View source for L-PI-03-108, Revised EPIPs Table of Contents, Rev. 23 to F3-2, Classification of Emergencies, and Rev. 23 to F3-15, Responsibilities of the Radiation Survey Teams During a Radioactive Airborne Release.

{{Adams
| number = ML033370031
| issue date = 11/21/2003
| title = Revised EPIPs Table of Contents, Rev. 23 to F3-2, Classification of Emergencies, and Rev. 23 to F3-15, Responsibilities of the Radiation Survey Teams During a Radioactive Airborne Release.
| author name = Solymossy J
| author affiliation = Nuclear Management Co, LLC
| addressee name = 
| addressee affiliation = NRC/Document Control Desk, NRC/NSIR
| docket = 05000282, 05000306
| license number = DPR-042, DPR-060
| contact person = 
| case reference number = L-PI-03-108
| document report number = F3-15, Rev 23, F3-2, Rev 33
| document type = Emergency Preparedness-Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures, Letter type:L
| page count = 111
}}

=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:INar Commited to Nudrcelenr~ce:
Praire Island Nuclear Generating Plant Operated by Nuclear Management Company, LLC L-PI-03-108 November 21, 2003                                                                 10CFR50.4 U S Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT DOCKETS 50-282 AND 50-306 LICENSE NOS. DPR-42 AND DPR-60 PRAIRIE ISLAND EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES Furnished with this letter are the recent changes to the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures F3. This submittal includes the following documents:
INDEX:
Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures Table of Contents REVISIONS F3-2             Classifications of Emergencies                                           Rev. 33 F3-15             Responsibilities of the Radiation Survey Teams                          Rev. 23 During a Radioactive Airborne Release ADDITIONS:
None DELETIONS:
None TEMPORARY CHANGE DELETIONS:
None INSTRUCTIONS:
Instructions for updating the manual are included.
This letter contains no new commitments and no revisions to existing commitments.
1717 Wakonade Drive East
* Welch, Minnesota 55089-9642 Telephone: 651.388.1121

USNRC                                                NUCLEAR MANAGEMENT COMPANY, LLC L-PI-03-1 08 Page 2 As per 10 CFR 50.4, two copies have also been provided to the NRC Region III Office and one to the NRC Resident Inspector. If you have any questions, please contact Mel Agen at 651-388-1121 Extension 7210.
 "Io JosephM. Solymossy tii*ce President, Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant CC      Steve Orth, USNRC, Region III (2 copies)
NRC Resident Inspector- Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant (w/o attachment)
Attachment 1717 Wakonade Drive East
* Welch, Minnesota 55089-9642 Telephone: 651.388.1121

Mfst Num:                 2003 -   0830                 Date    : 11/12/03 FROM                   : Bruce Loesch/Mary Gadient      Loc     : Prairie Island TO                     : UNDERWOOD, BETTY J Copy Num:                515                            Holder : US NRC DOC CONTROL DESK SUBJECT :                Revisions to CONTROLLED DOCUMENTS Procedure #                                 Rev      Title Revisions:
F3-2                                        33       CLASSIFICATIONS OF EMERGENCIES F3-15                                       23       RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE RADIATION SURVEY DURING A RADIOACTIVE AIRBORNE RELEASE UPDATING INSTRUCTIONS Place this material in your Prairie Island Controlled Manual or File. Remove revised or cancelled material and recycle it.                 Sign and date this letter in the space provided below within ten working days and return to Bruce Loesch or Mary Gadient, Prairie Island Nuclear Plant, 1717 Wakonade Drive E.,
Welch, MN 55089.
Contact Bruce Loesch (ext 4664) or Mary Gadient (ext 4478) if you have any questions.
Received the material stated above and complied with the updating instructions Date

l      PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR        l

==Title:==
l l         GENERATING PLANT           l Emergency Plan Implementing      Procedures TOC      l l                                    l        Effective Date : 11/12/03 X        l NOTE: This set may contain a partial distribution I                 D              I   I l of this Document Type. Please refer to the CHAMPS lApproved By:                          Module for specific Copy Holder Contents.
Docu    t   'BPA       Tsignee                                                      Re Document               Title         :Rev F3-1                   ONSITE EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION                                19 F3-2                   CLASSIFICATIONS OF EMERGENCIES                               33 F3-3                   RESPONSIBILITIES DURING A NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL            18 EVENT F3-4                   RESPONSIBILITIES DURING AN ALERT, SITE AREA,                 28 OR GENERAL EMERGENCY F3-5                   EMERGENCY NOTIFICATIONS                                      22 F3-5.1                 SWITCHBOARD OPERATOR DUTIES                                  8 F3-5.2                 RESPONSE TO FALSE SIREN ACTIVATION                           10 F3-5.3                 RESPONSE TO RAILROAD GRADE CROSSING BLOCKAGE                 8 F3-6                   ACTIVATION & OPERATION OF TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER           17 F3-7                   ACTIVATION & OPERATION OF OPERATIONAL SUPPORT                16 CENTER (OSC)
F3-8                   RECOMMENDATIONS FOR OFFSITE PROTECTIVE ACTIONS               20 F3-8.1                 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR OFFSITE PROTECTIVE ACTIONS FOR           13 THE ON SHIFT EMERGENCY DIRECTOR /SHIFT MANAGER F3-9                  EMERGENCY EVACUATION                                          i8 F3-10                 PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITY                                      19 F3-11                 SEARCH & RESCUE                                               8 F3-12                 EMERGENCY EXPOSURE CONTROL                                    14 F3-13                 OFFSITE DOSE CALCULATION                                      15 F3-13.3                MANUAL DOSE CALCULATIONS                                     11 F3-13.4                MIDAS METEOROLOGICAL DATA DISPLAY                             7 F3-13.5               ALTERNATE METEOROLOGICAL DATA                                 5 Page  1 of 3

I
                                                                                       .41 PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR       Title : Emergency Plan Implementing     Procedures TOC GENERATING PLANT         Effective Date : 11/12/03 Document #           Title                                                       Rev F3-13.6              WEATHER FORECASTING INFORMATION                             12 I.
F3-14.1              ONSITE RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING                              11 F3-14.2              OPERATIONS EMERGENCY SURVEYS                                10 F3-15                RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE RADIATION SURVEY TEAMS              23 DURING A RADIOACTIVE AIRBORNE RELEASE F3-16                RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE RADIATION SURVEY TEAMS              17 DURING A RADIOACTIVE LIQUID RELEASE F3-17                CORE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT                                      11 F3-17.1              CORE DAMAGE DETERMINATION                                   0 F3-18                THYROID IODINE BLOCKING AGENT   (POTASSIUM IODIDE)          10 F3-19                 PERSONNEL & EQUIPMENT MONITORING  & DECONTAMINATION        8 F3-20                DETERMINATION OF RADIOACTIVE RELEASE                        18 CONCENTRATIONS F3-20.1              DETERMINATION OF STEAM LINE DOSE RATES                      9 F3-20.2              DETERMINATION OF SHIELD BUILDING VENT STACK                 9 DOSE RATES F3-21                 ESTABLISHMENT OF A SECONDARY ACCESS CONTROL POINT          10 F3-22                 PRAIRIE ISLAND RADIATION PROTECTION GROUP RESPONSE         17 TO A MONTICELLO EMERGENCY F3-23                 EMERGENCY SAMPLING                                         19 F3-23.1              EMERGENCY HOTCELL PROCEDURE                                 13 F3-24                RECORD KEEPING DURING AN EMERGENCY                          7 F3-25                REENTRY                                                     8 F3-26.1              OPERATION OF THE ERCS DISPLAY                               7 F3-26.2              RADIATION MONITOR DATA ON ERCS                              7 F3-26.3              ERDS - NRC DATA LINK                                        1 F3-29                EMERGENCY SECURITY PROCEDURES                               18 I2 Page  2 of 3

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR      Title : Emergency Plan Implementing    Procedures TOC GENERATING PLANT         Effective Date : 11/12/03 Document #           Title                                                    Rev F3-30                TRANSITION TO RECOVERY                                   6 F3-31                RESPONSE TO SECURITY-RELATED THREATS                     8 F3-32                REVIEW OF EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS DURING OR AFTER         2 NATURAL DISASTER EVENTS Page  3 of 3

J. C PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT                         EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES h*' R-ERENCE'
* Procedure segments may be performed from memory.
* Use the procedure to verify segments are complete.
                       . Mark off steps within segment before continuing.
* Procedure should be available at the work location.
O.C. REVIEW DATE:     I .. l....-,                                                  _   An._ An__
EFFECTIVE DATE
                                   .......ryI1 ,;
      ,/./J j C/  a3 M. Werner                         ll -(2-6-2 Page 1 of 14

I WI PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT                       EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES KJ TABLE OF CONTENTS Section                                        Title                                           Page 1.0       PURPOSE .............                                                                      3 2.0       APPLICABILITY .............                                                                3 3.0       PRECAUTIONS                                        ..                                      3 4.0       RESPONSIBILITIES                                       ..                                  4 5.0       DISCUSSION .............. :       ;.4 5.1   Definitions                                    .4 5.2   Emergency Action Levels .....................                                        6 5.3   The Emergency Classification/Declaration/lmplementation Process                 .6 5.4   Technical Specification Required Shutdown NUEs                    .8 5.5   Rapidly Escalating then De-escalating Events          ;9 5.6   The Emergency Action Level Reference Manual Number .10 6.0       PREREQUISITES                    ............                                            10 7.0                                                     . .P.RO. .EDURE.... .11     .............. 1 LIST OF ATTACHMENTS Attachment 1 - Summary of Emergency Action Levels iJ Page 2 of 14

N i
PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT                       EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES 1.0     PURPOSE The purpose of this procedure is to specify the Emergency Action Levels that indicate an emergency condition exists and to properly classify the emergency into one (1) of the four (4) graded levels of emergency classifications. This procedure partially satisfies the requirement of 10CFR50.47 concerning the existence of an emergency classification and action level scheme.
2.0     APPLICABILITY This instruction SHALL apply to all Shift Managers (SM), Shift Supervisors (SS), Control Room Operators'(CRO), Emergency Directors (ED) and'Emergency Managers (EM).
3.0     PRECAUTIONS                                            I ..
3.1    This procedure SHALL be entered wheb'nev6r'there is indicatiori6f an Emergency Action Level being exceeded.
3.2    Attempt to verify the indications by' checking secondary or coincident indicators.
3.3    An emergency classification should be made based on current plant conditions
                    .described in Attachment 1 .of this .procedure.       .    ': '
3.4    These emergency classifications do not apply to offsite trarispoh1atish incidents that do NOT affect safe operation of the plant. Currently, the Radiation Protection group is responsible for offsite transportation incident assessment involving plant related shipments.
3.5     Continuously monitor the Control Room instrumentation, radiation monitors, or any other developments which would be indicative of further system degradation. Be I
prepared to escalate to a more severe emergency classification.
Page 3 of '14

RNNTP>:E PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT                            EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES CLASSIFICATIONS OF EMERGENCIES                             .        1-3V REV:      33 4.0       RESPONSIBILITIES 4.1      Duty Shift Manager has the responsibility to authorize the initial emergency classification.
4.2      Shift Supervisor of the unaffected unit has the responsibility to assist the Shift Manager as necessary including authorization of an emergency classification.
4.3      Shift Supervisor of the affected unit has the responsibility to direct activities related to the operation of the affected unit.
4.4      Emergency Director has the responsibility to authorize an emergency classification whenever an'Alert, Site Area, or General Emergency is declared and the EOF is not activated.
If - -     - I -
   .. I;j   . ,: .
4.5',    If the EOF is activated and fully functional, the Emergency Manager has the responsibility to authorize an emergency classification.
4.6      Control Room Operatb'rs and affected unit Shift Supervisor have the responsibility to assist the Shift Manager or unaffected unit Shift Supervisorin the identification and verification of control board indications.               u 5.0      DISCUSSION 5.1      Definitions
                     .,,, *  ~
                            ., ,. iJ 5.1.1         Notification of Unusual Event - events that are in progress or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant.
No releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response or monitoring are expected unless further degradation of safety systems occurs.
KJ.
Page 4 of 14

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT                       EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES 5.1.2    Alert - events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant. It is the lowest level of emergency classification when some necessity for emergency planning and offsite response is necessary.
Any releases expected are limited to'small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels.
5.1.3    Site Area Emergency - events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or likely major failure of plant functions needed for protection of the public.
Any releases are not expected to exceed the EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels except near the site boundary.
5.1.4    General Emergency - events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or imminent substantial core degradation or melting with a potential for loss of containment integrity."
Releases during a General Emergency can be reasonably expected to exceed the EPA Prot6ctiv6'Action Guideline exposure levels offsite for more than the'immediate'sitearea.
5.1.5    Emergency Action Levels (EAL) - specific instrument readings, surface or airborne contamination levels or radiation dose rates that designate a specific emergency class requiring emergency measures for that class.
5.1.6    Safety System(s) refers to systems that are required to be functional during and following a design basis accident or.transient to ensure the capability to shut 'down the reactor and.maintain it in a safe condition; or the capability to prevent or ritigate the consequences of accidents, which could result in off-site exposures'comparable toIhe guidelines of 10CFR1 00; or the integrity of the Reactor Coolant System pressure boundary. The structures and components of a Safety System are "Safety Related SSC."    .   .      ,,       ..        :
Page 5 of 14

I                                             I   - -              --
                                                                                                    -~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
W' EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES 5.2 Emergency Action Levels (EALs)
Attached to this procedure is a Summary of Emergency Action Levels, Attachment. 1. This summary identifies the four emergency classifications, the initiating condition(s), emergency action levels for each classification, and, where applicable, specific instruments and indication's to be used to detect and classify an emergency.
The emergency action levels for each classification and the instrument readings and indications listed do not reflect a complete list of instrumentation that will show abnormal indications but does list those key parameters useful in classifying the event.
The Su'mmary of Emergency Action Levels lists are based 'on the initiating conditions'as required by. Appendix 1 of NUREG-0654, accidents analyzed in the
              -Frairie Island USAR, and the NRC Branch Position on Acceptable Deviations From NUREG-06541 FEMA-REP-1, July 11, 1994.
        .5.
The Emergency ClassificationlDeclaration/lmplementation Process There are three distinct phases to consider: Classification, Declaration and Implementation.

====5.3.1 Classification====
The act of assessing the EALs to determine the appropriate classification for which the ongoing events are categorized.
Classification is expected to be made promptly following indication that the conditions have reached an emergency threshold in accordance with the EAL scheme. Promptly is a period not to exceed 15 minutes.

====5.3.2 Declaration====
The act of formally declaring the classification based on the assessment of EALs.
This is the point at which the classification time is set and the 10CFR50, App. E 15-minute offsite notification clock starts.

