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{{Adams
| number = ML20148T094
| issue date = 01/31/1981
| title = Investigation Into Information Flow During the Accident at Three Mile Island
| author name = 
| author affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION &amp; ENFORCEMENT (IE)
| addressee name = 
| addressee affiliation = 
| docket = 05000320
| license number = 
| contact person = 
| document report number = EA-81-017, EA-81-17, NUREG-0760, NUREG-760, NUDOCS 8102170618
| document type = NRC TECHNICAL REPORT, NUREG REPORTS, TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
| page count = 225
}}

=Text=
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NUREG-0760
                                                                    -                   1 Investigation into information Flow                                               l During the' Accident at Three Mile Island 1
Ie Pu shed J nu     1h1 Divi:lon of Program Development and Appraisal Offire of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Wrhington, D.C. 20556 y""*%
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF. INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT INVESTIGATION INTO INFORMATION FLOW DURING THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND Docket No. 50-320 License No. DPR                                          Category C Licensee:      Metropolitan Edison Company P. O. Box 542 Reading, Pennsylvania 19640 Facility Name:      Three Mile Island Nuclear Station Unit 2 Investigation conducted:       March 1980 - January 1981                                  .
1 Investigators                                                                             l J
                                                                                     /
                                                                       /Gllws%
s/n/es Norman C. Moseley                Date               TerryL.Harpsfer            /Date
                                                                   .:          /
hk William L. Fisher'
                                          ~    l 23/fl Date '
John W. Craig A     -
                                                                                         'A J    thf;?
pate J' .
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f ABSTRACT
        ~This report was prepared in response to a request from NRC Chairman Ahearne that' directed the Office of Inspection and Enforcement to resume its inves-tigation~'of information flow dur.ing the accident at Three Mile Island (TMI) that occurred on March 28, 1979. This investigation was resumed on March 21, 1980. The transfer of information among individuals, agencies, and personnel from Metropolitan' Edison was analyzed to ascertain what knowledge was held by various individuals of the specific events, parameters, and syster s during the accident at TMI. Maximum use was made of existing records, and additional interviews.were conducted to clarify areas that had not been pursued during earlier investigations. -Although the passage of_ time between the accident and post-accident interviews hampered precise recollections of events and circumstances', the investigation revealed information was not intentionally withheld during the accident and-that the systems for effective transfer of information were inadequate during the accident.                                      l
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CONTENTS P_ age .
iii Abstract......................................................
1 I. Introduction.............................................
10 II. Summary, Conclusions, and Recommendations................
III. Knowledge;and Reporting to'NRC of Key Indicators 12 Related:to the Accident................................
13
: 1. Primary Cool ant System. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
13 a.'   HPI and Letdown Systems........................
14
: b. Reactor Coolant Pumps..........................
16
: c. EH0V...........................................
l Th/Superheat/Incore Thermocouples..............                                 18
: d.                                                                                            '
20
: e. Count Rate Behavior............................
22
: 2. Containment Pressure Spike..........................                                          i Goldsboro Radiation Dose Rate Projection............                                   31 3.
33 IV. Onsite Information     F10w..................................
35 V. NRC Information F10w.....................................
39 VI. Operating Information Supplied to the State..............
45 VII. Enforcement Considerations...............................
45
: 1. Potential Material False Statement..................                                  46
: 2. License Modification Related to Gary Miller.........
47
: 3. Reporting...........................................
Regulatory Requirement to Report...............                                  47 a.
Knowledge of Reportable Events.................                                  48 b.
48
: c. Failure to Rep 0rt..............................
48 What Constitutes Reporting.....................
: d.                                                                                          d 49
: e. Assessment of this Case........................
Apoendix A--Notification Citation Considered by the Investigation Team l
Appendix B--Report References
  .e 4     T V
i
  'k    .

f INVESTIGATION INTO INFORMATION FLOW DURING THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND I.      Introduction On October 25, 1979, Victor Stello, Director of the Office of Inspection and Enforcement (IE), sent a Notice of Violation to Metropolitan Edison (Met Ed) resulting from the IE investigation into the accident at Three Mile Island (TMI) that occurred on March 28, 1979. In the transmittal letter, Mr. Stello said, "Among other things, additional enforcement action is under review with regard to the reportability of several items of information following the onset of the accident, including specifically the calculated dose rate of 10-40 R/hr in Goldsboro, the elevated incore thermocouple indicationr and the pressure spike in the containment vessel."
Subsequently, the Commission concluded that the area of information transfer should be examined by the NRC Special Inquiry Group. At the conclusion of its review,.the Special Inquiry Group reported that it
       'ound no direct evidence suggesting intentional withholding of informa-
                         ~
tion, but it did not reach conclusions on the questions of enforcement.
On March 21, 1980, NRC Chairman Ahearne requested that the Executive Director for Operations direct IE to resume its investigation regarding information transfer on the day of the accident at TMI. Accordingly, the IE investigntion effort was initiated on April 1,1980. The investi-gation examined information that did not adequately flow from TMI to NRC and to the Pennsylvania Bureau of Radiological Protection (BRP) on March 28, 1979.
This investigation examined the transfer of information and knowledge related to specific events, parameters, and systems. The summary, con-clusions and recommendations of this investigation are presented in Section II. Section III of this report contains a description of the information flow and a summary of'the knowledge of specific plant per-sonnel for each of the key indicators examined during this investigation.
The review of the information flow associated with the key indicators allowed a description to be developed for the onsite information flow (Section IV), information flow to the NRC (Section V), and information flow to the State (Section VI). This investigation concluded with an evaluation of enforcement considerations related to the transfer of information (Section VII).
The investigation team was composed of Norman C. Moseley (IE), Team Leader; Terry' L. Harpster (IE); John W. Craig (IE); and William L. Fisher (IE). David H. Gamble participated in this investigation as a represent-ative of the Office of the Inspector and Auditor, whose function is to protect the interest of the Department of Justice in any criminal matters that may arise. Richard K. Hoefling (ELD) provided legal advice and
'         assistance to the team and participated.in most of the interviews.
h

i Victor Stello, Director (IE), participated in some of the interviews.
Although Ronald C. Haynes (IE) was initially a member of the team, he was released to resume other pressing duties.
An early premise of the investigation was to make maximum use of the extensive-records that had been already accumulated. The records used included NUREG-0600, IE interviews, tape recordings, logs, depositions taken by the NRC Special Inquiry Group, testimony and depositions taken by the Kemeny Commission, testimony and depositions taken by the Senate investigation, and testimony before the Subcommittee for Energy and The Environment.
The investigation was delayed when some persons to be interviewed contested
-the validity'of NRC administrative subpoenas. After the. court enforced the subpoenas, all interviews were conducted under oath with a court reporter providing a verbatim transcript.       During the investigation, employees of Met Ed/ General Public Utilities-(GPU), Babcock & Wilcox (B&W), Pennsylvania Bureau of Radiologi.;al Protection (BRP), and NRC were interviewed. Copies of transcripts of the interviews will be available for inspection in the Public Document Room.
The following summary'of events that occurred on March 28, 1979 was developed from NUREG-0600.      This summary is intended to familiarize the reader with some operational aspects of the accident. It is not intended to ba all-inclusive. Detailed summaries are presented in NUREG-0600 and in the Special Inquiry Group's Report, NUREG/CR-1250. (The timing indicated is approximate.)

==SUMMARY==
OF EVENTS Time of Event, March 28, 1979                          Event Description 4:00 a.m.              The main feedwater pumps tripped resulting in an almost simultaneous trip of the turbine (actual time 04:00:37, March 28,1979). Low feedwater pump suction pressure or loss of the condensate booster pumps, while in automatic, caused the feedwater pump turbines to trip. Tripping of both feedwater pumps caused the main turbine to trip.
+3-6 seconds           Reactor coolant system (RCS) pressure reached electromagnetic relief valve (EMOV) opening setpoint (2255 psig),
seconds            Reactor tripped from reactor high pressure (setpoint 2255 psig). Indicated reactor pressure on the wide range RCS pressure-strip chart from the control room showed an increase to approximately 2435 psig, which would normally suggest that one of the two safety valves may have lifted.
2

Time of Event, March 28, 1979                   Event Description
  ~13 seconds    RCS pressure reached setpoint for EMOV closure (2205 psig). However, later events showed that closure did not occur.
Plant Status--TMI Unit 2 had just experienced a turbine / reactor trip. RCS pressure and pressurizer level were decreasing rapidly a*ter reaching their peaks. Unknown to the plant operators, the EMOV was not shut and was passing reactor coolant from the steam space at the top of the reactor coolant system pressurizer. Based on control room indications, the RCS pressure and pressurizer level were trending together and decreasing as was expected after a reactor trip. The once-through steam generator (OTSG) water levels were at about 90 inches and decreasing at about 4 inches /second. The OTS:: steam       ,
pressures were about 1030 psig and decreasing at 4 psi per second. The turbine bypass valves were open to relieve steam. The OTSG water levels had not yet reached the setpoint of 30 inches for the programmed opening of the emergency feedwater valves that would       ;
admit feedwater to the OTSG.                              .
14 minutes     The reactor cool u t drain tank (RCDT) rupture disc blew at an RCOT indicated pressure of 192 psig, dropping RCDT pressure to approximately 10 psig in 36 seconds.
Reactor building pressure appeared to jump one full psi. At this time, up to about 1.2 psig, pressure rise was evident in the reactor building.
74 minutes     The reactor coolant pumps (RCP) in B loop were chosen to be tripped to be able to maintain maximum pressurizer spray capability which comes from A loop. RCP 18 and 2B tripped.
Prior to        Approximately 5-10 minutes after the trip of the B      '
l 101 minutes     loop RCP source range monitor (SRM), count rate instability increased again as well as continued to trend upward. Intermediate range monitor (IRM) current also began to show an upward trend. Operators reported    ,
that loop flow instability was increasing again, and     i the indicated loop flow continued to show a decrease.
Operators asserted during interviews that they were concerned about a " seal failure loss of coolant accident (LOCA)" and decided to go on natural cir-culation. An operator stated that he started
                   " emergency boration" during this period, based on SRM increases and fear of a restart accident.
3
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Time of Event, March 28, 1979                    Event Description 101 minutes       The loop A RCPs tripped. SRM count rote spiked upward to peak at least one decade over count rate expected following a normal reactor trip. All radia-tion monitors exhibited substantial ramp increases.
Operators stated they did not believe that natural circulation had been established due to the differen-tial temperature across the steam generator and the low steam generator pressure with minimum heat removal, if any.
The reactor coolant system (RCS) had no forced-flow cooling. All reactor coolant pumps (RCPs) were stopped.TheRCSaveragetemperatureandpressure were approximately 520 F and 750 psig. Makeup pump 1A was operating. The operators were attempting to establish natural circulation flow to cool the reactor core. OTSG B was isolated because of a suspected leak to the reactor building.
6 a.m.           Nuclear engineer called the site-to gather information required'for standard post-trip report. There was some question of whether the reactor had experienced a restart based on SRMs. The third boron sample indicated approximately 400 ppm.
6 a.m.           A conference call was established among Unit 2 technical support (Unit 2 control room) and Station Manager, Vice-President of Generation, and B&W site represent-atives (at their homes) lasting approximately 38 minutes. They alt knew that the trip was abnormal since RCPs were off and they were unable to draw pressurizer bubble. Having a blown rupture disc and water on the floor were not surprising since this had happened before. The condition of the EMOV block valve was questioned and reported to be shut. The group decided that a need existed to restart an RCP and all should report to TMI. (A conference call had been :nitiated by station support following discussion with Unit 2 technical support (on-call Outy Officer) around I hour 15 minutes into event. The Unit 2 technical support had been on the site since 50 minutes into the event, following his call to the site shortly following the initial trip.)
6:18 a.m.        The operator requested computer printout of EMOV and code safety outlet temperatures (229 f, 190 F, and 194 F, respectively). The operator isolated the EMOV by closing the block valve. The operators had noted tail pipe temperature on relief valve 35 F higher than others and believed the valve to be leaking.
4

,     TimeofEvent, March 28, 1979                     Event Description They noted-a drop in reactor building pressure after
                     . closure of the block valve. The pressure change in the reactor: building was'more marked than when B OTSG
                     .was isolated. The plant operations group decided                          i I
that the B OTSG did not have a leak from the shell
                      -into the reactor building. The B OTSG still had a                         l water level.                                                             l 6:40 a.m.        An operator initiat'ed emergency boratitn based on increasing nuclear instrument (NI) indicator, low                      j ~
boron sample results reported, and calculated shut-down margin of only 2.4% reactivity.
     '7:00 a.m.        The RCS loop B hot leg temperature reached 800 F.
7:16 a.m.        The answering service attempted to reach the Region I-Duty Officer, but he had already left for.the Region'I Office.
7:18 a.m.         Plant Status--After attempts to establish natural circulation had failed, the operator started RCP 2B.
However, based on a no-flow indication, RCP 2B was stopped after 19 minutes. Superheated steam / gas was-present in the reactor vessel head and RCS hot leg.                     l Both reactor coolant system hot leg temperatures were offscale high (i.e., greater than 620"f). The RCS cold leg temperatures were about 375 F for loop A and 330 F for loop B. OTSG B was isolated due to a suspected RCS-to-0TSG 1eak. OTSG A pressure control was implemented by means of the power-operated emergency main steam dump valve A. An attempt was in progress to control pressurizer pressure and level with the EMOV.
7:20 a.m.        The answering service signaled the Region I Duty Officer beeper, but the beeper reportedly dio-not alarm.
The RCS loop A hot leg temperature dropped from 800 F to 710 F. Makeup pump 1B had bn n off since engineered safety features initiation (referred to as'ES initiation) at 2 minutes after the start of the incident. The RCS loop A hot leg temperature varied between 680 F to 760 F over the next 6 hours. Loop B followed loop A, but it was about 60 F hotter.
7:24 a.m.         A General Emergency was declared by the Station Manager.
7:26 a.m.         The pressurizer level and pressure were dropping. The pressurizer high-level alarm cleared indicating 254 inches 4
                                             '5

f TimeLof Eve't,     n
   . March 28, 1979                               Event Description and pressurizer pressure.had dropped to 1500 psig.        !
The pre'ssurizer surge line temperature had returned to normal at 581 F.
7:30 a.m.                    The borated water. storage tank low-level alarms were received at-53.03 and 53.06 feet.
7:56 a.m.                    The ES and reactor building isolation 'were initiated by high reactor building pressure (approximately 4 psig).
                               . Makeup pump 18 started automatically, joining makeup pump 1A in injecting through the wide-open valves. ; Intermediate closed-cooling pumps 1A and IB tripped.
8:00 a.m.                  .The'ES and reactor building isolation was defeated by operator. The operator restarted the intermediate closed-cooling pumps to ensure RCP seal and letdown flow cooling.
By this time, the pressurizer level was approximately 380 inches with a reactor pressure of 1500 psig.
The detector, shielded with 2 inches of lead located in'the containment dome, was reading 200 R/hr.
The Station Manager requested the B&W Site Operations Manager and other senior supervisors to caucus with him in the Snift Supervisor's office. It was decided to try another RCP start since pressure was high enough to satisfy net positive suction head (NPSH) requirements.
The nature of subsequent discussions was reported to consider the current situation and options available for return to normal conditions; discussions were not retrospective to determine what actions or conditions resulted in the plant reaching its current status.
The NRC Regional Director called the NRC IE Director to notify him of the activation of the Regional Emergency Center.
8:22 a.m.                   Technicians lifted the leads on RCS loop A hot leg-resistance temperature detector.(RTD) to take a reading (729 F). Initially, temperature readings were not believed due to their magnitude and the fact that.the readings were outside the calibrated range of.the' instruments.
8:00 a.m.,to,               The Station Manager had requested verification of 9:00 a.m.           '
incore thermocouple (T/C) readings, which were 6
__.__________._2__     .1.     .             _

    ~.            . _           -                              .-
l Time of Event,                      .
March 28, 1979                    Event Descripticn I
indicating off-scale temperatures. Technicians took             I incore T/C readings at terminal strips in the contrul building. The readings indicated temperatures from 80 F to 2620 F.                                                 l 9:15 a.m.      - Convinced that steam was present in each loop, the licensee's staff decided to raise'RCS pressure and collapse unwanted steam bubbles. They verified again that the EMOV was shut.     (Recall that ' position "indi-cation" shows valve position demand rather than actual position.) An increase in high pressure injection flow was directed.
11:30 a.m.       An operator opened both the EMOV and its block valve to depressurize the RCS. Reactor building pressure showed a rise from low point of 0.2 psig to 2.5 psig during this RCS depressurization.
1:50 p.m.      - ES was actuated on the reactor building isolation by       ,
high building pressure (4 psig). The building pressure experienced a spike to 28 psig (indicated), tripping the reactor building pressure switches (nominal 30 psig setpoint) some 6 seconds later. Building spray pumps started and the 30 psig actuation cleared within 4 seconds. The RCS pressure indication showed rapid 40 psi dip (probably due to increased pressure on RCS pressure detector reference leg) and recovery to 500 psig at the same time. Makeup pump 1C started             i (1B already operating and 1A in pull-to-lock). Decay         l heat pumps 1A and IB started, intermediate closed-cooling     ;
pumps 1A and 1B tripped.
Code safeties and RCP air temperatures alarmed high.
Operator defeated building isolation and restarted intermediate closed-cooling pumps 1A and 1B to              e maintain RCP seal water and letdown cooling.
1:55 p.m.         The Station Manager and Superintendent of Technical Support met with the Vice-President of Generation and proceeded to the Lt. Governor's office.
1: 56 p.m.       The reactor building spray pumps shut down and were placed in pull-to-lock position by operator to secure sodium hydroxide (Na0H) washdown of building when pressure drop indicated it was no longer needed. It appears these switches were returned to normal within minutes.
3:32 p.m.         Operators indicated that method of cooldown at this time was using one high pressure injection pump and the core flood tanks.
7 i

Y Time of Event, March 28, 1979                                          Event Description 4
4:10 p.m.                               TFe incore temperatures were reported to be unavailable.   ,
The Supervisor reported to NRC that the computers          I were all printing question rarks, which indicated that either the computer point or the sensor was malfunctioning. The supervisor did not indicate that the same result occurred when the temperature exceeded 4
the range of the software calibration for those points. These were the first thermocouple data or 2
comments to the NRC. The first request had been made at approximately 8 hours 20 minutes into the accident.
'                                                 It was stated that core flood tanks were floating on the core, the Th was 590 F, and that the staff was convinced there was no boiling in the core.
!        4:56 p.m.                               An NRC inspector reported the following:
t
: 1. Licensee was concerned that current cooldown process was too slow and believed that it would be faster to cool down by steaming the OTSG.
: 2. Licensee was working to get rid of bubbles in loops, to establish bubble in pressurizer, and j                                                      to go on natural circulation.
:                                                3.
4                                                      Licensee was concerned about further use of EMOV since water was dumped to the floor, and, with sources of' clean water being exhausted, was concerned that they would be forced to uso dirty sump water for recirculation.
: 4. Licensee concluded core was covered.
4                                                                                                Discussed and rejected further blowdown because this would     1 ultimately entail recirculation of sump water.       ;
5:30 p.m.                               Staff was repressurizing RCS to collapse voids and          l was prepared to start RC pump.        Plant charges con-    i firmed pressure increase.
!       7:50 p.m.                               RCP 1A was started and was allowed to run.         Flow     !
and amps looked good.      The reactor coolant pressure dropped to 1123 psig. OTSG B indicated level dropped i
below 79% and recovered to above 85% within 8 second span. OTSG A indicated level dropped below 81% and recovered to above 82% within a 9-second span, 40
: j.                                             seconds after OTSG B transient.
i 7:52 p.m.                              . Pressurizer level was still offscale high.
8:00 p.m.                              The RCP 1A was running with both RCS loop cold legs temperature at about 290 F. The pressurizer level was still full scale with RCS. pressure at about 8
i

1 i
Time of Event,-
March 28, 1979                     Event Descrlption 1350 psig. OTSG B was. operating with about 97% level and 99 psig, whereas OTSG A-was steaming to the
                       . main condenser at about 93% level and'76 psig.
Makeup pump 1B was operating and supplying RCP seals and normal makeup, the latter at 95 gpm.
Hakeup pumps 1A and 1C were secured, as were the decay heat removal pumps 1A and 18. Pressurizer temperature was at 150*F and operators were letting down in attempt to draw a bubble.
9 1:

II. Summary,-Conclusions, and Recommendations 1
Summary                                                                     i This investigation found that, although pertinent information was not
;   ~ intentionally withheld on March 28, 1979, information was not adeauately transmitted to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission or the Bureau of Radio-logical Protection (BRP). The investigators concluded that two primary factors examined during this investigation caused the failure of station personnel to adequately inform the necessary organizations. The predominant factor was the absence of an effective onsite system to accumulate, evaluate and disseminate information. The second factor was the lack of comprehension by plant personnel of the behavior of the plant systems.
The investigators relied heavily on existing information, including data from the plant computer, reconstructions of recorded parameters, personal notes, and tapes to establish the time when information could have been l    known. Other information came from personal notes and transcripts of statements made to the various investigators during interviews were conducted to supplement the existing information. In seme cases, the accumulated informatien contained apparent conflicts concerning the knowledge of individuals about specific information. The conflicts resulted from differences in an individual's testimony taken at different times, and differences in the testimony of different individuals with regard to the same subject.
j To reconstruct what information was known, the investigators examined j
~
several of these apparent conflicts. This examination resulted in con-clusions on the information known by various individuals. These con-         '
clusions are stated in the body of the report. One possible explanation for the apparent conflicts in knowledge of specific information is that one or more of the individuals involved has lied. Othe'r possible explan-ations include poor recall, different statements by an individual on the same subject as a result of a slightly different quastion, the inability of an individual to differentiate between what was known on March 28, 1979 and knowledge gained later, and the effect of elapsed time. The investigators did not attempt to assign a specific cause for each of the 4
apparent conflicts examined.       They did, however, conclude that none of the conflicts examined were the result of lying.
Two potential items of noncompliance were examined related to the failure to report specific information (discussed in Section VI of the report).
However, an additional citation of noncompliance is not recommended.
 ! Conclusions
: 1. There was significant information that did not adequately flow either on the site or to the necessary offsite groups on the day of the accident.
: 2. On the day of the accident, an effective system did not exist to 4
ensure adequate information flow; i.e., to provide significant j         information for dissemination and evaluation within the onsite 9
8 10

I l
l organization or offsite within the Met Ed and GPU organizations as well as the NRC,. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and other agencies.
l
: 3. Those individuals on site failed to understand the extent and signi-
                                            ~
ficance of the problems confronting them on the day of the accident; this contributed to the inadequate flow of information.
: 4. Met Ed was not fully forthcoming on March 28, 1979 in that they did not appraise the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania of either the uncer-tainty concerning the adequacy of core cooling or the potential for degradation of plant conditions.
: 5. Information was not intentionally withheld from the State on the day of the accident.
: 6. Information was not intentionally withheld from the NRC on the day of the accident.
: 7. The NRC did not have an effective system to ensure that information was properly accumulated, evaluated, and disseminated.
: 8. Reporting requirements, both to NRC and to the State, were not sufficiently specific on March 28, 1979.
* 1 Recommendations
: 1. The investigators recommend that no citation for failure to report be issued against Metropolitan Edison. Even though the investi-gators are unanimous in this recommendation, the underlying reasons vary. These reasons include the following:
: a. The regulatory requirements in existence on March 28, 1979 with regard to reporting were not sufficiently specific to support such a citation;
: b. Sufficient information was transmitted by Metropolitan Edison on March 28, 1979 to conclude that the reporting requirements existing at that time were satisfied; and
: c. A belief that a citation of this type at this time for this licensee has no real meaning.
: 2. The investigators recommend that NRC require emergency plans and implementing procedures'to specifically address, in detail, the following communications functions:
: a. Assignment of specific responsibilities to ensure that all pertinent information is accumulated, recorded, and displayed.
: b. Assignment of specific responsibilities to ensure that this information is disseminated to both those responsible for evaluation of the information and those responsible for commun-ication of the information, including specification of how this information is to flow.
11
: c. Assignment ,of specific responsibilities to ensure that all pertinent information is communicated to all offsite groups and agencies which require this information, including specifica-tion of how this information is to flow. This recommendation includes the communication of plant management's evaluation of the significance of the-information.
: 3. The investigators recommend that NRC reporting requirements and rehted regulatory guidance be modified or revised to ensure that 4
all pertinent information is provided. Those requirements and guidance should:
: a. Specify the nature of the subevent, occurrence, or indicator within an overall event that should be reportable in itself.
: b. Specify that, the evaluation or assessment of each reported subevent, occurrence, or indicator is reportable.
: c. Specify the responsibilities of the plant staff to promptly provide and continue to provide timely assessment of the plant conditions and the potential for deterioration.
: d. Spe::ify the responsibilities of the plant staff to provide information related to a v alous plant behavior; i.e., infor-mation related to plant behavior which is not understood.
: 4. The investigators recommend augmentation of the present system of verbal / telephonic information flow with a real-time data link in order to provide offsite organizations and agencies sufficient information to permit timely independent evaluation of plant condi-tions and the timely initiation of the resulting recommendations or actions.
5.
The investigators recommend that NRC review and revise, as necessary, the communications channels to be implemented in response to an accident.
: 6. The investigators recommend that the roles of those NRC personnel         ;
involved in responding to an accident be clearly defined. This includes those personnel to be on site, in the Regional Office, and at headquarters. These roles should also be discussed with and understood by licensees.
III. Knowledge and Reporting to NRC of Key Indicators Related to the Accident  -
The investigators reviewed previous testimony, reports, and other source l  materials. Based on the results of this. review, key indicators (events i
i or key plant parameters) were identified as being particularly significant.
Because these key indicators were significant, knowledge or lack of knowledge associated with them should have enabled the investigators to           l trace the flow of information among plant personnel on March 28, 1979.
However, it was found that past testimony contained both incomplete l
12 I

s answers and' unasked q'uestions.that prevented;the investigators from establishing knowledge-of the key indicators for some personnel. Therefore, a seriesiof. interviews was. conducted'in an attempt to get complete answers
       -and.to ask previously unasked questions. This process allowed the1 invest-igators to; reach conclusions concerning.the extent of knowledge possessed
       .by particular Metropolitan Edison employees related to each of the. key indicators. 'A summary concerning this knowledge of key indicators is discussed in the.following.
:1.      Primary l Coolant-System
: a.      HPI' and Letdown Systenis A review of the status of the makeup pumps (MVPs) and the letdown system during the initial. hours (prior to 8:00 a.m.) of the. accident confirmed previous TMI ' operating staff testimony that the behavior of the plant was not understood. Approximately 2 minutes into.the transient, reactor coolant system-pressure decreased rapidly through the 1640 psig level,
                    ~
initiating both trains of the'~ safety features actuation system (SFAS).
During the next 6-8 minutes, pressure continued to decrease to saturation.           .
values for the corresponding hot leg temperatures. Contrary to the-                     l transient' behavior of the plant for which they had been trained--that is,             J rapid pressure and level. decrease du' ring a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA)--the pressurizer level increased rapidly to an offscale value and returned intermittently within the indicated range ly when the operators
         ' throttled the high pressure injection (HPI) flow and increased letdown to a value greater than'160 gpm. The plant appeared to stabilize in this anomalous condition, with the pressure essentially stable at saturation and pressurizer level offscale high, until .the EMOV was closed after 2 hours and 19 minutes into the accident. At that point, pressure rapidly increased. In retrospe".t, it appears that, because the behavior of system pressure was essentially stable over much of this period, the operating staff became increasingly preoccupied with pressurizer level and a related concern over the possibility of operation with a solid primary coolant system (e.g., with the system completely filled with water). As a result, the operator actions of throttling the HPI and increasing letdown were directed toward restoring pressurizer level, thus contributing to the continual reduction of coolant ' inventory in the primary system.
This is significant because the incorrect analysis of the anomalous conditions not only resulted in detrimental operator actions but also
          . delayed recognition of LOCA conditions and the potential severity of the accident. The.resulting confusion was evidenced by the fact that some members of the key staff were aware of the prior. status of these systems.
However, post-accident testimony. reveals that little discussion occurred            '
early in the morning among' key staff members regarding either the status of these systems (HPI and letdown) or the resulting implications with regard to the potential magnitude of the coolant inventory deficiency.
13

i l
Knowledge of HPI and Letdown George Kunder--Kunder was aware that HPI had been secured shortly after initiation of the transient and that letdown had been increased in an attempt to restore pressurizer level to a less-than-full indication (SIG, 9/18/79, pp. 32-35, 42-45). Kunder cannot remember if this information was discussed with any of the key staff (IE, 9/4/80, pp. 3-4).
Leland Rogers (B&W)--Rogers was unaware of the status of HPI and letdown prior to 8:00 a.m.; he did not recall any subsequent conversations with regard to its status prior to 8:00 a.m. (IE, 9/2/80, pp. 3-5).
William Zewe--On the morning of March 28, 1979, Zewe directed the reactor operators to throttle HPI and increase letdown in an attempt to restore pressurizer level.
Zewe recalled briefing Kunder and Miller (separately) on what had happened prior to their arrivals and specifically recalled that the status of these systems was discussed (IE, 9/4/80, pp. 3-5).
Michael Ross--In testimony on September 18, 1979 to the SIG (pp. 11-12),
Ross stated that he thought the fact that HPI had been off for some time or was throttled back was discussed prior to 11:00 a.m. When questioned on September 24, 1980 (IE, pp. 4-5), Ross stated that the discussion would have involved the "think tank" people.
Joseph Logan--Logan vaguely recalled (IE, 10/16/80, p. 5) that when he arrived in the control room he was told by Zewe that a safety injection had been automatically initiated and that it had been secured. Logan recalls no subsequent discussions of this subject.
Gary Miller--When asked, Miller did not recall knowing that HPI had been secured and/or throttled for some period of time prior to his arrival in the control room at approximately 7 a.m. (IE, 9/5/80, pp. 6-7 and IE, 31/10/80, pp. 140-146). Miller did not think Zewe's recollection of twiefing him on the status of HPI and letdown was accurate.
The investigators conclude that Miller was briefed on the status of the HPI and letdown systems as they existed prior to his arrival. Zeve, who was present when the EMOV block valve was closed, probably did not recognize that a significant inventory loss had occurred. Thus, Zewe did not             l recognize the significance of the HPI system being secured and the letdown flow being increased for a period of time. Because of this, the investigators  !
l conclude that any information with regard to the status of the HPI and letdown systems was presented to Miller in the context of actions taken to restore an offscale high pressurizer level. Thus, Miller's attention was not directed to the length of tim the HPI system had been secured.
: b. Reactor Coolant Pumps As reactor coolant system (RCS) inventory decreased due to the stuck open EMOV, the reactor coolant progressively changed to a circulating two phase mixture with a continually increasing steam fraction. This condition was l
evidenced both by the increasing vibration of the RCPs and by the erratic       {
and decreasing RCS flow rates. In response to these indications and the         '
14 i

minimum net positive suction head limits, operators secured the loop B RCPs at 5:14 a.m. The loop A RCPs ware tripped at 5:41 a.m., thus termin-ating the forced coolant circulation through the reactor core. At 6:54 a.m., RCP 2B was restarted. At 7:12 a.m., the indicated flow was zero and the motor running current was 100 amps; therefore, RCP 2B was tripped.
At 8:09 a.m., RCP 1A was restarted to confirm the pump running conditions.
At that point, the indicated pump current rapidly decreased to less than 100 amps with no flow being indicated. RCP 1A was tripped 37 seconds later.
This sequence was significant for two reasons. First, termination of forced flow resulted in separation of the two phase mixture, thereby vapor-binding the loops. This effectively terminated an already degraded two phase heat transfer mechanism, resulting in coolant boiloff and initiation of core uncovery. Second, a qualitative indication of the severity of loss of coolant could have been inferred from the extent of voiding as evidenced by the steam environment in the RCP volute (suction).
The investigators conclude that the inability to run the RCPs on the morning of March 28, 1979'did not lead the plant personnel to infer the extent of voiding in relation to core water level.
Knowledge of RCPs George Kunder--Subsequent to the attempt at 8:09 a.m. to run RCP 1A, Kunder concluded that the RCP was spinning in a steam environment. At         j that point, Kunder was concerned that they could be uncovering the core (Senate, 8/22/79, pp. 17-18). Kunder recalls no specific conversation on March 28, 1979 regarding this concern (IE, 9/4/80, pp. 6-7).
Leland Rogers (B&W)--Subsequent to the attempt at 8:09 a.m. to run RCP 1A, Rogers concluded that the loop was filled with steam at least to the suction of the RCP (IE, 9/2/80, pp. 14-16).
Joseph Logan--Logan was aware of the inability of the RCPs to provide forced circulation on the morning of March 28, 1979 (IE, 5/9/79, pp. 6-7, 33).
William Zewe--After Miller and Rogers arrived, Zewe informed them of the actions he had taken with regard to securing the RCPs and the bases for his taking these actions (IE, 9/4/80, p. 9).
Michael Ross--Ross was convinced that the RCP was pumping steam. When asked about checking plant elevation drawings subsequent to the attempts to start the pump, Ross recalls some discussion within the think tank about levels and the probable problem. However, he does not think they ever related it to a core water level (IE, 9/24/80, pp.11-12).
Gary Miller--From the time the reactor coolant pumps were restarted and indicated 100 amps, Miller was aware that there was a coolant inventory deficiency in the plant (IE, 9/5/80, pp. 37, 48-50). Miller's concern was related to the level of water in the hot leg. The investigators conclude that Miller did not recognize the magnitude of the inventory 15

deficiency, and that he did not attempt to relate this inventory deficiency to core water level.
: c. EMOV Approximately 4 seconds after the turbine and generator trip, the EMOV       i opened as RCS pressure increased through the 2255 psig setpoint. When        i the pressurizer steam space was ' vented to the reactor coolant drain tank (RCDT), excess pressure, which was caused by the coolant expansion from the RCS into the pressurizer via the surge line reactor coolant was relieved. RCDT temperature and pressure began then to increase. At 2345 psig (approximately 8 seconds after turbine trip), the reactor tripped on high pressure and the coolant began to contract, thereby rapidly reducing system pressure and pressurizer le,-       Approximately 7 seconds after the reactor trip, pressure decreased through 2205 psig (the EMOV closure setpoint) and the EH0V dici not close.
The EMOV solenoid deenergized and the EMOV control board position indicator (which was sensed from the electrical state of the solenoid) indicated closure of the EMOV. From this time (approximately 15 seconds from turbine trip) until the EMOV block valve was closed (2 hours and 19 minutes into the accident), an unrecognized loss of coolant continued to flow from the reactor coolant system.
The RCS pressure steadily decreased to the saturation pressure for the hot leg temperatures. The unavailability of feedwater to remove heat from the RCS and the low RCS pressure caused a rapid expansion of reactor coolant into the pressurizer. In fact, contrary to the expected transient behavior for loss-of-coolant accidents and contrary to the symptoms for which operators were trained to respond, pressurizer level was increasing rapidly within 1 mir.ute of the reactor trip. A pressurizer high-level alarm (266 inches) was received at about 3 minutes and 28 seconds, and within 5 minutes and 30 seconds, the indicated pressurizer level was offscale high (maximum indicated range of 400 inches).
At 3 minutes and 15 seconds, the RCDT relief valve lifted (setpoint 122 psig), discharging coolant into the reactor building sump. The pressure and temperature in the reactor building began to increase as a result of the hot coolant expanding through the EMOV into the RCDT and out of the RCDT relief valve into the reactor building atmosphere (sump). At approx-imately 15 minutes into the accident, the RCD 1 rupture diaphragm burst (192 psig RCDT pressure) and released the contents of the RCDT into the j reactor building atmosphere. This caused a rapid increase in reactor building pressure.
From this time until the EMOV was isolated, conditions remained essentially stable: RCS pressure remained at the saturation level for the corresponding hot leg temperatures, pressurizer level remained offscale high, and reactor coolant inventory continued to decrease as the coolant expanded through the EMOV into the RCDT and into the reactor building atmosphere.
The EMOV block valve was closed at 6:19 a.m. The reactor building pressure decreased rapidly, and the RCS pressure increased from 680 to 2120 psig during the next 41 minutes, 16

Knowledge of the EMOV George Kunder--At some time on March 28, 1979 (he does not believe it was in the morning), Kunder became aware that the EMOV had been stuck open (IE, 9/4/80, p. 8-9). In earlier interviews (e.g., SIG 9/18/79, pp.
39-41), Kunder left the impression that it was earlier in the morning (perhaps shortly after the general emergency was declared) that he became aware that the EMOV had been stuck open.
Joseph Logan--Logan does not recall if he became aware on March 28, 1979 that the EMOV had stuck open (IE, 10/16/80, pp. 11-16).
Leland Rogers (B&W)--Rogers does not recall becoming aware that the EMOV had stuck open until March 29, 1979 when the reactimeter data was delogged (IE, 9/2/80, p. 7).
William Zewe--After the EMOV block valve was shut, Zewe recognized that the EMOV had been open for some period of time. Zewe was aware that some inventory had been lost and that, with closure of the block valve, the RCS pressure started increasing and the reactor building pressure started decreasing (SIG, 10/11/79, pp. 92, and Senate, 11/15/79, pp. 35-38). He recalled discussing this fact with several members of the plant staff, whom he believed included Kunder, Ross, and Logan. He also believed that it was discussed with Rogers and Miller some time on March 28, 1979 (IE, 9/4/80, pp. 11-12).
Michael Ross--Ross recalled arriving about the time the biock valve war, shut and Zewe saying that the reactor building pressure was decreasing with the EMOV closure (IE, 5/19/79, pp. 11-12). He also recalled dis-cussion in the think tank regarding the EMOV having been open (IE, 9/24/80, pp. 17-20).                                                        j Gary Miller--Miller has stated that he was aware on March 28, 1979 that     I the EMOV had been open longer than it should have been because the RCDT rupture disc had blown. However, his perception of that time period was in terms of minutes rather than hours (IE, 11/10/80, pp. 61-78),           j 1
The investigators conclude that Miller was aware on March 28, 1979 that    I the EMOV had stuck open and that it was related to the abnormal indica-    l tions in the early morning but that he did not perceive how much water     l had been lost from the RCS.
William Dornsife (BRP)--Dornsife recalled Miller briefing him at approx-   1 imately 9:00 a.m. on March 28, 1979. He recalled Miller stating that the EMOV had been stuck open for a period of time and that the position in-dication had been faulty (IE, 10/1/80, p. 11).
James Higgins (NRC)--Higgins stated in an IE interview on October 7, 1980 (p. 31) that he was told by Marshall (on his arrival at about 10:15 a.m.)
that the EMOV had been stuck open.
17

t
: d. Th/Superheat/Incore Thermocouples The loop B RCPs were secured at 5:14 a.m. Twenty-seven minutes later
.  (5:41 a.m.), the loop A RCPs were secured. Loops A and B hot leg temper-l  atures were approximately 535 F at that time. Within 9 minutes, the loop A hot leg temperature started to increase rapidly and within 30 minutes exceeded the wide-range console indication (maximum indicated 620 F).
The loop B hot leg temperature did not increase immediately, but went off the scale 19 minutes after the loop A temperature indication. Both loops A and B hot leg temperatures increased to greater than 700 F and remained there for approximately 7 hours.
The significance of these temperatures is derived from the thermodynamic
!  relationship of coolant temperature, pressure, and core water level.
After the loop A RCPs were secured, coolant boiloff reduced the coolant level below the top of the fuel. Steam rising above the steam-water
;  interface continued to be heated by the exposed fuel rods beyond the saturation temperature (i.e., the steam became superheated). The reduction in the heat transfer capacity of the superheated steam resulted in further degradation of heat removal from the exposed fuel. The overheating of the fuel rods resulted in a reaction of the zircalloy tubes with the steam, which produced free hydrogen.
Given the training of the plant personnel, it is questionable to believe that the extent of core damage during the accident should have been inferred from the indications present. However, recognition of the obvious superheated conditions should have led to a closer reexamination of some of the information present in the. control room. In fact, when the loop A hot leg temperature exceeded the wide range indication (620 F),
RCS prrssure was approximately 700 psig and decreasing, which was well below the saturation pressure for 620 F (1787 psig). The indicated temperatures were questioned by the plant staff, particularly with regard
; to the validity of the calibration of the hot leg temperature sensors in a steam environment. To verify the indicated temperatures, the plant staff checked these temperatures with other instrumentation. An attempt was made to read out the core exit thermocouples on the plant computer.
Question marks were obtained from many locations, which indicated that these core exit themocouples were damaged or off scale (700 F). The plant
! staff then tried to read the thermocouples with test equipment in the cable spreading room. The range of data presented to the Station Manager (five readings that varied from a high of >2000 F to a low of <100 F) was characterized as unreliable; how-ever, they provided him with a gross
; indication that the core was hot and that this was why the computer read off the scale. It is important to note that these personnel had no experience, training, or procedures for the use of these core exit
, thermocouples. In retrospect, if all the readings had been available and had been examined in the light of other confirming temperature indi-cations, it might have been recognized that the >2000 F temperature in-dicated that the core was within the range in which an autocatalytic exothermic zircalloy-steam reaction could occur. Confirmation of the
, magnitude of the hot leg temperatures was obtained (and believed) by connecting instrument bridges to the hot leg temperature sensors for the reactor protection system. These were read out in the control room and confirmed the hot leg temperatures in the range of 700-800 F (i.e.,
superheated).
18

1 o
Thelinvestigators. conclude that the significance of'superheated steam was
           - not understood-on March 28, 1979'by the people on site.'
Knowledge of Th/Superheat/Inco'res~
           . George Kunder--Kunder was aware that ~ the hot leg temperatures were in .the'
              -range of.700-800 F. Kunder inferred from these temperatures that there could be portions of .the core that were being cooled by steam. Kunder
           - believes that his' concern:was verbalized in the'think tank meetings (SIG,            1 9/18/79,.pp. 53-55, and IE, 9/4/80, pp. 11-17), but he does not recall any specific conversations relative to superheated steam.
Kunder,'who-was unfamiliar with the core exit T/Cs, briefly discussed these T/Cfreadings with Porter. Kunder accepted Porter's analysis of unreliability. Kunder was n9t awa're offany other discussions of these core exit T/Cs (IE, 7/11/79, pp.'12-14, and'1E, 9/4/80, pp. 28-29).
           ' James Seelinger--Seelinger concluded that the hot leg ttmperatures could
'              have been hetter.than indicated (maximum indication on meter was 620 F
            ' wide' range).
Although Seelinger was aware that Porter went to get the core exit T/C
             - readings,' Seelinger did not know the results of those readings. Seelinger was: aware of the question marks on the: computer and concluded that they
           -'were probably out~of range and that the hot' leg temperatures were v'alid (IE,-10/14/80, pp. 77-78).
             - Leland Rogers (B&W)--When interviewed, Rogers stated (IE, 9/2/80, pp.
16-17) that, although he was aware of a temperature readout (hot leg temperature)_ greater than 700 F, he was never certain on March 28, 1979 that the correct hot 1eg temperatures were being indicated in the steam phase. Rogers was aware of the core exit thermocouple readings but he was not certain of their validity (IE, 9/2/80, pp. 26-27). Rogers recalled no discussions of superheated steam on March 28, 1979 (IE, 9/2/80, p.
18).
Joseph Logan--Logan did not recall knowing the magnitude of the hot leg temperatures on' March 28,'1979. He recalled Porter's discussion of a range of' core exit T/C readings with Miller and the remark that the readings were questionable.. However, Logan was not aware of nor did he consider or discuss suparheated steam conditions on March 28, 1979 (IE,              1 10/16/80' pp. 18-22).
William Zewe--Zewe was aware of the hot leg temperatures on the extended scale device connected by Porter. Zewe then became aware that the temper-            ,
atures wereLin excess of the saturation values (16, 9/4/80, p. 15).                  l Zewe' has testified both that he was' not aware of the core exit T/C readings
              - taken by Porter (Senate, 10/18/79, p. 23) and that he does not recall whether he. knew these readings were being taken (IE, 9/4/80, p. 30).
             - Michael Ross--Ross was aware of the hot leg temperatures; however, he related them to inadequate core cooling and did not connect them with an 19

l inventory deficiency (IE, 9/24/80, p. 26). Ross stated in the same interview that, although the term "superheat" was never discussed, the
,       plant staff's analysis.was that the hot leg temperatures were too hot for the existing pressure (p. 28).
      'Ross recalled being aware of the core exit T/C readings and the discussion between Miller and Porter that took place in the control room. However, he only recalled the core exit thermocouples being discussed in passing
;       in the think tank (IE, 9/24/80, pp. 41-45).
Ivan Porter--Porter and four instrument technicians were involved in reading out the incore thermocouples in the cable spreading room. Based on the magnitude of the readings observed, some of the instrument techni-cians concluded that the core could be uncovered. Porter returned to the i-     control room to pass on the initial readings. Porter advised Miller that some readings were high (>2000 F), some were low, and some did not read out. Porter felt that the thermocouples may have been damaged. Porter did not pass on the concerns of the instrument technicians. Although a complete set of readings were taken after Porter left, neither Miller nor other key staff members were aware of them on fiarch 28, 1979.                ''
  . Gary Miller--Miller was aware that hot leg temperatures were greater than 700"F. Even though there was a discussion of steam conditions and Miller was aware of the readings from the extended-scale hot leg readout, Miller
,      said he made no conr. action between the existing steam conditions and core uncove ry. Miller did state, however, that they might have believed there i      was some steam er.vironment near the top of the fuel rods (IE, 9/5/80, pp. 21-56).
The investigators conclude that Miller did not believe that the core had been uncovered on March 28, 1979 and that Miller's concern, resulting in i      reinitiation of HPI at a less-than-maximum flow rate, was based predominantly on ensuring adequate core cooling (i.e., removing decay heat). The investigators also conclude that, prior to receiving the incore thermocouple
;      data, Miller already believed the core was hot. This belief (Miller's
,      belief) was based on the hot leg temperatures obtained from the instrument j     bridges hooked up to the reactor protection system (RPS) cabinets, the offscale computer indications, etc. Thus, when Porter advised Miller that the thermocouples could have melted and formed new junctions, Miller was 4
^     concerned that the c. ore was hot but he saw no further use for the incore thermocouple data,
: e. Count Rate Behavior Following the turbine and reactor trip, source range nuclear instru-4     mentation readings decreased at a normal decay rate of approximately
. one-third decade per minute for the first 20 minutes. At that point, the count rate leveled off at about 5000 cps and then increased slowly until 5:41 a.m. when the loop A RCPs were secured. The count rate then abruptly dropped. Shortly thereafter, it increased again and continued to behave
,-    erratically over the next 2 hours. This behavior has been postulated to represent both changes in core configuration and changes in neutron leakage due to moderator conditions in the reactor vessel annulus.
;                                             20

Although- the cc.nplexity of neutron transport mechanics could prevent a simple analysis of the count rate with changing plant thermal-hydraulic conditions, it is significant that the operators were presented with an unexpected and unexplained. increase in source range count rates foilowing the shutdown condition.
Boron concentration prior to the trip was in excess of 1000 ppm. At approximately 5:15 a.m., the shift supervisor received a boron analysis indicating that the concentration was approximately 700 ppm. A second sample taken at 5:45 a.m. yielied approximately 400 ppm boron in the RCS.
Based on the count rate behavior and the boron concentration, there was a concern about recriticality as a result of moderator dilution. Emergency boration was initiated at about 6:10 a.m. and continued until 7:22 a.m.
Count rate behavior essentially stabilized after about 7:45 a.m. Later in the morning, a B&W employee postulated that this count rate behavior could have resulted from increased neutron leakage due to void'ng. This conjecture, when combined with other-information, suggested that the core may have been uncovered.
Knowledge of Count Rate Behavior George Kunder--Kunder was concerned about the count rate behavior and low boron concentration. His concern, along with that of Ross and Zewe, resulted in initiation of emergency boration. Kunder had nuclear engineers looking at'the count rate behavior; however, he did not remember any            j further discussions with either of them or with the think tank members          '
regarding the count rate behavior. Kunder did not become aware of the implications (i.e., voiding and partial core uncovery) until he heard Flint's exolanation late in the morning (IE, 4/25/79, pp. 26-34, and IE, 9/4/80, pp. 24-26).
Joseph Logan--On the morning of March 28, 1979, Logan was aware of the low boron concentration and the count rate behavior (IE, 5/9/79, pp. 8, 9). Logan did not believe that the reactor was returning to criticality; however, he could not explain the count rate behavior. Logan recalled discussing these indications with Kunder and the reference to possible moderator dilution. However, he did not recall knowing of Flint's explan-ation as discussed below (IE, 10/16/80, pp. 33-39).
William Zewe--Zewe did not believe that the reactor was going critical.
However, he also could not explain the increase in count rate. Zewe recalled discussing with Miller, Kunder, Flint, and Chwastyk the reason for an increase in flux in the detectors. Zewe did not recall these discussions being concerned with core voiding (IE, 9/4/80, pp. 29-30).
Michael Ross--Ross was aware of the increasing count rate and believed that the reactor was returning to criticality. Ross recalled no discussions with regard to Flint's explanatic, of core voiding and increased neutron leakage (IE, 9/24/80, p. 37).
Gary Miller--Miller knew that emergency boration had been initiated, based on count rate behavior and boron concentration (IE, 5/7/79, p.76).
21

Miller did not recall being aware of Flint's explanation on March 28, 1979, nor did he recall any inferences related to inventory based on count rate behavior (IE, 9/5/79, pp. 57-59).
i Leland Rogers (B&W)--Rogers recalled discussing with Zewe a concern about low boron concentration and recriticality. Rogers recalled no discussion, however,.of count rate bemavior. Rogers did not recall discussions with Flint regarding core voiding and neutron instrumentation behavior (IE, 9/2/80, pp. 22-24).
John Flint (B&W)--After reviewing plant instrumentation, Flint concluded that the increase in count rate had probably been caused by a change in the leakage flux from the core. Based on this and other instrumentation readings, Flint believed that the core had been uncovered earlier in the morning (Kemeny, 6/30/79, pp. 18-19 and IE, 4/23/79, pp. 4-5). Flint recalled discussing this information with Kundar, Zewe, and Rogers.
4 Flint's recollection was that Rogers said ne would discuss it with Met Ed management (IE, 9/2/80, pp. 18-19).
The investigators conclude that Miller, Logan, Seelinger and Ross were not aware of the implication of core uncovery based on the count rate behavior. They-also conclude that Kunder did not learn of this explan-f.
ation until late in the morning or early ia the af ternoon. By this time, the count rgte had stabilized and Kunder dismissed this factor as not I
being priority.information.
: 2. Containment Pressure Spike Three aspects are pertinent to a discussion of the 28 psig containment pressure spike that occurred at 1:50 p.m. on March 28, 1979: (1) the containment and associated systers, (2) the hydrogen, and (3) the testimony of Chwastyk and Mehler.
The safety features actuation system (SFAS) is the instrumentation moni-        "
toring and actuation system for engineered safety features (ESF). SFAS receives input from reactor coolant pressure transmitters and containment pressure switches. On actuation, SFAS initiates emergency coolant injection, isolates the containment, starts the emergency containment cooling system, initiates the containment spray, and starts the emergency diesel generators.
Table 7.3-2 of the final safety analysis report (FSAR) for TMI-2 lists equipment associated with ESF actuation. Each of these components has component status indication in the control room (e.g., containment isolation, containment cooling equipment actuation, high pressure injection valves position indication and high pressure injection pump actuation, decay
;   heat removal pump actuation, containment spray valve position indication, and diesel generator status).
l   The signals for the containment spray functions are provided by six containment pressure switches. These switches are arranged in two separate and independent actuation logic trains (three channels per train with two-out-of-three logic). Each pressure switch has a range of 0-100 psig and trips at a nominal 28 psig. There is control room panel status indication for each channel and train.
l 22 l
l

e At 1:50 p.m. (9 hours and 50 minutes into the accident), the reactor building pressure rose abruptly from about 3 psig to about '28 psig and then decreased rapidly to less than 4 psig. Containment spray pumps automatically started. Coincident with these events, two 480 Vac busses were tripped, after which a " thump" or ." thud" was heard by some personnel in the control room. Several members of the control room operations staff witnessed the reactor building pressure recorder respond to the pressure transient and the accompanying spray pump actuation.       However, with the exception of two shift supervisors, it appears that the recorded pressure transient and spray pump actuation were generally attributed to electrical faults or instrument malfunctions.
It was not until late the next evening on Thursday, March 29, 1979, that the significance of the containment pressure spike was generally known, and it was not until early in the morning of Friday, March 30, 1979, that the Station Manager was aware that the pressure spike had been real. The investigators believe that, because the pressure spike was not generally recognized as being "real" on March 28, 1979, it was generally ignored.
  'It is reasonable, however, to expect that, based on their licensing, training, and required knowledge of engineered safety feature (ESF) systems and associated instrumentation, personnel at TMI-2 should have deduced that the observed pressure spike did not result from instrument malfunction or an electrical fault. The recorded containment pressure transient was, in fact, a real~ pressure excursion and a potentially serious challenge to the containment integrity. The investigators conclude that licensed operators and operating supervisors in the Unit 2 control room should have recognized that the pressure spike was caused by a real pressure increase inside the containment. [Two shift supervisors (Chwastyk and Mehler) have testified that they thought the spike was real; however, the investigators conclude that they did not explain or discuss this belief with tneir supervisors on March 28, 1979.       They appear to have diverted their attention away from the spike to other plant activities after a brief time period.       See also the discussion of the third aspect in this section.]
The second aspect related to the pressure spike is the extent of knowledge of hydrogen as the cause of the spike. Two shift supervisors have stated beliefs concerning the symptoms of the pressure spike that are substan-tially different from the beliefs of other Met Ed personnel.      In fact, they have testified that they were aware on March 28, 1979 that a real pressure transient had occurred and that a chemical reaction or hydrogen was the possible cause. Chwastyk also testified that an order not to restart electrical equipment was issued on March 28, 1979 (IE, 9/4/80, pp. 12-22).
The ESF systems at TMI-2 were designed to prevent core meltdown, to maintain the integrity of the reactor containment building, and to ensure that the exposure of the public to radiation would be below the limits of 10 CFR 100 during LOCA conditions. The principal document discussing the FSF systems and post-accident hydrogen production, and with which the TMI-2 personnel would have been familiar, is the final safety analysis report (FSAR). The FSAR analyses show that post-accident radiolytic hydrogen plus hydrogen contributed by metal-water and aluminum-corrosion 23

reactions does not approach the generally accepted lower flammability limit of.4 volume percent for several months (4 months) after the LOCA (refer to Figure 6A-10, TMI-2 FSAR). Therefore, it is probable that, prior to the THI-2 accident, it was beyond the range of credible operator knowledge to infer that amounts of hydrogen sufficient to recch a flammable
,   concentration in a 2 x 108 fts containment might exist 10 hours after the
!   initiation of the accident.
:  The investigators conclude that hydrogen was not believed to be the cause of the pressure spike. The testimony reviewed leads the investigators to further conclude that hydrogen was not discussed on March 26, 1979. This
,   conclusion concerning hydrogen not being identified as the cause of the pressure spike on March 28, 1979, is based.on the testimony of operators and a review of the engineered safety systems.
The third aspect of the containment pressure spike was developed from the testimony of Chwastyk and Mehler. The investigators examined a possible discussion of the pressure spike in the presence of an NRC inspector in the Unit 2 control room at the time of the spike. At this time, two NRC inspectors were in the area of the THI-2 control room. They were James Higgins, a reactor operations inspector, and Don Neely, a health physics inspector. Two Med Ed employees, Joseph Chwastyk and Brian Mehler, have testified that an NRC inspector was present in the THI-2 control room at the time of the spike.
Joseph Chwastyk stated that he told an NRC inspector that he (Chwastyk) believed that an explosion had taken place in the containment (IE, 9/4/80,
: p. 104). In testimony to the Special Inquiry Group (10/30/79, p. 18),
Chwastyk stated "...and I know specifica1ly there was at least one NRC inspector there. And I don't know who it was, I don't remember his name or what he looks like." (Although Chwastyk was interviewed on May 21, 1979 and October 11, 1979, the NRC inspector was not mentioned until October 30, 1979, even though the pressure spike was discussed.] In testimony before these investigators, Chwastyk stated that he later learned the NRC inspector's name. When asked by another NRC investigator, he remembered that Neely was the NRC inspector to whom he explained that the pressure spike was real. Chwastyk further stated that Neely saw the containment pressure recorder (IE, 9/4/80, pp.104-109).
Brian Mehler testified (Senate, 8/22/79, p. 9) that he. discussed the spray pump actuation that occurred as a result of the pressure spike with an NRC inspector. He stated that, "There were NRC people in there wandering around, and he asked me a question, so I explained it to him." Mehler then stated that he could not identify this NRC inspector (Senate, 8/22/79,
: p. 10). When asked about the identity of the NRC inspector, Mehler said that it was not Neely because he became acquainted with Neely after March 28, 1979 (SIG, 10/30/79, pp. 19, 20). Mehler also states that Donald Haverkamp was the only NRC inspector in the TMI-2 control room whom he j recognized on March 28, 1979 (SIG, 10/30/79, p. 19). Haverkamp did not l go to the site until Thursday., March 29, 1980.
Donald Neely testified that he was not aware of the pressure spike on March 28, 1979 and that he did not discuss the spike with Chwastyk or Mehler on March 28, 1979.(IE, 10/7/80, p. 10). He also testified that 24

l l weeks after the accident (in April), a Met Ed employee told him that he                        l (the Met Ed employee) had information relating to the spike. Neely                             i turned this matter over to the IE investigation team, whose findings are contt led in NUREG-0600 (IE, 10/7/80, pp. 10-13).
James Higgins also testified that he was not aware of the pressure spike on March 28, 1979 (IE, 10/7/80, p. 22). When asked how he could explain being in the control room during the time period of the spike and not be aware of the event, he stated:     "I guess I can't really explain that.
All I could say was that there was certainly a lot of activity going on at that time. I don't recall any thud of that type, and if it was a dull type of thud, similar to a main coolant pump check valve, when you start a main coolant pump on a submarine, which is what--when I discussed it with Gary Miller on Friday, the way he described it, and that is sort of a dull thud in the background. There are lots of noises at a plant that happen at various times, and if you are familiar wi+5 the plant, one that's a little bit different sticks out, if you're there all the time.                        ,
If you're not, and you hear all these various noises, and there are lots                      )
of them at a plant--now if you're not familiar with the noises, what's                         i common and what's not, they don't really register with you, and the odd ones that are not normal don't really stand out as they would to somebody that was very familiar with it and there on an every-day basis..." (IE, 10/7/80, p. 23).
Recognizing the apparent conflicts that exist between the testimony of Mehler and Chwastyk concerning the identity of the inspector, these investigators conclude that an NRC inspector was not informed that an actual pressure of about 28 psig had existed inside containment on the day of the accident. These investigators also conclude that the NRC inspectors in the control room at TMI-2 were aware of some of the symptoms associated with the rapid increase in containment pressure to 28 psig (indicsted). The symptoms of the pressure spike included the SFAS actuation and containment spray actuation. However, the investigators conclude that they did not understand the symptoms or pursue an explanation of any symptoms they may have observed.
Knowledge of Containment Pressure Spike and Hydrogen Gary Miller--Miller was in the Unit 2 control room at the time the pressure spike occurred when he heard a noise like a " thud." He did not observe the spike on the containment pressure recorder or recognize that the containment spray pumps had actuated (Kemeny, 5/31/79, p. 57; IE, 9/5/80,
: p. 112; Senate, 9/28/79, p. 25). Miller discursed the source of the noise with Ross and Marshall and requested an explanation. When the noise was attributed to the ventilation system changing modes, Miller did not question this explanation (Senate, 9/28/79, p. 25).
The investigators conclude that Miller was not aware of the 28 psig pressure spike on March 28, 1979, and also conc'. Je that he did not believe or have discussions concerning the possibility that hydrogen was being generated and could become a problem on that date. Although the investigators conclude thast it is possible that Miller was aware that the containment spray pumps actuated, they also conclude that he placed no 25

                        .       --          --   -      - _ - -      . .        ~-
E P            significance on'this actuation and accepted the explanation of the vent-ilation system to be the cause.of the " thud."
I Michael Ross--Ross was' in'the' Unit 2 control room at the time of the
   ,         pressure spike.' He.was aware that the containment spray pumps started,
;           .and.that.the containment pressure recorders showed.the 28 psig spike (IE, L           5/19/79, p. 3). . He believed that an instrument failure caused the spray
:          -pumps to'be actuated. :The event.itself, however, was not. believed to be possible (i.e., the rapid increase and rapid decrease in containment-
;          ' pressure). . Ross did-not:believe on the day of the accident that-hydrogen buildup would happen in.such a short period of time (IE, 9/24/80, pp.
           '47-56). Therefore, on March 28, 1979,.'he did not conclude that hydrogen had been or was~a problem.
William Zewe--Zewe was in the Unit 2 control room at the time of the
.            pressure-spike. . He was aware that the containment spray. pumps actuated j'           and that'the containment pressure recorders showed the 28 psig r, pike (IE, 1
7/2/79,.pp. 34-41)._ Zewe told Ross that-the spray pumps had actuated, e
but he did not believe that the pressure spike was real on March 28, i            1979. :He could "not conceive how the building of over 2 million cubic
!            feet could pressurize that rapidly, and then be depressurized that rapidly"
;            (IE,.9/4/80, p. 44). .0n March 28, 1979, he did not conclude that hydrogen was or could become a problem.
[
j            Joseph Chwastyk--Chwastyk was in the Unit 2 control room at the time of j            the pressure. spike (IE, 5/21/79, pp. 8-18). He has stated that he was
:            aware that containment spray pumps had started and that the recorders
!-           showed.a spike. After a few minutes, he ordered that the spray pumps be 1
secured.. He knew that a real pressure spike had occurred on March 28, l            1979, but he did not hear the " thud." During this same interview, he was-3 asked "...at that time as far as the cause was strictly a channel or
!            pressure spike in the containment but [did you] not have any feeling for L            what would cause that kind of problem?" He responded, "No, I did not."
.            However, when he later learned of the noise, he assumed that some kind of explosion.had taken place. Chwastyk also te:,tified (IE, 9/4/80, p. 24)
       ,     that he reached'the conclusion on March 28, 1979 that a zirconium-water
;            reaction had been caused by heat generated in the reactor core and that this reaction resulted in hydrogen generation that was sufficient to
]            cause an explosion. He also stated that shortly after the pressure spike          <
he "related".to Gary Miller that a hydrogen explosion had probably taken
:            place.
l           'In an IE interview (5/21/79, p. 9), Chwastyk stated that he was hesi ant 1            to secure equipment because he did not know what caused the pressure j            spike. In this same interview, he stated that he reset the equipment,
,            but he had no' idea-of the time frame after the-spike in which this equipment was reset: "Oh, I have no idea. It was...there were a lot of l            things happening. I remember it was just an oh-by-the-way type thing. .
i            How, exactly:long after the spike I don't know" (p. 12). . However, less 4
than 1 minute after..the spike, operators began to take actions to defeat the ESF actuation signals that were caused by the spike; at about 6
;          ' minutes:after the-spike, the containment spray pumps were secured.
L 4
i                                                  :26 i
                                                                  -                      _._.s

                                                                                  ~.
Chwastyk.has testifie'd that not very long after the spike he ".. . suggested to Gary Miller we no longer cycle the electromagnetic relief valve because it 'had...the explosion...or rapid rising pressure .in the reactor building corresponded to opening the electromagnetic relief valve" (IE, 5/21/79,
: p. 18).' Chwastyk also testitied that, "It was right after the hydrogen explosion and I mentioned that I correlated the opening of the valve with the detonation period that I again went to Gary Miller.and explained what I thought had happened as far as the hydrogen detonation and the simul-taneous opening of the valve, and it was shortly after that, Gary Miller got back to me and said go ahead and draw the bubble" (SIG, 10/11/79,p.
18).
In an SIG interview (10/30/79, p.17), Chwastyk was not sure that he told Miller of a hydrogen explosion;.he stated, "my best recollection of that is that I did relate to. Gary that we had some scrt of an explosion.
Whether I said it was hydrogen or not, I'm not sure. But I remember distinctly putting together the operation of the valve and the spike, and I think I relayed thore thoughts to Gary." In this same interview, Chwastyk stated that .e did not remember specifically discussing the possibility of an explosion with other control room personnel other than Mehler on March 28, 1979 (pp. 17, 18).      He also stated (pp. 19, 20) in this interview (in response to a question about Miller's lack of knowledge of.an explosion on March 28,1979), "Well, that could very well be true.
Again, I can't absolutely--if Gary said--I may not have told him what I thought at'the time, because I really wasn't certain." In testimony conducted as part of this investigation (IE, 9/4/80, p. 11), Chwastyk responded to the following:
     "Q. What about Mr. Miller, was he already aware before you discussed it with him that there had been a pressure spike?
A. I don't know that. To the best of my recollection, I think I asked someone to tell him that we had just had something happen in the building that caused a pressure spike. I don't remember who that was, and what they did, if they actually told Gary."
In contrast to Chwastyk's testimony is the testimony of the other think tank members who have testified that the spike was not believed to be          l real on March 28, 1979.                                                        l Chwastyk also stated (IE, 9/4/80, pp. 33-36) that he directed someone to inspect the containment to determine if containment integrity had been lost. He did not know that he ever got a report of the status of actions that he directed be taken. He stated, "I don't know that I ever get the report back on that outside, you know, check of the containment. I guess I don't remember because I think by the time they could make any kind of inspection I had come up with the idea, and quote if you will, of the hydrogen explosion. And I think after that I just sort of forgot about the containment check" (IE, 9/4/80, p. 36).
The investigators conclude that Chwastyk may have directed operators to make checks to help identify the cause of the spike. However, the invest-igators conclude that Chwastyk did not direct that the integrity of a 27

containment (known to contain substantial amounts of radioactivity) be checked on March 28, 1979. It is also concluded that Miller did not give Chwastyk permission to establish a bubble in the pressurizer before he (Miller) returned from briefing the Lt. Governor. [ Pressurizer heaters were turned off and on several times between 2:00 p.m. and 4:30 p.m. The actions being taken were attempts to maintain the plant status; i.e.,
continued efforts to collapse the bubble in the loops and cooldown by natural circulation using loop A and to make preparations to initiate the decay heat system.]
The investigators conclude that Chwastyk believed the pressure spike to be real (containment pressure reached 28.psig) and discussed it with Mehler on March 28, 1979. They conclude that Chwastyk's recollection of the cause of the spike is in error. The investigators conclude that
. hydrogen was not discussed as a cause for the pressure spike on March 28, 1979; there was no acknowledged cause for the spike on that date. It is cencluded that the order not to restart electrical equipment was given on some day subsequent to March 28, 1979.
Brian Mehler--Mehler was in the Unit 2 shift supervisor's office at the time of the pressure spike. He was aware that the containment spray pumps had actuated and saw the spiko on the containment pressure recorder (wide range) (IE, 5/17/79, pp. 29-33). Mehler discussed the symptoms associated with the pressure spike with Chwastyk. Part of this discussion concerned the cause of the spike as being "some kind of chemical reaction or something" (SIG, 10/11/79, pp. 14-15).
Mehler testified (SIG, 10/11/79, p. 15) that he did not connect the spike with the EMOV block valve operation.
 "Q. Did you connect the spike with the fact that it [ spike] just happened after the vent valve had been operated?
A. No, later on, yes. Two days later when everyone became concerned, yes."
Mehler also discussed an order not to start any pumps and "...not to do anything that could give an ignition" (SIG, 10/11/79, p. 15). When asked (SIG, 10/11/79, p. 16) about the time of the order or recommendations he may have made to Gary Miller in connection with the pressure soike, Mehler responded, "No. It's very hard.         I would like to put the time together, but I can't. I can't. I do not know sometime after the pressure spike happened we were told not to start equipment because they assumed that it could' happen again and they probably put it that there was hydrogen in there, but that was sometime after 1:50. Now how far past that, I don't know. And I do not, I said--well, to Gary Miller I said--he said don't start any more oil pumps and I said we don't have to, I already tested them all, because they were concerned--but how far into the afternoon at that time, I don't know whether it was 4:00, 2:00 or what, but it was sometime after."
The investigators conclude that Mehler recognized on March 28, 1979 that the pressure spike was real (containment pressure reached 28 psig), but 28

its cause was not known. It is concluded that Mehler's recollection of hydrogen being discussed on March 28, 1979 and his recollection that an order not to start electrical equipment which could cause a spark was given on March 28, 1979 are in error. It is concluded that an order not to restart electrical equipment was given on some day subsequent to March 28, 1979.
Charles Mell--Mell arrived in the Unit 2 control room after the pressure spike occurred. He learned of the spike on the evening of March 28, 1979. Subsequent to March 28, 1979, Mell learned that a hydrogen explosion had possibly caused the spike (Senate, 8/22/79, pp. 14-17).
Theodore Illjes--Illjes arrived in the Unit 2 control room after the pressure spike (3:45 p.m.) and was briefed by Chwastyk. Illjes and Mell were told of the pressure spike and resulting containment isolation.
Illjes testified that in this briefing there was a discussion of hydrogen having been the cause of the pressure spike (IE, 5/23/79, pp. 5-10). The investigators conclude that discussions concerning hydrogen and an order not to restart electrical equipment were learned by Illjes subsequent to March 28, 1979.
In a separate but related effort, the NRC Office of Inspector and Auditor (0IA) interviewed several of the inspectors who went to TMI on the day of     ,
the accident. During these interviews, Karl Plumlee, an NRC inspector,        i expressed several concerns related to this investigation. Copies of OIA summaries of their two interviews with Plumlee are attached as is an 01A suinmary of a followup interview with James Seelinger who was employed by Met Ed at the time of the accident.
Plumlee's concerns, as evidenced by the OIA interview summaries, may be condensed into the following:
(1) Knowledge by Region I personnel of elevated hydrogen concentration inside containment on the morning (s8:00 a.m.) of March 28, 1979; (2) Performance of hydrogen monitoring by Met Ed before the containment spike (1:50 p.m.) as evidenced by specific concentration numbers about which he was told; and (3) A perception that information may not have been freely supplied by NRC management to NRC inspectors or by Met Ed to its employees.
The investigators' review of these concerns included interviewing all of the inspectors who wsre sent .o the TMI site with Plumlee as well as interviewing George Smith, reviewing notes and records of information received by Region I prior to the departure of the inspectors, and reviewing TMI records for evidence of containment air sample results. The results of the review are summarized in the following paragraphs.
Plumlee's belief that regional. personnel had knowledge on the morning of March 28, 1979 of specific concentrations of hydrogen in the containment came from two' sources. First, he believed that his Branch Chief, George Smith, said that there was 2.3% hydrogen in the containment when Smith 29

I     briefed inspectors at about 8:15 a.m. prior to their leaving for the TMI site. Second, his own analysis of the other information he was provided led Plumlee to conclude that hydrogen. levels could be expected in the y     containment' building. Plumlee asked Smith at the time of the briefing about the hydrogen aad Smith said he believed that he had said pressure rather than hydrogen composition but, if he had said it differently, that
;    what he meant to say was. pressure.
i
    .The review leads ~these investigators to conclude that the containment hydrogen composition was not known by anyone until the morning of March
 !   31, 1979 when the first sample was analyzed at about 6:00 a.m. The
,     investigators also conclude that Plumlee was and continues to be mistaken
!     in his perception'that elevated hydrogen levels could be expected from.
the information that was available in Region I prior to 8:45 a.m., some of which he was' told on the. morning of March 28, 1979. He stated that his conclusion on this perception was based on the containment dome
;    monitor reading and the primary coolant sample result. The containment dome monitor was reported to Region I to be 200 R/hr at the time. Although 1'   there was a question as to whether this number was the shielded or unshielded value, lack of certainty about the value preclrded Plumlee's certainty,
'    A radiation rate of 200 R/hr on the containment is not evidence of core damage involving a zir: onium-water reaction. The initial report of primary coolant activity was reported to Region I ef ter Plumlee lef t for the site. Even if he had ' learned of the activity level reported to the regional office shortly after he left, he could not have properly concluded that the reported value was indicative of core damage involving a zirconium-water reaction.
Plumlee concluded that Met Ed had been monitoring the containment atmosphere for hydrogen before the pressure spike based on his conversation with Seelinger, which was followed very shortly by a discussion of the hydrogen analyses with Gallina. Originally, he believed that this conversation took place on Wednesday, March 28, 1979. On a subsequent day, a followup discussion with Gallina caused him (Plumlee) to think the conversation may have occurred on Thursday, March 29, 1979. Plumlee was certain that his conversation with Gallina immediately followed the discussion with Seelinger and that three sample analysis results were mentioned by Seelinger.
l Plumlee was also certain that, when he told Gallina of his conversation with Seelinger, Gallina told him that there was already general speculation that hydrogen burn had occurred. The investigators' review of this matter showed that the specific concentrations of hydrogen in the containment were not obtained until Saturday, March 31, 1979, at about 6:00 a.m.
Gallina and Plumlee were not on the site simultaneously on Thursday, March 29, 1979, but they were there simultaneously on the afternoon of March 30 and 31, 1979 between 2:00 p.m. and 5:00 or 6:00 p.m. The records show that these containment air samples were analyzed at about 6:00 a.m.,
2:00 p.m. , 9:00 p.m. , and 10:00 p.m. on March 31, 1979. Plumlee distinctly remembered three sample analyses being mentioned by Seelinger, and this information was not available until at least 9:00 p.m. on friday March 31, 1979 after Plumlee had.left the site. The investigators conclude that the discussion by Plumlee with Seelinger and Gallina of these data
.    )ccurred on Saturday, March 31, 1979.
I 30
                                                                          -~-      , .

d
    . The investigators' purcuit of;Plumlee!s feeling that NRC management was less than forthcoming with-the inspectors who were being sent-to the site
    . was' hampered by lack of specificity in the basis for Plumlee's feeling.
It is concludedLthat Smith could not have known specific hydrogen concen-trations in the containment, and that he could therefore not have been holding back this information. Likewise, even though Smith and others must have.had some conclusions of-the severity of the' accident, these conclusions would have been based in large measure on speculation.         There is not, a factual basis to conclude that failure to discuss speculation of specific severity was motivated.by fear that the inspectors would be reluctant to go to'the site. Conversely, the cause for incomplete briefing
    - seems to have_resulted from lack of information and a desire to get inspectors on oite;as promptly as possible.
Plumlee's feelings.about Met Ed's failure to_ inform those who were on site were also based on nonspecific feelings and inferences that are hard to address directly. These investigators differ with Plumloe, as discussed elsewhere in this report, that Met Ed management had a clear understanding of how bad the situation really was.         However, the investigators conclude that Met Ed was not fully forthcoming on March 28, 1979_in that the State was not appraised of either the uncertainty concerning the adequacy of core cooling or the potential.for degradation of plant conditions.
During the course of the investigators' review of Plumlee's concerns, they learned that inspector Neely had a notation on a sheet of paper refering to hydrogen and a concentration of 4%. There was on this same sheet a reference to the date of March 29, 1979 noting when a filter was          .
changed. On the basis of other events mentioned on the same page, it was          i concluded that the notes were taken on Sunday, April 1, 1979 and the              :
reference to March 29, 1979 concerned something that had happened earlier rather than it being a contemporaneous note.
: 3. Goldsboro Radiation Dose Rate Projection Upon arriving at the plant at 6:55 a.m. in time to hear the announcement of a Site Emergency, Howard Crawford, a nuclear engineer, proceeded to the Unit 2 control room. There, he gathered materials for predicting offsite exposure rates on the basis of the reactor building dome monitor reading, a task he had performed during drills for two years. Crawford recalls that his first calculation, which was completed soon after 7:00 a.m., showed an exposure rate of 40 R/hr in Goldsboro. Neither the time of day nor the result of this calculation has been substantiated by records or the recollection of others. However, a similar documented calculation (10 R/hr at the low population zone (LPZ) boundary) was performed before about 7:50 a.m. This calculation (10 R/hr at the LPZ) appears to have been performed by Crawford after 7:13 a.m., during the beginning of the massive release of radioactive material to the reactor building atmosphe e. Both tho time and magnitude of Crawford's dome monitor (HP-R-214) reading (300 R/hr) are uncertain. Accurate or not, the 300 R/hr reading formed the basis for the LPZ calculation. The time of 7:44 a.m. shown on the calculation sheet probably indicates either when the monitor was read or when the calculation was performed. There-fore, Crawford's calculation of 10 R/hr at the LPZ seems tu have occurred between 7:13 a.m. and 7:44 a.m.
31

l i
This prediction was reported to the Supervisor of Radiation Protection and Chemistry, Richard Dubiel. Although the projected dose rate of 10 R/hr was doubted because of conservative assumptions in the calculation, TMI management appears to have realized the need for a quick measurement in Goldsboro to confirm or deny Crawford's prediction. The containment dome monitor readings were questioned, but as a precaution the Station Manager, Gary Miller, requested that a State Police helicopter transport a survey team to Goldsboro for radiation monitoring. The helicopter did not arrive until 8:35 a.m., by which time Charlie Team had reported in from Goldsboro and Bravo Team had left by truck for Goldsboro.      The helicopter was not used to transport a survey team to Goldsboro.
There was a common concern for getting onsite and offsite radiation measurements to supplement the Crawford prediction. Upon declaration of a Site Emergency at 6:55 a.m., efforts to organize and dispatch onsite and offsite monitoring teams began. An onsite team (Alpha) was instructed
 ,    at about 7:30 a.m. to measure the radiation level west of the Unit 2 reactor building. During that survey, the wind was westward and very light with minute-to-minute variations of about 10 to 30 degrees. At 7:46 a.m., Alpha Team reported less than 1 mR/hr at Station GE-8 west of the Unit 2 reactor building. This measurement became the basis for discounting Crawford's prediction (s) of high exposure rates off site. At about 8:00 a.m. and 8:30 a.m., respectively, Charlie and Bravo Teams were dispatched by vehicle to Goldsboro. At about 8:30 a.m., Charlie Team reported less than 1 mR/hr in Goldsboro; Bravo Team reported similar results at about 9:40 a.m.
The calculation that resulted ir, the 10 R/hr projection in Goldsboro could also be used to indicate a predit. tion of 220 times the reportable level of xenon-133 at the LPZ established in 10 CFR 20.403(a). The reportable level of xenon-133 is 1.5 X 10 3 pCi/ai (5000 X 3 X 10 10 pCi/ml). The xenon-133 level calculated was 0.33 pCi/ml at the LPZ.
The licensee reported the 10 R/hr projected dose rate at Goldsboro to the BRP. The BRP notified the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency (PEMA) of this projection at 7:45 a.m. and suggested that it was advisable to make preparations for possible evacuations. However, Met Ed did not report the 10 R/hr projection to the NRC on the day of the accident. The licensee reported the accident to the NRC Region I office at 7:50 a.m. on March 28, 1979. The survey that was used to discount the 10 R/hr calculation was made at 7:46 a.m. Although this survey was not technically adequate to make a valid new calculation, it clearly demonstrated that the 10 R/hr calculation was predicting an excessively high radiation rate. It did not preclude the possibility that a lower but still significant offsite (LPZ) radiation release could occur.
Knowledge of 10 R/hr Dose Projcction Gary Miller--Miller was aware of the 10 R/hr dose rate projection for Goldsboro on the morning of March 28, 1979, prior to 7:50 a.m. Based on this prediction, action was initiated to get onsite readings that would be in the same direction of, if not actually in, the plume; in addition, he requested that a helicopter transport a monitoring team to Goldsboro.
He was aware that onsite readings were less than 1 mR/hr.
32

Richard Dubiel--Dubiel was aware of the offsite dose projections because he reviewed the calculation results. However, he believed that the results were probably not accurate because the dome monitor had not responded properly and because the calculation was based on an assumed containment pressure of 55 psig. Containment pressure at that time was known to be less than 4 psig. He discussed the dose projection of 10 R/hr and the calculation assumptions with State officials. He believed that offsite readings were needed to back up and recalculate the dose projection; he did not believe that an immediate offsite hazard existed (IE, 4/24/79, pp. 7-8).
Howard Crawford--Crawford made the calculations associated with offsite dose projections on the morning of March 28, 1979. He was involved in discussions that questioned the validity of the dose projection (IE, 6/6/79, p. 18).
IV. Onsite Information Flow The flow of informatica within the Unit 2 control room on March 28, 1979 has been examined in previously published reports; i.e., the "Rogovin" (SIG) and " Hart" (Senate) reports. The scope of the present investi-gation in this area was limited to tr % to understand the flow of information with regard to certain k        ticators or events that occurred                                       (
on March 28, 1979. These key indicato   are discussed in Section III of this report. An attempt was made to e nablish the recognition of key indicators and then to understand the subsequent flow of related information within the control room organizatioa. The purpose of this attempt was to evaluate this information and identify the resulting conclusions and recommendations or actions taken to mitigate the accident.
The flow of information was directly influenced by the organizational structure that existed at various times throughout the day. Key staff members, who were important to understanding the information flow, arrived at (or left) the Unit 2 control room at various times during the accident; e.g., Kunder (Unit 2 Superintendent Technical Support) arrived at approx-imately 4:50 a.m. ; Logan (Unit 2 Superintendent) arrived at approximately 5:45 a.m.; Mehler (oncoming Shift Supervisor) arrived at approximately 6 a.m.; Seelinger (Jnit 1 Superintendent) arrived at approximately 6:50 a.m. ; Ross (Unit 1 Operations Supervisor) arrived at approximately 7 a.m.; Rogers (B&W Site Operations Manager) arrived at approximately 7 a.m.; Miller (Station Manager) arrived at approximately 7:05 a.m.; Flint (B&W Startup Engineer) arrived at approximately 9 a.m.; and Chwastyk (Un't 2 Shift Supervisor) arrived around noon. Because there was not an effective system for accumulating and passing on information, many :f the key staff members did not become aware of important information related to events that occurred prior to their arrival. The best example of this is the EMOV (refer to Section III.1.c.).
At 6:19 a.m. , the EMOV block valve was closed. Reacte- building pressure decreased rapidly and RCS pressure increased from 680 to 2120 psig during the next 41 minutes. The recovery of plant conditions with block valve closure was known to three shift supervisors (Zewe, Mehler and Bryan), a shift foreman (Scheimann), and two control room operators. However, the 33

investigators were unable to establish'that Miller,. Logan, Seelinger, or     j
    ' Rogers (the four1 principal members of the "think tank" or " command team")
connected the closure of the EMOV block valve with the subsequent RCS pressure increaseLand reactor containment pressure de 9ase. Subsequent actions taken that morning are. indicative of a lack of understanding that a significant inventory loss had occurred through the stuck-open EMOV.
:   -It was~ concluded that Miller's order at around 8:00 a.m. to keep the HPI on unless he personally approved a change was motivated by the need for decay heat removal rather than making up for primary coolant inventory losses. If the order was based on a concern for primary coolant inventory, then the investigators conclude that Miller would have given more specific 4
instructions on maximizing net input of water into the system.
A second example of inadequate.information flow was that associated with j'   the apparent recriticality (refer to Section III.1.e.). Because of the concern of Kunder, Ross, and Zewe over what appeared to be an uncontrolled
'    approach to criticality (they concluded that a moderator dilution was in progress), the primary ' system was emergency borated- from 6:10 a.m. until i    7: 25 a.m. The count rate behavior stabilized after 7:45 a.m. and attention
,    was directed to other problems. Three engineers (Wilkerson, Benson, and j-   Crawford), who were attempting to resolve the unexplained behavior,
!    discussed the indications with Flint, B&W startup engineer, after his
;    arrival in the' control room around 9:00 a.m. Flint postulated that these
;    indications, along with others he checked shortly after his arrival, were results of voids forming in the core. Flint believed the core may have been uncovered. Both Kunder and Zewe, as well as other control room operators, were aware of Flint's explanation. Flint has-testified that he also discussed these conclusions with Rogers. In spite of the number of people who were aware of Flint's explanation (Crawford, Wilkerson, Benson, and Rogers), the investigators conclude that Miller, Logan, Seelinger, and Ross did not become aware of Flint's explanation of core j    uncovery on March 28, 1979.
l In each of the preceding two examples, at least one think tank member was aware of information that was not discussed in the think tank. An additional j
example is that Seelinger, Unit 1 Superintendent, testified that on the        ,
 ;. morning of March 28, 1979 he believed (based solely on radiation levels)
 ;  that the core was uncovered. Seelinger further testified that he discussed
 !  this important belief with no one else. The investigators conclude that the think tank did not exist as a group that held periodic formal meetings.
This is supported not only by the testimony of Miller but also by the
:   record, or lack thereof, of discussions / evaluations, conclusions, or i   resulting actions relating to significant knowledge of key indicators.
The investigators' perception of how the think tank actually functioned 4
is this: Miller would converse with different staff members at different
;   times depending on the subject, but usually with only one or two individuals i
i at a time. Further support'for this perception is provided by the              ,
testimony of the think tank members themselves; e.g., Seelinger has            +
j   testified that his primary involvement was overseeing the implementation       .
j   of the emergency plan and Logan's role was ensuring that individual steps
,   were performed (as in a quality control check). For almost every key
!                                           34 4

m
          -indicator, the record contains recognition'by at least one key staff However, the same record demonstrates a lack of discussion / eval-member.
uation of these indicators within the think tank itself.        Finally, there is no record of actions.taken that would indicate.an understanding of the implications of these indicators.
A final example of inadequate information flow is that of the pressure spike:on the afternoon of March 28, 1979 (refer to-Section III.2). Two shift supervisors-(Chwastyk and Mehler) believed the pressure spike to _be real. Numerous otheis in the control room (e.g., Ross and Zewe) were aware of one or more of the indications. The investigators conclude that i     this knowledge wasEnot passed on to other members of the organization who would have been responsible for evaluating this.information on March 28, 1979. It_is therefore concluded that on March 28, 1979 Miller, Logan, Kunder, Seelinger,'Ross, Rogers and Zewe did not have knowledge that the pressure spike was real on March 28,.1979.
           .V. NRC Information Flow At 7:10 a.m. on March 28,1979, a TMI-2 engineer left a message with the
          'NRC Region I office that a Site Emergency had been declared. The answering service was unable to contact the Outy Officer. At 7:37 a.m. a second message was left and at_7:40 a.m. a final message was left. A General Emergency had been declared at 7:20 a.m. at TMI-2, there was a primary to secondary leak in steam generator B, ano there had been an offsite release.
At 7:45 a.m. , the Region I Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch Chief received the messages and returned the calls to the site.
The'following gives a limited reconstru: tion of the information flow to the NRC during certain periods on March 28, 1979. This reconstruction is
            -based on the (1) IRACT tapes; (2) transcriptions of the Region I tapes; (3) Region I incident center message forms; (4) interviews'with NRC and Met Ed employees; and (5) reports by the Senate, Special Inquiry Group, and IE investigation group. Only information important to characterize the severity of the accident has been identified. It is important to note that this is only part of the information that flowed to NRC on March 28, 1979.
In the first 10 minutes following the notification of the Genefal Emergency
            . (prior to' 7:55 a.m.), the following information was passed on to Region I:
                   -       Reactor trip and safety features actuation had occurred Fuel had failed
                    -      Bubb'le was located in reactor vessel
                    -      Measurements of 1500 psi and 571 F recorded
                    -      All containment radiation monitors were in high alarm
                      -    Measurement of 1 to 2 psi in containment recorded
                    -      EMOV had lifted and blown the RCDT rupture disc i
                    -      Site and General Emergencies declared Based on these early communications, Region I declared a level 1 severity incident and' assembled a 5-member team to send to the site, George 35

