View source for M170239, GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy - ABWR DCD Markups for COL Information Items for Mitigating Strategies

{{Adams
| number = ML17283A305
| issue date = 10/10/2017
| title = GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy - ABWR DCD Markups for COL Information Items for Mitigating Strategies
| author name = Head J
| author affiliation = Hitachi-GE Nuclear Energy, Ltd
| addressee name = 
| addressee affiliation = NRC/Document Control Desk, NRC/NRR
| docket = 05200045
| license number = 
| contact person = 
| case reference number = M170239
| document type = Design Control Document (DCD), Letter type:M
| page count = 12
}}

=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy Jerald G. Head Senior Vice President, Regulatory Affairs 3901 Castle Hayne Road P.O. Box 780 M/C A-18 Wilmington, NC 28402 USA T 910 233 1134 Jerald.Head@ge.com M170239                                                                Docket Number: 52-045 October 10, 2017 US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001

==Subject:==
ABWR DCD Markups for COL Information Items for Mitigating Strategies As a follow-up to the NRC public teleconference held on September 7, 2017 regarding the ABWR certification renewal application and Reference 1, GEH hereby provides markups to the ABWR Design Control Document (DCD) for COL Information Items for Mitigating Strategies. provides a description of the proposed changes. Enclosure 2 contains the related ABWR DCD markups.
If you have any questions, please contact me or Tim Enfinger (910-819-4881).
Sincerely, Jerald G. Head Senior Vice President, Regulatory Affairs Commitments: No additional commitments are made.

M170239                                                                        Page 2 of 2 October 10, 2017

==Reference:==
: 1. Letter M170020 from Jerald G. Head, GEH, to USNRC, 

==Subject:==
Supplemental Information for GEHs Response to Item # 26 - Fukushima Recommendation 4.2 Mitigation Strategies - of NRC Suggested U.S. Advanced Boiling Water Reactor Design Changes, January 23, 2017

==Enclosures:==
: 1. GEH Proposed Changes to ABWR DCD for COL Information Items for Mitigating Strategies
: 2. GEH ABWR DCD Markups for COL Information Items for Mitigating Strategies cc:    A. Muniz (NRC)
DBR-0032285 R0

Enclosure 1 M170239 GEH Proposed Changes to ABWR DCD for COL Information Items for Mitigating Strategies IMPORTANT NOTICE REGARDING CONTENTS OF THIS DOCUMENT Please Read Carefully The information contained in this document is furnished solely for the purpose(s) stated in the transmittal letter. The only undertakings of GEH with respect to information in this document are contained in the contracts between GEH and its customers or participating utilities, and nothing contained in this document shall be construed as changing that contract. The use of this information by anyone for any purpose other than that for which it is intended is not authorized; and with respect to any unauthorized use, GEH makes no representation or warranty, and assumes no liability as to the completeness, accuracy, or usefulness of the information contained in this document.

M170239                                                                               Page 1 of 1 GEH Proposed Changes to ABWR Design Control Document In a public teleconference with the NRC Staff held on September 7, 2017, GEH proposed adding two Combined Operating License (COL) Information Items to the ABWR Design Control Document (DCD). These COL Information Items would add actions for a future applicant to (1) describe in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) the physical location of external connections for a portable diesel generator and (2) develop procedures for connecting the portable external diesel generators.
These ABWR DCD changes are shown on the attached DCD markups and will be incorporated in Revision 7 of the DCD.
DCD Impact Changes to the following table and sections are proposed as shown on the ABWR DCD markups (Enclosure 2):
* Table 1.9-1, Summary of ABWR Standard Plant COL License Information
* Section 8.3.1.1.2.1, Power Centers
* Section 8.3.4, COL License Information

Enclosure 2 M170239 GEH ABWR DCD Markups for COL Information Items for Mitigating Strategies IMPORTANT NOTICE REGARDING CONTENTS OF THIS DOCUMENT Please Read Carefully The information contained in this document is furnished solely for the purpose(s) stated in the transmittal letter. The only undertakings of GEH with respect to information in this document are contained in the contracts between GEH and its customers or participating utilities, and nothing contained in this document shall be construed as changing that contract. The use of this information by anyone for any purpose other than that for which it is intended is not authorized; and with respect to any unauthorized use, GEH makes no representation or warranty, and assumes no liability as to the completeness, accuracy, or usefulness of the information contained in this document.