====5.3.3 Implementation====
The-act of making the notification and/or augmentation of the emergency organizations.
Page 6 of 14

I PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT                                     EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NUMBER:
y>  Am,,.':          1CLASSIFICATIONS OF EMERGENCIES                                                               F3-2 REV:     33 5.3.4         Classification Timeliness:
Guidance for classification timeliness is provided in NRC Branch Position on Timeliness of Classification of Emergency Conditions, EPPOS No. 2 and the NRC endorsed Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, NEI 99-02.' The 'guidance is'summarized as follows:
Classification is expected to be made promptly following indications that conditions have reached an emergency threshold in accordance with the EAL scheme. Promptly is a period not to exceed 15 minutes. This 15-minute criterion is a reasonable period'o time for assessing and classifying emergencies.
5.3.5         Ideally, the Emergency Notification Report Form.(FINGP 577) should be conilducttneard       comp'letion while the classification phase is being
                                   -conducted'. Once the declaration is made'by-the SM/EDiEM, the 15-minute'offsite notificati'n'tiriie.starts. The'SMED/EM.should review the K.>                                contents of the Emergency Notification Reiport'Formn (PINGP 577) to ensure its completeness, verify the correct declaration time and then sign the form which gives permission to the Shift Emergency Communicator (or Offsite Communicator in EOF) to implement the E-Plan notifications.
5.3.6        Per 10CFR50.72 (a)(3) NRC notification is required immediately after the notification of the state and local agencies (which is completed within about 15 minutes) and not later than one hour after the emergency declaration.
                                          ~~.       . . .                   .   .
                        .     .,           '                 .  -I            .
Page 7 of 14

V EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES KJ~:
5.4                Technical Specification Required Shutdown NUEs 5.4.1  In some cases, exceeding Technical Specification limits (e.g., RCS leakage, reactor coolant activity, etc.) is considered to be precursors to more serious events and warrant declaration of an NUE.
5.4.2  In other cases, exceeding Technical Specification limits for the period designated in the T.S. ACTIONS Table is an analyzed condition of the plant and does not, by itself, represent an emergency. These events are reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 as a non-emergencies.
However, if the plant is not brought to the required operating mode within the allowable Technical Specifications action statement time limit
                                         'T.S. ACTIONS Table'COMPLETION Time, then a declaration of an' Unusual Event should be declared.
           .1- r I       .
: 1. -...
            "I
         ; !, ... -            ,   5.4.3  With regard to Emergency Plan classifications, Operations should handle a I, .     .     , . 'I 1.            Technical Specification required shutdown in the following manner:
: , .       -     ; I A. The conditions of the p;lant'should come first. That is, if the condition warrants initiating power reduction immediately, do so. The E-Plan classification can appropriately follow.
B. Following the initiationiof the reduction in power or temperature, the
                                               -classification phase of the E-Plan is. started. Review of the EALs
                .      .   .     .              should be done to assess for proper classification.? ,Once the Shift
                   .i       .:-,:,-  .:         Manager. has determined the appropriate classification for the event, the:Shift; Manager should declare the classification and note the time of declaration (this begins the 15-minute offsite notification clock).
C. Once the declaration is made, the Shift Manager should review the          I contents of the Emergency Notification Report Form (PINGP 577) to ensure its completeness, verify the correct declaration time and then sign the form which gives permission to the Shift Emergency Communicator to implement the E-Plan notifications.
Page,8 of 14

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT                                 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NUMBER:
CLASSIFICATIONS OF EMERGENCIES                                                  F3-2 REV:       33 5.5     Rapidly Escalating then De-escalating Events In the case of 'an event that rapidly escalates then de-escalates or begins at a higher emergency class then rapidly de-escalates, the initial emergency classification should be based on current plant conditions.
It may be discovered that a condition existed which met the emergency plan criteria but no emergency was declared and the basis for the emergency class no longer exists at the time of this discovery. This may be due to a rapidly concluded event or an oversight in the emergency classification made during the event or it may be determined during a post-event review. The NRC staff does not consider actual declaration of the emergency class to be necessary in these circumstances; an ENS notification (or an' ENS update if the previously reported event was misclassified) within one hour of.the discovery of the undeclared (or misclassified) event provides'an'acceptabl6 alternative.-
                                             *~~~~~~~~~~2 *     *.... t
                                                            .; -.I The NRC should be informed of the current emergency classification and the highest emergency classification' reached during the course of thevevent during the initial NRC notification via the ENS phone. The Shift Manager should ensure that this notification be performed by an appropriate individual other than the SEC using PINGP Form 666, Event Notification Worksheet.
To avoid possible confusion, other offsite authorities will be informed of the current classification during the initial notification and then given the full description of the highest emergency classification reached during the first update on the follow-up notification.. In those cases where no classification is declared, then 5AWI 3.6.4, Notifications.Regarding Plant Media Sensitive Events or Conditions, should be
               -utilized to make proper calls to the state and local government organizations regarding the rapidly escalating and de-escalating event.
Page   9o. 1.
Page 9 of 14

II PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT                                     EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES i,
* XC Ok-1                  :fS1                                                                     NUMBER:
X      3ii Xj1&~
                                *g Il CLASSIFICATIONS Ig                     OF EMERGENCIES REV:
F3-2 33 5.6                 The Emergency Action Level Reference Manual Number Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant has prepared a written manual (EAL Reference Manual) to provide general information about Emergency Action Levels to offsite authorities who are involved in nuclear plant emergency planning. This manual provides a description with text and drawings of the various conditions that might cause the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant to classify an event. By understanding what a particular condition or event means, emergency workers at the various offsite'agencies should develop a clear idea of what is occurring at the plant during the emergency.
Each initiating condition in this procedure is followed by a cross reference number that corresponds to the appropriate classification condition in the EAL Reference Manual: :When tIhe Emergency Notification Report Form (PINGP 577) is completed, the initiatin'd condition statement and the EAL Reference Manual cross reference number sho'uld'be included on the'form by'using the label from "Emergency Initiating.Conditions Labels -7PINGPI.1 89" or writing this information as it appears in the shaded box on the appropriate page in the Summary of Emergency Action Levels. '':         '' '- '^' '  ' ' ''     ''
6.0     PREREQUISITES An off-normal condition corresponding to one of the initiating events described in Attachment 1 of this procedure is occurring or has occurred.
                                        .L,                          '                               I. ._-.:
             ;"';'.i.i'i'.'.':;''.--' .      .                               '''. . ':.'.'.'.,':;..'
Page 10 of 14

j PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT                           EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NUMBER:
CLASSIFICATIONS OF EMERGENCIES                                     REV:     3-2
_Vlk                  ~      ~~~~~~~~~~E:33 7.0     PROCEDURE 7.1     Any significant event that may be classified as an emergency condition SHALL be reported to the Shift Supervisor, Shift Manager and/or Emergency Director immediately.
OTElr             It is an expectation that the emergency declaration will be made j4ly   promptly (within 15 minutes) upon reaching the EAL threshold.
Expectations for use of "SS, SM or ED Opinion".EAL statements:
5XSS, SM or ED Opinion" means that the decision maker Is to ensure the declaration Is made when conditions meet the EAL Initiating condition statement. The "opinion"lIs NOT a reason to dismiss any aNTE:        g     valid conditions that meet ani EAL threshold value. Judgme~nt Is to be used for any condition iot explicitly detailed as a set of EAL; I
                              -  threshold values, which is'a potential degradation in the level of safety of the plant. Classification of an emergency Is not to be' delayed pending an extended evaluation of possibilities and probabilities.
7.2    Attempt to verify the initial indication by comparing the indication to redundant instrument channels or to other related parameters, visual observations, and field reports'as applicable.                -
7.3    The Shift Manager, unaffected unit Shift Supervisor or Emergency Director SHALL assess the situation and determine the emergency classification, using the guidelines of Attachment 1.
7.4     Inthose cases when an event rapidly escalates, then de-escalates or begins at a higher classification, then rapidly de-escalates, the initial emergency classification should be based on current plant conditions.
7.4.1. Inform the NRC of th6 current emergency classification and the highest emergency classification 'reached during the course of the event during the initial NRC ENS notification.
Page 11 of 14

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT                      EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES 7.4.2    It may be discovered that a condition existed which met the emergency plan criteria but no emergency was declared and the basis for the emergency class no longer exists at the time of this discovery. This may be due to a rapidly concluded event or an oversight in the emergency classification made during the event or it may be determined during a post-event review. The NRC staff does not consider actual declaration of the emergency class to be necessary in these circumstances; an ENS notification (or an ENS update if the previously reported event was misclassified) within one hour of the discovery of the undeclared (or misclassified) event provides an acceptable alternative.
7.4.3    In those cases where no classification is declared, then 5AWI 3.6.4, Notifications Regarding Plant Media Sensitive Events or Conditions, should be utilized tolmake proper calls to state and local government organizations regarding the event.
7.5     The Shift Supervisor of the affected unit should take immediate actions, using applicable plant operating procedures to return the plant to normal (or Mode 5, Cold Shutdown, if determined to be necessary).
7.6     IF the EOF is not activated, THEN the Shift Manager or Emergency Director SHALL declare the appropriate emergency classification and perform actions as specified in the appropriate responsibility procedure applicable to emergency classification:
7.6.1    For a Notification of Unusual Event, proceed to F3-3.
7.6.2    For an Alert, Site or General Emergency, proceed to F3-4.
* n *.   -     .  .;.-I IFthe EOF isaictivaied, THEN contact the Emergency Manager for consultation on whether or not to change the emergency classification. The Emergency Director is
             - responsible to formulate the new classification while the Emergency Manager is responsible to authorize the reclassification.
7.7     Continue to assess and watch for changing parameters or visual indication of further system degradation and be prepared to escalate to a more severe emergency classification as indicated by the Emergency Action Levels in Attachment 1.
Page 12 of 14

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT                         EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NUMBER:
I CLASSIFICATIONS OF EMERGENCIES                                         F3-2
                   +                                    go                                   .
REV:    33 7.8     As plant conditions stabilize during a Notification of an Unusual Event (NUE) or Alert, consider terminating the event'classification.l 7.8.1    For the NUE and Alert classifications, the event may be terminated once the following criteria are met:
A. The plant is in stable condition with at least one fission product barrier intact, and B. Radioactive gaseous and liquid effluent are being controlled within the following limits:
: 1. Gaseous effluent release rates (or resulting dose rates) are within plant limits as defined in Section 3.1 of H4, Offsite Dose
                     -       f  -   : Calculation Manual (ODCM), and               ; i
: 2. Liquid effluent release rates (or resulting concentrations) are within the plant limits as defined in "Old 10CFR20 Appendix B in Table II, Colurni.2 (April 1992)" located in H4, ODCM, Table 4.3 and      -
C. The potential for future degradation of plant conditions is small.
7.8.2    Termination of an NUE classification may be performed by the Shift Manager. Review of'5AWI 1.13.0, Plant Event nvestigation and Recovery, should be completed to determine if this procedure needs to be implemented and the Plant Manager informed of the review.
7.8.3    Termination of an Alert classification may be performed by the Emergency Director when the EOF is not activated. Once the EOF is fully functional, the Emergency Manager SHALL terminate the Alert classification when the conditions are met for termination.
                                           ..     ~~~~        .               .  .
Page 13 of 14

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT                               EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES
          *  -.. pf~ k 4            . .      a~rZ      a U.fU% uf    a   ia5      ~  U~
: } IREV:                                                                           33 7.8.4     Termination of an Alert classification includes the dismissal of the site Emergency Response Organization. Any necessary in-plant or on-site follow-up activities should be coordinated and managed by the normal plant site organization. In some cases, conditions may require the establishment of a Recovery Organization in which case the Emergency Director and Emergency Manager should make this determination based on the extent of damage or other considerations. In this case 5AWI 1.13.0 should be reviewed and implemented as determined appropriate.
7.9     As plant conditions stabilize during a Site Area or General Emergency, consider transition to the Recovery phase.
7..TrIF the Site Area Emergency event does not require cignificant repairs or analysis beyond the capabilities of the normal plant site organization and the conditions of 7.8.1. A, ONTO ~~B.&C are met, THEN the Site Area Emergency may be 79        See Fi-iterminated without a transition to Recovery. However review 7.9.3     ReviewandImplementation Sof AWI 1.13.0 should be completed as appropriate.
7.9.1     Transition to Recovery should be directed by the Emergency Manager with coordinated recovery planning by the site Emergency Response Organization.
7.9.2     See F3-30, "Recovery", for instruction on transition to Recovery.
7.9.3     Review and implementation of 5AWI 1.13.0 should be completed as appropriate.
Page 14 of 14

EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE

==SUMMARY==

OF EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS l Definition of logic symbols:
AND symbol=
OR symbol =
Page 1 of 60

I PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT                           EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE INITIATING CONDITION INDEX No.                              Condition Description                         Page 1       Safety System Functions                                                3 2        Abnormal Primary Leak Rate                                             4 3        Deleted                                                                8 4       Abnormal Primary/Secondary Leak                                        9 5       Core Fuel Damage                                                      13 6       Loss of 2 of 3 Fission Product Barriers                               15 7        Secondary Coolant Anomaly                                             21 8       Radiological Effluents                                                26 9       Major Electrical Failures                                             31 10       Control Room Evacuations                                              35 11       Fires                                                                 36 12       Plant Shutdown Functions                                              38 13       Fuel Handling Accidents                                               44 14       Deleted                                                               46 15       Deleted                                                               46 16       Security Threats                                                      47 17       Hazards to Plant Operations                                           48 18       ISFSI (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation) Events            53 19       Natural Events                                                        54 20       Other                                                                 59 Page 2 of 60

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1.                                                                                                     REV. 33 Page 3 of 60 Condition 1: Safety System Functions IFailure~I~of
                       ~ ~asafety.or
                            ~          re lef valve in asafety
                          ~~~~~~~~~~~~.1-           1          -r related system.ir.
                                                                                   -   . (EAL Ref Manual 1 B) tt cls j-olwnreutotfapplicable 92i>'t'-i}
2>4,,_ X';<,~t~lt,,Z-' a; 4tiv ,!
j'resr.-
: '.9 '-t.,./
f.e.
                                                                                '< w''
* Visual and/or audible indication at discharge of open steam generator I safety or relief valve Notification of Unusual Event C u C i As determined by SS or SM          I a-06            Pressurizer safety     > 185 F & NOT R:
CU                     valve outlet decreasing temperature, TI-436 Pressurizer safety     > 185 IF & NOT valve outlet decreasing temperature, TI-437 Pressurizer relief    > 185 eF & NOT Ca                 valve outlet decreasing
      'a-     temperature, TI-438 to Acoustic Monitors indicate flow from either the pressurizer Ci Qa-      PORV's or safeties
:U PZR Pressure on at < 2335 psig
       &#xa3;0 least 2/3 channels I N-"
PRT Level increasing PRT Temperature increasing
                                                                                                         '-I PRT Pressure I increasing

I                                                                                                      I F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1                                                                                                    REV. 33 Page 4 of 60 Condition 2: Abnormal Primary Leak ePrirnarwsystem:lealqrate-from. Unidentified 'oru-$'
u~ncontro~lle'd sores exeding-tncl.g'                     (EAL Ref Manual 2A)
Primary system leak rate, other than controlled leakage sources, exceeds T.S.3.4.14                                             Notification of Unusual Event Requires a unit shutdown, as determined by the SM or SS I Reactor power reduction or cooldown has been initiated I t)/~~.R~.'1. - .. lav Pnmarcoola~lea              I i rh
                            ,at_1gre    .2>i    50gp            (EAL Ref Manual 2B1)
                        ;t4W~~~~~aW2X~Ak,.
Mode 1,2,3, or4
                                                                                     -b- Alert
* Sum of charging line flow + seal injection flow >50 gpm more than the sum of letdown flow + RCP seal                                             * 'Ntotwe leakoff flow                                             A rapid temperature decrease in the RCS results Inthe same indications SS, SM, or ED opinion
* Decreasing pressurizer level, as indicated by LI-426, U-427, LI-428 R2 (Containment Area Rad Mon)
R7 (Containment Area Rad Mon)
R-1 1(Containment Vent Rad Mon)
[Containment Position]
R-1 2 (Containment Vent Rad Mon)
[Containment Position]

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1                                                                                                   REV. 33 Page 5 of 60 Condition 2: Abnormal Primary Leak
 'LOCA
   &     w& ikth     ea rate I        M          anu al    pumc        )
     -~~~wthfaliz~re                     I .or&sect;!rgei                       (EAL Ref Manual 2C)
Mode 1, 2, 3, or 4l T.S. >200 'F Site Area I ... . . . . ..           J        u     l         w    Emergency Si Actuated annunciator illuminated I
                                               '-I
       'A SG is not depressurizing in an uncontrolled manner I ABE SG is not depressurizing in an uncontrolled manner High containment radiation levels High containment sump levels High containment humidity High containment pressure RCS Pressure I c No SI Flow I                  _
Subcooling l < 20F
                                                                                               ',I...   ,

I F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1                                                                                     REV. 33 Page 6 of 60 Condition 2: Abnormal Primary Leak Smai    OQCA and rnnitlallI     cen      eaCS
                                             -re  BYE v~severti teour~lsm,Adaeto.            melt      i(EAL Ref Manual 2D)
Mode 1, 2, 3 or 4    T.S. >200 F I''I
* g -ir.
o General LOCA has occurred                                                                   Emrgnc SS, SM or ED opinion that loss of ECCS is imminent Containment temp has become excessive, and is >3                                                    ,
still rising Containment pressure is >23 psia high and increasing l Operating containment      zero spray pumps Operating containment fan < One tri coil unit trains  O    t

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES' ATTACHMENT 1                                                                                          REV. 33 Page 7 of 60 Condition 2: Abnormal Primary Leak Small and large LOCA's with failure ofECCS to,,;-,&'ifY P Frn eaTrls to seve cisrd'd e dainifin                            (EAL Ref Manual 2E) liklyfr mlt eqencesf,-
Mode 1,2, 3, or 4     T.S. >200 F General SS, SM or ED opinion that                                                            Emergency core cooling capability does not exist High Head SI failure o -Joc.JU Low Head SI failure High dose equivalent 1-131 as determined by sample I                                ,Ci      d analysis Valid high radiaiton R-48              3
         ~     (Containment High Range           >,1x1O   ,hr Area Rad Mon)
Valid high radiaiton R-49 (Containment High Range           , ix 10   /hr Area Rad Mon)
Decreasing RCS pressure l                               >
Low subcooling margin andl          <10  F decreasing
            'A SG is not depressurizing        I in an uncontrolled manner       I 1BSG is not depressurizing        I            w in an uncontrolled manner       I o      Pressurizer Low Pressure < 1900      r Sig TripI o      RCS pressure decreasing I o                      uncontrollably I High containment radiation levels High containment sump levels High containment humidity High containment pressure

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1                                                                      REV. 33 Page 8 of 60 Condition 3: Abnormal Coolant Temperature/Pressure DELETED Deleted based on NRC Branch Position On Acceptable Deviations From Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, July 11, 1994.