1
;  Smith, the Region I Fuel Facilities and Materials Safety P. ranch Chief,
;  when interviewed by the investigators, said that it was.his impression of ,
the first calls that:it was an extremely serious accident and that it i  could get significantly worse. He further stated that, based on the 3  information Region I was receiving, he felt that the potential for further y  deterioration existed throughout the afternoon.
p
[  The Regional Director-notified NRC headquarters and at 8:05 a.m. the
[  headquarters' Incident Response Center was manned. At 8:23 a.m., head-
!  quarters returned the call to the Region I Incident Response Center and, from this time on, most of the inforration transferred to headquarters j, from Region I was taped. The first call (8:23 a.m.) was a discussion of 4
the-initial information received in the regional office. At 8:34 a.m.,
the first containment _ dome monitor reading of 200 R/hr was reported to i- headquarters. The reported temperature of 571 F-was an average of tree hot and cold leg temperatures that were already out of the indicated I  range. [ Regional personnel were not aware that this was an erroneous             ;
temperature when they received this information from the site and passed it on to headquarters.]
4 Shortly after 8:30 a.m. , bued on the initial information, John Davis, the Acting Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, informed Lee           -
Gossick, the NRC Executive Director for Operations, and Edson Case, the Deputy Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, of the accident.
He stated, "It looks like there's some loss of coolant." At 8:59 a.m.,
l  Kunder informed Region I that he was concerned the core was not being cooled. Kunder thought they were not getting proper flow to the core.
Kunder thought the loops were vapor locked.
At about this time, headquarters asked how the core was being cooled.
Region I reports the following:
~
Core was not being cooled RCPs were off Primary system was vapor bound There was no indication of primary temperature (no flow)              '
Containment pressure had been to at least 4 psi Between 8:30 a.m. and 9:15 a.m., NRC headquarters perception of the accident was that an earlier inventory deficiency probably resulted in partial core uncovery, and had caused damage to the fuel. However, in this time frame, the core was thought to be covered even though an inventory problem still existed, as evidenced by the voids in the primary system.           t By 9:15 a.m. , the NRC had notified the U.S. Senate and house of Represent-       ,
atives as well as the White House of the problems at TMI.
At 9:21 a.m., Region I reported that the core was being cooled by natura?
circulation only minutes after Region I had reported that the core was not being cooled. At 10:04 a.m. , Region I told headquarters that there was no natural circulation. Headquarters was now thoroughly confused and could not establish either how the reactor was being cooled or where the water was going. Finally, at 10:06 a.m., headquarters was told that they          ,
i 36                                        ,
I

[ site] were pumping in 500 gpm and using the EMOV to control pressure.
This was also the only means of cooling.
At about 9:25 a.m., Region I was preparing a press ralease and a prelim-inary notification (PN). They requested to speak to Kunder to establish the information and times accurately. In the folicwing exchange, Kunder j            was attempting to explain the steam conditions in the core and loops, and                                ;
l         why it appeared that the HPI system was not adequately cooling the cora.
Region I, however, moved on to get additional information for the PN.
Kunder then attempted to explain the anomalous plant conditions (level, pressure, and temperatures) and why they were not understood.                                 Region I again interrupted Kunder and asked him to get Dubiel so that they could get the health physics (HP) information.
Region I: "This is Don Haverkamp. I would like to go through the scenario with George Kunder--is he available. Or with someone familiar with it because I am going to try and get some times...."
Kunder: "Once the operators recovered from that, and pressurizer level went up and the thing I have not gotten from the operators yet- still debriefing on--because they are all pretty much tied up with the plant activities--but it looks like the pressurizer level went up and went virtually solid and.that apparently through the letdown activity and so forth- you lost your bubble--apparently pushed it right through the relief valves into the drain tank which subsequently ruptured the ruptured disc--when the level came down then you don't hava that st.eam bubble- you put too much cold water into the pressurizer ar.d new the heaters are on but you are not really drawing a bubble--the pressure came down at that point, all the way down to about 10 hundred pounds and that was over roughly a 15-minute span. I think it was during that condition that we                                 j possibly lost the--we got a bubble--steam bubbles or some such--through apparently the heating in the core up in the loops and the--it apparently had an effect of vapor-locking- you know--the coolant system such that we were not getting good flow--we did not have any RC pumps running for awhile--but once the pressure got down below their NPSH for the tempera-ture we were at t.nd then the flow dropped off. We secured the pumps--the indications were very confusing but now that we are looking at the thing now--it looks to me like we had that vapor locking effect being fed by the heat in the core--and we reinitiated llP injection, of course, to get the coolant flow in but it didn't appear to have the effect that we wanted--okay--and we did try to run another coolant pump to turn it on again but it didn't give you any flow--so it was still apparently vapor locked. The problem is trying to get the pressure down low enough so we are sure that the flow is going inte the--is going down--in the reactor                                 i vessel ennulus and up into the core. The vapor-lock apparently is preventing                           !
thit from occurring--and that is apparently what led to failed fuel."
Region I: "0kay...Let me go on, George, with a couple of things--to get your confirmation. . . ."
KUNDER:    "That's right, the pressurizer level being pegged, then the pressure was drifting down, temperature staying about where it was, around [545*] or so, in that range- pius or minus 5 degrees. That's the 37 l

thing I think that baffled people the most, and it was--we did have RC flow at the time--I think it was close to full flow."
Region I: "Just a minute, George, we have a couple of questions I think you can answer for us. . . ."
Region I: "The HP related questions, if Dick Dubiel is handy, you might, have him answer them...."
At 9:39 a.m. , Boyce Grier, Regional Director, and Karl Abraham, Region I Public Affairs Officer, discussed a draft press release with John Davis, Acting Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, and with Joe Fouchard, NRC Director of Public Affairs. The following statement was read: "They apparently have a vapor lock in the primary system so that they're not able to circulate coolant and get as cool as they would like i         to...."
Kunder's concerns were not passed on to headquarters. Headquarters was not aware of the concerns over steaming in the core and the inability to   :
get adequate HPI flow into the core. The following exhcange between-headquarters and Region I took place at 10:21 a.m.
Headquarters:   "We still don't know the status of the core."
Region I:   "They are still injecting."
Headquarters:   "Where is it going?"
Region I:   "I don't know."
Accurate temperature information had still not flowed either to Region I or headquarters at that time. Region I requested the primary system temperature and pressure at about 9:55 a.m. Kunder reported a pressure of 2000 psi and temperature of 571 F T        He cautioned the region that this was not a representative temperat b,. Kunder told Region I that Ross (Operations Supervisor) was sure the core was covered, but the hot leg temperatures were still high and that these were bothering them.
Shortly after 10:00 a.m., the 5-member team arrived on the site. They started reporting to Region I from the Unit 1 control room at 10:23 a.m.
Bubba Marshall, a Met Ed Operations engineer, had just been evacuated to the Unit I control room from the Unit 2 control room. Marshall briefed Higgins (Region I reactor operations inspector) on the status of Unit 2 prior to his departure (Unit 2 conditions up to approximately 9:30 a.m.).
Higgins testified that, as a result of this briefing, it was his under-standing that the EMOV had stuck open causing a loss-of-coolant accident.
Marshall did not know how long the valve had been stuck open or how much inventory had been lost. Higgins testified that he was sure that he oassed'on this information to Region I prior to proceeding to the Unit 2 control room,   This information, however, was not recorded on the Region I incident message forms with other information transmitted to the region by Higgins in his first update at 10:55 a.m. The following information l         was reported to headquarters as a result of these exchanges: 142,800 38

gallons;were injected.from the borated water storage tank (BWST), contain-ment > sump level was pegged high (6 ft max.), containment pressure was 2 psi and decreasing, pressurizer level was pegged high, they were trying to draw a bubble with heaters, they were using atmospheric dumps and
    ' steam generator A, cold leg temperature was 220 F, pressure was 1950 psi, and reactor coolant pumps were,off. Region I inspectors liiggins and
    - Neely proceeded to the Unit 2 c'ontrol. room. They arrived in the Unit 2 control room around 11:15 a.m. From that time throughout the afternoon, Higgins and/or Neely participated in most of the caucuses in the shift supervisor's office.
At 11:41 a.m.', Region I reported that the hot leg temperature was believed to be 620 F, cold leg temper'ature'was 220 F, and pressurizer temperature was 359 F; they were maintaining 2000 psi by cycling the EMOV. In fact, Mi.11er had just instructed that the EMOV block valve be opened to rapidly depressurize the plant and allow core flood tank injection. This decision was the result of discussions that were primarily concerned with the assessment of core coverage and core cooling.      Although the NRC inspectors.
were present for these discussions, the considerations that led to this action were not passed on to either Region I or headquarters.
At 12:17 p.m., headquarters requested the core exit thermocouple readings.
This. request went unanswered. (The readings were requested again at 4:00 p.m. This investigation did not attempt to determine why this data was not provided). At 12:33 p.m. , headquarters was informed by Region I that pressure was 1100 psi, the hot leg temperature was 565 F, and that there were bubbles some place in the system, maybe in the core. At 12:49 p.m.,
three-way communications were established between the Unit 1 control                                             )
room, Region I, and headquarters.
Throughout the early afternoon, the information flow was mainly through the Unit 1 control room to Region I and headquarters. Sr.ie of the inform-ation received by both Region I and headquarters was erroneous. Region I had a direct line into Unit 2; however, it received only a minimum of operating information. An example of this is an accurate hot leg temper-ature that was not reported to headquarters until 2:20 p.m. Headquarters repeatedly requested operational information until headquarters finally requested a three-way telephone call into Unit 2 at 3:56 p.m. At 4:35 p.m., headquarters established three-way communications with both the Unit 2 control room and Region I, at which time operational information began to flow directly to headquarters.
The NRC inspectors located on the site and at Region I had a better understanding of the accident than headquarters. The role of each of the NRC components was vague. This resulted in a degree of confusion concerning the flow of information within the NRC. The investigators conclude that, on the day of the accident, an effective system-did not exist within NRC to ensure that information was properly accumulated, evaluated, and
    - disseminated.
VI. Operating Information Supplied to the State Scope This portion of.the investigation addressed the reporting of certain key operating events by Metropolitan Edison to the Pennsylvania Bureau of 39 4

l l
l Radiological Protection (BRP) during the. day of the accident. The key events were the same ones discussed in Section III of this report. The             I three principal members of the BRP were interviewed to evaluate the operating information that was provided to BRP in contrast to information that'was supplied to NRC. The operating information supplied to the BRP was also reviewed with the objective of identifying improvements that could be made.
.TMI Emergency Plan Several of.the TMI Emergency Plan implementing procedures make reference to an Emergency Status Board and contain as an enclosure a format for the information that is contained on the Board. A list of the questions contained in the enclosure under the title " Penna. Bureau of Rad. Health Questions" is excerpted below:
: 1. What type accident has occurred:
: 2. Has the reactor tripped?
: 3. Did the Emergency Safeguards Systems actuate? If so, which ones?
: a. High Pressure Injection            Yes           No
: b. Low Pressure Injection             Yes           No
: c. Core Flood                         Yes           No
: d. Reactor Building Isolation         Yes           No
: e. Reactor Building Cooling           Yes_          No
: 4. What is the status of the Plant?
: a. At Power
: b. Hot Standby
: c. Hot Shutdown
: d. Cooling Down
: e. Cold Shutdown
: 5. Is offsite power available?
: 6. Are diesels operable?"                                                    -
The above operating information questions are followed by questions pertaining to radiology and other areas.
Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure 1670.2 (Rev. 1), " Site Emergency Plan Procedure," specifies that the plant nuclear engineer is to relay data.of plant status as defined in the enclosure to the procedure, the Plant Status Board format. (Note that the procedure actually refers to Enclosure 2, whereas.the Status Board format is labeled Figure 2, but the format sheet pagination is correct for an Enclosure 2). The procedure does not specify to whom the nuclear engineer is to relay the status information. However, the format identifies the particular questions as
 " Penna. Bureau of Rad. Health Questions," leaving little doubt that the information is to be passed on to the BRP.
40

Emergency Plan Implementation Procedure 1670.3 (Rev. 1),.." General Emergency Procedure," states in Note (1), page 4, that "It shall be the responsibility of all of the above to provide maximum assistance and
.information possible to the various offsite groups; i.e. , AEC, State of Pa., Bureau of Radiological' Health...."' This note is the first of three that conclude the procedure section entitled " General Emergency Immediate Action." It immediately follows a statement that says the duties of listed personnel during a General Emergency are outlined in a specified procedure. The personnel listed are shift supervisor, control room operator, supervisor of operations, station engineer, supervisor of maintenance, nuclear engineer, radiation protection supervisor, chemical supervisor, radiation monitoring teams, emergency repair party, and security guards.
Operating Information Supplied Based on the investigators' interviews and other interviews, the three principal BRP staff members (Gerusky, Dornsife and Riley) say that on March 28, 1979 the following operating information related to the. key events previously. identified was passed on or reported to the State:
(1) Dornsife knew of the low boron sample analysis (IE, 10/1/80, pp. 2-3).
(2) . All of them knew that the reactor coolant pumps were not running (Dornsife, IE, 10/1/80, pp. 9-10; Gerusky, IE, 10/1/80, pp. 9-10; Riley, IE, 10/1/80, pp. 5-7).
(3) Only Dornsife recalled knowledge that the EMOV had been open for a period of time that was longer than normal (IE, 10/1/80, pp. 11-14).
(4) Both Dornsife and Gerusky knew that there was some voiding in the primary coolant system (Dornsife, IE, 10/1/80, pp. 13, 11, 28; Gerusky, IE, 10/1/80, pp. 5, 29, 41-43).
(5) Gerusky and Riley knew of the early-morning calculated projected dose rate of 10 R/hr at Goldsboro and that this projection was believed to be high (Gerusky, IE,10/1/80, p. 33; Riley, IE,10/1/80, pp. 19)
(6) Dornsife believed that, although the plant was not in the desired mode, the plant was stable and that the core was being cooled through a feed-and-bleed process using HPI for feed and bleed through the electromagnetic relief valve / block valve (IE, 10/1/80, pp. 10, 14-15).
(7) The pertinent data from the Status Board " Penna. Bureau of Rad.
Health Questions" was passed on during a telephone conversation between Miller and Dornsife at about 9 a.m. (Dornsife's " Recollections").
(8) It could not be established that Gerusky, Dornsife, or Riley received specific knowledge on March 28, 1979 of hot leg or core exit thermocouple temperatures.
41

BRP Perception of Adequacy of Operating Information Supplied In general, the BRP expressed satisfaction with the information supplied to them by Met Ed on the day of the accident. Dornsife and Gerusky described previous drills as not having detailed operational information relayed and, in cases where information was relayed, the State relied on      l Met Ed to assess it. Gerusky said that they were not expecting much more information from the site than that received. He and Dornsife said that personnel at BRP were not thinking about the hardware as much as their
; major responsibility, offsite consequences. The key BRP personnel believed that the questions they asked of Met Ed were adequately answered. Both Gerusky and Riley said that the BRP personnel did not pursue sufficient additional questions with Met Ed. (Note that some specific questions, which are keyed to an identification of the specific accident under way, are contained in the State Annex to the TMI Emergency Plan. Although the Annex is not specific, the implication is that the State will initiate the questions.)
Notwithstanding BRP's apparent satisfaction with the communication of operational information described aoove, when the investigators asked BRP staff if a number of specific operational data or parameters should have been passed on by Met Ed on the day of the accident, each of the key BRP personnel were of the opinion (September 1980) that many of these parameters should have been passed on.
The loss of confidence in Met Ed, which Pennsylvania officials developed as a result of the mid-af ternoon briefing of the Lt. Governor, has been covered by other investigators and was not pursued in this investigation.
The effect of the meeting on Gerusky was opposite to that which he had as a result of direct telephone contacts. During the interview with Gerusky, he attributed his loss of confidence to Met Ed's failure during the briefing to admit offsite releases of which the BRP was aware. This was reinforced by Gerusky's percention of an attitude conveying that the accident was over and all that remained was cleanup.
NRC Assessment of Operating Information Supplied by Met Ed to the State The BRP staff with wiiom the IE investigators talked seemed to have concluded in hindsight that there was a need for the specific operational data that was not received. Although the BRP Emergency Plan Annex indicates that they have an interest in more specific operating data, BRP staff believed that they should have pursued these data through further questioning.
Operating information was provided by Miller in the telephone conversation (about 9:00 A.M.) he had with Dornsife in preparation for Dornsife's briefing of the Lt. Governor. There is a correlation between the operating information supplied to Dornsife and that supplied to Floyd. Although the correlation is not exact, the operating information supplied to Dornsife is'similar to that supplied to Floyd in his conversation with-Bryan in the Unit 1 control room at about 9:00 a.m. (Floyd was the Unit 2 Operations Supervisor who was in Lynchburg, Virginia, on the day of the accident.) The similiarity in the information supplied is substantiated by comparing Dorsife's notes and his written recollections with what Floyd said he received, which.was verified by the March 28, 1979 B&W log (Wandling notes). (Floyd was told among other things that there 42

was 'a natural circulation ~cooldown, the RCDT. rupture disc had blown,.the    l I
EMOV block valve had been closed, there was high radiation in the reactor building, and the reactor coolant pumps were not running.) Although the information supplied to both Dornsife and Floyd was not indicative of the      ,
concern the investigators now believe should have been conveyed, it is          '
believed to be representative of the assessment of the conditions prevailing    i in the Unit 2 control room at that time.
Shortly after Miller's telephone conversation with Dornsife, Miller had.a      .
telephone conversation with several people in Reading, Pennsylvania, in        l which he talked about the Do'rnsife conversation. A tape recording of          .
this conversation was made at the Reading office. This recording has           I become known as the "Troffer tape" because the principal person talking from Reading was George Troffer, a QA Manager.       If the Troffer tape transcript is_ read without relating it with what the investigators believe to be Miller's lack of understanding and, without relating it to what
  -Floyd h u been told, it can be inferred that Miller is describing a better tituation than he believed existed. Contrary to this inference, the. investigators conclude that Miller was describing how the accident was asse3 sed at that time in the corning. A complication to this conclusion is the information that Kunder was providin'g to the Region about one-half hour later. The investigators conclude that, although Kunder had a more accurate percepticq of the accident, Miller and others did not share         ;
Kunder's concerns at that time.                                               1 Near the end of the Troffer transcript,.there is a specific passage that could be interpreted.Bo mean that Miller believed the situation to be        ;
more severe than he had told Dornsife.      It says, "We've been assessing
* i the plant,' we don't trow where the plant is going. See, the situation we're in is a delicatr one because we actually have plant inte0rity. If we had a leak we'd be all right--as far as we'd have a lot more economic consequences. We've been trying to figure out how to cool down in the most expeditious fashion without releasing and without damage too much."
The investigators conclude that this passage means that the situation was not understood at that time, but it does not mean that Miller. believed that the situation was continuing to deterioriate. The phrase, "If we had a leak we'd be all right," seems to reinforce the conclusion of a lack of understanding because procedures for handling a leak existed. However, the cond_itions being experienced were not anticipated and were not covered by procedures. Conversely, the phrase "we'd have a lot more economic consequences" if.there was a leak seems to indicate that further deter-ioration was not expected. Another complication comes from Miller's statement to IE investigators on April 11, 1979 when he said, "I didn't feel I got...could get any help from anybody because I felt I didn't think anybody believed where I was...." Miller stated in an interview with the investigators that he did not intend in this statement to convey
     . hesitancy to pass on information. The investigators conclude that Miller was not withholding information from the State (BRP) in his telephone conversations with them. Although it is not concluded that Miller believed "The. transcript says " testing" but the tape itself says " assessing."
43

Ethat conditions-were going to deteriorate, he could not preclude this possibility.
The afternoon briefing'of the Lt. Governor:left a number of the State                      ;
                    ' people.with a belief that' Met Ed (Herbein was the principal spokesman)                    !
was 'downplaying the accident, and that "everybody was making a big deal                  l 4                    'out of.nothing (Gerusky, IE, -10/1/80, p. 23). The investigators review
                    .of-the Lt. Governor's briefing from the perspective of the State people was limited to their interview with Gerusky. Based'on.the information-
                    ; received, the investigators _ accepted thel fact that_some of the State people believed:they had been misled and attempted to assess whether this happened deliberately on the part of Met Ed. On the one hand, there
                    =could be-motives for Met Ed to: describe conditions as being better than they believed them to'be. On the other hand, although Met Ed: knew the plantLwas-outside~known. operating parameters, they also believed that conditions were improving.. It was concluded that Miller and Herbein were encouraged.by indications showing that the hot leg temperatures were decreasing and that the cold leg. temperatures were-increasing. . The notes of IE Inspector Higgins show that those located on site believed that the situation was improving.- Miller and Herbein would not have wanted to unduly alarm the State people. Not knowing exactly how much detail or background information the people present for.this briefing wanted or needed, Miller and Herbein could have expected to be guided by questioning as to how much information was wanted. Nevertheless, based on a belief.
that information was omitted about'their concerns earlier in the day and their lack of assurance that the situation would not deteriorate, the investigators conclude that the Met'Ed representatives were not completely forthcoming during the' briefing..
Miller was asked by Congressman Cheney during hearings by the House Sub-committee on Energy and the Environment (Transcript 5/11/79, pp. 203-204) about criteria for recommendations to the State for evacuation. In
                   -response, Miller referred to EPA Protective Action Guides (PAG) that-recommend threshhold radiation exposures for which protective . action should be.taken. He pointed out that the measured offsite dose rates on the day of the accident'did not indicate exposures near the PAG values.
Miller said that'he had to use judgment about plant status to give the State input as to whether he thought "the consequences in the plant is:
going to get severely worse quickly."'
The judgment that a plant may 'get " severely. worse quickly" is purely subjective. Nevertheless, the effectiveness of offsite protective actions is enhanced by as much notice'and preparation as possible. A lack of certainty about the assessment of plant conditions and the adequacy of core cooling should be communicated promptly and clearly to offsite agencies to enable contingency planning. As' discussed in the following paragraph, this lack of certainty was not communicated by Met Ed to the State on the day of the accident.                                                     -
E
,                    For much of the day on March 28, 1979 prior to the-Governor's briefing, TMI management personnel were primarily concerned with a continuing assessment of core cooling. They were unable to obtain a previously analyzed or.known configuration-of. system components-for which they could l
44                                          l 1
        . . _ . .                      . - ~ -     ,--      -- -       --       -

be confident that the core was being adequately cooled (Ross, IE, 9/24/80,
: p. 34; Miller, IE, 9/5/80, pp. 31, 43). Because of the extensive voiding, both natural circulation and forced circulation were precluded.      This left a feed-and-bleed method for which there were no direct indicators of the 6dequecy of cooling. Without a procedure to specify an adequate flow rate or a means for direct verification of the adequacy of cooling, those located on site were left with uncertainty (Miller, IE, 9/5/80, pp. 41, 43),     This lack of certainty led to depressurization of the plant before the noon hour in an attempt to assure core coverage with the core flood
[ tanks and to go into the decay heat removal mode, a known cooling con-i figuration.
In this section, aspects of the lack of full communications with the State have been discussed. These aspects involved a failure of Met Ed to be fully forthcoming in that information was not volunteered concerning the potential for degradation of plant conditions or concerning the uncertainty of the method being used to cool the core. The investigators conclude that the responsible Met Ed personnel did not perceive the situation to be as bad as it really was. However, it is concluded that their concern was sufficient to have made the receipt of this information important to the State. Finally, the invest.igators conclude that failure to pass on the information was not willful withholding, but rather it resulted from a lack of perception of the severity of the accident coupled with a perception that, unless PAG guidelines were approached, it was not necessary to discuss plant operational uncertainties with the State. In the time frame of the accident, the investigators believe that it would not have been uncor .i for other utilities to have been similarly influenced by offsite releases so far below PAG levels.
VII. Enforcement Considerations The reportability of three specific items of information was a central issue that led to this investigation. Consideration of these three items plus other possible noncompliance with reporting requirements is discussed in this section of the report following a discussion of two other enforcement issues that are related to the investigation.
: 1. Potential Material False Statement On May 9, 1979, Herman Dieckamp, President of General Public Utilities (GPU), forwarded to NRC Commissioner Victor Gilinsky a copy of a mailgram which he had sent to Congressman Udall. The mailgram contained the statement, "There is no evidence that anyone interpreted the ' Pressure Spike' and the spray initiation in terms of reactor core damage at the time of the spike nor that anyone withheld any information." In view of the testimony of Chwastyk and Mehler about their knowledge and conclusions on the pressure spike, the investigators reviewed the record to determine if a material false statement had been made in the mailgram.
The investigators have concluded that, for a statement to be considered a false statement under Section 186 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 as amended, the statement must be made in a license application or it must be a statement of fact required under Section 182 of the Act. The Dieckamp 45

mailgram was neither of the above. Therefore, it     does not constitute a potential material false statement under the Act.
: 2. License Modification Related to Gary Miller Gary Miller--In the c:ourse of a sessing the flow of information on March 28, 1979, the investigators identified common or focal points for the flow of information. The Emergency Director, Gary Miller, was identified as a key focal point through which critical onsite information flowed.
It is from the Emergency Director, as the manager of the think tank, that decisions flowed based on the assessment of information.       The final phase of this investigation was a consideration of enforcemen, action to be taken with respect to Gary Miller. This involved an evaluation of Miller's performance on March 28, 1979.
This evaluation was complicated by the absence of specific criteria on which an objective assessment could be based. Another factor complicating the evaluation was the brevity of the record concerning Miller's individual actions. However, the investigators attempted to evaluate Miller's performance based on the recorJ established during this and previous investigations. This led to two conclusions:
Miller's decision to leave the site to brief the Lt. Governor (regardless of Met Ed management influences) was not in the best interest of plant safety.
Miller could have more effectively utilized offsite technical resources known to be available on March 28, 1979 (i.e., GPU and B&W).
The investigators reviewed the need for enforcement action with respect to Gary Miller. These investigators reviewed the existing record, including the conclusions of this report. Based on this review, three investigators conclude that enforcement action directed to Miller is not warranted.
One of these investigators based his conclusion on his review of the 10 R/hr projected dose rate as this was the sole area examined by this investigator.
The fourth investigator recommended that, although the record does not strongly support such a conclusion, Met Ed be required to show cause why Gary Miller should be allowed to continue to be involved in the licensee's nuclear activities in a supervisory capacity. This investigator's recommend-ation was based on Miller's performance on the day of the accident as summarized below:
Miller's decision to leave the site to brief the Lt. Governor (regardless of Met Ed management influences) was not in the best interest of plant safety.                                   -
Miller could have more effectively utilized offsite technical resources known to be available on March 28, 1979 (i.e., GPU and B&W).
46

l
        +    Miller failed to effectively utilize onsite resources in that
;            he assumed the detailed decisionmaking role for a broad spectrum of activities. This diluted his own ability to overview these activities.
        -    The failure of knowledgeable plant personnel to put together symptoms, to review previous assessments in the light of later information, and to more thoroughly understand the accident is considered to be a supervisory or management deficiency in Miller's performance on the day of the accident. His role should have been to cause those under his direction to be more thorough and complete in their analyses. He should have questioned explanations that were given to him (for example, the explanation about the core exit thermocouples and the containment pressure spike indications).
: 3. Reporting
: a. Regulatory Requirement to Report The potentially applicable requirements to report information to the NRC on the day of the accident are contained in the following:
(1) Code of Federal Regulations, (2) Facility Technical Specifications, and (3) Procedures implementing the Emergency Plan.
The specific requirements of each are discussed in the following paragraphs.
Paragraph 403(a) of 10 CFR 20 requires immediate notification by telephone and telegraph, mailgrcm, or facsimile to the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office of any incident involving byproduct, source, or special nuclear material that may have caused or threatens to cause a whole-body exposure of 25 rems or more, release of radioactive materials in concentrations exceeding 5000 times the specified limits, loss of one working week or more in facility operations, or damage to property in excess of $200,000. Paragraph 403(b) of 10 CFR 20 requires notification within 24 hours of incidents of less severity.
Section 6.8 of the technical specifications states that writt m procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained for stated activities, including emergency plan implementation. Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure 1670.3, page 4, Note (1), following a list of key people for General Emergency, says, "It shall be the responsibility of all the above to provide maximum assistance and information possible to the various offsite groups; i.e. , AEC, State of Pa. , Bureau of Radiological Health. . . ."
Section 6.9 of the facility technical specifications requires reporting within 24 hours by telephone and confirmed by telegraph, mailgram, or facsimile to the Regional Director, or his designee, certain events, including " abnormal degradation discovered in fuel cladding, reactor 47

-                   -             -   - .      .-      --   = - - - .     ..     -.   -.      --.
:                                                                    a a
i coolant pressure boundary or primary containment;... personnel error or j'
procedural. inadequacy _which prevents or could prevent, by itself, the fulfillment of the, functional'. requirements of systems required to cope             l e             with accidents analyzed in'the SAR."
j                                                                                                    l
!             A broad concept of an " implicit reporting requirement" has been suggested.           '
Although'it isl clear that both NRC and the State-need pertinent information
            ..in order to discharge their: responsibility to protect public health and i
safety, expanding _this'need to include an " implicit reporting requirement" implies that failure to report such information is:a violation of a requirement, and, as such, can be.the basis for specific-enforcement action. Although NRC'is justified in criticizing Met Ed for failure to
: provide pertinent information, enforcement action based directly on an
: e implied' requirement does not appear to be. valid. This conclusion is supported by the Statement of . Considerations associated with promulgation of 10 CFR 50.72.      Since the TMI accident, NRC issued 10 CFR 50.72 requiring nuclear power plant licensees to report listed' events as soon as possible and in all cases.within one hour. As-a part of the same action, 10 CFR              .
;_           20.403 was modified to make incidents included therein also reportable               '
pursuant to 10 CFR 50,72. The Statement of Considerations for these regulation modifications says, "mo'st of these events are not required presently _to-be reported immediately to NRC." If the " implicit reporting requirement" concept _is applied, such a statement could not have been used as one of the justifications for waiving the normal public comment period price to making the rule change effective.                                    '
: b. Knowledge of Reportable Events-4 The knowledge of key members of the TMI staff on March 28, 1979 about a number of operating parameters and data is contained in the knowledge of key' indicators section (Section III) of this report. Even though the Emergency Director / Station Superintendent Gary Miller says he does not
           . recall knowing'of some of these key indicators, knowledge by any responsible licensee personnel on duty is all that is required to establish knowledge by the-licensee'.
: c. Failure to Report The facts concerning reporting or passing on of specific important individual events or pieces of data to the NRC by Met Ed on March 28, 1979 are contained elsewhere in this report. Although some key indicators were reported, a-question exists on the timeliness of the reporting. For those cases where timeliness.is a factor, this aspect is: discussed later as_a part of'the consideration of whether or not to cite Met Ed for noncompliance.
: d. What Constitutes Reporting On the day of the accident, the licensee communicated various times by telephone directly with NRC Region I, with NRC Region I and headquarters on a conference telephone line,and with NRC inspectors located on site.
In the circumstances of these various communications, the question is
          .-raised _as to what constitutes reporting.
48

One of the items of potential noncompliance considered refers to 10 CFR 20.403. This regulation states that the "... licensee shall immediately notify by telephone and telegraph, mailgram, or facsimile, the Director of the appropriate Regional Office...." As a matter of informal practice in the past, NRC has accepted telephone notification of the regionally based principal inspector, or his supervisor, as meeting the requirement to notify the Regional Director. From the time Region I returned the initial Met Ed telephone notification on the day of the accident, either the principal inspector or his supervisor was a party to the conversation,      i Therefore, any report made over this telephone is considered to be adequate     I in this instance.
It is less clear whether information passed on to an onsite inspector is        i acceptable. On the one hand, the onsite inspector may be considered a responsible NRC representative. Otherwise he would not be sent to the site. On the other hand, many inspectors are specialists in one particular  l discipline and cannot be expceted to understand the significance of each        I item of information they receive if it is outside their area of specialty. l Licensee representatives cannot be expected to know the limits of each         i inspector's expertise. A further complication is the danger of miscommun-      !
ications if simple mention of a subject by a licensee representative to an onsite inspector is taken to satisfy reporting requirements. This could put an unduly large burden on the inspector and could thwart the purpose of reporting. An acceptable resolution of this dilemma is that licensees should be expected to notify the regional office by telephone unless it is assured that the onsite inspector understands the significance of what he is told. Telephone notification to the regional office minimizes concern that information will not be understood because this communication automatically alerts the recipient that the licensee considers the information to be important.
The other area of potential noncompliance relates to failure to inform NRC and the State based on the emergency plan implementing procedure.
The procedure contains no guidance on which to base a conclusion as to how the passing on of the information is to be accomplished. For the purposes of this report, the investigators will use the same criteria as previously described for 10 CFR 20.403.
: e. Assessment of this Case Appendix A is a citation containing two specific items of noncompliance that were considered by these investigators. The citation includes the three items that were put aside last year plus an additional item related to the EMOV. The other key indicators were dropped from consideration because they were reported in a timely manner 'r they were not events.
The requirements and facts in this situation can be argued to a conclusion that further enforcement is either justified or that it is not justified.
In this section of the report, a rationale for both sides is presented.
Basis for Citations In the assessment of potential citations, the use of Section 6.9 of the technical specifications for failure to report information on March 28, 49

,                      1979 was found to be inappropriate. The requirement was not applicable to the projected dose rate ~ calculation.. In. relation to core temperatures,.
4 it was potentially. applicable-to the fuel degradation reporting requirement;
 .                     however, a belief that fuel damage had occurred was reported early in the i                      morning. Lack of knowledge by-those on site of the extent of core damage
(                      precluded this. meeting'the requirements for a citation for failure to
;                     . report. It was not applicable to the pressure spike because, even though the' containment was challenged, it was.not degraded. It was potentially          ;
applicable to the EN V both as.a degradetion of the primary coolant
                      . boundary and as a personnel error. (failure to recognize the open EMOV).
It was, however, reported to the onsite inspector within the time specified by the requirement. It.was concluded, therefore, that a case.could not
;                      be made.for citation.against Section 6.9 of the technical specifications.
;                      The use of' 10.CFR 20.403(a) as a basis for a citation must rest on there         l 4
having been an incident in addition to the incident reported by Met Ed            1
.                      (once communications were established with NRC Region I early in the              i morning). The containment _ pressure spike is the only potential item of
,                      noncompliance for-which a clear argument can be made that'a separate incident' occurred.- This event represents a unique challenge to the
;                      containment that was.known.to have a large inventory of radioactive i                      material,:the release of which could have caused consequences of the
:                      magnitude of those contained in 10 CFR 20.403(a). Such an argument is i                      not believed to be sustainable for the other items cited.
A calculation (the. radiation prediction in Goldsboro) cannot be successfully i                      argued to.be an incident. The other items in the citation are believed to be sufficiently related to the information that was reported to. pre-
;                      clude classifying them as individual incidents. Two members of the TMI crew on duty at the time the containment pressure spike occurred stated that they talked about the event with an NRC inspector who was also in the. control room at the time. One of the Met Ed employees identified the inspector by'name. Neither of the two NRC inspectors who were in the Unit 2 control room area at the time have any recollection that they-had knowledge of the event on March 28, 1979. Conversely, considerable evidence points to a general _ knowledge in the control room and shift supervisor's office that something significant happened at that time.
Alarms sounded, equipment changed operational state, and operators took actions in resetting and shutting down equipment. Notwithstanding their
 ,                   ' belief now that they-were not aware of the pressure spike on the day of
                     -.the accident, these investigators believe that it is likely that one or both of the inspectors were aware of some of the symptoms of this event.
If this'be the case, it .is believed that either they did not understand the symptoms-to be indicative of the problem or they accepted an incorrect explanation of the-symptoms. One of the Met Ed crew who stated he talked about.the spike'with-an NRC inspector said that the inspector did not appear to understand what he was told.
Knowledge and understanding of information by onsite NRC inspectors can be accepted as a substitute for a required immediate verbal report to the regional office. However, some knowledge without an understanding cannot be accepted as a substitute for a verbal report. Even though there is conflictir.;   ' formation on what the NRC inspectors on site were or were l
l                                                              50

            ..           ~     _   _                            _  _
l not told about the pressure gike, the necessary elements to satisfy reporting requirements were not met.                                            l l
The emergency plan. implementing procedure was used as a basis for the other item of noncompliance. As was discussed earlier, because of the          .
l wording of the requirement, it was concluded that 10 CFR 20.403(a) was         I
: not' applicable for.these examples, but the broad language in the implementing  '
I procedure does not present such constraint.- It can be argued that the
                                                   ~
l information contained in.the examples was not supplied in a timely manner,     I so this constitutes failure to comply with Technical Specification Section 6.8. In the context of the statement in the: implementing procedure,   i to be timely the information is'to be provided promptly or at the first        i available opportunity. .In the examples contained in Enclosure 1, it can be argued that the information either was not provided or that it'was not provided at the first available opportunity.
Discussion of~Whether or Not to Cite At this juncture, it can be asked, "Why should further citations be             '
considered in response to the TMI accident?" There are two apparent principal reasons that can serve as motivations for citation: (1) a citation can deter a licensee from future failure to follow regulatory requirements, and (2) a citation can " send a message" to other licensees as well.
1 With regard to deterence for this licensee in this case, no further civil       I penalty may be assessed because the legal limit has already been imposed.
The licensee is already facing a hearing to ju.tify restarting Unit 1 (much less Unit 2) so that license suspension is not a main deterent.
Licensee revocation would subject the licensee to a different sanction; however, it is not believed that the factual basis surrounding the events on the day of the accident would support license revocation. Use of a
   " failure to report" citation as a mechanism for deterence for this licensee  '
could then be viewed as unrealistic. The motive to " send a message" may be characterized as " tough but not fair." The changes already made in reporting requirements through the issuance of 10 CFR 50.72 and the revision of 10 CFR 20.403 have improved the specificity of NRC reporting requirements.
This report recommends further modification to the regulations. This action is needed regardless of whether or not Met Ed is cited in this case. It is not clear that what is in effect a " pro forma" citation against Met Ed will provide any meaningful remedial action for other licensees. Ample opportunity for any needed remedial action against Met Ed is already open before either unit _is allowed to start up.
The applicability of 10 CFR 20.403 may be challenged on the basis of the historical development of the regulation. The crecedent of prior citations against 10 CFR 20.403 is that in the past it has only been used to cite power reactor licensees for overexposure of people to radiation. The existenue in reactor technical specifications of explicit reporting requirements that are related to operational events adds weight to a conclusion that it is inappropriate to use 10 CFR 20.403 for operating events.
The failure to specifically report the calculation of a projected dose rate in Goldsboro and the related implications of the technically 51
                     -                         +

inaccurate early discounting of the calculation may be questioned on the basis of information that was supplied. Met Ed did report to NRC that the dome monitor was reading 200 R/hr and that the containment pressure was 1 psig. Although.this information alone does not enable a direct inference of potential offsite dose rates, it is a clear indication that significant releases could occur. It i,s true that, if the calculation        l
  'had been accurate, minutes were important.       Nevertheless, the Pennsylvania  l BRP was' notified and it was the logical agency to have initiated action if the need to do so had been confirmed.
l The citation against the Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure rests on a very general _ statement that can be characterized as more of a philosophy statement than a procedural step. This is exemplified by the fact that the statement admonishes all of the listed people to supply information.
Taken literally, this would have each of these individuals personally calling the agencies to assure that they received the information.
Furthermore, responsibility that is assigned to everyone may be respon-sibility that is assigned to no one. The lack of specific .ssignment of responsibility to one person with a systematic flow of informe. tion to that person was concluded elsewhere in this report to be the principal deterrent to full reporting. Citation against such a general statement as that referenced in the potential citation could have the effect of drawing attention to the wrong problem.       In conclusion, it is recommended that citations not be made against Met Ed for failure to report.
i l
l 52

APPENDIX A 1:0NCOMPLIANCE CITATION CONSIDERED BY THE INVESTIGATION TEAM i
A. 10 CFR 20.403(a) requires that each licensee immediately notify by telephone and telegraph, mailgram, or facsimile, the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office of any incident involving byproduct, source, or special nuclear material possessed by him and which may have caused or threatens to cause the release of radioactive material in concentrations that, if averaged over a period of 24 hours, would exceed 5,000 times the limits specified for such materials in Appendix B, Table II.
Contrary to the above, on t"e afternoon of March 28, 1979, at about 1:50 p.m. , two on-duty shif t supervisors of the licensee recognized that a pressure spike (approximately 30 psig) had occurred inside the contain-ment building of Three Mile Island Unit 2. Because the containment building contained radioactive material which, if released and averaged over a period of 24 hours, would exceed 5,000 times the limits specified for such material in Appendix B, Table II, this incident threatened to cause a release of such material. The incident was not immediately reported to the NRC by telephone and telegraph, mailgram or facsimile.
B. Section 6.8 of Three Mile Island Unit 2 Technical Specifications states that written procedures shall be established, implemented and maintained covering Emergency Plan Implementation. Radiation Emergency Procedure 1670.3, which implements the Three Mile Island Unit 2 Emergency Plan, states that, in a General Emergency, it shall be the responsibility of licensee personnel "...to provide maximum assistance and information possible..." to the NRC (among others).
Contrary to the above, following the declaration of a General Emergency at Unit 2 at 7:25 a.m. , on March 28, 1979:
(1) The licensee failed to provide maximum information possible to the NRC in that a projected dose rate of 10 R/hr in Goldsboro, Pa. ,
calculated at approximately 7:44 a.m. , was not reported to the NRC.
(2) The licensee failed to provide maximum information possible to the NRC in that the core exit thermocouple readings, taken at approx-imately 9:00 a.m., were not reoorted to the NRC-                     ,
(3) The licensee failed to provide max; mum information possible to the NRC in that the conclusion by an on-duty shift supervisor at approx-imately 6:30 a.m. that the open EMOV was the cause of abnormal plant  !
conditions was not reported to the NRC.                               l A-1

l APPEND 1X B
                                . Report References List of Attachments Page(s)
Attachment Page No.            Name. Source                Date      Referenced l '-l           Kunder   SIG                  9/18/79    32-35, 42-45 2 -1            Kunder   .IE                  9/4/80     3-4 3 -1            Rogers    IE                  9/2/80     3-5 4-1             Zewe      IE                  9/4/80     3-5
                                 ~
5-1             Ross      SIG                 9/18/79    11-12 6-1            Ross       IE                 9/24/80    4-5 7-1 ~           Logan     IE                 10/16/80   5 8            Miller    IE                  9/5/80    6-7 9-l             Miller    IE                 ~11/10/80  140-146 10-l'             Kunder    Senate              8/22/79   17-18             ;
11-1              Kunder     IE                 9/4/80     6-7 12-1             Rogers     IE                 9/2/80     14-16 13-1             Logan      IE                 5/9/79     6-7, 33 14-1             Zewe       IE                 9/4/80     9 15-1              Ross      IE                 9/24/80    11-12 16-1              Miller     IE                9/5/80     37, 48-50
     ~17-1              Kunder     IE                9/4/80     8-9 18-1              Kunder     SIG                9/18/79   39-49 19-1             Logan      IE                 10/16/80  11-16 20-1              Rogers      IE                9/2/80    7 21-l~            Zewe       SIG                10/11/79   92 22-1             Zewe        Senate            11/15/79   35-38 23-1             Zewe        IE                9/4/60     11-12 24-1             Ross        IE                5/19/79    11-12 t
25-1'            Ross         IE               9/24/80    17-20

d List of Attachments
;-       Attachment                                        Page(s)
Page No.         Name       Source       Date     Referenced 26-1         Miller      IE         11/10/80  61 -78
          .27-1           Dornsife    IE         10/1/80   11 28-1         Higgins     IE         10/7/80   31 29-1         Kunder     SIG         9/18/79   53-55
:            30-1         Kunder     IE          9/4/80    11-17 j            31-1         Kunder     IE         7/11/79    12-14 4
i 32-1         Kunder     IE         9/4/80     28-29 4
;            33-1         Seelinger  IE         10/14/80  77-78 34-1         Rogers     IE         9/2/80     16-17 35-1         Rogers     IE         9/2/80    26-27 36-1         Rogers     IE         9/2/80     18 37-1         Logan      IE         10/16/80  18-22 38-1         Zewe       IE         9/4/80    15 39-1         Zewe      Senate      10/18/79  23 40-1           Zewe       IE-        9/4/80    30 41-1           Ross       IE         9/24/80   26 42-1          Ross       IE          9/24/80   28 43-1          Ross       IE          9/24/80   41-45 4
44-1          Miller     IE          9/5/80    21-56       -
           .45-1         Kunder     IE          4/25/79   26-34 46-1          Kunder     IE          9/4/80    24-26 47-1          Logan      IE          5/9/79    8-9 48-1          Logan      IE          10/16/80  33-39 49 -1         Zewe       IE          9/4/80    29-30
: 50. -l .      Ross       IE          9/24/80   37

1 List of Attachments Attachment                                                                                                      Page(s)
Page No.                                                                    Name      Source        Date       Referenced 51 ~                                                   Miller    IE.          5/7/79      76 Miller    IE           9/5/79      57-59 Rogers    IE           9/2/80      22-24 54-1                                                  Flint     Kemeny       6/30/79     18-19 55-1                                                  Flint     IE           4/23/79     4-5 56-1                                                  Flint     IE           9/2/80      18-19 57-1                                                  Chwastyk  IE           9/4/80      12-22 58-1                                                  Fig GA-10 TMI-2 FSAR 59-1                                                  Chwastyk  IE           9/4/80      104 60-1                                                   Chwastyk  SIG          10/30/79    18 61-1                                                   Chwastyk  IE           9/4/80      104-109 62-1                                                   Mehler    Senate       8/22/79     9 63-1                                                   Mehler    Senate       8/22/79     10 64-1                                                   Mehler    SIG          10/30/79    19-20 1
65-1                                                   Mehler    SIG          10/30/79    19 1
66-1                                                   Neely     IE           10/7/E2     10 67-1                                                   Neely     IE           10/7/80     10-13 68-1                                                   Higgins   IE           10/7/80     22 69-1                                                   Higgins   IE           10/7/80     23 70-1                                                   Miller    Kemeny       5/31/79     57 1                                                          Miller    IE           9/5/80      112 1
72-1                                                   Miller    Senate       9/28/79     25 73-1                                                   Ross                   5/19/79     3 74 -1                                                  Ross      IE           9/24/80     47-56 75 -l                                                 Zewe       IE          4/23/79     34-41

                                                      .  -              -   . . - .     - _           ~
List of Attachments Attachment                                                           Page(s)                   l Page No.          Name              Source          Date             Referenced 76         Zewe            :IE-            9/4/80             44 77-1         ~Chwastyk           IE            5/21/79            8-18 78-1           Chwastyk-         IE            9/4/80            24 79-1           Chwastyk'         IE.           5/21/79           9                      !
80-1          Chwastyk.          IE.           5/21/79           12 i
81-1          Chwa'styk       -IE             5/21/79            18 82-1          Chwa'styk''       SIG           10/11/79           18 83-1          Chwastyk         SIG            10/30/79           17 84-1          Chwastyk         SIG            10/30/79          18, 19, 20 85-1           Chwastyk          IE            9/4/80            11 86-1           Chwastyk         IE             9/4/80            33-36 87-1           Mehler           IE             5/17/79           29-33 88-1           Mehler           SIG            10/11/79          14-15 89-1           Mehler           SIG            10/11/79          15, 16 90-1           Mell            Senate          8/22/79           14-17 91-1           Illjes           IE             5/23/79          5-10 92-1          OIA                              12/2/80
,                              Interview      Plumlee 93-1          OIA                             12/3/80 Interview    'Plumlee 94-1          OIA                             12/23/80 Interview     Seelinger                                                    :
95-1           Dubiel          IE              4/24/79           7-8 96-1           Crawford         IE             6/6/79          .18                         i 97-1           Draft PN        Region I        3/28/79 98-1           TMI Radiation Emer9ency Procedure         1670.3 99-1           Dornsife       .IE              10/1/80          2-3                         l 100-1           Dornsife        IE-            .10/1/80          9-10
_ = - _ . _ _ _ _ _      _    _         -                    .                     .      _ _. . ._

List of Attachments Attachment                                                Page(s)-          l Page No.         Name          Source           Date      Referenced 101 -1         .Gerusky       IE             10/1/80     9-10 102-1           Riley         IE             10/1/80     5-7 103-1           Dornsife      IE             10/1/80     11-14 104-1           Dornsife      IE             10/1/80     11, 13, 28 105-1           Gerusky       IE             10/1/80    5, 29, 41-43 106-1           Gerusky       IE             10/1/80     33                l 107-1           Riley         IE             10/1/80     19                I l
108-1           Dornsife      IE             10/1/80     10, 14-15         ]
109-1           Dornsife      " Recollections" 11 0-1          Dornsife      Notes          3/28/79                       I 1
111-1           "Wendling Notes" 8&W         3/28/79    Vol 1, 1-8 General Communications Record TMI-2 Transient 112-1           "Troffer" Transcript 113-1           Gerusky       IE             10/1/80    23 114-1           Energy and the Environment Subcommittee 202, 203, 204, 205 Hearings 115-1           Miller        IE             9/5/80     31, 41, 42, 43 116-1           Ross          IE             9/24/80    34 117-1           Dieckamp Mailgram

32 1
conversa: ion with Gary.        Iha: w::.d have been some :ime 2        a f:er 6 :00 o ' clock. - I :hink in previous :es:6cny the times 3~
are. a li::le bit more aecura:e.
1 4
Q      You arranged the conference call?                                            l 3              A      No, Gary Miller did.
6              Q      You tes:ified tha: yet had no basis :o disbelieve                            l 7        wha: you were seeing in the control rood?
8             A      Right.
f Q      Did there come a time when you began to disbelieve?
e 10              A      No. The whole time ! questioned it and I don':
11        think tha: :here was any one :Lme when I disbelieved it.                                  l 12 '      EY MR. FRAMPTON:
12                     Mr. Kunder, I believe you said at some poin:
Q 14        shortly after you came in you asked :he opera:or how long 15        high pressure injec: ion had been on and they said, "No:
16        very long"?                                                                               i 17              A      Right.
j                          ..
18
                                          ;          Q     Vna: did you understand that to mean?                    That the 19        actua:Lon had been recent and no: a: the beginning of the 20        tra nsien: ?
l 21 l
A      No. I perceive that as meaning when :he reac:cr i
22       cooling system pressure decreased to the actuation poin:
23    [ the high pressure injection came en and that the reactor 24       cooling 'sys:em level -- they had pressurized level 25      ! recovery and they secured i: within a brief period of tice.
                                                               .... m ...  ..  .a .. . .. . e : . . . . . .. .. m..
1-1

                   .      , .                                       -                             -     ~
f    t,3 33
            -1      I: would no: .be consis:en: with a high level.
          '2                      In o:her w:rds , if. you were :o leave :he high
$            3      press ure . injection, in eff e :, fer :he' full flow, tha: 1:                           1 1
                                                                                                             )
[.
4      develeps for.a long enough :ime, I would expec: to see the                             j
,            5      pressurized level' increase and in f a::, the reae:or cooling 6      syste       wenid.go selid.
7           .' Q     Se they were :elling you :ha: -the EP' had only 4
8      been on'for a shor: period of :ime a:' the beginning of the 9      ::a nsien: before.1: was thro:: led er turned off, is that 10        righ:?                                                                                ;
11                A     Tha t is =y perception.
12                Q     Was high pressure injee:icn secured when you came 13        in a: abou: 5 :15 ?
I did no: look.. Again, 'i: is more a =atter of
;         14                A.
J 15       nonfamiliarity with :he con:rols.                        2 Uni: 1 I am used to
         .16       geing in and I can look at everything and I know exactly                               i 17      what the status is and I can ge: :ha: quickar than by is      'asking people.          Urii.: 2 was not care'.y as obvious to me.                     ,
r 19               Q     Jus: to jump to two c:her pcints on the sa me issue, 20       when you then had a conference ca"1 beginning a: about 21    l - 6 :00 or 6 :15 a.m. , was there any discussion during the i
22       conference call, tha t you reme=ber, about whether high I
l-23    . pressure. injection was on?
i 2d             -A       I really don't remember any= ore.                   I don't think 25       I would have. hough: it was on based =n that question I 1-2

                                                                     -        -. .                       - - ~
34 l
1       asked':he opera: ors.
l 2              -Q     Was there any decision a: tha: time that you 2        be::er : urn 1: on, =anually?
4               A.  . No .
I
    '5-l          Q     I think you testified before that at some poin:
6       after you began to get radiation alar =s you and Mike Ros s 7       made a decision :ha: you should a::e=p: to -- tha: you E       should star high pressure injec: ion?
9              A     I remember becoming resi concerood over another 1c        issue bu: I think that occurred before we go: the radia: ion 11       a la r=c .
12             'Q     Waa: was that other issue? Was that ho                              leg 13       tempera:cre?
14               A  ' No . I was = isled in:o believing that we may have 13       a deboration event occurring.                   Tne indications of the                            - '
16       boron concentration ;M the indication of the intermediate 17       ra nge , how to core detectors , were beginning :o co= hine 18       to sugges: that we had a moderated delusion accident 19      occurring.
2:                    We had jus: initia:ed beration into the makeup 21       ta nk, the emergency boration syste=.                      Bill Zewn initiated 22       that when I received the phone ca*.1 from Dick Dubiel saying 23       tha: the concentration of baron in the system is 400 pp, 24       and so as a precau: ion he initiated that righ                             a wa y.
23                    I was ex:remely concerned that that was not going
        .                    ... . m .   ............u. .. . ... ... .. . . .      . .. . ..
1-3

                                                                                                                          '35' fu t i
                '1        1:o be;eno' ugh.- At. ha: p                    da-   '
                                                                                    -' e I wa s worried that
:1-           ina::Lon. was liading := a gre::e: proble= :han if we were 3-          :o.:ake Lab safe actionz of ini:La:ing high pressure injec:Lon.
S            d'         A:.laas: we could be ge::ing.-wa:er fro =~ :he boren water                                                 ,
r-       g                                                             .
5          storage tank, which. I wa s hoping i: war borated :he way i:.
d-          is' s u.; posed to be' and ge: :ha: in:                      the reae:or cooling 7          sys:e= te : urn this , in~ effect , around ,
v                       ~
E:                           I think it wa s . largely on that- basis _ a nd whatever '                              y 9      ' else I may' have been responsive to at that poin:, tha: I 10          yelled ::oi ge:' :he high pressure injec: ion back on.
EY M?.. DII1E*.T:
              '11                                                                                                                      i 12       <
Q-      Did you , order a state police helicopter?
13-                     A       Ye s . -
14                      Q     . When did you dc that'I 15                    'A       Tna: was af ter we had .:ade cen=ac: wl:h v"r:ually                                     <
16          all :he agencias required :o be con:ac:ed per the emergency 17        . plan. - It would have been roughly S:00 o' clock or some:hi.ng 18    , like : hat, quar:er of 8:00.                           It wasn't too long af:er the 19          general a=ergency was declared.
20                      Q.      Were you direc:ed :c ceder the helicopter?
21                    'A        Tne ' direction to order the helicopter was made by i
22 $ so:ceone, either Gary or probably Dick Dubiel in' the control                                                       l c                                                                                                                 3 23     , , ro ce..
l                                    . .
24                              A few minutes la:er we go: a call back fro = :he                                         ,
l                                 ,      .                                                                        >
25     ; . s:ste pclice .asking wha: services we wanted from : hem.                                        I i
                                                                                                                                       ?
                                                     ..o .n . . .... . .w a.  . , . .. a . . =   ..     .....
                                                                                                                                        'I 1-4

\
L2 i
1 l :he pressurizar be full er to have overfilled the s'ys:e=
2l            a nd ye: ' o have :he presscre con:inue :o be low?
3                   ,A    Yes,   I can't re= ember how I perceived i:
4 l precisely in tay own mind at the :ime.
I
         $,!                 Q    Did you perceive how that could happen?     Is there 6 ; any explanation of why the pressure --
7                   A    At : hat time I cocidn't pu: i: all together.      1:
2            is perfectly obvious now bu: a: that . time, as I recall my 9            percep:Lons at that :L=e, .somsher se had overfilled the 10            system and we lost the staa: bubble, the bubble tha: was 11            giving us the pressure.
12                         It just did not occur to me and I did not go 12      l through the :hought process that wocid have allowed me to 14            conclude at that point in      Lo* that we had voiding in :he                                  !
15             c:her por:Lon of the systa= and : hat the core itself or 16           :he fluid in the region of the core ac:ually took over 17            pressure control of the reactor cooling system.
It      :            Q    As you d5derstood it from the period o' 5:00 a.m.
19            :o le:'s say 7 :00 a.m. or 7:30 when tir. Miller arrived and 20            the emergencies were declared, whe: wa: the strategy for 2;            :rying to bring the plan: to a = ore c:able or more under-22       ,
s ta ndable sta:us ? iTnat was i: pri=arily tha: you under-22            s: cod tha: the opere: ors and 11. Logan and yourself were 24            :rying to do with the plan: during that time?
25                   A     it is a variety of things. Relative to the
                                        .w...-...     ......... ......... .
1-5

;                                                                                   .                               ~s 4
             .1      resetor cool'ing sys e= per se, :he operators were letting
:      down some water.            I understa nd free s ubseouen: testimony,
{                    I guess , iha: they did have sere high pressure injection 4     ' water going into the reae::: coeling system.                                       We were trying     !
5     -te 1e: down in order to bring :he pressurizer level back                                               ,
t i             6'      into ra nge, f
4 7             Q    So you were basically :rying tc reduce inventory e      in the sys:e= in order :o ge: :he pressurizer bubble backt
;             9 A. In effec: that was wha: was happening.
i le                   There were a lot of c:her ac:ivities that were
          . 11       ongoing at the : ice.               The fae: :ha: the containment- press ure                           ,
j          ;1:       wa s up around 2 ?SI wa s a t one point thought to have been a st'm a:
i 13       leak      frc= the 1 s:eam genera:or and that was believed to                                        -
14       be 'so because of' the dis pari:y in the pressure which is 13       classically some:hing that would indicate a potential steam                                            f
.           16       leak out of the lower pres sure stes= generator.
f 17                   The stea= generator, I believe, at one point was 4
1e   : secured, isolated,''on bo:h :he feed water and the steam i
1,       side in order :o bo:tle up tha: generator and ultimately
: a.               ,
i:          23       stop the suspected s:eam leak in::                              the building.
a                ,                                                                                                           ,
21                   Later on when the reactor building pressure did 22       not decrease as expected, the operators felt that that 23   ! wasn't 'the problem and they reestablisht                                     . tor =al feed water       i i
[           24   ! and steam removal from the stea= generator.
l                !
25    l          Q:   Did n ' t emergency boration using the .high pressure r
somete stimoaaaresise stevett. sete che ene66 seat, wveesteeme. pa seem
!                                                                                                                           6
                                                                                                                            ^
i                                                                                                            1-6 I                                                                                                                           i h

               .             - - . . .       =   .-    . ~ .
1 l
LL   i
   ~1'         'injection syste: goi coun:er :o the strategy of :rying to E
se: :he.bubb'e back?             Tha: was pu::ing = ore wa ter inte :he 3          ! s ystem, was 'it ' not ?
4                   A'     Yes.       At the time I was no: aware tha: : hey had
        .o 5           a high pressure injee:Lon con:inuing in the reac:o:
6           cooling sys:em.
7                         At that time, I am pre:ty cerrain I perceived                                l l
E           tha: they were jus: 1e::ing down.
9                  Q        Bu: you raid you and Mike Ross wanted :o get some                         l 1C            high prassure injection --
l 11                   A       That was later.
12                           Again, you have to realize that we were traveling 12:          along a: like 90 miles an hour and things were whi::ing 14           by and you are making decisions.                      I don't :hink'I could               1 15            ever recons:ruct the feedback tha: I wa s ge::ing and using 16            :o make decisions upon a: this point intime.
17                           By the time that we made : hat decision :o initiate i
12           high pressere injection a lot of things had trans pired by 19           the time I go: in the con:rel roo=.                        There were phone calls ,
2:           a lo: of develop =ents , =inor :hings that didn 't =ake sense 2'           :: : hat .ccused me to believe :ha: . something other than what 22      ', was really occurring wa s transpirieg.
23                         . By the time we made that decision to initiate high 24           pressure injee: ion it was apparen: tha ' we were dealing with 25           some:hing an awful lo: bigger or =:re consequential than I e
                                       .........~......n     .... ... .... .... . ....       ... .
g

                                                                                                                                                       \
r-45
                                                                                                                                                   -l
,       il ~ had recogni:ed when ~ firs: arsived a: the pla nt .
I: had                      i e
:         . deve'.oped.a *.o: .further by tha: . :ime.
 ,      2i                 Q   'You still believe.:ha: :he cooling system was 4
                  . solid , :he primary syste= was solid, when you wege ready e
l-      '. . f or a=ergency, boration, I :ake it ?
       .6 [                A'   I guess tha: would be true to say that.
F       7;                 Q_   Bu: . you' made a . choice tha: the' =os t importa n:
i j       E'         thing was to preven: renew cri:icali:y at                                                    hat point?
i
 !     -9'                'A    Tha: 'I :hink was :he overriding idea that I ha d.
2
!'     ic                  Q    Le: me a sk you a cues:Lon.abou: the conference                                                                     ,
1 11          call. with Ga ry Miller. and 16. Eeriein and yourself.
t
      .1:
* During : hat call there was some conversation 1-          about whe:her the EMOV was closed or the block valve was 14          closed. Do you recall the subs:ance of tha: co nversation is          ab ou: that subject ?
16      .
A    The thing tha: I recall and is pretty much what 17          1 sa id in the pa st , in past interviews , and that is , I think 1E          I was asked whethe or no: the electromatic release valve i
19          was opened.         I think tha: was : rue because I seem to recall                                                               I
:2            having gone ou: to the con:rol rect for a moment and asking
!     21           someone ou:. there 'if :he valve was opened or if i: was i
22          closed, i-23                        The response..that I think I recall getting -- :he
[     24       ,   response cha: I would'have go::en is tha                                                 L: was closed.
I just . remember going out and asking that cues:Lon.
                                                                    ~
                                                                                              ~
25 t
emessee n ste sece na psest
* 6ta v set. se       .e mig 6 seas wreasessesse pa seese I               1 1-8 l                                                                                                                                                    c l-
* L-i

                                                                                                           \
l l
3
                .a                                                                                         l 1              Whereupon, 2 ;                                         GEORGr a.
                                                                   .w..      :3 3               was called for interview and, having first been duly sworn, was l
4 l examined and testified as follows:                                                         \
!2           53t                                           EXAMIETIC::
e e.3               .,                                                                                       ,
@            6"                            BY MR. HA7.? STER :                                             I
* i e
y                 '.s 6            7    g                  O     George, a review of your testimony befcre d.e Special           ,
                   .                                                                                       \
n 8 ' Inquiry Group has indicated that shcr:1y af ter yc.ur arrival in                         l Y                 P
".            9I the control room on the morning cf F. arch 28, 1979, it was your                          i z-                  .
i l
10
{::                          perception that fol'.cWing the reac:c: and turbine trip high                  l i
 =                                                                                                         1 4
II 3 pressure injection had been secured, and let down had been                          i i::                 ,
g          12 . increased in an attempt to restere -he pressurizer le rel te T                  .
  =         13               normal.
y 14                             Uas the s tatus of these s;ste .s discussed in the 5_
   =
E        15                telephene conference call with Messrs. F.:.11 er , Regers a .d *-ierbein j        16               at approximately 6:00 a.m.
7.
N u
17 A     I don't recall specifica1'y what parameters
_                     discussed
(
IB              with them, other than : am pretty sure : discussed the f act 9.a i
814 g
I9               the pressuri::er level indicaticn was '.igh ,        that s a..ds cut in 20              my mind , and that the pressure was 1:w.           Beyond that, : can.c:
21               recc11ect for sure any scre.
22                            Did you ac any time en Mar:h :5, 1979, discuss the C
23               status of these syster as they existed pric: to apprc::imately 24              3:30  a....,  d.a : is the high pressure :. .lection securef , and the 25
_e: dew. increased?
ALDERSON REPORTING COMP ANY. INC.                2-1

   !                                                                                   4
               .y I
A. Uculd you repeat that again?
2 0   Did you at any time en the day of the accident discuss 3
* the status of the high pressure inje.ction system, and the let i                                                                          1 4
 ,                  , down system as they existed prior to 8:30  a'.m. , that morning with   l n      5 *:
,     g               Messrs Miller, Rogers, Zewe, Herbein, Mehler, Chwastyk?
n 6
     -{                     A    It is possible, but I cannot renamber.
A E     7 4     ;          -
0    To the best of your knowledge, was this information e
      =
a           g M               pass en to the NRC en March 28, 1979?
      *J         t c     9-g          !          A    Do you mean specifically that the high pressure           !
F i
10 : injecticn was secure, and that         the let down was increased?
 ?
E E
11 j           C    Yes.
3         12
. E.                    A   .I don't recall, nor de': recall in the communication j   13 i I had with 'the NRC from reviewing the taped conversations with lj    z
      =   14 >
5             , Region I, tha t that was in there either. That co==unicaticn is
      =          >
F   1 ~*
2               certain ene where the reccrd could be reviewed to see if I said
      =
16 y               anything relative to those two para eters.
a   ,#
d           :!        O    In your cpinion, should this information have been
      =
w          I v   18 9 3 pass ed to the NRC on that mcrning , that is , the high pressure
      ~
I n
19 ' inf ection was secured , and the 1e: dcwn flow increased?
20 '
A    De you =ean, what was =y cpinion at that time?
i
'         21 f         Q   . What is your opinion today.
.                l.
22
.                           A    obviously, all that infcrmation should have been given i                 5 23 ltc the NRC 2
I EY MR. MCSELIY :
l E
25 l                           C    Uhat would you have said then?
1 ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
2-2
(

e-                                                                                                            .e 1
I                                                                                                                                                                   i
                     ,                                                                                                                                                                   l 1
1-                                                         .P. _R. :" " =?      = = = :.:. .1                                     _S.                                 !
I                           .                                  .
21 i
MR.' GAM 31.I:            Could we 50 :. The reccrd.
I This interview is being conducted as a per:icn of the
              '3 If                                                                                                                                     ,
4 l NRC's investigation into the exchange f infer:hation between the 5.i Metropolitan Idison 00mpany and the ::RC en March 25:h, 1979.                                                                                                      !
s             s
    .Q               3
    .j          6*,                              Mr. Roger, we have counsel f:r 35W presen; here.                                                                  E:
     ,,.           .,'t R          7 ! you have a.y objections to their being present during the in;erview
     -                I*
    ; f8 f
3         8 "i..'' r*"'.
l l
n: ,
9 .-   -
MR. ROGERS:               No.                                                                                                      '
3                 2 4
      .       10              *~hereepen,
                               .                                                                                                                                                    j z                4 I
:                 8 y       }}       ,
s :. -y.
                                                                                        .. g.   .>x. ..,.,,.:
4
* b f.12,havin5 been firs duly swcrn by Mr. iar.b'e, was exar.ined and 2
: 0.      13 2 :estified' as fellows:
       =                   i i
                        ~'
E
       ,       14                                                            r_ XP. . .". . . . .. .".
       =
                                                   = v. .v. n . c. n.2 - .
:       15 4                C J      16 '      a 1,ee, en the scrning of 3/23/ 9 were you aware tha:
r.
                          's d
x 17 ,l high pressure injection flow had been thrc : led and the 1e -down
        =                 i E      18 : flew had been increased to a high va'ue , higher than normal value?                  _
g 19 '                      .
: e.         .. c,    ..s. d_4 .''e . .* y .    . "_ " . . ' . .' _'. _* - w . h a . .
20 .
* x          i.'ere y u aware tha: Opera:crs were taking actions to Irv                                                            .
i 21 ! a..d res :re pressurizer level?                                                                                                                              !
22 '                     A          That is a '.i :le strange questian really.                                                             Pressurizer 23              '. eve" was cr.e cf the things that we had ar.d we were trying ::
1s               ...
_                                                                                                                                  i 25                      0            :: was pegged high, and were you aware cf the acti:ns ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.                                                              3-1 r

u r.
,                l ,_thar othey: were taking to try' :0 ge it back down tc the indicating i'
2           range?
i 3                                                       Oh, yes, yes.
l Al                      .
4'                                                      What were they trying te dc?
,                                                                   Q
             '       I 5
A    Well, ta was being dene that I observed at least was
{ -
6 1 p hat we were trying to get the heaters 'cperable and with the                                                        ;
i f,     I       1
: 7. ! nertal plan systems type opera:icns     e ge: that level back down 1      n          .;                                                                                                                      1 0
[         8 l in the Operating range. -
4 L     *E
}
8
: 9)  a                                              Q'   Aside:frem,the heaters, what plant systems?
E            .j -
l-E E
10                                                   A    Well,/   couldn't really tell you what they were doing
.     =              3
{u Il jbecause : wasn't cbserving the: in that way. I was jus :bserving 4
       /= 12 he indiciation as : saw it frem further back in the cen:rcl rec =.
        ,            i:
5       13 j                      knew tha: they were having apparen                             trouble with the heaters
:      u.            r'                                 __
E        34      '
and se was following in that particular vein because it was easier 4      a k-s
        ~
j       15                c fc11cw in conversations, but as far as other actions, no, I i
u             ,,
g      16            wasn't .directly fel10 wing those.
:
* 3 II '                                                      Besides the information concerning pressuricer level N                                                            Q ee
{e     18            being pegged were any other actiens, the heaters, discussed en the                                           -
e a
I9 hconfernce call a                                               approxi-ately 6 a.m. that morning?
20 -                                                A     I don't recall. A this time I don't recall much of 8
5 1              21 ' hat cenversarlop a                                               all.
i                    I i
22 d                                                 Q    Did you at any time that day discuss the status of d,
23 ;high pressure injection and let-down as it existed pricr                                                 c 8 a.m.
i
                        ,                                                                           ..,s,~
l              24 -l with Messrs. Miller, Kunder, 2 ewe , *-- i..e or Chwastyk?
1
: i.             25                                                   A    Nc: that I recall, no.                                           ,
e ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
3-2
                                                                                                                                          +

c i
l Cur review cf your testimeny :0 II investigators IJ                        Q 2lSindicatesthat i,
d'uring the E c' clock think ank meeting in order i
3   H:o restart. a reactor 05clant pump that system pressure was raised i
4 lby increasing HPI flow.                        Ecwever, in                                                               estimony before the Special y        3' Inquiry Group in response to a questi:n about HP: discussi:ns a            n
   .           g
   $        6 during the                      a.=. Think ank meeting you state that you didn'                                                                recall
                ]
c E        7        the discussion of HF: cccurring.
e
   =        8,4                                                                                                                            .             .
                                            .n your statemen: c:. c./ 4/                         ...,., :ne statemen: :na; you M
9" 9   aprepared you state tha                      "The grcup i ;ression was tha                                                               HP: must u  z            :
h      10 he keeping the core eccl."                         Wocid you clarify ycur kn:w' edge of the
    =           .
   =
E Il :i status of the high pressure injecti:r syste= before the ! a.m.
t            '
I i      12 >' mee: ng?
z
    =
13                                : have no recollecticn of eter inquiring en my own part
[
i-                  'A z
5-14j lef wha:the                     ficw was    r wha  they were doing :: it.                                                               I just dcn't j
4 15 l!ever recall that I was in a conversati:n about that. I know                                                                                     we 16 lp g                  h ad the eenversation as you stateu there in your reading ic                                                                             e:
e            !                                                                              ,
f= II f :he pressure up. We increased the HFI, but that makes an assump-
      $     18 'j :icn that ycu have sene at that point :: me.                                                                                  Sc I guess I wculdn':
b I9            try to specult:e en anything else because I dcn't remember any 0
      "            a e
20 $ discussions cf wha: the flow may have been.
21 Q     After the primary system pressure was incre.ased :=
a
                     ?
22 h approximstely 2,000 pcunds in the ' C c' cicek to 11: 30 ti=e frame ,              .
d 23 h,would you clarify your knowledge abce: the high pressure injec:ict 24       Esys em frc= that poin: cn?
4, 25       J                  A     Well, I think I have already stated at c her times tha t,
d ALDERSON REPORTING COMP ANY,INC.
3-3

I. .
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:1   l- lconcerned you?
2l             A    .Nothing right that cinute.          later on we started
      ,3-         receiving radiation alares a nd at that time we became very 1
        'd        concerned.
3             -Q     When you said you asked Bill Zewe if he was.
6       . injecting and.he assured you that he was, did you ask him 7       that -because you would have to be using high pressure 8        injection to get the maximum amount of borated water into 9' the system or was,that a question that related to core 10         eooling7                                                         ,
11-              A    .It wa s both . It was a question relating to both,
       '12               Q     Was there any discussion between you and anyone 13         else the first hour or so af ter you had. come into the Unit 2            !
: 14.        control room as te whether high pressure injection had in 15        fact been on for a very long period after 4:00 a'm.?          .
16              A     I did not ask tha't question.           I didn't heve time    j 17        to go back and look at what happened between 4:00 and 6:00 18        or whatever time it was that I got there.
19              Q     Was there subsequently any conver.3ation about that 20        whether you asked the question or not?             What I am getting at 21       ' is whether, at some point in the time period before 11:00 22        o' clock in the morning, it was generally discussed that a 23        combination of the EMOV being opened and high pressure
        ~24        injection being off could have resulted in a substantial loss             !
25 -       of inventory?
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.                                                                                         12 1            A     I think we discussed the fact that high pressure 2      injection had .been off for some time or throttled back.
3 I don't think we ever ~ rela ted it to fullf uncovering the l    d    core tha t early.
5 We were concerneo that the possibility existed.
6     In our own minds we had a concern that we had to do something.
7    We knew we had some problem.
We had radiation monitor alarms.
B'l We knew 'we had fail fuel of some sort, and the seriousness 9     of it was not known, of course.'
;  10             Q,    In your own mind, did you entertain the possibility 11  i that the core had been partially uncovered for a period of 12     time?
13            A     No, I guess I really didn't.                     I was kind of 14    concerned about it particularly as the day went on but I 15    don't think I ever said, " hey, that thing could have been 16    uncovered ," definitely.
17            Q     What were the things that kept you from considering 18    tha t as a realistic pos sibility?                  Was it anything other than 19    the pressurizer level continuing to be high, if you can 20    recall?
1 21             A     Being honest, we just never had full time to 22     sit back and analyze the whole situation very closely and 23     very methodically.            I think that is the only thing that l
24     prevented us from making that look-see effort.
l 25            Q      I want to ask you a question about. that but maybe 5-2 ,

4 3-2.'JWBl I              his presence during the interview?                      .
                          ~2                                    THE WITNESS:     I do net.
5
                          ' 3.!e                                MR. GAMBLE:   Thank you.
,                                      t
'                          4                                                       EXAMINATION l-O-              5                                   BY MR. MOSELEY:
            .ill .--
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4            -Mr. Ross, during your questions I will make 7             reference to prior. interviews and statements that you have 2
l             8~
made.             I have those available'for reference, and if at any 0
          'd
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9              time you would. like to view the statement, just say so and I E
{= 10                      vill be happy to show it to your but I had not planned to i
i show you each of them.as we go along.                 But if at any ti.me you
: l. II "I         12              want to see' them, just say so and I will be happy to let you                                      1 4
l 13 l                     see them.
bM                                   A.         Okay.
[          5 0          In testimony to the Special Inquiry Group in                                 i September, in response to a question relating to the time f         I0 l h
II              period prior . to 11:00 a.m. , you respended -- and this is a E
18                                "I think we discussed the f act that high pressure 3                       quote:
F                ,
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injection had been off for some time, or throttled back.                     I 20 l            don't think we ever related it to fully uncovering the ccre I             that early."
22[1                                  Now in the first sentence of this quote, who do i
23 :            you specifically mean when .you use the pronoun "we"?
l 2&'l                       A.        As. I recall, "we" would be the people in the back
                                     'l 25 i            of the room in the think tank.                That would be our group.      Tha:
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ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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i 11 1                  would be Miller, Rocers, people like that participated in that
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that morning.,
3l:        I 0       . It would be specifically the think tank pecple?
I                                                                               ,
4;                        A         It would be the think tank people.                   ~1 1
4 1
e         5~i                       0        Now 'let me ask you some specific names, because 9-                 l j  _
6 3           they may or may not have been part of the think tank at that c                  R l          $.                              period in time.
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j-         8!                                .Did it include Kunder?
O 9l!        l A        I can't definitely say he was there, but he was
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in there, in the room and part of that most of the time.        I
          =                   s a
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can' t say he was there for that particular conversation.
1 3-       12 i                         O         Okay, but let's relate it back to the sentence that
         ,                  i.
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said,   "I think we discussed the fact that high pressure-7 14 d
i:
r injection had been of f for some time, or throttled back."
4 j-       15 New le: me ask you:    0: you think Kunder partici-
         =
4 3{       16 :l    .              pated in that discussion?
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       ,f        I7 i A        My recollection is "yes ," but that's just what it
     .   =                '
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is,  "=y recollecticn."
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I9 0        Okay. Tine. Do you recall zewe participating in 20 ,                     this?
1 d
21 A         Yes.
1 22 0         Chwas tyk?
23
,                                                       (Pause.)
24 t         You gave me the timetable, and --
25                           g         :: et me interrupt you -J.ere. I was making reference ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
6-2 4

: J. B. L Log an                                                                5 l
l'                              .there'where -- HPOI was not the first thing that was of 2                                   concern, then; rat,her the fact that we were having radiation-                                    [
3                                   ala rms. And to me that was more -- would have been more 4-                                  im po r tan t , I believe, rather than discussing whether they had 5                                  secured or started the high pressure inj ec tion.            That's what                         ;
i 6                              . I am saying . now.
7                                             of course, trying to remenber what actually went on, 8                                 I have no recollection.
9                              ~SY'MR. CRAIG:
10                                              Q. On page 21 of the same in te rv iew , May 9,       1979, in 11                                        r.esponse to a question about high pressure inj ection you-12                                        state, and I quo te ,   "I don' t recall being in f o rmed .       I don't                      ,
13                                       think -- let me rephrase that.             At the time I got there, they 14                                       were no t injecting. I recall vag uely that Zewe told me that 15                                      we had had an inj ection and that they had secured            it."
16                                                 During the course of any of the think canx meetings ,
17                                      was the fact that high pressure inj ection had been secured in la                                ; the morning discussed?
i 19                                !
I A.  .would you define think t a r. 47
               '20                                  i.        Q. This group of supervisors tnat Gary Miller was l:
21                                ' calling in to the shi ft superviso r's e f fice per iod ically .
I 22                               ,
A. Okay. Are you asking did they discuss the fact tna t i
23                               ' i t h ad previously been secured?
I 24                                       Q. Yes.
25                                     A. I don' t know. I remember Gary ordering hig n 7"I anvene seenres-re

e 0
1      mind.              He was discussing :..e re' e. a se , the ve n tila tion 2 s s.em.e,             a       .5=..ae     .                                                  . #.       .e..'....i-=.~     .
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3 his awareness cf the plant.                                                                                                   ~ hat occ : ed -hroughout the 4 day and : can't begin to place times and sub ect matter any 5 more.
6                    C             Yoving on to another subject, ve were told 7 yesterd:y in an interview by :!:. Zeve tha- "e had briefed                                                                                                               .
8 you when you a::ived on March 2Sth in the ::::ing tha: the 9 HP: had been throttled and the 1e:-down had been increased to in an effort te coctrol t.e level in the ;;essurizer.                                                                                                                                                           In :
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15 to recover ;:essurize: level.
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ALCERSON 8PCRTNG OMP ANY, INC.
400 VIRGINIA AVE. S.W. A ASMNGTON. 0.0. 200:4 ~20*:5 % :3dt                                                                    o w.)        i i
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7 1
strong in my-mind'is that se:ewhere in'-he early nerning,
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3    hour and a na15 it was th c- *ei heyond the point-where !
4 vanced it to be and                              very s:::n;17 :cid Zeve'and Ross 1
5    personally that it wouldn't be secured without'ne 1
                                                                                                                             -I 6    personally.                   That is the One s ren; conversatice that I can                                        J l
7 . re m e mb er.-
8-            0              Yes.
0-             A              The let-devn, : =an't recall today                             :         .fically T
10     I can the H.I securing, say, a                                2: 15 or 2:20 in ..._ morning.
11 -           0               Okay.       h*as the status of E.: in th e 19:-devn 12 system discussed in the tele;hene conference call that ycu 13 Eogers, Kunder and "erbein ;articipated in a t abou- 5 14    o' clock?
t 15             A              : can't recall.any hette: today than wha: I have 16 said ; eviously :c questiens tha: vere' asked like was the 17 block valve shut.                         Those kinds of thin;s I have said bef ore.
B 18 an d I ca n ' t remember.                                                                                                &
19             0               I don't believe this is mentioned in that.                                   That            ;
I 20 is why we vere interested in whethe: c: not this vas.
21             A               I can't re:all.              The status of the ;;an                    ves the 22 discussion, and-I can't :scall all the questi:ns that ca:e 23     up. The rasult of the conversation was that, y:u know,                                                . y 24 day was changed from another activity := ce to the plant, 25 the reasonia; being tha: the status =f the plan: vasn':
L ALDE,aSON REPORTING C:MP ANY, INC.
400 VIRGINIA AVE. S.W., W ASHfNGTCN. o.0. 200:4 i:02) !!d-2345       8-2

140 I                                     TEI W TNESS: ':s tha                            questien relative to the peri:d 2                    of time of. quarter to seven in the n:rning?
* hat is an encom-3 passing question'when you ask it about the day.
i
                                          !                            MR. MOSILIY:                       Would-you like ti respond to it in e                         5                   .:er=s ef c,ua:M:er to seven? We will start with that.                                                            ,
r n
E 6
TMI"WITNISS:                       I don't remember being         cid abou: thro: lini:
b                         7                    of the EP: in the period of time at quarter :: seven in the
    . n_
        =                        8 M                                   j m rning.
i 9                                     MR. MOSILEY:                       I a= asking in terms cf water flow inte
    . ~.                                     !
: e. . . .                              ,                                   .
1 n                        10           -
                                                         .ne system wnetner :.: :.s
                                                                                                                 .ne pum:s :.n :.ne E?C. mode or in the make-
.z                                                               -
     .. m II
                                             ! up' node?
* l
:!                       12 [                                     ..
Ans       k..TN A        sSS:          .
A don t remer.ber beinF ::. d o, a redu:t .on
: z
. . =. .                                   .l
:       d                       13                    :.n .,. 2c w .                                       vou are ask..r.; me?
7.s
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:      =                        14
,       s                                                               Ms . MOS:4. v.:                    Yes.                               .        .
ic                                              I
. =-
t 15                                      TEI WI~NISS:                        I don't reme ber being told about that.
; .h                                           'l
: =                                             ,
        /                       16f                                     MR. MOSILEY:                       Mr. Miller, I am geing to read to ye; e
.[
37
:     frc         Sewe's'cestimony to us en Serpember 1938.
jg        9-MR. MAU?~N:                      trTna     page?
   . i_
i I9 r                                   -R.                                   S. age L.
2       f_                                  8,                                     M..*. (. ?_*
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20
                                                                        " Question.                    Bill, our review of your testimony indicates a
2l                      on the morning of 3-28-79 you instru::ed the shift foreman :o h                                                i i
22               i reduce and maintain pressurizer level, and these actions were i
4 t
23 t.na: n. .F:. h pressure in]ect :n would :e reduced and ..e -down :_. w 5                               24 l                     wou~d be increased to recover pressurizer                                    level.      Oid ycu 1:  E. .:.
I I
25 l
time that day discuss the status of the high pressure inje::i:n I                                   "
:                                                                                                                                                        ~
4
                                       -           '                                        ALDERSON REPORTING COMP ANY. INC.

