSED, PRESSURIZER credited function.
Instrument air is assumed to be POWER OPERATED RELIEF unavailable in this fire area because air loss paths have not been identified.
The valve is normally closed, required to cycle to control RCS pressure.
Fire induced damage due to instrument air components prevent the ability to control RCS pressure, and a challenge to the RCS Inventory and Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-013-SEP-N2B21TR0410 (TE410) -RCS These RCS Loop 1 indicators are normally available, only 001 Cold Leg Temperature Recorder one set of the indicators from credited Steam Generator TR-410; N2B21TR0413 (TE413) RCS Loop is required available to provide process-RCS Hot Leg Temperature monitoring of Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Performance Indicator TI-413. Criteria.
Fire induced cable damage to component may result in failure to monitor the decay heat removal, and a challenge to the process monitoring capability of Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-013-SEP-N2B31L0001E:ON:OFF, The eater is normally in standby, required off to prevent 005 PRESSURIZER HEATER RCS pressure transients.
Fire induced cable damage can GROUP 2E DISTRIBUTION prevent ability to trip heater, and a challenge to the RCS PANEL Inventory and Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-013-SEP-N2B31LI0459A:AVAILABLE:AV The indicator is normally available, required available at 006 AILABLE, PRESSURIZER least one indicator from pressurizer level is required to LEVEL INDICATOR provide process monitoring of RCS level. Fire induced cable result in failure to monitor the RCS level, and a challenge to the process monitoring capability of RCS Inventory and Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-013-SEP-N2B31P10455:AVAILABLE:AVAI The indicator is normally available, required available for 008 LABLE, PRESSURIZER pressurizer pressure monitoring.
Fire induced cable PRESSURE INDICATOR PI-455 damage prevents the ability to monitor the pressure, and a (PROTECTION CHANNEL I) challenge to the performance monitoring of RCS Inventory and Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-013-SEP-N2B31P10456:AVAILABLE:AVAI The indicator is normally available, required available for 009 LABLE, PRESSURIZER pressurizer pressure monitoring.
Fire induced cable PRESSURE INDICATOR PI-456 damage prevents the ability to monitor the pressure, and a (PROTECTION CHANNEL II) challenge to the performance monitoring of RCS Inventory and Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-013-SEP-N2C55NI0031A 
-Source Range The indicator is normally available, required available to 014 Count Rate Indicator NI-31A and monitor shutdown margin. Fire induced cable damage N2C55NI0032A 
-Source Range prevents the ability to monitor the achievement of Count Rate Indicator NI-32A. adequate shutdown margin, and a challenge to the Reactivity Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.Revision I Page 4 of 36 Version 1.0 Page 2739 of 3726 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-013 Table 1-1 VFDRs VFDR Component(s)
Description U2-2-013-SEP-N2C55NI0031A 
-Source Range The indicator is normally available, required available to 015 Count Rate Indicator NI-31A and monitor shutdown margin. Fire induced cable damage N2C55NI0032A 
-Source Range prevents the ability to monitor the achievement of Count Rate Indicator NI-32A. adequate shutdown margin, and a challenge to the Reactivity Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-013-SEP-N2N11LR0477:AVAILABLE-The recorder is normally available, required available at 016 LT477:AVAILABLE-LT477, 2A, least one indicator from credited steam generator is 2B, 2C STEAM GENERATOR required to provide process monitoring of steam generator WIDE RANGE LEVEL level. Fire induced cable result in failure to monitor the RECORDER steam generator level, and a challenge to the process monitoring capability of Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-013-SEP-N2N11P10474:AVAILABLE:AVAI The indicator is normally available, required available at 018 LABLE, STEAM GENERATOR least one indicator steam generator pressure is required to 2A DISCHARGE PRESSURE provide process monitoring of steam generator pressure.Fire induced cable damage results in failure to monitor the steam generator pressure, and a challenge to the process monitoring capability of Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-013-SEP-N2N 11 P10484:AVAILABLE:AVAI The indicator is normally available, required available at 019 LABLE, STEAM GENERATOR least one indicator steam generator pressure is required to 2B DISCHARGE PRESSURE provide process monitoring of steam generator pressure.Fire induced cable damage results in failure to monitor the steam generator pressure, and a challenge to the process monitoring capability of Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-013-SEP-Q2N11PV3371A:CLOSED:CLO The valve is normally closed, required closed to control 022 SED, MAIN STEAM ATMOS steam generator pressure.
Fire induced cable damage RELIEF can spuriously open valve and prevent the ability to control steam generator pressure, and a challenge to the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-013-SEP-Q2N1 1 PV3371 B:CLOSED:CLO The valve is normally closed, required closed to control 023 SED, MAIN STEAM ATMOS steam generator pressure.
Fire induced cable damage RELIEF can spuriously open valve and prevent the ability to control steam generator pressure, and a challenge to the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-013-SEP-Q2N1 1PV3371C:CLOSED:CLO The valve is normally closed, required closed to control 024 SED, MAIN STEAM ATMOS steam generator pressure.
Fire induced cable damage RELIEF can spuriously open valve and prevent the ability to control steam generator pressure, and a challenge to the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-013-SEP-Q2N12V0001A:CLOSED:CLOS The valve is normally closed, required closed to prevent 025 ED, TDAFP STEAM SUPPLY uncontrolled TDAFW supply to steam generator and ISOLATION VALVE HV3235A overfill.
Fire induced cable damage can spuriously operate valve, and a challenge to the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-013-SEP-Q2N12V0001B:CLOSED:CLOS The valve is normally closed, required closed to prevent 026 ED, TDAFP STEAM SUPPLY uncontrolled TDAFW supply to steam generator and ISOLATION VALVE HV3235B overfill.
Fire induced cable damage can spuriously operate valve, and a challenge to the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.Revision 1 Page 5 of 36 Version 1.0 Page 2740 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-013 Table 1-1 VFDRs VFDR Component(s)
Description U2-2-013-SEP-Q2N23P0001A:OFF:ON/OFF, The pump is normally off, required on to provide AFW to a 027 2A MDAFW PUMP steam generator.
Fire induced cable damage can prevent the ability of pump to deliver flow to steam generator, and a challenge to the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-013-SEP-Q2B41PO001A:ON:OFF, RCP The pump is normally on, required off to prevent RCS 031 2A inventory losses. Fire induced cable damage to power supply may prevent pump trip, and a challenge to the RCS Inventory and Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-013-SEP-Q2B41P0001B:ON:OFF, RCP The pump is normally on, required off to prevent RCS 032 2B inventory losses. Fire induced cable damage and control power supply failure may prevent pump trip, and a challenge to the RCS Inventory and Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-013-SEP-Q2B31LO001A:ON/OFF:OFF, The heater is normally available, required available to 033 PRESSURIZER HEATER control pressure.
Fire induced damage to power supplies GROUP 2A DISTRIBUTION result in failure of heater operation, and a challenge to the PANEL RCS Inventory and Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-013-SEP-Q2B31 L0001 B:ON/OFF:ON/OFF The Heater is normally in standby, required off to prevent 034 , PRESSURIZER HEATER RCS pressure transients.
Fire induced cable damage and GROUP 2B DISTRIBUTION control power supply failure can prevent ability to trip PANEL heater, and a challenge to the RCS Inventory and Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-013-SEP-N2B31L0001C:ON:OFF, The Heater is normally in standby, required off to prevent 035 PRESSURIZER HEATER RCS pressure transients.
Fire induced damage to power GROUP 2C DISTRIBUTION supplies can prevent ability to trip heater, and a challenge PANEL to the RCS Inventory and Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-013-SEP-N2B31L0001D:ON:OFF, The Heater is normally in standby, required off to prevent 036 PRESSURIZER HEATER RCS pressure transients.
Fire induced damage to power GROUP 2D DISTRIBUTION supplies can prevent ability to trip heater, and a challenge PANEL to the RCS Inventory and Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-013-SEP-Q2B31V0053 
-Pressurizer The valve is normally closed, required to cycle to control 037 Power Operated Relief; RCS pressure.
Fire induced damage due to instrument air N2B31 PT0445 -Safety Injection components and transmitter signal prevent the ability to Pressurizer Tank Pressure control RCS pressure, and a challenge to the RCS Transmitter.
Inventory and Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-013-SEP-Q2E21P0002B 
-2B Charging The pump is normally in Standby, required off; sequencer 042 Pump; Q2E21 P0002C -2C normally available, required available, and panel normally Charging Pump; Q2R41L0001E energized, required energized.
Fire induced cable damage-125Vdc Distribution Panel 2E; and cascading power supply failures can prevent tripping Q2R43E0001B 
-Sequencer Bus the pumps, and a challenge to the RCS Inventory and 2G. Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-013-SEP-Q2E21P0002B 
-2B Charging The pump is normally in Standby, required off; sequencer 043 Pump; Q2E21 P0002C -2C normally available, required available, and panel normally Charging Pump; Q2R41L0001E energized, required energized.
Fire induced cable damage-125Vdc Distribution Panel 2E; and cascading power supply failures can prevent tripping Q2R43EOOO1B 
-Sequencer Bus the pumps, and a challenge to the RCS Inventory and 2G. Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.Revision 1 Page 6 of 36 Version 1.0 Page 2741 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-013 Table 1-1 VFDRs VFDR Component(s)
Description U2-2-013-SEP-Q2E21P0002B 
-2B Charging The pump is normally in Standby, required off; sequencer 044 Pump; Q2E21P0002C 
-2C normally available, required available, and panel normally Charging Pump; Q2R41L0001E energized, required energized.
Fire induced cable damage-125Vdc Distribution Panel 2E; and cascading power supply failures can prevent tripping Q2R43EO001B 
-Sequencer Bus the pumps, and a challenge to the RCS Inventory and 2G. Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-013-SEP-Q2E21P0002B 
-2B Charging The pump is normally in Standby, required off; sequencer 045 Pump; Q2E21P0002C 
-2C normally available, required available, and panel normally Charging Pump; Q2R41L0001E energized, required energized.
Fire induced cable damage-125Vdc Distribution Panel 2E; and cascading power supply failures can prevent tripping Q2R43EO001B 
-Sequencer Bus the pumps, and a challenge to the RCS Inventory and 2G. Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-013-SEP-Q2E21V0016A:CLOSED:CLOS The valve is normally closed, required closed to prevent 046 ED, HHSI TO RCS COLD LEG charging pump runout. Fire induced damage generates ISOLATION SIAS signal to cause failure of charging pump, and a challenge to the Reactivity Control and RCS Inventory and Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-013-SEP-Q2E21V0258:OPEN:OPEN, The valve is normally open, required to open to maintain 047 CHARGING PUMPS TO REGEN RCS inventory.
Fire induced cable damage may generate HX a SIAS to preventing ability to provide charging, and a challenge to the Reactivity and RCS Inventory and Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-013-SEP-Q2E21V0257:OPEN:OPEN, The valve is normally open, required to open to maintain 048 CHARGING PUMPS TO REGEN RCS inventory.
Fire induced cable damage may generate HX a SIAS to preventing ability to provide charging, and a challenge to the Reactivity and RCS Inventory and Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-013-SEP-Q2E21V0347:MODULATED:MO The valve is normally modulated, required modulated to 049 DULATE, CHARGING FLOW provide makeup. Fire induced cable damage and CONTROL VALVE instrument air components failure can prevent makeup, and a challenge to the RCS Inventory and Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-013-SEP-Q2E21V0376A 
-VCT Outlet The valves are normally open, required open to supply 050 Isolation; Q2E21V0376B 
-VCT VCT to charging pump. Fire induced damage to power Outlet Isolation.
supplies generate SIAS or low VCT level to spuriously operate valves to cause failure of charging pump, and a challenge to the RCS Inventory and Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-013-SEP-Q2E21V0376A 
-VCT Outlet The valves are normally open, required open to supply 051 Isolation; Q2E21V0376B 
-VCT VCT to charging pump. Fire induced damage to power Outlet Isolation.
supplies generate SIAS or low VCT level to spuriously operate valves to cause failure of charging pump, and a challenge to the RCS Inventory and Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.Revision 1 Page 7 of 36 Version 1.0 Page 2742 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-013 Table 1-1 VFDRs VFDR Component(s)
Description U2-2-013-SEP-N2N21P0001A 
-Condensate The pumps are normally on required off, the valve is 052 Pump 2A; N2N21P0001B 
-normally open, required closed to prevent steam generator Condensate Pump 2B; overfill.
Fire induced cable damage can fail pumps on and N2N21P0001C 
-Condensate fail valve open, and a challenge to the Decay Heat Pump 2C; Q2N21V0001A 
-A Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.Steam Generator Main Feed Stop Check Valve MOV3232A, Q2N21VO001B 
-B Steam Generator Main Feed Stop Check Valve MOV3232B, Q2N21VO001C 
-C Steam Generator Main Feed Stop Check Valve MOV3232C.U2-2-013-SEP-N2N21P0001A 
-Condensate The pumps are normally on required off, the valve is 053 Pump 2A; N2N21P0001B 
-normally open, required closed to prevent steam generator Condensate Pump 2B; overfill.
Fire induced cable damage can fail pumps on and N2N21P0001C 
-Condensate fail valve open, and a challenge to the Decay Heat Pump 2C; Q2N21V0001A 
-A Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.Steam Generator Main Feed Stop Check Valve MOV3232A, Q2N21VO001B 
-B Steam Generator Main Feed Stop Check Valve MOV3232B, Q2N21V0001C 
-C Steam Generator Main Feed Stop Check Valve MOV3232C.U2-2-013-SEP-N2N21P0001A 
-Condensate The pumps are normally on required off, the valve is 054 Pump 2A; N2N21POOO1B 
-normally open, required closed to prevent steam generator Condensate Pump 2B; overfill.
Fire induced cable damage can fail pumps on and N2N21POO01C 
-Condensate fail valve open, and a challenge to the Decay Heat Pump 2C; Q2N21V0001A 
-A Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.Steam Generator Main Feed Stop Check Valve MOV3232A, Q2N21V0001B 
-B Steam Generator Main Feed Stop Check Valve MOV3232B, Q2N21V0001C 
-C Steam Generator Main Feed Stop Check Valve MOV3232C.U2-2-013-SEP-N2N21P0001A 
-Condensate The pumps are normally on required off, the valve is 055 Pump 2A; N2N21POOO1B 
-normally open, required closed to prevent steam generator Condensate Pump 2B; overfill.
Fire induced cable damage can fail pumps on and N2N21P0001C 
-Condensate fail valve open, and a challenge to the Decay Heat Pump 2C; Q2N21V0001A 
-A Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.Steam Generator Main Feed Stop Check Valve MOV3232A, Q2N21V0001B 
-B Steam Generator Main Feed Stop Check Valve MOV3232B, Q2N21VO001C 
-C Steam Generator Main Feed Stop Check Valve MOV3232C.Revision 1 Page 8 of 36 Version 1.0 Page 2743 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-013 Table 1-1 VFDRs VFDR Component(s)
Description U2-2-013-SEP-N2N21P0001A 
-Condensate The pumps are normally on required off, the valve is 056 Pump 2A; N2N21P0001B 
-normally open, required closed to prevent steam generator Condensate Pump 2B; overfill.
Fire induced cable damage can fail pumps on and N2N21P0001C 
-Condensate fail valve open, and a challenge to the Decay Heat Pump 2C; Q2N21V0001A 
-A Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.Steam Generator Main Feed Stop Check Valve MOV3232A, Q2N21VO001B 
-B Steam Generator Main Feed Stop Check Valve MOV3232B, Q2N21VO001C 
-C Steam Generator Main Feed Stop Check Valve MOV3232C.U2-2-013-SEP-N2N21POO01A 
-Condensate The pumps are normally on required off, the valve is 057 Pump 2A; N2N21 P0001 B -normally open, required closed to prevent steam generator Condensate Pump 2B; overfill.
Fire induced cable damage can fail pumps on and N2N21P0001C 
-Condensate fail valve open, and a challenge to the Decay Heat Pump 2C; Q2N21V0001A 
-A Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.Steam Generator Main Feed Stop Check Valve MOV3232A, Q2N21VO001B 
-B Steam Generator Main Feed Stop Check Valve MOV3232B, Q2N21VO001C 
-C Steam Generator Main Feed Stop Check Valve MOV3232C.U2-2-013-SEP-Q2E11PO001A:OFF:ON/OFF, The pump is normally off, required off to prevent pump 058 2A RHR/LHSI PUMP; damage prior to transitioning to a NPO mode shutdown.Q2E1 1 P0001 B -2B RHR/LPSI Fire induced cable damage, spurious SIAS signal and / or Pump; Q2R43E0001B 
-damage to sequencer may spuriously start pump, and a Sequencer Bus 2G challenge to the RCS Inventory and Pressure Control and Decay Heat Removal NPO Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-013-SEP-Q2E1 1 P0001A -2A RHR/LPSI The pump is normally off, required off to prevent pump 059 Pump; Q2E1 1 P0001 B -2B damage prior to transitioning to a NPO mode shutdown.RHR/LPSI Pump; Fire induced cable damage, spurious SIAS signal and / or Q2R43EO001B 
-Sequencer Bus damage to sequencer may spuriously start pump, and a 2G. challenge to the RCS Inventory and Pressure Control and Decay Heat Removal NPO Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-013-SEP-Q2N11PV3371A:CLOSED:MOD The valve is normally closed, required to cycle to control 060 ULATE, MAIN STEAM ATMOS steam generator pressure.
Fire induced cable damage RELIEF and instrument air components failures prevent the ability to control steam generator pressure, and a challenge to the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-013-SEP-Q2N11PV3371B:CLOSED:MOD The valve is normally closed, required to cycle to control 061 ULATE, MAIN STEAM ATMOS steam generator pressure.