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1                                                                                           REV. 33 Page 9 of 60 Condition 4: Abnormal Primary / Secondary Leak Ilrtmary /Seconda SkIfi8tt eakrateexceedingeclin              ca
                                                                          , rt (EAL Ref Manual 4A)
SG primary to secondary I           150 GPD through any 1 SG Notification of leakage exceeds I                                                          Unusual Event T.S.3.4.14 limits K,'}^Wifi-x     KE E ~~ '@XtF
                   .PnmsySecnday lb'.', ,4-'~~, toJg lak~te~reaerihan50g gpm.
W                    (EAL Ref Manual 4B)
T.S. >200 IF Mode 1,2, 3, or4 Decreasing pressurizer level                                            Alert LU-426, LU-427, LI-428 R15 (Air Ejector Rad Mon)
Sum of charging line flow plus seal injection greater than 50 gpm more than the sum of Letdown Flow and RCP Seal Leakoff flow SS, SM, ED opinion

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1                                                                                REV. 33 Page 10 of 60 Condition 4: Abnormal Primary /Secondary Leak ur~fsta  gnertortube s)         ~
il, n CSY (EAL Ref Manual 4C)
                                       ~ IM "SI Actuated " annunciator illuminated on the Aqua panel Alert Safety Injection Flow indicated by FI-925 and/or FI-924 and pump discharge pressure corresponding to flow Lo Pzr pressure; PI-429,PI-430, P1-431 PZR level cannot be maintained on at least 2/3 channels LI-426, LI-427, LI-428 R-51 Steam Line Rad Monitor R-52 Steam Line Rad Monitor R-15 Air Ejector Rad Monitor Unexpected Rise in either SG level

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1                                                                                                            REV. 33 Page 11 of 60 Condition 4: Abnormal Primary /Secondary Leak Failuirei osteam generator tube(s) resulting rfriECCS- !.*c;--,,
4 :,.)N (EAL Ref Manual 4D)
         .actuationfand high potentialforldssof'conta nft6n*T&-
                     '4'X,- t-w-# > .1, a   :Jes-ad;7c    os*.--' A, ;*.'fv;t,:,'-itD     .k
             'SI Actuated " annunciator illuminated on the Aqua panel Site Area Safety Injection Flow indicated by FI-925                                                             Emergency 10             and/or FI-924 and pump discharge co pressure corresponding to flow LU Lo Pzr pressure; PI-429,PI-430, P1-431 co  PZR level cannot be maintained on at least
(-
2/3 channels Ll-426, Ll-427, Ll-428
      @2 R-51 Steam Line Rad Monitor R-52 Steam Line Rad Monitor R-15 Air Ejector Rad Monitor
    -U) t:o            Unexpected Rise in either SG level 0~
Indications of a steam line break outside containment, upstream of the ruptured Steam Generator MSIV Failure of ruptured Steam Generator MSIV to close with indications of steam line break downstream of MSIV Ruptured SG safety or relief valve opens and then fails to reseat indicated by visual and/or audible indication at discharges As determined by SS, SM, or ED N 6t-';'r64'If steam break is outside containment with SG tube rupture and fuel failure, this may be a General Emergency. See Condition # 6, Case 2.

I                                                                                                      I F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1                                                                                                 REV. 33 Page 12 of 60 Condition 4: Abnormal Primary /Secondary Leak o af e j C(EAL Ref Manual 4E)
        *SI Actuated annunciator illuminated on the Aqua panel  I oSieArea
    .^. Safety Injection Flow indicated by FI-925 U           and/or FI-924 and pump discharge                                                          Emergency pressure corresponding to flow s::   Lo Pzr pressure; PI-429,PI-430, Pl-431      < 1815 psig                              .
PZR level cannot be maintained on at I >5%                        W ffi  least 2/3 channels LI-426, LI-427, LI-428 R-51 Steam Line Rad Monitor R-52 Steam Line Rad Monitor      > bk 4
R-1 5 Air Ejector Rad Monitor >2x10 cpm Unexpected Rise in either SG level
                                                      < 3500 Volts 4.16 KV Bus 11 [211, 4119304 [41728041 4.16 KV Bus 12 [22],4119305 [4172805] l                       '350Volts
                                                      < 3500 Volts 4.16 KV Bus 13 123], 4119306 [41728061
                                                      < 3500 Volts 4.16 KV Bus 14 [24],4119307 [4172807]1 o                                D1 [D5] Tach 900 rpm 11200 rpm)
D1 [D51 Gen Volts    4000 - 4400 volts   T o     Safeguard Bus 15 [25] source from DG closed, Breaker 15-2 [25-2]
oF D2 [D6 ] Tach 1900 rpm [1 200 rpml 4000 -4400 voltsr D2 [D6 ] Gen Volts                         l Safeguard Bus 16 [26] source from DG closed, Breaker 16-9 [26-16]

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1                                                                                         REV. 33 Page 13 of 60 Condition 5: Core Fuel Damage Fuel Damage                     r.4.- Indlcatl&
(EAL Ref Manual 5A)
R-9 (Letdown Une Rad Mon in alarm Notification of R-9                        Unusual Event.
R9 confirmed by portable instrumentation High coolant activity sample exceeding T.S.3.4.17 limit on primary coolant iodine activity which requires a unit shutdown.
lSf t;,               .- e   b.<
           .Severe Loss of fuel cladding                    (EAL Ref Manual 5B)
I   . S  +, v  ,,i   w      SK.
Dose equivalent 1-131 Alert R-9 (Letdown Line Rad Mon) in alarm R-9 R-9 confirmed by portable Instrumentation

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1                                                                        REV. 33 Page 14 of 60 Condition 5: Core Fuel Damage x Degrded  a?                          (EAL Ref Manual 5C)
SS, SM, or ED opinion                                 Site Area Emergency Core Delta T increasing o o&deg; l             No core Delta T Dose Equivalent 1-131 > 300 uCVcc
                                      > 1200TF a 2    Core exit thermocouples , 700 F RVLIS full range <41
* F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1                                                                                               REV. 33 Page 15 of 60 Condition 6: Loss of 2 of 3 Fission Product Barriers Loss of 2 of 3 fission product barriers with a potential loss of 3rd barrier. (EAL Ref Manual 6)
GENERAL EMERGENCY
              'Gus-i        'r   1. Three permutations exist for loss of 2 of 3 fission
                ^    l   .     ~~~~product barriers with a potential loss of 3rd barrier; l    M w     a-     ~A. Failure of cladding and primary coolant l l li                ~~~boundary with potential loss of containment...
B. Failure of cladding and containment with potential loss of primary coolant boundary.
C. Failure of containment and primary coolant boundary with potential loss of cladding.-
These 3 permutations are represented In the following 5 cases, each with Its own set of EAL's:
: 2. All cases are applicable to operations in Modes 1, 2,3,
                                     & 4.                   .*

I F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1                                                                                  REV. 33 Page 16 of 60 Condition 6: Loss of 2 of 3 Fission Product Barriers
_____       Loss
__                              poteptialifor loss of
                          -                                        A4 (EAL Ref Manual 6) contaInment.
Valid high radiation R-48 (Containment High Range Area            1x10 3 R/hr Rad Mon)
U 0               Valid high radiation R-49     >                                           General (Containment High Range Area         F    tXl&  R/hr                               Emergency Rad Mon) 10
: r.                 Dose equivalent 1-131      > 300 uCVcc 0
Pressurizer low pressure trip       1900 psia Cu            RCS pressure decreasing
: 0.                         uncontrollably 0
High containment pressure U) 2-.
High containment humidity IC Cu High containment sump levels 0
to ta           High containment radiation, 0                                    levels A' SG is not depressurizing in an uncontrolled manner
          'B3 SG is not depressurizing in an uncontrolled manner I -nntntnmant nnnrnrnhinn I      .        _   JR --:-
CU design pressure and increasing I 0
0            Control Room containment U)    isolation status lights for Train A and B indicate open or partially.
open for any containment penetration U-                SS, SM, or ED opinion
 .2 0                 Operating containment Zero CU                          spray pumps 0
0.
Operating containment fan        One train coil unit trains

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1                                                                                                                      REV. 33 Page 17 of 60 Condition 6: Loss of 2 of 3 Fission Product Barriers
             .Case 2: -Loss'ofcaS                uerpueadhg         oe   al-.5-,S       (EAL Ref Manual 6) if-or itsvo conain                          eng0g          ,
Indications of a steam line break        I outside containment, upstream of          I                                             Pi z                           the ruptured SG MSIV                                                                    General
                                                                                                                  > ffiEmergency Failure of ruptured SG MSIV to close with indications of steam I-C line break Ruptured SG stuck open safety or relief valve indicated by visual and/or audible steam relief As determined by SS, SM, or ED 0.
R-51 (Loop A Steam Line) kU
:C t                                                                                            . 11 .. . -       ....
                                                                                                                          .  :: .1; I
R-52 (Loop B Steam Line)
R-15 (Air Ejector)
Unexpected Rise in either SG level Cl)
Si Actuated annunciator illuminated on Aqua panel
                                                                                                       .-    .: .. I. ...
Si flow indicated by Fl-925 and/or I      .   .. 1 0
4:I                    Fl-924 and pump discharge pressure corresponding to flow tol                                 Lo PZR pressure Pl-429, Pl-430, Pl-431 PZR level cannot be maintained on at least 2/3 channels LI-426, LI-427, LI-428 Dose equivalent 1-131
    -J

I F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1                                                                                     REV. 33 Page 18 of 60 Condition 6: Loss of 2 of 3 Fission Product Barriers 1W';      Ah        ~    otsntti'^agoloss~ofttih CnS~ounda' y        (EAL Ref Manual 6) 0 &deg;- ;! lDose                     equivalent 1-131   300 ucaccl Emergency Cold leg temperature decrease in the > 100-F rc3 last 60 minutes RCS cold leg temperature '250F Steam line break between_
containment and the MSIVI E         Steam line break downstream o cMSIV c       MSIV open-close indicator(s) shov; Qo                     open or partially openI o       Control room containment isolation status lights for Train A and B indicate open or partially open for any containment Denetration SS, SM,or ED

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1                                                                                     REV. 33 Page 19 of 60 Condition 6: Loss of 2 of 3 Fission Product Barriers i;I'ntt nI''(ilnn     (EAL Ref Manual 6) 4-b     Control room containment isolation status lights for Train A and B indicate a  E              open or partially open for any co 'r                   containment penetration co .
General SS, SM,or ED opinion Emergency RVLIS full range Core exit thermocouples C0 t a!t U)                  RCS pressure decreasing
   % 3                                uncontrollably cxL.'0 "A"SG is not depressurizing in an uncontrolled manner "B1SG is not depressurizing in an uncontrolled manner 1-J High containment radiation levels High containment sump levels I High containment humidity High containment pressure

I F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1                                                                                       REV. 33 Page 20 of 60 Condition 6: Loss of 2 of 3 Fission Product Barriers Case 5?r.+Lds ,ofRCS.Boundary;(SG Tube` Rupture)d
         'loss of'containmernt;'and, highptential f6'?oIjf:'j        (EAL Ref Manual 6)
         ;Fladd'Ing.j Steam line break between containment and the ruptured Steam 0:                           Generator MSIV                                               General 0
0                   Stuck open ruptured SG                                                Emergency I=                     PORV or Safety valve t.)
0       Steam line break downstream of to ruptured Steam Generator MSIV MSIV open-close indicator shows 0) open or partially open RVLIS full range 0~
Core exit thermocouples L.-
R-51 (Loop A Steam Line) 0.
   .U a 0                  R-52 (Loop B Steam Line)
R-1 5 Air Ejector Rad Monitor Unexpected Rise in either SG level SI Actuated annunciator illuminated on Aqua panel SI flow indicated by FI-925 and/or FI-924 and pump discharge pressure corresponding to flow Lo PZR pressure PI-429, P1-430, P1-431 PZR level cannot be maintained on at least 2/3 channels LI-426, LI-427, LI-428

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1                                                                          REV. 33 Page 21 of 60 Condition 7: Secondary Coolant Anomaly Rapid depressur htloi-of seco'ndary -l.'         (EAL Ref Manual 7A) g     ~~~~~~~$t''   '
SS or SM opinion that a rapid reduction in secondary pressure                                 Notification of occurred                              Unusual Event Steam Generator A/B pressure differential Increasing Containment Pressure Indications of a steam line break outside of containment Failed open Steam Dump, SG PORV, or SG Safety Valve Hi Steam Flow Lo-Lo Tavg Indication of steam line break downstream of MSIVs

I F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1                                                                         REV. 33 Page 22 of 60 Condition 7: Secondary Coolant Anomaly (EAL Ref Manual 7B)
High containment pressure Alert R-15 Air Ejector Rad Monitor reading Steam Line Monitor reading above normal background on faulted SG Unexpected rise in faulted SG level Pri/Sec Leak rate calculation Cu CEU u           Steam generator A/B pressure U)J~_                            differential Valid Lo-Lo

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1                                                                         REV. 33 Page 23 of 60 Condition 7: Secondary Coolant Anomaly
          *Unis&IabIe~team'liri; breakvoutsidei:S4 (EAL Ref Manual 7C) than .10 gpm),prlmary to secondarjr leaku Indications of unisolable steam line break outside containment                                Site Area Emergency R-1 5 Air Ejector Rad Monitor reading Steam Line Monitor reading above aU 2 normal background on faulted SG Unexpected rise in faulted SG level Pri/Sec Leak rate calculation
      'U        Steam generator A/B pressure Z J                              differential Valid Steamline low pressure safety injection signal Hi steam flow Lo-Lo Tavg

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1                                                                                      .ag   2REV. 33
                                                                                                  .Page 24 of 60 Condition 7: Secondary Coolant Anomaly
           ~.damage:'
               '4I r"~      "               .si-noXcontainmen  ~~(EALa (EAL Ref Manual 7D) snolr~hnn Iam
                                             - 3T'1!11T-.'.;kN 0VIT!
                                         ,     I ':'
I.,vk If steam line break is outside containment with SG tube rupture and fuel failure, this may be a General Emergency. See condition # 6, case 2 Primary to Secondary Leakage l > 50 gpm Site Area Valid high radiaiton R-48 , 200                R/hr                             Emergency (Containment High Range Area _
Rad Mon)
Valid high radiaiton R-49 > 200 R/hr (Containment High Range Area _
Rad Mon)
Steam generator ANB pressure                I>0      psig differential I 49      High containment pressure to~
2UI U)    Valid steamline low pressure U)             safety injection signal Hi steam flow
                             .o., .       f.a.
Lo-Lo Tavg

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1                                                                                                    REV. 33 Page 25 of 60 Condition 7: Secondary Coolant Anomaly
                                 ;tems,(principall heat vAw find oidrsystem fb~ii F1rIra.} r ,,.,       fA .T a lowed by falure 'of :
iemergencydJeedwati er.*system.fol'                      (EAL Ref Manual 7E) e!xtenided 'pe~riod:.C ore melting possible;.
Itiite giere of -,`
Wr},e,iwgu s:t~zfi f*.
          -cnrtbinmient lik&Vyii ,f, -I.,,rI -1^met.,L^t^ t '.
Condensate and Main Feedwater cannot be established to either SG                                                   General Aux Feedwater flow cannot be established                                                        Emergency to either SG High Head Safety Injection flow cannot be established to the RCS 30 minutes have elapsed since implementation of step in FR-H.1 requiring actuation of Si No Condensate or Main Feedwater flow to either SG No Auxiliary Feedwater flow to either SG No High Head Safety Injection flow to the RCS "Cannot be established' means that procedural guidance for establishing condition will not be successful based on knowledge of system/component condition/availability.