[. s.59 i                                                                                                    141 1'
and ziet-down systats with Mr. M11* er?  _
2 1                                     " Answer.      Yet u
n' I
l                                      " Question.       Would you tell us wha: the substance of 4
4 those conversations were?
5]                      " Answer,       Well, throughou: the day we,had discussed.the
               '' f.statusofthe'high'pressureinjectionsystemandstatusofthe l
l         f                                                                                                       j I
I le:-down system through          the   hole day at'various intervals.
X                l
;         I    8 A                I           "Questien.        Did you discuss the status of these two sys;<
U i
9
            .             ! as they existed prior to 8:30 a. . if that le:-down had been-1                I i         F   10 j
i                  increased and high pressure inf e: icn had s:cpped for a while and
          =               ;
E   11          l                                                                                     l 4        <
                          ' then thrc      led?
l NI
          =
                                       " Answer.       Yes, we did discuss that.
5   13 g             i.             "Questien.        Will ycu tell us the context of those 4
5   14 E              '
discussions?
N              i g   15                       . x, , , ,, , . g3,,x,, x11;,,   ,,,1y,,    ; y,, 3,1,f tn, 31, ,n a             >
I'                                                                                                '
E             ;    what had taken place to that pein; until he arrived.             As     recall v.
          $   17 {* ;I described the actions we took up :o that point which included                            ,
          =
w           k
          $   I8'l increasing the let-down at vari:us                    ines and else verifying hig'-   .
C           r g" 19 il pressure infecti:n flow and then further reducing it."
* i 20[i                     Mr. Miller, do you have any-recc*1ection of these cen-21 "i versations which Mr. Zewe is describing?
t 5
22 -
TEI WIT::ISS:       I don'   :oday have a ree:11ection cf i
23 :' those cenversations.
24
-                    +
MR . MO SI'_IY :    3iven Cave's clear recc1*ection which
: have fus: read :: you, isn't i; likely you knew on March 29                      ;
k l
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.             9-2 1

3 l
I i
: t.                                                                                                         - A$2 that water flow en the coolant syste                 had been thre : led move l
1 I
1l 2~         than the-ordina y amount?
3                       "MI WI"NISS:        In earlier testimony and earlier dis-
        '4 I cusssics where : had.been invclved we discussed in detail the i
n      5f< s        a us' of the HPI system four in the morning on, analyzed' it, I.        h                                                                                                                     I
{     6t looked at.it.                     We though    HP: was en a ic: mere gallens per min-                                 i k,     7 f ute than ycu guys calculate it was on.                          It is as simple as that.                             l H.        l l'8 ,_l'Ou 10:h at the flow-rate in y:ur 0500 report at seven in the i.
3 9          :Orning a.nd it comes like 60 gall:ngs.a minute.
I          i                         .
E 10                        M?. . MO SI*.2Y :  ' hat is the net.
z
:          i I!
11   .
i TEI WITNISS:        " hat is the ne: but that savs there wasn' u
l
{=,  12   ,      much EP:.       Bill does not reme=ber i: that way.                 I have been E
    =
13   : involved in cenversations.
On the May 25th tape you will find l
E x   14          that. I don't reser.ber that discussi:n and Bill's recollection z             -
2 s
15          heing vivid in September cf.1SEC is hard because we have gone
(*          I y   16-    l hrough an awful lo: cf discussion :n EPI for this whole process                                              i w
y   17     ; within the last year, year and a half.                                                                           i z          ,
s          .
N' 18 i,-
Y2. MOSI_IY:       : den': bC.ieve Mr. Zewe 's re :11ection is c          :                                                                                                                  l 19 . E11 th : new.
                                             ! believe his rec:11ee _On has been very simi'.ar X
20     .'
l
:: tha'      .ccm the very beginning.         ~~. .a    is my rece'le.                      :icn cf his I
l 21     !, testimony throughout.
i 22      ,
THE WITNISS:        I a= aware that when you initiate E?!
I I
23j a.d pressurizer level goes up, the procedure says :: thre::le I
24 pr it.         : have been aware of tha; ever since we have been in Uni:                                          ,
6 25l:: get en the discharge valve and get ready to thre :'e the:
i ALDERSON REPORTING COMP ANY. INC.

e C e,                                                                                                                                                1>.
L Q. [
1            to preven; damage to the pu=ps and that scr: :f thing.. I den' 2            haveLa recollection of 3i11's exact conversa:i:n that is ref erer.
3            here. .That would have been very soon af er the transien:                                                                           ;
4            started.
         ,=   5                                  MR. MCSELEY:                   What I a= ta2. king abou; is sc=ething in e              ,
         *     .l 3-  '6 - excess Of what would be nor:al. :n the qu: e that I have jus; e
         -              i I. 7         !. read Mr. Zewe is. clearly talking.about thre:: ling in excess of
        ~              l
        ]-    8        ,<what wculd be normally expected by your procedures and by                                                                 yetr
:J d     9            ;revious experience.
z.
        -             l E    10 i                                ~~iE W~TNISS:                  You knew, if you go back to what =y res-i 1
i< '11 ; ti=ony has bee'n earlier, you will see that at five in the n:rnin i
i 5       .
i
:! 12. j when I was on the phone with Kunder and he to'd =e the p ersuri:
: z.            ;
     .-:i 1.9 : was low,                            didn'; understand it.                              ! a= ne sure that Bill ~ ewe
                     =
        =.
       #r   14             En;       3-  T E. .xed aycut    .,
i..n: s :. s           at seven a.:. in the morning.
s be
        ~
                    !                           MR. MOSI;IY:
E    15     i.
wna: : a: :rying                     e ge: a: is the sare
    .x I
a.
16 -
i hing you were referring :: ea-lier.                                                 Given M . Zewe's clear                        ,
* l
* h1 17 : re0: le:: ion and your reccliecti:n or lack Of ree:11ection tha:
a           s N     18             that ycu were awa.re of tha;, sh:uldn'; we con:;ude tha                                                            Mr. ;ews r.
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                                                "'EE WITNESS:                  Ia           hating trouble with wha: you are i
22            trying .:o ge; ne to conclude a .d concluding ths; :!?! had been :u-1.
23             hack fer. hree hours?'
24                                  .v.y, .
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                                                         .-       ALDERSON REPopTINt: Et3MD A MV I M r*
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I from-four to'Seven in *he morning'a 'Tha: timf.
              .gf                                              .MR.LMOSELIY:                                Given your 'ack of 5'ec:11 e :'.icn ,                                                                           is.there l
a' reason that we should not concinde tha                                                                                        given F.r.                         ewe's clear                                            I a, :        5i                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 l
: n.              +                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             .
i=          6.I re 011ection, that y:u probably were aw=.re cf i:~                                                                                                                                                                                             l u,
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       ,,.                         ,'. I am to understand?
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             -23 i i     been asked that.before.
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                         'h ALDERSON REPORTING COMP ANY. INC.                                                                                          9.:5

                           ;                                                                                                                                                            145 a                      I 1 .' 6 ,',ys            .n         ..: . .g e. . . .. . .  .r wa er ang nav_:..e-                        _.                      -                                ,
g      .        . -                                                   .                                .. S_o e:3,yya x. _..- .,.y,._,                           ,
                  . . 4 2'
water, I have just got to believe that throughout the day th is
^                       .i 3
4 was a popular' discussion. Are you telling me that I shouldn' ?                                                      -
t                                                                                                                                               -
d 4 =i' : mean'you personally since you were the decisionmaker?
:                         f
       '$                 b THI WITNISS:                           No, I am not telling you that.                                                ! Em
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          -        7;. ::rical before seven in the morning.                                                                     There was a ~c                    .       ef talk a               i 5         8                            .
a               . about n.... after seven in :.ne scrning.                                                               The cuestions asked todav-
         .,              t i
,        -s
         ~         9 relate := me being told .what was dene at seven-in the scrning wi:'.-                                                                                              .
nr. .
4     .
        .:: . 10         .
_ a= saying
                                                                                 .        have no reccl_.e :ica o., That .,ae: meang given m-                                                           .
j
,               11 ;         :: me that H.:: had been this way f:r                                                             '. tis many hours.                           I don' 9
1M4 E                       ntr.k              .,. .
                                                =1__          we e remembers exactly .:ecause he was no;...;n the con:r:_.
-        =
L     =
1 m.         ,
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                                                                        . . _:me.
z 14 E                                              MF. . STILLO:                        The issue Of h:w =uch water was 50ing in tha
        =
15 t                    primary system is One that I 'wou: d think had censiderable discussic i       =.
        ,;      16                                                                                                                                                                                r
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21
                                                       !" I WI!NISS :                            Discussed it with the think tank.                                                                i dn.                                        ;                                -
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24 Ms. S._...;__s:                     .under.
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4 ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.                                                                  96

:                                                                                                                                                                            146          !
                                                                                                                                                                                                               ,1
         ~j' MR .        .  .e.:.. v :' .r.ogers.:
3
                      ..                         .. _ .           "a _ ~.."s_ s .e ...           v,e.
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                                                  .G . S*I1* 0 : 'Did you ever talk :: 2 ewe about it?
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,.                                                 .nz ..__h._SS:  w.                            a can't bel. eve 50.                                       I recal_ one _:nstance t          7',
:. ear. y . anc. :na: :.s unen n.e came :.
:.ne c '*:.ce around .e:_:
                                                                                                                                                                                      . . . and i-6'                                                                                                                                                                                                   l he sai:' They.were going to secure it.                                                                             ~
said no.
* hat is the 9 ! cne instance'~ can recall.                                                                     -
can reca_'1 ene instance .when we were
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O U [ were encore '1 cod, because people in the roon had dis =ussed ter-a
            ..g'
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ne       WE_,..<ed        out i
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                                                                                                                                                 ....        Ross .: . we.,.a...n,.               .
16                                                                                                                                                                                                      ,
be secure wi;heu                                        ne personally knowing it, =y directica being
                   .I j.
          '': that.: had to know that.
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h i                                                           ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.                                                                                 g.7

                                                                                                        - 7 _.
It
                   'l          .ridiction..'.cyci in tho esmplo' lines ross' vary sharply.
Dich 2         .ccm3.bnck'onzthe phons and callod'for myssif.cn line'11and-                            ,
1
:3           ' indicated this, tha:Lwe'had. big problems.- Just knowing.the fact 4         we were upset, I' knew it had to be coming from the core, and it t                                                           i L5           was within either seconds,or just a few minutes at the most, that s
6 '.weLreceived the alarms --
7'               Mr. Elush. Radiation alarms?-
       !            -g l         !:r. Kunder. .The radiation alarms on the back panel.             It            l
     .C              9-         progressed too rapidly to.really discern values on the meters.
:  E           1c ~ Ke got alert alarms.- They went into the full alarc status very
    .n ..
     .E ,          1);          quickly and a large majority of the alarms were coming in almcst
      . .. ?
jp          3;          . simultaneously. I know I turned to Joe' Logan and told P'm, we'va 2m pE          ;3           got big problems.
5 R
      ..s r
                   *~                 Mr-. Blush. Did ~vou say we have failed fuel?
55          15 Mr. Kunder. I said it in terms I don't want to repeat here, i,t . ;:
C 16 we're failing fuel.              ,
9                  Mr.' Arena. What did you attribute that fuel failure to?
e l o-Pr. Kunder. I don't know that I conceptualized the erecice
{           ),      J nature of the failed fuel in any other way than we are leaking g            radiation out of the core.          We are apparently damaging some clad-             )
ding =to some extent, plaats or thermally, something is happening that is releasing some of the activity.
Mr. Arena. When, can you recall, did you first start                          ,
worrying about the core being uncovered?
Mr. Kunder.  #I-guess it__wAs_within maybe the
                                                                  ~                      - na"-   i L..m i n u te..
25 10-1

I .-s v
I      hsif an_P.our._whan I, sleng wi-h evarybody 0100, racognic0d thc-
          'I       we had significant steam veid inside the reactor ecolant syster
                                      ~ .   . .  ...       .
2       and we had, observed the fact the reacter coolant pumps, the 4       pu=p that was attempted to be started again did not produce any 5      lficw and the amps o'n the meter went up to very low value and 6       the pump ran for quite a few mcments without producing any flow, 7       and it's apparent that it was just spinning in a steam environ-d 5        E    i ment which we vare concerned at that point that we migh be d
  -        9       uncovering the core.
5      1:                We had no indications to show what the water level is, of h,    i'         course. We had the high-pressure injection, I understood to Le E5
         .;        scing in based on the direction -hat we had given previously.
2 F
  ; ;   ;;         There was no indication to sus.:ec- that it was net being pumpod n
:  :        1 U 14         into the reactor coolant systan.
EE:    ;3              . I was conecrned, however, thct with the vapor lock, I jus:
5,  -
1     3          wasn't sure in r.y own mind tha- all the flow was going in throu .
2
         ,,-       the core. Mavbe somehow there was some phenomenen existine that e
33 was causing some cf that water to flash the steam, perhaps, or y                to bypass the core in some fashion.       So, I think we were concerr 19 g          for some indefi..ize time which may have been an hour or two thc-the core was, indeede covered.      I guess intuiti'.ely after some--
7
        .         where around 9 cr 10 o'cloch, just roughly, we felt that the ccr.
was covered, but we had no concre e proof of that.
l       3
        .y                 Mr. Arena. What, if you can remember, changed that perception?     Here you are saying that you were aware of the 10-2

:( it                                                                            6 l
l l
               'I           of .the high pressare injection' and the let 'down systems?                          )
h                                                                                          !
2; A: , No, not . to my knet:1 edge.                                            l 3j                  Q. A review' of Lyour testimeny, and this is office of L,                 't-                                                                                         .
A { Inspection report ,of July 1979, has -indicated' that on 'the morning -
i                       '
i g L5,j of March 28; 1979, sit'was your perception that the reacto-I o        -
:)
k, 6 J. coolant pur.ps'were pumping steam. Mas this discussed in the                                      l 7 :, telephone 'cenf erence call with Messrs .- Miller, Rogers , and 3
      .[-        8, . Herbein at approximately 6:00 a.m.
       ?
                        .                                                                                     J 9-                 A       To the best of my racc11ection, that would not have                  I 1               :
[ 10
      .2 heen discussed with Miller and Herbein, and Rogers, i- th e 5       II telephone conversation' because       I believe that : reached that                 l u
12            parception later en, af ter that phene call was terminated.
I
        =.
I3
[
0       What would you have discussed or what do you recall e
14            discussing with regard- to the reae::: coolant pumps tha: morning.
s E
15            and their inability to pump water?
z 16                  A       De you mean during the ph:ne conversation?
e z
I7                  0       Yes.
k.
       .9 18 3                          A       .t don't really recall.
         "m . 19                    Q       What discussions were subsequently held on March 25, H
20           197:, regarding the inability of the reacter coolant punps to 2I ' pump water with anyone that you were involved with?
22        -         A       De you mean days and weeks af ter the accident?
2*,
Q       Nc, just en March 28 in trying to analyze why the
                 '4
                 '          'rea::c      coolant pumps could net pump water?
25                  A       : would estimate that with:.: about an hour er two af:er t
ALDERSON REPORTING COMP ANY. INC.
.                                                                                              11-1

r                                                                                          7 Lp I h the phone conversation, .'it was evide .: to myself as well as R
2,3~ generally to the management. :ea=, ! wi'.1 call it, that the I
3r coolant pumps were unsuccessful in establishing any kin,d of.
I 4 !, coolant flow'. We reached the conclusion that we were steam-bound.
e 5 l I think ' that that is the terminoloc that I used. The behavior g_
n.
N              1                                                                                             ,
gg      6      1' of the coolant' pumps when we attempued to start them was consis tent
 ;              i-
 $.    ' 7 i with that perception.
 ..             t u              a A
8-                         .I cannot remerber any specific cenversation with any-4 9 ), ene, but I do remerier that general perception that I had.
z
 @     10 5                     0    Let me ask you if you ca'n expand on that just a little
.z
 =-              q
{B    11 '; f er us .            When you say that the rea:ter ccclant pumps were steam-9 e
.g     12 ; bound, are you saying that ycu envis:.cned them as the' hot loops E    13 3
being void down to the pump section                          -s elf ?
.=
                  ,I
:r.
5    14 S                          Can you explain what you rian by steam-bound?
  +
  =              :-
j    15 l.                    A    Yes. I had the cercettic.- that we had steam in the 1
g '16 >i system.                I don ' t think -- I don'': remerber quantifying, or being e               L t.
17 i able to c.uantifv how =uch steam and just where, but. that the c. e=.es
  =~
f
   ~
I8 ;l were sitting there rotating in a steam void.
* l o              ;                                                           1
[b    19 '
So by implication, I guess you could say that that was 20 [ my perception.                                                                                      i t
                   ,                                                                                             i r
21j.                     O    In testimony before the s_ecial inquiry group on 2
22 i September 13, 1979, you participat.cd in the fc11owing exchange 6
s y with       regard to the status of the electromagnetic rolle.f valve.
23
        + g.       ,Let me quote te yon.
25                           The (co is tion was ,            "I hoe reen f ocusi..g ther e questicns E
ALDERFON REPOPTING COMrANY,INC. 11 2

lw e                                                                                                                                                                                  1 a                                                                                                                                                                                  '
k                                                                                                                                                                                  I 1
            'I                                                                                                                                                                                 i 1
4 A           Well, a generalication is probably the bes                                                                    way : ca.                    i i
                                                                                                                                                                                               \
2
            .               put it, and : hat would be jus:                                                   c wha; actions can we new sugges; 1
4 3 '' to be taken towards getting this plan in a stable condi:icn.                                        !
l                                                                                                                                  .
t                           Q          The sequence of events surrcundi.ng the acciden; up unti; a     'S2
;;           i              that time, were they discussed at all?
a                                                                                                                                                                                              1 3        6,                             A           N.,.
e             i.                                                                                                                                                                               i
: v.       71 1
MR. .9AR S-'IR :                       Before we                ec     en let me ask Lee ancther u              2
=        8 '
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:        9-g                                                    3afore you had the firs: think ank session : believe
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                                                                                                                                                   .. ^ c _ a . . *. . " ... e d     12 E               ,' j u s t sa                      there and ran a                              a low current, at essentially a icw a      ,4 E
icurrent?                      Nc: necessarii.v vcu pers:nally, but what was the z               4
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20                   ~
ewe er anyene els.e gave me their feelings abou: that scr: cf
                      .i 21 :
athing and I wouldn't guess tha: they wculd.                                                                              In soliciting seme I
22 infer.a ion frem 2 ewe abcut the fac: had you attempted :: run the 23
                          , ump, and he gives mt the facts, yes, we did.                                                                            I tried := run al'                     .
24 fcur of the= and en;y go; cne cf the: :: start.                                                                           Then he says they 25                                                      M
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_= . .v.   .' ' -w 4                                              ALDERSON REPORTING COMP ANY. INC.
12-1

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                                                                             * .. ? s                                         .
3 5 ha; really :cok n.that day.
s It wou'.d seem reasonable that that was A
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ve wna was g::.ng on.
_    knew tha: was                            ,
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  =             !l 16
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PR. H.2.R?S' IR :                              Once ycu ge:                                 c the poir.: where the loops I
  =-
1
  'I'     18 ,
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_: wn:.:n 22l.as :ar down :..n he 10cp as the reac :r cec.. ant pump :. se..
23 * .
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: 3. v e . . a.n                                                             .
i 24 .                                                                                     The whole he: Leg was steam beund 'cwn tihere was I am sure.
I c 'r           -
25 ,.                                                                                                                                                                               -"
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::                                                                   ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
12 2

                                                                                                                                                                                                     ,6 1
                 .l 1
          ' ll MR. HARpSTIR:                    bcwn over the pump lift?
21;                                                                                                    *
                   ,                                ?. n"?_ *a*A
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                                                                                                                                     .o, , s  ,. J3 ve an s
l 3 g. .amoun . c f . voiding - conclusion                                                 guess a; that point.
l               .
l                                                                                                                                                                                                           1 l
4-                                      MR. HARPS IR:                    Did anyc..e ge                     0 the isemetrics
: try ko.       a
[C          5 -) . and equate this with where you migh; be at in the cere?
.e -
E-              ;;                                                                                                                                                                                     !
14
  . u                                               "stJ.*".
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o.s.--.         N* o e                                                                                                                     ,
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: u. .u.R . nRe.- w .. a                                                                                                                                 l
  . c-.              3 s        8j                          Q           Cur ceview of ycur testimeny indicates that you were
    .,-                e l
9 '', aware that hot-leg temperatures were abcve 700 degrees and tha                                                                                                                           I
  'I                  ,                                                                                                                                                                                     I
:      to i
    'e z                           instrumentati:n bridges had been h::ke d up s                                                       tha: rssiste.n=e
  .=                  9 11
    -E a.
ij readings could be used to determine the approximate het-leg 1
z      12 o t em eratures on .d e.4:.
     ~                              *
     -                 k E.
3i         .                           *das a rec:rd ke.t: cf the data indicated by this 4..
14
[                          extended scale read- u                              fer the h:
* s g temperatures ?
t:                 }
j
     =
15 A          A recorded reecrd, a leg-keeping book?
N                                        Any kind Of a record.
Ef v.
O I7 f*                                  A          None that I know ef, ne.                                   :would like to rephrase your 18                        '
                          ,sta emen; of my earlier tes;it.ec..y. .: was aware of a read-ou
       $                                                                                                                                                                                               ef a    so E
M.
                          , ever 700 degrees.
: wasn't aware tha: that was a correct 20            4
                          . temperature.                      I never agreed tha: That was a correct temperature I
21 ] a _. _. .a
                          .,            . _. _J
                                                  . me ,
t 22 )            ,             Q.          You didn't agree with the h: -leg temperature?
i 23              i A           ! didn't agree that we knew tha: that was wha                                                                      The 24 4 :enpera ure was.
25                                       MR. MCSE'IY: 'dith any =f the instrumentation even af er r.
                            ;i                                         ALDERSON REPORT!NG COMP ANY. INC.
  ,                                                                                                                                                                      12-3

TMI' Tape 182 ' 'I,ogan                   .May 9, 1979 Hunter: ' At that time were there any radiatics ala=s that you recall seeing or were there any brought to year attention?
Logan: Not at that time as I. recall. I know I didn't at that time I didn't anticipate that we had a leak I mean that we had a problem other than perhaps a primary to secondary leak in the steam generator but as I recall Bill Zewi didn't indicate that he had picked up an ala:m it was a pressure differential in the star.s generators that I believe gave him the indication that we had a leak in the steam generator.
Hunter:         Okay, Joe. The pressurizer level being full and the pressure being down can you give us a little information what that meant to you at that time?
Logan:. Well, it was somewhat it's not a ..ormal situation when we have a          J plant that is hot. To have that high a level and not have a high pressure         i also because you would a'nticipate with a bubble up there that the pressure would be high. At the time something you know didn't ring a bell. There was something that was wrong there at the time and I didn't, I couldn't identify what it was. The fact that the pumps were off certainly was you know abnomal,     j The shift supervisor was busy trying to get the plant squared away that's why I went to ask George Kunder you know what had happened, what was his assessment of this problem because he had been there for sometime and perhaps he could fill me in on some of the information. As I recall the information he gave me concernin's the pumps was that they had fluctuation in the discharge flow 13-1

T!iI Tape 182 - Losan                 liay 9,1979 or flow indication on the discharge of the ptump and I believe he alsc said that the amperage had dropped on the pumps indicating that they were not pumping water.
l 1
i Hunter: You at this time had personally were talking with George Kunder in the shift s'upervisor's office?
Logan: Yes.
Hunter: And you had discussed the pumps. Did you discuss the pressnrizar pressure and level problem?
Logan: I don' t, I can't recall that I did. I think the thing that really hit me was the fact that the pumps were off and we were still hot you know and that to me you want to maintain flow and that's the thing diat stuck in my mind. There's a tremendous problem I am real serious . .. .
Hunter: You are saying . Toe that the pumps were off. Ah, two pumps or all four pumps?
Logan: I don't recall right now how many were off.
Hunter: Okay.
13-2

TMI Tape #183 33 Logan: We were doing something, I'm trying to remember just what.
Hunter: 'Was there 'any discussion continuing and trying to put in core flood tanks'or was at that time your understanding that you were stable on the core flood tank's and that that's, that was as far as you, as far as you, as far as
    .you end up, was there any-~ discussion of going down to the decay heat at that time?
Martin:     Something like opening an altrematic relief at tha,t point.
i Logan:     It was further down here I believe, down here wasn't it.
Hunter:    This is the, that spike is concurrent with the, yeah 8 hou s, 9 hours, 10 hours, this is the spike almost, well it turned out right at 13, 50 whatever, this spike occurred but the power operated relief valve in fact, in the pressurize heaters which has very little probably, it could of been that but the power fail cperated valve appears to it open at that moment.
Logan:    Ycur right it was, something that could of caused the you know a spark in there and I think it was the pump, now refreshing my memory I believe se did cperate that, I'm.trying to, I don't recall right now why.
Hunter:     Ok, you don't have any reason, you don't remember why it was being cperated at that time?
13-3

I 9          ,
l 1-                  THE WITNESS:   I do not know that information.
2i                  BY MR. CRAIG:
l 3              Q    To your knew 1*dge, was the information withheld from the 4      NRC?
                                              .        5              A    To my knowledge, no information was withheld, h
g        6               Q   Our review of your testimony indicates that two reacter g                                                                                              1
                                               &      -7        coolant pumps were secured based on net positive suction head l
N
[        8       limits and about 20 ninutes later the remaining two coolant                  l d                                                                                             j d        9       pumps were secured due to deteriorated flow. With whom did you 10        discuss the inability of the reactor coolant pumps to pump water
.                                             s (a     11        other than George Kunder?
D y       12              A   The other members of my shift that were present there, y                                                                    B 13       the shift   foreman and control rcom operators Ken d< c.4,   the 5
u l
                                               $i 14        other shift supervisor who I had called from Unit I to Unit II.
ja      15 ,             Q   Later on after Gary Miller and Lee Regers arrived, did g
16        you have a conversation with them about the inability of the d          l ti     17l coolant pumps to provide forced flow through the core?                            l l
li_     18              A   I informed them of the actions thAt I had taken and E
19       why I had taken them.
20               Q   What was their reaction to that?
                                                                                                                          +
21               A   As I remember, their reaction was that we should proceed 22       and try to starr one of the reactor coolant pumps as soon as we 23        could.
h 24l              Q   During the conference call early in the morning, was it
                                                             't 25        your understanding that there was a direction during that phone
                                                         ^                          ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
i4-1

11 cprs-5-9
: 1.               G        In your-interview with the IE investigators back in May, you stated in part, and again I quote:             "Some people 2-1 3'
                                          . stated the' pump didn't run, and we were pretty well convinced L
that it pumped steam, I think."          And "the pump" here refers 5         to the primary coolant pump.
6                        Again, to whom specifically does the "we" apply?
[
7              'A        Again I think the "we" applies to the people that 8
were in the think tank and the people in the control room, j                                                             .
d si             9                 Q. Both the think tank and the control room?
z 10                       L     oh, yes.
h
                    !E.
I       11                       G     Does this statement mean that you believe that at      12              'each member of the think tank was convinced that the pump was z-i!I m        13             pumping steam?                                                                 !
u                                                                      ~
A     I think at least I could say that they had indica-l_14.
C'                                                                                  .
C        15             tion that it. wasn' t pumping water. Whether or not it was O
y         16            pumping steam, everybody could draw their own conclusions.
ad ti         17                    4    someone has testified - and I don't recall who 18           right off the top of my head -- that isometric drawings were B
19          checked in relation to this         Were you involved -- were you 20           personally involved - in the checks of isometric drawings?
21                    A     I recall something about that,'okay;-but I don't 22           think I was personally involved.        It's been a long time. I've 23           never been asked that'particular question before.
24                        MR. HARPSTER:   Gary Miller told us that af ter you 25          ran the pump and saw the steam down-around the valute ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
15-1

is'5-1                                                                        :12
             +
I that 'it would either be yourself or Seelinger that he would
,          2    rely on to. check those draw'ings to try and raiate that to the 3
levellof' water.
THE WITNESS:   I did not do that specifically myself.
5 g_         I do remember- some discussion within the tank about levels,
    .$.         possible levels, what the prcblem was.        I don't think we h7
      -         ever related!it yet to a core level, or I think our actions 0                                                                                 1 A          wouldLhave been slightly different at the time; slightly                    !
d d    9 different.
T                                                                                    i BY MR. EARPSTER:                                            l
     =-
5 '11            c.     . nee me ask you - excuse me -- why wou1d you get out u
h 12       the isometrics if you weren't trying to relate it to the inlet            ;
   ' S-j    3 nozzle levels and the core level?
A      Why we did a lot of things that day, quite honestly, I14~
u w
is'something that's hard for us to defend right now.         It's 16 g          easy for me to sit in this room and say I'd do things                     !
k.17       diffs:rently new -                                                        ,
     !'18
     -                G      -No, I think it's a very reasonabie thing to do,            -1
    ;E 19 l          don't misunderstand me.        I would have gotten out the drawings in a hurry, too.
21 A       I don't specifically remember relating it to the 22 core level; but I do remember a discussion about isometric 23
               -drawings.
I 1:       24 l
( Paus e. )
25
                                   . ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC.
15-2

l l
37 1'   are many-:ethods of determinin; ;rimary system invent =:y.
           -2'              ;
                                                                  ~
I'as asking ycu v1.at did you do en that day?                               Wha:
           .3     was done, to your kncvled;e.
4              A        Eut you stated there. vere many metheds.                               I as
           ' 5. saying that I don't 1;:en with that.
            .6              C        The question that ! asked you vas what efforts did 7 you . exert on .that day to determine this?
8             A'       Tres the time va ;ct there and started the reacter 9 coolant pumps and saw the: pus; a hundred as;s we were 10 convinced va didn't have a va:e                               level fully in that whcle The-efforts ve had vere := assure that the inven ter--
                                                            ~
11    plant.
: 12. which we c:uldn't see didn't degrade.                                   I can': remember
           -13     efforts in.the rasearch =ver h:2 lov it had ;ctten c: hev 4
14 deficiency the inventory '.ad been.                                Today I can't reca11 15 discussions alen; these lines.
16              ;-      : understand that there were isc=e::ic dravings 17 taken out en                  b.e basis of the ; n; perf:::ance.
i 18              A       0: look at elevati:ns of*the ;'. ant, where the 19 hot-less are,.where the to; ci the ac--les are and where th e 20 HP         comes in.                                                                                     ;
i l
21               ;      "icuidn't the c :e exi- thersec:u;1es he a..
22 indication of =cre level? Wouldn't the water level be 23 indicated by the nuclear instrumentasien and ether fa : ors?
24              A      :::e exit ther::ccu;1es weren't even wired Oct 25 except by a :;uirk Of desi;n.                               called fc          a se: ef these AL:ERSCN 8E?CRUNG C MPANV. :NC.
400 VIRGINIA AVE. S.W., WASHING:CN. 0.C. 200 4 (202)554 23 4 16-1

  .         .                 _ =                     .                                   .       . - - . .
43 1'       A   -Yes. -
2        Q     Okay. The-only thing you could thing you could 3 'think of is - turn on the pumps and put more water 'in , right, 4 as an engineer?
5        A     As an engineer with some knowledge of the plant 6 that was the'only'sethod I knew available.
                 -7         Q     As an engineering then wouldn't.the next question 8 he how do I find out if that was effective?                            D11.that           ,
9 thought enter you sind?
10        A     The thought that entered my sind is how do we 11   determine how nuch heat comoval we need versus such we are 12 putting in, yes.
13        Q     'J h a t did you consider to be indica tors of whether 14 rou were being successful or not?
15        A     I think we have gone through that.                          ~4e looked at 16 temperatures in the RCS, we looked at the steam generator l'7  pressure a.7d we put an indicator or an a test instrumen: c:
18 the RPS on the het legs if I remember right.                             ~4e ;ut that on 19 there because the on-scale meter was off.
20        Q    Slow down.
21        A    Okay.
ZZ        Q    Iou wanted to look at that ten; era ture .                          'Jhat were 23 rou ey.pected it to do?
24        A    At the initial stages of looking at it, 71r, there 25 - was no high ten;erature on scale available, so th e initial ALDER $oN REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
400 VIRGINIA AVE. S.W., INASHINGToN, o.C. 20024 !:02) 564 23k2

1 4 *J t
           -I'    idea vas to get some reading in_ addition to the other 2 information.
3<             Q          You ha111 reading-then.                 What voce you ex;ecting 4 th at reading to do as you added more and noce water?
5              A-         As vai added more and more water throughout the day 6      ve, were expectin; that reading to come down.                                                        ,
l I
7              0          So it 15 stayed supecheat it was clear then, was
             & it not, that it wasn' t covered with wate:7                                          Those RTDs took 9     'he desvings out and you looked at th ee , sho uld you no t have 10     concluded tn ey weren 't covered with watee?
11              A          Hot-le7 RODS I think are located up above the l           12 coolant.
13              Q          Yes, the ace in th at stcaight run area.
16              A         : thint that even early in the morning when the 15 pumps started and ve looked at the level we knev there vss 16 vater missing out of the het legs, yes.
17              0         Sus my point being that as-you kept adding va:e:
18 you knew you novec got those thersoccupies covered'?
19             A          I thins we knew tha t those were in a stems 20 condition of some type because I think there was sone 11      discussion            at sose point duri:q the day about now accurs:e 21 vers they in a staan environment vecsus their qualification 23 which was in a water environment, that type of thin 7                                         I 24 sean, I think there was that kind of re=ognition.
That means you had that part of the syste                           ef;ty 25              A ALDER $oN REPORTING COMPANY, lNC.
 '                                             400 VIRGIN 4A AVE, S.W., WASHINGTON. o.C. 20024 102)18 $

50 1   of water.- Io you should add more water.                          What is another 2 thing that ought to come in your mind?                         Is there any other 3 indicator?         You had this Navy training with the in-core i
4 thersoccupies.           Were you. thinking they might tell you if you                      )
5 covered tha core back up?
6              A    Either me' or Lee asked f or those initialir because 7 ' that was a part of the initial getting of some indication.
8              Q    Indleation of what, Gary?
9              A    Of temperature.           You know, when you go in and you 10 look at the panel on TH vhich is off scale high we began to 11   look for an instrument on the high end.                        Tha t is my sencry 12 of their initial, you know, why va started icokin; for, yo u 13 kncv, some indicator.               And once we had at least an 14 indicator, I don 't           believethein-coreswerereal$y a ;oint 15 of our discussion any more.
18             Q    You never thought of the in-cores as an indicat::
17 . o f ' v a t e level, that they weren't r0vered with water?
18             A    I don't believe I did, no.                I asked for them, and 19 then by the time ,! go t information on ,them they seemed 20 useless to me tecause the c'onversation indicated they 21 veran't reliable.             At the same time we got the RTO '. coked up Zt to a bridge and that was giving some information.
23             Q-    On the hot leg?
24             A     That is right.         But you are tsking about hea:
E removal, and I as saying that that was one.                                    There was s:en:
  .                           s ALDERSON MEPORTING COMP ANY, INC.
400 VIMQlNIA AVE $,W., WASHINGTON. 0.C. 20024 i2021554 234)b~4

4                                                                                  8 I
I '' cui the period between 5:00 and 6:02 in establishing a time frame, 2 ; and your answer is , yes.                    The questien, when subsequent to that
(
3 y time, if at all, did you becc=e involved in any discussions of
          -E 4 i; the release valve."                   I believe what was meant' there was a relief    i 0      5             -
n N
A. valve."
g 6*    -                        Your answer was:     "That would be after the general 1
n 1
6 7     ry acerc.ency was declared, and it was recce.nized that voiding had t
g      8 ., occurred.                 At that ein e , I presumed s    ecne had determined that   l
'-            5-
                                                                                                 )
o ! the relief valve had, in fact, opened, and that is how we ics:
z              -
y    10 i the inventcry of water.                    It pretty nuch became    ec= en knowledge z
:             1 l
v 4             3 wha: ..ad .nappened.,,
B             1 ja*         !
How did you find ou'     "=- - e relief valve had been i
_=
:    13 i stuck cpen?
  =                ,
14                         A     I don't really rnmember if anyone specifically told me.
g
  =                                                                                              1
[
  =
15                 Obvicusly, someone cbvicusly :cid me.       : cannot rerenber when.
l; I6 '-
e                                   Could i read that?
7.
   #   17 8                             Q     Sure. If you don't mind :-  ; notebook, I have put i,.
3 18 ' everf:hing in a notebeck.
They are i..dexed, and if you will go i
O '. to :E,                 bu: maybe I can find i: much faster for you.
20                        A     All right.
2I                               (Document was handed to the witness .)
22                        A     Chat testimony, I did not have any specific :L e frare.
23                  : was sometime af ter the general emergency, and I ca     't tell 2# whe:her it was minutes , hours, er jus: when that                       gained the 25                perceptien or the knowledge       ha: the relief valve haf been s:ue:.
                        .                     ALDERSON REPORTING COMP ANY. INC.
17-1
* 9
{
I
                          ,open.      I cannot remember any specific conversations , or ho : !
2 ,became aware that specifically we had a problem with the valve.
6 3;                     O
                        ,                 Can you recall exactly what it is that became cerner I
4 k
P kncwledge, is it the fact that it became ecmmon knowledge in the g
e
     *4 5 E(control room thatthe
                       ,                             relief valve had been stuck open fer scme 4
     ~
6 " period of time?
n                -
E N
7[                      A      When I say that it beca .e corron knowledge, I think :
2      8 s                      was referring to the fact that wher. bits and pieces of the
    -                S 9
   ~.
z-                 ,
l accident scenario became known, as part of the general deve;cprent 0      10 5 z                 ,'cf information and disseminatine. th a: to the s taf f , it jus: became
   =
  ,E ' j ) h,knewr bv the rest of the s taf f, and that was just av .nerce.::icn
  .:                n i
  =
12 (at the time.
But I cannot tell vcu for sure if that was i n the 13 5-imorning, in the af t:rncon, er later.
z ia 14
  ?                ,'            O       Do you recall that you a: any time that day dis:ussed c
  =-
i 15 b                        -he fact tha t the electromagnetic relief valve had been stuck
_                a 9
5      Ib lopen with Messrs . M:ller,                  Rogers, Herbein, Zewe, Mehler, er m
         ' 7 .j W
e                ,Chwastvk?    -
  ~
18 U.
n             A       : don't recall any specific conversations , but 1:    s
  -                h j      19
                   .:certainly possible that later in the morning, or later tha: day, 20 nwhenever I became aware of the fae: that the relief valve was I.
Il 21 > s tuck cpen, er was believed to have been stuck o.ce.n, we t                                                                                    -
22 ccertainly could have had conversati0ns.
               )', ,
23 j                          I do know that I was no   really aware of that ir tr.e
              'l 24 rmerning, and it was a piece of inf:rmation that I would have learnef 25 f rca someone else .
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.       17-2

39 l
1   ' patterns for radiological releases.                                 In tha t sense I wa s 2           responsible to make sure all those things happened if any 3           area was not being taken care of.
d                         Once those functions were carried out by individuals 5           I was available to assist in other matters .                            Most of the 6          time, .iust due to the involvement in the control root, I 7 il wa'sn't in a'very good position to relay -information or i
8 l perceiving certain needs , I would go ahead and take ca re of 9           requesting those.needs.
10                        For instance, trying to get in touch with someone 11     l at the observation center and letting them know that                                                     we          ,
i                                                                                                                    '
12     ,
have a problem and directing those kinds of activities.
 . 13     { Talking to security and trying to find out where the Muster 14           Sheets are so we can account for everyone and then I would l
15           re po rt to Joe Logan or - Gary Miller, whoever the et ;rgency 16      l director was, I would directly report to that ind ividua l.
17                 Q      Prior to the time that Mr. Logan arrived on the 18          morning of the 28th', had you been involved with or were you 19          aware of any consideration of whether the EMOV was cpened?
l 20       !         A      No, ex' cept from the standpoint of when I first 21           arrived , Ken Brian, who was the Unit 1 shtft supe.rvisor at 22          the time, had indicated to me that the relief valve 23          temperatures had looked like they were coming down.                                                  As a 24          result, q ua lita tively , I dismissed that we had a problem in 45        l tha t a rea . I don't t hink , a t tha t time , I wa s thinking in
                               .......,..............a           .. . . ..u .. - .~. .. .. m ..
!                                                                                                                   18-1     l 1

     ; =x          -              -        -          -          -                         .        - - - .      -     . - ..-
y    >
.                                                                                                                  40-o I    ter=st of a . stuck open valve.                    It wa s j us t another piece of 2
l / inf orma tion tha:     made sense to me and I don't think I ever i                    j 3
1-                      q ue st io ne'd ' it in my mind.          The ;%c tha:               .we.had a problem l
l               ' d' with the release valve s:uck open or a misoperation of the 5
l  release valve. ' I: sounded to me like'somehow they had :he
:.             . i                                                                                                          ,
l                  6 ; relea se lif t 'and. the amount of steam that was discharging
!                    l 7   'into the drain can'w was more than ,it was' able to handle for l) l                                                                     .
i                  8 that particular discharge.
I                 The fact that the release monitoring temperatures
                                                               ~
l               lI      were-high made sense.- : The fact that they were coming down -
U                                                                                                                              y j               11
                     . 'made sense and I didn't question it any further.
l
[
12           Q      Were you aware ' of any additional read 2.ngs or the                                       -
                                                                                                                               .l i               13      temperatures that were made?
It           A      I don't believe I was -- not af ter my conversation                                        ,
-                 15    with Ken Brian.
Were "ou involved in any discussions of any 16                                                                                                            '
Q 17     possible leaks?
18         A      I don't $elieve I was.
19 Q      I have been focusing those' questions on the                                               !
l' 20       period between 5 :00 and 6 :00.
t 21            A      Ye s .                                                                                     i i
22            Q      When, s ubsequen: to that time, if at all, did you.                                        '
23      become involved in any discussions of the release valve?
              -24 l                            A      That would have been af ter the general emergency 25 was declared and it was recognized that voiding had occurred.
                                        ... ... ... ..  ....u.:.... . .       .a .... .. .... ... .....
18-2

                                            .- . . .                    - - - . _          . . .. .         -- -    ~. ~
41 1                                At that time I presumed someone else had determined-2    -             tha t the ' release . valve ' had in fact stuck ' open a nd th'at is
    -3                  how we lost the inventory of water.                        It pretty much becane d
common knowledge of what had happened.                           ,
L           !
L     5;           -
Q     .Would- its be fair to say that the next time you                -
i.
I
    - 5' gave. any thought 'to the' stuck open release valve it was 7       , a f ter you had' learned from some other so~urce t' hat it was
              ,                                   !\
8                 assumed to have been stuck open?                                                                ,
i 9
             ;                  A      That is correct;
: j.             -         .
10         ,. BY MR. FRAMPTON:
11                         Q      Mr. Kunder, can you recall what kind of a 12_
situation you perceived that you were facing the first hour 13          ,
                         .or two in the control room, if there were infiteting
                                                                                't 14           ' indications of what was ha ppening in the plant, what were s
15          l they a nd what was , in your ~ mirid, or what. did you discuss 16           l. with others about what might be happening?
17                     'A          The thing that was foremost in my mind at that                                  l 18            : time was that somehow we had overfilled the reactor cooling l
      .19             i system.        In doing so we lost the pressurizer steam bubble,'                                 1 20             ;' which allowed the pressure. to be low.
21     'l                         I guess most of the activities that I.tried to --
22                 most of the indications that I tried to look at and assess 23                 was relative to that concern.                      It was an anomaly that I had 2d                 never seen before and 'it did not make ' sense.
1 25                          Q     When you. say it was an anomaly, you mean to have
                                                .............c....... ........u.......           .....
18-3

(               ,.                                                                          -42 1-  .l th's press'urizar be full' or to have overfilled the system i
,.        2      a nd . yet to. h' ave' the press ure continue to be low?
3L ,'       .A. Yes.      I can't remember how I perceived it
:             i
;         4      precisely in my own mind at t he t ime ..
        .5-              Q   .Did you perceive how that could happen?                 Is there 6   ; any explanation of why the pressure --                                             l l        .
7   j          A    At that time I couldn't put it all together.                  It l
l 8       is perfectly obvious now but at that . time, as I recall my 9      perceptions at that time, .somehow we had overfilled the 10        system and we lost the steam bubble, the bubble that was i
!. 11    . giving us the pressure.
I j      12    l                It just did not occur to me and I did not go l
F 3
13         through the thought process that would have allowed me to
;      14        conclude at that point in time that we had voiding in the 4
,      15        other portion of the system and that the core itself or i
16        the fluid in the region of the core actually took over
* 17        pressure control of the reactor cooling system.                                  .
!      is ,              Q   'As you understood it from the period of 5 :00 a.m.
I 19        to let 's say 7:00 a.m. or 7:30 when Mr. Miller arrived and i      20        the emergencies were declared, what was the strategy for 4
21        trying to bring the plant to a more stable or more under-l l      22        s tandable status ?       What wa s it primarily that you under-
     ' 23        stood that the operators and Mr. Logan and yourself were 24    l- trying :o do with the plant during that time?                                     '
{
25 ;            A      It is a variety of things.              Relative to the j-                                  . .n     .u ....n ....m..a.,.....         . . .
5 18-4       i l

43-1       reactor cooling system per se, the operators were letting i
2' down some water.           I understa nd . from subsequent testi=ony, 3 ! '.I guess , that they did have some high pressure injection i                                                                           >
I                                                        4 l water going into the reactor cooling system.             We were trying    i l
1' 5       to let down in order to bring the pressurizer level back 6   l .into ra nge.
I 7    l        Q    So you were basically trying te red'uce inventory e       in the system in order to get ' the pressurizer bubble ba'ck?
9    ,        A    In effect that was what was happening.
10                  There were a lot of other activities that were 11       ongoing at the time.       The fact that the containment pres s ure 12      . was up around 2 PSI was at' one point thought to have been a se, mar.
13       leak. from the 1 steam generator and that was believed to 14       be so because of the disparity in the pressure which is is       classically something that would indicate a potential steam 16       leak out of the lower pressure steam generator.
17                  'Ihe steam generator, I believe, at one point was 18       secured, isolated,''on both the feed water and the steam 19      side in order to bottle up that generator and ultimately 20       stop the suspected steam leak into         the building.
21                  later on when the reactor building pressure did 22       not decrease as expected, the operators felt that that 23       wasn't the problem and they reestablished normal feed water 24       and steam removal from the steam generator.
25             Q     Didn't emergency beration using the high pressure
                                                                                    ........m.%.....                   . . .
18-5

1'
 '~
l          ..                    .
injection system ~go counter :o the strategy of :rying' to 1
 ,            i                                       s 2            get the bubbla back?         Tha: was pu:cing more water into :he
;         3            s ystem, was it not ?         -
         't
               !              A    Yes. At the :ime I was not aware tha: ' :hev had l
5-a-high pres'sure injection con:inuing in :he reactor f               :
;         6 lcoolingsystem.-
i         7 !                      At tha: time, I am pre :y cernin I perceived
 ;               i 2
8           that they were jus: let:ing down.
9                  Q'   But you said you and Mike Ross wanted :o get some
      -10.             high pressure injection --
11                   A    That was later,                                              ,
12                        Again, you have to realize that we were traveling I
;        13'       i a long a t like 90 miles an hour and things were(whizzing 14        .
by and you are s vking decisions.        I don't think I could 15            ever reconstruct the feedback that I wa s getting and using 16       ; to make decisions upon at :his point in t ime .
17                       By the time that we made that decision to initiate 18            high pressure injection a lot of things had transpired by               ,
19            the time I got in the control room.          There were phone calls ,
20            a lot of developments , minor things : hat didn't make sense 21            or that caused me to believe that something other than what 22            was really occurring was transpiring.
23                        By the time we made that decision to initiate high 24           pressure injection i: wa s a p pa rent that we were ' dealing with 25 h something an awful lo: bigger or more consequential chan I
                                     ..................a .....s...u..........   .....
7 18-6

45 1                   had recognized when I first arrived at :he plant.          It had 2                  -developed a lot fur-her by that time.
2                        'Q      You still believe that the cooling system was 4       ,           solid , the prt=ary system was solid, when you were ready 5'                 f or emergency boration, I take it ?
6                        A      I guess.:ha: would be true to say that.
7-              .
Q      Bu: you made a choice tha: the' mos: importa nt B                  thing was to preven: renew criticality at that point?
9        i               A-     That I think was the overriding idea that I ha d.
I 10         ;               Q     Ist me a sk you a question abou: the conference 11          '; call with Ga ry Miller and- Mr. Herbein a nd you self.
12                               During tha: call there was some conversation is , about whether the EX0V was closed or the block valve was 14                   closed. Do you recall the substance of that conversa tion 15 I-     about that subject ?
16           j            A     The thing that I recall and is pre::y =uch what l
17           l I sa id in the pa st , in past interviews, and that is , I :hink l                             ..
la                  I was asked whether or not the electromatic release valve                  !
l 19            l was opened.          I think' that was true beccuse I seem to recall           )
l
                               '                                                                                 l 20                  having gone out to the control room for a- moment and asking               i 21                  someone out there if the valve. was opened or if it was 22                  closed.
23                               The response that I think I recall getting -- the 24                 -respot e that I would have gotten is that it was closed.
25                               I iust reme=ber coing out and asking that question.
om....c...........6...a.......... .....
18-7

                                                                                                                 ?.6 1
That is what I seem to recall.
2                      Subsequently, it turns out that the block valve Q
3        was apparently closed during that conversation --
d  1 A     . I am not s ure of that, f
5                      -- whether a s a res ult of your asking about Q
l i
6   ; whether the release valve was opened or perhaps as a result l
7 of somebody else coming in and suggesting that.                                            Do you 8    ! recall that happening?
     .l 9               A      No.
10                      Do you recall learning shortly after the conversa.
        ;          Q I
11    ; clon that the block va lve had been closed a nd some indica .
i l
12    i tion that this was having an impact on the system that the 13        pressure was geing back up?
14 j          A      I believe that I wasn't there.
l 15 j                Again, af ter we had declared the general 16        emergency and I had been told that we were trying to figure 17        out what happened to the water and I think it became 18        a ppa rent to the group af ter that tira that that is what had 19        t ra ns pired .
20 l                Vnoever closed the block valve relayed that 21        inf orma t ion a nd it eventually filtered ba ck to myself.                                        I 22        am certain that I didn't know that until after we declared 23 a general emergency a nd we had piecod together, very quickly, I
24        what we believe had occurred.
25                      And that might have been an hour later or more?
l        Q i
4 mes.ets ST ts.068eemeC*S tevaC t. 8419 Obe eB*bb #4569 weemespase pa igene 18-8'

L7 t
1 A      1: might have been.
i 2                       ' MR. FRAMPTON :   I bol leve this would be a good 3    l time for a short recess.
I 4    l                   (Short recess.)
i 5           BY MR. FRAMPTON:
6                 Q      M . Kunder, do you i ocall when you learned tha:
l  7           the ruptured disk on the react or cooling" draib.ing tank had B      I burst?
i 9      i          A      That I had assumed occurr ed when I first got into l
10       ! the plant and the pressure in the reacter building was up.
11                  Q     You learned that rig.ht away?
1 12                 A      Yes. It was based on a pres umption.                   It made 15           s ens e tha t that had occurred.       There is no indication that 14           the upper disk bicw other than by looking at other parameters 15        I in making that ind icat ion.
I.
16                        It was based upon previous experience in Unit 1 17          that that informa tion made senne.           I have seen Unit l's 1B          ruptured disk blow during -- it was a transient, I think, 19           involving some instrumentation problems during the star: of 20            prograc: ming Unt: 1, during :he hot functiona 1 test program 21            of Uni: 1.
22                 Q     Ead you ever seen a t uptured disk blow in either 27           unit simply as a result of the pressurizer release valves 24           opening and then shutting aga1n?
25                  A     The one in Unit 1w. the one I wa s familiar with.
                                ............-.m .... . ,,,u  .. . . ...... ,, . . . . .
I8-9

   .s,                        _     .        .         _       _     _                  _ __
;                                                                                    48 i       1 l That was due to an electronic problem.
i                         .
2          Q-    Do you know whether Unit       i ha s . a , much sma ller 3     reactor cooling drai; .ng tank?
{
:d i        A     My understanding is tha t it is smaller in terms-2 5 l of cooling capacity.       The ta nk s iz e its elf , I don 't      believe       )
l 4       6 ~ is all that much different.
I 7
l        Q     But the pressure would build up faster because 1
4 8 I the, cooling capacity of the tanks cooling syste= was 9     much smaller, is that correct?
4 10          A    No. The statement I am trying to make is that 11     the tank and its quenching capability are probably the same l
12 ,
order of magnitude, they are about the same size.
13               However, the Unit 2 system has the ability of 14     cooling down that water after the relief has occurred and 15     the quenching function has occurred.           It has the capability 16     of cooling it down much faster than the Unit 1 situation.
17          Q    How would that affect the speed with which the 18     ruptured disk might blow?
19          A    The only way that would have an effect is if you 20     had significant leakage into the drain ta nks prior to that 21 g event which allowed the concents to remain at an elevated l         l 22     temperature in Unit i vs. Unit 2.        Unit 2 could keep that l-23 temperature down where the full quenching ca pability is                       ,
24  l ~xaintained.                                                                    '
25   ,
Q    Was there any discussion about whether the
                          -.........................a..............      .....
18-10

                                                         #                                                         49 I ruptured dish might suggest tha: there was continuing-
                         ~
1 l
l 2             leakage through :he relief valve?                                Do you reme=ber that i
3' being considered or discussed in the time pa.riod before 4 . 7:00 a.m.?
I i
5:                 A    No.       1 thinh the fact : hat it was recognt=ed by l
6            Ken Brian that the relief :emperatures were coming down i
7     ; allowed me, in my ot.n mind, to say that :mde sense and i
8     l_ pretty much dismissed, you know, what had occurred there as I
9      ; relating to our current problem in the pressurizer.
i i
10       j           Q   I think you testified before that after the i
11       I emergencies were declared and notifications made and Mr.
12       l Miller had taken over command of the unit tha: basic I
13             stra tegy was put in:o effect to try to repressurise the 14            reactor cooling system.                     What was the purpose of that 13             strategy? Was that because you perceived that you had                                                  ,
1 16            Voids and ' you were trying to collapse them?                                                           I 17                   A   I think that would have been the basic strategy, la           although ! can''t re' member any more what our discussions l
19 l: centered around at tha t t ime, t
2n                       For instance , I can't remember any more whether 21             we delibe: tely closed the block valve in order to                                                     ~
l 22         l pressurize or whether it had been closed by the operator who 23            .first r.ecognized that it may be the cause of our basic 24          ; problem and then left closed.                             Do you see what I mean?
I
] 25          !        Q   Ye s.
tsteetSe $?f ss GGe6Pesag og gewet t. tel, hkS Magh 3363. erwee8496ame Pa 40410 18-11

4, 8. Log an                                                                                         11 1,  just don't recall. them shutting the PORV block valve.
2   BY MR. MCSELEY:
3                 Q. This is the time when Zewe made some communt to the 4   effect,. gee, this was the cause of the thing, the valve was 5  'open.            And some other comment whien I don' t recall offhand.
6                     And here we have. the principal problems that were
      '7   concerning people are going away.                  The low pressure, high 8   pressurizer indications, which were analogous, were goin%
9   away.            And ~ what we are trying to get at is were you involved 10    in discussions of this-h-vigg been the problem?
11                  A. No , no t at that particular time.
12                      As I say, there were several other t.iings going on, 13   as you will recall.                   We had a steam generator that was 14   isolated with a leak, evidence of a leak in there.                                           We had 15   the coolant pumps of f also , which was an abnormal situation, 16   certainly.                  And , a s I say , I tend to think that I was, at 17   this particular instant, probably in with Kunder trying to 18   f i nd o u t -- b eca u se he h ad a r r iv ed c e f o r e -- f r =n him t h e 19   sequence of events that had caused :ne trip, and also I 20   s'uppo se trying to help him in answering questions that Miller 21   and Herbein --
22                  Q. Were you in the room during the telepnene 23   conver sa tion?
24                  A. In and out, yes.
25      -
Q. It j ust seems strange that this is, you know, the 19-1

J. 8. Logcn                                                    12 4
I    thing that appar ently has turned around the problem, and we 2    a'r e ' trying to ge t at what discussions you had concerning thi s .
3   Do you recall any?
-   4           A. No, I don' t recall -- in fact, I'm almost posi tive
,   5    that I didn't really find out that that PORV had been the 6 , culprit until quite sometime later, and I don' t even remember           !
7 lifit       was the same day, with everything else that was going
;   8    on.
9                You have ts put yourself in the atmospher e that 10    exi st ed in that control room at this particular time, with 11   all the other problems that were attendant with the accid en t ,
;. 12    to appreciate that.                                                   ,
13 ;         Q. Because this was before tne radiation alarms were i
;  14   coming on?
i is i         A. Yeah, but the radia tion alarms, as I recall, came on I
i
;  15   abo ut 6:30.
17                MR. CRAIG:    Closer to 6 : 5C.
I 13 ,
THE WITNESS:    Okay. Sometime in that time frame.
19    It's surprising ho w f a st time goes wnen you ar e in those 20 l situations.
l I
21   BY MR. CRAIG:
22           2    This is also about the ti=e : ewe realited tha't the 21   s team g enerator was probably not lea king , and they were
,  24 ! watening     the reactor building pressure, and he snowed a 25   decrease at this point in time.
l M
;                               'TAYLOE AREOC?here i

l 1
J. B. Log an                                                                                                  13 I
l'  ..               A.-  Not loaking ir.to ' con ta i..m ent.
I I                  .
2                  -Q. Right.
l 3                   A. But tnere was still -- we knew tha t ' the r e wa s a                                                     !
1
: 4.          primary -- secondary leak in the steam generator.
l 5                   Q. You state in .your IE testimony of May 9,            pag e 31, 6   I you were aware the reactor building sump pumps had been 7           secur ed and tha t you wouldn' t have ex pec ted the reactor e           coolant drain tank disk to rupture.
9                        And you sta te , "Well, it" -- r e f e r r ing to the fact 10            that the disk had ruptured -             "was unusual, to me , for it to 11     ' occur .          I' would no t have an tic ipa te d tha t it wo uld rupe ur e .
12      , It's designed, of course,               to pro tect the tank, but und er i
13            no rmal circumstances I wouldn' t expect it to rupture."
14      [                  And Hunter asks you a question, "How did -- what did 15      lyouget the impr ession -- wha t kind of impression did you                                                            get '
I 16       ' f rom Bill when he's telling you a:o ut it and that it did 17       , rupture?"
i 18       ,
Your response was, "He wa s very vague .        I'll nave to 19           summarize that it was when we were probably discussing the 20            el ec tr omag ne tic relief valve ~ operation.      If it sticks open, I
21        ; you know, and . you can' t get the ste am in to it, it's not l.
22            designed fo r tha t,     I don't believe."
I 23        , BY MR. MOSELEY:
l 24         .          Q. Does that quote refresh your memory of any 25       l discussion you had with            zewe on this?
i 19-3

J. B.3 Log an                                                     14 1           A. ~When I first arrived,' Zewe give me a quick run-down 2   on the . status at tha t particular time, and as I recall in 3    that conversation, he' had mentioned the water in the 4   containment and the fact that he had secured the pumps , sump 5    p um ps .
6                Now, the discussion of the rupture of the ta n k , the 7    rupture disk going on the tank, I don' t really remember 8    whether that occurred at that particular time or whether 9    during the day or even days af ter that that that discussion 10    took place.
11    3Y MR. CRAIG:
12           0    Can you remember any more specifies concerning this 13    discussion between Mr. Zewe and yourself about ths EMOV 14  ,
naving been stuck open?
15           A. No. As I s a y , I don' t recall any conversation with 16    nim, at least on that day, acout the EMOV be ing , you know, 17    stuck open.
18               When I got there, there was no mention of the EMOV 19    mei ng stucx cpen, because we didn' t realite it , .of cour se , at 20    :nat time.      And vnen tha t info rmation became appar ent to me ,
21    as I say, I just honestly can' t remember.
i       22    BY MR. MCSELEY:
1 23           Q. It just seems to us this would have been discussed 24    wi n' people ecming in, Rodgers, Miller, as sert of br inging 25    :nem up to vna t we know about wh e r e we are.
19-4    I

1
[J.i B. , Leg an                                                       15-    ]
1:          . A. I' agree. That's why      say I didn't know abo ut it, 2    at 1 east when Miller got there.          I had no ~ -- I still, vnen he -
      '3     arrived, could not have' explained the situation, why i t 41    existed , because I wasn' t aware ef- it.        And , as I say, I.do 1
5     not rememb'er now when I became aware that the D40V had been I
o       5    found to be . stuck.
t .
i L      7'    BY MR. CRAIG:                                                                 l 3            Q '. Was the possioility tha t ene EMOV had been 4 tuck              .
l 9'   open' discussed ~ in the think tanx neeting on the day. of the 10       accident?                                                                   :
11              A. I d o no t recall any conversation concerning the IMOV, 12      .but I would assume that it was discussed.           Certainly if Zewe 13       was aware of it, I'm sure it wo uld nave come out on some of
    .14       those think tank meetings.
15             Q. Well --
    -16.            -A. Le t me clarify one thing. When you say think tank 17      meetings, this isn't what you might assume to be a group of 18     people that are remote from the pr o l em tha t get together in
     .19      a little :orner and talk about things.           This is Miller            ,
i 20     si tting in there and calling individuals in at times, or a
     ~21      couple of people in, or as many as he can get in there , and               ,
22     people. going cut and doing things.
     '23                   You have to ' apprecia te enu atmosphere that existed 24     of trying co control tha t accid ent , rather than trying to 25     rehash what caused it.       What ca u s ed it was not ma terial to 19-5

J. B    Logan                                                              16
                                  'l       the problem at this particular ti=e.                That's what I'm trying 2       to get across.
3      BY MR. MOSELEY:
4            Q. You don't really believe that, do you?
5             A. Yes, l' do.
6             Q. You' ve got to know how you got into a situation in                  l 7       o rd er to know how to get out.
8             A. Let me give a similar situation.               You' re acoard a 9       ship and you have a fire.           Your object is to put the fire 10        out, not to find out wha t caused it.
11              Q. But I don't think this situation is quite analogo us 12        to tha t. You had a situation that no one understood with the 13        low pressure and high pressurizer *.evel, and this was when s
14     l the valve was finally closed , things begin to come back, and 15        it seems to me if you are in a position where you don't know 16        wnat caused it, that it is quite r el ev an t and im po r tan t to 17        say, well, how did we get here?
18    f         A. I don' t disagree with tha:.             I'm saying yo u hav e to l
19    !ge: the priority of wha t's important.                   At the time that all i
i                                     i 1
20    ; of :nis was taking place, the main :ning was to stop any 21        releases of radiation, right?
22   li              Well, certainly.
Q.
I 13              A. Just like putting out the fi r e is wna c yo u wan t to i
24   i de first; then you look at what c a us ed it.
I 25   l          Q. Well, g o ahead.
W6

7 I                                                                                                                     L 1 '.j and what werc The' plans.and what we were-gcing te' decide :c
:2 !i..reconmend vfa -
                                                                                            -he further.actic.s were.
                                                                                                                                     ! don';'believe there 3              . were any explanaticns or statements :f surprise or any e her a
4                 reacif r.,Eif you will, .                         cL:he fae:           ha: the pumps were Off. It c               5- ,wer, merely stated as.a plant condi:icn.                                                                                     '
R                      l
                       ~
3'             6I                          .Q                Was there a discussion about what it mean ?
                        -                 .n v                   't
                 - A-                 7                                            'Nc, not. hat I recall.
                                                                .A-ear            /
l                                                                                                                          t
                        &            "l                                Q           'On March OEth cf 1979 when did you become aware cf the U       -
z
                               .                        continucus re'ief path through' he EMOV and bicek valve which we.
c                   3, 5          '1' have learned existed for approximate'y                                 _   wc hoursi z
3 i                                            A             Ycu mean prior relief 3i ' . :r?r.r to the time that I was 4
m                                    ,
E
                         =
:         in there and prior                            c The kn:wlecge cf wha: Time it was shut.                    :
                          -                   l.
5           13 'i did nc                                 knew until the nex: day cr the day after, I think i; was u                     i b          I4         ,          ne next                 day, when we delegged the da:a frcm the reac;imeter wha:
: s.                    I 15 E
8                    frimeit.wasshut.
i My en'_y knowledge :f it being opened a: the y         16 l time that I was there was when we were us'ng it as a pressure
: v.                   :
i "s~ 17 j centrol device, a mechanical pressure control device by operating 5
                             ~        *-I U_      18 l the bicek valve.                                          I didn'      know until some time later. ! am sure, w                   i b
i      U 'h as I recall new,                                      it was the next day when the data was reduced :har r1                  y 20 l i                    had been cpen . for that pericd :f time.
II MR. MOSELEY: If the EMOV was operating properly, why 22 l was the block valve used do you sup;cse?
23                                             THE WITNESS:           I think we are digressing here a li;;1e 24 d bit because 'in the conference call when I asked was the bicek -
25 . valve shut and got the answer that the block value was shut , then t
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
20-1

9978 07 16                                                                     92-LWRros      1                 WITNESS ZEME:  ,
Up until the si.te emergency and 2    everything else, I didn't' thing of . a problem reaching people 3    at all with any information I requested of them or I gave 4   'them. I- didn't have any problem in that respect.
l                5               ,MR. FRAMPTON:     What about' af ter the EMOV block l
6    valve was closed off?      Did you then realize very shortly 7    tha t that had .been the main leak?
8                WITNESS ZEWE:    Yes.
                .9                 WITNESS SHEIMANNs . .Yes.
10                 .R. FRAMPTON:
M                Then you rea'lized that in essense
               -11     you bad a small break LOCAI right?
12                 WITNESS ZEWE     True.
13                 MR. FRAMpTON:    Thereafter, didn't yo0 continue to 14     f ace a situation in terms of the plant parameters that it 15     was very difficult to understano why the plant was behaving 16     that way?
1,7               WITNESS ZEWEs    No. As soon as we closed the 18     electromatic valve the pressure in the reactor building 19    .startec   o go cown. The pressure in the coolant stem 20      startec to cooe up. So we knew then that we once again had l
21      a tight stem, which we didn't have bef ore but didn't             !
22     preceive we dicn't nave a tight stem.        So f rom then on we 23     knew that that was the leak and we were already on our 24     maximum capability of high pre ssure infe'ction and just 25     coutinued on that path to pre ssurize up.
21-1

35 I                      Mr. Zowe.. Yes.
2                     Mr.. Recktenwald.      And why wasn't that done prior to the j
            ~3     i         March 28th accident?.
1
            .d                       Mr. Zewe. Well, the temperatures that we monitored every 5              day on the discharge pipes of all three of the relief valves 6     -
were inconclusive where, which one was the leaky valve, and it 7     . was accepted generally, I think, that we really did not have 1
8             any' reason to believe that it was more one valve than another 9            valve.      That the one code valve had been consistenly, at least g.
w                -
     $        10             a few degrees higher than the other valves.
    .E                ,
O a        11 -                   So, I don't know why we didn't isolate it, and just count a
OE 12             it from that point.        I really can't say that the logic wasn ' t
:y.n$
g      ' 13             there to do that, just to eliminate it.
* n 14                     Mr. Recktenwald.      Could you have done this on a shift g5' os di m
15             yourself?
2        16                                  Yes, very easily.
Mr. Zewe.
O F
d       17                     Mr. Recktenwald.      Was there any concern that if you did 2
18 that, the isolation valve might stick?
I9        '
Mr. Zewe. Yes, there was, but that wouldn't have prohibitef 20              us from doing it if we thought that it was a problem, but the                          l l
21             concern always is in a high-temperature fluid system, in a high-                       I l
22             temperature atmosphere that the valve could remain shut and we 23             would lose the inability of having that relief valve.                         __ ,,-
24 We have had other valves on t.he
                                                              ..        - - pressurizer
                                                                            . - - --       that were 25             motor operated isolation valves similar to,that one that have I
j                                                                        22-1

36 I
had failure modes in that direction.
2    !        Mr, Recktenwald. During the first two hours of the March l
I 3
l 28 accident, do you recall explicitly considering thp possibili:-j 4
that the PORV could fail?
5             Mr. Zewe. No, I did not.
6             Ms. Giannelli. I've got sort of a follow-up question.
7       ID a previous interview with our staff, you stated that you I
8    ' realized the existence of superheated steam on Wednesday, the 9     , 28th. What time did you first realize that?
a W         '
Q   10    f        Mr. Zewe. Sometime later that morning and I'm not sure o f a         !
D         .
a   II    l the time frame, 8, 9 o' clock, I'm not sure, certainly not withir a$
O u
3;A n
12 I
the first one or two hours .
13 d?        ,        Ms. Giannelli. So,  8, 9 o' clock is your recollection?
z8        I Id hf                 Mr. Zewe. J''s probably as close as I could remember now.
05
  $[
e 15       I really couldn't say. It may have been later than that, I 2   16 really couldn't recall, but that would probably be the earlies t.
O V
d   17             Mr. Recktenwald. Going back again to the first two hours, I         l i
18 i do you recall what you thought was going on; what kind of l
19   i accident you thought you had prior to the time that the block 20       valve was closed on the PORV7 21             Mr. Zewe. Well, all kinds of items went through my mind.
22   l we had, of course, the low pressure coolant system and the higi-23       pressurizer level, and I could not conclusively come up with one 24 L single failure'that would cause all the indications that we had.
I I
25   lWehadthoughtthatwehadasecondarysteamgeneratorleakthat l
l i
I
         .)                                                            22-2

t t-                                                                                      :37.
I          was contributing tofthe pressure increase:in theLbuilding, ana
                                ~
: i.            '2'          also --
3 Mr.-Recktenwald. A steam line rupture?
I              d Mr. Zewe. Some secondary side leak.from the steam.gonorat        :
            ,   5'         Either being: feedwater or steam'. We suspect it's steam, and
;               6           that contributed to the higher temperature and-the increasing v.
'~              7          p ressure. -  And I' felt that we did have a hole of some type 8         'i n the RC drain tank' because. of the low pressure , low level in 9          the elevated temperature.
o W
j      Q      10'                7 felt that the loss of feedwater transient,as rapidly as a
O II           it was initiated, in that the pressure spike was high enough ::
g
..ag                 i
                     !.possibly lift the code safety va*ves.
j$.
12                                               .       And I though that whi'e    .
^
I3    l maybe that the valves blew and it ruptured scimething in the tank ,
i dl ZR Id           not thinking that it was the rupture disc or the relief valvo, j       $3 Oj'           (                                                                                ]
i      a-wg     15     I but it could have been something else in the tank.
f
:       E            l j       z      16 S r. , that would account for the high temperature and the low
.       O t       F l'      d      I7      l pressure, but I felt that the relief valves had lifted and tha:
4 I             t l
I8           they had recedad, I did not reclize that it was an ongoing --
1 19                                     Can I ask. What prior to the acciden:
j                                 Mr. Recktenwald.
4 20 would you have said, how would the reactor coolant drain tani.
1                       l
 ;             21           look after a normal reactor trip and turbine trip?
i             22                 Mr. Zewe.- It would have an elevated temperature, elevc:cd
;               23       i pressure, and an elevated level.
I I
24                 Mr..Recktenwald. And when you went back to look at it :2. i s f; -               -
 }
25           time -- and how would you have expected it to look?        Had the POP' 3
: j.                      I i-I 22-3 1

38 I
stuck open?
i 2
               !          Mr. Zewe. As it did.
I 3
Mr. Recktenwald.       Did you think during the accident that .:.
4 might have had a LOCA, were you considering the possibility?
       .5        ~
Mr. Zewe. I never really _ cons _isieraulthat..we had a_.L.OCA.
6    l The ___
automatic actuati.on of the engineering y eature syster 7
I felt at the time was because of feedwater initiation.
              \ .. ..                     . - . _ . . _      . . . . . -
And I 8
really didn't realize that we actually had a hole             n the reactc.-
9 o                coolant system until we shut the block valve for the electro-W           ,
Q     10 matic relief valve.
a O           ;
: c. Il a        1.
Mr. Recktenwald.       Do you recall what radiation alarms you OE c     12 l' got in during the first two hou. s of the accident?
E;h        I g    13 j           Mr. Zewe.'  During the first two hours, the enly alarms that 3l E Id y ;.
a!
fIrecallaretheintermediatemonitorsthatmonitoreachof
  $E   15  9' the letdown coolers.           Those were the only two that I can recal.
m Z    I6          that were in alarm.
I7 l
i Mr. Rechtenwald.       And if you had gotten an alarm on the I
18 j upR 227, alarm, what would that have told you about the accider.
I 19  !             Mr. Zewe. That would have told me that we had activity ir
,          U l
20 ltheatmosphereofthebuilding.
i          i 21                Mr. Recktenwald.
l                                    In terms of diagnosing rhe accident?
22                Mr. Zewe. Yes, because one of the things that you look 23         for if you do have a LOCA is that you have activity indicated 24 on the atmospheric monitor in the building, so that certainly 25  lwouldhavebeenakey. And I know that Ed Frederick and I 22-4

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23-1

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g                                                   ,
2 2                                                                                                %
1                          ;           ,
1 believe' ha- $r. : gan was also presen; a: that point in time.
j 2
i     .Concerr.ing the shu--i..; of the block valve, decreasing 3 ' l. cc.. ainment pressure and . increasing :;rimary system pres sure , dii 4            lycu discuss tha
[                                                      with '3ary ::i';er en ~/28/79?
4 l
                           .          .A      : am cer: sin that,we      aiked abcut it, but : at n:            surp e      6u l'         ;           ,
exae:1y wha       ti=e frame 1     a:::a-*y
                                                                         .    :: k place. Like : have-7
}.
: 4.        . fW.
E stated before, I tried        c c:ver everything that we had done and 4         A 8 .r5; what haf happened' whenever he cane . and                cok charge and -that she u *. :
1 1         *s i        d'     9a.               .
           .j          j nave been among              hem.
i i        E'. 10 '
  ,        E           ,
           =             ;
7     11
:         y                            7     iha; abeu- ice ?.:gers, did you discuss that wi-h hir
  '          .         >~
$          5.                         -A-    Here again : :an :n'.y rei erate tha: I believe -ha: :
.          ,-          n
:     13    -
E did, bu        can'    recall the exa:      :onversation..
r 14 i                                                              - , '' a m
 -         2                            C    How abou     3rian ::ehler =r Iack ''W .e?
g t_
r      5 3rian was presen- P.e g
           ~           .,
A                                  re shut the b'ock valve se he 16 -s g             j was auare -f the change in the ;ressure whenever we shu: the a                                               s
(        y     17
:         x           .
bicek valve and the repressurizati:n of the reactor ceclant itse;:
           =           .
N
           =     1831-':r.          "n'et-rii n  , I would say ne, : did n:: have direc           co==unica:i:n-
           #: 19 i     4 j
  ,                    jwithhironthat subject.
                       .i i              20 !
3
                         !              Q     lo 70u remember an. Of the conversation that v.: had
                    'N 21
.'                       . with Brian Mehler about the res;ense to shu::ing the bicek valte:
22 4
                       ;                A     I don't recall exae:17 , but sc=e:hing to the effec:                    ha-a
 '               23 1that i
was it, tha: that was the . re ason for the low pressure.
i
               -24
                       /
                                    'Q-Did you discuss this with 9eorge ::under?
                  'i                    A     In the same light, yes.
4
;                    ' ,4                             ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.                 23-2

11' 1           HUNTER:f Okay.
I 2
ROSS: At that time we I kind of decided that we kind of left' Unit l' hanging 3
with a probles going so we ought to have someone go back up.        So we sent 4
5 Brian back up in that he had the shift.up there prior to this starting and 6
he was.most current on information.
7' HUNTER:      Did the readings... does readings on the power operated relief 8
9, valve and the safety valve discharges in the range of 200 to 230 even as high as maybe 2507 Was that unusual if you have a leaking valve?
10 11                                                                                               l g            ROSS: No, I don't think they're unusual if you have a leaking valve . I think readings on the order of 2200 would indicata a leaking valve.
g
                                                                                                       )
4                        But not a valve that was. discharging for instance.?
HUNTER:
1 16)
ROSS:     That is correct.
181
           !        HUNTER: The valve was apparently looked at that temperature and even              !
UI                                                          By looking at the computer data,    l
:        though they were above 200 in some cases.
20 they finally ended up with, well Brian Mehler ended up, picking the tampera-tures off at a specific time. I don't have any reason why it changed right 22 now, but it was like 260 above the relief valve so he... somebody said, 23 close the power failure relief valve, block valve and it was closed and it l
24 turned out that was in fact the problem. In the previous tape and I want      l 29j
          -l 24-1 i

12 1        -to clarify something. At the time the power operated relief valve, block
'           I 2;        > valve was closed,-okay, which occurs at 2.2 hours in that range, do you
: i.  ,3            recall the pressure trcnsient or the events that occurred or the things
;      4!         that you do recallJseeing when the valve was closed?
5
!      6 ROSS: ' Yeah I basically just got there when that particular thing happened.
4
;      7         ~I.was still trying to digest what was going on around me.         A pretty frigh-g          taning sight walking into something like this.        I am sure you can understand.
9          Right t.fter it was closed, Zewe turned around and said, "Geeze, that was-10          it, the reactor _ buildirig pressure is going down." So he figured'ha had g        ,
found where it was going at that time.
3 12 HUNTER: Okay, do you recall looking at the reactor coolant pressure at
'                 that time yourself or was...?
14 15l
    ' 16l
                            ** '     *** * ""       " S       *I'    **'         ' **   '       "'
know 1,300 or 1,400 pounds maybe in that area.       It was not high. It was    i l
not axtremely low.       It was lower than we would like to see it, of course.
19 HUNTER: Okay. And in your p evious statement we had gone through you did I
not note the steam generator primaries you'were actually concentrating to 21l the left side of the control board and you had discussions concerning getting a reactor coolant pump started.       Can you characterize those discus-sions, the reason for getting the pump-back on?
25l l
l l        I l
3 24-2

l 45LJWB                                                                                                                  17 I;                          the oncoming people at that time in              he morning. I think right 2         '
af ter I got there, 'about the time I got there the PORV was 3
u shut, and that is information I hind of picked up from there..
4 O-    Let's see if we can identify people related to j                                      this particular thing.           Is the t1me new about 6 # 00, 6:30 a.m.?
j        6 What time are we talking about?
R
       "       7 A     Yes,.to the best of my recollection it is some-o                                                                                                                   '
s        g-    ,
A                                    where around 6,30 in the morning.
i 9
      .'y
                     ,                                     Oc    And this would' include ycurself, Kunder, Zewe,
        ; ' 10 i            ,
who else?
l 11                                                 A i                                                        Ch, there were a lot of people there by that time, i 12 I                                                .-
a lot of staff engineers.
Logan was there. Maylor . In fact, i.
: to" i                                       I think he's the guy who shut it, er had it shut.            Ken Bryant.
E 14 j                                     There were a lot of people there, an awful lot of people there
         ; 15 i              j                       at that time in the morning.
l 16 !
Rogers?
0 l
: 17 i                                           A      That, I don't remember. I don't remember him i 18 i i
l d
distinctly at 6:30 in the mc17.ing, but I do remember him
           ;    19j                                                                                     I don' t remember 2
g around right after 7:00 or so, in : hat area.
20 '
I                      him distinctly at - 6 : 30.
21 0     Do you recall discussing this - that is, the fact 22
                           .                        that it was recognised that the valve had been open for some u.
j                      period of time and that this had centributed to the proble=
24j 3                       that you were then in -- was this discussed with Mi;.ler when 25 j                      he arrived?
3                                                                                     25-1 ALDERSON REPORTING COM AaNY ' N ''

: :,6 Jh3                                                                                  18 I                L        I didn't take part in what he got turned over from 2 j         Iewe when he arrived. I don't knew what :: ewe told hi= about it.
3           In the think tank, it was brushed across that the PORV was a 4
part of the prcblem and it's now shut; but at that time they j
N I
were looking at so many other probler.s that had kind of j     6        i mushrocmed secondarily and they had a lot of confusing informa-R C.
7           tion by then.
a s                       C.       But didn't that informatien indeed contribute to a 4
belief that this was the cause of the problem?       This is why 9f 10 'I         you were where you were?      The pressurized level was high, your 5              k pressure in the system is icw?
fII I2 f:
A.       Well, I don't think anybody ever jumped up and
: j. 13 ,             said:     We got here because the PORV is open. I don ' t thirJe l
E 14 ''         anybcdy ever pounded on the table and said that.        I'm sure it 3
      ?
g
       ~
15 l         was discussec.
l 3[ 16                     0        Didn't this statement that I just read in effect I
     ' g: 37 >)            say:     This is why we are where we are?   Would you like to
      ;      18 refer no it?
19 i
L        Would you reread it?
i 20 (Handing document to the witness.)
l l           21 1
0        It starts about line 12 on page 9, and I am 22j           referring to the Special Incuiry Deposition on Septerber 18.
23
                   ;                     (Pause.)
i 24 A.        I think that particular statement refers to the n
D     4 information we heard as we came int: the control reem I think i
ii 1
a                          ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.            25-2

l                              '
19
. .17 JWB         l is what that particular statement refers to.
            ~1 ,
                                    'Is the interpretatien that I just gave you the one
: 2)              4 i
3.i        that is correct?       Is my'inte..pretation correct, that this says 4          that this is. how we got here?
g      .5                A. I don 't think that 'says that. I think it's a n
    . ~g      6         statement of the fact of what happened at the time.         The
      ^
n
    .d        7         conclusion we draw from that is sometimes hard to defend j       8          later on.
J d       9                4      I'll refer you to another quote from testimony of z'.
                                                                        "Right after it was
      @ 10               yours to II in May, and this quote says:
E_
      ~
g      11          closed, Zewe came around and said, gee =, that was it.        Ihe t
I      12          reactor building pressure was going down, so we figured he'd 13          found out what was going on at the time."
       =
z g     14.                       Isn't that saying that there was a realization by t_:
{=   15          I ewe , and he's making this statement to othe:s, that:       Hey, g   16           this is why we got here.
e
         !!   17 l              A. I think you'd have to ask Bill that, but that's wha w
E    18          that would mean to me, yes, w
r=
g    19 l               0     And was this discussed with Miller when he arrived, n
20          or at sometime later?       I believe I asked you whether it was 21          discussed.
22                 A. Again, I didn't take part in what he was brief ed i
23 ,         on when he came in.      In the think tank, I'm sure it was kncvn knowledge that_ the PORV was open and had been shut, 24l D;                  4     And that it w'as open for some period of time, ne:
I I
l ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC. 25-3

20 f.18 M .
1;     just for a couple of minutes?
2 ,!        A.      Yes, it was open for seme period c. timer but I don't 3      know what the conclusion we at the time drew from that.               I       ,
    ..d  A5' 4       think that information was known. The conclusion was not.
Jh3 e    $~
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25-4 1

61
  .1 a significan t ite: .from the otner end'of the-phene t-    -hat 2 time.
3            .EE. YCSELEY:         What ateut'later?'
4             THI'EITNESSs.~Ii;ht. thirty in the mornin; I am 5 sayinc; I ha ve said .tha t I Ldon 't           recall.       He is askins me,.I
  -ebelieve, could that h e' s occurred in there, and you don't 7 :ecall it, and that could have :: curred in there.                               ! at          t 3
8saying at 7:15 I wouldn't have had any discussions.                                  I veuld g not allev any because of what ! vas su; posed -o de.                                At 8:30 10 that could.have c= curred, in that session and I den'- recall 33 it.
i2             None of the other peo;1e recall it either, because 13 the April inth tape that I made with that same g::t;                                --
34 Eoss, Seelin;er, Kunder, ! eve, 10gan -- did not, that !
15 :emember, have th a t in it.            If it did, it veuld have heen in 16 my testimony whi:h was de:ived f::: that.                        I am ::ying to go 17 back to vtere ve           e and not get centacinated with the 33 knowledge tha t vt     ti have since.
39             YE . STE1Lo t - It would he easier if we                         oved a 20 11ttle fe::ner dow- and pich this u; sometiz e la te r, b ecause                               t 21 there are a couple of ether related issues.
22             !E. %AUP 54         Let us take a break fe: a cin                          e.
23              (Srief recess.)
24 EE. HAE? STER: . Judge Ei;;in s said in the 0:::her, 25 19SC, interview -- our inspec::: referred :                              notes he rede ALDER $oN zgs0RTING coWPANY,INC-                26-1 400 VWIGINIA AVa. S.W,. W ASHINGToN, O.:, 20C24 (202) f Wu t

62 1 vhile on site, 7%I,_on.harch 2!:h -- said th a t a- 10:3C a.:.
2 he 'vas 5:lef ed by. Pubba Earshall :: Unit II status as of
             's 9130 a.m. , when ?.arshall lef t the Unit II cont:o1 room.
4 Hi;; ins said that Marshall and he unde: stood, that I?CV had 5 been stuck. pen lon;e: than 1: she:11 have been.
6             H1; gins also said to us that while he was in Unit l
7 :: there was concern about cycli:; the tiock valve and there gwas a general ~ recognition that the IX0V had failed cpen.
9             Rose has testified to us on Septemhe: 20 -- an d I e
10 Vill' :' peat wha     Ecss said:
11              " Questions    Th en it was open for some pe:iod of 1htime,not just a couple of rinu es?
13              " Answers    It was open fe: some period cf tir.e, but t
14 ! don 't know what conclusion we            t-        the time d:ev froo that.
15-   think that infor:ation was knovt..                   The conclusion was 16 n o t . When you a;;eed with re, vi n =y assessment, that this 17 1s what was said, is that in agree:ent today and in 18 a;:eemen t that 'that is what was bein; said on'.5 arch 28th?
L          19              " Answer:    It is an a;ree:ent.                 That is =y 20 testimony :: the best of my recollection.                          ! don't have a 21 iistinct knowledge of that ri;h                nov, that particular scene 22 a t this time.      ! do remember that PE0V scene.
23              " Question:     Let me make sure I unders$and what you 24 said . _Have you said that the fact that the PE07 was open 25 for a period of time'such in. excess cf what you veuld expect ALosmsow urosmwe cowaNY. mc.                   26-2 4co vmewan ava, s.w.
* Asmnatos, o.c. scena (act) sad.234s

63 1
  .1 it to have been e;en, and tha: this was discussed by menbers            l l
l 2 cf the .think tank and me:bers cf the supervision on vatch, 3o     in the cDetrol room in the ently :orning cf Ka rch 2Eth, 4 is that what you have said?
5              " Answers     I am saying to my recollecten we did 6 have knowledge that it was open fer a period, a len; period
                                      ~
7 ef tise. I can't testify that is the conclusion ve drev 6 from that at this tine."
l g             Zeve testified to us en Se;te:her uth, 1950:
l l
10              ".Qu est ion s   And that the I! Y valve being c;en has      l gg caused the plant status, hi;h ;;essuri:e: level and lov 12 ;;is try system ; essure.          Oid you conclude tha: the I!OV had 1
l 13 been open fc: a period of time?
14              " Answers      A t that poin t, yes.
15              " Questions      With whe: did you discuss this 16 conclusion?
gy              " Answers      At that tice tnere vere several peo;1e is present -in the cont:cl room, and it was more of a gg c:llective-type c nclusion.            Once ve had shut the bi:ch 20 valve to the ele::: tati: and the ;:ess:re chcnged 21 d:tsatically, we just concinded it had teen cpened;, but I 22 :eally didn ' t have a feel for exactly hev long.-
23              " Question:      Would you identif y these pec;1e for us?
24              " Answers      Ey cont:o1 :::: ::arators were still 25=
esmacs unca ma coumv.mc. 26-3

4 6,
i
]                                                                                            6n i   i present, the shift fertman.vas still ; esent, Erlan %ehle:,
2 was ; resent,. Geo;;e Kunder was ;;esant; I.believe Eike Ross 3vas'; esentiat that points and             en irian; and I an not sure
[,  4 of all lof 'the c:hers involved.          : believe that Er . Lo g an - vas l
l 5 als: ; esent at that point in t.i: e .                                                      ]
~
1 6              "*uestion     Concernin; the ' shutting of the b"ock                   .
7 valve, dec:aasin; rentainmen: ;;essere and increasing g primary system ; ess       e,  did ye: discuss that with "ary e Miller on Yarch 28, 1979?
10              " Answer:
I an certa : that we talked abcut it, 33 but I.am not sure exactly what tine-f rane 1: actually teck l
12 ;1 ace . like I have stated before, ! tried to cove:
4 13 everything that we had done and what had happened whenever 34 he came and teck ::arga , and . r. a : should have been amen; 2
15 th* '"
16 After all that, le        ce ask ycu the question a                      Were 17 you aware that the I!OV had been stuck open for a period of 18 time lonce: than it should have teen?
19              THE W:TNI55:     Was I aware in the time period of 20 vhat , Terry, a: 2:30 in the ==:nin;, E:00 in the merinin;?
      !s he talking "l400 c' clock in the norning?                     Can ye         tell?
21 22              EE. HARPETER:      He is talking of the initial briefing when you =ame in.           He testified tha t he briefed you 23 24 for about ten minutes after you a :ived in the cont::1 :coc.
THE WITNESS 4    I can't recall, but I don't holi e ve 25 1
b s
                             ,           u.cansos armoansa courmy. we.               .26-4
                               . . . . . .    . .   . . . . . . . ~ - - - . . - . . . . . .