Page from M1700020 - no new changes. This page is included to show the external diesel generator connections on the power distribution system.
ABWR 2.12-6 25A5675AA Revision 6 Design Control Document/Tier 1 Electrical Power Distribution System
(;7 '* )(('(5 Figure 2.12.1a Class 1E Electrical Power Distribution System

25A5675AC Revision 6 ABWR                                                                     Design Control Document/Tier 2 Table 1.9-1 Summary of ABWR Standard Plant COL License Information (Continued)
Item No.       Subject                                                                 Subsection 8.4           Offsite Power Systems Design Bases                                       8.2.4.3 8.5           Offsite Power Systems Scope Split                                        8.2.4.4 8.6           Capacity of Auxiliary Transformers                                       8.2.4.5 8.7           Monitoring and Protection Against Design Vulnerabilities                 8.2.4.6 8.8           Diesel Generator Design Details                                          8.3.4.2 8.9           Not Used                                                                 8.3.4.3 8.10          Protective Devices for Electrical Penetration Assemblies                 8.3.4.4 8.11          Not Used       Change:                                                   8.3.4.5 8.12          Not Used 8.11 Physical Locations of Connections for                8.3.4.6 Portable External Diesel Generators 8.13          Not Used                                                                 8.3.4.7 8.12 Develop Procedures for Connecting 8.14          Not Used       Portable External Diesel Generators                       8.3.4.8 8.15          Offsite Power Supply Arrangements                                        8.3.4.9 8.16          Not Used                                                                 8.3.4.10 8.17          Not Used                                                                 8.3.4.11 8.18          Not Used                                                                 8.3.4.12 8.19          Load Testing of Class 1E Switchgear and Motor Control                    8.3.4.13 Centers 8.20          Administrative Controls for Bus Grounding Circuit Breakers               8.3.4.14 8.21          Administrative Controls for Manual Interconnections                      8.3.4.15 8.22          Not Used                                                                 8.3.4.16 8.23          Common Industrial Standards Referenced in Purchase                       8.3.4.17 Specifications 8.24          Administrative Control for Switching 125Vdc Standby Charger              8.3.4.18 8.25          Control of Access to Class 1E Power Equipment                            8.3.4.19 8.26          Periodic Testing of Voltage Protection Equipment                         8.3.4.20 8.27          Diesel Generator Parallel Test Mode                                      8.3.4.21 8.28          Periodic Testing of Diesel Generator Protective Relaying                 8.3.4.22 8.29          Periodic Testing of Diesel Generator Synchronizing Interlocks            8.3.4.23 8.30          Periodic Testing of Thermal Overloads and Bypass Circuitry               8.3.4.24 8.31          Periodic Inspection/Testing of Lighting System                           8.3.4.25 8.32          Controls for Limiting Potential Hazards Into Cable Chases                8.3.4.26 8.33          Periodic Testing of Class 1E Equipment Protective Relaying               8.3.4.27 COL License Information                                                                            1.9-7