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1                                                                                  REV. 33 Page 26 of 60 Condition 8: Radiological Effluents
[Airborrie
        , ' ic-9nica Radiological effluent.f,A; i .t.-t.
                                    ._-r s":exceedec#.A iSpec-ifiications    - ,f "      _    ]   (EAL Ref Manual 8A)
Unmonitored gaseous release to the atmosphere which is estimated or suspected to exceed Operations Manual H4, ODCM,                                Notification of Sect. 3.1 limits as determined by Rad                         Unusual Event Protection Confirmation of total gaseous activity by Rad Chemist that a 300 second marinelli gas grab sample analysis from 1[2]R-22 (Shield Bldg Vent Rad Mon)
Valid 1R-22 (Shield Bldg Vent Rad Mon)
Valid 2R-22 (Shield Bldg Vent Rad Mon) t,l                         entTechnacaIJ                 (EAL Ref Manual BB)
Unmonitored liquid release to river which exceeds the limits of Operations Manual H4, ODCM, Sect. 2.1 as determined by                             Notification of Rad Protection                       Unusual Event Liquid release exceeds the limits of Operations Manual H4,ODCM, Sect. 2.1 based on sample analysis R-21 (Circ Water Discharge Rad Mon)'
                                          >High Alarm setpoint R-18 (Waste Uquid Discharge Rad Mon) 10                                   >High Alarm setpoint 0              R-1 8 (Waste Liquid Discharge Rad Mon)
E                             isolation valve fails to close 4-LU R-1 9 (SG Blowdown Rad Mon) >High Alarm setpoint (while blowdown is directed to river)
R-19 (SG Blowdown Rad Mon) isolation valve fails to close

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1                                                                                                   REV. 33 Page 27 of 60 Condition 8: Radiological Effluents
               ,Liqud Radogoical Jbff Iuentfgreater'than~-'            (EAL Ref Manual 8C)
I     ~~~~~~t          IJ'~                    -
Unmonitored liquid release to river which exceeds 10 times the limits of Operations Manual H4, ODCM, Sect. 2.1 as                                                           Alert determined by Rad Protection Liquid release exceeds 10 times the limits of Operations Manual H4, ODCM, Sect.
2.1 based on sample analysis R-21 (Circ Water Discharge Rad Mon)
                          > 10 times High Alarm setpoint 0%   R-1 8 (Waste Uquid Discharge Rad Mon) a                 > 10 times High Alarm setpoint R-1 8 (Waste Uquid Discharge Rad Mon) wt                    isolation valve fails to close R-19 (SG Blowdown Rad Mon) > 10 times High Alarm setpoint (while blowdown is directed to river)
R-19 (SG Blowdown Rad Mon) isolation valve fails to close
           -Airborne Radiological efluents- greater than tenities Technical ,
                                                             ~~ ~~'~~~ ',Ite wi~hfic'h, If aSpecaficatlon.hinsiin'neous lImlts p n instantaneoustratew'chsi con        n ifor  overitwohodurs,-            result Inaboutw1rmremTEDE;.      (EAL Ref Manual 8D) al tnetsite         nda      udeq        m      et nditlonsayEDErTt        aIm DjsEquival Unmonitored gaseous release to the atmosphere which is estimated or suspected to exceed 10 times Operations Manual H4, ODCM, Sect. 3.1 limits as                                                           Alert determined by Rad Protection.
Confirmation by RPS that local measured count rate on 1[2]R-50 (Shield Bldg Vent Hi Range Rad Mon) gas chamber Valid 1R-22 (Shield Bldg Vent Rad Mon) r_
      %0.
Valid 2R-22 (Shield Bldg Vent Rad Mon)
   "I cr9       Valid 1R-50 (Shield Bldg Vent Hi Range Rad Mon)
Valid 2R-50 (Shield Bldg Vent Hi Range Rad Mon)

I                                                                                        I F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1                                                                                     REV. 33 Page 28 of 60 Condition 8: Radiological Effluents (EAL Ref Manual 8E) la Radiation survey teams measure gamma dose rates at site boundary I'U b
Radiation survey teams measure field data at site boundary corresponding to Thyroid CDE Valid 1R-50 (shield bldg vent hi range)
Oqu Valid 2R-50 (shield bldg vent hi range) 0 Thyroid CDE offsite dose projections CU                      at the site boundary 2
0 U) 0      TEDE ofisite dose projections at the ai                              site boundary

OF EMERGENCIES F3-2 CLASSIFICATION F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1                                                                                      REV. 33 Page 29 of 60 Condition 8: Radiological Effluents (EAL Ref Manual 8F) b4     Radiation survey teams measure gamma a.
dose rates at or beyond the site boundary Emeignc Radiation survey teams measure field data at the site boundary, corresponding to Eq4                                  Thyroid CDE 0,
Valid 1R-50 (shield bldg vent hi range)
Valid 2R-50 (shield bldg vent hi range)
I    TEDE of fsite dose projections at the site z r.                                        boundary Q t    Thyroid CDE offsite dose projections at the site boundary

I 13-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1                                                                                      REV. 33 Page 30 of 60 Condition 8: Radiological Effluents
        *Rhdciit~dio Iev&sect;Zor aIrbodrnecon ammiiation'which-%..
ra000tId 1 0
                  'd    e. aIt     rIn w8.dk~tra laio redi ds ihd    iiy&
ac it      4hn (EAL Ref Manual 8G)
SS, SM, or ED opinion Unexpected increase in plant area radiation    factor of 1000 monitors Widespread unexpected iodine or     1000 DAC particulate airborne concentrations as per 10CFR20 appendix B table 1, Column 3.
                                                     > 1.000,0O0donmJt00m2 beta-gamma Widespread unexpected contamination in          0        dm             .
the Auxiliary Building > 50.000 dom/1OOCM 2 alpha activity

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1                                                                                     REV. 33 Page 31 of 60 Condition 9: Major Electrical Failures
                                              ~                     (EAL Ref Manual 9A) 4.16 KV Bus 11 [211,4119304 [4172804]1 <3500     Volts Notification of 4.16 KV Bus 12 [22],4119305 [4172805]     <3500 Volts                          Unusual Event 4.16 KV Bus 13 [23], 4119306 [4172806] <3500 Volts 4.16 KV Bus 14 [24], 4119307 [4172807] <3500 Volts L.
DI [D5] Tach l900 rpm 11200 rp a)
Q.                                           4000 - 4400 volts Dl [D5] Gen Volts 0) a)    Safeguard Bus 15 [25] source from DG a)               closed, Breaker 15-2 [25-2]
0
     -J D2 [D6] Tach [1900 rpm  1200 rpi D2 [D6 ] Gen Volts 4000 -4400 volts Safeguard Bus 16 [26] source from DG closed, Breaker 16-9 [26-16]
(EAL Ref Manual 9B)
Loss of Dl & D2 [D5 & D6] diesel generators when they are required to                                           Notification of be operable by Tech Specs                                             Unusual Event

I F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1                                                                                                REV. 33 Page 32 of 60 Condition 9: Major Electrical Failures Loss of~o~fsite  -iwr    and l       -~b~v~
                  ~~~~~~6iis~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~i~~~~~~~~~~~AC I-Q-'-"-,-
                   ,~-4~ '            .. -         ~ ;-,;P                 (EAL Ref Manual 9C) 4.16KV Bus 11 [21] 4119304 [4172804] <3500Volts                                   -I I
P.
1, =
4.16 KV Bus 12 [221, 4119305 [4172805] <3500 Volts                                   PEW-o-      Alert P.wwq 00                                                                                        o,
                                                             <3500 Volts                       P.
00      4.16 KV Bus 13 [23],4119306 [4172806]
to  Q.' 4.16 KV Bus 14 [24], 4119307 [4172807] <3500 Volts 00 4.16 KV Bus 15 [25],4191801 [4190401]           <4000Volts 0
-J       Q.
4.16 KV Bus 16 [26], 4192401 [41923011l <4000 Volts of ffitepwr adIs3ofosis (EAL Ref Manual 9D)
Blackout duration                                             - Site Area Emergency 4.16 KV Bus 11 [21], 4119304 [4172804]
4) 0      4.16 KV Bus 12 [22], 4119305 [4172805]
0 0 Cx 0) to
     -J 4.16KV Bus 13 1231, 4119306 [4172806]
4.16 KV Bus 14 [24],4119307 [4172807]
.4-          4.16 KV Bus 15 [25], 4191801 [4190401]
4.16 KV Bus 16 [26]. 4192401 [4192301)

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1                                                                                      REV. 33 Page 33 of160 Condition 9 Major Electrical Failures ihi    6fiensite     ns-&sect;if
                                       '    pbierjIgj lifeedwaterJo                            (EAL Ref Manual 9E)
T.S. >20 IF Mode 1, 2, 3, or 4                                          General Emergency Turbine Driven Aux Feedwater pump I                            Ads , 2hours unavailable                                  2 rs Motor Driven Aux Feedwater pump from I other unit unavailable I 4.16 KV Bus 11 [21],4119304 [4172804] <3500 Vots o 2    4.16 KV Bus 12 [22],4119305 [4172805]
4.16 KV Bus 13 [23],4119306 [4172806]
    -J 4.16 KV Bus 14 [24], 4119307 [4172807] l <3500 Vonts
  &deg;      :!       KV Bus 15 [25], 4191801 [4190401] <4000 Volts cz4.16
_J o       4.16 KV Bus 16 [26],4192401 [4192301]l       <4000 Volts

F3-CLSIIAINO                 MRECE F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1                                                                                      REV. 33 Page 34 of 60 Condition 9: Major Electrical Failures (EAL Ref Manual 9F)
SS, SM opinion that DC power is not available for one unit                                    Alert "SAFEGUARD LOGIC TRAIN A DC FAILURE" 47018-0501 [47518-0501]
             'SAFEGUARD LOGIC TRAIN B DC FAILURE" 47018-0502 [47518-0502]
                                     , iN
                           .LVo~I'v~onsi-te oWeror         "*      (EAL Ref Manual 9G)
           "SAFEGUARD LOGIC TRAIN A DC FAILURE* 47018-0501 [47518-05011                                           Site Area Emergency
             'SAFEGUARD LOGIC TRAIN B DC FAILURE" 47018-0502 [47518-0502]
Loss of DC power has lasted more       > 15 min' than 15 minutes     I

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1                                                                                                     REV. 33 Page 35 of 60 Condition 10: Control Room Evacuations Evacuiation of theC anticipated or requit read wit1wonjtr~olw otfv, $.              (EAL Ref Manual 10A) shutdown systenmsi :.%tablish'ed
                                  -a.   .  -!1''
J fro'MHot,
                                                      -',' :.C.:,:
          ..Shutdown Ptels'ar nbddloclsaosSt tS,-t &sect;<.     .;.1S,,            vs..
SSSM, or ED determines evacuation of Control Room is anticipated or required with control of shutdown systems established 1                           Alert 3~~~~~~~~
from Hot Shutdown Panels and local stations I
If reason for evacuation is fire in Control Room or Relay Room, see initiating condition 11 C,
                     'Fire compromising the functions of safety systems for possible reclassification.
EvacuatIon 6f the Cotroil-Ro6m andix -
::onro of shutdown systems notesg                           (EAL Ref Manual 10B) and loc~al statlofis Wlthin.15,minutds:",Jti.
Evacuation of Control Room conducted                                        ':   ;'1Site Area Emergency Control of shutdown systems not established >15 mi.
from Hot Shutdown Panels and local stations l within 15 minutes

I F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1                                                                                                  REV. 33 Page 36 of 60 Condition 11: Fires g51  ie(EAL Ref Manual 11A)
FIRE: is combustion characterized by heat and light (flame). Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.
Notification of fire or fire detection alarm in the Control Room                                                 Notification of Unusual Event Fire confirmed within the Reactor Bldg.,
Auxiliary Bldg., Turbine Bldg., Service Bldg., Rad Waste Bldg., Plant Screen House, D5/D6 Bldg., Cooling Tower Equip.
House, Transformers, or on the surface of a loaded spent fuel cask in the ISFSI Area Fire not extinguished within 10-minutes of alarm or notification (EAL Ref Manual 1 B)
FIRE: is combustion characterized by heat and light (flame). Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do I   not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.
Physical observation of a fire that is[
affecting one train of a safety system I                                       jffio   o- Alert SS, SM, or ED opinion I

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1                                                                                                     REV. 33 Page 37 of 60 Condition 11: Fires (EAL Ref Manual 1 C)
FIRE: is combustion characterized by heat and light (flamne). Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.
Physical observation of a fire that is affecting both trains of a safety system for the same unit                                  -          .'I Emergency SS, SM, or ED opinion                                                                                 .
                                                                                      #                      l,,

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1                                                                                             REV. 33 Page 38 of 60 Condition 12: Plant Shutdown Functions si inthe Control- pt.       (EAL Ref Manual 12B)
SS or SM opinion that annunciators a                           are nonfunctional                                     Notification of U) to                                                                             Unusual Event a u     Loss of NSSS Annunciator System toU and loss of plant computer Loss of BOP Annunciator System and loss of plant computer (ERCS)
Loss of NSSS Annunciator System and BOP Annunciator System (EAL Ref Manual 12C)
IT.S >200-F Mode1,2,3,or4          .S.
Alert SS, SM, or ED opinion that I annunciators are non-functional Loss of plant computer (ERCS)
U, Loss of NSSS Annunciator System
 ,-   U a 0.0     z Q   u     Loss of BOP Annunciator System

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1                                                                                                         REV. 33 Page 39 of 60 Condition 12: Plant Shutdown Functions (EAL Ref Manual 12D)
Mndp 1-    - I-or4                                            -I Site Area Emergency Loss of plant computer (ERCS)
SS, SM, or ED opinion that annunciators are non-functional I SS, SM, or ED opinion that a transient I has occurred or is in progress U)
Loss of NSSS Annunciator System K- a-cU     Loss of BOP Annunciator System I
A transient is an UNPLANNED event involving one of more of the following:
(1) automatic turbine runback >25% thermal reactor power, (2) electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load, (3) Reactor Trip, (4) Safety Injection actuation, or (5) thermal power increase or oscillations >10%.