                                                                                                  .1 1
1 65      I L
Lt thersionifi:anseL:f that valve being open was discussed at i
h 2 th AtT time a                                                                             ,
i 1
L      s               MR. HA P.?S*IE s ' Oiv en . h e testi=eny           --
l l
4-              BB. tOSILIYa           Let us n:     restrict it to the time                l l
5 when .he f arrived.
6               THE W!!NI554             am sayin; at 8:15 in theinorning,                  1 l
7 1f everybody had attached the significance to it, I don't s understand ' why I had to ;: ovide -he direction to keep E7!
i g on. I am tryin; to go back and ;in nyzelf on things I knov to happened on the 2E th.              I know-that happened and nobody 11 d4sputes that.            X:F'vas dire -ad            be secured and I said nc 12 on e,  without me, pe:sonally.               :f that had that significance, 33 vhy would that have occurred ?
34               E R . S I I L ,*. C : You recal* it vas said each cf them 15 had.a reservation :: conclusions drawn therefrom.                       We are 16 trying to deal vish only the iss:e ef the stuck-open valve, 17 no- the conclusi:ns drawn therefren.                    Don't brin; the two 18 :ogether, if that is what is causin; you: reservation.
3g.              Let us see if we ca             s rictly deal with the issue 20 0f the I!OY stu'ch :;en fe: a ;eriod.:f time lon;e:,than it 21 sho:1d have been.
22               ER. MOSI*.?Y:          I ;uess he is waiting for the 3 question.
24               Were 700' avare that !!O" had been stuck oven fe: a 25 period of time len;e: than it she:1d have been-on March 28th?
Ai.:suo* esponso coupAny. INC,    26-5

I 1
66 1-             TEI "~!FISI:                       I'ennn:         recall tha         piece of 2 information exac-ly today.
3:             EE. XCSILIY:                       !s the ;;chlem the use of the word                                     ;
1 4 "stu ck "?   Ea ause you seem -o :n villin; to agree that you 5 were aware that it had ben'epened fe                                    a period * . once: 'than
                              .6 it should have' earlier. Is the v::t " s t u e r. " . s ti c kin g in 7your mind and is.that a probier, and why ve a:e not somehov 5 able to nall this - devn?
9 THE EI!FISS:-'You are asking me specifically if I 10 vas aware         ne valve was c;en 1                             ;e: -han normal et -he 26th, 33 period , the.vhcle day, anytime d::i ; the day; is that right?
W 12                .E.
W.          OC   7_ '
_ .          Y. .e  V. e s .
13                ~HI WI!FISS8                       Not res?rictin7 it             2*   all?
_34                W: ' W M.
                                                -_.     . _C ?___    * * .V. . V. e s .
15                THE WI!FISS:                       I cannet today remento                 exactly.         I 16 :an't remember tedty any discussic: of that.
3-                EE. STIL*.C                       You are ::nfusing me.                 You and I had 18 a discussien jus- a dev mcments a; , when I was trying to is use your exact verds, and I th: ;h- that you a;:eed that the 2nvalve was o ened 10 ;er than i- sneuld have been?
21                IHI '"L.!NISS:
                                                             -                     That is           : e.
22                !E. STI~.LO:                      If I don't use the word " stuck" you 23 a; e e with the sta ement?
24                THI WIINISS:                        I acree ''ith  .       the statement.
Wo
                                                 ~-*     em- - a ,
                                                     -*-~~~                       Se    4 -3  4
                                                                                                   -~e vo - -
                                                                                                   ...       d "s       ~" -
* a *- ' s
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25                                                                                                                            l 1
                                                                                                                                                            !1 i
AL.osascN meommo coway, me.
26-6 1

67 1sto;;ing ye 'f::: answerin; this question?
2:              THI EITEISS: ' The.verd " stuck" is -- eliminating 3 the verd "stu e;." do es m ar.e th e question diff erent te me, I l
l i
sguess.
5               ti. SOFL10:      Can you tell me why?
6               TEE WITFIES:       Because the valve opened loncer than 7 norm al vould' rupture that disk.and clers, that is, has 8 opened -bef ore as opposed. to sticking cpen f : a very len; gperiod Of time.
10               '?.
f   STE1LO:      What vecid be tne reason that the 11 Valve-VC:1d te OPen for a lo Ce: 78:1od Of time, in your 12 mind., Icc ce: than normal?
g3               TEE WITNESS:       It would have to be electro or 34:echanical, in my' mind; either the valve didn't get the 35 sign al' to shut 0: it didn't shut; but it cocid have been 16 e;en f or a ;eriod of time icnce: than normal and then shut.
37 Dcring that period uf time it v:uld have been cpen eithe:
16 due te bei:; stuck         : due to an electrical ;;chlen.
gg               %E. SOELLO:       That is the distinction?                  " Stuck" to 20 you ceans :echanical, not electrical?                      If it did not close 21 because cf an elect:f. cal probier , youw veuld net describe 22 that 'as stuck?
'                                                               des::ibe that as stuck, u,
        -                TEE WITNESS:       I would ne 24 :ich t. When y u say " stuck", t            me it means -he valve 25 ele:trically har been told to neve an d it stuck, as 0;; sed ALDER $0h RE*CRTING CoWPANY, lN:,
                   , .          .. a.400 VIRGINLA AVL $.W. WA$HINGioN,0.0. 20024 (2Ch $$4 234$ 2b"7

2 68 1
e an e'ect:ical
                 .             ;;oh"e- or 1:ss f pover, which veuld have 2 occ : red and that valve vould have fai'ed e;en, as opposed .
3 to being s :ck open.
:    4              I' ealize that the fai;                   ;.en part had been 5 ::::ected en:11er in -his plan .                      Ona- is the dif'ference 6 betweet your distinction and :1 e.
7              ME. 5"ELLO:              guess :tyhe wha t we eucht to do is                 )
g talk abeut is bein;-open'for a Lenge: ;eriod of time.                             If we 1
g don 't   use the verd " stuck", i- :ight he easier te                                      l l
10 cer unicate.      Yhy don'- you               ry that for a while?                        1 1
: 2. ECSILIY:          You testified that on               arch 2 9 th. you 11 i   12 were aware that EdOV vas'c;en'f:: a period of time longer                                ,
!   13 than it shocid have been; is that correct?
34              TEI'W!!NESE:           Today's testimony?
w:    wa e 15              -*       .. t..v.      v. e s .
16              THE WITNE55s            Yes, I have said that.
ER. EAEPSTI?:            In fairness to him, it is 17 18 ch ar acte:1:ad as having been c;ened for a short period of 39 time, as opposed :: lenger.
                    %?.. E~ELLO           He a; eed i           vas c;en for a locre:
20 i   21 ;eriod of time -han normal 22 If you can try to relate some of the things that 23   have been said :c decide on what -hat means --
ER. EA?? STER:           Gary, when you say "lon;e               than it 24 25 shculd have been," are you talking of seconds, ninetes, i
M.canses assosmNG CoMDMY. INC. 26-8
                                      -,u......,.        ..,...........~..--..---.-.-

i 1
  ,                                                                            69 1 hcurs? . Would you characteri:e f:: us vha: you :ean?
                                                     ~
l 1
2;            THE WITNE23:   As op;osed to hot:s--ne             hours:                   i 1
: 3. seconds or minutes, but not hours.
1 4             ER. HAR?STIn:   A relatively short pe: icd of tice?                          l l
t 5            .THE WITNESS:   Yes.
L6             EE. HAEPSTEEs   0; posed to a lan;e          period?                         I 7             THE WITNESS:   Yes.                                                          l 8             ER. STEL10    What was y:ur b sis f or making the i
gstatement that it was irrelevant, a sh ::ter pe riod cf ti:e?                            I 10 What infor:ation do you recall :: the 2Eth that made yo                                 '
l 33 answer that.vay?
12             THE WITFISS:   I am sayi:; st at during the six 13 o ' clock phon e call, Vic, when I k:ev the tank disk vas u ru ptured, I would have know the valve would have been o;ened 15 longer than      vould have expected on plant ::ip, period; and 16 that lence: than expected is a sher          period of time.                            )1 1
17             I am sayin; I would have had kneviedge of that in                            1 18 the bach of my mind from experience.
19             ER. STE110:   What did y:u plean from th e plan:
20 :endition that made you cc:clude i- vas relatively shor , a 21 f'W Ei3Ct*8, rather than hours?
22             THE WITNESS:   ?:obably because the answer case 23  back the block valve was shut.       When we asked the nex:
24 10;ical qeustion -- you can't see that valve's ;esitien; ve 25 all knov that    --
s: you don't have an actual ;crition Actases menostino coupA.c. iwe.
26-9

70  1 1 availahility f:: tha              valve.                                         Y:                         1:7.'s have a pesition 2 indicator.       So the question tht- .ae Ec;ers asked on that 3 :all vas, "Is the valve behind it sh: ?"                                                                            Which you do have 4 .t position indicate: for.                                         The a:sve: was, "We vill check."
5 The answer :are back "It is shus," ar.d that stop;ed me f rom 6 thinking about the I!OV fe: a whi*e.
7             EE. STI1LO4             The fact                                                    ..a : they told you the block a valve was shu- is when you cen:1cted in your nind that it gdoesn't matter about the PICV, -ha- ;ath is isolat6d?
So             OHI E!!NISS:              That is right.
11             MI. STILLOS             So you ide tified it your mind block 12 valve shut, pa-h isciated, right?
13             THE E!!NISSs              And identified we didn 't understand ,
14what we'had based on it.
15             XR. STILLO:             That is hev y:                                                               decided that the rath 16 was isciated?
17             THE 9:!NI55:              That is right, didn't think about is the EYOVs that is the though ;;= cess.
ig             ER. STILLO:             You asked that at 6:15.                                                                Would it 20 have been reasonable to conclude it was open until the block                                                                                l 21 valve was closed?
22             THE W:!NISS:              It would .. ave been reasonable to 23 conclude tha t now?
24             MR. STILL0s             No, then.
25             THE VITNISS:              I don't think so.                                                               We didn't knov ALosasoN 4ED:RTING CoWANY,INC, 26-10       !
     ~                                              400 VIAe4N!A AVE. a.w. WAswtN3 ton. D.C. 20024 (232; $84 234A l_-__ - -- ..        .                ..    . . . .        . . _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ - - - _ - - _ -

1 71 1 that they had just shut it.
2            MR. STILLO4                                   Ixcuse ne.       ! didn't ask you vhen athey shut it, because you did not know the position on the 4 PROV . You did know the position on the block valve, that 3 when the block valve was shut at that time that is when the 6 path was isolated?
7            TEI W!!NISS:                                   Eight.    ! think that va in the phone 8 etil sade the assum; tion f ro: the answer we got that the                                                  i e valve had been -shut previously, and h ere ve are; we didn't i
10 know that at that instant the va*ve had been shut. There            .
1,1 had not teen any time lapse." !! you look at the times that 12 tre documented, :i;ht at that period it nust have heen right 13 af ter, they must have looked right after we acted.
34            The answer came ba ch, "!: is shu ."                                             Ve didn't ge 15 back and say anything about that.                                        We said, "Ch, that is not 16 the cause of the ;;oblen."                                    Wo.stid, "What the hell is it?"
17 That is when we ven,t in and tried to figure it out.                                              Gec:ge 18 had gone th:cuch the discussion :n the phone about the 19 :uptured disk and all that.                                     He knew that.         That questien 20 that came out was the one that sa ;*d have been as'.ed                                         r      We 21 didn't pursue the ancver and say, you know, "hov 1:ng has it 22 been shut?"   The answer that ca:e back gave no indication of 23 its not being shut, and you vouli have expected possibly 24 that it was shu    earlier in the ::ansient.
25            ER. STILLC                                 At what tire did you have your first ALDEP$o% RI*oRTING COMPANY, INO, 26-11

72 1 briefingi..
THE WITNIES:   7:05.
3             ME. STE1104   What did they discuss then at that 4first'briefin;?
W 5             THE-WITNESS:   ; did:'t have a briefing.          Bill Zeve E talked to te over the cabinets Ebcut what he had.             He was at 7 that t'it e , he ended'up as the e:er;ancy director, because he 6 had sighted the emergency ~at te: :: 7' 00.          I den't remember sthe plant conversation.
'                                He rene:1ers t elling you abcut the 10            .EE. STE110 33 vtive being, stuck open fe: a 10 ; tire.
12             THE WITNESS:   I am not agreeing or disagreeing.
13             XE. h0SE1IYa   That is nct co::ect.          He does not      ;
l 34 recall what he said to Gary.
15 G ing ba:k to ot: dis::ssi:n ea rlier, you don ' t 16 :ecall bein g told of this dramatic rise in ;;ssure, what 17 caused thatt the problee you had been concerned with when 16 you lef t home no longer existed in terms of ; essure, that 19 vasn 't discussed?
20             THE WI!RESE:   I don't re:all that being 21 discussed. I was also tryin;     : ge     across to yeu that if 22 everybody realized what you are saying, then I. . d e n ' t Z3 understand why at 8:15 I had to be the one to say , " Turn the 24 vater on."    I am not trying     : dis;ute anybody's testi:eny, 25 but I am trying to say if that was ::snsmitted to ce ir the i
i x.csmsoN MPoCNG CoWPANY,INC,      26-}2 l
I

73 1 co r.* e x.*. .v o c a. e s =. "_'
                                                                                     ;     .*.. ,     *'e... "..'.;" ' .' ..'.= . o - . ". . '.
                                                                                                      . . .                          __               .          .                .~ . s ... '
t .' .'
2 n o *.            .k.           v e ,. an.a          tv..*. . . a .s .a      o c.. .L..           a.2..        .a . _as -.n .s.e..
                                                                                                                                         .                     ..          c..w a ...
3                                             !!. MOSILI!:                       Were y n tvare thsh the block valve l
4 was bein; crened and closed te h:-h cent:ci ; essure and to 5'et v=*e. ou
                             -              -                              a..' '. .h e s .-     v e e .-             d. . . ' ~- .           - .'. e --- . r d . ?
i                                                                                               l 6                                            v:: -~ y - . .>s; r. c-- e t        n~ C   . -a . ., . e
                                                                                                                                             ~..n     a n.,
                                                                                                                                                           ,       y. e ea .                                       l 7                                            XR. "0!!!IY:                        Unless the IX0V vas c;ened, the 8 block valve vocid n:t have let                                                                          t.'. e va a: out, vculd it?
s                                            THI WI?;ISS:                        No; !                 *1'          n:t knov which valve 'ike 10 was usin . . He v:uld have had te use both :: ;e                                                                                                          vater out 1.1
: w.      tw.a.
                                       . .                   .,a...a.
12                                             EE. %;IIIIY:                       Unless :.'.e 7% V was stuck c;en?
13                                             THI W:7FIYr                         Eut he v: 1d n:t have know that; he 14 vould have ;iven the va*ve a c:::an' si;nal.                                                                                                      '#
                                                                                                                                                                               -he valve 15 was stuck Open, he veuld never have kn:V that the valve was 3gnot cyclin;.                                          The valve does n:- have anything b:: a ecmnand 17 sign al.
vm       e r--                   -                  saa.      ..                     g, ..   ----a .--
16                                             -' ---<--               ,        'gy,               ---- -                -y..                           y..       .s
                                                                                                                                                                                    -~a...             -
                                                                                                                                                                                                               .I gg ar -. ..*..g                               .o   . ead. *..5 e s- ". e .e          ...* ' .. .= - d.    .          .. s ". e . :
                                                                                                                                        =                                                                        I 20                                             "c'8''-
                                                                   =             -
                                                                                               --*-*~ ~'--    -       - ' -'        --            s''-'*'                 '
                                                                                                                                                                         '-      'e
                                                                                                                                                                                           - - C~/-
I 21 valv e , decreasing containment ; ess :e and increacin; p.<.      g..,
i 22           ... ..                        svg.
                                                               .   . ..     .,.,ssg
                                                                               .                  , a ..a. a           v.. . . a .a _, . . s s .. s.
                                                                                                                                   .                         . .. .. . .a ... s. a .a       ,
23 w432 . c.** -3.d'_'
24                                              "Aasva
                                                                      -                 ' a-
                                                                                         -          -     e -'                  -' *       -
v a ta ' k e d a * * -
                                                                                                                                                                                         --i --
sa 25 ' am -et               "                   s" e        er=--'v v"-' = *- -' s ' a e
                                                                               -                              ~~-                      --
                                                                                                                                                    -     a c u a ' ' '. -~~~-
r-
}                                                                                                              cans:s are =.Tmc coumv.me.
t 26-13
                                                                                           ...,...........o.........                                          ,. .. , ,,.,,....,.,

Tu 1pla:e."
2               'a' hat : vas tryin~;!:: ;et at is, when did he talk 3 to? you ateu           it?          ".e'   is - es :nn ' t h at ' h e did.          There are many 4 times' an' ansver ysta:ts e u,t- in diseussin; Three %ile Island 5 where - r. bedys. says anythin; L abcut bein; certain.                                      The reason 6 it stuck s: ;*ainly in :.y.nencry is because it is ene cf the
                                             ~
7 fev times.he stif he is certain he talked to you about it; 6 but he does r.et - re . ember era :*                     . y when.
9              ". E .       P. A 'J P I X :    Aran't y:u first askin; if he recalls 10 Zeve-talki:; to him?
33                 Mi. STILLO:                     That was not my question.
12                 M*. mat?!N:                     The e st recent ene was wh en ?
13                 E .2     .STILLO:               I as aying Zeve said he is certain 14about talki..; te'hi: about 1, rut he is not                                           --
15                 3E. %ACPIN:                      You are askin; him when?
16                 XE. STILLCs.
Startin; at 7:00 o' clock, when he ;ot 17 there, did he cention it then?
18                 THI WI!!iESS:                      I d:n't recall.
19                 MB. S~ILT.O s = Can yo                         recall any time on the 20th 20 Zeve speaki:; about the 510:k valve, decreasin; contain er.t 21 P 'S82:8 inf i : 81810;                             :i:1:Y SY8 tem E '882 '' 1Y ti:e it E2 all on the 2Eth?
l 23 TEI WITNESS:- Vic, ! can't recall.                                       I have said in      i 24 :espese te Terry that in tha t first think tar.k neetin; th'at                                               q l
25 could- havbe been disucssed and I don't recs 11 it.                                                          !
i AL:ER$0N REPORTING COMP ANY,INC.
26-14 .      ,
400 VIRGINIA AVE. S.W. WASHINGTON. D.C. 20C24 (202) 554 2345      l 1
1

75 1               ' !? . MOCI1IYs      Ooss the con;ute: ;ick                 ; ce::end 1
a 2 signals to the IYOV ?
3-                3R. EAU 7IF       Eefore you ;c on, I kncv tha: the 4 testimony coes speak for.itself.                    I take it you a:e tying to 5 get semethinc.fron which ye                can drav some inf erer.ce among 6 other thin;s about the extent t:.Which Zewe .1;ht have 7 talked about the langth of ti:e when the valve was :;en.
8 We have been addressin; tve questions 4 whether he gknew i: vis open at all, and if he did, whether he had tny 10 :eason. to f orm seme conclusien as te how len; it had been 11 open . Zave.said that he had :: feel f:: ext:tly '.c v lon; 1:
                                                  ~
12 had been c;en based on the sa:e informatics Ceve :ee:s to 13 think he told Millar.
34                ER. MOSE1EY:        Dc y e: recall the outstandin; 15 qu es tion ?
16                YE. ETILLC:       " hat is the thrust of what yet have 17 just said?
33                K ?. . %A"P!N:    The 1:::ession I have, fe: better c:
gg fe: vo se, is that for the last -vc hours yet have been 20 ex;10:i ; funda:entally two ques-iins:                       (a) te what extent i
21 5:- Eill'        C*1i'V*d t Et 8 C o i ~ ' O f- th' 50 Tin; Of TEICh 22 26th that the IPOV had been ceps f or lonce: than n:::ti.
23                 ZR. STI1LC4       *4e have :*arified
                                                      .            that.
24                 U. %!.U? ifs      The se :nd is, wht              basis ..e had fer 25 forting a jud; ent, if any, as te hev lon; the valve had esasoN mapomT1No coupANY. iNO.
26-15 400 VIRQlNIA Ad. $ W., WASHINGioN, D.C. 20024 i t $54 234!

I
                                                                                         '76 1 heet 0;st.   .
2            1 was sin;1y afriad that in using the leve 3 testimony you were tyring to ;; ovide' the basis. for draving 4 an 'inf erence aheut whether Zeve night have told Miller about 5 how long the I CV had been open.                                                          4 1
6            I simply want to point out that on the ;;evices 7 page cf his testimony, Zeve said he did not have a feel fe:
aexactly how long the IECV had been 0;en.
g             EE. STILLC      You ou;ht         =. read the whole thing.
10 He said, ";, t that time there were several people present in 11 the cont :1.roon and it was mere cf a collective type of 12 :en:1csion once ve had shut the hiock valve fron the                                       l 13 electromatic and pressc:e char;id d:amatically, we just 14 concluded it had-been opened."
15            Then he added, "But 1 really don't have a feel for 16 ext:tly hov long."
17             rooving, I think reas:: ably f::= that statement, 18 that the valve had been open when they ci::ed the block 19 valve because it was the syste: :han es they saw that 20 111oved thee te ron:1ude at that -ime the valve vas c;en,
                                                                                                 )
21 that is what we are trying te establish.                   This is ve.,                       i 22 im; : tant info:mation and whether c: not that was kncvn and 23 by when is i:;ortant.
1 24            *What I as trying te ur.derstand d : myself is when 25 someone s a:ts a     uestion with he is confident of somethin; 1
ALosasoN mapomMNG CoWANY, WC.                 26-l6           i 4
ano vmomiA Avt. s w. wAsumotoN. c.c. 20o24 (2c21 sad ms           .

77
      -1 that is unusual, ve:y rarely de ve vet anybody saying he'is 2 'confid en t of anything.             In this case, he did.                    .
      .3                THE 'AI; NESS:          Did y:u ask me if tne'contand sicnal 4 as on the cec;u er?
5-              53. %3 SELE 75          Tec.
L e-              THI. WITNISS :          I thitk it is.               ! helieve it is.                   !
7 believe the computer gets an input where it can :sil. I
       'sdoc't-kncv that it is a dem:and si;nal. :t ocid be the g pressure sensing si;nal.                 I think it is ;; bably a command 10 sign al.-       .
11               !?. MOEILIY:            Oc: review ef.the cc ; uter data-does 12 not indicate sf.at this valve was beinc Oc;ers ed, th a t -he 13 only valve that was bein;                   ;ersted was the bicek valve.                             Is 34 it yec: statement that you verer.'t avara whether c                                          not both      I 15 VtlV'8     V'
* l'in? 3F'C3t*f?
16                THI %!!NIIE:           That is rights that is ry 17 st at emen t. I an also sayin; if you icek at -he NEAC 3g ;;in t= ut , doesn't that say the valve had an 0;en cc. mand 39 signal startin; at 7:30, the valve bein; the I!OV?
: . - *i : . . . -..x ,.a   ve.
v:
                         -*   v *- er. rv.4
                                       .         . .>. s 4 , e    ...*,e, 20 21 TEI W:!PISI:               a: sayin; hiha Fess v::1d have 22 done that, tr.d ! vocid net have needed t: Kn:V :nat.                                        The 23 operatien of these tvc valves ;1us the c her ene which coes to the frei: sink, ! voult                 :: have necesst:1y kncvn which 24
      .2nvalves they .*:e dein; spe idi: r.a ni;tia tion s with.
u
!-                                                     canseN manomnNo :ousam. is:.                    26-17 400 Vi2GINIA AVa 8.W. WASHINGTON. c.0,20C24 (20h $6d 2345

              ,1 J.'
: e.          .
78
                        <1                _M?. C SI1IY: " ~. e t : e ;: :n te screthin; else'fe a
i                '
2aoments        We may co:e tack'to this.
4
  ,'                     3;               .Y cr. estimony t: us'in September related te the 4 EMCV . c     :stner'the'ticek valve.. You said , "Certainly !
g votidEhave been           encerned ahec                 the other valve, but my
    .                    6 history.cf Inilt:e of.the blocr. va*.ve, it was a ;a.e valve,'
o 7 I believe, and it tends to sti:k sometimes open c: shut."
What was -he failure history yet had expe:ienced-
                                                        ~
8 3                                                                                                             ,                               .
;.                       p vith..the-block valve?.
l                      10                 THE WITNESS:            The valve was a cate valve and the                                          1 I 11 ' hi st or y ! had ex;erience'd was in " nit I, be atse :y res;cnse                                                 j l
i 12 in the te stimony wa s that the 11cek valve had a tendency to                                                         j i
13 stick open and shut.                                                                                                   1 14                  ME. MOSI1IY:         ,
D    7 0; ::al how many?              Was it less 15 th an a' half de en              r mere th an a half dozen?
16                  THE 'd:TNESSi          1 vividly recall Unit I bein; five 17 c:: six times.            ! don't ha've er ;oed a recall on Unit I 18 because ! wasn't as.close :: th e te st program.                                                                     ,
3g                  !E. X C EII.IY :       Set: sta ement refers to some                                                . '
                   - 20 perf er:a .ca related              .o Uni: I's h*.ock valve; is that =c::ect?                                           l 1
                                                                                                                                             -I 21                  THE %!TNESS:           Ey sta erent refers te the fact that                                           I 4
i l                     22 the valves,on t:; of the ;:ess :1:e: in either unit in an 23.ed d environ:ent is inside the building and it has the 24 potential :: stick, and tha .her happened.                                                  .
25                  That was only one                    f a   : ple cf cen= erns that I e
ermsou atoonimo cowAm me.                 26-18 ano wnom:4 Avt s.w. wAssmaTow. o.c. toop (2o2: es4.aus                             i
                                                 .    -     -          t-- - ,         - .-m- r -w   --*.c       mr         -      - .    -4

l
  ,'        s'
                                                                    <.                                                           _33 1-                    this is sene:hing-he.should-have tolf yeu?
y            -2                                A          Yes.
I
               '3     .,
0'         okay.            Or they.should have told you.
                       #~
               - 4;                              A           Yes.
i.
s             5:                              Q          Agai'n I would''like to ask you why you feel this l
   .3 i  j;             6I [ 'informatien was not passed en Oc yeu.
I
   'l             7'j                             A           Again probably the same reasons I gave fer the other.                 ,
                        'l 11
; -j _ c 8L [                                   ' O.          Chay.          And then I will ask you -- I wcn't go through                 'l
     .g .                   l.
2 9[ the. list of cuestiens again, but ceuld I ask you whether you
    .I                      ,
the state may have been i:         10 i                       feel that other crganizations withi i
j           11l.giventhisinformatien?'
g d                     ..!_                    A          I don't believe so, net to ey knowledce.
12 z-E.          13 '                             Q          Ancther fact, the electrcmatic relief valve had been-x
      =           14                       stuck cpen for a period in excess of two hours.                             To vour knowledga a
a                       (
x 2           15                       en March 28th, was this informati:n                       assed on?
    . 2.
u                    .;
     .g           16                               A          Yes , it- was, in conversatien with Gary Miller,.he M.                      ,
y          17                       told- roe the valve had been stuck cpen.                     The indication was faulty,
    .sp
: 7. - '18                            an'd it wasn't indicating the' preper position on the indicator,
        .=
T 19                                   and the valve was new closed.                      Eu: this was again a              9:00 a.m.
5 20                                Q          Did he tell you how icng the valve had been open?
21                        .v.aybe not two hours, tut a long ti=e?                    or do ycu recall a period 22                        ef time?
23-                               A          I think he indicated'it was open fer a fairly icng 24-                       pericd cf time, : believe.
                                                                                                            ~
25                                0         ckay.             Before we started the inte..iew,        ycu gave us
: ALOERSON REPORTING COMP ANY. INC.                      27-1

  -[
j                                                                                                   i j                                                                                                   1
                     ~1 '      9 : 30, the ' conditions in Unit 2 were, . and .I . have a readout. of                       -1
: 2. ,    the plant status.
                          .1 a
3 .'            Q      LIs that the --
s                                                                                                   1
: a.                   j 4'              A-      Actuany this 'is not really the plaht status. ' Fell, t
: 1. -
s,.
5!.-
it's a: plant status, plus -it's a rundewn of what had happened te -              j.
L       ~ 3.
u
                     -6'   .
Lin the initial accident.
m r.
E.,           7'                      BY MR'. ECEFLING:
         .               m ra                ;
[ -8 i' Q       Jim, I think you just referred to the ' time of your i
         =              9,;    a.rri'tal as 10:20.            Did you want to say that?
:i E           10                A-      In Unit 1, not Unit 2.             It tcok about an hour to get
         =                 ;
2           11        Over to Uni: 2.
         <                 l 3                 ;
12 -'             Q       okay.
1
        'h_
13                        BY MR. MCSEI.EY:
          =
A.'         14                0-     New is this time -- I guess I'=               conf 2 sed en that.
E           15                A       This is the status I get in Unit 1 at arcund 10 --
          =
: y. .     :16          ::cbab1.v hv the time I c.et this fr:m Subba Marshall, ~ had v.
H
          .           17        been in Uni: 1 fer maybe a half hcur, so it may have been 10:45 x-                                                                                                                 .
1 E_                 .by -he time I get this particular status.                      Subba Marshall had
           -          16 .
c
           ?          19        been in Uni: 2, had evacuated ever Oc Unit 1 centrol room, and
           =
20          -;.e las: ti e he had been in Uni: I was about 9:30, so he t:1d 21         me as of 9:30, this was his understanding of what had happened.
22                Q        Okay.       So you got this a: around 10:30, but it was 23          his reperti..g           c you of his knewledge at abou: 9:30 when '.e              left:
24                 A       Right.
25                 0        :*cw is that the place where yet have the notatien of ALDERSON REPORTING COMP ANY, INC.                 28-1

53     :
l I
1              in the system.      I know one of my pet concerns, which'I i
2              think was a more serious concern on ny part than any of the 3              other concerns that were being considered, was the fact i!                                                                     d=; ' that we could be concentrating boric acid in the core, I
5j            beca use any water that is getting in, if it is getting in, 6             it is fla shing to steam and that is a cooling mode at that 7 : . point in time.
I 8;                         Of cou: se, we didn't have any level indication so
                                                                            .t 9      : you couldn't be certain what the level of coolant would be I
I assumed that there is a significant 10 linthecore.
11             possibility that this boiling action that could' be occurring 12       l would be concentrating the boric acide in the core.                    I was 13        ; becoming worried that after some period cif time, which 14             quantitctively I couldn't define, we could actually form a 15             slurry boric acid which possibly could impede per the 16       ; cooling.
17 l                 I guess in the morning that was -- that iss ue 18       I along with the issue of how do I assure that I am indeed 19        , cooling the core were the major ones in my mind.
20                    Q    Was there ever anxiety about the core actually 1
21        ,
being uncovered during this period of time?
I 22                   A    I believe it would be saf e to say that there was 23         i some anxiety along that line, but intuitively I believe I i
24         j always felt the core was covered or at least being cooled i
25          l sufficiently to stop any increase in core temperatures or
                                                                                                     ..-.................u.........a..-.......-...
4 29-1

    . . .     .                               .                   .          --.          ..- =- ..          . -
5t.
1 l increase' in the voiding. that we may have e::perienced.                     We-2         I couldn't: prove it.          Tnere were no indications to prove that 1
3          i we were' cooling the core effectively, d
In that regard there was anxiety about guaranteeir:
i 5            ;that if we'-had the core cooled and verifying something that                          '{
1
            '6         l we' intuitively felt was occurring, either through direct                                  I 7               cooling with water or by. some steaming that was, .of course, j removing heat.
8.
9 1-                  Q'   _ How did the high hot leg temperatures figure in .
10               this evaluation?                                                                      ;
11 A    We were looking desperately for those temperatures I
12        ,
to show a Becrease and that would point towards an improve-i 13        i in our condition.
l ment 14       '
Tnroughout a good portion of the morning and I 15       ,       guess into the afternoon, those temperatures were not 16               responding as we were hoping them to respond in order to 17 -             use those as a basis for suggesting core uooling was le               improving .
19                     Q     Were the hot . les ta=peratures disbelieved?
20                      A     No,.I never disbelieved the hot leg temperatures.
!                 l 21                I thought they were about 800 degrees, in that range.
22 I think that we had believed in those because we 23                had~ more than one RTD telling us the same information.
2d
                ,                 Q So what you are saying is the hot leg temperatures l
25 ( showed you that you might not be getting out of the core
                                          .........,......u.m. .....s...a.....-....... . . .
J 29-2            ;

1               cooling with this particular mode of cooling?
2'                    A.   - At the time I viewed the hot leg temperatures of i
being representative of voiding steam in the core, I vis ua lize'd 3~'
l:
A : ? the reactor: cooling system as being steam bound in the
'.                                l
                           ;5 j upper 'section of the core -and hot legs-themselves.                                Since l-                            6-
                                             .we were relieving steam through the electromati.e relief
                           .' 7     ,
valve at- various portions of time in the morning and after-8!              noon, . that we were removing some heat.                We could not 9               confi.rm from those indications whether that removal of heat to                was adequate- to keep the core safely cocied or improve the 11-               cooling of the core.           We did not hcve indications that e uld 12                conclusively confirm that the core was covered in its t                                                                                                       1 13                entirety.
14 I believe that there was some possibility that is               we were having . steaming in the core which wa s contributing 16         -     to some voiding.and I guess in a technical sense you could 17                say the core was not fully covered but it was being cooled is               to some extent.        Sat is the way I think I perceived things 19               at'that time.
20                     Q     1 ate in the morning a ' decision was made to depressur-21               ize the system and to blow down to try to go on decayed 22               heat and to try to get the core flood tanks into the core.
23           ,
Why.was that decision made?                 Was that made simply because j
4 24              'you couldn't satisfy yourself that the strategy you had 25                employed during the morning was definitely working?
                                                                  ........,........%...u....,,,....~         .....
29-3

11   i r                                                                                            i i.
I , situation.                                                                                      l t
i 2,                       I think that ;it is unfair to task anybody with this i
3 j sert of Monday morning quarterbacking with the cerfect vision that t
t                                                                                           )
l         4 ,we all have after an event.
i 5
h g       5,                       MR. HARPSTER:    I think one thing you should und.erstand, R                                                           '
    $      6            and one of the reason that we repeat this question and' asks these                    )
I
                    ' gentlemen for their opinion, is that we are tasked with the i
E                                                                                                         ,
f' ' O [ prcblem of trying to write better reporting requirements , and 2                                                                                                         i
      '.  '9            determine how better to get this infermation.                  So it is necessary     !
z                                                                                                         l
:                1 g     10            to have these gentlemen's opinion.      t*e find it necessary te ask                  l z
    =                 -
11          , it.
4 t
12                        BY MR. EAR? STIR:
{*
                                                                                                              \
13 C    Gecrge, you have previous *y testified that en the z
I4           morning of March 28, 1979, af ter the reactor coolant pumps were
     =
{a    15           shu:'off, the hot-leg temperatures sreamed up.                  You were impressed 3
        ?  16           by the magnitude of 700 to 80C degrees of the 'he -les temperatures .
e I7           You e. arceived the core as being cooled              b>' over-heated steam.
N.
w
{     18          That is , you were censiderably in excess of the satura:icn
* 19 g                 temperature.
20                       And, you never disbelie*.*ed the he:-leg temperatures 21           because you had more than ene RTD te' ling you the same
            *2 infermation.
23                       Did you at any time en March 25, 1979, dis cus s                his 24          inf:rmation or its Duplicaticas with Messrs. Miller, R:gers, T*in:,               .
25         g,;3,13,   ewe, Mehler, er Chwastyh7 ALDERSON REPORTING COMP ANY. INC.                       30-1

                    -.                 .         .           -.     - -  , -   - ~ . . - - . -.-.-. -. . - - - . - . -
                                  .s L
1                                                                                                    - 12
                                       \.
                                  ;}.
i n.
Ii                   EA   I' would _ have .been engaged ' in various strategy discus-i                                      h-
                            ,  .2 p,; sionsowith ir. . Miller , 'and tir. ?. gers , drcughout the.=crning, ?.nd :
1'
 ;                              3..
1     i.
e; thatlinformation was a parameter that was a factor 1.n those i
                                  'i. .
2,                                    t 4 .c' n discussions.             But I don't remember an
* soecific discussions.
                                                                                                              .                           I
                . 's : 5J just; remember that at variou's ti=es we assembled in the ahif t n* ,              I
                 .                    f,
                .g-            6 supervisor's office, and perhaps cu: in the control roc =, and
                -e                  r
: 5.     ' 7 j discussed what we were goingito. dc .. ext because we recognized that'                                           I t                   E'                L                                      '
f                              8
                 'A                         we:did have a need to establish eccling : hat we- could identify
: i.                 .; -              .
h                 ',           9 l with, and. conclusively .say was -a situation that was under control.
:                   E               l
              'g 10[                                     I really cannot remember any specifics, though.
2                G
.                  =
                                                        ~ Was a record kept of the data ' indicated by the extended 4
4                                 0 IIl1 i
i:
1 5
12 {5 scale. read-out device connected :: the hot-leg RT".,7
:               e
!                  g      13 i                       A-  I can't remember - any spe:ifi: records, but there could 14 5
be records of that information.             ;f it is available, it would have
                   =                e 15 l
been retained by the data reductic.. grc.:p, and it would certainly B
+
j       16 7 be available today.
7:
J I{      17'l                   - Q-On March 28, 1979, what was your evaluation of the
                   ~
i=
i '1B [ hot-leg. temperatures when they sharply increased af ter the reactor 3
n-     I9 I cociant pumps were shut down?
: n.               .
l                         20' k                      A  ~~My general' recollection is tha - they indicated that we 4
21 i had an abnorral ' situation in the plant.
I think . tha t thos e 22              conditiens were beycnd- the bounds of plant conditions that I was a
                         ;23 , used .to dealing ~ with.-
: t.                                                                                                                                              t m                    .241                           My general perception cf the reactor coolant system                                   .
25            .eas that' it was indicative of the veiding that we had.
                                                                 ~
I cannot j..
G-i                                 ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.                                             ,
30-2

13
                 }'
T recall specifically when' I. reached that general' f eeling ,' or tnat 3
                   . ' l-u 2               conclusion.         It was sometime, ed c c:rne, af ter the temperatures
                   .6 t
3 ; went up, and af ter many discussions with dif*ferent people.
You
                  .p 4 1 gradually reached that' perception.
1 a
e       5 L'                             I cannot remesnbar any specific time frane for me'to-n             'i N
     .                 1 L
6 ' draw that conclusien.
l    t l-6 7
Q       John Flint of S&W testified that he advised several N
     $        8 ipeople, including: Lee Rogers and Gary Miller, that the zagnitude w                 a i
9 icf the temperature of the super-heated steam wculd preclude the
      ?                 j z
10 :abilitv to collarse the bubble.
i 11                                Were ycu aware, on P. arch 25, 1979, er did you take part u                  .
       "    12 i                  . in, or overhear a .y discussions =f these concerns?
       =
13
                          ,           A       I can'    remember specific discussions, bu         Jchn uns
       ?_
E 14                 part of the management team, se te speak.             He certainly had input.
g u                   i 15
       !=                      : had specific discussions with hir that I recall relative to the j    16                indications of the source and inter:.ediate range detectors , but I z
f I7 , don't ramember any specific discussions that we had relative to the
        =
f     I8 high temperatures and the process you discussed.
t I9                       0       De veu recall a ec .cer . cf v. cur inabili:V. te t. r es suri:e n
              "O
                               -le plant because cf the release as: peines tc a pein: where you 2I               cculd collpase the bubbles?
2*'                      A       Ue had a lot of concer..s that day , but iceking at it 23               f :   23, peite. cf view you have e:: pressed, : really can': ,cene:2:er .
               '4              : will have :: say tha:         just den'  recal'. reviewing i: s pe ci fi c a '. 2,      l 25               the way ycu have.nentioned it.
l 4
t ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
30-3

1 4' 4
I                .O    You previously testified that on March 28, 1979, your 2         interpretation of the super-heated temperatures indicates that 3 ' the core had been uncovered and that it was being cocied by the II 4          super-Puted steam.      Was this information d. scussed at any ti:ne e    5         en March 2S, 1979, with Messrs. Mi'.ler, Rogers, Flint, Herbein, e:                                                                                       ,
N                                                                                        I G
e 6          Zewe, Mahler, or Chwastyk?
n E   7.I:               A   Acain,
                                -     I think the perception I had was similar or the n
j    8 , same as the general perception of the rest of the management tea =.
J
:    9 A larce . cart of our discussions was directed toward what stratee..v a..
  @   10        we wculd take to try and assure tha . the core was covered.         I:
z
  =
{   11        =eant what strategy we would take :        get encugh water inte the
  ?
g   12        syster and achieve plant status that we could guarantee that we
  =.            .    .
  =   13        nac :.s.e core covered.
  =_
14 ..                   I think intuitively we a;1 hoped, or beliered that we h_
  =
{ 15 had the core covered, at least : did.        But there was not enough I
j   16        pcsitive information to say without a doubt that that was th e z
j 17 .; condition, and to relax, so to speak.
Thus, we continued to E
18 , define our gcals, and : a= speaking cf general goals, and come up
  ~
  ;   19        with a s trategy tha     get curselves in a conditien where we cculd l
20        s a-. for sure that the .clant was back under total centrel.
21                 O    George, let =e ask you a cuestion      which is similar.
22        As I have reviewed your previous testi=eny, and ycur conversations 23        wi .h Don Haverkamp on that acrning, I had the i=pression that ycu 24        were very sericusly concerned tha: the core was uncevered at scre 25        -i.e,'and in fact that it was being cccled through this super-ALDERSON REPORTING COMP ANY. INC.
30-4

i 1
1 15 f
\          I ; heated steam mechanism.
4 2                                     Did ycu express these ::r.cerns in this thi..k tank t
r 3
neeting, or meetings, as they were held throughout the morning?
4                                     I remember one specifi: feeling that I had relative k                     A n
5 ( to cooling of the cere, and that relates to the fact that if we n            1 g
6 ' were getting water into the core a:.d it was evaporating, and that n            ,-
  =
7
  "_-          r is the mechanis= I was thinking ef, re=cving heat through the r            i
  =        8 A                evaporation of the water.                                        ':'h e n , of reurse, as that steam wculd e.P
  =        9I' contact other hot material, it wculd become super-heated, that ge if 10 -
: z.                                      . .
g                w u _3 c. acnieve sc=e cooling.
  =              .
11 .
7 sg
* But I remember being                                  n= erne /. ahcut the .creci. tatior
                ?
E" 12 I:f bcron, and by this time, by the way, i: would have been sc=e: ire 13 ' arcu xithe middle of the mcrning, n r..                                                         -
believe that i: was after i
   =     14                                         .
x
    .              = v. conversation with Ocn Haverka                                             .c.         I den't recall anv                                             . more as
    =
         } ~t b             :: wr.a: terminated that co nvers a ti: r. , but tha: thought and cencerr
     =.
16
     's-          'was in the back cf =v mind.                       -
z
     "   1' f=          h Basically,                  think my feeling was that ~ was hop: ng tha:
      ~
I8
[
that was not going :: be a real gre:1er, and ~ had no way cf ic -
                                  ,- w.w.
                   . < . . ...._4 ...         e . w.e_. _.=. wae . . .4 . . c .                         -
_' a. _ = . . e ~. e ..* ". .=..'                          .
                                                                                                                                                                    . c .'. . e ..       .- . .,
         'O
         ^
f avoidine tha: ,:::b em was :: kae; ws:er but the enl-                  ; way                                                            _
21                                                                        . .             :
                 . v_.%... .      z.  . g _4n. o .uae c. e, anc xee r_
                                                                                                   ...      ... e _.
v"                                      We did have high pren tra i.. ection established at th a:
                                                                                                                                                .e on_y .     .w...
                                                                                                                                                                               .' a . w cs c.- .e
                   , c _4 ._.   . ,     a..c      _4. . s e e m ,. e    . o  ... e _.o w.. ....._   ,
24
: e.     .     ...a.,.,  _
                                                 . . e _ e . . . . _.". e . a _' . a . .. a . '. ". a. .=. . . ' . * . ' > e _- a. c -" v _" - "_ s . c ".. e , c-
         "# *C      -
e.= sure
* hat we , culd have per;.c.:s :a?s.. a d:.ffer                    .                                                                            crurse cf ALDERSON REPCCING COF I                                                                                                                                                                                       .s

16 F
l'ftact!                   different strategy, 2
i t
_. Le't me. ask you, did you' discuss these concerns on how 3'ii                      i d thel core as being c .'d with the other mec.bers c#
I
-                 - 4. h. you perce ve e t.ne management 1 team?                                                             1 5
:       e p
3      -Ue had discussions thrceghout the morning.          I an fairiv  ,
g 6 ' certain 2 verbali:ed that specific concern, and everybody else
,        y              . a..
r 3         7 . verbali;ed the concerns they had.                        We all came to reach cn t:                .
          =
A          8 i agreement on the course of acticn which seemed to' be the best                           4 I
* 9 !;ccurse cf action to take at                    that ::  int, z..              .
.       :         jo 5 b       y                  .
C       Do you foe; that people were in agreement with your
        ~
h II q understanding cf' the way the core was being cooled that morning?
i 12 '                  A Ny perceptien was that we all shared the sane general 13 , understanding, althcugh I wculd have to say that it was mere of a
.       7 3         14 (-qualitative feel fcr what was .geing cn, rather than a quantitative
 .      =
        ~
t 15
:                      understanding hecause we did no: ha te knowledge of actual level                 .
Ib
        ,.                 . in the core.           He did act know how nuch water we had in the system.
4 17
     . ' -b-             ewe e           believed we had encugh, but at least, I think on my part, it c                                                                                                       .
v         la !.was more of an intuitive feel fc s
                                                                              -he conditions in the s.ystem.
        *-               t 19 E
e                ..
G       Did .vou discuss er dt.d v. :u c rerhear or 2 :arn of anv I
20 j                              eenversations with regard to the implications of this super-
                         /
               ' 21 [l heated temperatures that =orning?
                         ?
22 A       I don't recall any specific conversations relative to           ,
a 23 tr.a t . Most cf the ti=e wa were f=cusing en how to get te the 2#
basic' plant in a centr:1 mode of cc: ling, one that we unders:ced 25 and one1that we had experience in thrcugh our training, and so                   ;
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.                         '
30-6       .

e
                              .                                                                                                                                                                    7 i
I.
1, for th, and that was either to try and achieve decav heat removal 4
s 2 *'operat:.cn, using the decay hea                                                             rencval pu=ps.                      Eticately it was, f
3 i . as . 2 recall, . our goal, and we tried a number of strategies toward 4
: j.                      4           achiev:.ng that goal, and we did try to keep in mind what we would r,
t l
i e.
5 .e, Ys -do if these individual strategies would fail, and have seme.back I                               .
l    n.
t l
3' 6          :: elan.
N
      ?;                 7 ..                                     But I. don't recall either taking the opportunity, er v
j.
E ., being able to really sit back and think, and focus en some of the
:                 9 2 academic aspects, shall we say, of paraceters that we were x..
10          seeing.                 .
2 ::. .:.nk what pre::v                   .          much ::::..vatec me .eersonas .v was =v.
y j
11          fesire :: see the plant in a centrclied =cde tha:                                                                                c:uld identif; e
s            12- with as being safe, and my backgr:und in operaticns which ~ th:.nk                                                                                                                     i
:                                                                                                                                                                                                       I g            13          :<..ded to make se reac: in that way.                                                                                                                                          l f.
             =           n4 0              '2.cw did . vcu acccunt, or what was v. cur f ee".ine. tcward
              =
i .c            ..
                                           ,. .- .-.... .: .. ..a. .. e e ,y... . . e..,e . y n c. .. . e.,. e e a . .. es c "v e .-
                                                                                                                                                          ' . e ~ . a .. c .. c ' ..' .e
               =.
j         16         d a.r ?
                /
j         17                                        Did this generate a concern about whether cr no: you                                                                                           ,
                 =
Inw were achievine. .vcur ommectives, as the terperatures s:a. red up ever i.
                   ;      19
                                       .he ecurse cf the da.v?
                          ,o t
: c.              ce ..:   .....;,,"         .'*
                                                                                                . w a s .=. "=..-"; #. .- ". .- . a ' _' . . ; e .v.
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                                                                                                ,ela.e...     . . ., . a .- .-...s
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22 Vith, to the bes: cf my reccliecti:n, my belief was that there n.
                           -;        was a 1:t more- water icss than eculd me made                                                                      = in a "erv. shcrt
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    \
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25 y .- .._- .. :...a e s           ,
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ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.                                                                 30 7

I 12
  ._                                                                                                                                            1 1
know it was sometime in the middle of the morning when we were meeting with                                                        )
2 Gary and Lee Rodgers and so forth.                                           The thing that was scaring me was the 3
thought that we were putting water in the core from high pressure injection                                                       l 4
and it was boiling off and concentrating boric acid and I was really scared                                                       !
5 that we would and up blocking flow lanes and stuff you know with the boric                                                        i 6
acid unless we'd get enough cooling water near to really' get some sort of                                                        l circuhtion'and the only circulation that we could conceive of getting 'was 7
to blow fluid out the electromatic relief valve which was the only place -
8 g
that we could find any kind of venting path and hopefully carry over whatever ther mechanism would exist would at least minimize any kind of buildup of j    10 boric acid and... but...I know the feeling that I had was that we were
           -cooling the core but at a elevated temperature in through the steaming process because we I don't think I thought in terms of the supercritical steam point I don't think that thought went through my mind but at that point I'm not sure I was prepared to think of that sort of thing but I knew 15 that we probably had a bubble in there, a steam bubble, so to avoid and I 16 couldn't define it in my own mind or really get a feel for what it was like                                                      l but as long as we were pumping in the high pressure injection that was the only thing we could do other than try and start a pump and that had been 19                                                                             .
i,  tried by others and it was apparently unsuccessful at that point.
20 !
21 CRESWELL:                                   George the implementation you had some technicians hook up a 22 thermocouple reader and digital volt meters to the thermocouples.                                                       Were you 23  ,
aware of the evolution?
25 31 -1

4 a 13
: 6 lKUNDERi      I was' aware of that evolut. ion, the extent of that evolution I J,k
           'gt               believe,,that's quite a few weeks after the incident, but I was aware that he'had gotten thermocouple data that co'rning and he had reported his findings
           ~
         ~3 4               to Gary and I also' discussed it 'with him briefly~that the data was irratic
:            5 and he didn''t know what kind of reliability to place on it cause he had
                                           ~
6
                ,            numbers that ranged all over the place.      You see up to that time I was unaware that Unit 2 had their thermoccuples tied into the computer.      Unit 1
                                             ~
;            7 l         -8
_ doesn't they don't.use them so I didn't even...I wasn't even aware of the
{l           9 8              ability to get that kind of informa.icn and the data since it was so scatterec I                            there was some questions marks there was temperature...I think he had            ,
10 g                   converted...I learned this after tne fact...he had converted the DVM data g                 .from all 52 thermocouples he took fcur of those or five of them, something
:                             like that it was a very small number, and he converted the data to tempera-4        la.
;                            tures just' to see what kind of a range he was getting there was some I guess a Couple of poir,t3 that weren't giving him any information at all.
One temperature was oown around. . .either under 100 or just over 1000 ,
another one 20... around 2300 or somewhere in that range, another one high 17 question, another question mark they get four data points that I had learned when I was down at the presidential hearings that he had actually converted 19l' f              at that time and given to Gary and er .ioned to me and they you know kind 20) of going along here at 90 miles an r.our and that just.. . he wasn't sure 21 i           what kind of reliability to derive frcm the information so that was pretty 4
22 much the extent of you know any kind cf involvement analysis that I can         ,
23 l              recall.
24i i
25 I
s i
o d                                                                               31-2

14 1      CRESWELL: What did the information mean to you?
2 3
KUNDER: Well, since I wasn't that familiar with the Unit 2 instrumentation 4
particularly in the area of the thermocouples, he said he wasn't sure if 5
there's anything that could be derived from it or anything reliable that we 6
e uld get from it at that point I guess I just dismissed it.
7 8
CRESWELL:   Discounted the information.
9 KUNDER:    Well, yeah I guess discountec might be one word. I didn't place 10 any concrete faith in that information you know I wasn't sure what it was telling me and I think we were all locking for something that we could identify with really pretty clearly in terms of meaningful instrumentation                                                          !
to tell us what the conditions were in the core and since that was...you
                                                                         ~
know you can only speculate on what it was telling you at least that's what we thought it was telling us at that ;:oint I didn't put a whole lot of meaningful restored at that point.
IS SHACKLETON:    Jim we are almost ready to run off our cassette and we'll 19 change the tape at this time. The tire is 2:03 p.m. and we'll discontinue 20 until we come back on tape again.
21 22 SHACKLETON:   The time is now 2:06 p.m. eastern daylight and this is a 23 continuation of the interview of Mr. George A. Kunder. Please centinue Mr.
24 Creswell.
25
           )
31-3
           ,f

o 28 I'             to me.      'It was'a vcitage. reading, anf Ivan just indicated ---
2,                      10    Uculd i . help to change your testi=ony from II on 7-117 h
s 3: Let me find ' that page for . yt.su.
k
              '4                        .A    I think that. it will refresh my memory.
k 2           5j                       O    Did your evaluation of this information, that is the
    @L i
6              .information you have just read in the II transcript, chance af ter 3,,
  . , ..               r.
     ~
y           7 f your discussions .with John Flin                        regarding the explanation of the c.
5 I..i re-criticality?
  ' '4             -
4 c
z-
       ,        9)d     a A    I cannot reme=ber which came first.               I tend to think          I e                  4 g.
z 10 !. that =y conversatien with John F1* nt came first, but to the best r                                                                                               i
_:        -) ;          i 4                   (.of my reccliecticn, I s= just not sure ,
3                   a u
E '12 (                              0    Okay.
E                   v 4                   4                                                                     .
13                             MR. MCSI'IY:      The cues:ic: remains the same, did Jou-
  .E=                                                     _            -
                     ..4 T
  .5-          I4           '
tie the two together?
i j         15                             THE WIT:I3S:      I dcn't think that I tied the two toge the;
     =                  l"l E         I6              no matter in which order it ca e.
t                    .,.
     #         17 '
4:                                       BY !!R. EARPSTER:
x         18 E                           To the best of vour        k..:wled:e, kas the core exit 3                       -                  -
_= .                ro "g        19            . :her:ccouple infer =ation repcrted tc the NRC en March 25, 1979?
n                    .
t 20 '                     .A    To the best of =y ree:11cetion, it was not.                              )
21                             Can you recall why?-
Q 22                       :A    Well, I am f airly certain that I was not aware cf tha:
                           ,                                                                                           )
23             : when I was talking to Don Haverkamp.                Again, I e.m no: sure in =3 24           4  own mind if I ever really knew that information in ter=s cf                            1 25               temperature', or if I knew it in terms of DV:: values.                There was a       l ALDERSON REPCRTING COMP ANY. INC.                                I 32-1              l

*'                           1
                           .3.
                                                                                                              '29
(.            ,
1 4
:1' ., nu=ber of them that just raced all over the place, and therefore J.
2              you could not pet.any specific reliability into what they are s
4 3 . .. telling .you.
4 F
My recollection is that it was something that did not l
                         $ :., give you a whole lot to work with, anc~ I don't recall really C
l g             -
n thinking about it, or dealing with that informatien much further
,                o       6                                                                                          .
,                m                                                                                                   ;
e n-      7               for the rest of the day.
2
                 ~
j_               j       8                      Q    At any time on March 28, 1979, did you =onitor, er
:l c'      9 were you aware of anyone else menitoring the south power neu.ron i.
E. 10                  detectors?
W                                                                                                                   D lt     11                      A    I don't remember anycne taking a 1cok at that,
;                 j     12 '                         MR. FISHIR:    1ould this be an appropriate     place to ta%.
E     13                a.five ninute break?
E 1
MR. HAP.?5TER:   Sure.
14
:                 =                                                                                                "
i     15                          (;;hereupen, a shcre recess was taken.)
u
                   =
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           .~:.ssi:'.s.
                   .-    17 S                ;l E
                   'A    18 I
                    -    19 20 21 22 hb 2$
25 ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
32-2             .

l 1'
77
                                                                                   ~
1                        3Y MR. HARPSOER:
2                 B       I quote page 73, *ine-6:
                                                               .           "One of the t
3.,
early conversations was to try to get a readout from
,                  1 t
4    ,
the incore thermocouples to determine'the temperature i
I
   .ce          5
                           . conditions'inside the core"    --
end of quote.
a               ,
     ,           6'                       In v.our I. I. interview on Mav 3th, 1979, n
   . E.
7, and I refer you to eage 101    -
you state in reference to n
   .j            8          your participation in the first Think Tank session 0
   .:           .9 .I. af ter arriving in the        'Jnit 2 co ntrol room -- and , I i
     @         10 ! quote:           "I do remember, in the first discussion we had, z                .
:                1 2
11 - bringing up the incere.theraccouples to look at for a
n               .
3 i
z 12 ;
i temperature, and we immediatelv went um to take a look r
     ,               i 13j at those and got them back with question = arks on them
     =
i E
a 14     .
out of the computer, which really. didn't e.ive us any m                I n
     ~
c         15 ;         infor=ation other than it was perhaps outside the u                 ;
z               1 g         li6          program, so we probably really did have the het condition I
h'
     .         17 :         in the core.
w                I 4                l 5         18 ;                       "In other words, the fact that T hot" -- and,
     =_              1, 19 I         I believe the transcript reflects:          Th   --
                                                                                  'was offscale s
n                 .
1 20 a.        was pro'cably valid from the basis of what we saw on the l'
21 i
computer"  --
end of quote.
22 ,                       on page 153 of this same interview, you i
23 ,         state -- and, I quote:      "Because of the incere i
24           thermocouples had question marks, and that T het was in 25           excess of six twenty, and we knew what our pressure was, ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.              33-1

d
:-                                                        7S i
4
                                         .j_          and.we ' knew that we had temperaturo in oxcoss of the           i i                                               .o 2           saturation. temperature for that pressure" -- and of 3          . quote.,                                                        f 4-                        Given that information that,you have 3
e-
                                   -      5 ,'
testified ' to in these quotes, what' then was your             (
:                                  E 6          evaluation of the thermocouple data taken by.Ivan Porter        >
a 7.
                                   ?.      7          it. the cable spreading room, which included a reading j
i                                          8          greater than two thousand degrees Fahrenheit?
E.      9                  A     Sir, I, on that day,.did not hear the i.
b . ' 10           reading, any of the readings, to the best of m"
..                                 E 11           recollection,. from Ivan Porter, taken in the c ble             !
a              .
i     12           spreading room.                                                 1
<                                   5 E
13                   0     Were you aware on Mar,:h 28th, 1979 that they l
j la           were taking readings locally in the cable spreading f
15           rocm?
g s
                                      ?  16 '                 A     I knew on March 28th, 1979, that Ivan Porter a
z 17           had been sent out of the room to try.to get readings            ;
i                                                                                  ,
w z              :
,                                   N     18          sonehov.                                                        )
                                    ~                                                                                 \
19                        ! do not believe that I ever heard the res'ults 5
i 20           Of any of those readings.
21                        :like Ross , in his special Inquiry Group i                                         22           feposition, has testified that the incere thermocouples i                                         23           were discussed in the Think Tank at least twice, and 24            .aybe four times.
25                         others have testified that there was ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
33-2

15 I
1 i                                                                                                                                        !
I'                                MR. HAR? STER:           Down over the pump lif:?                                                        I
                              ~
2'
                                                                                                                                                                          )'
THE ~4IT'!ISS :         Yes, whi:h w:uld to me jus: give an I                            -
3 ) amount of voiding conclusdon I guess at that point.
i 4                                -MR. EARPSTER:            Did anyc..e go*:0 the isemetrics :: try a
5 ] and aquare this with where you might                                                      be at in the =cre?
                .                 L                                                                                                                                      :
l                     0I                                THE ~4ITNISS:           No.
r                       i                          .                                                                                                           (
7 I                               BY MR. CRAIG:
.         w                       !
8,                         Q      Our 2eview of ycur testi=cny indicates that you were Je                    i
                                ,I aware that he -leg temperatures were above 700 degrees and tha I                       !
f= 10 instrumentati:n bridges had been he:ked up s tha resistance i:
           !a II I readings. c:uld be used to determine the approximate he:-;eg i
y 12 l                   :e:peratures en 3/23.
M,                    l 13
[v                                                   Was k record kep: Of the data indicated by this d                Id iextended scale read-cut fer the h:: 'eg temperatures?                                     _
b
["               15 (                         A      A recorded record, a icg-keeping book?
d j 16i                                        Q      A.ny kind of a record.
a                    <
: h.                II ,                         A      None that I know cf                     nc.                 would like to rephrase your h ,               18 il s:atemen: of my earlier testimony.                                                      : was aware of a read-ou: Of a                     i
              )               19h':ver700 degrees.                                   I wasn't aware tha: that was a correc f
20                                       -
7,=p,7,;u7,,                          never agreed tha                   that was a correc                             temperature 21 l a: tha: t ime .
n 22[  J Q      Y:n didn't agree with the hot-leg temperature?
23h                          A      ! didn'            agree that we kr.ew tha: that was wha                                      the     l l
24 tempera:Ure ***as .                              ,
l
                              '5 MR. MCSILIY: With any :f the instrume..:ation even after
                                  $                                           ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
34-1 L__ _ _ _                             .

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[ ' $ (.,(wehadP.'.1sa                                         down and reme::.bered everything maybe that we had
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6 i know . ear'.ier maybe we wculdn't have arrived at that speculati:n,.                                                                                                                                                                            l
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19 iii                                     . ., y ,
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20 4 was your eva.uation o., :.ne net ,eg l
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23                                                               -
l 1             A            'de didn't know that.                                             We did..'                                                      have that piece c'                                                              <
24 ,', :                         g. : - . .
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           '25 i             .
l                                                  ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.                                                                                                                                                 .
34 2

l                 n
!'                )
             .i. e 6'
                                 'O    Our review of your testimony before the . inspection --
ll' l
i'            -d L                                                                        indicates that vou were c-          2 l the Office of ' Inspection and Enforcenent,                              -
3...? . aware that the core exit thermocouples were being men,i:cred,
                  .I 4ll;' and that some were reading, and I quote, " pretty high and. some
:j      :
e n
          .5 C were reading 600 and some degrees.
A lo: of them are net P8 -
j-
          '6
                           - reading or indicating. "
   }.
7      i You also testified that you were aware that millivolt f8 a
readings of the core exit thermoccuples were being taken, and that 2       9               these readings were as high as apprcxirately 2400 en sc=e thermo-
    =
: 5. 10
    -                ,      =oueles.
   .{_
ll j-What was your evaluation and meaning Of the core j
I 12j exit thermoccuple temperatures?
:              a p
13                        A  I don't believe I would tr.> :o correlate it a    all at I               l i    14                that peint, merely as a piece of informatien that we were getting
     ~
15                as a group or individual, depending on the -- if it were part of i
j 16 ;                   e conversation at the time, and that is probably because they
     /
( 17 , didn't tie into the safety system, er part of the normal i
18               operating condition. It was j ust an auxiliary niece of inferma-i 19 4
tien fer use of anyone.
20                           I knew very well that the discussien cf the temperatures      l P
21 , that we were getting again, just like we did on the ?.Cs , how i
22               de we know that these are good, is the conversa icnal pieces 23               tha: came out, are these really reading ccrrectly?     Are they 24               the real temperatures, or do we knew . hat?    Do we know we can 25               r'e;y en them?
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
35-1

l 2                                                                                                27     '
3
                     't i-        .1 '.                            And I know that in that hind of an atmosphere,- once
 .        .          I 2! ycu're not sure that the people tha: are telling you they are L                      l 3 I right, they are not sure tha: the inf=rmation is really correct,
;           4l4 . you discount it as being informati n that you don't want to use.
3    '5i                            0   Did you~ discuss these terperature readings with John n              i N              4 g      s ;        -
                              .e. .i....
 . R E
7                          A    I'm not sure that I reca*.1 any conversation with John 4    N              !
E n
8                on the temperatures.       I'm not sure : can recall that.
:-     9     '
Q   The core exit or the hot'ep temperatures either?
z' I     E                                  A   Well, Jchn and I, during the course of the day, were z   10 ' 4, .
      =               i 2
11                  discussinc hotleg temperatures.because we were both reading them
,                     i 1
     .e               <
I
( 12 ; trying to see that the actions being taken in the plant would i     5        -
4
:   13 'il' res ult in getting an indication ba:k in a normal range, and I'm e
)
5 w
14                  sure we had discussions on the RT:s .
 !    w 2
)     i   15                             0   Did you discuss any time   hat day the core exit u
I     .. 16 j                thermocouple readings with the ex:er:Lon of can we really believe o
td
:     h*
      . 17                 them, with Miller, Kunder, Flint, !!erbein or Chwastyk?
4
      .a
.i
      =
3     E     18                           A   That's hard to recall a: all. The answer to that has
       =                I, 19 i to be ! don't recall these kind cf conversations, no.
E                f, 1
      "                 y 20 1                           0   Did you have a convers a:icn with John Flint with 1
21                  respect to the hotleg temperatures that he felt that the i                -
22 j temperature indication, both the : ore exit thermocouples and 4
1 23 lI - the hotleg temperatures, sort of backed each other up?
4.
24 "I         .-
A   Not.that I remember, nc.
4 l-          25                         .Q    Sased on your discussiens with John Flint, did you i                                                                                                     !
il                        ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
35-2

l
      ^                                                                                                                                   l l                                                                                                                    l
               .;=                                                                                                                   18 I
: 1.                                           O'                     on *.he morning c f 3/28,. were you aware that hotleg
                     'i.
2                  , temperatures were in excess of the saturation pres.iures to the I'
3 ,. correspending coolant system pressures?
I                                                                                                                 )
4 A                     As I stated, not until we got up to pressure.
g       5 4,                                          Q                     And that's again ac. oreximatelv. 9:307 N
   ,                  l.
5                                                     A                     Ch-h uh .                                                ,
N j                                                                                                                 i
{
   -       7 ]'                                          Q                     At that point, did you reccenize the tenperatures in n
j       8 ,i excess of 705 degrees were above the critical tenperature for                                                           f
   .                   1 8
9 3 steam and, in fact, meant that the system had c:ntained super-                                                           l z                   1
:                   1 y    10                       heated steam?
z 11                                               A                     I don't believe     put it all together l_ke that, nc.
B y    12 : I really didn't arrive at any cenclusiens fron an analysis peint
:                    1 13 '. cf view, no.
g
   =
z
:    14 ;                                                                   Was superheated steam dis:ussed with you cr in your Q
:                     :i
   =                    9 R
15                       rresence on 3/2S?
   =                        .
Il j    16 j                                             A                     Not that I recall, no.
z                        '
y17]
t                      .
BY MR. MOSELEY:
:                      T z
18 '                                             Q                     Excusa me. Did acgers --    mean Flin:, talk to vou
:                        i n
r    19                       about his conclusions on superhea:ef steam en the .crning of r.
20 ( March 2 S th?
i 21 3r                                           A                      I don't remember anybodv -
talking abcu: superheated E
12 9                     s te am a                                    all during that whole day.
23 '                                                                   3Y iR. CRA G:
,       24j                                              Q                     You testified on 3/28 that ycu were aware that the 25                       reactor cociant pumps had been shu: Off because they were net                                          !
i
: f.                                                                                      ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
36-1      >
t I
1
                                                                                                                  .. _                l

J.;B. Lsgen                                                                       18 El   :which?I just don't.
2-                MR. . MOSELEY:-          I can appreciate that problem.
         ,3'  - BY MR. L CRAIG s 4          Q. Wasi the fact tha t the RC d rain tank disk had 5    ruptured discussed -with Gary Miller?                   Did you discuss that 6    with him?
7          A. I can' t recall wnether I discussed it with him or 8    not. IfEI was aware 1that it had ruptur ed at that time, yes, 9    I did tell him, I'm' sur e.
i
: 10.                  By this I mean if he had' told me he was aware tha t 11'   'i t had ruptured, andL again I can' t remember when he told me 12      this, whether. it- was . af ter Miller was there or befo re, but                             l
       '13      I'm sure I would have told him.
14            Q. Was information passed on to the NRC, to the best of j       15     your knowledge , concerning the fact that the EMov had been 16     stuck open- or that the RC d rain tank rupture disk had, in                                  j.
17     fact, ruptured on the day of the accident?
18           A. Again, I did no t have a conversation witn                      nem
        ^19     concerning unis, and I wouldn't par tici pa te in that 20      conversa tion with him on 'it, so I don' t really remember.
a                                                                                                            t 21           Q. To your knowledge, was this information withheld 22     .from the NRC on 3-25-79?
23           A.. Not to my knowledge.
24           Q. Wer e yo u , awa r e tha t the he t leg temperature was 2700 25     and .800 degrees as measured by Ivan Porter on the digital 4
                                       , -,-                   ,    e      ,,m   . . - ,         --

                                                                                                                                                                                    .i
                                                                                                                                                                                    'I J.'s. Legen                                                                                                                                   19 1   volt meters and on the multi-point r eco rd er in .the control 2   room on 3-28-797 3          A. I don' t remember the readings that, Ivan had
                           -4   men tioned.      Ivan :ame through the control room at s ome po in t 5   in the accident or in the --
6   BY'MR. MCSELEY:
7          Q. I believe you are talking about the core exit E   th e rmoco uple. He's asking about hot leg temperatures.
9          A. I don' t . remember any readings on the hot leg 10   . tem pera ture that he had hooked up.                                                                                     At the time that Ivan was 11    making his measurements and things, both thermocouples -- I 12    was running the emergency plan for Miller, and as far as the                                                                                           ,
i l
13-   operation of the plant and particularly the parameters                                                                                                  !
14    af f ecting the plant, I wasn't really involved in those. Those 15    are things that I heard from being in there.
15                Yes, I can recall those, cut some of the things that 17    went on I did not get involved in just because I was doing 13    other enings.
19    SY MR. CRAIG:                                                                                                                                            1 20           2    Well, were you aware on the mo rning of 3-23 :nat the                                                                                        i J
21    temperatures were above 620 degrees Fahrenheit, which I                                                                                     ,
22   -telieve is the maximum incicated on the front pan el?
03          A. At some time during the ' day I was , . and that was when 1
24    I mentioned that Ivan came up, cecause ne we n t down to                                                                                                   i 1
                          ;5   measure thermocouple t em pe r a t u r e s .
37-2          )

a J. L8. j Leg an .                                                                        20
      '' 11                  ' M R. ' M OS E LEY :   Coreiexis.
2A                    THE WIT.4ESSi-        Yes.- Because obviously 'we didn' t have 3;     anyf pumps? running ,or stuff like that.                It would have been                                l 4      more' accurate tor get them of f ' tr.e; thermocouples core exit.
Sn                    I' remember him coming through the control room and                                      ,
       -6       LaentioningLto.Millbr -- I, think : it ' wa s Mill er . - Ye a h',                 I'm-7       sure vit was -- that heD had l some L awf ully high . readings and
                       ~
/        6      ~very low readings, the inference being that : they were I        9
                                      ~
questionable, the readingslwere questionable.                              Some of th'm e
10         were very low, some very high, so wha t did you believe. .
      'l l                         In . that context, Ilfeel I knew that the hot leg.
12        , temperatures. were unreliable up there.                 They were probably 13         off scale or he wouldn't have taken those.                                                             ,
14         SY MR. MOSELEY:                                                                                         ;
i 2     You den' t recall either perAcnally seeing or being
 ;     15        told that the meter indications of hot l eg tem pera ture , which 17        pegged ac 620 degrees, were either 620 degrees or the meters 18        were pegged?
19                 A. No, I don' t.         I can't recall th a t .
20                 Q. Do you recall having .any knowledge of the hot l eg 21        tem pe r a tur es , the fact they wars high, or some ' indication
                                            ~
22 other'than the reference that you made to the core-exit 23       'thermocouples?
24'              LA. I don' t _ recall tha t rigne now.          Now, at the time I
: 25.       may have.         I just don't recall right now of seeing that.
                                                                                                 ~
TAYLOS ASSOCIATES

{
_ s. e. Logcn                                                          21 1    ,            My big concern at that particular time -- now, when 2-  I first'got the r e , and 'the - period _ sho rtly thereaf terwards,   I-l-    3i  ~was interested in1 trying' Eto re-establish flow.          That was my 4    main . concern, was to . re-estaclish flow. - Now, whe ther I 5     looked' at the hot leg / cold . leg. _ temperatures or not, I don' t 5    rem embe r .                                                               I l
7                  Walking across that board, you remember the number 8     of gauges and dials that. you have on there.           And I was 9     concerned with trying to get the flow back.
10                  .Also, I.must say there were. some people that were in
                                                                   ~
11-     front of it.        I was trying to stay.out of their way, so I was       .
12      actually_behind them.                                                     ;
13              2. Wh, were you concerned acout getting flow back if 14     you had no feel for temperature?
15              A. Decay heat is there. We have been operating , and a le     philosophy that had been bred into me, if you try to sustain 17     flow -- I have never been -- natural circulations was a new
   '3
   .      concept to me, as f ar as actually coserving it or having a 19     lot of' confidence in it.         To me, une more desiracle 20     situations have fo rc ed circula tion .
l, 21     SY MR. CRAIG:
l' 22-            Q.    ~4ha t was. your evalua tion of- the meaning of super        ,
21     he a t ed steam in the system on 3-28-797 1
24             A. My evaluation of it?     I never discussed ena t with 25     anybody.        I didn't ev al ua te it, is wnat I'm saying. I never TAYLOE ASK00 ATES

J. S. Lcgan                                                             23 1;  considered it, at the time.
2           'Q. Did you believe that the loops were steam-bound?
3            h. I' don't recall even considering that..        I must have.
4  ' When they 'said tha t the pumps weren' t pumping water ,
5  : something was- preventing them f rom pumping it.           I would. have 6    assumed that I f elt there was something in the r e that wa s 7    preventing them f rom pumping.        Naturally, something would be 8   ' steam.
9                 But I don' t recall -- cer tainly I didn' t discuss
  '10     that with anybody, nor do I recall it going through my mind, 11     as far as super heating.
12     BY MR. M.CSELEY :
13              Q. But there is a difference, I think, between pump 14     cavitation limits that one sees on pumps and a pump that is 15    operating in a steam environment.            Did you have the 16     impression that this pump was operating in a steam 17     environment?
la             A. I didn't have any impression because, of course, 19     when I got there the pumps had been secured, or were secured 20     snortly af ter I got there.        And I did no t observe eneir 21     operation.
22                  There are dif ferent things that can cause a pump to 23-    cavitate, as you say.         Pressure, low pressure, or steam 24     env iro nm en t, o r wna tever. And I did no t wi tne ss the 25   . fluctuation of the current or tho' flow on the generator, so I 37-5 mavene acance==ce

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ALDERSON REPORTING COMP ANY. INC.
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23 1l       .
situation and tried to get ideas as'to what to do n.1xt as far I
i 2l as the core being cooled for sure was concerned, what certainty j
3 we had, et cetera.       But I don't recall any direct correlation l
4                     .
between that and something to require this action level.                l l
We didn't feel we were anywhere near 'the situation that we'would
                                                                               ~
5 6      affect the off-site population.
7                             In the morning there were actual measurements Mr. Carlson.
u Z
-      8      taken of the incore thermocouple readings besides the question i
d      9      marks that were being printed out by the computer.          Were you 5
y     10      aware of these measurements?
m m
e II Mr. Zewe. No. I was unaware of those measureinents until em 12       I believe sometime the next day.        Certainly not that day.
henf E5 WN I3              Mr. Carlson. Were you aware of the containment pressure e"   Id       spike when it occurred that afternoon?
a O z j0    15             Mr. Zewe. Yes,    I was. Because I was directly in front 2 4 d    16      of the roactor building corc, and I directed the operator at a
u                                                                                   '
g    17      that point to operate the electromatic block valve to open up 2
0    18      to further vent down the reactor coolant system because we U                               -
5    19      were into the depressurization point at that time, and we wanted 20      to try and limit the reactor building isolation four point 21        signal, so I was losing a point in time in the pressure where 22     we should open up the vents, and I was directing him to do so, 23       looking at the recorder, and I directed him to open it up and 24       as soon as we did that, we had a pressure spike.
25             Mr. Carlson. Did you hear a thump when that happened?
39-1

I-                                                                               3C I
ar2-5 I '~
: 1.            system for core uncovery, which would give you the increase in l
              . 2 i) flux at the otter detectors?
I 3     {                A    Not that I can . remember, no.
4                      Q    In your opinion today, should this increase in count I
e        5    >       rate and potential for recriticality have been passed on to the                                    j
:                                                                                                           I 5
{        6,  I URC on the day of the accident?
7                     A    Yes.
8                      Q   To the 'best of your knowledge, what we::a the core exit J
d       9              the =ocouples used for during no =al operation?                                                  ,
l II 10 ,                    A    Prior to the accident, we did not really use them.
z 3      11          ,They were unavailable in Unit 1, and they were available in Unit a
j      12              and to my knowledge, there were not any existing nrocedures that E
j      13              really had you use them at all.
a l      14                      0    To the best of your knowledge, who would have used g     15'              the core exit thermoccuoles?
u g     16                           MR. MC BRIDE:     On the day of the accident?
v5 (x    17 i                         MR. CRAIG: Previous to the day of the accident.
18                          MR. !!C BRIDE:    Mell, that question strikes me as a I
E 19              little odd, because he's just testified that they weren' t used.
20 l                        MR. CRAIG:    lie, he testified that he wasn' t aware 21               that they were used. I'll be a little more specific.
I 22                           MR. tc BRIDE:    Okay.
23      ,
BY 23. CRAIG:
24 I                    Q    I interpreted the respense that you didn't believe H
25 ,'; that they were                us ed , is that 'te:ropolitan Edison perscnnel didn' t I;
h                          ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
40-1

26
:;-6 l-        temperatures which were measured by the digital voltmeter set
            '2I       up by Mr. Porter were known by Ihink Tank members and discussed 3
in the meetings.
1-4 Were you aware that this instruments indicated L
(
j          I    temperatures of 700 to 800 degrees Fahrenheit?
6 3                     A      I was aware they indicated temperatures around 700 R
R-     7
       ;               degrees.
0
                             'Q    What was your assessnent of these temperatures?               '
J 9
["-             What did they mean to you?
t-    10 j                      A     They meant to me that I didn't have a cooling method       ,
       =
E     11 g               for the core, is what it meant at the time.      Today it means something different to me, as it does to any operator.        But f, '
       =     13 g               at the time it meant to me that I didn't have an adequate                  j l
E     14' g               cooling method in the core.                                                ;
E     15 s                      Q      And you related it to method rather than coolant             i a
16 l              available?
d-17 w                     A      I don't think I ever said, oh, I've got a low level.
I E
ca    18
         -              I think I said, hey, I'm not re=cving the heat.
c h
j                     Q     Did you at any ti=e c    March 28th discuss the implications that you drew of these temperatures with Mr. Mil'.e:
21 A     I think we did disc..ss them in the~Think Tank. One 22 -
of the things we discussed was to establish the cooling methed.
23 l    As you gentlemen know, no place in any procedure in any B&W l
24 plant was there an alternate cooling method thought of, like t:,-
25 That's why we started pushing water through the PORV.
PORV.
{.
I i                     ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.

                        .                                    .                                 .            -      .. ~. .
: 28. 1 a6-8                     '
1 i                                                      '
l I                             -Q'            . Okay.        You have told us what your assessment of these     1 2, ' temperatures were, in the range of 700 to 800.
Was'the
                                             . assessment, of any .of the members of the Think Tank dif ferent 3l
                 ' 4 ' 'I                     from your own?
g' 5                              A                    That I can't really say. I can say'in our discus-i
    ;E t
l g            6l                       siens, no one jumped up and down and said the core is uncovered.
I
        $            7                        A couple of times the questien was raised, are we sure it's s'
W
      . i'i 8
covered.           But no one related the temperature at that time to d                                                                                                                           i
        ~
        "g ' 9 -                               either superheat or anything, any of the things we would do j . 10                                  today.
         =                      i.
         !R        II Q~                   Zewe stated to us a couple of weeks ago that after        f i
T2        .i                the DVM was set up, that -- I'n quoting him now -                       "We were T                      I                                                                                                  1 l 13 l aware that we were in excess cf saturation temperature for
          -                      i J
e                      i E A' theexistinyPr*55u*"
h:
{=       15                                                   Ha also goes on to say that he believes that super-E d
I' l           i heated steam conditions were discussed by the Think Tank.
I h.
Did you participate in or overhear any discussions li:     l 7 ''l f       18 l                       about superheating conditions on the morning of 3/287
        - j:                         !
f-19 di                             A                   I don't recall that we got superheated steam ever M-                      .
60 lI,   being passed.                  We did discuss and we did look, or have St.W ice) 21 i-                      au'some steam tables, and what their analysis was, I don't knov 22 4 '                     Our analysis was we were too darn hot for where we were fer 23 '                      existing pressure.
M)i               !              Q                   Does the term superheat -- maybe that term wasn't 25-used,.but the implications that the temperature is beyond wha:
3 id                                             ALDERSON RF.FORTING COMP ANY, INC.         42-1
                                                         --&   -- w*+,4-                               w-        =

4     4 41 4 jwg.                                                                                        l 1! r-              *
                                        ,      Somewhat, yes', sir.
q I
2                          Did you.have reason to recall this prior experience G
                  'I and'the'use of-these on March 2Eth?
4 A      No, I did not.
m         5 g                             G-     Do you know why these thermocouples or alarms are
          +
                    ~6 E                        in the computer?
M R'        7                                                                               'l 7                             L      No, I do not.
n f         8 a                             G      To the best of your knowledge, is there any d
:! '       9 g                        procedure - Met Ed procedure - fer these thermocouples?
fi       10 Prior to March 28th, on Unit 1, there definitely A
g                                                                                            l E        11 j                         is none, on Unit 2, to my knowledge, none.
               - - 12 i                              G     Were you aware of anyone monitoring the computer E        13 '
i                        printout of in-core thermocouples during the day of March 28th?
l        14 L     No, sir.
N g        15
* g                              C     You were not aware that Flint, for ins tance, was      ,
j i                  16 l            doing this?
4 6        17
;-        x              .
A   ,
(Nodding in the negative.)
E
:n      18 l  i Your response is "no"?
           =                             G
!         5 19 8                             L      "No."
'.;        n           .
l 20l                          You stated to the Special Inquiry Group that you G
21' were in the vicinity when Perter reported to Miller the core 22 j    .        exit thermocouple readings which had been taken dcwn below I
i                  23 '                             Later in the sar.e interview, you say:   "They
.                          .        the terminal.
24 li were discussed a couple.of ti~.es" -- and I'm quoting you.
]
,                  25 - [ "They were discussed a couple of times, and I can't reme::ser l                                                                                       43-1 l

1 42-l'     :.1 m y
                                                             ~
.                    :1,        -whether -it .was just the two times that I :amember, or four p                  .2.           times','but'they-were discussed.        And each time:in the discus-
[                    '3          sion,'they werel discounted."
1
[                    4-                         Did the existence-of..the high, temperatures at least 5-         imply to you that the core was or hadibeen: uncovered?
i          3          6;,             L-        At the time, they' did not.
71              0,       -Did you discuss or overhear discussions with other
.i :
8'        . think tank members the possibility that these readings could
!          d j-         8
               ,      9l        ' indicate that th's core was uncovered?
I          $              l j          g     10 j       .
g,        As I stated before, I was aware of the readings,
<          3:             l I        I8      II'                       The span of the readingss i
sir.                                   I' don't remer.ber anybody
                                                                                                         }
j 12j l drawing any analogy to the core coverage based on the l          ;             I
         -5      13 -l           tharmoecupies.
;          l     14                   9         Do you. recall the reasons discussed on March 28th E'
j
                          ?
15 . ''         for discounting these thermocouple readings?
m                                                                                              -
gi    I8 !                 A. '      Yes. The rpan was very wide. There wafte some d              I 17
(                     anywhere from 200 degrees up.       It was just a fan. Basically E
c I8l     -
they were discounted because of their span.          There were some
'          o-s     l' FJ   '
that. were 0, 200*, 40', it was -- what I got out of what I M             t 20 lj           he.ard was it was just a real wide area, and no conclusion i
9 21              could be drawn from it.
22 '.                O,        Do you recall a discussion     nat new junctions may      -
[
23'l            have been formed?       Do you recall that statement on March 28th?
24                   A.        No, sir. No new junctions. I've heard since 25
* March 28th, but not that day; I don't recall.
J 1                            ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
43,2

  .,4 JWB'                 ,                                                    43
       'I           O      You- stated to the special Inquiry droup that you 2     think, or you recall hearing additional thermocouple readings 3     which I, in reading your statement, take that to mean reference 4     to additional-readings taken.down below'at the terminals.       And
: c. 5     you go on to say that the additional numbers were pretty much R
g    6     th e same .
3 A,   7           L     Yes'. I don't remember that today, but I remember
[    8     something vaguely with another set of readings ccming in, and
:J
{,   9. they discounted them the same way, and we just went on.
    @   10           g      can you give me scme -- Can you relate that in any E
11     way, those additional discussions, to semething else that E
a                                                                               .
j   12     was going on at the time?      Or can you enlarge on.the state-E g   13     ment that you have already made?
u m
w   14           A       No, si.rr you've got to ret. amber the time span ve're 1                                                                                l II      involved in here. I cannot.
5 u
16                   BY MR. GAMBLE:
a                        '
1 d                                                                               l f
E 17 I
0       Do you recall if it was a large quan'tity of I
18 '    readings?
E I9           A       I recall it was rot a large quantity of readings --
g 20      and this is a feel for how the thing ficwed.      I recall a 21      small sampling of readings, is hew       put it.
22                   BY MR. MoSELEY:
23   ,        Q. Do you believe the other discussions were somehow i
24      referring to the same set of readings?      or did you have the 25      impression they were e.dditional readings?
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.         43-3

e t            ,
i 1 Q JNB :                                                                                                          44
:                  1'       ;         A           My impression was they were. additione.1 readings,
                        .I 1-                                .
                  ;2;         . but ILcan't say. . I know now some things I didn'.t know then
: 3.         ' and'that's the problem,sas you guys know. .My impression at
;.                 4.            the time' is that they were additional readings; but where they l         g        5l            were taken, I. can't nail down because I have some other I       'N j
  !                4j;.          knowledge now.
j l       1_         7                 LG -         Do you at that time have knowledge that the i-       ;;-
.        j         8             instrument was' left hcoked up down below such that it could be e                                                                                                              r s:        9             read at various times during the day?
         ?                                                                                                 <
We had an instrument
        -@ 10-                        L           No, sir, not down balcw.
E
: j. 11                ' hooked up upstairs, but not on the thermocouple.                                         -
4 m
y       12                   4           And you don't have t.ny knowledge of who may have
.        =
         -,              I 1
E       13-             discussed these readings, or any recollection whatsoever as
{14                     to who was discussing it and in what context they were g
j
                       -l 15l             discussing it?
a                                                                                                                 "
l g       16 !                 A           The first discussion, Ivan made the discussion and                     -
l                                                                      i i       17 ' '          I. heard a part of that.          Subsequen           discussions are kind of N              i E       18 L            like a flowing blur, and I am sure Ivan was part of it.                                 #
:              I
         $              i BY MR. GAMBLE:
5-n       19 lj G           In the context of a think tank meeting?
i 21 j                 A,          All I remember about the first one;. it was out 22              in the control room.        That's'my best recollection, but vou've 23              got to remember that it's 18 men.hs old.
t-24 ?                 4           Right. The first one you believe might have been
                        .I
                       .)-
25 -            out in-.the control reem?                                                               ;
                        *l 43-4
                                                     . ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC.
L l-    -_:_-_-___________                               .                     - - . - -              -              -

  .i JWE                                                                               45 13       out in the control room?
l 2E            A       That's ny first belief. I don't know why I say that:
3 l
I just say that from something I remeriber and I don't know what l
4   f    it is. It seems to me it was right out in the control room.
I g      5             C        How about' the second one?   Do you have any feel I
l    @      6r       for that?
l R
b     7             A        I think they were nentioned just in passing, perhaps,
     $      8         in the think tank.
J
         ;  9                      BY MR. MoSELEY:
E          l
{    10    l C       You indicated that you have knowledge now, improved E        I j     II !      'know edge, of what may have gone on in terms of the thermo-3:        l
{:;   12 l       couple readings, the ones that were taken down below.       What I
j    13 l       1s that?    Do you have knowledge that additional readings were I
h    I4 !       taken?
[:: 15 l                     I hear rumors that a lot of things went on down-A.
16 J
       >              stairs. I've heard people say that -- I've heard a lot of e
N   I7 i       information that thermocouples were applied, and I've heard a E
Ese I
I i   18 ;       lot of things. I had heard that a complete set was taken, but p         II E   19         that's all hearsay information.
n 10              4        Have you seen the record that was made of a cumplete 2I         set on March 28th, which was subsequently I believe placed on 22          the console and its whereabouts was unknown for sc=.e per!.ed 23          of time?
24               A       I did not.
25 j             G       You are now aware of this?
i 43-5 ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.