25A5675AK Revision 6 ABWR                                                                     Design Control Document/Tier 2 Page from M1700020 - new change in blue.
Non-Class 1E loads being supplied from a Class 1E bus exists only in Division I, as described above for the FMCRDs. Except for associated AC standby and associated DC emergency lighting circuits, non-Class 1E loads are not permitted on Divisions II or III. This prevents any possibility of interconnection between Class 1E divisions.
8.3.1.1.2 Low Voltage Class 1E Power Distribution System 8.3.1.1.2.1 Power Centers Power for 480V auxiliaries is supplied from power centers consisting of 6.9 kV/480V transformers and associated metal clad switchgear (see Figure 8.3-1). There are two power centers in each Class 1E division.
Class 1E 480V power centers supplying Class 1E loads are arranged as independent radial systems, with each 480V bus fed by its own power transformer. Each 480V Class 1E bus in a division is physically and electrically independent of the other 480V buses in other divisions and non-Class 1E load groups.
To deal with an Extended Loss of AC Power (ELAP), external (to the Reactor Building) connections to each 1E RB divisional power center for portable FLEX 480 VAC diesel generators (DG) are installed, normally isolated from the 1E 480 VAC divisional Power Centers by open 1E breakers. The Reactor and Control Building 480 VAC buses can be re-([WHUQDO energized via FLEX DGs, powering the 1E battery chargers, DC buses, and vital buses through UPS. The 480 VAC bus feeder breaker from the 6.9 KV to 480 V transformer and all load breakers on the Power Center will be opened to isolate the bus. The FLEX DG is connected, started, then the bus feeder from the DG is closed, energizing the 480 VAC power center. Power center load breakers are then closed one by one to energize loads (MCCs and discrete loads).
Add Insert #1 The 480V power centers are sized to supply motor control centers and motor loads greater than 100 kW, and up to and including 300 kW. Switchgear for the 480V power centers is of indoor, metal-enclosed type with draw-out circuit breakers which will interrupt maximum fault currents. Control power is from the Class 1E 125 VDC power system of the same Class 1E division.
Power centers are located in their respective divisional equipment areas.
8.3.1.1.2.2 Motor Control Centers The Class 1E 480V MCCs are sized to supply motors 100 kW or smaller, control power transformers, process heaters, motor-operated valves and other small electrically operated auxiliaries, including 480-120V and 480-240V transformers. Class 1E motor control centers are located in their respective divisional areas in proximity to their division loads. Control and instrument power is internal to the MCC.
8.3-10                                                                                     Onsite Power Systems

,16(57
6HFWLRQ


7KH&2/DSSOLFDQWZLOOGHVFULEHWKHDFWXDOGHWDLOVDQGSK\VLFDOORFDWLRQRIWKH
FRQQHFWLRQVIRUWKHSRUWDEOHH[WHUQDOGLHVHOJHQHUDWRUV VHH6HFWLRQ 7KH&2/
DSSOLFDQWZLOOGHYHORSSURFHGXUHVIRUFRQQHFWLQJWKHSRUWDEOHH[WHUQDOGLHVHOJHQHUDWRUV
VHH6HFWLRQ 

25A5675AK Revision 6 ABWR                                                                         Design Control Document/Tier 2 No change on this page -- included to show the heading for Section 8.3.4, COL License Information.
effectively used to provide vertical and horizontal fire-resistive separations between redundant cable divisions.
In any given fire area an attempt is made to insure that there is equipment from only one Class 1E division. This design objective is not always met due to other over-riding design requirements; however, separation requirements of 8.3.3.1 are complied with. In addition an analysis is made and documented in Section 9A.5.5 to ascertain that the requirement of being able to safely shut the plant down with complete burnout of the fire area without recovery of the equipment is met. The fire detection, fire suppression and fire containment systems provided should assure that a fire of this magnitude does not occur, however.
Maximum separation of equipment is provided through location of redundant equipment in separate fire areas. The Class 1E divisional AC medium voltage switchgear, power centers, motor control centers, and DC distribution panels are located to provide separation and electrical isolation between the divisions. Clear access to and from the main switchgear rooms is also provided. Cable chases are ventilated and smoke removal capability is provided. Local instrument panels and racks are separated by safety division and located to facilitate required separation of cabling.
8.3.3.8.3 Fire Detection and Protection Systems All areas of the plant are covered by a fire detection and alarm system. Double manual hose coverage is provided throughout the buildings. Sprinkler systems are provided as listed on Table 9.5.1-1. The diesel generator rooms and day tank rooms are protected by foam sprinkler systems. The foam sprinkler systems are dry pipe systems with pre-action valves which are actuated by compensated rate of heat rise and ultraviolet flame detectors. Individual sprinkler heads are opened by their thermal links.
8.3.4 COL License Information 8.3.4.1 Not Used 8.3.4.2 Diesel Generator Design Details Subsection 8.3.1.1.8.2 (4) requires the diesel generators be capable of reaching full speed and voltage within 20 seconds after the signal to start. The COL applicant will demonstrate the reliability of the diesel generator startup circuitry designed to accomplish this.
8.3.4.3 Not Used 8.3.4.4 Protective Devices for Electrical Penetration Assemblies Appropriate plant procedures shall include periodic testing and calibration of protective devices (except fuses which will be inspected) to demonstrate their functional capability to perform their required safety functions.
Onsite Power Systems                                                                                      8.3-53