I F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1                                                                                               REV. 33 Page 40 of 60 Condition 12: Plant Shutdown Functions
                                               ,ow,,o<<,oliptge,  lj(EAL        Ref Manual 12E)
Mode 5, Cold Shutdown        *T.S.2OO     OF                                 Notification of Unusual Event lInterruption of RHR core cooling Entry into procedure E4, Core Cooling Following Loss of RHR flI-..
1I0W (EAL Ref Manual 12F)
Mitigation actions are unable to I prevent RCS temperature                                                      111-Alert exceeding 200 0F (EAL Ref Manual 12G)
Mode 5, Cold Shutdown I   T.S.2OO OF Site Area Emergency Total loss of RHR system cooling                                 _
Mitigating actions unable to restore makeup flow greater than inventory loss

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1                                                                                                      REV. 33 Page 41 of 60 Condition 12: Plant Shutdown Functions f function needed for..
(EAL Ref Manual 12H)
Mode 1, 2, or3                                                          Site Area Si350F Emergency Inadequate hi pressure injection capability (i.e., loss of 2/2 Si pumps [ > 15 min.
and loss of all charging pumps for [
more than 15 minutes) I SS, SM, or ED opinion that plant functions required to maintain Mode 3, Hot Standby not available All steam generator safety valves inoperable I Both steam generator PORVs inoperable All steam generator steam dump to atmosphere valves inoperable I Steam generator steam dump to condenser valve inoperable No Condensate or Main Feedwater           f   f    i flow No Auxiliary Feedwater flow                        . ,- 1:, '. -, ;:  .  ..
                                                                       . .        i 1. ..   . .  -        -: .
Wide range level in both < 25 %                                          .7. . '. ,
SG's

I F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1                                                                                           REV. 33 Page 42 of 60 Condition 12: Plant Shutdown Functions
                                     'eE                                 M ig aKreactroaU/   , ynr     (EAL Ref Manual 121)
Reactor or turbine trip due to turbine failure                                  Notification of Unusual Event SS or SM opinion (EAL Ref Manual 12J)
As determined by visual inspection
* Alert SS, SM or ED opinion        X

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1                                                                                                           REV. 33 Page 43 of 60 Condition 12: Plant Shutdown Functions
                                                                   .M let~e~trio khlch'.-;tt*+          (EAL Ref Manual 12K)
Any valid reactor trip setpoint has been exceeded I                      . ks I Alert Intermediate range detector I                 I output not decaying I t~rasien~rekinng opetatio' f'.;.s,^
Tshutdowtystemiwith failure to tripl x                    (EAL Ref Manual 12L)
(coninuedpowerigeneratlon butiio~-a-
       'core dan e meityeieti
                                                                                     .. :  I . .- .... - ,  I .
Failure to bring reactor subcritical                          .
with control rods inserted I                 -                                           >  Site Area Emergency No indication of core damage I                      l SS, SM, or ED opinion that a l_l transient is in progress X OThaisi f~Iqirei 0 fT,5rateiori~t^2'ttf
                               .corr1_4'-fe' or--'
makujiwnsystems(which oiuld t6d~o           tip;               (EAL Ref Manual 12M) wnc ren ultsi coedmg r*.B.v.-
makeupsystem;(whicflcoId lea"' 64 .,
Failure to bring reactor subcritical l                                                               General with control rods Inserted I                                                                Emergency aI-RCS pressure I2 Rapidly increasing containment pressure and temperature i 0o Dose equivalent 1-131

I F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1                                                                               REV. 33 Page 44 of 60 Condition 13: Fuel Handling Accidents (EAL Ref Manual 13A)
During refueling operations Alert SS, SM,or ED opinion Valid R2 (containment area)
Valid R7 (containment area)
Containment vent monitor in the Containment Position Valid RI 1 (containment vent)
Valid RI 2 (containment vent)
(EAL Ref Manual 13B)
SS, SM, or ED opinion Alert Valid Spent Fuel Pool Area rad monitor R5 Valid R-22 (shield bldg vent)
Valid R-50 (shield bldg vent hi range)

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1                                                                                   REV. 33 Page 45 of 60 Condition 13: Fuel Handling Accidents containimentor fuel h            building 4 eandlng (EAL Ref Manual 13C)
SS, SM, or ED opinion                                                  Site Area Emergency e ,cEValid R48 (containment area b     ,g,            hi range) hi Alarm 2     &deg; Valid R49 (containment area hi range) hi Alarm cX
    =            SS, SM, or ED opinion Valid R50 (shield bldg vent a  L                      hi range) ti 4j             Valid R5 (SFP area)

I F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1                                                                                                            REV. 33 Page 46 of 60 Condition 14: Coolant Pump DELETED Deleted based on NRC Branch Position On Acceptable Deviation From Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, July 11, 1994.
Condition 15: Contaminated Injured Person DELETED Deleted based on NRC Branch Position On Acceptable Deviation From Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, July 11, 1994.

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1                                                                                                                                     REV. 33 Page 47 of 60 Condition 16: Security iCredible-,site-specifi lesecurity Alhreat -.t.1 Inotification or attempted entry or.                                       (EAL Ref Manual 16A) attempted sabotage l-. :.
Security determines the threat to be credible Notification of Threat would have an adverse impact on safe                     L                                                           Unusual Event operation or shutdown capability of the plant                 I Security discovers an unauthorized attempted entry by force or stealth (secret) into the plant's protected area The FBI confirms that an act of attempted sabotage did occur to vital plant equipment or security equipment Low Credible Security Threat notification L received I J~sI_
            -      -   <           4 K'<'l*t t0PY i tlWjti
         .OngbingIsecuritylcompromise IS&?Yi:4 Se                                   (EAL Ref Manual 16B)
                                                                                                                                 .              t.. .1  .
I.:,. . -  i. . . .. v . . . .
                                                                                                         . I .'. . - - i                             -'   '
t ' 1 "1." . , - -,
Security Safeguards Contingency event that results in unauthorized personnel commandeering an area within the plant protected area, but not controlling shutdown                                                                               Alert capability or any vital areas Bomb device discovered within plant protected L area and outside of any vital area I High Credible Security Threat notification received
         'Imrminent loss of physical 'control ~of-h .f ~                            (A       e aul1C
                              '>p~~~~~int                           '~~~~(EAL Ref Manual 1SC) planU '
Physical attack on the plant involving imminent occupancy of the Control Room auxiliary                                                                              Site Area shutdown pan             els or other vital areas                                                              Emergency Bomb device discovered within a vital area l Loss,4S-of physical control oftlie plantr-^.~-
i  - **~* .fs         u  ,;fi   jr  ^   ;         i (EAL Ref Manual 16D)
Physical attack on the plant has resulted in General unauthorized personnel occupying the Control I                                                                    b.
Emergency Room or any other vital areas

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1                                                                                              REV. 33 Page 48 of 60 Condition 17: Hazards to Plant Operations Aircraft.'crash~tonsitef or6unusual aircraft-ti (EAL Ref Manual 17A)
                        ''-+>&deg;                               E Reported to the SS or SM                                       Notification of a                                                                                           Unusual Event c .2      KAircraft crash onsite within owner controlled
   = -M                                                   fence
     -0    Unusualthreatening aircraft activity over facility 0
Aircraft crashin the                 area p . rotected (EAL Ref Manual 17B)
Visual observation by plant personnel and/or plant security personnel of an aircraft crash                                  .. Alert in the protected area SAifraff crash',wIthipokte-c'tedarea and     dh affecting~vital'structures fb-.yjiipactror:i 0
(EAL Ref Manual 17C) fires wihpatno n+~oe 5,.Cold. 'M~.'
I    ydo            tW4  ,-t;. g~
Visual observation by plant personnel and/or plant security personnel of an aircraft crash     T.S. >200                   0F Site  Area within protected area and affecting vital Emergency structures by impact or fires with either unit in Model, 2,3, or4

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1                                                                                                  REV. 33 Page 49 of 60 r   ~~~         explo'sion Condition 17: Hazards to Plant Operations (EAL Ref Manual 17D)
Visually observed evidence of an unplanned or unexplained explosion within the owner                                           Notification of controlled fence but not affecting plant safe                                         Unusual Event operation Reported to the SS or SM (po~~~~~explosi ---*,!da'.~'ILgeWo faIty~
(EAL Ref Manual 17E)
Visually observed evidence of an unplanned             I    . ..
explosion directly affecting plant safe operation         I                              Alert Reported to SS or SM   l                      . .- . .   .

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1                                                                                      REV. 33 Page 50 of 60 Condition 17: Hazards to Plant Operations MI~~s~eimP-ts1- _om wi, -    tev'
                                                  ..;IX
                      ~~~~ j~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~- ,                      (EAL Ref Manual 17F)
Visually observed evidence by plant personnel and/or plant security personnel of missile [                           Alert impacts on facility from whatever source
          'Severe damage to safe shlutdowne.: '<<s vequlpmet rom swesoepoi                               (EAL Ref Manual 17G) with,.      nioion              ,ClSudw Mode1, 2,3, or4                                    Site Area Emergency Visually observed evidence by plant personnel and/or plant security personnel of missile impacts and/or explosion on facility from whatever source Reactor trip system is inoperable Inadequate high pressure injection flow (no safety injection or charging I.8 pumps are available) tu All steam generator safety valves inoperable Both steam generator PORVs Cu                                       inoperable v,
9 All steam generator steam dump to 0
atmosphere valves inoperable 0
Steam g6nerat6r steamn dump to condenser valve inoperable v) 0~       Unable to establish* any Condensate Cu                       and Main Feedwater flow U)
Unable to establish* any Auxiliary Feedwater flow

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1                                                                                                                                    REV. 33 Page 51 of 60 Condition 17: Hazards to Plant Operations IN'ear orontsite-toxlic 'or fwlammbe g'as.W (EAL Ref Manual 17H)
Widespread toxic or flammable gaseous hazard being experienced or projected onsite                                                                              Notification of (outside of plant) leading to evacuation or                                                                           Unusual Event sheltering of personnel outside the plant Receipt of recommendation by Local, County or State Officials to evacuate personnel from site based on an offsite hazardous or flammable gaseous release event
                                                                                                       ..        1                  I    .
I ..    ..' - , .           ..     ; , I      ..... 1, .. - . . :'
I . I .I            I     I    --     :. . I . . I ,
I            .  .   ..     - .
(EAL Ref Manual 171)
Ift       bIbis%               -
Explosive gas concentrations being measured within the plant at a distance of   > e osive limis                                                                                Alert greater than 10 feet from the source
                                                     > 50 ppm hydrazinea Toxic gaseous concentrations being , 300 ppm ammonia                     ru measured within a larae area of the olant > so ppm hydrochloric acid                  l     l at the breathing zone
                                                     > 1400 ppmn morpholine                          I       _
                                                     > 30 ppm ethanolamine (ErA).
                                                     > IDLH for any toxic gas (see D4.4 AOP 1)
Note: IDLH EIrrsedalety Dangerous to Life or Health.
IDLH 

==Reference:==
NIOSH Pocket GuLideto Cherrical Hazards, Je 1994.

F CLSIFIAINO                   MRECE F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1                                                                                                  REV. 33 Page 52 of 60 Condition 17: Hazards to Plant Operations
                                     -,   ,-..2*E'.                I Entryuotjoxic orflammabIegaseiiii&                      1 vitalareas           plant not In fb 4 d5,                        (EAL Ref Manual 17J)
                                                           *1-Mode 1, 2, 3, or4  4T1.>200F                                                   O.Site Area Xp1   Emergency Explosive gas concentrations being measured in a major Dortion of a vital area from an
                                               >  exalosive limits unisolable source such that further access to the vital area is being prevented at a time when it is needed
                                               >  50 ppm hydrazine Toxic gaseous concentrations > 300 ppm ammonia                    I*A being measured in a major Dortion of a vital area at the > 50 ppm hydrochloric acid breathing zone such that > 1400 pprn morphollnelX further access to the vital area is being restricted at a time > 30 ppm ethanolamin (ETA) when it is needed > IDLHfor anytoxic gas (see DI4.4 AOP1)*l Note: IDLH = Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health. IDLH 

==Reference:==
NIOSH Pocket Guido to Chemical Hazards, June 1994.

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1                                                                                              REV. 33 Page 53 of 60 Condition 18 :ISFSI Events ISFl csktip over or; drop resulting inX e (EAL Ref Manual 18A)
Loaded cask Upped over or dropped I                                                  Notification of I                         -b Unusual Event Overpressure monitoring tank I opsig pressure decreasing to 0 psig I td L6ss     of ISIiSI casklfuel c6Mnment>,?
(EAL Ref Manual 18B)
                                                                  .-  ..  -- ,  ! -, . i : ..
I    ,,
While loaded cask is outside the plant protected area                                             Alert 44
   .Z za           A radiation field near ISFSI cask
   -0  Z   increase by a factor of 1000 above the
   -S!         ambient radiation field (background CU plus the normal radiation field from the t0 Jc- U) cask(s))
IC ME
   , E 10 cm 16 tu
    ,Q):-,
4) jzt Widespread contamination r-                 outside the ISFSI protected
    , ,o                                         area i   gs EC

I F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT I                                                                                                    REV. 33 Page 54 of 60 Condition 19: Natural Events
                            'e        atqak.Z            ~
         , 'nyc       nfr                                         li (EAL Ref Manual 19A)
Confirmed by one or more off-site                                                   Notification of sources                                      Unusual Event
         'Seismic Event" Annunciator received on the Seismograph Alarm Panel Earthquake felt by plant personnel SS or SM or ED opinion Earthquake greater than Operatlonaix,                                (EAL Ref Manual 19B)
Basis~arthuaks                                           ;+
Confirmed by one or more off-site sources
                     'Operational Basis Earthquake' Annunciator received on the                                                Alert Seismograph Alarm Panel                        .   )-
Earthquake felt by plant personnel SS or SM or ED opinion
        --sr    .s~.-       %.~ie-,      .m      '--;-*_
I              rP o.IA Earthquake greater.pthan'1Design Basis.
:-h .;                                  (EAL Ref Manual 19C)
               -      -       'd Modes 1, 2, 3, or 41 Site Area Confirmed by one or more off-site                                                     Emergency sources
                           'Design Basis Earthquake' Annunciator received on the Seismograph Alarm Panel Earthquake felt by plant personnel S or 5RM nr PrD      ninimnn
_-   -  _... - --                 I

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1                                                                                REV. 33 Page 55 of 60 Condition 19: Natural Events
                 -1,                                      (EAL Ref Manual 19D)
Reported to the SS or SM I                                         Notification of Unusual Event Visual observation by plant personnel and/or plant security
[-m n   o1          4 ti~gth      ailt (EAL Ref Manual 19E)
I
                                                                .. I .;
Reported to the SS or SM, or ED I            ,                        D-Alert Visual observation by plant personnel and/or plant security

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1                                                                                REV. 33 Page 56 of 60 Condition 19: Natural Events 50.Year~ ~~-Flood.
v,       (EAL Ref Manual 19F)
River Intake Elevation l >686 ft                          Notification of Unusual Event approach n desgign I                     (EAL Ref Manual 19G)
River Intake Elevation -
(USAR 2.4.3.5) - requires both units to     >692 ft                       Alert be shut down to Mode 2, 3, 4 or 5 (EAL Ref Manual 19H) 1~~F~~bodI ve~~~s~~
design  Iev~~~~e,~.%.,j Mode 1, 2, 3, or44                                   Site Area Emergency
          * . River Intake Elevation - Power operation design level (highest level     , 698 ft transformers will function)

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1                                                                                                 REV. 33 Page 57 of 60 Condition 19: Natural Events "Low'wzal~iterIev~el's beingter~iecedor.
                   ,..,>.e~~~~~~~~~~~~~t z 1t    t<g i-F2>6+q-        ;1,.-.Iz, (EAL Ref Manual 191)
River intake elevation (11/21 Cooling I     <672.5 ft                                       Notification of Water Pump - Low Water Level Trip) I                                                         Unusual Event
:Lowwaterdvls en              xeine           r.;
(EAL Ref Manual 19J)
River intake elevation I  < 669-5 ft                                      Alert
            .,               w          it,*4 wlth'ait~'          n'Mode-P~Cold~
Stiutdown, lowwater evels expes~nlevelso prletdtobe. Iess than-                      (EAL Ref Manual 19K) equipment with low~watrlev'elt .'49-<:...
Modes 1, 2, 3, or 4                                                    Site Area
                                                                                      --qM   .  . Emergency River intake elevation corresponding to loss of Lock &                                          .   .. .".
Dam #3 Major vital equipment failure River Intake Elevation