Fire induced cable damage RELIEF and instrument air components failures prevent the ability to control steam generator pressure, and a challenge to the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.Revision 1 Page 9 of 36 Revision 1 Page 9 of 36 Version 1.0 Page 2744 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-013 Table 1-1 VFDRs VFDR Component(s)
Description U2-2-013-SEP-Q2N23HV3228A:OPEN:THROT The pump is normally off, required off; valve is normally 062 TLED, TDAFW SUPPLY TO open required closed to prevent uncontrolled TDAFW STEAM GENERATOR 2A supply to steam generator and overfill.
Fire induced cable damage and instrument air components failures may prevent the ability to turn pump off or close valve, and a challenge to the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-013-SEP-Q2N23P0002:OFF:ON/OFF, The pump is normally off, required off; valve is normally 063 TURBINE DRIVEN AUX open required closed to prevent uncontrolled TDAFW FEEDWATER PUMP TO supply to steam generator and overfill.
Fire induced cable STEAM GENERATOR 2A damage and instrument air components failures may prevent the ability to turn pump off or close valve, and a challenge to the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-013-SEP-Q2N23HV3228B:OPEN:THROT The pump is normally off, required off; valve is normally 064 TLED, TDAFW SUPPLY TO open required closed to prevent uncontrolled TDAFW STEAM GENERATOR 2B supply to steam generator and overfill.
Fire induced cable damage and instrument air components failures may prevent the ability to turn pump off or close valve, and a challenge to the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-013-SEP-Q2N23P0002:OFF:ON/OFF, The pump is normally off, required off; valve is normally 065 TURBINE DRIVEN AUX open required closed to prevent uncontrolled TDAFW FEEDWATER PUMP TO supply to steam generator and overfill.
Fire induced cable STEAM GENERATOR 2B damage and instrument air components failures may prevent the ability to turn pump off or close valve, and a challenge to the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-013-SEP-Q2N23HV3228C:OPEN:THROT The pump is normally off, required off; valve is normally 066 TLED, TDAFW SUPPLY TO open required closed to prevent uncontrolled TDAFW STEAM GENERATOR 2C supply to steam generator and overfill.
Fire induced cable damage and instrument air components failures may prevent the ability to turn pump off or close valve, and a challenge to the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-013-SEP-Q2N23P0002:OFF:ON/OFF, The pump is normally off, required off; valve is normally 067 TURBINE DRIVEN AUX open required closed to prevent uncontrolled TDAFW FEEDWATER PUMP TO supply to steam generator and overfill.
Fire induced cable STEAM GENERATOR 2C damage and instrument air components failures may prevent the ability to turn pump off or close valve, and a challenge to the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-013-SEP-Q2B41P0001A:ON:OFF, RCP The pump is normally on, required off to prevent RCS 068 2A inventory losses. Fire induced cable damage to power supply may prevent pump trip, and a challenge to the RCS Inventory and Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-013-SEP-Q2B41P0001B:ON:OFF, RCP The pump is normally on, required off to prevent RCS 069 2B inventory losses. Fire induced cable damage and control power supply failure may prevent pump trip, and a challenge to the RCS Inventory and Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.Revision I Page 10 of 36 Version 1.0 Page 2745 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-013 Table 1-1 VFDRs VFDR Component(s)
Description U2-2-013-SEP-Q2B41P0001C:ON:OFF, RCP The pump is normally on, required off to prevent RCS 070 2C inventory losses. Fire induced cable damage to power supply may prevent pump trip, and a challenge to the RCS Inventory and Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.1.2 Fire Protection Systems and Features Fire Area 2-013 consists of the following Fire Zones: a 2227 -Vertical Cable Chase, El. 128'-0" 0 2300 -Vertical Cable Chase, El. 141'-0" a 2466 -Vertical Cable Chase, El. 155'-0" 0 2500 -Vertical Cable Chase, El. 168'-6" 1.2.1 Construction Barriers for this fire area are of substantial construction and have been designed and constructed to meet separation requirements.
In the event the configuration utilized is not in accordance with recognized standards, the deviations have been evaluated to be adequate for the hazard.1.2.2 Detection Fire detection systems to provide notification to the Control Room are: H Fire Zones 2227, 2300, 2466, and 2500 are provided with detection.
1.2.3 Fixed Fire Suppression Fixed fire suppression systems to aid in control of both fire growth and spread in the fire area are:* Fire Zones 2227, 2300, 2466, and 2500 are provided with suppression.
1.2.4 Manual Suppression Manual suppression equipment to be utilized by plant personnel and/or fire brigade members are:* Fire Area 2-013 is provided with two fire hose cabinets and two portable CO 2 extinguishers located outside of Room 2300 in Room 2319 (Fire Area 2-042).1.2.5 Ventilation (Smoke Removal)Portable smoke ejectors are available to assist with smoke removal.1.2.6 Other Fire Protection Features Fire rated cable configurations are installed in the area.Revision 1 Page 11 of 36 Version 1.0 Page 2746 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-013 1.2.7 Fire Hazard Identification The major sources of combustibles in Fire Area 2-013 are cable insulation and rubber. Details regarding fire scenarios quantified in the fire PRA, and their associated ignition sources (where applicable) are discussed in Section 2.1.2.8 Fire PRA Input Fire protection features There are fire protection features specifically modeled in the Fire PRA as identified in the required plant modification section 2.2.4. There are fire rated cables that have been credited in this area (Fire Zone 2300 only).Fire protection systems The Hot Gas Layer evaluation credits the detection, automatic fire suppression system and manual fire brigade response.
The Multi Compartment Analysis evaluation credits the detection and automatic fire suppression system.Hot Gas Layer Treatment This fire area screened for potential Hot Gas Layer effects on the Zone Of Influence.
Credit for detection was taken in the Hot Gas Layer evaluation for this fire area. Credit for both automatic fire suppression system and manual fire brigade response was taken in the Hot Gas Layer evaluation for this fire area.Multi-compartment analysis Credit for detection was taken in the Multi Compartment Analysis for this fire area. Credit for automatic fire suppression system was taken in the Multi Compartment Analysis for this fire area.Scenario Review All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0, ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency.
2.0 RISK EVALUATION 2.1 Fire PRA Variant Case Calculation Tables 2-la and 2-1b provide the results of the variant case calculation for Fire Area 2-013. This is taken directly from the Fire PRA model with no changes or alterations made. The CDF and LERF results are provided on a scenario basis.Revision 1 Page 12 of 36 Version 1.0 Page 2747 of 3726 SE-C051326701 
-008Atahet-FEfrUi2Fre ra201 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-013 Table 2-1a Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train A Alignment IGF CDF LERF Zone Scen ScenDesc (Irx-yr) NSP SF CCDP (Irx-yr) CLERP (Irx-yr)2-013-ADJ 2227 2300 2466 2466 2466 2466 2466 2466 2466 2500 SE-C051326701-008 HGL D1 D2 D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D1 HGL SCENARIO 2.88E-07 TRANSIENT 2.40E-05 TRANSIENT 1.26E-06 TRANSIENT 3.27E-06 TRANSIENT 3.27E-06 TRANSIENT 3.27E-06 TRANSIENT 2.20E-06 TRANSIENT 3.27E-06 TRANSIENT 3.27E-06 TRANSIENT 3.27E-06 TRANSIENT SOUTH WALL 3.16E-06 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 8.89E-01 2.15E-03 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 6.69E-07 1.87E-03 6.63E-02 1.44E-02 1.29E-02 6.69E-07 2.56E-07 5.16E-08 8.42E-13 2.19E-12 2.19E-12 2.19E-12 4.13E-09 2.17E-07 4.71 E-08 4.21E-08 2.11E-12 5.43E-02 3.89E-06 1.61E-10 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-10 2.64E-06 1.76E-04 5.07E-05 4.16E-05 1.61E-10 1.56E-08 9.34 E-11 2.02E-16 5.26E-16 5.26E-16 5.26E-16 5.81 E-12 5.77E-10 1.66E-10 1.36E-10 5.08E-16 TRANSIENT IN FRONT OF 2500 D2 UNCOVERED TRAY BHL99Z 3.16E-06 1.0 1.0 1.29E-02 4.06E-08 4.16E-05 1.31E-10 ON W WALL 2500 D3 TRANSIENT NORTH OF 3.16E-06 1.0 1.0 1.82E-02 5.75E-08 5.60E-05 1.77E-10 LADDER Total CDF/LERF Fire PRA Variant Case 7.16E-07 1.69E-08 Revision I Pagel3 of 36 Revision 1 Pagel 3 of 36 SE-C051 326701-008Atahet-FEfrUi2Frera201 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-013 Table 2-1b Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train B Alignment IGF CDF LERF Zone Scen ScenDesc (rr NSP SF CCDP (rr CLERP (Iry (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr)2-013-ADJ 2227 2300 2466 2466 2466 2466 2466 2466 2466 2500 SE-C051326701-008 HGL D1 D2 D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D1 HGL SCENARIO TRANSIENT TRANSIENT TRANSIENT TRANSIENT TRANSIENT TRANSIENT TRANSIENT TRANSIENT TRANSIENT TRANSIENT SOUTH WALL 2.88E-07 2.40E-05 1.26E-06 3.27E-06 3.27E-06 3.27E-06 2.20E-06 3.27E-06 3.27E-06 3.27E-06 3.16E-06 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 8.89E-01 2.46E-03 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 6.64E-07 1.86E-03 6.47E-02 1.37E-02 1.29E-02 6.64E-07 2.56E-07 5.90E-08 8.35E-13 2.17E-12 2.17E-12 2.17E-12 4.1OE-09 2.12E-07 4.47E-08 4.22E-08 2.10E-12 5.43E-02 3.86E-06 1.61 E-10 1.61 E-1 0 1.61E-10 1.61 E-10 2.61 E-06 1.72E-04 4.78E-05 4.16E-05 1.61 E-10 1.56E-08 9.28E-1 1 2.02E-16 5.26E-16 5.26E-1 6 5.26E-16 5.74E-12 5.61E-10 1.57E-10 1.36E-10 5.08E-16 TRANSIENT IN FRONT OF 2500 D2 UNCOVERED TRAY BHL99Z 3.16E-06 1.0 1.0 1.29E-02 4.07E-08 4.16E-05 1.31 E-10 ON W WALL 2500 D3 TRANSIENT NORTH OF 3.16E-06 1.0 1.0 1.99E-02 6.30E-08 5.83E-05 1.84E-10 LADDER Total CDFILERF Fire PRA Variant Case 7.21 E-07 1.69E-08 Where: Zone = Fire Zone Scen = 'A' to signify the variant case ScenDesc = Description of the Fire Scenario IGF = Ignition Frequency 
(/rx-yr)NSP = Non Suppression Probability SF = Severity Factor CCDP = Conditional Core Damage Probability CDF = Core Damage Frequency 
(/rx-yr)CLERP = Conditional Large Early Release Probability LERF = Large Early Release Frequency 
(/rx-yr)Revision I Pagel4 of 36 Revision 1 Pagel14 of 36 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-013 2.2 Compliant Case Calculation The following sub-sections provide the basis for modeling each VFDR (or category of VFDRs)and the alterations that have been made to the variant case to represent the compliant case. In each section a discussion of the VFDR (or the category of VFDRs) is provided.2.2.1 VFDRs Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA For VFDRs specifically modeled in the Fire PRA, a table outlining the actual changes made to the Fire PRA model for that VFDR is provided.
The table includes: " Component Numbers associated with the VFDR. In some cases, there may be additional Component Numbers listed that may be the power supplies or other supporting components" Basic Event(s) associated with the Components" Scenarios which affect the VFDR.The components associated with the following VFDRs are specifically modeled in the Fire PRA: 2.2.1.1 VFDR U2-2-013-IA-001
* U2-2-013 -IA-00 1 -Q2B331 V0053:CLOSED:OPEN/CLOSED Table 2-2-1 U2-2-013-IA-001 ALTERATIONS Component ID Basic Event BE Description Model Alterations Scenarios N2P19PI4004B:A:
21API4004B-INSTR AIR COMPRESSOR PRESSURE INDICATOR NOMINAL NONE PI-4004B FAILS Q2P19HV2228:C:
21AAVHV22 INSTRUMENT AIR AOV Q2P19HV2228 FAILS TO NOMINAL NONE 0 28--D OE OPEN Model Alterations:
Failure mode probability set to nominal to eliminate fire contribution.
This model alteration is done in the Altered Events Table for the -COMPU2 scenario.2.2.1.2 VFDR U2-2-013-SEP-001
* U2-2-013-SEP-001 
-N2B21TR0410:AVAILABLE-TE410:AVAILABLE-TE410 Table 2-2-2 U2-2-013-SEP-001 ALTERATIONS Component ID Basic Event BE Description Model Alterations Scenarios RCS COLD LEG N2B21TR0410:A:A 2RCTR410--
TEMPERATURE
-410 --1F RECORDER TR-410 410 FAILS Model Alterations:
Failure mode probability set to nominal to eliminate fire contribution.
This model alteration is done in the Altered Events Table for the -COMPU2 scenario.Revision 1 Page 15 of 36 Version 1.0 Page 2750 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-013 2.2.1.3 VFDRs U2-2-013-SEP-005, 034, 035, 036" U2-2-013-SEP-005 
-N2B31LOOOIE:ON:OFF" U2-2-013-SEP-034-Q2B31LOOOIB:ON/OFF:ON/OFF" U2-2-013-SEP-035 
-N2B3ILOOOIC:ON:OFF" U2-2-013-SEP-036-N2B31LOOO1D:ON:OFF The PRA model requires 3 of the 5 pressurizer heaters to fail to turn off before there is a challenge to the PORVs. In this area 4 of the heaters are impacted by a fire. By setting the DC logic identified below to nominal heaters C and D will be modeled to have control and can therefore satisfy the logic to only have 2 heaters spuriously operating, therefore modeling the compliant case.Table 2-2-3 U 2-2-013-SEP-005, 034, 035, 036ALTERATIONS Component ID Basic Event BE Description Model Alterations Scenarios PZR HEATER GROUP E N2B31 L0001 E:ON: 2ACB31 LOOHETRGRU N B1LOO DISTRUBUTION PANEL NOMINAL 2466-D4 X O1E-U FAILS TO TURN OFF PZR HEATER GROUP B Q2B31L0001B:OX:
2ACB31 LOOHETRGRU OO 2AB3L DISTRUBUTION PANEL NOMINAL 2227-D1, 2466-D5, FAILS TO TURN OFF Model Alterations:
Failure mode probability set to nominal to eliminate fire contribution.
This model alteration is done in the Altered Events Table for the -COMPU2 scenario.2.2.1.4 VFDR U2-2-013-SEP-006 U2-2-013 -SEP-006 -N2B3 1 L10459A:AVAILABLE:AVAILABLE Table 2-2-4 U 2-2-013-SEP-006ALTERATIONS Component ID Basic Event BE Description Model Alterations Scenarios 2PZL1459A--
PRESSURIZER LEVEL N2B31LI0459A:A:A 2Z15A- PESRERLVLNOMINAL NONE--F INDICATOR LI-459A FAILS Model Alterations:
Failure mode probability set to nominal to eliminate fire contribution.
This model alteration is done in the Altered Events Table for the -COMPU2 scenario.2.2.1.5 VFDRs U2-2-013-SEP-008, 009" U2-2-013-SEP-008 
-N2B31PI0455:AVAILABLE:AVAILABLE
* U2-2-013-SEP-009 
-N2B3 1 P10456:AVAILABLE:AVAILABLE Table 2-2-5 U 2-2-013-SEP-008, 009 ALTERATIONS Component ID Basic Event BE Description Model Alterations Scenarios 2PZP1455---
PZR PRESS PRESSURE--F INDICATOR PI-455 FAILS 2PZP1456---
PZR PRESS PRESSURE N2B31P0456:A:A 
--F INDICATOR P-456NOMINAL NONE ReFvisDonATOPage4566ofIL Revision 1 Page 16 of 36 Version 1.0 Page 2751 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-013 Model Alterations:
Failure mode probability set to nominal to eliminate fire contribution.
This model alteration is done in the Altered Events Table for the -COMPU2 scenario.2.2.1.6 VFDR U2-2-013-SEP-016
* U2-2-013-SEP-016 
-N2NIlLR0477:AVAILABLE-LT477:AVAILABLE-LT477 Table 2-2-6 U 2-2-013-SEP-016 ALTERATIONS Component ID Basic Event BE Description Model Alterations Scenarios SG 2A, 2B, AND 2C LEVEL N2N11LR0477:A:A 2MSLR477--
WIDE RANGE-477 --7F RECORDER, LR-0477 477 FAILS Model Alterations:
Failure mode probability set to nominal to eliminate fire contribution.