                                                         - = . .            -_- -                .
2l.n
       'l   status of:the I"0V?
i i
2'         A     :Tha dis:ursiens : recall.in the think-ta:k I
3 involved the use of the bicek' valve and the EMOV fer vendin; 4 off'for'the.;1 tnt :enditicas ve were in then and not the 5 plant' conditions tna: had ;:c;:essed us to that ;cin .
6         Q      Your 30-;a;e ; eptred statement stated that you                                  >
       .7   knew that the ' hot-le; temperatures we re grea ter than 'C0 8 . de; ees afta      thout-Ss20 t.:..r and that you knew even 9  earlier that ~ the ::nsole TH inst::mants were pegged hi;h.
10                 Did yet chserve c: vere you told that the ex;anded.
11   scale multi;cint :ece der ;-intout shewed'a shar; increase 12 be; inning sa c r t". y af e: the ;2mps were shut devn?
13          A      Unich scale is tht ?
14          C      That is ie;ictef. here (Indicating on chart) duri ;
15 the time pericd a; sin f::: 5 :: 7 a.m.
16         A      !s tha t the blacx :-e:::dar en the back panel?                                   l 1
17                XE. HARP 5TIR:          It is the one on the back ;anel,                         I 18 Ga ry .
19                THE WIINESS:           "he ene that is net necessarily the 20 :;ualified grade inst:cment.                   :: is act normally used that                     I 21  much. It has get t 10: of-;cints on it.                        :- is-hard t: reti 22                ER. HARPETIE            On    _.e left-size of the c:: sole.
23                THE WITNISEs           37 recollection that I have of tha:
24 time f rame vns that we ve:4 h::ked up                       - $N vi h             ne tes-25 instrument.-       ~4e were usin; -ha..               There may have haen s ALDERSON atPCRTING COMPANY, lNC, 400 VIRGINIA AVd. S.W.. 'N ASHINGTON. O.C. 20C*4 ::::: 554 *385 44-1

22 l' discussion with me that ! 1:n't recall-on that black p an el 2 :ee:: der. _; always thou;h: -ht: the c;erators had a p;ctie-3 reading that black.;anel-recorder.                       ! '<new it was there , but 4 I don't think the RTDs are'hecked to the ?.P5s where we vere 5 takin'c voltace . eadines that I remember and ge-tinc simila:
.6  data, you kncv, in'the range.
7              =
                . v. v..e. . +v 3 e .r t..r y. a 8        C     Did you inquire,                    : .ere yo u told as to what had 9 happened' or 'how the shar; divergence between TH and TC had 10 developed and when it had devoleped?
11        A     : don't recall a dis                    ssion of tha t.         : did :ecall 12 in sy testi:ony I think in that earlier ti o frame, 7 to 5.
13 or e to 9 in the morning, a discussion of an evt1:ation of M some hea:       vmoval.           The TC ve veuld have thou;ht was 10v 15 because H7: physically cc:es ihto the systems, I :emember 16 bein; :old, and we veuld have expected that t: respond to 17 that c:1 der Vater.              TH ' vou' d be on scale.
_                   That is one ed           l 18 th e reasons we vere lookin; for a tem;arature device.                                ?lt:
19 I think we vare usi:; a steam ;enerste,: ; essure c:
Z) temperature rece: din; ins :usent.                      Tha: kind =d discussi:n 21 ramember-in the es:17 tiso frase as far as ::ying sc 22 deter ine s: e hea: :e: eval capability while we were ;um;i-23 the HPI in.
24        ;     In:1y on you tsked f:: a inst:::ent :: be set                                ;
3 to expand :ne scala of the TH indicati:ns en the consele.
AL:E.45:N REPOR"NG COMPANY, lNC, 400 VIRG;NIA AVE, S.W . WASHINGTON. D.C. 2 0:4 '20*' 55a:345 44-2

23 j l
   -1    Wasz a rece:d ke;    Of the da a frem these inst                     ments?
2          A      had a requested :nat a rece:d be kept.                          ! can't 3    tell you whe:e that is at c: vhether that was fully
   ' 4 -laplemented, but        had reque'stad that, yes.
5         0    Were you aware :n y. arch 20th that it was being l
6   kept?   Let me cc on to say -hat what I am ce: ting a- is was 1
7 this record locked at or :: ands c:               ovements c: changes in                I 8   these temperature indicatio:s?
9         A    There were ;:ints during the day when I recall 10 discussions with Ross : believe and some of the g: c; aboc:
                                                                                               ]
11    trending on temperatures, the diff erences in                      emperatures 12 and differences in the loe;r in the temperatures.                             I can 't 13    recall specifies of the dis::ssions, hut I think that was a 14 pt:: cf some of our think              anh meetings.
15         0    Was ?.ess or someene else assi;ned the 16 responsibility for trendin; these data?                                                 l 1 17       A    I can't recall wh: vculd have been assigned.
18         Q    D: you racall tha- someone was assi;ned ?
19         A    ! csn't recall a specific assi;n=ent othe: than 20   that was a ; art of the disc:ssions.              ! can't recall a 21   specific se: Of verds sayin; you do tha t trending.                          . ;tess 22 I am saying it was i:;1ied in :he kind of meetings : vas
   - lD having evecy hon: or every             vo hours t: discuss tha ,                   :
4 24 trend it. The assi;nnant c::1d have cc.se f::: ser, other 25 level than mine.
i ALDEMSCN 81EPORTING C:MP ANY, LNC.
400 VIMGINIA AVL 5.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 l 02)!!4 0345 44-3

24 1        C      Just to clarity, did y:c direct 0: :equest I:.
2 Ross to ' have someone - do ahis ?
3        A      : can't.escatl ;tiin; a specidi: direction today.
4        Q      :n your statament d::1:; the Xe:-Ed ;; cup 5 inte: view, and this was a rec:: ding ths: vas =ade on A;;ii 6  12th, you said, and I quotes 7               "Our major concern vas tha: :he duel didn't 8 de;;ade any'r. ore than it had degraded d::                       there on and to 9 somehov fi;cre out how to p:even- that and hev to stop 10 this. I didn't really feel tha- we were st=;;in; at the 11  initial stages.        I was sca:ed O f :: nin; cu                   Of wate:.        he 12 cutside pressure that I was ge ting indicated that you could 13  just pus; this thing solid and : couldn't ;et it solid.                               You 14 could have ;c=pst 111 day, hu:': a: ::: vin:ed -ht                             vithout 15 ;c:;in; water isto the het le; because you had to colla;se 16 t:ese b stles we didn't have a a,000 ;:end syster.."
17               !:t siso stated i              7:0: testiso y :: the Senate 18 inves-1;ato:s on Se;teste: 22:ha 19               "We were ;uc;ing 1: : .. s- time c: ci:se to tha 20  ti=e as hig- t pressure as we .ad decided -: ;, and the 2-  va e: level ::: :nsngin7 c: ::- :ht:;in; -he syste: solid.
22 :n dac , we ve:e losis; Vater                    :he reae::: huildin; dioc:,
1 03 in'::ho     v   ds, very h:: se;ernetted c:sdi-ions."
l 24               Tu:-her in y:ur s atore:-                o the Ee ate 25
* visti;t ::s en 0:tche: 29ta /:c s ated, sad : quote:
ALOERSON 8fs;er:No ::vpAuv, .ng,                                ,
400 VIRGINtA AVE. $.W,. WAletNGTON. 0.0. 200:4 200'554 0346    44"4

_. 7                                                                                _
2D 1                ,'"Scmewhere in -he :::ning, naybe because =f Lee Rogers' thrust, Ithere must have been' discussion of a :
l 2~
           '3       superheate:*. conditi:n , but as Of today I' can 't                    rememb er
            - 45 that ."                                                                                               i
            -5                   Later in the same 1. ertiev ycu said in anc:he:
6 quotes
             -7                  "I think sometise "ater in'the norning we nay have
.             8~ discusssd: steam conditions when ve got into the core ficod S' type discussion be:ause ve vere avare ve weren't setting 10       anywhere by char;ing th e pla n t. "-                                                            l
          - 11                   Yoa were then askaf.-if you think that.;erhaps-
: 12. inter in the norning the s:ean ::nditions vere discussed and 13 Tou res;:nded, and I quotes
          ' 14 -                  "I think that is :::e, and I base that en the fac:
15 that I think *.ee 3cce:s and hir ;eople :ay have b: ught that 16      up. I don't think that tha               ade auch difference f cm an 17 action stand; int.                ! think we .a*ked about scing agains:
18 the code release, but that is very hard :: remember."                                                i it.                  Now, a final refere.co.                    Ze.(e has stated :: us 1
20 - :n a: everyone was svare of su;e: heat af e: the b:idge was                                          I 21      set c; in on the 1.05.
22-                  Now, ny questics is, veren't you aware on .he
                                                                                                                     ]
i 23 morning of'Ha::h 28th that ho                       *.eg tem;erate:es were in 24 excess.of saturation temperat::e fo: the cc :es;cnding 25 reacter system ; ess :n?
AL.DERsON REPt**"NG OCMPANY. :NC.
44-5 400 vinoawa Ave. s.w., wAsMNGvoN. D.C. 20024 (2021 55 & 34s

26 1      :A:   ! don 't' think 'I~ ca.. add any 30:e t: the q :tes
       .2  that.ycu have given me f cm vht: ! have said ; eviously.
3 The essence of that was it is hard                   s remembe           at which time :l
;                                                                                                  1
<       4 the. steam conditions vere exactly discussed, and from an 5 action standpoint the concern was tc ' kee; putting water in.
6        C    Does that mean tha- in the mornin; of March 18th 7
:       7 you were aware tnat the tem;erature was in excess of e-8 saturation; in other words, there was superheat conditiens 1
9 existing?
1 l-     10        A    I don't understand -he question relative te
;      11  everything y u have read back := me.                    I d:n't know what I i
^
12 can answer to amplify it any be::er.
4 13        C    Would yon like to refer to the rece:ds?
14             33. ELAKE:        Could we '. ave the ;cestion re;ea teci or 15 have him read through it a c a l.. .
16             T'dI WIT. VEES :      :
                                            .~_     ease do that.
17             ME. 5 C E E*.II s            apel::ize fe: th e 'eng.h of it, 18 but.I was ::ying to ca; cra tne essence of several diff erent 19 things.
20             :n- your statemen . it :.n; the Xe:-Ed interview on 21 April 12th you stated ani ! q:::e.
22             "Our maj : concern was that the fuel didn':
23 degrade any more than it ind is;raded f:c: there on, and to 24 semahaw fi;ure hev to ;:even- -hat and how :                           st0; this.
25 didn's really fsel :na:           .*e     vers st.opping at the initial ALOERSON RE.80R**.NG tOMPANY. tNC.
4% VIRGINIA AVI,'S.W.. WA5MP.G70N. D.C. 20C24 't02) 554-2345 44-6 i

?                                                                                                                          27 1
1 sta;e.   : was s:L:ed ed runni ;                ::~ of water.           The outside                                               l l
l
           ;; essure that !' was . ;e . tin; indicated that you could just                                                                   l l
pua;1this thing solid and : :::1dn ' t ;et it sclid.                            You                                               l 1   could have ;us;ed a'11 day, h:: : a: =cavinced without 5   pumpin; water in the het le;s because you had to cella;se 6 'those bubbins ve didn't have a c,000 ;cund' systems."
7               You also sta ed in y :: testimeny to the Senate                                                                     ,
8=  investi;ators . in Se;:esber, and I quo te 9              "We were pumpin; a: that time c: close to that 10 ' time as hi;n a 7: essure as-ve '.ad decided to ;o and'the                                                                         I 11   vata: level no: chan;i..; er . : chargin; the system solid, 12 and in dae       we were 1:si ; vt:e: t: .he :eacter buildin; 13    dimor; in other words , v e:y a:             superhea.ad ecnditions."
14              In your statement :: the Senate in vesti;aters on' 15 October 29 you stateds 16              "Somevb.ere in the :::nis; maybe based en lee 17   R:;ers thrust there must have been a discussion of a 18   supe rh ea ted cor.ditic s , b ut as :d today ! can't remember 19   that."                                                                                                                           ,
I 20               la ter in th e stime int erviev y:n saids 21               "I think sece-1:e later in the                     c::in; we may have 22 discussed steam conditions whe...we ;o                      into the :::e diced
     ' 23    y;e discussion becausa We vare avare ve weren't ;e::in; 24 anywhere by char;in; the plan.."
25              You vece then asked Ld you think the- ;erhaps ALDERSON M*C STING COMPANY. lNC.
400 VIRGINtA AVE. S.W.. WA5-lNGTON, 0.*. 20024 !202: 554 2345 44-7

28 1- later-in the morning         .e staan conditions were disctssed tnd                ,
2 you respond:
3             "I think that is true, and ! base that on the dact 45 _that I think Lee Rogers and his people may h, ave brought that
                  ~
5 up. I don't think that ande such difference from an action                             i 6 standpoint. I think,va talked about going agains: the code 7 release but that is very hard to :emember."
8             Then I raf erred- t o Zeve 's 'sta temen t that everyone 9 in his view vas svare of su;erheat after -he hridge was se:
10 up on the RPS system.
11             THE WIONISS:        The initini think you read me was 12 out of what interview?
13             33. MCSELEY:        The initial one was out of your 14 croup interviev vith various Ye:-Id es;1oyees on u/12.
15             THI W!?NISSs        Is tha: the tape that I made?
16             Mo. MCSELIY:        Yes.
F 17             TRI WTINE3S:        Th t : :spe was made n.9enes: Ecss and 18 ! ave and ths w. ole ;::u;            :elievh, ri;h:?            Was tha: the 19 tape ve are referrin; to?
20             THI MOSILEY:        Le: ne :ske sure.
21             THI. W: NISS:       36ca:se : tho;;h: that was the icth.
22             (Ih :: ;ause.)
      ~3             ZE. :CSI;I?:        The reference the:e hegins on page 24 25 and*29.
25             THI W::SISS:        311; 2ede's state:ent of e veryhoby i
ALDE*50N ars;mmso :.OMPANY, INC.
j                         400 VIRGINIA AVE. S.W., WAS*NG:CN. D.C. 200:4 (202!$5& 345 1
44-8

29 1    bein; avara,.!;an-not sure : understand that. From the 2 sta'nd;cin Of my :sec*ecti:.,:n A;:11 *:-h 1: vas certain~y 3    better than September c: Oc Ober.                      I am sure-that comes
    '4    throuch-witn some of the statements you have read.                                   I don 't 5 believe there was a discussion of superheat in the enriy 6    hours. I'an sayin; steam c;nditions were.ncst certainly 7 discussed as a part of the ;1 ant c:nditices in these
: 8. think-tank sessions, and I :En't s;ecifically remember at
!     9 what point in ti:e that dis::ssion point veu~d have been a
  '10     stronc one.
11                S v.
                      . v. .t. . v. ----
                                    . o c T 7 e v. a 12          C     A;ain referring t: ~his,           :       would you conclude that 13   it :tst have been sometime before -he re; essurization whi:h 14 occurred betweeh 9 and 10 o' clock ?
15         A     :: could have bee: tha t ti:e f rame c                              the ti:e 16 fra e of the adverten: de;;essuri:a:Lon which we vent 17 th:::ch with the thought at:c                       the core fice d and all.                 Y::
18 know, ! cou'in 't pin;oin: the exac: ;oint                             tite honestly.
19        Q       Is it your state:en- that you were aware of 20 superheat but you 1:n 't < n:V at what time yo u cane to that 21   conclusion?      Is tha: your state ent?
22         A      : can't rese:te                at what time that ;oint was 23 dis:ussed in the :enverst-1:ns?
24         0      3ut you were aware of superhest?
25        A      Sometime in the                ::nic; I think ve discussed steam AL:ERSON REPCMTiNG COMP ANY, INC.
400 VIRGIN!A AVE. 5.W., WASHINGT N. D.C. 20024 ::::: 554 2345 44-9

4-                                       g i
m   ,
30 r                                      ,
l' -conditionsi c
I~ don't i believeCit'was-s: 7 65 or S: 15-in the
!~
2c sorning; because of the nushor t:f ' other activities that had
             '3          tontake-place to implement.all the other things that had to.
             ' 4 E occu r. "At someLpoint in that'think-tank ?.:ss :: Sellinger 5 or somebody could'have discussed that and                                    vouldn't                  . 1 6 . remember.
             ;7i                Q'       But it was during the morning to the best of your 8 recollection?
9               A      'I as.conclud'ing it vis at some:ine in the morning 10 because of the conditions we vent through 'in the plant moves 11         ve'made. :! hat is why.
12                 0        Oid you on March 23:h recognize th at tempers ures 13 in excess of 7C5 degrees were above the critical teoperature la of:steas and in-fact meant that the systen had to contain 15 superheat?
16                 A        Please ask ths: actin.                                                           L 17                  0        On March 29th did y:c reco;ni:e that temperatures 18 in excess of 705 degrees were above the. :itical temperature 19 .f or steam and in fact mean- -ht: the system had to contain                                             j 20 superheated steam?
r 21                   A'      I was tvs:e of -ha , but n:: ts a heavy ;cin: of                                  I 22 - discussion as opposed to :ne a:-ion s a .us and action 23 recommendations and impleoen t-1:n.                                    The conclusion was we 24 had to kee; the core c:el, 2:d ths: vas the thrust of the 25 pumping of water and lookin;                                t-    het: renoval.       It var a r
AL,DE.8tSON RI8CCNG ODMPANY. lNC.
doo vmomA Ava. s w.. wAsWG*CN. 3.0. 2X2d r20 ! 5k-2346         44-10

e            >                         .      .         .        _ - _        _      _ _ . . . .          .    .                              _
[
_ ..31 _
1 -part of-that kind Of dis                             ssi:n, yes.
          .2 -               O'
                                   ."h a t a vasey:c:.eva*. a-ien of                     :..e            aania; ef
         . 3 ' . superh eated steam in tho'systes?-                                                                                                o a
         '41                 A      It is very.hard to : - be' clouded by what I have L
5   read in the last year or sc.                                 . just don't recali
: l.          6, ' discussions .cf that in :hese cenciss to::s he:ause the t
1 I
L           7 cooling method we .rere in ' wa sn 't : =o;tized anywhere- hat L-c e
i 1
t 8 'had.'ever been studied.
i
<            9                      The fact' that 70: :::e in t*'                                =** :ne indicators l
10     are off' scale hi;h wasn'                         a ree:;nized condition fe                              this.
11 . reactor ;iant and i                       is r=:d.:: reca.1                  wha: that .eaning vs.                                       i i                                                                                                                                                      i 12 of somothin; that nadn', had '::ch ::sinin; :: discussie:                                                          1.- -
13      the' years of operation.                        5: f::: a stand;ci : of what I kn -
14 today and cathods.and =eans Of : unterin; this tyr.e of                                                                               .
15     p        blem are different thta they were on f. arch 23:h.                                             The 16 discussion involved hov -o :: *. the core d::: a condition 17 that.ve dids't have rece;ni:ed in any f : t'.1:ad ::tinis;                                                              :              j a
18 is;1emented document.                                                                                                                     l 19                 ;       I-guess wh.it : a: asking, Mr. Miii er, is wh at 7:::
20 evaluation of the meaning :f                                  :;erhet: in                  ..e system is.                               1 21     "avin;' concluded tha                     the:t was su;erhea , and certainly 22 this isn't secethin; that y:                                  v e cid. have ex;ectedi 30: wha:
23 vas your assessment' of this st;e: heat ?                                            0i1 7:u reiste 1: ::
         ' 24 cora covera;n7.               ,
25               A         ! can't :: day re e:te                  in ::: think-ta.X AL:ERSON agpce?'NG C:MP ANv. M
                                              ' 400 VIRGINIA Avt. S.WJ WA5wlNGTON'. 0.0. *:022 ::::!54 2345 44-11

3 ~9 1  discussions the detalis of these kind of disenssions.
'*                  .2   just can't remember the eval:a:Lon or the conclusions tha:
3- voce reached other than trying to coge up with action 4 recommendations from the c ndi:icas that existed.
5       Q    Sat I as asking what did you think?                                                .
l l
6       A    'I can't resenhor what I thought en March 28th any 7 more than what I have said.
;-                    8       Q    What did you concinde was the source of the l                     9 superheat, if it wasn 't core uncoverage?                  A;ain,         as a=Xin; 10 vhat you think.
11       A    You know, it is very hard to specifically renemhe:
12 What I thought that day.          T:c: the time we ;;; there and 13 started the reactor cociant pun;s we knew the:*e wasn't vate:
la in the het legs.      Where was the vate: level at?                    There was 15 no reco;nition or instrumentati:n to teli rec that.
I 16            So what ! vas thinking was that we had to keep U vatar mevin; into the co:e.             Where was the *evel at?                 We had 18 to make sure ve took every ; ecaution th:oc;h the whcie 19 fabric of the thing to kee; water :ovin; on t: the core, and 20 I =an't remenber any more Of what I thou;ht that day other 21  than the ft:: that there was rece;niti:n tha: there wasn't t 22 full system. Tht: is why the concern abou                   vater.       Tht: is 23 why the concern about keepin; the water on eccurred te :e 1 24 the early hours.      :t was the Only kncu :ethod : knev ef,0f i
                     %! assurin; core OcVerage.                                                                     i ALDEPSON 4E80P":NG COMPANY. INC.
400 VIRGINIA AVE. S.W., WASktNG:ON. D.C. 200:4 ;*02!854-2345 44q2
__________-_n_______                                                   _   _

3:t !
1 1
1 1             !! you cock at :.e               astimony scaewhere ve ve:e 1
;        2 aware that sten: ;: essure was 10v in the stea: ;ene:ater a-d i                                                                                                     1
[        3 therefore natural =1rculation vasn't very effective.                             That i-
                                                               .                                      l 4 was: avare to us.       For the conditions we were in we were no 5  where near 'saturatica ; essu:e in the steam generator.                           That 6 kind of dis:ussion and conclusion was what I thought on 7  March 28th.                                                                              I 8             To say va had this ta=;erature and theref ore we 9  had "X" fuel degredation, I just don't think ve had that 10  discussi:n.    'Je were very cles: on the f act tha t we didn't i
l 11  have a full system, and the recommendations and the thoughts                             l l
U2  and the conclusions of th a -hink -tank , including .my evn, El ve:a to maintain haat re== val snd water fiev.                           I: vas the 14  cnly thing we knew to de and we vere lookin; at any other 15 action that = cult te ta%en :                trin7 the plant.to stability.
16        0    3ct you did not atte:;; to : elate the su;erhen-17 conditions to what was the :ause ci this superheat?                            A: I      !
j 18 correct in '*. hat you have :01d :e?                                                     l 19       A    I just don ' t feel we had the evalcation time in 20' the cont:ci : cm to very ca:efully and cal:tistingly deduce 21  this is hev the plant ;:            : :nis ; int.              "e vere concerned 22 abou t 7etting it to a reco;nized ;0 int before we discussed 23 h ev ve.got it te vnere 1: vas and what etused it :: ;e:
24 the:e.
25             Everythin: we did was to ::7 and bring -he plant ALDERSON 4E80R* LNG COMP ANY, iNC.
400 VIRGtNLA AVE A.W., WASHING *0N. 3.0. 20C24 :2001 554 2045 44-13

3 ,9 1  to s stable condition so y:: could discuss what had ha;;ened 2 to the plant.       If you had tat.en the tise ar.d critiqued the 3 hours of four to savan in the torning, you veuldn 't have 4 been able to perform the emergency plan or handle the plan:
5 conditions.      We were act in a mode of stability yet.
6        Q     It was my impression that tha: vas the purpose of 7 the think-tank was to assess what needed to be done and :
8 assure that that was done, and it is also :y i:::cssion tha:
9 one needs to know how you ;:- there in order to know how to 10 get out of it.        Do you have, a differen: 1:; essien?
11          A    I don't nave a differant 1:; ession, but I am 12 saying that the         mili y ec ;c ba ck in time is secevha:
13 restricted when you a:e still in a sericus condition.                               Se, 14 yes, that is a part of the thisk-tank purpose, int the cthe:
15 part of the purpose was             c fi;ure out wha: :: do the nex:
16 y::: c      the next twc hours.            There was a *:: . t focus en the l'7  :squirements of an emergency ;1a n tha t had te be met with as 18 cuch imper:snee at tha: ti:e :ta: tha piar.: had.
19               !a    net disa;reein; vith yo,c, but it is a                        .atter 20   o' time and sv111 ability :f in f o rma tion a r. d the availabill:;
21 of nere technical talent.              :    vas, you kn v, :::.municati:t 22 vi ta a 10     ed ;ec;1e who           fel     vere     cin; :: help ana;y:e Z3 and to make tta nex: re ce s se ..d t t ion .           Tht: vas one of :e 24 reascas that the think-tar.h included th e ;eo;1e it dit.
25 Tha     is ena of tne raas:ns i- included t r. e                    a c.. n t e s 1
l l
AL:ER$CN agsORTING :MP ANY, .NC.
400 VIRGINIA AVE. $.W,, NASHING:ON. D.C. 20024 i:02: !!4 2345 44-p

l..
I l'                        ,
32b 1
                                                                                                                         .             1
           -1    ;;eeple.           ::' included lee'E ge:s f                            m 3C'4.       That'vas the                  H l
2:. 'whole pur;=se of --it.
: 3.             O       LCo you believe tha                          a very'i:;c : ant pars'cf 4-   assessing where you 70.is assessment of how you ;ct there?
r If             A        I don't disa;:ee witn that.                                     think full 6    assessment while you are in,the c: isis is hard'to a::ive at 7 when you are_10ckin; a                                   a'hund:ed indications o               ferty 8: 'i ndications and you can : me back at a subsequent'tice and 9    pick the ri;h: ;:1erity of inf:::ation to display exactly                                                           ,
10 ' what happenad.                   I.1: just sayin; that the a: cunt of 11     exa:: ness that you can ded:ce durin; the crisis is not at 12 the level vaere you are at :: day with this chart y:n have in 13    front of te.            The char                       ::ok six mcnths to make and I went-14 through a lo: ef questisns and had ;eeple in other places                                                              4
          -15     for weeks:a: a ti:e.                               I 1: tust sayin; tha: type of analysis 16~ can't be done during a                                  : isis. Yes, I s;:ee with you, but                        i 17 un' der these condi:Lons.                                                                                             ]
1 18              Q        Well,* V e ha ve talked shout so ft: the :ac: that                                               i
                                                                .                                                                    o t          >19 chere vas kncvled;e that                                     he E?:5I fidw and the ;:stlee of                          1 m     let-devn fi:V was increased, in e reactor ce:Lan: ;us;s were 21    shut eff to:aase ' ney weren 't suspin; vater, the .5 0 " had 9
Zt    been c;ened for some extended ;eriod of time., the het-le; 23 tem;e:atures were 'significtatly hi;her than one would 24 expect,'and in fact were 'in the superheat conditien.
3                        bid you infer f ::. :hese that shore was an neansCN REP:R9NQ COMPANY, !NC.

36 i    .1   inventory';rchlas and.that the :cre nay be in :::chle?
1 2..      'A
                                                                  ~
                                                                                         ~
                     .We inferred tha: ther's as an invente:y problen, j3- aindtve were certainly. avare of some f uel danage because of 4 .the readings in the buildisq.                 But to infer'tha: the core 5 had, say, been engty, va'didn't. arrive at that ;oint in our
;     6' mind s. I had. navec discussed ' chat -in my whole lif e ;:ior to 1
l l
7 March ~ 28 th. .Therefore I-was'cencerned and acti:n was taken                               l j-  .8 ~ to ensure vater vent en the.ccre.                  As.to whe: hor'the cere 9 rovera;a'vas of a :ertain ascun: based on these things, !
;   10    can't. recall tha: lucid a discussion of that, d.
:her than 11    assurance that the cora was he;: covered.
12-          0    Given these-indications, isn't                    nere reason te 13 suspect tha t it mi;ht not be?
14'          A    Thsen'is.:eason- :c suspect that 1: tight not be,
: 15. ye s .
4 16           0   . What' effs::s we made :: dater ine the extent of 17 inventory deficiency on the ::: ning cf Maren 22-h?
%  18           A    : quess I don'. understand the                   n e s- 1:n .
s 19          0     There are various vars of invente: yin; -he ;;imary 20 =colant syste: and f:c: ~tna: inferrin; c: calcula-in; the 21 -- deficie ncy.
22'         A'    Mov do you determine -he ; imary c:c'an: sys.em?        _
23 '        O     F.o v de you n::: ally de it?
24          A     The ; essurize           level.      We knew tha- .as     '
o ;oed.
25 What else is there?               You said -hat.          ! don't kn:V th a t there         .
ALCERSON sE10CNG COMPANY. lNC.
                           - M VmGINtA AVE. S.W., WASHNG ON, D.C. 20C24 32@$M2"AS     44*l6 g

J 37 1  are many methods of determinin; ;;i ary systen inventery.
2        0'   I am askin; ycu yht: did you do :n that day?                                  " hat 3 was dono, to.your knowled;e.
4       A    Eut you sta ed there vere many metheds.                             ! am 5 saying tha: I don't t;:ee vi h that.
6       0'   The question tha: : isked you vas what eff orts did 7 you exert on that day to determine this?
8       A    From the ti:e ve ;:: there and started the reactor 9 coolant pum;s and saw them ;; ; a hundred amps we vere 10  convinced we didn't have a vate                     level fully in that whole 11  plant. The eff:::s we had vere to assure.that the inventary
                                                                   ~
12 unich we couldn't see didn'                  de;rade.              can't remember 13 ef f orts in th e resea:cr. Over '.cv lov it had getten or how 14 deficiency the inventory ".af been.                        Teday I can't :ecall 15 discussions along these lines.
i 16        ;    I understand that th'ere vere isemetric drawings 17 taken out on -he basis of the ;um; performance.
18       A    To look st elevaticas of*the.;lant, where the                                        ,
1 1
19 hot-legs are, where the t:; cf the Oc                           les are and where ths           l 20 MP: comes in.
r-,e,s.e a    g.u
                                 .. ... .. e              .5.e -...c             ,.
21       s           . .                     . .A.4.. ..                   -    . . .
22 indication of =cre level?                Weuldn't the water level be 23 indicated by the nuclear instrument s:1:n and oth er f acters?
24       A    00:e exit the:mec:n;1es weren't even wired out 25 except by i quirk Of desi; .                       called for a set of these ALoERSCN mEPCRTING COMP ANY, lNC, 400 VIRGINIA AVE. S.W. WASHING:CN o.C.20C24 ;202) 554-1345 44 1'7

                                                                                                  '3B 1   readi=gs be:ause of my ex;erience 1: test ; ocra=z'in                                  aval 2   :sactors where ve used them.                       They weren't recognized, ther 3 weren.'t in th e ;;ocedu:es, their accuracy was in doupt and 4 they were naver used to my kncvied;e'in that plant for a l
5 coca condition.                                                                                   l 6                  Yasi to day I can very quickly conclude that tha:                                l 7 is true.         I don't'believe tha: was a ve ry rapid conclusi: on
: 8. that'mornin;.           .W e lockad me:e towards recognized                                 ',
                                                      ~
9-    indica t ors. Th'at is vny ve vant to the tes: equipment on 10     the R.:S tem;eratures because they were qualified 11     environmentaf instru:ents. -The core ther cc uples. vere                                  -
11 recoccized that I kncv cf.                         They weren't even vired ::: in 13 Uni: I.
14                  .U. STILLO:             5'orm, ! notice you are cestin; away 15 from the su;ernested s es:.                          ! vender if we could just cha:
16 . f or a somen , Oary.
1,                  .a. v. 2.. .
                                 .           .r..,. ,wa a 18           C      Sar: ally when you are c;erating a plan: there is a
      ,19    f;irly easy vsy in which :: *:ok                 . at where are the he:
20 tee;eraturas, whace ap;::xi a:11y they are.                                 Se if 70: ask 4
21    yourself tha questien de I . ave su;e: heated steam, ;iven y:;
22 nave' talked about it, wha                         de you think about it?            Y:c are 23 an en11neer.             Vhat is goin; th:cuch your mind?
24            A      We have Overheated seme-hing.
25           ;     ' 2 c f. . Hew?            What is ;.ere in -he plant tha: vas ALDERSoN agsOATING ODMPANY, IN .
400 viftGINIA AVE.4.W. WASHINGTON, C.C. 20024 (202)554 2345
                                                                                                  .44-18

1 39 l
ca;nbie of :ene:1*in; that hi;h a tem;e:ature?                            .et's try te i
2I ,;c 'thrcuch it.      You ce:tain'y can't do it in the steam 3   generats:s, right?
i-
: 4.        A    You certain*y can't.
5-        C    There isn 't anywhere in the plant where the metal 6 -can be hotsencu;h to do it, ri;ht?                        :: is hi;he: than any                  ;
7 metal to:perature we have eter been, ::ue?
8         3. T::e.
9         C    '*
                    . hat is left, the~cere?
10         A    The core was the hes: source.
11         C     :s it n:t :laa: :..a t as an enginee: you have te 12 say-if : am ; cia; te ;e: this steam hette: than sat :stion 13 have ;ct to raise netal ti; e: than saturati:n hea: to 14 steam, true?
1$         A n.
                             .u. a v e ... .. . _a _. _a ..coc,_z..
_ -, .  .o .u.e
                                                                              ..     ........ ....a
                                                                                                .. c ..u 16 is ac na*17 at a pret y high temperature anyway, : e fuel 17 elements themselves.
                ^    Th a t will do it, because you have got water.
    .18
    ,19,        A    We didn't have hea: renova 1                         We knew we didn't
     %)   h' ave good hea: car.: val.           We snew that.
21 Ns, cc.         ~f ycu ONye vate: and 7:u kncv f: are 22 not ;cin; :: cet supernettei steam, if you are ::ansf errin; 23 heat to va:ar, true?'               'Ther cdynamical".y you can't do it 24 that'vay. Isn't that t: e?                 *f the core is covered .i-h 25' veter, even if you have ;::: heat r e m o v al , i f th + '. e a t is ALDER 5CN 8E70RTING COMPANY, aNC.
400 vimGINtA ave. S.W.. .VA$HtNGTON, 0.0. 20024 (2021554 2345 44.] g

J
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40 1     going to the water.ycu can't see 700 de;;ee temperatures.
2            A        I' don't disa7:ee with you.                     ! as not'sure of the
                                    ' 3 '. condition you are' in ivhen you have, s ay, sono partial 4 .uncoverage and at what point y c could end up with hot fuel I                                     5 eles'ents and that type.of this; and the exact staan vete 6 conditions that vould have.- cccurred.
L                                                                         -
7            Q        Okay. LBut are you sayin; that in order fe: you t,:
8 - get . superheated ' steam you' re1117 concluded ' you had to have s
9 at some time core uncoverage?                           The care had'to be uncovered?
10            A        I guess I as havi:; -rouble with -- you know, the 11      plant - nozzally operates vi h su;e: heated steam . coming off 12 the steam generatocs.
13            Q        Out of the steam ;eneraters.
14            A        00:ing out of there eith vata = bci11:7 in the:e 15 and coing u; throu;h phases.                         Now, I am not sure, and                         ever 16 was =ade that familiar vit.. the condi:10:s that venid oc:::
17 'if you start to have conditi:ns is the core whe:e there is                                                             ;
                                                                                     . . . .J                                                                  r 18 ' supe:h eated regions sad iaisium heilisc re;iens c: what
                                   .19      would have ecc:::t in that ki:d Of tra,nsition.                               I am 20 relating 1: :: What ! kn:V tb::: a 3C'4 plan:.                                                                          s 21            Q        3:t as a: e:;i se              70: knew in :ne stea:
                                   '22 cenerators the only way ye: s ;e: heat is to have steam in                                                              [
23 contact vit.. the hot tubes, :i;..07 24            A        That 14 :1;ht.                                                                                      ,
25            Q        An anaio;y the., y:                have :         have steam in con                    :.
i
                                                                         ' A!Of4SOA agsOP*:NQ COMPANY. INC.
400 VIRGINIA Avt. 5.N.. 'A A$HINGTON. O.C. 200:d (2021554.:345 44-20
  . _----.-____ _-__- _ _+- -                       a mmsa      w                      w         rtw--                        _ + ,   ,--,+,-,,;s    _,,,s., _

4
                                                                                                                       )
1 J1
                                                                                                           'a A 1     withsthe.het fuel elements.
On steam ;enerater you have some level indicatcrs.
i       2'         . A.
i 3
j        Q.       .I understand. But ~ as tryin; to unterstand did 4' .t.htt analogy allev you to . conclude the
* core is uncovered?                                             ]
1
: 5.           A           And'I :an't recall that . analogy in discussions on 6 ! arch 25th. !=u know, I an s::e that.'our discussions were 7- in terms of the invento:y' deficiency, but I am not sure hev 8 ft: the discussion vent : elative to the technical terms we 9   are talking of new as ft: as su;erheat and lack of 10 superheat, you kncv what the :ss;e:sture was and what the 11     degredation of inventory vas.
12           .C            A few  .
inutes aq: y:             said you clearly knew you                  .
13 busted up fuel.
14            A           I said we knew the:e vere some deg:e;ation of fuel.
15           0             You busted fuel and y n ; t fissi:n ; oducts.                             I 16 inferred f: m that that you knew y c had poor cooling and 17 the core ove: heated and busted sene fuel, t::e?
18            A           ~4 e X:,ev ve had s==e f e*             degredation, Vie, and we 19 knew we had insufficient hea                            removal y 20            C But i as tryin; t: :.ake certain that you cou;1ed 21    the two.            The de;;ada ic: Of the f uel was a result of cere 22 cooling.
23            A           And I can't :emember hev close that cou;*.ing was 24 on Ee:ch 28th is what I am ::ying t: say as far as the 25 actual discussion.
ALDER $0N :lPCRTING OOMPANY, INC.
400 VIRGINIA AVE. 3.W.. WASHING *0N. D.C. 200:4 i:::: 554 :34!
44-21

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1         .Q      7tve no anyL other intrepretatiend - that comes to
          ~2    your mind even now.              How de you de;:ade the core without 1:
3 being ' th o' :ssult of core ' c cling?                 Iven today can you 'think 4 of a way?
5-             A. Of degrading the core without having a lack.of             .
1
          ~6    coca coolin;?
l 7-             C  .res.
8              A-  No . Unlass you are talking ef, ycu knov, .of .so::e 9 other mechanical damage.
10               Q-  Oh, yes.
11-            A    'Other than that, ri;ht.
12             Q    I am talring about the core stayin; in the f uel 13    without beine physically dama;ed.
1A            A     Yes.
15             Q    So the degreda:ics of the f uel y:t did couple tha;
                      ~
16 sc rnine as a result' of the acre coc*.in;?
17           A      : am saying I can't ;emeather the ceu;11a; of tha:
18 in the discussicas cf that morning. I can't honestly 19 remember the nice tie we have just dis:cssed.
20            Q      I'am not lookin; f er nice ties.                      ! am icokin; fe:
21    can you cc..clude anything :-her than that 1 = knew you had 22 busted fuel somehow, that tha- was a resul: ef poor.
       -23 coolin;7          :s it.reasonah*.e t              ::nclude that that was 24 unders: cod my the people that were ana*.y:ing .he ;;ebiam
      ' 25    t' hon?
ALDE8tSON *EPORTING OMP ANY, INO, 400 VIRGINIA AVE, $,W., WASHINGTON, O.C 20C24 I:2:1554 2345 44-22

                   .~                                                               -         .. .
43 1          A      . At some point in the :c nin;.tha- vas certainly 2   understcod and it is one of th e :easons ve asked,for flov 3 :ste from - 3C'J for decay heat, the same reason.                           F.cv much 4 heat removal do I need'for what we a:e at.
5          Q          Cood.    .1 : v , let ne ::7 a; sin lookin; at the
: 6. superheat.           What do you think was the nature of the core.
l l   7. coolin;?. Desc:ihe f or me hev can you get core coolin; in t
8   th e re teto: some two hours sf e: shutdown?                       What does it 9   mean te you.          What does ccre cc: ling mean?
10           A         yell, core cociin;            : ma means that we knev
  '11    natural cir:ulation was adequate for the desi;n of the plan:
12 and we veran't cettin; adequate natural cir:clation.                                   Beyond 1
1 13 that point on March 2Sth I i:n't believe there was any 14 infornetion available otha: than the stuff ycu knew you had, 15 to pas; vater in it at the fi:V rates reu had available.                                           )
l 16          0         Yes, but : as :: yin; :: ;et you to help ce 17 unds: stand ;cc: :esiin; cf the :::a.                      What d:es that mean ::
18 you?
19          A         And ~ as sayin; ina- what i t s e a.ns is th a t we vere 20 out of a re:ognized coolin; : de and theref ore ve inev tha-21   ve had to have mere ecolin;.                   "e didn't kncv hov much                   ::e.
22          C         Otry, we are ;assin; each other in the ni;ht.
23 Core coolin;, let me give 7:u se e things -hat come :: :y 24 mind.           The !* ev ra:e in the :::e was 1:ver than 1: sheuld
                                                             ~
25 be. There was not enou;h vt er.                    had stea: in the :::e ALDERSON *EPCMNG COMPANY. ;NC.
400 VIRQlNIA AVE. S.W.. WASMNGTCN. Q.0. 20024 200; $$4 23'5 44-23

44 1.'with water. I had staam blan'<.e:ed fuel.                   These to me are.
2 'c=ne'epts of inadequate :: clin;.               Are they the kinds et 3 things that.you'think a:e inadequate for cooling?
4         lA   Thosearekinfsofthingsth$t'swould. connect                                     '
: 5. vith that, yes.                                                                           l 1
      '6.
                 -Q    Was any of that connec lon made during the day,                               l l
7 core-uncovery, steam the re ?
8-        ,A    And I am .having a hard time recogniring whe ther we 9 discussed that specif1:alir c: at what point in the day it 10 coupled the way you have, Vic.
1 11          Q   You had a lot of peo;1e in the cont:01 reoc.
12           A  We didn't have a ic: cf people in the think-tank 13 though.
14          0   No, hut in the cons::1 =com vhe hopefully were 15 feeding information to the pe:;1e there, or : hope that was 16 the management concept you were verkin; under.
17           A   That was the mana;e.:en: concept.
18           C   Oood. Of all of these pe:;la ths: scoebody didn':
19 say, hey, if you have ;ct su;e: heated, steam there ain't but 20 one way to ;e        it.       The core ?.as ;0s .to be uncovered.                   That 21    '<ind of con:Lusion never ;c;;ed up all se:ning?
f
::          A    In the think-tank :eetin;s, hey, the core is 23 uncovered was no , you kncv, wasn't brou;ht cut to that                                     ,
24 de; ee.
e l    3           O   '4 E S it b:CU;ht CC: :            Eny degree?
                                              )
ALDERSCN sgscaT.NG nOMP ANY. 'NC.
400 vtmG;NIA AVE S.'W.. WASHING:oN. D.C. 20024 (202)554 2345 44-24

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l
(
1            'A,   ,The a: cunt'of.cere un::verace was net, to my                                      y 2' knowled;a , iis=ussed specifically as mu:h' as how do we 3 maintain water in there.
L4             -Q    : Gary,'notLisount, because I.can'.': .tell you that
        -5       even today, how'auch. . Net f.e;:e e > concept.                       Core uncovery 6 caused supernestad steam.                      Iid anyhet.y hint at, suggest at,
         ~7      and then you vould quickly cone to.the conclusion                                have get        .1
,.        8      to get more water in, ri;ht, which you f.it. c:me to?
:S             A      As far as the conclusion to get more water in, you 10 knov, .the racognitica early in the morning of inat. equate                                         'l 11      natural =ireclation lef: you enly.One way of doing 12 anything.              That was a::ived at without even havin; to hate-13 the other discussion you are iniking about.                                 We.had to put 14 ' v at e r in .       There was nothing else available.                      It doesn't
: 15. matter what the conditions were.                         At S:30 in the morning :
16 sait put, vate             en now eveh thcu;h people were sayin; don ' t
<         17 put vatar on.
18              C     Secause you needed natural circulati:n.
        .19               A     .sople
:         that were cut in the..centrol room.                      That is 20 right.-                                                                                               l 1
21 '            C-     That is what ! a: :: yin; to say.                     That is : lea:      :
22      me..
23 .            A      And it vas clear := ne, net'even'needing to incv 24 temperatures, just_needing :: Xnov the staa: ;; essure.
         , 25             0      I understand that, but did 70u also sncv -hat ye 1
ALDERSoN at.*CR*1.NG COMP ANY. INC.
400 VipGINIA AVE. S.W.. WASMNGTON. Q.C. *0024 002!554-13as   44-25

         ,      .                .-                       .     .         .          .            .    ~          . - ..       .     - . ..
      %,   r. b O                                                       .M                  ,
{y                                                                                                                                 d0 f
s 1 . were n't a tl that' tize : gettin; en: ugh vater, there vesn 't
;:                           2 enou g.t wa ter hecause' cf .-.su;e:hea- 7 4
6                         ..
I
:                         :3           :A-     .I didn't;know .hev =uch'vate: I needed.-
I                            4              y   I understand that, too.                             Co.you understand my
                                       ?C.                                                                                                     ;
i
: j.                           5 uquestion?.         'Jas.there'anycne'e u;1in; the only way t                                  get j_                        -. 6 su;e heat-was cere;uncovery?, Oid anybody suggest it?
i.
l                            7           A-     Ani ' I can .' t camenb er - th at .                     As of today I can't j                         ' 8. esember : tha t being sugges .ed clea:17 a t any ;oin t at leas:                                             i
: l.                           9 in the.early1 hours in the morning.
1.
[10                 C-     ic:get the early h:urs.                             At any time that day.                       ,
l                         11    Oon't ;ut, time contraints en it.
s
  ;                      12              A. I etn't resecher.- Ice'are right, I shouldn 't                                    put 4
k                                                                                                                                              ?
i 13 . tis e const:aints.                  I.can't re:eshe                    it in the afternoon
(-                                                  ~
;                        14 either.          Yoc are right.
i-T 15             0     .: find tha.: very-hard :: understand tha t here you
;                        16 s.:e s::ck vi-h temperatures tha- the only way :: cet then is i.
17 to have a metal, a heat seur:e beyond anything you ever had                                                       .i 18 in normai            ;eration.            !:      'n:v,
                                                                              <,         the* coupling, at'least the                           ;
                       .,19    question is -he core uncovered.
20               A     3: the questien've were asking is is the :: e 21     ::vered nov.              That is the ;;esti:n.                        "e veren't asking has                     ,
1
;                       22 .the' core been uncovered in -he sa:1y hours.                                            *4e were asking i
,                       23 hov do you kee; the core esvered nov.
t h
;                       24              0-     ?.ight.                                                                                         '
i 25              A      Ihat is wha- we ve re askin; ourselves.
i
                                                                                                                                               =
i l
                        ,                                           AL:ERSON #f *0RTING COMPANY. INC.                                          '
l l                                                        400 VIRGINIA AVE. 5 JN., NASHINGTON. C.0. 2002d ':021 554 345 g4
____u_=         __

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2'     ,    A'    'Jsin; the ' only systens and mesheds we had.                      Tht:
1 i
i 3 -is where.ve' vere at.
1 4          0     And hev de'you kn v if 1: is covered? '                                               )
5-         A     How do yo             know?
6          Q     Ri;ht.           If-there is s ;erheated steam you should                          ]i l
7 ,have a questi:n about it.                    Today 70      know that for sure.
8          A     7 day there is a vn:le vea*:h of ways of handlin; 1
l 9   this based on this. -
10          0      A; read , st: tha. is n:: a very sephisticated 11    conce;t. With a*.1 the people tnere I as :: yin; to
: 12. unde rstandin; .te v it veuld be sna: r.cbody brin;s it u;.                           :
13 day that you had s ;e:r.eated stem: and then d: ; it doesn':
14 sees rationale' t: :s.                    All :f us 12:eaucrats sittin; on our
       .15    duffs-in ;ashin;:en, that ir what we were fussir.; about.
16-          A     And : think at the ti.te of -he c: isis, 710, !
17 really believe we sere :: yin; .: 100k for anythin; that 18 vould tell us any other set..ed                        f a::ivin; at stability =cre 19    than the cou;1in; you are .= 1 kin ; e.h:::.                      Oc 7:u kncv vna           :
       . 20- as sayin;?         ;e are sayin; V.a               else .:an be done in the plan:
21    and what else do ve need :: de in the ;1an .
       .22           0      la: se ::7 One :::e way.                  Tec had a cencern and 23 you wanted to ;ct vater in.                       Y:: knew you had husted n; sc e
       ' 24 fuel and you knew icu weren't ;attin; encu;n cociant.                              Th:se 25 vera .hings you clearly underst::t that .cInin;, ri;ht?
4                               ALOERSCN PE808"NG 00MP ANY. 'NO '
                                      .........,..u,      .....w ma-  - - -er-, .-a-...,-,.. 44-27

48 i        x    Ies.
2         Q   Okay.      The caly thin; ycu c=cid : ing yet could
: 3. think of . is turn on the pungs and put : ore water it, ri;h t, 4 as.sn engineer?                                                                         ;
1 5         A   As an engineer with seme knowled;e of the plant
                                                                                                 \
1 6 that was tha only method I k:ev available.                                               l 7        Q-  As 'an en;ineering -han wouldn ' t the next question 8 .be how do I find out if that was effective?                        Dit that 9 thought entar you mind?
10        A   The thought that entered my mind is how de we 11   determine how much hea: re:cisi ve need ve:sur such we are 12 puttin; in, yes.
13        0    What did reu censider to be indicators of vnether 14- you were being successful :: .::?
15        A    I think we have g:ne through that.                        We. locked at 16 tempe:atures in the ?.05, we 1: ked at the steam generator 17 pressure and we put an indica c                or an a sect instrument on 18 the R?S on the het le;s if ~ ramenber right.                          We put that on 19 there because the er.-scale te e: vas off.
20'       C    51:v devn.
l 21        A    Okay.
22        0    !=u vanted tc icok            t. that ten;e:at :e.              ha. vere 23 yeu.ex;ected it to do?
24        A    At the initial sta;ts of lookin; at it, Vic, there 25 was nc hi;n tecperature en sette availahle, sc the initial AL ERSON RE* P*tNQ C:MPANY. INC.
44-28 400 vtRGINIA AVE. S.W. WA$NNG:ON. D.0. 20C24 ( :215 % :346

g i
c.,     .    ., .            -         -
i I
I                                            ,
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i                  1..ideanvas to ;e: some readin; i. addition to the other l
I
                '2'     info::stien.
: 3'              'Q'      .You.had a readin; then.                 " hat were yeu expecting
: 4. th a t readin'; L o do as ycc added more and more water?
5               A      -As we added more a:d :o:e wa e: th::ccheut the day 6- we were expecting that readi:q.to come devs.
1 7               0      'So it if stayed se;erheat it was clear then, was                                        l l
8' it not, that it wasn'                    covered with water?                 These ETDs               eck    I 9    the d=2 vin;s cc: and you 1 cked at th e = , sh=uld you not have
.               .10 . concluded they veren'.t covered with water?
-                11                 A.      H: -le; ETOs : thi:k are located                        ; abcVe the
                .12       =colan:.
13                -Q       Yes, the are in that strai;ht run area.                                                >
14                  A         thisk that even early in the =c nin; when the 15 pumps started and we looked at the 1e rei ve knev there was 16 vater missing cut of :ne h:: le;s, yes.
17                 0      Sc   my ; cia       bein; that as y:n ke;                    tiding wate:
18 you knew you never.;c: these thermoccu;1es covered?
19                A      I think we knev -ha: those v.are in a steam 20 :sadition of se:e ty;e because : -hink there was sete                                                         l 21       discuss 10:        at some ;ci:: deris; the day about new a :trate 22- were they in a steam envirensen: versus thei: qualification 23 which was in a water environment, tha: type of thin;.                                               I 24 maan, ! think thara was tha: kind of re::;niti:n.
25                A     That :eans you had that ;a r: Of the syste: em;;y ALDER $CN s!P:RTING COMP ANY, INC, 400 N1RGINIA AVE, $,W,i A ASHINGTCN. D.C. 20024 :C:t 554 *245     44-29

                                                                                      .6 I  of water. 'SoLyou should ad( n=re water.                     *Jh a t is a no ther 2 thin; that : ;ht to ::me 'in y=ur mind ?                  :s there any c:he:
3 indicator?    You had.this Navy trainin; with the in-core 4'    4 thec=occuplas.     '4ere you thinkin; they si;ht tall you if you v                                                                               ,
5 covared tha core back up?                                                               )
6       A    Either me or lee ' asked f or th=se initially because 7 that was a part of the initial ;ettin; of s::e indication.
8       0    Indication of what,              ary?
9       A    Of temperature.           You knov, when y:n ;o in and you 10 look at the panel on TH vhich is of f scale ".i;h we be;an to 1cok for an instruo,ent on the ti;h end.
11                                                             Cha    is :y =emory 12 of their initial, you know, why we started 1:0 kin; f er, you 13 know , some indicator.         And Once ve had at leas                 an             .
14 'i ndicator, I d:n't believe the in-cores were really a ;oin:
15 ef our discussion any m=re.
16       0    You neve        -ho;;ht cf the in-ceres as an indi= ster                   7 17  =f wa e: 1erel, that they waren't ::vered vi-h vate:?
18       A    : don't believe ~ did, :o.                  I asked fe: them, and 19 then by the time ! ; t infc::ati:n en . hem they seemed E :seless to me because the c:nve sati:: inficated                           ney 21  veran't reliable.       A    th e same -1:e we ;o: t h e .:. T .9         '. cked :;
22   : a trid;e and tha: vas -ivin; s=me inic:mati:n.
23       0    :n the hot le;?
24       A    That is ri;ht.           In: y:: a:e askin; abcut hea-2 :e:: val, ant      as sayin; that that was :ne.                    Thers was sten-     <
t I'
t l
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l AL:E8tSCN R E*CP,~1NG C MP ANY, INO.
400 VIRGINIA AVE S.W.. WASHINGTON. 0.0. 20C2d ::' 554-:345            ,
44-30

1 i
1 514          l 1
l I- l gens:at=:. dsvn c vs:' ve were using, there was.stean
            .2   generate: ;: essure ve vere usin; and we ve:e looking at heat                               j i
I 3  removal detarmination, yes.,
4       0     But you icoked at the RTOs and concluded that that.                             ,
                                                     ~
5 .vas also a level indicator,            hat they were is a sten:
6  environment.
7       A'    I didn't~ say ve concluded it was a level                                     .,
8 indicator.    ! am sayin; that just starting the pu=ps before 9  that instrument wasJavailahle ~ think told us that we 10   weren't gein; se have a water envi:enment on those ETDs 11   because they are up in the h:: leg.
II       O     Okay, so they were in stea=.                 That is what I mean.
13       A     And thera was even discussion I think cf the
                                                                                                            ~
14 accuracy    f ;;:ss versus fine, you kncv.                  That is a 15 qualified in strumen t .
16       ;     But you didn't have :nat same thou;ht.with the                      ---
17        A    Didn't even :ensider them qualified.                       I mean, in 18 my mind. F.ad they ccme back vish a censisten                     se: ef 19  readin;s en them tha:         vas aware of then I :i;ht have 4
20 :nsnged :y thougn: p:::ess : :. the in-ceres.                     3:: : have said
         . 21    bedore when they came hacX, you kncv, there was nothing at 22 all tha: : =culd see from them.              *4 hat came back to se said 23 there is one here, there is One :ere, there'is one there.
24 ::'veuld have been scu;h :: ;ick the one ! vas ;cinq :: use 25 :: believe.
4 AL:ERSON REPORTING C:MP ANY. INC.
400 VIRGWA AVE. S.W., W ASMG~ON, 0.0. 20024 (202)554-2345 44 3)

               ..                              ,       .                                        ~
     . .1..
1 3
5.9 1
1                 .It could 'ha te teen an : hor c nnection' to                                                                        i 2-  s u'       aated s vas..
                                                                ~
3            A      It could have-been anc hor connection for
-                                                                                                                                                           ?
t      forheated stwam.                                                                                                                1 l
4                   s
                                'C'     But that was no: ' :ade?
A      It was not nade.
f
                      .          O      By:anyone?.
i 8-          A      ByLanyone that ! s:.avare cf.
9           C-     It,c uld have been..sn' indication =f core 10 . n ce v e ry . That was also nc: . t a t. e .
11            A. T: :7 kasvled;e, 1: vas ne: =ade.                           They de sit 12 t bov e th e a::i*te Ocre ~ thot;n .                   ?:0 nean.from the stand;cin 13 ef.the steam ---
14-           Q      That these thernec :;1es were uncovered,'that was                                                                 -
15 nevs: b:: ;nt ;;?
16            A      That         don't re:e:ber bein; brou;h. 0;.                        'Je vare                                     s 17 ava:e that the              ..TD vas un::ve:nd be:ause we knew where ther 18 vere at and we knew when ve.;:: the elevation f. avin s                                                  ::
19 and we knew when the ; n;s didn': r un ,a n t. We knev th e '. c :
20 less were n:t f 11 cf vater.
21           ';      Ec: you :ade nc analysis?
                  '22            A      'J e d i t. n ' t naka in s.Laysis.               'Je did: '; ;       ba:k and 23 dic:uss the in- cres.                     That is exac:*.y vhat I rea.e.ber.                                    'J e 24 did net go back on the think-:Enk :: myself even, :y it;utus
                     . f:: the: didn'              ==:e back ::          .e. I get those thin;s and I
                                                           'ACERS:N 8 tis;p=',NQ COMPhNY, INC.'
400 vtRGINIA . AVE. S.vv.. WAS 'tNG::N. 0.20024 02)554."245                 44,,3g L
                                                                      *           ~ '                  e -      - - - _ - - . - - - - _ - . _ - _ _ - _ .

53 I
l 1
1  was'tolf t..'ay. vere :::alish"e and                        quess !-did ne: ;ursue                        l l
2 and question the in-cores f:::ne                         ence : get the. initial 3 ' shot from :ne.of the people tha: the.y were act reliable.
1
!   4       Q     Okay.         Let me ask you nov vithout trying :: recall l
5 a specific :enversation vi-h anyone or anythin; else.                                         In
  .6' your mind as you search back nov, vas there ever a -ime in 7  the day when you believed the :::e was uncovered?
8        A-   As I sen :h back, '.* i c , I can't honestly remember 9  vhat point of level I then;h: the system was at, including                                               I 4
l 10 the acre.                                                                                                 ;
11        0    : am not talkin; abett th e da;ree.                                   Did you ever 12 believe the core to be ene:vered ?                          By that I mean the wa:e:
13 level, two phase, dro;;ed into the core somewhere?                                         That is 14  the to; to the middle, I ::uli care less.                                   Just the fact 15 that i: vas       :: vered.            01: that enter your mind?
16        A    And ! can recall specifically the thoughts of that 17 day.
1 18        Q    ~. n. a.. . s . .. n. a >. . a . ..2.
_     ...a .,    ..
                                                                  ..  .e.,. .. .,co.
                                                                                           .m.....
n ..     . . . ,
19   to ;et specific, just y: ;eneral 1                            ressi:n of hev yc Z) felt.                                                                                                     I 21        A     : think the ;eneral i:pressi:n was tha: there was 22 a ; ssiblity of s::e level nea: the tc; c:                                     aybe ;ar-ia*17 23 -- you kncv, I am sayin; I -hink there was thou;h: :f sete 24 minimum une:verage as c;;: sed := an em; y cere.
25       0     One de; ee is n::                 ---
AL:ERsCN REPORTNG COMPANY, INC.
4o0 vinctNiA Avt. s.w.. wAsMNGTON. D.C. 20024 ::::t $54 234s          44-33

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                                     '11           A. 3ut. th e 'de;:ee is whore va vare a - as far as hen-V                      ,               29 removal.D p                                   .e                                t                                                                           !
13            Q:   - Not the degree to which it. vas uncevered,1)nt J
I             >
4 whether or.not it v'as uncovered. -
5         'A'   .I don't'believe:ve' felt that if it' uas uncovered                                                                     i 4
                                                             ~
6'  that -it wes of any magnitude is what I a: ::ying to say,                                                                           )
a f
T Yic. - We si;ht have believed that there was some -steam                                                                              :
1 '                                   .8. envi nnent on the tcp of the fuel' rods, is what': am'styin;                                                                 '
1     $
9 as; opposed to, you know, is ths core c: covered.                                                  We did'n t     i      3 l
10 . t ell' eve , t ha t we were doin; anythin; that was ; ing te. pet 2:                                                                :
:                                     11 : any fc ther than .ve vere, and tha t is ine best : can de.-                                                                         ;
i .
12                 ER. STELL0s~ Ckay.                                                                                                    ,
13 '               ER. HARPS EE.                 Oa:7, hel; se Out a .ittle bit.
.                                     1'    One of the things in
* 0cki:; back it . this and reviewing ~ he                                                                    :
t
                                     -15    testineny ve.;:t int: se:a ::nfusion.                                 Then 7:n ;c: f.own ::
16 the trying to star: the rea:::: cc:lan: ;um;s and obvie:si;.
17 you had the lov staam ;:ess:::e in t .e hot *e;, and you saw                  .
18 the hundret. a:;s and f := :na: yec tried :: draw sc=e
]
19 ::nclusien about what the state of your systen was.                                                           I D be*.ieve ye; said va.s'you ;ct Oct the is:cetics new and vere.
21    :: yin; te draw some infere::e f:0                               that. 20 you reca".1 vh:
22 : necked the is::stries?
23                 THE ; TNESS:                     .hink Ross and Sellin;er.                                     That
                                    - 24     .enas they vere probah'y ::: by the ep; uter :::se".e ant.                                                                        -
4 .                                                                                                                                                                            ,
                                       ~
J tte:e could have been                      eve and- :he                ;ec;14 -here, h:                              a .-             -
t ALDERSON aE*CRTiNG ::MP'ANY, INC.
400 vlRGINIA AVE S.W.. WASHING :N,3.0. 20024 ::::: 554 :345                        44 34                 -

                                                                                                       \-                         !
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                                                                          .                               .p .
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l 1    ;retty sure Ross and Sel*.in;e: veuld have been technica;1y                                                     .;
                                            ~
l'        2- the two :ha- were talkin; :: 'as.                      .Tht: 1.s what I think,                                       I 1
1
''        3 ' ' e rr y. ,                                                                                                         '
4 1
4                   EI XR. H ARPSTI5 4                                                                               .
                                                                                                                               .i I
5-~         ' Q :- i3eorge'Kander in his :esti:cny                       ---
iS-              A    A.d he could ha'te been another one.                           It is jus:
7 the nano slipped me.                                                                                                  I 1
i 8              0    Geo:ge has expre'ssed -he. concern                        any times that 9 that me: in; his belief vas :ht- the c:re was being cocied 10 bT steam.          .* n fact he was ' c::cerned about b uilt.ing up a                                                I i
11     boren.slu: 7 down there? tectuse ef- the steam.
12              A    Mn'.vas'there in the es:1y, early hours.                               At five
       .13     in the me ning he'was there.                      A:v. he has said that at the                 .
14..poin: cf tir.e of 6:30, se:ev..are in there.
       '15               0    3c: he goes.en in .is testinony to say he has had 16 this concern th:oughout. ::s :: .in; and ha can never assure 17 himself -ht           .he not'eceling -he core by steam, and in fact if     when he ta* ks with us a                 943; in -h a 20:ning h e de scribes 19 the c::e as being =coled by su;erheated steam, some 20 supe: heated steam sechaniac.                        Cid he discuss that in the 21     think-tank that day?                                                                                               l 1
22             .A    : don't believe sc.
23                  ?.P. . B L A K E      "f tnere is a :::estien about the ti:e 24 here, Terry, it mi;ht hel; :: ;;11 cc: these Kunder 25 statesents that you are :eferr'.n; to.
ALCEMSCN #asCCNG CCMPANY, INC.
                                     ' 400 vtAGINIA AVE. $.W., Wa$MNG:ON. D.O. 200:4 f.202) 554. 345      44-35

4 Od 1           .!R. HAR25TIIs            We have conflicts in the testimony 2 and I as trying to understant what concerns ve=e.:aised with 3 the.think-tank.         We have 3r. Xunder vita the concern 1.n his-4 testimony that the core is being cooled by stem: and is 5 uncovered.
: 6.           MR. BLAKIs          !c the extent there is a time 7 diiderence in what he recalls, id we have George's statemen t i
8 here saybe we could take m.lcok at it and sort that out.
9             MR. HARPSTER            I de have George's statement.                       I 10             33. ELAKIs         Maybe we could take a break and look 11   at it.
12             2R. 20SELEYa           We a:e almost ready to go in:o
.      13 another subject so ! think it v:cid be a convenient time to-r 14 take a brea'..
15             33. HARPSTERa            I was just trying to see if Gary 16 recalls George ex; essing his ::.cern.
17             THI W:TNESS4           : do :: .
18             XR. %CEILIY:           Let's take about 10 minutes.                         l 15             (Wherec;:n, a sho:: :.e:ess v,as taken.)                                    l l
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22 23 24 25 l
A':smsoN
                                         .       ne*:RTNG COMPANY, WC.                      44 36 l
i
* 400 VIRGINIA AVE. F.W.. WASwiN3*oN S e 96n94 #9asi saa..gse

p                                                                                                                        l
                                                                 .25 I
                                                                                                                         }
    -1             .
gj      KUNDER:     It had thougnt yean, I tnink i- lwas the B loop pumps, because I-i
         --j 2
reca11edLthe flow went down in the E-leep pumps'.                I believe that they
          .3 secured.the B-loops 'so that we coulc s 111 have adequate spray flow and the J4l
                      ~ *
* 9 I '* * ] * * ** " A " " "" *
* Y** E'           ** '' 'A     Y  *** 9 ''' Y*"
5          **** # E"""#i * 'P "Y *           "*"I '     "* *     ""Y #*  '    *   "*"#'"
* 6
                   *"#'""         " ""      " Y ""d u R gets sak 2ey wen coming.                   Joe Logan I think was the first Senior person te c me into the Control Room.                     Best to
           /
my re 11e ti n we had alreacy secured ene set of pumps by the time Joe came 8
in and it was about*the same time frame that when, it was either about the time he came in or shortly thereaf*.er . hat we' secured the second set of
             ;   . pumps, because the flow was starting te cegrade on the console ficw indicat:-
11l      -
l      I stem to recall that it was the flow in tne A-loop, two pumps running was 121                             ,
up abeve 60% on the indicator anc .he flew was degrading and had degraded 13                                                                                                             l somewhere I think in the' region arcur.d 3C% so it was clear to me that ficw was decreasing and that it was thougnt we were cavitating.                     So, the Shift-15i
:     supervisor secured that set of pumps expecting to go en natural circulation 16!
because the pressure was low and we cica't want run into cavitation preolems 17 with the pumps.         I guess prior to that point' I started to get into a dif-la farent thought process, I had a, But:a Marshall had c:me into the c:ntrol 19}       room, and Scott Wilkerson was still               nere anc I had askad to have a shu cown 20' margin calculation performed and I wantac to get the baron concentration 21.
from the system.       I had asked Bubba Marsna11 to call the lab and get a 22 boron pretty quick.         Again I was sort cf concern where tnis water was 23[
coming from but at tnat point I still falt, it still appearec to me that 23.
somehcw we _other water in the system and I didn't know where it hac ::c;e                           l
       '25!
l :
45-1 4 m

e
   ,,          [
;              ~!
^
i                                                  27
                  ?
4 from. Cause the operators had incicatec to me that tney didn't have high-2 pressure injection 'on for that long that it. woul.d hav'e filled the system up
                  !            and we would'have gone' solid. I dica't understand that.      I had a, let me      -
3 6                                                                                                      1 Dick Dubial had arrived and I tcld him that I had asked for that
                                                          ~
                              - think.
:            4;,
gf                boron sample-and asked if he'd ge dcwn anc coordinate and make sure we''get.              1
                             ' the boren sample, get the results 'of then and I guess-it was an interim
                                                   ~
i                 !
2
           . Gi b         .!                   period ef. perha'ps 15-20 minutes or ,10 .-inutes before Of ck got back to me.
;.           'l                                                                                                .
a                 This'was probably close to, when I askec Cick to go cown' and check en
'.           c:'
',                             getting the sample I believe it was arounc between 5:00 and 6:15 that sort
          ,9                                                                                                           s
                             ' of ' thing, so it would have taken tnem a :artain period of time and by that
         '10l     '
technicians may have been getting a samp'e cause that had been asNed for a u.
little bit earlier. Cick had callec u:: : me, and ! believe it was.around
.         12!
6:35 or so maybe '6:40 and he callec ac :ne result, and he said' the first,'I 131
              '!               think he said the first two samples 'nci:sted 700 pom baron and he said the 1
lA!                                                                                                          ,
next sample he didn't think that war -ignt so they ::ad another sample that n
was 400 or something, I don't recall the exact numbers but that enange all             i 15:
l           of a sudden really frightenec me, ce:ause I thougn: I hope that's a mad 17!
sample analysis because I couldn't a- tna: ::oint I started to think my God, IS{
.                              maybe were getting ::emineral water i-   ,F.   :c;n scme flewpath, I jus cen't 151' understand.
2Ci 21l
                 .j          - KIRKPATR:0X: This was really only a few :'nutes af ar the seconc se . of 1 -
22l
.                              pumps were cut off, probably arounc 6:20?
23 24i 25!
e e
9 4
45-2              -

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l l            ,
           .i,                                               28 s
l        .j          'KUNDER:     It was ;to far from tnat ti=e frame. ,I.dicn't' knew wnat initial
:2             b r n was I walked over to the status ceard and it was a little over a 1000
                      ;ipes that was the boren concentratien na we should have caen at at that
[   ,
point in time, then the thought went tr.rcugh my mind, Oh my God, wars deboring the system and I told them you got to get another sample and tell
_ :l
          .!          me whats wrong, at that point.! askee Eubca Bubba Marshall, that is to ei start looking at the Unit.2 system and see if there's anyway possible we
         .l e
could be getting domineralized water ir. c the system.       Then again the J}                                                                                            l primary side I ju'st was not familiar enough with over in Unit 2 and although     l eh                                                                                           R g
the basic S&W system is the same, the interconnections and rad was .e system      '
a are totally different between Unit 1 and Unit 2 and I had'very little feel
      ,j              for the various system the configura.icns and soforth anc how we could be u,
getting camineraliied water so I Sent ntcugh my head, mayce we hao dominera-
      ,               li:ed water in BWST and somehow we may ave tnis in our sample analysis, 2
lia             but nonetheless Bill Zewe initiatec energency beration,a: that as a precau-      4 tion. At that point, I knew something was really, really wrong and at scme
      .n.                                                                                             _l point in time in , hat same timeframe I .as alertad or I even noticed or         ]
li                                                                                               l
             !        somebody mentienec that the Nls were <inc of high, I went over a looked s.
131 e
sources ranges instrumentation and ne scarce ranges were reating in the
         .                                E range of acout 10 counts, intermecia e range had come onscale anc it was about half a decace ,o almost a cecace :nscale. The only thing :nat was 21 ,
going through minc at that point, is , hat the reactor had gene critical 22P again. I didn't understand what was really happening, I .hink I understanc 23!
            ]         now, we think we uncerstood after ne f ac: we seen, but at taa: poin- in
    -- 2D
            ]        Ltime I thought my Goc we've been cecc d r.g the system, semenew .nat's hc 25j l
a
               '                                                                                 45-3
              .i

T.
a I
2S '
               . .gj           i se'velbeen'.getting all'' the' water in tre' system and we taken the reactor.
critical',cso I started to urge, we got to get hi.gh pressure injec-ion back-i                ,
i                                 n, 'we g t to get some berated water, what we thought was borated water 3!
n                 ,l back into the system and Mike Rcss was in the Control ' Room at the time.          I    .
5                   ..+                                                                              l
              . .y;              remember him ccmmenting te me George we got to do scmetning because, there -           .
,       i:     . ,!              was a, the guys just set there at c:nsole; and I guess Jce Legan just weren't ot 1
sure 'of'what the next' step was anc all I could think of was get that damn, high pressure injection on, that was tne only thing I c:uld think of.
l            There was nothing else to cc excep , :: get some borated water into the
                .Sg
              ,0 system until we.u'noerstand wna was going cn.        And so we cid initiate hign-d 2 r cressure injectien an'd ! seem to recall I even yelled it out, get it on, !
don't care, we.go: to get that tning initiated and new.         Sc that was done,
             .12l immediately cfter we asked for i , anc continued thereafter.          Dick called 6p wl
                     .           vey shortly' thereafter anc
* heard nim screaming over :ne page George Kuncer.
George Kunder,.line one and I answerec.        Dick said, George tr.e sample line
_5 ;.
had just went uo up to 600 mR/hr, anc at that poin: I realize oh my god
             '16:
were failing fuel and I yelied a- Jce, ! said Joe were failing fuel, Dick            i iT'                gets 600 mR/hr at :ne sample lines anc :na was right around 6: 45 in that            i n..e i
                               ..regicn and I saio hey were in c. site emergency, its the eal tning and site
               .5, emergency was ceclared. I turnec ar:und and told Ren Warren anc Dicx 2C' sensil and who nac been in the C:ntr:1 Recm, .. oh I think just cefore tna .
             - 2'_ !
i           Ivan Porter.whc's ty lead IC engineer nac come into the Control Ecom and I 22'
                     !           criefed him on what had hapoendec, en *nat the plant was coing anc I seem 23!
                   .)            ::  recall, I may m e mentioned seme ning about failec fuei, we wehe getting
           . 21:
high activity in the system and nat. as all pretty muen ar:unc :ne same 25!
j                                                                                                  e j                                                                                      45-4 1

3 j.
p+                  .
t l'  .
it
                                                                                .30 g                     : time frame, but I do recall telling on Warren who had :een in tnere and.
Dick Bensil to.get on the phone and start making the phones calls.and we 2                                                                                 ,
1 3j                      went into the emergency procedures a.d began the emergency response and 'I don't know,-.at that time I really star:ac to 'just. starting reacting to the               f c ndition and really.getting it clear in mind, we were in a real- emergency
            - 5!, .
                                                       .                                     4
                  .!                   situation and we got'to initiate the ecergency plan and you know from that                  '
o!
_;                     peint on;I- was, I don't know how to :u: it, just keyed up to car y out 4
g                      those emergency plans and keeping -he plant in a safe concition.           Bill Zewe
                 -t                                                                                                                1 as I recall pretty much directed his atten .icn to the-console and it was
             . 91
                                      ' around the same time frame that Ga y M' ler came in, I think he came in, he
-          ,0 l                 definately came in after the site emer;ency was declarec, Joe Logan was the Senior. guy at the time the site emer;er.cy was declared anc Gary came in I 12l
                                      .woula estimate 15 minutes or so after .ne site emergency was initiated and 4
Gary took charge of the emergency as E ergency Director anc .he emergency la!
teams were formulated.       I basically was ressonsible at snat point to work
                   =.
for Joe Logan, carry out any technica'. ac:f vities he needed, make sure
             *. 5i                              .
communications was establishec with .r.e Sta .e, tna was ::r/ first concern, 17:
                        ,               to get hold of the Civil Defense anc . cid put two engineers on it, because ISi                                                                                      .
through pevious emergency crills i         .us: akes a ler.g time to maxa all tu d
151 phene calls. The first one of coursa f s to -he Civi' Defensa Duty Officer 20!
and maintenance times that goes to ge-       ..em notifiec so . hey couic notify 2*_:' -                         .              .
J the- Sureau.cf Radiological Health anc ;e . nat part of :. e plan moving.
22!         -
22[
h SHACKLETON:   At, this time we'11 enc    ..is :ste, its 9:02 :.O. , Acril 24, 23.i                        ..
1979 and we come on other tape.
           ' 25!
45-5
,-                      A.
l ..

l      .        !
l 3-.
SHACXLETON:    This is a continuation :f ne interview of Mr. George A. Kuncer.
2 Time is now 9:05 p.m. , April 25, 1979.
3;
         ;          XIRXpATRICX: George you were, you hac .iust commented that you had starting 3
making the appropriate calls, Joe Lc;an was the Senior man en site at tha
         ..'       time. Does that make him the Site E. er;ency Director? And sher:1y, -hen, ci
         .lr,      Gary Miller came in. At that time c:es . e assume the .. 7-1 8l XUNDER:    He did. Gary first appraisec n#mself cf the plant conditions and what we had and Gary, I thought, very 'cr:afully t:ok over ,as the Emergency Director. He anncunced it, anc ne i-di:2:ec that he, myself, Logan, !
     ,            think he said Ross, and I know he sa': Deciel were the guys that talked to a
     ,j           nim, to try and establish good clear ::n unicatiens paths with the pecple
     --d '
     ,,j in the Control Recm. And there was :.e. . ::mmunications were being estaa-lisned by someone else between the c:ntr:1 room and the emergency c:ntrol station. In etnerweres, between EC ar: EC5. I was pretty muca making sure that the cal's were being made :       .e Offsite people and we got s:me-
_/.
I    cne. . . I can't remember who it was a'ym:Pe... to keep the emergency status 13i, c;
                  = card and I wan ac to make carn sure .ra we go the information from ne
     ~~!          :allers, Ron Warren and Di:k 5ensel, :.: : the emer;ency bearc.         ~' a:
20 ",
scrked fairly well.      We had clearly f:e--f'ied who was called at wna- ,iine.
21,I In fact, there was a pnetograph mace :f      .,a ., so we wouldn't lose that 22l          information. That par cf the crill ;:: started fairly well.
221J 2di!
J 2Sf 1
I 45-6

i
                              .i        -
t
                                )                                                           32-t                X!RKPATRICX: . Step back a minute, I war.: to keep the emergency in mind, i
                              ~i want.to ask you earlier ab'out the c:r.ference call between yourself and Jack 2                                                                            ,
Herbein and Gary.          Did you keep a les cf that or is there a record of your
                              -i j                 call ...?
Ei i
                      .           !            KUNDER:' No.         I did not keep a recore, Jack or someone on tneir end may Si I
have kept some notes.
                               /;
I 8;
XIRKPATRICX: We're down to the point were the emergency has been ceclared ci
                              -l y                  now.        If my sequence is correct, the emergency occurrec, you saw radiation
                                   !           increase when Mr. Debiel was down in .he lao.
1:.}
12!.
I          KUNDER:         Dick saw the increase down tr.ere. When he .cid me what his proclem 13t I
was,-it was witnin seconds trat the a*. arms in the back panels of tne RMS 14!
starting coming in.           At this time in .y training, I'm net familiar with w
which alarms go to which area, but I saw tne alert and the alarm lights coming in anc tney all startec c ming in verj, very quickly.              I knew that 17 18i l{         there was prc: ably a dome monitor in eacn unit.             I was net aware that tnere was other moniters in the reactor bui'ci g.              :'m not sure wnat tney did, lil but the alarms for the area monit:rs :r ne a.mospneric monito s in tne 20j Auxiliary Building or fuel handling b.i'cing were apparently going of f.             A 2*_      ;
j iot of alarms were coming in.
22l' 231 1          XIRKPATRICK: Were you aware they starta:: the reactor coclant pump at that y,:'
time, or do you recall that?
                            '25ig i
45-7

e
: MMM XUNCERi    I was aware that the c:olant pum; was attempted to be started.           I
                                                      ~
,                      2 thought it was only' started one time.           3ut I'learnec a little later that-L                      3:
they had tried to start one and it' didn't work out, but I observed' when w.
:            they started -the--let me think, I think it was the 23 pump, if I'm not
                                      ~
1.
e                      mistaken.- There was one' control swit:n in the far right. They startec the
                       /.t pump, the indicating' light'was' red.          I looked at the flow indicator, it c
read zero. . And I seem to recall Mika R:ss and Zewe wondering if it was
[
nr eally running.      They called for some ne to go down to tne switchgear and           .
: neck to.see if the breaker was close:.           And you knew they said it was, anc they recognizac'it pr:bably was runni g, but you know it-was just pumping
                 ' ,,j                        steam up. There was just no water 'n :ne pump and that is wny we didn't
;                  e..
1
!                . _,2P see the flow indication.       About this same time by the way, the intermediate
[                  , , ,
                   .o range counts cropped off.
;                . 1*:
X:RKPATRICX:    Did that give you any kdnca--did somebecy report tnat to you,
                  , , .                      fer instance, or were you wat:hing ycur intermediate range?
Ac-l                17:
XUNDER:    I wasn't watching. I looked a- it just after it went cown, just
                          ,                'to verify that it was going down?
i 2;E l                  <!RKPATRIOX:    What does that mean :: y:.? At tne time, I mean?
21.l .
22.
l
                          '                 X"NDER:     At the time I was sort Of relieved, but I sti[1 didn't fully 2T j                        j                  understand what we were seeing.         ! ndn< it was later en wnen Jchn Kenna, 2&'
,                      -l                   of S&W, had been in the centrol reem :na ne mentionec that pretably was 23!
                         ~'
i g-l a-                                                                                                                  45-8
    ._-_x__               ___                                 -     :.--                --                  . - . -     -.

