View source for L-78-121, License No. DPR-67 Application for Amendment: Appendix a Technical Specification Proposed Change Concerning Supporting Operation of the Containment Spray Additive System Scheduled to Be Installed at Facility

{{Adams
| number = ML18088B273
| issue date = 04/05/1978
| title = License No. DPR-67 Application for Amendment: Appendix a Technical Specification Proposed Change Concerning Supporting Operation of the Containment Spray Additive System Scheduled to Be Installed at Facility
| author name = Uhrig R
| author affiliation = Florida Power &amp; Light Co
| addressee name = Stello V
| addressee affiliation = NRC/NRR
| docket = 05000335
| license number = DPR-067
| contact person = 
| case reference number = L-78-121
| document type = Letter type:L, License-Application for Facility Operating License (Amend/Renewal) DKT 50, Technical Specification, Amendment
| page count = 13
| project = 
| stage = Request
}}

=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:REGULATORY INFORMATION DI "TRIBUTION SY TEM (RIDS)
DISTRIBUTION FOR INCOMING MATERIAL                                ~0--35 REC:   STELLO V                       ORG:   UHRIG R E                         DOCDATE: 04/05/78 NRC                                   FL  PWR '< LIGiHT                     DATE RCVD: 04f 0l' 78 DOCTYPE: LETTER           NOTARIZED: YES                                         COPIES RECEIVED

==SUBJECT:==
LTR 3      ENCL 40 LICENSE NO DPR-67 APPL FOR AMEND: APPENDIX A TECH SPECS PROPOSED CHANGE CONCERNING SUPPORTING OPERATION OF THE CONTAINMENT SPRAY ADDITIVE SYSTEM SCH>>DULED TO BE I&#xb9;TALLED AT SUBJECT FAC1LITY DURING THE UPCOMINGi REFUELING OUTAGE {SPRING }978>... NOTARIZED PLANT NAME: ST LUCIE 51
                                     ~~<+<<~~~ - ~w~e~~ee                 ~
REVIEWER     INITIAL: X JM DISTR   I PUTOR  INITIAL:
DISTRIBUTION OF THIS MATERIAL IS AS FOLLOWS GENERAL DISTRIBUTION FOR AFTER ISSUANCE OF OPERATING LICENSE.
( D I STR I BUT ION CODE A001 )
FOR ACTION:           BR   CHIEF REID<+W/7 ENCL INTERNAL:             REG F ILE+4 WfENCL                   NRC PDR++Wf I 5 E++W/2    ENCL                     E             NLY HANAUER++l VENCL                     CHECK< +WfENCL E I SENHUT++W/ENCL                   SHAO+4W/ENCL BAER~~W/ENCL                         BUTLER++W/ENCL GR IMES++W/ENCL                      J COLLINS4+W/ENCL J. MCGOUGH++W/ENCL EXTERNAL:             LPDRiS FT PIERCEi FL++W/ENCL T I C++WfENCL NS I C++W/ENCL ACR -   CAT B++Wf 1 C ENCL DISTRIBUTION:          LTR 40      ENCL  . 9                         CONTROL NER:       780'>~700 -'7 S1ZE:     - P+6P 6+ w+444 w+00'.+ %4%+%%%%%4%44 4+4%+w%%4%        THE END   4 %04 W%% 4 4% 4%4%%% 0% %00% ++ +WOW%

t  P. O. BOX 013100, MIAMI, FL 33101 gyM l/g FLORIDA POWER      84 LIGHT COMPANY April 5,        1978 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attention: Mr. Victor Stello, Director                  g.gag t)IKK6@
Division of Operating Reactor U. S. Nucleax Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555

==Dear Mr. Stello:==

ll zfPfj(
Re:   St. Lucie Unit                                    .u~:, ~g Docket No. 50-335 1
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Proposed Amendment to Facilit    Operatin   License DPR-67             Cy I
p~~'i 4 In accordance with 10 CFR 50.30, Florida Power and Light Company  submits herewith three (3) signed originals and forty (40) conformed copies of a request to amend Appendix A of Facility Operating License       DPR-67.
The proposed   amendment   supports operation of the containment spray additive system     scheduled   to be installed at St. Lucie Unit 1 duxing the upcoming refueling outage (Spring 1978).
The system will be installed to comply with Condition of 'Operating License DPR-67. The proposed amendment is des-I.l cribed below and shown on the accompanying Technical Speci-fication pages bearing the date of this letter in the lower right
          ~/
hand  corner.
Surveillance Requirements 4.5.2.d.3 and 4.5.2.d.4 are deleted. The requirements apply to the trisodium phosphate dodecahy-drate (TSP) storage baskets. The function of the TSP (containment sump ph control) will be taken    over by the   NaOH spray add-itive system.
Pa e   3/4 6-16a New  Specifications 3.6.2.2 and 4.6.2.2 apply to the planned NaOH containment spray add-itive   system.
                                                 ~1qy037 PEOPLE... SERVING PEOPLE