This model alteration is done in the Altered Events Table for the -COMPU2 scenario.2.2.1.7 VFDRsU2-2-013-SEP-01 8, 019" U2-2-013-SEP-018 
-N2N11PI0474:AVAILABLE:AVAILABLE
* U2-2-013-SEP-019 
-N2N 11PI0484:AVAILABLE:AVAILABLE Table 2-2-7 U 2-2-013-SEP-018, 019 ALTERATIONS Component ID Basic Event BE Description Model Alterations Scenarios 2AFPI474---
SG 2A PRESSURE N2N11 P10474:A:A 
--F INDIA PR-474 NOMINAL 2466-D4--F INDICATOR PI-474 FAILS NA 2MPT474--
STEAM LINE PRESSURE Q2N11PT0474:A:A F TRANSMITTER PT-474 NOMINAL 2466-D4 FAILS 2AFPI475---
SG 2A PRESSURE N2N11P10475:A:A 
--F INDIA PRE475 NOMINAL 2466-D4--F INDICATOR PI-475 FAILS 2MSPT475--
STEAM LINE PRESSURE Q2N11PT0475:A:A TRANSMITTER PT-475 NOMINAL 2466-D4 FAILS RL CE 2ACBSL1 120V VITAL AC DIST Q2R21L0001C:E:E PANEL 2C RANDOMLY NOMINAL NONE FAILS 2AFPI1484---
SG 2B PRESSURE N2N11 P10484:A:A 
--F INIAO PRE4U4 NOMINAL 2466-D4--F INDICATOR PI-484 FAILS 2MSPT484--
STEAM LINE PRESSURE Q2N 11PT0484:A:A TRANSMITTER PT-484 NOMINAL 2466-D4 FAILS 2AFP1485---
SG 2B PRESSURE N2N11P10485:A:A 
--F INDICATOR PI-485 FAILS NOMINAL 2466-D4 2MSPT485--
STEAM LINE PRESSURE Q2N11 PT0485:A:A TRANSMITTER PT-485 NOMINAL 2466-D4 FAILS Model Alterations:
Failure mode probability set to nominal to eliminate fire contribution.
This model alteration is done in the Altered Events Table for the -COMPU2 scenario.Revision 1 Page 17 of 36 Revision 1 Page 17 of 36 Version 1.0 Page 2752 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-013 2.2.1.8 VFDRs U2-2-013-SEP-022, 023, 024" U2-2-013-SEP-022 
-Q2NI1PV3371A:CLOSED:CLOSED" U2-2-013-SEP-023 
-Q2N 11 PV337 1 B:CLOSED:CLOSED" U2-2-013-SEP-024-Q2N11PV3371C:CLOSED:CLOSED Table 2-2-8 U 2-2-013-SEP-022, 023, 024 ALTERATIONS Component ID Basic Event BE Description Model Alterations Scenarios Q2N11PV3371A:C:
2MSAVPV3 SG ARV PV3371A C 371A-U TRANSFERS OPEN Q2NllPV3371B:C:
2MSAVPV3 SG ARV PV3371B C 371B-U TRANSFERS OPEN Q2N11PV3371C:C:
2MSAVPV3 SG ARV PV3371C C 371C-U TRANSFERS OPEN Model Alterations:
Failure mode probability set to nominal to eliminate fire contribution.
This model alteration is done in the Altered Events Table for the -COMPU2 scenario.2.2.1.9 VFDRs U2-2-013-SEP-025, 026, 062, 063, 064, 065, 066, 067" U2-2-013-SEP-025 
-Q2N I 2V000 1A:CLOSED:CLOSED" U2-2-013-SEP-026 
-Q2N 1 2V000 1 B:CLOSED:CLOSED" U2-2-013-SEP-062 
-Q2N23HV3228A:OPEN:THROTTLED Note that the PRA does not model the OPEN:THROTTLED function state for the HV 3228A valve, the throttled function state is used to model the control of flow from the TDAFW pump into the steam generator to prevent overfill.
The PRA treats that in the OPEN:CLOSED function state.* U2-2-013-SEP-063 
-Q2N23P0002:OFF:ON/OFF
* U2-2-013-SEP-064 
-Q2N23HV3228B:OPEN:THROTTLED
* U2-2-013-SEP-065 
-Q2N23P0002:OFF:ON/OFF
* U2-2-013-SEP-066 
-Q2N23HV3228C:OPEN:THROTTLED
* U2-2-013-SEP-067 
-Q2N23P0002:OFF:ON/OFF Table 2-2-9 U 2-2-013-SEP-025, 026, 062, 063, 064, 065, 066, 067ALTERATIONS Component ID Basic Event BE Description Model Alterations Scenarios STEAM SUPPLY TO Q2Nl2VOO0lA:C:C 2AFKVHV32 TDAFW PUMP FROM SG NONE 35A-U B (HV-3235A)
TRANSFERS OPEN STEAM SUPPLY TO Q2N12VOO1lB:C:C 2AFKVHV32 TDAFW PUMP FROM SG NOMINAL NONE 35B-U C (HV-3235B)
TRANSFERS OPEN Model Alterations:
Failure mode probability set to nominal to eliminate fire contribution.
This model alteration is done in the Altered Events Table for the -COMPU2 scenario.Revision 1 Page 18 of 36 Version 1.0 Page 2753 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-013 2.2.1.10 VFDR U2-2-013-SEP-027 U2-2-013-SEP-027 
-Q2N23P0001A:OFF:ON/OFF Table 2-2-10 U 2-2-013-SEP-027 ALTERATIONS Component ID Basic Event BE Description Model Alterations Scenarios Q2N23PO001A:X:O 2AFPM001A MDP A FAILS TO START DUE TO RANDOM NOMINAL 2500-D3 FAULTS Q2N23P0001A:X:O 2AFPM001A MDP A FAILS TO RUN DUE TO RANDOM NOMINAL 2500-D3 X -TR-X FUT FAULTS Model Alterations:
Failure mode probability set to nominal to eliminate fire contribution.
This model alteration is done in the Altered Events Table for the -COMPU2 scenario.2.2.1.11 VFDRs U2-2-013-SEP-031, 032, 068, 069, 070" U2-2-013-SEP-031 
-Q2B41P0001A:ON:OFF" U2-2-013-SEP-032 
-Q2B41P0001B:ON:OFF" U2-2-013-SEP-068 
-Q2B41P0001A:ON:OFF" U2-2-013-SEP-069 
-Q2B41P0001B:ON:OFF" U2-2-013-SEP-070 
-Q2B41P0001C:ON:OFF To model the compliant case, the 2 out of 3 logic for the RCP temperature indicators, which are not credited in the fire PRA, needs to be set to a random failure probability.
For this, indicators A and B were chosen; these indicators, along with the other identified events will model the compliant case for any spurious operation of an RCP.Table 2-2-11 U 2-2-013-SEP-031, 032, 068, 069, 070ALTERATIONS Component ID Basic Event BE Description Model Alterations Scenarios N2R41LOOO1G:E:E 2DCBSR41 L DC CABINET 2G RANDOM NOMINAL 2227-D1, 2466-D5, 001GF FAILURE Q2B41P0001B:ON:
2RCP0001B X ----F RCP 2B FAILS TO TRIP NOMINAL NONE X ---- F Q21341 P0001 BXX 2RCP0001B RCP 2B SPURIOUSLY RE- NOMINAL NONE---- U STARTS N2R41 L0001 H:E:E 2DCBSR41L DC CABINET 2H RANDOM NOMINAL 2466-D5 001HF FAILURE CT2HHTUA3 RCP 2A MOTOR BEARING RCP-TI I-F TEMPERATURE 1.OOE-04 2227-D1,2466-D5 INDICATOR FAILS 2HHTI1UA3 RCP 2B MOTOR BEARING RCP-TI 2-F TEMPERATURE 1.00E-04 2227-D1, 2466-D5 INDICATOR FAILS Model Alterations:
Failure mode probability set to nominal to eliminate fire contribution.
This model alteration is done in the Altered Events Table for the -COMPU2 scenario.Revision 1 Page 19 of 36 Version 1.0 Page 2754 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-013 2.2.1.12 VFDR U2-2-013-SEP-033 U2-2-013-SEP-033 
-Q2B31LOOOIA:ON/OFF:ON/OFF Table 2-2-12 U2-2-013-SEP-033 ALTERATIONS Component ID Basic Event BE Description Model Alterations Scenarios EMERGENCY LOAD Q2R16B0002:E:LC 2ACBSLC2 MRECLA 2E ACBSLC CENTER 2A RANDOM NOMINAL 2466-D4 2D A-E--FFALR FAILURE Model Alterations:
Failure mode probability set to nominal to eliminate fire contribution.
This model alteration is done in the Altered Events Table for the -COMPU2 scenario.2.2.1.13 VFDR U2-2-013-SEP-037
* U2-2-013-SEP-03 7 -N2B3 I PT0445:AVAILABLE:AVAILABLE Table 2-2-13 U 2-2-013-SEP-037 ALTERATIONS Component ID Basic Event BE Description Model Alterations Scenarios PRESSURIZER 2PZPT445--
PRESSURE N2B31PT0445:A:A 
--- TRANSMTE NOMINAL NONE--F TRANSMITTER PT-445 FAILS 120V VITAL AC DIST Q2R21LO001C:E:E CBLO PANEL 2C RANDOMLY NOMINAL NONE C---FFAL FAILS Model Alterations:
Failure mode probability set to nominal to eliminate fire contribution.
This model alteration is done in the Altered Events Table for the -COMPU2 scenario.2.2.1.14 VFDRs U2-2-013-SEP-042, 043, 044, 045" U2-2-013-SEP-042 
-Q2E21POO02B:ON:ON/OFF-TRAIN B" U2-2-013-SEP-043 
-Q2E21 P0002C:ON:ON/OFF" U2-2-013-SEP-044 Q2R41 LOOO 1 E:ENERGIZED:ENERGIZED" U2-2-013-SEP-045 
-Q2R43E000IB:AVAILABLE:AVAILABLE-SEQ/SHED Table 2-2-14 U 2-2-013-SEP-042, 043, 044, 045ALTERATIONS Component ID Basic Event BE Description Model Alterations Scenarios 120V VITAL AC DIST Q2R21LO001C:E:E CSLO PANEL 2C RANDOMLY NOMINAL NONE C---FFAL FAILS STEAM LINE PRESSURE Q2N11 PT0484:A:A M TRANSMITTER PT-484 NOMINAL 2466-D4 FAILS 2PZLI459A--
PRESSURIZER LEVEL N2B31 LI0459A:A:A 2Z15A- PESRERLVLNOMINAL NONE--F INDICATOR LI-459A FAILS STEAM LINE PRESSURE Q2N11 PT0485:A:A M--F TRANSMITTER PT-485 NOMINAL 2466-D4 FAILS Revision 1 Page 20 of 36 Version 1.0 Page 2755 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-013 Table 2-2-14 U 2-2-013-SEP-042, 043, 044, 045ALTERATIONS Component ID Basic Event BE Description Model Alterations Scenarios 2MSPT494--
STEAM LINE PRESSURE Q2N1 1 PT0494:A:A TRANSMITTER PT-494 NOMINAL 2466-D4 FAILS 2MSPT495--
STEAM LINE PRESSURE Q2N11PT0495:A:A TRANSMITTER PT-495 NOMINAL 2466-D4 FAILS Model Alterations:
Failure mode probability set to nominal to eliminate fire contribution.
This model alteration is done in the Altered Events Table for the -COMPU2 scenario.2.2.1.15 VFDR U2-2-013-SEP-046 0 U2-2-013-SEP-046-Q2E21VO016A:CLOSED:CLOSED The following basic events are associated with the control of the MOV-8803A valve. By setting these events to nominal this valve will be modeled in its compliant state.Table 2-2-15 U 2-2-013-SEP-046ALTERATIONS Component ID Basic Event BE Description Model Alterations Scenarios 2ACBSLOO01 120V VITAL AC DIST Q2R21L0001C:E:E PANEL 2C RANDOMLY NOMINAL NONE FAILS 2MSPT484--
STEAM LINE PRESSURE Q2N11PT0484:A:A TRANSMITTER PT-484 NOMINAL 2466-D4 FAILS 2PZLI459A--
PRESSURIZER LEVEL--F INDICATOR LI-459A FAILS 2M5PT485--
STEAM LINE PRESSURE Q2N 11PT0485:A:A TRANSMITTER PT-485 NOMINAL 2466-D4 FAILS 2MSPT494--
STEAM LINE PRESSURE Q2N11PT0494:A:A TRANSMITTER PT-494 NOMINAL 2466-D4 FAILS 2MSPT495--
STEAM LINE PRESSURE Q2N11 PT0495:A:A TRANSMITTER PT-495 NOMINAL 2466-D4 FAILS Model Alterations:
Failure mode probability set to nominal to eliminate fire contribution.
This model alteration is done in the Altered Events Table for the -COMPU2 scenario.2.2.1.16 VFDRs U2-2-013-SEP-047, 048" U2-2-013-SEP-047 
-Q2E21V0258:OPEN:OPEN" U2-2-013-SEP-048 
-Q2E21V0257:OPEN:OPEN Table 2-2-16 U2-2-013-SEP-047, 048 ALTERATIONS Component ID Basic Event BE Description Model Alterations Scenarios 02R21 LOO1C:E:E 2ACBSL001 120V VITAL AC DIST C---F PANEL 2C RANDOMLY NOMINAL NONE Revision 1 Page 21 of 36 Version 1.0 Page 2756 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-013 Table 2-2-16 U2-2-013-SEP-047, 048 ALTERATIONS Component ID Basic Event BE Description Model Alterations Scenarios FAILS Q2N 11 PT0474:A:A Q2N1 1 PT0475:A:A Q2N 11 PT0484:A:A Q2N1 1 PT0495:A:A Q2N11PT0485:A:A Q2N1 1 PT0486:A:A Q2N11 PT0494:A:A 2MSPT474--
---F 2MSPT475--
---F 2MSPT484--
---F 2MSPT495--
---F 2MSPT485--
---F 2MSPT486--
---F 2MSPT494--
---F STEAM LINE PRESSURE TRANSMITTER PT-474 FAILS STEAM LINE PRESSURE TRANSMITTER PT-475 FAILS STEAM LINE PRESSURE TRANSMITTER PT-484 FAILS STEAM LINE PRESSURE TRANSMITTER PT-495 FAILS STEAM LINE PRESSURE TRANSMITTER PT-485 FAILS STEAM LINE PRESSURE TRANSMITTER PT-486 FAILS STEAM LINE PRESSURE TRANSMITTER PT-494 FAILS NOMINAL NOMINAL NOMINAL NOMINAL NOMINAL NOMINAL NOMINAL 2466-D4 2466-D4 2466-D4 2466-D4 2466-D4 2466-D4 2466-D4 Q2R21LOOO1D:E:E 2ACBSR21L VITAL AC PANEL 2D NOMINAL NONE 001DF FAILURE Model Alterations:
Failure mode probability set to nominal to eliminate fire contribution.
This model alteration is done in the Altered Events Table for the -COMPU2 scenario.2.2.1.17 VFDR U2-2-013-SEP-049, 050, 051" U2-2-013 -SEP-049 -Q2E21 V0347:MODULATED:MODULATE" U2-2-013-SEP-050 
-Q2E21V0376A:OPEN:OPEN" U2-2-013-SEP-051 
-Q2E21V0376B:OPEN:OPEN Table 2-2-17 U 2-2-013-SEP-049, 050, 051 ALTERATIONS Component ID Basic Event BE Description Model Alterations Scenarios 120V VITAL AC DIST Q2R21LO001C:E:E CBLO PANEL 2C RANDOMLY NOMINAL NONE C---FFAL FAILS STEAM LINE PRESSURE Q2N11PT0484:A:A M TRANSMITTER PT-484 NOMINAL 2466-D4 FAILS 2PZL1459A--
PRESSURIZER LEVEL--F INDICATOR LI-459A FAILS STEAM LINE PRESSURE Q2N11PT0485:A:A M TRANSMITTER PT-485 NOMINAL 2466-D4 FAILS Revision I Page 22 of 36 Revision 1 Page 22 of 36 Page 2757 of 3726 Version 1.0 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-013 Table 2-2-17 U 2-2-013-SEP-049, 050, 051ALTERATIONS Component ID Basic Event BE Description Model Alterations Scenarios 2MSPT494--
STEAM LINE PRESSURE Q2N11PT0494:A:A TRANSMITTER PT-494 NOMINAL 2466-D4 FAILS STEAM LINE PRESSURE Q2N11PT0495:A:A TRANSMITTER PT-495 NOMINAL 2466-D4-F FAILS Model Alterations:
Failure mode probability set to nominal to eliminate fire contribution.
This model alteration is done in the Altered Events Table for the -COMPU2 scenario.2.2.1.18 VFDRs U2-2-013-SEP-052, 053, 054" U2-2-013-SEP-052 
-Q2N21`V0001A:OPEN:CLOSED" U2-2-013 -SEP-053 -Q2N2 1VOOO 1 B:OPEN:CLOSED" U2-2-013 -SEP-054 -Q2N2 1 VOO I C:OPEN:CLOSED Table 2-2-18 U 2-2-013-SEP-052, 053, 054ALTERATIONS Component ID Basic Event BE Description Model Alterations Scenarios MAIN FW TO 2A SG STOP Q2N21VO001A:O:
2MFMV3232 VALVE MOV-3232A C A---K RANDOMLY FAILS TO CLOSE 2MFMV3232 MAIN FW TO 2A SG STOP Q2N21VO001A:C:C VALVE MOV-3232A NOMINAL 2466-D6 TRANSFERS OPEN MAIN FW TO 2B SG STOP Q2N21VOO01B:O:
2MFMV3232 VALVE MOV-3232B C B---K RANDOMLY FAILS TO CLOSE 2MFMV3232 MAIN FW TO 2B SG STOP Q2N21VO001B:C:C VALVE MOV-3232B NOMINAL 2466-D6 TRANSFERS OPEN MAIN FW TO 2C SG STOP Q2N21VO001C:O:
2MFMV3232 VALVE MOV-3232C C C---K RANDOMLY FAILS TO CLOSE Q2N21VO001C:C:
2MFMV3232 MAIN FW TO 2C SG STOP VALVE MOV-3232C NOMINAL 2466-D6 TRANSFERS OPEN Model Alterations:
Failure mode probability set to nominal to eliminate fire contribution.