25A5675AK Revision 6 ABWR                                                                         Design Control Document/Tier 2 8.3.4.5 Not Used                  See Insert on next page to use these two items.
8.3.4.6 Not Used 8.3.4.7 Not Used 8.3.4.8 Not Used 8.3.4.9 Offsite Power Supply Arrangement The COL applicant operating procedures shall require one of the three divisional buses of Figure 8.3-1 be fed by the alternate power source during normal operation; in order to prevent simultaneous de-energization of all divisional buses on the loss of only one of the offsite power supplies. The selection of that division should be based on the Class 1E bus loads, the reliability/stability of the offsite circuits, and on the separation of the offsite feeds as they pass through the divisional areas.
Continued plant operation will be appropriately limited when the reserve auxiliary transformer is inoperable. See 8.2.4 for COL license information requirements.
8.3.4.10 Not Used 8.3.4.11 Not Used 8.3.4.12 Not Used 8.3.4.13 Load Testing of Class 1E Switchgear and Motor Control Centers The COL applicant will provide procedures for load testing the Class 1E switchgear and motor control centers by operating connected Class 1E loads at 9% to 10% above, and 9% to 10%
below design voltage.
8.3.4.14 Administrative Controls for Bus Grounding Circuit Breakers Figure 8.3-1 shows bus grounding circuit breakers, which are intended to provide safety grounds during maintenance operations. Administrative controls shall be provided by the COL applicant to keep these circuit breakers racked out (i.e., in the disconnect position) whenever corresponding buses are energized (Subsection 8.3.1.1.6.2).
8.3.4.15 Administrative Controls for Manual Interconnections As indicated in Subsection 8.3.1.2(4)(b), the ABWR has capability for manually connecting any plant loads to receive power from any of the six sources. Appropriate plant operating procedures shall prevent paralleling of the redundant onsite Class 1E power supplies.
8.3-54                                                                                         Onsite Power Systems

,QVHUWIRU6HFWLRQDQG6HFWLRQ

3K\VLFDO/RFDWLRQVRI&RQQHFWLRQVIRU3RUWDEOH([WHUQDO'LHVHO*HQHUDWRUV
7KH&2/DSSOLFDQWZLOOGHVFULEHLQWKH)6$5WKHGHWDLOVDQGSK\VLFDOORFDWLRQVRIWKH
FRQQHFWLRQVIRUWKHSRUWDEOHH[WHUQDOGLHVHOJHQHUDWRUV
'HYHORS3URFHGXUHVIRU&RQQHFWLQJ3RUWDEOH([WHUQDO'LHVHO*HQHUDWRUV
7KH&2/DSSOLFDQWZLOOGHYHORSSURFHGXUHVIRUFRQQHFWLQJWKHSRUWDEOHH[WHUQDOGLHVHO
JHQHUDWRUV}}