        -                               .~ . .                       -    -.             .       -
1 Aj l
I i
j                                                              3*
i
: g.                 ..due to the fact na: We hac ne.c:re u.,c:verec, anc that the the neutron leakage utput to the out-of-core ce ac::rs was grecter, and we were seeing                         j 2,1                                                                                                                    '
3.
           !               the higher count rata. And that all ccrrelated.                      You know. . after the fact-4 y u start hinking about this, -and nen 1: fewis up your mamory a little-                           j
       ,[                . bit,1because you'know--I wasn't- ycu aimest tnink you.reccgnized it at the                       -
       -,                                                                                                                     1
            !              time but I don't think I really- dic.                  :id not ree:gni:e.why the ccunts Si went cown.
7 i
8!                                                                                                                    l KIRKPATRICK:          During the period tne um; -as off, somebecy.. .                              l 9!
10:
I
     ,j                    KUNDER:    Excuse me.        I think procacly         ,a-'s going througn my mind is tne
            .              high pressure injection was naving s::e affect, bu- : just can't recall 12l
:              exactly.-
14!
KIRKPATRICK:         During the time you ac ne if gn pressure injection going in
              ,             at the normal rate, 200 and some gall:nr :gr leg.
1 51 i
17!    ^
KUNDER:    250.
lat iSi.
K:RKPATR CK:         250, c(. Sc ycu f a'.-    ..a       .cu'c ce :cr' cn oa ar? Cecling water?
21!
22' KUNDER:     Right, it-would be 2270 p m.
23l l
2Af
      '25!
6 e    e
                   ,                                                                                       45                    7 3

x                                                                -                  . _ . _      ..
24-   .
1            tha( called forl site' emergency.-
                                                         ~
                                                                                                                 -)
2'                        I .S don'      recall exae:'.y.what they were doing at that                  I
                                                     ,                                                               1 l'   '
3: ' point.            Our gears shif tedLinte responding to the emergency
: i.                         _
14'            condition, and'I became ' involved with assuring that our emergency l
      ..      5 , = plani was' implemented at that. peint.                                                       .
      ?
j         '6                         I .do remember the conversation with Ochn Flint, but                       :
n b'     7            that was af ter we :had achieved the general perception that we n
E      8
    , F. t                 were havine. steam voidine. in the''s." stem, and his e>:planation or                   i
   ^C
:i      9           his conclusion- as. to why we. saw the- indicatiens we did made sense.                  ,
     .z.                                                                                                           ,
10; They .were 'censiste .t with wha: we fe'.: exis ted in - the syste=.
                                                                                      ~
z                                                                                                           '1
       =
     .S 11-                        We' felt .that we had stea.m and then we did net have
   .f-12
       =
the moderation that we normally.voulf have for the neutrons.
p z.
13                    O    Did ven'at an.? time en :: arch 28, 1979, discuss the 14            apparent return te criticality with the subsecuent inferences cf 5a                                     .                                                      -
        =
{x 15                core uncovery or veding with ::essrs
:: iller, Rogers , IIerbein, li            : ewe, or Chwastyki
        /              ,
        ,f N     17                   A    I don' t remerber any discussions .-
:s             .'
18                   O    To the best cf your, h .cwledge, was the count rate
        ,r-g    19 , behavier er apparent re-criticali .y reported to the NRC on :: arch I.
20~ 2 ii >
i 21                   A     I don't remer.ber if that was reper ed er not.                  Again.,
i
.             22 , it would be. in the tape if I did.                   If I didn't, it didn't repres e.- -
23          r a significant ites at the time that I had the conversatien because 24            the rate count did come down.
25                        I don't remerber if I associated the increase in the ALDERSON REPORTING COMP ANY. INC.
46-1

A, I-                                                                                        25 l
          -1 : count rate with the vciding . ri:: to cy conversation -w:.th the : E:
i 2 or if that came af terwards.                                 Zu:, the time frame was that it wet.
3..have been just af ter John Flint came in the control room that I t
3-4 ."be-=me aware of the connecticn between the two.
e
     .e   5>,                Q    In your ooinien     .             tcda.e, should the information regard:..-
f"       e r*       a                                                                                               l e
E    6 'de count rate behavior have been passed alone to the NRC cr the             -
r.
E     7 ..i..f erences fren it?
n
: j. 8, ,
A    All de infor=ation dat was available should have bee.
2     9 , passed along to the NRC.
At the sine, I believed that I had z.,       -
E 3
10 i:. assed on all de information dat was avai'.able and c. ertinent
    =
{>    11 jwidin de time frame tha: I haf :: discuss it over the phone.
s 12 -   ,
By. . . ... ~ . A. OS: . ...w 2 :
e            >
N
  =
13]                 C-   Let's go back a li                       le to the discussion of Flint's
[
14 conclusien of the voiding.                                   Y u were asked if you discussed with t:
j     15 ::nc nanef individuals, was tha: discussed in d e think tank wit..
t g     16 'de management group, to the bes: of your knowledge?
z y'    17   ,
A    I dcn't remember it being discussed.                       I suspect tha:
  ;:        4 E     18 'by the time we really go                                int    :ne management team environment d:
a.
  $     19 tha: was a parameter tha: was passed, and net of i==ediate concer-n 20 .I:            .a . have been because . bv da: time I had linked the two
(       21 'tegether in my own mind.                                I cann:: he sure.
22                        3Y MR. IiARPS TIR:
l l
l 23                   C    Let ce ask y:u sone :;;estions about the in-cere 24 ins trumentaticn, George .
: 25.                       To the best cf vcur k .:wledce, what are de core e>: .s :
I i
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
46-2

a     ,
jo                                                                                                                                          26        1 l
I
                           .f. '
                   .1                    ther: occupies- used for during sc=al cperatiens?
                  '2'.                                        MR. Mc3R DE: .A                       Uni         *
                                                                                                                  ,-at        ; nit 22, or in power plants t                                                                                                                                                      .
3 'i in eeneral?
l'                   . t
                   . 4 .:,,                                    m v. ng.-.u .sog n. R .
f.-
s         5 ;9 -                           O.       n ~.. Un.4. +. . 2  .
n                .
t4
        .g           6 L '3                          -A        pow,             ar aware tha: th ey are us ed , if anything, fc:
n-n 5,       7 ; c. ..agnes tic reasons .
U                                                                                                                                                                    ?
y,         8,                             Q              am scrry, prier tc the accident.                                                                            '
C-            .i
            ~,         9L                             A      :I don't remember thinking about the                                             prior to the
        -z.                  c
        . 3 '10 ; accident.
z-               t
            =             .s
        . j l 'II- l:-                                O         Had you had any trainin                              en in-ccre ther.ccouples a.
y                y g       12 ' a .i. ?           .
            -       13         4, n         ...s.
w       ..e e
a.-..a. a. _e;. . e ' ..
4             .=. . a. c' . I was aw_=~.e c'             '*.a_..
             =7. .
                                                                                                 +'.e"e-..'.
             =       14                  o u'. a         *'.ed.-      e .-"....' a *. 4 c . ,
: x.                                              .                  .          .     ..  ; --                e. c  a.*.v. w.". e. e .
              =.
z; . 15                                 0         Are v.cu aware of an.y c:her station eerscnnel who wculd                 .
              =                 ,
16 l,l
              -                 .! have had training on the in-core therroccuples?
y,'                 .
n
              $      17 -                             A         " ell, when you say, training on in-core _hermoccuples ,
              =
w 3
x 18 ' do v. eu mean were there other peccle who were aware tha: thens w                   :,,
E,     19 ,. e                 ._4 s .eu.n 3
              =.
              .                   .r.
                    .20                                                                                                                                         w.._.._._..
C             wa       .. n _4..o .e .g ...c e e_ _e .__.2...4
                                                                                             .                            . n g .4 ..   ..w... 4
                                                                                                                                                          -ee,            ...
21 :i.might be used for.
                             .L                                                                                                                                                    ,
i                                                                                                                                              i 22                                A-        The instrumentation engineers tha                                         I became responsihls 1
23 ' , to supervise when I came over to Uni: II, of ccurse , were f amil:.ar e
24 -fwith the fact that they were insta led and presumah'y they knew 25                 that thev        . were hocked uo.                 .
a                                              ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
46-3
.e
    .j-

THI Tape 182 - Logan.                                 .
May 9,.1979 l
l I.ogan:        Abnormal pump configuration and normally you would want to maintain
: cs much flow as you'could through the core to remove the heat.
1 l
Hunter:          I understand that. ' I tried co ascertain can you recall then after     j coming in and maybe talking with Bill with looking the charts over in the              j 1
control room and' then talking with ' George Kunder do you recall the two more          !
pumps,being secured while you were there within the first few minutes?
           ' Logan: Right now I can't recall whether.that happened before or after I got              I there.                                                                                  ,
1 Hunter: Did you spend some time Joe with Bill Zewe that morning you kncv when he came in discussing the plant conditions?               ,
1 Logan:         I didn't have much of an opportunity because when this. . . My first intention was to see that the calls had been made this was an abnormal situa-tion and I wanted to make sure that one, Miller had been called and informed of the situation.         I walked back out Zewe was having problems trying to get this thing under control because of the abnormal indications and my mind is kind of hazey right now as to what went on at that particular time you know trying.to decide what we should do.          I do recall we tried to start a pump. I can't- remember if it was shortly after I got there or not but we had received a report sometime shortly after I got there of a boron sample which indicated a low: boron content and as I recall we were concerned whether we were getting 4
an accurate sample. The results were I think were around 700 dpm when we 47-1

f
            ' TMI Tape 182 ) I.ogan                                   Bay.9,.1979 wererunningatthatltimearound'slightlyover1000dpasotheconcernhere
                                           ~
was that'an accurate sample or not. .As I recall we also had an indication about that. time of an increase 'on our source and intermediate range meters.
             . George Kunder I know had was concerned that we might actually that could
            -perhaps have been an accurate indication and as. I recall-'I believe we rain-itiated, or we, initiated emergency injection they had initiated this before and secured it. I might point out in previous reactor trips we had initiated high pressure injection and subsequently corresponding.with that high pres'sure injection we have the you know sodium hydroxide' injection also,and this has       #
caused us considerable problems of course in removing the sodium from the plant .and they secured the high pressure injection . . . I'm getting this . . .
from .... Talks that'I had with them after this occurred'of course, they had secure that when the pressurizer started filling.up you know. That indicated that they certainly had enough water in there and they didn't want to put anymore sodium hydroxide in the, plant and they secured both the sodium hydroxide and the BWST, the high pressure injection.
Hunter:      Okay. When you had discussed with George Kunder earlier you indicated you had discussed the reactor coolant puups, the problem with the pumps, do, you recall any other specific areas that you and George had talked about?
l-            net potitive suction pressure curve pin compression limits I'm trying to key on anything that you may have discussed.       It's looks like at 5:45 you logged in at'the gate. It's looks like at 5:45 that all the pumps had been secured.
47-2      ,

l J. si Logcn                                                                   33 LI             A.      Well, I guessieventually, yes, you know.           .Certainly 2"      I wouldn' t have expected to get the high radiation alarm in 3:      the reactor Leompartment, - no, and that may have been the thing 4-      that tr'iggered my mind that- we had a very serious problem.
L         5             Q.      Did that lead you to conclude the core had been at                         i 6      least partially uncovered?
71            A.      What, the one in the .high range?
8             Q.      Yes.
;         9              A.     'I don' t know, at this particular time, what I 10         tho ug ht about what 'n ad      ca us ed it, except we had one hell. of a 11         problem, or. were going to have one.                   >
L12                         Trying to -- you know, sitting back with 20/20 13        hindsight and knowing everything we know today, you say, why 14,       d idn' t you recognize that.         Again, you have to experience it 13        to appreciate it.         You can sit up here and go through the 16        testimony and everything and Monday night quarterback and say, 17       gee, you should have , recognized tha t .         You can't.      No wa y .
la       You can't.        You can't take people down and fight a fire in 19       the same situation that existed in the actual conditions.
20       BY MR. C RAIG:
21               Q. Concerning your early morning increase in this 22       source range nuclear instrumentation and intermedial nuclear 23       instrumentation, you told the1IE investigators again in your 24       May 9,    '79,    testimony that the source range indication really 25       bothered George Kunder.
48-1
                       <>                    ..wn,    .ccao..---

E d o. f L.og an -                                                             .:e "1"                Did .you observe the nuclear instrumentation between 2:        '2  .six and .S(457       Now,. refer
* ring co this NSAC chart again, We      .
3  .are looking here at Lthese high levels and the . source, which L4    is tho' blue.
l--        5            As   I can' t recall actually looking at them.             As I
                            .r j
: 15. - r eca111 the si t ua t ion , we h ad h ad a s pi ke o r an increase at i
I
.          7    the same time tha't ws : had received .a repo rt of a -low boron                   l 8    from' the1 primary coolant, an analysis that we had running.
1
,          9   Those 'two , I think, corresponded about the same tim e , if I'm l        10    not mistaken.
[        11-                The concern at that time, of course, was tha t we had 12   diluted the primary coolant.                  In retrospect we hadn't, but
:        13    tha t. wa s the inf e rence then; that we had diluted the pr imary 2
14    coolant boron concentration.
15            2    Did you believe that the reactor was or could return                 1
:                                                                                                \
;        16    to criticality?
17            A. At that pa rticular time, I can't tell you wha t I 18-  tho ug ht.      I don' t believe I thought that we were going i
!        19   critical.        We ha d -- fi r s t of all, we had several
:        20-  abnormalities that were going on.                  The thing was genera ting 4-21   heat obviously because it was -- the pumps were secured , so p        22   the decay heat was coming in there.
i-23                 The low boron condensation I didn' t und e r s ta nd .         I j        24. didn' t- see how we could have diluted it, in my own mind, 25   pertaining to the RWST, which was morated around two enousand 3
i                                                                             48-2               -
7A Vf or needF T ATF4 L
: s. c. + ogen               .-                                              35 1  epm. The facts just didn't jive.         It was an abnormal                .
I 2  sampling siemation because you didn' t have stuf f being                       l l
3  circula t ed. I don't xnow what I thought right at the moment, 4  you know.
S              aut we star ted inj ecti ng , I believe, at tha t time, 6  just because. chat was the indica tion we had; had a low bo ron, 7   so we took the precautionary measures.
8               I don't think, at that time, I felt we were going 9  critical, however.
10          2    In your interview befo re the succommittee of the 11   Nuclear Regulatory Commission on Environment and Public Works, 12   Oc tob er 15, 1979, you state on .page ten , and I'll quote, "The 13   count rate coming up sas because we were -- in fact, we had a 14   bubole in the -- wh a t we we r e se e ing wa s l e a k i ng neut r o ns . "
15               Vere you aware, on 3-23-79, that you were seeing 16   leakage neutrons?
17          A. No. Tha t is 20/20 hindsight, trying to ex pla in tha t .
18          Q. In Mr. Flint's testimony on June 30, 1979, he states 19    tha t he drew the conclusion that the nuclear instrumen:a tion 20    indications were not a criticality but were a change in the
                  ~
21    leakage fluxion resulting from a portion of uncovery of the 22   core. He says he discussed this .wi th Mr. Rodgers, and Mr.
23  Rodgers told him he would discuss this wi th Met Ed manag ement.
24               Did you discuss John Flint's conclusion wita Lee 25   Rodgers on the day of the acc id en t?
48-3 es ve n, neeer n ce i
: v. c. uuycn                                                        ad
   .1       A. No, I didn't.
    ? BY MR. MOSELEY:
3       Q. Or with anyone?
4       A. No. I don't remember when John snowed up, frankly.
5            Do you remember?
6 BY s4R. CRAIG:
7        Q. It was --
8            MR. MOS ELEY:     About ten.
9  BY MR. CRAIG:
LO        Q.   .41ne to 10 time fr ame.
L1        A. This occurred back around six or seven.
L2        2    Tha t's right.
L3        A. I d i d no t -- I don't recall having any conversa tion 14  with John that day.        In f act, I don't really recall se e ing 15  John that day now.        I may have.
16             Lee Rodgers was in there, I remember seeing him.
l 17  But Lee was, again, mostly talking with Gary Miller.           I had 18  no conversation on that particular subj ect with Lee.
19        Q. You have stated tha t you didn' t have any discussions 20  conce rning the apparent return to criticality or increase in 21  count rates with respect to voiding on ene day of the 22  accident.,
23       A. Restate tha t , pl ea se .
24       Q. I believe you nave just told us that you didn't have 25  any discussions wnich related the inc r ea se in co un t rates and 48-4 TAYLCE ASS OC I ATES

i J. Bi Legan                                                                         37
     '1          the nuclear' instr'umentation with. the possibility 1of voiding                              i
:2          in L thef corer :is tha cL correct?
     '3'                A.: 'I don' t lknow ,1f , I- had' any. conversa tions.-
                                   ~
I' don't-4        recall discussing .it with" John Flint.              Kund e r , I think,
      'S      ' raised 'the issue wnen - we:- had the count ra te increase,
                                                                                                            .i l
                                        -                                                                      i m     6      -combined with thisilow boron concentration.                       Whether I                   ]
i
      '7 ,       discussed , anything1 with him at this' particular time, I can':                             I
      '8-       -reca 9                    I don' t think , as-I'say, in my own mind, I f elt we 10          were critical, however.
11                 2      Oo' you recall any discussions with Miller , Zewe, 12           Herbein, Chwastyk, or anyone else, .at any time, on the day of
: 13.         .the ac c id en t , concerning the nuclear instrumenta tion behavio r                         i 14          in the morn,ing?
l'5                A. Right now I' don' t recall.      I may have, wnen Miller 16'         showed up, told him : hat -- I don't know.                Just in t ell ing                  !
17          him what events, as I remembered them, when he ar r iv ed , I may                          i 18'        have mentioned it.        I don't know.
I 19         3Y AR. MOS ELEY:                                                                            i
    - 20                Q. I'm a little bit confused.          Waa: did you and Kunder 21        . discuss in regard to --
:2 2               A. As I recall, we received, at about the time of :he 23-       count ra te l incr ea se , a report f rom a bo ron concentra tion :na:
: 24)       .nad been . run - sa rl'ie r , ?.ad been d rawn earlier, from :ne 25       ' primary coolant.       And that report was.a low moron 48-5
                                           ?AYLot 29;nctatts

       .(
JJs Ed Logan.                          .                                         '38
{         l       l concentration.       I. don't know what the 'value was , but it was 12        significantly-lower than what it should have been.
l-
                                   '                        ~
3               Q.   : And ;that; was1what you discussed with Kunder?
                           ~ I ' remember ';ha t coming up , but I can' t remember whac A.
                                                                                                          -)
i 5       L we said except. that,- as I recall, if we. -ere not inj ecting ,-
f 6       'then we : reinitiated in j ec tio n. .
>                                                                                                          e 7'              Q.  : And yo' u r conclusions, even though you weren' t u
i:       .8        concerned that the reactor was going critical, was that you 9        were ' having a boron dilution?                                                    -
: 10.                A.,   No, that wa s the in f er enc e , because I think Geo rge                  ;
11          felt that.        I couldn't quite agree with that, but the sa fest
,      12          thing is to go ahead and inj ec t.
E      13                 Q. What did you believe' was happening?
14                 A. At this pa r ticular. time, I don' t know.           As I s a y ,
      - 15.        there was a lot of abnormalities going on, as far as the 16          plant was not in - a no rmal . configuration.         At that pa r tic ula r 17         . time, I don't know what I thought.             I'm sure I did not feel 18         we were going critical.
l 19        :iMf M R. CRAIG:                                                                          '
20                 Q. . There was a subsequent boron sample which is even 21          lower - than the first one, as' I recall.                                               &
22                 A.-  'I think that's true. . I believe there was.
23:                Q. Did you draw any conclusion --
24                 A. Well,, you have to realize we were not circulating r
25        . water. So the sample _that you get can be suspect.
49.6

J. B. Log an                                                           39 1    SY MR. MOSELEY:
2           Q.      Bat the nuclear instrumenta tion is no t subject to             l 3    the same ' probism.
4           A.      No , but ' the . nuclear instrumenta tion. that it's
  -5    subject to, to a lot of heat or other things, can give you 6   some erroneous ' indications.                                                 '
l l  7           Q.      Did you believe there was that much ' heat in the area 8   of that instr umen ta tion?
9           A. I don' t know what I believed at this particular tim e ,
10     frankly.
11     BY MR. CRAIG:
12            Q. Was the count range behavior passed on to tne NRC on 13     3-28-797 14             A. I did no t pass it on. I don' t know if it wa s o r no t .
15             Q. In your opinion, sho uld it have been, on the day of          s 13    the accident, r e po r ted to th       NRC?
17             A. I think 'they should have been told ev erything that 18    went on when they go t there.
19    SY MR. MCSELEY:
20            Q. What about befo re they ar r ived?
21            A. Certainly if -- I'm trying to rememoer when we 22    actually established communications on a continuous basis 23    wi th them.
24            Q.      It was near eigne o' clock.
25             A. -  Yeah. Anythi ng that went on, I think we sho uld have, 48-7 7AYLOE ASSOCIATES

           'cr2-4                                                                                                                       :-
l l
                                             .1 '                      A     Yes.
l l
2                              BY MR. CRAIG:
3  .
Q     on the morning of the day of the accident, did you 4'1 believe that the reactor' was going recritical af ter the scram?
                                         . 5:                       JL    :I did not believe that it was going recritical, but. :
h           !
                                         ]
6' d:.d not have a good answer for why the increase in count rate.
k7 a
Q     Did.you at any time on the day of the ace: dent discuss
                                         $     8i                 this increase in count rate with Mr. Miller, Kunder, Flint, d
Herbein or Chwastyk?
9l       1 r
10 '                      A     Any time that day?         Mith Mr. Miller, Mr. Chwas:yk. Met z              ,
5
                                         $    11 !                Mr. Herbein.      And who else did you s ay?      I'm sorry.
m Y    12 !                      Q     Mr. Kunder.
E g   13                        A     Mr . K un de r , ' y e s .
m l   14 l                      Q     And John Flint?
j E
15j k
A     Yes, I recall discussing that with Mr. Flin: later in I
y 16 ,                  the day, yes, d                I d   17                        Q     Can you tell us the reaction to this increase in coun a
b, 18 !                rates for any of th,ese people?          Mr. Miller, Kunder, Flint or E
n  19 '          ,     Chwas tyk?
M                i 20!                        A     I really can't recall exactly what each of the gentlener 21 l expressed to me, other than some way the out-of-core detectors l
22 3 were seeing an increase in flux, and I don' t recall exactly i
23 ' what each of them had to say about it at the time.
24                        Q    At any time on tne day of the accident, were these s
25 ,i! conversations held with respect to voiding in the primary i!
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
49-1

ara-5 11             system for core uncovery, which- would give' you thE increase in 2-             flux-at'theLouter~4ete'ctors?
3"                    .A.          Not that ~:- can . remember, no, 4l                    .Q.       . In your op'i.hior. today, should this . increase in coun:
s         5': rateLand potentia
* for recriticality have been passed.on. to                                                           he g                                                                            ,
                $6 NRC on the day of the : accident?
A       Yes.,
                $          71 .
               'l         '8'                        O      ,To. the best. of your knowledge, what were the core' exi F
5          9.           -ther=occuples.used for during normal operation?
P
                                                                                                                                                             .i c        10                          A       Prior to the accident, we did not really use them, i
               .:              o j 'll          ,
They were unavailab's.in Unit 1, and they were available in Uni: ;,
a               i a
                "j .12 i and to.my knowledge, there were not any-existing nrocedures tha:
E              t 13 l really had you use : hem a all,.
5 E
a g       14                          Q       To the~ best of your knowledge, who would have used
               .a z         '
i 2
w
                       -15        ,
zhe : ore exit thermecouoles?
                 =
                 ,        16                                 MR. MC 3R:CE:           On the day of the accident?
s               f ji        17 '                               MR. CRA:3: Previous to the day of the accident.
a-2                                                                   Hell, that question strikes me as a m        18                                 MR.:MC 3 RIDE:                                                                                   !
19              little odd, because he's just testified that they weren': used.
R           .~.
c 2011-                              MR. CRA:G:          No, he testified that he wasn' t aware i
21 j that they were used.                              I'll be a little more specific.
L 22 ];                               MR. MC.3n:DE:          Okay.
BY !!.R . . C RAIG :
23 '1
                              .,                                                                                                                               T 24 ;                         Q. I interpreted the response that you didn' t believe 25              that they were                 used, is that 'letropolitan Edison personnel didn't
                                   .i -
j                                          ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
49   . . , _ '                                       -m--
_                       E-*                 + - - - -      e,          m e -

r
    'ar6-11                                                                                            37 l'           J that It didn' t like right ' af ter I' walked in. "           That's the end
          .2               of the quote.
3                             You~also~said that you asked Bill Zewe if he was l
4               injecting, and was he emergency borating.                 At the time you were       l e      ' 5 '.          .w atching' the . nuclear' instrumentation, did you believe that
  .!             i lthe reactor was actua11y' returning to criticality?
{6                                        '
7                    A'      I' don't'know what conclusions I drew.               My gut feeling 2
j        8'             was something was wrong, was the conclusion I drew.                   I just d
  ' i-       9             walked in, and the only conclusion I could draw, she is going 10               to go critical on us for some reason.               I remember that's one 11               of.the things ~we looked at.            Whether.I just walked in or ta g       12               whether it was an - times were real tough after something
: j.      13 i 5                       like this.        But it did bother me very much, and the conclusion l
14 !             the draw, the only thing I could draw, she is starting to go l"     15               critical, reason or'not.
I d     I6      l Q        In Flint's testimony to the Kemeny Commission, he d             l 4
h ' 17                 says that he drew the' conclusion that the nuclear instrument E
18               indications.were-not a recriticality, but were a change in 3
k I9               leakage flux.on the core.           He says that he discussed this with             l g              ,
20 l             Rogers, and Rogers told him that he would discuss with Met Ed i
21               management.
22                             Did Rogers inform you of Flint's conclusion?
i 23         ;           A       No,-sir.
i i          24'                    Q       Did you participate in any discussion on March 28th l
25        e     ,in which Mr. Flint':! conclusion or anyone else's similar j
                       .                         . . ,, . nm . .n m un eno. . ~v i m c sn.,

i        ,
l
[
l t
76 J
              ,    MILLER: ' That was ; discussed plus the' excores.            We watched both of.
2!                 .
j
                  . those. Early.inL the morning that was discussad if 'some thing had 3!                                      ~
       ;           occurred.fYou.know, we did not see, that I remember, after seven in the 41
   .,              morning'any kind of- an ueward response on those.              We were looking.at
                  . those.-They had:showed an. upward response earlier i'1.the morning.                  In
  ' 6i                                                                                          .
i
                  - fact early in the morning they probably emergency' borated it... things based on the excores going up.             And you .know they had low baron samples 8
                  - early in the morning and they thought they were getting a low baron 9l when they were probably taking water of the damn core.
10l i
HUNTER:   I understand.       I don't have any further questions at this time, Gary. I appreciate your time and would also like to indicate
                  - that after I review this conversation and would also like to review 14i your transcript. I would like to indicate that I would be getting back N                 and try to cover some of the scecific decisions at that time.
16i i
17                          I don't.have any problem with further interviews, MILLER:                                                                    I think you 18l               got 'to remember the further we get the harder it is to become honestly
* lf
                   - specific and I'll give you the answer as honestly as I can.                  Testimony   i 20{
gives my logic as best as I can present it and I, also, might say' that 1 21!               the level of stress that I felt under that day was almost intolerable 22f               because, I think the situation as I've said was one I wasn't schooled 1
23l               in, secondly, the amount of communications I was trying to accomplish 24              . were almost intolerable and that I actually removed myself at times 25j t
i 51 -1

                                                                                            '07 1~
MR .: 50SE1EYa- We are back on the record.
2               SY'MR. M3SELEY:                                                       .
3       Q       Mr. Millar,.! would like to?go to ' another subject 4- area now.
5               In your. transcript of your discussion with the :CI 6 investigator on May 7, you were asked if the SP!!O vere used 7 or discussed during the accident.                     Your response in part l     8. was, a'nd I quotes         "That.was discusse'd plus the ek-cores.
l l
l     9  We watched both of.these.                 Early in the morning that was o    10 discussed.        If something had occurred, you know, we                       f. id not l
11  see, that I remember after'7:00 a.m., in the morning any
    '12 kind of an upward cesponse on these.                       We were lookin; a:
13 . these. Thwy had shown an upward response earlier in the 1
14 mo rn ing .
1 In fact, earlier in the morning they probably                               I 15 borated it, things based on the ex cores ;oing u;, and you 16 know they took low boron sanples early in the tornin; and 17 they thou;ht they were getting a low boron when they were 18 probably taking water of f the damn core."
19               On the, morning of March 23, what did you believe 20 based on what you saw or were told about the nuclear 21 . instrument indications?
21       A       I think the samples were pertinent.                         ! have it in 23 sy sind because of the samples and the way that ! vo- into 24 this thing.        ! 7st a phone call saying that the sa.;;e lines 3 .in unit I were hot, because the unit sample lines vent in::
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
                            @ VIRGINIA Avi. S.W.. WASHINGTON. o.C. 20024 CO2) $54 234

s                                                                                         53 1  unit I.
1            As f ar as f urther seso:7 on the use of the 3 ex-cores and the in-cores, ve looked at those as an 4 instrument of indication of criticality or recriticality.
5 That is all would think of discussino.
6      Q     Was the count rate behavior' discussed in the 7 telaphone'confsrence call between yourself, Xunder, F.ogers 8 .and Herbein-at approximately 5:00?
9      A'    I can't recall specifically.
10      Q     I as not sure if you asked this question, so I                             ,
11  vill ask it again.
11            (id you, at any tine durin7 che da y on ! arch 28, 13 reach any inferences on core uncove:y from the nuclea:
14 instrumentation indications?
15      A     Not that I recall.              I als'o believe that the boren 16 boost in mid-se:ning was a :ecriticality as op;osed to lerel.
17      Q     I as aware that that was the initial 18 determination.
19      A     I don'; believe that the contersation vent any 20 furter than that during the day as far as an indication.
21      Q     You don't recall any conversations of that as an Zt indication of core uncovery by anyone during the day on Z3 ! arch'2S?
24      A     Today I don 't recall.
3       Q     In 711:t's testimony to the Xemmeny investigators ALDERSON ?4 EPORTING COM* ANY. INC.         52-2 400 VIRGINIA AVE. S.W., WASHINGTON. 0.C. 20024 (202) 554 2345 9"   t

                           .                           .         . = -
DJ
;     l'  on June 30, Flint.says that'he drew the conclusion that the l-i 2 instrument indications were not of a recriticality but were i
l    3 n change in liquid flux.
4              - He says that he discussed this with Rogers, and 5   that Rogers told him that. he would discuss this with Met Id 6 sanagement.       Did Ro;ers inform you or discuss it with you?
7        A      I can't recall a conversation of that context.                             !
8-  don't believe I recalled it in the past eith er.                                         i 9        0      3r. Kunder has indicated to us, in fact yesterday, 10   that he believed this was discussed in the think-tsak 11   seatings. This does not help you to.                     ecall this in any way?
12        A      No.
13        Q      Io the best of your knowledge, what are the core 14 exist thersoccupies used for, or how are they used in normal 15 c:    '? tionc+
r 16        A      To the best of my knowledge , in f act on Xaren 23 :
17 don' t :emember thes being in the procedures.
18        Q      Ihe:e was no ; ocedure at that cise?
I 19        A      There may have been a ; ore 4ure for use of them on                           l 20 the computer as a computer procedure, but ! don't beliere 21   any of the procedures for ICCS safety systems reco;ni:ed or 22 utilized them that I :emember.
23        Q      What vere they routinely used for in non-accident 24 situations?
25 '       A     I personally today cannot recall their being ALoERSoN REPRTING COMPANY, INC,             g,3 400 VIPGINIA AVE, S,W , WASHINGTON, o.C. 20014 (1121 554-2346

                      ~l a:-5                                                                             22 1      things together, . and we know there were discussions about some 2< . people were . concerned that the core wasn't covered, wasn't being
                                                      ~
                                                                                                'l 3l adequately ' covered, despite all these, and inventory deficiency          I l                   4 I was not specifically discussed.
o        5!                 Am I. capturing you correctly?                             I h
j        6             A-   That's f air to say, to characterize t.4e conversation, n
1 3       7j     yeah.
            %                                                                                     l l       8'                 BY liR. CRAIG:
d y       9I            Q    our review of your testimony before the Senate indicates   l
          - z,
            @      10 i     that you were aware there was a concern ever recriticality x          l j      11 !     before 8:00 a.m. on the morning of 3/28.
* l f      12 l           A    I was aware of some of the operators ' concerns E          I j=     13 '     because they told me about it, yes.
l l      14 l           Q    Did you believe on the morning of 3/28 that the reactor
             $         I i     15 i    had gone recritical af ter it scrammed?
U l
             /e 16 i   :
A    no.
N a
17 : -
Q    Was the count rate behavior discussed during this n     .\
j;   18 '    6:00 a.m. conference call?
              $    19             A    Not that I recall.
n 20 i           Q    Did you at any time during the day discuss the I
21       concern over recriticality with the count     rate behavior with 22 ,     Miller,.Kunder, Zewe, Herbein or Chwastyk?
23 '           A    Yes, I talked to Bill 'Zewe about it, when he and I had 24      - a discussion. I think that was probably before 3:00 o' clock.
25       Told me they thought they had been going recritical when some e
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC. 53-1

~
J i                                                                                 23 i
                   .I l      . of the . boron sample .. analyses had come - back iow numbers , and i
2; .maybe.this was shortly after C:00 o' clock.                        -I'm not sure now of i
1'                    fl            '
3i         the' time frames ,. but .it probably was , because we concluded chat 4                        ,
we .had steam in the sys tem, and 'I s aid' to him .some thing to the
                                                                          ~
                    <4
                       .i o     5;         ef fect .that it's reasonable .to assume thatL ycu're getting steam
~                          '
R                                                                                                     i jt     6j         ccming out through your s ampling lines , and it's really j us t-4                                                                                                          _
R j .- .7j
              ~
flushing your boron out, you're not getting representative fluid
.                     1:
[    .8 ;    .
s amples of boren.         Therefore, you' re getting low numbers .             And
              'J
:. 9l     i   it explained it away for me in that case.
2 I            !
j . 10 i                        .I don't recall that Zewe ever mentioned anything abou:
                                                                                . . -e j
all in that discussion, e:r any of tne boron sample i
:                  11          count rate at j
3 I
i f    12 ;        number results.
E            !
j    13 !                 O      Did you ever discuss this wi th -- the boron samples
              =            i n            i j    14 j        with Miller, Kunder, Herbein, Chwastyk or John Flint?
w j- 15 il                  A     .I think I did with John when he came in and .tried to E
'                         i                                                                                        >
j    16l catch him up with what I had known, what I had been able to find s
i a
17          out from either the discussions or the conference call, or plant 3           i j    18 l        conditions as I.saw them.
e           -
a n
19 l                        I think I told' him there had been some discussions i
20 l        towards orobably the recriticality was a concern, and gave him i
                       .l 21 i        my conclusions from the sampling results of the piping steam,
,                      -l l                  22     j    and those are the only conversations that I recall having.with 23l: John.
24 l                  Q     Did you discuss at any time the neutron 'instrumenta-l 25 ,        tion behavior with respect to voids or core uncovery?
l i
ALDERSON REPORTING COMP ANY. INC. 53-2
_____1_n

I l       -
24 l
l 1,                     A      Not that I recall, no.
I
                                - 2. i                          BY MR. 110S ELEY : -
                                                                             ~
                                 .3 ;                    Q      You don't recall such a discussion with Flin:?
i                              -
4'                    .A      No, I.do not.
l
                            . 5'.                           BY ' MR. C RAIG :
4          l M
* j                           j. 6                         0      To the best of your. knowledge, what are the core I
i l
i- 7j
                                                ' exit thermocouples used for during normal operations?               ,
i a
i    8' 1
A      Most of the information from that was accumulated in a           !
f3t 9l              what we call the PDC runoff from the computer for the analysis G~          !
j    10 !             to be performed at Lynchburg on core periormance, and it w0uld i           I j    11-              then be forwarded-down as a computer runoff, and the people in a
j, 12                 Lynchburg in the fuels section would take that informatien, 5            l 13 !             and then calculate the different performance characteristics cf
                            =
n             I i
14 l             the core overall and come back and form a report, which : think
                            =                                                                  .
j 15                  usually only came out about once a year, but, no, those i                                                                            l j 16l         -
reports were not a required periodic       frequency, as I recall,   !
                             $                                         3,.
                             $. 17 l              ex:ept for the 999 information being sent down at, I bellere, f
                            -             \
2 18 i             the first time we get to 100 percent power in each start-up, g
19 ,             and then some periodic point in time during any 4 ewe at pcwer, i                   ?Ct 20 I             we sent a Pe7 runoff down to Lynchburg.
II                             BY MR. MOSELEY:
22         ,            Q      This would just be a --
23                      A l                   It would be an encoded computer system, digital 24 ) numbering system, and as f ar as reading it in the runof f , i:
25 ,             had nothing- but a series of numbers than needed to be deccded i
l                            ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.      53-3

r i
F 1
         ~0-                                 T11st                                 18 L3
                  'i nformation that was avaliable from the compute:
4 relatively promptly?                                                                    l
            .      A       Yes, I was.
o j;               Q        Asd.were you consultisg wi-h anyone else'                        q l
as you reviewed that.satorial and analyzed it?
                         ~
            .                                                                                              l s
A       With 3111      ewe, shift supervisor, and Ed Fredricks, 8                                                                                             .
1 contro11 com operator.                                                                  l t
9 Q         Were you reviewing the computer printou:
10 together, or did you review it yourself and then                         alk       l 11 to them?
[~o A'      I reviewed it.syself and then talked with them.
D Q         What conclusions did you a :ive a s, , based 14 on the informatier. you acquired from the computer?
15                  - decided that a: that point is time, : would x
i have to have discussions.with Lee Rogers and wi-h                                     l 16 l
l 1*      the operators to obtain more information.
18              Q'        And what information did -hey give you?
L l
             !9 - A         They provided the fac: that -here had been a C-*'_,-                . gression-3       3urbise reactor : iseed and                              ..w   ;a.
s ere=--    -m  recritica'ity.
          ., 1_ they had recriti:ality or an                                                            ;
3
             .               : looked at the charts and informed them tha:
3 is a11 probabil;;y i               was no: a recriticali:y but a
:hasse is the leakage flux :::: -he =cre.
h               _
Q        A :hange is the leakage flux?
               ,3 54-1 S EN.JMIN N EPCE Na Scavicz

l-2                                  . Flint                  19 3    A       Yes, from the core.
4          -Q     'What was thei: response?                              l
                                                                                 -l 3    A       yust that'they.had apparently not thought of g     this possibility.
: 7.          .Q        'Did they appear ' to accept you: conclusion?-
g    A       To'the A t of my knowledge, yes.
9            Q        ,In retrospect, was your conclusion ac:urats?
m A       Yes.
     .0L w            #                                          ,
11             Q        once you had4 analy:ed the ecmpute: informa-13 tion, and once you had acquired additional.information J,
f cm Zewe and yredricks, and once you had given thes your analysis, did you do anything more?
A.      Well, of course, during the time : had reviewed is.
th e other strip chart recorders in the control room 16 and talked with Lee Rogers about my findings.
17 Q     --
And what did you tali Rogers?        Was it the 19                                                  --
same thing you cold them?
E     19 A       Issentially the same thing :        old them a-      : hat "O
      ~
tha: sise, yes, and advised his ::a:            <= -..-.d to
     .n, induce natural ci =ulation or run a =eactor :=olan:
nn
      --      pump.
03                      What was his response?
Q-
      *4
             -A     .He said that he vould discuss 1: with ?ie: Id
      ,,3 sanagemen .
E ENJAMIN     EPCMTING SEMVICE      54-2

It T'MI' TAPE #58' Interview with John H. Flint At approximately ,0830 on the 20th of March, I arrived at the North' gate .to the Island only to be . stopped due to security personnel ~ restrictir.g anyone o        .from-coming on the Island. .It took me approximately 20 ' minutes to a half l          hour to have the security guards call in and contact the control; room to find
!                                                                                                                   i out 'if my servicef were required.                                                                       :
At approximately 0900-I was granted permission to go on the Island; immediately i
went-to the Unit 2. turbine area where we have the entrance for Unit 2 and went directly to the control room.          On entering the control room, I noticed T
that-the ' normal alarms were lit and. that the typers were printing out as                            R normally occurs following a turbine / reactor trip.
Ah, I also noticed that                l
-             the Emergency Team for radiation type emergency was in attendance in the 1
control room at this time.      I talked with the Control Room personnel and this                      '
is primarily with (ah) Bill Zaywee, the Shift Supervisor, Ed Fredricks,,the Control Room Operator, and Lee Rogers, Babcock and Wilcox Site Representative, and learned that the conditions were abnormal for this type of a transient.
In talking with these' personnel and looking at the console indications and
            ~ the computer printouts, I noted that 'the hot lake temperatures for the primary system were in excess of 620*F, cold leg temperatures were significantly lower than this, which.would'be unusual in this conditi'on, pressure was low in the reactor coolant system, all control rods wers on .the bottom.                Indications for the source and intermediate . range . appeared to be normal, for this period               .
of. time following a shutdown. condition. I did notice however that there were e
55-1
_ = - -                             -                                _
: i.                                                                  .
THI TAPE #28 Interview with John H. Flint several blips on the recorder for source / intermediate range and in conversation 4
with Ed Fredricks:he informed me that they thought at the. time that they were
                              ~
: going critical and that they had added additional boron into the system.         At this: time, I-informed them.that in all probability this was not the case,
:that there' had been a change in leaxage flux path from the: reactor core to
                                                                                                '1 the detectors and it was 'not in fact the reactor going critical again.                   l Looking at the l recorder that prints out the steam generator and reactor -
4
: coolant temperatures on wide range.which runs Jfrom approximately 0 to 800*F,
,      . there were '2 temperatures- that were printing up scale on the hot leg tempera-
        -tures;. one approximately 770 degress, the other approximately 800 degrees.
Now these thermocouples are not normally used in this range so I was not certain that they would give an accurate temperature, only indications of approximata ranges. Ivan Porter, Metropolitan Edison I&C engineer, showed mi a setup where he had set up a bridge and was reading out a temperature in the
       -back of the control room that was (ah) convteting instances was above the normal Rosemont Calibration scale, came out to be approximately 725'F, which tended to back up the indications we'd seen on the other recorder.        Talked to various personnel ir, the Control Room, Gary Miller, the rest of the Operations p'ersonnel such as George Kunder, informed me of sequence of events that led up to this position.      At this time I again talked with Ed Fredricks and both he and I were convinced that we had in fact a solid steam bubble in both loops of the hot legs.      At the time, I attempted to initiate the filling of the steam generator to induce natural circulation or at least remove enough P
55-2

    ,   a l
13 1        that : they Lhad seen super-heated ' steam in the loops before.                     When 2 was'that. occurrence?
3nl' A      It was during some hot. functional testing, as :
1 1
L                    4 !! remember.
                       .I
!         $          5.j                    Q      You get super-heat without a core?
E               l
* 6' 3                                'A       I don't' remember all the details , but they did have tha:
R              i d'        7 l condition where the temperature remained elevated and were steam-t j         8 bound 'for an extended period of time in the top of the ho:-leg.
d-              !
l 1
d
           ".         9l                           BY PUR. EAPSTER:                                                       !
I                                                                                                             "
C                                                                                                              l j
10 i
Q      Was there any       discussion with regard to this, John?
i A'      Not on tnat day, no.
g       11 l
           "                 i                                                                                          '
12
           !;                l Q       You ' testified that you talked with Lee Rogers en the I
:       13 l j                 ; morning         of March la,1979, with regard to your analysis of the                   i E       14                                                                                                 J
          .y                        behavior of the nuclear instrumentatio.n.                That is, the apparent      i z
            ^
i 15 :
j                  i      re-criticality was caused by a change in the leakage #1ux with a 16 i j
              ?
result of a voiding in the core.               What was Lee's reactien?           i
(-
w 17 il                     A      This refers to the previous answer, where he was on i
l
             =                  ;
E       18          .
:-                 this - way to a meeting.         I think he understood that it had no:
             #                  I
             -       19 A-                  !actually gone critical again.               I am certain that he correctly
                                 !                                                    A 20-lj. interpreted the reason for it.
21           1
                                  !.         Q      You' further testified that Lee Rogers said that he
                    '22            l
                                   .would ' discuss your inferences with Met-Ed management.
i Did you have
                   . 23 t
any discussions on March 28, 1979, with Hiller, Herbein, Kunder, 24 (Zewe, Mehler or Chwastyk with regard to those inferences?
25 A        I remember speaking with Bill Zewe, George Kunder.
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.               56-1

                   +o t . -                                   .au    ,m.+         - u w. u
                                                                                    .           .a     -+               =a   s.
t
                                                                                                                                       -19
                                  .1
                        !) ' Again, -this. goes back to the ' previous answer, with Ed Fredericks
          ,' : 2e ,'and the nuclear- engineers about what I thought' the condition was.
                     .3l                             Q. Could you tell us a little bit about the discussions u                                      .
1 1
4' with . Kunder and' Zewe?                                                                                           {
c           '5-                             A      I can only paraphrase it now to the f act that it was (a                          a
       .[               6                  not a-re-criticality.              Basically, it was a- change 'in che leakage                     +
      . ;T
      .&.7, flux either die to voiding. of the core, or steam blanketing,
        ;;                       -g j'              8.                 uncovering, or whatever.                 I don't know exactly what words I used                   r a
n               9                  with which rindividuals at this timo.                                                              >
f                            i 10 z
Q      Uhat was Kunder's reaction to this?                                              !
j- 11                       i               A       I think, basically, his was the reaction the same as                             -
a                           i 12                     the rest of them.
Y I don't knew that he really believed what I was 3
       - _ - 13 ' telling him, a
     - I 14                                         Q   .Did you have any subsequent discussions with Rogers on
(
: j. 15                               that day. with regard to ' the inferences you were drawing?
       =
g            16 s
A      Not that I can remember.
N
      .a 17
* BY MR. HOEF'ING:
      ~                           '
y~18                                          Q      At what time did you talk with Kunder, do you recall?
i s            I9 ,
9                                             A M                                                  L.I' know that it was sometime between 10 :00 and 12:00 or 20 13:00, in that time frame, but I could not pin it down any closer II !                     than that.
I 22 l                              Q      It would have been around 10:30?
23 ' '
A     yes, somewhere around.that time.
             '4 BY'MR. HAPSTER:
                                                         ' John, to te best of your ' nowledge                    what are the
                                ,                  .Q .                                            i
                             . ;l ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY.-INC.                            2       [
t

12 1-            A    I ordered. monitoring of everything in the building. I 2    don't remember specifically temperatures, but I remember seeing 3    generator pressures that'we checked.       Other than just a general L        4    check _ of parameters fand equipment in the building, that is all
    . 5    I can stand by.      The specifics are a little fuzzy.
3 j 6 BY MR. MOSELEY:
h7                .Q_   Would that have been to get further confirmation of the n
j     8   reality of the pressure spike that you ' asked these other para-d d   -9    meters to be checked?
>   E y   10             A    Not primarily. . I think that primarily it was to check j   11    everything to find out if we could explain that.       If we had         i 5                                                                                  !
12     problems that could be explained by that pressure spike, a steam
    'd 5.
13     rupture or something of that nature.
g l   14                  I think that af ter the first few seconds, I knew it i
g  15     was not a steam rupture because the pressure dropped back.       It
     =
j 16      was in that vein, in trying to determine what _ the hell had gone e
on.
g 18                   BY MR. CRAIG:                                              )
t                                                                                  I j   I' Q   Did you, or anyone else, to your knowledge, monitor        l 20 the alarm printer during the pressure spike?
21 A. I don't remember specifically assigning anyone to 22 monitor. I don't even remember whatthe status of the alarm printer 23 g was at that time, but if it was real time, it had been caught up, 24 l someone was monitoring it.      I had either assigned them, or else 25 i
j there was just someone standing around.looking at it. I remember i
s 1
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
57-1

s      .                    .          ._               __
_        _       -   ~            ._.   .    . .
L        t                  I r
4 13
                                                             ,e I                    there was .a bunch of people there.~
[                            .2                                    Q    c Was this- information passed on to the NRC, to *.he 2
3                 ibest of your. knowledge?                                   "
!.                             4                                  A c a.
Okay, firct of all, the NRC was present ' at the - time: of '
        . t.                                          .
g
                             ,5 the n spike'.- I remeder an NRC inspector being, I don' t' want ' to                           l 1
6     ,             say involve'd because that is not the right word, . but he was I          7 present at the time Mehler.and I were discussing the spike.
1 1
                  .'3-f         8                                        BY MR. MOSELEY:
;                 .g:                \.
(-         9                               . Q:     Did you discuss the spike and its ramifications with 10                  .'this NRC inspector?
2
:                   $        11                                  'A      I did later.         We had sort of a general discussion at
.                 , is 3            12',                   that time, and-the'NRC inspector was standing.there.                             Again,-I i-l 33 a- 13 i                        don't remember if he took part in the discussion, or l'f he just                                 ,
                  -l       1 14                              ~
sort of listened-to'it.
                    $~
{x 15                                                After:I had talked to Miller, and after in my own mind .                   t fW .16                       I was pretty- sure .that we had gone through- a pressure' transient I
f I7 i                     in the building, I remember essentially ' telling that NRC '
E-1g         18 inspector- that.                  The words that come to my mind are:               "That 5                                                                                                                             {
II explosion 'was real.*
J                                                                       It was real. I don't know if I said,                 '
20 explosion, but. I said that the pressure spike, or whatever it                                     ,
                          '21 was ,- was real.              It had actually happened in the ' building.                  I 2
remember passing that .to him.
BY MR. GAMBLE:
Y That was afterlyou had spoken with Mr. Miller?
24 l                           'Q i                            25:
L                                                             A         Yes.                                                                        ;
                                  ]
                                  .s      .                                                                                                         .
d E
I                         t            ,     ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC. 57-2 s         s 9
                                                 -.                          -                            --.         +- , , . .          ,     -

14 1          (             You have to remember, or at least when it dawned on 2           me what I thought had happened, the first thing I did was to go i
: 3.         'back to Gary Miller and tell him that there was trouble.
  ~
4-                 Q-      That is the same conclusion that 'you passed to Mr. '
s 5          Miller, ' that you thought that it was real?
j     6                 A     . Yes . .
R
      .b     7                         BY MR. CRAIG:
N l     8 Q       I don't know how to phrase this properly, but if the d
I           NRC inspector had not been there to tell, is this the kind of Y
10           information that was reportable to the NRC?
a
            "                  A       Let me say this, during normal circumstances, yes.
Even during those circumstances, it was something that would have
:i 13 !
l                 been. The mode of communication would have assumed that.
I    14 g                               I am not sure, but if the NRC inspector was not there,.
1 b                we had telephone communication to communicate that to the NRC.        I w
16 g                 definitely think that it would be reportable in the sense that d   17 a                 if it happened during normal power operations or at some other s
E   18
        ;:                time, other than right in the middle of an accident,      it would 19-l                be properly reportable, the whole bit from the tech specs.
20 I am not sure how the reporting requirements f all 21 during that time period.
22 Q       At what time and what logic caused you to conclude 23      ,
that the spike was caused by hydrogen?
24                                                                                  .
A       The time , I have to say, the time really did not have   1 25      '
much meaning on the 28th. I don't think that it was very long ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
57-3

                                                                                                                             '15
                     +1                  ' simply because it did not take us long to -- It did not take the 2~             spike long.. The spike was not there very long.                 Mehler and I did 3'             not go into a two-hourLor'three-hour discussion. 'It was just a 4              ' matter of exchanging ideas.
5-                          It.was' shortly thereafter that someone'related to me E'6-                   .that they heard a noise of some type. . Again, Idon't remember whc L
I 7'                    related that to me'.       Somehow, the noise, the pressure spike, the                                  j 8
operation of .the valve which was being operated all came together                                     i d                                                                                                                             .;
                                         'and it scared the hell. out of me.          That is when I assumed that we                             ,
                       ~10 g                       had had some kind of explosion, a hydrogen explosion.
                  =
f"                              Q     Your best recollection is that it was on 3-287 a
12
                  !                              A     Yes.
3 l                               Q     on testified on 5-21-79 that you ' recommended to G#ry lg     14 Miller that the EMOV should not be cycled.               What was the basis
                -E      15 j*
for your recommendation not to cycle the EMOV?                             .                           k 16                                                                                                                       <
l                               A     The basis for the reco:nmendation was what I have just                                    ;
6      17 u-                      related. The operation of that valve with the- pressura spike, b 18 I therefore assumed that there was something wrong with the 19-                          -
l                        operator motor, or some kind of connection there that was causing 20 a spark.
21 Q     Was your concern based on the failure of the motor for 22 the block valve?
23 l         A     No, I will be quite frank with you, my first concern 24 i
                                       !  was, Holy Christ, we had an explosion in there, and if we operate 25 '
lthatvalvewemayhaveabiggerone.                      Of course, you know, I did I                                                .
i                        ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
c 57-4

16 1          not think 'it' through and the. fact that the .first burn should-21        .have burned'anything,that was there.
Were you concerned about. localized concentrations of
!                    3                  -Q
                   .4        ' hydrogen?                                                                                         ,
1
          .           5-                .A        well, yes.        I will state also that 'I assumed that the
{                                                                                                                      ,
         !j        .6            explosion-was localized in the pressurizer area.                one of my                       I 7          concerns was 'that there may be other pockets aro'und there, and 8          that'.would be dangerous.                                                                       $
         . :J d-          9-                 Q       Why didn't- your concern or recommendation include                             l I                                                                                                                     ,
10          other equipment inside containment?                                                             I E
l II.                  A       At that time,we were not operating any other equipment
          .a                                                                                                                    1 fs.       12         in the containment.              Our mode of cooling was cycling the valves.
                  . IS Q       If other equipment was to have been energized, would 14         you have recommended to Gary Miller that that not be energized 15 5                   also?                                                                                           )
             =                                                                                                                 .i E
w I6                   8        I will be quite frank with you, I did not think in                            j
: h II                 those terms .        As a matter of fact, there was word put out not to
{         18
_                  operate           the equipment, and I sort of kicked myself for not E.-
A                   thinxias about that ar**if-BY MR. HOEFLING:
21 Q       thenwas that word put out, do you recall?                          ,
A       To the best of my recollection, it was on the 28th.
23  i j               Q       Who put it out?
24:l                A       I assume that it came from Gary tillier, but I cannot 25 L,say-that Gary Miller told me specifically.
i 1
I                          ALDERSON REPORTING COMP ANY,INC.
57-5 P
  ^'                                                                             -                            . - . -    , , ,

                       .' l                                                                            17 4
l i
j               Q     .You mean that it might have been passed along from .
l
           ,         2i       someone else?
3               A-     Yes , and.. I am not' sure . of that.
4
                                                                                               '                 ,i
                 ~4!
BY MR. MOSELEY:
}                                                                        \
              .  -5                  Q      You don't . recall- who gave .you that order or
{
i            j
                  -6 il
                             ' instruction?                                                              ,
89
;             [ 7'l                 -A,     I am just . trying to think . about it.
7.
l~            j      8                    'I,will'be quite frank.       Again., I don't remember, but d           !
:1
*,                   9l       I think Gary Miller was there, but whethe'r he actually said it I
          'E     10          or'not, I don't remember...
i j   11 j                       BY MR. HOEFLING:
;            it         i
             $   12 !                0      But your best recollection is that it came out on the E. -        I g   13 , 28th?
m
                                        ^
A      yes.
             "I; 14
             ;;  I5                         BY 'MR. - 405ELEY:
             .2 y   16 ;                Q      Following up on the same thing, do you recall any e          ;
17      !
reason for the order or instruction not to operate equipment?                   Was f18 any reason for this order or instruction?
: g.                                                                                                      .
19 n
n                     A       I don't remember.now if it was stated, or I just 20
<t assumed that it was so that we did not cause any more sparking.
2I'               'O      You don't recall which?
22                 A:     Can I talk to my lawyer?
l 23 MR.'MOSELEY:      We will go off the record.
24 l                       (Discussion was     held off the record.)
1 25 )                      ___
                        ?
l                             .         .                                      ,
i-          l     .                  . ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC.
o 57-6                   .

i l; 1    18 l'.                       MR.'MOSELEY: 'We are back;on the record.
2'                      f THE WITNESS:    May we have the question asked again?
I            *
                   '3                          BY MR. MOSELEY:
!           [        4              Q          The question was, do you recall at the time that the
            .      '5        order was 'given whether or not there was a statement as to why the 5
            $        E        equipment was not to be operated?                                     '
e g.
            $        7'             A'         Again, I don't remember specifically. that the reason K
g,        8       was given or"that.I just assumed it that.this was to prevent
:J d         '
               .              sparking in the building.
l                                  I do re:nember the circumstances and who uas present._
: h. 10 Essentially Gary Miller had mentioned, and Brian Mehler was there.
                                                                                      ~
fII
            .f12
:3 Mehler said something to the effect that it was too late, and-that
: j. 13 '          he had just started some piece of equipment in the building.
I remember some comment of mine to the effect, and f  :   16 this was sometime later, " Don't worry about it because we have N
g               burned up h was in there anyway."
d      17 a
Q          That was your comment?
5 m
18l-            A          That was my comment.
E 19
               ]                                BY MR. GAMBLE:'
Q          To Mr. Mahler?
21 A         Yes.
22 Q         And Mr. Miller?
23
                            ;         A         To whoever was there.                                         '
24 BY MR. MCSELEY:
                    ' 25 '
y         Q          Mr. Miller, to your recollection was there?
I                       .
I ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
57-7

19
^                      1               A      Yes, to my recollection he was.
2           ,
BY MR. CRAIG:
I                                                     .
3                Q      How was that order transmitted?
4                A      Again, I . don' t remember specifically . Gary Miller giving 3   l5         that order.specifically to me.      I do. remember that soon after it 8-
;                     6                                                   ^
was given, Gary Miller and myself were discussing something when 3
R d
n 7l Mehler          walked in. How the order was actually transmitted, I don't j'
8 'know, d
~
9
             .                         Q-     It was not somebody saying to you in a calm voice, 9
j-   10
                              , " Don't restart any electrical equipment," as opposed to somebody
                =             l S
                !    II standing back;and saying in a loud voice, so that other people 12
{9               could hear, " Don't restart any electrical equipment in the f                containment."
g                       A      It was not a general announcement made in the control E
f room. I remember that definitely.
j             j                BY MR. HOEFLING:
6    17 a
u
                                      -Q      Would that kind of order or direction be recorded in a
               $ '18 g                log?
l ' 19 ~                       I am not familiar with plant operation, but normally 20 would something like that be recorded or logged?
21 A      It is difficult to answer because Icannot think of an 22 analogy to use during normal operations for an order like that.
23
{          0      So it is unclear.
     ,              24 I
A      Yes.
25]                 Q      So you don't have a feel for one way or the other.
                        .I i
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
57-8

20-
       -1              A'   Let me say this.                      During normal operations, or right 2     now,1for that matter, there are a number of ways that we would 3     ' prevent operation of equipment if we did not want it operated, and 4     that would be cagging it out, which involves a lot of time to get                                                       1
  . 5     instituted.
h                                                                                                                                   i j     6                   Prior to that time, it would have been a verb'al type -
R .                                                                                                                                 .
  &     7     of communication to whoever was in charge of the .shif t.                                                Right now,     l j     8, presently,the shift foreman.                          If I had a piece of equipment that I d
d     9     did not want run, I would institute the proper tagging, whether it 3
  @   10      be safety tagging, or a caution tag, or something of that nature, 5
II'     but until the time that ~ the tags were placed, I would give a verbal 5
a I   I2 order by way of dm shift foreman not to operate that equipment.
E         !
y  13 ! But I don' t think that they would log it.
m         i l  14                     BY MR. MOSELEY:
j
  =
15 g Q    In this circumstance, wouldn't that be sort of well 16 s           publicized to all the operators                                                    se control room because each of
* i
  "  17 i them may have had some reason to operate some equipment?
E IO
  $                    A    Normally it would, except for the f act that at the II g           time the word was put out, it started a piece of equipment and                                                        i 20 nothing happened. So I am not too sure how far we carried it out.
21                                                                                                    iS "I don't think that we did at all because that ++ about                                            the time 22 we were starting the reactor cooling pump.
23{               Q    This would have beenabout six o' clock in the afternoon?                                                  -
24lr              A    Between 4:00 and 10:00, I guess.
25                                                                                                                        '
Q    The pump was bumped at about 7:30.                                                                       !
E L                                 ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
57-9

  ,   Fi                                                   ,                                          21 e
iA
                                                                         ~
                     ;1 1                    I ~ remember, . to the, best of my recollection, that it n-
[3' Ewas about'that: time that we were~getting ready to run the reactor 3        ccoling; pump that !all of this.. happened. .             '
,:v 4                  Q~ .Couldiyou.tell me;from your knowledge what precipita-           l 5l      .ted at.thisl point'in-time, some six' hours or five hours after-the y '6                  time of the explosion?. Had there been discussien of this?.. What E
5           7       caused the'long time period?
         '%~                              .
j_ '8                     ,
A=  LI L n-t knoE, to tell you'the truth.      All I.can relate
:J                    .
d          ..9     - is what I remember, and my first impression was, "Oh hell, why
:E
         .@-10               'didn't I think ofIthat."-                                                      t E        .
:j' 11                              After I. thought about'it a little more, I thought,
[ 12              Loh hell, we have already. burned it.up in there.         We have.not 5                                                                                                  -
5 - 13
         .a
                             .been recycling the va .ves , so we have not been putting any more 14
         .h                   hydrogen in the building."
li 15
          $                                 How the order came about,'I just don't know.
z d          10                Q     I just wondered if you overheard or knew of any
* i fI7 z
conversations in the interim in which this was being discussed?
          !          II A    No,.I didn't, or at.least I don't remember any.
E.                                                                                                 .
{ II                              BY-MR.-GAMBLE:
               .20 Q. Do you recall hearing any comn:ents from any of the 21 personne1' who received this order, operators or anyone, indicating 22
                            .that they understood the. order was to prevent any sparks?                      ,
23 i           A     I don't really remember that the order got out to the control room' operators.       As I think about it now, t lere would be
                          ~d no reason to because we.had just started some equiy ent in the 4
I
                          !'                      ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.                           i 1
I 57-10 i

     *'                                                                                       22
             .1             building.
             .i                          Whether the word got out to them prior to my knowing
             ,3            'what happened, Idon't know.
4                   .Q     Was there any discussion amongst the personnel, aside
     .          5            from Mr. Mehler,:Mr. Miller and yourself, which you have talked
    .g.
    .j          6            about earlier?
     ;r E, -      7l                        Was there any d'iscussion along the lines, "Well, we 7.
j 1
8         . don't have . to worry about this problem because we just started
{          9            these. pumps and nothing happened," any discussions along that I
5 10                 'line?
      !              l 3
a II                      A    The ' one between Mehler, myself and Miller, I
     -[ I2            !
I definitely know about.
E
{ . 13 j                       0    Did you hear any of the other people, the operators, w
E I4            talking along these lines?
15                         I don't remember specifically that they did.
A                                                      I
      .f Knese
       ~.
l' !l ai                    vaguely seem to remember, and I don't if I am remembering this r.ow
        /.             i                                            A f::     II '
from the 28th or not. but I seem to vaguely remember someone
{18                   saying to me in the control room, after I left Miller and the shift supervisor's office, that "We just started a piece of 20 l . equipment," or something in that general vein.
21 I don't remember-who it was, and I am not even sure 22                                    I am not sure if that was a carry-on of the that it did happen.
23 i conversation.
l I remember carrying a conversation with Mehler.
24 a' d                 LY MK. CRAIG:
l 25j        ,        .Q     With respect to your recommendation that the EMOV 3                    ' ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
57-11

9 as                 s              e           e               s 8    -                                                                             -
           /                                                                               /
s'                                                                              /
8    -                                                                              -
   ;                  Flammacility Range     4.1 to 95 3
li; a
f5        _                                                                             _
.,  gi j              p         4.15 Lower Limit
                         -                    -                          ~
t   4    _                                                                              _
E                                           Purge Starts (2375 Hours)                      ,"
   ;=3       -
Chemical                                         #
                                                                           #-               ~
E                                   N                     /
Hydrogen                            /
g                        Concentration Maintained 3.55
             ~                                                                              ~
                     /
1   .                                                                             _
Radiolytic Hydrogen LOCA 0              '           UI                I          '               '
O        500            1000        1500           N00            2500         3000 l             l                   l                                      l 1M          1 N0               4 NO                                    4 NO Time after LOCA, Hours 58-1 REACTOR BUILDlHG HYDROGEN CONCENTRATIC' FOLLOWlHG LOCA THREE MILE ISLAND NUCLEAR STATION UNIT :
FIGURE 6A-1:
6...

a                                           . .- .-              -        .      -   . .           -  .  .   .    .. ..
4 104 1         pressureseaffecting decisions to report items to the NRC?
2                    'A'            Would' you = restate that question again . I am not'sure
!                                                                                                                                       1 l                     ;3-             that,I understood;the question.
l
                      '4                           Q           I'want-to know, on 3-28-79 what pressures'or influences
                                                                                       ~
i .             5          that you felt which would impact on your ' decision to either report
<             g'
            -j          _6    ,
                                     ~an item or not report = kn item to . the NRC?
17      '
A''         There was none that'I was. aware of.
The NRC inspec-tor' was there with me in the control- room, and we were exchanging
            -{-            8 l
d                                . .
c            9          viewpvints.
[
T ': 10                                            MR. CRAIG:    Now, if you want to ask     your questions.                I 1
            .j           11 ]                                . MR. McBRIDE :   Mr. Chwastyk, do you recall having-m-               i
( .12 - ! _te'stified'previously that subsequent to the pressure spike that lu        13          ' occurred 'in the reactor containment- building, you advised the
            . as g         14           NRC inspector in the control room that you believed that an le 15'         explosion had taken place 'in the containment?
            .h*
1 E          I0                                   THE WITNESS:    Yes.                                                     I ed '
l h -II'           :                              ML McBRIDE:     Do you also recall testifying that you 18 could not identify at the time of the earlier testimony who that E
I9          NRC inspector was?
g 20
                                ;                              THE WITNESS:    Yes.
21 MR. McBRIDE:    Didthere come a time subsequent to that 22 testimony when you learned the identify of that NRC in.apector?
I'                  N      '
THE WITNESS:    There  was a time afterwards that I 24 1
saw the inspector again, .and - at that time I learned his name.
l                             MR. 'McBRIDE:   What is his name?
it 1
I                                   N 9ERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
59-1

^
4   s 10 I
March 28th?         '
                     .2
                               .A    y. don' t remember specifically, but I'm sure I must have.
                    '3' -I was ' not trying?to keep 'it' a secret er anything'.
There were
                    'd all kind of fellow shift supervisors and people I worked with 3
there, I'm'sure I must have related it to someone.           I don't-remember specifically.
7 Q    It doesn' t' seem' to have been general knowledge or 8
it doesn't seem to have been generally appreciated that there l
9 had been a grea't deal of ' hydrogen in the rystem and a . hydrogen 10 explosion until Thursday afternoon or even Friday morning                !
u 11 Lamong many people here.       Yet you seem to have put this 12
                           -together in your own mind on Wednesday afternoon.
13 A   There were people in that centrol room that knew it.           l Id happened, and I know specifically there was at least one 15 3RC inspector there.       And I don't know who it was, I don't 16 remember his name or what he looks like.       But I do know there 17 was an URC inspector, because I remember him standing behind              )
1 I8                                                                                 i Mahler when we' shut down the spray pumps.                              1 i
I9 ,         Q    I want to ask you about that in just a minute, but wha-20 I was trying to ask you is whether you can shed any light 21 on why so many people around here didn't seem to really put 22 all this together until Thursday or Thursday night or Friday 23'      morning?                                                                 '
24
>-.s neaanen, sne.
A    I am not sure I understand that. You've got to 25 remember that -- I'm not sure I know what you're getting at.
60-1

l
                               ~J.
j                                                                       104 i
1:          pressures affecting decisions -to report items to the NRC7 l
2.;                 A   Would you. restate that question again I am not sure l
3 l .that I understood the question.
4 'I                Q   I want to know, on 3-28-79 what pressures or influences
                        =    5!          that you felt which would impact on your decision to either report    ;
                        ]    6           an item or not report an item to the NRC7 k   '7 l                 A   There was none that I'was aware of.      The NRC inspec-E         i l    8 {l tor was there with me in .the control room, and we were exchanging d                                    ..
ci   9           viewpoints.
I
                        @   10                       MR. CRAIG:      Now, if you want to ask your questions.
3
                        !          I j   11                       MR. McB RI DE :   Mr. Chwastyk, do you recall having u          !
(=  12' testified previously that subsequent to the pressure spike that 3
5   13 I occurred in the reactor containment building, you advised the
* I l5  14 ' NRC inspector in the control room that you believed that an j
m 15 explosion had taken place in the containment?
d M 16 l THE WITNESS:      'e s .
f  I7                       MR. McSRIDE:      Do you also recall testifying that you I8           could not identify at the time of the earlier testimony. who that E           !
g  I9 I NRC inspector was?
20h                      THE WITNESS:      Yes.
2I                       MR. McBRIDE:      Didthere come a time subsequent to that l
22 testimony when you learned the identify of that NRC inspector?
23 '                     THE WITNESS:      There  was a time afterwards that I M { saw the inspector again, and at that tA.ne I             learned his name.
MR. McBRIDE:      What is his name?
O
:I                  ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
61-1
:7
                                                                                                                       '105 I  .
                                                     'THE WITNESSi ItisNeky.
2d                                : MR. ' McBRIDE               Do you recall anything about your.
   +             '3               discussionswith.Mr.NeklyonMarch 28,'1979, subsequent to the.                                .
4               pressure spike?.                                                                            ,
l 5;                               iTHE WITNESS:                 The only' thing I remember, I related1 to 0!             him ' that iit was a real pressure. spike or explosion.
1 I                                   MR. ' McBRIDE:             How is,it that you came to learn his 3
[           8              . identity?
                          ,                                                                                                  l d                                 -
I                                 -THE WITNESS:                Like I said, I saw him.later at'the
                '10 g                   j     ( site, land when I saw' him I spoinb.dchim.                     F *D MR. McBRIDE                A'nother; question is, after your conver-f-l
                                  .sation'with'Mr.-Miller'about the pressure spike, the fact that.
j
                                           ~
13 j you be11wed' that en explosion had taken place,did you make any -
assumption Otth respect to whether Mr. Miller had passed along
     .E           15 g                    !     that information either to his, superiors or to the NRC?
16 l                    .
THE WITNESS:              I assumed -- He was their emergency
      ' !;[ ~ l 7 '
s               '
director, and he would pass that inforration along up our chain, 5         18
        -                          and also making the necessary NRC notification.
E ' 19
        $                                              BY MR. MOSELEY:
20 Q          Let me ask a couple of questions related to that.
21 In answer to the question, you used the term explosion.                           Was the 22''
term explosion used on March 28?
23)'                       A     ' I don't know.that.                    I remember the word "real," that 24 l the pressure spike, or the explosion was real, because in the
                               )'
25;3l previous discussions I had. there was some doubt .like I mentioned i
                               !                                      1 ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.                     ,
61 -2

     't .
ii j                   (
106 1.
1       earlier.
2
                                          .When it' dawned.on.me what had h'appened, the first 3      ' person that I went to was Gary Miller. .
4
;                                  g-      In your discussions with, we will assume it was Mr.
5 welly, did you have the perception that he understood what you 6' . were telling him? -
i I
M        .
A       I assumed that he ~ understood what I told him, that j        8 the pressure spikeL or the explosion, whatever word I used, was             f d
d        I
            .              real. I assumed that he knew what that meant.                           J I                                                                       I am not sure that 10 g                that ' answered your quescion.
          =
II m                        Q       I am not sure it did either.
d       12' 3
          #            '.                  What 'I am looking for is whether you. felt he perceived J
j      .I3 I the significance of this, either by the questions he asked, or I4 by comments - that he made, or by any other actions that you saw him j
3 15 take.-
I0 A       I assumed that he knew what I was talking about, and I
when he left I just assumed that he went back to notify his b       18 chain, whoever it was at that time, which I don't know.         That is
         -E 19 l                the only thing that I assumed at that time.
20 BY MR. GAMBLE:
21 Q      He did not, in fact, indicate to you what he was 22 going to do when he left?
                - 23 ,
j            A      No. He just walked away.
24
                      .,                  MR. FIDELL:      May I ask a ques tion.
25j'
                     .p                   Did you know Mr. Nealy from before?
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
61 3

10'7 I                          THE WITNESS:    I don't think so.
2                         MRL FIDELL:     Let me also mention , for the rectard , that 3        the l term employed . in' the subpoena is "pressur e spike. "
4'                        BY MR. CRAIG                                                                      l
    .g 5
0      WhendidyouseeMr.Nehly.andrecognizedhim,that                .
i     you. believed that he was ?          NRC-inspector that you had tal'ked
    .R'            i jil       7                                                                                                          '
n           Gl to?
t
     'si '      8-!
M'           J
                                  'A       1 don't even reme.mber. I have no idea,     It was - some-rJ .
    .a~         y-time af ter the interview. I remember one of the inspectors -- I
* 10 renember one of the first investigators that I gave an interview                               j
           , . I h'                 to ,, Iden' t remember the circtuns tances , 'but he and I somehow were                          '
d        12 '
E                  walking througn the plant' one day, and he asked me the same                                     :
3            !
      -        13 i                                                                                    c.
g             ;    question.      I told him then that I remembere? that it was NeAly, l        14 I
and I remembered afterwards.          I don't remember who the investigator 7        15 g                  was.
         ~
16 !
(             j                     MR. FIDELL:     May we have a moment please?
[ 17 ;
w             ;                     BY MR. GAMBLF,:
b 18 Q       Did you finish your explanction.      You were talking E
19 l                  a; bout the time that one cf the other investigators interviewed                                  a l              20 l                        you.
21
                                 .A       It was at that time that I notified him that I had                             j 22 see .Neky and recognized him as the man in the control room.                                     I 23 ;                     -
j            Q        That was after the interviews had been coupleted that                          t 24 l
: you talked to this investigator?
20
                     ,           A        Yes, ,and I don' t k now his ntme .                                            '
i ALDERSON RE. PORTING COMPANY, INC.                                         '
t,,  ,
:                                                                                                                        1
                                                                                       - . . _ . _ _ . - _ _ _ _- - b

  ,y
: i.                          L
                                                                                                                                 ,      108
   <y,m,'                    y
                             >o k
                                                           ,4 s    i p                                       g-f(               '
J1'k                         . ,              'BY MR..CRAIG:                    >
g c,y\1'    \.               '2                                           II hawn three nameal, maybe you will recognize one of Q.
t'                                     ;                                    ,
e
: y. i                                         them.          Robert LMartin, Dirwin .Hunterr or Owen Shackelton.
;    \             .\
                                      .\
4                                'A          I'think that I could recognize him again.
l l '.                                                                                                                                                1 5                                          BY MR. HOPELING:                                                    i I         1'
]                      3            6J :
Q        'Do you know at what tine this exchange took place?
I,                      .-
                                           }\^
k s
7
                                                           \         A~        What time of the day?
                        ;;.L               i
                     ]A'             O!                              Q          Yes.
                      'd                   !                                                                                                        l d            9                                                        -               -
                                                                              ' MR. FIDELL:      Which exchangn are you referring to?
i g
                                                                              'MR. HOEFLIU'3:         The exchange between Joe and the
::              .I a
k          II l invastigator where he informed him that he recognized Neky as a
I2                    the individual.
                      'y                                                                                                                           I
(                                                       MR. FrDELL:      Are you talking of the day of the E
w ' 14 !: accident?
l I          -
1                                                                                                      I 6-                                                      MR. HOEFLING:         No. I an talkirsg about the exchange E                    -
14 '
jt                   l          be-tween Jce and the NRC investigator, where he told the investigs-                         ;
tor that he recalled who the individual was thatt he spoke to on h         18 4
                         -                              the day of the accident,                    Apparently, that excha'nge took ' place F*
19 on site.
20 !        '
THE WITNES3:        I can renerier exactly where it took 21                                            hvkm* kNA           S pla ce , by the t---i "' in unit two, but I don't retcomber whether 22 it was fall or su:tner, or what hia name was.
23
                                                                               ~BY MR. HOEFLING:-
     \.                            24l           ,
O          00 you recall whether it was summer or fall?
25)
:                                                j                   A          It was summer because it was warm.          It wa   a warm day, ALDERSON REPORTING COMP ANY, INC.
y, 61-S

                               .t.
                               '.k.
8.
109 I         ~
I remember sunshine.            What else.was happening, I don't remember'.
2 t                                   BY MR. M. OSELEY :
3l             Q           Can we eliminate this summer, and it would have been 4      last summer?
4    5              g                                I know that I would know him again 7.really can't.
    -9 6                                          a.
2'        . if I saw him.           I- am terribby on names , I really am. I have always R        l 3    7'
     ;         l been that way, u
i
      "    8I BY MR. CRAIG:
J d     9 g                   Q           Let's go back for a minuto.      I have a couple more h   10                                                                                       ,
y        ,  ques tions about that.
g        t-x   11                                                                   .
j                               The day you recognized that it was NeMy, did you see d    12 !!
j            him walkingat a distance?              I am not going to get into a quarter
     =    13 i           mile, but did you go up and look at his badge to get his name;
     ]b   14 how did you learn that hi.s name was Nehly.
P   15 1 E
      ~
l           A           I don't remember the specifics behind the first time T
l
     .)   16 l seeing       him, and I was in the control room at the time , and it d    17 i' y            triggered in my mind that that was the guy.
c o   18
     =                    0          Did you walk up to him and say, "Do you remember 19 l
     $            talking to me the day of the accident"?
20 A          No.                                                           .
21                                                                                       '
Q          You did not talk to him at all?
22 A          No. The only reason I brought it up is because when 23 ,                  -
I talked to the investigator, afterwards he asked me specifically 24!
              !   if I remember, and I said, yes, I remembered it was Nekly because 25 hIsawNeklysubsequenttothat.
5                            ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC.
61-6

                                                                                         .9 Mr. Mehler.- Yes, I did.
2{                "Mr. Blush. When did that sor. of fall out of considera:icn?
3 ,l You saw it?
l 4                  Mr. Mehler.       Yes.
5j                 Mr. Blush. You discussed it?                                      )
                               .Mr. Mahler.       Yes. The pressure spike came in'-- I was 6h _
7l           actually in the shift supervisor's office at that particular d                                                                                                 l 2       8,           time.      17 hat I noticed is the people started to move a little
: m.              I, w       9'           faster, they were securing pumps.        So   essentially, I thought         l E
D o      jo l ve had an ES again, which is an emergency safeguard, but I m              i
    $c-11     3) didn't know whether it was low pressure or reactor buildup e-m            4 3$    12 , pressure.                I have never seen reactor buildup pressure go that
* 6 oE    ;3 3 high.                We went out to see what was going on. I don't know if it SE 2
i 0 0
        $ ja [ was me or the other individuals, but the spray pumps were
                  ]
o@
3 :
j3jrunning.                 To start spray pumps you need 30 pounds of pressure, zc               ,
w u     16 I , two out of three,and they were running.                 I couldn't believe m             i C                    tha t, 37l                     I looked at them. I walked over and looked at the charts I
    $      18            and that's when I saw the line straight up and straight down.
y     39             It looked like somebody played with the transmitter.           It couldn't 20 ,           have been that or we wouldn't have gotten the spray pumps.           :       j 21 ll kept who was the individual from NRC. I explained it to g              him. I can't give you his name. He did ask why the spray pumps g              were running.      I explained why they were running and I also I
g[pointedthechartout to him.                                                              .
I              Mr. Blush.
25 ;                                 It was one of the NRC people in the control room 62-1 p

10 gas $1887 Mr. Mahler. .There were a multitude of NRC' people in there 3           wandering arcund, and he asked me a- question, so I explained it t        ;   to hLE.
o                    .
[             5 '.!             be. Blush.- If you saw him again, would'you know who he 6           'was?
I
    ,        7   i              Mr.'Mehler.      No.
d          l 5        8!                 Mr. Blush. You have been asked that question again, "Wou'd d             I W        9l            you know him?"
5 8,      10                  Mr. Mahler.      No. I am sure the individual would never m
    $       11             remember I explained it to him.
em            ,
    ?$
    *n      12 _ ;
i Mr. Blush. What did you explain to him?
en O 5 13 i                Mr . Mahler . - He asked me why I was concerned because the
   .w N           il a "o g       14 llspraypumpswererunning.                   I told him they would only start at O5 0 g    -15             30 pounds. I said it is impossible to get 30 pounds. I walked 3   -
Z '         !
d e
16 l I
over to the chart and looked at it, we got up to 28, according to e     17 ;t! this chart; 31, it was straight up.              I looked at it and said, 2
c     18             "That's impossible. ", I showed it to him.
t            . r i     19                  Mr. Blush. What did he say?
20                  Mr. Mehler.      He didn't say anything. He didn't know what 21l was going on. All he did was write down what we told him.
22 '                Mr. Blush. And then he walked away?
23I,                Mr. Mehler.      Basically. Then we went back in the office i
24 ; after we secured from all that.                The pressure was down so there 25             was nothing else to do.      Someone did make a comment they thought i
63-1

19 v                                                                                1 l                                                                                 I I I                  O      I think !?r. Higgins is well ~over six fest and rathar t
                      'l
                 - 2 'j', thin, sharp face.                 You don't think it would have been him?
1                        No. And Neely I know.
l                 3 .i                  A l
t
                      ,1 4                      Q     How did you -- strike that. Do you recall whether l
5, people in the control room were in respirators at the time I
6;                that happened?
1 7 ',.                A     The time of the discussion, no, we weren't in
                         .I a;               respiratort, i
91                   Q      Do you remember how you identified him as an i
10 ;     .
NRC cerson?
1 1 .,                  A     I sean him earlier in the day in the superviser's l
12                  office over on the one side, and when he did come into the 13                  office, he had an NRC hat on.                                    .
l U.S. NRC, white hard hat?
14 l11     !l O
15 ;                   A     Yes.
I i
16)!                    O    Were you introduced to him?
17,!!                   A    No, I wasn't.
:t 18                      Q    You had conversations with him there in the I
19                 shift supervisor's office?
2c                      A     The only individual I knew that particular day that 21 .,               was from the NRC by name was Don Haverkamp.       All the other i:
22 ]                gentlemen there, even Mr. Neely, which I know now, I did nct I
23j; 'know that particular day.
n 24!;
O    This is on March 287
  . .i n e:nr m. < ne. '
25:                      A   Chat's correct.
Y i
:l 64-1

20-f                      . ,3              -Q-         Yeu;> ccogni:cd P.r. Eaverkampein the control room?               -
            -E   ,y :                    ( A ..    'Itseen-him
:-                 there;in   he centrol room.      That-was only I
                                             .     .     .                                                                      t 1.'pariedically..
a                           .
1I
                                        ,r7
,.c                 .:                             ' He was -not :the one that you' recall . speaking to?
i
.                                                                 '                          ~
if                  'gg                    Ax        'I definitely would have known id- it was him.                              l 3                     Q     'Was.there anybody'else standing there or listening, 4
                                    'a party to this conversation that you.had:with.the inspector?
!-                     g;-
A.        :'wouldn': want to.say definitely yes.            There's some       -l il -
-                      ;'.l . people 'I could ask.
                           .I                                       ~
QL       3t as_.you' sit here now,.you don't recall another
                  .1- ll     -
r li'               .persen being a party'to the conversation?-                                            i :
i                   *:
                     ,                       A        Nc,~and the conversation, like : said, could have                     I tr..,.. ' o ni v. 'asted     .            a minute or two, because we were quite concerned              ,
q l                                                                                              !
tri with what;was going on.                                                                             ,
k            .                                   .         .
n
                  ?13 j                        0      Do.you remember whether'there was a control room
 ,                           il t[operatorstandingthereinfrontofyou, fbr exer.ple?                                                      -
                             .i
                       -!                      A      I think we did have a control room operater over there                [
J.
                     ,3f             that secured the pumps, but whether he listened to the l
                    *;               conversatics, I couldn't tell you that.
                                            .Q.       You ment'oned that you thouc.ht that v.ou had c.iven                   .
                    .e           .
an instruction to secure the sprav. cum as?           .   .
e..p4                      A      Yes, and I know other r.eco.le that s a v. thev. c. ave the           E
                    -1
                    -- h.+
in3truction also.
    ,               :: :                       Q, You were nct the. shift supervisor in charge at that                      ;
      . . a.w .n, : t
                  . . ;3.. .         poin:, were,you?- Or' ware you, in fact?
r 1-  6 i'                                                                                             .
_jy                           -[,
M)
: 2.           f s

19 I
I I Q      I' thin}f Mr. Higgino;is'w311'over six foot and rathsr
    ~
r!
You don't think it would have been him?
                    .2 P thin, ~ sharp f ace.
3                     A     So. And Neuly I know.
0 How did you --' strike that.      Do you recall whether 4j   ,
Q
                     ~5 i I
peopl'a in the control room were in respirators at the time 1
I l                      6'   ,
that happened?
I A      The time of the discussion, no, we weren't in 7 'h i
3;               respirators.
1 91                  .Q      Do you remember how you idantified him as an 10 ,               NRC person?
f 11 [                    A     I seen him earlier in the day in the supervisor's            j l                                                                               l 12i {              office over on the one s'ide, and when he did cone into the 13                 office, he had an URC hat on.
14 l;                   Q     C.S.,NRC, white hard hat?
r A     Yes.
15 l i
16 ]                    Q     Were you introduced to him?                                 l 4
n 17 ll                  A     Mo, I wasn't.
:t 18                     Q     You had conversations with him there in the 19[ shif t supervisor's office?
20                       A     Che only individual I knew that particular day tha:
i 21.c was from the URC by name was Don Haverkamp.                       All the other p'
22j                gentlemen there, even Mr. Neely, wh_ch I know now, I did not i
23i;               know that particular day.
4 24 4a                   Q     Chis is on March 28?
i st R 00erttrt, Int. h 25 '                    A   'That's correct.
I ll 65-1

10 J'        .suggestionLbeing made not to start = electrical equipment inside 2:         containment?
3j                 A    The only time that. I L recall was af ter the hydrogen L
           ,4          problemL had' been surfaced, and - then the concern was- abou:
5          starting electrica1' equipment.
S       6                  Q _
Which day would this have been, do you know?
  .e g
             ,                 A     It was.when -- it~was after the NRC was cu: :n alert
  ' a_
           .i                                                                      .
N i       8          that.they hydrogen' bubbles had increased and were increasing n
d        9          in the f containment.
i-li '10 C. During interviews conducted af ter the inciden:, the z          .
    !<     11 Metropolitan Edisen employees.have stated that the 2^ psi pressur.
  .3 i 12 ,             spike was explained to an SRC inspector.         Did yo u '.a'te a ny z_        r                                                                                _
h     13           discussions with Mehler or Chwastyk on 3/28/79, the day :f :he E
5      14           accident?
N           i c
     !x '15 A       I did not. First of all, I did not knew those
      =          i
        .-  16           individuals, who they were, or by name .       I did no     fiscuss B
A p     17 l         anything of that sert.
x
      =
5     18                  Q      Do you believe that you could have been to' d cf the c
h                  28 cound cressure spike that was due to an electrical problem
: y. 19               -
a 20j          or any other reason, and dismissed it?
i 21                  A     ~I-don't think so. I -- again at that pein: my primary
                 -l 22           mission was . the radiological control of things .       Af terwards I 23 j         had' tc . g'o out and find out where that particular censo' e was .
c           24                         3Y MR   MOSELEY:
25 '                C      Had you been told, do you think you would have recalled s
l' -                      ALDERSON REP _ORTING COMPANY. INC.          66-1

10-
: 3.                suggestion;being made not to start electrical equipment inside
:  2                  containment?
3l                      A    . The only time that I rec 411 was af ter the hydrogen l
4                 problem had been surfaced' and then ' the concern was about 5,                starting. electrical equipment.
c A
      ;;                                 6                      Q      Which day would.this have been, do you know?
R                                                                 It was when -- it was after the NRC was put on alert R                                 7                      A                                                                     l 1
E                                   8               that.they' hydrogen bubbles had increased and were increasing M
       "J 4                                   9               in the containment.                                                         l 5                            to                          Q       During interviews conducted af ter the incident, the
:5 ju 11                    Metropolitan Edison employees have stated that the 23 psi pressur d                           12                     rpike was explained to an NRC inspector.       Did you have any         L z
        =
2:                           13                    discussions with Mehler or chwastyk on 3/28/79, the day of :he G
j, 14                                                iccident?
b
         !w 15 A      I did not. First of all, I did not knew those a                                                                                                                        ;
16                   individuals, who they were, or by name.       I did not discuss         !'
B.-
A i                           17                   anything of that sort.
a
[I                                                                                                                 he E                            18                        Q      Do you believe that you could have been told of c                                         .
* 28 pound pressure spike that was due to an electrical problem 19 9
M 20                   or any other reason, and dismissed it?
21                         A       I don't think so. I -- again at that point my primary 1
mission was the radiological control of things.       Afterwards 22 l
                                                      .t 23 I
                                                       !~
had to g'o out and find out where that particular censole was.
i.
24 ;                              3Y MR. MOSELEY:
i 25 '.                     Q       Had you been told, do you think you would have recalled ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.         67-1

4 . .           -                 .                        .              .       .. _.           _. . . _ .            . _ _    . .
p                                                                                                                                     ,
l                                                                                                                      ll-o       .
1 Lt?'
2,                     A    Lyes.
                           ,        i
:31                           .BY MR..CRAIG:
4                      :Q      Did you: see the' containment pressure increases 4      l'           indicated by the;chartLrecorder at'approximately 2:00'p.m. in                                       ;
                'b                                                                                                                              l jf j.                    the' af ternoon on .3/28 7
  ,       ,   :    R:
1                  2        7                      A-   .Could you.repea: that?
i                  -
8'                     Q      Did .you see ' the spike on the chart recorder?                                       l
,                  J 1
i~
J:          'i
                -:1.        9. i                   A      No ', I did not.          As I've said, I don't even know where
              -g
;-                5       to                that ree      lar is lecated at the: time, f-l                 l<     11                        Q     Were'yousaware.on 3/28 at abcut 2:00 p.m.                that-the 3
                                          -containment spray pumps came on?
!=                [ 12            ,
:-               !E      13                        A'     No, I did not.
j 14                              XR. CRAIG:        Le:'s go off the record just a second.
"                 E E
u 15                               :(Discussion of f the record. )
!                x n
14                                3Y XR. CRAI3:                                                                       ,
!               W p       17                         Q     Are you aware that you have been identified as the w
x                                                                                                                             '
5       18.                 inspector who received an explanation concerning this pressure
 ;              c                                                                                                                             ,
19                  spike by Srian Mahler?
l               $                                                                                                                             ,
a               n              i 1
20      i A      I was informed by an individual many, many weeks 21                  after the accident -- and I don't know if it was Mahler or net,
                                )
22 -                and I turned that ever to the investigating group.
                      ; 23 q                       Q      It was Chwastyk, I believe.            Which group?       The Rogovin i
24                ' group?
ja !                        A'    No, the 'special investigating group.
I
    ,                                                           ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.                     67-2                     +
                                                              ,  e   ,.n.,  - , -                - - - , -        .      - - - ,        -