This model alteration is done in the Altered Events Table for the -COMPU2 scenario.Revision 1 Page 23 of 36 Version 1.0 Page 2758 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-013 2.2.1.19 VFDRsU2-2-013-SEP-055, 056, 057" U2-2-013-SEP-055 
-N2N21P0001A:ON/STANDBY:OFF" U2-2-013 -SEP-056 -N2N2 1 P0001 B:ON/STANDBY:OFF" U2-2-013 -SEP-057 -N2N2 1 P0001 C:ON/STANDBY:OFF Table 2-2-19 U 2-2-013-SEP-055, 056, 057 ALTERATIONS Component ID Basic Event BE Description Model Alterations Scenarios N2N21PO001A:ON:
2MFPM0001 CONDENSATE PUMP 2A NOMINAL 2466-D6, 2500-D3 X A---U SPURIOUS START N2N21P0001B:ON:
2MFPM0001 CONDENSATE PUMP 2B NOMINAL 2466-D6,2500-D3 X B---U SPURIOUS START N2N21PO001C:ON 2MFPM0001 CONDENSATE PUMP 2C NOMINAL 2466-D6,2500-D3
:X C---U SPURIOUS START Model Alterations:
Failure mode probability set to nominal to eliminate fire contribution.
This model alteration is done in the Altered Events Table for the -COMPU2 scenario.2.2.1.20 VFDRs U2-2-013-SEP-058, 059 The spurious start of the RHR pump is modeled in the PRA. A spuriously actuated RHR pump can operate 3 hours if the miniflow line is available.
In the PRA a failure of the miniflow line results in failure of related RHR train regardless of RHR pump operation.
In addition, the operator will stop the RHR pump if not required during safety injection.
For the case where the sequencer is impacted, the sequencer failure would also result in a train of ECCS and supporting systems (ex: High head, SW, CCW). This means, RHR pump failure due to the loss of the sequencer is bounded by existing failures of major pumps due to sequencer failure." U2-2-013-SEP-058 
-Q2EI1P0001A:OFF:ON/OFF" U2-2-013-SEP-059 
-Q2E11P0001B:OFF:ON/OFF 2.2.1.21 VFDR U2-2-013-SEP-060
* U2-2-013-SEP-060 
-Q2N11PV3371A:CLOSED:MODULATE Table 2-2-20 U 2-2-013-SEP-060 ALTERATIONS Component ID Basic Event BE Description Model Alterations Scenarios SG ARV PV3371A FAILS Q2N1 1 PV3371A:C:
2MSAVPV3 SGAVP37AFIL N 2MSAPV TO OPEN DUE TO FIRE NOMINAL 2466-D4 DAMAGE OF CABLE PRESS. CONTROLLER N2N11 P13371A:A:
2MSPS3371 PRS.CNOLE A 2MPR7 PC-3371AA FAILS NOMINAL 2466-D4 A AATRF RNOL RANDOMLY INSTR AIR COMPRESSOR N2P19PI4004B:A:
21API4004B-ISRARCMRSO N PRESSURE INDICATOR NOMINAL NONE PI-4004B FAILS Model Alterations:
Failure mode probability set to nominal to eliminate fire contribution.
This model alteration is done in the Altered Events Table for the -COMPU2 scenario.Revision I Page 24 of 36 Revision 1 Page 24 of 36 Version 1.0 Page 2759 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-013 2.2.1.22 VFDR U2-2-013-SEP-061 U2-2-013-SEP-061 
-Q2NlIPV3371B:CLOSED:MODULATE Table 2-2-21 U 2-2-013-SEP-061 ALTERATIONS Component ID Basic Event BE Description Model Alterations Scenarios Q2N11PV3371B:C:
2MSAVPV3 SG ARV PV3371B FAILS TO OPEN DUE TO FIRE NOMINAL 2466-D4 DAMAGE OF CABLE N2N11P13371B:A:
2MSPS3371 PRESS. CONTROLLER PC-3371BA FAILS NOMINAL 2466-D4 A BATRF RNOL RANDOMLY N2P19P14004B:A:
21API4004B-INSTR AIR COMPRESSOR PRESSURE INDICATOR NOMINAL NONE PI-4004B FAILS Model Alterations:
Failure mode probability set to nominal to eliminate fire contribution.
This model alteration is done in the Altered Events Table for the -COMPU2 scenario.2.2.2 VFDRs Not Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA A Fire PRA was developed in accordance with the requirements of Part 4 "Requirements for Fires at Power PRA" of the ASME and ANS combined PRA Standard, ASME/ANS RA-Sa-2009, "Standard for Level 1/Large Early Release Frequency Probabilistic Risk Assessment for Nuclear Power Plant Applications".
Consistent with those requirements not all components required to meet the nuclear safety criteria need to be specifically modeled in the Fire PRA. The following VFDRs are associated with components not modeled in the Fire PRA: 2.2.2.1 VFDRs U2-2-013-SEP-014, 015 The NSCA model credits source range monitoring for verifying subcriticality.
The loss of this monitoring in and of itself does not result in the loss of any other NSCA required function.
The Fire PRA does not credit neutron monitoring as a cue for any credited human action. Therefore, the loss of neutron monitoring has no impact on the Fire PRA." U2-2-013-SEP-014-N2C55NI0031A:AVAILABLE:AVAILABLE" U2-2-013-SEP-015 
-N2C55NI0032A:AVAILABLE:AVAILABLE 2.2.3 Compliant Case Results Tables 2-3a and 2-3b provide the results of the compliant case calculation for this fire area. All of the altered events identified in Section 2.2.1 have been applied to their respective scenarios and the results have been quantified.
The CDF and LERF results are provided on a scenario basis.Revision 1 Page 25 of 36 Version 1.0 Page 2760 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-013 Table 2-3a Compliant Case CDF and LERF Results Train A Alignment Zone Scen Scenario Scenario Specific CCDP CDF CLERP LERF Description VFDRs (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr)2-013-ADJ HGL- HGL SCENARIO U2-2-013-SEP-005, 031, 032, 034, 035, 8.89E-01 2.56E-07 6.97E-03 2.01E-09 COMPU2 036, 068, 069, 070 D1-2227 D1U TRANSIENT N/A 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 2300 D2- TRANSIENT N/A 6.69E-07 8.42E-13 1.61 E-1 0 2.02E-1 6 COMPU2 D2-2466 D1- TRANSIENT N/A 6.69E-07 2.19E-12 1.61E-10 0 .2E-16 COMPU-2 52E1 D1-2466 D2 TRANSIENT N/A 6.69E-07 2.19E-12 1.61E-10 5.26E-16 COMPU2 D3- U2-2-013-SEP-005, 018, 019, 022, 023, 2466 COMPU2 TRANSIENT 024,033,034, 035,036, 042,043, 044, 6.69E-07 2.19E-12 1.61E-10 5.26E-16 045, 060, 061 2466 D4- TRANSIENT U2-2-013-SEP-005, 031, 032, 034, 035, 1.81 E-06 3.99E-12 8.89E-10 1.96E-15 COMPU2 036, 068,069,070 D5-2466 COMPU2 TRANSIENT U2-2-013-SEP-052, 053, 054, 055, 056, 057 6.62E-02 2.17E-07 1.75E-04 5.73E-10 D6-2466 D6- TRANSIENT N/A 1.44E-02 4.71E-08 5.07E-05 1.66E-10 COMPU-2 U2-2-013-SEP-005, 018, 019, 022, 023, 2466 D7- TRANSIENT 024,027,031,032,033, 034,035, 036, 1.29E-02 4.21E-08 4.16E-05 1.36E-10 COMPU2 042, 043,044, 045,047, 048,052, 053, 054,055, 056,057,060,061,068,069, 070 2500 D1- TRANSIENT SOUTH N/A 6.69E-07 2.11E-12 1.61E-10 5.08E-16 COMPU2 WALL TRANSIENT IN FRONT D2- OF UNCOVERED 2500 COMPU2 TRAY BHL99Z ON W U2-2-013-SEP-027, 055, 056, 057 1.29E-02 4.06E-08 4.16E-05 1.31E-10 WALL 2500 D3- TRANSIENT NORTH U2-2-013-SEP-005, 031, 032, 034, 035, 1.27E-02 4.01E-08 4.08E-05 1.29E-l0 COMPU2 OF LADDER 036, 068, 069, 070 Compliant Scenario Total CDF and LERF 6.42E-07 3.14E-09 Revision I Page 26 of 36 Revision 1 Page 26 of 36 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-013 Table 2-3b Compliant Case CDF and LERF Results Train B Alignment Zone Scen Scenario Scenario Specific CCDP CDF CLERP LERF Description VFDRs (irx-yr) (irx-yr)2-013-ADJ HGL- HGL SCENARIO U2-2-013-SEP-005, 031, 032, 034, 035, 8.89E-01 2.56E-07 6.99E-03 2.01E-09 COMPU2 036,068,069, 070 D1-2227 D1U TRANSIENT N/A 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 COMPU2 D2-2300 D2 TRANSIENT N/A 6.64E-07 8.35E-13 1.61E-10 2.02E-16 COMPU-2 D1-2466 D1U TRANSIENT N/A 6.64E-07 2.17E-12 1.61E-10 5.26E-16 COMPU2 2466 D-TRANSIENT N/A 6.64E-07 2.17E-12 1.61 E-1 0 5.26E-16 COMPU2 D3- U2-2-013-SEP-005, 018, 019, 022, 023, 2466 COMPU2 TRANSIENT 024,033,034, 035, 036, 042, 043, 044, 6.64E-07 2.17E-12 1.61 E-10 5.26E-16 045, 060, 061 2466 D4- TRANSIENT U2-2-013-SEP-005, 031, 032, 034, 035, 1.80E-06 3.97E-12 8.89E-10 1.96E-15 COMPU2 036, 068, 069, 070 D5-2466 COMPU2 TRANSIENT U2-2-013-SEP-052, 053, 054, 055, 056, 057 6.47E-02 2.12E-07 1.71E-04 5.61E-10 D6-2466 D6- TRANSIENT N/A 1.37E-02 4.47E-08 4.78E-05 1.57E-10 COMPU2 U2-2-013-SEP-005, 018, 019, 022, 023, 2466 D7- TRANSIENT 024, 027,031,032,033, 034, 035, 036, 1.29E-02 4.22E-08 4.16E-05 1.36E-10 COMPU2 042,043,044,045,047, 048, 052, 053, 054,055,056,057,060,061,068,069,070 2500 D1- TRANSIENT SOUTH N/A 6.64E-07 2.10E-12 1.61E-10 5.08E-16 COMPU2 WALL TRANSIENT IN FRONT D2- OF UNCOVERED 2500 COMPU2 TRAY BHL99Z ON W U2-2-013-SEP-027, 055, 056, 057 1.29E-02 4.07E-08 4.16E-05 1.31E-10 WALL 2500 D3- TRANSIENT NORTH U2-2-013-SEP-005, 031, 032, 034, 035, 1.27E-02 4.01E-08 4.06E-05 1.28E-10 COMPU2 OF LADDER 036, 068,069, 070 Compliant Scenario Total CDF and LERF 6.35E-07 3.13E-09 Revision I Page 27 of 36 Revision 1 Page 27 of 36 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-013 2.2.4 Required Modifications The following modifications are required as a result of the risk evaluation for this fire area: " Require protection of cable 2UYM0012A, 2UYMOO13A, 2UYMOO13B, 2UYMOO14A, 2UYMOO14B to prevent fire damage" Require protection of cable 2VBLB 1.8 B to prevent fire damage" Install new trip device in panel Q2R42B0001B, breaker LB14 2.2.5 Required Recovery Actions There are no required recovery actions as a result of the risk evaluation for this fire area.2.3 Risk Evaluation Results The total area ACDF is below the screening criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr and ALERF is above the screening criteria of 1 E-08/rx-yr.
However, the total plant delta CDF/LERF is below the RG 1.174 criteria of 1E-05/rx-yr and lE-06/rx-yr, respectively.
All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0 ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency.
The following tables present the fire zone/scenario fire risk as well as the total fire risk for this fire area.Table 2-4a'FIRE AREA aCDF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN A ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CCDP CDF CCDP CDF ACDF 2-013-ADJ/HGL 8.89E-01 2.56E-07 8.89E-01 2.56E-07 0.00E+00 2227/D12 2.15E-03 5.16E-08 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 5.16E-08 2300/D2 6.69E-07 8.42E-13 6.69E-07 8.42E-13 0.00E+00 2466/D1 6.69E-07 2.19E-12 6.69E-07 2.19E-12 0.OOE+00 2466/D2 6.69E-07 2.19E-12 6.69E-07 2.19E-12 0.OOE+00 2466/D3 6.69E-07 2.19E-12 6.69E-07 2.19E-12 O.OOE+00 2466/D4 1.87E-03 4.13E-09 1.81 E-06 3.99E-12 4.12E-09 2466/D5 6.63E-02 2.17E-07 6.62E-02 2.17E-07 3.19E-10 2466/D6 1.44E-02 4.71E-08 1.44E-02 4.71E-08 0.OOE+00 2466/D7 1.29E-02 4.21E-08 1.29E-02 4.21E-08 0.OOE+00 2500/D1 6.69E-07 2.11E-12 6.69E-07 2.11 E-12 0.OOE+00 2500/D2 1.29E-02 4.06E-08 1.29E-02 4.06E-08 0.OOE+00 2500/D3 1.82E-02 5.75E-08 1.27E-02 4.01 E-08 1.75E-08 Total CDF and delta CDF 7.16E-07 6.42E-07 7.35E-08 1 _ N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.2 -Compliant CDF/LERF of 0.OOE+00 signifies the use of the variant case CDF/LERF as the surrogate delta.Table 2-4b 1 FIRE AREA aCDF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN B ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CCDP CDF CCDP CDF ACDF 2-013-ADJ/HGL 8.89E-01 2.56E-07 8.89E-01 2.56E-07 0.00E+00 2227/D1 2  2.46E-03 5.90E-08 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 5.90E-08 Revision I Page 28 of 36 Version 1.0 Page 2763 of 3726 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-013 Table 2-4b 1 FIRE AREA ACDF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN B ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CCDP CDF CCDP CDF ACDF 2300/D2 6.64E-07 8.35E-13 6.64E-07 8.35E-13 0.00E+00 2466/D1 6.64E-07 2.17E-12 6.64E-07 2.17E-12 0.OOE+00 2466/D2 6.64E-07 2.17E-12 6.64E-07 2.17E-12 0.OOE+00 2466/D3 6.64E-07 2.17E-12 6.64E-07 2.17E-12 0.OOE+00 2466/D4 1.86E-03 4.10E-09 1.80E-06 3.97E-12 4.10E-09 2466/D5 6.47E-02 2.12E-07 6.47E-02 2.12E-07 0.OOE+00 2466/D6 1.37E-02 4.47E-08 1.37E-02 4.47E-08 0.OOE+00 2466/D7 1.29E-02 4.22E-08 1.29E-02 4.22E-08 0.OOE+00 2500/D1 6.64E-07 2.10E-12 6.64E-07 2.10E-12 0.00E+00 2500/D2 1.29E-02 4.07E-08 1.29E-02 4.07E-08 0.00E+00 2500/D3 1.99E-02 6.30E-08 1.27E-02 4.01 E-08 2.29E-08 Total CDF and delta CDF 7.21 E-07 6.35E-07 8.60E-08 1 2 N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.2 -Compliant CDF/LERF of 0.00E+00 signifies the use of the variant case CDF/LERF as the surrogate delta.Table 2-5a 1 FIRE AREA aLERF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN A ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CLERP LERF CLERP LERF ALERF 2-013-ADJ/HGL 5.43E-02 1.56E-08 6.97E-03 2.01 E-09 1.36E-08 2227/D1 3.89E-06 9.34E-11 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 9.34E-11 2300/D2 1.61E-10 2.02E-16 1.61 E-10 2.02E-16 0.OOE+00 2466/D1 1.61E-10 5.26E-16 1.61 E-10 5.26E-16 0.00E+00 2466/D2 1.61 E-10 5.26E-16 1.61 E-10 5.26E-16 0.00E+00 2466/D3 1.61 E-10 5.26E-16 1.61 E-10 5.26E-16 0.OOE+00 2466/D4 2.64E-06 5.81 E-12 8.89E-10 1.96E-15 5.81 E-12 2466/D5 1.76E-04 5.77E-10 1.75E-04 5.73E-10 3.36E-12 2466/D6 5.07E-05 1.66E-10 5.07E-05 1.66E-10 0.00E+00 2466/D7 4.16E-05 1.36E-10 4.16E-05 1.36E-10 0.00E+00 2500/D1 1.61E-10 5.08E-16 1.61E-10 5.08E-16 0.OOE+00 2500/D2 4.16E-05 1.31E-10 4.16E-05 1.31 E-10 0.00E+00 2500/D3 5.60E-05 1.77E-10 4.08E-05 1.29E-10 4.82E-11 Total LERF and delta LERF 1.69E-08 3.14E-09 1.38E-08-N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.2-Compliant CDF/LERF of 0.00E+00 signifies the use of the variant case CDF/LERF as the surrogate delta.Table 2-5b 1 FIRE AREA ALERF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN B ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CLERP LERF CLERP LERF ALERF 2-013-ADJ/HGL 5.43E-02 1.56E-08 6.99E-03 2.01E-09 1.36E-08 2227/D1 2 3.86E-06 9.28E-11 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 9.28E-11 2300/D2 1.61 E-10 2.02E-16 1.61 E-10 2.02E-16 0.OOE+00 2466/D1 1.61E-10 5.26E-16 1.61 E-10 5.26E-16 0.OOE+00 2466/D2 1.61E-10 5.26E-16 1.61E-10 5.26E-16 0.00E+00 Revision 1 Page 29 of 36 Version 1.0 Page 2764 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-013 Table 2-5b 1 FIRE AREA ALERF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN B ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CLERP LERF CLERP LERF ALERF 2466/D3 1.61E-10 5.26E-16 1.61E-10 5.26E-16 0.OOE+00 2466/D4 2.61E-06 5.74E-12 8.89E-10 1.96E-15 5.74E-12 2466/D5 1.72E-04 5.61E-10 1.71E-04 5.61E-10 5.73E-13 2466/D6 4.78E-05 1.57E-10 4.78E-05 1.57E-10 O.00E+00 2466/D7 4.16E-05 1.36E-10 4.16E-05 1.36E-10 O.00E+00 2500/D1 1.61 E-10 5.08E-16 1.61 E-10 5.08E-16 0.OOE+00 2500/D2 4.16E-05 1.31E-10 4.16E-05 1.31 E-10 0.OOE+00 2500/D3 5.83E-05 1.84E-10 4.06E-05 1.28E-10 5.57E-11 Total LERF and delta LERF 1.69E-08 3.13E-09 1.38E-08 1 -N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.2 -Compliant CDF/LERF of 0.OOE+00 signifies the use of the variant case CDF/LERF as the surrogate delta.3.0 DID EVALUATION 3.1 Defense-in-Depth Evaluation A review of the impact of the change on defense-in-depth (DID) was performed.