Mr'. Victor S tello Page Two Re:   St. Lucie Unit    1 Facilit   0  eratin    License DPR-67 Pa e  3/4 6-17 The  Specification number for the containment fan cooler Limiting Condition for Operation is changed from 3.6.2.2 to 3.6.2.3.
Pa e B   3/4 5-1 The  discussion of    TSP  is deleted from the Bases for  ECCS  Subsystems.
Pa e B   3/4 6-3 Bases   Section 3/4.6.2.2 is renumbered 3/4.6.2.3.
A discussion of the Spray Additive System is added as Section 3/4.6.2.2.
Condition of License      I.l requires that the NaOH spray additive system be installed either prior to startup following the first regularly scheduled refueling outage or by Yiarch 1, 1979, which-ever occurs first. FPL fully intends to install the system during the present refueling outage. At the moment, however, we are experiencing difficulties in the procurement of materials, and completion before .startup could be impacted.       Should this occur, in order to not delay startup, we would propose to leave the TSP baskets and their pertinent technical specifications in place and to request that completion of the NaOH spray additive system be deferred until the 1979 refueling outage (expected to begin in April 1979). Ne shall keep you advised of the status of procurement and installation and will be prepared to discuss with you the bases for an extension of this Condition of License should that appear to be necessary.
Since the proposed technical specification is being submitted in conjunction with the installation of the NaOH spray additive system as required by the Commission in its Safety Evaluation Report for St. Lucie 1 and Condition of License I.l, FPL believes that. this amendment falls in the category described by Footnote 2 of 10 CFR 170.22 and is therefore exempt from the facility license amendment fee schedule.

Mr .'ictor tello S
Page Three Re:   St. Lucie Unit Facilit  0 l
eratin License  DPR-67 The proposed amendment has been reviewed by the St. Lucie Facility Review Group and the Florida Power 6 Light Company Nuclear Review Board. They have concluded that involve an unreviewed safety question.
it does not Very  truly yours, Robert E. Uhrig.
Vice President REU:MAS:sl, Attachment cc:   Mr. Peter B. Erickson Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Region Harold F. Reis, Esquire II

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS      Continued
: 5. Verifying that each valve (manual,'ower operated or automa-tic) in. the flow path that is not locked', sealed, or other-wise secured in position, is in its correct position.
: 6. Verifying that   each ECCS subsystem is'aligned to receive electrical   power from separate OPERABLE emergency.. busses.
c ~   By a  visual inspection which verifies that ho loose debris
         'rags, trash, clothing, etc.) is       present in the containment which could be transported to the containment sump and cause restriction of the pump suctions during LOCA conditions. This visual inspection shall be performed:
: 1. For  all accessible areas of the containment    prior to establishing   CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY, and
: 2. Of the areas   affected withir. containment ai the completion of containment entry    when CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY  is established.
d., At least     once per 18 months by:
1.. Verifying automatic isolation of the      shutdown cooling system from the Reactor Coolant System when the Reactor Coolant, System pressure is above 300 psig.
          '. A visual'nspection of the containment sump and verifying that the subsystem suction inlets are not restricted by debris and that the sump components (trash racks, screens, etc.) show no evidence of structural distress or corrosion.
ST. LUCIE  -  UNIT                      3/4 5-5 1
5/5/78

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS SPRAY ADDITIVE SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION       FOR OPERATION 3.6.2.2   The   spray additive system shall       be OPERABLE   with:
: a. A   spray additive tank containing a,volume of greater than 4010 gallons of between -30 and 32 g by weight. NaOH solution, and
: b. Two     spray additive eductors each capable of adding NaOH solution from the chemical additive tank to a containment spray system pump flow.
APPLICABILITY:        MODES  1, 2, and 3".
ACTION:
llith the spray additive system inoperable, restore the system to OPERABL'E status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours; restore the spray additive system to OPERABI E status within the next 48 hours or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
SURYEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS, 4.6.2.2   The spray      additive   system shall   be demonstrated   OPERABLE:
: a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power operated or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.
: b. At least once per        6 months by:
: 1.     'erifying    the contained solution volume in the tank, and
: 2.   -
Verifying the concentration of the      NaOH  solution  by  .,
chemical  analysis.-
c~    At least once per 18 months, during shutdown, by verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position      .on a   cps    test signal.
  "Applicable   when    pressurizer pressure     1750  psia.
ST. WCIE  UNIT 1                    3/4 6-16a                            5/5/78

CONTA I Ni IENT S YSTEI IS CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEil LIMITING CONDITION         FOR OPERATION 3.6.2. 3    Four containment fan coolers shall be       OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY:        NODES    1, 2 and 3.
ACTION:
a~       V!th one containment fan cooler inoperable and both containment spray systems OPERABLE, restore th inoperable fan cooler to, OPERABLE status within 30 days or be in HOT SHUTDOt;IN within.
the next 12 hours.
: b.       Mith one containment fan cooler inoperable'nd one containment spray system inoperable, restore eith r the inoperable fan cooler or the inoperable spray system to OPEPABLE status within 72 hours or be in HOT SHUTDO>!N within th next 12 hours.
I IURUEILLRECE REtRUIRII ERTI 4.6.2.3 Each containment fan cooler shall             be demonstrated    OPERABLE at least once per 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST            8ASIS by:
: a.        Starting    each  unit from the control   room,
: b.        Verifying that     each  unit operates for at least    15  minutes, and c         Verifying a cooling water flow rate of       > 1200 gpm    to each cooling unit.
ST. LUCIE      - UNIT  1                     3/4 6-17                              5/5/78