12'
      ,      1                             'BY MR. MCSILEY:
2,1       '
                                    'Q      I'm sorry,.I missed something here.        When did'you say           t I
            -3 '      ,       you 'were tiold?          ,
4                        A-   'Several weeks after.ths accident, the -- and :'m no:           --
t
                  !                                                                                r.
r        5,               I think it was-Mehler, said he had-information about the. spike,           -
g              i g         6-              and~ I turned it over to the IE investigatine crour at tha . coir : .
4 i
  ;h          7. ;                   .Q-    Several weeks?      That would have been in April?
n
: j.      -8                        A     Yeah, it could have.been April.       It was when we had --
d                                                                                                           i d         9               we.were in our site coverage at that point.
E - ' 10''                               BY MR.- HOEFLING:
1 ime l
I Il                        Q     What kind of informatien did he -indicate he %.ad?
   .g-
:!   . 12                         A     I can't remember now, something -- he indicated a:
z-5       13                that point he had talked to people regarding the spike.
D                         '
E:                                Q    -NRC people?
w 1.4                                                                                                          .
b                                                                                                              l 2
15             .
A     Yes. And so     knew -- we had our i:t restigating :ean              l 2
16                on site, so at that pcint I turned it over to -- it was Tony a
A y       17                Faisano, who is the special investigator.
W u
5      18                              BY XR. MCSELEY:
c                                                                                                            ,
19 ;                      Q     Would this have been some time before this informatica X                 ,
20                was in the newspaper, which would have been early May, : be'ieve?       .           ,
21                       .'A    '"his was af ter.
h 22                         Q*    It would have been after that?
            ~23j                        A     (Witness nodding.)          ,
a 24 j-                            In fact, I was (n the, control reem :ne day and he brought up that poin:.
25!
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.              67-3

                                     "I a                                      ,,
k                          ,    ,
1                +                                                   73 t                                             i a-            #
               'l i               +Q         To you?'
: l.               (
2 hi                 .A       Yes. And ~ I pointed it out to' the investigators, that
: 1. #
3l              thisfindividual1 had some concerns and had this informacion.
                          ;                                        t 4h             A 9ein it wasn't my. area of expertise.        That's why I passed it-         1 l-it   .e       5             . k ong.
                              .a                 s 1
c3M 8
         =      6,?      i B Y MR. CRAIG :                                                  l R
2 7                    lQ      Were you aware that he believed -- I think it was t
       -A j
g;             Chwastyk believed that you were the inspector who was at the a       .I 4        9              recorder during the ' time of the~ spike, and that they tarned E.
         @    10 '      ,
around to you and said, in effect, "We have just had a 23 pound E
5    11               pressure spike inside. centainment"?                                         ,
E i 4      12                      A  s   No. I den't even know who he is. I mean new I do,
:E               l-
      ';               I j     13j              but then I didn't.         My main areas in the control room would m-             i E
a     14 I             f.avefbeen at the instrument panel, for the process monitors and c'
E     15'              area monitors, n
E
          ?
16                             SY MR. MCSELEY:
B
        'A           l
        @    17 -                     Q      Isn't that in the near vicinity of the --
w            4 3           '
h 18 i                     A      It's up in front.
c 19                       0      -- of the containment pressure?
k 20f                             BY MR. HAR? STER:
21 !.I Q      Let me ask you a question, to he*a clear this up.
t-                                                                      .
22j.              You had the
* operator's console, and then the vertical rods in I
i 23                back. Here is the radiatien monitors.        Were you in this par-24                here?
15                       A      No. Cp-on the' panel, in the back, the call panel in-I                                ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.          67-4

   +                                                                                                 22
    ~
i 1
1-                Miller's absence?
I T          .2 l                          A'    Not really,'no.
3' '
I
                                          .Q     Nothin7' perceptible changed while Miller was gone, in j
k             4'                . terms of.how. things were run?
1
      =       5,                           A     No.
                     '                                                                                      l p j-      f                                  BY MR. CRAIG:,
M 7                            Q    Who was in charge when Miller left?
R_
       "n g'      8                            A-    I'm not really sure now, to tell you the truth.
3
: d.      9                            Q    Ihs you remember, if you aren't sure, then, who the guy.
Y E      10                   was?                                                                     i l
      ' i_                                           ~
      . ii    11 ;                          A     I probably wasn' t.                                       l 6               !
g     1 2 ',                       ;Q      Ineprevious testimony before the Hart subcommittee, l
E                                              .
g     13 '                 you stated that you were not present during discussions concern-         '
u ing the containment' pressure spike which occurred at approximate.
l t' .
14 ,
i    15                   1:50 on 3/28, and that you did not know of the pressure spike 2
m 16                   until Friday.            Is that still your recollection?
f d
i    17                             A     Yes.
w d                                   Q      How can you explain the fact that you are present 2    18         .
7               i
                         ',         in the centrol room or the shift supervisor's office during X.19 20                    the pressure spike, and the people in the control room and 21 l                  people in the shift super's office have testified that the
             ~ 22          .        pressure spike or thud was common knowledge at the time it 23                   occurred?           In fact, virtually,everyone in the Unit 2 con:::1 24                    room and/or the shift superviser's office who was presen: rn i
25 Ii                '3/28.at about 1:50-has testified that they either knew Of the
                             .i 1                               ALDERSON REPORTING COMP ANY. INC.
68-1

l 23 1            spike or heard the thud?
i 2                 'A    I guess I can't really explain that. All I could say L     -3]          fwas'that there was certainly a lot of activity' going.on at that 4''          time. I, den't recall any thud of that type, and if it was a i
c' 5l            dull type- of thud, similar to a main coolant pump check valve, 9
3   6            when you start a main coolant pump on a submarine, which is W       .                                                   .                           \
g   7l           what -- when 'I discussed it with Gary Miller on Friday, the way       l N
j   8'           he described it, and.that is. sort of a dull thud in the d                                                                                       ,
d   9,           background.                                                            I i                                                                                       l p         ,                                                                             1 g  10 ,                     There are lots of noises at a plant 'that happen at         l 3
5  11 ,          various times, and if you are familiar with the planc, one that's U
y  12            a little bit'different sticks out, if you're there all the time.  .
  'E
_j  13            If you're not, and you hear all these various noises, and u
j  14 '
there are lots of them at a plant -- now if you' re not familiar 2  15            with the noises, what's common and what's not, they. den't a                                                                                    _
   =
y  16             really register with you, and the odd ones that are not normal w
y  17            don't really stand out as they would to somebody that was very        i a                                                                                       '
b  18             familiar with it and there on an every-day basis.
U                                                                                       l
   $  19 ;                      I really think that your characterizacion of it from       I M                                                                                       l 20 i           the different people that you have talked to isn' t correct,          l 21 '           because I know that when I discussed it with Gary Miller on 22             Friday, the impression I cot from him at that time was that, 23             okay, now that we understand what it is -- Friday, I'm saying 1
2,4            now -- new on Friday, March the 30th, we looked back and we 25 :           got .a feel that it was a hydrogen burn or explosion, and tied ALDERSON REPORTING COMP ANY. INC. 69-1

- - _ -.     .        -                     .     -               - - . .      ~ . - -    .
                                          >                                           57.
t introduced just'in our. calculation or our analytical technique
                                        ~
and I . don't 'think that we were able, at least I know . I was not able, to pin point whether we were talking about ten' percent or ninety percent.           ,
MR. TAYLOR:     Yes, I understand.
                                                                                            '1 MR. DUBIZL      But it was definitely beyond the one percent,                 j l
I think there's the part we were at.
MR. TAYLOR:     Now, about a little before two o' clock, according to the - sequence of events , there was a larger pressure spike which has been reported as 28 pai.           How did that ccme i
to.your t.ttention, Mr. Miller?        That that had happened.          Did         l you see this yourself, or did -- (interrupted) .
MR. Mm 71t :   At the time, I was not aware that we had the spike cd the chart, or that the safe guard system had re-initiated. It does so happen that I '..eard a noise.          And I did mention to .Mke that I heard a noise.          But I think that there are, the ventilation makes a noise that's similar.              I heard a noise.
1 MR. TAYLOR:     Could you characteri::e that noise.          I =ean          l vas it s loud bang, or what?                                                        l MR. MI"LER:     A thud.
MR. TAYLOR:     A thud?
MR. MI' ? ?* :
                             . It was a thud.
MR. TAY*CR:     Did it occur Oc you when you heard that r.a it might have been an explosion?
MR. M-~~?R:    No sir. It didn '  a  :r.e time. I didn':
70-1
: 1.             ,.                    W    ~
7
                                              ,1
                                              ,;                           o.
112-
%                 l      '
as- conflicting and you' could explain: any apparent conflicts                                                 1
                       '1..                       .           y-                                                                              4
               .1}-[Randiwecoial''             d    approach-itthatway. ..I                          think that might'be the-            -
i-           e                                                                .
l 3 [ preferabl'e waylof approachi.ng- it.
i MR. BLAKE:- Do.you want to take an opportunity, Gary,                                      .;
5]- .tc review -your prior statements or do you just want.to tell hit 1 4
1 v . ,:                                                                                                                                     !
     ]          6 4;           whatever;it is that-you recall right now and then we wil.1 go
     . ;r
                    .l
       $)
: c. [:i. that'way?_                                                                                                                     l
       $8                                   THE WITNESS:               I will' go right now.                                        '.
j - ' ,j MR. B(AKE:
Okay, why don' t we- do tha t then.
                                                                                                                                         'i j-      10'-                                                                                                             '
                                           .At the time th't.the      a               spike occurred, you know, my                            ;
y     -
l 3
L II- l thrust was'to be leaving the site, like, you know, making last-a-
5 ~j I believi minute pr_eparations to go;to the Lt. Governor's' office.
     .i
     .{ 13 { .I -was out in the control room.                                                 I don't remember looking at any
{ Mq instruments relative to that- incident.
i I do remember' hearing a-      .
y                ,
i- 15 , ,ncis e.                    I do remember that Mike Ross, and I think William Marshal 16 Sucha Marshall is his name, nickname, was standing near me and 5
II }< I think I asked what the noise was.
I think I was told that it 18 was th'e ventilation system.
i l9i                          I think I had at that time no awareness of the spray 20 pumcing starting that I can remember t: day or of. the soike itself 121'$              And : feel tnat:is accurate because when I came in in the days 22 I came back early Thurscay morning secause after tne accident.
23 -
                               ..nere were only two emergency directnrs, Jim Seelinger snd :yself 2d Then I believe I came back again eitner a -6 o' clock or 7 c'c'.cck 25              . rica) morning, 71-1
                                                       . ALDERSON REPORTING COMP ANY INf" w

                                                                                                                ,           (
W                       .,
2 r.
                             . ,6 a
l''          were-:made of?
u       g              .
l.
T<                     2l .                Mr. Miller.
I knew they were alum'elcromel. I would not
:3'             say I.had:an. intima 0 familiarity-with those particular i                 ,
1     4'' thermocouples..'I.am aware of what a thermocouple is and the
                          .i                                                                                                     l l                     -5 j type of' junctions they are, .that is' the familiarity I have
                            .i                                                                                                   1 6' with it..
1 7                   Mr. Arena.- You wouldn't know the melting point of
        .d Z~            8             alumalcromel?
ui y              9                  Mr. Miller.          I don't believe so off the top of my head.                      j
         <                                                                                                                    '1 h            10                   .Mr. Arena. 'Did you personally know it off the top of m
        .$    e-
                   - 11;. ;          your head on the morning of the 28th?                                                       I Q.@
        .2    i i12 i                       Mr. Miller.         No.                                                             l 5 '- $                 ,
8                            Mr. Arena.         On the afternoon of the 28th, did you become
        -@ N.         13 l W                       l 4
O
              !     11 4 . ! aware of the octurrence of a pressure spike in tho-containment i
0 g oy'.- 13 j           ,
in Unit 27 2    E d           16                    Mr. Miller.         In the afternoon of the 28th on that day I a:
U d
17l was aware of a noise at some point just prior to my leaving I
          $            18            the site, and in fact, I believe I asked what was that in fairly                            !
         .0 3            19            strong language.           I did not closely evaluate that the 28th, 20             because I was told, I believe, that it was a ventilation system 21             which was changing. modes and.did make a thud-type noise, and 22            I, based on. -- from the standpoint of getting ready to go to           ,
f 23            the governor'.s offic'e, I'did not come back and evaluate some 2dl of the data and events that I was aware of, say, on the 30th.
25 .!                 Mr. Arena.         Do you remember who told you they thought it was 4
^
72-1
_ _____ _ =

             .-                                                3
   -:. j d'         HUNTER: All right.       l.et us pick up another general item as we go.along.
4 2          In the afternoon at approximately.... after 12, 1300,:there was a pressure 3          spike in the containment.- Were you present and recall that particular          l
[          4          event?
l-L         -5 6          ROSS:    Yes.
7 8          HUNTER: Now can you give us your location at that time and what you recall '
9          seeing or hearing or discussing at that time?
10 g         ,
ROSS: Yes.      I was near the console at that time and if we are talking g             about the same time was around. 2:00, sometime in that area.      And at that g             time we got a an ES signal and some of the components restarted, decay heat, what have you. We got building isolation again and we took care of
        ,,            that and we looked back and the control room operator said "Jeese the spray 16            p mps are running" and we looked back at the charts at that time. We saw a g             fairly large spike on the chart and the exact pressure at this time I don't 181,          know, ...it wa's around 30 pounds. My thoughc at the time and Miller was 19 f        out there with us and he questioned he said, "jeese you know I thought I heard something, too." We are moving down the road there 100 miles an hour and we looked at it and we said "Jeese the spike was so short it must have been an instrument." That was our reasoning at the time.        We reached over
                                                                                                      \
and we said you can shut the spray pumps off now because the pressure came 23 right back to     0,... almost very, very rapid return and we shut the spray pumps off. I noin know the spray pumps were on about five minutes wnen
      '25l-  t l
l' i
73-1

                                               = ..                                                      . -
',g JWB' 47-l 1
I don't.mean you necessarily have some specific cuestions that                               '
2
                 . we've asked about your bellef on reportability -- but I would 1
3                                                                       '
like to ask you: 'To your knowledge, was this information 4
withheld from the NRC7 j5 Again, no'2.nformation that day was withheld from
                                                                     ~
A.
a anybody.
R R      7
   ;                     4'      You stateri to the IE Investigators in May that n.
E      8 M               you were aware.of the containment pressure spike.                       You looked d
c      9 g!
                  -at the charts showing the spike, and you said you knew that F     10 i               the containment pumps started                You also said you associated h"
the event with an instrument problem.
12
   !,                            You were: a.~ 1icensed' SRO ist.the;. time, Mr. Ross .
7
   !'              Didn't you know of the redundancy which would have to be set 14
   ,               aside for the building spray pumps to come on?
is 9     15 ill                    L      very definitely.
u
     ~
16 Q                      O_     And you then knew that an instrument or power I
h               malfbetion couldn't have caused the spray pumps to come on?
   =                  -
5     18 c*
                        - A. You say " knew."         We still associated it with some j    19 kind of a failure and proceeded.               We didn't say:          Hey, that 20 couldn't have happened, but we want to write this off.                       I'm
         *1 saying that what we concluded was that it couldn't have-22 I     happened, based on our previous training; therefore, it was I
y'                                                                                                  l l
an instrument failure -- be that logically rigM or wrong,                               1 24 L l      that's whct we concluded.
25 i,
                                        ~ _ _ _ _ . - _ . . . .    .  - - .. . ..   ...,. 74-1

m ''                            .,
i f pW ' [                                                                                                          a48 e          u                             !;
                                .I                            BY: MR. ' CR7.IG :
~                          '
M                           i2;         '-
O      You ' concluded that.what ceuldn't happan, specifi-l-
4-13                  cally? :-
                         <       4                     A. .
Any' kind of.a spika.       It couldn't have'been'there based on that; rapid.of a. change.
;                  e              5-                                                        We sean a' change that was h
c               - 0.;
!.                 $ . ' 6 f ' " bang, bang," ~and' I said 'it had to be an instrument failure.                                         i
:               .g
[              $ $.               7-            and we-t on.                                                                            [
 . . .           7.
                   $              8                            BY-MR. MOSELEY:
}.
d                                                                                                              '
j               ' c}              9                   '4      .And you.didn't question that the downside, the'                          '.
                 ?>-
;                  g          10                return to normal, may have been caused by some failure of ths                           .
.                   z
                   !it II-               containment vessel?.                                                                    ,
I I2 -                                  A      Definitely not.
!                   2l
 ;                             13                       4      Chwastyk has told us that after the spike he had
                 -l                  -
:               'E             I4        i       a survey made of the containment building because,he thought E                                                                                                                   -
j
{u 15                        the spike was real, and because the pressure had dropped so
!'               i              16               quickly that the containment could have failed.            He also said'.              l as
( 17              .!        that he had temperatures.and pressures checked as a result ofL 18              his belief that the spike was real..
4-               -
I9 ,  -
Were you aware of. these actions?
p                   &
: 20.                    A       I was not. . I'm sure we had temperatures and                           :
i                                                                                                                                      ,
e F                               21               pressures chc:ked' because we were doing that.          We were looking 22               at things -- what's the temperature?           What's your pressure in-c                                         i 23 '            : Ahe building? We had pressure in the building; we had the i                             '2# !              building bottled up-and we were looking at it.           The inspection r
il                                                                                          T
                                 .25             -I have'no knowledge of; nor do I have any knowledge that it                           .
P 74-2
                                             $-                     ~ ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
h

                                             ;m
  ,10 Td3 '                                                                                                  -49 1,         ,
was done.-
l
: 2. . '                      4L          Do you have knowledge _particularly that the 3                 containment' building temperature was checked as a result of 4             ,   the spike?
l
   .,. 5                           L          :As a. result of the spike?
e.
gf                            ~4            .Yes.                                                                   l 7                          L           No, I have no knowledge of that.
  'f      8_                         4           What particular temperatures are you aware of that
                                                                                                                       ]
'   e d     9                 were made specifically as a result of the spike?
l 10                           L           I'm aware of nothing-specific as a result of the l
E j   11                  spike.            I am aware that we were looking at pressure, and we li J   11                  were lookircir at temperature in the building.                    We wanted to Z           l x           i                                                                                                    '
2=.13 i                 make sure that the emergency core cooling, or the bui3 ding s
j    14                  cooling was keeping the pressure down for any reason, a;o we j    15                  kept the pressure it               in the building.- We wanted to keep what
    =
was in the building in. the building.
   .df .16 !
{17; j                            4          And Chwastyk didn't discuss any of these actions 0    18                  or their results with you?
E            i 19       !                   A           No,. not at that time. At subsequent times, days I            !
20                   later, we inspected the reactor building and we took radiation 21                   surveys on tcp of the dome with a meter and things like that, 22                  but at that time I have no knowledge of anything at the time 23                   of the spike.              We went on to something else.
l 24                           4            But, Mr. Ross, you were the man in charge of I
25 j                  operations on that.date,,
J ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.

    ,11 JWB                                                                             50 1l           A     'That's' correct.
: 2.          'O. Here's Mr..Chwastyk taking actions.       .He has some 3       concern that this was a real pressure spike.         He has people 4
4-      take certain actions and he didn't tell you?
g    5            A      or he didn't take them that day.
E
.      j    6            %      How was information flowing to you as the Director         i i      R 2    7       of operations on that day?
       )    8            A      I was coming out to the control roome I wasn't
      .0 4     9-      spending full time out there -        periodically; receiving
;. g 10         informations looking at certain parameters and coming back to
.-     E
!      j   11       the think tank. That's what we were doing that day.
4
* l     j    12            g      With whom would you discuss chis,'any status          ,
,      5 13            L       The shift supervisor.
j
[ 14              g       Do you feel that that information flow was working E
E   15       on March 28th?
E g ,16              A      As well as it could. under the conditions that we ai 5
ti  17       had; yes, sir
.      si  18             Q. Even when people say they had various concerns
:      E-19        and had actions taken, and ycu say that you weren't aware of
{n 20        theta, and you still conclude that that informat. ion flow was.
21       working?
22             A      I still conclude the information flow was working.
23  i I still question whether or not they say chings now that we 24ll      did then, or things we did days later         I've had that 7roblem i
myself.
25l I
l --
:                      ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC. 74-4

1
    .12 JWB         !                   .                                                                   51 I' ,                 S         Your-statement to the It.E Investigators in May l
             =2i          -
:. bout Miller's interaction with ycu'et the time of the spike 13               says, and I quote:
                                                           "My thought at the' time,-- and Hiller was 4'              out there with us, and he' questioned, he said:             Geez, you know,
       =      5               I' thought I heard something too.          We were moving down the road
      -h
[      6,            . there 100 miles an hour, and we looked at it, and we said:
7             ,
6,    '7'              Gee, the spike was so'short, it must have been an instrument."
[      8               That's the end of the quote.
d si     9                              Doesn't that quote'of Miller, "you know, I thought 10               I heard someti.hing, too,' say that he was saying, in addition z          -
       = -           i g 11 I                 to the other evidence of a spike, that he thought he heard u
[ 12 ;                 something?
E g     13                     A.        He did say he' thought he heard something.        That's
* i h . 14 l               what.his quote.says.           We didn't associate it with anything --
2    15 !              a ventilation fan shift, dampers go shut -- we just never Ii y 16 i                 associated it with anything other than an instrument failure.
si
      . a( 17 ,                We had'never been trained to say that a hydrogen buildup would b    18                happen in that short a period of time.             All our training said n             #
        &              R 19                60 days, not tes. worry.
20 l                    4          Well, you're a little ahead of me.       I'm trying to -
21l               before we get to relating it to hydrogen -- I'm trying to 22                understand knowledge that there was a pressure spike.
23 '                    A. .       We had knowledge that there was a spike indicated.
24 '                    S          And you and Mr. Miller were standing there, and
:t 25 4               someone is saying the spray pumps come on, and people are i
74-5 ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.

                            ...                              -            -.      -.=       ~-     .      ..
      .,13 LJWB ;y   i 52 i.
               'I'         1taking actions, and it's your belief that Mr. Miller is aware.
^
2     li   of these things the .same as you were aware of these- things?
3          Is that correct?
}_
4                        MR. BLAKE:    Could we,go back and read the first ,        '
4 4.d ' 5
                                        ~
: i.                          ques tio'n?                                                   -
A i.-       4-p         g      6                        MR. MOSILEY:: Sure.        Did you want the five-minute
:          R i         R      7.        - thing?
:        ;5'                                                     .
I
                ,I MR. BLAKE:   No, just the question which you started i
d                                                                                             ,
:!     9          with.
i         Y 10                         .MR. MOSILEY:   Would you reread the question?
h
          =
          $    II                          MR BLAKE:    I thought you asked half of a question u
(=   12           and he answered the second half.           I'm not sure what the answer
           -e g   13           was.
<          a n
E ' I4                          THE REPORTER:    " Q. Your statement to the I&E Inves-F          $
j z
15           tigators in May about Miller's interaction with you at the g[  I0           time of the spike says, and I quote:             "My thought at the time" -;
ed
           !lf I7                          MR. BLAKE:   Could we stop just for a second?          You're
           $   18          , quoting now Ross ' statement fr= y:ur statement?
c m
19                          MR. MOSELEY:   Yes.
n 20                          THE REPORTER:    * - and Miller was out there with 21           us, and he quet;tioned, he said:          Geez, you knes, I thought I 22           heard something, too.       We were moving down the road there 100 i
23l          miles an hour.       We looked at it and we said          Gee, the spike
                    -i 24I          was so short, it must have been an instrument."
That's th's 25ll          end of the quote.
i l
                    -l                          ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC. 74-6 I
w_ _ _.                                                                .

1-13LJWB-                                                     .
53-       !
1                          "Doesn't that quote of. Miller, 'you know, I thought 21       .I- heard something, too, ' - say. that he was saying, in addition
                     -3            to the other evidence of a-spike, that-he thought he heard 4         something?
e-           5                "L:     Ha'did say he! thought he heard something.           That's 5
           -l        .6-         .what his quote says.. JWe didn't associate it with anything -
:     7         a ventilation fan shift, dampers go shut -- we just never x                                                                                                             !
           -l            8         associated it with anything other than an, instrument failure..
d                                                 .
I d        ,9.           We:had never been' trained to say that a hydrogen buildup would-i o-
           . t ' 10                happen in that short a period of time.          All our training said
           ~ ili I        11-         .60 days, not to worry.
f j         12                   "4        Well, you're a'little ahead of me. I'm trying to -
ci j        13             before we get to relating it to hydrogen - I'm trying to u
j        14              understand knowledge that there was a pressure spike.
N 2        15-                   "L        We had knowledge there was a pressure spike
            $l 16              indicated.
d.
d g - '17-                      " 0. . And you and.Mr. Miller were standing there,-and
:s                      -
             !=      18          ,someone is.saying the spray pumps :ome on, and people are 19              taking actions, and it's your belief that Mr. Miller is aware I
20              of these thinga the same as you were aware- of these things?
21              Is that correct?"
22                               BY.MR. MOSELIT:
23    ,
g         Would you answer that question, then, the last 24 !!           one?                                                                               i l
25]                    A.        I'm convinced Miller was aware of the spike.
1 l
d                                ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC. 74-7

m i
t       Whether or not he'was aware of all the Es equipment functions, l              2!        I can't'say.      'Zewe turned around and said, " Hey, the spray 3         pump's started."
That's how I knew it happened.
(                                                                   '
4-              Q:      And Miller is standing next to you, and one might 3'    5         conclude from that that'he must have heard it.                      Is that             ,
;        g                                                                                                       I
       -l      6-        correct?
!        R 1
1       7               A       That'would be my conclusion.
You've got to remember i      ' M.                                                             .
j        j '. 8         there was a let of information being passed in that control d.
:i -  9       , room at that time.-
!-       p               .
i        @    10               0      -I understand.
E j    11                       BY MR.~ CRAIG:
l        D                             ,
l-       [ 12                  O       What about the spike itself as indicated on the E
       'E     13         recorder?     Did vou see that?                        .
1        g-l    14               A        I loc. :ed it. It was long enough.         It was from 2    15         here to there (12.dicating) .         I did look at it and seen the y    16         spike go up, and I seen it clear right away.                  They turned to d-
{17             me and said: -can we secure the spray pumps?                  We looked at the k    18         pressure and said:
Yes, secure themt no use spraying the E                                       -
19         building.
kr -
20               4        Is it your belief that Gary Miller also saw that 21         chart recording?
22               A        I can't say.       Gary was in the area.             I stepped
: 23.        away.and talked to Bill, and we were all kind of in the same 24         area, but I can't conclusively say he knew it and saw the                              ;
L             25 '       spike.
                             ~
He was in the area.
l
:                   1 I
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.                       74-8

     .\
9154JWB-l                                                                            55 l
1                    MR. CRAIG:   Can we go off the record for a second?
2h                   (Recess.)                                                 \
I 3                    MR. HARPSTER:     Back on the record.
4'                   BY MR. HARPSTER:
l l    g       5             O      Mike, could you tell us what you did see in terms N                                                                                       l l       6        of other indic adens and things like the containment itolation         l l
R'                  .
     &       7        valves and this, what did happen when you got the pressure I
     %l      8        spika in terms of other indicatiens that were available?
d                                                                                     1 d       9             A      WeII, the primary indication you have of course is         )
k                                                                                    -l
     @      10        the pressure rect;rder in the reactor building.      The thing you   j z                                                                                       1 I
g      11        do get is a four-pound building isolation signal that causen s
y      12        the valves to reclose anything you've had open, any building E
13        isolation valve. At 30 pounds, it causes the building spray l$     14 l      pumps to start. If those a-tions take place, operators are 15        talking saying the building spray pumps started; you hear
{*'                                                                                    l d    16         those kind of things and that would be your indication.
d ti   17              4      Do you have announciation on your vertical boards E
5 18         of your SFAS logic?
E          '
g    19              A      Yes,. " building spray start," a couple of different      I n
20         announciators you.would have.      I don't know them all.     ,
21              4      Things which might be more apparent to people that 22         perhaps didn't have visual perspective, those little reactor         .
i 23 '       building recorders sitting there, " loss of~ intermediate i
24l       cooling," things like that?
5 25              A. Things like that, but it would be a nurber of alarms
                   'I i                   ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
74-9

       $   g                                  p               j       ,;        . '.
[ ,::'                   hE               i
                                                  -)                 );I        !'
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                                                                   'W n %16 )JhF                                              -
                                                                                     ;                                              56
:< m                      4          ,,            ,      #
i 4
y\;  .
                               \jq                  . coming. finland loutt at that time, whether someone 'in that back
               "\               2                      c uld pick fit"up andisay:i Geez, that al.ar n wes' canned. by this?    .
F .,l                            3:                    It'a hard for ne' toisay.            For the operators, yos, we could g 4
                                                     ' pick (that up js                        . 4                                         .
p g-(      ,
                  ;g.
g      ,
5-                                         But. the Sn3 logic would put' the big announciators
( q:                  6           '      ' up there?.                        q.
           ,p . : i.                            '
I ff7 a
                      ~
                                                           - A.            Yesa                                                                 j
{:h                             g                            4             That's semathing that woui.d get your attention.                     ,
    ,             s d
                   - gg <       9.,                   That's not one'of the ala2mn you would loue track of?
i j           10                            A.            It .woul.d get yetz attention; but whether yok'd get                 ,
t i jj                       it in addition to all the other alarms fla.shing around tche
^
                  \U jg                       control. room, I. can't say for somebody else.
                 ]u                                                                                                                             ;
                     $.13                                                  BY KR ECEFLING:                                                      ,
n g'34                                    g.            Why do yett. say, Mike, that you were convinced that 15                      Gary Miller .was aware of, the pressure spike?
w a                                                                                                                          -
16                             A             Because he .nskad me, %at was tha t?"         And we were D
d g -17_                            in the area, and I guesu I probably said something to the u
                     $        18'                     effect that we had a spike.              And he says, well - I don't                     .;
b        19-                     race.12 ever saying to him, " Hey, Gary, all the apray pumps I
20                       started, and all the building isolation isolated."                   I don't r
21 (                    recall ever saying that.              I don't know what I said en the-22                      record, testimony-wise, but I guess ny basic reason for saying
                          - 23 : ,                     that is he was in there when it happened; he heard what went on .in the control room, basically.
24 l   -
25 '                             O             Do you recall saying to him:       We've had a pressare t
                                  'd                                          - ALDERSON REPORTING' COMPANY. INC.            74 17

gg,      h{                            h,
                                                                                                                                 ~
S' ~ [
                                                                                                                        ^
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3
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34 g3 1                 y(                                      ,
g =~                    '
I g-
                 ' .'ir   1 Nhan's?the reactor coolant' pumps?'
{Q                 12. q                                                                                                               l o,.                              1
%                   l3          (\c I nean, when we cycled the 'electromatic relief va.1ve, rather.
I ' m 'sorry. .
1 t         x                                            ,
G         ''4                 ,And it wasn't'until the next morning that I came in, that we:were.still
                    ~5                 strying to find out why we'had.that pressure surge.           So we were talking with 6               the electical engineers on how we could possibly go from that-DC operated:
7               valve over and trip the pressure switches, which are' set at 30 pounds for
(                    -g                .the building spray pumps 'and their on a logic of 2 out of 3, before you'll h
(9                  start a pump.       So, at least we had picked up 4 of those, plus both of the            .l 10 pnssun recorders showed an increase.         So, he' looked at it, and he said, e                                                   ..
n                    " Bill,L there'r no way that the, that cyclir.g the electromatic could cause y                    an electrical fault to' cause the pressure switches in the building spray to come up."       So then we th,ought, I wonder if the real reason was a hydrogen 3                                                                                                                .
'                                        exp1 si n, becaure in rder to pressurize a volume that large so quickly,                      !
14 it was almost like un explosion. But at first, then' I thought, no, 2.1 3
million cubic feet like that - no way.       But then I guess we have determined              ,
lo.1!                                                                                                             l g                   now, pretty well, that'it probably was a hydrogen explosion inside the                        l 48
    .\.
                   . 19 g                 ,Did you hear anything in the Centrol Room when that happened?
                                                                                                                                   -i' 21 I did.not., No.                                                                          l 22 23
: 0. K.-
24 25    .
k~
75-1 a

l.
35 l
l lj       I learned later that.at least two other people did.
I 2!
3        How did they hear it?
I mean -
4 5        Well, 6
7        How did they hear it? Do you have noise monitors or something? Or -
8 9        We.do have noise monitors that are in the Reactor Building, loose parts and 10 noise monitoring system. I don't recall hearing on that. But the person u          in question, who I first learned it, they had heard some:ning.      Pardon me, y         .it was Gary Miller, who is the Manager of the Island.      And he said that the g          had heard something. And that he had' mentioned it to whcever was beside him at that time. And they thought that it was dampers in the 'ventiletion system which sit directly above the Control Room.      And he cidn't think 15 anything more of it, at that time. But then as he looked back on it, that's what he feels it was the same time.
18!
    !      Sill, did these pressure spikes were proceeded by the operation of the U!;
EMOB7 20) i 21[
i Well, maybe I should clarify that. The one that I was there for was from 22l the electromatic, alright.
24ll 9
25q a-a i
     ;; _                                                                    75-2

u.
36-1          O. X.
2 L
I assume that'the other one was too.. Though'I'm not sure-of that.              It may
            -3
                        'have beenlfrom operating something'else from inside the containment.               I 4
5         don't know.that for sure.
6 Hunter:      .W e're interested in, in you know the - it's important         you saw 7
8 the      you had the electromatic cycle, Fred opened the valve?
9 10 Right at that instant.
11 And at that instant you had the pressure spike.         You saw the pressure
                                ~
            .g g            spike?.
14!
15 I'* E sitive. Because he was waiting for my direction on when to open it "p'
16                                                                                                ,
i 17' O. K.
18 19!
                   ;       Alright.       And I said, " Alright Fred, cpen it up now."     As soon as I said now,- you know within a fraction of a second, the spike went boom.
22 Alright, you saw the spike. You saw it come back down?                                     j l
              '24 25 l
i u
75-3
[
                              -   -            ,                   . . .               ._~          -

i 37 1           Yes. It came up and came right back down.
2' 3   .
Then it leveled out?
4 5           Yes.
6   .
7           0. K. And so then having the operators disappear in the containment spray 8           pumps - the operator. You - did you - what was your basis for securing the g           pumps?
10 11            Well, at the - I thought then that it was just a faulty indication and the pressure had come back down to 12l 13
                  ,             Do you have - how many channels of pressure da you have in front of you
.                 4 narrow range and wide range?
16 For the Reactor Building itself?
                  .71 18 I       'Right.
19i l
201
_l            Two. Two separate recorders.
ca, 5
22 ",
0.X. then. So you were sure then the pressure was back down?
24    ;
O
,                 2sr t
I
                    , tj ,            ,
75-4
_._.i________._

p
        ;. ..        ;                                                      e                                                    ;
e      , 1
                                                                             '38 1
11                    Yes; I was.-
I' 2                        >
l     .
: l.               3
: 0. K.
4 5
                                  'I was convinced at that . time that it was just a false electrical type
              - 6:
signal.
7                                                                                                             l g                   0. K.
9                                                                                                            1 It never entered my mind that it was a hydrogen explosion, at that time at 10
                                       'II' 11' 12 I - can I - can I - I'll ask you the cuestion of hydrogen analyzers on the 13 containment building - on the Reactor Building. Do you you apparently do not have that type of
                ]      !
                '16I We need a sample for hydrogen.
18 You,-I'm sorry go ahead.
20 We sample for the hydrogen, alright.
21, 22 Later on?
23 24 25                           .
l L-b-
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                           'h'                                                                                  75-5 y
w             er -

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3 a
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                             ,                  L O ;'                                    *r
                            ;q                                                           '39.
~                                                        '
1!              'We did .later, yes, but,I mean normally that's the only way we can determine
                                                                     ^
,                      J,\                  . .
e                                                                                               .    .
,                      : 2'         ; :what the hydrogen concentration is in the Reactor Building. 'Is'through:
n                      '3,                : sampling. Or if.we- run -the hydrogen recombiner, we can take - there'r a (4          ,     .Iformula for figuring out based on the reaction chamber temperatures and-5               -the heater, chamber temperatures. ' You Ast ltake Lthe Delta T and civide it
:                         6                by a~ constant.- You can come out with a relative percentage of hydrogen J
J7                  based on'the reaction volume of the chub.e,'Inowing the flow rate thr,ough
!                         8                it and everything else.
E 9
l~
i 10                    0. K.           Had you ever had to take a hydrogen sample of the-containment before 11                    that your aware of? Had you yeah - did you ever, before?.
i
                 ,7
!-                                         I'm sure that we have.            And, well, the only time that I can remember 3
:                .,4,4 ;
actually doing that is anytine that we have the building closed for any
 )                   ly, period of time, alricht. We normally go in an take an air sample for the
                                           ""                          **       ""    # E'       " ' " * ""       * *      '"     '"
16 g                      reviews the results, to make sure you have the least enough oxygen to s pp rt life and that you don't have any combustible vapors in the Reactor
                 . '8!
1_C g.
Building before you send people in.
p                                       .
p                   20f l
And that would include hydrogen in an analysis?
                    .21!
I 22                                                                                                                  -i 1 think it's just combustible vapors. There's oxygen on it and I belfeve the other one is just' combustible vapors.             Like-24 k
25!
o                            i                                                .
1
\ '.
t                       .            e e
                        'c                                                                                              75-6
                        .o
                            ?
                            ':.        'n                            .i

                           +3             ,. o 7-L
                                                                         .                                          3
         'l L                           C. K.
t ,-
1{..
i l
l 3            If you'll excuse me at this. minute, but hydrogen being a combustible, it.
0 '.4                       would be considered in that.
6            Creswell: hhat' would.the radiation levels have been in' the area of where-7            you could have drawn a hydrogen sample?
:8                .,
g           Well, our normal sample point for the building, alright, is a monitor that
"                             is right down on_ the 305 elevation of the Aux Building.         Right near the 10 11
_ intermediate CR0 filters. .Right next to the seal return filters and the seal return coolant from the coolant pumps.          And a . this point in time, I'm y
y               not sure of the radiation levels, but throughout tne building.           They were -
I had heard numbers and not just certain areas, but pretty well generally 14i y    !
in the 50 R range, at this point.
15 So from that'information, what would your cecision be about drawing a p
                                ""*E * # **        "9   # *  ***E
* 18 I        ,
19
                            ' Alright.          Your referring'to - I seen the pressure spike and did I think about drawing an air sample, at this point or what?
22 What things entered your a what sort of things did you have on your mind at poin*. of time regarding that?
251 i
I
                     .I                                                                                 75-7 t-4 E-              ,

                         .I 41 1             I. - di dn' t. I. totally-thought that.it'was just an electrical problem.
                   '2
                   -3                 0; K. .
4 Y                  5             I didn't even pursue it any.' further than that.
6
_7               ' O. K.
;       g             8                                                                                                        4
                    'g                I'- I.just~didn't.
10 i
n                   0. K. Lets. assume that you had thought of drawing a sample, would it have
: i.                g                   been practical to have drawn a sample?
13 p                   No. Because at that point, I had learned - and I'm not sure if it was 15
* I'      *    #*   '# - **    "    "    ' ' ~     * ***    *     **'      "'"
16                  Physics' technician had said that we had had water blowing from the Reactor Building containment monitor.
77 18 g
That was very early on in the morning though.             That was four or five o' clock apparently.         Say five a.m. in the morning, wasn't it?
21 I'm not sure.of the exact time of that.             But that stuck in my mind - like
                                     .now that your asking it - alright.         But at that time, I 'didn't even consider 43 sampling.        But just looking back on it, I did recall that they 'did report that it was blowing:1 cme water and we knew that the building was hotter
               '25 4
j                                                                                    75-8
  ..--__-L._.__..-L.

     . . ,       n.                                       -.. - . . -         - - - -.         .-     .
u Lar2-19
                                    -Did you conclude on March 28th that the pressure spike 1
2      was real? ~
3             .A       I did not.
l 4'              O      For whatever reason?
t L     '.-       5               A      I thought that it was a' f alse indication. I could
       !                 not conceive how the building of over- 2 Million cubic feet.
l        6, 7       could pressurize that rapidly, and then be . depressurized that -
8'    -rapidly.        I had 'not ' conceived of that before.
O d        9                    . BY MR.' CRAIG:
* I.
6       10             'O       o. the day of the accident, did you -- are you aware E
        $       11       of anyone else who nonitored any parameters such as containment a
(T     12       'tempe ratures , reactor coolant pump, air inlet temoeratures ,
3 13       steam generator pressures, durine or following the spike,                  .
8:
l$. 14       pressure spike of 28 pounds?
ju   15               A      We had various operators monitoring all portiens of g
16        the plant, but I was not specifically aware that we were monitor-d t.i c:
17       ing them at particular times or noted any changes at that                     ,
f18 g
particular time because of the spike.
19    ,
O       And specifically with respect to containment building 20 l temperatures?
21               A      no, l
22  l            0      Did you or anyone else, to your knowJ edge, monitor
                -23 lj the alarm printer during or after the spike on the day of the 24faccident?'
3 25.{            A       I don't remember if anyone was monitorine the alsrm s
{I                          ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
76-1

8 L               1.                                    .
i                            CHWASTYK:       I' don't'really remember. It may have been.
L               2.
HUNTER: Was the spray valve being used as a flow path? -
l-         ,
4
             ~
CHWASTYK:       No.
6                                                     ,
i                                            l y
HUNTER:       You were going to say something I didn't mean to cut you off.
8 These flow paths then being into the reactor coolant drain tank and then                     ;
9 out the flooded tank and out the tank at the time of the reactor building 10 sump and the water -then was standing in the reactor building.            Okay?
11 12l            CHWASTYK:        Yes.
13 14               HUNTER:      Shortly thereafter, there was a reactor building pressure spike 15             and as I understand you had the panel at that time.
                                                                                             ~
16 17             CHWASTYK:       Yes, I did.
18i 19             HUNTER:      Were you aware of that spike at that time?                                   !
20 21             CHWASTYK: -Yes, I was.
22 23              HUNTERi Can you describe your reaction, your feelings what you thought 24             it was at that time.?
25 77-1 4
     --c               -                   -    . ,            ., --                    ,e     -

9 l!
Mf reactions, I actually saw the recorder, the pressure gfWASTYX:
 *2.
recorder on the building, spike upward. I didn't know what caused it but 3
the fact that the spray valves started indicated to me that we actually 4-                                                                     ~
had some kind of pressure spike, either on the sensors on in the building itself. I was not sure. The spike of course started all the building 6
spray pumps, decay heat pumps, etc.        The pressure spiked up and it was 7
only up very briefly, as a matter of fact, a couple of heart beats.         I O
know because I missed those heart beats.        It came right back down again.
9 I still did not know what caused it so I sort of hesitated on securing 10 all the equipment that started until I thought I had a better feel for 11 what was going on. Of course, I never did because the pressure came 12 down and stayed down, and then I ordered them the building spray pumps 13            a$dtheDHV8sandeverythingclosed.              Stopped.
14 15            HUNTER:     What was the -- the pressure came back to what level Joe?
16 17    .
CHWASTYK:     It came back to somewhere around zero where I am not sure.
18'           It came back to just about where it started from as a matter of fact,'I 19            remember that.
20t i
21            HUNTER:     Okay, we. . . it looks like the system had run about four or five 22            minutes when it was finally secured.        Would you consider that amount of 23            time, the time it took you to avaluate the situation and see what was 24            going on?
25 l
l l
77-2

10 CHWASTYK: .Well, no that is -- I saw what was going on. 'I did not know
    '2L why. ~That is why I hesitated on shutting the emergency equipment off.
3-l 14 HUNTER:   Okay.
5 CHWASTYK:   Until I could be absolutely sure that I did not need it.
7 8
HUNTER;_ When you shut the containment spray pumps off, you had gone up to the 30 lb. trip point or 28 lbs.                                  .-
10 CHWASTYK:    Yes.
12 13            HONTER:   You had gone back to two lbs. or close to where it was when yet 14            started. You ended up shutting that system off. Can you describe that   l l                                                                                       l 15i           process for shutting that system down, reset,'and the position of the         l
                                                                         ^
16'           pumps and the valves?
17 18           CHWASTYK:   Okay, in this case, after I had come to the conclusion that I 19           did not need the emergency equipment I had asked the, I believe it was 20"          Chuck Adams, the shift foreman, who was in the back of the panel, I 21           asked him to shut the DHV8s.      About- that time Bryan Miller another shift
: 22.           supervisor came over to the panel and asked why the building spray pumps 23           were running. I. told them to shut 'em down by going full lock because 24            of course at that time I decided that we did not really need them.      And 25 I
i I                                                                         77-3

       ,l              4 11
        ~
essentially; ve'did'not reset the high pressure injection. We went-to 2:
the whole lock positio'n'on all the emergency valves. .Now when the man'                   ;
:3                         -
was going to'close 'DHV8s of course we'stil'1'had the -- but I am not sure
                   -of this...I think one of the CR0s reset the' high pressure...the building...
                  ' channels for reactor building pressure.
:6
      '7 HUNTER:        ' If you!did not reset those, th'a 108 valves 'would come back cpen I
8 as soon' as you;1st go of the. switch.                                                     !
9 10 CHWASTYK:           That is' right and I think after we tried to close the 8s the' U              started to go back open and that is when I had to zero... reset them.
12                                                                        -
13            Hi}NTER:         And the containment spray pumps were in full lock?
14 15             CHWASTYK:- Right.            We put those direc-ly in full lock so that we did not 16             have any problem.
17
    '18           -HUNTER:          Joe, did you take them back out of full lock as soon as everything 19            was reset?
20 21            CHWASTYK:            After everything was reset yes I did take them out of full           >
22             lock. I remember taking' all the equipment out of full. lock just in case -               !
23             someth'ng  i        else did happen and we would have it in standby.
24 25-t I
l                                                                                    77-4
                  =      - - -                   . _ . .  .
                                                                 ~             .--

t                      .
9 L,                             -. HUNTER: - Do you..have any-feel for that; the time frame?.                                 l 2 ',
                      ~
  . t- <
                  ;       't     CHWASTYK: Oh, I have no ' idea. -It was...there was a. lot of things
                                                                  ~
                               . happening.. I remember it was just'an' ch-by-the-way type thing.
How,.         l
: exactly how long -after the spike I don't know.
6                                        ,
7 HUNTER:   'O .you -- w'ho turned off the containment-spray pumps? Speci-8 fically..                                                                                 1 9
yn 10         ,-
CHWASTYK:    Bryan Miwl                                                    T 11                                       ,.                                                               ,
l                                                                  l 12             HUNTER:    Bryan +H ; 1 w, okay. All right, at that time as far as the 13             ciuse'was strictly a channel or pressure spike in the containment but 14             ycu did not have any feeling for wnat would cause that k'ind of problem?
15 15           CHWASTYK:    No, I did not.
17
                  '18            HUNTER: We have indications that some electrical buses tripped and that                   t 19           same time, during that the same time frame possibly do you recall that 20f      '' event?
21 22           CHWASTYK:    Y's.
e   I-recall something ab:ut it but I'think at the time I 23          -just dismissed it as having anything to do with the reactor building.
24 25 i
                               ,                                                                          77-5.

:9Q r              t i                           l 1                  ..
                       ~'
l:                                      HUNTER: . Okay,' I jdst wanted to'make sure that we clarify that. You sat 2
                                      , there 'at low pressure.;for a period of time ~ okay, en the . ore flood
                   '3                                            '
utanks, and you had the console?                                                     ,
                  -4 5
_ egyg37fg     .y,,,
g                                                                                                    l HUNTER: And you-were. receiving your orders from who at that time?
28
:9                    CHWASTYK:     For any changes I had to go through Gary Miller who was 10              -
                                       -essentially the man in charge of the control room.
11 12'                                                                                                      '
HUNTER:   How did Mike Ross fit in at that time?
                                         ~
13                                                                                                       .
14                     CHWASTYK:     Mike Ross apparently had been called in because Jim Floyd, 15                     our norma 1 ' Unit 2 shift supervisor operations, was down in Lynchburg, VA 16                   -at' simulator training, and Mike had been called in. Apparently Mike and 17                     Gary... Gary was running this, was totally in charge of it but Mike had
                '18                     been running the control room, and, I guess I am not sure because I 13                     wasn.'t there, was giving suggestions to Gary on what should be done.             !
20 21                     HUNTER: Was Gary'giving you the instructions and then you were instruct-22                    .ing the_ changes in the control room?
23 24                                                                                                       I 25 j                                                                               77-6

f:
g-                                              14.
1;                                       <
At this
;        l CHWASTYK:- Well, yes. _Any changes t.'.at would come up, now.
2L      a time we were still just maintaining this flow rate threugh the vessel, 3                                         .
the core' flood tanks,. floating on the vessel.
p    '4 HUNTER:         Okay Joe, did you recall any. specific instructions for main-k.aining a certain level high pressure injection flow?
7 CHWASTYKi, 'Yes, I think 80 gallons a minute seems to be whatever I remember.
10 U              HUNTER:        Eighty gallons a minute? Total or ---
12 13                             If I- rememcar correctly it was eighty gallons a minute.
                                                                                         ~
CHWASTYK:
14            Maintain 80 gallons a minute flow thr: ugh the vessel.             I don't think it 15            was any further instructions than that.
16 17            HUNTER:        Again you had the makeup panel.         I want to make sure that that S.8           was your particular position; ic 20             CHWASTYK:       Yes.
21:
22             HUNTER:        Again, we are talking in the time frame when we were down on 23           .the core flood' tanks and they had been depressurized.             You were floating e
24            on the core flood tanks and they were there. We can see this is 11: 30 -
     -25 77-7

15
                                                                                      ~
: 1.                              .
12:00 o' clock,1300 right in that ti .e frame. Apparently it went en for
: 2)                quite a while.. .there is a building
* spike by the way. . .and then the time
        ~
frame that the pressure is sitting barely fairly stable. Do you recall 4!'
maintaining that high pressure infection finw rate for a substantial period of time'or at any time during that day did you re,ceive word from 6
somewhere from like Unit l'or Gary Miller er a source to increase high 7
pressure injection flow?
8 9
CHWASTYK:   Well, later on of course, when we went to go solid but that 10 was afterwards somewhere in the neightcrhood of 3 or 4 hours later.
Prior to that I suggested to Gary Mi'.ler that we centinue the high 12 pressure injection but stop venting -brough the pressurizer so we car
      *~
get the heaters on to establish a bubble back in the pressurizer and 1
sometime later Gary came back to me and told me go ahead and do that, to 15' maintain your flew through the vesse'. but stop venting and get the 16 pressurizer, get a bubble back in the pressurizer.
17                                           '
18                  HUNTER:   And at time Joe, you closed which valve?
19:
20                  CHWASTYK: We closed the electrcmagnetic and the isolation valve I 21                  believe.
22 23                  HUNTER:   So you stopped the flow using both valves? Put the heat, did 24,                 you put the heaters on at that time?
25 f                                                                                 77-8

i l                                              16                                                       ,
l l!
             . CHWASTYK:  Yes. I know one thing I don't remember.        The heaters were 2
actuallyenatthattime_It.kinktheywereoff,andweturnedthemon.
3 4
HUNTER: We have a printout on the heater breakers so Tat may be able to e
    ~
putathat together. Okay. So they were either on or you,put them on at 6
:that time?
7 0
CHWASTYK:   That is true.
   .9 10          HUNTER:   Did you in fact verify the pressurizer temperature was increasing?
11 12          CHWASTYK:   Yes, we did.
13 14          HUNTER:   And where would you verify that, wc ld you watch it on the 15          computer or where would you read it?
16 17          CHWASTYK:   I read it on the console tamperature indicator.
18 19-         HUNTER:   Right on the console?                                                              !
20-21    ,     CHWASTYX:   Right.
22 23          HUNTER:   Then there was, do you recall when that particular...when that 24          particular change in velocity occurred generally?          I am trying to get. . .naybe 25          there was an event...?
77-9

1
      ]                                               17 1
1
    ~
       ;        CHWASTYK:    It was not very long af er the spike. Okry and the reason 2*t
  .             was I saw the spike of course and it had correlated with Fred Scheimann, who was the shift Tereman who was on the console at the time, had just a
opened the electr magnetic relief valse and the spike occurred.
5l 5
HUNTER:   Question, Joe. The electromagnetic valve and/or the block
    ,I valve?
8 9
CHWASTYK:    No. The block valve at that time was still open.
30 11            HUNTER:   It had been cpened from early this morning so you fellcws were, 12'           in fact, using the electromatic valve itself?
13 14    !       CHWASTYK:    Yes.
I 15!
I 16            HUNTER:   So it corresponded with that particular activity?
17 18 CHWASTYK:    That is right, it correspenced with that particular activity 19            and it was some time after the event...someone mentioned that they had 20            heard a loud noise.
2 '.
22            HUNTER:   Did you hear the noise?
23 24 25 )
l l                                                                                  .
       !                                                                        77-10

                                                                                                                           .-n-            .. .
3 j
: i.   .l t-1 M                                                      c,     .
b          ' .1!P                           .-            -   .      o               -            - .         .
CHWASTYKi L Nc/ I did not' hear the' noise.            But that was'the point at~
p- ,
l j]   t
                        ~
f which Ilhad 'assuaed- that we.'did,have some: kind of, explosion in the' e
                ~
_ building.         c.nd that is'when I; suggested to Gary Mille, se no longer                                   a 4,                               x          .
A                  cycle the; electromagnetic relief valve because it had...the explosion...or-
             .c l       .
1                . rapid rising l pressure in the reactor buiM.'nq corresponded to opening 6
:the; electromagnetic relief valve.                                                                          '
j
              '8 ;
                                  .HUNTEP.i L0kay,ldid it cross your mind at that' time' Joe that...that...was
               '9                   fuel' damaged? I ass'ume that during your turnover that you realized'that 10 you: . nd damaged the core to some' degree or did you have any idea?
11
            .-12L                   CHWASTYXi At the time I wasn't aware of how much damage, like tnere was                                         ,
           - 13                     not'a very good turnover.         It was like I said, everybody was pretty busy                                 I 14 (                   and I didn't want to stop anybody from what they'were dcing so I just l     '
15'                      tried to get a feel for what was happening by looking around and asting i            16       ,
the . operators at the panel what they were doir.g. Up until the time or 17                       sometime after the explosion and it dawned on me what it was, I didn't                 _
3 18                      know how much core dah.:1e we had.            Of course, that plus later on when se                           '
19                      did start to draw the bubble in the pressurizer a, about 100 and...as                                         I 20                     the pressurizer level was coming down due to the. increased temperature                                        ,
t21                       in the pressurizer, at about 150 inches I had instructed the control                                            ,
22                   -room operators to open up some of the 15s further, okay so that we...it
         ,     23                      looked like our pressure was dropping so rapidly that essentially I                                            I 24                     thought at the time we were short soma watcr in the reactor coolant
:25 i
e-77-11

          ,                                                                                       ~24 1         or not there' was core damage. . It was' only ' afti.r the explosion that<
  '                                                                                                              l
                ~ 2;      i it ' dawned { on me' that we. did, in ' fact, - have some . core damage in           '
3     Ithere because the Zire water reaction created the hydrogen. .That
                                                                                                                 )
i
:4            is:where I.gotinervous..                                                          1 A
                 ~5,                        Until that time, I did not really knew what the -status i
6          of the plant was.      I only knew what I was told. -But when I put
    . &f-                                                                                                       l
[7                       together the ' explosion Ad. the hydrogan, I knew then. that we had
                 '8'           suffered ~ at ,least some core damage. ; I did not know how to
,   :0
    'd              9          quantify;it simply because,.you know, it could have been a localizeB.            <
Y F
E 10 y explosion, like I mentinned earlier, or. it could have been a mininal!                       )
II           amount ef hydrogen.
la ' 12 '        ..
That was about the time that I understood that we did               .
13 f have core d unge.
                 -I4                        BY MR. MOSELEY:
g 15 j                  Q   Did you conclude this Zire water reaction on March g 16 l28th?
a                  ,
fI7                               A   In my mind, you know, when I put the explosion II
       .:                      together and it was hydrogen, you know, it came from Zire water, E
j                       it was just an assumption I made.
0  So you did conclude that the core        had heated up 20 (-
21-l
                          .,sufficiently to cause the, Zire water reaction.
22        :
A   Yes.
I 23k> -
Q   You reached that conclusion in the afternoon of                   .i 24 tMarch 287
                    ?*
A  Ytt S .
: f.                       ALDERSON REPORTING COMP ANY, INC.
78-1

I 9                                     l 1
1                                                                                  l CHWASTYX:    My reactions, I actually saw the recorder, the pressure         l 1                                                                                  i recorder on the building, spike upward. I d.dn't know what caused it but i
3 the fact that the spray valves started indicated to me that we actually l
4 had rome kind of pressure spike, either on the seniors on in the building
       '     itself. 'I was not sure. The spike of course started all the building 6
spray pumps, decay heat pumps, etc.      The pressure spiked up and it was 7
only up very briefly, as a matter of fact, a couple of heart beats.      I 8
know because I missed those heart beats.      It came right back down again.
I I still did not know what caused it so I sort of hesitated on securing 10
             ,)) the equipwent that started until I thought I had a better feel for 11 what was going on. Of course, I never did because the pressure came 12 down and stayed down, and then I ordered them the building spray pumps 13 and the DHV8s and everything closed.      Stopped.
14 15     SUNTER: What vp the -- the pressure came back to what level Joe?
16 17     CHWASTYK:    It came back to somewhere around zero where I am not ;ure.
18      It came back to just abot!t where it started from as a matter of fact, I 19      remember that.
20 21      HUNTER:    Okay, we...it looks like the system had run about four cr five 22      minutes when it was finally secured. Would you consider that amount of 23'     time, the time it took you to evaluate the situation and see what was 24      gofng on?
25 I
i 4
79-1 i

l                                        12 f
           ;    HUNTER: ' Do you have any feel for that, the time frame?
       .1      CHWASTYX: Oh, I have no idea. It was...there was a lot of things 4      happening. I remember it was just an' ch-by-the-way type thing. How, f      exactly how long after the spike I don't know.
j 6i I
II      HUNTER: Do you -- who turned off the containment spray pumps? Speci-8       fically.
9 10 vW CHWASTYK:   Bryan 4trMer) 11                                  -.
12         HUNTER:   Bryan 4iillar, okay. All right, at that time as far as the 13         cause was strictly a channel or pressure spike in the containment but 14         you did not have any feeling for what would cause that k'ind of problem?            ,
15 16l        CHWASTYF           did not.
17 l
18         HUNTER:   V<! have indications that some electrical buses tripped and that           l l
19         same time, during that the same time frame possibly do you recall that               l l
20         event?                                                                               l 21 22         CHWASTYK:   Yes. I recall something about it but I think at the time I 23         just dismissed it as having anything to do with the reactor building.
24 25 80-1

1 1                                            18 l
l CHWASTYK:   No, I did not hear the noise.      But that was the point at l    2 which I had assumed that we did have some kind o' explosion in the 3                                                                                         l building. And that is when I suggested to Gary Miller we no longer             l 4                                                                                         l cycle the electromagnetic relief valve because it had. . .the explosion. . .or   l c*                                                                                        i rapid rising pressure in the reactor building corresponded to opening            1 the electromagnetic relief"/alve.
7 8
HUNTER:   Okay, did it cross your mind at that time Joe that. . .that. . .was 9
fuel damaged? I assume that during your turnover that you realized tr.at 10 you had damaged the core to some degree or did you have ar.y idea?               l 11!
12   .
CHWAST/X:    At the time I wasn't aware of how much damage, like there was 13        not a very good turnover. It was like I said, every3ody was pretty busy-14        and I didn't want to stop anybody from what they were doing so I just 15[       tried to get a feel for what was happening by looking around and asking 16!        the operators at the panel shat they were doing. Up until the time or i
17         sometime after the explosion and it dawned on me what it was, I didn't 13         know how much core damage we had. Of course, that plus later on when we
          ,                                                                                    l 19        did start to draw the bubble in the pressurizer a about 100 and...as 20         the pressurizer level was coming down due to the increased temperature 21         in the pressurizer, at about 150 inches I had instructed the control 22         room operators to open up some of the 16s further, okay so that we...it       ,
23         looked like our pressurs was dropping so rapidly that essentially I 24         thought at the time we were short some water in the reactor coolant 25 i
j                                                                       81-1

1, .
L                                                        18-
            .-          ,i
       . fl16      ~1"            ?       Co you think you definitely had made this reccamen-i i
2 3 r
datiod to. Gary Miller by. the time we reached . shortly af ter the
                   '3{hydrogendetonation?'
4             A       Yes, I 'had made the recommendation earlier.      I had --
5,       the' recommend < tion to allow me to . fill the system -- at that 6        time I didn' t say to fill the system, to inject and draw a.
7        bubble' in the pressurizer. And I assume that was under 8        advisament of Gary Miller and Jack Herbein, who was at the 1
9        observation center at that time.       It was right after the 10          hydrogen explosion and I mentioned. that I correlated the
                 -11 cpening of the valve with the detonation period . that I again J
12 -
went to Gary Miller and explained what I thought had happened 13 as far as the hydrogen detonation and the simultaneous opening-        ,
14 i
of the valve, and it was shortly af ter that, Gary Miller got 15 l-      back to me and said go ahead and draw the bubble.
1 16 '                  BY 'IR. JOENSTON :
l 17 .
G       Whitt was it that you thought had happened that you 1
18 l       communicated. to Gary?
19 ;                  MR. ALLISON:    I have a line of questions.
20 !'                  MR. JOENSTON:    Okay, I understand.
21 i                  MR. ALLISON , Well, go ahead.
22                    BY MR. JOHNSTON:
23 ;                  Oksy.
4 G                I was just going to ask you, you just stated
  .wa2,o r.
24 , that when yau were aware of the prassure spiked, you went mri, inc.
to 25        Gary and said something to him about wha        you thought it was?
                          .I 82-1

j                                                                     17J  I
          .        l y *.5.:              PORV'in the vent valve.and try to' lower the pressure as much
            ' t.;                                                                             ,
I
            ~2 j as.you can. And a. third one'that can go with'either one, is       l
!             3!        the: max tie HPI flow.                                                I l
I               4            . Did you think at the time that you would have a -better 5       chance of cooling the' core with some combination of those
            -6,          strategies?
l 7             A      Yes, I'did. My initial reaction was of course to 1
let the reactor coolant system fill and that was what I             1 8
9       suggested,.not long after I-took the console and then'getting --
10          it was .some time af ter the hydrogen explosion that I ir:sistec     .
I 11         ~to Gary Miller on what I wanted to do and I requested permissic:     ;
12         to do it.
Remember at this time I could not do'anything-on that
            ' 13 {
14       console without prior approval from Gary Miller, 15            0,      Go what was it that you Wanted toi do then?            U 16            A       I wanted to fill the sys. tem going to at some higher   ;
i l
17        flow rate than we were going whether it was 80 gallons a minute 18        or not, I don't remember. But close up the pressurizer, 19'      continue with the let-down and increase makeup flow, which 20        we did do eventually.
21-           0      So this was your recommendation shortly after you 22       took charge of the control room?
23            A      I think it was shortly after, Let again, thme during 24  ,
that time frame had no meaning because it could have been an ew. m.oonm. inc.
25      hour, it could have been five hours, I don't remember.
I I
83-1

lH                                                                                 10- '
l             ..
I           ' March 28th?.
2         l
                                         'A         I don' t remember specifically, but I'm sure I must have u
3            I. was not ; t.h. ing- to keep ' it a secret or anything.         There ware l
d            all 7.ind offfallow shift' supervisors and people I worked with 5            there, I'm sure I 'must have related it to someone.                   I don't 6             remember specifically.
                    ,7                    Q         It _ doesn' t seem to have been gencrr.1 knowledge or 8             it doesn' t seem. to have been generally appreciated that there
:'               had been a grea't deal of hydrogen in the systen and a -hydrogen
                  - .10 f explosion until Thursday afternoon or even Friday. morning 11  '
among many people here.            Yet you seem to have put this 12                together in your own mind on Wednesday afterncon.
                   .13                     A         There were people in that control room that knew it Id               happened, and I know specifically there was at . east one 15               NRC inspector there.            And I don ' t know who. it was , I don' t 16 remember his name or what he looks like.               But I de know there 17             . was an NRC inspector, because I remember him standing behind 18               Mehler when we' shut down the spray pumps.                                    l
                                                                                                                    )
I' Q         I want to ask you about thst in just a minute, but wha:
                            - lq 20 d              I was trying to ask you is whethar you can shed any light
: 21.              on. why so many people around here didn' t seem to really pu'.
22               all this ' together uz.til Thursday or Thursday .ight or Friday 23              morning?
2d                   ~A'       I am not sure I understand that.      You';'a got to
  .n m ere a m ewra,sne.
25               remember that -- I'm not sure I know what you're getting at.
84-1

y 19 1        ,Should weihave made a press release or something?
E2
                                                                           'Q   No',4I'm reall'y. talking about internally, there are
: 3.     !'-.quite a few people from Met Ed who have told us and other I
~
4         g::oups' in interviews and depositions that they really didn't
                                                           .3        . appreciate the fact that there had been a possible hydrogen 6         explosion until' Thursday or'even in some cases Friday y                                                             -i morning. Yet, you seem to have figured it out fairly 7l 1         .
1
                                                          .a         quickly , 'and you say that there were other people around who 9i probably.did or could have~or might have.                                         .
10                 I' wondered whether you can recall this being discussed 11           *hursday morning or. Wednesday night with other people?
l                                                        12'         .W hether yea knew if this was common knowledge?
13                A    I'm sure that when I was relieved the next morning, . I 14            passed that on, and I'm sure, I know that I must have talked             i 15            to people in the control room.          Who specifica1.Ty, I don't know.
16            Mehler is probably one.          I'm trying to think of who else i
e
                                                       .37            was there.       Kunder -- well, no, I didn't talk to Mr. Runder i
                                                      .33             that day. Mike Ross is a possibility, I guess.
19 j-               A'm fairly certain -- and again, I can't be absolutely certain,.but.I'm fairly certain I reported it to Gary.             I p                                                       20 l
: i.                                                      21            guess my question is, who els4 was supposed to have known?               i 4
22                  O    Well, Gary Miller says he doesn't recall himself i                                                       22            learning or reali::ing that there was a hydrogen explosion 1
24             till Friday morning; that's his best recollection.
I-  OJacerol Reporters, Irw .
                                                      ' 23' '              O    Well, that could very v?ll be t ue.          Again, I can't 4
i 84-2
_ - . - . _ _ . _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . - _                            ~   w      -    * * -

                 ;                                                                          20
                ,i         ..
1                                                                                      l
:        absolutely ---1: Gary said -- I.may not have told hi= what I l             2 il                                                                                   l l
                  !i i
thought'at the time, because I really wasn't certain.
L             3 "l                                                                                  I l                              Q   We can only ask you your best recollection.                       I l             4' A   I can only give you my.best recollecticn.
S Q   I understand.- Let me ask you this:         Was there any --      i 1
6                      .                        .
I strike that.    .Let me start it a different way:       When you 7                             .
saw this and then it together what you thought had happened, a[                                           .
j       that must have been, something that gave you scme cause for i
9''          concern?
10 !
I A   Yes. It scared the hell out of me.
            .Il i l          0   Did you think that this was something that better 17 '
I      ought not to be generally broadcast around the certrol room 13 and outside?- Was.there any reason to keep this fairly close            ,
14 i      among the people who were there in light of the fact that i' l
15 -
was fairly alarming?
g         A   I'll say this:        I didn't go out in the control room and 17 broadcast it, no.        It did scare me, therefore, I'= sure I 18 didn' t just make it general knowledge to everybody in that 3
:i. control room.
I'm sure I did pick out specific
* ndivid uals 20 i!
that, my counterpart types of people, and talked to them abou           ;
f
<                           it.
22 Q   You said you think that you probably discussed it 23 i j    with Brian Mehler, and your best recollection is that you 24
  >r.em, nexnm, ine.}y discussed it with Gary Miller.              Do you have a pretty specific 25 h
                        !i   recollection of who else you cay have actually discussed it j                                                              84-3

11' I          at the. spray pump, he probably looked at the pressure indications
           .2           ,1 ,o ,.        I don't really= remember.
            'I BY'MR. GAMBLE.                                                               '
4 Q'  o  What about Mr. Miller, was he-already aware before' J
you discussed it with' him that there had been a pressure spike?-
f'-
                                    'A      I don ' t know that . To the best of my recollection, I I;       7 think I asked someone to tell him that we had just had something 8l happen in the building that caused a pressure' spike'.                  I don't d             l d        9 remember who that was, and what they did, if they actually told
           -10 g                 ~ Gary.
j9      11 MR. MOSELEY:
f      12 Q     'When you talked to him, he was already aware that the 5
     -      13 R''                pressure spike had already occurred?
IC      14 A
I assume he was , but again I make that assumption                         t 15 u                 because I did ask someone, I don't know who it was, to tell him                                -
what had happened here, and "I am not sure what the hell'                            O M      17 g                 2.>...
g                              Q      He was back in the shift supervisor's office at the 19 I                 time, as far as you know?
20 A      Yes.
21 BY MR. CRAIG:
22 Q      Did you, or are you aware of anyone else on the 3-28-79 23-monitoring.any parameters suct ai;- containment temperatures, 24
                     . reactet ;oolant pump inlet temperatures, or steam generator 25j i pressures during or following the spike?
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
85-1

        ' :                                          I   { \                       p m                                               - ,       ,
'g   ,                                ,
i    'O o.
33 e'
1                                ,
or wa's' it ~ throughout: the whole buildinr.
                'I                        -
You know,~I ha'd no             '
                                                                                                                                         ~
l
                '2-             means of_ knowing those things.                                                                             '
                ;3 Q 3 ' Oni 3/28 or- even .3/2 9 'was the possibilit'y of containment 4           fintegrity ever being breechad' aver discusced?                                                     ,       '!
3                             I am not sure " discussed" would be the proper word'.
                                                              ~
A'
:.1 C
os ll                          You know, it entered my mind that it may have been breechod.                                   As L
7            a matter of fact, the pressure dropping, you 'know, as fast as 8           it did, -one of the things' that came through try mind was that.
A f9                        possibly it- did.have some kind of pressure increase in the
          ,      10             building, .and I think I' mentioned this earlier, a steam leak,                                           q 11             and simultaneously containment was breeched and we are therefere
[s 12                    relieving'the pressure.                     You knou, we checked everything we 13             possibly could and found that.wasn't the case.
I4                              MR. MOSELEY :          What specifically did you check and whom 15           did you ask to check this?
d       I6 THE WITNESS:           Well, things like the steam Zenerat:r d                  I 17              pressures, the containtent isolation, you know, the valves to i
18
          .                      ensure that the valves were closed, that were supposed to be                                               '
I g                     closed were closed,                  I think, and I don'c really remember, you                             I E            know, I'can't say, and this doesn't stand out in my mind, but I II think'I had someone get the procedure for loss of coolant which 22           describes containment isolation.and verify that, you know, what You know,
                                    ~
was supposed to be isolated was in ft:t isolated.
24       i
                        . J reactor coolant pressure, of' course.                                There were a number cf
  '                  25
                              . . things ' that we did check j ust to verify the Sct that we did still i
l                                                                              .
i                                 ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
86-1

    ,.y t          -
                               '                                              g s
34 1        have containment, and not only to verify that we did still have 2        containment but. also to try to determine what caused it , you know, 3
did'we have either a less of coolant or a steam leak or somethinz 4       that caused pressure io go up and simultaneously lost centainment.
  ,         g n
5       We checked everything 5.t could and didn't find anything.
9 j          6!                  MR. MOSELEY:
                                                                      ~
Did you spe:ifically ask for the radiation R
            $         7       monitoring people to make a quick survey around the building to j 3l see                if there was activity leading out?
O 2
9l                  THE WITNESS:       I remember directing someon;2 to .:ake z
o y       10         an inspection of the centainment.           I think it was an Opera:cr z
i
          %                i j        ll         type person. It w a s r. ' a health, physics or radiati:n centrol I
12          person,,and it was probably a shift foreman, a senior C?0, cr i.
:                i 5        13 -I      something of that nat ure , because 3su must understand hcw,          ,,'u j
14 I know t
I the chain of ccmmand there is.          Essentially the shift w
j:      15 I
foreman directs the cperators , the control room operstars primari~: ;
y       16 : and the control rcom :perators direct the auxiliary operat:rs
          ^               i I7 U
w                   who werk out in the -:lant.
5
{       18 I asked and directed someone to make an inspection.            '! w .
E g       I9 l I don't remember who , you know.                 It was just a possibility that n                                                     ,
20          came into my mind, you know, that something in containment or 21 some part of the structure itself had possibly broken or fell 12          apart. I didn't really believe it but I thought it was.scmething 23l that I had to check anyway.
i 24h                     MR. MOSLLEY:       Did you discus.1 with Miller, Kunder, P. css a
25 f or others that you were having these checks made?
f.
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
86-2

v             Il          i-                                                                              3C Maybe the problem' with the questfon is 1
1-                         MR. McBRIDE:                                                                 i 1
               '2' :could you. explain whoLyou mean'the others tofbe?                                                     I l              :3                           'THE WITNESS:         Let me'say, normally I w'ould ,s part 4
of the report, you know, to the chain, in other words , Gary          .
          .       5           Miller, I would not only explain what had' happened but what : am i
: j. 6                'doing about it.          Whether I did'that in this case or not,'I den't 7           reme mb er.
X j-      8-                       - MR. MCSELEY :        What abciut to Ross or Kunder'and maybe                 I d
df -9                Cewe?   Zewe was the ncminal shif              supervisor at that time, right?
I
          @      10                           THE WITNESS:        It is possible,'but I really can't E
I j '11        l remember.               Again, ycu knew, the way 1 work I would : ha /e 'unce r s            i 12    I j                    normal conditions, and whether or no: I did in this case !
          =            ..                                                                                                .
          !-     13    !-just can'               re membe r .                                                            l
[ 14                              'M R . MOSELEY :     You just don't recall.
n 2
a 15                           THE WITNESS:        :
* ust don't recall.       -
1 g     16                           '':
voerLEv:     Oc you recall 'Jhether you discussa"       '
                                                                                                            --a S
l                                                                                             o d     17 : results of these checks, some statement o: con: rmati:n :ha:
a z             i 5     18 ' everything is ekty, we have checked the containment and it is c
h j       19 i still good?
20                           THE WITNESS:        Again, no, I don't recall, but, a:ain, i
21 l knowing the way I opera:e , I assume I would have.                        I don'     reca'_1 22            that I did.
23,!                          BY MR. CRAIG:
1
]                 24l                Q         Do you remember how long-it took before         you g:: a
                       .i A'             25 irepor- back.on that check of the containment?
i l
I                            ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC.
86-3

                                                                                    ,-.               ,                               ~
                                                                             .,~-..
      .D .                   ,
5, Q        i                        ,
4                                      ,
36!
o 21                 A'     LIdon.'t.knowthat I everl got, the report back on that
                               .d 2        [outside, you know, check of the containment.                       I guess I: don't-
                     ,3             . remember.becauseIthinkbyIhetimetheycouldmakeanykind.of-4        Linspection I1had''come up 'wi-h the ' idea , and quote if , you will, .
                *.         5 of the.hydrog'en' explosion. lAnd I think after that.I'just. sort
             .]
            -[             6 l of forgor'about the containment check.
1
                $          7                         BY MR.'HOEFLING:,
g
: j.          8                :q-    .. J oe , : le t me go back to something we have already talked a
9-5;.
about. This is the instruction not to' start electrical equioment
* C        10
              -j that: we talked about earlier.              What'you b'asica'.ly.said was'that II the' instruction was given en March 28th by Miller not'to start-
:D                    i
      .        .:     - 12 '' anf electrical equipment in the containment.
,.             E                                                                                                                         ;
'              ~
j        13                         - Now, we-have talked'to Brian M$hler on.this~same A
k I4 subject, about the instruction and when it was'given.                                            This is n
                    ' IU             how that spun out.             On October lith , '79 Br.an testified :n -his l
            - a[ .16 ; subject and he said basically what you have said that he' recalled as                 .
s        I7
            ;d                   :
the instruction having been given by Miller on the 28th.                            After 18 l that he had some doubts, reconsideration , what have-you, and he l
i-to '
later testified that he wasn't sure when the instruction was E
n 20 l given.              He sasn't.sure if it was given-on the 28th or the 29th.
L                      21 -
He still recalls such an instruction being given, but ne didn't 22 L                                   know.~when it had been.given.
23
                                ,                   We talked to Brian about this yesterday and asked him                                f what prcepted him to think about thir and begin to doubt the 1-
                     'Dltime.  ?'
He indicated that'he had some conversations.                      Specif1: ally           -
l i
:                               ' ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC.
86-4                   1
                                                        -    -             . -          - . . _ . .           ~. . _           _ _ . . .

    ;l; i
                     .u
                                              .+
gg y           . HUNTER:    After the K-3 relay .was jumpered the pump started without..
  . .[
3             MEHLER:    We; bumped the pump, yes.
4 3             HUNTER:    Okay. .Let's move on.a little'further in the cay.
6      .
7            .MEHLER:   I didn't realize it was that early in the morning we bumped it.
8 g                     .
10 HUNTER:   Yeah,' it may be - . . . it's a little suprising. I have two 3               sheets and the two sht :s taka us from the four o' clock trip out to g             . where we're going out to 16 hour ... the point where you get the pumo g               back on'and then we consider in our investigation or in our program as y               being from then on its recovery. ..that you' re stable.        I just use that as a key.
16 MEHLER: Okay.
13 HUNTER:     Okay.        There was a discussion about -- in the afternoon approximately 1:50 or so -- there was a spike in the containment to a high pressure.
21.
    . 22' MEHLER:     The spike in the containment occurred about l'0 of.2.                                Some-23 where around 10 of 2 or 2:00, 24, 2Sj l
i 87-1
                                         .                                           . , . - , _ _ . . . , _ ~ . .

,                                                        30 1          , HUNTER:    Were you in the area when that occurred?
2.
i    3            MEHLER:    When that occurred I was in the shift supervisor's office.
f    4           What alerted me to it is I notiNd the CR0s moving over towards the 4    5            makeup pumps and, starting to secure them, and that indicated that we 6
had probably another ES. And there's two conditions that could have 7            caused it. Either low pressure, which we were already at, or a high 8            reactor building pressure of four pounds.                                             l 9                                                                                                  l 10 HUNTER:    Okay, Brian, did you' r.otice that the containment spray pumps             l 1
g             were on at that time?
u MEHL!st:    Yes I did, I walked out and I went to the left side of the g
g              console where the building spray pumps are.       Previous to.that I glanced
   .di,i over the RP pressure indication and it was reading roughly in the neighborhood of one to two pounds.      At that particular p'oint I looked I         at the spray pump and they were running and I didn't know why, bec'ause              '
they should start at 30 pounds. So we secured the spray pumps because there was no need to put the sodium hydroxide into the containment                    l 19                                                                                                   l all over the equipment.                                                               l 20                                                                                                  ;
21 4 HUNTER:    Okay, Brian. Did you have the wtde range pressure trench                 l recorder available to you for reactor pressure?
23 24 25 1
l 1
87-2 l

                                                                                              . ~ ..
31
: 1.      MEHLER:     O'h yes.
l          I l        t!
3       HUNTER:    Did you look at'that?                                                    ,
l 5
MEHLER:     Yes, after we-secured the spray pumps I went back and checked 6
the recorders.        And definitely there was a spike aligned' straight up.
y        It went up to approximately 32 to 33 pounds and it came down in the                 l 8
sam line.
9 g          HUNTER:     What' did this mean to you? Did it mean anything at that 1
time?
u        .
I l
12 l
MEHLER:      First thought in my mind tnat someone was. screwing with the i
transmittar.
15 l
HUNTER:      Do you know what activity the shift was involved in at the time that today ignition or explosion occurt+d?
18 MEHLER:      I didn't how at that particular moment what activities were involved. Later on I found out.
20 21 HUNTER:      Okay.        And what did you find out latar?
22 23 MEHLER:      Well, later the only activity that could have caused the 24 explosion was some kind of spark because they opened the block valve --
25 I
n j                                                                         87-3 i

c                           .
I                                                         u o __.       !
fj          Ij                no, no it'was not the block ;alve.''It was'the vent valve from the o              i 2j              ' pressurizar to relieve some water. And that was the only thing that I                                                                      *
             '3               'could'have given us detonation of the hydrogen.
41 5
HUNTER:      Were they using the vent valve and the block valve on the pressurizer? At different times?
6i 7
8 MEHLER:      At dif' forent times,' yes.                                             .
9 HUNTER:      What's the difference between using a vent valve and a block-10 valve for that activity? Is is a smaller line?
4 12.
MEHLER:      Maybe I screwed up.
14
                 !               HUNTER:     Is it a smaller line?
15!
l 16 MEHLER:      The vent valve is 137 and that is sme'ler.       I could be wrong in that, it might have been the bioch.        But I know it was one or the othat that they did open at that specific moment when...
19 20
                                .H.UNTER_:   Does the vent valve or block valve are those -- 1. At a limitorque tyi.e motor on id        Is that electrical motor drive, that 22 type of a motor?
2a 25j r
r                                                                                    87-4 ll

                                                            ~33 i              MEHbRi Yes. ' An electromatic has a pilot valve on top of it, which h:
causes that to open. The pilot valve actuates first.
3 l      4              HUNTER: Okay. There was some discussion that the ventilation reactor 5              building, refueling building and auxiliary bu'ilding ventilation was 6              restarted at nine.o' clock.   ,
Do you recall any discussion about that?.
1
      .y                                                                                             1 g              MEHLER:    I don't know when it was restarted.      I do know it was running g              later. in the day. I do remember seeing the control switches taped to 10 the "on" position.
1 u                                                                                              I y               HUNTER:     Okay. You don't know when it was turned off or when it was       ;
g               started?
14' 3
MEHLER:      It would have automatically tripped on the high radiation levels.
17 HUNTER:      Okay. Which high radiation levels automatically trip it?
19 i          MEHLER:      Both the reactor buildings. I as sorry, not the reactor building.      Fuel handling buildings, aux building, and probably it would have also tripped on the stack monitor, probably.
23 HUNTER:      To restart that do you have to reset the actual radiation 24 monitor?
25-1 i
87-5 5

14
$2 1
Q      Which meant that there had          f been a pressure signal 2        that went through and started the building spray pumps?
ge 3            -A       Right.-            i t) 4                     Then I think in your I & E interview you said later Q
l 5;       you told Gary Miller -
6            .A.      No,-I don't believe I did say that.                   I'did say that
           ;7         I told an NRC man standing right,along' side of me and I a       pointed out the pressure spike to him and. told him that it a       happened and why the building spray pumps came on because ha 10        wanted to know.
1.1             Now you're going to ask me his name.                                                     ,
12              Q      No, I'm not interested in that strangely enough.
13              A      Well, I don't know it.
14                     MR. M.1ISON:         Give me just a second to look at my 15 , notes.
is                     (Discussion off the record.)
17                    BY MR. AIaISON:
Is i           Q      Now, after looking at'it in that initial dismissal, 19       did you later rea.i.ize that there had been pressure in the 20,       containment that caused that spike on the instrument 7                                        a 21            .A      Yes.
           -22    .         Q      Do you have any idea what could cause that kind of l
23'  l'arapidpressurespike?
i 24    i        A       I know Joe and I talked about it later en that day, ss ' about what could have caused it and I don't think hyd:cgen                                          1 h                                                                                                 1
                                              <Acc* 9edesc{ c$c:cste:.1, $nc ame NO47W Capt?OJ. STMEET WA G Mf MSTS M. S.C. 390(e sms m.am                           88-1
                                         ,_        -        .                    _        _. ~        ,_.         --

Inw 13                   entered 1into it. Wo thought maybe some kind of chemical 2
reaction cr.something: happened because it was up and'down so 3'      quick.
d
                                 . Q.     -That'is Joe Chwastyk?
5 A      Yes, l '~
6~
Q      So you really didn't have a good diagnosis?
7 A      I personally didn't think hydrogen could form that
                    's       quick in the building to that concentration to cause it in 8
that period of time.
10 0      Did you connect the spike with the fact that it 11 just' happened after the.vant valve had been opened?
12              A      No,.later on,.yes. .Two days later when everyone 13       became concerned, yes.
14              Q      But not on the 28th?
G h                       A      We were told, scmeone mt,st have connected it, because we were told not to start any pumps, not to do anythins
                          !  that could give an ignition.
Q      Were you told that on the 28th?
A      Yes, in a supervisor's office.                  I forget who told i
us that, so it was someone who was hoed in on something.
Q ,
It sounded like somebody made e connection with 22     ,
hydrogan'?
                  '23              A      Who, I i.on't know.              I would have to make an assump-1 24 , .                                                                                      'I tion and I don't want to do that.
25              Q      Did you make any recommendatior.4 to Gary Miller - -
i i                        caceBedesai cReputau. Dne
:                                  - ... omos .,mr
;.                                                              w ...uovea, o.e. se 88-2
                         .i                                          is.c so a=
1     --.                         .   .               .       -

15 nw 13l
             '    . entered,into it..       We thought maybe'some kind'of chemical
            '2-     reaction or something happened because it was up and;down so 3
quick.
4                       That is Joe Chwastyk?
Q
:            5               g      .y,,,
            .6                Q      So you really didn't have a good diagnosis?
7'              A      I personally didn't think hydrogen could form that a        quick in the building to that' concentration to cause it in                               ,
                                                                                                               -l 8       that period of. time.                                                                     l 10 Q      Did you connect the spike with the fact that it 11        just happened after the vent valve had been opened?
12               A      No,'later on, yes.          Two days later when everyone 13        became concerned, yes.
14               Q     .But not on the 28th?
15              A      We were told, sonsone must have connected it, 16  ' because we were told not to start any pumps, not to do anything 17        that could give an ignition.
18               Q      Were you told that on the 28th?
19             A       Yes, in a supervisor's office.               I forge-  .'ho told           ,
20        us' that, so it was someone who was honed in on                  oi. . .ing .
21               C      It sounded like somebcdy made a connection with 22   ;
hydrogen?
I 23 :            A'     Who, I don't know.          I would have to maka an assump-l 24         tion and I don't want to do that.
,              2s ;            Q      Did you make .any recemmendations to Gary Mi:1.e:               -
i t                                              cAc:. 9ede:aI cReposteu, Onc
                                                   - ad.a mostw CAPtTCt. STREET w .. m aron o.c.         .       89-1
                      !                                    .nw w.am                    .