NFPA 805 defines DID as: " Preventing fires from starting" Rapidly detecting fires and controlling and extinguishing promptly those fires that do occur, thereby limiting damage" Providing adequate level of fire protection for structures, systems and components important to safety; so that a fire that is not promptly extinguished will not prevent essential plant safety functions from being performed.
In general, the DID requirement was considered satisfied if the proposed change does not result in a substantial imbalance among these elements (or echelons).The review of DID was qualitative and addressed each of the elements with respect to the proposed change. Fire protection features and systems relied upon to ensure DID were identified in the assessment (e.g., detection, suppression system).The VFDRs and the associated Fire Area risk (CDF) and scenario consequences (CCDP values)were evaluated to identify general DID echelon imbalances.
Potential methods to balance the DID features were identified ensuring an adequate balance of DID features is maintained for the Fire Area. See Section 3.2 for the results of the evaluation.
3.2 Defense-in-Depth Review Results A review of defense in depth and risk evaluation results show that, given the systems and features specified in Table 3-1 and Section 2 respectively, risk acceptance criteria are met and that the balance of defense in depth is maintained.
The risk acceptance criteria are met with substantial margin to account for analytical methods associated with fire scenarios.
The analyzed scenarios bound potential fuel packages which can reasonably be expected to occur in this area.Revision 1 Page 30 of 36 Version 1.0 Page 2765 of 3726 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-013 The transient scenarios of zones 2277, 2466 and 2500 present the highest risk contribution of this fire area; therefore, to provide additional margin for the risk analysis, suppression, detection and transient restrictions in these zones are required for DID.In the event of no intervention by the plant fire brigade, it is not expected that a credible fire would develop which would not be bounded by the analyzed scenarios.
Based on the systems/features specified above, no additional DID systems/features are warranted and the ability to meet nuclear performance criteria is ensured.The table below summarizes how an adequate balance of DID is maintained.
Table 3-1 Defense-in-Depth Impact Review Method of Providing DID Discussion Echelon 1: Prevent fires from starting Combustible Control Designate Fire Zones 2277, 2466 and 2500 as a transient restricted areas.Hot Work Control No change necessary to procedure(s) 
/guidance document(s).
1 Echelon 2: Rapidly detect, control and extinguish promptly those fires that do occur thereby limiting fire damage Detection System Detection system is installed in all zones and required in zones 2277, 2466 and 2500.Automatic Fire Suppression Automatic suppression system is installed in all zones and required in zones 2277, 2466 and 2500.Portable Fire Extinguishers Portable extinguishers are available, but no enhancements required.1 Hose stations and hydrants Fire hose cabinet(s) are available, but no enhancements required.located in the area(s)Pre-Fire Plan No change necessary to procedure(s) 
/guidance document(s).
Echelon 3: Provide adequate level of fire protection for systems and structures so that a fire will not prevent essential safety functions from being performed Walls, floors ceilings and structural No changes necessary to existing barriers.
1 elements are rated or have been evaluated as adequate for the hazard.Openings in the fire barrier are rated No changes necessary to existing barrier openings.or have been evaluated as adequate for the hazard.Supplemental barriers (e.g., ERFBS, Fire rated cable is installed, but no enhancements required.cable tray covers, etc.)Guidance provided to operations No VFDR related DID recovery actions required.personnel detailing the credited success path(s) including recovery actions to achieve nuclear safety performance criteria.1 This fire protection feature is relied upon without further DID enhancements beyond inherent programmatic requirements of NFPA 805, Chap. 3 and will not be reported in Table 5-2.3.2.1 Required Modifications There are no modifications required as a result of the DID evaluation for this fire area.Revision 1 Page 31 of 36 Version 1.0 Page 2766 of 3726 SE-CO51326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-013 3.2.2 Required Recovery Actions There are no required recovery actions as a result of the DID evaluation for this fire area.4.0 SAFETY MARGIN EVALUATION 4.1 Safety Margin Evaluation In accordance with NEI 04-02, 5.3.5.3 guidance, the maintenance of adequate Safety Margin is assessed by the consideration of categories of analyses utilized by this fire risk evaluation (FRE).Safety margins are considered to be maintained if: " Codes and standards or their alternatives accepted for use by the NRC are met, and" Safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) are met, or provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty.
The maintenance of adequate safety margin for the change analysis is described for each of the specific analysis types used in support of the fire risk assessment.
4.1.1 Fire Modeling Fire modeling performed in support of the transition has been performed within the Fire PRA utilizing codes and standards developed by industry and NRC staff to provide realistic yet conservative results. Specifically, the heat release rates utilized in the transition analysis are based upon NUREG/CR 6850, Task 8, Scoping Fire Modeling.
These heat release rates are conservative and represent values used to screen out fixed ignition sources that do not pose a threat to the targets within specific fire compartments and to assign severity factors to unscreened fixed ignition sources.The combined analysis approach is used during transition; therefore, maximum expected fire scenario/limiting fire scenario have not been analyzed separately.
The bases for the application of these fire modeling codes and standards were not altered in support of this FRE.4.1.2 Plant System Performance Plant system performance parameters were not modified as a result of this FRE. These performance parameters were originally established to support nuclear performance criteria contained in the plant specific accident analyses.
These analyses established component and system performance criteria necessary to establish safe and stable plant operation, as well as, safe shut down of the unit in the event of a fire. These performance parameters were not modified as a result of this FRE.4.2 Safety Margin Results All analyses and assessment have been performed utilizing accepted techniques and industry accepted standards.
In addition, safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) have been considered and provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty.
As such, the Safety Margins are maintained as discussed in Section 4.1.Revision 1 Page 32 of 36 Version 1.0 Page 2767 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-013 5.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION RESULTS 5.1 Dispositions of VFDRs Based on the FRE results contained in Sections 2, 3 and 4 the VFDRs identified in Section LI.1 have been resolved as follows: Table 5-1 Final Variance Disposition VFDR ID Disposition U2-2-013-IA-001 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action U2-2-013-SEP-001 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action U2-2-013-SEP-005 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action U2-2-013-SEP-006 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action U2-2-013-SEP-008 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action U2-2-013-SEP-009 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action U2-2-013-SEP-014 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action(VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)U2-2-013-SEP-015 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action(VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)U2-2-013-SEP-016 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action U2-2-013-SEP-018 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action U2-2-013-SEP-019 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action U2-2-013-SEP-022 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action U2-2-013-SEP-023 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action U2-2-013-SEP-024 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action U2-2-013-SEP-025 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action U2-2-013-SEP-026 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action U2-2-013-SEP-027 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action U2-2-013-SEP-031 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action U2-2-013-SEP-032 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action U2-2-013-SEP-033 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action U2-2-013-SEP-034 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action U2-2-013-SEP-035 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action U2-2-013-SEP-036 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action U2-2-013-SEP-037 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action U2-2-013-SEP-042 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action U2-2-013-SEP-043 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action U2-2-013-SEP-044 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action U2-2-013-SEP-045 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action U2-2-013-SEP-046 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action U2-2-013-SEP-047 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action U2-2-013-SEP-048 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action U2-2-013-SEP-049 Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Revision 1 Page 33 of 36 Version 1.0 Page 2768 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-013 SE-C051326701 
-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-013 VFDR ID U2-2-013-SEP-050 U2-2-013-SEP-051 U2-2-013-SEP-052 U2-2-013-SEP-053 U2-2-013-SEP-054 U2-2-013-SEP-055 U2-2-013-SEP-056 U2-2-013-SEP-057 U2-2-013-SEP-058 U2-2-013-SEP-059 U2-2-013-SEP-060 U2-2-013-SEP-061 U2-2-013-SEP-062 U2-2-013-SEP-063 U2-2-013-SEP-064 U2-2-013-SEP-065 U2-2-013-SEP-066 U2-2-013-SEP-067 U2-2-013-SEP-068 U2-2-013-SEP-069 U2-2-013-SEP-070 Table 5-1 Final Variance Disposition Disposition Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Revision I Page 34 of 36 Revision 1 Page 34 of 36 Version 1.0 Page 2769 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-013 5.2 Fire Risk Evaluation Summary of Fire Protection Systems and Features Table 5-2 Summary of Required Fire Protection Systems and Features Required Required Required Fire Fire Area Fire Zone Suppression Detection Protection Feature Required Fire Protection System and Feature Details System System (R, D)(R, D) (R, D)R -Modification to provide fuse or other electrical isolation U2 2-013 R device at the DC shunt connection point and replace trip device in panel Q2R42B0001B, breaker LB14 R -Suppression system, Detection system;2227 R, D R, D D D -Suppression system, Detection system, Require zone as a restricted transient area 2300 R R R R -Suppression system, Detection system, Fire rated cable R -Suppression system, Detection system;2466 R, D R, D D D -Suppression system, Detection system, Require zone as a restricted transient area R -Suppression system, Detection system;2500 R, D R, D D D -Suppression system, Detection system, Require zone as a restricted transient area Required Suppression/Detection/Feature:
required in the Fire Area based on NFPA 805 Chapter 4 compliance.
The information is provided on a zone basis. The basis for the requirement of the fire protection system is designated as follows:* R -Risk Criteria:
Systems required to meet the Risk Criteria for the Performance-Based Approach (NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4)* D -Defense-in-depth Criteria:
Systems required to maintain adequate balance of Defense-in-Depth for a Performance-Based Approach (NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4)Fire Protection Features in this Table only refer to those features installed in the Fire Area that have a corresponding NFPA 805, Chapter 3 requirement.
5.3 Summary of Recovery Actions No recovery actions are required for this fire area.Revision I Page 35 of 36 Revision 1 Page 35 of 36 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-013 5.4 Summary of Plant Modifications Table 5-3 -Plant Modifications Item Unit Problem Statement Proposed Modification In FPRA Comp Risk Informed Characterization Measure 2UYMO012A, 2UYMOO13A, 2UYMOO13B, 2UYMOO14A, 2UYMOO14B 
-Provide fuse or other Reduce risk due to fire induced failure by U2 2 Require protection of cables electrical isolation device at the DC Yes Yes protecting cables preventing damage to 013-1 to prevent fire damage shunt connection point for associated components.
components:
N2R42B0505A:A:A, N2R42B0505B:A:A 2VBLB18 B -Provide fuse or other electrical isolation device at the DC Reduce risk due to fire induced failure by U2 Require protection of cables shunt connection point for Yes Yes protecting cables preventing damage to 013-2 to prevent fire damage components:
associated components.
Q2R42E0002B:A:A Reduce risk due to fire induced failure by U2 bReplaCetrip device toensure Replace trip device in panel Yes Yes modifying the circuit breaker and 013-3 supply and load breakers Q2R42B0001B, breaker LB14 preventing damage to downstream components.
5.5 Fire Area Risk Summary Table 5-4 -Fire Area Risk Summary Fire Area Area Description NFPA 805 Fire Area CDF/LERF VFDR RAs Fire Risk Eval Additional Risk of RAs Basis (Yes/No) (Yes/No) A CDF/LERF Aux Building Cable U2 2-013 Chase Rooms 2227, 4.2.4 7.19E-07/1.69E-08 Yes No 7.97E-08/1.38E-08 N/A 2300, 2466, and 2500 Revision I Page 36 of 36 Revision 1 Page 36 of 36 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-014 Attachment 
-Unit 2 Fire Area 2-014 FRE for Fire Area Computer Room Revision:
0 Name Fire PRA Preparer Fire PRA Reviewer Fire Protection Preparer Fire Protection Reviewer NSCA Preparer NSCA Reviewer FRE Preparer FRE Reviewer Jonathan Hedrick Clint Pierce Robert Kirkpatrick Rebecca Puckett Larry Valmonte Dan Funk Steve Hardy Brandon Jamar Revision 0 Page 1 of 15 Version 1.0 Page 2772 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-014 1.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION INPUT .....................................................................
4 1.1 Variances from the Deterministic Requirements 
....................................
4 1.2 Fire Protection Systems and Features ..................................................
5 1.2.1 Construction 
...............................................................................
5 1.2 .2 D ete ctio n ................................................................................... 
..5 1.2.3 Fixed Fire Suppression 
...............................................................
5 1.2.4 Manual Suppression 
...................................................................
6 1.2.5 Ventilation (Smoke Removal) .....................................................
6 1.2.6 Other Fire Protection Features .....................................................
6 1.2.7 Fire Hazard Identification 
..........................................................
6 1.2.8 Fire PRA Input .............................................................................
6 2.0 RISK EVALUATION 
.........................................................................................
7 2.1 Fire PRA Variant Case Calculation 
.......................................................
7 2.2 Compliant Case Calculation 
..................................................................
9 2.2.1 VFDRs Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA ..............................
9 2.2.2 VFDRs Not Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA .......................
9 2.2.3 Compliant Case Results ...................................
9 2.2.4 Required Modifications 
................................................................
9 2.2.5 Required Recovery Actions .......................................................
10 2.3 Risk Evaluation Results ......................................................................
10 3.0 DID EVALUATION 
..........................................................................................
11 3.1 Defense-in-Depth Evaluation 
...............................................................
11 3.2 Defense-in-Depth Review Results ......................................................
11 3.2.1 Required Modifications 
.............................................................
12 3.2.2 Required Recovery Actions .......................................................
12 4.0 SAFETY MARGIN EVALUATION 
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13 4.1 Safety Margin Evaluation 
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13 4 .1.1 F ire M o d e ling .......................................................................... 
..13 4.1.2 Plant System Performance 
......................................................
13 4.2 Safety Margin Results ..........................................................................
13 5.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION RESULTS .............................................................
14 5.1 Dispositions of VFDRs ........................................................................
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-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-014 SE-C051 326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-014 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 Fire Risk Evaluation Summary of Fire Protection Systems and Features 15 Summary of Recovery Actions .............................................................
15 Summary of Plant Modifications 
..........................................................
15 Fire A rea R isk Sum m ary ......................................................................
15 Revision 0 Page 3 of 15 Version 1.0 Page 2774 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-014 1.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION INPUT 1.1 Variances from the Deterministic Requirements The VFDRs identified for evaluation for Unit 2, Fire Area 2-014, Computer Room are: Table 1-1 VFDRs VFDR Component(s)
Description U2-2-014-IA-Q2E21V0243:CLOSE This component requires instrument air to perform its credited 001 D:CLOSED, RCS function.
Instrument air is assumed to be unavailable in this fire area ALTERNATE because air loss paths have not been identified.
Isolating the alternate CHARGING LINE charging line is necessary in order to obtain a significant pressure gradient in order to de-pressurize the RCS via aux-spray.
This valve (the Alternate Charging line supply from CVCS) fails open on a loss of instrument air, and hence the necessary pressure gradient will not be sufficient to supply the pressurizer through the spray line. Failure to de-pressurize via aux spray challenges the RCS Pressure/Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-014-IA-Q2E21V0244:OPEN:
This component requires instrument air to perform its credited 002 MODULATE, RCS function.
Instrument air is assumed to be unavailable in this fire area NORMAL because air loss paths have not been identified.
Isolating the normal CHARGING LINE charging line is necessary in order to obtain a significant pressure gradient in order to de-pressurize the RCS via aux-spray.
This valve (the Normal Charging line supply from CVCS) fails open on a loss of instrument air, and hence the necessary pressure gradient will not be sufficient to supply the pressurizer through the aux spray line. Failure to de-pressurize via aux spray challenges the RCS Pressure/Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-014-IA-Q2E21V0245:CLOSE This component requires instrument air to perform its credited 003 D:OPEN/CLOSED, function.
Instrument air is assumed to be unavailable in this fire area RCS PRESSURIZER because air loss paths have not been identified.