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1                                                                                             REV. 33 Page 58 of 60 Condition 19: Natural Events i
S~tstaie~f~irds bng.ex perl encddabr~~i";
(EAL Ref Manual 19L)
Sustained wind speed indicated by I         > 90 mph Alert met tower I (EAL Ref Manual 19M)
Modes 1, 2, 3, or4 l     T.S. >200'F                           Site Area Emergency Sustained wind speed indicated by I > 100 mph              J met tower I
       * &sect;       f,6'   eartqae~btn~                                 (EAL Ref Manual 1 9N)
W      n!      e                   oho          e
         ~~~~I%
                       ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
s.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Protect~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ve~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Actlon As.. deteirmined
               .I .- .I by the SS, SM, or ED   [                                     *
                                                                                             *General Emergency

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1                                                                                            REV. 33 Page 59 of 60 Condition 20: Other Conditions that warrant increased                    ,
awareness on the part of plant operation, (EAL Ref Manual 20A)
           'staff                an brtu sta~tie5    o<Ba rig_16661         Pa.>tM SM and SS concurrence that plant L                                        Notification of conditions warrant increased awareness I                                          Unusual Event (EAL Ref Manual 20B)
T.S.ACTION TABLE not met I                     I,^,              Notificati3n of
              .-requires plant shutdown or cooldown I                                       Unusual Event Reactor power reduction or cooldown              l requirements have been exceeded (EAL Ref Manual 20C)
Reactor power reduction or cooldown has                                            Notification of been initiated                                Unusual Event Emergency Safeguard Function equipment did NOT perform its function if required Cooldown rate exceeded Tech Spec Limit SS or SM opinion that lack of control of shutdown or cooldown warrants offsite agency notification

I F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1                                                                                                                 REV. 33 Page 60 of 60 Condition 20: Other ConditIons tht                intactivatl6nofj Technlbalsupport Center and nearsije. "                               (EAL Ref Manual 20D) a.i'-'
Emergency Operation Facllit-*:'.A..1'..;,
SS, SM, or ED opinion                I                                  Alert
           ,'     z-'u;--  XL t.'I  '' -  ti-s' -       P- a  s-14 1 7i 9--
Other plant conditions that warrant                           .
         'actlrvatlo f'emency   u               operatlon :~r i.x~-.
cetersnd'monitng teams or a-,*                              r!.e-  (EAL Ref Manual 20E) precutlnar,'noicalor        tote         uV i-neriiestl,-%                         z~          ij;~
w   Site Area SS, SM, or ED opinion                I                             -
Emergency (EAL Ref Manual 20F)
General SS, SM. or ED opinion                I Emergency

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT                  EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE RADIATION                       NUMBER:
SURVEY TEAMS DURING A                                   F3-15 RADIOACTIVE AIRBORNE RELEASE                             REV:    23
* Proceduresegments may be performed from memory.
* Use the procedure to verify segments are complete.
* Mark off steps within segment before continuing.
* Procedure should be available at the work location.
                                      . . . .I             .I - , . . 7 - I I ,  . . .
O.C. REVIEW DATE:       OWNER:                                                 EFFECTIVE DATE
   /D -a        %-0)                            M. Werner                       11 -/ 2 - by Page 1 of 31

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT                   EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE                       NUMBER:
RADIATION                        ~~~F3-15
                               ~~~~SR      AE TEAMS DURING A .
RADIOACTIVE AIRBORNE RELEASE                           REV:        23 1.0     PURPOSE This procedure describes the responsibilities of the Radiation Survey Teams during an airborne radioactive release to the environment.
2.0     APPLICABILITY This procedure applies to all members of the Prairie Island Radiation Protection Group.
3.0     PRECAUTIONS AND SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS 3.1     Each team should obtain information pertaining to the magnitude and the direction of the release, either from the Control Room, the Radiological Emergency Coordinator (REC), or the. Radiation Protection Support Supervisor (RPSS).
3.2     Radiation Survey Teams should observe the respiratory protection
* : - - uirequir'' ments arid the field dose rate precautions as stated in Attachment B.
3.3     Report airborne activity sample results in whole numbers, (i.e., microcuries per cc with no decimal places).
3.4     Report all radiation levels in whole number mREM per hour, (i.e., three Rem per hour should be.reported as three thousand mREM per hour).
3.5    Preface each'communication with the title or name of the receiving party and your title or name;..'For example: "Prairie Island TSC; "Survey'Team 1..."
After the communication is completed, request the receiving party to repeat the message, if numerical data was relayed.
End message transmission with an appropriate termination phrase. For example: 'Survey Team 1, out". During drills always include the words,
                 'THIS IS A DRILL," with each transmission.
3.6    When making field estimates of gross activity, if background exceeds 1000 cpm, notify the REC, or RPSS, and proceed to an area of lower background, <1000 cpm for counting, if so instructed by the REC, or RPSS.
Page 2 of 31

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT                              EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE RADIATION                                NUMBER:
rgSURVEY          TEAMS DURING A                                  F3-15
                             ;t    -RADIOACTIVE AIRBORNE RELEASE                                    REV:    23 3.7       The normal means of transportation for survey teams during any emergency is plant vehicles. Extreme environmental conditions (blocked roads, snow, bridges out, etc.) may preclude the use of these vehicles. The following alternate transportation is available:
NOTE               xl,~       This does not prohibit the use of personal vehicles in cases where plant vehicles are not available in sufficient numbers.
3.7.1        Power Boats - Sheriff's Department, plant environmental monitoring team, Red Wing Police.
3.7.2        Four Wheel Drive Vehicle - at Prairie Island
                . 3.7.3        Helicopter - available during suitable weatherbconditions from
       ''               ' ''    charter services in Minneapolis and St. Paul. Arrangements to be made via the site ernergency organization at the EOF.
3.8       The normal means of communication for the survey teams; is the portable
:radios. The normal telephone system will serv'e as a backup communication system. Telephone numbers in the TSC f6r the' Radiological Emergency Coordinator are:
(651) 388-1121                                            Local Plant (800) 216-1986                                       -    Long Distance Plant x4350                                                    REC x4334                                                    F.T. Coin..
      .       (715) 839-0382            - :,                            REC (Wisconsin) '
:(612) 330-7690         .            - ;         ;        .REC (Twin Cities).
                 -Tplpnhnn'p ni imhprcq qt thp-FOF nr
                   . -1    .....-               -
Prairie Island EOF .                         Contact    .   -      -     Monticello EOF
           .(651) 388-1121, Ext. 4502                    -  Field Team Comm            .   (763) 295-1504 (651) 388-1165, Ext. 5244                .      RPSS RO.            .             ,(763) 295-1503 (651) 388-1121, Ext. 4500                       EOF Coordinator                (763) 295-1502 (651) 388-1121, Ext. 4505                      'EOF Count Room                 (763) 295-1435 (651) 388-1165, Ext. 5236                  .   -EOF Count Room                 (763)295-1583 3.9       Periodically check dosimeter readings and report'results to the Radiological Emergency Coordinator (REC), or the Radiation Protection Support Supervisor (RPSS).
Page 3 of 31

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT                    EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE                        NUMBER:
RADIATION                                    F3-15 SURVEY TEAMS DURING A RADIOACTIVE AIRBORNE RELEASE                           REV:       23 3.10      Check meter batteries by switching to BATTERY CHECK position. Replace if necessary.
3.11      Meters checks SHALL be completed prior to use.
3.12      Observe the cold weather operation restrictions (Attachment C).
3.13      All surveys should be taken at approximately one meter from ground unless specifically directed by the REC, or RPSS.
3.14      During inclement weather, the instrument may be placed against the inside vehicle window or on the dash.
3.15      IF connecting or disconnecting the air sampler to the vehicle battery, located in the engine compartment, THEN turn the vehicle OFF. (personnel safety) 3.16     'Particulate filters and silver zeolite adsorbers'must be installed and removed carefully to prevent cross-contamination from foreign objects.
3.17      The air s mple shouldou     e a standard 25 cubic foot sample. Sample collection time may be affected if the activity is too high.
3.18      All samples SHALL be labeled properly with the required information and saved for further analysis.
3.19      If hands are contaminated, handle samples-with surgeon gloves.
3.20      Don appropriate protective clothing for the situation to be expected, this includes orange safety'vests when working along roadsides.
4.0     RESPONSIBILITIES 4.1    The REC and the RPSS have the responsibility to determine sample priorities and to direct the Radiation Survey teams sampling.
4.2    The Radiation Survey teams have the responsibility to conducts sampling during a radioactive Airborne release in accordance with this procedure.
4.3    The Radiation Team communicator has the responsibility to maintain communications between the Radiation Survey Teams and the REC in the TSC or the RPSS in the EOF.
Page 4 of 31

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT                  EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES i  RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE RADIATION i  F3x '                   SURVEY TEAMS DURING A RADIOACTIVE AIRBORNE RELEASE NUMBER:
REV:
F3-15 23 5.0     DISCUSSION There are three radiation survey teams. Two (2) teams perform offsite surveys and another team provides onsite coverage. Each offsite Survey Team as a minimum requires one (1)Survey Team Member. A second Survey Team Member is desirable. Another person maybe assigned as a driver. All team members report to the Radiological Emergency.Coordinator (REC) in the Operation Support Center, for assignments. Other personnel can be used to assist Survey Team Members. The Survey Team Member.has the responsibility to ensure proper survey and sampling technique and to perform field calculations. .            :
In the event of an offsite airborne release, the Radiological Emergency Coordinator (REC).may request support for offsite surveys from Monticello. When the Monticello Field Teams arrives at the Prairie Island Near-Site EOF, they will be provided Prairie Island Radios if necessary and they will accept the responsibility for offsite surveys and sampling. -This allows the Prairie Island personnel, to augment the Onsite Radiation Survey Team. All offsite surveys will continue under the direction of the Emergency Manager at the Prairie Island Near-Site EOF, with the Offsite Survey Teams reporting their activities to the Radiation Protection Support Supervisor.
6.0     EQUIPMENT AND PERSONNEL REQUIRED, 6.1    Team Members Personnel trained in performing surveys.
6.2    Team Equipment Required
                -6.2.1 Field Teams 1 & 2 (Offsite Survey Teams)
A. Vehicle (plant or personal).
B. Offsite sample kit (Attachment A) 6.2.2   Onsite Radiation Monitoring Tearn A. Normal counting room equipment, if available B. E.O.F. counting room equipment C. All available onsite radiation protection equipment 7.0     PREREQUISITES An emergency of an Alert, Site Area, or General Emergency has been declared.
Page 5 of 31

I PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT                       EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE                          NUMBER:
l  FS3    S    RADIATION                        F3-15 RADIOACTIVE AIRBORNE RELEASE                               REV:      23 8.0     PROCEDURE 8.1     All members of Radiation Survey Teams should assemble in the Operational Support Center, unless directed by the Emergency Director or the Radiological Emergency Coordinator (REC):
8.2     Field Teams 1 & 2 (Offsite Survey Teams) 8.2.1     Obtain the necessary information from the Control Room Operator or TSC personnel regarding the type and amount of release, wind direction, etc.
8.2.2     Designate two (2) members for Team 1 and two (2) members for Team 2 (if available) to perform offsite surveys.
                              'Any available plant personnel may be designated as the driver for a single team member.
8.2.3   ,,Obtain,a plant vehicle or personal vehicle..
8.2.4     Obtain the necessary equipment (Attachment A) from the NPD Office Building equipment locker or EOF.
8.2.5     Obtain TLD's and dosimeters for each Team member.
Survey Team Members should keep their personal TLD's if departing from the plant site.
8.2.6     Ensure.dosimeter is <25% of scale and record readings on the dosimeter signout sheet.
8.2.7     IF vehicle with installed radio is NOT available, THEN obtain a portable radio, and magnetic antenna from EOF Receiving Area.
8.2.8     Test the operation of the radios (on channel 13, Rad Team 1) and meter check all meters prior to departing.
8.2.9     Perform offsite surveys as directed by REC or RPSS.
8.2.10     Conduct a search for the plume, in accordance with Attachment D, when departing the plant site.
Page 6 of 31

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT                            EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE RADIATION F3
                  -9 SURVEY TEAMS DURING A NUMBER:
F3-15
: 8.     'to_'-RADIOACTIVE             AIRBORNE RELEASE                           REV:    -23 8.2.11     Observe the respiratory protection and the field dose rate precautions, as stated in Attachment B, at all times.
8.2.12     Perform beta and gamma surveys in accordance with the applicable procedure, Attachment E, as directed by the REC, or the RPSS at areas where the plume is encountered, or at each designated survey point.
8.2.13     Identify survey locations using either:
A. Predesignated survey location numbers, as shown on the applicable Radiological Sampling Points map;
                                      -OR
                      -   B. Known landmarks, road intersections, grid coordinates, etc. to identify locations the plume is encountered and/or sampling is done when NOT at a predesignated survey point.
8.2.14     Report results to the REC, or the RPSS, via'the radio or telephone.
8.2.15     Obtain airborne samples (particulate, iodine and gas), or ground deposition samples,' at locations requested by the REC, or RPSS, lAW Attachments F, G, and H.
8.2.16     Document all survey data on the PINGP 1226, Field Team Air
                        - Sample'Results Log,'PINGP 1227,' Plume Search Log, or PINGP 956, Ground Deposition Sample Results Log.
8.2.17     WHEN directed by REC or RPSS, Onbe(1) Team should perform offsite surveys depen'ding on the'wind direction and time of emergency per Attachment I..                      .           ,
8.2.18     Check personal dosimeters frequently.- IF cumulative exposure approaches administrative limits, THEN request relief.
8.2.19     WHEN directed by the'REC or RPSS, THEN deliver samples to the designated location for pickup by a Sample Courier.
Page 7 of 31

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT                         EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE                      NUMBER:
RADIATION                                  F3-15 i   is         N      SURVEY TEAMS DURING A RV RADIOACTIVE AIRBORNE RELEASE 8.3    Radiological Monitoring Team 8.3.1           Perform all operations requested by the Emergency Director or REC.
8.3.2          Control radiation exposure onsite (internal and external).
8.3.3          Analyze air samples, ground deposition samples, food stuffs, etc.,
obtained by the onsite and offsite survey teams, using the Count Room facilities and/or the E.O.F. count room facilities. Store all samples for future analysis.
8.3.4           Perform'onsite surveys as requested by the Emergency Director and/or REC per F3-14.1, Onsite' Radiological Monitoring.
8.3.5           Perform required personnel monitoring at the emergency operating centers and supervise any necessary personnel decontamination per F3-19, Personnel and Equipment Monitoring and
                               'Decontamination.
8.3.6       -  Obtain and process samples from the reactor coolant system, containment air, stack.release, etc., as requested by the REC per Fj3-23, Emnergency Samoling'an'd'F3-20, Determination of Radioactive Release Concentrations.
8.3.7           Report all results to the REC via the available communication system.
8.4    Radiation Field Team Communicator 8.4.1           Report' to the Technical Support Center when the emergency is declared,, and utilize PINGP 1156, TSC Field Team Communicator Checklist.".
8.4.2          Obtain current plant status, release information and meteorological
                           -    data      -.
8.4.3        -Establish communications with the Field Teams, using the TSC
                     . .'.      ':Cons6le in the REC area.
                             ' A. Identify teams as Pi Team 1, etc.
B. Obtain team member names.
C. IF radio communication is NOT possible, THEN Survey Teams will utilize telephone system.
D. Update Teams with present plant status, release information, met data, etc.
Page.8 of 31