                                                                                                                                   -~.
(.l6 nw-14'       ''
with- regard to that pressure spot ~ either 'immediately af ter it             ..
                        'I happened 5or-later-on on the'28th?'
A-     'No. It's very hard.             I would like to put the time
                       ~#
together, but'I can't.         .I'can't.       I do know sometime after the 8'
pressure spike happened we worn told not to start. equipment 8'
because.they assumed that it could happen again and they.
                                                                                                                                          -l 7
                                   .probably'put it that thers was hydrogen in there, but that was 8
                                   .sometime after 1:50.        Now how far past.that,-I. don't 1ctow.
9:
And I.do not, I said -- well, to Gary Miller 7. said -- he said 10L don't. start any.more oil pumps and I nid we don't have to, I 11 already tested-them all,-because they were concerned -- but he.                                       .
12             far into the afternoon G that time, I don't know whether it 13             was 4:00, 2:00~or w'.at, but i.h was sometime after.
14                 Q       Now basically this was a site involvement in the 15             plant operation when you vent.out to see what happened, was it i
16 ' not?             When the radiation alarms came in, did you become 17             involved in emergency plan business?
18                 A       Basically I became involved in setting up -- I sent 19             somebody downstairs to the control room down there to establish 20              communications and we were making notifications immediately.                                         i l              .
21 '            I went through the procedures to make sure we were doing them
                                                        ~
22 ; all and sometime in that medium -- oh boy, Jim Schielinger
                     -23              showed up and took control of that.                 I then, sometime along the
                                                                                        ~
24 . line that day, we broke vacuum and we were going through the 25        l atmospheries and the State .of Pennsylvania said no and I got cAce. Jede:al cAepo:te:2. $nc.
I                                add MORTM CAPITO4 31 ASET                                                  "
                              .l                                  WASM8MGTON. O.C. 80801
                               ;                                        <sess w.m.                         89-2

a                                               1
: s.                                                                              b A; '
1             Wednesday,or[6Tursday?
2',                    Mr. Mell. 'I'cameito the plant.about'6 o' clock   L     Wednesday,
                                                              . .            c         .
3          -and:I worked through until!the'following morning,.until 7 or C l-
                                  ~;
4 1-
                                     '' o' clock in the morning.-
1
                                     .l -
l
                             '~ 5 L '                  Mr.' Arena.. During that time in tne control room, did things 6 + quiet downl a little in terms of the .nur.ber of L people there and 7 "; all of that during theiduration of the . shift from. that night untC 4                                                                                                                  .I 2                 6    7 the'next morning?
m-y-                9-l                    Mr. Mall.          What do you.mean by quiet down?-
h                10 .',                  Mr.LArena.          The impression.we have gotten is at least, a             m             -
[,               11          .certainly during the afternoon of Wednesday,.there were lots of e5 2.E              12          . people in:the control. room, there were plant people, NRC peoplc,                    1
       , - . 6.                          .
t > r:
D-8          .13       ,l. B&W people - maybe-to back up, when you got to the control room 14              at,6, how many' people were there?
0 c-                       i Mr. Mall.          The control room was full,.but the people were
            .z'h ''h 15'! f l
g;               16 i-- like we.have a roped-off area up there in the front.                                         I e
u 37 1                    Mr. Arena.          The lines 1around the floor?
              '4. -                  :l r,
                            ~ 18-l Mr. Mell.
Most of the people were behind that line to where
            . j.               j9 [ the operator could get up there and operate.                           Our bosses were I
g-             there suggesting.different things, talk.ing to us, allcwing us ze v
21 ff essentially. - I didn' t have any probl em to operate up there.
22 d l.'here were a, lot of people there, but A ven when I got there at a.
23      .h6lo' clock.itwasn'tthatexcitable.- People were quiet and doing 2j ' their, job.
                             '25 :                     Mr. Arena..         But did the control room stay full during the t
7 a.
                                                                                                            . 90 1 am                                                                                    -

15 I
t night?
L                      2-           Mr. Mell.  .I really couldn't'tell you. We were so busy all 1
:3         night. i never kept t;ack.
d            Mr. Arena. During'that night, what do you recall being --
5            Mr. Blush. Before you go on to that night, I have a questic 6      about the 28th. -Was there any discussion when you came on about 7 ' whether or not the core coverage was being maintained?        Were d                    i               .
3-              6    : people concerned as to whether or not the core was covered at vi                 .'
j               9      that point?
h, m
10'N     ;
Mr. Mell. Well, when I first came en, or there shortly m         '        "
       <. Q 11         afterwards, we were worried about getting the reactor coolant a-c$ .12 ' ', pumps. started.
3'                                      Because we were worried about getting them E'R'               A
[c          13 l started, I would say, yes, they were concerned about coverage w
       " !!E C     -
14 , to the core because you start'the reactor coolant pump, you'have C-Y                'l
      'O c         15 1 got water in there.
2L                 0 d           16 .j            Mr. Blush. But I mean, do you remember that being factored a                  h 17 ll into the consideration of starting the reactor coolant pump.
e
       $.          16         that they were not certain that the core was covered?
O                  !:
      .i           19 :             Mr. Mell. Nothing was said to me, if that's what you are ll 20         asking.                    ,
21 'j            Mr. Blush. That's what I am asking.
L
,                  22               Mr. Mell. Although they were concerned about starting the l                         i.
23 [ reactor coolant pump.          To me that would mean they were concerned 24         about getting w ner into the core.
I 25 t         Mr. Arena. And when did they finally get that pump started, n
1 E
                          ;                                                     90-2
                          .i

I'!d2ycu:mnaber?
I' Mr. Mell.                      A time?
3 tir. Arena.                       Yes. About 8 o' clock?
t 4
                    .           Mr. Mall.                      I really couldn't tell you the time frame becaust
                                                                                         ~
l                5 .l that was quite some night.
                     .I 1
                    .I 6             Mr. Blush.                        Early on in the chift?
       .               I 7!             Mr. Me.11.                     Esshy on in the s:        yes.
ti            !
1
         .Z      8             -Mr. Arena.                       Did they try to start more than one and were th W
9 l only able to get one going, do you recall?. Was it a cautionary                             J 5
         @     10 ,      thing of trying to get one going and see if it would be advisabi-m
         $     11 ' to start the others?
et         i                                                                        -
i z[    12              Mr. Mall.                       We started the one. In order to start that, we l
         *A en            i O :
13 ,' had to jump routes and different relays, starting int.erlocks.
WQ                                                      ,
e  ti c ..
14 9
                       - As far as I know, we were going to start another one, but that CE         3.
oi 3r 15 j was cancelled for some reason.
I really couldn't tell you why.
2   -
b     16]! Discussions were going back and forth all night trying to figure 2
e     17        out what would be the *.est way to t'ake care of it.                         I believe
       ).      18 j they were discussing starting the second one.
                                                                                                      ~
O          E j     19 l
* Mr. Arena.                       While you were on shift, did they go ahead and 20'       get any other reactor pumps going?
I 21 _             Mr. Mell.                      Did we start one?
                    <t 22 'j            Mr. Arena.                       You got one started?
t 23 ,[         . Mr. Mell.                      Right.
24              Mr. Arena.                        And subsequent to that one, did you start any 1
25 . others?
v 90-3

, j ..                                                                   . , .
I .' )
Not to myEknowladgo'.
~
                                            'Mr.; Mall.
2              g;,; Arena. : Sack to the evening.                    The control room was ful"
                           .3          about 6.        Did 'it st'ay full unnil the .next morning or did it
                             '4      : thin;out a little bit behind.the'line, people were going home?'
                             .5 -]           Mr. Mall.        I can't tell yeu.
                           -6                Mr. Arena.        Do you remember hearing during that time frar.e 7'       any discussions about the existence or theLpresence of hydrogen cd 2:               8        either in containment or-in the system itself?
m                     1
             $                9lJ           ler. Mall.        Hydrogen itself, no.              That we did have a bubble, 5                     1 8             10.] 'yes, we talked abouu tMat af ter we started the reactor coolant
            .m                     ;
m                     !                 .
                         .11           pump.      The'way the plant was responding it wasn't responding e    m.               .I              ..-
2$            12          normally and one of my co-workers suggested.we had a bubble some-
             *n 2 e                   9 8
           ;[Q N           13 ;' where.
g.c" 14 -I             Mr. Blush.        Who was that?-
0 'O                  ;
             - z-cc 3    -
13 h
Mr. Mell. Ted E113es.             He suggested as soon as we started 2 L d             16          the pump, that reacted sluggishly and there probably was a bubbli 2                                                                                                                 .
0                                                                                                                 -
17 3.somewhere.              He suggested it was in the steam generator, being a e
c             16          higher point.
O.                      i i             19        I       Mr. Arena.        During the evening, do yoy remember anybody                     ;
7c PJ looking at or discussing the reactor building containment pressu                              '
li 21          strip chart?
                        ' 22         !       Mr. Mell'.       That was shown to me when I came in on the afte'r-23        l noon.- The man I relieved showed that to me.
He said today they 24 i both went up and the pumps came on. S'o he said they looked at 25 p it, the pressure went back down, they turned the pumps off.
90-4

5 1       FASANO: What time ~did you actually take over the console?
2 3        ILLJES:    I think the log says, arou'nd 1820, or somewhere in 1800.
5        FASANO:   0. X. So it was close to 6:307 6                -
7        ILLJES:   Right. 6:30 p.m.
8 g       FASANO: You actually started to manipulate approximately 12.5 minutes and 10        when you go back again, when you just got to the control room, how did it yy        appear to you? How were things being conducted?                              ,
12 g         ILLJES:    Well, the shift supervisor was running it. He was at the console 14        and he was directing each and every move of the control . room operator, and 3         that's the way we operated more or less the same way.      Anything that we g         did, any recommendations that we did, went through the shift supervisor.
17 g         FASANO:    This wari Mr. Zewe at the time, when you came in?
19 g         ILLJES: When we came in, I believe Joe Chwastyk had relievad Bill Zewe.
He was directing our operations at the time.
22 F.' S."R . Let's ses. The primary, you were o:: the primary?
24 25 91 -1

6 r       'l      ILLJES: The. primary side. We were taking care of the reactor coolant 2      pumps, pressurizer, make up system. That's the left hand side of the 3      console.
4 5     FASANO: That would be close to the reactor building, wide range-narrow 6
range indication?
7 g      ILLJES:   Correct, correct.
9                                                                                     .
10      FASANO:   Do you recall being briefed on the wide range-narrow range reactor H       building indications?
12 3        ILLJES:   I was told that they ha:: a spike on both indications of the reactor 14 bui ding pressure recorder. There was some discussions as to what it was.
3       A hydrogen explosion was discussed.       This was later on in tne evening.
16 FASANO:    How late in the evening?
77 18 ILLJES:    Oh my.
g
:       20 FASANO: You took the controls at 67 22 ILLJES:    At 6. Well....
23 24 25                                       -
91-2

n      . g.      s                 -                  >+   ..   .                     -.    - ~ . . - . ~ .       . . .
s 7
1      FASAN0i l6:2.0 or so?.
              -2
              ;3      ILLJES: . No, I would- say it was more. .. It was later cause we were...                It 4      was after we drew'a bubble. 0. K. If I want to relate it, I'would say it 5      was after we drew the bubble in the pressurizer which we did after that.
6      As:far as what time that was mentioned, as far as we. discussed it, I~ know 7     ~ it was discussed when we turned over, when we came in, but we didn't make 8     . any bones about it because we were interested in getting flow through the -
g      reactor and the bubble in the pressurizer and so.        They had recovered from 10      the building isolation high pressure injection.        They had recovered from a
n       that situation, and our concern was cooling the reactor and insuring it had y       flow. Later on when we had things stablized, we had a bubble in the pressur-g       izer and had a reactor coolant pump running and that term area,:we were discussing with', I can't remember if it was one of our engineers.            But we 3
did have a pressure spike. We pulled it out and I don't know who wanted a 3
g       copy but we made a couple copies of the chart.
L7 FASANO:    0. K. This was sometime after 67 l
19 ILLJES:   Somewhere.... Hell, I would say it was after 8:00.
21 FASANO:   After 8:00 that night?
23 ILLJES: Yea, I'd say it was if I had to put a' time on it.
25 91-3

e..            .      .            .-                        .                . -
t 4
                                                              .8
!          1     FASANO:      Lat,'s go back a bit.       When you first came in, where. there xerox 2     copies of.that at that time?-
:          3 s                                    .
4     ILLJES:      I don't know.
s 5
6   .FASANO:       You.didn't see any?
r         .7 ILLJES:- I didn't see any.
                                                ~
8 9
10 FASANO:      Discussion was not really centered on that?         ar was it centered on 3      that to any degree that you remember?
u g    .ILLJES:       No, it wasn't centered on that.
14 g       FASANO:      As far as the . . .?
16' g      ILLJES:       It was over.
18 FASANO: Were you there when they were talking about it?
i
      ' 20 l              ILLJES:- Not when I came in.         I was there and I wasn't involved in any l       21 L              discussion until-it was brought up....            Except when it was turned over it was. mentioned that we did have a pressure spike, when we turned over. That 23 was the only' thing that was mentioned, and that they had recovered from 24 reactor building isolation.
25 91-4

9 1     FASANO:' So ,a pressure spike was discussed at the turn over, when you;first'.
2    fcame in, about' 3:45. And'then somewhere'about 8:00 further discussion and 3     also xerox copies?
       .4 l
: l.      '5     ILLJES:    Right.
6 7-FASANO:    And apparently...
e 9
ILLJES: -! think we remembered the xerox machine' wasn't working too good 10 g       FASANO:    At this time you discussed what~and wir.h whom, if you can remember?
12 3        ILLJES:   We talked, I talked.about it with the trainee on our shift, who
_g4       was Chuck Mell.                And the person that asked for the information, and I-don't remember who that was, whether it was an NRC inspector or a B&W representa-3 tive.
6 17
                  ^           "'         ""#     "" "            **         **      * # N '" """ I ***
J18 a real spike or was this discussed as an electrical spurious signal possibly?
20 ILLJES:   This was discussed that evening but we also talked about it several times after that and I cannot separate the two different discussions but as far as I remember we related it to a. cycling of the el'ectromatic relief
               . isolation, whfch is a'DC operated valve I believe and that has a contact in there which will cause~ arcing which possibly could ignite the hydrogen.
91-5

10 1    That was dis. cussed, but I can't say we discussed it that night. We didn't 2    really have that much time to do a lot of di.scussion, but we talked about 3     it and when I valked away from the panel, the guy that wanted the copy, ysu 4     know, he wanted it now, and I had to walk away frem the panel to make sure 5     that the other guy, att shift supervisor, was f.'iere while I walked away 1
6     '0-   '
7 g      FASANO:   On the first evening, can you recall if on thr.t first evening you g     were discussing after 8:00 that it was possibly a hydrogen burn?
10 g        ILLJES:   As far as I know that possibility was discussed that evening.
12 g       FASANO:    With this engineer, you don't know whether he was GPU or NRC or what? Can you recall?
3 15 ILLJES:    No, I won't say. I don't remember. No. We... It was also that 6
night, you know, that we determined that we had a hard bubblo and what that bubble was, you know, we had talked about that too, you know... What f.s the gas and is it hydrogen or other and all that water that went through the reactor and out into the RC drain tank and out into the reactor building.
21 FASANO:     So at that time it appeared to be'still inconclusive within your j         own ...?
l 23 24 25 91-6

REPORTOFINURVIEW Karl E. Plumlee, Radiation Specialist, Radiation Support Section, Fuel l
Facility and Materials Safety Branch. Office of Inspection and Enforcement,
  . Region I, was interviewed telephonically on December 2,1980, by Roger A. Fortune and David H. Gamble of the Office of Inspector and Auditor (OIA). Plumlee indicated that he did not have his notes regarding the TMI accident readily available, therefore, his responses were based entirely upon his-recollection.
Plumlee said he arrived at TMI's North Gate around 10:00 to 10:30 am on March 28,1979, with four other Region I employees: Ronald Nimitz, Charles Gallina, Donald Neely, and James Higgins. He believed it took about a half hour to get in and that by 11:00 am they were certainly in the room adjoining the Unit 1 Control Room (CR). Upon arrival they were infonned by Met Ed that all personnel entering the Unit 2 CR had to wear respirators; because respirators were in short supply, Met Ed asked that only two NRC inspectors go to the Unit 2 CR. Plumlee recalled that Neely and Higgins donned respirators and left for Unit 2 CR. He did not believe there was much delay after their arrival in Unit 1 before they left, so he estimated their departure time at 11:00 am. Plumlee said that Nimitz, Gallina, and he remained at Unit 1.
Plumlee said they established telephone contact from Unit 1 to Region I shortly after arriving. He recalled that about 11:30 George Smith (his branch chief) asked him to survey the radiation levels outside the buildings out of a concern over possible airborne releases. Plumlee said he conducted these surveys with Joe Manosky (a Met Ed plant operator)   .
from about 11:30 until noon. Plumlee said he did not go inside Unit 2 then or anytime that day; he surveyed as close as Unit 2's 'nnennost fence. Plumlee understood that Nimitz and Gallina continued to review      ,
Met-Ed's efforts in the Unit 1 CR during the time he (Plumlee) was surveying.
Plumlee said he returned to Unit 1 shortly after noon. He said that by this time Raymond Smith and another Region I inspector had arrived.
Plumlee said that not long after he returned with his outside surveys, he discussed the condition of the plant with the senior Het Ed manager in Unit 1: Plumlee believed it was James Seelinger. Plumlee said they discussed things such at the plume and whether it com from the plant or the steam dump lines. 91umlee recalled that he informed Seelinger that because the wind was variable, the airborne radiation.probably would get into Unit l's air intake structure. Plumlee said it was only about a half hour later that the Unit 1 CR area became filled with airborne 92-1

4
    -   F
[
7   >
2 b                                    ._
radiation. and' the NRC inspectors were asked to leave because they did                        o F                              not have respirators.         Plumlee.said that he, Nimitz, and (he believed)
[                              Raymond Smith and the. inspector who arrived with Raymond Smith all t oved off the site to a reception center. Plumlee said Gallina remained at i
;                              Unit 1.- Plumles'said'that.he and Nimitz then perfomed (separately) offsite radiation surveys with Met Ed personnel. He believed that he
                              .next returned to the site about 5:00'or 6:00 pm that day, but that
[                              Nimitz'did not return until the following day (March 29,1979).
                                                                                                                               -1 L
Plumiee related that he and the other inspectors were briefed on the
!-                             status of TMI before they left Region I on the morning of March 28,                              +
1979.' Plumlee said that at the briefing heunderstood George Smith to say i
that one of Met Ed's samplings of the reactor contafnment atmosphere i
showed. it~ contained 2.4 percent hydrogen.        Plumlee said that when he
!:                            sought to: confirm this with George Smith after the briefing, George Smith_
I                             said that he (Plumlee) was mistaken and George Smith actually had imparted f
t
                           .that the containment-had 2.2 poundt overpressure. Plumlee indicated-that this' exchange had him thinking about hydrogen'during the day. He
                            'said that based on this concern, during his conversation with Seelinger                            !
(just before being asked to leave Unit- 1 in the early afternoon), he                               .
j                            asked Seelinger if he had any better information about hydrogen content'                          4 in the Unit 2. containment. Plumlee explained by way.of background.that
                           'the only gas analyzer at TMI which could detect hydrogen was in Unit 1;                             r
'                           so samples pulled from Unit 2 were taken to Unit I to be analyzed.
'                           Plumlee recalled that Seelinger had a sequence of numbers representing the percentage of hydrogen in each of the samples tested. He recalled that Seelinger had varying amounts,-with a lower current figure than the one Plumlee thought George Smith mentioned (2.4 percent), but with another figure that was higher than 2.4 percent. ' Plumlee said that Seelinger indicated he had been in contact with a number of people in Unit 2 CR and that some Met Ed personnel had guessed that there might                                '
have been an explosion based upon the reduction in hydrogen levels.
Plumlee understood that'Seelinger received his instructions that day from TMI Station. Manager Gary Miller, but Plumlee did not know whether 4
the conjecture about the hydrogen explosion came from Miller.
Plumlee said his conversation had to have occurred between the times he arrived at Unit 1 (about 11:00 am) and left (about 1:00 pm) on March 28, 1979. He said that based upon surrounding events, he would estimate the                               -
time to have been sometime between 12:00 and 12:30 pm.
'                        Plumlee did not recall anyone being with him when he discussed hydrogen with Seelinger. Plumlee said he did discuss with Gallina what he learned from Seelinger. Plumlee said Gallina was manning the telephone to                                      '
Region 1 at the time and it was just at this time that they were told to leave Unit 1 because of the airborne radiation. Plumlee said that they (he and Gallina) did not report his infomation to Region 1 because they 7
assumed the inspectors in Unit 2 CR (Neely and Higgins)-were providing this information. He said it did not occur to him that the inspectors in Unit 2 CR did not know everything he knew. Plumlee said that in restrospect he has no indications that Neely or Higgins actually knew of the hydrogen content of the containment.
          . . .                                                                                           92-2 e             r                  +                       .+             -- 4

Plumlee related that'two or three days after the accident, he and Gallina discussed.his conversation he had had with~Seelinger. He said that Gallina then indicated that he believed it occurred later in the day on March 29, 1979 (the day after the accident). Plumlee indicated, without i
refuting his recollection of when the conversation had occurred in relation to other events, that the conversation thus could have been either on the 28th or the 29th of March 1979.
Plumlee believed that in general, Unit E management was only following the policies they were expected to follow. He explained that it appeared Met Ed's main interest was to get the plant back on line to start generating electricity. Plumlee felt this influenced much of the underlying logic for the actions cf Met-Ed personnel, and it is something of which they are not now prcud. Phanlee said they followed a strict attitude of
      " mind your own business" vis-a-vis NRC until the problems got big enough that they realized it could not be done. Plumlee expressed the opinion that Met Ed only told NRC what it was bound to tell and that at his level, Met Ed personnel pretty much only provided the information that was asked of them.
     . INVESTIGATORS' NOTE:  During his May 30, 1979, interview by IE (for         l "NUREG-0600"), Plumlee, described a number of details he received during a briefing re TMI about 8:15 a.m. on March 28, 1979. One of the details he recalled receiving was "...the fact that the containment building had the hydrogen present in the atmosphere in a significant quantity. I don't know whether it was 2% or 3%, but it was well above the detection limit. .." (Tr.5 at line 8).
92-3

1 1
l REPORT OF INTERVIEW l
l Karl E. Plumlee, Radiation Specialist, Radiation Support Section, Fuel Facility and Materials Safety Branch, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Region I, was reinterviewed on December 3, 1980, by David H. Gamble of the Office of Inspector and Auditor. Plumlee indicated he had located his notes for March 28, 1979, and was providing OIA with a copy. He said the notes were taken on single sheets of paper which he numbered consecutively at the time. He said he was providing all his notes for the 28th'except one page that only contained motel infonnation.
Plumlee said it was common knowledge, even in Unit i     that the trips associated with the hydrogen explosion had occurred. He said that it was obvious that the only thing that could have caused these trips (e.g., the actuation of the containment sprays) was a pressure increase in the containment. Plumlee said his notes reflect that he was at the North Gate on his way out at 1:30 pm; therefore, he estimated that he was asked to leave Unit 1 sometime around 1:20 pm. Plumlee said that by 1:50 pm he was probably at the observation center.
Plumlee said the first time he heard about the spike was from Gallina.
He believed that Gallina told him about it immediately after he (Plumlee) informed Gallina about his conversation with Seelinger about hydrogen in Unit 2's containment.
Plumlee recalled that Gallina said he received.this information either from the NRC inspectors in Unit 2 or from a Met-Ed person, such as Greg Hitz who was relaying information. Plumlee said that his belief that Gallina already knew of the pressure spike indicates that his (Plumlee's) conversation with Seelinger may have been en March 29, 1979, or even later.
Plumlee then related tL'it the possible reasons Met-Ed and NRC may have had for keeping some avails about the accident from being widely disseminated must be considered. He said that, if it were known that the accident was far beyond anything anticipated and that the fuel had lost much of its cladding, th(y wcaid have run the risk of some Met-Ed employees nalking out, some number of NRC inspectors deciding against going in, and a major problem of frightened citizens jamming the highways leaving the area.
Plumlee recalled what he thought he heard George Smith say during their briefing regarding. hydrogen content of the containment. Plumlee said his guess at the time was that Met-Ed had told NRC (probably Smith or Eldon Brunner -
another Region I branch chief) about the hydrogen and Smith " slipped" when he mentioned hydrogen during his briefing. Plumlee said that it was for this reason that he broached the subject of hydrogen with Seelinger.
93-1

u Interview of Former: Met-Ed Employee   .
James L. Seelinger, Manager, Facilities Advance Planning, Government Products Division, Pratt and Whitney Aircraft Group, United Technologies Corporation, West Palm Beach, Florida, (formerly Unit 1 Superintendent, Three Mile Island Nuclear Station), was interviewed telephonically at his residence on December 23, 1980, by David H. Gamble of the Office of Inspector and Auditor. Also participating in the conference call on
                                  ~
i behalf of Seelinger was Harry H. Voigt, Esq. , of Lebouf. Lamb, Leiby, and bacRae,1333 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C.
Seelinger stated that he knew NRC Inspector Karl.Plumlee and recalled.
Plumlee's presence at TMI on the day of the accident (March 28,1979).
Seelinger said he could not recall any conversation around mid-day with-Plumlee and could not recall discussing hydrogen content in the Unit 2 containment with him anytime that day. Seelinger said the only conversation he remembered having with Plumlee on the day of the a:cident was that night when'they discussed radiation; readings Plumlet had taken from a car off Route 230.
Seelinger was not aware of any analyses completed thst day of the gas content in the Unit 2 containment. He was aware of one unsuccessful attempt to draw a sample in the morning by one of Richard Dubiel's employees. Seelinger said he recalled first hearing o" data or, hydrogen, content in the Unit 2 containment sometime after the day of the accident -
although he was not sure-just when.
(?Y 94-1

                                                                           -7 A
:  Dave Limroth who is'a superintendent I still .am required to support the individual units superintendent,'with the appointment.of technical superin-
        ,3
                         . tendent, it. allowed'me to go through him to assist in priority between the             .
l two units.      Also,'gave us a better direction in trying to support both of
        ,                   them on a' day-to-day operation.         The superintendent technical support.then
                           ' reports directly to the station manager as does the unit superintendent               ]
  .        6                                                                                                       1 from each unit.
7                                                                                                       .
8
                          - DONALDSON: .Then the, your group essentially is somewhat autonomous in that
                           - the line or chain of command goes directly from yourself through one additional
                           - supervisoQirectly-to the station superintendent.
                                    '/.      N                                                                   [
      ' 12.                    .
t DUBitL: That's correct.       Station superintendent, the exact title means         I
      =13                               \
Station'' Manager      / is Gary Miller.
which 14,                              ,
uI i         <
DONALDSON: Under you, would you briefly outline the first line supervisors 16 under your command?
18 DUBIEL: To the. foremen level?
19j                 ,
[
        .20' DONALDSON: That would be two levels, rignt?
        '21 22
                            '00BIEL: That's correct.
23 24-1
,       ' 25}
i l
95-1

4
               ,1
          ;                                                                    8' 4,A               00NALOSON OK,let's'take it down to the foremen level.
I
        '2 DUBIEL: OK.         In the area of health physics I have Tom Mulleavy, reports directly to me as radiation protection supervisor and belos Tom, reporting 4
to Tom there are four radiation protection foremen.              Did you want names, o
Dale?
7 DONALDSON: Why don't you go ahead and fill those in.
9 OUBIEL:~ The four radiation protection foremen are: , Joe Deman, Pete Velez, Bob McCann, and Fred Huwe.            They report directly'to Tom, and are radiation protection foremen.         Alsr reporting to Tom are two radwaste foremen, Jim-
     ' 12 l             Smith, and Leo Hydrick.             Reporting directly me is a health physics engineer, 13                                                                                                      .
Len Landry .who reports to me anc works closely with Tom in handling most of 14 j
:             the project oriented problems, something that Isn't a day-to-day type of a                     ,
15i problem.      Also there is a radweste engineer, Ed Fuhrer, who reports directly 16l j             to me, again working hand in hand with Tom in trying to solve some of the 17 problems associated with radwaste that are a little bit beyond the ability 18 or the scope of the foremen.             In the chemistry area I have four, let me 19l
            ;         ' back up, three chemistry foremen there is no chemistry supervisor in an 20' attempt I have and intended to follow-tnrough on as to structure
* similar to 21 the HP site.         There is no chemistry supervisor so the three chemistry 22 foremen are all on a equal level.             There is a unit 1, and I will refer to 23 it as a Plant Chemist, Gary Reed.             Gary is very knowlegeable chemist in the        !
24 l
area of systems chemistry, demineralization, evaporation, the effects of 25 l
h'                                                                                   95-2                   ;

TMI Tape #302 18 CRAWFORD:    7:10 to 7:15.
i l
ESSI(1: 7:10 ?.o 7:15 and it was apparent then from the calculation anyway whether it was right er wrong at that time you assumed it was right since
     -you couldn't finst any errors in it tnat there was an apparently a dose rate of 40 R per hour in Goldsboro and that was perceived to be confinned by dispatching the onsite teams survey at point GE-8 which is in the general direction.of the predicted value of Goldsboro and then that measurement came back in at 0746 according to your sheet there.
CRAWFORD:    Right and between the time that I told Dick Dubiel and I guess I came back and there was a lot of conversation between Dubiel, myself, and Jim Seelinger mostly between Dubiel and Seelinger that I was kind of standing there listening to you know what reasons there could be that the Dome Monitor was so high thtt this calculation was so high could that in fact be an actual number or could it be a bad number. I don't know how long that conversation went on.                                                          )
ESSIG: Okay. Mike were you involved in any of those conversations between Dubiel and Seelinger? Were you asked for any input on this monitor as to whether or not it was reading?
BENSON:   I don't correctly remember any. I may have to talked with Howard.
I remember talking about the possibility of steam damage to it. I'm not sure if Howard got that from conversation with Dick and Jim or how it come about. I don't remember directly talking to Oubiel.
96-1

l PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION - NOT FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE                                                                     [M6Y            l No: PN-NRC:I-38 Date:                            3/ 28/79 PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION OF EVENT OR UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE This__oreli ninary notification constitute _s_ EARLY notice of events of_
POSSIBLE safety or public interest sionificance. The infonnation
                   ~
oresented is as initially receivec without verification or evaluation and is basically all that _is known ac Qe time of this notification _.            _
IT SHOULD BE SPE_CIFJ,CALLY NOTED THAT THIS NOTIFICATI_0N MAY_ CONTAIN_
TIIEOR'MATICN THAT LATER MAY SE FUERMINED TO BE illACCORATE OR FGNSISTENT.
Facility:     Three Mile Island Unit 2 Middletown, Pennsylvania (Docket No. 50-320)

==Subject:==
NUCLEAR INCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND - UNIT 2 The lican ce notified Region I at approxirately 7:45 AM of an incident at TMI-2 which occurred at approximat.ely 4:00 AM at 935 power when the secondary feed pumps tripped due to a feecwater polishing system problem. This resuited in a turbine trip and subsequent roactor trip on Figh Peactor Conlor.t Pres-sure. A. combination of Feed Pump Operation and Pressurizer Relief - Steam Generator relief volve operation caused an RCS cooldown. At 1600 psig.
Energency Safegudeds Actuation oc::urred. All ECCS components star *.ed and operated properly. Woter level increased in the Pressurizer and Safety Injectio was secured r.anually approximately 5 minutes after actuation.                                                                     It was sub';eq ently resumed. The Peactor Coolant Pumps were secured when low net positiv. suction head limits were approached.
About 7 s AM, high activity was noted in the RCS Coolant Sample wines (opproxinately 600 :nr/br cont &ct readings). A Site 'mergency was then decl6 red.
At approxi :ately 7:30 AM, a General rmergency was declared based on High Radiation levels in the Reactor Building. .At 8:30 AM site boundary radiation levels were reported to not be significant (less than 1 mr/hr). The scurce of activity was stated to be failed fuel as a result of the transient, and due to a known previous prirr.ary to secondary leak in Steam Generator B.

==Contact:==
D. Haverkanp                                                  R. Koinio                   E                         J. Brunner 5240 Prepared by        Ext.                                      Section Chief      Ext.   ' Branch Chief                            Ext.
Di_s tribution :
Dudley Thompson, Executive Officcr for Operations Support, hQ N. C. Moseley, Director, Division of Reactor Operations Inspection, HQ G. Klingler, PN Cuordinator M:.
Transmitted to HQ //. Oc.-,               ~
7/86 (TIME)
Transmitted to Other Regions (ilME)
PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION - NOT FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE Region I Form 83 (Rev. Oct. 78) 97-1 l
t .                      --          _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

    ' PN-4RC: !-38 3/28/79                                2 The Region RI Incident Response C(nter was activated at 8:10 AM and dirwet communications with the licensee and IE; Headquarters was estab-lished. . The Response Team was dispatched at 8:45 AM and arrived at the site at 10:05 AM.
   "At 10:25 AM the Reactor Coolant System Pressure was being held et 1950 psig with temperature at 2500F in the cold leg. By.10:45 AM, Iodine-131 levels as high as 1.25 E-8 uc/ml and radiation leveis of 3 mr/hr had been
   ' detected offsite.                                                             l There is significant r.edia interest at the present time because of concern about potential offsite radia tion / contamination. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and EPA have been informed. Press contacts are being          ,
made by the licensee and NRC.
97 'l

J/u/t*
Revision 0 RADIATION EMERGENCY PROCEDURE ~ 1670.3 4
                                                                                                                 )
GENERAL EMERGENCY PROCEDURE 1.0 Discussion A General Emergency is an incident which involves areas external to the site boundary and will require assistance from off-site support groups. A General Emergency is declared when:
: a. The Reactor Building high range gama L.onitor indicates 8R/hr.
OR
: b. The radiation level at the site boundary is 125 mr/hr.
OR
: c. The liquid effluent radiation monitor (RML-7) indicates greater than 6.8X10-3pC/CC.
2.0 Objective i
To outline action required in ',ne event that a General Emergency is declared.
3.0 Symptoms                                                                                                           '
Examples of symptoms of a General Emergent.y are as follows:
: 1. Off-site survey results indicate dose levels , down-wind from the site boundary, in excess of 30 Rem to the thyroid or 5 Rem to the whole body.
l 1.0 98-1

3/6/74 Revision 0 RADIATION EMERGENCY PROCEDURE 1670.3
: 2. Radiation monitor Rm-G8 indicate:, en exposure rate of 8 R/hr.
in the dome of the Reactor Building.
: 3. Radiation monitor RM-L7 detects radioactivity in excess of 6.8 X 10-3 p C1/cc in the discharge to the Susquehanna River.
4.0 General Emergency Insnediate Action l
I. Station Superintendent / Assistant Superintendent / Shift Supervisor          j (backshiftandholidays).
: 1. The initial actions and responsibilities are delineated
.                   in 1670.2 (Site Emergency Procedure).
4 2.-   Declare a General Emergency when any or all symptoms listed above are present.
: 3. In addition to 1 above, the Station Superintendent /
Assistant Superintendent shall:
: a. Request off-site support group assistance from any or
.                        all of the following, if results of off-site radia-tion monitor survey indicate dose rates that could -
result in a 2 hour off-site exposure in excess of 30 Rem to the thyroid or 5 Rem to the whole body.(See Figure #2)
: 1. AEC Drookhaven (RAP) Radiation Assistance Program
: 2. Radiation Managenent Corporation
: 3. Medical C'onsultants
 ,                            NOTE: Telephone numbers of above are listed in Contact List Radiation Emergency Procedure 1670.14
: 4. Pennsylvania Buret:1 of Radiological Health.
i S. State Police shall be notified to establish road blocks in the vicinity of Three M1'le island as indicated in Figure 1 of the Interfect. Plan found in Section 3 of the Emergency Plan.                           ,
2.0 98-2

   .         .       .=       .--           .        ..
3/6/74 Reyision 0.
RADIATION EMERGENCf PROCEDURE 1670.3-
: 4.       Inter-act and provide infonnation to various groups out-
                    ' lined in the Interface Plan found in Section 3 of the Emergency Plan, i.e., Civil Defense, Bureau of Rad. Health, Coast Guard and State Police.
: 5.       In the event Three Mile Island and/or off-site agency monitoring teams determine that the off-site radiation doses to the public exceed dose outlined in the State of Pennsylvania Radiation Protection Guide, found in the Met-Ed Radiation Emergency Plan (Section 4), recomend' to State of Pennsylvania representatives that affected portions of the LPZ be evacuated according to Section 3 of the Radia-tion Emergency Procedure 1670.4.
NOTE: The State of Pennsylvania Radiation Protection Guide values for probable evacuation of LPZ are greater than 5 Rem whole body or greater than 30 Rem to the thyroid.
: 6.       In the event the Bureau of Radiological Health cannot be contacted and the situation.is catastrophic, causing severe danger to the local population, as determined by the Off-Site Monitoring Team, then the Station Superintendent /
Assistant Superintendent, in conjunction with the State Police, will initiate evacuation of affected portions of the LPZ in accordance with Section 3 of the Radiation Emer-gency Procedure 1670.4. The Station Superintendent /
3.0 98-3'

                                                                       '3/6//4 Revision 0 RADIATI0ft EMERGENCY PROCEDURE 1670.'3 Assistant Superintendent will use the following dose criterion for initiating LPZ evacuation in the event the Bureau of Radiological Health cannot be contacted.
: 1. Greater than 5 Rem who16 body and/or greater than 30 Rem, Thyroid.
II Duties of the following personnel during a General Emergency are outlined in Radiation Emergency Procedure 1670.2 -- Site Emergency,
: a. Shift Supervisor
: b. Control Room Operator                                                   j
: c. Supervisor of Operations
: d. Station Engineer
: e. Supervisor of Maintenance fi Nuclear Engineer
: g. Radiation Protection Supervisor
: h. Chemical Supervisor
: 1. Radiation Monitoring Teams                                             ,
J. Emergency Repair Party
: k. Security Guards NOTE (1):     It shall be the responsibility of all the above to provide maxi-mum assistance and information possible to the various off-site gro;ps, i.e., AEC, State of Pa., Bureau of Radiological Health,        i State Police, Civil Defense and Coast Guard.
NOTE (2): Should the General Emergency occur during other than normal work-l l
ing hours, then the Shift Supervisor will assume the duties of the Station Superintendent / Assistant Superintendent Station Engineer, Radiation Protaction Supervisor, Supervisor of Main-tenance, until suitably relieved.
4.0 98-4
: q.                        _                              .
3/6/'4 Revisien 0   l RADIATION EMERGENCY PROCEDURE '1670.3 NOTE'(3)- On" determining that a possible General Emergency exists, tie          l Shift Supervisor will immediately contact appropriate plar.-
L-management in accordance with Administrative Procedure #1C:4 (Reca11' of Standby Personnel), found'in Section 7. Three Mile' Island Emergency Plan.
5.0 Post Emergency Action                                                         :
: 1. Post Emergency Actions following a General Radiation Emergenc.< are     )
as outlined in Section 5 of Radiation Emergency Procedure .167:.2 (SiteEmergency).
: 2. In addition to 1 above:
a.-  If portions of the LPZ were evacuated, persons will be          .I 1
provided shelter, food and clothing by the Civil Defense          l Organization of the State of Fcnnsylvania for duration c#
High Radiation levels in the LPZ.
: b. If road blocks were established and no evacuation of the LPZ was initiated, the road blocks would be removed on            ;
1 direction from the State Bureau of Radiological Hehlth.           !
: c. Evacuated personnel will be permitted to reoccupy the LPZ when conditions are declared safe by the Pennsylvants Bureau of Radiological Health.
5.0 98-5

2 1
P R.o C E_ E :_ _ _2 M_ 4_ _S 2                       P.R . GAMBLI:     This inter.'iew is being conducted as a 3        ,
portion of the Nuclear Regulatory Ccemission's investigation inte 1
4            the exchange of infor:ation between the Metropolitan Idison B
e     5            Ccepany and the NRC on March 29th, 1979.
H
    ~
e 6                       At this tir.e if ycu wculd raise your right hand to n
E     7'           adr.inister an cath.
{
8 q
Whereupon,
    .'         'I d     9!                                   MILL 17M DOP2: SITE
-i               i
    ;            f
.b.      10 i          was called as a witness and, having been first duly sworn, was z
1               1
.g 3    11      ,
examined and testified as follows:
1 z      12 i                                  r v          -
:. 1 '_' u" a ":c.s - 7a : 0 ".:.
5             I E
13 I                     EY MR. GAMPLE:
::           t, z            '
14 -                0 M,.
  .b           i Will vou c. lease state vcur full name for the record.
i 1
l 15 A    Filliam Paul Dernsife.                                      l
  -                                                                                           1 q                                                                                ,
J 16 ;  ,
O     okay. Thank you.
M          q ti.
       ~17                        SY MR. MosELEY:
r=          a E     18 !                 O    Mr. Dernsife, it was perceived by the plant staff
:i-2, n
19             that shor:1v followine. the autcmatic shutdown cf the reacter, 20 -           the reacecr was returnine te criticality, as indicated by the 21   ;
scurce and inter:nediate rance instrumentation.            ~
22                        To your knowledge, on 3/28, was.this knowledge 23             provided to the Ccer.onwealth cf Pennsylvania by the Met Id er 24             GPU crganization?
25                   A    Net initially.         The Only indica:icn that we gc: :ha:
99-1 ALDERSON REPORTING COMP ANY. INC.

i                                                            3 1
1       they were having some problem with return te criticality was a 2'      beren concentration reading they did give us at about 9:00 a.m.,
3       when I talked to Gary :: iller, and I think thev vere saying that i
4 . the levels were -- it's on my notes -- 100 parts per million r
i g   'S i     beren, which was way down free what it was before the trip, and E       l
@    6:       hey suspected that a possible reason was a primary secondary K         :
$    7 y     leak, and when the reactor pressure.went icw, they could have
.        I j    8; i
get some secondary water into the primary. That's the informa-U
:    9       tion they gave me concerning it.
z
$       I g                 O    Did they mention to you the source and intermediate z
=
10 '.i G  11 j      range instrurentation readines?
c J
z  12 '           A    No.
=,
13 !i               BY MR. CRAIG:
=
a x
=  14             C    What discussions did vou have with Gary Miller bv.
p                                            .
_j 15        way of explanatien of the 100 ppm reading?
2 y  16             A     I was really pressed for time. In fact, I was about t
i  17        half an hour late going to the Lieutenant-Governcr 's office x
=      i j  18        uhen I finally got the information, so I didn't have any chance
?  19        to ask any fc11cw-up cuestiens. It was just a matter of him n
20        filling me in en information he had. It was not a real good 21        interchange, by me asking him cuestions. I just didn't have 22        the time to do it. It took a while for me to get aheld cf him, 23        first of all, te cet the infer =ation. I was really rushed for 24        :ime to get cver there fer the briefine. Se it was just him --
25        a ene-way inferratien f2cw, basically,    t.*ery lit:1c , I asked ALDERSON REPORTING COMP ANY. INC.         99-2

O t
1                   O     Yes'.
1
               .4 2,                  A     Yeah, there was a lack of direct ecmmunications with i
                  ~
l 3..          what was goinc on.       We had the open line,. but again it was a
'           4,           delay in getting information when we needed it.          There.could i
c    :5-1.          have been better communications.
E j       6)j                 Q     Do you feel the utility saw no need to pass this N
   '$       7.           information on to you?
!n.
 ,   y, 8,j                 A     That could have been part of it.
:;      9 .<l               Q    'Do you feel that other organizations within the 3           4
    @    10 i             state may have received this, that is the --
z
    =           s9 j.11j                       A     No, I can't   imagine who, because we were the only ones n           -
i f
    ,=
12 ;             in direct communications with the plan         at that point.
E    13 '                   O     okay.
    =
i t
E s
14 4                   A     Now, unfertunately I wasn't invited -- it was an t             :
j
    -             i 15 :             eversight on the state's part     --
to the meeting that occurred t
                ,4 16 s.'
    .            t in the afternoon with the' operator, so I don't knew wha:
    'A           ;
{=   17 j             information was passed during that reeting.
E    18 '                  'O     We intend to talk with others about that.
:-          1
     ,   19 ,.                  A     okav. .
20                     Q     on " arch 29th, the reactor coolant pumps had been 21               secured and were unable to pump water because of the significant 22 '             voiding'in the reactor coolant system hotlegs.
23                           To your knceledge, on March 29, was this information 24               provided to the Ccemenwealth of Pennsylvania?
25                     A     Mc: that directly. The inferratien -- the bes:
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.             100-1

10 1          inic mation I was able to ser: cut was the pumps yere net 2         running, but the plant vas being cooled by forced -- by a 3           'eed-and-bleed method, and that there wasn't anticipated to be a 4          preblem in continuing to use that method.
I
: g. 5                      There was an indication that Gary Miller told me in R         7t j    6l         the cenversation there was a possibility that there were bubbles R
    ~
     $    7    4     or some voics in the . systems, but certainly not indicating the i
j      8$   I ccre cculd have been uncovered. But there were fuel failures,
    'N         l Z,
9        prebably due, in his cpinien, prebably due to the low pressure c     10 '        transient, sore gap activity being released.
  ?_
But specifically in terms of the voiding in the h'etlegs 11                 Q u
{'
12           and the fact that the pumps were not pumping water, that was not 13 i         passed on to you as a specific p.iece of information?
  =
z           I g     14 i               A    No, nc.
i
  -b i     15 .i'             C    Should this information have been passed on?
E          i f     16 l               A    Yes.
  ^          l i     17 '               C    And again, if we can differentiate between how you y
E     18 1       might have felt on March 28th and. how you feel today, if you
  =
w 19 ,       would.
E 1
20                 A    It would have made a difference, obviously. It 21         would have probably prcmpted mere cuestions.       Any of these hits l
l       22         cf information could have, you know, sprung the point, " Hey, 23         ycu know,    d'
                                    -"d s is the case, what are some of these 24         parameters?"
25                 0    But en March 28th, you believe you would have felt 00 4 ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.

9 j                                     ._
1            would have asked for r. ore infor:ati:n.       I don't believe that we --
2            ycu know, the technical features of what' was happening
         .3                individually.with components in the reactor at that time, we 4;           considered important for our activities related to the accident.
J
:.g.         .5j-                        .We didn't know, for example, that NRC had not been
!E                i                  .                                      .
l3            6;           contacted-until 8:00 o' clock..      We assumed they were contacted
' it
; ?;          7f           at the same time we were contacted, and that they were on their
((         8j           way.
I          9,                          So, you know, by -- and they were in contact with I               l
   @       10 !..          them over the telephone, the same way they were -in contact with j       11 us, only someone else -- we didn't ask.         We just made the i
y '12 :                 assumption       the NRC was aware of what was going on, and they
    =               i E       13             were handling that aspect of it.
E j        14j                 'O      'okay. I think you have answered generically a number
    $                 4 E        15 l           of questions I have here, but I think just for clarity we would j         16 -    ,     go through these and get a specific answer to sema of these.
5                 i y         17 ',                       Do you feel that other organizations within the state 5
2        18 ,          may ,have received the - again right now I'm specifically talking; i
     ?        19            about the source range and inte: mediate range nuclear                   ,
a 3
20 I          instrument readings?
21                  A        No.
a 22 ;                 Q       on~ March 28th, the rear or coolant pumps had been
                         ~
23             secured and were unable to pump water because of significant 24            veiding in the reactor coolant system hotlegs.
25                          - To your knowledge, was this information passed on to 101-1 ALDERSON REPORTING c'.nMeaNY W.
                                                                                ,, a_

1 I                                                                                                                          10 il
                     .i-1: you?
                     ;)-
2:;             A    ..I  am not'sure if.that -- I didn't look again at those s-3: notes, especially the notes -that Sill took, b.efere coming over
: 13.     .
4 ;j here.        We~ had: another minor problem today at Three Mile Island.                                                              !
1 g       J5; j.           0    'I'll be happy to let you review them, if that would i
       .M              ;
       - es                                                                                                                                                 ,
4                             ,
c.
6: help you.
4 l.
E             j                              ..
I'
       .R-        7:J.          A       I don ' t think ' so , early on.                                                         Later in the day we may
                    .n5 j
si '
8/ have been told ' that.            We knew that there were some voids early                                                -
u s        9,     on, some voids in-the system,'but I don't knov if that -- if i-4
         @       10 ] the actual reactor coolant pump problem we were privy to during z            ,
:             I
: 7.      11      the first day.
P        <
h        8 1
i                        C     You were not sure er don't know -- and I'd like for-z       12-l 5'           ?
E       13 ;, you to say which -- but let me finish the cuestion, whether or E
I N       14 j net ycu had a belief that the pumps could not be run because of C            ,i
         =                                                                                                                                                     ;
2       15 l the extent of the void?
x
         =
y       16 '             A     I was under the impression that the pumps were shut off a                                                                                                                                                .
1 y       17 ' r because of vibration, and I believe that .information came from 5
         -            i.
E       18 2 NRC, inspectors onsite, rather than frem the operators.
:            4 e            4 I 19) 2                       O      So this would have ecme seme hours later?
e            -
20 1             A     Well, it would have come after 9:00 o' clock, 9:30 in
                      .i 21 4    the scrning, when they arrived.                                                                   The time, you know, went by so 2:2 '   fast it seemed like they were there before we had plotted.the 23    ,
fcse. rates across the river, se it -- and we were talking to them.
24               O     Again I'd:like to ask you if you believe this informa-                                                                   !
15      ti.n -- again en the ability of the reacter cociant pumps to ALDERSON REPORTING COMP ANY. INC.                                                                                j.
l
                                                           . . . _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ . _ _ . _ . _ . _ _ _ .                                    .)

                                                         ~ ._.___ _ - -. -.                   .    .. ..
i-
             .J-i 5
l ' ]' - '
EY MR. 110EFLING:
l l'
2j                -Q   But on March 28th, you felt that you were getting 5
l-       3A           the information irom the site you needed?                                          )
l i
4,                 A   Yeah.      We had no reason -~ I think I indicated to the 1
m    5            Rogovin group, I never had any reason to believe they were l-l-
6!      4 holding anything back.
k7 BY MR. MOSELEY:
l 8
I Q   Do you believe that other organizations within the                       ;
si   ?i           statt may have received this information?                                          !
I          i                                                                                         I a
10j       t A    If they did, I don't know who.                I don't know if any       i
    =                                                                           '
3  11 .l          other organization would understand what it would mean.                            l i
n          ;
f 12 )                 Q   Going to another specific, the reactor coolant pumps ei         )
j -13l
    =
had been secured and were unable to pump water because of                          i j                                                                                         l
[W 14-l           significant voiding in the reactor coolant system hotlegs.
g I  15 :                     To your knowledge, was this information passed on to U         $
g' 16l            you at BRP by Met Ed or GPU?
d-                                                                                                   {
              .]
ti 17 j                 A   I don't know that I got it, but I knew there were p
   .E  18 :           notes to the effect that there were voids in the system, that 5         j
    $  19 '           there was something about -- scme information come through to n
20             the effect --
21                   Q   Do you want to refer to this?
22                   A    (Witness examining document.)
23 There was something seme place about, "We are going 24             to shut the pump down to avoid cavitation," but I don't knew if 25             thau's written.
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.                   102-1

e d
6
!              a 1l                              Okay, here is an ' indication that th'ey knew there was a
                .(
2,              void"in there alluded to as a bchble, which would sucgest that                                          --
3 ].;                  Q        I ' guess maybe the question that we can -- if I can
.              a.
l 4 I             rephrase'it slightly differently.                                     Did'you have a perception'on i                l
!T    i                     March'28 that they could not run the pumps 'because of the
     -R    .5]'  .
3-    6j              amount of voiding that existed in the loops?
{
4
     -r          j                                                                                                                     ~I
!    .$      7                     A        I think it was on the -- I knew on the 28th, there l
4                E
.    .X           1 was words to the effect that there were voids in the system.                                                  ;
~
J      8',
d                                                                                                                                   '
. d      9'                    Q        I'm trying to get some feel for cause and effect.                                              '
:     I        'j A        The thing is, I'm not a nuclear engineer.                                   Bill was
)     5    10 l t     3           1
{     lU   11 {
doing most of the talking.                                     We knew things were not wonderful.
y   12               That's about as f ar as I can legitimately talk about it.
l                  '
I      E i      E   13 -                    O        Ckay.
I      I a
j      g    14 ;                   A        And without going into speculation or whatever.
;      i    15                      Q        De vou feel that this information, that is the fact
,      w            ...
4      x            4 l      j~ 16i        !
ef the amount of voiding and its effect on primary coolant                                                   [
r
;      w             J t
d'  17 '              pump operation, do you feel that should have been passed en te 4      x             1
:     7              I l
a E
       =
18j' you at 3RP?
#      w             4 d      $.~19,'                      A        It should'have been passed to the state, yes, and I                                         .
i
!      M             .,
:           20 i             think in a way maybe it was, sort of, you know, in light of l
21       .1      you have voids in the system, you have to kill the pump to
.                    9 22               avoid cavitation.              You know, to that extent.
23                               Now to the ' extent of how big this void was physically, 24               you know,'in terms of the bottem line being the core is uncovere:                                           -
!           25'              we - didn't have that inferrat: on, or that didn't sink in.                                       It t
)
: ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC.                               102-2' 5
5

i l
1 2                                                               7           )
l 1;     wasn't said in those words, or wasn't understood, whatever.             )
l                                                                           I 2j     It's one of my key points before the actien, was if the core is         '
1 3i     uncovered, you have necessarily' big trouble, and to that point 4.,    I used to have sort of a set point in my mind that if the core s   5. is uncovered, you are going to pack up the folks and move them E
j   6 out, and if I had known that on the 28th, you'd still have a R                                                                                  i
$   7,     wrecking crew still trying to get me off the wall, to' be perfectly     :
A j   8      honest.
d   .
l y   9)            Q    Well, I'm not sure this is worth further pursuit, but 5       1
@  10 1    let me try it.                                                          I E
g  11             A     Try it.
t y  12 j           0     The sense that I am trying to understand is whether        ,
1
,=
E  13 !    or not you had the feeling that this voiding was of high                l E        ,
l
$  14       significance in leading us down to this core uncovery, or that
$  15       it was an operational inconvenience.
E                                                                                  ,
j 16              A    It sort of had the flavor of an operational incon-         l A
i 17       venience, if memory serves.
x
 =          '
5 18              Q    Why do you feel this infornation wasn't passed on to
 ?
 $ 19       you?
R 20              A    The <ay you are phrasing the guestion suggests that 21        this was indeed the case, and they knew it, right?     Am I to assume 22        that?
23              0     Yes.
24              A     Okay. The framework of your cuestien is indeed a 25         fae . -Assuming that that was the case , I have no ide.a why in 102-3 ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.

11-
                        't
:l                                                           .
1                                   this istsomething he should have t::1d you?
2-                                                A   Yes.
3..           .
Q   Okay. Cr.they should have told you.
                  ..i 4j                                                A   Yes.
t.
e.
5!           1 O  'Again I would like to ask you why you feel this
      .H j     6l                                   informatien was not passed en to you.
R
      &     7 - )'                                            A   Again probably the same reasons I gave fer the ether.
   'E                     I
    'l      8                                                 0   Chay. And then I will ask you -- I won't go through U
9                                    the list of cuestions'again, but could I ask you whether you i
10           4-                       feel that other crganicatiens within the state may have been
: z.                   ,
     =                  j j     11                                    given this information?
3                                           -
    .y     12 ,                                               A   I don't believe so, not tc my knowledce.
     =                   l 5     13 !                                               O   Ancther fact, the electrematic relief valve had been E                   l x                                                                                                                       .
g     14 ,                                    stuck open for a period in excess of two hours.         Tc your knowledge
     =
E     15                                     on March 29th, was this informatien passed on?
5
                        .i i
j     16j                                                A   Yt. 5 , it was, in conversatien with Gary Miller, he i                   ,
: b. 17 '                                    told me the valve had been stuck cpen.         The indication was faulty,
     =                   ;
     =                   .
{:: .18 '                                     and it wasn't indicating the prcper position on the indicator, 19                                       and the valve was new closed.        Eu: this was again at 9:00 a.m.
     $=
20 '                                               O   Did he tell you how 1cng the valve had been open?
21                                      Maybe not two hours, but a long time?         Or cc you recall a period 22                                       cf time?.
: 23.                                                 A   I think he indicated it was open for a fairly icng 24                                       peried of time, : be lieve .
25                                                  C   Ckay. 5efore we star ed the inter.iew, you gave us 103-1
                                                                        ~ ALCERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.

                    ?                                                                   12-
:1' seme notes that had.beenttaken en that day.- Can you. refer to
:2           those notes and point to us the note.that you nay have made 1
          -3.-         that.wculdEreflect.on this?-
         ~4-''                A         (Witness examining document.)
   .e         5fb                      I. don't believe.it's on those particular notes, but I       i R            l
[      6b         did' write a.more detailed list of things that Gary did tell re F              :
7g        very; shortly, a few days.after this particular conversation, y             (t
: g.      8'        because at that point I realized it.was going to become a very             ,
J 9          critical' piece of inferration.
I             (
     @                        O       Do you have a copy of that?
     !   10]                                                                                      ,
j 11                   A       Yes, I do.
    *          .l j                         O       Could we take a look at that?
    =
12 )
E 13                   A       This is basica11v nv. recollecticn of the first -- of x
    =    14 .          what I did frem 0700 when I first re'ceived the call from
    ;             4                                                                               .
:              i 15 ;          Clarence Deller up until, ch, about 9:00 a.m., when I received             t F
    =
   ./x   16 '          a call from Garv Miller.          It includes that conversation. And 6    17 '          this again has not been given to anybody officially.            This r             i.                                                                               ?
E                  infernation -- and. this has been given in , ether reccrds -- this
    - -  18i.            ,
    -            .1 E    19 ;          is somenhing I wrote down on my own af ter, I would say, tuc F.
20 '          weeks af ter the incident occurred'       .
21                   0      . I was goine to ask you to try to identify when this l-       12                                  Would you say it was within two weeks?
was prepared.
        '23                   A         I would say within two er three weeks af te _ , yes.
24                  .Q        Then I'r trying for as much specificity as we can get 25            here, would you say by the middle of April?
[
NLDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.             103-2   ,

   ....       -                     - . -          ,          ..      . . _ .. . . ~ . . - .                    .-       .    .  . .
4 13 1:                        A       Yes, I would say bv the middle of 7pril.
                '2                                   MR..MOSELEY - Let's'take a short, break.
l-              <                                ,    .
l                  3-                                : (Rece s s . ),
t                       4 l-4                                  MR. MOSELEY:- During'the short recess, we have                                  ;
e         5           -reviewed.'the:three pages of noter or. report -- I don't know E         . ..
j          6           how to title it.
* i;          .
6          7'l                                 TEE WIniESS:. Recollection is probably more like it.
        *l          8                                   BY MR. MOSILEY:
C
:f g
9[    .
Q         An area I would like to pursue just a little bit more-                        l
         @       10 )           has to do with what Miller told you about the valve having
                         .i 3
        .lt      11             been stuck cpen and the block valve having been closed.
y       12 f                                   Do you recall any discussiens of inventcry deficiency 3            -
p         13 1         cr deficienev ei c.rimary coclant as a result cf this valve
                                                            -                                                                         i
        ,g                  ,
a 4
          =
:M         14           having been ~ open for an extended period of tir.e?                                                   ,
1                 ,
,         g 15 ,                        A      .Other than' him sayinc possibly there were voids in i
g 16 l          the system, he didn't know how big, I believe he might have sait.
x                 ,
i        17 i           acssibly the candy canes could have been blocked.
x                                 '
                            .I if x        18 4                        O          Did he relate the openine of the valve or the valve t            .
           ,       19            having been open as the cause of these bubbles er voids? -
u 20 ;                        A          : believe so, yeah.                 That wculd be ebvious, the only 21 J          way to do it, to remove the inventery from the system.                                   I don't 22            knew if_he specifically said that.                                It was just, you knew, 2'3            assumed en my part that was the reason.
24-                          0         Eu: that's an assump icn you made en March 2Sch, based 25            - en what y.r. Miller had told you?
103-3 ALDERSON REPORTING COMP ANY. INC.

1                                                                                  14 4                         i
            ,1                     A      I.believe so, yes.
1
             ~2                          '3Y'MR. EARPSTER:
3                    0      Do you recall, in looking at your notes, the plant 4             wasLeharacterized as being stable at seme later point.                    Was g
51 :this as 'a result of the block valve having been closed, that 1
i te
* l
[6
                                                                     ~
                            .they now felt that the transient was stable?
E                -
     &      .7 .'                 A.      I believe it- was that, 'along with the feed-and-bleed j         8 [ cccling daey thought was 'taking place as being a stable ecde.
d                2
:         9        t' BY MR. MOSILIY:
I                 i
  ~@       10 i                   O      .Did Miller characterize this, the open block valve, z
    =
3      11 l     as being the cause o.           the plan: was in the condition it was         .
i             1 1                       in?
z
    =
12 ]                                                                                            >
    -                s.
E     13 l                    A       I don't think directly, but : inferred that was the E                :
z.
g       14                case.
* I 2       15 '                    O      Can you give us any benefit of your recollection of a                :,
y       16 j. what he actually said to you?
i       17'l    .               a       It's been so 1cng ago.       It was difficult to write a               !
  =               :
E-                        these recollecticns er other se: cf papers.
18 :
I really have no
  )
R 19 ,              idea. Things were going so fast a: that point, a lot of it was 20 '               a blur.
21 !                            3Y MR. CRAIG:
22                       Q      Did you believe the plant was stable when ycu go:
23                 that report?
1 24                       A      Yeah. I guess so. That was vnat            cid everybcdy.
        .25                 : didn't really question, I didn't have ti=e to questien that ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.

11 i
l 1-               this 'is'. ser.ething he should ' have told you?'
             ,      t.
2                                    Yes..
I
                                       .'A                                                                                       1 1               3'                           Q-     okay.      Or - daey should have - told ,you.                                1
                    >                                                                                                             I 1
l                  .,
l
             -4.. t A      Yes.
Again I would like to ask you why you feel'this 0'                                                                                R
;-  e           5!  i
:n
[ "61!                        Informatien was' not passed en to you.                                                         ,
    @               i R         .7j-                           A     Again'probably the same reasons I gave fer the other.
W             k j          8                             0     Chay., And then I will ask you -- I won't go.through
. e
:          9                 .the list of cuestions again, but could I ask you'whether you I              l                    .. -
5         10 i                feel that other crganizations within the state may have been 3
2
          . 11 .                   given this information?
p.12                                     A      I don't believe so, not to my'knowledce.
E                I s         13 !                           O      Another fact, the electrematic relief valve had' heen 3               4 z
   .g          14 I                stuck cpen for a -period in excess of two hours.                        To your kncwledge E                I 2' 15                         en March 28th, was this informatien massed on?
5                l g         16 j                            A     Yes, i: was, in conversation vith Gary Miller, he i               I f        17 ',               told me the valve had been stuck cpen.                         The indicatien was faulty, x .
      =                '
    -E         18                  and it wasn't indicating the proper position on the indicater, 2    .
>     a 5        19                   and the valve was new closed.               Eut this was again at 9:00 a.m.
S 20                              0     Did he tell you how long the valve had been open?
21                  Maybe not two hours, but a long tine?                         Cr do ycu recall a period 22                   cf time?
d v
             .23                               A      I think he indicated it was open for a fairly icng 24                   pericd of tine, : helieve.
l         , 15                                  C      Ckay. 5efere we started the interriew, ycu gave us
                                                             ' ALDERSON REPORTING COMP ANY. INC.

                                                             . - .             -   ~ , ~ . - - .     .-
J                  .
13
;             LIL '               A      Yes, I'would say,bv the =iddle of 7pril..
!             '2          .
MR.'MCSILEY:    Let's take a short break.
4-                  ,
l              34                        (Recess.l
: v.                   ,
i             -47                        MR. MOSELEY:    Durine the short recess, we have s
l    .c      'S [ ' reviewed the three'pages.cf nctes er report -- I don't knew e
.      n 6 ',
j f_
i hcw to title it.
.      v              ,
7; '    7 c.                      TEE W: 3 ESS:   Reccliection is - probably more like it.
4 J                                                                                          ;
8                         3Y MR. MOSELEY:
i
       *J
     -c        9                  0      An area     would like to pursue just a-little bit more
     }              }
            '10 i           h'as to. de with what Miller told you about the valve having z            o
:             1 4    .c
{     l 1.
heen stuck open and the block valve having.been closed.
r 4
     -5. 12 s                        De .vou recall any discussiens of inventer *.r
                                                           .                                     deficienc.v
       =.            4
,      E      13 l     ;
cr deficienev of.erinarv cciant as a result of this valve 1
f 14     1 havine. been ocen for an extended period of time?
       =
j      15 i
A      Other than him sayinc possibly there were voids in                  e 4
fz     16            the system, he didn't know how big, I believe he might have said                  '
i .
4 d     17 ':    '-
possibly the candy canes could have been blocked.
2
:.           .I
,       2     18 i                O      Did he relate the cpenine of the valve or the valve 4
        =             i        *
        ;     19 '          having been open as the cause of these bubbles er voids?
-       =
            'C0:j                  A      I believe so, yeah.        That wculd be cbvicus, the only 21 I           way to do it, to rereve the inventery from the sys'ter.                  I don't 22'           knew if he specifically said that.               :: was just, you know, 23              assu=ed en my part that was the reason.
24                   Q      But that's an assumption ;cu nade en March 29th, based 25..           en what Mr. Miller had' told yet?                                               ,
4 I
104-2 ALDERSON REPORTING COMP ANY. INC.
                                                                         , -     y       e

28 i.
1                 any ditect knowledge about this, I think we ought te ask the 2                 questions.cf him.
3                             George Kunder, the superintendent of Technical l       4 1
Support at Three Mile Island, told the Senate Special Investigatic
* e     5l                that he and others had been concerned that the core had been Pi I
j     6        ,
uncevered for a period of time after 6:45 a.m.
R R. 7'                            To v.our knowledge, on March 28th, was this infor=aticn
  .              i n
E n      8!      .g cassed on to the Cenmenwealth?
0                :
:      9'                      A     No, it was not.
z_.
   @ 10 !                        O     rhculd it have been?
z               ,
   =               i
   ?    11 :                     A     Yes, it should have been.
   <                l j-   12 '                     O     Why, in your view, was this information not passed on?
    -                                                                                               l j   13 :                     A      Mell, primarily because the people who were believing t
z                                                         It was the final data ecming free 5   14                  chat were not talking tc us.
1 m                 .
l
    =                 <
15                  the utility to us, net the dissenting opinions.      But   think i
u
     =
1 S
16                 we shecid have been alerted that there is a cuestien of whether l
: t. 17 '
I the core is uncovered, or whether the core is covered.
x 7  18                       Q     The fact that someone --
I u
19                      A     There are cecc.le that believe the cere may have been
      =
20                 uncevered, and why, ycu knew, why they believe it.                   .
21                       C    Then if we are trying te characterize this, according 22                 te my li::le list here, then you would say -- would ycu categcri:e 23                 _: as the utility didn't reccgnize er adecuately evaluate this 24                 ind:=natien?     Meuld it fit in tha: catego ry?
15                      A     I believe it would fit in that categer;, yes.
ALDERSON REPORTING COMP ANY. INC.       104-3

           -                                                                       5-1-            arrived in the office, and the two of us were talking to the i
2            . person en the phone -- I think it was Dich Dubeal who we were 4
3-            talking to at that peint, and he gave us a cuick and dirty t            >             .
l                    update based upon what we knew at the time, and it was very 4- l 3    5 ''          cuick and dirty.
E         !
3,    6     .
We assumed NP.C was on its way and had been told at t$          '
E
  ~
7!           the same time, so I didn't pursue it . any further, other than l
  -.         2 5     8-s          what was ha:c.enine. offsite, y,                              .
  's n     9.                   O   Then you didn't have a perception at that point as I           :I E '10 !       '
to the extent of core coolant that had been lost?
i_                                                                                       ,
5
  <    11jl                  A   No, nor the failed fuel. There had to be failed fue~.
a           i i   12 '          to cet these kind of readings. Tha: was iust, vou know, an z                        -                                              -
   =          ,
E   13 i           autematic reaction. I wrote it dewr. I have no idea what ---
   =             1 14             it didn't make -- it didn't -- althcugh it was hectic in the
* I c            a i
w 15;            background, there was an awful le: of noise on the telephone,            i i
a
   =            :                                                                              \
J 16       3>' and it appeared that things were geing to -- getting worse
   *         .i y   17 i           rather rapidly, it still didn't see     like it was, you know, f              1
: 5. 18j            approaching a loss-of-coolant type accident, the kind where E            :
2  19 "           you would have a severe -- vou knew, a major loss-of-coolant
    =
20 -           accident, frcm the telephone conversation.       They were having 21             some problems, but nothing that serious at that point.          That was 22              the general impression that I got from the telephone conversa-23              tion.
24                     0   It was perceived by the plan     staff that  --
this is I5             en the =crning of ." arch 28th -- thac shortly folicwing the 105-1 ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.

29 1            A     No. Again, they didn't think we needed to knew that 1-2*     i information. It was irrelevant to our activities.
a 3?i           O     Durine a good part of the day on March 2 8th, there 1
4;       was superheated steam in the reactor coolant system.
c     5l                  To your knowledge, on March 28, was this information ---
U           l j     6;            A     No, to my knowledge, it was.                                l
 -                                                                                     l v           i E     7;            Q. To your knowledge it was not. Should it have been?
M j     8             A     Well, in retrospect, yes.
e d      9             0     on March 27th, what would you have answered?
Z'         '
h     10 J           A     Yeah, I think so.
A E
5     11             0     There was a serious inventcry deficiency, a loss of a
j    12   3     water or absence of water, voids in the la:ye part of the --
I 5
j    13         both the steam generators and the hotlegs.
=
7 j    14    -
To your knowledge, on March 28th, was this inventory
_b j    15 :       deficiency communicated to the Ccmmonwealth7 d
9 I
g    16   3 A     Yeah, I believe we had information that the -- that z         1 d    17 '       bo th -- both were dry and there may have been a leak from the' N         i 2
18 1 7
primary to the secondary side some time during that day, and
-         a i
R 19         that may have come frcm that meeting with the Lieutenan: Governor.
20 '            O     Was this the secondary side that was dry?
I 21              A     secondary si0s being dry.
22              0     I am thinking about the primary side and the extent of 23         the voiding, rather than that there was a void.
24              A     Nc, I'm sure it was net. If it was, i   didn't register 25         with me as being impcrtant, ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.

l 1
41
              '1T                         Q    Yes.
2                    ,
A    Yes. I think --
                      .                                                                                           l 3-                             BY MR. GAMBLE:
              .4 l'                    -Q     .Mr. Gerusky, during the time interval from when you 1            5 [ l received the calculated dose rate of.10-R'per hour, and when
,.1                     ,
: j.        6'            you received the actual Goldshcro other-side-of-the-river 4{        7'$           measurements that caused everyone to discount the calculated 4
, ' ~~M'           .
   .g           81j           reading, was there any other information passed during that a                  l         .                        .
      =          9i           time, any other onsite measurements or any other kind of informa-i E        10 ,            tion which would tend to discount the original reading?
E                   1,
      =
    -lU        11 8            .
A    I don't remember.      I know that we were not very - we b
didn't really believe            that evacuation would have to take place.
      *f 12 l j
E       13 i             I don't think there was any time in there we felt we would have
       =                 .i z
Ne just didn't want to take any chances, g       14 :I          t o evacuate people.
a I
R       15               even, until that reading came back.
Q 4       y       16                              BY MR. HOEFLING:
e             .
p       17                         0    And how long was that, again?
        $                 1.
E       18 1                       A    I don't know.      I think in reconstructing it, or at.
E                 .I E       19 :             least the telephone - the PEMA telephone duty log indicated 8!
20 .L            it may have been an hour, which surprised me a little bit the 21 ]             first time I heard that, six menths ago at another one of these 22 ,             briefings.
23                               BY MR. MCSELEY:
24                          Q    Going back, I have one more specific paried :: ::uch 25-              en, as we have done in o thers .
Gecrge Kunder, who is the 2:i'.ity 105-3
                                                       - ALDERSON REPORTING COMP ANY. INC.

x        -
42 1I 3   }
1- '      ' superintendent of Technical Support, told the Senate Investigative
: i. -
2         ~Grcup that he and others had been cencerned that the core had       ,
3          heen uncovered ' for a period of hours after 6 :45 a.m.
4                       To your knowledge, was this information passed on to i
g     5!          the Cc=monwealth of Pennsylvania?
E~
~[     6[                   A  No, not until Friday, with Jce Eendrie's probably W
 $,    7j          seccnd cr third telephone call, or' the visit to the Governor's Ti        .
j-    8l'l        office where ne informed us of that.
t-    9-                   0  Should this information have been passed en to you?
i                    '
I-   10 j                  A  As a matter of fact, it may have been Thursday
 ?
5                                                                                  .
t j- 11     i       night, in a telephone call frem the Governor back to the onsite a
j    12 NRC inspector, who-said, "There are more problems than we
 =        .
E    13 l         anticipated. There is a possibility the core was uncovered. "
 =        !
j 14 ;
i didn't even knew-that telephone call took place at all until
 =        i
: 2. 15 u         .
reading it in ene of the reports of one of the ecmmittees.
 =        1 3   -16 j                  Q  This was late Wednesday night?
z-       I j    17 ;                  A  Thursday.
x
.=
2    18                  ,O   Thursday.
 ?
 =
19                    A  That's when things started happening, Friday morning.
20                    C  Yes.
21 -                 A   Thursday night and Friday morning, Washington started 22           to get invcived. .
23                    c ..I'm not sure, did ycu answer when : said -- fid             !
24           ask yce, shculd.this informacien have been passed en to yeu?             l 25                . A   Ch,-hell, yes. I mean if --
ALDERSON REPORTING COMP ANY. INC.       105-4 i

1 l
43 1                O      March 27, same answer?
2                A      We nave always said if they had known that the core 3          was -- if the core had been uncovered and they couldn't get it l       4   -      covered again, we would have evacuated people with no questiens l
5          asked. But we felt if we knew the ccre was uncovered, they l s
  ?>
  ~
6         would have known the core was uncevered, and they could have e
R
{      7,        gotten it covered again.       It just d=esn't seem reascnable to me n
j*     8         that they knew the core was uncevered and didn't do something i<
t     9j         about covering it.
i i
E    10 !
t
* Can you recall any other information which should have E          :
5    11 j       'been passed on to yourself or 3R? cn March 28, but was not?
3          3 i    12 ,              A      No. I really don't knew how much they knew cn z           ,
   =
:    13 !1       March 28th.
   =
M    14                       BY MR. GAMBLI :
2            ,
   =-
E    15                0      I have one thing, Mr. Gerusky.      It is something s-a J-   16 ',       more about the dose rate in Goldsbero.         Do you know of any        1 1
T'         i 1
y  17' -       subsequent recollections, if not by your office, maybe by PEM.A n
E  18 -        er anycne, as to the events that cccurred during that early C  19           time, the first reports of the calculated dose rates, the first u
r.
20 a         readings?     Eas anybody written any    aports or recollections en 21 i         that?
22                 A      I don't understand your question.
23                 0      I'm talking about the --
24                 A      Did anybcdy get anything in be: ween the time?
25                  0     No, no, no. Subse'quent , fays, weeks, mon:hs 'a:er, dd ALDERSON REPORTING COMP ANY IN(~

33 1l                      O'      New you'have testified ~to'others, and in fact I~
12:                notice.on your note sheet of'your knowledge of the 10-R per hour                                                 l
                     -3               . prediction in Goldsboro --
J'                                                                                                                         .
                     ,4 . '                     A-      That's what th'ay gave us.
                     ~5 'l                      Q       Are there'other records, notes, or reports or i
H                    l accu =ulcted recollections, Lany of those- things , that might                                                   .
l L[
* 6;
                             'e                              ,,         .
                                                                                                              =
contain additional information con,cerning --
7j n                    ,
          !               8"                      A     That.particular --
N t
s                                                -- that particular -- for instance, that we could. use d          -
91                      0 E                   j F.          10 )             to nail down more precisely the time in which you received lE                                                                                                                                              '
je          11              that'information.                 Did you personally receive that?
i                                    .A     I think it was on the speaker phone.                           If I wrote it z
             =
:12l:t                                                                                                                              ,
         '!!            13 iI           down, I received it one way or the other, either on the speaker e
A     ~ 14 R '
l-phone er direct . phene.                            Margare: Reilly was there, and.she                            I
                                                                                                                                                          )
             =                   ,
         -2              15 ,           went        to get the maps to start her plot of the wind direction, x
              =                  4 J           16 i . wind speed, and she -- so we both received the information, I
              -                   i p           17 i          .believe, over the speaker phone.
               -y -                                                                                                                                       l
: 7.        18 ,                -
Q    Do you recall what was told you -- what specifically
                -                 u 5'                 I 19 ',          was told you which caused you to no lor. gar give any credibility
                =.
to the 10-R per hour . reading?                           I'm talking about surveys.                  What 20 i.
21j            surveys were made, for instance?
22'                       A    Yeah, we were told that there were no ensite readings 23            of any consequence, in- that wind direction. We were also tcid 24             that the centainment pressure was still very, very lcw, and
                          '25             that this was' designed -- that the calculatien he was using was 106-1 4l m e" m e A m a m s=-= a - ==+ =

I' I
                           }-                                                                                19 f,
1                    A          Yes.
2g                  .O         ' -
from the state on March 28th.          Is that your view?
3                   LA          Yeah. Essentially. i: was my feeling earlier on, 4           and maybe it''s wrong, but that's the feeling I had.                                ,
l                          ,
T-3          5                   -Q          So whatever information wasn't passed en, there may
: 2. ;                              -                                           -
l {.          '6 < r _ have been a variety of -reasons which would include that maybe 4
        .i            7 l                                                                         or --
N              h.theydidn't-thinkyouwereinterestedinit,
[.         8 A-         They forgot to tell us, or they didn't realize it U
         'i
* was a problem.
Y               ,
             @~ 10 )                       Q           okay. Any others that we could add to that list?
2 i            =               i E       11                    A           Notereally. I think it sort of characterizes the
(
a               .
d
{-           y       12 j[        situation.
5                                                                                                      .
[            j .13
             =
0           okay. Mr. Gerushy has testified and, in fact, it
{
[,      14 :
appears oa this note which he had taken, that there was a 10-R m                a
!             j- 15               per hour calculation made at Gcidsboro.
:             E               ,
j
[ 16 '
g ..
A           A projection, yes.
I             p. 17                         Q          For Goldsboro. Were you aware of this on March 28th'.
;             x                 i z                 :
i             $      18-j                   A-         Yeah, that was very early.      That was on the order of F
j 1
                               ~
j                    19        5 7:30, quarter to 8:00 in the ecrning.
n l                    20 "                      O       Are there any other records, documents or any other i
l                    21i          materia.1 that might bear on the information that was exchanged h                              i
!                    22           with you, you or any other members of SRP, about this, other i
4                    23'          _than-this note that I have in ny hand?
;                    24                         A       I'have the distinc    ~reccliection at ene time :- wrcte i.
25            some of this stuff down, especia;1y having                     c de witn sc-a cf i~
107-1'
!                                                              ALDERSON REPO9 TING COMP ANY. INC.
a

10                  !
                                                                                                       '1 1
1
          -1       inferration I vas able te sort ou     was the pumps vere not                          i 1
2i      running, but'the plant var being cooled by forced -- by a l
              .                                                                                          i 3       feed-and-bleed mothed, and that there wasn' t anticipated to be a
!          4   ,
prc'blem~in continuing to use that method.
i'                                                                                        I e                         There was. an indication that. Gary Miller told me in E      5}:
j 6 .{    the cenversation there was a' possibility that there were bubbles G-6      7)      or some voids in the systems, but certainly not indicating the.
K         1 l      8 ''    core could have been uncevered. But thare were fuel failures,                      i U.
2 9-      probably due, in his opinion, prebably due to the low pressure
  'n-         v m     10}      transient, some gap activity being released.
E
    =         .
    $     11 '      .
Q   Sut specifically in terms of the voiding in the hotlegs y     12       and the fact that the pumps were not pumping water, that was not, E         i                                                                                          ,
j     13 L passed en to vou as a srecific piece of information?
z                                                                                                    l T
g     14              A   No, no.
w a           .
j 15l 4 0   Should this information have been passed on?
* 3 g,16 i                A   Yes.
i    17'Il           Q   And acain, if we can differentiate between how you a         a F         9
{ 18j might have felt en March 28th and how ycu feel today, if you 1
itt  19 -     would.
20 2   ,
A    It would have made a difference, obviously.           It i
21 i     would have probably prompted mere cuestions.        Any of these bits 22        cf information could have, you know, sprung the point, " Hey, 23        ycu know, if this is the case, what are some of these 24        parameters?"
25~             Q    But en March 28th, you helieve you would have f elt 108-1 ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.

i-
                                                                           ' 14 1               A'     I believelso, */es.
2                      13Y MR. EARPSTER:
3!               0;     Do you -recall, in looking at your notes, the plant            l 1
4 4       ,
was characterized as being stable oat some later point.         Was        !
5_         Lthis a.s a result of the block valve haring been closed, that 6-         they now. felt that the transient was stable?
7 ,,              A      I believe it was that, along with the feed-and-bleed 8           ccoling they thcught was taking place as being a stable mode.
      .I 9!9                      BY MR. MCSELZY:
t 10 i               Q-     Did Miller characterize this, the open block valve,
-11           as being the cause of why the plant was in the conditic.1 it was l
12 '   :
in?
1 13 ;               A      I don't think directly,.but : inferred that was the 14           case.
I 15                 0     -Can you give us any benefit cf your recollection cf 16           what he actually said to you?
i 17                 A      ::'s been so long ago. It was difficult to write 18           these reccliections er 7ther set of pa:ers.        I really have no 19-          idea. Things were going so fast at that point, a lot of it was 20           a blur.                                                                   >
21                        3Y MR. CRAIG:
22                 ;      Cid you believe the plant was stable when ycu ge:
22           that report?
.;4                 A      reah. I puess sc. That vas . shat I   cid everybedy.
 ;5.          .: f In': really questien, I didn't have time to questien tha:
108-2 ALCERSON REPORTING COMP ANY I N (*

                                                                                      ~.
l
           ;,                                                                             15 I
r           much-the informatien he was giving.           Fe were1 relying on their 2
inferration at that point.
3'            C      Well, if you could describe ycur impression of the a
4 (lant, why you inferred-it was stable.           The feed-and-bleed g             .5 '      method implies that they are cooling the core.             Did Miller tel2 s                  ,
              '6 fn                      you ha had a ecoldewn rate, that the plant was being cooled i
 ;             ~7 ;
effectivalv.?
j               8
                    ;         A      I recall someone alcng the line mentioning a cooldown C                  a 9I  -
rate. Whetner it was in that conversation er not, I'm not sure,
 -                  a, j            10 J
                     ;  but I believe at ene point on that day semebody mentioned a
 -                  1
: 3)            .                                                                        ,
M I'  cooldown rate.                                                             -
3 12 i..                 ,        O      In the 7.c:ning or afterncon?
i            13 '!           A      Again, I don't knew.       I only believe semebody menticned:
14 '
a cooldown rate at some ceint.-
t_ '15              ;               EY MR. GAMILE:
* i E            16 i            G      Semebody from Met Ed?
 -.                  1'
 ;            17 '            A      Yeah.
  =                  .
  }           18 ;                   gy gg, gegg;g,;;
i          I9 C      But you don' t recall whether that was merning or 20 afternoon?
6 II #
A      No, I don't.
22 SY MR. CRAIG:
3 C     could you relate that to befsre or aft er the
              *4 Lieutenant Governer was briefed by the 'le: Ed people?
e A. No, I can't.-     I real.ly can't.
108-3 ALDERSON REPORTIN("; (".*M D A MV * * ' * *

  - - .        -       ..      ..    .  -           .  -   -     ~   ..   .-.       .     .
I
                   " Recollections" prepared by W. Dornsife in April 1979 Times are approximate
  - 0705 - Received call' from C. Deller. PEMA duty officer indicating that TMI has a site emergency and.to call' plant to get details 0706 - Called Maggie to inform her and verify number to call at plant site -
only number we had was thru plant switchboard 944-4041 0707 - Cal' led plant site - had difficulty getting through switchboard to. Unit 2
                                                                                             )
control room - finally gave switchboard my home number to have control.
I room directly call me 0710 - Shift supervisor called back to my home number. He told me the. plant had suffered a transient and RB [ reactor building] radiation level'was high initiating the site emergency - things sounded very confused at i
this point in time - I tried to get a status of important safeguards without very much success - they did tell me that reactor was shutdown and RB pressure was about 1 or 2 psi - SI [ safety injection] had been initiated and was cooling core - They informed me that they had sent out monitoring teams and there was no detectable radiation levels outside the plant.
I then heard in background the announcement to evacuate the Unit 2              l fuel handling and auxiliary buildings. At this point a health physics type got on the phone and things sounded extremely confused and finally he hung up saying he would call back.
0720 - Called office - talked to Diane - told her briefly about what had happened and I was on my way.in to the office - told her first technical type who arrives in office should call Unit 2 control room immediately.
I arrived in office about 0750. Tom was there with open line established to plant control unit. Plant had declared a general emergency about 0730 due to higF radiation levels in the reactor building. There still were no releases outside plant. Met Ed monitoring teams were out and around.
109-1

                                   .         . - _ _ .             _~                 -
I. talked'to plant to get a later s'tatus. As I recall, they said they were being core cool by feeding' with makeup pumps and bleeding out through' pressurized electromechanical relief valve.             From the information that.I was getting it sounded as if plant conditions were stabilized (In reality the core was probably being uncovered at this time and fuel damage'was continuing).
For the next hour or so we kept getting plant status reports periodically.
(The open line was not manned continuously by Met Ed. They would come to the phone when ready to report). Things seemed to remain' the same with still no release occurring. At about 0900 I was asked by Middendorf or                    c Duncan to go brief the Lt. Governor and attend a press briefing that was scheduled .for about 1000.            I called back to plant to get more details on what had initiated accident and what the present status was in order to br.ief Lt. Governor and Governor. At this point, Gary Miller, plant super-intendent, came on the line and briefed me on .what had occurred. His briefing was as follows (based partly on notes and partly on recollection):
At 4:00 a.m. a turbine trip from 98% power occurred - reactor shutdown automatically - violation of tech specs in that aux feed was valued out temporarily S/G may have boiled dry - electromechanical relief valve lifted but did not reseat - indication in control room (elec signal, to valve) indicated that it had reseated - block valve upstream is now closed - High pressure safety injection was initiated - all i                       safeguard system operated as designed - pressurizer may have gone solid and low pressure in primary probably caused flashing and bubbles in primary - may have temporarily lost main coolant circulation - even currently stabilized and cooling normally on A S/G - possible primary to secondary leak in B S/G - B S/G has been isolated - 100 ppm Boron in primary may have been diluted 109-2

k by secondary to primary feedback thru tube leakage - there has probably been a slight amount of failed fuel no speculation as to amount RB dome monitor reading 600 R/hr - RB pressure or approximately 1 psig - fence post dose ( l mr/hr - wind blowing to west currently sending monitoring team to Goldsboro 0
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