This valve is required AUX SPRAY to cycle in order to supply CVCS inventory to the pressurizer to de-pressurize via aux-spray, and the valve fails closed on a loss of instrument air. An inability to cycle this valve due to a loss of instrument air would prevent de-pressurization of the RCS via aux-spray. Failure to ensure cycling capability of this valve challenges the RCS Pressure/Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-014-IA-Q2E21V0347:MODU This component requires instrument air to perform its credited 004 LATED:MODULATE, function.
Instrument air is assumed to be unavailable in this fire area CHARGING FLOW because air loss paths have not been identified.
Flow control Valve CONTROL VALVE V0347 permits normal charging flow to be injected into the RCS system. Instrument air is required to control the flow and thus charging inventory that is injected into the RCS Cold Legs. A loss of instrument air could result in this valve failing in the open position.
Failure to throttle flow to the RCS system challenges the RCS Inventory/Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-014-IA-Q2N11PV3371A:CL This component requires instrument air to perform its credited 005 OSED:MODULATE, function.
Instrument air is assumed to be unavailable in this fire area MAIN STEAM because air loss paths have not been identified.
The Atmospheric ATMOS RELIEF Relief Valves are required to modulate in order to relieve steam to the atmosphere and facilitate the removal of decay heat. Decay Heat Removal via SG2A is desired in this fire area. A loss of instrument air will cause valve ARV PV3371A to fail closed. This failure challenges the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
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-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-014 Table 1-1 VFDRs VFDR Component(s)
Description U2-2-014-SEP-N2B21TR0410:AVAI RCS Temperature Indication at the control room (or local control 001 LABLE- center) is required in order to remove decay heat through the steam TE410:AVAILABLE-generators.
Fire induced circuit damage to Temperature Element TE410, RCS COLD TE410 will prevent indication from being available at the control for LEG RCS Loop 1(Hot Leg). Furthermore, a loss of power to AC Panel 2B TEMPERATURE will prevent indication via TE410 from being available, due to power RECORDER TR-410 feed circuit damage. This failure challenges the Decay Heat Removal Performance Criterion.
U2-2-014-SEP-Q2C22LT0475:AVAIL Decay Heat Removal via SG 2A is desired in this fire area. In order to 003 ABLE:AVAILABLE, remove Core Decay Heat, Steam Generator Level Indication must STEAM remain available for operators at the control room. Fire induced circuit GENERATOR 2A failure to L10474, L10475, L10477, and L10478 could render SG 2A LEVEL Level Indication unavailable.
This failure challenges the Decay Heat TRANSMITTER Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion. (All four indicators must suffer failure).U2-2-014-SEP-Q2E21V0347:MODU Flow control Valve V0347 permits normal charging flow to be injected 004 LATED:MODULATE, into the RCS system. This valve is required to be throttled in order to CHARGING FLOW control the charging inventory flow into the RCS System. Fire induced CONTROL VALVE circuit failure could result in the valve spuriously opening, or closing.Failure to throttle flow to the RCS system challenges the RCS Inventory/Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-014-SEP-N2C55NI0031A:AVAI Source Range Instrumentation is required to monitor Reactivity 007 LABLE:AVAILABLE, Conditions.
A loss of channel 1 and channel 2 Source Range SOURCE RANGE Detectors could occur, due to fire induced circuit failures.
This would COUNT RATE prevent operator ability to monitor source range count levels. Failure INDICATOR NI-31A to monitor subcritical conditions challenges the Reactivity Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
1.2 Fire Protection Systems and Features Fire Area 2-014 consists of Fire Zone 2201. This fire area is located in the Computer Room at elevation 121 '-0".1.2.1 Construction Barriers for this fire area are of substantial construction and have been designed and constructed to meet separation requirements.
In the event the configuration utilized is not in accordance with recognized standards, the deviations have been evaluated to be adequate for the hazard.1.2.2 Detection Fire detection systems to provide notification to the Control Room are: M Fire Zone 2201 is provided with detection.
1.2.3 Fixed Fire Suppression Fixed fire suppression systems activated by the detectors to aid in control of both fire growth and spread in the fire area are: 0 Fire Zone 2201 is provided with an automatic total flooding Halon suppression system.Revision 0 Page 5 of 15 Version 1.0 Page 2776 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-014 1.2.4 ManualSuppression Manual suppression equipment to be utilized by plant personnel and/or fire brigade members are: Fire Area 2-014 is provided with a CO 2 hose reel located in Room 2210 (Fire Area 2-020).1.2.5 Ventilation (Smoke Removal)Portable smoke ejectors are available to assist with smoke removal.1.2.6 Other Fire Protection Features No additional fire protection features are required for this fire risk evaluation.
1.2.7 Fire Hazard Identification The major sources of combustibles in Fire Area 2-014 are cable insulation and computer paper.Details regarding fire scenarios quantified in the fire PRA, and their associated ignition sources (where applicable) are discussed in Section 2.1.2.8 Fire PRA Input Fire protection features There are no fire protection features specifically modeled in the Fire PRA for this fire area.Fire protection systems There are no fire protection systems specifically modeled in the Fire PRA for this fire area.Hot Gas Layer Treatment This fire area screened for potential Hot Gas Layer effects on the Zone Of Influence.
No credit for detection was taken in the Hot Gas Layer evaluation for this fire area. No credit for manual or automatic fire suppression was taken in the Hot Gas Layer evaluation for this fire area.Multi-compartment analysis No credit for detection was taken in the Multi Compartment Analysis for this fire area. No credit for manual or automatic fire suppression was taken in the Multi Compartment Analysis for this fire area.Scenario Review All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0, ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency.
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-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-014 2.0 RISK EVALUATION 2.1 Fire PRA Variant Case Calculation Tables 2-la and 2-lb provide the results of the variant case calculation for Fire Area 2-014. This is taken directly from the Fire PRA model with no changes or alterations made. The CDF and LERF results are provided on a scenario basis.The total area CDF and LERF is below the screening acceptance criteria of IE-07/rx-yr and IE-08/rx-yr, respectively.
The total CDF/LERF can be used as a conservative estimate of the delta CDF/LERF with respect to a compliant configuration.
No further analysis of the delta CDF/LERF is required.Revision 0 Page 7 of 15 Version 1.0 Page 2778 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-014 Table 2-1a Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train A Alignment IGF CDF LERF Zone Scen ScenDesc (/xr NSP SF CCDP CDF CLERP (Iry (/rx-yr) (Irx-yr) (/rx-yr)2201 D1 TRANSIENT IN NE CORNER 8.09E-06 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 5.41E-12 1.61E-10 1.30E-15 2201 D2 TRANSIENT ON S WALL 8.09E-06 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 5.41E-12 1.61E-10 1.30E-15 2201 D3 TRANSIENT IN NW CORNER 8.09E-06 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 5.41E-12 1.61E-10 1.30E-15 2201 E Comp Input/Output Cab B 1.82E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 1.22E-11 1.61E-10 2.93E-15 2201 F Comp Input/Output Cab A 1.82E-05 1.0 1.0 6.69E-07 1.22E-11 1.61E-10 2.93E-15 Total CDF/LERF Fire PRA Variant Case 4.06E-11 9.76E-15 Table 2-1 b Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train B Alignment IGF CDFLERF Zone Scen ScenDesc IGF NSP SF CCDP CDF CLERP (Irr (Irx-yr) (/rx-yr) (Irx-yr)2201 D1 TRANSIENT IN NE CORNER 8.09E-06 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 5.37E-12 1.61 E-10 1.30E-15 2201 D2 TRANSIENT ON S WALL 8.09E-06 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 5.37E-12 1.61 E-10 1.30E-15 2201 D3 TRANSIENT IN NW CORNER 8.09E-06 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 5.37E-12 1.61E-10 1.30E-15 2201 E Comp Input/Output Cab B 1.82E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 1.21E-11 1.61E-10 2.93E-15 2201 F Comp Input/Output Cab A 1.82E-05 1.0 1.0 6.64E-07 1.21E-11 1.61E-10 2.93E-15 Total CDF/LERF Fire PRA Variant Case 4.03E-1 1 9.76E-1 5 Where: Zone = Fire Zone Scen = 'A' to signify the variant case ScenDesc = Description of the Fire Scenario IGF = Ignition Frequency 
(/rx-yr)NSP = Non Suppression Probability SF = Severity Factor CCDP = Conditional Core Damage Probability CDF = Core Damage Frequency 
(/rx-yr)CLERP = Conditional Large Early Release Probability LERF = Large Early Release Frequency 
(/rx-yr)Revision 0 Page 8 of 15 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-014 2.2 Compliant Case Calculation The following sub-sections provide the basis for modeling each VFDR (or category of VFDRs)and the alterations that have been made to the variant case to represent the compliant case. In each section a discussion of the VFDR (or the category of VFDRs) is provided.2.2.1 VFDRs Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA The following VFDRs are modeled in the Fire PRA and are therefore included in the total fire area CDF/LERF used as a surrogate for the delta risk evaluation for this fire area: " U2-2-014-IA-00 I -Q2E2 I V0243:CLOSED:CLOSED" U2-2-014-IA-002 
-Q2E2 I V0244:OPEN:MODULATE" U2-2-014-IA-003 
-Q2E2 I V0245:CLOSED:OPEN/CLOSED" U2-2-014-IA-004 
-Q2E21V0347:
MODULATED:MODULATE
* U2-2-014-IA-005 
-Q2N 1 IPV337 1 A:CLOSED:MODULATE" U2-2-014-SEP-00 I -N2B2 1 TR04 I 0:AVAILABLE-TE4 10:AVAILABLE-TE4 10" U2-2-014-SEP-003 
-Q2C22LT0475:AVAILABLE:AVAILABLE" U2-2-014-SEP-004 
-Q2E2 I V0347:MODULATED:MODULATE 2.2.2 VFDRs Not Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA A Fire PRA was developed in accordance with the requirements of Part 4 "Requirements for Fires at Power PRA" of the ASME and ANS combined PRA Standard, ASME/ANS RA-Sa-2009, "Standard for Level 1/Large Early Release Frequency Probabilistic Risk Assessment for Nuclear Power Plant Applications".
Consistent with those requirements not all components required to meet the nuclear safety criteria need to be specifically modeled in the Fire PRA. The following VFDRs are associated with components not modeled in the Fire PRA: 2.2.2.1 VFDR U2-2-014-SEP-007 The loss of source range monitoring is associated with a reactor trip. The 24 hour mission time does not require neutron monitoring for boration to cold shutdown.
The fire PRA assumes a reactor trip in every scenario.&sect; U2-2-014-SEP-007 
-N2C55NI0031A:AVAILABLE:AVAILABLE 2.2.3 Compliant Case Results The total area CDF and LERF is below the screening acceptance criteria of I E-07/rx-yr and 1E-08/rx-yr, respectively.
The total CDF/LERF can be used as a conservative estimate of the delta CDF/LERF with respect to a compliant configuration.
No further analysis of the delta CDF/LERF is required.2.2.4 Required Modifications There are no modifications required as a result of the risk evaluation for this fire area.Revision 0 Page 9 of 15 Version 1.0 Page 2780 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-014 2.2.5 Required Recovery Actions There are no required recovery actions as a result of the risk evaluation for this fire area.2.3 Risk Evaluation Results The ACDF/LERF is below the screening acceptance criteria of I E-07/rx-yr (CDF) and 1E-08/rx-yr (LERF) for acceptable risk. All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0 ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency.
The following tables present the fire zone/scenario fire risk as well as the total fire risk for this fire area. Given the relatively low risk for these zones/scenarios the delta risk is defined by the variant case risk, the compliant case risk is conservatively assumed to be 0.Table 2-2a 1 FIRE AREA ACDF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN A ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CCDP CDF CCDP CDF ACDF 2201/D1 6.69E-07 5.41 E-12 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 5.41 E-12 2201/D2 6.69E-07 5.41 E-12 O.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 5.41E-12 2201/D3 6.69E-07 5.41 E-12 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 5.41E-12 2201/E 6.69E-07 1.22E-11 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 1.22E-11 2201/F 6.69E-07 1.22E-11 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 1.22E-11 Total CDF and delta CDF 4.06E-11 O.OOE+00 4.06E-11-N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.Table 2-2b 1 FIRE AREA ACDF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN B ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CCDP CDF CCDP CDF ACDF 2201/01 6.64E-07 5.37E-12 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 5.37E-12 2201/D2 6.64E-07 5.37E-12 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 5.37E-12 2201/D3 6.64E-07 5.37E-12 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 5.37E-12 2201/E 6.64E-07 1.21E-11 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 1.21 E-11 2201/F 6.64E-07 1.21 E-11 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 1.21 E-11 Total CDF and delta CDF 4.03E-11 0.OOE+00 4.03E-11 1 _ N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.Table 2-3a'FIRE AREA ALERF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN A ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CLERP LERF CLERP LERF ALERF 2201/01 1.61E-10 1.30E-15 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 1.30E-15 2201/D2 1.61E-10 1.30E-15 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 1.30E-15 2201/D3 1.61E-10 1.30E-15 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 1.30E-15 2201/E 1.61 E-10 2.93E-15 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 2.93E-15 2201/F 1.61 E-10 2.93E-15 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 2.93E-15 Total LERF and delta LERF 9.76E-15 O.OOE+00 9.76E-15 Revision 0 Page 10 of 15 Version 1.0 Page 2781 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-014 1 _ N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.Table 2-3b 1 FIRE AREA ALERF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN B ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CLERP LERF CLERP LERF ALERF 2201/D1 1.61E-10 1.30E-15 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 1.30E-15 2201/D2 1.61E-10 1.30E-15 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 1.30E-15 2201/D3 1.61E-10 1.30E-15 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 1.30E-15 2201/E 1.61E-10 2.93E-15 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 2.93E-15 2201/F 1.61 E-10 2.93E-15 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 2.93E-15 Total LERF and delta LERF 9.76E-15 0.OOE+00 9.76E-15 1 -N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.3.0 DID EVALUATION 3.1 Defense-in-Depth Evaluation A review of the impact of the change on defense-in-depth (DID) was performed.
NFPA 805 defines DID as: " Preventing fires from starting" Rapidly detecting fires and controlling and extinguishing promptly those fires that do occur, thereby limiting damage" Providing adequate level of fire protection for structures, systems and components important to safety; so that a fire that is not promptly extinguished will not prevent essential plant safety functions from being performed.
In general, the DID requirement was considered satisfied if the proposed change does not result in a substantial imbalance among these elements (or echelons).
The review of DID was qualitative and addressed each of the elements with respect to the proposed change. Fire protection features and systems relied upon to ensure DID were identified in the assessment (e.g., detection, suppression system).The VFDRs and the associated Fire Area risk (CDF) and scenario consequences (CCDP values)were evaluated to identify general DID echelon imbalances.
Potential methods to balance the DID features were identified ensuring an adequate balance of DID features is maintained for the Fire Area. See Section 3.2 for the results of the evaluation.
3.2 Defense-in-Depth Review Results A review of defense in depth and risk evaluation results show that, given the systems and features specified in Table 3-1 and Section 2 respectively, risk acceptance criteria are met and that the balance of defense in depth is maintained.
However due to uncertainties associated with analytical methods and the existence of significant fuel packages in the area, it is deemed prudent to require detection to ensure prompt fire brigade response.These additional systems coupled with the other required features will provide additional assurances that any unknown weaknesses or uncertainties, such as HGL formation and Revision 0 Page 11 of 15 Version 1.0 Page 2782 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-014 uncontrolled fire development, will not adversely affect the ability to meet nuclear safety performance criteria.The table below summarizes how an adequate balance of DID is maintained.
Table 3-1 Defense-in-Depth Impact Review Method of Providing DID Discussion Echelon 1: Prevent fires from starting Combustible Control No change necessary to procedure(s) 
/guidance document(s).
1 Hot Work Control No change necessary to procedure(s) 
/guidance document(s).
1 Echelon 2: Rapidly detect, control and extinguish promptly those fires that do occur thereby limiting fire damage Detection System Detection system is installed and required.Automatic Fire Suppression Automatic suppression system installed and not required.Portable Fire Extinguishers No portable extinguishers are available and not required.Hose stations and hydrants CO 2 hose reel is available, but no enhancements required.
1 located in the area(s)Pre-Fire Plan No change necessary to procedure(s) 
/guidance document(s).
Echelon 3: Provide adequate level of fire protection for systems and structures so that a fire will not prevent essential safety functions from being performed Walls, floors ceilings and structural No changes necessary to existing barriers.elements are rated or have been evaluated as adequate for the hazard.Openings in the fire barrier are rated No changes necessary to existing barrier openings.or have been evaluated as adequate for the hazard.Supplemental barriers (e.g., ERFBS, No supplemental barriers installed and not required.cable tray covers, etc.)Guidance provided to operations No VFDR related DID recovery actions required.personnel detailing the credited success path(s) including recovery actions to achieve nuclear safety performance criteria.1 This fire protection feature is relied upon without further DID enhancements beyond inherent programmatic requirements of NFPA 805, Chap. 3 and will not be reported in Table 5-2.3.2.1 Required Modifications There are no modifications required as a result of the DID evaluation for this fire area.3.2.2 Required Recovery Actions There are no required recovery actions as a result of the DID evaluation for this fire area.Revision 0 Page 12 of 15 Version 1.0 Page 2783 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-014 4.0 SAFETY MARGIN EVALUATION 4.1 Safety Margin Evaluation In accordance with NEI 04-02, 5.3.5.3 guidance, the maintenance of adequate Safety Margin is assessed by the consideration of categories of analyses utilized by this fire risk evaluation (FRE).Safety margins are considered to be maintained if:* Codes and standards or their alternatives accepted for use by the NRC are met, and Safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) are met, or provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty.