PRAIRIE'ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT                               EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE RADIATION                                 NUMBER:
SURVEY TEAMS DURING A                                        F3-15 RADIOACTIVE AIRBORNE RELEASE                                      REV:    23 8.4.4         Dispatch Survey Teams in the downwind direction, to conduct a search where the plume is expected. The search area should be wide enough to ensure plume is encountered. DO NOT let Survey Teams sit idle. Crossing of the plume by field teams should be limited in order to minimize personnel dose.
8.4.5         IF and WHEN directed by the REC, THEN direct one field team to perform surveys lAW Attachment I.
8.4.6         Plume search should be conducted to identify the edges of the plume, confirm the projected dose rates associated with the plume, and verify the expected isotopic mixture.
                                   .Consider that plume diversion Is likely to occur if the wind Is from the East or West such that the plume is traveling towards the Minnesota or Wisconsin bluffs. Deploy the survey teams to conduct a plume search both beyond the bluffs and up and down the valley, where plume diversion is likely to occur.: ,
: a. A tall obJect.(bluff or mountain')'will normally prevent dispersion and will almost always change'the plume' direction.
: b. The bluffs and hills around the plant can change the plume direction by more than 900 depending on the time of day.
During morning hours It Is possible for the plume to double back on Itself due to heating of the air In the valley.
8.4.7          LXg p Most   nc.of the bluffs are within about 1.5 miles of the plant and PINGPh598,     Ee plum diversion e        Is going to occur within about the 20 minutes of the release In low wind situations'.
llZag~-irs l     I     l    ~d. A wind direction from about 3450 to about 350 can result In lo~~~~evr diversion as the plume goes over Mt. Carmel and
                   "     !   N~~~intothe Cannon Valley,,,
8.4.7         Log pertinent information and Survey Team results on the REC Log, PINGP 598, Emergency Center Nar6rative Log, or PINGP 647, Field Team Communicator Emergency Sample Results Log.
                     .     ~      ~           ...      I.    ..
Page 9 of 31

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT                      EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE                           NUMBER:
RADIATION                .                      F3-15 SURVEY TEAMS DURING A RADIOACTIVE AIRBORNE RELEASE                              REV:      23 Repeat results for verification from survey teams If numerical results are communicated.
8.4.8    Instruct the Survey Teams to obtain particulate, iodine and gas samples, as directed by the REC when the plume has been encountered. Air samples taken within the plume (beta activity detected) should be taken in areas of low dose rates, if possible.
Obtaining a sample for iodine and radioactive gas and determining the ratio of gas to iodine is crucial for verifying the offsite doses and can affect protective action recommendations. This is especially critical during steam releases as there are limited sampling methods in the plant. Therefore, these samples should be taken as soon as possible when the plume is encountered. These samples must be taken in the plume (area where beta is detectable).
These samples take approximately 2G-30 minutes to accomplish.
vN@T-E-SR~Communlcator            should minimize radio contacts with sampling team
                 "  !l~~until the team reports sampling results.
8.4.9    Instruct the Survey Teams to return samples to the EOF Count Room for analysis, or dispatch a sample courier.
8.4.10     Develop a plume map as follows:
A. Obtain dose projection data, if available and plot on survey map (use red marker). Also plot the time on the mile markers when the plume is expected to arrive.
B. Plot Survey Team results on map (use blue marker). Log gamma and beta survey results in mREM/hr followed by air sample results in IiCi/cc.
C. Determine the plume edges and plot on the map.
D. Plot or outline areas (using green marker) indicating where protective actions have been implemented or recommended.
E. Occasionally direct survey team to check location of plume front edge and note on map with time circled.
Page 10 of 31

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT                                         EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE RADIATION                                            NUMBER:
                                          . SURVEY TEAMS DURING A                                                       F3-15
                                     *RADIOACTIVE AIRBORNE RELEASE                                                 REV:    23 8.4.1 1           Perform a comparison of radiological data as follows:
A. Compare offsite monitoring results for consistency.
Re-monitor areas of concern.
B. Compare offsite monitoring results with dose calculation projections. Re-monitor areas of concern.
C. Compare plume dose rates close to plant with projected dose rates., This will allow dose projection adjustments and may affect offsite protective action recommendations.
D. Inform REC, or RPSS, of results.                                 .       .
8.4.12       . Update the Field Teams periodically with: -
A. Emergency Classification*
                    -     -        B. Plant Status                                                       -
C. Release Information D. Meteorological Data 8.4.13            Direct the Field Teams periodically to read their dosimeters and log results.
8.4.14           Instruct the Prairie Island Field Teams to report to the OSC for
              ,.       .-  .onsite        assignments when the Monticello Field Teams assume
                                -responsibility for offsite surveys. -                                  .:.:
a: .     ,     a, f . .a
                                                             .)   !. I          .     '              .
                                                        , .. I..I~                 .    .   ; .     .       .
                                                                      *,  , .     .  &#xa2;     l     .I'   v
    .. A" '. : .   :' '' ,   - . -'
      .. 1; . . I Pabe'l 1 of 31

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT                  EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE                     NUMBER:
GR  - . . RADIATION'                                  1F3-15 SURVEY TEAMS DURING A 1_ RADIOACTIVE AIRBORNE RELEASE                          EV        2 Attachment A Offsite Survey Team Equipment Package
: 1. Each offsite survey team should be equipped with a kit containing the following:
Dose rate instrument RO-2 or equivalent Count rate instrument RM-14 or equivalent 2" GM pancake probe Battery powered air sampler Personnel self-reading dosimeters (Low Range)
Personnel self-reading dosimeters (High Range)
TLD's (ifindividuals have a normally assigned TLD, they should wear those assigned)
Plastic Sample Bags Garbage bags Paper towels Masking tape Silver zeolite adsorbers       -
GMR-I canisters Full Face respirators Gas Sample Chambers Filter assembly (gas sampler)
Suction bulb (gas sampler)
Filter paper (gas sampler)
One liter poly bottles Four inch air sampler filter papers Survey sample labels For Monticello response: .IF NOT using vehicles with a radio installed pick up spare radio in EOF or get radio'fro'n Monti.
.. .J   .. %Y,:
E. I S  Flashlight         .
0  D-Cell batteries S  Potassium Iodide Tablets (Thyroid Blocking Agent)
S  Orange safety vests S  Tweezers:       '
S  Anti-C clothing Life Jackets PI Field Team vehicles have PI radios installed Page-12 of 31

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT                EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE RADIATION                     NUMBER:
April,,?                  SURVEY TEAMS DURING A                                 F3-15 RADIOACTIVE AIRBORNE RELEASE                          REV:    23 Attachment A - Offsite Survey Team Equipment Package
* Compass
* Clipboard
* Pens
* Pad of paper (8-1/2" x 11" minimum size)
* Road map of State of Minnesota
* Road map of State of Wisconsin:
* Umbrella
* Watch or clock
* Calculator
* Foul weather (rain) gear
                . .Line (100 feet)                               .
* Weighted poly bottle holder
                * 'Snow Scoop
* Surgeon gloves                            .;       -
: 2. The Procedures Binder contains:
* Ground Deposition Sample Results Log Forms
* Plume Search Survey Log Forms
* Copy of F3-15, "Responsibilities of ihe Radiation Survey Teams During a Radioactive Airborne Release".
Copyof F3-16, "Responsibilities of the Radiation Survey Teams During a Radioactive Liquid Release" -:
* Copy of F3-22, "Prairie Island Radiation Protection Group Response to A Monticello Emergency"                       !
Narrative Log              .
: 3. Prairie Island and Monticello Emergency Plan Map Sets .
: 4. Aluminum Forms Clipboard/holder:                         '
* Field Team Air Sample Results Forms, Page 13 of 31

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT                 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES Attachment B Survey Team Radiation Protection Guidelines 1.0     Respiratory Protection 1.1    Radiation Survey Team members should don respirators with GMR-l canisters IF the following conditions occur:
1.1.1    A General Emergency is declared AND the affected sectors have been evacuated; AND 1.1.2    Measured dose rates are more than 100 mREM/hr        13, [(w/o - w/c)5]
OR IF directed otherwise by the REC or RPSS.
1.2    Respiratory equipment may be removed IF the following is indicated:
1.2.1    Field measurement of gross iodine activity indicates less than 1E-7 iCi/cc; OR 1.2.2   The REC, or RPSS, indicates that no significant iodine is OR has been released from the plant.
OR 1.2.3    Measured dose rates are less than 100 mREM/hr       1, [(w/o - w/c)5]
OR as directed by the REC or RPSS.
2.0     Plume Dose Rates 2.1    Survey Teams should periodically read their personal dosimeters as determined by observed dose rates.
2.2    Survey Teams- should NOT linger in areas greater than 100 mREM/hr gamma.
2.3     Survey Teams should NOT proceed to areas greater than 1000 mREM/hr gamma unless directed by the REC, or the RPSS.
2.4    Survey Teams SHALL NOT proceed to areas exceeding 10,000 mREM/hr gamma.
Page 14 of 31

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT                       EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDUREER RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE RADIATION                                            NUMBER:
SURVEY TEAMS DURING A                                                      F3-15
                                -RADIOACTIVE AIRBORNE RELEASE                                                REV:    23 Attachment C Cold Weather Operation
: 1. IF outside temperature is greater than 320 F (00C), THEN instrument use is unlimited.
: 2. IF outside temperature is between 32 0 F (00C) and 0F (-18 0 C), THEN no instrument should be used for more than 5 minutes.
: 3. IF outside temperature is between 0F (-18 0C) and -20 0 F (-280C), THEN no instrument should be used for more than 2 minutes.
: 4. IF the outside temperature is below -200 F (-280C), THEN no instrument should be used unless special batteries (alkaline or Ni-CD) are in the instrument and this would increase the temperature range to -400 F (-40 0C).1 The instrument should only be used for very short times (less than 30 seconds).
: 5. The instrument should completely warm up between periods of cold weather use.
Instrument warm-up may be indoors or in a heated vehicle and should take 2-5 minutes.                                      -
                                  .    .  ~~
                                           ~ ~.       .                   .
I11. ., .  . .1 I    .   ;  -      .  .
                                                                   .    .      .   . ., !v,      ., .. , ,
I Io .
I
                                                         .. I   . - I     .
       -...                                                             ,    .,    . . .      . 1. -
Page 15 of 31

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT                    EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE                         NUMBER:
RADIATION                          17~~~3-15 al   RADIOACTIVE AIRBORNE RELEASE                             REV          23 Attachment D Plume Search Technique
: 1. Purpose Plume search should be conducted to identify the edges of the plume, confirm the projected dose rates associated with the plume, and verify the expected isotopic mixture.
All surveys should be taken at approximately one meter from ground unless specifically directed by the REC, or RPSS.
       '2. WHEN departing the plant site:
2.1     Energize the instrument observing proper precautions for cold weather (Attachment C).
2.2     Allow meter to stabiliz6 and zero meter.       - -
2.3    Record the sami'ple results on PINGP 1227, Plume Search Survey Log.
: 3. Hold the instrument out the vehicle window, while in transit, and watch the instrument for a meter deflection.
During inclement weather, the instrument may be placed against       l the inside vehicle window or on the dash.
: 4. Stop the vehicle and perform a beta and gamma survey of the area when a meter deflection is observed as follows:
4.1     Scan the area for maximum meter deflection.
4.2    Open the probe window for beta gamma reading.
4.3    Record the "window open" reading.
4.4    Close the probe window.
4.5    Record the "window closed" reading.
4.6    Determine the corrected beta reading.
Page 16 of 31

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT                       EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENlTING PROCEDURES NUMBER:
RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE RADIATION SURVEY TEAMS DURING A :                                        F3-15 RADIOACTIVE AIRBORNE RELEASE                                     REV:    23 Attachment D Plume Search Technique
: 5. Calculate the beta and gamma dose utilizing PINGP 1227, Plume Search Survey Log 7.
I
: 1. A gamma reading with zero beta reading indicates the plume Is elevated or displaced.
: 2. A gamma reading and a beta reading Indicates that the plume is at ground elevation.
: 3. Crossing of the plume by field teams should be limited In order to.minimize personnel dose.
: 6. Report the results to the REC, or the RPSS via the Field Team Communicator, as follows:

===6.1 Location===
6.2                                  .- milliRem/hr Gamma 6.3                -                     milliRem/hr Beta, [(w/o - w/c)5]
                                                                     .;" I!:,  .  ~
                                                                                 . .- .. t.  .
Id Page 17 of 31

I PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT               EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE                    NUMBER:
i    X RADIATION                              F3-15 W    l          ~SURVEY   TEAMS DURING A RADIOACTIVE AIRBORNE RELEASE                        REV:      23 Attachment E Beta and Gamma Survey
: 1. Record results on PINGP 1227, Plume Search Survey Log.
: 2. Energize the instrument.
: 3. Allow the meter to stabilize and zero meter.
: 4. Switch to the highest scale and scale down until an onscale reading is obtained.
: 5. Scan area at approximately one meter from ground for maximum reading.
5.1    OPEN the probe window to obtain the beta-gamma reading.
5.2    CLOSE the probe window to obtain the gamma reading.
: 6. Determine the beta and gamma dose rates as follows:
6.1    GAMMA (mRem/hr)       = "Window CLOSED" reading 6.2    BETA (mRem/hr)               = 'Window OPEN" reading minus
                                                'Window CLOSED" reading times CF or (w/o - w/c) CF Where:                  CF = beta correction factor for meter or assume 5.
Beta dose rate. reported in mRemlhr "Beta" assuming a quality factor of 1.
: 7. Report results to REC, or RPSS via the field team communicator.
Page 18. of 31

PR JRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT                  EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTNG PROCEDURES I~iR I
RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE RADIATION R SURVEY TEAMS DURING A RADIOACTIVE AIRBORNE RELEASE NUMBER:
REV:
F3-15 23 Attachment F Particulate and Iodine Sampling
: 1. Record results on PINGP 1226, Field Team Air Sample Results.
INLET Flow OUTLET
: 2. Install a new particulate filter and silver zeolite adsorber into the cartridge/filter paper holder as follows:                  . .
: 3. The air sampler SHALL be placed in an area that will ensure a representative sample. DO NOT place the sampler on the ground or on contaminated surfaces.
: 4. IF connecting OR disconnecting to the battery in the Engine compartment, THEN turn OFF the engine.
     -5. IF using terminals located in rear of vehicle, THEN connect the negative (yellow) terminal and then the positive (red) terminal
: 6. Connect the air sampler (CF-1 8V) to the vehicle 12 Volt battery terminals.
6.1    IF the vehicle engine is NOT running, THEN start the engine to maintain a steady battery voltage.           ;-
6.2    Set the TIMER toggle switch to either the TIME or the MANUAL POSITION.
6.3    IF the TIMER switch is in the TIME position, THEN WHEN the TIMER times out, the sample pump will stop.
6.4    IF TIMER switch is in the MANUAL position, THEN the sampler needs to stop manually at the designated time.
Page 19 of 31

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT                         EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE                         NUMBER:
RADIATION                        ~~~F3-15
           !tlB        N l    l ~SURVEY TEAMS DURING ARE:                                            2 RADIOACTIVE AIRBORNE RELEASE                              REV:        23 Attachment F Particulate and Iodine Sampling (1j'DO NOT'USE HIGH SWITCH POSITION (CAUSES HIGH am_       ~~FLOW AND MOTOR DAMAGE).
(2) STOP THE AIR SAMPLER TO PREVENT DAMAGE TO
                     -  -       I     ~THE UNIT IF-THE SAMPLER BEGINS TO RUN HOT, Z  l       l     ~(FLOW DECREASING CONTINUOUSLY).
6.5      Set the FLOW TOGGLE switch to the VARIABLE position. The air sampler will now start.
6.6     Adjust the flow, using the flow adjustment knob, to 2.5 CFM and collect sample for 10 minutes to obtain a 25 cubic foot sample.
6.7'     Record the flow rate, sample start and stop time on PINGP 1226, Field Team Air Sample Results.
6.8      Disconnect the positive (red) terminal and then the negative (yellow)
                  -  terminal..
: 7. Place the particulate filter'and silver zeolite adsorber in separate plastic sample bags.
: 8. Utilize PINGP 1226, Field Team Air Sample Results, to calculate field sample activities.
: 9. Estimate gross activity in the field by the following methods:
9.1      Particulate Activity   -
9.1.1.   .. Count    the particulate filter outside plastic bag using an RM-14,'(or equivalent) with a 2" GM pancake probe.
9.1.2    -Estimate      the gross particulate activity using Figure 4 or the following formula:
Page 20 of 31'