3/4.5   'EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS        ECCS BASES 3/4.5.1     SAFETY INJECTION TANKS The OPERABILITY of each of. the RCS safety injection tanks ensures that  a sufficient volume of borated water will be i@mediately forced into  the reactor core through each of the cold le'gs in the event the RCS pressure    falls  below the pressure of the safety injection tanks. This initial   surge   of water ihto the core provides the initial cooling mechanism    during large    RCS  pipe ruptures.
The limits on safety injection tank volume, boron concentration and pressure ensure that the assumptions used for safety injection tank injection in the accident analysis are met.
The   limit of    one hou} for operation with an inoperable .safety injection    tank  minimizes   the time exposure of'the plant to a LOCA event occurring concurrent with failure of an additional safety injection may result in unacceptable peak cladding temperatures'.
tank'hich 3/4.5.2   and   3/4.5.3    ECCS SUBSYSTEhS The OPERABILITY      of two separate and independent CCS'subsystems ensures   that sufficient emergency core cool'ing capability will be avail--
able in the event of a LOCA assuming the loss of 'one subsystem through any single failure consideration.          Either subsystem operating in conjunc-.
tion with the safety injection tanks is capable of supplying sufficient core cooling to limit the peak cladding temperatures within acceptable limits for all .postulated       break sizes ranging from the double ended break of the largest RCS cold leg pipe downward. In addition, each ECCS subsystem provides long term core cooling capability in the recirculation mode during the accident recovery period.
ST. LUG I E  - UNIT  1                   B 3/4 5-1                        5/5/78

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.6.2.2     SPRAY ADDITIVE SYSTEM The OPERABII ITY of the spray additive system ensures that sufficient l'laOH is added to the containment spray in the event of a LOCA. The limits on flaOH volume and concentration ensure a pH value of between
{8.5) and (11.0) for the solution recirculated within containment after a LOCA. This pH band minimizes the evolution of iodine and minimizes the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems.
and components. The contained water volume limit includes an allowance for water not usable because of tank discharge line location or other physical characteristics.       These assumptions are consistent with the iodine removal efficiency assumed in the accident analyses.
CONTAINl"IENT COOLING SYSTEM                       '/4.6.2.
The OPERABILITY    of the containment cooling system ensures that 1) the containment    air   temperature will be maintained within limits during normal operation, and 2) adequate heat removal capacity is available when operated in conjunction with the containment spray systems during post-LOCA   conditions.
3/4;6:3'ONTAINtlENT ISOLATIOil VALVES The OPERABILITY of the containment isolation valves ensures that the containment atmosphere will be isolated from the outside environment -in the event of a release of radioactive material to the containment atmos-phere or pressurization of the containment.        Containment isolation within the time limits specified ensures that the rel ase of radioactive material to the environment will be consistent with the assumptions used in the analyses for a LOCA.
3/4:6;4    COllBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL The OPERABILITY of the equipment and systems required for the detection and control of hydrogen gas ensures that this equipment wilil be available to maintain th" hydrogen concentration within containment below its flammable limit during post-LOCA conditions. Either recombiner unit is capable of controlling the expected hydrogen generation associated with 1) zirconium-water reactions, 2) radiolytic decomposition of water and 3) corrosion of metals within containment.
The containment fan coolers are used in a secondary function to ensure adequate mixing      of the containment atmosphere following a LOCA.
This mixing action will prevent localized accumulations of hydrogen from exceeding the flammable limit.
3/4.6.5    VACUUM  RELIEF VALVES The OPERABILITY of the containment vessel to annulus vacuum relief valves ensures that they will open at a pressure differential of 2.25 + 0.25 inches Hater Gauge. This condition is necessary to prevent exceeding the-containment design limit for internal pressure differential of 0.70 psi.
ST. LUCIE   -. UNIT 1                  B 3/4 6-3 5/5/78

l STATE OF FLORXDA      )
                      )       ss COUNTY OF DADE        )
Robert E. Uhrig, being     first     duly sworn, deposes and says:
That he is a Vice President of Florida Power                      & Light Company, the Licensee herein; That he has executed the foregoing document; that the state-ments made in this said document are true and correct to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief, and that he is authorized to execute the document on behalf of said Licensee.
Robert E. Uhrig Subscribed and sworn to before          me     this day of                                       19~1 NOTARY PUBL1C,    in and  for the      County      of    Dade, State of Florida NOTARY PUBUC STATE OF FLORIDA st LARGE MY COMMISSION  EXPIRES AUGUST 24, Ny commission    expires:  BONDED T'HRU MAYNARD BONDING AGENCY

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