The maintenance of adequate safety margin for the change analysis is described for each of the specific analysis types used in support of the fire risk assessment.
4.1.1 Fire Modeling Fire modeling performed in support of the transition has been performed within the Fire PRA utilizing codes and standards developed by industry and NRC staff to provide realistic yet conservative results. Specifically, the heat release rates utilized in the transition analysis are based upon NUREG/CR 6850, Task 8, Scoping Fire Modeling.
These heat release rates are conservative and represent values used to screen out fixed ignition sources that do not pose a threat to the targets within specific fire compartments and to assign severity factors to unscreened fixed ignition sources.The combined analysis approach is used during transition; therefore, maximum expected fire scenario/limiting fire scenarios have not been analyzed separately.
The bases for the application of these fire modeling codes and standards were not altered in support of this FRE.4.1.2 Plant System Performance Plant system performance parameters were not modified as a result of this FRE. These performance parameters were originally established to support nuclear performance criteria contained in the plant specific accident analyses.
These analyses established component and system performance criteria necessary to establish safe and stable plant operation, as well as, safe shut down of the unit in the event of a fire. These performance parameters were not modified as a result of this FRE.4.2 Safety Margin Results All analyses and assessment have been performed utilizing accepted techniques and industry accepted standards.
In addition, safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) have been considered and provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty.
As such, the Safety Margins are maintained as discussed in Section 4.1.Revision 0 Page 13 of 15 Version 1.0 Page 2784 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-014 5.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION RESULTS 5.1 Dispositions of VFDRs Based on the FRE results contained in Sections 2, 3 and 4 the VFDRs identified in Section 1.1 have been resolved as follows: VFDR ID U2-2-014-IA-001 U2-2-014-IA-002 U2-2-014-IA-003 U2-2-014-iA-004 U2-2-014-IA-005 U2-2-014-SEP-001 U2-2-014-SEP-003 U2-2-014-SEP-004 U2-2-014-SEP-007 Table 5-1 Final Variance Disposition Disposition Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)Revision 0 Page 14 of 15 Version 1.0 Page 2785 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-014 5.2 Fire Risk Evaluation Summary of Fire Protection Systems and Features Table 5-2 Summary of Required Fire Protection Systems and Features Required Required Required Fire Suppression Detection Protection Feature Required Fire Protection System and Feature Details Fire Area Fire Zone System System (R, D)(R, D) (R, D)U2 2-014 2201 None D None D -Detection system Required Suppression/Detection/Feature:
required in the Fire Area based on NFPA 805 Chapter 4 compliance.
The information is provided on a zone basis. The basis for the requirement of the fire protection system is designated as follows:* R -Risk Criteria:
Systems required to meet the Risk Criteria for the Performance-Based Approach (NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4)* D -Defense-in-depth Criteria:
Systems required to maintain adequate balance of Defense-in-Depth for a Performance-Based Approach (NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4)Fire Protection Features in this Table only refer to those features installed in the Fire Area that have a corresponding Chapter 3 requirement.
5.3 Summary of Recovery Actions No recovery actions are required for this fire area.5.4 Summary of Plant Modifications No modifications are required for this fire area.5.5 Fire Area Risk Summary Table 5-3 -Fire Area Risk Summary Fire Area Area Description NFPA 805 Fire Area CDF/LERF VFDR RAs Fire Risk Eval Additional Risk of RAs Basis (Yes/No) (Yes/No) A CDF/LERF U2 2-014 Computer Room 4.2.4 4.05E-11/9.76E-15 Yes No 4.05E-11/9.76E-15 N/A Revision 0 Page 15 of 15 Revision 0 Page 15 of 15 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-015 SE-COSi 326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-015 Attachment 
-Unit 2 Fire Area 2-015 FRE for Fire Area Communication Room Revision:
1 Revision:
1 Fire PRA Preparer Fire PRA Reviewer Fire Protection Preparer Fire Protection Reviewer NSCA Preparer NSCA Reviewer FRE Preparer FRE Reviewer Name George Hunter Clint Pierce Robert Kirkpatrick Rebecca Puckett Larry Valmonte Dan Funk Steve Hardy Brandon Jamar Revision I Page 1 of 17 Revision 1 Page 1 of 17 Version 1.0 Page 2787 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-015 1.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION INPUT .....................................................................
4 1.1 Variances from the Deterministic Requirements 
....................................
4 1.2 Fire Protection Systems and Features ..................................................
5 1.2.1 Construction 
...............................................................................
6 1.2 .2 D e te ctio n ................................................................................... 
..6 1.2.3 Fixed Fire Suppression 
...............................................................
6 1.2.4 Manual Suppression 
...................................................................
6 1.2.5 Ventilation (Smoke Removal) ....................................................
6 1.2.6 Other Fire Protection Features ....................................................
6 1.2.7 Fire Hazard Identification 
............................................................
6 1.2.8 Fire PRA Input .............................................................................
6 2.0 RISK EVALUATION 
.........................................................................................
7 2.1 Fire PRA Variant Case Calculation 
.........................................................
7 2.2 Compliant Case Calculation 
..................................................................
10 2.2.1 VFDRs Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA ............................
10 2.2.2 VFDRs Not Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA .....................
10 2.2.3 Compliant Case Results ...........................................................
10 2.2.4 Required Modifications 
.............................................................
10 2.2.5 Required Recovery Actions .......................................................
10 2.3 Risk Evaluation Results ........................................................................
11 3.0 DID EVALUATION 
.........................................................................................
12 3.1 Defense-in-Depth Evaluation 
...............................................................
12 3.2 Defense-in-Depth Review Results ......................................................
13 3.2.1 Required Modifications 
.............................................................
14 3.2.2 Required Recovery Actions .......................................................
14 4.0 SAFETY MARGIN EVALUATION 
...................................................................
14 4.1 Safety Margin Evaluation 
......................................................................
14 4.1.1 Fire Modeling ...........................................................................
14 4.1.2 Plant System Performance 
......................................................
15 4.2 Safety Margin Results ..........................................................................
15 5.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION RESULTS ............................................................
15 5.1 Dispositions of VFDRs ........................................................................
15 Revision 1 Page 2 of 17 Version 1.0 Page 2788 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-015 SE-COSI 326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-015 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 Fire Risk Evaluation Summary of Fire Protection Systems and Features 16 Summary of Recovery Actions .............................................................
16 Summary of Plant Modifications 
..........................................................
16 Fire Area Risk Summary ......................................................................
17 Revision 1 Page 3 of 17 Version 1.0 Page 2789 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-015 1.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION INPUT 1.1 Variances from the Deterministic Requirements The VFDRs identified for evaluation for Unit 2, Fire Area 2-015, Communication Room are: Table 1-1 VFDRs VFDR Component(s)
Description U2-2-015-SEP-Q2B31L0001A:ON/O The Pressurizer Heaters are required to increase RCS Pressure by 001 FF:OFF, heating Pressurizer Inventory.
In order to establish pressure control, PRESSURIZER the Pressurizer heaters are required off. Fire induced control circuit HEATER GROUP 2A damage could spuriously actuate Pressurizer Heater Group A, or DISTRIBUTION prevent remote tripping of the load. Failure to secure the Pressurizer PANEL Heater Group A could challenge the RCS Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-2-015-SEP-Q2E21P0002A:ON:O An inability to trip a non credited charging pump could result in an 002 N/OFF, 2A overcharging condition, thereby impairing the ability to control the CHARGING PUMP overall cool-down rate. Charging pump 2A suffers a loss of control power that would prevent remote tripping of the pump and/or potential spurious start of the pump due to fire induced circuit failure. This failure challenges the RCS Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-2-015-SEP-Q2E21P0002B:ON:O An inability to trip a non credited charging pump could result in an 003 N/OFF-TRAIN A, 2B overcharging condition, thereby impairing the ability to control the CHARGING PUMP overall cool-down rate. Charging pump 2B (Aligned Train B) suffers a loss of control power that would prevent remote tripping of the pump and/or potential spurious start of the pump due to fire induced circuit failure. This failure challenges the RCS Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-2-015-SEP-Q2E21V0347:MODU Flow control Valve V0347 permits normal charging flow to be injected 004 LATED:MODULATE, into the RCS system, for both aux-spray and inventory makeup. This CHARGING FLOW valve is required to modulate in order to control the quantity of CONTROL VALVE charging Inventory that is injected into the RCS System. Fire induced control circuit damage could spuriously close the valve or cause it to fail in the open position.
Failure to throttle flow to the RCS system challenges the RCS Inventory/Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-015-SEP-Q2E21V0376A:OPE The cited circuit is associated with the RWST outlet valve. If the 005 N:CLOSED, VCT RWST outlet (V336A) were to spuriously open, a valve interlock would OUTLET ISOLATION initiate swapover to the RWST by closing the VCT outlet isolation valves. Since this the credited lineup for safe shutdown, this failure mode is not considered detrimental to the functionality of this valve.Operator capability will still remain available to initiate swapover.U2-2-015-SEP-Q2N11PV3371A:CL Atmospheric relief is required on the secondary side to relieve steam 006 OSED:MODULATE, generator pressure.
Since DHR via SG 2A is desired in this fire area, MAIN STEAM MSARV 3371A must modulate to relieve steam. Fire induced control ATMOS RELIEF circuit damage could result in the valve spuriously opening, or failing closed. This failure challenges the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-2-015-SEP-Q2N1 1 PV3371A:CL The Atmospheric Relief Valves are required to modulate in order to 007 OSED:CLOSED, relieve steam to the atmosphere and facilitate the removal of decay MAIN STEAM heat, however they must be closed initially.
Fire induced control circuit ATMOS RELIEF damage could result in MSARV 3371A spuriously opening. Decay Heat Removal via SG2A is desired in this fire area. This failure challenges the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
Revision 1 Page 4 of 17 Version 1.0 Page 2790 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-015 Table 1-1 VFDRs VFDR Component(s)
Description U2-2-015-SEP-Q2N1 1 PV3371 B:CL The Atmospheric Relief Valves are required to modulate in order to 008 OSED:CLOSED, relieve steam to the atmosphere and facilitate the removal of decay MAIN STEAM heat, however they must be closed initially.
Fire induced control circuit ATMOS RELIEF damage could result in MSARV 3371B spuriously opening. Decay Heat Removal via SG2A is desired in this fire area. This failure challenges the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-2-015-SEP-Q2N11PV3371C:CL The Atmospheric Relief Valves are required to modulate in order to 009 OSED:CLOSED, relieve steam to the atmosphere and facilitate the removal of decay MAIN STEAM heat, however they must be closed initially.
Fire induced control circuit ATMOS RELIEF darnage could result in MSARV 3371C spuriously opening. Decay Heat Removal via SG2A is desired in this fire area. This failure challenges the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-2-015-SEP-N2B21TR0410:AVAI Decay Heat Removal via SG 2A is desired in this fire area. In order to 010 LABLE- remove Core Decay Heat, RCS Loop Temperature Indication must TE410:AVAILABLE-remain available for operators at the control room. Fire induced circuit TE410, RCS COLD failure to circuits associated with TR0413 or TR0410 (Hot Leg and LEG Cold Leg respectively) could render Loop 1 Temperature Indication TEMPERATURE unavailable.
Furthermore AC panel 2A which provides power to RECORDER TR-410 TE410 suffers circuit damage associated with the panel feed. This failure challenges the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criterion.
U2-2-015-SEP-Q2E21V0367:OPEN:
Letdown isolation is necessary in order to maintain adequate 011 OPEN/CLOSED, pressurizer level and thus an adequate amount of RCS Inventory.
LETDOWN LINE Letdown isolation can be achieved by closing the letdown line isolation ISOLATION valves LCV0460 or LCV0459, or by closing all 3 Letdown Orifice Isolation Valves (8149A, B, C). Fire induced control circuit damage to the Letdown Orifice Isolation Valves (all 3) could result in the valves spuriously operating.
The Letdown Line Isolation valves are subject to spurious operation from control circuit damage. A spurious letdown path could result in an inadequate amount of RCS Inventory.
This failure challenges the RCS Inventory and Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.U2-2-015-SEP-Q2N12HV3226:CLO The TDAFW Pump is not credited in this area; therefore a spurious 012 SED:CLOSED, start of the TDAFW Pump (via spurious steam admission) along with TDAFWP TURBINE spurious TDAFW feedwater admission to a non-credited steam STEAM SUPPLY generator could lead to an uncontrolled cool-down condition.
The ISOLATION TDAFW regulator valves (HV3228B and C) could spuriously open in this fire area. If an acceptable mitigation strategy exists to close these valves, then spurious steam admission is not a concern, since the feedwater flow is isolated.
Alternatively, fire induced circuit failure could cause spurious steam admission to the TDAFW Pump. If these steam supplies can be isolated, and hence the TDAFW Pump secured, then, the feedwater regulator valves need not be closed.(HV3228B and C).1.2 Fire Protection Systems and Features Fire Area 2-015 consists of Fire Zone 2202. This fire area is located in the Communication Room at elevation 121 '-0".Revision 1 Page 5 of 17 Version 1.0 Page 2791 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-015 1.2.1 Construction Barriers for this fire area are of substantial construction and have been designed and constructed to meet separation requirements.
In the event the configuration utilized is not in accordance with recognized standards, the deviations have been evaluated to be adequate for the hazard.1.2.2 Detection Fire detection systems to provide notification to the Control Room are: 0 Fire Zone 2202 is provided with detection.
1.2.3 Fixed Fire Suppression Fixed fire suppression systems activated by the detectors to aid in control of both fire growth and spread in the fire area are: E Fire Zone 2202 is provided with a Halon suppression system.1.2.4 Manual Suppression Manual suppression equipment to be utilized by plant personnel and/or fire brigade members is:* Fire Area 2-015 is provided with a CO 2 hose reel located in Room 2210 (Fire Area 2-020).1.2.5 Ventilation (Smoke Removal)Portable smoke ejectors are available to assist with smoke removal.1.2.6 Other Fire Protection Features No additional fire protection features are required for this fire risk evaluation.
1.2.7 Fire Hazard Identification The major sources of combustibles in Fire Area 2-015 are cable insulation, panels, and paper.Details regarding fire scenarios quantified in the fire PRA, and their associated ignition sources (where applicable) are discussed in Section 2.1.2.8 Fire PRA Input Fire protection features There are fire protection features specifically modeled in the Fire PRA as identified in the required plant modification section 2.2.4.Fire protection systems The Hot Gas Layer evaluation credits the detection, automatic fire suppression system and manual fire brigade response.
The Multi Compartment Analysis evaluation credits the detection and automatic fire suppression system.Revision 1 Page 6 of 17 Version 1.0 Page 2792 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-015 Hot Gas Layer Treatment This fire area screened for potential Hot Gas Layer effects on the Zone Of Influence.
Credit for detection was taken in the Hot Gas Layer evaluation for this fire area. Credit for both automatic fire suppression system and manual fire brigade response was taken in the Hot Gas Layer evaluation for this fire area.Multi-compartment analysis Credit for detection was taken in the Multi Compartment Analysis for this fire area. Credit for automatic fire suppression system was taken in the Multi Compartment Analysis for this fire area.Scenario Review All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0, ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency.
2.0 RISK EVALUATION 2.1 Fire PRA Variant Case Calculation Tables 2-1a and 2-1b provide the results of the variant case calculation for Fire Area 2-015. This is taken directly from the Fire PRA model with no changes or alterations made. The CDF and LERF results are provided on a scenario basis.Revision I Page 7 of 17 Revision I Page 7 of 17 Version 1.0 Page 2793 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-015 Table 2-1a Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train A Alignment IGF CDF LERF Zone Scen ScenDesc (ry NSP SF CCDP (ry CLERP (/rr (Irx-yr) (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr)2202 D1 TRANSIENT FIRE 9.38E-06 1.0 1.0 1.96E-03 1.84E-08 3.41E-06 3.19E-11 2202 D2 TRANSIENT FIRE 9.38E-06 1.0 1.0 1.1OE-03 1.03E-08 1.53E-06 1.43E-11 2202 D3 TRANSIENT FIRE 9.38E-06 1.0 1.0 2.29E-03 2.15E-08 7.41E-05 6.95E-10 2202 E1 BHSDP, AHSDP, EHSDP, 7.28E-05 2.00E-02 1.OOE-01 2.71E-01 3.95E-08 1.54E-03 2.25E-10 GHSDP-SEVERE 2202 E2a A HSDP -NON SEVERE 1.82E-05 2.00E-02 1.0 6.46E-02 2.35E-08 1.07E-04 3.89E-1 1 2202 E2b B HSDP -NON SEVERE 1.82E-05 2.00E-02 1.0 2.34E-05 8.52E-12 3.68E-08 1.34E-14 2202 E2c E HSDP -NON SEVERE 1.82E-05 2.OOE-02 1.0 4.07E-03 1.48E-09 6.09E-06 2.22E-12 2202 E2d G HSDP -NON SEVERE 1.82E-05 2.OOE-02 1.0 1.43E-04 5.20E-11 1.86E-07 6.78E-14 Total CDF/LERF Fire PRA Variant Case 1.1 5E-07 1.01E-09 Table 2-1 b Fire PRA Variant Case Results Train B Alignment IGF CDF LERF Zone Scen ScenDesc (Gr NSP SF CCDP rxr CLERP (Ir-(/rx-yr) (/rx-yr) (/rx-yr)2202 D1 TRANSIENT FIRE 9.38E-06 1.0 1.0 1.96E-03 1.84E-08 3.41E-06 3.19E-11 2202 D2 TRANSIENT FIRE 9.38E-06 1.0 1.0 1.10E-03 1.03E-08 1.53E-06 1.43E-11 2202 D3 TRANSIENT FIRE 9.38E-06 1.0 1.0 5.17E-03 4.85E-08 8.30E-05 7.78E-10 2202 El BHSDP, AHSDP, EHSDP, 7.28E-05 2.OOE-02 1.O0E-01 2.78E-01 4.05E-08 1.62E-03 2.37E-10 GHSDP -SEVERE 2202 E2a A HSDP -NON SEVERE 1.82E-05 2.OOE-02.