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT                    EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE RADIATION                           NUMBER:
SURVEY TEAMS DURING A                                    F3-15 RADIOACTIVE AIRBORNE RELEASE                                REV:    23 Attachment F Particulate and Iodine Sampling Sample Vol cc's = (CFM)(Sample Flow CF)(Sample Time in Min.)(2.83E4cc/ft 3 )
(Background Corrected Count Rate) (4.5x10'7iCi/dpm)
Activity ( 1 iCi/cc) =
(Probe Efficiency) (Sample Volume, cc's) (CF) 9.1.3      Log jtCi/cc on PINGP 1226.
9.2     Iodine Activity -
9.2.1      Count the silver zeolite adsorber using an RM-14 or equivalent, with probe contacting the bag.
9.2.2      Calculate sample activity using Figure 2 or the following           I formula:
                                                       -     (CIX's 011 adsorber)
* Iodine Activity (pLCIcc) =    - io                       o    r (Sample Volume in cc's)
: 1. tiCi's on adsorber      =    activity on adsorber determined from Figure 2 using the                   I corrected count rate.
: 2. Place 2' GM pancake probe directly on adsorber, with adsorber Inside poly bag.
9.2.3      Log [tCi/cc on PINGP 1226.
: 10. IF requested, THEN conduct Gaseous Activity Sampling per Attachment G.,
Page 21 'of 31

I PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT                 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES RADIATION SURVEY TEAMS DURING A RADIOACTIVE AIRBORNE RELEASE Attachment F Particulate and Iodine Sampling
: 11. Report the results to the REC, or the RPSS.
: 12. Separate colored NCR copies of PINGP 1226 Field Team Air Sample Results,          I and attach to the respective samples:
Golden Rod copy.              Gas Sample Pink copy                     AgZ Adsorber Yellow copy                   Particulate Filter White copy                    Field Team copy 13     Save all samples for future analysis.
r, V>
Page 22 of 31

IPRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT                  EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE RADIATION                     NUMBER:
SURVEY-TEAMS DURING A                                1F3-15 RADIOACTIVE AIRBORNE RELEASE                         REV:     23
                          ..Attachment G Gaseous Activity Sampling
: 1.      Assemble gas sample apparatus so air passes through filter, gas chamber, then suction bulb.
: 2.       Install new filter in filter assembly.'
: 3.       Open the stopcocks on the gas chamber.
: 4.       Squeeze suction bulb minimum of 10 times to obtain representative sample.
: 5.       Shut the stop cocks on the gas chamber.
: 6.       Obtain acount rate of the chamber volume' using an'RM-14 or equivalent and a 2 inch GM pancake probe by placing the probe over the mylar window.
: 7.       Log the result as 'gross'CPM", on PINGP 1226, Field Team Air Sample Results.
: 8.      Obtain a second chamber labeled "Background". DO NOT OPEN the stop cocks of the background chamber.
: 9.      Obtain a background count rate by placing a 2 inch GM pancake probe over the mylar window.
: 10.      Log the results as "Background CPM", on PINGP 1226.
11  . Obtain the "Net CPM" by subtracting the "Background CPM" from the "Gross
                'CPM".
: 12. Apply the "Net CPM", obtained by using, Figure 3 to determine the gross gas activity in ItCL'cc Xe-1 33 equivalent.
13.-     Record the air-sample results on PINGP 1226, and report the results to the Radiological'Emergency Coordinator, or the Radiation Protection Support Supervisor.                            -
: 14. Attach the Golden Rod copy'of PINGP '1226 to the Gas Sample and save the sample for future analysis.
: 15.      Estimating the Gross Gaseous Activity in the plume can be done by:
A (w/o - w/c) reading of about 30 mRem/hr indicates a gas concentration (Xe-1 33 Dose Equivalent) of about 1 x 10 3 [Ci/cc. Therefore (w/o - w/c)
(3 x 10-5) = gCi/cc Xe-133 DE.
Page 23 of 31

I PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT                       EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE                           NUMBER:
RADIATION.                                      1F3-15 WB                    ~~SURVEY TEAMS DURING A                                             k RADIOACTIVE AIRBORNE RELEASE                               REV:       23 Attachment H Ground Deposition Sampling
: 1. Procedure for Direct Frisk Survey to Determine Ground Deposition Activity 1.1     Energize an RM-14 or an E-120 survey meter with a 2" pancake probe, and allow the meter to stabilize.
1.2   Switch to highest scale and scale down until an onscale reading is obtained.
1.3  Scan flat surfaces in the designated area (e.g., roads, lawns, mailboxes, vehicle, fields, etc.), holding the pancake probe about 1" from the surface.
1.4   Record survey results on a PINGP 956 Ground Deposition Sample Results Log and calculate ground deposition activity as follows:
                                         -i~il 2 '       Net CPM Rci/m2 =            0 400
                                     ',    1           .
l   Net CPM is frisker count rate about 1"from surface.
1.5  Notify the REC, or RPSS, of the survey results
: 2. Procedure for Smear Samples to Determine Ground Deposition Activity 2.1   Utilize numbered cloth smears and plastic bags.
2.2   Proceed to designated area for survey and using moderate pressure, swipe an area, along a line or shape 15-18 inches in length X~~  _%   ~~~
Surfaces to be smeared should be smooth (e.g., cars, mail boxes, machinery, rain gutters, etc.).
2.3   Fold the smear folder in half and place in a plastic bag.
Page 24 of 31

PRAIRIE IS.LAND NUCLEAR GENERATING P.LANT               EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NUMBER:
RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE RADIATION SURVEY TEAMS DURING A                                F3-15
                                .RADIOACTIVEAIRBORNE RELEASE                       .REV:    23 Attachment H Ground Deposition Sampling 2.4    Count the smears ina low backgriound area, using an RM-14 or E-120 with a 2" pancake probe. Cover work area with poly or absorbent paper to minimize contamination spread., Hold the probe about 1/8" above the smear while 'counting.
2.5    Record results on'a Ground Deposition Sample Results Log PINGP 956, and calculate ground deposition activity as follows:               I Smear CPM - BKGD CPM
[tCI/M2 =
200 2.6   Notify the REC, or RPSS, of the survey results.
: 3. Procedure for Gamma Exposure Rate Survey to Determine Ground Deposition Activity'                 -    ''.             '.
3.1   Proceed to designated survey area, as requested by the REC, or RPSS.
3.2   Conduct a survey with an RO2/RO2A or equivalent.
3.3   Energize the instrument and allow meter to stabilize.
3.4   Scan area while observing meter for maximum meter deflection, with Beta Window CLOSED, one meter from the ground.
3.5    Record results on a Ground Deposition Sample Results Log PINGP 956, and calculate ground deposition activity as follows:
I
                                    -:.Cim 2 =(mR/hr)x 100       '
           --3.6 - Notify the REC, RPSS, of the survey results.,
                                                       ...  . .; ~ ~ ~ 1 Pag        , .3 Page 25 of 31

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT                             EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE                          NUMBER:
RADIATION                          17~~~3-15 l       al         ~~SURVEY TEAMS DURING A 31 q l       ~~~~~RADIOAC TIVE AIRBORNE RELEASE                                          REV:         23 Attachment H             Ground Deposition Sampling
: 4. Procedure for Snow/Dirt Sampling to Determine Ground Deposition Activity 4.1      Proceed to designated survey area, as requested by the REC, or RPSS, and select an area where the sample will be taken.
lll       l     3      ~The area selected should be based on an evaluation of current Nw        D       l    ~~weather and'ground cover conditions (high winds, rain, snow, dirt,
: &enTHXXl           ~etc.) such that the sampled area Is representative of the ground l    N l id~ove surface. Sample the area where the deposition of i M"      l       X ~contamination      Is most likely to occur.       -
4.2     Remove Snow/Dirt from area surface to a depth of about 1 centimeter (about 0.4 inches) utilizing the scoop from Field Survey Kit.
The area of the snow scoop is approximately 1,000 square centimeters. By removing surface snow, to a depth of 1 centimeter, the volume of the melted snow sample will be approximately 100 cubic centimeters of liquid, assuming 10:1 snow/water ratio.
4.3      Place the sample material in a poly bag, seal, label and save the sample or future analysis.
4.4      Document sample collection on a Ground Deposition Sample Results Log PINGP 956.                                                                                l 4.5      Activity will be determined by the Count Room.
Page 26 of 3.1

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT                  EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NUMBER:
RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE RADIATION
                                 - SURVEY TEAMS DURING A                                     F3-15 RADIOACTIVE AIRBORNE RELEASE                               REV:    23 Attachment I       Radiation Survey Team Survey Route Description
: 1. IF the wind is from the north or west, THEN proceed on the Emergency Route from the plant, through Red Wing, to Diamond Bluff, to Prescott, to Hastings, and back to the plant as shown on Figure 1.
: 2. IF the wind is from the south or east, THEN proceed on the Emergency Route from the plant, to Hastings, to Prescott, to Diamond Bluff, to Red Wing, and back to the plant, as shown on Figure 1.
: 3. AFTER completing the emergency route (Figure 1), THEN report to the REC, or RPSS, for further survey instructions.
T. ..
                                                                                  'Page 27 'of31

I I PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT             EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE
                            .           -- , RAIJIATION' '
: 1.    . SURVEYTEAMSDURINGA RADIOACTIVE AIRBORNE RELEASE Figure 1 Radiation Survey Team Survey Route A11 4     :    -- -
I... . -.- .
Page,28 of 31

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT                    EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NUMBER:
RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE RADIATION SURVEY TEAMS DURING A                                     F3-15 K1,,                               RADIOACTIVE AIRBORNE RELEASE                              REV:      23 Figure 2          Gross Iodine Table Using RM-14 or Equivalent With 2 Inch Pancake Probe With Silver Zeolite Absorber Run Time              10 Minutes                      Volume              707500 cc Flow rate            2.5 CFM Cor. Fact              1 The uCVcc activity assumes the above conditions.            I uCi                               uCi, CCPM          uCi    uC Icc       CCPM        Iodine   uCIU cc       CCPM       Iodine     uCVI cc Iodine 100      4.30E-02    6.E-08       1000      5.OOE-01  7.E-07        10000    5.60E+00     8.E-06 120      5.30E-02    7.E-08       1200      6.OOE-01  8.E-07'       12000    6.OOE+00     8.E-06 140      6.OOE-02    8.E-08       1400      7.OOE-01  1.E-06        14000 - 7.50E+00      1.E-05 160      7.00E-02    1.E-07      ,1600 - .. 8.OOE-01  1.E-06        16000    1.OOE+01     1.E-05 180      9.OOE-02 -1.E-07         1800      9.`O0E-0i 1.E-06        18000    1.30E+01     2.E-05 200      1.OOE-01    1.E-07       2000      1.OOE.00  1.E-06        20000    1.50E+01     2.E-05 220      1.20E-01    2.E-07       2200      1.1 OE-00 2.E-06        25000    2.50E+01     4.E-05 240      1.40E-01    2.E-07       2400      1.20E-00  2.E-06'       30000    3.30E+01     5.E-05 260      1.50E-01'   2.E-07       2600      1.40E-00  2.E-06        35000    5.OOE+01     7.E-05 280      1.60E-01    2.E-07       2800      1.50E-00  2.E-06        40000    6.OOE+01,    8.E-05 300      1.70E-01    2.E-07       3000      1.60E-00  2.E-06        45000    1.OOE+02     1.E-04 350      1.80E-01    3.E-07       3500      1.80E-00  3.E-06 400      2.00E-01    3.E-07       4000      2.1OE-00  3.E-06 450      2.30E-01    3.E-07       4500      2.50E-00  4.E-06 500      2.60E-01    4.E-07       5000      2.80E-00  4.E-06
                                                                             . I 600      3.OOE-01    4.E-07       6000      3.20E-00  5.E-06 700      3.60E-01    5.E-07       7000      3.80E-00  5.E-06 800      4.0OE-01    6.E-07       8000      4.50E-00  6.E-06 900      4.'0E-01    7.E-07       9000      5.OOE-00  7.E-06 Page 29'of 31

I I
PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT                                       EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES I
RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE                                NUMBER:
                                                --           .I
:.        RADIATION                                          F3-15 SURVEY TEAMS DURING A                                     I             K)1~
                                              -RADIOACTIVE AIRBORNE RELEASE                                        R           2 Figure 3 Gas Chamber Table Using RM-14 or equivalent with 2 Inch GM Pancake Probe with 100 CC S.S. Gas Chamber
                                                      *uCVcc                                                uCicc CCPM              (Xe-133 equiv.)                       CCPM          (Xe-133 equlv.)
100                1.E-05                            2500              4.E-04 150                2.E-05                            3000              6.E-04 200                2.E-05                            3500              8.E-04 250                3.E-05                            4000              9.E-04 300                4.E                           4500              1.E-03 I                                    350                5.E-05                            5000              1.E-03 400                5.E-05                            5500              1.E-03 450                6.E-05                            6000              1.E-03 500                7.E                          8000        -     2.E-03 F        I    .
600             . 9.E                           10000 .          -3.E-03 I- I     -      I        - --   800-               1.E-04.                          12000            - 3.E-03 f    , .-.-
1000                2.E-04:                          14000              4.E-03 i      .- ...1    .     ;          1200       *-       2.E-04                         -16000               5.E-03 1400             -  2.E-04                           18000              5.E-03 1600                3.E-04                           20000              6.E-03 1800                3.E-04                         -25000               8.E-03 2000                4.E-04                           30000         -    1.E-02 I.-,                    .. -.1  t  t i
                                                                                                - ,1. -
I.
1:11.
I      -..
II                               I i
                         . ..   ..-                   I    II-                 i    . .I II.
I..
    *                 --I.
I-
       - .               S
       *     .                       ,  ,.:*.              I.
                               ---.     . - -      I I i    I    ,
                                                                                                       .. -   .         I I
i
                                                                                                                                 \'Ji Page 30 of 31

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT                        EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NUMBER:
RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE RADIATION
                                 , SURVEY TEAMS DURING A                                              F3-15 RADIOACTIVE AIRBORNE RELEASE                                      REV:     23 Figure 4 -Gross Particulate Table Using RM-14 Or. Equivalent With 2 Inch Pancake Probe Run Time    EII     Minutes           volume         707500 cc                   4" filer  CF       0.3 Flow rate    2.5 CFM               Probe eff.             0.10 Flow CF        1-                Conversion       4.51 E-07    uCi/dpm The uCl/cc activity assumes the above conditions.
I CCPM                  uCU cc       CCPM                   uCU cc         CCPM       l               uCV cc 100             ;  -.2.E-09        1000                ' 2.E-08,          7000    -.               1.E-07 120                  3.E-D9.       1200               ,3.E-08.         -8000-                      2.E-07 140                  3.E-09        1400                  3'.E-08        ''9000,' :     ..  .       2.E-07 160                  3.E-09        1600                  3.E-08          10000,                    2.E-07 180                  4.E-09       .1800                  4.E-08          12000       .             3.E-07 200                  4.E-09        2000                  4.E-08          14000                     3.E-07 220                  5.E-09       .2200                  5.E-08          16000                     3.E-07 240                  5.E-09        2400                  5.E-08          18000                     4.E-07 260                  6.E-09        2600                  6.E-08         20000                      4.E-07 280                  6.E-09        2800                  6.E-08         25000                      5.E-07 300                  6.E-09        3000                  6.E-08         30000                      6.E-07 350                  7.E-09        3500                  7.E-08         35000                      7.E-07 400                  8.E-09        4000                  8.E-08         40000                      8.E-07 500                  1.E-08        4500                  1.E-07         45000                      1.E-06 600                  1.E-08        5000                  11.E-07 700                  1.E-08        5500                  1.E-07 800                  2.E-08        6500                  1.E-07           __I__I                 __
900                  2.E-08        7000                  1.E-07 Page 31 of 31}}