1.0 7.28E-02 2.65E-08 1.36E-04 4.96E-1 1 2202 E2b B HSDP -NON SEVERE 1.82E-05 2.OOE-02 1.0 2.42E-05 8.82E-12 3.75E-08 1.37E-14 2202 E2c E HSDP -NON SEVERE 1.82E-05 2.OOE-02 1.0 4.07E-03 1.48E-09 6.09E-06 2.22E-12 2202 E2d G HSDP -NON SEVERE 1.82E-05 2.OOE-02 1.0 1.43E-04 5.20E-11 1.86E-07 6.78E-14 Total CDF/LERF Fire PRA Variant Case 1.46E-07 1.11E-09 Where: Zone = Fire Zone Scen = 'A' to signify the variant case Revision 1 Page 8 of 17 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-015 SE-COSI 326701 -008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-015 ScenDesc = Description of the Fire Scenario IGF = Ignition Frequency 
(/rx-yr)NSP = Non Suppression Probability SF = Severity Factor CCDP = Conditional Core Damage Probability CDF = Core Damage Frequency 
(/rx-yr)CLERP = Conditional Large Early Release Probability LERF = Large Early Release Frequency 
(/rx-yr)Revision I Page 9 of 17 Revision 1 Page 9 of 17 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-015 2.2 Compliant Case Calculation The following sub-sections provide the basis for modeling each VFDR (or category of VFDRs)and the alterations that have been made to the variant case to represent the compliant case. In each section a discussion of the VFDR (or the category of VFDRs) is provided.2.2.1 VFDRs Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA The following VFDRs are modeled in the Fire PRA and are therefore included in the total fire area CDF/LERF used as a surrogate for the delta risk evaluation for this fire area: " U2-2-015-SEP-00 I -Q2B331 L000 1 A:ON/OFF:OFF" U2-2-015-SEP-002 
-Q2E21 P0002A:ON:ON/OFF
* U2-2-015-SEP-003 
-Q2E21 P0002B:ON:ON/OFF-TRAIN A* U2-2-015-SEP-004 
-Q2E21V0347:MODULATED:MODULATE" U2-2-015-SEP-005 
-Q2E21V0376A:OPEN:CLOSED" U2-2-015-SEP-006 
-Q2N 1 IPV337 1A:CLOSED:MODULATE" U2-2-015-SEP-007 
-Q2Nl 1PV3371A:CLOSED:CLOSED" U2-2-015-SEP-008 
-Q2NI 1PV3371B:CLOSED:CLOSED" U2-2-015-SEP-009 
-Q2N II PV337 1 C:CLOSED:CLOSED" U2-2-015-SEP-010-N2B2 1 TR04 10:AVAILABLE-TE4 10:AVAILABLE-TE41 0" U2-2-015-SEP-0 I1 -Q2E21V0367:OPEN:OPEN/CLOSED
* U2-2-015-SEP-012 
-Q2NI2HV3226:CLOSED:CLOSED 2.2.2 VFDRs Not Specifically Modeled in the Fire PRA All VFDRs and their associated components are modeled in the Fire PRA.2.2.3 Compliant Case Results The total area ACDF is above the screening criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr and the total area ALERF is below 1 E-08/rx-yr, respectively.
However, the total plant delta CDF/LERF is below the RG 1. 174 criteria of I E-05/rx-yr and I E-06/rx-yr, respectively.
2.2.4 Required Modifications The following plant modification is required as a result of the risk evaluation for this fire area:* Incipient detection in panels Q2H21NBAFP2605A, Q2H21NBAFP2605B, Q2H2 1NBAFP2605E, and Q2H21NBAFP2605G" Install new trip device in panel Q2R42BOOOA, breaker LA20" Install new trip device in panel Q2R42BOOOIB, breaker LB14 2.2.5 Required Recovery Actions There are no recovery actions as a result of the risk evaluation for this fire area.Revision 1 Page 10 of 17 Version 1.0 Page 2796 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-015 SE-COSi 326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-015 2.3 Risk Evaluation Results The total area ACDF is above the screening criteria of 1 E-07/rx-yr and the total area ALERF is below 1E-08/rx-yr, respectively.
However, the total plant delta CDF/LERF is below the RG 1.174 criteria of 1E-05/rx-yr and 1E-06/rx-yr, respectively.
All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0 ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency.
The following tables present the fire zone/scenario fire risk as well as the total fire risk for this fire area. Given the relatively low risk for these zones/scenarios the delta risk is defined by the variant case risk, the compliant case risk is conservatively assumed to be 0.Table 2-2a 1 FIRE AREA ACDF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN A ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CCDP CDF CCDP CDF ACDF 2202/D1 1.96E-03 1.84E-08 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 1.84E-08 2202/D2 1.10E-03 1.03E-08 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 1.03E-08 2202/D3 2.29E-03 2.15E-08 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 2.15E-08 2202/El 2.71 E-01 3.95E-08 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 3.95E-08 2202/E2a 6.46E-02 2.35E-08 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 2.35E-08 2202/E2b 2.34E-05 8.52E-12 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 8.52E-12 2202/E2c 4.07E-03 1.48E-09 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 1.48E-09 2202/E2d 1.43E-04 5.20E-11 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 5.20E-11 Total CDF and delta CDF 1.15E-07 0.OOE+00 1.1 5E-07 1 -N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.Table 2-2b 1 FIRE AREA ACDF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN B ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CCDP CDF CCDP CDF ACDF 2202/Di 1.96E-03 1.84E-08 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 1.84E-08 2202/D2 1.10E-03 1.03E-08 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 1.03E-08 2202/D3 5.17E-03 4.85E-08 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 4.85E-08 2202/El 2.78E-01 4.05E-08 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 4.05E-08 2202/E2a 7.28E-02 2.65E-08 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 2.65E-08 2202/E2b 2.42E-05 8.82E-12 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 8.82E-12 2202/E2c 4.07E-03 1.48E-09 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 1.48E-09 2202/E2d 1.43E-04 5.20E-11 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 5.20E-11 Total CDF and delta CDF 1.46E-07 0.OOE+00 1.46E-07-N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.Revision 1 Page 11 of 17 Version 1.0 Page 2797 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-015 Table 2-3a 1 FIRE AREA aLERF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN A ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CLERP LERF CLERP LERF ALERF 2202/D1 3.41E-06 3.19E-11 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 3.19E-11 2202/D2 1.53E-06 1.43E-11 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 1.43E-11 2202/D3 7.41E-05 6.95E-10 0.00E+00 O.00E+00 6.95E-10 2202/El 1.54E-03 2.25E-10 0.OOE+00 0.OOE+00 2.25E-10 2202/E2a 1.07E-04 3.89E-11 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 3.89E-11 2202/E2b 3.68E-08 1.34E-14 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 1.34E-14 2202/E2c 6.09E-06 2.22E-12 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 2.22E-12 2202/E2d 1.86E-07 6.78E-14 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 6.78E-14 Total LERF and delta LERF 1.01 E-09 0.OOE+00 1.01 E-09 1 _ N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.Table 2-3b 1 FIRE AREA ALERF EVALUATION 

==SUMMARY==
TRAIN B ALIGNMENT Scenario Variant Case Compliant Case Variant -Compliant CLERP LERF CLERP LERF ALERF 2202/D1 3.41 E-06 3.19E-11 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 3.19E-11 2202/D2 1.53E-06 1.43E-11 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 1.43E-11 2202/D3 8.30E-05 7.78E-1 0 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 7.78E-10 2202/El 1.62E-03 2.37E-10 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 2.37E-10 2202/E2a 1.36E-04 4.96E-11 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 4.96E-11 2202/E2b 3.75E-08 1.37E-14 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 1.37E-14 2202/E2c 6.09E-06 2.22E-12 0.00E+00 0.OOE+00 2.22E-12 2202/E2d 1.86E-07 6.78E-14 0.OOE+00 0.00E+00 6.78E-14 Total LERF and delta LERF 1.11E-09 0.OOE+00 1.11E-09-N/A indicates that quantification is not applicable and 0.00 indicates that the delta is below the quantification level.3.0 DID EVALUATION 3.1 Defense-in-Depth Evaluation A review of the impact of the change on defense-in-depth (DID) was performed.
NFPA 805 defines DID as: " Preventing fires from starting" Rapidly detecting fires and controlling and extinguishing promptly those fires that do occur, thereby limiting damage Providing adequate level of fire protection for structures, systems and components important to safety; so that a fire that is not promptly extinguished will not prevent essential plant safety functions from being performed.
Revision 1 Page 12 of 17 Version 1..0 Page 2798 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-015 In general, the DID requirement was considered satisfied if the proposed change does not result in a substantial imbalance among these elements (or echelons).
The review of DID was qualitative and addressed each of the elements with respect to the proposed change. Fire protection features and systems relied upon to ensure DID were identified in the assessment (e.g., detection, suppression system).The VFDRs and the associated Fire Area risk (CDF) and scenario consequences (CCDP values)were evaluated to identify general DID echelon imbalances.
Potential methods to balance the DID features were identified ensuring an adequate balance of DID features is maintained for the Fire Area. See Section 3.2 for the results of the evaluation.
3.2 Defense-in-Depth Review Results A review of defense in depth and risk evaluation results show that, given the systems and features specified in Table 3-1 and Section 2 respectively, risk acceptance criteria are met and that the balance of defense in depth is maintained.
The risk acceptance criteria are met with substantial margin to account for analytical methods associated with fire scenarios.
The analyzed scenarios bound potential fuel packages which can reasonably be expected to occur in this area.The installed detection and suppression systems are required for DID to ensure prompt brigade response and mitigate fire damage. In the event of no intervention by the plant fire brigade, fire suppression is also required to control and limit the potential fire propagation.
Based on the systems/features specified above, no additional DID systems/features are warranted and the ability to meet nuclear performance criteria is ensured.The table below summarizes how an adequate balance of DID is maintained.
Table 3-1 Defense-in-Depth Impact Review Method of Providing DID Discussion Echelon 1: Prevent fires from starting Combustible Control No change necessary to procedure(s) 
/guidance document(s).
1 Hot Work Control No change necessary to procedure(s) 
/guidance document(s).
Echelon 2: Rapidly detect, control and extinguish promptly those fires that do occur thereby limiting fire damage Detection System Detection system is installed and required.Automatic Fire Suppression Automatic suppression system is installed and required.Portable Fire Extinguishers Portable extinguishers are available, but no enhancements required.'
Hose stations and hydrants CO 2 hose reel is available, but no enhancements required.located in the area(s)Pre-Fire Plan No change necessary to procedure(s) 
/guidance document(s).
Echelon 3: Provide adequate level of fire protection for systems and structures so that a fire will not prevent essential safety functions from being performed Walls, floors ceilings and structural No changes necessary to existing barriers.
1 elements are rated or have been evaluated as adequate for the hazard.Openings in the fire barrier are rated No changes necessary to existing barrier openings.or have been evaluated as adequate for the hazard.Revision 1 Page 13 of 17 Version 1.0 Page 2799 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-015 Table 3-1 Defense-in-Depth Impact Review Method of Providing DID Discussion Supplemental barriers (e.g., ERFBS, No supplemental barriers installed and not required.cable tray covers, etc.)Guidance provided to operations No VFDR related DID recovery actions required.personnel detailing the credited success path(s) including recovery actions to achieve nuclear safety performance criteria.1 This fire protection feature is relied upon without further DID enhancements beyond inherent programmatic requirements of NFPA 805, Chap. 3 and will not be reported in Table 5-2.3.2.1 Required Modifications There are no modifications required as a result of the DID evaluation for this fire area.3.2.2 Required Recovery Actions There are no required recovery actions as a result of the DID evaluation for this fire area.4.0 SAFETY MARGIN EVALUATION 4.1 Safety Margin Evaluation In accordance with NEI 04-02, 5.3.5.3 guidance, the maintenance of adequate Safety Margin is assessed by the consideration of categories of analyses utilized by this fire risk evaluation (FRE).Safety margins are considered to be maintained if: " Codes and standards or their alternatives accepted for use by the NRC are met, and" Safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) are met, or provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty.
The maintenance of adequate safety margin for the change analysis is described for each of tile specific analysis types used in support of the fire risk assessment.
4.1.1 Fire Modeling Fire modeling performed in support of the transition has been performed within the Fire PRA utilizing codes and standards developed by industry and NRC staff to provide realistic yet conservative results. Specifically, the heat release rates utilized in the transition analysis are based upon NUREG/CR 6850, Task 8, Scoping Fire Modeling.
These heat release rates are conservative and represent values used to screen out fixed ignition sources that do not pose a threat to the targets within specific fire compartments and to assign severity factors to unscreened fixed ignition sources.The combined analysis approach is used during transition; therefore, maximum expected fire scenario/limiting fire scenario have not been analyzed separately.
The bases for the application of these fire modeling codes and standards were not altered in support of this FRE.Revision 1 Page 14 of 17 Version 1.0 Page 2800 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-015 4.1.2 Plant System Performance Plant system performance parameters were not modified as a result of this FRE. These performance parameters were originally established to support nuclear performance criteria contained in the plant specific accident analyses.
These analyses established component and system performance criteria necessary to establish safe and stable plant operation, as well as, safe shut down of the unit in the event of a fire. These performance parameters were not modified as a result of this FRE.4.2 Safety Margin Results All analyses and assessment have been performed utilizing accepted techniques and industry accepted standards.
In addition, safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) have been considered and provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty.
As such, the Safety Margins are maintained as discussed in Section 4.1.5.0 FIRE RISK EVALUATION RESULTS 5.1 Dispositions of VFDRs Based on the FRE results contained in Sections 2, 3 and 4 the VFDRs identified in Section 1. 1 have been resolved as follows: VFDR ID U2-2-015-SEP-001 U2-2-015-SEP-002 U2-2-015-SEP-003 U2-2-015-SEP-004 U2-2-015-SEP-005 U2-2-015-SEP-006 U2-2-015-SEP-007 U2-2-015-SEP-008 U2-2-015-SEP-009 U2-2-015-SEP-010 U2-2-015-SEP-0l 1 U2-2-015-SEP-012 Table 5-1 Final Variance Disposition Disposition Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Revision 1 Page 15 of 17 Version 1.0 Page 2801 of 3726 SE-C051326701-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-015 5.2 Fire Risk Evaluation Summary of Fire Protection Systems and Features Table 5-2 Summary of Required Fire Protection Systems and Features Required Required Required Fire FireSuppression Detection Protection Feature Required Fire Protection System and Feature Details System System (R, D)(R, D) (R, D)R -Modification to install incipient detection and to replace U2 2-015 R trip device in panel Q2R42BOO01A, breaker LA20; panel Q2R42B0001B, breaker LB14 R -Detection system, Suppression system;D -Detection system, Suppression system Required Suppression/Detection/Feature:
required in the Fire Area based on NFPA 805 Chapter 4 compliance.
The information is provided on a zone basis. The basis for the requirement of the fire protection system is designated as follows:* R -Risk Criteria:
Systems required to meet the Risk Criteria for the Performance-Based Approach (NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4)* D -Defense-in-depth Criteria:
Systems required to maintain adequate balance of Defense-in-Depth for a Performance-Based Approach (NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4)Fire Protection Features in this Table only refer to those features installed in the Fire Area that have a corresponding NFPA 805, Chapter 3 requirement.
5.3 Summary of Recovery Actions No recovery actions are required for this fire area.5.4 Summary of Plant Modifications Table 5-3 -Plant Modifications Item Unit Problem Statement Proposed Modification In Comp Risk Informed Characterization FPRA Measure Install incipient detection in panels U2 Panel contains equipment with Q2H21 NBAFP2605A, Allows early detection which provides U2-1 2 potential to result in significant Q2H21NBAFP2605B, Yes Yes additional risk benefits for CDF and 015-1 risk impacts Q2H21NBAFP2605E, LERF.Q2H21NBAFP2605G Revision I Page 16 of 17 SE-CO51326701 
-008 Attachment 
-FIRE for Unit 2 Fire Area 2-015 Table 5-3 -Plant Modifications Item Unit Problem Statement Proposed Modification In Comp Risk Informed Characterization FPRA Measure U2 Replace trip device to ensure Replace trip device in panel Reducre by difyto fire induced 015-2 2 breaker coordination of supply Q2R42B0001A, breaker LA20; panel Yes Yes failure by modifying the circuit and load breakers Q2R42BOO01B, breaker LB14 breaker and preventing damage to downstream components.
5.5 Fire Area Risk Summary Table 5-4 -Fire Area Risk Summary Fire Area Area Description NFPA 805 Fire Area CDF/LERF VFDR RAs Fire Risk Eval Additional Risk of RAs Basis (Yes/No) (Yes/No) A CDF/LERF U2 2-015 Communication Room 4.2.4 1.30E-07/1.06E-09 Yes No 1.30E-07/1.06E-09 N/A Revision I Page 17 of 17 Revision 1 Page 17 of 17}}